BIBLIOTIURCA INDICA: COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS ss ननित abies oases, Epiven ny Dr. E. Roen.

ण पत ९८? ५७१ th he tlt de ७ ०७.७9७ सो PIPPI

Vou. 1X.—Nos. 32 ann 35.

वि ए्वनाथपच्याननकृतसिदात्मुत्तावनीषहित- भाषापरिष्ध्दः ¶

DIVISION OF TITE CATEGORIES OF TIT NYA'YA PILILOSOPITY, ` WITH A COMMENTARY एष VISWANATIIA PANCIIANANA, EDITED, AND THE TEXT TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSCRIT, By Dr. E. [ठक

ती RA NAR RARE RAANRARMAAH..

CALCUTTA:

PRINTED Ny J, THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION URESS.

1090,

BIBLIOTIECA INDICA;

A

COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS

PUBLISHED UNDER TIE PATRONAGE OF THE Mon. Court of Mirectors of the Rast Invia Company, AWD TNE GUPRRINTRNDENCE OF THE ;

ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL.

पाकहा ny Dr. E. Réer.

चि श्वनाथपन्चाननकृतसिचान्मुक्तावलीसहित- भाषापरिङ्केदः ¶

DIVISION CATEGORIES OF TILE NYA’YA PHILOSOPHY, WITT A COMMENTARY VISWANATIIA PANCITANANA. EDITED, AND THE TEXT TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSCRIT,

By Dr. E. [ठा FASCICULUS I.

APE

CALCUTTA :

PRINTED BY उ, THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS. 1850. |

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PREFACE.

Tur Asiatic Society accepted alrendy in 1847 my offer to publish the text of the Nyfya with a translation, but only the Introduction to this work appeared in the Journal of the Socicty, the MS. of the translation having meanwhile been lost (vide Journal of the Asiatic Society, July, 1847). The present translation is based upon a rough copy of the former, which I afterwards found among my papers. The notes are entirely new, and the introduction has received so many addi- tions, that it is almosta new casay. The Sanscrit text, in ac- cordance with an enlarged plan, is now accompanied with its commentary ; it will thus form another cdition of the one pub- lished by the Committce of Public Instruction, which is out of print, and satisfy thercby a desideratum, long felt in the Government Sanscrit Colleges, where the Bhisha Paricchéda is

e

introduced as a class-book.

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wel सिद्वान्तमुक्तावलीसदितभाषापरिक्छेदः |

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were ----~ -

भाषापरिष्छदः ॥

NFAT ॥ ॐ नमो गणेशाय ॥ नूतनजलधरसचये गोपवधूरोदुक्रलचाराय | मिङ्खान्तमृक्रावली॥ गङ्का चरमं | ॐ नमा गणेशाय | चृडामणोकृतविपुन्न॑लयीछतवा सुकिः । भवे भवतु भवाय सीलाताण्डवपर्डितिः ॥ afar i | मिजनिर्ितकारि कावलीमतिषंचिप्न चिरन्तन क्रिमिः । विषदीकरवाणि काकान्ननु राजवद्‌ यावश्नम्वर्‌ः ॥ ग्रन्धप्रशं खनेम तप्प्रतिपाद्यकथनं ॥ azar गृणग्ज्फिता सुकृतिनां सत्कमाणां ज्ञापिका घत्सामान्यविगेषनित्यभिलिता भावपरकौ ज्वला | विष्णावक्तसि विश्चनायृतिना बिद्धान्तमृष्कावली विन्यस्ता मनसे मुदं वितनृतां सदयक्तिरेषा चिरं ॥ विघ्नविघाताय रतं मङ्गलं भि यजिक्ताये मिबभाति। मूतनेत्यादि ॥ ननु मङ्गलं न विप्तष्व॑सं भतिन वा

। |

श भाषाः तसे नमः छष्णाय संसारमशे्दस्य Asa ॥

सिङ्का० समार्चिं प्रतिं कारणं विनापि awe नासिकादीनां ग्रन्थे निविवत्रपरिसमा-भिदभंनारिति चेत्‌ । न । शरविगीतदबिष्टाचारविषयलेम मङ्गलस्य सफलत्वे faz ततर च फलजिज्जासा्यां सम्भवति इषएटफलकत्येऽङ्‌ ्ट- फलकन्यनाया अन्या्यलात्‌ उपख्ितत्वाच । समा्ि- रेव fe फलं wea इत्थञ्च यत्र aye न gaa तत्रापि saat तत्‌ करते । यत च स्यि aya समाक्निनं इश्यते तेज बलवत्तरा fant fan- wre वा वेध्यं) प्रचरख्णारेव मलतत्तरविघ्रनिरा- करणकारणरतं | fandag मङ्गलस्य दारमित्याञ्जः। WATE AFA fansia एव फलं | समात्निम्त्‌ बुद्धि- प्रतिभादिकारणकलापात्‌। न च खतः सिङ विप्नविरद- ` वता शेतभङ्गलसख निष्फललापत्तिरिति are car पततोः विप्नाशङ्कया तदाचरणात्‌) ada निष्टाषर- णाच। भ च त्य fread तद्वाधकभिष्टाचारानु- सितवेद्‌ प्रामाष्यापत्तिरिति वा्यं। सति चिन्नि तता- wea वेद वाधितलात्‌। अत एव wae शतप्राय- farra निष्फलवतेऽपि भ तेद्ाधकवेद्‌ा प्रामाण्यं । मङ्ग wy ufandafang कारणं । विप्नत्न॑सविेषे च विभायथकस्तवपाटारि। कचिख विघ्रा्यन्ताभाव एव समाततिमाधनं । प्रतिबन्धकसंसमाभावसयैव कार्यजनक-

Halo fagre

द्रवयं YUN कम्म सामान्यं स॒विशेषकं।

त्वात्‌ । इत्थञ्च नाख्तिकादिकतगन्धेषु लनान्तरोयग- ब्रलजन्यद्‌ रि त््व॑मः खतः सिद विन्नात्यन्ताभावे वा- सोति म व्यभिचार cars: wu संषारेति। संसार एवं AWE ठचर्एस्य वीजाय । एतेन Hat प्रमाणमपि afid भवति। तथाडि । यथया घटादिकं aaa तया दित्यङ्कुरादिकमपि। न चख तत्‌ करटलमस्रदा- दीनां सम्भवतीत्यतस्तत्‌कलंवेमे्रसिद्धिः । न चख भरी राजन्यलेन क स्ेजन्य॑त्साधकेम anfara इति वाच्यं । श्रयोजकलात्‌ । ममतु waa काययैवेम काकार णभाव एव अनुकूलतकंः । दयावाभूमी अन- यन्देव एक We विश्वस क्ता Yate Arar इत्या द्यच्रागमा अ्रणनुमस्ेयाः॥

पदाथानामुदेभमाद । Tal गृणा इत्यादि । सप्त-

गस्याभावलकयनारेव Gat भावलं प्राप्न तेम भावलेन

एयगृपन्यासा म छतः । एते च पदाथा वेभेषिकप्र- fagr मैयायिकानामणविरद्धाः । प्रतिपादिते वमेव भाये। Wa एव उपमानचिन्तामणे सप्तपदा्थभिन्न-

तया गक्निसादूश्धयारतिरिकपदाथैलमाशङ्धितं। 7s

कयमेत एव पदाथा; जकतिसाङृश्यादीनामणतिरिक्त waar) तयारि। मण्ादि समवहितेन afar दादा न जनते तनच्छन्येन त जन्यते । aa मनण्णादिना

४

भाषा? समवायस्तथाऽभाषः पदाथाः सुप्त की्तिताः॥ ९॥ चित्यपेजा मशङ्धोमकाला PTS PAT मनः!

fagre वक दाहामुकूला शक्तिर्मौ श्वते उक्तेजकेन मण्याश्चप- सररेन स जन्यत fa Heya) एवं सादु श्यमष्यति- fom: पदाथैः। तद्धि न षट्‌ पदार्यैष्वमर्भवति सामान्ये ऽपि war) यथा भालं नित्यं तया चरशलमपीति साबु प्रतीतेः । नायभावे । स्वेन प्रतीयमानला- ` दिति Aq न । मण््ाद्यभावविभिष्टवद्यारेदंाहारिकं प्रतिं खातच्येख मण्भावारेरेववा रेत लकम्पमेय सा- WTO अनम्त्नक्तितेप्रागभावध्न॑सकस्पमानैाचित्यात्‌। म arava सति गरिप्रतिबस्धकषङ्भावेऽपि कथे दार दूति वाच्यं । उक्तेजकाभावविजिष्टमणिसामान्याभावस्य Tara । सादृण्मपि म पदार्थामारं किन्‌ तञ्चि- ga सति aganardad । यथया wefraqa सति च्द्रगताहादकला दि मलत मुखे चन्रमा दूष fafan ९ ॥ zaife विभजते । faafafa । एतामि a4 x- व्याणि cad: । नम्‌ इव्यतजाते किं apis महि तजर प्रत्य प्रमाणं चुतजतुप्रखतिषु इव्यलागरहादिति चेत्‌ । म । काग्येसमवायिकार णतावच्छंदकतया स॑या- wea विभागस्य वा समतवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया तत्सिद्धिरिति a मन्‌ quai eA: कते नोक्तं!

MMe RANEY ऽथ गुणा ST रसो MARA: परं ॥ २॥ .. रपः संख्या परिमितिः vay ततः परं । संयोगश्च विभागश्च परलन्चापरत्वकं ॥ ३ ॥ न्धिः सुखं दु:खमिच्छा दभा यत्ना गुरुत्वकं । द्रवत्वं खेदसंस्कारावदष्टं शब्द एव च ॥ ४॥ SAI AAAI तथा । ` प्रसारणच्च गमनं कम््ाण्येतानि पच्च च ॥ ५॥ भ्रमणं रो चनं स्यन्द ना्ज्वलनमेव ष्च |

fagre तद्धि प्रत्ये हाते । तख च सूपवच्वात्‌ क्याव्ता च Tad तश्च गन्धश्ून्यलात्‌ म एयिवी। नीलदूपव्वा ख म जलादिकं । तप्मत्यके चालाकनिरपेकं चुः कारणं दूति चेत्‌ । न। ्रावण्छकतेजाऽभावेनापपननो दर थाभ्तर- HUMANA अरन्यालात्‌ | सूपवन्ाप्रतीतिस्त॒ BAST | KUTAAAM A BWerarqa4rcargi ya भान्ि-

` रेव । तमसाऽतिरिकलेऽनन्तावयवादि कल्पमानारवश्च स्यात्‌ । ada यथा तेजखन्तभौवस्तया वच्यते ॥ गृणन्‌ विभजते । श्रय गृणा दति । एते गृणखतु- विवशतिषष्यकाः कणादेन कणष्ठतखनरब्देन च cian: | aa गणलादिकजातिभिद्धि रये वच्यते ॥ २॥२॥४॥ atte विभजते । उत्छेपणमिति । कमांलजातिम्तु प्रत्यक्तशिद्धा । एवमुलेपणलादि कमपि । नन्वत्र भग-

भाराः

fagte

९

तीग्गमनमप्यचर गमनादेव सभ्यते ॥ द्‌ ॥ सामान्यं दिविध प्राक्त परच्चापरमेव च । द्व्यादिचिकव्रत्निसतु सत्ता परतयोच्यते ॥ ७॥ परभिन्ना च या जातिः सेवापरतयोच्यते।

णारिकमपि पञ्चकश्माधिकतया कुता नाक्तगत ATE 1 भ्रमणमित्यादि ॥५॥६॥

सामान्यं निरूपयति । सामान्यमिति | तछ्लकणन्त्‌ fama सत्यमे कसगवेतवतवं । अरनेकममवेततलतै म॑यागारी- aaa उक्तं । fra सतीति । faa सति समवेतल॑ गगणपरिभाणादौनामप्यस्यत उक्र । अमे afar नित्यले मत्यमेकटठज्तिलमल्यन्ताभावे ऽणस्यतेा इत्तिलमामान्यै विहाय समवेतलमिन्युकतं । एकमा त्र- afaahay न जातिः । तयाचाक्तं । व्यक्ते रभेद स्तुस्यलं WET ऽयानवस्थितिः । रूपहानिरसम्बन्मरा जाति- वाधकसङ्गुदः ॥ एकव्यक्निकलाद्‌ाकाशलं न जातिः । तुल्यव्यक्िकलात्‌ घ्टलं waa न जातिदयं। TET

Ware, भूतलं मूत्तलं न जातिः । अमवस्भयात्‌ मा-

मान्यल म जातिः | five व्याटक्सखभावसय रूप- हानिः स्यादतेा विेषलं न जातिः । समवायसम्- न्धाभातात्‌ समवाया न जातिः ॥ द्‌व्यादीति 1 परल अधभ्िक्रदेशदरत्तिलं । sated त्रन्णरेशटठततिलं |

०,

भाषा० दरव्यतवादि कजातिस्तु परापरतयोच्यते॥ ८॥ व्यापकत्वात्‌ परापि स्याद्माप्यत्वादपरापि च। न्त्या नित्यदरव्यवृ्निरव्विशेषः परिकोर्तितः ॥ « ॥ घटादीनां HUA TAIT TUATHA |

fagte षकलजात्यपेलयाऽपिकरेशट्त्तिलात्‌ सत्तायाः ITH ।

एतद्दाधमायेव द्रव्यादि चिकटन्तिरिल्युक्त । तद पे्तया चान्यां जातीगामपरलं । परभिन्ना सन्ताभिन्ना । व्यापकल्ादिति॥७॥८॥

प्रयिवीलाद्यपेचया व्यापकलाद्‌पिकरेभटत्तित्वात्‌ AVANT: UTS । TANIA व्याणलात्‌ wisw- afware द्रव्यलस्यापरववं । तथाच धर्ण्दयममावे- भादुभयमविरुदध ॥

विभेषं freuafa । अनध दतिं। wa वमाने ava इत्यन्य: । यद पेया विशेषा ना सीत्यथः । एक- माजटत्तिरिति फलिताथैः । घरादीरां श्मणुकपरय- न्तानां तज्नदवयवभेदात्‌ परस्परं भेदः | परमाणूनां परस्यरभेदके faig एव । धतु खत एव Baw | तेम aa पिज्ेषाम्तरापे्ता भासीति भावः॥<॥

समवायं दशयति। घटादीनाभिति । अवयवाव- यविनेजीातिष्यक्तगलगृखिनोःफियाक्रियावतेर्भित्यद्र- afanqary यः waa: स समवायः । समवायल

| ८

भाषा० तेषु जातेश्च स॒नन्धः समवायः प्रकीर्तितः ॥ १०॥ अभावस्तु द्विधा संसगोन्येन्याभावमेद्‌तः | fagre ena । ततर प्रमाणन्तु गृणक्रियादिविनिष्टवु- दविरविंगेषण्विभेग्यसम्नन्धविषया विशिष्टबुद्धिलात्‌ दण्डी ` पुरुष इति विशिष्टबुद्धिवत्‌ इत्यनुमानं । तच संया- मादि वाधात्‌ खमवायसिद्धिः। म च खद््पमम्बन्धेन सिद्धसाधनं अथीान्तरं वा । अ्रनन्तखरूपाणणं सम्बन्ध- तल्रकन्यने Aaa) लाघवादेकममवायसिद्धिः। म. च समवायस्येकले वाये रूपवत्ताबद्धि प्रसङ्गः । तच रूपममवायसक्वेऽपि रूपाभावात्‌ । म तेवै WATTS: धचैशिषौ सम्बन्धान्तरं सिष्येदिति avel । तस्य भित्यले' भूतले घटानयनानन्तरमपि घरटाभावबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात्‌ 1 ` घटाभावषम्बन्धस्य तत्र wala ae भि्यलात्‌ 1 अन्यथा रेषाम्तरेऽपि तप्रतीतिर्गं स्यात्‌ । Ff च तच सत्वात्‌ । ममतु मते घटे पाकरक्रतादभायां MAKI गष्टलाश्न तदन्तावबुद्धिः । वैजिच्यस्यामित्यले लननतवैशरिच्छकक्पमे ततैव ATA) इत्यञ्च तत्षत्का- लीगतन्तद्रूतलारिकं तत्तदभावार्मां सम्बन्धः ॥९०॥: अभावं विभजते । अभावस्छिति । अभावलं द्रव्या दिषटकान्योन्याभावलं । सं सगति। संसमाभावान्यान्या- भावरभेदारित्यर्थः ॥ अन्योन्याभावसेकविधलात्तदि-

भाषाः प्रागभावसथा ध्व॑सोऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एव च॥ ११॥

सिद्धा

भागामावात्‌ संसगाभावं विभजते । प्रागभाव इति । संषगाभावलं॑श्रन्योन्याभावसमिन्नाभाववं । अन्यान्या भावत तादाव्यषम्बन्धावदधिश्नप्रतियोागिताकाभावलं | विनाश्भावलं प्रागभावत्वं । लन्याभावलं wad | नि- त्यसंस्गाभावलं wad) यत्र त॒ भूतलाद घटादिकमपसारितं पुनरानोतश्च aa घटकालख मम्बन्पाचरकतया श्रत्यन्ताभावसख्य नित्यवेऽपि चर- काले न घटात्यन्ताभावबृद्धिः । तजर उत्पादविनाभ्- शाली चतुयोाऽयमभाव इति केचित्‌ । अच ष्वंस- प्रागभावयोरधिकरणे मात्यन्ताभाव इति प्राचोन- मतं । श्यामघरे रक्ता नास्तीति रक्रवरे wrar ar- सीति धीख प्रागभावं ष्वंसञ्चावगाहइतेन नतु तदव्य नाभावं । wag तत्र विरोषे मानाभावात्‌ ष्वंसा- दिकालावच्छेदेमात्यन्ताभावा aia इति ats: | मन्वस्तु अभावामामपिकरणत्मकलं लाघवादिति चेत्‌। न । अभन्नाधिकरणात्मकत्वकस्यनामपेच्यातिरि क्रक- क्पनाया एव GNIS । एवच्च श्राधारासेयभा- वाऽणुपपद्यते । एवश्च तक्च्छब्दगन्धरसाद्यभावानां प्रत्थंलमु पपद्यते । aaa त॑त्तदधिकरणानां तन्त- दिद्धिवाणामयराद्चलाद्‌प्रत्यचलं स्वात्‌ । एतेन ज्ञान-

Cc

Yo wee एवं तेविध्यमापन्नः सं सर्गिाव दृष्यते ।

सप्तानामपि साधम्ग्यं शयत्वादिकमु्यते ॥ ९९॥ RUTH पच्च भावा अनेके समवायिनः।

fagr विग्रेषकालविनेषाद्ात्मकलमत्यन्ताभावस्येति प्रवय । प्रत्यखलापन्तेः HAT ॥. | carat पदानां सामये Quady वकत प्रक्रमते । शप्नानाभित्यारि । समाने walt येषां ते सघमाण- सेषां भावः साधम | समाभा wal इति फलिताः । एवं faegr wat aah ते विध्ौणसोषां भावा Gund) विरङ्धा चेमं दति फलिताः । Raa जाम- विषयता । सा च wearin ईरारिज्चानवि- षयतायाः aawrafaaty । एवं अरभिषयलप्रमेय- ata Ary n ce rufa । xa शक्मा मान्ववितेवाणां माधमवै- ममेकलं tyra ममवार्थिलश्च । ` यद्यप्यनेकलवं अभावे sufa तयाणनेकले सति aad wert era । NUIT शनमेकभावटम्िपदायविभाजकापाधिमस्वं w- feared: । तेन . चराद्य naa नाव्यात्निः । सम- aufad समवांयसम्मन्धेम संम्बन्धिल म तु समवायवत्तं | सामान्याद्‌ावभावात्‌। तथाच समवेतटस्िपद्‌ाथेविभा- marae फलितायथेः । तेन नित्यद्रव्येषु ararfa:

* ayafra मिदं

भाषा

fagte

९९

सन्नावन्तस्तयस्त्वादया गुणादिर्निगणक्रियः ॥ ९३ ॥ सामान्यपरिचोनासु सव्वं जात्यादयो मताः |

सावका दति द्रव्यगुणकर्कणां सत्तावत्वमिव्यर्थः गृणारिरिति। यद्यपि गृणक्रिया प्एुन्यलमा दक्षे घटा- दावतिव्याप्तं क्रियाश्ुन्यलश्च गगणादावतिग्यान्नं तथापि गृखवद्‌ ठत्तिधग्मेवत्वं कमांवद ठ्तिपदार्थविभाजकाषा- भिम acd: । म हि चरत्ादिकं gad वा गृणव- कषत्ति कांवद्रत्ति वा किन्तु गृणलादिकं । तया आकाभलादिकन्त्‌ न पदा्विभाजकोापाधिः*॥९२॥ सामान्येति । सामान्यामधिकर लं मामान्यादोना- भित्यथैः ॥ पारिमाण्डष्येति । पारिमाण्डश्थं अ्रणप- रिमाणं। कारणव तद्धिश्नामामित्य्च॑ः | अ्रणुपरि- ae ag कस्यापि कारणं । तद्धि खाश्रयारसद्रग्य- परिमाणारमकं भवेत्‌। we मन समवति । परिमा- रस्य ससमामजातोयाक्छषटपरिमाणजमकलात्‌ । मद- द्‌ारम्ध॑स्य महक्नरत्वत्‌ | श्रणुजन्यस्याणतरवप्रमङ्गा च | एवं परममहत्परिमाणं श्तीदधियषणामान्दं faigr

* यदा जंर्हत्ित्वे ofa कम्हनिने सति वाखुनययनातिद्यम्बाभा- यत्वं विमथितं । awewdrcanhiarcay सता व्येति । afr भेद्गभा निवेशिता इत्यते! म दाषः । उययमण्ान्दतरत्वभाद्‌ा य ततेषा सात्निवारक्ाय जातीति । खभावेऽतिनयाक्निवारराय भावत्वमिति। जण agin सजान्य।प्यजानिद्रव्यलं तब्कनम्यत्वं पच्ानामस्धेन | grata asa पाठः प्रताम्‌ पथाजित्वान्‌ प्ष्ठकानमारालिखिताच्ाधामहितः॥

९९

भाषा० पारिमाण्डल्यमिन्नानां कारणत्वमुद्‌ दतं ॥ Cs tt अन्धथासिद्ि्य्यस्य नियतो पूल्वेवत्तिता । कारणत्वं भयेत्तस्य Al परिकीत्तितं॥ १५॥ समवायिकारणत्व ेयमथाप्यसुमवायिदेतुतवं | एव॑ न्धायनय्नैसतमोयमुक्तं निमित्तत्वं ॥ १६ ॥

सिद्धा ° सेति Arey इदमपि योभिप्र्ये favre न का- Ted । भायमामसामान्यं न प्रत्यासत्तिः । ज्ञायमानं fay नागुभितिकारणं इत्यभिप्रायेण armen KAAS कारणलात्‌ मरत्परिमाणं काला- Vira तष्यापि न कारणलमित्याचा्याणामाभय इत्यन्ये । wa ज्ानातिरिक्ं प्रति कारणताया एव आचार्यरक्तला ॥ ९४ ॥' aq कारणम्वं किमत, are: अन्ययेत्ति । तख कारणलस्य ॥ ९४. ॥ wa समवायिकारणे pared प्रत्यासन्नं कारणं दितोयमसमवायिक्तार मित्यर्थः । चर यथपि त रीतन्तुमयागानां पराषमवायिकारणलं स्थात्‌ एवं वेगारौमामपि अभिधाताद्यसमवायिकारणलं॑ स्यात्‌ एवं ज्ञानादि कमिच्छाद्यशखमवायिकारणं स्यात्‌ तथापि पटासमवाचिकारणएलच्णे तुरीतम्तुषये गभिन्नलवं देयं soars Total प्र्यसमवायिकारणं yada) vd ales ः वेगखन्दा्समवायिकारणं |

भाषाऽ

fagte

९९

यत्‌ समवेतं काय्यं भवति Way समवायिजनक तत्‌। Taree जनवं दविमीयमाभ्यां परं मयं स्यात्‌ ॥१७॥ येन सद पुव्वेभावः कारणमाद्‌एय वा यस्य |

भवत्येवेति तत्तत्का्याखमवायिकारणसलसणे anfz-

भिन्नलं न देयं । श्रात्मविरेषगृणानान्त्‌ कुत्राणयषम- वायिकारणल afe तेन afgad सामान्यलक्षणे देयमेव । wa समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नं fafay का- यकार्थप्रत्यासस्या कारकैकार्थप्रत्यासत्या च । आयं यथा घटादिकं प्रति कपाखसंयागादिकं । तज कार्णं घटेन AY कारस्य कपालसंयागस्य एक- स्मिन्‌ कपाले प्रत्यास्तिरस्ति। fad यथा घटरूपं प्रति कपाणषरूपमसमवायिकारणं । तत्र चटरूपं प्रति कारणं घटः । तेन सद कपालरूपस्य एकस्मिन्‌ कपास प्रत्यासत्तिरस्ि । तथा च क्रचित्‌ समवायसम्बन्धेन कचित्‌ खसमवायिसमवायसम्बन्धेमेति फलितायैः । ` इत्यश्च कार्यं काय्यैकार रेकार्चान्यतरप्रत्यासत््या का- रणं ज्लानादिभिन्नमसमवायिकारणमिति सामान्यल- ey qaqa । भ्राग्यां समवायिकारणाषमवायिका- रणाभ्यां भिन्नं कारणं aad मिमित्तकारणमित्ययथः॥ ९६॥९७॥

द्दागोमन्यथासिङ़लमेव feat पदाथानां त- दार । येग सरेत्यादिना । यत्काय प्रति कारणख

१४

भाषा० अन्य परति ana भाते यत्‌ प्वभावविभानं ॥१८॥ जनकं प्रति पूव्ववत्तितामपरि षाय न यस्य TA !

सिद्धा ° पूष्व॑वर्तिता येन रूपेण शयते तत्का प्रति तद्रुष- मन्यथाचिद्धमिति भावः । यथया az प्रति द्‌ष्डल- भिति ॥ इहितीयमन्ययासिङडमाडइ । कारणमिति) यख खातच्येणानयव्यतिरोकेा.न सः किमु खकारण- साद्‌ाचैव अन्वयव्यतिरंके एते तदन्ययाषिङं। यथा TE ठतीयमाद। wi प्रतीति। wa प्रति qafid waa qe यत्का प्रति पूर्वैव्तिलं Waa तख तत्‌क्राययै प्रत्यन्यथाषिङ्लं । यथा चरा- fea प्रत्याकान्रख्य । आकाशस्य हि चरादिकं प्रति अआआकाभतेन कारणत्वे स्यात्‌ । आ्रआकाञ्तवे ज्रब्द्ममवायि- कारणटलवं | अतः wed प्रति जमकलं गररीलेव चरादिकं अति जनकले याद्यमतसदन्यथाभिद्धं । भरब्दाश्रयलेम कारलते कान्यथाभिडि रिति चेत्‌। पञ्चमोति Tere | अथाकानस्य we प्रति जमकले fanaa fafa चेत्‌। कवलादिकं विगेषपरा्थौ afta ett चतुर्थमन्यया सिद्धमा इ । ` जमकं प्रतीति । aT dana प्रति पूस्वैव्तिंलं waa ae यत्काय परति पूव्ववर्भिंलं wma `तख तक्कराय्े मरत्यन्यथामिडतवं । यया कलालपितुषंटे nla तस्य शुलालपिदटलतेन

१५.

