HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 1
NOVEMBER 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
Pursuant to
S. Con. Res. 27
79th Congress
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 1
NOVEMBER 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina

JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

(After January 14, 1946)
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
### HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part No.</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Transcript pages</th>
<th>Hearings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1– 399</td>
<td>1– 1058</td>
<td>Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>983–1583</td>
<td>2587– 4194</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3929–4599</td>
<td>10518–12277</td>
<td>Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4601–5151</td>
<td>12278–13708</td>
<td>Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5153–5560</td>
<td>13709–14765</td>
<td>Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part No.</th>
<th>Exhibits Nos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1 through 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7 and 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>9 through 43.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>44 through 87.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>88 through 110.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>111 through 128.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>129 through 156.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>157 through 172.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>173 through 179.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Roberts Commission Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Hart Inquiry Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Clarke Investigation Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Clausen Investigation Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III
### NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

**KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS ENCLOSED IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1941, to May 31, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Brooke E., Maj.</td>
<td>233–209</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Riley H.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Edward B., Maj.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Ray</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anstey, Alice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold, H. H., Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asher, N. F., Ens.</td>
<td>1127–1138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball, N. F., Ens.</td>
<td>1033–1038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballard, Emma Jane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber, Bruce G</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett, George Francis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beardall, John R., Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens.</td>
<td>1219–1224</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benoy, Chris J.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benson, Henry P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berquist, Kenneth P., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berry, Frank M., S 1/c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betis, Thomas J., Brig., Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicknell, George W., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5089–5122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bissell, John T., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pages**

- 233–209
- 3105–3120
- 3091–398
- 1022–4027
- 148–186
- 1127–1138
- 1033–1038
- 2567–2580
- 3572–3988
- 2492–2515
- 1719–1721
- 1219–1224
- 836–951
- 1382–1399
- 3720–3749
- 1185–1220
- 1224–1229
- 1413–1442
- 1, 2

**Vol.**

- 64

**Pages**

- 5269–5291
- 3814–3826
- 3150–3519
- 5089–5122
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
<th>Claim Numbers</th>
<th>Index Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boone, Gilbert E., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td>86-96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bothn, A. M., Btswn.</td>
<td>1181-1185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bragdon, John S., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2894-2922</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brainard, Roland M., Vice Adm.</td>
<td>399-403</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratton, Rufus, Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>T.S.54-96</td>
<td>206-208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brenchman, Albert L.</td>
<td>520-527</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briant, Granville C., Comdr.</td>
<td>229-233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooks, H. E., Lt. Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>974-994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brotherhood, F. M., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Wilson, Rear Adm.</td>
<td>1241-1259</td>
<td>135-146</td>
<td>919A-930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunner, Gertrude C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2216-2221</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryden, William, Maj. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>898-909</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkley, Joel W., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>413-415</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgin, Henry T., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>268-283</td>
<td>2593-2664</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burr, Harold S., Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3067-3073</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton, H. Ralph</td>
<td></td>
<td>848-896</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler, Bernard</td>
<td>1753-1765</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butterfield, James W.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4103-4121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calhoun, W. L., Vice Adm.</td>
<td>951-960</td>
<td>225-228</td>
<td>931-946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capron, W. A., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2015-2030</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmichael, W. A., Lt. Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4015-4021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caufield, Frances M.</td>
<td></td>
<td>143-144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chun, Philip Chew</td>
<td></td>
<td>3258-3265</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarke, Chester R.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3623-3636</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claterbos, Louis J., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4095-4103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausen, Henry C., Lt. Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll, Raymond S</td>
<td></td>
<td>3166-3184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colton, Roger B., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>670-696</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combs, R. E.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2427-2455</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conant, Joseph M., Lt. (jg)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connolly, Thomas E.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2158-2193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper, Howard F., Maj.</td>
<td>473-478</td>
<td></td>
<td>2130-2133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>478-483, 301-310</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crosley, Paul C., Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)</td>
<td>1171-1178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtis, M. E., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1178-1180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidson, Howard C., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>1650-1663, 170-198</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis, Arthur C., Rear Adm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawson, Harry L.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delany, Walter S., Rear Adm</td>
<td>812-843, 1538-1571</td>
<td>71-85</td>
<td>1695-1732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickens, June D., Sgt.</td>
<td>501-509</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillingham, Walter P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillon, James P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillon, John H., Maj.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dingeman, Ray E., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donegan, William Col.</td>
<td>2-32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doud, Harold, Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunlop, Robert H., Col.</td>
<td>365-368</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunning, Mary J.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earle, Frederick M., W/O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN</td>
<td>1747-1753</td>
<td>368-378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebey, Frank W., Capt., USA</td>
<td>437-412</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgers, Dorothy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eichelberger, Leslie E.</td>
<td>1286-1295</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott, George E., Sgt.</td>
<td>994-1014, 644-659</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emanuel, Theodore, Ch/S. C.</td>
<td>183-184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evans, Joseph K., Col.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabian, Rudolph J., Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farthing, W. E., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>832-848</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferguson, Homer, Hon.</td>
<td>4385-4408</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielder, Kendall J., Col.</td>
<td>287-301, 311-313, 1670-1682</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnegan, Joseph, Capt., USN</td>
<td>2943-3010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitib, Aubrey W., Vice Adm.</td>
<td>288-290</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flannery, Harry W.</td>
<td>2516-2522</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleming, Robert J., Jr., Col.</td>
<td>1254-1343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood, William F., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>2848-2865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeman, Frederick L., Lt., USN</td>
<td>149-150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French, Edward F., Col.</td>
<td>1842-1847</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedman, William F.</td>
<td>186-206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuqua, Samuel G., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furbush, Edward A</td>
<td>515-528</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furlong, William R., Rear Adm</td>
<td>4338-4345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabrielson, William A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gailey, Charles K., Jr., Gen.</td>
<td>145-147</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerow, Leonard T., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>1 B198-200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gesler, Earl E., Col.</td>
<td>4224-4338</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibson, Ernest W., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>932-964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glover, Robert O., Capt., USN</td>
<td>277</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grafe, Paul</td>
<td>1 T. S. 271-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graves, Sidney C</td>
<td>170-178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew, Joseph C</td>
<td>170-178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffith, Edwin St. J</td>
<td>517-520</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haim, Robert W., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>2288-2320</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall, Mobley, Sgt.</td>
<td>3304-3355, 3650-3661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halsey, William F., Vice Adm.</td>
<td>428-437</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>978-1025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INDEX OF WITNESSES
### Names of Witnesses in All Proceedings Regarding the Pearl Harbor Attack—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 29, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1941)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 21 to Oct. 19, 1941)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 10, 1941, July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 25, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept.</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hämnum, Warren T., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>2030–2090</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrington, Cyril J.</td>
<td>3957–3971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator</td>
<td></td>
<td>241–274</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4797–4828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>461–469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard, William A., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA</td>
<td>1571–1574</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>207–240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill, William H., Senator</td>
<td></td>
<td>2934–2942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col.</td>
<td>1664–1670</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hornbeck, Stanley K.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>763–772</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horne, Walter Wilton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard, Jack W., Col.</td>
<td>469–473</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1914–1917</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull, Cordell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey, Richard W., RM 3/c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunt, John A., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 More pages than listed might be found in the report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jensen, Clarence G., Col.</td>
<td>54-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judd, H. P.</td>
<td>80-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaminsky, Harold, Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td>3931-3951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karig, Walter, Comdr.</td>
<td>1494-1506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katz, Benjamin, Comdr.</td>
<td>2701-2915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kay, Harold T.</td>
<td>2497-2663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelley, Welbourn, Lt., USNR.</td>
<td>1121-1135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kestly, J. J., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>2696-2707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimball, George P., Lt (jg), USNR.</td>
<td>1453-1485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimball, Richard K.</td>
<td>2629-1333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimmell, Husband E., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>4453-4485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King, Edgar, Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>1722-1738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King, H. J.</td>
<td>1507-1524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King, William, Capt., USA</td>
<td>1469-1488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingman, Howard F., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>1538-1571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingman, John J., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>1744-1747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitts, Willard A., III, Rear Adm.</td>
<td>511-527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klatt, Lowell V., Sgt</td>
<td>185-194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogan, Mary B.</td>
<td>463-469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kramer, A. D., Comdr.</td>
<td>1073-1077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kramer, A. D., Comdr.</td>
<td>950-987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 21 to Oct. 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Claussen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 11 to July 11, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
<th>( \text{Pages} )</th>
<th>( \text{Pages} )</th>
<th>( \text{Pages} )</th>
<th>( \text{Vol.} )</th>
<th>( \text{Pages} )</th>
<th>( \text{Pages} )</th>
<th>( \text{Pages} )</th>
<th>( \text{Pages} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
<td>Index Pages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, H. M., Comdr.</td>
<td>1206-1212</td>
<td>227-228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Howard W., Capt., USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, John M.</td>
<td>2321-2333</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mason, Redfield, Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td>68-79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayfield, Irving H., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1039-1068</td>
<td>558-575</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McBriarty, Raymond F., Pvt.</td>
<td>490-495</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCarthy, William J., Col.</td>
<td>1918-1928</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCollum, Arthur N., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td>10-42 3381-3448</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCormick, L. D., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>66-73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCrea, John, Capt., USN</td>
<td>273-278</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonald, Joseph P., T/A</td>
<td>1152-1163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKee, John L., Brig. Gen</td>
<td>50-90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKee, Robert Eugene</td>
<td>2398-2412</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKenney, Margaret</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meurlott, Byron M., Maj.</td>
<td>1574-1578</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midkiff, Frank E.</td>
<td>2803-2832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midkiff, John H.</td>
<td>2833-2846</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles, Sherman, Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>91-132F 1 214-216</td>
<td>776-982, 1360-1375, 1541-1583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minkler, Rex W., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mollison, James A., Brig. Gen</td>
<td>790-832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moody, George H.</td>
<td>3181-3189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murphy, Vincent R., Capt., USN</td>
<td>195-204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray, Allan A., Lt. Comdr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray, Maxwell, Maj. Gen</td>
<td>259-268 3075-3101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton, J. H., Vice Adm.</td>
<td>314 323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimitz, C. W., Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noyes, Leigh, Rear Adm.</td>
<td>917-948 1026-1051</td>
<td>153-157 4710-4792</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse, Howard B., Lt. Col</td>
<td>3966-4012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Dell, Robert H., Lt., USA</td>
<td>4504-4514</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmun, Russell A., Brig. Gen</td>
<td>133-142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outerbridge, William W., Capt., USN</td>
<td>3775-3795</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parker, Maurice G.</td>
<td>87-96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedley, Alfred R., Maj.</td>
<td>1587-1594</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pering, Alfred V., Lt. Comdr</td>
<td>3605-3719</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perliter, Simon</td>
<td>2705-2721</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrie, Lester</td>
<td>1357-1367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Chauvin Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 14, 1946)</td>
<td>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pettigrew, Moses W., Col.</td>
<td>212–247, 234–253</td>
<td>1107–1160</td>
<td>477–495</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phelan, John, Ens.</td>
<td></td>
<td>234–287</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4933–5009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips, Walter C., Col.</td>
<td>1584–1594</td>
<td>3636–3640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickett, Harry K., Col.</td>
<td>937–943, 994</td>
<td>3636–3640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierson, Millard, Col.</td>
<td>2375–2398</td>
<td>3990–3996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pine, Willard B.</td>
<td>1584–1594</td>
<td>3636–3640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov.</td>
<td>1340–1356</td>
<td>3153–3165</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powell, Bolling R., Jr., Maj.</td>
<td>1584–1594</td>
<td>3636–3640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratt, John S., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1968–1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafter, Case B.</td>
<td></td>
<td>778–789</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raley, Edward W., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>578–608</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsey, Logan C., Capt., USN</td>
<td>937–943</td>
<td>1091–1108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>1584–1594</td>
<td>3636–3640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness Name</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reierstad, Leo, Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renchard, George W.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reybold, Eugene, Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>568-634</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards, Robert B., Col.</td>
<td>730-745</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson, J. O., Adm.</td>
<td>1052-1061</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts, Owen J., Mr. Justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robins, Thomas K., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>697-723</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson, Bernard L., Col.</td>
<td>3588-3623</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochefort, Joseph John, Capt., USN</td>
<td>1096-1123</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rohl, Hans William</td>
<td>2222-2237</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross, Mary L.</td>
<td>70-71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row, Lathe B., Col.</td>
<td>2002-2129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowlett, Frank B., Lt. Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudolph, Jacob H., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>198-202</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell, Henry D., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>1221-1240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell, John E.</td>
<td>1362-1436</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadtler, Otis K., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safford, L. F., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltzman, Stephen G., Lt., USA</td>
<td>455-463</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seabron, Martin F., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>4164-4186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schlesinger, Helen</td>
<td>3287-3304</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schley, Julian L., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>635-669</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schuirmann, R. E., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>404-412</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schukraft, Robert E., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schulz, Lester Robert, Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settle, F. A.</td>
<td>1570-1583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw, C. H., CH/T</td>
<td>1138-1146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirley, J. P.</td>
<td>2354-2360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shivers, Robert L.</td>
<td>1401-1447</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoemaker, James M. Capt., USN</td>
<td>1191-1205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoemaker, Thomas B.</td>
<td>4366-4383</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Names of Witnesses in All Proceedings Regarding the Pearl Harbor Attack—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 21 to Oct. 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short, Arthur T.</td>
<td>37-169, 1617-1647</td>
<td>276-541, 4411-4445</td>
<td>220-270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2921-3231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short, Walter C., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>452-455</td>
<td>3265-3286</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortt, Creed, Pvt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisson, George A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smedberg, William R., II, Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Ralph C., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, William W., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>32-65</td>
<td>528-572</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1738-1742</td>
<td>1077-1081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5009-5027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoot, Perry M., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2096-2223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2244-2477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5153-5175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff, W. F., CH/CM.</td>
<td>1186-1190</td>
<td>2-194, 320-324, 774-810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5202-5269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark, Harold R., Adm.</td>
<td>1805-1808</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5543-5555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>323-334</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stilphen, Benjamin L.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1539-1575</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5446-5440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimson, Henry L.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1037-4094</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5441-5463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone, John F.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street, George.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Page Range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweeney, J. J., Rev.</td>
<td>1368-1372</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Angus M., Jr., Capt.,</td>
<td>1447-1469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Kenneth, Lt., USA</td>
<td>415-422</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, William E. G., Comdr.</td>
<td>1229-1240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thielen, Bernard, Col.</td>
<td>338-354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1071-1094</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>609-627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26-27, 34-36,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38-41, 49-55,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57-61, 64-65,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70-75, 79-80,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92-101,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>103-111,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>130, 138,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>139-154,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>165-172,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, James K., Lt., USA</td>
<td>481-486</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, O. N., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throckmorton, Russell C., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tillman, Thomas E.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tindal, Lorry N., Col.</td>
<td>390-393</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinker, Clarence, Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>1706-1718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman, Louis W., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turner, Richmond K., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>1809-1829,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250-272</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>988-1024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyler, Kermit A., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>1861-1862</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulrich, Ralph T., Sgt.</td>
<td>368-376</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underkofler, Oliver H., Lt., USN</td>
<td>486-489</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utterback, Charles J.</td>
<td>509-517</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Deurs, George, Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walker, Eugene B., Col.</td>
<td>290-292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh, Roland, Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>965-972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterhouse, George S.</td>
<td>1262-1272</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterhouse, Paul B</td>
<td>1373-1381</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weddington, Leonard D., Col.</td>
<td>1213-1219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welch, George S., Maj.</td>
<td>422-423</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellborn, Charles, Jr., Capt.,</td>
<td>383-390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welles, Sumner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
² Sworn statement presented to committee.
## Names of Witnesses in All Proceedings Regarding the Pearl Harbor Attack—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 14, 1941, to Jan. 25, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 21 to Oct. 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Hewitt Investigation, May 14 to July 11, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White, William R., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>247-259</td>
<td>1345-1381</td>
<td>3663-3665</td>
<td>1083-1090</td>
<td>105-106</td>
<td>376-386</td>
<td>511-553</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichison, Rea B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3677-3683</td>
<td>1083-1090</td>
<td>105-106</td>
<td>376-386</td>
<td>511-553</td>
<td>507-602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilke, Weshie T.</td>
<td>1334-1340</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>279-288</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>3677-3683</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, Erle M., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wimer, Benjamin R., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wong, Ahoon H.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodruff, Donald, Jr., Lt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodward, Farnsley C., Lt. (jg), USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolley, Ralph E.</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright, Wesley A., Comdr.</td>
<td>370-382</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col.</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York, Yee Kun</td>
<td>1683-1705</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1683-1705</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zueca, Emil Lawrence</td>
<td>2580-2596</td>
<td>3750-3773</td>
<td>3357-3586</td>
<td>1523-1538</td>
<td>3233-3259</td>
<td>3303-3354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF DOCUMENTS APPEARING IN THE JOINT COMMITTEE'S HEARINGS NOT INTRODUCED AS EXHIBITS

PART 1

Senate Concurrent Resolution 27, establishing the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

Correspondence between joint committee and State, War, Navy Departments, and between committee and President Truman and estate of former President Roosevelt, concerning liaison officers and records to assist committee

Presidential directive of August 28, 1945, concerning disclosure of cryptanalytic technique or procedures

Presidential order of October 23, 1945, lifting ban of August 28, 1945, directive for benefit of committee

Presidential order of November 7, 1945, concerning information given by service personnel

Presidential memorandum of November 9, 1945, enlarging on order of November 7, 1945

Excerpts from the Congressional Record of September 6, 1945, including the discussion and adoption by the Senate of Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 establishing the joint committee

Paragraph from “I Fly for Vengeance,” by Commander Clarence Earl Dickinson, appearing in Saturday Evening Post of October 10, 1942

Tentative order of proof submitted by committee counsel

Paraphrase of message of October 6, 1945, from Secretary of War to General MacArthur

Statement by Japanese officer who participated in Pearl Harbor attack

Order issued by Navy Section of Japanese Imperial General Headquarters concerning attack

Statement of Japanese officer on information concerning ship movements reaching Japanese task force from Honolulu commercial broadcasting stations

Japanese Naval General Staff Instruction of December 2, as contained in MacArthur report

Letter received by Navy regarding FBI check of Honolulu programs

Prepared statement by Admiral Richardson on meeting with Admiral Leahy and President on October 8, 1940

Memorandum of October 9, 1940, by Admiral Richardson on his conference with the President

Messages between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Bloch concerning War Department 1940 alert

Statement of Admiral Richardson’s view on security of fleet in Hawaiian area

Admiral Leahy’s statement on function of Navy before Naval Affairs Committee

Admiral Richardson’s statement concerning patrol line from Hawaii to Asiatic coast
Admiral Richardson’s dispatch of June 22, 1940, to Chief of Naval Operations concerning War Department alert-----------------------------312
Answer of Chief of Naval Operations to Richardson’s dispatch of June 22, 1940-----------------------------------------------312
Letter of January 25, 1941, from Admiral Richardson to Chief of Naval Operations, regarding air-defense conditions at Pearl Harbor---------------------------368
Excerpts from war and defense plans----------------------------------------------------372

PART 2

Article of August 13, 1941, sent to New York Times by Otto D. Tolischus, on American and British stand in far eastern crisis---------------------487
Prime Minister Churchill’s statement in House of Commons on January 27, 1942, relating to United States entry into the war------------------------489
Memorandum of November 30, 1941, on conference between Secretary of State and Lord Halifax, on United States position if Britain should resist Japanese move on Kra Isthmus------------------------------------------491
Winant telegram of December 2, 1941, to Secretary of State, concerning Japanese moves toward Kra Isthmus----------------------------------------493
Winant cable of December 6, 1941, to Secretary of State, concerning Japanese convoy movement-----------------------------------------493
Welsh-Halifax discussion of November 28, 1941, concerning Japanese situation-----------------------------------------------------------------495
Memorandum of December 2, 1941, by Under Secretary Welles to British Ambassador, transmitting documents handed to Japanese Ambassador-----------------------------508
New York Times article of August 25, 1941, giving text of Prime Minister Churchill’s address on meeting with President-------------------324
Letter of November 12, 1945, from Mr. Grew to committee counsel, regarding assistance to committee------------------------------------------623
Letters exchanged between Mr. Grew and the President, December 14, 1940, and January 21, 1941---------------------------------------------630
Telegram of December 5, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, regarding opinion in Japan of the “ten point” note of November 26, 1941-----------------------------------------------686
Quotations from New York Times of December 5, 1941, on possibility of closing Japanese consulates in United States------------------------688
Conversation of February 14, 1941, between Mr. Doorman and Mr. Ohashi---------------------------------------------------------------726
Dispatch No. 796, dated November 28, 1941, from State Department to the American Embassy, Tokyo, concerning the proposed modus vivendi studied by the Department-------------------------742
Campaign address of October 30, 1940, at Boston by President Roosevelt---------------------------------------------------------------750
Dispatch of December 4, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to naval attachés at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, and Shanghai, concerning destruction of codes-------------------------------------------------765
Memorandum of September 6, 1941, from General Fielder for G-2, regarding Summaries of Information--------------------------------------------846
Excerpt from memorandum from Maj. Gen. H. A. Drum, commanding general, Hawaiian Department, to The Adjutant General, War Department, dated September 21, 1935, concerning defense mission, Hawaiian Department---------------------------868
Excerpts from Colonel Montague’s memorandum of November 2, 1945, on function of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee---------------------911

PART 3

Stimson-Knox letter of June 2, 1941, to the President transmitting Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan -Rainbow No. 5, and ABC-1, recommending approval-----------------------------------------394
LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Memorandum of June 9, 1941, from Colonel Scobey to Chief of Staff, explaining the President's position as to approval of ABC-1 and Joint Army and Navy Rainbow No. 5........................................ 995

Stimson-Knox memorandum of August 20, 1941, to the President, transmitting ABC-22 and recommending approval........................................ 997

Memorandum of August 29, 1941, from Colonel Scobey to Chief of Staff, stating President's approval of ABC-22........................................ 997

Letter of November 28, 1945, from Admiral Richardson to committee counsel, covering dispatches between himself and Admiral Stark on Army alert in 1940........................................ 1055

Corrected memorandum of July 17, 1941, for the commanding general, United States Air Forces from Col. Orlando Ward, concerning Chief of Staff's request for study of air situation in Hawaii........................................ 1105

Excerpt from letter of December 20, 1941, from General Marshall to General Emmons regarding unity of command in Hawaii........................................ 1122

Letter of September 25, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey........................................ 1128

Letter of September 27, 1944, from General Marshall to Governor Dewey........................................ 1129

Excerpt from telegram of August 30, 1941, from General MacArthur to General Marshall expressing appreciation for War Department support of his command........................................ 1161

Excerpt from United States Code, 1940 edition, page 491, paragraph 33, regarding duties of Chief of Staff........................................ 1201

Minutes of Joint Board meeting of November 3, 1941........................................ 1253

Admiral Hart's proposal that the United States photograph islands of Far East and Western Pacific........................................ 1291

Memorandum of December 11, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, answering questions on November 5 and 27, 1941, memoranda by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and on November 27, 1941, Marshall warning........................................ 1307

Admiralty dispatch of December 7, 1941, to Chief of Naval Operations, concerning Far East conferences........................................ 1341

Dispatch of December 7, 1941, from commander in chief, China, to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning Japanese convoy movement........................................ 1341

Dispatch of December 7, 1941, from special naval observer, London, to Naval Operations, concerning landing at Khotabahru........................................ 1342

Extract from congressional directive to Secretary of War and Navy to conduct Pearl Harbor investigations........................................ 1359

Memorandum of December 1, 1941, from Stanley K. Hornbeck to Secretary Stimson, enclosing memorandum on far eastern situation........................................ 1394

Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, transmitting dispatch (probably of June 19, 1940) from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson, concerning movement of Pacific Fleet........................................ 1409

Top secret report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and top secret memorandum of the Judge Advocate General........................................ 1443

Cable of December 16, 1941, signed "Marshall," concerning relief of General Short........................................ 1529

Questions for General Marshall submitted by counsel for General Short........................................ 1536

Letter of July 3, 1941, from Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to special naval observer, London, commenting on report of Singapore Conference........................................ 1542

General Short's endorsement of August 20, 1941, Martin Air Study........................................ 1545

Headline of Washington News for December 3, 1941........................................ 1569

Quotation from article stated to have appeared in newspapers on November 29, 1941, concerning statement by Prime Minister Tojo........................................ 1570
XX

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Letter of November 25, 1941, from First Secretary, Japanese Embassy, Washington, to Mr. Herbert S. Mills

Advertisement in Honolulu Advertiser for August 24, 1941, concerning war risk insurance

PART 4

Article in Honolulu Advertiser of August 13, 1944 (1941?) on war bombardment insurance

Quotation from page 233 of Hawaii—Restless Rampart by Joseph Barber, Jr., concerning statement by General Herron on fortification of Oahu

Excerpt from Field Manual 100-15, W. D., Field Service Regulations, June 29, 1942, on method of transmitting orders to theater commanders

Excerpts from Staff Officers' Field Manual

Field Manual 100-5, May 22, 1941, Field Service Regulations, W. D., Operations, concerning forms of orders for tactical situations

Chart on Arrivals of vessels in Port [Pearl Harbor] just prior to December 7, 1941

Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, dated December 13, 1945, reporting on recall of United States merchant ships to west coast after attack and on dispatch of December 7, 1941

Executive orders establishing defensive sea areas around Pearl Harbor and other areas

Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, listing naval planes in Pacific Fleet on January 6, 1940, and February 1, 1941, and sectors and distances from Oahu covered

Memorandum of November 25, 1941, to Secretary Hull from Dutch Ambassador Loudon, concerning Japanese proposals

Department of State memorandum of conversation with Dr. Loudon concerning modus vivendi

Memorandum of December 10, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, enclosing intercepts between No. 836 and No. 841 of Exhibit No. 1

Memorandum of December 12, 1940, by Chief of Naval Operations on Fortightly Summary of Current National Situation, to be prepared and distributed regularly

Memorandum of March 11, 1941, from Admiral Kirk for Chief of Naval Operations on Admiral Kimmel's request for advice on diplomatic activities

Excerpts from United States News of September 1, 1945, page 34, concerning movements from Japan to Tankan Bay

Letter of November 17, 1945, from committee counsel to Senator Ferguson concerning request for information on Japanese knowledge of reading of their codes by the United States

March 11, 1941, memorandum of Admiral Kirk to Chief of Naval Operations

Letter of August 19, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, regarding information on Pacific situation

Intercepts of Japanese messages relating to suspicion of American code-reading activities

Statement of Admiral Wilkinson on responsibility for development of enemy intentions; memorandum of December 19, 1945, from Admiral Kirk, same subject; two cables (to and from Admiral James), same subject

Memorandum of December 12, 1940, from Admiral Stark to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, on Instructions Concerning Preparation of United States Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan Rainbow 31, and relating to American-Dutch-British conversations
LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Note of April 13, 1941, from British military mission giving instructions to representative at Singapore conference................................................................. 1923

Report of December 7, 1941 ( Philippine time), from commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to Chief of Naval Operations, concerning discussions at conference with Admiral Phillips, and reply by Chief of Naval Operations on December 7, 1941................................................................. 1933

Report from Admiral Kimmel on December 8, 1941, concerning damage to ships in Pearl Harbor attack................................................................. 2023

PART 5

Memorandum of December 19, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel on Japanese messages relating to suspicions that their code messages were being read................................................................. 2069

Copy of December 1, 1941, United Press dispatch and of report of December 2, 1941, from United States military observer in Singapore, relating to status of Singapore alerts................................................................. 2071

Memorandum of December 27, 1945, from Colonel Root to Lieutenant Colonel Duncombe, on Philippine plane situation................................................................. 2073

Cable of December 17, 1941, to General Short from General Bryden concerning orders for relief of General Short; cable of January 6, 1942, to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, from Adams, on relief of Generals Short and Martin................................................................. 2076

Memorandum of December 21, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel on Japanese intercepts containing code word “Haruna”................................................................. 2077

War Department memorandum of December 31, 1945, giving information on Japanese ships moving southward and on cable of December 6, 1941, from Winant to State Department concerning Japanese ship movements................................................................. 2078

Information from documentary evidence on messages at pages 14–29 of Exhibit No. 2................................................................. 2082

Memorandum of October 31, 1941, by Dr. Hornbeck, read to joint board meeting of November 3, 1941, on far-eastern situation................................................................. 2085

Telephone calls from outside through White House switchboard on November 25, 26, 27, and 28, 1941, as shown by operator's notes................................................................. 2093

Memorandum of December 31, 1940, from Chief of Naval Operations to Director of Naval Districts Division, signed “R. E. Ingersoll,” regarding defense of Pearl Harbor by the Army................................................................. 2138

Memorandum of January 9, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Staff, signed “R. E. Ingersoll,” concerning installation of aircraft detection equipment................................................................. 2138

Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, concerning removal of planes from Hawaii to Wake and Midway................................................................. 2155

Dispatch of November 27, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, concerning Army making available to Navy infantry units for defense battalion................................................................. 2156

Message of November 28, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, on sending planes to Wake and Midway, and Army troop reinforcement................................................................. 2157

Dispatch of October 17, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, on reinforcement of Philippines, and precautions at Wake and Midway................................................................. 2160

Memorandum from CinCUS Fleet to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force and Commander Patrol Wing 2, concerning basing of aircraft at naval air station at Wake and Midway................................................................. 2160

Memorandum of November 28, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, concerning defenses and reinforcements................................................................. 2161

Dispatch of November 28, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to his subordinates; orders to local aircraft units, Wake, Midway, and Pearl Harbor................................................................. 2161
Dispatch of December 4, 1941, from CincPac to ComTaskFor 3, Comfourteen, and ComPatWing 2, concerning local unit orders Wake, Midway, and Pearl Harbor................................................................. 2162
Memorandum of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, on defense of outlying bases................................................................. 2167
Memorandum of November 6, 1945, giving names of major vessels in Pacific Ocean on December 7, 1941................................................................. 2210
Memorandum of May 1, 1941, from commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to Chief of Naval Operations, on plans for air defense of Pearl Harbor................................................................. 2239
Memorandum of June 20, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to commander in chief, Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic fleets and commandants of all naval districts, on joint security measures for protection of the fleet and Pearl Harbor base................................................................. 2240
Table submitted by Admiral Stark on dispositions of Atlantic, Asiatic, and Pacific fleets on December 7, 1941................................................................. 2249
Letter of December 19, 1945, signed by Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State concerning memoranda prepared by Lawrence Salisbury................................................................. 2250
Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to OPNAV, concerning information there on Japanese Fleet locations................................................................. 2256
Dispatch of November 26, 1941, from Comfourteen, on location of Japanese Fleet................................................................. 2256
Dispatch of December 1, 1941, from special naval observer in London to Chief of Naval Operations, on French and German ships believed to be sailing from East to Europe, and United States Navy interception................................................................. 2311
Dispatch of December 2, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to special naval observer in London, denying our right to intercept vessels................................................................. 2311
Excerpt from speech by President Roosevelt on October 27, 1941, relating to our pledge to help destroy Hitlerism................................................................. 2313
Excerpt from Washington Post, November 27, 1941, page 4, on activities of Secretary Hull and conference with Kurusu and Nomura................................................................. 2323
Report by Secretary of the Navy to President on Pearl Harbor attack................................................................. 2338
Memorandum of March 17, 1942, for Admiral Draemel, giving views of Captain Zacharias................................................................. 2354
Dispatch of November 7, 1941, from Admiral Hart, concerning ABD–2................................................................. 2369
Admiral Stark’s reply of November 11, 1941................................................................. 2369
Letter of July 22, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Mr. Sumner Welles, concerning embargoes and July 19, 1941, study by Admiral Turner on embargo problems................................................................. 2382
Letter of commendation from Secretary Knox to Admiral Stark, dated March 21, 1942................................................................. 2402
Citation from President to Admiral Stark, dated April 9, 1942................................................................. 2403
Dispatch from commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, to OPNAV December 2, 1941, giving Admiral Hart’s views on Japanese situation................................................................. 2417
Dispatch from Secretary of Navy to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, dated December 16, 1941, concerning relief of Admiral Kimmel................................................................. 2430
Table on time of transmission to Honolulu by Radio of Navy dispatches................................................................. 2439
Memorandum from Superintendent of Naval Observatory concerning dawn at Honolulu on December 7, 1941................................................................. 2439
Message of August 11, 1945, from General Eisenhower to Admiral Stark, expressing appreciation for latter’s efforts in European theater................................................................. 2442
Army citation of July 15, 1944, to Admiral Stark for Distinguished Service Medal................................................................. 2442
Excerpt from Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter V, Coastal Frontier Defense................................................................. 2455
Excerpt from an article "I Fly for Vengeance," Saturday Evening Post, October 10, 1942, by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson

Memorandum of January 2, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, concerning all-out alert at airfields in Hawaii from December 1 to 6, 1941

Memorandum of December 27, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, on all-out alert in Hawaii from December 1 to 6, 1941

PART 6

Memorandum of December 21, 1945, from committee counsel to Miss Grace Tully, concerning photostatic copy of original signed Roberts report and drafts of report in President Roosevelt’s files

Memorandum from Miss Grace Tully to committee counsel, concerning Roberts report

Memorandum of January 2, 1946, from committee counsel to Mr. Justice Roberts, concerning submission of Roberts report

Letter of January 4, 1946, from Mr. Justice Roberts to committee counsel, concerning delivery of Roberts report to President Roosevelt

Excerpt from Admiral Kimmel's letter of January 12, 1941, to Chief of Naval Operations, concerning assignment as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet

Excerpt from report by Admiral King on Our Navy at War dated March 27, 1944, regarding strength of Pacific Fleet prior to Pearl Harbor

Excerpt from joint action of Army and Navy, 1935, concerning security of fleet base

Excerpt from Admiral Bloch's memorandum of October 17, 1941, requesting planes, equipment, and forces

Endorsement by Admiral Kimmel to Bloch memorandum of October 17, 1941

Excerpt from memorandum of November 25, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, on inability of Navy Department to assign planes to district

Memorandum of September 28, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Bloch on security of aircraft, Hawaiian area, from air attacks at fields or stations

Order issued by Admiral Kimmel on November 28, 1941, after receipt of war warning

Memorandum on January 14, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, on establishment of Pearl Harbor

Letter from Admiral Stark enclosing dispatch of August 28, 1941, concerning Southeast Pacific

Letter of January 14, 1946, from Admiral Stark enclosing dispatch of October 9, 1941, advising CinCPac of issuance of shooting orders in Atlantic

Dispatches of December 2 and 3, 1941, from OPNAV to CinCPac, relating to patrol in Western Pacific

Table comparing actual damage to fleet at Pearl Harbor and damage as stated in report by Secretary of Navy, released December 15, 1941

Table showing times when various points in Pacific were attacked

Memorandum of December 11, 1945, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, on water-tight integrity of vessels

C. B. Munson report of January 11, 1946, concerning Japanese on west coast

Dispatch of November 28, 1941, from CinCPac to Admiral Halsey
# XXIV

**LIST OF DOCUMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorial in Chicago Tribune of October 27, 1941, entitled “Mr. Knox Spies a War”</td>
<td>2751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report of House Committee on Naval Affairs concerning establishment of a naval base at Pearl Harbor, dated 1908</td>
<td>2768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headline from Honolulu Advertiser, November 30, 1941</td>
<td>2806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table showing times of attack at various locations in Pacific</td>
<td>2819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photostat of front page of Christian Science Monitor for September 28, 1944</td>
<td>2820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of January 18, 1946, from Dean Acheson to Mr. Gearhart, concerning copy of Tripartite Pact enclosing Department of State translation</td>
<td>2853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotation from Black’s Law Dictionary on interpretation of ejusdem generis rule</td>
<td>2858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotation from volume 14, Words and Phrases (permanent edition) p. 135, on ejusdem generis</td>
<td>2858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt from The Situation in the Far East, a general summary on November 26, 1941, to the Secretary of State, concerning strengthening defense of Dutch Guiana</td>
<td>2862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotation from New York Times of December 6, 1942, on time of attack on Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>2892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter of November 18, 1941, from Mr. Hamilton to the Secretary of State, concerning exchange of certain territories in Pacific for Japanese ships</td>
<td>2912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegram of February 7, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of State, taking stock of political and military situation in the Far East</td>
<td>2917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**PART 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cable of November 29, 1941, from Adjutant General, War Department, to commanding general, Hawaii, on reinforcement of outlying islands</td>
<td>2938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, concerning message of December 5, 1941, from G-2 War Department, to G-2 Panama</td>
<td>2991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report of December 20, 1941, by Fifty-third CA Brigade (AA) on action during Pearl Harbor attack</td>
<td>2992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegram of January 22, 1946, from Maj. George Leask, former assistant signal officer, San Francisco Port of Embarkation to General Short, concerning radar towers shipped from Oakland to Hawaii</td>
<td>3033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Army-liaison officer to committee counsel, with enclosures relating to General Marshall’s message of December 7, 1941, to General Short</td>
<td>3091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiogram of December 7, 1941, from General Short to Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, reporting attack on Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>3096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Colonel Lawton, concerning the budget estimate for 1941-42 for radar operation</td>
<td>3114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter of January 25, 1942, from General Short to General Marshall, enclosing application for retirement</td>
<td>3134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of January 26, 1943, from General Marshall to Secretary of War, concerning retirement of General Short</td>
<td>3139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of January 28, 1942, from General Marshall to Adjutant General, concerning General Short’s retirement application</td>
<td>3139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handwritten note by General Marshall to G-1, on opinion of Judge Advocate General, concerning General Short’s retirement</td>
<td>3140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of February 13, 1942, from Secretary of War to Chief of Staff concerning General Short’s retirement</td>
<td>3140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Memorandum, undated, from Secretary of War to President, concerning retirement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel and handwritten note on Secretary of War's proposed wording............................................. 3140

Memorandum of February 14, 1942, from Assistant Chief of Staff to Attorney General, concerning General Short's and Admiral Kimmel's retirement applications ........................................................................ 3140

Memorandum, undated, from General Marshall to Secretary of War, for decision concerning General Short and Admiral Kimmel.......................... 3141

Memorandum of February 14, 1942, from Attorney General to Secretary of War, concerning retirement applications of General Short and Admiral Kimmel ................................................................. 3141

Order of February 17, 1942, directing retirement of General Short........... 3142

Undated memorandum from Secretary of War to Judge Advocate General, requesting further opinion on General Short's retirement.................. 3144

Undated memorandum to Secretary of War, signed "G. C. M.," referring to Judge Advocate General's recommendations concerning General Short.............................. 3144

Memorandum of January 27, 1942, from Judge Advocate General for Chief of Staff, on course of action with respect to General Short.................... 3145

Memorandum of January 31, 1942, from Judge Advocate General to Secretary of War on course of action with respect to General Short.............. 3146

Memorandum of September 18, 1943, from Secretary of War to General Short, concerning waiver of statute of limitations................................. 3151

Waiver of statute of limitations signed by General Short, dated September 20, 1943 ......................................................................................... 3151

Memorandum of July 4, 1944, from Acting Secretary of War to the President, asking his approval or disapproval of a request from General Short for a copy of Roberts Commission proceedings......................................... 3153

Letter of October 20, 1944, from Secretary of War to General Short, concerning General Short's request for information from records.................. 3154

Message of December 9, 1941, from War Department to commanding general, Hawaii, requesting report on time of receipt of War Department message No. 529................................................................. 3163

Memorandum on time of receipt of No. 529 and reply to December 9, 1941, message.................................................................................... 3164

Memorandum for AC/S, G-2, concerning supplementary Pearl Harbor investigation by Major Clausen......................................................... 3198

Memorandum for Major Clausen from General Cramer, on unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor investigation...................................................... 3198

Letter of December 16, 1941, to the President from the Secretary of War, on commission for Pearl Harbor investigation................................. 3260

Letter of January 27, 1942, to Mr. Justice Roberts from Secretary of War, concerning report on Pearl Harbor.................................................. 3261

Letter of January 31, 1942, from Mr. Justice Roberts to Secretary of War, acknowledging January 27 letter.................................................... 3261

Report of January 23, 1942, from the Roberts Commission to the President........................................................................................................ 3285

Memorandum of March 17, 1942, for Admiral Draemel from Captain Zacharias, on Hawaiian situation......................................................... 3307

Memorandum of January 26, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, on comparison of Army and Navy intercepts December 2, 3, 4, 1941 ........................................................................................ 3324

PART 8

Memorandum of January 7, 1946, from committee counsel, to Senator Ferguson, enclosing Army and Navy liaison officers' memoranda on Japanese intercepts in Exhibit No. 1.................................................. 3423
Memorandum of January 22, 1946, from committee counsel, for Senator Ferguson, enclosing memorandum from Army liaison officer, concerning part 2 of message No. 985........................................3423
Letter of December 22, 1943, from Captain Safford to Captain Kramer, on winds message.................................................................3608
Memorandum of December 28, 1943, from Captain Kramer to Captain Safford, replying to December 22 letter..................................................3699
Personal letter of January 22, 1944, from Captain Safford to Captain Kramer, using code, concerning Pearl Harbor and winds message............3700
Memorandum of January 26, 1946, from Army liaison officer, to committee counsel, on comparison of Army and Navy intercepts December 2–4, 1941........................................................................3779
Memorandum of February 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, on Alusna Batavia dispatch 031030 December 1941..........................3779
Memorandum of December 6, 1941, for Colonel Holbrook from Lieutenant Perry, reporting burning of codes and ciphers at Japanese Embassy in Washington..............................................................3780
Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer, to committee counsel, enclosing certificates of search for communications between the President and the Prime Minister during period November 24–December 7, 1941.....................................................................................3840
Memorandum of December 13, 1945, from Lieutenant Commander Baecher to Captain Safford, enclosing “Presidential Directives for Witnesses before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack”...........................................................3883

PART 9

Letter of January 15, 1946, from Captain Welker to Captain Safford, answering inquiry about winds message.........................................................4009
Memorandum of January 14, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, on duty officers in offices of Chief of Staff and General Gerow on night of December 6, 1941..........................................................4010
Memorandum of January 31, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, replying to request by Senator Ferguson on working hours in Admiral Turner’s office December 6–7, 1941; circular letter from Secretary of Navy, dated November 10, 1941, prescribing duty hours.........................................................4010
Memorandum of February 11, 1946, from Army liaison officer, on message No. 900, dated December 6, 1941.........................................................4188
Message of December 5, 1941, from Berlin to Tokyo, requesting that Germany and Italy be advised of contents of Konoye message.........................4199
Berlin to Tokyo message of December 3, 1941, reporting status of German-Russian hostilities.................................................................4199
Berlin to Tokyo message of December 3, 1941, reporting on interview with Ribbentrop.................................................................4200
Washington to Tokyo message of December 5, 1941, from Kurusu, requesting retention of Terasaki until end of negotiations..................................4202
Memorandum from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, giving information on handling of Alusna Batavia dispatch 031030 December 1941..........................4214
Memorandum of January 29, 1946, Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, on transmission and receipt of OPNAV dispatch 061743 December 1941.................................................................4288
Secret memorandum of June 10, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Secretary of the Navy, discussing strategic situation in Pacific Ocean.................................................................4299
Excerpt from statement of December 1, 1944, by Secretary of War that his investigation would be continued.........................................................4306
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary of interrogation of Captain Takahashi, dated October 20, 1945...</td>
<td>4439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safford citation for Legion of Merit, dated February 11, 1946</td>
<td>4461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message from Merle Smith to War Department and Hawaii dated December 6, 1941, on Dutch activation of plan A-2 because of Japanese naval movements out of Palau.</td>
<td>4566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter of July 14, 1943, from President Roosevelt requesting military attaché dispatches after January 1, 1937, indicating possibility of war.</td>
<td>4588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Message of March 25, 1941, from OPNAV to commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District, on exchange of Army and Navy intercepts.</td>
<td>4721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message of March 25, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Staff, commanding general of the Philippine Department, and commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District, authorizing exchange of information.</td>
<td>4721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt from instructions to staff of commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, July 14, 1941.</td>
<td>4829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter of April 22, 1941, from Captain McCollum to Captain Layton, on dissemination of diplomatic traffic.</td>
<td>4845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of February 12, 1946, from Army liaison officer, on planes and guns sent to foreign countries from February 1 to December 7, 1941.</td>
<td>4873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of February 14, 1946, from Army liaison officer, enclosing memorandum on transfers of antiaircraft weapons before December 7, 1941.</td>
<td>4874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter of January 16, 1946, from Mr. Robert Shivers, concerning Japanese language broadcasts.</td>
<td>4912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegram of November 29, 1941, from Panama Canal Zone, reporting defensive measures taken.</td>
<td>4976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidential letter of November 10, 1941 from CinCPac, on emergency basing of aircraft at Wake and Midway.</td>
<td>5014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citations of John F. Sonnett by Secretary of Navy and Admiral Hewitt, dated July 17, 1945.</td>
<td>5023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of May 18, 1945 from Admiral Hewitt to Secretary of the Navy, on further investigation of Pearl Harbor attack.</td>
<td>5025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimony of Lieutenant Lockhart at special Signal Corps investigation, concerning detection of Japanese planes approaching Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, 1941.</td>
<td>5076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message of December 6, 1941, from American Naval Observer Singapore to Admiral Hart, concerning reported pledge of American armed support of British in case of Japanese attack.</td>
<td>5082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of newspaper headlines in Hawaiian and Honolulu daily papers.</td>
<td>5123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 of February 15, 1941, on Security of fleet at base and in operating areas.</td>
<td>5128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Department table giving relative strength of Japanese and United States Fleets and Air Forces in 1932.</td>
<td>5133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of January 26, 1946, on B-17 flights to Hawaii after December 7, 1941.</td>
<td>5134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of February 15, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, concerning microfilms received from General MacArthur's headquarters.</td>
<td>5136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Memorandum of February 20, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, inclosing February 1, 1946, report from General MacArthur's headquarters on pre-Pearl Harbor transmission of coded messages from Hawaii. 5138

Memorandum of February 6, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel, concerning planes sent through Hawaii to Philippines from July to December 7, 1941. 5142

Memorandum of January 24, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, on search for dispatches sent from Navy Department to naval commanders in field on December 6 or 7, 1941. 5146

Memorandum of January 25, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, on governmental authority of United States and Great Britain during 1941 over Johnston, Canton, and Christmas Islands. 5147

State Department reply to Senator Ferguson's inquiry whether memorandum of Mr. Max Hamilton on proposal to transfer Borneo to Japanese reached the President. 5147

Message of December 5, 1941, from Washington to American Legation in Budapest, requesting transmission of note verbale to Hungarian Government. 5148

Memorandum of May 18, 1945, from Admiral Hewitt to Lieutenant Commander Baecher, concerning preliminary investigation at Pearl Harbor and July 6, 1945, modification of precept. 5149

PART II

Undated letter from State Department to committee counsel, replying to counsel's request of February 23, 1946, requested proposal message from British and Dominion Governments to Japan, warning her against invasion of Thailand. 5165

Memorandum dated December 7, 1941, from British Embassy, for President, for comment to Prime Minister on attached proposed message from British and Dominion Governments to Japan warning her against invasion of Thailand. 5165

Paraphrase of telegram (undated) from Australian Minister for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom, which refers to proposed message to Japan warning her against invasion of Thailand and mentions decision of President of United States to send message to Jap Emperor, and subsequent intentions if it was not answered, including a warning from President to Japan. 5166

Message from OPNAV to CinCAF, December 7, 1941, 971722 re request of Jap Government for safe conduct of S. S. Madison on trip to Chingwangtao to arrive December 10, 1941. 5202

Message from CinPac to OPNAV dated December 1, 1941, 0103300, suggesting ship might be sent to Chingwangtao to evacuate marines and civilians. 5203

Message from Secretary Navy to CinCAF dated December 1, 1941, 012359, granting authority to charter President Madison for trip from Manila to Chingwangtao for evacuation of civilians. 5203

Message from CinCAF to Commander, United States Marine Corps forces, North China, dated December 2, 1941, 021634, re instructions to withdraw marines via President Harrison due to arrive Chingwangtao December 10. 5204

Message from CinCAF to OPNAV, December 3, 1941, 921829, reporting evacuation of Fourth Marines, President Harrison departing Manila December 4 for Chingwangtao. 5204

Message from OPNAV to CinCAF dated December 8, 1941, 972230, canceling OPNAV 971722 asking CinCAF to give appropriate instructions to the President Harrison. 5206
LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Memorandum from Admiral O. S. Colclough to committee counsel, dated December 10, 1945, re two dispatches in "White House File" of messages maintained at Navy Department for messages sent by President over Navy facilities .......................................................... 5213

Dispatch 261854 dated November 26, 1941, from OPNAV to CinCAF transmitting message from the President to the Philippine High Commissioner .................................................................................. 5214

Dispatch 289228 dated November 28, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV transmitting message from Philippine High Commissioner to the President .......................................................... 5214

Memorandum dated December 4, 1941, from R. E. Schurmann, Navy Department, re time of receipt of message from U. S. S. Ward, by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel, and attached brief of testimony appearing in prior proceedings on that point ......................................................... 5293

Memorandum dated April 2, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee counsel, re testimony as to why B-17's arrived at Oahu from the west coast on December 7, 1941, without ammunition, citing testimony appearing this and prior proceedings on the proposition .......................................................... 5294

Memorandum dated January 25, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee counsel, re draft and notes made in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement of the attack on Pearl Harbor .................................................................................................................. 5294

Memorandum dated February 19, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee counsel, re conditions of radio silence in effect in Atlantic and Pacific Fleets on December 7, 1941 .......................................................................................................................... 5294

Memorandum dated April 2, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee counsel, re conditions of radio silence in Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and date conditions made effective .......................................................................................................................... 5295

Memorandum dated January 22, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee counsel, re description of notations appearing on radio message No. 489, dated January 29, 1941, from The Adjutant General to the commanding general, Hawaii .................................................................................................................. 5296

Memorandum dated February 27, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee counsel, re number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by War Department on December 7, 1941, and re priority messages decoded in Hawaii before the December 7, 1941, warning from General Marshall .................................................................................................................. 5297

Message dated December 7, 1941, from General Marshall to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., No. 529 Seventh, text omitted, on original Signal Corps record .................................................................................................................. 5297

Message appearing on page 14077, as received at Hawaiian Department, or original sheet after decoding .................................................................................................................. 5297

Western Union Telegraph Co. Tariff Book No. 73 for 1941 (cover only) .................................................................................................................. 5298

Western Union regulations for handling United States Government messages .................................................................................................................. 5298

RCA Communications, Inc., Telegraph Tariff, Effective April 1, 1940 (cover only) .................................................................................................................. 5300

RCA regulations for handling Government telegrams .................................................................................................................. 5301

Message dated December 7, 1941, from Colton, acting, for Fort Shafter, T. H. No. 530 .................................................................................................................. 5301
Memorandum dated February 21, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee counsel, re operation of radar stations at New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle on December 7, 1941 .................................................. 5302

Message dated January 31, 1946, from commanding general, Eastern Defense Command, to War Department, re operation of radar at Atlantic Highlands, N. J., Mount Cadillac, Maine, and Fort Hancock on December 7, 1941 .................................................. 5302

Memorandum dated February 8, 1946, from commanding officer, headquarters Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Bradley Beach, N. J., for chief, Engineering and Technical Service, War Department, in operation of radar on east coast on December 7, 1941 .................................................. 5302

Memorandum dated February 18, 1946, from adjutant general, headquarters, First Air Force, Mitchell Field, N. Y., to War Department special staff, re photostatic copy of logs of radar sets in operation on December 6 and 7, 1941, in New York area .................................................. 5303

Message dated February 4, 1946, from commanding general, Fourth Air Force, San Francisco, Calif., to War Department, re operation of radar stations on west coast on December 7, 1941 .................................................. 5303

Copy of letter dated November 25, 1941, from Admiral Nimitz, then Chief of Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, to Admiral Kimmel, on general subject of radar for fleet .................................................. 5304

Memorandum dated February 6, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee counsel, re false weather messages intercepted on December 4 and 5, 1941, by the FCC .................................................. 5304

Letter undated, from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State, to committee counsel, giving history of lend-lease procedure prior to December 7, 1941 .................................................. 5305

Memorandum dated February 25, 1946, from Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes for committee counsel, re typographical errors noted in record of his testimony and his suggestion re possible message he discussed with Colonel Saddler on December 5, 1941 .................................................. 5306

Memorandum dated February 25, 1946, from Admiral Noyes for Navy liaison officer, re typographical errors reported in his testimony .................................................. 5307

Letter dated February 27, 1946, from John F. Sonnett to committee counsel, re typographical errors reported in his testimony .................................................. 5308

Letter, undated, from Cordell Hull to committee counsel, re typographical errors reported in his testimony and clarification of two answers to questions in his testimony .................................................. 5308

Memorandum dated March 11, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, transmitting requested corrections in testimony of Capt. A. D. Kramer, United States Navy .................................................. 5309

Memorandum dated March 3, 1946, from Capt. A. D. Kramer, United States Navy, to committee counsel, forwarding requested corrections in his testimony .................................................. 5309

Memorandum dated April 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, forwarding requested corrections in testimony of Capt. A. H. McCollum, United States Navy .................................................. 5313

Letter dated March 18, 1946, from Capt. A. H. McCollum, United States Navy, to committee chairman, forwarding suggested corrections in his testimony .................................................. 5313

Memorandum dated April 4, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee counsel, re source material used in preparation of a timetable of Japanese attacks at outbreak of war in Pacific .................................................. 5315

Memorandum dated February 21, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee counsel, re authority of Lieutenant Colonel Clausen to administer oaths during the investigation which he conducted regarding the Pearl Harbor attack at the direction of the Secretary of War, citing Article of War 114 .................................................. 5316
LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Memorandum dated February 1, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee counsel, re additional information relating to the initial Japanese attack against the Philippines .................................................. 5316

History of the Fifth Air Force (and its predecessors), part 1, December 1941 to August 1942—December 1941 installment .......................................................... 5318

History of Thirtieth Bombardment Squadron (H) and Nineteenth Bombardment Group (H), December 7, 1941, to December 31, 1942, including reports by Maj. W. P. Fisher .................................................................................. 5330

History, Twenty-fourth Pursuit Group in the Philippines from November 1, 1940, through December 8, 1941 .................................................................................. 5333

Record of interview with Major Heald, communications officer, Fifth Air Force Service Command, re activity of Fifth Air Base Group in Philippines from November 15 to December 8, 1941 .................................................. 5335

Memorandum dated January 15, 1946, from Lt. Col. Joseph B. Mitchell, General Staff Corps, for Army liaison officer, re organization of the Far East Air Force, with enclosures ........................................................................ 5336

Letter dated February 11, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, Assistant Chief Engineer, Federal Communications Commission, to committee counsel, transmitting statements of FCC employees re monitoring for “winds” message at Hawaii .................................................................................. 5340

Memorandum dated February 7, 1946, from Lee R. Dawson to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC re “winds messages” ................................................................. 5340

Memorandum dated February 4, 1946, from Lee R. Dawson to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC re “winds messages” ................................................................. 5340

Memorandum dated February 5, 1946, from Earl A. Nielsen to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC re “winds message” ................................................................. 5340

Letter dated February 5, 1946, from John H. Homsy to George E. Sterling, FCC, re “winds messages” ............................................................................................... 5341

Memorandum dated February 7, 1946, from Tom B. Wagner to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC, re “winds messages” ................................................................. 5341

Message dated February 6, 1946, from monitoring officer, Theodore H. Tate, Koloa Kauai, T. H., to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC re monitoring for “winds messages” ................................................................. 5341

Memorandum dated February 5, 1946, from Waldemar M. Klima to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC, re “winds message” ................................................................. 5342

Letter dated February 14, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, FCC, to committee counsel, re “winds message” and transmitting an affidavit by A. Prose Walker, an FCC employee ................................................................. 5342

Affidavit dated February 13, 1946, from A. Prose Walker to Mr. George E. Sterling, FCC, re “winds message” .................................................................................. 5343

Letter dated February 18, 1946, from G. E. Sterling, FCC, to committee counsel, transmitting information received from Hawaii re “winds message” .................................................. 5343

Letter dated February 11, 1946, from supervisor, Hawaiian monitoring area, to Chief, Radio Intelligence Division, FCC, re “winds message” .................................................. 5343

Memorandum dated January 9, 1946, from State Department liaison officer to committee counsel, re telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated August 16, 1941 ................................................................. 5344

Memorandum dated January 9, 1946, from State Department liaison officer to committee counsel, re telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated August 16, 1941 (five sections) ................................................................. 5344

Memorandum dated December 11, 1945, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, re watertight integrity of major vessels in Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, transmitting table of inspection ................................................................. 5347

Memorandum dated December 11, 1945, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, re condition of watertight integrity of major vessels in Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, transmitting statement compiled from ships logs of various ship inspections on December 5 and 6, 1941 ................................. 5347
Memorandum dated January 29, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, re further check of logs of ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, concerning watertight integrity

Memorandum dated April 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, re official notification to Navy Department of air raid on Pearl Harbor and orders sent by Navy Department to fleets, re execution of war plans against Japan

Memorandum dated February 28, 1946, from Army liaison officer for committee counsel, re microfilm received from General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, containing material from Japanese files on United States-Japanese negotiations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack

Memorandum dated April 5, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, re document presented to Secretary of State Byrnes, containing information of Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, based on subsequently obtained information

Reconstruction of Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor (based on information obtained subsequent to December 7, 1941), which is the document presented to Secretary of State Byrnes and referred to at transcript page

Memorandum dated February 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee counsel, re report of Japanese air reconnaissance over Philippines or other United States possessions prior to December 7, 1941, enclosing message dated November 23, 1941 (229228) from Alusna Singapore to OPNAV re Gilbert Islands, message dated November 24, 1941 (240619) from Governor, Guam, to OPNAV, re Guam, and memorandum on interrogation of Captain Takahashi on October 29, 1945, re Philippines; and mentions interview with Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga, re Guam and dispatch from marines on Wake Island, re report of Pan-American clipper sighting Jap planes east of Guam

Memorandum dated March 7, 1946, from Navy liaison officer for committee counsel, re testimony of Vice Adm. T. S. Wilkinson, and letter from Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Wilkinson, re scope of activity of Office of Naval Intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor attack

Letter dated May 20, 1946, from Senator Homer Ferguson to committee counsel concerning War Department documents relating to the development of long-range heavy bombers as proposed by General Andrews and Colonel Knerr

Letter dated February 4, 1941, from commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, H. E. Kimmel to his task force commanders concerning aircraft in Hawaiian area, maximum readiness of

Memorandum dated December 5, 1941, of conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador concerning cooperation with Dutch East Indies against Japan

Dispatch No. 1906 dated December 8, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department advising of the delivery to the Japanese Foreign Minister of the President's message of December 6, 1941, to the Japanese Emperor

Dispatch No. 286 dated December 6, 1941, from State Department to American Embassy, Chungking, advising of the delivery of the President's message that date to the Japanese Emperor, with instructions to repeat the message to Chiang Kai-Shek for his information

Dispatch No. 823 dated December 7, 1941, from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo, relating the attack on Pearl Harbor and delivery by the Japanese Ambassador of the 14-part note

Memorandum dated May 3, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning orders purporting to delay the return to Pearl Harbor in December 1941 of Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey, as mentioned in testimony of Captain Zacharias, p. 8734

Memorandum dated January 31, 1946, from committee counsel to Navy liaison officer requesting information set forth above
Memorandum dated May 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning memorandum dated November 12, 1941, prepared by Capt. A. D. Kramer, United States Navy, regarding dissemination of Magic material to the White House, enclosing a copy of such paper obtained from Capt. L. S. Safford, United States Navy.  

Memorandum dated May 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel in respect of statements made by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson in the October 10, 1942, issue of the Saturday Evening Post, concerning orders under which he flew a plane from the U. S. S. Enterprise from November 28 to December 7, 1941.  

Memorandum dated May 22, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning the winds code as referred to in the so-called history written in 1942 of the activity of the Navy Department Communications Unit, about which Admiral Hart testified was involved in his conversation with Captain Safford, and messages quoted therein.  

Memorandum dated May 16, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel and attached copy of study made by Captain Kramer of the times of delivery to the White House of certain translations of Japanese Intercepts.  

Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel, enclosing two Navy communications with Rear Adm. Cato D. Glover, United States Navy, concerning notation in OPNAV watch officers log on December 6, 1941 of contact with Admiral H. R. Stark, and second memorandum to counsel dated May 7, 1946, concerning compilation of location of naval forces requested by Secretary of War.  

Memorandum dated May 8, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning report that reconnaissance was not being carried out at Hawaii due to wear on planes and crews.  

Memorandum dated May 10, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning search of Navy files for message from Capt. John Creighton, Singapore, to Admiral T. C. Hart on December 4, 5, or 6, 1941, concerning sighting of Japanese convoy.  

Memorandum dated May 2, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning air patrols operating from Oahu prior to December 7, 1941, enclosing Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated February 15, 1941, and Pacific Fleet confidential memorandum No. 1CM-41 dated February 25, 1941.  

Memorandum dated May 9, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning report in exhibit No. 160 of information from a Captain Smith, mentioned by the President.  

Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel concerning intercept and translation of message No. 1405 from Berlin to Tokyo, and memo dated April 15, 1946, from Navy liaison officer on the same subject.  

Memorandum dated May 3, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning monthly reports of Navy intercept stations at Winter Harbor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Md.  

Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer to committee counsel concerning exchange of correspondence between President Truman and Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel, retired, enclosing copies of the correspondence.  

Memorandum dated April 26, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning any report of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on the report of the Roberts Commission.  

Draft of proposed charge against Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy, retired, for a general court martial.  

Memorandum dated April 23, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning cards prepared in Navy Department relating to execute message for the winds code.
Memorandum dated April 18, 1946, from Navy liaison officer correcting memorandum dated January 25, 1946, concerning the destruction of drafts and work materials used in preparation of statement made by Admiral Inglis before the committee.

Memorandum dated December 13, 1945, from Army liaison officer to committee counsel concerning production and distribution of B-17 bombers as of September 1, 1941.

Memorandum dated April 16, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning transmission of dispatch 061743 of December 1941 from OPNAV to CINCPAC for action and to CINCAF for information. (This dispatch authorized destruction of secret and confidential documents in outlying islands.)

Memorandum dated April 17, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning phrase "CINCPAC and CINCAF provide necessary escort" appearing in dispatch 252203 of November 1941 (exhibit No. 3).

Memorandum dated April 17, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning time table of Japanese attacks—source of material, relating to time of attacks at Clark Field and Nichols Field in the Philippines.

Memorandum dated April 15, 1946, from Navy liaison officer enclosing four intercepted Japanese messages relating to Japanese news broadcasts.

Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning memorandum mentioned in letter dated April 4, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel.

Memorandum dated May 1, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning copies of orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice versa from May to December 1941 enclosing letter dated April 7, 1941, from OPNAV to CINCPAC.

Memorandum dated April 30, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning identity of ship on chart dated December 5, 1941 (exhibit No. 102) located to north of Oahu.

Memorandum dated April 20, 1946, from Navy liaison officer concerning transfers of ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific between May 1, 1940, and December 7, 1941.

Memorandum dated April 23, 1946, from Army liaison officer concerning duty officer logs kept for offices of Secretary of War and Chief of Staff between November 1 and December 7, 1941.

Memorandum dated May 21, 1946, from Army liaison officer concerning Japanese estimate of United States air strength in Hawaiian area prior to the attack on December 7, 1941.

Memoranda dated from April 9 to May 23, 1946, concerning information obtained by the Australian Minister as to proposed action of the President in the event the Japanese did not reply to his message of December 6, 1941, to the Emperor.

Letter dated November 2, 1941, from committee chairman to President Truman's secretary, suggesting Presidential memorandum to executive offices regarding scope of committee inquiry, and reply dated November 7, 1945.

Suggested corrections in his testimony by Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias.

Suggested corrections in his testimony by Admiral H. R. Stark.

Suggested corrections in his testimony by Rear Adm. John R. Beardall.

Suggested corrections in his testimony by Henry C. Clausen.

Interrogations and answers by Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, United States Army.

Interrogations and answers by Vice Adm. William A. Glassford, United States Navy.

Memorandum for committee counsel's files concerning exhibits Nos. 1 and 2.
Letter dated November 15, 1945, from Senator Ferguson to committee
counsel concerning intercepted Japanese messages from January 1 to
July 1, 1941. .......................................................... 5523
Letter dated December 17, 1945, from Tyler Kent to committee chairman... 5524
Correspondence relating to State Department papers concerning the Tyler
Kent affair. .................................................................. 5524
Correspondence relating to all messages between this Government and the
British Government for November 25, 26, and 27, 1941. .................. 5530
State Department memorandum of conversation dated November 27, 1941,
concerning British parallel action desired re our export policy to French
Indo-China. .................................................................. 5532
Dispatch No. 5727 dated November 27, 1941, from Ambassador Winant,
London, to State Department concerning British economic study of
Japanese industrial potential. .............................................. 5533
Copy of letter dated November 25, 1941, from Dean Acheson to Mr. R. J.
Stopford, financial counselor, British Embassy. .............................. 5534
Memorandum dated May 22, 1946, from Army liaison officer to committee
counsel concerning former Secretary Stimson's diary ..................... 5535
Letter dated May 26, 1946, from Admiral H. R. Stark to committee chairman
concerning information which was furnished by Capt. H. D. Krick,
USN, regarding the activities of Admiral Stark on December 6, 1941.... 5543
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1945

Congress of the United States, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Washington, D.C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

All those in the auditorium will please be seated.

Before we start, the Chair desires to admonish the audience that we are glad to have them here, but in view of the difficult acoustics in this room, it will make it necessary for the committee to use these microphones. We must ask the audience to refrain from any sort of conversation or any sort of demonstration during these hearings, any applause or otherwise.

Also I think it is advisable to say to our friends, the photographers, we are glad to cooperate with you in getting all the pictures you may wish to take so long as it does not interfere with these hearings.

During the testimony, while the witnesses are on the stand, the photographers will not be permitted to occupy this space here in front of the committee.

Take whatever pictures you want to take and then leave this congested area here.

The last time I sat on a committee in this room, I could not see the witness half the time, because of the photographers standing between me and the witness, trying to take him with his hands up, or something like that.

We must insist that during these hearings, while the witness is on the stand and testifying, that the photographers will not occupy this space between the committee and the witness and counsel.

I want to make the announcement in advance so that there will not be any misunderstanding. It applies to everybody alike.

I believe the members of the committee are all here.

Mr. Mitchell, as counsel for the committee, we are ready to proceed.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman—

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

[1]
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed, I would like to make one comment for myself and others. I want to record my regret and protest, at the start of the hearings at this time, and as has previously been said, and I would like to have that entered in the record, and that is this:

It has only been within the past week that the members of the Executive Department have had the permission, under notification of the President's order to submit the exhibits so they will be in the best order, and I have been given a stack of papers, over a thousand pages, which it is essential to go over in order to conduct any intelligent cross-examination.

I hope my fears will be disappointed, my fears that this will result in confusion and delay, but I do think it ought to be made a matter of record at this time that we regret this somewhat premature beginning of this inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair desires to be reasonable in regard to that. The committee at one time, some 2 or 3 weeks ago, I forget the date, unanimously decided to begin hearings today; that is, those who voted.

Senator Ferguson. I would like the record to show that——

The CHAIRMAN. Those who voted in the committee, voted without dissent to begin the hearing today. Two members were absent and two were present and not voting.

At a meeting later, a week ago, or a week or 10 days ago, a motion was made to postpone the hearings from today until the 23d day of November, which is the day following Thanksgiving, and that motion was voted down.

The situation that confronts us, that confronts all the members of the committee, is that documents have been given to us as quickly and as practicably as counsel obtained them. Inasmuch as these hearings will probably last several weeks, it occurred to the Chair that we will have, as we go along, ample opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the testimony brought before us today, without attempting to read any documents before we begin.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a statement on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I had made a request previously that the committee be furnished these exhibit copies at least 10 days prior to the hearing. If I had had some assistance, I would have been able to have carried down the exhibits that had been given to me on Wednesday and on Tuesday. Over a thousand of them have been placed in our hands. Many of them it is impossible to read because of the job of photostating them. Therefore, it is just a physical impossibility to go over the papers prior to this hearing.

While I will do my very best, I do want the record to show that we have not had these exhibits in this form properly indexed.

Here is the first one. It is over 200 pages, and no index to it. It has been just a physical impossibility to go over them intelligently, although I want to say on the record, I will do my best to go over them as the hearing goes along, and it may be essential that we recall witnesses in order that we may properly examine and obtain all of the facts.
The Chairman. Of course, if I may say so, there would be no objection to recalling any witness by the committee. The exhibits were given to all members at a given time. They have been given to members as soon as it was possible, and as fast as it was possible to obtain them. There are large quantities of them. We are all laboring under the same handicap, that we have not been able to read them all since [6] we got them.

As I said a moment ago, I think as the hearings go on, we can familiarize ourselves with them sufficiently to permit us to know each day what would be expected in the way of testimony, and prepare for that day.

Senator Ferguson. The record ought to also show that I have made many requests for other things. We do not have all the files here at the present time.

The Chairman. In order that the record may be correct, as the requests have been made, the records have been sought, and have been either delivered, or are in the process of preparation. It is manifestly impossible to provide all the exhibits at one time. As soon as they were ready, they were delivered to the committee, as soon as they could be obtained.

Senator Ferguson. May I understand that it is a fact as to the exhibits that have been requested, that the staff has them but they are not at the present time ready for delivery? That is my understanding.

[7] The Chairman. The committee has no way to know what personal requests have been made either in writing or orally by members of the committee to the counsel, by individual members. Counsel explained to the committee that as fast as these exhibits could be obtained and could be copied for each member and for others, that they would be supplied.

Now, Mr. Mitchell, will you proceed?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, to open the record, there are some informal matters. I have some documents——

Senator Brewster. Before he proceeds I renew my motion.

The Chairman. Let's have order, please, in the committee room.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, to open the record formally, there are a few documents that should be entered.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Mitchell. First is the concurrent resolution of the Senate under which the committee was organized.

(S. Con. Res. 27 follows:)

[S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Cong., 1st sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original
selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

[9] Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of [10] the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman.

Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.

Attest:

Leslie L. Biffle, Secretary.

Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945.

Attest:

South Trimble, Clerk.

Mr. Mitchell. Then there is the record of the members of the committee.

(The list of the committee members is as follows:)

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Alben W. Barkley, Kentucky (chairman).

Walter F. George, Georgia.

Scott W. Lucas, Illinois.

Owen Brewster, Maine.

Homer Ferguson, Michigan.

[11] Mr. Mitchell. Next is a list of all counsel, including counsel for a number of witnesses who will be called.

(The list of counsel for the committee is as follows:)

Counsel for the committee:

Chief counsel, William D. Mitchell.

Chief assistant counsel, Gerhard A. Gesell.

Assistant counsel, Jule M. Hannaford.

Assistant counsel, John E. Masten.

Executive secretary for the committee:

Mrs. Flo E. Bratten; office, 357 Senate Office Building; telephone extensions 1150 and 1169.

Counsel for General Short:

Capt. Patrick H. Ford, 2001 Munitions Building, War Department, extension 7-8109.

Counsel for Admiral Kimmel:

Charles Rugg, Building N, Room 1-N-90, Navy Department, extension 3292; Lt. Edward B. Hanify, Navy Department, extension 6-3036.
Counsel for Admiral Stark:
Lt. Comdr. David Richmond, Navy Department, extension 2326.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then there is the correspondence, with which you are familiar, between the chairman of the committee and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the White House, asking for the appointment of the liaison officers and the responses from those Departments and the President.

There is also a letter here from the estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt respecting the late President’s files in the Archives Building.

(The correspondence referred to follows:)

October 5, 1945.

The Honorable JAMES F. BYRNES,
The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the joint congressional committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the State Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the State Department. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the committee or their counsel, and that the committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

ALBEN W. BARKLEY,  
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

The Secretary of State,  
Washington, October 13, 1945.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY,  
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ALBEN: Replying to your letter, I have asked Under Secretary Acheson to make available any information the State Department may have which is desired by the committee with reference to the investigation referred to by you.

[13] Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES,

October 5, 1945.

The Honorable ROBERT P. PATTERSON,  
The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the joint congressional committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the War Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department’s records and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the armed forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the committee or their counsel and that the committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings, and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

ALBEN W. BARKLEY,  
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 10, 1945.

Hon. Alben W. Barkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, United States Senate.

Dear Senator Barkley: In accordance with the suggestion in your letter of October 5, Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe has been designated as the representative of the War Department for the purpose of assisting the joint congressional committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor. He will have full access to all pertinent files and records of the War Department and will arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the Army.

The War Department is prepared to furnish the committee and their counsel all information in its possession material to the investigation and to have the committee make free use of any pertinent evidence. Also, the War Department will be glad to assist the committee in its desire to hold public hearings.

Sincerely yours,

Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War.

October 5, 1945.

The Honorable James Forrestal,
The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On behalf of the joint congressional committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the Navy Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the armed forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the committee or their counsel, and that the committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

Alben W. Barkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, October 11, 1945.

The Honorable Alben W. Barkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, United States Senate.

Dear Senator Barkley: Reference is made to your letter dated October 5, 1945, suggesting the designation of a Navy Department representative with whom counsel for the committee may deal in matters concerning information and witnesses desired by the committee.

In accordance with your request, Rear Adm. O. S. Colclough, USN, the Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy, is designated to receive and act upon counsel's request for information from the Navy Department's records and for the attendance of naval witnesses.

In addition to the foregoing suggestion, your referenced letter expresses the hope that, by virtue of the war's end, reasons of national security do not require the withholding from the committee, or its counsel, any information material to the investigation, and that the committee, whose hearings will be public, will be free to use any pertinent evidence. Please be assured that the Navy Department stands ready to render full assistance to the committee and its counsel, making available from its records all information material to the investigation.

Sincerely yours,

James Forrestal.
The Honorable Harry S. Truman,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, I respectfully suggest for your consideration that someone in the Executive Offices be named by you, to whom the committee and its counsel may go to obtain information from the files in the Executive Office bearing on the matter under investigation, and that the committee may be free to disclose at its public hearings information so obtained.

Respectfully,

Alben W. Barkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

The White House,
Washington, October 13, 1944.

Hon. Alben W. Barkley
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Barkley: Replying to your letter of the 5th, regarding the appointment of someone in the Executive Offices to consult with the committee and its counsel, I am appointing Judge Latta, who has been in charge of all the files in the White House for the past 28 years.

Any information that you want will be cheerfully supplied by him.

For your information all the files of the previous administration have been moved to the Archives Building and Hyde Park. If there is any difficulty about your having access to them I'll be glad to issue the necessary order so that you may have complete access.

Sincerely yours,

Harry S. Truman.

Estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt,
120 Broadway, New York 5, October 31, 1945.

Dr. Solon J. Buck,
Archivist of the United States,
National Archives Building, Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir: On behalf of the executors of the estate of the late Franklin D. Roosevelt, it is hereby requested that you permit Miss Grace G. Tully to withdraw from the files of the late Mr. Roosevelt, now at the National Archives for storage and safekeeping, and make available to the Senate-House Joint Committee Investigating the Pearl Harbor Disaster such papers relating to the subject of the investigation as it may request.

This is to certify that such papers are being withdrawn and made available to said committee at the instigation of the President of the United States and with the approval of the executors of the estate.

Yours very truly,

Earle R. Koons.

Mr. Mitchell. Then there is a list of liaison officers who have been designated by the various departments, with their addresses and telephone numbers, which may be of service to the members of the committee.

(The list of liaison officers follows:)

List of Liaison Officers, Appointed by Agencies

War Department:
Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe; telephone, extension 2335; room 4D761, Pentagon.
Capt. R. M. Diggs; telephone, extension 2335; room 4D757, Pentagon.
Capt. C. Roger Nelson; telephone, extension 73157; room 2C686, Pentagon.
Lt. Bennett Boskey; telephone, extension 71470; room 4D757, Pentagon.
Navy Department:
Rear Adm. Oswald S. Colcough, Assistant Judge Advocate General; telephone, extension 3365; room 2307.
Lt. Comdr. John Ford Baecher, United States Naval Reserve; telephone, extension 2451; room 1083A.

[24] State Department:
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson; telephone, extension 2101; room 203½.
Edward Miller; telephone, extension 2210; room 280.
Joseph Ballantine; telephone, extension 2210; room 288.

White House:
Judge Maurice C. Latta.
Miss Grace Tully (Roosevelt papers).

FBI:
D. M. Ladd, Assistant Director; telephone, Executive 7100, extension 2121; room 1742, Justice.

[25] Mr. Mitchell. Then there follows the directive of August 28, 1945, by the President forbidding the disclosure of technique or procedures or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit, the agencies that break codes.

(The directive of August 28, 1945, follows:)

[26] Memorandum for—
The Secretary of State.
The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of the Navy.
The Attorney General.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Director of the Budget.
The Director of the Office of War Information.

Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent release to the public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of: Information regarding the past or present status, technique, or procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States Government or any Department thereof.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

[27] Mr. Mitchell. There is the order of October 23, 1945, by the President lifting the ban of that directive for the benefit of this committee.

(The memorandum follows:)

[28] Memorandum for—
The Secretary of State.
The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of Navy.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to hold public hearings and make public pertinent evidence relating to the circumstances of that attack, a specific exception to my memorandum dated August 28, 1945, relating to the release of information concerning cryptanalytic activities, is hereby made as follows:

The State, War, and Navy Departments will make available to the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, for such use as the committee may determine, any information in their possession material to the investigation, and will respectively authorize any employee or member of the armed services whose testimony is desired by the committee to testify publicly before the committee concerning any matter pertinent to the investigation.

(Signed) Harry S. Truman

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Approved October 23, 1945.
[29] Mr. Mitchell. There is another order, of November 7, 1945, by the President respecting leave for men in the services to talk freely with the committee and volunteer information.
(The memorandum of November 7, 1945, follows:)


Memorandum for the Chief Executives of all Executive Departments, Agencies, Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Section 3 of the concurrent resolution creating the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack reads as follows:

"Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs."

In order to assist the joint committee to make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, you are requested to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies, if they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to give any information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the committee's investigation.

You are further requested to authorize them whether or not they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel to come forward voluntarily and disclose to the committee or to its counsel any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the committee.

This directive is applicable to all persons in your departments or agencies whether they are in the armed services or not and whether or not they are called to testify before the joint committee.

Harry S. Truman.

[32] Mr. Mitchell. Then there is a memorandum by the President under date of November 9, 1945, enlarging on the last-mentioned memorandum.
(The memorandum of November 9, 1945, follows:)

[33] Memorandum for the chief executives of all executive departments, agencies, Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With further reference to my letter of November 7, 1945, addressed to the above executives, you are requested further to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies, whether or not they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to come forward and disclose orally to any of the members of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think has not already been disclosed to the committee.

This does not include any files or written material.

[Handwritten:] O. K.

H. S. T.

[34] Mr. Mitchell. Those formal documents I hand to the reporter to open the record in that way.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think it would also be proper and helpful if the record of the original presentation of the resolution by the chairman, and the discussions on the floor at that time—not subsequent—at that time, be inserted in the record so that there may be a full interpretation of what was the purport of the hearings.

The Chairman. There being no objection in connection with the introduction of the joint resolution, the statement made by the author of the resolution, and the discussion that took place at that time, will be inserted in the record.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the full discussion that took place at that time be inserted in the record.
Senator Brewster. That is what I intended.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I understood the Senator from Maine requested.

Senator Brewster. Yes.
I would like also to have the request of the committee to the President, the final draft of the order, inserted, in connection with the order which was made. I think you are familiar with that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be inserted in connection with these papers.¹

[340] (Excerpts from the Congressional Record of September 6, 1945, including the discussion and adoption of S. Con. Res. 27, ordered to be printed at this point, follow.)

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, inasmuch as I shall be compelled to leave the Chamber shortly on an important matter and may not be present during the entire call of the morning hour's business, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted at this time to make a brief statement and, following that, to introduce a concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Kentucky may proceed.

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor occurred on December 7, 1941.

On December 18, President Roosevelt appointed by Executive order a board or commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

This commission was composed of Justice Owen J. Roberts, as chairman, Admiral William H. Standley, Admiral J. M. Reeves, Gen. Frank H. McCoy, and Gen. Joseph T. McNarney.

The commission made its report to the President on January 29, 1942, and this report was immediately made public.

In June 1944, by joint resolution approved June 13, Congress in effect directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to designate appropriate boards or courts of inquiry "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper."


This board made its report to the Secretary of War on October 20, 1944, and the report was released to the public on Wednesday, August 29, 1945. The report consists of more than 300 pages of typewritten matter detailing the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, indulges in criticisms of certain military and other officials, and makes no recommendations to the Secretary of War.

The board appointed on behalf of the Navy consisted of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, as president, Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews.

This board finished its inquiry on October 19, 1944, then adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

The report of the Navy board went into some detail concerning the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, and recommended that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

This report was also made public by the President on August 29, 1945.

Since these reports were made public, I have spent a large portion of my time studying them, and also, in connection with them, I have reread the report of the Roberts commission.

The official report of the board appointed by the Secretary of War I have here, and, as I have said, it consists of 304 pages of typewritten matter on what we call legal size paper, not letter size. The report of the board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy contains various divisions, all of which add up to something like 100 pages of typewritten matter.

Reading these reports and studying them, insofar as I could in the limited time at my disposal, required my attention not only during the daytime since the

¹ See the suggested memorandum approved by the President in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5510.
reports were made public on last Wednesday, but required practically all of two nights, in order that I might read not only the reports, but the statement or summary made by the Secretary of War based upon the report of the Army board and the statement made by the Secretary of the Navy based upon the report of the naval board of inquiry, as well as other documents pertaining thereto. I have not been away from the city of Washington during the entire adjournment since the 1st day of August, when the Senate adjourned.

Mr. President, I shall not at this time attempt to discuss these various reports in detail, but after studying them to the extent possible in the time at my disposal, I am convinced that a further searching inquiry should be made under the authority and by the direction of the Congress of the United States.

In forming this opinion, Mr. President, I cast no reflections upon the ability, the patriotism, the good faith, or the sincerity of the boards which have thus far investigated and reported upon the Pearl Harbor disaster, nor on any member of these various boards. They are all outstanding American citizens and officials, who have rendered signal service to their country over a long period of time in various capacities. That includes the members of the Roberts commission, the War Department board, and the Navy Department board, as well as all those officials who have commented upon these reports or are in any way involved in them.

But these reports, Mr. President, are confusing and conflicting when compared with one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and inconsistencies within themselves.

Under these circumstances it is not strange that widespread confusion and suspicion prevail among the American people and among the Members of Congress.

In these several reports men in the armed services and in civilian positions of executive responsibility and authority are subjected to criticism, and the defenses are themselves inconsistent and contradictory. It would be easy now, if time allowed and if it were necessary, to point out these inconsistencies between the report made by the naval board and the report made by the Army board, and both of them as compared to the Roberts report. I do not deem it necessary to go into that at this time.

It is my belief, therefore, Mr. President, arrived at immediately upon the conclusion of my study of these reports, that under all the circumstances Congress itself should make its own thorough, impartial, and fearless inquiry into the facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing prior to and at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order to appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the attack.

This inquiry, Mr. President, should be of such dignity and authenticity as to convince the Congress and the country and the world that no effort has been made to shield any person who may have been directly or indirectly responsible for this disaster, or to condemn unfairly or unjustly any person who was in authority, military, naval, or civilian, at the time or prior thereto.

Ever since the day of Pearl Harbor there have been discussions of courts martial in the Army and in the Navy. We have here extended from time to time the statute of limitations pertaining to courts martial. The report of neither the naval nor the military board of inquiry recommends any further proceedings in these matters. It is my understanding that the law is that in the Army no man has a legal right to demand that he be court-martialed. Charges must be filed against an Army officer or an enlisted man setting out the offense which he is alleged to have committed. He has no right, as I understand the law, to go into the War Department and demand that he be court-martialed upon any accusation or any charge of misconduct on his part.

[345] I understand that in the Navy any officer or man who is charged with an offense that would constitute a violation of the Articles of War or Navy Regulations has the right to demand or request—I am not certain that he has the right to demand, but has the right to request, and it may be to demand—that he be given a court martial.

So that as it applies to any Army officer who may have been responsible prior to or at the time of this attack, as I understand, he has no right to demand that he be given a trial in order that he may be vindicated or that the facts may be brought out. Whether in the Navy formal request has been made by any naval officer for a court martial I am not in position to say, though the newspapers have carried stories that such a request has been made.

But if it were possible or appropriate, Mr. President, to subject high-ranking military or naval officers to courts martial, the trials might be conducted in
secret, and would relate themselves principally, if not entirely, to the guilt or innocence of the person against whom the specific charges were leveled. I do not here feel called upon or competent to determine whether court martial should be inaugurated in any case involving any officer of the Army or Navy or any person in the armed forces.

But I am convinced that the Congress and the country desire an open, public investigation which will produce the facts, and all the facts, so far as it is humanly possible to produce them.

Such an investigation should be conducted as a public duty and a public service.

It should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any responsible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living or dead.

It should be conducted in an atmosphere of judicial responsibility, and it ought to be so complete and so fair that no person could doubt the good faith of the report and the findings made in it, or those who make it.

It ought not to be conducted or undertaken for the purpose or with the sole view of vindicating or aspersing any man now in office, or who has been in office during the period involved.

It ought not to be undertaken or conducted for the purpose of enhancing or retarding the welfare of any political party, or any person now in office, or any person who desires or aspires to hold public office.

It should not be conducted for the purpose of attempting to bedaub the escutcheon of any innocent man, high or low, living or dead, with the infamy of imputed wrong.

It should not be conducted with the purpose of gratifying the misanthropic hatreds of any person toward any present or past public servant, high or low, living or dead.

It should not be conducted for the purpose of casting aspersions upon the names and records of men who have rendered outstanding service to their country and to the world; nor should it be conducted for the purpose of whitewashing any person who may have been guilty of wrongdoing in connection with the whole affair.

Such an investigation should look solely to the ascertaining of the cold, unvarnished, indisputable facts so far as they are obtainable, not only for the purpose of fixing responsibility, whether that responsibility be upon an individual or a group of individuals, or upon a system under which they operated or co-operated, or failed to do either. It should be conducted with a view of ascertaining whether, in view of what happened at Pearl Harbor and prior thereto, or even subsequent thereto, it might be useful to us in legislating in regard to the operations of our military and naval forces and the executive departments having control of them, or which are supposed to work with them.

In my opinion this investigation should be a joint effort of the two Houses of Congress. If the two Houses should undertake separately to investigate, going their separate ways, the result might be divergent reports made by the two Houses, which would contribute to further confusion in the minds of the public, as well as in the minds of Members of Congress. Whatever the findings may be, they will carry more weight and bear greater authority if both Houses of Congress jointly and concurrently conduct the investigation.

For these reasons, Mr. President, acting in my capacity as a Member of the Senate and in my capacity as majority leader of this body, I am submitting a concurrent resolution directing such an investigation by a joint committee of the two Houses, consisting of five Members from each House, no more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party, to be appointed by the respective Presiding Officers of the two Houses, with all the authority they will need; and, in order that there may be no unnecessary delay in making the investigation and the report to Congress, directing that such report be made not later than January 3, 1946.

It is now nearly 4 years since disaster occurred at Pearl Harbor. During the war, for certain military reasons, it was deemed inexpedient to do what I am now proposing. I believe that that decision on the part of the Congress and the Government as a whole was a wise decision. But the war is now over, and there is no military reason of which I am cognizant which would make it advisable any longer to delay a complete revelation of all the facts and circumstances leading up to this disaster, and the events which occurred while it was in progress.

Mr. President, I am submitting this resolution with the full knowledge and approval of the President of United States. After I had studied the reports and made up my own mind as to what my duty was, I called upon the President.
and discussed the matter with him, because obviously I would not want to take such a step without discussing it with him or at least letting him know what I had in mind and what I thought about it. He not only approved but urged that I be not dissuaded for any reason from my purpose to submit the resolution calling for this investigation.

Also, since the preparation of the resolution, I have discussed the matter with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and I have his assurance that if and when the Senate acts upon the concurrent resolution, it will receive prompt consideration by the House.

Mr. President, I express the earnest hope, which the President shares, that the two Houses may promptly agree to the resolution; that the investigation may proceed forthwith, without further delay; and that the Congress and the country may expect a full and impartial report, without regard to the consequences, within the time limit designated in the resolution. I send the resolution to the desk and ask that it be read and appropriately referred.

[34c] Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. Barkley. I yield.

Mr. Ferguson. I think it would be appropriate to ask that the concurrent resolution be immediately considered and agreed to.

Mr. Barkley. That is what I had in mind. I should like to ask that that be done. Under the rule, a resolution providing for an investigation and calling for the expenditure of funds is supposed to be referred to a standing committee, reported back, and then referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate. Personally I should like to obviate those necessities, and I suppose it could be done by unanimous consent. I make the parliamentary inquiry now as to whether, notwithstanding the rule, the Senate could, by unanimous consent, proceed to consider and agree to the concurrent resolution.

The President pro tempore. It will be done by unanimous consent.

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. Barkley. I yield.

Mr. Ferguson. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the concurrent resolution.

Mr. Barkley. I think it would be appropriate to read the resolution first, for the information of the Senate. If I could obtain unanimous consent for its present consideration, I should be extremely happy.

The President pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be read for the information of the Senate.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 27) was read as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

"Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

"Sec 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.
“(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

“(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman.”

Mr. Barkley, Mr. President, in view of the Chair’s ruling that the concurrent resolution may now be considered by unanimous consent, without reference to a committee, I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the concurrent resolution and for its immediate adoption.

The President pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Kentucky?

Mr. White, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Lucas addressed the Chair.

The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. Barkley. I yield to the Senator from Maine. I have promised to yield to the Senator from Michigan, and later I shall yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. White. Mr. President, in all ordinary circumstances I should be moved to object to such a request as has been made, for I think that by and large we progress most wisely if we observe the rules of the Senate as to procedure in this body. But I believe there is so nearly unanimous sentiment of approval in this Chamber in respect to a resolution similar, if not identical, to that offered by the Senator from Kentucky that I have no purpose to object.

I do wish to say, Mr. President, that I know of at least one resolution of similar purport prepared by a Senator upon this side of the aisle whose purpose it was to introduce it at some proper time, but I take it that the two resolutions are not dissimilar in their object. Their purpose is the same; and so far as I am concerned, I am not going to object to the request made by the Senator from Kentucky. I think the Senate overwhelmingly approves the purpose of his resolution and of his request.

Mr. Barkley. I thank the Senator.

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President—

Mr. Barkley. I yield now to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, I had prepared to offer a concurrent resolution nearly identical in terms to the concurrent resolution which is now before the Senate. I merely had in mind that probably seven Members from each House would be better because of the question of attendance, but I should like in the time of the Senator from Kentucky to say a few things now in relation to why I believe a resolution such as the one which has just been read should [347] immediately be adopted.

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me to do so, I should like to make a remark in regard to his attitude and situation. I appreciate his attitude and his cooperation. I did not know that he contemplated the introduction of a resolution until I saw mention of it in the newspapers last night. But in the meantime I had already prepared mine and, as I have said, I had conferred with the President and with others about it. So it was not prepared and offered in any way for the purpose of interfering with the introduction of any other resolution. But I felt probably it should be offered and considered and, if possible, adopted immediately. So that the country will understand the Senate, and, I am sure, the House of Representatives, feel that they owe a public duty to go into this whole matter; and I wish the Senator from Michigan and all other Senators to know that I deeply appreciate the cooperation which seems evident in regard to the matter.

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, I appreciate and I understand the situation. It is not a question as to who introduces or offers the resolution, but it is a matter of having the job done. I should like to make a few remarks at this time regarding why I believe such a resolution should be adopted.

At the very outset I want to make clear precisely what I think should be investigated. The question is why our Army and Navy were not able either to avoid or to cope with the initial attack launched by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. Everybody—those who opposed the war and those who favored it —was shocked at the swift liquidation of our Pacific naval strength; I am
sure that everybody, men of every point of view—will agree that we ought to have the whole truth about this unfortunate event. The only question is as to how this inquiry should be made.

I am sure that no one will question that some inquiry is necessary. The President of the United States dispatched Secretary Knox to Hawaii immediately after the battle to investigate, because he felt the people ought to know the truth. In 5 days the Secretary of the Navy was back with his report. He said:

"The United States services were not on the alert against the surprise air attack on Hawaii. This fact calls for a formal investigation which will be initiated immediately by the President. Further action is, of course, dependent on the facts and recommendations made by this investigating board. We are all entitled to know it if (a) there was any error of judgment which contributed to the surprise, (b) if there was any dereliction of duty prior to the attack."

Only a few days later, the President named a commission of five, headed by Justice Owen J. Roberts, to go to Hawaii and make a fuller investigation. However, the Executive order for the Roberts inquiry read as follows:

"The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment on the part of the United States Army or Navy personnel!"

We in the Senate must note that it referred just to Army or Navy personnel—"contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned; and, if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor."

That meant that the commission could go only into the question of dereliction of duty or error of judgment of the Army and Navy personnel.

The report of that commission became a subject of endless discussion and questioning.

The last report of the War Department said that their Board had made a careful review of the record and exhibits of the Roberts commission. It further said that the Board had been materially helped and enlightened by the report and record of the Roberts commission, and that "we append to this report a section indicating the additional information and documents which have been made available as a result of our extended investigation, and which probably did not come to the attention of the Roberts commission; or at least were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents, or report of the Roberts commission."

In June 1944 Congress by resolution directed the Army and Navy to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe of December 7, 1941. Under that authority the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry filed their reports in October 1944. That was 9 months ago. But the nature of their findings was not made known until last week. This delay in turn created the impression in many minds that something was being suppressed. I do not wish to make any criticism of this myself. It can be argued that it would have been unwise to publish these findings while we were still engaged in active warfare and when unity of purpose and spirit against the enemy was essential. Some persons even claimed military security was involved. Nevertheless, men—being what they are—had their curiosity and their suspicions whetted about the contents of these reports by the very act of withholding them.

I am sure the officers charged with the investigations have performed their duties with a full sense of their responsibilities. Now that they have made known their conclusions the whole situation remains more clouded than ever.

Returning to the Army report, it says further:

"We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent letters, documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been secured."

We note that they do not say that all have been secured, but that "practically" all have been secured, "although we have found a few files from which important and vital papers are missing. In many instances we have found these documents elsewhere, or we were able to prove them through copies in other hands."

This quite clearly shows that the Army board felt the investigation was not complete. Neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Secretary of War was
satisfied with the report from the respective boards. When the Navy report was delivered to him last October, Secretary Forrestal said:

"The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted."

Last October, when the Army report was delivered to him, the Secretary of War said:

"In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible, and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material fact can be obtained, and I have given the necessary direction to accomplish this result.

Thereafter the Army detailed Lieutenant Colonel Clausen of the United States Army to continue an ex parte investigation into the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and the Navy Department detailed Vice Adm. Henry K. Hewitt to continue the Navy Department investigation as an ex parte investigation into the catastrophe.

While Admiral Kimmel was entitled to counsel and to take part in the proceedings before the Navy Board of Inquiry, General Short was entitled to counsel but had no right to take part in any of the proceedings. These continued investigations made by the Secretaries of War and Navy have not been given to the public. There is no evidence that the continued investigations dispose of the conflict between the two reports and fix the responsibility on the basis of persuasive evidence. That being true, Congress must try to find out the facts for the public and for itself. The two boards are quite far from being in agreement, and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have each issued critical opinions of the findings of their own boards.

The last published findings have added to the list of the accused names which are still more eminence than those of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. As matters now stand Admiral Stark, who was Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, and General Marshall, who led our armies through the great struggle just crowned with victory, and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, have been held to share in the guilt of the defeat. The President of the United States has agreed with some of the findings and has disagreed with others.

Certainly no responsible statesman will quarrel with the curiosity of the people about this now badly confused episode. The curiosity of the people about their public affairs is the safest bulwark of a republican government. There are too few nations left in which there is a public opinion. This court of public opinion is a valuable institution in the United States, and must be able to function.

It is a citizen's duty to be curious. But it is also his right to have the whole truth about even small matters, and, of course, for a greater reason to have the whole truth about a subject which has cost so much in the blood of our sons, and the treasure of our people.

But there is still another force to be recognized here. I refer to the American's sense of fair play. It is a powerful feature of our national character. First, we had two distinguished officers who were accused of neglect of duty, and removed from their commands. Everyone expected they would be tried. But they have never been tried. And because they are officers of the armed services they are not at liberty to talk up with the same freedom possessed by an accused private citizen. They have not had a trial and they have not even had the opportunity of defending their honor in the public press. I do not want to enter into a discussion of the conditions which may have made this possible.

The only point I want to make is that our Government cannot behave in this way without creating in the minds of the masses of our people a feeling of sympathy for these men. Our Government cannot afford to do this sort of thing. To do so violates a fundamental principle of conduct which our boys and girls learn in the very first years of their schooling, namely, the great principle of American fair play. It violates the fundamental principle of the right of the accused to a fair trial with the opportunity of presenting his side in public.

Every consideration—the demands of public policy, the obligation of justice to the men who fell in the battle, the duty of fair play to those who have been
acccused—cries out for some form of inquiry which will bring to light the whole truth.

Here we have Cordell Hull, a distinguished former Member of this body, publicly and officially charged with a dereliction of duty, partly responsible for the loss of thousands of lives. We cannot subject him to a court martial, but we must not permit that stain to remain on his name without invoking all the powers of the Government to uncover all the facts. He is entitled to have those facts produced. He is entitled to more than mere conclusions based on part of the facts. All the facts cannot be produced by an Army court martial of General Short, or a naval court martial of Admiral Kimmel. The Pearl Harbor tragedy was a single great episode in which many services, such as the Army, the Navy, and the State Department participated. The controversy relating to the subject cannot be settled by a group of trials and inquiries in which each service will be the judge of its own actions. There is in the Government no agency capable of examining the whole chapter and compelling the production of all the facts, except the Congress of the United States.

What is true of Mr. Hull is true of General Marshall. He has presided over our military forces in the greatest war of our history, and has, in the public mind, managed that great task with courage and ability, and certainly with success. On the very day of final victory he is confronted with the judgment of an Army board that the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, which began the war, was due in part to his failure to perform his duty. We cannot leave that slur upon the name of General Marshall without giving him the full benefit of a complete and unprejudiced publication of every fact. Here again we cannot do it in a court martial. General Marshall ought not to have to submit to a court martial, for if he escapes the judgment of any Army court martial he may run into a verdict of guilty against him in the eyes of the public by a Navy court martial of Admiral Kimmel, where he would have no right to defend himself.

All these men, Secretary Hull, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel, and General Short, have an inescapable claim upon the conscience of the American people for a full and honest inquiry into the whole incident, and that such inquiry be conducted by a Congress which will proceed in the open, with full opportunity for every side to participate in the proceedings.

I do not see how Congress can ignore the things that are being said throughout the country about all this subject. Newspapers and magazines have offered their versions of this distressful event, and millions of people have read the accounts. Whether they are true or false is not the question here. Some of them are certainly not true, because the numerous versions themselves contradict each other quite as freely as do the official versions. But this subject is one which must be set straight, and I can think of no way to do so except by a congressional investigation, and because it is so important, nothing less than a committee which represents both Houses of Congress should make the inquiry.

The reason why this inquiry is needed is as I have pointed out. The Roberts inquiry was limited by the Executive order. The Army report covers 304 pages, but when we reach page 241 it jumps suddenly to page 294. A whole chapter of 52 pages of the Army board’s findings has been omitted by order of Secretary Stimson. The Navy report contains a clause which indicates that the Navy board of inquiry was directed to leave out certain testimony. In fact, the Navy board said:

[341] “The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in these findings, the court having been informed that their disclosure would militate against the successful prosecution of the war.”

This tells us plainly that the Army board of review and Navy court of inquiry left these details out not on their own motion but under orders from the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy. Let us concede that there may have been a reason for omitting this testimony during the war; there is certainly no reason for hiding it now. It is unthinkable that the Congress and the public shall not have access to this testimony in order to appraise justly the correctness of the findings of the Army board and Navy court of inquiry.

There are points of serious difference between the Army and Navy board reports. For example, one of them fixes the date when General Marshall and Admiral Stark petitioned the President that no ultimatum be issued to Japan as of November 5, the other as of November 27—a very vital difference.

A congressional investigation is the only means of producing all the facts. All we have now are the conclusions of the Roberts commission and the conclu-
sions of the Army and Navy commissions, but the public has been denied all the facts and testimony on which these are based.

There is a feature of these reports which is certain to impair public confidence in them regardless of their internal soundness. In this whole episode not only the conduct of the leading commanders but of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State is involved. The press has already caught the significance of who was responsible for appointing the Army board and the Navy court of inquiry. It has been noted that neither report makes any criticism of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, but that the Army report goes out of its way to castigate the Secretary of State, who had no hand in appointing his judges. These are reasons why neither the Army, the Navy, nor the State Department, or any tribunals within them, should make the final investigations. It is also a reason why courts martial cannot properly determine all the facts of this case. Actually this is no longer a case where Kimmel and Short, Marshall and Stark, Stimson and Knox and Hull, along with various subordinate commanders of both services, are on trial. Stated more correctly, the case brings in the responsibilities of so many that what we have on trial is the Army, the Navy, and the State Department, and only Congress has the authority to find all the facts.

The Army report puts blame on General Marshall and Secretary Hull. The Secretary of War criticizes the findings of his own board and disagrees with the verdict against General Marshall. The President of the United States approved the verdict in part and criticized it in part. He dissented from the criticism of Secretary Hull and General Marshall. As disclosed by the Army report, Mr. Stimson furnished most of the testimony against Secretary Hull. Secretary Stimson declares that Hull gave the Japanese an ultimatum on November 26, while Secretary Hull stoutly denies this.

Whatever point there may be in these differences, which are merely samples which come to mind, the fact remains that a great deal of information which has been withheld because the war was raging at top height 9 months ago must now be made public.

If we, the Congress, do not do this, history will do it, and will also appraise our neglect.

Mr. Lucas and Mr. White addressed the Chair.

The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield, and if so, to whom?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I should like to make an inquiry with respect to the concurrent resolution. In section 2 I find the following:

"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941."

I should like to ask the able majority leader whether or not he considers that under this resolution the committee would have the power to investigate, let us say, what took place at Wake Island on the morning of the 7th of December 1941, or what took place in the Philippines on December 7, 1941, or the following day. In other words, are we going into the investigation of what transpired in the Pacific on December 7, 1941, or does the concurrent resolution confine the investigation solely to what happened at Pearl Harbor? Would the committee be able to make further investigation as to what happened in the Pacific at that time?

Mr. BARKLEY. In answer to the question propounded by the Senator, in my opinion the language of the concurrent resolution is broad enough to permit the committee to investigate anything which happened prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, or led up to it, the circumstances which produced it, as well as the consequences of the attack. I realize that it would be impossible to include in a single resolution reference to all the islands in the Pacific which were attacked either concurrently with the attack on Pearl Harbor or shortly thereafter. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the attack which precipitated the war, which brought us into the war, and all the controversy has revolved around the attack on Pearl Harbor. But I use the language "relating to the attack" so as to make it possible for the committee to investigate anything which took place prior to it, or any of the consequences which may have followed from the attack. The Philippine attack, the Guam attack, and the Wake Island attack were all within a radius of a few hours, and they were related to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So I think the language is sufficiently broad to cover those attacks.

