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भाषापरिभेदः उ

DIVISION OF THE
CATEGORIES OF THE NYÄ'YA PHILOSOPHY

WITH A COMMENTARY

BY

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TRANSLATION.
Preface.

The Asiatic Society accepted already in 1847 my offer to publish the text of the Nyāya with a translation, but only the Introduction to this work appeared in the Journal of the Society, the MS. of the translation having meanwhile been lost (vide Journal of the Asiatic Society, July; 1847). The present translation is based upon a rough copy of the former, which I afterwards found among my papers. The notes are entirely new, and the introduction has received so many additions, that it is almost a new essay. The Sanscrit text, in accordance with an enlarged plan, is now accompanied with its commentary; it will thus form another edition of the one published by the Committee of Public Instruction, which is out of print, and satisfy thereby a desideratum, long felt in the Government Sanscrit Colleges, where the Bhāsha Pariccheda is introduced as a class-book.
INTRODUCTION.

In the following introduction to a translation of the Bhāsha Paricechēda, one of the most celebrated works of the Nyāya philosophy, it has been my endeavour to subject the logic of the Nyāya, as well as the leading ideas of this and the Vaiśeshika systems, to a critical review, in order to bring the discussion about the merits of the philosophical researches of the Hindus more to a point. Colebrooke’s exposition of those systems, though founded on the ablest and most exact researches, as well in a philosophical as in a critical point of view, does not suffice for this purpose, as it is a mere abstract from the works of those schools, and does not enter upon the discussion of the position they are to hold as systems of philosophy.

It is well known, how difficult it is to write a history of ancient India, only a few strictly historical records having been left to us by the Hindus themselves. The same difficulty obtains with regard to the history of their philosophy, as in the mind of the Hindus philosophy was associated with the idea of being raised above change, and no regard therefore paid to the social and intellectual condition of the time, in which lived the founder of a system or his successors who more

* I have translated Bhāsha, in deviation from its ordinary sense "speech," by "categories of the Nyāya philosophy;" for Bhāsha means here evidently not "speech" in general, which would give no sense whatever, but "Nyāya Bhāsha," speech in the Nyāya, that is to say the philosophical language or terms of the Nyāya. In the Sabda Kalpa Druma, "Bhāsha" (under the head of Bhāsha Paricechēda) has the meaning of Paribhāshā, which is explained by the authoritative language of the teacher, which considers the meanings of the words (Paddētha). This sense agrees essentially with the rendering which I have given.
developed it. Still it is not impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy, if it be limited to the task of tracing the gradual development of philosophical principles and modes of thinking, without reference to a strict chronological order; for the internal nature of a doctrine will point out its more ancient or modern date. At the same time we must admit, that even in this attempt, we can only partially succeed. The doctrines even of those who are considered as the founders of the different schools, bear the marks of a far advanced progress in systematical arrangement, and must therefore have been the result of a long series of preceding philosophical enquiries.* Hence it would be preposterous to expect, that we should be able to discover the first steps of their researches. We, however, decline here embarking upon a historical research of such a kind, believing, that under the present circumstances, when only so few of their philosophical works have continued to be the norm of the whole following time, and the labours of his successors were limited to the task to narrow or amplify his rules or more lucidly to arrange them. From his work the same effect results, as from other pursuits of the Hindus on the field of science. *By a person of superior talent the labours of his predecessors were rendered more perfect and brought to a close; he united them in a system of rules, or Sūtras, which he condensed as much as possible. This exposition remained the standard of all later times, and formed the foundation for the succeeding teachers of the same science, whose efforts were in general directed to the correct explanation and elucidation as well as to the emendation and perfection of the fundamental work, and by whom the science was carried to a higher degree only as to its extent, but not as to its contents. We may discover a double motive, from which this manner of exposition took its rise. First, the sum total of the results which had been gained, should be condensed in the shortest form and hence the learning by rote facilitated. Secondly, this mode of exposition rendered the understanding of the text difficult and often impossible, unless it was accompanied by an explanation. Such an explanation was at the disposal of the teachers, and by their guidance alone the pupils were able to comprehend the obscure sense of the text-books. The Brāhmans, the only possessors of the sciences, thus secured for themselves the privilege of communicating them only to those whom they thought worthy of this information, and of preventing the other castes from an initiation with them. It is only in this sense that a secret doctrine of the Brāhmans can be admitted. From the circumstance, that for each single science text-books of this kind were generally acknowledged as standards, it was a consequence, that the works of the first founders and of the predecessors of the person who brought a science to perfection, were forgotten and frequently lost.
by its amalgamation with the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika, since we are of Colebrooke's opinion, that both sprang from the same root, and are but branches of the same school; the one being directed more to the explanation of material, the other of logical forms. Or to state it more exactly,—to the Nyāya belong the logical doctrines of the forms of syllogisms, terms and propositions; to the Vaiśeṣika the systematical explanation of the categories (the simplest metaphysical ideas) of the metaphysical, physical, and psychical notions, which notions are hardly touched upon in Goutama's (the supposed founder of the Nyāya) Sūtras. They differ in their statement of the several modes of proof; the Nyāya asserting four modes of proof—from perception, inference, analogy, and verbal communication; the Vaiśeṣika admitting only the two first ones.

The name of logic, usually applied to the Nyāya, does not correctly define it. It does not treat of the theory of syllogisms and the notions connected with them, as its direct object, but only as a component part of its investigation. It rather aspires to the distinctness of giving a complete system of philosophy, based upon the most elementary metaphysical notions, and the division dedicated to the explanation of syllogistical forms, is not even more explicitly treated than other parts of the system. To call the Nyāya logic, would be the same as to assign this name to the philosophy of Aristotle. There is no doubt, however, that the Nyāya has first among the philosophical systems of the Hindus thoroughly examined the art of reasoning, and shaped it into its present form. Hence it gained such ascendancy among the learned Hindus, that all of them, however they may deviate from other doctrines of the Nyāya, refer to it as to their standard in logic, and deem its study necessary for the purpose of giving a firm basis to their reasoning.

† The view above given, was based upon the Sūtras of Goutama, without a reference to a work of the Vaiśeṣika school. I have since compared the Sūtras of Kanāda and found my view completely confirmed.
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It is indeed one of the principal merits of the Nyāya, that its progress is marked by an admirably exact division of the topics, treated in it, and in this respect it is not only superior to all other systems of the Hindus, but even modern philosophy might, with advantage, study it on account of its clearness and exactness. Though none of its investigations has been carried on to a satisfactory end, the Nyāya has, with the means at its command, fully described the circle within which it moved. We must at the same time admit, that notwithstanding its exactness, there is one inherent fault in its exposition, viz. the neglect of all analytical method, a fault of all systems of the Hindus, which has, perhaps, more than any thing else, contributed to the narrow limits of their mental horizon. This fault, which, however, it shares with many other expositions of philosophy, for instance, to mention a celebrated name, with Spinoza's system, is rather a fault of exposition than of the system itself; for no synthesis (in science) is possible without analysis, and having well understood the leading notions of a system, we can easily trace the analytical way by which they were obtained.

This apparent absence of analysis in the construction of the philosophical systems of the Hindus is the reason why so many enquirers have done injustice to their philosophical talent. For want of a clear analysis, unable to understand the aphorisms of the Hindu schools, composed in a language in form as well as in thought, foreign to them, they thought the philosophical productions of many centuries and of an ingenious people, a web of either abstruse or puerile notions. On a closer examination we shall come to a juster opinion of them, and although we find a limit as well in the range as the depth of their enquiries, we shall come to place them among the nations which advanced the intellectual progress of mankind.

That Hindu philosophy will, however, have any great influence upon the development of European philosophy and mediately of European civilization, must be denied. Why should this be the case? Although we must admit, that the philosophical researches of the Hindus are as worthy of attention as those of the Greeks, still it is at the first glance evident, that the philosophical works of the former are unfit to be transferred to another soil, while those of the latter will have always the same influence upon every rising generation in every clime and age. This difference lies not so much in the development of the system
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as in the form. You are compelled to think by reading the works of the Greeks, they introduce you into the process of their thoughts, and by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until you arrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of their systems, from which point it is easy either to look back upon the way you have made or to advance further. The Hindus, on the other hand, are dogmatical. They commence synthetically with a statement of their principles, yet do not descend to unfold the train of thought which has led to them. Hence it is impossible for any one to understand their writings who has not previously, to a considerable degree, been practised in philosophical enquiries. The punishment however of this mystery and exclusion is the want of interest, felt in the study of their writings. The same doctrines which might have been instrumental in enlightening thousands, are now forgotten, or in the possession of a few who are hardly able to comprehend them.

Among the general metaphysical notions, the notion of substance is the most important one, as upon it all other notions are either founded or are closely connected with it, and whatever may be the solution of all other metaphysical problems, it must be influenced by the notion of substance.

Substances are, according to the Nyāya, the substrata of qualities and actions, a definition, which is the right one, as the basis of further investigation—it is the right one, because founded on experience. Substance, we add, is in so far the substratum of qualities and actions, as the existence of qualities and actions depends upon the existence of substance; if quality were independent of another, it could not represent another, whose quality it is. The existence of substance must therefore be absolute, that is to say, not dependent upon the existence of another; for in this case, it would be comprehended, not by the notion of substance, but by that of quality. And consequently, to think the idea of substance by any notions including dependance, is a contradiction. This contradiction (of comprehending substance under the notion of quality, and therefore of dependance) was committed by the Nyāya by the distinction between eternal and non-eternal substances, because the

*Or rather of qualities alone according to the modern school of the Nyāya. The definition, that substances are the substrata of qualities and actions, belongs to Kanāda.
existence of the latter is not independent. In the notion of eternal substance, however, the true notion of substance is included, which is to be independent of time and cause.

Another question is, how a substance is united with its qualities? That a substance should have qualities, appears a matter of course, and to question it, shows a vast progress in metaphysical thinking. Although the Nyāya entered not expressly into the discussion of this subject, it must have felt its weight, as they found it necessary to invent a contrivance for such a connexion. A substance is, according to them, united with its qualities by a relation, called intimate relation, which is something real, and is neither in substances nor qualities, nor actions. We do not intend here to analyze this notion any further (stating, however, that the difficulty is not really removed by it, *) but we turn to a third point in the notion of substance. Substance, according to the Nyāya, is not only united with its qualities by the relation, just mentioned, but all substances are united with the general notion of substance, and single substances in the same way with the notion of their own class. This general notion is rather a common property; for it does exist, independent of the mind which may conceive it, in the substances (also in qualities and actions) themselves, and is even eternal in eternal substances, not eternal in transient substances. This notion exactly corresponds with that of the so-called realists among the scholastic philosophers, who maintained the reality of general notions. Duns Scotus, for instance, asserted, that general properties (notions) were not only in objects potentia, but actio, and that generality was not only formed by the understanding, but that it existed previously to the mental conception per se as a reality, viz., the quiddity itself, which was

* For if it is necessary, that qualities require some link to unite them with substances, it is also necessary, that this link should be united with them by a similar link, and so on. The difficulty, as regards the connection of qualities, is briefly stated, thus. The existence of qualities is dependent upon the existence of the substance, whose qualities they are, but not vice versa. Substance in accordance to its notion, is independent of qualities. Substance therefore is something of itself, and also something on which qualities are dependent, and in this latter respect it is not substance, which is to be independent of qualities. That is to say, the notion of substance in this form is contradictory, and should be abandoned for a notion which is consistent.
indifferent to general or individual existence. A cause, however, was
required to remove this indifference, viz. another more extensive
quiddity, closely united with the first, and with the principle of indivi-
duity. (Afterwards called haecceity.)

In one point the Nyāya went a step in advance of most of the ancien
t systems of philosophy, viz., in its assumption, that the special
qualities of substances are effects; for instance earth is the intimate (or
material) cause of smell, the soul of knowledge, &c. They were no
doubt urged to this assumption by the contradiction, which arises, if
beside substance, a quality which is necessary and therefore belongs
to the quale of the substance, is admitted. If quality is an effect of
substance, its existence is evidently derived, and the contradiction re-
moved. Although, however, this hypothesis is a step in advance, it is
not the complete solution of the difficulty; for here again the question
will arise, how it is possible, that a substance can become a cause, that
is, produce something, which is foreign to itself.

Substances, as before said, according to the Nyāya, are either etern-
al or non-eternal. Eternal are space, time, ether, soul, and the atoms
of mind, earth, water, fire, and air. Non-eternal are all compounds, or
the things which we actually perceive, and which must have a cause of
their existence. Thus substances are divided into those which are with-
out cause, and those which have a cause.

There are three causes:—1. The cause of intimate relation, or
material cause, as yarn is the material cause of cloth;—2. The proximate
cause, or the actual union of the parts which are to form a compound;
—and 3. The instrumental cause, viz. the cause by which this union is
effected.

This is similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, who admitted four causes;
a material cause, a moving cause, a formal cause, and an end cause.
The instrumental cause includes Aristotle's formal, moving, and end
causes.

The notion of causality is certainly well considered, and infinitely su-
perior to the notions which other Indian systems formed of it; for there
are already made some steps in advance towards the proper discussion
of this notion, if a difference in causes is acknowledged. In the enum-
oration of causes—the cause of motion appears to have been omitted; it is,

however, contained in the notion of instrumental causality. All activity according to the Nyāya is limited to motion, acts of the mind being considered by them as qualities, and as all actions abide in substances, we must think every substance as a cause of motion (viz. the last cause). They did not, however, discuss, whether motion was necessary to all substances, or only to some or to one, that is to say, whether there is a *primus mobile* or not; they did not discuss the question, whether or not different motions require different causes; nor did they lastly enter into an explanation of the notion itself. They appear in fact not to have been aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the idea of causality, which undoubtedly is one of the most difficult metaphysical notions. The contradictions in the notion of cause and effect appear with special force to apply to such causes, by which a change in the qualities of a substance is effected, as chemical, animal, and psychical effects. Such effects are, however, denied by the Nyāya. Material causes must be understood as only the substrata, or the materials for a new union, as for instance, the two halves from which a pot is produced, are the material cause of the pot. There are therefore no real changes, but only changes of the accidental form, which substances may assume in their connexion with others; and there should not be changes at all we add. Every compound substance, according to the Nyāya, is ultimately produced from simple substances. Simple substances, however, are eternal, and all their qualities are also eternal. If this is the case, there is also

* The contradictions which Zeno found in the idea of motion, are well known, and without fully acknowledging their weight, it is impossible to obtain a correct notion of it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and endeavoured to remove Zeno’s objections to this notion. How important it is, correctly to define this notion, is evident even from the influence, which it exercised on the Nyāya, where motion is considered as an act, and even as the only act.

† Vide Sext. Emp. Adv. mathem. in Ritter’s History of Philos. Vol. iv. p. 339. That cause could not be later than effect, is evident; but also: the effect cannot be later than the cause; for if so, the cause, being antecedent to the effect, would be without effect, and a cause without effect, is a contradiction. And if the effect would be consequent to the cause, it would be, when the cause is no more, therefore an effect without cause. Both therefore must be necessarily together. If this be conceded, then there is the difficulty, why the one more than the other is producing (or cause). These are only part of the difficulties, and without solving them, the objections made against causality, are quite just.
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no change of qualities in any compound substances, because by any connexion between them, different from an accidental relation, they would assume changes, contradictory to the notion, under which they are conceived. As the Nyāya, however, admits an actual change in compound substances, in which qualities, not to be met with in the simple substances, are produced, and moreover admits a compound, in which there is a comparatively firm connexion of the parts with each other, it has deviated from its notion of causality, and is hence guilty of the contradiction which it first endeavoured to escape. Notwithstanding these deficiencies of the Nyāya, we still maintain, that it approached nearer than any other Hindu system, to the true notion of causality, causality being, according to Pantheistic, not less than to skeptical idea, a product of habit in the association of our ideas.

In passing from the general metaphysical (ontological) to more special investigations (comprehending natural philosophy and psychology), we may first observe, that the same clearness obtains in the latter as in the former. Existence, or rather that which exists (dvārtam svat), in its connexion with material and immaterial phenomena, is much more distinctly conceived than in other systems of the Hindoos. We find indeed the same material elements as in the latter; viz., earth, water, light, air, and ether, and also the same qualities; but while in all others they are only generally described, here there is made an attempt to explain the special phenomena as well as the sources of our perception of them, or in one word, we find here the basis of observation, and of the first lineaments of the consequent reflection upon the results of that observation. We meet here also with the first remarks about space and time, and even with some correct notions of their nature, and although both of them are placed among the substances, we must not forget the intrinsic difficulties of this subject, which in our times only has been more satisfactorily investigated by Kant, Fichte, and Herbart. The error of considering space and time as substances, is a consequence of the notion the Nyāya had formed of substance, viz. as the substrate of qualities and actions. This idea would, indeed, have been correct, had the notion of existence been preserved. The Vedanta certainly had a much more exact idea of existence, maintaining, that which exists (to "dvārtam svat") must be simply existent, without any attribute whatever, and should strictly not be even considered by a plurality of notions. The Vedanta,
however, by denying the reality of phenomena, had nothing to explain, while the Nyāya, retaining the crude notions, given by observation, had no principles whereby to explain them. The most interesting point in this part of the system is the investigation into the nature of matter, an investigation which was indeed entered into by other Hindu systems, yet not with the same success. The Védánta, for instance, reduced the objects of the senses, or the things composed of the gross elements, to elements which are finer and imperceptible to the senses, undoubtedly for the same reasons as the Nyāya, viz. because the origin, the changes, and the destruction of the material things compelled the mind to fix the notion of existence upon some other natures, not affected by those conditions. But according to the Védánta, the simpler elements are only simple, because they are unmixed with others. As regards space, however, no reduction was made, and their view on this point is very like the doctrine of Anaxagoras, who also started from an original identity of the elements with space. The Védánta indeed did not confine its thoughts to those elements, but proceeded to the supposition of a substance, in which there is no difference whatever, but for what reason this supposition was here made, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory reply, and as regards the principal point, space filled out by matter, it was not even touched upon. The Nyāya, on the other hand, has examined matter under this point of view, and arrived at the theory of atoms, in the same way as Leucippus and Democritus. It proceeded even further. With Leucippus and Democritus atoms have some, though imperceptible, extent, and also different figures and mo-

* It is astonishing, that the Nyāyaikas made the supposition of such a substance as the ether, which, like space and time, is pervading and infinite. It is not space itself, but a kind of matter, filling out space, and can therefore be distinguished from it merely by a less degree of density. If so, the consequence should have been, that it was also composed of parts, the last elements of which are atoms. Instead of this, ether is some thing analogous to space, by its being infinite, and yet filling out an infinite space. In fact it appears, they assumed this notion of ether only historically, or as a part of the views on matter which had been formed previously to them. The doctrine of the fire elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth) is one of the most ancient hypotheses of Indian philosophy. It is taught already in the Upanishads, and probably more ancient even than the doctrine of the soul. Hence it passed over into the different systems, viz. the Védánta, Sāṅkhya and Nyāya, modified according to the different views they held of substance.
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...tions, while the Nyāya held them to be absolute units of space, without any dimensions and motions, that is, mathematical points as regards space. They are eternal and unchangeable, and while they are without cause themselves, they are the cause of the material universe. They are imperceptible to the senses, and the knowledge of them is obtained by inference.

The system of Democritus is throughout a crude materialism. The last elements of existence are with him atoms which have no qualities whatever beside form and motion. The soul itself is merely a compound of round atoms, and a deity is of course impossible. A theory of atoms of such a kind is contradictory in its principle, and in its results leads to an annihilation of truth in general. The Nyāya is vastly superior to Democritus' theory; for atoms are first conceived in their real notion as units of matter without any extent, and secondly the theory of atoms forms only a subordinate part of their researches.

The same clearness and to a certain degree comprehensiveness is met with in their psychological enquiries. The faculties of the soul and its relations to the material things and other objects of knowledge, are methodically described. The Nyāya draws a marked line between matter and spirit, by distinctly stating the notions, under which either is perceived.

The soul has, according to the Nyāya, qualities, opposite to the qualities of the substances perceived by the senses, and is therefore distinct from these substances, that is to say, as regards special qualities; for as to qualities, ascribed to substances as far as they are substances, both must of course agree. Qualities of the soul are the emotions and desires, volition and aversion, etc. and knowledge. Knowledge is produced by intellect, which is one of the qualities (faculties) of the soul. Intellect is again fourfold, it is perception, inference, analogy and verbal knowledge. Perception (viz. perception generally, as well as external as of internal objects), is the source from which all other knowledge flows, or rather, without objects of perception the other faculties of intellect have no materials to work upon. All knowledge, that is perceived, is perceived through a medium, through an instrument, by which the soul is in communion either with objects from without or from within itself. External objects are perceived through five external senses, these being in contact with the mind, while internal objects, and
by them the soul, are only perceived through the mind. The doctrine of the communication of the soul with external objects is very curious and interesting, not only because it is original, but because it shows a remarkable acuteness in overcoming difficulties, met with in every system, which considers substances not only as individual beings, but also as a common essence that exists, although dependent upon the individual substances. To perceive individual external substances, and their properties in common with others, it is necessary that the intercourse of the senses with the external objects should take place accordingly, that is to say, that individual substances should be perceived by the connexion of the senses with these individual substances, and the common properties by the connexion of the senses with these common properties. Substances are then perceived in their different relations, viz. first, in the relation of this individual substance and this individual quality, or of this individual substance and this individual act; further, in the relation, which this individual substance has with its class (general essence) or with its generality; and lastly, in the relation, which this individual quality or this individual act of this individual substance has with its class or generality.

This, however, is not sufficient; for a full comprehension, there are required also general notions corresponding with those relations. A tree for instance would not be perceived, without the general notion of a tree, by which a tree at any place and at any time is perceived. This general notion requires again a kind of special knowledge, by which the general notion of a tree is referred to a certain tree. This kind of knowledge, though corresponding with the relations of all substances, which have both general and special properties, and though (implicitly) contained in every object of perception, still differs from the general properties of the things. It is a conception of the soul, produced by its own activity. "This knowledge then is internal perception, that is to say, it is not produced by inference, or analogy, or verbal communication, but it is immediate and complete, as all knowledge by perception." Every perception of external objects then, according to this exposition, is based upon two elements, an external and an internal, or as these expressions do not exactly represent their notions, an immediate and mediate, an objective and ideal knowledge. In the same way are the objects of the soul perceived, viz. its different qualities, as aversion,
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Volition, &c. are called. Though the soul is the object of the mind, it is not directly perceived by it, but is inferred from its qualities. It is not necessary here to explain the other faculties of intellect, viz. inference, comparison, and verbal communication, as they are discussed in another part of this paper. We here only add, that they must be considered as parts of the quality of knowledge, as we would express it, as modified operations of one and the same activity of the soul.

The mind, by which all knowledge is perceived, is not a quality or faculty of the soul itself, but an independent substance, atomic in its nature. Hence only a single perception or idea is at one time perceived by the soul.

The soul itself is eternal, and therefore also are its qualities, we should say, also its knowledge, although this knowledge be not perceived by the soul itself. It is at the same time every where, not, however, as an infinite soul, as the universal soul of the Vedantists, where all things constitute the pervading soul, be it even a piece of matter, though bound by ignorance to a state of apparent material existence, but in the same way as space and time are connected with every thing. There is a general soul, and there are individual souls. The general soul has the same qualities with the individual souls, with the exception of aversion, pleasure, pain, merit and demerit, because these qualities would involve imperfections. The individual soul is subject to the law of transmigration, and happiness and misery are the consequences of its good or bad actions. It is, however, possible for the individual soul to emerge from the vicissitudes of worldly existence by the attainment of true knowledge.

Here it is necessary to point out what place the notion of the general soul or the deity (Iswara, the Ruler) holds in the system of the Nyaya.

The Vedanta denies a personal deity. There is a supreme soul, but this soul is all in all, individual souls are emanations from it, as sparks from fire, and are essentially identical with it. Nature in its first elements as well as in its development depends upon it. The

- How is mind united with the soul? Not by any act of either; for they are independent of each other. They are united by something without them, viz., by the power of God, in the same way, as atoms are united with each other; for these latter, although the material causes of compound substances, are not causes of their connection.
Vedânta in fact destroys the distinctions between God and nature; every distinction is delusion, and there is nothing but one all-pervading, knowing and blissful being, and even such distinctions as of existence, knowledge, bliss, are not real distinctions, they are but contrivances to approach to the true idea of the One.—If there is nothing but existence, but knowledge, but truth, there should be no difference whatever, and least of all any delusion, on the contrary, there is with man almost nothing but delusion; only few approach the true notion of God, and but inadequately; in most men there is only difference found, and nature is altogether opposed to it. Nay, this is not only the case in the last emanation of this deity, but if we comprehend nature in its principle, where all differences of substance, quality, form, &c. disappear, if we comprehend it as dependent upon the soul, it is ignorance, that is to say, indiscreet matter, it is non-existence, non-knowledge, &c. but this, Proteus-like being, of which it cannot be said, that it exists, nor, that it does not exist, is to be placed upon the soul, to be understood by it. This is to say: in theory the Vedânta acknowledges but one principle, the infinite soul, in fact, however, two, soul and non-soul, ignorance or matter.

With reference to God, the Sânkhya is divided into two sects, the thetical and the atheistical. *

* Col. M. E. pp. 251-2. God, Iswara, the supreme ruler according to Pâtanjali, is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected by the ill with which they are brest, unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the eldest beings that have a beginning (the dottes of mythology) himself infinite, unlimited by time.

Kapila, on the other hand, denies an Iswara, ruler of the world by volition, alleging, that there is no proof of God’s existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed. He acknowledges, indeed, a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute, source of all individual intelligences and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, that the truth of such an Iswara is demonstrated, the Creator of worlds, in such sense of creation; for “the existence of effects,” he says, “is dependent upon consciousness, not upon Iswara,” and, “all else is from the great principle.” Yga, that being is finite, having a beginning and an end, arising from the grand development of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guide of the universe, by volition, Kapila positively denies.

See also Wilson’s Sânkhya Kârâks, pp. 166 to 168.
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Kapila denied altogether a deity; the Īśvara whom he admits, is only a finite being; for although he assumes a being, whose intelligence is absolute, yet this being issues from nature, and is again to terminate in nature. It is very much to be regretted, that of Patanjali’s doctrine nothing as yet has been published. It is difficult to form an exact idea of his being from the words, quoted by Colebrooke. According to them he has some attributes of the deity; he is of the utmost omniscience, infinite, unlimited by time; but how he is connected with the creation and ruling of the universe, is impossible to conceive. If his doctrine in other points agrees with the atheistical Sānkhya, all the development of the world in its different forms is independent of him; for it is the necessity of nature, that certain emanations are issuing from it, and returning to it after certain periods. It would rather appear, that he is a kind of Epicurean deity, blissful in himself and unconcerned with the affairs of the world.

The Nyāya is essentially theistical. According to them, God is personal. He is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere knowledge, mere bliss, but he is a substance, of which existence, &c. are attributes; for it is impossible to think of existence, knowledge, &c., without referring them to a subject which exists, which has knowledge, &c. He is not the supreme soul of the Vedānta which is the whole universe, but distinguished as well from the world as from finite spirits. He is not a mere emanation from nature, as Kapila asserted, but altogether different from nature, and self-existent. He is also not, as appears to be Patanjali’s opinion, a merely omniscient being; but he is of infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, and nature could not exist independent of a God, or could exist only without order, harmony and object. And this idea is not only a fortuitous addition to the system, but one of its chief springs; for all the substances in the world, without God, remain unconnected. There may be atoms, but they do not constitute a world, they are solitary, unconnected, without any apparent difference; of themselves they have no action, produce no effect, and not even the simplest compound of two atoms can arise from them alone, much less a compound of a certain form and for certain objects, nor the world in its unity, harmony, and infinite variety of forms. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, without enjoyment, without development and without a final end, for
they are not united with mind, the instrument, by which they are connected with the world, among themselves and with the creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who by his infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervading harmony of the world. This argument for the existence of a deity is essentially teleological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the world as to its form, not as to its matter.

The Nyāya approaches most closely of all Hindu systems the Christian notion of God, as its deity is an infinite spirit and at the same time personal, as it is wholly distinct from matter, and the creator and ruler of the universe.

It would be superfluous to point out the marked distinction, drawn here between body and soul. Though a higher development of philosophy may destroy the distinctions between soul and matter, that is, may recognise matter, or what is perceived as matter, as the same with the soul (as for instance, Leibnitz did), it is nevertheless certain, that no true knowledge of the soul is possible, without first drawing a most decided line of demarcation between the phenomena of matter and of the soul. In the Nyāya there is even an approximation to the doctrine, that soul and matter are as to their principles one and the same, viz. in the theory of atoms, according to which atoms are the negation of space. From this notion we may draw the inference, which has not been drawn by the Nyāya, it is true, but which would have been only a necessary consequence from the premises, that matter, being a compound of atoms, is only a phenomenon, as regards its extension through space. Where then is here shown the difference between the soul and the true substratum of matter? Let us see then, what is the soul? The soul is different from matter, as this last is perceived by the senses as extended through space. This distinction is true, but further to conclude, that the soul is also different from matter in its real nature, where matter is not extended, is certainly hasty, and does not follow from the premises. What then is the soul according to them? It is all-pervading, infinite, like ether, space and time. This answer, though far from satisfactory, shows, that they felt the difficulty in determining the notion of the soul, when their other notions had undergone a decided alteration.—

The most peculiar notion in their psychological theory is the existence of
of the mind independent of soul, although most intimately connected with it; for through the mind only the soul perceives, as well its own qualities, as the qualities of external substances. How could the Nyāya have made a supposition in which the contradiction is so evident? For it is easy to conclude, that if the mind is independent, its perception is also independent. If the mind perceives, this perception is not in the soul, and if this perception is in the soul, it is not perceived. The soul then has knowledge, which is not real knowledge, because not perceived, and the mind has no knowledge, though it perceives.

We may solve this difficulty at least in some way. The mind was first undoubtedly considered as an internal sense according to the analogy of external senses, in order that there be a unity of perception, and that, as the external objects are perceived through different media, the objects of the soul be perceived, through an analogous internal medium, a supposition, which has also been made in modern (English) philosophy. So far the Nyāya might have considered the mind as an internal sense, but they met with a difficulty, which was not felt in the same intensity by modern philosophers. If knowledge be perceived by the soul through the medium of the mind (the internal sense), why is it not always present in the mind? Why does it disappear and give place to other objects of perception, etc.? Locke was surprised at the narrowness of the human mind, without being able to account for it; the Nyāya in endeavouring to account for it, invented an independent substance, the mind, which is an atom, and according to its atomic nature only able to represent or to perceive one object at one and the same time.

This, I think, is the solution of the difficulty, and though it is certainly only an evasion, because its supposition creates greater difficulties than the former one, it still gives evidence of a spirit of enquiry in the school.

In comparing the psychological theory of the Nyāya with more modern doctrines (with the exception of the latest period) we must admit, that in a metaphysical point of view there is no great difference between them. The same objections are to be made to either, the doctrine of faculties being involved in the same contradictions as that of qualities. In either case, if you are to explain, what the soul is, you have to state, what it is, independent of its qualities or faculties, and
also to enumerate the latter. Your explanation will thus point out a quale, which is not a unity, but something defined by a variety of notions. This, however, is not the place to discuss the matter, and we wished only to remind the reader, that modern philosophy in this respect cannot boast to have advanced one single step beyond that of the Hindus, that is to say, in the metaphysic of the soul, although it would be absurd to deny that modern psychology, as to the observation of psychical phenomena, has made rapid strides towards perfection.

In passing over to the strictly logical enquiries of the Nyāya, we have to premise, that we cannot view them with the same satisfaction, and although we may make ample allowance for the different forms of language, in which they are explained, we are compelled to confess, that they are neither exact nor complete.

The Nyāya has treated the logical topics in the inverse order of that adopted by us, viz. first inference, then ideas, and lastly propositions. This order is followed, not in consequence of a different method of arrangement, but in consequence of the subjects being based upon different grounds, and flowing from different sources. Logic might undoubtedly be treated analytically and commence with the exposition of syllogistical forms. Considering argument as a fact, we might analyse various arguments, and proceeding to their elements, that is to propositions, gradually arrive at ideas or notions. But the Nyāya, far from following such an analytical course, holds inference to be a quality (or modification of a quality), different from the quality of forming names and notions, and discusses inference before verbal knowledge, evidently with the purpose of showing, that the latter in some way depends upon the former.

We, however, treat these doctrines in their common order, with no other intention than to make ourselves better understood.

Verbal knowledge is one of the divisions of intellect. The first act or the first condition of understanding words, is the forming of the name! A name is corresponding to a certain object, and this object is connected with the name by the power of the name. A name which has such a power, is a word. The clear and distinct knowledge of what is implied in a word, is produced by a third act, and is the meaning of a word. This latter is in fact identical with idea or notion, as is evident from the examples given, as for instance, a tree is a thing which has root, stem, branches, leaves, etc.
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Here again is the order perverted, the name is certainly not the first operation, and the object to be named, the second, but just the reverse. There must be objects to be named, and though we may admit, that the clear idea of a subject often succeeds a name, still the object, of which the notion is formed, is the first, and we must assert, that what precedes the notion, also precedes the name.

The enquiry, how ideas are formed from a variety of similar objects, belongs to psychology, and however interesting this question otherwise may be, logic has nothing to do with the psychical process, by which ideas are produced. If this were the case, we might still have to wait for a logic, as a psychological theory has not yet been established to general satisfaction, while logic as a science has been complete for more than two thousand years. By the considering first of the names and afterwards of the corresponding notions, the real character of a notion has been at least obscured. From the given examples we see, that a notion, instead of being defined by the genus, under which it is contained, and the specific difference, is explained by a genus, which is distant from it by a number of intervening notions (for instance, genus of tree: thing) and by a specific difference, which besides its own difference, enumerates properties which it partakes with others (for instance root, stem, leaves, etc. specific difference).

The meaning of a word or idea, ought to have been considered in its connexion with other ideas, as made up by genus and differentia specifica, and as excluded from them by their compatible, contrary, and contradictory opposition. Here, however, are genus and species raised to categories under the names of generality and particularity, being there the common properties of substances, qualities, and acts, while the opposition of ideas or terms is treated in the seventh category, that of negation. Negation is the category which arises, if the categories are mutually denied of each other. It is the mutual difference of the categories and therefore the same with logical opposition. Negation is again of four kinds, mutual negation, antecedent negation, (negation of a thing, that is to be,) emergent negation (destruction) and absolute negation. Of them antecedent and emergent negations are not logical, but metaphysical negations, viz. the relations which a thing may have with regard to its origin or cessation in time. Mutual negation corresponds to contrary opposition (oppositio contraria) of terms. For instance
black is the negation of white, of red, &c. and vice versa; here the one is not denied in an absolute, but in a relative manner. Absolute negation* would correspond to contradictory opposition (oppositio contradictoria) as is evident from an allusion to it in the explanation of a negative inference. Here it is said, that a notion is the negation of its absolute non-existence, for instance cloth is the negation of its absolute non-existence, non-cloth, or $A = \text{Non—Non—} A$, that is to say, $A$ is the negation of what is in contradictory opposition to $A$.

From this arrangement then did not only result an imperfect exposition of the logical relations among ideas, but an important metaphysical error, by which logical relations of ideas are considered as real properties of substances.

In finding the logical treatment of notions by no means satisfactory, we may at the same time observe that there are many valuable remarks on some psychological and grammatical relations of ideas which we do not recollect to have found elsewhere. These we have given in a note to the text, where this subject is explained.

A proposition to convey a distinct meaning, must, according to the Nyāya, have four qualities:

1. Contiguity, which, according to some, is the uninterrupted succession of the words pronounced in a sentence, so that for instance, the first word of it be not pronounced in the present moment, and the next half an hour afterwards, according to others, the arrangement of the words according to their grammatical connexion, for instance, that a proposition be placed together with the word which depends upon it, and not with a word, to which it does not refer.

2. Consistency, or the mutual agreement of the words, according to their sense, so that contradictory terms be not connected.

3. Structure, or the grammatical (terminations) forms of the words, which correspond in their meanings (for instance, that the verb agrees with the subject in number and person.)

* There is a difference of opinion in the Nyāya with reference to absolute negation. Some appear to conceive it merely as a negation of present existence, others as the negation of a contradictory notion. In this last sense Colebrooke understood it, (Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 283,) and this is also the interpretation of the Mimāṃsā. (Wilson's Sāṅkhya Karika, p. 19.) That the author of the Phāsha Pariccheda adopted also this sense, appears to me evident from the above explanation.
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4. Intention, that is, the meaning which the speaker wishes to convey by a sentence.

There again the logical characteristics of a proposition have been omitted, as all those points, with the exception perhaps of consistency, belong to the grammatical structure of a sentence.

The logical explanation of propositions, as a matter of course, passes over any grammatical form a proposition may assume; it treats only of the relation between two ideas, and its simple question is, whether two ideas can be connected or not.

It is evident, that in this way neither quantity, nor modality of propositions could have been discovered. We might, however, dispense with them, as these forms are not strictly logical; but not even the division of propositions according to their quality has been made by the Nyāya.

The theory of ideas and propositions is the weakest point in the logic of the Nyāya; they are more successful in explaining the form of arguments; for though the theory of syllogism is far from exact and complete, we must admit, that they understood the general character of a syllogism.

According to Gautama a complete syllogism contains five members (Avayava = proposition). 1. The proposition (pratijñā, that which is to be proved by the argument). 2. The reason, argument (hetu). 3. The instance (Uddhārama, drishtiśānta). 4. The application (upamaya). 5. The conclusion (nigamana), for instance:

1. This hill is fiery,
2. For it smokes,
3. What smokes is fiery, as for instance, a culinary hearth,
1. This hill smokes,
5. Therefore it is fiery.

The modern school of the Nyāya reduced the syllogism to three, and even to two members, and this last reduction appears to have been most generally adopted,* as it is in the Tarka Sangraha and Mūsāha

* Colebrooke (Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 292), added only to Gautama's Sūtras, and not to a more modern work of the Nyāya, where he asserted, that the regular syllogism of the Nyāya consisted of five members. The modern school of the Nyāya (read Dr. Ballantyne's Lectures on the Tarks Sangraha, p. 31), declares the five-membered form rhetorical in distinction from its logical form, which contains only two members. Dr. Ballantyne has clearly pointed this out in loco.
Pariccheda. In this form the two premises, viz. major and minor propositions are condensed into one premise, of which we shall now give a description.

That a syllogism be correct, two things are required. 1, a general proposition, in which the subject (reason) is invariably connected with a predicate (conclusion), more comprehensive than the subject, and 2, a minor term, with which the subject of the general proposition is connected. That there is this double connexion of the minor term with the reason, and of the reason with the conclusion, is to be decided by consideration, which is the intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as connected with the general predicate or the predicate of the conclusion. This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion can only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as determined by the reason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion.

For instance: let a man from former observation know, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, as for instance on a culinary hearth;

tise on the Nyaya system, and also in his Lectures on the Nyaya philosophy. He says, (Nyaya system of philosophy, p. 5.)

"Now, in this form of the syllogism (which we do not find alluded to in Mr. Colebrooke's essay), there is neither more nor less than there is in the Aristotelic syllogism. The wonder would be if there had been. The first formal difference observable is, the wrapping up of the premises in one logical datum. The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable members of a single statement appears to have been this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind, that the premises suggest the inference, and this simultaneity of cognizance is secured by combining the two assertions into a period, or sentence, of which the whole becomes intelligible only when the last word in it has been uttered... If we separate the two members of the original datum in the example above cited, we obtain the following:

- Whatever smokes, is fiery;
- The hill smokes,
- Therefore the hill is fiery;"

and p. 9. "To return to our text-book. The author tells us, that a man, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred the presence of fire from the perception of smoke, may wish to impart his conviction to another. In other words having ascertained the truth as a logician, he may wish as a rhetorician, to establish it to the satisfaction of somebody else. Here we step distinctly out of the province of logic, and enter that of rhetoric."
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let him see afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising from a hill, he will recollect the general proposition, that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence the knowledge arises: This hill is possessed of smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge, this one act, by which there is a progress from one object to a third by a second, is consideration, from which the conclusion arises: This hill is fiery.

This is in its principal points the theory of the Nyāya of the form of the syllogism. It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle. The differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two premises are combined into one. The exposition is certainly not simple, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in their natural form, which is the connexion of two in a proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applied to the conclusion; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conclusion also should not be stated in a separate sentence, but the whole syllogism should form one sentence, for instance, in the example: This hill, determined by smoke, which is determined by fire, is determined by fire. Yet the difference is only apparent; for the Nyāya, as Aristotle, connects one notion with the other through a third with which the latter is connected, or excludes it by a third, from which the second is excluded.

The second difference is, that the Nyāya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but to guard against false premises, and for this purpose the consideration was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the preposition was exemplified. Their consideration was therefore not only directed to the logical operation of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it, and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argument should be the result of one and the same operation, which of course is impossible.

With the exposition of the form of syllogism the logical theory of the Nyāya is nearly completed. Gautama divided inference into three kinds: 1, inference of an effect from a cause, as if rain is inferred from a collection of clouds; 2, inference of a cause from an effect, as if rain is concluded from an increase of the water in a river, and 3, inference from general notions, as if earth is inferred to be a substance from its
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having the quality of smell. This division, it is hardly necessary to remark, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. The modern school of the Nyāya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms; which are: only affirmative inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given in illustration, it appears, that the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara and Camestres; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestres for all general negative ones. Here, however, is their theory finished, and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can enter into.

It is a remarkable circumstance, that the general form of syllogism should have been found by the Hindus, and yet that they should not have discovered the different figures and moods, the diversities of which are the result of mere combination. We think, this deficiency was the consequence of two causes especially,—first, of their technical language, which although precise, is yet cumbersome and not comprehensive, and secondly, of their pious regard for every thing traditional, be it in political institutions, in religion, or in science. The Sūtras, which are the foundations of their systems, have always remained text-books, and any discovery that had been made in theory, did not prompt them to attempt a new exposition of science, but gave only occasion to a new interpretation of the school.

The Bhāṣa Paricēchā is itself a work of the modern Nyāya. The author Visvanātha Panchānana Bhaṭṭa, the son of Vidyāvīśa Bhaṭṭa, accompanied the text with a commentary under the title "Siddhānta Muktāvali" (the pearl-wreath of truth), and he is known also by his commentary to Gautama's Sūtras, which bears the title "Nyāya Sūtra Vṛtti." According to the statement of the Pandits, he lived about two hundred years ago. The Bhāṣa Paricēchā is a text-book in the schools of the Nyāya in Bengal. There is no Pandit of any repute who does not know it well, and many know the whole of it by heart. And indeed it is admirably adapted for the purpose of introduction into the study of the Nyāya philosophy. It is a succinct exposition of the principal topics of the whole system, and may easily be committed to memory. It is written in the well known Anustup metre. The style,
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however, is not poetical at all, but that of the most sober prose, and nowhere is the attempt made to combine the graces of imagination with philosophical method.

The course, followed in the work, is simple. The author gives first the leading ideas of the system, that is, the most comprehensive metaphysical notions, viz. the notions of substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation. He then enumerates the various substances, qualities, actions, &c. and defines the properties common to all categories as well as those common to more or less of them. After this exposition the different substances in their relations to themselves, to other substances and to their qualities and actions are explained. In the same way the author discusses the qualities of substances, and his work is finished, when he has treated on the last quality, enumerated at the commencement of his treatise.

The commentary is in thought and language a very different composition. It is written with the object of supporting the views of the author and of the school in its controversy with other doctrines, and enters therefore frequently into intricate discussions in establishing the fundamental tenets or defending disputed points of the system, and makes use of the whole armory of the sometimes very abstruse technical language of the Nyaya.

This commentary has again been commented upon by Mahâdeva Bhattâ, but I received a MS. of his work too late to make any other use of it than to compare it with the text.*

The Sanscrit text of the Bhaśa Paricchedha was first printed in Bengali characters in 1821, with the addition of a Bengali translation of the text and of the commentary. The translation of the latter, however, is rather, a paraphrase, as the alterations are sometimes considerable.†

* The MS. is in the Library of the Sanscrit College of Calcutta, of which, however, I was for a long time not aware, as it is above mentioned in the list of books in that Library, printed in the Sanscrit Catalogue of the Asiatic Society. It has two titles, "Mahâdeva Bhattâ-kritâ-Muktârali Prakâśa," and the shorter one. "Dinakari Īṭikā." In his introduction, the author mentions also the name of his father, Bâlakrishna.

† The title is, "A system of Logic, written in Sanscrit, by the Venerable Nûpû Bharadvâja, and explained in a Sanscrit commentary by the very learned Viswanath Tarkalâncâr, translated into Bengalee by Kashâk Nath Turkoparchanu. Calcutta, 1821."
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Another edition of the Sanscrit text together with the commentary, appeared in 1827, under the auspices of the Committee of Public Instruction. The text is correct, but not so the commentary. It is full of mistakes, omissions and interpolations. The interpunction is either faulty or entirely disregarded, and the numbers of the successive Slokas are not attached to the corresponding portions of the commentary, so that an easy reference of the one to the other is impossible.

The present edition has been carefully revised partly by comparison with Mahádeva Bhaṭṭa's commentary, partly by a reference to the corrections in the copy of Jayanárāyana Tarkapanchánana, the professor of Nyáya in the Sanscrit College, which he had the kindness to lend me, and for which I offer my grateful acknowledgments.

The notes which I have added to the translation, are chiefly given for the purpose to elucidate the principal points of the system of the Nyáya, in accordance with the object of this work to contribute to a fair estimate of the merits of Hindu philosophy, and are therefore more copious in such parts as contain the distinguishing features of the Nyáya, for instance, the ontological portions, the doctrine of atoms, their notion of the deity, and their logical theory. They are less copious in portions which contain their explanation of the differences of matter; for as natural science with the Hindus has hardly made its beginning, their explanation is without any value. I would, however, guard here against the misconstruction, that their failing to explain the phenomena of matter, affected also the correctness of the principles, by which they tried to explain them. Natural science with reference to those phenomena is quite distinct from the philosophical theory for the interpretation of them. Democritus' explanation of natural phenomena may be entirely false, and still his theory of atoms may be correct, (although it is not in our opinion,) which is at least partly borne out by the fact, that in modern chemistry the theory of atoms has been adopted, although no one would admit the application of it which Democritus made for the explanation of the phenomena. The cause of this is a double one; first, philosophy is quite distinct from natural science, the latter being based upon observation and experiments, the former upon the relations which notions have among each other. Secondly, a philosophical system may have obtained the true principles for the explanation of intellectual and material phenomena, but at the same time
not have fully investigated the intermediate notions which may be necessary for explanation. A hasty application of these principles without due regard to such notions and to the results of natural science, is very apt to throw discredit upon the previous researches by which a system arrived at its principles, and also upon philosophy itself.

To mark the more the method of the philosophical discussion of the Nyāya, I have generally preferred to give their interpretation in their own words, and therefore made large extracts from the commentary in as literal a translation as possible, which I hope will be found also useful to the student of the Nyāya in general, as facilitating the reading of the commentary and the understanding of the technical language of the Nyāya.
DIVISION OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE NYA'YA PHILOSOPHY.

SALUTATION TO GANESHA.

1. To Krishna, radiant like the new cloud, the thief of the clothes of the milkmaids, to him, who is the seed of the tree of the world, be adoration.

2. There are seven categories, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation, and negation.

1. Padārthā is explained in verse 13, as that which is object of knowledge, the commentary adds object of proof, of nomination; but as this applies to every idea, the definition is too wide, and ought to have been restricted to the most general object of knowledge.

I have followed Colebrooke in translating Padārthā with category, although that term somewhat differs from the idea which Aristotle expresses by the same. According to him, categories are the most extensive classes of what is denoted by the simple word (the word in no connexion with another), Cat. 2. ἐνακτόν μετωπίζειν αἱ μεταδοχία λέγοντας ἕνατον ἐπιστήμην αὐτόν σχεδον κ.τ.λ. He enumerates ten, viz. essence (ἐσχήμα), quantity (πλῆθος), quality (ποιήμα), relation (πρός τι), the where (ποῦ), the when (πότις), position (ποσειδή), to be possessed of (ἐχειν), action (ποιεῖν), and passion (πότις).

Ritter in his history of philosophy (English Transl. Vol. III. p. 66) remarks on them: "If the categories had been put forward as an accurate and exhaustive division of the modes of being, it would be open to many objections, but Aristotle does not usually ascribe much importance to this enumeration of the most general notions, so that we may regard it as nothing more than an attempt to exhibit in a clear
Division of the Categories

light the signification of words taken absolutely in order to show, how truth and falsehood consist in the right or wrong combination of these elements."

However, as most of Aristotle's categories refer to classes of existence or to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy, the term of category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely adopt it here, viz. as referring to the notions, which express the general forms of knowledge, or what is the same, the general modes of existence. It will be interesting to compare the categories of the Nyāya with those of Kant, with which they have a curious resemblance.

They are:

1. Quantity.
   a. Unity.
   b. Multiplicity.
   c. Totality.

2. Quality.
   3. Relation.
   a. Reality
      a. Inference and subsistence (substantia and accident).
   b. Negation.
      b. Causality and dependence (cause and effect).
   c. Limitation.
      c. Community (Mutual causality).

   a. Possibility (impossibility).
   b. Existence (non-existence).
   c. Necessity (accidentalness).

The categories may be divided, according to the commentary, into two classes: into categories of affirmation, and negation. It was, however, not necessary, expressly to introduce this division in the text; for, the seventh being the category of negation, it is self-evident, that the six preceding must be categories of negation. The number of seven categories is adopted by the Vaisēshikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nyāya, as established in the Bhāṣya.

Kapāla acknowledged only the six first categories, excluding negation. Gautamī, the founder of the Nyāya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (categories) soul, body, sense, object of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, condition of the soul after death (transmigration), retribution, pain, deliverance from pain. Two more categories, power and similarity, adopted in the Upamāna Chintamani, are contained in the first six categories, and must therefore be rejected.
Substances are earth, water, light, air, ether, time,

2. The definition of substance is to be the substrate of qualities, and to have substantiality (v. v. 24). To explain this more fully, it is said in the commentary to be the substrate of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (Sāmakāya Sambandha) or in the relation of antecedent negation (Prāgabhāva) that is of future existence. The latter definition is given to obviate an objection which may be raised from the condition of substances at the time of their production. When substances are produced, they have according to the Nyāya no qualities. If they have no qualities, they are no substances according to the definition, that substances are the substrates of qualities. By the second definition, that they are substrates of qualities either in the relation of intimate union, or of future existence, this objection is removed.

With regard to substantiality or the genus of substance the commentary remarks: If somebody (this is the statement of the Charvaka) would say: There is no proof that substantiality is a genus; for it is not proved by perception, as melted butter or lack (according to your own admission) have no substantiality, we contradict, because substantiality is proved by the necessity, that there should be some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of an effect, or some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of the connection and separation (between the parts composing a substance). This argument is founded on the supposition of the Nyāya, that every cause must have some distinguishing attribute (व त्र म ्त वरिष्ठता जन्म) under which it is comprehended, it is a cause, because for instance, it has the general attribute of earth, water, &c. Substance therefore, as the cause of qualities, for instance earth of smell, must be conceived by the distinguishing attribute of substantiality. The genus substantiality depends therefore not on perception, but on inference.

Some suppose, continues the commentary, darkness to be also a substance; for, they argue, it is proved by perception, it has colour and action, and is neither earth nor any of the other substances. Its organ is the eye, at the time that it is without light. This argument is not valid;

Kanada gives the following definition of substance, Vid Vamshika Sutra 1st Adhyaya, 11th Sutra. विद्यमानम शस्त्रसिद्धांशनित्र वर्ण-चरण 1. Substance is the substrate of qualities and actions, and has intimate causality.
space, soul and mind; qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction, priority, and posteriority, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, gravity, fluidity, viscosity, faculty, fate, (merit and demerit) and sound.

6. There are five actions,* throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding and going.

7. Wandering about, evacuating, trickling, flaming upwards, moving crookedly, are included in going.

8. Generality* is considered two-fold, extensive and non-

for, darkness being produced by the absence of light, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another substance. The supposition of its colour arises from delusion, as does also the supposition, that it has action, viz., from the cessation of light. If darkness were a separate thing, and not included in the category of negation, as gold is included in light, an infinite number of substances, (viz. in accordance with an infinite number of negations) must be assumed.

3. The definition of quality,* which is given in verse 89, is: Quality is, whose substrate is substance, and which is without quality and action, that is to say, there is no quality of a quality, nor an action of an action, or the notion of quality would be changed to that of substance. The argument, by which it is proved, that quality in a class, is the same as that, which proves the same of substance.

4. Action,+ according to the Bengalee translation, is the special category, which in the relation of intimate union is present in a substance which has velocity, or the category, which after a duration of five moments is subject to destruction, viz., at first, there is contact; 2, Separation; 3, Destruction of a former connection; 4, A new connection; 5, Cessation of the action.

5. Commentary.—Generality (or class) is intimate union of many

* Kanàda's definition of quality is: विभिन्न गुणधर्मं विभिन्निपरिभिन्नार्थार्थस्य । प्रभुष प्रभुष महत्त्वस्य || A. 1. that is, quality is seated in substance, has quality and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause.

† एकार्थस्य उपस्थितिपरिभिन्नार्थस्य विविधां विभिन्निपरिभिन्नमेति काव्यस्य || A. 1. action is, whose site is substance alone, which is without quality, and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause.
extensive. Existence, as including substances, qualities and actions, is called extensive.

9. The class which differs from this is called non-extensive; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non-extensive.

10. By its including many things, it is extensive; by its being included in a more extensive class, it is non-extensive.

in something eternal, or is eternal and the intimate union of many. It is said, "in something eternal," because intimate union of many exists also between things in contact. "Of many," because intimate union in something eternal exists also in such infinite quanta as the sky, "in intimate union," because the existence of many in something eternal refers also to absolute negation. Consequently there is no generality or genus, where only one individual exists, or where there is no difference of individuality, or where there is confusion, or where there is a retrogress in infinitum, or where an idea is changed to its contrary, or where there is no relation. For instance, the sky forms no class on account of its individuality. The notions of a donkey and of an ass (in Sanscrit the terms: घोट and घोष) are selected, either of which means a pr. are no class. The notions of element and form are no class, because the value of these notions is confounded. Generality is no class, because, there is no place of support for it, (it would require a retrogress in infinitum; for if there is a class of a class, or a notion of a notion, there must also be a class of the class of the class and so further) particularity is no class, because it would thus be changed to its contrary. (Particularity by becoming generality would be the contrary of its notion.) Intimate union is no class, because it is not in the relation of intimate union (in the relation of intimate union are only substances, qualities and actions).