भाषा अतिरिक्तमथापि यहवेन्नियतावश्छकपून्वभाविनः॥९९॥

fagte

एते पच्चान्यथासिद्वा द ण्डत्वादि कमादिम। घटाद दण्ड पादि हितीयमपि दशितं ॥ do tt ANY HASTA कुलालजनकोऽपरः |

uz प्रति जनकलेऽन्यथासिद्धिः। qaraaa जनकत्वे

fag: । कुखालमा जस्य घरं प्रति जमकल्वात्‌ ॥ पञ्चममन्ययासिडमाह । श्रतिरिक्रमिति॥ जियताव- श्कपृष्वेभा विनः । अरवश्क्तृप्तनियतपून्वैवन्तिन एव का- aaa तद्धिल्लमन्यथासिद्ध मित्यर्थः । अतं एव प्रत्यक मत्वं कारणमनेकद्र्‌ व्यवत्वमन्यथासिद्धं। aa हि मरस्वमवग्यै कपतं । तेनाभेकद््‌ष्यवत्वमन्यथासिद्धं । न

वैपरीत्ये fa विभिगमकमिति वाच्यं। agaa-

जातेः कारणतावच्छंद्‌ कत्वे लाघवात्‌ ॥ ९ tl राषभारिरिति। यदहरव्यक्ि प्रति रासभस्य नियप- पू्मवर्नित्वमस्ति तत्रापि घटजातीयं प्रति सिद्धकारण- भावैदहष्डादिभिरेव तद्वक्केरपि समवे रासभाऽन्यथा- fag इति भावः॥ एतेखिति । एतेषु पञ्चसखन्यथा- fadg मध्ये पञ्चमोाऽन्ययासिद्ध आवश्वकः । तेनेव परेषां चरिताथलवात्‌ au fe दण्डारिभिरवण्ष- कु हनि यतपूमवंवज्तिंभिरेव arena इष्डलादिकम- aufag 1 ग च परोतये किं विभिगमकमिति

९९

भाषा" TIA रासभादिः स्ादेनेष्वाकण्यकस्तवसे ॥ ९९। समवायिकारणत्वं द्व्यश्येवेति AR गुणकममात्तवत्ति Wars TE URN अन्यत्र नित्यदन्येभ्य आग्रितत्वभिरोच्यते | सित्यादीना नवानान्तु द्रव्यत्वगुणएयोगिता ॥ ९२ ॥

fogre areal । Twa कारणत द्ण्डघरितपरम्परायाः सग्बन्धलकश्यने नार वात्‌ । एवमनोषामणनेन चरि- तार्थलसम्भवात्‌ ॥ २० ॥ २९ ॥ | समवायिकारणलभिनि 1 गुणकरमोति 1 अममवा- यिकारणल् गृणक्ीभिन्नानां वधम मतु गुणकम साधम इत्यापि ara । चथवा असमवायिका- रणदटठन्तिषक्ाभिननजातिमचं ace: । तेन जानादी- मामपि असमवायिकारणलविररेऽपि न खतिः॥२९॥ श्रन्यत्रेति । faxes परमाणष्वाकाभादीनि विहायाज्रितत साधमयैभित्ययेः । ahaa सम- वायसम्बन्मेन chara । atone मित्यानामपि कालाद ठकः । कालिकरसम्बन्धान्यसम्बन्धेन तेषा- nefuafafa परमार्थः । तेन समवाया*भावयोाः समवायेनाटत्तावपि म चत्तिः॥ rei cae वि- भिव्य साधम व्हुमारभते। चित्यारीमामिति WR en

+ नाहितपूनयमिति !

१५

भाषा शिति्ज॑लं तथा Ast पवनो मन एव च। परापरत्वमूततत्वकरियावेगाश्या अमी ॥ २४॥ कालणखात्मदि शां Waa परमं महत्‌|

fagre कितिर्जंलमिति । एचिव्यप्रेजावायुमनर्षां परत्ा- परलवस्वं मू जतं लं fara वेगवच्वश्च साधमये । मच यत्र घटादौ परत्वमपरत्वं वा नेत्पन्नं तचाव्या्ि- रिति वाच्यं। परलादिममामायिकरणद्र वयलवव्याष्य- लातिमचस्छ विवक्षितात्‌ । aia अपरृष्टपरिमा- wae | तख तेषामेव गगखादिपरिमाणखख कुताऽष- परष्टला भावात्‌ पूववत्‌ Head * Aaa कषंसमाना- | पिकरशद्रव्यतव्याप्यजातिमत्वै वेगवदुन्तिद्रव्यलव्याप्य- लातिमल्लच are ९४॥ कालेति । कालाकाशजात्मरिभां wand स््वम्‌- मासंयागिलं waaay । परममदत्वलं लाति- विषरेषाऽपकषानाश्रयपरिमाणलं वा । चित्यादीति। एयिव्यप्रेजावायाकाश्चानां wad. तख वदिरिदिय- afters । wa awa लाकिकम्रत्यल्षखद्ट- पयेग्यल म्यं । तेन wat चट गत्यादिप्रत्य्े w- मख्याप्युपनीतभामविषयलात्‌ तदति आत्मनि नाति- प्रसङ्गः । ग वा प्रत्य्ताविषयष्ह्पादिमति परमाष्वा-

es ce ee ee ee eee

# ag यगृषटितनिरं ।

१८

भाषाः चित्यादि पश्च भूतानि चत्वारि stale हि ॥ ९५ ॥ ATAPI LTA TU |

fagre qraenf: । तस्यापि खष्ूपयोाग्यलात्‌ मरस्वलदण- कारलाम्तरासन्नधिभाच न Was | Waar ज्ात्मा- ठसिविभरेषगृणवस्वं तत्वं ॥' चलारीति 1 एचिव्यप्रजा- arent wiad i २५ ॥

Tarra इति । एथिव्यक्ेजावायुषु चतुषु द्रया- THURS । म च द्रव्यामारमके चराद्‌ावव्यात्निः t द व्थसमवायिकारणटज्तिदर वयवव्या्यजातिमत्वखख वि- afanara ॥ आकान्रशरीरिणामिति । जआ्आकान्रात्- मामव्याणदज्निखणिकविगेष गु णवं ॥ आकात्रस्य वि- WAG: wey स ware) यरा क्िञ्चि- दवक्धेरेन शब्द उत्पद्यते तदन्यावङेरेन सद भावस्यापि सत्वात्‌ । afearg ठतीयक्षणदक्तिष्न॑षप्रतियेा- fred) येोग्यविभुविकेषगृणानां खा सर वतिं गणना - लात्‌ WANs दितोयगभन्देन मात्रः ॥ एवं WT नादीनामपि। ज्ञानादिकं हि sarah विभा wt रावङेरेनात्प्ते। चरथवष्ेरेन तद भावाऽस्छेव । एतं आानादिकमपि सणदयावश्ायि । इत्यञ्चाग्याण- हक्षिविभेषगुणव्तं चिक विगेषगुणवत् श्चा थैः ॥ एयथि- व्याडौ र्पारिरविजेषगुाऽसीत्यतेऽव्याणडत्तिरिषयुक |

१८

भाषा Wa सणिको विशेषगुण द्यते ॥ ९९॥ SUA AMAT स्यात्‌ प्रथमच्रिकं |

fagte gfaarcraqrrsfrdarnfe tear fatane द्त्युक्त। न च खूपादीनामपि कदाचित्‌ दतीयक्षणे मा्मसवात्‌ खणिकविनेषग्‌ णवच्वं चिग्यादावतिव्याप्त- fafa वाच्यं। चतःवलट््तिजन्याटस्तिजातिमदिगेष- गृणवत्वश्व faafenara अपेखाबुद्धिः werd ति- ति । खणचदुष्टयन्तृ किमपि जानादिकं म तिष्ठति, रूपलारिकमु खणचतुष्टयस्ायिन्यपि रूपादो वरात इति व्युदासः । hare चतःखणट़त्तिलाञ्‌ जन्ये am । यद्याकाजजीवात्मनोः साधम्य तदा जन्येति a देयं इेषलारिकमाद्‌ाय शकणसमन्वयात्‌ परम- महत्वस्य तादूत्रगृणलाच । wee दिलादीमा- गपि नाभराभ्युपगमाद्‌ दिलादौमामपि तथालात्‌ तदा- रणाय विशेषेति चिचणद्स्यटृत्तिलं वा वाच्यं । देष- त्ारिकमादायात्मनि शक्षणसमन्वयात्‌॥ ९६॥ ्पेति। पएयिव्यप्रेजणां रूपवत्वं दर यत्ववच्वं प्रत्यच- विषयल्ेण्ययेः । म च चचुरादोनां भजंनकपाखस- amquayg aaa किंमामभमिति षां । तजरापि AGA रूपानुमानात्‌। एवे वाय्वानीतषएटयिवीनल- तेजाभागानामपि एयिवीलादिना सूपानुमानं Fre

भाषा?

वङ्धा°

Re गुरुणी F CIN SAMPARA NV II SUT भूतवगेश्च विशेषगुणएयोगिनः | यदुक्तं यस्य AME TUE AAT RT तत्‌ ॥ ९८॥

कन ee. ee

Re i = a ce cn ts ee GRE CaN SUEDE - apap हा च प

ग॒ च uztar द्ुतसुवलादिभिन्ने तेजपि चं द्रवल- वत्व मव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं । द्रवल्वदुिद्रग्यल्व्याण- जातिमक्वस्य विवकितलात्‌ । चुततेलप्रतिषु एयि- वीषु जलेषु द्ुतसुवलौादै तेजसि च ease |

तच ख पए्यिवीलादिमचासदाराय aa लचण- भमन्वयः । म च॑ प्रत्यलविषयलं परमाण्लाद्‌॥वस्थापतं

अतिव्याप्रश्च रूपादाविति वाच्यं । चाचुषप्रत्यरवि- षयटल्तिद्र्‌ लव्याणजातिमल्स्य विवचितलात्‌ । aT त्मन्यतिव्यार्तिवारणाय चाचुषेति ॥ गुर्ली इति । गृर- aad रसवस्वं एथिवीजलयेरित्ययैः । न च प्रारे- दियादीमां वाखानीोतषफार्चिवादिभागामान्च रसा- दिम किं मानमिति वां । तत्रापि एयिवीला- दिना तद्मुमागात्‌ ॥ इयोारिति शएयिवीततेजसारि- व्यर्थः । न च जेमिन्तिकंद्र वल्लवं घटाद TBST चाव्याप्नमिति are भैभिल्षिकंद्रवलममानापिकर्‌ण- द्र व्यतव्याणजातिमस्वस्य faafaaara + ९७ ॥ आत्मामं इति । एथिव्यत्नेजावाखाकानात्म्मां विशेष गणवत््वमित्यर्थैः । यदुक्मिति । ओेयलादिकं वि-

९९

भाषा" स्पशादयोऽष्टो वेगाख्यसंसकारो AVAL UT: | अष्टो खादथ GG A वेगश्च तेजसि ॥ ९९ ॥ UNA वेगश्च PRY द्रवत्वं | BI रसस्तथा खेद वारिण्येते ATS ॥ ve Swan गन्धयुताः Panda चतुदश |

बुद्मादिषर्‌कं संख्यादिपच्चकं भावना तथा ॥ ३१ It

WATT गुणा एते आत्मनः ITT | सहृयादि पञ्चकं कालदिशेः शब्दश्च ते च खे ॥ ३९॥ संख्याद यः पच्च बुद्धिरिच्छा यन्नापि चेश्वरे । CITT पच्च वेगश्च मानसे IB It aa कितिग॑न्धरेत्‌ नानापवमी मता |

ee EPS १ ORES SD =» (0 ० मा

fagre हाय डति बधय aya कापि suai) केवला- न्वयिलात्‌ । ते च स्यादयः WES आकाशे ues

२८ ॥ २०।। ALI VIN AQ ti सां धम्म्यवेधम्म्यै freq सम्प्रति प्रत्येकं एयिष्या- दिकं निरूपयति aa चितिरित्याडिमा । गन्धरेतु- रिति घन्ध॑समवायिकारणमिव्ययंः । यद्यपि गन्धव- लमा equated तथापि एथिवीलजाते प्रमाणोा- पन्यासाय कारणत्मुपन्यसतं । तयाडि एथिवीलं हि गन्धसमवायिकार णतावकेद कतया सिध्यति । swt

| ९९ भाषा FRU रसस गन्धसत द्विविधौ मतः ॥ ४ ॥

fagre गन्भलावदिश्नस्याकसिकलापत्तेः । न स पाषाणाङा गन्धाभावोद्न्धवत्वमव्यान्नमिति वास्यं । तत्रापि मन्ध- सच्वात्‌। शअरगृपलसिर्ं श्रमुत्क टलेमाणुपपशते। कथ- मन्यया तद्धख्मनि गन्ध उपलभ्यते । भस्मन हि पाषा- णष्वंसजन्यलात्‌ | पाषाकापाद्‌ागोापारेयतवै मिध्यति । ae यद्रूव्यस्न॑सनन्यं तत्तदुपाद्‌ानेपारेयमिति WR TERA खण्डपरे महापरध्वंमजन्ये । इत्यञ्च पाषाणपरमाणः एथिवीलासतस्तन्यखय पाषाणश्यापि प्रथिवीलं । तथाच तस्यापि गन्धवक्वे बाधकाभावः ॥ मानाष््पेति | इक्तमीलादिमेरेम मानाजातीयं «d ष्रथिव्यामेव ata नतु जलादौ । तत्र Wee स- स्वात्‌ । एथिग्याकतु एकसिन्नपि ufiife पाकवनेन नानाङूपममस्भवात्‌। न च यत्र TATE नत्तनं तजा-

` व्यार्निः | रूपद्वयवदुत्तिद्र व्यलव्याप्यजातिम॑लस्य ्प- माजवदुत्तिद्र व्यलव्याप्यजातिमच्ख वा वाच्यलात्‌ | वैभेषिकनये एथिवीपरमासे eam ete च सत्वात्‌ । न्यायमये घटादावपि तात्त्वा लल्एसम- न्वयः wate इति । मधुरकटुकषायादिभेदे यः षद्धिधोा रसः स एचिव्यामेव । जले च मधुर एव रसः । waft पुत्कतदर्‌सद्यतदुज्तिद्रन्यलव्याणजानिगलं रस-

XR

भाषा० MATA विक्तेयो छनुष्णाशोतपाकलः । नित्याऽनित्या च सा दधा नित्या स्यादणुलक्षणा ॥९५॥

सिद्धा ° नाशवदुत्तिव्या्जातिमन्वं वा लच्षणार्थाऽवसेयः । गन्भस्तिति ॥ दिविध इति । वस्तुयितिमाच॑ न त॒ दि- fauna wad fefawe व्ययैलात्‌ । faery भारभातारभमेरेन Frey BB ad सति। war: एचिष्याः। अनु श्रा भीतस्य वन्त वायारपि ava इत्युक्तं ॥ पाकज दति । इत्यञ्च एयि- व्याः साऽनुशरा्ीतताश्चापनाथ तदुक्तं । AWAD WHAM स्तं । अधिकस्य Fquitq । य- पि पाकजस्पर्ा पटादौ नासि तथापि पाकजस्पञ्ं- वदुन्तिद्र यलव्याप्यजातिमत्वमयैौ बोध्यः ॥ नित्येति । सा एथिवो दिविधौ जित्या अनित्या चेत्यथैः । श्रणु- Saar परमाणुलक्णा एथिवो नित्या । तदन्या पर- माणुभिन्रा faa द्मणुकारि रूपा सव्वाऽणनित्येत्यथैः | सेव अनित्या एथिव्येव अवयववतीत्यथेः । भन्‌ अवय- विनि किं मानं। परमाणुपश्चैरेवेापपकेः। मचपर- माशूमामतीद्धियलाद्‌ were: wad म स्यादिति वाच्यं । URS परमाणार प्रत्यचवेऽपि AYALA प्रत्य- GAIA! यथा एकस्य कंस्य दू रोऽपरत्य चले तत्समूहस्य WAV । म च एकः WaT महान्‌ घट दति बुद्धे

e

९४ भाषा अनित्या तु तदन्या श्यात्‌ सैवावयवयोगिषी |

fagre रगुपप्तिरिति वाच्यं । एका महान्‌ चान्यराभिरिति- वदु पपकत । मैव । परमाररतीद्धियत्वेन तत्समूद- स्यापि प्रत्यक्ायोाग्धलात्‌ | ZTURWY AANA: | सन्निधाने aaa waaay म च तदानीं अड्ण्ठ- परमाणपुश्नात्‌ दृ ष्रपरमाणुपृच्रसात्पन्नलात्‌ न प्रत्य चले विराध दति वां । eee Parque त्वात्‌ । अन्यथा चचुरप्मादि सन्तता कदाचिद लप- सङ्गात्‌ । न alates कथमदृण्द्‌ रमसमते- दूद्‌ दनेत्पस्तिरिति are तत्र तदम्तःपातिभि- TTA: BHT WAT ACTA | ग चादृ- श्द्मणुकेम कथं अमरणारत्यत्तिरिति areal । यता न ad दृ्वमदूष्षल वा कशचित्‌ Brae? परन्तु मर्वोद्ूतरूपादिकारणममदायवनाद्‌ दृ ae | तथाच WCAG HAG मत ह्मणुकारेरद- भावात्‌ । म हि ततेऽषोदं सममवति परगाशे मर- स्वाभावात्‌ दृत्यं चावयविभिङ्का तेषामुत्पाद्विनाण्याः प्रत्य चलाद्‌ नित्यलं तेषां चावयवावयवधाराया त्रन- ma सेरमर्षपयारपि साभ्यग्रमङ्गः । चतः वाचिडि- खमे वाच्यः। यवं च विश्रामसतस्यामित्यले avaaa- भावका्थात्पन्नि प्रसङ्गः स्यात्‌ । अतसस्य frat मह

९१

भाषा सा च त्रिधा भवेह च xia विषयस्तथा ॥ ६९ ॥ malaga cea प्राणलक्षणं |

fagre त्परिमाणतारतम्यस्य गगणाद्च विश्रान्तलमिवाणुप- रिमाणतारतम्यस्यापि कचिरिश्रान्तवमस्तीति तस्य परमाणुवषिद्धिः। न च जसरेणावेव विश्रामोाऽस्लिति वाच्य॑। चसरेणुः सावयवञ्चाचुषद्रव्यलाङ्‌ घटवदित्य- गुमागेन तद्वयवषिद्धा चशरेणारवयवाः सावयवा मदद वयवश्वात्‌ कपाखवदि त्यमु मानेन तद्‌ वयवसिद्धिः। न खेदमप्रयाजकं। अरपषटष्टम इत्वं प्रति अनेकद्रव्यवल्वस्छ , भ्रयोजकलात्‌। म चेवं कमेख तदवयवधारापि पिष्टे दिति वाश्थं। अरनवखाभयेन तद िद्धः। खा च Faas, सा कार्यरूपा wut चिविधा भरोरेङियविषयभे- दादित्य्थः nee तत्र देहमदा दरति। योगिजादीति। याभिंजमये- भिजधेत्यथः । यामिजमपि जरायुजमण्डजस्च। जरायुजं मानुषादीनां । च्रष्डजं सपादीमां । अयानिजं सेदजा- ्विदारिकं। azo: रमिदं्ाञ्याः। उद्धिदसर्ग्‌- ara मारकरि्णां भरीरमपि अरयोगिजं। म च मामु- wifewircrat पाथिवल्वे किं मानमिति aren गन्धा- fea प्रमाणलात्‌।म Sy RTT HTT CTT ATT TT. atfeaafe arf fa वां) तथा सति नललष्टयिवी-

९९ भाषा° विषये SPRATT ब्रह्माण्डान्त उदाहतः ॥ २७॥

fagte लादिनासङ्करप्रसङ्गात्‌। म च तरिंजललारिकमेवास्त न तु ufdaafafa वाच्यं । क्रेदादौ्नां विनाऽपि शरीरत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्‌। गन्धादयुपलब्पेशख्च एयिवील- सिद्धेः । एनेन पार्थिवादि भरीरे जलादीनां निभिन्न- त्वमा बध्यं wetter ग जातिः एचिवरीलादिमा WEA किन्तु चेष्टा श्रय्ल। टलादीमामपि चेषटास- लान्नाव्या्िः। न चट्ादौर्नां भरोरलेक्िं गानमिति वाच्य । आध्या्तिकवायुभम्बन्धस्य प्रमाणलात्‌ । तजक किं arifafa aq ane treat ear तद्नुमा- my यदि Waar शरोरव्यवहारो मै भवति तरा- नयावयविल्ेमै विभेषणोयं । न च यत्र WT Var 7 जाता तज्रा्यारिरिति वाच्यं । एतादूके प्रमाखाभा- वात्‌ । च्रयवा चेष्टावद्‌ नधावयविमाच्रट्िद्रव्यलव्याण लातिमच्वै तत्‌ ° मामुषलक्ेजलजातिमाद्‌ाय ITT A भ्वयः। नं च ATEN AT कथं लचणसमन्वयः | तत भिंदलस्येकव्यक्तिटृन्तितया लातिलाभावात्‌ । ललो- यतेजसशरीरखृस्ितया रेवतस्यापि लातिलाभाषा- दिति षाच्यं । कर्पमेदेन मुमिंहनरीरसख नामालेन - गुमिंहतजात्या लचणममन्वयात्‌ । इद्धियमिति wT

, # अनावयनिभाजचेष्टावहु तिजातिमचं Srey ॥

ts भाषा वर्णः WA रस जे AMAT |

fagre afd पाथिवमित्यथैः। wfdad कथमिति चेत्‌ इत्यं च्राणेडियं पार्थिवं खूपादिपु aa गन्धसेव व्यश्जक- त्वात्‌ कुङ्कुमगन्धादिव्यञ्चकघुतवत्‌। मच दृष्टान्ते ख- कीयङूपादि व्यन्नकल्वादसिड्िरिति वाच्यं। परकीथ- खूपा्व्यश्च कलस्य तद ्ंलात्‌। ग ख नवअरावगन्धव्य- कजलेगामेकान्तमिति वाच्यं । तख भक्ररसाभिग्य- कलात्‌। यदा परकीयेति न Se वायूपनीतसरभि- WITS दृ एटान्तलसम्भवात्‌। म च च्राणेशियसन्ञिकर्षंख गन्धमाचव्यन्नकलान्तच व्यभिषार इति वाच्यं । Tara afa दति तिभरेषणात्‌ ॥ विषय इति) उपभोागबाधमं विषयः । सम्पैमेव हि कार्यजातं weer यत्‌ काये यर्‌ दइृष्टाधोनं AUG ere परन्परया वा जनयत्येव । न हि वीजप्रयाजभाभ्यां विना कस्यचि- earache i तेग ह्णुकादि ब्रह्माण्डं waa विष- ar भवति । भरीरेदिययोविंषयववेऽपि प्रकाराम्तराप- न्यासः fraafgaward: ॥ ger | जलं निरूपयति। ad: शक्त दति । खलेदसमवायि- कारणतावच्छेदकतया wee जातिः सिष्यति। यद्यपि शेत नित्यानित्यदटसितया म कायेतावच्छेद्कं मथापि ATs तथा Aral अथ परमाण जललवं

Rt भाषा स्तेदसतच Ray सासिद्िकमुद्‌ांइतं ex it

fagre न स्यात्‌। aa HATA हाभावात्‌ । मित्य खरूपयाग्धतव फलावश्वमा वमियमादि ति चेत्‌ । म। जन्यखडइजमकता- बङ्केद कतया अन्यजलत्जातेः fagr तर वच्छिलिजन- कताव चरेद्‌ कैतया जलत्वजातिमिद्धेः ॥ भुक्तष्टपवत्वमेव दशंयितमुक्ं ad: शुक्त इति । वस्तश्ितिमात॑नत भकंरूपवत्ते UIs । अथवा मेमित्तिकद्रवतलवद्‌ इ्ति- ` रूपव्िर aT TAM TAG अरभाखरगरक्रेत- THAT IATA RTT SIT HA AAI IGA ~ fava तदर्थः ॥ रसस्पर्ाविति । जलस्य मरुर्‌ एव शसः! शीत waa: । तिक्राटस्िमधुर हस्तिद्र यल- सावाद्ाणयजातिमततं ॥ नमु शुक्ररूपवत्वमेवेति कुतः कालिन्दीजलाडा नीखेापलसेरिति चेत्‌। न। नीलज- मकतावङ्केदि कायाः एयिवीलजातेर भावात्‌ जले नी- सरूपासम्वात्‌। कालिन्टोजकते मीलप्रतीतिः ez Draft ! जरत एव वियति asd धंवलि मे पलेः। अथ जलमाधुै किं aris म हि प्रत्यसेण काऽपि TAMA AYA | न च नारिकेलजलारे ATYAYI- wea एवेति वाच्यं । तस्याञ्रयापाधिकलात्‌ | aa जम्नोररसाद्‌ात्रम्लाथुपलग्धेर सादि मत्वगपि स्छादिक्ति चेत्‌। ग । इरीतकयादिभक्णस् WETTA AAA |

९८ भाषाः नित्यतादि प्रथमवत्‌ किन्तु Sena fst |

fagre a स इरीतक्यामेव जलाष्णमंयागाद्र्‌सान्तरोत्प्नि- रिति वाच्यं । कल्यनागेारवात्‌ । एथिवीवखानच्ारिज- भकतावच्छेदकताश | HS नाश्ञादिकं जम्बोररमारा ह आआञ्योपाधिको तथा प्रतीतिः। एव॑ जन्य्नोत- UIT NAA Wasa वा बाध्यं । धृष्टचन्दनारा त॒ जत्यापलसिशखन्दनमा मामवति ीतत- रमलिलस तेजः संयागाष्लले च्रष्णप्रतोतिरापाधिकी HSI । तज पाकामसवात्‌॥ सेदसेचेति । चृतादा- वपि तदे म्तरव्वभिंजलस्येव Gul wea सेरसमवा- यिकारणलात्‌ । तेग जल एव. सेह इति मन्तव्यं ॥ xaafafa रखासिद्धिकद्रवललं जातिविशेषः प्रत्यक fag: तद वच्छिश्नजमकतावष्छेदकमपि तरेवेतिमावः। पलाद्‌ावपि नलस्य ad खेप्रकर्ेख च दरहनागृङ्र्‌- afafa वच्यति nasi अरथमतदिति। एचिव्या इव्यर्थः । तथाहि saad दिविधं भित्यमनित्यञ्च। परमाणुरूपं नित्यं । इ्णु- कारिकं सम्यैमनित्यं श्रवथवममवेतञ्च । श्रनित्यमपि fafad ्ररीरेद्धियविषयमेद्‌ात्‌ । किन्तु एथिवीता a विग्रेषसखमाह। faPafa । अयाजिजमिति अया- निजमवेत्यथैः । जलीयं गरीरमयानिजं वर्णलाके

