BIBLIOTHECA INDICA;
A
COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS
PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF THE
Hon. Court of Directors of the East India Company,
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ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL.
EDITED BY DR. E. RÖER.

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विश्वनाथपञ्चाननकृतसिङ्गालमुक्तायलीमहितः
भाषापरिशेषः ॥

DIVISION
OF THE
CATEGORIES OF THE NYA'YA PHILOSOPHY,
WITH A COMMENTARY
BY
VISWANATHA PANCHANANA.
EDITED, AND THE TEXT TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSCRIT,
By Dr. E. Röer.

CALCUTTA:
PRINTED BY J. THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.
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विश्वनाथपंचनानकृतसिद्धान्तमुद्दामनलीसहित-
भाषापरिक्रेदः १

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FASCICULUS I.

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1850.
PREFACE.

The Asiatic Society accepted already in 1847 my offer to publish the text of the Nyāya with a translation, but only the Introduction to this work appeared in the Journal of the Society, the MS. of the translation having meanwhile been lost (vide Journal of the Asiatic Society, July, 1847). The present translation is based upon a rough copy of the former, which I afterwards found among my papers. The notes are entirely new, and the introduction has received so many additions, that it is almost a new essay. The Sanscrit text, in accordance with an enlarged plan, is now accompanied with its commentary; it will thus form another edition of the one published by the Committee of Public Instruction, which is out of print, and satisfy thereby a desideratum, long felt in the Government Sanscrit Colleges, where the Bhaṣa Pariccheda is introduced as a class-book.
चर्च शिवागमुक्तावनीसचित्रभाषापरिवर्तितः
ভাপারিচ্ছেদ: ॥

গণেশাচরণ ॥

ॐ নমো গণেশায় ॥

নূতনজলধরহ্যে গোপবধূটি দুকুলচৌরায় ॥

বিজ্ঞানসুকার্তিকী ॥

গণেশাচরণ ॥

ॐ নমো গণেশায় ॥

পূজার্মণীকতাবিধুর্ভূষণীকতাবাস্যকি: ॥

ভবে ভবতু ভবায় লীলাতালপ্তপশিনতে: ॥

প্রতিশ ॥

বিজ্ঞানিততাকার্তিকার্থীমতিতাশিতাপ্রকাণানন্দনবিশিষ্ট: ॥

বিষদীকরবাণি কৌশলকান্তু রাজীবধ্রাবানায়: ॥

গুর্জ্জর্জনেন প্রতিনিধারকর্মেন ॥

বড়িয়া গুণগম্ভীরতামৃতান্তরাতি খল্লকর্নারা জ্ঞাপিকা

বিশালমানবিপীলমিত্যমিত্যমিত্যমিত্য ভাবপক্ষে কুক্ষ্যতত্তন্তত ।

বিশ্বাধুর্ভব বিশ্বাধুর্ভব বিশ্বাধুর্ভব বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা ॥

বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা বিশ্বাধুর্ভবার্তিতা ॥

গুরুনেতবাদি: ॥ ননু গুরুস্য ন বিদ্যব্যয়ে প্রতি ন না ॥
भाषा: तसू नमः कङ्गाय संसारमहीदेवहस्य वीजाय ॥

विष्णुः समार्थि प्रति कारण विनायक मनुष्यं गाथिकारीं

ग्रन्थे निर्विकारप्रियसत्संदेशादिति बेलु ॥ न ।

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अविगत्वमहादारविष्णुं मनुष्यमं सप्ताहे निक्षेपे तत्र च फलजिज्ञायां समस्यात् दूष्परित्वकलेकृष्यः-

फलकल्पनया जन्मायलात् उपविन्यतलाच। समानि-

सिद्धि-श्रेष्ठ वि फलं कल्प्यते । दृढ़्यथ यत्र मनुष्यं ग दूष्यते

तत्रापि जन्मानस्य तत् कल्प्यते । यत्र च सत्यां

मन्नत्रे समार्थिं दूष्यते तत्र बलवतरो विनोग विश्व-

प्राचुयं वा बेचयं । प्रचुरस्कृतीं बलवत्ता विगग्निरा-

करणकारणम् । विन्दुस्दत मनुष्यं दारमिन्याणः

नवेत । मनुष्यं विन्दुस्त्र एव फलं । समार्थितुं वुज्जि-

प्रतिभातिकारणकलायाणः। न च खतवः विनायकविनिरस-

तत्वा शतनः उकृष्याय निश्चितलाप्तिरिति वाच्यं। राजा-

पितोः विनायकस्य तदाधिरात् । तथैव विश्वाध्याय-

वाच । न च तसू निपर्द्याय तदपाधिकारणकारणु-

सतेद्रास्तमायत्वितिरिति वाच्यं । भति विनोग तन्त्रा-

आदेशे वेदवेदितलात् । चेत एव पपपत्र्वे सत्तमायं-

स्तिताय निपर्द्याय सतेद्रास्तमायत्वितिरिति वाच्यं । मनु-

स्त्र कारण। विन्दुस्त्रविनेत्रेव विनायकज्ञात्वं

विनायकस्वरूपाणि । काविष्ठ विनायकान्वाव एव

समार्थिताऽः। प्रतिभावस्तुर्मयावात्मेय कार्यांनक-
भाषा० द्रव्य गुणात्मक कर्म सामान्य सुविदेशां।

विवेक० लाभ रत्नस्च मातिकादिकेशुक्तमुदरो जनानारीरग्र- 
कशज्ञवृद्धिरत्यां: खतः विद्वविप्राययात्माभावे वा- 
तीत व यभिषार रत्नाऋऽः संयातीत। संयार एव 
सहीद्रे द्रव्यगृह वीराय। एतेऽन द्रावले प्रमाणमपि 
वर्षितं भर्तत। तथाच। च यथा घटार्दिकायसं कर्षजनं 
तथा बियुकरार्दिकाय। न च तत्त्र कर्षलसर्दाये 
दीनां सधवविनोतसङ्कर्षवेरीयिरितीतमां:। न च 
सरीराजन्यलिन कर्षज्ञालाभकेन श्वासिपुष रूपि 
वाच्यं। त्प्रयोज्यकलात। नम तु कर्षलेन कार्यं 
चार्कारकेन पवित्रविधाय एव अनुकृतकात।। चावाभूली जन- 
यम्भ्याय। एक ज्ञात्वा विषस्य कर्त्ता भुजासी गोत्रा 
रत्नाः च भागमा भूमनुम्नेव।।

पदर्थान्यानुस्हेष्मात। द्रव्य गुणा रत्नाः। चक- 
गायकाभाववकरणार्देव पृथ्वी भाववे प्रारं तेन भाववेन 
प्रकृतगुणवासै न ज्ञत।। एते च पदर्थाः वैशेषिकप्र- 
मित्वा नैयायिकान्याणविद्वत्वा। प्रतिपदित्तचीवेबेल 
भाग्येः। चतुऽ एव वप्प्रानामनुमाता षष्ठपदर्थां क्षरित- 
तथा प्रकृताकृत श्रेणीरिकिर्षपदर्थलाभामाध्यमाः। मनु 
कथमेव एव पदर्थाः प्रकृताकृत श्रेणीरिकिर्षपद- 
र्थलात्। तथाच।। मण्डलाधिमबित्तेन वज्ञिना 
दृष्टे न जनाते तथ्यूले तु जन्यते।। तत्र मण्डलाधिमा
भाषा० गम्बायक्तथाभाषां पदा०ं सम सूक्ष्मतिना || १ ||
चित्यापेशे महाद्वासकाला त्रिग्रंथचिन्नो मनः ।

चित्यापेशे महाद्वासकाला त्रिग्रंथचिन्नो मनः । नमः ।
चित्यापेशे महाद्वासकाला त्रिग्रंथचिन्नो मनः ।

चित्यापेशे महाद्वासकाला त्रिग्रंथचिन्नो मनः । नमः ।
चित्यापेशे महाद्वासकाला त्रिग्रंथचिन्नो मनः ।

चित्यापेशे महाद्वासकाला त्रिग्रंथचिन्नो मनः ।

चित्यापेशे महाद्वासकाला त्रिग्रंथचिन्नो मनः ।
भावार। द्रव्यमाय ध्य गुणा हर्षं रसो गम्भृततः परं॥ २॥

गुरुः संख्या परिमितः पुष्वक्रमः ततः परं।
संयोगमयेव विभागमयेव परत्वचारपत्तकं॥ ३॥

बुध्य तपः दुःखमिच्छा देवे। यतो गुस्तकं।
द्रव्यतं छैचर्यं कारानिवर्त्तं श्रव्यं एव च॥ ४॥

tन्त्रेपणं तनोवचेपनमाधुर्यः तथा।
प्रसारणं गमनं कर्मभेदावलमिति पच्छं च॥ ५॥
भृमणं रेवनं खण्डनेनर्क्षवलनमेव च।

भिन्नार। तद्भव प्रत्येकं देवतेः। तस्य च द्वपवचात् कर्मेनवचात्
द्रव्यतं। तद्व गम्भीरञ्जयागाथं द्रव्यक्षितः। चिश्वपवचात्त
न जलाइतः। तदः ताराचेपः चतुः कार्यं

दृश्य चेतु । न। भ्रावकोतनेऽजाभावेषस्तिः क्रृष्णानार--
कणमाय अभायमानः। द्वमात्राप्रतिविशुष्ठ्यः भमचूः।
कर्मवतन्त्रात्तीर्ति रत्नोकापससारणाहापाधिकी भाविन-
रेव। तमसोदितिरिहवेनखमावथवासिकक्ष्यमागैरवस्थ
खात्। सुर्येन्द्र चत्ता तेजस्मार्गावस्था वस्वते॥

गुणान् विभाजनः। तथागुणं दृश्यः। एते नुषालत-
विमृ्द्धितपप्पकः। कणादेवत कष्टत्यब्रह्मदेव च दृश्यतः॥
तच गुणवासिकजातिमित्रिकरिषो वस्वते॥ ६॥ ७॥ ८॥

cर्माणि विभाजनः। तत्त्वं मिति। कर्मलजातिमु
ग्रामां चविद्या। एतेनुलोपणलाविरुपि। नामचः भग-
भाषा ६० तीर्थगमनमयतन गमनादेव साहले ।
सामान्य दिविने प्रेमांचं पर्याप्तारसेव च ।
ह्रव्याधिन्तिकस्वरूप सर्वा परतीयोच्चाचै ।
परभिन्न च या जाति: सैवापरतयोच्चाचै ।

विद्वान ६० षारिकामणि पशुकर्षाधिकारात खुते नीरागत चाह ।
भगवानमिस्यादि ॥ ६ ॥ ६ ॥
सामान्य निरुपयति । शामान्यमिति । तत्रशब्दशृंखला
नित्यशे माध्यमगमवर्तलं । चरितमंडलवर्तलं वियोगादि
नामाखलं उकं । नित्यशे मर्यमि । नित्यशे मर्यमि
समवेतलं गगनपरिमाणादीनामाखलं उकं । अन्यसे
केतिं । नित्यशे माध्यमगमवर्तलस्वयं वियोग च
मध्यमगमवर्तलस्वयं वियोग च । मध्यमगमवर्तलस्वयं
वियोग च । एकात्म
वाक्यमर्यादित् न जाति: । तथायोगां । यात्रसमृद्धस्वतं
विद्वानां । यस्यानं दण्डायते साक्षरो । रघुनारायणेऽछो
तथायोगां । एकात्मवाक्यमर्यादित् न जाति: । तथायोगां
दण्डायते साक्षरो । रघुनारायणेऽछो
तथायोगां । एकात्मवाक्यमर्यादित् न जाति: । तथायोगां
दण्डायते साक्षरो ॥ तथायोगां । एकात्मवाक्यमर्यादित्
न जाति: । तथायोगां । एकात्मवाक्यमर्यादित्
न जाति: ॥
भाषा ० क्रयवादिककातिसम् परापरतयोच्चते॥ १॥

व्यापकलान परापि स्थायित्वद्याल्परापि ०

शन्ये नित्यप्रवादवल्लिविषयं परिलक्षितं ॥ २॥

घटादीनां कपालां द्रव्येषु गुणकम्योऽः।

# Bhāṣa 10 कश्चलोप्रेष्यते क्रयवादिककातिसम् परापरतः परसः।

परस्परार्थार्थेऽवत् क्रयवादिककातिसम् न ददेवार्थः काचार्यान जातीगमं परसः। परभिभाषा कताभिष्का।

व्यापकशास्त्रं ॥ ३॥ ४॥

श्रव्यवाच्यवेष्यत क्रयवादिककातिसम् द्रव्यादेः परसः। सत्ताधेष्यत क्रयवाच्यात् अवस्तेषः द्रव्यवेष्यत क्रयवल्लक्षापरसः। तथाच धामदेवत्समावे-श्रादुभयगविद्वं ॥

विशेषः सिद्धपतिः। श्रुत्य दृश्य। प्रमे श्रव्यस्माद्

वर्त्तम दृश्यमः। यद्देवार्थ विशेषः नाशीत्यमः। एक-

मात्रवादिुतिरविशेषः। चतादीनाः श्रुतकवसाहि

मात्र नवस्यविदेशात् परसरं भेदः। परमाणुनां

परसकिंवेदः का विशेष एव। गृह स्थात। एव वाचवतः।

तेन तत्र विशेषाद्यारापि साक्षीति भावः॥ ८॥

समवायं दर्शयति। चतादीनामिति। श्रवयवाच-
भापां नेपु जातेश समवायः समवायः प्रकीर्तिनः ॥ १० ॥

अभ्रावस्तु दिधा संसर्गायोन्याभावबेदतः ॥

भिघुः निख्ययमस्ते । तत्र प्रभावां नुष्णगुणकृताणि विनिषिक्षिणुः

विनिषिक्षणविनिषिक्षणमययुः विनिषिक्षणविनिषिक्षणमययुः दण्डे

पुद्रः दत्त विनिषिक्षणविनिषिक्षणमययुः दश्यनुः । तत्र संचेया.

गारिबाघातः समवायसिद्धः । न च सख्यपस्मने विद्युः

वधानसाधारणं अश्वसारः वा । अभ्रावस्तु मययुः सममः

लक्षणे चैतरः । साधवाद्यक्षमययुः सिद्धः । न

च समवायस्यैवे वायैः रूपवत्तानुबुद्धिः । तत्र

रूपवत्तानुबुद्धिः प्रकीर्तिः रूपाभावान् । नैवं अभ्रावः

वैष्णो समश्चारः सिद्धेकिति वाच्यः । तथा निधाये

भूमि रे भ्रदानसागरस्मि चराभावाबुद्धिः ।

घराभावायमयस्ते तत्र संचेयः तत्र निख्यलामः

अन्यथा देवामारेऽपि तप्ततीर्थस्य खातः । वैरिष्णवः च

तत्र बलान् । समेत तु सते घटे पावरक्षादृश्यां

ग्रामस्युः ग्रामस्युः तद्दत्ताभुद्धिः । वैयिष्णवः सिद्धेने

लक्षणवैष्णवकपो नैवेद गैरवः । दश्य तत्तका.

सीमसत्तत्तृत्तादिइं तत्रद्भावारः समस्तः ॥ १० ॥

अभ्रावः सिद्धिः । अभ्रावस्तु नुष्णगुणक्षेत्रः वैष्णो

दिधा संसर्गायोन्याभाववं । संसर्गायोन्याभाववं

भावान्नैर्दिद्य्यादितरः ॥ ॥ अनोन्याभावशैलेक्षणविदादितरः
भाषा  प्रागभाष्यत्था धानंदीप्रत्यक्षनाभाव एव च। ॥ ११ ॥

विशदः प्रागभाष्यात् मंशयंभावार्थ विभजते। प्रागभाष्य दृश्य।
मंशयंभावार्थ धन्यानंभावसिद्धाभावार्थ। धन्यानंभावार्थ तादर्थयमक्षमभावानुप्रतिष्ठानाभावार्थ।
विनायकभावार्थ प्रागभाष्यार्थ। जननामभावार्थ धन्यानंभावार्थ। निन्यामनंभावार्थ धन्यवानभावार्थ।
चतुर्वत् भूतवाणीः घटाधिक्क्रमपरिवर्तनो नृपराणीनाद्वैत चतुर्वत् घटाधिक्रमक्षमस्माधिकृतमत्यं धन्यानंभावार्थ निम्नलिखित प्रति घटात्तैः न घटाधिक्रमाभावातुः। तत्र उत्तरद्विनाशमशाशी चतुर्भंधुभमावार्थ दृश्य कैवितुः। प्रति धन्यानंभावोपररिधिधिकरणेण मात्यानंभावार्थ दृश्य प्राकृत्वमण्याः।
श्रवणैः रक्षोऽम्बीतिर् रक्षोऽम्बीतिहारमाणो गान्धीतिधीर्ष मात्यानंभावार्थ धन्यानंभावार्थ धन्यानंभावार्थ तथा तत्त्वानंभावार्थ।
गवायुः तत्र बिरोधे मात्यानंभावात् धन्यानंभावानुप्रतिप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रतिप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रतिप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति धन्यानंभावानुप्रति ।
भाषा: एवं वैविध्यामध्ये संसर्गांभाव द्वेष्टे।
समानामपि साधनं श्रीयत्वादिकमुच्ये || १२ ||

d्रव्याद्यः पत्र भावा चनेके समवायिनः।

विद्रोः विशेषकालविज्ञ्यार् तत्कलमायाम्यमाभायस्यति प्रवृत्तः।

gमायचलापने: || १६ ||

d्रव्याद्यः पदार्थांना गाञ्छय वैधमयस्य वन्धु प्रकारम्।

d्रव्यामिष्यानि। समाने धन्या चेषा ने वध्यान- 

cेषा भावः साधने। समाने धर्म द्रति फलितार्थः।

eya विद्रोः धन्या चेषा ने वध्यानशेषां भावे 

वैधग्ने। विद्रोः चेषा द्रति फलितार्थः। जेवले मान- 

विचयता। या च सम्बन्धिविधि। द्रव्याद्यः तावगि- 

मयातायाः: तेतकान्यायान्। एवं श्रव्येशनप्रमेय- 

लाल्मिक बेक्षे || १६ ||


d्रव्येति। द्रव्य वचवाक्यामान्यशेषवार्षक साधने- 

मानकल "भावसं समवार्पिततः। चरणाने कक हावे 

पश्चिम तथापने कक हावे पश्चिम पसार्या साधने। 

तथाच चने क्षेत्रावद्धिपदार्धविवांकोपाधिनयस्य फ- 

लितार्थः। तेन घटार्वै प्रत्येक मानास्यः। सम- 


cवार्षिकः समवार्षिकोमाह सम्भविल व तु समवार्षिकः 

सामान्यार्थवभावः। तथाच समवेद्वधिपदार्धविवाह- 

जकोपाधिनयस्य फलितार्थः। तेन विषयाद्वेषाय सामान्यः।
भाषावते समामण्डयस्तथाया गुणादिनिमाणान्वित:। १९।।
सामान्यपरिचीतानलु सभेपहिटाद्यो मनः।।

चित्रावते समावन्द प्रति द्रव्यवेणकर्णां यशावचमितः।।
गुणादिनिमाणां प्रवेशितः। यथापि गुणादिनिमाणानल्याल्याचमितः प्रवेशितः
क्रिया युज्यमाणी गणणादिनिमाणार्थां तदापि
गुणवर्तनिमाणानां कर्णवर्तनिमाणार्थविभाजकोपार्थमसं तदार्थः।
न द्विः घटलार्थिस्क्रुव्यलं वा गुणवर्तनिमाणार्थविभाजकोपार्थमसं
तथा आकाशलार्थिस्क्रुव्यलं पदार्थविभाजकोपार्थमसः।॥२१॥

सामान्यति। यथामाण्डलिकर्तानव यमाण्डलोनामितः।।
पारमाण्डलिकोति। पारमाण्डलो अर्णपरिमाणः।
कार्णध्वनि तद्विशालामिति:।। अर्णपरिमाणः न तु कसापि कार्णध्वनि तत्त्वः
सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः। सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः।
भवेत्। तत्र अर्णविश्वमाण्डलीय: परिमाणार्थमसं भवेत्।
सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः। सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः।
भवेत्। तत्र अर्णविश्वमाण्डलीय: परिमाणार्थमसं भवेत्।
सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः। सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः।
भवेत्। तत्र अर्णविश्वमाण्डलीय: परिमाणार्थमसं भवेत्।
सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः। सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः।
भवेत्। तत्र अर्णविश्वमाण्डलीय: परिमाणार्थमसं भवेत्।
सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः। सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः।
भवेत्।

* पदा गुणादिनिमाणाम् प्रति कर्णवर्तनिमाणाम् प्रति वा यमाण्डलिकर्तानवः।
गुणादिनिमाणाम् निमाणान्वितः । गुणादिनिमाणार्धितः।
अर्णपरिमाणः न तु कसापि कार्णध्वनि तत्त्वः।
सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः। सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः।
भवेत्। तत्र अर्णविश्वमाण्डलीय: परिमाणार्थमसं भवेत्।
सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः। सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः।
भवेत्। तत्र अर्णविश्वमाण्डलीय: परिमाणार्थमसं भवेत्।
सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः। सामाण्डलिकर्तानव अर्णपरिमाणः।
भवेत्।
भाषा० पारिसापण्यभिभवाना कारणतमुदाहृतं \( १४ \) \।
अन्यायारिणिःप्रमत्ताना नियता पूर्वावर्तिता।
कारणतमं भवेतरसं चैविः श्रीकीर्तिः \( १५ \) \।
समवाविभक्तानां द्रौपदीराशियामध्यमवाविभेदतुल्यं।
एवं न्यायनयजैसःतीयसं निमित्तचेतुल्यं \( १६ \) \।

बिंदु० चेति तेजसः। द्रौपदि चेतिग्रामचे विश्वस्य न कारणसः।
शायामण्यांिमाने न प्रवाहसः। शायामण्यां
किंव नागुमितिकारणं रत्नभिमाचेनं मागवप्रलोकां
सातसकलुम कारणसातं सहायनिमां काला-
देववं तत्त्त्वाचि न कारणलभियाष्टायांमाने
तथां। तथा शायामण्यां प्रति कारणताताय एव
शाचार्येदलसः \( १७ \) \।

गमु कारणसः किमति भाष। अन्यायेशि। तत्सः
कारणसः \( १८ \) \।

तत्समवाविभक्ताः। श्रावण प्रत्यास्मात् कारणं
द्वितीयमसमवाविभक्तागमितय्य। तत्स चचपि तु-
रीतमुखंयोगङ्गो न पदासमवाविभक्तारसं स्वातः एवं
शेगार्दीछांपि प्रभवतात्यांमसमवाविभक्तारसं स्वात्
एवं शायामण्यांमक्षाध्यमसमवाविभक्तारसं श्वात्
तथापि पदासमवाविभक्तारसं तुरीतमुखंयोगभिक्तारसं दैयं।
तुरीतमुखंयोगङ्गो तुरीतपरंयोगङ्ग मध्यमसमवाविभक्तारसं
अवलुप्ति। एवं शेगार्दिं शेगार्दीससन्नधिमाविभक्तारसं
भाषा १५

यत् समवेत्त काय्यं भवति श्रेयंतु समवायिज्ञक नत्।
नचास्तत्तु जनां द्वितीयमाध्यम परं तत्त्वी यात्॥१७॥
येन सच पूर्वभवाचः कारणमादाय या यस।

विध्वा १५

भवयेवेति तत्तकार्याः समवाचिकारण्यस्य तत्त्विदी-भिन्नतः न देहय। ास्त्रस्वीकेश्युगानातू ख्रायायम-वाचिकारणस्य नात्स्य। तेन तद्देहस्त्यास्त्रस्य शामास्त्रस्य शेषमेव। श्रेण समवाचिकारणप्रायायस्य द्विविषण कार्याय प्रत्यायवथः तत्सः यथा चतुर्थत्तमाद्रीकं प्रति कपालसंयोगाद्विं। तत्त कार्यं ग्रहेन यथा कारणस्य कपालसंयोगाद्विं एकस्मानू कपाले प्रायगार्थं तद्याय। द्वितीयं यथा चतुर्थत्तमाद्रीकं प्रति कपालसंयोगाद्विं। तत्त चतुर्थत्तमाद्रीकं प्रति कपालसंयोगाद्विं। तेन यथा कपालसंयोगाद्विं कपाले प्रायगार्थं। तथा च श्रवण समवायस्यमेव कपालसंयोगाद्विं। श्रवणस्य सवायस्यस्मार्थक्यमेव।

रत्नश्च कार्योऽयं कार्यायत्तिहृदयान्या यत्र दक्षार्यं श्रायार्यमिश्रमस्मार्थक्यमेव। श्रायार्य समवाचिकारणाः समवाचिकारणाः हिंस्यं कारणवथः नितिः कारणभिंसथः॥१६॥१७॥

हेदानोमथाबिष्कृतमेव कियति पद्यवर्तानां त- दास। येन बस्तेत्तादिनां। चत्तायं प्रति कारणस्य
भाषा ० चन्द्र यः प्रति पूर्णभावे चाते यतं पूर्णभावविद्यान।
जनक प्रति पूर्णवर्तितामपरिवर्त्याय न यस्मापि प्रश्ने।

विभाग ० पूर्णवर्तिता चें हुमें गृह्याये तत्कालि प्रति नद्रोपमन्यवायुविद्यते भाषा:।
यथा घटर्न प्रति रुपलिमितं।
द्वितीयमन्यवायुविद्यत्वमाह।
कारणमिति।
यथार्थ्यार्थमिति।
वक्ष स्वतत्रोक्षम्यवतिर्कृति।
किंगू स्वकारणसारायेव श्रवणवतिर्कृति।
मृत्युंतेत सदायेव प्रामाणिको श्रुतीते नद्रोपमन्यवायुतुं।
यथा द्रुक्कृप्य।
द्वितीयमात्र।
चन्द्र प्रतीति।
चन्द्र प्रति पूर्णवर्तिं गृह्याये।
यथार्थ्यार्थमिति।
प्रति पूर्णवर्तिं गृह्याये।
यथार्थ्यार्थमिति।
वक्ष स्वतत्रोक्षम्यवतिर्कृति।
मृत्युंतेत सदायेव प्रामाणिको श्रुतीते नद्रोपमन्यवायुतुं।
यथा घटर्न द्रुक्कृप्य।
सत्त्वमात्र।
चन्द्र प्रतीति।
चन्द्र प्रति जनकलं गृह्याये।
घटर्न कारणमिति।
जनकलं श्रवणसारायेव नद्रोपमन्यवायुद्रुवः।
श्रवणसारायेव कारणले कारणविकड़िती चेतु।
प्रति चन्द्र प्रति जनकले किमवविद्यते किमवविद्यते चेतु।
कलान्तिं खोपश्चाचै।
चन्द्र प्रतीति।
चन्द्र प्रति पूर्णवर्तिं गृह्याये।
यथार्थ्यार्थमिति।
जनकलं प्रति पूर्णवर्तिं गृह्याये।
यथार्थ्यार्थमिति।
चन्द्र प्रति पूर्णवर्तिं गृह्याये।
यथार्थ्यार्थमिति।
चन्द्र प्रति पूर्णवर्तिं गृह्याये।
यथार्थ्यार्थमिति।
यथा कुशास्पिलित।
यथा कुशास्पिलित।
भाषा

श्रैत्रिक्रमणापि यज्ञविष्णुयथापत्यकपूर्वकाचरणः १५॥

एते पञ्चान्याविनाति द्रष्टव्यादिकादिति

धर्द्धे द्रष्टव्यपादि द्वितीयपरिप द्विगुं ॥ २० ॥

तत्तात्त्वु महेष्क्षेम कुलाज्जनकोपरः।

शिष्या १० घटे प्रति अनकलेनयाचारिनि। कुलकलेन जनकले

नियोजितः। कुलाज्जनकां घाते प्रति जनकलात्॥

पञ्चान्याविनाति ॥ नियोजनाथ श्रैत्राविनाति ॥

पञ्चान्याविनाति ॥ इत्यादिकादिति एव कार्याचारे

वाढनातितिपूर्वकाचरणं एव कार्याचारे तत्त्वाचारणां

श्रैत्राविनाति ॥ श्रैत्राविनाति ॥ तत्र च नियोजनाति

महेष्क्षेम कुलाज्जनकोपरः ॥ २४॥

राष्ट्राधिकारिं। यहैदविनाति प्रति राष्ट्राधिकारं

नियोजिनीतिमयति तत्त्वापि घटजातीयं प्रति विद्वंकारणं

भावैर्हि श्रैत्राधिकारिं तत्त्वापि यथो राष्ट्राधिकारान्या

विषेषं प्रति भावः ॥ एतेविनाति ॥ एतेवा पञ्चान्यावि

नियोजनाति। ततापि तता श्रैत्राधिकारिं

कार्याचारे द्रष्टव्यादिकादिति ॥ न च वैपरित्यं किं विनिगमकाचर

करणतात्वविदेषकं साधवत्॥ १५॥
भाषाः पश्चमे रामभाद्रि: स्त्रादेंत्र्यवावधाग्यकस्वसी। ॥ ११ ॥
समवायिकारणः इन्यशैवेनि विचेयः।
गुष्कर्मानुमात्रानि चेत्यमयायसमवायिकेति ॥ १२॥
अन्यत्र नित्याभिः आश्रितकल्लिमिते।
शिवादीनो नवानामु इन्यत्वगुणेणोगिता ॥ १३ ॥

शिवाः वाचः। दृश्यकल कारणः दृश्यविषयकपरम्पराः।
ययोक्तकविने गौरवत्र। एवमसोल्यामणेन चरितार्थायमवत्ता ॥ १० ॥ ११ ॥

समवायिकारणलिमिति। गुष्कर्मोऽति। अभसमवायिकारणलिमिति।
गुष्कर्मानुमात्रानि वेधार्थीमयायसमवायिकेति।
ययोक्तकविने गौरवत्र। अन्यत्र अभसमवायिकारणलिमिति।
ययोक्तकविने गौरवत्र। अन्यत्र अभसमवायिकारणलिमिति।
ययोक्तकविने गौरवत्र।

चत्रबैराग्यः परमाश्रयाकाशादीनि
विद्यायिनिलयाघाम्बित्यथः। आश्रितलक्षु समावायमणेन दृश्यमनस्य।
विश्वेत्यत्वा नित्याभिमध्याय प्राचार्यः। कालिकमवायमणेन तेषामः
मष्टितलिमिति परमास्तः। तेन समावायमभावः।
समावायमान्यायविच न चतुः। दृश्यां इन्यान्यविच विचित्राय साधवः त्रहुमारबमेत्। चित्रादीनाशिमिति ॥ १२ ॥

* माहिष्मपुष्पांमिति ।
भाषा० शिरिजख़ा तथा तेज़ः पवनो मन एव च।
परापर्यन्तवृत्तव्यक्तियाः श्रेयस्या चारणी। ॥ २४ ॥
कालिकानामदित्रित्वा सर्वेधङ्गानः परम्परमणु।

विभा० शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा शिरिजख़ा ॥ २४ ॥

काशेनि। कालिकानामदित्रित्वा सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वे�धङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् सर्वेधङ्गानम् ॥ २४ ॥

* श्रूयंविदितं तिनं।
माणा विद्यादिपथ भूमानि चलारि सर्वावनि मि॥ २५ ॥
क्रमारंभशतृणु ह्याद्याकाशशरीरिणा।

विष्णु ३ दारावति। तशापि संस्पर्योगलाटु मधुलखणकारणामाराष्ट्रधिवाच न प्रदवै। अथवा चातामः
हस्तिनिमिश्वगुरुवल तत्॥ चतारीति। चृतिविषयंजे-वायुर्ग। सर्वावन॥ २५॥
क्रमारंभशतृणु। चृतिविषयंजे-वायुं चतुर्थुप्रवेशभशतृणु। न च क्रमारंभशतृणु घटादारवति।
क्रमारंभशतरुपण्डटिने वश्वायमाणातिमलखा विनिविनलाटु॥ अत्ताश्वरीरिणि। अत्ताश्वरी-
सामवयायस्तिरिणिकाबन्धणवस्य॥ अत्ताश्वरीरिणि। चृति-निमिश्वगुरुः पश्चाद्। न च चापायहर्षि। यथा किष्कि
दचर्यंधर्म श्रवण भजये तदन्ववक्रेण तदन्वावक्रेण पत्तान्। सिद्धिकल्य दक्षिणखण्डनयिर्षिंगीले-
गिर्या। चृतिविषयंविभिन्नः स्वातरविभिन्नः भास्यात् प्रथमस्वर्थं द्वितीयमोऽनि नाम॥ एवं ज्ञानीनामि। ज्ञातिज्ञें च ज्ञातिज्ञनि विशेष ब्रह्म-राधावक्रेण नास्ते। घटायवक्रेण तदन्वावक्रेणै।
एवं ज्ञातिज्ञें च ज्ञातिज्ञनि विशेष ब्रह्म-शास्त्रविभिन्नः सिद्धिकाबन्धणवस्य॥ प्रस्ति-
वायुर्ग। सिद्धिकाबन्धणवस्य॥
ভাষা। অস্ত্রনিগৃতিঃ বিশেষগুণ ব্যতায়নে। ২৬।।

ঈশ্বরানামপি কদাচন ব্রজেশ্বরে মাধবভাট্টে শিক্ষিকৃত বিশেষগুণ বিষয়ে ছাড়ার সিদ্ধার্থতায়ন্নি বাচ্ছ। যথঃ অস্বস্তিনিসর্গালোকিতানি মধুরভাষায় বিষয়তালামায়। অতঃপরাবৃদ্ধি চপাচ্ছ নির্ধিত।

ঈশ্বরানামপি কদাচন ব্রজেশ্বরে মাধুর্যাচিন্তাপিতৃ স্তুতি যুদ্ধাঃ। দ্রষ্টার্যাগ স্তুতি প্রতিমা যুদ্ধ। বাচ্ছ কালীবাসনা তথায না জানোপরি ন দেখে রূপলালিকমান্দায় একেদ মহান নাড়ুগুলো এবং স্তুতি কীর্তি বিচিত্রতায়ন্নি বাচ্ছ।

তন্ত্রময় সূত্রপাতচ রূপভক্তিকার অথবালবণ্য প্রতিহ অধিক বিশ্বতালে রচিত হয়েছিল। যদঃপূর্বক দীপাকার মধুভাষায় দীপাকার শিক্ষা সম্পাদিত তথাযাত না।

দেশলালিকমাদায় স্বরায় নামভাষায়। ২৬।।

কোষনি। পুরুষঃপ্রসংজ্ঞা রূপস্ত ক্ষয়বচনে স্পবার্থ-বিষয়লিখিত্যাচ্ছ। ন চ চঁদুরাদেশ মধুভাষায় বাঙালিয়ানর্ঘর রূপস্ত কিংষ্ঠমিতি বাচ্ছ। তত্ত্বাত্মা নেতৃস্থ রূপাণুমানাত। এবং বাযামীতপ্রশ্নেরভাগমাসামান নতুনবিলাসী রূপাণুমান বাচ্ছ।
भाषा। गुणिते दे रसवती दृष्योणिको द्रवः॥ ५३॥
आत्मानेन भूतवर्गणो विशेषगुणयोगिनः।
यदुः कादि साधकः वैश्वमय्यिनसर्वः तत्॥ ५४॥

विष्णुः ग च पटारिनि कुरसुवर्ष्टारिमनि तेजस्वि च क्रवल-
वलमय्यिनसर्वः वाच्यः। क्रवलवृक्षस्य क्षणयणामय्यी-
जातिमतस्य विविषितलानु। शून्तिस्मादि श्रिये-
वीशु अलेवु कुरसुवर्ष्टारिनी तेजस्वि च क्रवलमय्यिनः।
तत् च श्रीवीलातिरितमाराताणां मन्त्रं सहस्र-
समयः।। ग च प्रविष्टविषयस्य परजयात्रार्वामस्य
अत्यन्तयुक्तं रपरांविविषिति वाच्यः। शाकुप्रप्रायविए-
पञ्चस्यसिद्ध्वयणयाति मतस्य विविषितलानु। श्राप-
वन्तियानिचारणाय चालुक्येन॥ गुणिते द्रवः। गुण-
सिद्धवर्ण रपरत्वं श्रीवीलातिरितमारायः।। ग च प्राणे-
प्रक्ष्यातीन्ना वामाणोपायांविद्वानभागायश्च
रसाठिमसंगतिं माणिकमय्यां वाच्यः।। तराभि श्रीवीला-
रिताः नदुमागाः॥ इत्यारं तिष्ठविस्तेर्नितर्थः।। ग च नैसिसिनक्रवलस्य च पटारिनि वृजाकारीं
साधकमय्यां च नैसिसिनक्रवलस्य माणिकमय्यां
क्रवलवणयातिमतस्य विविषितलानु॥ ५३॥
आत्माने द्रवः। श्रीवीलातिरितमाराताणां
विशेषगुणवलमय्यां।। यदुमय्यिनः। श्रीवीलातिरितमारात्ता
विशेषगुणवलमय्याः।। यदुमय्यिनः। श्रीवीलातिरितमारात्ता
विशेषगुणवलमय्याः।। यदुमय्यिनः। श्रीवीलातिरितमारात्ता
विशेषगुणवलमय्याः।। यदुमय्यिनः। श्रीवीलातिरितमारात्ता
विशेषगुणवलमय्याः।। यदुमय्यिनः। श्रीवीलातिरितमारात्ता
विशेषगुणवलमय्याः।। यदुमय्यिनः। श्रीवीलातिरितमारात्ता
भाषा। श्रीदयोष्टे वेगाक्षरसंकारो महत्तो गुणाः।
भ्रो श्रीदयसे बुरप द्रवे वेगस्य नेजसि ॥ २८ ॥
श्रीदयोष्टे वेगसा गुषणलक्ष्य विभवकं।
बुरप रसस्या जे देवा वारिष्टे चतुर्दश ॥ २० ॥
जे जीवीना गन्धुयता जिताविने चतुर्दश।
बुज्जादिष्टकं संख्यादिपञ्चकं भावना तथा ॥ ३१ ॥
भर्गाप्रेममिल गुणा एते आत्मनः सुकल्पतर्कश।
महादि पचकं कालद्रोहः प्रक्षो तेन च श्रेये ॥ ३२ ॥
संख्यादय: पच्च बुन्तिरिच्चा यम्मापि चेस्वरे।
परापरवस्स्त्राया: पच्च वेगस्य मानसे ॥ ३३ ॥
तत्त्व चितिरिवषेत्तर्नानाद्धपवती मना।

चित्र। दच दचि बेस्यं। तत्तु न कस्तापि वेधस्यं। केवला-
चित्रालात्। तेन च बटादय: पच्च से खचकरे ॥ २८॥
२८। ॥ २०। ॥ ३१। ॥ ३२। ॥ ३३। ॥

वांच्चत्त्ववेधनेन निरूप समूह प्रत्येकं श्रीविनां-
सिनिष्ठसि। तत्त्वं चितिरित्वादिना। गन्धेशुर-
रिति चन्द्रस्मवायिकाणमित्यि। चर्चिपि गन्धव-
लमार्य सच्चनुसिन्त तथापि श्रीविनलजानी प्रमाणे-
पन्नाय मारो दक्षतुस्पमनस्। तथापि श्रीविनं चि-
गन्धशमवायिकाणमित्यि। भवस्य।
विद्या गन्धारविनिवासानंतरं कस्मिन् गस्तु निविष्ये मतः ॥ २४ ॥

धान्यो जस्विध्यतु रसस्तुत्र गन्धस्तु निविष्ये मतः ॥ २४ ॥
भाषा। खर्चलाग्रक्षु विनेयो म्वनुस्त्रागिनि पाकज।

निया निया च चा देघा निया स्वादिष्ठनुलचना॥४॥

विख्या। गावश्रवणविवाहग्निमश् वा लघुष्याग्निवेष्यं।

गमुक्तिः दिविभ देरत। बसुखितिमार्गं न तु वर- दिविभ ग्मन्यावलं सचं। दिविभ च वर्णलाल्। देविधाग्नि

शैरभागिनीहरभेद्यकं बेघ्रं॥ ४॥

खर्च देरतं। तथाः प्रेमिकाः। चनुसागीतखर्चवर्षं

वायोरूपं वर्तम द्विद्वः। वाकङ देरत। दत्सा पृथिवी-

धवाः। म्वीनुस्त्रागीतनतास्तपायः नद्रुपं। वस्तुतः

पकङखर्चवर्षमार्गं सचं। भैलिक्ष वैयार्घातः। या-

पकङखर्चमं प्रत्याय पाणिनि। नान्स तथापि पकङखर्च-

वल्लिन्द्रवल्लिन्द्योजातिमथ्यं। बेघ्रं॥ निरोति।

या प्रब्धिवी दिविभा निया चनुसागीया चेक्षयः। चनु-

खर्चपरमाशुबचन्द्र प्रब्धिवी निया। तदन्वया पर-

माशुभूषित्र प्रब्धिवी िशुकार्धिमुर्यम वर्मायाध्यानितेतायः।

वैव चनुसिया प्रब्धिवेय ज्ञवाववतीतवर्षयः। मनु ज्ञवत-

विनि किं मानं। परमाशुपुष्क्रीवेवतपषोः। ग स पर-

माशुभूषित्रप्रक्रियालावरं पत्रणं। म्वत्वर्यं न स्वात्त्विति

वार्ष। एकः परमाशुराध्यवत्सलपि तस्मूकेश प्रवह-

पलात्। यथा एकः केत्रस्तु द्वैतमस्यस्तस्मूकेश प्रवह-

पलात्। न च। एकः केत्रस्तु द्वैतमस्य घट देरत बुधे-
भाषा। अनित्य तु तदन्या स्थान सैवाग्नयोगिनी।

विद्वा। रमुपपतितिरिति वाच्यं। एको गद्यम् धान्यराजितिरिति
पद्धपने। सैवं। परमाणुरसिरविशेष तदस्मृत
स्वापि प्रत्यायोगमात। वृ रक्षकसबू मातीमित्र:।
सन्निहाते तस्मृत प्रत्यज्ञान्त॥ न च तदानां अधुमका
परमाणुपञ्चात। हू भृपरमाणुपञ्चसैवाग्नयोगिनी। न प्रयोजने
विराम रति वाच्यं। अभृमाणु हृर्षाङ्गुपंडरलात॥
अनुष्ठाचा वषुप्रशांदिक्षात। कदाचिदृढमण्डपमण्डप
स्नात॥ न जातिमातृसत्वा। कथमहु मर्गनिपन्न
दृढःसनेतवतितिरिति वाच्यं। तथा तदन्तःपातिः
हृदहारेष्वाचवण;। स्वीकु दर्नोचित्तंप्रमाणमात॥
न भास्करु
ग्रहणपक्षकेन कर्म चार्णेऽस्पतितिरिति वाच्यं। यतो न
वर्षं भृमलग्राहक्षालां वा कृतिततुः ख्राहाराध्यानं
परं महत्त्वस्तुरहुपरार्थिकारणमुद्रायवमादु हृप्ताः॥
तथा। चार्णेऽस्पतितिरिति। वाच्यं न तु व्रषुपार्थिक
भावानु। न त्य तस्मृत:परिवहनंविशेषते। परमाणु महा
चावायात। द्वायं चावाव्यतिसिद्धा तेषामुत्त्वविमानाः;
प्रवचनानंविद्यां तेषां चावाव्यव्यवहाराभो। अनं
माले मेंसंपदेऽस्पति। सामायमाणु॥। जनः कच्छिदि
सामीवाच्यः। च च विद्यामुद्रामाणु: चालमवेत
भावार्योत्तमित्रिप्रमाणः कालाः। अनुसचार नियमले महा-
भाषा । सा च जिथा भनेद्वै बुद्धिय विषयतथा ॥ २६ ॥
योनिजादिभनेद्वै दुन्दिर्य मापलमचन ॥

विद्वा । तपरिमाषतारतमचन गणपादै। विशालालमवाक्षय-परिमाषतारतमचमापि कहिदिशालालमचीति तस्क परमाणुलविधवः। न च चनरेशावेव विश्रामोक्षितसि वाच्य। चनरेशुः। बावववा सुधूरस्यालारु घटवदिध-गुसानेन तद्रवयविन्कृः। चनरेशोरववः। बावववा महर्षववनालु। काशवदिधगुसानेन तद्रवयविन्कृः।
न च चचेरमचनकम। यपेश्वरमचन प्रति यन्तकर्मववचम प्रयोजकि। न हैं चमेश तद्रवयवधारापि विषयो-दितित वाच्य। प्रमवस्याभेय तद्रविन्कृः। या च चिथेऽल।
सा कार्यक्षण्या प्रथिवि विविधा बारवेन्द्रिक्षविवयभे-दारिवयः। ॥ २७ ॥

तत् देशमुद्रानशति। योनिजादिति। योनिजमो-विषेशसि। योनिजमपि। जरायुमक्षमसा। जरायुमसा। मानुसारोऽभी। चण्ड चण्डादीति। चण्डोरिज्जोहेन-स्निद्दार्थः। सरदजः। शमिद्वश्चायः। कविदेशायः। कविदेशायः। नारकिण्या। श्रीरममय्या। श्रीगिरिजि। ग म सानु-णणिद्विन्दुराराष्ट्रा। पार्थविले किं मागमिति वाच्य। गन्धा-द्रिति मतवेद्वै म्मानालातु। ग म श्रृंगशादेशपन्वाराष्ट्र-लार्कितमय्यां क्षार्दिति वाच्य।। तथा चति ज्ञातसबही-
भावा। विषयो व्हाणुकादिश मान्याण्डाजा उदाहरण। ॥ ६७ ॥

चित्ता। लाप्निन वस्थरम्यक्षान्त। न य तर्क जजस्कारिकमिवाच्या न स पञ्चिवल्लकति वाचे। हेशारीगृं विनाशेणं बरीलंग्ल अवभिधिकानात्। गंगाचुपलस्य प्रियवील-सिंहः। एलेग पार्थिवादिग्रांरी अलादीगृं निमित्त-लभार्थ बोध्यं। बरीलक्ष्मु ग जाति। प्रियवीलाबिन्द्र शाक्त्योत्त किलयु चेष्टाचयं। रञ्जनागामिदेवो चेष्टाय-लाभायावायः। न च चंद्रा देवीं बरीलंग्ल किं मागमिति वाचे। आयतालिकाययुयमनस्य प्रमाणलात्। तंहक नीं मागमिति चेष्टा। भस्मबहरीस्त्रश्रांग्ल गद्युस्माद-गात्। यद्य चंद्रादौ बरीलक्ष्म्यवाच्यारे म सवति तद-म्यालवविलेग्न विशेषिणौं। न च चंद्रादौ बरीलंग्ल न नाति तत्त्वाद्यासिरिति वाचे। प्रणार्ये म प्रमाणकाभा-वात्। प्रयवा चेष्टाचय द्वाचत्वांविनंतिहलिङ्क वाल्याय जातानां तसू मांगुवलवैचसंञ्जातिमादाय सन्तरणम-न्ययः। ग च गुरुसंग्रहरी मंघ सन्तग्नमनंग्लः। तन्त्र मिश्ललीकसंञ्जमधितरथ्या जातिलाभावात्। अखो-यनेकसंग्रहरीस्त्रञ्जतथा रेवल्लकायं जातिलाभावाव-द्विति वाचे। कर्त्तविक्र्येन गुरुसंग्रहरीह नागालेग्न

* वभावित्वच्चाशापेन ब्रजसंञ्जगितंवस वेष्यं।
भाषा: वर्ष: पृष्ठो रसायनी जले मधुरस्थलीय.

विज्ञप्त: जेम्स्क्रि पार्श्वविनियम: पार्श्वविनियम कारणांत चेन्दु दृश्य प्राणेखित पार्श्वविनियम द्राक्षादृश्य मध्ये गंधेंच्या द्राक्षकाळातून कुकुमगंधाद्राक्षं वृत्तात.