According to their definition of class only substance, quality, and action, further the general notion of those three, which is reality, the notions of the substances, with the exception of sky, space and time, the notions of the different qualities and actions as well as the notions which are included in them, form generalities or classes. The other four categories are not classes, but as the Bengalee Translator calls them, Upadhis, titles, general characteristics.
Division of the Categories

The ultimate condition of eternal substances is called particularity.

11. The connexion of a substance with its componing parts, as of a jar, &c., with its two halves, &c.; further the connexion of substances with qualities and actions, and lastly the connexion of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes is called intimate relation.

6. Comm.—The ultimate condition of eternal substances is particularity.* The ultimate condition, viz., the condition, which remains ultimately, last after all (according to the Bengalee translation, the condition which remains until the general conflagration of the world), than which there is no further particularity, that is to say, the condition, abiding in one substance only; for in compound substances from a jar down to the union of two atoms there is mutual difference, by means of the difference of all their respective parts; but the mutual difference of atoms is particularity; this is a difference by itself, and a particularity further than this does therefore not exist.

7. Comm. The relation of parts with things possessed of parts, of generality with single objects, of qualities with things possessed of qualities, of actions with objects possessed of actions, is intimate relation. Intimate relation means constant relation. It is proved by the fact, that the intellect, when determined by qualities and action, is in the relation of what is determining and what is determined (predicate and subject) for it is a determined intellect, as the sentence: The man bears a stick, is the result of a determined intellect. Hence, since in this case neither the relation of contact nor any other relation is possible, intimate relation is proved.

As the Bengalee translation expresses the meaning much more clearly, I have given it here instead of the explanation of the original. Intimate relation, excluding distinctive relation, is constant relation of only one thing which regulates a condition. By the term "constant" the relation of contact is excluded, by the term "excluding distinctive relation," the relation of distinction, by the term "which regulates a con-

*Both, generality and particularity depend on intellect. The commentator, Sankara Misra adds, "generality is the intellect, which is found in many; particularity, which is separated from others."
Of the Nyaya Philosophy.

12, 13. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and reciprocal negation. The first includes three kinds, antecedent
dition," the relation of identity, as for instance of the sky; for the
relation of identity (the relation, that a thing is to be comprehended
under its own notion) is not regulating a condition, by the term "of
only one thing," the notion of mutual negation. In the relation of
contact, is for instance, a jar with the ground. The class of distinc-
tion is three-fold, viz. as referring to time, space and place. In the
distinctive relation of time and space are all things. The distinctive
relation of place is again two-fold, the distinctive relation of nega-
tion, and the distinctive relation of identity (of a thing with itself).
The distinctive relation of negation is the site of negation. In the dis-
tinctive relation of identity is for instance the notion of the sky with
the sky. In the relation of identity remains every thing with itself.
In mutual relation is the notion of the jar with the ground.

8. Comm.—Negation is the reciprocal negation of the six cate-
gories, that is to say, negation arises from the six categories, being
denied of each other. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and
mutual negation. Universal negation is negation, different from mutual
negation. Mutual negation is the negation of identity. Universal
negation is of three kinds, antecedent, emergent, and absolute negation.
Antecedent negation is a negation, which is afterwards removed, for
instance, if it is said, in this half a jar is to be produced, there is a ne-
gation of the jar, which is to be produced. Emergent negation or de-
struction is a negation of what is produced, for instance, in the sentence,
in these parts a jar is destroyed, there is a negation in the cause (the
parts) subsequent to the production of the effect. Absolute negation
is constant universal negation, for instance in the sentence, here is no
jar. Here, this objection may be made: If a jar or any other thing
is removed from a certain place, and again brought back to it, the no-
tion of absolute negation cannot be applied; for, absolute negation be-
ing constant negation, the notion of absolute negation is not produced,
when the jar is brought back. Hence they have assumed a fourth kind
of negation, referring to the liability of a thing to be produced or de-
stroyed, excluding absolute negation. For instance, in the notion: a
black pot is not red, and a red not black, there is antecedent and
negation, destruction and absolute negation. The common notion of all seven categories is object of knowledge, and similar ideas.

14. The five first categories are positive, many and in the connection of intimate relation. The three first (substances, qualities, actions) have the attribute of existence; qualities and the subsequent categories are without qualities and actions.

15. Class ( générality), and the subsequent categories are considered to be without generality; causality is a predicate of all substances which are not atoms (whose measure is not an atom).

Emergent, but not absolute negation. The modern school, however, reject this view, because they deny, that a contradiction has been proved; according to their opinion absolute negation is met with in emergent as well as in antecedent negation.

Negation is assumed as a distinct category; for in denying it, an infinite number of negations, corresponding to the things, whose negations they are, would be necessary.

9. Object of knowledge, &c. viz. capable of being known, named, proved, &c.

Comm.——The general notion (definition) of substances, qualities, actions, generalities and particularities is multiplicity, positiveness and connection by intimate relation. Multiplicity is also found in negation; therefore the distinction of the five is: the state of position in many. It is said, "which are in the connection of intimate relation," and not, which have intimate relation, because otherwise the categories of generality and particularity would be excluded.

11. Comm.—Causality is an attribute of all substances, whose measure is not an atom (परिमाणस्य means, whose measure is an atom.) Or: Atoms, considered as a measure, have no causality. A substance whose measure is an atom, cannot be the cause of any thing; for a measure commences things, which are included in its notion (as for instance the half of a jar is the measure, from which the jar is produced) but this is impossible in this instance; for a measure produces a measure, exceeding the measure, contained in its own notion (that is from a measure is produced something greater than itself) hence as the greater is
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

16. The notion of the necessary previous existence of a thing, which has not the fault of superfluous causality, is causality. *

17. Of this three kinds are specified, viz. causality of intimate relation, of non-intimate relation (the connexion of the produced, if the measure commences from the great, so from the infinitely small (the atom) would be produced something smaller (more an atom). This is impossible (hence the measure contained in the conjunction of two atoms, is not produced from the measure of an atom, but from number) For the same reason causality must be denied of substances which are infinite, further of any class, transcending the senses, and lastly of particularity. (The reason for this is clear; any thing infinite which can be exceeded, must have become finite, there cannot be any thing which exceeds the senses more than another thing, both being thought under the same idea, viz. to exceed the senses. Particular are the distinctions of eternal things, they cannot be distinguished by any thing else, because they are the last distinctions.)

12. I give here a note of the Bengali translation. The category which has not the fault of superfluous causality, and whose existence constantly precedes, is causality, or cause is, by the existence or non-

* The principal Sutras of Kanada, referring to causality, are

कारणमयान कारणम्: 1st Adh.
कारणमय्यान्तत्त्वम्: 2nd Adh.
कारणविधि: कारणमयक: 1st Adh.
कारणसत्त्वम् कारणमयान: 10th Adh.
कारण सम्बन्धान कारणमयकारणम्: 10th Adh.
(सम्बन्धानां कारणसत्त्वानि) 10th Adh.

If there is no cause, there is no effect.

The quality of the effect depends upon the cause.

The cause, which refers to substance, is intimate cause, because substance is intimately related to effects, (viz. compound substance qualifies and actions.)

Action is a non-intimate cause, because they are intimately related to the cause (the intimate cause).

* In the same manner are qualifies intimately related to substances, therefore they are also non-intimate causes.
component parts), and instrumental causality is mentioned as the third by the followers of the Nyāya philosophy.

18. That from which in its intimate relation an effect is produced; (for instance thread from which cloth is made,) is causality of intimate relation; that which is proximate to this, (the conjunction of the threads) is the second cause, (of non-intimate relation), and as the third (instrumental causality) must be considered what is different from either, (for instance the loom of the weaver.)

19. There are five classes of superfluous causality, viz.

existence of which the existence or non-existence of an effect is necessary. If there is no thread, there is no cloth; if there is no conjunction of the two halves of a jar, there is no jar; if there is no virtue, there is no happiness, &c. There are three kinds of causes, intimate, non-intimate and instrumental causes. Such things as, intimately united, (that is, such as are in the connection of intimate relation) produce an effect, are intimate causes. Two atoms for instance are the cause of a bi-atomical compound, threads of cloth, the two halves of a jar. Non-intimate is a cause, which is, proximate to an intimate cause, that is, which is connected with the intimate cause; for instance the conjunction of two atoms is the proximate cause of the bi-atomical compound, the conjunction of threads of cloth, the conjunction of two halves of a jar. Instrumental is the cause, differing from either; for instance, the instrumental cause of a jar is the stick, of cloth the loom, of a bi-atomical compound god. It must here also be borne in mind, that an effect may be destroyed either by the destruction of the intimate cause, or by that of the non-intimate cause, as a jar is destroyed by the destruction of the two halves, and a bi-atomical compound by that of the conjunction of the two atoms. The intimate, non-intimate and instrumental causes are called special causes; God, the omniscience of God, desire, endeavour, time, space, antecedent negation and fate (virtue and vice) general causes.

13. A cause is called superfluous (अन्यायाभिक्षु:) if, without its co-operation, the effect is produced in another way. Commentary. Faults of superfluous causality are: 1. The notion, under which the cause is per-
1st.—The general idea (class), under which the former state of a cause is perceived; 2nd, that the existence or non-existence of which can only be comprehended by the existence or non-existence of the cause; 3rd, that of which the previous existence is applied to the effect, when its previous existence is already applied to another (effect).

20. 4th, that the existence of which is applied to the effect, because it necessarily precedes the existence of the producer of the effect; and 5th, that which is superfluous beside the thing whose former existence is necessary.

21, 22. Of the first class is an example the notion, under which the stick (by which a jar is made) is perceived, of the second the form, &c. of the stick, of the third the ether, of the

received, as for instance the idea of a stick (रूप the class of a stick) by which (stick) for instance a jar is produced. 2. Such things as cannot be thought of themselves as causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect, but are causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect only by means of the real cause, as for instance the shape of a stick; (for it cannot be said, that, it this or that shape of a stick is given, the effect, viz. the jar, is given, nor, if this or that shape of a stick is not given, the jar is also not given.) 3. The application of a cause to an effect, if this cause has been already applied to another effect, for instance, if the ether should be considered as the cause of a jar. The ether could be only the cause of a jar by its being perceived under the notion of ether; this, however, is the intimate cause of sound, and it is therefore first taken as the cause of sound, and secondly as the cause of the jar. 4. The application of a cause to an effect, by which (cause) the (actual) cause of an effect is produced; for instance, if the father of the potter would be considered as the cause of the jar, for the potter only is the producer of the jar. 5 The application of any thing (as cause of an effect) which is not necessary to the production of the effect, as for instance the donkey, carrying the garth, &c. of which a jar is made. Of all the kinds of superfluous causality the last alone is necessary, as including the other kinds.
third the father of the potter, of the fourth the donkey, &c.
Among those superfluous causes the last alone is necessary
(because the others are included in it).

23. Intimate causality belongs to substances, non-intimate
causality only to qualities and actions.\(^*\)

24. Dependence is the attribute of every thing, save eternal
substances. The property of all nine kinds of substances
is: to have substantiality and qualities.

25. Earth, water, light, air and mind are the sites of compre-
hensive and non-comprehensive generality, form,\(^*\) action and
velocity.

26. Time, ether, soul and space have the attributes of unity
and infinity.\(^*\) Of the five elements, viz. earth and the
subsequent four substances (water, light, air, and ether), are the
first four the sites of touch.

27. The commencement of things takes place in the four
first substances. The special qualities of ether and soul\(^*\) are:
limitation to space, and momentary duration.

14. Intimate causality belongs to substances; non-intimate causality
to qualities and actions, that is, intimate causality is the common attrib-
ute of substances, non-intimate causality that of qualities and actions.

15. Comm.—Dependence in the common attribute of all things ex-
etcept eternal substances; it is to be thought under the idea of intimate re-
lation. Eternal things are only dependent on distinctive relation (vide p.
7) as for instance on the relation of time. Eternal substances are atoms,
(viz. of air, fire, water, earth) ether, time, space and soul. The common
attribute of substances is, substantiality and substrate of qualities.

16. Form (रूप) is, the measure of which is limited.

17. Infinity (परस्पर संत) is, the measure of which exceeds every
other measure.

18. Comm.—The special qualities of the ether and soul are: a state
which does not pervade (is limited), and a state which has only momen-
tary duration. (A state which does not pervade is such as is produced
only in one part, and is not present in another. And a thing has
momentary duration, if in the third moment after its production it is
28. Earth, water and light, have the properties of colour, fluidity and perceptibility by the senses; earth and water have gravity and taste; the fluidity of earth and light is a derived one.

29. The soul and the elements have special (contrary) qualities; that which is considered the property of the one, is the opposite of the others.

30. The qualities of the air are touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, velocity and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and velocity are assigned to light.

31. Water is the site of 14 qualities, i.e. of the eight, before mentioned, and further of velocity, gravity, fluidity, colour, savour and viscosity.

32, 33. Earth has the same qualities, with the exception of viscosity, and the addition of smell. The 14 qualities of the soul are intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, number, quantity, severality, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit. The qualities of time and place are number, quantity, severality, conjunction and disjunction. The same qualities together with sound belong to the ether.

34. Those five qualities, together with intellect, desire and volition are cited in God, the same five qualities, with priority and posteriority and velocity, in the mind.

destroyed.) The special quality of the ether is sound, which does not pervade: for it is produced in a small part only of the ether, and not found in a different portion. It has only momentary duration; this means, it is destroyed in the third moment, after it has commenced to exist. Because the respective special qualities of pervading substances are destroyed by the same qualities which are afterwards produced, therefore the first sound is destroyed by the second. The same is the case with knowledge, &c, for knowledge is produced in the soul, which is a pervading substance, within the limited space of the body, and it is absent in any other part of space, for instance in the part belonging to a jar. In the same manner knowledge continues only for two moments, and pervading substances are therefore those whose special
35. The earth is the cause of smell (the intimate cause), and the site of the various colours. Savour is of six kinds (sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid and saline), smell two-fold (fragrance and stench).

36, 37. It has three kinds of feel, hot, cold and temperate. It is two-fold* eternal and non-eternal; eternal as considered in its atoms, non-eternal as being composed of parts; this latter is threefold, organism, organ and object (inorganic matter).

38. Organisms are viviparous, oviparous, engendered in filth and vegetative; organ is the sense of smell; objects are all compound substances from the smallest, of two atoms, to the largest, Brahma's egg.

qualities are: existence that does not pervade, and momentary duration. The special qualities of earth, &c., are: existence which does pervade, and continuance for a longer time.

19. Comm.—Earth is two-fold, eternal and non-eternal, eternal in its atoms,* non-eternal, if different from atoms, viz. if consisting of two, three, &c. atoms. Earth, if non-eternal, is composed of parts.

If it is said: 'What evidence is there, that earth is composed of parts; (viz. a part being already a compound of two, three, &c. atoms) for you obtain the same notion, if any earthly substance, as a jar, is thought to be composed of the totality of the single atoms. Under this supposition you need not fear, that the invisibility of each single atom implies the invisibility of a jar, &c., which consists of atoms; because, although each single atom is invisible, yet the totality of them is visible, as from a certain distance the hairs of the head together are visible, although none of them alone is visible. Moreover we arrive at the idea for instance of one extended great jar, as we arrive at the idea of one great heap of rice.'

We reply: If one atom is no object of the senses, a totality of atoms is also beyond the perception of the senses. As to your example,

अत्यन्त रससंपन्नम् ॥ ३. । काय सूतः।
तत् विभयोपादेकः म। ॥ ४. ।

An atom is, what exists has no cause, and is without commencement and end; an atom is contrary to what has a measure (तत् प्रसन्नचारी चतुर्विषेधः ॥)
39. Water has white colour; its taste, and feel, are sweet and cold; it has also viscidity, and its fluidity is innate.

40. As to its eternity and non-eternity the same holds good as before; its organisms are not born. Its organ is the tongue; its objects are the sea, snow and similar substances.

41. Light is hot to the feel, its colour white, its fluidity not innate, but an effect from some cause; eternity and non-eternity are attributed to it in the same way as to the earth.

42, 43. Organ is the eye, objects are fire, gold, &c. The feel in the air is considered as natural; it is temperate, neither hot nor cold; its motion is crooked; its qualities are touch, &c.

we maintain, that a hair, although at a distance, is not beyond the perception of the senses, because it will be perceived, if brought nearer. Nor can you say, that from a totality of invisible atoms a totality of visible atoms is produced, on the ground, that it is not contradicted by perception; for visible things are not produced from invisible things; otherwise heat of the eye for instance would one or the other time become visible. If you say, that a quantity of invisible heat, contained for instance in very heated oil, may produce a visible burning, we object; for the visible burning arises from the visible parts, contained therein.

You can also not maintain, that from the invisible compound of two atoms the production of a compound of three atoms (which is visible) is impossible; for we do not say, that the visibility or invisibility of a thing arises from its own nature but from its necessary causes, as greatness, manifest form, &c. A compound of three atoms for instance is visible on account of its greatness, but not a compound of two atoms, as it has no greatness. This, however, is according to your view, impossible, because there is no greatness in an atom.—As in this manner it is proved, that earthly substances as a jar, are composed of parts (a part, as above already reminded, is a compound of at least two atoms) so it is clear, that they are not eternal, in consequence of their production and destruction. And there is no difference between the mountain Meru, and a mustard seed, because in either there is the same composition of parts after parts. Therefore it is necessary, that there should
Eternity and non-eternity are assigned to it as before to the other elements. Its organ is the skin, which extends over the whole body; objects are all substances, intermediate between the vital air and the great element.

44, 45. The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound, organ is the ear. Though one, it has many titles. Time is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the support of the worlds; it is the cause of the knowledge of be somewhere an end (in the division of parts). To say; that the point, where the end is obtained, is not eternal, would be to admit the production of an effect from a thing which is not in the connection of intimate relation. Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one great thing to another still greater, finds its end in the assumption of the sky and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cessation of the progress from a small to a smaller thing. Thus the necessity of atoms is proved. There is certainly no end of the division, if one has arrived at the compound of three atoms, because a compound of three atoms as an object of the eye, has parts like a jar, &c.; for from the argument, that the parts of a compound of three atoms have parts on account of its size, like the half of a jar, it is evident, that such a compound has parts. Nor can you say, there is no necessity for this (for assuming parts of such a small compound as that of three atoms) because many things (atoms) are required to produce a magnitude for so small things. This, however, does not prove the necessity of a continuation of parts after parts, because thereby a regress is infinitum would become necessary.

20. *Comm.*—Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This is proved by the perception of the "now." If for instance the perception: here is now a jar, is given, there exists a union between the motion of the sun and the jar. This is not conjunction (vide p. 7) or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more things,) but it is a relation of a different kind, which is produced by time.—That time is to be thought under the notion of a substrate, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-general) cause of the perception of priority
priority and posteriority; though one it has many names as that of moment, &c.

46. Space is the cause of the notions of distance and proximity; it is one and eternal.

47. Though one, it obtains various designations, as east, west, from the division of its attribute. The soul is governing the and posteriority. Or if both definitions are combined: Time is the substrate of the special union, which is the non-intimate cause of priority and posteriority.

21. Comm.—Although one, it has many names, viz. moment, hour, day, &c., past, future and present time. Past is the time, whose destruction is present, as yesterday; future is the time, whose future existence is present, as to-morrow, and present is the time, whose future existence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future moment, be another moment, because there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be the case at the general conflagration, where also the terms of “moment,” “day,” &c. are applied.

22. Comm.—“The soul is ruling the senses and the body.”—The class of soul is the class, by which the intimate cause of happiness, and unhappiness, &c. is comprehended (or: soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness, &c. and the substantiality of the soul is proved by its being the substrate of the qualities: happiness, unhappiness, &c.) Iswara (the ruler, God) is thought under the same notion (class); but since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to him, he is not subject to happiness or unhappiness; for we do not admit the invarianleness of the rule that, that which is a consequence from the nature of a thing will necessarily exist.

Others† say: The notion (class) by which the soul is thought, is not applicable to Iswara, as there is no proof for this; yet hence it does not follow, that a tenth substance must be assumed, as the soul is dis-
senses and the body; for an organ (instrument) must possess its agent.

48. There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by its disappearance after death. If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed.

tinguished from the other substances by the idea: to be subject of knowledge. "Is governing the senses," &c., because it successively produces the conscience of the sense end of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: I know, I am happy, &c., yet it cannot at first be proved against one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, etc. To prove this, the text says: "for an instrument must possess its agent." As an instrument, for instance a knife, the instrument for cutting, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed.

23. To show, that the body is not the agent, it is said in the text: "There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappearance of consciousness after death." If it is maintained: "Conscience is knowledge, and this in your opinion is not present in the soul which he obtained liberation. Why should it therefore not just as well be absent in a dead body, because, if life ceases, also knowledge ceases?" We answer: this is impossible; for, if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles.

Nor can it be said, that by an impression, produced in a former body, an impression in the second body is produced, because this would oblige you to assume an infinite number of impressions.—Further, if consciousness were inherent in the body, a child could not commence to take the milk from the breast of its mother; for the cause of this action is the knowledge of what accomplishes the desire, and at that time there does not exist the recollection of any means, accomplishing the desire. According to my opinion the commencement of the action takes then place by the recollection of the causes of the desires, experienced in a former birth. Nor can it be objected: "Well, if this be true, let any body
49. The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then knowledge and other internal qualities would remain imperceptible.

recollect any thing else, experienced in a former birth, for there is nothing which calls it into recollection. In this instance there is no other means but to admit of fate for the individual soul. If this is the case, the body is without commencement, and also the soul. Hence the eternity of the soul also follows; for what is without beginning, cannot be destroyed.

Well, let us then transfer to the eyes and the other senses the notion of cause and agent with regard to knowledge, for otherwise no cause is possible. The answer is: "If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed." If the eyes and other senses were destroyed, how could, by the absence of the eye, recollection remain, as the subject which perceives exists no more, and as it is quite unreasonable, that the same thing should be seen by one, and recollected by another sense, because perception and recollection must depend on the same subject, as being cause and effect.

21. Comm. Let then consciousness not belong to the senses (external) but be maintained for the eternal mind. The answer of the text is: "The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then knowledge and other internal qualities would remain imperceptible;" for as the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if knowledge, happiness, &c. were placed in the eternal mind. How mind is an atom, will afterwards be explained.

If it is said, (by the Vedantists) : "The soul is knowledge; for its consciousness is proved by its self-manifestation; but knowledge of this or that object, happiness, &c. are special forms of it. And because this (special form) has only the existence of a production (रिति, I translated जन्मार्था) its duration is momentary. Further, since the preceding knowledge is the cause of the consequent knowledge, and the former again the effect of a preceding, there is even in deep sleep an uninterrupted chain of knowledge down to the time of universal destruction, as the smell of musk remains in cloth. And by the communication of the impressions, produced by prior and prior acts of
knowledge, with posterior and posterior acts of knowledge, recollection and similar acts are possible.

We deny this; for if the object of recollection is the world, omniscience would be obtained (because knowledge is a product of self manifestation); and if the object is something, there is no proof for the second member of the alternative; for hence would also follow, that in sound sleep knowledge were manifesting its object.

And if you say, 'that in this state (in the state of sound sleep) knowledge remains, but without form,' we object also; for you cannot prove, that knowledge manifests itself, as otherwise such things as a jar, &c. would also be possessed with knowledge.

Nor can you say, 'that this would answer your purpose;' for it is impossible to reject the perception of a jar and similar things.

If you maintain, 'that this is a special form of knowledge,' we would ask, what is 'that form? Is it distinguished from knowledge, we agree with the assumption of something different from knowledge. Is it not distinguished from knowledge, then in accordance with the general notion of knowledge, a jar of blue colour would be the same with one of yellow colour, because by its own nature there is no distinction of knowledge.

If you pretend, 'that any special property of knowledge, as yellow and blue colour, &c. must be abandoned,' we object, because the contrary notions of blue, yellow, &c. cannot be predicated of one and the same thing; otherwise it would be difficult to connect any meaning with contrary ideas.

Nor is there any communication of desires, because the communication of desires even between son and mother is impossible.

You can also not say, 'that there is a rule for things, that are the causes, and others that are the effects of communication,' because there is no communication of desires.

And if you define 'communication' to be the production in something else, there is again a contradiction; for there is no producer.

If you contend, 'that it is produced by another knowledge,' you must admit another knowledge of the same kind, and so on in infinitum.

If you think, 'there is but little contradiction in a momentary knowledge,' you cannot prove such a knowledge, and your assumption is complicated.
For the same reason consciousness in bodies of momentary duration is rejected, because it has the fault of complication and cannot be demonstrated; in the same manner the production of the fruit from the seed and from collateral causes is evident, so that there is no need of assuming a special form of making, &c.

Let the assumption of a momentary knowledge be complicated, yet you must grant, that the soul is eternal knowledge, which cannot be destroyed; for the Sruti says: Lo, this is the soul, true knowledge, the infinite Brahma.

We object also to this, because such a knowledge is evidently without object, and because it cannot be proved, that knowledge has no object; in this case it would not have even itself as an object.

Therefore, it has been proved, that the soul is different from knowledge, and that it is eternal.

True knowledge, that is the supreme Brahma, is not found in individual souls, because they are clearly distinguished from it by knowledge and ignorance, happiness and unhappiness and similar qualities, and in consequence the difference of Iswara is established. Otherwise servitude and liberation were names without meaning.

If it be objected: 'The same text of the Veda, which explains the difference of Iswara, brings also forward his identity by his indifference; for it says: "Let us strive for the state of indifference, therefore all is placed upon the soul,"' and also: "In the state of liberation ignorance is annihilated."

We deny this, because, the difference being eternal (constant) its annihilation is impossible. Admitted even, that the difference is destroyed, a dualism is for this very reason established, and it cannot be said, that duality is destroyed. And as it is well said, that to Brahma in his state without qualities, and therefore without the quality of existence, existence is yet attributed, so it is also well said, that although there is no duality, still there are two possessed of duality.

If you say, 'that the absence of unreality which is the place of identity, is there meant with existence,' we say likewise, that the absence of identity which is the state of two possessed of duality, is meant with duality.

Although every unit is comprehended by the notion of unity, still one is not both, as it is said: smell is no attribute of earth and water,
which is clear to every body. As regards the passage of the Sruti, establishing the indifference at that time (the time of liberation), it establishes in fact an equality by the removal of unhappiness, &c., as it may be said, that this Purusha by great prosperity has become a King. In this sense it is said in the Sruti: "He who is without sin, obtains the supreme state," meaning equality.

God is not the soul which is knowledge and happiness, but the substrate of knowledge. In such a sentence as: "Brahma is eternal knowledge and happiness," the term "knowledge" means the substrate of knowledge, by the authority of a passage like this: "He who knows all, is omniscient;" hence happiness means also a person who is happy. . . . .

Hence is also the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya refuted, which is as follows.* Nature, (Prakriti) is the agent; the soul (Purusha) remains

* To understand more clearly the argument of the Nyāya against the Sāṅkhya, I shall briefly state the principles of this doctrine. According to the Sāṅkhya there are two kinds of substances which are the substrates of all phenomena, nature and soul. Nature (Prakriti) is one and undistinct in its original state, which is incomprehensible to the senses. As such it is Māla Prakriti, nature as the root of all things. It is productive, and in its productions various. Nature in its state as production is Vikriti, changed, or derived nature. The first production is intellect (Buddhi) or the great one, Mahāt, which as a production of nature has no consciousness.—The soul (Purusha) is manifold, or there are many souls. The soul, as contrary to nature, is not active, but it is conscious. Accordingly it has no activity in the production of ideas, which are given to the soul by intellect, and the opinion, as if the soul were an agent, is a mere delusion.

The following quotation from Prof. Wilson’s Sāṅkhya Kārika will still more elucidate the subject (p. 16).

... III.—Nature, the root (of all) is no production. Seven principles, the great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

Bhāṣya. Māla (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradhāna (chief) from its being the root of seven principles, which are productions and productive; such nature is the root. "No production." It is not produced from another... "Seven principles;" —Mahāt and the rest, from its being the great (mahāt) element; this is intellect (Buddhi).

The seven principles are 1. intellect; 2. egoism 3—7. the five subtle rudiments. These seven are productions and productive, in this manner. Intellect is produced from the chief one (nature) that again produces egoism, whence it is productive (prakriti). Egoism as derived from intellect, is a production; but as it gives origin to the five subtle elements, it is productive. The subtle rudiment
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

without stain (that is untouched, neither active nor suffering) as a lotus-leaf by water; but it is conscious. It is without causality, because there is no difference between cause and effect (cause and effect are identical) and hence with the destruction of the effect, that which is like the effect, would also be destroyed. This idea (that the soul is conscious) is necessary, because the perception of consciousness which is found in intellect, would be otherwise impossible. Intellect is a modification of nature. Intellect is also called greatness and the internal organ. Under the condition, that it (intellect) exists or not exists, the soul is subject to transmigration or liberation. Its modification has the form of knowledge through the channel of the senses. If it (this modification of knowledge) is in connection with external things, as with a jar, &c., the perception of agency takes place in the soul, and the perception of consciousness in the intellect, on the ground, that the difference is perceived. For instance if it is said: ́By me this is to be performed; ́ the first member of the sentence, ́by me, ́ means the perception of the soul, which is without reality, because it is the reflection of consciousness (in the intellect) by the clearness of the intellect, as the reflection of the face in a looking-glass (is without reality by the clearness of the looking-glass). The second member: ́this ́ means the perception of the object, which by its being modified through the channel of the senses, has reality (truth) as the unclarity, produced by breathing upon a looking-glass. The third member: ́Is to be performed ́ refers to the performance of business. Hence is intellect possessed of three parts. The connection of the soul (Pūrṇāna) with knowledge, which is a modification of intellect, is called untrue, as is the percep-

of sound is derived from egotism, and is therefore a production, but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtle element of such as generated from egotism, is a production, as giving origin to air; it is productive. The subtle rudiment of smell is derived from egotism and therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and as therefore productive. The subtle rudiment of form as a production from egotism; as generating light, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of flavour, as derived from egotism, is a production; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the great principle and the rest are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the seventeenth, and the five elements, these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term viśāra being the same as viśāra. Soul is neither a production nor productive.
The site of merit and demerit is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities.

... of the face in an unclear looking-glass. What has been said about knowledge, &c., is also true with regard to happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, endeavour, merit and demerit, because they are evidently identical as being effects of intellect; but intellect is not possessed of consciousness, because it is a modification.

This doctrine of the Sâṅkhya is refuted on the ground, that consciousness is dependent on the same substrate, as action, fate and enjoyment, because there is no proof, that there is another substrate, different from this.

If you say, 'that from such a sentence as: I, who am conscious, am acting, an error of the part of consciousness is possible in consequence of the modification of intellect,' we reply by asking, whether this is not also possible on the part of the agent. Otherwise, if intellect is eternal, there is no liberation, or, if it is not eternal, there is no transmigration.

If you further contend, 'there is no consciousness of intellect, because it is an effect of unconscious nature, as effect and cause are identical,' we protest, because this has not been shown; there being no proof, that the agent is a production; for from the text, that it is without passion, that it has no birth, it follows, that it is without beginning, and as such it is also without end, as it is unreasonable, that it should be destroyed. Of what use is therefore the assumption of nature (Prakriti) and similar notions?

Nor can you say, 'that our opinion does not agree with the passage of the Bhagavadgita saying: "by the qualities of nature are everywhere actions done; the soul, blinded by pride, fancies: I am the agent;"' for its real meaning is: "by "nature's," fate's, "qualities," the qualities, produced by fate, viz. by desire, etc., I am agent. If this is the case, the intention of the Bhagavadgita is attained by the words: He, who believes the soul to be the sole agent, is liberated.

25.—"The site," &c., viz. the soul is the site. If the body were the site of them (merit and demerit, &c.), the consequences of the works, done in a former body, could not be experienced by a later body.

26.—"It is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities." The soul becomes perceptible by its being united with its respective special qualities, and not in another way by such an observation: I know, I do."
50. It can be deduced from activity and similar phenomena, as the charioteer from the motion of the carriage. It is the site (substrate) of egoity, and perceptible only through the mind.

51. It is pervading, and the site of intellect and other qualities. Intellect is two-fold, apprehension and remembrace. Apprehension includes four sorts, viz.

52. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge. Perception comprehends six kinds, in accordance with the six organs of perception.

53. The object of the nose is smell and the notion of

27.—Comm. "It can be deduced from activity, &c." That the soul is in another body, is inferred from activity, etc. Activity means here exertion. As it has been mentioned before, that knowledge, desire, endeavour, &c. do not exist in the body, and further as exertion implies endeavour, it follows that there is a soul which has endeavour, on the ground that there is exertion.

28.—Comm. Perception is the knowledge (apprehension) which is produced by the senses, and the cause of evidence from perception are the senses. Inference is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition (Vāpyti) and inferential proof is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition, which is the cause of the conclusion. Comparison is the knowledge, produced by similarity, and proof by comparison is the knowledge of similarity, which is the cause of comparison. Verbal knowledge is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of words, and proof by verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words, which is the cause of the former.

29.—&c., means the notion of good and bad smell.

* Similarly says Kanāda: राजसधान्यान्यायास्मीतज्ञे बुधिः स्वरुपमन्तः।

**" विद्यार्थियां समाजास्त्रान्याय्यां श्रेष्ठमाणिकाराणि।** Sūtr. 4th Adh. The vital airs, which go upwards and downwards, the closing and opening of the eyes, life, the actions of the mind, and the modifications of the other senses, happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, and endeavour are proofs of the soul.
smell, etc. Thus the object of the tongue is savour, and sound that of the ear.

54-55. Object of the eye is proportionate form. Substances of such kind (of perceptible greatness) individuality, number, conjunction and disjunction, priority, posteriority, viscosity, fluidity, quantity, action, class, and the relations which are appropriate to the respective objects are perceived by the eye through the contact of light with proportionate form.

56. Substances, perceptible of touch, are objects of the skin; the objects of the eye, with the exception of colour, are also objects of the skin.

57. In the perception of substances is the union of the skin with the mind the cause of knowledge. Through the mind are perceptible: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and volition.

58. A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses. Proportionate greatness is the cause as regards the perception of the six classes; organs (instruments) are the different senses.

30.—Further, sweetness, &c.

31.—Sound, articulate and non-articulate, &c.

32.—Proportionate means fit to be perceived. The same proportionate greatness must be admitted also with regard to the objects of the other senses.

33.—Comm. "A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses." If (for a man who has not the knowledge of a jar) the contact of the eye etc. (with the jar) has taken place, the determined knowledge: This is a jar, viz. determined by the general notion (class) of a jar, does not exist, because there was not before the knowledge of that, which is determining, viz. the general knowledge of a jar, &c.; for the cause of a determined knowledge is another which is determining. For instance at first is produced a knowledge, not determined by the two parts,—that which is to be determined, and that which is determining,—as a jar and the general notion (class) of the jar. Such a knowledge is without determination, and no object of perception; for from perception it is evident that I know
59. The connexion of the senses with their objects is called intercourse; this is also six-fold. 1. The perception of things takes place by contact.

60. 2. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the things, by intimate relation with that which is in contact.

61. 3. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the last mentioned relation, (viz. intimate relation with that which is in contact,) by the corresponding intimate relation, (intimate relation of that which is intimately related with that which is in contact.) 4. The perception of sound, by intimate relation.

5. The perception of what is intimately related with sound, by the intimate union with that which is intimately related, and 6. The perception of every negation by particularity.*

62. If it takes place, it is perceived, at the place where it happens to be. Intimate relation is perceived by particularity.

63. Transcendent intercourse" is three-fold according to its division into intercourse whose character is general," or the jar. In this perception is knowledge the determination of the soul, the jar that of knowledge, and the general notion of jar the determination of the jar. The determination which is in the determination, is called the general notion of determination. The knowledge containing the general notion of determination, is the cause of the knowledge determined by determination. For instance in the knowledge without determination of a jar is the general notion of a jar not determining. Therefore when there is an undetermined knowledge of a jar there is not such a knowledge, as: I know the jar under the general notion of the jar, (that is to say, not such a determined knowledge, by which the soul is determined by knowledge, knowledge by the jar, and the jar by the general notion of the jar.)

34.—Comm. "Transcendent intercourse." Perception is two-fold, common and transcendent. The intercourse of common perception is of six kinds, which have just been explained. The intercourse of transcendent perception is three-fold.

35.—Comm. If in this definition the term "character" denotes its

* See note to v. 11.
whose character is knowledge, or which is produced by Yoga.

nature (its identity with itself) the meaning is, that the intercourse is of a general nature, and this must be understood as the determination of a determinable knowledge which is in connection with any of the senses. For instance, let smoke be in contact with the eye. Here is smoke the determinable knowledge, and the general notion (class) of smoke, which (general notion) forms the intercourse, is a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever. If it is then said, that such a knowledge is in contact with a sense, the consequence would be, that, if a cloud of dust by mistake were apprehended under the notion of smoke, there could not arise a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever, as in this case with the general notion (class) of smoke no connection of the senses could take place. According to my (the author’s) opinion, however, the cloud of dust is in contact with the eye; the knowledge to be determined is smoke, and the general notion of smoke, which is here the determination, the intercourse. Its contact with the sense is the common one, which takes place on the part of the external sense. On the part of the mind, however, the intercourse is merely general, and determining the knowledge. Hence if by words any kind of perception of a Pisícha,* &c. has been obtained, the apprehension of all Pisíchas is produced.

The term “general” means here rather the state of similar things, and this is sometimes constant, as the general notion of smoke, &c. sometimes not constant, as a jar, &c. For instance a jar is perceived either in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with its half. Hence arises afterwards the knowledge of all such things, as a jar, either in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with their halves. This must be so understood, that the intercourse of similar things (of things included in the same notion) depends on the same relation, under which the generality itself is comprehended. On the other hand where after the destruction of this jar, &c. a recollection arises of a thing like this jar, there could not, by the intercourse of a general character, take place the perception of all things like this jar, because the generality would at that time be not present. Moreover, suppose the knowledge of a jar to be determined by the contact with any sense. Here does not exist even the next day a contact with the eye, yet there arises a knowledge of similar things, because there is a generality which

* A kind of goblins.
64. The intercourse of things, comprehended in a notion, is called general knowledge. It is required a thing which manifests this or that property produced by this or that sense."

65. The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse, whose character is knowledge".—The intercourse, produced by Yoga, is of two kinds, determines the knowledge of similar things. Therefore the "knowledge" of "generality" is the intercourse, and not "generality." With this view it is said in the text:

36.—Comm. Intercourse, "whose character is general." The term "character" means object, and the sense is: intercourse is a knowledge whose object is general.

"But where without the contact of the eye, &c. the knowledge of the common state of similar things (generality) exists, should there not be a perception through the eye of all jars, &c. ?

37.—Comm. To remove this objection, the text says: "It is required something which manifest this or that property, produced by this or that sense."

The meaning of this is: When by an external sense through an intercourse of a general character knowledge is to be produced, there is required an object of knowledge, to be produced by one or the other sense, of this or the other generality, with reference to a thing whose generality it is. This object is the contact (or a similar relation) of the light, further the contact of the eye, &c. Hence such a knowledge is not produced by the eye for instance, when it is dark.

But if the intercourse whose character is knowledge, is an intercourse, whose nature is knowledge, and if the intercourse whose character is general, is defined in the same way, what difference then is between them?

38.—Comm. To show this, it is said in the text: "The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse whose character is knowledge."

Namely an intercourse whose character is general, produces a knowledge of the things upon which it depends; but an intercourse whose character is knowledge, is intercourse of the knowledge with that object to which it refers, (which is comprehended by it.) The mea-
that which belongs to the Yogi who is perfect, and that which belongs to the Yogi, who strives after perfection.  

66. The intercourse of the former is a constant manifestation, that of the latter takes place by the assistance of meditation.  

The intercourse, as regards inference, is consideration, the (instrumental) cause the knowledge of a subject, invariably con-

ing of this is: A perception does not become manifest without intercourse. First without an intercourse whose character is general, how could there exist by the mere notion (class) of smoke and fire, an apprehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever? For this reason an intercourse whose character is general, is necessary. The objection, 'that it does not matter, whether there is an apprehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever,' is not valid; for with the visible smoke the connection of fire is indeed perceived, but no other kind of smoke is included therein, and therefore a doubt, whether smoke is invariably connected with fire or not, could in this case not arise. According to my opinion, however, the doubt, whether smoke, in whatever place or time, is to be predicated of fire or not, takes place through the intercourse of general character, by which every smoke whatsoever is comprehended.  

The objection, 'that on the supposition of an intercourse of general character man would be omniscient, because in the notion of all objects of knowledge every single object of knowledge is included,' is also untenable; for although all objects of knowledge may be known by this notion, yet, there is no omniscience, because the differences of all objects are not known.  

Secondly, if no intercourse whose character is knowledge, were assumed, how could there be in the knowledge: 'sandalwood is fragrant,' also the perception of a thing, which is fragrant? Be knowledge of fragrant things granted through the intercourse whose character is general, but the notion of fragrancy is only possible by an intercourse whose character is knowledge. 

39.—Comm. 'Intercourse, produced by Yoga,' that is, a special virtue, produced by the practice of Yoga, (the union of the soul with God by means of abstract contemplation,) in accordance with the evidence of the Sruti, the Purānas and other authorities.
nected with a predicate in a general proposition. (The knowledge of the Vyāpti.)

67. The reason which is actually known, is not the cause; in this case, there would be no inference, if the reason had for instance not yet arrived, or had been destroyed.

68. Consideration is the knowledge that a subject in its invariable connection with a predicate is united with the place of conclusion (Paksha, subject of the conclusion).

The invariable connection of a subject with a predicate in a general proposition (Vyāpti) is called the non-connexion of the reason (middle term) with any thing different from the subject of the conclusion, (Paksha, minor term.)

40.—Comm. Manifestation means the perception of all things, meditation is the thinking of the mind, which is separated from all objects.

41.—Comm. “The intercourse as regards inference is consideration.”

The special cause (instrumental cause) of an inference is the knowledge of the invariable connection of the subject with the predicate in a general proposition, (वाळ्पिहान,*) and consideration is the intercourse. For instance, let a man who from the smoke on a hearth, etc. has become aware of the invariable connection of smoke with fire, see afterwards any where on a mountain an uninterrupted line of smoke. He will then re-

* वाळ्पिहान (Vyāpti). It is difficult to find an adequate word for this term in English. It means literally, pervading inference, the inherent and essential presence of any one thing or property in another, (see Wilson’s Dict.) but it is used in the Nyāya and other philosophical systems to denote the logical relation of one notion to another in a proposition of such a kind, that under circumstances an inference may be drawn from it; or: it is the relation of the subject to the predicate, and vice versa, as the major proposition of a syllogism. The subject of such a proposition is the वाण्य: the notion, which is pervaded by another (by the predicate) that is to say, which is only a part of the predicate, which is less extensive than the latter, or included in it. The subject is therefore invariably connected with the predicate, and if the former is thought, also the latter is thought. The predicate is the वाण्यक; the pervading notion; it has a greater extent than the subject, and the latter is only a part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, and if the predicate is thought, the subject is not necessarily thought with it. The Vyāpti is, accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to be connected together, on either part is understood. * Further, the Vyāpti is a proposition,
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60. Or the perception of the identity of the reason with the conclusion (predicate of) which is not connected with anything incompatible with the subject of the conclusion. Subject (of conclusion; minor term,) is the certainty of the conclusion where the intention to conclude is not absent.

collect the general proposition, according to which smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence arises the knowledge, this (mountain) is possessed with smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This (the knowledge, that any subject is connected by the middle term with a general predicate, or the knowledge of the two premises) is consideration. Hence arises the knowledge, this mountain is fiery, which is an inference. The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived, together with the notion, that it is invariably connected with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. This is denied, in the text; for if the reason (कर्त्त, sign) were the special cause of the conclusion, then inference could not take place, if the reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed, because then the reason, the pretended special cause of a conclusion, were not present.

which an inference can be derived, that is to say, it must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a syllogism. The names of Vyāpya, Vyāpaka are only used with reference to the general proposition; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, viz., the Vyāpya (middle term) the name of विद्युः, reason, argument, or कर्त्त, sign, and the Vyāpaka (major term) the name of विद्या, conclusion, predicate of the conclusion. The minor term (the subject of the conclusion) is called विद्या: place (minor term, subject of the conclusion), viz. the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major term, or predicate of the conclusion. —If these names in their literal acceptation appear at first curious to a European student and totally deviating from those, used in the logical terminology of the West, it must be borne in mind, that their literal sense does not in the least affect their value as logical terms, and also, that the European names for the same notions are equally figurative, and the names for instance of subordination, co-ordination, subject, predicate, conclusion, &c., but very imperfectly express the logical relation to which they refer. In fact most of these relations are in all languages taken from relations of space, as almost all terms which are of an abstract nature. As the literal translation of Vyāpī, Vyāpya, &c. might easily lead to false views, I have preferred to give their equivalents in the terminology accepted in Europe.
70.—From the knowledge, that with such a place the reason (middle term) is connected, inference is the consequence.

42.—Comm. "Consideration is the knowledge, that a subject in a general proposition (the reason, the middle term) is united with the subject of conclusion," (terminus minor.)

The knowledge of the determination of the reason (middle term) which is determined by a general predicate, (major term) in connection with the place (minor term) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be comprehended in a double manner, either, it is the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (the middle term) is connected with the place (subject of conclusion, minor term) or, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of conclusion) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term.) Accordingly the conclusion takes place either from the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (middle term) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from which follows that the conclusion (predicate of the conclusion, major term) is connected with the place, (minor term,) or it takes place from the knowledge, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term) from which follows, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the conclusion (major term.)

Some think: 'Also from a two-fold consideration ensues the inference, that the place, (subject) is possessed of the conclusion (predicate of.) There is (according to them) no necessity for the knowledge, that the mountain is possessed with smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. First there is the perception, that the mountain smokes; further the recollection arises, that smoke is the subject, with which fire is invariably connected. In this case inference evidently takes place from those two acts of knowledge. A knowledge of something (of the Paksha, the minor term) determined by a notion, which is again determined by the predicate (by a notion, determined by the Vyápti,) can never be the cause, but there takes place the cause by the knowledge, that the place is determined by the general notion of the subject (middle term, for instance a mountain determined by the general notion of smoke) because this is necessary, and because the assumption of a knowledge, determined by what is determined (by the general proposition, by the Vyápti), has the fault of complication.'
71.—There are five semblances of a reason, which are called going astray, contradiction, inconclusiveness, equalization and absurdity.

72.—The fault of going astray is again three-fold, that which is too general, that which is not general enough and non-exclusive.

We deny this; for even if there is no knowledge of the general notion (the class) of the middle term (vyāpya, for instance the general notion of fire) the inference takes place from the knowledge, that there is a subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by something (middle term) with which fire—for instance is invariably connected. And this assumption is also more simple; for the cause takes place by the knowledge, that there is a determination of the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by the predicate of the general proposition (determined by the Vyāpti).

Moreover according to your opinion from the knowledge: “The mountain is smoking,” the inference (the mountain is fiery) should follow, because there is a knowledge, that the subject of the conclusion (Paksha) is determined by the general notion (class) of smoke, which in this case is the general notion (class) of the middle term (vyāpya) but this of course will not be granted by any one.

And if you further say, the cause is the knowledge that the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) is determined by the general notion of the middle term (vyāpya) when perceived together with the predicate of the general proposition (Vyāpti) the consequence would be, that an inference would ensue, if Chaitra perceived a subject as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition, and Maitra the general notion (attribute, class) in connexion with the subject (of conclusion).

If you lastly assume, that the perception of the place, determined by a general notion, by A, in conjunction with the perception of the middle term in its invariable connexion with the major term (the middle term, determined by the Vyāpti) by the same A, is the cause of the conclusion, made by this A, there would appear an infinite series of causes for the same effect.

According to my opinion, the knowledge of the attribute (middle
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73.—It is too general, if applied to the subject (of conclusion) and to an opposite one, not general enough, if excluded from either.

term) of the subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate (major term) with which it is invariably connected, takes place through intimate relation, and produces the conclusion by the same relation. In this case an infinite series of causes is avoided. On the contrary, if it is said, that the knowledge of the middle term as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition (with the major term, as the Vyāpti) and also the knowledge of the general notion (attribute, middle term) of the subject (of conclusion, minor term, Paksha) are causes, independent of each other, there would be a two-fold state of the cause of the same effect, and a conclusion would follow from the sentences: “There is smoke, which is invariably connected with fire,” and: “The mountain is fiery.” If this is correct, we may say, that if there is a double knowledge, there must be also a determined knowledge, and here at the end of the discussion, where its result is given, a complication is no fault.

(This is on the whole an excellent exposition of the logical relation of the cause of the conclusion. It is here lucidly explained, in what manner the three notions of a syllogism are in relation to each other, and also, that the cause of the conclusion is not the middle term, as separated from the major term, but only in its connexion with it. As this is sometimes not attended to, it is not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the same time it is true, that the logical form of a syllogism does not consist of one premise, and the conclusion, but of two premises with the conclusion; for if one reflects as to the form, given by our author, viz. the minor term in connexion with the middle term, which is itself determined by the major term, it is evident, that there are two connexions, viz. of the minor term, with the middle, and of this with the major. That is to say, there are two propositions or two premises.)

43.—Comm.—Too general is a reason, which abides as well in the subject of the conclusion as in an opposite one. (Subject of the conclusion is, where the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountain or a hearth is the subject or the minor, ...
74.—Non-exclusive," when no other subject (of the conclu-
&c. A subject, opposite to the conclusion, is where it does not abide,
for instance, in the example above given, a tank is a subject, opposite
to the major term.)

That is to say, the reason is too general, when it abides also in a
subject, where the major term is not found. For instance, let a hearth
be the subject (minor term), smoke the major term, and fire the reason,
the conclusion would be: the hearth smokes, because it is fiery, which
would be false, because the reason is too general; for fire (the reason)
is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for
instance, with an iron Jill.

(We would not acknowledge this as a logical fallacy, which takes
place, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises, but as
a fallacy extra ditionem, where the matter of the premises is wrong;
for the conclusion follows here from the premises. In this instance
the major proposition is wrong, which is: where there is fire there is
smoke. The conclusion, however, is quite right as well in form as in
matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The
fault would, however, be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been
<taken for the minor term.>

As the Nyâya knows only the two first figures of syllogism, and of them
only the two moods Barbara and Camestres,* we may say, that the fal-
lacy has arisen by the major proposition being special instead of general.)

41.—Comm.—Non-general is the reason, which has no similar sub-
jects of conclusion for the major term† (that is where the major term
has only one subject, or where no similar instances can be adduced
for the reason.) (Thus says the commentary in explanation of the text.

* In Barbara, it is hardly necessary to say, there are all three propositions general
affirmatives, in Camestres the first a general affirmative, the second a general nega-
tive and the third a general negative.
† This is much more clearly stated in the Tarka Sangraha. I quote the passage
in Dr. Ballentine's translation (Lectures on the Nyâya philosophy, p. 41.) "The
pretended reason, which applies neither to similar instances nor dissimilar ones,
is one devoid of community." As, when one says: "Sound is eternal, for it has
the nature of sound." Now the nature of sound resides in sound alone, and is no-
thing else, whether eternal or uneternal.
mission) is possible. A reason, which does not abide in the subject (of conclusion) is called contradictory."

75.—Three kinds of inconclusiveness are enumerated, viz.

The latter, however, is here much clearer than the former, because the question is not, whether the major is immediately found in the minor, but whether it is found there by the means of another term; in the first case there would be no necessity for an argument. The example given in the commentary is: Sound is not eternal, because belonging to the class of sound. Here is, according to it, no similar instance, in which the reason (the class of sound) and by it the major is found, as the class of sound abides only in sound, and nowhere else. We should reject this argument at once, as having only two terms; but the Nyāya is obliged to look out for some other appliance, because class is something different from the objects comprehended by it.

45.—Comm.—Non-exclusive, is a reason, where the major term is the negation of absolute negation (where the major term may be predicated of any other notion). Hereby a general negative is impossible, and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.

(The Bengalee translation gives the following explanation:

"A reason, for which there is only an affirmative, is non-exclusive, that is to say, a reason, whose subject does not exclude any thing, for instance all, &c. Let all be the subject, (minor term) object of proof the major, and fit to be named the reason. This argument is non-exclusive; for here cannot be given a similar instance with regard to the subject (minor term) as it can be given in the argument: "The mountain is fiery, because it smokes;" for here is a similar instance on the part of the subject a hearth, &c. According to the opinion of the modern school a non-exclusive reason takes place, where the major admits of only an affirmative (that is to say, where the major is not excluded from any other notion) for instance in the argument: "a jar is an object of proof, because it can be named.")

(We would not consider either of these conclusions faulty in form, because the middle term is properly connected with either of the extremes. A reason then goes astray; to state it briefly, if the reason is too wide, further if it does not refer to similar instances, and lastly, if it does not refer to dissimilar ones.)
conclusiveness on the part of the subject, inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason, and inconclusiveness from limitation.

76.—Where there is a jewel hill, for instance, subject of the conclusion, there is inconclusiveness on the part of the subject. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason takes place, for instance, if the substantiality of a tank be inferred from its having the quality of smoke.

77.—Inconclusiveness from limitation would take place, for

46.—Comm.—"A contradictory reason is one which does not abide in the subject of conclusion," (minor term) that is to say, a reason, whose negation is the major term (a reason which is the contrary notion of the major term). Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major, and the notion of horse the middle term. Here the reason, the notion of horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore does not admit of an inference.

(Here the fault again is not in the reasoning, but the major premise is wrong; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictum.)

47.—Comm.—1. Inconclusiveness on the part of the subject is there, where the notion of the subject (the minor term) is impossible. For instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill.

(Here also is the conclusion not wrong, the fault lies in the minor premise, where the subject is a notion, not given by experience; and the fallacy is therefore one extra dictum.)

48.—Comm.—2. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason (middle term) takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed (if the reason and the subject exclude each other). Let it for instance be argued that a tank is a thing, because it smokes. Tank (or water in the tank) and smoke are contrary notions, and smoke cannot therefore be predicated of a tank.

(Here again lies the fault in the minor premise. We observe, that the second kind of inconclusiveness does not correspond to the first. In the first the minor term was contradictory, and we should therefore have expected, that in the second the reason would have been contradictory.)
instance, if fire should be inferred from blue smoke. Equalization, 19 is called a consideration from contradictory reasons.

49.—Comm.—3. Inconclusiveness from limitation (on the part of the invariable connexion with the predicate). This can be two-fold, on the part of the subject, and on the part of the predicate.

a. First on the part of the predicate. This takes place, if the predicate is a contradictory notion. For instance if the inference were made, that the mountain has a golden fire, the notion of a golden fire (major term) is contradictory.