Re भाषा" इ्दियं रसनं सिन्भुदिमादिर्विंषय मतः ॥ ९९ ॥ खश उष्णतेजससु स्याद्र LRT ।

रसनं जलीयं warqagnea षति Tae Rate | शक्तुरसाभि्यश्जकोादकवन्‌ रसममन्निकवें व्यभिचार्‌- वारणाय इव्यलं देयं ॥ विषयं द्‌ ण॑यति । मिन्धुहिमा- दिरिति। षिन्धः we: । हिमं gare: । आदिपदात्‌ सरित्‌ काषारकरकारिः सौ arg) नच fea- करकयोाः कटिमलात्‌ पाथिवलमिति वाच॑ । ower विखीमस्यर तस्य जजलवसखय प्र्यसषिड़्‌लात्‌। यद्वयं यद्र व्यष्नं मजन्यमिति व्याकेजलेपाद्‌ामेनेापादे यलसिद्धः | अदृ ्टविशेषेशवाद्र वलविरोधात्‌ करकादीनां कारि- ग्यप्रत्ययस्य भ्राग्तत्वात्‌ ॥ ३९ ॥

तेजो frevafa vat ow इत्यादिभा । saa uvfrer जातिविगेषः परत्यकरिद्धं। इत्यञ्च जन्याष्ण- स्पजनैममवायिकारणतावच्छेदकं Ane जातिविशेषः । na ayaa त॒ जलवस्तेवागु सन्धेयं | न चा- ष्णास्पशंवस्वं चन्द्रकिरणाद्‌ावव्याप्तमिति are: तज्ापि arya स्वात्‌ | किन्तु तदम्तःपातिजलसखपर्जनाभिभ- वादग्रदः 1 एव॑ रत्रकिरषाडै पार्थिवसत्रैमाभिभ- | वाखचुरादे लाग्ूतलाद्‌ गः ॥ खूपमित्यारि ६ |

fagre प्रमिद्‌मिति। cfd रसनं जलोयमित्ययंः | तथाहि

९९

भाषा नेमित्तिकं द्वत्वन्तु नित्यतादि च पूर्व्ववत्‌ ॥ ४०॥ इद्धियं नयनं वह्धिखणादिविषयोा मतः। `

fagre वेश्वानरे मरकतकिरणादा च पार्थिंवररूपेणाभिभवात्‌ WHAT: ॥ मनु तद्रा धष्िणाऽपि werd ज स्यादिति सेत्‌।म। अरन्यदीयरूपेणापि ufaler दसम- वात्‌ शङ्खःस्येव पिन्षपोतिष्रा। asa शुक्रं नाभिण्डतं किन्तु तदीय शक्तवमभिगतमित्यन्ये । भेभित्तिक- भिति। सुवणलोारिरूपे तेजसि तत्छलात्‌ । न च मे- मित्तिकद्र वलवन््ं ग॒ wad द्‌ दनाद्‌ावव्याकनेष॑ताद्‌ा- घतिव्यात्तेचेति ari एयिव्यटन्तिनेमित्तिकद्रवल- atfamfanae विवचितत्वात्‌ ॥ पूम्वेवदिति। जल- Baa: । तथा fe तदूदिविधं नित्यमनित्यञ्च । fret | परमाणुरूपं । तद न्यद्‌ जित्थं श्रवयवि। तच्च विधा शरीर- चियविषयमभेद्‌ात्‌। भरीरमयानिजमेवेत्ययेः। तख छ्य साकारा प्रसिद्धं॥ ve ti wa यो पिगरेषख्तमाह इद्ियमिति । waded परकीयस्यभाद्यव्यश्लकल्वे सति परकोयरूपव्यश्चकलात्‌ प्रदीपवत्‌ । at सखीयखर्थव्यञ्नकलाद्‌ाद्यं पर- कीयेति। घटादे; खोयरूपव्यञ्च कलात्‌ व्यभिचारावा- «ara faite परकोयेति। अथवा प्रभाया इटा न्तवखध्यवात्‌ परकीयदयं म देयं । चघुः सन्निकर्षं व्यभि-

RR भाषाः श्रपाकजेऽनुष्णशोतः खशसतु पवने मतः॥ ४९॥

fagre चारवारणाय gaa देयं ॥ विषयं द्ंयति। aia मनु yada तेजमले किं मौनमिति चेत्‌ । a । wat तैजसं आसति प्रतिबन्धके saranda ऽ्यनुच्छि माभ वलात्‌ यत्रैवं aad यथा एयिवी । म was एयिवीद्र वतस्य जन्यजलद्र कत्वस्य चाचि यागनाश्लात्‌ ॥ मन्‌ पीतिमगरूलाञ्रयस्छ पार्थिवस्यापि सद्ानीं दुतला क्तेन व्यभिचार दति चेत्‌।म। जलमध्यख- मसीकादवत्‌ तस्याद्र वलात्‌ । अपरे तु पीतिमगृरला- mae च्रत्यम्ताभ्निसंयोगेऽपि खूपापराटृलििद गंमात्‌ त- पतिबन्धकविजातीयं द्रवद्र शं करुते । तथाहि अरभ्नि- wae पीतिमगुरुलाच्रयः विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धक- वद्र व्यसंय॒क्तः । श्रत्यज्ताग्निसंयागेऽपि पृष्व॑रूपविजा- तीयद्ूपानधिकर णपार्थिंवल।त्‌ जलमष्यस्छपोतपरवत्‌ तस्य च एयिवीजलभिन्नस् तेजस्वनियमात्‌ ॥ वायं frauafa । अपाकज इति । अमुष्काीतसयनस्य एयिव्यामपि waren श्रपाकज इति । अपाकजख- शंस लखाद्‌ावपि waren अमृर्शाक्रीत tft तेन वायवीये विजातीयस्पन्ना द रितः। तष्जनकतावच्छेदकं वायुतमिति भावः॥ ४९ ॥

RR

भाषा" तिय्यैगामनवानेष Ba खशादिलिङ्गकः। gaara देचव्यापि त्वगिन्दियं ॥ ४९॥ प्राणदिसु मचावायुपय्यन्तो विषये मतः ।

सिद्धा एष वायुः स्थशादिलिङ्गकः । वायुरं ainez- एतिकन्पेरनुमोयते । विजा तीयस्यंन विलचणरष्देन दणादीरनां wat शाखादीनां कम्पेन ख वायारनुमा- नात्‌ । यथा च वायानं neared तथा awa ॥ पूवयै- वदिति ॥ argfefaar नित्येऽभित्यच् । परमाणुरूपा नित्यसदन्याऽनित्यः waaay) साऽपि तिविधः शरा- रद्धियविषयभेदात्‌। aa शरीरमयोनिजं fawrer- दीनां। wey जलीयतेजघवायवीयश्ररोराणां पार्चिंव- भागेपषटमादूपमोागमापनलं जलादीनां प्राधामा- ल्ल लीयल्मिति ॥ अचर या विशेषस्तमाद । देरग्या- पीति । शरीरव्यापकं खश्रंगादकमिद्ियं तक्‌ ae वायवोयं । रूपादिषु मध्ये aida व्यश्नकलवात्‌ nye it अङ्गसङ्किसलिलभेत्यव्यञ्नकव्यजनवातवद्‌ विषयं cH यति। प्राणादिरिति। यद्मपि च्रनिव्योा वायुखतुर्बिधः we चती विधा प्राणादिरित्युक्रमाकरे तथापि मङ्ख पादज चेविध्यमुक्रं। प्राणस्लेक एव इदादिनानाखा- नवजागखनिगंमादिमानाक्रियावभांच मानाषञ्ना लभत दति i

| 1

२४ भाषा० आकाशस्य तु विन्नेयः शब्दे ANTAL गुणः॥ ४९॥ इधियन्तु भवेत्‌ rae सन्नणुपाधितः।

गणिम

= ==> >

सिद्धा श्राकाशं जिरूपयति। आकाभस्सेति। आकाजकाल- दिभामेरकेकव्यक्रिलाद्‌ श्राकाशलादिकंन जातिः कितु आकाशत्वं wears | वैशेषिक दतिकथमनू विभे- षगृणान्तरव्यवच्छेदाय । एतेन प्रमाणमपि दर्शितं, तथा हि । wat गृण्खचुगरणायेग्णवहिरिदधि यग्राह्न- लातिमच्तात्‌ wiley) weal द व्यसमवेते गृणलात्‌ सं- array दत्यमृमामे शब्दस दर व्यसमवेतले सिद्धे wear म खभंवदधिशेषगृणः। अभिमंयो गासमवाविकारणकला- भावे षति अकारण गणपुव्व॑कप्रत्य चलात्‌ सुखवत्‌। पा- कजरूपाडा व्यभिचारवारणाय wart पररू्पास अभिचारवारणायकारणगृणपूव्वकंति । जलपरमाणु- Sarat शभिचारवारणाय प्रत्यकेति। weet मदिक्षा- water विेषगृणलात्‌ । मात्मविग्रेषगृणः । वहि- रिङ्ियग्राद्यलार्‌ रूपवत्‌। इत्यञ्च warfare मव- मद्वयं गगणमामकं सिषध्यतीति। भ च वाखवयवेषु दर च्गन्दक्रमेण वाया कारण गृणपुर्वकः शब्द उत्पाद्य तामिति वाच्थं। यावद व्यभाविलेन वायुविशेषगुणला- भावात्‌। तज WTS विषयस्य लाभावात्‌॥ ४९ A tit otafa दद्धियमितिगन्ाकाभरं साघवा-

२५.

भाषा० जन्यानां जनकः काला जगतमाख्रयो मतः ॥ ४४॥ परापरत्व पीतः Was: स्यादुपाधभितः। fagre देकं fag ओतं परषभेदेन भिन्नं कथमाकाभरं स्यादत STG एकः सन्नपील्यादि । aay एक एव sala Be: कर्ण॑ज्रष्वा्यादेर्भराद्धिन्नं Brava भवरती- व्यर्थः ॥ कालं निरूपयति । जन्यानाभिति ॥ तच ware दशंयितुमाह। जगतामिति । तथाहि इदानीं घट इत्यादि प्रतीतिः खग्परिस्मन्दादिकं यदि विषयीक- रोति तदा खर्यपरिस्पन्दादिना घटादेः सम्बन्धावाच्यः स चसंयागादिमं संभवतीति काल एव तत्‌सव्बन्भघ- रकः WAN ४४ ॥ इत्थञ्च तस्याश्रयत्वमपि सम्यक्‌ प्रमाणामर दर यति । परापरलेति । परलवापरत्वबुद्धेरमाधारणं नि- भित्तं काल एव । परलापरत्योारषमवायिकारणमसं- Ararat लाघवादतिरिक्रः sega दूति भावः ॥ गन्वेकस्य कालस्य सिद्ध चणदिमिमासवषौदिसमयमेदे मे स्यादत wre) चणारिरिति। कालस्तेकाऽपि उपा- भिभेदात चणादिव्यवहारविषयः । उपाधिस्त॒ खजन्य- विभागप्रागभावावच्छिन्नं कर्मा पूव्वेसंया गानवच्छिन्न- विभागे वां पुब्वंस॑योा गमाभावच्छिन्न उन्तरमंयोागप्राग- भावा वा उ्रम॑यागावच््छिनं कथं वा। नचात्तर-

९६

भाषा० दृ रान्तिकादि षीचेत्रेका नित्या दिगु्यते ॥ By tt

सिद्धा °

उपाधिभेदादेकापि प्राच्यादिव्यपदे शभाक्‌। संयो गानन्तरं लषणवव्यहारो न सादिति वाचं । कका- भ्तर सत्वादिति । महाप्रलये सणारिष्यवहारो यथपि तदनायत्या ष्व॑सेनापपादमीयः। दिमारिव्यवदारम्ब तत्तत्‌्णकूरे tata ti

fa Grevafa । qufmafa i ged अन्ति aay ईैभिकं परत्मपरल्ं Are । तद्ुदधरमाधारणं वीजं दिगेव । शेजिकपरत्वापर लयेारसमवायिकारण- संथेगाश्रयतया दिक्‌ भिथ्यतीति भावः॥ ४१५॥

aaaa दिग्‌ यदि तदा प्राचीप्रतीच्यादिव्यव- हारः कथमुपपद्यतामित्यत आद । उपाधोति | यत्प caw उद यगिरिसल्निहिला at fea खा ae प्राची खद्यगिरिष्यवदिता. च प्रतीची । एवै तप्पुरषीयसुमे- सन्निहिता दिग्दीची agafeat लवाची। सर्भैषा- मेव वर्षाणां Acerca: स्थित इतिं नियमात्‌ ॥

आत्मानं निरूपयति । arafxafa । आत्मल- जातिम्ह सुखदुःखादि समवाथिकारणतावच्छेदकतया सिष्यति । खरेऽपि सा जातिरस्येव । अ्रष्ृष्टादिरूष- कारणाभावाख भ सुखदुः खाश्ुत्यन्तिः | नित्यस खच्ू- ware फलाव श्चम्भाव इति भियमस्राप्रयोजकलात्‌॥ परे लीश्रे सा जातिमंस्येव प्रमाणाभावात्‌ | न च

eee eo eG

eS भाषाः श्रात्मद्धियाद्यधिष्ठाता करणं हि TENT ॥ ४९॥ शरीरस्य न चेतन्यं तेषु व्यभिचारतः!

fagre दश्मद्रव्यलापतस्तिश्ानवच्ेन विभजनादिति वदन्ति॥ दड्ियादीति । <fraret भरीरस्य च परम्परया नैतन्यसन्पार्‌ कः ॥ यद्यप्यात्मनि अददं जाने wt सुखो- व्यारिप्रत्यक्षविषयत्मस्येव तथापि विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति प्रथमत एव शरोरादिभिन्तस्तप्मतीतिमोचर इति प्रतिपादयितुं म शक्यत इत्यतः प्रमाणं दशयति | करणमिति । कुटारारीनां हिदारिकरणामां adi रमनरेण फलानु पधानं Tai एवं चचुरादीनां ज्ाग- करणानां फलापधाममपि कन्तारमन्तरेख AIGA दत्यतिरिक्रः कन्त करूयते ॥ ४६ ॥ ममु अरीरस्येव कन्नुंलमम्ह चरत आह । शरीर- स्येति ॥ मभू सेतन्यं ज्ागादिकमेव । मृक्ातननां लसत wa ग्टतक्ररीराशामपि तदभावे का शतिः राणा- भावेन arma fugit Wi म । शरी- Te Waa ae विलाकितस्य ख्ाविरे areas पक्तेः | अरौराणामवयवेापचयापग्वयेरत्पादविनान्र- भालिलात्‌ ॥ न च पृष्वेश्ररीरोत्पन्नसंस्कारेण हिती- awit संस्कार उपपद्यत इति वाच्यं । अनन्तसं- रकारकम्पमे गोरवात्‌ । एवं रीरस्य चैतन्ये बालकस्य

३८ भाषा तथालन्ेदि द्ियाणामुपघाने कथं सूतिः ॥ ४७॥ मनोऽपि न तथा HTT ATT भवेत्‌।

भिद्धा° सनपानादौ प्रदक्षिनं स्यात्‌ । दष्टसापनतान्चानख ARTA । तदामीमिष्टमाघधमतास्मारकाभावात्‌ । aya WAAR तदानीं खार णादेव प्रठस्तिः॥ म च जमाम्तदुाम्‌भूतमन्यदपि सथं ताभिति वाच्यं । उदाधकाभावात्‌। श्रत्र लमाचत्या जीवनाद्‌ टमेवे दाधकं करूप्यते । इत्यञ्च संमारस्याना- fama आ्रत्मनाऽपि श्रनारिलसिङ्धा warfare नाज्नासम्भवात्‌ Grad सिद्यतीति Are ॥ नन्‌ चचुरा- frat जागार करणलं कर्दलघ्ास्तु विरा साध- काभावादत आह तथालमिति। तेतन्यमित्यर्थंः । उपचाते are सति त्रयाखक्रादीमामेव । कथमिति। प्ये Wy साचात्‌ wart चचुषोऽभावे सरषं ग स्यात्‌। शअरनुभवित्त रभावात्‌ । अन्यद ष्टस्य अन्येन WT- ` णासम्भवात्‌ । अनमुभवस्रणयोः सामानाधिकरण्येन कायेकारणभावारिति भावः ॥ vo tt ननु चक्रादीनां चैतन्यं aise मनसस्तु नि- त्यस्य चेतन्यं Wea wre । मने ऽपीति ॥ न aati म चेतनं । ओ्रामादीति । ममसोाऽणुलात्‌ । wae. च away रेतुलात्‌। गनि भ्नामसुखादि मचे तत्‌-

९५ \५ ¢ N ~ भाषाः धम्माधम्राग्रयाऽध्यत्त ATI Wes

fagre प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेरित्य्थः । चया मनमाऽणलं तथा त- च्यते ॥ नन्वस्तु विज्ञानमेव श्रात्मा तख खतः प्रका- शरूपलाच्‌ Wad जागसुखादिकन्तु तस्यैवाकारवि- wa: । तस्यापि भावलारेव afward पर्पू्ववविज्चा- मस्या र विन्नाने Waar | सुषुप्रावपि आआलयविन्ना- मधारा निरावाधेव ग्टगमद्‌ वासनाया वमन इव yd पम्बविश्नागजनितरमस्काराणामुत्तरोाततरविक्नाने सङ्खा-

मालान्नानुपपत्तिः सरणाद्‌रिति चेत्‌।न। तस जग- दिषयले सार्व्वश्नापत्तेः। यत्किञ्धिदिषयले विनिगमभमा- भावः ॥ सुषुप्तावपि विषयावभासप्रमङ्ः । तदानीं मिराकारा चित्सन्ततिरमुवक्तत इति चेत्‌ । म। तख QUANG प्रमाणाभावात्‌ | अन्यथा चरादीमामपि शज्ानत्वापत्तिः ॥ म चेष्टापन्तिर्विंज्ञानव्यतिरिक्रवस्टुना ऽभावादिति वाच्यं | घटाद्‌ रनुष्धयमागस्यापलपितु- मशक्यत्वात्‌ ॥ आकार्विशेष एवायं विज्नागरेति चेत्‌। किमयमाकारोऽनिरिच्यते विक्षानात्‌। तरिं समायातं विज्नागव्यतिरिक्रेन । नातिरिच्यते चेत्‌ तरिं समूलाल- aa नीललाकारोाऽपि पीताकारः war खर्ूपता fa- भ्रानस्याविशेषात्‌। अपोादरूपोा मोललवादिधिवज्नानध्ं दति चेत्‌। न। नीलत्वादौनां विङ्द्धागामेकमिननऽममा-

Yo

fagte वेशात्‌ caver विरोधरेवदुर्पपन्नतात्‌॥ न चवाम- arg: varia माहपुत्योरपि वामनासङ्कूमप्रसष- HUAN न चउपाद्‌ामोापादेयभावोाभियामकद्तिवार्। वाखनायाः सङ्ुमासम्भवात्‌ ॥ उक्रस्िभुत्प्तिरेव स- म इति चेत्‌। न। तदुत्पादकामावात्‌। उत्तरविभ्रा- नरवेात्पादकलते तदामनयप्रसङ्गः॥ खणिकविज्चानेऽति- शयविगेषः कर्प्यत इति चेत्‌। न । मानाभावात्‌) ae माजोरवाष । एतेन चणिकभररोरम्वेव चेतन्यभपि a त्युक्तं । गारवादतिभये मानांभावाख। वीजाद्‌ावपि ay- कारिसमंवधामादवेापपक्तेः | SAITAMA ॥ aq afe लणिकविन्नामे गेरवान्नित्यविश्चाममेवात्मा- विमाशीवा। श्रे अयमात्मा सत्यं ज्ागमनमं ब्रद्मेत्या- अदि श्रतेरित्ति चेत्‌। न। तस्य सविषयलासम्मवख्य दर्जिं- ललात्‌। मिधिषयस जामते मानाभावात्‌ । सविषयव- स्था्यनुभवात्‌। अते ज्ञामभिन्नेो भिवय आत्मेति भि ॥ सत्यं ्आममिति ब्रह्मपरं Nay नोपयुज्यते ज्ञामाशा- मसुखिलद्‌ःखिलादिभिर्जीविार्मां मेद्सिङ्धा सुतरामी- MUTANT! अन्यया बन्धमेाक्तामुपपक्तेः। योाऽपीश्वरमे- दमेएधके aq: माऽपि तदभेदेम तदीयत्वं प्रतिपाद यन्‌ Wiis अरभेदभावने च यतितव्यमिति वदति! श्रत एव wee एव आत्मनि समर्पिताः ya | Are द्‌भायामन्ञाननिटक्ता BATT जायत cata a

४९

fagte ize नित्यलेन नाजशायोगात्‌। भेदनागेऽपि व्यक्तिदयं स्थास्यत्येव ॥ ग च दिलमपि wana are तज निर्ध wa ब्रह्माणि सत्यलाभावेऽपि सत्यखद्पं तरितिवद्‌ दित्वाभावेऽपि इयात्मक ताविति । सुवचलाम्‌ मिथ्या- लाभावोऽधिकरणाद्मकः ॥ तजर खत्यलभिति चेद्‌ एक - त्वाभावे व्यक्गिद्यातमकोा दित्वमणु चतां प्रव्येकमेकल्वे ऽपि एथिवीजखया्ं गन्ध दतिवदुभयं भेकमित्थसख स््यजनसिद्धूतवात्‌ । योऽपि तद्‌ानौमभेद्‌प्रतिपादरक श्रागमः खाऽपि निदुःखलवादिना साम्यं प्रतिपादयति, सम्पदाधिक्ये पुरोाहिताऽयं राजा daw इतिवत्‌ wa एव face: परमं साभ्यमुपेतीति भ्यते ॥ शखरा ग शागखुलात्मा किनु wal) नित्यं विज्ञान मामन्दंः Wy Lae aad We एवाक्रः। यः स्वश्च रृत्यमुरोधात्‌। Te दृायस्यापि च्रान- न्द वरित्यर्थः । अर्ब॑श्रादिवाश्मलर्यींयाचृप्रत्ययात्‌। अ- न्यथा पुलिङ्गलापक्तेः । आनन्दाऽपि वुःखाभावे उष- aaa भाराद्यपगमे खी संन्ताऽइमितिवर्‌ दुःखा- भावेन सुखिलप्रत्ययात्‌ । अष्ठु वा तस्िन्नामन्दा न त्वसावानन्द् मित्य च मलर्यीयप्र्ययविरोधात्‌ | श्रानन्दं ager fara बिभेति कद्‌ाचनेत्यच् भेदस्य स्यष्टवा- Ufa THT: tt | एतेन owefa: wat पुरषः पृष्करपलात्रवन्नि-

G

BR

fagre a: किमु चेतनः । कार्यंकारणयारभेदात्‌ कार्य- मागे कार्ययष्पतया arm: स्यारिल्यकारणख्लं तथ्य । जुदधि गतचेतन्याभिभानान्ययाऽनु पत्या art | बु- द्धिख naa: प्रथमः परिणामः। सेव aera करणमणुच्यते । तत्‌स्रासचार्यां पुरुषस्य संसा- Tat) wear एवेद्दियप्रणालिकया परिणति wea । चटादिना सम्बन्धः पुरषे कलटताभिमामो बुधे ॐतन्याभिमानख । मेदायरदात्‌ । waz कार्म afafa मदंशः पुरषेपरागेो बुद्धेः खच्छतया चेत- गप्रतिनिम्बाद्‌ तालिका दप॑ंणरोव FATT: | इृद्‌- fafa विषयेापराग इड्ियप्रणाक्िकया परिणतिभे- दसखात्विका निगश्ासाभिरतदप॑णस्येव afafaar | कर्कव्यमिति व्यापारातैशः। तेना ्चरयवती बुद्धिः। तत्‌- परिणामेन जानेन पुरषष्यातालतिकः सम्बन्धो दपंष- मखिष्बेव मुखखापणयिरुच्यते। भ्रानादिवत्‌ सुखदुः- खेचछारेषप्रयलध्ौधकौ आपि बुद्धेरेव! कतिसामा- नापिकरष्येन प्रतीतेः । न च बुद्धिखेतना परिणभि- खादिति शा्चमतमपासतै tt कल्यदटभागानामिव शेतन्यस्यापि सामानाधिक- TAMARA मानाभावात्‌। चेतनोाऽदं करोमीति प्रतीतिमुद्धिपरिणामिलात्‌॥ केतन्यांशे भरम cht चेत्‌ र त्याज किं Aaa अन्यया बुद्धभिंत्यले मेाक्ताभावेऽनि-

भवा"

सिद्धार

BR प्रव्त्यायनुमे याऽयं रथगल्येव सारथिः।

wa ततृपृल्वंमसंमारापन्तिः ॥ अचेतनायाः waa: काय्यार्‌ वृद्धेर्‌ चेतन्यं कार्यकारणयेखाराव्यारिति चेत्‌ । न। अरमिद्धेः vaya मानाभावात्‌। वीतराग- जन्मरारंमाद्मादिल॑ । अनारेनजासम्मवान्नित्यवलं | तत्‌ fa प्ररत्यादिकम्पनेन ॥ ग च

waa: क्रियमाणानि गुेःकर्णाणि स्व॑ः!