Mr. WHITE. What the Senator from Kentucky has just said about the language "relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor" in
part answers the question I had in mind. The language "relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941" is in itself rather restricting. But the Senator has said it is his intention, and he thinks it is within the authority of the resolution, to have an investigation of all the facts and all the circumstances and all the events preceding the day of the attack upon Pearl Harbor which had any relation to that tragic day's events, and also anything which may have happened subsequent thereto which throws any light upon the occurrences preceding December 7 and happening on that day.

Mr. Barkley. The Senator from Maine is absolutely correct. Anything which relates itself to the attack, whether it occurred prior to the attack or whether it grew out of the attack, all has to do with the attack, because without that attack presumably we would not at that time have been involved in the war, we would not have declared war on the following day. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the key attack of the Japanese armed forces in that area, and these other attacks were incidental to it. So I think they all relate to the attack on Pearl Harbor, whether they happened prior to it or after that attack.

Mr. White. And the resolution gives practically plenary powers of investigation with respect to all matters which occurred before the time of Pearl Harbor or thereafter, which relate in any way to the occurrence of the attack?

Mr. Barkley. Yes. Whether those things happened in Washington, or whether they happened in the Philippine Islands, or whether they happened in Japan, or whether they happened anywhere else in the world—if they relate themselves, prior to or subsequently, to the attack, the committee can go into them. I think the language is broad enough to permit that.

Mr. Taft. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?


Mr. Taft. I have some doubt whether the resolution should not be amended to be somewhat broader, to include the Philippines; to include, so to speak, the Japanese attack on the United States. I assume that the Senator's remarks, however, will be brought to the attention of the House of Representatives when it considers the resolution, and if the language is too narrow that his remarks may have the effect of broadening it.

Mr. Barkley. Of course, the Senator realizes that I have no pride of language. I consulted with our experts in the framing of the resolution, and it was thought that its terms were broad enough to cover anything that had any connection with Pearl Harbor. As much as the attack on Pearl Harbor constituted the key event or episode around which all this investigation revolves, it seems to me that the committee would have plenary authority to go into any matter anywhere in the world that had anything to do with it. But if anyone can offer better language I certainly would not stand in opposition to it. I think, however, the language is broad enough. If we name Wake Island, the Philippines, and some other place, we run a risk, by naming more than the Pearl Harbor incident, of by inference excluding other things that the committee would undoubtedly want to go into.

Mr. Taft. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. Barkley. Yes.

Mr. Taft. Does the Senator consider that the language is broad enough to go back to the beginning of the war, that is, I mean to the general policy, the application of the Neutrality Act, the shipment of scrap, and so forth?

Mr. Barkley. Yes. I think it is broad enough to go back to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria or to any other period in past history that can in any way be connected with or related to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Taft. Mr. President, since the Senator is the author of the concurrent resolution, and since that is his interpretation of it, I am willing to accept that interpretation.

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. Barkley. I yield.

Mr. Ferguson. The language I had prepared was that "the committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts surrounding the attack and the events and circumstances leading to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii December 7, 1941." But I am glad to have the explanation of the able majority leader that his language is intended to cover this entire field. I think that the battles of the Philippines and of Guam and elsewhere were merely battles in our war.

Mr. Barkley. We were practically at war when those things happened.

Mr. Ferguson. Yes; that is right. The spark was ignited, or the button was pushed, as was said in the report, by the attack at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. BARKLEY. That is correct.

Mr. FERGUSON. That was the initial attack.

Mr. BARKLEY. Yes.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I wish to associate myself completely with what the Senator from Kentucky has stated today, and I think he has rendered a very great public service to his country. I do not mean to intimate any doubt as to the concurrent resolution containing language properly calculated to implement what the Senator has said.

I recognize, however, the very great importance of what we are doing, and that, under well-settled rules of parliamentary construction, the language of the concurrent resolution, if unambiguous, must control, irrespective of the very illuminating discussions here, and of anything which the Senator himself may have said.

I do feel that, having delayed 4 years the consideration of this matter by the Congress, certainly the public interest will not be seriously prejudiced if we should delay 24 hours, and send the concurrent resolution to an appropriate standing committee which may consider this whole question as to whether or not the language is calculated to carry out what is obviously the unanimous desire of the Senate.

I hesitate to be the only Member who apparently is concerned, but I frankly do feel that this matter should go to the appropriate standing committee.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator that I hope nothing will happen today in the Senate which will create the impression that we are quibbling over the adoption of the concurrent resolution. If any broadening or any change might have to be made to the language, since the measure must go to the House, I myself will take the responsibility of conferring with the Members of the House who will be interested in the matter, with the view of broadening the language as may seem necessary; and I hope the Senate, under those circumstances, will not object to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I frankly do not possess the agility of mind which is possessed by the 95 other Members of the Senate to render an opinion from the very hasty consideration given this matter on the floor of the Senate today, as to whether or not this concurrent resolution implements the marvelously adequate speech of the Senator from Kentucky. I do think that not only his interest but that of the country and of the Senate will be served by at least pausing to consider whether or not this concurrent resolution is well calculated to carry out what is obviously our unanimous purpose. I think the suggestion that the 24 hours delay, which is all that would be required to send the matter to an appropriate standing committee, cannot have great weight.

Mr. BARKLEY. Of course I do not know how long it would take a standing committee to meet and deliberate about the matter.

Mr. BREWSTER. To which committee does the Senator from Kentucky consider the matter should go?

Mr. BARKLEY. It would go, according to the advice I have received from the parliamentarian, to the Committee on Naval Affairs. It might go to either the Committee on Military Affairs or to the Committee on Naval Affairs, but inasmuch as Pearl Harbor was a naval base, and the greater proportion of the damage was done to the Navy, it has seemed appropriate that it go to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Mr. BREWSTER. Well, I feel that certainly that committee could meet quickly.

Mr. BARKLEY. There is another matter involved. If the concurrent resolution is sent to the Committee on Naval Affairs under the rule and comes back to the Senate it must then go to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, which would involve further delay. I think no substantial loss, either in the matter of broadening the resolution, or anything connected with it, would be incurred by allowing it to be adopted now without having to go through the routine of two committees before we can secure action.

Mr. BREWSTER. What I anticipate will almost inevitably occur, if the proposed action is taken, is that when it goes to the House the scope of the resolution will there be broadened, and I will much prefer that the Senate should now undertake to place in the concurrent resolution language which will carry out what is obviously now the unanimous desire of the Senate, rather than to rely on the House to amend language which may be deemed as not entirely clear, particularly as the Members of the House will not have the benefit of the very splendid
explanation made by the Senator from Kentucky as to what he intends by the [34th] resolution.

Mr. Barkley. I entertain no jealousy on my part toward the House in the matter of amending anything the Senate may adopt. We frequently exercise that right in the Senate. If the House should see fit to broaden the language, unless it, by broadening the language, thinned it out and watered it down, I certainly would have no objection. But I think it important that we get to work on this bill at once without creating the impression that we are seeking to cause delay, through any technicalities, or through any effort of evasion, or in any other way.

Mr. Brewster. I certainly share the desire of the Senator from Kentucky for expedition, but as I said before, having waited 4 years, I am certain that we can safely wait 4 days more, and I think the country will be much more impressed with the deliberateness of our consideration if that course is taken.

Mr. Barkley. I do not think the country will have any doubt about our deliberateness. We have been talking about this matter ever since it occurred. We have debated it on the floor of the Senate time and time again in connection with the extension of the statute of limitations. I do not think that any impression of hasty action on our part, can be gotten from the adoption of the concurrent resolution now. I think it would be a wholesome example to the country and to every one concerned if we could handle it in the way now proposed.

Mr. Brewster. There is one thing about the language which gives me concern, and which I should certainly like to consider. The language is, "the facts relating to the attack by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii." As I understand, a very intimate part of that attack involved two silk-hatted gentlemen who spent the time during the attack with Secretary Hull. Whether they were a part of the armed forces may perhaps be a matter of debate. I believe that what occurred in connection with all those events is very intimately concerned with the attack, and I should not want any language to be calculated to limit our inquiry.

Mr. Barkley. The Senator is too good a parliamentarian and too good a draftsman to assume that the language ought to be amended so as to mention specifically the silk-hatted gentlemen to whom he has reference.

Mr. Brewster. But I do not like to exclude them by saying "Japanese armed forces."

Mr. Barkley. They are not excluded.

Mr. Brewster. They are certainly not included in that language.

Mr. Barkley. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred while they were here carrying on negotiations with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State received notice of the attack while they were in his office. Certainly that circumstance is related to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Brewster. I think it might well be a debatable question as to whether they are included within the term "Japanese armed forces."

Mr. Barkley. These things are all related to that attack. Whether they were members of the armed forces or not is not very important, because they certainly did not themselves make the attack in person when they were conferring with the Secretary of State in Washington.

Mr. Brewster. I should say that they were a most essential element.

Mr. Vandenberg. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. Barkley. I yield.

Mr. Vandenberg. The language contained in the resolution submitted by the able junior Senator from Michigan [Mr. Ferguson] was given very careful consideration, and from our point of view it has had the sort of study which the Senator from Maine has indicated. I am sure the language fully meets the purpose of the Senator from Kentucky. Would there be any objection to changing the first sentence in section 2, which now reads, "The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii?" so as to read "The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts surrounding the attack and the events and circumstances leading up to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii?"

Mr. Barkley. I see no substantial difference between the words "relating to" and the word "surrounding." However, I have no objection to the remainder of that language. I believe that the words "relating to" are more appropriate than the word "surrounding," but I certainly would have no objection to including the phrase "leading up to," which could be inserted after the words "relating to."

Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. Barkley. I yield.

Mr. Ferguson. I was somewhat concerned as to whether to use the words "relating to" or the word "surrounding." I think they mean the same thing in relation to this event. If the able senior Senator from Michigan would use the words "relating to," and then add the words "the events and circumstances," I think that would cover the objection of the Senator from Maine.

Mr. Barkley. I had in mind also the question as to whether additional language, which would specifically apply to previous events leading up to the attack, should be included; but I did not include it for the reason, as I have explained, that I thought the words "relating to" covered it fully, and included events both prior to and subsequent to the attack. However, I have no objection to inserting, after the words "relating to" the language suggested by the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. Vandenberg. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. Barkley. I yield.

Mr. Vandenberg. The language would then read:

"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii."

Mr. Barkley. I have no objection to that language.

Mr. Lucas. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. Barkley. I yield.

Mr. Lucas. May I ask whether or not that language would prevent us from investigating anything subsequent to the attack? We talk about everything leading up to the attack.

Mr. Vandenberg. And subsequent.

Mr. Lucas. The word "subsequent" is not in there.

Mr. Barkley. We can say "leading up to or following the attack."

Mr. Vandenberg. I believe that would cover it.

Mr. Barkley. I have no desire to cut off the investigation at any particular date if it has any relationship to this attack, or the consequences of it.

The President pro tempore. The Senator has the right to modify his concurrent resolution.

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, I will modify the concurrent resolution by inserting after the words "relating to," the words "the events and circumstances leading up to or following."

Mr. Walsh. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. Barkley. I yield.

Mr. Walsh. Before the vote is taken on the resolution, which I hope will be unanimous, I wish to take occasion to compliment the distinguished majority leader upon the magnificent and generous manner in which he has responded to the overwhelming popular sentiment of the country. He has not only done that, but he has relieved us all of many hours of anxiety, lifted this question above partisanship, and made an appeal for what the country wants—a high-minded, clean, judicial investigation of all the facts connected with the Pearl Harbor disaster. I wish to say to him that he has exercised statesmanlike judgment on many occasions in the past, but never of a loftier character than today. He has never rendered a better public service. He has not only rendered a service by responding to the public demand, but he has removed all doubts or questions as to the sincerity of our present Government and of the Navy Department in their willingness to have the whole story told truthfully and candidly. As chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, before which this problem has been pending by reason of petitions filed with us, I wish to compliment the Senator from Kentucky and thank him for the service which he has rendered the country.

Mr. Barkley. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the remarks of the Senator. The President pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Kentucky that the concurrent resolution, as modified, be immediately considered, without reference to a committee? The Chair hears none.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 27), as modified, was agreed to, as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than
three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

"Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

"Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

"Sec. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

"(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

"(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent funds of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman."

Mr. Barkeley. Mr. President, I did not intend, at the outset, to take so much time at this hour, but I hope it has been well spent.

[35] (Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Counsel may go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think if counsel spoke into the microphone we could better hear, rather than if he stood up.

Mr. Mitchell. I have never tried a case with my nose in a microphone, but I will do my best.

The Chairman. I am sure you will do all right, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell. You would like me to keep my seat?

Senator Brewster. I think so.

Mr. Mitchell. There are two master exhibits which have been distributed to the committee. They will be referred to by innumerable witnesses on the stand, and I think this is the appropriate time to present them.

One is a document, printed in the Government Printing Office, entitled "Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government Between July 1 and December 8, 1941." These were messages, in code, intercepted by our services, decoded and translated. They were exchanged between the Japanese Government and its Embassy at Washington, and include the responses from Washington to Tokyo. There are a few of them that are diplomatic messages from Japan to their Ambassadors in other nations.

They are arranged chronologically in the order in which they were sent. We will not refer to them this morning, I think, but will shortly. The document, of course, will be supported later au-
thentically by detail witnesses, but for the present we present it to the reporter as Exhibit 1.

The Chairman. Are those to be printed at this point in the record?

Mr. Mitchell. No, they are already printed by the Government Printing Office, and they are available in this form to the committee. We will mark it "Exhibit 1," but the reporter will not have to transcribe it.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1")

The Vice Chairman. That is one of the documents that was supplied to the committee?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, not long ago; I think yesterday.

Senator Brewster. Are copies of that now available to the press?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. This is being received in evidence as exhibit 1?

The Chairman. Yes. It is filed with the committee as exhibit 1, and will be referred to specifically, as I understand it, by witnesses later.

Mr. Mitchell. And it is wide open once it is offered.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to be sure of. It is a part of the record.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

[37] Senator Brewster. That was the one that was received by us yesterday?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

The next exhibit, I have marked "Exhibit 2." This is another volume of Japanese messages from their Government and their people around the world relating to military installations, ship movements, and so forth. The first exhibit we will call the diplomatic messages, because they related to diplomatic negotiations, but this one is concerned with the military installations, reports from their espionage people in different places, and matters of that kind. That volume also includes documents in code, intercepted, decoded, and translated by our cryptanalytic units, and they are arranged in chronological order.

I present that as Exhibit 2 so that it may be available to every witness.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 2.")

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry as to whether counsel claims that is all the information: are these two exhibits now complete?

Mr. Mitchell. There may be additional information. I do not claim, Senator, that anything we have is final or complete. We will see after we get going whether you are satisfied with what is produced.

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to have the record show as to whether or not it is purported that these are complete.

[38] Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. These are selected messages that seem pertinent to the case, and it is always open, if there is any inquiry by anybody on the committee that we are asked to pursue, why, we will pursue it further.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not copies of Exhibit 2 have been supplied the individual members of this committee?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Were they included in the packet given us yesterday?

Mr. Mitchell. They are earlier than that.
Senator Brewster. That was delivered to us on November 13, I think.

Mr. Gesell. I think it was early this week.

Senator Brewster. Yes; Tuesday of this week, I think.

The Chairman. All right. You may go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, in the previous investigations that have been held, scores of witnesses and thousands of pages of testimony were taken on piecing together the story of the situation at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and to describe the incidents of the attack.

If this committee were to pursue that same course, it might take 2 or 3 weeks for that kind of testimony.

We have, in an effort to save time of the committee, had prepared by the Army and the Navy jointly, under our direction, a narrative and detailed statement, based upon reports and material available in those departments, of the conditions prevailing at Pearl Harbor on that day, and the events that took place. We have tried to eliminate, and I think we have, every question that is in controversy, every matter of fact that hasn't clearly been established, and any question of responsibility.

I think the officers who are presenting that for us have followed that schedule.

This isn't intended to foreclose the fact on anything. It is a picture of the conditions that existed on the 7th and things that happened, and if there is any question that arises later as to whether it is accurate or not, of course, it will be open to the taking of eyewitness testimony. And there are also many questions, doubtless, that aren't covered by the statement, because they are not yet fully established, or in controversy, that will have to be filled in by eyewitnesses.

The officers who have done this work for us are Rear Adm. T. B. Inglis, of the Navy, and Col. Bernard Thielen, of the Army, and we would like to have them sworn.

The Chairman. Which one do you want first?

Mr. Mitchell. The narrative statement is a consolidated one. It is not a Navy or an Army statement. It is all woven together, and these gentlemen ought to be sworn together, and they will pick up portions of it and pass the ball as they go along.

The Chairman. Will the two witnesses referred to arise, and be sworn?

(The witnesses were sworn by the Chairman.)

The Chairman. Be seated.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the men taking pictures complete their work before we get started.

The Chairman. The photographers may get their pictures and then clear this space in here.

The committee, in executive session, decided that the order of procedure, so far as the examination of witnesses is concerned, shall be that counsel should be first permitted to examine the witnesses without interruption; that upon the conclusion of his examination, members of the committee will alternate from the Chair right and left between the members from the Senate and the House, and they will ask such questions as they have, and following that, counsel for any witness who has counsel will be permitted to examine the witness himself.

So, gentlemen, we will now proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS, UNITED STATES NAVY, AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN, UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Inglis, what is your status in the Navy now?
Admiral Inglis. I am attached to the Office of Naval Operations as Chief of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Mitchell. How long have you been in that post?
Admiral Inglis. I have had that particular post for about 1 week.

Mr. Mitchell. What were you doing before that?
Admiral Inglis. Before that I was Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you had in your naval work the task at times to prepare material and documents and review the facts and do work of that kind?
Admiral Inglis. I have had something over 31 years of naval experience, and during this time I have served on several admirals' staffs. More recently, my duties in the Navy Department do require that I prepare evaluations and studies somewhat comparable to this we are discussing this morning.

Mr. Mitchell. What duty were you engaged in on December 7, 1941?
Admiral Inglis. I was commanding officer of the [42] U. S. S. Algerab, which was a ship in the Atlantic Ocean at that time. On that particular date, my ship and I were in port in New York.

Mr. Mitchell. Had you been stationed at the Pearl Harbor base previously to that?
Admiral Inglis. I have never had shore duty at Pearl Harbor. I have visited Pearl Harbor on numerous occasions on board ships.

Mr. Mitchell. So you are familiar with the locality?
Admiral Inglis. I am generally familiar with the locality; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You prepared here, in connection with Colonel Thielen, a narrative statement from the official records and other data available to you?
Admiral Inglis. I have, sir, with the assistance of officers under my control.

Mr. Mitchell. You were instructed, or asked by counsel to eliminate matters that were in dispute or questions of responsibility, or questions where your reports and records showed a point of fact had not been clearly established?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, and we have done our best to carry out that directive.

Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Thielen, what is your status in the Army today?
[43] Colonel Thielen. I am a member of the War Department General Staff, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you been stationed at Pearl Harbor?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I was stationed there from 1934 through 1936.

Mr. Mitchell. Where were you on duty on December 7, 1941?
Colonel Thielen. I was instructor at the United States Military Academy.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you had occasion in your work to do the sort of thing that I asked Admiral Inglis about, preparing documents and related material?

Colonel Thielem. Yes, sir. That is my normal duty.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, you gentlemen proceed as you have prepared your work and give us this narrative statement of the conditions at Pearl Harbor on December 7, and what occurred there.

Admiral Inglis. I propose to start this presentation with a brief description —

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, do we have copies of this statement?

Mr. Gesell. No, Senator; there are no mimeographed copies of the statement. There are before each member of the committee two basic folders which I show you now, the Navy folder of exhibits and charts, and the Army folder, which is the red envelope, large red envelope. I suggest that those are the two basic documents that each member of the committee will wish to have before him to follow this presentation.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, it was my understanding that if there were any prepared statements we would have them 24 hours in advance. Was that not the understanding?

The Chairman. Well, it wasn't the Chair's understanding that that rule applied at this preliminary testimony here.

The witnesses who were to testify after this groundwork was laid as to what happened on that day would present to the committee copies of their written statements in advance.

Senator Brewster. It is equally essential here, I think. Do you have prepared statements we can have now?

Mr. Gesell. We haven't considered these were prepared statements, Senator. The charts and schedules which contain the basic information are all before the members of the committee. There is going to be a good deal of ad libbing on the charts. It is not quite in the nature of a prepared statement. For that reason it is not before the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Has counsel had a copy of this prepared statement, and if so, when did he get it?

Mr. Gesell. We have no copy, Senator, and we have never had a copy of any prepared statements from either of these witnesses.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, will it be understood that after today the rule will apply?

The Chairman. It will apply to witnesses. Whether it will apply after today I don't know. I can't tell how soon these witnesses will be through.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. We didn't understand that this type of prepared statement came within the rule, but we will have it mimeographed and furnish it to the members of the committee as rapidly as possible, and if you want the witnesses recalled we will be happy to recall them.

The Chairman. The Chair might also state that arrangements have been made with the reporters taking this testimony to provide each member a copy of the day's testimony on the following morning, and I think they will be able to furnish it to the members on the evening the testimony has been brought forward.
Senator Brewster. Fine.
The CHAIRMAN. We will have it as soon as possible.
Mr. Mitchell. You may proceed, Admiral.
Admiral Inglis. I propose to start this presentation with a brief description of the geography of the Hawaiian Islands and their relation to the whole Pacific Ocean area.
Commander Biard has a chart which has the title up in the upper right-hand corner “Disposition of United States Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941.”
I will ask the committee to refer to that chart and also to item No. 1, which is a reproduction of that chart, and which is contained in the white folder which has been given to each member of the committee.
It will be seen that Pearl Harbor is on the southern or lee side of the island of Oahu, which is one of the eight principal islands of the Hawaiian chain. These eight Hawaiian Islands lie in a strategically and commercially important position in the North Pacific Ocean approximately 2,000 nautical miles west to southwest of San Francisco.
Commander Biard is pointing out these distances and directions as we proceed.
Oahu is the most important of the islands because of the excellent enclosed fleet anchorage at Pearl Harbor and the commercial port of Honolulu. It is 3,430 nautical miles southeast of Tokyo, 4,685 nautical miles northwest of Panama, 1,990 nautical miles south of Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands and 4,767 nautical miles east of Manila.
A table of distance from Pearl Harbor and other important points in the Pacific is item 2 of the Navy folder. In this connection, it must be remembered that a nautical mile is approximately 1 3/4 land miles.
The islands have a mild subtropical climate with moderate seasonal changes of temperature. They lie in the path of the steady north-easterly trade winds; therefore, the northern portions of Oahu and the immediate adjacent waters are characterized by fresh winds from a northerly direction. The force of the trades is broken by the configuration of the lands so that to the south of Oahu the seas are relatively smooth.
Commander Biard, will you point to the other chart, please, showing the island of Oahu? That is the lee of the island, where the winds and seas are more moderate than on the windward side.
Much of the moisture of the trade winds is deposited on the high peaks to the north forming mist and clouds. Because of this, the visibility to the south of the islands is better than to the north. Further, the northern fringe of the trade belt lies roughly about 300 to the north of Oahu—will you point that out? Three hundred miles to the north of Oahu there is a belt characterized by low ceilings, poor visibility, squalls, and rain.
The Hawaiian chain of islands and adjacent waters are shown in item 3 of the Navy folder. It may be seen from this chart that the sea area around the Hawaiian Islands was on December 7, 1941, divided into certain restricted fleet training areas where units and aircraft of the fleet might carry out exercises and target practices. This same chart also shows two defensive sea areas off Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe. These defensive sea areas were designated by the Presi-
dent of the United States and entry of all merchant ships, both United States and foreign, and of all foreign men-of-war was prohibited unless specific permission for such entry had been granted by the Secretary of the Navy.

The next item is a rather puzzling question of time, difference of time, in different parts of the world.

Time varies throughout the world. For instance, when going from Washington, D. C., to Chicago it is necessary for a traveler to adjust his watch upon arrival in Chicago, because Chicago time is 1 hour behind that in Washington. Comparable changes of time occur whenever the traveler moves about the world.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor at 7:55 on the morning of December 7, 1941, it was 1:25 in the afternoon of the same day in Washington, D. C., and was 3:25 a.m., December 8, in Tokyo.

[50] Item 4 of the Navy folder is a table showing comparative times and dates for Greenwich, England, Washington, D. C., San Francisco, Hawaii, Tokyo, and Manila on December 6, 7, and 8, 1941.

The time of sunrise on the morning of December 7, 1941, the beginning of morning twilight was 5:06 a.m., Hawaiian time, and sunrise was 6:26 a.m., Hawaiian time. That is an hour and twenty minutes before sunrise.

Proceeding next to the composition of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, on the 7th of December 1941 the Pacific Fleet was numerically two-thirds the size of the Atlantic Fleet but the Pacific Fleet contained more modern and more heavily armed vessels.

Next, the commanders of major units of the United States Pacific Fleet:

The commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, who was also the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, was Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

The force commanders were commander, battle force, Vice Adm. W. S. Pye; commander, scouting force, Vice Adm. Wilson Brown; commander, base force, Rear Adm. W. L. Calhoun.

The type commanders, and by “type” I mean the type or classification of the ships which they commanded:

Commander battleships, battle force, Rear Adm. W. S. Anderson.
Commander cruisers, battle force, Rear Adm. H. F. Leary.
Commander mine craft, battle force, Rear Adm. W. R. Furlong.
Commander cruisers, scouting force, Rear Adm. J. H. Newton.
Commander submarines, scouting force, Rear Adm. Thomas Withers.
Commander aircraft, scouting force, Rear Adm. J. S. McCain.
Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Rear Adm. C. C. Bloch.

And in explanation of the relationship between the Fourteenth Naval District and the commander in chief, the Fourteenth Naval District was a subordinate command of the commander in chief Pacific Fleet and in this respect differed from the then usual practice in the continental United States.

The Fourteenth Naval District included the Hawaiian Islands,


79716—46—pt. 1—5
Commander Biard, will you just draw an imaginary line about the Fourteenth Naval District? Just circle it with your wand, will you?

The disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet outside of the continental United States at 8 a.m., December 7 was roughly as follows:

The main body of the fleet in Pearl Harbor comprised 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 49 other vessels such as submarines, mine craft, tenders, transports, and miscellaneous small craft.

Those are the ships that were in Pearl Harbor. We will go into greater detail on that a little further along in the discussion.

You may also refer to the chart in item No. 1, Navy folder, for the location in detail and the naming of these ships.

In addition to that, item 5 of the Navy folder contains a complete list of every ship in the Pacific Fleet.

Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey consisted of one aircraft carrier (Enterprise), three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers. It was about 200 miles west of Oahu, en route to Pearl Harbor after having ferried Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island.

That task force was coming back from Wake Island to Pearl Harbor.

Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton consisted of one aircraft carrier (Lexington), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. It was about 460 miles southeast of Midway, en route to Midway from Pearl Harbor with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers.

Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown consisted of one heavy cruisers and five destroyer minesweepers. It had just arrived off Johnston Island to conduct tests of a new type landing craft.

One heavy cruiser, with four destroyer minesweepers, was in the fleet operating area about 25 miles south of Oahu conducting exercises.

The heavy cruiser Pensacola with an eight-ship convoy west-bound was in the Samoan area. More will be said about convoys later.

The heavy cruiser Louisville with a two-ship convoy east-bound was near the Solomons.

Two submarines and a cargo ship were in the Midway area and a similar group in the Wake area.

Two tankers were about half way between Hawaii and the west coast of the United States.

Some smaller units of the fleet were in positions as follows: One destroyer (Ward), concerning which more will be said later, was patrolling off the entrance of Pearl Harbor; one destroyer in company with a submarine was about 60 miles southwest; three submarines were 200 miles east of Oahu; the seaplane tender Wright was 300 miles west, and four auxiliaries were in Honolulu and Lahina Roads.

The remaining units of the United States Pacific Fleet are shown on the chart as item 1 of the Navy folder.

A detailed list giving the names and locations of United States naval ships of the Pacific Fleet is item 5 of the Navy folder.

Turning next to the location of cargo ships and troop carriers:

About 25 cargo and troop carriers which were United States owned or chartered were west of Hawaii at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. As shown on the chart (item 1, Navy folder), eight of these, including one Navy and three Army troop transports and four ships
carrying general cargo bound for the Philippines, were in the Samoan area, escorted by the heavy cruiser Pensacola. Two Army troop transports were in the Solomons area bound for Pearl Harbor, escorted by the heavy cruiser Louisville. Four independently routed ships without escorts carrying general cargo were between 700 and 1,200 miles southwest of Hawaii westward bound, while another, eastbound, was in the same area. One vessel was at Canton Island, four in Australia, one in New Guinea, one in Java, and three in the Manila area. All troop carriers were being escorted.

All of the west-bound ships had left Honolulu from 2 to 9 days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, routed and dispatched from there by the port director, Fourteenth Naval District.

A detailed list of these ships and their locations is item 6 of the Navy folder.

There was no United States or Allied shipping of consequence along the North Pacific trade routes west of the 180th meridian on December 7, 1941.

Those thin black lines represent the great circle course to the Orient from Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Puget Sound.

Mr. Inglis. You mean the regular ship lanes?

Mr. Inglis. The regular, normal shipping lanes used in time of peace.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. Those great circle courses are the shortest distances between those points. That is because of the Mercator projection on the chart. A straight line is not the shortest distance between two points on such a chart.

[56] The Chief of Naval Operations, on November 25, 1941, directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through the Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea.

Senator Ferguson. May I have that date again, please?

Admiral Inglis. The name? Torres.

Senator Ferguson. No, the date.

Admiral Inglis. Oh, the date? November 25, 1941.

Therefore, the usual shipping lanes, as shown on the maps of the North Pacific, were not being followed, but rather all ships were being routed as indicated—from Honolulu via Suva in the Fijis and thence to Australia, or via the Torres Strait to the Philippines. Ships destined for Guam were routed via the Philippines, thus avoiding as much as possible the sea area controlled by the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific.

Trans-Pacific shipping lanes, both the usual lanes and those being followed just prior to and on December 7, 1941, are shown in item 1 in thin black lines.

Passing next to a description of the Navy installations ashore in the Hawaiian Islands; except for Pearl Harbor itself these are all classified as minor United States naval installations and were naturally integrated in the over-all defense of the islands, of which Pearl Harbor was the focal point.

[57] I will ask the committee now to refer to item 3-A of the folder and Commander Biard is going to point to the Army chart, on which we have a Navy overlay.
On the island of Molokai there was the Homestead Field Naval Air Base, which consisted of a runway, a warming-up platform and supporting installations.

On the island of Maui there was the Puumene Naval Air Base, which consisted of runways; a warming-up platform, and a CAA Territorial landing field.

Also on Maui was the Maalaea naval emergency landing field, which consisted of two runways and other supporting installations.

On the island of Hawaii, the largest island in the group, there was the naval radio station at Hilo.

On the most important island of the group, Oahu, although not the largest, there was a naval air station at Ewa, which consisted of a mooring mast, a landing mat, and supporting installations.

At the naval air station, Kaneohe, on the opposite side of the island, was a landing mat and warming-up platform and supporting installations and also a seaplane base.

At Kahaiku Point, up at the north end of the island, there was an emergency landing field.

At Lualualei, a naval radio station, transmitting station.

At Wahiawa, in the interior, a naval radio receiving station.

At Heeia, a naval radio transmitting station, and at Wailupe a naval radio receiving station.

If the committee will now turn to item 7 in the Navy folder you will find a chart of the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

That is a reproduction of the smallish chart that has just been mounted on the easel.

You will see that the only entrance is from the south via an entrance channel blasted through the fringing coral reef which had formerly blocked the entrance to the harbor. This channel extending to the harbor entrance proper was 375 yards wide and 3,500 yards long, with a minimum depth of 43 feet. The entrance proper to Pearl Harbor is between Keahi Point and Holokaihi Point. From here the channel leads to the various lochs and passages which form the harbor.

I think I should explain at this time that the word "l-o-c-h" is used occasionally throughout this presentation and indicates an arm of the harbor, or perhaps the Scotch would call it a "wake," although it is not fresh water. It is not a "lock" as used in connection with canals.

The ramifications of the harbor are shown on the chart, item 8 of the Navy folder, and also on the chart which has just been mounted on the left-hand easel.

You will see on that chart that the water surface is illustrated by a blue color and the land surface by a white color. The positions of certain ships are marked in red, but I will ask you to disregard that for the moment. We will come back to those later on.

There were varying depths in the harbor, as shown by soundings on the chart. Those tiny black figures show the soundings.
The major channels or the main channels and water in the vicinity of the major ships' berths had a depth of 40 feet. From the sea buoys to the large drydocks a portion of the channel had a minimum depth of 45 feet to provide for the entrance and docking of damaged vessels. The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective nets. Here the channel through the coral reefs was about 400 yards wide and the depth was from 41 to 50 feet. The nets themselves consisted of a combined antitorpedo net and antiboot boom to seaward and an inner antitorpedo net without the boat boom.

[60] You see, there are two nets there. The barrier one has antiboats, which are usually cross-armed with spikes to prevent surface craft from sliding up over the boom. Of course, the nets down below the buoys are to stop torpedoes and also submarines proceeding under water.

The standard net is 30 feet deep and when suspended covers a depth of 35 feet. Because the channel was of a greater depth, the Chief of Naval Operations instructed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to suspend the inner net 15 feet, making a total coverage of 45 feet.

The Pearl Harbor fleet base included every type of naval activity. Many of the installations operable at that time were new, having been built subsequent to August 1939. Major installations in operation were, at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor: One battleship dock, built 1928; one battleship dock, under construction; one floating drydock, 18,000 tons; one large repair basin, supporting industrial establishments for repairs to anything afloat; one fuel depot with two tank farms above ground—as you all know, a tank farm is a collection of fuel-oil storage tanks; one submarine base—all services for war conditions; [61] one section base—inshore patrol and harbor entrance control post.

And then, of course, there was the administrative office of the Fourteenth Naval District which was inside the navy yard.

At the naval air station—Ford Island, which is the large island at the center of the harbor—there was a large flying field, warming-up platform, seaplane parking areas, and supporting installations.

Next we come to the ships present at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. You can refer again to item 8 in the white folder.

Eight battleships of between 29,000 and 33,000 tons each were among the ships of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Units of the fleet were located as follows:

The battleships Nevada—Commander Biard is pointing those out now; those battleships are shown in red and they are as precisely as we can make them to scale.

The Nevada, Arizona, West Virginia, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Maryland, and California were moored on the southeast side of Ford Island; the Pennsylvania in drydock No. 1 at the navy yard.

Two heavy cruisers, New Orleans and San Francisco, of the 10,000-ton type, were at docks in the navy yard repair basin.

[62] Four light cruisers of the 10,000-ton type were berthed as follows: St. Louis, Honolulu, Helena at navy yard docks, and Phoenix moored northeast of Ford Island.

Two light cruisers of the 7,000-ton type, Raleigh and Detroit, were moored on the northwest side of Ford Island.
Twenty-nine destroyers (all but three of which had been completed since 1933) were moored to the north and west of Ford Island. There were five submarines, four of which were tied up at the submarine base, and the fifth at Ten-ten dock in the navy yard.

That dock is called Ten-ten dock because it is 1,010 feet long.

One gunboat was tied up at a navy yard dock. Nine minelayers (eight of which were converted flush-deck destroyers) were located at navy yard docks and in middle loch.

Eleven minesweepers (five of which were converted flush-deck destroyers) moored in middle loch and at navy yard docks.

Twenty-three fleet auxiliaries, such as repair ships, oilers, tenders, store ships, and tugs were located at various berths throughout the harbor.

There were no aircraft carriers in port.

All battleships of the Pacific Fleet except the Colorado, which was in the Navy Yard, Puget Sound, were present, in Pearl Harbor.

Item 9 of the white folder gives a list of the vessels present at the time of the attack.

In accordance with existing fleet orders, the vessels of the Pacific Fleet except those undergoing navy yard overhaul maintained condition of readiness 3 while in the harbor. This condition at that time varied according to the armaments of the various types of ships but, in general, required that about one-fourth of the antiaircraft batteries and necessary control stations be manned and that ready ammunition be at the guns. Vessels likewise were limited in the degree to which they could disable their propulsive machinery. In general, most vessels were on 12 hours' notice.

By "12 hours' notice" I mean that the ships were required to be able to get under way 12 hours after receiving the order to get under way.

I will ask Colonel Thielen to pick up from this point.

Colonel THIELEN. Very well.

[62] The Army's report, of course, roughly parallels that which Admiral Inglis has just completed for the Navy. That is, it takes up the Army organization in that area and the disposition of Army units, with their strength indicated.

The Hawaiian Islands were organized for joint defense as the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The Army command was designated as the Hawaiian Department. On February 7, 1941, Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short relieved Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.

The principal elements of the Department were two infantry divisions and supporting ground troops composing the beach and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery command, consisting of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense forces; and the Hawaiian Air Force.

On December 6, 1941, General Short had approximately 43,000 troops under his command, disposed as shown in detail on pages 1 to 5 of the Army exhibit which the committee has and which lists the unit locations by district, with an indication of the strength of each unit and the station at which located.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Army exhibits are in the brown folder.

Mr. GESELL. It is the mimeographed folder in a brown folder, I think.

Mr. MITCHELL. Go ahead.
Colonel ThieLEN. On the small chart there is the indication of the major units as distributed in the various islands of the group. A reproduction of that chart, is in the hands of each member of the committee.

In the Kauai district we had the Third Battalion, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry—less Companies K and L—and attached troops; Company C, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry; First Platoon, Signal Company Aircraft Warning; Air Corps Detachment.

In the Maui district we had the First Battalion, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry, less Company C, and attached troops; Company K, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry, Molokai; Fourth Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft Warning Air Corps Detachment.

In the Hawaii district we had the Second Battalion, Two hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry and attached troops: Camp Detachment, Kilauea Military Camp; Fifth Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft Warning Air Corps Detachment.

On the principal island of Oahu we had the following lesser units: The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division—less Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry Regiment; Twenty-fifth Infantry Division; Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command; Hawaiian Air Force; Thirty-Fourth Engineers; Eight Hundred and Fourth Engineer Battalion, Aviation; Eleventh Tank Company; Company A, First Separate Chemical Battalion, and Hawaiian Pack Train.

The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division was responsible for the ground defense of the northern half of Oahu, and the Twenty-fifth Division for that of the southern sector. Most of the components of these divisions were located at Schofield Barracks.

The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, under Maj. Gen. Henry T. Burgin, consisted of the following harbor defense units: Fifteenth Coast Artillery Regiment, harbor defense; Sixteenth Coast Artillery Regiment, harbor defense; Forty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, railroad; Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery Regiment, 155 millimeter, tractor-drawn; and of these antiaircraft units: Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile; Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile; Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile; Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, mobile.

The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command were as shown on page 6 of Army exhibit.

Other large-caliber guns available for defense but manned by field artillery were two 240-millimeter howitzers and thirty-two 155-millimeter howitzers. The seacoast guns were installed principally in permanent fortifications. The fixed antiaircraft guns were emplaced generally to defend the seacoast artillery, and the mobile antiaircraft units were normally stationed at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, and Camp Malakole.

Liaison between the Coast Artillery command and the Navy was maintained prior to December 7 by one Army officer and one enlisted man stationed at the harbor patrol station at Pearl Harbor. The harbor patrol station was controlled and operated by the Navy. The purpose of this liaison was to coordinate identification of waterborne craft and other possible targets.

The principal units of Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin’s Hawaiian Air Force were the Fifth and Eleventh Bombardment Groups, the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Pursuit Groups, the Eighty-sixth Obser-
cation Squadron, and the Air Corps Services. The Air Force was generally disposed on four fields, Hickam, Wheeler, Haleiwa, and Bellows.

Prior to the attack on December 7, alert No. 1 of the local defense plan set up by the Hawaiian Department was [68] in effect. This alert, one of three provided in the plan, was therein defined as a "defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without." Military installations and equipment, planes, hangars, ammunition, communication centers, highway bridges, and the like were protected by standing guards and patrols.

I will now explain the dispositions as indicated on the chart, on the large map of Oahu, under alert No. 1.

The two divisions, as I have already indicated, had all their principal elements located in Schofield Barracks. There were, however, a number of patrols and standing guards primarily on the road around Kakanoe Island from Honolulu, around to the east, up past Kaena Point, and back down the central valley. These patrols were located at intersections, highway bridges, and other critical points.

The yellow squares indicate antiaircraft weapons, and, as I remarked, it will be noted that in general they are situated down on the south coast, protecting the seacoast installations, except for concentrations of these weapons at Schofield Barracks, the regiment at Fort Shafter, as previously mentioned, and several mobile batteries out at Camp Malakole.

Most of the white squares are either seacoast weapons of various types, those that have the general appearance of [69] cannon, and the aircraft installations at the field which I have mentioned.

That concludes the Army's indication of organization and strength and I believe the Navy will now resume.

[70] Admiral Ingrams. The next topic is "Offshore reconnaissance."

There is no written record available of any searches having been made on December 6, either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway. However, Midway had orders to have one squadron of aircraft search daily a circular area with a radius of 100 miles. Patrol squadrons from Midway were also ordered to perform searches wherever sea forces were operating—that is, surface forces. In general, the operating areas for fleet units were south of a line drawn from Midway to Oahu.

I would like now to invite the attention of the committee to item 10 of the Navy folder, which is a reproduction of the large chart that is on display on the right-hand easel. That chart shows in green and white diagonal lines the air searches conducted on the 6th of December and in black and white horizontal lines the searches conducted just prior to the Japanese attack on the 7th of December and then in red and white vertical lines the searches after the attack on the 7th of December.

Of course, in reproducing that chart for your folders the colors do not show, but the identity is preserved by the direction of the stripes—horizontal, vertical, and diagonal.

[71] Patrol squadrons from Midway were also ordered to perform searches wherever sea forces were operating. In general, the operating areas for fleet units were south of a line drawn from Midway to Oahu.
Although there is no record of regular reconnaissance flights being made on this date, the U. S. S. Enterprise, 375 miles west of Pearl Harbor and traveling due east, did at 1 in the afternoon launch 15 torpedo bombers which searched, ahead of the ship, an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles. At the time of the above search, the Enterprise had six other planes in the air as an antisubmarine patrol ahead of the ship.

On the morning of December 7 there were three patrol planes of the PBY-5 type from Kaneohe Air Station engaged in a routine search of the fleet operating areas approximately 120 miles south of Oahu. That is shown in the black and white horizontal stripes.

According to the operations plan then current, each plane was to be fueled with 1,000 gallons of gasoline which would give it a patrolling range of 800 miles. The planes were to take off at dawn, 5:27 Hawaiian time on the 7th, carrying two depth charges and with all machine guns fully armed. However, these planes did not take off until about 6:40. Later, when the attack took place, these planes were [72] diverted to the northwest to search for the Japanese forces.

Four patrol planes were also in the air when the attack came, engaged in intertype tactical exercises with United States submarines near Lahaina Roads. They also were diverted after the attack to search for Japanese forces. All their machine guns were fully armed but they carried no depth charges. Thus there were a total of seven Navy patrol planes employed in the search.

In addition to regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the U. S. S. Enterprise, 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, launched 18 scout bombers armed with machine guns, shortly after 6 a. m., which searched to the eastward ahead of the ship an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles. The mission of these planes was to search an area around and ahead of the Enterprise and then to land at Ewa where they were to be based while the ship was in port. They arrived there during the attack on Pearl Harbor and engaged Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes landed at 9:40 and 10 at 10:15. The other five never arrived.

There is no written report available of any inshore reconnaissance and by "inshore" I mean a distance up to only 30 miles—flown by the Navy off Oahu the afternoon and evening of December 6 or the morning of December 7, 1941.

From neighboring islands on the morning of December 7 [72] there was a reconnaissance of five patrol planes armed with machine guns and a full allowance of ammunition, which took off from the naval air station, Midway, at 7:50 Hawaiian time. Their mission was to patrol the area to the south and southeast of Midway to a distance of 450 miles. Although this reconnaissance was scheduled before, it actually occurred after the attack and is shown on the chart in vertical stripes.

Two additional planes of the same type took off at the same time to rendezvous with the U. S. S. Lexington at a point 400 miles from Midway in a southeasterly direction. These planes were to escort the 18 marine scout bombing planes being brought in by the Lexington as reinforcements for Midway. This marine flight was canceled after news was received of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Five additional planes, armed with two 500-pound bombs each, were on the alert at Midway ready to take off on 10-minutes' notice.
I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here again. [74]

Colonel Thielen. As for Army reconnaissance, there is no evidence that any inshore patrol was maintained by the Army Air Forces on December 7 or on the days preceding the attack. Neither is there evidence that Army bombers were patrolling offshore on December 7 prior to the attack.

Closely related to this subject, however, is the flight of B-17's being ferried from the mainland, which arrived in Oahu about the time of the attack.

Beginning at 9:30 p.m., December 6, 1941, six B-17's of the Eighty-eighth Reconnaissance Squadron and six B-17's of the Thirty-eighth Reconnaissance Squadron took off from Hamilton Field, Calif., at 2-minute intervals. These airplanes were to travel to the Philippines via Oahu. They were not armed.

The aircraft did not maintain formation or visual contact with each other, and made landfall at Oahu at various places. The course from the mainland followed the arc of a great circle which would bring the planes into Oahu from the northeast. However, one plane approached Oahu from about 100 miles north-northwest of the island and another from Kauai, about 75 miles west-northwest of Oahu.

All planes landed on Oahu between 8:30 and 9 a.m., December 7. One landed at Wheeler Field, one at Bellows Field, one on a golf course, two at Haleiwa and the remainder at Hickam Field. Three planes were badly damaged and one was destroyed during landing.

As to the air warning service which was in effect at this time, this air warning service included the radar detecting stations and related equipment and was under the control of the Hawaiian Department signal officer. The warning net did not include any system of ground observers.

By December 7, the Hawaiian Department had received all components for three fixed detector stations (SCR 271). At the time of the attack, construction work had not been completed on the fixed installations at Mount Kaala (Oahu), Kokee (Kauai) and Haleakala (Maui), for the use of this equipment. Six mobile, long-range radar sets (SCR 270) had been received, five of which were in operation early on December 7 at the following points on Oahu—Fort Shafter, Koko Head, Kaaawa, Opana and Kawaiola. This mobile set (SCR 270) has a normal range up to 150 miles, depending upon the height of the station and height of aircraft. Detection of planes at a distance of 150 miles and flying at 20,000 feet may be expected from sea-level positions. The set consists essentially of four large, heavy truck units. It takes at least 4 hours to place the set in operation. Its full operating complement requires four crews of six trained men to each crew. The equipment is accurate to within 2 miles in range and 3° in azimuth, that is, in direction.

[75] As a matter of interest, the range and other characteristics of the fixed sets were substantially the same as those of the mobile sets.

In use radar indicates the presence of an airplane by a luminous pip on a dark screen. A large number of airplanes at a great distance flying in formation would appear as an abnormally wide pip. At the radar station one of the crew observes the indication of the airplanes on the screen and periodically calls off the distance. Another reads
direction from an azimuth scale. From these data are plotted positions on a chart. There was no way on December 7, 1941, of distinguishing between the images formed by enemy planes and by friendly planes.

When he placed alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed that the Aircraft Warning Service operate all mobile aircraft-warning stations from 2 hours before dawn to 1 hour after dawn—specifically, from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. Thus, the operating schedule of the mobile radar detector stations was daily from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m., routine training from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m. except Sundays, and daily except Saturday and Sunday from 12 to 4 p.m. for training and maintenance work.

May I call your attention to the chart which represents a consolidation of the recorded plots at the Opana station [77] before and after the attack; also, in the Army exhibit, page 7, is a reproduction of a photostatic copy of the record of early flights on December 7, 1941, obtained by the Opana detector station. This chart on the easel is taken from the photostatic chart.

On page 8 of the exhibit is a reproduction of a photostatic copy of mobile detector-station records obtained prior to 7 a.m. on December 7, 1941. The dots indicate the location of aircraft. Going back to the chart on the easel, the blue arrow represents the direction of approach of the B–17’s previously mentioned as being ferried from the mainland.

I perhaps should mention that those planes were not recorded by the radar station. Their direction is put on the chart merely as a matter of orientation.

At 7 a.m., December 7, 1941, all radar detector stations closed down except the Opana station at Kahuku Point, which remained in operation in order to continue the training of a new man, Pvt. George E. Elliott, who had volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose. [78] At 7:02 a.m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and Pvt. Joseph L. Lockard, picked up an indication of airplanes at 132 miles, bearing 3° east of north, indicated by that pip at the top of the chart marked with the time 7:02.

The soldiers kept tracking the target. At 7:20 a.m. Private Lockard called to inform Lieutenant Tyler, the watch officer at the information center, Fort Shafter, of his observations, but that officer decided to take no action.

Shortly after 8 a.m. Lieutenant Tyler received a telephone message that Wheeler Field was under attack. Lieutenant Tyler thereupon directed that all radar crews be recalled to their stations.

Sound detectors: In the Coast Artillery Antiaircraft Regiment there were generally two battalions of guns, each of which included three gun batteries and a battery of ten 60-inch searchlights.

Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute, Colonel. Will you put the map back there? I would like to ask him a question.

Colonel Thielen. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you have anything to say about those purple ink marks on your exhibit, “6:45” and “6:45”?

Mr. Keefe. I can’t hear your question, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry. I have to put my nose in [79] the instrument.
Have you anything to say about those indications of interception at earlier hours to the left of that, as you pointed out?

Colonel Thilen. As I mentioned, that chart was taken from the historical plot, so-called, of which the committee has a photostatic copy. I reproduced the information in those pips on the chart for the sake of accuracy, but I am not in a position to interpret them.

Mr. Mitchell. That is, the Army hasn't any information, from its records, to interpret what the radar station showed, what the record of the radar station showed, to the left, I mean?

Colonel Thilen. Any interpretation would be speculation, I think, on my part, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I just wondered, as it is shown there, whether something ought to be said about it.

Colonel Thilen. They are taken, as I said, for the sake of completeness from the historical plot. They do appear on the plot. They were plotted on the Opana station. As I indicated, with the state of radar at that time, it could not be definitely stated whether any image was that of a friendly or hostile aircraft.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

[80] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am going to raise the point of order. If we are going to have a rule it ought to be followed.

Senator Ferguson. Since the point of order is raised—

The Chairman. I think we have a point of order that we agreed to follow, otherwise we will be breaking down the rules before we start. Go ahead.

Mr. Mitchell. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel Thilen. As for the sound detectors—

Senator Ferguson. I assumed, Mr. Chairman, when the counsel asked questions and no one else asked questions, that it would naturally come around to ask him a question.

The Chairman. The Chair's interpretation of the rule is that the committee members are not to ask questions until the counsel has finished with the witness.

Senator Ferguson. That means completely finished with the witness and he turns him over to the committee?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Brewster. It might be quite in order for the committee members to suggest questions, so if they have any suggestions to make they make written suggestions. I think it might clarify the record as to procedure.

The Chairman. Certainly.

[81] Mr. Mitchell. Colonel, may I ask you also if there is anything you have to say about the purple arrow going from 10:39 to 10:27 on that map? What does that mean? Why is that on there?

Colonel Thilen. Because those two points were plotted by the Opana station at that time.

Mr. Mitchell. After the attack?

Colonel Thilen. That is correct. We could see definitely that they were going away, those at 10:27 having been plotted earlier than that at 10:39.

Mr. Mitchell. That is all. You may go ahead.

Colonel Thilen. As for the sound detectors, in the Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft Regiment there were generally two battalions of guns, each of which included 3 gun batteries and a battery of 10 60-inch
searchlights. One sound detector generally worked with each searchlight. The primary purpose of the sound detector was to pick up an airplane by its sound and then to point the searchlight; consequently detectors were employed only at night.

The sound detector in use at the time had an optimum range of about 10,000 yards.

I believe the Navy will now discuss their radar.

Admiral Inglis. Before discussing Navy radar I would like to reconcile one point that might seem inconsistent to the members of the committee.

You will recall, in describing the search of the patrol planes, I said that the planes were to take off at sunrise, 5:27 Hawaiian time. That word "sunrise" was taken out of the report, but I think it was a typographical error because sunrise was actually an hour later, at 6:26.

It is my understanding that the plan did call for the planes to take off at 5:27, an hour before sunrise, which is usually considered as dawn in those latitudes.

With that explanation, I would like to pass on now to the Navy's radar equipment. The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipped with ship search radar at that time, on December 7, 1941, were the battleships Pennsylvania, California, West Virginia, and the seaplane tender Curtiss. The radar equipment on these ships was not manned since the height of the land around the harbor would have made it ineffective. The equipment on the Curtiss was put into operation at the beginning of the first attack and that on the Pennsylvania began to operate 15 minutes later, both with negative results.

Facilities for aircraft spotting: On board the naval vessels at Pearl Harbor, aircraft spotting was a function of the crews manning their stations at condition of readiness then existing. Every ship's organization bill provided for certain members of the watch at the gun and control stations to act as aircraft lookouts. There were no naval air lookout stations ashore. However, crews of the signal tower at Pearl Harbor had certain air lookout duties as part of their general signal duties.

Character of antisubmarine patrol operations, December 7, 1941: On the morning of December 7, 1941, the United States destroyer Ward was assigned and was carrying out an inner antisubmarine patrol off the Pearl Harbor entrance. Commander Biard is pointing to that locality. This patrol searched the navigable waters between bearings 100° to 250° (true) from entrance buoy No. 1 to a distance of 2 miles.

The mission of this patrol was to detect and prevent unidentified submarines and unauthorized vessels from entering the approaches to the Pearl Harbor entrance channel.

Although not part of the antisubmarine patrol, the United States minesweepers Condor and Crossbill were conducting minesweeping operations in the channel and approaches thereto.

The fleet units at sea were screened by both a surface and air antisubmarine patrol.

Account of Japanese attack on ships and installations at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941: Possibly the first Japanese contact off Oahu was made at 3:50 a. m. Pearl Harbor time—9:20 a. m. Washington time when the United States coastal minesweeper Con-
sighted the periscope of a submerged submarine. At that time the Condor was conducting minesweeping operations approximately 1½ miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. At 3:57 a.m. the Condor, by visual signal, informed the destroyer Ward, then patrolling off the Pearl Harbor entrance, of this contact.

The Ward thereupon immediately instituted a search and at about 6:40 a.m. sighted the periscope of an unidentified submarine apparently trailing the United States target repair ship Antares, then en route to Honolulu Harbor.

Commander Biard, will you show the relationship between Honolulu Harbor and Pearl Harbor entrance?

That is Pearl Harbor [indicating] and that is Honolulu Harbor, about 10 miles apart.

Upon sighting the submarine, the Ward ordered all hands to battle stations, increased her speed from 5 to 25 knots, and started the attack. The Ward opened fire with her guns at 6:45 a.m. and a depth charge attack was commenced. The second gun salvo scored a direct hit upon the conning tower of the Japanese submarine. As a result of these attacks, the submarine is believed to have gone down in 1,200 feet of water. A large amount of oil came to the surface.

At 6:54 a.m., the Ward sent the following dispatch by voice transmission to the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District:

We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area.

At 7:15 a.m.—12:45 p.m. Washington time—this message was reported delivered to the district officer, Lt. Comdr. Harold Kaminski. In turn, at 7:16 a.m., Lieutenant Commander Kaminski notified the duty officer of the commander-in-chief, United States Fleet. This was the first information received at the Pearl Harbor headquarters of the commander-in-chief, United States Fleet, that unidentified forces might be in the Hawaiian area. Twenty-five minutes after this telephone report, a second was received at the headquarters, commander-in-chief, United States Fleet, from the operations officer of patrol wing two relaying a report received at 7:32 a.m. to the effect that a patrol plane had sunk an unidentified submarine south of Pearl Harbor channel entrance buoy. This was the same submarine reported by the Ward. This report was followed by another telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District duty officer in which it was stated that the Ward was towing a sampan into Honolulu. This last report was undoubtedly erroneous since there is no mention in the Ward's administrative log of her towing a sampan.

Upon receipt of the Ward's report by the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, the commandant ordered the ready-duty destroyer U.S.S. Monaghan to proceed to sea, to close the net gate, to attempt to verify the contact report giving full details, and to notify the commander in chief's staff duty officer. A dispatch was sent to the Ward at 7:37 a.m., asking verification of the report and details of the attack on the enemy submarine.

After the Ward's message and prior to the Japanese raid, no other reports indicating or verifying the enemy's presence were received at the headquarters, commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

At about 7:55 a.m. Pearl Harbor time—1:25 p.m. Washington time—the navy yard signal tower telephoned the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:
Almost simultaneously, Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battleships. From then on until 9:45 a.m., Pearl Harbor time—3:15 p.m. Washington time—there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor. However, there seemed to be separate periods of greatly intensified activity. On this basis, the narrative of the attack may be divided into five phases.

The five phases of the attack are:

Phase I: Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting from 7:55 a.m. to 8:25 a.m.

Phase II: Lull in attacks lasting from 8:25 a.m. to 8:40 a.m.

Phase III: Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8:40 a.m. to 9:15 a.m.

Phase IV: Dive bomber attacks between 9:15 and 9:45 a.m.

Phase V: Waning of attacks and completion of raid after 9:45 a.m.

The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the heavy combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement of the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore.

The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time—namely 7:55 a.m.—Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island, concentrated on the planes parked in the vicinity of hangar No. 6.

At the time of the attack, our planes—patrol flying boats, float planes, and scout bombers, carrier type—were lined up on the field. These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then as suddenly as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this air station was made during the day. Except for a direct hit on hangar No. 6 resulting from a bomb which was apparently aimed at the battleship California and which fell short, the damage to the station itself was comparatively slight. However, 33 of our best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or damaged.

As soon as the attack began, commander, Patrol Wing 2 broadcasted from Ford Island the warning: "Air raid, Pearl Harbor—This is not a drill." This warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar message from the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at the Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the water. Machine guns and rifles were brought out, and men dispersed to fire at will at the low-flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15
minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from sight. Several other contingents of bombers passed over, but none dropped bombs on Kaneohe Bay.

About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes similar to one of our light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and commenced bombing and strafing. Number 3 hangar received a direct hit during this attack and four planes in the hangar were destroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered at Kaneohe resulted from this attack. Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes or to save those [90] planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy withdrew, some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage operations were commenced, but it was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which burned until only its steel structural work was left. Only 9 out of the 35 planes at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack. Six of these were damaged and three were in the air on patrol south of Oahu as previously described.

Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar attack. Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about 2 minutes. It was delivered by two squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seater fighter planes using machine-gun strafing tactics, which came in from the northwest at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet of the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire. Then they would pull over the tree tops, reverse their course, and attack from the opposite direction. Within less than 15 minutes, all the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire. Then the guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon our utility aircraft, upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and upon the Marines themselves.

Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid hadsubsided. Pilots, aching to strike at the enemy in the air, viewed the wreckage which until a [91] few minutes before had been a strong air group of Marine fighters and bombers. All together 33 out of the 49 planes at Ewa had gone up in smoke. Some marines, unable to find anything more effective, had tried to oppose fighter planes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were too badly damaged to fly.

Although in phase I of the attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor Japanese dive bombers were effective, the torpedo planes did the most damage. They adhered strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed their attacks from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy ship objectives. Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel depths and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of our fleet. At least in the great majority of cases, the depth of water in Pearl Harbor did not prevent the successful execution of this form of attack. Shallow dives of the torpedoes upon launching were assured by the use of specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which were discovered on enemy torpedoes salvaged after the attack.

Four separate torpedo-plane attacks were made during phase I. The major attack was made by 12 planes which swung in generally from the southeast over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry Point. After splitting, they launched their torpedoes at very low al-
titudes (within 50 [92] to 100 feet of the water), and from very short distances, aiming for the battleships berthed on the southeast side of Ford Island. All the outboard battleships, namely, the Nevada, Arizona, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and California, were effectively hit by one or more torpedoes. Strafing was simultaneously conducted from the rear cockpits. A recovered unexploded torpedo carried an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds.

During the second of these attacks, the Oklahoma was struck by three torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding the efforts of her defenders to beat off the attackers.

The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared from the west and was directed against the light cruiser Helena and the minelayer Oglala, both of which were temporarily occupying the berth previously assigned to the battleship Pennsylvania, flagship of the Pacific Fleet. One torpedo passed under the Oglala and exploded against the side of the Helena. The blast stove in the side plates of the Oglala. Submersible pumps for the Oglala were obtained from the Helena, but could not be used since no power was available because of damage to the ship’s engineering plant.

The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and attacked the seaplane tender Tangier, the target [93] ship Utah, and the light cruisers Raleigh and Detroit. The Raleigh was struck by one torpedo, and the Utah received two hits in succession, capsizing at 8:13 a.m. At first it was feared that the Raleigh would capsize. Orders were, therefore, given for all men not at the guns to jettison all topside weights and put both airplanes in the water. Extra manila and wire lines were also run to the quays to help keep the ship from capsizing.

The Utah, an old battleship converted into a target ship, had recently returned from serving as a target for practice aerial bombardment. As soon as she received her torpedo hits, she began listing rapidly to port. After she had list to about 40°, the order was given to abandon ship. This order was executed with some difficulty as the attacking planes strafed the crew as they went over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island safely. Later knocking was heard within the hull of the Utah. With cutting tools obtained from the Raleigh, a volunteer crew succeeded in cutting through the hull and rescuing a fireman second class who had been entrapped in the void escape underneath the dynamo room.

An interesting sideline on Japanese intentions and advance knowledge is suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the Utah and Raleigh were placed were [94] designated carrier berths and that a carrier was frequently moored in nearby F-9.

The Detroit and Tangier escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo passing just astern of the Detroit and burying itself in the mud. Another torpedo passed between the Tangier and the Utah.

It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in these four attacks was 21.

In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three types of bombs were employed—light, medium, and incendiary.

During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 14-inch powder magazine on the battleship Arizona and caused a ravaging oil fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby inter-
fering with antiaircraft fire. The battleship *Tennessee* in the adjacent berth was endangered seriously by the oil fire.

The *West Virginia* was hit during the third of these attacks by two heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the *California*, she had to be abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive officer, the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the *Tennessee*, where he organized a party of *West Virginia* survivors to help extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash, and oil which covered the water between the *Tennessee* and Ford Island.

The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at 30. While a few fighters were reported among the attackers in the various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers and accordingly are not treated as a distinct type.

Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers did not occur until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in four groups were active during phase I.

Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8:25 a.m. All the outboard battleships had been hit by one or more torpedoes; all the battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with the exception of the *Oklahoma*, which took four torpedoes before it capsized, and the *Pennsylvania*, which received a bomb hit later. By the end of the first phase, the *West Virginia* was in a sinking condition; the *California* was down by the stern; the *Arizona* was a flaming ruin; the other battleships were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree.

Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise, defensive action on the part of the fleet was prompt. All ships immediately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns likewise opened fire at once, and within an estimated average time of less than 5 minutes practically all battleships and antiaircraft batteries were firing.

The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers, although opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.

During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships within the harbor proper. The destroyer *Helm*, which had gotten under way just prior to the attack, was outside the harbor entrance when at 8:17 a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of the entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately submerged. The *Helm* opened fire at 8:19 a.m. when the submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.

Phase II—8:25–8:40 a.m.—Lull in attacks

This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air activity continued during this phase although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon the ships in the navy yard, the battleships *Maryland*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*, and *Pennsylvania*, and various light cruisers and destroyers.

Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull, these appear to have overlapped into phase III and are considered under that heading.
At 8:32 a.m. the battleship *Oklahoma* took a heavy list to starboard and capsized.

During phase II, there was still relatively little ship movement within the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer *Monaghan* had received orders at 7:51 a.m. (Pearl Harbor time) to “proceed immediately and contact Ward in defensive sea area.” At about 8:37, observing an enemy submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from both the *Curtiss* and *Tangier*, the *Monaghan* proceeded at high speed and at about 8:43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had submerged, the shock was slight. The *Monaghan* thereupon reversed engines and dropped two depth charges.

The *Curtiss* had previously scored two direct hits on the conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and disposal. The *Monaghan* then proceeded down the channel and continued her sortie. At the same time that the *Monaghan* got underway, the destroyer *Henley* slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and sortied, following the *Monaghan* down the channel.

**Phase III—8:40–9:15 a.m.—Horizontal bomber attacks**

The so-called lull in the air raid was terminated by the appearance over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers which crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions, inflicting serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were converted 15- or 16-inch shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked by very little flame. According to some observers, many bombs dropped by high-altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area.

During the second attack (at 9:06 a.m.) the *Pennsylvania* was hit by a heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships and detonated, causing a fire, which was extinguished with some difficulty.

The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battleship moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the *California* with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile equipped with tail vanes which penetrated to the second deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch to the machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, resulting in the spreading of a serious fire.

Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had participated in earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.

Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing, approximately 18 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.

It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable damage to the *Nevada*, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also to the *Shaw*, *Cassin*, and *Downes*, all three of which were set afire.

During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in dropping 1 bomb on the seaplane tender *Curtiss* which detonated on the main-deck level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other unaccounted for.

During this same phase, the *Curtiss* took under fire one of these bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit squarely by the *Curtiss*’ accurate gunfire, the plane crashed on the
ship, spattering burning gasoline and starting fires so menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.

Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8:40 a.m. the Nevada cleared berth F–8 without assistance and proceeded down the South Channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship was trying to reach open water, they sent dive bomber after dive bomber down after her and registered several hits. In spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of floating dry-dock No. 2, and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempting to make a turn in the channel, the Nevada ran aground in the vicinity of buoy No. 19.

Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had gotten underway at about 8:40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at about 9:10 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.

Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs began to move the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at "Ten-ten" Dock. The Oglala was finally secured in her berth at about 9:00, but shortly thereafter she capsized.

At 8:42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F–4 unaided and stood toward Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the way for a possible sortie by the battleship Maryland.

Next, phase IV, from 9:15 to 9:45, dive-bomber attacks—

The Chairman. Under the program of the committee, 12 o'clock having arrived, I think we should now recess until 2 p.m., and complete your testimony then.

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, if I may have 30 seconds longer, I could finish this particular part.

The Chairman. Just a moment. You might as well come back at 2.

(Whereupon, at 12 m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P.M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Admiral, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

Admiral Inglis. In this morning's portion of the presentation I finished phases I, II, and III. I propose now to take up the story with phase IV, which lasted from 9:15 to 9:45 and was characterized by dive-bomber attacks.

Phase IV—9:15–9:45 a.m.—Dive bomber attacks

During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing attacks directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In all probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted previous attacks. These attacks overlapped by about 10 minutes the horizontal bomber attacks previously described in phase III.
**Phase V—9:45—Waning of attacks and completion of raid**

By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading our aerial searches, both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force retired to its home waters without being contacted by any of our units. For summary of Japanese planes participating in attack see item 11 in the white folder.

The foregoing has been a discussion of the attack phase only. The details of our aircraft and antiaircraft action will be given later.

[103] Summary of percentage of personnel mustered on station: Fleet orders at the time of Pearl Harbor directed that one-fourth of the officers and one-half of the enlisted personnel be on board at all times.

Excerpts from a summarized report of personnel actually on board at the commencement of the attack on December 7, 1941, are as follows:

*On board*

Commanding officers of battleships ........................................ 5 out of 8
Commanding officers of cruisers ........................................... 6 out of 7
Commanding officers of destroyers ....................................... percent 63
Damage-control officers of battleships ................................... 6 out of 8
Average percentage of officers:
Battleships (approximate) ................................................... percent 60-70
Cruisers, battle force (approximate) .................................... do 65
Destroyers, battle force (approximate) .................................. do 50
Average percentage of men:
Battleships ............................................................................... do 95
Cruisers, battle force ......................................................... do 98
Destroyers, battle force ....................................................... do 85

There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval shore installations.

I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here.

[104] Colonel THIELEN. In presenting the Army’s story of the attack, I propose to describe what happened at each of the three major airfields, Hickam Field, Wheeler, and Bellows, and after that to describe the action taken by our ground forces, and our coast artillery command in response to the attack.

Our planes on Hickam Field at the time of the attack were lined up on the warming-up aprons three or four abreast, with approximately 10 feet between wing tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail of one plane to the nose of another.

If you will note the plan of the Hickam Field as displayed on the easel, you may be able to distinguish the aircraft on the warming-up apron. They are actually drawn to scale. They may not be legible. However, each member of the committee has a photograph of the plan of each of these airfields.

Hickam Field observers report that the first indication of an attack was at 7:55 a.m. when nine enemy single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, were observed southeast of Hickam Field hangar line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet toward Pearl Harbor. They were in two echelons, five planes in the first and four in the second. These airplanes did not attack Hickam Field.

[105] At almost the same time, however, nine dive bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hangar line from the south, and three additional planes attacked the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes later nine additional dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the southeast. Immediately thereafter, seven additional dive bombers attacked the
Hickam Field hangar line from the east. All planes dived at approximately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 feet. Bombs were released at about 1,000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives from 800 to approximately 300 feet. Machine gun fire was employed before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about 10 minutes.

The second attack on Hickam Field occurred at about 8:25 a.m., when between six and nine planes approached from the south and attacked No. 1 aqua system, which is a hydrostatic pass for the fuel pumping system, and also the technical buildings immediately behind the hangar lines, and the consolidated barracks. These planes when first observed were flying level and released their bombs from level flight at an altitude of about 150 feet. During and immediately after this bombing attack our planes on the parking apron were attacked with gun fire. About 1 minute later (8:26) a formation of five or six planes bombed the baseball diamond [106] from a high altitude, possibly believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area. The second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes.

The third attack at Hickam occurred about 9 a.m., when six to nine planes (presumably those that had previously bombed from level flight at 150 feet at 8:25) attacked with machine gun fire the technical buildings behind the hangar lines and certain planes which by then were dispersed.

These attacks came from four directions almost simultaneously. At the same time a formation of from seven to nine planes, flying in V formation at an altitude estimated at 6,000 feet approached from the south, releasing bombs which struck the consolidated barracks, the parade ground, and post exchange. The third attack lasted about 8 minutes. All enemy planes observed at low altitudes were single engine, low-wing monoplanes. The type of high altitude bombers was not definitely established. Largest bombs used were believed not to exceed 600 pounds. Gun ammunition was identified as 7.7 and 20 millimeter ammunition.

At Wheeler Field, our planes were parked in the space between the aprons in front of the hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines approximately wing tip to wing tip, the lines varying from 15 to 20 feet apart.

[107] About 25 Japanese planes approached at 8:02 a.m., generally from the southeast, at about 5,000 feet altitude. They passed well to the east of the field, circled counter-clockwise, losing altitude and approached for attack from the north at about 3,000 feet, generally perpendicular to the hangar line. The formation of the entire group was roughly a V—with five sections of four planes each forming the V formation—that is indicated on the chart and on the photographic reproductions thereof—with a fourth plane extending the right leg of the V.

A single odd plane flew slightly to the rear of the formation. They dived at an angle of about $45^\circ$ and struck the hangar line and vicinity over a length of about 900 yards, starting from the engineering hangar which is at the extreme southwest of the hangar line. Out of approximately 35 bombs dropped, 4 were about 600 pounds, 3 were about 250 pounds, 8 were about 100 pounds, and the remainder were smaller, some of them appearing to be oil or other type incendiary bombs. Machine gun fire was employed during the dive bombing attack. Practically all bombs struck the hangar line and points in the rear
and were released at altitudes of 200 and 250 feet. After releasing bombs, the planes continued to dive for a short distance and pulled out at about the same angle as at the [108] start of the dive.

After the first dive bombing the formation broke, apparently in all directions, with individual planes continuing gun fire without regard to the possibility of collision. This phase of the attack was carried on from altitudes of approximately 200 feet and the only semblance of order appeared to be that planes circled counterclockwise. Principal targets for this gun fire were our planes on the hangar line and buildings, and personnel in the immediate vicinity. All planes in the first attacking formation appeared similar and were single-engine, low-wing monoplanes. While not positively established, it is presumed from evidence of 20 millimeters fire that this attack included fighters in support of dive bombers. The entire attack lasted approximately 15 minutes.

Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes after 9 a.m. This attack consisted of seven enemy planes which approached from the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of about 500 feet. They fired machine guns at planes being taxied onto the airdrome, but it is believed that no plane fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven planes were single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, two-seaters. They withdrew to the north. The whole second attack lasted less than 5 minutes and could very reasonably have been [109] made by a group of planes expending the remainder of their ammunition.

During the first raid at Wheeler Field, personnel were employed in rescuing the wounded, fighting the numerous fires and in removing airplanes from danger. As soon as undamaged aircraft had been rolled away to a safe place, the crews began arming them.

On Bellows Field at the time of the attack the P-40's were parked in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals. The reconnaissance planes were also parked in a line at slightly greater intervals.

I might point out that those aircraft on the white squares represent the original formation as it was at the time of the first attack. We have also represented aircraft in blue squares dispersed over the field. Those are the same aircraft represented as being initially in line. After the first attack they were all over the field.

A single Japanese fighter plane initiated the attack at approximately 8:30 a.m. It came directly from the east and employed machine-gun fire on the tent area apparently expending all its ammunition in this one attack.

At about 9 a.m., the nine fighters attacked Bellows Field from the north in three groups of three planes each in V formation. This attack lasted about 15 minutes and [110] consisted of gun fire only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all nine planes, after which the three formations of three each peeled off and attacked from various directions. The antiaircraft defense during this attack on Bellows Field consisted of small-arms fire by elements of the Two Hundred and Ninety-eighth Infantry.

After the single plane, tent-area attack, one of the B-17's which had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land at Hickam Field, attempted to land at Bellows Field but rolled off the runway. And that can be seen on the chart in the orange circle, the approximate position where it left the runway. This plane was repeatedly machine-gunned by the nine attacking planes.
The attack at Bellows Field appeared to be well planned, rehearsed, and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by the Infantry troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the sea for identification.

At Haleiwa—you might point that out, Captain, on the big map—the planes of the Forty-seventh Pursuit Squadron were parked in the open in close formations. However, Haleiwa Field was not attacked.

In all these attacks on Oahu airfields, strafing planes came down to a very low altitude. They used .50 caliber, 7.7 millimeter and 20 millimeter ammunition. Rigid flight discipline was demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced. Such attacks could not have been performed without numerous and detailed rehearsals. Every movement was well executed. The evidence indicates that the attacks on the airfields were made by a maximum of 105 airplanes; the number may have been less since some of the planes may have taken part in more than one attack.

After 9:45 a.m., December 7, there were no further attacks on Oahu installations. Despite numerous false reports, no landings were attempted.

A few bombs were dropped in Honolulu, but probably this was the result of individual planes clearing their bomb racks before departing. There was some strafing and a few bombs were dropped on Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. Several bursts of machine-gun fire were delivered at targets other than military objectives.

When the first bombs were dropped and machine-gun fire commenced, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few minutes the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps 2 or 4 minutes elapsed before General Short was informed by his chief of staff that an attack was in progress. General Short immediately directed that all troops be turned out under alert No. 3.

This alert required all units to occupy battle positions shown on this map—[112] which I will explain in a moment—in the shortest possible time and to defend Oahu. All troops accordingly moved to their prescribed positions. The advance command post of the Hawaiian Department was operating in Aliamanu Crater by 8:45 a.m. with limited personnel, and the advance command posts of the Twenty-fifth Division and of the Hawaiian Air Force by 11 a.m. Rear echelons remained at their normal locations—which, for the department, was Fort Shafter; for the division, Schofield Barracks.

At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding the Twenty-fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at about 8:05 a.m. Within a few minutes his chief of staff had issued instructions to the units to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft positions, to increase the standing guard and to send patrols throughout the division sector—which was the northern half of the island—to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, General Wilson heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8:50 a.m. the division received word from department headquarters that alert No. 3 would go into effect at once. Approximately 90 percent of the Twenty-fourth Division troops were present for duty on the morning of December 7, according to a report made shortly after by the Hawaiian Department. The division was in position in [113] the north sector by 5 p.m. with ammunition except for the 240’s, 240-millimeter howitzers.
The disposition of the division, Twenty-fourth Division, as shown on the map, can be picked up by the crossed rifles for Infantry positions, by the cannon for Field Artillery battalions, and the main line of resistance on the east coast can be seen following the ridge line of the Koolau Range on the east and the Waianae Range on the west.

Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray, commanding the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, stated that the attack began about 7:53 a.m. Some machine guns were in firing positions on the roofs within 10 minutes. Alert No. 3 was placed in effect at about 9 o'clock. Some ammunition—other than high explosive—had been moved into the barracks which meant that most of the men had as much as 30 rounds. About 85 percent of the Twenty-fifth Division troops were reported present for duty at the time of the attack. By 4 p.m., on the 7th all units of the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division were in war positions in the south sector with ammunition, except for the 240-millimeter howitzers. Map shows sectors and subsectors of responsibility in the south sector.

The yellow squares, the antiaircraft, which I will discuss in a moment, of course, were not under division control. Again, the crossed rifles indicate the Infantry [114] and the wheel cannon the Field Artillery, indicating the disposition under alert No. 3.

Under alert No. 1, the harbor defense troops of the Coast Artillery Command were at their gun positions while the antiaircraft units remained at their home stations and guarded against sabotage. On December 7, some of the AA units got into position in 15 or 20 minutes, but others had to go to the other side of the island and were not in position until afternoon. A detailed account of the movement of antiaircraft units is given on pages 11 and 12 of the Army exhibit. An estimated 87 percent of the Coast Artillery personnel were present for duty at 8 a.m., December 7. No Coast Artillery Command officers were reported absent at the time of the attack except one who was killed trying to get back to his place of duty.

Maps captured from planes shot down in the attack indicated that the enemy had complete and up-to-date information concerning the exact dispositions of military forces, depots, and engineering establishments.

Percent mustered: A summary of a report compiled by the adjutant general of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent of the officers and men were present with their units at 8 a.m., December 7.

[115] Now, going back to the subject of aircraft, and the results of the attack, also the condition of aircraft before the attack, at the time of the attack the Hawaiian Air Force, in common with other units of the Hawaiian Department, was operating under alert No. 1. General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, had informed his subordinates that it was a real and not a practice alert. He had further instructed that aircraft would not be dispersed and that all units would continue training under condition "Easy 5."

"Easy" being phonetic for "E."

"Easy 5"—E-5 under the standing operating procedure—meant that all aircraft would continue to conduct routine training operations, with none in readiness for combat operations, and with 4 hours' time allowed for the first plane of each unit to be in the air, armed, and prepared for combat.
Page 10 of the Army exhibit shows when and in what numbers planes took off from Oahu Army airfields after the attack, and page 9 of the same exhibit shows the status of all combat planes before and after the attack as reported by the Hawaiian Air Force. In this connection attention is invited to the fact that final reports to the War Department show that total plane losses was somewhat greater than initially reported. In explanation of the disparity it [116] should be stated that to meet the emergency created by the attack certain damaged planes which normally might have been repaired were stripped for parts and destroyed.

The attention of the committee is invited to the chart which has just been placed on the easel and which is a blowup of the exhibit previously referred to, the status of combat planes before and after the attack. The color code is applied to the number of planes in each column. The blue indicating planes in commission, the buff out of commission, and finally the total on hand, and at the head of each column where the numerical designation of the plane is given, if that designation is on the green background, that plane was considered obsolete by the Air Force.

The yellow code, which occurs only in the columns “After Attack,” indicates those aircraft which were destroyed.

At Hickam Field, prior to the attack, 6 heavy bombers—B-17—20 nonmodern medium bombers—B-18—and 5 modern light bombers—A-20—were in commission but were not ready for immediate use because they were not loaded with bombs and ammunition. The following planes were on hand but out of commission for reasons indicated:

Six B-17’s—engine repair, fuel tank repair, 50-hour inspection, 200-hour inspection, and carburetor repair;

Twelve B-18’s, overhaul, damaged landing gear, damaged [117] elevator, and first echelon maintenance;

Seven A-20’s—damaged wing flaps, repair and first echelon maintenance.

First echelon maintenance is maintenance of a nature which can be performed by the crew of the plane; 50-hour inspection is an inspection and overhaul of each plane which is required to be made after each 50 hours of flight; and 200-hour inspection is a more thorough overhaul made after 200 hours of flight.

After the attack, 8 B-17’s were on hand of which 4 were usable; 20 B-18’s were on hand of which 10 were usable; 10 A-20’s were on hand with 5 usable. Eighteen of our combat planes were lost on Hickam Field. It was 11:27 a. m.—as shown in another exhibit—when the first four A-20’s took off from the field for combat.

At Wheeler Field and Haleiwa prior to the attack, the following planes were in commission but not ready for immediate use since they were unarmed; 82 pursuit, 52 P-40’s, 20 P-36’s, 10 P-26’s; 2 medium bombers, 1 B-12A, 1 B-18; 2 light bombers, A-12; 5 reconnaissance 1 O-47, 1 OA-8, 3 OA-9’s; and 3 advanced trainers, AT-6; which are not shown on the chart, the chart including only combat aircraft.

On hand but out of commission for maintenance work were [118] these additional planes: 2 B-12’s, 35 P-40’s, 19 P-36’s, 4 P-26’s and 1 AT-6—not shown on the chart.

After the attack, the number of usable planes by type were as follows: 27 out of a total of 57 P-40’s, 16 out of 35 P-36’s, 4 out of 8 P-26’s, 1 B-18, 1 out of 3 B-12’s, 1 of 2 AT-6’s, 1 O-47, 1 OA-8 and 1 OA-9.
Forty-two combat planes were lost in the attack in this airdrome. At 8:30 a.m. the first aircraft, four P-40's and two P-36's took off for combat.

Planes assigned to the Forty-seventh Pursuit Squadron, which was in training at Haleiwa Airfield—and they have been included in this Wheeler chart—consisted of 17 pursuit, 13 P-40's, 2 P-36's, 2 P-26's, and 1 medium bomber, B-12. That is the table of organization strength of the unit.

The exact number of planes at Haleiwa on the morning of December 7 is not known. The field was alerted at 8:15 a.m. Between 8:15 and 10 a.m. two flights were made, each consisting of four P-40's and one P-36. Four enemy planes were downed by the first flight while the second flight downed three. One pilot was lost over Schofield Barracks.

At Bellows Field 12 pursuit planes, P-40; and 6 reconnaissance planes, 4 O-47's, 2 O-49's; were in commission prior to the attack. However, none of these were ready for immediate use because their weapons were not loaded with ammunition. An additional two reconnaissance planes, O-47, were located at Bellows Field but were out of commission for engine change. It was 9:50 a.m. before the first O-47 took off. Three of our combat aircraft were destroyed on this field.

After the attack on December 7, about 11:40 a.m., four A-20's and two B-17's took off. Also at 3:20 p.m., three B-17's were dispatched, as a result of a request of the Navy, to search for an enemy carrier. The search was unsuccessful and they returned at 6:25 p.m.

As for the antiaircraft their activities subsequent to the attack, shown as previously mentioned on pages 11 and 12 of the Army exhibit, show the time required for the various units of the Fifty-third Coast Artillery Brigade, Antiaircraft to take battle positions after the attack of December 7 and the extent to which they engaged the enemy.

Under alert No. 1 only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry and Artillery units of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Divisions had only a small amount of machine-gun and rifle ammunition. All divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and mortar shells were in the ordnance storage depots, principally at Schofield Barracks.

The 3-inch antiaircraft gun issued to units in Hawaii at that time had a maximum effective range of about 10,000 yards. It had a minimum effective range of about 2,000 yards.

The 37 millimeter antiaircraft gun had a maximum horizontal range of 9,300 yards, and a maximum vertical range of approximately 6,300 yards.

This concludes the Army's story of the attack.

Admiral Inglis. Turning now to the Navy's aircraft and state of readiness of aircraft and antiaircraft guns, the committee will find in item 12 of the white folder the locations, squadrons, numbers
of planes in commission, types, numbers available, numbers in operating condition, readiness in operating condition, readiness of crews, numbers participating in combat and service assigned to land based naval and Marine planes in the Hawaiian area.

Item 13 of the white folder contains this information summarized on a chart showing location of the fields and stations.

The planes in flight at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor were armed for combat as follows:

The 7 patrol flying boats in the air, 3 from Kaneohe and 4 from Ford Island, all carried machine guns and were fully supplied with ammunition. In addition to machine guns and ammunition, the three planes from Kaneohe searching the fleet operating areas south of Oahu were armed with two depth charges each for use against submarines. These planes were working with the destroyer Ward. One of these aircraft dropped one depth charge in an attack on a submarine in the defensive sea area off Pearl Harbor at 6:45 Hawaiian time. Utility Squadron 3, stationed at Maui Airport, which was the new naval air station at Puunene, seems to have had some planes in the air prior to 7:50, Hawaiian time, on the day of the attack. These planes are not combat planes and do not normally carry armament. Available reports do not indicate the state of armament of the scout bombers from the Enterprise that arrived over Pearl Harbor during the attack. As they engaged the enemy, it appears that machine guns were equipped and ammunition provided.

Next, antiaircraft: There were no naval antiaircraft shore batteries in or around Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack. All naval antiaircraft batteries were ship-based, and were composed of the following types and number of guns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gun types</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Maximum range (Feet)</th>
<th>Maximum effective range (Yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-inch, 38 caliber antiaircraft</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>37,200</td>
<td>15,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-inch, 26 caliber antiaircraft</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>26,300</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-inch, 50 caliber antiaircraft</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft machine guns from 1.1 inch to .30 caliber</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Effective ranges of 500 to 2,500 yards.

Effective range is that range at which fire should be opened with reasonable chance that fire would produce damage on the target.

Antiaircraft guns by ship classes and types of guns is shown in item 14 of Navy folder.

Official reports indicate that all naval antiaircraft batteries were in operating condition. The number of temporary gun stoppages during action was so low as to be negligible and when such momentary stoppages occurred, except as guns were knocked out in battle casualties, they were quickly remedied.

All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on board except in a few cases where removal was necessary because of repairs in progress.

All ships had ready ammunition at the guns in accordance with existing directives. Battleships and cruisers had 15 rounds per gun for two guns of the 5-inch antiaircraft battery and 300 rounds per gun for half of the 50-caliber machine guns. The destroyers present
all had 50-caliber ammunition available and some 5-inch ammunition. Although the initial attack was launched as a surprise, ready machine guns opened fire at once and all batteries except those on ships undergoing overhaul took up the fire within approximately 7 minutes after the attack was initiated.

The considerable amount of ammunition available is shown by a tabulation of all rounds expended.

There were 1,663 rounds of 5-inch 38-caliber antiaircraft ammunition fired.

There were 1,523 rounds of 5-inch 25-caliber antiaircraft ammunition fired.

There were 1,741 rounds of 3-inch 50-caliber antiaircraft ammunition fired.

There were 275,807 rounds of machine-gun ammunition fired.

At the time of the attack, roughly one-fourth of all shipboard antiaircraft guns were manned, and within 7 to 10 minutes, all antiaircraft batteries were manned and firing.

Ready antiaircraft machine guns opened fire immediately and within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes practically all battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4 minutes; and destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action. Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10 minutes after the beginning of the attack.

Turning next to the question of sabotage, there is no record of any sabotage during the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Next the subject of first aid: The dead and wounded were handled by a number of naval medical activities; battle dressing stations and sick bays of the warships; hospital ship Solace; United States Naval Hospital; dispensaries of the two naval air stations; Marine Corps air station at Ewa; defense battalions of the Fleet Marine Force; navy yard dispensary; section base dispensary; ammunition depot dispensary, and at a "field hospital" which was set up in the officers' club of the navy yard shortly after the attack.

Three hundred thirty dead and 1,113 wounded were brought to naval hospital stations during the period December 7-10. Many others died who were trapped in capsized or sunken ships.

Colonel Thielen will take up from here.

[126] Colonel Thielen. As to the miscellaneous subjects of hostile agents, sabotage, and civilian protection I have a few remarks.

Prior to the attack, all known Japanese, Italian, and German agents had been listed by Army G-2, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Naval Intelligence. Within a few hours after the attack the Japanese agents were being apprehended and assembled in the Immigration Station, Honolulu. All agents were subsequently assembled in the Quarantine Station on Sand Island, the total being 370 Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 Italians.

There are no proven instances of sabotage before, during, or after the attack, although the jamming of radio frequencies which occurred immediately after the attack and which made communication difficult may have been due, in part, to sabotage.

By noon the roads were becoming jammed with traffic going in every direction. Under the direction of Mr. Addison Kirk and his civilian
relief committee, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., which operates a large number of busses, immediately moved into Hickam Field and Fort Kamehameha, and started evacuating civilians from these areas. All during Sunday afternoon and the following day the evacuation of civilians continued, most of them being quartered in schools and homes [127] throughout the city. At Fort Shafter, where the headquarters of the Interceptor Command was being constructed in a spur of the Koolau Mountains, the women and children of Fort Shafter and a few from Schofield barracks were accommodated. Slit trenches were being dug at all the posts and in parks, school grounds, and all open places accessible to civil communities.

Admiral Inglis will take on from here.

[128] Admiral Inglis. With respect to damage to Navy ships, a general description of the damage to naval vessels has been given in the narrative. In item 15 of the Navy folder the members of the committee will find a complete detailed description of this damage, with the first sheet being a summary.

Item 16, Navy folder, describes the loss of 87 nonairborne naval aircraft, and the loss of five airborne planes from the carrier Enterprise, for a total of 92 planes, and itemizes also the damage to installations at Ford Island Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, and the Marine Air Base at Ewa.

Now, turning to the damage to Japanese, it was estimated that the Japanese lost a total of 28 planes, most of which were dive bombers and torpedo planes, due to Navy action.

Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each and carrying two torpedoes were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy action and one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered.

From reports available to the commander in chief, it is estimated that the Japanese lost, due solely to Navy action, a minimum of 68 killed. An estimate of wounded cannot be made. One officer, an ensign, was taken prisoner when he abandoned the small submarine which grounded off Bellows Field.

[129] The above report on the Japanese damages or losses does not include operational losses, only losses in combat.

With respect to efforts to track the Japs after the attack, air searches to track the Japanese striking force were ordered and carried out without result.

Colonel Thielen will take over now.

[130] Colonel Thielen. As to the Army casualties and the damage suffered by Army installations, on page 13 of the Army exhibit there is a list of Army casualties in the Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941. They were:

Killed in action................................................................ 194
Wounded in action.......................................................... 360
Missing in action............................................................ 22
Died, nonbattle.............................................................. 2
Declared dead (Public Law, 490)..................................... 1
Died of wounds................................................................ 21

Total............................................................................. 600

In addition to the extensive damage to installations on airfields shown by the various photographs submitted herewith, final reports show that 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action on
December 7. This figure includes aircraft destroyed in depots and also those damaged planes which were stripped for parts.

As to the damage done to Japanese, General Short reported that 11 enemy aircraft were shot down by Army pursuit planes and antiaircraft fire.

[131] Admiral Inglis. The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a total of 2,835 casualties, of which 2,086 officers and men were killed or fatally wounded. Seven hundred and fifty-nine wounded survived. None were missing.

Next with respect to the conduct and behavior under fire of the personnel.

In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired.

References to individual valor are replete with such acts as—

(1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treatment while they themselves needed help.

(2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame and from flooded compartments.

(3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames.

(4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and strafing.

(5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.

(6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or while ships were sinking.

[132] (7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being blown off their own sinking vessels.

For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor have been awarded and 60 Navy Crosses.

Colonel Thielen will now take over.

[133] Colonel Thielen. On the Army side, too, acts of heroism were numerous. Five Distinguished Service Crosses and 65 Silver Stars were awarded to Army personnel for heroism displayed during the December 7 attack.

That concludes the Army’s narrative of the attack.

Admiral Inglis. That also concludes the Navy’s formal presentation.

[134] Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, the Navy had the Fourteenth Naval District and the Pacific Fleet. This story you have developed covered both?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. As I pointed out, the Fourteenth Naval District in this particular instance was under the command of the commander-in-chief and the presentation that I have given covers the activities of both the forces afloat and the forces ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I understand it, the Navy commands had for antiaircraft defense only the antiaircraft guns based on the ships?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You said something about marines on shore setting up machine guns. I was not so clear about that.

Admiral Inglis. The marines that I mentioned ashore as firing back at the Japanese planes during the attack were the personnel of the Marine air squadrons at Ewa and those machine guns, I think, in most cases, were stripped from the—perhaps not stripped, but taken from
the armory and comprised the guns which normally would be used by the aircraft themselves.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, the only other defense the naval command had when under attack was in the airplane defense?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Mitchell. And those planes, as I understood you, were carrier planes that came in and became land based at Ford Island as their carriers came into port, except for some that were on the cruisers, two or three per cruiser?

Admiral Inglis. The planes that I mentioned from the carriers were en route—no, I take that back. They were sent out by the Enterprise on search and then when the attack developed they were diverted in an attempt to repel the Japanese attack.

Mr. Mitchell. Could you sum up and state how many naval planes of the fighter type capable of fighting enemy planes got into the air before the attack was over?

Admiral Inglis. Before the attack was opened—

Mr. Mitchell. Over.

Admiral Inglis. Oh, before the attack was over?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, after it commenced and before it ended. I am not interested in those which got into the air after it was over.

Admiral Inglis. I have a table here which I think will give you the information that you asked for.

At the naval station, Ford Island, there was a total of 70 planes before the attack started. Of these 19 were destroyed, [136] 14 were damaged and 37 were left undamaged. Of those 37 planes, 31 were utility planes, not designed for combat, 4 were the patrol planes already in flight and 2 were in the shop under repairs, so that there were no planes at Ford Island available to engage in combat except the four which were already in flight. That is from the Ford Island Station.

Mr. Mitchell. And you say none of them got into the air at all?

Admiral Inglis. None except four which were already in the air. They were in the air before the fight started.

Mr. Mitchell. They were in the air before the fight started?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.

At Kaneohe 37 planes were attached to the air station. 28 of those were destroyed, 6 were damaged, 3 were undamaged and those 3 which were undamaged were in the air before the attack.

At Ewa 49 Marine planes were based at that naval air station and of those 49, 33 were destroyed and 16 damaged, leaving none in operating condition.

At Maui there were a total of eight planes but all of those planes were utility planes and not designed for combat operations. None of those, of course, were damaged.

At Johnston Island there were two PBY's undamaged. I have [137] no information on the employment of those, but Johnston Island is a long way from Hawaii.

Mr. Mitchell. A PBY is an observation plane?

Admiral Inglis. The PBY is a long range airplane.

Mr. Mitchell. Not a fighter?

Admiral Inglis. Not a fighter; no, sir; but equipped with fairly respectable armament.
At Midway there were 12 PBY's. None of these 12 was damaged, of course, because Midway was not attacked, but these planes were on the search, as has already been described.

Now, in addition to that the Northampton, a heavy cruiser, launched two or her observation planes which are not very efficient as fighters but, nevertheless, they did succeed in shooting down one Japanese plane off the Island of Niihau.

That is about the extent of my information in answer to your question, sir.

[138] Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Thielen, as I understand it, the Army exhibit, in accordance with the statement on page 10, covers that information from the Army standpoint, does it? Is that complete?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; that is complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Mr. Mitchell. According to that, on Hickam Field the first plane that got into the air was at 11:27?

Colonel Thielen. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. The attack was over by that time?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; the attack was well over.

Mr. Mitchell. At Wheeler Field you got some P-40's up at 8:34?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That is a fighter group?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I believe that is a significant point. The airplanes at Hickam Field were bombers and those at Wheeler Field were pursuit ships, as they called them in those days, fighters as we call them now, which did get up all right.

Mr. Mitchell. You got some up at 8:20, some at 8:55, an hour after the attack started, some at 9:15 and some at 9:30. Those were all the planes at Wheeler Field that had gotten into the air?

[139] Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, since 9:35 is taken as the definite termination of the attack.

Mr. Mitchell. What are those at 7:47 at Bellows Field and that one that you say got up at 9:15?

Colonel Thielen. Those are observation airplanes.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you a summary of your figures to show how many planes of fighting type the Army forces had in commission and how many of them got into the air before the attack was over? Could you secure that for us? Could you sum that up for us without too much trouble?

Colonel Thielen. I think the exhibit on the preceding page, taken in connection with that which you cited, sir, on page 10 do tell a complete story. The exhibit on page 9 is that which I have displayed on a chart. I will be glad to recall the chart.

Mr. Mitchell. No. I thought maybe you had a total. Well, that is satisfactory; the committee can see it.

Will the committee inquire?

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.

[140] Admiral, as I understood you, on December 7, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was about three-fourths the size of the Atlantic Fleet, but I understood you to say the Pacific Fleet was more modern and stronger or had larger vessels? Is that correct?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, Mr. Congressman, except that the figure was two-thirds.

The Vice Chairman. Two-thirds?
Admiral Inglis. Rather than three-fourths.

The Vice Chairman. And I also understood you to say that there were no searches made on December 6, 1941, by aircraft.

Admiral Inglis. That is not correct. We have no written record of any searches except the search from the Enterprise which is shown on the chart.

The Vice Chairman. Were there any searches made the day before that anywhere near this approximate time?

Admiral Inglis. I am not prepared to answer that specifically. I might hazard an opinion that there were.

The Vice Chairman. Then one other question, if I may, while along the line of General Mitchell's inquiry.

According to item 11 of the Navy exhibit presented here, it is shown that the Japanese aircraft participating in this attack totaled 105.

Is that correct? Item 11 of your white exhibit here, the second page of that, it shows there, total [141] number of planes making attack, including those which repeated, and out at the right hand column, "Total 156." Then under that, "Total number of planes, exclusive of those which repeated," it totals 105.

Admiral Inglis. I have those figures now, sir. I must say that that number—that is the number of planes which repeated their attacks and, therefore, are counted as more than once in the first figure, is necessarily an estimate but our best estimate, according to the records that we have available, is 105 as the total number of planes which actually attacked.

The Vice Chairman. As far as the Navy and Army can ascertain—

Admiral Inglis. No, these are only Navy figures.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I understood the colonel to give the same figure in his statement. You agreed on that. So far as the Army and Navy knew at that time there were 105 Japanese planes that participated in the attack?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, are you prepared to tell us what the United States air strength in Hawaii was at that time?

Admiral Inglis. I can tell you what the Navy air strength was. That is contained in one of the exhibits.

[142] In item 12 in the Navy folder you will find a table giving, among other things, the number of planes attached to the various squadrons and stationed at the various naval air stations.

The Vice Chairman. I have examined that, Admiral, in an effort to get the information I am now requesting. At least, it is not put up in the same form as the Jap planes and I was wondering what the total was.

Admiral Inglis. I would have to qualify any answer that I might make to your question by pointing out that a large number of those planes given in item 12 are utility types and not suitable for combat.

For instance, all of those marked "VJ" are utility type planes and that takes out a large proportion of the total as being suitable for combat operations. Those planes are used for towing target sleeves for antiaircraft fire and for transport and things of that nature, duties other than combat.
The Vice Chairman. Well, in an effort to not detain you unduly as I am sure other members of the committee want to inquire, could you gentlemen give me a figure that would compare with the 103 Jap planes which made the attack?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; if you will bear with me just a moment while I add them up. I come out with the answer 52.

Mr. Gesell. That is Navy planes?

[143] Admiral Inglis. Those are Navy planes.

The Vice Chairman. Navy planes 52?

Admiral Inglis. 52 Navy planes comparable in design to the Japanese planes which made the attack. That excludes the utility planes and the PBY's.

The Vice Chairman. In other words, this 52 would be the number of combat Navy planes?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Admiral Inglis. I think I should add, to make the story complete, that that does not include the planes from the carriers, that is, the Enterprise and Lexington. These are only the planes based on Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. Well, how many carrier planes were in a position that they could have been used?

Admiral Inglis. The Enterprise was 200 miles away from Pearl Harbor at the time and any planes that she might have had available to participate in the attack would have been nearly at the extreme limit of their radius of action. However, there were 18 Enterprise planes which did get into the general area of the attack.

The Vice Chairman. Eighteen?

Admiral Inglis. So if you cared to you could add the 18 to the 52, making a total of 70.

[144] The Vice Chairman. Now, at what stage of the attack did these 18 get into it?

Admiral Inglis. Those planes took off from the Enterprise shortly after 6 a.m. The attack was launched at 7:55 a.m. and 3 of the planes landed at 9:40 and 10 at 10:15. I would gather from that that the Enterprise planes reached the scene of the attack at an estimated time of perhaps 9 o'clock.

The Vice Chairman. Would that be during the time the attack was in progress?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Were there any other carrier planes that were available there, such as you have described about the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; no other carrier planes.

The Vice Chairman. And no others that did participate?

Admiral Inglis. The only other planes that we have not already covered were the two planes from the Northampton and, again, those planes are not of combat type. They were observation planes but they did shoot down one Japanese plane in spite of their comparative weakness.

The Vice Chairman. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the colonel for the same type of information so far as the Army is concerned.

[145] Colonel Thielen. First, sir, I would like to correct what I believe is your impression that only 105 planes were involved in attacks on both Army and Navy installations. Is that correct?
The Vice Chairman. That is the way I understood it.

Colonel Thielen. I want to say that is not the Army view. We consider that 105 airplanes is our estimate of the number that were involved in the attacks only on Army installations and I believe it is a mere coincidence that the Navy has the same figure.

The Vice Chairman. Well, the figure is the same in both statements. Does that mean, then, that there were just exactly 105 planes that attacked the Army and just exactly 105 planes that attacked the Navy?

Colonel Thielen. I am not prepared to say how many attacked the Navy, but our estimate is 105 aircraft attacking Army installations only.

Mr. Mitchell. We will give you later the Japanese story showing how many planes they sent. This is only confusion and guesswork, these figures that are given here.

Colonel Thielen. It is purely an estimate. It is obtained by adding up the total number of aircraft reported by observers at the three Army fields attacked. It is entirely possible that there is considerable duplication, as no one [146] was in a position to observe more than one airfield at a time.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I had this figure. I had just assumed from what I heard you both say that there were 105 Japanese planes engaged in the attack and I had assumed that was the total number of Japanese planes.

Colonel Thielen. As I say, the Army considers that 105 aircraft attacked Army installations.

The Vice Chairman. What do you have to say about that, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis. I have the same thing, Mr. Cooper. The figure of 105 is just an estimate.

The Vice Chairman. I understood that.

Admiral Inglis. It is just impossible to arrive at a precise figure because, as you know, there was a great deal of confusion at that time and this is just the best that we can make of the reports that we have and the estimate is 105 planes engaged in the attacks against naval ships and naval shore installations.

You remember that in answer to your question I tried to bring out that these were Navy figures. These presentations that the colonel and I have been making were made up separately. There is no, if I may use the term, collusion between us except insofar as we have arranged for certain portions [147] of the presentation to go to the Army side and then certain portions to go to the Navy side, but we have not tried to reconcile our figures.

The Vice Chairman. It had not occurred to me, Admiral, that there was any collusion but I was rather in the position of hoping to congratulate you gentlemen if the Army's estimate of the number of Jap planes and the Navy's estimate of the number of Jap planes happened to be the same. I thought you were doing remarkably good estimating if you were both estimating the same.