(Here the major premise is wrong.)

b. Secondly, on the part of the reason. (This takes place, if the reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were, the mountain is fiery from golden smoke. The fault is here again in the major premise.)

Others say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow, as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has blue smoke.

(This division of inconclusiveness is evidently faulty; for the first kind is inconclusive, because the minor term is contradictory, the second, because the middle and minor terms exclude each other. In the third kind two divisions are mixed, in the first of which, both the reason and the major term, are considered as contradictory, in the second the reason and major term are limited in their application by an addition which they ought not to have (in the example the addition of blue).

There are accordingly three different divisions confounded. The first proceeds from contradiction in each of the terms. In this would be included the first member of the author's division, and a and b of the third, by which it is complete. The second division proceeds from the contradiction of two of the terms; of this only one part has been given in the second member, viz. where the reason and the minor term exclude each other. Of the two other members of this division, the first, where the minor and major terms are contradictory, has not been touched upon, and the second, where the reason and the major term are contradictory, has been given in another place, viz. under the head of contradictory reason. The third division proceeds from limitation,
78.—Absurdity is called the error of stating a subject in which there is not the conclusion; as if, for instance, smell would be inferred to be a quality of a jar, because it was accidentally perceived at the time of its production.

79.—If a rustic first sees a Gayal (species of ox), &c. his similar knowledge of cows, &c. is the instrument to form his notion of a Gayal.

80.—The recollection of the meaning of a sentence which had been previously pronounced, is called the intercourse in the comparison. The result of comparison is the knowledge of the force of the word "Gayal" and similar expressions.

that is to say, where, instead of the notion in its whole extent, only a part of it is connected with the other two notions (in the examples blue smoke, blue fire).

50.—Comm.—"An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons."

An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the consideration of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclusion (major term) the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connected; as for instance, if at the time of consideration of water, &c. which is invariably connected with the absence of fire, there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.*

51.—Comm.—"Absurdity is, if a subject is without the conclusion," (which is assigned to it.)

Absurdity takes place, if the conclusion does not abide in the subject (minor term) for instance, if at the time of the production of a jar the jar is taken as the subject (minor term) and smell as the conclusion,

* The Tarka Sangraha (B. I. p. 12.) explains this: a counterbalanced reason is that along with which there exists another reason which establishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, "Sound is eternal, because it is audible," as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be) it might be argued with equal force on the other side, that "Sound is not eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is."
81.—The knowledge of words is the special cause. The knowledge of the meanings of words, is here the intercourse, and the result is verbal knowledge. The knowledge of the power of words assists in this act.

there is an absurdity, because at the time of production there is no smell in a jar, &c. for all things are at that time without smell.

52.—Comm.—"The knowledge of words is the special cause: the knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse and the result is verbal knowledge."

The cause of verbal knowledge is not a word, when actually heard; for though there be no word spoken, yet there may be verbal knowledge, for instance, if one who has made a vow not to speak, writes down a Sloka.

53.—Comm.—"The knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse." Intercourse is the recollection of the meanings of the words, produced by the words. Otherwise a person who had a knowledge of words, (who heard words) would have verbal knowledge, if he had obtained the meanings of words by perception or any other evidence. (That is to say, if he heard words, the meanings of which were given to him by perception, inference, etc.; for instance, if he heard the word "tree," while at the same time the meaning of it were conveyed to him by his actually seeing a tree. There would be two kinds of knowledge, independent of each other, and not verbal knowledge which is produced by words alone.) Here it must also be understood, that the effects of words are produced by special relation (अफ़ित;) otherwise the effect of the word "jar" for instance, would be the recollection of ether by intimate relation, and there would be accordingly verbal knowledge of the ether.

Special relation is of two kinds, implication (अमिशस) and power.

The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary; for unless the power of a word is previously apprehended, there cannot be verbal knowledge from recollection, which depends upon that relation (power

* A word is a sound which has a power, as for instance, the power of the sound "man" refers to an animal which has hands, feet, &c. The meaning of a word is the object to which it refers, for instance, the meaning of the word "tree" is a thing, which has a trunk, branches, leaves, &c.
of a word) although there may exist a knowledge of the words (the words may be heard). The recollection of the meaning of the knowledge of a word takes place according to the rule of the knowledge of any object which is in relation.

Power is the connexion of the meaning of a word with the same word. That by such or such a sound such or such a meaning is understood, depends upon the will of God. In names, which are at present given, there is also a power, because the rule: "Let the father on the eleventh day (after the birth of a child) give a name to the child," depends on the will of God. In a sign, however, given at present, there is no power. Such is the opinion of some, but the modern school (of the Nyāyaśākhas) maintain, that the will of God is not the power, but merely will (of man.) Hence is also power in a sign, which may be given at present.

The apprehension of power depends upon grammar, comparison, dictionary, the instruction of persons worthy of confidence, actual intercourse, the supplying of the sentence, substitution, and the connexion with well-known words.

a. The apprehension of the root, of the inceptive base, the derivative affixes, &c. of a word is produced by grammar; it does not take place, whenever there is an obstacle, as there is, if, according to the statement of the grammarians, the power of the grammatical terminations (that is of the verbs and nouns) refers to the agent. In the sentence: "Chaittra cooks" the termination in "cooks" is inseparably connected with the agent "Chaittra."

This connexion, we maintain, does in this case not arise, in consequence of its complication; but in the action (cooks) the power is produced, because this assumption is simple,* for it is manifest, that the action is a determination of Chaittra. . . .

b. The power which takes place by comparison, has been before described.

c. In the same manner power is also apprehended by the dictionary; if there is, however, any obstacle, it is not apprehended. Thus according to the dictionaries, the adjective terms of "blue," &c. have power with reference to blue colour and to a thing which has

* According to the grammarians it must be said: "Chaittra, not separated from what is determined by the action referring to cooking," while the Nyāyaśākhas say: "Chaittra, determined by the action, referring to cooking."
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blue colour; but it is more simple to say, that this term by its power refers to the quality of blue, and by implication to a thing which has blue colour.*

d. Or the power is derived from the word of a person, worthy of confidence, if for instance it is said, that the word "Pika" (a black cuckoo) is the same as "Kokila," the power of the word "Pika" is apprehe nded.

e. Or from actual intercourse. If for instance the master who is a grown up person, orders his servant who is also a grown up person, to bring the jar, and the jar is brought by the latter, a boy who attends to this, hence observes that the action of bringing a jar is connected with those words. If he further hears: "Take away the jar," "bring the cow," he understands the power of the term: "jar," &c., to be brought or to be taken away, with reference to a jar, &c. in connexion with an action.

Some say: "Under this supposition there is no verbal knowledge in the sentence: "There is a blue jar on the ground;" for the power of a jar, &c. is apprehe nded by a jar, as connected with an action, and the power of any termination of a verb refers to the understanding of an action, but in this case there is no connexion of such a kind, and therefore no verbal knowledge?"

We do not agree, because, although it is at first necessary for brevity's sake to admit a power with reference to a jar, as determined by action, it is right to omit it afterwards. . . . .

f. Or from supplying the sentence. (This takes place, if in a sentence a word has a special meaning, while from other sentences it is known, that the meaning is more general.)

g. Or from substitution. Substitution means the definition of the sense of a word by another word of the same sense; thus, if for the word belligerous "warlike" is substituted, the power refers to the word "warlike."† . . . .

h. Or from the connexion with well-known words, for instance in the sentence: "In this mango tree the Pika sweetly sings," the power of the word "Pika" is apprehe nded in this manner.

* If a word has several meanings, there is a separate power for each of them.
† In the original the examples are: "ghaṭa:" and "kalasa," either of which means a jar.
Division of the Categories

Some (the Mīmāṃsikās) maintain: 'The power of a word refers to the class (notion) and not to the individual, because in the latter case it would go astray, and require assumptions without end. And on the first supposition there is also a knowledge of the individual, because without individuals the knowledge of a class is impossible.'

We deny this, because without assuming a power, the apprehension of an individual does not take place.

Nor does implication (ellipsis) refer to an individual; for an individual may be apprehended, although there is no want of apprehension of the literal meaning of a word (an implication is dependent on the circumstance, that a word cannot be comprehended in its literal sense.)

Nor need there be any fear, that by assuming a power, referring to an individual, the fault of an infinite number of hypotheses is committed; for we assume one and the same power for all individuals.

Nor is there (by the assumption, that power refers to the individual) a want of extension; for this extension is effected by the class of cow for instance (when a cow is the individual).

Moreover, if the power is apprehended for instance in cow, possessed of power, the force refers to an individual. If on the contrary the power is apprehended for instance in the class of cow, then there would be a recollection of the meaning of a word, determined by the class of cow, and a verbal knowledge would be impossible, because the knowledge of the power by the same determination would be the cause of the recollection of the meaning of a word and of verbal knowledge. Moreover, if the power refers to the class of cow, we must declare, that the class of the class of cow is the determination of what is possessed of the power. But the class of cow, which is not in intimate relation to any thing that is not cow, is in intimate relation to all cows. Hence your assumption of a determination of the notion of any thing, possessed of power, is complicated, because this notion does not refer to individual cows; therefore in order to comprehend this or that individual, possessed of this or that class, it is necessary to assume a power, which is founded on individuals, determined by class and form.

A word, possessed of power, is either Yaugika, or Ruṣha, or Yoga-rūḍha, or Yaugika-rūḍha.

1. A word is Yaugika, if its meaning is understood by the meaning of its parts; for instance in the word "giver" (in Sanscrit the ex-
82.—Implication, is the relation of a word which has power, and it takes place when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal meaning of a word. The cause of understanding a sentence is contiguity, consistency, construction and intention.

ample is Pachaka, cook) the root give (e) expresses the action give, and the termination “er” refers to the agent. And the whole expresses the meanings of the parts, viz. an agent with reference to the action “give.”

2. Rudha is a word, which, independent of the power of its parts, is only understood by the power of the whole, as for instance “go” (cow, for “go” is derived from “gam,” to go, which does not express the meaning of go) “ghaṭa” (jar) etc.

3. Yogārūḍha is a word, which, beside the power of its parts, expresses a different meaning as a whole, for instance “Pankaja” (from “Panka,” mud, and “ja,” born) for the word “Pankaja” means by the power of its parts “an agent, born in mud” (which includes any thing, produced in such a manner) but by its power as a whole a “water-lily” (that is only one of the things, born in mud).

4. Yangika-rūḍha is a word, which is understood either by the meaning of its parts, or by Rūḍha, for instance Uḍbhid. The power of the word “ud” refers to upwards, the power of the root “bhūd” to cutting. Therefore by its Yangika power it refers to tree, and by its power of Rūḍha it refers to any germ, produced from corn.

54.—Comm.—“Implication is the relation of a word, which has power, and it takes place, when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal sense of a word.”

For instance, let the sentence be given: “Ghoshā dwells on the Ganges.” If in this case, with reference to the literal meaning of “Gangā,” viz. the current, either the connexion of Ghoshā, or the intention of the speaker is not obtained, the meaning of “bank” is understood by implication. This implication is the relation of a word which has power. Here, from the knowledge of the connexion of the literal meaning of the current with the bank, a recollection of the bank is produced, and hence the meaning of the sentence is understood.

Moreover if the want of connexion alone were the cause of implication, there would be no implication in the sentence: “Let the staffs
83.—Contiguity, "is called the proximity of words.

enter," because there is no want of connexion with reference to the entering of the staffs. Therefore, because here the entrance of the staffs has no reference to the intention of the speaker, which is the taking of food, the implication refers to the bearers of staffs. In the same manner, in the sentence: "Protect the ghee from the crows" the word "crow" has an implication to any thing which may injure the ghee, because the intention of the speaker refers to the preservation of the ghee generally. In the same manner, if it is said: "The umbrella-bearers are proceeding"; the word "umbrella-bearers" implies the merchants of a caravan.

This latter is called the implication which does not lose its own meaning (Ajahatsåthâ Lakshñá, which keeps its own meaning, beside that which it obtains from implication) because by the term "merchants of a caravan" the bearers of umbrellas as well as those without umbrellas are understood.

Moreover, if the want of sense in the connexion alone were the cause of implication, sometimes the word "Gangâ" would imply: "bank," sometimes the word: "Ghosa," "fish," &c. and there would be accordingly no rule. This, however, must be understood: if the connexion of the meaning of a word, possessed of power, is apprehended by the notion of bank, bank must be apprehended by the notion of bank; if, on the other hand, it is apprehended by the notion of the bank of the Gangâ, it must be recollected by that notion. Therefore there is no implication in the general notion of an implication, because the general notion is understood without implication. Likewise, there is no power in the general notion of what has power, because any word is able to remind of the meaning of its general notion.

But if there is an implication by the successive connexion of a word, possessed of power, it is called an implied implication, as for instance in the word "Dvirepâ" (literally, that which has two wings, figurative, "black bee") the connexion of: "two-winged," refers to "Bhramara" (black bee) that of "Bhramara" to black bee; this is an implied implication. . . .

55.—Comm.—Contiguity means proximity, viz. the uninterrupted succession of two, or more words which have a connexion among each
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other. Therefore there is no verbal knowledge in the words: "The by inhabited was Dévadatta volcano;" but if by a mistake in the proximity no mistake in the verbal understanding is the consequence, it does not matter.

But in the sentence: "With umbrella, earrings and clothes adorned is Dévadatta," the recollection of the second words destroys the recollection of the first; accordingly, as there is an interruption, a recollection of the second word is impossible.

We do not grant this, as by the impressions of each word until the last an uninterrupted recollection of all objects is possible; for as by several kinds of intercourse one and the same perception arises, so also one and the same recollection arises by several impressions, and the knowledge of the last letter together with the impressions of all words brings all to recollection. How could otherwise exist the recollection of any word that has many letters?

Moreover; some say, that, as in a field all pigeons are caught in the same net, so by the recollection of all the meanings of words does take place the verbal knowledge of all meanings of words, which is corresponding to the knowledge of the connexion depending upon the object and verb. Others say: if connected with all such words, as are construed, consistent and contiguous, verbal knowledge of all the words (included in, the sentence) takes place; for, they say, after the meaning of the single sentences has been understood, the meaning of the great sentence will be comprehended by the recollection of the meanings of the words. Hence the assumption of a total impression of a word, manifesting all the letters, has been refuted, because by the apprehension of the last letter, together with the impressions of all the preceding letters which (apprehension) manifests the word, the word is apprehended. This must be understood, if it is said: "the door," the meaning of the word is obtained by the knowledge of the word "close," but not by the knowledge of the meaning of such acts as closing, &c., because the actual presence of the meaning of a word, which is produced by a word, is the cause of verbal knowledge. Moreover, as the words denoting action and object, are mutually connected, it is impossible, that there is verbal knowledge without a word, denoting a verb. In the same manner, if it is said: "Of the flowers," it is necessary to assume: "he is desirous," because without this the preposition "of" could not be applied.
Consistency is the mutual correspondence of the meanings of the words.

84.—Construction is the selection of such terminations, without which the meaning of a sentence is unintelligible. Intention is based on the wish of the speaker.

56.—Comm.—Consistency is the connexion of the meaning of one word with that of another. Accordingly there is no verbal knowledge in such sentences as: "He sprinkles with fire," because there is no meaning in it. If it is objected, 'that previously to the verbal knowledge there is nowhere a knowledge of this consistency, because there is not before a meaning of the sentence,' we reply: there is a knowledge of consistency which is sometimes doubtful, sometimes certain, if there is a recollection of the meanings of the different words. The modern school, however, says, that the knowledge of consistency is no reason of verbal knowledge. If it is said: "He sprinkles with fire," there is no verbal knowledge, because the inconsistency, which is that fire cannot be an instrument in the action of sprinkling, is certainly an obstacle. Because the certainty of its absence is an obstacle only in a knowledge, which is not produced by common intercourse or by special defects, therefore it is proved, that it is an obstacle with reference to verbal knowledge,—although it is not proved, that by the late appearance of consistency verbal knowledge is late.

57.—Comm.—Construction is the connexion of one word with another, without which the former has no sense. The case, denoting agent, has no connexion without the case, referring to action, and with this the former is construed. In fact, however, the proximity of the cases denoting agent and action, is included in contiguity. Moreover, with reference to the objective case, for instance of jar, the cause is the knowledge of the termination of the second case. Therefore there is no meaning in such sentences as: "The jar is the accusative case," "to bring is an action."

58.—Comm.—Intention is the wish of the speaker. Suppose, intention were not a cause of verbal knowledge, and such a sentence as: "Bring the Saindhava" (meaning horse and salt) were pronounced, there would sometimes the meaning of "horse," and sometimes the meaning of "salt," be obtained. It cannot be said, that the circum-
85.—The instrument in the perception of happiness and other internal qualities is the mind. The atomic nature of the mind is inferred from the fact that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at once and the same time.

stances, &c. by which the intention is apprehended, are the cause of verbal knowledge, because they are not included in the definition. And if it is said, 'that they are included as being the cause of the knowledge of the intention,' it is simple to say, that the knowledge of the intention is the cause. In this manner, God is assumed for the knowledge of the intention with reference to the Vedas. It must not be said, 'that the knowledge of the intention of the teacher is here the cause,' because at the commencement of the creation there is no teacher. Nor must it be said: 'there is no general conflation (destruction of the world,) how can therefore be a commencement of creation?' for a general conflation is proved by the Sûtra. In the same manner is in the sentence of a parrot the knowledge of the intention of God the cause, but in a vile sentence of the parrot the knowledge of the intention of the speaker.

Others say: If there is a word which has different meanings, the knowledge of the intention is sometimes the cause; moreover, in the sentence of a parrot is also verbal understanding without the knowledge of the intention, and with reference to the Vedas the meaning is apprehended by the discussions, which are purified by the eternal Mimânsa.

59.—Comm.—Intelect was divided into two kinds; viz. apprehension and remembrance (vid. verse 51.) The nature of apprehension has been explained. Remembrance will not be explained, because it is easy to be understood; for the cause of it is a former apprehension. Some say, 'the class (notion) of apprehension is not causality, but the class (notion) of knowledge;' otherwise there would be no remembrance after a remembrance, because the former impression would be destroyed by the remembrance of the common notion. According to my opinion, however, there is by this remembrance through a new impression a new remembrance produced. This we cannot grant; where after the remembrance of a perception in its totality the remembrance of

* That is to say, apprehension is not the cause of remembrance, but knowledge in general.
the single objects (constituting a totality) as of cloth, jar, &c. is produced, but so that there is no remembrance of all the objects, there it must be said, that, as the impression of every single remembrance is not destroyed, time, or disease, or the last remembrance is the cause of the destruction of the impression. Accordingly, it cannot be said, 'that a gradual remembrance is impossible,' nor, 'that by repeated remembrance, a stronger impression is impossible;' for the word "strong" means here what suddenly recalls to mind. It also cannot be said, 'that the cause is knowledge, as there is no alternative;' for if the special attribute is assigned, there is no going astray; but knowledge has the fault of superfluous causality, as it is a general attribute. How could otherwise a stick be the cause of a jar by being turned round, and not as well by its being a substance or having colour? Nor must it be said: 'There is an apprehension, that the intermediate remembrance will go astray, because the impression is destroyed;' for by objecting to assuming an infinite number of impressions and by assuming the destruction of the impression of the last remembrance, a going astray cannot be apprehended.

60.—Comm.—The existence of mind is proved by the following inference. The perception of happiness, &c. takes place by an instrument, because the perception is a production, as for instance is the perception by the eye. This instrument is the mind. It cannot be said 'that the perceptions of unhappiness, &c. are produced by other instruments,' because the necessity of only one instrument as cause for all similar perceptions is evident from its simplicity. Thus the mind is proved as being the substrate of contact, which is the non-intimate cause of unhappiness, &c.

61.—Comm.—"The atomic nature of the mind is proved from the fact, that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time."

It is clear from apprehension (perception) that various objects of perception, for instance, objects of the eye, of taste, &c. are not at one and the same time produced; for although there may exist an intercourse of the several senses with these objects, yet knowledge is produced by only one sense, because the mind is in contact with only one
Material qualities" are colour, taste, feel, and smell, priority and posteriority,
sense, and it is not produced (at that time) by any other sense, as the mind is not in contact with it. Therefore if the mind were to be comprehended by the notion of a pervading substance, it should be connected with every thing; hence (as this is not the case) it follows, that the mind is not pervading. It must not be said, 'that the knowledge of the mind is late (successive) because at that time the special fate (merit or demerit) which reminds of knowledge, is also late;' for, if this were the case, there would be no necessity for assuming such instruments of knowledge as the eye, &c.

Nor must it be said: 'How can the narrowness of the mind be reconciled with the fact, that at one and the same time a knowledge from different senses exists, for instance at the time when one eats a large cake; for the mind is some thing very subtle, and is therefore rapidly in contact with various senses, so that different kinds of knowledge may arise in the same imperceptible succession, as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pierced; it is a mere delusion, if several kinds of knowledge appear at the same time.

Nor must it be said, 'that both (the atomic and pervading nature of the mind) is reconciled under the assumption, that the nature of the mind may contract or expand,' because the assumption of many parts subject to destruction, &c. is complicated, and on the other hand, the assumption of a mind without parts is simple.

62.—Comm.—"Qualities abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions."

If it is asked, what proof is there for a separate class of quality? The answer is: The causality, found in what is possessed of generality, different from that (generality) referring to substances and actions,* is determined by some attribute, because causality for a thing which is not determined by some attribute, is impossible; but neither the class of colour, &c. nor the class of existence is this determination, because in the first case it would not comprehend enough (all other quali-

* To understand this, it must be recollected, that generality (class) abides in substances, qualities and actions; the generality therefore, different from the class of substance and action, must be that of quality.
87, 88.—Fluidity, gravity, viscosity and velocity.—Merit and
demerit, memory, sound, intellect and others of similar nature
are called immaterial qualities by philosophers. Number,
quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction are con-
sidered qualities of either class.

89.—Conjunction and disjunction, the different numbers
from two upwards, separatedness found in two things or more,
are qualities which abide not in one and the same thing.

"It abides in substances." Although it is not its definition: to be
dependent on substance, because it would be too wide, as including also
action and class, yet it is right to say: it is what is possessed of the
class different from existence which class is the determination extending
as far as substantiality, because the class of quality is the determination,
extending as far as substantiality, and quality is what is possessed of this
determination. The classes of action and substance are not determinations,
extending as far as substantiality, because substantiality and action
do not abide in the sky, &c. and the class of the class of substance, and
the class of generality (class) are no real classes.

"Without qualities." Although action, generality, &c. are also
without qualities, yet it must be understood as the absence of qualities,
found in the category which is possessed of generality and different
from action; for class and the subsequent three categories have no gen-
erality (class); action is not different from action, and substance is
not without qualities. Therefore this definition is not too wide.

"Without actions" is only said to describe it, not to define it, be-
cause it would otherwise be too wide, the other being also without
action.

63.—Material substances are: earth, water, light, air and mind
(material according to the Nyāya is that the measure of which has a
limit, and for this reason, mind which is an atom, is included in it.)

64.—Immaterial qualities are: merit and demerit, memory, sound,
intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, and endeavour (sol-
ition). Immateria' substances are: the sky, time, space and soul.
90.—All the remaining qualities\(^a\) abide only in one thing. Special qualities\(^b\) are: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, touch, viscosity, original fluidity.

91.—Fate, memory and sound: General qualities are: number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, derived fluidity.

92. 93.—Gravity and velocity. Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction, and disjunction, priority and posteriority, fluidity and viscosity are perceived by two senses.

Sound, colour, taste, smell and touch, are respectively perceived by one of the external senses.

94.—Gravity, fate and memory, transcend the perception of the senses. The special qualities of the pervading substances\(^c\) are not produced by the qualities of any cause.\(^d\)

65.—Comm.—The remaining qualities are: colour, taste, touch, measure which is an unit, separatedness, found only in one individual, priority, posteriority, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, gravity, viscosity, faculty, fate (merit and demerit) and sound.

66.—The special qualities of the earth are: colour, taste, smell and feel; of the water: colour, taste, feel, viscosity and natural fluidity; of the light: colour and feel; of the air: feel; of the sky: sound; of the soul: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and memory.

67.—Comm.—By two senses, viz. by the eye and the skin.

68.—Comm.—Qualities of the pervading substances are: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, memory, and sound.

69.—Comm.—"They are not produced by the qualities of any cause." Colour, smell, &c. depend upon the quality of the cause (for instance the colour, taste, smell and feel of a jar depend upon the same qualities of the two halves, of which it is formed) the same cannot be admitted with regard to intellect, &c. because there is no cause of the soul, the ether, &c.
95. 96.—Natural colour, taste, smell, feel, likewise fluidity, viscosity, velocity, gravity, unity, separatedness found in individuals, quantity and elasticity are produced from the qualities of causes. Conjunction, disjunction and velocity are effected by actions.

97.—Colour, taste, smell, touch, quantity, unity, separatedness found in individuals, viscosity and sound are non-intimate causes.

98.—Special qualities of the soul have only instrumental causality. Hot feel, gravity, velocity, fluidity, conjunction and disjunction and the other qualities denoting two extremes, are of two fold causality. 

99.—The special qualities of pervading substances, as well as conjunction and disjunction and other qualities denoting two extremes, are limited.

100.—Colour is perceived by the eye, it manifests substances, qualities and classes, it is the cause of the perception of the eye, and is white, &c., according to the variety of colours.

101.—It is eternal in the atoms of water and light, in all other substances it has a cause. Taste is perceived by the tongue; it is various, as sweet, bitter etc.

(The special qualities of the soul are only instrumental causes; for intellect, &c. is not the non-intimate cause of any thing; but the knowledge of what is possible by action is the instrumental cause of the desire of action.)

69.—Comm.—Viz. the instrumental and non-intimate causes.

70.—Comm.—Colour is eternal in the atoms of water and light, because it is there from their nature, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, as by the process of cooking another colour is produced.

* The second distich of this verse in the former edition has been omitted, the whole context showing that it is an interpolation. The same has been done with the first distich of verse 69, for the same reason, so that the present edition contains one verse less than the former.
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102.—Its instrument (organ) is the tongue; as regards eternity, &c., it is like colour. Smell is perceived by the nose, it is the cause of perception through the nose.

103.—There are two kinds of smell, good and bad.

Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin.

104.—It is threefold, tepid, cold and warm. Hardness and similar qualities are in the earth; with regard to its eternity, the same holds good as above.

105.—These qualities as abiding in earth, are produced by cooking, while this is not the case as regards the other elements. The change produced by cooking takes place according to the opinion of the Vaisēshikas in the single atoms.

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71.—Comm.—Taste is eternal in the atoms of water, all other taste is non-eternal.

72.—Comm.—Smell is non-eternal (because it abides alone in earth, and in the atoms of earth another smell is produced by the process of cooking.)

73.—Comm.—The feel of earth and air is temperate, of water cold, and of light hot... Feel is eternal in the atoms of water, light and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, (for the same reason as before.)

74.—Comm.—These, viz. colour, taste, smell and feel. As abiding in earth, they are produced by a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour, taste, smell and feel of earth are changed; not so as abiding in water, &c. for although water, &c. be a hundred times boiled, yet no change of its colour, &c. takes place. The smell and heat of water, on the other hand, are artificial, because they are present or absent by the presence or absence of artificial means, like the cold feel of air and earth.

75.—Comm.—The Vaisēshikas say, that as to earth the change by the process of cooking takes place in the atoms. Their view is, as follows. As long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of cooking is possible; but when by the union of fire the compound substances have been destroyed, that change takes place in the
atoms which have become independent of each other. And again by
the union of the atoms which have been changed by the process of
cooking, a production is effected from the compound of two, three, &c.
atoms again to a compound of many parts; for by the extraordinary
velocity of heat the transition from the destruction of one compound to
the production of another is sudden. Then from the destruction of a
compound of two atoms by a new production a compound, possessed of
shape, &c. is formed in a few moments.

For the instruction of the student an explanation of this topic is here
given.

The Sutra of the Vaisë-bikas is as follows: "Action is a cause which
is independent of conjunction and disjunction?" which means, that its
consequent state is independent of its antecedent state; otherwise, as
the action also produces the consequent conjunction, there would be
the fault of too wide a definition, because the action would depend
upon the destruction of the antecedent conjunction.

If here a disjunction, produced by disjunction, is not acknowledged,
nine moments are required. If it is acknowledged, the disjunction,
depending upon something produces disjunction; but if the cause is
something independent, action takes place. If there is a disjunction
produced by disjunction, as depending upon the time, which is de-
termined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first ele-
ments of a compound substance commencing perceptible substances (for
which a compound of three atoms is required) ten moments are neces-
sary. If further the disjunction produced by disjunction depends upon
the time or upon part (of a compound) either of which is determined
by the destruction of a substance, eleven moments are necessary.

1. Nine moments.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom,
therefore disjunction from another atom, hence the destruction of the con-
junction, forming the first elements of a compound substance (which
consists of three atoms), hence 1. the destruction of the compound of
two atoms, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue, &c. in the
atom, hence 3. the production of the quality of red, &c., hence 4. the
action in accordance with the production of the first elements of
things, hence 5. disjunction, hence 6. destruction of the former conjunci-
tion, hence 7. the conjunction, by which the first elements of a com-
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pound are formed, hence 8. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 9. the production of the quality of red, &c.

If it is objected, 'that in the moment, when the quality of blue is destroyed, or in the moment, when the quality of red is produced, there is in the atom the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance;' we deny this, because in an atom, previous to the destruction of the action which takes place in an atom that is united with fire, and also previous to the production of a quality, there is no other action with regard to the atom possible; for we hold the principle, that in a thing where there is an action, no other action is possible, and also, that in a substance without quality an action, in accordance with production of the first elements of substances, cannot take place.

Nor can in an atom at the same time that the quality of blue, &c. is removed, the quality of red be produced, because the destruction of the antecedent is the cause of the consequent colour, etc.

2. Ten moments. They take place, if by disjunction, depending upon a time, determined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, another disjunction is effected.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, which is the element of a compound of two atoms, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, by which the first elements of a compound are formed, hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms and the disjunction, produced by disjunction, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue and the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 3. the production of the quality of red and the consequent conjunction, hence 4. the destruction of the action, produced by the conjunction of the fire, with regard to the atom, hence 5. the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 6. disjunction, hence 7. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 8. the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 9. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 10. the production of the quality of red, &c.

3. Eleven moments.

* Nolaman means a conjunction, by which no sound is produced. See v. 119.
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From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance; hence 1. the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 2. disjunction, produced by disjunction, depending upon a time determined by the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 3. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 4. the consequent conjunction, hence 5. the destruction of the action with reference to the atom, hence 6. the action, forming the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 7. disjunction, hence 8. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 9. the conjunction forming the first elements of a compound substance; hence 10. the compound of two atoms, hence 11. the production of the quality of red. One and the same conjunction of fire destroys not the blue colour and produces the red colour, as the intermediate sound destroys the preceding and produces the subsequent sound; for one and the same fire continues not for the whole time. Moreover, if the cause of the production were also the cause of destruction, then, if by the destruction of the colour &c. the fire were also destroyed, the atom would remain for a long time without colour. If on the other hand, the cause of destruction were also the cause of production, then, if at the production of the red colour the fire (the cause of the production) were destroyed, there could not be produced the red colour.

If in this manner the action is considered in another atom, the quality is produced in five and more moments.

In five moments. The action takes place in one atom, hence disjunction, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and disjunction, produced by action in another atom. This is one time. Hence destruction of blue, &c. and from the disjunction the destruction of the former conjunction. This is the second time. Hence the production of the red, and the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound. This is the third time. Hence the production of the compound of two atoms, which is the fourth time, and hence the production of the red, which is the fifth time.—If one considers the destruction of the substance at the same time with the action in another atom, then the production of
106.—While the Naiyáyikas affirm, "that change is effected also in two or more atoms. The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number."

107.—Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient unity to transient substances." Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect,

the quality takes place in six moments. In this manner. By the action in one atom disjunction takes place in another atom, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the blue and disjunction, produced by action in another atom, hence production of the red, and destruction of the former conjunction in another atom, hence conjunction in another atom, hence production of the compound of two atoms, then production of the red. In the same manner seven moments are required, if one at the time of the destruction of the blue considers the action in another atom, and eight moments, if one considers the production of the red at the same time with the action in another atom.

76.—Comm:—"While the Naiyáyikas affirm." It is the opinion of the Naiyáyikas, that also in compounds, viz. in compounds of two, three, &c. atoms, change by the process of cooking takes place. Their view is this. As compound substances have pores, the minute parts of fire enter into the inside, and therefore change by the process of cooking is possible, although the parts be retained in the compound. The opinion of Vaisishikas is complicated, as it assumes the destruction of an infinite number of parts. If this is the case, the recognition: "this is that jar," is consistent; but where there is no recognition, there we can admit a destruction of the compound.

77.—Comm.—"The cause as regards the operation of counting is called number." The cause, viz., the non-intimate cause.

78.—Comm.—"Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient to transient substances." Eternal substances are the atoms of material substances, further time, space and soul, transient substances for instance a jar, &c.
108.—And they are collectively apprehended in their dependence upon more than one object." The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers are also destroyed."

79.—Comm.—“Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect, and they are collectively apprehended in their dependence upon more than one object.”

Numbers from two upwards, depending upon the addition of one to one, are produced by comprehending intellect.

Although the relation, indicating the class of two, three, &c. abides for instance in each of two, three, &c. jaws &c. yet as there is not a knowledge, that one is two, and further as there is the knowledge, that one is not two, it must be assumed a relation, indicating the collective apprehension of two, three, &c. which depends upon more than one object.

80.—Comm.—“The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers, (from two upwards) are also destroyed.” First there is the comprehending intellect, then the production of the class of two, &c. then the determining knowledge, viz. the determination of the class of class of two, they the perception determined by the class of two. If the comprehending intellect is destroyed, also the class of two is destroyed.

Although no other knowledge does continue for three moments, because the special qualities of the respective prevailing substances are destroyed by the qualities succeeding to them,* yet it must be assumed, that the comprehending intellect continues for three moments; otherwise the comprehending intellect would be destroyed at the time of determination, and thereby also the class of two, three, &c.; for there would be no perception of the class of two, because no object were present, and only when it is present, a knowledge is produced by the eye, &c. Therefore it must be assumed, that the perception of the class of two destroys the comprehending intellect.

It must not be asked, ‘how by the destruction of the comprehending intellect the class of two, &c. is destroyed,’ because at another time there is no perception of the class of two; for it is clear, that the

* For instance a sound by another, which follows it, or a perception, thought, etc. by a succeeding one.
109.—Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unités. "Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring."

110.—Point (atom of space) length, thickness, breadth, are the differences of quantity; in transient things it is transient, in eternal things eternal."

comprehending intellect is the cause of those numbers, and its destruction destroys also them. Therefore the class of two, produced by the comprehending intellect of A, is comprehended by the same A.

Nor must it be said, "that the comprehending intellect is the cause of the perception of the class of two," &c. Because it is right for brevity's sake to assign it as the cause of the class of two, &c.

The comprehending intellect of the Yogis refers to compounds of two atoms, &c. which transcend the perception of the senses. The comprehending intellect of God (Iswara) or of the Yogis abiding in the mundane egg, refers to the atoms at the time of the creation of the world.

81.—Comm.—"Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unités." This is the intellect, which apprehends, that this is one, this is one, &c. It must be understood, that, where there is a knowledge of undefined unités, there is produced the number, referring to many, different from two, three, &c. as where there is a forest, an army, &c. This is the opinion of Kandali-kāra. The Achāryas, however, think, that the class of many, is the class of three, &c. Therefore the class of many includes the class of three, &c. Although the class of three, &c. is included in an army, yet the class of the class of three, etc. is not comprehended, because this would be wrong. If this is the case, the notion is possible, that this army is greater than that, because if the class of many were without number, there could not exist the notion of a comparative and superlative degree.

82.—Comm.—"Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring," viz. the non-intimate cause.

83.—"In transient things it is transient," viz. in a compound of two atoms, &c. "In eternal things it is eternal," viz. is the sky, &c.
111.—Transient quantity is produced from number, measure, and heaps. Quantity found in two and more atoms arises from number;¹

112.—As met with in a jar and similar extended things it arises from measure; the conjunction of so called loose things, it is a heap. By this (conjunction)

113.—Measure is produced in such things for instance as cotton. If the place, upon which ǻ (the measure) depends, is destroyed, it is also destroyed. Separatedness which is like number² is the cause of the knowledge of separate things.

114.—It cannot be said, that it is included in mutual negation; for it is not the same to say, "this is different from that," and, "this is not that."

115.—Conjunction is called the obtaining of two things unobtained before. It is threefold, the first kind is produced from the action of one of two;

84.—Comm.—"Quantity found in two and more atoms." The measure of one atom is not the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of two atoms, nor a compound of two atoms the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of three atoms, because a measure produces a measure which is greater than its own kind.* But the measure of a compound of two atoms is not greater than one atom, and the measure of a compound of three atoms has nothing of its own kind; therefore the non-intimate cause of a compound of two atoms is the number of two in an atom, and of a compound of three atoms the number of three in a compound of two atoms.

85.—Comm.—"Separatedness which like number," viz. the non-intimate cause of the knowledge of separatedness is separatedness. It is like number in its relation to eternal and transient things; viz. as the class of unity is eternal in eternal things, and transient in transient things, as transient unity is produced in the second moment after the production of the thing upon which it depends, and is destroyed, when this is destroyed, so the same must be understood with regard to separatedness of two, three, &c.

*Vid. p. 8.
116.—The second from the united action of both, the third from conjunction. Of the first is an instance that of the falcon and the rock.

117.—Of the second, the fighting of two rams; of the third, the conjunction of the tree and the jar which is produced by the conjunction of the tree with one half of the jar.

118.—The conjunction which is effected by action is again two-fold, the one effected by violent, the other by soft motion; the first is the cause of sound.

119.—The second is not the cause of sound. Disjunction comprehends also three kinds. The one is produced by the action of one, the second by the action of two,

120.—The third by disjunction. This latter is again of two kinds; the one arises by the disjunction of the cause only, the other by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.

86. Comm.—With regard to the two first kinds of disjunction, the same examples are to be understood as with regard to the two first kinds of conjunction. The third is again two-fold, viz. as produced either by the disjunction of the cause, or by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.

Where there is an action with regard to one half of a jar, there ensues a disjunction of the two halves, hence the destruction of the conjunction forming the jar, hence destruction of the jar, hence by the action, which consists in the disjunction of the half, the disjunction of the half of the jar from the other part of space, hence a destruction of the conjunction with the other part of space, hence the conjunction with another part of space, hence the destruction of the action.

Where by an action of the hand, a separation of the tree and the hand takes place, there arises the belief that the tree is also separated from the body. Here in the separation of the body from the tree is the action of the hand not the cause, because they are not at one and the same place. Again there is no action in the body, as the action of a compound is regulated by the actions of each of its parts; therefore is here produced by the disjunction of cause* and non-cause also a disjunction of effect and non-effect.

* Cause, as it appears, is here the tree.
121.—Posteriority and priority are two-fold with regard to time, or to space, and are only applicable to material bodies.

122.—Posteriority of place (distance) is perceived from a greater space intervening between the conjunction of the sun, priority (nearness) by the perception of less space.

123.—The non-intimate cause of them is conjunction of space which is the substrate of them.* Posteriority with regard to time is produced by the knowledge of the anterius existence of the revolutions of the sun.

124.—Priority (recent time) from the knowledge of what succeeded the former. The non-intimate cause of them is the conjunction of things which are in time.

125.—If the comprehending intellect were destroyed, posteriority and priority would also be destroyed. Intellect has been previously nearly explained.

126.—What is left, will now be explained. Knowledge is two-fold, wrong notion and right notion.

127.—A knowledge which manifests something where this something is not present, is a wrong notion." Of this there are two kinds, mistake and doubt.

128.—The former is the certain knowledge of a thing where such a thing is not present, as for instance, the notion of the soul in the body, or yellow colour in a shell.

129.—Doubt" is a knowledge in question, whether for in-

87.—Comm.—If a knowledge, which manifests something, is transferred to something else, and represents itself at the same time as certain, it is error; for instance, if the knowledge of the soul in such sentences as: "I am reddish," &c., is transferred to the body, or yellow colour to a shell.

88.—Comm.—Doubt is a knowledge, determined by the contradictory absence or presence of a predicate in one and the same subject.

* Their substrate is: near or far with regard to space.
stance a thing is a man or a trunk. A knowledge which does not manifest something, where this something is not present, but, which manifests this something alone, is certitude.

130.—The apprehension of absence and presence in one and the same object is doubt. The cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute, &c."

(The Bengalee Translation explains this as follows: A doubt is a knowledge such as this: Is this a man or a trunk? This kind of doubt is called a doubt of four extremes (चारुप्रतिविर्द्ध) because there are four extremes, viz. the notions of a man and non-man, and the notions of trunk and non-trunk. The contradictory notions of presence and absence are called extremes. If it is questioned, whether the mountain is fiery or not fiery, the doubt is, whether one of the two extremes fiery or not fiery abides in the mountain.)

89.—Comm.—There are three causes of doubt.

1. Cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute which is found in two extremes, for instance the notion of height, found in trunk and non-trunk, as if it is doubted, whether this is a trunk or not a trunk.

2. Cause of doubt is a non-general (special) attribute. (Non-general is a predicate, which is not found in the subject of the two extremes;) for instance, if the notion of sound, which is separated from the notions of eternal and non-eternal, (that is the notion of sound is not the general notion, under which eternal and non-eternal are comprehended) is conceived in sound, the doubt arises, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal.

3. Cause of doubt is contradiction (of two extremes,) but not the contradiction, referring to the mere sound alone, because a knowledge of a general predicate of sound is the cause of certitude only, for instance, if it is said: Sound is eternal, sound is not eternal, but the knowledge of the two extremes, which is produced by, sound. The doubt takes place by the mind.

In the same way, if there is a doubt, that a knowledge is proved, there is also a doubt with regard to the object of the knowledge.

In the same way, if there is a doubt with regard to a subject in its
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131.—Defect produces wrong notion, excellence right notion. There are different kinds of defects as bile, distance, &c.

132.—Excellence as regards perception is the intercourse of a sense with what is determinable, determined by its determination. Excellence as regards inference

invariable connexion with a predicate, there is also a doubt with regard to the predicate. But the cause of doubt is the knowledge of a subject, determined by an attribute, or the intercourse of a sense with such a subject.

90.—Comm.—Defect is the cause of wrong notion, and excellence of right notion. Defects as for instance, bile, &c. are only of a contingent nature; for their causality is established by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaja and Vyatička; if the defect is there, the notion is wrong, if the defect is not there, the notion is not wrong). That excellence is the cause of right notion, on the other hand, is established by simple inference; for right notion is produced by a cause, different from the general cause of knowledge, because it is a knowledge that is produced, as wrong notion is. It cannot be said, 'that the absence of defects is the cause.' In the sentence, "the shell is yellow," bile is the defect; from this the right notion of shell is not obtained, because there is no authority to ascribe it more to the one member of the alternative than to the other, and it is right to assume a causality from one excellence in preference to a causality from the absence of numerous defects.

Nor can it be said: 'Let excellence even be granted, there is no perception of white colour in a shell, as bile is an obstacle to it; therefore the causality of the absence of defects, as for instance of bile, is necessary. Of what use is then the assumption of a causality of excellence?' for in this case the causality of excellence is proved by the argument of a general affirmative and negative. In the same way it is well said, that the absence of excellence is the cause of error.

What are those defects? "Bile," &c. Sometimes bile is a defect, when a yellow colour is mistaken for a white one (as in jaundice) sometimes distance, for instance if the moon, sun, &c. by their distance are mistaken for small bodies.
133.—Is the consideration connected with the place (subject of conclusion) which is determined by the conclusion. Excellence, as regards comparison, is the knowledge of similar objects, derived from words possessed of power.

134.—Excellence as regards verbal knowledge is the right notion of consistency or of the intention. Right notion is a knowledge without error.*

135.—Or right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind and accordingly predicated. A knowledge which is undetermined, is neither right notion nor error;

136.—For that which is without determination and determinability is not comprehended under any relation. Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt.*

91.—Comm.—"Right knowledge is a knowledge without error." As here the objection might be made, that,—if at the perception of silver and tin, both, silver and tin, are considered as silver,—also on the part of the silver a wrong notion is produced, because that knowledge is not free from error, a second definition is given: "Right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind, and accordingly predicated." Here it must be understood, that, under which relation the right notion is perceived, under the same relation must be perceived that which is determined, and also the determination. Hence it is not against this definition, if a jar, &c. is comprehended by the same conjunction as the two halves of which it is composed. If this is the case, any thing without determination is no right notion, as there is no general notion, by which it is determined. A notion which is undetermined, is neither true, nor false.

92.—Comm.—"Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt."

Namely, the Mīmāṃsakas say, that right notion is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus* a knowledge is a right notion by its

* Col. Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 298. Next to him (Bhatta Kumārāśvāmi) is a writer usually cited under the title of Guru, more rarely under the designation of Prabhākara. His work I had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present
137.—The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition is the non-apprehension of what goes astray and the apprehension of what is known. (Bengalee Tr. They state the object of knowledge, for instance of a jar, to be three-fold, viz. the jar, the soul, and the knowledge of the jar &c. in connexion with that which is to be proved, because by the means of object of the knowledge, for instance of a jar, first the jar, further the soul, and lastly, the knowledge of the jar in connexion with that which is to be proved, form one and the same knowledge, which may be pronounced in the sentence: "I know the jar," which means, I have a knowledge, which manifests a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Bhāttaś* knowledge is beyond the senses; the notion (class) of knowledge, produced by that knowledge (which is beyond the senses) is perceptible; by this (notion) knowledge is inferred (B. T. According to the Bhāttaś knowledge, without determination as well as with determination, is beyond the senses; but after the knowledge of a jar there arises the notion of what is known with reference to the jar, &c. then the notion of what is known, viz. by me the jar is known, is perceived, and lastly, "I have a knowledge of a jar," &c. determined by the notion of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Mūraśmīras knowledge is obtained by reflection (U. T. the Mūraśmīras say, that after the knowledge essay, and he is known to me chiefly from reference and quotations; as in Māñjūśaś's summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Kumāraśaś, and in the text and commentary of Sūktra-dīpākā, where his positions are canvassed with those of numerous other writers.

* Id. p. 297. The annotations (Vārtika to the Commentary of the Sātras of the Mīmāṃsa, by Sābaraśvānīa) are by Bhāttaś Kumāraśvānīa, who is the great authority of the Mīmāṃsaśa school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, Bhāttaś, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Sābaraś's gloss, often delivers a different interpretation, &c. . . . Id. p. 298. Kumāraś Bhātta figures greatly in the traditional religious history of India. He was predecessor of Sākaraś Achānya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the Vedas. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy . . . . The age of Kumāraś, anterior to Sākaraś, and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the Baudhāṇas, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand year.
sion of what does not go astray; sometimes doubt is removed by discussion."

of a jar, &c. there is the reflection, I know the jar, by this there is a
knowledge, manifesting the knowledge of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of all of them this or the other knowledge is
right notion by a knowledge, manifesting this or the other knowledge;
for knowledge is to be ascertained by its object; therefore the object is
to be known by the knowledge of knowledge. This opinion is blamed
in the text: "Right notion is not perceived by itself," &c. If right
notion of knowledge were comprehended by itself, there would be no
doubt with regard to knowledge, produced by practice; for it in this
case knowledge is known, also its right notion (evidence) is known;
hence how could doubt exist? On the other hand, if knowledge is not
known, then, in the absence of the knowledge of something determined
by an attribute, how can doubt arise? Therefore right knowledge is an
object of inference; for instance: This knowledge is right notion, because
it is produced by the agreement of those who discuss on it. That, which
is not of such a kind, is not of such a kind, as wrong notion. For instance:
This knowledge, the general notion of earth, is right notion, because the
notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of earth, is found
in that which has smell. In the same manner this knowledge of water
is right notion, because the general notion of knowledge, representing
the general notion of water, is found in that which has viscidity.

93.—Comm.—"The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition
(Vyāpti, the invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate) is
the non-apprehension of what goes astray, and the apprehension of
what does not go astray; sometimes a doubt is removed by discussion."

The invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate (Vyāpti) has
been before explained, but not the means of its apprehension. This is
now done in the text, viz. "The cause," &c. 1st. The non-apprehen-
sion of what goes astray is the cause, since, if this apprehension takes
place, the general proposition (Vyāpti) cannot be apprehended. The
apprehension of what does not go astray (of similar instances) is the

* Vyabhichāra: a reason goes astray, if it is connected with any subject, where
the conclusion (major term) cannot abide. Sahāchāra: a reason does not go astray,
if it has similar instances, in which the conclusion abides.
138.—Specification is an attribute which is contained in the conclusion, but not in the reason. Its chief points will now be explained.

cause, as proved by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Aitare Vyatireka, if there are similar instances, there is also the general proposition; if there are no similar instances, there is no general proposition). Repetition (the repetition of similar instances) is no cause, since, although there be not an apprehension of what goes astray, yet the general proposition (Vyapti) is sometimes at once apprehended. Sometimes, however, repetition is required to remove a doubt with reference to what goes astray. Where by repetition the doubt does not disappear, discussion is required to guard against the contrary supposition. For instance, if there is a doubt, whether smoke be not also found with something, where there is no fire, this doubt is removed by the consideration, that fire and smoke are in the relation of cause and effect. If this mountain is without fire, it must also be without smoke, because an effect is not without its cause. If it is sometimes without cause, it is an effect without cause. In this case doubt arises, which is to be removed from its obstacle, in such a manner: If an effect is without cause, fire is not the invariable means to produce smoke, or food to satisfy hunger. Where doubt does not of itself arise, there discussion is not necessary. With this view it is said in the text: "Sometimes doubt is removed by discussion."

94.—Comm.—"Specification is an attribute, which is contained in its conclusion, (major term) but not in its reason."

'If this definition is correct, then in the inference: "This man is black, because he is the son of Mittra," the notion of the origin of black colour by her eating bad vegetables, would be no specification, because

* The Bengalice Translator says in illustration of this: For instance if hearth is the subject (minor term), smoke the conclusion (major term), and fire the reason (middle term), then is wet fuel the specification with regard to the faulty reason, viz. fire, because it is the condition of smoke, but not of fire; for where there is smoke, there is necessarily also wet fuel; but where there is fire, there is not (necessarily) wet fuel, as for instance if fiery iron-ball; on the other hand, if there is a faultless reason, for instance, if mountain is the subject, fire the conclusion, and smoke the reason, there is no specification, because the attribute, which is a condition of the conclusion, is also a condition of the reason.
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

139.—All admissible specifications abide in the same place with the conclusion. Those, which abide in the same place with the reason, go astray with regard to the conclusion.

it is not contained in the conclusion; (black) for blackness is also found in a jar, &c.

Further: In the inference: "Air is perceptible" because it is the site of touch, the notion of proportionate greatness, would be no specification, because perception takes place also with regard to the soul, &c. where there is no greatness.

' Nor would the notion of existence (आत्मन) by a specification in the inference: "Destruction is transient from its being a production," because the notion of something transient is also in antecedent negation, and here, without any doubt, is not existence.'

We deny this; for the meaning is, that the specification, which is a condition of the conclusion, as determined by this or that attribute, is not a condition of the reason, as determined by the same attribute; thus for instance the notion of a production by bad vegetables is the condition of the blackness, which is determined by the notion of son of Mitra. In the same manner is proportionate greatness the condition of the perception, determined by the notion of external things. Thus in the inference: "Destruction is transient from its being a production," is the notion of existence the condition of the conclusion, as determined by the notion of production.

In a faultless reason, there is no such attribute, viz. something, being a condition of a determined conclusion (major term), while it is not a condition of the reason under the same determination. But in a reason which goes astray, one of the two at least takes place, either that the place of the specification, which is also the place of the conclusion (major term) is the condition of the conclusion and the non-condition of the reason, or that the place, where there is not the specification, which is also the place, determining the absence of the conclusion, is the condition of the conclusion, and the non-condition of the reason.

95.—Comm.—"Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray." That is to say, the assumption of specification is necessary to infer, that the conclusion goes astray, which takes place by the
140.—Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray. It is the opinion of the Vaiseshikas that verbal specification going astray. Therefore, where there is a specification which is the condition of a conclusion without any further addition, there by the going astray of the specification which has no further addition, may be concluded also the going astray of the conclusion. For instance, where it is concluded that something smokes, from fire, there fire (as the reason of smoke) goes astray with regard to smoke, because wet fuel goes astray; for, if the more comprehensive notion goes astray, it is necessary that also the more narrow notion goes astray. But where the specification is of such a kind, as to be a condition of the conclusion (major term) as determined by any attribute (addition) how insignificant soever, there the inference, that the conclusion goes astray, follows from the going astray of the specification in a subject, determined by such an attribute (addition,) for instance, if it is inferred, that this person is black, because he is the son of Mittra, the notion: “a son of Mittra” goes astray with regard to blackness, because with regard to the son of Mittra, goes astray the specification of a product of bad vegetables.

96.—Comm.—“Verbal knowledge and comparison are not different kinds of proof.”

According to the opinion of the Vaiseshikas there are only two kinds of knowledge, viz. perception and inference, verbal knowledge and comparison being included in the latter; for such sentences as: “Drive the cow away by the stick,” or Vedaic sentences, depend upon the knowledge of the connexion of the meanings of the words, which are recollected by the object the speaker has in view, because all the words, which form a sentence, have intention, consistency, &c., as in the sentence: “Bring the jar,” &c.—Or: These meanings of words are mutually connected, because the words have consistency, &c., like similar meanings of words. The same is the case with regard to comparison. When a Gayal has been perceived, the word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal, because the old have attached this meaning to it, no other kind of proof being admitted, as the word of cow is the cause of the power with
knowledge and comparison, as included in inference, are not
different kinds of proof.

141.—This is not correct, as, independent of inference, verbal
knowledge and comparison are intelligible.

142.—The connexion of the subject with the predicate is
two-fold," one positive and the other negative; the first has
been explained, the other will now be explained.

reference to what is determined by the notion of cow. Or: The word
Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined
by the notion of Gayal on the ground, that trustworthy people have
attached this meaning to it. By this inference the cause of the power
with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal is evident,
viz. because there is a connexion of a general proposition with a minor
term.

This opinion is blamed in the text in the words: "This is not cor-
rect;" for without the knowledge of a general proposition (of the Vyápti)
an understanding is possible from the mere word. There is no proof,
that after the hearing of words a general proposition is always neces-
sary. Moreover, if it is assumed, that a general proposition (Vyápti)
is always required with reference to the understanding of words, why
then is it not admitted, that it is necessary to assume a verbal knowledge
with reference to the understanding of an inference?

97.—Comm.—"The connexion of the subject with the predicate is
twofold."