अरहद्धारविमृढात्मा कजा इमिति मन्यते ॥ इत्येन विरोध दृति वाश्यं। प्ररतेरदृष्टस्य । गकर Tessie: दूच्छारिभिः। क्लौं कर्लाइमेव | इत्यस्य तदर्यलात्‌ ॥

wad खति कक्ारमाक्मानं केवशम्तु a: | vale वदता भगवता ्रकटोताऽयमुपरि टादा्रथ दति सङ्घेपः ॥

धराधराय दात । aaa । were तराअयववे देदाम्तरङतकमांणां Pur TY भो गागुष- aa: ॥ विक्ेषगणयोगत इति । योग्यविेषगणसम्ब-

न्पेनात्ममः ward भवति म aaa । श्रं जाने we

राभि इत्यादिप्रतीतेः॥ yc ॥ प्रतीति । अयमात्मा पररेशारो प्रदत्यादिना ईऽगुमीयते । प्रहत्तिर च चेष्टा । भानेच्छाप्रयन्नादीनां

४४

भाषा० श्रदद्कारस्याभ्रयोाऽयं मनेमाचस्य गोचरः ॥ ४८ tt विभुवद्यादि गुणवान्‌ वुदिखु दिविधा मता | श्रुमूतिः शूरश श्याद नुभूतिशवतु्निधा ॥ ५०॥ पर्यक्ष॑मप्यनुमितिसधापभितिशष्दंमे |

fagre रेरे श्रभावस्याक्रप्रायलात्‌ । चेष्टाया यल्लमाधयलात्‌। चेष्टया प्रयलवाभात्माणनुमीयतं इति भवः ॥ तज वृ्टान्मांर । रथेति । यशपि रथककंचेष्ठा म भ- ति तथापि तेन कर्मणा भारचिर्यथाऽमुमीयते तया चेष्टाताकेन Baar परा्मापोति भविः ॥ अररङडार- स्येति । श्ररङ्ारोऽहमिति प्रत्ययः सस्याञ्रया विषय आत्मनि अरीरादिरिति॥ शन इति। मभेाभिन्ेगि- यजंम्यप्रथक्ताविषये मागसपरत्यशविषयसेत्यचैः । खूपा- अभावेनेद्धिथाम्तरायाग्यलास्‌ ॥ ४९ ॥ विभुरिति । विभुत्वं vores we पु्ाक्रमपि स्ट यमु । गुद्यादीति । मुडि सखदुः खेच्छादि चतर waar: पुप्वीक्ता वेदितव्या । अतेव प्रसङ्गगदुदधेः कति- wenn” दर्शंयति । बुदधिस्लिति। देविष्यं युत्पारयति । अनुतिरिति। अरनुभ्तिखतुविधेति । एतामाश्चत- सरणा करणानि WAAR TATE: प्रमाणा- गीति gannf afeaanFr nye a पर्य खमिति। tran wet ward । यथपि

BY भाषा० प्राणजादिप्रभेदन प्रत्यक्षं षड्धिधं मतं ॥ Ye ॥

fagre मनेरूपेद्ि यजन्यं सर्व्वमेव ज्ञानं तथापि cfixaaa aay इद्धियाणां यत्र wma कारण्वं ततत्यख- fafa विवक्तं । शैश्वरपरत्यक्षनु ग aay tfc - घन्िक्ात्पन्नं भान मव्यपरे ्समव्यभिचारि व्यवसाया- त्मकं प्रत्थकमिति खतरे तथैवाक्रलात्‌। श्रय वा ज्राना- करणकः भागं nays | इदं BSG ई अरप्रत्यचषाधारणं इ्यमुभिति anfinera उपमित aaa भाष्दमेघे VT HITS सारणेऽनुभवस् च WATT तत तज्रातिव्या्चिः॥ परा मर्जभन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । यद्यपि परामर्भप्रत्यचादिकं परामभंजन्यं तथापि मरामर्भंजन्यं देलविषयकं यज्त्ानं तरेवानमितिः। म च काराचितृक- देठविषयकामुमितावव्या्तिरिति वार्य । तादृश्रन्नान- ` arava विवक्ितिलात्‌ । अथवा वयात्तिज्ागकरणकं आचआगमनुमितिः। एवे साङ्ग aus ्ानमुपमितिः।पदज्नागकरणकं शानं भब्द are: । agar यत्‌किञ्चिद्मुमितिव्यक्रिमादाय तद्म क्रिषटज्िलवे षति यत्किञ्चित्‌प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तिमाद्‌ाय aqe- न्तिजातिमन््ं अनुमितिलं । एवं यत्किचित्‌प्रत्य्ादि- मादाय तद्यक्तिदत्तितवे सति यक्किञ्चिदमुभितिव्यक्ति- मादाय तद्‌ टन्तिजातिमन्ै प्रत्य शल्रादि कं वा च्यमिति।॥

४९ भाषा" प्राणस्य WTA गन्धो गन्धतवादिरिपि Yr | तथा रसो CTR शन्दाऽपि च गतेः ॥ \५९॥ उद्भूतरूपं नयनस्य गोचरो द्रव्याणि तदन्ति VTE विभागसंयोगपरापरत्वस्ले्द्र वत्व परि माणयुक्तं॥५९॥ क्रिया जातिं aerate समवायश्च तादशं |

fagre चाण्जादीति । wrest रासभं aad स्पार्शनं श्रतं

मानसमिति षड्विधं प्रत्यकं । म चेश्चरपत्यषस्याविभज- माश्ूमलं । जन्यपरत्यचस्यैव निरूपणोयलात्‌ उक्ष ता- MMT ॥५९॥

त्राणस्येति । गाचर इतिं गाह Cae: | गन्धला- दिरिति । आदिपदात्‌ सुरभिलासुरभिवपरिग्रहः । ` गन्धस्य गरत्य्वाकदुकिजातिरपि प्रत्या | गखाश्रय- गदे तु प्राणस्य म सामथंसिति Arey तथा रन द्ति। रसलारिसडित cart: i गन्धो रस azar aren i तया अरम्दलारिसहितः॥५९॥

जद्तरूपमिति सोभा श्रारावमङूतरूपमिति न चा चुृषं प्रत्यकं । तदन्ति उद्ूतरूपवनि ॥ ५९ ॥

योग्येति । एथक्तादिकमपि योाग्यदत्तितया are age येाग्यहन्तिमित्ययैः ॥ चकुयीग्यवमेव कथ त- दाह । TaN । च्रालाक्संयोग उद्जूतरूपच्च चाशु- anes प्रति कारणं । ततं उव्यसासुषं प्रति तयोः

४७

भाषा VHA चतुः संयोगादालोकोदरुत्पयोः ॥ ५४॥ SHAUNA द्रव्यं गोचरः सोऽपि च त्वचः |

सिद्धा समवायसम्बन्धेन कारणलतं | द्रष्यसमवेतप्रत्यचं प्रति खाश्र यसमवायसम्बम्धेन द व्यसमवेतसमवेतस्य SIAN: WMD खाञ्रयखमवेत स मवायसम्नन्धेनेति ॥ ५४ ॥ खद्भूतस्पर्भवद्‌ द्रव्यं । गचरस्वचा गा चरः। साऽपि . खड्रूतस्य्राऽपि सख्पर््त्वादि सहित ; ॥ सूपान्यदिति। <9- भिन्नं रूपलादिभिन्नञ्च चचुषा यद्‌ योग्यं तत्‌ लगि- सियस्यापि arg तया चष्यक्तादिस््याद्याये चष drat ser उक्ता एवं क्रिया एवं जातये योग्यट्‌- way ते aw ग्राह्या इति। wary त्वगिङ्ियजन्ये $पि रूपं इव्यप्रव्यते कारणं | तथा च वहिरिष्ियजन्य- canes रूपं कारणमिति ॥ गवीनास्हु afer ana रूपं ग कारणं प्रमाणाभावात्‌ किनं चाचुषप्रत्यक्ते रूपं alana ख्भःकारणं श्रन्वयव्यतिरेकात्‌ ॥ af, रिद्ियजन्यद्र्‌ व्यप्रत्थलमाजे किं कारणमिति चेत्‌ । न। किञ्चिदात्माज्तिभव्दभिन्नविश्रेषगृणवत््वं वा प्रयाजक- मस्तु ॥ रूपस्य कारणले लाघवमिति चेत्‌।न।वायास्ल- गिद्धियेषाग्रडणप्रसङ्गात्‌॥ दृष्टापन्तिरिति aa स्यं एव लाघवात्‌ कारणमस्तु । प्रभाया sna विष्टापन्ति- रित्येव किंग स्यात्‌। तस्मात्‌ wat पश्ठामीतिकंद्‌ are

धट

भाषा० GUTTA योग्यं STAT कारणं ॥ ५५॥ द्रन्याध्यसषे त्व योगो मनसा ज्नामकारणं |

fagre qurifa प्रत्ययस्य ware वायोरपि werd भवत्येव। वदिरद्रव्यप्रत्यलमाते तु म STS A ar ude Waa वायुप्रभयोारेकल्व॑ग्डद्मत एव कित्‌ हित्वादिकमपि कचित्‌ सञ्चापरिमाणाद्गरह रेषारित्थाङः॥ ५१५॥ चे यागा मनसा शागकारणमिति। वदनः संया- भो ज्ञामसामान्ये कारशमित्ययेः॥ किं तच प्रमाणं सुषु- भिकाले स्वस त्यक्ता पुरीततिवर्मामेन मनसा ज्चागा- लननमिति॥ नमु सुषुर्तिकाले कि ज्ञानं भविष्यति च्रन्‌- NIST ACTS वा । ATG अनुभवसामय्यभावात्‌। तथा fer चाचुषादि प्रत्ये चचुरादिना सर ममःसंया- गख रेतुलात्‌ । तदभावादेव म चाचुषादिप्रत्यकं ्ा- गादेरभावादेव न मागसप्रत्यकतं WTA ऽपि प्रत्यसषमिति व्याजिज्ञानाभावान्‌ नामुसितिः।सादृ- श्छज्ञानाभावात्‌ नेापसितिः । पद ज्ञानाभावात्‌ मना- SATS इति। अनमुभवसामथ्यभावाम्‌ मागुभवः। उदाध- काभावाख MATS मेवं सुवु्निप्राक्षालात्पन्ने च्छादि- न्यक सत्सम्बन्धेनात्मनञ्च प्रत्यकप्रषङ्गार्‌ तद्तीद्धि यत्व मामाभावात्‌ सुपषुर्निप्राक्राले निर्व्विकण्यकमेव जायते CAT प्रमाराभावात्‌। अय ज्ञाममाजे ल्मनःसंचा-

भाषा

भिद्धा°

४८

मनोग्राद्रौ oe दुःखमिच्छा देषो मतिः छतिः॥ ye It ज्ञानं यन्निव्विकण्पाख्यं तद तोद्धि यिष्यति |

wa यदि कारणत्वं तदा राषनचाजुषादिप्रत्यक्काले सपान प्रायं खात्‌ । विषयवकुमंयागस्य aq: संयोा- गस्य च त्वात्‌ । परस्प॑रप्रतिबन्धादेकमपिवाम स्वा fafa wa कंचित्‌ पून्वीक्रयु्धा aqme रेतुले fey चाचुषादिसामग्याः स्ा्रंनादिप्रतिबन्धकत्वमम्‌- भवानुरोधात्‌ कर्यत दति । अरन्ये तु BATT Wadia भ्रागहेतुलं कल्पये चाचुषादि प्रतच- काले लकूयृगःसंयेा गाभावान्न स्याम प्रत्यच्तमिति वद्न्ति॥ सनोग्राद्यं सुखं दुःखमिच्छादेषोा मतिः रतिरिति। मनो जन्यप्रचविषय tad: मतिज्नानं । छतिः waar: । एवं सुखलत्वादि कमपि atrary । vaarvanfa मनोा- are: । किन्तु मगेामाजरस्य गोचर इत्यनेन पूव्वमृक्- लार्‌ श्रत माकरः ॥ ५९ ॥

नागं ufafaaure तदतीणि यमिष्यत.इति। चःमंयागाद्यनन्तरं चर इत्याकार azarfefafad ज्ञानं भ सम्भवति । पूर विश्ेवणख चरलादेश्ौना- भावात्‌ | विजिष्टमुद्ध विभ्रेषणश्रानस arcuate | तया च प्रथमतो चरघरव्वयेर्भभिष्ामवगादहि जानं जायते तरेव मिखव्विकन्पकात्मकं ae म प्रत्य । तथा

| 6 भाषा werd षद्धिषे रेतुरिन्ियं करणं मतं ॥ ५७॥

सिङ्का° fe विषयागवगाडिन्नागमस्व vad म भवति । azay जामामोति weer तजात्मनि भानं प्रकारीभूय भाषते | शाने चरस usa a: प्रकारः सएव विशे षण मित्युच्यते | विगरेषणे afgiad तदिगेषणताव- च्छेदकमित्युच्यते । विगेषेएतावच्छेदकप्रकारकं wet विरिष्टवेयिष्छज्चागकारणं। निध्विकर्पके च घटादिकं ग प्रकारः | तेन चटलादिविजिष्ट्वटादिप्रैभिष्ठभानं भामे न स्भवति। *आत्यतिरि कपदार्थज्नानस्व किञि- ङषोपरकारकलनियमात्‌ ॥ ave ufea. रेतुरिति। sande ave समवायसम्नन्पेन कार्‌ । व्रष्यसमवेतानां जातिगृणक- Wat wae खाश्रयसमवायसम्बस्धेन कारणं । दव्य समवेतणमवेतानां गृणलक्भवरूपलादीनां प्रत्यक सवाञ्रयममवेतसमवायमम्नन्भेम कारणमिति दडि- यमिति । च्रत्रापि परञ्चिध इत्यनुषज्यते | इङियलमतु न लात्तिः। एचिवीलादिना खाद्कप्रसङ्गात्‌ । किमु शब्देतरोद्रू तविभेष गृणा नाञ् यले उति भ्नकारणम- मःसंयागाञ्र यल ्रात्मादि वारणाय सत्यम्तं।उद्भूतविगे- WIGS WT AI सत्वात्‌ । agatha fava wa

*uzarqqetca चडाटिजिगिश्ज।नं न oat इति qrig far: - पाठेानाकरः ॥

५९ भाषाः विषयेन्दियसम्बन्धो व्यापारः सोऽपि षद्धिधः।

विद्धा" रूपाद्‌खक्षि सनात्‌ उद्भूतेति sqaat म आतिः शएक्षलादिना सङ्करात्‌ ॥ न च ्क्तवादिव्याणं नाभ्न- वोङ्गूतत्वमिति वाच्यं उद्भूतरूपलादिना चाचुषा अजभकतामुपपन्तेः । किन्तु षएक्तलादिव्याप्यमनुङ्ूतलं माना तदमावङ्कटोद्मूतलं। तच संयोगादावपि। तथा 4 WATT RATT: damfraquecear fa- शेषेति । कालादिवारणाय fated 1 इद्धियावयव- विषयस॑यो गख्ठापि प्राचां मते प्रत्य्तजमकलात्‌। दद्द यावयववारणाय कालादौ रूपाभावप्रत्ये घन्निकर्ष- रक्तया कारणोभूतख्चचुः ंयेगाद्या्रयस काला- रेख वारणाय मनःपदं ्षानकरणमित्यपि तदार- णाय कारणमिति ।्रसाघारणं कारणं करणं | असा- WITUR BWC ॥५७॥ favafxaaaait व्यापारः साऽपि afew cha | व्यापारः सन्निकषंः॥ why सक्जिकर्ष॑मुदाहरणदारा द्यति) द्रव्यग्रहदृति। द्रव्यप्रत्यषमिरियसंयोागजन्ये। Rena दृदियसंयुक्रषमवायजन्यं । एवमे ऽपि॥ वस्तुतस्तु ured प्रति चकःसंयोगः कारणं। द्र व्यसमवेतचाक्ृषं प्रति चकलुःसंयुक्रसमवायः। द्रयस- मवेतसमवेत चा षं प्रति मंयुष्षमवेतममवायः। एवम-

UR भाषा० RATA संयोगात्‌ संगुक्तसमवायतः ॥ ५८ ॥

fagre न्यजापि fafeaia कार्णकारणभावः । परु परमा- qe Med एथिवीपरमाक्ञ एथिवीलश्च wy कथं UMA तच परम्परया TANS महस्यमम्बन्धसख च विद्यमामलात्‌ । तथा fe ea जातिरेकेव चट नीले परमाखनोले च वर्सते।तथाचं महत्व सम्बन्धा चरनीखलमाद्‌ाय aA! खूपसम्बन्धसतर- भयमाद्‌ायेव anal एवं Wane घटादि कमादाय सहत्वसम्बन्धा मेष्यः । एष॑ चाथा तदीयस्प्भाशि च सज्ायाखाचृषप्रत्यचं स्सात्‌ | MATT RAK ITAL Ey | मरस्वावस्छिन्नचचुःसंयुक्रममवायस्य द्रव्यसमवेतसचा चुष- WAS ताद्‌ शचचुः्मयुह्स मवेतसमवायष्य द ष्यसमवेत- षमवेतलाचुषे कारणलवं वाच्यं । त्यश्च परमाणुनो- शारो न नीखललादिगरहः । परमाणुचचुःसंथागस्छ मदस्वावच्छिश्नला भावात्‌ ॥ ` एवं वास्वारौ म सचादि- aye । तच चघुःमयास्य रूपावच्छिश्नलाभावात्‌ । एव ` यत्र ay मध्यावच्छेरेनालाकमंयागखकचुःसंयागम्तु. ATARI तच चरप्रद्यक्ाभावादालाकमसंयागाव- (axe चचुःसंयेगे विगरेषणं Zan एवं earls प्रत्ये लक्संयोगः कारणं" दउवष्यसमवेतस्पां * स्वक्‌संयुक्तसमवायः । द्रष्यसमवेलसंमवेतस्यार्मप्रत्यचे |

५९

भाषा" AG समवेनानां शन्दस्य समवायतः ॥ ५९ ॥ AGM समवेतसमवायेन तु यदः |

रमी = roe

fegre तक्‌संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः कारणं । जरापि मरत्वाव- स्िश्नतव उद्नुतसखशावच्छिन्रलस् yeaa ary ॥ एवं AMMA घ्राणसंयक्रममवायः। गन्धसमवेतख घ्राण- जन्यप्रत्य् घराणसंयुक्तसमवेतशमवायः कारणं ॥ एवं THs रसनासंयुक्रसमवायः | रससमवेतस्य रासम- प्रत्ये र सनासंयुक्रसमवेतसमवायः कारं | भब्द प्रत्ये Baral meqaanara: | wee समवेतश्रावणप्रत्यसते जओआ- आवद्धिश्नसमवेतसमवायः कारणं 1 अज aaa प्रत्यकं सै किकं माध्यं । वच्यमाणमलाकिकं wad chra- मैयोागादिकं विनापि भवति॥ एवमात्मनः vara ममः- संयोगः ।आत्मस मवेतमा नसपरत्य चे ममः संयुक्तसमवायः, ओआत्मममवेतसमबेतमा भस प्रत्यखे मनः संयुक्समवेतस- मवायः कारणं | अरभावप्रव्यचे समवायप्रत्यक्तेच इटि यसम्बन्धविषेषणता Ya: ॥ वैशषिकमते तु न समवायः प्रत्यचः। भ्र यद्यपि विश्रेषणता भानाविधा aut fe भूतल चटामावः संयक्तविभेषणतया डते । सञ्चारो रूपाद्यभावः मंयुक्तसंमवेतविभेषणतया । wears Saat: मंयुक्समवेतसमवेतविजेवकशतया | अब्दाभावः केत्रल-

५४

भाषाः विशेषणतया तद द्भावानां TAT भवम्‌ ॥ fo

यदि स्यादुपरभ्येतेत्येवं यतर प्रसज्यते । सिद्धा मरोतावच्छिन्नविज्ेषणतया । काः warn: ओज्रावच्छिश्चममवेतविन्रेवखतया । एवं warafear- भावे खलाभावादिकं विजेषण विशेषणतया । एव॑ चटा- भावाद पटाद्यभावः संयुक्तविजेषणतिजेषलतया | एवमन्यदणषध। तथापि विकेषणतालवरूपेखेकेव सा गण्छते अन्यया Wer सज्िकषं इति uret प्रवादो च्यारन्ये-

तेति ॥ ५८॥ ५९ ॥ ६० ॥

यरि स्यादुपलभ्येतेति । mane’ येग्यामु- पणयः कारणं । तथाहि RATT यटादिश्नाने जाते चटाभावादिकं न जायते सेमाभावापलमो प्रतिय गपलस्ाभावः कारणं । तत्रापि येोागणताणपे- चिता। साच प्रतियाभिसखप्रसश्जनप्रसजिजितप्रतिया- fanaa तद्‌ यंश प्रतियागिनेा बरार; wera प्रसञ्िजित उपलमारूपः प्रतियोगी यस्व स खपलमा- भावाऽभावप्रत्यके रतु: । तयाः fey यच्ालाकम॑योागा- दिकं ada तच यद्यत्र घटः स्यात्‌ तिं उपलभ्येत इत्थापारथित्तं wai aa चराभावादिमप्रत्यक्चं भवति अन्धकारे तु मापादयितं waa इति. तेन चटाभा- वादेरन्धकारे चाचुषप्रत्यस्ं म Ulnar भवत्येव।

\

भा"

fate

५५.

nerd समवायस्य विशेषणतया भवेत्‌ ॥ ९१॥ अलोकिकः स॒न्निकर्षस्तिविधः परिकीर्तितः।

्रालाकसंयोगं विनापि स्ार्भनमरत्यललखापादयितं शक्यत्वात्‌ WAH यद्योग्यं तदभावम्तु न प्रत्यक्तः। | तजर गुरलादिप्रत्यचस्यापादयितुमशक्यलात्‌ । वाची RITA: | पाषाणे तरभाभावः। HB तिक्ताभावः। Wal शब्दाभावः। आत्मनि सुखाभावः । एवमादय-. wufafigasd gaa | तत्त प्रत्थचसखापाद्यितत क्य त्वात्‌ । संसगाभावप्रत्यकते प्रतियेाभिने योग्यता। ऋ्रन्यो- न्याभावम्रत्यक्ते त्वधिकरणयेग्यताऽपेकिता । अतस- आरो पिजाचादिमेराऽपि weet UA एव ॥६९॥

wad लाकिकालाकिकमेदेम दिविषं। तक लै किक प्रत्यक्ते षोढा सन्निकर्ष afar: । अक्ञोकिक सक्िकषंानिदामों वदति। अलौकिक इति। व्याधारः afaad: । सामान्यलनणेति । सामान्ये wad यस्या cad: । तच लकणपदेन यदि सखष्टपमव्यते तदा सामान्यस्तरूपं प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यथा waa । तचेदधि- aaa gan yaya भकारौभूतं Frei aur fe यत्र thradgnr धूमादि सद्धिजेव्यकं धूम इति भानं

आनं । तजन जाने धूमं प्रकारः । yaaa सन्निकर्षेण

धूम इत्येनं रूपं सकलधुमविषयकं wet जायते |

५९

भाषा० सामान्यलक्षणा ज्ानलक्षणा योगजस्तथा ॥ १९॥ आआसक्िरा्रयाणान्तु सामान्यन्नानभिष्यते |

-~ ~~ ~ न

सिद्धा wa यदि इद्धरियसम्बद्धमित्येवाच्यते तदा पूली- परमे धूमलभमामन्तरं रकलधुमविषयकं Wet न सात्‌ । तत्र धूमलेन मह रृद्धियसम्बन्धाभावास्‌। मते त इडियमम्बडुं धुलोपरसं तदिजेग्यक धूम दति writ तच प्रकारीभूतं धूमलै प्रत्यासत्तिः ॥ trav fear ww: xy वहिरिग्धियस्यले। मागणे त भागप्रकारोभूतसामान्यमा wearer: । अतः शब्दादिना यत्किञ्चित्‌ पिाचाथुपखिते मागमः सक- सपिशाचादिनाधं उपपश्चते॥ परन्तु समागानां भावः सामान्यं we what धुमलादि कचिजाभित्यं च- रादि यत्रैका चटः सये गेभ भूतले समवायेन कपाले शातस्सदममतरं aaaraa agzaat भूतलादीगां कपालादौर्मां वा wrt wafa श्रे Fre ware येग सम्बन्भेन waa तेन सम्बन्धे अधिकरणामां प्र- mata: । किन्तु यत्र तहुरनाश्रानन्तरं तदरवतः स्मरणं जातं तत सामान्यणकणया सर्भवषां ayzaat भान॑नस्यात्‌ । सामान्यस्य तद्‌ानीमभावात्‌॥ QR faq <feuaagfarest घट इति wrt | aa परदे इद्दियसम्बन्धं विभापि तादूत्रजाग-

yo भाषा० तदिन्दियजतद्टमागेोधसामग्यपेच्छते ॥ ९२ ॥

fagre प्रकारीभूतषामान्यख wary तादृ भानं कुतानजा- यते । तस्मात्‌ सामान्यन्नानं wereld तु सामान्यभि+ wares आ्राषन्तिरित्यारि॥ आरासज्िः प्रत्याशतन्तिरिव्ययः। तयां च सामान्यलसखेत्य च wayne विषयाऽ्चः | तेम सामान्यविषयकं wrt प्रत्यासन्िरित्य्यी ead ॥ मनु चचुःसंयागारिकं विनापि सामान्यश्नानं यत्र वर्तंते तत्र ख्कलखवरारीगां चाघुषादि पत्यक aga Are) तदिद्दियज इति ॥ ward: यदा वहिरिन्ियेण सा- मान्वलकषफया जानं जननीयं तदा aafafagfafe तत॒सा मान्य तदि द्धि यजन्यश्चागसामपरो अपेता t माच सामी चचुःसंयागालाकसंयागादिकं। तेगान्ध- करार VITAL तादृशश्नानं म जायते॥६१॥ गमु ज्ञागलक्तणा naval ase जानरूपा सामा- WMG Ty ज्ञानरूपा तदा WAAL A VITA ATs) विषयी ve weta व्यापारो ज्ानलचला eft षामा- न्यलकखणाप्रत्यासन्िदिं तदाश्रयस्य Wea लनयति। जागलचणाम्रथासन्तिस्त यदिषयकं wrt awa मर- त्याश््तिरिति । अज्रायमर्यः । प्रत्ये सन्निकै विना भामं म बम्भवति। तया च सामान्यशशकणां विमा धूम-

ay waa धूमानां afeaa षकलखवङ्गीनाञ्च are |

भाषा०

fazre

Y=

विषयो यश्य aia व्यापारो श्ानलच्णा । योगजे दिविध प्राक्त युक्तयु्छानभेदतः॥ ९४ ॥

कर्थं भवंतु ATS VATA TTT खीक्रियेत॥ न च सक- खवङ्किधूमभाभाभावे का चतिरिति वाचं प्र्यचधूमे वङ्िसम्बन्धस्य Whaat were चानुपखित- argat afwareir न वेति संशथानुपप्तिः। भन्ते त॒ साभान्यलचणया सकशधूमापशिता कालान्तरीय- दे ान्तरीयधूमे वर्धिव्या्यलसन्दे इः सम्भवति ॥ न च शाभांन्यलकणाखीकारे waaay wena ओते सार्गन्ञापत्तिरितिं वाच्यं । प्रमेयलेन सकलशप्रमेये जा- तेऽपि fafa सकलपद्ाथाभामज्नातलेन Vth वात्‌ ॥ एवं शागलेरणाया अखोकारो उरभिचन्दन- मिति wa वेरभंख्य भागं कथं खात्‌ । चद्यपि शा- मान्यलककथापि धारभभानं स्वति तथापि सार Hay भानं ज्ामलकणया । एवं यज yaa धूलीप- ससं शातं तजर धूलोपर लस्यागुव्यवमाये भागं ज्ान- WITT ॥