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid in all modesty I will have to admit that that is a pure coincidence.

The Vice Chairman. What I was trying to find out was how many Jap planes were attacking us.
Admiral Inglis. As Mr. Mitchell has said, Mr. Cooper, a later presentation will give the Japanese side of the story and I think we will get much more accurate figures from that.

The Vice Chairman. All right. I was hoping to ascertain, so far as you could tell us, the number of Jap planes that were attacking us.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And the strength of the United States aircraft in Hawaii at that time, combat planes that might have been used in meeting or repelling that attack.


The Vice Chairman. That is what I was hoping to get.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. I think you have the whole figure. It is 70 in the case of the Navy.

The Vice Chairman. Seventy in the case of the Navy?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, and our best estimate of the Japanese planes that were making the attack, that is, from the American point of view, without the Japanese intelligence before us, was 105 against naval targets.

The Vice Chairman. Now, let me see if I can get some help from you, Colonel.

Colonel Thielen. I would like to point out first that no aircraft were armed and equipped for combat against these Japanese, but of the pursuit aircraft in commission on Oahu at the time of the attack we had 94 pursuit aircraft before the attack and 53 after the attack.

The Vice Chairman. Ninety-four before the attack?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And your total number was what, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis. My total was 52 shore-based planes, plus the 18 from the Enterprise, making 70.

The Vice Chairman. That is 164 for the Army and Navy.

A question to both of you gentlemen. Are you prepared to [149] give us some estimate of the number of Japanese planes that attacked both Army and Navy installations?

Admiral Inglis. The only way I could answer that would be to add Colonel Thielen's figures to mine and that would be 210, but there again, Mr. Cooper, we must qualify that by saying that some of these reports have been duplicated. Perhaps the same plane attacked both a Navy ship and an Army air station.

[150] The Vice Chairman. I can well understand that. I would expect that to be the best guess.

Admiral Inglis. I would say the best estimate we can come out with would be 210.

The Chairman. Senator George would like to ask a question.

Senator George. Admiral, I believe you stated this morning that United States shipping along the northern route had been discontinued as of November 25, 1941; is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Senator George. Did you assign any reason for that order for discontinuing the shipping on that route?

Admiral Inglis. This presentation that we have made has omitted all reference to any reasons for action taken.

Senator George. I merely wanted to get clear in my mind what you said. You did not assign any reasons?

Admiral Inglis. I did not; no, sir.
The Chairman. All right, Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Admiral, in the earlier part of your testimony you gave to the committee some facts with respect to the reconnaissance planes which took off on the morning of December 7. I am not sure that I thoroughly understood just why the delay existed there, or whether the evidence, or the records of the Navy disclose the reason for that hour's delay of these planes taking off for reconnaissance work.

Admiral Inglis. That, as I recall it, was the case of the planes taking off from Midway—

Senator Lucas. No: not from Midway.

Admiral Inglis. You remember, Senator Lucas, I corrected that word "sunrise" to make it read "dawn." The plan was to have these planes take off at dawn, which is usually considered as 1 hour before sunrise. That was the standing order, that they were to take off at dawn, which was 5:27.

However, these planes did not actually take off until about 6:40, which is even more than hour late. Those were the three patrol planes from Kaneohe air station.

Senator Lucas. That is right. Are there any records which disclose the reason for the delay in taking off?

Admiral Inglis. There again, Senator, in our presentation we have purposely avoided—

Senator Lucas (Interposing). I am not asking for your conclusion, I am asking you whether or not you have discovered any records in the Navy Department giving or disclosing any reasons why these three reconnaissance planes were over an hour late in taking off on the dawn patrol.

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I do not know the reason.

Senator Lucas. One other question with respect to those reconnaissance planes: Do the records disclose the distances that these reconnaissance planes covered on their usual dawn patrol flight?

Admiral Inglis. Those patrol planes were described in the exhibit which is number—do you remember the zebra stripes?

Mr. Mitchell. Item 10.

Admiral Inglis. Item 10. Item 10 in the Navy folder, you will find the horizontal stripes due south of Oahu. As I recall it that distance was 120 miles.

Senator Lucas. 120 miles?

Admiral Inglis. 120 miles.

Senator Lucas. Now one other question. Do the records disclose as to how long that patrol had been in existence previous to December 7?

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question, sir. I do not know whether they do or not.

Senator Lucas. Will counsel please take these questions that I am asking and supply, if he can, the answer for the record? ¹

You also discussed the sighting of the submarine at 3:50 in the morning on the morning of December 7. You also stated that the commander of that ship notified the commander of the destroyer Ward that at 3:57 he had sighted the periscope of the submarine.

It is my understanding of your testimony that the Ward opened fire at 6:45 on that submarine, after sighting it at 6:40, and

¹ See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1387 et seq.; see also Part 11, p. 5484 et seq.
then the commander of the Ward reported to the commanding officer at 6:54 that the submarine had been sunk.

Now who was the commanding officer at that time?

Admiral Inglis. The name of the commanding officer of the Ward?

Senator Lucas. Yes; the name of the commanding officer of the Ward—or, I mean the name of the commanding officer to whom the commander of the Ward reported.

Admiral Inglis. The Ward sent the dispatch to the office of the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Senator Lucas. Who was in charge of it at that time?

Admiral Inglis. The dispatch was delivered to the district duty officer, who was Lt. Comdr. Harold Kaminski.

Senator Lucas. It was delivered to Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, but who was in charge of the Fourteenth Naval District at that time?

Admiral Inglis. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was Admiral Bloch.

Senator Lucas. Do the records show where Admiral Bloch was at the time this message was delivered?

Admiral Inglis. To the best of my knowledge and belief, he was in his quarters.

Senator Lucas. Do the records show whether or not he was notified by Lieutenant Commander Kaminski with respect to the sinking of this submarine?

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot answer that question.

Senator Lucas. Do the records show whom Kaminski—or whatever his name is— notified about the sinking?

Admiral Inglis. Kaminski was notified and he in turn passed the message to the headquarters of the commander in chief of the United States Fleet.

Senator Lucas. Who received that message at the headquarters?

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got that information. I can get it for you.

Senator Lucas. I wish you would get it. Admiral Kimmel, of course, was the gentleman in charge of the fleet at that time.

Admiral Inglis. Admiral Kimmel was commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet.

Senator Lucas. Does the record show whether or not Admiral Kimmel received the message at any time before the attack?

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question either, sir.

Senator Lucas. According to your testimony the attack took place at 7:55.

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

[155] Senator Lucas. The submarine was sunk by the Ward at 6:54. I should like to know whether or not, during that hour's time, Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel received any direct notice of the sinking of that submarine.

Now of course we will ask the officer who made the report on the sinking of the submarine to have it with him in the morning, to see what importance was attached to the sinking of this submarine, as far as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned.

Admiral Inglis. Senator, I would not expect that any of those authorities or officials would have received the report that the sub-
marine had been sunk, because the report of the Ward was "We have attacked"—

Senator Lucas. Whatever the report was—I do not care for the report itself, but whatever the report was that went in.

Admiral Inglis. I will get that information for you.

Senator Lucas. I want to know why it happened, and if they made a report on it, and whatever the report is, and to whom it went, and especially would I like to know at what time—if there is any time—that Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel received that report.

Admiral Inglis. We will get that information and insert it in the record, if it is available.

Senator Lucas. One other question and then I will be through.

When you say that the Fourteenth Naval District was under the commander in chief, you mean the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Lucas. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark.

Senator Lucas. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, before you go to Congressman Clark?

Do the records disclose as to whether or not those on patrol duty around Pearl Harbor looking for submarines discovered at any time previous to the morning of December 7 anything that would direct their attention that submarines were in that area previous to the morning of December 7?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; the records on that subject are completely negative.

Senator Lucas. That is, up to that time, up to the morning of December 7, as far as the record is concerned, there is no record that shows that there was any danger from the standpoint of looking for submarines, or a submarine attack, even though they were on guard and the boys were looking for submarines?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, to the best of my knowledge.

[156] Senator Lucas. That is all, Admiral Inglis.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark. Admiral, you showed a diagram this morning on the extent of the plane patrol. The impression I gained was the extent of the patrol immediately after the attack is shown in red.

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.

Mr. Clark. Would you mind having that map put back?

Admiral Inglis. Commander Biard, will you put up the chart showing the patrols.

Mr. Clark. Now what I was trying to get clear in my own mind, if the red diagram there shows the extent of the patrols by the planes around Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack—is that right?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Clark. Is that a larger or a smaller area of patrol than had been the case immediately prior to the attack?

(The roll call buzzer sounded.)

The Chairman. I might say to the committee that that is a roll-call vote in the Senate on the substitute offered by Senator Byrd to the amendment offered by Senator Donnell to the reorganization bill.

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5293.
The committee has been excused from attendance during the hearing here.

Senator Ferguson. Without waiving my right to examine the witness, might I be excused just long enough to vote on that? I think it is an important matter.

The Chairman. Yes, if the Senator wishes to, and if any other Senators wish to vote I think they may also be excused.

Senator Lucas. I am willing to give you one vote here.

The Chairman. What is the wish of the committee?

Senator Brewster. I am willing to stay here and allow Senator Ferguson to go.

Senator Ferguson. That is a very important vote. That is the only reason why I ask to be excused.

The Chairman. The Senator may be excused. The Chair will ask the Vice Chairman to take the Chair while he goes and votes.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. You have my question.

Admiral Inglis. I believe your question was: Did the patrol which was ordered immediately after the attack cover a greater area than that which had normally been covered before the attack?

Mr. Clark. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. To the best of my knowledge, the answer to that question is "yes."

Mr. Clark. Now you gave us a very graphic picture of Pearl Harbor, and the military establishment there, including everything on the airport and so forth. I am interested to know, and I assume you would be the proper witness to ask, how that establishment on the Hawaiian Islands, the military establishment, compares with any other base or military establishment we may have had in the Pacific area at that time, including the Philippine Islands, as to size and strength and equipment, and munitions of war.

Admiral Inglis. You wish me to compare Hawaii with any other United States base or establishment, military installation?

Mr. Clark. In the Pacific area.

Admiral Inglis. In the Pacific area?

Mr. Clark. Yes, sir.

Admiral Inglis. Of course that perhaps is a matter of opinion, but my opinion is that it was by far the strongest United States base in the Pacific area.

Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. I will waive questions at this time.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in answer to Mr. Clark's question as to whether or not the patrol afterward, after the attack, was larger than before, your answer was, in your opinion, "yes."

Isn't it true that the black lines indicate the patrol before and the red, which includes the area of the black, was afterward, and therefore the necessity much larger than it was before?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now then, it is my understanding that you and Colonel Thielen are prepared only to discuss the details of the attack and not to go into the whys and wherefores.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, speaking for myself.

Colonel Thielen. I concur in that.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to know from someone in the Navy, and I assume you are not the one, I would like to record to show that I want to know whether or not there was any inspection order within a week prior to Pearl Harbor, the effect of which would be to put the ships out of commission.

One member of the committee has intimated that such an inspection was ordered. I would like to meet it squarely just as soon as we possibly can.

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question, but perhaps I can throw a little light on your inquiry, and that is this, that a careful study of the damage sustained by the ships at Pearl Harbor on that day was made by some competent officers in the Bureau of Ships, and as a result of that study they concluded that the California was the only ship where the opening of the compartments had any effect or was in any way a contributing factor to the damage suffered by the ship.

Mr. Murphy. Now then, so far as the other ships are concerned, they were not under a condition of inspection that would call for open compartments and other conditions that would disable them in case of combat; is that right?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I did not intend to give that impression in my answer. I do not know the answer to that specific question. All I can say is any openings did not contribute to the spread of the damage or the flooding of the ships, except on the California.

Mr. Murphy. May I indicate to counsel on the record, and to the Navy, that I hope some witness will be called who will be able to give any details of what inspection, if any, was ordered within a week of December 7; what effect, if any, that had on the ships on the morning of December 7, 1941.

Mr. Mitchell. I would say, Mr. Congressman, that we are hard at work on that now.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. We haven't the story here today because we haven't gotten to the bottom of it.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. We are cutting out of this statement anything that has not been definitely established.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. That very point is under inquiry now. [162] We have some information about it, but it is not complete.1

Mr. Murphy. My next question, Admiral, is that in your exhibit you have given a list of the ships that were sunk, damaged, and capsized. That was Exhibit No. 17.

Admiral Inglis. That is item 15.

Mr. Murphy. Item 15. That contains a list of battleships, light cruisers, destroyers, repair ships, mine layers, seaplane tenders, and miscellaneous auxiliaries.

The Navy did make a public statement, did they not, through Secretary Knox, within a few days subsequent to December 7, 1941, as to the damage to ships at Pearl Harbor, including those sunk and those damaged?

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347, for all communications on the subject of water-tight integrity of vessels at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Inglis. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have some witness from the Navy testify on the record as to how the list given today compares with the public notice given immediately after Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Inglis. I will have to get that for you, sir, and insert it in the record.¹

Mr. Murphy. The next thing I would like to ask, Admiral, and I would like to ask of you, Colonel Thielen, and that is what reconnaissance was ordered by Admiral Kimmel or by General Short subsequent to the messages received by them on November 27 down to and including December 7, 1941, and I assume that neither of you are prepared to answer those questions at the present time.

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer.

Colonel Thielen. I cannot give a definitive answer, I can only point out the condition of alert that was placed in effect at that time, which did not envisage the possibility of attack from without.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have a specific answer. In addition to the fact that alert No. 1 as to sabotage was ordered, I would like to have a specific answer as to what reconnaissance, if any, was ordered by the Navy and Army immediately subsequent to November 27 and prior to the morning of December 7, 1941.

Mr. Mitchell. We have other witnesses that are going to be brought on that will cover that, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now then, the two figures of 105, they, of course, would make 210, but neither of you, as I take it, would attempt to say that the planes that were used in the Army attack were not also used in the Navy attack?

Admiral Inglis. Speaking for myself, I see no way of unscrambling those figures.

¹ The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson would be next but he has been temporarily excused. Mr. Gearhart, of California.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Inglis—

The Vice Chairman. Here is Senator Ferguson. He is your turn, Senator Ferguson. Will you defer, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. Gearhart. I defer.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, can I inquire as to when you first knew that you were to be the witness to give these facts?

Admiral Inglis. At 3 o'clock last Friday afternoon, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And up to that time, what did you have to do with assembling the facts? Up until 3 o'clock Friday, what did you have to do in relation to assembling the facts?

Admiral Inglis. As Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, my officers had been engaged for perhaps a week before that in getting up this presentation.

Senator Ferguson. From whom did you get your instructions as to what was desired by the committee?

Admiral Inglis. The instructions were relayed to us through the Judge Advocate General's office.

² Senator Ferguson. Are they in writing?

Admiral Inglis. Are they what, sir?

² See Hearings, Part 6, p. 2674 for a table submitted by the Navy Department showing a "Comparison of actual damage suffered by the fleet at Pearl Harbor and that stated in the report that was released by Secretary Knox on 15 December 1941."
Senator Ferguson. Are they in writing?
Admiral Inglis. I believe not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What were the instructions you were given by the Judge Advocate General's office?
Admiral Inglis. The instructions were to be prepared to make a presentation before the committee of the factual evidence concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.
Senator Ferguson. Were you instructed to give no conclusions, or no orders?
Admiral Inglis. Those instructions evolved in the course of time. I don't believe that they were specifically stated in that form when the instructions were first passed along to us.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first get the instructions not to draw any conclusions or not to give any orders; that is, to cite any orders?
Admiral Inglis. We were given an outline of the subjects which were to be covered.
Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the outline? Was it in writing?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read it off, sir?
[166] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. It is two pages.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the same outline we gave the committee.
Senator Ferguson. Could I see it?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
(A copy was handed to Senator Ferguson.)
Admiral Inglis. The Senator may keep that copy if he wishes.
Senator Ferguson. You have others?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Who selected you, Admiral, to be the spokesman?
Admiral Inglis. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Edwards, gave me the directive.
Senator Ferguson. Can I inquire from the colonel as to when he first learned that he was to be a witness?
Colonel Thielen. I didn't receive positive information until just before the past week end, Friday or Saturday. I had been told before that time that I might be called upon to actually present the story.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when did you first know that you were to present the story?
Colonel Thielen. As I say, I was informed positively [167] on Friday or Saturday last.
Senator Ferguson. Who drew up your presentation?
Colonel Thielen. I belong to a section of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, which is continuously engaged in research of this type, in examination of after-action reports, and other such first sources, to prepare digests similar to this. We work together. We have a procedure whereby a number of researchers, both officers and enlisted personnel, are given their task, and the material is assembled and edited.
Senator Ferguson. When was your report assembled?
Colonel Thielen. The first draft, a week or 6 days ago.
Senator Ferguson. A week or 6 days ago. When did you first furnish counsel of the committee with a copy of your draft?

Colonel Thielen. No such copy has been furnished to this time, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. Up until the present time. Admiral, when did you first furnish the committee or any counsel with a copy of your draft?

Admiral Inglis. I beg pardon?

Senator Ferguson. When did you first furnish the committee or counsel with a copy of your draft?

[168] Admiral Inglis. I don't believe I have given the counsel a copy of the draft. I have given the committee, I mean the counsel, copies of the exhibits, but as far as I know, not of the draft of this script.

Senator Ferguson. Of what you read to the committee?

Admiral Inglis. I don't believe so: no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I noticed one conclusion that you drew, and that was in relation to the radar, that the man was practicing after 7 o'clock.

Admiral Inglis. No; that was the Army.

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, will you give us what information you have on that?

Colonel Thielen. Would the Senator care to have me repeat the story?

Senator Ferguson. No; I don't want the story repeated. I would like to have what information was given to you that he was actually practicing. Who told you that?

Colonel Thielen. You mean my sources on that, sir? This copy is documented. The fact that these two enlisted men picked up an indication of hostile aircraft by radar at 7:02 a.m. on the morning of December 7 comes from the Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of Private McDonald.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you examined [169] the Roberts report in order that you might give us this summary?

Colonel Thielen. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. What other reports did you examine?

Colonel Thielen. I have a rather long list here, Senator. I did not examine that all personally. It so happens I did examine the Roberts report personally. I examined the Grunert report personally, and various other sources. There is a list of some 74 documents which were examined by the various members of the section of which I am a part.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, when you examined these various reports, were they in conflict with the reports on the items which you have given us?

Colonel Thielen. None came to my attention, sir. I was not looking for any conflicts. I was deliberately omitting any conflicts or controversial subjects from my report.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us if these witnesses testified in any other hearing besides the Roberts, as to whether or not this man was actually practicing?

Colonel Thielen. I don't believe I am the best witness on that, sir. I don't know. I am not an authority on all of the various reports.
Senator Ferguson. Why would you give us the conclusion out of the Roberts report when you know that that was a cursory report?

Colonel ThieLEN. Because there is, apparently, no conflict, as far as our researchers were able to determine.

Senator Ferguson. You say there is no conflict at all on that question?

Colonel ThieLEN. Apparently not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand your statement is hearsay on that?

Colonel ThieLEN. Everything that I have said today is hearsay, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Everything that you have said here today is hearsay?

Colonel ThieLEN. That is correct, and none of this material—I was not present at Pearl Harbor, nor was I in the War Department on December 7.

Senator Ferguson. How much comes out of the Roberts report on Elliott's training?

Colonel ThieLEN. On his training?

Senator Ferguson. On Elliott being in training at that particular moment.

Colonel ThieLEN. I believe merely the statement.

Senator Ferguson. To whom did he telephone?

Colonel ThieLEN. I won't say to whom Elliott telephoned.

I will say, as I said in the script, that the telephone report was made by the Opana radar station to Lt. Kermit Tyler, the watch officer at the information center, Fort Shafter.

Senator Ferguson. What was his title at that time?

Colonel ThieLEN. He was known as the watch officer.

Senator Ferguson. At what particular station?

Colonel ThieLEN. At the information center for the various radar stations.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how many people were present at that community center on that morning?

Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Does the Roberts report show, or any other report that you examined?

Colonel ThieLEN. I have no recollection of that being given.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Navy had a watch there at that time?

Colonel ThieLEN. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not either Tyler or Elliott, or the other man with Elliott knew that B-17's were coming in that morning?

Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir; I don't know what the extent of their knowledge was.

Senator Ferguson. Did you give us the exact plan of what was shown on the radar design plan?

Colonel ThieLEN. It was a copy, as faithful as we could make it. It was not a mechanical reproduction. It was done by an artist. It was as good a copy as we could make of the so-called historical plot.

Senator Ferguson. Have you the original?

Colonel ThieLEN. I have an original.
Senator Ferguson. Will you produce it for the committee?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
(The document was handed to Senator Ferguson.)
Senator Ferguson. Do you know who made this original?
Colonel Thielen. It is authenticated by an officer named Murphy.
Senator Ferguson. Back to the Admiral, now. I have to keep skipping back and forth.
Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the Pacific; is that correct?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I said that the numerical strength of the Pacific Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was smaller than the Atlantic Fleet.
Senator Ferguson. I beg your pardon. One third was in the Pacific and two-thirds in the Atlantic?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We still haven't got our fractions right.
Senator Ferguson. What is that?
Admiral Inglis. We still haven't got our fractions right.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how many capital battleships were in the Atlantic?
Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic Fleet were 6 battleships. In the Pacific Fleet were 9 battleships. Six in the Atlantic and 9 in the Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. And eight out of the nine were destroyed, or damaged?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How many were?
Admiral Inglis. Well, I have to distinguish between damaged and destroyed.
Senator Ferguson. How many were hit. Put it that way.
Admiral Inglis. Well, the Colorado, of course, was the ninth one, and she was not present at Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Were all the others hit?
Admiral Inglis. All the others were hit to a greater or lesser degree.
Senator Ferguson. Then there was only one battleship in the Pacific that was not hit?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, how many battleships were in the Atlantic?
Admiral Inglis. Six.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I read from Battle Report, Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6:
In the Atlantic there were eight battleships.
Reading from page 6.
Admiral Inglis. I can't recognize that book as being official. I have here a list of the specific ships—
Senator Ferguson. I read you the first part of this book:
Notes on the background and writing of this book. When the authors of this book were directed by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to begin a preparation, a few months before his death, the instructions were brief and to the point—indicating that he had something to do with the preparation of this Battle Report, and the Navy officers that wrote this book.
It says:
Prepared from official sources by Commander Walter Karlg, and Lt. Welbourn Kelley.
Admiral Inglis. I personally still don't recognize that as being official, except what you have told me now, but, if I may, Senator Ferguson, I will read the list of ships that were in the Atlantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic were the New York, the Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, Arkansas, and Texas.

In the Pacific, the Pennsylvanina, California, West Virginia, Arizona, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Colorado, and Maryland.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the Secretary of the Navy Knox's memorandum or report that he drew up or had drawn up at the time of—after the incident?

Admiral Inglis. You mean immediately after the attack?

Senator Ferguson. No. Did you use anything from that report in making up your report here?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He gave a report at that time; did he not?

Admiral Inglis. I read such a report in the newspapers. You mean about a month after Pearl Harbor?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Didn't you try to get that as a part of your source?

Admiral Inglis. Well, I am not too familiar with the sources that were used by my researchers, but I don't believe that was used.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the report the President used sometime after was used in making up this report?

Admiral Inglis. I am not familiar with the President's report.

Senator Ferguson. How are we going to check the accuracy of this report?

Admiral Inglis. All I can is that my presentation was made from the official reports, not those that were prepared for the President, but from the original reports of the Roberts inquiry, and the Murfin board inquiry, and documents of that nature. Wherever possible, they were documents that contained sworn testimony.

Senator Ferguson. How many battleships did we have in December 1941?

Admiral Inglis. Fifteen, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Fifteen?

Admiral Inglis. Fifteen that were attached to the Fleets. There were two or three that had just been completed, or were on their shake-down duty.

Senator Ferguson. Where were they?

Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that the Washington and New Mexico were on shake-down duty in the Atlantic. One of those ships, I am sure, from personal observation was in the navy yard at New York—Brooklyn.

Senator Ferguson. Two of those then were in the Atlantic even though on shake-down duty?

Admiral Inglis. That probably accounts for the discrepancy between the six and eight.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that this book was a little more accurate than your figures.

Admiral Inglis. That would indicate my figures contain the number of ships attached to the Atlantic Fleet and the number attached to the Pacific Fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long after the attack came at Pearl Harbor, it came at the Philippines? Will you name the attacks that were had by the Japs on the date of the 7th, or if it was across the international date line, on the 8th, and give us the hours of those attacks?

Admiral Inglis. I have confined my studies to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands. I can get that information for you.

Senator Ferguson. Would you get us that? Get us the hours of the attacks.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.¹

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you any knowledge of what reconnaissance there was on or about December 1, from Pearl to Johnston to Midway?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have nothing earlier than December 6 readily at hand.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that on or about the 3d that there was some reconnaissance from Wake to Midway to Pearl, arriving on the 5th?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have no information readily at hand earlier than the 6th of December.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know each flight was with at least 1 squadron and 12 PBY’s?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have no information readily at hand earlier than the 6th of December.

Senator Ferguson. On the 5th or 6th, did the Lexington proceed to Pearl from Midway?

Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was en route to Midway from Pearl.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Who was in charge of the Lexington?

Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was in a task group commanded by Admiral Newton.

Senator Ferguson. What did Halsey have charge of—Admiral Halsey?

Admiral Inglis. Just a minute, sir. I want to be sure I have got those correct.

¹ A table showing “Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941, supplied by the Navy Department, appears in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2675.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What reconnaissance was there from the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis. As given in the presentation, the Enterprise launched a squadron of 18 planes to scout through a sector of 110° immediately forward of the ship's course to a distance of 150 miles. [180] Senator Ferguson. How far south would that be of the line where the Jap planes were supposed to have been?

Admiral Inglis. The Japs what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Planes; the carriers of the Japs.

Admiral Inglis. You mean the carriers?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. How far would this reconnaissance be south of that?

Admiral Inglis. That will come out in the Japanese presentation, but I would say about 200 miles, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About 200 miles.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever read the article in the Saturday Evening Post by Lieutenant Richardson about his orders?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. From the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know anything about those orders?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what caused the delay in having the planes leave the ground on the various occasions that you have mentioned, that they were an hour or two late, they were also late at Midway?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I do not know the reason.

[187] Senator Ferguson. Did you look it up or try to find out?

Admiral Inglis. I didn't personally. Perhaps some of my researchers may have.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether any transports left our west coast on the 6th?

Admiral Inglis. In answer to that question—whether they left the west coast of the United States?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I don't.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether one had left and came back because of the assault on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis. I have no positive knowledge of that.

Senator Ferguson. Will you find out?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. ¹

Senator Ferguson. Senator George asked you about why the traffic was diverted from the north route. Have you that data or did you ever see it?

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got it; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. From whom did you get your information that it was diverted on the 25th?

Admiral Inglis. I have got the source right here, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the source?

¹ See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1650, for a report, dated Dec. 13, 1945, from the Navy Department showing the recall of merchant ships to the West Coast, by names of ships, dates they sailed, and dates they returned.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. That was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 25, 1941.

[182] Senator Ferguson. I didn't hear you.

Admiral Inglis. That source is a dispatch originated by the Chief of Naval Operations on the 25th of November 1941, carrying the reference number 252203.

Senator Ferguson. That was Admiral Stark?

Admiral Inglis. Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations at that time; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That came out in Washington; is that true?

Admiral Inglis. That is true.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether a copy of that was ever sent to the admiral in charge of the Fourteenth District?

Admiral Inglis. I am practically certain that it was addressed to him among others, but I am not positive of it.

Senator Ferguson. Have you the order with you?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you get me the order?

Admiral Inglis. I will, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why did you use that in your report and not bring us the order?

Admiral Inglis. The material from which this presentation was made is tremendously bulky. I haven't got it all here.

Senator Ferguson. Who determined to put that in?

Admiral Inglis. Who determined what?

[183] Senator Ferguson. Who determined to put that item in the report?

Admiral Inglis. That was presented to me by the researchers and I made the decision to include it in the presentation. I felt that it was quite pertinent.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who gave the order for the B-17's to leave Hamilton Field, San Francisco?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I do not know. That is an Army activity.

Senator Ferguson. Going back to the colonel, do you know who gave the orders for the B-17's to leave Hamilton Field, Colonel?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you look into that?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when the orders were given?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time they left?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What time?

Colonel Thielen. At 9:30 p.m., 6th December, San Francisco time.

Senator Ferguson. And what field were they destined for?

Colonel Thielen. They were destined for the Philippines [184] by way of Oahu.

Senator Ferguson. What was their destination at the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel Thielen. I could only guess that it would be Hickam Field, the biggest field, a bomber field, and therefore suitable for B17's.

Senator Ferguson. Were they equipped with radio?

---

1 The dispatch, subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 3," was read into the record; see p. 82, infra.
Colonel Thielen. I can't answer that definitely. Presumably they were.

Senator Ferguson. Have you any information that they had been in touch with any radio station on the islands prior to the flight of Japs coming in?

Colonel Thielen. I have only the negative information that they flew without contact with Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. Were they flying blind or without contact?

Colonel Thielen. Apparently they were, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why they were unarmed at that time?

Colonel Thielen. They were being ferried to the Philippines. They were not on a combat mission.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand from that that all planes not on combat missions are unarmed? Have you any personal knowledge of that, Colonel?

Colonel Thielen. That is a rather broad generalization, sir. A state of war did not exist at the time of their departure. They were on a ferrying mission. In time of peace it would be normal for them to be unarmed.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you why it was that on the Enterprise that, as the lieutenant says, they had war orders?

Colonel Thielen. I have no knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. That was just 200 miles west of the Hawaiian Islands. Can you tell why the B-17's didn't have any orders and those from the Enterprise did have orders?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I cannot.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look that up and try to find out?

Colonel Thielen. I believe that is outside my scope, but I will be glad to do it.¹

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean that you are limited in what information you will be able to get for the committee?

Colonel Thielen. I have not been designated by the War Department to coordinate all witnesses who are to appear before the committee.

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you that. I am asking you to get that particular order, if you can, why one didn't have and one did have.

Colonel Thielen. Very well, I will make an effort to get that order.

Mr. Mitchell. I might say we have witnesses on the list for all these things.

The Chairman. We have reached the hour of 4 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. I have considerable more, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I think, in view of the fact that we cannot finish with these witnesses this afternoon, we might as well recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. Gesell. Senator, I have something for each member of the committee before we break up.

(Documents were handed to the committee.)

The Chairman. Very well.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committees recessed until 10 a.m., Friday, November 16, 1945.)

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5293-5294.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Master, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

The Chair understands that counsel wishes to make a brief observation before we proceed with the further examination.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, there is a little confusion in regard, I think, to these requests of witnesses to produce information and documents.

Now, Admiral Inglis and Colonel Thielen had a special job to do, simply to prepare a narrative statement compiled from records of the Departments. We have a liaison staff, as the committee knows, whose job it is to respond to every request from the committee or counsel for documents, and, of course, it is a little confusing to a witness who isn't on that liaison staff to be asked to produce something.

Counsel is delighted to have the members of the committee state in the open hearings here anything they want produced, but we would like to have it understood that when a request of that kind is made for information to the Navy, for instance, that the people that have been set apart by the Secretary of the Navy to respond to those requests are the ones supposed to dig it up.

For instance, Admiral Inglis has the custody of these records and all he could do would be to pass it on to the secretary of the staff.

So we would like to have it understood that when a member of the committee makes a request while the witness is testifying, a request to have matters produced, why, we will have to channel it through the liaison staff, because the witness isn't in that category. If he is, all right. If he has personal custody of that document.

I am not suggesting that the committee not make requests but I want them to understand that to avoid confusion it will have to be handled that way.
The Chairman. In other words, any requests made of these witnesses will be—

Mr. Mitchell. It is a request to the Navy Department.

The Chairman. The documents will be furnished but it will be furnished by the staff that is charged with looking up the documents?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. The witness will have to turn the request over to the proper people in the respective Departments.

The Chairman. The main object is to get the documents.

Mr. Mitchell. There is no difficulty about that. Simply the witness is sometimes embarrassed a little bit in being asked to produce things personally.

Among the things asked for yesterday which we have already been able to obtain, one of the members of the committee requested a copy of the order which routed shipping to the south. We have already obtained that and I will read it into the record to have it out of the way, if it is agreeable.

[190] This is a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations. The commander to whom it was directed for action is the commander of the Twelfth Naval District. I understand that is San Francisco. Copies were sent to four commanders. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District—

that is at Honolulu—and the commander of the Sixteenth Naval District. I understand that is at Manila.

And the dispatch reads in this way:

Route all trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits. The commander in chief, Pacific Fleet; commander in chief Asiatic Fleet, providing necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 230258.

It is marked “Top Secret” in purple. Certified to be a true copy by Ralph W. Lundberg, lieutenant commander.

Mr. Gearhart. What is the date of that?

Mr. Mitchell. November 25, 1941.

The Chairman. The Chief of Naval Operations at that time was Admiral Stark?

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.

The Chairman. And who was the commander in the Twelfth Naval District at San Francisco, does the record show?

Mr. Mitchell. It doesn’t.

Admiral Inglis. I think it was Admiral Greenslade.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I have the exhibit?

[197] I requested it.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Do you want it offered in evidence?

Senator Ferguson. I will offer it in evidence after I have identified it with the witness.

The Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. That is all.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Ferguson.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, this exhibit which has just been read—
Route all trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits, Cinepac and Cincpac provide necessary escort, refer your dispatch 230258—
when did you first see that?
Admiral Inglis. The dispatch you have in your hands?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[192] Admiral Inglis. I first saw that piece of paper this morning at about 9:30.
Senator Ferguson. What did you see to give us the information yesterday?
Admiral Inglis. The information that I gave you yesterday was from a brief or script which was prepared by my research staff with the notation that that dispatch that you have in your hand was the source.
Senator Ferguson. You had your staff go over the files?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did any counsel sit with you to prepare your script?
Admiral Inglis. I have no personal counsel. Is that what you mean?
Senator Ferguson. I am not figuring that you personally are interested here. You are acting as an admiral of the Navy.
Admiral Inglis. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. As an admiral, did you have any counsel with you?
Admiral Inglis. The Judge Advocate General’s office had representatives at various times when we were going over this script.
Senator Ferguson. Did the committee have a counsel member present?
Admiral Inglis. On one or two occasions the script was discussed with the committee counsel.
Senator Ferguson. With whom did you discuss it?
Admiral Inglis. With Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.
Senator Ferguson. Did they see this exhibit?
Admiral Inglis. Not until this morning.
Senator Ferguson. Not until this morning. Do you know why it was not delivered to the committee before?
Admiral Inglis. I do not, sir. It wasn’t asked for.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do I understand they only get what they ask for?
Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I can’t answer that. I was only given a specific job, Senator Ferguson. I don’t know.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see these instructions?

Story of the actual attack and Japanese plans will be presented by an Army and a Navy officer who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under the direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and question of individual responsibility.
Admiral Inglis. I did not see that paper.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see that?

[194] Admiral Inglis. I did not see that paper. I did have an outline, and I was told pretty much the gist of the material you have just read, but it was given to me verbally.

Senator Ferguson. In preparing the conclusions that you prepared, did you furnish to the committee the data upon which it was founded? For instance, you gave the substance of this message. You said it was routed, but you didn’t give the committee the exhibit. Do you know why they were not furnished with the exhibits so that the committee might draw the conclusion?

Admiral Inglis. I didn’t feel that that was part of my function.
Senator Ferguson. What was your function?

Admiral Inglis. My function was to prepare a presentation for this committee, giving the facts that were not controversial, and were substantiated rather conclusively, in my opinion, by the documents we had available in the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. Well now, were you to furnish the documents, or just the narrative form?

Admiral Inglis. I personally was furnished with a narrative prepared by my researchers. In certain cases I asked them to produce the source of the data for my own inspection. Also we produced the folder which has been [195] called the Navy folder, in the white cover, and which does contain certain factual material, but that again has been digested from the basic documents.

[196] Senator Ferguson. You furnished me yesterday a blue sheet with information?

Admiral Inglis. That is the outline.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And that differs somewhat from the one that was handed to the committee by the counsel?

Admiral Inglis. That outline was subject to modification from time to time as we worked up this presentation.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, who modified it?

Admiral Inglis. I would say it was probably a joint effort. The Judge Advocate General and I might have had a little something to do with it. We collaborated with the Army in arranging the sequence of presenting the various items.

Senator Ferguson. How many times did you confer with Mr. Mitchell?

Admiral Inglis. I would say three; three times.

Senator Ferguson. And how many with Mr. Gesell?

Admiral Inglis. About the same number of times.

Senator Ferguson. Did they change anything that you had in your exhibit?

Admiral Inglis. They did not change anything. They suggested a few changes.

Senator Ferguson. What did they suggest?

Admiral Inglis. Well, wherever there was anything that was controversial or that might have been interpreted—
[197] Senator Ferguson. Tell us some of the things that they took out.
Admiral Inglis. They did not take out anything, Senator Ferguson, I want to make that quite clear. They only suggested that—
Senator Ferguson. All right, what did they suggest that you take out?
Admiral Inglis. There was one paragraph, for example, that I remember that I had in suggesting that the country as a whole was not unified just before Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Now, who told you that?
Admiral Inglis. That was my own opinion and, therefore, I agreed that it was not proper to put in the presentation. There were some other items.
Senator Ferguson. Had you talked over with anyone the fact that you wanted to put that in?
Admiral Inglis. I talked it over with my staff; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And who was your staff?
Admiral Inglis. Captain Davis, Captain Phelan and Commander Hindmarsh and a number of others.
Senator Ferguson. How did that happen to come into this question of what actually happened at Pearl Harbor? Were you trying to fix responsibility?
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why would you suggest even putting in that the people were not prepared?
Admiral Inglis. I thought that it might give a little background that would be good for the—
Senator Ferguson. You used the word “united,” that the people were not united?
Admiral Inglis. The people of this country were not united.
Senator Ferguson. I understand the President said something to that effect about the time that the reports were issued. You did not get the suggestion from that, did you?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I got it from my own understanding of the psychology of this country at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Of the American people?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, with whom did you discuss that item?
Admiral Inglis. I discussed it with Captain Davis, with Captain Phelan. I am quite sure, with both Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.
Senator Ferguson. What did they say about it?
Admiral Inglis. After considerable discussion it was agreed, and I concurred in the decision, that it should be [199] omitted.
Senator Ferguson. What was the discussion?
Admiral Inglis. The discussion was whether or not that was appropriate to put in a factual presentation of this kind.
Senator Ferguson. What did it have to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. Well, we all agreed——
Senator Ferguson. Do you think the people were to blame?
Admiral Inglis. Are you asking for my opinion?
Senator Ferguson. Well, you put it in the memo and they persuaded you to take it out. I am asking you whether that is your opinion?
Admiral Inglis. My opinion is that they did contribute to some extent to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you explain how that contributed to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Admiral Inglis. Because the armed forces were not as strong as they might have been had the country been unified and had the appropriations been larger for the Army and Navy.

Senator Ferguson. All right; now, do you know anything about the appropriations?

Admiral Inglis. I only know that the Navy kept asking for more than they could get.

[200] Senator Ferguson. Did you know this, that when the Navy asked for an item that on many occasions the Budget Director and the Executive branch of the Government cut it down?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And Congress often put them up?

Admiral Inglis. I did not know about the latter. I did know about the former.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the people, the Congress for the people, did put those up?

Admiral Inglis. Now that you mention it I believe very likely that there were certain specific instances where the Congress did increase appropriations.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how could you blame the people for not getting armament?

Admiral Inglis. I am not blaming them, Senator. I am just saying that that was my opinion, that that was the frame of mind that this country was in at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you furnish to the committee your original drafts where you had that in and I would like to see all the other things that were taken out, and will you now give us the other things that were taken out?

Admiral Inglis. I will furnish that if I can. I am afraid that was destroyed. Now, the other things that were taken out——

[201] Senator Ferguson. Why would you destroy anything like that afterward?

Admiral Inglis. I did not see any reason to keep it if it was not to be presented.

Senator Ferguson. Have you any notes or any memorandum in relation to the preparing of your memo?

Admiral Inglis. I am not sure, sir. I will have to look through my papers; I am not sure.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you furnish to the committee, so that the committee may have them, all your notes and all your memoranda?

Admiral Inglis. I will furnish anything I have.1

Senator Ferguson. All right; now, what else was taken out?

Admiral Inglis. The other things that were taken out were historical items dating back to 1931.

Senator Ferguson. What were they?

Admiral Inglis. An outline of the Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the Marco Polo Bridge incident, of the aggression of Italy toward Ethiopia, of Germany towards Austria, the Saar, and showing the rise of nazism and fascism.

---

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294.
Senator Ferguson. Will you just take this outline and tell me how many of the items, including the blame on the American people, are included in the request?

[202] Admiral Inglis. They are not in the outline and, therefore, they were taken out.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you come to put them in at all? The Navy was not going to make a defense, were they?

Admiral Inglis. That is why they were taken out, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Because the Navy was attempting to make a defense, is that right?

Admiral Inglis. That was my own personal idea and I soon saw that it was not sound and, therefore, they were taken out.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you discuss it with the Judge Advocate?

Admiral Inglis. I believe I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And he consented to put it in?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; no, sir; I was advised by everyone that I talked to that it should come out.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you show it to Mr. Mitchell?

Admiral Inglis. I am not sure whether it was Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Gesell that I talked to about it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you show them your memo?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a memo prepared of that?

[203] Admiral Inglis. I had a rough draft of this material.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you try and look to see whether you have your rough draft?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I have already agreed to get anything that I have available.

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk with Admiral King——

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. (continuing) ——about preparing it?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of the Navy Forrestal?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; that was my own idea, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you discuss it with anyone?

Admiral Inglis. I discussed it with the people whom I have already enumerated.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that data?

Admiral Inglis. From my own recollection of the history of the world from 1931 on.

Senator Ferguson. What did you think that had to do with the actual physical facts at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis. It was only background material that I thought might be of some value.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, on this exhibit, we will call it exhibit 1—Mr. Chairman, I now offer it in evidence.

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 3.

[204] Senator Ferguson. What?

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 3.

Senator Ferguson. I offer Exhibit 3.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3").
Senator Ferguson. The first that you saw of this particular exhibit was this morning?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got your testimony before you? Have you got your page where were referring to the shipping route?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?
Admiral Inglis. I quote from the testimony of yesterday.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis (reading):

The Chief of Naval Operations on November 25, 1941 directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through the Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is all you said about it?
Admiral Inglis. That is all I said about it except under cross-examination.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, and I asked you some questions on cross examination. I asked you to get the original.
Now I will ask you why you did not put in the part that was to provide for escorts?
Admiral Inglis. I think that was perhaps omitted by my staff because it might have been somewhat controversial.
Senator Ferguson. You think that this part of the message is controversial, "Provide necessary escort"?
Admiral Inglis. It might lead to controversy because of the word "necessary." That would be a difference of opinion as to the disposition of ships for escorts as opposed to the need for keeping them concentrated for combat.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did any member of this staff, of this committee staff, check your memorandum that you were going to write here prior to its writing?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir, not the draft. There was some discussion about it.
Senator Ferguson. There was some discussion. Did any member read it prior to the time that you gave it here?
Admiral Inglis. Not to the best of my knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ever see the exhibits upon which it was founded?
Admiral Inglis. Do you mean by "exhibits" these things in the folder or that—
Senator Ferguson. No; I mean such as Exhibit 3.
Admiral Inglis. I don't know what they saw, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea whether they ever saw it?
Admiral Inglis. I think that a great many records were available to the counsel.
Senator Ferguson. What do you mean "available"?
Admiral Inglis. Were turned over to them.
Senator Ferguson. Why was this not turned over?
Admiral Inglis. Perhaps it was.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel now, when did counsel get this Exhibit 3?
Mr. Mitchell. I first saw it about 10 minutes ago.
Mr. Gesell. Well, I think, to make the record clear—
Senator Ferguson. That is what we would like to have.
Mr. Gesell. (continuing) — There is in the file of counsel a very substantial number of dispatches.

Senator Ferguson. No, no, let us keep the record clear.

Mr. Gesell. I beg your pardon, Senator. I am answering your question, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you get Exhibit 3?

Mr. Gesell. That particular dispatch is very likely among the group of dispatches which we have had in our office for a considerable period of time. If you are talking about the piece of paper in your hand, we saw that this morning.

[207] Senator Ferguson. Well, did he make the statement of yesterday based on very likely whether this was in your file or not?

The Chairman. Is there any dispute about the authenticity of this Exhibit No. 3?

Admiral Inglis. None whatsoever.

The Chairman. Is there any dispute on the part of any member of the committee?

Senator Ferguson. Am I to take that that I am not supposed to examine the witness about that?

The Chairman. Not at all; I just want to know whether there is any dispute about the authenticity of this document that you are talking about.

Senator Ferguson. The question is why it has not been produced to the committee, that we are on right now.

Will you give me all the information in the Navy in relation to the part of this message that says, "Provide necessary escort?"

Admiral Inglis. I am authorized to say that the Navy Department—or to say for the Navy Department that any information requested by the committee which is available to the Navy will be produced.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, but do you take that request as not from one of the committee?

[208] Admiral Inglis. No, sir; from the committee as a request which will be complied with to the best of our ability.1

Senator Ferguson. Have you any information, personal information, on this "Provide necessary escort?"

Admiral Inglis. I have not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know at any time that there was any message including this "Provide necessary escort?"

Admiral Inglis. The only information that I had was what I gave the committee yesterday, until I saw that message which you have in your hand.

Senator Ferguson. You gave us a list yesterday of the location of all ships in the Pacific, did you not?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you where the Boise was between the 23d of November 1941, and the 6th of December 1941?

Admiral Inglis. The Boise?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. My recollection is that the Boise was in the Asiatic Fleet.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know where the American Leader ship was?

1 See memorandum from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5499.
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; never heard of that ship.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the American Leader left Honolulu on November 23, 1941?

Admiral Inglis. I do not, sir. I rather gather from the name of the ship that she is a merchant ship.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is right.

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. My information—

Senator Ferguson. What is your information on the Boise?

Admiral Inglis. On the Boise?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. I haven't anything in writing here, but my recollection is that she was attached to the Asiatic Fleet out in the Philippines at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I will ask you whether or not she was not convoying many other ships, or, at least, convoying the American Leader?

Admiral Inglis. I don't know that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You don't know that?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I don't know anything about the American Leader.

Senator Ferguson. Well, so that the record may show, what we would like to get the information on, as to who was the captain of the American Leader, whether or not she left Honolulu on November the 20th and arrived in Manila on December the 6th, whether she was in a convoy or not, in convoy during any of that time. Do you have any information on that?

Admiral Inglis. If we have any we will produce it, sir.1

Senator Ferguson. Well, have you?

Admiral Inglis. I have not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And whether or not one of the convoying ships, at least one was the Boise; whether or not the ships were blacked out at night. Do you know whether that was true?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the definition of what was meant by "a convoy" in this message of November the 25th?

Admiral Inglis. In its common term a convoy is a collection of ships steaming together as a group under escort.

Senator Ferguson. Did any ships leave the Pacific coast after the 25th in convoy?

Admiral Inglis. I believe my presentation described two convoys.

Senator Ferguson. Where were they?

Admiral Inglis. The heavy cruiser Pensacola with an eight-ship convoy was west-bound, located in the Samoan area.

Senator Ferguson. When did she start on convoy?

Admiral Inglis. All of those ships left between 2 and 7 days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as I recall it, but I cannot give you the precise date. I will get it [211] for you, though; at least, the Navy Department will get it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I would like to have on that American Leader and also on the Boise a record of orders for blackouts and when they were given and how they were distributed.

---

1 See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127, for a statement re the American Leader based on information received from the Navy Department.

See also "Exhibit No. 68," the log of U. S. S. Boise.
Admiral Inglis. The Navy Department, I am sure, will make all that information which they have available also.

Senator Ferguson. And when the first order of convoys was in the Pacific.

By the way, had you any evidence when you were getting this up, or any evidence that there were German submarines in the Pacific?

Admiral Inglis. I know of no evidence.

Senator Ferguson. Or battleships?

Admiral Inglis. I know of no evidence; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You know of no such evidence. As one of the Intelligence officers do you know of any reason for convoys in the Pacific on the 25th of November 1941?

Admiral Inglis. Of course, I was not an Intelligence officer at that time and all I can do is express an opinion that the——

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you furnish to counsel for the committee all the information that you have as to the [213] convoying, whether there were German subs or German battleships or other instruments, or anything that would be of danger?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The Navy Department will make that information available.

Senator Ferguson. Did you prepare your statement from original data?

Admiral Inglis. My staff did; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see all the data?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then you did not check it with your statement?

Admiral Inglis. Only in certain cases.

Senator Ferguson. Will you state some of the cases that you did check it?

Admiral Inglis. I checked some of the distances from Oahu to other strategical and geographical points on the chart. I asked the staff to verify several points that came up.

Senator Ferguson. What are some of those points?

Admiral Inglis. The relationship between the Fourteenth Naval District and the commander in chief was one of them. There was some argument about the spelling of some of these Hawaiian words and their pronunciation; the depths of water in Pearl Harbor and in the channels approaching, I think.

[213] Senators Ferguson. Did you say anything in that report about torpedo nets?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; that is another thing I questioned my staff very closely on, because I wanted to be sure I had the basis for it.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what you were talking about when you referred to torpedo nets?

Admiral Inglis. A torpedo net.

Senator Ferguson. Will you get me the part in your testimony?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, if I may quote from my yesterday's statement.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis (reading):

The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective nets; into the channel through the coral reefs it was about 400 yards and the depth was from 41 to 60 feet, and the nets themselves consisted of a combined antitorpedo and antiboat net.
Senator Ferguson. Just a minute now. You were then referring only to torpedo nets at the entrance to the harbor?

Admiral Inglis. The two torpedo nets; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. At the entrance to the harbor?

Admiral Inglis. At the entrance to the harbor.

Senator Ferguson. How far would they be from ships?

[214] Admiral Inglis. We can get that from the chart, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well—

Admiral Inglis. About 2 miles.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the torpedo nets in relation to the ships.

Admiral Inglis. Oh, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you refer to them in your report?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; the torpedo nets I referred to were across the channel entrance, as shown on the chart.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see a message that was intercepted at Fort Hunt in Virginia?

Admiral Inglis. A message about what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. That was translated on the 6th.

Admiral Inglis. A message from whom?

Senator Ferguson. A message from Japan—Honolulu.

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have not had—

Senator Ferguson. From Honolulu to Japan, rather, or Tokyo.

Admiral Inglis. Japanese message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. I have not had access to any of those messages.

Senator Ferguson. Did you refer in your statement to barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor?


Senator Ferguson. Were there any?

Admiral Inglis. I do not know, sir. That would be an Army question.

Senator Ferguson. You would not know that?

Admiral Inglis. I would not know that.

Senator Ferguson. Were there any torpedo nets close to the ships, the battleships?

Admiral Inglis. Not to the best of my knowledge. There were no nets, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. Did you try to check on that, as to whether or not there were any nets?

Admiral Inglis. As long as nobody said there were, I did not see any reason to check it. It was my personal understanding that there were no nets about the battleships at that time.

[216] Senator Ferguson. Going to the colonel, Colonel, in your testimony yesterday, on page 168 you referred to page 116, and you say [reading]:

You mean my sources on that, sir? This copy is documented. The fact that these two enlisted men picked up an indication of hostile aircraft by radar at 7:02 a.m. on the morning of December 7 comes from the Roberts' report, page 116, affidavit of Private McDonald.

I have the Roberts' report before me liere, and the last page in my copy of the report is No. 21.

Colonel ThieLEN. I think I can clarify that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you give me the item of the report that you were referring from?

The Chairman. Let the witness clarify his answer to that question, Senator Ferguson. He is entitled to do that.

Colonel Thielen. The reference which I gave was to the testimony, not to the report itself. I was not referring to the conclusions, the findings, or any element of the Roberts' report other than the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses.

Senator Ferguson. Now were you talking about the page in the transcript of the testimony in the Roberts' report?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; I believe that is the reference.

Senator Ferguson. Is there an individual in there, a man by the name of McDonald?

Colonel Thielen. I do not have that transcript of testimony before me so I cannot answer the question.

Senator Ferguson. Have you got something before you there?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; I have some extracts which I had made last night of testimony given before the Roberts commission relative to the radar question.

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us that testimony?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now this is what you founded your statement on?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Thielen. General Short's testimony before the Roberts commission, page 65 of the transcript.

Senator Ferguson. You had read that before you made up your report?

Colonel Thielen. My researchers had read it. I had also read the Roberts report, but not closely, with the view to incorporating it into the statement which was prepared, merely by way of acquiring some background for this assignment.

Senator Ferguson. Were you instructed to avoid any controversial matters or matters of opinion?

[217] Colonel Thielen. I was instructed to avoid them in the statement; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; I was instructed to avoid them in the statement which I was to present to the committee.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first show the counsel for the committee, or any member of the committee, your report?

Colonel Thielen. I never showed the counsel or any member of the committee my report.

Senator Ferguson. Did you confer with anyone?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Whom did you confer with?

Colonel Thielen. I conferred with counsel for the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Who was the counsel?

Colonel Thielen. Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.

Senator Ferguson. And did they make any suggestions as to what should go in or come out?

Colonel Thielen. Their only suggestions, as far as the Army presentation was concerned, had to do with bringing the presentation
within the scope of the directive; in other words, of eliminating controversial material. Also some mechanical suggestions, such as eliminating tedious lists of equipment that could be transferred from the oral presentation 219 to the exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us some of the controversial matters that they suggested that you take out?

Colonel Thielen. I recall none, sir. I believe they were very minor. I do not remember any body of testimony. It may have been a word which could be improved here and there.

Senator Ferguson. When did you last confer with them?

Colonel Thielen. On last Monday, sir. That was the only conference I had.

Senator Ferguson. That is Monday of this week?

Colonel Thielen. The past Monday.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have your statement finished at that time?

Colonel Thielen. I had a statement finished; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you give it to them to read?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. How did you confer on it if they did not read it?

Colonel Thielen. It was discussed with them. I told them orally what I was going to say. I quoted pages from my script.

Senator Ferguson. Have you got your original script?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not have it. It has been revised since then, largely in a mechanical way, to 220 improve co-ordination with the Navy, as far as the presentation is concerned, and to eliminate tedious details which were later incorporated in the Army exhibits.

Senator Ferguson. Did you show it to them after you revised it?

Colonel Thielen. No, I did not; nor did I discuss it with them after revision.

Senator Ferguson. Now going back to that item that you want to read from General Short, will you read it?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. General Short's testimony before the Roberts Commission, page 65 of the transcript, and I quote:

This Opana station is along the ridge here, somewhere along in here [indicating]. It is not marked on the map; up to the north. That station, just on its own—they work normally for training from 7 to 11 every day and apparently they just thought they would not knock off just because it was Sunday, and the staff went ahead and worked.

And I close the quotes there.

I have also the testimony of Colonel Powell, who was the Hawaiian Department signal officer, before the Roberts Commission, page 358 of the transcript, and I quote:

It is almost fantastic the way these things operate, and the men are all anxious to learn about them. This 221 particular one wanted to work longer to get more training, because we were to put control sets on the other islands, and he wanted, I suppose, to become one of the operators on the other islands. That he did not say, but that is what they were working for, to be able to operate those sets on the other islands.

That closes the quotation of Colonel Powell.

I have also an extract from the testimony of Sergeant Elliott before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Senator Ferguson. Now he did not testify before the Roberts Commission—Elliott did not, did he?
Colonel ThieLEN. I cannot answer that question offhand.
Senator Ferguson. All right, go ahead.
Colonel ThieLEN. This is page 1001 of the transcript and I quote:

Well, that, sir, is: After our problem was over at seven o'clock, I was to get further instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, and at that time I was at the controls. However, Lockard was instructing me as to the different echoes that I would see, and it was at that time that the flight was noticed by Private Lockard.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know at what time they started work that morning?
Colonel ThieLEN. I know what the schedule called for. [222]
It called for work from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m.
Senator Ferguson. Three hours?
Colonel ThieLEN. That would be correct; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you find in the Army report that it was 4 hours?
Colonel ThieLEN. I do not believe I thoroughly understand that question, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, look at page 1029, where it says:

Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, each group had four hours on, and—let's see—we were divided into three groups, four hours on and eight hours off; but we had four hours on the 'scope, then four hours guards, then we had four hours off.

Colonel ThieLEN. That was the weekday schedule, I believe, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Was there a different schedule on Sunday?
Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir. I can review the schedule as I gave it in my testimony yesterday. On weekdays other than Saturday and Sunday the schedule was specifically from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. actually tracking aircraft.

Senator Ferguson. What time does the record show that they actually shut down the radar?
Colonel ThieLEN. On 7 December?
Colonel ThieLEN. I doubt that the Opana station was shut down, sir. They continued operation at 7 a.m., as indicated on the historic plot, so-called. That plot indicates echoes well into the morning, and we have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that he recalled, or states, that after he was notified at, I believe, about 8 a.m., that Wheeler Field was under attack.

Senator Ferguson. You examined all of the Army and Roberts report before you brought in your conclusion about the practice, and so forth?
Colonel ThieLEN. I did that.
Senator Ferguson. Now do you say that anything that was brought in here is beyond dispute, that it is not disputed in any way?
Colonel ThieLEN. That is a relative term, I believe, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Well——
Colonel ThieLEN. Any statement could be disputed. We have tried to confine it to statements concerning which there has been no controversy.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, let me review page 1105 from the Army report in relation to Colonel Tyler; let me read General Grunert's remark. [Reading:]

"[224] General Grunert. And there was nothing for you to do, there, between 7 and 8, but twiddle your thumbs?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir; there was nothing to do.
General Grunert. Then it appears that the organization seemed to be faulty, and if instruction faulty, and there seemed to be a lack of organization and common sense and reason on this. You went up there to do duty as a pursuit officer in the information center. There was nobody to do the work with, because the controller was not there, and the Navy liaison man wasn't there, and probably some others were missing, so you couldn't do your duty, as a pursuit officer, because there was nobody to do duty with; and then, at the end of the tour, at 7 o'clock, everybody disappeared except the telephone operator and you; and the telephone operator remained there for apparently no reason. You had no particular duty, did you?
Colonel Tyler. No, sir; we hadn't.
General Grunert. It seems all cockeyed to me—and that, on the record, too.

Did you read that part of General Grunert's statement there in the testimony?

Colonel Thieilen. I did not personally read that, sir. I believe I can clarify a possible faulty impression in that the testimony which you just read refers to the information [225] center, which was located at Fort Shafter and not to the radar unit at Opana, out at Kahuku Point.

Will you point that out, please, Captain?
Senator Ferguson. Will you say that the reason these boys were at the radar station after 7 that morning was that the truck did not come to pick them up? That is the reason they were there?
Colonel Thieilen. The evidence I have indicates that Private Elliott volunteered for additional training. I know nothing about the delay of the truck in picking them up.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the reason that they were not picked up was that the truck did not pick them up?
Colonel Thieilen. No, sir; I did not know that.
Senator Ferguson. Did you read all this testimony?
Colonel Thieilen. No, sir; I did not read it all. Perhaps I should explain my position is very similar to that of Admiral Inglis. I did not perform any appreciable quantity of research on this testimony. It was done by other staff officers.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will you permit Mr. Murphy to interpose?
Senator Ferguson. For what purpose?
Mr. Murphy. I was wondering whether or not the witness had finished the question that you asked 15 minutes ago. He read three paragraphs. In my impression, that question is still [226] not answered.

Senator Ferguson. I will go back to that.
Colonel Thieilen. I have some further testimony.
Senator Ferguson. All right. You read what you claim you founded your statement on.
Colonel Thieilen. After reading the testimony of Sergeant Elliott that he wanted to get some instruction on the use of the oscilloscope on which Lockard was instructing him, and that the flight was noticed by Private Lockard, I go on to further testimony by the same witness.
In response to a question by General Frank, "Who wanted to shut it down?" Sergeant Elliott replied:

Private Lockard wanted to shut the unit down, and since I was to get the instruction on it I wanted to continue operation. Finally, after insisting on that, we did continue the flight and completing the flight on this chart which you have just shown me before, sir, and we followed the flight all the way in until it was approximately 15 or 25 miles from the island of Oahu, and the flight was lost.

That concludes the testimony which I wish to quote.

Captain, put the radar plot up, please.

Senator Ferguson. Have you got the testimony there? Look on page 1004.

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not have that.

Senator Ferguson. What?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not have the testimony. I have only the pertinent extracts.

Senator Ferguson. He says this [reading]:

The oscilloscope, from the beam that is sent out, has a back echo, and at that particular spot the oscilloscope is blank, and it is impossible to pick up any flight whatsoever at that particular point, and that was as far as we could follow the flight, and at approximately 7:30 is when we started to shut down the unit, and at 7:45 our truck came from our camp (incidentally, which was 9 miles away from the unit) to pick us up to take us to breakfast, and upon arriving at the camp, why, we had found out what had happened at Pearl Harbor.

Does not that indicate the reason that they were there with the machine, that they were waiting on their truck?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. May I point out the time that that flight was picked up, at 7:02, as indicated on the chart, and it was tracked continuously to, I believe, the testimony that you quoted said 7:45.

Senator Ferguson. 7:45 is when the truck picked them up.

Colonel Thielen. When it actually picked them up?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. He says [reading]:

At 7:45 our truck came from our camp to pick us up.

Colonel Thielen. What opinion did I give you on that, [228]

Senator Ferguson. In answer to this question, "What time did the center close up where Tyler was?"

Colonel Thielen. I do not know that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Taking Sergeant Elliott's other statement [reading]:

No, sir; there was no time. I am sure there wasn't. Another point, sir, that I might bring out, our clock at the unit I said showed 7:02 at the time that we sent in the first plot. However, when I was ordered, over the plotting set while we were operating the problem, to shut down, the time by the clock there was 6:54, and I can't remember as to whether we had made any time check whatsoever that morning.

Do you know whether or not the main board closed down at 6:54?

Colonel Thielen. I believe that is highly controversial, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You say that is highly controversial. Is that the reason it is not in your report?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; that would account for it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not these controversial matters are going to be presented to the committee?

Mr. Mitchell. I could answer that. We have all the evidence on this radar report, the witness is prepared to [229] testify about
it. It is one of those things that we are going into fully. This witness was instructed to keep out of fields where that situation existed.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, do you know anything about the operations of the radar after the attack?

Colonel Thielen. Only the statement which I gave in my script yesterday, that Lieutenant Tyler, after receiving word from Wheeler Field of the attack, recalled all crews to their stations. What the results of that call were I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there is a vacuum here then, as far as we are concerned with any information as to the operations of the radar after the attack. I am talking about the movable sets. The permanent sets were not completed. The movable sets we are talking about; are we not?

Colonel Thielen. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Is there any information you obtained or you can give us in relation to the operation of these sets after the attack?

Colonel Thielen. Only those Opana plots which show on the radar chart which is on the easel.

Senator Ferguson. From what set did those come?

Colonel Thielen. Those are Opana plots.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who was operating that set at 10:27?

[230] Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Have you any records to show whose information this is? I cannot see because of the light. Between 9 and 10:27, 651, 652, and 648.

Colonel Thielen. That entire record is authenticated by Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

Senator Ferguson. From what machine?

Colonel Thielen. From the Opana station.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why these machines were not used to get the enemy going out? When you knew they would come in on the machine, why were not the machines used to get the enemy going out?

Colonel Thielen. I do not know that they were not, nor if not, why not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know of any information or any place that the committee can get information on that?

Colonel Thielen. I am sure that the committee can, through counsel, obtain the best available witnesses on that.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what general—was it General Powell?

Colonel Thielen. Colonel Powell.

Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list of witnesses.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what he stated in relation to that?

[231] The Chairman. Colonel Powell, I will say, is on the list of witnesses to appear here in person. Whatever he stated, or whatever he has to state, will be brought before the committee by him in person.

Senator Ferguson. I was just trying to get at what might be in their files in relation to this.

Colonel Thielen. I am not a very good authority on what is in the War Department files, sir. Another procedure has been set up for obtaining any information which the War Department has.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the B-17's had radar in them?
Colonel ThieLEN. I do not know. My opinion would be that they did not. I do not believe that radar—
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not they had radio?
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I submit, the witness ought to have an opportunity to answer.
Senator Ferguson. Did you answer that question?
Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir, I have not completed my answer.
Senator Ferguson. Then you may complete your answer.
Colonel ThieLEN. The presumption would be that they were not equipped with radar, considering the status of development of radar at that time.

[232] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they had radio upon them?
Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir, I do not know definitely. Presumably they would have.
Senator Ferguson. Did you look into that?
Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir; I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any station on Hawaii operated all night with Hawaiian music that night, the 6th?
Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not it was played for the purpose of these B-17’s tuning on it?
Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether at the same time the Jap planes tuned on it too?
Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir, I have no information on that whatsoever.
Senator Ferguson. Did you read all of Tyler's testimony?
Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have any information in relation to whether or not these radars would pick up whether it was enemy planes or friendly planes?
Colonel ThieLEN. That, as I testified yesterday, is not practicable, for that type of radar, at least. They could not distinguish between hostile aircraft and friendly aircraft.
Senator Ferguson. Who has charge of the submarines? That would be the admiral, would it not?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, did you state yesterday anything about what submarines had been in the Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. The submarines that were in the Harbor, the United States submarines that were in the Harbor were listed in the script.
Senator Ferguson. How many Japs got into the Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. The best evidence we have indicates that only one got in. There was some evidence that might lead to the supposition that a second submarine got in, but on further research my people told me they did not think there was more than one.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that the one sub came in at 4:30 in the morning and went out at 5:30?
Admiral Inglis. I do not know about that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any information on that?
Admiral Inglis. Nothing conclusive; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you find any maps, or have you any maps in your possession showing the log?

Admiral Inglis. I was told there was no log, and I was told that there was a chart which was recovered from—I believe it was the submarine that went aground at Bellows Field, showing the track around Ford Island, but that we thought was only a prospective course and not one which was actually taken by the submarine.

There is a little confusion that comes in in translating the Japanese characters. Some of their tenses are hard to distinguish between the present tense and future tense.

Senator Ferguson. Then that is a disputed item, is it, as to whether or not a sub came in and went around Pearl Harbor, around Ford Island, and came out?

Admiral Inglis. The evidence on that is certainly not conclusive.

Senator Ferguson. That would be one of the reasons why it would not be put in your statement?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. I would like to add, Senator, to that that our best evaluation of the information is that only one submarine entered Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. We have in this battle report, at one point on this chart, to bolster the evidence of his better vision he wrote in Japanese, "I saw it with my own eyes." Did you read that?

Admiral Inglis. I did not; no. No, I did not read it.

Senator Ferguson. What about it? Do you know whether that is in your evidence, in your Navy Department?

[235] Admiral Inglis. I presume——

Senator Ferguson (interposing). That is on the log, isn’t it, that you recovered?

Admiral Inglis. If you are talking about the submarine that went ashore at Bellows Field, I do not believe that that is in the log.

Senator Ferguson. Well, is there any evidence at all in the Navy Department on that item?

Admiral Inglis. The only evidence that I know about is what one of my officers told me, which is to the effect that they recovered a chart in that submarine showing, as I said, a track around Ford Island and out again. They think, from the translation of the Japanese characters on that chart now that is what it was.

Mr. Keeffe. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Chairman. I think the witness might finish his answer.

Mr. Keeffe. I thought he did.

The Chairman. He did not.

Admiral Inglis. The translation of the Japanese characters were somewhat confusing. A great deal of time was spent on that chart trying to determine whether or not the submarine actually entered the harbor or only planned to enter the harbor, and the conclusion which the experts came out with was that the submarine did not probably enter the harbor.

[237] Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that we are taking the opinion of the expert here?

Admiral Inglis. Perhaps I should not have used the word “experts.” I will correct that to “translators.”
The Chairman. If I may say there, that would be another matter that would be left out, because it is speculative and controversial.

Admiral Inglis. Exactly, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further on that?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Might I say, Senator, while you are questioning with respect to this item, my understanding is that these two officers from this grounded submarine were captured by the Army.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Keefe. And that the information obtained from those officers was obtained by the Army and not by the Navy. I wish you would inquire into that question from the Army, because there seems to be a sharp line of cleavage between the two services.

Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir; I have no information on that.

The Chairman. I might suggest to the committee—

[238] Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire—you captured those men, did you not, with these charts? The officer you captured on the sub, and the operator you took, with the charts, did you not?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman. Just a minute. Let the witness answer this question.

Colonel ThieLEN. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Haven't you any information that he was captured and the sub was captured?

Colonel ThieLEN. I personally have no such information.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Inglis—

Mr. Murphy. My request for the gentleman to yield is that we have been given an outline as to what the testimony is going to be that will be gone into subsequently, and it is on that very subject.

Senator Ferguson. I want to find out what information these gentlemen have.

Mr. Murphy. You are anticipating the statement of the witness.

The Chairman. Go ahead. Let us make progress.

Senator Ferguson. Going to the admiral, did Admiral Halsey's ships have radar?

Admiral Inglis. The carrier did, yes, sir.

[239] Senator Ferguson. The carriers had radar?

Admiral Inglis. His carrier had radar; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On the memo that went to you, Admiral, on page 2 [reading]:

Summarize percentage personnel mustered various departments—summary testimony showing no drunkenness.

Was that on yours?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; that was scratched off.

Senator Ferguson. Why was it scratched off? Did you go into that question at all?

Admiral Inglis. It was discussed just very briefly, and the opinion seemed to be that there was not any drunkenness that had anything to do with the case.

Senator Ferguson. Whose opinion was that?

Admiral Inglis. Of the researchers.
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it then, we are getting the opinions of your researchers, that do not come up here. Is that right?

Admiral Inglis. Senator, I would like to make again the same statement that I made several times, that this presentation which Colonel Thielen and I have given is an attempt to give the committee just the high lights of the attack on Pearl Harbor, we only covering those matters which are not controversial, and which are fairly well substantiated by the evidence available to us.

Senator Ferguson. Well now, you say "fairly well." Is anything controversial if it is only fairly well shown?

Admiral Inglis. May I delete the word "fairly" then?

Senator Ferguson. You want to take the word "fairly" and leave only the word "well" in; is that right?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, or conclusively.

Senator Ferguson. How well?

Admiral Inglis. Conclusively.

Senator Ferguson. And in whose opinion is it conclusive?

Admiral Inglis. Well, it is a combination of the opinions of the people that are working on the statement.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, can you give us from your evidence why it took from 9 a.m.—or until 9 a.m. to put No. 3 alert into effect?

Admiral Inglis. That is an Army question, I believe.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, did you ever put the No. 3 alert in for the Navy?

Admiral Inglis. We did not have No. 1, 2, and 3, alerts. That is an Army term.

Senator Ferguson. What do you have?

Admiral Inglis. We have condition 1, 2, and 3.

Condition 1 is general quarters with all battle stations manned. It is just the opposite with the Army. They have 1, 2, and 3 in the opposite order.

Senator Ferguson. Now, at 6 o'clock in the morning, at Pearl Harbor, on the 7th, what alert was in effect, as far as the Navy was concerned?

Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that condition 3 was in effect. That, as I have described, calls for, roughly, one-half of the anti-aircraft battery to be manned—or one-fourth.

Senator Ferguson. At 6 o'clock?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was the condition on the 6th?

Admiral Inglis. On the 6th?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. Well, I would assume that the same condition prevailed. It is my understanding that condition No. 3 was the routine condition that applied at that time.

Senator Ferguson. That was the routine condition?

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did that alert change?

Admiral Inglis. Of course there are routine drills at scheduled times during every day, when they go to condition 1. But for the purpose of this inquiry, I think, to answer your question, I should say that that condition changed at the time of the attack.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long it took to put another alert in at that time?
Admiral Inglis. It probably would—of course, it would vary with different ships, but I would say on the average, about 3 minutes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you look into the question of inspection Sunday morning, whether or not there was inspection of the ships?

Admiral Inglis. Inspection of what nature, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Any inspection. Were any of the bulkheads open, or any of the doors?

Admiral Inglis. You mean inspection of watertight integrity?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. That question was raised by one of the other members yesterday. It is being looked into now, and I am sure complete information on that subject will be made available.

Senator Ferguson. Up to date have you looked into it?

Admiral Inglis. I have not personally, but some of my people have worked on it last night.

Senator Ferguson. You cannot give us an answer on that?

[243] Admiral Inglis. No, sir; but that information—

Senator Ferguson (interposing). As I understand—

The Chairman. Wait a minute. The witness was about to say something else. Let him finish.

Admiral Inglis. I cannot give you anything at this time, but that information will be available.1

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, the alert changed then from No. 3 to No. — what?

Admiral Inglis. One.

Senator Ferguson. In about how many minutes?

Admiral Inglis. I estimate 3 minutes.

[244] Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask the colonel why it took until 9 o'clock to change their alert, when the Navy said they changed theirs in 3 minutes.

Colonel Thielen. I cannot answer why, but I would like to review this much of my testimony yesterday. [Reading:]

When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced—

Senator Ferguson. By the way, will you give us the time of the first report of a bomb dropped?

Colonel Thielen. The first report of a bomb dropped was at 7:55 a.m.

The Chairman. Go ahead now.

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead.

Colonel Thielen (reading):

When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few minutes the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps 3 or 4 minutes elapsed before General Short was informed by his chief of staff that an attack was in progress. General Short immediately directed that all troops be turned out under alert No. 3.

Later, in speaking of the two divisions, I say:

At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding the Twenty-fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at about 8:05 a.m. Within a few minutes his [245] chief of staff had issued instructions to the units to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft positions, to increase the standing guard, and to send patrols throughout the division sector—which was the northern half of the island—to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, General Wilson heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8:50 a.m. the division received word from department headquarters that alert No. 3 would go into effect at once.

1 See footnote 1, p. 70, supra.
Col. Thielen. What time was that?

Ferguson. What time was that again?

Thielen. At 8:50 the division received word.

Ferguson. My question was about 9 o'clock.

Thielen. In the case of the other division, it was the figure given, as 9 o'clock.

Ferguson. That is all the information there is in the Pearl Harbor file, is in the Army file here in Washington?

Thielen. No, sir. There is unquestionably additional testimony on that subject. Of course the actual extent of the alert is a question of debate. The reason I referred to my testimony is to point out that action was taken immediately on hearing the sounds of fire.

Ferguson. Have you prepared any other reports, Colonel, on the Pearl Harbor matter?

Thielen. This is the only one?

Ferguson. This is—I would like to point out that I did not personally prepare this report. I am presenting it.

Ferguson. Do I understand you were just sent here to read it?

Thielen. That is not exactly true. I had a hand in the preparation of the report, but I did not do the research into the first sources.

Ferguson. Are you through?

Thielen. Yes, sir.

Ferguson. Who would you say prepared it?

Thielen. A number of officers in my group in the War Department General Staff.

Ferguson. Will you give their names; all the people who worked on it that you know of?

Thielen. I can give the name of Lieutenant Colonel Carroll, Lieutenant Colonel Root, as the two principal researchers under whose direction various enlisted personnel looked up specific points.

Ferguson. Admiral, have you prepared any other reports on the Pearl Harbor incident?

Inglis. Yes, sir; I have a report which, I understand, is scheduled for presentation as soon as this cross-examination is finished, on the Japanese attack. That is, the attack as viewed by the Japanese, which is digested.

Ferguson. Any others beyond that?

Inglis. No, sir.

Ferguson. That is the only other report that you prepared?

Inglis. That is right, sir, on this subject.

Ferguson. What time did you, Admiral, first confer with Colonel Thielen?

Inglis. Colonel Thielen? Oh, I think it was Monday morning, this week.

Ferguson. Is that when you had a rehearsal here in this room?

Inglis. It might be described as a rehearsal.

Ferguson. What would you describe it as?

Inglis. It was a discussion.
Senator Ferguson. A discussion?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; and we came to an agreement as to the sequence in which various items would be presented.

[248] Senator Ferguson. Were all these maps prepared especially for this committee hearing?
Admiral Inglis. Speaking for the Navy maps, I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And, Colonel, were your maps prepared especially for this hearing?
Colonel Thielen. These maps were prepared under my personal direction for this presentation.

Senator Ferguson. It was stated yesterday, Colonel, that the radio was jammed. It was said there was no evidence of sabotage, but the radio was jammed. What do you mean by that?
Colonel Thielen. In general, the jamming of a radio means setting up signals over a frequency band which will interfere with the transmission of signals from other stations. This can be done in several ways mechanically. It can be done by the old-fashioned spark set. There are any number of ways of obstructing radio channels.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know how this was done?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I don’t have that information. Perhaps the Hawaiian Department Signal Corps officer does.

Senator Ferguson. At least you don’t know?
Colonel Thielen. I don’t know; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Could it be done from the Japanese carriers out at sea?
Colonel Thielen. That is a technical question which I prefer not to answer because I don’t know definitely.

Senator Ferguson. Have you, Admiral, any orders not to sink any subs, to Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Inglis. I have nothing on that; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there were any orders issued?
Admiral Inglis. I don’t know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, Colonel, whether or not there was any limitation on the distance that Army planes could fly to sea?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I don’t know whether there was or not.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there was a 10-mile limit?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not know that.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any planes were diverted and shipped elsewhere than to Hawaii a few weeks or months before?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I don’t know that.

Senator Ferguson. You haven’t any information on that?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir.

[250] Senator Ferguson. We spoke yesterday about Kaminski, Kaminski was a naval or Army man?
Admiral Inglis. That was Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, who was the duty officer in the office of the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Senator Ferguson. I understood that you were to give us the message he gave. Was it in writing?

Admiral Inglis. I was to find out, as I understand, when this message was delivered personally to Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. Did you find that out?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; not yet.

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned Admiral Bloch. You stated yesterday that he would make reports to Admiral Kimmel. Is that true?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I don't recall making that statement. The normal channel for such a report would be from the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, duty officer, who was Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, to the fleet duty officer.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he ever made any report directly to Washington, Admiral Bloch?

Admiral Inglis. To Washington?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[251] Admiral Inglis. I don't have that, but I am quite sure Washington was informed of the attack shortly after the period.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you spoke yesterday about the aid to the injured at the time.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not all of the physicians turned out on the island to help the Navy?

Admiral Inglis. The only information I have on that is just the impression that I gained from reading reports in the press and other sources shortly after the attack happened, and my impression is that the performance of the Medical Department was beyond reproach.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you get any evidence at all that the supplies were locked up in such a way that they couldn't be obtained and it was necessary to go to the private physicians to get help?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I hadn't heard that.

Senator Ferguson. You have no information on that?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the private physicians did render service?

Admiral Inglis. I don't know; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any evidence on that, one way or another?

Admiral Inglis. I have no evidence; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart, I believe, is the next member of the committee.

Mr. Gearhart. Colonel Thielen, I have listened to some of your testimony with increasing amazement and for that reason I would like to ask you a few questions.

First, concerning the portable radar set at Opana. During the course of your testimony, you have referred to it as a "practicing event."

May I ask you if, in your conferences with your staff, in the preparation of your statement, that you decided to refer to it as a "practicing event" for the purpose of belittling the report that came from those men that were there operating the machine on December 7, 1941?
Colonel ThieLEN. First, I don’t place your reference, but I can assure you that I had no intention of belittling the men.

A “practicing event” was that?

Mr. Gearhart. You spoke of some men practicing there.

Colonel ThieLEN. I don’t recall using that term. May I check my script for a moment?

Mr. Gearhart. You have heard the term used by others in this room, haven’t you, since you have been testifying?

Colonel ThieLEN. I recall no instance of that.

Mr. Gearhart. You didn’t hear the admiral, your associate there, and colleague, use the word “practicing”?

Colonel ThieLEN. I think the admiral would have no reason to refer to our use of radar.

Mr. Gearhart. Haven’t you testified here these boys continued, these young men continued, the use of that machine in operation after 7 o’clock because they wanted to practice?

Colonel ThieLEN. I did not use that term, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. What term did you use?

Colonel ThieLEN. May I quote my testimony on that point?

Mr. Gearhart. I am not only confining myself to your written testimony, but the other testimony you have given orally. You say you haven’t used the word “practicing.”

Colonel ThieLEN. May I take it from the transcript?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

The Chairman. Suppose you read what you said from your paper while somebody is looking it up in the transcript, if that is agreeable.

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

At seven a.m., 7 December, 1941, all radar detector stations closed down except the Opana station at Kahuku Point which remained in operation in order to continue the training of a new man, Private George E. Elliott, who had volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose.

At 7:02 a.m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and Private Joseph L. Lockard, picked up an indication of airplanes at 132 miles, bearing 3 degrees east of north.

The soldiers kept tracking the target.

I believe that is all that is applicable.

Mr. Gearhart. I will read you from the testimony of Lt. Joseph Lockard, given on the 30th day of October 1944, at the Pentagon Building. [Reading:]

Question. In order to operate the machine you had to mount the truck?

Answer (by Lieutenant Lockard). We had to unlock the vans and open them.

Question. There was nothing in this van except the machine itself?

Answer. That is right.

Question. Was Elliott doing the actual computation or were you?

Answer. I was doing the computation. Elliott was doing the plotting and keeping the log.

Question. What do you mean by “operating the equipment”?

Answer. Operations consist of controlling the movement of the antenna and reading the information from the oscilloscope both on the screen and on the mileage scale.

Question. As you were operating this thing you didn’t see anything at all until about two minutes after seven. When seven o’clock came, what did you say to Elliott?

Answer. We mentioned the fact that the truck hadn’t arrived, and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out on the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

Question. At about two minutes after seven, you were the first to notice anything on the scope?

Answer. Yes.
Does that indicate to you that they continued after 7 because Mr. Elliott, who had already had instructions, day after day and week after week, under Lieutenant Lockard, because he wanted a little more training?

Colonel THIELEN. I have already quoted testimony which does indicate the situation as I testified yesterday, and, by the way, I find that my oral presentation agrees with that which I gave you.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; and, as a matter of fact, the truck was late to take them to breakfast, and didn't come until [256] 7:45—
you know that to be a fact?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you testified a moment ago in respect to the hours in which the radar at Opana was in use. Will you give that again, please?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

When he placed Alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed that the aircraft warning service operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn, specifically from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. Thus, the operating schedule of the mobile radar detector stations was daily from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m.; routine training from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m., except Sunday, and daily, except Saturday and Sunday from 12 o'clock to 4 o'clock P.M. for training and maintenance work.

Mr. GEARHART. Where do you get that information?

Colonel THIELEN. I have that documented, sir. I can look it up I take that from General Short's testimony before the Roberts commission, volume 2, page 43.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you think Lieutenant Lockard ought to know when he was working and what his hours of duty were, since he was on the job?

Colonel THIELEN. Presumably he would; yes, sir; although [257] at that time he was a private, and would naturally be under the orders of someone else.

Mr. GEARHART. He was a rather capable private, to be a lieutenant today; doesn't that demonstrate that he was a capable private?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; but his capabilities, I don't believe, are the issue. It was his actual position at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Let's read more of his testimony given when he was a second lieutenant in the Signal Corps, and after he had been commissioned. [Reading:]

Answer. There were approximately six men per unit. We had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 5 o'clock.

Question. Nobody operated at nighttime, so far as you know?

Answer. If there was an alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something of that kind, there were not night operations.

Question. From 7 to 5, except for lunch period, you were on daily?

Answer. Yes; during the week.

Question. Sunday was a day off, normally?

Answer. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened [258] to be my Sunday.

From that it would appear that they worked Sundays and presumably holidays, from 4 in the morning until breakfast time, 7 o'clock; that on weekdays they worked from breakfast time, 7 o'clock, until 5 in the afternoon.

How do you account for such a discrepancy in the testimony that you have quoted in opposition?
Colonel ThieLEN. Admitting the discrepancy between my closing time of 4 p.m. and that testified as 5 p.m., I believe the discrepancy is in the term "work." I broke that down to actual operation of the detector in picking up aircraft from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m., and training, which might not actually involve tracking aircraft, from 7 to—I don't remember the exact time—from 7 to 11, and training and maintenance from 12 to 4, which agrees, I believe, substantially with—

Mr. Gearhart. I think, you, Colonel, picked the wrong word from the wrong place, when you stress the word "work." It was I that used the word "work." It doesn't appear in the testimony I read. He called it operating the machine.

Have you another explanation?

Colonel ThieLEN. Operating the machine would not necessarily be "on the alert for the detection of aircraft."

Mr. Gearhart. I want to ask you, Colonel, as a military man, whether or not you think there is anything significant in the fact that, according to your orders, this machine should have been turned off at 7 o'clock, and the further fact that the range of these machines was about 136 miles and no farther, that the Japanese planes should fly into that oscilloscope 2 minutes after it ought to have been off the air?

Colonel ThieLEN. I draw no conclusion from that, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Does it suggest to you, as a military man, that the Japanese had knowledge of the orders that we had under which these machines were operated?

Colonel ThieLEN. Not necessarily, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Would you give consideration to that?

Colonel ThieLEN. It is a very definite possibility; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think it strangely significant that the Japanese planes flew into the range of that machine just 2 minutes after it was supposed to be off the air?

Colonel ThieLEN. It might have been.

Mr. Gearhart. Who made the order?

Colonel ThieLEN. The order, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. The order fixing the time for these radars to be on the air.

Colonel ThieLEN. General Short was responsible for that order.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you a copy of that order?

Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir. I have a reference to it in my testimony.

Mr. Gearhart. I will remind counsel that I asked him weeks ago for copies of that order, together with a statement of the history source, and the name of the person who signed it, and I have not received it. Now, radar is operated in the daytime as well as nighttime?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. In daytime they will record the approach of planes that are far beyond the range of human vision, will they not?

Colonel ThieLEN. With exception taken to the term "record," yes, sir; they indicate.

Mr. Gearhart. Using that distinction, it will indicate on the oscilloscope?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir.

1 Reports from the War Department on orders governing the operation of radar in Hawaii prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor were subsequently introduced as Exhibit No. 137.
Mr. Gearhart. On the oscilloscope, that the airplanes are approaching from a very great distance?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And the range of those portables, the only radars they had on the islands, six of them, was 136 to 138 miles?

Colonel Thielen. My figure is 150.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there have been many different maneuvers down through the years in the islands over there in which an air attack upon the islands was under contemplation, maneuvers in which cups were bestowed upon attacking forces, simulated attacking forces, for taking the islands, for instance, in these maneuvers. One was held a few months before, and at that time it was found by the judges that the proper time to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor is to ride in on the rays of the sun; is that not correct?

Colonel Thielen. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know that, as an Army officer, that is the generally accepted thesis among military and naval people?

Colonel Thielen. You refer to coming in on the sun?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Colonel Thielen. It is a commonly used tactic; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, the Japanese didn't have to have any imagination in planning this attack; all they had to do was to read the newspapers and listen to speeches, and know that that was the accepted idea among American officers as to when the islands should be attacked with the greatest possibility of success, was to ride in on the rays of the sun, as the Japanese did later; is that correct?

Colonel Thielen. I don't know, sir. I say it is a recognized tactic. That is as far as I can go as an Army officer.

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think it was strangely significant that the order keeping these radars on the air should provide that they should be off the air at a time that an attack of that kind could be made with the greatest chances of success, according to the accepted views of the Army and Navy?

Colonel Thielen. Do I see significance in that?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Colonel Thielen. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Does it suggest that possibly somebody was exerting a tremendous influence over the writing of orders somewhere along the line, in headquarters at Honolulu or America?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; it suggests nothing of the kind to me.

Mr. Gearhart. When we had six radar machines over there, why were they all on at once, and all off at once? Why wasn't it provided that they should spell each other off over the 24-hour period of the day?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. No, sir; I don't think I will.

Colonel Thielen. I am no expert on radar, which is a highly technical subject. I can suggest an answer to your last question—and he might drop the chart showing the radio stations. Let me say, each radar in general covers a certain sector. No one radar detector on the island could determine an approach from any direction.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you think that answer justifies the taking off of the air radar during the dangerous hours of the 24-hour period?
Colonel Thie len. By no means, but it accounts for the simultaneous operation of several radar stations.

Mr. Gearhart. If you were in charge, don't you think you could think of a way of getting six machines in operation over a period of 24 hours a day?

Colonel Thie len. I would want complete coverage. It would not be a solution to alternate the operation of radar around the island. You would have to have coverage of each sector while that particular station was operating.

Mr. Gearhart. Considering the terrain of Oahu, there are high points on the mountains, on the top of which these machines could be placed, and they could cover larger theaters than assigned to these fixed machines when you scattered them [264] along the coast; isn't that correct?

Colonel Thie len. I believe that is correct in general. There are technicalities in the field of radar that I wouldn't want to testify on.

[265] Mr. Gearhart. Now, were there any orders from Washington to General Short or to any other person directing that no fire be had on any Japanese vessels or any Japanese installations—

Colonel Thie len. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). Until the Japanese fired first?

Colonel Thie len. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You know that such an order was issued to General MacArthur, do you not?

Colonel Thie len. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Gearhart. You know that the provision of the Constitution of the United States is that war shall be declared by the Congress of the United States?

Colonel Thie len. Yes, sir; I am familiar with the Constitution.

Mr. Gearhart. You know that is a fact. Was any order issued from Washington that you know anything about, either to General MacArthur or to General Short, reminding them that they should not take any offensive action because of this constitutional provision?

Colonel Thie len. I was in no position to have any such knowledge and I do not have any.

[266] Mr. Gearhart. Is that the reason—

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. Is that the reason why they have you people come up here to read hearsay testimony to us, so that whenever we ask you a question in connection with that testimony you can always reply, "I am only here to give you the information I was sent up here to give you"?

Colonel Thie len. No, sir; in my case, at least, that is definitely not true. I can explain the reason I was sent up here, I think, satisfactorily.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, there are admirals and generals available to subpoena by this committee who went through this attack. Why are they not here to read these statements instead of yourself?

Colonel Thie len. Because the directive setting up this particular testimony was merely, I might say, to orient the committee by giving a narrative of the facts of the Pearl Harbor attack.
Mr. Gearhart. And there are others that could give the narrative from reference to documents, as you have, and also to give testimony in respect to actual personal experiences and they are not here.

The Chairman. If that kind of thing is going to go on here the Chairman desires to say for the record that this \[267\] method of procedure was unanimously agreed to by the committee as the procedure to be followed. It was understood that this narrative recital was to be made by a representative of the Navy and a representative of the Army. The men who were on the ground and know what happened will be called, but they cannot all be called en masse.

Mr. Gearhart. With all due respect to the chairman of this committee, I want to say at this particular time that I never agreed and neither did any other member of the committee agree that they would consent to calling the witness in question just to get hearsay statements.

The Chairman. Counsel for the committee for an hour and a half explained this procedure to the committee and no member of the committee, all members being present, raised any objection.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, but we expected to get witnesses who knew something about what they were talking, not hearsay.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman the Chairman has stated something on the record that is not as I understood it at all. There was no consent given, there was no consent passed about the manner of producing this. We were told that this was a tentative outline and I want the record to emphatically show that I never consented to trying this matter in this way.

\[268\] The Chairman. Well, I don't care to get into a controversy here, but I don't want the record to be misrepresented. There was no objection expressed on the part of any committeeman to having a representative of the Navy and a representative of the Army come up and from documents and reports and evidence within the two departments give us a narrative recital of what happened physically at Pearl Harbor. They did state that evidence would be produced during the hearings by eye-witnesses and that will be done.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, may I speak—

Mr. Gearhart. I yield to the Senator.

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Senator Brewster. I don't want to add to any confusion on this score, but I certainly do not want to be recorded as one who ever assented to this method of procedure. I had very grave doubts regarding the method when it was proposed, I expressed considerable concern; I urged very strenuously, as the record shows, that this matter be deferred until we could acquire a more proper understanding of it from the various exhibits and records and twice renewed my motion for postponement.

I think that the developments to date have amply demonstrated the inexpediency of this method of procedure, with two men here to occupy 2 days, who had no information what-\[269\] ever, who had no connection whatever with Pearl Harbor and who evidently have very little familiarity with the records and I think it is most unfortunate that the first 2 days have been so largely wasted by this work.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed?

The Chairman. Yes, Congressman Gearhart, proceed, but as a mat-
ter of information, whether this is wise or unwise, it is the method
that we agreed to and I hope that it can be speedily accomplished.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I again want to make this
record clear that I did not agree to this method of procedure. My
motion was to adjourn it so that we could get the original records
here and so that we might go over the matter before we brought wit-
nesses in.

The Chairman. Well, neither the Senator nor any other committe-
eman objected to these representatives being brought here for a narra-
tive recital, as explained by counsel. The Senator did move to post-
pone it. The Senator from Michigan moved to postpone it on another
ground entirely; but go ahead, Mr. Gearhart.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to—

Mr. Gearhart. I want to proceed. It is only a few minutes before
noon.

The Chairman. Let us go ahead with the witness and let [270]
the committeeman continue without any further interruption.

Mr. Gearhart. Addressing my next question to Admiral Inglis, I
will ask you, Admiral, whether or not there were any orders issued
either from Washington or in the islands, directing the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Fourteenth
Naval District not to fire upon Japanese ships or installations until we
were fired on first?

Admiral Inglis. I have no knowledge of such an order.

Mr. Gearhart. You know of orders that were issued by Admiral
Kimmel which were to the opposite effect, do you not?

Admiral Inglis. I have no personal knowledge of such orders; no,
sir. I would have to look that up.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will refer you to the report of the Naval
Court of Inquiry wherein they refer to certain orders issued by Ad-
miral Kimmel in violation of Washington instructions, the admiral as-
suming the responsibility on the theory that he would act first and ex-
plain later. Do you remember that part of the report?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, have you read the report?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. Gearhart. Then you are not giving us [271] informa-
tion that is based upon the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Admiral Inglis. The information which I have given you has been
based on the research work of the people who work for me and I as-
sume that they have read some of those things. I might also say
that, in my opinion, from what I know at this moment, that that is
controversial and also has something to do with fixing the respon-
sibility. We have omitted those subjects from this presentation.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know a man in the Navy by the name of
Commander Clarence Earl Dickson, or Clarence Earl Dickinson, Jr.?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. A flying naval officer, serial No. 74369?

Admiral Inglis. I do not know him, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, in addition to being a competent flying officer
he is also a very capable author. He wrote a story for the Saturday
Evening Post which appeared in that publication on the 10th of
October issue of 1942, which he entitled “I Fly for Vengeance.” I
want to read you just one paragraph. Maybe this will refresh your
memory on some orders that were issued at that time. It is the second paragraph of the story. [Reading:]

It was not that we pilots did not sense the tension that lit up the Pacific. You could feel it everywhere all the time. The mission from which we were returning—

I will interpolate, on December 7—

had the flavor of impeding action. We had been delivering a batch of 12 Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 21 to Wake Island where they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from Pearl Harbor on November 28 under absolute war orders. Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the aircraft battle force, had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in the sky and pound anything we saw in the sea. In that way there could be no leak to the Japanese.

And I might point out to you that at the time that was written Clarence E. Dickinson was a lieutenant and that the last time I recall he had been promoted twice and is now a commander, so evidently there wasn’t any objection in the Navy Department to that which he said.

Now, do you anything about that of which Lieutenant and now Commander Dickinson wrote?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We did not attempt to read magazine articles and things of that character in making up this presentation.

Mr. Gearhart. Will you get me, Mr. Counsel, the orders under which Lieutenant Dickinson flew on that trip and if those orders were in part verbal will you please ascertain for me what the verbal part of the orders were?¹

Senator Lucas. I would suggest you get the witness also, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. Gesell. The witness is on our list. Admiral Halsey is on the list to testify. He was in command of those flyers. He seemed to us to be the logical person to give the facts that the Congressman is interested in.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. I merely advert to this because of all of this being a surprise. Why should anybody be surprised when we are making war orders?

The Chairman. Does any member of the committee think that this is argumentative matter that should appeal to the committee and not to the witness?

Mr. Gearhart. That is to the entire country, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Well, I have no doubt of that.

Mr. Gearhart. And that will, accordingly, include our distinguished Chairman as well.

The Chairman. No doubt and I accept my part of the responsibility.

Mr. Gearhart. It is a very heavy burden for you to bear, I admit that.

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5470 for a letter from the Navy Department.
Admiral Inglis. She was attached to the Pacific Fleet, but actually present in the Philippines if my information is correct. I just obtained this information just this moment.

Mr. Gearhart. Who was commander of that ship?

Admiral Inglis. What is that?

Mr. Gearhart. Who was commander of that ship at that time?

Admiral Inglis. Captain Robinson. I am not sure of his initials.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know who is commander at the present time?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know a Commander or Captain Moran?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Mike Moran?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. He at one time was in command [275] of that ship and at one time preceding that was executive officer of that ship; is that not correct?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Can you tell me whether or not the Japanese fleet, the attacking force that was proceeding to rendezvous 200 miles north of Oahu—if that ship did not sight the Japanese fleet?

Admiral Inglis. I know of no sighting of the Japanese fleet at all. My information is that the Japanese fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was not sighted.

Mr. Gearhart. Will you make an investigation and determine whether or not there is a report on file indicating that the officers and crew, somebody in an official position on the cruiser Boise, sighted the Japanese attacking fleet during the first week of December?

Admiral Inglis. If there is any evidence, either written or from witnesses, I am authorized to state that the Navy Department will make that available to you and the committee, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It will not be forgotten now that I have raised the question, I trust.

Admiral Inglis. It will not be forgotten.¹

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there is another thing that I would like to ask you about.

[276] Were any orders issued from Hawaii or from Washington or from any other place placing restrictions upon the use of ship radios, radios of the type, for instance, on the cruiser Boise? I am now referring to the fatal week in December.

Admiral Inglis. I am answering that question now from my own personal memory, Mr. Gearhart, and I have a recollection that I am not too sure of, because this was nearly 5 years ago, that there was a general order in effect about that time which applied to both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets, instructing them to maintain radio silence. I cannot be positive that that applied to the Pacific Fleet, but my recollection is that it applied to the Atlantic Fleet and in all probability it applied also to the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. Gearhart. When was that order enjoining silence upon ships at sea made?

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got that information available. The Navy will try to get it for you, sir.²

¹ The log of U. S. S. Boise was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 68."
² See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, it was made just shortly before, around the latter part of November or the early part of December, 1941, wasn’t it?

Admiral Inglis. It is my recollection that the order was issued long before that, sir, but my recollection may be faulty.

Mr. Gearhart. By the way, was that phrase, "task force" used in 1941?

Admiral Inglis. I believe it was, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. I was told that it came into use and was borrowed from the Japanese nomenclature on or well along in 1942.

Admiral Inglis. That is not my understanding.

Mr. Gearhart. Don’t you think it is strangely significant that there should be an order directing all of our ships to sail south of Hawaii, that there should be a radio beam directed to be held on all night for the benefit of B-17’s which the Japanese availed themselves of? Don’t you think it is rather significant that there were naval orders enjoining silence upon all of our ships at sea, which would forbid them from reporting anything that they might obtain by way of information on the high seas? Don’t you think it is strangely significant that the radar should be turned off the air during the danger hours of the day?

What effort has been made by the Intelligence Service to break down and ascertain how all these strangely significant things could occur, all of which, every one of them, operating to the benefit of our enemy and to the vulnerability of our own crews and ships?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I object to that on the ground that the witness has been asked five different questions and I think they should be propounded one at a time.

The Chairman. Let him answer all the five.

Mr. Gearhart. I think the five together is what makes it significant.

The Chairman. The question of significance will not be gone into at the moment, but answer, if you can, Admiral, all five together or ad seriatim.

Admiral Inglis. Congressman Gearhart, that covers a lot of territory. Two of these questions, if I recall them, refer to Army matters, the B-17’s and the radar going off the air at 7 o’clock.

Now, you ask me my opinion of the significance of those five things? I am not sure that I understand what the point is that you are making, but I will do the best I can to give you my opinion of the significance.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you say you don’t understand why I have raised this question, or what I mean by it?

Admiral Inglis. I don’t understand what—

Mr. Gearhart. I understand that the Intelligence Service is an agency of the Army and an agency of the Navy, created for the purpose of taking these strange circumstances and finding out what they mean. Therefore I asked you have you made any investigation to determine why this long list of events, all of which tied the hands of America and all of which benefited the Japanese, why they should all occur at one time, in one picture? Has that been a study of the Intelligence Bureau of which you are a part?

Admiral Inglis. I would like to leave out, if I may, from the record any discussion of the functions or success of the Intelligence Service
at present. Insofar as it affected Pearl Harbor I think I can answer
the gentleman's question.

My opinion is that the significance of those three things is accounted
for by the tense relationship which existed in world politics at that
time and it was only natural, for instance, that under the circum-
stances information concerning the movements of our fleet should be
denied to any country with which our relations were strained. That
is the only significance that I can read into the five items that the
gentleman has just given me.

Mr. Gearhart. In your testimony yesterday you said that there
was a condition existing on the battleship California which prevented
it from performing its best service under the crisis. You said you
had a report from the Chief of Naval Yards and Docks.

Admiral Inglis. The report came from some officers in the Bureau
of Ships who had made a study of that and the gist of the report that
I gave yesterday was that the California was the only ship where any
openings or lack of closures, let us say, of watertight
doors and hatches contributed in any way to the damage which
resulted.

Mr. Gearhart. The words which caught my attention was that—
in any way contributed to the inability of that ship to fight.

Now, were there other ships that had their doors opened, other ships
that had themselves in such a condition that they could not fight in the
most efficient manner?

Admiral Inglis. The openings, of course, would not stop the ship
from fighting but might possibly lessen the ability of the ship to stay
afloat.

Now, as I said earlier this morning, we are getting that material
together for you in response to that question and the Navy Depart-
ment will make available to you and to the committee everything
that they have on the subject.

Mr. Gearhart. Very well, but why put it off when you have right
in your hands a report from which you can give us that.

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got it right in my hands.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you read this report of the Yards and Docks,
the Bureau of Ships or Yards and Docks, whichever it was?

Admiral Inglis. I read no report. This is the Bureau of Ships,
Mr. Congressman, that is responsible for that sub-
ject, not the Bureau of Yards and Docks; the Bureau of Ships.

Mr. Gearhart. The Bureau of Ships?

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got a report, in response to your question.
I was told by my staff that they have received verbally this informa-
tion that I have given you about the California being the only ship
where the openings contributed in any way to the damage which was
suffered by any of the ships there.

Mr. Gearhart. Did your staff tell you what the conditions were
on the California?

Admiral Inglis. Not in detail, no, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Generally what did they tell you?

Admiral Inglis. They told me that because of some difficulty in
closing the watertight doors and hatches after general quarters were
sounded, which changes the conditions of readiness from three to one,
because of that difficulty that the flooding and perhaps resulting fire
spread more rapidly than otherwise might have been the case.
Mr. Gearhart. Why were the doors and hatches of the California opened on that day?
Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question at present, but we will get that information.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, this is one of these [282] things we are going into and it has got to the point where we feel we have to call witnesses who were actually on those ships to be sure to know what the conditions were and we are going to do so and I hope we will get it all here.

Mr. Gearhart. Counsel will recall that I have asked for all written orders which might have produced that condition or a similar condition on our ships, verbal orders, ship orders or district orders or commander in chief orders or Washington orders.

Mr. Mitchell. My impression is that things of that kind are individual ship matters. As the matter stands we may have to call officers or men who were on the vessels themselves, but we are going ahead to try to get the facts.