Namely, there are three kinds of inference, viz. only affirmative, only
negative, and affirmative and negative at the same time.

1. The only affirmative kind takes place, when there are no dissi-
milar instances with regard to the conclusion (major term), that is to
say, when the major term is not excluded from any other notion) for
instance, if it is argued, that something is an object of knowledge,
because it can be named; for here is a dissimilar instance impossible, as
every thing is an object of knowledge.

If it is said, 'that the only affirmative kind is impossible, because it is
separated from all other notions' (that is to say, such a notion is sepa-
rated from all other notions, and cannot therefore be connected with
all.) We deny this; for what is separated, is common to all, and this is
143.—The necessity of the absence of the conclusion where there is an absence of the reason, is the second.\

merely affirmative. Moreover, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether, &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that ether, space, &c. are not found anywhere, so it cannot be proved with regard to such notions as knowledge, &c.)

2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar subjects (of conclusions) for instance in the inference: Earth is distinguished from all the other elements, because it is possessed of smell;† for in this case there is no similar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.

3. Affirmative and negative inference take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances (of the conclusion or major term) for instance: This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there are similar instances, as a hearth, &c., and dissimilar instances, as a lake, &c.

98.—Comm.—The cause of the negative conclusion is the knowledge of a general negative proposition. (Vyntirekavyápti). For this reason the text defines the notion of a general negative proposition: “A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion” (major term) that is to say, a general negative is the absence of the reason, which absence is included in the absence of the conclusion (major term). Here it must be understood, by what connexion, at what place, and by what notion the more extensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows: by what connexion and notion the more comprehensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distinctive relation, &c. (see p. 7.) there

* Pratýyogī is that of which there is a negation (it is the contradictory opposition to its own negation) for instance a jar is the Pratýyogī of the negation of a jar. Apratýyogī is a thing of which there is no negation, as for instance space, which is everywhere, and of which it cannot anywhere be said, there is no space.

† Here is earth the minor term, the conclusion the distinction from what is different from earth, and the reason smell.
144.—Presumption* is not considered as another proof, because it is included in negative inference. Happiness, the object of desire of all worlds, is produced by virtue.

145.—Unhappiness the effect of vice, is abhorred by all conscious beings. The desire of happiness and of freedom from unhappiness arises from the knowledge of either.1

146.—There is a desire of obtaining the means for those ends (avoiding misery and gaining happiness) if there is knowledge follows the absolute negation of the notion of the other elements by the negation of the negation of smell, but where the more extensive notion of the other elements is comprehended by the relation of identity, there also is the negation of the other elements expressed by the relation of identity. This is reciprocal negation. And lastly, when by the relation of conjunction for instance the more extensive notion of fire with regard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, in a tank also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of conjunction. Here is the cause of the apprehension of the general negative proposition the knowledge of what agrees with a general negative. Others say:  By means of the negative the general affirmative is understood, but the knowledge of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative the general proposition is understood, there it is called a negative inference. The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first evident from single things, as a jar, &c. and afterwards it is established for the notion of earth" &c.

99.—Comm.—"The desire of freedom from unhappiness and of obtaining happiness arises from the knowledge of either."

Desire is threefold, viz. the desire whose object is the last end, (sumnum bonum, which is not the means to accomplish another object,) the desire whose object is a means (for something else) and the desire of action.

1. The desire whose object is the last end. The last end (केतु) is

* Vid. Col. M. E. Vt. p. 303. Presumption (arthāpāda, one of the five modes of proof of the Mīmāṃsākas) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proven.
of these means. The wish to act is the desire determined by what may be accomplished by action.

147.—The cause of this is the knowledge of what may be accomplished by acts and what may accomplish the object of a desire. The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle.\(^\text{100}\)

148.—According to others the cause of the wish to act is the knowledge of what does not produce that abhorrence. The cause of aversion is the knowledge of what accomplishes things that are abhorred. Endeavour is of three kinds according to philosophers, viz. activity, cessation from activity and vital endeavour.

149.—The wish to act, the knowledge of what may be ac-

happiness and freedom from unhappiness. The cause of the desire of the last end is the knowledge of the same; therefore it is of itself the object of man; for it follows from the definition, that any thing, which, when known, is desired by its own nature, is the object of man, and its full meaning is, that it is the object of a desire, not dependent upon another desire.

2. The desire whose object\(^*\) is a means (for something else.) The cause of this is the knowledge of what accomplishes an object of desire.

3. The desire of action is the desire, whose object is an effect to be accomplished by action, which (desire) is determined by the notion of what may be accomplished by action. This depends upon an apprehension such as this: I shall accomplish cooking by action. The cause of the desire of action is the knowledge, that an object may be obtained by action, and the knowledge, that the object of desire may be obtained. Therefore there is no desire of action with reference to rain, because it cannot be obtained by action.

\(^{100}\text{Comm.}—\)"The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle."

\(^*\) The object of a desire, independent of any other desire, is the last object; this is happiness and deliverance from unhappiness; for both are not desired for the sake of any thing else, but for their own sake. An object of a desire, depending upon another desire, is a secondary object; such are for instance, the fruition of love, eating the removal of the unhappiness of another, the refraining from desires, &c.
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complished by acts and what accomplishes such or such a desire, and the perception of the material causes produce activity.

150.—Cessation from activity rises from aversion produced by the knowledge of what accomplishes abhorred objects.

151.—Vital endeavour is constant; it transcends the perception of the senses;

152.—It is the cause of the flux and reflux of the vital airs in the body. Gravity abides in earth and water; it is imperceptible to the senses;

153.—It is transient in what is transient, and eternal in what is eternal. It is the non-intimate cause of the action which is called falling.

154.—Fluidity is twofold, innate and derived from a cause; the first abides in water, the second in earth and light;

155.—In the atoms of water it is eternal, in every other thing transient. Derived fluidity is produced in clarified butter and similar substances when heated by the union with fire.

156.—Fluidity is the cause of trickling and instrumental cause in a collection (heap). Viscidity abides in water; it is eternal in atoms, non-eternal in a compound.

For instance, there is no desire of action with regard to honey, mixed with poison, because the strong aversion is an obstacle.

(Material or intimate causes are those substances by means of which a desire is accomplished; for instance the material causes of a sacrifice are: the presence of ghee, wood, rice, &c.)

101.—Comm.—"Is constant;" which means, it lasts as long as life does.

102.—Comm.—"It transcends the perception of the senses; for the flux and reflux of the vital airs, when stronger than usually, is accomplished by endeavour, for instance a stronger inspiration (this is evident from perception). If this is the case, then from the inference, that the flux of the vital airs is accomplished by endeavour (for there must be a cause of it) and further from the inadmissibility of an endeavour that is perceived (for in the ordinary function of respiration, &c. it is not perceived) it follows, that the flux of vital airs is accomplished by an
157.—By the abundance of this (visciditv) in oil combustion is favoured. There are three kinds of faculty, viz. velocity, elasticity and memory.

158.—Velocity abides only in bodies, and is twofold, either produced by action or by velocity.\(^{181}\) Elasticity is according to some only found in earth, according to others in the four first elements.

159.—It is imperceptible to the senses, and is sometimes the cause of vibratory motion.\(^{184}\) The faculty which has the name of memory, is found only in sentient beings; it is imperceptible to the senses.

160.—Its cause is certitude without inattention.\(^{185}\) Memory is called also the cause of remembrance and of recognition.

endeavour, which transcends the perception of the senses. This is vital endeavour.

103.—Comm.—"It is twofold, either produced by action, or by velocity." Velocity in an arrow arises from action produced by conjunction without noise, (Child. v. 118.) hence from the destruction of a former action arises another action. In the same manner all the subsequent actions must be considered. And without velocity, since one action is an obstacle to another, the destruction of a former action, and the production of a subsequent one were impossible. Where velocity is effected by velocity, for instance, where the velocity in a jar is effected by the velocity of its half, there is velocity, produced by velocity.

104.—Comm.—Elasticity is proved for instance by the fact, that a branch which is attracted, returns to its former position, when released. The opinion of some, that elasticity abides in the four first elements, is not supported by any evidence.

105.—Comm.—"Its cause is certitude without inattention." If it is said: 'Is certitude, different from inattention, rather not the cause of remembrance? And if this is the case, let us say, that knowledge in general is the cause of memory.'

We object; for as there is no authority of assuming an alternative, it is evident, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory. Moreover, with reference to inattention, the assumption of
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

161.—Fate is twofold, merit and demerit. Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained. It is a practice of ablutions in the Gangā, &c. and of sacrifices, &c.

162.—It is thought perishable by the contact with the water of the Karmanásā. Demerit is the cause of hell, &c. and is produced by blamable works.

163.—It may be destroyed by expiations, &c. Both qualities abide in living creatures. They are produced by desire and destroyed likewise by knowledge.

memory is complicated (superfluous) and hence it is proved, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory.

The proof of this is given in the words: "It is called the cause of remembrance and recognition." That is to say, memory produces remembrance and recognition; therefore memory is assumed, for it is impossible, that a former perception produces, without intercourse, remembrance, because a cause is impossible, if it is not in respective intercourse with either of the two (remembrance or recognition.) Nor can it be said, 'that, as memory, determined by the category of identity, is the cause of recognition, remembrance is obtained, because recognition is produced by memory;' for there is no cause for this.

106.—Comm.—"Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained."

That is to say, it is the means of obtaining the happiness of heaven and all other happiness, and of bodies fit to enjoy the happiness of heaven.

107.—Comm.—"In living creatures," because merit and demerit cannot be assigned to God.

108.—Comm.—"They are produced by desire, and destroyed likewise by knowledge."

"By desire," that is to say, if good or bad acts are done by one who has perfect knowledge, they are of no effect. "Likewise by knowledge." "Likewise" is said to indicate enjoyment.

'But how (it may be objected) can the knowledge of truth destroy merit and demerit? for this (the destruction of merit and demerit)

* The name of a small river, which separates the territory of Benares, Kasi, from Bihar.—Vid. Lassen's Ind. Altirth. Vol. I. p. 140.
Division of the Categories

164.—There are two kinds of sound, inarticulate and articulate; the first is produced by a drum, &c. and the latter, as ka and other letters, by the contact of the throat with the palate.

165.—Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when its is produced in the ear. Some say, its production takes place like a succession of waves.

would be contrary to the passage (of the Yoga-sūtra): "An action, of which the effect is not experienced (which has not produced its due consequence in the soul of the agent, viz. happiness, if a good action, and unhappiness, if a bad one) does not perish even in a hundred crores of Kalpas." If this is the case, then the destruction of merit and demerit takes place in this manner, that a person who knows the truth, experiences the consequences of all his works; at once by all his bodies. (viz. all the bodies which he is to assume in future births.)

There, however, "to experience the consequences of works," is only given as an example of the various ways, in which works are destroyed according to the Vedas. How could otherwise works be destroyed by expiations? &c. It is said (in the Bhagavadgītā) "The fire of knowledge consumes all works." And in the Sruti: "All his works perish, when the general and individual souls are known."

If it is said: 'In this case there cannot exist for him who knows truth, the state of the body, nor happiness, unhappiness, &c. as by knowledge all works are destroyed,' we object; for only the works different from those which are commenced, are destroyed; for only the work which is the cause of the enjoyment of this or that body, has been commenced.

109.—Comm.—"Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear."

Abiding in the ether, means, that the ether is its ultimate cause. As a sound, when distant, is not perceived, it is said, "in the ear." As it may be doubted, how a sound, produced in the space determined by a drum, &c., is produced in the ear, it is said: "Its production takes place like a succession of waves," its sound produces another, determined by a space, external to the first, and the second produces again a third, and so on. In this manner it is perceived, when it is gradually produced in the ear.
166.—According to others, like the bud of the Kadamba plant. From the knowledge, that the letter ka is produced, and that it is destroyed, non-eternity of sound would follow.

167.—The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon the perception of general knowledge. "This is the medicine," such and other sentences depend upon general knowledge.

110.—Comm.—"Like the bud of the Kadamba plant." In this manner: From the first sound ten sounds are produced in the ten divisions of space. Hence ten other sounds are produced. As this assumption is complicated, it is said in the text: "according to some."

111.—Comm.—"From the knowledge," &c. To remove the objection, that sound is not produced, because it is eternal, it is said: "From the knowledge," &c.

112.—Comm.—If it be objected: 'The eternity of sound follows from the fact, that this letter ka is recognised as that letter ka,' the text gives the answer: The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon community of class, &c. Here is the object of recognition, the community of class of this and that object, but not the identity of this and that individual: because it is contrary to the knowledge which has been mentioned. If this is the case, there cannot be a mistake with regard to those two perceptions (viz. sound is not eternal, and this is that sound).
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CORRECTIONS AND EMMENDATIONS.

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i. 22, for in read of.

xii. 17, for with read to.

id. 19, for with read to.

xiii. 3, for faculties read modifications.

xxi. 23, for drishṭanta read drishtiṭanta.

2. 15, for negation read affirmation.

3. 35, for रमन read रमन.

4. 2, for individuality read separatedness.

id. 3, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.

id. 4, for volition read endeavour.

id. 31, for संधीविभाजन read संधीविभाजन.

6. 18, for with read to.

7. 14, for with read to.

12. 26, for after earth add and mind:

id. 29, for रमन read रमन.

13. 7, for individuality read separatedness.

id. 8, for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority.

id. 16, for volition read endeavour.

id. 22, for volition read endeavour.

id. 22, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.

16. 26, for is read in

id. 33, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.

17. 1, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.

19. 31, for भाष read भाष.

23. 28, for such read touch.

26. 4, for individuality read separatedness.

id. 5, for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority.

27. 4, for with read to.

44. 1, for Mīmāṃsikas read Mīmāṃsakas.

51. 1-2, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.

53. 6, for ditto read ditto.

id. 8, for ditto read ditto.

id. 17, for ditto read ditto.

54. 1, for natural read innate.

N. B. The translation counts one verse more than the original, as the invocation, forming the first verse of the former, has not been taken into the text of the latter.
चन्द्र सिद्धान्तमुक्तावलीस्थितभाषापरिचयः

भाषापरिच्छेदः ॥

मक्खलाचरण ॥

ॐ नमः गणेशः ॥

नूनजलधरकृच्ये गोपवन्धुतिदुकूलचौरयाः ॥

गिस्मानमुकुली ॥

मक्खलाचरण ॥

ॐ नमः गणेशः ॥

चूरामणिजलविपुर्णविविहारातनुष्कीः ॥

भवा भवतु भवाय लोकातामकश्रिसि: ॥

प्रतिष्ठा ॥

निजसन्योगिताकारिकासोममतत्वमिद्धिष्ठ्रेण सरसा गिर्भिः ॥

विष्णुदरवरणि कैतुकाथानुऽराजीवद्यावशमः ॥

रघुप्रसादनेन तमातिपदावस्थयमः ॥

हस्त्या गुणसुतिता सुहितिनाम वल्कर्ष्णाः जारिका
वनामात्मनेवातिरितिमिलिता भावप्रकर्ष्णास्त्रयः ॥

विष्णुवंचिबि विष्णुमधुसुबिमिलाना गिस्मानसुकुली
विन्याससमावेर्यां विविलितमुद्युवत्रो चिरः ॥

विप्रविधाताय ज्ञान सकृतं यियामिदाय निष्ठमानि
नूरलेखादि ॥ नागुर्गकृतं तवत्याध्येयं प्रति न वा
भाषारत तद्वते नमः कृष्णाय संसारमहिलाम् वीजाय।

शिखारां समाधिः प्रति कारणः विनायक महान्नार्रिशाहो न च निरिंधति प्रभावात्। न च अग्नि-धारितं शिखरं शिखरं च न दृश्यते तत्वं न दृश्यते। यद्यपि च यथापि महान् समाधिः अगंग्यते न च अनुभवना विद्या विद्याधारार्यं करणकारणं। विस्मयं शक्तं शिखरं दार्शययादः।

नवासम् महान्नार्रिशाहं विद्याधारार्यं विद्याधारार्यं च करणकारणं। विद्याधारार्यं महान्नार्रिशाहं विद्याधारार्यं न च स्त्रियः।

यथा-प्रसेति विद्याधारार्यं तदारत्ता। तथैव शिखरचरणम्। न च तथान्निर्यालेन तदाधकारणम्। नवासम् महान्नार्रिशाहं विद्याधारार्यं विद्याधारार्यं।

तथान्निर्यालेन तदाधकारणम्। तदम् विबोधितं तदाधकारणम्। नवासम् महान्नार्रिशाहं विद्याधारार्यं विद्याधारार्यं।
भाषा। इथे गुणार्थवा कणी सामान्य सविशेषकां।

पदरांगिनामुहुर्समाधृ। इथे गुणार्थवा। संपर्कम्मकान्वयनादेव वेणां भावना क्रियां तें भावेनां प्रयोगमिलेन न हतः। एते च पदरांगिन विकल्पकामात् खिंचू नैचिशिकांग्नानानानानानानारूपी। ग्रन्थिरूपमिलेन। वेणां भावनामिद्यानानारूपी। भविष्य आत्मानः भविष्यारूपी।

यानी गुणार्थवा।
भाषा: समवायताबाबाई पद्याः सम्बन्धिता॥ १॥

चित्रांजो महकुशामङ्का दिग्रेद्विना मनः।

चित्रांमृता दानानुकुला शकिनांग्ले उत्तेजकेन महाशय-चरणेन च जन्यत दृति कर्यते। एवं सादुम्भमणेन दिशां पदार्थः। तत्रुद्ध न चं गंधर्वाधीकः नस्ताणि सामान्य-शिशु खलात्। यथा गांवं निजं तथा नार्तमपीति बाठुशास्त्रोतोः। नाथभावे। सचेन प्रतीयमालादिरितिः। न। मण्डामभावविश्रृंखलान्वेव ब्रह्मादिकं प्रति खात्वीण मण्डामवादङ्के वा चेतुलकपने मण-मखस्य अपनमाशितमागमाभावमक्षरणानीचित्यात्।

न धात्वात्रीतो धातुष्ठितं मण्डाममुक्षसाधिनः कथं साधृरुवत्वं वाच्यं। सचेन अभावविश्रृंखलाचारमाणायामाभावस्तु चेतुलाति। बाठुष्ठाधि न पदार्थांतः तं तिन्नु तद्देशस्य वाच्यं। यथा बक्षुविश्वासं वैति चक्रवतीकुलाकाराविच्छिन्नं मुखे चक्रं बुध-मिति॥ २॥

क्रियाविभिन्न विभेदेत। चित्रांबिधि। प्रतानि नव क्र-व्याप्ती। दृश्यः। न बुधबलाजाती चिन्मायां। न धर्मत् साधु गौमाणं धृतजतुस्मित्वेत्। बुधबलायाद्विधि चेतु। न। कार्यवाचिकारणाववेदकादत्या संघ-गश्च विभागश्च व वस्मवाचिकारणाववेदकादत्या तविशिष्टीति॥ गुणू द्रस्मं कुलनमः कृतं नाग्नः।
भाषा । कथ्याण्यमय गुणाः गृह्यं रसी गम्यताः परं ॥ २ ॥
सम्भृतः संध्या परिमितः प्रायत्नकर्त्ततं परं ।
संयोगस्य भिक्षाय परलोकपारतं ॥ ३ ॥
बुद्धि शुष्कं दुःखिष्ठका हेतुः यलो गृह्यत्वं ।
द्रवं धीरसंस्कारावदेन्त गृह्यं एव च ॥ ४ ॥
उत्तेजपणं तनोऽवलोप्यप्रणाश्यते तथा ।
निसर्जनं गमनं कल्याणेनानि पवनं च ॥ ५ ॥
भ्रमणं रेणं स्वदोषां विज्ञानमन्व च ।

विद्या । तद्वयं प्रत्यतेषां गृह्यते । तथा च रूपवचनां कर्मविवर्णां
ध्रुवलं । तत्स गम्यप्रमुखः न ह्रद्युवो । नीलकुशवचनां
न जस्तिदिवं । तत्प्रायते वालोकनिरपेक्ष चतुः कारणं
द्रव्यं वेदत् । नास्यन्ते भावस्थार्थं भावोपपत्तिः क्रत्यान्तः
कल्याणं ग्रह्यमात् । रूपवचनान्तितिनिधी भ्रमरः
कर्मवचनान्तितिरपि आचार्यपापाय गौःपापाय अन्नानि
रेव । तत्मोग्यानितिरक्ष्येने भाववाहिदिक्षाय गा०गा०
वचनं । शर्षकं गर्त्या तेजहस्यसम्भवन्या वचनं ॥

गुणां विभज्ये । चतुः गुणा द्रव्यं एवं गुणांकतु-विनमितिस्मृक्षकाः
कसाध्येषु कपटसंयुक्तं च दर्शिता ॥
तत्र गुणांतिकिरज्ञेन तितिदिरं वचनं ॥ २ ॥ ३ ॥ ४ ॥
कर्माणि विभज्ये । उक्तेंपरमिति कर्माणि अन्तः
अत्यन्तिकर्म गम्यं एवमुक्तेनलादिकमणि । नक्षत्र भ्रम-
भाषा। नीर्यगमनस्यच गमनादेव लभये॥ ६ ॥
सामायः द्विविधे प्रासं परस्परमेवः च।
इत्यादिनितीहेतसु सुखा परन्यथे॥ ७ ॥
परबहुवा च या जानि: सेवापरतयोऽयचे॥

सिद्धा। शास्त्रिकसं राज्यकार्याधिकार्या कुतो नेशास्त सारं।
अभमणिमिखादि॥ ८ ॥ १० ॥

शास्त्रायः निरुपयत। शास्त्रात्मिति। तत्त्वचारणुन्
नियते साधनशेषमवेति॥ अनेकमवेति धनोऽधारी-
गामणकक्तत उपक। नियते सतीति। नियते बति
समवेति गणणपरिमाणार्य नामयधक्त उपक। अनेकी-
करोऽरुऽनियते साधनशेषमवेति विषयमस्मवेवतीमियुक्त।
अभकारण्य वकज्ञित्वम् न जातिः। तथापि। बलवंशकालान्तः
श्वरो विषयाश्वति। रुपान्तिरवस्मथो जाति-
वायुक्तपूजः॥ एकाः शिल्पराखागः न जातिः।
तुच्छाशिल्पराखागः घटालं कलाघाण न जातिष्ठे। शशि-
वि अन्याय भूतान् मूर्तत म जाति।। अभवशाख्यात् सा-
माणः न जातिः। विशेषा शाबदक्षिणभावान् रूप-
शानि: आदिन्स विशेषवान् न जाति।। बमवायुवन-
अभावायः समायोऽ न जाति।। कुशादीति।
परस्य विषयाधिकारः॥ च सः परस्य विषयाधिकारः॥
ভাষার অধ্যায়ের উল্লেখিতা পরামর্শের চাপ ॥ ৮ ॥
ব্যাপকাধার প্রাপ্তি স্তব্ধালালাপরাপি চ।
অন্যে নিয়ন্ত্রণ নির্মাণের পরিকল্পনা ॥ ৫ ॥
ঘরাড়ী কপালাঢ্য দ্বিধার গুণকাম্পণ।

বিলাত ১০ সবজ্ঞায়েপেয়াধিকেশিনিলাভ চ চতায়। পরলং পাদাধ্যায়েতে দ্বাদশ ধিনিচিত্রণ। তদপেয়া চার্যর্থে জাতীযঃ পরমপরলং। পরমের চতাভিষিক্ত।
ব্যাপকালিক। ৭ ॥ ২ ॥
এক্ষীলানালে ব্যাপকাধিকেশিনিলাভ দ্বিধার। চতায়। সত্যাচরণ্যা মাত্রাত্রে শ্রদ্ধেয়-রক্ষালাভে দ্বিধারলং। তথ্য ধর্মোদয়মানে শাদ্যভবমভবনীত॥

বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্টতত। অন্তর ডিত। বলন ব্যবস্থানে বর্ণন বৃহদ। বৃহদেচ্যা বিশিষ্টা নাশিকায়। এক- মাত্র ডিতনিতত বিশিষ্ট স্বত্বঃ। ঘটাড়ীনাম দ্বিধার নাশিকায়-নাশন তন্ত্রবৃহ ভেদত পরের ভেদ। পরমাণুর পরের ভেদায় বিশিষ্ট পরব ॥ যা তু ভেদ পর ব্যাখ্যা।
তন তথ বিশেষাভাবে নাস্তিক ভাব ॥ ৪ ॥

সমাবার দ্বীপ ভূত। ঘটাড়ীনামীত। ভ্রাতৃত্ব- যাবিনীর্তিতাত্ত্বিক গুণগুণীত। বিষের ভাবতাঙ্কিতে। সম্প্রতি। য সমাবার। সমাবার ব্যাপে।
भाषाऽ नेपु जातेन सम्बन्धः समवायः प्रकृतिर्चितः॥ १०॥
अभावस्तु दिघः संसर्गोष्योन्याभावजेद्वः।

भिन्नऽ जित्यमभवलः। तत्र प्रमाणाणु गुणज्ञायाः दिविषयसंबंधः निद्रेवेश्यैः ज्ञायसः महसंज्ञायो विशिष्टविभिन्नः द्वारः कुक्षुः दृतः विशिष्टविभिन्नः द्वारः कुक्षुः। तत्र चंद्रे -
गाणिवायानां सम्बायायिनिः। न च सहस्यमन्नेन
विद्युसाधनं चर्यान्तः वा। चनिन्दनश्चृपाणां समस्य-लक्षणान्तः श्रीहर्षः। शास्यवादेकसमवायविनिः। न च समवायथेऽकं वा यथं रूपवर्ताबुद्धिः प्रस्थः । तत्र
रूपसमवायास्चेचिपि रूपाभावात्। न चैवं प्रभावस्तु
वैशिष्टों समस्यान्तः विस्मृतिः ताथं। तथा नित्ये
भूते चंद्राणवाणनार्मणैः चंद्राभावुद्धिः प्रस्थः।
चंद्राभावास्यमेऽ तत्र स्वर्णः तथा विद्यात्।
चनिन्दा देशारोज्जिपि तिथ्यैतिनिः खात्। वैशिष्टां च
तत्र स्वर्णः। सम तु मेव घटे पाकरजातार्याः
आदर्शस्य स्वर्णग्नि तद्निर्भूः। वैशिष्टानिः
वनस्यवैशिष्टाशकान्तः तेषां गौरवः। रंगख तत्त्व-
स्तूगतन्तुतवादिन्क तत्सद्भावाः सम्बन्धः॥ १०॥
प्रभावविभजे। प्रभाबःक्लिति। प्रभाबस्तु दुर्यय-
दिष्टस्याभावाः प्रभावस्तु दुर्यय- 
रणिचात्योन्याभावलः संसर्गेऽनि। संसर्गोष्योन्याभावाः-
भावमेदारितिः॥ अन्याभावस्तुक्विधिलवाचरः।
ভাষার প্রাগাভাবলুপ্ত ধৃষ্টচতুষ্যায়নাভাব এব ন ॥ ৯১ ॥

শিখ ॥ প্রাগাভাবাতু সঃপরিভাববিভিত্তে । প্রাগাভাবে দতি ।
সঃপরিভাববলম  অন্যায়ভাবভিবিশালভাবলম । অন্যায়-ভাবল নাদাকৃষ্ণমেবভিক্ষুপ্রতিষ্ঠিতাকামভাবল ।
বিনাভাবল প্রাগাভাবল । জনাভাবল ধ্বংসল । বি-ল্যাংসঃপরিভাবল ধ্বংসনাভাবল । রচ তু দুঃকলামতী
ঘটাদিকশালিতে পুনরারীত্ব তেহ । ঘটাংসঃসং
কালস ন ঘটাত্বাভাবাবকুলিঃ । তেহ উত্তাদিবিনাশ-
শালিবীতা চতুর্থাধিকম ভাব দতি কৃতীত । চতু ধ্বং-
প্রাগাভাবঃজোরধিরে নাথাভাবঃ দতি প্রাচোন-
মত । শ্রামঞ্জে রক্ষা নাস্তিতি রহঃপতি জামে নাস্তিতি ধোৎ প্রাগাভাব ধ্বংস্যায়নাভাবে ন তু তদ্বিধ-
মাভাব । নান্দন্তেত তচ্চ বিরিধে মানাভাবতু ধর্মঞ-
বিকালেরত্নপ্রায়নাভাবে বর্তম দতি প্রাচ ॥

শরুতু অধ্যায়ধিকরণেরমকথ্যকরণে কারাত্তি চতি ।
ি । অধ্যায়ধিকরণায়ককলকলনমত্ত্বাতিরিধ্যক-
ৰামায় এব সংবিধায় । এহঁকার ধারাধিপথাঞ্চ

dায়ককল প্রশ্বল প্রশ্বল । এহঁকার নামকর ধারাধিপথাঞ্চ

dায়ককল প্রশ্বল প্রশ্বল । এহঁকার নামকর ধারাধিপথাঞ্চ

dায়ককল প্রশ্বল প্রশ্বল । এহঁকার নামকর ধারাধিপথাঞ্চ
भावा् एवं चौबिड़मापनः संसर्गभाव द्वारे।
सम्पन्नामपि साधनमें श्रीयतादिकार्मिकुष्यते॥१२॥
द्रष्याद्वः पद्ध भावा चनेके समवायनः।

विष्णूः विशेषिस्क्रियेषांश्राभम्भ्रमणानांभावाभिनेौतिः प्रयुक्तः।
अर्धशरायासः॥१३॥

हताहृ वाचनस्थानों साधनस्य विशेषिक्षणः वुक्तः प्रक्रमः।
भावारसामायिकः। समाना ध्याया वेदां ते धार्मिकः
लेक्षणां भावः धार्मिकः। समाने ध्याया दृषि फलितार्यः।
एवं विष्णुः ध्याया वेदां ते विशेषिक्षणसेवा भावः
विशेषिक्षणः पद्ध दृषि फलितार्यः। श्रीयताः ज्ञानः
विविधता। याच वाचनविधि। ईसारादिकार्त्तिक्षणानिः
वस्त्रानिः केवलालिन्यात्। एवं भविष्यानमें
वाचनिक बोधे॥१५॥

क्याचर्यः क्रये शक्तिभावाविशेषाणां साधनस्य
मानकलं "भावल समवायः। यथापनेकलं भावे
स्थलः तथापनेकलं वति भावल पद्धारा धार्मिकः।
तथाच अनेकभावाविदिपद्धार्यविवाहकायापाधिकारणं
धारितार्यः। तेन घटावै प्रत्येकः सांख्याति। शम-
वाचलं शमावचाराग्निष्ठं समाधिं न तु शमावचारवलं।
शामान्यकाराधारानु। तथाच शमवेदिपद्धार्यविवाह-
कायापाधिकारणं फलितार्यः। तेन निष्ठूः चतुः सांख्याति।

* चर्चामूलासिद्धः
भाषा । सत्तावण्यक्यस्वाया गुणादीर्मिगुणकियः ॥ १६ ॥ 
समान्यपरिधिनासु सबैं जातवादयो मननः ।

मन्त्र। सत्तावण्य रूपित रक्षाकारणं सत्तावण्यमित्यतः ।
गुणादीर्मिति। यथापि गुणिकायमूलभास्करणो घटते
दातादिर्रां चिरगुणनमस्त गुणादर्दिर्रां। नायिका
गुणवद्धनिधिधिविश्वविद्वार्धविभाजकोपा- 
भिधिमं तदर्थः। न वि प्रवाल्दिके द्रव्यः का गुणव- 
देशित कर्मवद्वद्वितिवां किलो गुणादीर्मित्यतः। तथा
अकाशसागरिकनु न पदर्थविभाजकोपाधि: ॥ १६ ॥

समान्योति। समान्यार्थविधारणां समामार्थनो- 
मित्यतः। परिसमार्णकोति। परिमार्णविधानां अभिप- 
रिमाणं। कारणे तह्विन्यासामितः। अभिपरि- 
रिमाणं न तु कस्मापि कारणं। तद्वृत्त खास्यायामरङ्गां- 
परिमाणारङ्गां भवेत्। तथा न घणतिः। परिमा- 
णाय कस्मार्थसातीयतारस्तिपरिमाणाजनकालाधुत। अभ- 
दारभन्य महत्तरवत्त। अशुरण्यायानुतप्रमस्कृष्ट। 
एवं परममुक्तपरिमाणं शतीश्चित्रयामानं विशेषा-
भाषां पारिमाह्लक्ष्यभिन्नाना कारणांसुदारां नाळे १४ ||
अनुसरिण्यत्वात् नियता पूर्णवर्तमाना ।
कारणांभवेसंश्च वैविध्यं परिक्षितां नाळे १५ ||
समवाचिकारणानां चियमधायसमवाचिकारणां एवं
व्यायन्यजैशैलीमुखी निमिषसंचितां नाळे १६ ||

सिद्धांत हैं | हर्दमपि शैवग्रंथं विवेकश्च न कारणांना | ज्ञानमागानां न ज्ञानपिमा | ज्ञायमान
किंक्रनानुसिद्धवियतिकारणं देवभूतप्रत्ययं मानवप्रथमं
श्रीमानमलख कारणांक्त मधुरविनिर्धारां कारकान-द्रवीतथा तत्त्वांपि न कारणलिखितायांणांमानाय
देवाने। तद्भवं | ज्ञानतिरिक्त मिति कारणतारथा एव
श्रीमानमलख | १४ ||

समवाचिकारणानां। किमं किमत स्राह | अन्यंताति | तत्त्व
कारणस्थान। १५ ||

तत्त्व समवाचिकारणाः। ज्ञानं प्रत्याशितं कारण
द्वीपमधममवाचिकारणमिथवः। तत्त्र चक्रपि तु-रीतनाथेश्वरां पटाममवाचिकारणं स्थानु एवं
वेणारीमापिशंभिन्नानां पारिमाह्लक्ष्यभिन्नाना कारण
एवं ज्ञानादिकमङ्क्षाग्नयमवाचिकारणं स्थान। तथापि
पटाममवाचिकारणस्थान्यं तुरीतनाथेश्वरांभिन्नाना कारण
स्थापो | तथापि
एवं वेणारीमिव वेणारीमवाचिकारणं
ভাষা ১২
বর্তমান কার্যে ভবিঃ স্বয়ং সমবায়িতজন্ন নানা।
নারায়ণে জনক দ্বিযোগায়ণে পরে তত্ত্বিয় স্বাত।১৭।
যেন সুখ পূর্বভাগে কার্যমাদায় বা যোগাত।

মিত্রা ১৫ ভবেষ্টি তত্ত্বার্থসমবায়িকারণলঃ তত্ত্বব-রিচ ন দেয়। অন্তঃসিদ্ধালগা হুতায়সম-
বায়ীকারণলঃ বাস্ত। তণ নিবিজ্ঞ সামান্যলঃ প্রেমত।
স্তন সমবায়িকারণপ্রায় স্ববিধে কার-লেক্যার্থপ্রায়স্বাধ্যায়া কার্যোপার্থপ্রায়স্বাধ্যায়া চ।
ার্থ ব্যাঘ্য ঘটতি প্রতি কপালপত্যোগাঙ্গঃ।
তপন কার্যায়ণ ঘটত যাহ কারণায় কপালপত্য্যাঞ্চ এক-
মিন্ন কপালপ্রায় চিন্তিতায়। দ্বিতীয় ব্যাঘ্য ঘটতিত প্রতি
কারণায়ণ ঘটত। তন যন্ত কপালধ্রুপর্ণ একমিন্ন কপালপ্রায় চিন্তিতায়।
থ্যা দ্বিতীয় স্ম্রবার্থযোগেন
কাহন সমবায়িকারণপ্রায়স্বাধ্যায়কায়ণ।

মহাব্যাঘ্য কার্যকার্যায়ণকার্যায়ণত্যায়াঃ কা-
রণ প্রায়স্বাধ্যায়মানভুতায়ণায়ণ সামায়োন-
ন্য প্রায়স্বাধ্যায়া। অত্যন্ত সমবায়িকারণপ্রায়স্বাধ্যায়-
ন্যায় নিয়ম ভবায় কারণায়ণ তত্ত্বিয় দ্বিযোগ

১৭। ১৭।

দৃষ্টান্তমধ্যস্থলতে নিয়ম প্রথা না হার ন-
হার। যেন সুখ পূর্বভাগে কারণায়ণ।
ভাষা। অন্য প্রতি পূর্বে সে হাতে যন্ত পূর্বের প্রবঞ্চনায়।
অন্য প্রতি পূর্বের প্রতি ন যন্ত যেহেতু।

বিক্র। পূর্বের সিঁদুর ভুলে তত্ত্বাত্মা প্রতি তদ্রূপ-মতাধিশ্রমিতি ভাষাত। চরা ঘটন প্রতি দৃষ্ট মিতি।
বিক্র। সমন্তাধিশ্রমাধিশ্রম। আরম্ভিতি।
ক্ষু ক্ষতি ক্ষতিক্ষতির দিকে যা সাধন কারণ-সাধনার্থ চরণ্য ক্ষতিক্ষতির দিকে যন্ত যেহেতু চরা দৃষ্টান্ত।
বিক্র। প্রতি।
অন্য প্রতি পূর্বের সিঁদুর প্রতি গভীরাদেব যন্ত যকায় প্রতি পূর্বের সিঁদুর যন্ত যেহেতু তত্ত্বাত্মা প্রক্ষতি রূপমণ্ডল।
চরা ঘটানিতে প্রতি মুখার্জিতে।
প্রাক্তা জানিতে প্রতি প্রক্ষতে বর্ণ কারণ চরণায় প্রক্ষতে বর্ণ কারণ।
চরা ঘটানিতে প্রতি জনকে প্রতি প্রক্ষতে বর্ণ কারণ।
কন্যাদিকে প্রতি নিন্দা প্রতি বেদিত।

জন্তুর্মধ্যে প্রক্ষতি মাদান।
অন্য প্রতি।
চরা-যাকসন প্রতি পূর্বের সিঁদুর প্রতি পূর্বের সিঁদুর তত্ত্ব প্রক্ষতে তত্ত্ব।
চরা কুশাসনপিতুষট।
তত্ত্ব কুশাসনপিতুষট।
भाषा  अतिरिक्तमण्डपि वस्त्रेःक्षित्यनवयमक्षणपूर्वंवभाविनः॥१८॥
एते पञ्चावध्याक्षिस्मा दण्डविदिभिकामादिम्।
घटादै दण्डविस्मादि नित्यायमपि दर्शिनं॥२०॥
ततोयतु भवेष्ट्रो नुलालजनकोपरः।

बिहार  घरं प्रति जनकलयन्यायान्यासिद्धः। कुलालमेव जनकले
विष्टापनः। कुलालमाच्छा घरं प्रति जनकलात्॥
पञ्चमन्यायाचिद्रमाः । अतिरिक्तमण्डपि  निष्टावः
पञ्चमयभाविनः। चवशस्त्राच्छिन्नतपञ्चवर्षिन सः कार
यवभवे नीच्चमन्यायाचिद्रमाः। खर एव प्रत्ये
महं कारणमनाक्रुद्वयस्मयाचिद्रमाः। तत्र चि
महं मन्यस्य काः। तेनानुक्रमः कवचमन्यायाचिद्रमाः। न
च वैपरीत्य च विगममक्षितं वाच्यं। महचल
शान्ति: कारणताब्दृशेऽहि साधवात॥ १८॥

राष्ट्रातिरिक्तः। यहत्यानि प्रति राष्ट्रनाथ निवन्त
पञ्चवस्त्रमाळकाः तथापि घरजातीयां प्रति विद्वकारण
भावैौत्त्वदिविरेभि नपञ्चवर्षिन गम्ये राष्ट्रोपन्याया
चिद्रमाः दृष्टं भावः॥ एतिविद्यः। एतयु पञ्चावन्याय
शिवद्वयु मधे पञ्चमस्मयाचिद्रमाः चावष्टकः। ' तेनाव
परेऽपि विरतायुः। तथा च दण्डविविष्कर्षं
कुमनाक्रुद्वयस्मयाचिद्रमाः कार्यम्य िश्वार्दिकरः
नापार्थितूः। न च 'वैपरीत्य च विगममक्षितं
भा:। पञ्चको रासभादि: स्यादेन्यावभाषकस्वते। ॥ २१॥
समवाचिकारणमः क्रियाशैवनि विशेषं।
गुणकर्मानात्तथा ज्ञयस्यापयमस्वाभिचित्रतुलं। ॥ २२॥
अन्यजै नियमदीर्घं नारायणलबाचने।
चित्तादीनां नवानान्तु क्र्यमालगुणयोगिता। ॥ २३॥

चित्तादी। दच्छलमः कारणः क्रणधितिपरमेवः।
समविशालतः गोरवः। एवस्याश्यामः चरितार्थः लक्ष्यः। ॥ २०॥ ॥ २१॥
समवाचिकारणलभितः। गुणकर्मः। अभसवाचिकारणः गुणकर्मानाग्रं विद्याय न सुगुणकर्मः।
वाध्यः दृष्टिरापि वातः। अथवा अभसवाचिकारणः
रणुदिनिष्टासहिप्रावित्तिमतं तदः। तेन ज्ञानादी
नामः अभसवाचिकारणविनिरेक्षये व चाहिये। ॥ २२॥
अन्ये॥ नियमथः परमाणाकाकादीपि
विद्याचारिततः साधुमयामितः। अश्लीलतम् सम
वाचिकारणः टनिमथः। विशेषतः नियमानामः
काष्ठादी स्तुतः। कार्लकर्मभाषायम्यामेण तेषाः
नुस्कलम्यामितम् परमाणः। तेन समवाचिकारणः
समवाचिकारणाय प्रातिनि न चाहिये। ॥ २३॥
दच्छलमः क्रणधितिपरमेवः। चित्तादीनामिति। ॥ २४॥

* बाचित्यपुष्पोऽभिः*
भाषा

निर्देश

परापरमूर्तलिंगावेगास्रय चर्मी चै।

कालाध्यादिश्री स्वर्गनालं परमं मन्त्रं।

मित्राः

निर्देशार्थमिति। प्रत्ययसृजेयार्थमिति। परस्रूपमे परम। परमशयम् प्रवाहील। प्रवाहमेव परमस्रूपम्।

नव। बल्वु रसायनस्यार्थमिति। परलोकात्मकानाधिकारणां कथं। परस्रूपार्थं विविधतालं।

ततो तदाति गणादिपरिमाणां कुरूणां पदङ्कराभावान् कथं। वेगवं कर्ममानाधिकारणाय प्रभाषकतांतितिवर्गीयेऽपि।

काशीपति। कालाध्यादिश्री स्वर्गनालं परमभूतं। परममहत्त्वं। परमस्रूपपरमी। भविष्यार्थपरमेरिष्यार्थार्थं।

विष्णुभिदेशकथार्थमिति। प्रत्ययसृजेयार्थमिति। ततो वस्तिविशिष्यः पदङ्कराभावान्।

स्थानाद्यं कृत्यादिकारणां कथं। तत: ब्रह्मराध्यायाय प्रभाषकतांतितिवर्गीयेऽपि।

नव मित्राः प्रत्ययसृजेयार्थमिति।
ভাষার বিষয়বস্তু মূলানি চলারি সংক্রান্তি চি মূল।

ক্ষ্যারাম্বল্পুর্ণ নাদঢাকাঠামোরীরিতু।

ধারায়িনি:  তথ্যাপি ছড়িয়েমানত প্রকাশকারণায় রাষ্ট্রাধিনায়ন ন প্রয়োজন। চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র নত বলা রীতি। ঃধ্যাপিকেনীयায়ন চতুর্থায়ন চতুর্থায়ন ॥ ২৫ ॥

ক্ষ্যারাম্বল্পুর্ণ নাদঢাকাঠামোরীরিতু। ঃধ্যাপিকেনীযায়ন চতুর্থায়ন চতুর্থায়ন চতুর্থায়ন।

চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন। চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন।

ঃধ্যাপিকেনীযায়ন চতুর্থায়ন চতুর্থায়ন চতুর্থায়ন।

ঃধ্যাপিকেনীযায়ন চতুর্থায়ন চতুর্থায়ন।

ঃধ্যাপিকেনীযায়ন চতুর্থায়ন।

ঃধ্যাপিকেনীযায়ন।

ঃধ্যাপিকেনীযায়ন।

ঃধ্যাপিকেনীযায়ন।

চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন।

চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন।

চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন।

চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন।

চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন।

চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন।

চর্চায় স্বায়ত্ত্বসমন্বিত কর্মকারণায় কর্মরাষ্ট্র ন প্রয়োজন।
মানী৷ অন্যান্যত্বনি: কাষ্টাকো বিশেষগুণ দ্বন্তে ॥ ২৫ ॥

রূপাণ্যলক্ষণের গ্রন্থ প্রাধান্যমূলক।

ভিন্ধা৷ প্রথিতযাদাবাযায়াচিত্রময়ীনাদীক্ষরীনাতে বিশেষগুণ

dত্বম। ন চ রূপাণ্যলক্ষণে কার্যতীর্থেতি বর্ণেতি

dাসস্বলত্বাত্ম বিষ্ণুক্ষেত্রবিশেষগুণত্ব চিত্রাদীপ্তরথারতি

স্মিত বাচ্যঃ। বুঝঃ ভাষিতি ভাষিত গুণবচন বিবচিতবাচ্যঃ। অপেক্ষাবীঢঃ: ভাষ্যত্ব নি

dহি। ভাষ্যাচার্য্যরেখা কিমুপ ভাসানের ন নিতিত।

রূপাণ্যলক্ষণে ঘনমন্ত্রযার্থায়িনি পুপাদী বর্তন

dিন বদ্ধাঃ। ঈষ্যঙ্গ বুদ্ধ: সন্ধিসন্ধিলাব্ধ অগ্রে

কুন্ডঃ। যথাকাণ্ডাকামালম: ফাল্গুনী তেত সন্ধানঃ

তেঘ দেশলালিকমাদায় শচজ্জাস্বত্ব প্রমাদ

মাত্রবৃহৎ তানুসমুদায়। বুঝঃ দিনাদিনীনা

মিব নাগস্বপ্নমারু দিনাদিনীনা পুপাদী তদাদী

রণায় বিশ্রামিতি বিচারস্তূপিতিত্বা বাচ্যঃ। দেশ

লালিকমাদায়াস্বর্ণি লুচিস্যস্মায়ান। ২৬ ॥

রুপান্তি: প্রথিতযাদাব রূপেন্ত দ্বারবত্বাং প্যাঙ্গ-বিষয়লক্ষেধ্যঃ। ন চ চুর্যাদিনী ভজনকাপালক

বল্লভসম্প্রদায় রূপকে সামান্ততি বাচ্যঃ। তৰাপি

নেতাসেতি রূপান্তমাজন। পণ্য বিজ্ঞানীত্রিজ্ঞপশ

নেতাভাগানামাপি প্রথিতযাদিতা রূপান্তমান বাচ্যঃ।
भाषा। गुरुत्री दे रसवली द्रव्यसंबंधित क्रम || २७ ||
आद्यानि भूतवर्गाणि विशेषगुणकोंगिनिः।
यदुर्वल्य यस्य साधस्येऽवधस्मिन्निरस्त तत् || २८ ||

सिद्धान्त। म. स पठादै। कुतुकुवर्तीदिबिम्बिः तेजसि च द्रव्य-क्रममयागमिति वाच्यं। 'द्रव्यवृत्तिकोट्यत्वाय आतिमञ्चस निष्किरिततान्। घृतदेहमस्थितिः श्रव्य-वीषुः। अर्थेऽ मुप्तसङ्कवर्तीदै तेजसि च द्रव्यमयान्।
तच्च वय्यवेलोलिलाश्रीदागाय सम्भवं स्वैपुष्पा विस्तेत। नन्त्र प्रायजन्येवि धर्माल्यानि परमाश्रयाधारां अवतारमया कुपादाविनि वाच्यं। बालुकास्त्राणि यथा-यथा वय्यवेलोलिलास्य आतिमञ्चस निष्किरिततान्। आ-लाल्याश्र्यातिमञ्चस निष्किरिततान्। गुरुत्री हर्षं। गुरु-लवक्ष्यं रसवलं यव्यवेलोलिलास्य विस्तेत। नन्त्र प्रायजन्येवि निर्देशानि वाययोनि वायुलोकितार्थं सर्व-विशेषं किं मार्गमिति वाच्यं। तद्विपं यव्यवेलोलिलास्य विद्वेषनमेव तदमुग्धानात्। इत्यादिति यव्यवेलोलिलास्य विद्वेषनमेव तदमुग्धानात्। नन्त्र प्रायजन्येवि निर्देशानि वाययोनि वायुलोकितार्थं सर्व-विशेषं किं मार्गमिति वाच्यं। तद्विपं यव्यवेलोलिलास्य विद्वेषनमेव तदमुग्धानात्। इत्यादिति यव्यवेलोलिलास्य विद्वेषनमेव तदमुग्धानात्। नन्त्र प्रायजन्येवि निर्देशानि वाययोनि वायुलोकितार्थं सर्व-विशेषं किं मार्गमिति वाच्यं। तद्विपं यव्यवेलोलिलास्य विद्वेषनमेव तदमुग्धानात्। इत्यादिति यव्यवेलोलिलास्य विद्वेषनमेव तदमुग्धानात्। नन्त्र प्रायजन्येवि निर्देशानि वाययोनि वायुलोकितार्थं सर्व-विशेषं किं मार्गमिति वाच्यं।
भाषा । सूर्याद्युगोपायों वेगाः क्षत्काराः मकना गुणाः ।
अष्टी शुरुद्युगयों कुपं इत्याय वेगाः तेजसि ॥ २५ ॥
शुरुद्युगयोपायों वेगाः गुणसिद्ध द्रवक्कं।
कुपं रसस्वया शेषेचे वारिष्ठेहने चतुर्दश ॥ ३० ॥
विशेष्याना गम्भुः सतावने चतुर्दश ॥

वुद्धारिपत्कं संख्यादिपफ्फकं भावना तथा ॥ ३१ ॥

धर्माघोणी गुणाः ये आदन्तः सुन्दरदश ॥
संख्याद्यः पन्तकं कालदिर्धोः सम्बुधं ते प खे ॥ ३२ ॥

संख्याद्यः पन्त बुद्धिरिक्ष्य यन्नापि चेष्वरे ।
परापरस्काराः पन्त वेगाः मानसे ॥ ३३ ॥

तत् चिनितेशाहेतुनीनाद्विवनीं भनला।

शिष्यार प्राय रती बतायें। ततु ल केशापी वेधमिव। केकना-

शिविलान्। ते च शास्त्रधायः पन्त से नारायमे ॥ २८ ॥

२८ ॥ २५ ॥ २१ ॥ २२ ॥

साधनस्वेदस्वते निष्क्रिय सम्मिति प्रत्येकेऽध्वनि-

द्रविं निरुपावति। तत् चिनितेश्वराय रा। गम्भेतु-

रिति गम्भमञ्चवारिष्ठेत्व:। साध्रि गम्भेतु-

जांते संख्यादसुः तथापि गाम्भिरोपायता समाणा-

प्याराय कारणसपूवन्त्यं। तथाति ग्रहितोषिं वि

गम्भमञ्चवारिष्ठेत्व:। तथाति ग्रहितोषिं वि
भाग ८

बिष्ठा

गम्भीरविभ्रमार्जिकावज्ञापनः। न च पाराशान्ति।
गम्भीरवासुधवालसमाजामिति वाच्यं। तत्तवः गम्भी-
र्वतानः। अनुपलब्धिः चुणुकलकेलामुपपयते। कय-मन्यथा तस्मानि गम्भीजपवते। भक्ताने हि पायार-
ाध्यान्तमानात्। पायारलोपणार्यवऽपेतेन विशडति।
ढृढः यह्र्व्वाण्यमन्यं तन्त्रपुपाण्यार्यवऽपेतेन विशडति
वाच्यं। दुःख्वीतं खण्डपेक्ष महापर्वकपमन्। रूपम
पायारवर्माः। श्रीधिवीराब्दाल्मा गमवले वाधकाभावः।
नामांशेति। प्रश्नोन्निर्दिष्टेन नामाजातों रूपम
श्रीवाममवें वर्तमाने न तु जालादाः। तथा प्ररोक्षितं भ-
व्वात्। श्रीवाममे एकसांख्यमयं धर्माण्य पाकव्वेन
नामांशेति। न च च च च नामांशेति नामप्रमणं तत्तव-
व्वात्। रूपमवन्ववृत्तान्तमालापांशितमस्मभवः।
रूपमवन्ववृत्तान्तमालापांशितमस्मभवः। वर्कालात्।
वैशिष्ट्यांशेति श्रीवाममवर्माः। रुपमांशेति रूपाशेति
‘क बलात्। क्रियामये घटाराणि तत्तालान्यमश्च-
न्यः।। बिंधु दुति। महुर्त कृत्यार्थार्थिनेन ये
बिंधुगो रष्यः। श्रीवाममवें। जले च महुर्त एव रष्यः।
एतराणि प्ररोक्षितं रूपमवन्ववृत्तान्तमालापांशितमस्मभव-
বাংলা মধ্যপালি বিষয়া ভাবনা নির্দেশনামূলক।

- নিয়ামনিয়া চ সা রেখা নিয়াম স্থাপনজন।।

বিষয়া ৪নাথবুদ্ধিযাত্রাতিসম- বা লক্ষায় অধীন।

গঠনীতি। দ্বিতীয় দৃষ্টি। বক্ষুক সিদ্ধান্ত ন তু দ্বি-
বিধ বিষ্ণুত সাধন। দ্বিতীয় অবস্থান। দ্বিতীয় চতুর্থ
বৈরভাবের সমন্বয় ২৪।

খ রূপ সৃষ্টি। তথ্যঃ প্রকাশ। পশ্চাভিনীত সজ্জনকর্তা
ব্রতার্থী বন্দন দ্বারা। পাকজ দৃষ্টি। দ্বিতীয় দৃষ্টি:
ব্যাপ্ত হয়। খ। বক্ষুক সমাজ দুঃখ মাত্র। সত্তাত পাকজ
স্বতন্ত্র মাত্র। ন্যায়বিচার প্রতিষ্ঠার। এবং পাকজ ব্যতিরেকে
ব্যবস্থাপনা নিয়ামচার্য। নিয়াম। শাস্ত্রীয় দ্বিতীয় নিয়াম
ব্যবস্থাপন। ৩-এ জন্য। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। দ্বিতীয় দৃষ্টি। নিয়াম
প্রথম দৃষ্টি। নিয়াম। দ্বিতীয় দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।
নিয়াম। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি। প্রথম দৃষ্টি।

গ স একে খাসি সমাজ পুত্র দৃষ্টি বুঝি-
भाषात अनिवार्य तु तदन्यां स्थान सैवायत्वयोगीनीः।