यागजे डिविषं इति । यो गाभ्यासजभिता waifa- ae: भ्रुतिपुराशादिप्रमाणक इत्यथैः । युक्युश्ानमभेद्त इति । crepe erate frag lett हविष्य fafa भावः ॥ ६४ ॥

uc भाष।° BMA VHA भानं PMG TRAIT | व्यापारस्तु परामशः करणं PTAA ॥ ९१॥ ` अनुमायां जायमानं लिङ्गन्तु करणं न चि।

सिङ्कार (ene घम्बदा भानमिति । योागाग्यासवश्रीरुतमा- गमः खमाधिसमासादितविविधषिद्धियुक्र्व्युश्यते । अयमेव वि्निष्ठधो गवत्ताद्‌ व्रियुक्त इत्यण्युच्यते। सर्ववरेति। चिग्ाषदकारिणं fata: । भागं wafararet ward) अपरो Part विषयव्याटृक्तमामसः। चिन्ता ष्यानं ममशसतरेकागोकरसं | तत्‌ सरकारात्‌ YAT- च्छाव्यवरहितविप्रशुषानयीन्‌ प्रत्य्ीकरोतीव्ययैः ॥ अमुमितिं qrrzafa ॥ व्यापारख्विति । श्रन्‌ मार्या अमुमिती afer करणं । पराम व्या- पारः। तथाहि येन पुरषेण महामारा धूमे वक्े- व्यातिर्टहीता पञ्चात्‌ स एव पृरुषंः कचित्‌ पर्वताश अविच्छिन्नधूमां धूमलेखां पश्ति तदननारं धूमे वङ्धिव्याण इत्येवंरूपं व्यार्िस्मरणं भवति । तसाख वह्कि ाप्यभूमवानयमिति wei भवति स एव परा- at taped तद मन्तरं षथ्येताऽयं वद्धिमानिति जाग जायते । तदे वाजुमितिः। श्रत प्राचीमास्त व्याणलेन rear धूमादि कमन्‌सितिकरषं । दूषयति भाय- माममिति॥

भाषा

भद्ध

९४ अनागतादिलिङ्गेन न स्यादनुमितिस्तद्‌ा ॥ ९९ ॥ व्यापनस्य TAMAR: TaN उच्यते |

an atc EEEEREREEEEREER EERE RRERE nae

सिङ्ग्यागुमित्यकरणंले afware ॥ शमागता- रीति । य्चगुमिता fey करणं स्वात्‌ agro we गतेन विगष्टेन वा लिङ्गेन अनुभितिनं सात्‌ । अरम्‌- मितिकरणस्य faye तदा नो मभावात्‌ ॥६१५॥ GaN व्याप्त्य पथधर्मलधीरिति । व्याक्तिविजिष्टखय परेण

“ey पैजिष्वावगादिज्ञानममुमितिजमकं । तल व्याप्यः

पके इति wei परा व्याण्यवानिति wet वा। wafa- fag पे ष्याय इति ज्ञानात्‌ पके साष्टं इत्याका- रिका। पका व्या्वानिति जानात्‌ पः साध्यवानि- व्याकारिका ॥ दिविधादपि परामभात्‌ पकः साध्य वाभित्येवामुमितिरित्यन्ये । ननु बङ्किव्यायधुमवान्‌ asia शति ज्ञानं विनापि यत्र पर्व॑तो धूमवानिति परत्यष॑तता धूमे afeara इति स्मरणं भवति । तत्र ओगदयारमुभितिद्‌ज्रनात्‌ । व्याञ्षिविजिष्टवेशि- श्छावमारिक्नानं waa न कारणं किन्तु व्याणयतव- च्छदकप्रकारकपसधमतान्ञागलेग कारकलै आवन्न- कलात्‌ । विभिष्टतेभिष्छननानकन्पने शारवा चेति चेच । व्याप्यतावच्छेदकाज्चानेऽपि वद्िव्याप्यवाजिति ज्ाना- द्‌ मुमिुत्यक्तेः । सावां व्यातिप्रकारकपक्धमता-

६९ भाषा० MA: साध्यवदन्यसिन्नसम्नन्ध GSA ॥ ९७॥ `

fegre ज्ञामलेमेव कारणत्वं । किञ्च धूमवान्‌ पन्वैत दति शा~. मारमुमित्थापल्षिः। व्याणतावच्छेदकीग्तघुमलप्रका- रकपशधर््ताश्चामख्य मच्वात्‌ ॥ न च तदागीं शृदय- माणशव्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपखधम्म॑तान्नामस्य देतु- afafa वाच्यं । Sve व्याश्निग्ररे मेषस्य पष्ठध्ंता- श्षामादभुभितिः स्यादिति । यरि त तत्‌पुरषीयश्- च माखव्याणतावच्छेद कप्रकारकततृपुरूषीयपकधर्मता- जानं तत्‌पुरषीयाममिते रेतरश्यते तदा अनमका- कारणमावः॥ मन्मते त॒ खमवायेन व्यार्तिप्रकारक- wean समवायेनामुमितिं erent ना- ममाकार्कारणभावः। यदि त॒ व्यार्निप्रकारकं wt पलधण्मताश्ानस्च qa कारकमित्युच्यते तदा का- गणकारणभावदयं बङ्किव्यायोा धूम जालाकवाम्‌ Gala इति ज्रानादष्यममितिः स्यादिति । इत्यश्च यत्र न्नान- इयं wate विजिष्टशानं कल्पनीयं । फलमुखगेारव- ष्टाद्‌ाषलात्‌ दति ॥ qa नाम agra: aa का afaftaa आह ॥ व्यातिरिति । साध्यवद्‌न्येति । afeary धूमा- ferret साध्या वह्धिः। area महानसारिः।तद- न्या wage: | acefaea yaaa सचणएवमन्वयः

९९ We Wal चेतुमन्निष्ठविरशाप्रतियोगिना |

fagre धूमवान्‌ बङ्ेरित्याश साच्यवरन्यसिन्रयःपिष्डारा वहधिस्वाशातिव्यात्भिः । अच येम easy साच्यं Aaa way साध्यवान्‌ RE । अन्यथा समवायसम्नसेन afeary वङ्ेरवयव्दग्येा प्रहागसारिः। तज YR विद्चमानलादष्या्तिमषक्गात्‌ । साष्यवद्म्य्च खाष्यव- ष्वावच्छिन्तप्रतियेागिताकमेद्वान्‌ Ire । सेन यत्‌- किञश्चिदहिमान्‌ महानभारिः aa wees पुम aac भ ofa: येनं सम्बन्धेन रे तुखेन सम्बन्धेन शाध्य- वंश्न्यास्तिलं बरं । तेन प्राण्यवद्न्यस्िन्‌ धुमावयवे Ye . समवायसम्बन्धेन waste न सतिः | साष्यवद्‌- arated साग्यवद्‌म्यटन्िललावच्ि्राभावः । तेन धूमवान्‌ वकेरित्यत्र साध्यवद्न्यद्दादि ठभ्िलाभा- Asta मातिष्यांिः । अज्र यद्यपि get गृलकम्मीन्य- लविजिष्टसत्वादित्याशा विजिष्टसन्तायाः watrarg- क्यात्‌ साष्यवैद्न्यस्मिन्‌ गुणादावहसिलं मासतोति तयापि रेत॒तावच्छेदकरूपेणाद्न्तिरवं are । शेतुता- वच्छेदकः तादूत्रठत्तितानबच्छेद कमिति फलिताः | ay कवलाण्वयिक्नोयलारौा साध्ये साष्यवदन्याप्रषिड-

aizanfi: ॥ ६७ ॥ faq सज्ञावान जातेरित्यादेप माध्यवदम्यस्जिन्‌

९९

भाषा" साध्येन VAC MMT IA ॥ ९८॥ ,

चङ.

QAM रेतताषण्छेदकषमनन्पेभ घमवाधेन ठ्न

| श्प्रसिडलारव्या्निञ्चात aren अथवा रेतमननिरेति।

देत॒मतिं fret ठन्तर्यख सतया । विरडाऽमावः। तथा च हेतपिकरणठन्तिर्याऽभावः तद्प्रतियागिना

साथ्थेन षड Rar: सामानाधिकरण्यं anf: | यथ्चपि

वेह्छिमान्‌ धुमादित्यारो देलपिकरणपग्वेतादि टत्य-

` भावमतियोागिलं तत्तद छयादेरणीव्यव्याक्भिः ॥ न च

सभागाधिकरखवङ्किधुमयोारेव व्यारिरिति वाच्यं । तदक रणुभयामावस्वारेकसल्वेऽपि इयं नीति प्र- तीतेः । गुणवान्‌ द्र व्यलादित्यारावव्या्तेखच । तथापि साष्यतावच्छेद्‌ कं प्रतियेोागितागवच्चछेदकं तदवच्छिन्न- सामानाधिकरण्यं व्यात्तिरिति वाच्यं ॥ ननु खूपतव्या- प्जातिमान्‌ wattage साध्यतावच्छेदक- खूपलव्यायजातयस्ासां ¶दक्तलादिखसरूपाणां नीलघ- टादिदस्यभावप्रतिवागितावष्डेदकलमणीत्यव्यात्िरि- ति चेल । awe cerca. र्ूपलव्याप्यजांतिमत््व्येव साध्यतावच्छेद्‌ कलात्‌ ।ग डि तादृ बरधम्मावच्छिन्नाभावः कापि एयिय्यामस्ति । रूपलव्याप्यजातिमाम्‌ नासीति Fars: । घाध्यादिमेरेन व्याक्नेभरात्‌। तादृ रस्ये शाध््रतावच्छेदकतावच्छेद्‌कं प्रतियेमितावच्छेदकता-

qe

fagte मवच्छेदकमिन्येवं शचणधरटकमित्यपिवदेन्ति । एवं CUA साध्ये परम्पराषम्बद्धं दण्डलारिकमेव साध्य marae प्रतियागितागवच्छेद्कनमिति वाच्यं | हेल- धिकरणष्च रेत॒तावदेदकविभिष्टाभिकरलं वार्थं । तेन व्यं गृणकश्मान्यलविजिष्टषत्वारित्यारै इड्‌ वच्वाभि- करलगृादिमिष्टामावप्रतियागिलेऽपि Fata मा- ` aifa: | रेतुतावरेदकमम्बन्धेन रेवसिकरणं Frei तेन समवायेन धूमाधिकरणतदवयवनिष्ठाभावप्रतियाभि- asta वड नाव्यात्तिः । अभावं प्रतियागिष्यधिकरणा बोध्यः । रेन कपिसंथेनी रतद्ललारित्थारै मूखाव- केरेमैव एतदुकटत्तिकपिसंयोगाभावप्रतियेाभिलेऽपि dare माव्या्चिः॥ म च प्रतियागिष्यसिकरणतं प्रति- येाग्यनधिकरणठसिलं । तदा तयेवाव्याज्िः । प्रतिये- गिनः कपिसंयेगसख्वागपिकरंणगृलारा वर्ते याऽभा- awea मूलावक्तेदेन wera चरि प्रतिचोग्धधिकर- wafiad तडा मंयाभगिष्वादित्थाद्‌ावतिद्धा्िः | warfare HUTT यः संयागाभावसखछ प्रतिया- ग्यधिकरणद्रष्यटञ्जिल्वादिति are । रदेष्वधिकरणे प्रतियेग्यनधिकरणंहन्तिलविजष्टस्त विवलितलात्‌ | खप्रतियोग्यनभिकरंणीभूतरहेलपिकरणटत्यभाव इति frend: । प्रतियोग्यनपिकरणं ख प्रतियागितावच्डे- ` दकसम्नन्धेम प्रतियोगितावंच्छेद्‌कावङिक्नागसिकरग

९१५

भिद्धा° and) तेग विदिष्टसक्ावान्‌ जातेरित्यारे। जायभिक- रणगृणारे विभिष्ठसक्ताभावमप्रतियोगिखमागापिकर- wasfa a तिः । एषं साध्यतावद्धेदकसम्बन्पेन प्रति- येोग्यमभिकरणत्वं are तेन wear इष्यलादि- व्याड दइव्यलापिकरणचटादे विषयतासम्बन्धेन न्नाना- धिकरणल्येऽपि स efi: । इत्यञ्च वज्गिमान्‌ पूमादि- त्थाद धूमाधिकरणे समवायेन afefateresta न सतिः ॥ ननु प्रतियोामितावद्ेद्‌ कावि यख्य कम्व- चित्‌ तत्‌सामान्यष्य वा च्रमधिकर शत्वं । यत्‌ fafya- प्रतियोाभितावक्ेद काव्रङिश्नस्य वामधिकरणलमुष्रं । आये कपिसंयोगी एतदु लादित्याद्‌ावव्यात्िः। कपि- संयोगाभावस्य fe म्रतियागितावदेदकावदिना war- efacta कपिसंयोगे भवति तदमधिकरणञ्च zy इति । fata प्रतियोगिष्यसिकरणाभावाप्रभिड्धिः | wigan पूर्व्वकणटन्तिलविशिष्टखमभावात्मकम- - तिथे गिसमानाधिकर लात्‌ ॥ ग च वह्किमान्‌ धूमा- दित्यादेा षराभावारेः पूर्वक्षण ट्ितविभिषटखभा- वात्मकप्रतियाग्यसिकरणतवं यशपि पव्व॑तारेखयापि साध्यता वद्धेरकसम्नन्पेम ततप्रतियोग्यमधिकरणदरसि- व्वमस्सेषेति कथमप्रसिद्धिरिति ari wera ar aQuagwa चटाभावात्मकतया घटाभाव afe- रपि प्रतियोगी acfuareyg पर्व्वतारोति क्रमेण

4

९९

fagre प्रतियेोगिष्यधिकरणश्ाप्रमिद्धलात्‌ । यरि च घटा- भावारै वद्युभावादिर्भि्न cepa . तथापि धूमा- ` भाववाम्‌ वक्रुभावादि्याद्‌ावव्याज्निः। तत्र साध्यताव- देदकमम्नन्धः खरूपसम्बन्धः | तेग सम्बन्धेन सम्यैसेवा- ` भावस्य च पृव्व्॑णटृन्निलविश्रिष्टखभावात्मकप्रतिये- ग्यभिकरणलं रेलधिकरणस्येति । दतीये त कपिम योगाभावकान्‌ आत्मलारित्याद्‌ावय्यात्निः |. wara- खत्तिकपिसंयागाभावाभावः afar च गृण- लात्‌ तक्षतियेगितावेदकं गुणणामान्याभावल्रमपि तद वंहिश्रानंसिकरणशत्व रेसिकरणस्यात्मन इति | Ady यादृ्नप्रतियागितावद्धेदकावङ्िख्नांमधिकरणलं रेतुमतसादूश्नप्रतियोभितानवक्ेद कतरस्य faafaa- त्वात्‌ ॥ नन्‌ काला घटवान्‌ कालपरिमाणाद्‌ ca- arate: । प्रियागिष्यधिकरणाभावाप्रसिद्धरदल- धिकरणस्य महाकालस्य जगद्‌ाधारतया षर्व्वषाम- भावा साष्यतावष्रेदकसम्बन्धेन कालिकविंशेषणतया प्रतियेोग्यधिकरणत्वात्‌ ॥ जच केचित्‌ महाकालमे- इविशिष्टवटाभावस्ततच प्रतियागिष्यधिकरण्मदहाका- ww घटाधारेवच्तेऽपि महाकालभेद विभजिष्टचराना- धारलात्‌ । महाकाले महाकालभेदाभावात्‌।॥ वसु ag पअरतिधे गितावष्ेदकसम्नन्धेन प्रतियोाग्यनधिकर- शोडतरेलपिकरणद्टत्वमावप्रतियोगितासामान्ये यत्‌

.

fagre मम्बन्धावदिस्रत्यद्न्(वदिन्नलेभयाभावेस्तेन सम्ब aa तड्‌ मोवक्धिखनम्य तच Waar माध्यं । व्याप- कसामानाधिकरण्छञ् wf | यत्सम्बन्धः साध्यता. वेद कसम्नन्धः | यद्धं; साध्यतावकेदकः। -तचर यदि यङ ष््ावदिश्नलाभावमा अ्रभिन्युच्यते तदा -खमवायेन ar वह्मभावस्तस्य प्रतियागितावेदकसम्बन्पः समवा- यस्तेन प्रतियेग्यनधिकरणपम्वतारि दन्तिः ख एव तत्‌- waaay वह्कित्वमित्थव्या्िः ara । यदि च यत्‌सम्बन्धावदधिनल्ाभावमात्रमुच्यते तदा तादू- अस्वर dain घराभावस्य प्रतियोगितायां संयो गस- म्बन्धावक्िश्नलसत्वादव्यात्निः स्यादत उभयमुपाज्तं। ` इत्यञ्च काला घटवाम्‌ कालपरिमाणारित्थारो dar- गसम्बन्धेन या चरामावस्तत्‌प्रतियागिनेा षरस्यानधि- करे ARTS व्ल॑मामः स एव संयागेन घराभाव- खस्य प्रतियागितायां कालिकसम्नन्धावच्डिम्रलघरला- वच्छिन्नलाभयाभावस्वान्नावयात्निः । धूमवाम्‌ वकेरि- व्यादावत्िव्यातषिवारणाय सामान्यपदमुषान्तं । गम्‌ प्रमेयवह्िमाम्‌ धूमारित्यारोा प्रमेयवड्िलावच्छिनि- लमप्रसिद्धं। गृरुधम्॑खानवच्छेदकलादिति चेत्‌। न। कम्बृशोवादिमाम्‌ माखोति प्रतीत्या कम्बृ्ीवादि मला वच्छिनप्रतियागिताविषयीकरणेन गृरुधन्मंसाणयवरेर- RAMA THA WET

+ ge

भाषा० सिधाधयिषया श्यूज्यसिद्धियग्र नं विद्यमे।

frat

qesftafuaa wa fe acres faary- यिषया आल्या भिद्धिरित्यादि । भिषाधयिषातिर्‌ इ- विजिष्टायाः शिद्धेरभावः पणता तदाम्‌ पच इत्यर्थः| faarufaqrard न amar. विनापि बिषाभयिषां धमगर्जितेम मेषागुमानात्‌ fagr सत्यामपि निषाष- यिषा सत्वेऽनुमितिभंवत्येव । अतः भिषाधयिषाविरद- fafued लिङा विरेषणं। तया च यजत्र बिद्धिनाकि- तत्र मिषाधचिषाथां मत्याममतव्यामपि पख्ता। a4 4 रिषाधयिषाऽस्ि तज सिद्धो म्रत्याममादामपि पणता येच च सिद्धिरस्ति मिषाघयिषा च नास्ति तत म पचता । भििवाधयिषाविर इविजिष्टमिङ्धः सष्वात्‌॥ गमु: यत्र wilt fafa: मिषाधयिषा तत सिषाधयिषाकाले परामर्भनान्रान्नागुनितिः । यत्र शिडि परामभंसिषांधयिषाः क्रमेण भवन्ति तजर पिवाष- faarara Fagan प्रतिबन्धकाभावारेवामुमितिः। यज मिषांधयिषामिड्धिपरामनाः श्नि तत्र पराम- Ware. सिषाधयिषिव नास्ति । एवमन्यत्रापि बिडि- कामे परामलकासेन मिषाधयिषा॥ येाग्यविर्भुविश्रेषग्‌- णानां धागपथनिकेपात्‌ कथं मिषाधयिषाविर्‌ दविनि- ad सिद्धर्विगेषशमिति रचेत्‌। न । यज बह्किव्याणधूग-

tna भाषा० FTAA चरत्नित्वन्नानादनुमितिभयेत्‌ | ९८ ॥

fagre वाग्‌ addr वङ्किमानित्यनुमितिः। सुखसाधममिति प्रत्यस्तं सरणं वा। ततः सिषाघयिषा। तच पसषतासम्प- भये सिषापयिषाविरइविभिष्टलविगशेषणस्यावश्कल्ना- fafa । wad ara यादृश्रयादृज्रसिषाधयिषामत्त् fafgra यलिङ्गकानुमितिस्ताद्‌ भसिषाधयिषाविर- रविभिष्टषिद्यभा वस्निङ्गका नमिता wear तेन षि- द्धिपरामभ्रंसत्ेऽपि यत्‌किञ्चिज््ानं जायतामितीख्छा- यामपि arafafa: | वह्िव्याणधूमवोम्‌ पर्ता वङ्ि- मागिति प्रत्य्तसन्वे प्रत्यच्तादिभिन्नं वङ्धिज्ञानं sra- तामितीच्छायान्त्‌ ` भवत्येव । एवं yee आलाकेन वङ्िमनमृमिनेमोतीक्धायामपि नानुमितिः, शिषाधयिपाविरइकाखे यादृ भ्रसिद्धिमल्वे नानुमिति- सादूभी दिद्धिविज्रिष्य तक्षदमुभितिप्रतिबन्धिका व- क्रव्या । तेन WIAA पाषाणमया वद्धिमानिति जागसत््रऽ्यमुमितेनं विरोधः परन्‌ पचतावच्छेद्क- समानाधिकरणेन शाध्यमिद्धावपि तद्‌वद्धदेनानमि- तिर भर॑मात्‌। प्तावच्छेदकावढेदेनानुमितिं प्रति प्त तावद्रेदकावक्देन बिद्धिरेव प्रतिबस्िका। पषठताव- केदकसामानाधिकरष्येनानुमितिं प्रति तु बिद्धिमाचं विरोधि) ददन बाध्यं । wa पर्षा गवेतिसंब्र- याममर्‌ यत्र पुर्षतलव्याप्यकरार्मागयं इति जागें

‘80

भाषा” अनेकान्तो विरुद्श्चाणसिद्वः प्रतिपत्तितः । fagre तज्रासत्यामनमित्छायां yaaa प्रत्यकं भवतिं ग ल- मुभितिर तेऽमृ मित्साविर्‌ हविभिष्टंसमामविषयकप्रत्यस- aan कामिमीजिन्ारारदिवत्‌ खातच्छेण प्रतिब- सिका । एव॑ परामभाननम्तरं चिनापिं saat पलादि प्रत्यलानुत्यत्तेः । प्रत्थशेच्छाविर शविनिष्टानु- fafaarad सिनश्नविषयकप्रायकते प्रतिबस्िका॥६८॥ प्रसङ्गसङ्गत्या देत्वाभामान्‌ विभजते । अनेकाम्न- इत्यादि । aweunm यदिषयलैन ज्ामस्यानुमितिवि- ` रोाधिलं ad तथाहि व्यभिचारादिविषयकलेन ज्ा- मस्यानुमितिविरोधिलात्‌ ते .ोषाः । यद्धिषयकलञ्च यादु शवििष्टविषयकलं Fre. तेन वाधभ्रमस्यानुमि- निविरोषिललेऽपि तत्र waar वद्युभाववाजिति fafae- साप्रभिङलान्न Var: | न च वद्युभावव्याणपा- षाणमयतवान्‌ wa दति परामर्शकाले वङ्किव्याय- WRT ea म स्धात्‌ तत्र व्युभावव्याणवाम्‌ we tf fafrewnufagarfsfa वाच्यं । दष्टापन्तेः। अन्यया वाधस्रमस्याप्नित्यदाषलापत्तेः | तस्मात्‌ तच AYAT- वब्या्यपाषाणमयलवाम्‌ दति परामभेकाले वद्किग्याण- . धूमस्य माभासलं भेमाद्नुमितिप्रनिबन्धमाते। Was ae thal द्यश्च साध्याभाववदुभिरेलारिकं रोषः तैदका च देत येन Karly सम्बन्धेनेति मव्याः। परे तुः

७९

भाषा० कालात्ययोपदिष्टश् VARTA पञ्चधा ॥ ७०॥ AY: साधारणस्तु स्यात्‌ स्याद साधारणे मतः ।

fagre यदिषयकलेन ज्ञानस्वानुमितिविरोषधिलं ace देला- भासलं सत्रतिपक्वे विरोाधिव्याघ्यादिकमेव तया ace रेते जनौगरूपषम्बन्पेम ॥ न चेवं वहिमान्‌ धूमादित्याडै वामे परे घाध्याभावविषयकल्वेनामुमितिविरोाधि- BITE तदस्वस्यापि सत्वात्‌ सदधतारपि वाधितलापन्तिरिति वाच्यं । तच were सम्नन्यला- ` कल्पनात्‌ । wa सत्रतिपकित इति व्यवहारेख तत्‌- BIT तत्र वाधितव्यवहाराभावादित्याङ्ः। ze गृमितिविरोधिन्वश्च श्मुमितितत्‌कारणान्यतरविरोा- भिलै। तेन एकरते व्यभिचार ग्रहे हेलन्तरेष्णामुभित्यु- त्पन्तेस्तद भावाद्यनवगाडिलाचच व्यभिचारन्नानख्छानु- भितिविरोधिलाभावेऽपि न चछतिरिति aga: ॥ या- Tear यावन्ता रोषास्तावदन्यान्यलं तत्र हेलाभासलं | पञ्चकथयनन्तृ तत्‌ समवस्वलाभिप्रायेख | एवं साघार ््ाचन्यतमलं अ्रनेकान्तिकलवं ॥ ७० ॥ थः साधारण इत्यादि | साधारणः साध्यवद्न्य- fata: । तेन च व्याक्भियरम्रतिबन्धः फरियते। असा- WITS: साध्यासमानाधिकरणा रतु: । तेन शाध्यसा- मानाधिकर्ग्रः प्रतिषध्यते। यथा शब्दा नित्यः शम्दलारित्यारा चाषाधारण्थं | शब्दाऽनित्यः चब्दला-

=

भाषा. तथेवानुपसं डरो चिधानेकाग्तिके। भमेत्‌ ॥ ७१ ॥

fagre femrat अ्रमाधारणष्छभ्रमः। अन्ये तु सपक्ताटभिर- | साधारणः | सपशः निखितसाध्यवाम्‌। इत्यञ्च wet stra: नब्दयलारित्याद पके यदा साध्यमिखयकदा arate aa हेत॒निखयादरिति वदन्ति ॥ अरन्‌ पमंहारी च श्रत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियागिसाध्यकादिः। तेन च व्यतिरेकव्या्चिग्रदप्रतिमन्धः क्रियते ॥ fares साधव्यापकोश्धताभांवप्रतिर्योगी । ज्यश्च माध्याभाव- पहसामग्नीलेन प्रतिबन्धकः it सत्‌प्रतिपक्ते तु प्रतिरेत्‌- माध्याभावमाधकः । अच तु -देतुरेषेति fare: 1 सा- ष्याभावसाधक एव 'साथ्यसाधकलेन उपन्यस्त दत्य - क्ििविजेभापम्धापकलाख विजेषः॥ सप्रतिपकः साष्या- भावग्याणवाम्‌ Vey अरग्ररीताप्रामाण्छकमाध्यव्याप्यव- तेनो पगम्थितिकालीनंसाध्याभावव्याणवच्ेनेा पग्यितिति - पयस्तथा Taya | अचर च परसखराभावव्याणवका- ae परख्रानुमितिप्र॑तिगन्धः फलं ॥ अत्र केचित्‌ यथा घराभावव्या्येव्ता ज्ञाने विद्यमानेऽपि चट चचुः- dara सति vezi जायते। यथाच aaa पोतत्वाभावव्या्यशद्खुःत्वत्ता ज्ञाने frase पोतः we इति सीजीायते एवं कारि दयव्याष्यवन्ादर्भमे कारिदयप्रत्यकरशूपंः dna भवति तथा सत्रतिपक्तले ` संनयरूपाममितिभ॑वयेव aa जचैककोारिव्याष्यदूर्भर्ग

SR

fagre तज्राधिकबलतया दितीयकारिभागपरतिषन्धान्न घं

भ्यः। फलबलेन चापधिकषममखलभावः कल्यत दति वदन्ति । तच्च । तद्‌ भावव्यायवन्ञान्नाने खमि तदुपनी- तभागविशेषभ्ान्दमेधारेरनुदयात्‌। सकिकयन्निक- षाजन्यङाषविगरेषाजन्यन्नानमातरे aw प्रतिबन्धकता । खाघवात्‌। न ढ्पनीतभागविभेषे wees च एथक्‌- भतिकन्धकता। गारवात्‌। तथाच प्रतिवन्धकसत्वात्‌ क- यमनुमितिः। न हि लाकिकमन्निकषंखसखे अत्यचमिव सप्प्रतिपदम्वले . संशयानमितिः प्रामाणिकी येभान- भितिभिन्नलेगापि fate) यज कोारिदयव्याणव- AT तत्रेभयवाप्रामाष्छन्चानात्‌ Mar नान्यया ऽष्डहीताप्रामाखकसेव fattfuyrne प्रतिबन्धक- त्वादिति॥

आग्रयाषिद्याद्यन्यतमलमसिद्धलं | आञ्रयासिद्धिः परे पषताबच्छेदकस्याभावः । यज च काञ्चनमयः पर्वता वङ्धिमानिति area तच qtr म काञ्चम- मय इति wrt विद्चमामे काञ्चनमयपर्ष्वते परा- मजं प्रतिबन्धः फलं i

सरूपाधिद्िस्ठ परे व्याणयलाभिमतसखाभावः। अत्र च दरो xe पूमादित्याश पके यण्यवा- भिमतख हतार भावे WA We खाध्यवयाणयरेतुमन्ा- न्नानस्ूपपरामर्ज प्रतिबन्धः फलं ॥

L

शद्धा.