न च द्राक्षात खेतीयस्वाद्राक्षकला द्रिचित वाच्य: परक्षियेन-रूपायद्राक्षकला तवर्ष्यलातू. न च नवम्बरावगम्बर-चक्रकला वाच्य: तस्य ब्रह्मार्थाभिय-शकालातू. यदा परक्षियेन न देवत्वायूपोतसुरभिभाग्य पृथ्यालालम्ब्रातू. न च प्राणेक्रियस्वाद्राक्षपर्यंत गंधमाचय-शकालतं च चायिकार दृष्टि वाच्य. कृत्याने विष्ठि दृष्टि विचित्रावतू. विश्व दृष्टि. उपभोगशाधने विश्व: सर्वसेव चि कार्यांच्या क्रस्ताधीवीं. यतू कार्ये यत्र क्रस्ताधीवीं तत्रात्मेवेंगे शायाता पर्वर्ष्या वा अनयते. न च वीजाणेव्याधीमध्ये विष्ठा कार्यचिदुप्तातिरिक्ष. तेन ग्राणुकार्तिक्ष्याष्ट्र वर्मेमरे विष्ठा भवति. नरीरेण्यच्योविष्ठा विष्ठावेंपि प्रकारामरापन्नाश: निम्नेषुद्वितिवेशार्थ: || १३ ||

जलं निर्दृप्तयति. वर्ष: पृष्ठो दृश्यति. केहीमलावाचि-कार्यनतावल्केदकतया जलं जाति: विष्ठयति. वचापि जेलं विन्यासावल्केदकतया न कार्यनतावल्केदकतया तथा जाति. यत्र परमाश्च जलं
भाषा ० चौद्विंशति द्रव्यवलयुं सृष्टिकृतमुदात्तं ॥८॥

तत्र जनविभेषाः प्रभावाः। नित्यः सहस्रपथोगले
रूपावर्गशाबंगवियमादिति चेतु। न। जनविभेषाः वनकता-
बन्धुसदकत्या जनजलमलाते: भिरूः न नदवक्षिष्णग-
कतागम्यसदकत्या जलजातितिमिः। ॥ मुकुटपालसमेव
कर्मि स्वयंपुरुषुः। वर्ष: मुकुट रतिः। वसुकित खमारे न तु
मुकुटपालस्य बचने। अथवा शैवस्तिकज्ञलवं द्रव्य-रूपविकृतमुदात्तं जलभावणिकरणं रूपविकृतमुदात्तं जलभावণितं
तिमिः तदर्शः। ॥ रसनाप्रचिति । जलसा मधुर । एव रसः। 
शीत एव सम्वः। तिकायामधुरस्तिकवल-वालात्मात्मातितिमि ॥ मनु मुकुटपालसमेवति बुनः
कालिन्दीजलादी। शीतापरशुरिति चेतु। न। शीतात-
नकतावंकत्यकाएः। प्रथितोळ्यातरभावात् जसे शी- 
वर्षाबाजायात्। कालिन्दीजली शीतग्रामीति: खास-
गैण्डकिकी। अत एव विषयति। विषय: धनवीषयेपलवे:।
अथ जलमधुरेः फुंग गांग। न। प्रथमचेष्ट कारपि
रक्षकाध्यात्माः। न। जारिकेल्लजलादी। माधुर्यागुप- 
स्वातं एवेति वाचे। तस्यायापाधिकारात्। अन्यवा
जनीरसाधारणागुपमेव। जादिमतगपि सृष्टिकृतम
चेतु। न। चरीतकादिर्भवणसा जलरसाध्यकलावत्।
भाषा नियमादि प्रथमचतुः किंतु देशमयोनिजः।

विद्युः न च चरितकामेव जशोष्मयेगाद्रायामारायत्वमिः-
रिति वाच्यं। कल्पनागैरवात्। प्रथितीलकासार्धिज-
शकतावप्रेकल्पात्। जशे नाथादिर्वं जन्मीररामायी तु भाष्ययोपयुक्तकी तथा प्रतीतः। एवं जन्मीत-
शास्त्रजनकार्यप्रेकल्पकं जसलं जन्मजनां वा शेषं।
पूर्णनिमोद्य। तु प्रेमोपबमियसयामायामर्पितसंगुनीत-
रथसिद्धः तेजः वंचेणायेः प्रश्यात्तितिरिपुणाधिकी
सुतेव। तत पाकामश्चात्। चेष्टानितिः। घृतादा-
विपि तद्ग्रामार्चिसल्लातेव। दशः। जसस्त्रे शेषवमा-
अधिकर्षलात्। तेजः जश। एवं शेष। दरि मनावे।
इशिरसमिः। नार्यक्षितक्रवलं जातिज्ञाषेः। प्राचू-
शिल्लः। तद्वस्यश्रुतजनकार्यप्रेकल्पकमपि महेन्द्रितभावः।
नैस्थार्यवपि जसस्स क्रवलं शेषप्रकर्षेः। च जग्नानगुकु-
क्षमिः वच्छताः।$ १८।

प्रथमवच्छताः। प्रथिता नवेत्याः। तथापि जसलं
दिविशं नियमसिद्धः। परमाशुम्बः नियत्। द्वाय-
कादिरिः शर्मानिः। प्रत्यवस्मवेत्ताः। अनियमपि
निविष्पं भरीरेक्षितविषयवेदात्। किंनु प्रथितीतो
थेया विशेषस्मास। किम्वतः। प्रथेनिज्ञमिः प्रथेः-
निजभमेत्याः। जलीयं भरीरस्मयोनिजं वहस्तोके।
भाषा। द्रष्ट्रयं रसने सिद्धिचार्मदिशिरिषयो मतः॥ ८४॥
सार्थं उपासतेजसस्तु स्वादूपं ध्रुक्कभासरं॥

चित्रः प्रभ्यत्मित। द्वारण्ययम सलीयमितः। तथाचि रसं सलीयं गन्धास्यं ज्ञाते शति रसो ज्ञातान्।
शाकुरसाहिबस्यको दक्कवत्त् रसगामस्यंक्षेपं वधिचार-वार्णयाः दृष्ट्वां देखि॥ विषयं दर्शयति। सिद्धिस्मानादिरिति। चित्तः समुद्रः। दिमं तुषारः। पारिप्रदायकं धरितं कात्यायनकारः। मांसं चायतः। न च चिन्तकर्ता। कठिनलाम पारिवत्तमि वाचि। उसरणा विशीणणता तस्म जललस्य प्रतयंविशिष्ट्वात्। यद्यवन्धाय चद्ध-अध्भुतमगायमिति वायुर्वेदेनायमायामायेयचलिष्ट्वे॥
धनुर्धविवेश्ये दिवं वस्तविरेधाधान् करकादीनां काठि-भग्नत्वमस्य भ्रान्तात्॥ ८५॥

tेजय निरक्ष्यति। सार्थ उष्मा रत्यार्दिना। उषरलं शर्मनिहस्ता ज्ञातिविशेषः प्रत्यपनिहं। द्वारणं ज्ञोप्यम ख्येत्रमवार्णयाः वात्स्लेकम् तेजसं ज्ञातिविशेषः।
तत्स्म परमार्गस्तिस्ततं हु अर्थश्लेष्यंगमयं। न चेप्राधारं वाणकरणाद्वायमायमिति वाचि। तथा चि चेर्मायसं सलात्। किमु ततरः पारिवस्यशुरिनाभित्व-वार्यवहः। एव मलकिर्ष्टादी पार्थिवशशुरिनाभिव-वाणुसरादी। सागुन्तलाद्रवः॥ द्धवमित्याहः।
ভাষা। নৈমিত্তিক প্রস্তাবনা নিয়মানুসারে না পূর্ববয়স। ॥ ৪০ ॥

দ্বিতীয় নন্দন বিভিন্নবিধিবিশেষে। মনে। ॥

বিষ্ণু। বৈশ্বনার্য সরকারকিরণায় পার্শ্বনাথাভিভাষ্যের গুরু।

নন্দন তাবারে পার্শ্বনাথোপাধ্যায চাহিয়া বন্ধু না চাহিয়া

বন্ধু না চাহিয়া পরিজীবনে। বন্ধু না চাহিয়া পরিজীবনে। নৈমিত্তিক

মনে। সুর্যাক্ষর তেজসি নবমণ তাবারে। ন চ নাম

নৈমিত্তিক ক্ষ্যাতবল ন চ সুর্যাক্ষরীতে নানাতান্ত্রি বিষ্ণু

নানাতান্ত্রিতে বায়ু। পুরুষবিষ্ণু। জল-ক্ষেত্রে। তথা চে তবুবিষ্ণু নিত্যানবিষ্ণু।

নিত্যানবিষ্ণু পরস্পর পরস্পর। তবুবিষ্ণু পরস্পর। তয় বিষ্ণু পরস্পর নানাতান্ত্রি নানাতান্ত্রি।

নানাতান্ত্রি বিষ্ণু বিষ্ণু নানাতান্ত্রি। তথ সুর্য-নানাতান্ত্রি। প্রথম। ॥ ৪০ ॥

জ্ঞান চর বিভেদকারায় দ্বিতীয়মহিম। চন্দ্রকৃত পরক্ষর পরক্ষর প্রস্তাবনায় প্রথম পরক্ষর প্রস্তাবনায়।

প্রথম প্রথম প্রথম প্রথম প্রথম প্রথম প্রথম প্রথম প্রথম। ॥ ৪০ ॥

গঠনে। স্বয়ম্বর স্বয়ম্বর স্বয়ম্বর স্বয়ম্বর স্বয়ম্বর। পুরুষর স্বয়ম্বর স্বয়ম্বর। পুরুষর স্বয়ম্বর।

পুরুষর স্বয়ম্বর। পুরুষর স্বয়ম্বর। ॥ ৪০ ॥
ভাষা: 《অজাতীতে নৃনৃশারীলে সূর্যাস্ত পাতনে মনঃ》||৫১||

বিষ্ণু: চারোপায় রাখতে দেখ।|| বিষ্ণু: দূর্যোধন।
গণু সুমিষ্ট তেজসঃ কিং মানসী প্রতিষ্ঠা চতুর্থবলত।
বসুজ তেজসঃ প্রতি দিল্লু প্রতিষ্ঠায় অত্যন্ত গনির্ণয়ে
পুনুষ্ঠিত শক্তিনাথ মানালায়। এবে তমোময় যথা শ্রীধরী।
নান্দাপ্রায়ের ক্ষের ত্রিপূরোত্তর জ্ঞানেশ্বর চাণিশ-প্রায়রোধ
নানা পীতিময় ঘৃত পার্থিব স্মরণ সদাী কুটলাসঃ আধিপার রাতি পেত।
অজস্র মধ্যঃ রাধিকার রত্ন সংগ্রহ। অপর দ্বার পীতিময় ঘৃত
অত্যন্ত প্রতিষ্ঠায়ের শেষ কুপারাধুনিতাপতান প্রতিষ্ঠাস্মৃতি
ক্ষেত্রীয় হর কাপায়। তখন অন্ধকার প্রেম প্রতিষ্ঠায়
প্রতিষ্ঠায়ের পীতিময় ঘৃত স্মরণ: বিজাতীয় স্মরণ।
অ্যানামিতে স্মৃতিবাগান: পূর্বে পরিতার্থ পীতিময় ঘৃত
অত্যন্ত প্রতিষ্ঠায়ের শেষ কুপারাধুনিতাপতান অজস্র মধ্যঃ রাধিকার রাতি
তথা নির্মল মানালায়। অপাক জনালিত। পীতিময় ঘৃত
পীতিময় ঘৃত পার্থিব স্মরণ সদাী কুটলাসঃ আধিপার রাতি।
অপাক জনালিত। পীতিময় ঘৃত পার্থিব স্মরণ সদাী কুটলাসঃ আধিপার রাতি।
তথা নির্মল মানালায়। অপাক জনালিত। অপাক জনালিত।
মনঃ প্রতিষ্ঠায়ের পরিবর্তন অদৃশ অপাক রাতি।
পীতিময় ঘৃত পার্থিব স্মরণ সদাী কুটলাসঃ আধিপার রাতি।
তথা নির্মল মানালায়। অপাক জনালিত।
ভাষা: ||৫১||
भाषा  निर्यागमनवाक्यः त्रयः सर्पाधिकरणः ।
पूर्वविविधतायुक्तं दुःखव्यापि लघुग्रन्थियं ॥ ४२ ॥
प्राणादिनवं मचाभायुपर्यणों विषये मतः ।

विख्रवः । एव वायुः सर्पाधिकरणः । वायुर्वेष सर्पपथविनिकेतोपरेये । विज्ञातीयसंकुल विखंचनमनोग्राह्य वहारीया धध्या शाखारीया कामेबं तवेऽरुपमानान्तः । यथा च वर्धायेन प्रत्येकं तथा वर्धाये वध्याते ॥ पूर्वबिद्वाति ॥ वायुदिनिधे नियोगानिधिः । परमायु कुण्ये नियक्षिताधोपनिधिः कषमतः । चेरापि निविधः शरीररेखियविशेषमेतः । तत् शरीरस्पर्शोदिन विंशतिः ॥ परमु ज्ञौथैतज्जवायुविश्वमरीराशा पार्थिवभागेनशादुपभोगवधानव अशादीरीया प्राधान्यार्जीविन्यासिः ॥ चत्र च ये विशेषक्षमाः ॥ देखच्यायीः ॥

शरीरव्यापक सर्पपाणकमिनिः तक्तुक्त तथा वायुविधोः ॥ दुःखव्यापि सर्पस्वरूपकं वयस्कलानां ॥ ४२ ॥

श्रवणसत्ंग्यं विनदस्तियमयुक्ताध्यायवातवद्विषयं विषयं दुःखतिः । प्राणादिरितिः ॥ चेरापि चन्द्रशोऽवायुद्विभिः

तस्य चतुर्धिविधा प्राणादिरितियुक्तसाधारे तथापि मश्व-पाद्य नैमिन्यायमुकं । प्राणस्के पद्मदिनाराकम्

श्रवणसत्ंग्यं विनदस्तियमयुक्ताध्यायवातवद्विषयं विषयं दुःखतिः ॥
महाभारतत्त्व विशेष: शब्दोऽवैशेषिको गुणः॥ ४१॥
इन्द्रियन्तु भवेन् श्रोतमेकः सज्जनुपाधितः।

विद्यार्ज्ञ विद्याप्रमणन्ति। विद्याधेति। श्रवणकार्यं
दिशामेतेककविजितां सुमार्कविद्यार्थिकं न जाति: किमु
श्रवणलं मभ्रास्यलं। वैशेषिक इतिकथनं विशेष
वृत्तान्तानवर्षवर्षविवेकाय। अतेन ग्रामिणा आपि दर्शिते।
तथा हि। यद्येको गुणं च चुरुच्छायोगवर्षरिस्तिः चान्तिसम्तः स्वर्णस्।
यद्येको दृष्टिसम्वेदो गुणस्तु संगीतवर्ष दृष्टियुगमानी च चान्ति
न स्वर्णविद्वेष्येङुः। श्रवणेऽनौपायवाचवाचकारणकाला
भवेत् बनि दृष्टियुगपूर्वकप्रत्य चलान्त सुखवत्। पा
कलाकृत्यै विभिन्नवार्ताय वशनं पर्यंतपार्यः
विभिन्नवार्तायाधारणकारणगुणमूलंकेरोषि। जलपरमाणु
रूपादिव विभिन्नवार्ताय प्रत्येकः। यद्येको न दिशाम्
कसमन्तो विशेषगुणस्। साधारणगुणम्। वशि
रिस्तिः चान्तिसम्बालाः रूपवत्। दृष्टियुग महाधिकारण
गव
मद्यवचं गणेनारम्भैं विद्याति। न च वायुवचेषु
कलात् कारणगुणपूर्वकः। यद्येको उपाधि
तामनिति वायं। श्रवणवत्त्वाभावलें वायुविशेषगुणस्तु
भावाः। तत्र स्वरूपवाचवाचवाचमानवात्॥ ४२॥

drṣṭrī vṛṣṭitā. drṣṭrī vṛṣṭitā. māyākārṇ lañcavā-
भाषा । जन्यानी जनकः काशे जगतमाश्रयः मतः || ४४ ||

परापरलघीचेतः चणादिः शादुपाधितः ।

विष्ठा ॥ देवं सिद्धं शेषं पुरवेंद्रेन भिन्नं कथमाकांशं खादन चाहः । एकः सत्यपीयादि । श्राकाश एक एव मन्नपि उपाधीः कर्षणप्रकृतार्देरवंराहिमे ओषधार्यः भवती-लयः ॥

काशं निक्षप्यति । जन्यानामिति ॥ तत्र प्रमाणं दशविद्विनाश । जगतामिति । तपाशि दृढ़वीं घट दशाविन्दितीः सूर्यपरिशिक्षादिकं चतुर्थि विशयीक-रोगि तद्रा सूर्यपरिशिक्षादिनं घटादे । समझे वाच्यः सु च यं योगादिनं संभवनीति काशं एव तत्समाम्भ-टकः कस्यते ॥ ४४ ॥

दत्वं तस्मात्सत्त्वतलः सम्बूकः प्रमाणार्यः दर्श-चयि । परापरलेकः । पर्लापरलकुदृढराखारणं निः-भीतं काशं एव । पर्लापरलकृषिकारणचर्यानं योगायोगसाधितिरिक् । कस्यत दृषति भावः ॥

नगेकस्य काशं सिद्धैः । चणदिर्गमाश्चवर्षिणिः शादुपाधितं न खादन चाह।। चणादिरिति । काशेकेकरेऽपि उपाधिभीत्वाच चणादिरिववृद्धिरिवपयः । उपाधिरेतुं खजन-विभागाङ्गभावावविचिच्चितं कर्णं पूर्वसंगोगावविचिच्चितं द्विभागे वा पूर्वसंगोगभावावविचिच्चितं उत्तरसंगोगाग-भागे वा उत्तरसंगोगावविचिच्चितं कर्णं वा ॥ न चेतनर-
भाषा० दूराणिकाद्रिशिवेळूरका निया दिगुळ्यते॥ ४५॥
उपाधिवेदार्दैकापि प्राच्यानिद्वापदेशमानाक।

शिष्ठा० संयोगमहरं चतुबाध्यारो न खार्दिति वाच्यं। कसोनारसतार्दिति। महाप्रति चतुरानिद्वाख्यारो च घरपी
तदनाध्याय अंबानाइपपादावीः। अद्यानिद्वाख्यार्क तन्नतुढणुकुटोबिति॥

दिर्गं निगुळ्यति। दूराणिकेति। दूरले चाः चन्द्र।
कर्षण दैशिकं परलमपरं बेच्यं। तदुपरसभांधरं
वीरं दिर्गेव। दैशिकपर्वपरसभारं चारंकारणः।
चन्द्रगाञ्जयत्सत्य दिक्कं निगुळ्यति भावः॥ ४६॥

न्येवा० दिर्गं वधि न्या प्राच्योपतीपाद्रिश्वाराः। कथम्पूद्यातात्मित्यं भावः। उपाधीति। दुपुराी
उद्यगिरिसम्भितता या दिक्कं सा सया प्राची
उद्यगिरिसविं या प्रतीकोधी। एवं तपुरसभामूः
इस्विभिता दिगुळ्येको नदाविभिता लवारीं। वर्षेज्ञा
वेकू वर्णार्य मेवेदचतरतम स्मत दति निवमान्॥

आत्मां निगुळ्यति। आतेक्षिणेति। आत्मां
जातिस्तु सुखदुःखदिसमवानिद्वार्कारणः।
विधाति। दैशिकोपि सा जातिरेको। अद्यानिद्वार्कादिरुपकारणानाध्याय न सुखदुःखादिरुपकारणानाध्याय दति निवमान्यांथोजकालार्॥
परे सीरे० सा जातिरेको प्रगाढानाध्यायः। न च
भावो चात्मकियां ध्यायिकाता करणं चि सकार्कम्॥

शरीरसम् न चैतन्यं खण्डेषु व्यभिचारतः॥

विश्वासः दशमभ्रष्टापरिन्यासानवचनं विभजनाद्विति वदन्ति॥

इख्यादीर्घि। रक्षियार्यं शरीरसम् च परमर्था
चैतन्यशब्दांकः।। चधणाकानि चर्चा जाने चर्चा सुखी-
व्याधिभ्रष्टविषयविषयमकेव तथापि विप्रतिपन्नः हि
प्रथमतः एवं शरीरार्थिमाध्यमात्मातिगृंदशर्ति
प्रतिषार्थतिः न भक्ति दृढ्यतः प्रभाणं दर्शयति।

करणाति। ज्ञाताराथिं विद्वानिकरणार्यं कर्तवा-
रमनार्थेषु पाण्डुपारं दृढ्यत। एवं चचुराराथिं शास-
करणार्यं पाण्डुपारामपि कर्तवरमनारेषु नापपपत
दृष्टितिरितः कर्ता कल्लयते॥

गनु शरीरकैवेद कारुङ्गमयं जतः चाच। शरीर-
केरि॥ गनु चैतन्यम् ज्ञानार्थिकेमेव। सुखाम्यानां लक्षण
हव ज्ञाताराणामपि नद्भावे का त्यतः प्राणात-भावेन ज्ञानाभावं विद्वेबिरिति चेतु। न । शरी-
रखनं चैतन्यं बाँधे विन्यासितव खाविरे भाषानुग-पति।। शरीराशामलव्यापपचायपचायद्वादितिरितानिकारण-भाजितात॥ न ॥ पूर्वशरीरार्थेष्वर्द्धारेष्वरीयस्य
नित्ये च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च
चारारं बागारं उपपत्तिः दृष्टि वाचयं। भाषणानं-
खारकरते बौद्धबतृ। एवं शरीरसम् चैतन्यं वाजकस्य

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भावः  तथातः दिन्निर्ग्राणमुपपाने कथं शृवति: || ४७ ||
मनोकुपि न तथा ज्ञानवननाथाँ तद्वा भवेत् ।

विभा । सनपानावे प्रश्नविंक स्मात् । दृष्टममवता शास्त्रां
तद्वृत्त्तान्त् । तद्व्यगीर्भिमाध्यमतस्मारकावावात् ।
समाने जनासमारुषोत्सः शार्धनवलस तद्वारी कर-
शांदेव प्रतिनिः । न च जनासमारुषोत्सः गुणवस्स्य
सार्थ-तामिल वाच्य । उद्धाधाकावावात् । अत्र लगाभ्यां
वीवांकुशः जेवेवदेवाध्यक्षम कल्याते । दृष्टस्म वंमारीभावा-
वितित्या शास्नानावपि अकालिलच्छैः अकालिलास्वा
कामस्वातूः निष्कर्त्ये विधातावति बाच्ये ॥ गणु चुजुरा-
रीगाः शास्नावे करणलं कर्तव्याध्यातुं विरोधे वाध-
कामावात्रत भाच । तथालिमित । चैनवसिद्धः ।
उपवाते नामे वति सार्थस्मुजुरारीभावेन । कथमित ।
पौवेच चुजुरा याचातुः कतांगाः चुजुरेश्वाभाले सार्थम न
स्वात । अकणविन्दुरमावात् । अकणविन्दुः अनेन सार-
शामस्वातूः । अकणविन्दुशेषे: सामानाधिकरणेन
कार्यकारणभावावादन्ति साव: ॥ ४७ ॥

गणु चुजुरारीगाः चैनवं मातूः मगवतु निल-
स्याः चैनवं प्वादं भाच । गणु श्वीतिः ॥ न तथा ।
न चैनवं । ज्ञानारीगाः । मगवे्यमुलातूः । ग्रामवेचे
च महलास देवेततुः । गणवमि ज्ञानसुखार्थिमची तत्त्-
भाषा। सम्बोधनायोग्यत्वं विशेषतः\n
dhúra\n
शिक्षा प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तिरिलाभ्। यथा मनोहस्तुं तथा न-न्येत। नदी विश्वासेव श्राव्यं तथा खात: प्रकाश-प्रतिकार्ष्यः चेतनं तथासुतारिकथानुत, तत्केवाकारविशेषः। तथापि भावलाभेऽ बखालं पूर्वविश्वातः नखोपरविशकानेचेतुलात्। सुभुमावपि ज्ञात्वाविश्वात्

गडार निरावधिपूर्वविश्वासाय वसन रववृत्ती-पूर्वविश्वासानन्तरकारायुक्तरोकारविविधान सम्बालात्रानुपत्तिः। श्रवणार्द्रेतेति चेत। न। तस्मां अग-मिषयवेष सांस्कृतिक कारकोऽविविधये विनिमयमाभव॥। सुभुमापि विश्वासाभायप्रमित्। तदान्तः

निराकारं विश्वासाततुुवर्ष्टिदृश्ये चेत। न। तस्मां ख्य्यमकाशः प्रमाणाभावात्। जनया घटादीनामापि

ज्ञानापति॥ न चेताप्पत्तिविश्वासाततितिक्रसवृहतः

भावादिरिति वाच्य। घटादीमुखायुगायुक्तपित्य-मन्त्रकलात्॥ नाराकारविशेष प्रावधिर विश्वासकेत पेश।

किमयमाकारातितिचतेति विश्वासात्। तापि समयातं

विश्वासातितिक्रमेन। चातितिचतेति पेश। तापि समूलाभ-र्माने नीराकारोपि प्राप्ताकारः। खातः। खृष्णवे वि-

श्वासाविशेषात्॥ चपेषःकृतः बीमलादिश्विंशायवधारं

drati 체त्। न। नीलादीना विश्वासानेकारायवधारम्

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विन्दुः वेगात्। धरत्रया विरोधाधीन मुद्रपच्चलाय्। न च वास-नामक्रमः प्रकाश्यति। माहुपृत्तीरपि वार्षिकमुद्रसम्य-प्रांशः। न च उपादानोपदेशभावेश्च्यामिनयांस्कृति वाच्यः। वार्षिकः: चक्षुभाववात्॥ उत्तररज्ञिमुपर्यापत्तिरेव मु-जुत्रम प्रवत्। न। तदुत्पादकाभावात्। उत्तररिष्ट्रानि ज्ञातो विद्यात्मकी सद्द्वारस्यरूपः॥ वहिद्विज्ञानेनिति-ग्रंथविखें: कल्यन्त दृष्ट्य चेत्। न। माणार्यावात्। कथ-नागारबाच्छ। एतेऽन वचिकमार्यारबेव चैतन्यर्याहं मन्तुम॥। नैर्वानविद्यात्मवै माणार्यावाच्छ। चौजार्यापि सच-कारिमवाचपालादेवोपद्यः। कुव्यप्प्रलक्षपालाच॥ कहत्व तत्त्वे वचिकविशेषेण नैर्वानसिद्धिविज्ञानमेवमान्यज-विशार्याः। चरे चरमाच्छा सदाया श्रायोगमनस्त्व ब्रम्हात्मा-गविष्णुतेरिति चेत्। न। तस्य यथावदसाधारस्य दृष्टिनतात्। निनिश्चितमेव श्रायले माणार्यावात्। मविष्यल-स्वाच्छान्तुभवात्। चरे श्रायोगमनस्त्व निन्दा श्रायमिति चिन्तु॥। अवर्ज्याश्रायोगस्मिति ब्राजापर्येव सौविध्यो नैर्वानस्यस-मुखिवः: सिद्धार्थिर्भूमिणीवाभिः भृदायिनः सुतदयालो-सराभेदः॥।। प्राचयव चभृत्वेऽवाचानुपपत्तः। गौणपीतकर्म-द्वेषाधिका शेतः। भृदायिनः तसदेवें तसदेवं प्रतिपाद-चन्द्र सौत्ती। अभेदभावेः च यतिनागमिति वद्वति। अत एव सर्वं एव सन्तुभासितमिन समर्थात्। सूयनोऽभेदऽ अभेदः जातां दत्तं पि।
চিহ্নায়: মেদুস নিয়লেন সাশায়েগাতু। মেদুস নিয়লেন অকিদরূপে নিয়লেন। দ্বিমময় দ্বিমময় নির্ধারণ করা যাচ্ছে। তবে নির্ধারণের বিধান নিয়মিত বিধান। তন্ত্র নির্ধারণ করা যাচ্ছে। কারণ অকিদরূপে নিয়মিত বিধান। দ্বিমময় দ্বিমময় নির্ধারণের প্রয়োজন। এই প্রথম নির্ধারণ গতি দ্বিতীয় বিধান করা যাচ্ছে। যেহেতু তদার্থের প্রতিপাদক জ্ঞান: নিয়ম নির্ধারণ করা যাচ্ছে। অন্যদিকে প্রতিরোধের রাজ সংঘটিত হয়েছে। এই এবং নির্ধারণ: পরম গতি নির্দেশ করে। ঈশ্বরের জ্ঞান সন্ন্যাস কিন্তু জ্ঞান প্রদান করা যাচ্ছে। নিয়ম নির্দেশনা নির্দেশ করা যাচ্ছে। মেদুস নিয়লেন নির্দেশনা। বিধান করা যাচ্ছে। অন্তর্ভুক্ত বিধান করা যাচ্ছে। মেদুস নিয়লেন। 

এতে প্রদান: কর্তৃ পুষ্প। পুষ্পকার্যাধিকার।
विष्णु। लें: किंतु चेतनः। कार्यकार्यकार्यकार्यकार्यकार्य-
माये कार्यकार्यकार्यकार्यकार्यकार्यकार्यकार्य
गामः। साधितालिकालिका तस्य।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
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तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामपञ्चायत:। तस्य:।
तुल्यकृततचे साधितालिकालिका नामप殓
भाषाः प्रवृत्त्याचनुमेयाःसंरयगतस्य साराध्यः ।

चिन्ता । तत्तुपूर्वसंस्कृतमार्यापति । चचेतनायाः प्रक्ष्णे।
कार्यलाबू युक्तेर प्रेषितं कार्यकार्यपेशकाश्चाताक्यादिनी
चेत । न प्रविष्टे । कर्णुजनवले सागाभावात् । वीरराग-
जम्भार्णजनादिनादिने । भगवानेन्द्राणाशरवाणियले ।
तत् निं प्रक्ष्णार्थद्रुक्यनेन ॥ च च

प्रक्ष्णे। कियमाणानि गुणेषु कर्माणि कर्मं ।

प्रक्ष्णार्थद्रुक्यनेन कर्माद्रूपितं सन्यते ॥

रुद्रनेन विरोध दृष्टि वार्ष्यं। प्रक्ष्णसुरुस्य । गुणेषु-
हृदाणि गुणेषु: रक्षादिरिहः । कर्माविरुष्येन ।

रक्षात्तद्यमान्य।

तत्तथे दत्त कर्मारमाध्यां केवलातु च ।

रक्षादि वदता भवता प्रक्ष्णार्थद्रुक्यनेन सुपरिश्रावधानस्य
दृष्टि वशुष्प ॥

प्रक्ष्णार्थद्रुक्यनेन दान। चालोर्युक्तवेभ्ये।

मरिशमहार्थकर्त्तवीस। देशानानसां भोगानुप-
पते ॥ विशेषपुज्येऽगत्व दृष्टि। योगाविशेषपुज्यकाँ-
जनाधनम: प्रत्यक्ष भवति ग लम्बा। ख्रिः आने ख्रिः
हृदेशमि रक्षादिरिहते: ॥ ४८ ॥

प्रक्ष्णानि। कियमाणानि परेक्षादै मन्त्रादिना
उगुमीयते। प्रक्ष्णिर्च चेता। ब्रह्मज्ञानाच्यावादीगां
भाषा: यशस्विनीस्यध्येययश मनोमालयो मोचर। ॥ ८५ ॥
विभुविरित। विभुविर तततथो तत दुःखांमाषी रंथेति। यथै: र्धक्षेत्रमेधा न संवत्ति तथापि तेन कर्मणा मार्ग्यायाणुनीयते तथा वेषाराकै कर्मणा प्रातारापौरिति भाव:। यशस्विनी
रंथेति। यशस्विनीस्यध्येयस्यध्यायाणुनीच्छत रंथि भावः। तत
विभुविरित। विभुविरित। विभुविरित। विभुविरित। विभुविरित। विभुविरित। विभुविरित।
प्रार्थे: तंतामध्ये विषय नामिनि नविरामिति। नन रंथि। समाधिभविष्यिः
प्रार्थ्यायाणुनीविवधो मानसप्रायणविवधस्येः। यथा-
भाषायायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्य�ाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्यभाषायास्य�
भावे  ऋषिजाद्रिप्रभेदेन प्रत्ययः बल्हिं सतं ॥ पूर्व ॥

तिष्ठा० मनःकपिद्रिघाणं सर्व्वमेव शान्ति तत्तथापि दृश्यलमेव ।
रूप्येष दृष्टिपाशं दन्त शान्ति कारणं तद्धत्त्वथ-मिति विविधं ।
० ईव्यात्यचन्द्रु न सच्च दृष्टिपाशं बल्हिं सतं तद्धत्त्वथ-मिति विविधं ।
वधिकसङ्ग्रहं प्राणश्चाराचिश्च धाराचिश्च राज्यमुत्तनं
आत्मिकाणां उपनित्तां दाहुःशान्ति शान्त्वेष्येदिपर्य सार्वत्रणा
मध्ये धर्म्पर धार्मणुरुमभेषणां च देशलाभं तत्र
तंत्रात्मिकं ॥ परार्थषणं शान्तमून्निति ।
वधिकर्मणं परार्थषणं तत्थापि मरार्थषणं
हेतुविधम् महासां तद्देवमुन्निति ॥ च जाराष्ट्यकृत-
हेतुविधम्कानुमुनिामधामिति वाच्यं ।
ताणुहाना-शतसुलभवायामातिमस्य विविधतिलाभ ।
वधिक स आत्मिकाणकरणं शान्तमून्निति ।
एवं शान्तमून्निति करणं शान्तमून्निति ।
पदश्चानकरणं शान्ति शाक्ति-वोध ।
वज्रतो वन्द्यविद्वन्त्यमितिविजितिमादाय तद्न-मितिर्देवी शति
चक्षुद्दवत्र्यमहाबुधादाय तद्न-मितिजातिमलं भूविदितीलं ।
एवं तुत्त्विविद्वन्त्यनिवादि-मादाय तद्न-मितिर्देवी शति
चक्षुद्दवत्र्यमहाबुधादाय तद्न-मितिजातिमलं प्रत्ययलाभिक्ष वा
चतिमि ॥
भाषा। भाषाच्या गायचे गन्ये गण्येवादिरपणे खूंतः।
तथा रसे। रसमायात्तथा शब्देच्या च सुने।
उज्ज्वलांपणे नयनाच्या गोळेरून स्वयं
विभागासंगोऽगपरापरत्वसंगोऽगद्रवते परिमाणयुक्ते। पूर्वः
किया जाति योग्यवत्ती समवायन्य ताहारः।

सिद्धार्थ गाढवाढणे वाहन वाहन वाहन वाहन
मागमंत्र विधिर्विधित्व प्रत्येकः। न चेस्टरपदार्तकालिक
गाण्यूनला। गन्येचित्रकृत निधन्यौिधन्यौि वाग्नु मुखारात्।

गाण्ये हति या बाच दात्मचः। गाण्ये बिद्धितमः। चारिद्वारः सुरभित्वाच्च भिन्नपरिवर्तः।
गन्यु पदार्थाया वाहनमंत्रित रूपा। गण्युपार्थ
यथा ह गाण्यू न गाण्यूमंत्रित वेधे। तथा रस
दहित। रसप्रदायिते प्रत्येकः। गन्ये रसुः उज्ज्वले
वेधः। तथा प्रम्पदायित्वः।

उज्ज्वलरूपितमः। प्रोक्टोऽवाकवन्तकु तरूपितमः। न
वाहन प्रत्येकः। तदर्णित। उज्ज्वलरूपवितः।

चेतांतः। विध्यासूक्षमिः योग्यविधिसिद्ध चाराः।
ताभूम योग्यविधिसिद्धां। च चारुच्य गम्यसंग वर्ते तद
दात। धातीतः। अखोकसंगीत सुहुलानुसरण प्रायः प्रति
कर्षणं। तत्र ज्योत्सारुप प्रति तेधाः।
ভাষাও শ্রীকার্তিত চলঃ সংয়োগার্জালোকাহুতক্ষরয়ো।। ২৪।।
জ্ঞুনস্পর্শ্বস্ব দ্যঃ গোচর। সৌপিণ্ডি চত্বর।।

বিষ্ণু১০ যমার্থার্থমৈষুন কারণল। ক্ষুদ্রায়সায়বায়সমনো প্রতি
মায়বায়সবায়সমনো প্রতি ধ্রুবায়সবায়সমনো প্রতি রশ্লাদি:
প্রতৰ্ভে প্রতৰ্ভে প্রতৰ্ভে প্রতৰ্ভে প্রতৰ্ভে প্রতি।। ২৪।।

চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
চৈত্রাযুৎকর্ষবু দ্যঃ। গোচরাক্ষো গোচর।। বোঃপি
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भाषा: कृपार्यक्ष्यसुिा योग्र रुपमतापि कारणां || पुष्प ||
हत्वात्प्रके लघु योगि मनसा प्रामाकारणां।

ित्रा: सुभाषिमति प्रमानं सचारु वाचयर्पि प्रवचनं भवयेन।
विन्द्र्क्षप्राण्यमाले सु न द्वम न वा सर्षस रेतुलं
वायुप्रमाणेरकवं सम्बन्ध एव काश्तु हितार्थकमपि
काष्ठ्यु कक्षाप्रपिमाणारे जे मार्गद्रिष्याकः || ११ ||
लेभे योगि मनसा प्रामाकारणांमति। लक्षणः संदे-
गे स्वागमाले कारणालांक्षे! विभक तथा प्रमाणं सुपू-
चिकाले सर्व लक्ष्या परितिवर्तमानेन मनसा प्रामाण-
अन्विति। ननु सुपूचिकाले किं भाष भविष्यति चन्द्र-
भवदृष्टि कारकृष्णवा। नाथः। चन्द्रभवमामयमातात्
तथा हि। चाण्डैनायर्थाचें चोरङ-रिणा वष्ट मनः संदे-
गस आद्यः। सदभावादेव न चाण्डैनायर्थाचेन मत-
मादेरभावादेव न मामचनारचं मातायभाबवेयायामे
पि प्रमाणमति वारिष्णामामानास नागुर्विति। वाणु-भाजामामाताः नेपणिति।। पद स्वामामाताः न राष-
स्त्रोध धर्म। चन्द्रभवमामयमातास नागुर्वध। उद्धे-कामाभाष न कारणं। मेवं सुपूचिमांश्चार्यापिन्त्यहि
अन्त्यामसमायांग्रं मत्यमाणाङ्खासु नद्यांक्षं यिधे
मातायभावात् कुचिकालामे नित्यमेकामेब आतां
कक्षयापि प्रमाणामातां।। सव स्वामाचे लक्षणः संदे-
भावः मनोयाघ्र सुख दुःखसिद्धा देखो मनि छति ॥ पूर्व ॥
शान्त यज्ञिर्मिवकाशी तदनीतिनिष्ठिते ।

विच्छेदः गसा यदि कारणम् तदा राधनाबाणार्द्रिग्रहणकाले
शारणग्रामं सम्। विषयलक्ष्मेयोगस्थि सघ्नःन्यो-
ग्यां च बलात्। परस्परगतिशास्त्रकालपि वा न खलय-
दिति। चतुर्वेदी पूर्वाकाखल्ला सघ्नःन्योगस्थि स्वतः चे
विच्छेदः चापुवादिमया: शारणार्द्रिगतिशास्त्रकालमु-
भवानुर्वाहारान् कल्यण धृति। चतुर्वेदी पूर्वाकाखल्ला
वेष्यभम:सघ्नःन्योगस्थि शान्तेनेतरं कस्यं चापुवादिग्रहण-
काळे लघूः।संयोगभावाय शारणग्रामगतिशास्त्रमितिवर्तिति।
मनोयाग्नि सुख दुःखमिच्छादेशे मति: छतिरिति।
मनोवनमाधविविध रघुर:। माणिकियां। धृति: प्रथम:।
एवं सुखलादिकालमण मनोयाग्नि। एववागमापि मनो-
ष्ठाल्ला।। किंतु मनोयाग्नि गोरी रघुरेण पूर्वागः-
लादू ग्रजः नेताः।। पूर्व ॥

शान्त यज्ञिर्मिवकाशे तदनीतिनिष्ठितमिति।
विच्छेदः संयोगकाणां घट रघुराकारं घटलादिविषये
शान्त ग्रजः च मध्यवर्ति। पूर्वं विषयवर्ते घटलादेशाणामी-
भावान्। विषयवर्ते विषयवर्तमाणाय कारणात्।
तथा च प्रथमं घटघटलेशाणात्राणां ग्रजः
आयते तदेव निर्मितिकालवर्तं तच न प्रधार्यं। तथा
ধ্বজাণু মধ্যে ভর্তি চতুরিন্দিয় কর্ম মন্ত্র "ধ্বজা।"

ধ্বজাণু হি বিশ্বাসপ্রাপ্ত বিশ্বব্যাস ভর্তি ন ভবতি। ঘটনায় জানানীতি প্রাধান্য। নতুনি মন্ত্র প্রকারে বহু ভাষ্যে। মন্ত্রে ঘটনায় ঘটনায় গঠন। প্রকার: তে এব বিশেষশাস্ত্রের। বিশেষে চলনীয়তা তদন্তিযুক্ততায় বিশেষভাবে বিশেষে বিশেষের প্রকার মন্ত্র বিশেষে বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের। নির্দেশনায় চলনীয়তা প্রকার: তে প্রকার:। সেত ঘটনায় চলনীয়তা রিক্ষানীয় বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের। সেন বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের বিশেষের।

সন্ধর্ষ্যে বিষয়প্রকারে হর্ষাচ। ক্রুষ্ণশ্চরে সন্ধর্ষ্যে সমাবেশসমাবেশে কারণ কারণ। ক্রুষ্ণসমাবেশে জনপ্রিয়প্রিয়া প্রায় ছেন সাধারণসমাবেশসমাবেশে কারণ কারণ। ক্রুষ্ণসমাবেশসমাবেশে গুণলক্ষণলক্ষণমূলক প্রায় ছেন সাধারণসমাবেশসমাবেশে কারণ কারণ। দ্বিতীয় দ্বিতীয় দ্বিতীয়। অধ্যাপক বিষয়প্রকার রামায়নজন। দ্বিতীয় দ্বিতীয় দ্বিতীয়। অধ্যাপক বিষয়প্রকার রামায়নজন। কিন্তু ক্রুষ্ণরূপত্তিতে বিষয়প্রকার রামায়নজনে থাক। মন্ত্রানুসারে মন্ত্রানুসারে মন্ত্রানুসারে মন্ত্রানুসারে মন্ত্রানুসারে মন্ত্রানুসারে। ক্রুষ্ণসমাবেশে গুণলক্ষণ সম্ভ্র মন্ত্রানুসারে মন্ত্রানুসারে।

* গুণলক্ষণসমাবেশে গুণলক্ষণসমাবেশে মন্ত্রানুসারে। দ্বিতীয় দ্বিতীয় দ্বিতীয়।
ভাষা। বিষয়েশ্রিয়সমন্ধো ব্যাপারে চোপি পদ্ধতি।

বিষয়া। স্থাপাদেশকুষি বলাত। উদ্ধুনিতি উদ্ভবঙ্গ ন জাতি।
কৃত্তিতাদিতা কররাম। ন চ প্রকল্পাদিত্যান্তন্তী-বোজ্জুতালমিতি বাচ্ছে জন্মতুলালিন্ত। জানায়ান্ত্রে জন্মকরণপ্রভা। কিন্তু প্রকল্পাদিত্যাভষ্মমন্ত্রলং
নামা তথ্যাচারিতোষ্ঠুলং। তথ বংলেরাজার্পিন্তত। তথা
চ ঘটেন্দ্রনন্দ। বংলেরাজাদেশচুরারেকাতি বিত্রীণিত।
কাশালিয়ারাণাচ বিষয়বদেছ। ইন্দ্রিয়বধ্য
বিষয়েত্রিয়খাপি প্রার্থন মতে প্রথমজনকাতু।
ধ্যানচ্যায়বাচারণ্যায় কাশাদে স্থ্যাভাবায়েতে বিশ্রাম-কথকায়া কারণীং নোতুষ্টসুতু: বংলেরাজায়। ধ্যান-
চ বাচারচ মনঃপদে ক্ষানকরণমিত্যপি তদার-কায় কারণমিতি। জ্ঞানাধারণ কারণ কারণ। জ্ঞান-
ধারণেল ব্যাপারত্তর। ১৩।

বিষয়েশ্রিয়সমন্ধো ব্যাপারে চোপি পদ্ধতি দ্বতি।
যাপার্থ র্যাপি পদ্ধতি দ্বতি।
ক্ষান্তু যাপি পানা সুদাচারণ্যদহার
চতুর্থযাতি। ধ্রুবযাচ চতুয়।
ধ্রুবান্ধুচিন্ত্যায়েং ধ্রুবায়েং।
ধ্রুবান্ধুদ্বেলপ্রমাচ চতুর্থায়স্যামায়জননা। এতমে
ধ্রুবান্ধুদ্বেলচারিত প্রতি প্রতি প্রতি চতুর্থায় মাযায়চ: মায়ু-
भागः ३  क्राक्षसारं संगीतानं संयुक्तसमवायः ॥ ३८ ॥

विज्ञा: ३ नवनापि विशिष्टाि काय्यकारणभावः । परमेश्वर परमाशुनीले मीहरल धित्वीपरमाशुले धित्वीलश चचुष्यन कर्त्य न प्राप्ताते । तत्र परमेश्वर उज्ज्वलिष्ठमये महामये स्तिष्ठानलात् । तथा इि मीहरल जयते केवल घटनीले परमाशुनीले स्तिष्ठानले । तत्त्वं महामये घटोपमाद्राय स्तिष्ठानले । एवं धित्वीले घटार्धिकमाद्राय महामाद्राय स्तिष्ठानले । एवं वाचे तदृशर्वर्गादि च बन्त्याः । एवं वाचे तदृशर्वर्गादि च बन्त्याः । तस्मादुपद्वपाविष्ठिः महाविष्ठिः महाबिष्ठिः मनुः । वर्यमवेंद्रशुप-पायो तादृशबिष्ठिः मनुः । वर्यमवेंद्रशुप-पायो तादृशबिष्ठिः मनुः । वर्यमवेंद्रशुप-पायो तादृशबिष्ठिः मनुः । वर्यमवेंद्रशुप-पायो तादृशबिष्ठिः मनुः । वर्यमवेंद्रशुप-पायो तादृशबिष्ठिः मनुः । वर्यमवेंद्रशुप-पायो तादृशबिष्ठिः मनुः ।
भाषा। कृपया समवेतानां शब्दसः समवायत:॥पृ४॥

नहुन्तीनां समवेतसमवायेन तु ग्राहः।

विष्णु। लक्ष्युक्तसमवेतसमवायः कारणः। चतुर्पि महत्वावः

क्षिणां उज्ज्वलं कालवृद्धिवनस्य: पूर्ववर्षेन विपयः॥ एवं

ग्राहयात्रे ग्राहसंयुक्तसमवायः। ग्राहसमवेतस ग्राहसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः

कारणः॥ एवं राशिप्रथाये राशीसंयुक्तसमवायः। राशिसमवेतस राशी-

प्रथाये राशीसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः कारणः। शब्दप्रथाये

श्रीचावदिपिक्षामवायः। शब्दसमवेतसावश्चार्यः श्री-

चावदिपिक्षामवेतसमवायः कारणः॥ चतुर्य समवेत प्रत्यथेः

शैलिक्षेप्न वेदः। वर्गानुवृत्तां तैत्तिर्कं प्रत्यथं द्रष्ट्रय- *

संयोगादिद्रथं विनार्यं भवति॥ एवमात्मानः प्रथते मन:ः

संयोगः। आधोपतीमात्मानाय प्रथते मनः संयुक्तसमवायः।

आधोपतीमात्मानाय प्रथते मन: संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः

कारणः। अभावप्रथाये समवायप्रथाये च दुस्क्री-*

चक्रसार्वविष्णुस्य चेतृः॥

वैशिष्ट्यकामने तु न समवायः प्रथते। चतुर्य वच्छाः

विशेषत्वाय गानाविधा तथा वि भूतवादी घाटामायः

संयुक्तविशेषत्वाय युक्ते। ब्रह्मान्त्वैै उपाधेयाभावः

संयुक्तविशेषत्वाय रासायनिकः। ब्रह्मान्त्वैै उपाधेयाभावः

संयुक्तविशेषत्वाय रासायनिकः। भवाभावः केत्रस-
पृष्ठ

भावम् विशेषणतया तद्दृश्यानां यथे भवत् ॥ ६० ॥
यद्य स्यादुपलभेनेतोऽव यज्ञ प्रसङ्गते ।

संहिता: आचार्यचिन्तामणिविशेषणतया । कार्यं खलासभावः
श्रेष्ठविक्षणमवेतविशेषणतया । एवं कलाबद्धिष्ठा-
भावे खलासभावादिकं विशेषणाववंशेषणतया । एवं घटा-
भावार्दी पराश्वाभावः मन्युअविशेषणविशेषणतया ।
एवमनद्यूऽह। तथापि विशेषणात्वालक्षणपैथिको वा गाज्ये
नमस्तु वेदः वस्त्रिकर्ष दति ग्रार्य प्रवार्यो चास्ये-
नेति ॥ ५८ ॥ ६८ ॥ ६० ॥

चयं स्यादुपलभेनेति । श्रावस्यांचे चोम्यानु-
पस्य: कार्यं । तथापि मूलवार्दी घटादिशयाने
जाते घटाभावादिकं न जायते तेनाभावोपेनो
प्रतियोगुपलस्याभावः: कार्यं । तत्त्वापि घोषणात्वाणे-
विषयः या प्रतियोगिनिग्राध्यात्मकप्रकर्मोपरिवर्ती-
गीताः । तद्वचन स्त्राणेचिन्तिना घटादि: वल्लमपत्ता
प्रकर्मात्ल उपलस्याकारः: प्रतियोगी यस्य औपलस्य-
भावोपाध्यात्मकस्याचे वेदः । तथार्थ: । चालोकयोगार-
दिकं वर्णविन्ते तत्र वचनं घटः स्त्राद । तर्कु उपलभेत
राजार्धिनिर्दित रक्षणे । तत्र घटाभाववादिप्रस्तवर्पणं भवति
अभभावे तु गापादित्यं विरतं दति । तेन घटाभा-
वादो भवेन्तः वाप्लाभावानं न खार्यग्राध्यात्मकं भवेन् ।
भाषा ० प्रायः समवायस्य विशेषणतया भवेत् ॥ ६१ ॥

बिहु ० शैलोकसंबंधोऽगं विनापि खार्जनद्रव्याकाराद्विष्ठू
सकलात्। गुलालदिकं यद्ये गं तद्भावमुः न प्रवचः।
तत् गुलालदिप्रश्रयेकाराद्विष्ठमसकलात्। वायो
रुपाभावः। पाणाये मैसरभावः। गुले निकाभावः।
श्रेये श्रव्भावः। ब्लालिन्युखाभावः। एवमाद्य
स्तरकिंत्रित्येवर्तने। तत्तपायवस्थार्थं अन्तः
संगर्भभावत्तत्रे प्रतिप्लेधिने बोग्यता। रणे
म्याभावपि लघुकरणऽयोग्यतापेशिता। रात्रि
श्लोकादै विष्णुवादिवकेदानिपि चधुषा ्युभान्त एव ॥६१॥

प्रायः शैलिकाशैलिकभेदेन दिविधः। तत्
शैलिकभेदः प्रेषणा शैलाकर्णा वर्षिता। अशैलिक
शैलाकर्णाविदानी वदति। अशैलिक दृढः। वापारः
शैलिकः। यामान्यमेति। यामान्यं समस्य चेष्टा
दृष्टवर्यः। तत् समस्ययद्यि समस्यमुच्यते तदा
यामान्यस्य प्रत्राम्यतिरित्यम् सम्भवे। तदेनक्रि
यमान्यतिरित्यमन्यद्विजे रक्षने प्रकारीभूतं वेद्यं। तथा दिव
साधत्रस्त्रिषयूखो धूमादिशिविशेष्यं धूमे दृढः स्थान
जातं। तत् शानेन धूमने प्रकारः। धूमने शैलाकर्ण
धूमे दृष्टवर्यं कष्टधूमभविष्यकं शानं जातवे।
भावः सामान्यलयणा शान्तलयणा योगजस्त्या ॥ ५ क ॥
प्रासतिराष्ट्रायान्तु सामान्यशान्मिष्ठे ।

विष्णुः पत्र यदि द्रष्ट्रहस्तस्त्ररूपेियोिथे तदा धूली-पत्रे ध्यूमलभ्यान्तरे वकलभूमविषयको ज्ञान संसात। तत्र ध्यूमलोकं वह द्रष्ट्रहस्तविश्वाभावात्। समाते त् द्रष्ट्रनमस्कृ ध्यूमपत्रे तद्विश्वाकु म दृष्टि ज्ञाने।
तत्र प्रकारीभूतं धूमलोकं प्रस्थापितं।। द्रष्ट्रहस्थमोहणे लोकका धाशः।। दुःस्व च वद्यरित्रिक्रिया।। सागसस्ते ते ज्ञानप्रकारीभूतसामान्यमार्थ प्रस्थापितं।। ज्ञानं
ज्ञानदिनं भविष्यस्तु पिन्धाप्राप्तिकितं सागसं सक-भूपवाचारद्रिवेधं उपस्थितं।। परस्मु समासागिनी भावं
सामान्ये। तत्र भविष्यितं धूमवादि कष्टागितं च-टादि।। यथेको चतः संयोगे मुलसे वमवाचें कपाले
सामान्यद्रमारे क्षेत्राधीत तद्हत्तवत॥ भूवलादीगिना
कपालदीगिना वा ज्ञानं भृतत॥। ज्ञायें चों चों सामान्ये
यें समवेते प्राप्तवे तन्नमवेतन प्रधिकारणांगं प्रस्थापितं।। किन्नु च तद्हत्तनाधारात् तद्हत्तवं
साधरण जातं तत्र सामान्यलयणं क्षेत्राधीत तद्हत्तवत॥
भारं न संसात॥ सामान्याः तद्विश्वाभावात्॥ ६२ ॥
किंवद द्रष्ट्रहस्तस्त्ररूपेियोिथे च दृष्टि ज्ञाने।।
तत्र परस्परे द्रष्ट्रहस्तस्त्ररूपेियोिथे विनापि तद्विश्वाभाव-
भाषा । तदिैुप्रतायजनांमध्येराष्ट्रामध्येरणे \। अघ \।

विष्णु । प्रकारिैैुप्रतायजनांमध्ये बलातून ताहुतमारां बलून न जायते । तस्तात् यामान्यत्वां प्रत्यायजनिति मुक्तिसिद्ध। शास्त्रितबाद । शास्त्रित: प्रत्यायजनितिैर:।

तथां च यामान्यसंस्कृतच संस्कृतभाषा विष्णुैर:॥

तेन यामान्यविशेषज्ञ शास्त्र प्रत्यायजनितिैर्यां सथाये ॥

दु:ष श्रेष्ठाय: वाच्यं योगार्थकं विनापि यामान्यत्वां वच वर्तने ततः षाण्डारोंतां यारुकायमृतप्रश्चारं खारत राष्ट्र ॥

निर्दिष्ट्वर्ण दृष्ट॥ अन्नार्थ: यहां यद्रिविनिर्दिष्ट यामान्यसंस्कृतत्वां शास्त्रं समीपांत ततां तत्किलेक्षिणिषेषव तन्त्रामान्यत्वां निर्दिष्ट्वर्णद्वजः शास्त्रामाणि अध्येनित ॥

या च यामाणि चनुः:वंशयोगार्थकं योगार्थकं ।

तेनाणि कारादी चंपुराणिन ताण्डुराणां न जायते ॥ १२ ॥

संस्कृत संस्कृतिः शास्त्रुपाय यामान्यसंस्कृत वनारुकायमृत संस्कृत संस्कृति मुक्तिनां ततात्वां साधुतप्राप्त। विनापि घन्य तष्णीव यापारेष्वाणि यामान्यसंस्कृत दृष्ट॥

शास्त्रां प्रत्यायजनिति न तदात्यन्य शास्त्रं जनाति।

शास्त्रां प्रत्यायजनिति न तदात्यन्य शास्त्रं जनाति।

शास्त्रां प्रत्यायजनिति न तदात्यन्य शास्त्रं जनाति।

शास्त्रां प्रत्यायजनिति न तदात्यन्य शास्त्रं जनाति।

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शास्त्रां प्रत्यायजनिति न तदात्यन्य शास्त्रं जनाति।

शास्त्रां प्रत्यायजनिति न तदात्यन्य शास्त्रं जनाति।

शास्त्रां प्रत्यायजनिति न तदात्यन्य शास्त्रं जनाति।

शास्त्रां प्रत्यायजनिति न तदात्यन्य शास्त्रं जनाति।
भाषा । विषयी यथा नस्लेऽवापरो ज्ञानसंचारान ।
योगजी दिविल ग्रेतो युक्तसुक्तान्मे हृदि ॥ ८४ ॥

विषयात् करण महत्त्वदेहं वामानसंचारां ख्यातीयत ॥ ग च सक-सध्यायुध्युधमागामाधे कां चतुरीति वाचः प्रविष्ठधुऽ
वजिष्ठसंचारा युनीतात् ॥ अन्नपुष्करण चाणुपिनात-लांकुसी वज्ञाणाधे न वेति चंद्रायागुप्तानि ॥ कमः ते यु
वामानसंचारां सकरभूमोपपिनाते काशार्यार-देवार्यार्याधूसे वज्ञायालसवन्देहः वामवति ॥ न च वामानसंचाराधीनेके प्रमीलमेव सकरभूमेते जाते
वार्षिकपञ्चितमिति वाचः ॥ प्रमीलमेव सकरभूमेते जाते
नेपक विशिष्ट वक्तान्यायांगामामाल्यतेन यार्यानामः
वातु ॥ एव ज्ञानसंचाराय च्योकारे नरिस्वपनम-मिति जाने वैरभुक्ते भान्ति कर्तर्कामणभारस्य नर्तर्कामणभारस्य
कर्तर्कामणभारस्य नर्तर्कामणभारस्य ॥ एवं वह भूलित भूली-पर-ठझ माल्य भान्ति ज्ञानसंचाराय ॥ एव वह भूलित भूली-पर-ठझ माल्य भान्ति ज्ञान-संचाराय ॥

योगजी दिविल दृशि । योगायासंजिते संस्कृति-
ग्रेतः नुसिमुखार्थितसाधनमुर्दैवन दृशि ॥ युक्तसुक्तान्मे हृदि
दृशि । युक्तसुक्तान्मे हृदि दिविल ग्रेतोनिदिविराहाक्षणां हृदि दिविल ग्रेतोनिदिविराहाक्षणां हृदि दिविल ग्रेतो
भावः ॥ ८४ ॥
भाषा । युक्तत्व सर्वेद्रा भाने चिन्तामयकनोपर ।
व्यापारस्तु परामर्शं करणं व्यासिनिस्विदेवेऽऽुपः ॥
ग्रनुमायं श्राहमानं लिङ्गनु करणं न च।

विद्वता । युक्तत्व सर्वेद्रा भानमिति । चेतासाोववश्रीकतमानः :
बमभिषमायास्वातिविषविषविन्दुयुक्तस्थतः ।
चर्चमेव विनिष्ठैव गविंद्र विन्दुरथ्युच्चतः सर्वेद्रेिति।
चित्ताधारिकं विनेतरः। भानं सर्वाविषयाणि
यत् स्यः। चपेते। युक्तानो विषवाभाद्यानामः। चिन्ता
श्राहं मणिश्येक्यायकरः। ततु यथार्थान् शुल्कः
नायवविषविषविन्दुयुक्तस्थिति नायवायान् प्रत सरीकरानि यतः।

ग्रनुमिति युक्तादित्यति। व्यापारश्चिति। ग्रनु-
मार्याय ग्रनुमिति व्यासिकारं करणं। परामर्शं व्या-
पारः। तथायथ पशु दर्शनानां भूम्ये वक्षे-
वार्ताहिरियिः पशुतः व एव पुष्पः कृकित्व पर्वेतादैव
विविष्ठधूमासः धूमस्येव प्रमाणि तन्त्रमारं धूमे
वक्षुधाय दत्त्वं करिष्यार्थं व्यासिकारं भवति। तत्तादा
वक्षुधायधूमवाणालयिति श्रातं भवति व एव परामर्शं दश्युचाता। तदग्नारं पर्वेततां वक्षुधामिति श्रातं
आयते। तदेवग्रनुमिति। अत्र प्राचीनात्त्वा व्याप्तेलर
श्राहमारं धूमादिकमनुमितकरबं। तदवशयति प्राचार-
मानमिति।
भाषा। वनागताहरुम न स्वादुनमितिष्ठान॥ भा॥
व्यास्य रक्षनवित्तिचे परामर्श उच्चते।

भाषा॥ सिस्थानुभूतिकरणं पुष्पिमाल॥ वनागतादे
रति॥ सम्भवनाते निर्माण करणं साधु तदा वनाग
गतेन विशेषय वा सिस्थ चनुमितिम खात्॥ सम्
मितिकरणश्च सिस्थ तदानीमभावाम्॥ ६४॥ ६६॥