मिळावत रसुपर्ष्टिति वाचनं। एकी महान धार्मिकिरिति
दुप्रयनी। इत्यदि। परमाणुरीतीर्थाश्रम तद्नांकुंज
खारे प्रत्यावशयनालात्। दूरस्रावकेश्वर नातीकोिमी।
संविधाने तक्षेवं प्रथयालात्। च च तदनां त्रिश्र-परमाणुप्रयात्। दूरस्रावकेश्वरक् प्रववस्तवावत्। न प्रव-चने विरोध हति वाचनं। त्रिश्रस्रावक दूरस्रावकप्राण-लात्। चत्वारथा चरुङ्गारिष्टादनमात्रोऽदायति दुह्रिष्ट्र शन्युक्तात्। न च चातित्रासौताधी कथमात्रु श्रावलनमाने
दूरस्रावकप्राणिति वाचनं। तत्र तदनां: परिपरिष्टिश्रः
दूरस्रावकनायवश: खुलाहनोतात्त्वरुपमात्। न च चात-श्रावकाने कथं चरुङ्गारिष्टप्राणिति वाचनं। यत् न वर्ण दूरस्रावकादृशं वा कर्तवं तु सङ्कायाञ्च चविले
प्रस्तुतु दुह्रिष्ट्र शन्युक्तारस्तिरविद्याधिकाराणमात्रयथावधायः दूरस्रावकादृशं।
तत्वाच चरुङ्गारिष्टादनान्तो प्रस्तुतं न दूरस्रावकादृश- भवानान्। न च हि तत्ततोऽपि सत्यसति परमाणुलो मह-
लाभावात् दूपं चावयवस्त्रिष्टौ तेषामुत्याद्विनाशये:।
प्रस्तुत्वादिदिशान्यं तेषां स्वायत्वश्रयार्थ शास्त्रयपः। चत: कथितः
अनुष्मानी बाचनं। यं च च बिन्धामः श्रावकिष्टा लक्ष्मवत- भावाद्विष्ट: त्वम्प्रस्त:। चतुर्स्रावक श्रावकि श्रावकि च।
भाषा। सा च चिथा भवेदिष्ठ द्र्विण्य विवधलय।। ४६ ॥

योनिजादिर्भवेद्ह द्र्विण्य ध्रापानां।

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विख्यानं त्यरिमाणशतरतमस्कः गणसः। विषादगन्तवषाणुपकृतरिमाणशतरतमस्कः काधित्रत्रानन्तमस्कृतः। तथा परमाणुस्मिद्धः। न च चर्येनावस्य विषादग्निक्ति वाच्यः। चर्याणुः सावध्यक्षाणुरुक्तः घनस्वरत्वः गुमाणेन तद्वभवसिद्धः। चर्येनाववर्यः सावध्यक्षाणुरुक्तः। गुमाणेन प्रद्ववसिद्धः। न च चर्येन न महद्ववक्तुः कपालविद्युमाणेन तद्वभवसिद्धः।

न च वेदमप्रयोजनः। अपप्रमृद्धस्य गति गणेक्त्रुप्लवक्ता प्रद्वेजकलात्। न चैव कमेष्ठ तद्वभवघारापि मौधोदिति वाच्यः। ज्ञवेद्यामीयेन तद्वभावसिद्धः। यथा च चिठ्ठिः

या कार्यकुपा प्रधितो चिथिधा ग्रहोऽन्निश्चितविवयथे।

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तत् इड्रवुपारतरतिः। योनिजादिति। योनिजादिनिजश्वेतयः। योनिजादिपि जरायुसमस्तिः। ज्ञानं मागवारामेऽनामं ज्ञ्यवारामेऽनामं। अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां। अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां। अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां अष्टं यष्टीमां

गण्धविवधश्च प्रमाणतः। न च भागुवादिसिद्धिरकष्टिनां लादिकमपि आदिति वाच्यः। तथा वचित्ति अकवश्चिती-
ভাষা  বিষয় মনুকাছিয় বন্ধ্যাগন্ত উদাহারণ: ॥ ২৫ ॥

শিক্ষা, লাক্ষিন্দ্র বন্ধ্যাগন্ত। ন চ তথ্য বর্ণালিকামেলা ন চ পার্থিব বলিত বাচ্চ। ক্ষীরারোহী বিনাশের শরীর রেন প্রয়োজানান্ত। গায়ত্রীপদাম্বী ধ্রুবক্ষিন্ন:। এতের পার্থিবাদিভারিত জালারোহী বিনাশকলমান্ত বেঞ্চ। শরীরের ন জানি: ধ্রুবক্ষিন্নী শান্তি কিন্তু চেষ্টায় চলন। চানীয়াতর এমন চেষ্টায় লাভায় পার্থিবাদিভারিত জালারোহী ন চ চন্দ্রারোহী শরীরেলে কিং মানসিক ব্যাচ্চ ন চ ব্যাচ্চ মানসিক ব্যাচ্চ। আত্মাক্ষরিত স্বরূপমস্তক প্রমাণবাহন। তাঁর কিং মানসিক চেষ্টা ভগবতমরিয়াহার্ন নস্তমানা যাত্রী যাত্রী শরীর চন্দ্‌বার্থারন ন ভবতি তদ্ভাববালেন বিশেষেণঃ। ন চ যত্র শরীরে চেষ্টা ন ভাসনা তষ্ঠাদারিত ব্যাচ্চ ন চ প্রথমাভাবাবাহী রূপে। এতাদৃশী: প্রমাণাভাবাবাহী অথবা চেষ্টায় যথান্যবিশিষ্ট নামষরিতেন জাতিত্যাদিতেন তন্তু: মানসিকবিবৃত্তিভাষায় জাতিত্যাদিতেন তন্তু মানসিক শরীরের কথা লক্ষণময়:। তত্ত্বাবধিকারিক্ষরিতেন জাতিলাভাবাবাহী জাতিলাভাবাবাহী শরীর দেবলাভাবাবাহী কথা:।

* মনোবিবাসনায় পুরুষ জাতিত্যাদিতেন কথায়।
भाषा: वस्त्रं पुष्करं रसस्यं जले मधुरशोलीं।

विद्या: संस्कृतं पार्थिवमिथ्यं। पार्थिवं कस्मिनं चेनुं दत्तं
द्राणेन्द्रं पार्थिवं रूपादित्यं मधै गमसेव वचव्य-
क्लात् कुसमग्रामाक्ष्यकघ्रपतं। न च दुर्घानो खं-
कीयंरुपादित्यक्लादशिरिति वाचं। परकीय-
रूपायक्लोकसं तद्धंधलां। न च नबश्रावग्नाय-
क्ललेनानेर्नासतिति वाचं। तस्य शूरामाधिब्य-
क्ललात्। यदा परकीयति न देयं नावपीतसुरभी-
भागमः दुर्घानलोधत्वान्। न च द्राणेन्द्रंस्वयङ्करसं
गनमाचवक्ललात्चत्र विश्विरी दृति वाचं। द्राणे
परि दृति विशेषणात्। विश्व दृतिः। औपभोगाधानं
विश्व।। वभेंव धि कार्यं घण्ठ वषुराधों। यत् कार्ये
दद्राणे कोऽनं नसर्वभागं प्राचात् परमर्यादा वा
अनत्योव। न वि बीजमस्यजानां विभा कार्यं-
दत्तिनिरङ्क। तेन झुण्कादिज्ञानादेव वभेंव विश्व-
थे भवति। रामदेवस्यांविश्वाद्वेपिप्रकाशावलोके-
नाशः। विश्वाक्षिकीविश्वाय:।। २३।।

असं निकृपयति। वस्त्रं पुष्करं दृति। केषवसायति-
कार्यं स्यं क्षेत्रीकात्या जश्वं जाति:। विश्वति। चयापि
केसी नित्यानिघष्टिनित्यं न कार्यं रक्षितं।
नाथापि जन्मशेषं तद्यं वाचे। पच धर्मग्राहा जश्वं
ভাষা: লেখকের দ্বারানু সাবিত্রিকাস্তেত ||৫৮||

ধিল্লোন ন্যাত। তথা ন্যায়শ্রেষ্ঠানাং। নিয়ম মুক্তপুরাণাং বলাবাসাম্ভাবানিয়মাদিতি চেত। ন। ন্যায়শ্রেষ্ঠনক্তত-রক্ষণত্বত্যা ন্যায়শ্রেষ্ঠানাং। নিয়ম তদানিনি কলাতে কলামধুক্ততানাং স্বর্ণালিতিচিরঃ। | মুক্তপুরাণমেব দ্রষ্ট্যতমসূত। বর্ষ: মুক্ত দতি। বসুতিতিমায় ন তু মুক্তপুরাণমেব সাধনাম। রথব নৈটিকঃ নারায়ণবদ্ধঃ বসুতিতিমায় নারায়ণবদ্ধঃ বসুতিতিমায়। রথবানু নিরামৃতসাধু অল্পালোচ্যায়ানিতিয়ান অভিজ্ঞতানে রক্ষার মানানাধিকরণ মুক্তপুরাণমেব অল্পালোচ্যায়ানিতিয়ান নিত্যং তদং। | রত্নশ্রেষ্ঠমি। জাল্লায় মধুর এব রস। । শোভ পূর্ব স্থান। | নিকট: মুক্তপুরাণমেব কুতৃষ: কালিন্দি রাজার্থনীয় নারায়ণবদ্ধঃ। ন। তালো- নক্ততাতে দেবীক্ষায়: পৃথিবীতার্থনারায়ণমেব কালিন্দিপ্রতি। নিত্যং তদং। | নিরামৃত মূলতীজ্জায়ে নীহারিস্পৃস্তিন চেত। ন। নীলাঙ্গ- নক্ততাতে দেবীক্ষায়: পৃথিবীতার্থনারায়ণমেব কালিন্দিপ্রতি। নিত্যং তদং। | তথা এব বিশিষ্ট বিপুলে ধর্মভিত্তিময়মেব। | অথ জালালানায়ে কর্মান্ত। ন নিরামৃত কোপী- রক্ষার মানায়ে ন। না মার্জনক্ষায়ে মাধুর্যমূপ- স্বভাব এবতি রক্ষায়। | তথা আরব্যায়াধিকানাত। | নামী অন্যবায়ারায়ানায় অন্যবায়ানায় || কার্তিকী চেত। | ন | পরিত্যাগাধিকানাত। | অন্যবায়ানায় ||
भाषा। नियन्त्रि प्रथमवत् किंतु देशमयोनिः।

बिंदूः। न च चर्चनायिन्यं जोशीवंतेः ग्रामामार्करासन्निष्टिः।

कलनागारवात्। द्विद्रवयास्चार्विन्धः। नक्तावं ज्ञेश्वरकलालम्।

चल नाचारिकं जमोरराहि।

tu आश्रयापाधिकृ। तथा मंत्रितः। एवं जन्मित्रे।

णजनकान्तवेच्छूः। जलां जन्मालम् वा शैवः।

पृष्ठान्तराद्वादृश्यं तु शैवतपविन्धनामार्करासन्निष्टिः।

रथविशेषम् तेजः। शंयागामिः। श्रीमुरुतिरसापाधिकृ।

स्वदेशं। तज्जोनो भवानू। शृङ्ख्लात्। धृताराजः।

धृताराजः।

पत्रमतात्रिः। ब्रह्मचर्यं देवतायः।

तदोस्मास्मादिभिः।

प्राप्तस्माति। जीवं जन्मार्करासन्निष्टिः।

प्रसारुः। जन्मादिभि।

ब्रह्मचर्यं नियमविश्वासं परमाणुः।

शृङ्ख्लात्।

कलादिकं चण्डमरितवर्गमतं च जन्मार्करासन्निष्टिः।

कर्मादिपि निपुष्पं ग्रामार्करासन्निष्टिः।

किमूः जीवीनेता

यद्रि ब्रह्मवास्यमाः। श्रृङ्ख्लात्। अयोध्यामिति ब्रह्मचर्यं,

निपुष्पे।

जीवप्रारप्याणो वन्द्याकाः।
भाषा। इत्यद्रे रचना सिम्भुविमाद्विरिस्यो मतः॥ ३५॥
सन्त प्रभुस्तेजसहु स्त्रापु गुजलमारसः।

विख्या प्रसिद्धमित। इत्यद्रे रचना जलीयाधिपः। तथाचि
रचना जलीयां गन्धारायणकर्त्त। धर्मसंहिताभिस्मादकर्तु धर्मसंहिताभिस्मादकर्तु
विभिन्नमयीः। विभिन्नमयीः। विभिन्नमयीः। विभिन्नमयीः।
विभिन्नमयीः। विभिन्नमयीः। विभिन्नमयीः। विभिन्नमयीः।
विभिन्नमयीः। विभिन्नमयीः। विभिन्नमयीः।

तेजों नित्यपरित। सन्त उष्ऊ दशापदिना। उष्ऊवं
श्यायने हि आतितिकिषः। प्रवेधं ध्येयु। इत्यद्रे
श्यायने हि आतितिकिषः। प्रवेधं ध्येयु। इत्यद्रे
श्यायने हि आतितिकिषः। प्रवेधं ध्येयु। इत्यद्रे
श्यायने हि आतितिकिषः। प्रवेधं ध्येयु।

तथापि
श्यायने हि आतितिकिषः। प्रवेधं ध्येयु। इत्यद्रे
श्यायने हि आतितिकिषः। प्रवेधं ध्येयु।
ভাষা নৈমিত্তিক ক্রমবল্লুকিতে নিয়নাকরে চ পূর্ববত্ত। ৪০।।

দ্বিতীয় নয়নে বিভিন্নিকিষাপিতায় মতঃ।

বিষয়ের প্রকল্পকরণ এক প্রাপ্তিবিধে প্রশ্নরসায়ন বহুলায়। তখন প্রকটিপঞ্জি দ্বারা সূচিত বিতৃপ্ততা। অন্যদৃষ্টির প্রতিচ্ছিন্ন প্রাপ্তির প্রতিচ্ছিন্ন প্রাপ্তি। বিশেষ ব্যাখ্যা সাধন করিবল। কিন্তু তদীয় শ্রুতির মতবাদে। নৈমিত্তিক বিষয়ত। সুর্যহারি দুঃখে নিজ বহুলায়। ন নৈ- মিত্তিকদ্বতবল ন লভ্য কর্মকালার্থমাত্র বিত্তাপেশেৰ বাচি। শব্দশ্রুতিনৈমিত্তিকদ্বতবল- বৃত্তাতিসামগ্রিক বিবর্তননায়। পুনরাবৃত্তির। গুণ- সর্বস্বলো। তথা চ তদুদ্বিবিধ নিয়মনিয়ম। নিয়ন্ত পরমাণুপূর্ব তব্য দেবায় অনুসরণ। তথা উদ্ধারের নিয়মবিষয়ভেদায়। শরীরসম্বন্ধনিয়মবদ্ধ। তথাচ সর্ব- লোকাদের প্রশ্নসূত্র। ৪০।।

প্রত্য তথা বিশেষনমায় দক্ষিণমিত। বহুলসৌজ্ঞ পঞ্জীরঞ্জন পরকীর্ত্তনলগ্ন সহিত পঞ্জীরঞ্জন সর্বশ্রেষ্ঠ পদ্রপতি। পরমেশ্বর স্বয়ং বিধানকারী পদ্রকীর্ত্তনলগ্ন পর- কীর্তি। হেতায় স্বয়ং পাকোনং বিভাষারো- শাস্ত্র দ্বিতীয় পরকীর্ত্তন পরকীর্ত্তন পর- লোকাদের প্রশ্নসূত্র। প্রথম ভাষায় কুটার-
भावां अष्टाङ्गानुवाचारित: सूर्यस्व: पवने मनः॥४९॥

शिव्रां चारवर्षाणां दृश्यते देवी॥ विषयं दर्शयति। वशीति।
ननु सूर्यस्वः तीजस्वः फिं मानसिद्धि चेत्। न।
दृश्यं तीजस्वं अश्वम प्रतिष्ठेन्द्रा नानाग्राहस्योऽग्रः
वेणुक्षिप्यमान्द्रवलात् चैवं तत्स्वं यथा दृष्टियोऽ।
न चार्यं ज्ञातं दृष्टिवेद्व खलाद्भवल्लक्ष चारिमं
चेग्नागाधिलात्॥ ननु प्रतिशमुखाः जस्व वार्षिकापि
वर्षां दृश्यते यथा चेत्॥ जस्व नमित्वम्
स्वगीयां दृष्टिवेद्व खलाद्भवल्लक्ष॥ धर्मे च धर्मनुस्वरूपः
प्रतिशन्त्राणिं दृष्टिवेद्व खलाद्भवल्लक्ष। तथाति अभिनि
स्वगीयां प्रतिशमुखाः दृष्टिवेद्व खलाद्भवल्लक्ष। विज्ञानीयांस्यप्रतिशन्त्राणिं
दृष्टिवेद्व खलाद्भवल्लक्ष। आत्मानित्वाद्विज्ञानीयांस्य
प्रतिशन्त्राणिं दृष्टिवेद्व खलाद्भवल्लक्ष॥ वायुः
निरुपर्यति। चापकर दृष्टि। अणुप्याभित्त्वस्वः
दृष्टिवेद्व खलाद्भवल्लक्ष अपाकः दृष्टि। अपाकः
स्वागां दृष्टिवेद्व खलाद्भवल्लक्ष अणुप्याभित्त्वस्वः
तत्कालकामिनीकों दृष्टिः। तत्कालकामिनीकों
वायुसिद्धकों भावः॥४९॥
भा० निर्धारणमण्यानेष्ट श्रेयः सर्गादिलिक्षः
पूर्वब्रजीयनायुतं देशव्यापि लगितङ्खः ॥ ४२ ॥
प्राणादित्यसु महावासुपर्यानो विषयो मनः ॥

श्रीमतेऽ एश वायुः सर्गादिलिक्षः । वायुर्विभिः सर्गरङ्खः
हर्स्मिनं जयस्तरमणः विनात्मकः ब्रजवः
वर्षादिरीये द्वादशाणाम् श्रास्त्रीयां कतः । तथाधरां ।
त्यं च वायुः यथावचरं तथावर्षे व्यतितः ॥ पूर्वे
वर्धितं ॥ वायुद्विधाय नियोजङ्खितः । परमाणुः ।
नियोजङ्खितः नियोजङ्खितः समवेतः । भोज्ये विंविधः । शरी
रेंद्रियर्विभेदः । तत्र शरीरस्याणां निपाशचा
दोषां । परमतः जलोपयेतत्वावोगर्यार्यां पार्थिवः
भागेययादिएकं भोगाधिपुत्रार्याणां जलादीमा । प्राधाना
पशुयालोपमाति ॥ ॥ तथा यथा ्विंशिताः । ॥ ॥
हृद्या
पौन्ते । शरीराधापकं सर्गादिलिक्षिणणं लक्ष तच्च
वायुः । कुलादिपु मध्ये सर्गादिनेव वच्चलात ॥ ॥

ब्रह्मकृष्णसत्यालिकेऽयत्र काल्पनानवातदृश्यें दृश्यें
यति । प्राणादिनेति । यथार्थ अनिध्या वायुः तुभियं
तस्तः वर्तेक बिधा प्राणादिनेत्रुकारं तथापि मनः
पादेन प्रथियसुमुः ॥ प्राणालेक एव बुद्धिन्यात्क्षा
नवेशास्यकालितमादिनः । नागाध्यायः ॥

नभवत् हरिः
भाषा। आकाशस्य तु विबोधः शब्देऽवैशेषिको गुणः॥ ४२॥
इत्यथान्युयोगेन श्रावणेः साध्यपाठितः॥

विद्या। आकाश विद्ययति। आकाश खोति। आकाशविद्यानि। विद्यामहोकविज्ञानार्थम् आकाशविद्यार्थिन्हं त जानिः किमु आकाशविद्यानि शब्द अवयं। वैशेषिक इतिकथयनु विभीषणामरवाच्येदाय। प्रतिन प्रभावमयि दृष्टिः॥
तथा दि। शब्दो गुणस्य चुरुच्छिन्नोवार्तयथायां जनित्रिकयान्स्य जातिरिचात् सृजसम्। शब्दो श्रवणमवेतो गुणसम् मसे रश्यितग्रहं रश्यितग्रहे शब्दो। न सत्त्वविद्ययुक्ताः। चन्द्रमंगे गामवसमविधिकारणकाल-भावे वति चंकारणगुणपूर्वककर्मवाचत् सृजसम्। पाक्षकृपाद्वै वास्करावरणाय सत्यं पत्राप्तों वास्करावरणायकारणगुणपूर्वककर्मवाचते। अल्लपरामणुपराप्तों वास्करावरणाय प्रतिहृते। शब्दो न दिशक्षास्मेवं विशेषगुणात्म। गामविशेषार्ध। वर्तिनिन्त्रिकयान्स्य चप्राप। दत्त्व श्रवणदिकरण नव-सद्रव्यं गणणामति सृजसमीक्षे। न 'ष वामवनाद्वेय चूर्णक्षणामभेषं वाचे कारणगुणपूर्वक: शब्द उत्शय-समिति वाचे। च्याबहुव्याख्यातिलेः वार्षिकविशेष्युक्तामरवाच्यात्। तत्र धर्मस्य विवधसय भाषायात्॥ ४३॥

दृष्टिर्देश दृष्टिहृत्। इन्द्रियार्थिनि। धनुर्वाकृतिः। ज्याकाश्य शापवा-
भाषा: जन्याला जरको कला जगतमार्गाने मन: || ४४ ||
परापरलोपित: चणदिरे: काळुपारित: ||

चित्राने देखि चित्राने पुढोप्रेसेन भिढं कथामार्गांश खादत साध। एक: वर्षापि ढाकाः एक एव संपूर्ण उपाधि: कर्षणमुखाजीरे कहिरुपूर्व औराप्रावं भवतो-यथा:: ||

काळी निरूपयति। जन्याधिकारिन: || तत्र प्रमाणं
दर्शितुमाह। जगताधिकारिन। तथाच: हदाने घट
देशाधिकारिन: संयुक्तमाणाधिकरं वति विचारक-रूपति तदा संयुक्तमाणाधिकरं घटाये: समस्यावा वाच: य च यथार्थार्थिनं संवेच्छाति काल पेक्षा तत्तंतमभां-टकः कथ्यति || ४५ ||

dत्यथा तथार्थार्थिनं सम्बं प्रमाणांशरं दर्श-यति। परापरलोपित। परलोकालुक्राजाधिकारण विचारनं काळं एव। परलोपलियाणमार्थिकारणम- योगाग्रेशीया खादवादितिरिकः कल्यंत दृढं भावः। ||

नग्रेशी काळाशं मिद्वा चणादिनमार्थिकारणावेद्य
न खादत साध। चणादिरिति। कालसंकारिया उपार-धिभेदानूत्त: चणादिरुव्यवस्थित: || उपारितथु संयुक- विभागप्रामाणायाबाबाभाविकः कर्षण पूर्णमियाग्रामविश्विक- विभागो वा पूर्णमियाग्रामायाबाबाभाविकः पूर्णमियाग्राम- भावो वा मुखमियाग्रामविश्विकः कर्षण वा। न च जातः.
भाग २०  

दूराणिकादिप्रीतिरूक्ता नियता दिनुन्मे। ॥ ४५ ॥

उपाधिनेत्रदेकापी प्राच्यदिव्यपदेशभाकः

विद्या२० मृण्योगानन्तरं वधवविद्या न स्रायदिति वाचः। कथा नात्मावदि। महाप्राप्ते चन्द्रादिव्यवचारो वयस्म।

dिनादिव्यवचारसः नन्दनाश्रयपदनीयः। दिनादिव्यवचारसः नतत्त्वाधकृतेवेरति। ॥

दिनुं निरूपायति। दूराणिकेति। दूरस्य चन्द्र
कलस दैशिकं परलमपरं वाचं। तदुद्वेषयासाधारणमाः
वीजं दिवेगं। दैशिकपन्तत्वपलायशरस्वातिकारणम्
म्योगानन्तरश्च दिक्षितात् भावः। ॥ ४५ ॥

नचनिकैव दिग्ग तंद्रा प्राचीनतीवचादिव्यव

dीर्थः ऋषुसुध्वरासाधीयत भावः। उपाधिति। यतु-
हस्ताः उत्तरयगिरिमन्निर्भित त दिक्षः तस्य प्राची
उत्तरयगिरिवस्त्विताः प्रतीतिः। एवं तपस्योध्यसुभर
हस्ताभिः दिनुण्डीतो तदविषिः लवचौ। वर्षेशाम
भ्रवे वर्षां मेंस्तत्तरं स्मित हति निधमानाः।

आभान निरूपायति। आभानकृतिः। आभान-
जातिः सुखदृः; चान्द्रदिनवार्तकरणात्तपरेवकत्या
स्मिति। ईश्वरेपिः या जातिरक्षोऽपि। ईश्वरेपिः
कारणाभावाः न सुखदृः; चाक्षुशतः। निर्दान सुखदृः
प्रयोगमयम्म फलावश्याम दृति नियमश्चावयोजकलाः।

परे लोके ब्राह्मण मास्यकेव प्रभाणभावाः। न च
भा. ५

इत्यादि। द्रष्ट्रांकृति। ईश्वरस्यं परमेश्वरं

चैतन्यसमाध्यं। यथा चासनं च चासनं सबोऽविवर्त्तितप्रत्येकस्य महत्तत्त्वमेव तथा विविध प्रतिपद्धतिः प्रति

प्रथमम् एवं श्रीरामेश्वरस्य भूर्वनामादिभिः। हति

प्रतिपद्धतां न भक्तादिरात्। प्रेमानं प्रमाणम्

हर्ष्यति। कुठाराणां चिदानिद्राणां कर्तारः

रमनरीरोकोऽन्नमा पञ्चात्र एवं चूकु राणां भावः

करणामां फलोपासमानोऽपि कर्तारः रमनरीरोकोऽन्नमा पञ्चात्र

इति बतवतः नान्तु। ५६। ॥

नन्दु श्रीरामेश्वर कर्तारम्यात्मा अत्र भाषा। श्रीरामेश्वर भविष्यति। नन्दु चैतन्य भानादिकर्मेऽवस। सुखानां लग्नं

द्रव्यश्रीराणामपि नाद्भग्रं स्वायत्तं च भविष्यति। प्राणात्मभविष्यति। न श्रीरामेश्वरस्य बालस्वरूपिकारणं।

श्रीरामेश्वरस्य कर्तारस्य बालस्वरूपिकारणं। श्रीरामेश्वरस्य कर्तारस्य बालस्वरूपिकारणं। न च पूर्वपाठूर्वपायसंकारणं। दीनायेन

यज्ञार्थं अन्योऽन्नमां उपयोगं। दत्तं बालस्य। अन्यायं

कर्तारं नान्तु। एवं श्रीरामेश्वरस्य बालकारणं ॥
भाषा । तथावचद्दिव्यायः अमुपात: कथा सृजित: ॥ ४३ ॥
मनोपि न तथा ज्ञानविधानं तदा भवेत्।

मिद्रा । खण्डानाहि प्रवद्वितर्क्षत: । इष्टवाधननिद्राणः
नूऽतुलात् । तदाशिीष्टवाधनसङ्कारकाभावत्।
मण्डः ज्ञानवाचद्दिव्यायनिद्रासङ्कारकाभावत्।
सर्वः मण्डः ज्ञानवाचद्दिव्यायनिद्रासङ्कारकाभावत्।
उत्तमकाभावत्। अन्तः लनायया
जीवादृश्यवेद्विद्धतः कथयत्। इष्टवाध मण्डः
विद्वानः गतिः इष्टवाध मण्डः
कथयत्। बुद्धवेदविद्धतः इष्टवाध मण्डः
कथयत्। उपयत् नामो तत्त: इष्टवाध मण्डः
कथयत्। पूर्वः चुँजः वाचात् जतायो चुँजः वाचात्
कथयत्। अनुभवमो भावत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयат्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयत्। अनुभवस्थः
सर्वः ज्ञानविधानं कथयত्।
भाग: धर्माध्यक्षार्थियों विशेषणायोग्यान: || ४८ ||
मिळ्याले वेगवानं इतरथा विरोधकं दुर्योगपञ्चालात्॥
च वारम
नामहृमः सर्वसति। मातुपुच्छेतरपि वाचनासहुद्रोप्यसः
ज्ञातः न च उपादकोपाध्यय्याध्यायिनयमक दृष्टि वाचः।
वाचानि यात्र शब्दार्थाश्वात्॥ उत्तरस्वस्वतेषतिरेत म
ज्ञातः दृष्टि वेतु। न। तदुनैत्यकाभावात्। उत्तरसन्धा
सशिवाप्तास्तरे तदानन्तरस्वेतः॥। चणिकविविष्णुति
शरविष्णुः कल्यक्त दृष्टि वेतु। न। मानाभावात्। कल्य
गामेरवाचस। एते चणिकशरीरेऽस्वेत चेतन्यार्थः प्र
वकुः। गैरवाद्वैतिस्येत मानाभावाच। बीजाद्वैतिः म हे
कारितिसवातान्तिरे वाचनेन।। कुष्ट्रेवालस्वाप्ताच।
जस्त तर्कश्च चणिकविरुढ़ाने गैरवाद्वैतिविजात्स्रवादः
विनाशी वा जरे सच्चान्तामा यथा ज्ञानसंगम ब्रह्माया
अहंकारितिः चेतु। न। तत्र सचिष्ठवायुम संसारम् दृष्टि
सत्तान्ति। निर्विष्णुः ज्ञाते मानाभावात्। मविष्ठयोऽ
स्थानभावात्। भस्तू ज्ञानभिरोऽत्वं श्राद्धीति मिळ्याले
फलं ज्ञानार्थ गोर्गणरं आयुर्वेदः नारायणः ज्ञानाङ्
मसुखिद्वेश्वरामणिर्मात्रानां भेदभिबं मृतरामो
श्रामेदेहः॥ श्वस्तर वस्तुमेद्यावान्नरणः॥ यज्ञियचं ब्रह्म
द्वित्यांके चेतुः। भेदां तदमेव दृष्टे भृत्येन प्रतिपद
वन्यः औष्ठित्। श्वाभिभवे क्षयं तथावध्यायिते वेर्दि।
अतेऽवर्षां एव आज्ञायी समर्थितः। भृत्योऽऽ मात्रायः
द्वित्यां मेवायामस्निग्धतः। भस्तू ज्ञाते इत्यादि न।
प्रिष्ठा २०। भ्रजक निवासलेग पाणियोगादान्। भ्रजकाष्टिपिं वाक्षिण्डय
व्यासादेव। न च द्वितेसस्य रुपत्तीति वाच्यं। तत्र निधं
कन्ने ब्रजस्वाम ग्यालाभावेश्वर गद्यकृपुल्लु कलिनिवृत्ति
द्विलाभावेश्वर नवात्मकां तावित। सुभवलाम्ब्यपरमित्वं निर्माणमस्वरूप
कन्ने वाक्षिण्डय वाल्यकां दिलस्य स्वत्त्। प्रतिकमकं
कन्ने प्रविष्ठिकारणां गधे ददिनवुधुम्बं नेकमिस्याच
व्यासानिमिन्तुलान्। योधिपि तद्वाकं मेंदृश्यप्रति प्राप्तवरूप
अगमः। स्वस्य निर्निर्निखलादिना ब्यासं प्रतिपादित।
सम्प्रदायको युर्वमिर्यताय स्वतं मंडलस्य विरूपकान्। जत
एव निर्रजनः। परं स्वगमुवैलिकः सूक्ते। ईश्वरः
न ज्ञानानुसारं किंतु ज्ञानानुसारं नित्य मिलिकान्त। ज्ञान
भानम्। चोत्रो वेद विवेद विवेद विवेदवधेण ज्ञानांशः। वेदान्तः
यो वेदान्तं दयुगलोकायाः। भाणन्द निवासो विश्राम
न्दरविद्यायां। अन्तःविद्वानराज्यालं प्रायायायाः। चः
वत्ताऽ वृक्षशिलपचणेः। भाणन्दोपिनेदुः भावां उप
वर्ष्यः। भारादयसमु वृक्षो मंढलस्य दीपादिविक्तः दुःस्वा-
भवेन सुखिलप्रत्यायाः। चतु वा तस्मिन्न न
लक्षाबान्नद्यमि मल्ल्यविस्तुः। भाणां
चं वशिष्ठे विवेदालं भोक्ति कृदानात्वं भेदभ्या प्रतिन
िधित्वं रोचः।।

एतेन प्रक्रियं: कर्तव्यः पूजयारुपान्नवर्षे
भिद्या संपू: किमु चेतन:। कार्यकारणपेतर्भेदादत् कार्याभिने कार्यकारणतः नामः कार्यमार्करणवं तस्य।

उद्धुतस{}{}}{}}{}}{}{}}{}}{}}{}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}{}}

परिषादः। त्रिधि तत्त्वतः-कर्मशास्त्रपुश्चन्ति। तत्त्वधारायां पुरुषेऽ शंकादेर्मार्गीं।

तस्य एवेन्द्रीयप्रक्षालिकायां परिषाति। नक्षत्र। परिशालिणा सम्भवः पुरुषे कर्त्त्वाभिस्माने

वृद्धी, चैतन्यभिमन्नन्य। भेदादश्चात्। संवेद कर्मावर्तितार्थः पुरुषवर्षारगो वृद्धीः अक्षयत्वा चेतनाभिमानार्थः

प्रक्षालिकों दर्पणश्रेण सोमार्गायां। दृष्टि विशेषपर्यं दर्पणप्रक्षालिकाया परिषातितं

दृष्टांतिनः निश्चयाभिस्वत्वं दर्पणश्रेण सलिनिमः। कर्मभावितम् वायारवेशः। तेनान्वकल्वति बुद्धि। तत्

परिषादमेण भानेन गुज्ञितानात्तिकः संमानो दर्पणश्रेण सलिनिमेण सुन्दायपाश्चिमचन्ते। भानादिवस् सख्तकः

सेवार्धयप्रायस्थाणार्थः अहुः बुद्धेऽविव। भानिताद्वन्दात्

नवनाधिकरणकेत्रम् प्रतीतः। न च बुद्धीस्ततताना परिषामिना

लाभितम् चास्तमस्तपांसः।

हृदयुक्तप्रेमभीमानात्तिनेवतनाथार्थाधिक-रसातीनेवताः सामाभावाः। चेतनेऽर्त करणीति

प्रतीति वृद्धिकर्षितानात्तिनाः। चैतन्यां स्रम्भ दत्ते चेत्र कर्मं

किं नः भच्चति। नवनाथा बुद्धिसिद्धान्ते शास्त्रानांगायनी-
भाषा। प्रकृत्याच्युमेयोऽयं रथगाधैव सारथः।

भिन्नो तत्तपूर्वममत्मगृहरापति। अर्धछत्ताखः प्रकटे। कार्यलाब्धू बुद्धिरेत्ततं कार्यकारणमेणोऽसा राज्याधिकत्रेत। न। अभिन्नः। कर्त्तरमीले उत्तममायेत। वितराग-जन्माकार्यम् नानादानादनविन्द्रै। अनावर्यं गममभविभ्यं। न तत्। किं प्रज्ञात्यादिकल्पने। न फ। प्रकरणे। क्रियमाणाम् गुणे। कष्ट्याण्व सङ्कृष्ट।

अञ्ज्ञातविशम्याभ्यं कर्मनिमित मनः पने।

द्वानेन विरोध दृश्वि वाचं। प्रकटेऽरूपयं। गुणे-एक्षट्जने। रक्षादिभि। कर्णां कर्माष्ट्रेभ।

द्वानेन तद्यथलात्।

तैवें वति कर्मारामानं केवलः।

द्वानेदि वदति भगवता प्रज्ञातोत्साहमपरिचारकाधिक दृष्टि यौगः।

धर्माधार्माधार्म हार। आत्मानुसारः। ब्रह्मचर्या

वदानेन देशान्तर्जस्तकारणं देशानिरेश भोगाणु-पने।। 'ब्रह्माविविष्यश्यवने।

अभ्यासः प्रभुवति न लव्या।। भर्गण जाने च।।

कर्माणि द्वानेन अविष्कृतम्। द्वानेदि मृत्युमित्रे। ॥ ४८ ॥

प्रज्ञातीति। भ्रमास्मा परंदेशार्द्वं प्रह्लादिनं

उपमीते। प्रदुषितैष चेश्च। जानेवः प्रश्नवादीतः।
भाषा। अश्वकारास्यायेः मनोभावस्य गोचरः। ॥ ४५ ॥

विभुद्वादिरुपणवान् विष्णुस्तु दिनिधा मनः।

अनुभूतिः सृष्टिः सा ज्ञानन्मूलस्यतिर्थि। ॥ ५० ॥

प्रण्यर्थेन्नृमित्वसहस्रार्थिनिविष्कर्षणे।

चित्राः देशे भा.भावशःप्रमालात्। चित्रात्यस् च ब्रम्भायन्नात्।

चित्रार्थस्य प्रामाण्यात् प्रमाणनमीयत हृतं भावः। ॥ तथ।

चूढःस्यान्तः रूपिः। चित्रार्थस्य न भवति तथापि तेन कार्याणां भार्य्यवेच्यास्यन्तः तथा

चित्रार्थस्य न कार्यः पराभवः पौराणिनः भावः। ॥ अश्वकारः

कार्यः। चित्रार्थार्थिनिः प्रायः। तथाचर्थाः। विषयः

आत्मनि शंकोराणिः। ॥ मनं हृतं। मनोभवेष्टह्रेष्टाः

व्याख्यायायायायायायायाः। ॥ रूपः

प्रायः भावमेकेष्वाचित्रार्थगणात्। ॥ ४५ ॥

विभार्तिः। विभुभलं परमस्तथा तथ। पूर्वाऔकमपि

श्राधवमुष्ठं। पुष्कारीतिः। पुष्कुकुलद्वै। वेष्टकादिचतुर्व-

भृणाः। पूर्वाथो वेदिनम्। अनैव। प्रश्नसुहद्वै। कांता-

पत्रयवस्य हृतं। ॥ पुष्कुक्कृतिः। इत्यादिः। पुष्काराद्याः।

अनुभूतिः। अनुभूतिः तुर्विधे शताः। एतानामास्वति

माणां कर्षणां श्रव्यानुमोक्षशास्त्रः। श्रवणाः

सत्ति श्रव्यानुमोक्षशास्त्रः। ॥ ५० ॥

प्रायः। इत्यादिः। इत्यादिः। प्रायः। चित्राः
भाषा ॥ ग्रामज्ञादिप्रभेदन प्रत्येक वाक्यें गमिन ॥ ५१ ॥

विख्या । मोक्ष्येक्ष्णिणां मण्डमेव ज्ञानं तथापि दिन्त्रियनेन
रूपेण दिन्त्रियाणां यथा ज्ञाने कारणं तत्त्रायम-मिति विविचित । इत्यर्थप्रद्यतनु न लक्ष्यं दिन्त्रियेये
अर्निकर्यात्मकं ज्ञानमापदेशामधविचारः अविवेया-
त्त्तं प्रयाचित्ति सुने तथावकलाल । ज्ञय वा ज्ञान-
करणं ज्ञानं प्रत्यय । इदं च चारणं इत्यर्थप्रद्यतामधवारण
दिन्त्रिनुमितार्यामिने उपमितं भारु मधुनाथ
शान्तिवेदी पदमानसु मारणजमवि च चेतुलाच तत्र
तत्तात्त्यायमः ॥ परामर्शजनम ज्ञानमुनिति । यथापि
परामर्शप्रत्य्यादि विपरामर्शजनगमरमर्शजनं
विलित्यकं यस्मादं ततेवादुनिति। नं काराप्रति
हेवित्यकानुमितावाचारितमचय वाच । तादृशमान-
च्छलुर्वशवचनानुमितमचय विविचितावत । ज्ञय वा
वाचारिकान्तकं ज्ञानमुनिति । एवं भारु मधुनाथ-
करणं ज्ञानमुनिति । पदमानसुकरणं ज्ञानं मधु-
सोधः ॥ वशुन्ति वत्तिकिरदुनितिविकिरिकादाय नैत्या-
विकिरिति वत्ति वत्तिकिरदुनितिविकिरिकादाय वत्तिकी-
विकिरितिलं मनुमितिं । एवं वत्तिकिरदुनितिविकिरिकादाय
मधुराय नैत्यकिरिति वत्ति वत्तिकिरदुनितिविकिरिकादाय
मधुराय नैत्यकिरितिलं प्रयाचित्ति वाचारितमः ॥
भाषा। भ्राष्टत्वा गौधरो गन्यो गम्भीरार्थिण्यं सूक्तः।
तथा रस्सिः रस्सिः यायाकत्व भ्राष्टार्थिण्यं च सूक्तेः।॥५२॥
उद्भवं नवन्येन गौधरो द्व्याणिः नाबन्धित्वयथाकर्मिः।
विभाेगसंयोगपरापरत्वक्षेत्रादः परिमाणायुक्तः॥५३॥
क्षियो जातिः योग्यवृत्तिः सम्बायवृत्ति नादं।

सिद्धा। भ्राष्टादीपित। भ्राष्टं रायतं चारुम यार्यां स्त्रीं
सामायितं शिखरं प्रश्यं। न चेष्टामत्वस्वाभाविः
नास्मयं। जन्यप्रत्यतिती निरूपणोऽयत् उपमाता
मुखारात्॥ ५१॥

भ्राष्टेचे। गौधर दृति पार्श्व दृष्यः। गम्भीरां
दिरिति। प्राधिरूपः सुरभिलसुरभिल्परियः।
गम्भीर मघवलाः नदीविषाणितिपरियः। गम्भीरां
वशं तु भ्राष्टेचे न सामायितं बोधेः॥ तथा रसश
दृति। रसभादिनिषिद्धं दृष्यः। गन्यो रस्सिः उद्वृत्तो
बेस्यः। तथा श्रुतीदिनिषिद्धः॥ ५२॥

उद्भवरूपिति। योग्राष्टाद्वादुरुखरूपितं न
चारुणं मघवः। नाबन्धित उद्भवरूपविद।॥ ५३॥

श्रायुति। प्राधिरूपः सर्वयोगुप्तितः पार्श्वः।
पार्श्वं सामायित्विषिद्धः॥ चुरुणायमलमेव कथं त
दाः॥ द्रष्टानिति। श्रायुतास्योऽविद्वेद उद्भवयथः
चारुमण्डितं प्रति काळं॥ तत्र द्रष्टाणुमण्डितं प्रति तथा।
भाषा। युक्तात्म चतुः संयोगातासातिको।वर्णपयोः।। ॥ ४४ ॥

उत्तरसंयंवायद्रव क्रयं गोचरः। साधिपि चतुः।।

किशोरः समवायसंबन्धेन कारणः। दुःखम्बोदप्रतिवर्णात् प्रति
स्थायः समवायसंबन्धेन दुःखम्बोदप्रतिवर्णात् शुभवादः।
प्रत्येके स्थायः समवायसंबन्धमथमनानेतः। ॥ ४४ ॥

उत्तरसंयंवायद्रव क्रयं। गोचरलोके गोचरः। साधिपि

किशोरसाधिपि सहितादिप्रशिष्ट:। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

भाषासाधिपि सामालादिसहितः।। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।

तथा वैभवकालिकावः विश्रावसः चः रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः। रूपायर्द्रितः।
भाषा १ दुःशान्यचिं तेषां श्रीमान्य दुष्क्रमार्गापि कारणं || पुषु ॥

इत्यावधे लक्षणशी शेगो मनसा शानकारणं।

शिखा २ १४३ उपाणीति प्रत्यस्य वत्तादृव वाघार्क प्रवचनं भवते।

वर्णविन्यासवचारं तु ग्रुष्कन न वा शर्शलं देहुलनं

वायुमयोरुक्तं प्रभात एवं काच्यत् द्वितीयकर्मापि

काच्यत् महापरिमाणांचे द्रापादिवाद: ॥ ५ ॥

लक्षण: शेगो मनसा शानकारणमिति। लक्षणशी: शेगो मनसां शानकारणमिति।

किं कथन प्रमाणं सुपुर्पिकांके लघं वक्ष्यं पुरातितवर्त्मानं मनस्या ज्ञान

सुपरिचयं तत्सुपुर्पिकांके कणं बिश्वाय श्रुतविश्वाय श्रुतविश्वाय वा ॥ नाथः ॥

शुचिवाच्यामध्यवात।

तथा च। चापुपदिप्रवचे चुन्दः। चुन्दः।

तद्भावादेव न चापुपादिप्रवचं ज्ञानवादेव न मानवादेव ज्ञानवादेव ज्ञान

ज्ञानात्मकानाभावान् गान्मितां ॥ पदज्ञानाभावान् न ज्ञानव्यवायुं दृष्टं।

श्रुतविश्वामध्यवात। नानुभवं उद्धध-काभ्यात् न, स्करणं। नेतं सुपुर्पिकानांलोके त्वत्रादि-

ब्रह्मकालोष्णां वाक्यादि-प्रज्ञासाधु तद्वतोष्णां न वदवत्ते

मानवाभावान् सुपुर्पिकानां निर्दिष्टकयकावे जातं

रत्नार्थि प्रमाणाभावात॥ पुषु शानमाचे लक्षण: शेगो-
माञ्छे मनोयाछ्या चुवं दु:खिन्या हेल्या मान्ये कानि: नू ॥ ५६ ॥

रन्यं यत्तिमुक्ताय नदरिन्मिर्यिमयने।

मिद्ध्वान गण्य चदिक कारणं तदा रामन्याचार्याखिक्रियाध्यायः स्थाने। विषयलक्ष्मेयार्यं नन्मक्ष्मेयं गण्य च बलान्। परस्या प्रतिस्वरुपार्थक्ष्मेयं वा न स्यादित। अर्थ केचिवे पुनः अजुनक्ष्मेयं लघुमाणार्याका दु:खलिन्यान्त स्यानान्त विनिर्देश्यचक्षु: अवागुरोधान् कल्याणं हृदा। अन्वयं नू मुस्यस्युः धारान्तः विषयम्: मयोग्य गणान्नेव दक्ष्मेयं कल्यं वाधुपार्थ प्रावभार्यादिकानं लघुक्ष्मेयार्याभावान्त स्यांग्रहार्द्धचरितमिति वदलि।

मनोवालं पुरुं दु:खिन्यान्त भौतिकं हनितं भौतित।

मनोज्ञानप्रविष्टस्व दक्ष्मेयं: मतिर्ज्ञानं: कानि: प्रचयं।

एवं सुखालंकारं मनोवालं द्वमथापारम् मना यानं।

किल्क मनोमात्रयं गावर दक्ष्मेयं पूणमस्वः

कानि मनोयस्थि ज्ञातस्तु नदरिन्मिर्यिमयने।

वशं मयोगांवनमारं घट इत्यातं घटनाविधिगुः

जानं ज समभवति। पूणं विष्यकोणं घटनादित्वाना भावान्। विष्यकोणं विष्यप्रसंगां कारणावलं।

तथा ज प्रथमानं घटतघटनाविधिगुः जानं

जायने तदेव विशिष्टकारणं तच ज प्रथमं। तथा
भाषा० महानं विद्वधे चैतुरिन्द्रियं कारणमानं मनं ॥ ५० ॥

शिशुा० हि विषयानवगाहितानस्य प्रत्ययं न भवति। घटमथं
ि आनंबोहि प्रत्ययात्। नानात्मकं मनं प्रकारोभूय
भावते। मात्रे घटकं घटं यो प्रकारः म एव विशेष-
विधिशेषं तदष्ठर्षनां नैक्षेककिम्यः। विशेषणात्वचकोकारं मनं
विशेष्यवैष्णवनामकां। निर्बौधक्रवः च घटलादिनं
न प्रकरः। तेनं घटलादिविषयांघटादिविष्णुभानं
मात्रे न संभवति। जात्यति� riffपर्यायशास्त्रकिंसिद्धि-
कुञ्जकारकलृतिनियमातु।

महां विद्वधे चैतुरिति। क्रयस्थयं महानं
समवायसम्बन्धन कारणं। क्रयस्थयतानां जातिःगणकां
रोणं प्रत्येक समवायसम्बन्धन कारणं। क्रयस्थ-
स्थयतानां गुणवृत्तगतः पलालो नामं प्रत्येके
समवायसम्बन्धननाम कारणमिति। क्रयस्थ-
यमिति। अत्रापि विद्वधे क्रयनुपायन। दक्ष्यतनु
अ न आति।। १२४४। बृहदीवििनां साधुप्रसंस्कारुत। किन्नु
ब्रह्मेनाच्छूतनिविष्णुगणानाधृते बहिः शास्त्रकारणम-
सः यथा गाम्यन आदर्शादिवर्तणां यमाः। उद्वृत्तिश्चिनी-
गुणाः शास्त्रः त्राचे विचारः। श्रेष्ठतरि। विशेष गुणां

* महापार्ज्जकारं चतादिविष्णुभानं न संभवति। हि २०४मिसेवः
कारः।
ভাষা। বিষয়েচিত্রমূলভা আপার। বর্ষপি ব্যাপ্ত।

ভিত্তা। হঞ্জাদিলি সমাজ। উজারিত উজ্জীলন ন জানি। শুক্লাদিন সংক্রান্ত। ন চ শুক্লাদিয়ান্ত নামে। বাহুলন্তবিত বাচু উজ্জীলনাদিনা চালুক্যী। অনকলাটাপনাট। কিন্তু শুক্লাদিয়ান্ত মুক্তল নানা তদ্ভাবকুল্য উজ্জীলন। তত্ত্ব মঃরাগাদারায়। তথা চ শশরেঃ দৃঃতরাণি। মঃরাগাদিস্তুে সরলতা বিশেষিত। কালাদিবারাণ্য বিচিত্রদৃশ্য। দক্ষ যাবতায় বিষয়মূলগারাণি প্রাচীন প্রতি প্রয়চনকল্প। দক্ষ যাবতায় বাবনীকারণায় কালাদী। শাপাভাবক্রীচৈ মঃরাগাদারায়। বিশালাকারা কালাদী। উজ্জীলায় মুক্ত জানকীরাণিতার্থ তদ্ভাবণায় কারণমূলি। খ্যাতিধারণ করণ করণ। উজ্জীলায় ধারণায় আপারায়।

বিষয়েচিত্রমূলভা আপার। ভর্ষি ব্যাপ্তি হই।

আপার। বর্ষপি। ব্যাপ্তি মঃরাগমূলমুদরাহরণাদার। ইহা হই। দক্ষঃথিতন হই। দক্ষঃথিতন্তন্ত্রমঃইদারায়।

দক্ষথিতন্তন্ত্র দক্ষথিতন্তন্ত্রমূলবহুকায়। ইদা হই। ইদারায় দক্ষঃথিতন্তন্ত্রমঃইদায়।

দক্ষথিতন্তন্ত্র দক্ষথিতন্তন্ত্র কারণায়। দক্ষথিতন্তন্ত্র ভক্তি চুঠে মঃকায়। মঃকায়।
भाषाे ध्वन्यवसूल संयोगान्त संयुक्तसम्बन्धात्। पूर्व।

विन्दात्दि विनिमेय कार्यकरणम्। परमस्य कपालस्य नीलान्त प्रतिविपरमाणैः प्रतिभविलोक्ति च चुः
कध्यं न गुणः। तत्र परस्तेऽव ज्ञातस्तपसम्बन्धं
सहजसम्बन्धं च ज्ञावमानालावत्। तथा वि नीलान्त
अतिरेकवृत्त पट्टाने परमाणविनेत्तो च वर्नते। तथा च
सहजसम्बन्धोऽव घटनीष्ठानात्। प्रतिभविलोक्ति घटारिकमादाय
सहजसम्बन्धवे बाध्यः। एवं वाक्ये तद्रूपायश्च तद्रूपाय
वत्सायाकारश्रृवश्रृवप्रयोगः। तद्रूपायसुतपार्वत्चक्रमेस्तिः
सहजार्थस्वयम्याचुः। संयुक्तसम्बन्धायः। ध्वन्यस्तिति चाचुः。
वत्सायाकारश्रृवश्रृवप्रयोगः। तद्रूपायसुतपार्वत्चक्रमेस्तिः।
संयुक्तसम्बन्धायः। ध्वन्यस्तिति चाचुः। तद्रूपायसु
संयुक्तसम्बन्धायः। ध्वन्यस्तिति चाचुः।
एवं वाक्याद् न सचार्थः। तत्त्वं। संस्कृततिः
संस्कृततिः। एवं वाक्याद्। न सचार्थः।
तत्त्वं। संस्कृततिः। एवं वाक्याद्। न सचार्थः।
तत्त्वं। संस्कृततिः। एवं वाक्याद्। न सचार्थः।
तत्त्वं। संस्कृततिः। एवं द्वायसर्वं
प्रमाणं सध्यं विशिष्टं देखं। एवं द्वायसर्वं
प्रमाणं सध्यं विशिष्टं देखं।
भाषा। क्रयोपु समवेनानं षड्युक्तं समवायतः॥२४॥

कहते न समवायः।

विज्ञान लक्ष्मणसंवेदतमवायः कारणः। चतुर्दशि महावराणमेव

c्यक्रमेण उत्सवसाधिक्रियतरुपं चूर्वंतर्पृथ्वींयथा। प्राण

गम्भरतयेः घाणसंयुक्तसंवेदतमवायः। गम्भरतयेः घाणसंयुक्तसंवेदतमवायः

कारणः॥ परं रससंवेदतमः रस्ता॥ रससंवेदतमः रामन

प्राणेः रससंयुक्तसंवेदतमवायः। श्रुतिसंवेदतमः श्रुतिसंबधतमसंवेदतमवायः

कारणः॥ गत्य संबंधप्रायः श्रुतिसंबन्धप्रायः

विदितकं विचारं। वच्यमाणमण्डकं प्रायः दृष्टियुक्तार्गतिः विचारं भ्रमिताः। प्रायः मनः

मंदिरः। श्रुतिसंवेदतमान्तः प्रायः मनः मंदिरमंदिरमवायः।

श्रुतिसंवेदतमान्तः मनः मंदिरमंदिरमवायः।

कारणः॥ श्रुतिसंवेदतमान्तः मनः मंदिरमंदिरमवायः।

कारणः॥ श्रुतिसंवेदतमवायः।

वैशिष्ट्यमणि तु न संबंधाः। प्रायः। गत्य श्रुत्युक्तिनक्षणता नानाविधा तथा जिः मूलमायी घटामातः।