Og

साध्यामिद्धिश्पि व्या्यलादसिद्धिः । मा च ang लाध्यतावश्छेदकाभावः। तथा खं काञ्चनमयवड्किमा- भिंत्याद aa साच्यतावच्छंद्‌काभावे ते माध्य ATA a कविजिष्ठसश्यव्यायवक्ाजानश्पेपरामनप्र-

«faa: SE

एवं Vie रेदुतावच्छंदकोामावः साधनापरमिदधिः।

चथा च काञ्चमैमयधूमादित्धारे रेततावच्छेदकवि-

निष्ट रेते ज्गाभाभावात्‌ तत्तद तकव्या्िन्नानार्‌ cat वः welt ud वङ्किमान्‌ नीखधूमारित्यादौ गृरतया

Aeyrd रेत ताभवच्छेरकमिति व्थाणलासिद्धिरि-

tafa वदन्ति

वाश्च परे साथ्याभ्रारि! । wrattfafay- निबन्धः फलं | तदर्िकतदमभावनिर्चंये लाकिकसन्नि- कर्षाजम्यशाषविनेषाभन्यतडर््िकतज्छागैमाते विरोा- Wat तु aa सियार qe मौध्यम॑सटतना- भमनुमितिकारणं । तददिरोषितैया वाध्पतिपच- यारदंलाभासवसितिः युक्तं । ए थिच्याभिंतर मेर -एता- | ङ्‌ ज्ामुमित्यमापकीः;। पुथ पके eerie भावात्‌, | अ्रप्रिद्धसाष्यकानुमित्यपलापापन्तेः । सा- wind विभामुभिल्युत्यततेशं॥ ud शाध्याभावन्नाने प्रमालज्ञाममपि म प्रतिबन्धकं ! प्रमाणाभावार्‌ गी Vay अन्यथा मप्रतिपराद्‌ावपि तैद भावव्यायक-

By

भाषा” यः सपक ag च भेत्‌ VI सः। fagre काश्चन प्रमालविषयकल्वेन प्रतिबन्धकतापक्तेः। जिन्त भ्रमलन्नगनामाखकन्दिता वाधादिनद्धः प्रतिबन्धकता। तज भरमलश्रङ्धाविचटने मामाण्ज्ञानं कषिदुपयुञ्यते ॥ ग च MVM पे tare व्यभिचारः पशे रेव- भावे खरूपादिद्धिरेव tre दति are) वाभज्चान- व्यभिचार ज्नानादेभदात्‌। किच wer परामभागन्तरं वाघमुद्धि स्तत्र व्यभिशारन्नानारे रकिञ्चित्‌करवाद्‌ वा- धस्त्ानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकल्वं वाच्यं । एवं चत्रात्पज्िचणा- afd चरा मन्धव्याणयषटयित्रीतल स्वनं ततर वाधस्येवं प्रतिबन्धकल्वं वाच्यं ॥ न च घटे TTA कथं वाध दूति वाच्यं । पचतावच्छेदकदेब्कालावच्छेर्‌नानुमिते- रनु भवसिद्धलात्‌ । * इति वाधतद्माणमिन्रा ये चे रेला- arene अपि तक्ष्य एवा नभवन्ति । अन्यया Vara avarqenfrer भिन्र एव । खतन्तेच्छेन मुनिना एयगुपाद्‌ानात्‌ । सत्मतिष- खब्याप्यस्त॒ म प्रतिबन्क दति प्रकरितेाऽर्थः ॥ ७९ ॥ य: खपे विपचे च भवेत्‌ साधारण्य सद्ति। षप- खविपशषटृन्तिः खाधारण card: 1 ede: साध्यवान्‌ । fave: साध्याभाववान्‌ विरङ्धवारकलाच सपचट्तिल-

+ दूति दिणकरासग्यतः पाठः ॥ सत्परतिप्तदाणभिन्चा या चे Sa स सन्ध्य Caan Kad पून्यपाडा{वरोकनः।

Og ; भाषा" यसतभयसार्‌ VMI स चासाधरणो मतः ॥ ७९॥ ` तथवानुपसं चारौ केवलान्वयिपक्षक । | यः साध्यवति नंवास्ि स विरद उदाहतः ॥७३॥

सिद्धा सक्र । वसता विपकटल्िलमेव वां । faqge साधा- रणेऽपि दूषकतावोजस्य भिन्नतया we पार्थक्यात्‌ ॥ BANAT व्याः स चामाधारशो मत नि सपष्विपसव्याट क care: ey: लाष्यवज्षया fafy- तः। विषक्त: साष्यप्रून्यतया भिखितः। भब्द नित्यः जम्द- लारित्थाडा थद्‌ ज्रम्देऽभित्यलषन्देद रदा शपेललै वि- quay घटलादीनामेव agrewyg weafata तरा तद्साधारणं। यदातु we नित्यलनिथ्यस्तदा arar- धारणः। इदञ्च प्राचां मतेन। नवीनमतं PA ॥७९॥ के वलान्वयिपचक एति।.केवसलाग्वयिषश्नावच्छिन्न- wax इत्यथैः । सव्व॑ममिसेयं प्रमेचलादित्याशा सनव स्येव पचलात्‌ सामानाधिकरख्छग्रद्वलान्तराभावी- सानुभितिः। इरणतु म सम्यक्‌। VHT घटमरचा- रथेऽपि तेरभावात्‌ | WY a षरचारागदसाव- तापि ्रन्नागर्ूपाषद्धिरंव न ठु anne तं ` तथापि कवलान्वयि साष्यकत्वं waft ॥ यः साधय वतीति । एवकारेण साथ्येव्वावच्छेदेन Yaar गा- धितः । तथा च साध्यव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगिनं ATU: ॥ ३ ॥

७७

भाषाः श्राश्रयासिदविरायया स्यात्‌ wenfafgcae | व्याप्यत्वासिद्विरपरा स्याद्सिद्वितस्तिधा ॥ ७४॥ Tafa पक्ता भवेन्मणिमयेा गिरिः। द्‌ द्रवयं RT ATS चासिद्विरथापरा ॥ ७५॥ व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपरा गीलधूमादिके भेत्‌ | विरद्रयोाः परामश tae सत्‌प्रतिपकिता॥ ७६॥ ALAA यच पक्स्त्वस षाध उदाहतः | उत्पत्निकारीनघरे गन्धादिर्य॑त्र साध्यते ॥ ७७॥

fagre श्रसिद्धिं विभजते। च्राञ्रयासिद्धिरित्यादि wos quifafsftfa 1 आ्राश्रयासिद्धिरित्यथैः। गील- धूमादिक द्ति। Nawal गुरुतया न देतुतावच्छे- दकं । समानाधिकरणव्याष्यतावच्छेदकधन्ौन्तराघ- fanaa व्या्यतावच्छेद कलात्‌ । धूमप्रागभावलसङ्गु- हाय समानासिकरणरेति॥ ७५॥ ` विङ्ड़योारिति। कपिसंया गतद्‌भावव्याणवस्वपरा- aisha न anfaufaaaaa on विरद्धयोारिति। | तथा च सषाध्यविर्डषाध्याभावव्या्यवन्ापरामभं- कालोनमाध्यव्याप्यवक्नापराम्भविषय इत्यथैः 1 ७६ ॥ माथ्यश्रून्य ति wa: पचतावच्छंद्‌कविर्िष्ट इत्यथैः । तेन घटे गन्धसक््रेऽपि न चतिः। एवं मूलाव- fear ae: कपिसंयागीत्यत्रापि ara oon

OG

भाषा MATS प्रथमतः पश्छतोा गवयादि क ।

firgte

TEAM TAL at या स्यात्‌ सा करणं Ha ॥७८॥ ARTA MATTE सुतिव्यापार उच्यते | गवयादिपदानान्तु शक्तिधौर्पमाफलं ॥ ७५ It पद शान्तु करणं दारं ततर TTT ।

उपमितिं व्युत्पादयति । यामीणखेति । यत्रावम्त- केन केमचिङ्‌ ate we मोमदृण गवयपद्‌- वाच्य दति gare ure कचिद्रण्छे गवया दष्टः तच Trager यत्‌ aq उपमितिकरकं ॥ ७८१. लदमगनरः गामदूभो गवयपदवा्यं दत्यतिरेनवा- कया्यसरणं जायते तरेव व्यापार्‌ः। तदनन्तरं ततं गवये गवयपदवाच्य इति set जायते agafafin i न लयं गवयपदवाच्य इत्युपंमितिः। Haare whin- गहाभावप्रमङ्गमत्‌ ॥ Oe ॥ | आग्दमाधप्रकारं cata | पदश्ञानण्लिति। नतु जायमानं पदं करणं । पदाभाकवेऽपि भमानिशाकारा शाम्दमाधात्‌ । प॑दर्यधीरिति । पदजन्यपदार्चसारष व्यापारः। aaa dew: प्रत्यसादिना पदायाप- स्थितावपि watered: | तत्रापि * art पद जन्यत - Ara) अन्यथो घटादिपदात्‌ समवायसम्बन्धेन WaT * पड्लम्दापंदातौापख्ितावपोति दिनकरोनाखा॥. नि

७५.

भाषाः META फलं तच MMM सदकारिणी ॥ ८० ॥

सिद्धा ° अस्मरणं जायते आआकानस्यापि जाग्दमाधापन्तेः। तति afauquraat: सम्बन्धः | अजेव भक्िज्ञानखाप- यामः । yet अङ्धिग्रदाभावे पर्‌ भ्रागेऽपि तत्‌ सम्नन्धेनं MTA: | VENTE सम्नसििन्नानविधयाऽथे- स्मारकलं। whiney पदेन सर पदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः।साचा- स्माच्छभ्टाद्यम्यौ बेद्धव्य CATT ASI | रधु faa माचि जक्गिरस्येव । एकाद रेऽरनि पिता माम SAT CMU च्छायाः सत्वात्‌ । Wyse त॒ स्ते भ शक्तिरिति amare: Wo rare रशरेच्छामशक्तिः fara. तैन आधुनिकसद्धेतेऽपि भक्तिरसोति वद्ज्ि॥ अक्ति व्याकरणारितः। aur fe अक्रिशद्ं व्याकरणेापमागकोाषाप्तवाकाड्गावहारतय। धाक्यस्य जेषादिषतेव॑दम्ति सान्निष्यतःसिद्धपदय्यदद्धाः॥ भातुप्रकुतिप्रत्ययादीर्नां wheat ग्याकणाद्भवति। कचित्‌ त सति वाधके त्यच्यतेऽपि । यथा वेयाकरषै- राण्यातस्य wilt अरक्िद्च्यते। 8a: पचतीत्यारोा कन्तु से जराभेदान्वयः । तज गओेारवाश्न अन्यते किन्तु wet winger लाघवात्‌ कति्यौत्ारा प्रकारीभूय भाषते॥ ग च कर्तुरमभिधानाच्‌ चेचादिपदागन्तर्‌ तीया श्यादिति वाच्य॑। कद्रंमद्धानभिषानख्य तच तन्तलात्‌ । सद्याभिधामयोागद्च कर्षालाद्यनवर्डः

To

fagre अचमान्तपदापश्लाणः Hees fatqeaared- ग्थाविषयलमर्थः | तेन V4 ca गच्छतीत्याङषम aa सद्खान्वयः । यत्र कम्रा म विन्नेषणलतात्पसै तदा- Tey प्रथमानेति। यदा चाल्थातिरिक्राविजेष- wa WANTAGE: | तेन चेदव Wes चेचा- देवरं । साकं पचतीत्यारा सोाकारेवारणाय चं famaced । तस दितीयाकोापस्याण्लादारणशं । एवं व्यापारेऽपि न शक्तिः। रवात्‌ ॥ रथो eee BMT WTI वा WHAT ॥ नानातीत्यारा त aaa wearer प्रतिय मिले निक्‌्ढखचणा ॥ उपमानादचया गक्तिग्रस्तेयाहं ॥ एव॑ कोाषादपि wiwoe: । सति माधके कचित्‌ व्यज्यते । यथा गीलादिपदा्मां Naser नीला- f<fafnd च भक्तिः B12 व्युत्पादिता तथापि खाघ- वान्‌ गीला अक्षिः मीखारि विश्रि खसणशेति॥ एवमास्तवाक्याद पि | यथया कोकिलः पिकपदवाच्य इत्यादि ज्रम्दात्‌ पिकादिगक्रियरः॥ एवं व्यवडहारादपि। यया प्रयोजकटद्धन घट मानये- तयुं Awa ATARI चट WANA तर वधार्यं Waa Wear चरानयमर्पं काये चरटमामयेतिभब्द- प्रयाजखमवारयति | ततं चरमपसारय गामानय इत्याश जवाचादापार्भ्यां चशादरिपद्ानां कायानित-

os

fagre uzrar uf ceria ixerg YAS नीला चट cay

famargq शान्दबाधः। चटादिपदामां कायथाजित- चटादिबाधे सामध्यावधारणात्‌। araiarérey प्रति च किडादीनां सामथ्यात्‌ तदभावान्न weqiry cafe केचित्‌ सन्न । प्रथमतः काय्यौन्वितघटादो ब्षमवधार- सोऽपि लाघवेन पञ्चात्‌ तख परित्यागेचित्यात्‌। अत एव चेच Tae जातः Hear a गर्भिणी जाता इत्याद मखप्रसादमुखमाशिन्याभ्यां सुखद; खेऽनुमाय तत्‌- erway. परिभेषाच्छाब्द्माधं निर्णीय तद्धेतुतया त॑ भब्दमवधारयति । तथा च व्यभिचारात्‌ area wwf: | मचतज्रते WRT META THT ETE मानाभावात्‌ । चे TAA जाता BARAT तद- भावाच्च । इत्थञ्च लाघवादज्ितचटेऽपि ufat त्यक्ता घटपदस्य घटमात्रे अक्रिमवधारयति॥

एवं वाक्यनेषादपि wie: | यथा यवमयखरर्भ- ama यवपद् स्य दीर्ष॑श्एकविशिष्टे आशाणां प्रयामः. कडा चश्बेच्छानां।. तजर fe यथाऽन्या Brava |r- यन्ते Wha मोदमाना दूवात्तिष्टन्ति॥

वसन्ते सम्व॑सस्यानां जायते पवग्रातनं ।

मादमानाञ्च तिष्टन्ति यवाः कणिभ्रन्ालखिनः ॥ इति वाक्यरेषाद्‌ दीच॑श्यूके शक्िनिंर्णयते। ager त शल्तिभ्रमात्‌ प्रयोगः । नामाश्नक्तिकम्यने गेारवात्‌ ।

M

६

fagre दरिपदादरो तु विनमिगमकाभावाश्नानाभक्रिकर्पभं tt एवै विवरणाद्‌पि भक्तिगरहः । Garey तत्समानां पदानरेण NATURA | यथा घरोऽसीत्यम्ब कल- भेऽखीत्यमेन विवरणाद्‌ घटपदस्य कलमे ज्रक्तिगरहः। एवं VEN पाकं करोतीत्यनेन विवरणाद्ास्या- तख यत्नार्थकलवं HVA ॥ एवं प्रभिङ़पद्‌माल्निष्याद्पि भक्तिगरहः। aut ce सहकारतरो मधुरं पिका Ciara पिकपरश्य भंकिग्रह इति ॥ तज जातावेव viet त व्यक्ता व्यभिचारादान- ware | व्यक्तिं विना च जांतिभाभस्वासम्मवाह्क्ेरपि भानमिति केचित्‌ ta । जक्तिं विना व्यक्तिभानानु- पपत्तेः । न च व्यक्ता Va | अमु पपन्निभरतिसन्धानं विनापि व्यक्तिषाधात्‌। भच afar सक- ` लव्यक्रावेकस्या एव भक्तेः सीकारात्‌। न सागनुगमः। Arena रेवामुगमकलात्‌ wv किञ्च गोः waif शक्ति- ग्रहा यदि तदा व्यक्रा wf: 1 यदित गाल चका- fafa ufsurewet मालप्रकारकपदार्थसारणं शाब्द माध मस्यात्‌। संमागप्रकार्वेम NNT पदा- Bate weary प्रति च रेहुलात्‌ ॥ किच्च गाते यदि शत्तिरदा trad जक्यतावच्छेदकं वाद्यं । गा- ay गवेतरासमवेतले सति सक लगा समेतत । तथा च,

८९

सिद्धा ° Trantat भक्यतावच्छेद्‌ केऽनुप्रवे्नात्‌ तवेव नेरवं।त- |

स्मात्‌ तत्तव्नात्याहतिविभिष्टतत्तद्भाक्रिबेाधानुपपत््या कसर्प्यमाना अकरिजीात्याृतिविशिष्टव्यक्त विश्राम्यतीति॥

wi पदन्तु कचिद्योगिकं afer? बाचियोगरूढं कचिदोगिकङ्ढं । यजावयवाथं एव बुध्यते त्चागिकं। यथा पाचकादिपदं॥

यत्रावयवशक्तिनेरपेषेण समुद्‌ायञ्नक्रिमाचेण बुध्यते लद डं । यथया गापदघरादिपदं।

यत्रतु अवयवश्रक्रिविषये खमुदायभक्रिरष्यस्ति त- चाग । यथा पडजादिपदं। तथाहि पद्ध जपद म- aaa पद्धजनिकर्दरूपमथे बोधयति । समृदाय- WAT च पद्मलेन रूपेण oy बाधयति ॥ न च केवला- वयवज्नह्या कुमुदे var: wifefa वार्थं । रूडिभ्नानखं चेवलयेागिकार्थन्नानप्रतिषन्धकलादिति प्राञ्चः ॥

वम्हुतम्त॒ ममृदायज्नक्षापखितपद्मोऽवयवार्थपङ्ज- निकतुरग्वयो भवति । सान्निध्यात्‌ ॥ यत्र ङ्क्स वाधः प्रतिसन्धोयते तत्र लक्णया कुमदादेौघः। यत्रतु HATA SAY माधे न तात्पर्यज्ञानं पद्मलस्य च वाधसतत्रावयवजक्तिमातेण fare cars:

यच तु स्थलपद्मादाववयवार्थवाधस्तव षमदपय- अत्या च पद्मतेम रूपेण बाधः। यदि त UAT विजातीयमेव तदा लक्णेव ॥

cy

भाषा सल्लणा शभयसगनन्धसतात्यय्यनुपपक्तितः। ` सिद्धा यतावयवार्थ्च्यैयोः aaa बेाधसद्ेागिक- wei ययेद्धिदारिपदरः । तज fe adiqandr नर गृादिरपि मुष्यते यागविजेषोाऽपीति tice i लखंणा भक्यसम्नन्य रत्यादि। गङ्गां ite caret गङ्गापद्स्य way ` प्रवारर्ूपे साषस्छानयागुपप्ति- wary यज प्रतिमन्धीयते तत्र waaay तीरस्य माधः। सा waar. तथा हि प्रवा- इरूपनक्याथभम्बन्धस्यं तीरे Waar NTA aca लतः भाग्दमोधः। परन्तु ` यदयन्वयागुपपत्तिणं वणा- वीजं ATT यष्टीः प्रवेभ्रयेत्यत्र WAIT म श्यात्‌) यष्टिषु भवेक्नाश्वयस्यानुपपकतेर भावान्‌ । तेग यष्टिप्रवेे भाजनंतात्पय्ानुपपत्या यष्टिधरे weeny एवं काक- भ्या दधि रच्यताभित्यादा aT दधुपघातके लक्षा । स्यत दधिरणायासार्प्धविषयलात्‌ ॥ एवं afaar raha इपर सेकसार्थवादिलेम VI | दयमेवाजहत्ताया लचरेग्युच्यते । एकसाथे- वाहिलेम रूपेण कत्चितरन्ययेर्भधात्‌ ॥ यदि we- पपञ्िरलंकणावीजं wre तदा कञिद्धङ्गापदसय तीरे कचिदेषपदस ws ललणेति नियमे A wT) ददमतु Ang अक्यार्थसम्नन्ध यदि was रूपेण WAI तीरलेम Mears । यदित AyTANT-

ey

fagte लेन Sie श हीतंस्तद्‌। मेनेव रूपेण सरणं । अतं एवं लच्यतावष्छेदके A Wat | तत्मकारेकबेभस्य तज सचणां विनापयुपपत्तैः । परन्तु एवंक्रमेण भवय तावच्छ- caste भलि स्यात्‌ । तसकारकबष्दार्थख्यरणं प्रति तत्पदस्य सामय्यभित्यस्यं सुवचेवादिति विभावनीयं ॥ थत्र तु wade घाश्रयपदवाच्यवरूपा Seur धा लक्ितंलचणेतयुच्यते। थया दिरेफादिपदे रेफडय- BARN भ्रमरपदे Wal) WATITA चं सम्नमेा wat waa तच शक्तितलश्ा। किन्तु लाक्षणिकं पदं नाभभावकं । लाचलिकार्थख नष्टमपि 7 पदा- we कारणं | भकिलसणान्यतरसम्नन्धेनेतरपदा्था- वितसन्रक्याथंभाम्दमां परति पदानां सामथावधा- cafes प्राञ्चः Wray तदष्णभुभावकमेव | पदारापल्ितिस् दार । अन्यथा gaye warts पर स्धाभनेभावैकलापत्तेरित्याडः | ° वाक्ये तु भक्र- भावाच्छकाभम्नम्धरूपा रसखणा ईपि भासि । यच गमी- राथा wat घोषं ca तच नेदीपदख AAA शलणा । गभीरापरार्यस्यं मथा बदहाभेरेगान्वयः | काचिरेकरे शान्वयस्व सीकतलान्‌ । यदि तंतैकरेन्ाव- येऽपि भे सीक्रियते तदा aise गभीोरमदोतीर SSA गभोरापदं तात्पथाय्रादकं ॥ * नै वोनभतादशनं विद्य ततेयाऽनाडतपूम्देमणत्रादे a

८१

सिद्धा बङत्रीहावययेवं । aa fe चिवर्गुपदारैष यथक twa: खीोक्रियते तदा गोपदस्य गाखामिभमि ससणा । गवि चिकरामेद्‌ान्वयः। यदि लेकदेज्ान्वया ग खोक्रियते तदा गेापद्स्य चित्रगाखामिनि wae चित्रपदं सात्पयैगरा रकं if

एवमारूढवामरेो TY CWA वागरपदे वाभमरा- THC RAG लकणं | WETITY तात्पर्यग्राहकं । एवमन्यत्रापि ॥

AUT ठ पूर्वपदे लक्षणा । तथाहि राजपुरूषा- faut राजपदार्थेन परषारिपदा्थख साकचान्नाश्व- यः। निपातातिरिक्रनामार्थयेोरभरेनाचयचेाधखान्य्‌ त्पश्नलात्‌। अन्यया राजा पुरुष Cele तथानय- नाधः WA पटो a az tear घरटपराभ्यां नञः मालारेवान्वयाम्‌ -मिपातातिरिक्रैति । गीला घर दयार मामाय॑योरमेद सम्नन्धेनान्वयाद्धदेनेति ॥ न

` च राजपुरुष इत्यादे खुविभक्तः सार णं कर्ूप्यमिति वाच्यं । अष्तविभक्तेरपि तते मभेदात्‌ । तस्माद्‌ Targa राजसेंम्नस्िनि ager तख च पुरषेण सहाभेद्‌ाग्वयः॥