व्यास्य परामर्शविषयाचारिति। व्यास्यविविधत्रिति।
व्यास्यविविधानं पयेण वैचिन्द्र्यवाचविचारभूमिनितजनं।
तत्र वापः
पचे दृष्टि जाग्न। पचे व्याख्यानिति ज्ञानं वा।
चनुमीतिस्तु पचे वाप दृष्टि ज्ञानात् पचे साधनं वैयाकर
रितक॥ पचे व्याख्यानिति ज्ञानात् पचे: साधनानि
वैयाकरिक।॥ द्विवादिपि परामर्शात् पचे: साध
विविधयानुमितिरितत्त्वः॥ मनु वज्ञानाधृतमवाक्षु
पर्यत्न दृष्टि ज्ञाने विनापि गच पर्यते धूमवानिति
वच्छति ततो धूमेत वज्ञानाधृत दृष्टि साधनं भवति।
तत्र वागवस्यानुमितिरितजनात्॥ व्यास्यविविधवै
विचारविचारं साधनं न कारणं किन्तु वाच्यतान
खेडकारकप्रचारं जागलेन कारणले वाच्यम
कलान।। विचित्रतेविभिन्नवाचकलये गौरवाचति चेत॥
वाच्यतान्नामकारणं पार्थवाचवानिति ज्ञान
दृष्टि:॥ साधनाय व्यास्यविविधरकप्रचारं यत्नाते।
भाषा० यासित: साध्यवद्यस्मिन्सवन्न उदाहरण: || ३७ ||

शिर० स्मारकेपैल कारकाले। किण्या धूमवानु पर्वत दृति श्रा-मादजुम्भियापि:। यातावश्चेत्यकि:तर्पुमलएक-रक्षषंधर्मात्रासानसव सलातु।। न च तदानी। दस्त-मादव्यशापातक्षेत्रकककारकपधंधर्मात्रासानसव चूळ-लमित वार्थ। देवनाथ यासित्रेत। नेचत पक्षधंधर्मात-मादादगुम्मिति: अखारित। यदि तु तत्पुष्ट्यविघ-श्मादादव्यशमायाश्चेत्यकककारकपकत्तत्पुष्ट्यविघपधंधर्मात्रासानसव तत्पुष्ट्यवाणागुम्मिता। शेतास्वयं तदा प्रवक-कारकारखाभाव:। माधवे तु एव्यवाहेन यासितमारक-पक्षधंधर्मात्रासानसव एव्यवाहेनागुम्मितिः अनयात्तीवर्यं ना-भानकारकारखाभाव:। यदि तु यासितमारकं श्रान्त-पक्षधंधर्मात्रासानसव खलस्तं कारकारखाभावे विष्णुवा० धूम श्रावोकवानु पर्वत दृति श्रादादगुम्मिति: अखारित। देवनाथ च धारां-द्वय तथापि विशिष्टाश्चारं कल्पनीय। फक्सुण्यागैरव-श्रादेवलातु दृति॥

यासित: नाम यासित: साध्यवद्यनाथ। तच का यासितित श्राच॥ यासितित। यासित: द्वारेनि। वनःमानु धूमा-दित्याद्वै यासित: वकः॥ साध्यवानु मचाणवाहः॥ तद्भे। जल्ल्वदार्थ०:। तदंश्चमि: धूमकेति। चचचचमन्मयः
माणा। भ्रात्वा चेतुमन्धिन्निजविश्वासप्रतियोगिना।

बिद्वा। धृमवान्न जङ्गेरिक्षार्हे संपाध्वदेशभिज्ञः पिष्कारे। वक्ष्यस्यान्नविस्मित्वाणि। च चेत भ्रात्वा चेतुमन्धिन्निजविश्वासप्रतियोगिना।

"समध्वा समवायवभन्न वक्ष्यस्य जङ्गेरिक्षार्हे भ्रात्वाणि। तति धृमवान्न विश्वासप्रतियोगिना। साध्वदेश साध्व- 

लार्ज्यस्यान्नविस्मित्वाणि। तति धृमवान्न विश्वासप्रतियोगिना। साध्वदेश साध्व- 

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ভাষার সাধারণ চেনেরীকাজিকাক্রমে ব্যাপ্তিকরণে।

বিষয়াদি সামাজিকের চেতনাতস্কলবান্ধব সমাবেশ হনী-রাজ্যবাসী রাজ্যধর্মী নাগর্জুনী। মেহরী নিজের হাতে দৃশ্যমান হয় তাহা হইয়াছে, তিনি কর্মকান্ড এবং নির্দেশনা।

তথাৎ সাধারণধারায় অবকাশপালন করিতে দেখা যায়। সাধারণ ইতিহাসের উপর নির্ভর করিয়া থাকে। যদিও বিশেষ উদ্ধারের নিম্নতম অংশের উপর নির্ভর করে।

নাম্নীয় বুদ্ধবিদ্যায় চেতনাটিকের নিকটবর্তী অবস্থা অবচে যাইলেও নানা আবেগের দাত হয়।

তাদের প্রথম অবকাশের মধ্যে নিয়মপত্র অবকাশকারী এবং উন্নত কর্মীর মধ্যে সাধারণের স্বাক্ষরী প্রতি নিশ্চিত যোগ নিয়মিত।

নতুন কল্যাণের প্রভাব সম্পন্ন সাহিত্যবিদ্যায় সাধারণভাবে উন্নত কর্মীর মধ্যে ব্যাপ্তিকরণের সূত্রপাত।
ग्युग्युगा१० गव्यांकसुधकिमवेल संचारसज्तकमित्यविवंभनी। एवं
दुःखादेव साते परमराजस्वयं दुःखालिद्रिकवेल माया-
तावंस्कर्व प्रसिद्धोगितागव्यांककिमवंभणी। सेल-
धिकरक्षण भेतुभावावलकिमिःधिकारं कवाँ। तेन
क्रमं गुणकस्मयसविकार्यसतादिनालिनाभावातिरिवेल्पि
क्रमालंक बांधम। एकुतावलक्षकमनी गेलिंकर्णं बोधां। तेन
समवायेन भूमाधिकरणसद्वसयनिधिभावातिरिवेल्पि
कंपि वर्क्षामायकं। भावाऩ्या प्रसिद्ध गिथिमसधिकरणं
वेदाः। तेन कपिल्योगी एतदुःखालिनार्दे मूलाव-
केरेवै एतदुःखालिनिकपिवेगाभावातिरिवेल्कं
संयोगम भावामायकं। न च प्रसिद्धं किमिःधिकारं भवानी
धिकरणसद्वसयनिधिभावातिरिवेल्पि नह तद्वाभावामायकं।
प्रसिद्धं: कपिल्योगावलकिमिःधिककरणगुणार्दे वर्षके चेसबा-
वस्याय सतात्। यदि प्रसिद्धमिकार-
पांिनं तेना संयोगिसविकार्यसतादि कपिल्योगावलकिमिःधिककरणगुणार्दे
स्वाभाविकरणुःसद्वसयनिधिभावातिरिवेल्पि वर्षके।
प्रसिद्धमिकारणं सतात्। चेलधिककरणं
प्रसिद्धमिकारणुःसद्वसयनिधिभावातिरिवेल्पि नविबिकतलाभु।
संयोगिसविकारणुःमूलावलकिमिःधिककरणुःसद्व
झटमायकं। प्रसिद्धमिकारणं सतात्।
विष्णुः वाक्यं। तेन विष्णुक्षुडङ्गः जागुरुः जातेरित्वा। नानाधिकरणुः विष्णुक्षुडङ्गः प्रतित्याळीमारात्माधिकरणुः अलेकोगिन्यं च। एवं साधनाऐवेरकमसचेष्ट्व ज्ञातेव। तेन भागवान् दुधार्याश्री द्वारे दुधार्यादशरण द्रव्यमण्डलायेन भागवान्धिकरणकष्ठियं च। दुधार्यः वल्किमान् धुमार्यायाश्री धुमार्यादोषायस्माद् धुमार्याय द्रव्यमण्डलायेन कष्ठियं च। न गनु प्रतित्याळीमारात्मानुवादिकारविश्वा यज्ञ कथितः सत्यमान्यः व अनुमाणिकरणाः। यत् किन्निश्चितं प्रतित्याळीमारात्मानुवादिकारविश्वा वानुमाणिकरणलमुखः।
आश्रि कपिलयागी पत्रुवचार्यान्त्यासांवान्यात। कपिलयागाद्वारेः प्रतित्याळीमारात्मानुवादिकारविश्वा हुथा-हनिरपि कपिलयागी भवति तर्कनिकरणस्व दृष्टि । द्विस्ते प्रतित्याळीमारात्मानुवादिकारविश्वा प्रमाणाय। यथेववाहावाणक पूर्णषस्त्रसालिनाशिर्सिस्वभावावात्मकः प्रतित्याळीमारात्मानुवादिकारविश्वा प्रमाणाय। गच वल्किमान् धुमार्यायाश्री घट्याभावाः। पूर्णषस्त्रसालिनाशिर्सिस्वभावावात्मकः प्रतित्याळीमारात्मानुवादिकारविश्वा प्रमाणाय। वात्याश्रित्यालाला गृहाभावावात्मकः पूर्णषस्त्रसालिनाशिर्सिस्वभावावात्मकः प्रतित्याळीमारात्मानुवादिकारविश्वा प्रमाणाय।
ধিয়া। প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। কি ও ঘটান্তে বাসুদেব বিভিন্ন রয়েছে ন ধূমারোণ বাহ্যিক রয়েছে দারোণ। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী। তেজ সমন্বয় শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বোক্ত শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। কৰ্ম্মকর্মপ্রতিষ্ঠা যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। নামতাত্ত্বিক কর্মকর্মপ্রতিষ্ঠা যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে।

এই সময়ে যে বাসুদেব অভাবাত্মায় প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। বাসুদেব অভাবাত্মায় প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে।

এই সময়ে যে বাসুদেব অভাবাত্মায় প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। বাসুদেব অভাবাত্মায় প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে।

এই সময়ে যে বাসুদেব অভাবাত্মায় প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। বাসুদেব অভাবাত্মায় প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে।

এই সময়ে যে বাসুদেব অভাবাত্মায় প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। বাসুদেব অভাবাত্মায় প্রতিযোগিতাধিকরণ মাধ্যমিক হলাটু। তাত্ত্বিক শ্রেষ্ঠতাবী যুগান্ত পূর্বে পূর্বে শ্রেষ্ঠতাবীরশ্চ যে ধারণ করা যেতে পারে।
ধিন্দা। সমমাণাবিষ্ণলয়েব অবিনিষ্ণলেমায়ালাবাঙ্গলোন সম- 
বেন তদ্ধোঁয়াবিষ্ণল তথ চেতুযায়কলং চেত্তং। যাপ- 
কথাসামান্তধিকরণঃ শাস্তি।। মত্তামাং সাধ্যাত- 
বসংদ্রক্ষমাং। যেীীং সাধ্যাতাবৃত্তং। তথ প্রি- 
চুড়ায়াবিষ্ণলাভাভাবমাজমিয়ুচ্তে তত্ত সমবায়ন 
শেী বল্লাভাবক্ষণাত্রিয়াটাতাবৃত্তগ্রহণ ষে ইক তত- 
াত্রিয়াটাতাবৃত্তক্ষণ বল্লিকাশ্যায় স্থান। যবি 
ষ মত্তামাণাবিষ্ণলাভাভাবমাজমিয়ুচ্তে তত্ত তাব- 
ষো শং সন্তোষে ঘটাভাব প্রতিয়েষিতায় সন্তোষে ঘট- 
মাণাবিষ্ণলাভাভাবমাজমিয়ু খাদত্ত ভাস্মসংখ্যা। 
রত্নাকাশী ঘটবাণঃ কাশলরিমাণাভিযাদাহী সন্তোষে 
গ্রহণেন তোীং ঘটাভাবাত্রিয়াটাতু গ্রহণাধিক- 
করণী যুতোৎপাতী সর্ব্বাং। য এব সন্তোষে ঘটাভাব- 
ক্ষণ প্রতিয়েষিতায় কালিত্রমাণাবিষ্ণলঘটলাভ ক্ষণ 
ুলেমায়ালাভাভাবমাজমিয়ু খাদত্ত ভাস্মসংখ্যা। 
ধূমবাণঃ বন্ধীরি- 
থানাভিপ্রাণিকার্যায় যামানাপদমুখার্য । গছ 
প্রমুচ্ছখানাদী ধূমাদাযী প্রমুচ্ছখানাধিক- 
ক্ষণপ্রাপ্তাঃ। গুদাধ্যানসম্প্রতিবৃত্তকালাদিতি চেতু। গু 
কনুঠোবাদিরাদী সায়েদি গ্রন্থী কনুঠোবিদিদ্বারাধিক- 
বিষ্ণুপ্রতিয়েষিতাভিষাককারণী গুদাধ্যানসম্প্রতি— 
কনুঠোবাদিরাদী সায়েদি। গু 
টু। ২২।
भाषा: सिद्धांतविद्या प्रूयथिसिद्धियत्र न कियने।

विषुः परमाणुमीत्रस्य पचलं किं तदरह। विषाध=
विषया गृहः बिल्लिरित्यादि। सिद्धांतविद्यारच=
विषियत्या: बिल्लिरभाव: पचता तद्राण्य च पच द्रुततः।
विषाधविषाधार्य न पचता। विलापि विषाधविषाध
पारसाधनमेषा सुः क्षमापि विषाध=
विषाधश्चेदुमिनिमित्ववव्यव:। यत: विषाधविषाधारच=
विषियत्या: बिल्लिर विषेष!। तथा च यत् बिल्लिराग्न्वि
तत्त्व मित्राधविषाधारा प्रायानमधायमपिपचता। चतुः
विषाधविषाधारविषियत्या: परमाणीमसममापिपचता।
चतुः च बिल्लिराग्न्वि विषाधविषाधारच नागिष्ठ तत्त्व:
पचता। विषाधविषाधविषाधारविषियत्या: सतात्। ननु:
चतुः परमाणमारपरशुः बिल्लिराग्न्वि: विषाधविषाधा
tतत्त्व मित्राधविषाधारकाले परमाणानान्महानुयमीति:।
चतुः बिल्लिरपराणानान्महारविषाधविषाधा
विषाधविषाधार: ननुष्ठ भवनित्य तत्त्व विषाध=
विषाधारकाले बिल्लिराग्न्वि: प्रसिद्धवकाभावादेक्ष्यागुमितिः।
यत् विषाधविषाधविषित्यपराणाश: बलिन्तात्त्त्व पराम=
रधानालेविषाधविषाधाराणी नागिष्ठ। एवमेत्यापि बिल्लि=
काले परामाणाकाले विषाधविषाध। येज्यविषियत्या: बुजु=
जानानां धीताधारिविषाधारतत्त्व विषाधविषाधारविषि=
त्या: बिल्लिरित्यादिविषेषियनं व्याख्या। च। यत् वस्त्रायथापूर्णः
ভাষা। স পচষ্টু ছুটিত্বমানাদনুমিতভেবে। 'টোটন

বিভাগ। বাগি পর্য্যালোচনা বক্ষ্মাসিত্যনুমিতি। সুখপাধানাং গতপথ গার্ভ হা। সত্য: বিশালকথা। সত্য পচষ্টু পথতে বিশালপ্রয়োগবিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট। বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট।

নেহন বিভিন্নপ্রকার বিভিন্ন কারণ মাত্রা যাতে মাত্রা মাত্রা যাতে মাত্রা যাতে। বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট।

নেহন বিভিন্নপ্রকার বিভিন্ন কারণ মাত্রা যাতে মাত্রা মাত্রা যাতে মাত্রা যাতে। বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট।

নেহন পর্য্যালোচনা পাশায় পাদ্যালিত্য মাত্রা মাত্রা যাতে মাত্রা যাতে। বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট।

নেহন পর্য্যালোচনা পাশায় পাদ্যালিত্য মাত্রা মাত্রা যাতে মাত্রা যাতে। বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট।

নেহন পর্য্যালোচনা পাশায় পাদ্যালিত্য মাত্রা মাত্রা যাতে মাত্রা যাতে। বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট।

নেহন পর্য্যালোচনা পাশায় পাদ্যালিত্য মাত্রা মাত্রা যাতে মাত্রা যাতে। বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট বিশিষ্ট।
भाषा: च्छेदनीय विवेकावलम्बिपण्य: प्रतिपादिता

विवेका तत्त्वाचार्यमहेन्द्रस्थलपति भवति न लिनितर्नामिकारिवा नित्यविषयसमावेशमाणविश्वकृतहृदयादीरकः स्वामी कारिगोक्षिणा अधिकृतोऽधिकृताय खातयेष प्रतिवेक्षिता। एवं परामर्शान्तरं विनायक प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः। प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः प्रतिवेक्षिता ॥ ६८ ॥

प्रवचनव्रता देनाधिकार्य विभजने। च्छेदनीय विद्याधर्मी। तत्त्वाचार्यमहेन्द्रस्थलपति भवति न लिनितर्नामिकारिवा नित्यविषयसमावेशमाणविश्वकृतहृदयादीरकः स्वामी कारिगोक्षिणा अधिकृतोऽधिकृताय खातयेष प्रतिवेक्षिता। एवं परामर्शान्तरं विनायक प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः। प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः प्रतिवेक्षिता ॥ ६८ ॥

च्छेदनीय विद्याधर्मी। तत्त्वाचार्यमहेन्द्रस्थलपति भवति न लिनितर्नामिकारिवा नित्यविषयसमावेशमाणविश्वकृतहृदयादीरकः स्वामी कारिगोक्षिणा अधिकृतोऽधिकृताय खातयेष प्रतिवेक्षिता। एवं परामर्शान्तरं विनायक प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः। प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः प्रतिवेक्षिता ॥ ६८ ॥

च्छेदनीय विद्याधर्मी। तत्त्वाचार्यमहेन्द्रस्थलपति भवति न लिनितर्नामिकारिवा नित्यविषयसमावेशमाणविश्वकृतहृदयादीरकः स्वामी कारिगोक्षिणा अधिकृतोऽधिकृताय खातयेष प्रतिवेक्षिता। एवं परामर्शान्तरं विनायक प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः। प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः प्रतिवेक्षिता ॥ ६८ ॥

च्छेदनीय विद्याधर्मी। तत्त्वाचार्यमहेन्द्रस्थलपति भवति न लिनितर्नामिकारिवा नित्यविषयसमावेशमाणविश्वकृतहृदयादीरकः स्वामी कारिगोक्षिणा अधिकृतोऽधिकृताय खातयेष प्रतिवेक्षिता। एवं परामर्शान्तरं विनायक प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः। प्राचे प्रकाशः प्रवाहित्राध्यायानुरूपः प्रतिवेक्षिता ॥ ६८ ॥
ভাষা: কাশায়োপদিষ্ট্যে বেলাভাষাত্তু পদ্ধতি। ৩০।
চাষায়: সাধারণতু স্ত্রী সাদৃশ্যাভারণে স্ততঃ।

চিকা: বিদ্যমকলেগ জ্ঞানস্মানুমিতিরিওজিল বুদ্ধি বেলা-ভাষায় সম্প্রতিপচ্ছি বিগোধিতাযাবাস্ত্রার উপাধি তথা বুদ্ধি বিচিত্রান্নূপপনচ্ছে। ন চৈবে বিদ্যমানূ ধূমাদ্যাদী বাধতে পবে বাধ্যাভাবাবিষয়কলেগানুমিতিরিওজি-লাভানন্দানুপপনে বুদ্ধি বিচিত্রান্নূপপনে বাধতে পবে বুদ্ধেরাপি বাধ্যাভাবাবিষয়কলেগানুমিতিরিওজি বাধতে পবে। তত্ত্ব জ্ঞানস্মানুমিতিরিওজি বাধতে পবে। চৈবে বিদ্যমানূ কৃত্যান্নবত্ত্বতু তত্ত্ব জ্ঞানস্মানুমিতিরিওজি বাধতে পবে। তত্ত্ব বাধ্যাভাবাবিষয়কলেগানুমিতিরিওজি বাধতে পবে।

চাষায়: বাধ্যাভাবাবিষয়কলেগানুমিতিরিওজি বাধতে পবে। চৈবে বিদ্যমানূ কৃত্যান্নবত্ত্বতু তত্ত্ব জ্ঞানস্মানুমিতিরিওজি বাধতে পবে।

এবং সাধারণাভাবাবিষয়কলেগানুমিতিরিওজি বাধতে পবে। ৩০।
भाषा । तथुवानुपर्ष्ट्याः ग्रथाकान्ताकिस्मताः भवेन ॥ ३१ ॥

विद्वान् विद्वाने । चर्मावरण्यासभम् ॥ अन्ये तु वपवानांनिर- 
साधरणः । वपवस्य निर्मितयाधेयाः । रूपज्ञ प्रस्तुती निर्विज्ञाति, 
स्वविषयः मस्तिलादिव्रती पचे यदा याथानिश्चययथा 
नामाधारणः तद्र देहुसिद्धार्थिति वदन्ति ॥ अगु- 
पसंहारी च अद्यतानभावास्त्रिविशालाः ॥ तेन च 
विशिष्टवत्त्यावस्थाप्रतिष्ठात् किंतु ॥ विश्वासु 
साधवकोम्बुताभावास्त्रिषेवं ॥ चय वा माधाबाव- 
विषया च च च च साधारणकलेख प्रतिवेक्षणः ॥ सत्त्वनिपते तु मुख्येन- 
माधाबावाधारः ॥ ज्ञ स्तु देहुरवेदी विशेषः ॥ साध- 
अभावाधारः च च साधारणकलेख उपयोगः देहुस्य- 
किंवदेहोपकथापरस्त्रां विशेषः ॥ श्राविषयः साध- 
भावावास्त्राः पञ्चः ॥ श्रुतिस्तु श्रुतास्त्रामेयास्त्रां वैवेशः 
स्वविषयकाेनान्यां भावावास्त्राः स्वविषयितरि - 
वयस्काः वर्णदेव ॥ ज्ञच च परस्तराभावावास्त्राः 
राजात् परस्तरानुस्रितप्रतिवेक्षः पञ्चः ॥ ज्ञच कृप्न- 
यथा घटाभावावास्त्राः ग्रज्ञात्मकरूपमेव नियोगार्थेद्भूतः 
संयोगे वर्षते । घटासाहायाः ज्ञाते ॥ यथा च मधवप्र- 
यिन्द्राभावावास्त्राः संवताः पिण्डादिनाः पीतः 
मम रति धीरजयते । एवं कोटिदेशाभावावास्त्राः 
कोटिदेशाभावावास्त्राः संगमे ममति तथा यामिनिपञ्चाम् 
संगमकह्पासुस्तिक्षार्थ यथा ज्ञः । दैवकृतिकार्यावर्धनं
बिंब ३ तत्त्वाधिकारसः तद्विस्तारकोटिभान्तरतिविवर्णभाषा । उपलब्धेन चालीकारसः नियमऽपरमविवर्णभाषा । कस्यत दृष्टि बहुः। तत्त्वः तदभावावायुसः स्वतः तदुपनीताकात्यायनविवेचनाद्वैशार्यादेहारस्मृताः। लोककारार्जकारणार्जनवैविवेचनावत्मकानुमानपूर्वकः तत्त्वः प्रतिबन्धकानुमानपूर्वकः। साहवान्। न द्वन्दवसन्तमानविवेचनेऽस्वदेशवंशवृत्तिः च प्रकृतिप्रतिबन्धकानुमानपूर्वकः। गौरवान्। तथाच प्रतिवेशकविवेचनानुमानपूर्वकः क-प्रतिवेशकानुमानपूर्वकः। न पि लोककारार्जकारणार्जनवैविवेचनावत्मकानुमानपूर्वकः प्रत्याविवेचनार्जनवैविवेचनावत्मकानुमानपूर्वकः। प्रामाण्यकी वेणुकुंजांकविवेचनार्जनवैविवेचनावत्मकानुमानपूर्वकः। चन्द्र कौटिल्यवाणपालसः तिरोभावायुसः च अवायुसः चायुवर्त्यकः निरोधित्याकारणार्जनवैविवेचनार्जनवैविवेचनावत्मकानुमानपूर्वकः। प्रतिवेशकानुमानपूर्वकः।

आस्याबिविवेचनावत्ममस्तिभिन्दुः। आस्याबिविवेचनाः प्रथम पर्यासांक्षेपकारणाः। प्रथम च काव्याममः। पर्यासां किंमालिनिः बाध्यते। तत पर्यासां त बाध्यते। काव्याममः दृष्टि भाषाः स्वाभा विद्यामाः काव्याममपर्यासां परागम्यात्ममः। परागम्यात्ममः।

खः पासित्वमुखः पथे धार्मिकत्वायुः। च च च परो दृष्टे धुमाविवेचनाः पथे धार्मिकत्वाभवी तते। पथे धार्मिकत्वायुः तस्मात् पथे धार्मिकत्वायुः प्रसारमेत्यात्ममः। परागम्यात्ममः।
बिभा। धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि। या च गायि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
तथा च धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि। या च गायि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
शाल तथा धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
एवं चैति शाल तथा धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
शाल तथा धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
वायस्य पच्च माध्यामाध्यामाथि। एतस्यामुक्तिसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्व।
धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि। एतस्यामुक्तिसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्व।
तद्विरिक्तत्त्वसंग्रहमित्व। एतस्यामुक्तिसंग्रहमित्व।
धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
वायस्य पच्च माध्यामाध्यामाथि। एतस्यामुक्तिसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्वसंग्रहमित्व।
धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
वायस्य पच्च माध्यामाध्यामाथि। एतस्यामुक्तिसंग्रहमित्व।
धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
वायस्य पच्च माध्यामाध्यामाथि। एतस्यामुक्तिसंग्रहमित्व।
धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
वायस्य पच्च माध्यामाध्यामाथि। एतस्यामुक्तिसंग्रहमित्व।
धार्मिकिणिष्ठि धार्मिकिणिष्ठि।
ভাষায় তাঁর নিজের বিপরীত প্রতিপক্ষকলার গতিবছর শর্তঃ। কিন্তু 
অসমসাধারণার্থকতা বাধাতে পরিণত। বিজ্ঞান বিভক্ত তাঁর প্রামাণ্য লাভের জন্য বধুরস্ততে। 
তাতে অসমসাধারণতার উপরে প্রামাণ্য শর্ত করতে। 

এবং চিন্তানিবন্ধনের 
বিভ্রমে ঘটাইলা গাথারাজারাত্রিবিশেষের 
স্বপ্নে ঘটনা গাথারাজাত করার জন্য বাহিক 
গতিকলার সাথে। 

চলাচলের মধ্যে রামনারায়ণ বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল, বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল, বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল, 
একাধিক বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল। 
এবং রামনারায়ণ বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল 
স্বপ্নে ঘটাইলা গাথারাজাত। 

* গতি বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল পরিপূর্ণ স্বপ্ন 
গতি প্রকৃতিতের প্রতিপক্ষের 

ধর্মঃ বিপদের স্বপ্ন বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল। 
বিপদের স্বপ্ন বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল। 

বিপদের স্বপ্ন বাধাবাষ্কন্তকরকুল। 

* গতি ধর্মঃ বিপদের স্বপ্ন। 
গতি প্রকৃতিতের প্রতিপক্ষের 
বিপদের স্বপ্ন। 

বিপদের স্বপ্ন। 

ধর্মঃ বিপদের স্বপ্ন। 
ধর্মঃ বিপদের স্বপ্ন।


�ાજા । 

tિથિયાનુપરત્યારી કેબલાંલીયિપન્નક ।

ય: સાધ્યાવતી નૈવાસતી સ વિદ્રોહ ઉત્દાહન: !! ૭૨ !!

વિખ્યાતં: 

મમ । પૂર્વતો વિપણંદમીલિયે વાખ્ય: \ વિદ્રોહ શાખા-

રાશલીય દૂરસન્યાયી મિત્રતાય તથા પાટકાયાતુ ।

બચ્છભનભાદુ બાદલ: ય બાશાધારણે મત રાખી 

વિપણંદિયા્યાદે હુદા બાદ્ધતિયા્યાદે પણચણે વિ-

પણચણ પઠલાડીયિયાદે તસનાષટે બલલયિયા તથા 

રદ્રવાહારણે: પહિલે વિચલનિવશયના સાહસ-

ધારા: । દર્શા પાસે સમેગ। સભીનંત પૂર્વદુમા પણ 


cેબલાંલીયિપન્નક રાખિ: 

દ્વિમૂઠિય: \ ઉશેલાદિયા્યાદે 

સભ્યી પચલાનું \ સાહ્યવાહક વષાણાધિકી 

સાંભાલા: \ દર્શા ન સમ્પ: । પાદીયાદે પધરભુ-

પધરભુ પણચણે ચંડરભાવાત: । અસં બ બધિયારાંખાવ-

તા પણચણ પદાનાદિયારિયાદે \

દુ: સાધ્યા-

વટિતી: \ એવકારણ સાધ્યવાલાખ્યાદે દેલભાટે: દેલ- 

બટિતી: । તથા ચ, સાધ્યાયપકી ભૂમાભાવાગતિયિયાગને 

તદથ: !! ૭૨ !!
भाषा० आग्रावासिंहवाण्या खात्‌ सहस्रासिंहप्रथम।
व्यायामासिंहपरा दानसिंहपतिलिखा॥ ३४॥
पत्तासिंहप्रति पेदी भवेनामाजिमेयो गिरिः।
पदे। इत्यं भूमवचाण्यासिंहप्रयारा॥ ३५॥
व्यायामासिंहपरा नीलधूमार्दिकं भवेन।
विष्णुया। पराम्रव। चेलों। सत्यनिपिन्ता॥ ३६॥
साधारणयो यत्‌ पक्षस्तिौ वाध उदाह्रण।
ज्ञातिकालीनपटर गन्धार्यिः साधन॥ ३७॥

विष्णु० 
असिंहिं विभजने। आस्रावासिंहपिरिवारिः॥ ३४॥
पत्तासिंहप्रति। आस्रावासिंहपिरिवारेः। नील-
भूमार्दिक दति। नीलधूमवं गुहदत्या न रेततवास्ते-
द्रवं। धमागाधिकरणवासिंहवृक्षकर्षकनानांराखे-
विलिफैव यातावृक्षकर्षकलात। धूमप्रागभावालष्ठः-
हाय धमागाधिकरणेः। ३५॥

विष्णुयारिति। कपियंतेषां गतधामभावायायस्थपराः
मश्रीपिं न धमागितिपिततमत जन। विष्णुयारिति।
तथा च खातयंविष्णुवासिंहाभावायायस्थपरामर्ग-
कालिनभावायायस्थापरमर्गविधिय रथयं॥ ३६॥

साधारणयो दति। पचाः परामर्गविद्वहरिष्य
रथयं। तेन घटे गम्भिरेत्यं न चति। एवं मुखाव-
च्छिन्ने द्रोण। कपियंतेषां गोतारापिः वेधयं॥ ३७॥
भाषा० ग्रामीणस्त्र प्रथमानि पश्चात्।
साधारणींगवादीनां या खात्र् करणं मन्।
वाक्यार्थस्त्रातिकृत्र्य वृत्तत्व्यापरं जष्ठन्।
गवयादिपदानानु प्रकृतिस्वपनापलं।
पद्यान्वयनु करणं स्वरं तत्र पद्यार्थेऽः।

बिंदू० उपस्थिति चुराण्ड्यति। ग्रामीणस्त्रै।
वाक्यार्थस्त्रेण वाचकस्त्रेण प्रत्यूक्तं गोष्ट्रेण गवयादिकृतः
वाच्य दृशि पश्चात् ग्रामीणस्त्रानि कविद्वृत्तिः गवये आश्रेषः
तत्र गोष्ट्रेण दृश्चारणं वत्। तत्र उपस्थितिकरणं।

तद्गुर्गारं गोष्ट्रेण गवयपदार्थां रूपमिश्रेत्रवाच्य फलार्थार्थां जाते तर्फेच प्रयाशः।

गवयादिकृतः पद्यान्वयनु करणं स्वरं तत्र पद्यार्थेऽः।

भाष्यावध्यायां वृत्तत्वः। पद्यान्वयन्तो न तु
भाष्यावध्यायं परं करणं। पदार्थावध्यायं वैभवावध्यायं।
पद्यार्थायथेः। पदार्थानेव पदार्थावध्यायं पदार्थावध्यायं
चापरः। अनेकं पदार्थावध्यायं पदार्थावध्यायं
वितावपि भाष्यावध्यायात्। पदार्थावध्यायं बेल।
भलावा घटार्थपदानुष्ठानां वस्मावस्थापनाः भाष्याः।

* वर्षस्यादानां विश्वासां जाती ज्ञान।
ভাষা: শান্ত্বনেভঃ ফর্জ নতুন প্রক্তিপঃ সচকারিনী ॥ ৮০ ॥

বিষ্ণু: প্রকারণ জানিতে। আকাশালি শান্ত্বনেধাপনে। স্ঠানঃ প্রক্তিসমাকান্তাঃ স্থানঃ। প্রকাশসাগরাল শান্ত্বনেন। শান্ত্বনায়িয়ে তদনন্তর। শান্ত্বনায় প্রকাশসাগরাল শান্ত্বনায় শান্ত্বনায়। শান্ত্বনা যত প্রকাশসাগরাল। তা শান্ত্বনা যত প্রকাশসাগরাল। শান্ত্বনা যত প্রকাশসাগরাল। একালে যাইতে গাত্র কুঝালো প্রকাশসাগরাল। শান্ত্বনা যত প্রকাশসাগরাল। তা শান্ত্বনা যত প্রকাশসাগরাল। তা শান্ত্বনা যত প্রকাশসাগরাল।

শান্ত্বনে আকাশমুখসাগরাল তাঙ্গাতিকালাল।

সাক্ষাত বিষ্ণুযোগবিশ্বাসাল। শাক্তিয়ত্যাদিরূপে শাক্তিয়ত্যাদিরূপে শাক্তিয়ত্যাদিরূপে।

তাতুদ্যন্তৰাতিনী শান্ত্বনা যাক্ষাণ লুকাল।

কারণূ ত বাঁচু বাধকে খাওয়াতে পাই। যথা বিষ্ণুকার তাঙ্গাল কাঃ সাগরাল শান্ত্বনা যত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জা সাগরাল। তত গীর্জায়োগাল কর্মালঘন্নবুদ্ধ:
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विष्णुः प्रथमानपदोपखाणः कर्षलागोरेखा विशेषवस्तार्थः। तेन पैत्र द्व गक्षतीत्वादि न पैत्रे बश्चांनयः। पत्र कर्षलागोरेखा विशेषवस्तार्थः तद्दर्शय प्रथमानेति। चढ़ा धार्यात्तीतिनिर्माणविशेषः पदमरयार्यः। तेन पैत्र द्व नृस्वतीत्व चेत्रा-देवर्ष्ण। स्वातं पंक्तीत्वादि सोकादेवर्ष्ण चिंति तीर्थः। ततः दीनीयानाध्यायान्तार्यार्यः। एवं खापारे पिन न श्रवः। गौरवान्। रशया गक्षतीत्वादि स्थापते वा ललितः। गतातीतासि। तु गर्भायन्ते गलातीतासि प्रातिःनि कल्लचन्दः। जपमाणाश्च श्रवणर्षक्षेत्रः।

एवं कौशलपिं प्रक्षिप्तः। चति गाढ़के कबिन्तू
मयाः। चत्ता महादीपदार्णां महाधुपादि मीलादीविविष्टेऽपि 
श्रवः। कौशले बुधारिता तथापि लासवान मीलादी प्रक्षः। मीलादीविविष्टेऽपि चः।

एवमौसिनास्ति। चत्ता कोक्रिष्ट। पिकपदवायप
धारणारित्वार्थू पिकाविर मन्निप्तः।

एवं वच्छारार्द्धः। चत्ता प्रथोजकस्तळभुवन घटमाणेचे
लक्ष। तक्षुला प्रथोजकस्तळभुवन घट चारीः। तत्रवधाय बाल्यश्रेी मालेघनाचन्द्रः काशो घटमाणेन्निर्गमस्कृतम्
प्रथोजकस्मथार्यः। ततस्य घटमणेनार्य नामानुष
ध्वार्षि ज्ञावपेदाण्नां घटादीपदार्णां कार्यावन्ति
विष्णूः घटारे। श्रीकं गुरुवारि। रत्नद्वार भूतवे नीलो घट रत्नद्वार-दिश्रमार्ग ऋषभे। घटादिपदारा कायोत्वित-घटादिबेधे वासर्थीवधारवाहण। कार्यतावेध ग्रंथि च निजिन्ते। वासर्थीवधार तद्भावाश्रय समयस्य एव च प्रविधि। न च एव। कन्या ते गद्दिशी। जाता दत्तात्री। निजिन्ते वासर्थीवधार तद्भावाश्रय समयस्य एव च प्रविधि। न च एव। कन्या ते गद्दिशी जाता दत्तात्री।

प्रथम ग्रंथि ऐवं घटादिपदारा। श्रीभक्तावेध निर्धारणपरिशिष्ट पवित्र प्रकाशाश्रयस्य एव च। प्रथम ग्रंथि ऐवं घटादिपदारा। श्रीभक्तावेध निर्धारणपरिशिष्ट पवित्र प्रकाशाश्रयस्य एव च।

परं वाक्येशावदि प्रसंगः। चत्ता चतृश्वयानरु-वतीत्थ च घटपदशे दीर्घग्रुटकविष्टे चार्यायुं प्रचेष्टामिदीय। कप्पा च बेचकारां। तत्त च वहायस्य श्रीसभ्यां बह-चयो भक्तियते मद्यमाना करोजितहनं।

वयस्वे सुर्योध्यानं जावे प्रत्राननं।

मद्यमाना भक्तिहिंसा। यथा: कष्टिंशातिनः।

दति वाक्येश्वरादि दीर्घाग्रुटे प्रसंग संपूर्णं। कप्पा च प्रकाशभावस्य प्रचेष्टामिदा। साक्षार्धक्षाने कृपावतः।
विद्या• दरिपदाैै तु विनिगमक्षाभावानागांगिकक्षणं।
एवं विवरणादिपि श्रेणियः। विवरणमू तद्वासायणं-
पदानारेण तत्त्वमक्षणं। यथा चत्रोक्तेष्वीक्रम कक्षां-
विवरणादिपि विवरणादिक्षणं कालं श्रेणियः।
एवं परमिमीय्यं पारं करोतिनामेन विवरणार्थानां-
तत्त्व यथार्थकलं कल्याने॥
एवं ग्रहितुम्पर्द्वारिष्ठादि प्रक्षिप्तं। यथा दृष्ट
वहकारतर्या मधुरं पिको रातिस्थाय्ये। पिकरपदेः
श्रेणियः दंति॥
तत्र जातावेव श्रकिम् तु यथमो अविचारार्थानां-
वस्त्रे। श्रकिं विग्नः च जातिभागमनायाकालोक्तिः
भागतिः देवित। तत्र। श्रकिं विग्नः जातिभागानु-
परते॥ व च यथात्मा स्त्रिया। ज्ञातिभागमनायाकाले
विग्नापि वक्तवेधातृ। गं च जातिभागायान्यो। वक्त-
वववाकालेक्ष्मा एव श्रकिः। रीकार्ताः। न चत्वारम्भः।
गोलादे। रेवागुमकस्तात्। किंस्त गैः श्रकोटि श्रकि-
वशे। वदि तदा यथात्मा श्रकिः। यदि तु गैले श्रको-
मिनि श्रकित्वेदः गैलग्रहार्थाद्यायानां शाश्व-
वेद्य न खान। संहृग्रहार्थत्वः श्रकित्वाद्यानां पदार-
थानार्थं शाश्ववेद्य प्रति व देवेन्लात। किंस्त गैले
वदि श्रकित्वाद। गैलले श्रकोदायकवेद्यकं वाच्य। गै-
लमतु गैवेत्तारामसेवेति यथि सक्षमेववेल। तथा च।
शिश्ना

गौतमग्निकृति सकातावश्चत्रोकृतमुपक्षेत्रात् तवेय गौरवं। ता-स्त्राक्त् तत्रशायात्मकतिविशिष्टतुप्पणिद्विभोधानुपपत्त्वा
कुस्मान्ता शिरिजियात्मकतिविशिष्टस्यै विश्मातुतीयी।

तसं पद्मयुक्ताद्विषिकण्डशिरिजि कस्त्रुण्ड कस्तृष्णाग्नरुद्ध
कस्तिरिजिकरुद्ध। यज्ञाध्वारणं एव मुख्येते तथ्याङ्गकृत।

यथा पाषकादिपरसं।

यज्ञाध्वारणशिरिजिकर्पेश्च मनुदायशिरिजिमात्रे युज्यते
नवर्षु। यथा गोपरघटादिपरसं।

यथं तु यज्ञाध्वारणशिरिजिक युज्यते युज्यते नवर्षु। यथा गोपरघटादिपरसं। तथा ति पद्मयुक्ताद्विषिकण्डशिरिजि वेदयतिः। युज्यते मनुदाय-

शिरिजि च पद्मलेण कङ्गेष पद्मो वेदयतिः। न च केवलाद-

वेदयतिः कङ्कुतर्दे ग्रंथेऽ तादुत्तिः वाच्यं। कृंतिस्नात प्रेमश्री
केवलशीरिजिकार्णब्राह्मणसम्प्रदेशकलादिति प्राश्च।

वसुतस्तम मनुदायशिरिजिकृतिप्पत्त्रेऽवेदयतिप्पुजज-निकारणस्येऽ भवति। कान्तिस्नात। यथ । कश्चिं वाच्येऽ

वाच्येऽ त्रिन्य तत्र स्त्राक्त्वे तत्र स्त्राक्त्वे तत्र स्त्राक्त्वे तत्र स्त्राक्त्वे तत्र स्त्राक्त्वे।

यथ । तु कङ्कुद् युज्यते तु कङ्कुद् युज्यते तु कङ्कुद् युज्यते तु कङ्कुद् युज्यते।

यथ । तु कङ्कुद् युज्यते तु कङ्कुद् युज्यते। यदि । तु कङ्कुद् युज्यते

विश्मातुतीयमेव तद्भ लक्षष्ठेऽ
भाषा०      श्रवण प्रक्षणमल्लसात्मकयुपपालित०

चिह्न० चन्द्रावासवर्षकाल्यावः स्नातकावेशरोधिक-फूडः। चेतोहिदारिपूः। तत्र चं जञ्जनशालीकर्ताः गुरुगुरुसारिपि मुखाते यागविशेषायपीतू।१२५॥

लघुण सकालमय रामादि।गणार्या चेंप रत्नादि
गढ़पद्धश्र श्रवणं प्रभावहृद्दे चोपपायापुपपालिता
चाषणाबुपपालिता यथा श्रवणसे तत्र लघुणा
तीर्थां नेताधेणु। या त श्रवणसे। तत्र च प्र्वाः
हुँपपालार्थान्तर्वता तीरे युःपपालानु तीर्थां सार्थां।
ततः शास्त्रेनः। परस्य कालवाद्यापुपपालितां
कीज सङ्कोः यथिः। प्रवेशमेरुला लघुणां न नातुः।
धष्टः। प्रवेशमेरुला अपुपपितरसभावानु। तेन धष्टःक्रैवेदे
भोजनवायापुपपिता तंत्रिधरं लघुणः। एवं काके-
को दृष्टि रचणात्मक्यारा। काकपद्ध रसुपपालके
लघुणां। श्रवणवाक्षायापुपपितुद्विविशयवरूः।
एवं चक्रित्वा धामीयारी चक्रिपद भूसरायालितेन
लघुणाः। रस्मेकाणलालाः लघुणेयुः। एकायार्य-
वालिलेन रुपेष्ट चक्रितद्वयेयेवीः। चदी शानु-
pपित्वाधिकायां चार्। तदा काशिद्वापद्ध तीरे
काशिराहपद्ध महादे। लघुणेति नियमे न नातुः।
ऽदनुः वेंधां प्रक्षणस्मेवें चदी तीर्थेन रुपेष्ट
युःक्षत्सा तीर्थेन तीर्थेवांः। चदी तु गणातीर-
धिरः तेन द्वेष गृहीतस्या तेनेव द्वेष स्वरणं। ज्ञते एवं लक्ष्यात्मकोऽस्मि न लक्षणं। तदाकारकस्तवेधि तच स्वरणं विभाग्युपनसि। परमु न्दम्येह वर्त्तात्मकोऽस्मि वर्त्तात्मकोऽस्मि प्रणिष्ठ अस्तु। तदाकारकस्तवेधि अध्या यस्य तत्पदेः सामर्यमिः सघनस्वलादिति विभासीयोऽ॥

तथा तु भक्तार्थः भाष्योपद्यताः लक्षणः

श्या लक्षितस्यात्मकः यथा दिरेष्वादिपि देवदत्तप्रवेषार्थः अस्मि। भवतरङ्गः च वर्षोऽस्मि भवते भवते तत्र लक्षितस्या। किंतु साधनिकं परं नामभवाकः। साधनिकार्थः प्राप्ते तत्र पदार्थः कार्थः। भक्तिदत्तायान्तरण्यवेद्येऽन्तरपदार्थायाः

गुणायान्तरणाः प्रति पदार्थः सामर्यादिति प्राप्तः॥ गवीनाः तद्रप्राप्तनुमारकः

पदार्धार्थसिद्धं दारुः। यथा तुष्णायुक्तः त्राक्षश्रापः देवसार्थानुभावकः समस्याये॥ वाचे तु भक्ते भावार्थकालमधुप्रसारिताः।

वचे गभीरार्थे गभीरार्थे राधार्थे तथ गभीरार्थे गभीरार्थे राधार्थे राधार्थे गभीरार्थे गभीरार्थे गभीरार्थे राधार्थे राधार्थे राधार्थे

ज्ञानिकेदेवश्रावस्य शीलतानाः। यदि तद्विकार्याः

* मातं भाषानिविशेषं विद्वद्वारात्मकः तत्त्वानुमानः॥
दश०

मिठ्यारे बझकण्याच्या तत्त्र ति चित्रंगुपदार्द्धी चर्चित-चित्रार्थम्। क्रीडाच्याते तद्दा गोपरक्ष गौरलक्षामिनि 
सञ्ज्ञा। गवि चित्राभेदार्थम्। यदि नेकर्षेषायो 
गौराक्षाच्याते तद्दा गोपरक्ष चित्रगोरलक्षामिनि सञ्ज्ञा।
चित्रापि तालस्यांशं।

एववास्तवामरे चंद्र राजाचं वागरपदेष वागरा- 
रंगंकर्मिणि सञ्ज्ञा। श्रावंदरक्षं तालस्यांशं।
एवमवच्चापि।

तत्तपुर्वे सुपूर्वपदे सञ्ज्ञा। तथाचं राजपुरुषवा- 
दिक्षेष राजपदार्धेष पुरुषादिपदार्धेष साताराश्च- 
च्। निपतातिरिक्तगामायोभेदार्थमम्माध्यक्षार्थस्य 
पञ्चमलात्। अनुढा राजा पुष्प राजार्थापि तच्छाराश्च- 
बेगः ेवत्। पर्वोऽय गं भव दायार्थी घटपटावरो नः 
शांधेवात्म्यायात्। निपतातिरिपूर्वे। यीके घट 
दायार्थी नामार्थयारंम्मम्माध्यक्षार्थस्य बेडितं निः 
न च राजपुरुष दायार्थी पुष्पविभक्त: प्राणमस्तिमि 
वाच्। अशुलक्ष्यकर्मिणि ततो शेष्यदात्। तस्यादृष्ट 
राजपदार्द्धी राजसमस्तिमिनि सञ्ज्ञा। तस्य च पुष्पमे 
दायार्थक्ष्यात्।

ब्रह्म छठे धवखदिरी विमंजीव्यादि धन: रहितश्च 
विभिन्नथं दलप्रकारे शुभाते तत्त्र सञ्ज्ञा। न च 
वाचिते लक्षणे वाच्। वाण्यम्मक्षयार्थापि द्रव-
चिच्चाॅ दर्शनात्। न च एकणणमण्डलकर्त साहित्यक-क्षीति वच्चे। बिष्णुभेदारे धर्मयुद्धारे बिष्णुवादिर-दर्शनात्। साहित्यकाव्यानुभवाच। तत्तत्त्वार्थाव- विक्षो नाच्। चतुर्व राजपुरोरस्तु काव्यकालीन। चचेचत्तात्मित्वाच सचिनभावादृष्ठ नाना चार्योत्तरं। किंतु वाच्चेतारे धर्म तथा दर्शन;। न च नीसर्घप्राप्तयोगेशै। दर्शादृश्यन करण्यं नाच्छे। तया नीसर्घदास नीसर्घां चतुर्वस्त्र पदार्थम:। अभेद। दर्शानिर्देशायेशै। दर्श्यतात्।।

समाचारकर्मे त च निल समाचारकर्त्यनुभूत दत्त-कर्ते तदार्थाविक्षरतु विद्याधी। परपेशधिनिकृष्णावदार्शी ततवाच। पूर्णपद्ध नात्याविधािक।।। न च भेरी-मदव वादमेक्षण कदं जमात्रताणांृ वराणां नानानृत्वाक्षणान विदिते वच्छे। झाण-भुवनिलक्ष्यनमें तदन्त्वात्। एवं प्रेममानग्रिन-रावण्य।। परंतु त लिनिकृष्णावदार्शी लिनिकृष्ण बुधवारे। प्रत्येकाक्षरमरण: समाचारकर्त्य;। यथेक वालं गुणसंकल्लनापूर्वित्वाहिनित्वमें तच्छे। अभष-चैत्यनानसमाभिति वर्दन्ति।।

कर्माचारये थो लोकवग्रामकृत्तियारे। अभेदयक- निने नीसर्घदार्य चतुर्वस्त्रदार्शी प्रकरण:। न च तया लक्षणा। चातुर्व एव निवादर्शपंि धार्जयेदित्यच न
भाषा: ऋषिनिर्यायणकारकांतात्पर्यंत्रभाषामिथ्ये || ८९ ||
कारण सन्तिधानगुँ पद्मसासिद्धचये।

विष्ठा: १४। सत्युपयो: कथापत्ये: किमित कर्मचारणे सच्चाभावः वान्। न स विष्ठा सदरज्ञितिविशेषं वेदाधि-कारारु धारामध्यं रूढः कार्यः। विष्ठा विष्ठा-प्रयुक्तेऽपि एव कल्याणाः। साधवेन मुखार्थ्यावम्ये तद्गुरुपचा कल्याणाः: फलमुखैरवत्त्यादीयाँत-सार्थिति। उपयुक्ताः अनुच्चिपिलीथार्थै: परस्ये तत्समुच्चितं संस्कृतं पूर्वपदार्थप्रभावंर्त्यत्या चाचय-बोध रूढि। दत्तस्य समाये न कार्यः प्रकि:। पद्मास्वेत विष्ठाचारिति। पितराः शुद्धरी दत्तादी: पितपदे ज्ञानद्यो: संगुरपदे स्त्रीजनकदभगीर्ष्णि:। प्रवर्मालत्रापि: घटां दत्तादी: न शचः। घटादेव रुपेष गापाहार्षितिनिश्चारान्।

ऋषिनिर्यायणस्थमुः। ऋषिनिर्यायण योगतालकां श्राकालाःकारणं तत्पर्यंत्रभाषा ब्राह्मबोधे कारणं || ८९ ||

तत्साधितयायामाः। सन्तिधानस्यति। यत्य-दार्श्यं तत्पदार्थमन्येकं वेदाधिविशेषत्वेऽर्ज्ञवधानेनेनक-स्विति: कारणं। नेव मिर्हितमध्यमानूः देवबनी-पद्यादी: न ग्राम्बोधः। नीलो घटः दृढः पठ! दृढः!
सिद्धान्त रावणसिन्धुभाष्यांबः। शास्त्रमिहमाध्यम-ब्रम्हामाध्यमपि न चति। गनु वच हच ऊपवी वासकू देवदत रघुमं तचारपदार्थमें पूर्णपद-शाराधा नागात्। अन्वयवधाने तु उत्तरपदार्थां-वक्त्रव दति चेत्। न। प्रत्येकपदसंख्यारैः ताव-दिवस्यक्षारवायवधानेनेतरस्। नागार्जुनकर्मिकरैः-कागामयिष्ठ नागार्जुनकर्मिकरेकारावेत्तारूपी चक्रा-वात्। तावतुपदसंख्यारविचित्तरमभर्षणां नखोदाधक-वात्। कथमन्यता नागार्जुनपदार्थां। परस्तु ताव-वर्त्तार्थां अर्णाधकेव खेस कपोलनाघात्। ताव-तदार्थां निधारंभावेत्ताम्वपेक्षाधृतः। शाल्याधे भवयति केषित्। अधरे तु।

चक्राकाराभिर्मयय घोरः विशिष्यां प्रपन्धते।

तेन तेनान्नितः खार्यः पदरेववागमने॥

तथा च खुष्वाकार्याभिधानां तवेत पदार्थस्वा
महावाकार्याभिध रथयाजः। एतेन तावबार्तिकि-कार्यः पद्रुक्टोर्विपि गिरस्यः। तस्यदर्शसंख्यार्थविचि-तचारमर्विक्षालमों नागनद्यैवेनास्वरीपस्तेऽरितः॥ दुर्लक्ष
बोधां। चतु दीर्घानुम्भ तेन पिण्यानीति पदर्श
नागाधि बोधः। न तु पिन्धार्जुनरिवार्यष्मानात्।
पदवतरपदार्थापृथिवतिख्याम्से धेतुलात्। किश्न

* मोक्ष रावणदिवसपाठी दिग्गज रघुमञ्जनाम्। विद्वानः पारागः।
भाषा। पदार्थं तत्र तद्वत्र योग्यता परिकीर्तिता॥ ५२॥
शत्पदेन विना यथानुभावकता भवेन्॥

विष्कर्मां किष्किन्द्रस्मान्तं तेन तेनेन्त यह साधका ज्ञानं। तेन किष्किन्द्रः विना वर्त्तं शास्त्रेषु फूल। तथा पुष्ये रेखादेशी नृत्यस्वतीतिपदार्थार्थं विना चतुर्वेणुपपन्ने।
पुरुषाचार्य शास्त्रं भवम्॥

\( चेरक्कन गिर्जशालं। पर्याप्त रत्नां दिग्द्रिणा। \) एकपदार्थं
परपदार्थेण ग्रंथं दिग्द्रिण। \( सत्यां ज्ञानाभावाः \) वज्ञिना विष्किर्मियो न शास्त्रेषु। \( गंगेत्तरं द्वारा योगक्ता ज्ञानं शास्त्रे धारणे आक्षेपां भवन न भवेनि वाशस्त्रेषु अपूर्वसादिति चेरक। न। \( तत्तत्त्वार्थार्थसारं शिष्यं कश्चिद्विषेक्षपुर्वे कश्चिदिश्विषेक्षपुर्वे चेरक्कन द्विषेक्षे रत्नां शास्त्रं भवम्॥

शाकास्त्र चेरक्तात्या ज्ञानं न शास्त्रे भवने कारणं।
वज्ञिना विष्किर्मियो द्वारा वज्ञिनकर्षणान्तं चेरक्नागिनाश्रये चेरक्नागिनाश्रये प्रतिवेधां न शास्त्रेषु। \( तद्भवनि स्वस्वत्वविद्येऽविद्येऽविद्येऽविद्येऽविद्येऽविद्येः \) योगिताशास्त्रार्थविद्येऽविद्येऽशास्त्रेधिविद्येँ स्वस्वत्वविद्येऽविद्येऽविद्येऽविद्येऽविद्येऽविद्येः दृश्यवर्णितं॥ ५३॥

शाकाम्बरी गिर्जशालं। चत्वर्देन्तिवादं। शेष पदेनं
विना चत्वर्देन्तिवादे नृथानुभावकर्मं तेन सब शाकाम्बरी-
भाषात आकांक्षा, व्यक्तुरिच्छा तु तात्पर्यं परिकीर्तितं॥५॥

शिश्नूऽ लघु रत्नः। क्रियापदं विना कारकपदं नामस्वेतोध्य अनवथीतं तेन तक्षाकाक्षा। वशुतस्य क्रियाकारकपदां वाचनिधानमावत्या चर्चात्थेङ। परशुं घटकर्तारत् नाणां नाणां दिनवितीयाकाक्षारं कारणं।

तेन घटः कर्मवागनयं कारितित्यादि न शास्न्येषः।

अवभेति पुनः रात्रेऽ दुधोष्प्रकारसार्वतालितो तु पुण्येष वह राजपद्ध तात्पर्यवेश्लाभावान् न तेन शस्यायचः॥

तात्पर्यं निर्धारितं। वशुतस्य इति। यदि तात्पर्यावर्तमान कारणं न श्रात्तु तदा शेषवाङ्मयस्यादि कार्यावर्तमान कार्यस्य बोध्यते न श्रात्तु। न श तात्पर्यावहकप्रक-राधामाणमेव शास्ने चारवशीलस्वरूपति वाच्यं।

तेषामन्नुगमात्। तात्पर्यावर्तमानकलेवं तेषामन्नुगमेपु तात्पर्यावहकमेव चारवशु कारणमुः। उत्तरं वेदरलेभिपि तात्पर्यावर्तमानमीशर: कहच्चंते। न च तात्पर्यावहकतात्पर्यावर्तमानं कारणमिति वाच्यं। वर्गार-राधावहकाभावात्। न च प्रक्ष्यं एव नावीतित

कृत्यं। प्रक्ष्यवाहं श्रावणप्रतिपादलाभात्।

उत्तरं मुक्तवाक्येष्टि द्विषयरद्वातात्पर्यावर्तमानं कारणं।

विषयादिमुक्तवाकातु तु विषयतितीतेव तात्पर्यवेश ज्ञानं कारणं। अनेके तु जानार्थादै। कार्यित्वे तात्पर्यावर्तमानं
চিহ্নান কারণ। তথায় মুক্তাঙ্গী বিনীত তার্কবিজ্ঞান শাস্ত্রেন। বেদে স মনান্তন্ত্রার্থাপরি মন্তাভিনন্দনঃ প্রারম্ভসমাজঃ।

পূর্বমুখবক্তারণকেীতাী কটিন্থ প্রকার দৃষ্টিত: সংগমত্যা কারণ ন দৃষ্টিত। তত্ত্বস্তি পূর্বস্তুতবক্তারণ। কারণ। চতুঃকেীত প্রারম্ভকারণেন ন কারণকারথে কিন্তু শাস্ত্রেন। অভ্যন্তরীণঃ কারণঃ ন সারথমান্তরেকভাবে পূর্বস্তুতকারণেন কর্তৃক কর্তৃকে পূর্বস্তুতবক্তারণেন বিনষ্ঠান মুখবক্তারণেন। মনস্তে স তাৎপ্রকারে কর্তৃক কর্তৃকে সারথমান্তরেকভাবে সারথমান্তরেকভাবে জনক প্রেতে উৎসাহিত প্রক্ষণপ্রকাশনা।

চতুঃস্তুতকারণেন গীতসারনাগার্থে ঘটনারতিহিত ক্ষণেক সারথমান্তরেকভাবে নিত্যবিশ্বাক্ষরক্ষণে মাধ্যম্যতম তত্ত্ব পরিকল্পিত। কৃতি কৃতি কৃতি কর্তৃক কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃ�ে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে কর্তৃকে 

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भाषाः साधारण रुखादीनां करणं मन उच्चने।
प्रयोगपद्याः शासनां तन्त्राणुलस्मिन्मित्यते॥ ८४ ॥

सिद्धाः खीव संस्कारगणकलकप्यन्न अभिचारसंस्काराभावाः
॥ ८५ ॥

द्वारां क्रमशः सना विषुपच्यति। साधारण प्रति
दृष्टि। एतेऽन मनसि प्रमाणं दर्शिते। तथापि सुखातृत्वाः
साधारण। शकरणकं जन्यताचारलाशचुः श्वस्त्रमेक मनयः
विद्ये॥ च चैवं दुःखातिः
साधारणां ग्रंथाय सुधारति वाचं। करणसाधारण चुरिति
साधारण च। चाघारेक्षाय तारुं शकरकस्थानात्तमेकम्
विद्ये॥ एवं तुः खादीनाममवावाचिकारसंकेते ऊर्ज्जवल
साधारणां सना विद्युष्टा॥

मन्येयाः प्रभाषायः। प्रयोगशास्त्रिती।
शासनां चाणुररामसदीनां धीम्यायकाचार्यानी
प्रत्येक्षोद्वनुभविष्यें। तत काणेनि वाच्यं विश्वासं
क्षणमेकं चतुर्वेद्येकं नामस्वरुपां तदस्यमादि च। चारणां
विद्ये॥ च च तरणेमुद्गतिविदेशादिविश्वाचरें
तद्विराजसमां दृष्टि वाचं। तथा चति चाणुरादीनां
मपि क्रमानात्तमें॥ च च दीर्घमुद्गतीभच्छादें।
ഭാവം. ചരിത്രാരോഹിതം ദീപാനന്തരം നിരീർണം നിഷ്ക്രിയയാണു.