Mr. Gearhart. It is now past 12, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Is that all, Mr. Gearhart?
Mr. Gearhart. No. I say it is now past 12. We have reached our adjournment hours.
The Chairman. Well, then, we will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[282] Afternoon Session—2 : 00 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Before proceeding further with the witness, in view of the discussion that took place this morning among members of the committee, the Chair feels that in the interest of accuracy there ought to be placed in the record at this point a memorandum prepared and submitted to the committee by Mr. Mitchell, the general counsel, which is described as a “Tentative order of proof.” Then a Preliminary statement, covering committee procedure, relations with agencies concerned, and introduction of letters exchanged with Secretaries Forrestal, Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt estate, plus Truman directives—which was done previously, when we started.

Then on the following page of this memorandum it is stated [reading]:

The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be presented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack.

And following that there is subdivision “A,” under the heading of “The Attack,” and under that subdivision “A” there are 17 points, outlined by the counsel, and discussed in the committee. That memorandum is dated November 7, and which is a revision of a previous memorandum dated November 1 and distributed to all members of the committee on the 1st of November.
Mr. Mitchell. I think it was the 2d. I think the meeting took place on the 2d. The memorandum is dated the 1st.

The Chairman. The memorandum is dated the 1st, yes and the meeting took place on the 2d, and the following meeting probably on the 8th, because the following memorandum was dated the 7th, which was the day before.

Under subdivision “A” there are 17 different points which were discussed with the committee in a session that lasted from 10:30 in the morning to about 1:30 in the afternoon.

Then there is a subdivision “B,” which is “The Jap Plan.” That is, the plan of the Japanese as discovered from the records since obtained from Japanese sources, captured Japanese ships, and so on, and which is to come later under Admiral Inghis’ testimony.

These 17 points were thoroughly discussed by the committee and the list of witnesses was gone over and what they would testify to, or a general outline of their testimony was [234] discussed, and there were three or four or five witnesses added to the list, including Sumner Welles, Mr. Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Tyler, whose name has been mentioned here, and Mr. Lockard, whose name has been mentioned here, and also Captain Zacharias, whose name was suggested by Congressman Keefe of Wisconsin.

The only other changes made to this tentative suggestion of procedure was that under Item No. 12, which was headed as follows, “Summarize Percentage Personnel Mustered Various Departments,” and then in parentheses “perhaps here summary testimony showing no drunkenness”—the committee decided to strike out No. 12 and not go into that in this preliminary statement because that would be a matter that would have to be testified to, probably, by witnesses who were on the ground and in addition it was thought in any preliminary statement it would not be wise to go into that phase of the question.

Outside of those changes, this memorandum was discussed at length and no objection was raised to it, and every name, every additional name suggested by the members of the committee was added to the list of witnesses, and has been published.

I ask that this document, with these additions and corrections, be printed at this point.

(The document appears in full at pp. 125-129, inclusive.)

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to it being printed in the record, but I don’t want my cross- [235] examination interrupted with it. I ask unanimous consent that it go in the record immediately after the conclusion of my remarks.

The Chairman. Yes; that is entirely satisfactory.

Mr. Gearhart. I have only two or three questions to ask anyway, and I don’t want my remarks interrupted.

The Chairman. That is entirely satisfactory.

Mr. Gearhart. I want to say in explanation, if that is offered to establish any point, that there is no objection to that order of proof, that the only objection I have raised has been against the people who have been brought here to establish the things that are set forth in that document.

I objected to it on the ground that they are hearsay witnesses and I have never been in a court room where they allowed hearsay evidence when there were live witnesses to furnish direct evidence.
The Chairman. It was understood during this whole discussion that this presentation, this preliminary presentation, was not to be made by eyewitnesses, that it was to be made by a representative of the Army and a representative of the Navy, and that that relation and that delineation and narrative recital of what happened, the physical situation surrounding it, was to be given by a representative of the Army and of the Navy from the records in the War and Navy Departments, and not by eyewitnesses, which would require, as everybody understood, as the committee understood, and as counsel explained, probably 2 or 3 weeks, to get eyewitnesses to everything that transpired out at Pearl Harbor.

I think it is due the committee, and the public, to say that there was no objection to this procedure, and that every suggestion of additional witnesses or modification of procedure was agreed to at the time.

Senator Brewster. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to amend your statement.

In the first place, as to the extent of the discussion, it is my very clear recollection that most of our discussion was centered, in all of our recent meetings, on much more controversial matters, which have been fully aired on the floor, and need not be discussed here.

This matter was brought up, this memorandum you speak of was submitted, and I recall very distinctly—which, apparently, the chairman does not recall—that I urged the point of view of Representative Keefe, of Wisconsin, who, out of a considerable experience as a trial lawyer, preferred to approach this in chronological order, starting back and bringing the events in in chronological order, in order that we might make a proper record for posterity.

It was the recommendation of counsel, and it was, we [287] gathered, the opinion of the majority, that this was the way to proceed. This discussion of which you speak followed three or four votes in which there had been a sharp difference between the majority and the minority and there was no reason to think that any further agitation would have resulted differently.

I am not prepared—I was not prepared, at any rate—to hold too strong an opinion as to which course was better and I so stated, but I do feel that events have demonstrated that it has not been as fortunate as, perhaps, was anticipated. I think that is a fair statement of the attitude.

[288] The Chairman. I might add to that that it was discussed in the committee and presented by the counsel as probably the most logical way to proceed so as to describe the actual attack, what took place on the day of the attack and the conditions which surrounded it and then bring it out in that method. It was the general understanding that that would be the course pursued.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. I want the record to be clear. Mr. Chairman, it is true that item No. 12 was discussed and the question of drunkenness was taken out. The discussion was not as full as indicated by the chairman. I distinctly remember protesting doing it in this manner because I asked the committee to have counsel give us the exhibits at least 10 days in advance so that the members of the committee would be fully acquainted with all of the facts.
It was stated then that we would get the exhibits either that Friday or Saturday or possibly Monday. As a matter of fact, I received mine on the Tuesday and Wednesday, the day before the hearing.

Now, it appears that we have not received all of the exhibits. I want this record to show that there was no vote taken on this method of handling the matter; there was no consent, as far as I know, of any member concerned. We were [289] given this outline, it is true. There was no vote taken as to whether that was to be the method or not and I protested, as I did on the floor, that this method of trial would be a trial such as the Army and Navy and the various services wanted it to be.

The Chairman. Unfortunately, there was no stenographic record taken in any of the executive sessions of what discussion took place. Any Senator or any Congressman or any member of the committee could have moved that this method not be adopted as the procedure, and that we should adopt any other method of procedure. No motion being made, no vote was taken. The whole thing was discussed, each item was read by the counsel, Mr. Mitchell, item by item and discussed, each witness that was to be called and what he was expected to testify to in the various divisions of the tentative procedures of proof and the fact that no vote was taken on whether this should be the procedure was due to the fact that nobody made any motion about it, and it was generally accepted as the procedure which would be followed.

Senator Brewster. Well, I don't think it is proper, Mr. Chairman, to carry this discussion to any great extent, but I am quite sure that you are correct in stating that each item was read. That is not my recollection as to what was done. We had it for 2 or 3 days to examine it.

[290] The Chairman. You had it for a week before that meeting, every member of the committee had it for a week before the meeting and that memorandum was dated the 1st of November. Every committeeman was given a copy of that and had it a week before we had the following meeting.

There was this new revision which had come about by the consideration of the November 1 memorandum and that was discussed, as I said a little while ago, in a meeting which lasted for about 3 hours. I don't say that that was the exclusive thing that was discussed. There were motions made to postpone the hearing that were voted upon also, but this memorandum was read and explained by the counsel to those present and that means all the members of the committee.

Put this in the record.

Mr. Murphy. At a previous meeting when the plan was before the committee certain members asked that it be put over to the following meeting because they did not have enough opportunity to study it; that was the meeting previously to the November 8 meeting. And after the meeting on November 8 I dictated to my secretary a memorandum of what actually took place there, and I have that memorandum that was made that afternoon, and it is in accord with what the chairman outlined except as to the 3 hours of discussion. I have a record here of what each member brought up at that time.

[291] Senator Brewster. I trust that the Secretary's records will be presented to the committee and that they will be more accurate than the only other one that was presented to the Chairman and that we had to ask to have corrected because it was inaccurate.
The Chairman. That is not correct. The Senator had demanded a roll call, which was not taken in the committee by a vote; it was taken by a show of hands, and I asked the Senator from Maine that if there was any way by which the Government Printing Office could indicate a vote by showing of hands that I would accept it. The vote was later taken as if it was by a show of hands, and it was put in the record that way. That is why that mistake was made.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words.

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. I haven't said very much in this hearing, and I am not going to say much now. It seems to me this is much to do about nothing anyway.

There is just one thing that I want to direct to the attention of the committee and that is this: This case is being prepared by General Mitchell anyway, but the committee employed him and unanimously accepted him as general counsel. I doubt if there is any individual here that would probably try the case the same way that he is trying it. However, we selected him to do it, and I am thoroughly satisfied with the way he is handling this case.

The Chairman. Well, go ahead, Mr. Gearhart and finish your interrogation.

Mr. Gearhart. Let me conclude this discussion by pointing out that the principle for which I contend, the violation of which I will constantly protest, is the calling of hearsay witnesses to prove facts when there are eyewitnesses available to the same point. I am not questioning what is in that paper at all; I never have, and this is not in the nature of impeachment to offer it in the record. For that reason I will welcome it at the conclusion of my cross-examination.

The Chairman. I will be glad to have it put in at the end of the Congressman's examination. Go ahead.

Mr. Gearhart. There is just one thing, Admiral Inglis, that I want to conclude my cross-examination by asking you about, and that has to do with the order of May 1941 transferring three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers to the Atlantic. Then there was much discussion about two-thirds and one-third which left me with confusion confounded.

Before any of the ships were transferred to the Atlantic you would say that that was a hundred percent of our fleet. What you mean is when they transferred these ships that numerically, at least, the Pacific Fleet was reduced one-third, is that it?

Admiral Inglis. I will try to make that just as clear as I can, Mr. Gearhart. I cannot give you the precise dates when various specific ships were transferred from one fleet to another.

Mr. Gearhart. By that you mean that the ships were, at different times, under different orders?

Admiral Inglis. I presume so.

Mr. Gearhart. Did that all occur during the month of May 1941, or was it over a larger period than that?

Admiral Inglis. It would be my impression and understanding that it was over a considerable period of time. There was some shifting of ships around from one fleet to another for—well, as a matter of fact, that has been going on forever, but as of the 7th of December 1941 the numerical strength of the ships of the Pacific Fleet was roughly two-thirds that of the numerical strength of the ships of the Atlantic Fleet.
Now, the question has been raised about several ships which were not a part of either the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet. Those are the battleships North Carolina and Washington and the aircraft carrier Wasp; in particular. Those ships had recently been completed and commissioned, they were still on their shake-down periods.

I have a personal recollection of one, the North Carolina, which was in the Brooklyn Navy Yard undergoing some repairs, having some very serious defects remedied. Those defects show up on a shake-down cruise and must be corrected before the ships are ready in all respects to join the fleet.

Those ships I did not count in my numerical summary and they have no effect on these proportions which I have given you of two-thirds numerical strength.

I think I should also say again that that is numerical strength and not necessarily battle efficiency or battle fighting efficiency or power, because it so happens that the numbers in the Atlantic Fleet were increased to a good extent by the preponderance of destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet. On the other hand, there were more battleships in the Pacific Fleet, but I have counted each ship by one regardless of whether it was a battleship or a submarine or a destroyer.

In other words, of the aircraft carriers there were three assigned to each fleet and that again does not count the Wasp which had not yet joined either fleet and was still in the shake-down period.

Does that answer your question, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. It clears it up considerably.

Now, what was left in the Pacific Fleet when the ships that I have just enumerated were transferred to the Atlantic?

Admiral Inglis. I have the list of ships that were in the Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941. Is that what you wish, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Are you going to draw a distinction between the Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Inglis. I have the figures for the Asiatic Fleet also if you wish those.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, give those separately so that the record will be clear on it.

Admiral Inglis. I can give those by ships, that is, so many battleships, or I can give them by names of specific ships. Which way would you prefer it?

Mr. Gearhart. By ships.

Admiral Inglis. All right, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you the record in the other way, that is, by name?

Admiral Inglis. I have it any way you want it; yes, sir. It is much longer by names of ships. It runs into seven pages of tabulated data.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, let us have it by type then.

Admiral Inglis. Taking first the battleships: There were six assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, nine assigned to the Pacific Fleet, and none assigned to the Asiatic Fleet.

In the case of the aircraft carriers, there were four assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, three to the Pacific Fleet, and none to the Asiatic Fleet.

Well, I might add parenthetically that I have not counted the Long Island in my ad lib testimony. The Long Island was a very inferior

\[296\] Subsequently corrected to Hornet. See p. 199, infra.
type of carrier. She was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and makes the fourth one.

Heavy cruisers: 5 assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, 12 to the Pacific Fleet, and 1 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Light cruisers: 12 to the Atlantic Fleet, 10 to the Pacific Fleet, and 1 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Destroyers: 97 to the Atlantic Fleet, 54 to the Pacific Fleet, and 13 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Submarines: 58 to the Atlantic Fleet, 23 to the Pacific Fleet, 29 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Minelayers: None to the Atlantic Fleet, nine to the Pacific Fleet, and none to the Asiatic Fleet.

Mine sweepers: 37 to the Atlantic Fleet, 26 to the Pacific Fleet, and 6 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Patrol vessels: 5 to the Atlantic Fleet, 13 to the Pacific Fleet, 14 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Now, the numerical totals of all of those are Atlantic Fleet 224, Pacific Fleet 159, Asiatic Fleet 64.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, prior to May 1941, which was prior to the transfer of any of the ships that I have listed [297] from the Pacific to the Atlantic, was the American Navy in the Pacific numerically stronger than the Japanese Navy?

Admiral Inglis. Prior to May 1941?

Mr. Gearhart. That is a date that I take from the Navy court of inquiry report as the date when the transfer of these ships occurred.

Admiral Inglis. I haven’t those figures readily available. Again will be very happy to get them for you.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you have the list of ships that were transferred?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. I thought by one order and you tell me by several orders, to the Atlantic.

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I haven’t got that readily available. What I have here is a list of the ships and the assignment of those ships to their respective fleets as of December 7.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I will ask the question in this way: You are an expert in naval affairs. If you would add to the Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers, would you say that the American Fleet in the Pacific would be numerically superior to the Japanese?

Admiral Inglis. If you will give me those figures again [298] I will answer that definitely.

Mr. Gearhart. Three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers.

Admiral Inglis. That would give our battleship strength in the Pacific Fleet as 12 opposed to 10 Japanese battleships; aircraft carriers 4 opposed to 8 Japanese aircraft carriers; 16 heavy cruisers as compared to 18 Japanese heavy cruisers; 10 light cruisers as compared to 17 Japanese light cruisers; and 63 destroyers as compared to 109 Japanese destroyers.

On balance I would say that the Japanese Fleet was superior to the Pacific Fleet with the increments which the Congressman has just given me.
Mr. Gearhart. So while we were inferior in May of 1941, we reduced our relative position to the Japanese Navy still further, that is the effect of it.

Admiral Inglis. Any transfer of ships from the Pacific Fleet resulting in a reduction would, of course, result in a deterioration of our own position.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, where do the orders effecting a transfer from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet emanate?

Admiral Inglis. That would be Chief of Naval Operations. Just what reasons would bring about those I am not prepared to say. I don't know whether they would come from any higher source or not, but the orders would be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, whatever that higher authority would be the orders would probably come in the name of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Inglis. As far as the fleet is concerned that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know anything about these particular orders?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. May I ask counsel to endeavor to secure them? I would like to look at them.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the order transferring ships to the Atlantic Fleet in May 1941?

Mr. Gearhart. Beginning in May of 1941.

Mr. Gesell. I take it you want transfers both ways.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. If there are any transfers indicated from the Atlantic to the Pacific I would like to see those, too; that is, the orders providing for them.1

The Chairman. Is that all the cross examination?

Mr. Gearhart. I am through; yes.

(Tentative order of proof—Preliminary statement covering committee procedure, submitted by Mr. Mitchell and referred to at p. 119, follows:)

[300] TENTATIVE ORDER OF PROOF
(Draft of November 7, 1945)

Preliminary Statement Covering Committee Procedure, Relations with Agencies Concerned, and Introduction of Letters Exchanged—Secretaries Forrestal, Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt Estate, Plus Truman Directives

[301] The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be presented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack.

A. THE ATTACK

1. Disposition Pacific Fleet 12/7. Show in map form.
2. Description:
   (a) Transports west of Hawaii on 12/7.
   (b) Fleet base and Oahu ground and harbor installations—Map.

1 See Hearings, Part 11, pp. 5502 and 5504 et seq. for documents supplied by the Navy Department in this connection.

70716—46—pt. 1—11
(c) Harbor nets and topedo baffles.
(d) Depth of harbor and channel.
(e) Absence barrage balloons.

3. Brief notes installations neighboring islands.

4. Time differentials and distances.

5. Detailed map showing fleet in Pearl Harbor 12/7—
   (List of vessels—class and type.)
   Estimates of time required 12/7 to get fleet under steam and out of harbor.

6. Reconnaissance:
   Extent of offshore reconnaissance evening 12/6.
   Extent of offshore reconnaissance morning 12/7.
   Extent of inshore reconnaissance evening 12/6.
   Extent of inshore reconnaissance morning 12/7.
   Missions of all other friendly planes in air morning 12/7, including Halsey fliers, B-17's from the mainland, P-40's on submarine exercise, etc.
   Extent reconnaissance from neighboring islands.

7. Radar:
   Hours operating 12/7, scheduled and actual.
   Description facilities available:
      Location.
      Range, high flight or low flight.
      Inability to distinguish friendly planes.
   Presentation of historical plot.
   Summary testimony re qualifications of operators and handling of information obtained before and during attack.
   Reasons ship radar not useful.

8. Sound detectors:
   Facilities for underwater—extent operating and manned.
   Facilities for airplane spotting—extent operating and manned.

9. Submarine contacts:
   Indicate character of any submarine patrol operating 12/7.
   Summarize reported contacts 11/27-12/6, inclusive.
   Summarize contacts morning 12/7 giving detail of messages sent to shore and action taken.

10. Present account various phases of attack, working in general picture of defensive action taken.
    (Note Jap objectives, indications advance knowledge.)

11. Efforts to track the Japs after attack.

12. Aircraft:
    Disposition planes on ground by fields at time of attack and service assignments.
    Number and types available.
    Number and types in operating condition.
    Headlines of aircraft in operating condition.
    Note specific reasons for lack of readiness such as engines dismounted, guns dismounted, gas tanks empty, ammunition not loaded.
    Readiness of aircraft crews.
    Number and types aircraft participating in combat.
    Time required by type.
    Summarize state preparedness for combat of planes in flight time attack.
    Extent types and equipment up to date.

14. Antiaircraft:
    Number of ship and shore units available.
    Number of ship and shore units operating condition.
    Availability ammunition and proximity to guns.
    Number ship and shore units manner and in action.
    Time required for various units.
    Defective ammunition.
    Extent gun types up to date.

15. Brief summary work done in such departments as antisabotage, first aid, civilian control, canteens, etc. Heroism.

16. The damage to United States ships, installations, and personnel (photographs and supporting statistics).
    Note extent damage self-inflicted.
    Indicate extent of sabotage, if any.

17. The damage to the Japs.
B. THE JAP PLAN

1. Chronology:
   - Date plan completed.
   - Date left port.
   - Date Dec. 8 fixed.
   - Date instructed carry-out plan.

[304] 2. Route taken to and from:
   - Fix position various key days before and after attack.
   - MAP—noting mileages from possible reconnaissance points, shipping lanes, etc.

3. Details of execution.
4. Projected losses compared actual losses.
5. Sources data used in planning.

Note.—The Jap Plan will be reconstructed from captured plans and statements made by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.

[305] TENTATIVE ORDER OF WITNESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Principal subject examination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Richardson*</td>
<td>Re Complete story of the reasons why the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, his trips to Washington in July and October, 1940, his discussions and disagreement with President Roosevelt and conversations with other officials, his relief, his part in the Bloch report of December 30, 1940, endorsed January 7, which led to the Knox-Stimson correspondence, and other matters pertaining to his Hawaiian command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hamilton, formerly Chief, Far Eastern Division, State Department*</td>
<td>Re Jap negotiations, details of information available to State Department, exchange of information with Army-Navy representatives, and State Department attitude toward basing fleet Pearl Harbor,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain McCollum*</td>
<td>Re Information available Army and Navy concerning Far Western developments, Jap military preparations, fleet locs [306] tion, etc., reports made to responsible officers, State Department and White House, handling of &quot;magic&quot; intercepts and distribution of messages generally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Safford*</td>
<td>Re Function and organization of intelligence units; information available to these officers and action taken thereon except as to events of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later; warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Bratton*</td>
<td>Re Function and organization of War Plans units; information available to these officers and action taken thereon (except as to events of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later); warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Miles*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Wilkinson*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Gerow*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Turner*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Whenever witness will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this is indicated by an asterisk.*
Admiral
Admiral
[307] FCC monitoring report
Commander Safford
Commander Kramer*
Admiral Noyes
Colonel Bratton
Colonel Saddler
Colonel Clausen
Monitoring witnesses
Commander Kramer
Commander Safford
Captain McCollum
Admiral Turner
Admiral Schurmann
Admiral Wilkinson
Admiral Ingersoll
Colonel Bratton
Colonel Dusenbury
General Miles
General Gerow
Colonel French
Admiral Bearsdall
[308] Miss Grace Tully
Admiral Stark
General Marshall
Mr. Thomas E. Dewey
Mr. Hull
Mr. Stimson
[309] Knox papers

Witness
Principal subject examination
General Arnold
Admiral Ingersoll*
Re Warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.

[307] FCC monitoring report
Commander Safford
Commander Kramer*
Admiral Noyes
Colonel Bratton
Colonel Saddler
Colonel Clausen
Monitoring witnesses
Commander Kramer
Commander Safford
Captain McCollum
Admiral Turner
Admiral Schurmann
Admiral Wilkinson
Admiral Ingersoll
Colonel Bratton
Colonel Dusenbury
General Miles
General Gerow
Colonel French
Admiral Bearsdall
[308] Miss Grace Tully
Admiral Stark
General Marshall
Mr. Thomas E. Dewey
Mr. Hull
Mr. Stimson
[309] Knox papers

Re Presidential files. Any documents which may be found in the Roosevelt papers bearing on the Pearl Harbor situation will be introduced through Miss Tully.

Re All events, including information available to him, conferences with Cabinet officers and President Roosevelt, handling of warning messages, extent of knowledge of impending attack, conferences with War Department, etc.

Re All events, including information available to him, conferences with Cabinet officers and President Roosevelt, handling of warning messages, extent of knowledge of impending attack, conferences with Navy Department, etc., and Dewey incident of 1944.

Re Communications with General Marshall and any additional information available to him.

Re All events, with particular reference to conversations and meetings with President Roosevelt and other Cabinet officers, General Marshall and Admiral Stark, the question of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, information available to him and handling of crucial messages, participation in warnings, and the events leading up to the Nov. 26th note to the Japanese Government.

Re All events, with particular reference to information available to him, his part in the warning messages, and his conferences with President Roosevelt and Cabinet officers.

We are advised by the Knox estate that the only papers which may be available are at the Navy Department, and this is being investigated.

(Note.—Throughout the testimony in this branch of the presentation, particularly that directed to high-ranking officials, a detailed inquiry will be made

*Whenever witness will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this is indicated by asterisk.)
into just what information was available to President Roosevelt and the Department of State as to impending attack, and what part, if any, either took in giving or withholding warnings to Pearl Harbor.)

**PEARL HARBOR**

**Witness**

General Herron

(To be determined)

Captain Layton
Commander Rochefort
Admiral Mayfield
Mr. Shivers, FBI
Colonel Fielder
Colonel Bicknell
Admiral McMorris

[310] Admiral Bellinger
General Martin
General Davidson

Commander Taylor
Colonel Powell
Colonel Phillips
Admiral Smith

Admiral Bloch

General Short

Admiral Kimmel

**Principal subject examination**

Re Condition of Pearl Harbor defenses prior to Short's appointment, earlier alerts, and general background information.

Re Delay construction fixed radar and additional airfields.

Re All classes of information including ship location reports and intelligence bulletins, messages of various classes intercepted before and after Dec. 7, activities of Jap consular agents, Mori tap, Merle Smith cable to Short, Wilkinson Manila report, etc.

Re Pearl Harbor air defense, reconnaissance, and all points bearing on air aspects of situation, including details of Martin-Bellinger annex.

Re Radar installations, efficiency of information center, adequacy of equipment and personnel.

Re All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.

Re All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.

Re All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.

Re All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.

[311] The **Chairman**. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. **Keefe**. Mr. Chairman, I have had no occasion to say anything up to date.

The **Chairman**. You have been very quiet, I will say that.

Mr. **Keefe**. May I say, as one member of the committee, I presume I am correct in the assumption that the weight to be extended to the testimony given by these two witnesses who have testified in behalf of the Army and Navy will be governed by the sources of their information, the character of the information, whether it is of their own knowledge, hearsay, or what not.

Does the Chair so understand the situation?

The **Chairman**. The committee will, of course, consider the nature of the testimony, the source from which it comes, and the weight to be given to it.

Mr. **Keefe**. Yes, sir.

Now, I understand from both the Admiral and the Colonel that you have heretofore testified that your evidence, in the main, is purely hearsay; you have no definite knowledge from personal observation of any of the events which occurred at Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack, or immediately after and that the sources of your
information are based entirely on material which you have discovered as a result [312] of searches made, and analyses made by those working for you on your respective staffs; is that right?

Admiral Inglis. Speaking for the Navy, that is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Is that correct also for the Army?

Colonel ThieLEN. That is essentially correct; yes, sir. I have been asked a few questions on cross-examination in my professional capacity, which I answered to my own knowledge.

Mr. Keefe. Do you qualify as an expert on all matters relating to the Army?

Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Keefe. Do you qualify as an expert on all matters relating to the Navy, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that neither of you qualify as experts in the accepted sense of the term "expert witnesses."

Now, I have a few questions that I would like to ask which have apparently not been heretofore developed in connection with the cross-examination. I direct my attention first to the statement made by you, Admiral, to the effect that certain orders were issued declaring certain waters—they were issued as the result of the Executive order of the President—around the Hawaiian Islands to be defensive [313] borders, as I understood it.

Admiral Inglis. That order, if that is your point, sir, was, as far as the Navy was concerned, contained in a general order issued by the Secretary of the Navy, and it defined two defensive sea areas which were outlined on the chart in the course of the prepared statement.

Mr. Keefe. Will you refer to your prepared statement and see if I am in error, that you referred to it as an Executive order of the President designating certain prohibited areas?

Admiral Inglis. It is not in my prepared statement. I gave that ad lib, because general orders of that nature usually derive from Executive orders, and I personally assumed, as I gave that statement, that it was derived from an Executive order.

Mr. Keefe. Is that a mere assumption on your part?

Admiral Inglis. If that is a question at issue, I will be very happy to verify that. I still think it did derive from the Executive order.

Mr. Keefe. You have not seen the Executive order?

Admiral Inglis. Not recently; no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you ever see it?

Admiral Inglis. I cannot say whether I ever did or not.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know the content of that order?

Admiral Inglis. Not now, no sir. I can look it up.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know the date of the general order, if any was issued pursuant to the Executive order?

Admiral Inglis. Not at this time; no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Have you a copy of that general order in your possession now?

Admiral Inglis. No. We will get it for you, though.

Mr. Keefe. Now, may I state, Mr. Counsel, that I would like to have, for purposes of identification, the Executive order issued by the President, if any, establishing the prohibited waters around the Philippine Islands.

Mr. Gesell. The Philippine, or the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Keeffe. I mean the Hawaiian Islands. Pardon me. 

Well, if there is one relating to the Philippine Islands it might possibly be included in the same order, I don't know. 

I would also like to have a copy of the order issued by the Navy, the general order, if such an order was in fact issued, including the date of that order. 

Admiral Inglis. The Navy Department will produce that.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, what is your present recollection, from the source of the material which you have, and which you studied, as to the purpose and intent of that order? What did it generally establish?

Admiral Inglis. My recollection is that it established a defensive sea area. It gave the boundaries of this area, and it required that no merchant vessels, either foreign or U. S., be permitted to proceed through that area, nor no foreign men-of-war be permitted to proceed through that area without the approval of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you know how extensive the area was?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. That was outlined on the chart during yesterday's presentation. It was not very extensive. It did cover the approaches to Pearl Harbor and the Kaneohe air station.

Mr. Keeffe. Was that a secret order?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Was it published to the world?

Admiral Inglis. I am morally certain it was; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. So foreign ships would have notice of the existence of such an order?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Did the order provide as to what action the Navy was to take in the event any foreign ships entered that prohibited area?

Admiral Inglis. I do not believe the specific action was prescribed, but certainly the Navy was to prevent any movement of that kind with all resources at its command.

Mr. Keeffe. Your evidence, as I recall, indicates that the Navy did so on the morning of December 7 before the Japanese attack.

Admiral Inglis. That is a fair assumption.

Mr. Keeffe. In the matter of sinking the submarine by the destroyer Ward.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Is that right?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you have, as the result of the search which you have conducted, any knowledge of any other ships or vessels of any character having been sunk other than those which you have testified to?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. You mean prior to December 7, on or prior to December 7?

Mr. Keeffe. On or prior to December 7.

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now I believe you testified that the aircraft carrier Enterprise on December 7 was proceeding eastward.

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Do your records indicate what that group of ships was composed of? 

1 Copies of the orders appear in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1681-1686.
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. That were escorting the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Will you identify them, please?
Admiral Inglis. That task force consisted of the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the heavy cruisers Northampton, Chester, Salt Lake City; the destroyers Balch, Maury, Craven, Gridley, McCall, Dunlap, Benham, Fanning, and Ellet. The total was one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers.
Mr. Keeffe. That task force had been taking some material out to Wake Island?
Admiral Inglis. It had been taking airplanes to Wake Island; yes, sir.

[318] Mr. Keeffe. Do I understand that the cruisers and destroyers were acting as convoys for the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. The word that we used for it is "escort," sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Escort?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The convoy is or are the ships which the escort escorts.
Mr. Keeffe. Pardon me. I am not very familiar with Navy practice. The convoy is the whole works and the escort are those that escort the convoy; is that right?
Admiral Inglis. We usually speak of a convoy as the ships to protect.
Mr. Keeffe. In this case the convoy was what? The Lexington or the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. The flagship was the Enterprise.
Mr. Keeffe. What were the ships that were being protected on their way along from Wake Island?
Admiral Inglis. In this particular case it was called a task force rather than either a convoy or an escort. However, I will try to clarify that by saying that the Enterprise—
Mr. Keeffe (interposing). Let us get it right there.
The Chairman. Let him complete the answer.
Mr. Keeffe. On the way out, when we were taking planes out to Wake, and other material was that a convoy?

[319] Admiral Inglis. We would call it a task force in that case, because there were no noncombatant ships in that group of ships.
Mr. Keeffe. So on both occasions then this group of ships that left Pearl Harbor and went out to Wake was a task force?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And it was a task force on the way back?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Is that correct?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
Mr. Keeffe. All right, we will strike the word "convoy" out of this discussion then.
Now what time did that task force leave Wake on the way back to Pearl Harbor? Do your records indicate that?
Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot give you that offhand. We will find it.
Mr. Keeffe. Do you have available the log of the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. We can get it. It may take some time, though. These logs are not readily available. We will try to get them.
Mr. Keefe. In connection with your examination of the facts immediately before and after Pearl Harbor, did you have access to the logs of the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis. The log itself was not available, but a number of extracts from the log were included in the court of inquiry and the Roberts Board report, and war diaries, things of that nature.

Mr. Keefe. What do you mean when you say the log of the Enterprise is not available? Do you mean it cannot be obtained?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I do not mean that. I mean it was not readily available in the time we had to conduct this research.

Mr. Keefe. Now in order that this record may be clear—because I am a boy from the country and do not understand all these things—will you explain in the record just what the log of a ship is supposed to contain?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.

The log of a ship in the Navy consists in general of two types of information. One is contained in columns which tabulate meteorological data such as temperature, humidity, height of the barometer, such data as the speed which the ship is making, the number of miles, nautical miles that have been steamed during each hour of the day, the drills that have been held, the ship’s position at 8 o’clock in the morning, at noon, and at 8 p.m.

Then the other classification is under the term “remarks,” and the remarks in the log contain a journal of events of interest, and those are divided into the various watches, that is the midwatch from midnight to 4 a.m., the morning watch from 4 a.m. to 8 a.m., and so forth.

The watch officer, the officer of the deck, signs in person the remarks, or the diary pertinent to his particular watch. That signature is also taken as an authentication of the corresponding data which appears in the columns, such as the meteorological data and the speed and mileage that the ship has covered.

Mr. Keefe. Does the log ordinarily contain information as to orders received by the ship?

Admiral Inglis. The log would probably contain the briefest sort of reference to the reason for the ship getting under way. I do not think for the purposes of this committee that would be particularly valuable, because it usually is couched something like this:

“In accordance with signal from division commander got under way and stood out of the harbor.”

That would not give the source of the division commander’s order.

Mr. Keefe. Would it contain information, for example, as to when a flight of scout bombers or planes left the deck of a ship?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Would it contain memoranda as to any orders relating to the conduct of those planes after they left the ship?

Admiral Inglis. Will you repeat that question?

Mr. Keefe. Read the question, please.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral Inglis. In general; no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then if the Enterprise, either on the 6th of December 1941, as it proceeded from Wake to Pearl Harbor, toward Pearl Harbor, or on the early morning of the 7th of December, had escort planes in the air patrolling the area ahead of this task force, would that information be found in the log of the Enterprise?
Admiral Inglis. I would expect the information as to the time and number of planes which were launched would appear in the log; also the time and the number of planes which returned to the ship would appear in the log, and probably a brief word or two about the mission of those planes would appear in the log.

[325] Mr. Keefe. Would the log also indicate whether those planes were armed or unarmed?

Admiral Inglis. Under those circumstances, on December 6 and 7, I would be inclined to think that it would not contain that information.

Mr. Keefe. I have indicated, I believe, that I would like to have the log of the Enterprise available.¹

Well, now, you testified, as I recall, in your general statement as it appears in our record of the testimony, page 72, that in addition to regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the U. S. S. Enterprise 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor launched scout bombers armed with machine guns shortly after 6 a.m. which searched to the eastward ahead of the ship, an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles.

Where did you get that information?

Admiral Inglis. That information was taken from the action report of the Enterprise, and from various other original sources. I would hazard a guess that some of that came from the interrogation of the pilots on those planes.

Mr. Keefe. You say the action report of the Enterprise. What is that?

Admiral Inglis. Whenever a ship of the Navy is in action involving any shooting, the commanding officer is required to submit a report of the action, which contains numerous details, such as the number of rounds of ammunition fired, the damage to his own ship, the estimated damage to the enemy, a narrative of the events.

Mr. Keefe. Was the Enterprise in action that morning at 6 a.m.?

Admiral Inglis. Her planes were in action at that time.

Mr. Keefe. In action against whom?

Admiral Inglis. Against the Japanese planes that attacked Pearl Harbor. Not at 6 o'clock, but in the course of that flight.

Mr. Keefe. Well, but, my dear sir, let us make this clear. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred at 7:55, according to your testimony. These ships left the Enterprise, these planes, according to your testimony, shortly after 6 a.m., nearly 2 hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. They certainly were not engaged in any action at that time, were they, against the Japs?

Admiral Inglis. They were engaged in action against the Japs sometime after 7:45 and before they landed at Ewa Field at times varying from 9:15 to 10:15, which I believe were the figures.

Mr. Keefe. When they left the Enterprise, they were equipped and ready for action, were they not, at 6 o'clock [325] that morning?

Admiral Inglis. I think that is a fair assumption, because they were firing at Japanese planes on their way into Ewa landing field.

Mr. Keefe. You stated in your general statement that they were armed.

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And after leaving the Enterprise they were supposed to proceed on and land at Ewa; is that right?

¹The log of the U. S. S. Enterprise was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 101.
Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. As they were coming east that morning, and finally came over the island, they engaged the Japs who were then attacking Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis. That is the story as I have it; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you deduce from any of the information you have been able to obtain, that the commander of that task force had any knowledge that there was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor that morning at 6 o’clock?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Where is the action report of the Enterprise? Have you seen it?

Admiral Inglis. It is now in the archives and records of the Navy Department.

Mr. Keefe. Have you seen it?

[326-7] May I ask, Mr. Mitchell, that that action report of the Enterprise be produced?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. For use in connection with this examination.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.¹

Mr. Keefe. Now, may I ask you this question:

So far as the world knew, and the people of America knew, and so far as the records show, this country was at peace with Japan at 6 o’clock on the morning of the 7th day of December; was it not?

Admiral Inglis. I cannot speak for the people of the world, but speaking for myself, that was my impression, that we were technically at peace; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. We were technically at peace?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that the way you want to say it?

Admiral Inglis. That is the way I want to say it, because with a task force approaching Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making a surprise attack on the Navy and Army at that location, I would say it was highly technical.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Do your records disclose, in the action report of the Enterprise, as to why these planes were launched in making reconnaissance on the morning of the 7th at 6 o’clock?

[328] Admiral Inglis. I am advised that the purpose given was routine flight training.

Mr. Keefe. Routine flight training?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I hope you will not try to pin me down too closely on that, because I am really not too well informed.

Mr. Keefe. Very well; we will try to go into that maybe at the time when Admiral Halsey, or someone who was on the job, testifies to it, perhaps.

Then, am I to understand that so far as the information available that you have from the record, the log of the Enterprise, the action report of the Enterprise, or whatever record you may have examined, or your researchers may have examined, that while we were technically at peace at 6 o’clock on the morning of the 7th day of December, the Enterprise, returning as part of the task force from Wake Island with the ships which you have described and enumerated, did have out

¹The action report of the U. S. S. Enterprise was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 103.
in front of that task force a patrol of planes, 18 scout bombers fully armed, ready for action?

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And that those bombers, as they proceeded east, learned of the attack at 7:50, and proceeded then to Pearl Harbor and engaged the enemy?

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

[328a] Mr. Keeffe. Is that right?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, then, at 7:55 when this attack came on Pearl Harbor, where do you locate this task force of Admiral Halsey specifically?

Admiral Inglis. Two hundred miles west of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Keeffe. Directly west?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. All right.

Now, there was another task force, was there not, in which was included the aircraft carrier \textit{Lexington}?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Who was in command of that escort?


Mr. Keeffe. Where was that task force on the 6th of December 1941?

Admiral Inglis. I have that as 460 miles from Midway, on route to Midway.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, where was it with respect to Pearl Harbor, and with respect to Halsey's task force?

Admiral Inglis. Will you get the other chart, No. 1, giving the disposition of the task fleet?

I make it as roughly, 350 miles, a little north of west \[329\] of Admiral Halsey's Task Force 8.

Mr. Keeffe. Will you point on the map, just for the purpose of observation, about where the Halsey task force was, and where the Newton task force was.

Admiral Inglis. There is Task Force 12, that blue dot, at which Commander Biard is pointing. And then he is going to draw his wand in the direction immediately south of east to Task Force 8. I just made a very hasty estimate here of the distance between the two, and it comes out about 350 miles.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

Now the task force commanded by Admiral Newton was on the way to Wake Island, was—or Midway?

Admiral Inglis. Midway.

Mr. Keeffe. Midway?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. To deliver certain Marine planes?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. To Midway?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Will you enumerate the ships that composed the task force commanded by Admiral Newton?

Admiral Inglis. The ships were the aircraft carrier \textit{Lexington}, the heavy cruisers \textit{Chicago}, \textit{Portland} and \textit{Astoria}, \[330\] and destroyers \textit{Porter}, \textit{Drayton}, \textit{Flusser}, \textit{Lamson}, and \textit{Mahan}. A total of one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, nine altogether.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have any information as to whether reconnaissance was conducted by Admiral Newton by the use of planes?

Admiral Inglis. The evidence on that, Mr. Congressman, is a little bit—in fact, it is very vague. In the testimony of Admiral Newton I believe he said that planes were out scouting, but he did not say what planes they were. They may have been planes from the Lexington, or they may have been planes from the heavy cruisers.

There is also something to indicate that the Lexington carried a heavy deck load of these Marine planes, which cluttered up her flight deck, making the launching of planes difficult.

Mr. Keefe. I want to clear this situation up if I can.

On page 179 of the testimony which you gave yesterday, under cross examination by Senator Ferguson, referring to the Lexington group under the command of Admiral Newton, Senator Ferguson asked you this question:

Do you know whether they did any reconnaissance?

Your answer was:

I understand, because of the additional Marine Corps planes on board, the flight deck was so cluttered [331] that they were not able to launch any. Senator Ferguson. So there was no reconnaissance from that?

Admiral Inglis. Not from the Lexington.

Is that your testimony?

Admiral Inglis. I presume it is, sir; and that was my understanding yesterday. My attention was invited last night to—

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Well, that—

Mr. Gesell. Wait a minute, Congressman. Let him finish.

Admiral Inglis. Because of this cross examination of Senator Ferguson's, my staff attempted to look this matter up a little more thoroughly, and the best they could give me this morning was there was some doubt as to just what planes there were in the air. So I would prefer Admiral Newton to answer that.

Mr. Keefe. After you so testified, Admiral—which, of course, I understand you are testifying just from your recollection of the material and papers and files, so on and so forth—you were not there, and necessarily you have no personal recollection of it.

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. As a matter of fact, when you got through your testimony yesterday, some of your stuff called your attention to the testimony of Admiral Newton himself given before Admiral Hewitt, did they not?

Admiral Inglis. I am not sure to whom the testimony was given, but that is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I now call your attention to the testimony of Admiral Newton himself given before Admiral Hewitt in the so-called Hewitt investigation which appears on page 318, questions 29, 30, and 31 on that page. This question was asked of Admiral Newton by Admiral Hewitt:

Do you recall having any particular concern over the fact that the mission was advancing your course over 1,000 miles towards Japan?

Answer. I consider that I was going into waters that had not been frequented by our ships for some time, and there might be more danger from submarines than we had considered in the past. I set a speed of 17 knots in daylight, and zigzagging. I also had scouting flights made by planes to cover our advance.

Did you read that testimony of Admiral Newton himself?
Admiral Inglis. That was invited to my attention either late last night or early this morning, the very selection you just read.

Mr. Keefe. Then, as a matter of fact, whether the planes came from the flight deck of the Lexington, the [333] carrier, or whether they came from some other ship that was part of that task force, the record, as given in the testimony of Admiral Newton himself, said that he had not only scout planes covering his advance, but that also because he was in waters that our ships had not theretofore been traveling for some time, zigzagging his ships to avoid possible attack by submarines.

Did you gather that from the testimony?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; that is precisely what the testimony says.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, then, what submarines would be liable to attack at that time?

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid that is a conjectural question which I am not prepared to answer.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I would like, for a moment, to address my remarks to the Colonel, and I would like to have placed back on the easel that map or plot showing the—

Colonel Thielen. The radar, sir?

Mr. Keefe. The radar chart.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question while the testimony is waiting?

Mr. Keefe. A question of whom?

Mr. Murphy. The gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. Keefe. You want to ask me a question?

[334] Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.

I wonder if the gentleman is reading from the Hewitt report, or the Hart report?

Mr. Keefe. When I said Hewitt I meant Hart. Will you correct the record? I am reading from the Hart report.

Mr. Murphy. That is not the Hewitt report at all. It is page 318 of the Hart report.

Mr. Keefe. Thank you very much for your diligence in correcting me.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to the date of the Hart report?

Mr. Keefe. It is dated February 12, 1944, to June 15, 1944.

Senator Ferguson. Is it the report or the testimony?

Mr. Keefe. It is testimony in the hearing conducted by Admiral Hart.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to correct the record in any way, making it show it is testimony rather than report?

Mr. Keefe. Well, it is all included. The testimony is included in the report.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, can I inquire whether or not Admiral Hart filed a report?

The Chairman. Does the Congressman know whether he did or not?

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest it would be better to call it the Hart record.

Mr. Gesell. I think the confusion comes because the transcript, which is the record, is called the report. As I understand it, that is the reason for the confusion.
Mr. Keefe. That is what I have understood it to be. In reading references to it in other parts of these very voluminous records, it is referred to as the Hart report.

In this report, of course, is contained the testimony of innumerable witnesses, and I quoted from the testimony of Admiral Newton.

Now, I call your attention particularly to this chart. I will get over here so I can see it myself. My eyesight is not good.

As I understood from your testimony, colonel, this streak that you have indicated on the exhibit——

Is this going to be an exhibit? The record will not be very good, because the record will not show what I am pointing to unless we have it as an exhibit.

The Chairman. It is an exhibit that has been submitted to all of us here, which is not in color.

Mr. Keefe. What is the number of the exhibit? Army exhibit No. 10.

[336] Mr. Mitchell. That is going to be offered.

Colonel ThieLEN. That is page 8 of the Army exhibit, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Just so the record will indicate what we are talking about.

[337] Mr. Murphy. May I suggest that is the exhibit that has been verified by Colonel Murphy.

Mr. Keefe. And further authenticated by Congressman Murphy. That ought to make it unanimous.

At least here is a map blown up, as you testified, from an Army exhibit, showing what I understood you to say was information that was obtained from this mobile radar unit located, on the morning of the 7th of November, up here at Opana, is that right?

Colonel ThieLEN. The 7th of December, sir. Otherwise your statement is correct.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now these dots in the center starting at 7:02 and going down through 7:39, 7:40, 7:43, indicate a flight of planes coming in?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Coming in Pearl Harbor?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that right?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And that is taken from the chart made out there at this radar detecting apparatus, is that right?

Colonel ThieLEN. I do not know exactly how that record was made. We have it as an authorized record of the plot of the Opana radio station, signed by the assistant signal [338] officer of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. Keefe. What are these dots over here on the purple arrow pointing toward the island? What do they indicate?

Colonel ThieLEN. Those are plots which were made at the times indicated by the Opana station.

Mr. Keefe. Well, the times of those are 6:45, 6:48, 6:51, so on and so forth.

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir. There is no implication that those were Japanese planes.
Mr. Keeffe. They may have been our own planes, so far as the evidence shows?

Colonel Thielen. They may have been.

[339] Mr. Keeffe. There is no evidence to show what those planes were then?

Colonel Thielen. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Keeffe. I notice also, to the left of the large purple arrow pointing toward the island, two streaks, with an arrow pointing in the opposite direction, and two times indicated, 10:39 and 10:27.

What does that arrow indicate?

Colonel Thielen. That is taken from the plot. That was indicated on the plot as an arrow. The clear arrow is an attempt to reproduce the arrow shown on the basic document, an original of which was offered to the committee yesterday afternoon.

Mr. Keeffe. My question related to this arrow to the left. What does that indicate?

Colonel Thielen. It is the blue arrow. I am explaining the blue arrow which lies within the purple arrow. That is the arrow formed by the mask which was placed over the purple arrow.

Mr. Keeffe. I am talking about the arrow which has to the left of it the time 10:39 and 10:27. What does that arrow indicate?

Colonel Thielen. It indicates a plot. That is the way it was given on the document from which that exhibit was taken, [340] as an arrow rather than as a succession of pips.

Mr. Keeffe. Does that indicate, if the pips were on here, would it indicate planes flying away from the island?

Colonel Thielen. It appears to indicate one or more aircraft flying away from the island.

Mr. Keeffe. Why aren't the pips on here the same as on the other arrow?

Colonel Thielen. I can't answer that. That is the way it was on the original.

Mr. Keeffe. At least, so far as your testimony is concerned, then, the arrow to which I have referred which is pointed toward the top of the exhibit, and to the left of which appears the times 10:39 and 10:27, refers to planes that were leaving the island?

Colonel Thielen. Two or more planes.

Mr. Keeffe. Going away?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, then, I would like to know this: In your examination of the files relating to this aircraft attack on Pearl Harbor, did you find a record of the transmission to any authority in the island of the planes as they left?

Colonel Thielen. There is no such statement in my testimony nor did I encounter any such statement in any other testimony.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you know whether or not the records [341] contain information furnished from this mobile unit which was ultimately given to the authorities out there at Pearl Harbor which indicated the flight of planes away from the island?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. All I know about the outgoing flight is that it appeared on the historical plot, so-called.

Mr. Keeffe. And you have no knowledge as to when that information appearing on the historical plot may have been given to the authorities on the island?
Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir; I have no such information.

Mr. KeeFE. Have you ever checked the records to ascertain whether there was in fact any such transmittal of information as to this outgoing flight?

Colonel ThieLEN. I have not personally done so. I know that this whole Opana station question was gone into very thoroughly by the researchers working with me.

Mr. KeeFE. Well, from your knowledge and the information gained from your gleanings of this material that you went over and that your researchers went over, could you say whether or not when information was obtained at this mobile station whether that information was transmitted to the commanding officer, General Short, or anybody else in command out there at that time?

Colonel ThieLEN. It divides itself into two parts, sir. I have testified concerning that long inward plot which starts at 7:02, which was reported to the watch officer at Fort Shafter, and I have further testified that the watch officer took no action in that connection.

Mr. KeeFE. Well now, in order that I might be perfectly clear, I understood that this particular radar station had shut down some time after 7 o'clock.

Colonel ThieLEN. I didn't say that, sir.

Mr. KeeFE. Well, was it in continuous operation all during the attacks?

Colonel ThieLEN. The plot indicates that it was in operation from 7:02 to 7:43. We have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that when he received notification of the attack at 8 o'clock he recalled all radar personnel to their stations. Whether they actually so returned or not I do not know. What happened after 8 o'clock I have only the knowledge indicated by the plot which we have been discussing.

Mr. KeeFE. Then the historical plot which gives you the information that certain planes were spotted leaving the island, certainly would indicate that that radar station was in operation at the times indicated on the exhibit, 10:39 and 10:27?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir; that would so indicate.

Mr. KeeFE. So if this station was in operation at 10:39 and 10:27 and picked up flights of planes, one or more, leaving the island, going away, would that information normally have been immediately transmitted to General Short's office, or somebody in command on that island?

Colonel ThieLEN. It would unquestionably have been transmitted as far as the information center in order that the proper action could be taken by the Air Forces. Whether or not it would have come to General Short's personal attention or not I can't say.

Mr. KeeFE. The plotting also indicates the direction that those planes were taking and the distance they were away at the time the radar picked them up.

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KeeFE. So if they had had the information they would have known that these returning planes were flying away from the island in this direction, would they not?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KeeFE. And the task forces at sea, both of them were out there for the purpose of going into action, weren't they?

79716—46—pt. 1——12
Colonel Thielen. They were out there for that purpose?
Mr. Keefe. You can’t answer that. You are from the Army. Pardon me.
Do you know whether or not in the search of your records and all of the material that came to your attention—radar [344] being on land under the control and jurisdiction of the Army and the Navy not having any land-based radar—do you know whether or not there are any records available as to when General Short’s office, or anybody else in command, was notified of this plot showing these planes leaving the island?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir, I have no such information. I should, however, like to point out in this connection that we have no definite information that those were hostile planes.
The Chairman. Are you through, Mr. Keefe?
Mr. Keefe. Just a moment, please.
I would like to ask the Admiral, if I may.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have available—strike that out.
Colonel, may I have your attention a moment, please.
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. There has been offered the duly certified record of the plotting of these planes, an instrument which is certified to by Lieutenant Murphy—Lieutenant Colonel, I guess—
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think that should be offered. I understood it was.
Mr. Keefe. I would like to have it identified and offered in evidence now.
Mr. Murphy. That will be Exhibit 4, Mr. Chairman.
[345] The Chairman. This is the one that was asked for yesterday and obtained. It was not put in the record as an exhibit.
Mr. Keefe. Will you have it identified as an exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. We will make it Exhibit 4 and offer it in evidence.
Exhibit 4 will be this chart showing the plotting by the radar station at Opana on the morning of December 7. That is enough, isn’t it, Colonel?
Colonel Thielen. That is a sufficient description.
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit No. 4, Mr. Congressman.
(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 4.”)
Mr. Keefe. Now, Colonel, this exhibit 4 is supposed to be a correct record. I note that you have, in preparing the big chart which has been exhibited to the committee, you have left off two words that appear in red ink opposite the numbers giving the time 10:39 and 10:27, the words being “enemy return.”
Did you see those?
Colonel Thielen. I did, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Who put that on there?
Colonel Thielen. Presumably Lieutenant Colonel Murphy. May I explain the omission from this chart at this time?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Colonel Thielen. In addition to the words “enemy return” appears a question mark. I have deliberately omitted from [346] my testimony all questionable material.
Mr. Keefe. That is why it was left out?
Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to point out that on the exhibit which we have prepared to offer the words "enemy return" and the question mark appear. Item 7 of the Army exhibit.

Mr. KEEFE. We have offered this and this shows the same thing. This is the original.

That is all of this witness. I want to talk for a moment to the admiral.

Do you have a printed pamphlet known as, I think it is 2CL-41, a certain security order?

Admiral INGLIS. That is in the archives of the Navy Department. We haven't got it at hand but again we will produce it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in preparing your statement for the Navy did you examine this security order issued by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral INGLIS. My staff did; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you familiar with what it contains?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir, not personally.

Mr. KEEFE. Beg pardon?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not personally familiar with that document. [347] I have just been informed by my helper here that he did look at that and decided that it was outside of the scope of the outline handed to us.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it related, did it not, to the manner in which these ships were to be berthed and moored in the harbor at Pearl Harbor for security purposes?

Admiral INGLIS. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I am not familiar with the order.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am sorry that in making your presentation you have omitted this very, very important and highly important matter.

Mr. GESELL. It is controversial.

Mr. KEEFE. Is there anything controversial about it, Mr. Gesell? Is there anything controversial about the fact that such an order was issued? It is a printed order.

Mr. GESELL. If that is the order that has to do with the disposition of vessels in the harbor, so as to effect the maximum antiaircraft opposition, and matters of that sort—we felt that should be taken up with the officers who ordered the disposition of the fleet so they could give their reason and explain what was done, when it was done, and why it was done.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the order was issued by Admiral Kimmel, wasn't it?

[348] Mr. GESELL. I believe so.

Mr. KEEFE. And, which I understand is in a printed pamphlet, although I haven't been able to get it yet. As a member of the committee I am interested in it.

Mr. GESELL. We have it; if you ask for it we will be glad to give it to you.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, we are going to ask for a lot of things as we go along in this matter, and maybe we will get them. We hope so.

I am now making the request that I be furnished with this order. And are there additional copies available so that the committee may have copies?
Mr. Gesell. I believe it is a printed order. Therefore there should be copies.

Mr. Keeffe. There shouldn't be anything controversial about the fact. Here is an order which is printed. What could be controversial about it?

Mr. Gesell. Are you asking me, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Keeffe. You said it was controversial.

Mr. Gesell. The question of why it was ordered and who it was ordered by is controversial.

Mr. Keeffe. So that I may understand, wasn't it an order issued by Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. Gesell. I so understand.

[349] Mr. Keeffe. Then there is nothing controversial.

Mr. Gesell. As to the content of the order, I take it not.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you discuss that matter, Admiral, with our counsel?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; not personally. This is the first time I ever heard of it.

The Chairman. The Chair will ask counsel to attempt to secure sufficient copies of that printed order to furnish each member with a copy.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, Admiral, a couple of other questions.

You gave some testimony as to the reconnaissance of planes around the Fourteenth Naval District. That includes Wake, doesn't it; Midway, Johnston?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, there were 12 PBY's that left Pearl Harbor on the 30th of November, were there not?

Admiral Inglis. My presentation did not go back before the 6th of December in that connection.

Mr. Keeffe. So you have no knowledge of that?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

[350] Mr. Keeffe. You didn't make any examination of anything prior to the 6th of December?

Admiral Inglis. Not in connection with reconnaissance; no, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. So you are not in position to testify as to any reconnaissance that took place on the 5th or 4th or any other time except the 6th and 7th; is that right?

Admiral Inglis. That is right.

Mr. Keeffe. That is all.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask a question or two.

In regard to this map—will you put that radar map back, the one that was just there? I guess Colonel Thielen can answer this question.

This long purple line in the center indicating an arrow, as far as the radar is concerned, shows the direction in which planes were flying?

Colonel Thielen. That is a graphical representation which we made to indicate that fact.

The Chairman. That arrow indicates what was recorded from 2 minutes after until 7:30; is that correct?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. The white squares actually indicate that.
The Chairman. Those white squares were put in to indicate the time that synchronizes with the particular portion of that arrow?

Colonel Thießen. No, sir. More accurately, the white squares are the basic data. They represent the plots which were made. The purple arrow was added to indicate, make it more graphic to the committee, the direction of the attack.

The Chairman. In other words, the purple arrow, the long purple arrow, indicates incoming planes?

Colonel Thießen. For the purpose of that attack; yes sir.

The Chairman. Yes. I understand you to say that there is nothing on the plot, as you call it, which indicates whether they were friendly or hostile planes?

Colonel Thießen. That is correct.

The Chairman. How close would they have to get to the point of attack before those in charge of the radar station would know whether or not they were enemy or friendly planes?

Colonel Thießen. As I understand the development of radar at that time there would be no indication whatsoever purely by radar. It would have to be either by visual recognition, or by an identification signal sent out by the plane radio independent of the radar.

The Chairman. Now, some question has been raised about these radar operators remaining at this Opana station after 7 o'clock, in view of the fact that their duty required them to stay until only 7 o'clock. Would you be able to say from the records, whether the reason they remained there was because the truck was late, or whether they wanted to get some more training.

Colonel Thießen. Well, it appears to me immaterial why. They had the option of resting while the truck arrived, or actually continuing to conduct training. They took the latter alternative.

The Chairman. Some importance seems to be attached to the fact that the truck was late, and I am wondering whether, if the truck had been on time, if they would have been there between 7:02 and 7:39 and would have made these records which you have exhibited.

Colonel Thießen. I don't think anybody could answer that.

The Chairman. That is speculative.

Colonel Thießen. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And while they were waiting for the truck they decided to operate a little?

Colonel Thießen. Yes, sir. They showed commendable zeal.

The Chairman. The small purple arrow pointing the other way indicating the direction of the planes being at 10:27—is it?

Colonel Thießen. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And going down to 10:39—

Colonel Thießen. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. That is 12 minutes.

Colonel Thießen. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Which was nearly an hour after the attack had ceased, as I understand it from your testimony, the attack having been over at 9:45.

Colonel Thießen. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. So, if that is a correct representation of the flight of enemy planes—which could still be unidentified, I suppose, so far as the radar was concerned—
Colonel ThieLEN. Even more likely because of the range—the range is greater.

The Chairman. That would have indicated that 45 minutes or an hour, 45 minutes approximately, after the attack was over, the departure of these planes was caught on the instrument at that time?

Colonel ThieLEN. An outgoing flight was picked up.

The Chairman. Now, I don't know whether you testified, Colonel, or whether the admiral testified yesterday, stating that on the 6th of December there were no searches made by airplanes from Pearl Harbor; is that true?

Admiral Inglis. My testimony was that we had no written record of any searches.

The Chairman. No record—no written record of any searches, and that is limited to the searches that would have been made from Pearl Harbor as a base, is it? The reason I ask, on your item No. 10, which is the reproduction of that map there [indicating] in your black space, you say "Air searches flown in Hawaiian area." Then you have in that diagonal square, "6th of December, 1941," indicating that in that square there was some air flight in progress. Was that the airplanes from the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis. Those were the airplanes from the Enterprise. My statement that there was no written record of any reconnaissance flights applied to shore-based planes, but there were aircraft in flight from the Enterprise, as shown on the diagonal stripes.

The Chairman. So that there is no contradiction between your statement yesterday that there were no flights from shore bases on the 6th of December and this indication that from the Enterprise, which was 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, that there were these flights participated in by the 18 planes that attacked from it?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir; no contradiction.

The Chairman. All right. Now, at the time that these planes took off from the Enterprise in what direction was it going?

Admiral Inglis. The Enterprise was traveling almost due east.

The Chairman. Toward Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis. Toward Pearl Harbor.

The Chairman. Now, in what direction was the Lexington traveling?

Admiral Inglis. The Lexington was going a little north of west—a little north and west.

The Chairman. Toward—

Admiral Inglis. Midway.

The Chairman. Midway?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.

The Chairman. And they were about how far apart?

Admiral Inglis. At the time of the attack, as we have just brought out, they were approximately 350 miles apart and rapidly drawing further apart.

The Chairman. Yes. One of them was going northwest and the other coming east?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Yes. Well, now, do the records from which you have taken your statement and upon which your statement is based indicate whether these planes that were armed, apparently, when they left the deck of the Enterprise had any knowledge of an attack or impending attack at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis. The record is completely negative in that respect and I would certainly assume that the pilots had no knowledge of that at all.

The Chairman. Now, let me ask you about these planes that left Hamilton Field, is it, San Francisco, Hamilton Field? That, I believe, is the colonel's statement; it is in the colonel's statement.

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. At what time did you say they left on the night of the 6th?

Colonel Thielen. 9:30 p.m. the 6th December.

The Chairman. 9:30 p.m.?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Unarmed and without radar, as you said?

Colonel Thielen. Unarmed; presumably without radar.

The Chairman. And probably having radio sets?

Colonel Thielen. Probably, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Probably, but you have no positive evidence on that score?

Colonel Thielen. No positive evidence. It would be extremely unlikely that they did not have.

The Chairman. They were headed for the Philippine Islands but were to stop at Hawaii for what purpose—for refueling or do you know?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that would unquestionably be one of the purposes of the stop.

The Chairman. Yes. And when they got there they found this attack in progress, is that right?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The Chairman. And being unarmed they had no facilities with which to engage very effectively in the battle, did they?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. They all attempted to land.

The Chairman. They all attempted to land?

Colonel Thielen. Yes.

The Chairman. And some of them were destroyed in that process?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Your testimony, the testimony of both of you gentlemen has been referred to here as hearsay evidence. I suppose that you knew when you were asked to present this chronological narrative or physical narrative of what happened out there, not being there yourself, understood that you were not to testify from personal knowledge but from records that you were able to obtain in these various departments and that there is no misunderstanding that what you were to say here is, technically speaking from the standpoint of a lawyer, hearsay evidence.

Is that true, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Is that yours also?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that is my understanding.
The **Chairman.** Of course, as a matter of law we all understand what you do not see yourself and testify about is legally referred to as hearsay, and there was no misunderstanding about that. Nobody expected it to be anything else, so far as I know.

1. Is that your understanding of it?

Admiral Inglis. That was my understanding, yes, sir.

Colonel Thie len. Yes, sir.

The **Chairman.** I think that is all I want to ask him.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I did neglect to ask one or two questions that I had in mind, that I would like to complete if I may do so at this time.

The **Chairman.** Yes, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Colonel, I would like to ask you this: How many fixed antiaircraft batteries were there on Oahu at the time of this attack?

Colonel Thie len. That will take a little counting, sir. There were a good many of them and in the Army exhibit. section 1, page 1—or, rather, beginning on page 2, we have a list of Coast Artillery units. In general this could be narrowed down to the gun. I am sure, and made very accurate with a little further study, but, in general, units other than the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery Regiment—the six batteries at Schofield Barracks and the seven batteries at Camp Malakole—all of those other yellow squares situated at Fort Weaver, at Fort De Russy and Fort Ruger and at Black Point, which is down at the top of Diamond Head, are fixed batteries situated to protect the coastal defenses, the seacoast defense guns in that sector.

2. Mr. Keefe. Now, how many mobile batteries were there on the island that day?

Colonel Thie len. The only fully mobile unit was the Sixty-fourth—let me check that—the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery Regiment which would contain 3 batteries having 3 gun batteries, a total of 9—well, wait a minute; the Third Battalion, with semiautomatic weapons, has 4 batteries. That would give us 10 full mobile batteries.

The semimobile armaments had three Coast Artillery regiments with weapons which could be transported but for which the prime movers, as we call them, the trucks to tow them, were not available in sufficient quantity to move the entire regiment at one time.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I assume in making up your statement you had opportunity to and did read the Army Board’s report?

Colonel Thie len. I read it, sir, not as closely as did my researchers. I read it not with the idea of extracting anything but for the purpose of acquainting myself with the background.

Mr. Keefe. Who was General Burgin?

Colonel Thie len. General Burgin commanded the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, which embraced two major divisions, the seacoast regiments and the antiaircraft regiments.

Mr. Keefe. Now, on the morning of December 7, 1941, when the attack took place, how many of these fixed batteries were ready for action?

Colonel Thie len. I believe that that could be figured out. May I invite your attention to section 7 of the Army exhibit, from which we can probably deduce those facts? None, of course, were loaded.

Mr. Keefe. None were loaded?

Colonel Thie len. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Was the ammunition available?
Colonel Thielen. The ammunition was, in general, in boxes at the position.

Mr. Keefe. It had to be unboxed and taken out of the boxes to the guns to be loaded?
Colonel Thielen. That is for the 3-inch guns, the primary armament, that is true.

Mr. Keefe. That is after the so-called No. 3 alert went into effect?
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; no fixed guns were in position with ammunition at the gun positions under alert No. 1.

Mr. Keefe. Yes, but I mean they were not loaded, you said.
Colonel Thielen. No, sir; they were not loaded.

Mr. Keefe. In order to put them in position to fire, the ammunition would have to be taken out of the boxes in places where it was adjacent to the battery; is that right?

[362] Colonel Thielen. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Now, where was the ammunition for the mobile units?
Colonel Thielen. That was located at Aliamanu Crater.

Mr. Keefe. And how far away from the mobile batteries?
Colonel Thielen. That was quite close. That was near Fort Shafter, which is the nerve center of the island defense and the intersection of the road net which goes down along the south sector and critical area. There was also antiaircraft ammunition at Schofield Barracks.

Mr. Keefe. Well, the ammunition for the mobile gun batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in an old volcano; is that right?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And all the mobile batteries, wherever they were located, had to send up to this crater to get their ammunition; is that correct?

Colonel Thielen. Well, not all. As I pointed out, some was at Schofield Barracks, where some of the mobile batteries were situated.

May I review my brief, which I believe covered that? Would you care to hear it, sir; hear the discussion that I gave yesterday directly pertaining to this question?

Mr. Keefe. Well, if you care to repeat it. I haven’t [363] asked for it, but I haven’t any objection to it if you want to do it.

Colonel Thielen. It is directly responsive to your question, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Very well.

Colonel Thielen. Under alert No. 1 only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks.

Mr. Keefe. Now, in connection with your testimony, did you read the testimony of General Burgin as he gave it to the Army Board?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I do not recollect it.
Mr. Keefe. May I call your attention to the fact that General Burgin testified before the Army Board, which is cited and referred to in the Board’s report, and I quote:

They were all ready to get into action immediately with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the sea [366] coast, those batteries imbedded in concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that to General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition moved up into the seacoast to the battery positions and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out.

Ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions.

Is that correct?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir, as applied to the mobile batteries. As I pointed out, they were located at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, and Camp Mālakōle.

Mr. Keefe. Did you ascertain the facts with reference to the issuance of ammunition and why it was that ammunition had not been issued to these mobile batteries?

Colonel ThieLEN. I am not prepared to give a why, to give an answer as to why that was not done, sir. I may say that I have had a discussion with the people who were doing the researching on this subject and they assured me that testimony, [366], including that of ordnance officers, places us on very firm ground in the testimony which I gave yesterday and which I just repeated.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I call your attention to the testimony of General Burgin on that issue, in which he testified:

They didn’t want to issue any of the clean ammunition and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of a person who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazine. We tried the ordnance people without result. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the Field Artillery; I asked for ammunition for antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time and that we would have warning before any attack ever sprung up.

Did you find that, review that testimony before you made your statement to the committee here?

Colonel ThieLEN. I was generally familiar with that testimony and I know that my researchers knew it in detail.

[366] Mr. Keefe. Well, then, it is safe to say, is it not, that so far as the mobile units were concerned after the attack came they had to be dispersed to their positions and had to send to this crater in order to get their ammunition before they could enter the fight?

Colonel ThieLEN. To the crater and to Schofield Barracks.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir. The ammunition was centrally located.

Mr. Keefe. How long did it take to get it, to get that done after the attack came, normally?

Colonel ThieLEN. That would, of course, depend upon the location of the various batteries. May I point out that the bulk of the antiaircraft not in position, the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, was located at Fort Shafter, which was only a mile from Aliamanu Crater.
Mr. Keefe. Well, then, let me ask you this question: In your research and in your examination to present this situation you have disclosed a good many other pertinent and very technical facts. Do the records any place disclose how long it actually did take?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And how long did it take?

Colonel Thielen. We have a schedule of that in the Army exhibit. [367] Mr. Gesell. It is right in the exhibit for each particular battery.

Colonel Thielen. For every battery.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you may have seen it, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. Gesell. It is before you, Congressman. It is the schedule that was discussed yesterday. I was calling your attention to it. It gives the time intervals.

Colonel Thielen. That is on page 11 of the Army exhibit.

The Vice Chairman. We went over that.

Mr. Keefe. He went over that?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

The Chairman. Admiral, I want to ask one or two questions; maybe you testified about it yesterday. If you did, I don’t want to repeat.

You stated, I think, that there was a net strung across the mouth of this channel into Pearl Harbor but that notwithstanding that net a Japanese submarine did get in. Is that true?

Admiral Inglis. That is true; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Does that record show when the net was spread and when the submarine got in?

Admiral Inglis. The record does not show when the submarine got in and the record is not clear as to when the net was opened.

You see, those nets have a gate, as we call it, which usually can be opened to allow the passage of friendly ships, and I am not prepared to give the information as to just when that gate was opened and when it was closed. I would say from the construction of the net that the submarine must have gone through that net at some time when the gate was open because the net seems to be very effective in stopping the passage of any ship except when the gate was open.

The Chairman. Do you know whether it was customary to open the gate in the daytime or at night or both?

Admiral Inglis. I don’t know what the custom was at that place at that time.

The Chairman. How far was it from the mouth where the net was that this channel that had been chiseled out, how many miles is it to, we will say, the Ford Island?

Admiral Inglis. Roughly about 2 miles, sir.

The Chairman. About 2 miles?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.

The Chairman. Now, one other question and I think that is all.

You testified here that the Pacific Fleet—which is independent of the Asiatic Fleet, I believe? [369] Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I have no reference to that. The Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, was about two-thirds the size of the Atlantic Fleet. Now, how much of the Pacific Fleet was in Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Inglis. You will find that in the statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do not want to repeat.
Now, yesterday you said that there were six battleships in the
Atlantic Fleet and attention was called to two others that were doing
what you call——
Admiral Inglis. Shake-down.
The CHAIRMAN. Shake-down.
Is that a naval term for practicing or try-out? Were they new
ships that had not yet joined the Atlantic Fleet?
Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, I did not include in my statement
any ships that were in the blueprinting stage, that were being built
and had not yet been launched, or that had been launched but were not
commissioned, or that were commissioned but had not been ordered
to join the fleet. The ships are in various stages of completion from
the time the blueprints are drawn until the shake-down cruise is com-
pleted.
Now, after a ship goes into commission with her full crew and her
ammunition allowance and become a working organization, a period
called a shake-down cruise or shake-down period is allowed the ship
to work out all the kinks in the machinery and [370] in the
organization, to teach the crew their ships, and that, depending on the
type of ship, may take anything from perhaps a month to some times
as much as 6 months or even, in cases where they run into a great
deal of difficulty with the machinery, perhaps as much as a year.
Now, those two battleships, the Washington and North Carolina,
were of that status. They had been commissioned, they had their
crews and their ammunition on board, but they were still under
shake-down and had not yet joined the fleet.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that they
were in the Atlantic Ocean or in some body of water adjacent to it,
they were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That is all. I understand that Senator Brewster
wants to ask you a question or two.
Senator Brewster. I have said I wanted to ask some questions.
You said I wanted to ask a question. I would like to ask some ques-
tions. I haven't asked any questions so far.
I think 4 o'clock has rung.
Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield to get some information here,
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. We are constantly referring to Army exhibits, which I
now have before me, and reference was made to the place— [371]
ment of the various batteries and the time they got into action. Has
that exhibit been offered in evidence in this case, or do you intend to
offer it?
Mr. Mitchell. I was just waiting for a chance, Mr. Congressman.
At the close of their testimony I was going to make a formal offer.
You have copies of it, but I was going to put it into the record by a
formal offer.
Mr. Keefe. I want to concern myself with that. I understand,
then, that you are going to offer this Army exhibit formally?
Mr. Mitchell. We will do it now, if I may. I would like to get it
over with before I forget it.
The Chairman. And also the Navy.

Mr. Mitchell. I offer as Exhibit 5 the Army folder of documents, maps, and so forth, that was produced by Colonel Thielen in connection with his part in the narrative statement.

I also offer as Exhibit 6 the Navy folder, with all papers therein contained, which are those produced by Admiral Inghis in connection with his statement, and that includes the document that you just have in your hand. They are all offered.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of information: Of course, the testimony given by these gentlemen went right through these exhibits that were presented to each member of the committee. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. Mitchell. That is true, but I am offering the exhibits complete so that they will be formal parts of the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 5 and 6," respectively.)

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I make a request from counsel?

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to request counsel to get the original plotting chart made by Private Elliott at the Opana station on the morning of the 7th of December 1941.

As I understand it, they have been talking about originals here and this seems to be a photostatic copy and at the next session I will want to ask some questions upon that plotting.

Mr. Mitchell. Where would that be, Colonel? Is it in Washington?

Colonel Thielen. No, sir; I think not. We have never come across that, the plotting that was actually made on the plotting board at the station.

Senator Ferguson. Are you talking about the station at Opana or the main station? I am talking about the one that Elliott plotted, that he actually plotted. 2

Colonel Thielen. I have never encountered any—this is one point that I have gone into in some detail. I have never encountered any reference to the plot that was made by the enlisted men when they were tracking a plane. We have heard of Colonel Murphy's authenticated document which presents the plot that was made.

[373] Mr. Mitchell. Who is he?

Senator Ferguson. Where was Murphy when this plot was being made? Why can't we get the original plot to show the line of flight and whether or not planes came in at six something and whether or not they went out at 10:45 and 10:25? What I want is the original plotting made by Elliott, that he describes in his testimony.

Colonel Thielen. I am sure the War Department will make every effort to get it.

Senator Brewster. Will the counsel indicate in connection with the presentation of the Navy and Army exhibits the number of items included which, as I think, were illustrated numerically, so that they can be identified in that way?

Mr. Mitchell. In the Navy folder they are itemized as items 1 to 20.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

1 The plot referred to was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 155.
Mr. Mitchell. And in the Army folder I don't think they are. I doubt if it had a list. The mimeographed part of it is a document divided into sections, with 13 pages. In addition to that there are six charts.

Senator Brewster. Can the radar records of any one distinct station from the other stations for this period from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock at all the stations on Hawaii and during the later part of the morning, whenever they were in operation, be made available, or copies of it?

[374] Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir; anything that is in existence will be made available. I will give you my personal opinion as an artilleryman, though, that ordinary computations made at the time by personnel in the operation of such a device would not ordinarily be a matter of permanent record.

Senator Brewster. Do you think, Colonel, and would it be likely that records of the morning of December 7 would be destroyed?

Colonel Thielen. I believe, and again I am giving you a personal opinion based on professional experience, that Colonel Murphy, foreseeing the situation and the possible demands for information of this type, deliberately made this historic plot of information that was available.

Senator Brewster. Colonel Murphy was in charge of all the radar stations, was he?

Colonel Thielen. He was a signal officer in the Hawaiian Department. The chief signal officer, Colonel Powell, was in charge of the aircraft warning system.

Senator Brewster. Are either of those officers available here now?

Colonel Thielen. I believe Colonel Powell is. I understand Colonel Murphy has since died.

Senator Brewster. Colonel Powell, is he expected to appear, do you know?

[375] Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list.

Mr. Gesell. He is on the list.

Senator Ferguson. Was Murphy a witness before any of the boards?

Mr. Gesell. No, not that I know of.

Colonel Thielen. I believe he died shortly after that time. I cannot state definitely.

Senator Brewster. Would you, Mr. Mitchell, advise Colonel Powell that we would be interested in whatever original as well as transcript of those records are available of those records?

Mr. Mitchell. I will ask Colonel Duncombe to get a hold of him. Even if he hasn't these records here he can explain to you where he saw them and what was done with them.

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, may I make one brief correction in the statement that I made yesterday?

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. It won't take but a moment.

In my original statement I said that the three patrol planes from Kaneohe were to take off at sunrise, 5:27 Hawaiian time on the 7th, but that they did not take off until about 6:40. I later corrected that by saying that the plan was that they take off at dawn, 1 hour before sunrise.

I have since found that I was mistaken in both cases and the facts are that the order was for them to take off at sun-
which was at 6:26. They actually took off at 6:40. In other words, they were 14 minutes late instead of 1 hour and 13 minutes late.

Senator Lucas. Will you produce those records that show that also?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. I have two requests to make: One, that I be furnished with a copy of the summary of far eastern documents, the G-2 and Signal Corps documents as I understand, and I would like to have a copy of the log of the cruiser Boise for the last 5 days of November 1941 and, say, the first 10 days of December 1941.\(^1\)

The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, if there is nothing further we will recess until 10 o’clock tomorrow and the chairman will express the hope that we will conclude with the testimony of Admiral Inglis and Colonel Thielen before 12 o’clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 o’clock p. m., Friday, November 16, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 o’clock a. m., Saturday, November 17, 1945.)

\(^1\) Exhibit No. 68.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[377] The Chairman. The committee will be in session.

When the committee adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster, was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses. Senator Brewster?

The Chair just announced that when we adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses. You may now proceed.

Senator Brewster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear what you said. I cannot hear you.

The Chairman. I said that when the committee adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses and that he would now proceed.

Mr. Keefe. Before he proceeds may I inquire from the Chairman? There has been a lot of inquiry directed to me. May I inquire as to whether it is contemplated to hold hearings this afternoon?

The Chairman. Well, the Chair would hope not, we hope we can finish these witnesses by noon, but if we do not finish them we will try to finish them by going as late as 1 o'clock if necessary and not adjourn at 12 as we have been. Neither house is in session today.

Go ahead, Senator.

Senator Brewster. Admiral Inglis, covering one or two points which you have not fully developed in connection with [379] the hypothetical submarine entrance into Pearl Harbor at 4:30 on the morning of December 7, have you any further naval theory or record to that effect? You intimated that you did not consider the maps which were shown of the so-called battle area were, possibly, authentic. I assume that you have made some explorations of that situation.

Admiral Inglis. I cannot add anything to what I said yesterday. I am not sure that I have the map which you have just mentioned
in the book of battle reports precisely identified as identical with that map that I had in mind. I am not sure that we are talking about the same map.

Senator Brewster. So when you intimated that the entry—I saw it with my own eyes—was not on the map, did you find another map?

Admiral Inglis. It may have been a different map than the one in that book.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. But all I can do is repeat the general statement that I made yesterday, that the best picture or estimate that we can make from the evidence available to us is that one submarine definitely did enter Pearl Harbor.

Senator Brewster. Well, that is not a matter of anybody's opinion, is it? You got the submarine, didn't you, that you captured or sank at the time?

[380] Admiral Inglis. That is right.

Senator Brewster. So that there isn't any dispute about that.

Admiral Inglis. If the Senator will permit me, I was just reviewing what I said yesterday, which was that one submarine did definitely enter Pearl Harbor. A second one may possibly have entered Pearl Harbor but we rather think it did not.

Senator Brewster. And what became of the map which was captured with the submarine at Barbers Point?

Admiral Inglis. I think that that, or a photostatic copy of it, is in the Navy archives.

Senator Brewster. And you do not agree with the interpretation of that by the Army or FBI, or by the so-called battle report account?

Admiral Inglis. I am not personally familiar with the opinion of the Army or FBI on battle reports. My own translators, after considerable research and considerable study of the Japanese symbols on that map, have decided that the evidence tends to be against the conclusion that that submarine entered the harbor.

Senator Brewster. And what is your theory of how the submarine did enter into the harbor that actually did get in there?

[381] Admiral Inglis. Well, that is in the realm of speculation, Mr. Senator, but if you wish me to speculate I would speculate that the submarine probably followed a United States ship through the gate, the gate having been opened for the admission of a United States naval vessel.

Senator Brewster. What are the records on the ships coming in that morning?

Admiral Inglis. We haven't got that. We tried to find it and we haven't got that and I suggest that that material could better be obtained from some of the witnesses who were present at the time.

Senator Brewster. What was the arrangement between the Army and Navy about offshore patrol; what was the understanding between them?

Admiral Inglis. I don't know what the understanding was. So far as I know there was no off-shore patrol conducted by the Army. There was an off-shore patrol conducted by the Navy, as I have described in my previous testimony.

Senator Brewster. And what was the nature of that?

Admiral Inglis. The Navy's off-shore patrol?
Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. It consisted of the searches by aircraft that were shown on the charts.

Senator Brewster. I am speaking now of the routine, not of the ones which you have described, but of the routine throughout the weeks or months preceding that. Were there any regulations covering that in that period?

Admiral Inglis. We did not attempt to cover that prior to the 6th of December. Our presentation only took up from the 6th of December and from then on, because that is all that was in the outline.

Senator Brewster. And you are not, then, prepared to testify as to what the understanding was between the Army and Navy as to the patrol around the waters of Hawaii?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. What was the range of the PBY's? What was the range of the PBY bombers?

Admiral Inglis. I am just speaking off the cuff now, but as I recall it the figure was 800-mile radius of action. It would be something more than twice that much for the range. They would go out 800 miles generally on the course followed and then back again, making a triangular track.

Senator Brewster. You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii, did you not?

Admiral Inglis. I did not hear your question.

Senator Brewster. You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii, did you not?

Admiral Inglis. Oh, yes.

Senator Brewster. How many of them, do you recall?

Admiral Inglis. I am not certain. Referring to item 12 of the Navy exhibit, at Kaneohe there was a total of 36 PBY's. At Ford Island a total of 31—I beg your pardon, 33.

Senator Brewster. Thirty-three; that makes a total of 69 PBY's.

Admiral Inglis. I believe that is substantially correct, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Those were suitable at that time for this long-range patrol?

Admiral Inglis. That type of plane was suitable for that type of patrol, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. How long have you been in Intelligence, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis. How long have I been in Intelligence?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. Since the 1st of June of this year.

Senator Brewster. Has your experience before that been any in that field or in operations?

Admiral Inglis. More in operations and communications, general service that most of us have, no unusual type of duty, except that I was a specialist in communications for a while.

Senator Brewster. And it would not require any special training to know that the Japanese had in previous wars indulged in these sneak attacks, would it?

Admiral Inglis. I believe that is a matter of history.

Senator Brewster. So that if there were likely to be trouble between the Japanese and the United States, provoked by the United States,
it was altogether likely that it would be started in that way, wouldn't that be right?

Admiral Inglis. I think that would be a safe conclusion to draw, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And that it is rather accepted in military and naval strategy to aim at the jugular?

Admiral Inglis. I did not get the last part.

Senator Brewster. To aim at the jugular. You try to strike at the strongest spot, where you can do the most damage?

Admiral Inglis. Well, I—

Senator Brewster. Let me put it this way: Hasn't that been what the Japs have always done? In their previous wars didn't they always hit the enemy where they would do the enemy the most damage at one time in those sneak attacks?

Admiral Inglis. Of course, that is a pretty broad, general statement, Senator. I guess I could agree with you as a general statement.

Senator Brewster. Yes; so that if there were to be trouble it would be reasonable to anticipate that it might come in Pearl Harbor, would that be a fair statement?

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid you are going out of my field now, sir.

Senator Brewster. Well, you are the Director of Intelligence for the Navy, so you are assumed to have a certain competency in this field. You are handling this responsibility now and you must be looking to the future.

Admiral Inglis. Well, I feel flattered at your compliment, Senator.

Senator Brewster. Well, I am quite serious. I have a very high respect for your accomplishments, I think you have exhibited them already and we are trying to learn, of course, by experience to avoid trouble hereafter.

What I am coming to is this, that if there were any reason to anticipate trouble at Pearl Harbor, where most of our Pacific fleet was concentrated, most of its striking power, it would have been possible by the use of the PBY patrol bombers readily to have ascertained whether any striking force or carrier force were approaching, would it not, by a patrol?

Admiral Inglis. I am not sure whether the number of planes available for that type of search at that time was sufficient to allow a continual search all day every day.

Senator Brewster. Well, would it have required anything more than an 800-mile patrol from Pearl Harbor over the areas which were not covered by your shipping each day to have made it impossible for a hostile fleet to have approached?

Admiral Inglis. I think again you are getting a little bit out of my field and more into the field of aviation officers, but from my broad general experience as a naval officer I would say that probably that number of planes was not sufficient to cover all possible avenues of approach of a hostile force 24—

Senator Brewster. That is not what I asked you and you are intelligent enough to answer my question.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to the questions of the Senator from Maine.

The Chairman. Let the Senator from Maine proceed in order.
Admiral Inglis. Will the Senator please repeat the question?
Senator Brewster. You ask the question—read it.
(The question referred to was read by the reporter as follows:)
Well, would it have required anything more than an 800-mile patrol from
Pearl Harbor over the areas which were not covered by your shipping each
day to have made it impossible for a hostile [387] fleet to have ap-
proached?
Admiral Inglis. I beg your pardon. I did not understand the
question.
Senator Brewster. I thought you did not.
Admiral Inglis. The answer to that question is "Yes," with this
qualification, that again speaking now in general terms, the areas
which would be hypothetically covered by your own shipping could
probably not be counted upon. In other words, to carry out such a
thorough search as the one you have in mind we would have to cover
almost the whole 360° arc.
Senator Brewster. Well, that may be true, Admiral, but isn’t it also
true that, exactly as the Japanese planned, they would not be likely
to approach through areas where our shipping was frequenting the
courses?
Admiral Inglis. That is right.
Senator Brewster. They would be desirous of avoiding us.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. So that if at the time we abandoned our ship-
ning on the northern route patrols had been carried out on the northern
area, with the limited range of the battle planes from carriers, it would
have been, let us say, at least exceedingly difficult for the Jap force to
have approached?
[388] Admiral Inglis. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. And, of course, that is one of the things which
I think is of serious concern and in my visits to Pearl Harbor before
and after it occurred there was always great discussion, the Army
feeling that if it had been permitted to carry out these patrols with
their long range bombers they could have detected this and the Navy
holding the Army strictly accountable for the defense of Hawaii; but,
as I understand—and I will ask the counsel or you to have this veri-
ified—it was a matter of agreement and orders that the Army was not to
participate in a patrol beyond a very limited area, a hundred miles or
so, I believe, while the Navy was to take care of the longer range
patrol because of the existing controversy at that period which, I am
sure, both of you gentlemen are thoroughly familiar, as to the control
of long-range aircraft and the function and the mission which they
were to perform.
Mr. Mitchell. It may help the Senator if I say that at a very
early stage of the case, in fact, within the next day or two if we take
the normal course, we will produce all the defense plans that show
the respective duties of the Army and Navy about that reconnaissance
and we have a very splendid document here prepared by General
Martin, I think, in the summer of 1941 that answers every question
that you [389] have asked about the patrols that could have been car-
ried on, how many planes were required to do it and quite a
complete picture of the thing that you are interested in.
We have that and it is coming in with the defense plans which show the respective duties of the Army and Navy and what was required in the way of equipment to execute it.

Senator Brewster. Well, I should be glad to have that. I did not assume that this was a matter which was in controversy in any way, as to what were the Army and Navy arrangements, so I think it is a little regrettable that the Army and Navy did not agree to give us what were the actual arrangements, unless it was at the suggestion of counsel.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, these gentlemen were only giving the facts as to the actual conditions on the day of the attack and the available equipment, and the Army and Navy plans for defense prepared during the summer of 1941, over the months prior to Pearl Harbor, being a series of plans, each of them all arranged, with these things in them that you are interested in and you will get a more accurate story from those than you would from possibly a witness who was called on another matter and has not studied it lately.

Senator Brewster. Very well, I will be very happy to waive the presentation of that until the proper time.

Admiral, I want to take one other phase, which is all I [390] care, I think, to examine you about, and that is the matter of the distribution of the fleet.

You have realized, I presume, in your position that that has been one of the matters that has been much agitated in connection with this matter, as to the allocation of the fleets between the Atlantic and the Pacific, have you not, Admiral? There has been considerable discussion as to whether or not there was a good disposition.

Admiral Inglis. There has been considerable discussion, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And also as to the reasons for it and where the orders were developed, so that speaking from that background and your position you would gather also that that is one of the questions that will very likely be considerably discussed in this case.

Admiral Inglis. I would expect that.

Senator Brewster. Now, when the matter came up you spoke of the Pacific Fleet as being two-thirds of the Atlantic Fleet in strength. Admiral Inglis. That is numerical strength, yes.

Senator Brewster. That is based on the unit. And you were then asked further by Senator Ferguson about the allocation of the units. I want to read you your evidence and ask you your comment on it. I read quotations from your [391] evidence on page 172:

Admiral, you said—

this is Senator Ferguson speaking—

Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the Pacific; is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I said that the numerical strength of the Pacific Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was smaller than the Atlantic Fleet.

And then after some other colloquies, turning to page 173, Senator Ferguson again:

Well, how many capital battleships were in the Atlantic?

Admiral Inglis. In the Atlantic Fleet were six battleships. In the Pacific Fleet were nine battleships. Six in the Atlantic and nine in the Pacific.

Now, at that point it seems to me, Admiral, you were a little less than careful. Your first statement was absolutely correct. Your ad-
dition was absolutely incorrect and it occurs to me that hearing of this colloquy you must have been rather well aware of what Senator Ferguson, at least, was asking.

I will read the next page, after some further colloquies:

Senator Ferguson. Now, how many battleships were in Atlantic?


On the basis of the subsequent evidence which was finally extracted from you that statement was unqualifiedly false; is that not correct?

Admiral Inglis. I think the Senator is drawing some conclusions with respect to the—

Senator Brewster. I am quoting your testimony before this tribunal and that statement, as you have now admitted after we finally elicited the information, was unqualifiedly false.

The Chairman. If the Senator will permit——

Senator Brewster. The chairman can do anything he likes. I am making a statement of fact.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair feels that this inquiry ought to be conducted with decorum and respect and for a member of this committee to charge a witness with making an unqualifiedly false statement seem to the Chair, whether it seems to other members of this committee proper, to be out of order.

Senator Brewster. I will continue the quotation:

Senator Ferguson. Well, I read from battle report, Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6:

"In the Atlantic there were eight battleships."

[393] Reading from page 6:

Admiral Inglis. I can't recognize that book as being official. I have here a list of the specific ships—

I go on:

Admiral Inglis. I personally still don't recognize that as being official, except what you have told me now, but, if I may, Senator Ferguson, I will read the list of ships that were in the Atlantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet.

Still it is apparently contemplated that we were wishing to discover the truth.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

You then proceeded to read the list of the two fleets. I want to go now to another page and quote. This has gone on now for five pages trying to extract the simple facts as to the disposition of our fleets, of our battleships, which is what Senator Ferguson repeatedly asked you, and he finally, and I might say at my suggestion, because I was completely bewildered by what you were trying to tell us, on page 176 Senator Ferguson says:

How many battleships did we have in December 1941?

Admiral Inglis. Fifteen, sir.

There again is a statement which, on your subsequent [394] evidence when you finally admitted the existence of the Washington and the North Carolina ready for their cruises and shake-downs, is a statement that does not correspond with what up in our part of the country would be considered as the truth.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman. No; let the Senator proceed without interruption.
Senator Brewster (reading):

Senator Ferguson. Fifteen?
Admiral Inglis. Fifteen that were attached to the fleets. There were two or three that had just been completed, or were on their shake-down duty.

At last we are permitted to find out what is the answer to this conundrum.

Senator Ferguson. Where were they?

You then testified as to the Washington and the North Carolina on shake-down in the Atlantic.

All I have to say is this, Admiral, and I say it in all charity. I have served on the Naval Affairs Committee during my period in Congress; I have been interested in the Navy; we have the Navy up in Maine in large measure and everybody else is interested in it and, of course, for 4 years we have been dealing very definitely with preparedness and defense and I speak not only from observation but the thoughts of most of the members of our committee involved in that task and of its distinguished chairman, President Truman, in regretting profoundly that there has developed an attitude of mind on the part, particularly of the Navy, that does not seem to recognize the rights and interests of this Congress to receive full, frank, and fair answers to the questions that have come up and I say particularly in the process of this hearing for yourself and your fellow officers and for the future welfare of the Navy, which is the great problem in this country in building up the confidence that it wants to command, by a freer and a franker approach to the aims of myself and other members of the committee it would do much to increase that confidence that I think we all want to establish.

[395] Senator Lucas. Is this going to be a lecture school, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Whatever it is, it will speak for itself.

Go ahead. Admiral, if you want to comment on that dissertation you are at liberty to do so.

Admiral Inglis. May I comment in full, sir?

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Maine has impugned my honesty and my motives. I resent that. I gave the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The point he has brought up about the Washington and North Carolina, and the other ships which had not joined the fleets was fully covered in a statement which I made yesterday afternoon. I said in that statement that, of course, you might count battleships or other ships which were still in the blueprint stage, you might count battleships or other ships still in the building ways, you might count battleships or other ships which had been launched but which had not been completed, you might count battleships or other ships which had been commissioned but had not joined the fleet, but I was counting the ships that had joined the fleet, and I thought I made that quite clear in my statement.

I have done my very best in this presentation to give all the facts to the best of my knowledge and ability. I [397] don't believe the Navy, and certainly not the organization, is attempting to withhold any evidence whatsoever. I repeatedly stated I was author-

1 Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program
ized for the Navy to state that we would produce any facts that we were asked to produce.

Senator Brewster. I think the record will speak for itself.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions, Senator?

Senator Brewster. No.

The Chairman. Does any other member of the committee wish to ask Admiral Inglis any questions?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask the colonel some questions.

Colonel, I show you the exhibit that is in evidence here, this map of the radar.

Colonel ThieLEN: Will you put the radar plot up, Captain Barnes?

Senator Ferguson. Was the chart that is on the board here made from the exhibit that you have?

Colonel ThieLEN. It was made from an exhibit which I believe was identical.

Senator Ferguson. Have you looked for the original charting done of the Opana station?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir; a radiogram was dispatched to the Hawaiian Department since the last meeting asking for the original plots from all radar stations on December 7, 1941.

Senator Ferguson. I show you a photostat that is exhibit 3-B in evidence, and I ask you what that is.

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 3-B in evidence where?

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, 3-B of what?

Senator Ferguson. The exhibit itself does not show, but I am of the opinion it is of the Army exhibits. Does counsel agree with that? I shall just identify it from the mark on the paper itself.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, just as a matter of information, I understood the Senator to say it was in evidence.

Senator Ferguson. I was reading what was on the sheet. That is on the sheet.

The Chairman. That was a part of the Army file which was yesterday put in evidence along with the Navy white folder.

Senator Ferguson. No, no.

Mr. Mitchell. Let me clear that up. The document which the Senator just produced is not in evidence in this hearing.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. I understood him referring to it as having been in evidence in some other investigation.

Senator Ferguson. I merely read off the identification numbers, what is on the blueprint itself. It is only for the purpose of identification. That expression I used is on the sheet itself.

The Chairman. If there is a memorandum on the sheet showing it is in evidence, it ought to show in what proceeding it is in evidence.

Senator Ferguson. It does not show that. I would like to make that clear for the record. Will the colonel read what is on the corner of the sheet so the record will be clear?

Colonel ThieLEN. I see the statement "Exhibit 3-B in evidence."

Senator Ferguson. That is exactly what I read. That is for identification purposes.

Have you examined it?

Colonel ThieLEN. For the first time now.
Senator Ferguson. Will you compare it with the board and with
the exhibit now in evidence?
Colonel Thielen. I have compared it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Are they alike?
Colonel Thielen. Exhibit 3-B, so-called, appears to include the
information on the board.
Senator Ferguson. That is not what I asked you. Are they alike?
The Chairman. Let the witness explain in what particular they
differ, if they do differ.
[400] Senator Ferguson. Cannot I have an answer to my ques-
tion first? Are they alike?
The Chairman. He was in the process of answering your question,
Senator, when you interrupted.
Go ahead and give your answer.
Colonel Thielen. The exhibit 3-B in evidence, so-called, appears
to include the plots referred to on the board and on the exhibit which
you handed me previously, sir, and in addition appears to have other
plots which were made later in the day.
Senator Ferguson. Now will you tell us how they differ? Will
you give us all that is on the exhibit that I gave you this morning,
exhibit 3-B in evidence, the way it is marked?
Colonel Thielen. It contains numerous additional plots.
[401] Senator Ferguson. Will you give them to us?
Colonel Thielen. It would be very difficult to do that orally, sir.
I see pips and plots all over the area.
Senator Ferguson. You mean to say you cannot give us any of
them? Are your eyes not able to read them?
Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir. I start up in the upper left-hand
corner and I see a spot—
Senator Ferguson. What is the time marking?
Colonel Thielen. 10:3—and the final digit is illegible. Below
that is 10:35. Below that is 10, and then illegible and the digit 3.
Below that is 10:30. Below that is 10:2 and an illegible digit. Be-
low that is 10:27 and an illegible digit. About an inch below that
is a spot with illegible digits. Below that about a half inch is a
spot 10:31.
Senator Ferguson. Now, are not they illegible just simply because
the photostat is not clear?
Colonel Thielen. I believe that is true, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right, go ahead.
Colonel Thielen. That appears to conclude that plot of the 10:00
series.
Senator Ferguson. Give us the other plots.
Colonel Thielen. Which are you referring to?
Senator Ferguson. On the map, that is not on the one  [402]
shown to us.
Colonel Thielen. About 3 inches due north of Kaena Point, I find
a single spot, and to the southeast is a dotted line, about an inch,
and another spot surrounded by numerals, some of them illegible, one
of which I make out as 7:50 or 7:56.
Senator Ferguson. They are to the left of what is on the chart
here, 7:39?
Colonel Thielen. It would be in the neighborhood of a point
on the chart marked 6:59.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel ThieLEN. Below the broad arrow.

Senator Ferguson. What is the mark on this chart I gave you? 6:30?

Colonel ThieLEN. I read 7:50 here.

Senator Ferguson. 7:50.

Colonel ThieLEN. There is no indication, however, that that is the same plot as the one on the board.

Senator Ferguson. Now what else is on that chart that is not on the one on the board?

Colonel ThieLEN. There are—

Senator Ferguson (interposing). I am talking about the Opana chart, 3-B in evidence, so marked.

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, this is marked "Opana" down in [403] the lower left-hand corner. Out to the east-northeast—or west-northwest of Kaena Point is a series—I should estimate the distance on this scale of about 50 miles—is a series of arrows pointing out spots, no one of which, as near as I can make out, has a time indicated on it. South of that, in the general area off the Hawaiian coast of the island are a number of white dots which may be caused by faults in the photostat, or may be plots.

Senator Ferguson. Just there it is very important then to get all of the facts that we should have the original instrument and not be depending upon a photostat which can be so defective that you cannot read it; is that right?

Colonel ThieLEN. Since the last meeting, sir, the War Department has dispatched a radiogram to the Hawaiian Department asking for the originals of the plots of all stations on December 7, 1941.

[404] Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us why you produced the plot you did and did not give us the one in the Army board records? I understood the evidence was to be evidence not disputed, that you were to bring in. How do you account for that?

Colonel ThieLEN. For one thing, sir, this appears to include all plots made during the day and not those made during the attack, with which I was dealing.

Senator Ferguson. Why did you bring in your 10:39 then?

Colonel ThieLEN. Because that occurs on Exhibit 4, which I clearly specified was the one from which I had taken the chart.

Senator Ferguson. Is not Exhibit 4 a plot made up by an individual and not the original evidence?

Colonel ThieLEN. Both plots are authenticated by Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

Senator Ferguson. I ask you whether the one I gave you, 3-B, the Opana photostat, is not purporting to be from an original?

Colonel ThieLEN. That appears to be, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I show you another photostat, exhibit 3-A in evidence—and I take it for granted that means it was in evidence at the Army board, and I just use that for identification purposes—and ask you if you [405] ever saw that?

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir. I have not only seen that but I have had it reproduced as an Army exhibit on page 8.

Senator Ferguson. That one is reproduced. Did you use that information on the chart that you gave us?
Colonel ThieLEN. Not on the chart of the Opana station, sir, because
the chart to which you have last referred is not the chart of the Opana
station.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you to read the notes down in the
corner and see whether part of it is not of the Opana station.

Colonel ThieLEN. This says:

Detector station records at Kaena, Opana, Kaala, Shafter, Kokohead on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, prior to 7:00 a.m.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think we only wanted, in your verbal
evidence here, the Opana station?

Colonel ThieLEN. As I pointed out, Senator, the chart to which
you refer was offered in evidence as Army exhibit, page 8.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that. Why did not you include the
showings on this map?

Colonel ThieLEN. The only significance I see in this chart is that it
confirms the plots earlier in the day of the Opana station, indicating
that that station was tracking [406] correctly.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we understand then that we have received
here on the board a corrected chart?

Colonel ThieLEN. By no means.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you to look at page 116, that you
gave me the other day as the page from which you got the evidence on
this radar, about what Elliott was doing. Do you find anything on
that? That is the Roberts evidence. You gave me page 116 as the
report as I told you I could not find it in the report because the report
did not have so many pages and then you said it was in the evidence.

Now I show you page 116 of the evidence and ask you if you find
anything on that?

Colonel ThieLEN. I will check my documentation on that, sir. It is
to entirely possible that my documentation is incorrect; but I read them
correctly. It is exhibit S of the Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of
Private McDonald.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got the affidavit of Private McDon-
ald?

Colonel ThieLEN. It is in the files of the War Department; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How could he give what Elliott was doing when
he was the telephone operator down at the center? Why would you
rely upon his affidavit?

[407] Colonel ThieLEN. Let me check that to see just what that
referred to, sir. I see that that evidence refers to the location of the
aircraft as picked up by Private Elliott and Private Lockard, which
was presumably reported to Private McDonald.

Senator FERGUSON. Now might I inquire from counsel whether or
not they have the affidavit in the Roberts report?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I haven’t them in court this minute.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you whether you have them.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have the Roberts record, if that is what you
mean, all the exhibits in the War and Navy that the Roberts commis-
sion is presumed to have had.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel try and locate that affidavit for
the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. My chief assistant suggested that you may have the
Roberts record. We were passing these things out.
Senator Ferguson. I do not have the affidavit. I did not know there were any affidavits until the witness has been giving affidavits.

Mr. Mitchell. We will look up our records and see who has that information. What is it exactly you want, Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson. I want the affidavit in the Roberts investigation.

Mr. Mitchell. All the affidavits?

[408] Senator Ferguson. All the affidavits in the Roberts investigation.

Colonel ThieLEN. I learn that my citation in my document was incorrect originally, page 116. I should have cited volume 2 of the Roberts report, pages 66 and 67, General Short’s testimony, as to the facts mentioned.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now on this map that you have given us the Opana station shows 6:45, 6:48, 6:50, 6:51, 6:58, 6:48, 6:51, 6:52, and 6:59.

Now referring to the testimony of Elliott on page 997, transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on Thursday, August 17, 1944, and reading back one question:

General Frank. What I am trying to ascertain is whether on the morning of December 7 there was more activity than usual or whether there was less activity than usual, or was it average?

Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, during our problem on Sunday there was practically no activity at all.

General Frank. Prior to this time?

Sergeant Elliott. Prior to 7 o’clock; yes, sir. We had no plots to send in to our information center and had no targets.

Now how do you reconcile that evidence with what you are giving the committee? I show you the original.

Colonel ThieLEN. I consider this evidence of the plot [409] authenticated by a signal officer responsible at this station to be evidence that is worthy of being presented to the committee, under my directive of giving them the facts, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Over and above the sworn testimony of the man who did the charting, is that correct?

Colonel ThieLEN. There is no evidence that he was on the set at that particular time.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about Elliott.

Colonel ThieLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Are we then going to get from the Army the conclusions of some officers later on and not the eyewitnesses to these facts? Is that what we are getting here?

Mr. Mitchell. That is a question for counsel, I think.

Senator Ferguson. I am asking the witness.

The Chairman. The witness cannot answer what we are going to get hereafter. As everybody has been advised, Mr. Lockard and Mr. Tyler are both on the list of witnesses. They were in charge, making these records, and certainly their testimony will be produced here.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I correct my statement, but I cannot speak for the future. I am talking about what we did get.

Is that correct, that it was the conclusions of officers rather than the testimony of eyewitnesses?

[410] Colonel ThieLEN. I see no conclusion in what purports to be and is authenticated as the record of the plots of the Opana station.

Senator Ferguson. You do not see any—

Colonel ThieLEN. I do not say it is a conclusion to reproduce a plot.
Senator Ferguson. Where the witness himself, who made the chart, says there were no other targets that morning, in the statement, and you bring in the conclusion of an officer that there were?

Colonel Thielen. I do not consider it a conclusion, sir. It is a plot.

Senator Ferguson. What is it?

Colonel Thielen. It is a written record, sir. It is a plot.

Senator Ferguson. Who made it?

Colonel Thielen. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

Senator Ferguson. What did he make it from? Did he make it from the one I gave you?

Colonel Thielen. From the records of the Opana station. I cannot say what he saw when he made this record.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for two records of that station then?

Colonel Thielen. One of them covers the entire day, sir, and one covers the critical period.

Senator Ferguson. How could the one that followed, that covered the entire day, be any different than the one that gave them the exact period, and that is up to 7:39?

Colonel Thielen. In what way, sir?

Senator Ferguson. How could they differ? The one that covered all day, how could it be different from the one that covered it up to 7:39? I take it the 7:39 chart up to that point, would be complete up to that time, would it not?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir, that would be the supposition.

Senator Ferguson. Then it would not have any thing on that was not on this chart. Now where do you get this 6:50 and 6:45, if this man who made the chart said he did not have any other targets on that day?

Colonel Thielen. Where do I get it, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Thielen. I get it from the so-called historic plot.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now will you give us when the first bomb was dropped again?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman suspend a minute until I can look at the report and the exhibit on which he questioned the witness?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Will you pass them over, please?

The Chairman. Will we have to suspend in order to do that?

Mr. Murphy. No; I just made the request.

Senator Ferguson. I want them back. I have some other questions.

Mr. Murphy. All right, in just a minute.

The Chairman. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read my last question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson. What do your records show?

Colonel Thielen. The observers at Hickam Field saw aircraft at 7:55 a.m. and the attack was initiated immediately, presumably the first bomb dropped within a matter of seconds after 7:55 a.m.
Senator Ferguson. 7:55 a.m. All right. How do you account for the planes that came in at 7:39 to 7:55? How do you account for their action from 7:39 to 7:55?

Colonel Thielen. Well, I am not prepared to state positively that those planes appearing at 7:39 off Kahuku Point were the planes that appeared at Hickam Field at 7:55.

Senator Ferguson. How far is the point 7:39 from Hickam Field?

Colonel Thielen. I should estimate that at approximately 60 miles. [413]

Senator Ferguson. About 60 miles. Do you know what Elliott said about how far he followed these planes in? Fifteen to twenty miles, did not he say?

Colonel Thielen. I do not recall.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the radar was doing at that time?

Colonel Thielen. What the radar was doing, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Thielen. I do not believe I understand the question, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?

Colonel Thielen. I understood the words sir, but not the intent. I do not understand what is wanted.

Senator Ferguson. Read the question.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how the radar would function at that time?

Colonel Thielen. How it would function?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, whether it would take it 15 or 20 miles from the radar itself.

Colonel Thielen. No, sir. I know that the lobe, so-called, sent out by the radar, behaves very erratically. I am not technically qualified to state how it would behave at that short range.

[414] Senator Ferguson. Have you examined Lockard’s or Elliott’s testimony about these targets before 7:02, during their so-called, as you call it, regular shift?

Colonel Thielen. I did not direct their attention specifically to that; no, sir. They have unquestionably read that testimony in researching this particular phase.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, instead of what the testimony shows you gave us a plot that was made up by Colonel Murphy.

Colonel Thielen. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. That is the way you leave the record, and that is the way it stands, is it not?

Colonel Thielen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just one observation.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. On Exhibit No. 4 which was offered in evidence there is a statement “Record of early flights December 7, 1941, obtained by Opana detector”, and then the signature of Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

On the exhibit which the gentleman from Michigan questioned the witness about there is a notification “Opana detector” and then some word that is illegible, “Record of early flights”, [415] and then a notation which would seem to bear the initials of some other witness.
So this record, Exhibit 4, is of the early flights, and this other notation by someone else appears not to be on the record in question, and I wish the witness would find out what the last of this notation on the lower right-hand corner of exhibit 3-B is, so we might see what the difference between the two exhibits is.

Colonel Thielen. I will endeavor to find that out, sir. I learned that my researchers are familiar with that, consulted radar experts on it, and determined that it was generally illegible.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Any further questions?

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for information from Admiral Inglis? He has been very accommodating up to now. I want to follow up the naval strength in both the Pacific and Atlantic.

I have in my hands a rough draft of what I would like to see in the record in the form of a chart. It asks for the strength of the German Navy as of May 1, additions from the then Vichy France, the Italian strength, and for the augmentation from Axis, Allies, or from other sources.

Then, in the last column, the total naval strength from all sources in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

I ask for that same information as of December 7, 1941.

Then, information to the same effect of Japanese strength as of May 1, 1941, and as of December 7, 1941, in the Pacific, and for American strength in the Pacific with Allied augmentation both in respect to the Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet.

If you can have that prepared, Admiral, and insert it in the record of today's proceedings, I would appreciate it very much. But if that is too short a time, I hope you can get it in by Monday.

Mr. Mitchell. We will hand it to the Navy Department.1 Admiral Inglis. We can have it ready for you by Monday. I am afraid we cannot by today.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you concluded, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I ask now to put into evidence these two exhibits that I handed to the witness for identification, and I ask now that they be part of the record.

Mr. Counsel, will you tell us what numbers they will be?

Mr. Mitchell. I will mark them as soon as I have them.

Senator Ferguson. So they will get the correct numbers.

Mr. Gesell. One of them is already in evidence.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want them both? We already have one.

Senator Ferguson. Just the large one.

Mr. Mitchell. At the request of Senator Ferguson, the document he has produced, which for identification has on it the words "Exhibit 3-B in evidence," apparently from some earlier proceedings, is now marked Exhibit 7, and offered in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7.")

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, in fairness to myself, as a member of the committee, I just simply want to say I do not share the views expressed or the remarks made to the admiral who has been

---

1 Admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 86.
appearing before us as a witness. I think both of these gentlemen have acquitted themselves with great credit and distinction, and are a distinct credit to the great services they represent.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed now with anything further he has.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to make a statement along the same line as Mr. Cooper.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me suggest that these two witnesses will be here for a while longer and at the conclusion of their testimony, it might be appropriate to have a testimonial meeting with respect to the opinions of the committee with regard to this very testimony.

Senator LUCAS. I want to be the first one to testify when the testimonial meeting starts.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to join in that too.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman wants to be in that too. Go ahead.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Inglis, one question. You spoke about Jap submarines entering Pearl Harbor. Are you referring to the midget submarines, so-called?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Not the large seagoing submarines?

Admiral Inglis. Not the large seagoing submarines; no, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. As to those midget submarines, what does the record show as to how many men were in the crew?

Admiral Inglis. I believe they were manned by a crew of two men—that is, two persons, I should say.

Mr. Mitchell. A very small vessel?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, I ask you if you have brought here, at my request, all of the documents in the Navy from Japanese sources relating to the Japanese account of the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis. Substantially everything except the communication intelligence material which I believe counsel has from other sources and not from me.

The CHAIRMAN. A little louder. We could not hear the last remark.

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Mitchell. I do not understand, I thought you produced here all of the material from Jap sources which have made any disclosure as to what they did in respect to this attack.

Admiral Inglis. I wanted to be quite meticulous.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the espionage documents, do you?

Admiral Inglis. I mean the material you referred to as cryptic analytical.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. I think you have that. You did not get it from me.

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. Now, let us look at this material and see what it is. I hand you a bundle of loose sheets in the Japanese language. What is that?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does the record show clearly when counsel received these papers? Have you made clear on the record when you received these papers, counsel?

Mr. Mitchell. I think I received these original documents within the last 24 hours.
Senator Ferguson. About when did you get them?

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the exact hour?

Senator Ferguson. When? There are two sets of them and I would just like to know when counsel got them.

Mr. Mitchell. My assistants says these documents reached me approximately 2 p. m. yesterday afternoon.

Senator Ferguson. Two p. m. yesterday afternoon.

Has counsel had time to examine each one of them?

Mr. Mitchell. We went over them in a rough way. I have not spent much time on this document in the Japanese language, but we thought we would get back to the original source here.

Senator Ferguson. Did they give you translations?

Mr. Mitchell. They are in the papers here.

Senator Ferguson. They are among the papers?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. May I ask him about what these are, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I do not know.

Mr. Mitchell. I want you to know.

What is this document, this bundle of photostats here in the Japanese language? Will you state generally what that is?

Admiral Inglis. There are photostat copies of two documents in the Japanese language which my translators inform me are Japanese top secret operation orders No. 1 and No. 2.

Mr. Mitchell. That is a staff plan, do you mean, a staff order?

Admiral Inglis. It is a plan and an order, in effect.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you look over these other documents and just generally describe what they are.

Admiral Inglis. This first one I have is a translation of a captured document; the title is "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences Off Hawaii."

Senator Ferguson. Could I inquire from counsel when counsel requested these documents from the Navy?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think these particular documents I asked him to bring in here sometime yesterday, because I understood the committee wanted all the original material on which any testimony was based.

Senator Ferguson. I understand it has not been requested by counsel prior to yesterday.

Mr. Mitchell. We had the operational order in English, the translation of it, but I did not have the Japanese rendition, if that is what you mean. I had a translation of it for some days, I think.

Senator Lucas. You should have translated them right, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell. I could not swear to that.

Senator Lucas. I know there are going to be a lot of questions about that.

Mr. Mitchell. I do not suppose anybody can settle that question. Will you go on, Admiral—if I may proceed uninterruptedly.

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead, gentlemen.

Admiral Inglis. Are you ready, sir?

Mr. Mitchell. All right. Go head.

Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the date on that is January 12, 1941.

The next document that I have is dated March 2, 1943. The subject is Kuboaki, Takeo. That is obviously the name of a Japanese. "Superior class engineer petty officer, interrogation of." That is the subject.

[424] The next document that I have is entitled "Japanese Submarine Operations at Pearl Harbor." This is an evaluation prepared by intelligence officers.

Mr. KEFFE. Jap intelligence officers?
Admiral INGLIS. United States intelligence officers.

The next document is entitled "Intelligence Report". The subject is "Japan Navy submarines." The date on this is April 22. The year is not given. It might be deduced, however, that the year is 1944.

The next document is 16 August 1943. It is marked "Interrogation Report No. 148 of Yokota, S." Yokota is the family name and S the initial of the given name.

The next document is entitled "United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944."

The next document is dated 30 June 1943. The subject is "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 472, Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii.

"ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 473, Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai."

"ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 474, Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands."

The next document is dated 25 July 1945, Translation [425] No. 290. Subject, "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti, Iki", Kuramoti being the family name and Iki the given name.

The next document is a translation of combined fleet top secret operation order No. 1.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that a translation of the Jap script we have here, or is supposed to be?
Admiral INGLIS. This is a translation of the Japanese script. I am informed by my translators that there are a few corrections which they feel should be made in this document here, and those corrections will be produced at the proper time.

We haven't got the photostatic copies now.

The next document is entitled, "Enemy Lists of Sorties by Subcarried Planes." There is no date on this. Its precise source is not indicated.

The next document is a memorandum dated October 13, 1945, addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps. The subject is "Prewar Espionage in the Hawaiian Island," and it pertains to an interview with Yoshio Shiga, lieutenant commander, Imperial Japanese Navy. In this case Yoshio is the given name and Shiga is the family name. That memorandum is signed by Robert N. Tate, special agent of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, attached to the Four Hundred Ninety-sixth CIC Detachment of the Fifth Marine Division, and contains several endorsements through official channels, showing its [426]
receipt in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations yesterday, November 16. I believe counsel ought to have the copy, which is not included in these papers, of reports submitted by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, from headquarters at Tokyo.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. At this point I will read into the record a paraphrase of a message dated October 6, 1945, from the Secretary of War to General MacArthur, as follows:

The War Department has been requested to provide the joint congressional committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack with information concerning the attack available in Japanese files and records, to include Japanese agencies involved or informed of plans, date the attack was first planned, sources and nature of information on which plans and operation based, details of plans as they developed, composition of attack force, Japanese losses, routes followed by attack force before and after attack, and Japanese knowledge of damage inflicted. Request suitable measures be taken to obtain above information. Advise by cable information now available, steps open to you to obtain desired material with estimate of time required, summary of additional information as available. Air mail pertinent documents.

Now in response to that message the War Department has produced three documents: One, cables from General MacArthur, dated the 14th of October—this is a preliminary report—and a further detailed report dated October 26, 1945.

Then you just spoke of another one. That last one came in last night, that was a Navy report, is that right?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That came from the Marines through Navy channels.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you had this report from General MacArthur's headquarters in this message before you?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And examined that?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now the War Department handed me last night, or early this morning, another message from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. That means General MacArthur, Tokyo. That is dated November 8, 1945. Have you examined that?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, we have also examined that.

Mr. Mitchell. How would you classify this material, as to the type of material it is? First there is an operational order and other captured documents from the Japs, is that it?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Then you have also a number of documents recording interviews of captured Japanese prisoners?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

[428] Mr. Mitchell. Then you have the report from General MacArthur?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, and those are interviews of Japanese officers who were not in the status of prisoners of war.

Mr. Mitchell. Is there anything else in that file that is classified in a different way, that you can think of?

Admiral Inglis. The only remaining item is the report which originated with the Marine detachment and which was forwarded through Navy channels, and that is largely the interrogation of Lieutenant Commander Shiga, Imperial Japanese Navy.

Mr. Mitchell. Is not he a prisoner of war?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; he is in more or less the same category as the others, an officer who was interviewed after VJ-day.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the document that came in last night, isn't it?

Admiral Inglis. That is the document that came in last night.

Mr. Mitchell. Now previous to the receipt of that document, and the one of November 8 from General MacArthur, have you prepared a summary digest of these documents?

Admiral Inglis. I had, sir. I would like to add to my [429] answer to your former question that this last document which has just been presented, the one that was received last night——

Mr. Mitchell. By the Navy?

Admiral Inglis. Through Navy sources, through Navy channels—also contains an endorsement, or rather a carbon copy of an endorse- ment from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, which pertains to some investigations we have made out there, in an effort to corroborate or contradict some of the testimony of this Lieutenant Commander Shiga.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, since the receipt of these last two documents that came through Navy sources and Army sources within the last few hours, have you gone through them to see whether your digest requires any additions?

Admiral Inglis. I have, sir; and it does require some substantial changes and additions.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you made those?

Admiral Inglis. I have, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You had to do that last night and this morning, is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And you have already put in motion mimeographic machines so that copies of them may be supplied?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now I would like to ask the Admiral if [430] you will please give your digest of these original documents that you have there.

Admiral Inglis. I would like to say, first of all, that throughout this presentation which is to follow, the dates will be expressed in Japanese time. Thus the date of the attack will be given as December 8, which is Japanese time, rather than December 7, which is Hawaiian time. Wherever I deviate from that practice I will specifically so state, as I proceed.

With respect to that difference, we should add 19½ hours to Honolulu time in order to get Tokyo time; we should add 5½ hours to Honolulu time in order to get Washington time, and we should add 14 hours to Washington time in order to get Tokyo time.

I would also like to make the preliminary comment that some of the phraseology used in this presentation may sound a little strange to American ears. That is because of peculiar Japanese usage, where the Japanese are directly quoted.

The first item concerns the formulation of the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is reported that a surprise attack——

Mr. Mitchell (interposing). When you say "it is reported" you mean it is disclosed in these documents? Is that what you mean?

[431] Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That expression
it is reported” is used advisedly, to indicate that it has not been confirmed by other sources, and we cannot guarantee its accuracy. All we have is the report.

Mr. Mitchell. You are not guaranteeing the Japs?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

[432] It is reported that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was originally conceived and proposed in the first part of January 1941 by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief combined fleet, who, at that time, ordered Rear Adm. Takihiro Onishi, then chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. In the latter part of August 1941, Admiral Yamamoto ordered all fleet commanders and other key staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminary to a final formulation of operation plans for a Pacific campaign which included a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A war plans conference was held continuously at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to September 13. On September 13 an outline containing essential points of a basic operation order, which was later to be issued as Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, was completed. This operation order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force commanders on November 5, 1941. Therefore, this date, November 5, 1941, is to be regarded as the date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed.

Operation order No. 1 under heading of “Preparations for the Outbreak of War” states that—

When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be [433] issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for commencement of operations and announcing “First Preparations for War.”

That completes that quotation.

The operation order continues to say that—

The time for the Outbreak of War (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters Order.

The details of the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as set forth in operation order No. 1, were worked out by members of the naval general staff operations section, combined fleet operations staff and first air fleet operations staff.

III. Determination of December 8 as day of attack; under date of November 7, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued combined fleet top secret operation order No. 2 saying “First preparations for war. Y-day will be December 8.” In accordance with the definition of Y-day as given in operation order No. 1, this establishes December 8 only as the approximate date for commencement of operations. An Imperial naval order issued from the Imperial general headquarters under date of December 2, 1941 states:

The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on 8 December.

This order is in effect the announcement of X-day as defined in operation order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative approximate date for the attack [434] selected on November 7 and defined as Y-day is reaffirmed on December 2 as X-day. In other words, the original tentative date—Y-day—and the final precise date—X-day—are in fact the same date.

Mr. Mitchell. That is December 7, our time?

Admiral Inglis. The date of attack is December 7.
Mr. Mitchell. You explained in the beginning that Japanese times were given, but to just point it up. I am asking if that December 8 was December 7 Honolulu time.

Admiral Inglis. That is correct. Unless I make some parenthetical, all times will be Tokyo time.

To repeat, in other words, the original tentative date—Y-day—and the final precise date—X-day—are, in fact, the same date.

In discussions prior to November 7, the Imperial headquarters navy section generally recognized December 8 as suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the combined fleet. For a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area in December, the 10th would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon.

Mr. Mitchell. That you are taking from the documents; it is Japanese opinion?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct. This is all oriented to the Japanese point of view.

However, it was expected that the United States Pacific Fleet, in accordance with its custom during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday and leave on Monday—Hawaiian dates.

That is Friday and Monday, Hawaiian dates.

Therefore, Sunday—Hawaiian date—was decided on. In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the attacking planes was to be set as near to dawn as possible—approximately 1 hour after sunrise.

Here I come to the deviation from the original script.

Mr. Mitchell. A deviation resulting from these last documents?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct.

The following statement is made by a Japanese officer pilot who participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor:

On October 5, 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers, aboard the Akeji in Shibushi Bay, by the chief of staff of the carriers, Rear Admiral Rynosuke Kosaka. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly, that on “December 1941 (Japan time), a Japanese naval air force would strike the American Fleet at Hawaii.” Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoruku Yamamoto, also addressed the group, saying that, “Although Japan never wanted to fight the United States, they were forced to because they would be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to China and its oil embargo. The United States Fleet,” he said, “was Japan’s strongest enemy, so if they could strike it unexpectedly at Hawaii it would be 2 or 3 months before it could maneuver. By that time occupation of Borneo, the Philippines, Singapore, Java, and Sumatra would be complete.”

The next title has to do with the date of leaving port.

It is reported that on or about November 14 CINC of the combined fleet ordered the units of the Pearl Harbor attacking force to assemble in Hitokappu Bay.

Commander Biard, will you point to Hitokappu Bay? That is the Island of Etorofu.

It is further reported that about November 21 the situation seemed to be approaching a stage where commencement of hostilities were inevitable. The navy section of the Imperial general headquarters therefore issued the following order:

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet the situation promptly.
I would like to say at this time that upon introducing the subject of "Date of leaving port," I went back to the original script as prepared a few days ago.

On November 25 the commander in chief, combined fleet, issued the following order to the striking force, which had, since November 22, been assembled at Hitokappu Bay.

(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first aid raid is planned for dawn of X-day—exact date to be given by later order.

Upon completion of the air raid the task force, keeping close coordination and guarding against enemy counter attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan.

(b) Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases. [438]

(c) The task force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of November 26 and advance to 42° N. and 170° E.—standing by position—on the afternoon of December 4, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling.

Commander Biard, will you point to that position?

The actual time of departure was 9:00 a. m., November 26, Japan time—1:30 p. m., November 25, Hawaii time.

V. Date of instructions to execute plan: Combined fleet top secret operation order No. 2, issued by Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the combined fleet, and dated November 7, 1941 is the basic order or instruction to execute the detailed plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

On December 1 the Cabinet Council approved the commencement of hostilities against the United States. On the same day, an Imperial naval order issued on instruction by the Imperial general headquarters stated:

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a position (sic) to declare war on the United States of America.

On December 2 an Imperial naval order issued under instruction from the Imperial general headquarters stated:

The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on December 8.

There is no copy of this order available nor is there conclusive evidence that [439] it constitutes the formal X-day order referred to in operations order No. 1. Its effect, however, is clearly equivalent to the final determination of a specific time for the outbreak of the war, and it may be regarded therefore as a final determination of X-day.

VI. Details of plan: Hitokappu Bay was selected as the point of departure from Japan because it was recognized as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new developments in the situation as well as to keep its location and movements secret.

In formulating final plans, it was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships in Pearl Harbor was the most effective method.

1 See p. 205, infra, for correction by Adm. Inglis.
of putting the main strength of the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaii area out of action for a long period of time. The following two obstacles were considered:

(a) The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow.
(b) The fact that Pearl Harbor was probably equipped with torpedoes.

In regard to point (a) it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.

In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

I must deviate again from the text prepared the other day and refer to this last source received just yesterday.

Evidence indicates that as late as 29 November—Japan time—the Japanese force expected to find six United States carriers in Hawaiian waters; they were aware that the U. S. S. Saratoga was, in late November, on the west coast of the United States and also that the U. S. S. Enterprise would be "two or three days out of the attack." On 31 November, Japan time, when the striking force was well out to sea, it received a report that only one or two carriers were in Pearl Harbor. On December 6, Japan time, word was received that no carriers were in Pearl Harbor, but that 8 battleships and 15 cruisers were in the harbor. At a briefing, which took place on or about December 5, Japan time, each pilot was furnished a photograph of a map of Pearl Harbor on which each pilot made notes on courses, anchorage areas, or missions.

Now I return to the script of 2 or 3 days ago.

Three courses were considered for the Hawaii operation: The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following the Hawaiian Islands, and a southern route passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the south.

[441] Commander Biard, would you roughly indicate those three routes?

That would be the northern route (following Commander Biard’s pointer), that would be the central route, through the Mandated Islands and the Hawaiian chain and the southern group just out of the Mandated Islands, up to Hawaii.

On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy, United States, patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were important. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages were generally just the opposite to those of the northern route. Although it may be assumed that the central and southern routes would be preferable for the purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes lie near Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston Islands, and so forth. Consequently, it was hardly expected that a surprise attack could be made. The ability to refuel and the necessity of surprise were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed, the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be as [442] sured by Japanese strength alone. Therefore, the northern route was selected.
By routing the striking force to pass between Midway and the Aleutians, it was expected to pass outside the patrol zones of United States patrol planes. Moreover, screening destroyers were sent ahead of the fleet, and in the event any vessels were encountered the main body of the force would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection. If the striking force had been detected prior to X-2-day, it was planned to have the force return without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1-day, the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions. If the attack had failed, it was planned to send the main force in the Island Sea out to the Pacific in order to bring in the task force.

I would like to remark again, that this is Japanese phraseology and may appear a little strange in its reasoning processes.

Returning now to the prepared script, item 7 is entitled "Sources of data used in planning the Pearl Harbor attack were as follows."

These sources—I am speaking now from the point of view of the Japanese—were:

(A) American public broadcasts from Hawaii.
(B) Reports of Japanese naval attachés in Washington, D. C.
(C) Reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack. A Japanese pilot states that at no time were visual land signals used from Hawaii.
(D) Information obtained from ships which had called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.

Those are the only four sources which the Japanese have admitted. We know, however, that there is a fifth source:
(E) Espionage network in Hawaiian Islands, being uncensored cable communications with Japan.

That last is from an American source, not from the Japanese source. Mr. Keefe. Under (C), with respect to signals, I didn't quite catch that. It doesn't appear here.

Admiral Inglis. I beg your pardon. I am glad you brought that up. That last sentence "a Japanese pilot states" came from this last source which we just received last night. That was a change in the script.

Mr. Keefe. That will be included in the mimeographed corrected statement which we will receive later?

Admiral Inglis. That is right.

The Vice Chairman. And that goes under what?

Admiral Inglis. Under source (C).

Now, again I must deviate from the original script and quote this last document which was just received yesterday.

A Japanese officer pilot has reported his belief "that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a Honolulu commercial broadcasting station." Source was certain "that there was a Hawaiian Nisei"—a second-generation American of Japanese descent—"who was a Japanese naval officer, aboard the flagship Akagi, whose specific job was listening to these broadcasts and decoding them." Source said "that in his opinion the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast the German attaché lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left Pearl Harbor. If the German attaché wanted a cook or houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor."

Source states "that the information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6:30 a. m., 12 noon, and 7 p. m. He was prone to think that time following the 7 p. m. broadcast was
used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information concerning a whole day's activities.

[445] I would like to say at this time that the endorsement which the authorities at Hawaii, the FBI, ONI, and MIS, have placed on this last document indicates that they cannot find any substantiation for this plan to use Honolulu commercial broadcasting stations to convey information to the Japanese task force. They also pointed out that this procedure would not have been necessary since the Japanese consul, who was the center of the espionage network, had full access to a direct connection via cable uncensored directly from Honolulu to Tokyo.

That completes the deviation from the original script, and I return now to item 8, which is "Details of execution."

[446] VIII. Details of execution: Study of the Japanese plan of operation indicates the Japanese high command made the following assumptions with regard to the United States Fleet:

(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Sunday, Hawaii time.

(b) That a carrier force could be moved from home waters across the Pacific to within striking distance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive reconnaissance.

(c) That should assumptions (a) or (b) be in error, a reserve group of heavy naval units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement with the American Fleet. The other task forces of the Japanese Fleet (southern force, northern force, and the south seas force) would be available for this purpose. Implied in the plan is the assumption that, in the event of such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of available Japanese major fleet units would be sufficient to defeat the American Fleet.

(d) A powerful carrier air strike directed against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effected, achieve the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet; that such a strike would achieve also the destruction of American land-based air power and thus permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage.

The omission from the Japanese plans of provision for landings on Oahu was decided upon during discussions held on September 6 and 7 when operation order No. 1 was being put together. It was decided that no landing operation should be included because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities; it was further recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could be accomplished without detection; it was further recognized that insuperable logistic problems rendered landings on the island impractical.

The complete plan of the Pearl Harbor attack was known in advance to members of the Navy General Staff, the commanders in chief and Chiefs of Staff, and staff members of the combined fleet headquarters and first air fleet headquarters. Part of the plan was known in advance to the Navy Minister, Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking naval officers.
It is also reported—again I use that expression advisedly—it is also reported that the Emperor knew in advance only the general outline of the plan and that none of the Japanese officials who were in the United States, including Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, knew anything about the plan in advance.

Parenthetically again, that last sentence, referring to the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the Emperor and Nomura and Kurusu, is only based on a single report purely from recollection of a Japanese officer.

The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, were predicated on the desire for military conquest, security, and enhancement of the Empire by occupation of areas rich in natural resources. With regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, operation order No. 1 says that:

In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation, and supply lines to the Orient, will be out. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight.

Since the American Fleet and air power based in the Hawaiian area were the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built around a carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting a successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the following allocation of forces for the Pearl Harbor attack was made:

Refer now, please, to item 17 in the Navy folder, which gives the composition of the forces in some detail. I will summarize by saying that it consisted of:

Striking force: Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo.

BatDiv 3 (1st Section) (Hiei, Kirishima), 2 BB.
CarDiv 1 (Kaga) (Akagi).
CarDiv 2 (Hiryu, Soryu).
CarDiv 5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku), 6 CV.
CruDiv 8 (Tone, Chikuma), 2 CA.
DesRon 1 (Abukuma, 4 DesDivs), 1 CL, 16 DD.
11 train vessels.

ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi Shimizu.

Isuzu, Yura, 2 CL.
Katori, 1 CL–T.
I-class submarines (including SubRons 1, 2, 3), 20 SS.
(I–1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22–24, 68, 69, 74)
Midget submarines, 5 M–SS.
6 train vessels.

Of the 11 train vessels allotted to the striking force only 3 tankers and 1 supply ship actually accompanied the force. In addition, 3 submarines of the advance expeditionary force accompanied the striking force, the other submarines having proceeded from the Inland Sea independently of the striking force.

The striking force departed Hitokappu Bay at 9 a. m., November 26, and in accordance with orders from CinC Combined Fleet, proceeded to its destination 200 miles due north of Oahu. It was fueled en route.
At this time I would like to pause to advise the committee that the reproduction of this chart to which Commander Biard is pointing is included in the Navy folder as item 18.

On leaving the harbor, the striking force was joined by three submarines which, with several of the destroyers, took station as scouting screen. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels and the need for fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots. Lookouts were posted but no searches or combat air patrols were flown. It had been anticipated that North Pacific weather would cause difficulty in refueling at sea and those ships whose capacity in relation to consumption was small were loaded with oil in drums for emergency use.

Now, off the script, the next paragraph is modified somewhat by this document which we just received yesterday through the naval channels.

The weather, however, proved uniformly calm, and fueling from the tankers was carried out as planned. A participating pilot states that the weather was foggy part of the time. On or about December 2, all ships were darkened and condition two (second degree of readiness; gun crews stationed) was set.

That condition of readiness was set about December 2.

On December 4, Japan time, the rendezvous point (42° W., 170° E.) was reached and the combat ships of the force fueled to capacity from the tankers, which were dropped that night. The task force then turned southeast, probably at increased speed. The carriers _Hiryu_ and _Soryu_, whose fuel capacity was small, had been oiled daily while in company with the tankers and now had to be fueled by bucket brigade from the oil drums taken on board. The cruise up to this date had been uneventful; no ships or planes had been sighted and no false alarms had been sounded. When the force was 800 miles due north of Hawaii, on December 6, Japan time, it received from the Japanese Navy Department a radio message "Climb Mount Niitaka"; this was the signal for the attack and the force proceeded south at 24 knots to its destination. On the night of the 7–8th of December, Japan time, the run in was made at top speed, 26 knots.

Again I would like to say that radio message concerning "Climb Mount Niitaka" was derived from this last source which we just received yesterday.

Returning now to the original script:

The problem of defeating enemy—United States—radio intelligence was met by a program of deceptive traffic—false assumption of call signs, padding of circuits, and so forth—to simulate the presence of a striking force, carriers and carrier air groups [453] in the Inland Sea. In contrast, no effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical observation of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy.

Again ad libbing, just to be sure that there is no misunderstanding, the movement southward that the Japanese are speaking of in this connection was a movement of other forces from Japanese Empire waters south toward the French-Indochina coast, and not the movement of the task force, the Japanese task force, from its position 400 miles north of Hawaii to its position 200 miles north of Hawaii.

Returning to the script:
Upon arrival at their destination, 200 miles due north of Oahu, the carriers of the striking force launched on schedule a total of 361 planes in three waves, commencing at 6 a. m. and ending at 7:15 a. m., December 7, Hawaii time.

I might add here at this point, which is not in either script, the note that I have: "It was planned that the force be protected during the attack by a combat patrol of 18 fighters to be launched about 0545—5:45. That, presumably, is in addition to the 361 planes forming the attack group.

Returning now to the script:

\[454\] The planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated attacks. In addition to the attack planes launched at this time, it was planned to launch two type Zero reconnaissance seaplanes to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage just before the attack.

I must deviate again from the script which was distributed 2 or 3 days ago and say that from the source just received yesterday we derived this additional information.

Apparently, one seaplane from a cruiser took off at about 0430 Hawaii time for observation purposes at 16,404 feet altitude.

Returning now to the original script:

Upon completion of the launchings, the force withdrew at high speed, 26 or 27 knots, to the northwest. Plane recovery was effected between 10:30 a. m. and 1:30 p. m., December 7, Hawaii time. The striking force then proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure, arriving December 23, Japan time. En route carrier division two—Hiryu, Soryu—Cruiser Division Eight—Tone, Chikuma—and two destroyers—Tanikaze, Yurakaze—were detached on December 15, Japan time, to serve as reinforcements for the Wake Island operation. Original plans called for the retiring task force to strike at Midway if possible, but, probably because of the presence of a United States task force south of Midway, that strike was not made.

\[455\] Until completion of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the striking force, the advance expeditionary force of submarines was under command of the striking force commander. The precise movements of the participating submarines are not known, but it is believed that most of these units departed from home waters in late November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area via Kwajalein; a few of these submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, changed course and proceeded directly to Hawaii.

The functions assigned to the submarines of the advance expeditionary force were carried out as planned in operations order No. 1, namely:

(a) Until X–3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe and report on any strong American forces discovered.

(b) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking force in advance of the movement of that force to ensure an undetected approach.

(c) Until X–5 the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed.
(d) On X day the submarines in the area were to—
observe and attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii area; make a surprise attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves out to fight, he will [456] be pursued and attacked.

During the evening of December 7 (the day before the actual attack), the force of I class submarines took up scouting positions in allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor; these submarines were ordered not to attack until the task force strike was verified.

Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, 5 midget submarines were launched from specially fitted fleet submarines as a special attacking force to conduct an offensive attack against American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air strike. Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor; it inflicted no damage on American units and none of the five rejoined the Japanese force.

After the actual attack, the I class submarines maintained their partol in the Hawaiian area and at least one of the group (the I-7) launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain the status of the American fleet and installations. The operation plan provided that, in the event of virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, one submarine division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic: in fact, at least one submarine (the I-17) was dispatched to the Oregon coast on or about December 14. One large submarine (pilot rescue) was stationed east of Kauai.

That last also comes from this latest source, about the rescue submarine stationed east of Kauai. Kauai is northwest of Oahu. I might also say parenthetically that this is the first information we have ever had that the Japanese used the submarine rescue tactics which were later so successfully employed by our own forces.

The next subheading is “Projected Losses Compared with Actual Losses.”

During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor striking force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units; it was specifically assumed that one Akagi class carrier, and one Soryu class carrier would be lost. No mention is made of probable plane losses. A very slight expectation was held that some of the five midget submarines would be retrieved but all midget submarine personnel were prepared for death. The losses actually incurred were 27 aircraft and all of the 5 midget submarines.

The Japanese assessment of damage inflicted on the American forces was made from reports of flight personnel upon their return and from studies of photographs taken by flight personnel. No reconnaissance planes were used during the [458] attack to assess results, although one plane was launched from a submarine for this purpose well after the attack had been completed; one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to make observations. The official Japanese estimate of damage inflicted and the contrasting actual damage inflicted is as follows:
In this table I give material both from Japanese sources and American sources. In the left-hand table is the Japanese estimate. In the right-hand table is the actual damage as reported from American sources.

The Japanese estimated that they had sunk four battleships, two cruisers, and one tanker.

Actually they sank four battleships, a converted battleship, the *Utah*, and also one mine layer, the *Oglala*.

The Japs estimated that they had heavily damaged four battleships and five cruisers.

Actually they had heavily damaged one battleship, two light cruisers, three destroyers, and one repair ship.

The Japanese estimated that they had lightly damaged one battleship. Actually they had slightly damaged three battleships.

I beg your pardon. Three battleships, one light cruiser, and one aircraft tender.

The Japanese estimated that they had destroyed a total of 450 aircraft. Actually they destroyed 92 Navy planes.

Perhaps the colonel can give the number of Army planes destroyed and then we will have it all at this point.

Colonel Thiele. Yes; we have some figures on that.

The Vice Chairman. You have 105 here, Admiral.

Admiral Inglis. You mean Navy planes?

The Vice Chairman. One hundred and five Navy.

Admiral Inglis. That figure of Navy damage has been bandied about among my staff, and we have had reports all the way from something down in the 80's up to 136. The other day we gave as our best estimate 105. We have revised that to our best estimate of 102.

Colonel Thiele. Our figure was 96 Army planes lost, and I should explain that is greater than the initial reports primarily because some of the planes were cannibalized to put other aircraft in the air. But the final figure is 96 Army planes lost as the result of enemy action.

Admiral Inglis. I think it is fair to state that the Japanese estimated that they had destroyed 450 planes; that they actually destroyed, in round numbers, 200 planes, perhaps a little less than 200.

Finally, it may thus be concluded that the Japanese estimate of damage to United States ships was highly conservative, whereas their estimate of damage to United States aircraft was grossly exaggerated.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to put up the map there, Admiral, that shows the reconnaissance?

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I note the time, and before any cross-examination, as far as we are concerned, we would wish to have an opportunity to look at the exhibits, other than the Japanese language ones—we would not be able to read them. There will perhaps be opportunity during the recess.

The Chairman. The Chair announced a while ago that we might run to 1 o'clock. What is the wish of the committee?

The Vice Chairman. Let us hear from counsel.

Mr. Mitchell. We are willing to stop or go on, as you please.

The Chairman. What is the desire of the committee with respect to an afternoon session?

Senator Brewster. I think we better go over to Monday morning.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that the witness has not yet concluded his direct testimony.

Senator Brewster. He has completed the statement.
Mr. Murphy. I understand counsel is now referring to some charts.
The Chairman. He had finished his statement.
Senator George. I suggest we go over to Monday.
The Chairman. He had finished reading his statement, whereupon counsel was going to ask him some questions.
Admiral Inglis. I have just two more charts.
Senator Ferguson. Could we have counsel ask his questions and then recess?
The Chairman. We can determine about the recess, but I [462] think in the meantime counsel should be permitted to conclude.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is what I mean.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Admiral Inglis. I would like, before concluding my direct statement, to invite the attention of the committee to two charts, which are also included in the folder which has been presented to you, in reduced form.
The first one is an outline of the island of Oahu and shows the track or path of the two attacking units. I think you can see by the chart, without any great amount of explanation from me, the track which the Japanese pilot reported that the attacking units took. That is the first one there.
The first wave is on the left. It shows how it is split up into several parts to attack various objectives.
Then, the other arrows, on the right, show the second wave. It shows how it is split up to attack three different objectives.
Now, if we could have the other chart showing the searches.
That chart is item 19 in the folder, and the next is item 20—I beg your pardon. It is the other way around.
Mr. Murphy. In order to keep the record straight may it be noted that the witness is now referring to item 20 in the Navy folder.
Admiral Inglis. I have just completed referring to item 20.
[463] Item 19 is a reproduction of searches that were shown in the previous testimony but now we have added to it, superimposed on it, the track of the Japanese task force, and you will notice there is one point where the track of the Japanese force overlaps a searched sector. However, the best evidence that we have is that by the time the search planes got out to that point the Japanese task force had left the area and was on its way northwestward at high speed and no contact was made.
That concludes my statement.
Mr. Gesell. One or two questions, Admiral, on the statement.
You stated that the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed on November 5, Jap time. I gather from that you were talking, at that point, about the war plan as opposed to the operational decision to put the plan into execution; is that right.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gesell. In other words, by the 5th of November, Jap time, the Japs had worked out how they were going to accomplish this attack, but you did not mean to indicate that by that time they had reached a decision of a final and binding nature to attack; is that correct.
Admiral Inglis. That is correct.
[464] Mr. Gesell. Coming over to the order of November 25, to which you referred I think on page 4 of your statement, where you said the commander in chief of the combined fleet issued an order to the
striking force, and directing your attention particularly to subpara-
graph B, which reads as follows:

Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an
amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action all the forces
of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

I want to ask you whether there is any evidence in any of this mate-
rial that that order, and specifically the portion I just read, was ever
revoked by any Japanese authorities prior to the attack?

Admiral Inglis. That order was not revoked. By inference it
might be perhaps assumed that the order to climb Mount Niitaka was,
in effect, a final firm commitment.

Mr. Gesell. And when was that order received, did you say, by the
striking force, to climb Mount Niitaka?

Admiral Inglis. That was on the 6th of December Japanese time,
or the 5th of December United States time.

Mr. Gesell. Now, what time of day; does your information disclose
what time of day?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

[465] Mr. Gesell. Will you point to the chart and indicate
approximately what distance from Pearl Harbor you would estimate
that the Japanese Fleet was at the time that order was received?

Admiral Inglis. That will take a minute to figure out.

Mr. Gesell. All right.

The Vice Chairman: While we are waiting, could you spell that
name, the name of the mountain, for us?

Admiral Inglis. Niitaka. That is N-i-i-t-a-k-a.

The best estimate that I can make is the point where that track
intersects the 160 meridian.

Will you point to that, 160 west.

That is, necessarily, just pretty much of a guess, but I would say
that it was at about this location, where the Japanese striking force is
alleged to have received the message to climb Mount Niitaka.

Mr. Gesell. I didn’t understand whether that message was pur-
ported to have come from Tokyo.

Admiral Inglis. We understood that message came from Tokyo.

Mr. Gesell. At the point you estimated the message was received
the striking force was about ready to start its direct run toward Oahu;
is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. Almost; yes, sir.

[466] Mr. Gesell. Now, with reference to the sources of data
used in planning by the Japanese. You stated that source “E,” espion-
age network in Hawaiian Islands, using uncensored cable communica-
tions with Japan, was a source which you had added from your
own knowledge of Japanese sources; is that not correct?

Admiral Inglis. Not from my own personal knowledge but from
the United States records.

Mr. Gesell. You were referring, were you, to intercepted Japanese
messages concerning military installations, which were classified as
the “magic” material or the “ultra” material by the Navy and Army?

Admiral Inglis. The sources that I have indicated here are the
FBI and ONI. These are derived from investigation reports of our
agents in the Hawaiian area, not cryptanalytical material.

Mr. Gesell. I thought I understood you to use the word “crypt-
analytical” material when discussing that paragraph?
Admiral Inglis. Not intentionally. I said using uncensored cable communications with Japan. That would be to forward the results of the Japanese espionage. They would use uncensored cable communications.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, we would like to direct the committee’s attention to Exhibit 2 at this time, which is already in evidence, containing the Japanese messages concerning [367] military installations and ship movements, and particularly to the section concerned with Hawaii. The committee will there see a series of messages between Tokyo and Honolulu, some of them translated after December 7, many of them before, all of them concerned with the disposition of the fleet in the harbor, the nature of the reconnaissance, questions as to whether or not torpedo nets were down, the area in which the fleet conducted its regular maneuvers, and other information of a direct military espionage nature.

I think subsequent testimony will indicate that at least most of these messages were sent by cable facilities from Hawaii to Tokyo or vice versa.

The Chairman. May I ask, do you mean commercial cable facilities?

Mr. Gesell. Commercial cable facilities; yes, sir.

We would like particularly to call attention to a message which appears at page 117 under the heading of “Other Messages of Particular Interest,” which indicates that on February 15, 1941, general notification was sent out concerning the nature of the espionage data that was wanted from various points by the Japanese authorities.

Now, you referred, Admiral, to “train vessels.” What are “train vessels?”

Admiral Inglis. Train vessels are what we call auxiliary [468] types, such as tankers, supply ships, repair ships.

Mr. Gesell. Now, in discussing the actual activities of the Japanese aircraft at the time of the commencement of the attack you stated that the planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated action. Did you mean to indicate by that that the planes came to Oahu from points in the south?

Admiral Inglis. By no means. Of course, this is Japanese language, that I have been quoting, or translations of it, but the intent of that statement was that the Japanese planes would rendezvous south of the carriers which were north of Oahu, and then proceed from that rendezvous on farther south to Oahu itself.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, they would simply gather south of where the carriers were, but still north of Oahu, to make their formation for the attack?

Admiral Inglis. Correct.

Mr. Gesell. As a matter of fact, your item No. 20 sketch indicates plainly, does it not, that, at least according to those records, the planes did come into Oahu from the north?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I was somewhat puzzled by the time shown on item 20 and I wanted to see if you could verify those times with the times that we have been discussing heretofore. The [469] times that appeared on the radar maps that the committee has been considering were, of course, all Hawaiian times, starting with the early pick-ups at 6 and 7 o’clock.
Now, the times that appear on this map, if I read it correctly, say 3:10, 4:10, 3:20, 4:25, and some of the notes indicate other times in about that area.

I wonder if you could reconcile that difference for us?

Admiral Inglis. As I understand it, this sketch is a reproduction of one drawn by the Japanese officer who was interrogated and the best we can make out of that is that that time given was Tokyo time.

If you subtract 19½ hours from 3:10, that should convert it into Hawaiian Honolulu time.

Senator Ferguson. What would that be, will counsel inquire?

Mr. Gesell. I was going to make the computation, Senator.

Senator Brewster. It is on the map, I understand.

Admiral Inglis. Another way is to add 4½ hours in 1 day. That would make it at 7:40. That would make the figure on the left-hand arrow 7:40 instead of 3:10.

Mr. Gesell. Where it appears as 3:10, that was 7:40.

Admiral Inglis. That is the best we could make out of it; yes, sir. [470]

Mr. Gesell. Now, that somewhat closely coincides, does it not, with the information contained on the historical plot that we have been discussing?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, it does.

Mr. Gesell. That showed that the planes were in fairly close to the northern tip of the island by, I believe, 7:39?

Admiral Inglis. Right, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, this tract does not show any Japanese air activity earlier than 3:10 or 7:40, does it?

Admiral Inglis. That tract does not, no, sir..

Mr. Gesell. Have you given in your statement all the information which is available as to the preliminary scouting activities of Jap planes prior to this main flight that actually made the attack?

Admiral Inglis. I think we have quoted verbatim the statements that these two pilots made.

Mr. Gesell. Now, with respect to the discussion of the submarine movements—

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Gesell, may I interrupt a minute?

Mr. Gesell. Certainly.

Admiral Inglis. I don't think that I gave you a final definitive answer to your question. My answer was that to the best of my knowledge and belief we have quoted precisely the translations of the statements made by the two pilots [471] and also, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that is the only evidence which we have.

Mr. Gesell. I did not mean to interrupt; I am sorry.

Now, with respect to the disposition of the submarine forces which you have considered, you reported that at least one body of the submarines went to Hawaii via Kawajalein, did you not?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. That is in the Marshall group of islands, is it not?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Have you any information as to when those submarines arrived in the areas of the Marshall Islands?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. In discussing whether or not midget submarines penetrated into the harbor you again indicated that your data pointed
to the fact that only one submarine had penetrated into the harbor but that involved, did it not, the same qualitative judgments on your part as have already been considered by the committee in connection with your previous statement concerning submarines in the harbor?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. I have nothing to add regarding submarines than I stated in my previous statement.

[472] Mr. Gesell. This is merely a repetition of your statement on this score?

Admiral Inglis. That is right.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese in any way report how many submarines got in the harbor?

Admiral Inglis. We have no such report.

Mr. Gesell. It is known, is it not, that none of the submarines returned, none of the Jap submarines returned?

Admiral Inglis. The Japanese admit that.

The Chairman. That is midgets.

Mr. Gesell. We are talking about the midget submarines.

The Chairman. That is right.

Admiral Inglis. The five midgets did not return.

Mr. Gesell. Now, you say that they were these midget submarines from a mother ship. You mean that the small submarine was inside a larger submarine, or just how did it work?

Admiral Inglis. Those midget submarines are carried as a deck load on the larger submarine.

Mr. Gesell. Under water or on the surface?

Admiral Inglis. Under water or on the surface.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, the mother submarine can submerge taking the midget submarines with it?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. Of course, with some loss of military effectiveness because of the unusual [473] load.

Mr. Gesell. Yes, I imagine so.

Now, I wanted to ask one question of you concerning the reconnaiss ance map item which we had, on which the track of the Jap striking force was presented.

You stated that there was one overlap of the radius shown there. I am not clear whether the reconnaissance as shown on that chart is the actual distance flown by the reconnaissance airplanes or whether it takes into account the visual reconnaissance which would be possible from the end of the radius of a flight.

Do you understand what I mean?

Admiral Inglis. I understand what you mean and I am not clear on that either.

Mr. Gesell. The question, of course, arises, if it is the former rather than the latter, whether from the terminal points of the actual flight it would have been possible to see the departing or incoming Jap forces. I take it the incoming clearly no; the question only relates to the departing Jap forces.

Admiral Inglis. Of course, that is a highly speculative matter from my point of view, as to just what the visibility was, what the altitude of the planes was and how far they could see and I am afraid I cannot answer that question except [474] to say again that no sight contact was obtained.

Mr. Gesell. Could you, when you get to it, also let us know whether the chart has charted the flight of the planes or whether it has taken
into account the additional reconnaissance possible by eyesight from the extremity of the reconnaissance?

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the chart was only intended to show the actual flight of the planes and not the extension because of any radius of visibility.

Mr. Gesell. Have you any opinion as to what the maximum area of visibility might be?

Admiral Inglis. I am afraid I cannot answer that.

Mr. Gesell. That would depend on the height of the planes and the atmospheric condition at the time, I take it.

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. As well as the eyesight of the pilots?

Admiral Inglis. Correct.

Mr. Mitchell. Just one question, Admiral.

This reconnaissance we have just been talking about on the vertical lines was the reconnaissance made after the attack in an effort to locate the carriers?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. The horizontal lines west of Pearl Harbor represent the only reconnaissance. I understand, that was made on the 7th, prior to the attack?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And that reconnaissance, whether you can see 50 miles beyond the limits of the plane’s flight, was obviously nowhere near the Jap fleets or the Jap carriers or the incoming planes?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is all.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Mitchell, I wonder if you would inquire from the witness what the initials “GMT” mean in connection with time?

Mr. Mitchell. Greenwich meridian time; over in England somewhere.

Mr. Gearhart. Of course.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the starting point of all time.

Mr. Gesell. Congressman, you will find all times transposed from that base in one of the schedules in the Navy folder.

Mr. Gearhart. I see the exhibit here. In one of the items here they classify the time as “GMT December 8.” What would that mean in United States, what would that mean in Hawaii and what would that mean in Japan?

Mr. Mitchell. There is a table that gives all that. We can look it up for you. It is in an exhibit in evidence.

Mr. Gesell. Item 4, Mr. Gearhart, of the Navy exhibit. It is transposed into our time for the fifth, sixth and seventh, so that we can tell from any time we have what time it was at the key points, any different kind or type of time we want.

Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much.

Mr. Gesell. I think that will prove helpful as the hearing goes along.

Mr. Gearhart. Thank you.

Mr. Gesell. All right.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have another exhibit of that Opana marked “15,” in evidence. This may be clearer than the one I put in. I wonder whether we should also put this exhibit in? The other one was not so clear.
Mr. Mitchell. Is it a photostat of that other one?
Senator Ferguson. I cannot tell without comparing the two.
Mr. Mitchell. Suppose we look at it over the week end and see what it is.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, for the record, in view of the fact that the witness was asked about the other one I would say that they both should go in.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I had in mind, that they both go in.
The Chairman. I see no objection to them both going in, but counsel say they want to see over the week end what it is.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire if the witness over the week end will compare it, compare the three to show the differences? I think this is much clearer and it will be helpful and he will be able to see the differences between them.
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I had in mind.
Admiral Inglis. This is not mine.
Mr. Mitchell. Oh, this is the Army's?
Admiral Inglis. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Senator Brewster asked about these sources of material exhibits on the last statement. Would you like to have them over the week end?
Senator Brewster. I would like over the week end and for the convenience of counsel to have them for 2 or 3 hours. I will send them back to counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. We will turn them over to you and leave them in your office and if any of the other members of the committee want to see them they can do so.
The Chairman. Is the English translation on the exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. We will give him one with the English translation on.
The Chairman. I think the Senator from Maine wanted the English translation. I thought if the Senator from Maine wanted the English translation I would take the one in Japanese home with me over the week end.
Senator Brewster. I might comment that I think probably the examination would be as much as the Senator has made of any of the other exhibits.
The Chairman. The Senator from Maine has no information on that subject.
Senator Brewster. Well, the Chairman had no information from me either.
The Chairman. As is the similar case on many subjects which he discusses.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire when Senator Brewster will get them, so that we may be able to see them in Senator Brewster's office?
Mr. Gesell. Why doesn't he put them under his arm and take it right now?
Senator Ferguson. That is a good suggestion.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of the Senator from Maine?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. May I be permitted to see the Hewitt report?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. There is one question that I am not quite clear on and I would like to have the witness give the information. He may have given it but I am not quite clear on it, [479] and that is the question as to the approximate mileage distance from Pearl Harbor of this task force, the Japanese task force, at the time the message was received.

Admiral Inglis. I gave it as closely as I could estimate it and you will remember, Congressman Keeffe, that they were 800 miles north of Oahu at the time they turned due south. That was 800 miles north of Oahu.

Now, the point at which—I just guessed and I must insist that it is only a guess—at which they probably received that radio message is where that track crosses the one hundred and sixtieth meridian, and again just guessing, I would say that was 200 miles further back toward Japan or, let us say, a thousand miles roughly.

Mr. Keefe. About a thousand miles north of Oahu when this message was received?

Admiral Inglis. Well, a thousand miles back along their track. Of course, that was not due north because it was a zigzag course.

Mr. Keefe. That's right.

The Chairman. Well, is there any further clarification desired by anybody of the Admiral's testimony before we recess?

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have one more initial clarified. "GCT", what does that mean?

Admiral Inglis. Greenwich civil time.

[480] Mr. Gearhart. What is the difference?

Admiral Inglis. I am a little rusty on my navigation at the moment, but as I recall it Greenwich meridian time starts at midnight and Greenwich Civil Time starts at noon, or just the other way around.

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to ask you to help me in deciding what kind of time we have got here.

The Chairman. We don't want any two-timers.

Mr. Gearhart. But the message was broadcast over the radio in Japan at 2 o'clock, I think it was GMT December 8, 1941. Do you know whether that refers to Japanese time or to time within the United States?

Admiral Inglis. If it is expressed in that way that would be London time.

Mr. Gearhart. London time?

Admiral Inglis. That would be London time, when it says "GMT". That is what it says, isn't it, "GMT"?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. GMT would be that time in London with the base point noon rather than midnight.

Mr. Gearhart. Then if I should look at the chart in the Navy folder and find London time, in a moment's calculation I can take the time for London and determine what it is in the United States and what it was in Japan?

[481] Admiral Inglis. I think you can, sir.

The Chairman. If there is nothing further, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., November 17, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Monday, November 19, 1945.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

General Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, you apparently concluded your examination of the witnesses on Saturday. Is there anything further you wish to ask them this morning before the committee examines them?

Mr. Mitchell. No, Mr. Chairman, but the committee ought to say whether they want Colonel Thielen to take up the radar chart business that one of the Senators asked him about, or whether we should go on with the Japanese attack. Would you like to have the radar matter come up first?

Senator Ferguson. Personally, I would like to go along with the Japanese attack, to keep the sequence.

Mr. Mitchell. Then counsel have no further questions at this time about the Japanese attack.

Mr. Murphy. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I want to go into the radar matter, but I will postpone it until later.

The Chairman. We will let the radar matter slide until we get through with Admiral Inglis.

The Chair wishes to make this statement. In the committee a few days ago, when we decided the order in which the examination of witnesses would take place, the Chair, as a matter of courtesy to all the other members, suggested that he postpone any examination on his part until all the members of the committee had an opportunity to examine the witnesses. The Chairman had no thought that there would be any advantage or disadvantage in whether he asked any questions at the beginning or waited until the examination was over to ask such questions as had not been covered by other members of the committee.

However, in view of the fact that that may be regarded as an effort to get the last word—which no member of this committee really has,
because even after formal examination, and after committee members have examined the witnesses, if a Senator or a Member of the House thinks he has some other question to ask, he can do it freely—but in order that there may not be any question about it, the Chair will exercise the right to proceed to examine the witnesses before he alternates among other members of the committee.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I should like to make clear there is no objection, as far as the ranking minority member is concerned, to the Chairman making the final examination. The suggestion which I made was that I, as a member of the minority, would not like to precede you, that is all. That would be probably helpful all around, as the Chairman himself originally conceded.

The Chairman. I want to say to the Senator from Maine, it is entirely immaterial to me, as a member of the committee, \[485\] and as Chairman, whether I examine the witness first, or wait until all other members have examined the witnesses. I personally see no advantage or disadvantage in the particular position that any member of the committee occupies in examining the witnesses. I do not know that the ranking minority member or the ranking majority member, if it is divided up into minority and majority, in the interrogation of witnesses, has any particular significance. But for the time being, in regard to this witness, the Chair will go ahead and ask only a few questions, if that is agreeable to the committee.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, the acoustics are so bad, I can hardly hear at this end of the bench what you are saying.

The Chairman. The Chairman thought he was talking loud enough to be heard. He will elevate his voice and move the microphone in more proximity to his mouth.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

The Chairman. Admiral, the information which you have given us in your statement of Saturday is based entirely upon the captured documents since the end of the war with Japan, the documents captured by American forces and also conversations had with captured Japanese?

Admiral Inglis. Not necessarily since the end of the war, Senator Barkley. Some of those documents were captured during the progress of the war. Some of the interrogation was made of prisoners of war who were captured during the war, and who were interrogated during the war.

The Chairman. So that your statement as outlined here is based upon captured documents before and since the surrender of Japan and conversations had with prisoners of war captured before the end of the war, but who were still in custody of the American forces?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.

The Chairman. Up to the end of the war?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. And also statements made by Japanese officers, or men who were not prisoners of war; is that true?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, with one exception; there is one statement in the prepared statement which was based on reports
of FBI and ONI investigators, just one sentence. Aside from that, all of this material came from Japanese sources.

The Chairman. For the record, will you explain—of course the FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation—what is the ONI?

Admiral Inglis. The FBI stands for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the ONI stands for Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Chairman. I do not think I care to ask any further questions.

Admiral Inglis. Mr. Chairman, may I make one correction of the testimony that I gave on the 16th of November?

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. On page 293, line 23, and on page 294, line 19, I would like to correct "Wasp" to read "Hornet."  

The Chairman. Well, both of them have quite some stingers.

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. I have no questions at present, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.

Admiral, you are familiar with this document here, containing messages, reports, and information forwarded by General MacArthur?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.

[487] The Vice Chairman. As I understood it, anything contained in this document was included in your statement presented here on Saturday.

Admiral Inglis. The gist of that document, which is dated October 26, 1945, was considered in preparing the statement, and we feel that all of the pertinent and essential material contained in there was incorporated into the statement where it was appropriate, and where we felt it was properly confirmed or where it was not contradicted in some other document.

[488] The Vice Chairman. This material was handed to me and other members of the committee by counsel on Saturday and I understood that you had had the benefit of this material and that your testimony Saturday embraced the information contained in this.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. One other question, if I may, please, Admiral.

In your statement presented to the committee on Saturday, I would like to invite your attention to the bottom of page 11, the last sentence, continuing to the top of page 12, in which it is stated:

In addition to the attack planes launched at this time it was reported that two type zero reconnaissance seaplanes were launched at approximately 5:00 a.m. 7 December, Hawaiian time, to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina anchorage just before the attack.

Now, especially this sentence:

Available evidence indicates that these reconnaissance planes reached their destination one hour before the arrival of the attack planes.

Admiral Inglis. I believe that was in the former draft and was not presented Saturday. That was corrected later on—or changed later on.

[489] The Vice Chairman. I know you called attention to some changes in that paragraph and I didn't know whether that sentence was supposed to be changed or not.

1 P. 123, supra.
Admiral Inglis. That sentence was struck out and another one substituted for it. If the Congressman desires I will read the statement that was made Saturday morning.

The Vice Chairman. Well, we have been provided with a copy this morning of your statement as you gave it with the necessary changes and corrections included.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. So the correction would appear in this draft.

Admiral Inglis. It should appear, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Then that sentence to which I have invited attention, or, rather, two sentences, that did not reflect the situation then, is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. We think that the statement as made in the corrected draft which was given Saturday more truly reflects the information that we had.

The Vice Chairman. Then the information that the reconnaissance planes reached their destination an hour before the attack planes, is that accurate or not?

Admiral Inglis. We have no proof of that, sir.

The Vice Chairman. No proof of that?


The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Admiral, just one or two questions.

The draft which was submitted by the Navy and presented to the committee on Saturday last was prepared, as I understand it, by the Navy officials?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. That draft, as I understood it, was based upon, primarily upon captured documents by the United States Navy?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. United States Navy and in some cases Army.

Senator Lucas. Now, in the main, the investigation in the first instance was made by the officials of the United States Navy?

Admiral Inglis. Some of the interrogations were made by Army officers, as well as Navy officers.

Senator Lucas. I understand that. I am talking primarily about the captured documents. That was a Navy undertaking?

Admiral Inglis. The study of those which transposed that into this prepared statement was made by Naval officers, yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Then you have prepared a draft to submit to the committee before you learned of the last information [492] which came from General MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo?

Admiral Inglis. There were several drafts prepared, Senator Lucas. The last of them, the one that was used was altered, as compared to the one just before that, by the receipt of a document forwarded through naval channels. Not from the Senior Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo.

Senator Lucas. That was the first alteration and that was based on additional information which was received by the Navy?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Then a third alteration was made and that was based upon information received from the Allied headquarters in Tokyo?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. Just the other way around.
Senator Lucas. Will you just make it clear for me?
Admiral Inglis. I will try to make it as clear as I can. The first draft was prepared without the benefit of the material which was received from the Tokyo headquarters of General MacArthur. The second draft was prepared with the benefit of that material. And the third and final draft was prepared with the benefit of a paper which was received through naval channels late Friday afternoon.
Senator Lucas. Thank you.
Now, the Army and the Navy both have been working independently upon this, have they?
Admiral Inglis. The Army has had no direct connection with the preparation of this script.
Senator Lucas. But insofar as the examination of witnesses and talking with prisoners, and any other thing in connection with the investigation, the Army followed the course that they thought was correct and the Navy followed the course that they thought was correct in working up this case?
Admiral Inglis. Throughout the war the interrogation of prisoners was a joint effort of Army officers and Navy officers, and also in some cases enlisted men, working together in the interrogation of Japanese prisoners. Also there was a complete interchange generally of documentary information and intelligence as between the Army and Navy throughout the war.
Senator Lucas. Insofar as the information which came which caused you to make some changes in the second draft, that was information which was received by the Navy from the Army operating under MacArthur in Japan?
Admiral Inglis. That information was obtained by officers attached to General MacArthur's headquarters.
Senator Lucas. And the Navy had nothing to do with that?
Admiral Inglis. I would be morally certain that naval officers assisted in the interrogation but they were attached to General MacArthur's command.
Senator Lucas. Let me ask you one further question.
Is there any material difference between what the Navy originally found, upon which the draft was prepared, and what General MacArthur and his forces found and sent to the Navy, upon which this second draft was prepared? If so, please state.
Admiral Inglis. Speaking in general terms, the material obtained from General MacArthur merely confirmed information which we had previously received from other sources. There are a very few cases where there was a conflict between the two. Wherever there was a conflict we tried to resolve, the staff tried to resolve, the conflict in favor of the most credible evidence.
However, I think, speaking in general terms, that the conflict was not particularly significant.
Senator Lucas. Upon all major points, as I understand it, the two reports more or less agreed?
Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lucas. I think that is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark.
Mr. Clark. No questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster.
Senator Brewster. I understand, Admiral, that the translations which you presented on Saturday covered all of the Japanese documents which you turned over?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Senator Brewster. Well, in what examination I was able to make over the week end there was some 300 pages of Japanese material that was not translated. Can you explain that discrepancy?

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the translation is complete.

Senator Brewster. Well, have you the exhibits there?

[Pause.]

Admiral Inglis. Senator Brewster, I am informed by the translator who is sitting at my elbow that this material was received by microfilm and that at the end of the microfilm there was some additional Japanese documents which had nothing to do with the Pearl Harbor case but in the mechanical process of turning it out that is included with the material which has to do with Pearl Harbor.

Senator Brewster. That would mean there were approximately 118 pages of material bearing on this and 300 pages bearing on other matters.

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that is correct, sir.

Senator Brewster. Well, that would explain the discrepancy.

That other material, what did it have to do with?

Admiral Inglis. Those were combined fleet orders which were issued subsequent to the attacks and had nothing to do with the attack itself concerning Japanese operations after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Brewster. Now, you, in the summary which you gave, cited the Japanese estimate of damage as 450 planes. From what examination I was able to make there appeared to be an estimate of 250 planes that were damaged, plus 10; another estimate of 157. They apparently were different estimates. Estimates of different pilots. I didn’t find the figure of 450. Was that a cumulation, or what was the basis of it?

Admiral Inglis. The source of that figure of 450 is a combination of sources A, B, and C. There was one statement that 250 planes were known to have been destroyed plus an indeterminate number of others presumably in the hangars, and therefore not subject to photographic reconnaissance and observation.

Senator Brewster. Two hundred and fifty plus ten.

Admiral Inglis. Some of the other sources increased the figure and said specifically that their estimate was 450.

Senator Brewster. That specific figure appeared somewhere didn’t it?

Admiral Inglis. That figure is in the diary of a Japanese ensign captured at Tarawa. The committee has that exhibit.

Senator Brewster. Yes, I have that. What is the citation on that?

Admiral Inglis. I am sorry, that we haven’t got.

Senator Brewster. What I have is page 15, showing this estimate of 157.

Admiral Inglis. The only copy of any of those documents in existence are in the hands of the committee.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, for the record may we have what the Senator is reading from, page 15 of what?

The Chairman. Will the Senator state what that was that he was reading from?
Senator Brewster. It was the document the witness now has.
Admiral Inglis. I have before me a document entitled "Translation of Captured Document, Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the Japanese Navy, Captured Tarawa, 24 November, 1943."

Senator Brewster. Is that the diary to which you are referring?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And that shows, on the page I pointed out, the figure of 157?
Admiral Inglis. On page 4 of that document, at the top of the page, fifth line, is the figure "shot down, 450 planes".

Senator Brewster. That is right. What was the later record, how did he distinguish between these two? What is the discrepancy between them?
Admiral Inglis. The official figure which the Japanese announced shortly after the attack was 450 planes. I am informed that later on, in a more detailed analysis of the evidence which, apparently, was available to the Japanese, that they became more conservative and cut this down to 157, but that was never incorporated into a subsequent official announcement. As far as the public knew they stood by their original announcement of 450.

Senator Brewster. What does that purport to be, on page 115, where the figure of 157 was used?
Admiral Inglis. I am informed that this purports to be just the ensign's recollection, apparently, of an order from the Navy Ministry, but the text is so obscure that I wouldn't like to state just what the significance of that is.

Senator Brewster. Now, about the records of the Hawaii broadcasting stations to check up on the report as to espionage, are those station records available for that period?
Admiral Inglis. I believe that the Army will have those, if any, and I would like to inform the Senator that I only had about 5 minutes to look at this last document which came in, and I am not too familiar with the substance contained in that document; and, of course, with respect to any intelligence or counter-intelligence material that the Senator may be interested in, I would like to refer him to the then district intelligence officer out in the Fourteenth District, naval district, Admiral Mayfield, who is listed as a witness, and also Admiral Wilkinson, who was then the Director of Intelligence, and who is also listed as a witness.

I am not prepared to answer questions on that.

Senator Brewster. Well, as I understand, this possible tip as to the broadcasting from Hawaii to inform the Japanese fleet came on October 13, that they made this extension "Tokyo" at the suggestion of the authorities here and that an immediate check was made then to find out whether transcripts of those Hawaiian broadcasts during the period just preceding Pearl Harbor, December 7, were available.

That, I assume, came under your office.
Admiral Inglis. From a very hasty look at that document I would have that same impression.

Senator Brewster. Yes; and that it then appeared that those records were missing. Is that also your impression?
Admiral Inglis. That is my impression.

Senator Brewster. Yes; so that the records for that period apparently disappeared. The suggestions were made that some of them
think that might possibly have been turned over to the Army or the FBI.

Admiral Inglis. I believe that is what the paper says, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Now, can the Army find out? Colonel, have you any information about this?

Colonel ThieLEN. No, sir; I have no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Senator Brewster. Well, the matter will be followed up.

Admiral Inglis. Under which jurisdiction would that matter come?

Admiral Inglis. Well, I would suggest that the Senator address a question of that nature to Admiral Mayfield and Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator Brewster. Well, no, I am speaking to the Director of Naval Intelligence now, as this is apparently a current matter. It apparently is obvious that there are no past records about this and the question is to determine what did become of those records and not under whose authority they were destroyed.

Admiral Inglis. According to our records, those documents were turned over to a Major Putnam, an Army major, who was on duty in Hawaii at that time.

Senator Brewster. Well, I know you don't want to do an injustice to the Army, but I think there is great doubt on that score. I think Major Putnam expressed some doubt as to whether he got them. In any event, the station claims it did not turn over any but limited ones, which may or may not have had any relation to this particular episode, but would it come within your purview now as Director of Naval Intelligence to pursue that matter and to find out as fully as possible whether or not there may have been any relation?

Admiral Inglis. The Office of Naval Intelligence has already inquired into that matter and the best information that we have is that these documents were turned over to Major Putnam of the Army.

Senator Brewster. In connection with the message of—or the battle orders of November 25 and December 2 as appear in your evidence on page 437 in our text, it may not be particularly material, although it has sufficient significance so that I am sure you would want the record correct.

According to the exhibits which we examined, the battle order which you cited on November 25 was actually the one of December 2. The phraseology was somewhat different in those two orders.

Have you those there? That is subhead B on page 437, at the bottom of the page. You will find that under the transcript that you presented to all the members of the committee from General MacArthur's headquarters on complying with your orders of October 26th.

Admiral Inglis. Is the Senator referring to the quotation:

"Japan now understands her self-preservation and self-defense has reached"— "Japan under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America"?

Senator Brewster. No; have you the transcript of the evidence? Well, yes, it is after that order, but it is 4-A, and in your testimony there cited as "B" at the bottom of page 437.

Admiral Inglis. I have that, sir. Your question is, what is the source of that?

Senator Brewster. Well, yes.

Admiral Inglis. The source of that is the material from headquarters in Tokyo.
Senator Brewster. Well, my point was that the language which you used—I think you have transposed them between the 25th of November and December 2.

Admiral Inglis. If the Senator will refer to the so-called Mac-Arthur paper on—

Senator Brewster. Yes; I have it before me.

Admiral Inglis. Sir?

Senator Brewster. I have it before me.

Admiral Inglis. On page 3, at the bottom of the page, subpara-

graph 4-A.

Senator Brewster. That is right.

Admiral Inglis. Issued in December.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, is there a copy of that to be made available to all the other members of the committee?

Senator Brewster. Yes, you have that.

Mr. Murphy. You are reading from the copy?


Admiral Inglis. Then the—

Senator Brewster. I have it before me.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. That was issued on December 2, is that right?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Now, you show that in your testimony on page 437 as issued on the 22d of November.

Admiral Inglis. Now, if the Senator will bear with me and refer to page 8 of that same document, down near the bottom of the page, there is a shorter version of that same paragraph.

Senator Brewster. That is right.

Admiral Inglis. Now, that version on page 8 was issued on the 22d of November.

Senator Brewster. That is right, and that is the one which should appear at the bottom of page 437 as the 22d of November order, is that right?

Admiral Inglis. To be chronologically correct, I believe that is the case, yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. I don't know that there will ever be any mater-

ial distinction between them but I think it would be well if you would see that the record is corrected so that [505] whatever variation there is in language between the order of the 22d of November—
on the 25th of November, that is the date, the 25th of November and the December 2 order is clarified in the record in whatever way you find most practicable.

Admiral Inglis. May I ask the reporter now to make this correction on the record? At the bottom of page 437, lines 21 to 25, inclusive, substitute the following:

(b) Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble.1

Senator Brewster. Now, the other is on page 464, which is the order of—well, that refers again to the erroneous order. You subsequently put in the message of December 2. It seemed to me it might have some importance that on December 2 they did issue the order which you have erroneously quoted. Perhaps you can put it in at

1 P. 180, supra.
that same point, at page 437, if you wish to, and substitute for that on December 2 that further language was used in the battle order.

Admiral Inglis. Yes; will the reporter please add to that previous quotation that on the 2d of December the longer version, as shown in the original transcript, volume 3, was issued as an Imperial naval order.

Senator Brewster. I don't know what the significance is. [506]

They call it a Naval General Staff instruction. Does that have any significance in your documents.

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the Japanese procedure in a case of that nature is for the Imperial General Headquarters to issue instructions to the Navy section. The Navy section then converts those instructions into an order.

Senator Brewster. Now, will you properly complete the text as shown in the MacArthur report of that December 2 Navy General Staff instruction?

Admiral Inglis. The version as contained in the so-called MacArthur paper is:

Naval General Staff instruction (issued 2 December) Bear in mind that should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to re-assemble and to return to their bases.

Senator Brewster. Now, the only other comment I have. Admiral, and I don't want to seem too meticulous, but it did seem, at least, we are dealing in connection with the question of visual hand signals.

You remember that was a matter of discussion, as to whether or not that ever occurred and you reported from the Japanese manuscripts reports that the Japanese pilots stated [507] that no visual signals were received.

I noted in the report of it that he added—it may or may not be significant—the words "to his knowledge," and it seemed to me it might be illuminating as indicating that he did not presume to say as to whether anybody else might have received them but as far as he knew none were received. I am sure that was simply—

Admiral Inglis. I agree with the Senator and think that the same reservation should be applied to nearly all of the verbal testimony given by these prisoners of war.

Senator Brewster. Thank you.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Senator Brewster. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Inglis, as I understand it in the printed testimony at page 422 you outlined in the record the sources of material upon which you based the summary which you gave to the committee, is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, as I also understand it, the committee were furnished with a group of papers, the first one dated November 8, 1945, and headed "General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers", continuing down to a paper which appears to be a questionnaire, all of these papers [508] apparently having been forwarded to us from the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
Are there any of these papers that are not covered by the originals or the photostats of originals given to the gentleman from Maine? In order to make myself clear, have you seen these papers which we were handed as coming from the Allied headquarters?

Admiral Inglis. I am quite sure that is the same document as this, although this is mimeographed and mine is not.

Mr. Murphy. Now, may I inquire of counsel of these papers are to be put into the record so that they will be available to whoever reads the record? Are they going to be offered as an exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell. We will offer them.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when the Navy Board sat in order to go into this question of the Jap invasion they had in that record, as I understand it, the testimony of the Japanese ensign, or the reports of the Japanese ensign’s testimony, as well as the prisoner at Pearl Harbor, did they not?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And they had the major part of the material which you have supplied to the committee, with the exception of the additions which were furnished by General MacArthur during the recent several weeks since October, is that right?

Admiral Inglis. This plus the letter that was received Friday night through naval channels; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the prisoner who was captured at Pearl Harbor, is he still living and available?

Admiral Inglis. We have been trying to find the answer to that question and so far we have been unable to.

Mr. Murphy. But there was some testimony in the several reports, were there not, concerning his version of the map that was taken from the submarine?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And there are two maps, are there not, two submarine maps or charts?

Admiral Inglis. There is only one, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, the submarine that was beached at Pearl Harbor, was there a chart taken from that?

Admiral Inglis. There was no chart taken from the submarine that was destroyed in Pearl Harbor. The chart was taken from the submarine which beached itself near Kaneohe.

Mr. Murphy. Well, there was one beached—I mean there was one map taken from that submarine; you got the chart out of that, didn’t you?

Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And then there was another beached in the bay area, or did that approach Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis. That submarine that was beached or destroyed inside Pearl Harbor had no—I shouldn’t say it had no chart because I don’t know, but they did not obtain a chart from that submarine.

Mr. Murphy. My recollection is that there was testimony concerning two different charts. Am I correct in that? You say there was only one?

Admiral Inglis. The other one, I think that was a chart that was made by aviators.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the operational orders and the plans concerning which you testified and concerning which we have photostatic copies here, now where are the originals?

Admiral Inglis. The best evidence that we have indicates that after that original was photostated it was purloined by a souvenir hunter.

Mr. Murphy. Well, on page 422 you referred to a captured document. The title is, "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences Off Hawaii."

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Where is that document, do you know?

Admiral Inglis. The original of that document. I understand is in the files of the Joint Intelligence Section of the Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the operational order about which you testified on page 422, where is that, the original?

Admiral Inglis. The committee has the original of that document.

Mr. Murphy. Is that one of the papers that was handed to the gentleman from Maine?

Admiral Inglis. That was handed to counsel, I guess. It was in that sheaf of papers.

Mr. Murphy. To the Senator from Maine?

Mr. Gesell. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the next document on page — —

Mr. Mitchell. Let us straighten that out.

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to clear that up, as to whether or not that was a photostat or the original instrument.

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that that particular document was the original.

Senator Ferguson. Would you identify it here?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir, if you will pass the papers to me.

I will have to correct the statement that I made. The original was not turned over to the committee. A copy of that which was turned over to the committee is photostated but the original itself is here in Washington but it is in such bad shape physically that it cannot be handled. It will [512] disintegrate if handled.

Mr. Murphy. And was it in the same shape as it is now when the photostat was made?

Admiral Inglis. Approximately, yes. I am informed it was under water for 4 months.

Mr. Murphy. The next document you testified about was on page 423, "Translation of a Captured Japanese Document. The professional notebook of an ensign in the Japanese Navy." The date is February 25, 1944.

Where is that notebook?

Admiral Inglis. The original of that document is also in the Joint Intelligence Section of the Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. For the record I want to note that the witness corrected the date of the second document and said it was January 12, 1941.

Is that the date you were correcting at that time? You said "the second document." Now, were you referring to the Japanese ensign's notebook or were you referring to some other document? I am talking about page 423.
Admiral Inglis. The document which is referred to on page 423 carries the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area’s letterhead with their date February 25, 1944. The document was captured at Tarawa on November 24, 1943. It is the same document.

Mr. Murphy. But what I am trying to clear up, that in your testimony on page 423—and do you have a copy there before you?

Admiral Inglis. I have, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You said:

Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the date on that is January 12, 1941.

You were speaking about some other document, other than the notebook, were you?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir. That is a different document that I had inadvertently entered previously without giving the date.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the next document you talked about you said was dated March 2, 1943, and the subject is: “Kuboaki, Takeo,” and you said, “That is obviously the name of a Japanese.” “Superior Class Engine or Petty Officer, interrogation of.”

Where is the original of that?

Mr. Gesell. Is this it, Admiral, here? He is handing you another one now.

Admiral Inglis. No. That document is a photostat of a letter from the Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces. I am not sure where the original would be but I presume that it is in Pearl Harbor with the files of Commander, South Pacific Area.

Mr. Murphy. Well, when my examination is concluded, Admiral, I am going to have the Navy liaison officer that is working with the committee to see that every one of these originals and every one of these documents are made available for the inspection of the committee in Washington get in touch with you.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you say that you concluded on that, Admiral, as to where the original was?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the next document that you referred to on page 424, “Japanese Submarine Operations at Pearl Harbor.” You said that was an evaluation prepared by United States intelligence officers. Where is the original of that?

Admiral Inglis. This document is the original of an evaluation. It is undated.

Mr. Murphy. And that is before the committee?

Admiral Inglis. It is before the committee. It is undated and unsigned but I am informed that it was prepared by Captain Pearson.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the next one you referred to is entitled, “Intelligence Report on the Subject of Japan Navy Submarines.” Where is the original of that? That was a paper prepared by American intelligence, wasn’t it?

Admiral Inglis. I have the paper here: yes, sir. I am trying to examine it. The document in question was prepared, was mimeographed from a stencil and this is as close an approach to an original as we could provide. The stencil itself was destroyed.

Mr. Murphy. I see. The next document you referred to was dated August 16, 1943, marked, “Interrogation Report No. 148 of Yokota, S.”
Where is the original of that document?
Admiral Inglis. Presumably the original of that document is in the files of Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
Mr. Murphy. The next document you talked about was, "United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of December 8, 1944."
Do you have the original copy of that here?
Admiral Inglis. The document which the committee has is as close to an original as could be produced, as that is a periodical.
Mr. Murphy. The next document you spoke of was dated June 30, 1943. The subject is, "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item. No. 472, Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii."
[517] Where is the original of that document?
Admiral Inglis. The Japanese version of that document is in the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area, Pearl Harbor. This document which the committee has, the translation is a mimeograph and, therefore, as close an approach as could be made to the original of the English translation.
Mr. Murphy. Then you also testified about an "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item. No. 473, Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai."
Where is the original of that?
Admiral Inglis. 472, 473, and 474 are all included in the same document.
Mr. Murphy. The next document you spoke of is dated July 25, 1943, translation No. 290. Subject: "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti. Iki."
Where is the original of that?
Admiral Inglis. May I ask, Congressman Murphy, whether you want any of the Japanese version or the English translation?
Mr. Murphy. The original source.
Admiral Inglis. The original source is in Japanese and is here in Washington. The committee has been given a mimeographed copy of the English translation, which is as close an approach to the original as could be provided.
[517] Mr. Murphy. Now, the next document referred to is a translation of combined fleet top secret operation, order No. 1. Where is the original of that. I mean the original Japanese version?
Admiral Inglis. The original in Japanese of that document is here in Washington but it is in such an advanced state of deterioration that it could not be handled.
Is the photostat presented as a photostat in the condition in which it now is?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. The next document referred to is: "Enemy Lists of Sorties by Sub-carried planes."
Where is the original of that? You stated, "its precise source is not indicated."
Admiral Inglis. The original is probably in the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor, although I am not certain of that.
Mr. Murphy. The next document you referred to is a memorandum dated October 13, 1945, addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
of the Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps on the subject, Pre-war Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands.

Is the paper you have an original copy of that?

Admiral Inglis. The paper that has been submitted to the committee is the original copy. In fact, it is the only copy in Washington.

Mr. Murphy. Now, there was some testimony concerning the paraphrase of a message dated October 6, 1945, from the Secretary of War to General MacArthur and, as I understand it, all committee members have been furnished a copy of that.

Mr. Mitchell. They have it. It is a paraphrasing for the protection of our codes.

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. The committee understands that.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

And then there was testimony on the bottom of page 426 concerning cables from General MacArthur dated the 14th of October and a further detailed report dated October 26, 1945, and then the report of the night preceding your testimony.

As I understand it, all of those are originals in here, is that right?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, those are copies furnished by the War Department.

Mr. Murphy. To the committee?

Mr. Mitchell. To us and to the committee. They were reproduced so that everybody would have copies of them.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. The original dispatch from MacArthur may be in the files of the War Department.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the committee have a copy of it.

Mr. Gesell. The originals are right here, Congressman, if there is any question as to whether they were correctly reproduced.

Mr. Murphy. All right. And would that hold true, too, as to the message from General MacArthur dated November 8, 1945?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. Congressman Murphy, I have just been handed a note here that says:

There were several charts recovered from the submarine that was beached at Bellows Field. These are now held and will be produced by Captain Layton.

Mr. Murphy. I understand there was more than one there, that was why I asked about it.

There were certain corrections, Admiral, made in the record as a result of the testimony of the previous questioner, the Senator from Maine, and do we have in the exhibit which will be offered a copy of each of the papers from which you read, each of the orders?

Admiral Inglis. The basis of those corrections are contained in the headquarters Tokyo report.

Mr. Murphy. Which is part of the exhibit, as I understand it.

Admiral Inglis. Which is part of the exhibit.

Mr. Murphy. And, counsel, it will be offered?

Mr. Gesell. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I have no other questions, Admiral, except to say that I expect and hope that all of the originals will, insofar
as possible, be made available for the inspection of the entire committee.

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; they will, sir.

Mr. Murphy. No other questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Inglis, when you received this present data—now, I am talking about the data prior to the MacArthur data—who evaluated it so that you might put it in your statement?

Admiral Inglis. Commander Hindmarsh and Lieutenant Kurts, who are now sitting at my right elbow, did most of the work on that.

Senator Ferguson. Who else worked on it?

Admiral Inglis. A Lieutenant Ebb also worked on these and much of the source material was in the form of translations received from the Southwestern Pacific area headquarters.

Senator Ferguson. Was it evaluated out in the field at all?

Admiral Inglis. It received an evaluation in the field and then a second evaluation here in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what evaluation are we getting in your statement, the one that was made in the field or the one that was made here?

Admiral Inglis. Fundamentally you are getting the evaluation made here. However, there is no conflict of significance between the two evaluations.

Senator Ferguson. When was it evaluated?

Admiral Inglis. The people who have been doing this work have been working on it since the middle of June of this year.

Senator Ferguson. I see by the press that Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State, made a statement using some of this information. Do you know who evaluated it for Mr. Byrnes?

Let the record show Admiral Inglis is conferring with his aides.

The Chairman. He might also give the names of his aides and their qualifications, that he conferred with.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. The evaluation which has been presented to the committee, that is, the evaluation before it was affected by the last two documents, in substance was presented to the Secretary of the Navy—I mean the Secretary of State, some time ago.

Senator Ferguson. I notice also by the press that the Secretary of the Navy used a certain amount of this data. Who evaluated his information?

Admiral Inglis. He received a copy of the same document that was presented to the Secretary of State.

Senator Ferguson. And when was that document presented to the Secretary of State?

Admiral Inglis. I haven't got that date at hand, but we can get it.

Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Would you be able to get the document itself that was given to the Secretary of State as well as to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Counsel General Mitchell, will you get that then for the committee?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.¹

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5352.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I will ask you, Admiral, when these gentlemen, your aides here, evaluated this information did they use the diplomatic messages between Japan and America?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I want to make that quite clear, that none of the material contained in this presentation was obtained from cryptanalytical sources.

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. Did they use in order that they may evaluate the evidence that they obtained from the Japanese prisoners and evidence that they obtained from maps, and so forth, did they also check it with the diplomatic messages?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know as an intelligence officer how you could evaluate that and not check it with the diplomatic messages from Japan?

Admiral Inglis. We evaluated it by checking with all of the source material which we had available. We did not have available to us the cryptanalytical material which the Senator has just mentioned.

[524] Senator Ferguson. In other words, you did not have in your possession when you evaluated this for the committee, Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, and so forth, which is the instrument with the yellow cover on it?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; we did not have them.

Senator Ferguson. It is Exhibit No. 2 in this case. Have you ever had this?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then you made this evaluation of the Japanese information from prisoners when you had in your files at least, direct evidence from the Japanese officials, and did not use this official information to evaluate evidence?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I call the Senator's attention to the fact that Exhibit 2 does not contain any Japanese intercepts; this Exhibit 2 contains messages passing to and from Tokyo.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that, but they gave an outline of the source of their information, and they intimated that certain sources were used, and certain sources were not used.

Now, I want to refer you to this instrument which is marked "Exhibit No. 2," and call your attention to page 22. Have you got a copy of it?

[525] Admiral Inglis. I have not got a copy of it. I have never seen a copy. Those messages were not in the files of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. Will you refer to page 22?

Admiral Inglis. If I may have a copy; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Here is one.

Mr. Gesell. What page is that?

Senator Ferguson. Page 22.

(A document was handed to Admiral Inglis.)

Senator Ferguson. This is from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 3, 1941.

Admiral Inglis. I have it before me.

Senator Ferguson. You have it?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you make inquiry to see whether or not that instrument was not translated in the rough and in the posses-
sion of the Navy by 1:30 and not later than 2 o'clock on December 6, 1941? Do you know whether that is a fact?

Admiral Inglis. I do not understand your question, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I want to know from your aides whether or not that instrument was not translated in the rough and in the possession of the Navy at 1:30 and not later than 2 o'clock on December 6, 1941?

Admiral Inglis. I cannot answer that question, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to ask if your aides know.

Admiral Inglis. They cannot either. If you will let me complete my answer?

Senator Ferguson. I will let you complete it.

Admiral Inglis. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. I will let you complete it. Go ahead.

Admiral Inglis. I would like to say all of this crypt analytical material comes in the cognizance of Naval Communications, rather than Naval Intelligence. There are several witnesses who are listed to appear before the committee who can give first-hand knowledge or evidence along this line. I cannot.

Senator Ferguson. You cannot?

Admiral Inglis. No.

Senator Ferguson. Look on page 23, to the KGMB want ads. Was that considered by the evaluators when you gave your statement?

Admiral Inglis. I am informed that the material was obtained by us from another source.

Senator Ferguson. As a matter of fact, it was obtained from the Army staff here in Virginia, was it not, at Fort Knox?

Admiral Inglis. Our source was a man by the name of Otto Kuhn who was interrogated on this subject.

Senator Ferguson. He was later tried, was he not, in Hawaii?

Admiral Inglis. I understand that he was; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now you say that the Navy's source of this information was Kuhn and not a translation?

Admiral Inglis. I say that the source available to my staff was Kuhn.

Senator Ferguson. Kuhn was not apprehended until after the 7th of December, was he?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did your staff use that instrument or that information in evaluating the Japanese information?

Admiral Inglis. It was considered. That was considered, but it was also understood from another source that that particular scheme or system was not actually used, and therefore it was not considered.

Senator Ferguson. Give us that source.

Mr. Murphy. While they are looking for it, will the gentleman yield for one observation?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, the exhibit says it was not translated until 12/11/41, and then in parentheses (7). I do not know what that (7) means.

Senator Ferguson. We will develop later it was translated on the 6th at noon.
Admiral Inglis. In reply to the Senator’s question I would like to quote from a carbon copy of an enclosure to an endorsement which is contained in a letter received through naval channels originating in the Fourteenth Naval District.

On page 10, paragraph 13, of this carbon copy appears the following:

The KGMB want ads morning programs from November 24 to December 8, 1941, were checked by FBI Honolulu with negative results in locating any coded phrases regarding the Chinese rug, chicken farm, or beauty-parlor operator. It appears unlikely that phrases regarding the German attaché, had they appeared on this program during the period in question, would have gone unnoticed by the agency conducting that investigation.

[529] Senator Ferguson. Did they examine the original broadcasts or scripts?

Admiral Inglis. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do we understand then there is quite a bit of controversy on these items you have given us? Are we to understand that you evaluated it without using any of these codes or the coded messages?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And we also understand that they did not use in any way diplomatic messages?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether more weight was given to the information obtained from the so-called prisoners of war than was given to the MacArthur information, that came directly from the Navy in Tokyo?

Admiral Inglis. There was very little conflict between the two. Where there was conflict, all I can say is we resolved the conflict and gave the material which in our judgment most accurately presented the case.

Senator Ferguson. Now will you look on page 452 of our transcript—I will withdraw that.

Are the ads that you cannot substantiate from the same evidence as this message “Climb Mount Niitaka”?

Admiral Inglis. Are the ads from the same evidence as the message “Climb Mount Niitaka”? [530] Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Inglis. What is the Senator’s question?

Senator Ferguson. Is it from the same source as the rug ads and the climb the mountain?

Admiral Inglis. It is mentioned in the same document but not from the same source.

Senator Ferguson. Isn’t it in the same interview?

Admiral Inglis. No, Sir. The want ad, the paragraph about the KGMB want ads is derived from the FBI investigation in Honolulu. The “Climb Mount Niitaka” material is derived from one prisoner of war and one Japanese who was interrogated after VJ-day.

[531] Senator Ferguson. Was not the clue, though, from the same source, the information that you were investigating?

Admiral Inglis. The pilot Shiga, who was interrogated at Sasibo, and the report of his interrogation contained in this last document which we just received Friday, did mention a want ad code.

Senator Ferguson. He mentioned the want ad code, did he not?

Admiral Inglis. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you accept, at his suggestion, the climbing of the mountain and not the want ad proposition? Do you have any reason for that?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir. The item about climbing the mountain was also mentioned by another Japanese prisoner of war, and had some confirmation. The item about the KGMB want ads had been investigated by the FBI in Honolulu and could not be confirmed. In fact, the information seemed to be negative. Therefore, the "climb Mount Niitaka" was included and the KGMB want ads was not.

Senator Ferguson. In the United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area Weekly Intelligence, the one you gave to the committee, states the information as to climbing Mount Niitaka was in Order No. 1, combined fleet secret order No. 1, that is, that was his memory of it?

[553] Admiral Inglis. We have no positive evidence of that. Senator. If I may give you as complete a story as possible on that, I would like to do it. at this point, sir, on this "climb Mount Niitaka."

Senator Ferguson. Will you wait until I get through, and then give your version of it.

Admiral Inglis. Certainly.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look on page 11 of the analysis there of the lieutenant, and see what he says about this Mount Niitaka?

Admiral Inglis. What page?


Admiral Inglis. Can you identify the document?

Mr. Mitchell. Page 11 of what document, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to point it out. There [indicating].

Admiral Inglis. Paragraph 14, about the Japanese consulate general?

Senator Ferguson. No; paragraph 15.

Admiral Inglis. I have that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?

Admiral Inglis (reading): Inasmuch as Shiga's information was reportedly given to him by another officer aboard the Akagi following the attack, its accuracy is subject to some doubt.

[553] Senator Ferguson. And who says that? Is that Lieutenant Peterson of the United States Navy?

Admiral Inglis. R. H. Peterson, lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve, signed that report; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. With that doubt in mind, then, and with MacArthur's information as to order No. 1, do you still place much credence to that information? Order No. 1, as far as the MacArthur information is concerned, does not include that at all, does it?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. We still think——

Senator Ferguson (interposing). Did you analyze it with that in mind?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, let the witness answer the question.

The Chairman. Let the witness complete his answer.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Admiral Inglis. We still think that the statement made in the presentation is the best estimate that we can make, sir, because it was partially confirmed from another source.
Senator Ferguson. Where is that source?

Admiral Inglis. That source was a Japanese prisoner of war, who was captured at Saipan in the Marianas campaign.

In his interrogation—remember, please, this was a year before VJ-day—in his interrogation, he said it had been planned to use that phrase "climb Mount Niitaka" to confirm the launching of the attack. However, he did not say, and was not able to say, that that phrase was ever actually used. He did not know whether or not it had ever been received.

So in the first draft all mention of "climb Mount Niitaka" was omitted, because it could not be confirmed. Then later on when we got this other report from Shiga which said he had been out with the Japanese striking force, and that the message had been received. We then felt there was sufficient confirmation of that to incorporate it into the presentation.

Senator Ferguson. But operational order No. 1, that is, what purports to be operational order No. 1, does not contain it?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. There were a number of things from operation order No. 1 which had been deleted. Presumably the Japanese did not give operation order No. 1 in full to any ships except those which were in the striking force. I presume that would be for security reasons. There was no need to give it to those who did not need to know it. Therefore operation order No. 1, which we had and which was captured in the Nachi, which was not in the striking force, had some deletion from the operational order, and it is quite possible "climb Mount Niitaka" was one of the deletions since the Nachi was not one of the striking force.

Senator Ferguson. Why do you say it was possible? Was there anything in there about climbing the mountain?

Admiral Inglis. There was nothing in the operation order No. 1 which we received that mentioned "climb Mount Niitaka."

Senator Ferguson. You received it from two sources, one from the ship and one from the MacArthur source, is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. You are referring to "climb Mount Niitaka"?

Senator Ferguson. No; I am talking about operation order No. 1.

Admiral Inglis. Operation order No. 1 that we had was received before VJ-day. It was translated from a document captured from the Japanese cruiser Nachi.

Senator Ferguson. Did you also get a copy of it, or information concerning it, from MacArthur?

Mr. Mitchell. MacArthur's report does not contain it. His report states that the documents in Japan, in Tokyo, had been destroyed.

Admiral Inglis. The MacArthur report contains some reference to operation order No. 1, but does not contain the operation order itself.

Senator Ferguson. Did it give any information or any intimation that the information given about climbing the mountain was on the same day?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can you account why our Navy has not the record at least of receiving the messages sent to this fleet?

Admiral Inglis. I have no specific information on that. Again, that would come from Naval Communications rather than from me.
Senator Ferguson. Did you make any check to ascertain whether or not we intercepted the radio at the time it was sent, and this information is in line with that radio interception?

Admiral Inglis. I made no such check, because the instructions were to exclude from my presentation anything from a cryptanalytical source.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Will you state that again? Is your answer that you were supposed to exclude from your presentation any decoded messages?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir, on the understanding it would be brought before the committee by later witnesses.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

[537] The Chairman. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to make the observation that Captain Layton is coming, and that he will be available on the very subject about which he is asking the witness.

Senator Ferguson. I am concerned now with one thing, and that is about the instructions to the admiral, not to use in his information anything that was decoded.

Mr. Mitchell. I can answer that.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would.

Mr. Mitchell. The instructions to the admiral were to prepare a statement of the Japanese attack from Japanese sources, and confine himself to that, and that is what I think he has tried to do. These things you refer to are not Japanese sources at all. The full information about all these intercepts is going to be covered by other witnesses. The admiral was asked not to present anything except what he had obtained from the Japanese.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, the decoded messages are certainly from Japanese sources.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I did not so treat them in my instructions to the admiral.

[538] The Chairman. Decoded messages would be messages decoded by the War or Navy Department. As far as the Navy Department is concerned, they would be here in the possession of the Navy and not in the possession of Japanese prisoners of war; isn't that true?

Admiral Inglis. That is true, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now going back, Admiral, have you any reason why you did not use the source of information that came from the Japs prior to the outbreak of the war, the bombing, that we decoded and which came from the prisoners after the attack?

Admiral Inglis. We used all the information from the prisoners. We did not use any of the information from cryptanalytical sources, because we did not have access to the latter, and it was not within the scope of the instructions which we received.

Senator Ferguson. And was it also because of the instructions from counsel?

Admiral Inglis. It was the instructions which my staff received. I suppose they originated with counsel.

Senator Ferguson. And did the exclusion that you were not to use the information also exclude the so-called diplomatic intercepts?
Admiral Inglis. It did, sir.

[539] Senator Ferguson. And also the information in our white papers, our messages? Did it exclude that, that you were not to consider that when you were giving us an evaluation of the evidence?

Admiral Inglis. I do not know what the Senator refers to as the "white paper."

Senator Ferguson. You do not know what the white papers are?

Admiral Inglis. Not by that name, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The papers that have been printed, the information by the State Department that may be known to you as peace or war.

Admiral Inglis. I think the Senator refers to a State Department paper which did not contain any reference to deciphered or cryptanalytical material.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

Admiral Inglis. And that material was used in making up this presentation, or at least it was considered.

Senator Ferguson. Was that from Japanese sources?

Admiral Inglis. That was from the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Was the original source the Japanese? Will you find out? In other words, the messages on the diplomatic relations, November 20, to our State Department, was that considered in evaluating any of this information?

[540] Admiral Inglis. I am informed by my staff that that was considered by them as background, but no quotations were made from it.

Senator Ferguson. I see one statement in the MacArthur information, and I want to know what credit they gave, and what value they gave this question No. 12.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman give the page number?

Senator Ferguson. They are not paged. It is under November 1, 1945.

When was the final confirmation of this plan made?

Answer. 1 December, 1941.

Have you got it before you?

Admiral Inglis. I have that; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And now will you turn to operational order under October 26, 1945, the letter of transmittal, and then read under "(a)" the information? Will you read that? Have you got the instrument I am talking about?

Admiral Inglis. I will read it, if I can find it. Senator Ferguson. I have the first reference which you made, December 1, 1941. You say this is the other document?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[541] Admiral Inglis. The first reference which the Senator made—

Senator Ferguson. Read the imperial order.

Admiral Inglis. On page 3, paragraph 1 (a), 3 (a):

Imperial Naval Order, issued 2 December:
The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire—

Senator Ferguson. No. Read No. 1, the imperial naval order, No. 1.
Admiral Inglis. No. 1:

Imperial Naval Order, issued 1 December. Japan under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start action will be given later.

Senator Ferguson. Now, going over to 12, that I read into the record, when was the final confirmation of this plan made, the 1st of December 1941, is that correct?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman. Will the Senator from Michigan yield to the Congressman from Pennsylvania?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. In the broadcast of the 5th of December, which might be what the gentleman is looking for, there was a [543] message:

In reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon.

That seems to be pointing to some additional order. That is on page 294 of the examination of Captain Layton in the Hewitt report.

Senator Ferguson. Have you, Admiral, any information as to what the Congressman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, is speaking about?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; I have not had that message available.

Senator Ferguson. Have you had the privilege of talking with Captain Layton?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You haven’t discussed this with him?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What date do you say that the fleet left the bay in Japan?

Admiral Inglis. The actual time of departure was 9 a.m., November 26, Japan time.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar in the diplomatic messages that there had been a time limit of the 25th put on the negotiations, that they had to be ended by the 25th?

[543] Admiral Inglis. No, sir, I am not familiar with that.

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the fact that then it was extended to the 29th?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. I may have some vague recollection of reading something like that in the newspapers.

Senator Ferguson. Would you know of anything that would make the date of leaving, which is the 26th, being the 25th here—is it not?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The same date as the order from CNO to divert all shipping south and to start convoys—is there any relation between those two?

Admiral Inglis. There is no relationship that I know of; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have you tried to analyze those dates, that they are on the same date?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir; that hadn’t occurred to me.
Senator Ferguson. Will you ask your aides and see if they put any
significance on those dates?

Admiral Inglis. I am sorry I can't be helpful, Senator. [544]
The staff who prepared the Japanese plan are not the staff who pre-
pared the American plan and the staff who prepared the Japanese plan
felt that that was not relevant to their plan and wouldn't attempt to
make any evaluation.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not—when was the
time, what was the date of the order to “Climb Mount Niitaka”?
Admiral Inglis. Climb Mount Niitaka?
Senator Ferguson. The 3d of December?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir; that was later than that. Our informa-
tion is that that message was received by the Japanese striking force
on the 5th of December, Hawaiian time.

Senator Ferguson. 5th of December, Hawaiian time?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That would be on the 6th, our time?
Admiral Inglis. On the 6th, Japan time.
Senator Ferguson. Japan time?
Admiral Inglis. Not our time. On the 5th, Hawaiian time.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Inglis. Which would be the 6th, Japanese time,
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, have you made a search to ascertain
whether or not any of our monitor systems, any of our radios picked
that message up?
Admiral Inglis. No, sir. That again would come under communi-
cations rather than intelligence. I think that later [545] wit-
nesses can give a better answer than I on that.

Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. I don’t believe we quite understand what these
gentlemen have been asked do. In the outline of the case and the
nature of the proof which was furnished to the committee on the 2d
of November is found first an analysis of the attack from the Amer-
ican point of view and second the attack from the Jap point of view
and it contains this statement:

The Jap plan will be reconstructed from captured plans and statements made
by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.