इन्दे तु घवखदिर Fanaa wa: खदिर विभक्तथंदिलप्रकारेख बुध्यते सत्र weer ॥ म चः साहित्ये लच्रोति arety साहित्यश्एून्ययोारपि इन्द-

cys

fagte रर्जनात्‌ ॥ म च एकक्रियान्यिलरूपं साहित्यम- सीति वाच्यं । करिधामेरे धवखदिरौ किन्भोव्यादि- दमात्‌ । ' साहित्यस्यामनमुभवाख । तसात्‌ मारित्या- रिकं ard: अत एव राजपुरोहित सायव्यकानै यजेयाताभित्यत्र लचण्टाभावाद्‌ इन्द श्राज्रोयते। किन्त वास्तवे AST थत्र as VT | मचखमीलघरयारभेद tatat कथमिति are aw मीखलपदस्य aed घरपदस्य waa । WHE इत्यखांख्रयामेद्‌ दत्य्थात्‌ ॥ समाहारदन्दे त यदि समाहारोाऽयनुभूयत द्यु च्यते तद्‌ाऽरिमकुलमित्यादौ परपदेऽहिनगकुलषमा- हारे SOOT । Gag तात्पर्यग्राहकं ॥ न च भेरी- aqy aia कथं समाहारस्यान्वयाऽपेक्लाबु- द्धिविशेषरूपस्य वादनासम्भवादिति are खाश्रय- ठज्ित्वरूपसम्नन्धेन तद्‌न्वयात्‌ । ud पञ्चपृलोत्या- दावपि॥ परे तु afergufaare: अिनकुलख बध्यते । प्रत्येकमेकलान्वयः खमा हारसच्छा च । यच कलं मपुंसकलं प्राणिव्र्थैत्यारि तरेण तजेव । अन्य- चेकवचनमसाध्विति वदन्ति ॥ कर्षीधारयग्बले त नोलात्पलमित्यार अभेदसम्ब- VIA मोलपदाथं BMI प्रकारः। न च तव waar शरत एव मिषादस्पतिं याजयेदित्यन म

aa

भाषा" ALPHA SAT TATA ॥ ८९॥: कारणं VU पदेस्यास्िंरुच्यते।

बिद्धा ° तत्पुरुषः । weer: i किन्तु कर्॑धारये लकणाभा- वात्‌ ग च forge षद्करजातिविभरेषस्य ेद्‌ानधि- MITT थाज़्मासमात्र देति arety निषादस्य विद्या- WORT एव कक्पनात्‌ BIT HATA ACAI कष्पनायाः फलसुखभारवतथाऽरोाष- सादिति ॥ उपकु शङ्पिष्पलीत्यारौा परपदे तत्छम्बसिनि weet पुष्व॑पद्ायंप्रधागतया चान्वय- ara दति । इत्यञ्च aaa a aria wie: | पर्‌ भ्षेव fastrerfaft ॥: faate आप्र इत्यादि पिपर लगकर न्त्याः शश्ुरपदे स्ीजमकदम्बल्योखंखणा | एवमन्यत्रापि | चरा दष्थारोा न WoT । azar पेण मानाचरख्थितिसंमवात्‌ ॥ आस्तियाग्यतेत्यादि । आमल्िज्ञानं याग्यता- शनं आकादधुगज्नामं तात्पर्य॑ज्नानश्च बाष्दयापे कारणं ॥ ८९ ॥ तचासभ्तिपद्‌ांथ॑मा ड । सन्निधागन्विति । यत्प- qe यत्यद्‌ाथैमा येाऽपेदितरयार व्यवधाभेनेाप- fafa: कारणं । तेन गिरि भुक्नमभ्निमान्‌ रेवद्‌ ेने- TAT न WECATY: | MAT wet Tal पट CAT

च्ल

सिद्धा द्‌ावासत्तिभ्रमाच्छान्दयाधः* | ्राषत्तिभमाच्छान्द्‌- wararasta न खतिः ॥ मनु यन्न कचो gv} TAA TATA LYM तचाश्लरपदस्मरणेन पूष्वंपद- अरणस्य माज्ात्‌। व्यवधाने तु उकरपदस्मरणा- aaa इति चेत्‌। न । प्रत्येकपद म॑स्कारेरमं ताव- दिषयकस्ररणस्याव्यवधामेनेात्पक्नेः | गानासन्निकर्वैर- कप्रत्यशख्येव मानासंसकाररेकसमरणोात्प्तेरपि way- वात्‌ । तावत्‌पद संस्कार सहितचरमवषंक्ना नस्याराधक- त्वात्‌ । कथमन्यथा मामावर्चकपद शरणं | परन्तु ता- वत्पदा्थामां सरणादेकरैव खले कपोतन्सायात्‌ ताव- त्पदाथानां क्रियाक्माभावेनान्वयवोधरूयः भाग्बमाधा भवतीति केचित्‌ ॥ wat तु।

यद्यदाकाङ्धि्तं Gra सन्निधानं प्रपद्यते। तेन तेनाजितः are: we Taranto

तथा च खण्डवाक्यार्थबाधानमरंः तथैव yada महावाक्यार्थबोध CATE: । एतेन तावदाभि- ` ay: पदस्फाटोाऽपि face: 1) तम्तदष्ंसंसकारमरहि- तचरमवसापलमेन ag~@aaaraatefa ॥ ट्र Te । यत्र wefan तच पिधेदीति पदस्य wees Wei मतु पिधानादि ङूपा्यश्चानात्‌ | पदजन्यपदायौपख्वितेजच्छाम्दमाषे trary । किञ्च

ren ee ७) जनक क

* Ae इत्याद्कपाठा दिनकरोपकाततवा fasts: समादनः। N

do

भाषा० पदार्थं तच तदन्ता योग्यता परिकीत्तिता ॥ ER Ut यत्पदेन विना यस्याननुभावकता भवेत्‌ |

fagre क्रियाकमांपर्‌ाभां तेम तेनैव we साकाङ्कलं । तेन क्रि- यापदं विमा कथं: जाब्द् बधः Brat तथा पुष्येभ्व- दत्यारा स्यहयतीतिपद्‌ाष्या हार्‌ विना चतु्यगुपपननेः पदाष्याार ओआषश्चकः॥

याग्णतां निर्वक्ति । पदार्थं इत्यादिना । एकपदा ऽपग्पदार्थ॑मम्नन्भाः योग्यतेत्यर्थः । तज्त्रानाभावाखं fear विश्चतीत्यांदा न भाब्देगराधः।॥ मन्वेतस्या या- ग्यताया जाने जाष्दमाधात्‌ प्राक्‌ wala न Maratea वाकधार्थस्यापूष्व॑लादिति By ग । ततत्पद्‌ाथंसारणे सति कचित्‌ संभथर्टपंसय कचिन्निच्यंरूपस्यापि येाग्य- लाया जानसय सम्भवान्‌ il ।

ABE AMATI We म शाब्दज्ञाने कारणं, वङ्किना सिश्तीद्यारेा सेके वङ्किकरणलाभावश््पाऽ- याग्यतामिख्चयेन अरतिबम्धाम्‌ न are are: | तदभा- afaqae सकिकसज्िकषाजन्यदेषविगेषाजन्न्नान- साजे . प्रतिवन्धकलात्‌ भ्ाष्दम्ं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकत्वं fag । योग्यताज्नानविलम्वाच च्राब्दमाधविलम्बाऽसिद्ध इति वदन्ति nn ce

arargt frie 1 यत्पदेनेत्थारि । येन at

विना यत्पदसखान्वयाननुभावकलं तेन सद तस्याका-

५९.

भाषा ARTS, वक्तुरिच्छा तु तात्पग्यं परिकीर्तितं ॥८९॥ fagre gr xed: क्रियापदं विना कारकपदं नान्बयमाधं अनयतीति तेन AAA agayg क्रियाकारक- पटामां सज्निषाममासतच्या अरिताथें। UT घटका तामं प्रति घरपदोा्रदडितोयाकाङ्गाज्ञामं कारणं। नेन uz: कर्ममलमानमयमं रत्तिरित्यादोा न चाब्दमाधः। श्रयमेति gat राज्ञः पुरषाऽपसार्यताभित्यारौ तु परुषेण सद राजपदस्य तात्पर्यं यदहाभावाम्‌ न तेन सहान्वयः ॥ ` ` तान्प निर्गक्नि। वक्ुरिङ्ेति । चदि तात्पर्यज्ञानं कारणं भ स्वात्‌ तद्ग सैन्भवरमानयेत्थारो कचिद्‌ अख कचिक्रवणस्यमेसा नस्वात्‌॥ म च तात्परथंय्ारकप्रक- रणादोनामेव weary कारक्वमस्विति वाच्यं | तेषाममनु गमात्‌ | तात्र्य॑ज्नानजनकल्वेन तेवामनुगमे त॒ तात्पयथैश्ना नमेव लाघवात्‌ कारणमस्तु । इत्थञ्च बेदश्लेऽपि Wawa: करयते ॥ न च. ` लचाध्यापकतात्पव्यैज्ञानं कारणमिति वाच्यं । सगी- द्‌ावध्यापकाभावात्‌ ॥ म च प्रलय एव नाखोति ea: स्गादिरिति वाच्यं । प्रलयस्साममप्रतिपाद्यलात्‌। इत्यञ्च भकवाक्येऽपि दै खरीयतात्पग्यन्नानं कारणं | विषम्बादिभ्ुकवाकये त faefagta तात्प ari BITS BIG नानायीारो कचिदेव तात्पर्ययज्ामं

८२

fagre कारणं) तथाच श्कवाक्तो fata तात्पर्यंन्ार्म wrez- गाधः वेदे त॒ अनादिमोमासापरिजाधिततर्वैर्थाव-

धारषमित्याङ्गः ॥ | प्व॑मनु भवार णभेदा दुध रं विष्यमतं । तजानुभव- प्रकारा दर्डिताः सुगमतया ace ग दर्जिंतं। तत दि पु्ानुभवः कारणं ॥ श्र केचिद्‌ अनुभव ay नकारणलं किन्तु शानत्वेन । अन्यथा सारणा नन्तरं MTG सात्‌ | समागप्रकारकस्मर शेन प्व संस्कारख्य विगष्टलात्‌ । मन्ते तु तेव सारखेग स॑- VACANT खसारणशान्रं जन्यत CITHA_ | यत्र VACUA AT चरपरारशौनां mae सरखमजनिष्ट भकलविषयकस्मरणनत AA तजर WHS FATA WRATATATY BIAS रोागस्व चरमफलस् वा स॑ सारमान्रकलं are) aut क्रमिकस्मरशागुप- पन्तिः। न च पमः पुगः सरकार दृढतरम॑स्कारामप- uf: | प्ररिग्यदेधकममवधानख दारऋपदार्थलात्‌ tt ay विनिगममाविर हादृव ज्ञानलेभापि जमकलं खा- दिति avers विरेषधर्भोणास्मिचाराज्‌ wt सामा- न्यधर्मखान्ययासिडलात्‌। कथमन्यथा Tee शनि- दारा दव्यतेम SVT न कारणलं॥ न सामराखिकसा- दकानां सस्कारनान्रकत्संज्यार्‌ व्यमिचारसंज्रयद्ति यार्यं | WHAT TATA TT चरमखारख-

ck We साक्षात्कारे स॒खादौनां करण मन उच्यते| अयोगपदयाज्‌ ज्ञानानां तस्याणुत्वमिरेष्यते ॥ ८४ ॥

सिद्का° सैव darcy व्यभिचारमं्याभावात्‌ ॥ २८९ ॥ ददानो क्रमप्राप्तं मनो निरूपयति । साक्षात्कार इति। waa ममसि प्रमाणं cfd anf qaerer- त्कारः सकरकं जन्यसाकतात्कारलासाचृषवद्‌ Cay- मुमानेन करणस्य मनसः सिद्धेः ॥ मेवं दुःखादिसा- चात्काराणामपि करणाम्तराशि स्यरितिवाश्थं।ला- घवादेकस्येव तादृ ्रसकलसाकात्कारकरणतया fA: | एवं दुःखादीनामसमवायिकार्‌शसंयोागाञ्रयतया म- मःसिद्धिर्बादव्या॥ ममखाऽणुले प्रमाणमाह । श्रचोगपश्चादिति। werat चादुषरासनादीनां भैगपद्यमेककालात्प- सतिन शीत्यमुभवसिद्धं । तत्र नानेद्धियाणां सत्यपि विषयसन्निकर्षे यन्सम्बन्धादेके्डियेष श्ानमृत्य्ते तदसम्बन्धाद्पि त्वगादिभिः wey aqua | तन्मनो विभुले चासन्निधानं ग सम्भवतीति न विभ मनः ॥ न च तद्‌ाभमीमदृष्टविर्ेषादाघविलम्बारेव तज्च्रामविखम्न इति वाच्य॑। तथा सति चकुरादीमा- मपि कन्यमाऽनापन्तेः ॥ न च दी्षष्कलोभक्णारीा

भाषा"

भिदा °

५४

अथ द्रव्याश्रिता रोया निगुण निच्छिया गुणाः ।

मानावघामभाजास्च कथमेकद्‌ा नामेड्ियश्नानमिति वाच्यं | ममसाऽतिलाघवात्‌ वरया भानेद्धियसम्नन्धात्‌ AAT: । उत्पलभ्रतपत्रभेदारि वत्‌। चाग- पद्यप्रत्ययस्य तु भराकलात्‌ ॥ ग च मनसः सद्धा सवि- का्र्रालिलादुभयोापप्तिरस्विति वां । नानावये- वतन्नाज्नादि कम्पने ओारवात्‌ | खाघवात्‌ Mra मनसः कम्यनादिति मनङ्गोपः॥ दति सिद्धाम्तमुक्रावष्यां TAIT समाप्ता Woy * ॥

xa जिरूप्य गृणं जिरूपयति । अयेव्यारिमा। गृण- | aatar fa मानर्भिति चेत्‌1 ee द्रव्यकर्माभिनसा- मान्यवति या arcdar ar fafegaltaferari नि- Tafeqaartuarat waaara ग दि रूपलादिकं मक्ावाततावच्छेदिका। न्यूनातिरिकदेभटत्तितवात्‌। अतखचतुर्जिंभत्यनुगतं वाच्यं तरेव गृणलमिति fig ॥ द्रव्याञ्भिता इति। यथपि cenfsad न लकणं कमा- द्‌ावतिव्याभ्नेखथापिं दर बलव्यापकतावच्छेद्‌कसन्तान्य- जातिमन्वं age भवति हि awed द्‌ व्यलव्यापकता- वचछेदकं तदन्ता च गणानामिति ade xa वा भ द्रव्यलव्यापकतावच्छेदकं। गगणादे द्रव्यकर्मणार- भावात्‌ । द्रव्यतललं सामान्यलादिकं ग जातिरिति तद्म

भाषा.

fagre

दासः ॥ निगणा इति । यद्यपि मिगएलं कम्मौदावपि

९१५

पं रसः खशंगन्धो परत्वमपरत्वकं ॥ ८५॥

द्रवे गुरुत्वं खेदश्च वेगे मूत्तगुणा अमो ।

WAAL भावना च शन्दे वुद्धाद योऽपि च ॥८९॥ एतेऽमूर्तगुणाः सव्वं विद्भिः परिकोश्तिताः । सद्यादि विभागान्त उभयेषां गुणा मत्‌ः॥ ८७ ॥ dang विभागश्च सहा दित्वादिकास्तथा। दिष्थक्वाद्‌ यस्तददेतेऽनेकान्रिता गुणाः ॥ ८८॥ अतः शेषा गुणाः सरवै मता THAT AT |

1

तथापि सामान्यवक्ते कम्र न्यते च सति निर्गुणलं मेध्य जात्यादीनां न सामान्यवत्तं कर्मणा न salad x- व्यस्त म निगृणत्वमिति तत्र नातिदयाक्तिः । निक्ियेति Vena नतु wae | गगमादावतिव्याग्नेः wows मूत्तंगुणा इति । aa श्ितिखापकाऽणुपशक- लीयः। प्रमूत्तेषु म वन्त रत्यर्थः । सक्णन्तु ताव- दन्यान्यलं । एवमयेऽपि ॥ ८६ ॥ खभयेषामिति । मूक मू्तगणा इत्यथः ॥ ८७ ॥ अनेकाथिता cf संयागदिष्ादोनि दिदन्तोनि। जरिलचतुष्ादिकं चिचतुरादिदटनत्तोतिमेध्ये॥्८॥ अतः येषा इति। स्परमगन्भस्पर्भैकलपरिमारैक- एयक्रपरलापरलमुद्धिखुखदुःखेच्छादेषप्रयनगुरुलद्र :

८९

भाषा" बुद्यादिषरकं शान्ताः सेदः सासिद्िको द्वः॥८९॥ दृष्टभावना शब्दा अम वैशेषिका गुणाः स॒ङ्कादिरपरत्वान्तो दवः AAMT ॥५०॥ RAIA सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीर्तिताः | URSA AG सेच एव च ॥ UI एते तु DIATE अथ खयशान्तशब्दकाः । TARA PRATT He? Il शरतेद्िया विभूनान्ु ये स्युवेशेषिका गुणाः अकारणगृणेत्यन्नाएते तु परिकी्तिताः ॥ <३॥ अपाकजासु TTT RIT तथाविधं ! सेदवेगगुरूत्वकप्रथक्तपरिमाणएकं ॥ ८४ ॥

fagre वलस्ेहस॑सकाराद्‌ एजम्दा TH TAT Taal nee tt Bafear दति। fata एव वैचेषिकाः ara ठक्‌ विजेषगणा रत्यर्थः ॥ सह्ादिरिति । eaqrafrare- षयक्कमंयोा गविभागपंरलापरलानीत्यथैः॥< ene Un दीद्धियेति । wy लचाऽपि यहणयेग्यलात्‌ ॥

areata, रूपादीनां चचुरादिग्राद्यलान्‌॥ ९२॥ विभूगामिति । -बुद्धि खुखदुःखे च्छादेषप्रयल्ल धमी ध्माभावनांगष्टा इत्यर्यः Wi अकारणेति ! कारण गण- Yaa श्पादयेा FYAHA FTI A ATTA: | पत्मारेः कारणाभात्रात्‌ | पाकजरूपादीनां कार

५७

भाषाः खितिखापकं इत्येते स्युः कारणगुणोद्भवाः | संयोगश्च विभाग वेगधैते तु कमाजाः॥ ८५॥ सभान्तपरिमाणेकप्थक्तलेदशब्दके। भवेदसमवायित्वमथ वैशेषिके गुणे ॥ ५६॥ आत्मनः UPA WYN TTA । सेगेऽपि च द्रवत्वे च संयागादिद्वये तथा * ॥ ८७॥ दिपैव कारणत्वं स्यादथ प्रादेशिक AT I

fagre कगुणपूस्वंकला भावाद्‌ च्रपाकज TEM ॥ ९ २।९४॥

९५॥

सराोति। VAIS ATT: | एकषटयक्तत्य व तवप्रत्ययस्य प्रत्येकमग्याद्‌ एकलं WAY Ue | एयक्तपरेन चेक थक्घं विवच्ितं ॥

भवेद्‌ समवायिलसिति । घटादिरूपरसगन्धस्पनाः कपालारिरूपरमगन्धस्यर्जग्योा afi एवं कपा- लादिपरिमाणादीमां चटादिपरिमाणाद्यममवायि- कारणलं ॥ एवं शब्दस्यापि faded nfs ee

निभिन्तलमिति । बद्यादीनां इच्छादिनिमिन्त- त्वादिति ara: neo

fala arcuafafa | अषमवायिकारणलं fafa- waaay । aur fe suai उष्णस्यभंस्यासम-

* पर।परत्वहदिल।दिद्दिएयक्लयादिके पुनः॥ दत्यनाकराधये प।ठः॥ ¢

ft

भाषाः SHR विभुगणः संयोगादिद्यं तथा Wes I चतुग भवेद्रूपं AMS ATTA | fargre वायी पाकजे Fafa | गृरलं गुर््पतमयोरभगवायि प्रतिघाते निमित्तं । वेगा वेगस्पन्द्‌मयारमगवायो अभिघाते निमित्तं । cad द्र वलस्यन्दनयारसषभ- वायि ag? भिभित्तं। मेरीदंण्डयागः wee भिभमित्तं। Yaramndarar ऽसमवाथी वंज्रद्‌लदयतिभागः we निमित्तं । व॑न्नदसाकानविभागेऽसमवायोतिं। * प्रादे जिकोाऽव्याणदत्तिः-॥ ९ स ॥ चत्तरिति । sani: प्र्यचसमिङ्ा । रूपग- sean प्रतोनिमाखोति चेत्‌ args रूपनब्दप्र- यागस्लथापि मीलंपीतारिव्वमृगतजातिविजेषोाऽम्‌भव- मिद्ध एव । सूपनम्द्‌ा प्रयोगेऽपि Dar as: पीता वणं दति वर्ण॑शन्दाक्तेखिनीःप्रतीतिरस्येवं । एव॑ नील- त्वादिकमपि परत्यलमिद्ध।।'न Bar एव मीलष््पा- frana इत्येकवष्यकिटत्तिलाम्‌ मीरलारिनं जाति- रिति areal । गीला मशि रक्त उत्पन्न इत्यादि- प्रतीतेर्मीलारेरत्यांद विनाशन्नालितया नानालात्‌ । ` अन्यया URNA जगद्‌ नीलमापयेत।॥। न च गी-

व Se Se

ea fants परलादौनां गासमनाभ्कि।रशलं न fayfanarcwag- त्यथः । Cee winlafcwrd प्रति Fri दिल्व.दिषदेम ay faa WE तेन परमाकददिलरेदाकुकादिवरिमार्हावेऽपि न षति! CAAT! पाठः ॥

५८५ भाषा WHE सदकारि स्यात्‌ भ्एक्तादिकमनेकधा ॥ << ॥

fagre लरक्रादिसमवाययोारेव विनाशओात्पादविषयकाऽ प्रत्यय इति वाच्यं । प्रतीत्या समवायाम्‌्ेखात्‌ ॥ भ च स एवायं नोल इति प्रत्ययाल्लाघवासैक्यमिति वाच्य। प्रत्यय तव्वातीयविषयकलात्‌ । चैवेयं गृष्न॑रोति- वललाघव॑ प्रत्यचवाधितं । अन्यथा घरादोनामपेक्य- प्रसङ्गात्‌ । उत्ाद्‌ विनाग्रभब्दमुद्धेः समवायावलम्बन- ल्ापन्तेरिति। एतेन रषारिकं व्याख्यातं॥ चुरा खमिति । चसु हाविशेषगृण रत्यर्थः । एवमयेऽपि | द्रव्यादेरिति। sway उपलयिकारणं॥ इदमेव विदृणोति। चचृष xfs दइव्यगृणकर्मा- सामान्यानां चासृषप्रत्यकं प्रति eared कारणं ॥ इरक्रारि कमनेकधेति । तद्रूपं श्एक्लनीलपीतर कर्य रादिभेरादनेकप्रकारकं भवति ॥ मनु कर्वुरं कथ- afaftwed भवति । इत्यं नीोखलपीताद्यारमाऽवयवी न AAAS: | अप्रत्यल्तप्रसङ्गात्‌। मापि arash मोलादिकमुत्पद्यते । पीतावच्छेदेगापि नीलोापलथि- प्रसङ्गात्‌ Waa । व्याण- ठतन्तिजातीयगृणानामव्यायटन्निले विरोधात्‌। तस्मात्‌ मानाजातीयष्ूपैरवयविनि विजातीयं चिच्रमारभ्यते। श्रत एवैकं चिचरमित्यनुभगेऽपि। मानाङ्पकन्पने त॒ गारवात्‌ । इत्यञ्च नोखादीनां Waray प्रति-

१००

भाषा अजलादिपरमाणे तन्नित्यभन्यत्‌ सेतुका । रसस्तु रसनग्राह्यो मधुरादिरनेकधा ॥ ९००॥

सिद्धा* बन्धकलकस्पभाद्‌ श्वयविनि म पोताुत्प॑न्तिः । एतेन OUT व्याख्यातः॥ रसादिकमपि नाव्याणषटन्तिः किन्तु नानाजातीयर सवद वयवेरा रम्पेऽवयविनि रसाभावेऽपि ज ofa: | aa रसनया. अवयर्वर्म एव Waa | रसभेद्धियादौनां KUTeATTATATATA | waafaat मीरमवेऽपि PATAUTaA ॥ AAG WaATalUas- Ta ATATSY । arate: पीतादिप्रतिबन्धकलकमयने गीरवात्‌ | श्रत एंव । ` खारि यम्ह वर्चनं सुखे पुच्छे च पाण्डरः । ओतः खुरविषोणाभ्यां स नीला ष उच्यते॥ इत्यादि भास्तरमणुपेयद्यते । "न च च्याणाग्याणदन्तिजा- तीययाद॑यारविरोधंः । मानाभावात्‌ । म च लाचवा- देकं ed अमुभंवविराधात्‌ । अन्यथा चरदेरपिः खाचवाङ्ेकं स्यादिति । एतेन स््ारिकं व्याख्यात- fafa वदन्ति ॥ ee ॥ जलादीति । जसपरमाणेा तेजःपरमात्ा चकर्ष नित्यं यिवीपरमाणरूपन्तु म नित्यं । पाकेन रूपान्त- सत्पतेः । न हिःचरस्य ` पाकामम्तरं तद्‌ वयवेाऽपक्तः उपलभ्यते! म fe रककपासस्य कपासिका मीशा

१०९

भाषा सरकारी रसद्चाया नित्यतादि च पूष्ववत्‌ । प्राणग्राद्या HAF प्राणस्येवापकारकः ॥ Lod सरभवासीरभश्च स दधा परिकीर्तितः । सशस्वगिन्दियदाद्यस्व चः स्य्ादपकारकः॥ QR Ut अनुष्णाशेतश्नोतोष्णमेदात्‌ स त्रिविधो मतः। काटिन्धादिः कितावेव नित्यतादि च TAAL LRN

सिद्धा ° वयवा भवति । एवंक्रमेण परमाणावपि qrafafy:

AACA ITA CSAS सहेतुकं जन्यं ॥ रसं निरूपयति । cafe cee ॥

सरकारीति। रासनश्नाने रसः कारणमित्यर्थः ॥ पष्वैवदिति | जलपरमाथो रणा नित्याऽन्यः सव्वाऽपि Testa इत्यथैः ॥ गन्धं निरूपयति । weary इति । उपकारका त्राणजन्यन्नामे कारणमित्यर्थः । श्रन्यो गन्धः Tas Wal ९०९ ॥

सभे निषूपयति । at इति । उपकारक दति स्परार्थमप्रत्यक्ते a: कारणमित्यर्थः ॥९०९॥

अमुष्णाश्नीत इति । एथिग्या airy सान्राऽनु- ष्णाग्रीतः । जलस्य Mea । तेजस उष्णः ॥ काठिन्ये fa. करिमसुकमारस्प्नः एयिव्या waa: । कटि- मलादिकम्त्‌ म संयोगनिष्ठा जातिविशेषः । weit waren: ॥ पुस्वंवरिति । जलतेजेवायुपरमाणु-

१०२

भाषा एतेषां पाकजलम्तु सिते नान्यच APT सिद्धा स्पा भित्याशद्धिन्नरखभस्वनित्या cared: ti qee i