നിസർ മാനവധാനഭാവം കാരണംകാരാ നാമഹിരിച്ചുമാതിരിക്കുന്ന വാച്യം. മന്ത്രാട്ടിലായി തു ഭാവനാത് നാറുകാലം നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി.

ജെ. പി. പാലിജ്യാധിയിൽ പ്രാധാന്യം വരുന്ന നാമാശാന്തി.

നാമാശാന്തി നിരാൻബാധനുള്ള വാച്യം. നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി.

മാനവധാനഭാവം കാരണം നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി.

ബാലാസാമ്പത്തിലായി പ്രാധാന്യം വരുന്ന നാമാശാന്തി. (11 )

ഉദ്യാനം നിർമിതി നിർമിതി നിർമിതി നിർമിതി.

ജെ. പി. പാലിജ്യാധിയിൽ പ്രാധാന്യം വരുന്ന നാമാശാന്തി.

നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി.

ജെ. പി. പാലിജ്യാധിയിൽ പ്രാധാന്യം വരുന്ന നാമാശാന്തി.

നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി. നാമാശാന്തി.
भाषा° कृप्य रस: सप्तगम्यापरदल्लगकं || ८यु ||
द्रव्यो गुणहरूं खेचिह वेेंगो मूर्तगुणाचा चमो.
धर्मादर्शा भावना च शब्दो वुधाद्योपिणी च ||८५ ||
एते मूर्तगुणा: सर्वेच विदितं: परिकौरितं: 
संस्कारिक विभागात जमायं: गुणा मत: || ८७ ||
संगोग विभागाविया साक्षा दिव्यादिकातथा 
दिव्यादिकायसंयुक्तेनेक्याहिता गुणा: || ८८: 
चन्द्र: शेषा गुणाचा: सर्वेच मता एकाक्ष्यत: 

चित्रार दश: || निर्गुण दश:। धार्मिक निर्गुणानं कर्मदारावति
तथार्थ धार्मिक सामान्याचे कर्मदारावते च दश: निर्गुणानं वेदार्थं।
शास्त्रादीतीय न सामान्याचे कर्मांचा न कर्मोद्धार यु: व न निर्गुणानं तत्र नातिविप्रमाण:। विकृत्येति
खर्दकचयं न तु यथसंभव:। गगनकारावतिचार: || ८५: 
मूर्तगुणाचा दश:। बेेंगे स्वतंत्रावकापेक्षणं
कीच:। अर्थात: न वर्णभाषा दशाय:। सच्चिदानन्द ताव-
द्रव्य: || एवंपूष्पिय: || ८६: 
सज्जेद्विमाण:। मूर्ताभास्मशा दशाय: || ८७ 
अनेकान्तात दश:। संयोग्योदस्त्राकृति दिश्यतोऽनि।
त्रिलखुत्तावतिं निषुताभित्रवतीत वेदार्थं: || ८८: 
चन्द्र: शेषा दश:। शुभदस्म व्यक्तलपतिमृतस्वक-
युधक्षिपरकर्माभिवऽकु: शेषादेशप्रयादगुणमलः 

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भाषा ।  

वुज्जिपुरस्त्रं सांभान्ता। खेचं सांसिद्धिको त्र्यवःः

ग्रहणभावनां श्रंबं च्यमी वैशेषिका गुणः। 

स्मार्थास्वपल्पान्तो त्र्यवः सांसिद्धिक्षत्या || ८० ||

गुरुशालाय रामाण्यायु एते प्रकृतिताः। 

स्मार्थास्वपल्पान्तो त्र्यवं खेचं एव च || ८१ ||

एते तु द्वीरिग्रहाः। चर्च स्थानान्तः। 

वाच्यांकैवीरिग्रहाः। गुरुशालायभावनाः || ८२ ||

आनेनिया विभूमानं ये चुर्वेषिका गुणः। 

ग्रामपर्युत्वात्पर्यन्ते तु परिकृतिताः || ८३ ||

ग्रामपर्युत्वात्स्तु सांभान्ता। त्र्यवं च तथाविधि। 

स्मार्थास्वपल्लेल्के प्रथक्षपरिमाणः || ८४ ||


विद्वा । वलांकं संकारान्तु छीम्ब्राध्यवं राष्यचः। द्रवः ब्रह्मः || ८५ ||

वैशेषिका प्रति। विशेष एव वैशेषिका। खार्यं उन्न विशेष गुणः राष्यचः। 

स्मार्थादिरिति। स्मार्थापरिमाणः

प्रथक्षमेयागविभागपरत्वलापलाब्धीयः। || ८५ || ८६ ||

द्वीरिग्रहिति। वासुदेव सचारपि वहणेयागमलात्।

वाच्यिति। कुषार्यां। बाबुराजियांसवानाः || ८७ ||

विभूमानिति। भुद्रिस्वकुमः। नखराडिष्यावष्ठलाभिक्रमः

धर्मावाणासङ्ग्या राष्यचः। || ग्रामपर्यन्ति। कारणगुणः

पूर्वां कुषार्यां च्यमो। ग्रामार्थसं तत्त्ववशः। 

अतातः। कारणाभावात्। पाकजुपार्थीर्गार्थः कार-
ভাষা: শিখিন্দ্রাক ইতেমে সু: কারণগণেহনা:।
সম্মতগণ বিভাগে বেগমৰীত ত কর্মজা:। ৮৫।।
যুরান্তরসম্বন্ধক্ষাল্লালেহ শ্বান্ধক্ষে।
ভেদসম্বাচিতময় দৈর্ঘ্যপিতৃ গুণ:। ৮৬।।
জ্ঞাতন: শাচিমিত্রমুখঃস্থয়ীগুর্ভটয়ো:।
বেদেপি চ দ্রব্যে চ সংযোগাদিভ্যে তথ্য:। ৮৭।।
দ্বিচিত্র কারণলঃ স্থায়ি প্রাদেশিকঃ ভূতেন।

বিভাষা: বৃক্ষপূর্বকলাভাবাদু সরকাজ ইস্তুমন ৮৯।।৮৪।।

ষ্ট্রামোদতি। ষ্ট্রামোচারুকো যায়ৃ:। একগুলোপঞ্চ লাভয়ন্ত শ্রেীকীমস্যযাবৃ একস্ম গৃহম্বু যায়ৃ।
প্রথকরেী চৈত্তুতু বিশিষ্টঃ।

ভেদসমবাচিতমিত। চটালিসকা গবর্মীশর্ম্মান:।
কাপ্তালিসকা গবর্মীশর্ম্মান: বন্ধিত। এবং কলপাঞ্জি পিন্ধাপি বিম্বঃ চ বিন্ধাজেী ভিন্ন বর্ণ:। ৮৯।।

নিমিত্তলাভত:। বুজাদীরূপুো চৈত্তুতুলিনির্মিত-লাভতি ভাবঃ:। ৮৩।।

দ্বিচিত্র কারণলাভত:। সরকাজবিচারকালে নিম-নাকারণলঃ। তথ্য: চি তৃণ্যস্য স্ত্রোধর্ম্মস্যায়ম।

* প্রবালমন্দিরযুক্তরিযিদ্রেঃ পুনঃ:। রূখগার্ভরঃ পাতঃ।।
भाषा: वैदेशिको विभुगण: संयोगादिद्वयं तथा || ५ ॥
चतुर्गाद्वन्म भवेद्वृपुर्ष क्रियादेवस्य कारणांकः

भिधा: वायी पाकर निमित्ते। गुदलं गुद्यवत्सर्वसम्बन्धगतवश्च प्रतिधाते निमित्ते। वेगा वेगसन्द्वर्योररणमवायी
श्रभिधाते निमित्ते। द्रवलं द्रवलसन्द्वर्योररणमवायी
वार्ती स्तुः पे निमित्ते। मेरीद्रणयोगः प्रति निमित्ते।
भेर्यातात्योषयोगः समवायी वायुदस्य दयत्तमाभः प्रति
निमित्ते। वायुसन्धाकानविभागोऽसमवायीयोगः। * प्रादेशी
रक्षकोवायणशिष्यः || ५ ॥

चूचरिति। कुललम्बति: प्रत्यक्षभिधा। कुलाम्प्रेक्षेपेक्षणी प्रतीतिनिर्धारणः प्रयोगः। मात्रै कुलम्प्रेक्षा
प्रोक्तस्तथापि सनस्तर्वुपादायतिविकासारथमभव-
भिधा एव। कुलम्प्रोक्तस्तथापि सनस्थ वर्णः पीते
वर्ण दृश्य विधम्वेक्षेपेक्षणी प्रतीतिरक्षेत। एवं सन
नास्तिकमक्षि प्रत्यक्षभिधा। * न चैवैकै एव सनस्थपादाय
प्रयोगः प्रत्यक्षकिहार्लिताम् सनस्तानां ज्ञातिति
तिति वाचे। सनस्थ गृहैं रक्ष उपच द्विगति-
प्रतीतिनिद्धारस्वायद्विगतान्वालिताया गायलात्तु।
अस्त्रम्य एकलस्मास्मां नागद्वयकालापेति || न च सी-

* न द्रिष्टिः परस्याद्येकम् नाद्वयकालापरणं न शिक्षितकालापवि
वर्णः। द्विस्त्रायादिदिशर्याय प्रतिप्रयां। द्विस्त्रायादिदिशर्याय प्रयां
पार्थ परस्यादिदिशर्याय प्रयां। द्विस्त्रायादिदिशर्याय प्रयां। द्विस्त्रायादिदिशर्याय प्रयां।
भाषा । चंभुः सच्चारि स्थानं प्रश्नार्थिकलनेकथा ॥ ५५ ॥

विष्णु । लर्कारिदेशमवाययोरेव विनाशिद्यान्यविषयकोऽवशीः प्रत्ययं दृढ़ित वाच्यं । प्रतीतां वमवाययागुंवेखातु ॥ न च 
य एवां नील्द दृढ़ित प्रत्ययायायावाष्टाकमिति वाच्यं। प्रत्ययथिर तवातीविषयकलात् । धारेः गुर्जरीतिवशापं प्रत्ययवभिरं । अनारा 
घटारोणार्थिकोऽप्रभातु । उत्ताराविनाशकन्यकुःः समवायादलमन 
लापनोरितः । एतन्त रघुरि वावांतः । चंभुः प्रभातिः । चंभुः ध्वाणिः गुणं दृश्यं । एवमप्रेरितः । 
क्रार्डरीतिः । उपस्मयां उपसविभिकरणं ॥

तदनेव विष्णुः। चंभुः दृष्टि। ध्वाणकर्जन्यायः 
समवायां चापुःश्रायं श्रान्ति चचुरुःलघुं कारणं ॥ 
चंभुः प्रश्नार्थिकलनेकथिः । तद्रूपं चतुरसीपीतरसर्वकर्ज्ज 
रादिभेदारंगमणकारकं भवति ॥ नन्द कर्षुः कर्जं 
सनिर्गत्तलं भवति । एतन्त नीचपीताचारायवभि 
व नावबीर्दः । श्रान्त्यमसार्फः । नापि वायुर्ट्वि 
शोभारकगुणमधवने । पीताब्बेदेवापि नील्दाप्पाशिभ 
प्रभाताः । नाश्वायुकर्त्तिनीशाहिनकुम्भवयते । वायु 
रत्नार्थिकायुगामनायायार्थिस्तिले विरोधाः । तराष्ट्र 
नानाजातीयक्षेत्रवर्त्त्विनि विजातीयं विचारर्ध्यते । 
अत एवेकं विचारमित्यलभोरोऽपि । नानारूपकल्पोऽह 
शैरवकाः । एतत्त्वो सोशार्टीणां पीताचारमें प्रभति-
भाषावर जतादिपरमाणू नसमथमनृत सचेतां।
रसस्तु रसनायाद्वी मधुरादिरिणकथा॥ १००॥

विङ्कलकलक्षणस्वरुपाधारिंन लोकाधारितः। एतेऽन खरी वाक्यात्॥ रसादिकमः गाय्याध्यक्षः। किन्नु
गान्यातीतिसबुद्धवेदव्रेष्टारभेज्याधिकरिणि रसाभावाविदयः
ग चति। तत्र रसानां रसावरम् एव श्रुण्ये।
रस्यमन्त्रयादिः रूपरेषासमर्थाभावात्। अवयविनोः
गीतमलेको चतर्भुवात्॥ नवायुष नारायणश्रृवे
वानाकृप। वीलासः। पीतादिप्रतिमभक्तकलक्षणे
गीतरावान्। एते एव।

खोशिते यस्य वर्तेन मुखे पुष्पे च पाण्डः।
गेितः शुरविषाणााः। वीलासः हवं वहः।

तत्त्वादिन्द्रााहारमप्पप्पि न च गाय्याध्यक्षजातीयदीविनातिः। नागाभावात्। न च शाखां
स्वेकं हर्षं। अजुव्वलिताध्यक्षाः। श्रवणमीलाङ्गे
खावावाकं खार्दिति। एतेऽन खरी वाक्यात्म-
मिति वद्यां। ॥ १६४॥

अथार्थात्। जगत्परमार्गी तेजःपरमार्गी च हर्षं।
सत्यवर्षीपरमाणुपुस्तनां निम्बं। पाकेम हर्षां
रूपस्यै। न विचारात्म पाकामार्यं सदवेवशेषं
उपलब्धे। न वि राक्षसाध्य कपालिका वीलासः।
भाषा  सचकारी रसद्याया निविनाद्रिः स पूर्ववत्।
प्राण्यपादोऽभेक्चं मवाण्यैवापराकारं। ॥ १०९ ॥
सैरभक्षयायरभष स देभा परिन्धित।
सुर्यन्तिमक्रियायायामल्लच समुदापराकारं। ॥ १०२ ॥
नन्दन्त्यालात्त्वशोत्तेता्यामर्यादान स चिंविषीय मतः।
काठिन्याद्रिः चितावे क्षत्रियदार्शन निविनाद्रिः स पूर्ववत्। ॥ १०१ ॥

विद्वान  स्वयम  भवति। एवंक्षेत्र  परमांकावपि  पाक्षिकित्तः। ॥
तवश्चसनेत्र:परमाङ्गपशंसार्यं  भषेतुर्मुं  अर्थं।
रसं  निद्यपति।  रसस्लित।  ॥ १०० ॥

सचकारीति।  राष्ट्रनाथाने  रस:  कारणसिद्धार्थः। ॥
पूर्ववर्तिति।  जलपरमामश्  रशो नित्यायन्यः  वर्षापि
रथार्जिन्य  दृश्यं। ॥  गते  निद्यपति।  ग्राण्यायाम
दृश्य।  उपकारके  ग्राण्यायामाने  कारणसिद्धार्थः।
नन्दन्त्यो गमः:  वर्षापिनित्य  एव।  ॥ १०९ ॥

सक्रिय निद्यपति।  सक्रिय  दृश्य।  उपकारक
दृश्य  सार्वार्जनस्य  सक्रिय  कारणसिद्धार्थः।  ॥ १०२ ॥

नन्दन्त्यालात्त्वो दृश्य।  पुरुषग्न्यायशोत्तेताल्पासु
शारिषातः।  जस्मा प्रीतः।  तेजस  उष्णः।  काठिन्ये
ति।  काठिन्याक्रमार्यं:  पुरुषग्न्यायवे दृश्यं।  काठि
गलाचिरुणि  न  चयोजंगिन्नः  आविन्देशः।  चणुयाने
ि स्तापति।  ॥ पूर्ववर्तिति।  बनस्ते जो वायुपरामाणु—
भाषा: एतेपणा पाकासाहि तिती नान्यन शुचिपुरीः।

विद्या: स्मरो निवासाङ्केत्रेश्वराः शास्त्रियो द्वारः॥ १०२॥

एतेपणामितः एतेपण रघुरंगमंग्लशरणं। गाय- प्रणवा। प्रश्नेषु च रघुरंगमंग्लशरण्यां राजः। कसम्योगादुपांसेवयेत्। न चित्र उत्तराधिपति राजांगाने च- स्वातः। रघुपादिक परावर्त्तेत्। जीवे श्रीरमामीत्वम् अन्त्यत्तत्त्वमित्रकाश्चाशुमार्गधिपिप्रस्थविनि निश्चितेऽते। पव- 

मुद्धियोऽयुः देशसन्तोऽस्ती। तत्त्वां श्रवितो यो जचे परमरायणेऽवं पाक दृश्य वेणिकता वर्द्धित्क। तैवान- 

चमणः। विद्याविनायकस्वेयवेयवेये पाको न सम- 

वति। परणु वाकीस्मोगेनावयविभु विग्रहेऽसु खस्तवेनु 

परमाजुषु पाकः। दुर्गें अंकपरमाणुमयोगादु रघुका- तिष्ठकेश गुरज्ञातवधिष्ठपर्यांमुक्तिः। रघुवानमिति चतुर्थितमेवव्यवस्था पूर्ण्युषुभक्तेऽब्ज चार्थित्य यूधानारेः तैवान- 

स्थितेऽति॥ चच रघुकादिविनायकभारभं कर्त्तिति: 

चले: पुण्यत्तथा रघुपादिन्धुस्वतीति श्रवितो द्विवेष्याय 

प्रक्ष्या तत्र खान्तू॥ तांयवविनायाच्छेत्रारघ्यकारण 

कचरे दृश्य वेणिक्षुचुः। खैराधकिस्मावाकर- 

गेचल ताश्चाः। अन्यत्था कर्मेणकुस्मारस्येयोग- 

गमे पूर्ण्येयोगानापेश्यकार्यात्मिः खादित्ति॥ तत्र 

विभागजविभागाजान्त्रिकारे नववणा तद्प्रिकार्तिविभाग: किस्मिविस्मेचो विभागेन जनवेत्ति निरपेक्षव
भाषा। तत्तापि परमाणी स्वत् पाको वैशिष्टको नये।

तद्विते कर्मेण स्वत्। तत्र चद्रि क्रार्धशक्त्रयोगविना-

शिविन्तं कालमेवेभ्य विभागविभागः स्वत् तदा

दृश्यत। अत्र क्रार्धशिविन्तं कालमवयं वापेष्वरं

विभागविभागः स्वत् तदा। एकादशमणा। तथा वि

विशिष्योगानुत् परमाणी कर्म। ततः परमाणानारेष

विभागः। तत्र चारशक्त्रयोगमणाम। ततो न्यायसागरः।

ततः परमाणी। श्रीमाद्विद्याम। ततो रक्षायुपत्ति।

ततो द्वारानानानुगुणविधि। ततो विभागः। ततः पूर्वसं-

बोधगणानं। तत्र चारशक्त्रयोगमणाम। ततो न्यायसागरः।

ततो रक्षायुपत्ति। गनु श्रीमाद्विद्यामचन्द्र रक्षायुप-

ज्ञानं वा परमाणी। द्वारानानान्तुगुणविधिद्विनृत्तं

शेष। नौ भविष्यवर्ते परमाणिः चतुः कर्मातिश्रमारमा-

रेष गुणाःतिविन्तरेष च तत्र परमाणी। श्रीमाद्विद्या-

भावात्। कर्मवति कर्माणुपनोऽवर्गवर्ते। नौ भविष्यवर्ते

द्वारानानान्तुगुणविधिद्विनृत्तं। तत्तापि परमाणी। श्रीमाद्विद्या-

निश्चितंशय्यविनां रक्षायुपत्ति: खादिक्ति चेताः। नौ

पूर्वसंस्कारविवेच्यं रुपान्तरे चेतु लाग्न। दृति गर्भवता।

चध

दृश्यत। सा च चारशक्त्रयोगविनाश्विन्तं कालमेवेभ्य

विभागविभागः विभागविभागाने वति स्वत्। तथा वि

विशिष्यः।

* समालोऽपि परमाणी स्वतं दृति वैशिष्टको नये। दृति चामकर्षणं

सिरिद्वाऽऽपि वाह।
चिद्वा मंथेयागार्ध श्राणुकारसकारे परमाणू किंया। ततो विभागः।
तत चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो श्राणुकारसकारे विभागः। तत श्राणुकारसकारे विभागः। तत\c:\ श्राणुकारसकारे विभागः। ततो रकायमात्रकयोगादिके गानः। ततोसकु द्रव्यवादात्मकयोगादिके तथा श्राणुकारसकारे विभागः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। ततो पूर्वयोगागादिके तथा चारवश्रकथेयागाकः। ततो गानः। मध्यमात्रवश्रकथेयागादिके गानः। ततो जागरण क्षेत्रातील। तावलू कालमेके जागरण क्षेत्रातील। तिच्या यथाप्राप्तीत गाजकसद नसे परार्थविनायक नीरुळांत गानः। गाजकसदुपारककरण रक्षेत्रात तदसिद्धि रक्षता नीरुळांत। एवे परमार्थात जागरण क्षेत्रियात पंथमार्थात अस्य गानः। ततो विभागः। तत चारवश्रकथेयागाकः।
भाषाः नैयायिकायानु नये द्वापुकारद्विपीयते।

विन्दुः करणः परमाणुकारकर्षणविभाग दृष्टेकः काष्ठः।
ततः खामाधिनाशः विभागाच पूर्वांशगणनात् दृष्टेकः काष्ठः।
ततो रक्षोत्पतिः चारकारकर्षणविभागात् गंभीणेकः काष्ठः।
चः द्वापुकारः। चः द्वारकार्यतिरिति। पञ्चव्यः।
द्वयनामात्मकाः परमाणुकारकर्षणाः परमाणुकारकर्षणाः।
ततः खामाधिनाशः। परमाणुकारकर्षणविभागः।
चः द्वापुकारः। परमाणुकारकर्षणविभागः।
ततः खामाधिनाशः। परमाणुकारकर्षणविभागः।
ततः परमाणुकारकर्षणाः। ततो द्वापुकारः। चः द्वारकार्यतिरिति।
एवं खामाधिनाशः परमाणुकारकर्षणाः।
रक्षा-कर्मविभागाः परमाणुकारकर्षणाः।

नैयायिकायानुः। नैयायिकायाः। नये द्वापुकारः।
उपविविषयः पाको भवति। तेषाः मम मायारः।
उपविविषयः वांशम्। संभावयेव: 'प्रविष्टिरविवेकविषये:
यथापि पाको न विस्तरते। जैवित्तिकते जन्मावस्थास्थिरास्वतः
कलने शैलवातः। रत्नं शेषं घट द्वाराय: मायाविभागाण्यां
मध्ययो वस्तुः। चः तु न प्रमायणां तज्जाविविन-
भाषा । गणन्यन्यवञ्चारे तु चेतुः सर्वः अभिधीयने ॥ १०४ ॥
म्योऽपि निद्यमेकतमनि हन्नादिकने ।
ब्रह्माद्यः पराश्रान्ता अपेशावुद्दिण्डा मनाः ॥ १०५ ॥
प्रानेकाण्यथा यथा एते तु परिकीर्तिता।

प्रित्र ॥ श्रीपित कीक्रियत हुति ॥ श्रमां गिर्धपथितमार । गण- नेति। गणन्यक्षाराणिः अरणयकारण मण्डलययः। ॥ १०५ ॥
निद्येषि । नीतोऽपि श्रमाणक्षाराणिः एकलं गिर्ध जनितो घटावै। एकलमैत्रिमातिधः ॥ ब्रह्माद्यः
वाः अतः ॥ श्रीपित कीक्रियत हुति ॥ श्रमां गिर्धपथितमार । गण- नेति। गणन्यक्षाराणिः अरणयकारण मण्डलययः। ॥ १०५ ॥

प्रेमेकति । चचपि ब्रह्माद्यः समवयः गत्वेकं घटा-
वववि कर्तहे ततात्पत्रो द्राविकग्राहयामावावः एको
न दार्विन प्रार्थस्यभाषा ब्रह्मादीर्ग वष्णाततिर-
वषः कक्ष गणन्यन्यवञ्चा अभिधीयने ॥ श्रीपित की-
क्रियत हुति ॥ श्रमां गिर्धपथितमार । गणन्यक्षाराणिः
निद्येषि । नीतोऽपि श्रमाणक्षाराणिः एकलं गिर्ध जनितो
घटावै। एकलमैत्रिमातिधः ॥ ब्रह्माद्यः

प्रेमेकति । चचपि ब्रह्माद्यः समवयः गत्वेकं घटा-
वववि कर्तहे ततात्पत्रो द्राविकग्राहयामावावः एको
न दार्विन प्रार्थस्यभाषा ब्रह्मादीर्ग वष्णाततिर-
মাত্রা  অ্যাপেশায়াকুড়া নামকোর্ষ নিষ্কপিতা || ১০৩ ||
অনেকেকটিকেবল্য যাতে আপেশায়াকুড়া শিখিত হৃদয়ে।

বিষ্ণুং ন ত দিলগ্রাম তহ্যা বিষ্ণুবাভাবনদ। বিষ্ণুবাভাবন শিশু স্বভাব ক্ষুদ্রতা ক্রিয়া স্বচ্ছ স্বচ্ছ রূপ দৃশ্য মাত্র। সমস্ত চিত্রগুলি মেঝে প্রমাণ প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে প্রমাণ হতে।
भाषा° परिमाण समेकान्यवचारस्य कारणं। १०८।

प्रणु दोषं सच्चिधांसिः तत्सदृश दैर्घ्यः।
निर्विकल्पात्मक चिन्तनाके नियममुद्रार्थं। १०८।
सहायत: परिमाणार्थ प्रचयाद्विपि जायते।
निर्विपरीतां सहायतार्थ तु सहायतान्युवाचारं। १०८।

मिळतो निर्धारपल्ये। संख्या लाभार्थे सत्तारम्भाभावादिश्वरसिः।
परिमाणार्थ निर्खणयति। परिमाणमिति।
परिमितिसत्कारारामार्थार्थ कार्यं परिमाणमिति
लयः। १०८।

तस्यमुखस्य नरु मद्दर दोषैः संख्याः। तत्त परिमाणं।
निर्माणार्थ निर्देशमिति। परिमाणमिति। १०८।

आयत इत्यादिपि परिमाणमिति। निर्माणार्थोऽपि निर्माणमिति।
तथा चालिताः परिमाणां मद्दर जनं परिमाणस्नानां प्रथमः।
तत्त नरु मद्दर जनं परिमाणस्नानां प्रथमः।

श्राकुलार्थिनी। श्राकुलाच्छेरेरे
श्राकुलार्थि परिमाणार्थ नेि परिमाणपरिमाणार्थ श्राकुलार्थिनी
परिमाणार्थ वा न कार्यं। परिमाणस्म प्रवहनाभावादी
तीचात्मकपरिमाणस्नानां। श्राकुलार्थिपरिमाणार्थ।

परिमाणस्नानेयस्य श्राकुलार्थिनी। नेि परिमाणस्नानेयस्य श्राकुलार्थिनी।
निर्माणार्थ सहायकार्थार्थ निर्माणमिति।

* रद्द्वायुववच्चन्य प्रवहनिः। नरुस्समावेशं सत्तारम्भाभावादिश्वरसिः।
निर्माणार्थ सहायकार्थार्थ निर्माणमिति। नरुस्समावेशं सहायकार्थार्थ निर्माणमिति।

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भावाने परिमाणं घटादैः तु परिमाणांजुमुखने।
प्रचयं शिष्यांला तः संयोगस्वतोऽजनने॥ १११॥
परिमाणं ठस्यात् नाग्न्याक्षमायनां।

विष्या० वजंतीवः। भृत: परमाणे विलम्बग्राहा झणुकपरिमाणेश्व झणुके चिलम्बा च चसरेषुपरिमाणांशीयः-मवानिकारणमित्यः॥ ११०॥

परिमाणांजुमुडाचरती। परिमाणं घटादाविती॥
परिमाणं कपासांविद्विरङ्गनं॥ प्रचयंज्ञानमुदाध्ये-नः प्रचयं निर्मिति। प्रचयं दृष्टि॥ १११॥

भाषा दृष्टि। प्रधातुः परिमाणाः। न चावघ-नाशः। कथां परिमाणानाग्राहः। कालवयविनिविष्टु-रपरस्तुपुक्षिश्वेदः तदुपश्चे चावघविनः। प्रत्यभिषारे श्रीर परिमाणानाग्राह प्रयाम्यविङ्क्लिंदित वाच्यः।
परमाणुपुक्षिश्वे झणुकः कालाध्यावधमापूर्णवत्तत्त्रा च चसरेषुकानातः। एवं क्रमे साहवविणा। गार्भाक्षायकालातुः। वृत्ति च गार्भकेत्युम्बुन्धमाचे। गार्भाक्षायकालातुः। गार्भाक्षायकालातुः। गार्भाक्षायकालातुः। गार्भाक्षात्वादित्युतांकालातुः। गार्भाक्षायकालातुः। गार्भाक्षायकालातुः। गार्भाक्षायकालातुः। गार्भाक्षायकालातुः।

जैती च पटानिमाणे रेप तस्मातस्येव चाराः परिमाणांतराण खाद्यानि वाच्यः। तत्रापि वेमाणविधातेन भमवायकारणस्युत्तरं योगनामातः पटानिमाणायाः।
भाषा० सद्धारपतु प्रथक्ष भालू प्रथक्ययकारण पू० १९३ पू०

विष्णू० कलात् पिन्हास तत्त्वयाचले पृथि तपत एव न खान्। तत्त्वाकृप्तकारणाभावात्।
तत्त्वादनवलबासाषे च न तेन परिमाणाधिकं सं-
पुर्वजः वाचारवत्। सच्चात् तत्त तत्त्वार्थेष्याने चति
पूर्वपदनाग्रहत: पुरात्तरैवत्तिर्यत्वं स्वीकार्ये।
प्रवर्णिन: प्रयात्मानसमू भालोयम दीपकलिकाकादि-
वत्। न च पूर्वत्वत एव तत्त्वार्थाकारात् पूर्वपदे
क्षेव पुरात्तरायाभावं हस्तात्त्वाभावं वाचायं। सूर्याएः यमान-
देवताविरोधात्। एकह भालोयम तत्त्वाकृप्तवभावं
वाहितलाच। पूर्वजः प्रतिवन्धकश्व विनाशे प्रवा-
जारोयरत्तिर्यत्वसंभुप्रेयलात्।

प्रश्चलं कारणं निर्हःपति। सच्चायब्रह्म। प्रथक-
प्रतियावावायारणं कारणं प्रश्चलं। तत्त्वादनवत् सच्चा-
वत्। यथा व हि निर्योष एकले निर्यो भ्रमिति निर्यों
प्रतियमेकल्या भ्रमित्वसिद्धियोषा भ्रमित्वसे भ्रमित्वा-
मात्स्योपनि तच्छक्षकाम रम्य। दिलादिवया दिल्यक्षका-
रिकाल्याध। नन्त्वार्थाभाव प्रश्चलं प्रत्यादावनो-न्याभावे भावे। तत्तु च प्रश्चलं गुणारं तीक्ष्यते
न चाचु प्रश्चलं नल्येवाभाव दृढति वाचायं। रूपे
ग च तदं दृढति प्रतीयंगानुसे। २६३ ॥

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भाषा । अन्योन्योऽभावतो नास्त्य  चरितार्थलमृष्ट्ये ।
अक्षात् प्रथिगिद्ध नैति प्रनीतिनिर्थि विच्युच्या ॥ १९९ ॥
अभिप्रयोगात् या प्राप्ति सौवः संयोग दीर्तिः ।
कौर्यिनिजिवधक्लेप अन्योन्यान्तरकर्मजः ॥ १९४ ॥
तथोभवन्यक्ष्यात्या भवेत् संयोगवेदापरः ।
चार्दिमः अनुवृत्तादिसंयोगः परिकृतः ॥ १९५ ॥
वेष्योः संस्त्रापते यस्मात् स द्विनयं उद्राज्ञतः ।

विन्दुः । न चि रूपे घटावधिकं प्रथमं गुर्दारमरर्मखं न च घटे घटावधिकप्रथमरसिं चेन परस्यायामवः क्रस्य द्रव्यत चाष । अन्योन्याभावत द्रति ॥ विषमणिति ॥
गुरु म्र्जविविष्यानेव म नये प्रविष्यास्विति चेन् । न। विनार्यभेदं घटात् प्रथमं दुर्लभं दुर्लक्षं चेन् वेमासापि पवमी खात् । तथावृद्ध घर्जनकथाऽने पवमी चेयतां नवर्षा नये उन्माध्याभावते भिष्यो गुप्तान्त् क्रस्य द्रति ॥ १९१ ॥
संयोगे निलृष्पयति । अभिप्रयोगरिति । तं विभजते ।
कौर्यिनिद्रति । एव संयोगः ॥ १९४ ॥
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चार्दिमः ऋक्षिताः । द्वितीये आदृताः संयोगः द्रति । विभक्तमद्यकर्मकार्यं विभागं निष्पर्यान।
भाषा
कपालविलसयोगानु संयोगस्यस्यमाथः। १९५।।
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भाषा । चेतुमात्रविभागेऽऽ चेतचेतुविभागजः ॥ १८॥
परत्वच्छायापल्लु दिवर्ध परिकीर्तितः।
दैशिकम कालिकाचणि मूर्ति एव तु दैशिकम ॥ २०॥
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अपरत्वं नाद्यतवुक्तिः ख्यादिनीरिति ॥ २१॥

विष्णु । नैव दैशणनाशत । शून्यं चून्यं दैशणात्विभागो न जन्मत दुःखित वाच्यां। चाराबार्त्तथोऽगार्तदथीविभागवोऽव- चैव सकियत दैशणात्विभागाभावात्। चन चक्षुसङ्गाय चक्षुसङ्गविभागः । तत्त: चैरित्पित विभक्त- प्राशयो भवति। ततः च चैरित्तबिभागे चक्षुसङ्गित भ कारर्षिं। वादिकश्यास्त्रीरं तु किया नाखिं। चक- चक्षुकमं यावदुवक्षण्माणिषयतान्त्र। अतः च कार- प्रकारणविभागं कार्यानुकूलविभागो ततो दृष्टि। चतु एव विभागे गुणान्तरं। चतुचा चैरित्पित विभक्त- प्राशयो न ख्यातु॥ चतुः चोण्याणमण विभागे नाभया- बिष्टेऽ भवति ॥ १८॥

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किंसिन् नरो वा चिंतानुवांशविद्धिविहितः संग्रामः।

नल्लभावप्रकाशः चीत्तन्त्रप्रकाशः तु निलः॥ १५॥

स संज्ञाया मन्त्रस्य शायाकात्तकनााः।

विज्ञ। तन्त्रप्रकाशः ज्ञानं भव द्वाराः॥ तन्त्रप्रस्थः चारमापः।

श्राहः धरि। विवर्गणः द्वाराः। दर्ष्रीरावः युद्धा-

संज्ञायारण्यः ज्ञानं गौरवावस्थायंकारः। एवं ज्ञानः

पीतः ज्ञानः रक्षाकारः ज्ञानः ज्ञानः निश्चयः

तन्त्रम धरि॥ १५॥

किंसिन्त्राधिकः किंसिन्त्राधिकः विग्रहः। विग्रहः

स्थलसमारः। तदस्तेति। तदभावप्रकाशः वलि

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मित्रका न संस्कारकारणं । गद्यनाटिकामादर्शी निमं
ययमापणसंपर्कं भावायत् । किमु तत्र प्रभेक कौटिद्वं
वन्द्राण्ग जन्तुे । संस्कारसु माणश एवंति । एवे जाने
प्रामाण्यसाङ्गवादिनिवासिस्त्रयं वर्तति । एवं वार्ताप्रगाधिपि
वापकसंस्कार द्वाद्रिकं बोध्यं । किमु संर्थं धर्मसाङ्गरं
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मारुन्तप्रतिमान्त्रयं । विनिगमानिर्बादु प्रमाणावसं
भावादन कारणसंपर्कु गुणकारणतायाः स्वायत्तार्तः
गच्छ मुक्तिक्षुम पितादिरुपसाङ्गवादानो कारणसंपर्कु
वाचः तथा ॥ किमु गुणका द्वाद्रकसंपर्कवेति वाचः।
भाषा० पिन्दूरलब्धिदस्ते देशे नानाविभू कृति: ॥ १७० ॥ प्रत्येके तु विशेषोप विशेषज्ञता समे। सचिन्तने गुणस्तु खाद्य लनुमितो गुणः ॥ १७१ ॥ पचे साध्यविशिष्टे च परामर्श गुणो भवेत्। प्रचे साध्यविशिष्टे भवेदुपथमितो गुणः ॥ १७२ ॥ प्रचे साध्यविशिष्टे योग्यतायात्तायये साध्यवा प्रमा। गुणः खाद्य भवमिन्द्र गुणः भानमाणो च यत्र प्रमा ॥ १७३ ॥ प्रत्येका तत्प्रकारे यज्ञाचारं निदिष्टपूजयं。

विष्णू० तदाविष्णुचङ्गातिरेक्षाभा गुणशापि पैठलविधे। एवं भवम प्रति गुणाभावः कारणमिन्द्रश्चापि सुविधालाच। तत्र देशे चे रत्नाकारान्यायामाश। पिते तिर्। कारिगा पिण्णादिरिभी विरा देशे। कारिगरादः खण्ण-प्रिमाशने दूरवस्ते देशे:। कारिगर वंशोगमभे मथ्यू-कवालाचणमस्येव दोषा भानिजनका द्वीत्यः ॥ १७४॥ ग्राह के गुणा रत्नाकारान्याया प्रत्यावहृतक शमशी गुणानू दर्श्यति। प्रत्येके सिद्धि। प्रत्येके विशेषशब्द-विशेषविशाखरूङ्गुणः। गुणुमिता वायव्यन्त वायव्य-वेदिक्षार्थ गुण दुष्टि। एवमपत्यूघः ॥ १७५ ॥ १७६ ॥ प्रमा निरुपयति। भवमिन्द्रनिमति ॥ १७७ ॥

सूत्र वध गुणितरपदाविरोधी रजने दृश्य स्मार्य आत्मा तत्र रजनेंद्रापि प्रमा न स्मारे तस्मानं भवमिन्द्र-
भाषाः तन्त्र प्रमाण न प्रमाण नापि अथः स्रावस्तिम्वर्कप्यं कै ॥९७॥

प्रकारत्वादिन्यमेव समन्वयनवर्गाच्छ तन्त्रः

विद्या । स्राभवातु चतु श्रावः । प्रच्छेदीति । तद्रेष्ठेऽवकर्षम् तप्रकारः शास्त्र प्रमाण द्वारं प्रकृतीः। द्वीतिः चैव च। ग्रेव चन्द्र श्रेयं तद्वकर्त्ता तेन समस्में। तद्रेष्ठेऽवकर्षम् तेन समस्में तप्रकारकर्त्ता शास्त्राः। तेन कपालाणि संबोधिता घटानु-श्रेयश्ने नानित्याष्ट्रः || एव वशिष्ठ गर्भिपाक्यं प्रमाण गत्र खातः।।

गत्र खातः प्रकारकलाभावावशु ज्ञात श्रावः। न गतविषयमिति ॥

नरु ॥ श्रेयं कपिमंत्यात्रां अथः: खातः। प्रमाण च खातः। श्रेयः ।

गत्र प्रतिध्यातिमिकरायसंकेताभावाति संबोधिता अभावात्तिष्ठलात्ति ॥

गत्र श्रेयं संबोधिता अभावात्तिष्ठलाति श्रावाभावात्तिष्ठलाति श्रावः। न श्रावः। तत्र संबोधिता अभावावशु प्रतिध्यातिमिकरायसंकेतार्थः वाच्यः।

तत्र संबोधिता अभावावशु प्रतिध्यातिमिकरायसंकेतार्थः अभावावशु अभावावशु। श्रावः।

संबोधिता: ॥ ९७ ॥

प्रमाणमिति । मीमांसको तद्वित्रो विश्वातो अथां

प्रमाणस्मिति । तत्र गुरुणां मने ग्राह्यं स्मरकाराकृ-

पलातु तस्मानासासाः। तेनेव ग्राह्यं द्वैते वृत्ति। भाषाः।

मने ग्राह्यमतीश्चिर्यं। शास्त्रावती। शास्त्रावती स्मरकाराः।

तथा च शास्त्रावतीश्च। सुरामिनिनिन्द्वानि सर्वेष्णां

शास्त्राणां ग्राह्यं द्वैते। सर्वेष्णां ग्राह्यं स्मरकाराः।
विष्ठा १० पञ्चस्यानेन तत्त्रास्त्रामाणि यथा तस्तस्तो विषयनिश्चयं चि
जानं। अथा भागवित्तिवेदी विषयं। तत्त्वानि दूष-
चारत्। न खेतो यास्मिनि। चंगविति। यदि भाग-
प्रामाणि खेतो यथा खाँ& सच्च महाभाष्यमेवदेशायने
तत्संस्करः य सात्त्। तत् च यदि शान्ति भाषां तदा
प्रामाणि शास्मेवेदी कथं चंगवाय। यदि तु भाषा ग
सातं तदाध्यायः शास्माभावात् कथं चंगवाय। शालि
श्चास्मः शास्मानाध्यायाण्येः। तथा च द्रवं भाषा गमा शवा-
दिशस्तितानंकलावू घर्जे तस्मैव स्थायाप्रमा। द्रवं
प्रथितिद्वारकारकं भाषा गमा। गन्धवति प्रथितिद्वारकार-
कालकलातू। एवंद्रवं अध्यायां गमा। चेष्वति
शंस्लकारकालकलात। न च पेतु भाषां कथं जात-
मिति वाच्यं। प्रथितिद्वारकारकालकलख खेतो यास्मालान्।
तत् गन्धवदिशशकान्तकारी सुपलानात्। तराकारक-
लांवचिस्तदिशशकलं परं न राखते। चंगवायागुरो-
धातू। न च प्रामाण्य साध्याय प्राधिकृ। कथमिति
वाच्यं। द्रवं भाषा गमा खेतो यास्मालात॥ न च प्रका-
रमेरेन्द्र भाषाप्रेमार्दुए घटवति घटलकारादेः
कथं प्रधिकृतिरिति वाच्यं। घटलकारकालकख खत्रिबे-

* विष्ठा१० विषणविश्वासविवेकसंविवेकतंत्रप्रमनादाबं भाषातिवम्। अस्मिते-
प्रकाशसु भाषा विषणविश्वासविवेकसंविवेकतंत्रप्रमनादाबं विषणविश्वासविवेकतंत्रप्रमनादाबं
संविवेकतंत्रप्रमादाबं। भाषाप्रशासनं विषणविश्वासविवेकतंत्रप्रमादाबं


"\textbf{चिंत्या} \textbf{श्लोकाचे खंतो याश्वलन्। चर्म व शुभ्मुखप्रियतानुसार \textit{छठविचितर} चर्ममंगङ्करकरकमिति श्लोके प्रामाण्यांचा गापकाहात: । वषोत्सवपर्यंत प्रामाण्य न खण्डाने । तत्र संबंधणामंडळोऽधे संबंधणांवैपर्ये । किंवा वास्तव- \textit{दृश्यांभूमी} वशीचानुकूलवधायादिवा प्रामाण्यांचा स्रोत एवं तथा श्रवणांनुसार वत्तेव च प्रमाणीतीतीती चतुर्युतान् ॥ अश्च प्रामाण्यामुक्तमिती प्रामाण्यसंबंधे न तस्म विशेषणविश्वसकलाः कारणांचे वाच्य: । नेत्रंयुतामुमितारेवैत वस्मुखी वाक्रणमुखी या नागविश्वते चेष्ठा । अनुप्रीतामाणां- \textit{प्रकाशिक} विशेषविश्वसकलाः । यत्र व प्रामाण्यसंबंधव्यञ्जन परं प्रामाण्यामुक्तमितेनेवर्या वदास्तु प्रामाण्यामुक्तमितेनिरूपत एव वर्णवत तु न वस्माद: । \textit{विषित} कोणानुपर्यावरिते: \textit{हँसिविरोधर्मनारित:} \textit{हँसिविज्ञानारम्भ- वर्णादितं यत्रत्र: ॥} नन्द वर्णवते प्रामाण्यां पयार्य- चतुर्युतांतस्म विवृत्तकलां विवृत्तकलां वर्षोऽ न च \textit{रक्षे} रज्जुस्थितम्: प्रत्सिद्धांगमंजया न स्वाता तव मते \textit{अमुकासाधारितर्वाच्यं । तत्र सि इन्द्राधीनसः पुरोवर्तिनिः सन्तमोपप्रियतरजेतभेदायांध देहुतताः । सत्यरञ्जायसे तु विमलप्राणस्य घलातु मंदिव कारण । अस्तु वा तत्रापि भेदायां एव कारणमिति । न वायुर्भी या खातिः सम्भवति । रजज्ञानांवस्करकारणक्षा रजज्ञानिः ।}
भावान् प्रमादं न स्तो ग्राह्यं संबहायानुपपत्तिः \| १२५ \|

विद्वान् कर्ष्याभावान्। रजने रजतुबुल्लरुपस्तरिति चेष।
साधरकंभ्यें प्रस्तिं प्रति विनियोज्याग्नि हेतुतायः
कृतायां। अन्यप्राप्ति तत्क्रमानां \| २ \| न च समाविष्ट
अन्तः। न तत्त्वादिप्रभुत्तो तत्त्वाकर्षण विनियोज्याग्नि हेतु
इति भेदाययः कारणमिति वाच्यं। जाग्रत्वम् प्रस्तिमाचे तत्त्व हेतुत
कर्ष्यानां। रज्ज्य रजने रजनतविनियोज्याग्निरोपिन
ग्राह्याभायानुपपत्तिकारणम्। न चति:। फलसुख
सैयारवाढामुलान्। किंतु यदु रज्ज्यराजत्यारिमे रज्ज्ये
दति भार्य बाये तत्र न कारणबाधेयानि। चपिच
चत्र रज्ज्यराजत्यारिमे रज्ज्यराज्ज्ये दति भार्य तते वायुव्रत
युगप्रत्येकितानि सायान। रजने रज्ज्यभेदधेले रज्ज्ये
रज्ज्यभेदधेले सत्याभायानुपपत्तिः। सत्यते रजने रज्ज्य
भेदधेले रज्ज्यभेदधेले च सत्यान्। सत्याभावे
रजने रज्ज्यभेदधेले च च च च च च च च च च च च च
किंतु गुणमिति प्रति भेदधेले हेतुने जयस्त्रेदे विश्लेष्यार्थेन
वायुधृववदभेदधेले च गुणमिति निर्मिवायासा। यदि च
विनियोज्याणि कारण तदाभोगानेक्षे विश्लेष्यायसूख
वायुमुन्त्वनुरोपाधाराकर्षितं। दत्त अन्यथा खाता
सत्यमभे मेव तत्त्वम्। रजने रज्ज्यतथा आनामीयंभवा
दति यद्यें: \| १२५ \|
भाषा। व्यभिचारश्लेष्ये च इसचारयचस्तायिः।
चेतुर्योगसिद्धशे तकः कचित् प्रश्नानिवर्तकः॥ १५२॥

विभा। पूर्वः व्यभिचारका तद्धेरोपायसः न दृश्यति रूपः
तस्मां दृष्यति। व्यभिचारक्षेत्रः। व्यभिचारश्लेष्यः
व्यभिचारश्लेष्ये कारणमिलयः। व्यभिचार-
श्रवयाग्ध स्ताविकत्रतिवेकलात् नदाभायः कारणः।
अन्येषयत्वंतः शरायकाम्या यज्ञारयाहस्तव। भृधे-
दर्गमणु न कारणः। व्यभिचारशुक्लसिद्धश्राविरूपः
कचित्त श्रायकम्यात्। कचित्त श्रायकम्यश्लेष्यविधुनन-
द्वारा अंगेददर्गमणुपुष्यते। चतुः भृधेर्दर्गमणुदायिन
शक्रा नापैनि तत्र विपञ्चनाधकालः। कारणः।
तथापि
बालविरहितायाय भूमः स्वादिः वचारश्रा भवति तदा
शक्रा बक्षणमेऽः कार्यकारणभावस्य गौतिवधानानिव-
रंते। चस्यां वक्षणाम् न खातः तदा गौतिवधानां न खातः।
कारणः विना कार्यानुपल्लिः। चश्च कचित्त कारणः त्रिन-
पाय भविताः प्रहलादकव कव वा भवितानीति तवा-
बक्षण भवति तदा शक्रा यमातादप्ररयाया। चश्च
कारणः विना कार्यां खातः तदा गौतिवधानेन प्रक्षेपमेऽः
भूमाशाः नियमत शेषार्द्व ततेषव न खादिः। चतुः
क्रम अन्य शक्रा गायतरति तत्र ग तकाप्रेपमिति तत-
दिवमुक्तं तकः कचित्त शक्रानिवर्तकः रति॥ १५३॥
भाषा। साधकां व्यापकी यत्कु चेतनार्थावापकस्थाय।