Now, these gentlemen haven’t been asked to go into the other fields,
crypt analytical things, and they are really not prepared to do it,
because their instructions were to confine themselves to a reconstruction
of the Jap plan as far as they could from captured plans and statements made
by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.

All this material, about the diplomatic intercepts and exchanges,
and other crypt analytical material, was all listed on our analysis here
for presentation by other witnesses.

Senator Ferguson. I am not going to spend much time on it.

Mr. Mitchell. I think your questions are pertinent, Senator, but I
think other proof will cover it.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out what weight we [546]
should give, as a committee, to this testimony, and since we have the
General MacArthur statements, I ask, Mr. Chairman, I note from what
counsel has said that they were not asked for, therefore I ask that the
information from General MacArthur be made a part of the record.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. That request was made 15 or 20 minutes ago by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Senator Ferguson. Has it been made a part of the record?
Mr. Murphy. Counsel said he would offer it and make it a part of
the record.
Mr. Mitchell. I proposed to do that several days ago.
The Chairman. I am quite certain it wasn’t necessary for either of
the members of the committee to ask counsel to make that a part of
the record but now that it is done it will be done.
Senator Ferguson. That is all I have at the present time.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few questions.
Admiral, when I had you under examination on Friday last, I asked
you to supply any evidence that might be available in reference to the
condition of the ships in Pearl Harbor.
[547] Admiral Inglis. You asked that, I believe, to be furnished
through the usual Navy liaison channels, and I would like to recom-
mandat this time to the Congressman that Captain Kniskern, of the
Bureau of Ships, I believe, is best informed on that subject.
Mr. Gearhart. K-i-s-k-e-r-n?
Admiral Inglis. That is right, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Was Captain Kniskern at Pearl Harbor at the time
of the catastrophe and before?
Admiral Inglis. I don’t think so, but he has made a detailed study
of all the reports for the Bureau of Ships.
Mr. Gearhart. I wonder if I could have those reports upon which
which he has based his conclusions; is that possible?
Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; I presume it is, although I would hazard
a guess they are very voluminous.
Mr. Gearhart. Who was commander of the Task Force No. 1 on
that day?
Admiral Inglis. Admiral Pye.
Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire of counsel if Admiral Pye will be one
of the witnesses?
Mr. Mitchell. He is on the list.
Mr. Gearhart. Who was the executive officer of Task Force No. 1?
Admiral Inglis. We don’t have an executive officer of the [548]
task force commander. The chief of staff, I think, was then Captain
Train, although I am not positive.
Mr. Gearhart. Is the chief of staff second in command?
Admiral Inglis. He is the chief of staff. Very often another officer
in the task force may be senior to the chief of staff and would succeed
to the command in case of disability of the commander. But the chief
of staff is the senior staff officer and next senior to the admiral on his
own personal staff in his official family.
Mr. Gearhart. Who is the officer in such a fighting contingent who
would have possession of all orders, written and unwritten, which
would have to do with the management of the task force?

1 See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2677-2678; see also Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127.
Admiral Inglis. I would think that the flag secretary would probably come closest to that.

Mr. Gearhart. May I ask counsel if he will be a witness?

Mr. Mitchell. I don’t know who he was. What task force are you referring to?

Mr. Gearhart. Task Force No. 1, under the command of Vice Admiral Pye.

Mr. Mitchell. We haven’t listed him.

Mr. Gearhart. Can you tell me the name of the officer you have just mentioned?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir. The Navy will try to find that out for you.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you received any report on why the one battleship was in drydock?

Admiral Inglis. I haven’t got the information as to why she was in dock; no, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. The battleship that was in drydock on December 7, 1941, was the battleship Pennsylvania; is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Who issued the orders for the lining up of the battleships in Pearl Harbor opposite Ford Island in pairs?

Admiral Inglis. That was contained in a circular letter issued by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and contained the berthing plan for the ships in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Gearhart. Has that order been supplied for the record yet?

Mr. Mitchell. No, Your Honor.

Mr. Gesell. Talking about 2CL41, Security of Fleet at Base in Operating Areas? I think that is the one you are talking about.

Mr. Mitchell. That is not in port, is it? That is in operating areas.

Admiral Inglis. In order to save time, I will say this in response to the Congressman’s questions, that if that has not already been furnished the committee, it will be furnished.

Mr. Gearhart. What is the date of it?

Admiral Inglis. I don’t know, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Who issued it?

Admiral Inglis. You will remember that the Fourteenth Naval District at that time was under the command of the commander in chief. I think that in all probability the plan issued by Admiral Kimmel would be an outline; the details probably would be carried out by the Fourteenth Naval District. But without the document, I can’t discuss that too accurately.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you recently read the order to which you have just referred?

Admiral Inglis. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I would like to ask you professionally, not so much about what transpired there, but what could transpire there.

What is the descriptive name or term that is applied when the ships are under the highest form of inspection?

Admiral Inglis. I am sorry, Congressman.

1 See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever hear of a military inspection, that phrase being used?

Admiral Inglis. Yes, sir; there is a military inspection and a material inspection.

Mr. Gearhart. All right, military inspection, is that the term under which you have the most complete inspection of [552] vessels?

Admiral Inglis. They cover two different subjects. The material inspection covers a very searching inspection of the material condition of the ship. Its state of corrosion, or lack of corrosion, the structural strength of the ship and condition of machinery. Military inspection is directed more toward inspection of the efficiency or effectiveness of the ship as a fighting unit of the fleet and includes such factors as the state of discipline among the crew, and the effectiveness of the battery, matters of that kind.

Mr. Gearhart. You can have a military or a material inspection of an entire contingent, or it can be directed to special ships within the contingent; is that correct?

Admiral Inglis. The usual practice is to have a progressive schedule of inspections. In general, the division commander would inspect the ships of his own division, and it is quite possible that inspection of two ships might coincide on the same day, but as a general rule they probably would be staggered throughout the year.

Mr. Gearhart. What are the names of the ships, the battleships, which were in Pearl Harbor on the day of the catastrophe, that did not belong to Task Force No. 1?

Admiral Inglis. I haven’t that information readily available, sir. [553] Mr. Gearhart. You know as a matter of fact that Task Force No. 1 had six battleships, did you not?

Admiral Inglis. I don’t know, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. As regular contingents?

Admiral Inglis. I don’t know; I haven’t got that information.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you happen to know from other sources that there were three battleships in the harbor at the time of the attack which belonged to Task Force No. 2?

Admiral Inglis. I am sorry; I don’t know the organization of the task forces by ships.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, when Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands on his missions, or task, leaving behind three battleships in the harbor, under whose command would those three battleships be during his absence?

Admiral Inglis. In the case which the Congressman has cited, I believe they would be under Commander of Battleships, who was Admiral Anderson.

Mr. Gearhart. Where was Admiral Anderson headquartered at that time? Where was he stationed?

Admiral Inglis. His headquarters would be on a battleship. We haven’t the information here as to which battleship it was. Probably the West Virginia.

Mr. Gearhart. In the harbor?

[554] Admiral Inglis. The West Virginia was in the harbor, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, when Admiral Halsey left with his Task Force No. 2, leaving behind his three battleships in the harbor, where
Task Force No. 1 was anchored, would those three battleships become attached to Task Force No. 1 subject to the orders of Admiral Pye?

Admiral Inglis. Not necessarily, sir; the organization by task forces differs from the administrative organization, and in this case that you cite, the battleships would have fallen under the commander, the administrative commander, rather than the task force commander.

Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire of distinguished counsel, whether there will be a witness here who can give testimony on that subject?

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, these gentlemen have only been prepared within narrow limits to testify here. Of course they can't furnish all of the information that the committee ought to have and is anxious to have.

Mr. Gesell. And which we are anxious to present.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, and which we are anxious to present, but we can't try the whole case with one witness. We have a lot more down the line, witnesses who have personal knowledge of these things.

[555] Mr. Gearhart. I am very anxious to know the details.

Mr. Mitchell. I appreciate that.

Mr. Gearhart. I am hoping I can get them a little in advance.

Now, referring to your statement of yesterday, to your description of Operational Order No. 1, and Operational Order No. 2——

The Chairman. If the Congressman will permit, the hour of 12 o'clock has arrived, and unless he can conclude very soon, we might recess here.

Mr. Gearhart. Very well.
The Chairman. Until 2 o'clock, then.
(Whereupon at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2:00 p.m., of the same day.)

[556] Afternoon session—2 p.m.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

When the committee recessed, Congressman Gearhart was examining the witness. He may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

Mr. Gearhart. I notice, Admiral, from your report, that in your report given to this committee, I find the following words, which I will read:

Under date of 7 November, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2, saying "First Preparations for War. Y Day will be December 8." In accordance with the definition of Y Day as given in Operation Order No. 1, this establishes December 8 only as the approximate date for commencement of operations. An Imperial Naval Order issued from the Imperial General Headquarters under date of 2 December 1941 states: "The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on 8 December." This order is in effect the announcement of X Day as defined in Operation Order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative approximate date for the attack selected on 7 November and defined as Y Day is reaffirmed on 2 December as X Day. In other words, the original tentative date (Y Day) and the final precise date (X Day) are in fact the same date.

[557] That is the end of your statement.

In the light of that testimony, and substantiation of it, I desire to read an abstract of certain decoded or cracked Japanese messages, which are referred to in the memorandum of the Judge Advocate General for the Secretary of War.
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Report.

The first one is:

5 November translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy, setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort.

The next one I desire to read is the following:

16 November translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline to 25 November and to press negotiations with the United States.

The third one, 19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the United States consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off."

The next one, I call the committee’s attention to is the following:

22. November translated 22 November, Tokyo to Washington. [558] Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute deadline. After that things are automatically going to happen.

The next one I desire to read from this same summary of the Judge Advocate General is the following:


Now, I read one more:

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. States that in spite of Ambassador’s superhuman efforts the United States has “presented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as a basis for negotiations.” Therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days. After that negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield?

Mr. Gearhart. And finally, and in conclusion of my readings from the summary of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, I read this one:

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.

I thought it would be very interesting, because it [559] absolutely sustains the position here.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield to a question?

Mr. Gearhart. I have concluded.

The Chairman. Was that a question or a statement?

Mr. Murphy. I am making a request, asking the gentleman from California whether he will yield.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to inquire of the gentleman from California whether what he read was in the nature of a question or a statement on his part.

Mr. Gearhart. As I read it, it is a statement, but I can convert it very quickly into a question by asking the witness:

Are you familiar with those documents?

Admiral Inglis. Officially, no; but they do sound strangely familiar to my ears. I may have read them in the newspapers or certain portions of them.

[560] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?

Mr. Gearhart. I have concluded.

The Chairman. You decline to yield?

Mr. Gearhart. No, I don't; I said I have concluded. If the gentleman wants to make a statement he can be recognized in his own right.

Mr. Murphy. This time is in the hands, as I understand it, of the gentleman from California.

What I wanted to say was that the paper to which he referred, the Army Pearl Harbor Board report from which he read, those very same messages are already in evidence in this case in Exhibit No. 2.

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit No. 1, I believe.

Mr. Murphy. Exhibit No. 1.

Mr. Gearhart. I wanted them at this point.

Mr. Murphy. I also wanted to make this request before the gentleman concluded his questioning, if he would yield.

There has been a request made for the log and certain other papers from the Boise. According to the newspapers it is in connection with whether or not the Boise had sighted the enemy force on the way to Pearl Harbor.

In connection with that I want to make the request that the officer in charge of the Boise be produced at the time of the logging and that the general officer of the ship who was the informant of the gentleman from California also be produced so that we might have the information first-hand.  

The Chairman. Give the name to counsel.

Mr. Murphy. I don't know the name, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mitchell. We have already taken steps to get the log of the Boise. I don't know who her commander was, but if he is still alive he will be produced.

Mr. Murphy. I understand the log itself will show certain notations, but since the gentleman from California has raised the issue I think we ought to have before us the informant, who was an officer of the Boise and the officer in command of the Boise, so that we might give the American people a full picture.

The Chairman. Will the Navy furnish the committee the name of the commander of the Boise?

Admiral Inglis. The committee has been furnished the names of Commander Robertson and Commander Moran. Perhaps the gentleman from California can repeat the name of his informant. I am not sure that I know that, sir.

Mr. Murphy. May I request the gentleman from California, Mr. Chairman, to state the name of the officer who was his informant about the Boise incident so that the committee, and the American people, might have all the facts?

Mr. Gearhart. I will have to obtain the name from my files in my office.

Furthermore, I am not a witness on the stand and I am not subject to cross-examination by any member of the committee, unless called as a witness.

If you think that I am going to divulge of my informants you have seven or eight guesses coming. Anybody who gives me information can rely on the fact that their confidences will be kept.

1 The log was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 68.
The Chairman. The Chair would simply observe that if members of the committee do not wish to be put in the attitude of witnesses they ought not to testify.

Mr. Gearhart. I hope the Chairman follows his own admonition. The Chairman. I have done so up to now and will try to do so in the future, Congressman.

Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions by any member of the committee of Admiral Ingris?

Senator Ferguson. One question. I think Admiral Ingris, when I was examining him, wanted to make a statement, and I suggested that he wait. I would like to have him make that statement now. I don’t want him to feel that he was not allowed to make it.

The Vice Chairman. I made a note at the time. The Admiral indicated that he wanted to make some further statement about the “Climb Mt. Niitaka” message.

Senator Ferguson. I wanted him to have the privilege of making any statement for the record that he desired.

Admiral Ingris. Thank you, Senator. I have already cleared up that point to my own satisfaction.

Senator Ferguson. By the questioning?

Admiral Ingris. Yes; just following that question.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. I should like to make one observation in view of the colloquy between Congressman Murphy and Congressman Gearhart.

It does seem to me that if we are going to obtain all the facts, that any informant, or any individual who has any knowledge about Pearl Harbor, the full committee should know about that individual. The name of that individual should be given to counsel in order that he, that individual, may be requested to come and testify, and if he does not want to testify, and we think his evidence is pertinent and material, he should be subpoenaed. That is the only way you are going to get all of the facts which, as one member of the committee, [56a] I want.

These rumors that are being spread by individuals and are occasionally used, at least as a portion of the truth, we should be able to get to the bottom of those rumors.

The Congressman from California says that anyone who wants to tell him anything will have his confidence, which means that he is not going to give to the committee the name of that individual, and yet we are asking, all of us are asking the Navy and the Army witnesses to give us the facts completely.

That is what we want and certainly if any member of the committee has the name of an important witness about Pearl Harbor, who hasn’t the courage to come before the committee and tell his story, then, it seems to me, such information, or statements, should be seriously discounted.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. I want to say for the benefit of the distinguished Senator from Illinois that I intend to exercise a wise discretion in the
matter of revealing the names of those who give me information, and if any citizen of this country comes to me and gives me valuable information which will lead me to believe he is a proper witness to be placed upon the stand I will call that witness' name to the attention of the [565] committee and I will keep the confidence of the man who tells me of that witness and the testimony that he will give.

If I am to be deprived of the right, or if any member of the committee is to be denied the right of receiving information from people by reason of the necessity of revealing their name, that means that you have closed the door of investigation in our face. I can't think of any better way of discouraging people from coming forward than to announce in advance that any information they convey will result in their own subjection to publicity and perhaps to personal embarrassment. I will keep their confidence, if it should be kept.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the Congressman from California concluded?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. The Chair wishes to make this observation, that the record will show that in order to obtain the fullest information from those in the Government services, whether they are in the military services or in civilian life, the President issued an order lifting any ban against them coming forward and giving to the committee, or to its counsel, or to individual members of the committee, any information they had in their possession, or thought they had, [566] which had not otherwise been disclosed.

It has been the understanding, at least it has been my understanding, that when any such person came forward and gave to the committee or its counsel information, that that information would be divulged and the name of the informer would be brought to the attention of the committee, so that it might determine whether to call such person as a witness.

There was no need for lifting of the ban so far as persons not in the Government services are concerned. Not only are they free, but I think it is their duty to come forward and give to the committee, or any member of the committee, or committee counsel, any information that they have that will shed light upon this Pearl Harbor situation.

In view of the fact that it was understood that any person in the Government of the United States, in any capacity, who came forward with information to the members of the committee, the member receiving such information would make it known to the committee. The Chair, of course, has no desire to regulate the attitude of any member on that subject. The very object of lifting the ban, so far as Government employees was concerned, was so that the committee might have all the information.

[567] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. I might say the only reason I brought up the subject is that I understand from reading the papers that the gentleman from California was informed by someone of the crew, an officer of the Hōise, as to something relative to the Japanese force having been sighted. That is a question now that we have to decide and certainly that is pertinent evidence; it is important evidence.
If there is an eye-witness in the world, we ought to have him, and if the gentleman from California knows of that eye-witness, I think he ought to put his name on the record.

Mr. KEFFE. Mr. Chairman—
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEFFE. As one member of this committee, down at the tail end, the last one, may I suggest that I am interested in getting on with this proceeding. Let's call the witnesses and get the facts. I would like to get on with this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes enthusiastically to confirm and commend the gentleman from Wisconsin in that desire.

Are there any further questions by any member of the committee of Admiral Inglis?

(No response.)

[568] The CHAIRMAN. Is there any further question any member desires to ask Colonel Thielen?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. If not, the Chair will—

Does the admiral wish to make any further statement?

Admiral INGLIS. I think I can make one statement that may be helpful to the committee. It concerns the Japanese operation order No. 1. I just want to clear up one point that might be confusing.

The copy of this order which we have does not specifically direct the striking force to attack Pearl Harbor. An examination of the document shows that an attempt was made by the Japanese to delete all reference to the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Apparently this was done before the document was forwarded by the Japanese to the heavy cruiser Nachi, because the Nachi was not allocated to the Pearl Harbor striking force.

However, apparently, due to an oversight by the Japanese official who forwarded this to the Nachi, several brief references to the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor were left in the document as recovered from the Nachi.

That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to thank Admiral Inglis [569] and Colonel Thielen on behalf of the committee for the diligence with which you have carried out the assignment given you, in undertaking to bring to the attention of the committee a vivid picture of what happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the circumstances surrounding it.

The Chair feels that you are entitled to have it said that you have both had a very distinguished career in the armed services of the United States.

I understand that you, Admiral, were appointed to Annapolis, the Naval Academy, from the State of Michigan, by Congressman Woodruff, who is still a member of the House of Representatives, and that you have had, in service in World War I, and World War II, an outstanding record, that you have been cited numerous times, decorated for that service. It is a matter about which I know you would not speak, but I want to commend your enthusiasm and your diligence and commend you for the patriotic service that you have rendered the United States in World War No. I and in World War II.

To you, Colonel Thielen, I wish to say that the committee thanks you.
You were appointed, as I understand it, to West Point by competitive examination from the Army, and that you have also had a distinguished career in the Army and have rendered outstanding service in this war, have been decorated and cited a number of times for heroic service, evidence of which you bear upon your bosom, and on behalf of the committee I wish to thank you and commend you for the task which you undertook and for what seems to the Chair to be a successful accomplishment of that task.

Admiral Ingris. Thank you very much.

Colonel ThieLen. Thank you.

The Chairman. Who is the next witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. Mitchell. We will first offer in evidence as exhibit 8, the material from the War Department, which contributed to the summary of the Japanese attack. This includes the preliminary message from General MacArthur's headquarters, dated October 14, the follow-up message of October 15, and then the other documents which he sent along by air mail, and which have been referred to by the witnesses.

Now, there are many other documents which have been used as the basis of this summary of the story of the Japanese attack, and unless some members of the committee have a different view, I would suggest that instead of being put into the record, and making a big printing job, these documents be just held for the use of the committee members here. If you want them in the record, I will offer them.

[577] The Chairman. Are they sufficiently numerous that each member may have a copy?

Mr. Mitchell. There is only one copy here. We could have a set made of all of them, and if you want them in the record later, we can offer them.

The Chairman. The Chair suggests that for the time being they not be printed as a part of the record, but if members of the committee desire them individually, they can have them.

The Vice Chairman. I didn't quite understand Mr. Mitchell's statement. Are these additional messages, or additional information received from General MacArthur?

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 8 I offered, because one of the members of the committee requested I do so. It includes everything that came from MacArthur.

The Vice Chairman. That is the same one that all of us were given a copy of?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Is there anything in addition to that?

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. I thought you were referring to these Japanese exhibits. Were those the documents you were referring to?

[577] Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 8 includes all the documents that came from the War Department through General MacArthur's headquarters on which the Japanese story of the attack is based.

I offer that separately, because some members of the committee requested me to do so.

If that request had not been made, I would have made the request as to all of this material, both Army and Navy, that we not put it in the record at present, unless somebody wants it, but have it copied and distributed among the members.
The committee already has copies of the MacArthur material.

Senator Brewster. I understood that the request was that the MacArthur material should be in the record. I thought you were now referring to the other exhibits which offered all of these translated Japanese documents, which I think certainly wouldn't be at all necessary to put in the record, but simply have available.

[572] The Vice Chairman. That is just what I am thinking.

The Chairman. That is right. As the Chair understands it, the MacArthur information has already been made part of the record.

Senator Brewster. Is that correct?

The Chairman. Is that correct?

Mr. Mitchell. I have just offered it as Exhibit 8. That is the MacArthur material and I offer it because some members of the committee wanted it in. Now, the Navy material, I have not offered that.

Senator Brewster. Just a minute. I thought that was going in the record.

The Chairman. It is.

Senator Brewster. He is offering it as an exhibit and it is a part of this record and is going to be in the record, is it not?

Mr. Mitchell. Not according to a lawyer's point of view.

The Chairman. Well, the exhibit may or may not be printed in the hearings and it is my understanding that this exhibit is to be printed in the printed record.

Mr. Mitchell. Maybe the Senator, when he speaks of the record, is referring to documents being read in the room and transcribed by the reporter. Is that what you have in mind?

Senator Brewster. When I referred to the record I meant [574] to the typed record which we are receiving as opposed to any exhibits which are, of course, part of the record, but are not incorporated in the printed records.

Mr. Mitchell. This exhibit will not be written out at large in the reporters' transcript, but when the record is made up, the whole record, the exhibit will appear as a part of the record of the committee.

The Chairman. You are speaking now about exhibit 8?

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 8.

The Chairman. Yes. Now, the other exhibit that you referred to, which you suggested not be printed as a part of the hearing, what is that?

Mr. Mitchell. Now, unless some member of the committee thinks it necessary——

The Chairman. What was that exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell. This was the material, the captured documents, statements from captured Japanese war prisoners, that the Navy received.

The Chairman. Is it agreeable then that that be held for the information of the committee subject to later action if it is desired to have them made a part of the hearing?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think they should be made part of the record for only this reason. The people of America want to know all the facts and this hearing is being held for the people of America as well as for the committee [575] and, certainly, these documents are such that in order for the ordinary citizen to judge the record they ought to be spread on the record for them.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, if the Congressman feels that way I would have all the material, both Army and Navy, on which the story of the Jap attack has been based, introduced in evidence and I am doing that in Exhibit 8.

Now, Senator, do you want this MacArthur material transcribed at length in the daily transcript, is that what you want?

Senator Brewster. That was my understanding. You say "at length." It is not, of course, at all at length compared with what we have, but this, it seems to me, to be a most excellent summary, comparable, certainly, to the summary which we received.

The Chairman. Is it the wish of the committee that these exhibits referred to, the MacArthur information, and also the Japanese exhibits upon which the statement has been based, as has been already detailed by Admiral Inglis, be printed now as a part of the daily record of the hearing?

Senator Brewster. As far as I am concerned, I sense counsel's distinction between the MacArthur report and the captured Japanese documents. I think that Representative Murphy's suggestion is that it might be well to have those printed as exhibits as well, but I think that we may want to [576] put them in the transcripts as well.

Mr. Mitchell. Let me see if I can settle it this way:

I offer in evidence as Exhibit 8 all of the material, Army and Navy, on which the story of the Jap attack has been formulated here, with the understanding that that part of Exhibit 8 which came from MacArthur's headquarters will be copied into the daily transcript by the reporter and the Navy material will not, but will be printed later on as a part of the exhibits. That is what you want, is it?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. That is agreeable.

The Chairman. Is that satisfactory?

Senator Brewster. Now, then, that includes the captured Japanese personnel material in the later part of the record, is that correct?

Mr. Mitchell. The Japanese captured material will not be written in the daily typewritten transcript.

Senator Brewster. No.

Mr. Mitchell. But it will be attached to the record as an exhibit.

The Chairman. That is understood then.

(The documents referred to above were marked "Exhibit No. 8," and in part follow herewith.)

[577] 

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE DATED 14 OCTOBER FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary information received from the Japanese Navy is as follows: On 5 November 1941, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack.

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North—170° East by afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Akagi (Akagi), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu
and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines.

Japanese lost 27 aircraft; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships (Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk. [578] 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot down.

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.

[579] confidential

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR’S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

1. We are continuing local investigation.

2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have already been sent to Washington.


AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45) GB

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75361, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ H. W. Allen,
H. W. Allen,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[581] Doc. No. 1668

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

PEARL HARBOR QUESTIONNAIRE

26 October 1945

The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON’S questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack, are contained herein.

Note: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty in the Intelligence Department at that time.
14. Sources of intelligence?
Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES FLEET in the HAWAII area, the condition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet moved out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc.; were used as basic intelligence material. This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff [582] and used as the basis for the operation plan.

The primary sources were:
2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
3. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.
5. General information.

[581]

15. Characteristics of intelligence?
Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of years.

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of the air units obtained?
A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in “14”, beginning in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.
B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled from the sources listed in “14”.
C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force and the air units were determined from information provided by the previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.

17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was underway?
As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in “14” it was forwarded to the Attack Force.

18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII?
None.

19-21. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.
Applicable facts not available.

22. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the attack?
Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of information mentioned in “14”.

[583]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (1 Nov 45) GB

1 November 1945.
Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945), GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 7531, War Sec, 7 October 1945 and WX 75361, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Indl. No. 4 to our communication of 23 October (referred to above) and includes
detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive, thereof.

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interrogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text.

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. Allen,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl. Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[586] Doc. 1032

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel Munson, Historical Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[587] Doc. #1032

DRM/FMO/HDP

[PP. 1] 1. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the information therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded later.

II. The reply to Paragraphs 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people concerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in preparation.

[PP. 2] (Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 are based on the recollections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt Tomioka, Sadatoshi; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Comdr. Miyoko, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt Kuroshima, Kameto, and Comdr. Watanaabe, Yasuji.)

1. Who conceived and proposed the Pearl Harbor surprise attack?
Adm Yamamoto, Isoroku, then Cinc, Combined Fleet.

2. When was this done?
The first part of January 1941. (Cinc Yamamoto ordered Rear Adm Onishi, Takihiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)

3. Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a war against the United States) included in Japan's [588] prewar plans?
No.

4. If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans
(No statement.)

[PP. 3] (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the recollections of Adm Nagano, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

5. When was it decided to attack Pearl Harbor?
3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, when Cinc, Combined Fleet Yamamoto came to Tokyo.

6. Who made the foregoing decision?
Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano.

7. If the decision was made in conference, give time of said conference and names of all persons present.
It was not made in conference.

4. (Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt Tomioka, Sadatoshi, Comdr Miyoko, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operation Sec-
tional Naval General Staff; and Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff.)

8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent [589] the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.

9. Who were the persons who worked out the details of the actual plan?

Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

10. When was the above undertaking started?

In the first part of September 1941.

11. Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

[PP. 5] 12. When was the final confirmation of this plan made?

1 Dec 41.

13. Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?

(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm NAGANO, Osami; Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; and Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)

Those connected with the Navy are as follows:

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:

[590] Chief of the Naval General Staff
Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff
Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff
Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff
The Commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff
Navy Minister
Navy Vice-Minister
Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry
Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some of their personnel
Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.

(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government [591] had been delivered.)

(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. However, it is certain that none of the Japanese officials who were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)

[PP. 7] (Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji; and the commanding officer of the AKAGI Air Unit, Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)

21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved.

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome.

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the [592] destroyers had a cruising radius extending to approximately E. Long. 100°. In the event the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.
(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method or putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.

(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.

(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom? There were none.

c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate selected? (surface forces and air forces)?

[PP. 9] Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car [593] Div 1 (AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time the most highly trained units in the combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.

Surface forces: As far as possible, vessels with a long cruising range were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.

d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected?

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON [594] Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack could be made.

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery en route?

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.

[PP. 11] (3) Complete radio silence was carried out.

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been taken?

The day of the attack was designated as X-day.

If discovered prior to X-2 Day, we would have returned without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an [595] attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions.

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU Area.

h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been taken?

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.
22. State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 7 December.

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday [596] and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.

23. How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons? In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). (Sunrise that day was at 0230 hours.)

[598] (2) Air Strength: (a) Reconnaissance Unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of airplanes</th>
<th>Number of airplanes</th>
<th>Ships on which based</th>
<th>Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type Zero Reconnaissance Seaplanes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TONK (1)</td>
<td>CHIKUMA (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 95 Reconnaissance Seaplanes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>HIKI (1)</td>
<td>KIRISHIMA (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.

(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.

26. (Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target.

(1) First Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships.

Reasoning:

(1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.

(2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of bombers.
(3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many of them as possible, however, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:
   (a) If torpedo nets were lays, the attack would otherwise be unsuccessful.
   (b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in PEARL HARBOR requires special technique.
   (c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.

b. Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).
   Target: Battleships and aircraft carriers.
   Reasoning:
   Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)

c. Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).
   Target: Air bases.
   15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD Island.
   16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at WHEELER.
   Reasoning:
   (1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet temporarily out of action, the attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our main attack units—the horizontal bombing and torpedo bombing units.
   (2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.

d. Fighter striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).
   Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.
   2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKHAM.
   4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.
   6 Fighter Striking Unit—KANEHOHE.
   Reasoning:
   (1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.
   (2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.

(2) Second Attack.
   (a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).
   Target: Air bases.
   6 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.
   5 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEHOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.
   Reasoning:
   By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.
   (b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 90 Carrier Bombers).
   Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.
   Reasoning:
   (1) Although the 250-kg. bombs which the airplanes were able to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleships, it was estimated that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers of that time.
   (2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)
(c) Fighter Striking Unit (30 Type Zero Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.
2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKHAM.
4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and KANEHOE.

Reasoning:
Same as stated previously.

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.

[007] Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the carriers to OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows:

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

[pp 26] The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is shown in the appended sketch.

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.

First Attack Unit:
Dive Bombing Unit—WHEELER Field—0325 hours.
Torpedo Attack Unit—Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage—0327 hours.
Horizontal Bombing Unit—Same as above—0233 hours.

Fighter Striking Unit—Began ground strafing—0330 hours.

[008] Second Attack Unit.
All three units—Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter Striking Unit—attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.

(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).

[pp 27] d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the carriers? Why were these courses chosen?
A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to the carriers.

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on courses designed to deceive possible opposition.

[pp 29] 27. How were midget submarines used?
(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)

a. Reasons for use:
To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in the assault by the air forces.

[009] b. How many were used?
Five.

c. Were they expected to return?
While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)

d. Did any return?
None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon.

[pp 30] The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on 8 December; but it was verified that the night attack [010] on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.
28. Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed for the emergency?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been discarded or modified?

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been modified?

(Replies by FUCHIDA:)

1. Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have counterattacked.

2. Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.

30. When did the Task Force begin to form?

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.

31. Where was the rendezvous?

TANKAPPU-WAN.

32. When did the Task Force get underway on its mission?

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.

33. Was there any provision to receive word of a settlement while this Task Force was underway?

What steps would have been taken if a compromise had been reached?

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.

34. Did everything proceed according to plan?

Yes.

35. If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen and why?

(No statement.)

36. Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?

No.

37. Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway?

[612] None.

38. If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been taken?

(No statement.)

39. Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

1. The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.

2. No landing operation was planned because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without detection.

(Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Unit at that time.)
40. What damage did the Japanese receive?

In the First Attack:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter planes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dive bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo bombers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Second Attack:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter planes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dive bombers</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand total**: **20**

41. What was the estimated damage to American forces?

1. **Naval vessels:**
   - Sunk: 4 battleships
     - 1 cruiser
     - 2 tankers
   - [pp 36] Heavily damaged: 4 battleships
   - Lightly damaged: 1 battle

2. **Airplanes:**
   - Shot down: Approximately 10 Airplanes.
   - Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes.
   - **Total:** Approximately 260 airplanes.

[615] It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a considerable number were destroyed in the hangars.

42. How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined?

1. From reports of flight personnel upon their return.
2. From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)

[615] [Pp 37] 43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the main attack?

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)

Apart from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.

[616] [Pp 38] (Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of the attack.)

45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR?

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

46a. If there were, where were these submarines based?

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJALEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.

b. What were their operation orders?

The orders given to the submarines were as follows: Part were to proceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters by the evening of [pp 39] 7 December, while the midget submarines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.

At the same time, they were given strict [617] orders not to attack until the Task Force strike had been verified.

c. Were reports made during and after the attack?
When the Task Force and the midget submarine strikes were completed, the midget submarines reported as follows:

1. Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the night of December 8.
2. A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack succeeds".
3. A report on the departure of midget submarines and that it was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been tried.

d. What damage was sustained by the submarines?

One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the entrance [pp. 49] to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely. Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; the time and place of its sinking are unknown.

47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters?

The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 8 December, the day of the [618] attack, until early January of the following year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.

[619]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB. 26 October 1945.

Subject: Additional data with reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attn: A. C. of S., C-2)

1. Compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75567, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in amplification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which has been furnished the Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage possible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. O.,
Ass't Adjutant General.

[620]  5 incl's:

Incl 1—Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.
Incl 2—Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.
Incl 4—Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.
Incl 5—Map, routes of Jap Fleet.

[621]  LIAISON COMMITTEE (Tokyo) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

8 October 1945

N. D. No. 108

To: Colonel F. P. Munson, USA.

G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.

K. NAKAMURA,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

(Incl. #1)

I. Operation Orders

A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters

(1) Imperial Naval Order
   (a) (Issued 1 December)
   Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be given later.

   (2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General staff under the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).
   (a) (Issued 1 December)
   The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.

(3) Imperial Naval Order
   (a) (Issued 2 December)

[623] The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8.

(4) Naval General Staff Instruction
   (a) (Issued 2 December)
   Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and other Headquarters.

The subject matters are being investigated through memnners connected with the said forces of that period.

II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources.

(1) Reports of Naval Attaché in Washington D. C. (Announcements by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)
(2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.
(3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters immediately preceding the outbreak of war.

[624] (4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.

III. Organization of Attacking Force

First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)
Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu)
Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku)
Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)
Eightth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma)
First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th Destroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division.)
Supply Force (3 Transports)
Submarine Force (2 Submarines)

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)

V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy.

Sunk—2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma), 1 Destroyer, 1 Transport.
Seriously Damaged—4 Battleships, 4 Heavy Cruisers.
Aircraft shot down or burned—over 350

VI. Losses of Japanese Navy

Failed to Return—27 aircrafts.

N. B. As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be made.
N. D. No. 123.
To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
Subject: Additions to the Answers already given to the questions regarding the Attack on Hawaii.

1. Additional operational orders:
   (a) Units of the attacking forces assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofu-jima), by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.
   N. B.—About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet issued the above order because he recognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situation, as well as to keep its location and movements secret.
   (b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General Headquarters.
   N. B.—Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a stage where commencement of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following order (Imperial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such situation promptly."

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurosu to the United States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United States proving successful.

2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of the Japanese Navy.

Even within the Navy, the only ones who knew of the above fact were in addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and [627] a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet operation.

3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.

K. NAKAMURA,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

[628] LIAISON COMMITTEE (Tokyo) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

N. D. No. 130.
To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our report as follows:

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.

   The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 7 November:

   "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.

   The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

   (a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and [629] aircraft, shall advance into
Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order). “Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan”. (b) “Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble”. 3. Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission: The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November: “The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete refuelling”. 4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon. (a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval operations against the [630] United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (Including the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November. (b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December. (c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that hostile action was to be opened on 8 December. 5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor: The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet. N. B.—Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made as a result of further investigation.

K. Nakamura
Rear Admiral, JIN,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

[631]

QUESTIONNAIRE

To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other official documents available. In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official position.

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? (Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral --------------, General Staff, Naval General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)

2. When? (Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922—any time such a proposal first was considered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion.)

3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese plans for possible use in event of war with U. S.? 4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans. (State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected to accomplish, etc.)

5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor. (Give dates as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September [632] 1941, Spring of 1941.)

6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry, or some combination of persons or agencies.)

7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.

8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? (e. g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I.?; Destroy U. S. main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands? or what? (incl #4)

9. Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed? (e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) Note: When I say Plan, I differentiate between plans or staff studies and the actual orders issued to put the plan in effect.
10. When did this work begin?
11. When was the plan completed? Who finally approved it?
12. When was the plan finally approved?
13. Who and what agencies knew about this plan?
   (e. g., the Emperor, the War Ministry, the Central Staff, [633] the Naval
   Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to
   — The Ambassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc.)
   (Note: Names of individuals and agencies are both desired—for example, the Cabinet as a whole might
   not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also, state persons who
   had partial knowledge, e. g., the Emperor might have known you planned to
   attack but not without declaring war, etc.)
14. What sources furnished information on what the plan was based? Give
   names, rank and positions.
   (e. g., Military Attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu,
   Broadcasts, New articles).
15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-
   listed sources?
16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps
   carried by your aviators obtained?
   (e. g., Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on
   which to approach, etc.).
17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?
18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?
   [634] 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units
   in the harbor?
20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).
21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed.
   Discuss:
   a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.
   b. Partial decisions made and by whom.
   c. How were the commanders and particular units to (Both fleet
      units and air units) selected?
   d. Why was the route you selected chosen?
   e. What provision was made against discovery en route?
   f. What action was to be taken if discovered?
   g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were em-
      ployed?
   h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?
22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?
23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?
24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).
25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time
   during the operation, e. g., to attack secondary targets?
26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack.
   Include:
   [635] Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?
   Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?
   Time each group was to strike its target.
   Route(s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?
27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.
   (Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any
   back, any other details, conclusions as to usefulness of this weapon).
   [636] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give de-
   tails: (e. g., If the U. S. had made some concessions was it to be abandoned or
   changed?) If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have
   been made?)
29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:
   a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.
   b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.
   c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.
   Note: If any document is not available give all details of it you can from
   memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)
30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?
31. Where did it assemble?
32. When did it move out on its mission?
33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while the
   Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.
ROUTE FOLLOWED BY JAPANESE FLEET TO AND FROM PEARL HARBOR

DATA PUBLISHED IN THE "CLAIRON EXECUTIVE" TIBET
FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY.
34. Did everything go as planned?
35. If not, what changes or mishaps occurred and why?
36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?
[637] 37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?
38. If so, what was done about them?
39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a landing?
40. List your losses.
41. List estimated U. S. Losses.
42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?
43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the attack.
(e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.)
44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case.
(e. g. “All copies of order burned on surrender”, “ads. ____________ who is only person who knew this was killed on (date).”).
45. Did you have any submarines operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation instructions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were there any casualties among these submarines?
47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in Hawaiian area?
48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?
[639] Mr. Mitchell. Now, Mr. Chairman, in connection with the story of the Jap attack I have been awaiting an opportunity to take a few minutes to read into the record certain of these so-called diplomatic intercepts that were picked up and decoded.
The Congressman from California has already referred to some, I think, which are pertinent but he only gave extracts from the Judge Advocate General’s report.
Mr. Gearhart. It was the Judge Advocate General’s summary, not mine.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. And I think there are many obscure statements in these diplomatic decoded messages which you cannot understand except by paralleling them with the movements of the Japanese attacking force, and with the permission of the committee—I have just a few pages—I would like to put into the record at this point these portions so as to connect them up with the story.
The first one is on page 96 of our exhibit 1, which contains all of these messages. It is from Tokyo to Washington. That means their ambassador at Washington. It is their number 727. It is dated November 4, 1941 [reading]:

Proposal “B”:
This proposal is based upon proposal “A”. If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put forth some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows:

Then I will omit certain portions which are not pertinent right at this moment and it follows [reading]:

The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return—
this is part of his proposal to the United States—
mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the Government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs.
Turning over on page 98, if the committee wants to follow me on this, of Exhibit 1, we have another message, No. 731, Tokyo to Washington, November 4, 1941 [reading]:

In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reached an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.

Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign these terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results.

Then follows another message from Tokyo to Washington on the same page, dated November 5, 1941 [reading]:

If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals, we feel that the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate ratification.

We have been led to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and that it would be classified as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do. We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. Will you please ascertain the U. S. attitude on this point?

In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into along the lines given in the message referred to in the heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolute essential factor.

Then on page 99, a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 5, 1941. The first two paragraphs I will not read at present. The third [reading]:

If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B. Please, therefore, ascertain the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.

On page 100, from Tokyo to Washington, a message of November 5, 1941. That is numbered 736. [Reading]:

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

On page 116 of Exhibit 1, Tokyo to Washington, November 11, 1941 [reading]:

Judging from the progress of the—
The Chairman. When you say "from Tokyo to Washington," do you mean from the Japanese Government to their Ambassador in Washington?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. [Reading]:

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736—that is on the 25th—is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential [644] that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

Page 122 of Exhibit 1. I only have two or three of these. This is from Washington, from Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, under date of November 12, 1941. [Reading]:

Departmental secret.

Continuing he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force—not by any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, I don't think that [645] the United States will have any objection to our proposal."

Page 137 of Exhibit 1. This is from Tokyo to Washington, November 16, 1941. [Reading]:

For your Honor's own information.

I have read your #1000 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you please try to realize what that means.

That is the one fixing the 25th as the dead line.

In your opinion, we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the dead line for the solution of these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, [646] and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

Page 165 of Exhibit 1—

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire? I understand counsel is now reading for the purpose of the record, certainly, these code cablegrams, these decoded cablegrams that are printed at length in an exhibit already in evidence.

Mr. Mitchell. They are already in evidence, but my point about them was that you cannot understand the hidden suggestions in here, particularly the ones I am about to read, unless you parallel it with the story of the Japanese movements and planning for the Japanese
attack. That is the reason I am putting them in now, sir, in order to make the comparison for the committee, so they can form their own judgment about it.

Mr. KEENE. I see.

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 165, from Tokyo to Washington, dated Novem-
ber 22, 1941. [Reading]:

To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 20th, (let me write it out [647] for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanges; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if every-
thing can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful considera-
tion and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

Now, there is just one more. It is a message from Tokyo to Wash-
ington, dated November 24, for both Ambassadors.

The time limit set in my message of 812—that is the one I have just read—is Tokyo time 20th.

Now, Mr. Chairman, will you call Admiral Richardson?
Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question?
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. You have read to us decoded messages, continu-
ously referring to Japanese No. 736. Now, I presume that that 736, of course, is in that exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. I read that. It is a message from Tokyo to Wash-
ington dated November 5, stating that because of various circum-
stances it is absolutely essential and necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed [648] by the 25th.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Well, now, I was going to follow that up with whether or not the agreement that they discuss in these messages is now a part of the record?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the terms that they proposed to our Govern-
ment.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I mean.

Mr. MITCHELL. There never was any yielding to them.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, I was wrong in using the word “agree-
ment.” I meant to inquire whether or not the terms proposed by the Japanese Government, upon which they based these messages, are a part of the record and even so I think it would be apropos at this time to include them at the end of the messages that counsel read.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I will say this. The terms that they trans-
mited to their ambassadors to be submitted to our Government, about doing away with the freezing and furnishing them oil and things of that kind are in other intercepted messages in this very same exhibit 1, but there will be evidence introduced, after Admiral Richardson, from the State Department, giving the full story of the negotiations and just what proposals they made.
Senator Lucas. All right. My only thought was that if it would come in at this particular point it would clarify the record.

[649] The CHAIRMAN. We can hold that up until later.

Senator Lucas. Very well, then, I withdrew the request.

Mr. Mitchell. I was just referring to some vague happenings and things that would happen and the reason for the deadline.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General, call the next witness.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, please state your full name.

Admiral Richardson. Admiral James Otto Richardson.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson, how long did you serve in the United States Navy?

Admiral Richardson. I entered the Naval Academy in September 1898; graduated in 1902.

Mr. Mitchell. What is your present rank?

Admiral Richardson. Admiral, United States Navy, retired.

Mr. Mitchell. You were giving us—

Admiral Richardson. Oh, would you like for me to give you —

Mr. Mitchell. No. During your Navy service have you spent some of your duty time in Asiatic areas and Pacific areas? Would you give us a brief review of your Asiatic experience?

Admiral Richardson. If it meets the wishes of the counsel to the committee, I will give a brief summary of my service record using my own judgment to select those items which might be of interest to the matter under investigation.

In 1902, in accordance with my request, I was ordered to the Asiatic station where I remained until 1905. During that time I served 1 year in the southern Philippines. The remainder of the time I was on the China coast and in Japan.

It so happened that I arrived in Yokohama in time to see the Russian Minister depart immediately preceding the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. I was in Yokohama when that war was initiated by the surprise attack of the Japanese on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur and the Russian ship at Chemulpo.

I remained in Japan for approximately 3 months. I returned to Japan again in time to be in Tokyo when the Japanese Government received the first news on the battle of Tsuschima which in effect closed the Russo-Japanese War.

I went to the China station again in 1922, where I remained until 1924. During that time I served on the China coast and the last year I was in command of the south China patrol. I was in Amoy when the first news of the earthquake on the 1st of September 1923 occurred.

From 1924 until 1931 I performed various duties in Washington, at the Naval Academy, and on the Atlantic coast. In 1931 I placed the U. S. S. Augusta in commission and she served as flagship for the scouting force then in the Atlantic and proceeded to the Pacific when practically all of our combatant ships were concentrated in the Pacific.
I was detached in 1933 and was a student at the Naval War College for 1 year.

From 1934 to 1935 I was budget officer of the Navy Department. From 1935 to 1936 I served for a short period in command of Cruiser Division 6 and then chief of staff to the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

From 1936 to 1937 I commanded the destroyers of the scouting force. From 1937 to 1938 I was the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, during which period the China incident started and during which period the attack on the *Panay* occurred.

From 1938 to 1939 I was the Chief of what was then called the Bureau of Navigation, now known as the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

From 1939, the summer, until 1940 I was commander of the battle force. From 1940 to 1941 I was commander in chief of the United States Fleet. At that time the United States Fleet comprised all combatant ships in commission that were not assigned to the Asiatic Fleet or not operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

I reported for duty as commander of battle force on June 24, 1939. On January 6, 1940, I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch as commander in chief of United States Fleet. On the 5th of January 1941 I received a secret dispatch in a code held only by the Chief of Naval Operations and myself informing me that I would be detached on the 1st of February.

On February 1, 1941. I was relieved by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. At that time the fleet was reorganized, and Admiral Kimmel became commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and another officer became commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

I departed from Honolulu on February 14, 1941, and on March 25, 1941, I reported for duty as a member of the General Board.

Mr. Mitchell. At that time when you were commander of the United States Fleet was there a separate command known as the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Richardson. There was not.

Mr. Mitchell. Who was Chief of Naval Operations while you were chief in command of the United States Fleet?

Admiral Richardson. Admiral Harold R. Stark, who was my immediate superior.

Mr. Mitchell. When you were at that time commander of the United States Fleet at what Pacific city or was it on the Pacific side or the Atlantic side that you went to?

Admiral Richardson. When I assumed command of the United States Fleet there was a portion of the fleet serving in the Atlantic. There was a detachment of the United States Fleet serving in the Hawaiian area, known as the Hawaiian detachment, which was composed of heavy cruisers and destroyers, and, if my memory serves me correctly, one aircraft carrier. The Hawaiian detachment was under the command of Vice Adm. Adolphus Andrews, who was also commander of the scouting force.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, were you located on the Pacific coast?

Admiral Richardson. All the fleet in the Pacific assigned to the United States Fleet, that did not form a part of the Hawaiian detachment, was based at San Diego and San Pedro, Long Beach.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is where you made your headquarters then?

Admiral Richardson. I actually assumed command of the fleet in the harbor of San Pedro, Long Beach, and I remained there until approximately the 1st of April, when the fleet departed for their annual fleet exercises.

[654] Mr. Mitchell. What was your flagship at that time?

Admiral Richardson. The U. S. S. Pennsylvania.

Mr. Mitchell. You say the Pacific Fleet that you were in command of out there that was not included in these other detachments, that was based on the Pacific coast, was ordered out to maneuvers in the spring of 1940?

Admiral Richardson. It had been the custom for many years to have annual fleet exercises, including fleet problems and other exercises under simulated war conditions, where all available ships and aircraft were employed in training.

Mr. Mitchell. What were the base ports of the Pacific Fleet at that time other than the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic vessels you spoke of?

Admiral Richardson. Well, each ship had a home port.

Mr. Mitchell. Generally speaking, I mean what were the principal points?

Admiral Richardson. They were based practically all the time at San Pedro and Long Beach but the ships periodically proceeded to Bremerton and to San Francisco for overhaul, and normal operations in training and gunnery exercises were off the coast of southern California.

Mr. Mitchell. When the fleet vessels under your command made that movement in the spring of 1940, to what area did they proceed?

[655] Admiral Richardson. They proceeded to sea divided into two task forces representing opposing fleets and conducted a war game and various exercises and then united with the Hawaiian detachment and proceeded to the Hawaiian area, arriving there on the—I actually arrived at Lahaina Roads at 1500 on April 10.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you had been ordered to move out into Hawaiian waters after these exercises, or had you—at

Admiral Richardson. Each year the fleet exercises were held in a different part of the world, a different part of the ocean, to familiarize the officers with the weather conditions and the terrain and everything else that it was necessary to know and before I became commander in chief the plans for this exercise had already been drawn up and approved and I carried out exercises which were planned by my predecessor.

When I arrived in Pearl Harbor according to the published plan the fleet, with the exception of the Hawaiian detachment, was to depart from the Hawaiian area on the 9th of May—no, the 9th of April. Wait a minute, let me see. No, the 9th of May.

Mr. Mitchell. This is 1940?

Admiral Richardson. 1940.

Mr. Gearhart. What was the date?

[656] Admiral Richardson. The 9th of May 1940.

Mr. Mitchell. And you say, do you—

Admiral Richardson. From the Hawaiian area the return would normally have been to the Pacific coast.
Mr. Mitchell. The point is that when you went to Hawaiian waters at that time you expected that that would be a temporary arrangement and that you would shortly return to the Pacific coast?

Admiral Richardson. That was an arrangement the schedule for which had been prepared and approved and was known to all the officers and men in the fleet.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you understood it was temporary?

Admiral Richardson. Oh, yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Now, we have a file of correspondence that includes some letters between you and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, running from January 1940 to January 1941. You have examined that file and have a copy of it?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. You have supplied me with a copy of that file.

Mr. Mitchell. At this point I would like to offer in evidence as Exhibit 9 the file of correspondence that I have just referred to, of which each member of the committee has a copy.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 9.")

[657] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just so that I will be able to follow the questioner, is there any way of telling how many parts there are in particular in Exhibit 9? I have seen several groups of papers.

Mr. Gesell. I think, Congressman, that there are really basically two parts; the letters called Stark to Admiral Richardson are mimeographed and the letters of Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark are the ones you have there in your hand; they are photostatic copies.

Senator Brewster: Does this purport to be a complete record of their correspondence in that period?

Mr. Gesell. No, it does not.

Senator Brewster. How were the eliminations made?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are a great many personal letters. I think these letters were chosen because they relate to the reasons for the fleet going out there and the objections that Admiral Richardson later developed as to their staying there. That was, really, what I think they are mostly pertinent to.

Senator Brewster. Has your staff been over the complete file to select those which they consider pertinent?

Mr. Mitchell. These letters were furnished us both by Admiral Stark and his counsel and by Admiral Richardson. I won't say that I have seen every letter that passed between them during that period.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, has counsel or have any of the counsel staff seen all of the letters?

Mr. Gesell. We have seen all the letters that we have been able to read.

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean that you have been able to read?

Mr. Gesell. Just exactly that, Senator, the ones we have been able to find. This correspondence is personal correspondence and we asked counsel for Admiral Stark to submit to us all of the letters that he had exchanged with Admiral Richardson and counsel submitted us a file which they stated was the complete file of correspondence which they had.
We have also had searches made in the Navy Department for any correspondence between these two officers. Admiral Stark and his counsel have reviewed the selection of the letters made here and we have also shown the file to Admiral Richardson and he has double checked the selections, so that we have taken such precautions as we can to assure that the correspondence is representative of the topics that the documents were selected for and have done everything we can to make sure that we have obtained any letters that we can find.

[659] Senator Ferguson. Are you through?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, on page 14-c there seems to be no beginning to that letter. Can that be explained?
Mr. Gesell. That is a last sheet which came in there by error and connects to another letter which is not offered in evidence.
Senator Ferguson. You have the other letter?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have, for submission to the committee, the other letters?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. How many letters will that be?
Mr. Gesell. A small number. I have not counted them. You are welcome to see them. Many of them are personal letters that do not seem to us to be germane.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I make one suggestion?
As these exhibits go into this record it seems to me, in order for anyone to clearly understand the letters and the answers thereto, the letters should go in, and then they should be followed by the answers.
Mr. Mitchell. I have mine arranged that way.
Senator Lucas. The exhibits that were given to us were not arranged that way.

[660] Mr. Mitchell. I know it, so I tore mine down and put them in chronological order.
The letters I have here are letters that seem to me to be pertinent to the inquiry that I was going to make of Admiral Richardson here. If there are any more of those letters that you want to see I will get them for you.
Admiral Richardson. May I make a statement, Mr. Chairman, in regard to this correspondence?
The Chairman. Yes, go ahead, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. When I relieved Admiral Bloch as commander in chief of the United States Fleet I found that quite a little official business had been conducted in personal correspondence, so that when I relieved Admiral Bloch it was necessary for me to write to Admiral Stark for information which I needed. I did not want that to occur when I was relieved, so before I was relieved I gave my file of personal letters to my relief.
The Chairman. To whom?
Admiral Richardson. To the officer who relieved me.
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
Mr. Gesell. Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Richardson. Admiral Kimmel, with the request that he and his prospective chief of staff look over the file of letters and indicate those that they felt would be useful [661] in the conduct of the
affairs of the fleet, and I would retain them and deliver them to Admiral Kimmel. The majority of the other letters were destroyed by me because I was unwilling to take away and have in my custody letters that referred to fleet business, so that I could not supply counsel with my file of letters. I have been able to secure some copies from the Department and from various sources, so that my supply of letters, which will be essential to refresh my memory on many of these points, would not have been made available to me except through the counsel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman.

I understood you to say, Admiral, those letters that were not being desirable by your relief you destroyed.

Admiral Richardson. I did. A few found their way into my papers when my effects were packed up, so I did have a few, but by no means a complete file.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, Admiral, I have here a letter dated March 15, 1940.

Admiral Richardson. March what?

Mr. Mitchell. March 15, 1940, addressed to “Dear J. O.” and signed “Betty”. Who is “J. O.”?

Admiral Richardson. I am J. O.

Mr. Mitchell. Who is “Betty”?


Mr. Mitchell. Is that the way you usually addressed each other in this personal correspondence?

Admiral Richardson. It was.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice in the letter of March 15, 1940 on page 2 there is a paragraph that reads as follows:

I still think that the decision to send the detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy.

What did the word “orange” stand for in naval parlance? Was it Japan?

Admiral Richardson. Japan.

Mr. Mitchell (reading):

The State Department is strong for the present set-up and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

That is a letter from Admiral Stark to you?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, and that was in reply to my letter to him asking about why the Hawaiian detachment was there, and I would like to invite your attention to the second paragraph in that letter of March 15, 1940.

Mr. Mitchell. When you went there you expected to come back soon and then you found you were not ordered back; that is right, isn’t it?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

Mr. Mitchell. Then you wanted to know why you were kept out there?

[663] Admiral Richardson. That is true.

Mr. Mitchell. And this correspondence started, and you asked Admiral Stark why you were there, and this reference I just made is to that discussion, is it?

Admiral Richardson. No; I think not. It is March 15, is it not?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. I was not out there. This 15th of March letter relates to the presence in the Hawaiian area of the Hawaiian detachment—

Mr. Mitchell. I see.

Admiral Richardson. Which had proceeded to the Hawaiian area in the fall preceding.

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. Then we pass on to the letter of May 7, 1940, by Admiral Stark to you, and I find that contains this statement:

When the fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the fleet schedule be so arranged that on extremely short notice the fleet be able to return concentrated to Hawaiian waters. This will present somewhat of a [664] problem in lugging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board, because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your proposed schedule meets this requirement, and unless you hear to the contrary, you may assume it is O. K.

That is on May 7, 1940, and up to that time you expected to come back in the course of 2 weeks?

Admiral Richardson. No—oh, yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. I thought it was possible.

[665] Mr. Mitchell. We have here a letter of May 22 that is written by you to Admiral Stark, May 22, 1940, in which you write him:

As you no doubt well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule, and employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is necessary to know more than I know now about why we are here and how long we will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely dependent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on.

For instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require wholesale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following are pertinent questions:

(a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as we can under the limitations on anchorages, airfields, facilities and services) have on this purpose? The effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered.

(b) Are we here as a stepping-off place for belligerent activity? If so, we should devote all of our [665] time and energies to preparing for war. This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, filling up complements, docking, and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completion.

As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is a diversification of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment of neither.

If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration should be given to the certain decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, airfields, facilities, services, recreation conditions, for so large a fleet. If only peacetime training is involved, should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer details?

Now, with that statement before you, will you state to the committee just what your situation had been up to that time, and how you happened to write that letter?

Admiral Richardson. Well, a fleet composed of a large number of ships and men and planes must secure careful planning, in order that time not be wasted and that something be accomplished. When the fleet went to the Hawaiian area as a part of the fleet exercises, we had
a definite schedule of gunnery exercises, steering competitions, full power [667] drives, inspections, and everything else that is required to keep a fleet busy, and keep them under training.

When the fleet went to the Hawaiian area we did not take with us tugs, targets, target rafts, target planes, towing planes, repair ships; so that if the fleet was to remain in the Hawaiian area, in order that it could be usefully employed, it was essential that I know that we remain there long enough to bring out all of the gear that was necessary for training the ship, for fear that I would start all this material to Hawaii and then, after it once started and got halfway there I would return, and then have to wait for several weeks for it to get back to the normal bases on the west coast, so I could continue training.

So that, from my point of view, my effectiveness in the fleet and continued training in the fleet demanded an early decision, so that plans could be made.

Mr. Mitchell. When did you first learn, and how, that the decision had been made here in Washington to base your fleet at Pearl Harbor instead of on the Pacific coast?

Admiral Richardson. The first notice that I received was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, United States Fleet, May 4, which reads—

Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of it?

Admiral Richardson. May 4.

[668] Mr. Gearhart. 1940?

Admiral Richardson. May 4, 1940.

It looks probable but not final that Fleet will remain Hawaiian waters for short time after May 9. Will expect to apprise you further Monday or Tuesday next.

The 4th of May was Saturday. On the 7th of May I received from the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed to CINCUS—CINCUS was the abbreviation for commander in chief United States Fleet—

CINCUS make immediate press release instructions as follows:

"I request permission to remain in Hawaiian waters to accomplish some things I wanted to do while here. The Department has approved this request."

Delay Fleet departure Hawaiian area is for about two weeks prior to the end of which time you will be further advised regarding future movements. Carry out regular scheduled overhauls of individual units, movements of base force units at your discretion.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you issue the press release?

Admiral Richardson. I did.

Mr. Mitchell. You had not requested or asked to be left out there, had you?

Admiral Richardson. I had not.

Mr. Keefe. I am having difficulty, Mr. Mitchell. I have [669] the answer but I did not get your full question.

Mr. Mitchell. I probably did not have my nose in the microphone again. My question was whether he had given the press release, and he said he did, and I asked him if he had asked to be kept out there at Hawaii, and he said "No."

Mr. Keefe. Thank you.

Mr. Mitchell. I refer now to a letter of May 27, 1940, which was written by Admiral Stark to you in response to the letter of May 22 that I just read from, and in which you wanted to know about what you were supposed to do, and he said, among other things:
Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph.

First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action.

[670] We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned, she, Japan has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Then later in the letter:

Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know, and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thought contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing, and that is even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do, and so long as they don't know, they may hesitate or be deterred. These facts I have kept very secret here.

The above, I think will answer the question "why you are there." It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get [671] this information I will rush it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned, you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important, and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically, if you want to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices, or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status—go ahead. Just keep us informed.

Later on, he says:

You ask whether you are there as a stepping-off place for belligerent activity?

Answer: Obviously it might become so under certain conditions, but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return, it might nullify [672] the reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

He says later:

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base, but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, airfields, service, recreation conditions, for so large a fleet:

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies.

Now, that brings to our minds the question of your attitude about the basing of the fleet, and I call your attention to a letter you wrote to Admiral Stark—before we get to that, I have a letter here of June 22, Stark to Richardson.
Mr. Keefe. Is that contained in this file?

Mr. Mitchell. I am not so sure. It is a loose sheet.

Mr. Gesell. It was sent to you subsequently, Congressman Keefe. There were additional letters discovered after the first mimeographing, and they were sent to the members of the committee, and they did not come in the same attachment as the others.

The Chairman. They were put in a folder marked "Additional Letters Between Stark and Richardson."

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry we did not have them all together at the start.

This letter is from Stark to Richardson, June 22:

Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to the movement of the Fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively, decision has been made for the Fleet to remain for the present where it is.

Is that about the first—

Admiral Richardson. What letter is that?

Mr. Mitchell. June 22, 1940. Maybe the Admiral hasn't got a copy of it.

Mr. Gesell. I will get him one.

Admiral Richardson. I have my letter.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. There is one from you dated June 22, but this is one from Admiral Stark to you dated June 22, which was supplied to us later from the original file.

I am sorry, I thought you had seen it.

Admiral Richardson. All right; I have that letter.

Mr. Mitchell. Had you received any information more definite than that as to the permanency of your station at Pearl Harbor prior to that letter? It says:

Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This decision may be changed at any time.

Admiral Richardson. No, I had received no prior information.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you had developed by that time very definite ideas in your own mind in opposition to the advisability of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, had you not? Will you please state in your own way just what the situation was and what your objections were grounded upon?

Admiral Richardson. My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for the men, a long distance from Pearl Harbor to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation, inadequate airfields.

A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields available, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying fields.

There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time.

Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are perfectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when
there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their families, away from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of morale that is essential to successful training.

For those reasons, and because I believe that the fleet could be better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted to return to the west coast.

Mr. Mitchell. There is also a letter from you—or rather a memorandum from the Secretary, it is called, dated September 12, 1940, Will you please turn to that?

[676] Admiral Richardson. I have it.

Mr. Mitchell. You have it.

Admiral Richardson. September 12, 1940.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Was that prepared while you were out in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral Richardson. It was. At that time I had shifted my flag and was then flying it from the U. S. S. Enterprise, an aircraft carrier.

The Secretary of the Navy visited the Hawaiian area from September 6 until September 15. During that time I had him off Lahaina for dinner aboard the Enterprise with all the flag officers present. He was aboard the Enterprise for awhile. Then he was shifted to other types of ships, battleships, destroyers, cruisers.

I did that in order that he might see the operations conducted by various types of ships and in order that he might meet other flag officers in the fleet. I was particularly careful to see that he had an opportunity to talk with Admiral Kimmel, Vice Admiral Andrews, Admiral Snyder, and a destroyer captain named Binford.

I knew that he would hear the news of many officers and I was anxious that he remember the things that I had said to him; and in order that he might not confuse what I had said to him with the things that had been said to him by others, I [677] prepared a memorandum setting forth a brief outline of the points that I had covered in very extensive conversations and I filed a copy of that memorandum with the Chief of Naval Operations, because I endeavored at all times to let the Chief of Naval Operations know what I was doing, or what it was my intention to do.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you please turn to that memorandum of the 12th of September 1940. At the bottom of page 2, under "4 (A)" is the title "Retention of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area."

Was that statement intended to sum up your views about the retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral Richardson. It was.

Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading that, Admiral?

Admiral Richardson (reading).

Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.

(a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are:

1. Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
2. Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
3. Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.
(4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface.
(5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing.
(6) Prolonged absence from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.

(7) In case of war, necessary for fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measure resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

Shall I continue?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I think those are pertinent.

Admiral Richardson (reading):

If the disposition of the fleet were determined solely by naval considerations the major portion of the fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.

If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the fleet. In other words, is it more important [679] to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the fleet in the Hawaiian area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?

In case our relations with another Pacific nation deteriorate, what is the State Department’s conception of our next move? Does it believe that the fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary training from the insecure anchorage at Lahaula which is 2,000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases?

Mr. Mitchell. Shortly after that you made a visit to Washington, did you not, Admiral?

Admiral Richardson. I did.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember when you reached here and when you left, approximately? You were here on October 8, were you not?

Admiral Richardson. Yes. At 07:07, on October 7. I talked with Stark, Nimitz, Knox. That was my second visit to Washington. I came at that time because the Secretary said he wanted to talk to me. I arrived. I found that they were considering increasing the strength of the Asiatic Fleet, which was under the command of Admiral Hart. And while here I lunched with the President. Had a long talk with him. I saw Dr. Stanley [680] Hornbeck of the Department of State, who was at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, the advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs.

Mr. Mitchell. In your interviews with the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Stark, did you take up this question with them of your objections, the objections that you just stated, as to the basing of the fleet in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral Richardson. I think not, because I had given a memorandum to the Secretary and fully stated my views to him. I had sent a copy of it to Admiral Stark, who was thoroughly familiar with my views. And I had sent a copy of part of it to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck of the State Department who knew what I thought. So, if I remember correctly, I did not talk about that with Admiral Stark. I talked primarily about detaching ships from the main fleet to strengthen the Asiatic Fleet.

And the first day I arrived I was suddenly confronted with the fact that 5,000 sailors had landed on the west coast to be turned over to me and I had to find some means of getting them out to Hawaii. So I had to take a carrier—I think it was the Saratoga—and use her to
transport the men that I was unable to accommodate in ships that had
come to the coast with me.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the White House records show that on October
8, 1940, you had lunch with the President and with Governor Leahy at
1 p.m. Do you remember that?
[681] Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Governor Leahy or Admiral Leahy?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral William E. Leahy.
Mr. Mitchell. He was then Governor of Puerto Rico.
Admiral Richardson. Yes. We did not go to the White House
office in company. I was invited by the President through the Chief
of Naval Operations to lunch at 1 o’clock. When I arrived there I
found Admiral Leahy there.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state in your own way, Admiral, just what
occurred at that meeting and what was said about any of these matters
we have been referring to?

Admiral Richardson. The President talked to Admiral Leahy about
Puerto Rican affairs, and as I was not interested, I remember little
of what was said; but I have a vague recollection that one subject
under discussion was the question of housing.

The President asked Admiral Leahy his opinion about strengthen-
ing the Asiatic Fleet and my recollection is that Admiral Leahy said
that whatever you sent out will be lost, therefore I would send the
least valuable combatant ships we have, the 7,500 ton cruisers, but I
recommended, I personally recommended that none be sent. A deci-
sion to send none was reached.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Leahy had been Chief of Naval Operations
previously?
[682] Admiral Richardson. He had been Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. He was Chief of Naval Operations when I was the assistant.

Mr. Mitchell. Then proceed, Admiral, with your statement of
what occurred there.

Admiral Richardson. The following statement, because of its im-
portance, I have written out. I wrote it out several weeks ago when
it appeared certain, in my mind, that I would, unfortunately, be called
before this committee. And with the permission of the Chairman I
would like to read this statement—

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. Which I prepared in the quiet of my home,
where I could think and refresh my memory to a maximum extent
possible.

The Chairman. You may proceed, Admiral, to do that.

Admiral Richardson. I took up the question of returning to the
Pacific coast all of the fleet except the Hawaiian detachment.

The President stated that the fleet was retained in the Hawaiian
area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of
Japan.

I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might
influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military
government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared
for war, and had no train of [683] auxiliary ships without
which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the pres-
ence of the fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on
Japanese action.
I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations.

The President said in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan."

I said, "Mr. President, I still do not believe it, and I know that our fleet is disadvantageously disposed for preparing for or initiating war operations."

The President then said, "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the west coast we are not stepping backward."

This is embarrassing.

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.

Mr. Mitchell. Does that complete your statement of the conversation?

Admiral Richardson. That is about all of it.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to adjourn?

The Chairman. Four o'clock having arrived, the Chair thinks we might recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., a recess was taken until 10 a.m., Tuesday, November 20, 1945.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Mitchell, you were examining the witness when we adjourned. You may proceed.

Before you proceed, Mr. Mitchell—this is not necessarily on the record. (Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON (Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Richardson, in the correspondence which you have there appears to be a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations dated October 9, 1940, made by you. That was the day following this visit with the President?

Admiral Richardson. It was.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if counsel will permit me to interpose.

Last week I requested from Admiral Inglis a chart which he said he would have ready for me yesterday showing the disposition of the ships in the Pacific from May 1941 to December 7, 1941. I would like to have that at this moment, if I could.

Mr. Mitchell. I am informed that they have been working on it; they ought to have it any time; they haven't sent it yet.

Mr. Gearhart. I am most anxious to have it before I am permitted to examine the witness now on the stand. I want to ask him questions concerning those figures. So if a chart can be supplied me, I will appreciate it very, very much.

The Chairman. I am satisfied that Admiral Inglis and the Navy Department will make the chart available as soon as possible, and as soon as it is available it will be presented here.¹

¹ Exhibit No. 86.
Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. You made that memorandum of October 9, 1940, following your visit the day before with the President?

Admiral Richardson. I did. In order that the Chief of Naval Operations might be informed as to the decisions of the President and as to his views as expressed to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. The first item on that memorandum is: “Go ahead with assembly of train.”

What does that mean?

Admiral Richardson. There had been some discussion as to assembling auxiliary vessels, transports, repair ships, supply ships. I had urged that it be done as one evidence of our intention to be prepared. The President stated that [688] we would go ahead with the assembly of a train.

Mr. MITCHELL. Item 2 is: “Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four old light cruisers?”

Is that a question the President asked, or one you wanted to know about?

Admiral Richardson. The President asked me. I knew we did not have it. So I wanted the Chief of Naval Operations informed that he might find it necessary or advisable to have a supply of fuel oil in Samoa.

Mr. MITCHELL. Item 3:

Give me a chart showing British and French bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines, or airplanes in islands in the Pacific east of the international date line.

Was that another request from the President?

Admiral Richardson. No. That was a request by me, as I remem-

ber it.

Mr. Mitchell. Then, in paragraph 4, you stated:

The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley—

That is Admiral Ghormley, is it?

Admiral Richardson. It is Admiral R. L. Ghormley.

Mr. MITCHELL (reading):

was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the [698] British Admiralty felt that they should have offices prepared for staff conferences.

Were you reporting a thing that the President had said to you?

Admiral Richardson. I was.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. 5:

The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain overland through Africa.

Under that, in brackets, “F. D. R.”

What does that mean?

Admiral Richardson. “F. D. R.” belongs to the next paragraph.

The first is a bit of information. The next, the sixth paragraph is intended to read:

I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, can be convinced of the desirability,

because that is what the President stated to me.

[670] Mr. MITCHELL (reading):

I can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American peo-
ple, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward.

That was informing the Chief of Naval Operations what the President had said?

Admiral Richardson. That is true. I was at that time, just before going to Washington, on board a flagship on the west coast with approximately one-third of the battleships. We had returned to the west coast for replenishment and for recreation and for overhaul and, if my memory serves me correctly, I was at that time flying my flag on the New Mexico.

Mr. Mitchell. Item 7, the last on the memo, is this [reading]:

The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindanao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force.

That was just passing on to the Chief of Naval Operations an item of information?

[691] Admiral Richardson. It was.

Mr. Mitchell. Going back now, Admiral, to July 1940, prior to this visit in October 1940, you made a visit to Washington in July 1940, did you?

Admiral Richardson. At my suggestion, before I left the west coast for the Hawaiian area, I was ordered to proceed by air to Washington for a conference with the Chief of Naval Operations and the President.

I actually started and France capitulated and my trip was delayed. I later came by air, arriving in Washington on July 8 and departing from Washington for Honolulu on July 11.

Mr. Mitchell. The appointment book at the White House states that on July 8 you had a luncheon engagement with the President at 1 p.m.; on July 11 another appointment with the President at 12 noon. What is your memory about that?

Admiral Richardson. As to the appointment on July 8, I had lunch with the President and talked with him for 2 or 3 hours and my mission at that time was primarily to find the thought back of our retention in Hawaii, to explore and endeavor to ascertain, if possible, the duration of our stay and, from my point of view, stress the necessity of increasing the number of men in the Navy because we were at that time building a very large Navy; we had on board ship [692] approximately 85 percent of the number of men required to man the ships.

In normal times, in normal peacetimes, you can build a destroyer quicker than you can train the men to man them. Therefore, I was very strongly of the opinion that all the ships in active commission in the fleet should have on board them all the men that they could carry in order that the ships themselves might be prepared and that nucleus crews should be trained for the new ships, because they would be required whether we had peace or had war. I was also desirous of securing the retention of officers in the fleet without the normal change of duty.

Mr. Mitchell. Were those the subjects that you discussed with the President?

Admiral Richardson. They were.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to state in your own way, as near as you can recollect, what the general tenor of the conversation was?
Admiral Richardson. Well, the President was rather loath to increase the number of men because he felt, as expressed to me, that men of mechanical trades in civil life could be quickly inducted and made adequate sailormen if their services were suddenly required.

Mr. Mitchell. What about the second appointment at 12 noon on July 11 with the President? Do you remember about that and what was said?

Admiral Richardson. I believe that that—well, I know that that meeting lasted only a few minutes and I went by to tell the President good-bye and no subjects of any moment were discussed.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any appointment with Mr. Hull or Mr. Welles, or both of them, during July 1940? Their record shows an appointment on July 9.

Admiral Richardson. During that visit I saw Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles and talked to both of them at the same time, or, rather, I talked to Secretary Hull in the presence of Under Secretary Welles for an hour or so.

I saw Senator Byrnes on the 10th of July. I had lunch with General Marshall on the 10th of July. I saw Dr. Stanley Hornbeck on the 11th of July and outside of naval personnel I think those were the only officials that I saw. I wanted to see the then Congressman Scrugham, who was chairman of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House that handled naval appropriations, but he was not in town.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the subject of your discussion with Mr. Hull on that meeting of the 9th of July, what the general tenor of it was?

[694] Admiral Richardson. I saw Mr. Hull to fully explore and learn all that I could as to why the fleet was retained in Hawaii, how long they would probably stay there and what the future intentions were, because I had been directed to retain the fleet in Hawaii and announced that it was retained there at my request and naturally, since I had made no such request, I wanted to know what was back of the whole thing.

I also felt so strongly the need for men that I wanted to impress on both the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State that I felt that they should assist insofar as possibly they could in seeing that the fleet was fully manned.

Mr. Mitchell. In this correspondence file is a letter from you to Admiral Stark dated June 22, 1940, dated at Lahina Roads, is it?

Admiral Richardson. Lahaina Roads.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you please look at that?

Admiral Richardson. I cannot find that.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I will hand it to you, my copy.

Admiral Richardson. I have it. My letter?

Mr. Mitchell. Your letter.

Admiral Richardson. Yes; I have it.

Mr. Mitchell. Your letter refers to the fact that General Herron, then commanding the Hawaiian department, had [695] received an alert from the War Department. Do you remember that incident?

Admiral Richardson. Vividly.

Mr. Mitchell. Was any alert ordered from Washington for the Navy at the same time? Just go on in your own way and tell us about it, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. Lieutenant General Herron, commanding the Hawaiian department, received from the War Department a dispatch on July 17, 1940, which read:

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific trade to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

At that time I was at sea. Lt. Gen. Charles D. Herron visited Admiral Claude C. Bloch on June 17, informed him of the receipt of these orders and requested the Navy establish a distance reconnaissance. This is hearsay and gained from official correspondence.

Admiral Bloch, in company with General Herron, either had Vice Admiral Andrews come in or visited him and requested him to establish the long range reconnaissance because the patrol planes were under Vice Admiral Andrews. Vice Admiral Andrews was the senior officer afloat in Pearl Harbor.

I was informed of what had been done by both Admiral Andrews and I believe Admiral Bloch, so I sent to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, the following message:

Would like to know whether request of Commanding General Hawaiian Department for additional air patrol is a part of Army exercises or is it based upon information from the War Department?

I received at 0945 local time on June 19, 1940 the following reply:

Request of Commanding General was based upon a directive from the War Department. He has no information as to whether or not it is an exercise.

I had received no information from the Navy Department. Therefore, despite what anybody else believed, I knew that it could not be other than a drill.

The Vice Chairman. Other than a what?

Admiral Richardson. Other than an exercise, because I firmly believed that no important information would be available to General Marshall that was not available to Admiral Stark and if the information was of such a character as to [697] necessitate alerting the Army, the Navy would be equally alerted; but in order to be certain I—

Mr. Mitchell. Are you looking for your letter of the 22d?

Admiral Richardson. No. On June 21 I had a plane come out from Pearl Harbor, pick me up at 0745, take me into Pearl Harbor, where I had a conference with Admiral Bloch and General Herron. I read the order. I asked General Herron whether it was a real alert or a drill. He said he did not know. I assured him that it could not be anything but an exercise.

I sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations requesting information. No reply was ever received.

In compliance with General Herron's request to establish a patrol Vice Admiral Andrews modified the patrol that was then in effect. I had established a plane patrol centered on Lahaina, which covered the arc from 220 to 335 degrees to a distance of 180 miles. Admiral Andrews changed this patrol to cover the arc from south, through west to north to a distance of 300 miles. He also established a dawn and dusk patrol, reported his action to me in a letter dated June 18
and requested that I confirm this action. I sent to Vice Admiral Andrews the following dispatch:

Affirm patrol.

Do you want me to go on?

Mr. Mitchell. That report from Admiral Andrews is the document in the correspondence file dated June 18, 1940, "Memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet." You have it before you, have you?

Admiral Richardson. I forwarded that with a letter from Admiral Bloch to me, with the dispatch exchange between me and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in my letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in order that he might be fully informed as to the whole incident.

Mr. Mitchell. The report of Admiral Andrews states that the sector you spoke of from south through west to north to a distance of 300 miles would be searched.

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. With what types of planes was that reconnaissance conducted?

Admiral Richardson. Well, the patrol planes, a type then known as VP, which is a seaplane, unarmed, used later in this war, primarily as a rescue plane.

Mr. Mitchell. How long did you keep that plane reconnaissance operation on that scale?

Admiral Richardson. In order that the committee may be fully informed with respect to long-range reconnaissance which prevailed for a number of months, it will be necessary for me to cover some correspondence and make a comprehensive statement. Shall I proceed?

Mr. Mitchell. If you are ready to.

Admiral Richardson. In connection with the annual fleet exercises, it had always been the custom to simulate war conditions, and therefore, when the fleet arrived in the Hawaiian area, about April 10, and all of the heavy ships anchored off Lahaina Roads, I established, as a part of the exercises, a dawn and dusk inner patrol of planes, which extended to a distance of about 30 miles. I established an antisubmarine patrol of destroyers at all the entrances to Lahaina Roads, and I established a long range reconnaissance of approximately 180 miles.

This reconnaissance was established solely as an exercise. It was not adequate either as to the density of the planes or as to the distance searched to provide warning of any impending attack from a prospective enemy. Because of the frequent warnings which I had received from the Chief of Naval Operations in personal letters, because of my orders to remain in the Hawaiian area with the fleet for reasons unknown to me, I continued this patrol and gradually the purpose for which it was maintained was somewhat modified.

It was continued for three purposes: First, for training; next, because of my knowledge of the Japanese, and the Panay incident. Although I felt there was absolute ly no danger at that time of an attack by the Japanese fleet, I feared that there was, at any time, a possibility that some fanatical, ill-advised officer in command of a submarine or a ship might attack.
Also I felt—and this may have been wrong, but I felt that Admiral Stark might not have all the information that there was available, or he might not fully understand the implications of all the information that he had, and that partly as a personal defensive device, he was warning me to be on the alert against a possible attack, and being an officer of long experience, I wanted the same protection, and therefore I flew this patrol so it could not be said of me after the thing happened that I was warned and did nothing about it.

It was in effect from that point of view a token reconnaissance.

That was continued until, in November 28, 1940, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I said, in part—that is my letter of the 28th of November—

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii.

The third paragraph states:

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern—

Mr. Mitchell (interposing). You might read that fully, that second paragraph.

Admiral Richardson. That relates to another item, but I will do that.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Admiral Richardson (reading):

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern, and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships at present are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that wartime measures of security must be carried out.

Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training, and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on fleet units.

Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters, and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

Now, Admiral Stark replied to that letter in a letter dated December 23, the third paragraph of which says—have you got it?

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, I have, but I was wondering if you would not get the thread of this a little better if you went back to Admiral Stark's letter to you of November 22, the reply to which you just read? You refer to that in the reply. That is November 22, 1940.
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Counsel, there are two points, there are two lines of thought. There are two chains of action, and I am pursuing one.

Mr. Mitchell. All right. Go ahead. You may go back to that, if necessary.

Admiral Richardson. Go back?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. What I am now discussing is long range reconnaissance. In Admiral Stark's letter of December 23, he stated, in paragraph 3:

First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy—

Murphy was at that time Commander Vincent R. Murphy, my war plans officer, whom I had left in Washington to discuss matters with the War Plans Division of Naval Operations. [Reading:]

[704] I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as to the extent security measures should be prosecuted, namely, that while the extent of security measures required his increasing, it has not yet reached the demands of full wartime security. As I discussed with Murphy, there will be an advantage in making occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not yet necessary to make these continuous. I agree with you that the wear and tear on equipment, and the detrimental effects on training, of full security measures should be given due weight.

Upon receipt of that letter of December 30, 1940, in a letter addressed to the fleet, the number of the letter being "U. S. Fleet Confidential Letter No. 8CL 1-40; Subject: Security of fleet units operating in the Hawaiian area", which is the finished product, the tentative draft of which I sent to Admiral Stark—

The Vice Chairman. What is the date of that, please?

Admiral Richardson. December 30, 1940. I doubt whether the committee has a copy of this letter, because I myself received it just yesterday, and I secured this letter because the counsel indicated to me his intention to interrogate me with respect to long range reconnaissance. Undoubtedly the counsel will supply the members of the committee with a copy of this letter, if he has not already done so.

[705] Mr. Gesell. It has not been supplied as yet.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, you are not referring to the report of December 30, 1940, from the commandant?

Admiral Richardson. No.

Mr. Mitchell. They are different documents?

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Counsel, there are two chains of circumstances and letters originating at about the same time. I am pursuing one of them.

Mr. Mitchell. This letter you refer to is from you to Admiral Stark, is it?

Admiral Richardson. When Admiral Stark informed me that he felt it was no longer necessary to do other than sweep operating areas and do what his letter of December 23, said to do, then I had no concern over doing other than what I thought was necessary. I discontinued then long range reconnaissance of any kind except the sweeping of operating areas.

I present this letter primarily to show that I discontinued patrol plane reconnaissance. I also issued this directive:
Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

Now if counsel so desires, I will pursue the other chain of circumstances.

Mr. Mitchell. What was the precise date that Admiral Kimmel assumed command there?

Admiral Richardson. After issuing this directive, 8CL-40 of December 30, 1940, I felt that this letter was not sufficiently comprehensive to provide for the security of the fleet, so I immediately started the preparation of a revision of that document. I was engaged—at least my staff was—in revising that when I received information of my prospective detachment. So I amplified that very much. But inasmuch as I was to be relieved in the near future, I asked that my staff confer with the prospective staff of the prospective commander in chiefs to ascertain their views. So the document that was later issued under the title of “Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, date of February 15, 1941” was signed by Admiral H. E. Kimmel, who was the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet having relieved me on February 1, 1941.

Had I remained in command of the U. S. Fleet this order would have borne my signature and it would have been substantially the same order.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, let us go back for a moment to Admiral Stark’s letter to you of November 22, 1940, which I have before me. He says:

While you were here early in October we sent a dispatch to Comfourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being afforded to the vital element of the naval establishment in Hawaii was satisfactory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian Department.

Admiral Bloch’s answers to this dispatch and to a second dispatch on the same subject were not very definite, and did not provide bases for further action by the Department.

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander in Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

For instance, is it desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor itself? I will appreciate your comment and those of Comfourteen on this question.

Anti-aircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet, actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times; by stationing about the Navy Yard of Army A. A. defense measures including mobile batteries, and possibly by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Anti-Aircraft Units now available in the Pearl Harbor area, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go.
And so on.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, you responded to that letter on the 28th of November and you said:

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii.

Now you did take it up with Admiral Bloch?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Just tell us what you did about that.
Admiral Richardson. The letter of Admiral Stark to me dated November 22, 1940, is one of a series of letters and incidents about which at least three witnesses in addition to me will testify, and in order that that matter may be initially understood I think it advisable to cover the whole series.

When I was in Washington the 7th, or the 11th of October [709] I discussed with Admiral Stark the position of the fleet when in Pearl Harbor, the inadequate provision that had been made both by the Army and Navy to protect the fleet, and before I returned to Pearl Harbor Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Bloch, commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, a dispatch requesting certain information, as indicated in his first paragraph of the letter of November 22.

I remained on the New Mexico on the west coast and did not arrive in Pearl Harbor until the 6th of December. Admiral Bloch was the commandant of the district, and he was exceedingly busy with work under construction. I felt that it was essential that I personally know what we had, and what the Army had, therefore I arranged with Lt. Gen. Charles D. Herron to inspect everything that the Army had to defend the Army and Navy installations in Hawaii from all forms of overseas attack.

I asked General Herron to have the officers who were subordinate to him, who were directly responsible for any part of the defense, prepared to show me what they had, to give me a list of what they had, give me a list of what the plans called for them to have, and the best estimate they could make of when they would receive what they required.

The flagship was going to sea on individual exercises which did not require my presence. Therefore, on December 19, [710] in company with General Herron, I reviewed the Army equipment and received the data requested. I delivered this data to Admiral Bloch and told him that inasmuch as he represented the fleet in relations with the Army in Hawaii, because I might be away at any time, that I wanted him to use this data and prepare a letter to the Navy Department setting forth his views and forward the letter through me, which Admiral Bloch did in a letter dated December 30, 1940. The subject: “Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.”

[711] That letter was forwarded by me to the Chief of Naval Operations with the first endorsement dated January 4, 1941. I have been informed, and I believe that rear admiral, now Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, then on duty in the War Plans Division of NavalOperations, prepared, for the signature of the Secretary of the Navy, a letter dated January 24, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of War.

Reference to this letter appears on page 5, section 7 of the report of the Roberts Commission.
Mr. Mitchell. This letter, Admiral, of December 30, 1940, signed by Admiral Bloch and addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, is in evidence here. Have you it before you?

Admiral Richardson. I have.

Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading paragraphs 1 and 2 of that letter, or shall I read it for you?

Admiral Richardson. I will read it:

In view of the inquiries contained in references (a)—which is Stark's dispatch of October 1940—(b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

Aircraft Raids:

[712] Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack.

First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with antiaircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate any enemy carriers, and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area 30 B-13 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is 6 years old and the planes themselves are 5 years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched, will require both fighting planes and antiaircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area, 36 pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are 6 years old, and some of them are 4 years old. [713] In numbers and models there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor Base by antiaircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 100 .50-calibre out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50-calibre machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the number of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of antiaircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the antiaircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of antiaircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of antiaircraft barrages [714] abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area.

This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 calibre machine guns.

[715] In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of 8 radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and 55 are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

May I also read the last paragraph?

Mr. Mitchell. Any part of it that you think is material, Admiral.

Admiral Richardson. This is paragraph 11:

It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the 14th Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, then on January 7, 1941, you placed an endorsement on that communication of Bloch’s?

Admiral Richardson. I think that is January 4, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Is it?

Admiral Richardson. Yes.


Admiral Richardson. That is Saturday, and I wanted this away as quickly as I could and I know I would not hold it.

Mr. Mitchell. That expresses directly your individual views about the situation, did it?

Admiral Richardson. It did. I think that Admiral Bloch and I were in complete agreement, because we fully discussed the matter.

Mr. Mitchell. Would you care to read the portions of that that you think are especially useful? The first paragraph probably covers the ground really, and the second—I will read it if you like.

Admiral Richardson. I think, if I may be permitted to suggest it, that the first and third paragraphs ought to be read, because the third paragraph contains the matter that has been mentioned several times.

Paragraph 1:

Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant 14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant 14th Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant 14th Naval District in the opinion that the Army Pursuit Squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 65 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

[718] Mr. Mitchell. I will read “2” for you, to relieve your voice, Admiral.

Admiral Richardson. All right.

Mr. Mitchell (reading):

2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries, nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of the Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in the event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present, the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

Admiral Richardson. Paragraph 3:

There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the Harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the Harbor, particularly the movement of large ships and the landing and takeoff of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area, any pressure defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided.

Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered it is necessary to lay such nets.
That paragraph was, in part, based on information from the Navy Department; insofar as was known torpedos launched from aircraft would not operate in water of the depth of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Mitchell. You spoke, Admiral, of the fact that following that report of Admiral Bloch of December 30, forwarded with the endorsement you have just read, there resulted the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, to the Secretary of War, which you stated was prepared for him by Admiral Turner.

Admiral Richardson. Admiral Turner so informed me.

Mr. Mitchell. I have that letter here and it hasn't been offered in evidence yet. Probably I had better read it if the committee is ready.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Will you identify that?

[720] Mr. Mitchell. These are letters which we will mark Exhibit 10.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 10.")

Mr. Mitchell. It follows right along logically after this Bloch report. It is a letter from Secretary Knox, dated January 24, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of War.

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of it?

Mr. Mitchell. January 24, 1941.

[721] My Dear Mr. Secretary: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.

(6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
(2) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire.
(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibility, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.
Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 106 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one of the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 50-mm. [724], and one hundred twenty 37-mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

1. That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.
2. That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special services for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.
3. That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gunfire, against surprise aircraft raids.
4. That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor. [725]
5. That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Then attached to that is the reply of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, dated February 7, 1941:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, Feb. 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36’s and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This
will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-P pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks [727] and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified [728] opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

Signed by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

[729] Attached to that is a letter of transmittal from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

“Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,” and copy of Secretary Knox’s letter, and one of Secretary Stimson’s letters; transmitted under date of February 11, 1941.

And another, addressed to the the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, signed by General Dick, Adjutant General, dated February 7, 1941, inviting attention to the correspondence I have just read between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War.

And attached then is a document dated February 13, 1941, signed by Carl Grosse, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, acknowledging receipt of the Adjutant General’s letter of February 7, together with the two enclosures noted.

They are all part of the same exhibit (No. 10).

[730] Now, Admiral Richardson, had you left Hawaii before February 11 and 13 when this Knox-Stimson matter was up?

Admiral Richardson. I was relieved of command of the fleet on the 1st of February 1941. Thereafter I knew nothing about fleet matters, although I did not actually leave the islands until the 14th of February.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, this correspondence between the Navy and the War Department that I have just read, that reached there February 11 and 13, would not have come to your hands?

Admiral Richardson. This is the first time it has come to my notice.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, going back to your visits with Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox, which was your first trip here in 1940, along in
July, you said you went to Mr. Hull and others to find out what the situation was, why you were being kept at Pearl Harbor. I neglected to ask you what Mr. Hull said, if he gave the reason for it.

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Hull in a very complete and comprehensive manner presented to me his views of the relationships, relations between the United States and Japan. He felt that we should take a very strong position with respect to Japan and that the retention of the fleet in Hawaii was a reflection of that strong attitude.

[732] I did not receive this impression from Secretary Hull, and I cannot state with certainty how I received it, but I left here with the distinct impression that there was an opinion in Washington that Japan could be bluffed.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, when you were here during that trip you visited with Admiral Stark, I suppose?

Admiral Richardson. I did. I stayed with Admiral Stark at the Admiral's house.

Mr. Mitchell. In your contact with him did you gather any different impression about his attitude toward basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor instead of on our west coast than he expressed in these letters?

Admiral Richardson. It is my belief that had Admiral Stark been uninfluenced by other considerations he would have wholeheartedly agreed with me.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, just what did he say about it in your meetings with him, if you remember.

Admiral Richardson. Well, his letters, I think, in many places show that he hoped that the fleet would return to the west coast, and after the fleet had been in Hawaii for some time he authorized me to return approximately one-third of the fleet to the coast at a time for recreation and replenishment and the securing of additional men, and when he informed me that I might do that he said that he informed me with great [732] pleasure. And I believe that I came with either the first or the second one of those task forces that visited the coast.

Mr. Mitchell. During 1940, when you were in command of the fleet, did you have fleet war games out in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral Richardson. We had, while I was in command of the fleet, only one big fleet exercise which involved two fleet properns. They took place between the first of April and the 9th of May.

Mr. Mitchell. Did any of those exercises involve a simulated air attack by an enemy carrier force?

Admiral Richardson. Those exercises did not. The exercises were planned by my predecessor. They did not include a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. And joint exercises with the Army were discussed by Admiral Stark with me in letters, and it was too late to modify the plans, and in those exercises the only exercises in which the Army participated was, I believe, on the 8th or 9th of April. I sent some heavy cruisers in to simulate an attempted raid in order to exercise the forces stationed in Hawaii, the Navy patrol planes, in locating the force and the Army bombers in bombing it, and the submarine stations normally in Pearl Harbor in attacking the force, which was simulating an attack, so that there was not a large scale joint exercise between the Army and the Navy in which a carrier raid on installations in Hawaii occurred, although in previous years, when I was in a
position other than commander in chief, I had been present in the fleet when such attacks were made.

[734] Mr. Mitchell. I think we are ready for the committee to inquire of the witness.

The Chairman. Admiral, who was your immediate predecessor as commander of the United States Fleet?

Admiral Richardson. I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch.

The Chairman. What is the technical relationship between the commander in chief of the fleet, such as that which you were commander of, and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral Richardson. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District is a subordinate of the commander in chief. He is also under the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to other than fleet matters.

The Chairman. When the fleet is at sea does the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have complete authority within that district or is he still subject to orders of the commander in chief of the fleet?

Admiral Richardson. He is always subject to the orders of the commander in chief. Because the commander in chief may not be present in Pearl Harbor he is the representative of the commander in chief in dealings with the commanding general.

The Chairman. Yes. Now, up to the time when you were detached, the force of which you were commander in chief was known as the United States Fleet, is that true?

Admiral Richardson. That is correct, because at that time the commander in chief of the United States Fleet had command of all the ships in the Atlantic that were in commission and not operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as a ship would be were she undergoing shake-down preparatory to joining the fleet.

The Chairman. So that during the time you were commander in chief of the United States Fleet that meant that you were the commander in chief of the entire fleet?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

The Chairman. No matter where it was located?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

The Chairman. Now, there was a reorganization that was somewhat coincident with your detachment?

Admiral Richardson. Absolutely coincident.

The Chairman. And they divided the fleet into the Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral Richardson. No.

The Chairman. No?

Admiral Richardson. There had always been a small force known as the Asiatic Fleet that was not under the command of the commander in chief of the United States Fleet but passed under his command in case the United States Fleet moved to the western Pacific.

The Chairman. Well, on the 1st of February, then, 1941 approximately, the Pacific Fleet as such came into existence?

Admiral Richardson. It did. The title and the position of commander in chief United States Fleet disappeared and in lieu thereof there was established the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which commanded all the ships in the Pacific Ocean that were not part of the Asiatic Fleet and were not operating directly under the
Chief of Naval Operations. There was a commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, who commanded all the combatant ships in commission in the Atlantic Fleet except those that were operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

The Chairman. When did you become commander in chief of the United States Fleet?

Admiral Richardson. On January 6, 1940.

The Chairman. So that you were in command of the fleet approximately 13 months?

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

The Chairman. Was Admiral Kimmel associated with the fleet under your command in the Pacific?

Admiral Richardson. He was. He was in the fleet under the command of, or the immediate senior under Admiral Stark before I became commander in chief and before Admiral Stark became Chief of Naval Operations. In fact, he relieved Admiral Stark as commander of the cruisers and from that position he relieved me.

The Chairman. What relationship did he occupy in authority with respect to you as commander in chief of the fleet? Was he senior officer under you or how far down the line did he go?

Admiral Richardson. Admiral Kimmel?

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. Well, he was very far down. He was a rear admiral and under me came first the commander of the battle force, who was an admiral. Then commander of the scouting force and commander of battleships, who were both vice admirals. Then Admiral Kimmel commanded the cruisers and as such he was on the same level as the commander of the battleships, the commander of the destroyers and the commander of the aircraft.

The Chairman. And he was commander of all the cruisers then in the force?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, what we call a type commander.

The Chairman. Yes. Now, in this correspondence between Admiral Stark and you, you continuously emphasized your belief that the fleet should be based on the Pacific coast rather than in the Hawaiian Islands or Oahu?

[738] Admiral Richardson. I did that.

The Chairman. And there were, as I gather from the correspondence, many reasons for that opinion on your part, one among them being that you had larger areas for training of the aircraft force and the other activities of training the men and also that you believed that the morale of the men would be improved by being closer to their homes?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. I presented solely the naval point of view.

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. There are other considerations that at times determined the disposition of the fleet or the units thereof.

The Chairman. Yes. And in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations and in your conversations with him in Washington and with the Secretary of State and with the President you were impressed with their belief that in addition to naval reasons that there
was probably a diplomatic or other, maybe psychological, reason for keeping the fleet in that area as a deterrent against activities on the part of Japan?

Admiral Richardson. Absolutely.

[739] The Chairman. Now, when you were in Washington you emphasized the fact that you needed more men and that the Navy was being vastly expanded and that men were not coming in as fast as ships were being built?

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

The Chairman. That you needed more men?

Admiral Richardson. I did it in and out of port, everywhere.

The Chairman. Yes. Then you referred to 5,000 men that were allotted to you on one of your trips here, or while you were here on one of your trips and that you sent them out to the Hawaiian area on a carrier, did you say?

Admiral Richardson. Those that I was unable to accommodate in the ships that came with me to the west coast I sent out to Pearl Harbor in a carrier.

The Chairman. Yes. Following your detachment from the fleet you became a member of the General Board of the Navy here in Washington?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

The Chairman. I think that is all I want to ask at this time. Senator George?

Senator George. I don't care to ask any questions at the present time.

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper?

[740] The Vice Chairman. I don't think I have any questions now, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the admiral two or three questions.

In your memorandum of September 12, 1940, to the Secretary of the Navy you submitted a number of pertinent points to be considered, among which were the operations of the fleet and in that part of the memorandum you discussed the problems involved if the fleet was to be retained in Hawaiian waters.

As I understand it, those points of disadvantage that you stressed in that memorandum were purely problems from a naval standpoint and nothing else?

Admiral Richardson. Oh, absolutely.

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, you set forth seven points, seven disadvantages to basing the fleet in that area. Those points have been gone over by counsel and yourself and I was anxious to determine from you as to whether or not at that time you considered the question of the possibility of a hostile air attack from some aggressor nation, in connection with not basing the fleet in the Hawaiian waters?

Admiral Richardson. I had not considered that it was likely that the fleet would be attacked by a carrier raid [741] and I so stated repeatedly in security orders issued to the fleet.

The Chairman. Will the admiral desist for a moment? The Chair announced at the beginning of these hearings that the photographers would not be permitted in this areaway. It interferes with the wit-
nesses, with the counsel, and with the committee, and I hope that my friend will observe that rule hereafter. You may proceed, Senator.

Senator Lucas. This memorandum was in June 1940, and if I understand you correctly, Admiral, the possibility of a hostile air attack on the fleet was not considered in making up the recommendations which the authorities here in Washington should study?

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. And the question of a submarine attack was not considered either in connection with those plans?

Admiral Richardson. I have difficulty in hearing the Senator.

Senator Lucas. I say the question of a submarine attack by a hostile force was not considered in 1940 either?

Admiral Richardson. No. I think my view is clearly presented in a document before the committee which says:

The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions:

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

(1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor,

(2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel,

(3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

So that, actually, before I left the fleet we were sweeping the channel against magnetic mines.

Senator Lucas. How long was it after you gave your seven points of disadvantage to keeping the fleet in Hawaii that the order of Admiral Andrews was issued to start the patrol which you discussed?

Admiral Richardson. Admiral Andrews' order did not start a patrol.

Senator Lucas. What was that order?

Admiral Richardson. It modified the patrol that I had in existence.

Senator Lucas. I see, all right. And when did that patrol go into existence that you had, Admiral?

[742] Admiral Richardson. It started the day that the fleet arrived in the Hawaiian area on the 10th of April.

Senator Lucas. 1940?

Admiral Richardson. 1940, purely as a part of the fleet exercise for training purposes.

Senator Lucas. For training purposes only?

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. And how long did that continue?

Admiral Richardson. It continued until, I think, the 30th of December 1940.

Senator Lucas. Well, how did the admiral's order augment that? I had just forgotten your statement a moment ago.

Admiral Richardson. Initially the long-range patrol, so-called, but it was not a long-range patrol, it was to 180 miles centered on Lahaina between the arc of 220 and 235, as I remember, but I can verify that—220 to 335 to 180 miles.

Now, when the Army received an alert Admiral Andrews shifted the center from Lahaina to Pearl Harbor and increased the distance to 300 miles and changed the arc from 180 through west to north. Later on I modified that patrol.
Senator Lucas. Yes. Now, before you leave the patrol, how long did that continue?

Admiral Richardson. The patrol established by Admiral Andrews?

[744] Senator Lucas. That is right.

Admiral Richardson. I am not certain, but I think it continued as long as the Army maintained their alert which was, as I remember, almost a month.

Senator Lucas. Now, how many planes were being used on that patrol?

Admiral Richardson. I haven't the faintest idea.

Senator Lucas. That is an Army question?

Admiral Richardson. I haven't any idea.

Senator Lucas. Did the Navy use any planes?

Admiral Richardson. Oh, the Army used no planes.

Senator Lucas. But you don't know how many planes the Navy used on that patrol?

Admiral Richardson. No.

Senator Lucas. Well, who would know that?

Admiral Richardson. I doubt if anybody would know—

Senator Lucas. Well, weren't you—

Admiral Richardson—Because you cannot remember, at least, the commander in chief cannot remember, details of activities after 5 years.

Senator Lucas. Well, did you make any record of the daily patrols that were made by these planes from the ships?

Admiral Richardson. No. You established it in an order and forgot it, assuming that it would be carried out.

[745] Senator Lucas. You do not recall? You wouldn't want to make a guess as to how many planes daily went out on this patrol to cover this arc that was established by the admiral?

Admiral Richardson. No; I would not hazard a guess and the only possible source of information of any reliability would be in the files of the commander in chief and the files—

Senator Lucas. Of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral Richardson (continuing). Become very voluminous and are normally retained active only about 2 or 3 years.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand that at that particular time the planes that were on the sea on the Enterprise, that were making daily flights in training, that there was no record of the number of planes that went out and when they came back?

Admiral Richardson. Well, every ship keeps in her log a record of everything that it does.

Senator Lucas. Well, that is what I thought.

Admiral Richardson. And in the patrol squadrons there would undoubtedly be maintained a record of when the planes left and when they returned.

Senator Lucas. Now, who would have the record of the patrol, of the men who were making the determination of the number of planes that were going out on this patrol in line [746] with the order that was augmented by Admiral Andrews?