संयुक्तसंवेदतत्त्वाः। श्रुति ततः। मन्त्रां रूपायभाषा॥

संयुक्तविवेदतदिनसंवेदाधियाः। मन्त्रां रूपायभाषा॥

संयुक्तविवेदतविवेदितशिष्यततः। मन्त्रां रूपायभाषा॥

संयुक्तविवेदतविवेदितशिष्यततः। मन्त्रां रूपायभाषा॥
भाषा

विशेषणतया तद्भवायनो ग्रंथो भवन्

यदि स्मादुपलभेनेलोवं यत्र प्रसज्ञने।

विषया

श्रेष्ठावर्क्रियाविशेषणतया। काद्रो कलायुभवः

विशेषणविशेषणमात्रानि। एवं कलाविभिन्न

भवेकलायुभावे विशेषणविशेषणतया। एवं घटायु

भावार्थे प्रतायुभावः। संयुक्तविशेषणविशेषणतया।

प्रवत्तवत्तू। तथापि। विशेषणातलसुपूर्वकः। छ। गणिते

सर्वाता शृंखला शृंखलेन इति प्रार्थना प्रवदाये। वाचनानि

ते॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥

यदि स्मादुपलभेनेति। श्रमावप्रार्थे चार्यामु

पल्लवः कारणः। तथापि भूतभावी घटायुस्माने

जाते घटायुभावानि न जायते तेनाभावापल्लवे

प्रतियोगुपलभाभावः। कारणः। तथापि चार्यापल्लवे

चिन्ता। ता। प्रतियोगिताविशेषणविशेषणप्रतियोगिता

विशेषणरूपः। तदर्थसु प्रतियोगिनिः। घटायुः प्रतियोगिता

विशेषणप्रतियोगिताविशेषणप्रतियोगिताविशेषण

प्रकारः। तथा च। चार्यापल्लवयथोऽगा

विदः वचने तत्त्वादेश घटः। तद्भवानि उपलभेत

रक्षापार्थिष्ठं बकृते। तत्त्व घटायुभावाद्रिप्रवदाये

भवति। श्रमावर्क्रिया तु ग्रंथार्थिष्ठं बकृतं इति। तत्त्व घटायु

भावाद्रि। नामवर्क्रियां न जार्यावप्रसज्ञवेतवेदः।
भाषा । प्रखच्च समवास्थ विशेषार्थ भवेन ॥ ६१ ॥

अनौपक: सन्निकार्षित: परिकृतिनः ।

विद्या । आलाकार्षयोऽगं विनावि स्थानप्रंज्ञाचार्यापार्थितं सक्ष्यात्।

शक्तिनां गुह्यादिति बद्धयोर्यर्थ तदभवन न प्रयः।

तत्र गुह्यादिगृह्यचार्यापार्थितमुण्डार्थात्। वायो

रूपाभवः। पापाणि मैगाभावः। गुड़ि निकाभावः।

भिक्षे महाभावः। आलाकार भुक्षाभावः। एवमाद्य-

सतादिर्मिति श्रीकृष्णी। तत्तत्त्वाचार्यापार्थितं सक्ष्यात्।

संबंधिभावप्रवर्ते प्रभुत्वोऽग्निको योग्यता। अन्वः

न्याभावप्रवर्ते लघुकरणं योग्यत्वपरिवर्तिता। अग्नि

आदेश प्राप्तिः पिष्चाचार्यबेरेडपि चुज्जन्य गुणति तव ॥ ६२ ॥

प्रथवच सैलिकालौकिकमध्येन दिविध। तत्र

सैलिकप्रायस्ते प्राणम मंथिकवर्षिता। अन्नादिक

मन्त्रिकर्षानिदानी वदति। अन्नादिक रति। यारामः

संकर्ष:। सामाजन्यवर्षी। सामाज्य印度 वर्षा

इवतः। तत्र लक्षणपदेन यद्य सबस्यगच्चति तदा

सामाज्यकर्षप्रायाचिरार्थिः सर्वत्र। अविन्द्यके

श्वासव्याप्तिः सर्वमार्गदीर्घां शस्त्रेभिः वार्ष्यां।

तेन विश्वसर्वविस्मार्योऽभ्यामितिस्थिरत्वमध्यम धृतं धर्मं

शास्त्रं ज्ञात। तत्र धर्मं धृस्तं प्रकारः। धृतम्बन्द मन्त्रिकर्षः

धृतम कर्षोऽक्ष्यं कर्षायद्विन्धु संभाव्याविषयकाः ज्ञातं ज्ञातं ।
भाषा० सामान्यलक्षण स्वानलक्षण योगालक्षण ॥ ४२ ॥
आस्तित्वार्यन्यान्तु सामान्यस्वास्तिमिद्यने ।

विषय० प्रति वद्धि दृश्यस्मात्मायेवोक्ते तदा धूली-
पतले पूथ्मलभम्म्मानन्तवं भक्तिर्कृत्यविषयं ज्ञानं न
कायत । तत्र धूमलेन भस दृश्यस्माभास्मावात् । मकाने
तु दृश्यस्माद्भूतं धूलीपतलं तद्विशेषायकमृतम् दिति ज्ञानं
तत्र अवकाशीमात्रेऽधूमलं प्रव्यासर्विस्य ॥ दृश्यस्मात्माः
नामांको नास्ति । दुःखः विश्विश्विश्वयाने । मानमानमें
तु ज्ञानप्रकारीभूतसामायमाङ् प्रत्यावादितः । अतः
मद्यादिम सन्तिष्ठुति पिताशास्त्रमाप्स्यति । मानम् सक-
लपितालाश्चाष्टिधिः उपप्रभुते ॥ परन्तु समकाहास्मांवाहः
वामायेऽ । तत्र कथितमृधूमलादि कथिचानिमिरं घ-
टानि । यथे जगत् संयोगेन भूमिलं समवायेन कपाले
शास्त्रददन्तत्र वैवेदामहें श्वेतजाधीनां
कपालाधीनां वा ज्ञानं भवति ॥ पशेचथे श्रीमायें
शेष समस्येन शायथे तेन समस्येन अधिकरणां प्र-
वादितः । किंतु चतु तह्यानन्दं तह्यातः
र्वायं ज्ञानं तत्र सामायलक्षण वच्चे तह्यातः तह्यातः
भावं न ज्ञात । शामायेः तद्राजीमावात् ॥ ४२ ॥
किंतु दृश्यस्मात्मायेव दशायं घटं दिति ज्ञानं
तत्र परिहारे दृश्यस्मात्माने विनापि ताधुलक्षान-
বিদ্রুপঃ প্রকারীভূতঃ মাধামাথ্যঃ সজ্জাতঃ তাল্পুটাস্ত কুণো ন জানতে। তস্তান্ত্রবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়নাং তু ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন। ঘট্টতিক্রিয়াং। ঘট্টতিক্রিয়াং। ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন।
তথ্য যা ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন সত্যম্যন্ত্র্যায়ন 
তত্ত্ব ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন নভন্তে।
শিনু শ্নুে সংহিনেদর্মন বিবাহি ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন সত্য সার্থকতার নবস্তি 
তথ্য বক্ষুগত্বারোগনাম ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন 
ভাবা যা বামী বিশিষ্টান্ত্র্যায়ন জয়ন্তী বিবাহি 
তথ্য নাচারী শুধুাচয় তাল্পুটাস্ত ন জানতে।

বনু ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়নন্ত্র্যায়ন ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন 
অমাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন বসা তথ্যান্তায়ন ন জাত্র বসা।

বিগ্রহ ধ্বসন্তী সাক্ষারন্তভাবা ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন দত।

ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন তথাকথনায়ন ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন 

dhsm-

বভূমান্ত্র্যায়ন স্বাধীন কৃষিকৃতায়ন ভাবামাথ্যান্ত্র্যায়ন


dhsm-
भाषा० विषयी यसू तसी० व्यापरो ज्ञानलगणा।
योगजो हिविष्ठः प्रोत्तीयुत्ताणामेवदः॥ ६४ ॥

विषय० कर्ण भवतु तद्विष्ठ शामान्यक्षणा क्लीकिर्ति॥ न च मकः
छविज्ञ्ञधूमभानाभावे कः। च्छतिरिति वाच्यं प्रत्ययधुमे
विज्ञ्ञधूममया यथोत्तमत्। १२ अभ्यं चानुपस्थितः
वाच्याशो न वैति भंज्याभास्यां। मकाते तु
शामान्यक्षणा, मकल्पधूमपरिधानाओ वाच्याचारीयः
विस्मिति तु काशारीवः ध्रुवारीवधुममया विज्ञ्याभास्यां॥ यथोति॥ न च
शामान्यक्षणास्विकारे योगद्विलेन शकलामेये श्लाते
वाच्यपरिधानपरिधिरिति वाच्यं। योगद्विलेन शकलामेये
कालेष्टेति विस्मिति शकलयपन्यास्यामात्लेन शाक्ष्याभासान
वात्॥ एवं शामान्यक्षणाय भ्रोकारे सुरस्वितन्नुम
मिति भाने धारभव स्वान कर्ण यथात्। यथापि शामान्यक्षणाय
धारभवां भानं कर्णक्षणाय। एवं बच धूमलेन धूसोप
तव श्रातं तस धूसोपस्वानुवायो भानं शान
क्षणाय॥

योगजो हिविष्ठ रती। योगाभास्यनिते भर्षविषेषः मृत्युराणामिकावर्षम द्यायः। युक्तुः यानेवदं
रती। युक्तुः तत्तत्त्वाविविद्धापर्वहुर्वकार्यः द्विविधान्
मिति मोकः॥ ६४ ॥
भावः युक्तेऽर्था चयः चिन्तामणिकोवः।
व्यापरस्तु परास्त्। करणं व्यासितिधिवैत्॥
अनुमायं चिन्तामणि चिन्तनु करणं न वि॥

विद्वा । युक्तेऽर्था भाष्मिति। चोगाध्यायवधेषोहः।
नरः हस्याध्यायवधेषोविधिविलेयोहः।
वर्णविविश्वतथोऽववत्रारः विकिर्तं द्युतयुक्तः।
सर्वंदित्त। विलासकारिण्यं विनेतरः॥ भानं वत्सित्ववाणूं
यतः। चवरोऽनुक्तो विषयथाष्ट्रसमानः॥ चिन्ता
ध्यानं सन्धादेशकीयर्यं। तन्तु बद्धकारत् युक्तेऽ
चार्युत्तित्वप्रतिष्ठानसन् प्रविशोक्तरः।

अनुभवति युक्ताद्वयति॥ यथाश्रविति। भगु
मायां अनुभवती। वासिष्यां करणं। परास्त्रा या
पारः। तथावहि येन पुक्ते। सहानात्रेऽधूमे। एवं
विनितिष्ठताप पशुः। एव पुक्तः। कवितः वस्त्रां
विस्मितः स्वभूम्भराः। धूमसेवा पर्यातं तदस्मानं भूमा
विष्याय दलेवंस्तु। वासिष्यारं भवति। तस्माच
विष्याय धूमसेवायस्मिति ज्ञातं भवति न्य एव परा
स्मात दलेवं। तदस्मातः अन्यतरं विशिष्यातं ज्ञात
आयते। तदवनुभवति॥ अत्र भाषोजान। अयावेन
ध्यायानं धूमादिकमविनितायुः। तद्वयति ध्यायान
मानविति॥
भाषा: अनागानादिभिन्नै न स्मार्नुभितिमत्तरा। दृश्य। अनुसूचय नन्दसमिवत्वोऽय स्च उच्चाते।

विष्णु: विन्द्रानुभितकरणस्य युक्तमात्र। अनागता-हर्षी। वर्णुमिती विन्दुः करण्य आत्र तदा अनागतस्वितन्त्र विन्द्रेऽ वास्तवानुभितम्स्य आत्र। अनुमितिकरकथा विन्द्रोऽ तदात्मः मभावात्। दृश्य। दृश्य।

अनुसूचय पदवधानसिद्धीतति। अनुसिद्धांत्य परेण वै विन्द्रयावसाहित्यां नृत्तमित्वात्। तस्म वार्षिकः परेण दृश्या स्मार्नुभिति भान्त वायुवाच्चिति महान वा। अनुमितिलक्षणं परेण वायु दृश्या स्मार्नुभिति भान्त् परेण वायु रथाकारिकः। परेण वायुवाच्चिति महान वा। वायुवाच्चिति-वायुकारिकः। दिनिधािः विन्द्रायन् रथामात्रः परेण वायु-वापिष्ठवानुभितिर्गुर्जः। नन्तो विन्द्रायन्यावसाहान् परंत दृश्यां स्मार्नुभिति भान्त विन्द्रेऽ चक्रं प्राप्ता धूर्मवाच्चिति महान तते धूर्म भगवान्याय दृश्या भर्गव भवति। तत्र भाषव्यानुभितमहामात्रः। अनुसिद्धांत्य भाषव्यानुभितमहामात्रः। विन्द्रायन्यावसाहित्यानं कर्त्त्वं न कर्त्त्वं किन्तु वायुताव-स्त्रेत्रकारकपञ्चवेदस्तान्तः कार्यते भार्यस-कलान्। विन्द्रायन्यावसाहित्यानं गार्भवधीति वेश। वायुवाच्चिति-वायुकारिकः। विन्द्रायन्यावसाहित्यानं स्मार्नुभितिमहान दृश्यानुभितः। वायुवाच्चिति भाषाकारकपञ्चवेदस्तान्तः।
भाषा: यथा: साधवद्यमांशिरसमासं उदाहरणः ||६३||

बिंद्र० स्मालेनै वाकपरं। किंस्व धूमवानं पर्यं दृष्टि स्मादनुमित्वापि। याष्टावश्क्षेत्रस्नितधुमस्मतःकपकपञ्जन्याभासं चचतां। न च तदानि युगस्मायायो वश्क्षेत्रस्मतःकपकपञ्जन्याभासं देहुलमिति वाच्यं। देशसु यथिते देशस्य पञ्जन्याभासं-स्मादनुमिति यथिति। चर्द तु तन्नुववीयायः स्मायायो वश्क्षेत्रस्मतःकपकपञ्जन्याभासं-स्मायायो पञ्जन्याभासं देहुलमिति तदर्शमन्त्र्येतदा बणामकार्यकारभावः। मन्त्रे तु समवायेन यासिंकारक-पञ्जन्याभासं समवायेनानुमिति-तन्यातीयं सम-मन्त्रकार्यकारभावः। यथि तु यासिंकारकं स्माय पञ्जन्याभासं स्माय पञ्जन्याभासं दृष्टि समवायेनानुमिति: यथिति। इत्यय वचन स्माय-बचन तथापि बिनिष्ठितम् कथान्यं। फलसुधारेव-स्मादोरबासः दृष्टि।

यथा: नाम यथास्मयः तत्र का यासिंकार्यं भाष। यासिंकार्यं। यावथावेिति। विभासं धूम-विभथादैं यथा वव्हं। यावथावेि स्मायागार्जि। तद-लोकमयदाहिं। तदर्शांसि धूमपूर्विति समवायमयः।
भाषा  अर्थवा चतुर्सिद्धिविरूपानानियोगिना ।

विष्णु  धूमवान्  वक्रोरित्यादिः  साधवद्यवाचिक्षकः । चतु चेन  समबन्धः  याथे  तेनेव  
समस्यान्  साधवान्  बेचारः । अन्वया  समवायसम्बन्धः  
संक्षेपान्  वृक्षवायवशबद्धो समानाद्विदि । तच्च  धूमच  
विष्णुनारायणाप्राप्त्वशकान्त । साधवद्यवाच  साधव- 
राचक्षिक्ष्याप्रतिपोष्यागतकेचब्रवाल्  बोधः । तेन  यन्  
किस्मितक्षणाम्  समानाद्विदि । तथीमेव  पर्यतादां  धूमच  
कलेपिन्  न चावति । चेन  समस्यान्  चेतुक्षेत्र  समस्यान्  साधव- 
वद्यवाचिन्यः  बेचारः । तेन  साधवद्यवाचिन्त्र  धूमचवये  
धूमच  समवायसम्बन्धः  कलेपिन्  न चावति । साधवद्य- 
वाचिन्यः  साधवद्यवाचिन्त्रवाचिन्त्रवाचिन्त्राभावः । तेन 
धूमचवये  वक्रोरित्यादि  साधवद्यवाचिन्त्रवाचिन्त्राभावः 
वेचार  नित्याभावः । चतु चेन  द्वार्यं  गुणकर्माणं 
विष्णुमहानानमहाधर्मविश्वासः  विद्वानांस्कारः  सन्तायसे- 
कान्तिः  साधवद्यवाचिन्त्र  गुणात्मकवीशिलिन्य  नास्तीति  
तथापि  चेतुचार्यमूक्षेत्रवाचिन्त्रवाचिन्त्राभावः । चेतुचार्य- 
वक्रोरित्यादि  साधवद्यवाचिन्त्रवाचिन्त्राभावः । नन्द  
केवलाद्यवाचिन्त्राभावः  वाथे  साधवद्यवाचिन्त्राभावः 
लाभाभावः । ॥ ६३ ॥

किंचि  वत्तावन्  जातेरित्यादि  साधवद्यवाचिन्त्रः
ভাষায় সাধারণ তেজোত্তরকাঠিকরণ ব্যাপ্তির নেপদের শ্রেষ্ঠের গর্ভাশায়ী কুজ্ঞ। পুত্র গর্ভাশায়ী নিরাল দিয়া তাহা স্বব্ধান্ত মাথা দিয়া। কিন্তু গর্ভাশায়ী শ্রেষ্ঠের বিশ্বাস যথাযথ না হইলে তাহার মধ্যে যৌথান্ত্রিক শাখায় বিষয়।

তাহার না গর্ভাশায়ীর বিশ্বাস যথাযথ না হইলে তাহার মধ্যে যৌথান্ত্রিক শাখায় বিষয়।


dh

নন্দ কুপলায়ণ যৌথান্ত্রিক ধ্রুবত্তালিকায়। তত্ত্বাত্মান কুপলায়ণ যৌথান্ত্রিক ধ্রুবত্তালিকায়।

কাপিটু তুবভাব বিদ্যাতালিকায়।

নন্দ কুপলায়ণ যৌথা নাত্তান্ত্রিক ধ্রুবত্তালিকায়।

নন্দ কুপলায়ণ যৌথান্ত্রিক ধ্রুবত্তালিকায়।
विष्णुः गच्छेदकमित्रवेषः सचंष्टकमित्रविपद्रेति्। एवं
द्वारायणं सार्चे परमश्चलनं द्वारलाभ्यस्मितं सायां-
तावस्येव अविनयवाद्योगियानवच्छेदकमिति वाच्यं। देवतां
विकारणं रेषुतावस्येवाविकारणं वाच्यं। तेन
वेश्वरं गुणक्षोण्यलविलिपिकारिता भूभर्ष्याधि-
करणमाणाणिङ्गाब्रजावस्तुंग्रामगलिपि क्रमालं ना-
याति॥ देवतावस्येवकालः सेवकधिकरणं शान्ति। तेन
धन्याधिकारयमहत्तरसुखाविद्यमाणियोगीमलिपि
वर्णेनायाति॥ भवावशं प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं
वेष्यं। तेन कपिलंधारि एतद्वंजलिद्वारि मूलां
कृतेनकृतेन एतद्वंजलिकारित्विलिपिग्रामाविद्यमाणिगुरु
संक्षेपं अर्थात्॥। गच्छे प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये
योगमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत्याति॥ प्रतियो-
गिति वस्तुं दिल्लिकारित्विलिपिग्रामाविद्यमाणिगुरु
वर्णेनायाति॥। तां संक्षेपं एतद्वंजलिकारित्विलिपि
संक्षेपं अर्थात्॥। गच्छे प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये
योगमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत् प्रतियो-
गिति वस्तुं दिल्लिकारित्विलिपिग्रामाविद्यमाणिगुरु
वर्णेनायाति॥। तां संक्षेपं एतद्वंजलिकारित्विलिपि
संक्षेपं अर्थात्॥। गच्छे प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये
योगमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत् गच्छे
प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत्
संक्षेपं अर्थात्॥। गच्छे प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये
योगमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत् गच्छे
प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत्
संक्षेपं अर्थात्॥। गच्छे प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये
योगमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत् गच्छे
प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत्
संक्षेपं अर्थात्॥। गच्छे प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये
योगमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत् गच्छे
प्रतियोगियमधिकरणं प्राप्त्ये। तदर्ता तथावत्
संक्षेपं अर्थात्॥।
विद्या वांछ। तेन विद्यानिदान अर्निएन आय्याकर-रणगुणा विद्यानिदान प्रतिष्ठितविद्यामहादिकरण-शास्त्रो नै चास। एवं माशािन्दककारकमेघन प्रति-खोयामधिकरणलं वांछ। तेन जानवाण्डुच्यानि-ख्यादाच उत्तमाधिकरणसंगठनदिवसयात्मकमेघन जाना-धिकरणलेपि नै चास। इत्यद वांछणां धुमारित-ख्यादाच ध्रुमाधिकरणसं समवायेन विज्ञितविचारविलय नै चास। ननु प्रतियोगितावर्गकारविधान यथा कथ-चित्त तत्त्वमायास वा अन्धिकरणं। चतु विशिष्टान्वित-प्रतियोगितावर्गकारविधान वान्धिकरणलुम।

आय वायुवं वायु एवं बलाच्याध्यायवायन। कौ-ं खेमाधिकारविन्दकारविधानं धर्म-सत्तरापि कौण्यवं भवति तद्वैदिकरणस्य दुःख दुःख। द्वितीये प्रतियोगिताधिकरणाभावार्थार्थम्।

पर्यालोकाव्या पूर्ववर्गुज्ञानविक्षिप्तरं भावावात्मक-प्रतियोगितामधिकरणलान। न च वाङ्गानं धुमारि दिखादे। पूर्ववर्गुज्ञानविक्षिप्तरं भावावात्मकप्रतियोगितामधिकरणलं यथापि पर्यांत्रां श्लोकं भाष्ट्रविवशोऽहादे। पूर्वात्मककारकमेघनतत्त्वप्रतियोगितामधिकरणस्य-सम्बन्धित कथासाधित्रितिप्रवाः। भाष्ट्राववां वां व्याश्वाकास्य ग्रंथाभावात्मकत्या भाष्ट्राववां विशिष्ट-राप प्रतियोगी तद्वैदिकरणस्य पर्यातार्विति रूपाणि।
বিশ্বাস প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণার্থে প্রথিতীয় হইলে। যদি যে ঘটা
ভাবায়া বস্তুভাবায়ে ভিত্তিতে তথ্য প্রতি ভূমি-
ভাবায়া বস্তুভাবায়ে আচার্য্যানি। তবে সাধারণ-
ঘটকসম্প্রেষণ: স্বরূপসম্প্রেঞ্জ:। তবে সম্প্রেষণ সাধারণ-
ভাবায়া চ পূর্বক্ষয়নির্দিষ্টে স্বাভাবিক আচার্য্যনি-
গোধিক প্রতি ঘটিলে আর্থিক প্রতিযোগিতারণ। হতে যে তু কর্ম-
ধোগাভাবায়া আচার্য্যানি। তবাভাবে সংলাপকারণে গুণ-
মাত্র সাধারণ চ গুণ-মাত্র ত্বরিতচিঠিগতাবিক্রম গুণসাধারণ ভাবায়া
গৃহস্থা গুণসম্প্রেষণঃ প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম গৃহস্থাবিক্রম
স্বীকৃতিসম্প্রেষণঃ প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম স্বীকৃতিসম্প্রেষণ
সাধারণ নিযুক্ত। প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম সাধারণ স্বীকৃতি
সাধারণ নিযুক্ত। প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম সাধারণ স্বীকৃতি
সাধারণ নিযুক্ত। প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম সাধারণ স্বীকৃতি
সাধারণ নিযুক্ত। প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম সাধারণ স্বীকৃতি
সাধারণ নিযুক্ত। প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম সাধারণ স্বীকৃতি
সাধারণ নিযুক্ত। প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম সাধারণ স্বীকৃতি
সাধারণ নিযুক্ত। প্রতিযোগিতাবিক্রম সাধারণ স্বীকৃতি
गौरवे सम्मनाभविष्यलयुक्ताभिक्षिणाभाषाभाष्येन सम्मनन तदुपराभिक्षिणः तत् स्वरूपपरमेव यथा। यापक भाषामागाधिकरणम् यथा। चतुर्माण्डः सचान्ता-वर्तमानः। यदैवः यामतावर्तमानः। ततः चतुर्भाज्यविष्णुलाभाभवमाणिक्ये भवति। सम्मनन यथा वन्यनियमात्म ग्रंथिग्रंथात्म यथा। चतुर्माण्डः सचान्ताविष्णुलाभाभवमाणिक्ये भवति। सम्मनन यथा वन्यनियमात्ममध्ये यथा। चतुर्माण्डः सचान्ताविष्णुलाभाभवमाणिक्ये भवति। सम्मनन यथा वन्यनियमात्म। धार्मिक वन्यसंगीत्या निर्माणात्म प्रस्तुतीयोगितायः ग्रंथिग्रंथात्म यथा। चतुर्माण्डः सचान्ताविष्णुलाभाभवमाणिक्ये भवति। सम्मनन यथा वन्यनियमात्म।
ভাষাত: বিদ্যাধিক্যা মূল্যমানিতিত ন বিদ্যতে।

বিদ্যা মূল্যায়ন বিদ্যার মাধ্যমে বিদ্যাধিক্যার বিশেষ অর্থ প্রদান করে। বিদ্যাধিক্যার বিশেষ বিশেষ অর্থ প্রদান করে। বিদ্যাধিক্যের মাধ্যমে মাধ্যমিক বিদ্যাধিক্যের বিশেষ অর্থ প্রদান করে। তথ্য বিদ্যাধিক্যের বিশেষ অর্থ প্রদান করে। বিদ্যাধিক্যের বিশেষ অর্থ প্রদান করে। বিদ্যাধিক্যের বিশেষ অর্থ প্রদান করে। বিদ্যাধিক্যের বিশেষ অর্থ প্রদান করে। বিদ্যাধিক্যের বিশেষ অর্থ প্রদান করে।
भाग १ स पञ्चमिक वृत्तितिव्यावहार निष्कमितभेद १३ ॥

मित्रवा वान पञ्चिकान्ति विज्ञानिकिखुमिति । सुखाधानामिति
प्रवर्ण स्वरुपं वा । तत्: मित्राधिधित्या। तत्र पञ्चात्मकं
स्वे मित्राधिधिविशेषविशेषविशेषविशेषविशेषविशेषकलां
दिति । चतुरं बोधयं यागृहायुक्तवियाधिभाषिकः
विद्वाने यश्वकान्तिसन्तोष शिबाधिधिविशेष
विशेषविशेषनियुक्तः वासुकिकान्तामिति पञ्चिक ॥ तेन नि-
दिपरामर्शयुक्तं वत्तिक्रिया संसारा गायनामिति
यामिपि नागुमिति । विज्ञानयोगुमान्ति पञ्चिकान्ति
पञ्चिकान्ति प्रायवर्षार्द्धान्ति पञ्चिकान्ति जाय
वाक्योत्तोक्ष्यायानु अवबाय ॥ एवं धूमपरामर्शवे
आलोकेन वाक्यमुनिनोपनित्तिकाष्टामिपि नागुमिति ।
मित्राधिधिविशेषविशेषविशेषविशेषमणिति
पञ्चिकान्तिकार्नाम यागृहायुक्तवियान्ति
मणिति
अरुठो विद्वानियान्ति तन्त्रामिति अतिविनियान्ति व न त्वा
पञ्चिकान्तिकार्नाम विद्वानियान्ति
निदळपानत् । पञ्चात्मकादङ्काभिनुमिति प्रति पञ्चा
अदङ्काभिनुमिति विद्वानियान्ति निदळपानात् । पञ्चात्मक
अदङ्काभिनुमिति प्रति निदळपानात् विद्वानियान्ति
विद्वानियान्ति । रद्देन बोधयं । चाय पञ्चिकान्ति न वरि
विद्वानियान्ति च न पञ्चिकान्ति विद्वानियान्ति
त्वा
श्रीनारायण
ভাষা: অনৈকান্তি বিশ্বব্যাপারিতিনি প্রতিপাদিত।

বিষয়: তথাতীত্যাবামানসান্যাস পুষ্পবল্প প্রথম নিঃকৃতি ন ন- সম্পূর্ণীয়তায় নিমিত্ততাবিশ্বিষ্ঠসাথিভাবভক্তির সাথে প্রভাবী কারণে নির্ভরপূর্ণ সত্যগোষ্ঠী প্রতিপাদিত। এবং পরামাণুনিতে বিনার্থ প্রস্তাবনায় প্রচুরভাবে প্রাণীমূল প্রাণতন্ত্রি। প্রাণবিশ্বব্যাপারিবিশ্বস্তানু- প্রভাবী প্রাণতন্ত্রিভিক্ষু নিয়ন্ত্রিত।

প্রথম প্রথম বিষয়বল্প

প্রথম প্রথম নিমিত্ততাবিশ্বিষ্ঠ সাথে প্রক্ষণ তারত। প্রথম ভিক্ষুবিশ্বিষ্ঠ সাথে নির্মাতামূল নিয়ন্ত্রিত তথাপি প্রবাহের বিশ্বব্যাপারিতিনি নিয়ন্ত্রিত।

প্রথম প্রথম বিষয়বল্প

প্রথম প্রথম নিমিত্ততাবিশ্বিষ্ঠ সাথে প্রক্ষণ তারত। প্রথম ভিক্ষুবিশ্বিষ্ঠ সাথে নির্মাতামূল নিয়ন্ত্রিত তথাপি প্রবাহের বিশ্বব্যাপারিতিনি নিয়ন্ত্রিত।
भाषा: कालावधिपरिश्रम चेलाभाषालय पद्धति। ३०।।

आयु: साधारणच स्थान स्थायथाभाषाणो मन:।

विषयः विद्ययमनन्तः शास्त्रात्मकमित्विरेचाधिपिं तदर्थ चेलाभाषान्तः स्थानात्मिक्य विनिरेचाधिपातिकमेव तथा तदर्थ चेलाभाषान्तः। न च वेद विद्विद्वत्वानुवाचार्याः वाच्यातः पचे साधारणविनिरेचाधिपातिकमेव स्थानात्मिकमेव तदल्पकापि साधारणाट्वतेवातः बाधितांनिर्मिति वाच्यः। तस्त्रां शास्त्रान्तः विद्ययमनन्तः कालावधिपरिश्रम चेलाभाषालय पद्धति। न च वेदान्तिपदिक रूपः वाच्यारण्यमृण्डावः। तस्त्रां वाच्यारण्यधारावाच्यारण्यधारावः। कालावधिपरिश्रम चेलाभाषालय पद्धति। न च वेदान्तिष्ठानस्य शास्त्रान्तः वाच्यारण्यमृण्डावः।

प्रवृत्त: साधारणच दृष्टिकोण। साधारण: साधारणच दृष्टिकोण। तस्मिन: शास्त्रान्तः साधारणच दृष्टिकोण।
ভাষাতে তথ্যানুপন্মধারী বিজ্ঞানেকালিকো ভবেন।

নিদ্রায় দিব তথ্যাধারণাধারণ। মূল্য তু শিক্ষিত সাধারণ। স্বপ্ন নিদ্রা নিদ্রায় দিব তথ্যাধারণাধারণ। মূল্য তু শিক্ষিত সাধারণ। স্বপ্ন নিদ্রা নিদ্রা নিদ্রায় দিব তথ্যাধারণাধারণ। মূল্য তু শিক্ষিত সাধারণ।
পোহা তন্তৰাধিকৃতনাথে দ্বিতীয়কোটিভাষামন্তব্যমাঙ্কন‌ক্ষমত। ফলঃ লৌকিক পার্থ‌শ্রমক্ষমত কল্পনা দৃষ্ট বহন নিরাপত্তা তথ্য। তাই ব্যাব্যাপারে উপাদানে লৌকিক মূলকৌণিক বিশ্বাসের অধিকারচেষ্টা সমাপ্ত। স্কৃতির কাহিনী-কথার সর্বসময় মানুষের তথ্য প্রতিষ্ঠানরায়ন। জ্ঞানবান। ন তথ্যরূপ মানুষের নামকরণ চল্লাত প্রতিষ্ঠানরায়ন। আরু নিধু প্রতিষ্ঠান মানুষ চল্লাত প্রতিষ্ঠানরায়ন। তাই এর, প্রতিষ্ঠান অনুমোদন করা এবং সম্পর্কিত সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার। না। এ কৌণিক কথার মূল যথেষ্ট সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার। ও সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার। না। এ কথার মূল যথেষ্ট সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার। ও সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার।

আরু প্রতিষ্ঠান সমন্বয়কৃত। আরু প্রতিষ্ঠান: প্রতি প্রতিষ্ঠাতে সম্পর্কিত তথ্য। ও সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার। ও সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার।

আরু প্রতিষ্ঠান সমন্বয়কৃত। আরু প্রতিষ্ঠান: প্রতি প্রতিষ্ঠাতে সম্পর্কিত তথ্য। ও সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার।

আরু প্রতিষ্ঠান সমন্বয়কৃত। আরু প্রতিষ্ঠান: প্রতি প্রতিষ্ঠাতে সম্পর্কিত তথ্য। ও সম্পর্কিত তথ্য সংগ্রহ করার।
ধীতার সাধারণতরি যাপনাশিক্তি। এ চ সাধারণতাত্তাত্ত্বিকভাবে তথা চ কার্মিকধর্ষিত্বা- মিষ্ঠাদী সাধারণতাত্তাত্ত্বিকভাবে যাপনায় নাতাত্ত্বিককথিতায় যাপনায় অনেকগুলি প্রতি- নিবন্ধ: ফলং।

এবং দ্বিতীয় শত্তাত্ত্বিকভাবে সাধারণশিক্তি।

হৃথ্যাচার হৃথ্যাচারই হৃথ্যাচার! শতাব্দিককথিতায় শতাব্দিককথিতায় শতাব্দিককথিতায় শতাব্দিককথিতায় হৃথ্যাচার। এবং শতাব্দিকন তত্ত্বাবধায়ানে গুহতায়ত নীরবধূমালন শতাব্দিককথিতায় যাপনার যে শিক্তি শিক্তি।

যায় প্রক্রি যায় যায় যায় প্রক্রি 

এর শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি শিক্তি 

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भाषा ॥ सप्तस संपर्के च भवेन साधारणस्य सः।

विश्वासं तासाणे प्रमाणविषयकलेन प्रतिष्ठितःकर्माणे। किंचनु
भाषाप्राणाकान्नित्वा बाधादीर्युः प्रतिस्थापत्तार।
तत्र भाषासंहितानि प्रागात्मकाणं काव्योपनिषयेन।
न च वाचकाः पधे हृदतेन वाचिन्धरः पृथी चेष्टे भवे
वाचलोकसिद्धिरीव दृष्टि वाच्यं। वादशानेन
वाचिन्धरशानायनादिष्टः। किंचन्न शुद्रामार्गानि
वादधुसुपंश्च वाचिन्धरशानादिष्टिकत्वत्करादाः वाधा
वाचिन्धरसिद्धिप्रतिव्रम्यकलां वाच्यं। एवं वहितात्त्विलियाः
विष्णुव घटायो नगमाधुप्रतिव्रोहत्वाणि तत्र वाच्येन
ग्रहितव्रम्यकलां वाच्यं।। न च घटे ग्रहितव्रम्यकलां न्यं वाच्य
व्र मृत्यु कालान्त्यं वाधात
प्रदश्च। कहकृपे एकाधिकारः चक्षुसः नामितः
रणभवविश्वलाः। इति वाधतालाला भेज्य ये चेष्टे
भाषाप्राणाय श्रीं मन्यो एवं अभिन्नतः। यथा वहे
चेष्टा भाषाप्राणिकुशेऽपि प्रवधवास्यकिंत्रोऽविभव
प्राणः। खत्तोऽकृपे मुद्राः प्रथमप्राप्ताः। नामित्विलियाः
वादधुसुपम न प्रतिव्रम्य कर्तित्वांकिंत्रोऽवन्नां।। ११।।
यः सप्तस संपर्केः च भवेन साधारणस्य सः। यत्राः: साधारणः
विष्णुव ग्रहितव्रम्यकलां वाधात:। सप्तस: चेष्टे।
ভাষাতঃ যথোভিষ্টাত্ম ব্যতির: স চ চাসাধারণো মনঃ। ৩৫।

ন্যথাযানিৰ্বায়ন কোষলাভবিষ্যতে।

য: সাধারণা নৈবালিঃ স বিষ্ণু উদাসিন। ৩৬।

বিষ্ণুে চারুঃ বন্ধ শাসকতঃ বিষ্ণু তিলমেব বার্স্যাঃ। বিষ্ণুত্রাণ শাসায়াঃ। চারুশজ্জিলেব বৃহদতাত্ত্বজ্জ বিষ্ণুতয়া তথ্যা পার্থ্যকান্তু। ॥

চারুমূর্তিকাদ: বালন্ত: স চ চারুতাধারণ মনঃ রাশি।

বিষ্ণুমূর্তিকাদ: বালন্ত: স চ চারুতাধারণ মনঃ রাশি।

বিষ্ণুমূর্তিকাদ: বালন্ত: স চ চারুতাধারণ মনঃ রাশি।

বিষ্ণুমূর্তিকাদ: বালন্ত: স চ চারুতাধারণ মনঃ রাশি।

বিষ্ণুমূর্তিকাদ: বালন্ত: স চ চারুতাধারণ মনঃ রাশি।

বিষ্ণুমূর্তিকাদ: বালন্ত: স চ চারুতাধারণ মনঃ রাশি।

বিষ্ণুমূর্তিকাদ: বালন্ত: স চ চারুতাধারণ মনঃ রাশি।

কেবলাভবিষ্যত দতি। কেবলাভবিষ্যত্রীবিভিন্ন

পঞ্চক দত্যাঃ। সঃ ব্রহ্মেনিধিং প্রমেয়লাভিদশাগীত সঃ ব্রহ্মেনিধিং পঞ্চকাতু ব্রাহ্মানাধিকারায়কাভাষ্যালাব্ধাবানুষ্ঠিত। ॥ ৩৭।
भाषा । आयामायिन्द्राय स्यान लक्षणायिन्द्राय ।
आयामायिन्द्राय प्रासमायिन्द्राय । ७६ ॥
प्रासमायिन्द्राय प्रासमायिन्द्राय । ७७ ॥
व्रजमय सुमज्जाय नानायिन्द्राय । ७८ ॥
व्रजमय नानायिन्द्राय नानायिन्द्राय । ७९ ॥
बिषुर्याय भरां बिषुर्याय । ८० ॥
साध्याय साध्याय । ८१ ॥
उत्तरतित्रत्याय उत्तरतित्रत्याय । ८२ ॥

बिषु ।

अस्यस्य विभजन । आयामायिन्द्राय । ८३ ॥

प्रासमायिन्द्राय । आयामायिन्द्राय । ८४ ॥

व्रजमय । नानायिन्द्राय । ८५ ॥

तथा । काश्यप तथा । ८६ ॥

साध्याय द्वार । ८७ ॥

व्रजमय । ८८ ॥

व्रजमय । ८९ ॥

साध्याय । ९० ॥
भाषा। ग्रामीणस्य प्रथमः पथर्ना गवयादिकः।
साधयधीर्गवादीनां या खान् सा करानं मनं।॥७५॥
वाक्यार्थायतिरदेशाय मृतिवर्यापर उच्चने।
गवयादिपद्यानां महीनोद्युपमात्।॥७५॥
पद्यानां करानं द्वारं तनं पद्यार्थोऽऽ।

विद्या। उपस्मितं चुत्वादधिति। ग्रामीणस्य। चतावश्चे।
केवं केतनिष्टू यांगीणः प्रत्युक्तं गोसदूरशा गवयपद-
वाच्छ इति पंशाच्छ ग्रामीणः कविधर्मैः गवथिः।
तत्र गोसदूरशा ज्ञानं यत् तद्व उपस्मितिकरणं।॥७६॥
तदन्नरः गोसदूरशा गवयपदवाच्छ इत्यतिर्देशवा-
कार्यार्थः जाते तदेव आपारः। तदन्नरः तनं
गवथिः गवयपदवाच्छ इति ज्ञानं जाते तद्वपमिति।
न च गवयपदवाच्छ इत्यपसितिः। गवथानरः श्रेष्ठे-
यथा भावप्रस्माणाः।॥७६॥
शाब्दवधिप्रकारं दुर्शिष्टिः। पद्यानांकर्थिः। न त्
शाब्दस्मानं पदं करणं। पद्यापावायिः मैलिशोकारामैः
शाब्दोधानः। पदार्थार्थिः। पद्यज्ञपद्यार्थस्वरुपं
आपारः। ज्ञाना पद्यायतं प्रत्यचारिनां पदार्याय-
पितार्थपि शाब्दोधारीपायपि। त्रायिः द्वयाय पद्यनितं
वोति। शुद्धा घटाचिपद्यतं समवायमस्मेव ग्राहाका-

* पद्यनितपद्यायपितार्थपितैह द्वयाय पद्यनितं ग्राहाका।
ভাবঃ শাব্দবোধি ফল তন্ত্র শক্তিভূ সহস্রার্থ।

বিষ্ণুঃ শক্তিনাং জ্ঞাতে শাক্তশাস্ত্রে প্রশ্নয়িত।

শক্তিনাং নাম্নতঃ সম্বন্ধঃ। শচিবে শক্তিনাং শখয়েব প্রস্তুতচালন।

ধৃঢ়ে শক্তিবোধেন পদ্ধতিতি তন্মমিঃ স্তবঃ। পদ্মে শক্তিবোধেন পদ্ধতিতি তন্মমিঃ স্তবঃ।

শাক্তিতে সমসাময়িবস্ত্যায়ে স্তবঃ। মা শাক্তিতে সমান্তরায়ে ভূতব্যবস্থায়ে শাক্তিতে সমান্তরায়ে।

শাক্তিতে নারিকে শক্তিতে শাক্তিতে। একাদশপাঠ, পিনার নাম শখবাব শাক্তিতে শাক্তিতে।

শাক্তিতে নারিকে শাক্তিতে শাক্তিতে। শাক্তিতে নারিকে শাক্তিতে।

শাক্তিতে শাক্তিতে শাক্তিতে শাক্তিতে।

শাক্তিতে শাক্তিতে শাক্তিতে।

ধাতালামাণ্ডলিতাণীনাং শাক্তিতে স্তবঃ।

শাব্দবোধিতে শাব্দবোধিতে। যথা শৈবারাদিকতার কর্তৃত্বপথে।
চিন্তা । প্রয়োজনপদ্ধতিতে কর্ম্মাবস্থায় গ্রন্থীধীর্ঘতার্থ ব্যাবসায়ের পরিবর্ধন। 
তেন বেচ দুর্গ গচ্ছতীবার্তা ন চ বেচ 
ক্ষ্যাম্বি। যত কর্ম্মাবাদিতে ন গ্রন্থীধীর্ঘতার্থ তদার্থ 
রশায় প্রয়োজনিত। প্রদাদ ধারীকারিকাবিশেষ 
ধারণ গ্রন্থমদ লাভে। তেন বেচ দুর্গ গচ্ছিতীবার্তা বেচ 
বেকার রূপে। লোক যজ্ঞী চারণায় বহু ক্ষ্যাম্বি 
সাফি তীর্থীয় ঘটনায় ব্যাপক। এবং 
আর বেচ দুর্গ গচ্ছ তীবার্তা বহু ক্ষ্যাম্বি 
সাফি তীর্থীয়ালোকায় বহু এবং 
আর বেচ দুর্গ গচ্ছ তীবার্তা 
সাফি তীর্থীয় ঘটনায় ব্যাপক। 
 এবং কোষাধর্মী লক্ষিবিষ। শনি সাধন বাধিতে লক্ষিবিষ। 
যথা নীচুচিদিত্ত নীহলং নীচুচিদিত্ত নীহল 
নিদ্রিত বিষ। শনি। কোষাধর্মী লক্ষিবিষ। নীচুচিদিত্ত নীহল
 শনি। 
 এবং কোষাধর্মী 
যথা কোষাধর্মী লক্ষিবিষ। নীচুচিদিত্ত নীহল 
 শনি। 
 এবং কোষাধর্মী। 
যথা প্রয়োজন প্রয়োজন প্রয়োজন প্রয়োজন 
 শুন। নীহল নীহল। নীহল। নীহল। 
 এবং কোষাধর্মী।
চিঠি৷০ ঘটাঠী শ্রদ্ধা প্রকাশ করে। দ্যতছ স্মৃতি৷০ মনোমালী ঘট রহন্তে-দিশায় শব্দবাধার।
ঘটাঠীপদান কায়ারিত্বঘটাঠীপদান সাক্ষাৎমৌলিক কায়াতায় শ্রদ্ধায় শরীরে কেপিত।
তল্ল। প্রথমঃ কায়ারিত্বটীপদান শ্রদ্ধায় এমীপিল লাঘনে প্রাপ্ত তত্ত্ব পরিয়া কালিয়া।
তল্ল। এবং চৈত পুনর্ব্বলী জাতেঃ কল্যা তে গান্ধী জানা ঘটাঠী মুখপ্রাণ সমস্তমুখ কলিয়া মুখ তালকারণ জাত শরীরে এমীপিল নিঃশ্বাস তত্ত্বন তন্মধ্য তথাপি শরীরবিচ্ছিন্নতাত।

এবং ব্যাক্সীরিত্বপিশক্তিয়াপা৷ যথা যথাযথ অন্ত বনীয় ঘটপদান দীর্ঘপ্রভায় শায়ানায় প্রচ্ছাদনঃ
কল্লো চ সাক্ষাৎ জাতেঃ তত্ত্ব পরিয়া যথা৷ যথা৷ স্মরণে মান্তঞ্চ রাজতিন্দ্র অতি নমঃ

- ব্যাপ্তো যথাযথায় জাতেঃ প্রচ্ছাদন তালকারণ অন্ত সমান্ত প্রচ্ছাদন যথা।

মানাইন্ত তিনি গন্তেঃ কণিকলিচি৷।
ধরি ব্যাক্সীরিং দীর্ঘ প্রচ্ছাদনে শরীরবিচ্ছিন্নতাত।

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মানাইন্তে কণিকাশ্ম অট্টালক।
यिद्धा। धरिपार्द्धि तु विषयमजाभावान्धानाधिकरणं।
एवं विवर्णाकर्षणं। विवरणमात्र तत्समानार्य-
पदार्थसंयमं तद्विकरणं। यथा घटोपासीयस्य कल-
माध्यमस्य विवरणानां घटपद्धकं कलस्या शर्मिश्यः।
पुःरं पच्चिमीयस्य ठाकः करैनीमयन्ते विवरणाधाक्षा-
रस्य यन्त्रार्थः कलस्ये॥

dवं प्रशिरवसादास्याकर्षणं शर्मिश्यः। यथा दह
महाकार्तर्कं समुद्रं चिमो रात्रीयात्रा च चिमोपद्ध
शर्मिश्यः दति॥

tह जातावेब्य शर्मिं तु च बद्ध। विक्रमावर्तान-
स्याः। यमुनं दिना ् जाताभागास्यास्याकार्षणं शर्मिं तु ब्रवजिति कैलित। tह। शर्मिं दिना वाक्षयानु-
स्याः॥ न च च बद्ध। सताः॥ अनुपपत्तिमतिस्यानं
विभाषय अनुसारान्त। न च विक्रमावर्तानन्यं। सक-
मागस्याबिक्रमं एव ब्रवजिं स्त्रीकारं। न च चानुमः।
गोलाद् दे देवानमस्यान्त। तिच्च अपौमा शर्मिं
चदाः तद्य बद्ध। शर्मिं। शर्मिं च दृष्टं शर्मिं। यदि तु गोलं गक्षामीति शर्मिं
स्याः ् ब्रह्मत्तो वहस्त व सताः॥ चानुमः। गोलाद्
प्रकारम्यां शर्मिं शर्मिं यदि तु गोलं गक्षामीति
शर्मिं। यदि तु गोलं गक्षामीति शर्मिं। यदि तु गोलं
भूजामः। भूजामः। गोलाद् शर्मिं शर्मिं शर्मिं। गो-
लाद् शर्मिं शर्मिं शर्मिं॥ तथा च
बिहार गोविन्दी समुदायवाचक विषयमात्र तत्वी गीतम्। तस्मात् तन्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मात्मातः
भाषा: लच्छा ग्रहणमयसतात्मक्यनुपपत्तिः।

शिश्ना: ब्रह्मवाच्यांक्यपच्छिम: स्वातंत्र्यं व्याधिकारिकणां नुहां। यथाज्यदिक्षितं तत्र हि ज्ञातनेदनं तत्त्वाग्निसादिर्प्रवृत्त शास्त्रिः शास्त्रायिप्तं।

लच्छा ग्रहणमयसतात्मक्यो लख्यादि। गुलाञ्च घोष दृष्टां गुलाञ्च पदश्रुधार्थ श्राधार्थ प्रवाहस्य घोषश्रुधानुपपत्तिः।

शास्त्रायिप्तानुपपत्तिः यत्र प्रतिसमीयते तत्र लच्छणा नौरूः वातः। श्राच श्लासमयसम्यक्य नौरूः यस्ती सारां।

नतः शास्त्रोऽथ। परम्य वदवाच्यानुपपत्तिः च। वनवाज्ञानानुपपत्तिः। तेन वाच्यानुपपत्तिः भाजनस्यानुपपत्तिः।

वद्धर्म्यु वर्णस्थान्यानुपपत्तिः। ततः मृत्युश्रुधार्थ शास्त्रायिप्तानुपपत्तिः।

वाच्यानुपपत्तिः। च अवकाशीयां दृष्टिः रचनात्मक्यानुपपत्तिः। काकपदश्रुधार्थ दृष्टिपादात्मक्यानुपपत्तिः।

कृत्यां भाषायां दृष्टिः भाषायां दृष्टिः। काकपदश्रुधार्थ दृष्टिपादात्मक्यानुपपत्तिः।

कृत्यां रचनात्मक्यानुपपत्तिः। काकपदश्रुधार्थ दृष्टिपादात्मक्यानुपपत्तिः।

कृत्यां रचनात्मक्यानुपपत्तिः। काकपदश्रुधार्थ दृष्टिपादात्मक्यानुपपत्तिः।

रुपेण श्राधार्थ लोकोऽवरीं तोरुः तोरुः। वही तु गुलाञ्चीयौ।
बिहृतै लेन रुपेण युग्मनत्सदा नेविके रुपेण खासैं। अत्र पशु
लघूनालवटि नौ खराबै। तद्राकारकवाॅधुष धन खराबै। वाल्पु एवंकमेण भक्तावश्यः
दक्षिनं शर्कश्नात्। तद्राकारकर्मण्डार्थसारण प्रति
तन्द्रस्य सामथर्यिष्येक्षु सुचारुसङ्गर्नाति विभावनों॥

यत् तु रक्षताहरू खास्यपदवा चालवै खराबै
शाल्यतत्तवेन्तू। यथा दिक्षाददने दैविकादयय-
समथेय भस्मरपदे भायते।। भस्मरपद्यः च समथेया
भस्मरे भायते। तत्र लघूनालवणा किन्ने लाजशिकं
पद्य नान्दभावक। लाजशिकास्यां भाष्यायेधं तु पदा-
काण कारण। भक्त्वनुवातस्य नित्यमार्कलापादश्यायी-
नित्यशक्त्वश्राधार्ष्याय्य प्रति पदान्तै सामथर्यधा-
रणात्ति श्राद्ध।। नवीनासु तद्यन्त्यभावकमेव।
पदस्वार्थिति दारं। भवेतथा नुथाया शर्कशाया
पद्यानुभावकलापादश्याय।। वायु तु भक्त्व-
भाष्यकर्मण्डार्थसारण शर्कशाया शाल्यवाय।। यत् गाही-
राष्ट्रां निस्तां घाय। रुपयेण तत्र नौदृष्टवस्य नौदृष्टीतकोरस्य
खराबै।। गाहीरापथर्यां निस्ता श्राघावै नाथस्यः।।
कर्धिकरकर्मण्डार्थस्य कस्तलाब। यद्य तद्यन्त्यभावनास्य-
किन्ने न कर्धिकर्तकी तदा नौदृष्टवस्य गाहीरापदेनिस्तैरस्य
खराबै।। गाहीरापदे तात्त्वाकास्यां॥

* नवीनासु तद्यन्त्यभावकेव।
विष्णु• बखळीङ्गकऱ्यावैः। तत् वि धित्रुगुप्तादी यशोऽ
देहाय। नृत्तिति तदा गोपद्रुक गोक्षामत्ति
खण्डः। गवि वित्राभेदाय।। यद्य लेवेदेशावधे
न नृत्तिते तदा गोपद्रुक निष्कृत्तामिनि खण्डः।
विष्णुपद तात्पर्यार्थं ॥

eवमार्कवारे रङ्खं यथं वासरपमे वानरा-
रोकरक्षणी खण्डः। राशुपद्रुक तात्पर्यार्थं ॥
eवमनक्षृणः॥

tदुसे तु पूवपमे खण्डः। तथासि राजपुष्पा-
विद्ये राजपदार्धन पुद्वादिपदार्धं सामात्मा-
वः। निपातातिरितकामाध्यं पर्वेनालथे
ध्वषायं
वर्णं। राजा पुष्प द्रव्यभारं तथाभ-भागः। 
भाट्। पदे न घट द्वारादी घटपर्यामे नाम:
शाकादेवान्सूरं निपातातिरितेन। बीसे घट
द्वारादी शामार्थयोहरेदवथवभक्षान्याख्याते
हते। न
वर्णं। राजपुष्पं द्वारादी सुविधाणः वारणं
कर्ममिति
बाध्यः। निपातातिरितेन तोता समाधात्। तत्कारु
राजपदारादी नागवमात्ति खण्डं। तथां च पुढळेन
शाकादेवान्सूरं॥

dसे तु पृवसिरेत रक्षेन्द्राय धवः। खदिरथ
विभाष्यक्ष्मे जलपत्रः मुखते तथा खण्डं ॥ न च
सार्वित्वे खण्डिति वाचः। विसंविद्यमान्योर्षां दन-
वैखरी पर्वनौत। न च एकाक्षरायिकनन्त्रं शास्त्रस्म-स्तीति वाचय। किंतु श्लोक धुक्काविरोधी किमीश्वराधि-प्रश्नान्त। शास्त्रीयांशानृतवाच। तथा तत् साधयानं दिक कार्य। अत्र एव राजपुर्णेविता साध्यकामै शैवयातात्मिकः लघुशाबाधाकाँड मुद्रणात् अश्वीने। किन्तु वाक्यकृतः भेदे यथा तच तद्। न च नीलघण्टांर्यभेदः द्वादशी कर्ममिति वाचयं। तच स्लोकपद्धः नीलं घटपद्धः घटलमणः। ज्ञेण, द्वाशास्त्रायभेदः द्वाध्यायः।