चिद्धां। द्वारां परकीयावातिप्रश्न अतिबार्य सिद्धस्य शाखाकां साधनाबिन्धमानावापक प्रयत्न। साधकां साधनाबिन्धमानावापकम् गणु तथा गणेश सिद्धान्तवात रत्न प्रकाश। तथा रत्नवार्तमानस्य वहां

एवं बायुः प्रत्यक्षः अन्नस्य रत्न ज्ञातृत्व प्रक्षत नैपादिः खान्। प्रत्यन्ध राजाजीतिः ध्यानात् नैपादिः खान्। व्यवहारात् अन्नस्य रत्न ज्ञातृत्वते तत्र

एवं ध्येया विनाशी जन्यमस्य रत्न ज्ञातं नैपादिः खान्। विनाशिल्य नैपादिः प्रागभावे ध्यानात्।

ततैः भावार्हावादित्या चेत्यास्य विभिन्नस्यावापकम् तत्तथाविभिन्नस्यावापकस्य मनवात्यायान्तः। सिद्धान्तवायक्षरितः बायकः राजाकाशीवापकम्।

एवं विभिन्नस्यावापकम् तत्तथाविभिन्नस्यावापकस्य विभिन्नस्यावापकस्य विभिन्नस्यावापकम्।

एवं ध्येया विनाशी जन्यावादित्याः जन्यमस्य अन्नस्य अन्नसिद्धार्थावापकां भावान्। व्यवस्थिता न एतारुवेश धर्मीया

ध्येया अन्नसिद्धार्थावापकः विभिन्नः अन्नसिद्धार्थावापकै विभिन्नः अन्नसिद्धार्थावापकै धर्मीयाः। नैपादिः खान्। विभिन्नस्यावापकम् तद्विभिन्नस्यावापकम् धार्मिकः राजाकाः।

* भाषा: माख्या निधातानयामां द्रत्यार्थाः मितिवधातानयः

निधातानयामां धार्मिकः माख्या निधातानयामां द्रत्यार्थाः

"पां:"

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भाषा। सं उपाधिभवेतस्य निष्कृत्वेतर्वं प्रदिन्ती। १३७॥
सर्वं साध्यसमाधिकरणं सदुपाधं।
चेतोरेकािग्ये येणं साध्यव्यभिचारिता। १३८॥
व्यभिचारसात्मनमुपाधिनेतु प्रयोजनं।

मित्राः स्नेहं उपाधिभवेतस्य यथायतिभवेतस्य यथोपाधि
गृहं साध्यव्यभिचारिनिधिकरणं सत्यतर्ला
विशिष्टस्य साध्यस्य यापकसं साधनं साध्यानुपकलमसं
पाधे। सम्भववतीत। १३७॥

अत एव संस्कृत्व वृद्धसमाधिरेण दर्शयति।
सर्वं इति। सनाचित। सं उपाधं। सत्यं साध्यसं
स्वाध्यसं तथोपव्यभिचारिता इत्यतः। १३८॥

उपाधिभवेतस्य अय पाधोबिष्ट्य अय पाधोग्रहसं उपाधं। प्रथो
ज्ञानं इति। तत्कार्यं यत गृहसाध्यव्यभिचारिता उपाधि
शिक्षां गृहसन्योगनिधिभविचारिते साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानं।
वयथा भूस्वस्य वज्रित्यादिः वज्रं हीरानिधी विभिन्न
सात्रेः साध्यव्यभिचारितां इति यापकभिधिभिचारितो
अयपाधिकरणं यायव्यभिचारानुमानं। यथा स्वयं
सत्यं साध्यसं इत्यतः सत्यं साधनं साध्यव्यभिचारितो
भाषा० श्रवणमाणयेंवृतन्त प्रथ्यक्त प्रमाण्यमिवध्ये ॥ १५८ ॥
धनुभांगनाथायत्वादिनि साहित्यिक मतं।

विषय० चारि । निर्ज्ञातन्ये यात्राशनकजलवधिष्ठायितादिनिः।
वाधानुश्रीपेठेदृश्य साहित्यप्रकाशिकाप्रमाणाभावाटू ख्यातापक्तकालाच नेपाधी।। वाधोश्रीतस्त परेट उपाधि धर्मवेच्ये दृश्य बधकरणां दक्षकलादु रूढ़ि हृद यथाई। प्रथाघेष वसेदेरजलस्त वसेदीरसनुपाधी।। वच साहित्यप्रकाशिकाः सन्त्रास्ते म सन्त्रास्ते पाधी।। परेटस्त शिन्धीसेवपतिः नेपाड्यायकोः कंपकम्य- द्वाणूर्द्धादिनिः। कृततन्त्र यात्रितिष्ठायाः साहित्यामण्यमुपाधिः।।
तथाचाः क्रेणशोभाः धूमवधकसरित्याः दर्शी लोणामयां रिद चार- तिर्थसाहित्यकाराः कातिबुद्धि।। यथा करका प्रश्निवो वत्तिवेश्योगवचाराधिकाः। भद्द्राशीतस्ताव्यां ॥ न च वशी धूमधुपाधित्येव दृष्ट- प्रतिस्तित वाचः।। सुर्वमेकापेदृश्याकारात्माश्च यथा।। न च साहित्यप्रकाशिकाः शिन्धीसेवपरिधारित वर्णित।। ब्रह्म- पमाणेऽविविधिः ॥ १५९ ॥

साहित्यिकास्ते मेदूतश्चर्चनमुमाणावज्ज च साहित्य ब्रह्म- पमाणात्तेंत्रमाणाविधेि च साहित्यां । तथा क्रि रुखने गामधाकेल्यायाधिपदानि बैलिकपदानि वा तारपयां-
ভাষায় তথ্য সম্মিলিত ব্যাপারের ব্যবহারের অর্থ বুঝা যেতে \[ ১৪০ \]
বৈবিধ্যান্ত মনে হয় ব্যাপ্তির ব্যবহারের অর্থ বুঝা যেতে।

বিষয়ের বিশ্লেষণ পরিবেশের সংখ্যাগুলি কার্যকারী করে। শান্তি-মতপথ সঙ্গে জড়িত হয়। অদ্ধ প্রাচীন সাধারণ সাধারণ। এই গবেষণার প্রভাবের কার্যকর সমস্ত সম্প্রদায়ের সাথে মিলিত হয়। যদি গবেষণার প্রথম সম্প্রদায়ের সাথে মিলিত হয়। এতে গবেষণার লক্ষ্য প্রাঙ্গণ যার গবেষণার প্রথম সম্প্রদায়ের সাথে মিলিত হয়। চর্চা এর গুলি যার গবেষণার প্রথম সম্প্রদায়ের সাথে মিলিত হয়। এই গবেষণার প্রথম সম্প্রদায়ের সাথে মিলিত হয়। যদি গবেষণার প্রথম সম্প্রদায়ের সাথে মিলিত হয়।

বিষয়ের বিচারামৃত শব্দদ্বৈতের ভাবানুভূতি।

গেঁ শব্দ শব্দের অর্থ প্রস্তুত হয় প্রথম শব্দের অর্থ প্রস্তুত হয়। কিছু শব্দ শব্দের অর্থ প্রস্তুত হয়।

তাই শব্দের অর্থ প্রস্তুত হয়।

তাই এর কিংবা পূর্বক দৃষ্টি।

তাই এর কিংবা পূর্বক দৃষ্টি।

তাই এর কিংবা পূর্বক দৃষ্টি।

তাই এর কিংবা পূর্বক দৃষ্টি।

তাই এর কিংবা পূর্বক দৃষ্টি।

* সমস্ত পেজের সমালোচনা।
भाषा  अनुवादयापितीव व्यतिरिक्ताद्योपचने ॥ १४९ ॥
साध्याभावव्यापकले चेलभावस्य लक्षणेन ॥

विद्यारो  धर्षाणां  बाहुतलाल  केवलाभ्यायिकरीति  चैतन ।
बाहुतलाला  वर्षंशाखरे  तत्ततै  केवलाभ्यायिलाल ॥
किन्तु  विनिमयमालाभावमार्गिलो गितं  केवलाभ्यायिला ।
तत  गगणाभावाद्  प्रियवर्त  ॥  अनुत्तपः
केवलाभ्यायिकी । चधा  प्रियती  रतरंभे  भिन्ने
गणवलाहितादि । तत  वि  वला दित्रेष्वेदयेववस्त्रा
पूर्वमानिनितनया  निर्दितमालयवत्:  वचनाभाव
दृष्ट । वचनकवि विशेषपरामर्शायितं । चधा विश्वमानं
धुमाहितादि । तत  वचनक  महानवादीविषयम्  जस-
ब्राह्मदेख  वलाहितति  ॥ १४९ ॥

तत  व्यतिरिक्ति । व्यतिरिक्तायापितां  कारणं
तद्यथे  व्यतिरिक्तां  निर्लक्षति । साध्याभावव्यापकले
चेलभावस्य  चक्रवेदुः  दृष्ट । साध्याभावव्यापकोभूताः
भावात्मात्योऽगलमधियमहः । चचेहं  वेद्यं । चेन  यम-
नेन  यथा  येन  रुपेश्व आपकता  ग्रहणे  तत्केनाभा-
व्यक्तियत्वांगितकमातृपरमावस्थाभावव्यापकाः।
यत्रामनेन  यथौथावस्थाः  आयता  ग्रहणे  तत-
त्वात्मावस्थाविशेषपरामर्शायितं  आंगितकमातृपरमावस्थाभावव्यापक
विषिद्द: । दत्तश्च  यथा  विश्वमानात्मानेनेतरलयाप-
भाषाः अश्यपन्नखु नेवेच प्रमाणाचारतेव ईश्वर।

पिठः कलं गणारायणे गुरुते तत्र गणारायणवानेतरसः
तथा गणारायणवानेतरसः शिष्यति। चतु तृ तारात्मिक्षमनेतरवारः
पक्ता गुरुते तत्र तारात्मिक्षमनेतरवासः सिध्यति।
एवं यथा यथार्थम् एवं यथा यथार्थम् धूमः
प्रति संयोगसम्बन्धेन वैश्वययोकपक्ता गुरुते तत्र
संयोगसंबंधेन तारात्मिक्षमनेत्रयोगितात्कल्पना
वाचार्यावेग अध्यायान्वितान्योगिताकल्पना।

चतुर च तारात्मिक्षयावर्तमेत्र वात्तिकसङ्काराद्वारः
कारणां। कौशिकतु वात्तिकसङ्काराद्वारान्योगितानस्य
गुरुसः तथा वात्तिकसङ्काराद्वारान्योगितास्य
कारणां। चतु वात्तिकसङ्काराद्वारान्योगिताप्रधानसः
वात्तिकवस्तुवाचार्यान्योगितास्य। वाचार्यानि
स्वतः च चटाद्रवः भाषां विद्यातु श्रुत्विन्यासः वाचार
दृष्टि द्वर्यत।

चर्यापन्नखुः। चर्यापन्नखुः प्रमाणान्तरं मन्त्रो
केतन। तथां च चतु देवदर्शक मन्त्रवर्ज्येवति:
गुरुते शास्त्राद्वारं जीविकाः गुरुवर्ज्येवति
तत्र शास्त्राद्वारं जीविकाः प्रवृत्ताद्वारं तत्र
शास्त्राद्वारं जीविकाः गुरुवर्ज्येवति
तथां च गुरुवर्ज्येवति तथां च गुरुवर्ज्येवति
शास्त्राद्वारं जीविकाः गुरुवर्ज्येवति
तथां च गुरुवर्ज्येवति

जाचारां गुरुवर्ज्येवति दृष्टि वस्तुगृहिति भाषाते।
ভাষার্থ: ব্যতিরেক-যাদুই চরিতার্থ হয়ে যায়।

dুঃখনুর্জন জগন্ময় কাম ধর্মঃ প্রত্যেক জনয়নে। ১৪৩।
অধ্যায়ন দুঃখ স্বাগ্ন্য প্রতিহরিত সচেতনে।

বিষ্ণু সুখে চেক্রা তাজ্জ্বানাত্রে জায়নে। ১৪৪।

বিষ্ণুর্থ: এবং পীঠে দ্বন্দ্বনী দিবা ন মুক্তি দ্যায়ে। পীঠলক্ষণ ভাজনায়লাভ গমান্ধোজন বিধাতি। দিবাভোজন-

বাধে রালি ভোজন বিধাতি। ভাবাপ্রতিচাক্ষুষ- কিভাবে পলঃ ভ্রাতারে। হেতু মানার্ক প্রকাশ প্রতিহরিত।

জ্ঞান হেতু দিবা তৃতীয়োপাধি এতে। 

বিষ্ণুর্থ: প্রমাণন নি। তথা: সুবর্ণাক্ষর মানার্ক লিপিবিশারদ শিবলোকপ্রাকত।
চন্ত যে যাপ্রাপ্ত মুগ্ধতামিতি অনিন্দিত। ১৪৫।

সুখে নিক্রিয়তাত। দুঃখনুর্জন জগন্ময় কাম ধর্মঃ প্রত্যেক জনয়নে। 

কামভিকায় দৃষ্টি। ধর্ময় ধর্মলেন 

dুঃখনুঃক্রিয়ত। প্রতিহরিত। প্রত্যেকে ধর্মলেন
cার্কারণ প্রথমোল দ্রুত্যঃ। ১৪৬।

dুঃখনুঃক্রিয়ত। প্রতিহরিত। প্রত্যেকে ধর্মলেন
cার্কারণ প্রথমোল দ্রুত্যঃ। ১৪৭।

নিক্রিয়তাত। নিদুঃখল দ্রুত। ১৪৮।
भाषा १२० दक्षा तु तदुपाये स्वामिष्कोशायतवंधीयति।
चिकिर्या छातिसाधारणान्तरक्षा च या भवेन् ॥ १४५॥
तत्त्वं स्त्रामिसाधारणसाधनसमित्वेऽभिंषि
सङ्गुज्ज्वलिष्टत्वमर्यमिति स्ताम प्रतिविष्ठिका ॥ १४६॥
तदचेतसतुलवेष्टु सेतुतम काश्चिद्माने।

विष्ठा १२१ दक्षा वि फलविषयविषयी उपायविषयविषयी च।
फलनु सर्वे सुःकामावस्तुः तत् फलेष्वर्ग प्रति फल-
श्राम नास्ति ॥ तत् एत सत: पुढ़वार्ष: समावति।
बन्धनं तत् खोहिताचर्याते म सत: पुढ़वार्ष रति
तत्त्वमहत् ॥ रतनरेखाबोन्नेष्वर्विषयवर्त फलेष्वर
येण: ॥ उपायेष्वर प्रतीत्रसाधनतायां कारणवर
चिकिर्यिति । छातिसाधारणकारिका छातिसाधारणे-
विषयविषयीका चिकिर्याः । पार्वं तत्त्व साधयामिति
तदनुभवात् ॥ १४६॥

चिकिर्याः प्रति छातिसाधारणमनिष्ठाधननां-
श्राम कारण ॥ तत् एत दस्ये छातिसाधारणाभा-
वान्न चिकिर्यः ॥ बलविद्विषि । बलविद्विषाधननां
तत् प्रतिविषि। प्रति मधुविषाधननां मोजने न
चिकिर्या। बलविद्विष: प्रतिविषयक देवन्ये ॥ १४६॥

कश्चिद्मान रति। बलविद्विषाधनकल्पनां कार-
चिन्तयतः । क्षितिसाधारणानादित्वसं वलविद्विषाधन-

भाषा। दिष्टसाधनताबुद्धिभेदः देशस्थ कारणं || १४७ ||
प्रदूषीय निदर्शनियम तथा जीवनकारणं।
एवं प्रयत्नायचिङ्ग तान्त्रिकों परिदृश्यं || १४८ ||
चिकित्सा कार्याध्येय साधनलब्धितस्यः।

चिकित्सा धनसाधनमणुया बलवर्धिप्राप्तकल्पमां विशापि
विद्वान्यां विलामाभावान् कलाविभाति रङ्कखरसे
दुर्भिन्त:- देयं निदर्शनमिति। दुःखधारणनिति। दुःखोपाय- विशेषकं देयं प्रति दिष्टसाधनतास्यां कार्यानुपादः:
बलवर्धिप्राप्तकल्पमां गतिविधमयं। तेन नामान्
वीरक्षतः खजनको पाकाद्रिय न देशः। १४३ ||
मम निदर्शनमिति। प्रदूषीयिति। प्रदूषीयिग्निति-
वीरक्षतेऽविधानां मेदातृं यथात्विधमयं रस्येः। १४५ ||
चिकित्साधीय। सभूविषयहस्वाभावस्य भोजनाद्वारा बल-
वर्धिप्राप्तकल्पमविलेन विद्वान्याभावान् प्रदूषीयिति
भावः। ज्ञानसाधारणानाद्रिव बलवर्धिप्राप्तकल्पमविलेन-
ज्ञानसपि स्वतंत्रसाधारणतिरेकात् गढ्यान्। कार्यान-
त्वृत्वपि वदन्ति। कार्यतास्यां मनवस्थापिति मुरवः।
तथांसि राागसा प्रदत्ती। जनमृत्युयां विद्वान्यादितिरिक्तः
वार्षिकसपि। या च ज्ञानसाधारणानाद्रिका। रस्ये-
चाय: सप्रकाशप्रकारकमेवाः शालविन्यमात्। चिकित्सा चि-
ज्ञानसाधारणप्रकारके चाय:। तत् ज्ञानसाधारण मनवस्थातः।


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शिवाः

सुखा देशुलात्। न च माधवसाधनलयोविरोधः। यह-कदाचित माधवसाधनलयोविरोधात्। एकद्रामा-पालसाधनलयोश्राजामात्। नवीनां समेद्य कतिमाधवसाधनलयोस्मान न प्रवर्तकमनागतेऽस्य वाच्यमन्वक्षात्।

किन्तु यादृशम पुंशेछतिसां पद्दतां तास्तुसां खस्त्व प्रतियम्याय तत्र प्रवर्तने तेनेद्रनकामश्च तत्-भाधनतासागानवरत्त्कुपकरणवत् पाकः कतिमाधवसाध-प्रुण्यसाधनस्मितानुपिताय पको प्रवर्तत दृश्याधिकृत्।

सुकामित्तिन्यासिद्यप्रह्लादी चैतन्ये कामोद्यद्रादिनास्मे वोगावे च तर्थभावात्। द्रूपदु बैचायं। तद्धनीमिष- खावलालादिन्यार्न प्रवर्तकं। तेन भावियोवराजे माळास्यान्त्रिक।

न प्रह्लादं। तद्धनीमिष- साधनार्थ ज्ञानं प्रवर्तनं। तेन भावियोवराजे माळास्यान्त्रिक।

न प्रह्लादं। तद्धनीमिष- साधनार्थ ज्ञानं प्रवर्तनं। तेन भावियोवराजे माळास्यान्त्रिक। तद्धनीमिष- साधनार्थ ज्ञानं प्रवर्तनं। तेन भावियोवराजे माळास्यान्त्रिक।
खिड़का० विषयिता घोषते दत्तादेव यज्ञ फले न शूष्टे सत्तापि खर्ग: फले कसयते। नवःतर व: सन्त्यामुवांशितेदािा रुष्ट्रामुनयें प्रज्ञिति: करिं ॥ न च चार्यसारदिकं महाकैकार्ति प्रव्यायायांभावे वा फलसमिति वार्ष्य। तथा वति कामले नित्यलहानयापि कामानभावेकरणापनेष्य।
दात्यस्य फलसुनिष्ठार्णवार्दुभामुक्तिभि चेत्य ॥ यहक्षणात्मकायियो नित्यलनैमिचिकव्रोहिरिं भर्षीशािु कामलनैमिनसकलक्षणीयो नित्यलकामलवेद्यो रविक्रियाधार्थात् ॥ न च कामानभावेकरणापि:। विकृतस्य वपाठादिरिव कामानमुख्याशीवः कन्यनादृत ॥। नु रैवशेषाधीतकायन्तानं चामानात प्रज्ञिति: भङ्गलकोमल्यते वेश ॥
रुष्ट्राध्यात्मकमाणय ताणुकार्यसमापत्तानगरस्याशिष्यै ग्रहन्ते रसयोगमान्यात ॥। यद्वपि पश्चापूर्बफलसमिति तद्वपि न। कामानभावेकरणापि चामानानमानिपृणिकलक्षणीयरातिरिक्तन्यायात अस्त्यासमन्यायमाण। प्रज्ञागुप्तसि:। तेन।
चर्च कृतिवहुपापसा पुरुषविश्व प्रभुवते। अनुत्तानति तथा जानेग्राह्यायायसम्भवे नस्थते॥
एवं।
सन्त्यामुवाश्च से तु मतं भजितमन्तमता:।
विधुतपापसि चार्तिती महालेकखमनामयं॥
एवं।
भिद्वाँ  

दशाद्रेषः याहान् पितमशः प्रीतिमावहनः ।

dāyādikameva pālagaṃ || ca pitāmṛtī: karyān
dāsakrīṣṇalādavita vaṇe ।

ग्रामाःस्तेवादित्वा

उद्योगमन्येनैव pālakamakalas ca ṇitī kṛṣṇaṇān ।

śat arohaṁ śāstardṛṣṭi pālakamudgāntaṁ rīyārāga

ṛ̣ṣi । pīthān saukhale tu khaṁ sargafalāḥ ca āvalī-

yamāttāsīyānānagatā śāmanvī: sargafalakalpanāt

paśa pūryārāmgātaṁ g āṁśāvati । g hi nubhū-

du:kaḥāvaham śat: puṭṭhāro । n vā na nāṃdhī ।

prāvāyaagnāṇāte karyā prātisārītaṁ pesā ।

dāvar । yāpa hi nītyānta prāvāyaābhāvāśantaṁ tadbhavo tadbhāv: ।

yāvai prāvāyaśāma vasci hū:kaḥāvahahās tu

prāvāyaśāma tadbhāvā dṛ̣ṣi: yogasamāghārāraṇkārṣataya

du:kaḥāvahā prāyīpya suvalaṇī । etamev prāyīpya-

nāḍaṁ prā:kaḥāvahahāsīlīnī: । nāmu n khaṁ

māthēdīrtho viśāro karyā nāmāryāvati: ।

dāvāgānā
tadbhavā jñātāsāvānā tadbhavābhāvā ch nāmārthānaya-

āhatā vahā jñātāsāvānā bhāvā ch nāmārthānaya-

āhatā pesā । tadbhāvaśāma vahā jñātāsāvānā bhāvā
g viśāro: kīnū pāvadvānagānagānagānagānagānagānagān
g viśāro: kīnū pāvadvānagānagānagānagānagānagānagānagān

viśāro: tadbhavāvahānā nāma vahāmaṇe vahā
dhāvā vahā viśāro viśāvāvahāvā viśāvāvahāvā viśāvāvahāvā viśāvāvahāvā viśāvāvahāvā...
१२८

शिंता नगु श्रीनगान्तोऽथे जयेन्याच कर्ष्य वर्णोदितात्मणुकुष-भिमलयः। शैवंश मरणानुकुलशापारकश सिंधालेख
मरणाध्यक्षनलाम्। न च वैधलानिषिप्रै रति वाच्य।
अभिषारे प्रायश्चितापदेशां॥ न च मरणानुकुल-
शापारामाः यदी श्याम तथा ख्याकार्य कृपकर्तुवः
विश्वकलापणिं खंगालश्रवणजन्यगरणे खातावधि-
लापतितिः वाच्य। मरणोऽद्यश्लकलकार् प्रिष्ठथाना-
तान्। नाते इत्यसहस्त्व न शिंता लाम्। श्रीनो-
हेमशनिमाराजवत्तामाणस सु वार्षिकां प्रायः-
शिविनमिति चेतोः। शैवारणाथायानुसारकोर मिश्रणान्।
नाते कामेमरणाध्यक्षातन्त्रत्वाद्रैरूपी न शिंतां। न च मात्रारणाथवनकोव रिहालं
श्रीमति न तथा किंतु तद्रसापूर्वमिति वाच्य।
ख्याचतेन श्रान्त्ये मश्यंकपापर्यायां माते शिंताद-
लामापने। केषीतु श्रीमति शिंताशयं न तु मरणं।
श्रीमण्डित्वात्तातिविद्वां दिष्टा अभिषारपदायः।
तथा च पापमकल। नात् श्रीमति वैधलानु। पापमकलं
सिंहसनं अभिमानं प्रतिसङ्गम। नातो न भवतु-
नात्तो॥ श्राचार्याः श्राचारभ्रायते विययः। पापं
कुर्यादृ दादाई। श्राचारिकर्मोऽस्त्राचिलाकार्यान
देक्षारावलं सापाराम। एवंश्रा खंगकालो जयेन्याच-
त्यादैं यागः खंगकालाधित्याधत्याधिक दत्तारं। नात
भाषा॒ उपादानशः चांगवर प्रयत्नौ जनकं भवेन ॥ निद्रुतिसः भवेतृ देवपादुः दिष्टसांधनातिथिः ॥

सिद्धांतः प्राचेितेणेष्ठमाधवलालसाधिकामम भवति । कस्मः भगवान्दराहृ भद्रावेशः भवति । यस्मै वेदे पौड़ेववयोः नैभूष्यति तत्र वैतिरिव तावद्रभः एव भूतिः खु-मायाः पुष्पांगे मांम ॥ न च कर्तेशारणं वाध्यः । कपि-खक्षादार्डिकमार्गाध्यायं कर्तेशारणस्वेत प्रतीयां-माणलतू । भ्रमणं प्रतीगमकर्मविलापाते । नदिव न कर्तेशारणस्मृति चेवेदेईः प्रस्ताः जाण्ये तस्मानाय-विद्यादार्डिकमुरार्धमस्वेत । एवं प्रतितस्मार्यं वेदा भूतिरिव विद्विगुत रुत्यिपि द्रुष्यवर्ष ॥

छ्यामुने भगवान्दराहृ वेदे गीतक्ष्यदा पुरा ॥

बिवाणा च विधिपञ्चि: चार्तीर्णिं ग कारकः ॥ द्रतिविद्वेदस्मृतिमां ॥ च च मौस्येवलभ्वमान्दि-बन्धवाभाभ्यां त्योहरिति वाच्यः । निद्रामवसंगः चिकर्षेन ग्रंिर्वादवत । भ्रम एवं पुष्पामार्गादिकमार्गवतः कविलार: कविलूं वेद्यः । किंय वर्षाण्मागवानित्यवलखं वच्छ्यामाणलाः सत्राः तमाण्डेतस्मृत्य वेद्यानित्य-सतिः ॥ उपादानेिति । उपादानशः नम्बावयिकार-णः शाख्येन प्रत्येक प्रदृष्टी कारणनिति ॥ १४१ ॥

दिष्टसांधनातामः शुः खस्ताधुरविशयवकः प्रदृष्टिः
ভাষা ২
লোক জীবনের নিষ্ঠুর সস্বভাবে নিজের নিজে ভাবে ।
শ্রীরামে রাষ্ট্রগাথার পরিকীর্তিত
চ্যানিনিত্য গুণল ৰাজ্য প্রতিষ্ঠান দ্বারা তু কমন।
হারিয়ের তদন্ত নিষ্ঠুর নিত্যমূলক নয়।
তদবাসমিক রাজ্য পশ্চাদ তু কমনে পাণ্ডবর।
ধারিতিতী নিত্যমূলক নিয়মমান করুন।

বিদ্বান ২
প্রতি জনকলস্কলকম দ্বারা নিজারিত মাত্র ।
চন্দ রত। জীবনজীবনের মাযাবনের মুখার্থ ।
এ ধৰ্মধার্ম ।

তত্ত্ব প্রমাণ প্রমাণ ।
শ্রীরামে রাষ্ট্রগাথার পরিকীর্তিত।
নাটীনিত্যাদি শায়িবাদি: প্রয়োগবাদি:।
নাট রাষ্ট্রগাথার শব্দাধিকার দ্বারাৰ ভারতীয়ভাবে বিদ্বান।
বহ জীবনজীবনের প্রয়োগ: ৫ গুলো বিদ্বান চিন্তা ।
ননী-স্বরূপ চিন্তা ।

অনিলে প্রাণকারী তথ্যমুদ্রায় ।
নিমিত্ত পর-ভাবী নিমিত্ত ।
গুলোমুদ্রায় গুলো ।
তথ্যমুদ্র রাষ্ট্রের রাষ্ট্রের প্রমাণ প্রমাণ রাষ্ট্রের প্রমাণ ।
প্রতি শারাপনে রাষ্ট্রঃ ।

ক্রমবিন্ধুপ্রাণিত। বিশিষ্টজ্ঞানমিত। ক্রমবিন্ধু বিন্ধু বিন্ধু।
শ্রী সাংসিদিকান্তু সতিতে দ্বিতীয় বিত্তিনে অষৎ: ইিঃ ১৪২২

c. p. 144

গ্রহণং পরমাণু জানে নিত্যমন্ত্রানিত্যমন্ত্রণাতি।

নৈমিত্তিকং বজ্রত্যোশাগুণপনিয়তাত্মাত্মাতি।

c. p. 144

ত্রিভুজং স্থানে চিত্তনিমিত্তস্ত মৃদুক্ষেত্র তন্তঃ।

অশেচ জালে স নিত্যস্মারিভৃত্যাভিভৃত্যস্তে।

c. p. 145

তাখানায় তত্ত্বক্ষয়ো দ্বিত্তিয়াত্মাত্মাতি।

শিব্রুগার্ভিক নৈমিত্তিকং ভাস্কিতায়চি।

দ্বিতীয় নৈমিত্তিকং প্রাপ্তার্থতি।

c. p. 145

জলপরাগায়া দ্বিতীয়ং নিয়ম।

নৈমিত্তিকং প্রশ্নায় অন্ত্য প্রশ্নায় প্রশ্নায়।

কুঁত্রিষ্টা লতাপনিয়তাত্মাতি।

তত্ত্ব কে নৈমিত্তিকার্থঃ বিভবঃ নাম।

নৈমিত্তিকং বিভবঃ।

বজ্রতি পদং পদার্থঃ তত্ত্ব নৈমিত্তিকং দ্বিতীয়ঃ।

তথা তেজিত্যাগ্রস্থিতি নৈমিত্তিকং দ্বিতীয়ঃ।

তথা স্থতাদিত্যে নৈমিত্তিকং দ্বিতীয়ঃ।

পৃষ্ঠাজন্য প্রশ্নায় প্রশ্নায় জন্য গঠন।

c. p. 145

স্তুতঃ স্তুতঃ নৈমিত্তিকিনি মন্ত্র: মন্ত্র: তত্ত্বত।

প্রত্যক্ষাত্মিকার্থাত্মাতে। মন্ত্র মন্ত্র পরমানিত্যানি।

স্তুতঃ স্তুতঃ নৈমিত্তিকিনি মন্ত্র: মন্ত্র: তত্ত্বত।

প্রত্যক্ষাত্মিকার্থাত্মাতে।

মন্ত্র: মন্ত্র: তত্ত্বত।

নবা প্রকাশায় তথ্যায় প্রকাশায়।

নাম ১৪৫৬।
भाषा: संस्कारभेदे वेगळेच विष्क्रियापकभावने || १५०.१

मूर्तमाचे तु वेगळे म्हणजे वेगळा काहीत ||

संस्कारपकंसकार! चिते! केवळभेदुपर्यंपे || १५०.२

चर्चान्निेरघृणे विशेष: काहीत सन्देशांपी कारणां ||

चित्राळा असायेन: || तथा वृती दचनमातिकूर्य सादत साव ||

नैवायने नतुङ्कापहुण्याकृत्यनेति || नतुङ्कापातत्

वेळाप्रकारात। नैवाय उपत्याध्यमाचे भेदभाव एव ||

तत्त्व प्रक्षलवादीप्रेमगुणं || अपहरणे भिन बङ्क वर्करं नामध्यनीती भाव: || संस्कारार्जितपयति || संस्कारेित ||

वेगाचित्रयापकभावनाभेदानु वेगाचित्रार्जितधार्म: दृष्ट-धे: || १५०.३ ||

मूर्तमाचे तु वेगळे म्हणजे वेगळा काहीत-विते। काबलवेगाचे भेदभेदारे विविध दृश्याचे: || भरावी

विने नेालमाणित्य काबलं वेगळो जन्मते: || तेनूँ पूर्व-काबलानुजातां काबलं || सलापेदिपे || विना भरूँ वेगां

काबलं: काबल्यात्रिव्यबळानु पूर्वकाबलानु वाचारकाबलं-

त्ययस्य न चातूँ: || चन वेगाता कापलेज जन्मते घटे वेगळे जन्मते च वेगळे वेगळे: || विष्क्रियापक दृश्य: ||

सारास्त्राखादीजग कापलागे "पुराणमस्य विष्क्रियापक पाकाध्यायानु" केवलित || लत्तपि "सिवाचित्रु विष-

क्रियापकेकथेवाणी" महामार्गसिद्धतं स्थितिमंतिर भाव: || १५०.३ ||

* परिवर्षाचे दृश्य घात ||
भाषा । भावनाकेशु संस्कारो जीवनविविधतीनिद्राय \। १५७ \।
उपेशावाकालकत्त्व निश्चयः कारणं भवेत्।
सारणे प्रत्यभिषायायामसैं चेतुस्मते \। १५८ \।

सिद्धार्थ स्थितियापकः \। कलिरु चार्यताखारी।
भावाक्ष रूपं \। १५९ \।
तत्त्वं वस्माराकारः। उपेदात्मकानान् संस्कारानु--
वषोपवेदावानाकार दिश्यन। तत्त्वं वायु तं संस्कारानु
तत्त्वं तत्त्वं वायु तं तत्त्वं तत्त्वं वायु
तेनोपेशालयिनियन्त्रेऽ वस्मारां
प्रति चेतुस्तिति भावः \। नन्द सारणं प्रशुप्रेमावालयिनियन्त्रेऽ
चेतुल तेनोपेशालिंक न सारणं द्रश्यं वस्मारां
प्रति ज्ञातयेव चेतुस्तिति चेयस। विनाकावतिर
रसेशापि संस्कारं प्रति उपेशावालयिनियन्त्रेऽ चेतुस्मत्
चिन्तुलात्। किंद्र उपेशायले संस्कारकथनाय गुह
लात् वस्मारं प्रति कविप्रेमालयेऽ चेतुस्मत्
चिन्तुलात् \। तत्र प्रमाणं दर्शमति। सारणं प्रशुप्रेमावालय
मणीं चेतुस्मते रूपं। चर्चा वस्मारः सारणं
प्रशुप्रेमावालय अवर्द्धन || चतुः संस्कारः कवियते।
विनाय कापपरं शूर्यानुभवं सारणं द्रश्यनान्यावारधान्तः।
संस्कारायाम्यात्रायावे काशनाखावात् \। न च
प्रशुप्रेमावालयः प्रति नतां संस्कारः चेतुस्मते प्रशुप्रेम
प्रशुप्रेमावालयः \। संस्कारजनालेन खमिलापन्निर्दिति वाचः।
argin końций रज्जु िरणि स्थान भर्गम स्थानि स्थानि साखन।
गुरुांण वायार वायार परिक्रिया॥

विष्णु॥ प्रयोगकलात्। परे त गुनुःवर्षकारान्त प्रक-
भिष्माकुज्जालुःवर्षकारान्त वेंडवेंइवा तन्नग-
रक्षकै गतविष्ठा गति वेंडवें कक्षत रखवारः॥
१६॥

भर्गमार्कति। भर्गमार्कति। खर्गोरिस-
कल्याणाद्वृत्तिः खर्गोरिसवृत्तिः भाषण
धर्म दत्तवः॥ तत्र प्रमाण दश्यतितसारः। वायारीति।
वायारीति। वायारीति। वायारीति। वायारीति।

चर्चायति प्रसादाः न कर्ष्टायितिः विना तति॥
गुनु वायारां वव वायारां मानु न प्रतिविष्ठिः-
खंगेयरिखायणे वव। भर्गम तथाये मानाभावात्॥
व ० लगते प्रसादाः महतों चर्गखंगानृपूर्वकारण-
क्लाभः तथायिती वाचाः। कालविशेषगढऺ सागर-
रिलायु दयात चाह। गुरुांणेति। गुरुांणेति।
गुरुांणेति। गुरुांणेति। गुरुांणेति।
हि खर्गोरिसवृत्ति गतविष्ठा जस्यवेंगधंिसाना वायार-
रक्षकै गतविष्ठा जस्यवें गतविष्ठा भावः॥
१६॥
भाषा  कर्मशालाजसुरराधिना नागस्वरसा मनः।
प्रवर्मों नरकर्दीनों चेतुर्निर्दितकर्मणि। १८९।।
प्रायकित्तादिनायोगोः सा जीवन्वृत्ति लिम्बी मुल्लो।

शिखर । नयु ध्रुवापापि न वापरेऽभूमि। न च निर्वा-
पारस्ख विरधक्षक कर्षणसम्बन्ध मात्र। चन्द्र-
वधामिनियतपूर्णविरिक्षित तथापि जलान्। चन्द्र-
विकृतपूर्णविनितं हि चचुंंसंयोगादि: कारणसं न हु-
म्न कार्यकारणस्तिस्वि समवायिकारणस्का-
रणसिद्धि चाच। कर्मशालाजसुरराधिना नाग-
स्वरूप मनं रूपत। यदि हि अपूर्णं न सारं तदा
कर्मशालाजसुरराधिना नागस्वरसा धर्मसं न सार। न
ति च। तेन चागादिनाम: प्रतिवने पा कर्मं सक्षते।
तशं पूर्णपेत ज्ञातायतेत।। पैनेन देवताप्रीतिरेव
फलमित्यपासं। गड्डायागादा: सर्वेऽदेवताप्रीति-
रस्यवात। देवतायाच्यंतापेत तस्मात्वतं नुस्वाम-
लात्। प्रौते: सुखक्षणपेत विष्णुप्रीयादि: तदमव-
वात॥। जगभवस्यादेशशास्त्रमातात। तेन विष्णुप्रीतिजन-
परा रमणस्कर्मार्दिते विष्णुप्रीतिश्रविदेश सद्याने॥
प्रस्थं नरकसारं चेतुर्निर्दितकर्मणि। नरक-
इधु: कार्यकारणस्कु: खानाः नारकिर्तिराधीनाथाः शा-
धनस्यध्वर: रूपः।। १८५।।
प्रमाणमात्। प्रायकित्तादिनायोः। जीवन्वृत्ती
ভাষার দৃষ্টিতে কৃত্তিকৃষ্ণ কাহার প্রকাণ্ড কথাবাদুর্গতি। এক পাশব্যলে না খাতুন তবে প্রায়শ্চিত্তাসাহিত্যের যন্ত না। ন হি তে শচন্তাদ্বারা নাস্তীকের নামে অনিশ্চিত বা বিষমার ব্যাপার। তখন পূর্ববিদ্যমান সিদ্ধান্তে ব্যাখ্য হয়। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব। জীবের প্রতি ধর্মভূষা ভাব।
हाणां शाल्यों धारणां वर्षांच्या ग्रंधारांत धार! धारिते।
कण्ठसंयोगालांत्रिक वर्षांसारख्या कार्यां मद्दा। १६३॥
शर्ये: शाल्ये नमोदुति: भोजात्या काय्य ग्रहणे।
शीर्षकर्णयायेन तदुपपितमुलं कोर्तिता । १६१॥
कद्मकोरकात्यायादुर्मुखिति: कस्मिच्या उपदेशी।
उत्तमः को बिनालय: क इति सुमहेनुजित्यता। १६५॥

विन्हा:। शाल्ये गिर्हे चतुर्विंशति। शाल्ये धारणां वर्षांच्या ग्रंधारां
दिवर्वे धारिते। कण्ठसंयोगालांत्रिक वर्षांसारख्या कार्यां मद्दा। १६३॥
सर्वे: शाल्ये नमोदुति: भोजात्या काय्य ग्रहणे
दर्शने। नमोदुतिरात्रिकायायेन दूरुपेक्षाकायसतः
महाराज। भोजाति। गणु श्रद्धालोकेष्येंनारखे
शाल्ये भोजे काश्मुरपितारत भाव। वीररामकन्यायेन
तदुपपितमुलं कोर्तिती। चाचंद्ररध विहूर्विदिगः
वाच्चिकेनार्व्यार्क्ष: चाचवेन श्रवण जनवे। तेन चापरसा
श्वापक:। एवं कन्येस्य भोजात्या प्रश्नात दर्शन । १६३॥

१६४॥
कद्मकोरकात्यायादुर्मुखिति: कस्मिच्या उपदेशी। श्रां
चंद्ररध दशतिधुरुक्षरध उत्प्र्वमो। तत्तदायें दश-
श्रवण उपदेशात दर्शन भाव। भस्माद मले गौरवाद्रुकं
कस्मिच्या उपदेशी। गणु श्रवण धिक्कादुर्मुखिति: कस्मिच्या

* कद्मकोरकाततिष्ठ पावतार!
भाषा० सच्चयं क दृष्टि बुझितु साजालयमयनामते।
नदेवैषपविद्याधीन सजातीयेषु परं दृष्टनागः। रूपं
दृष्टि श्रीमचामचेरापाचायविद्यानिवासमल्लकाचार्यतुत-।
श्रीयूतिविष्णुनायपञ्चाननमल्लकाचार्योरिचिते। भाषाप-।
रिस्केदार समापः। || * ||

विद्या० मत भाष। चतवर्तः को तिनं क दृष्टि शुद्धसे निश्चिते।
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विष्णूः। || ११५ ||

गृह ओ एवांं कोर दृष्टि महाधिमत्वमिदानात्मः
मानित्यल। दृष्टि चौराजनामसुदुःखमः पुराणः
पेशनतां भाष। सच्छयं क दृष्टि बुझितु साजालयमयन-।
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रिस्केदार समापः। || ११५ ||

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श्रुतामुकांशी संपूर्णा। || * ||
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दृष्टि गुवलमणिनिरीक्षण चतुर्थांश ॥
दृष्टि भावामणि निरीक्षणविभाग समूह ॥
TRANSLATION.
INTRODUCTION.

In the following introduction to a translation of the Bhāsha Paričedā,* one of the most celebrated works of the Nyāya philosophy, it has been my endeavour to subject the logic of the Nyāya, as well as the leading ideas of this and the Vaiśēshika systems, to a critical review, in order to bring the discussion about the merits of the philosophical researches of the Hindus more to a point. Colebrooke's exposition of those systems, though founded on the ablest and most exact researches, as well in a philosophical as in a critical point of view, does not suffice for this purpose, as it is a mere abstract from the works of those schools, and does not enter upon the discussion of the position they are to hold as systems of philosophy.

It is well known, how difficult it is to write a history of ancient India, only a few strictly historical records having been left to us by the Hindus themselves. The same difficulty obtains with regard to the history of their philosophy, as in the mind of the Hindus philosophy was associated with the idea of being raised above change, and no regard therefore paid to the social and intellectual condition of the time, in which lived the founder of a system or his successors who more

* I have translated Bhāsha, in deviation from its ordinary sense "speech," by "categories of the Nyāya philosophy;" for Bhāsha means here evidently not "speech" in general, which would give no sense whatever, but "Nyāya Bhāsha," speech in the Nyāya, that is to say the philosophical language or terms of the Nyāya. In the Sabda Kalpa Druma, "Bhāsha" (under the head of Bhāsha Paričedā) has the meaning of Paribhāsha, which is explained by the authoritative language of the teachers which considers the meanings of the words (Padārtha). This sense agrees essentially with the rendering which I have given.
Introduction.

eveloped it. Still it is not impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy, if it be limited to the task of tracing the gradual development of philosophical principles and modes of thinking, without reference to a strict chronological order; for the internal nature of a doctrine will point out its more ancient or modern date. At the same time we must admit, that even in this attempt, we can only partially succeed. The doctrines even of those who are considered as the founders of the different schools, bear the marks of a far advanced progress in systematical arrangement, and must therefore have been the result of a long series of preceding philosophical enquiries.* Hence it would be repugnerous to expect, that we should be able to discover the first steps of their researches. We, however, decline here embarking upon a historical research of such a kind, believing, that under the present circumstances, when only so few of their philosophical works have

* Lassen's Indische Alterthumskunde, vol. ii. p. 477. His (Pāṇini's) text-book continued to be the norm of the whole following time, and the labours of his successors were limited to the task to narrow or amplify his rules or more lucidly to arrange them. From his work the same effect results, as from other pursuits of the Hindus on the field of science. By a person of superior talent the labours of his predecessors were rendered more perfect and brought to a close; he united them in a system of rules, or Śūtras, which he condensed as much as possible. This exposition remained the standard of all later times, and formed the foundation for the succeeding teachers of the same science, whose efforts were in general directed to the correct explanation and elucidation as well as to the emendation and perfection of the fundamental work, and by whom the science was carried to a higher degree only as to its extent, but not as to its contents. We may discover a double motive, from which this manner of exposition took its rise. First, the sum total of the results which had been gained, should be condensed in the shortest form and hence be learning by rote facilitated. Secondly, this mode of exposition rendered the understanding of the text difficult and often impossible, unless it was accompanied by an explanation. Such an explanation was at the disposal of the teachers, and by their guidance alone the pupils were able to comprehend the obscure sense of the text-books. The Brāhmans, the only possessors of the sciences, thus secured for themselves the privilege of communicating them only to those whom they thought worthy of this information, and of preventing the other castes from an initiation with them. It is only in this sense that a secret doctrine of the Brāhmans can be admitted. From the circumstance, that for each single science text-books of this kind were generally acknowledged as standards, it was a consequence, that the works of the first founders and of the predecessors of the person who brought a science to perfection, were forgotten and frequently lost.
been published, and in general so many more materials are required for the task than we can boast to possess, it is more important to place an original work of Hindu philosophy before the public, and to examine the principles under which it has been constructed. For this end we consider the Nyāya in that shape, which it has acquired by its amalgamation with the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika, since we are of Colebrooke's opinion, that both sprang from the same root, and are but branches of the same school; the one being directed more to the explanation of material, the other of logical forms.* Or to state it more exactly,—to the Nyāya belong the logical doctrines of the forms of syllogisms, terms and propositions; to the Vaiśeṣika the systematical explanation of the categories (the simplest metaphysical ideas) of the metaphysical, physical, and psychical notions, which notions are hardly touched upon in Goutama's (the supposed founder of the Nyāya) Śūtras. They differ in their statement of the several modes of proof; the Nyāya asserting four modes of proof—from perception, inference, analogy, and verbal communication; the Vaiśeṣika admitting only the two first ones.†

The name of logic, usually applied to the Nyāya, does not correctly define it. It does not treat of the theory of syllogisms and the notions connected with them, as its direct object, but only as a component part of its investigation. It rather aspires to the distinction of giving a complete system of philosophy, based upon the most elementary metaphysical notions, and the division dedicated to the explanation of syllogistical forms, is not even more explicitly treated than other parts of the system. To call the Nyāya logic, would be the same as to assign this name to the philosophy of Aristotle. There is no doubt, however, that the Nyāya has first among the philosophical systems of the Hindus thoroughly examined the art of reasoning, and shaped it into its present form. Hence it gained such ascendancy among the learned Hindus, that all of them, however they may deviate from other doctrines of the Nyāya, refer to it as to their standard in logic, and deem its study necessary for the purpose of giving a firm basis to their reasoning.

† The view above given, was based upon the Śūtras of Goutama, without a reference to a work of the Vaiśeṣika school. I have since compared the Śūtras of Kapāla and found my view completely confirmed.
Introduction.

It is indeed one of the principal merits of the Nyāya, that its progress is marked by an admirably exact division of the topics, treated in it, and in this respect it is not only superior to all other systems of the Hindus, but even modern philosophy might, with advantage, study it on account of its clearness and exactness. Though none of its investigations has been carried on to a satisfactory end, the Nyāya has, with the means at its command, fully described the circle within which it moved. We must at the same time admit, that notwithstanding its exactness, there is one inherent fault in its exposition, viz. the neglect of all analytical method, a fault of all systems of the Hindus, which has, perhaps, more than any thing else, contributed to the narrow limits of their mental horizon. This fault, which, however, it shares with many other expositions of philosophy, for instance, to mention a celebrated name, with Spinoza's system, is rather a fault of exposition than of the system itself; for no synthesis (in science) is possible without analysis, and having well understood the leading notions of a system, we can easily trace the analytical way by which they were obtained. This apparent absence of analysis in the construction of the philosophical systems of the Hindus is the reason why so many enquirers have done injustice to their philosophical talent. For want of a clear analysis, unable to understand the aphorisms of the Hindu schools, composed in a language in form as well as in thought, foreign to them, they thought the philosophical productions of many centuries and of an ingenious people, a web of either abstruse or puerile notions. On a closer examination we shall come to a juster opinion of them, and although we find a limit as well in the range as the depth of their enquiries, we shall come to place them among the nations which advanced the intellectual progress of mankind.

That Hindu philosophy will, however, have any great influence upon the development of European philosophy and mediately of European civilization, must be denied. Why should this be the case? Although we must admit, that the philosophical researches of the Hindus are as worthy of attention as those of the Greeks, still it is at the first glance evident, that the philosophical works of the former are unfit to be transferred to another soil, while those of the latter will have always the same influence upon every rising generation in every clime and age. This difference lies not so much in the development of the system
as in the form. You are compelled to think by reading the works of the Greeks, they introduce you into the process of their thoughts, and by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until you arrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of their systems, from which point it is easy either to look back upon the way you have made or to advance further. The Hindus, on the other hand, are dogmatical. They commence synthetically with a statement of their principles, yet do not condescend to unfold the train of thought which has led to them. Hence it is impossible for any one to understand their writings who has not previously, to a considerable degree, been practised in philosophical enquiries. The punishment however of this mystery and exclusion is the want of interest, felt in the study of their writings. The same doctrines which might have been instrumental in enlightening thousands, are now forgotten, or in the possession of a few who are hardly able to comprehend them.

Among the general metaphysical notions, the notion of substance is the most important one, as upon it all other notions are either founded or are closely connected with it, and whatever may be the solution of all other metaphysical problems, it must be influenced by the notion of substance.

Substances are, according to the Nyāya, the substrata of qualities and actions,* a definition, which is the right one, as the basis of further investigation—it is the right one, because founded on experience. Substance, we add, is in so far the substratum of qualities and actions, as the existence of qualities and actions depends upon the existence of substance; if quality were independent of another, it could not represent another, whose quality it is. The existence of substance must therefore be absolute, that is to say, not dependent upon the existence of another; for in this case, it would be comprehended, not by the notion of substance, but by that of quality. And consequently, to think the idea of substance by any notions including dependance, is a contradiction. This contradiction (of comprehending substance under the notion of quality, and therefore of dependance) was committed by the Nyāya by the distinction between eternal and non-eternal substances, because the

* Or rather of qualities alone according to the modern school of the Nyāya. The definition, that substances are the substratum of qualities and actions, belongs to Kapāla.
existence of the latter is not independent. In the notion of eternal substance, however, the true notion of substance is included, which is to be independent of time and cause.

Another question is, how a substance is united with its qualities? That a substance should have qualities, appears a matter of course, and to question it, shows a vast progress in metaphysical thinking. Although the Nyāya entered not expressly into the discussion of this subject, it must have felt its weight, as they found it necessary to invent a contrivance for such a connexion. A substance is, according to them, united with its qualities by a relation, called intimate relation, which is something real, and is neither in substances, nor qualities, nor actions. We do not intend here to analyze this notion any further (stating, however, that the difficulty is not really removed by it,*) but we turn to a third point in the notion of substance. Substance, according to the Nyāya, is not only united with its qualities by the relation, just mentioned, but all substances are united with the general notion of substance, and single substances in the same way with the notion of their own class. This general notion is rather a common property; for it does exist, independent of the mind which may conceive it, in the substances (also in qualities and actions) themselves, and is even eternal in eternal substances, not eternal in transient substances. This notion exactly corresponds with that of the so-called realists among the scholastic philosophers, who maintained the reality of general notions. Duns Scotus, for instance, asserted, that general properties (notions) were not only in objects potentia, but act, and that generality was not only formed by the understanding, but that it existed previously to the mental conception per se as a reality, viz., the quiddity itself, which was

* For if it is necessary, that qualities require some link to unite them with substances, it is also necessary, that this link should be united with them by a similar link, and so on. The difficulty, as regards the connection of qualities, is briefly stated, thus. The existence of qualities is dependent upon the existence of the substance, whose qualities they are, but not vice versa. Substance in accordance to its notion, is independent of qualities. Substance therefore is something of itself, and also something on which qualities are dependent, and in this latter respect it is not substance, which is to be independent of qualities. That is to say, the notion of substance in this form is contradictory, and should be abandoned for a notion which is consistent.
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indifferent to general or individual existence. A cause, however, was required to remove this indifference, viz. another more extensive quiddity, closely united with the first, and with the principle of individuality. (afterwards called haecceity.)*

In one point the Nyāya went a step in advance of most of the ancient systems of philosophy, viz., in its assumption, that the special qualities of substances are effects; for instance earth is the intimate (or material) cause of smell, the soul of knowledge, &c. They were no doubt urged to this assumption by the contradiction, which arises, if beside substance, a quality which is necessary and therefore belongs to the quale of the substance, is admitted. If quality is an effect of substance, its existence is evidently derived, and the contradiction removed. Although, however, this hypothesis is a step in advance, it is not the complete solution of the difficulty; for here again the question will arise, how it is possible, that a substance can become a cause, that is, produce something, which is foreign to itself.

Substances, as before said, according to the Nyāya, are either eternal or non-eternal. Eternal are space, time, ether, soul, and the atoms of mind, earth, water, fire, and air. Non-eternal are all compounds, or the things which we actually perceive, and which must have a cause of their existence. Thus substances are divided into those which are without cause, and those which have a cause.

There are three causes;—1. The cause of intimate relation, or material cause, as yarn is the material cause of cloth;—2. The proximate cause, or the actual union of the parts which are to form a compound; —and 3. The instrumental cause, viz. the cause by which this union is effected.

This is similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, who admitted four causes; a material cause, a moving cause, a formal cause, and an end cause. The instrumental cause includes Aristotle’s formal, moving, and end causes.