Admiral Richardson. Well, Admiral Andrews' order to the officer in command of the patrol wing would tell him how many planes to
use, when to start out, how far they would go, when they would return.

Senator Lucas. Well, was that Admiral Andrews’ responsibility then?

Admiral Richardson. What?

Senator Lucas. Would that be Admiral Andrews’ responsibility for issuing the order and for the keeping of the record of the planes?

Admiral Richardson. No; he would not keep a record. In consultation with the commander of the patrol wing, which I think was Patrol Wing 2, he would issue the order in general terms. The commander of Patrol Wing 2 would implement it and record his compliance.

Senator Lucas. All right. Later on, Admiral, you modified this order?

Admiral Richardson. I did.

Senator Lucas. Just how did you do it, now?

Admiral Richardson. Because of the number of planes that were available and because of the need for training men, I modified the patrol to cover periodically an arc between 170°, which is 10° to the east of south and 250°, and I covered daily an arc, a sector of that arc and in order that it might not be evident to Japanese residents of Oahu that I was searching the same sector every day, I rotated that sector.

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, one further question and then I will be through.

With respect to the letter that you wrote to Admiral Stark after General Herron, as I understood you to say, had been notified that an alert was on in the Hawaiian Islands, you did not receive any information at that time from anyone in Washington, D. C., about that?

Admiral Richardson. Not at that time.

Senator Lucas. You later said that you wrote to Admiral Stark about the type of alert that was on and that you had never received any answer from him.

Admiral Richardson. Oh, I telegraphed him, I mean I sent him a radio and asked him what it was all about.

Senator Lucas. And you never received any reply to that?

Admiral Richardson. Never.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark after that as to why he did not reply to that important message of yours?

Admiral Richardson. I talked to both Admiral Stark and General Marshall.

Senator Lucas. What did Admiral Stark say as to the reason he did not reply after this type of alert went out to the islands?

Admiral Richardson. He said it was an exercise, an Army exercise.

Senator Lucas. That is what Admiral Stark said?

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. And he did not think it was sufficiently important, even though he had received a message from you, he did not think it was important enough to make reply to you?

Admiral Richardson. Well, he knew that I had enough confidence in him to know that if it were the real thing he would have told me.

Senator Lucas. But you did send him a wire?
Admiral Richardson. I did.

Senator Lucas. And asked him about it?

Admiral Richardson. I did.

Senator Lucas. You wanted to find out for yourself?

Admiral Richardson. I wanted an answer, too.

Senator Lucas. That is right. One other question, if I may. Over in one of these letters in reading this correspondence I note this, Admiral. In your letter of May 13, [749] 1940, addressed to Admiral Stark—at that time you were still discussing the reasons pro and con as to why the fleet should or should not be based in Hawaiian waters—in this letter you state this:

It seems that under present world conditions the paramount thing for us is the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends everything, anything, certainly, in the Far East, our own or other interests. South America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed.

Who did you expect to grab South America in that letter?

Admiral Richardson. Well, Senator, I haven't a copy of that letter.

Senator Lucas. It would be interesting to know because—

Admiral Richardson. May what?

Senator Lucas. This is May 13, 1940.

The Chairman. If the Admiral is in a position to answer that question he may do so. We have gone past our adjourning hour.

Admiral Richardson. Oh, I have that.

Senator Lucas. I am sure you and I agree on the same thing, probably, as to who we thought might grab South America, but it was just interesting to get your further reactions.

Admiral Richardson. Well, I didn't want anybody to grab [750] South America.

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

[751]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P.M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

When we recessed Senator Lucas was examining Admiral Richardson. You may resume.

Senator Lucas. Admiral Richardson, in one of your statements made before the committee this morning you stated that you were certain that the Navy could have been alerted as well as the Army had it been any other thing than a drill.

Admiral Richardson. Correct.

Senator Lucas. Later on you told the committee, and told me on examination, that you wired, you radioed, I think you said, Admiral Stark, asking him directly in this radiogram what the alert meant, and you received no reply.

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Later on you had a talk with Admiral Stark here in Washington and in that conversation with the Admiral he advised you that it was merely a drill?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You also said that while you were here you had a conversation with General Marshall on that same question.

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Lucas. Will you give to the committee what General Marshall said about the alert?

[752] Admiral Richardson. I told General Marshall that the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department had received an alert, that I was certain that it was a drill, but a situation had been created where there was some uncertainty and some uneasiness, and that I would like to know what was the purpose of the alert dispatch sent by him.

He said:

Oh, that was simply an exercise and I thought if I did not state that it was an exercise the exercise would be carried out more completely.

Senator Lucas. That is about the end of the conversation, I take it?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you stated previously—
The Chairman. The Chair will state that Congressman Clark would be the next in order but he is not here at the moment.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, you stated in your examination that you and Admiral Stark were close personal friends?

Admiral Richardson. Had been. Admiral Stark entered the Naval Academy 1 year after I did.

Mr. Murphy. When in Washington you stayed at his home?

Admiral Richardson. I did. He served with me when we [753] were both ensigns.

Mr. Murphy. What was the attitude of Admiral Stark in regard to the location of the fleet at Hawaii?

Admiral Richardson. Well, from all that he said to me, and from all that he wrote to me, I gathered that he was fully in sympathy with me. Of course, he was more closely in touch with diplomatic considerations than I was.

Mr. Murphy. Did you receive a message from Admiral Stark dated March 15, 1940?

Admiral Richardson. A letter?

Mr. Murphy. I understand that on March 15, 1940, Admiral Stark sent you a message in which he declared, despite your many doubts, that the policy of keeping the fleet units in Hawaiian waters was sound, and that the State Department was very strong for it. Did you receive such a communication?

Admiral Richardson. That communication did not refer to the retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian waters, for the reason that the fleet had not arrived in the Hawaiian waters at that date. That referred to the Hawaiian detachment which was sent to the Hawaiian area the fall preceding, I think, September or October 1939.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know of any written memorandum, by letter or otherwise, where at any time Admiral Stark stated his position as to whether or not the fleet should be assigned [754] to Hawaii?

Admiral Richardson. He stated repeatedly that he hoped we would return and that our delay in Hawaiian waters would not be unduly prolonged.

Mr. Murphy. Will you state—give me a reference to any communication that you know where Admiral Stark made his position clear in writing?
Senator Brewster. May I be permitted to speak?

Mr. Murphy. Do you want to help me?

Admiral Richardson. On the 7th of May in a letter to me he says:

Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian waters for a couple of weeks.

When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) * * *

He said:

Of course, you know the thought behind the above * * *

Mr. Murphy. Are you following the letter?

Admiral Richardson. No, I am skipping.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you stopped at “but I cannot tell” in the second line in the second paragraph, did you?

Admiral Richardson. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Then you go from there to where?

[755] Admiral Richardson. The fourth paragraph?

Of course, you know the thoughts behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then — 7?7?7 nobody can answer the riddle just now.

Mr. Murphy. Where is Admiral Stark’s position in that?

Admiral Richardson. That is all I know.

[756] Mr. Murphy. All right.

Admiral Richardson. It is manifest that he trusted that the fleet would not remain there long.

Mr. Murphy. Well, where is his position, I mean as to whether it should or not? Can you refer to anything in writing at any time, anywhere, where Admiral Stark states his position to you that he is in agreement with you, or that he disagrees with the proposition of having the fleet there?

Admiral Richardson. Well, whatever he said I firmly believe that he wholeheartedly agreed with me.

Mr. Murphy. But can you give us a reference to anything in writing anywhere? If so, state it.

Senator Brewster. I refer you, Admiral, to the letter of May 22 to you, the first paragraph of which is [reading]:

Replying to your letter of May 13th—

in which I think Admiral Stark made his position very clear.

Admiral Richardson. Unfortunately, I have not a copy of that letter.

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest to the Chairman that inadvertently the Chair has overlooked that this would be the turn of Senator Brewster, the Senator from Maine, to examine the witness.

The Chairman. Well, the Chairman exercised his right [757] at the beginning and I examined following the examination of counsel and did examine the Admiral but not upon this point.

Mr. Murphy. I beg your pardon, you misunderstood me. I meant that after Mr. Clark it would then have been the turn of Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. I have placed no objection to your examining the Admiral.

Mr. Murphy. And then I would follow.
Senator Brewster. That is quite all right, Congressman Murphy, and I hope you will accept my suggestion which is simply in the interest of saving time.

The Chairman. The Chair is subject to correction. In the absence of Mr. Clark the next in order by the alternation would have been the Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster.

Senator Brewster. I am quite willing to let Mr. Murphy proceed. The Chairman. I apologize to the Senator from Maine for that omission.

Senator Brewster. I know that my rights are being saved, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Murphy. Now, do you have the letter of May 22 suggested by the gentleman, the Senator from Maine?

Admiral Richardson. I doubt if I can find anywhere a specific statement saying:

I am opposed to retaining the fleet in the Hawaiian area.

Mr. Murphy. Can you find a specific statement saying that he agrees with you categorically?

Admiral Richardson. This is what he says on the 22d of May.

[Reading:]

When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy—that means the dispatch to return—it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent “blitzkrieg” events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least) the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself.

Mr. Murphy. That is the only written memorandum to which you can refer?

Admiral Richardson. Well, I—

Mr. Murphy. I mean is that the only one?

Admiral Richardson. Congressman Murphy, since the receipt of this correspondence I have been almost constantly in attendance here. If I had time to search through all of the papers carefully I have no doubt that I would find sufficient evidence of his concurrence with me as to convince anyone.

Mr. Murphy. If you find it will you produce it, please?

Admiral Richardson. I will, or I shall.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you had a meeting with the President about which you prepared a memorandum in October of 1940. Did you prepare any memoranda after the previous meetings?

Admiral Richardson. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster?

Senator Brewster. Pursuing further the question which the Congressman has been asking, I think it should be clear what was the representation in your letter to which Admiral Stark expressed his view on. It was, as I understand it, your letter of May 13, in which you used the following language [reading]:

I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to become involved in the West where our interests, although
important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere which is vital.

If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be [760] docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.

Rest assured that although I am entirely without information I realize your position, and I want you to know that if the situation becomes such that higher authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have.

That is the end of the quotation from your letter, to which I understand Admiral Stark in his letter of May 22 replied. [Reading:]

I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself.

Would that lead you to believe, or would that leave you in any doubt, Admiral Richardson, as to the position of Admiral Stark in this matter?

Admiral Richardson. I was never in any doubt about his position.

Senator Brewster. And what was the situation, Admiral, of the fleet? With the fleet which you had at Pearl Harbor—was it what would be considered in naval parlance as a fleet?

Admiral Richardson. Well, it was a combatant fleet but it did not have in company with it the auxiliaries that would be essential to active operations.

Senator Brewster. So that if there were hostilities [761] that should develop, what would have been the mission of the fleet under any plans that were in existence?

Admiral Richardson. Under the existing plans it would have been necessary for the fleet to return to the west coast to mobilize, assemble a train, fill the ships with the regulation number of personnel, provisions, supplies, stores, fuel, strip the ships of needless articles which necessarily appear on a ship during a long period of peace and prepare them for offensive operation.

Senator Brewster. State whether or not the fleet on December 7 was in such a condition as would have required its return similarly?

Admiral Richardson. It had been more completely prepared for war action because before I returned to Pearl Harbor with a portion of the fleet, arriving thereon the 6th of December, we had placed in storage a lot of inflammable material that we carried in time of peace.

The ships had been degaussed.

The Chairman. Had been what?

Admiral Richardson. Degaussed.

The Chairman. I don’t get that word.

Admiral Richardson. Well, it is a French word which means running a coil of wire around them which energized will probably prevent the magnetic field of the ship from exploding a magnetic mine.

[762] Senator Brewster. Under the plans existing prior to December 7, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it contemplated should be the mission of the Navy during the earlier period of any hostilities with a Western Pacific power?

Admiral Richardson. Well, the plans then in existence were called the “Orange” plan or the “0-1” plan and it was, in my opinion, a fairly sound plan theoretically, but the time element bore no relation to reality and some time in October I wrote a comprehensive letter to the Chief of Naval Operations presenting my conception of the then existing “Orange” plan, which is in the hands of the committee.
Senator Brewster. That was in 1940?
Admiral Richardson. 1940.

Senator Brewster. And did that contemplate some manner of offensive action by the fleet?

- Admiral Richardson. It did, early action to reconnoiter and attack some of the mandated islands and a progressive step-by-step movement westward with the taking, eventually, of Truk in a time stated that absolutely could not be realized.

Senator Brewster. I want to quote to you, because I think we all are going to be vitally concerned with this matter of naval defense. You were Assistant Chief of Naval [763] Operations during 1937 and 1938 under Admiral Leahy?

Admiral Richardson. One year.

Senator Brewster. I am quoting from Admiral Leahy’s statement before the Naval Affairs Committee on the function of the Navy, as I think it will contribute to this matter, and I want to know whether you would agree with this concept. I quote Admiral Leahy on the first page of his testimony at the 1938 hearings. [Reading:]

In defending our territory in war, we cannot assume an attitude of passive defense and simply beat off an attack at one place and later at another. In such a case we would see our coasts blockaded, our outlying possessions seized, our commerce, both coastwise and foreign, driven off the seas, and we would undergo the costly experience of finding the war lasting just as long as the enemy willed it; that is, until he had attained every objective and everything he wanted. The only way that war, once begun, can be brought to a successful conclusion is by making the enemy want to stop fighting—by injuring him before he reaches our shores so badly that he will be anxious to make peace. Prompt and effective injury to an enemy, at a distance from our shores, is the only correct strategy to be employed.

[764] We have outlying possessions in Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Samoa, Panama, Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The Philippine Islands are still United States territory and will remain so until complete independence is attained. All of these outlying island possessions are more or less vulnerable, and their defense depends upon two factors. One is a local defense by mobile forces and fortifications. The other, and the dominant factor, is sea power. A superior Navy can prevent powerful attacks being made on all those island possessions that lie closer to our home territory than they do to those of an enemy or enemies. A sufficient Navy can keep open the lines of supply to the defenders of such possessions, and, if they are secure in their own local defenses against minor attacks, the Navy can use them as bases from which to operate against the enemy or enemies. Defense of those possessions—Guam, the Philippines and Alaska—which lie nearer to the home territory of another power or powers than they do to the continental United States, is dependent solely upon sea power and the ability of sea power to support forces in those areas.

[765] I presume you would be in full agreement with that?
Admiral Richardson. Complete accord.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Now, I have here an exhibit which has been furnished us, which is extracts from the joint Army and Navy war plan, Rainbow No. 1. That is a part of the extracts from joint Army and Navy war plan, Orange 1938.

I assume that was in the process of development year by year, but this does not contain any of the tasks that were assigned under section 6 and others. In section 6, the presentation apparently confines itself to the defense plans of the Hawaiian area without including therein anything regarding the tasks which I assume were the function of the Navy to carry out, the task forces, or tasks.

Admiral Richardson. That is true. What is the date of that?
Senator Brewster. This one is dated 1938, the Orange plan. I think that was Orange No. 1. This was approved, it says, by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy August 14, 1939, verbally by the President October 14, 1939, by the Joint Board April 10, 1940. That is April 10, 1940, brought down current. That was finally Rainbow No. 1.

You have that before you, do you?

Admiral Richardson. I have it.

Senator Brewster. Now, whether or not—

[766] Admiral Richardson. But, Senator Brewster, these are copies of extracts from plans that were modified from time to time. They are not complete; some of them were made after I left the fleet; some of them were in process of being made, so any questions that I answer with respect to this is certainly to be most confusing because here is one that is dated March 28, 1941. I know nothing about it.

Senator Brewster. I think my question won't involve, perhaps, any confusion. The point which I wish to inquire about is whether or not the appointment of the tasks as they are called, which I assume were the functions of the Navy, the affirmative tasks, would be essential to an appraisal of the responsibility of the commanders in that area?

Admiral Richardson. Well, I think it would be but it would not be anything other than confusing to consider any other plans than the plans that were in existence on the 7th of December 1941, about which I know nothing.

Senator Brewster. Well, I don't intend to enter into that field. My point is in attempting to appraise the responsibility of those who were in authority at Pearl Harbor, as to whether or not their responsibility in taking aggressive action with the fleet under their charge must not necessarily be known in order to determine as to the wisdom of their course at any given time?

[767] Admiral Richardson. Well, of course, no plans ever made by the Army or the Navy of the United States visualized their being put in effect without either a declaration of war or an attack upon us, so if you take the joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, that was the basic plan on which the Navy drew its war plan and on which the Army drew its war plan.

Senator Brewster. Well, reading these excerpts, these extracts I have given you, which are apparently exclusively of a defensive character, one might draw the impression that the Navy had no function than to be there at Pearl Harbor and assist in its defense. That, of course, would not be a warranted conclusion, would it, Admiral? The Navy had another job to do under all plans, did it not?

Admiral Richardson. Oh, absolutely, and the Navy's job was to be aggressive.

Senator Brewster. That is right.

Admiral Richardson. Now, the pages of this refer specifically to the joint responsibilities of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area and it does not refer, as I can find here, to anything about what the fleet is going to do.

Senator Brewster. Well, over on page—I should say it is No. 2. For instance, on that first page we have section 1. We then have section 2 on the first page. There is no [768] section 3 apparently. It becomes section 4, then section 5, section 6. Then we
come to extracts of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans, Rainbow No. 1, section 6. [Reading:]

Tasks * * * Joint Tasks * * *

Now, I take it those refer to omissions as to the naval tasks which they were supposed to undertake.

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Brewster. It is a part of the function of both the Navy and the Army to keep in constant preparation for possible war plans under any eventualities, is it not?

Admiral Richardson. If you will turn to page 3, under paragraph 35, "Naval tasks";

(F) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island areas.

Now, all war plans that I am familiar with for the Navy contained a task along those lines.

[769] Senator Brewster. What you were reading answers my question, I guess. It is a function of the Army and Navy to keep in constant operation war plans in the event of any eventualities?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

Senator Brewster. When this came up, orders were immediately issued, were they not, to execute war plan 46 against Japan?

Admiral Richardson. I have no idea.

Senator Brewster. On that date?

Admiral Richardson. I have no idea.

Senator Brewster. I heard you mention when the order came through. That was what impressed me. I do not know what it meant. I assumed it was the plan which had been prepared.

Admiral Richardson. In every war plan there is a provision for putting it into effect, and it is defined and known how the plan will be put into effect, and when that order is received it goes into effect and everybody knows it is in effect, but during the latter part of 1940 and the early part of 1941, due to changing world conditions, the Navy war plans were in a constant state of flux, in an effort to have a plan that was in accordance with the existing situation.

As a matter of fact, there is in this correspondence a [770] letter from me with respect to the plan that was being developed, in which it is stated that the plan and that letter was prepared with the knowledge and approval of my successor. We worked on it jointly during the week or 10 days before I was relieved.

The numbers of the plans are so numerous and the provision of every plan is so different, the assumptions are so different, that it would be impossible for me to recall now the assumptions in Rainbow 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

Senator Brewster. But you would be—had you finished?

Admiral Richardson. No. In fact, there was a plan which was known, I think, as "plan dog" for a while. "Dog" being the Navy name of the "D".

The Chairman. "Dog"?

Admiral Richardson. Dog, d-o-g.

The Chairman. Common cui.

Senator Brewster. But all of these plans contemplated aggressive action by the Navy as contrary to merely defensive action in fixed positions?
Admiral Richardson. The Navy had always believed that the only way you could defend the country was by aggressive action.

Senator Brewster. The basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor then would, of necessity, mean a return to the west coast, in time of war, and did inevitably affect the time element very seriously, the time involved in the return?

Admiral Richardson. Well, there is a difference of opinion on that point. I thought it did.

Senator Brewster. What would be the approximate time for the return to the west coast and making the preparations under the condition when you were there?

Admiral Richardson. Well, it is about a little over 2,000 miles, and the fleet would only make about 15 knots, and that is 360 knots a day, or about a week to get back.

Senator Brewster. In the matter of the patrol reconnaissance, the difficulty, so far as the air reconnaissance was concerned, was with the shortage of planes, was it not?

Admiral Richardson. That is right.

Senator Brewster. Are you familiar with the naval expansion bill of 1888, which provided for 3,000 naval aircraft?

Admiral Richardson. Well, I am familiar with it to a very limited extent.

Senator Brewster. Was that during your period as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, but the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in those days concerned himself primarily with administrative matters. Relations with the committees of Congress, with the other executive departments, and with the President were handled by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Brewster. It was becoming evident, more evident each year, was it not, as to the part which airplanes would play in naval as well as land war?

Admiral Richardson. No doubt about that.

Senator Brewster. That was a constantly expanding activity?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. You spoke about getting the impression while you were in Washington, but not from Cordell Hull, that Japan could be bluffed. Do you recall where you gained that impression? Could I recall to you, did you confer with Stanley Hornbeck while you were here?

Admiral Richardson. I did.

Senator Brewster. Whether or not you gained any impression of that through your conferences with him?

Admiral Richardson. Well, whether I was correct or not, I was distinctly of the impression that Dr. Hornbeck was exercising a greater influence over the disposition of the fleet than I was.

Senator Brewster. Could you develop that at all?

Admiral Richardson. The only way in which I can develop that is this: I saw Dr. Hornbeck on July 11. I talked to him from 10:30 to noon.

According to my notebook I said he is the strong man on the Far East and the cause of our staying in Hawaii where he will hold us as long as he can. And that was an impression that I wrote in my notebook when it happened.
[774] On October 9 I saw Hornbeck, who was unwilling to accept the responsibility for retaining the fleet in Hawaii. Now I may have been entirely wrong; but that was the impression I gained.

Senator Brewster. Did you express to him, Admiral, in your conversations, the same opinion that you had expressed to the President as to the psychology of the Japanese military authorities on the situation?

Admiral Richardson. Well, inasmuch as Dr. Hornbeck was the advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs and had written many books on the subject, some of which I had read, I doubt whether I told him that he was completely wrong, but I expressed my view fully.

Senator Brewster. He was at that time the one in charge of what they called the far eastern desk in the State Department?

Admiral Richardson. No. I had known Dr. Hornbeck for some time.

Senator Brewster. His first name is Stanley?

Admiral Richardson. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, and I think he had been relieved as head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and had been superseded by Mr. Max Hamilton, if I remember correctly, whom I had also known for many years. Dr. Hornbeck was the advisor of the State Department on far [775] eastern affairs.

Senator Brewster. In connection, Admiral, with your service in Hawaii, was there a local influence in leaving Hawaii?

Admiral Richardson. If there was it was unknown to me.

Senator Brewster. You did not have any situation of that kind locally?

Admiral Richardson. None at all.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark, when your name was reached you were temporarily absent. Do you have any questions of the Admiral?

Mr. Clark. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Am I next in order, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. I think in order to balance between the two sides, inasmuch as the Chairman has assumed to do the first interrogating on the Senate side, that you would come next.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, pursuing the questions that have been asked just a moment ago by the Senator from Maine, I think you testified that the fleet, as you commanded it in 1940, was undermanned, undertrained, understaffed, under provisioned and under provisioned.

Admiral Richardson. Well, no American force was ever [776] under provisioned. We eat better than anybody in the world.

Mr. Gearhart. But did you have a sufficient supply of edibles to keep you going for a long time, for instance, through a war engagement, a war responsibility?

Admiral Richardson. Well, normally we carried dry provisions for about 60 days, if I remember correctly. Insofar as I remember, there was no question of provisions. The ships did not carry the full wartime allowance of ammunition because of the needless expenditure of fuel in pushing that much weight through the water. There was a deficiency in certain types of ammunition.
For example, we had little, if any bombardment ammunition which would be necessary in effecting a landing.

As to enough men, never within my knowledge, except in war, has the Navy had on board enough men to fight the ship. We have been lucky if we could secure sufficient appropriations to maintain 85 per-cent of complement. Men of experience were being removed from the ships in order to train new men.

Mr. Gearhart. Now to place it on a percentage basis, what would be the percentage of fighting efficiency of the Navy as you commanded it?

Admiral Richardson. Well, that would be a highly theoretical question. No answer would be of any value.

Mr. Gearhart. You consider you were 85 percent manned?

[777] Admiral Richardson. Well, we had 85 percent enough men to man the battery and steam at full power for more than a very short time, and as an instrument of war their value was prospective. They could be fully realized in a short space of time by the addition of men, because men in war learn far more rapidly than they do in time of peace.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, the Navy under your command was not in a condition of readiness to commence the war with Japan?

Admiral Richardson. Absolutely not.

Mr. Gearhart. And if it were the policy of the United States to commence a war with Japan the ships would have to return first to the west coast, spending a week in travel and a week in coming back—and how many weeks being put in shape for striking?

Admiral Richardson. Well, in my letter, one of my letters, I stated that in the event active war operations were undertaken it would either be necessary to return to the coast for mobilization or preparation or accept the handicaps of preparing in Pearl Harbor. I could not hazard a guess as to how soon they would be ready from Pearl Har-

Mr. Gearhart. You say a year or so?

Admiral Richardson. Well, before we really got going well in this war it was not a matter of weeks.

Mr. Gearhart. Then in order to prepare the fleet to strike, say, Japan originally, it would have to travel from Hawaii to the United States, spending a week, then uncertain weeks in the United States being equipped for war, and then travel back a week, and that would mean really by leaving it in Hawaii it was 4,500 miles further away from the enemy than it would be if it had been in the United States?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, but I think when you consider the many, many other things that had to be done before active war opera-
tions could be undertaken, the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the west coast would have little effect on the over-all time, because you had to assemble, train, you might have to build some, you might have to have drydocks, you might have to have repair facilities, you had to have a terrific amount of stores and all kinds of equipment for building roads and airfields, and everything else, none of which was ready.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. So that the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the west coast, when actual war started it was a matter of no moment, in my opinion, because [779] other things controlled the time of getting ready.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, considering the other situation, the one which actually happened, by having our fleet in Hawaiian waters we had our fleet 2,500 miles closer to the enemy for their sneak attack?

Admiral Richardson. Do you want an opinion on that?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, unless it is a question of geography, unless it is a matter of going over water, or something else.

Admiral Richardson. In my opinion, Congressman Gearhart, a Japanese fleet that could cross most of the Pacific ocean and deliver an undiscovered attack on Pearl Harbor would quite likely have been able to deliver the same attack on Puget Sound.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that is amazing.

Admiral Richardson. But the whole question is the amount of oil they have got in the ships.

Mr. Gearhart. Now you have outlined the deficiencies in our Navy's strength at that time. Were those deficiencies known to the Japanese? Have you any way of knowing whether they were or not?

Admiral Richardson. Well, I never had any doubt that the Japanese knew everything they wanted to know about our fleet, and the Secretary of the Navy told me himself that they knew more about it than I did.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then in the light of what you have [780] just said, do you think that the President was correct when he said he thought the presence of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters had a restraining effect on the Japanese?

Admiral Richardson. I did not think so when I was talking to him, and I have not changed my mind.

Mr. Gearhart. Now while you were in command of the ship—or of the fleet in 1940, and during the months of 1941 when you were in charge of the fleet, were any of your battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers or service vessels transferred to the Atlantic?

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, my memory is not active, and certainly with changes made during my incumbency as to the ships in the Atlantic and ships in the Pacific, because new ships were being built, and joining the fleet, and some ships were being transferred from that part of the United States Fleet in the Pacific to that part of it in the Atlantic, so I have here something that has just been prepared for me, expecting that this question might be asked me, from the records of the Navy Department the transfers that were made.

Before I can answer that I would need about 5 minutes to look over the data which has been compiled at my request.

Mr. Gearhart. Will you take a minute or two and see if there were any considerable or important transfers made one [781] way or the other?

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, it might be well to have it incorporated in the record.
Mr. Gesell. We were hoping to get the final answer on that, Senator.

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in lieu of presenting at this time a hurriedly prepared presentation of this kind, may I request that the counsel secure that information from the Department and present it to the committee?

The Chairman. The Chair understands that the counsel is in process of doing that and it is to go in, as it no doubt should. It ought to be accurate to the last item. Therefore the Chair, as far as he is concerned, and I am sure the committee, will be glad to accede to the Admiral's request.

Mr. Gearhart. That will be entirely satisfactory.

Senator Lucas. What does that include?

Mr. Gearhart. With the understanding it will be incorporated in the record as soon as it can be made available.

The Chairman. That compilation will include the date at the beginning of any transfer and the end, the final date covering the transfer period.

Admiral Richardson. What I propose is that they give me a list of the transfer of vessels to and from the Atlantic, the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets between May 1, 1940, and February 1, 1941.

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. They might have been numerous, but within my recollection they were not substantial, except possibly some cruisers and destroyers.

The Chairman. Will that record show the class of ship?

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

The Chairman. All classes of ships?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, even show the name of them and the class.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, can you bring that down to December 7, 1941?

The Chairman. The Chairman would suggest, from other sources and under the testimony of other witnesses, it ought to be brought down to the 7th of December.

Mr. Gearhart. I have already requested that, Mr. Chairman. That was promised me yesterday. I presume it will be coming along pretty soon.1

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I assume the reason the admiral requested the material on February 1 is because that was the time of the change of his command.

Admiral Richardson. Exactly, Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. As the Chairman suggests, of course for our purposes we will probably want it to come on down to the date of this happening at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Richardson. That has previously been requested.

The Chairman. You can only speak for the time in which you were in command.

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. That will undoubtedly be furnished.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you, during your command, have occasion to protest to the Chief of Naval Operations against the detachment from

1 See footnote 1, p. 125, supra.
your command of ships and their transfer to the Atlantic or any other place for duty?

Admiral Richardson. Not to my present recollection.

Mr. Gearhart. Can you tell us, as a naval expert, as to whether or not your fleet, the one you commanded, was numerically inferior to the Japanese in the Pacific, or superior?

Admiral Richardson. Well, our knowledge of the Japanese Fleet and its composition was not complete and, therefore, any answer I give might later be proved inaccurate, in the light of better information. But to the best of my knowledge and belief, the Japanese Fleet was either equal to or superior to that part of the fleet that I had with me in the Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart. Then calling for an opinion answer too, this being addressed to you as a naval expert, which you undoubtedly are, what effect would the detachment of three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers in May 1941 have upon that numerical comparison of strength?

Admiral Richardson. It would have made the Pacific Fleet relatively weaker than the Japanese Fleet.

Mr. Gearhart. And wasn’t it that transfer which caused the change in the name of the fleet that you have been the commander of, it having been known as the United States Fleet and because of these detachments it was actually known thereafter as the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Richardson. I think that had no bearing on it, insofar as I know.

Mr. Gearhart. When did the change occur, Admiral?

Admiral Richardson. The change in the name?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. The 1st day of February 1941. In my opinion it was occasioned by the increasing importance of naval activity in the Atlantic.

Mr. Gearhart. Then really you were the last commander in chief of the United States Navy?

Admiral Richardson. Until Admiral King was made one, and a bigger one.

Mr. Gearhart. Is there a United States Fleet now?

Admiral Richardson. Admiral King is commander in chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations—at least he was during practically all the war.

Mr. Gearhart. That is, he is commander of every naval ship afloat, is that correct?

Admiral Richardson. He was and is today.

Mr. Gearhart. You, as commander of the United States Fleet, were commander of all ships afloat except those that composed the Asiatic detachment?

Admiral Richardson. No, Mr. Gearhart. I will answer that question this way: As commander in chief of the United States Fleet I was in command of every combatant ship in commission in any ocean that did not belong to the Asiatic Fleet or was not serving directly under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations. Many ships serve directly under the Chief of Naval Operations, because when a new ship is built, until she has had some cruising, some target practice, some training, some tests of new equipment, she is not considered
worthy of joining a fleet, and she may be in an ocean, but she does not belong to the fleet in that ocean.

Mr Gearhart. I see. Thank you very much, Admiral.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Mr. Gearhart. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, can you tell us when the fleet went from the west coast to Hawaii in the spring of 1940, if there was a definite date for its return, or whether there was not a definite date for its return?
Admiral Richardson. There was a definite published schedule available to all officers in the fleet.
Senator Ferguson. And what was that date?
Admiral Richardson. Based upon dates that occur in this correspondence, it is my opinion that it was on May 9.
Senator Ferguson. The 9th of May 1940?
Admiral Richardson. The 9th of May 1940.
Senator Ferguson. Who would fix that date? Would you fix that date, or would it be fixed here in Washington?
Admiral Richardson. Actually it had been fixed either by me or possibly by my predecessor and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.
Senator Ferguson. So it would be really an order of the Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Richardson. A fleet schedule is prepared well in advance that shows all the exercises planned, all the fleet activities well in advance. The over-all plan is prepared in the fleet and is approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and then it is carried out without any further orders. In accordance with that approved plan all of the ships participate in the annual fleet exercises and leave the west coast, and the [787] Hawaiian detachment left Hawaii to join the fleet in the exercises of the fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Was there any delay, Admiral, in leaving the west coast at that time to go to Hawaii or did you go on the scheduled day?
Admiral Richardson. We went on the scheduled day.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first get word that you might not return in May of 1940?
Admiral Richardson. I received it in the dispatch which I put in the record yesterday, on the 4th.
Senator Ferguson. That is the dispatch that you were to make a press release?
Admiral Richardson. No. This is the dispatch from OPNAV to CINCUS:

It looks probable but not final that Fleet will remain Hawaiian waters for short time after May 9. Will expect to apprise you further Monday or Tuesday next.

Senator Ferguson. When you received that were you out in the Hawaiian waters?
Admiral Richardson. No, I had finished the fleet exercises and we were all, except the big ships, big carriers, in Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Admiral Richardson. Because at the end of a fleet exercise
[788] all of the senior officers are assembled.
Senator Ferguson. Did you give us the date of that order?
Admiral Richardson. Which order?
Senator Ferguson. The one you just read. I haven’t seen it.
Admiral Richardson. May 4.
Senator Ferguson. The 4th of May?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. What is the date of the memo that you were to
release a press release?
Admiral Richardson. I received that on May 7.
Senator Ferguson. The 7th of May?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever discussed that with Admiral
Stark or anyone here in Washington?
Admiral Richardson. Before the event?
Senator Ferguson. No, after the event. After you had that paper
asking you to make a press release, did you ever discuss that with
Admiral Stark or anyone else?
Admiral Richardson. No, sir. No, I never discussed it with any-
one.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever discussed your testimony here
with anyone other than the counsel? You have never written
[789] any books about it, or magazine articles, or anything of
that kind, have you?
Admiral Richardson. No, I have never talked to anybody about it.
Senator Ferguson. Now when did you first receive definite infor-
mation that the fleet would be kept at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Richardson. We never received any definite information
as to the duration of our stay in Hawaii. We just gradually drifted
into staying.
Senator Ferguson. At that time were you receiving any diplo-
matic information between our country and Japan?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you, while you were commander in chief,
receive any diplomatic information?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you came here to Wash-
ington to receive your instructions as far as any diplomatic relations were
concerned.
Admiral Richardson. I came here to find out the background of
our stay, the purposes back of it, and, if possible, how long we would
stay.
Senator Ferguson. And did you get the background from the State
Department or anyone?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I acquired the information that
[790] we would stay there as long as it was considered essential
for us to support diplomatic representations by being there.
Senator Ferguson. Now were you told what the diplomatic repre-
sentations were that you were supporting? Were you taken in on
those?
Admiral Richardson. No, but I can read it in the paper.
Senator Ferguson. Well, will you state what your opinion was as
to what were the diplomatic relations that were going on at that time?
Admiral Richardson. Well, the United States has always believed in a strong China, a China that could stand alone, and we were doing all that we could, without going to war, to induce Japan to cease what we considered was aggressive action in China. We also were opposed to the extension of Japanese activities and Japanese influences further south in Asia.

[791] Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss with anyone the question of a patrol line from Hawaii to the Asiatic coast?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, I did.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us whom you discussed such a matter with?

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, may I read a memorandum on that subject which I prepared several weeks ago, thinking that I might be asked that question?

The Chairman. Yes. The committee will be very glad to have it, Admiral.

May the Chair ask what sort of a line that was you were inquired about?

Admiral Richardson. A patrol line.

In presenting this, I would like to state that my war plans officer accompanied me to Washington, and I discussed with him most of the things that were talked about. He was a man whose judgment I held in very high esteem, and when I prepared this he went over it so that I discussed with him what I might present here as part of my testimony, and I did it in the interest of accuracy.

On October 10, the day that I had reservations to return to the west coast by plane—

The Chairman. That is 1940?

Admiral Richardson. 1940; October 10, 1940.

[792] About 5 p. m. Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, sent for me and Admiral Stark to come to his office. I was accompanied by Commander Vincent R. Murphy. Admiral Stark was accompanied by Admiral Ingersoll, and Capt. C. M. Cook, who is now, I think, perhaps a vice admiral.

The Secretary stated that he had important information bearing on the employment of the fleet. He stated that he had just talked to the President, and that the President was concerned as to the Japanese reaction to the British on the reopening of the Burma Road scheduled for October 17. In the event the Japanese took drastic action, he, the President, was considering shutting off all trade between Japan and the Americas, and to this end was considering establishing a patrol of light ships in two lines extending from Hawaii westward to the Philippines, and from Samoa toward the Dutch East Indies.

The question was raised—I do not recall by whom—as to whether this included stopping Japanese ships as well as others, and the view was expressed that this would be an act of war, and I asked whether the President was considering a declaration of war.

The Secretary stated that the President hadn't said, and that all he, Knox, knew was what he was told.

I was amazed at the proposal and stated that the fleet [793] was not prepared to put such a plan into effect, nor for the war which would certainly result from such a course of action, and that we would certainly lose many of the ships.
Parenthetically, I had seen that thing tried in the war plans, and it didn’t work.

There was some further discussion that a line of light ships as proposed would entail such dispersal as to expose the ships to destruction in detail, and that the best way to accomplish the President’s purpose was to control the source of the trade by patrol of the relatively few ports involved.

The Secretary appeared displeased at the general reaction and mine in particular, and said:

I am not a strategist; if you don’t like the President’s plan, draw up one of your own to accomplish the purpose.

The conference closed with the understanding that Stark and I, with our war plans officers, would draw up a statement of assumptions, proposed decisions, and tentative plan of operation in connection with the reopening of the Burma Road.

An outline plan was drawn up. It envisaged the transfer to the Pacific of additional patrol planes, an aircraft carrier, some destroyers, and possibly a cruiser or two.

Admiral Stark was not prepared to approve these transfers. [794] and stated that he would talk the matter over with the President and let me know later what decisions were arrived at.

When the plan was completed, the Secretary and the President were away from Washington, and I returned to the west coast on the 11th.

Senator Ferguson. Are you through, Admiral, with that answer?

Admiral Richardson. I am ready for another question, sir.

[795] Senator Ferguson. Did you hear any more about the plan after you left Washington? You say that the Secretary and President—you mean the Secretary of the Navy and the President—were not in Washington when the plans were completed, and you left Washington.

Now, did you hear anything further about the plan?

Admiral Richardson. I received, after my return to the New Mexico at Long Beach, a dispatch from Admiral Stark directing me to send to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet a copy of the assumptions and the tentative United States Fleet disposition, and operations to meet the situation, which I did in a letter dated 16 October 1940, and my recollection is that I sent this to Admiral Hart, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The Vice Chairman. Asiatic?

Commander Richardson. Asiatic Fleet. By the commanding officer of the Houston, which was bound out from Long Beach.

I sent this letter out by Captain Jesse B. Olinford, now either a rear admiral or vice admiral, and this [indicating] is the paper.

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, do you know what paper the admiral is referring to? Have we a copy of it?

Admiral Richardson. What?

Senator Ferguson. I asked counsel if we had a copy, if [796] they knew what memorandum you were referring to, and if we had a copy of it.

Admiral Richardson. The date is 16 October, 1940, and the subject is "International Situation Re Enforcement of the Asiatic Fleet."

You had this duplicated.

Mr. Mitchell. Let me see it.

Admiral Richardson. The light paper doesn’t belong with it. I would like to have that.
Mr. Mitchell. All right, sir. I will tear the light paper off.
(A document was handed to Senator Ferguson.)
Mr. Mitchell. The admiral is right. We do have a copy of it.
This is it, isn’t it, Admiral? [Indicating.]
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Are we ready to proceed?
Senator Ferguson. I haven’t had time to read this, but I will come back later to it.
Admiral Richardson. If I may add, this plan was never carried out.
Senator Ferguson. Can you give a reason why it was not carried out?
Admiral Richardson. Well, it served as a base, I mean it influenced in some way the development of succeeding plans, but I never heard any more about it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, at that time we did not have an embargo on, did we, in October of 1940? That did not come until July 25, was it not, in 1941?
I notice the “B” item here is:
Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.
C. Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and America.
At that time we did not have an embargo on, did we?
Admiral Richardson. As far as I know, we did not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any embargo prior to sometime in July of 1941?
Admiral Richardson. I do not remember when the embargoes, any embargoes were placed, but there was either a limitation on the shipment of aviation gasoline under consideration or in effect before I relinquished command of the fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did I understand you to say that you said something to the Secretary of the Navy about—that this would mean war or would not mean war, if you put this into effect that he had suggested?
Admiral Richardson. Well, I thought it would mean war, and I so stated to the Secretary.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us his reply to that?
Admiral Richardson. Well, he said that he didn’t know whether the President meant war or not. And I further stated that the fleet was not ready for any such plan—was not ready for war.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, you told the Secretary of the Navy that you were not in position to put this plan that he was putting up to you into effect?
Admiral Richardson. No; I never stated that I couldn’t put it into effect. I could have tried it.
Senator Ferguson. What was the substance of what you said to him?
Admiral Richardson. That in my opinion it would mean war; in my opinion we would lose the ships; and in my opinion we couldn’t stop trade between South America and Japan without being in trouble with both of them.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything else you can add to what you have said that took place at that time in relation to this embargo or patrol of the Navy?
Admiral Richardson. No; except as I stated before that the Secretary stated, if you are unwilling, deem it inadvisable, highly inadvis-
able to establish this line of ships to shut off trade between Japan and America, draw up a plan by which you would shut off such trade, if ordered to do so.

[799] Senator Ferguson. That is the plan?
Admiral Richardson. That is the plan.
Senator Ferguson. I will read this over and come back to it.
Will you refer to your long-hand letter of January 26, 1940, please? It is the part where you are talking of Admiral Leahy as “Bill Leahy.”
Do you have your letter, Admiral?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where you say:

I use to say to Bill Leahy “be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to be drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they cannot leave us in the lurch.”
There is a possibility that this constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

Now, do you remember that part? Whom were you talking about—“the boss”?
Admiral Richardson. The President of the United States, who is also known as the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy by the Constitution.
Senator Ferguson. Then there is a paragraph in that same letter, on the first page:

When this understanding was reached it had some value, [800] but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about two and one-half continents.

What were you talking about there?
Admiral Richardson. Well that might be some slight exaggeration.
Senator Ferguson. What were you exaggerating about?
Admiral Richardson. About the 2½ continents. But my recollection of that is this, that Rear Admiral Royal R. Ingersoll—I think that is his initial—Royal Ingersoll anyway, then a rear admiral, had made a trip to London to have some exploratory conferences with the British Admiralty, because if there appears a possibility of nations being associated, it is always customary, in my opinion for the military or the naval staffs to discuss with each other what might happen if such association becomes a reality, so they would not be taken by surprise.

So I was expressing my understanding of the meaning of exploratory discussions between the Navy Department and the British Admiralty, as what might be considered by them as reasonable steps to be taken if the United States and Great Britain should become associated in an effort.

Senator Ferguson. At that time Admiral Ingersoll held what position in the United States Navy?
[801] Admiral Richardson. I am not certain, but I believe at least there is a possibility, that he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
Senator Ferguson. Who was the Chief of Naval Operations at that time? It was Admiral Stark, was it not?
Admiral Richardson. Admiral Stark; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when you had been saying to Bill Leahy, as you describe him—Admiral Leahy—what position did he hold in the Navy when you were telling him to “impress the boss”?
Admiral Richardson. Well, when the China incident started, Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations and I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what base were you speaking about in that letter?

Admiral Richardson. My recollection is that it was Singapore.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, we were to have the use of the base at Singapore?

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And what were we to do for that use? You expressed it as “protect two and a half continents,” which you now say was a slight exaggeration. But what were we to do?

[802] Admiral Richardson. What I meant was this, that when this understanding of what might take place in the event of closer association between the United States and Great Britain that we would have the use, in case we were drawn into the war, would have the use of Singapore, and we would have the assistance of the British in the Western Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. Assistance to do what?

Admiral Richardson. Well, this was all—

Senator Ferguson (interposing). I understand.

Admiral Richardson. Drawn on the assumption.

Senator Ferguson. In your letter here you stated that we were to, in case the agreement went through, we were to have Singapore as a base for at least part of our Fleet; is that correct?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was our part in that?

Admiral Richardson. Well, it was all based on the assumption that we would be drawn into the war as an associate of Great Britain, and she would be occupied, and we would have the rest of the bag to hold.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you explain what you mean by “the rest of the bag”? What would we be holding?

Admiral Richardson. Well, we would be protecting North America, South America, and Australia.

[803] Senator Ferguson. This was in January 1940, was it not?

Admiral Richardson. 1940.

Senator Ferguson. 1940.

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. You say that Admiral Ingersoll did go to London; is that correct?


Senator Ferguson. Do you know what month or what time he went to London?

Admiral Richardson. I don’t remember. I have forgotten.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the war games of 1932 that were discussed in the Reader’s Digest, I believe, in an article?

Admiral Richardson. I was in it.

Senator Ferguson. You were in it?

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether or not he put on a war game wherein we took airplane carriers north of the Hawaiian Islands and made an attack from those carriers?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know the opinion of the judges?
Admiral Richardson. 1932? I was in command of the U. S. S. Augusta at that time and I played such a minor part in that that my memory is not vivid and whatever I might try to say would be wholly memory, and while I think I have a good memory, it isn't that good.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, when you were commander-in-chief of the Fleet did you have any enemies—they were not an enemy at that time—but any submarines that were near Pearl Harbor that did not belong to the United States?

[805] Admiral Richardson. That is, in my opinion, largely a matter of opinion. I had several reports from destroyer patrols of the presence of foreign submarines in that area, their opinion being derived from underwater or sound of supersonic listening devices and at one time, particularly on the 16th of December, the presence of a submarine in the prohibited area right off the entrance to Pearl Harbor was reported to me. This report was believed by several officers, including the commander of the destroyer, the sound officer, the commander of destroyers, about three-fourths of my staff, but it was not believed by me and two other officers on my staff and we later proved to everybody else that all the manifestations of the existence of a submarine at that time could be attributed to something else.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was that reported to Washington, do you know, or after you decided that you thought it was a false alarm did you just forget the incident?
Admiral Richardson. I do not remember whether that was reported or not but at that time I issued an order for the destroyers to drop depth charges on any such contacts they made and then after further consideration, without being influenced by any superior authority, I rescinded that order; but in looking over this correspondence I do find in one letter somewhere that Admiral Stark said to me that he regretted [806] the destroyer had not followed the contact for a longer period and I think that referred to another reported contact with a submerged submarine, the contact having been lost after several hours.

Senator Ferguson. I assume, then, that you never had occasion to use the depth bombs on any subs and that you revoked the order. Now, was a copy of that order sent to Washington?
Admiral Richardson. So far as I know, no; it was not. Well, I am certain it was not.

Senator Ferguson. When you gave yesterday the conversation that you had at the White House with the President and Admiral Leahy did you finish reading your entire statement?
Admiral Richardson. I did.

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall anything more that took place at that conversation?
Admiral Richardson. No. In a conversation of the length of 2 hours, some of it about Puerto Rico, some of it about the fleet, some of it about a selection system, some of it about retiring officers, it is impossible to remember more than what impressed one at the time as being of grave import.

Senator Ferguson. You had some very definite opinions on the subject that you were discussing with the President, did you not?
Admiral Richardson. I did.

[807] Senator Ferguson. And he had some very definite opinions on the subject that he was discussing with you?

Admiral Richardson. He did.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you tell us—or, first, you told us, as near as you can state it, what the President had said. Will you state, as near as you can, what you said to the President? Did you make a written memo based on that? I thought that you—

Admiral Richardson. I read that for you yesterday. Shall I read it again?

Senator Ferguson. What you said to the President?

Admiral Richardson. I did.

Senator Ferguson. Have you anything to add to that?

Admiral Richardson. No.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, did you hear from the President on that subject again?

Admiral Richardson. I never heard from the President again and never saw him again.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when was that conversation at the White House in relation to your conversation with the Secretary of the Navy about the convoys—or not convoys—patrols? Was the White House conversation prior to the one that you had with the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary Knox? This exhibit that you passed to me is dated October 16, 1940. [808] What was the date you were at the White House?

Admiral Richardson. I was at the White House on the 8th of October. The conversation with the Secretary of the Navy with respect to the opening of the Burma Road and the line of patrol ships was on the 11th. I left Washington—no, it was on the 10th.

Senator Ferguson. Well, at the time you were at the White House and talked with Admiral Leahy and the President you did not know anything about this patrol that the Secretary of the Navy discussed with you on the 10th or the 11th?

Admiral Richardson. Absolutely not.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. And I was amazed with the presentation of facts made by the Secretary, but everything is influenced by after-knowledge. I assume now that the question of fuel oil at Samoa might have had some relation to the intention to establish this patrol, or the prospective consideration.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think now that some part of your discussion with the President brought up this subject of the patrol?

Admiral Richardson. I feel fairly certain that nothing that I said or did had anything to do with creating the idea that the establishment of this patrol should be undertaken.

[809] Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss this patrol question with anyone in the Secretary of the Navy—or no, pardon me, the Secretary of State's office?

Admiral Richardson. No.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with Dr. Hornbeck?

Admiral Richardson. No; although I saw him after that.

Senator Ferguson. But you did not discuss it with him?
Admiral Richardson. Well, insofar as I know, I did not discuss it with him, but at about that time, and I think—well, I know—on the 10th of October 1940 I had sent Dr. Stanley Hornbeck a part of my memorandum of September 12, 1940 which I had given to the Secretary of the Navy and it is possible and highly probable that I discussed with him some of the contents of this memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire now from counsel whether or not we have any data or memorandums or any information of Dr. Hornbeck upon this question, any memo that he may have written after he talked with Admiral Richardson? As I understand it, it is the custom of the State Department after they have a conversation they record that conversation in a memorandum.

Mr. Mitchell. We have asked for all their material on that, and nothing of that kind has come forward as yet. We have not received all that we have asked for.

[810] Senator Ferguson. Well, will you inquire specifically for that? I would like to defer that question for the time being.

Were you ready for a question, Admiral?

Admiral Richardson. Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I am humiliated to be compelled to request that I be permitted to change a statement which I have made here. I made it honestly but it is a mistake.

The Chairman. Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral Richardson. After a further search of the records of the dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark I find that I did receive a reply to my inquiry about the alert of the Hawaiian Department.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read that?

Admiral Richardson. And this is my dispatch.

Senator Ferguson. Would you give us the date?

Admiral Richardson. Yes. The dispatch from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations dated 22 June 1940 read as follows [reading:]

Commanding General Hawaiian Department received orders War Department placing forces on alert against hostile trans-Pacific raid and since no information received Navy Department have assumed this exercise. Navy patrol planes are participating.

[811] In testimony that I gave somewhere I stated that I had received no reply, but it appears that I did receive a reply which reads [reading:]

War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue cooperation.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate, Admiral, that it was not a war game or practice alert, would it? What would you say about that reply?

Admiral Richardson. Well, I will say that I was completely wrong, because this is the first time—

Senator Ferguson. I am asking now. I realize that and we are glad to have you correct your testimony, but would this order that you read indicate that it was not a war game that was going on but it was something that was considered both by the War Department and the Secretary of State's office?

Admiral Richardson. It indicates that to my mind.
Senator Ferguson. That being true, how do you account for the Army being alerted and the Navy not? What is the date of that last instrument that you read?

Admiral Richardson. The dispatches that I have read apparently are contained in a report of Admiral Hewitt's investigation.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, Admiral, whether you were a witness before Admiral Hewitt? His investigation took place after May of 1945.

Admiral Richardson. I know that I was not a witness.

Senator Ferguson. You were not a witness?

Admiral Richardson. No; and this is the first that I have seen of any part of his report.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you just make the record clear now? What refreshed your memory? One of your officers gave you this information, did he?

Admiral Richardson. He just handed it to me now.

Senator Ferguson. He just handed it to you?

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, reading that, can you account for the fact that the Navy was not alerted and the Army was alerted?

Admiral Richardson. That passes my comprehension.

The Chairman. You were asked, Admiral, the date of those two communications.

Admiral Richardson. They are both dated 22 June.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I see that the hour of recess has come and I have considerably more. Do you want to adjourn at this time?

The Chairman. Very well, we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[813] (Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Tuesday, November 20, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, November 21, 1945.)
[814] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1945

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (Room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[815] TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON
(Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson, you were in the process of examining Admiral Richardson. You may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson—

Admiral Richardson. Could I make an opening statement with respect to the testimony of yesterday?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. I have not had an opportunity to verify whatever evidence there is in official records with respect to dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark regarding the Army alert, and, therefore, I request that the members of the committee hold in abeyance their judgment on that subject until I have had an opportunity to search the original records.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be glad to grant you that privilege, Admiral Richardson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson, I want to speak to you about this instrument that you handed to me yesterday which I did not have time to read yesterday, dated October the 16th, 1940.

I ask counsel when he received a copy of that, when the committee received a copy of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Senator, the Admiral tells me [816] that he handed me not the one you have but this document here, which is a copy of it, 2 or 3 days ago. I had it in my files. I had not studied it myself or felt that it was pertinent to what I was inquiring of him about so I did not pursue it further.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there is no question about that. I just wanted to know when you had received it.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't think the committee has had it at all yet.
Senator Ferguson. Well, counsel has had it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, yes; in the way I state.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the Admiral may use the one copy and I
will use the other, so that we will know that we are talking about the
same thing.
Admiral Richardson. I have a copy.
Senator Ferguson. You have a copy?
Admiral Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. I assume, Admiral Richardson, that that ex-
hibit—and might we have it marked exhibit—what is the last exhibit
number, General?
Mr. Mitchell. This will be Exhibit 11.
Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 11.
Mr. Mitchell. A communication dated October 16, 1940, directed
to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet by [817] the
Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, the first three pages, if
you will refer to it, were written by you?
Admiral Richardson. It was.
Senator Ferguson. And written about the time of October the 16th,
1940?
Admiral Richardson. Approximately on that date.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know whether it was written on the
flagship New Mexico?
Admiral Richardson. It was.
Senator Ferguson. Now, this is the instrument that you indicated
as being delivered to Admiral Hart, Thomas C. Hart, Commander in
Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And what is the last page on this Exhibit 11
dated? The same day, October the 11th? The photostat does not give
the initialling or writing at the top—at least on mine it does not. Does
it on yours?
Admiral Richardson. It says:

Secret, October the 11th, 1940:
U. S. Fleet Dispositions and Operations to Meet Special Situation in Western
Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. Would you read it?

[818] Admiral Richardson (reading:)

Assumptions: The gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the
opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.
(2) The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road
is an unfriendly act to Japan.
(3) The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with
Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.
(4) Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation
by the Dutch East Indies.
(5) The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the
United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with
Japan.
(6) The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent
Japanese trade in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations with the Western
Hemisphere.
(7) The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific—
in Australia and Singapore—and Dutch forces in the Dutch East Indies in
stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea—Celebes Sea area.
(8) The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.

(9) Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis powers.

(10) The situation and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October 1940.

[820] Senator Ferguson. Let us speak about the last, No. 10, that "The situation and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940."

As I understand it, you wrote this memo that you just read.

Admiral Richardson. No; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Who did write it? Where did you get it?

Admiral Richardson. May I explain?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I want you to explain.

Admiral Richardson. The Secretary of the Navy directed me and Stark to draw up a plan of action should decision be reached to stop trade between Japan and the Western Hemisphere.

In order to draw any war plan, you must start with some assumptions as to bases for the plan. This whole document which I have read is nothing but the assumptions that the officers who drew up this plan set up as the basis for their plan. It was drawn up by the officers in the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations in collaboration with me and Admiral Stark and my war plans officer, Commander Vincent R. Murphy, now rear admiral.

So that these assumptions, when I left Washington, had not been seen by the Secretary of the Navy or by the President of the United States, neither one of whom was in Washington that day.

Senator Ferguson. Was this the substance of what you had received from the Secretary of the Navy a few days previous?

Admiral Richardson. It was our joint conception of what the Secretary informed us the day before, on October 10.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and you made a memo of what he informed you, and this is the memo?

Admiral Richardson. I made no memorandum. I did not write one word of this. It was drawn up by the War Plans officers of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations in collaboration with the War Plans officer of the United States Fleet.

Senator Ferguson. Where did he get the information to put in this document?

Admiral Richardson. He was present—all of them were present when the discussion was had with the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say then that this represented a fair statement of what the Secretary of the Navy said to you at a previous date?

Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir; this is a more formally stated, comprehensive presentation of the assumptions arising from what he did state to us.

[822] Senator Ferguson. Getting to the date of the 17th of October, can you explain that any more?

Admiral Richardson. The 17th of October?

Senator Ferguson. It is on the last line, the No. 10 item.

Admiral Richardson. That was the day that Great Britain was to reopen the Burma Road, and it was thought that the Japs, or the Japanese, might take some aggressive action in connection with the reopening of the Burma Road.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know about when Admiral Hart received this instrument?

Admiral Richardson. Of my own knowledge, I do not know, but I think it entirely possible that I may have somewhere among my papers a letter from Admiral Hart written in December, informing me that he had received this document.

Senator Ferguson. Now when the document went to Admiral Hart, it had the sheet on it which you read; is that correct?

Admiral Richardson. Had what?

Senator Ferguson. It had the sheet on that you read? The last sheet was on it when you sent it to Admiral Hart?

Admiral Richardson. Oh, absolutely. It is Enclosure A in this letter.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Will you now read your letter which you wrote on the flagship New Mexico, October 16, 1940.

[823] Admiral Richardson. May I have your copy? That is my own copy and it is clearer than this photostatic copy.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will ask you what these things are on the margin.

Admiral Richardson. You can see them better on that copy.

Senator Ferguson. I will use this one. Before you read it, on the last page where your signature appears, at the top is 01 in the margin and a line drawn. Do you know what that means?

Admiral Richardson. The numbers in the right-hand margin of the last page of the letter indicate numbers of my staff. 01 is the chief of staff. The initial which is rather indistinct is “T” for Taffender, who is rear admiral, who was my chief of staff. 11 is the operations officer. “B” stands for Beery, Rear Adm. Bernard H. Beery, then captain. 16 is the war plans officer. VRM stands for Vincent R. Murphy.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would those lines crossed through those numbers indicate that those respective officers had seen this instrument prior to sending it, or signing it?

Admiral Richardson. Those marks are the initials of the officers, and the initials I recognize as their own.

Senator Ferguson. Does it indicate, when the line is drawn through their number, that they have seen the instrument?

Admiral Richardson. My memory is not definite on that, but the line, I think, means that they are to see it, and an initial indicates that they have seen it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you read that instrument? Admiral Richardson. This is “CinC File No. A16/01687.”

Long Beach, California. October 16, 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

Subject: International Situation—Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of Assumptions. (B) Copy of Tentative Operations.

1. During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road the following:

[825] (a) Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peacetime move.

(b) Declaring a complete embargo in shipments to and from Japan.

(c) Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas. To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line
roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracti-
cability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after
some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer
in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operation's
office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the
situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations
(Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable
manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11
for submission to the Secretary and the President as to what the Navy proposed
to do if directed to proceed on the proposed assumptions and tentative decisions.

2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has had no further word in
regard to the memorandum referred to above, [826] but received a dispatch
today from the Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be forwarded to
you via the Houston. It is believed that further study in the Department and in
the Fleet will result in some modifications in the operations proposed for the
Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph 9 of Enclosure (B) are measures
for the reduction and occupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the
Mid-Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled and transports are
ready. Due to the situation in the Atlantic, the Department did not feel that
our main Fleet should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be necessary to call
it back on short notice. It was felt, however, that active operations against
ORANGE possessions might have a deterring effect on ORANGE full scale opera-
tions in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations parallel very closely the present
ORANGE Plan, modified by the dispatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and
further modified by the restriction of main Fleet operations in the Mid-Pacific
area.

5. I was further told, in the Department, that no Army forces would be available
and that the British had agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

[827] 6. In the event that the assumptions are not realized prior to about
January 1, 1941, or decision is not reached to dispatch the Advance Detachment
before that time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transports in West
Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll,
as a Fleet exercise, utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken
for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready
around that time. If this is done, the reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may
take place coincidentally with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be
impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests.
I presume you will be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more
fully developed.

7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, covering the composition and prepa-
racion of the tentative detachment slated for reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in
case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to you by clipper locked box, a copy
being sent on the HOUSTON with this letter.

8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable
to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other
than secret.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything under your name? I
[828] see some marks here which are illegible.

Admiral RICHARDSON. "Copy to OPNAV via air mail. This copy
to be acknowledged by dispatch"—no, "This copy acknowledged by
dispatch 132,000 of October" something blank "1940". It is very
vague.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence
now Exhibit 11, two parts of which have been read, so that the other
part will be in. It is the Enclosure (B). Let it all be contained in
the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be inserted at this point
as Exhibit No. 11.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 11").

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, do you have any comment to make on this document Exhibit 11 that I may not have covered, anything that you may want to put in the record to clarify it?

Admiral Richardson. No.

Senator Ferguson. You have no comment on it?

Admiral Richardson. No.

Senator Ferguson. During your tenure as Commander in Chief did we have any convoys in the Pacific?

Admiral Richardson. Only on one occasion was a single ship convoyed by a ship under my command from Pearl Harbor to Guam, from Guam to Cavite, by a ship under the command of Admiral Hart, and the ship on her return voyage was convoyed in like manner from Cavite to Guam and from Guam to Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall the name of that ship? Do you recall that?

Admiral Richardson. My memory is not certain, but I believe it was the Chaumont.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the occasions were for convoying that ship?

Admiral Richardson. I received orders to escort her to Guam, to have the escort await for her return, that she would be escorted from Guam to Cavite by a ship from the Asiatic Fleet and likewise escorted from Cavite to Guam by a ship from the Asiatic Fleet, and escorted from Guam to Honolulu by the escort which accompanied her outward bound. I have no information or knowledge—or I had no information or knowledge at the time as to why she was escorted, what she was guarded against, or what her cargo was.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you received an order?

Admiral Richardson. I received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations directing me to—

Senator Ferguson (interposing). From the CNO?

Admiral Richardson. The CNO.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel, do we have a copy of that dispatch?

Mr. Mitchell. I doubt it because I have never seen it.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, do you know where we could locate a copy of the dispatch to you to convoy that ship, and could you give us about the date of it?

Admiral Richardson. I have frequently endeavored to recall when this incident occurred, and I have, unfortunately, no record in any of my papers as to the time. Any statement I made would be a pure guess, but I should say around—

Senator Ferguson (interposing). After the instrument of October 11 that we just read?

Admiral Richardson. My guess would be that it was in December of that year, because I received a dispatch to escort her when I was in the Hawaiian area. I did not return to the Hawaiian area until the 6th of December 1940, so my guess is that it would be within the month of December 1940.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not you wrote any letters about it? Is it mentioned in any of this correspondence that we have?
Admiral Richardson. I wrote no letters about it. I sent a dispatch, however, to the Chief of Naval Operations and inquired as to whether the escorting of this ship indicated an intention to escort all U. S. Government vessels, or an intention later to escort all United States flag vessels. That is, ships flying the American flag.

I promptly received a reply from the Chief of Naval Operations saying, "Negative to your inquiry."

Senator Ferguson. That is the only knowledge you have about that convoy that you have given us, that you recall?

Admiral Richardson. I have an impression; I cannot state as an absolute certainty, that after I was relieved and after I returned to Washington, purely as a matter of curiosity I asked the then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, as to why I was ordered to escort this vessel, and he stated that it was rumored that there were German raiders operating in the mid-Pacific area within the Marshall Islands or north thereof and that I was directed to escort this vessel to protect her against possible attack by German raiders.

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything else you wish to add to that?

Admiral Richardson. No. That is as complete an answer as I can give.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that you stated you left the position as commodore in chief of the fleet February 1, 1941.

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And you at that time were succeeded by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And you also stated that he was a commanding officer under you in charge of cruisers?

Admiral Richardson. He was a type commander, not commanding officer, because with us commanding officers command a single ship.

Senator Ferguson. I see. Now, do you know how Admiral Kimmel came to succeed you; have you any information on that you could give the committee?

Admiral Richardson. When I was in Washington in October 1940, in conversation with Admiral Stark and Admiral Nimitz, who was then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now Bureau of Naval Personnel, I stated that in my opinion they should have in mind the names of officers whom they would consider favorably as the relief of all of the important officers in the fleet, as any officer of the age of most of the flag officers of senior rank might break down in health or might be detached for other reasons, and that in order that they might not be taken unawares I thought they should have a tentative slate of prospective reliefs, and they agreed with me and asked me to suggest the names of possible reliefs.

Senator Ferguson. Did you make any suggestions?

Admiral Richardson. After some consideration I submitted a list of names and in that list was the name of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us who else was in the list?

Admiral Richardson. I do not remember with certainty, and I hoped I would not be required to answer that question, because I have very many friends in the Navy and I would hate for them, any of them, to feel that their name was not on that list.
Senator Ferguson. I have no desire to press for an answer. About how many were in the list, so that they may feel that they were included?

Admiral Richardson. I think probably five or six.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what was your suggestion —

Admiral Richardson. Just a minute.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.

Admiral Richardson. Much to my surprise, and as evidence [834] of how uncertain some testimony may be after 5 years, I thought in that letter I stated that I had not included Admiral King's name, because he was already afloat in the Pacific—I mean in the Atlantic—but in looking over some old papers I was surprised to find this entry, 29 October, letter from Nimitz agreeing to King's shift up if I had to be taken out.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have in mind when you made that suggestion about replacement of officers that you might be replaced in the very near future?

Admiral Richardson. Not at all.

Senator Ferguson. Not by one of the names that you mentioned.

Admiral Richardson. When I left Washington in October, Admiral Stark and Admiral Nimitz informed me that it was their belief that I would remain in command until I completed 2 years' service as commander in chief, and I had no reason for suggesting this excepting that when a man is over 60, in a strenuous job, he might not hold out.

Senator Ferguson. What was the normal tour of duty —— is that how you express it in the Navy?

Admiral Richardson. That is how we express it, but there is no such thing, because there have been officers remain Commander in Chief one year; there have been officers remain two years. My predecessor remained, I think, 2 years.

[835] Senator Ferguson. The normal, you would say, then, is 2 years—average?

Admiral Richardson. Well, it was not normal for a number of years, and I believe that a feeling grew up in the Navy that a 1-year tenure of office was too short, and there was a tendency, as exemplified by actual practice, to extend the cruise of a commander in chief to 2 years.

Senator Ferguson. Was 13 months an average tour of duty?

Admiral Richardson. I know of one or two flag officers who were detached as commander in chief after 1 year.

Senator Ferguson. When you say the commander in chief, that would be in the same position as you were?

Admiral Richardson. Same way.

Senator Ferguson. Was seniority recognized in the Navy, for instance as it is recognized in the Senate, that the next in line would take your position?

Admiral Richardson. Seniority is recognized in the Navy in the assignment of officers to duty up to and including that of captain, but in the selection of officers for flag assignments an effort is made to base assignments on an estimate of the officer's ability rather than upon his lineal position on the list.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how long of a notice did you have that you were going to be removed, when you were commander in [836] chief of the fleet?
Admiral Richardson. I received a dispatch on 5 January, about 11:30 in the morning Honolulu time, Sunday.

Senator Ferguson. And from whom did you receive that dispatch?

Admiral Richardson. I am not positive. I think it came from the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, who was Admiral Nimitz, and was charged with the preparation of all orders, but it came to me in a secret code that was held by no one in the fleet except me, and the reason it was in a secret code was that the same message involved many other changes of flag officers, and I was directed in the message to inform all of the officers concerned but to inform no one else in a public release of the impending changes made.

Senator Ferguson. When was the first public release that you were retired from that position as commander in chief of the Navy?

Admiral Richardson. My recollection is that it was on the 6th of January or possibly the 7th, Tuesday.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who made that release?

Admiral Richardson. I have no idea.

Senator Ferguson. Did it come from Hawaii or did it come from Washington?

Admiral Richardson. Well, I read it in the newspapers in Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever discuss your retirement from that particular position with anyone in the service, I mean in the Navy?

Admiral Richardson. May I correct the word. It was not a retirement.

Senator Ferguson. What was it?

Admiral Richardson. It was relief or detachment.

Senator Ferguson. Detachment. Did you ever discuss that detachment with anyone?

Admiral Richardson. I did not—yes. I discussed it with one official in the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us who that official was?

Admiral Richardson. The Secretary of the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us your discussion with him about your detachment?

Admiral Richardson. Well, I said to the Secretary upon reporting here—

Senator Ferguson. First, will you give us about the date, if you can, Admiral.

Admiral Richardson. Well, my orders directed me, my orders detaching me from command of the United States Fleet directed me to report to the Secretary of the Navy for duty. I reported, as nearly as I can remember, on the 24th day of March, 1941. I can verify that date.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it is near enough.

Admiral Richardson. By the Secretary of the Navy I was ordered on 25 March 1941 to report to duty with the General Board. When I went in to report to the Secretary of the Navy I said, in effect, in my experience in the Navy I have never known of a flag officer being detached from command of the United States Fleet in the same manner that I was, and I feel that I owe it to myself to inquire why I was detached, and he stated that the President would send for me and talk the matter over with me.
[839] Senator Ferguson. Did the President ever send for you and talk the matter over with you?

Admiral Richardson. He did not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever seek to go to the President on the matter after being told that he would send for you?

Admiral Richardson. By no means.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any other discussion with the Secretary of the Navy—the Secretary at that time was Mr. Knox, was it not?

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any other discussion about your detachment? Will you give us the full story?

Admiral Richardson. No, I had no more discussion about my detachment. I had some discussion about my duty, to which I was to be assigned.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us something about the duties? Was it a promotion that you were going to; was this general board a promotion?

Admiral Richardson. Oh, no.

In accordance with the law, upon detachment from the position of commander in chief of the United States Fleet, I reverted from the rank of admiral to that of rear admiral, and from being senior to many people to whom I had been senior only temporarily I reverted to my normal position on the Navy list.

Senator Ferguson. What was the duty of this general board?

Admiral Richardson. Well, it was a board that has been held in high esteem by many people for many years. It is a board of senior officers of the Navy that consider matters referred to it by the Secretary of the Navy and advise him on any subject that is referred to them. The primary duty in time of peace was the consideration and recommendation as to the building program, and the type and characteristics of the ships to be built.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with the Secretary of the Navy that would indicate that he knew why you were detached?

Admiral Richardson. He said to me, "The last time you were here you hurt the President's feelings."

Senator Ferguson. Did he say what the occasion was that you had hurt the President's feelings?

Admiral Richardson. He did not say.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ask him.

Admiral Richardson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know on what occasion you could have hurt the President's feelings?

[840] Admiral Richardson. Well, it would hurt my feelings if a senior subordinate under me disagreed with me and I couldn't make him change his mind.

Senator Ferguson. Then you feel that probably the conversation that you had then on the—was it the 8th of October at a luncheon with Admiral Leahy and the President—was the occasion that you may have hurt his feelings?

Admiral Richardson. I think so.

Senator Ferguson. That is the occasion that you told us that you were rather definite in your opinions?
Admiral Richardson. Unfortunately, I am definite in most of my opinions.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any other conversation with the Secretary of the Navy as to why you were removed—Pardon me—detached. I want to use that word instead of "removed." Detached.

Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, may I say something off the record?

The Chairman. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record).

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement made by the Admiral, it is apparent that he doesn't think that is material and pertinent and I seriously doubt whether [342] we should go fishing in every direction here in view of the Admiral's last statement.

Admiral Richardson. I have no humility about making this statement. I am perfectly willing to make it, if it is useful. It is a trivial thing.

The Chairman. The Chair thinks probably the Admiral had better finish.

Admiral Richardson. There is a requirement in the Navy that on every annual fitness—I mean on every fitness report submitted, an officer indicates his preference for duty, and inasmuch as I had been informed that I would remain at sea longer if that were carried out, I would have only a short time remaining on the active list when I was detached, and therefore I did not want to move my household effects from Washington to some naval station. I did not want to be assigned to a responsible position in the Department for only a short time, and really, as a joke, I entered on my last fitness report that I preferred duty on the Naval Examining Board.

In all my experience in the Navy—and I have had 4 years in the Bureau of Navigation, charged with assigning officers to duty, I never heard of anyone looking at a fitness report of a flag officer to see where they would assign him to duty. So before I reported to the Secretary, I read [343] in the paper, or heard a rumor, that I was to be assigned to the Naval Examining Board in accordance with my request, and when I reported to the Secretary, I said, "Mr. Secretary, I have reported for duty. I am willing to do any duty that can in any way contribute to the preparation of the Navy for war, but having heard or read a rumor that I was going to the examining board at my request I want to tell you that if I am ordered to the examining board, I am going there gladly, willingly, rather. I will do the job to the limit of my ability, but if a press release is made that I was assigned to the examining board at my request, I will inform the press that it is a lie."

He said, "Well, Admiral, you, of course, won't go to the examining board. Where do you want to go?"

And I said, "Any other place you send me."

So I went to the general board.

The Chairman. That completes that statement? That is all there is to that?

Admiral Richardson. That is all.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, had you put on a long-distance reconnaissaine at Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Richardson. I had, Senator Ferguson, and I think in the previous testimony I have covered it as comprehensively as I can.

Senator Ferguson. You have given us all of the data on that?
Admiral Richardson. I have.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have anything to do with the reconnaissance orders or directives as of 1941, that is what I was getting at. Were you consulted in relation to that after you left?
Admiral Richardson. I discontinued prior to my detachment long-range reconnaissance of the type that I established upon arrival in the Hawaiian area, and in lieu thereof I established a search of the operating areas and a search off the entrance of Pearl Harbor before ships left the harbor. That was incorporated in a security order which was in process of revision when I was detached.

The first order, that revision, that was issued after I was detached, was issued over the signature of Admiral Kimmel on 15 February, and I knew what was in that order, and I previously stated that had I remained there, while I had not read this order thoroughly, it is my belief, based on the fact that the officer who prepared it on my staff remained with Admiral Kimmel until after that order was issued, it is my belief that had I remained there the order would have been substantially as it is now, and would have been over my signature.

Senator Ferguson. What were the places that you could anchor the fleet? What places were there to anchor this fleet at the Hawaiian Islands?
Admiral Richardson. The main anchorages were within Pearl Harbor, in Lahaina Roads off the Island of Molokai, and for carriers, off Oahu, between the entrance to Pearl Harbor and Diamond Head, and small vessels used Hilo and Kahoolawe.

Senator Ferguson. Was all anchorage considered open anchorage except Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Richardson. All were open anchorages, except that it was possible for small ships to enter the harbor of Hilo and enter Kahoolawe.

Senator Ferguson. The antiaircraft protection was placed to cover what anchorage? Lahaina Roads or Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Richardson. There was no antiaircraft protection any place except Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. At the time that you left did you consider the antiaircraft protection sufficient to protect the fleet in Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Richardson. By no means. I so indicated in my endorsement on the letter that was prepared by Admiral Bloch under date of 30 December 1940, my endorsement being dated 4 January 1941.

Senator Ferguson. When we were given maps here, we were shown that the fleet was—that the battleships were moored in pairs. Do you know why that would be? Is that the way you kept them?
Admiral Richardson. That is the only way you could get them in the Harbor. There wasn't room for putting the ships at individual berths.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, it was so congested that it was necessary to put them in pairs?
Admiral Richardson. That was habitual practice.
Senator Ferguson. Could they have been placed in any other position, all the fleet as we have seen it on these plats?

Admiral Richardson. No, there were not separate berths adequate to berth each big ship separately.

Senator Ferguson. Did you start, during the period that you had the fleet at Pearl Harbor, to place it in shape for active duty, war duty?

Admiral Richardson. I did everything within my power to make the officers and men of the fleet become war-minded, and one great deterrent of my effective accomplishment of that aim was the fact that many officers who were long-time friends would say, in effect, "Joe, we cannot be on the verge of war, otherwise they would give us enough men to man the ships."

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell me who told you that?

Admiral Richardson. One specifically will be a witness before this committee, I think, possibly. His name is John Henry Newton. I think his rank is vice admiral.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would you say that the fleet was a liability or an asset in the defense of Pearl Harbor, being in the Harbor, was it a liability or an asset?

Admiral Richardson. You are not on very safe ground in expressing an opinion 5 years or 4 years after the occurrence of an event in hopes that your mind will not be conditioned by after-knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. You feel that you wouldn't want to give an opinion on that question at the present time.

Admiral Richardson. I prefer not to.

Senator Ferguson. All right. You have had considerable experience in the Far East in your previous years in service, you stated?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

Senator Ferguson. After you were retired as Commander in Chief, was that experience utilized in any way?

Admiral Richardson. Not to my knowledge.

[848] Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted on any matters in the Far East?

Admiral Richardson. I was not.

Senator Ferguson. After the 5th of January when you received your first notice of detachment, did you confer with anyone in the State Department?

Admiral Richardson. Between that time and the time of my detachment?

Senator Ferguson. No; after your detachment, did you confer on any questions with anyone in the State Department officially?

Admiral Richardson. Oh, no; I had no official standing that would entitled me to confer with anybody in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted by anyone in the State Department?

Admiral Richardson. Not on official business; no.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Admiral, I have just one question that I think hasn't been pursued fully. You were asked yesterday by Senator Ferguson as to Naval games or maneuvers early in 1932 or 1936.

Admiral Richardson. In 1932, I think, only.
Mr. Keefe. 1932?

Admiral Richardson. I think only 1932.

Mr. Keefe. Only 1932.

Admiral Richardson. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. In which simulated attacks by air power were made upon Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. But the matter was not pursued so that I have any very definite ideas as to just what the conclusion of those Naval games was.

Now, there would be a record maintained, would there not, of the character of the simulated attack upon Pearl Harbor at that time?

Admiral Richardson. Undoubtedly. I cannot recall the part that I played in fleet exercises of 1932, but I know that at that time I was the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Augusta, which was the flagship of the scouting force, and that ship participated in whatever exercises we had.

I do not remember what those exercises were in the Hawaiian area, but I believe there must have been a simulated air raid. I know that on return to the United States, the task force to which the Augusta was assigned, did conduct a simulated air raid on the west coast of California, somewhat north of Santa Barbara. However, I know that many carrier [350] raids against Pearl Harbor have been simulated previous to the 1941 fleet exercises.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, the purpose of conducting those maneuvers and those exercises and simulated attacks is for the benefit of the fleet in considering the defense of Pearl Harbor, in connection with the Army?

Admiral Richardson. No; the purpose was primarily to exercise the Army in Hawaii and the local Naval defense forces which was composed of submarines, long-range patrol planes, and in the War Plans—

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me, Admiral. What I am getting at is this. Judges were appointed to judge the effectiveness of the attack in those cases, were they not?

Admiral Richardson. My impression is that we did not have umpires to determine the success or the failure of the attack, but at the conclusion of every fleet exercise, there was what is called a critique attended by all senior officers and at which those who played an important part in exercises present their views as to what took place and what lessons were learned and the commander in chief himself sums up his conception of how well the job was done and how much was learned and what mistakes were made.

Mr. Keefe. Now, is a record kept and filed with anybody for future study?

[351] Admiral Richardson. The whole thing is printed.

Mr. Keefe. Printed by whom?

Admiral Richardson. Printed in a document and sent to the Naval War College or the Chief of Naval Operations, or should be.

Mr. Keefe. If there were maneuvers in 1932 and subsequent to that time when simulated attacks by air were made upon Oahu and Pearl Harbor within Oahu there would be some place in the Navy Department a printed report showing the actual character of those attacks and the summaries?
Admiral Richardson. That is my belief.

[852] Mr. Keefe. Have we such reports, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, there was laid on my desk this morning at 10 minutes to 10 from the Navy Department a document which I think is the report or material on the 1932 war game.

Mr. Keefe. Is it a voluminous report?

Mr. Mitchell. I haven't had time to examine it. I came in only about 5 minutes before I came to the committee room this morning. I understand that the Army's report of this game, of some of the 1932 games, is already in the hands of Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will be very glad to have it sent from my office. I just received it recently. I haven't had the time to study it.

Mr. Keefe. May I ask counsel whether or not there are any records or files in the hands of the committee showing the results of any war maneuvers or simulated attacks on Pearl Harbor subsequent to 1932 and prior to 1941?

Mr. Mitchell. I think not. We have asked for them but we have not received them. I asked the Admiral about the war games of 1940 when I examined him and his information was not as definite as we wanted. We have asked for the report of 1940 in so far as, I think, they relate to attacks on Pearl Harbor.

[853] Mr. Keefe. Will that report be made available to the individual members of the committee?

Mr. Mitchell. As soon as we get it we will let you have it.

Senator Brewster. Well, could the Admiral make a statement?

Admiral Richardson. I know that in the annual fleet exercise he apparently has one in mind, while I was commander in chief there was no simulated carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. I also know that many such attacks have been simulated in preceding years. Some times they have one of these simulated attacks and some years they do not have them, so that I could not state which years they had them.

Mr. Keefe. Now, one other question, Admiral. Prior to the time that you took the fleet from the West coast to conduct maneuvers in 1940, I believe in January—

Admiral Richardson. I think the 1st of April.

Mr. Keefe. The 1st of April?

Admiral Richardson. When I took them out.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Prior to that time the base of the fleet had always been at San Diego and San Pedro, do I so understand your testimony, except the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic Fleet, perhaps?

Admiral Richardson. Well, "always" is a long time. [854] Within my memory we had practically no ships in the Pacific. I never served in the Pacific except on the Asiatic station, until I went out there in the Augusta about 1932, so that in 30 years service I was never on duty in the Pacific Ocean except when I was on the Asiatic station.

From 1932 until 1940 the normal bases of the fleet were in the San Pedro, Long Beach, and San Diego areas.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

The Chairman. Admiral, I want to ask you a question or two prompted by other questions.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. In this October 10th or 11th memorandum in which you set out a number of assumptions from which war plans were based, those were all theoretical assumptions?

Admiral Richardson. Wholly.

The Chairman. And did any of this materialize while you were in command?

Admiral Richardson. My recollection is that that never materialized. They opened the Burma Road and the Japanese never did disturb us or the British very much, so that the plan was never implemented.

The Chairman. Yes. Now, let me ask you this question: While you were in command had the practice arisen of having the fleet go into Pearl Harbor periodically for recreation [855] or for any other reasons?

Admiral Richardson. Oh, yes. In fact, it is probable that there were more ships in Pearl Harbor in December 1940 than there were in December 1941.

The Chairman. So that this was a recognized practice of the fleet to assemble in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Richardson. A ship cannot remain at sea or anchored out in the open roadstead all the time. They must go in now and then for replenishment of provisions, for recreation, for upkeep, disabling engines if necessary and for the material maintenance of the ships and it was my custom for ships to go in periodically, all of them, not at the same time but for every ship to have a turn in Pearl Harbor.

The Chairman. In the correspondence between Admiral Stark and you, all through it is emphasized the caution in regard to practices or exercises or maneuvers to do nothing that would create the impression of any offensive step being taken with reference to Orange, which I understand is Japan.

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

The Chairman. And in your conferences here in Washington with the Secretary of the Navy and with Admiral Stark and with the President was any further emphasis placed upon that precaution in connection with your exercises and maneuvers?

[856] Admiral Richardson. No; because I had been so thoroughly indoctrinated with that idea over a great many years that I needed no further instructions.

The Chairman. Yes. That is, of course, I presume, always a precaution that the Navy takes and always takes regardless of circumstances under which it exercises and maneuvers, that it is not to be understood as an offensive action against any country?

Admiral Richardson. Absolutely.

The Chairman. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in your statement about the meeting at the White House October 8, 1940, you quoted the President or said in effect, and I am reading from the record at page 684 [reading]:

That if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war.
You are quite clear that the President said that about the Philippines?

Admiral Richardson. That is according to my firm conviction, my best opinion and belief.

Mr. Murphy. Now, at the time that you were at the White House we did have ships based at Manila, did we not?

Admiral Richardson. They were on an Asiatic station. They might or might not have been at Manila, but they were in the western Pacific area. They might have been in the southern Philippines, they might have been in Manila and some of them might have been on the China coast.

Mr. Murphy. But what I mean is, Manila was the base of the fleet. That was its home port, wasn’t it, of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral Richardson. Quite right.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I notice in the letter of December 28, 1940, a letter from Admiral Stark, apparently, to Admiral Hart, the following on page 2 [reading]:

In regard to your next paragraph I am completely with you and have sought at every turn to improve the security of Manila Bay and the Philippines. I might say, in this connection, that opinion in general, in regard to how far we should go in maintaining our position in the Philippines seems to be changing upward. While such a change is going on, it is not always practicable to be definitely final on questions that arise.

Apparently the view was changing as to the Philippines.

Do you have any other thing on that subsequent to October the 8th, 1940, as to our attitude as to what would have happened if the Philippines were attacked?

Admiral Richardson. I have not. I have nothing further to add.

Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions by members of the committee

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask one or two questions.

Admiral, the question was asked you by one of the members of the committee as to whether or not in January 1940 the Pacific Fleet, of which you were in charge, was ready for war duty and you unqualifiedly answered “No, it was not.”

Now, even though this may be somewhat repetitious I would like to ask you, Admiral, how many men were in the Navy under your command at that time, in January 1940, if you know?

Admiral Richardson. I do not know how many men were there at that specific time but I would like to further amplify my statement regarding lack of readiness of the fleet by stating that it was as ready at that time as it had been ready in many years preceding.

Senator Lucas. Yes. All right. Now, you stated, as I recall, the percentage of men that were attached to the battleships?

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. And, as I recall, you said it was about 85 percent of its actual strength.

Admiral Richardson. That had been the long custom in the Navy, to maintain about 85 percent of the required complement on board
ships because the Navy was faced with two alternatives: Based on the number of men allowed by Congress they must either limit the number of ships in commission to those that they could fully man, thereby curtailing the opportunity for officers to acquire experience in command, or they had to maintain in commission ships that could not be fully manned for war operations.

Senator Lucas. That is correct. Now, one further question: With respect to the auxiliary equipment that would have been necessary to have placed the fleet of which you were in command upon a wartime basis, will you give to the committee just as near as you can what you believed in 1940, at that time, would have been necessary in the way of auxiliary cruisers or whatever ships were necessary and whatever implements were necessary to have had it on a war footing basis in 1940 when you were in command?

Admiral Richardson. I would be unwilling to hazard without a thorough study a curbstone opinion as to the number of ships, auxiliary ships, that would have been required [860] to accompany the fleet and service it in war operations.

Senator Lucas. Well, whatever would have been necessary in January 1940 in order to put this fleet upon a wartime basis as has been suggested here by you, that was a matter that was wholly in the hands of the Congress of the United States as to the supplying of the men and the supplying of equipment and the tools to put it on a wartime basis?

Admiral Richardson. Absolutely.

Senator Lucas. Now, one other statement that I want to read into the record here from a letter that is already in the record as one of the exhibits, and it is a letter that you wrote, Admiral, to Admiral Stark dated September the 18, 1940. The fourth paragraph of that letter says this [reading]:

During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries. During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the officers and men of the Fleet, and I have frequently heard officers say, “I hope that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election.”

That is all.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, please?

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

[861] Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Richardson, during the early part of your testimony you testified while you were making one of your visits to the United States during the days you were commander in chief that you picked up at San Francisco 5,000 men to take back to your fleet. Is that correct?

Admiral Richardson. If I made such a statement it was erroneous. I did not pick them up at San Francisco. There were 5,000 men made available to me on the West coast ports. I think the majority of them were made available to me in the San Pedro, Long Beach, and San Diego area, although some of the 5,000 might have reported to ships that had proceeded to Mare Island and those that had proceeded to Puget Sound for repairs. The point I make is that they were not made available to me at San Francisco but on West coast ports.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. Wait a minute.
I did not want to insist on the San Francisco and I was not making any point on that. The point that I want to start from in this examination, you did obtain 5,000 additional men on the West coast?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

Mr. Gearhart. And they were taken to your fleet in the Pacific?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

Mr. Gearhart. That suggests to me a question. I would like to know how many men you had with your fleet before you obtained these additional 5,000?

Admiral Richardson. I think it would be impossible for anyone to answer that question at this time.

Mr. Gearhart. Without endeavoring to be accurate, can you give me round figures as to what the complement and manpower would be of a fleet such as you were commanding at that time?

Admiral Richardson. Congressman Gearhart, the commander in chief of a fleet, with constant changes in the number of men, with changes now and then in the number of ships, could not discharge his responsible position if he burdened his mind with such details.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you testified that your fleet was about 85 percent of what it should have been in manpower?

Admiral Richardson. That is true.

Mr. Gearhart. What I am trying to find out is, how did it affect that percentage that you have fixed at 85 percent by the addition of 5,000 additional men? That is the point that I am leading up to.

Admiral Richardson. Well, if the committee is willing to accept a wild stab.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I don't think that anything you say in the way of opinion is wild. I have that much respect for your opinion.

Admiral Richardson. It would be a wild stab.

The Chairman. Well, make a stab.

Admiral Richardson. It would be somewhere between 1 and 7 percent.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then the 5,000 improved the situation considerably?

Admiral Richardson. Five men would have improved the situation.

Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Richardson, you were asked by a member of the committee as to whether or not it was not Congress whose duty it was to furnish men for the Navy and I think your answer was that it was.

Admiral Richardson. Well, I would like to —

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would elaborate on that.

Admiral Richardson. I would like to change it.

Senator Ferguson. Would you elaborate on it or change it?

Admiral Richardson. It was not Congress' duty. Congress alone had the power to do it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, Admiral, what requests were made to Congress at or about that time for men and matériel for the Navy?
Admiral Richardson. Well, of course, I have no knowledge but having served as director of the office of personnel, Bureau of Navigation, for almost 3 years and having been budget officer of the Navy Department for 1 year, having been assistant chief of naval operations for 1 year, having been chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel for 1 year, I know that we always asked for more men than we had any hopes of getting.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, were you acquainted with the fact that the Navy would make a request and then the Budget Director and his force would pass on it and then it would come to Congress as an estimate of the Budget Director? Are you familiar with that?

Admiral Richardson. I am.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether the period that you were talking about, that it was Congress', at least, power to give more men; do you know what the Navy had requested and how much it had been reduced or increased by the Budget Director?

Admiral Richardson. I have no knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. You haven't those figures?

Admiral Richardson. But I am perfectly willing to volunteer the statement that I believe that the President had it within his power by an act of Congress to increase the number of men in the fleet faster than he did do it.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you stated something that you had a conversation with someone relative to the fact that if we needed men in the Navy we could take machinists or mechanically inclined people and use them in the Navy.

Will you tell me more about that? Where did you get that idea and whom did you discuss it with?

Admiral Richardson. Everything that you stated, Senator Ferguson, is in accordance with my statement except that you did not add the name of the President of the United States, which I did.

Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that you got that idea from the President?

Admiral Richardson. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you at that time discussing with the President the amount of men that you felt that you needed?

[866] Admiral Richardson. I was. I discussed it with everybody. Everybody thought I was a nut on it.

Senator Ferguson. And what month was it that you had that discussion with the President?

Admiral Richardson. On both occasions.

Senator Ferguson. That would be when you had luncheon with Admiral Leahy and the President?

Admiral Richardson. If my memory serves me correctly, I think that I would never forego the opportunity to urge that additional men be added to the fleet. Therefore, I think I discussed the matter with the President at my meeting with him in July and also in October.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with the Secretary of the Navy when you received the information that is now at least partly contained in Exhibit 11 in relation to the embargo or the patrol, whichever you want to call it, in the Pacific?

[867] Admiral Richardson. No; at that time, in my discussion with the Secretary of the Navy, I cannot state that I said any-
thing with respect to the inadequacies of personnel, but I did state
that the fleet was not ready for action that might involve us in war,
and the Secretary said, “Richardson, we have never been ready, but
we have always won.”

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.
The Chairman. May I ask you on that point, the only way to get
men in the Navy at that time was by voluntary enlistment, is that true?
Admiral Richardson. That is true.
The Chairman. And during that period was it true that the Navy,
through posters and recruiting stations and by methods that the
Navy usually adopts, was seeking to urge enlistment in the Navy?
Admiral Richardson. I cannot answer specifically.
The Chairman. Now, Admiral—
Admiral Richardson. Do you want me to finish?
The Chairman. Go ahead, yes. I do not want you to answer unless
you feel free to do so.
Admiral Richardson. When I became chief of the Bureau of Naval
Personnel we had on the waiting list thoroughly acceptable qualified
young men that wanted to enlist in the Navy as apprentice seamen.
We had 8,000 of them. Some of them had been on list for 4 or 5 months.
The Chairman. Were they later taken on the ships?
Admiral Richardson. They were taken on under a quota system
in accordance with their position on the waiting list as funds ap-
propriated by the Congress made it possible for them to do so.
The Chairman. Does counsel wish to ask any further questions?
Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question.
The Chairman. Congressman Clark.
Mr. Clark. Insofar as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned,
what, in your opinion, would have been the difference in the attack,
or the result of the attack if there had been a full complement of
men on each of the ships involved?
Admiral Richardson. I am not now aware of the state of per-
sonnel in the fleet 11 months after my detachment.
Mr. Clark. Assuming it was only 85 percent of the full comple-
ment, what difference would it have made if it were a full complement?
Admiral Richardson. That being the only change?
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. I think the difference would have been
infinitesimal.

Mr. Clark. That is all.
The Chairman. Counsel may proceed.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Does the Senator want to ask any more questions?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. I am not quite clear, Admiral, on two of your
statements to reconcile. I understood one of your answers indicated
that the amount of men in the Navy was limited by the money ap-
propriated by Congress, and in another statement you indicated that the
President could have put more men on.
Now I am not undertaking to quote your testimony, but just to refresh your memory probably as to what you did say on those two items. How can we reconcile those two? The reporter may be able to read that to you.

Admiral Richardson. There is no need for him to read me that, because normally Congress does not, in its annual appropriation, limit the number of men. It provides so much money.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. But there is a general limitation on the number of men. Now it is my belief, which I am certain I can verify, or it can be verified, that under legislation [870] the Congress, the President, had the authority to increase the number of men allowed in the Navy, and I believe that there were substantial appropriations made available to the President which he could allocate for purposes that were not specifically stipulated by Congress.

Senator Ferguson. So he could have used it for increasing the Navy?

Admiral Richardson. So I think he could have used it had he seen so fit.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Richardson. Now if you wish—and I think it has no bearing—but if you wish I can go into this further.

Senator Ferguson. That reconciles it.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of the Admiral to the fact that subsequent to the short question which I asked him with relation to the 1932 maneuvers there has been placed before me what purports to be the report, and the preliminary reports incident to those maneuvers, consisting of a bundle of perhaps 1,000 or more pages, of the preliminary work done preparing for the maneuvers. One is a report, Copy No. 1, entitled "Confidential Report of the Chief Umpire Joint Army and Navy Exercises, Grand Joint Exercise No. 4."

[872] There is another large report entitled, "Confidential Black Report (Army) on Grand Joint Exercise No. 4, February 6-12, 1932."

Then a bound volume containing many pages which appears also to be a report, confidential, of Army participation in the grand exercise No. 4.

Now from these reports that had been furnished a few moments ago it appears quite clear that in initiating these exercises umpires were appointed by both the Army and the Navy to observe the results of those exercises and maneuvers, and to make a full and complete report, confidential in character.

Now, as commander in chief of the fleet, when you assumed command, did you have the benefit of the examination of these reports?

Admiral Richardson. Not those specific ones, but later ones.

Mr. Keefe Then you are sure now, Admiral, that so far as the record now appears, those exercises were meticulously conducted apparently, according to a long preparation by both the Army and Navy, and that reports were filed by the umpires appointed?

Admiral Richardson. I feel sure, I feel sure that I was on perfectly safe ground when I said that I thought you could find evidence of the holding of those exercises.
[872] The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, at some time or other in the course of these proceedings it would be interesting if some of us had time to read these reports. I do not know when anybody will get time, when they are presented on such short notice, but I think that question should be explored, and I assume counsel will explore it, to bring it to us in concise form so we can understand what the report of the umpires was on those maneuvers.

Mr. Mitchell. I was going to ask if that is the 1932 maneuvers?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. I am frank to say I have not gone back to 1932 for maneuver reports. I supposed we were more directly interested in war games along a year or two before the Pearl Harbor attack, which would deal with simulated air attacks, and on that is where our inquiry was directed.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know whether these reports contain the report of a simulated air attack upon Pearl Harbor? Are they part of those maneuvers?

Mr. Mitchell. I do not know. They were brought in at the request of one member of the committee who asked for the 1932 maneuver report. If I thought that were directly involved here I would have had them long ago, I think.

[873] Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, Admiral, if I understand your testimony in response to questions by Senator Ferguson, you at one time served as Budget Officer of the Navy Department.

Admiral Richardson. I did.

Mr. Keefe. And you had experience in coming before subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee.

Admiral Richardson. I have.

Mr. Keefe. To present the Navy’s budget estimate.

Admiral Richardson. I have.

Mr. Keefe. I think in your testimony yesterday you stated that you made an effort to see the chairman of that subcommittee upon one of your visits here.

Admiral Richardson. I did. I saw one and made an effort to see the other.

Mr. Keefe. The former Senator from Nevada, I believe.

Admiral Richardson. I saw the then chairman of the Senate subcommittee, the present Secretary of State. I endeavored to see Governor Scrugham, who was at that time a Congressman and chairman of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House.

Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact, Admiral, when the Navy prepares its request in the first instance for each fiscal year it makes up the request which is submitted to the President’s Bureau of the Budget first, isn’t that true?

[874] Admiral Richardson. The preliminary estimate made by the Navy bureaus and officers of the Navy Department are submitted to the budget officer of the Navy Department.

Mr. Keefe. I understand that. That is the first step.

Admiral Richardson. And he himself, with the approval of the Secretary, frequently reduces the estimates, in the hope that his action will preclude more drastic action by the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. Keefe. In any event, following that the procedure is that the request from the Navy goes then to the Bureau of the Budget?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And you make a presentation to the Bureau of the Budget?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. On the Navy's request.
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. After the individual departments of the Navy have submitted their request to the budget officer of the Navy he finally prepares the presentation for the Bureau of the Budget?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Then when the Bureau of the Budget finally acts, that budget is then submitted by the President to the Congress?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. In his annual budget message. That is true, is it not?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
[876] Mr. Keefe. And during the course of the year there may be supplementary estimates submitted?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. By the Bureau of the Budget to the Congress?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Now, when you come before the Congressional committee to present the request, do you have instructions to defend and present the budget as submitted by the President?
Admiral Richardson. If my memory serves me correctly, an act of Congress provides that, as a representative of the Navy Department, I would be subject to imprisonment if I asked for funds in excess of those set up in the budget.
Mr. Keefe. So that, as a matter of law, and as a matter of practice, the executive officers coming before a Congressional committee to present a budget support the President's Budget as submitted to the Congress?
Admiral Richardson. In accordance with an act of Congress.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, have you ever examined the complete submission of estimates by the Navy Department to the Bureau of the Budget?
Admiral Richardson. For what year?
Mr. Keefe. In the fiscal years, say, 1934–41.
[877] Admiral Richardson. I certainly did, in 1934–35, because I was the budget officer of the Navy, but that is the only time.
The Chairman. The Chair might suggest that those budget estimates are matters of record which could be obtained from the Department and from the budget messages of the President and the Appropriations Committee. The Chair doubts whether the admiral could remember all of them.
Admiral Richardson. I could not.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I have before me, Mr. Chairman, and may I say, Admiral, figures submitted to me by the Navy Department showing in each fiscal year the appropriations requested by the Navy Department, the budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress and the amounts in each fiscal year made available by the Congress.
Now, I assume, of course, that you have no familiarity with those figures except perhaps the estimates which you examined when you were budget officer for the Navy.
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
The Chairman. Is that all, Congressman?
Mr. Keefe. That is all at this time.
The Chairman. Does counsel wish to ask further questions?
Mr. Mitchell. I have one question of the admiral.
Admiral, you testified that following the letter from Admiral Stark to you of November 22, suggesting you examine into the question of security of the fleet in port against a possible air raid, and your reply of November 28, when you got back to Pearl Harbor, you made that inquiry?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the one you described?
Admiral Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Which led up to the Bloch report and the Knox-Stimson letter. Had you made any study of the proposition before?
Admiral Richardson. I had not.
Mr. Mitchell. In your memorandum of September 12 to Secretary Knox in which you listed the objections that you had to basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor there was no reference there or statement about peril to the fleet in part, was there?
Admiral Richardson. That consideration had not arisen in my mind.
Mr. Mitchell. So it was in your representations about basing, or your objections about basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor which you had in that document and which you presented to other officials of the Government, including the President, you had not included any point of that kind in there?
Admiral Richardson. Not air raids; not protection against air raids.

[378]

Mr. Mitchell. That is the only question I have.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions by the committee?
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request.
The Chairman. Is it a request of the admiral?
Mr. Gearhart. A request of the counsel. I would like to have the log of the U. S. S. Wright, the war vessel that I think was a part of Admiral Halsey's task force, the log from the 25th of November on to the fatal day of December 7.
Mr. Mitchell. If we can get it, it will be made available.
Mr. Gearhart. Likewise if there is a log available of the cruiser Helena, which I understand was in the harbor and went through the attack.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask the admiral one concluding question, and that is, if he has anything now that he wants to volunteer to the committee, rather than a direct question, relative to this issue that he believes to be relevant.
The Chairman. The Chair was about to ask the admiral about the same thing. If the members of the committee are through with their questions, and I assume that they are, Admiral, if you have any further statement that you wish to make, the committee will be glad to receive it.
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to state that I never bore any resentment toward

---

1 Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 125.
2 Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 163.
President Roosevelt because of my detachment from command of the United States Fleet.

He was the constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. I was one of his senior subordinates; there was a difference of opinion; each of us frankly expressed his views; neither could induce the other to change his opinion; I was relieved of command of the Fleet. Had I been constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I would have taken the same action.

Because of this conviction, on January 28, 1941, 4 days before I was relieved of command of the Fleet with orders to proceed to Washington for duty, I sent to the Chief of Naval Operations by an officer, the following oral message:

The day I was made commander in chief I realized then and thereafter that the same power which made me commander in chief could unmake me at any time. When I arrive in Washington I shall keep my lips sealed and my eyes in the boat and put my weight on the ear in any duty assigned.

Living up to this resolution has resulted in the circulation of many rumors which bear little relation to fact.

I hope my testimony given here has clarified the situation to some extent.

The Chairman. On behalf of the committee, Admiral, the Chair wishes to thank you for your frank and forthright [837] testimony and to say that the Chair feels sure that every member of the committee has undoubted respect for your ability, your opinion, and your patriotism, in the diligence with which you have sought to follow your duty before the committee, as well as while you have been in the Navy of the United States.

Admiral Richardson. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The Chairman. Now counsel may proceed.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Leahy has been waiting quite a while. His engagement has been quite severe. I wonder if you could not call him right now? The committee can sit a few minutes longer.