विमात्रां धर्मानि तु शब्दी विमात्रारूप्यायुभूत द्य-अते तदर्शिनकुशभियादै यथात भेदे साध्यकामै द्वारार्य श्रावण। पूर्वपद तत्त्वार्यांक। न च भेदे-ञुक्तः वाद्यमेव कर्त्य समाजार्यार्यायापञ्चावृ- द्रविविकृष्टांक वाद्यमतिवादिति वाचयं। शौकत्य-हविलक्ष्यम्भेदः तदस्वार्य। एवं परिपलो-आ काव्यार् परे तु विहितकुशभियादै अर्थसंकषण धेरंति। प्रतीक्षेकलावकः विमात्रार्य च। चर्च-कलं श्लोकस्मोऽभ्रातिः शक्तेर्षेकं तच्च। ज्ञेण- चैव विद्यमानाः शास्त्राध्याय: वदनः।

कर्माधारायुक्तं तु नीलघण्टामितादै ज्ञेनात्म-भेदः नीलघण्टार्य घटपद्धार्यः प्रकारः। न च तंत्रः लघुणः। अत्र एव निम्नाक्षरति द्वाशर्याधिति न
भाग १० अर्थवियोगोनकार्त्तात्त्वं ज्ञानिकारविषयं स्वामीनारायण स्वामी

कारणं सविन्धानन्तु पद्मासनिष्टवणे।

विष्कृता तत्पुष्टः। लच्छापि। किंतु कर्माधारयो लच्छाभावान्। न च निषद्ध शक्तरजातितिविशेषः वेदानिधिकारादृशो धाजनास्वध दृत्त वाच्यं। निषद्ध विषयस्य चुक्तेः। एवम कल्यनात्। लाघवेन मुखमयिङ्गावधें तदद्वृत्तपञ्चमा कल्यनायः। फलमुखस्य वालतोर्क्कः।

लाभं। उपकुं भुव्यंपिपणीवीरं परपदे तलक्ष्मिनिः संवधा पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानतया चालन्यवेदाधि हृद्वत्सा समाधि न कारपि शक्ति। पद्मकृत्ति निवासार्धित स्वतः निधित। विनिधार्धित। पितरी श्रीमद्वीद्याधमः दियमेव विषयं अनकयमयोः। जुगुरपदे जीवनकदमलोकार्चणं।

एवमादापि। घटा इत्यादिः न लच्छा। घटलेन कुणेष नासाघटकितिस्वावान्।

अर्थवियोगायतेयादि। अर्थवियोग योगतान्त्रशास्त्रसः भाकाळाण्ड तत्पद्धार्थस्य शास्त्रेऽधि कारणं।

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तत्वार्थविनिष्टमाहेषं यस्मिनः। यत्व-पदार्थस्य वायुदार्थान्वयोऽपिततिलक्ष्यावधाननेः।

विनिष्टं। कारणं। तेन गिरिर्महामिन्न देवदानेवयादेः न शास्त्रेऽधि। नीलो घटोऽद्वं फलं पद्माया
दरवारकमाल्कालेवः। खारसिमालकालेवः
अमाभाविदः। शः। गनु चर्च हें दुःखी
वास्ते देवस्त दुःखुयं तथोऽसारधमार्शेण पुरुषपद-
सारणेः नागात्। अवनिधानी तु दशरपदसारणा-
सार सह दति चेति। न। प्रत्येकपदसारणाः खरम् ताव-
दिपकसारणाः अवधानिनेत्रम्। गानारशिकारे-
कागा दखेश्वर गानारकारे रेकारणायोपरिः कम्भ-
वात। तावदिपकसारणाः दिपकसारणाः खोधक-
लान्। कामस्मयं गानारस्यकपदसारणाः। परस्तु ताव-
दिपकसारणाः शारणादेकेव वल कपालनादातः ताव-
दिपकसारणाः विधार्णार्थभवालावधक्षणः। श्रावणः
बहत्वनत्ति कृष्णसः। अपरे तु।

वंद्याकार्यं शौरं भविष्यां प्रपभाने।

तेन तेनालिमित्। सार्थोः पदीवारागमिनी।

तथा च खुश्याकार्यार्थवास्तवानां तथेक पदार्थवस्त्र
महाश्चाकार्यार्थवस्त्राः। प्रकोकारनाथी-
बङ्गः। पदर्थवार्तायं तिरचः। तस्मात्तसर्वायमानी-
स्तरसार्वायाप्यमेव तस्मानिवायाप्रतिः। दुःक्ष
वेयं। वच दारस्मिवुः तत् विधीहैति पद्यमा
शानादेव वेयं। न तु विधािरधुर्याः जागात्।
पदसारण्यायोऽपि शरणेः अवधियोऽि थूः। किंतथ

* सोऽहु राविर्नायाः विनिमयसङ्गमं निधिं। बहत्वः।
भाषा। पद्यां तत्तत्ता योग्यता परिकीर्तिता॥ ८॥
श्यादेन विना यस्माननुभावकता भवेन।

विद्वान। किंयत्कर्मपदार्था तेन तेनैव वह याकाश्च। तेन किंया विना कर्त्ता शास्त्रवेदः स्वात। तथा पुष्येभुः
द्वादशैंर्सूहयतोतिपदांथारं विना स्तुत्यानुपन्नतः
पदांथारा भ्रावयक।

धोभन्तां नियमक। पदार्थ द्वारादिना। एकपदार्थे
परपदार्थमनेकं योग्यशेषदिना। तज्ज्ञानाभावाच
वज्ञना सिद्धकोरिष्ठैदैं न साध्वेदिन। नवेतभा यो-
मयताया ज्ञानं शास्त्रभावं प्राक्त सर्वम् न महत्ततिः
वाक्यांशीयापूविवादित चेत। न। तज्ज्ञानाभावाचरणे
शति कारितं संहारं प्रक्षमिष्यापुष्पमापि योग-
ताया ज्ञानं महत्तत।

नवेये योग्यतात्पर्यं ज्ञानं न शास्त्रशालने कारण।
वज्ञना सिद्धकोरिष्ठै। तेके विज्ञकरकलाभावहुपुरानेके योग्यतानिष्ठेन प्रतिम्यानं न शास्त्रवेदः। तदभा-
विषयत्सूहसि मैकिकसिकारं जनदेशविष्ठाणामोक्षानां
माचे प्रतिम्यकलातु शास्त्रवेदुं प्रति प्रतिम्यकलं
विज्ञ। योग्यतानिष्ठानिष्ठानं शास्त्रवेदोपरिष्ठानं धृतिवदृश्या। ८॥

श्यादेन नियमक। यत्पदेनेवादि। तेन पदेन
विना यज्ञाणाश्चकाननुभावकलं तेन वह त्याकाँ-
भाषाः आकाद्यः, वज्जुरीक्षा तु तत्त्वावधारम् परिक्रियातिनं।

शुद्धा हि च दत्ताः। क्रियापदं वा बुद्धी कार्यपदं साध्यवायां जनयतीति तेन तस्मान वा। 

वितकद्रश्यं क्रियाकारसळि-पदानं मशिधानमात्रत्वं चरिताऽ। 

परम घटकः-तात्त्विकः प्रति घटके देयन्ते विदशाकज्ञाः कारणं। 

तेन घटः कर्मसंयमनं कर्तिरिवाधी न शास्वंवधः। 

अयमेति पुजे राजः पुष्पमध्यमायंनमिकाः श्रीते । तु पुष्पेण सब्र राजपदः तत्त्ववत्स्याभावं न तेन 

सहस्तवः।

तत्त्वविष्णुः। वज्जुरीक्षा यदि तत्त्वावधारणां 

कारणं न खात् तदा मैत्रसागरवैहारी कार्यिधरण 

कर्मसंयमसः वा धीरा न खात्। न च तत्त्वावधारण प्रकारः 

रणादोषाः मेव शास्वंवधः कारणशक्तिः वात्स 

तेषामशुगमाः। तत्त्वावधारणसंक्षेपे तेषामशुगमाः 

तु तत्त्वावधारणसेव शास्वातू कारणसचा। 

इत्यतः 

वेदाभिर्याति तत्त्वावधारणानमीयः कारणम्। न च 

तत्त्वावधारणतत्त्वावधारणान कारणभित्ति वात्स 

सन्तां 

दायरामाकाभावात्। न च प्रसन एव नाश्यानि 

कुतः सन्तानिरेऽवतः। शरायास्यरत्नविपाध्यावर्तः 

इत्यतः 

दुःखाविस्तयिः, ईदारीतशष्ठ्यमाणां कारणः। 

विधमादिश्वरकाशं तु श्रविच्छिदुरेऽत्त्वावधारणां 

कारणम्। अन्यं तु शाश्वातादृशं कार्यवेदः तत्त्वावधारणां
खिञ्चाॅ कारणः तथाच शुकवकी विनेव तात्त्वध्यानं शास्त्र-वैधः। वेदेः तु अनादिमीगापरिशोधितात्त्वध्यानं प्रधारणमिववाकः॥

पूर्वमनुभवारणमोदातुदृढविध्यमुनः। तत्त्वात्मव-प्रकारं दर्शितं। सुगमतया कारणं न दर्शितं। तत्र विष्णु शुरुः कारणं॥, यत्र केसिं अनभव-लेन कारणलं किंतु शास्त्रेन। अन्वथा कारणं-नामकं कारणं न शास्त्रं। समानप्रकारकारणं पूर्वं संस्काराय विनंत्यतां। ममते तु तेवेव कारणं सं-संस्कारान्नद्यान्नारं जयति द्याक्षाकृष्णः। यत्र सन्दर्भासनं घटपदार्थां कमेय कारणमण्डितं-विस्तारे कारणां संस्कारान्न-श्रवणामात्रं कालक्रमे रोगाः हरसफलसंव वा सं-संस्कारनाशकं वाच्यं। तथा छ न क्रिकारांनवपुपथं।

न च पुनः पुनः कारणादु चउज्ज्वलंकारणपभंजं।। द्वितीयब्रह्मविभागं द्भावीपदार्थं।।

न च विद्यमणाबिरविचारं ऋषिनयां जनकं श्राव-दिवलं वाच्यं। विशेषज्ञाशीशाबिचाराः श्रावे शामा-महर्षिनागायांविशुलात। काकमनया दुःखम् भभिभद्यान्नारं कारणां। न चालाराशिकं-रष्यां दंसंस्काराभम्भकंबद्धं अभिभारंष्प्रथं दृतं वाच्यं। अपारंसंस्कारान्तचालपद्मां शरसंस्कार-
भाग १० साधकारे खाद्यावन करण मन उच्चैः।
अथायोगवाच ज्ञानाणि तस्यायुज्ञिते न || ८ ४ ||

महर्षि १० क्षीव संबांगाराङ्गकलकलपनेन योजितार्गावं यावावात्

१ ४ ।।

दृश्यानि क्रममाणि मनं निभयति । साधकार

दति । एतेन मनस्य प्रमाणं दृशयितम् । तत्तथाच सुखान्त-कारः भक्षणको जन्मात्माकारः खाद्य-नुसाने करणसः समस्यम् विहृतः ।

न च वै दुःखान्त-चालकारणाधिपि करणात्माणि गुरुः । भाषावतिकस्तव ताहूः रूक्षकालानामि करणात्माणि जुरित वाच । भाषावतिकस्तव

प्रबुद्धाणि समानविकारं योगाणि समानविकारं
मः विष्कृतं हृदयं ॥

सम्बांगारालो प्रमाणानि । अथायोगवाच्यत ।

ज्ञानाणि खाद्यावनाद्रीः विपिनाद्रीकालान्त-स्तिनां श्रीप्राप्त। तत्र वाणीद्रियाणि विख्यपि विष्कृति खाद्याद्रीक्रियेण साम्राज्याणि

नद्यमानाधिर्यं नगरिः विराज्ञान ।

तद्योगवाच्येऽविलै चालविधानं न, स्मरवतीति न, विभु

नमः ॥ न च तदायेऽविपिनात्तिथेऽविकारं योगवाच्यं

तथा निति ज्ञानाधिपि क्रमवायुज्ञिते । न च दृष्टिश्रृणायोभाषणाः ॥
भाषा ५४ ग्रंथ ख्यातिनात्रा देवा निरुष्णा निग्रियाया गुणाः।

शिप्ता ५४ नानाधातमिकात् कलनेकरता नानेन्द्रियन्तानमिति
वाचन। मनस्यान्तिलाघवात् लरवाना नानेन्द्रिययथासात्
नानाधातमिकानामः। उत्तराध्यं तप्तवेदाधिवत्। धैर्यं
पर्यन्तात्राः न भांडालात्। न च मनस्योऽस्सूरविकार्याः
कालीकिलातुभयोपपन्नकरित्वात् वाचन। नानाधात
वत्ताधातारक्तयते श्रावपात्। ध्यपवातः नित्रवसेषे
मनस्यं कल्याणाधितिः मक्षेपः। दत्ते शिप्तान्नमात्जावां
नृपपदरथ्याज्ञाया श्मायता।

ग्रंथं निकृष्य गृहं निकृष्यतति। धैर्यं शत्रुः। गुण
लजनानं कृं भाषमिते चेत्त। इदं। ग्रंथकर्मिनः भिक्षलमात्मायति या कारणता था किंविष्ठुंक्ताविनिज्ञज्ञ। नित्रक्रीडङ्करणताधात्स्नमावत्। न हि कुपलादिकं
स्थलं वा तवाविष्टधिकः। नृपातिरिविघ्नं चंद्रिन्तितः।
अन्तमातुत्गितैः सारागारं वाचनं तदवगुणलस्मिति शिप्तं।
ग्रंथस्तु देवित। चर्चायं ग्रंथस्तुस्तलं न लघुं कर्पो
दायियाः स्ताहस्ताः ग्रंथस्तु ताः दक्षेषु कर्मि। नृपाति
बालपति शानानामिति कर्मिं दक्षेषु वा न दक्षेषु
मातायाः। ग्रंथस्तु दक्षेषु शानायाः। न जातिरिति तदः।
भाषा। क्रूरं रसं, स्पष्टग.HashSet परत्व्यपरत्वं || ८४ ||

द्रवेण गुलांब लक्ष्मण वेगो मूल्यमुग्धयोपयोगिपच || ८५ ||

धनरधरदेशा भवन्ता च श्रद्धो बुद्धादयोगिपि च || ८६ ||

अनेकमूल्यमुग्धयो सभ्य विधि। परक्षयोपयो।

संहितादिश विभागार्तं संभवेण गुणां मनं || ८७ ||

संयोगश्र संधित विभागार्तं संहित दिवकारस्य।

दिव्यात्मकाद्रयक्ष्यते नसकाः हिमाः गुणः || ८८ ||

अनं ते स्पष्टर गुणं सभ्ये मनं एकंकुल्कन।

महर्षीं द्रायं || निहर्जितं द्राय। यथपुर्वं निर्गुणास्तं कर्मादावपि

तत्त्वं निहर्जिताः सामान्यान्तं कर्मान्तं च हृदति निवर्जिताः सवत्त॥

जाचारादीपियान् सामान्यान्तं कर्मान्तं न कर्मान्तं द्रवा

यो न निर्गुणास्तं तत्त्वं निहर्जिताः सवत्त॥ निष्कामेन्ति

संतुष्टकर्मान्तं न तु सवत्त॥ गेहवार्तकं मनोहारः || ८५ ||

मूल्यमुग्धयो हृदति। वेगो निमित्ततिः स्थानापूर्वणपूर्वणपूरणा

णीयाः। असूचण्यु न वर्त्त। मनस्युः। चचाकलुमात

द्वारकायिनिः। एकमेवपि || ८६ ||

संतुष्टात्मिति। मूल्यमुग्धयो हृदयः || ८७ ||

अनेकादेशिता हृदि। संधितमदास्ति हिमाः गुणः

मिलछत्रं द्वारकापिभिः मिलछत्रं पिभिः।

अनं ते हृदति। कयक्युन्मध्यस्तमपिलापयातन्त्रे।

केशं दायेण। चक्रवर्तादावपियान् कर्मांके।
भाषा । वृद्धिपर नं भ्रात्या । खेच । सूर्यकोको । इति || ८ ॥

वृद्धमञ्चनां बस्था अभी वैशेषिक गुणा ।

संज्ञानिग्राघातानो इति । सूर्यकोकलामथा ॥ ५ ॥

गुस्तवेषी शास्त्राभि एते प्रकृतिन्ता ।

संज्ञानिग्राघातानो इति खेच एवं च ॥ ८ ॥

एते तु वृद्धिपरायण अथ यथ्यत्नशब्दका ।

वाञ्चाकैकिंचित्रवाच्यात्मकुश्चित्र सत्सत्सन्यात्मका ॥ ८ ॥

अनौद्विक विभूषण ये खेचे वैशेषिक गुणा ।

अधकारणगुणायात्मक एते तु परितिकिता ॥ ८ ॥

अपाकजाता भूशंसकां द्रुतविच्च नयाविच्च ।

खेचवेमुक्ताग्रंहतः शब्दपरिमाणकं ॥ ८ ॥

विश्वाति । विशेषमं वाताराहुषम् द्रुतविच्च ॥ ८ ॥

वैशेषिकार दति । विशिष्यार एव वैशेषिकार । स्थार्य तक्र

वृद्धिपरायण दत्तान्त्रम् ॥ संज्ञानिग्राघिति । संज्ञानपरिमाण-

प्रथमान्त्रम् विशेषिनविधापरायणानीयान्त्रम् ॥ ८ ॥

वृद्धिपरिमाण । चलुक्य लघुपद्य गङ्गायोगमधुमत् ॥

वाच्यति । रूपार्यों चुरार्यादिपालनम् ॥ ८ ॥

विभूषणसिनि । बुद्धि सुखदृष्टिकोक्तप्रयतनधर्म-धर्मभावनायश्च दत्तान्त्रम् ॥ संज्ञानिग्राघिति ।

कारणगुण-पूर्वका रूपार्यों विशेष । वृद्धिपरायण न तात्पूर्यः ।

अखंडः कारणाभावत । पाकजग्गार्यों कार-
भावः। स्थितिस्थापक इत्येन्न सुः कारणमुणिष्ठ्वः।
संयोगस्व विभागो सोधनेतु करमाजा॥ ५४॥
शुर्णपरिमाणेकप्रयोिकचिन्द्रवने।
भवेदसामवाचियितमथ वैशिष्ट्यके गुणे॥ ५५॥
चातमः स्थाशिरस्मुष्मधुसुथगुहतवोः।
वेञ्जः पि च ड्रव्यः च संयोगादिविद्यते तथा॥ ५६॥
दिखिन्य कारणालं खाद्यत्र प्रादेशिको भवेन।

विख्या। पणुषु सूखकलाभावादु प्राप्तज्ञ इत्युक्त॥ ५५॥

खण्डोत्तरित। खण्डाचार्यजो च वर्णः। एकपेक्षकाचः
लक्ष्यस्य प्रदेशकमच्छासः। एकनं धर्मस्य चाचः।
प्रथापदेन चेकुष्यं विविधित॥
भवेदसामवाचियितमिति। चतादिकरछागमस्यः
कपालादिकिरछागमस्येऽवस्य भवति॥
वर्तं कपालादिकिरछागमस्येऽवस्य
खण्डितार्थादिकिरछागमस्यायनः।
कारणाऽ॥ एवं श्च दानायिपि विद्यविद्यम् प्रतिः ॥ ५६॥

निमित्तमिति। बुधादीनां रक्षादिनिमित्तमः
लाभित्य भावः॥ ५७॥

दिखिन्य कारणालिंतमति। शब्दविवर्णीकारणावः।
निमित्तममकारणस्य निमित्तमकारणस्य निमित्तममकारणस्य निमित्तममकारणस्य निमित्तममकारणस्य

"परापरबिज्ञानभिज्ञानसंख्यानं पुनः॥ इत्यं पर ते"
भाषा: वेदोपिको विभुगणः संयोगादिद्रुवं नथा ॥ ५८ ॥

चूँच्छ्याः भवेद्रुपं द्रव्यादेशप्रकाशः

भूमिः वाय वाक्यं निमित्तं । गुहलं गुहलपतनयायोरसमवायी प्रतिपाद्यां निमित्तं । बेगा वेगस्थुदनयायोरसमवायी अभिधानं निमित्तं । द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्थुदनयायोरसमवायी मूलज्ञं निमित्तं । स्वरुपं तत्त्वस्थुदनयायोरसमवायी वेदविभागः शब्दं निमित्तं । भेष्याकाश्ये वेदविभागः वेदविभागः शब्दं निमित्तं । वेदस्थानकाश्ये वेदविभागः शब्दं निमित्तं ॥ ५८ ॥

चूँच्छ्याः। रूपवज्रतः प्रत्यवेचनम् । रूपशास्त्रायी श्रुतिः निरीक्षणांशिता चैत। राजशास्त्रयाय आदेशापि नीतिरितिपादित्युनतातिविशिष्टं प्रत्यवेचनं । रूपकालांशशुद्धिपि अवतारितं । शब्दशास्त्रायाद्वितीयं नीतिरितिपादित्युनतातिविशिष्टं प्रत्यवेचनं । अवतारितं, नीतिरितिपादित्युनतातिविशिष्टं प्रत्यवेचनं ॥ ५९ ॥

न च नी-}

* न च नीतिः परस्परान्तः नाथस्वर्गो ब्राह्मणां न च नीतिकारवानयां। द्रव्य शास्त्रविधिशास्त्रां प्रतिपादो च। इति दिक्पन्न च स्रुतिः पाण्डः। भूत परस्परान्तद्वितीयायां अद्वितीयमेव चािं च। द्रव्यमालेक: पाण्डः।
भाप०: चुचुक सच्चारी स्थान प्रकाशिकमनकामंका || टॅट ||

मिठा०: लरकादिसमवादवर्त०, विचारिनानाथनागकाविश्वासी वास्तव दृष्टि वाचो। ग्रन्थाया समवाचारनृत्यात् न च च न प्रवाच नीलदृष्टि प्रकाशयाझाप्रशस्ता कामिनी वाचो।
प्रकाशिं तत्त्वादिसः विषयकलात्। मैथि गुजरीत्वा, बस्तावं वास्तववर्गविनः। भनाया घटावीनामतुष्य प्रस्तुत।
उन्मादविनाशकाम्बुवे: समवाचारबंभन रायस्तीति। एतत् रामदा धार्मिक साधित्यात:। चुवं ख्यािति।
चुरुंगार्जिकमिः द्राध्यः। प्रवासनां:।

dEसे, विषयाति। चुचुक चत्ति। द्राध्यानुक्षमायाः
सामायानाः चाचुषपार्वः त्रिति उद्वितपार्वः कारणाः॥
प्रकाशिकमनकामंक्ष्यि। तयथा आनुपयोगीपार्वः
रायादर्शादिसकारां भावात्। न च कथा: कथा
सतिरक्रियां भवात्। एत्यां दुष्पिठायां मयांमत्वो
न तत्त्वात्रधिः । अप्राथवक्ष्यां:। नारी दयात्र। तां
नीतादिकमल्याः। प्रतात्त्वांत्यां नारी नीतापर्यान्यः
प्रम्पावाः। साविकादनीलार्कमल्याः। यात्राः
त्रितात्त्वादिसः गाणामत्त्वादिसः सताधार्ताः। नेश्थाः
सामानात्त्वादिसः प्रतात्त्वाः। प्रकाशममक्ष्यां च
स्त्रीः। एत्यां जनानां विचारायां त्रिति।
भाषा  जलादिपरमाणै तनिलयमयत् सचेतुकं।
रसस्तु रसनायााधो मधुरादिरनेनकथा || १०० ||

विद्वा  बन्धकलक्षणादु वचवविनि न पीतादित्वति:। एतेन
खरा वृहत:। रसांदिकामध्यायायविनि: किलु
मानासातीयरक्षवदत्ववैरा रसयवविनि रसभाववैपि
न चति:। तत्र रसनया अवयववस पव युञ्जने।
रसस्त्रियश्रीराअं कृत्यससादाम्यभावात्। अवयविनि
नीरस्वतेपि चतरभावात्। नवास्तु तत्रामघायः
क्षेत्र मानाभू। नीलार्दै: पीतादिग्रहितष्ठकलक्ष्णे
गौरवात्। अत एव।

शोभिता बाल वर्षेन मुखे पुष्के च पाण्ड्र:।
एतेन: खुरवविषाम्भां च नील्या त्रय उच्यते।
द्वारादित्वस्तम्पुपपवते। न च वायुवायामदानि
नीयथोदेषोविराधः। मानाभावात्। न च खाघवा
देवकं रूपं। अनुभवविरोधात्। अनुष्ठया घटादेवपि
स्वामवाकं खादिति। एतेन खादितं वायात्म
भिति वदति। ८८।

जलादेनि:। जलपरमाणै तेजःपरमाणै च चरण
विन्य इत्योपरमस्नपुष्पन्न न विन्यः। पाकेन चपाल-
रीर्याय:। न हि चतुष्क पाकान्नां तद्वयवाधपक
उपलभ्यते। न हि रक्षकपालसू कपालिका नीला-
মাৰ্গ ৰংকারী রংখায়া নিবন্ধনি চ পূজ্যন।
লাণ্যাব্ব্বীত ভূমিক্যো লাণ্যাব্ব্বীত প্রকাশী। ২০১।
চারহার্সারভন স কীৰ্ত্তা পারিকোচিনি।
চৰচ্চি চিন্তিয় চিন্তিয় প্রকাশ্যর্থ। ২০২।
অনুচ্ছেদিতলীলকীণবী ম বিনিয়েৰ মন;।
কাঠিন্যাদি। চিন্তাচেৰ নিদৈর্ঘনি চ পূজ্যন। ২০৩।

মিৰ্দান ব্যথা অবতি। এবংকোম পরমাণুপতি পো কোম্পিড়।
অন্যচ্যাৰ্জন প্রমাষঃ পবমাণুচ্যাৰ্জন পবমাণু অচ্যাৰ্জন ।
রষ্য নিৰ্নিপ্যোত। রষ্য কোরচ। ১০০।
চৰচ্চি রংকারী। র্যায়পন্নে রংকারী সামান্যায়িক সামান্যায়িক
পুৰ্ব্ব বদ্ধ দিধি। চয়রসান্নী চয়রসান্নী মনঃ মনঃ
চৰচ্চি চিন্তিয় পবমাণু। পবমাণু চিন্তিয় পবমাণু। ২০৪।
চৰচ্চি রংকারী। র অসাত্ব পৰ্যাৰ্য্য অসাত্ব পৰ্যাৰ্য্য অসাত্ব পৰ্যাৰ্য্য।
ফায়রাঙ্গো ফায়রাঙ্গো ফায়রাঙ্গো ফায়রাঙ্গো ফায়রাঙ্গো ফায়রাঙ্গো।
হ্রদ । উপকার চৰ। চৰচ্চি চৰ পরমাণু পৰ্য্য পৰ্য্য। ২০৫।
চৰ নিৰ্নিপ্যোত। চৰ হৰী। ২০৬।
চৰ পৰ্য্য পৰ্য্য। 
চৰ পৰ্য্য পৰ্য্য। 
চৰ পৰ্য্য পৰ্য্য।
भाषा। एतेषां पाकजलनु चितैः नायन कुजचित्।

सिद्धार्थः सर्वा नियान्त्रिकास्यश्चर्याः स्नियः इतयथः। १०३।।

एतेषां धर्मशमश्च नायन। नायनः चेति। प्रदिष्या चि धर्मशमश्च स्नियः प्राप्तः। किर्मेऽगारुपलभयेत्। न किर्मेऽगारुपलभयेत्। नैरोऽकैर्षण्युक्तं अन्यायात्तरं राज्यामार्गायः अनुष्ठितस्थितं निःश्चित्येत्। यत्रः नायनेऽथप: बोध्यत्तरं दिव्यः। तत्रापि प्रत्येकस्यापि मध्ये परमाणुवेत पाक दृष्टि वैशेषिकः बदन्ति। तेवापि यथास्थः। अन्य्यविग्रहात्रेऽकैर्षण्युक्तत्वसः पाको न मथ्ये विन्यः। परन्तु विकृश्यं ग्राहाविविषाय विन्येऽस्तु ब्रह्मानुपुरः परमाणुः पाकः। पुनः प्रकर्षमाणुः स्नियः दुःखार्दः दिक्मितेऽनु यथार्थवाच्यमानसानुपलभम:। तेज्यार्थ: प्रथ्याक्षवेत्त्वः पृष्ठशून्यविशाभ: स्नियः स्नियः ब्रह्मानुपुरः निःश्चित्येत्। यथा ज्ञानकार्यविनाशामञ्जगः कतर्भः।

भवः पुनः तथा रुपादिस्मृतविस्मृति अन्य्यविनाशाय प्रक्षिप्या तत्र खात्। संयोगविभागश्च नपेवकारणः कर्मे दृष्टि वैशेषिकः। खोत्तरलोकाभावानानशः नपेवकारणः तथारः। नश्चतः कर्मादानशुः पुष्करस्याग्रं नायनं पृष्ठशून्याविविषाय विन्यः। खादित्। तत्र विभागश्च विभागश्च नवचनः तदः नारीशिकः । विभागः विभागः विभागः अनुष्ठितः निःश्चितः।
भाषा। तत्त्वापि परमाणु स्थान पाको वेदेश्वर के नये॥ १०४॥

मित्रा। तत्त्व कर्षण स्थान। तत्त्व यदि द्रव्यार्थकम्यं ग्यायी। शविशिष्टं कालमेध्यं विभागविभाग। स्थान तदा दशं स्वर्गं। यथा द्रव्यनाब्राह्मणं कालस्वयं वापिकृ विभागविभाग। स्थान तदा एकादशं स्वर्गं। तथा वेदं विष्णुमं योगात् परमाणु कर्षण। तत् परमाणुवर्णं विभाग। तत् ग्रहणकम्यं ग्यायान। तत् ग्रहणकारण।

तत् परमाणु ग्रहणरूप विभाग। तत् रक्षारूप। तत् द्रव्यार्थकम्यं ग्यायान। तत् विभाग। तत् पूर्वमण्यं योगान। तत् ग्रहणकम्यं ग्यायान। तत् ग्रहणकारण।

तत् रक्षारूप। न ग्रहणार्थकम्यं ग्यायान। न रक्षारूप। न ग्रहणार्थकम्यं ग्यायान। न रक्षारूप। न ग्रहणार्थकम्यं ग्यायान। न रक्षारूप। न ग्रहणार्थकम्यं ग्यायान। न रक्षारूप। न ग्रहणार्थकम्यं ग्यायान। न रक्षारूप।

तथा त्यो! परमाणु ग्रहणरूप विभाग किरकिरान ग्रहणकम्यं ग्यायान। ग्रहणकारण। ग्रहणकम्यं ग्यायान। ग्रहणकारण। ग्रहणकम्यं ग्यायान। ग्रहणकारण। ग्रहणकम्यं ग्यायान। ग्रहणकारण। ग्रहणकम्यं ग्यायान। ग्रहणकारण।

नाथा हि तस्माद वेदं विभाग:।

* समांः परमाणु: पूर्वमण्यं विभाग। नाथा:॥

* समांः परमाणु: पूर्वमण्यं विभाग। नाथा:॥

* समांः परमाणु: पूर्वमण्यं विभाग। नाथा:॥
सिद्धा । संयोगादृक्षणकारभक्ति परमाणू क्रिया । ततो विभागः
तत आरभक्षणयोगनाथः । ततो ज्ञानकनाथविभागः विभागी । ततः ग्रामवाणिज्ययोगनाथः । ततो रक्षात्मकत्वयोगनाथः । ततो वक्रियाद्रि ज्ञानमाणुकारभक्तिः नामः । ततो उपदेशात्मकयोगानु द्रव्यारूढळु अवस्थानः। ततो विभागः । ततः पूर्वयोगनाथः । तत आरभक्षणयोगः । ततो ज्ञानकनाथविभागः। ततो रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। अधिकाद्रिष्ठाणि। वक्रियाद्रि ज्ञानमाणुकारभक्तिः परमाणू कथा । ततो विभागः। ततो द्रव्यारूढळु ज्ञानयोगः। ततो चूर्णनाथः। ततो ज्ञानकनाथविभागः। कालमेयः विभागः। विभागः। ततः पूर्वयोगनाथः। तत उत्तरयोगः। तत रिमाणुकारभक्तिः। ततो उपदेशात्मकयोगानु द्रव्यारूढळु अवस्थानः। ततो विभागः। ततः पूर्वयोगनाथः। ततो द्रव्यारूढळु ज्ञानयोगः। ततो चूर्णनाथः। ततो रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। मध्यमाद्रि वस्त्रदेशाद्रिष्ठाणियोगानु रुपमाणुक्त्रयाद्रि। ततवत् कालमेयः। रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु वस्त्रदेशाद्रिष्ठाणियोगानु रुपमाणुक्त्रयाद्रि। ततवत् कालमेयः। रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु वस्त्रदेशाद्रि रुपमाणुक्त्रयाद्रि। ततो विभागः। तत आरभक्षणयोगनाथः। परमाणुक्त्रयाद्रि। ततवत् चूर्णनाथः। ततो विभागः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु चूर्णनाथः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु विभागः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु चूर्णनाथः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु विभागः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु चूर्णनाथः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु विभागः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु चूर्णनाथः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु विभागः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु चूर्णनाथः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु विभागः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु चूर्णनाथः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु विभागः। तत आरभक्षणयोगः। परमाणु रक्षात्मकत्वयोगः। किंतु चूर्णनाथः।
भासा० नैयायिकानांना नये ग्नृष्कादाग्नेवते।

गुंडऱ० कनाम: परमाश्नेतरकर्कर्षं विभाग द्वितीय: काल।

तत: अभामानीद्र: विभागान पश्चिमेतिहासि दृष्टि: काल। ततो श्लोक्तियो तारणात्मकार्यं ध्वन्यालेखं काल। अभ श्लोकार्थ: अभ श्लोकार्थ: त्वच्चिरित विच्छेदः। इच्छाप्रमादमकार्यं परमाश्नेकर्षाने कथितनात यथा गुणार्थ्यः। तथापि परमाश्नेकर्षान्य परमाश्नेनाभ्यायः। तत शार्कर्षेतरकर्षं संयोगानां। अभ श्लोकनामपरमाश्नेकर्षानि। अभ अभामानी, परमाश्नेतरकर्कर्षं विभाग:। तता रक्षत्वनि: परमाश्नरे पूर्वमंथयमाणासि। तत: परमाश्नेतरसंयोगान:। ततो श्लोकार्थ: अभ रक्षत्वनि: त्वच्चिरित। एवं अभामानीनां परमाश्ने तथापि चिन्तनात ध्रुवदः। रक्षत्वनिमानां परमाश्ने नारे कथितनात श्र्यवचः। १०४।

नैयायिकानामकार्यः। नैयायिकानां मंते ग्नृष्कादेष्टे।

व्याख्याविविध विचारां भावते। नैयायिकामशाहः। ज्ञाताविविध पाको व्यक्तार्थं। व्याख्या कार्यः। स्वत्विधयेज्यः प्रविष्टिः व्यवसायविविध मात्रां पाको व विच्छेदः। विधिभिस्मात ज्ञातवचारान्तः कथयने गौरवतः। दत्त स्वाम्यपाण्डुलिपिः प्रक्षुल्काने यथः। यते तु न प्रयाभिष्का तत्तताविविधः।
भाषा। गणनवधरे तु चेतुः संख्यामिश्रीते।। १०५॥
नित्येः नित्यमकर्मणिश्च नित्यमिश्रे।
दिलाद्रः परार्द्धं अपेक्षाः बुद्धिज्ञ भयः।। १०६॥
अनेकाण्यपर्यायः एते तु परिक्रितिः।

विष्कृतः ग्राहः पोखिलत दृश्यः। बट्टः निरहुपं नित्यसारः।
गणण-भेकति। गणणवधारामध्याय भास्त्राः संख्यायः।। १०५॥

मिलोपः नित्यं परमाणुः अकलं निपते।
शणियो घटाइते एकलमनिर्मितिः।। दिलाद्रः
व्यवस्थाः संख्या अपेक्षाः बुद्धिब्रह्मः।। १०६॥

पनेकेति। घटाशपालाद्रिस्यवायः प्रथमभाक्ति घटाशपालान्तः बन्धुः
तथापि दृश्यमथा बन्धुः तथापि दृश्यमथा बन्धुः एकान्ता दृश्यमथा कर्मानि
द्विगुणः। कसन सम्भवेकारायणस्य भष्यमवेकारायणस्य।। अपेक्षाः बुद्धिवादिति।
प्रथमपुण्यशुद्धिरा ततो दिलाद्रिति।
ततो विप्रशेष्यां दिलाद्रिकाल्पकर्मः। ततो दिलाद्रिकाल्पकर्मः।
अपेक्षाः बुद्धिवादिति। ततो दिलाद्रिति।
घटाशपालान्तः ततो दिलाद्रिति।
धन्मण्डलशान्तः न विप्रशेष्यां धन्मण्डलशान्तः। धन्मण्डलशान्तः न विप्रशेष्यां धन्मण्डलशान्तः।
अनेका ग्राहिकान्तः अपेक्षाः बुद्धिवादिति। धन्मण्डलशान्तः दिलाद्रिति। नित्यसारः।
ভাষায় অক্ষরপ্রতিভার নামানুষ্ঠান উপস্থাপন: ||১০৭||
অনেকাকল্পবিদ্যা সাধনাবুদ্ধিবিচ্ছিন্ননে।

বিষ্ঠায় ন তু দিব্যাত্মে তথায়ো বিশ্বাসভাবন। বিশ্বাসঃ শ্রুতিবিদ্যা স্বাভাবিকতা গাঙ্গনোপায়নাম। তথায় দিব্য-বিদ্যাধরকে পেশাবিদ্যা গুণমঃ কথায় | ন পাপশাসনি-বিধাতাকথা কথা দিব্যাত্মা হৃদি রাথ্য। কাশারি দিব্য-বিদ্যাভাবন। অপেক্ষাবিদ্যাকামলকাম অক্ষরসাধন হৃদি কথায়। প্রতি এব নতুনবিদ্যা পালিন্দ্রকামলকাম কত্ব। তথায় পাপশাসনি-বিধাতায় লাভের মাত্রায় দৃষ্টি কর্ষণাত। বিধান দিব্যেন কর্ষণে প্রতি কারণেলোকেরবিনতান। অনুষ্ঠানযে গ্রামকারাদুপসংবাদ- বিচ্ছিন্নিয়ে ন। সংগৃহীতদিকোনপলযাত্রিগোত্র: পাশাকামলকামলকামবিদ্যা প্রতি বিনোদনসনাতরবিদ্যাধারনামপ্রথমে অক্ষরবিদ্যা চি-লাবিহারণমিতি ||১০৭||

অপেক্ষাবিদ্যা: কন্যান আধি। অনেকতি। অক্ষরকে দৃষ্টান্‌ত্রাকারিকা রাত্রি। ইদুলুবাং। বাধারা নাচনকল- মানত। তত্ত্ব দিব্যাবিভাগে বক্তব্যের ফায়র। যথা সোনাবনাহারিত কন্যাকারি: || অক্ষরানে-নান্দিনিকর- রথিকে বক্তব্যে মনোহরত। তথা ক বিনোদনিযাচা- যিকা বক্তব্যের মহামনোহরতাত। চাত্য দুই বর্ষকে বিলাদী বিল- নাগলা হৃদায়। দ্রুত দ্বিতীয় প্রেম নির্মাণে প্রতি-
भाषा। परिमाणं भवेन्मानव्यवहारस्य कारणं || १०५ ||

भ्रमु द्रोणं मध्यवस्थितं तद्वेदं ईरितं।

अनियो तदनियो नाशित्यो नित्यमुदाहरं || १०६ ||

सूक्ष्मां परिमाणां प्रचयादृपि जावे।

अनिवं ध्रुवकादश संभवाञ्जनमुदाहरं || ११० ||

सिद्धा। निश्चयविदे। बलचत्त मंचानार्कले तत्सारतमथामात्रा दिलितवध्ये। परिमाणं निश्चयविद। परिमाणविद। परिमाणविदध्याधारं कारणं परिमाणसिद्धये। || १०७ ||

तत्तुरुविशं भ्रमु मध्यव स्वर्णं द्रुणं। तत परिमाणं निश्चयमिति परिमाणमिद्यनुवते। || १०८ ||

जालुन द्रुणापि परिमाणमिद्यनुवते। अनिवं निश्चयमिति पूर्वसाधिति। तथा चार्गां परिमाणं स्मरा-जनं परिमाणजनं प्रचयंनं चित्यं॥ तत स्मरा-जनं मुदाहरं। ध्रुवकादशिति। ध्रुवकादश चन्द्रेश्वरं परिमाणं प्रति परमाणुपरिमाणं ध्रुवकादके परिमाणं वा न कारणं। परिमाणं स्मरामाजात। तोत्ताकुप्रिमाणां जनकावट। ध्रुवकादिपरिमाणां परमाणुपरिमाणं िहतं॥ चन्द्रेश्वरपरिमाणां न

* द्रुवकादिपरिमाणां प्रद्धं नतं। स्मरामाजात चन्द्रेश्वरं च समिद्र-स्वं वर्तं॥ निश्चयविदे संभवाञ्जनमुदाहरं पादं॥
ভাষা: পরিমাণ ঘটাই তু পরিমাণাঙ্কনে।
প্রচণ্ড: প্রতিধিলামে যে সংযোগস্থলে জন্মে॥ ১১১॥
পরিমাণ লম্বায়া। নামক্ষরায়নায়।

মিথ্যায় সজাতীয়। অক্ষ: 'পরমাণী দিলজী জ্ঞানকপরি-
মাণসী জ্ঞানে বিলুপ্তি। প্রথমপরিমাণাঙ্কাধার-
মাণ্ডিকারন্তৃক্যয়:॥ ১১০॥

পরিমাণাঙ্কনমুদায়িত। পরিমাণ পদার্থিন।
পরিমাণে ক্যাপাকারের পরিমাণস্তব। প্রক্ষয়নমুদায়িত।
হলু। প্রথম নিদীর্ণ। প্রথম নিদীি। ১১১॥

নাম রূপ। কচ্চাল পরিমাণমাণ। ন চাপ্পায়-
নামান। কথা পরিমাণাঙ্কাধার: সত্যপরিচিতি জীবন-
পরমাণীকর্তৃক তদুপচয়ে রাখীবিন: প্রথমাঙ্কাধার
মূলি। পরিমাণাঙ্কাধার স্তব্ধমুদায়িত বাঙ্গায়।
পরমাণীকর্তৃক জ্ঞানসী জাগায়নে মধ্যমহৌস্যাঙ্কাধার চ
ক্ষত্রেনাটানারায়া। এবং কর্পন মন্দার্থিন: নাম-
ক্ষরাঙ্কনাত। মতি ত নামকে নম্বরে মাণনে
নামক্ষরাঙ্কনার মাণক্ষরাঙ্কনার মাণক্ষরাঙ্কনার পারবিং
ক। ২। প্রতিপিত্ত তথ্যনারম্য। পরি
মাণ্ডিকাঙ্ক আদিতি বাঙ্গায়। তাত্ত্বিক বিষয়মাণ
লেক সমাণ্ডিকাঙ্ক সাধীতাঙ্কনামাণ। পলায়নক

भाषाृ सहार्यथा प्रथास्थृत्यमान प्रथाषक्रमाध्यकारणम् ॥ ११२ ॥

विद्वाृ कलात् । किंतु तत्त्वचरणेन तत्त्वत्ववचनके पूर्व
तत्त्व एव न खात् । तत्त्वनृष्टकारणमाभावत्।
तत्त्वनार्थवत्सलाभिते । न तेन परिमाणाधिकों कं-
युक्तः अर्थातवत्। तत्त्वात् तत् तत्त्वचरणविन्यासं शति
पूर्णपत्नामान्तः परतान्त्रप्रतिकर्तितवर्षम्य सौकायम्।
ब्रजनिविनः; प्रथाभिमानम्य भाषायणं दीपकलिकारि-
वत्॥ न च पूर्णतत्ववेच तत्त्वचरणकारात् पूर्णपत्ते
कथे परतान्त्रमान्त्रात्तमान्तितवाच्यं। मूलस्य: वर्मान-
देशतपारिवर्तमात॥ एकदा नाय्यास्थः तत्त्वनृष्टवभा-
मानिन्तितवाच्यं। पूर्णतत्वस्य प्रतिभवकष्ठिति विनाधि
फ्यारितप्रतिकर्तितवर्षमामभुपेयलात्॥

श्लोकम् कारणम् नित्यपरम्। श्लोकम्
प्रक्षयासाधारणम् कारणम् श्लोकम्। तत्त्वतत्विकम् मक्खा-
वस्। यथा 'ति' निष्क्युः एकविं नित्यो अभियोगोंविनाय
अविनयमेकन्तः शार्कश्चालीसवशेषस्यायां शायस्या-
माण्यति तत्त्वकारणम्। द्वितीयस्य द्वितीयकारण-
कारणिकमित्यथं॥ मन्याययास्तु व्यायास्तु द्वादाययो-
न्यायाभ्यां भाष्येति न तत् कथं श्लोकं गुणात्मारं लिङ्कारे
न चृस्तु श्लोकम् न तत्त्वमाभावं दृति वाच्यं। दृष्टम्
न भ्रम दृति प्रतीयमारसं॥ ११२॥
भावः अन्येयाभक्तो नास्ति चरितार्थलम्पृच्छते।
व्याकाः पूर्वगीदं नेति प्रकृतिन्धिच विलोक्य। ॥ ११४॥
प्रामाण्येयां या प्राप्ति: सैव संध्योग दृष्टिः।
कैसितिविधकारुप आयोगन्यनकरम्यं। ॥ ११४॥
नयोभययक्षाण्यो भवेन संध्योगजाप्यर।
आदित्म: यथेऽप्रत्यथेऽपिः संध्योग: परिकीर्तिः। ॥ ११५॥
मेणेः: सचिवपाठ यथ: स दिनियु उदाहरः।

विश्वाः न च। कपो घटावधिक प्रथां गुणान्तरमसि न चा
घटे घटावधिकप्रथामसि धे धे वर्षरामं: कडय
दुर्योग चाह। अन्येयाभक्ति दृष्टि। विलोक्यानि।
नमु श्रव्यस्थानेः न लघुविधानामसि चेतन्न। न। नि-
वार्थेमें घटात् पृथ्वी दर्तेवार मेण्यापि पञ्चभी
खात। तस्कारं चार्यकांशं पञ्चभी साधिया गर्भवी
उयोक्तावातो भविष्य गुणान्तरं कथ्य दृष्टि। ॥ ११५॥
संध्यां निर्दृश्यति। अप्राप्तारिति। तं विभगते।
कैसिति दृष्टि। नेति संध्योगः। ॥ ११४॥
भिष्पिण्याः: संध्येऽगा दिनियु उम्भयकर्षः। दिनियु
दृष्टि संध्योगज दृष्टिः। दिनियु: आदित्य पूर्वाणि-
चिंतं। ॥ ११५॥
आदित्य: अभिधानं। दिनियु: माद्वास्य: सः
संध्योग दृष्टि। विभागस्यवाक्यां विभागं निर्दृश्यति।
भाषा: कपालसंयोगान् संयोगसंभवन् || ११४ ||
लक्षण: स्नातः कार्येषोपि विशेष परिकृति:।
आभिधात्म मेधानम् शब्दवेदार्थसंयुक्तम् || ११७ ||
शब्दवेदार्थसंयुक्तम्: गृहिणाश्च शब्दगृहेऽपि चिद्वा भवेत्।
एककालादिवश्वायो इत्यक्षमाः परः || ११८ ||
विभागस्तुतिनिमय: स्नातः दलनियोपि दिष्टा भवेत्।

पद्धति: विभाग द्वत्वैः एककालात। उदाहरणानु श्रेणीमयविभागादिकः पूर्णविभागः || ११६ || ११७ || ११८

लक्षणीय: विभागः: कारणाधिकार्यविभागं: कारणाकारणविभागस्य द्वति। चार्यवात्। यतः कपालसंयोगान्। ततः कपालदेशविभागः। ततो घटारस्यक्षणोपयोगानाः। ततो घटनाः। तत्तत्र कपालसंयोगान् आभिधात्म कपालस्य देशान्तरविभागः। ततो देशान्तरसंयुक्तानाः। ततु उन्नतसंयुक्तानाः।

ततः: कार्यणां द्वति। न च तेन कार्यप्रणव कार्यं देशान्तरविभागः। न च जतं द्वति। वार्ता। एकवाक्य कार्यं आर्थकसंयोगा प्रतिद्वद्धसंयुक्तानार्थकम्यक्षणार्थकम्यक्षणार्थकविभागजनकलसंयोगार्थकम्यक्षणार्थकविभागजनकविरोधात्। अन्यथा विशेषार्थसंयुक्तम् कार्यनिधिकारार्थकसंयोगार्थकप्रतिद्वद्धविभागजनकलसंयोगार्थकम्यक्षणार्थकविभागजनकविरोधात्। अन्यथा वि-

कार्यनिधिकारार्थकसंयोगार्थकप्रतिद्वद्धविभागजनकलसंयोगार्थकम्यक्षणार्थकम्यक्षणार्थकविभागजनकविरोधात्। अन्यथा विशेषार्थसंयुक्तम् कार्यनिधिकारार्थकसंयोगार्थकप्रतिद्वद्धविभागजनकलसंयोगार्थकम्यक्षणार्थकम्यक्षणार्थकविभागजनकविरोधात्。
भाषा १५७
चेतुमाणविभागोऽव चेतुचतुतुगिरागः॥१६॥
परलस्यापरलम दिषिध्य पारीक्षितं
दैत्यिक कालिकस्तोपि मूर्त्तिः एव तु दैत्यिकां॥१७॥
परलं सुस्यंदायोऽभ्यर्मस्तुभानो भवेत्।
अपरलं नृस्यल्पयुविल: स्वादिशिरितिः॥१८॥

विष्णु १५७ वैव कण्यागारे नृपः तु तेजसऽन्तरविभागोऽव अज्ञात
रति वाच्यः। चाराकारणं भृत्तिरिजिध्यंविभागव्यं
वचं वर्णितं केवले दैत्यादिकविभागाभ्यात्। च च
रक्षसज्ञाय जस्तप्रश्नविभागः। ततः गृङ्ग्रेषपि विभागः
प्रायः भवित। ततः च गृङ्ग्रेषविभागे भ्रात्सिद्या न कारणः।
वधिकरणलाॊकारे तु भ्रात् वाच्यः। च- वनिकबःशे भावदक्षरस्वस्तिलोकरानां। जातसुष्ण कार-
णाकारणविभागेन कार्याकारणस्तिलाबोऽज्ञात। न्यत्
पते विभागो गुणान्तः। शेषयु गृङ्ग्रेषे विभागस्ति
तथा न खात्। न्यतः संपूजकामन विभागे साधयामा
विष्णु भवित॥१९॥

परादरवाचारनिमित्ते परस्परसः विनिःपत्तिः।
परलशेषित। दैत्यिकाः॥१७॥
दैत्यिकशतं क्षतरसुस्यंदायोव्याकरणपरिवर्तमादि
वस्यन्त। एवं तदन्तोऽवकाशाऽपि: स्वादिशिरितियोऽव
वधिलार्थितियोऽवेशः। यथा पाटलिप्पुष्टादानकादि
भाषा  

तथारसमवायी तु दिक्षंयोगसत्ताश्रये।

दिवाकरपरिश्रन्दृष्टं चतुरुच्छिन्नः॥ १२२॥

परतमपर्षप्नु तदनन्तरुच्छिन्नः।

चत्त तस्मवायी स्या श्रायः संयोगः कालप्रियद्रोणः॥ १२३॥

श्रेष्ठाचुद्धिनाशेन नाशस्त्वेपामुद्य्येतः।

बुद्धः प्रकारः प्रागेव प्रायश्चित्विन्नुचितः॥ १२४॥

अर्थाविधयं पुराणः प्रकारः परिद्धेयेन।

अप्रमा च प्रमा चैनि चानि द्विविधमुच्चते॥ १२५॥

तक्तूमहे तम्भतियोऽसुद्प्रमा सा निक्पिला।


विद्या  

मथेय निच निधारणः परः। वार्तिपुच्छतु हृष्यचन्द्रपथ्या

प्रयोगेन पवसः॥ १२६॥


tथेयादिशिकपर्लापारलयोः। श्रमसमवायी श्रमसमवा-

यिकारण। तदथारे दीर्घकपर्लापारलास्ये॥ दिवा-

करित॥ १२७॥


dच परलं घटरस्य कालिकं गायः। यस्य स्वर्य-

परिश्रन्दपेश्या यस्य स्वर्यपरिश्रन्दोधिकः। य चेष्टा।।

यस्य नूः। च कालिक:। कालिकपर्लापलरे जन्मक्रय

एव। चतुर्चतुर्चकालिकपर्लापलयोः॥ १२८॥

पराः कालिकदीर्घकपर्लापलास्य॥ क्रमप्राप्ताः

वुक्तिः निजस्वतिभाष:। बुद्धिरित॥ १२८॥ १२९॥

चप्प्रापं विभजते। तक्तूमहे दृश्य। तद्भवावति।
भाषा। तत्प्रपच्छिल्ल विपस्वायासः संग्रहे वापि प्रकौशितः। १२५॥
ञायी देवी याससबुद्धिः श्रवणं दै। पीतादस्तं।
भोजनश्रवणवर्ग यत्र संग्रहे वापि प्रद्धयते। १२६॥
किंसी नरा वा ख्यातिवैवादिबुद्धिः संग्रहं।
नद्धभावप्रकारा धीरसंतप्रकारा तु निषयः। १२७॥
स संग्रहे महत्या ख्याताहो जार्येकात्मकाभावः।

महत्या। तत्प्रकारक क्षाणं भवेद दृष्टः॥ १२८॥
तत्प्रपच्छ। यथार्थः। ॥ १२९॥
ञाय। दृष्टः। विपस्वाय संग्रहः। मारा। वदानः। बखालप्रकारक क्षानं गैराहस्वमयाकरं।
एवं श्रवणं पीतः। श्रवणं द्वारकरं शक्तिः निषयः।
तथां दृष्टः॥ १२४॥
किंसी दृष्टः। किंसी दृष्टः विनर्षः। निषयः।
स्वाधिकारः। तद्भावः। तद्भावप्रकारकं धारा-तप्रकारकं क्षानं निषयः। १२६॥
संग्रहं स्वाधिकारः। संग्रहं दृष्टः। प्रधारिकारकुयुनु-भावाभावप्रकारकं क्षानं संग्रहं दृष्टः॥ व्याधारः ज्ञातः।
संबधागारणः यथा धारानां संग्रहं धाराकरं। यथा
उदाहरणं ख्यातिवैवादिबुद्धिः प्रत्यापणं बाधु।
वन्दतुः। एवं अधारणामार्गं कारणः। यथा सत्तवं
निषयानिश्चातसं प्रबर्त्तिः। किंचिदं न वर्तने।
ভাষা: সাধারণাদিভিঃ স্থানে সংশয়কারণে।। ১২৫।।
দৃষ্টাপ্রমাণে অনাম: প্রমাণায়তু গুণার ভবিষ্যঃ।