The notion of causality is certainly well considered, and infinitely superior to the notions which other Indian systems formed of it; for there are already made some steps in advance towards the proper discussion of this notion, if a difference in causes is acknowledged. In the enumeration of causes—the cause of motion appears to have been omitted; it is,

however, contained in the notion of instrumental causality. All activity according to the Nyāya is limited to motion, acts of the mind being considered by them as qualities, and as all actions abide in substances, we must think every substance as a cause of motion (viz. the last cause). They did not, however, discuss, whether motion was necessary to all substances, or only to some or to one, that is to say, whether there is a primum mobile or not; they did not discuss the question, whether or not different motions require different causes; nor did they lastly enter into an explanation of the notion itself.* They appear in fact not to have been aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the idea of causality, which undoubtedly is one of the most difficult metaphysical notions.† The contradictions in the notion of cause and effect appear with special force to apply to such causes, by which a change in the qualities of a substance is effected, as chemical, animal, and psychical effects. Such effects are, however, denied by the Nyāya. Material causes must be understood as only the substrata, or the materials for a new union, as for instance, the two halves from which a pot is produced, are the material cause of the pot. There are therefore no real changes, but only changes of the accidental form, which substances may assume in their connexion with others; and there should not be changes at all we add. Every compound substance, according to the Nyāya, is ultimately produced from simple substances. Simple substances, however, are eternal, and all their qualities are also eternal. If this is the case, there is also

* The contradictions which Zeno found in the idea of motion, are well known, and without fully acknowledging their weight, it is impossible to obtain a correct notion of it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and endeavoured to remove Zeno's objections to this notion. How important it is, correctly to define this notion, is evident even from the influence, which it exercised on the Nyāya, where motion is considered as an act, and even as the only act.

† Vide Sext. Emp. Adv. mathem. in Ritter's History of Philos. Vol. iv. p. 339. That cause could not be later than effect, is evident; but also the effect cannot be later than the cause; for if so, the cause, being antecedent to the effect, would be without effect, and a cause without effect, is a contradiction. And if the effect would be consequent to the cause, it would be, when the cause is no more, therefore an effect without cause. Both therefore must be necessarily together. If this be conceded, then there is the difficulty, why the one more than the other is producing (or cause). These are only part of the difficulties, and without solving them, the objections made against causality, are quite just.
no change of qualities in any compound substances, because by any connexion between them, different from an accidental relation, they would assume changes, contradictory to the notion, under which they are conceived. As the Nyāya, however, admits an actual change in compound substances, in which qualities, not to be met with in the simple substances, are produced, and moreover admits a compound, in which there is a comparatively firm connexion of the parts with each other, it has deviated from its notion of causality, and is hence guilty of the contradiction which it first endeavoured to escape. Notwithstanding these deficiencies of the Nyāya, we still maintain, that it approached nearer than any other Hindu system, to the true notion of causality, causality being, according to Pantheistic, not less than to skeptical idea, a product of habit in the association of our ideas.

In passing from the general metaphysical (ontological) to more special investigations (comprehending natural philosophy and psychology), we may first observe, that the same clearness obtains in the latter as in the former. Existence, or rather that which exists (τὸ ὑπὸ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ἄτομον, in its connexion with material and immaterial phenomena, is much more distinctly conceived than in other systems of the Hindus. We find indeed the same material elements as in the latter; viz., earth, water, light, air, and ether, and also the same qualities; but while in all others they are only generally described, here there is made an attempt to explain the special phenomena as well as the sources of our perception of them, or in one word, we find here the basis of observation, and of the first lineaments of the consequent reflection upon the results of that observation. We meet here also with the first remarks about space and time, and even with some correct notions of their nature, and although both of them are placed among the substances, we must not forget the intrinsic difficulties of this subject, which in our times only has been more satisfactorily investigated by Kant, Fichte, and Herbart. The error of considering space and time as substances, is a consequence of the notion the Nyāya had formed of substance, viz. as the substrate of qualities and actions. This idea would, indeed, have been correct, had the notion of existence been preserved. The Vēdānta certainly had a much more exact idea of existence, maintaining, that which exists (τὸ ὑπὸ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ἄτομον) must be simply existent, without any attribute whatever, and should strictly not be even considered by a plurality of notions. The Vēdānta,
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however, by denying the reality of phenomena, had nothing to explain; while the Nyāya, retaining the crude notions, given by observation, had no principles whereby to explain them. The most interesting point in this part of the system is the investigation into the nature of matter, an investigation which was indeed entered into by other Hindu systems, yet not with the same success. The Vēdānta, for instance, reduced the objects of the senses, or the things composed of the gross elements, to elements which are finer and imperceptible to the senses, undoubtedly for the same reasons as the Nyāya, viz. because the origin, the changes, and the destruction of the material things compelled the mind to fix the notion of existence upon some other natures, not affected by those conditions. But according to the Vēdānta, the simpler elements are only simple, because they are unmixed with others. As regards space, however, no reduction was made, and their view on this point is very like the doctrine of Anaxagoras, who also started from an original identity of the elements with space. The Vēdānta indeed did not confine its thoughts to those elements, but proceeded to the supposition of a substance, in which there is no difference whatever, but for what reason this supposition was here made, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory reply, and as regards the principal point, space filled out by matter, it was not even touched upon. The Nyāya, on the other hand, has examined matter under this point of view, and arrived at the theory of atoms,* in the same way as Leucippus and Democritus. It proceeded even further. With Leucippus and Democritus atoms have some, though imperceptible, extent, and also different figures and mo-

* It is astonishing, that the Nyāyaśikas made the supposition of such a substance as the ether, which, like space and time, is pervading and infinite. It is not space itself, but a kind of matter, filling out space, and can therefore be distinguished from it merely by a less degree of density. If so, the consequence should have been, that it was also composed of parts, the last elements of which are atoms. Instead of this, ether is some thing analogous to space, by its being infinite, and yet filling out an infinite space. In fact it appears, they assumed this notion of ether only historically, or as a part of the views on matter which had been formed previously to them. The doctrine of the five elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth) is one of the most ancient hypotheses of Indian philosophy. It is taught already in the Upanishads, and probably more ancient even than the doctrine of the soul. Hence it passed over into the different systems, viz. the Vēdānta, Sākhyā and Nyāya, modified according to the different views they held of substance.
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Intimations, while the Nyāya held them to be absolute units of space, without any dimensions and motions, that is, mathematical points as regards space. They are eternal and unchangeable, and while they are without cause themselves, they are the cause of the material universe. They are imperceptible to the senses, and the knowledge of them is obtained by inference.

The system of Democritus is throughout a crude materialism. The last elements of existence are with him atoms which have no qualities whatever beside form and motion. The soul itself is merely a compound of round atoms, and a deity is of course impossible. A theory of atoms of such a kind is contradictory in its principle, and in its results leads to an annihilation of truth in general. The Nyāya is vastly superior to Democritus' theory; for atoms are first conceived in their real notion as units of matter without any extent, and secondly the theory of atoms forms only a subordinate part of their researches.

The same clearness and to a certain degree comprehensiveness is met with in their psychological enquiries. The faculties of the soul and its relations to the material things and other objects of knowledge, are methodically described. The Nyāya draws a marked line between matter and spirit, by distinctly stating the notions, under which either is perceived.

The soul has, according to the Nyāya, qualities, opposite to the qualities of the substances perceived by the senses, and is therefore distinct from these substances, that is to say, as regards special qualities; for as to qualities, ascribed to substances as far as they are substances, both must of course agree. Qualities of the soul are the emotions and desires, volition and aversion, etc., and knowledge. Knowledge is produced by intellect, which is one of the qualities (faculties) of the soul. Intellect is again fourfold, it is perception, inference, analogy and verbal knowledge. Perception (viz. perception generally, as well of external as of internal objects), is the source from which all other knowledge flows, or rather, without objects of perception the other faculties of intellect have no materials to work upon. All knowledge, that is perceived, is perceived through a medium, through an instrument, by which the soul is in communion either with objects from without or from within itself. External objects are perceived through five external senses, these being in contact with the mind, while internal objects, and
by them the soul, are only perceived through the mind. The doctrine of the communication of the soul with external objects is very curious and interesting, not only because it is original, but because it shows a remarkable acuteness in overcoming difficulties, met with in every system, which considers substances not only as individual beings, but also as a common essence that exists, although dependent upon the individual substances. To perceive individual external substances, and their properties in common with others, it is necessary that the intercourse of the senses with the external objects should take place accordingly, that is to say, that individual substances should be perceived by the connexion of the senses with these individual substances, and the common properties by the connexion of the senses with these common properties. Substances are then perceived in their different relations, viz. first, in the relation of this individual substance and this individual quality, or of this individual substance and this individual act; further, in the relation, which this individual substance has with its class (general essence) or with its generality; and lastly, in the relation, which this individual quality or this individual act of this individual substance has with its class or generality.

This, however, is not sufficient; for a full comprehension, there are required also general notions, corresponding with those relations. A tree for instance would not be perceived, without the general notion of a tree, by which a tree at any place and at any time is perceived. This general notion requires again a kind of special knowledge, by which the general notion of a tree is referred to a certain tree. This kind of knowledge, though corresponding with the relations of all substances, which have both general and special properties, and though (implicitly) contained in every object of perception, still differs from the general properties of the things. It is a conception of the soul, produced by its own activity. This knowledge then is internal perception, that is to say, it is not produced by inference, or analogy, or verbal communication, but it is immediate and complete, as all knowledge by perception. Every perception of external objects then, according to this exposition, is based upon two elements, an external and an internal, or as these expressions do not exactly represent their notions, an immediate and mediate, an objective and ideal knowledge. In the same way are the objects of the soul perceived, viz. its different qualities, as aversion,
volition, &c. are called. Though the soul is the object of the mind, it is not directly perceived by it, but is inferred from its qualities. It is not necessary here to explain the other faculties of intellect, viz. inference, comparison, and verbal communication, as they are discussed in another part of this paper. We here only add, that they must be considered as parts of the quality of knowledge, or, as we would express it, as modified operations of one and the same activity of the soul.

The mind, by which all knowledge is perceived, is not a quality or faculty of the soul itself, but an independent substance, atomic in its nature.* Hence only a single perception or idea is at one time perceived by the soul.

The soul itself is eternal, and therefore so also are its qualities, we should say, also its knowledge, although this knowledge be not perceived by the soul itself. It is at the same time everywhere, not, however, as an infinite soul, as the universal soul of the Védánta, where all things constitute the pervading soul, be it even a piece of matter, though bound by ignorance to a state of apparent material existence, but in the same way as space and time are connected with every thing. There is a general soul, and there are individual souls. The general soul has the same qualities with the individual souls, with the exception of aversion, pleasure, pain, merit and demerit, because these qualities would involve imperfections. The individual soul is subject to the law of transmigration, and happiness and misery are the consequences of its good or bad actions. It is, however, possible for the individual soul to emerge from the vicissitudes of worldly existence by the attainment of true knowledge.

Here it is necessary to point out what place the notion of the general soul or the deity (Īśvara, the Ruler) holds in the system of the Nyāya.

The Védánta denies a personal deity. There is a supreme soul, but this soul is all in all, individual souls are emanations from it, as sparks from fire, and are essentially identical with it. Nature in its first elements as well as in its development depends upon it. The

* How is mind united with the soul? Not by any act of either; for they are independent of each other. They are united by something without them, viz. by the power of God, in the same way, as atoms are united with each other; for these latter, although the material causes of compound substances, are not causes of their connexion.
Védánta in fact destroys the distinctions between God and nature; every distinction is delusion, and there is nothing but one all-pervading, knowing and blissful being, and even such distinctions as of existence, knowledge, bliss, are not real distinctions, they are but contrivances to approach to the true idea of the One.—If there is nothing but existence, but knowledge, but truth, there should be no difference whatever, and least of all any delusion, on the contrary, there is with man almost nothing but delusion; only few approach the true notion of God, and but inadequately; in most men there is only difference found, and nature is altogether opposed to it. Nay, this is not only the case in the last emanation of this deity, but if we comprehend nature in its principle, where all differences of substance, quality, form, &c. disappear, if we comprehend it as dependent upon the soul, it is ignorance, that is to say, indiscriminate matter, it is non-existence, non-knowledge, &c. but this, Proteus-like being, of which it cannot be said, that it exists, nor, that it does not exist, is to be placed upon the soul, to be understood by it. This is to say: in theory the Védánta acknowledges but one principle, the infinite soul, in fact, however, two, soul and non-soul, ignorance or matter.

With reference to God, the Sánkhya is divided into two sects, the theistical and the atheistical.*

* Col. M. E. pp. 251-2. God, Iswara, the supreme ruler according to Pátanjali, is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected by the ills with which they are beset, unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythology) himself infinite, unlimited by time.

Káptia, on the other hand, denies an Iswara, ruler of the world by volition, alleging, that there is no proof of God’s existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed. He acknowledges, indeed, a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute, source of all individual intelligences and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, that the truth of such an Iswara is demonstrated, the Creator of worlds, in such sense of creation; for “the existence of effects,” he says, “is dependent upon consciousness, not upon Iswara,” and, “all else is from the great principle.” Yet, that being is finite, having a beginning and an end, dating from the grand development of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guider of the universe by volition, Káptia positively denies.

See also Wilson’s Sánkhya Kárika, pp. 166 to 168.
Kapila denied altogether a deity; the Yavara whom he admits, is only a finite being; for although he assumes a being, whose intelligence is absolute, yet this being issues from nature, and is again to terminate in nature. It is very much to be regretted, that of Pātanjali's doctrine nothing as yet has been published. It is difficult to form an exact idea of his being from the words, quoted by Colebrooke.

According to them he has some attributes of the deity; he is of the utmost omniscience, infinite, unlimited by time; but how he is connected with the creation and ruling of the universe, it is impossible to conceive. If his doctrine in other points agrees with the atheistical Sāṅkhya, all the development of the world in its different forms is independent of him; for it is the necessity of nature, that certain emanations are issuing from it, and returning to it after certain periods. It would rather appear, that he is a kind of Epicurean deity, blissful in himself and unconcerned with the affairs of the world.

The Nyāya is essentially theistical. According to them, God is personal. He is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere knowledge, mere bliss, but he is a substance, of which existence, &c. are attributes; for it is impossible to think of existence, knowledge, &c., without referring them to a subject which exists, which has knowledge; &c. He is not the supreme soul of the Vēdānta which is the whole universe, but distinguished as well from the world as from finite spirits. He is not a mere emanation from nature, as Kapila asserted, but altogether different from nature, and self-existent. He is also not, as appears to be Pātanjali's opinion, a merely omniscient being; but he is of infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, and nature could not exist independent of a God, or could exist only without order, harmony and object. And this idea is not only a fortuitous addition to the system, but one of its chief springs; for all the substances in the world, without God, remain unconnected. There may be atoms, but they do not constitute a world, they are solitary, unconnected, without any apparent difference; of themselves they have no action, produce no effects, and not even the simplest compound of two atoms can arise from them alone, much less a compound of a certain form and for certain objects, not the world in its unity, harmony, and infinite variety of forms. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, without enjoyment, without development and without a final end, for
they are not united with mind, the instrument, by which they are connected with the world, among themselves and with the creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who by his infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervading harmony of the world. This argument for the existence of a deity is essentially teleological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the world as to its form, not as to its matter.

The Nyāya approaches most closely of all Hindu systems the Christian notion of God, as its deity is an infinite spirit and at the same time personal, as it is wholly distinct from matter, and the creator and ruler of the universe.

It would be superfluous to point out the marked distinction, drawn here between body and soul. Though a higher development of philosophy may destroy the distinctions between soul and matter, that is, may recognize matter, or what is perceived as matter, as the same with the soul (as for instance, Leibnitz did), it is nevertheless certain, that no true knowledge of the soul is possible, without first drawing a most decided line of demarcation between the phenomena of matter and of the soul. In the Nyāya there is even an approximation to the doctrine; that soul and matter are as to their principles one and the same, viz. in the theory of atoms, according to which atoms are the negation of space. From this notion we may draw the inference, which has not been drawn by the Nyāya, it is true, but which would have been only a necessary consequence from the premises, that matter, being a compound of atoms, is only a phenomenon, as regards its extension through space. Where then is here shown the difference between the soul and the true substratum of matter? Let us see then, what is the soul? The soul is different from matter, as this last is perceived by the senses as extended through space. This distinction is true, but further to conclude, that the soul is also different from matter in its real nature, where matter is not extended, is certainly hasty, and does not follow from the premises. What then is the soul according to them? It is all-pervading, infinite, like ether, space and time. This answer, though far from satisfactory, shows, that they felt the difficulty in determining the notion of the soul, when their other notions had undergone a decided alteration.—

The most peculiar notion in their psychological theory is the existence of
of the mind independent of soul, although most intimately connected with it; for through the mind only the soul perceives, as well its own qualities, as the qualities of external substances. How could the Nyāya have made a supposition in which the contradiction is so evident? For it is easy to conclude, that if the mind is independent, its perception is also independent. If the mind perceives, this perception is not in the soul, and if this perception is in the soul, it is not perceived. The soul then has knowledge, which is not real knowledge, because not perceived, and the mind has no knowledge, though it perceives.

We may solve this difficulty at least in some way. The mind was first undoubtedly considered as an internal sense according to the analogy of external senses, in order that there be a unity of perception, and that, as the external objects are perceived through different media, the objects of the soul be perceived through an analogous internal medium, a supposition, which has also been made in modern (English) philosophy. So far the Nyāya might have considered the mind as an internal sense, but they met with a difficulty, which was not felt in the same intensity by modern philosophers. If knowledge be perceived by the soul through the medium of the mind (the internal sense), why is it not always present in the mind? why does it disappear and give place to other objects of perception, etc.? Locke was surprised at the narrowness of the human mind, without being able to account for it; the Nyāya in endeavouring to account for it, invented an independent substance, the mind, which is an atom, and according to its atomic nature only able to represent or to perceive one object at one and the same time.

This, I think, is the solution of the difficulty, and though it is certainly only an evasion, because its supposition creates greater difficulties than the former one, it still gives evidence of a spirit of enquiry in the school.

In comparing the psychological theory of the Nyāya with more modern doctrines (with the exception of the latest period) we must admit, that in a metaphysical point of view there is no great difference between them. The same objections are to be made to either, the doctrine of faculties being involved in the same contradictions as that of qualities. In either case, if you are to explain, what the soul is, you have to state, what it is, independent of its qualities or faculties, and
also to enumerate the latter. Your explanation will thus point out a quale, which is not a unity, but something defined by a variety of notions. This, however, is not the place to discuss the matter, and we wished only to remind the reader, that modern philosophy in this respect cannot boast to have advanced one single step beyond that of the Hindus, that is to say, in the metaphysic of the soul, although it would be absurd to deny, that modern psychology, as to the observation of psychical phenomena, has made rapid strides towards perfection.

In passing over to the strictly logical enquiries of the Nyāya, we have to premise, that we cannot view them with the same satisfaction, and although we may make ample allowance for the different forms of language, in which they are explained, we are compelled to confess, that they are neither exact nor complete.

The Nyāya has treated the logical topics in the inverse order of that adopted by us, viz. first inference, then ideas, and lastly propositions. This order is followed, not in consequence of a different method of arrangement, but in consequence of the subjects being based upon different grounds, and flowing from different sources. Logic might undoubtedly be treated analytically and commence with the exposition of syllogistical forms. Considering argument as a fact, we might analyse various arguments, and proceeding to their elements, that is to propositions, gradually arrive at ideas or notions. But the Nyāya, far from following such an analytical course, holds inference to be a quality (or modification of a quality), different from the quality of forming names and notions, and discusses inference before verbal knowledge, evidently with the purpose of showing, that the latter in some way depends upon the former.

We, however, treat these doctrines in their common order, with no other intention than to make ourselves better understood.

Verbal knowledge is one of the divisions of intellect. The first act or the first condition of understanding words, is the forming of the name! A name is corresponding to a certain object, and this object is connected with the name by the power of the name. A name which has such a power, is a word. The clear and distinct knowledge of what is implied in a word, is produced by a third act, and is the meaning of a word. This latter is in fact identical with idea or notion, as is evident from the examples given, as for instance, a tree is a thing which has root, stem, branches, leaves, etc.
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Here again is the order perverted; the name is certainly not the first operation, and the object to be named, the second, but just the reverse: there must be objects to be named, and though we may admit, that the clear idea of a subject often succeeds a name, still the object, of which the notion is formed, is the first, and we must assert, that what precedes the notion, also precedes the name.

The inquiry, how ideas are formed from a variety of similar objects, belongs to psychology, and however interesting this question otherwise may be, logic has nothing to do with the psychical process, by which ideas are produced. If this were the case, we might still have to wait for a logic, as a psychological theory has not yet been established to general satisfaction, while logic as a science has been complete for more than two thousand years. By the considering first of the names and afterwards of the corresponding notions, the real character of a notion has been at least obscured. From the given examples we see, that a notion, instead of being defined by the genus, under which it is contained, and the specific difference, is explained by a genus, which is distant from it by a number of intervening notions (for instance, genus of tree = thing) and by a specific difference, which besides its own difference, enumerates properties which it partakes with others (for instance root, stem, leaves, etc. = specific difference).

The meaning of a word or idea, ought to have been considered in its connexion with other ideas, as made up by genus and differentia specifics, and as excluded from them by their compatible, contrary, and contradictory opposition. Here, however, are genus and species raised to categories under the names of generality and particularity, being there the common properties of substances, qualities, and acts, while the opposition of ideas or terms is treated in the seventh category, that of negation. Negation is the category which arises, if the categories are mutually denied of each other. It is the mutual difference of the categories and therefore the same with logical opposition. Negation is again of four kinds, mutual negation, antecedent negation, (negation of a thing, that is to be,) emergent negation (destruction) and absolute negation. Of them antecedent and emergent negations are not logical, but metaphysical negations, viz. the relations which a thing may have with regard to its origin or cessation in time. Mutual negation corresponds to contrary opposition (oppositio contraria) of terms. For instance
black is the negation of white, of red, &c. and vice versa; here the one is not denied in an absolute, but in a relative manner. Absolute negation* would correspond to contradictory opposition (oppositio contradictoria) as is evident from an allusion to it in the explanation of a negative inference. Here it is said, that a notion is the negation of its absolute non-existence, for instance cloth is the negation of its absolute non-existence, non-cloth, or A = Non—Non—A, that is to say, A is the negation of what is in contradictory opposition to A.

From this arrangement then did not only result an imperfect exposition of the logical relations among ideas, but an important metaphysical error, by which logical relations of ideas are considered as real properties of substances.

In finding the logical treatment of notions by no means satisfactory, we may at the same time observe, that there are many valuable remarks on some psychological and grammatical relations of ideas which we do not recollect to have found elsewhere. These we have given in a note to the text, where this subject is explained.

A proposition to convey a distinct meaning, must, according to the Nyāya, have four qualities:

1. Contiguity, which, according to some, is the uninterrupted succession of the words pronounced in a sentence, so that for instance, the first word of it be not pronounced in the present moment, and the next half an hour afterwards, according to others, the arrangement of the words according to their grammatical connexion, for instance, that a preposition be placed together with the word which depends upon it, and not with a word, to which it does not refer.

2. Consistency, or the mutual agreement of the words, according to their sense, so that contradictory terms be not connected.

3. Structure, or the grammatical (terminations) forms of the words, which correspond in their meanings (for instance, that the verb agrees with the subject in number and person.)

* There is a difference of opinion in the Nyāya with reference to absolute negation. Some appear to conceive it merely as a negation of present existence, others as the negation of a contradictory notion. In this last sense Colebrooke understood it, (Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 280,) and this is also the interpretation of the Mimāṃsā. (Wilson's Sāńkhya Karika, p. 19.) That the author of the Bhāsha Parichēda adopted also this sense, appears to me evident from the above explanation.
4. Intention, that is, the meaning which the speaker wishes to convey by a sentence.

There again the logical characteristics of a proposition have been omitted, as all those points, with the exception perhaps of consistency, belong to the grammatical structure of a sentence.

The logical explanation of propositions, as a matter of course, passes over any grammatical form a proposition may assume; it treats only of the relation between two ideas, and its simple question is, whether two ideas can be connected or not.

It is evident, that in this way neither quantity, nor modality of propositions could have been discovered. We might, however, dispense with them, as these forms are not strictly logical; but not even the division of propositions according to their quality has been made by the Nyāya.

The theory of ideas and propositions is the weakest point in the logic of the Nyāya; they are more successful in explaining the form of arguments; for though the theory of syllogism is far from exact and complete, we must admit, that they understood the general character of a syllogism.

According to Gautama a complete syllogism contains five members (Avayava = proposition). 1. The proposition (pratijñā, that which is to be proved by the argument). 2. The reason, argument (hētu). 3. The instance (Udāhāraṇa, drishtiṇa). 4. The application (upanaya). 5. The conclusion (nigamana), for instance:

1. This hill is fiery,
2. For it smokes,
3. What smokes is fiery, as for instance, a culinary hearth.
4. This hill smokes,
5. Therefore it is fiery.

The modern school of the Nyāya reduced the syllogism to three, and even to two members, and this last reduction appears to have been most generally adopted, as it is in the Tarka Sangraha and Bhāsha.

* Colebrooke (Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 292), adverted only to Gautama's Sūtras, and not to a more modern work of the Nyāya, when he asserted, that the regular syllogism of the Nyāya consisted of five members. The modern school of the Nyāya (vide Dr. Ballantyne's Lectures on the Tarka Sangraha, p. 81), declares the five membered form rhetorical in distinction from its logical form, which contains only two members. Dr. Ballantyne has clearly pointed this out in his trea-
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Pariccheda. In this form the two premises, viz. major and minor propositions are condensed into one premise, of which we shall now give a description.

That a syllogism be correct, two things are required. 1, a general proposition, in which the subject (reason) is invariably connected with a predicate (conclusion), more comprehensive than the subject, and 2, a minor term, with which the subject of the general proposition is connected. That there is this double connexion of the minor term with the reason, and of the reason with the conclusion, is to be decided by consideration, which is the intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as connected with the general predicate or the predicate of the conclusion. This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion can only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as determined by the reason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion.

For instance: let a man from former observation know, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, as for instance on a culinary hearth;

tis on the Nyaya system, and also in his Lectures on the Nyaya philosophy. He says, (Nyaya system of philosophy, p. 5.)

"Now, in this form of the syllogism (which we do not find alluded to in Mr. Colebrooke's essay), there is neither more nor less than there is in the Aristotelian syllogism. The wonder would be if there had been. The first formal difference observable is, the wrapping up of the premises in one logical datum. The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable members of a single statement appears to have been this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind, that the premises suggest the inference, and this simultaneousness of cognizance is secured by combining the two assertions in a period, or sentence, of which the whole becomes intelligible only when the last word in it has been uttered... If we separate the two members of the original datum in the example above cited, we obtain the following:

Whatever smokes, is fiery;
The hill smokes,
Therefore the hill is fiery;"

and p. 9. "To return to our text-book. The author tells us, that a man, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred the presence of fire from the perception of smoke, may wish to impart his conviction to another. In other words having ascertained the truth as a logician, he may wish as a rhetorician, to establish it to the satisfaction of somebody else. Here we stop distinctly out of the province of logic, and enter that of rhetoric."
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let him see afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising from a hill, he will recollect the general proposition, that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence the knowledge arises: This hill is possessed of smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge, this one act, by which there is a progress from one object to a third by a second, is consideration, from which the conclusion arises: This hill is fiery.

This is in its principal points the theory of the Nyāya of the form of the syllogism. It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle. The differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two premises are combined into one. The exposition is certainly not simple, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in their natural form, which is the connexion of two in a proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applied to the conclusion; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conclusion also should not be stated in a separate sentence, but the whole syllogism should form one sentence, for instance, in the example: This hill, determined by smoke, which is determined by fire, is determined by fire. Yet the difference is only apparent; for the Nyāya, as Aristotle, connects one notion with the other through a third with which the latter is connected, or excludes it by a third, from which the second is excluded.

The second difference is, that the Nyāya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but to guard against false premises, and for this purpose the consideration was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the proposition was exemplified. Their consideration was therefore not only directed to the logical operation of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it, and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argument should be the result of one and the same operation, which of course is impossible.

With the exposition of the form of syllogism the logical theory of the Nyāya is nearly completed. Gantama divided inference into three kinds: 1, inference of an effect from a cause, as if rain is inferred from a collection of clouds; 2, inference of a cause from an effect, as if rain is concluded from an increase of the water in a river; and 3, inference from general notions, as if earth is inferred to be a substance from its
having the quality of smell. This division, it is hardly necessary to remark, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. The modern school of the Nyāya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms; which are: only affirmative inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given in illustration, it appears, that the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara and Camestros; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestros for all general negative ones. Here, however, is their theory finished, and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can enter into.

It is a remarkable circumstance, that the general form of syllogism should have been found by the Hindus, and yet that they should not have discovered the different figures and moods, the diversities of which are the result of mere combination. We think, this deficiency was the consequence of two causes especially,—first, of their technical language, which although precise, is yet cumbersome and not comprehensive, and secondly, of their pious regard for every thing traditional, be it in political institutions, in religion, or in science. The Sūtras, which are the foundations of their systems, have always remained text-books, and any discovery that had been made in theory, did not prompt them to attempt a new exposition of science, but gave only occasion to a new interpretation of the school.

The Bhāsha Parichēda itself is a work of the modern Nyāya. The author Visvanātha Panchānana Bhaṭṭa, the son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭa, accompanied the text with a commentary under the title "Siddhānta Muktāvali" (the pearl-wreath of truth), and he is known also by his commentary to Gautama's Sūtras, which bears the title "Nyāya Sūtra Vṛtti." According to the statement of the Pandita he lived about two hundred years ago. The Bhāsha Parichēda is a text-book in the schools of the Nyāya in Bengal. There is no Pandit of any repute who does not know it well, and many know the whole of it by heart. And indeed it is admirably adapted for the purpose of introduction into the study of the Nyāya philosophy. It is a succinct exposition of the principal topics of the whole system, and may easily be committed to memory. It is written in the well known Anuṣṭup metre. The style,
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However, is not poetical at all, but that of the most sober prose, and nowhere is the attempt made to combine the graces of imagination with philosophical method.

The course, followed in the work, is simple. The author gives first the leading ideas of the system, that is, the most comprehensive metaphysical notions, viz. the notions of substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation. He then enumerates the various substances, qualities, actions, &c. and defines the properties common to all categories as well as those common to more or less of them. After this exposition the different substances in their relations to themselves, to other substances and to their qualities and actions are explained. In the same way the author discusses the qualities of substances, and his work is finished, when he has treated on the last quality, enumerated at the commencement of his treatise.

The commentary is in thought and language a very different composition. It is written with the object of supporting the views of the author and of the school in its controversy with other doctrines, and enters therefore frequently into intricate discussions in establishing the fundamental tenets or defending disputed points of the system, and makes use of the whole armory of the sometimes very abstruse technical language of the Nyāya.

This commentary has again been commented upon by Mahādāra Bhaṭṭa, but I received a MS. of his work too late to make any other use of it than to compare it with the text.*

The Sāmarcīt text of the Bhāṣa Parācieśa was first printed in Bengali characters in 1821, with the addition of a Bengali translation of the text and of the commentary. The translation of the latter, however, is rather, a paraphrase, as the alterations are sometimes considerable.†

* The MS. is in the Library of the Sanscrit College of Calcutta, of which, however, I was for a long time not aware, as it is not mentioned in the list of books in that Library, printed in the Sanscrit Catalogue of the Asiatic Society. It has two titles, "Mahādāra Bhaṭṭa-kṛta Muktāvali Prakāsa!" and the shorter one, "Dinakari Tīkā." In his introduction, the author mentions also the name of his father, Balakrishna.

† The title is, "A system of Logic, written in Sanscrit, by the Venerable Sage Doohd, and explained in a Sanscrit commentary by the very learned Viswonath Tarkalacar, translated into Bengale by Kashee Nath Turkopunchanam. Calcutta, 1821."
Another edition of the Sanscrit text together with the commentary, appeared in 1827, under the auspices of the Committee of Public Instruction. The text is correct, but not so the commentary. It is full of mistakes, omissions and interpolations. The interpunctation is either faulty or entirely disregarded, and the numbers of the successive Slokas are not attached to the corresponding portions of the commentary, so that an easy reference of the one to the other is impossible.

The present edition has been carefully revised partly by comparison with Mahâdâva Bhaṭṭa's commentary, partly by a reference to the corrections in the copy of Jayanârâyâna Tarkapanchânama, the professor of Nyâya in the Sanscrit College, which he had the kindness to lend me, and for which I offer my grateful acknowledgments.

The notes which I have added to the translation, are chiefly given for the purpose to elucidate the principal points of the system of the Nyâya, in accordance with the object of this work to contribute to a fair estimate of the merits of Hindu philosophy, and are therefore more copious in such parts as contain the distinguishing features of the Nyâya, for instance, the ontological portions, the doctrine of atoms, their notion of the deity, and their logical theory. They are less copious in portions which contain their explanation of the differences of matter; for as natural science with the Hindus has hardly made its beginning, their explanation is without any value. I would, however, guard here against the misconception, that their failing to explain the phenomena of matter, affected also the correctness of the principles, by which they tried to explain them. Natural science with reference to those phenomena is quite distinct from the philosophical theory for the interpretation of them. Democritus' explanation of natural phenomena may be entirely false, and still his theory of atoms may be correct, (although it is not in our opinion,) which is at least partly borne out by the fact, that in modern chemistry the theory of atoms has been adopted, although no one would admit the application of it which Democritus made for the explanation of the phenomena. The cause of this is a double one; first, philosophy is quite distinct from natural science, the latter being based upon observation and experiments, the former upon the relations which notions have among each other. Secondly, a philosophical system may have obtained the true principles for the explanation of intellectual and material phenomena, but at the same time
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not have fully investigated the intermediate notions which may be necessary for explanation. A hasty application of these principles without due regard to such notions and to the results of natural science, is very apt to throw discredit upon the previous researches by which a system arrived at its principles, and also upon philosophy itself.

To mark the more the method of the philosophical discussion of the Nyāya, I have generally preferred to give their interpretation in their own words, and therefore made large extracts from the commentary in as literal a translation as possible, which I hope, will be found also useful to the student of the Nyāya in general, as facilitating the reading of the commentary and the understanding of the technical language of the Nyāya.
DIVISION OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE NYĀ'YA PHILOSOPHY.

SALUTATION TO GANE'SA.

1. To Krishna, radiant like the new cloud, the thief of the clothes of the milkmaids, to him, who is the seed of the tree of the world, be adoration.

2. There are seven categories, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation.

1. Padārtha is explained in verse 13, as that which is object of knowledge, the commentary adds object of proof, of nomination; but as this applies to every idea, the definition is too wide, and ought to have been restricted to the most general objects of knowledge.

I have followed Colebrooke in translating Padārtha with category, although that term somewhat differs from the idea which Aristotle expresses by the same. According to him, categories are the most extensive classes of what is denoted by the simple word (the word in no connexion with another), Cat. 2. τῶν κατὰ μηδέμιαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων έκαστων δεότε σχισαι κ. τ. λ. He enumerates ten, viz. essence (οὐσία), quantity (ποσόν), quality (ποιόν), relation (πρός τι), the where (πόθε), the when (πότε), position (πεποίθη), to be possessed of (ξηρὰ), action (ποιεῖν), and passion (πάθειν).

Ritter in his history of philosophy (English Transl. Vol. III. p. 66) remarks on them: "If the categories had been put forward as an accurate and exhaustive division of the modes of being, it would be open to many objections, but Aristotle does not usually ascribe much importance to this enumeration of the most general notions, so that we may regard it as nothing more than an attempt to exhibit in a clear
Division of the Categories

light the signification of words taken absolutely in order to show, how truth and falsehood consist in the right or wrong combination of these elements."

However, as most of Aristotle's categories refer to classes of existence or to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy, the term of category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely adopt it here, viz. as referring to the notions, which express the general forms of knowledge, or what is the same, the general modes of existence. It will be interesting to compare the categories of the Nyāya with those of Kant, with which they have a curious resemblance.

They are:

1. Quantity.
   a. Unity.
   b. Multiplicity.
   c. Totality.

2. Quality.  3. Relation.
   c. Limitation.  c. Community (Mutual causality).

   a. Possibility (impossibility).
   b. Existence (non-existence).
   c. Necessity (accidentalness).

The categories may be divided, according to the commentary, into two classes: into categories of affirmation, and negation. It was, however, not necessary, expressly to introduce this division in the text; for, the seventh being the category of negation, it is self-evident, that the six preceding must be categories of negation. The number of seven categories is adopted by the Vaisēshikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nyāya, as established in the Bhashya.

Kanāda acknowledged only the six first categories, excluding negation. Gañitama, the founder of the Nyāya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (catégories) soul, body, sense, object of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, condition of the soul after death (transmigration), retribution, pain, deliverance from pain. Two more categories, power and similarity, adopted in the Upamāna Chintamani; are contained in the first six categories, and must therefore be rejected.
3—5. Substances' are earth, water, light, air, ether, time;

2. The definition of substance* is to be the substrate of qualities, and to have substantiability (v. v. 24). To explain this more fully, it is said in the commentary to be the substrate of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (Samavaya Sambandha) or in the relation of antecedent negation (Pragabhava) that is of future existence. The latter definition is given to obviate an objection which may be raised from the condition of substances at the time of their production. When substances are produced, they have according to the Nyaya no qualities. If they have no qualities, they are no substances according to the definition, that substances are the substrates of qualities. By the second definition, that they are substrates of qualities either in the relation of intimate union, or of future existence, this objection is removed.

With regard to substantiability or the genus of substance the commentary remarks: If somebody (this is the statement of the Charvaka) would say: There is no proof that substantiability is a genus; for it is not proved by perception, as melted butter or lack (according to your own admission) have no substantiability,—we contradict, because substantiability is proved by the necessity, that there should be some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of an effect, or some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of the connection and separation (between the parts composing a substance). This argument is founded on the supposition of the Nyaya, that every cause must have some distinguishing attribute (वार्षक वस्तु विनिरंतरानविप्रेष) under which it is comprehended; it is a cause, because for instance, it has the general attribute of earth, water, &c. Substance therefore, as the cause of qualities, for instance earth of smell, must be conceived by the distinguishing attribute of substantiability. The genus substantiability depends therefore not on perception, but on inference.

Some suppose, continues the commentary, darkness to be also a substance; for, they argue, it is proved by perception, it has colour and action, and is neither earth nor any of the other substances. Its organ is the eye, at the time that it is without light. This argument is not valid;

* Kanada gives the following definition of substance, Vid. Vaiseshika Sutra. 1st Adhyaya. 11th Sutra. जिसमें भवन्ति चक्षुविकारणिभिनितां चक्षु भवेऽ' च Substance is the substrate of qualities and actions, and has intimate causality.
space, soul and mind; qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction, priority, and posteriority, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, gravity, fluidity, viscosity, faculty, fate, (merit and demerit) and sound.

6. There are five actions,\(^*\) throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding and going.

7. Wandering about, evacuating, trickling, flaming upwards, moving crookedly, are included in going.

8. Generality\(^*\) is considered two-fold, extensive and non-

for, darkness being produced by the absence of light, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another substance. The supposition of its colour arises from delusion, as does also the supposition, that it has action, viz., from the cessation of light. If darkness were a separate thing, and not included in the category of negation, as gold is included in light, an infinite number of substances, (viz. in accordance with an infinite number of negations) must be assumed.

3. The definition of quality,\(^*\) which is given in verse 89, is: Quality is, whose substrate is substance, and which is without quality and action, that is to say, there is no quality of a quality, nor an action of an action, or the notion of quality would be changed to that of substance. The argument, by which it is proved, that quality in a class, is the same as that, which proves the same of substance.

4. Action,\(^\dagger\) according to the Bengalee translation, is the special category, which in the relation of intimate union is present in a substance which has velocity, or the category, which after a duration of five moments is subject to destruction, viz.; at first, there is contact; 2, Separation; 3, Destruction of a former connection; 4, A new connection; 5, Cessation of the action.

5. Commentary.—Generality (or class) is intimate union of many

\(^*\) Kanada's definition of quality is: रुखायधी समझाव, विभाजिताहरुसंगमने पेलियो तस्मिन। A. 1. that is, quality is ailed in substance, has quality and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause.

\(^\dagger\) एकत्रकरणमुद् संयोगमेवाहरुसंगमके प्रमिति बहुभूषिकर। A. 1. action is, whose site is substance alone, which is without quality, and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause.
extensive. Existence, as including substances, qualities and actions, is called extensive.

9. The class which differs from this is called non-extensive; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non-extensive.

10. By its including many things, it is extensive; by its being included in a more extensive class, it is non-extensive.

In something eternal, or is eternal and the intimate union of many. It is said, “in something eternal,” because intimate union of many exists also between things in contact. “Of many,” because intimate union in something eternal exists also in such infinite quantas as the sky, “in intimate union,” because the existence of many in something eternal refers also to absolute negation. Consequently there is no generality or genus, where only one individual exists, or where there is no difference of individuality, or where there is confusion, or where there is a retrogress in infinitum, or where an idea is changed to its contrary, or where there is no relation. For instance, the sky forms no class on account of its individuality. The notions of a donkey and of an ass (in Sanscrit the terms घोड़ा and अक्षम्य are selected, either of which means a jar) are no class. The notions of element and form are no class, because the value of these notions is confounded. Generality is no class, because, there is no place of support for it, (it would require a retrogress in infinitum; for if there is a class of a class, or a notion of a notion, there must also be a class of the class of the class and so further) particularity is no class, because it would thus be changed to its contrary. (Particularity by becoming generality would be the contrary of its notion.) Intimate union is no class, because it is not in the relation of intimate union (in the relation of intimate union are only substances, qualities and actions).

According to their definition of class only substance, quality, and action, further the general notion of those three, which is reality, the notions of the substances, with the exception of sky, space and time, the notions of the different qualities and actions as well as the notions which are included in them, form generalities or classes. The other four categories are not classes, but as the Bengalee Translator calls them, Upadhis, titles, general characteristics.
The ultimate condition of eternal substances is called particularity.*

11. The connexion of a substance with its composing parts, as of a jar, &c. with its two halves, &c.; further the connexion of substances with qualities and actions, and lastly the connexion of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes is called intimate relation.†

6. Comm.—The ultimate condition of eternal substances is particularity.* The ultimate condition, viz., the condition, which remains ultimately, last after all (according to the Bengalee translation, the condition which remains until the general conflagration of the world), than which there is no further particularity, that is to say, the condition, abiding in one substance only; for in compound substances from a jar down to the union of two atoms there is mutual difference, by means of the difference of all their respective parts; but the mutual difference of atoms is particularity; this is a difference by itself, and a particularity further than this does therefore not exist.

7. Comm.—The relation, of parts with things possessed of parts, of generality with single objects, of qualities with things possessed of qualities, of actions with objects possessed of actions, is intimate relation. Intimate relation means constant relation. It is proved by the fact, that the intellect, when determined by qualities and action, is in the relation of what is determining and what is determined (predicate and subject) for it is a determined intellect, as the sentence: The man bears a stick, is the result of a determined intellect. Hence, since in this case neither the relation of contact nor any other relation is possible, intimate relation is proved.

As the Bengalee translation expresses the meaning much more clearly, I have given it here instead of the explanation of the original. Intimate relation, excluding distinctive relation, is constant relation of only one thing which regulates a condition. By the term "constant" the relation of contact is excluded, by the term "excluding distinctive relation," the relation of distinction, by the term "which regulates a con-

*खासात्मनिष्ठ रूपित युक्तिवेष॥ A. I. Both, generality and particularity depend on intellect. The commentator, Sankara Mira adds, "generality is the intellect, which is found in many; particularity, which is separated from others."
12, 13. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and reciprocal negation. The first includes three kinds, antecedent

dition," the relation of identity, as for instance of the sky; for the
relation of identity (the relation, that a thing is to be comprehended
under its own notion) is not regulating a condition, by the term "of
only one thing," the notion of mutual negation. In the relation of
contact, is for instance, a jar with the ground. The class of distinc-
tion is three-fold, viz. as referring to time, space and place. In the
distinctive relation of time and space are all things. The distinctive
relation of place is again two-fold, the distinctive relation of nega-
tion, and the distinctive relation of identity (of a thing with itself)
The distinctive relation of negation is the site of negation. In the dis-
tinctive relation of identity is for instance the notion of the sky with
the sky. In the relation of identity remains every thing with itself.
In mutual relation is the notion of the jar with the ground.

8. Comm.—Negation is the reciprocal negation of the six cate-
gories, that is to say, negation arises from the six categories, being
denied of each other. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and
mutual negation. Universal negation is negation, different from mutual
negation. Mutual negation is the negation of identity. Universal
negation is of three kinds, antecedent, emergent, and absolute negation.
Antecedent negation is a negation, which is afterwards removed, for
instance, if it is said, in this half a jar is to be produced, there is a ne-
gation of the jar, which is to be produced. Emergent negation or de-
struction is a negation of what is produced, for instance, in the sentence,
in these parts a jar is destroyed, there is a negation in the cause (the
parts) subsequent to the production of the effect. Absolute negation
is constant universal negation, for instance in the sentence, here is no
jar. Here, this objection may be made: If a jar or any other thing
is removed from a certain place, and again brought back to it, the no-
tion of absolute negation cannot be applied; for, absolute negation be-
ing constant negation, the notion of absolute negation is not produced,
when the jar is brought back. Hence they have assumed a fourth kind
of negation, referring to the liability of a thing to be produced or de-
stroyed, excluding absolute negation. For instance, in the notion: a
black pot is not red, and a red not black, there is antecedent and
negation, destruction and absolute negation. The common notion
of all seven categories is object of knowledge, and similar ideas.

14. The five first categories are positive, many and in the
connection of intimate relation. The three first (substances,
qualities, actions) have the attribute of existence; qualities and
the subsequent categories are without qualities and actions.

15. Class (generality), and the subsequent categories are
considered to be without generality; causality is a predicate of
all substances which are not atoms (whose measure is not an
atom).

emergent, but not absolute negation. The modern school, however,
reject this view, because they deny, that a contradiction has been prov-
ed; according to their opinion absolute negation is met with in emer-
gent as well as in antecedent negation.

Negation is assumed as a distinct category; for in denying it, an in-
finitive number of negations, corresponding to the things, whose negations
they are, would be necessary.

9. Object of knowledge, &c. viz. capable of being known, named,
proved, &c.

10. Comm.—The general notion (definition) of substances, qualities,
actions, generalities and particularities is multiplicity, positiveness and
connection by intimate relation. Multiplicity is also found in negation;
therefore the distinction of the five is: the state of position in many.
It is said, "which are in the connection of intimate relation," and not,
which have intimate relation, because otherwise the categories of ge-
nerality and particularity would be excluded.

11. Comm.—Causality is an attribute of all substances, whose measure
is not an atom (पारिसाधक means, whose measure is an atom.) Or:
Atoms, considered as a measure, have no causality. A substance whose
measure is an atom, cannot be the cause of any thing; for a measure
commences things, which are included in its notion (as for instance the
half of a jar is the measure, from which the jar is produced) but this
is impossible in this instance; for a measure produces a measure, ex-
ceeding the measure, contained in its own notion (that is from a mea-
sure is produced something greater than itself) hence as the greater is
16. The notion of the necessary previous existence of a thing, which has not the fault of superfluous causality, is causality.*

17. Of this three kinds are specified, viz. causality of intimate relation, of non-intimate relation (the connexion of the produced, if the measure commences from the great, so from the infinitely small (the atom) would be produced something smaller (more an atom). This is impossible (hence the measure contained in the conjunction of two atoms, is not produced from the measure of an atom, but from number). For the same reason causality must be denied of substances which are infinite, further of any class, transcending the senses, and lastly of particularity. (The reason for this is clear; any thing infinite which can be exceeded, must have become finite; there cannot be any thing which exceeds the senses more than another thing, both being thought under the same idea, viz. to exceed the senses. Particular are the distinctions of eternal things; they cannot be distinguished by any thing else, because they are the last distinctions.)

12. I give here a note of the Bengali translation. The category, which has not the fault of superfluous causality, and whose existence constantly precedes is causality, or cause is, by the existence or non-

* The principal Sutras of Kaṇḍaka, referring to causality, are:

कारविचारवाद कार्यार्थ: 1 1st Adh.
कारलोकवाद कार्यसाप! 11 1st Adh.
कारसूत्रवाद कार्यमुत्तो दश: 1 1st Adh.
कारसूत्रस्तुतिः स्वेत कार्यार्थमवादान् 11 10th Adh.
कार्येऽऽम्बर्यात् वर्यां वच्चि । 10th Adh.
(अवत्तेविनाविकारुपापकोशिति ५५) ।
सत्पायेव कार्यार्थसमावाद ज 10th Adh.

If there is no cause, there is no effect.
If there is no effect, there is no cause.

The quality of the effect depends upon the cause.

The cause, which refers to substance, is intimate cause, because substance is intimately related to effects, (viz. compound substances, qualities and actions.)

Action is a non-intimate cause, because they are intimately related to the cause (the intimate cause.)

In the same manner are qualities intimately related to substances; therefore they are also non-intimate causes.
component parts), and instrumental causality is mentioned as
the third by the followers of the Nyāya philosophy.

18. That from which in its intimate relation an effect is pro-
duced; (for instance thread from which cloth is made,) is causa-
licity of intimate relation; that which is proximate to this, (the
conjunction of the threads) is the second cause, (of non-intimate
relation), and as the third (instrumental causality) must be con-
sidered what is different from either, (for instance the loom of
the weaver.)

19. There are five classes of superfluous causality," viz.

existence of which the existence or non-existence of an effect is neces-
sary. If there is no thread, there is no cloth; if there is no conjunction
of the two halves of a jar, there is no jar; if there is no virtue, there is
no happiness, &c. There are three kinds of causes, intimate, non-
intimate and instrumental causes. Such things as, intimately united,
(that is, such as are in the connection of intimate relation) produce an
effect, are intimate causes. Two atoms for instance are the cause of a
bi-atomical compound, threads of cloth, the two halves of a jar. Non-
intimate is a cause, which is proximate to an intimate cause, that is,
which is connected with the intimate cause; for instance the conjunc-
tion of two atoms is the proximate cause of the bi-atomical compound,
the conjunction of threads of cloth, the conjunction of two halves of a
jar. Instrumental is the cause, differing from either; for instance, the
instrumental cause of a jar is the stick, of cloth the loom, of a bi-
atomical compound god. It must here also be borne in mind, that
an effect may be destroyed either by the destruction of the intimate
cause, or by that of the non-intimate cause, as a jar is destroyed by the
destruction of the two halves, and a bi-atomical compound by that
of the conjunction of the two atoms. The intimate, non-intimate and
instrumental causes are called special causes; God, the omniscience of
God, desire, endeavour, time, space, antecedent negation and fate (vir-
tue and vice) general causes.

13. A cause is called superfluous (अवस्थापिन्य:) if, without its co-oper-
ation, the effect is produced in another way. Commentary. Faults of
superfluous causality are: 1. The notion, under which the cause is per-
of the Nydia Philosophy.

1st.—The general idea (class), under which the former state of a cause is perceived; 2nd, that the existence or non-existence of which can only be comprehended by the existence or non-existence of the cause; 3rd, that of which the previous existence is applied to the effect, when its previous existence is already applied to another (effect).

20. 4th, that the existence of which is applied to the effect, because it necessarily precedes the existence of the producer of the effect; and 5th, that which is superfluous beside the thing whose former existence is necessary.

21, 22. Of the first class is an example the notion, under which the stick (by which a jar is made) is perceived, of the second the form, &c. of the stick, of the third the ether, of the

received, as for instance the idea of a stick (रक्षम the class of a stick) by which (stick) for instance a jar is produced. 2. Such things as cannot be thought of themselves as causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect, but are causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect only by means of the real cause, as for instance the shape of a stick; (for it cannot be said, that, if this or that shape of a stick is given, the effect, viz. the jar, is given, nor, if this or that shape of a stick is not given, the jar, is also not given.) 3. The application of a cause to an effect, if this cause has been already applied to another effect, for instance, if the ether should be considered as the cause of a jar. The ether could be only the cause of a jar by its being perceived under the notion of ether; this, however, is the intimate cause of sound, and it is therefore first taken as the cause of sound, and secondly as the cause of the jar. 4. The application of a cause to an effect, by which (cause) the (actual) cause of an effect is produced; for instance, if the father of the potter would be considered as the cause of the jar; for the potter only is the producer of the jar. 5. The application of any thing (as cause of an effect) which is not necessary to the production of the effect, as for instance the donkey, carrying the earth, &c., of which a jar is made. Of all the kinds of superfluous causality the last alone is necessary, as including the other kinds. 

c 2
fourth the father of the potter, of the fifth the donkey, &c. Among those superfluous causes the last alone is necessary (because the others are included in it).

23. Intimate causality belongs to substances, non-intimate causality only to qualities and actions."

24. Dependence" is the attribute of every thing, save eternal substances. The property of all nine kinds of substances is: to have substantiality and qualities.

25. Earth, water, light, air and mind are the sites of comprehensive and non-comprehensive generality, form," action and velocity.

26. Time, ether, soul and space have the attributes of ubiquity and infinity." Of the five elements, viz. earth and the subsequent four substances (water, light, air, and ether), are the first four the sites of touch.

27. The commencement of things takes place in the four first substances. The special qualities of ether and soul" are: limitation to space, and momentary duration.

14. Intimate causality belongs to substances; non-intimate causality to qualities and actions, that is, intimate causality is the common attribute of substances, non-intimate causality that of qualities and actions.

15. Comm.—Dependence in the common attribute of all things except eternal substances; it is to be thought under the idea of intimate relation. Eternal things are only dependent on distinctive relation (vide p. 7) as for instance on the relation of time. Eternal substances are atoms, (viz. of air, fire, water, earth) ether, time, space and soul. The common attribute of substances is, substantiality and substrate of qualities.

16. Form (वृत्तिः) is, the measure of which is limited.

17. Infinity (शंकर वृत्तिः) is, the measure of which exceeds every other measure.

18. Comm.—The special qualities of the ether and soul are: a state which does not pervade (is limited), and a state which has only momentary duration. (A state which does not pervade is such as is produced only in one part, and is not present in another. And a thing has momentary duration, if in the third moment after its production it is
28. Earth, water and light, have the properties of colour, fluidity and perceptibility by the senses; earth and water have gravity and taste; the fluidity of earth and light is a derived one.

29. The soul and the elements have special (contrary) qualities; that which is considered the property of the one, is the opposite of the others.

30. The qualities of the air are touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, velocity and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and velocity are assigned to light.

31. Water is the site of 14 qualities, viz. of the eight, before mentioned, and further of velocity, gravity, fluidity, colour, savour and viscosity.

32, 33. Earth has the same qualities, with the exception of viscosity, and the addition of smell.—The 14 qualities of the soul are intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, number, quantity, severality, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit. The qualities of time and place are number, quantity, severality, conjunction and disjunction. The same qualities together with sound belong to the ether.

34. Those five qualities, together with intellect, desire and volition are ascribed in God, the same five qualities, with priority and posteriority and velocity, in the mind.