The Chairman. If it is agreeable to the committee, Admiral Leahy has been waiting here a couple of days, and counsel desires to call Admiral Leahy now.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I do not know, of course, the scope of Admiral Leahy’s testimony, but I think, in view of the position which he held as Chief of Naval Operations during the period covered today by something contained in Admiral Richardson’s testimony, and in view of the importance and magnitude of the issues, any suggestion of disposing of him in any brief fashion is unjust to his position, his prestige, and the importance of the issues with which he was necessarily concerned. I am sure his testimony is worth at least an afternoon’s session.

[832] The Chairman. The Chair is not advised as to what particular point counsel wishes to call Admiral Leahy on now. Admiral Leahy is on the list of witnesses, I imagine, to testify in a comprehensive way. The Chair does not know whether counsel wishes to interrogate him with respect to this luncheon about which Admiral Richardson testified.

Mr. Mitchell. Under the circumstances, I think it would be useless to try to finish his examination before lunch.
Admiral Leahy, I believe, retired from the Navy in 1939. He was Governor of Puerto Rico in 1940, and he went to Vichy in the fall of 1940, and he was not serving in the Navy in 1940 and 1941. When I arranged to call him, I did not suppose he had contacted the Navy during those 2 years, and it would make his testimony on other matters particularly wanting, although as an expert witness he might testify to anything.

I had proposed to ask him as to his attendance at that luncheon at the White House. I felt if any witness is called to testify to a conversation with the deceased President, every other person who was present in the room should properly be called too. That was the reason I called Admiral Leahy, and his description in that regard would be very short.

[883] It is up to the committee to say how much they want to go into expert matters with him. If they say that they will, then let us call Admiral Leahy back at 2 o'clock.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think it is evident from the scope of Admiral Richardson's examination that the preparedness of the Navy and of the United States defense forces during the decade preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor is one of the relevant matters about which, of course, Governor Leahy speaks with considerable authority as Chief of Naval Operations for 4 years. How far that may be gone into I do not know, but I do think it deserves some time.

The Chairman. It is obvious to the Chair that we cannot conclude with Admiral Leahy, and therefore this committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed until 2 p.m., of the same day.)

[884] Afternoon Session

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Counsel, will you call the next witness?

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Leahy.

The Chairman. Admiral Leahy, will you come around and be sworn?

(The witness was sworn by the Chairman.)

Testimony of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, United States Navy

The Chairman. You may be seated there, Admiral. You may proceed, counsel.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, your rank is that of admiral of the fleet?

Admiral Leahy. Fleet admiral.

Mr. Mitchell. Fleet admiral?

Admiral Leahy. Fleet admiral, United States Navy.

The Chairman. Admiral, will you talk into that microphone? The acoustics in this building are not excellent and we have to do that in order to be heard.

Mr. Mitchell. How long have you served in the Navy?

Admiral Leahy. I entered the Navy as a midshipman in 1893 and I have served continuously since except for approximately 2 years, from 1939 to 1942, during which time I was part time Governor of Puerto Rico and the rest of the time Ambassador to France.
Mr. Mitchell. You were Governor of Puerto Rico during all of the year 1940 up to December?

Admiral Leahy. I went to Puerto Rico as Governor in the fall of 1939 and left there in November, about the end of November 1940.

Mr. Mitchell. And then you went to Vichy and how long were you there as our Ambassador?

Admiral Leahy. I went to France as ambassador, arriving in France on January 2, 1941, and I left about the end of April 1942.

Mr. Mitchell. You were Chief of Naval Operations at one time, Admiral. What was that period?

Admiral Leahy. I was Chief of Naval Operations from January 2, 1937, until August 1, 1939.

Mr. Mitchell. What is your present duty? What duties are you now performing as Fleet admiral?

Admiral Leahy. I am at present assigned to duty as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

Mr. Mitchell. Were you in Washington in October 1940?

Admiral Leahy. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Were you present at the White House at a luncheon on or about October 8 of that year at which Admiral Richardson was present?

Admiral Leahy. I did have luncheon with the President on October 8, 1940, and Admiral Richardson was also present at the luncheon.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state in your own way just what occurred at that luncheon?

Admiral Leahy. I was at that time in Washington on duty connected with the Government of Puerto Rico and the President asked me to have luncheon with him on October 8. I found after I arrived that Admiral Richardson was also to be at lunch.

Many matters were discussed at the luncheon, some in connection with my affairs in Puerto Rico and some with Admiral Richardson in regard to the condition of the fleet.

Perhaps it would be best for this inquiry for me to state as well as I can remember the discussion that took place between Admiral Richardson and the President in regard to the condition of the fleet. My memory in that matter is good, principally because I was exceedingly surprised to learn that the commander in chief of the fleet did not consider the fleet prepared for war and at that time I was apprehensive in regard to an early war situation in the Pacific, although I was very far from sources of information and I had no late information in regard to that matter.

I do not remember how the subject was brought up but Admiral Richardson told the President that the fleet in Honolulu was not ready for war for numerous reasons.

He said the ships did not have their war complements; that the facilities in Pearl Harbor were not sufficient to keep the ships in a top condition at all times; that he had not a sufficient number of fuel ships to make it possible for him to operate the fleet at any distance from the Hawaiian Islands; that the personnel of the fleet, the officers and the crews, did not know why they were in the Hawaiian Islands; that apparently nobody expected to be called upon for war duty; that the families of the men and officers were in the continental United States
and they wanted to get home and see their families; that the recreation facilities and the means for taking care of his men when they were on shore in Honolulu were almost nonexistent, at least they were entirely insufficient and that he felt that if there was a prospect of calling upon the fleet for war service it could be done much more advantageously in a port on the Pacific Coast of the United States where he could clear his ships for action, get the additional things that would be needed and reinforce his peacetime crews.

I think that covers very well all of the conversation that went on between the President and Admiral Richardson at this luncheon which I attended with them in the President’s office.

[888] Mr. Mitchell. Did the President himself say anything about basing the fleet there that you heard?

Admiral Leahy. I do not remember that the President made any comment whatever as to why the fleet was in Pearl Harbor or as to whether or not it might be required to remain there. He may have made a remark of that kind but I have no recollection of it.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you leave the White House with Admiral Richardson?

Admiral Leahy. We left the White House together and we rode to where we were going, he to the Navy Department and I to the Interior Department, either in a car which I had or in his car.

During this short ride I expressed to Admiral Richardson my surprise to find that the fleet was in the condition which he had stated to the President and I said that I hoped he would manage to correct as many of the deficiencies as possible without any delay because I had been telling the Congress and the people of this country for some time that the Navy was ready for war and I was distressed to find that it was not.

Mr. Mitchell. At the meeting at the White House did you participate with Admiral Richardson in discussing the condition of the fleet? Did you take part in that conversa-

[889] tion or were you a listener?

Admiral Leahy. Well, I was very generally a listener. I do not remember having said anything about it although I may have interjected a remark from time to time. I do not remember anything that I may have said in regard thereto at the White House.

Mr. Mitchell. The committee may examine.

The Chairman. The Chairman has no questions at this time. Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman. No questions now, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. No; I have no questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark is not present, Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, there was some statement made by Admiral Richardson to the effect that the President said something relative to what we would do in the event that there was an attack on the Philippines. Do you have any recollection of any such conversation?

Admiral Leahy. I have not.

Mr. Murphy. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Brewster. Did you hear all of Admiral Richardson's testimony?

Admiral Leahy. I did not, Senator. I only heard very small parts during the time I was here waiting to be called as a witness.

Senator Brewster. Did you read in the papers the full account of his statement as to his conversation with the President?

Admiral Leahy. I did not, sir.

Senator Brewster. He referred not only to the incident which has been cited as to the Philippines, but also as to the reasons which seemed to the President sufficient for a fleet to be stationed in Pearl Harbor, and the effect that it might have on the Japanese. Do you recall any conversation along that line?

Admiral Leahy. I have no recollection of any conversation in the White House that might have a bearing on that question, Senator.

Senator Brewster. Admiral Richardson said he expressed himself rather strongly to the President as to what he felt about the effect on a military-minded government, such as the Japanese, of the location of an inadequately prepared fleet in Pearl Harbor. Do you have any recollection of anything of that kind?

Admiral Leahy. No; I do not remember, Senator, anything that was said about that in this conversation at the luncheon.

Senator Brewster. Do you recall as to whether Admiral Richardson queried at all as to the reasons why the fleet was laying at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Leahy. As I remember he stated none of the officers or men knew why they were in Pearl Harbor, and that he personally felt that they could accomplish preparations for war service to much better advantage in a port on the Pacific coast. That is all I remember.

Senator Brewster. You do not recall that the President made any rejoinder or any remark as to the reasons why he felt the fleet should be there?

Admiral Leahy. No; I do not, Senator.

Senator Brewster. Did you make any memorandum of the conversation at that time?

Admiral Leahy. I did not. I am speaking entirely from memory. The only thing that impressed me was the fact that the commander in chief, in whom I had great confidence, and have always had, reported officially to the President that the fleet was not prepared for war, and I thought at that time that a war was a very likely contingency.

Senator Brewster. You referred to the commander in chief.

[892] Admiral Leahy. I mean the President—the commander in chief of the fleet.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Leahy. Admiral Richardson.

Senator Brewster. Admiral Richardson had served under you as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for a period?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct, and I, of course, have served with him in other places in the fleet at various times.

Senator Brewster. You would have considerable confidence in his recollection of events?

Admiral Leahy. Well, I would have complete confidence in Admiral Richardson, but whether or not he remembers the conversation, I could not say.
Senator Brewster. He apparently was rather positive and rather careful in his statement as to the matters to which he had given considerable thought, and he had written out the purpose of his conversation, so his testimony was affirmative, that "I do recall this as the conversation." Your evidence is apparently of a negative character, as to not recalling certain items of this testimony, is that correct?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct, sir. I cannot say the conversations did not take place, but I do not remember them.

Senator Brewster. You would not have any question if Admiral Richardson said he recalled it that he did recall it?

Admiral Leahy. I have no doubt whatever he would be correct. He may have made notes following the conversation or he may not.

Senator Brewster. In any event it was true that the particular matter in discussion was one with which he was very vitally concerned, was it not?

Admiral Leahy. He was very serious in his statement to the President, so much so as to definitely make an impression on me so that I have not forgotten what he said about the fleet.

Senator Brewster. He had come there and he rather definitely indicated that he wanted to find out what the reasons were, or at any rate, he posed questions which were calculated to elicit that information?

Admiral Leahy. That I do not know, Senator, but I presume so.

Senator Brewster. From his statement that he and the officers of his fleet did not know the reason why they were there you apparently implied that he was in Washington to find out if he could?

Admiral Leahy. Well, he made that statement. What his purpose was, of course, I could not say.

Senator Brewster. As far as you were concerned, it was not a matter with which you were at that time officially concerned?

Admiral Leahy. No; I had nothing whatever to do with it at that time, Senator, because I had separated myself from the Navy Department and I had very little information. Perhaps that accounts for my surprise.

Senator Brewster. Your presence was in that respect that of a casual bystander, as far as official relations were concerned?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct. I think I just happened to be invited to luncheon at the same time that Admiral Richardson was. I usually lunched with the President once or twice when I came to Washington.

Senator Brewster. And there were some Puerto Rican matters discussed at the luncheon, and he apparently was killing two birds with one stone?

Admiral Leahy. We discussed some of the problems before the Puerto Rican Government at that luncheon.

Senator Brewster. You naturally were interested in the naval aspects of the matter, as one who had been so long actively associated with the service?

Admiral Leahy. I was very much interested in it, Senator.

Senator Brewster. And you had been for 4 years Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Leahy. No; about 2½ years, Senator.

Senator Brewster. What period did that cover?
Admiral Leahy. It was from January 2, 1937, to August 1, 1939.

Senator Brewster. And during that period you were the naval officer primarily responsible for the preparation of our naval defense?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct, sir.

Senator Brewster. And the development of the fleet?

Admiral Leahy. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And were associated with the presentation of the expansion program of the fleet in the 1938 expansion bill?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct.

[896] Senator Brewster. Which you submitted before the Naval Affairs Committee as of that time?

Admiral Leahy. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And also the preparation of the budget for the Navy during that period?

Admiral Leahy. Yes; I was charged with the preparation, with the supervision of the preparation of the budget in the Navy Department at that time.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Keeffe. May I have that time exactly?

Admiral Leahy. From January 2, 1937, to August 1, 1939.

Senator Brewster. And you heard this morning the outline of the procedure in the preparation of naval budgets in the discussions between Congressman Keefe and Admiral Richardson?

Admiral Leahy. I heard that this morning, Senator.

Senator Brewster. And that was an accurate presentation of the procedure in the preparation of the budget and submission to the Congress?

Admiral Leahy. I think, from what I heard, it is an accurate presentation of the procedure.

Senator Brewster. The only thing I was not clear about—and perhaps you may have answered this—was the manner of the Congressional presentation of the question of increased items in the Navy. I always understood that was a matter of [897] Executive order, that the officials in the Navy Department could not testify in support of items in excess of the Executive budget, and I think Admiral Richardson spoke of it as a Congressional provision.

Are you familiar with that?

Admiral Leahy. I am unable to answer that, Senator.

I know we were not permitted to introduce items that were in excess of those that were transmitted to Congress by the Budget Bureau with the President's approval. Whether it is a statutory provision, or whether it is an Executive order, I am unable to say, but it is a fact we were not permitted to do it.

Senator Brewster. I am familiar with that fact. I was simply surprised at that statement. I wanted to clarify it. It was the usual experience for the Budget Bureau to reduce somewhat your estimate?

Admiral Leahy. Well, during the time I had the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, they always reduced our estimates after we had cut them as much as we thought we could with safety. They did it carefully, always, with consultation always, to find out from the Navy, from me, what damage would be done if they did cut an amount from the budget, and we always told them, and they said, "We have only a certain amount of money which can be obtained, and we must
divide it among the different departments, so you will have to take so much of a cut."

Sometimes they would say, "Where do you want it?"

Then, if they were kind enough to give us a choice of the lesser of the evils, we would choose the place where the cut should be made, if it must be made.

Senator Brewster. Do you recall, admiral, the episode in connection with the Naval Expansion Program of 1938, the question of the limitations proposed on naval aircraft to not exceed 3,000?

Admiral Leahy. I would be unable to answer that without looking at the records, Senator. I remember there was such a limitation, but beyond that I would not like to make a statement, and probably it might not be correct.

Senator Brewster. If there were a limitation of 3,000 at that time, then the later events have demonstrated the wisdom of a very great increase in naval aircraft that has since occurred?

Admiral Leahy. That is quite correct, Senator. The Navy Department was quite desirous of a large increase in naval aircraft at that time. I know at the time I was associated with it, we were extremely anxious to build up the air arm as much as we could. There was a limitation in the number of carriers that were available.

Admiral Leahy. It would not have been worth while to get more planes than could have been taken on the carriers. Perhaps you remember well that we were advocating more carriers all the time.

Senator Brewster. Prior to that time, the limitation on naval aircraft had been whatever was commensurate with a treaty navy, isn't that correct? That is, there had never been an actual limit at that time. Is that not correct?

Admiral Leahy. I do not remember, Senator, that the treaty limitation limited the number of aircraft that we were permitted to have.

Senator Brewster. No; it did not. It simply set forth a number commensurate with the treaty navy, which might have been any number that the development of the naval art might have made advisable.

Admiral Leahy. That is correct, sir, and also what we could carry with the vessels that were permitted to us by the treaty navy.

Senator Brewster. It was after that time that you began to develop land-based aircraft in the Navy?

Admiral Leahy. No; we had developed land-based aircraft long before that time, Senator, but in a very limited number. There was a question as to whether the Navy should have any land-based aircraft. Finally it was adjudicated with the understanding that the Navy would have a limited number of land-based aircraft for the purpose of patrolling about their bases.

Senator Brewster. That was a matter of agreement with the War Department?

Admiral Leahy. An agreement between the War Department and a predecessor of mine, as Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Brewster. Was the custom developed at that time of carrying two or three or four times the number of planes required for the complement of a carrier?

Admiral Leahy. I do not remember that we had such a policy at that time, Senator. I doubt it very much. We were having difficulty
getting the planes that we really wanted without getting a multiple of three in capacity.

Senator Brewster. To refresh your recollection, I have before me the act of 1938 as presented by you to the committee, which provided for the authorization of the construction of additional naval airplanes, the number not exceeding 3,000. That was the increase proposed at that time. They at the same time imposed a limit. I do not know whether you recall the circumstances, but on the floor that was amended by striking out the words so it read “not less than 3,000.”


Senator Brewster. You remember that episode?

Admiral Leary. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. So after that you did have the authority for any number of planes in excess of 3,000, providing you could get the appropriations?

Admiral Leary. I would hazard the guess that the reason for the limit of 3,000 was a bugetary limit which had been imposed upon us, but I am not certain. We wanted more than that, I am quite sure, and we had some friends in the House who arranged it for us.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Leahy, according to your testimony, when you left the White House with Admiral Richardson, you expressed your surprise over what Admiral Richardson had said to the President about the fleet not being ready. You further testified that you were distressed as you regarded war as “a very likely contingency.”

Was anything said by the President at the White House which caused you to accept that thesis that a war was a very likely contingency?

Admiral Leary. I have no recollection of the President saying anything in regard to that matter, but I had thought that war was a likely contingency for several years, and I was practically certain in my own mind that it was going to come at some time in the reasonably near future.

Mr. Gearhart. Was anything said at that luncheon by Admiral Richardson which added to your conviction that war was a very likely contingency?

Admiral Leary. On the contrary, the fact of Richardson saying that his fleet was not ready for war should have led me to believe that many people did not agree with me that war was a contingency—a likely contingency.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, among all Navy and Army experts, war with Japan had been regarded for many years, perhaps as long as 30 years, as inevitable, is that not correct?

Admiral Leary. Well, I would not like to use the word “inevitable.” It was considered a reasonable probability at some time in the future.

Mr. Gearhart. Army and Navy experts have to keep themselves informed with respect to the manifested plans of other countries in respect to expansion, do they not?

Admiral Leary. They make every possible effort to get all of the information that can be obtained in regard to those very questions.

Mr. Gearhart. It was quite apparent to you, and I [903] presume, to others in a similar position, that Japan’s expansion pro-
gram was bound, in time, to bring her into clash with the interests of the United States?

Admiral Leahy. Well it seemed inevitable to me.

[904] Mr. Gearhart. Then, not being afraid of that word “inevitable,” it really was inevitable to anybody that understood, even people beyond the exact range of the Army and Navy, that we were in for trouble with Japan?

Admiral Leahy. Of course it is impossible for me to say what other people thought. I know what I thought myself, and I would think your statement would be correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Leahy. But of course what they thought I could not say.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, you had no reason for believing that you alone entertained that opinion, but it was a general opinion?

Admiral Leahy. I am quite sure a great many other people entertained that opinion.

Mr. Gearhart. At the time you were at the White House and attended this luncheon the inevitability of war was becoming more and more a question of imminency of war in the estimation of people who were closely watching the events in the Pacific, is that not correct?

Admiral Leahy. I think that is exactly correct, but again I must say that I cannot tell you what was in the minds of other people, but the development in Asia indicated that the difficulty with Japan was approaching much more rapidly [905] than it had been in the past.

Mr. Gearhart. Now as you got along into 1941 and had become the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, you became informed from day to day, did you not, of the intercepted messages that were being exchanged between the Japanese diplomatic and military and naval authorities?

Admiral Leahy. In 1942 I assumed my present office, and subsequent to that time I probably received all of the information that was available to the State, War, and Navy Departments, I probably did.

[906] Mr. Gearhart. Yes. That is, the question is based upon the assumption that you were there in 1941. What were you doing there in the year of 1941?

Admiral Leahy. I was Ambassador in France.

Mr. Gearhart. While you were in France did you receive any information in respect to the plans of the Japanese which you transmitted to the White House?

Admiral Leahy. I received from time to time rumors from my acquaintances, and so forth, from other countries, as to what their information was in regard to Japanese activities and I reported them at once, of course, to the Department of State, under which I was serving.

I had much information of sharp interest at the time that the Japanese moved into Indochina because they were dealing with the Government of France at that time and the Government of France kept me fully informed as to their demands and what they proposed to do.

That, of course, was immediately, instantly reported to our Department of State.

Mr. Gearhart. It was reported in the public prints that the Japanese went into Indochina with the premission of the Vichy Government; is that true?
Admiral Leary. That is correct; under pressure from the German friends of the Japanese.

[907] Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever see any written assurances from the Japanese Government to the Vichy Government that they, the Japanese, would withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their objectives in other spots in the Orient?

Admiral Leary. I did not. I was told by Marshall Petain the details of the agreement with the Japanese. I saw no written communication.

I thought of telling a story but I better not.

Mr. Gearhart. I would be very interested in hearing it, Admiral.

Admiral Leary. There are too many of my friends in the news business here.

Mr. Gearhart. The next time I see you at the Army and Navy Club I will get that story in private.

Admiral Leary. All right.

Mr. Gearhart. I will ask this concluding question, Admiral.

Did anything occur, or was anything brought to your attention while you were in Vichy representing the United States to the Vichy Government, that caused you to feel that a war with Japan had become any less a very likely contingent?

Admiral Leary. At the time that the Japanese moved into Indochina with the permission of the Government of France I told the Chief of the Government that that convinced me that we would be at war with Japan over the Philippines in the near future.

Mr. Gearhart. And did you advise Washington of that information which had come to you leading you to that conviction?

Admiral Leary. I did.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you, while you were in France, receive any information which would lead you to believe that there was a danger of Hawaii coming under attack by the Japanese?

Admiral Leary. I did not.

Mr. Gearhart. I believe that is all. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Leary, you were speaking about the French Vichy Government's agreement with the Japs in their occupation of Indochina. Do you recall whether Marshal Petain, then acting as head of the Vichy Government, informed you as to what the agreement provided for in the number of men that the Japs could put in there under that forced agreement?

Admiral Leary. He did give me such information, Senator, but I cannot remember the number. It was a small number of Japanese that were by agreement to remain in a small part of Indochina. The French were to be permitted to continue the government of Indochina and the Japanese were to withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their purpose, which was to facilitate their movement to the south. That was related to me by the Marshal.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Leary. I have no doubt it was true.

Senator Ferguson. Then later did they violate the agreement as to the number of men they were to send in under the alleged agreement?
Admiral Leahy. They later sent in more men than they had agreed to send in and they took more widespread action in seizing control of the Government than was stated in the original agreement.

Senator Ferguson. Did you, as Ambassador for the United States, make protest to the Vichy Government that they were doing this, did you protest that?

Admiral Leahy. No, I did not, because I got my information from the French Government. It was the only way we could get that information and they told me about it and expressed their regrets and I transmitted that to our Government.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am getting at. They seemed to be claiming, at least, that they were unable to stop this flow of Jap troops into Indochina.

Admiral Leahy. They were unable to stop it. It was unnecessary for them to tell me that because I knew that quite well.

Senator Ferguson. And you notified the State Department here?

Admiral Leahy. That was transmitted to the Department of State as it came to me.

Senator Ferguson. Did you make more than one protest during 1941, up until Pearl Harbor date?

Admiral Leahy. As I remember it—you are speaking of Indochina now?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Leahy. As I remember, the only protest—

Senator Ferguson. Let me straighten out about the protest. You notified your own Government, our Government, that they were violating the agreement and what the French had told you about it; is that correct?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you get any information back from the State Department to take up with the French Government?

Admiral Leahy. I do not think so, Senator, because I had already taken it up with the French Government immediately when I got the information from them.

Senator Ferguson. What did you take up, what was the tenor of your conversation with them? Did you tell them you thought this increase would mean war or not?

Admiral Leahy. No; it was not that, Senator. The tenor of my conversation with the French Government in regard to Indochina was always the same, that they should refuse officially and diplomatically to agree to these things.

Now, I doubt very much if they ever agreed to the increase in the number of troops that went to Indochina, Japanese troops, but they knew it, and there wasn't any purpose in disagreeing with it, there was nothing they could do about it; it was done by force of arms.

Senator Ferguson. And it was a violation of the original agreement as to the number?

Admiral Leahy. There is no doubt about that.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, I wanted to be a little more specific than the others have been on what happened at the White House on the 8th, when you had lunch with the President and Admiral Richardson.
I am going to use the direct quotes from the official record. Admiral Richardson said:

which I prepared in the quiet of my home, where I could think and refresh my memory to a maximum extent possible.

The Chairman said:

You may proceed, Admiral, to do that.

Admiral Richardson.

apparently reading, and was reading, from a memorandum.

I took up the question of returning to the Pacific Coast all of the Fleet except the Hawaiian detachment.

[912] Do you know whether or not that was discussed?

Admiral Leahy. I do not remember that it was discussed in that way. I have already stated, Senator, that Admiral Richardson said in my hearing that he considered it wise to bring the Fleet back to the Pacific Coast in order that it could be prepared for war if that was the purpose.

Senator Ferguson. And that, of course, would include all except the Hawaiian detachment?

Admiral Leahy. I would say that Admiral Richardson, having made these notes on the same day of the conversation, is probably much more accurate than I am.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Leahy, he does not purport to have made that memorandum on that day. He made the notes recently.

Admiral Leahy. Oh, recently.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Leahy. Well, stated another way, this was a matter in which Admiral Richardson was interested in detail. To me it was only a matter of general interest. And his recollection should be more accurate than mine.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, he says that he remembers very little of what you and the President talked about about Puerto Rico, because that was your problem, about some housing, and you remember that, do you?

[913] Admiral Leahy. I remember that very well.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; because you were directly interested in that part of the conversation.

Admiral Leahy. But there would be a difference, Senator. I was also very much interested in the Navy, and perhaps Admiral Richardson never heard of Puerto Rico, for all I know.

Senator Ferguson. Well now, I am reading from the official record Admiral Richardson's language:

The President stated that the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.

Are you prepared to say now that that did not take place?

Admiral Leahy. I cannot say that it did not take place, Senator. I can only say, as I said before, that I do not remember it, but it is quite likely that that statement was made, because a great many people, before I left the Navy Department, had exactly that idea, that if we would send small forces to various places it would be a deterrent on the Japanese.

I was in complete disagreement with them always.

[914] Senator Ferguson. You did not agree then with the fact,
the idea, that the fleet being in Hawaii, in the Hawaiian area, would be a restraining influence on the action of Japan?

Admiral Leahy. Not if it was unready for battle, Senator, but I assumed that it had been made ready, and then it would have been a deterrent and a very useful one.

Senator Ferguson. But you received your first information on that particular day from Admiral Richardson that it was not ready for action?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, reading on, and giving you a direct quote again from Admiral Richardson's—

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman cite the page?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Page 682, Witness Richardson, questions by General Mitchell:

I stated that in my opinion the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the Fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no train of auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action.

[915] Are you prepared to say that that was not said at that meeting?

Admiral Leahy. I am not prepared to say that it was not said. I do not remember a statement of that kind.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall anything about the Japanese being a military government rather than, as it is expressed here, a civilian political government?

Admiral Leahy. No, sir, Senator; I do not remember that but that is the kind of thing I would not remember because I knew that so thoroughly, so somebody's saying it would make no impression on me.

Senator Ferguson. That was in your mind as an exact fact, that it was a military government rather than a civilian political government?

Admiral Leahy. That is an exact statement of fact according to my opinion at that time, and up until the other day when it ceased being a government.

Senator Ferguson. And that kind of a government, a military government, is much harder to negotiate with along diplomatic lines than a civilian political government, isn't it?

Admiral Leahy. I should think so, unless you have something with which to negotiate.

Senator Ferguson. You mean by that that unless you have [916] a military force that you can really use.


Senator Ferguson. That is exactly what you mean. Now, quoting Admiral Richardson further from the record, page 683, he further stated:

I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the Fleet returned to the Pacific Coast, the complements filled, the ships docked and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel and then stripped for war operations.

Now, are you prepared to say that that didn't take place at the meeting?

Admiral Leahy. I am not prepared to say that it did not. I doubt very much if it went that far into detail without its impressing itself
on my memory to some extent, but I should like to say that I am in complete agreement with the statement.

Senator Ferguson. Now, quoting further Admiral Richardson, and I have very little more:

The President said, in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area has had and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan."

Do you recall that, or are you prepared to say that that did not take place?

Admiral Leahy. I am not prepared to say that it did not take place, and I do not recall that statement. I would not be surprised to learn that it was made, because there was a general impression in this country that the presence of ships in Honolulu was exercising a restraining influence on the Japanese.

Senator Ferguson. But from a military viewpoint you differed with that opinion, knowing, after, at least, after Admiral Richardson, that it was not prepared?

Admiral Leahy. I would not say that I was in disagreement with that line, Senator. I would be in disagreement with the effectiveness of it, but I would not say it did not exercise a restraining influence. As a matter of fact, I am inclined to think it did. But it would have a much more effective restraining influence if it had been prepared for war.

Senator Ferguson. Then, Admiral, do I understand that you would have anticipated that, if war was coming, that they might attack the fleet in the harbor at Pearl Harbor if war was coming?

Admiral Leahy. I would have been afraid of that, Senator, because it was possible—it was a difficult operation for the Japanese, but it was a possible one, and I would have been afraid of it, and as a matter of fact, I was always fearful that such a thing might happen to us, and many other officers were as well.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you knew the conditions at Pearl Harbor, the size of Pearl Harbor, and, as the admiral said this morning, the necessity of docking the ships in pairs, and that that did create a hazard as far as the fleet was concerned?

Admiral Leahy. I was thoroughly familiar with the situation in Pearl Harbor. I have been there in the fleet myself and I know exactly what it looks like and how easy it is to hit from the air.

Senator Ferguson. Now, quoting again from page 683, Admiral Richardson:

I said, "Mr. President, I still do not believe it and I know that our Fleet is disadvantageously disposed for preparing for our initiating war operations."

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place?

Admiral Leahy. I am quite prepared to say that I remember that Admiral Richardson told the President that Honolulu was not a suitable place to prepare the fleet for war service, which is approximately the same.

Senator Ferguson. Approximately this statement.

Admiral Leahy. I am only speaking from memory of 3 years ago.

Senator Ferguson. I understand. That is why I am giving the correct quotes of the admiral.
On page 683, again reading:

The President then said, "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast, we are not stepping backwards."

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at that meeting? Admiral Leahy. I am not prepared to say that it did not take place, but I do not remember it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember any conversation about stepping backward or taking the fleet out of the Hawaiian area would be a step backwards?

Admiral Leahy. I have—

Senator Ferguson. Or a surrender of something?

Admiral Leahy. I have some kind of recollection, which I cannot locate at that luncheon, that there was a fear expressed that moving our ships away from the Hawaiian Islands might be interpreted by Japan as a withdrawal from our advance into the Pacific, but I do not remember where that was, it might have been in the Navy Department. I do not know whether it was at the talk with the President.

Senator Ferguson. But it could have been at the President's luncheon?

Admiral Leahy. It could have been.

Senator Ferguson. Because that was a fact as far as you know; that is, someone had related it, or stood for that proposition?

Admiral Leahy. There were people in America who had that attitude at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Reading again from page 683:

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.

The sentence before that is:

"This is embarrassing." I didn't quite see how that was in there.

The Chairman. Admiral Richardson made the statement.

Mr. Murphy. That is what the admiral said. I heard him.

Senator Ferguson. It is part of his answer then.

This is embarrassing.

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place, those two sentences, Admiral?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The gentleman has asked the witness about the two sentences. Certainly you are not asking about "This is embarrassing."

Senator Ferguson. No; but I had to read that because it is in the record. This is the sentence I wanted an answer on:

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at the luncheon?

Admiral Leahy. Well, I am inclined to think that that question was asked but whether it was made in those words or not, I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. That is the substance of what was said?

Admiral Leahy. I am inclined to think that was made by Admiral Richardson.
Senator Ferguson. What did the President reply?
Admiral Leahy. I do not remember.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will give you the answer Admiral Richardson gave, quoting from page 683:

He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at the meeting?
Admiral Leahy. I am very much surprised to hear that the President made a statement that he would or would not enter the war under any conditions, because, of course, I talked the war situation over with the President many times and at length during the time I was Chief of Operations, and the President never indicated to me that he could declare war. That would be a function of other branches of the Government. He might have said that he would recommend that we go to war. I am surprised also to hear Richardson's recollection that the President said he would not go to war if they, if the Japanese, invaded the Philippines.

From my knowledge of the President and my relations with him in the matter of war for the preceding years I feel quite sure that if the Japanese had invaded the Philippines, which was then under our Government, the President would have recommended a declaration of war.

[923] Senator Ferguson. In other words, you had conversations with the President that brings you now to this answer that if the Japs had invaded the Philippines he would have recommended to Congress that we go to war?
Admiral Leahy. That is my thought from a very intimate knowledge of what the President was thinking about and doing.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Leahy. I cannot believe that he would not have recommended war if the Japanese had invaded our territory.

Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt for a minute?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. I think the witness misunderstood the quotation. Admiral Richardson said the President said we will not go to war over the Kra Peninsula or Thailand. I think the Admiral here today understood you to say "he" would not go to war.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will read it again.

Admiral Leahy. That is quite all right, then. I have no disagreement. He meant the United States.

Mr. Murphy. So there is no mistake, Mr. Chairman, would it be permissible to have the stenographer read back the exact words of the Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. Does General Mitchell think that I said "he"?

Mr. Mitchell. No. I say the Admiral here misunderstood.

Admiral Leahy. I misunderstood. I thought you said "he", the President.

Senator Ferguson. No. I will read the language again.

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East
Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded, sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.

Now, do you understand the quotation?
Admiral Leahy. I understand it now.

Senator Ferguson. Are you prepared to say that that did not take place?

Admiral Leahy. I cannot say that it did not take place or that it did. I think it is not in discord with the President's ideas, as I understood them, at that time.

Senator Ferguson. That would be in accord with what the President had been thinking as far as he had expressed himself on other occasions to you, at least?

Admiral Leahy. It would not have been in disaccord, Senator. I should think it would have been in accord with his thoughts.

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The Chairman. Well, let the Chair go down the line first.

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Admiral Leahy, in view of the cross-examination of Senator Brewster, I think it is perhaps proper to place in the record at this time specific facts with respect to the budget estimates for appropriations, the amounts requested by the Navy Department and the appropriations actually made by the Congress.

Now, I have before me, secured as a result of my request of the Navy Department, a statement prepared by the Navy Department, signed by E. G. Allen, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Director of Budget and Reports, which is dated November 14, 1945. It appears that these reports cover the period covering the fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive.

The annual appropriation act of the fiscal year 1932, Admiral, shows that appropriations were requested by the Navy Department in the sum of $354,809,746.

That request was submitted to the Congress by the President in his annual budget in the sum of $347,794,248.

The Congress appropriated in that year $358,262,123, plus contract authority of $7,700,000.

Now, Admiral, do you understand that contract authority is a vehicle adopted by the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House which authorizes the Department to which contract authority is granted the authority to go ahead and carry out plans requested even though the money is not then made immediately available; do you so understand that?

Admiral Leahy. That is my understanding of it, Mr. Keefe. Of course, that was a matter for legislative, legal decision, but that is my understanding.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I think, if I may state, as a member of the Appropriations Committee of the House, that that has been my understanding of it, while the money itself is not made immediately available contract authority is granted to the agency so that expenditures may,
or contracts for expenditures may, be incurred and the appropriation subsequently made to cover it.

Admiral Leahy. It is practically a promise for a future appropriation to cover that authority.

Mr. Keefe. That is right, generally speaking. I understood Admiral Richardson to say that, in the preparation of the Navy budgets, they always anticipated that there would be some cuts by the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, perhaps. Did you so understand that when you were in charge?

[927] Admiral Leahy. I have often heard that statement made, Mr. Keefe. When I was charged with supervision of the budget preparations I endeavored to cut our requests for money to the lowest point that was consistent with the preparations of the Navy.

Mr. Keefe. Now, for the fiscal year 1933, the annual appropriation act, the Navy Department requested of the Bureau of the Budget $399,139,886.

In that same year they had supplemental and deficiency appropriation requests amounting to $10,000,000; or a total in the fiscal year 1933 of $409,139,886.

For similar items for the regular annual appropriation plus the supplemental, the budget submitted to the Congress by the President called for an appropriation in the fiscal year 1933 of $351,677,450.

The Congress actually appropriated for that fiscal year $327,583,591, plus $5,715,000 contract authority.

In the annual appropriation for the fiscal year 1934 you requested—rather, the Navy Department requested $352,717,786.

The President’s budget submitted to the Congress requested $308,669,562.

Congress gave to the Navy in response to the President’s budgetary request $308,669,562, plus $8,100,000 of contract authority.

[928] In the annual appropriation act of 1935 the Navy requested during the fiscal year 1945, $335,410,918.

The President’s Budget cut that amount to $303,407,649.

The Congress gave in response to the President’s Budget estimate $301,734,056, plus $2,800,000 of contract authority.

In 1936 the Navy requested in its annual appropriation act and in supplemental and deficiency acts during the fiscal year 1936 a total of $526,787,542.

The President’s Budget submitted to the Congress was $509,375,572.

The Congress appropriated $482,600,230, plus $6,590,000 of contract authority.

In 1937 the annual appropriation requested plus supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts for that fiscal year, was $586,932,284.

The President’s Budget cut that amount to $551,125,599.

The Congress appropriated $528,467,832, plus $13,000,000 of contract authority.

In 1938 the annual appropriation act, plus the supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts, for the fiscal year 1938, amounted to $599,635,223.

The President’s Budget reduced that amount to $567,191,709.

Congress appropriated $519,139,808, plus $15,000,000 of contract authority.
In the fiscal year 1939 the annual appropriation requested by the Navy plus the supplemental and deficiency request amounted to $719,380,009.

The President's Budget cut that request to $620,246,411.

The Congress appropriated $629,895,194, plus $15,000,000 of contract authority.

In 1940 the annual appropriation and supplemental and deficiency appropriations requested by the Navy amounted to $1,077,377,889.

The President's Budget cut that budget request of the Navy to $976,430,769.

Congress appropriated $943,375,249, plus $22,450,000 contract authority.

In 1941, the fiscal year 1941, the requests of the Navy, annual appropriation and supplemental and deficiency appropriation requests amounted to $5,236,629,902. The President's Budget cut those requests as submitted to the Congress to $3,561,405,919. The Congress appropriated for the fiscal year 1941 $3,549,383,345, plus $846,098,112 of contract authority.

Now I have totaled, Admiral, the figures beginning with the fiscal year 1934 from this statement prepared by the Navy Department and the total asked by the Navy Department for the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, amounts to $9,434,271,533. The amounts submitted to the Congress in response to those requests by the President in his annual Budget and supplemental Budget estimates was $7,428,240,190.

The Congress appropriated in the same period $7,256,896,276 plus $1,029,035,112, or a total of $8,285,934,388.

The estimates indicate that in the period from the fiscal year 1934 to 1941 inclusive, the Budget cut the Navy's requests for appropriations $2,006,031,343 and the Congress exceeded the Budget estimates in making appropriations and contract authorizations in the same period $857,694,198.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Keeffe. I yield.

Mr. Murphy. I am just wondering if the gentleman is going to have the witness swear to the testimony. It seems to me if it is relevant, and I believe it is, that there ought to be some way to bring it out so that it might be thoroughly examined. Certainly, we do not want to examine the gentleman from Wisconsin. If it is relevant and important I am wondering if this is the way to approach it.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, I have the figures right here and they have been submitted to counsel also, may I say, and I think counsel has the figures and the figures which I am quoting are accurately those which have been submitted by the Navy Department. Is that not true?

Mr. Mitchell. I assume you have got a document directed from the Navy as to the Navy budget.

Mr. Keeffe. I have no objection to submitting the letter from the Navy Department and other figures which I have before me.

The Chairman. The Chair does not raise any question as to the accuracy of the figures. The regular way in which it should be presented, however, would be to present an official copy of the naval budget and the President's budget and the appropriation acts of Congress for these various years, which would be official documents.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I say that that can be done. That would require a tremendous amount of work because of the tremendous number of supplemental estimates that were submitted during many of these years. I have before me not only the estimates submitted by the Navy Department but I also have those from the Bureau of the Budget itself.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask the Congressman this question: In your total tabulation of the amount asked by the Navy for the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, that includes only appropriations. Does that include any authority or any contract authority, or is that the dollars-and-cents figure?

Mr. Keefe. That includes the actual money appropriations, plus contract authority, and I so designated it.

The Chairman. I don't think the Congressman understood my question. In the Budget estimate requests of the Navy, do they request an appropriation in money or do they add to that, from your tabulation also the amount they wish in contract authority?

Mr. Keefe. If I understand you correctly——

The Chairman. In other words, does the recommendation of the Navy include only appropriations asked for in money, or does it include also contract authority?

Mr. Keefe. The figures which have been submitted to me by the Navy Department do not include any submission of contract authority or any requests for contract authority.

The Chairman. So that the contract authority, then, is a figure that was put into the appropriation bills by the Congress itself?

Mr. Keefe. That is right.

The Chairman. And is not included in the Navy estimate, and not included in the President's Budget; is that true?

Mr. Keefe. That is true.

The Chairman. So that your last figure there which shows that the Congress for the total period exceeded the requests of the Budget by some $800,000,000 includes contract authorizations put in the bill by Congress, which in your last year were more than a billion dollars; is that correct?

Mr. Keefe. No; that is not true. The contract authorizations in the last year, in the fiscal year 1941, was 797 million in round figures.

The Chairman. What would be the total amount of comparative appropriations for those years——

Mr. Keefe. I gave those figures.

The Chairman (continuing). If you eliminated the contract authority which increased in 1941 and 1940 as the situation developed?

Mr. Keefe. Well, the situation is perfectly clear. Mr. Chairman, and you are as familiar with that situation as I am and I am quite well aware of the fact, as a member of the Appropriations Committee of the House, that very frequently any department such as the Navy or the Army may ask for a direct appropriation of money and the House or the Senate, as the case may be, might take the position, "You cannot spend that money in this fiscal year as money. We will give you so much money, but we will give you authority to go ahead and carry on your program and buy the material or the ships or whatever you want and we will appropriate the money for you when you need it;" and that is the vehicle that has been adopted by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. When they give contract
authority it is as good as an appropriation because it is an authority to the agency to whom it is extending the power to go ahead and expend the money.

The Chairman. The Chair is making no question about that policy but the point that the Chair wanted to clarify was that the excess to which you referred is made up in part of contract authority as well as appropriations.

Mr. Keefe. There isn't any question about that at all. The actual appropriations of money that were made during that period by the Congress were $7,256,896,276 and the contract authority extended to them in that same period was $1,029,000,000.

The Chairman. And that contract authority, if carried out to the full, would be included in a subsequent year's appropriation, in a subsequent fiscal year's appropriation?

Mr. Keefe. It might be.

The Chairman. In other words, if contracts were entered into according to the authority given, naturally the cost of those contracts would be presented and paid for in the subsequent fiscal year's appropriations.

Mr. Keefe. May I say this, Mr. Chairman. The question is the Navy comes in and says, "We want so many ships, we want so many airplanes, we want so much ammunition, we want so many guns," and so on and so forth, "and we have requested an appropriation for that amount."

Now, when they come before the House or Senate committees that committee may find that it is all right for them to have the ships that they asked for or the guns or what not, or the ammunition, but they won't be able to spend the money in that fiscal year, so they give them contract authority to go ahead, which is just as good as money, with the assurances that it will be provided. That is the fact of the matter.

The Chairman. The Chair is sure that all members of the committee are familiar with the practice and there is nothing in it that is subject to criticism. It is a practice that Congress indulges in by giving authority to the Navy and the Army and other departments, if they see fit, to make contracts for things to be supplied in the future.

Mr. Keefe. Yes; that is right.

The Chairman. But the actual payment for those things comes in a later period.

Mr. Keefe. That is right, but the Congress has committed itself, Mr. Chairman. When it gives contract authority it has committed itself to so much money toward that.

The Chairman. There is no question about that.

Mr. Keefe. Then I am rather surprised the Chairman would raise that question.

The Chairman. The Chair was trying to differentiate between the net amount of appropriations and the amount of contract authority, that is all the Chair was seeking to do.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether the gentleman has finished.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, if the committee has finished with the Admiral I would like to have him excused. I have kept him here on a false alarm twice and he is a busy man.
The Chairman. Are there any more questions?

[937] Mr. Keefe. I would like to ask in view of this colloquy that has taken place, Admiral Leahy, you have heard the statement that I have made with respect to the manner in which these appropriations have been made in the past at the request of the Navy and these contract authorizations. You have heard my statement, have you not?

Admiral Leahy. I have heard it, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you consider that it is substantially correct?

Admiral Leahy. Of course, with regard to the figures I have no knowledge. In regard to the procedure, it is quite correct. When I was in charge of the business of getting money for the Navy we found it impracticable to spend in a fiscal year all of the money that was asked for and the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee would give contract authorization for so much of the business as they felt should not be financed within that fiscal year.

Mr. Keefe. Well, that contract authority would permit you to let the contract—

Admiral Leahy. That is quite correct.

Mr. Keefe (continuing). For the construction of the ships and what not and go on with your program, as it were?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. The program that you asked for, isn't that true? [938]

Admiral Leahy. That is true.

Mr. Keefe. Although the actual money that you asked to pay for that work might not be needed until the next fiscal year?

Admiral Leahy. It could not be obtained until the next fiscal year except by deficiency appropriation.

Mr. Keefe. So that when the authority was given you to enter into these contracts you were in effect assured that you could go ahead with your program to that extent?

Admiral Leahy. That is correct, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me in order that there not be any question, that I would like to ask if the counsel, or I will offer in evidence this document, if there is any question about it, the report from the Navy at this point as to these appropriations, so that it may appear in the record. I have read it in the record, if there is any question about it.

The Chairman. The Chair understood counsel had some document, too, on that subject. If you are mistaken about it he can clarify it.

Mr. Mitchell. This comparison between department requests, budget allowances and appropriations was requested from the War and Navy Departments at the suggestion of Mr. [939] Keefe and I assume it is in just the form he wanted it and the document itself is undoubtedly sufficiently authenticated to be offered here as an exhibit.

The only question I have about the figures— I don't suppose it is any of my business—is whether or not there may not be a duplication, because where there is a contract authority and in the very next year the appropriation, the same figures to pay the bills come in and if you use the authority in one year and the appropriation in another you might have a duplication.

Now, suppose we check it and you can offer the exhibit that way and we will find out whether you need any more figures.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I haven't any objection to doing that. I personally understand what you are talking about, but as to the comparison between what the Navy asks and what the budget gives and what the Congress gives, that is carried forward year from year, year after year.

Mr. Mitchell. You have the document. I will offer it as Exhibit 12, as a report from the Navy. Have you the Army figures, too?

Mr. Keefe. Well, I have those, too. Those little notes on the bottom of the page are my notes.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Just a moment. If the counsel have the same document or similar documents from the War Department it might be well to put them in together.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I have it.

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know that I have it for the Army.

The Chairman. Well, if there is any occasion to check it and see whether there is any duplication, it can be done and the figures corrected later.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I find that the Army and Navy have not yet sent us a copy of these documents. This is dated November 14th and I have not received it, but let us offer it and we can check it later.

Mr. Keefe. Well, here is the one from the War Department right here. You can see there is the letter and here is the enclosure, except that penciled memoranda of mine on there, Mr. Mitchell. I did not know you were going to offer these. I thought you would offer yours.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, we haven't any.

Mr. Keefe. But you may have my copy. Let me have my letters back. Do you want those? Those are simply the letters of transmittal.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that they go in with the exhibit.

Mr. Keefe. Yes; you can put the letters of transmittal right in with them.

[941] The Chairman. Minus the personal notations.

Mr. Mitchell. In pencil.

The Chairman. In pencil, all right.

Mr. Mitchell. We will offer in evidence as Exhibit 12 the letters from the Navy Department to Congressman Keefe dated November 14, 1945, together with the enclosure which is a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941, inclusive, and a similar letter from the War Department to Mr. Keefe dated November 7, 1945, and an enclosure detailing the appropriations for the War Department Military Establishments for the fiscal years 1932 through 1941, inclusive.

Mr. Keefe. Except the penciled memoranda at the bottom.

Mr. Mitchell. It is understood that the penciled notations on these exhibits are not offered.

The Chairman. All right. Are they marked as Exhibit No. 12?

Mr. Mitchell. 12.

The Chairman. Both as Exhibit 12?

Mr. Mitchell. It is one exhibit.

The Chairman. That goes into the record.
Mr. Keefe. Do I understand that the figures which are on the exhibit which has been offered will be copied in the record?

[942] The Chairman. That is my understanding.

Mr. Keefe. Do we so understand it?

The Chairman. It will be printed as a part of the hearing at this point.

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. The reporter will put the schedules right in his daily transcript, if you like.

The Chairman. Yes. All right.

(The documents referred to, without Mr. Keefe's penciled notation, were marked "Exhibit No. 12" and follow herewith.)

Address Reply to Executive Office of the Secretary

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 14 November 1945.

And Refer to EXO S: OBR/G-Tn

Hon. Frank B. Keefe,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. KEFFE: I am enclosing a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941 inclusive to be substituted for the one enclosed with the Secretary of the Navy's letter sent you on yesterday.

This revised statement was prepared after collaboration between this office and the Bureau of the Budget in studying [943] the records of the years in question, and the figures appearing thereon will agree with those furnished you by the Bureau of the Budget. While the records concerning the regular Naval Appropriation Bills for each year were complete, information concerning deficiency and supplemental estimates requested by the Navy Department was lacking in many cases and required extended search through the files for the years in question.

Sincerely yours,

E. G. Allen,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Budget and Reports.

(Enclosure.)

[944] Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Appropriations requested by the Navy Department</th>
<th>Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress</th>
<th>Amounts made available by the Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>Contract authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>$354,809,746</td>
<td>$358,262,123</td>
<td>$7,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>$354,809,746</td>
<td>$347,794,248</td>
<td>$358,262,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>354,809,746</td>
<td>347,794,248</td>
<td>358,262,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>$399,139,886</td>
<td>$341,677,450</td>
<td>$317,583,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>$399,139,886</td>
<td>$341,677,450</td>
<td>$317,583,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>409,139,886</td>
<td>351,677,450</td>
<td>327,583,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>$352,717,786</td>
<td>$308,669,562</td>
<td>$308,669,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>$352,717,786</td>
<td>$308,669,562</td>
<td>$308,669,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>352,717,786</td>
<td>308,669,562</td>
<td>308,669,562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Appropriations requested by the Navy Department</th>
<th>Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress</th>
<th>Amounts made available by the Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>$318,324,414</td>
<td>$326,332,392</td>
<td>$284,658,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17,086,504</td>
<td>17,075,257</td>
<td>17,075,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>335,410,918</td>
<td>303,407,649</td>
<td>301,734,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1936

| Annual appropriation act | 502,855,817 | 455,443,847 | 458,684,379 | 0 |
| Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts | 23,931,725 | 23,931,725 | 23,915,851 | 0 |
| Total | 526,787,542 | 509,375,572 | 482,600,230 | 6,590,000 |

1937

| Annual appropriation act | 585,010,984 | 549,591,299 | 526,546,532 | 0 |
| Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts | 1,921,300 | 1,921,300 | 1,921,300 | 0 |
| Total | 586,932,284 | 551,512,599 | 528,467,832 | 13,000,000 |

1938

| Annual appropriation act | 594,260,223 | 562,425,709 | 516,258,808 | 15,000,000 |
| Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts | 4,766,000 | 4,766,000 | 2,881,000 | 0 |
| Total | 599,026,223 | 567,191,709 | 519,139,808 | 15,000,000 |

1939

| Annual appropriation act | 629,665,104 | 564,406,461 | 546,866,494 | 15,000,000 |
| Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts | 89,714,905 | 85,839,950 | 76,659,700 | 0 |
| Total | 719,380,009 | 650,246,411 | 623,526,194 | 15,000,000 |

1940

| Annual appropriation act | 788,775,549 | 790,342,453 | 773,049,151 | 20,000,000 |
| Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts | 283,602,340 | 186,088,316 | 170,326,098 | 2,450,000 |
| Total | 1,072,377,899 | 976,430,769 | 943,375,249 | 22,450,000 |

1941

| Annual appropriation act | 1,384,442,202 | 1,337,311,577 | 1,274,171,138 | 148,741,612 |
| Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts | 3,852,187,700 | 2,224,094,342 | 2,275,212,207 | 797,356,500 |
| Total | 5,236,629,902 | 3,561,405,919 | 3,549,383,345 | 946,098,112 |

[946]


HONORABLE FRANK B. KEEFE,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. KEEFE: Attached is a statement which contains for the War Department Military Establishment, data on amounts requested of the Bureau of the Budget, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and funds and contract authorizations made available to the War Department for the fiscal years 1932 through 1941. These data were requested by you on October 10th for use as a member of the Pearl Harbor investigating committee.

Insofar as can be determined, there is no copy in the files of the War Department, of a speech delivered by the President of the Philippine Islands, Mr. Quezon, in Manila some time in November 1941.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Secretary of War.

Incl. Stmt.
79716—46—pt. 1—26
### Appropriations, War Department Military Establishment, fiscal years 1932 through 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Requested by War Department</th>
<th>Requested by the Bureau of the Budget</th>
<th>Appropriated by the Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>Contract authorizations</td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>$347,856,137</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
<td>$339,725,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.</td>
<td>3,448,157</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,444,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$351,304,294</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>$343,170,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>316,679,255</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>301,030,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>15,164,468</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,164,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$331,243,723</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$316,195,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>320,884,513</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>277,730,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$320,900,513</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$277,746,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>279,913,374</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250,624,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>25,357,947</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25,357,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$305,271,321</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$285,980,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>346,723,362</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>317,450,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>14,627,792</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14,340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$361,351,154</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$331,790,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>458,193,807</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>375,925,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>8,829,018</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,846,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$467,022,825</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$383,771,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Annual appropriation act</td>
<td>Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>456,608,221</td>
<td>1,896,830</td>
<td>468,204,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>416,486,461</td>
<td>9,546,875</td>
<td>426,033,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,462,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,462,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>415,263,154</td>
<td>2,721,875</td>
<td>417,985,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,887,394</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21,887,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>510,733,043</td>
<td>73,869,087</td>
<td>584,002,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46,801,000</td>
<td>1,896,830</td>
<td>532,088,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>459,088,835</td>
<td>72,399,287</td>
<td>532,088,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,126,894</td>
<td>48,801,000</td>
<td>19,126,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>459,401,254</td>
<td>71,660,743</td>
<td>459,401,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34,045,394</td>
<td>48,801,000</td>
<td>34,045,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>548,628,698</td>
<td>373,941,352</td>
<td>922,570,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,275,000</td>
<td>74,407,500</td>
<td>299,672,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>526,305,698</td>
<td>369,349,392</td>
<td>526,305,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,700,000</td>
<td>78,997,500</td>
<td>20,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>508,092,894</td>
<td>342,828,786</td>
<td>508,092,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40,205,988</td>
<td>78,997,500</td>
<td>40,205,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,454,435,482</td>
<td>7,211,422,529</td>
<td>8,685,918,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59,100,000</td>
<td>4,857,959,752</td>
<td>8,685,918,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,412,107,511</td>
<td>6,626,443,207</td>
<td>1,412,107,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>279,010,136</td>
<td>4,749,992,958</td>
<td>279,010,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,433,308,655</td>
<td>7,047,390,692</td>
<td>1,433,308,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>322,229,636</td>
<td>4,683,398,812</td>
<td>322,229,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942-41</td>
<td>8,038,550,718</td>
<td>8,038,550,718</td>
<td>8,038,550,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,029,003,694</td>
<td>8,480,594,407</td>
<td>5,029,003,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,066,589,651</td>
<td>8,480,594,407</td>
<td>5,066,589,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,807,789,142</td>
<td>12,807,789,142</td>
<td>12,807,789,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,063,033,252</td>
<td>12,227,640,717</td>
<td>5,222,090,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,830,355,139</td>
<td>12,227,640,717</td>
<td>12,227,640,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,222,090,488</td>
<td>5,258,883,466</td>
<td>5,258,883,466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Office of the Budget Officer for the War Department, 1 Nov. 1945.
The Chairman. Any further questions of Admiral Leahy?

Admiral, the Chairman would like to ask you just one question. When you were testifying about the agreement between the Vichy French Government and the Japanese Government, with respect to certain troops going into Indochina, did I understand you to say that that was done under pressure of the Government against the Vichy French Government?

Admiral Leahy. At the time that was brought up to the French Government Marshal Petain sent for me and told me about it and told me that the pressure from the German invaders of France in behalf of the Japanese was so heavy that he could not refuse to allow the Japanese into Indochina in the small number that they asked for and under an agreement that they would withdraw when they had accomplished their purpose.

The Chairman. Do you know whether under the same pressure later they were unable to prevent other numbers from going in in violation of the agreement?

Admiral Leahy. I do not see how they could have prevented other numbers going in, Senator, because they had very few troops in Indochina and they were outnumbered by the Japanese.

The Chairman. At that time, the Vichy Government was pretty generally understood to be under pressure constantly from the German Government?

Admiral Leahy. I am sure it was constantly under pressure for whatever the Germans thought they needed to help them with the war.

The Chairman. Any further questions, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. Mitchell. None.

The Chairman. Well, the committee thanks you, Admiral, for your testimony and for your cooperation, and regrets that you were held so long before you could go on the stand.

Admiral Leahy. Thank you very much, Senator. I am very pleased indeed to contribute any little thing I had to this very difficult investigation you have, and my short detention here was no trouble whatever, sir.

The Chairman. Anything further now, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. Mitchell. I have some documents that ought to go into the record at this point.

The Chairman. All right, we will receive them.

Mr. Mitchell. First, I would like to read into the record extracts from a letter dated January 25, 1941, dated at Pearl Harbor, from the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet—that was Admiral Richardson—to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. It follows along this investigation about the air conditions—the air defense con- [950] ditions at Pearl Harbor (reading:)

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander in Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefore should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.
3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander in Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline, as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.
(b) War with Japan is imminent.
(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.
(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.
(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.
(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.
(g) Local sabotage is possible.

5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

**WAITING ATTITUDE**

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment, both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.
(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.
(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes, supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.
(d) Augment Army A.A. defenses with A.A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.

(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant.

(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) I will omit. They relate to operations away from Pearl Harbor.

6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the Lexington class should be selected, due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defense of Oahu and in the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as an opportunity for maintenance and
upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the
wear and tear on both men and material cannot but result in impaired readiness
for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this
readiness of the Fleet are:
(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl
Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port.
(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, neces-
sitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet
planes for local patrols.
(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District,
necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this
duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels,
but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable char-
acteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is par-
icularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore
necessitating patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by
submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.
(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.
8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to
correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that
these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the
training program, and material aid to Great Britain.
9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements re-
ferred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W. P. L. 44 (advance copy) be dispatched
as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass
the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.
10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It
represents his, as well as my own, views.

Copy to: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

J. O. Richardson.

[956] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, do I understand
that is a letter from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations here in Washington?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, dated January 25, 1941. It is al-
ready in the volume that the committee has. We are occasionally
pulling out the documents and putting them in the record, so it con-
nects up the story.
Mr. Chairman, I have next, if you want to sit and listen to it tonight,
the defense plans having to do with Pearl Harbor. They cover a
wide field beyond that, and we had prepared extracts from that vol-
ume which has reference particularly to the air defense. It is true,
as one of the members said the other day, this book of extracts of de-
defense plans does not cover a great many operations that go far afield
from Pearl Harbor. We think it ought to be brought into the record
at this point, and I will preface that statement by calling the atten-
tion of the committee to the fact that, as the result of Admiral Stark's
letter of November 22, to Richardson asking him to look into the air
defense system, Richardson went back to Honolulu and did that work
in December.
It resulted in the report which has been read in already. That
inspired the letter from Secretary Knox to Stimson which started in
motion the set of revisions of plans, field [957] orders, and so
forth, that dealt with air defense at Pearl Harbor.
We have two purposes in bringing that in:
One is to show the extent to which the possibility of an attack at
Pearl Harbor was in the year 1941, in the minds of people here in
Washington, and people at Honolulu, and the other purpose is to show, in as brief form as we can, the respective functions that have been assigned to the Army and Navy forces in Pearl Harbor in connection with air attack.

The Chairman. This document you have here in your hand, the document you have referred to, is the one which you want to place in the record?

Mr. Mitchell. I do not want to place it all in. The committee has it, but there are certain paragraphs of it that I would like to read into the record.

I would say the original plans are here that cover everything. General Gerow was War Plans Officer of the General Staff at that time, and I found out he is the most appropriate witness to explain the plans to the committee as you may require. With the understanding he will be here shortly to authenticate these plans and explain them further, and on the assumption he is going to do so, I propose next to place in the record at this stage certain extracts that I think bring out the air-defense plans there as they were [958] worked out locally and in Washington.

The Chairman. If it is agreeable to the committee, we might hear that now.

Mr. Mitchell. It will take you more than 10 minutes, I am sorry to say.

The Chairman. We might sit a little longer than that.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I think it might be very well to have the extract of which he speaks, but I think, also, there should be available, as exhibits, the complete plans. While the extracts that he presents to the committee relate to the defense of Pearl Harbor, the functions of the Navy went very much afield. I think for an accurate appraisal of the relative responsibilities of the Navy and Army, it may be very relevant to know what the Navy was supposed to do in the event of a war, which might have a very definite bearing on the appraisal of the whole situation.

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, here is the original material from which these extracts were obtained. Now, would you like to have these duplicated in the same way, or do you just want to examine them?

Senator Brewster. Are those the only copies which you have?

Mr. Mitchell. They have not been asked to reproduce [959] them. It might be possible we could get one or two other copies.

Senator Brewster. I think one copy is all that is necessary as an exhibit in the case.

Mr. Mitchell. I have them here for that purpose, and I was planning to have General Gerow offer them generally and tell you what they are. We have not gone to the trouble and expense of copying this mass of stuff.

Senator Brewster. Will you find out if they will allow us to keep it?

Mr. Mitchell. I am keeping it now so you will have access to it, if you want to borrow it. I planned, as I say, to have the general authenticate them.

The Chairman. Let us go ahead with the reading of these extracts.

Mr. Mitchell. I will do the best I can.

The Chairman. Would it be feasible, gentlemen, to have these extracts printed in the record without reading them?
Mr. Mitchell. I do not see why not. If the committee does not want to hear me read them, I will hand these to the reporter, and ask him to transcribe into the daily transcript the sections I have marked in pencil, that have particular relation to our air defenses.

The CHAIRMAN. Each member of the committee has the document itself?

Mr. Mitchell. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Each member of the committee has the transcript daily.

If it is agreeable to the committee to have these extracts printed in the daily transcript of the record, it would be available to us tomorrow, as well as the documents from which the extracts were taken.

Mr. Mitchell. I am glad to be relieved.

Senator Lucas. That will give the committee an opportunity to study these over tomorrow, if they desire, and if they want to explore further any extract that you have here, it may go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, that will be done.

(The extracts referred to follow:)

[961] EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE (1938)

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans—ORANGE, All Navy Plans—ORANGE, all Joint Plans—ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

This plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicated, but in general it may be assumed that:

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.

2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.

3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

2. COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE.

b. HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier.

(1) Boundaries.

The HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

(3) Missions.

(a) Joint Mission.

To hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(b) Mission for the Army.

To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

(c) Mission for the Navy.

To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Armed forces.
HOLD OAHU AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE AND CONTROL AND PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Joint Decisions:

a. Boundaries: The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu.

b. Category of Defense: Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."

c. Army Task: To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

d. Navy Task: To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

f. Joint Plant to be Prepared: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

---

EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW NO. 5

The Pacific Area

33. Army Tasks.

[964] d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

35. Navy Tasks.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Category D

e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 b.

36A. Hawaiian Coastal frontier.

a. Boundaries.
The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned Naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.
30. HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

Extent.

a. OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.


c. Missions.

(1) Joint—Hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval base and control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(2) Army—Hold OAHU against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

[966] (3) Navy.—Patrol the Coastal Zone: control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

EXTRACTS FROM HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECT, REVISION 1040

BRIEF ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. a. Missions.

(1) Joint Mission: To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(2) Mission for the Army: To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the naval forces.

(3) Mission for the Navy: To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces (Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange).

b. Category of Coastal Frontier Defense: Category "D" defense, prescribed by the War Department for this department, assumes the possibility, but not the probability, of a major attack. Defense measures specified envision the employment of seacoast, air, and antiaircraft elements, and the use of a general reserve (Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935)

4. d. Forms of hostile attacks: The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department Assignment of Category [967] "D" to this Department.

(1) Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

(a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.

(a) Sabotage.

(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.

(d) Air raids, carrier based.

(e) Surface ship raids.

(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.

5. a. Basis for Planning.

(1) Missions and Conditions.

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:

The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par. 1 b). The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange (see par. 1 a).

(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

(2) That the most probable form of attack is [968] a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

1 Approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 August 1941.
b. Conclusion.

To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined to the next paragraph.

c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major echelons upon initial deployment:

(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacoast and beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simultaneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as follows:

(a) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division:

The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6.)

The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and assures flexibility to meet external and internal attacks.

[669] (b) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade:

The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces. (See paragraph 6.)

(c) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:

In carrying out the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.

---

[970] HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN—HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Section 1.—Directives

1. Responsibility.—This joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. Basis.—This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, pages 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. Method of Coordination.—The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this [971] method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b.

4. Planning Representatives.—The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40 a, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

5. Joint Planning Committee.—A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI,
13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.

14. TASKS.

a. Joint Task.—To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. Army Task.—To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. Navy Task.—To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

15. FORCES.

a. Army Forces.—The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

b. Naval Forces.—Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

c. Overseas Reinforcements.

16. Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

17. ARMY.—The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Proctection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval [97] Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. e.

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmitted and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."

j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
18. NAVY.—The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain [976] effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch, Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.


[977] HEADQUARTERS
14th NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
1939 28 March 1941.

ANNEX NO. VII
JOINT AGREEMENTS
SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

JOINT SECURITY, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE.

I. GENERAL.

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39 (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their
renunciation in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

[378] II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be [379] the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate the Aircraft Warning Center. This will be a part of the Army Air Corps and will be under the control of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. It will be staffed by Army and Navy personnel.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of the Army Air Corps and Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed [387] equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.
IV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES.

S. Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.—During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereof will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

11. Aircraft Warning Service.—The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding,
Hawaiian Department.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. Bloch,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.

[983]

MARCH 31, 1941.

Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO,
Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. Commanding General
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. Summary of the Situation.

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armoured and armed with 10–8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament...
of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material [986] readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present plans are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, [987] can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible enemy action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

[988] (e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities [989] have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks would be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us.

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.
(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:
1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.
2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.
(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:
1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.
2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.
3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.
(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:
1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.
2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.
3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.
(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readi_ness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:
1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.
Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions.
1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.
2. Subsidiary decisions.—In order to be in all prepared to promptly execute the above decision:
   (a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:
1. Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).
The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:
   Patrol squadrons.
   Shore-based VO-VS units.
   Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
   Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
   Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
   Army bombardment squadrons.
   Army reconnaissance squadrons.
   Navy Utility Squadrons.
2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force).
The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:
   Army pursuit squadrons.
   Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
   Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
   One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft.)
(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

[994a] 1. Search and Attack Group.—Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. Air Combat Group.—Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.
(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

[994b] (d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

**MATERIAL READINESS**

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

[995] C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

**DEGREE OF READINESS**

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
2. All types—30 minutes.
3. All types—one hour.
4. All types—two hours.
5. All types—four hours.
The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

[996] (c) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

| (Signed) | F. L. Martin, |
|          | F. L. MARTIN, |
|          | Major General, U. S. Army. |
|          | Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. |

(Signed)  P. N. L. Bellinger,  
P. N. L. BELLINGER,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.  
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,  
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)
10. Antiaircraft Defense.—a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit.
   d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:
      (1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.
      (3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and matériel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

Section II—Alerts

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15f (8) below.

14. Alert No. 1.—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.
   b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.
   c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

15. Alert No. 2.—a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.
   b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.
   c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

   (1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.
   (2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

   f. THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE WILL:
      (1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.
      (2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
      (3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
      (4) Disperse bombers with crews.
      (5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:
   (a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of
       readiness "A." The bomber [1000] commander will report to the Com-
       mander of Patrol Wing TWO.
   (b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes
       in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor
       Command for operational control.

   (i) The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
       (1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service
           and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
   (2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for imme-
       diate employment.
   (j) The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:
       Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery
       (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning
       Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-
       aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:
       (1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
       (2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or
           HONOLULU HARBORS.

   [1001] 16. Alert No. 3-a. This alert requires the occupation of all field posi-
   tions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army
   installations on outlying islands.

   f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
       (1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
       (2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
       (3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
       (4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage,
           air and ground attacks.

   (8) Disperse bombers with crews.
   (9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

   f. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations
       of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine
       Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will
       provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military
       control to include:
       (1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
       (2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in
           PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.
       (3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

   [1003] Section III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

   17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of
       a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs a and b below. The letter in-
       dicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned
       task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed
       for that part.

   a. MATERIAL READINESS.
       A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
       B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a
          task.
       C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available
          and ready for a task.
       D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available
          and ready for a task.
       E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of
          this plan.

   b. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.
       All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of
       a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.
1. For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

2. All types: 30 minutes.

3. All types: One hour.

4. All types: Two hours.

5. All types: Four hours.

\[\text{Operations Orders—Hawaiian Department}\]

\[\text{Field Orders}\]

\[\text{No.— Ins—}\]

\[\text{Headquarters Hawaiian Department,}\]

\[\text{Fort Shafter, T. H.}\]

\[\text{(2) In the current unsettled international situation, it is assumed that it is possible that a declaration of war upon the United States may be preceded by a surprise raid or attack upon the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet by hostile aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with a view to the destruction or damaging of naval installations, ships, and facilities. Such a raid or attack may be accompanied by acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers.}\]

\[\text{b. The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District, while continuing normal training and operations, are taking certain security measures, which include:}\]

\[\text{(1) By the Pacific Fleet:}\]

\[\text{a. Daily air patrols of areas in which elements of the Pacific Fleet are operating.}\]

\[\text{b. The organization of a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to cooperate with Army and Navy aviation in the attack on hostile surface ships.}\]

\[\text{c. The organization of a destroyer attack unit [1006] to locate and destroy hostile submarines.}\]

\[\text{d. The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.}\]

\[\text{(2) By the Naval Base Defense Force (Fourteenth Naval District and attached units):}\]

\[\text{a. Establishment of an inshore patrol consisting of a destroyer patrol at the entrance to the Pearl Harbor channel, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and daily mine sweeping operations.}\]

\[\text{b. The organization of an air striking force consisting of Patrol Wing TWO, attached Fleet aircraft, and attached aircraft from the 18th Bombardment Wing to search for and attack hostile surface ships.}\]

\[\text{2. The Hawaiian Department, supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend OAHU from attacks by hostile aircraft and hostile naval vessels, will take precautionary measures to prevent acts of sabotage by hostile sympathizers, and will support naval forces conducting aerial attacks on hostile naval vessels.}\]

\[\text{c. The Hawaiian Air Force, in cooperation with fleet aircraft, will defend OAHU against attacks by aircraft, [1007] will attack hostile Naval vessels, and in furtherance thereof, will conduct operations as follows:}\]

\[\text{(1) Offensive Action.—Conduct air operations against hostile naval vessels. Bombardment and reconnaissance aircraft participating in joint air operations will be placed under the tactical control of the Navy.}\]

\[\text{(3) Reconnaissance.—Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat efficiency of the Air Force and to supplement, where practicable, that of naval air forces in securing information of hostile fleet movements.}\]

\[\text{(5) Conditions of Readiness.—Aircraft and crews thereof will be maintained in the condition of readiness directed by this headquarters.}\]

\[\text{(6) Hostile Air Attack.—Air operations directed above will be instituted without further orders from this headquarters by all aircraft maintained in condition of readiness therefor upon receipt of information of an air attack upon OAHU or an attack upon fleet units in Hawaiian waters. All other aircraft and crews thereof will be alerted and this headquarters advised of action taken.}\]
(2) Hostile surface ships and aircraft will not be taken under fire except under the following conditions:

(a) After hostile offensive action, such as the use of bombs, torpedoes, mines and other ammunition, has been observed.

(b) After receipt of a verified report of a hostile attack.

(c) Upon orders from this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHORT:

(S) Philip Hayes, Philip Hayes, Colonel, General Staff Corps, Chief of Staff.

[1009] Cincape File No. A2-11/FF12/A4-3QL/(13) Serial 01646

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 14, 1941.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(G) DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK:

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

[1011] (a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

Condition I.—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II.—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III.—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns
required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Mr. Mitchell. We have a study dated August 20, 1941, five months before this attack made by General Martin of the Air Corps and Admiral Bellinger of the Naval Corps, which is a most voluminous document.

I think the committee have had copies of it, and have had it for some time. I would like to offer that as Exhibit 13.

The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the body of that report transcribed into the record, except the diagrams. It is only a few pages.

The Chairman. That will be done. The general counsel will mark the part to be copied so the reporter will understand.

(No further reference to was marked "Exhibit No. 13" and follows hereupon:)


In reply refer to:

Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

Thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan.)

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beachheads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support on the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required.

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian
Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C & D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,051 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the difference above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber [1016] squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barking Sands</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morse Field</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunai</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parker Ranch</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. [1017] This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.

12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Inclos:
Incl #1—Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu. (In triplicate.)
Incl #2—Personnel Requirements Recapitulation. (In triplicate.)
Incl #3—Air Force Housing Facilities. (In triplicate.)

[1018] PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF BOMBARDMENT AVIATION IN THE DEFENSE OF OAHU

I. GENERAL

1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for, first, a complete and thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight; secondly, an attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search and thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for an attack.

2. The most difficult problem presents itself when it is necessary to search through 360°. This might occur daily and it is the only one considered in this study. It is possible, of course, that intelligence obtained from advanced naval bases and ships at sea might implement this plan and reduce the search area
to 270°, 180° or even 90°. In this case, the striking force would be augmented by those planes not required for search.

3. All computations in connection with air operations under this plan are based on the B-17D airplane. This type of airplane is considered available for either a search mission or an attack mission and consequently no reference is made to reconnaissance or bombardment aviation as such but to the search or the attack forces. The combat crew training of both will be identical and search and attack missions will [1019] be rotated for the purpose of resting crews and maintaining aircraft.

II. THE PROBLEM

1. To analyze the mission of heavy bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu with a view to promulgating a plan in accordance therewith.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE

1. Facts:
   a. The Army mission is: “To defend the Naval Base of Oahu.”
   b. The bombardment mission is:
      (1) When Navy reconnaissance is adequate:
      To attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action.
      (2) When Navy is absent or not present with equipment in Numbers of Quality:
      To search for, attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action.  
      c. Capabilities of B-17D type airplanes are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gal Fuel used</th>
<th>Miles flown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Search at 45% Power at 5,000' Altitude (No bombs—2000 gallons fuel): One hour full throttle operation</td>
<td>432 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two hour fuel reserve</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>30 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise at 143 knots at 126 gal/hr</td>
<td>1766 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radius of Action in nautical miles</td>
<td>2500 2134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Search—Attack at 45% at 5,000' (4-600# bombs—2100 gallons fuel): One hour full throttle operation</td>
<td>432 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two hours fuel reserve</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>30 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr</td>
<td>1356 1462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radius of Action in nautical miles</td>
<td>2100 1709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Attack at 65% Power—Return at 45% Power at 15,000' (4-600# bombs—2100 gallons fuel): One hour full throttle operation</td>
<td>432 236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>60 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65% Power—193 knots at 208 gal/hr</td>
<td>657 643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% Power—150 knots at 136 gal/hr</td>
<td>612 643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radius of Action in nautical miles</td>
<td>2000 1549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Attack at 65% Power—Return at 45% Power at 15,000' (8-600# bombs—1700 gallons fuel): One hour full throttle operation</td>
<td>432 236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>90 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65% Power—193 knots at 208 gal/hr</td>
<td>483 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% Power—150 knots at 136 gal/hr</td>
<td>483 450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radius of Action in nautical miles</td>
<td>1687 1163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G. Capabilities of B-17D type airplanes are:

---

NOTE.—The capabilities were taken from [1022] curves in the B-17D handbook and checked by tests.
d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsibility for the defense of its base.

c. If the solution to a problem is designed to meet the most adverse conditions, any less adverse condition will facilitate the solution.

d. Army Air Force units at present are not charged with the reconnaissance mission for the defense of Oahu.

e. The combatant force having the longer range weapon has a basic advantage, other factors being equal.

h. The bombardment airplane is the longest range weapon which the Department Commander has at his disposal.

2. Assumptions:

a. The following are the assumed or known maximum capabilities of enemy equipment:

(1) Some of his carriers can steam at 30 knots for at least 24 hours. (Best available intelligence indicates ORANGE has three carriers with this performance.)

(2) His carrier bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (based on performance data of the U.S. Navy carrier planes [1023] and no allowance is made for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

b. The following are the assumed probable capabilities of enemy equipment:

(1) His carriers steam at 27 knots for 24 hours. (28 knots is the mean top speed of his carriers; 1 knot reduction is made for foul bottoms.)

(2) His carrier bombing planes have 400 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (reduction in range from 600 to 400 nautical miles is made to allow for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

Note.—In the discussion that follows it is assumed that hostile carriers operating under conditions a and b above once committed to action will steam straight in to their launching radius. Any maneuvering by the enemy when within our search area will simplify our problem for it will give the search force more time in which to locate the enemy.

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu.

[1024] d. An enemy will not venture an attack against the Hawaiian Islands until control of sea lanes of communication is obtained. Then as the enemy fleet approaches those islands, raids by surface vessels, submarines and carrier-based aircraft, may be expected.

c. Our most likely enemy, ORANGE, can probably employ a maximum of 6 carriers against Oahu.

f. A 25-mile visibility is assumed. This assumption is based on standard U.S. Navy search and patrol methods employed in this area.

g. For the purpose of this problem the day is divided into 13 hours of daylight and 11 hours of darkness. These assumptions are based on the following computations:

(1) June 22, 20° N. Lat.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunrise</th>
<th>0521</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunset</td>
<td>1842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hours of daylight | 1321 |

Add:

| Morning twilight | 25 |
| Evening twilight | 24 |

| Total hours of daylight | 14:10 |

[1025] (2) December 21, 20° N. Lat.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunrise</th>
<th>0630</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunset</td>
<td>1750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hours of daylight | 1120 |

Add:

| Morning twilight | 24 |
| Evening twilight | 24 |

| Total hours daylight | 12:08 |

Average (1) and (2) | 13:09 |
Part 1: The Search.

1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly searched for enemy surface craft, particularly aircraft carriers, in the event of a situation requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with 100 percent coverage through 360°. A method of searching 5° sectors through 360° to a radius of 833 nautical miles from Oahu employing 72 B-17D airplanes is indicated in Chart No. 1. It will be noted that the outside lines of visibility for the diverging tracks cross at the 600 nautical mile circle, the overlap area inside of that distance becoming a noncovered area beyond that distance. The width of the noncovered area increases as the distance increases beyond 600 nautical miles with the corollary that the probability of finding the target decreases as the search continues out. However, as can be seen on the chart, each search plane on the search back covers the area not covered between any two planes on the search out and, in addition, covers the area previously searched by the plane on its left on the search out but uncovered on the search back, 100 percent coverage of the area is, therefore, obtained on the search out and back.

2. In order to have available for ready reference a means of determining coverage and noncoverage of areas on the search out using 3°, 4° and 5° sectors, there is attached Chart No. 2. The method of constructing the curves thereon is indicated on the chart. It will be observed that, with the assumed visibility of 25 miles, 100 percent coverage on the search out is obtained to a radius of:

a. 600 nautical miles with airplanes in 5° sectors.
b. 750 nautical miles with airplanes in 4° sectors.
c. 1,000 nautical miles with airplanes in 3° sectors.

3. Under any given set of operating data for the search planes and enemy carrier, the radius of action of the search force is determined by:

a. Rate of closure of the carrier and search planes.
b. Minimum distance the carrier can be offshore and allow the search force to make interception and relay the information to the attack force.
c. Minimum time required for the attack force to make interception beyond the radius of action of the carrier planes.

4. In developing this plan, all search aircraft take off at daylight. They might take off during darkness in order to be at a certain location at dawn if definite information as to the movements of enemy surface vessels is reported from some source such as our search of a previous day, friendly surface vessels or Navy patrol.

Part 2: This part of the discussions deals with the maximum capabilities of enemy equipment namely his carriers steam at 30 knots and his bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots. See Chart No. 3.

1. Section No. 1:

a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum cover of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illustrates four possible uses of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. In each case the distance out for dusk and dawn is computed from the most distant aircraft launching circle, or 350 nautical miles. This figure is based on the fact that after launching, the carrier planes will be in the air 3:20 and during that time the carrier steams in 100 nautical miles to recover its planes.
b. 1A shows a carrier launching its aircraft at midnight, attacking and recovering during darkness; 1B shows the launching at dusk with the attack and recovery during darkness; 1C shows the launching at noon with the attack and recovery during daylight; and 1D shows the launching at dawn with the attack and recovery during daylight.
c. It will be noted that each time schedule has a daylight period within the radius of action of the attack force but that 1D permits the least time interval for our forces to operate against an enemy and requires it to attack at the longest range. The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.
d. It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons:

(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.
(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D Day at close range.
(3) The enemy will be more concerned with delivering a successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful.

2. Section No. 2:
a. This section illustrates a routine daily search by the search force which will be made in order to prevent an [1030] enemy from making an undiscovered approach on Oahu.

b. Specifically, with the carrier approaching at 30 knots and the search force taking off at dawn, interception must be made no closer to Oahu than 485 nautical miles and no later than 3:03 after dawn on D Day. This permits 40 minutes to send a radio message to the home base and get the attack force in the air and 2:10 for it to intercept and deliver its attack before the carrier can launch its planes. The attack force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 5:34 D Day, 359 nautical miles out.

c. On a time distance basis, dawn D Day for a carrier is 526 nautical miles from Oahu; dusk D Day—1 is 856 nautical miles out and dawn D day—1 is 1,246 nautical miles from Oahu. Solving the rate of closure problem for the two forces 1,246 nautical miles apart, it is found that contact will be made at 1,030 nautical miles from Oahu at carrier’s dawn plus 7:12 an D Day—1.

d. It must be pointed out that this solution is the maximum radius of action for the search force, yet not necessarily the most difficult problem presented to our attack force. While a carrier arriving at the 1,030 nautical mile circle at dawn plus 7:12 on D Day—1 cannot be attacked that day, it can be attacked the following day as shown in b [1034] above when it must come within easy range of the attack force if it is to attempt to steam to within its launching radius.

3. Section No. 3:
a. This section illustrates the most difficult problem which the attack force has to solve. It is the same problem that is illustrated in Section No. 1D. The critical point here is the carrier’s position at his launching radius at dawn. Under these circumstances he is able to launch his aircraft before we intercept him and deliver an attack against him on D Day. Therefore, we must hit him D Day—1, or the day before he arrives at this position.

b. Specifically, if his dawn position D Day is 350 nautical miles from Oahu, his dusk position D Day—1 must be 880 nautical miles out and his dawn position D Day—1 must be 1,070 nautical miles out. If he makes good this schedule, interception by the search force will be made at 884 nautical miles out at his dawn plus 6:11 on D Day—1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit a message and to get the attack force in the air, the attacking force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 10:43 D Day—1 at a distance of 748 nautical miles from Oahu and can operate against it during the remaining 2:16 before dusk. Under the most favorable conditions for the enemy the enemy carrier can be subjected to attack by our attacking force during a period of 2:16 on D Day—1.

[1032] 4. Section No. 4: This section shows the radius of action of the B-17D type airplane with full load of bombs and 1700 gallons of fuel.

5. Effect of Visibility (See Chart No. 2):
a. To cover the required search area under the above conditions 120 airplanes, each covering a 3° sector, would be needed to operate to a distance of 1030 nautical miles. This number of planes would permit 100% coverage of the entire 360° off the search out.

b. Obviously any decrease in the number of planes employed will increase the sector to be searched by each plane and therefore reduces the probability of finding the target. Any uncovered area would, however, with a lesser number of search planes be covered on the search back, and depending upon the location of the carrier and the hour of the day, might permit an attack to be made on D Day—1 or D Day.

Part 3: This part of the discussion deals with the assumed probable capabilities of enemy equipment (see Chart No. 4). It is believed that his maximum capabilities will be reduced from those assumed for Sections 1 to 4, inclusive, (Chart No. 3) by the following factors:

1. His average carrier top speed will be 27 knots. This statement is predicated upon the fact that the average top [1033] speed of ORANGE carriers is 28 knots, and the belief that on his run across the Pacific, foul bottoms will probably further reduce his speed.
2. The cruising range of his carrier aircraft will be 400 nautical miles. No allowance is made in previous computations for full throttle operation, for fuel reserve, or for time required to take off from, and land aboard, the carrier.

3. He will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.

a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.

b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by friendly surface vessels. It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0° counter-clockwise to 180° around Oahu; the next most probable, the quadrant 180° counter-clockwise to 90°; the least probable, 90° to 0°.

c. The tactical search enunciated above is not the only source of information as to his movements. Office Naval Intelligence, surface scouting forces, commercial ships at sea, radio intercept and proposed advance naval line patrol, will tend to disclose his general location and might, therefore, reduce the search area for our forces.

d. He will want to take the shortest distance to his objective, although this will be of minor consideration if his range is sufficient to permit him the long approach.

4. **Section No. 5:**

a. This section has been drawn to show one possible plan of attack of the enemy under his assumed probable capabilities. Here consideration has been given to the factors enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 immediately above, with the result that his performance characteristics have been reduced to 27 knots speed for his carrier and to 400 nautical miles range for his airplanes. Under these conditions it will be necessary for the carrier to approach within 233 nautical miles of Oahu before it can launch its aircraft; recovery would be made at 167 nautical miles. Accordingly, the radius of search can be reduced to 833 nautical miles and still permit the search force to locate the carrier and the attack force makes its attack before the carrier-based aircraft can be launched. These assumed characteristics can reduce the required search radius to 833 nautical miles and still permit the carrier being attacked before it reaches the position from which aircraft can be launched.

b. If on Day—1 the carrier force is at a distance of 591 nautical miles steaming in at 27 knots and the search force takes off at dawn, interception will occur at the carrier's dawn plus 5:40, 833 nautical miles away, the maximum radius of search under these conditions. Allowing 40 minutes to order the attack force out and 3:42 for the flight, the carrier can be attacked at its dawn plus 10:11 D Day—1, 715 nautical miles out and can operate against it during the remaining 2:49 before dusk.

c. Further, should the carrier be missed on D Day—1 there still remains an opportunity to attack it on D Day. Interception must be made by the search force not nearer than carrier's dawn plus 2:02, 288 nautical miles out on D Day in order to make an attack prior to launching. This attack would occur at dawn plus 3:56, 237 nautical miles out.

5. **Section No. 6:** The problem here is the same as that shown in paragraph 3, Part 2, above, i.e., the most favorable plan of action open to an enemy. With the carrier making good its time schedule to arrive at its airplane launching position at daylight, interception by the search force will be made at dawn plus 5:11 of carrier's D Day—1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit the message to the home base and for the attack force to take off, the attack force can reach the carrier at dawn plus 9:08 of carrier's D Day—1 and can operate against the carrier during the remaining 3:42 before dusk. Under the most profitable plan of action of an enemy carrier, a B-17D attacking force can operate against the carrier for 3:42 of the day prior to his attack on Oahu.

6. **Effect of Visibility:**

a. In Section No. 5, a 5° search spread should give adequate coverage. The search time schedule is such that if interception is not made on the search out it can be made on the search back in time to transmit the information and to deliver an attack by the striking force before dusk on D Day—1. There is 75% coverage at 500 nautical miles on the search out, but on the search out and back there is 100% coverage. 72 airplanes would be used for the search.

b. In Section No. 6, with 5° search sectors, the probability of finding the target at 740 nautical miles is 85% for the search out and as stated in a above, 100% for the search out and back. 72 airplanes would be sufficient for complete coverage in this case, for if interception is not made on the way out, it can be made on the search back in time to transmit information and deliver an attack.
V. CONCLUSION

1. Action by enemy carrier-based bombing planes against Oahu should be figured on the basis of their having 400 nautical miles range and a speed of 180 knots.

2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should base our plans of operation, is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the attack.

(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the attack.

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day of the attack.

(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn of the day of the attack. [1038]

b. Any variation from the above time schedule permits our attack force to strike the enemy during daylight of the day before his attack over a greater time interval and at a shorter range; or, permits our attack force to strike him during daylight of the day he attacks but before he is within his radius of action of Oahu. If an enemy carrier succeeded in slipping in undetected by our search force and launched an attack, we could and would, of course, attack as soon as possible in order to destroy or disable the carrier prior to, or during, the recovery of its planes.

3. The area between the circles with radii 530 nautical miles and 833 nautical miles from Oahu is the operating area for the solution of this problem under its most adverse condition.

4. a. With the Army Air Force responsible for its own reconnaissance, 72 B-17D airplanes will be required to search daily the area within the circle of 833 nautical miles radius from Oahu, each plane covering a 5° sector.

b. Based upon the assumption of visibility used in this study, 72 airplanes employed to search a 360° sector should result in 100% coverage with some overlap to 600 nautical miles, 85% coverage at 700 nautical miles and 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles in the search out. In every case, the search out and in would permit 100% coverage within the time interval which would allow the launching of the bombing attack prior to dusk on D Day—1.

5. If a similar search could be conducted from Dutch Harbor, Midway, Johnston or Palmyra the possibility of enemy surface ships approaching Hawaii and the west coast of the United States undetected would be practically non-existent. [1039]

6. Search must be conducted during daylight hours because of the extreme difficulty of locating what will be an unlighted objective proceeding under cover of darkness. The B-17D airplane is capable of searching for, and attacking, an enemy force the day prior to its arrival within its striking distance of Oahu.

7. With this plan in actual operation the defenses of these islands can be assured without assistance from the Navy. This will permit complete freedom of action of the Pacific Fleet.

8. The B-17D airplane is capable of operating beyond the combat range of any known enemy carrier-based aviation.

9. Attack must be conducted during daylight hours because it is considered impracticable to locate and bomb a maneuvering precision target during darkness.

10. Based on the worst situation that could arise, i.e., the employment of 6 enemy carriers against Oahu simultaneously each approaching on a different course, an attack force of 36 B-17D’s would be required to disable or destroy the carriers. It is expected that 6 B-17D’s with bomb loads of seven 000# bombs would be sufficient to accomplish the desired result (see Study No. 1). It is contemplated that this attack force will be augmented by 36 additional B–17D’s of the maintenance [1041] and reserve force if in commission.

11. This attack force should be further augmented by a minimum of 36 long-range planes of the B–26 or similar type, capable of carrying torpedoes to be used as the striking force under conditions of low ceiling and visibility when high altitude level bombing technique is not practicable. (See Study No. 2).

12. A reserve of 72 planes will be needed to provide for maintenance, replacement and reserve for both the search and attack forces. As was stated in paragraph 10 above, 36 of this number may be employed as part of the attack force if in commission.

13. In order to operate the above number of B–17D’s, a minimum of 216 combat crews will be needed as indicated in Chart No. 5.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the War Department give immediate consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal or better performance and operating range and 36 long-range torpedo-carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the performance of search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is 833 nautical miles and center is [1042] Oahu, as follows:

72 for daily search missions.
36 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in readiness daily, fully armed and loaded with bombs, for a mission).
72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment the attack force.
180 total B-17D's.
36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type.

2. While this number of bombardment airplanes could not be accommodated at Hickam Field and there are no other suitable bases available on Oahu, it should be only a matter of time until projects submitted to the War Department for the construction of airfields on outlying islands of the Hawaiian group are completed which, with Hickam Field, will be adequate for operations of the above number of planes. Existing plans for the dispersion of the 18th Bombardment Wing (H) provide for units of one and two squadrons to operate from dispersed airfields. Modification of the plan to apply to operations therefrom are anticipated and will be made.

3. It is further recommended that in making future allotments of officers and enlisted men to the Hawaiian Air Force consideration be given to providing a minimum of 216 B-17D combat crews and 36 medium bomber-torpedo combat crews. In this connection, see paragraph 8, basic letter.

4. Our leading tacticians and strategists here concur in the opinion that this plan will solve the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and that to their knowledge it is the best and only means that can be devised to locate enemy carriers and make attacks thereon before said carriers can come within launching distance of Oahu. The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. The best defense is an aggressive and well-organized offense. The basis of this plan is offensive action. We have had clearly demonstrated to us in Europe the follaclicity of depending upon passive measures of defense. We must not base our plans of action on the "Defense of Hawaii", but rather upon a vigorous offensive. We must ferret out the enemy and destroy him before he can take action to destroy us.

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action.

In order to initiate offensive action, the Hawaiian Air Force must have at its immediate command well-organized, equipped and trained combat crews. It should be remembered that while reinforcements from the Mainland can be made available on short notice their expeditions presence here will not solve the problem. Upon their arrival they must be given an opportunity to undergo a certain amount of indispensable indoctrination and training in the plane of action of the Hawaiian Air Force. If this plan is to be effective the force recommended above must be made a reality and maintained in existence in Hawaii for combat at any time. With the United States living and working under a condition of unlimited National Emergency, Japan making its southward movement and the world in general in a complete state of turmoil we must be prepared for D Day at any time. Reinforcements, therefore, must be considered from the standpoint of replacements for losses only. Any delay in placing this plan in operation, such as would be necessary for the above reasons, would mitigate against its success.

It is believed that a force of 180 four-motored aircraft with 36 long-range torpedo airplanes is a small force when compared with the importance of this outpost. This force can be provided at less cost to the Government than the cost [1055] of one modern battleship. It is further believed that this force should be made available as soon as possible even at the expense of other units on the Mainland.
STUDY OF THE BOMBS REQUIRED TO DISABLE AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER

1. It is assumed that two direct hits by 500-pound or 600-pound demolition bombs will be sufficient to disable an aircraft carrier.

2. From the tables of probability of direct hits by bombing, results obtained by units of the Hawaiian Air Force in bombing sleds towed by Navy surface craft and from previous experiences by bombadiers who have made attacks of this nature, it is determined that about 90 percent probability of two direct hits may be expected from 6 B-17D’s or similar type airplanes attacking a maneuvering carrier from 15,000 feet, each dropping seven 600-pound bombs in train. Bombardiers are assumed to be capable of at least a 20 mil accuracy.

3. In arriving at the number of bombs and airplanes required, several methods of attack are considered:
   a. Attack by individual airplanes from different directions, attacking in close succession.
   b. Formation attacks by three plane elements from different directions and in close succession.
   c. Formation attack on a six-plane flight.

   [10/46] In all cases bombs are assumed to have been dropped in train by each airplane with a spacing of 80 feet between bombs. The number of bombs (42) and airplanes (6) required to give a 90 percent probability of two effective hits was determined to be nearly the same for each type of attack.

   [10/47] NEED FOR TORPEDO PLANES IN THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

1. a. Any or all of the following factors could be expected to partially or wholly prevent the successful accomplishment of the bombardment mission:
   (1) Inability to find enemy force (navigation).
   (2) Lack of bombing accuracy.
   (3) Enemy fighter action.
   (4) Hostile antiaircraft artillery fire.
   (5) Weather obscuring objectives.
   b. Consideration of these factors:
      (1 and 2) Navigational and bombing accuracy are primarily matters of training and practice. Efficient standards can be and are being attained by the training of combat crews in the Hawaiian Air Force.
      (3) The critical altitude, high speed and defensive armament of the present heavy bombardment aircraft is such as to provide excellent defense against enemy fighters. It is not believed that carrier based fighters will be very effective against the B-17D’s at high altitude.
      (4) Reports from abroad indicate that antiaircraft fire will be only partially effective and will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission.
      (5) The weather of the Hawaiian Islands is probably the best in the world from a standpoint of flying conditions and yet a very definite percentage of bombing missions fail because of adverse conditions which obscure the objective. Heavy low cloudiness such as overcast conditions (200-1,000 feet) prevail, and it is doubtful if it could be used below 5,000 feet without prohibitive losses from antiaircraft fire before reaching the bomb release line. Enemy surface craft may be expected to take full advantage of all cloudiness conditions and even to wait until such conditions occur before launching an attack. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has no weapon to effectively combat surface craft under such conditions.

2. The following is submitted as a solution to this problem:
   a. The most effective action against surface craft under poor weather conditions is believed to be a torpedo attack from low-flying aircraft. This is substantiated by reports from abroad, i.e., Bismarck sinking, Taranto attack, etc. A torpedo plane flying just off the water can operate under a very low ceiling and with guaranteed accuracy against all surface craft. The torpedo plane should be land-based, of long range, fast and capable of being accurately navigated. It should operate in conjunction with heavy bombardment.

   [10/49] 3. a. The only type airplane that could be adapted to this purpose at present in the Hawaiian Department is the A-20A. It is believed that this adaptation can be made and the problem is under consideration and test at present.
   b. It is believed that the medium bombardment airplane of the B-26 type will be even more satisfactory because of its longer range.
   c. It is recommended that adaptation of some such airplane be made, preferably in such a manner as not to interfere with the normal bombardment mission.
Mr. Mitchell. Before I forget it, I want as the next exhibit, No. 14, to introduce a letter from Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Commander, dated 14 April 1941. Subject: “Air Defense of Pearl Harbor,” addressed to the Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., and signed for the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department by Carl Grosse, assistant adjutant general. It has a notation on it, “Copy to Commandant 14th Naval District.”

I will not read that letter. It contains reference to several of these air defense plans.

The Chairman. You want that printed in the daily transcript?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I want to put that in.

(The letter referred to was marked Exhibit No. 14 and follows herewith:)

In reply refer to:
AG 381/67a JDP.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to secret letter from The Adjutant General to Headquarters Hawaiian Department, above subject, dated 7 February 1941, file AG 381 (1-24-41) M. There are enclosed herewith for your information copies of the principle directives, orders, and estimates which have been issued, in cooperation with the local naval authorities, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

2. Inclosure 1, joint letter HHD-14th ND, dated 14 February 1941, initiated the study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the defense which were mentioned in the correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy, inclosed in the letter referred to in paragraph 1 above, and also included study of additional problems which were raised by Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

3. Inclosure 2, Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (HCF-38) is a new joint agreement with the local naval authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Attention is particularly invited to Section II of this document which relates to joint air operations. This joint agreement covers the major points which were studied by the joint committees organized in inclosure 1. Inclosure A to this Annex No. VII has not yet been completed, however tests are now being conducted to determine the most effective means of positive identification of friendly aircraft and insure its protection from antiaircraft artillery fire.

4. Inclosure 3, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force and Patrol Wing TWO (Naval Base Defense Air Force) is self explanatory and will serve as the basis of joint air operations orders to be issued in the near future. These joint orders are required since it will be noted that, in the conduct of air operations, aircraft of one service passes to the tactical control of the other service.

5. Inclosure 4, Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security) is a new operations order for this Department covering the measures which will be taken during an alert period and initially upon a sudden raid or air attack. This order has been coordinated with comparable security orders of the Pacific Fleet and the Naval Base Defense Force. This order is in addition to and does not replace the existing Field Orders No. 1 and No. 1 W which are contained in OHD-38.

For the Commanding General:

Carl Grosse,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Copy to Commandant 14th Naval District.

Mr. Mitchell. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Is counsel in a position to advise the committee as to who will be called next?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Hull is our first witness on Friday morning.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. In the interrogation of Admiral Richardson there were some facts that he did not know which I would like to have the Navy liaison officer attempt to discover for me. Here are the questions I am going to ask:

How many naval planes were attached to the fleet when Admiral Richardson took it over?

[1054] How many naval planes were attached to the fleet when Admiral Richardson was relieved of his command?

How many planes were capable of doing reconnaissance duty during that time?

How many planes were actually on reconnaissance work every day after the reconnaissance orders issued by Admiral Richardson were augmented by Admiral Andrews which directed reconnaissance on dawn and day patrol 300 miles covering a western semicircle of 180°?

That is the information I would like to have.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. May I ask a question of counsel?

In the event Mr. Hull is not able to appear, or for some reason does not appear, would you be able to give me who the witness will be to substitute for him?

Mr. Mitchell. There are a group there: Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr. Grew, and Mr. Hamilton. Our idea is if Mr. Hull gets tired and has to retire in order to return later, we will bring on some of these other witnesses and keep going on with the State Department story as rapidly as we can. We had to assure Mr. Hull and his family that the committee will not detain him for questioning more than 45 minutes at a time. He tires very rapidly. That upsets our schedule a little.

[1055] The Chairman. In connection with that, copies of the written statement of Mr. Hull have been furnished to all members of the committee.

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.

The Chairman. I presume it will be read by the committee before Mr. Hull comes on.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

We have given you copies of it in advance so you can study it beforehand.

The Chairman. As to whether the other statement should be read by somebody in the meeting, they do concern matters on which the committee may want to take action after it has been examined.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I want to inquire of General Mitchell whether or not the committee has received all of the exhibits, or all of the written information in relation to the State Department witnesses?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Gesell will answer that.

Mr. Gesell. We have received from the State Department all of the documents which we intended to introduce in connection with the testimony of the State Department witnesses, with the exception of one or two documents which are being [1056] cleared with other governments, and we expect that the clearance will be obtained
before we go ahead Friday morning. All of the documents which we have obtained have been distributed to each of the members of the committee. I think the bulk of them went to the committee about a week ago, and we have from time to time, I think, including this morning, handed additional documents on the subject to the members of the committee.

Senator Ferguson. So then, at the present moment, we have all of the documents that the committee counsel desire to use, except those that you must receive clearance on? As I understand it, you are being delayed from getting certain information from the State Department because other governments will not clear the committee getting those documents.

Mr. Gesell. There has been no refusal to clear, Senator, by any Government.

Senator Ferguson. What is the situation?

Mr. Gesell. The situation is this: There is an understanding, I am informed, which has prevailed between the United States and other governments with which we are in friendly relations that they will not give publication to notes and documents they received from our officials, and we will not give publication to similar material we received from the officials for a period of 15 years, unless specific authorization [1057] is obtained.

Now, we have not received any refusal from any government to release the documents which we wish to present to the committee.

There are one or two situations where we have not yet heard either way, and we expect to hear in those situations before Friday morning. [1058] Senator Ferguson. Then if you get the approval we will receive those copies of those papers prior to the hearing?

Mr. Gesell. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. It would be difficult to examine witnesses on documents, as I said before, unless we get them sometime before the witnesses are put on the witness stand.

Mr. Gesell. You are quite right. I can assure the Senator in this instance the volume of documents to which I refer is extremely small. We hope it may be even possible to get them to you tomorrow, if the clearance comes through. We will do the best we can on that, of course.

Senator Ferguson. As one of the members of the committee, I think I have quite a few questions on the documents that I have not received. They are included, I take it, among those that the other governments must clear.

Mr. Gesell. I do not know about that.

Mr. Mitchell. We will have to check the rest to be sure it is what you have in mind. They come in pretty fast. We have a system set up of taking them and trying to keep up with them.

The Chairman. If there is nothing further, the committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock Friday morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee recessed until 10 a.m., Friday, November 23, 1945.)

Part 2—November 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30, and December 3 and 4, 1945—follows.