বিষয়: শক্তিরে। বিশিষ্টপ্রসারস্ত ব্যাখা গিয়া ন বিদ্যাদিশ।
ব্যাখ্যানিকারিণী বিশ্লেষণাবৃত্তকাল সংশয়কারণে। কিন্তু তত ব্যাখ্যা কোটিপ্রচুর ব্যাখ্যা জন্মে। সংশয়ক মানব প্রযোজন। এবং ব্যাখ্যার গভীরতায় সংশয়কপ্রচুর স্বত্ব বিশ্লেষণ। এবং ব্যাখ্যায় ধর্মশাস্ত্র ধর্মশাস্ত্র স্থানে ধর্মশাস্ত্র ধর্মশাস্ত্রের কারণে প্রতিনিধিত্ব। ১২৫।।

দৃষ্টাপ্রমাণে প্রতি দৃষ্টাপ্রমাণে প্রতি গুণার কারণে। গুণার প্রতি পিত্তাধিকতা দৃষ্টাপ্রমাণে প্রমাণায়তু।
তত্ত্বায় কারণাত্মন ন্যায়ভূতিরকারীমুখ্য বিশ্লেষণ। গুণায় প্রমাণায়তু অনুমানায়তু বিশ্লেষণ। সংবা প্রমা স্থানে
স্থানাধিকারকারণেমুখ্যকারণে স্থানাধিকারকারণে প্রমাণায়তু।
ন জ দৃষ্টাপ্রমাণে। কারণের মূলে গুণার প্রমাণায়তু।
পীত: প্রতিক হিতিকারণকল্পে পিত্তদৃষ্টাপ্রমাণায় বিশ্লেষণ।
বিদ্যানাস্তাে অনুমানায় পিত্তদৃষ্টাপ্রমাণ।
হিতিকারণকারণকল্পে গুণাদৃষ্টাপ্রমাণ।
ন জ গুণাদৃষ্টাপ্রমাণ পিত্তদৃষ্টাপ্রমাণ।
বিদ্যানাস্তাে পিত্তদৃষ্টাপ্রমাণ।
হিতিকারণকারণকল্পে গুণাদৃষ্টাপ্রমাণ।
ন জ গুণাদৃষ্টাপ্রমাণ।
भाषा १ पितृदुर्वाकरिस्सपो दोवो नानाविभ सृजना। १२०।।
प्रख्ये तु विश्वेषण विशेषणार्थ समेत।
सुजितकृष्ण गुप्तस्तु स्माद्य लघुमिनी गुण। १२१।।
पचे साधवषिण्ये च परामर्शा गुणो भवेत।
प्रख्ये सोद्धवुद्रात्र भवेदुपमितार्थार्थ गुण। १२२।।
शाक्ते सौभयायणस्य भवेदुपमितार्थार्थ प्रमा।
गुण: स्माद्य भमभवज्ञऽ ज्ञानचौरूप्ये प्रमा। १२३।।
प्रथवा तन्त्रधारां यज्ञाः नदिनिरेखां।

विद्या १ तथापन्यथार्थार्थिरेकाभिर्गुणसार्थ प्रेमसम्पेदः। षवं
अभं प्रति गुणाभावः कारणसम्मिश्रता सुवर्णज्व।
तथा द्वारा: के द्वाराकाञ्चायामां। पितृचिन्त। कार्यः
pिन्नाधिर्भवे पिन्न द्वारः। कार्यार्थार्थ: सम्पूर्णः
स्राधिः ब्रह्मानन्द्वे दूरवलं द्वारः। कार्यं वंक्षररभवे मण्डलानी
कविताब्रह्मसार्थार्थ द्वारा अन्नासनका द्वारः। १ ३ ॥

cथ के गुणाद्वारार्थार्थ विश्वासी गुणानवर्णायति। प्रकृते स्मित। प्रकृते विश्वासी
विश्वासनकाः गुणा: स्मितात् वायथायथि
विष्णुर्वर्णाः गुणदत्ता:। एवमधिपुर्वः। १ ३ २॥

प्रभु गुणार्थश्रमानी गृहस्त: सत्गुणम् जान।
तथा रजनांश्रयस्य गृहस्त: न खास्तु तस्मानवशः अभमित्


cथवा तन्त्रधारां यज्ञाः नदिनिरेखां।
भाषा। तन् प्रमा न प्रमा नापि भमः खानञ्जनिविकल्पकं॥२४॥
प्रकारताधिपूहूण्यं च सम्बलानवगाच्छ नत॥

सिद्धा। लाभावशु अत शास्त्रं अध्येति। तद्रिधिशकं तथाकारा
रकं श्रानं प्रमा दखवं। इदनु वेदं ये येन सम
ध्येत तात्ता तेन सम्बोधने तदहिदिशयं तेन सम्बोधने
तथाकारकलं वाच्यं। तेन कपालादृः संहडागार्दिता घटा
दिष्टानि नातिविधी। एवं विदि निर्विकल्पकं प्रमा न
खात् तस्मि संप्रकारक्लाभावादु अत शास्त्र। न प्रभवत॥
ननु तथे कपियंग्रामाणं भमः खातू प्रमा च खार
दिति चेत। न | प्रतियोगित्विधिकरणमेऽपुराखावर्भें
संह्याग्रामणं भमवानं। न च तथे संह्याग्रामाव
व्यक्तिक्रषिदेन संह्याग्रामाणं भमवानं न खात्त तत्र
संह्याग्रामावप्रतियोगित्विधिकरणलाम्बावर्भें
वाच्यं। तत्र संह्याग्रामावव्यक्तिक्रषिदेन संह्याग्रामाण
भमवानं। लचणा-खाननुगमात्। लचणानुगमेऽपि न
चतः॥ १ २ ४॥

प्रभवस्वादित। मीमांसकः द्रष्ट्र प्रमालं खत्ता याज्ञव
स्वास्वादित वद्रित। तव गुरुणां मते शास्त्रं ख्रप्रकाशक
पवात् तस्मात्प्रमाणं तचेव खत्ता दृत। भवनां
मते खानञ्जनीक्षितं। खानञ्जन ज्ञातता प्रख्यात।
तथा, ए मातमगुमोरते॥ मुरारिनिविर्भा मनसी
वास्तवेऽपि मटे तस्मानवि-
गिथा* यथक्षाश्च तस्मान प्रामाण्यं यथात। विषयनिर्भयं हि शानं। यतो शानविचिठ्ठिद्वारा विषयं। तत्सातं दूष्य- चति। न सन्तो यास्यमिति। संघःस्यति। यदृच् शान- प्रामाण्यं सन्तो यास्य स्नात तदानश्चांशोषाणां तन्तस्याया न अतु। तत्च हि हि शानं शानं तदा प्रामाण्यं शानं तदांते च प्रथं संग्रहं:। यदि तु शानं न शानं तदानश्चांशोषाणात्मायातं कर्म संग्रहं। तस्मान् शानश्रामणम भवने। तथा यदि राेशं स्मोऽ- दिमण्डलितजनकलाहु। चतैति तर्कवेच व्याख्याम्मा। राेशं दुष्यीवलप्रकारकं शानं प्रमा। गम्भःति दुष्यीवलप्रका- रकस्मानलाहु। एवं राेशं जनाांतं प्रमा। संघःस्यति जलप्रकारकस्मानलाहु। न च पृथुतं शानं कर्म शान- सिति वायं। दुष्यीवलप्रकारकलयं सन्तो यास्यमिति। तत्च गम्भःविद्वारकलिपणो सुखहलाहु। तस्मानक- लावःविद्वारकलिपणं परं न स्यं। संयस्याः भावाः। न च प्रसादन्विता साध्याद्य प्रमीखः कर्मसिद्धि वायं। राेशं श्रामणलाहु सन्तो यास्यमिति। न च प्रका- रकस्मान श्रामणेऽद्वृत्तं क्षर्कवान घटन्त्रकारकः। कर्म दुष्यीवलप्रिति वायं। घटन्त्रकारकलयं वायः。

* विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं विषयनिर्भयं
বিষয়ে অংকণ এ সতে যাবায়। ঘটাই পূর্বমুখিতাকালীন ঘটনায়কারকিতি ভাষা প্রামাণ্য বাণ্ডকামাত:। অবস্থায়নয় প্রামাণ্য ন গ্রহণ।
তথা সংবাদকৃময়ভিত্তি সংবাদক্ষেবিপ্রবন্ধঃ। জিজ্ঞাসায়-
দ্রহাঁ দত্তিকালীন ব্যাখ্যা প্রামাণ্য সত্য এবং
প্রকাশনামূলক প্রথামূলকনাথপর্যন্ত ন নিদ্রারকালিক কথিতে সংবাদকারোপন।। অথব প্রামাণ্যাতিক প্রা-
মাণার্যে ন তথা বিশ্ববিভাগায়নাধীনের তখন প্রামাণ-
যোগ্যতা বাণ্ড:। সেকারণকিতি ফলস্বরূপ কার
রপ্তমূখ বা নাগবিশিষ্টত বিষয়। অন্তর্বাণ প্রামাণ্য-
কৃত্য বিশ্বনামান। এবং প্রামাণ্যান্তরিতেরে বহুতর প্রামাণ্যান-
বিশিষ্টিতিহৈ এবং সর্বনা তু ন সংশয়:। কারণ কোণ
নুপুরিতি: স্বল্পতন্ত্রনাদিত: স্বল্পতন্ত্রকারণ-
স্থানাদি দর্শন।। নন সজ্ঞায় প্রামাণ্যান ব্যাধিকার
লাত। প্রামাণ্যে গতিশীলকমল বিশিষ্টত বিষয়।। ন চ
কলে রজতাধিক: প্রহ্লাদভস্মাদা ন আত্ম তব তাতে
অসমাভাবাদি বাণ্ড।। তথা যৈ দীনাধিকতাধা
পুরোনীতিতে স্বতন্ত্রপীতরত্নে প্রামাণ্য দুই তরুতাত।
যথারসায়স্থবাদুববিশিষ্টানাবাদান তদবেব কারণ।
অথব যা তথাকথি ভেদাভেদ এব কারণায়িত। ন বাণ্ড-
কাম আত্ম: বাণ্ড। রজতস্বাধিকারস্থ রজতস্বাধি-

ধিঙ্কা
কর্ষ্যাভাবাত। রজ্জু রজ্জুমূলকরুপপরিনিতিবিষ্ণুঃ।
বক্ররূপকলে প্রশ্নিত প্রতি বিষ্ণুঃআচার্য শাস্ত্রেতথা: 
কামাতি। অম্মিন্ধাতি নতকলাত। ২ এ সংজ্ঞারত্ন 
দৃষ্টিবিষ্ণুগিরতীতি তত্ত্বাদ। দেবারাজা: কার 
রূপালিত বাচ্য। লাভান্ত চূর্ণিতাধার তথাপি পুত্ত 
কল্পন। রূপ রজ্জু, রজ্জুলবিষ্ণুসাচার্যপৈবিষ্ণু 
স্ত্রীলোকপ্রাণ্যাযায়তি কল্পনেতি ন চ চিত। ফলমূল: 
লোকেশচারীপালান। বিষ্ণু ধৃত রক্ষীরত্রেবিহিতে রজ্জু 
রূপ ক্ষের কালী তরঞ্চ কারাণীপালি। প্রভৃতি চ 
যথেষ্ঠ রক্ষীরত্রেমনেহ রজনরূপ হিত ক্ষের তথামূল 
পূর্ণাত্মিতত্রিতিতি খাতি। রজ্জু রজ্জুপঞ্চ রজ্জু 
রজনমূলকন্ত নামাখাচার্যবাক্য। বলমিতে রজ্জু 
রজ্জু আপাপথ রজনে রজনমূলকন্ত সত্তাত। হাত 
ধৃত রক্ষীরত্রেতথাপি পূর্ণাত্মিতি কল্পন। বিষ্ণু 
স্ত্রীলোকপ্রাণ্যা স্বতীতি কক্ষ নামাখাচার্যবাক্য 
কিংবদ্নেতি কল্পন। যথেষ্ঠ পূর্ণাত্মিতিতি কক্ষ 
নামাখাচার্যবাক্য। ২ এত্যন্ত স্থান। রজ্জু 
রজনতত্ত্ব বুদ্ধান্ত।
भावः व्यभिचारसङ्ग्रहार्थसः सच्चारयचनूष्ठाया।
चेतुव्यासिणीने नर्कः काजिन प्रक्रियानिवर्तकः॥ १२६॥

चित्रः पूर्वे व्यासिणी तद्वेषापायसः न दर्शित र्यवथतां दर्शयति। व्यभिचारकेति। व्यभिचारयशः सच्चारयचसः व्यासिणी कारणविमयः। व्यभिचारयसः व्यासिणीसङ्ग्रहस्वतः तद्भावः कारणः।
अवेच्यातिभक्षाम् सच्चारयचसः प्रेतुतता। भूयो-यश्नभन्नु न कारणः। व्यभिचारायङ्कृतैः सच्चारययः कवितूः व्यासिणीसः। कवितूः व्यभिचारः ज्ञानार्त्थनः
द्वारा भःद्यादर्शनमुपयुक्तः। यथा तु भोधदर्शनादपि
श्चन्ता नापिति तथ विपववार्तकानां पेघः। तथापि
विज्ञापितेष्वार्थः प्रामाण्यः यक्षितः वयासिणी भविति तदा
था विज्ञाप्यः: कार्यार्थभावः प्रतियध्यानाचिनव-चते। यथायः विज्ञाप्यः न खात्तूः तदा धृष्टवाचः न खात्तूः।
कारणः विना कार्यार्थनपपतः। कथि कवितूः कारणः वि-
पापि भविधृति विदृष्टक प्रांव वा भविधृती तत्त्वानु
श्चन्ता भविति तदा सा याग्यादिप्रभुणीयः। कथि
कारणः विना कार्यां खात्तूः तदा धृष्टवाचः वि.
भाजनखय मिलित व्याप्तानं तैतृव न खात्तूः। यथा
कारणः विना कार्यां खात्तूः तदा धृष्टवाचः
विद्यमानं ततः कवितूः श्चन्त्रानिवर्तकः दृष्टि॥ १२६॥
भाषा साहसाय वापीभ यत्तु तेतारायबपकलिथा।

शिल्ला... रद्वानीय परकीयराशियिपरतिवम्भार्यमुपाधि निरुपयति। साधस्तेति। साधलाभिमत्यापकले मति
साधनलाभिमत्यापक दत्तायः। नून ये भाषासे भिषणासे तनतनचलादृ दत्ताय शास्त्राकाराणे नामाधि: खात्त। तत्त
शास्त्रवाकालाभावान्त। भाषालक्ष घटारिपि बचताः।
एवं वापु: प्रथम: शम्पणग्यवलादृ दत्ताय उद्देश्यप्रकर
वचन नामाधि: खात्त। प्रथमवृक्षाः विषयादिः बचताः तत्र
रूपाभावान्। एवं धवनेऽविनाशी जनलादृ दत्ताय भावले नामाधि: खातृ विनुग्रितमः भागाभी: म
चती। तत्र च भावाभावार्दिति चेत। यद्विषाणाः
विद्वतमायापकाणयः तद्विषाणान्वीत भागनायापकार
वर्धमायार्यान्। भिषणाननाविद्वतमायापकाणयः या
पकाण्याकाराणे। एवं विद्वतमायापकारनात् गहनानाम
आपकारविद्वतमायापकाणयः पकाण। एवं धवनेऽविनाशी जनलादित्यः जनलादि
विद्वतमायापकारं भावां दर्दुतृ तु एतासमां धर्मां
नाश्क। यद्विषाणां सामुः वापेकं तद्विषाणां साधनवायापकं
कियतनृत्त्वात्। अभिविद्वतिः तु

* भाषा: भाषासे भिषणाननाविद्वतमायापकारनात् भिषणाननाविद्वतमायापकारनात् भाषालक्ष घटारिपि बचताः।
भाषा। स उपाधिभिशिष्टस्य निव्ववैशविस्य प्रदर्शनी। ॥ १३ ॥
सच्च साधस्यसामान्यविशिष्टकणा सदुपाध्य। ॥
चेतोरिकाये तेषां साधस्यबिशिष्टविचारिन्द। ॥ १३ ॥
वाभिचारार्कनामानुसार्यपेशेव प्रयोजनं। ॥

विन्दु। अमल उपाधिभिशिष्टम वाभिताधिकरण वसेराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण वसराधिकरण ॥ १३॥

चत: एवं ज्ञानसौप रूपमेतदनुपालितवर्य हर्षशिरि। ॥
संस्कृत । संस्कृत । संस्कृत । संस्कृत ॥
उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित। ॥

उपाधिवृहेतुपोजामम। वाभिचारित।
भाषा शब्दकोशायुक्त पुस्तक प्रामाण्यमित्रे। २३४। अनुमानमगनाथंवादिति वैदिकिकं संस।

विज्ञ्यायः कारि। विचारनये भाषापाठायाभिषेकरितादिति। वाधानुक्रमेतरसं शास्त्रशाप्तायायनस्माणाभवत्। ख्यातांकलंबं नापाधि।। वाधानुक्रमं, मन्त्रतर उपाधिकंहितं, यथा विक्रमं, सत्कालादृश्यारी। तथार्थार्थ श्रवणान् श्रवणज्ञालम्ये वंधीतरस् शुभांपरापि।। यथा शास्त्रशाप्तायायनस्माणाभवत। वंधीतरसं श्रुतिज्ञाथायायानस्माणाभवत। कौशल्यं भगवतिप्रायायायनस्माणाभवत। धिष्ठत। तत्त्वाति अथोमािशकं धूमधरसायित्वादात् अथोमािशकं धूममािवावन धार्मिकमािवावन रूपं महात्मिषप्रवत्। रत्नं रत्नांवधायकाियां काशायाध।। पद्यं करका गृहीकी काठमधंगचारितराधारी अनुसारीशिलाशायंग। न चार्चां खस्त्रपश्चायानदेव दृष्ट्य-शरिष्टित वाच्यं।। सर्वोपथध्वंसकारात्मकाधित्यनत्ति वदन्ति। प्रमाणपादारिति। २३५॥

बैदिकिकार्यं सति प्रात्यशुमण्माण्यम् प्रमाणं शब्दायायानारुपमाण्यमित्रे। नाथं दिति ब्रम्हं गामभाजियाधिपदानि वैदिकिदर्शन वा तारं-
वार  \[ \text{श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण} \] \[ \text{श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण} \] \[ \text{श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण} \] \[ \text{श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण} \] \[ \text{श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण श्रवण} \]
ভাষা । অনন্যব্যাকরণ অনির্দিষ্টচিত্তে ১৪৯।
সাধ্যাভাবব্যাপকাং চেতনাভাবং যাবৎ বেন।

বিদ্যা । ধর্মীয় আত্মজ্ঞান ক্ষেত্রাভ্যাসে মহার্ষিতে চেতনাভাবস্বরূপি বিদ্যা ।
যাহাতে সাধ্যাভাবব্যাপকাং চেতনাভাবার্থী মহার্ষিতে সমস্তচিত্তে ।
কিছু গটিতে অভ্যাসে অনন্যব্যাকরণ অনির্দিষ্টচিত্তে চেতনাভাবে 
বিদ্যা যাহা নিজস্বার পঞ্চমাবর্তন সমস্ত পূর্বকালের শাসন।
তথ্য দিইয়া অনন্যব্যাকরণ অনির্দিষ্টচিত্তে চেতনাভাবব্যাপকাং 
সাধ্যাভাবব্যাপকাং অনির্দিষ্টচিত্তে চেতনাভাবব্যাপকাং।

তথ্যে অনির্দিষ্টচিত্তে অনির্দিষ্টচিত্তে চেতনাভাবব্যাপকাং অনির্দিষ্টচিত্তে 
সাধ্যাভাবব্যাপকাং অনির্দিষ্টচিত্তে চেতনাভাবব্যাপকাং।


भाषा ३३ अर्थप्रसंस्कृतं वैविध्य प्रभावान्तरणेतिने ॥ १४५ ॥

विद्वान ३३ कलं गम्भीरी श्रव्यते तत्त गम्भीरावाधीविनेतरसाधनानां बालपाण्डवं: सिद्धिति। च तु ताराजयमानेतरावा- पकता श्रव्यते तत्त ताराजयमानेतराशास्त्रां: सिद्धिति। य एवान्यथाभावं। एवं च यथागम्भीरभन्न ध्यामं प्रति यथागम्भीरभन्न वक्ष्यिपकता श्रव्यते तत्त यथाग- बन्धाविभिन्नप्रतियोगिता काव्याभावेन जतनकेदे सं- यथागम्भीरभन्नप्रतियोगिता कार्याभावं: सिद्धिति। 

क्रम च व्यातिरिक्तार्थार्थेषु व्यातिरिक्तकृतार्थार्थ वार्तान्त्यां कार- र्यान्। क्षमस्य व्यातिरिक्तसंवच्छारण्यवाच्यापिरेव श्रव्यते 

ज्ञ तु व्यातिरिक्तवाच्याणि कार्यान्। तथा व्यातिरिक्तकृता- चारायुगशिशुपलस्य व्यातिरिक्तकृतार्थार्थार्थ भाषा प्राप्त श्रव्येन स्था तत रूपति वहना॥

अर्थप्रसंस्कृतिः। अर्थप्रसंस्कृतम प्रभावान्तरणं मन्नने 

केषन। तथाहि यथा देवद्रव्य ग्रतिवर्जनिवलं ज्ञेतबी: 

ब्राह्माद्वयं जीविना गृहयोक्त्व मध्यचाद्रवयं तथा 

गृहयोक्त्विलक्ष्यायुगपत्र क्षणमाने कल्याते तद- 

नुमानेज गतार्थालं चक्ष्ये तथाहि जीविना विहि: 

वच्चलयोक्त्वचाप्यायुगं चक्ष्ये। तचात्तृतविषयं जायमानान्या गृहसतवाधा दहि:बलमुनिमिता भाषति।
ভাষাধীন ব্যতিরেকে মিত্রব্যাপি চরিতাভাবে সা যোগ
সুখনু জগতামো কাজে ধর্মং জন্মে। ॥ ১৪২ ॥
চর্চ্চ চুঁিক যে দুঃখ শ্রুতি মনিকুলাং বচনিতাঃ।
নিদ্রাকলে সুখে চেক্রাত তস্মানাদেব জানুন। ॥ ১৪৪ ॥

সিদ্ধার্থনাথ এবং পীর প্রকাশকে দিবা ন মৃদু দ্যায়ারী পীনলল
ম্ভোজন্যায়লাভগমান্ধায়নন্ম নিয়তি। দিবাভজনি
ফর্ম রাজ্যরঞ্জনন্ম নিয়তি। প্রভাবায়ঘায়নম
কিঞ্চিত্তেন শ্রীমতা মন্ত্র ন দ্যায়ারী মন্ত্রং
শ্রীমতা দিত্তে তু তন্মমিতলস্মাত্রায়া প্রচলন।
চেত্তার্থে মন্ত্রায় ন ত। তত্ত্বং সত্যত্যাহকীম
স্মারকের নিষ্ক্রিয়মঃ শুভাভাবাত্ত।
যথ তু শুভাভাবায় কান্তিমিতি নিবিন্দীতি। ॥ ১৪৫ ॥

সুখনু নিদ্রপয়িত। সুখনু জগতামো কাজে ধর্মং জন্মে। গন্ধ হত।
কালমমিতি ত্রিত্যায়:। গন্ধ হত ধর্মিন সুখিনে।
কাজে কার্যকারণভাব দ্যায়:। ॥ ১৪৬ ॥

dুঃখিনিদ্রপয়িত। গন্ধ হত। ধর্মিন দুঃখিনে।
কার্যকারণভাব দ্যায়:। প্রতিকৃতিমিতি দুঃখম
মন্ত্রায় শ্রীমতৈদিত্য নিয়তি। প্রচলন
নিদ্রপয়িত। নিদ্রাকল গন্ধ হত। ॥ ১৪৭ ॥
भाषा

रूपक हे तन्दुरस्ये खाद्यातिपासून वाचनी बनुने।

विचारां ज्ञानिकायविश्वास प्रकारेश्वर च या भवेन॥ १४५॥

देवस्य ज्ञानार्थं साधनावलमीनिवेन॥

वर्णमृदु डुटी चे चे चे मतिं सानु प्रतिविभिका॥ १४६॥

तद्रातृतुमवृहु हृ ती चे चे मंत्रिनवीने।

चिका १२

रूपक चि वर्णविश्वासी उपायविश्वासी च।

फलाव खुशुं दुःखाबासः। तत्र वलेक्ष्यां प्रति फल-

ज्ञानं कारणं। घ्रं एव खतः पुष्पाधि: समावितः।

यज्ञां अत्र खुशुं संतुष्टितमेते खतं पुष्पाधि दृष्टि

तकर्तव्याः। इतरसंहारानधोनीस्वास्तिका वनिताय

सि हि। उपायेक्षां प्रतीष्ठानवासां मानवम्

चिकोपिनि। 'जितिसाधिकारिकाज्ञित्याक्षरियां

विशेषार्थीसंहारा चिकोपिनि। पाकं क्रमं वाचायांति

तद्गुरुवात॥ १४५॥

चिकोपिनि च प्रति ज्ञिताधिकार्यसमाधिधार्यता-

मानवस्य कारणं। घ्रं एव दुःखां ज्ञिताधिकार्यसमाधिधार्यता

वचना चिकीड़ा॥ बवलबिद्वेशमानतासानं

तत्र प्रतिविभिन्न॥ चतो मद्धुविसमहाकाव्यीभोजे न

चिकीड़ा॥ बवलबिद्वेशः प्रतिविभिन्न दृष्टि॥ १४६॥

कद्रातृतुमवृहु हृ ती चे चे मंत्रिनवीनें। जितिसाधिकार्यानाधिकार्यता ववलबिद्वेशः।
ভাষা ॥ দিষ্টসাধননাত্তুদ্বিতীয় দেয়া কারণ ॥ ১৪৭ ॥
প্রয়োজন নিষ্ঠুরতি নয়া জীবনকারণ ॥
এবং প্রয়োজনীয় নানাকীন্তি পরিদৃশ্য ॥ ১৪৮ ॥
কীর্তির্যা জ্ঞাতিসাধারণসাধনলক্ষণসত্য ॥

বিদ্যা ॥ ধনন্তরাজ্ঞুমূলমঃ বলবদ্ধনিষ্ঠাজনকব্যার্থ বিনাপি
কীর্তির্যাবা জ্ঞানমাধায়া কলাশ্চতাত নিয়ন্ত্রণে
সাধিতঃ ॥ দেব নিষ্ঠুরতি । দিষ্টাধাননীতি ।
বিষয়কার্যক দেয় প্রতি দিষ্টাধাননার্থান কারণানীতি ।
বলবদ্ধনিষ্ঠাধাননার্থান প্রতিনিধিত্ব ॥
তেম মান- তেম মান--
লোককে লোকে পাকার্থ ৷ ন দেয়: ॥ ১৪৭ ॥
নলমিষ্ঠপথ । নলস্তন্ত্রতি ।
প্রয়োজনীয় নিষ্ঠুরতি
জীবননিষ্ঠাসমক্ষেত্র প্রতিনিধিত্ব রূপায় ॥ ১৪৮ ॥
কীর্তির্যাবার্থ নিষ্ঠুরতা বল-
বলবদ্ধনিষ্ঠাচরণে কীর্তির্যাভাবায় প্রদত্ত সাধন ॥
কারণানীতিবা বিপ্রস্তুতি ॥ কার্যতান্ত্রিক প্রবর্তিত গুরু ॥
নারীতান্ত্রিক প্রদীপস্তুতি ॥
তথাপি মানস প্রহস্ত জননীর্যায় কীর্তিসাধারিগুরু
সাধনভাবে । যা বিদ্যা জ্ঞানোৎপন্ন্য কীর্তিসাধারিকে ।
কীর্তির্যাবৃততায় সাধনার্থ ॥ তত জ্ঞাতিসাধারণ প্রকার ॥

शिब्दः ८ नयं च सुखत्वालसार्गब्रह्मचारिणीः। यद्रा-
कर्त्तानमृत्युवायते भविष्यनिकोणोनस्। कलमाणा-
यस्मात्स्त्यतः। नवोंत्वमु समीयं जगतमा-
यं मर्यमरयानः। नान्यायमधुराधिश्रुतिः श्रवणेवपत्तिः।
किंतु अधवः शुचः। सतिमयं च ताज्जु शालं
स्मिर्मेयायत्वः। तत्र प्रवत्तिः। तेनाद्वंत्वमासम् तत्
भिषणताणवं भूतपूर्वः। वाकः स्मिर्मेयायत्वः
श्रुतां स्मिर्मेयायत्वः। परमावरास्। तत्रात्मा श्रुतां
स्रुतारुमात्रादिप्रकटिः। यथा तृतीयामः श्रुतां
स्रुतारुमात्रादिप्रकटिः। मोक्षायां च तदव्यावाहः।
हृदयुः। तदतानिनिष्ठं
साधनलाब्धिद्वां च प्रवर्तकः। तैनात्तुर्वाहः। वानस्य
स्मिर्मेयायत्वः। तदानां सतिमयार्थाभावः। चेत् विद्या
भोज्यां न प्रवर्तकः। तदानां सप्तान्निर्धायिनाय
स्मिर्मेयायत्वः। प्रवाहः। च रोणां रोणिनः। चिदानिनिविचारः
तदानां वन-वदविनिघानन्यन्त्रिषमात्। च चालकमालसागु
लक्ष्मीहारियां प्रकटिः। कथां ब्रह्मविनिघानन्यन्त्रिषमातिः
नरकाधिश्रुताणवं रीति वचं। उत्तरार्काविद्या
बरकाधिश्रुताणवं रीति वचं। दुःखादं तु सतिमयं
तामात्रादिप्रकटिः। किंतु अधवः शुचः। सतिमयं
चिदानिनिविचारः। सतिमयं प्रवर्तिकः वाचः। तैनात्तुर्वाधिपयो
वनस्य स्रुतारुमात्रादिप्रकटिः। तदर्थैव
स्मिर्मेयायत्वः। चेत् श्रुतां
प्रवर्तिकः वाचः। चेत् श्रुतां
प्रवर्तिकः वाचः। चेत् श्रुतां
प्रवर्तिकः वाचः। चेत् श्रुतां
प्रवर्तिकः वाचः। चेत् श्रुतां
प्रवर्तिकः वाचः। चेत्
विद्यार्थिता चैति द्याणी यव फलं न सूचये तत्त्वापि

भिक्षा: फलं कल्याणे। जनविक्रम: सन्ध्यामुपासितेवादी

दृष्टान्तपि: प्रकटम् कथा।। न चार्यार्थिकं ब्रज्यो-राजः

कार्य प्रत्यवायाभावे वा फलमिति वाचे। तथा यति

काम्यकोशीख्यानांपि: कामनाभवेक्षणसन्धाने।

दृष्टांश फलमुक्तिकार्यवादमाधमिति चेत। यथा-

श्राद्धार्थी नित्यलैंमितिकलथारिव भरणिशाङ्क: काम्यलैंनितिकलथारिव नित्यलकाम्यलथारिव भरणी-अणु-

धातु॥ न च. कामनाभवेक्षणसन्धाने। चक्ष्यकाल-भवाणादायित्व काम्यनाभवेक्षणव चक्ष्यात्॥ नन्दन-बोधितकार्यायर्ज्ञानात् प्रकटमि: सन्ध्यावतीति चेथ। दृष्टान्तसंध्यामश्च ताराश्चार्थार्ज्ञानसंध्यामिणिपि

प्रत्योगसंध्यात्॥ चप्पुप षड्यापूर्णफलमिति तद्वि

न। कामनाभवेक्षणक्षेत्राय। कामनाभवेने लार्थवार्तकसाधकमेव रानिन्द्रनाम्यात् कस्ध्यात्मानवधा

प्रकटनमुक्तिपि: १ तेन।

चर्च के विच्छुपास्य सुरितस्य प्रचति।

अनुसरणं तथा चाँदे प्रत्यवायस्य भवते॥

एवं।

सन्ध्यामुपासिते च तु सत्तं प्रभवित्वत:।

विध्वंसपालिचार्योऽपि ब्रज्योकामनामयम॥

एवं।
चित्र १०

द्यादाद्यर: आठुँ पिल्हा: प्रीतिमसावलम्।

द्यादिकत्रप फलमसुः। न च पिल्हा। कचिं
फलं विधिकरणलाविं वाच। गाजाबाजारविर
उद्देश्यमध्येन्त्र फलवनकलयं किरदं कन्यानात।
अतएवं शाख्यर्तंफलमनुकृतता रीतामर्ग
इती। पिल्हणं मुक्ति तु सधा खर्गशं यथायथ
वनमिन्तिकानुकृतम् सामान्यम्। खर्गशकथानात,
पशुपार्श्वायंप्रस्तुतिसः न समावतः। नासि तमुष्ट
दुःखाभावस्तु खतं। पुद्धाप्यः। न या तत्साधवः।
प्रयवायाखावर्ती। कथं प्रदेश्तिनित्यं चतं। हतसं। युधा
सि नित्यातः प्रयवायार्बार्त्यातः तद्भावं तदेक
भावः। एवं प्रयवायाभावः मल्लदुःखाभावां संत्तमां तदेकभावं तदेकभावं इति यथाचेत्तमां कारणालयावर्त्यायं
दुःखाभावां प्रयविपु चतुष्काशः। प्रत्येक प्रायायः
सांख्यारिपुदुःखाभावांतुलितिः। ननु न कल्याणः
अच्छे० चतुष्काश० विनाश० कथं नागाशायः। दुःखाभावना-
भावः जातिभावः भावः उ प्रायायमशक्तिवादि
दिति चेतः। तत्व वाचार्द्यमानम् जातिसाधवसः न
विधिः। किंतू वलवद्यतानुविधिमार्गसत महाभावः
नवः विद्यायिः। अयस्म वलवद्यतानुविधिमोऽधिकवि
पति जातिसाधवलं विधिः। तदीभाबः नुभा वाचार्यः
विशिष्टावै। विशेषावति विशिष्ठावै। विश्रामः।
शिष्योऽनु श्रीमेनाभिषेरन धर्मकृति कार्य वस्तव्यतिप्राकृतत्वनुसा स्थिरयति। श्रीनाथ मरणानुकूलकार्यायापि शिष्यालेन नरकोस्याधक्षनलात्॥ 「 श्रीधरार्थ वैधलाग्रीष्णेद्वीत वाचं। अभिदर्शन प्रायिकानेपदेयाहु न च मरणानुकूल- आपारसंत्रां च चिंता भव्यता खज्ज्यनुर ज्ञएः कुपरकं च विद्यकलापनतिगलयाः अभिनवजन्यरणं खासवधिकारस्य लायपदिष्ठितं वाचं। मरणोद्दोखलखापि विलोकयानु। प्रत्यृतं एवं मण्डलांतप्यवधुक्ता न शिष्याली। अन्यो- देशांकछिद्रानायास्यतमसा द्वारा न ताचैनं प्रायः- श्रीधिसमिति वेद्य। श्रीमवारणायास्यकाव्यारकतलेन विलोकयानु। प्रत्यृतं एवं काशीमरणायाघूंतंगिटवन्नीयादेवरीपि न शिष्यालं॥ न च माधवभारंजनकसौवर शिष्यालं। एनसु न तथा। किन्तु तत्त्वनापूर्वमभिति वाचं। खज्ज्यांत्र बालां श्रेण्यकपकपरमवर्या खते शिष्याशालानावते। केवलं श्रीनाथ शिष्यालेन न तु मरणं। श्रीनजन्यखज्ज्यातादिक्रेपघ्रा शिष्याधिश्चरारम्भार्यः। तथा च पापजनकलं। प्रत्यृतं श्रीनाथ वैधलात्व पाप- अनकलागिनं अभिन्नवयं प्रतिशांभाय स्मृता न प्रव- चर्ते॥ आचार्यसुः आशीभ्रिमणोऽविद्ययं। पाकं वृत्तः कुर्यादुः द्वान्ते। आशीभ्रिकृताण्यावाचिलाशिङ्गाचे- वेद्याशिलं खापुवाने। एवं णण खर्णामवा यज्ञेऽ- खर्णामवा यज्ञेऽ यागः। खर्णामवद्विधायतयाब्याभीष्टद्याय॥ नत
भावं उपादानस्य शास्त्रं प्रज्ञानी जनम भवेत्। १४८।
निदानतिलुभवेत् देवादृश्यादिशायमनाधिकारिः।

सिद्धि  वाष्पण्यालं नमोदिकममुखाय प्रवचनात्। कन्धारः
भक्तिरथी तदभाववीण प्रवचनात्। यथा वेदे वाणाध्वं
नामावृत्ती ते श्रवणार्थं विपरीतं तावदेशं ते वै वृत्ति: त्रुटि:
माया: पुंज गङ्गासम्भविः। न च कर्ज्जराण वाणाध्वं
कापि-संकाश्यादिकर्मार्थिकान्तुतः कर्ज्जराणेषु प्रवीताः
मायाः। चच्च प्राणः समेतमथं यथावतः। तच्चेव
कर्ज्जराणेषु तदादेशापि ब्रम्हा विभूतिः अवधे तथा-
निध्यादिकर्मार्थिकान्तुतः प्रवीताः। एवं प्रति आकारः वेधा
मुनिनान्य विभूतिः। र्वधे र्वधे देवो मिथुनः प्राणः।

विनाशा स्वाधिकारी: साधारणः व नागार्जुनः।
हति वेदान्त खलिमां व। न च प्राणाध्वं भामारः
वस्मादार्थाय विकृतिः वाणाध्वं। विनाशमकान्तु
निरीक्षयतो। यस तु पुराणार्थार्थार्थिकान्तु
कापिलाः: कर्ज्जराण देवश्री। तदर्थावलम्बिताः
वाणाध्वं संघर्षात् सुनयते। तस्यामयि वेदान्तायणय-
तिः। उपादानायतति। उपादानश्री यथार्थवाकारा-
शताध्वं प्रत्यः प्रसंस्ती। कारणशास्त्रः। १४८।

दिव्याधिकारार्थाः दु:समाधिविषयविश्वासः।
भाषा  यद्यो जीवनयोगलितु सम्बद्धातिनिधियो भवेन।
शरीरे प्राणसंभारकारण परिकूप्तिः।
अन्तिन्निः गुलां खाते प्रयित्यादिदेहे तु तत्।
आनले तदर्शितं खायिती नितिनुदाहतु।
तदोपासमवायि खायन पतंजलायि तु अभिक्षण।
सूर्यस्वादिक्रवं खायोममिनिकमयापर।

चिह्नाः प्रति जनकलमंथक्तातिर्कताबद्धारितिमिति भवेन।

तथा प्रमाणमार्ग। शरीरे प्राणसंभारकारण
परिकूप्तिः प्राणसंभारा रूप श्रेणः खायादि:
प्रथमायथः। दुर्दशो यस्मात् संभारकाा यहंयुक्तमानो-
नात् प्रथमायथः। वाधायातोर्निन्निः अनुभिष्टः।
एव जीवनर्योगप्रयतः।

अनिध्ये द्वापकादे तदलमानिधिः। निधये पर-
मायः निधृं।

शुद्धमिथापनाने।

पतने आश्रयने दृष्टयः। निधुः दिविधः।

* तसु प्रतिनिधिमिति पादार्थः।
ভাষা । সাংসিদ্ধিকান্ত সহিতে দিনেংমিতিরিদে। ॥ ১৫২ ॥
পরমাণু জলে নিয়মন্ত্রণান্তনিয়মস্ততি ।
নেধরিকাং বিঙ্কুঞ্জ্যাগাম্বুনীয়াধিপত্য ॥ ১৫৩ ॥
দ্রব্যং ধরমে চন্দনে চেতনিনিমিত্ত সুসাগর চতুর্দশ।
লোচনী জলে সু নিয়োগানিয়োগনিয়োগনিয়োগনিয়োগ ॥ ১৫৪ ॥
নৈলান্তে তত্ত্বাচকাস্তং দ্বুচনতানুকুলনত।

ধৈত্তয় ॥ সাংসিদ্ধিকান্ত নেধরিকায় । 'দ্বীপবং নেধরিকাং পর- 
মানাচিতি ॥ ১৫৫ ॥

জলপরমাণু দ্রব্যং নিয়। । অতঃপুরবিয়িত- 
মায়াদী জলক্ষুদ্রশুদ্রকান্তী ত দ্রাব্যলবনিয়। কুচ্ছিন্নে- 
জালি কুচ্ছিন্নত ধৃতিনাথ নেধরিকাণু দ্রাব্য। তথ 
কো সব নেধরিকার্কাতে আচরিতি ॥ নেধরিকার্কামি।
কৃতি পদ্মজলোচনক তথা তেজ সংযোগগ্রামমত্য- 
গজন্য নেধরিকান্ত দ্রাব্য। তথ সূর্যাচার্য্যে সুপ্রতাষি 
পৃষ্ঠতমু প্রদত্তনিমিত্ত জীবন রক্ষয়। ॥ ১৫৬ ॥

দ্রাব্য স্থলে চেতনিনিমিত্ত মানস তু নিশ্চিত ।
চেতনিনীত অস্মাচার্য্যানিমিত্তয় । স্বাত্বন নাশক- 
দিম্বায়াগ্রামন্ত্রী চ প্রথম নিয়মনামিতি বাদুড়ী । তেজ 
দ্রুতস্বখাদিসন্ন মনু মুক্ত ॥ চন্দন স্বকৃতি। অঞ্চল 
দ্রুত । জল প্রস্তুত। ॥ আমো স্বেথ ॥ ১৫৭ ॥

ননে ধৃতিযোগসপি তৈষ্কাহ উপলব্ধ । ন চা মা।
भाषा: संस्कारभेदात वेगाच्य स्थितिशापकभावने। १५६।
मूर्तमाचे तु वेगः खात् कर्णेज वेगः काचित।
स्थितिशापकसंस्कारे चिती कोविचित्रत्वापि। १५७।
ऑनीक्षेपाते विभेदः काचितः स्नेक्षपि कारणां।

विद्वा: जलीयः। तथाच शिरौ महाप्रतिकूलः चादृत ध्रुवः
तेजानाचे तत्त्वप्रकृति हस्तानुकूलते। तत्त्वप्रकृति
संहङ्कारधातः। तेल उपलब्धमानच्छेदापि अलीय एव।
तथा हृदयलक्ष्मीरंगमुकृष्णं। चप्पाच्छोंच्च द्य च अंगे वर्धिं
वाच्यमतीति भावः। संस्कारशुभापति। संस्कारेऽति।
वेगाच्यस्थितिशापकभावाभेदात् संस्कारश्चिविष्ठ द्यभि
विद्वा। १५६।

मूर्तमाचे तु वेगः खात् कर्णेज वेगः काचित्।
कर्णेजवेगांगमेराजेः सिद्धिवद द्यर्थं।। शरार्दी
चि नेत्रानन्दनेन कर्णणा वेगो जन्ये।। तेन च पूर्वे
कर्णेजातामुकं कर्णे।। एवमतः।। विना च वेगः
कर्णः। कर्णेजनितविशिष्टकाः पूर्वकर्णानाम उपरकर्णी
तपाषणं व खात्।। घट वेगवता कपालेन जन्ये
जटे वेगे जन्ये यु वेगो वेगः।। स्थितिशापक दृष्टि।
प्राक्काराखादीजा कपिद्यागे पुरगमसवः स्थितिशाप
पुक्कांगाधलात। कौचित्येति। सतद्यू पिब्यादिन्यु ख्या
स्थितिशापके कौचित्यं तत्स्रामणसिति भावः। १५७।
विख्यात्तः कांचि ञ्चकष्ट्वशाकारः। 
वाचनाखः रहित ||१५४॥

तथा वंस्कारः। उपेच्छादस्यानात् संस्कारादु- 
तपस्निपेच्छादस्यरुयुक्त। ततसम्प्राकृत संस्कारानु- 
तपस्निपेच्छादस्यरुयुक्त। तेनापेच्छादस्यानिपेच्छाद 
वंस्कारः प्रति धेतत्तेति भावः॥ नन्तर खरण प्रत्येकपेच्छादस्यानिपेच्छाद 
हेतुम तेनापेच्छादस्यानिपेच्छाद ग खरणं द्विवेक 
वंस्कारं प्रति ध्वस्तनेव धेतत्तानिद्विगतिः चेतनः। विष्णुवनाविद- 
रत्नान्यपि वंस्कारं प्रति उपेच्छादस्यानिपेच्छाद 
हेतुतात्रः विख्यातः। किंतु उपेच्छादस्यानिपेच्छाद 
कण्याकप्रयत्ना गुहा- 
वलात् संस्कारं प्रति चोपेच्छादस्यनिपेच्छादहेतुतात्रः विख्यातः॥ तत्र 
प्रमाणं दर्शयति। खरणे प्रत्येकपेच्छादस्यनिपेच्छाद 
संस्कारमेव धेतत्तेति तत्र। अतः वंस्कारः। खरणं 
प्रत्येकपेच्छादस्यानिपेच्छाद 
अनवभिष्टति। अतः संस्कारः कल्यातः। 
विना यथार्थ पूर्वाचतुर्वश नुषाधिजनवाचमयातः। 
खरणपारात्मकाति भावे कारणलावशवातः॥ न च 
प्रत्येकपेच्छादस्य प्रति तत्कारणस्यादु केतुत्तेति प्रत्येक- 
पेच्छादः। संस्कारनिपेच्छाद ध्वितिलापसिद्धति वाच्यः।
भाग ७ सध्याध्यामाप्रविष्ट खातू धम्मः खर्गीदिसाधनः
गखाशानावति यागुण्डु व्यापः परिकृतितः॥१६॥

दिशा १ प्रभेदोज्ञकलात् परं छ अनुदृढः संक्षरात् प्रयामः
भिषानुद्रासनुदृढः संक्षरारै० दितुताण्डर्चया तत्तत्सा
र्णसेव प्रत्येक प्रतिः देहेंलं कल्यङ्त दयाः॥
१४॥

चर्चुः विधुप्रभुति धम्माध्यामाविति। खर्गीदिसाधनः
कल्पुत्राणां खर्गीधाधिभूतश्रोरादीनाष्ठ धाराण
धशि दल्वर्यः॥ तत्त्र प्रमाणं दश्यचिविष्टमाण। यागादीरिति।
यागादिव्यापारत्यां चिं धम्मः कल्यङ्ते। अनया यागा
गादीरोऽऽ चिं विनाश्यत्या निर्यापारत्या च काला
नारभावादिसर्वगृजनकं न खातू तदुपमावित्॥

चिरबधः फलायाणां न कल्याणातिश्रयं विना द्रवृ॥
ननु यागादिवेषः एव व्यापः खाल न प्रतियोगिता
हृंधोत्तरसार्वाणकं। सम्भवं तथासे मानाभावात्॥
न च लम्बाति फलायाणयो मन्नते चरमपरमपर्यन्ताष
कलापां तथालम्बिति वाच्यं। काशिविविशः सहीका
रिलां दल्वर्य शाह॥ गखाशानवति। गखाशानव
चिं खर्गीनकलाजन्ततानां अधर्मे मध्याध्यामाणां व्यापः
रलमयेकविशेषपूवः कल्यङ्ते लागवादिरिति भावः॥
१६॥
भाषा: कर्णनामाजलयाशादिना नामस्वलसा मतः
धर्मोऽनरकादिनां चतुर्निनितकर्मम् || १६४ ||
प्रायोजनातिदिनाव्योऽसाधीव्यवनी विन्यासगुणोऽ

विश्वास: न तु अंहेवथम न आपारोऽसुः || न च नियोऽ
पारस्य चिरकारायः कथं कारणमिति वाचस्यं। जन
अयासाभुवयत्पूर्वविनिलम्य तचापि सचात्। अया
वहितपूर्वविनिलम्य हि चचुःमंथेगांहाः कारणलम् न तु
ववः कार्यः कार्याङ्कोऽविनिलम्यं सभावयिकारणेऽनु
कारणलिङ्ग धात। कर्णनामाजलयाशादिना नाम
स्मृत्ती मत दृष्टि। यदि ‘हि’ अपूर्वस्य न खात्तं तदाद
कर्णनामाजलयाशादिनां नामस्वलं धर्मस्य न खात्तं। न
dि तेन यागाधिनामः प्रतिवेद्यं वा कथं शक्ते।
ततथा अपूर्वन्तः चतादादिति। एवेन देवताप्रीतिरेंवर
फलस्वयम्भतां। गकुरारायादैव सर्वं देवताप्रीति
रक्षब्यात्। देवतायाश्रेष्ठश्रेष्ठस्य तत्प्रीतिरुपुष्ये श्री
लाभौ। प्रीति: सुखस्वरूपलेन विष्णुप्रीतियाः। तदस्य
वात्। जन्मसुखार्द्वजाभावात्। तेन विष्णुप्रीतिबन्धः
लेन परार्श्वविनिष्ठाविनिष्ठाविनिष्ठ विश्वनिष्ठाविनिष्ठ
लेनते। अधिबीं नरकादिनां देवताप्रीतिरुक्तकत्र सृष्टि।
नरकः दुःखाधिशक्तुः कारणोऽत्तरकिरीराद्रोपांच वा
धनमाध्यमं दयः। १६४ ||

प्रमाणमात्। प्रायोजनातिदिनाव्योऽसाधीव्यवनी: जीवनमात्रोऽ
भाषा। इसैः तु वासनाजस्विष्ठि शानादि विनन्धनः॥ १२॥

शिवरेष्वस्वी कुञ्जाविति। यदि झाबहोऽि न खातः तदास्पदं सत्वाहिं साविन्धायकलं न खातृ। न निः तेन भ्रमण-भ्रम्छोत्रानां नाम: प्रतिबन्धं वा विधाशु हश्यते। ततो न्यूनविनहारं बलिति भावः। जीविति। ईश्वरक धार्मिक-धार्मिकभावार्थीति भावः॥ इसैः तु वासनाजस्वि शा-नादि विनन्धनः॥ १२॥ द्रौए धार्मिकालाः। वास-नेति। भूताः शालिना हरे सुकृतमूलकः कन्याः न फलायाशमिति भावः। शालापीथापिना भग-परियोः॥। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथम-परिण।। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। नाम्बुजं चौथे कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। ननु तत्त्वानां कथं कथाधार्मिकः कथाधार्मिकः-प्रकाशग्न। १२॥
भाषा। शब्दों अनिश्चित वर्णन स्त्रियादिभवें अभिन्।
कष्टसंयोगादिजः वर्णितोऽवाद सङ्क्रमितम् मनः॥ १६३॥
वर्ष सङ्क्रमो नभोदुतिः श्रीभोगजस्तु गृहान्ते।
विीतकरणस्य नतयस्तिष्ठा बोधिता॥ १६४॥
कदम्बकौरक्यायायापि कश्चिंभिने।
उदयः को विनंतं न दिति वहननिरन्तर॥ १६५॥

विख्या। शरव्य निर्देशन्ति। शब्दः धर्मन्त्रण वर्णन स्त्रियोऽदिभवेः अभिन्। कष्टसंयोगादिजः वर्णितोऽवाद ऐसते॥ १६३॥
षर्वः शब्दः नभोदुतिः। श्रीनान्तिष्ठितस्य दृष्टे दिति॥ नभोदुतिसहस्रमेव। दूरकष्टमयस्य यथा। विचित्रवर्णमेव नतयस्तिष्ठा बोधिता॥ १६४॥
शरव्यः, र्गुन सदाजः विदेहे नामयेन शस्त्रे श्रीते। श्रीविद्यायायाय ब्यक्तिर्वेदान्ते। श्रवणः विधानेनः कष्टस्य बन्धे। तेन चापरस् ज्ञानः॥ एवं वामेव श्रीतिस्व यथास्य दिति॥ १६५॥

कदम्बकौरक्यायायापि कश्चिं वचनभिने दिति॥ चाप-स्चान्तः सद्विद्भव दृष्टत्वं वार्तालोकः। तत्वायः कपोलः। शब्दः वामतिर्वेदान्ते॥ चापित्रः। दूरकष्टमयस्य यथा। नभोदुतिः सहस्रमेव नतयस्तिष्ठा बोधिता॥ १६५॥

* कदम्बकौरक्यायापि पाठार्थः॥
भाषा। सेवव्यं कद्र्ष्टि बुद्धिष्टु साधारणवालमने।
तद्वैष्ठधिमित्वादै। प्रजानीयेश्वरं दर्शनाल॥ १६॥
इति श्रीमचामछोपायायविद्यानिवाससभ्य्याचार्येकूलन- ।
श्रीध्वंस्यायाभप्रज्ञाननभंद्दार्यायेविरिचै। भाषाप- ॥ ३२॥
रिक्तवेदः समाप्॥ * ॥

शिष्यं महा भाषा। ज्ञानं को विनयं: क दृष्टि-वृद्धरिग्नियः
तेति। ग्रंथनासुपरायाविद्याप्रत्यक्षाविक्षितादिश्ययनबीति। ॥ १६॥

ननु सु एवाद्य ककार द्रव्यविग्नयभिग्नागानाः-
ब्धारी निश्चार्य। दल्यमेवचतुर्विनासशुद्धिवृत्तमुक्ता
चेष्टात भाषा। सेवव्यं क दृष्टि बुद्धिष्टु साधारणवाल- ॥ ३२॥
मने। तद्वैष्ठधिमित्वादै। प्रजातीयेश्वरं दर्शनादिदिति।
तुष्ट ग्रंथप्रभवणसु तत्समाजीयां विषेष्यं न छु तथा-
क्रमबोधिय विषयं। उत्तमतीतविवेदमातु। दृष्टिभूमणे-
रिपु बुधोर्न भमास्विति। ननु समाजीयां सेवविशेषमिति-
प्रत्येकविश्वाया भाष्यं। दृष्टि कुच्छुद्धिष्टवृत्त भाषा। ॥
तदेवैति। वदीर्घं मना कते तदेववनेचार्यं क्षत्र-
मित्वादिश्याभनादिदिति भावः। ॥ ३२॥

इति श्रीमचामछोपायायविद्यानिवासभंद्दार्य- ॥
पुनश्रीध्वंस्यायाभप्रज्ञाननभंद्दार्यायेविरिचिता
विद्यार्थविद्याधिकारी संपूर्णा। * ॥ ॥
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