The special quality of the ether is sound, which does not pervade; for it is produced in a small part only of the ether, and not found in a different portion. It has only momentary duration; this means, it is destroyed in the third moment, after it has commenced to exist. Because the respective special qualities of pervading substances are destroyed by the same qualities which are afterwards produced, therefore the first sound is destroyed by the second. The same is the case with knowledge, &c.; for knowledge is produced in the soul, which is a pervading substance, within the limited space of the body, and it is absent in any other part of space, for instance in the part belonging to a jar. In the same manner knowledge continues only for two moments, and pervading substances are therefore those whose special
36. The earth is the cause of smell (the intimate cause), and the site of the various colours. Saviour is of six kinds (sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid and saline), smell two-fold (fragrance and stench).

36, 37. It has three kinds of feel, hot, cold and temperate. It is twofold*: eternal and non-eternal; eternal as considered in its atoms, non-eternal as being composed of parts; this latter is threefold, organism, organ and object (inorganic matter).

38. Organisms are viviparous, oviparous, engendered in filth and vegetative; organ is the sense of smell; objects are all compound substances from the smallest, of two atoms, to the largest, Bramha's egg.

qualities are: existence that does not pervade, and momentary duration. The special qualities of earth, &c., are: existence which does pervade, and continuance for a longer time.

19. Comm.—Earth is two-fold, eternal and non-eternal, eternal in its atoms,* non-eternal, if different from atoms, viz. if consisting of two, three, &c. atoms. Earth, if non-eternal, is composed of parts.

If it is said: 'What evidence is there, that earth is composed of parts; (viz. a part being already a compound of two, three, &c. atoms) for you obtain the same notion, if any earthly substance, as a jar, is thought to be composed of the totality of the single atoms. Under this supposition you need not fear, that the invisibility of each single atom implies the invisibility of a jar, &c., which consists of atoms; because, although each single atom is invisible, yet the totality of them is visible, as from a certain distance the hairs of the head together are visible, although none of them alone is visible. Moreover we arrive at the idea for instance of one extended great jar, as we arrive at the idea of one great heap of rice.'

We reply: If one atom is no object of the senses, a totality of atoms is also beyond the perception of the senses. As to your example,

बतं निष्ठौतसः 11 4. 'A.

An atom is, what exists has no cause, and is without commencement and end; an atom is contrary to what has a measure (यत्यथारमस्वसात् अतिविकेसात्)
of the Nydia Philosophy.

39. Water has white colour; its taste, and feel, are sweet and cold; it has also viscidity, and its fluidity is innate.

40. As to its eternity and non-eternity the same holds good as before; its organisms are not born. Its organ is the tongue; its objects are the sea, snow and similar substances.

41. Light is hot to the feel, its colour white, its fluidity not innate, but an effect from some cause; eternity and non-eternity are attributed to it in the same way as to the earth.

42, 43. Organ is the eye, objects are fire, gold, &c. The feel in the air is considered as natural; it is temperate, neither hot nor cold; its motion is crooked; its qualities are touch, &c.

we maintain, that a hair, although at a distance, is not beyond the perception of the senses, because it will be perceived, if brought nearer. Nor can you say, that from a totality of invisible atoms a totality of visible atoms is produced, on the ground, that it is not contradicted by perception; for visible things are not produced from invisible things; otherwise heat of the eye for instance would one or the other time become visible. If you say, that a quantity of invisible heat, contained for instance in very heated oil, may produce a visible burning, we object; for the visible burning arises from the visible parts, contained therein.

You can also not maintain, that from the invisible compound of two atoms the production of a compound of three atoms (which is visible) is impossible; for we do not say, that the visibility or invisibility of a thing arises from its own nature but from its necessary causes, as greatness, manifest form, &c. A compound of three atoms for instance is visible on account of its greatness, but not a compound of two atoms, as it has no greatness. This, however, is according to your view, impossible, because there is no greatness in an atom.—As in this manner it is proved, that earthly substances as a jar, are composed of parts (a part, as above already reminded, is a compound of at least two atoms) so it is clear, that they are not eternal, in consequence of their production and destruction. And there is no difference between the mountain Méru, and a mustard seed, because in either there is the same composition of parts after parts. Therefore it is necessary, that there should
Eternity and non-eternity are assigned to it as before to the other elements. Its organ is the skin, which extends over the whole body; objects are all substances, intermediate between the vital air and the great element.

44, 45. The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound, organ is the ear. Though one, it has many titles. Time is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the support of the worlds; it is the cause of the knowledge of

be somewhere an end (in the division of parts). To say; that the point, where the end is obtained, is not eternal, would be to admit the production of an effect from a thing which is not in the connection of intimate relation. Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one great thing to another still greater, finds its end in the assumption of the sky and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cessation of the progress from a small to a smaller thing. Thus the necessity of atoms is proved. There is certainly no end of the division, if one has arrived at the compound of three atoms, because a compound of three atoms as an object of the eye, has parts like a jar, &c.; for from the argument, that the parts of a compound of three atoms have parts on account of its size, like the half of a jar, it is evident, that such a compound has parts. Nor can you say, there is no necessity for this (for assuming parts of such a small compound as that of three atoms) because many things (atoms) are required to produce a magnitude for so small things. This, however, does not prove the necessity of a continuation of parts after parts, because thereby a regress is infinitum would become necessary.

20. Comm.—Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This is proved by the perception of the "now." If for instance the perception: here is now a jar, is given, there exists a union between the motion of the sun and the jar. This is not conjunction (vide p. 7) or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more things,) but it is a relation of a different kind, which is produced by time.—That time is to be thought under the notion of a substrate, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-general) cause of the perception of priority
priority and posteriority; *though one* it has many names as that of moment, &c.

46. Space is the cause of the notions of distance and proximity; it is one and eternal.

47. Though one, it obtains various designations, as east, west, from the division of its attribute. The soul is governing the

and posteriority. Or if both definitions are combined: Time is the substrate of the *special* union, which is the non-intimate cause of priority and posteriority.

21. *Comm.*—Although one, it has many names, viz. moment, hour, day, &c., past, futuro and present time. Past is the time, whose destruction is present, as yesterday; future is the time, whose future existence is present, as to-morrow, and present is the time, whose future existence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future moment, be another moment, because there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be the case at the general conjugation, where also the terms of "moment," "day," &c. are applied.

22. *Comm.*—"The soul is ruling the senses and the body."—The class of soul is the class, by which the intimate cause of happiness, and unhappiness, &c. is comprehended (or: soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness, &c. and the substantiality of the soul is proved by its being the substrate of the qualities: happiness, unhappiness, &c.) *Isvara* (the ruler, God) is thought under the same notion (class); but since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to him, he is not subject to happiness or unhappiness; for we do not admit the invariableness of the rule that, that which is a consequence from the nature of a thing, will necessarily exist. *

Others† say: The notion (class) by which the soul‡ is thought, is not applicable to *Isvara*, as there is no proof for this; yet hence it does not follow, that a tenth substance must be assumed, as the soul is dis-

* Or in other words, for though it is necessary, that when there is an effect, there is also a cause, yet it is not necessary, that, when there is a cause, there is invariably an effect.

† Probably the ancient Nyāya is meant.
‡ The individual soul.
senses and the body; for an organ (instrument) must possess its agent.

48. There is no consciousness" in the body, as is proved by its disappearance after death. If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed.

tinguished from the other substances by the idea: to be subject of knowledge. "Is governing the senses," &c., because it successively produces the conscience of the senses and of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: I know, I am happy, &c., yet it cannot at first be proved against one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, etc. To prove this, the text says: "for an instrument must possess its agent." As an instrument, for instance a knife, the instrument for cutting, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed.

23. To show, that the body is not the agent, it is said in the text: "There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappearance of consciousness after death." If it is maintained: "Conscience is knowledge, and this in your opinion is not present in the soul which has obtained liberation. Why should it therefore not just as well be absent in a dead body, because, if life ceases, also knowledge ceases?" We answer: this is impossible; for, if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles.

Nor can it be said, 'that by an impression, produced in a former body, an impression in the second body is produced,' because this would oblige you to assume an infinite number of impressions.—Further, if consciousness were inherent in the body, a child could not commence to take the milk from the breast of its mother; for the cause of this action is the knowledge of what accomplishes the desire, and at that time there does not exist the recollection of any means, accomplishing the desire. According to my opinion the commencement of the action takes then place by the recollection of the causes of the desires, experienced in a former birth. Nor can it be objected: 'Well, if this be true, let any body
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

40. The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then knowledge and other \textit{internal} qualities would remain imperceptible.

recollect anything else, experienced in a former birth; for there is nothing which calls it into recollection. In this instance there is no other means but to admit of fate for the individual soul. If this is the case, the body is without commencement, and also the soul. Hence the eternity of the soul also follows; for what is without beginning, cannot be destroyed.

Well, let us then transfer to the eyes and the other senses the notion of cause and agent with regard to knowledge; for otherwise no cause is possible. The answer is: "If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed." If the eyes and other senses were destroyed, how could, by the absence of the eye, recollection remain, as the subject which perceives exists no more, and as it is quite unreasonable, that the same thing should be seen by one, and recollected by another sense, because perception and recollection must depend on the same subject, as being cause and effect.

24. \textit{Comm.}—'Let then consciousness not belong to the senses (external) but be maintained for the eternal mind.' The answer of the text is: "The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then knowledge and other \textit{internal} qualities would remain imperceptible;" for as the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if knowledge, happiness, &c. were placed in the eternal mind. How mind is an atom, will afterwards be explained.

If it is said, (by the \textit{Védántists}): 'The soul is knowledge; for its consciousness is proved by its self-manifestation; but knowledge of \textit{this} or \textit{that} object, happiness, &c. are special forms of it. And because this (special form) has only the existence of a production (अयावत); I translated \textit{अवावत्युत} its duration is momentary. Further, since the preceding knowledge is the cause of the consequent knowledge, and the former again the effect of a preceding, there is even in deep sleep an uninterrupted chain of knowledge down to the time of universal destruction, as the smell of musk remains in cloth. And by the communication of the impressions, produced by prior and prior acts of
knowledge, with posterior and posterior acts of knowledge, recollection and similar acts are possible."

We deny this; for if the object of recollection is the world, omniscience would be obtained (because knowledge is a product of self manifestation); and if the object is something, there is no proof for the second member of the alternative; for hence would also follow, that in sound sleep knowledge were manifesting its object.

And if you say, 'that in this state (in the state of sound sleep) knowledge remains, but without form,' we object also; for you cannot prove, that knowledge manifests itself, as otherwise such things as a jar, &c. would also be possessed with knowledge.

Nor can you say, 'that this would answer your purpose;' for it is impossible to reject the perception of a jar and similar things.

If you maintain, 'that this is a special form of knowledge;' we would ask, what is that form? Is it distinguished from knowledge, we agree with the assumption of something different from knowledge. Is it not distinguished from knowledge, then in accordance with the general notion of knowledge, a jar of blue colour would be the same with one of yellow colour, because by its own nature there is no distinction of knowledge.

If you pretend, 'that any special property of knowledge, as yellow and blue colour, &c. must be abandoned,' we object, because the contrary notions of blue, yellow, &c. cannot be predicated of one and the same thing; otherwise it would be difficult to connect any meaning with contrary ideas.

Nor is there any communication of desires, because the communication of desires even between son and mother is impossible.

You can also not say, 'that there is a rule for things, that are the causes, and others that are the effects of communication,' because there is no communication of desires.

And if you define 'communication to be the production in something else,' there is again a contradiction; for there is no producer.

If you contend, 'that it is produced by another knowledge,' you must admit another knowledge of the same kind, and so on in infinitum.

If you think, 'there is but little contradiction in a momentary knowledge,' you cannot prove such a knowledge, and your assumption is complicated,
of the Nyāya Philosophy.

For the same reason consciousness in bodies of momentary duration is rejected, because it has the fault of complication and cannot be demonstrated; in the same manner the production of the fruit from the seed and from collateral causes is evident, so that there is no need of assuming a special form of making, &c.

‘Let the assumption of a momentary knowledge be complicated, yet you must grant, that the soul is eternal knowledge, which cannot be destroyed; for the Sruti says: Lo, this is the soul, true knowledge, the infinite Bramha.’

We object also to this, because such a knowledge is evidently without object, and because it cannot be proved, that knowledge has no object; in this case it would not have even itself as an object.

Therefore, it has been proved, that the soul is different from knowledge, and that it is eternal.

True knowledge, that is the supreme Bramha, is not found in individual souls, because they are clearly distinguished from it by knowledge and ignorance, happiness and unhappiness and similar qualities, and in consequence the difference of Iswara is established. Otherwise servitude and liberation were names without meaning.

If it be objected: ‘The same text of the Veda which explains the difference of Iswara, brings also forward his identity by his indifference; for it says: ‘Let us strive for the state of indifference, therefore all is placed upon the soul,’ and also: ‘In the state of liberation ignorance is annihilated.’

We deny this, because, the difference being eternal (constant) its annihilation is impossible. Admitted even, that the difference is destroyed, a dualism is for this very reason established, and it cannot be said, that duality is destroyed. And as it is well said, that to Bramha in his state without qualities, and therefore without the quality of existence, existence is yet attributed, so it is also well said, that although there is no duality, still there are two possessed of duality.

If you say, ‘that the absence of unreality which is the place of identity, is there meant with existence,’ we say likewise, that the absence of identity which is the state of two possessed of duality, is meant with duality.

Although every unit is comprehended by the notion of unity, still one is not both, as it is said: smell is no attribute of earth and water,
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which is clear to every body. As regards the passage of the Sruti, establishing the indifference at that time (the time of liberation), it establishes in fact an equality by the removal of unhappiness, &c., as it may be said, that this Purohit a by great prosperity has become a King. In this sense it is said in the Sruti: "He who is without sin, obtains the supreme state," meaning equality.

God is not the soul which is knowledge and happiness, but the substratum of knowledge. In such a sentence as: "Brahma is eternal knowledge and happiness," the term "knowledge" means the substratum of knowledge, by the authority of a passage like this: "He who knows all, is omniscient;" hence happiness means also a person who is happy.

Hence is also the doctrine of the Sānkhyas refuted, which is as follows.* Nature, (Prakriti) is the agent; the soul (Pūrusha) remains

* To understand more clearly the argument of the Nyāya against the Sānkhyas, I shall briefly state the principles of this doctrine. According to the Sānkhya there are two kinds of substances which are the substrates of all phenomena, nature and soul. Nature (Prakriti) is one and indistinct in its original state, which is incomprehensible to the senses. As such it is Māla Prakriti, nature as the root of all things. It is productive, and in its productions various. Nature in its state as production is Vikriti, changed, or derived nature. The first production is intellect (Buddhi) or the great one, Mahat, which as a production of nature has no consciousness.—The soul (Pūrusha) is manifold, or there are many souls. The soul, as contrary to nature, is not active, but it is conscious. Accordingly it has no activity in the production of ideas, which are given to the soul by intellect, and the opinion, as if the soul were an agent, is a mere delusion.

The following quotation from Prof. Wilson’s Sānkhya Karika will still more elucidate the subject (p. 16.)

... III.—Nature, the root (of all) is no production. Seven principles, the great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

Bhūḥya. Māla (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradhāna (chief) from its being the root of seven principles which are productions and productive; such nature is the root. "No production." It is not produced from another... "Seven principles,"
—Mahat and the rest, from its being the great (mahat) element; this is intellect (Buddhi).

... The seven principles are 1. Intellect; 2. egoism 3—7, the five subtle rudiments. These seven are productions and productive, in this manner. Intellect is produced from the chief one (nature) that again produces egoism, whence it is productive (prakriti). Egoism as derived from intellect, is a production; but as it gives origin to the five subtle elements, it is productive. The subtle rudiments
without stain (that is untouched, neither active nor suffering) as a lotus-leaf by water; but it is conscious. It is without causality, because there is no difference between cause and effect (cause and effect are identical) and hence with the destruction of the effect, that which is like the effect, would also be destroyed. This idea (that the soul is conscious) is necessary, because the perception of consciousness which is found in intellect, would be otherwise impossible. Intellect is a modification of nature. Intellect is also called greatness and the internal organ. Under the condition, that it (intellect) exists or not exists, the soul is subject to transmigration or liberation. Its modification has the form of knowledge through the channel of the senses. If it (this modification of knowledge) is in connection with external things, as with a jar, &c., the perception of agency takes place in the soul, and the perception of consciousness in the intellect, on the ground, that the difference is perceived. For instance if it is said: "By me this is to be performed;" the first member of the sentence, "by me," means the perception of the soul, which is without reality, because it is the reflection of consciousness (in the intellect) by the clearness of the intellect, as the reflection of the face in a looking-glass (is without reality by the clearness of the looking-glass). The second member: "this" means the perception of the object, which by its being modified through the channel of the senses, has reality (truth) as the uncleanness, produced by breathing upon a looking-glass. The third member: "Is to be performed" refers to the performance of business. Hence is intellect possessed of three parts. The connection of the soul (Pārūsha) with knowledge, which is a modification of intellect, is called untrue, as is the perception of sound is derived from egotism, and is therefore a production, but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtle element of such as generated from egotism, is a production, as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of smell is derived from egotism, and therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtle rudiment of form is a production from egotism; as generating light, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of flavour, as derived from egotism, is a production; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the great principle and the rest are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements; these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term vikāra being the same as vikrit. Soul is neither a production nor productive.
The site* of merit and demerit is perceptible* by its being united with distinguishing qualities.

* The site of merit and demerit is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities.

This doctrine of the Sánkhya is refuted on the ground, that consciousness is dependent on the same substrate, as action, fate and enjoyment, because there is no proof, that there is another substrate, different from this.

If you say, 'that from such a sentence as: I, who am conscious, am acting, an error of the part of consciousness is possible in consequence of the modification of intellect,' we reply by asking, whether this is not also possible on the part of the agent. Otherwise, if intellect is eternal, there is no liberation, or, if it is not eternal, there is no transmigration.

If you further contend, 'there is no consciousness of intellect, because it is an effect of unconscious nature, as effect and cause are identical,' we protest, because this has not been shown; there being no proof, that the agent is a production; for from the text, that it is without passion, that it has no birth, it follows, that it is without beginning, and as such it is also without end, as it is unreasonable, that it should be destroyed. Of what use is therefore the assumption of nature (Prakriti) and similar notions?

Nor can you say, 'that our opinion does not agree with the passage of the Bhagavadgīta saying: "by the qualities of nature are everywhere actions done; the soul, blinded by pride, fancies: I am the agent;" for its real meaning is: by "nature's," fate's, "qualities," the qualities, produced by fate, viz. by desire, etc., I am agent. If this is the case, the intention of the Bhagavadgīta is attained by the words: He, who believes the soul to be the sole agent, is liberated.

25.—"The site," &c., viz. the soul is the site. If the body were the site of them (merit and demerit, &c.), the consequences of the works, done in a former body, could not be experienced by a later body.

26.—"It is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities." The soul becomes perceptible by its being united with its respective special qualities, and not in another way by such an observation: I know, I do.
50. It can be deduced from activity and similar phenomena, as the charioteer from the motion of the carriage. It is the site (substrate) of egoity, and perceptible only through the mind.

51. It is pervading, and the site of intellect and other qualities. Intellect is two-fold, apprehension and remembrance. Apprehension includes four sorts, viz.

52. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge. Perception comprehends six kinds, in accordance with the six organs of perception.

53. The object of the nose is smell and the notion of

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27.—Comm. "It can be deduced from activity, &c." That the soul is in another body, is inferred from activity, etc. Activity means here exertion. As it has been mentioned before, that knowledge, desire, endeavour, &c. do not exist in the body, and further as exertion implies endeavour, it follows that there is a soul which has endeavour, on the ground that there is exertion.

28.—Comm. Perception is the knowledge (apprehension) which is produced by the senses, and the cause of evidence from perception are the senses. Inference is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition (Vyapti) and inferential proof is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition, which is the cause of the conclusion. Comparison is the knowledge, produced by similarity, and proof by comparison is the knowledge of similarity, which is the cause of comparison. Verbal knowledge is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of words, and proof by verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words, which is the cause of the former.

29.—&c., means the notion of good and bad smell.

* Similarly says Kaṇḍa: राजापानियवेदात्मवीर्यममनातस्तदिव्यायाँविशलि चूण्डन्यवेदात्मवीर्यममनातस्तदिव्यायाँविशलि। 84tr. 4th Adh. The vital airs, which go upwards and downwards, the closing and opening of the eyes, life, the actions of the mind, and the modifications of the other senses, happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, and endeavour are proofs of the soul.
smell, etc." Thus the object of the tongue is savour," and
sound that of the ear.""

54-55. Object of the eye is proportionate form." Sub-
stances of such kind (of perceptible greatness) individuality,
number, conjunction and disjunction, priority, posteriorty, vis-
cidity, fluidity, quantity, action, class, and the relations which
are appropriate to the respective objects are perceived by
the eye through the contact of light with proportionate form.

56. Substances, perceptible of touch, are objects of the
skin; the objects of the eye, with the exception of colour, are
also objects of the skin.

57. In the perception of substances is the union of the skin
with the mind the cause of knowledge. Through the mind are
perceptible: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and voli-
tion.

58. A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond
the perception of the senses." Proportionate greatness is the
cause as regards the perception of the six classes; organs (in-
struments) are the different senses.

30.—Further, sweetness, &c.
31.—Sound, articulate and non-articulate, &c.
32—Proportionate means fit to be perceived. The same propor-
tionate greatness must be admitted also with regard to the objects of
the other senses.

33.—Comm. "A knowledge which is without determination, is
beyond the perception of the senses." If (for a man who has not the
knowledge of a jar) the contact of the eye etc. (with the jar) has
taken place, the determined knowledge: This is a jar, viz. determined
by the general notion (class) of a jar, does not exist, because there was
not before the knowledge of that, which is determining, viz. the general
knowledge of a jar, &c.; for the cause of a determined knowledge is anoth-
er which is determining. For instance at first is produced a know-
ledge, not determined by the two parts,—that which is to be determin-
ed, and that which is determining,—as a jar and the general notion
(class) of the jar. Such a knowledge is without determination, and
no object of perception; for from perception it is evident that I know
of the Nyaya Philosophy.

59. The connexion of the senses with their objects is called intercourse; this is also six-fold. 1. The perception of things takes place by contact.

60. 2. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the things, by intimate relation with that which is in contact.

61. 3. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the last mentioned relation, (viz. intimate relation with that which is in contact,) by the corresponding intimate relation, (intimate relation of that which is intimately related with that which is in contact.) 4. The perception of sound, by intimate relation. 5. The perception of what is intimately related with sound, by the intimate union with that which is intimately related, and 6. The perception of every negation by particularity. *

62. If it takes place, it is perceived, at the place where it happens to be. Intimate relation is perceived by particularity.

63. Transcendent intercourse is three-fold according to its division into intercourse whose character is general, or the jar. In this perception is knowledge the determination of the soul, the jar that of knowledge, and the general notion of jar the determination of the jar. The determination which is in the determination, is called the general notion of determination. The knowledge containing the general notion of determination, is the cause of the knowledge determined by determination. For instance in the knowledge without determination of a jar is the general notion of a jar not determining. Therefore when there is an undetermined knowledge of a jar, there is not such a knowledge, as: I know the jar under the general notion of the jar, (that is to say, not such a determined knowledge, by which the soul is determined by knowledge, knowledge by the jar, and the jar by the general notion of the jar.)

34.—Comm. "Transcendent intercourse." Perception is two-fold, common and transcendent. The intercourse of common perception is of six kinds, which have just been explained. The intercourse of transcendent perception is three-fold.

35.—Comm. If in this definition the term "character" denotes its

* See note to v. 11.
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whose character is knowledge, or which is produced by Yoga.

nature (its identity with itself) the meaning is, that the intercourse is of a
general nature, and this must be understood as the determination of a de-
terminable knowledge which is in connection with any of the senses. For
instance, let smoke be in contact with the eye. Here is smoke the deter-
minable knowledge, and the general notion (class) of smoke, which (gen-
eral notion) forms the intercourse, is a knowledge, whose object is every
smoke whatsoever. If it is then said, that such a knowledge is in con-
tact with a sense, the consequence would be, that, if a cloud of dust by
mistake were apprehended under the notion of smoke, there could not
arise a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever, as in this
case with the general notion (class) of smoke no connection of the senses
could take place. According to my (the author's) opinion, however,
the cloud of dust is in contact with the eye; the knowledge to be deter-
mined is smoke, and the general notion of smoke, which is here the de-
termination, the intercourse. Its contact with the sense is the common
one, which takes place on the part of the external sense. On the part of
the mind, however, the intercourse is merely general, and determining
the knowledge. Hence if by words any kind of perception of a Pāśchāta,*
&c. has been obtained, the apprehension of all Pāśchats is produced.

The term "general" means here rather the state of similar things,
and this is sometimes constant, as the general notion of smoke, &c. some-
times not constant, as a jar, &c. For instance a jar is perceived either
in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with its half. Hence
arises afterwards the knowledge of all such things, as a jar, either in
contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with their halves.
This must be so understood, that the intercourse of similar things
(of things included in the same notion) depends on the same rela-
tion, under which the generality itself is comprehended. On the other
hand where after the destruction of this jar, &c. a recollection arises of
a thing like this jar, there could not, by the intercourse of a general
character, take place the perception of all things like this jar, because
the generality would at that time be not present. Moreover, suppose
the knowledge of a jar to be determined by the contact with any sense.
Here does not exist even the next day a contact with the eye, yet there
arises a knowledge of similar things, because there is a generality which

* A kind of goblins.
64. The intercourse of things, comprehended in a notion, is called general knowledge. It is required a thing which manifests this or that property produced by this or that sense."

65. The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse, whose character is knowledge".—The intercourse, produced by Yoga, is of two kinds, determines the knowledge of similar things. Therefore the "knowledge" of "generality" is the intercourse, and not "generality." With this view it is said in the text:

36.—Comm. Intercourse, "whose character is general." The term "character" means object, and the sense is: intercourse is a knowledge whose object is general.

"But where without the contact of the eye, &c. the knowledge of the common state of similar things (generality) exists, should there not be a perception through the eye of all jars, &c. ?

37.—Comm. To remove this objection, the text says: "It is required something which manifest this or that property, produced by this or that sense."

The meaning of this is: When by an external sense through an intercourse of a general character knowledge is to be produced, there is required an object of knowledge, to be produced by one or the other sense, of this or the other generality, with reference to a thing whose generality it is. This object is the contact (or a similar relation) of the light, further the contact of the eye, &c. Hence such a knowledge is not produced by the eye for instance, when it is dark.

But if the intercourse whose character is knowledge, is an intercourse, whose nature is knowledge, and if the intercourse whose character is general, is defined in the same way, what difference then is between them?

38.—Comm. To show this, it is said in the text: "The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse whose character is knowledge."

Namely an intercourse whose character is general, produces a knowledge of the things upon which it depends; but an intercourse whose character is knowledge, is intercourse of the knowledge with that object to which it refers, (which is comprehended by it.) The mean-
that which belongs to the Yogi who is perfect, and that which belongs to the Yogi, who strives after perfection."

66. The intercourse of the former is a constant manifestation, that of the latter takes place by the assistance of meditation."

The intercourse, as regards inference, is consideration;" the (instrumental) cause the knowledge of a subject, invariably con-
ing of this is: A perception does not become manifest without inter-
course. First without an intercourse whose character is general, how could there exist by the mere notion (class) of smoke and fire, an apprehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever? For this reason an inter-
course whose character is general, is necessary. The objection, "that it does not matter, whether there is an apprehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever," is not valid; for with the visible smoke the connection of fire is indeed perceived, but no other kind of smoke is included therein, and therefore a doubt, whether smoke is invariably connected with fire or not, could in this case not arise. According to my opinion, however, the doubt, whether smoke, in whatever place or time, is to be predicated of fire or not, takes place through the intercourse of general character, by which every smoke whatsoever is comprehended.

The objection, "that on the supposition of an intercourse of general character man would be omniscient, because in the notion of all objects of knowledge every single object of knowledge is included," is also untenable; for although all objects of knowledge may be known by this notion, yet, there is no omniscience, because the differences of all objects are not known.

Secondly, if no intercourse whose character is knowledge, were assum-
ed, how could there be in the knowledge: "sandalwood is fragrant," also the perception of a thing, which is fragrant? By knowledge of fragrant things granted through the intercourse whose character is general, but the notion of fragrancy is only possible by an intercourse whose char-
acter is knowledge.

39.—Comm. "Intercourse, produced by Yoga," that is, a special virtue, produced by the practice of Yoga, (the union of the soul with God by means of abstract contemplation,) in accordance with the evidence of the Sruti, the Purāṇas and other authorities.
connected with a predicate in a general proposition. (The knowledge of the Vyāpti.)

67. The reason which is actually known, is not the cause; in this case, there would be no inference, if the reason had for instance not yet arrived, or had been destroyed.

68. Consideration is the knowledge that a subject in its invariable connection with a predicate is united with the place of conclusion (Paksha, subject of the conclusion).

The invariable connection of a subject with a predicate in a general proposition (Vyāpti) is called the non-connexion of the reason (middle term) with any thing different from the subject of the conclusion, (Paksha, minor term.)

40.—Comm. Manifestation means the perception of all things, meditation is the thinking of the mind, which is separated from all objects.

41.—Comm. "The intercourse as regards inference is consideration."

The special cause (instrumental cause) of an inference is the knowledge of the invariable connection of the subject with the predicate in a general proposition, (आध्यात्मिक, *) and consideration is the intercourse. For instance, let a man who from the smoke on a hearth, etc. has become aware of the invariable connection of smoke with fire, see afterwards any where on a mountain an uninterrupted line of smoke. He will then re-

* आध्यात्मिक (Vyāpti). It is difficult to find an adequate word for this term in English. It means literally, pervading inference, the inherent and essential presence of any one thing or property in another, (see Wilson's Dict.) but it is used in the Nyāya and other philosophical systems to denote the logical relation of one notion to another in a proposition of such a kind, that under circumstances an inference may be drawn from it; or: it is the relation of the subject to the predicate, and vice versa, as the major proposition of a syllogism. The subject of such a proposition is the आध्यात्मिक: the notion, which is pervaded by another (by the predicate) that is to say, which is only a part of the predicate, which is less extensive than the latter, or included in it. The subject is therefore invariably connected with the predicate, and if the former is thought, also the latter is thought. The predicate is the आध्यात्मिक, the pervading notion; it has a greater extent than the subject, and the latter is only a part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, and if the predicate is thought, the subject is not necessarily thought with it. The Vyāpti is, accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to be connected together, on either part is understood. Further, the Vyāpti is a proposition, from
69. Or the perception of the identity of the reason with the conclusion (predicate of) which is not connected with anything incompatible with the subject of the conclusion. Subject (of conclusion, minor term,) is the certainty of the conclusion where the intention to conclude is not absent.

collect the general proposition, according to which smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence arises the knowledge, this (mountain) is possessed with smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This (the knowledge, that any subject is connected by the middle term with a general predicate, or the knowledge of the two premises) is consideration. Hence arises the knowledge, this mountain is fiery, which is an inference. The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived, together with the notion, that it is invariably connected with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. This is denied, in the text; for if the reason (विप्र, sign) were the special cause of the conclusion, then inference could not take place, if the reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed, because then the reason, the pretended special cause of a conclusion, were not present.

which an inference can be derived, that is to say, it must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a syllogism. The names of Vyāpya, Vyāpaka are only used with reference to the general proposition; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, vis., the Vyāpya (middle term) the name of विप्र, reason, argument, or विप्र, sign, and the Vyāpaka (major term) the name of विप्र, conclusion, predicate of the conclusion. The minor term (the subject of the conclusion) is called विप्र: place (minor term, subject of the conclusion), vis. the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major term, or predicate of the conclusion.—If these names in their literal acceptation appear at first curious to a European student and totally deviating from those, used in the logical terminology of the west, it must be borne in mind, that their literal sense does not in the least affect their value as logical terms, and also, that the European names for the same notions are equally figurative, and the names for instance of subordination, co-ordination, subject, predicate, conclusion, &c., but very imperfectly express the logical relation to which they refer. In fact most of these relations are in all languages taken from relations of space, as almost all terms which are of an abstract nature. As the literal translation of विप्र, Vyāpya, &c. might easily lead to false views, I have preferred to give their equivalents in the terminology accepted in Europe.
70.—From the knowledge, that with such a place the reason (middle term) is connected, inference is the consequence.

42.—Comm. "Consideration is the knowledge, that a subject in a general proposition (the reason, the middle term) is united with the subject of conclusion," (terminus minor.)

The knowledge of the determination of the reason (middle term) which is determined by a general predicate, (major term) in connection with the place (minor term) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be comprehended in a double manner, either, it is the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (the middle term) is connected with the place (subject of conclusion, minor term) or, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of conclusion) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term.) Accordingly the conclusion takes place either from the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (middle term) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from which follows that the conclusion (predicate of the conclusion, major term) is connected with the place, (minor term,) or it takes place from the knowledge, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term) from which follows, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the conclusion (major term.)

Some think: 'Also from a two-fold consideration ensues the inference, that the place, (subject) is possessed of the conclusion (predicate of.) There is (according to them) no necessity for the knowledge, that the mountain is possessed with smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. First there is the perception, that the mountain smokes; further the recollection arises, that smoke is the subject, with which fire is invariably connected. In this case inference evidently takes place from those two acts of knowledge. A knowledge of something (of the Paksia, the minor term) determined by a notion; which is again determined by the predicate (by a notion, determined by the Vyápti,) can never be the cause, but there takes place the cause by the knowledge, that the place is determined by the general notion of the subject (middle term, for instance a mountain determined by the general notion of smoke) because this is necessary, and because the assumption of a knowledge, determined by what is determined (by the general proposition, by the Vyápti), has the fault of complication.'
71.—There are five semblances of a reason, which are called going astray, contradiction, inconclusiveness, equalization and absurdity.

72.—The fault of going astray is again three-fold, that which is too general, that which is not general enough and non-exclusive.

We deny this; for even if there is no knowledge of the general notion (the class) of the middle term (vyāpya, for instance the general notion of fire) the inference takes place from the knowledge, that there is a subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by something (middle term) with which fire for instance is invariably connected. And this assumption is also more simple; for the cause takes place by the knowledge, that there is a determination of the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by the predicate of the general proposition (determined by the Vyāpti).

Moreover according to your opinion from the knowledge: "The mountain is smoking," the inference (the mountain is fiery) should follow, because there is a knowledge, that the subject of the conclusion (Paksha) is determined by the general notion (class) of smoke, which in this case is the general notion (class) of the middle term (vyāpya) but this of course will not be granted by any one.

And if you further say, 'the cause is the knowledge that the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) is determined by the general notion of the middle term (vyāpya) when perceived together with the predicate of the general proposition' (Vyāpti) the consequence would be, that an inference would ensue, if Chaitra perceived a subject as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition, and Maitra the general notion (attribute, class) in connexion with the subject (of conclusion).

If you lastly assume, 'that the perception of the place, determined by a general notion, by A, in conjunction with the perception of the middle term in its invariable connexion with the major term (the middle term, determined by the Vyāpti) by the same A, is the cause of the conclusion, made by this A,' there would appear an infinite series of causes for the same effect.

According to my opinion, the knowledge of the attribute (middle
term) of the subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate (major term) with which it is invariably connected, takes place through intimate relation, and produces the conclusion by the same relation. In this case an infinite series of causes is avoided. On the contrary, if it is said, that the knowledge of the middle term as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition (with the major term, as the Vyāpti) and also the knowledge of the general notion (attribute, middle term) of the subject (of conclusion, minor term, Pakṣa) are causes, independent of each other, there would be a two-fold state of the cause of the same effect, and a conclusion would follow from the sentences: "There is smoke, which is invariably connected with fire," and: "The mountain is fiery." If this is correct, we may say, that if there is a double knowledge, there must be also a determined knowledge, and here at the end of the discussion, where its result is given, a complication is no fault.

(This is on the whole an excellent exposition of the logical relation of the cause of the conclusion. It is here lucidly explained, in what manner the three notions of a syllogism are in relation to each other, and also, that the cause of the conclusion is not the middle term, as separated from the major term, but only in its connexion with it. As this is sometimes not attended to, it is not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the same time it is true, that the logical form of a syllogism does not consist of one premise, and the conclusion, but of two premises with the conclusion; for if one reflects as to the form, given by our author, viz. the minor term in connexion with the middle term, which is itself determined by the major term, it is evident, that there are two connexions, viz. of the minor term with the middle, and of this with the major. That is to say, there are two propositions or two premises.)

43.—Comm.—Too general is a reason, which abides as well in the subject of the conclusion as in an opposite one. (Subject of the conclusion is, where the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountain or a hearth is the subject or the minor,
74.—Non-exclusive, when no other subject (of the conclu-
&c. A subject, opposite to the conclusion, is where it does not abide, for instance, in the example above given, a tank is a subject, opposite to the major term.)

That is to say, the reason is too general, when it abides also in a subject, where the major term is not found. For instance, let a hearth be the subject (minor term), smoke the major term, and fire the reason. The conclusion would be: the hearth smokes, because it is fiery, which would be false, because the reason is too general; for fire (the reason) is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for instance, with an iron ball.

(We would not acknowledge this as a logical fallacy, which takes place, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises, but as a fallacy extra dictionem, where the matter of the premises is wrong; for the conclusion follows here from the premises. In this instance the major proposition is wrong, which is: where there is fire there is smoke. The conclusion, however, is quite right as well in form as in matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The fault would, however, be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been taken for the minor term.

As the Nyāya knows only the two first figures of syllogism, and of them only the two moods Barbara and Camestres,* we may say, that the fallacy has arisen by the major proposition being special instead of general.)

44.—Comm.—Non-general is the reason, which has no similar subjects of conclusion for the major term† (that is where the major term has only one subject, or where no similar instances can be adduced for the reason.) (Thus says the commentary in explanation of the text,

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* In Barbara, it is hardly necessary to say, there are all three propositions general affirmatives, in Camestres the first a general affirmative, the second a general negative, and the third a general negative.

† This is much more clearly stated in the Tarka Saṃgraha. I quote the passage in Dr. Ballentine's translation (Lectures on the Nyāya philosophy, p. 41.) "The pretended reason, which applies neither to similar instances nor dissimilar ones, is one devoid of community." As, when one says: "Sound is eternal, for it has the nature of sound." Now the nature of sound resides in sound alone, and is nothing else, whether eternal or uneternal.
tion) is possible. A reason, which does not abide in the subject (of conclusion) is called contradictory."

75.—Three kinds of inconclusiveness are enumerated, viz. In-

The latter, however, is here much clearer than the former, because the question is not, whether the major is immediately found in the minor but whether it is found there by the means of another term; in the first case there would be no necessity for an argument. The example given in the commentary is: Sound is not eternal, because belonging to the class of sound. Here is, according to it, no similar instance, in which the reason (the class of sound) and by it the major is found, as the class of sound abides only in sound, and nowhere else. We should reject this argument at once, as having only two terms; but the Nyâya is obliged to look out for some other appliance, because class is something different from the objects comprehended by it.

45.—Comm.—Non-exclusive, is a reason, where the major term is the negation of absolute negation (where the major term may be predicated of any other notion). Hereby a general negative is impossible; and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.

(The Bengalee translation gives the following explanation:

"A reason, for which there is only an affirmative, is non-exclusive, that is to say, a reason, whose subject does not exclude any thing, for instance all, &c. Let all be the subject, (minor term) object of proof the major, and fit to be named the reason. This argument is non-exclusive; for here cannot be given a similar instance with regard to the subject (minor term) as it can be given in the argument: "The mountain is fiery, because it smokes;" for here is a similar instance on the part of the subject a hearth, &c. According to the opinion of the modern school a non-exclusive reason takes place, where the major admits of only an affirmative (that is to say, where the major is not excluded from any other notion) for instance in the argument: "a jar is an object of proof, because it can be named.")

(We would not consider either of these conclusions faulty in form, because the middle term is properly connected with either of the extremes. A reason then goes astray, to state it briefly, if the reason is too wide, further if it does not refer to similar instances, and lastly, if it does not refer to dissimilar ones.)
conclusiveness on the part of the subject, inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason, and inconclusiveness from limitation.

76.—Where there is a jewel hill, for instance, subject of the conclusion, there is inconclusiveness on the part of the subject. "Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason" takes place, for instance, if the substantiality of a tank be inferred from its having the quality of smoke.

77.—Inconclusiveness from limitation" would take place, for

46.—Comm.—"A contradictory reason is one which does not abide in the subject of conclusion," (minor term) that is to say, a reason, whose negation is the major term (a reason which is the contrary notion of the major term). Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major, and the notion of horse the middle term. Here the reason, the notion of horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore does not admit of an inference.

(Here the fault again is not in the reasoning, but the major premise is wrong; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictiorem.)

47.—Comm.—1. Inconclusiveness on the part of the subject is there, where the notion of the subject (the minor term) is impossible. For instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill.

(Here also is the conclusion not wrong, the fault lies in the minor premise, where the subject is a notion, not given by experience; and the fallacy is therefore one extra dictiorem.)

48.—Comm.—2. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason (middle term) takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed (if the reason and the subject exclude each other). Let it for instance be argued that a tank is a thing, because it smokes. Tank (or water in the tank) and smoke are contrary notions, and smoke cannot therefore be predicated of a tank.

(Here again lies the fault in the minor premise. We observe, that the second kind of inconclusiveness does not correspond to the first. In the first the minor term was contradictory, and we should therefore have expected, that in the second the reason would have been contradictory.)
instance, if fire should be inferred from blue smoke. Equaliza-
tion, is called a consideration from contradictory reasons.

49.—Comm.—3. Inconclusiveness from limitation (on the part of
the invariable connexion with the predicate). This can be two-fold,
on the part of the subject, and on the part of the predicate.

a. First on the part of the predicate. This takes place, if the pre-
dicate is a contradictory notion. For instance if the inference were
made, that the mountain has a golden fire, the notion of a golden fire
(major term) is contradictory.

(Here the major premise is wrong.)

b. Secondly, on the part of the reason. (This takes place, if the
reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were the moun-
tain is fiery from golden smoke. The fault is here again in the major
premise.)

Others say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow,
as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has
blue smoke.

(This division of inconclusiveness is evidently faulty; for the first
kind is inconclusive, because the minor term is contradictory, the second,
because the middle and minor terms exclude each other. In the third
kind two divisions are mixed, in the first of which, both the reason
and the major term, are considered as contradictory, in the second the
reason and major term are limited in their application by an addition
which they ought not to have (in the example the addition of blue).

There are accordingly three different divisions confounded. The first
proceeds from contradiction in each of the terms. In this would be
included the first member of the author's division, and a and b of the
third, by which it is complete. The second division proceeds from the
contradiction of two of the terms; of this only one part has been given
in the second member, viz. where the reason and the minor term ex-
clude each other. Of the two other members of this division, the first,
where the minor and major terms are contradictory, has not been
touched upon, and the second, where the reason and the major term
are contradictory, has been given in another place, viz. under the head
of contradictory reason. The third division proceeds from limitation,
78.—Absurdity" is called the error of stating a subject in which there is not the conclusion; as if, for instance, smell would be inferred to be a quality of a jar, because it was accidentally perceived at the time of its production.

79.—If a rustic first sees a Gayal (species of ox), &c. his similar knowledge of cows, &c. is the instrument to form his notion of a Gayal.

80.—The recollection of the meaning of a sentence which had been previously pronounced, is called the intercourse in the comparison. The result of comparison is the knowledge of the force of the word "Gayal" and similar expressions.

that is to say, where, instead of the notion in its whole extent, only a part of it is connected with the other two notions (in the examples blue smoke, blue fire).

50.—Comm.—" An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons."

An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the consideration of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclusion (major term) the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connected; as for instance, if at the time of consideration of water, &c. which is invariably connected with the absence of fire, there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.*

51.—Comm.—" Absurdity is, if a subject is without the conclusion," (which is assigned to it.)

Absurdity takes place, if the conclusion does not abide in the subject (minor term) for instance, if at the time of the production of a jar the jar is taken as the subject (minor term) and smell as the conclusion;

* The Tarka Sangrahas (B. I. p. 42.) explains this : a counterbalanced reason is that along with which there exists another reason which establishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, "Sound is eternal, because it is audible," as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be) it might be argued with equal force on the other side, that "Sound is not eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is."
81.—The knowledge of words is the special cause. The knowledge of the meanings of words, is here the intercourse, and the result is verbal knowledge. The knowledge of the power of words assists in this act.

There is an absurdity, because at the time of production there is no smell in a jar, &c. for all things are at that time without smell.

52.—Comm.—"The knowledge of words is the special cause; the knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse and the result is verbal knowledge."

The cause of verbal knowledge is not a word, when actually heard; for though there be no word spoken, yet there may be verbal knowledge, for instance, if one who has made a vow not to speak, writes down a Sloka.

53.—Comm.—"The knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse." Intercourse is the recollection of the meanings of the words, produced by the words. Otherwise a person who had a knowledge of words, (who heard words) would have verbal knowledge, if he had obtained the meanings of words by perception or any other evidence. (That is to say, if he heard words, the meanings of which were given to him by perception, inference, &c.; for instance, if he heard the word "tree," while at the same time the meaning of it were conveyed to him by his actually seeing a tree. There would be two kinds of knowledge, independent of each other, and not verbal knowledge which is produced by words alone.) Here it must also be understood, that the effects of words are produced by special relation (स्वैरित्व) otherwise the effect of the word "jar" for instance, would be the recollection of ether by intimate relation, and there would be accordingly verbal knowledge of the ether.

Special relation is of two kinds, implication (ellipsis) and power.

The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary; for unless the power of a word is previously apprehended, there cannot be verbal knowledge from recollection, which depends upon that relation (power.

* A word is a sound which has a power, as for instance, the power of the sound "man" refers to an animal which has hands, feet, &c. The meaning of a word is the object to which it refers, for instance, the meaning of the word "tree" is a thing, which has a trunk, branches, leaves, &c.
of a word) although there may exist a knowledge of the words (the words may be heard). The recollection of the meaning of the knowledge of a word takes place according to the rule of the knowledge of any object which is in relation.

Power is the connexion of the meaning of a word with the same word. That by such or such a sound such or such a meaning is understood, depends upon the will of God. In names, which are at present given, there is also a power, because the rule: "Let the father on the eleventh day (after the birth of a child) give a name to the child," depends on the will of God. In a sign, however, given at present, there is no power. Such is the opinion of some, but the modern school (of the Nyāyaśikas) maintain, that the will of God is not the power, but merely will (of man.) Hence is also power in a sign, which may be given at present.

The apprehension of power depends upon grammar, comparison, dictionary, the instruction of persons worthy of confidence, actual intercourse, the supplying of the sentence, substitution, and the connexion with well-known words.

a. The apprehension of the root, of the inflective base, the derivative affixes, &c. of a word is produced by grammar; it does not take place, whenever there is an obstacle, as there is, if, according to the statement of the grammarians, the power of the grammatical terminations (that is of the verbs and nouns) refers to the agent. In the sentence: "Chaittra cooks" the termination in "cooks" is inseparably connected with the agent "Chaittra."

This connexion, we maintain, does in this case not arise, in consequence of its complication; but in the action (cooks) the power is produced, because this assumption is simple,* for it is manifest, that the action is a determination of Chaittra.

b. The power which takes place by comparison, has been before described.

c. In the same manner power is also apprehended by the dictionary; if there is, however, any obstacle, it is not apprehended. Thus according to the dictionaries, the adjective terms of "blue," &c. have power with reference to blue colour and to a thing which has

* According to the grammarians it must be said: "Chaittra, not separated from what is determined by the action referring to cooking," while the Nyāyaśikas say: "Chaittra, determined by the action, referring to cooking."
blue colour; but it is more simple to say, that this term by its power refers to the quality of blue, and by implication to a thing which has blue colour.*

d. Or the power is derived from the word of a person, worthy of confidence, if for instance it is said, that the word “Pika” (a black cuckoo) is the same as “Kokila,” the power of the word “Pika” is apprehended.

e. Or from actual intercourse. If for instance the master who is a grown up person, orders his servant who is also a grown up person, to bring the jar, and the jar is brought by the latter, a boy who attends to this, hence observes that the action of bringing a jar is connected with those words. If he further hears: “Take away the jar,” “bring the cow,” he understands the power of the term: “jar,” &c., to be brought or to be taken away, with reference to a jar, &c. in connexion with an action.

Some say: 'Under this supposition there is no verbal knowledge in the sentence: "There is a blue jar on the ground;" for the power of a jar, &c. is apprehended by a jar, as connected with an action, and the power of any termination of a verb refers to the understanding of an action, but in this case there is no connexion of such a kind, and therefore no verbal knowledge?'

We do not agree, because, although it is at first necessary for brevity's sake to admit a power with reference to a jar, as determined by action, it is right to omit it afterwards. . . .

f. Or from supplying the sentence. (This takes place, if in a sentence a word has a special meaning, while from other sentences it is known, that the meaning is more general.)

g. Or from substitution. Substitution means the definition of the sense of a word by another word of the same sense; thus, if for the word belligerent "warlike" is substituted, the power refers to the word "warlike."† . . .

A. Or from the connexion with well-known words, for instance in the sentence: "In this mango tree the Pika sweetly sings," the power of the word "Pika" is apprehended in this manner.

* If a word has several meanings, there is a separate power for each of them.
† In the original the examples are: "ghața:" and "kalasa," either of which means a jar.
Some (the Mīmāṃsākās) maintain: 'The power of a word refers to the class (notion) and not to the individual, because in the latter case it would go astray, and require assumptions without end. And on the first supposition there is also a knowledge of the individual, because without individuals the knowledge of a class is impossible.'

We deny this, because without assuming a power, the apprehension of an individual does not take place.

Nor does implication (ellipsis) refer to an individual; for an individual may be apprehended, although there is no want of apprehension of the literal meaning of a word (an implication is dependent on the circumstance, that a word cannot be comprehended in its literal sense.)

Nor need there be any fear, that by assuming a power, referring to an individual, the fault of an infinite number of hypotheses is committed; for we assume one and the same power for all individuals.

Nor is there (by the assumption, that power refers to the individual) a want of extension; for this extension is effected by the class of cow for instance (when a cow is the individual).

Moreover, if the power is apprehended for instance in cow, possessed of power, the force refers to an individual. If on the contrary the power is apprehended for instance in the class of cow, then there would be a recollection of the meaning of a word, determined by the class of cow, and a verbal knowledge would be impossible, because the knowledge of the power by the same determination would be the cause of the recollection of the meaning of a word and of verbal knowledge. Moreover, if the power refers to the class of cow, we must declare, that the class of the class of cow is the determination of what is possessed of the power. But the class of cow, which is not in intimate relation to any thing that is not cow, is in intimate relation to all cows. Hence your assumption of a determination of the notion of any thing, possessed of power, is complicated, because this notion does not refer to individual cows; therefore in order to comprehend this or that individual, possessed of this or that class, it is necessary to assume a power, which is founded on individuals, determined by class and form.

A word, possessed of power, is either Yangika, or Rādha, or Yuga-rādha, or Yangika-rādha.

1. A word is Yangika, if its meaning is understood by the meaning of its parts; for instance in the word "giver" (in Sanscrit the ex-
82.—Implication,  “ is the relation of a word which has power, and it takes place when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal meaning of a word. The cause of understanding a sentence is contiguity, consistency, construction and intention.

ample is Pachaka, cook) the root giv (e) expresses the action give, and the termination “er” refers to the agent. And the whole expresses the meanings of the parts, viz. an agent with reference to the action “give.”

2. Rūḍha is a word, which, independent of the power of its parts, is only understood by the power of the whole, as for instance “go” (cow, for “go” is derived from “gam,” to go, which does not express the meaning of go,) “gūṭā” (jar) etc.

3. Yogarūḍha is a word, which, beside the power of its parts, expresses a different meaning as a whole, for instance “Pankja” (from “Panka,” mud, and “ja,” born) for the word “Pankja” means by the power of its parts “an agent, born in mud” (which includes any thing, produced in such a manner) but by its power as a whole a “waterlily” (that is only one of the things, born in mud).

4. Yaugika-rūḍha is a word, which is understood either by the meaning of its parts, or by Rūḍha, for instance Udbhid. The power of the word “ud” refers to upwards, the power of the root “bhid” to cutting. Therefore by its Yaugika power it refers to tree, and by its power of Rūḍha it refers to any germ, produced from corn.

54.—Comm.—“Implication is the relation of a word, which has power, and it takes place, when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal sense of a word.”

For instance, let the sentence be given: “Ghosha dwells on the Ganges.” If in this case, with reference to the literal meaning of “Ganges,” viz. the current, either the connexion of Ghosha, or the intention of the speaker is not obtained, the meaning of “bank” is understood by implication. This implication is the relation of a word which has power. Here, from the knowledge of the connexion of the literal meaning of the current with the bank, a recollection of the bank is produced, and hence the meaning of the sentence is understood.

Moreover if the want of connexion alone were the cause of implication, there would be no implication in the sentence: “Let the staffs
83.—Contiguity," is called the proximity of words.

enter," because there is no want of connexion with reference to the entering of the staffs. Therefore, because here the entrance of the staffs has no reference to the intention of the speaker, which is the taking of food, the implication refers to the bearers of staffs. In the same manner, in the sentence: "Protect the ghee from the crows" the word "crow" has an implication to any thing which may injure the ghee, because the intention of the speaker refers to the preservation of the ghee generally. In the same manner, if it is said: "The umbrella-bearers are proceeding;" the word "umbrella-bearers" implies the merchants of a caravan.

This latter is called the implication which does not lose its own meaning (Ahañatāthā Lakṣhañā, which keeps its own meaning, beside that which it obtains from implication) because by the term "merchants of a caravan" the bearers of umbrellas as well as those without umbrellas are understood.

Moreover, if the want of sense in the connexion alone were the cause of implication, sometimes the word "Gangā" would imply: "bank," sometimes the word: "Ghoshā," "fish," &c. and there would be accordingly no rule. This, however, must be understood: if the connexion of the meaning of a word, possessed of power, is apprehended by the notion of bank, bank must be apprehended by the notion of bank; if, on the other hand, it is apprehended by the notion of the bank of the Gangā, it must be recollected by that notion. Therefore there is no implication in the general notion of an implication, because the general notion is understood without implication. Likewise, there is no power in the general notion of what has power, because any word is able to remind of the meaning of its general notion.

But if there is an implication by the successive connexion of a word, possessed of power, it is called an implied implication, as for instance in the word "Dārēphā" (literally, that which has two wings, figurative, "black bee") the connexion of: "two-winged," refers to "Bhramara" (black bee) that of "Bhramara" to black bee; this is an implied implication. . . . .

55.—Comm.—Contiguity means proximity, viz. the uninterrupted succession of two or more words which have a connexion among each
other. Therefore there is no verbal knowledge in the words: "The by inhabited was Dévadatta volcano;" but if by mistake in the proximity no mistake in the verbal understanding is the consequence, it does not matter.

'But in the sentence: "With umbrella, earrings and clothes adorned is Dévadatta," the recollection of the second word destroys the recollection of the first; accordingly, as there is an interruption, a recollection of the second word is impossible.'

We do not grant this, as by the impressions of each word until the last an uninterrupted recollection of all objects is possible; for as by several kinds of intercourse one and the same perception arises, so also one and the same recollection arises by several impressions, and the knowledge of the last letter together with the impressions of all words brings all to recollection. How could otherwise exist the recollection of any word that has many letters?

Moreover; some say, that, as in a field all pigeons are caught in the same net, so by the recollection of all the meanings of words does take place the verbal knowledge of all meanings of words, which is corresponding to the knowledge of the connexion depending upon the object and verb. Others say: if connected with all such words, as are construed, consistent and contiguous, verbal knowledge of all the words (included in the sentence) takes place; for, they say, after the meaning of the single sentences has been understood, the meaning of the great sentence will be comprehended by the recollection of the meanings of the words. Hence the assumption of a total impression of a word, manifesting all the letters, has been refuted, because by the apprehension of the last letter, together with the impressions of all the preceding letters which (apprehension) manifests the word, the word is apprehended. This must be understood, if it is said: "the door," the meaning of the word is obtained by the knowledge of the word "close," but not by the knowledge of the meaning of such acts as closing, &c., because the actual presence of the meaning of a word, which is produced by a word, is the cause of verbal knowledge. Moreover, as the words denoting action and object, are mutually connected, it is impossible, that there is verbal knowledge without a word, denoting a verb. In the same manner, if it is said: "Of the flowers," it is necessary to assume: "he is desirous," because without this the preposition "of" could not be applied.
Consistency is the mutual correspondence of the meanings of the words.

84.—Construction is the selection of such terminations, without which the meaning of a sentence is unintelligible. Intention is based on the wish of the speaker.

56.—Comm.—Consistency is the connexion of the meaning of one word with that of another. Accordingly there is no verbal knowledge in such sentences as: "He sprinkles with fire," because there is no meaning in it. If it is objected, 'that previously to the verbal knowledge there is nowhere a knowledge of this consistency, because there is not before a meaning of the sentence,' we reply: there is a knowledge of consistency which is sometimes doubtful, sometimes certain, if there is a recollection of the meanings of the different words. The modern school, however, says, that the knowledge of consistency is no reason of verbal knowledge. If it is said: "He sprinkles with fire," there is no verbal knowledge, because the inconsistency, which is that fire cannot be an instrument in the action of sprinkling, is certainly an obstacle. Because the certainty of its absence is an obstacle only in a knowledge, which is not produced by common intercourse or by special defects, therefore it is proved, that it is an obstacle with reference to verbal knowledge—although it is not proved, that by the late appearance of consistency verbal knowledge is late.

57.—Comm.—Construction is the connexion of one word with another, without which the former has no sense. The case, denoting agent, has no connexion without the case, referring to action, and with this the former is constrained. In fact, however, the proximity of the cases denoting agent and action, is included in contiguity. Moreover, with reference to the objective case, for instance of jar, the cause is the knowledge of the termination of the second case. Therefore there is no meaning in such sentences as: "The jar is the accusative case," "to bring is an action."

58.—Comm.—Intention is the wish of the speaker. Suppose, intention were not a cause of verbal knowledge, and such a sentence as: "Bring the Saindhava" (meaning horse and salt) were pronounced, there would sometimes the meaning of "horse," and sometimes the meaning of "salt," be obtained. It cannot be said, that the circum-
85.—The instrument in the perception of happiness and other internal qualities is the mind. The atomic nature of the mind is inferred from the fact that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time.

stances, &c. by which the intention is apprehended, are the cause of verbal knowledge, because they are not included in the definition. And if it is said, 'that they are included as being the cause of the knowledge of the intention,' it is simple to say, that the knowledge of the intention is the cause. In this manner, God is assumed for the knowledge of the intention with reference to the Védas. It must not be said, 'that the knowledge of the intention of the teacher is here the cause,' because at the commencement of the creation there is no teacher. Nor must it be said: 'there is no general conflagration (destruction of the world,) how can therefore be a commencement of creation?' for a general conflagration is proved by the Sástra. In the same manner is in the sentence of a parrot the knowledge of the intention of God the cause, but in a vile sentence of the parrot the knowledge of the intention of the speaker.

Others say: If there is a word which has different meanings, the knowledge of the intention is sometimes the cause; moreover, in the sentence of a parrot is also verbal understanding without the knowledge of the intention, and with reference to the Védas the meaning is apprehended by the discussions, which are purified by the eternal Mímanás.

59.—Comm.—Intelect was divided into two kinds; viz. apprehension and remembrance (vid. verse 51.) The nature of apprehension has been explained. Remembrance will not be explained, because it is easy to be understood; for the cause of it is a former apprehension. Some say, 'the class (notion) of apprehension is not causality, but the class (notion) of knowledge;' otherwise there would be no remembrance after a remembrance, because the former impression would be destroyed by the remembrance of the common notion. According to my opinion, however, there is by this remembrance through a new impression a new remembrance produced.' This we cannot grant; where after the remembrance of a perception in its totality the remembrance of

* That is to say, apprehension is not the cause of remembrance, but knowledge in general.
86.—Qualities" abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions.

the single objects (constituting a totality) as of cloth, jar, &c. is produced, but so that there is no remembrance of all the objects, there it must be said, that, as the impression of every single remembrance is not destroyed, time, or disease, or the last remembrance is the cause of the destruction of the impression. Accordingly, it cannot be said, 'that a gradual remembrance is impossible,' nor, 'that by repeated remembrance, a stronger impression is impossible;' for the word "strong" means here what suddenly recalls to mind. It also cannot be said, 'that the cause is knowledge, as there is no alternative;' for if the special attribute is assigned, there is no going astray; but knowledge has the fault of superfluous causality, as it is a general attribute. How could otherwise a stick be the cause of a jar by being turned round, and not as well by its being a substance or having colour? Nor must it be said: 'There is an apprehension, that the intermediate remembrance will go astray, because the impression is destroyed;' for by objecting to assuming an infinite number of impressions and by assuming the destruction of the impression of the last remembrance, a going astray cannot be apprehended.

60.—Comm.—The existence of mind is proved by the following inference. The perception of happiness, &c. takes place by an instrument, because the perception is a production, as for instance is the perception by the eye. This instrument is the mind. It cannot be said 'that the perceptions of unhappiness, &c. are produced by other instruments,' because the necessity of only one instrument as cause for all similar perceptions is evident from its simplicity. Thus the mind is proved as being the substrate of contact, which is the non-intimate cause of unhappiness, &c.

61.—Comm.—"The atomic nature of the mind is proved from the fact, that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time."

It is clear from apprehension (perception) that various objects of perception, for instance, objects of the eye, of taste, &c. are not at one and the same time produced; for although there may exist an intercourse of the several senses with these objects, yet knowledge is produced by only one sense, because the mind is in contact with only one
Material qualities are colour, taste, feel, and smell, priority and posteriority,
sense, and it is not produced (at that time) by any other sense, as the mind is not in contact with it. Therefore if the mind were to be comprehended by the notion of a pervading substance, it should be connected with every thing; hence (as this is not the case) it follows, that the mind is not pervading. It must not be said, 'that the knowledge of the mind is late (successive) because at that time the special fate (merit or demerit) which reminds of knowledge, is also late;' for, if this were the case, there would be no necessity for assuming such instruments of knowledge as the eye, &c.

Nor must it be said: 'How can the narrowness of the mind be reconciled with the fact, that at one and the same time a knowledge from different senses exists, for instance at the time when one eats a large cake; for the mind is some thing very subtle, and is therefore rapidly in contact with various senses, so that different kinds of knowledge may arise in the same imperceptible succession, as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pierced; it is a mere delusion, if several kinds of knowledge appear at the same time.

Nor must it be said, 'that both (the atomic and pervading nature of the mind) is reconciled under the assumption, that the nature of the mind may contract or expand,' because the assumption of many parts subject to destruction, &c. is complicated, and on the other hand, the assumption of a mind without parts is simple.

62.—Comm.—"Qualities abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions."

If it is asked, what proof is there for a separate class of quality? The answer is : The causality, found in what is possessed of generality, different from that (generality) referring to substances and actions,* is determined by some attribute, because causality for a thing which is not determined by some attribute, is impossible; but neither the class of colour, &c. nor the class of existence is this determination, because in the first case it would not comprehend enough (all other quali-

* To understand this, it must be recollected, that generality (class) abides in substances, qualities and actions; the generality therefore, different from the class of substance and action, must be that of quality,
87, 88.—Fluidity, gravity, viscidity and velocity.—Merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect and others of similar nature are called immaterial qualities by philosophers. Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction are considered qualities of either class.

89.—Conjunction and disjunction, the different numbers from two upwards, separatedness found in two things or more, are qualities which abide not in one and the same thing.

ties being excluded) and in the second it would comprehend too much, (viz., also substances and actions.) Therefore it is contained in the 24 (qualities) and is the class of quality.

"It abides in substances." Although it is not its definition: to be dependent on substance, because it would be too wide, as including also action and class, yet it is right to say: it is what is possessed of the class different from existence which class is the determination extending as far as substantiality, because the class of quality is the determination, extending as far as substantiality, and quality is what is possessed of this determination. The classes of action and substance are not determinations, extending as far as substantiality, because substantiality and action do not abide in the sky, &c. and the class of the class of substance, and the class of generality (class) are no real classes.

"Without qualities." Although action, generality, &c. are also without qualities, yet it must be understood as the absence of qualities, found in the category which is possessed of generality and different from action; for class and the subsequent three categories have no generality (class); action is not different from action, and substance is not without qualities. Therefore this definition is not too wide.

"Without actions" is only said to describe it, not to define it, because it would otherwise be too wide, the ether being also without action.

63.—Material substances are: earth, water, light, air and mind (material according to the Nyāya is that the measure of which has a limit, and for this reason, mind which is an atom, is included in it.)

64.—Immaterial qualities are: merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, and endeavour (volition). Immaterial substances are: the sky, time, space and soul.
90.—All the remaining qualities"" abide only in one thing. Special qualities" are: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, touch, viscosity, original fluidity.

91.—Fate, memory and sound. General qualities are: number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, derived fluidity.

92. 93.—Gravity and velocity. Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction, and disjunction, priority and posteriority, fluidity and viscosity are perceived by two senses.

Sound, colour, taste, smell and touch, are respectively perceived by one of the external senses.

94.—Gravity, fate and memory, transcend the perception of the senses. The special qualities of the pervading substances"" are not produced by the qualities of any cause."

65.—Comm.—The remaining qualities are: colour, taste, touch, measure which is an unit, separatedness, sound only in one individual, priority, posteriority, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, gravity, viscosity, faculty, fate (merit and demerit) and sound.

66.—The special qualities of the earth are: colour, taste, smell and feel; of the water: colour, taste, feel, viscosity and natural fluidity; of the light: colour and feel; of the air: feel; of the sky: sound; of the soul: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and memory.

67.—Comm.—By two senses, viz. by the eye and the skin.

68.—Comm.—Qualities of the pervading substances are: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, memory, and sound.

69.—Comm.—"They are not produced by the qualities of any cause." Colour, smell, &c. depend upon the quality of the cause (for instance the colour, taste, smell and feel of a jar depend upon the same qualities of the two halves, of which it is formed) the same cannot be admitted with regard to intellect, &c. because there is no cause of the soul, the ether, &c.
95. 96.—Natural colour, taste, smell, feel, likewise fluidity, viscosity, velocity, gravity, unity, separatedness found in individuals, quantity and elasticity are produced from the qualities of causes. Conjunction, disjunction and velocity are effected by actions.

97.—Colour, taste, smell, touch, quantity, unity, separatedness found in individuals, viscosity and sound are non-intimate causes.

98.—Special qualities of the soul have only instrumental causality. Hot feel, gravity, velocity, fluidity, conjunction and disjunction and the other qualities denoting two extremes, are of two fold causality.

99.—The special qualities of pervading substances, as well as conjunction and disjunction and other qualities denoting two extremes, are limited.

100.—Colour is perceived by the eye, it manifests substances, qualities and classes, it is the cause of the perception of the eye, and is white, &c., according to the variety of colours.

101.—It is eternal in the atoms of water and light, in all other substances it has a cause. Taste is perceived by the tongue; it is various, as sweet, bitter etc.

(The special qualities of the soul are only instrumental causes; for intellect, &c. is not the non-intimate cause of any thing; but the knowledge of what is possible by action is the instrumental cause of the desire of action.)

69.—Comm.—Viz. the instrumental and non-intimate causes.

70.—Comm.—"Colour is eternal in the atoms of water and light," because it is there from their nature, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, as by the process of cooking another colour is produced.

* The second distich of this verse in the former edition has been omitted, the whole context showing that it is an interpolation. The same has been done with the first distich of verse 68, for the same reason, so that the present edition contains one verse less than the former.
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102.—Its instrument (organ) is the tongue; as regards eternity, &c. it is like colour. "Smell is perceived by the nose, it is the cause of perception through the nose.

103.—There are two kinds of smell, good and bad. "Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin.

104.—It is threefold, tepid, cold and warm. Hardness and similar qualities are in the earth; with regard to its eternity, the same holds good as above."

105.—These "qualities as abiding in earth, are produced by cooking, while this is not the case as regards the other elements. The change produced by cooking takes place according to the opinion of the Vaisēshikas" in the single atoms.

71.—Comm.—Taste is eternal in the atoms of water, all other taste is non-eternal.

72.—Comm.—Smell is non-eternal (because it abides alone in earth, and in the atoms of earth another smell is produced by the process of cooking.)

73.—Comm.—The feel of earth and air is temperate, of water cold, and of light hot... Feel is eternal in the atoms of water, light and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, (for the same reason as before.)

74.—Comm.—These, viz. colour, taste, smell and feel. As abiding in earth, they are produced by a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour, taste, smell and feel of earth are changed; not so as abiding in water, &c. for although water, &c. be a hundred times boiled, yet no change of its colour, &c. takes place. The smell and heat of water, on the other hand, are artificial, because they are present or absent by the presence or absence of artificial means, like the cold feel of air and earth.

75.—Comm.—The Vaisēshikas say, that as to earth the change by the process of cooking takes place in the atoms. Their view is, as follows. As long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of cooking is possible; but when by the union of fire the compound substances have been destroyed, that change takes place in the
atoms which have become independent of each other. And again by the union of the atoms which have been changed by the process of cooking, a production is effected from the compound of two, three, &c. atoms again to a compound of many parts; for by the extraordinary velocity of heat the transition from the destruction of one compound to the production of another is sudden. Then from the destruction of a compound of two atoms by a new production a compound, possessed of shape, &c. is formed in a few moments.

For the instruction of the student an explanation of this topic is here given.

The Sutra of the Vaisēshikas is as follows: "Action is a cause which is independent of conjunction and disjunction," which means, that its consequent state is independent of its antecedent state; otherwise, as the action also produces the consequent conjunction, there would be the fault of too wide a definition, because the action would depend upon the destruction of the antecedent conjunction.

If here a disjunction, produced by disjunction, is not acknowledged, nine moments are required. If it is acknowledged, the disjunction, depending upon something produces disjunction; but if the cause is something independent, action takes place. If there is a disjunction produced by disjunction, as depending upon the time, which is determined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance commencing perceptible substances (for which a compound of three atoms is required) ten moments are necessary. If further the disjunction produced by disjunction depends upon the time or upon part (of a compound) either of which is determined by the destruction of a substance, eleven moments are necessary.

1. Nine moments.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction from another atom, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance (which consists of three atoms,) hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue, &c. in the atom, hence 3. the production of the quality of red, &c., hence 4. the action in accordance with the production of the first elements of things, hence 5. disjunction, hence 6. destruction of the former conjunction, hence 7. the conjunction, by which the first elements of a com-
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pound are formed, hence 8. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 9. the production of the quality of red, &c.

If it is objected, 'that in the moment, when the quality of blue is destroyed, or in the moment, when the quality of red is produced, there is in the atom the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance;' we deny this, because in an atom, previous to the destruction of the action which takes place in an atom that is united with fire, and also previous to the production of a quality, there is no other action with regard to the atom possible; for we hold the principle, that in a thing where there is an action, no other action is possible, and also, that in a substance without quality an action, in accordance with production of the first elements of substances, cannot take place.

Nor can in an atom at the same time that the quality of blue, &c. is removed, the quality of red be produced, because the destruction of the antecedent is the cause of the consequent colour, etc.

2. Ten moments. They take place, if by disjunction, depending upon a time, determined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, another disjunction is effected.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, which is the element of a compound of two atoms, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, by which the first elements of a compound are formed, hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms and the disjunction, produced by disjunction, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue and the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 3. the production of the quality of red and the consequent conjunction, hence 4. the destruction of the action, produced by the conjunction* of the fire, with regard to the atom, hence 5. the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 6. disjunction, hence 7. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 8. the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 9. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 10. the production of the quality of red, &c.

3. Eleven moments.

* Nodanam means a conjunction, by which no sound is produced. See v. 119.
From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 1. the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 2. disjunction, produced by disjunction, depending upon a time determined by the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 3. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 4. the consequent conjunction, hence 5. the destruction of the action with reference to the atom, hence 6. the action, forming the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 7. disjunction, hence 8. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 9. the conjunction forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 10. the compound of two atoms, hence 11. the production of the quality of red. One and the same conjunction of fire destroys not the blue colour and produces the red colour, as the intermediate sound destroys the preceding and produces the subsequent sound; for one and the same fire continues not for the whole time. Moreover, if the cause of the production were also the cause of destruction, then, if by the destruction of the colour &c. the fire were also destroyed, the atom would remain for a long time without colour. If, on the other hand, the cause of destruction were also the cause of production, then, if at the production of the red colour the fire (the cause of the production) were destroyed, there could not be produced the red colour.

If in this manner the action is considered in another atom, the quality is produced in five and more moments.

In five moments. The action takes place in one atom, hence disjunction, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and disjunction, produced by action in another atom. This is one time. Hence destruction of blue, &c. and from the disjunction the destruction of the former conjunction. This is the second time. Hence the production of the red, and the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound. This is the third time. Hence the production of the compound of two atoms, which is the fourth time, and hence the production of the red, which is the fifth time.—If one considers the destruction of the substance at the same time with the action in another atom, then the production of
106.—While the Naiyáyikas affirm,\textsuperscript{10} that change is effected also in two or more atoms. 'The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number.'

107.—Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient unity to transient substances.\textsuperscript{11} Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect,

the quality takes place in six moments. In this manner. By the action in one atom disjunction takes place in another atom, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the blue and disjunction, produced by action in another atom, hence production of the red, and destruction of the former conjunction in another atom, hence conjunction in another atom, hence production of the compound of two atoms, then production of the red. In the same manner seven moments are required, if one at the time of the destruction of the blue considers the action in another atom, and eight moments, if one considers the production of the red at the same time with the action in another atom.

76.—\textit{Comm.}—"While the Naiyáyikas affirm." It is the opinion of the Naiyáyikas, that also in compounds, viz. in compounds of two, three, &c. atoms, change by the process of cooking takes place. Their view is this. As compound substances have pores, the minute parts of fire enter into the inside, and therefore change by the process of cooking is possible, although the parts be retained in the compound. The opinion of Vaiséshikas is complicated, as it assumes the destruction of an infinite number of parts. If this is the case, the recognition: "this is that jar," is consistent; but where there is no recognition, there we can admit a destruction of the compound.

77.—\textit{Comm.}—"The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number." The cause, viz., the non-intimate cause.

78.—\textit{Comm.}—"Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient to transient substances." Eternal substances are the atoms of material substances, further time, space and soul, transient substances for instance a jar, &c.
108.—And they are collectively apprehended in their dependance upon more than one object." The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers are also destroyed."

79.—Comm.—"Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect, and they are collectively apprehended in their dependance upon more than one object."

Numbers from two upwards, depending upon the addition of one to one, are produced by comprehending intellect.

Although the relation, indicating the class of two, three, &c. abides for instance in each of two, three, &c. jars &c. yet as there is not a knowledge, that one is two, and further as there is the knowledge, that one is not two, it must be assumed a relation, indicating the collective apprehension of two, three, &c. which depends upon more than one object.

80.—Comm.—"The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers, (from two upwards) are also destroyed." First there is the comprehending intellect, then the production of the class of two, &c. then the determining knowledge, viz. the determination of the class of two, then the perception determined by the class of two. If the comprehending intellect is destroyed, also the class of two is destroyed.

Although no other knowledge does continue for three moments, because the special qualities of the respective pervading substances are destroyed by the qualities succeeding to them,* yet it must be assumed, that the comprehending intellect continues for three moments; otherwise the comprehending intellect would be destroyed at the time of determination, and thereby also the class of two, three, &c.; for there would be no perception of the class of two, because no object were present, and only when it is present, a knowledge is produced by the eye, &c. Therefore it must be assumed, that the perception of the class of two destroys the comprehending intellect.

It must not be asked, 'how by the destruction of the comprehending intellect the class of two, &c. is destroyed,' because at another time there is no perception of the class of two; for it is clear, that the

* For instance a sound by another, which follows it, or a perception, thought, etc. by a succeeding one.
109.—Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities." Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring."

110.—Point (atom of space) length, thickness, breadth, are the differences of quantity; in transient things it is transient, in eternal things eternal."

comprehending intellect is the cause of those numbers, and its destruction destroys also them. Therefore the class of two, produced by the comprehending intellect of A, is comprehended by the same A.

Nor must it be said, "that the comprehending intellect is the cause of the perception of the class of two," &c., because it is right for brevity's sake to assign it as the cause of the class of two, &c.

The comprehending intellect of the Yogis refers to compounds of two atoms, &c. which transcend the perception of the senses. The comprehending intellect of God (Iswara) or of the Yogis abiding in the mundane egg, refers to the atoms at the time of the creation of the world.

81.—Comm.—" Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities."

This is the intellect, which apprehends, that this is one, this is one, &c. It must be understood, that, where there is a knowledge of undefined unities, there is produced the number, referring to many, different from two, three, &c. as where there is a forest, an army, &c. This is the opinion of Kandali-kāra. The Achāryas, however, think, that the class of many is the class of three, &c. Therefore the class of many includes the class of three, &c. Although the class of three, &c. is included in an army, yet the class of the class of three, etc. is not apprehended, because this would be wrong. If this is the case, the notion is possible, that this army is greater than that, because if the class of many were without number, there could not exist the notion of a comparative and superlative degree.

82.—Comm.—" Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring," viz. the non-intimate cause.

83.—" In transient things it is transient," viz. in a compound of two atoms, &c. " In eternal things it is eternal," viz. is the sky, &c.
111.—Transient quantity is produced from number, measure, and heaps. Quantity found in two and more atoms arises from number;"  

112.—As met with in a jar and similar extended things it arises from measure; the conjunction of so called loose things, it is a heap. By this (conjunction)  

113.—Measure is produced in such things for instance as cotton. If the place, upon which it (the measure) depends, is destroyed, it is also destroyed. Separatedness which is like number* is the cause of the knowledge of separate things.  

114.—It cannot be said, that it is included in mutual negation; for it is not the same to say, "this is different from that," and, "this is not that."  

115.—Conjunction is called the obtaining of two things unobtained before. It is threefold, the first kind is produced from the action of one of two;  

84.—Comm.—"Quantity found in two and more atoms." The measure of one atom is not the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of two atoms, nor a compound of two atoms the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of three atoms, because a measure produces a measure which is greater than its own kind. But the measure of a compound of two atoms is not greater than one atom, and the measure of a compound of three atoms has nothing of its own kind; therefore the non-intimate cause of a compound of two atoms is the number of two in an atom, and of a compound of three atoms the number of three in a compound of two atoms.  

85.—Comm.—"Separatedness which like number," viz. the non-intimate cause of the knowledge of separatedness is separatedness. It is like number in its relation to eternal and transient things; viz. as the class of unity is eternal in eternal things, and transient in transient things, as transient unity is produced in the second moment after the production of the thing upon which it depends, and is destroyed, when this is destroyed, so the same must be understood with regard to separatedness of two, three, &c.  

* Vid. p. 8.
116.—The second from the united action of both, the third from conjunction. Of the first is an instance that of the falcon and the rock.

117.—Of the second, the fighting of two rams; of the third, the conjunction of the tree and the jar which is produced by the conjunction of the tree with one half of the jar.

118.—The conjunction which is effected by action is again two-fold, the one effected by violent, the other by soft motion; the first is the cause of sound.

119.—The second is not the cause of sound. Disjunction comprehends also three kinds. The one is produced by the action of one, the second by the action of two,

120.—The third by disjunction. This latter is again of two kinds; the one arises by the disjunction of the cause only, the other by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.*

86.—Comm.—With regard to the two first kinds of disjunction, the same examples are to be understood as with regard to the two first kinds of conjunction. The third is again two-fold, viz. as produced either by the disjunction of the cause, or by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.

Where there is an action with regard to one half of a jar, there ensues a disjunction of the two halves, hence the destruction of the conjunction forming the jar, hence destruction of the jar, hence by the action, which consists in the disjunction of the half, the disjunction of the half of the jar from the other part of space, hence a destruction of the conjunction with the other part of space, hence the conjunction with another part of space, hence the destruction of the action.

Where by an action of the hand, a separation of the tree and the hand takes place, there arises the belief that the tree is also separated from the body. Here in the separation of the body from the tree is the action of the hand not the cause, because they are not at one and the same place. Again there is no action in the body, as the action of a compound is regulated by the actions of each of its parts; therefore is here produced by the disjunction of cause* and non-cause also a disjunction of effect and non-effect.

* Cause, as it appears, is here the tree.
121.—Posteriority and priority are two-fold with regard to
time, or to space, and are only applicable to material bodies.

122.—Posteriority of place (distance) is perceived from a
greater space intervening between the conjunction of the sun,
priority (nearness) by the perception of less space.

123.—The non-intimate cause of them is conjunction of space
which is the substrate of them.* Posteriority with regard to
time is produced by the knowledge of the anterior existence
of the revolutions of the sun,

124.—Priority (recent time) from the knowledge of what
succeeded the former. The non-intimate cause of them is the
conjunction of things which are in time.

125.—If the comprehending intellect were destroyed, pos-
teriority and priority would also be destroyed. Intellect has
been previously nearly explained.

126.—What is left, will now be explained. Knowledge is
two-fold, wrong notion and right notion.

127.—A knowledge, which manifests something where this
something is not present, is a wrong notion." Of this there
are two kinds, mistake and doubt.

128.—The former is the certain knowledge of a thing where
such a thing is not present, as for instance, the notion of the
soul in the body, or yellow colour in a shell.

129.—Doubt** is a knowledge in question, whether for in-

87.—Comm.—If a knowledge, which manifests something, is trans-
ferred to something else, and represents itself at the same time as
certain, it is error; for instance, if the knowledge of the soul in such
sentences as: "I am reddish," &c., is transferred to the body, or yel-
low colour to a shell.

88.—Comm.—Doubt is a knowledge, determined by the contradic-
tory absence or presence (of a predicate) in one and the same subject.

* Their substrate is: near or far with regard to space.
stance a thing is a man or a trunk. A knowledge which does not manifest something, where this something is not present, but, which manifests this something alone, is certitude.

130.—The apprehension of absence and presence in one and the same object is doubt. The cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute, &c."

(The Bengalee Translation explains this as follows: A doubt is a knowledge such as this: Is this a man or a trunk? This kind of doubt is called a doubt of four extremes (ভারব্যাপারিত্য) because there are four extremes, viz. the notions of a man and non-man, and the notions of trunk and non-trunk. The contradictory notions of presence and absence are called extremes. If it is questioned, whether the mountain is fiery or not fiery, the doubt is, whether one of the two extremes fiery or not fiery abides in the mountain.)

89.—Comm.—There are three causes of doubt.

1. Cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute which is found in two extremes, for instance the notion of height, found in trunk and non-trunk, as if it is doubted, whether this is a trunk or not a trunk.

2. Cause of doubt is a non-general (special) attribute. (Non-general is a predicate, which is not found in the subject of the two extremes;) for instance, if the notion of sound, which is separated from the notions of eternal and non-eternal, (that is the notion of sound is not the general notion, under which eternal and non-eternal are comprehended) is conceived in sound, the doubt arises, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal.

3. Cause of doubt is contradiction (of two extremes,) but not the contradiction, referring to the mere sound alone, because a knowledge of a general predicate of sound is the cause of certitude only; for instance, if it is said: Sound is eternal, sound is not eternal, but the knowledge of the two extremes, which is produced by sound. The doubt takes place by the mind.

In the same way, if there is a doubt, that a knowledge is proved, there is also a doubt with regard to the object of the knowledge.

In the same way, if there is a doubt with regard to a subject in its
131.—Defect produces wrong notion, excellence right notion. There are different kinds of defects as bile, distance, &c.

132.—Excellence as regards perception is the intercourse of a sense with what is determinable, determined by its determination. Excellence as regards inference

invariable connexion with a predicate, there is also a doubt with regard to the predicate. But the cause of doubt is the knowledge of a subject, determined by an attribute, or the intercourse of a sense with such a subject.

90.—Comm.—Defect is the cause of wrong notion, and excellence of right notion. Defects as for instance, bile, &c. are only of a contingent nature; for their causality is established by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya and Vyatiréka; if the defect is there, the notion is wrong, if the defect is not there, the notion is not wrong). That excellence is the cause of right notion, on the other hand, is established by simple inference; for right notion is produced by a cause, different from the general cause of knowledge, because it is a knowledge that is produced, as wrong notion is. It cannot be said, 'that the absence of defects is the cause.' In the sentence, "the shell is yellow," bile is the defect; from this the right notion of shell is not obtained, because there is no authority to ascribe it more to the one member of the alternative than to the other, and it is right to assume a causality from one excellence in preference to a causality from the absence of numerous defects.

Nor can it be said: 'Let excellence even be granted, there is no perception of white colour in a shell, as bile is an obstacle to it; therefore the causality of the absence of defects, as for instance of bile, is necessary. Of what use is then the assumption of a causality of excellence?' for in this case the causality of excellence is proved by the argument of a general affirmative and negative. In the same way it is well said, that the absence of excellence is the cause of error.

What are those defects? "Bile," &c. Sometimes bile is a defect, when a yellow colour is mistaken for a white one (as in jaundice) sometimes distance, for instance if the moon, sun, &c. by their distance are mistaken for small bodies.
133.—Is the consideration connected with the place (subject of conclusion) which is determined by the conclusion. Excellence, as regards comparison, is the knowledge of similar objects, derived from words possessed of power.

134.—Excellence as regards verbal knowledge is the right notion of consistency or of the intention. Right notion is a knowledge without error."

135.—Or right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind and accordingly predicated. A knowledge which is undetermined, is neither right notion nor error;

136.—For that which is without determination and determinability is not comprehended under any relation. Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt."

91.—Comm.—"Right knowledge is a knowledge without error." As here the objection might be made, that,—if at the perception of silver and tin, both, silver and tin, are considered as silver,—also on the part of the silver a wrong notion is produced, because that knowledge is not free from error, a second definition is given: "Right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind, and accordingly predicated." Here it must be understood, that, under which relation the right notion is perceived, under the same relation must be perceived that which is determined, and also the determination. Hence it is not against this definition, if a jar, &c. is comprehended by the same conjunction as the two halves of which it is composed, if this is the case, any thing without determination is no right notion, as there is no general notion, by which it is determined. A notion which is undetermined, is neither true, nor false.

92.—Comm.—"Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt."

Namely, the Mīmāṃsakas say, that right notion is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus* a knowledge is a right notion by its

* Col. Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 296. Next to him (Bhaṭṭa Kūmārīśīwā) is a writer usually cited under the title of Guri, more rarely under the designation of Prabhākara. His work I had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present
137.—The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition is the non-apprehension of what goes astray and the apprehension of the own manifestation. (Bengalee Tr. They state the object of knowledge, for instance of a jar, to be three-fold, viz. the jar, the soul, and the knowledge of a jar &c. in connexion with that which is to be proved, because by the means of object of the knowledge, for instance of a jar, first the jar, further the soul, and lastly, the knowledge of the jar in connexion with that which is to be proved, form one and the same knowledge, which may be pronounced in the sentence: “I know the jar,” which means, I have a knowledge, which manifests a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Bhaṭṭas* knowledge is beyond the senses: the notion (clāsa) of knowledge, produced by that knowledge (which is beyond the senses) is perceptible; by this (notion) knowledge is inferred (B. T. According to the Bhaṭṭas knowledge, without determination as well as with determination, is beyond the senses; but after the knowledge of a jar there arises the notion of what is known with reference to the jar, &c. then the notion of what is known, viz. by me the jar is known, is perceived, and lastly, “I have a knowledge of a jar,” &c. determined by the notion of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Murārimisras knowledge is obtained by reflection (B. T. the Murārimisras say, that after the knowledge

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essay, and he is known to me chiefly from reference and quotations; as in Mādhava’s summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Kumārila, and in the text and commentary of Śāstra-dīpikā, where his positions are canvassed with those of numerous other writers.

* Id. p. 297. The annotations (Vārtika to the Commentary of the Śāstras of the Mīmāṃsa, by Sahasāswāmi) are by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, who is the great authority of the Mīmāṃsākā school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, Bhaṭṭa, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Sahasā’s gloss, often delivers a different interpretation, &c. . . . . . Id. 298. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India. He was predecessor of Sāṅkara Aχārya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the Vēdas. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddhists, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy. . . . . . The age of Kumārila, anterior to Sāṅkara, and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the Buddhists, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand year.
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sion of what does not go astray; sometimes doubt is removed by discussion."

of a jar, &c. there is the reflection, I know the jar, by this there is a knowledge, manifesting the knowledge of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of all of them this or the other knowledge is right notion by a knowledge, manifesting this or the other knowledge; for knowledge is to be ascertained by its object; therefore the object is to be known by the knowledge of knowledge. This opinion is blamed in the text: "Right notion is not perceived by itself," &c. If right notion of knowledge were comprehended by itself, there would be no doubt with regard to knowledge, produced by practice; for if in this case knowledge is known, also its right notion (evidence) is known; hence how could doubt exist? On the other hand, if knowledge is not known, then, in the absence of the knowledge of something determined by an attribute, how can doubt arise? Therefore right knowledge is an object of inference; for instance: This knowledge is right notion, because it is produced by the agreement of those who discuss on it. That, which is not of such a kind, is not of such a kind, as wrong notion. For instance: This knowledge, the general notion of earth, is right notion, because the notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of earth, is found in that which has smell. In the same manner this knowledge of water is right notion, because the general notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of water, is found in that which has viscidity.

93.—Comm.—"The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition (Vyāpti, the invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate) is the non-apprehension of what goes astray, and the apprehension of what does not go astray; sometimes a doubt is removed by discussion."

The invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate (Vyāpti) has been before explained, but not the means of its apprehension. This is now done in the text, viz. "The cause," &c. 1st, The non-apprehension of what goes astray* is the cause, since, if this apprehension takes place, the general proposition (Vyāpti) cannot be apprehended. The apprehension of what does not go astray (of similar instances) is the

* Vyabhichāra: a reason goes astray, if it is connected with any subject, where the conclusion (major term) cannot abide. Sahāchāra: a reason does not go astray, if it has similar instances, in which the conclusion abides.
138.—Specification is an attribute which is contained in the conclusion, but not in the reason. Its chief points will now be explained.

cause, as proved by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya Vyastireka, if there are similar instances, there is also the general proposition; if there are no similar instances, there is no general proposition). Repetition (the repetition of similar instances) is no cause, since, although there be not an apprehension of what goes astray, yet the general proposition (Vyapti) is sometimes at once apprehended. Sometimes, however, repetition is required to remove a doubt with reference to what goes astray. Where by repetition the doubt does not disappear, discussion is required to guard against the contrary supposition. For instance, if there is a doubt, whether smoke be not also found with something, where there is no fire, this doubt is removed by the consideration, that fire and smoke are in the relation of cause and effect. If this mountain is without fire, it must also be without smoke, because an effect is not without its cause. If it is sometimes without cause, it is an effect without cause. In this case doubt arises, which is to be removed from its obstacle, in such a manner: If an effect is without cause, fire is not the invariable means to produce smoke, or food to satisfy hunger. Where doubt does not of itself arise, there discussion is not necessary. With this view it is said in the text: “Sometimes doubt is removed by discussion.”

94.—Comm.—“Specification is an attribute, which is contained in its conclusion, (major term) but not in its reason.”

* If this definition is correct, then in the inference: “This man is black, because he is the son of Mittra,” the notion of the origin of black colour by her eating bad vegetables, would be no specification, because

* The Bengalee Translator says in Illustration of this: For instance if hearth is the subject (minor term), smoke the conclusion (major term), and fire the reason (middle term), then is wet fuel the specification with regard to the faulty reason, viz. fire, because it is the condition of smoke, but not of fire; for where there is smoke, there is necessarily also wet fuel; but where there is fire, there is not necessarily wet fuel, as for instance a fiery iron-ball; on the other hand, if there is a faultless reason, for instance, if mountain is the subject, fire the conclusion, and smoke the reason, there is no specification, because the attribute, which is a condition of the conclusion, is also a condition of the reason.
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139.—All admissible specifications abide in the same place with the conclusion. Those, which abide in the same place with the reason, go astray with regard to the conclusion.

It is not contained in the conclusion; (black) for blackness is also found in a jar, &c.

Further: In the inference: ‘‘Air is perceptible’’ because it is the site of touch, the notion of proportionate greatness, would be no specification, because perception takes place also with regard to the soul, &c. where there is no greatness.

‘‘Nor would the notion of existence (नास्ति,) be a specification in the inference: ‘‘Destruction is transient from its being a production,’’ because the notion of something transient is also in antecedent negation, and here, without any doubt, is not existence.’

We deny this; for the meaning is, that the specification, which is a condition of the conclusion, as determined by this or that attribute, is not a condition of the reason, as determined by the same attribute; thus for instance the notion of a production by bad vegetables is the condition of the blackness, which is determined by the notion of son of Mittrā. In the same manner is proportionate greatness the condition of the perception, determined by the notion of external things. Thus in the inference: ‘‘Destruction is transient from its being a production,’’ is the notion of existence the condition of the conclusion, as determined by the notion of production.

In a faultless reason, there is no such attribute, viz. something, being a condition of a determined conclusion (major term), while it is not a condition of the reason under the same determination. But in a reason which goes astray, one of the two at least takes place, either that the place of the specification, which is also the place of the conclusion (major term) is the condition of the conclusion and the non-condition of the reason, or that the place, where there is not the specification, which is also the place, determining the absence of the conclusion, is the condition of the conclusion, and the non-condition of the reason.

95.—Comm.—‘‘Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray.’’ That is to say, the assumption of specification is necessary to infer, that the conclusion goes astray, which takes place by the
140.—Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray. It is the opinion of the Vaiséshikas that verbal specification going astray. Therefore, where there is a specification which is the condition of a conclusion without any further addition, there by the going astray of the specification which has no further addition, may be concluded also the going astray of the conclusion. For instance, where it is concluded that something smokes, from fire, there fire (as the reason of smoke) goes astray with regard to smoke, because wet fuel goes astray; for, if the more comprehensive notion goes astray, it is necessary that also the more narrow notion goes astray. But where the specification is of such a kind, as to be a condition of the conclusion (major term), as determined by any attribute (addition) how insignificant soever, there the inference, that the conclusion goes astray, follows from the going astray of the specification in a subject, determined by such an attribute (addition,) for instance, if it is inferred, that this person is black, because he is the son of Mittrá, the notion: “a son of Mittrá” goes astray with regard to blackness, because with regard to the son of Mittrá, goes astray the specification of a product of bad vegetables.

96.—Comm.—“Verbal knowledge and comparison are not different kinds of proof.”

According to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas there are only two kinds of knowledge, viz. perception and inference, verbal knowledge and comparison being included in the latter; for such sentences as: “Drive the cow away by the stick,” or Védæic sentences, depend upon the knowledge of the connexion of the meanings of the words, which are re-collected by the object the speaker has in view, because all the words, which form a sentence, have intention, consistency, &c., as in the sentence: “Bring the jar,” &c.—Or: These meanings of words are mutually connected, because the words have consistency, &c., like similar meanings of words. The same is the case with regard to comparison. When a Gayal has been perceived, the word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal, because the old have attached this meaning to it, no other kind of proof being admitted, as the word of cow is the cause of the power with
knowledge and comparison, as included in inference, are not different kinds of proof.

141. — This is not correct, as, independent of inference, verbal knowledge and comparison are intelligible.

142. — The connexion of the subject with the predicate is two-fold," one positive and the other negative; the first has been explained, the other will now be explained.

reference to what is determined by the notion of cow. Or: The word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal on the ground, that trustworthy people have attached this meaning to it. By this inference the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal is evident, viz. because there is a connexion of a general proposition with a minor term.

This opinion is blamed in the text in the words: "This is not correct;" for without the knowledge of a general proposition (of the Vya\(\text{\textregistered}\)pti) an understanding is possible from the mere words. There is no proof, that after the hearing of words a general proposition is always necessary. Moreover, if it is assumed, that a general proposition (Vya\(\text{\textregistered}\)pti) is always required with reference to the understanding of words, why then is it not admitted, that it is necessary to assume a verbal knowledge with reference to the understanding of an inference?

97. Comm. — "The connexion of the subject with the predicate is twofold."

Namely, there are three kinds of inference, viz. only affirmative, only negative, and affirmative and negative at the same time.

1. The only affirmative kind takes place, when there are no dissimilar instances with regard to the conclusion (major term, that is to say, when the major term is not excluded from any other notion) for instance, if it is argued, that something is an object of knowledge, because it can be named; for here is a dissimilar instance impossible, as every thing is an object of knowledge.

If it is said, 'that the only affirmative kind is impossible, because it is separated from all other notions' (that is to say, such a notion is separated from all other notions, and cannot therefore be connected with all.) We deny this; for what is separated, is common to all, and this is
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143.—The necessity of the absence of the conclusion where there is an absence of the reason, is the second."

merely affirmative. Moreover, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether,* &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that ether, space, &c. are not found anywhere, so it cannot be proved with regard to such notions as knowledge, &c.)

2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar subjects (of conclusion) for instance in the inference: Earth is distinguished from all the other elements, because it is possessed of smell;† for in this case there is no similar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.

3. Affirmative and negative inference take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances (of the conclusion or major term) for instance: This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there are similar instances, as a hearth, &c., and dissimilar instances, as a lake, &c.

98.—Comm.—The cause of the negative conclusion is the knowledge of a general negative proposition. (Vyatirakavyapti). For this reason the text defines the notion of a general negative proposition: "A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion" (major term) that is to say, a general negative is the absence of the reason, which (absence) is included in the absence of the conclusion (major term). Here it must be understood, by what connexion, at what place, and by what notion the more extensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows: by what connexion and notion the more comprehensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distinctive relation, &c. (see p. 7.) there

* Pratityogi is that of which there is a negation (it is the contradictory opposition to its own negation) for instance a jar is the Pratityogi of the negation of a jar. Aprotityogi is a thing, of which there is no negation, as for instance space, which is everywhere, and of which it cannot anywhere be said, there is no space.

† Here earth the minor term, the conclusion the distinction from what is different from earth, and the reason smell.
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144.—Presumption* is not considered as another proof, because it is included in negative inference. Happiness, the object of desire of all worlds, is produced by virtue.

145.—Unhappiness the effect of vice, is abhorred by all conscious beings. The desire of happiness and of freedom from unhappiness arises from the knowledge of either."

146.—There is a desire of obtaining the means for those ends (avoiding misery and gaining happiness) if there is knowledge

follows the absolute negation of the notion of the other elements by the negation of the negation of smell; but where the more extensive notion of the other elements is comprehended by the relation of identity, there also is the negation of the other elements expressed by the relation of identity. This is reciprocal negation. And lastly, when by the relation of conjunction for instance the more extensive notion of fire with regard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, is a tank also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of conjunction. Here is the cause of the apprehension of the general negative proposition the knowledge of what agrees with a general negative. Others say: "By means of the negative the general affirmative is understood, but the knowledge of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative the general proposition is understood, there it is called a negative inference. The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first evident from single things, as a jar, &c. and afterwards it is established for the notion of earth" &c.

99.—Comm.—"The desire of freedom from unhappiness and of obtaining happiness arises from the knowledge of either."

Desire is threefold, viz. the desire whose object is the last end, (sumnum bonum, which is not the means to accomplish another object,) the desire whose object is a means (for something else) and the desire of action.

1. The desire whose object is the last end. The last end (कल्याण) is

* Vid. Col. M. E. Vt. p. 303. Presumption (artha-patti, one of the five modes of proof of the Mīmāṃsākāra) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proven.
of these means. The wish to act is the desire determined by what may be accomplished by action.

147.—The cause of this is the knowledge of what may be accomplished by acts and what may accomplish the object of a desire. The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle."

148.—According to others the cause of the wish to act is the knowledge of what does not produce that abhorrence. The cause of aversion is the knowledge of what accomplishes things that are abhorred. Endeavour is of three kinds according to philosophers, viz. activity, cessation from activity and vital endeavour.

149.—The wish to act, the knowledge of what may be ac-

happiness and freedom from unhappiness. The cause of the desire of the last end is the knowledge of the same; therefore it is of itself the object of man; for it follows from the definition, that any thing, which, when known, is desired by its own nature, is the object of man, and its full meaning is, that it is the object of a desire, not dependent upon another desire.

2. The desire whose object* is a means (for something else.) The cause of this is the knowledge of what accomplishes an object of desire.

3. The desire of action is the desire, whose object is an effect to be accomplished by action, which (desire) is determined by the notion of what may be accomplished by action. This depends upon an apprehension such as this: I shall accomplish cooking by action. The cause of the desire of action is the knowledge, that an object may be obtained by action, and the knowledge, that the object of desire may be obtained. Therefore there is no desire of action with reference to rain, because it cannot be obtained by action.

100.—Comm.—"The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle."

* The object of a desire, independent of any other desire, is the last object; this is happiness and deliverance from unhappiness; for both are not desired for the sake of any thing else, but for their own sake. An object of a desire, depending upon another desire, is a secondary object; such are for instance, the fruition of love, eating, the removal of the unhappiness of another, the refraining from desires, &c.
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complished by acts and what accomplishes such or such a desire, and the perception of the material causes produce activity.

150.—Cessation from activity rises from aversion produced by the knowledge of what accomplishes abhorred objects.

151.—Vital endeavour is constant; it transcends the perception of the senses;

152.—It is the cause of the flux and reflux of the vital airs in the body. Gravity abides in earth and water, it is imperceptible to the senses;

153.—It is transient in what is transient, and eternal in what is eternal. It is the non-intimate cause of the action which is called falling.

154.—Fluidity is twofold, innate and derived from a cause; the first abides in water, the second in earth and light;

155.—In the atoms of water it is eternal, in every other thing transient. Derived fluidity is produced in clarified butter and similar substances when heated by the union with fire.

156.—Fluidity is the cause of trickling and instrumental cause in a collection (heap). Viscidity abides in water; it is eternal in atoms, non-eternal in a compound.

For instance, there is no desire of action with regard to honey, mixed with poison, because the strong aversion is an obstacle.

(Material or intimate causes are those substances by means of which a desire is accomplished; for instance the material causes of a sacrifice are the presence of ghee, wood, rice, &c.)

101.—Comm.—"It is constant;" which means, it lasts as long as life does.

102.—Comm.—"It transcends the perception of the senses; for the flux and reflux of the vital airs, when stronger than usually, is accomplished by endeavour, for instance a stronger inspiration (this is evident from perception). If this is the case, then from the inference, that the flux of the vital airs is accomplished by endeavour (for there must be a cause of it) and further from the inadmissibility of an endeavour that is perceived (for in the ordinary function of respiration, &c. it is not perceived) it follows, that the flux of vital airs is accomplished by an
157.—By the abundance of this (viscidity) in oil combustion is favoured. There are three kinds of faculty, viz. velocity, elasticity and memory.

158.—Velocity abides only in bodies, and is twofold, either produced by action or by velocity." Elasticity is according to some only found in earth, according to others in the four first elements.

159.—It is imperceptible to the senses, and is sometimes the cause of vibratory motion." The faculty which has the name of memory, is found only in sentient beings; it is imperceptible to the senses.

160.—Its cause is certitude without inattention." Memory is called also the cause of remembrance and of recognition.

endeavour, which transcends the perception of the senses. This is vital endeavour.

103.—Comm.—"It is twofold, either produced by action, or by velocity." Velocity in an arrow arises from action produced by conjunction without noise, (vid. v. 118,) hence from the destruction of a former action arises another action. In the same manner all the subsequent actions must be considered. And without velocity, since one action is an obstacle to another, the destruction of a former action, and the production of a subsequent one were impossible. Where velocity is effected by velocity, for instance, where the velocity in a jar is effected by the velocity of its half, there is velocity, produced by velocity.

104.—Comm.—Elasticity is proved for instance by the fact, that a branch which is attracted, returns to its former position, when released. The opinion of some, that elasticity abides in the four first elements, is not supported by any evidence.

105.—Comm.—"Its cause is certitude without inattention." If it is said: 'Is certitude, different from inattention, rather not the cause of remembrance? And if this is the case, let us say, that knowledge in general is the cause of memory.'

We object; for as there is no authority of assuming an alternative, it is evident, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory. Moreover, with reference to inattention, the assumption of
161.—Fate is twofold, merit and demerit. Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained. It is a practice of ablutions in the Gangâ, &c. and of sacrifices, &c.

162.—It is thought permissible by the contact with the water of the Karmanâs. Demerit is the cause of hell, &c. and is produced by blamable works.

163.—It may be destroyed by expiations, &c. Both qualities abide in living creatures. They are produced by desire and destroyed likewise by knowledge.

memory is complicated (superfluous) and hence it is proved, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory.

The proof of this is given in the words: “It is called the cause of remembrance and recognition.” That is to say, memory produces remembrance and recognition; therefore memory is assumed, for it is impossible, that a former perception produces, without intercourse, remembrance, because a cause is impossible, if it is not in respective intercourse with either of the two (remembrance or recognition.) Nor can it be said, 'that, as memory, determined by the category of identity, is the cause of recognition, remembrance is obtained, because recognition is produced by memory;' for there is no cause for this.

106.—Comm.—“Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained.”

That is to say, it is the means of obtaining the happiness of heaven and all other happiness, and of bodies fit to enjoy the happiness of heaven.

107.—Comm.—“In living creatures,” because merit and demerit cannot be assigned to God.

108.—Comm.—“They are produced by desire, and destroyed likewise by knowledge.”

“By desire,” that is to say, if good or bad acts are done by one who has perfect knowledge, they are of no effect. “Likewise by knowledge.” “Likewise” is said to indicate enjoyment.

* But how (it may be objected) can the knowledge of truth destroy merit and demerit? for this (the destruction of merit and demerit)

* The name of a small river, which separates the territory of Benarces, Kâsî, from Bihâr.—Vid. Lassen’s Ind. Alterth. Vol. I. p. 130.
164.—There are two kinds of sound, inarticulate and articulate; the first is produced by a drum, &c. and the latter, as ka and other letters, by the contact of the throat with the palate.

165.—Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear." Some say, its production takes place like a succession of waves.

would be contrary to the passage (of the Yoga-sūtra): "An action, of which the effect is not experienced (which has not produced its due consequence in the soul of the agent, viz. happiness, if a good action, and unhappiness, if a bad one) does not perish even in a hundred crores of Kalpas." If this is the case, then the destruction of merit and demerit takes place in this manner, that a person who knows the truth, experiences the consequences of all his works at once by all his bodies." (viz. all the bodies which he is to assume in future births.)

There, however, "to experience the consequences of works," is only given as an example of the various ways, in which works are destroyed according to the Vedas. How could otherwise works be destroyed by expiations? &c. It is said (in the Bhagavadgītā.) "The fire of knowledge consumes all works." And in the Sruti: "All his works perish, when the general and individual souls are known."

If it is said: 'In this case there cannot exist for him who knows truth, the state of the body, nor happiness, unhappiness, &c. as by knowledge all works are destroyed,' we object; for only the works different from those which are commenced, are destroyed; for only the work which is the cause of the enjoyment of this or that body, has been commenced.

109.—Comm.—"Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear."

Abiding in the ether, means, that the ether is its intimate cause. As a sound, when distant, is not perceived, it is said, "in the ear." As it may be doubted, how a sound, produced in the space determined by a drum, &c., is produced in the ear, it is said: "Its production takes place like a succession of waves," its sound produces another, determined by a space, external to the first, and the second produces again a third, and so on. In this manner it is perceived, when it is gradually produced in the ear.
166.—According to others, like the bud of the Kadamba plant." From the knowledge," that the letter ka is produced, and that it is destroyed, non-eternity of sound would follow.

167.—The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon the perception of general knowledge." "This is the medicine," such and other sentences depend upon general knowledge.

110.—Comm.—"Like the bud of the Kadamba plant." In this manner: From the first sound ten sounds are produced in the ten divisions of space. Hence ten other sounds are produced. As this assumption is complicated, it is said in the text: "according to some."

111.—Comm.—"From the knowledge," &c. To remove the objection, that sound is not produced, because it is eternal, it is said: "From the knowledge," &c.

112.—Comm.—If it be objected: 'The eternity of sound follows from the fact, that this letter ka is recognised as that letter ka,' the text gives the answer: The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon community of class,' &c. Here is the object of recognition, the community of class of this and that object, but not the identity of this and that individual; because it is contrary to the knowledge which has been mentioned. If this is the case, there cannot be a mistake with regard to those two perceptions (viz. sound is not eternal, and this is that sound).
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i. 22, for in read of.
xii. 17, for with read to.
id. 19, for with read to.
xxii. 3, for faculties read modifications.
ii. 23, for drishtanta read drishtanta.
2. 15, for negation read affirmation.
3. 35, for सम्ब उ read समब
4. 2, for individuality read separatedness.
id. 3, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.
id. 4, for volition read endeavour.
id. 31, for संवेदनविधानेश्व read संवेदनविधानेश्व
6. 18, for with read to.
7. 14, for with read to.
12. 26, for after earth add and mind.
id. 29, for सच read सचस
13. 7, for individuality read separatedness.
id. 8, for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority.
id. 16, for volition read endeavour.
id. 22, for volition read endeavour
id. 22, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.
16. 26, for is read in
id. 35, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.
17. 1, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.
19. 31, for भाग read भाग
23. 28, for such read touch.
26. 4, for individuality read separatedness.
id. 5, for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority.
27. 4, for with read to.
44. 1, for MIMÁNSSIKAS read MIMÁNSSAKAS.
51. 1-2, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority.
53. 6, for ditto read ditto.
id. 8, for ditto read ditto.
id. 17, for ditto read ditto.
54. 1, for natural read innate.

N.B. The translation counts one verse more than the original, as the Invocation, forming the first verse of the former, has not been taken into the text of the latter.