एतेषामिति ॥ एतेषां खूपरसगम्धसखशानां । गान्य- Afar vent हि रूपरेसग॑न्धस्य्ंपरारटत्तिः पाव- क्॑योगादुपंलभ्थते। न Fe भतधापि श्रायमाने ज- लाश रूपादिकं परावर्तते । नीरे सारममेाष्णश्च अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्वाभपाभिकमेवेति निर्धीयते 1 पव- मण्थिययोः भीतसखगादिवत्‌# तत्रापि एयिवीनपि मघ्ये परमाणावेवं पाक tf वैशिषिका वदन्ति । तेषाम- थमाज्यः। अवयविनाऽवष्टरेष्ववयवेषु पाका न सम- वति । avy वद्धिम॑योगेमावयविषु विनष्टेषु खतन्तेषु परमाणुषु पाकः। पुभंख पेक्तपरमाणसंया गाद्‌ चणुका- दि क्रमेण पुममरहावयविपय्थन्तमुत्प्तिः । तेजसा मति- भयितवेगवजात्‌ quae इटिति व्युडानरोप्प- frau अथ श्यणुकारिविमाज्मारभ्य कतिभिः ae: पुमरत्यत्या रूपादि मद्धवतीति भिवन हिवष्याय प्रक्रिया aa uray संयागविभागयोार नपे्षकारणं am इति वैगेषिकखचं । खात्रठल्िभावानरा- wad तस्यार्थः । ` अन्यथा कर्माणाऽणुत्तरसंयागज- ममे पूस्वैंयेमनाशापेखणादव्यात्िः स्यादिति ॥ तच विभागजंविभागागङ्गोकारे नवच्णा तदङ्गीकारऽपि विभागः किञ्चिर्ापेचा विभागं जगयेत्‌ निरपेक्षस्य

RR

WANS AAT परमाणे स्यात्‌ पाको वेशेषिके नये ॥ १०४॥ fagre ad कमलं era’ । aa यदि द्रव्यारसकसंयो गविना- vfafrd कालमपेच्छ विभागजविभागः स्यात्‌ तदा दशका ॥ अरय दव्यमाश्रविर्गिष्टं कालमवयवं वापे विभागजविभागः स्यात्‌ तद्‌ एकाद्‌श्तणा | तथा हि वद्िमंयोगात्‌ परमाणौ Hal । ततः परमाठन्तरश विभागः। तत ्रारम्कसंये गनाः! तते PORATM: | ततः परमाणो ्यामादिभागः । तते Target तते द्रव्यारम्भानगणक्रिया। तते विभागः। ततः पुष्बसं- AMAT: | तत च्रआरम्रकसंयोगः। तते STURT ET: | तते र कादयुत्यत्तिः nar श्ामादिनाश्रचणे रक्तात्प- Free वा परमाणो द्रव्यारमामुगृणक्रियाऽस्तिति चेत्‌। न । अभ्िंयुक्ते पर माणा यत्‌ करं तदिनाशमन्त- रेण गृणात्थत्तिमन्तरे्ं च तत्र परमाणो क्ियाकरा- भावात्‌। Salata कम्मामुत्पक्तैः। निर्गुणे xa द्रव्यार- सामुगृणक्रियानुपपक्तेख॥ तथापि परमाण श्ामादि- निदत्िसमकालं रक्ाययुत्यन्तिः स्छादिति चेत्‌। म। पुल्वै रूपादिष्वंसखय रूपान्तरे देठुत्वात्‌। दूति मवचणा ॥ अरय TWIT) aT च आररम्भकसंयागविनाश्रविशिष्टं कालम- पेच्य विभागेन विभागजनगे afi स्सात्‌। तथा हि वह्कि-

५ ररी

+ ana परमासयः qepa cfs देरेभिकमतं। इति खमाकराऽव- मतिरिक्कः पाठटः॥

A

१०४

fegre संयोगाद्‌ इणकार मकं परमार Feary तेते विभागः

सत श्रार्‌म्मकमंयोगेना्ः । तते द्याणकगा विभागज- विभागे । ततः श्ाममानपुर्तसंये गमान | तते रक्ता- त्प च्यतत संयोगे | तते वङ्गिनेाद्‌ मजन्यपरमाणुकरणे नाज: । ततोऽदृष्टवदात्ममंये गाद्‌ द्रव्यारम्भानुगृश- fanaa विभागः) ततः पूम्व॑संयेो गनान्रः। तत ATT- मकसंया गः। तते द्यणुकोत्पत्तिः। AAT THEA: I अथेकादभक्णा | वह्किम॑यागात्‌ परमा RAL ता विभागः! तते दव्यारमाकमंयगमाज्नः। तता दयणुक- ATM तता दणुकभागविभिष्टं कालमपेच्य विभागज- विभागः। ततः Gees rr तत उत्तर संयोागः। ततः पर माणुकर््ना शः | ततेाऽदृ एवर्‌ात्मसंयागार्‌ द्व्या रआगुगृणक्रिया । तते विभागः । ततः पूव्व॑स॑याग- मागः | AAT ATT मकम॑यागः। तते TTA । ततो cae । मध्यमन्नब्दवरेकस्मादभ्रिसंयागान्न रखूप- माशरक्रात्पारा । तावत्‌ कालमेकच्याभ्रेरखिरलात्‌ tt किञ्च यद्यु्पादको*माभकस्तदा गष्टे ूपाद्‌ावभ्मिनाभे मीरूपञ्चिरं परमाणुः प्यात्‌। माशकचेदुर्पादकसतदा Tara aah रक्तता न खात्‌॥ एवं परमा- ष्वन्तर काचि मनात्‌ पञ्चमादि णेऽपि Aare: | तथाहि एकतर परमार कणं । तते विभांगः। तत आर कमयो ATTICA ATH ततस्त श्मषु-

९०५ भाषाः नेयायिकानान्त॒ नये इाणुकादावपोष्यते ।

fagre wate: परमाष्ठमरक््मजय विभाग इत्येकः कालः । ततः ्सामादिना्ः विभागा way द तोकः कालः । तता रक्ात्पनिद्धव्यारम्भकसंया- WAAR: काणः । अच CRG: । अथ TR त्प्िरिति पञ्चषा ॥ दव्यनान्रसमकाशं पर माण्लन्तरे कम्मंचिन्तनात्‌ षषे गफेत्पत्तिः । तथाहि पर माण॒क््ंणा परमाण्ठन्तर विभागः । तत आर मक- HATHA, । अथय हयणुकनांब्रपरमाण्ठनारकममशो । अय आमना परमाणवम्नरकष्मंजख विभागः। तता carafe: परमाष्ठमारे पूव्वसंयेागनाशख्च । ततः परमाष्वन्तरमंयागः तता द्मणकोात्प्तिः अरय TAT- त्पल्तिरिति ॥ एवं ामनाश्चणे परमाण्ठमरे कर्न चिन्तनात्‌ erga) रक्रत्पन्तिखमकालं परमाख- न्नर कमांचिन्तनात्‌ Wey Ul ९०४ ॥ नैयायिकानामिति । नेयायिकानां मते इणकारा श्रवयविन्यपि पाका भवति।तेषामयमान्रयः। अवयवि्गां सच्छिद्र लादङकेः स च्छावयतैरम्तःप्रविषटैरवयवेष्ववष्ट्े- स्वपि पाके न विर्ध्यते। वेशेषिकमते ऽमम्तावयवतन्नाश- BUF गेारवात्‌। दत्य ञ्च साऽय चट इत्यादि प्रव्यभि- iste सङ्गच्छते। यव तुम प्रत्यभिन्ञा तत्रावयविमा-

। +

१०६ भाषा गणनन्यवचारे तु चेतुः संख्याऽभिषोयते ॥ १०५॥ निरयेषु निलयमेकल्ममनितये नित्मिष्यते | दित्वादयः TORE अपे्ातुद्विजा मताः ॥ १०९ ॥ ` अनेकाश्रयपय्थापता एते तु परिवीर्तिताः।

fagre जऽपि खीक्रियत clin wat निरूपयितुमाह । गण- he) गणखनव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं WRT NT fafafa । नित्येषु vareticg une frei अनित्ये चराद एकलमनित्यमित्यथेः ॥ frarzat व्यासज्यटसि der श्रपे ोव्रह्धि जन्याः ॥ ९०६ ॥ अनेकति। यद्यपि दिलवादि समवायः प्रयेकं चटा- इावपि aia तथाणेको इावितिप्रत्यथाभावाद्‌ एका भ दाविति मअरत्ययसमावाच feardiet पय्यात्निल- SU! क्न THAR NATTA ॥ श्रपेल्ानु- द्धिनाशारिति । प्रथंममपेलाबुद्धि रते दिलोात्यत्तिः। तते विशेषणज्ञानं दिवलनिर्विंकन्यकषश्पै 1 तता इडि- afafrenad । अपेचानुद्धिनाभे तता दिल्मान इति vate weit म जिकणमात्रखायि योाग्य- विभुवित्ैवगणामां सात्तरवन्तिंगणमाश्यलात्‌ तथयाण- पेखाबदस्विकण सा यिलं wed । अन्यथा fafadan- काले अपेलागुद्धिनाजाद्‌ wart fees गाः खात्‌ > रकल्वानवननिध्पप्यौतिषतमं णासन्तहतिले 1 Se ॥

१०७

भाषाः श्रपेकानृदिनाशाच्च नागस्तेषां निरूपितः ॥ १०७॥ ` TARR साऽपेसानुदिरु्यते।

frgre a4 feared i तदानीं विषयाभावात्‌। faqara-

3 Sr wyUfea ज्ञागजमनेापगमात्‌। तस्माद्‌ दिलप्र- त्थक्ादिकमपेलाबुद्धेगा शकः करयते ॥ न चापेकामुद्धि- मात्रात्‌ कथं दिलनान्र इति ares काणाकरे दिलप्र- HAT ATTY! MATa gare eee a TATA दति कक्यनात्‌ । अत एव तत्पशवोयापेखाबुद्धिजन्यदि- त्वारिकं तेनेव aya इति कख्यते ॥ न चापेचागृद्धदि- लप्रत्य्कारणतलमसख्जिति वाच्यं । खाघवेन feat प्रति कारणलस्धेवोचितलात्‌। whe व्रणुकादावपेखान्‌- द्धियागिनां। सगारिकालीनपरभाष्छादावीश्वरीया- पेचामुद्धि बरह्लाष्डान्तर वन्ति योगिनामपेलाबुद्धिग्वा दि- लादिकारणखमिति ॥९०७.॥ अपेचाबद्धिः केत्यत आह । अनेकेति । अयमेक इत्याकारिका इत्यर्थः । इदन्तु बध्यं यजानियतेकल- भानं aa fxenfefaqr «asada यथा सेनावमादाविति कन्दखीकारः ॥ आआचाय्ास्तुजिल्ा- दि्कमेव aes मन्यन्ते । तया च चिल्रलादिव्या- पिका बडललजातिः। सेनारे। Wag बिलार जिल- लाद्यग्रहा रोवात्‌। इत्यञ्च एता वज्क्यं सेनेति प्रती-

| १०८

भाषाः परिमाणं भवेन्ानव्यवदारस्य कारणं ॥ १०८ ॥ say दीर्घं मदद्रखमिति Anz शरितः। श्रनित्ये तदनित्यं स्यान्नित्े नित्यमुद्‌ाइतं ॥ १०८ ॥ Vet परिमाणाच्च प्रचयाद्पि जायते | mara BMA सह्याजन्यमुद्‌एइतं ॥ ११० ॥

भिद्धा० faxqqya | ana स॑स्याकरले तन्ारतम्याभावा- famate ॥ परिमाणं जिरूपयति। परिमाणमिति} परिमितियवददारासापारणं कारणं परिमाखमि- MU: ॥१.८॥ तथचतुर्विधं ay महद्‌ दीपं wag’) तत्‌ परि- मालं | नित्यमित्य परिमाणमित्यमुषज्यते ॥ ९०९ ti ` जायत इत्यापि परिमाणमित्थनुवर््तते । अनि- wfafa qaurfad । तथां चानिलं परिमाणं मश्या- जन्यं परि माणजन्यैभप्रचयंजनयै चेत्यर्थः ॥ तत्र सन्या जन्यमुदाररतिं । द्णुकाद्ाविति । gene अषेर- शाख परिमाणं प्रति परमाणुपरिमाणं द्मणकादि- परिमाणं at म कारणं । परिमाणस्य खषमामजा- तीयोात्छष्टपरि भाणजनगकलात्‌ । ह्णकादि परिमाणन्तुः पर मावापेकया ‘armed । जमरेणुपरिमाणन्त्‌ न

* xcwyhad ayer | WUVAR IA aywezwa च समनि- अने chr निष्पुयोजमतया निदद्‌नादतलाद्षरोरुनोाऽयं ss: |

१०८ ।

भाषा० परिमाणं घटाद तु परिमाणजमुष्यते प्रचयः UMA यः संयोगस्तेन जन्यते ॥ १९१९१॥ परिमाणं ITS नाशस्ाश्रयनाशतः ।

बिद्धा° सजातीयं । अतः परमाणो दिलमद्या इणकपरि- माणस्य gua faa चं चसरेणुपरिमाणस्यास- मवायिकारणमित्यथैः ॥ ९९० ॥ परिमाणजन्यमुद्‌ाइरति । परिमाणं घराद्‌ाविति॥ परि माणजं कपाखादिपरि माणजन्यं #॥ प्रचयजन्यमुदा- WH प्रचयं Helin प्रचय दति॥ ९९९ ॥ भाव दूति । adr परिमाणस्य । न चावयव- am: कयं परिमाणशनाशकः अत्य्यवयविनि चिचत रपरमाणविकषेषे तदुपचये चावयविनः प्रत्यभिज्ञाने $पि परिमाणामरस्य xaafagarfafa वास्यं | पर माणंविक्ेके णकस्य नाजाऽवण्यमभ्युपेयसखक्नात्रे च चसरोषकनाजनः । एवं क्रमे महावयविगेा मान्न स्सावश्वकलात्‌ । सति च नाश्रकेऽनभ्युपगममातेण ना शस्यापवदि gare । अरोराद्‌ाववयवापचये ऽषमवायिकारणमा्स्यावश्छकला दवयविनाज्र आआवश््- कः॥ म च पटाविनाशेऽपि तन्बनरषंयागात्‌ परि- माणाधिक्यं स्थादिति वाच्यं । तत्रापि वेमाद्यभिषा- तेम समवायिकारणतनोषयागनान्रात्‌ परनान्खाव्र-

९१० भाषा" सङ्ावन्त WAH स्यात्‌ परथकरप्र्ययकरारणं ॥ ११९ ॥

fagre कलात्‌ ॥ किञ्च तन्वनारख त्पटावयवले पै तत्ट एव म रसात्‌ । तक्षम्तुखूपकार णाभावात्‌ | ल्न्तारवथवलाभावे च मं तेन परिमाणाभिको सं- य॒कद्र व्याम्तरवत्‌ । ` तस्मात्‌ त्र तन्वन्तर संयोगे सति प्व॑पर ना खतः पटाम्तरोत्पक्तिरित्यवग्ं sara | अवयविभः प्रधभिज्ञाननतु साजात्येन दीपकसिकादि- यत्‌॥ GAMA एवं तन्भ्तरसहकारात्‌ Yee सत्येव पटाम्तरमारभताभिति वा॑। मूर्तयः समान- देनताविरोाधात्‌। एकदा मामाद्रव्यस्य सत्रामुपलभ्य वाधितला ख । yizae प्रतिवन्धकस्य विना दर या- ना रो त्पस्िरित्यवण्ठ गभ्युपे यत्वात्‌ ॥ vam कारणां निरूपयति । सद्यावदिति । एयक्‌- प्र्ययासाधारणं कारणं ए यतां । तजित्यतारिकं स्या- वत्‌ । यथा fe भित्येषु und भित्ं अनिष्येऽमित्यं अभित्यमेकलं आआश्रयदितीयसषरेनात्यद्यते ज्ाश्रयना- शान्ति तयेकएयक्कमपि । दित्ारि वद्‌ दिष्यक्ा- दिकमपीत्यथैः ॥ नन्वयमस्मात्‌ yor इत्यारावन्या- न्याभावो भाषते तत्‌ कचं एयह्गं TAT खीक्रियते भ॒ चास्तु yoat म लन्यान्याभाव इति ave ख्पं म चट एति प्रतीत्यनापत्तेः NUR N

भाषा०

सिद्धा

९९१

श्रन्ोन्याभावतो नास्य चरितार्थत्वमच्यते |

असमात्‌ एथगिदं नेति प्रमतिं विलक्षणा ॥ AB अप्राप्योखु या प्रातिः सैव संयोग शरितः, वीज्तितस्तिविधस्वेष ASIA HUE ॥ तथाभयक्रियाजन्योा भवेत्‌ संयागजेोऽपरः |

श्रादिमः श्येनभेलादि संयोगः परिकीर्तितः॥ ११५ ॥ मेषयोः सन्निपातो यः स॒ दिय उदातः |

नहि रूपे घटावधिक vert गुणानरमसख्विगवा चरे चटावधिकष्यक्कमस्ि येग परम्परासम्नन्धः कस्य TWA श्राह । अन्यान्याभावत इति॥ fawedf ny

भग्‌ रम्ट्वेललष्मेव म लयवे लक्ष्यमिति चेत्‌। म। वि-

मार्थभेर चटात्‌ way इतिवद्‌ चट मेत्यचापि पञ्चमी ष्यात्‌ । ware यदर्थकथेगे पञ्चमो सऽ्चौ मजी ऽन्योन्याभावते भिन्नो werent wea इति ॥९९१॥ dart भिरूपयति । अप्रात्रयोारिति । a विभजते। कीर्तित दूति । एष संयोगः ॥ ९९४॥ सन्निपातः संयोगे दितीय उभयकमंजः | दतीय दति संयागज दत्यर्थः। ware: स्यादिति waar: fat ॥९९५॥ , आदिमः अभिघातः । दितीये arzare: सं- योग इति ॥ विभक्तमरत्ययकारणं विभागं निरूपयति।

भावा.

fagte

१९९

कपालतरुसं योगात्‌ संयागस्तरुकुम्येोः VLE ठतीयः स्यात्‌ कर्रजाऽपि दिषैव परिकोर्भितः। अभिघातो ATA WTA TATA ॥ ९१७॥ शब्टाचेतुरहिमीयः स्यादिभागोऽपि चिधा भवेत्‌। UHRA दयकमरी्गवा ऽपरः ॥ १९८ ॥ विभागजस्तृनीयः स्यात्‌ ठतीयोऽपि हिधा भवेत्‌ ।

विभाग दति॥ एकंकर्मति । उदादइरणन्तु waaweala- भागादिकं peared wv Ug ॥९९७॥९९८॥

aaa विभागजः कारणमात्रविभागजन्यः का- रणाकारणविभा गजन्यदेति । आद्यसावत्‌ । यत कपाले Yl ततः .कपालदयविभागः । तता षरि - RIAA: | तता चरमाः । ततेन कपाल- विभागेन सक्षणा कपालस्य देज्ाग्तर विभागे जन्यते [

` तते रेज्रा्तरमंयागनान्ः। तत उक्रदेज्म॑यागःैः

ततः कर्मानान cf a ने च तेग Kea कथं देजा- मरविभागेा म जन्यत दति are एकस कर्माण आरम्मकसंयोागप्रतिदन्दिविभागजगकतखानार मकंमं- या गप्रतिदन्दिविभागजनकल्वविरोाधात्‌ । अन्यथा वि- कमत्कमरकुद्मलभङ्गप्रमङ्गात्‌। TUTTI TH कसंयो गप्रतिडन्दिविभागं जनयेत्‌ तरा ऽऽरकमयो- गप्रतिदद्दिविभागं 'न जनयेत्‌ । न च कारणविभागे-

We

fagre

१९९

चेतुमाचविभागेत्यो रेत्वचेतुमिभागजः ॥ ११८ ॥ परत्वश्चापरत्वश्च दिविधं परिकीर्तितं।

शिकं कालिकश्चापि मत्तं एव तु देशिकं ॥ १९०॥ परत्यं ख्॑संयोगभूयस्त्वन्नानतो भवेत्‌ | रपरत्वं तदष्यत्वनुद्धितः स्यादि तीरितं ॥ १९९१ It

मेव द्रव्यनाच्ात्‌ पृषं छते रे्ामर विभागो न जन्यत

इति are आआरमभकसंयागप्रतिदगर्दिविभागवताऽव- we सति xa रेत्रामरविभागासम्भवात्‌ । यज इशाकत्रियया इस्ततर्विभागः ततः अरीरेऽपि विभक्त- अत्ययो भवति। ततर च अरीरतरद्विभागे wafer म कारणं । व्यधिकरण्लाच्छरीरे तु क्रिया ara) wa- विकर्णा यावद्वयवकम््गियतलरात्‌। अतस्त कार णाकारणविभागेन कायाकाय्यैविभाभा जन्यत इति, अत एव विभागे wernt । अन्यया WOT विभक्तप्र- त्यया न स्यात्‌ । अतः Varvara विभागे मान्यथा- fagr भवति॥ wren .

परापर व्यवहारमिभिन् wana निरूपयति । परत्वश्चेति । Sfaafafa ॥९९०॥

रेशिकपरलं बङतरखर्॑संयो गाम्तरितलन्नागाद्‌- {Ta | एव॑ तद गपोयस्सन्नानाद्‌ परल मुत्पद्यते | WaT- afuardfed@araer । यथा wefaqaa arm

a

१९४

भाषा तयोरसमवाधो तु दिकसंयोगस्तद्‌ाश्रषे। दिवाक्ररपरिखन्द पन्त्य न्नत्वनुद्धितः ॥ १९६ ॥ परत्वमपरत्वम्तु तद नम्तर बुद्धितः | त्र TAA स्यात्‌ संयोगः कालपिण्डयोः॥१९२॥ ्रपेक्तागुद्धिनाशेन नाशस्त्वेषासुद्‌ादतः। युः प्रकारः प्रागेव प्रायशोऽपि निरूपितः ॥ १९४ ॥ अथावशिष्टाऽष्यपरः प्रक्रारः परिद्श्यते। प्रमा च प्रमा चेति जानं दिविधमु ते ॥ १६९५ ॥ तच्छुन्ये तन्मतिय्यी स्यादप्रमा सा निरूपिता । fagre qty प्रयागः परः) पारचखिपुज्ात्‌ कुरखे्रमयेच्य पभ्रयागेाऽपरः इति ॥९२९॥' तथेोर्देडिकपरलापरतवयेः । च्रममवायी अममवा- यिकारणं। तदाश्रये रिकपरव्वापरत्वा्ये॥ दिवा- करेति॥ ९२९ ॥ | अञ परत्वं अरपरतञ्च कालिकं UT! यख्य परिस्पन्द्‌ापेखया यस्य सूर्य॑परिस्यन्दाऽधिकः घ se: | यर न्यूनः स कनिष्ठः | कालिकपरलापरत्वे ware एव । श्र कालिकपरलापरवयाः॥९२२॥ एषां कालिकदज्िकपरतापरलानां॥ क्रमप्राक्ना बुद्धिं निरूपचित॒माइ। बुद्धेरिति nye mean अप्रमां विभजते.) तच्छून्य दति । तदभाववति

१९१५

भाषा ततप्रपच्चो विपासः संशयेऽपि प्रकीर्तितः ॥ १९९॥ AA ददे याऽऽत्मबुदिः शंह्मदे॥ पीततामतिः। भवेन्निश्चयड्पा या संशयोऽथ प्रद श्यैते ॥ १९७ ॥ किंखिन्‌ नरो वा खाणुववैत्यादिबुदधिसतु संशयः। तदभावाप्रकारा धोश्तत्प्रकारा तु निश्चयः॥ LEE Ut 4 संशये AA स्यादकचाभावभावंयोः।

सिद!» तैतृप्रकारकं आनं aa इत्यथः ॥ ane: अप्रमाप्र- पञ्चः WUE

are दति। विपय्ास इत्यर्थः । शरोर यदा- त्मलप्रकारकं जानं गारोाऽहमित्धाकारकं। एव॑ a wie पोतः wy इत्याकारकं wari faqaed MGA thre VLRO

fafafafa un fafafefa fant ॥ faqae weuare तद्‌ भावेति । तदभावाप्रकारकले सति amarta wr निखयः॥ ९९८॥

ind लकयति । संजय दति। एकपर्िंकविश्द्ध- भावाभावप्रकारकं न्नाम Swe दत्यधैः॥ साधाररेति। उभयस।धारणा या udqsart संज्यकारणं। यथा उचचैखूरत्वं स्याणत्वसाधारणं भाला wd खाणुनं वेति सन्दिग्धे । एवं अमाधारणन्नानं कारणं | यथा शब्दलं farted शब्दे णदीला बन्दा मिता नवेति

१९९

भाषा” साधारणादिधर्सय नरान संशयकारणं ॥ १९९ ॥ दोषोऽप्रमाया जनकः HATA गुणा भषेत्‌ |

fagre खन्दि गपे। विप्रतिपन्तिस्त शब्द नित्यो मवेत्यादिनष्दा- त्मिका नसं्रयकारणं । गब्दव्यात्निज्ानारीनां भिश्च यमात्रलगकत्वखाभाय्यात्‌ । किणं तजर शब्दम कारिद- यज्ञां जन्यते । संग्रयस्तु मानम एवेति । wa we प्रामासंभरयादिषयसंनय इति । एवं व्याणमंश्रयादपि. व्यापकसंभय cafes Are) किमु dnd धर्नां धर्मीडिि यष्न्निककौ वा कारणएमिति॥ ९२८ ॥ दाषश्ति। अप्रमां परति रोषः कारणं, प्रमां प्रति गृणः BTS तंभापि पिकतारिरूपा रोषा श्रननुगताः। तेषां कारणलं अन्ववव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेवं feg । गणस Way अभुमानात्‌ fag) यथां प्रमा आनं साधारणकारणभिश्चकांरणजन्या जन्यश्ञानलाद्‌ Wie मावत्‌ ॥ न -च दा षाभाव एव arcuate वाचं \ पीतः we tire पिक्तराषसत्वाच्छङ्वःलम- सागुत्पन्तिप्रसन्गात्‌ । विभिगममाविर्‌हाद्‌ WAM षाभावस्व कार शलमपेच्छ गृणकारणताया न्याय त्वात ॥ न च गृणसस्वेऽपि fornia ग भेत्यशागं अत॑ः पित्षादिदाषाभावानां कारणलमवभ्प वाच्यं तया चकि गृण रेतुलकश्यगयेति वाच्यं |

९९७

भाषा० HE रत्वादि खपे दोषो नानाविधः सुतः॥ १९० ॥ Were तु विशेष्येण विशेष्यता समं । सन्निकपौ गुणस स्यादथ त्वनुमिते गुणः ॥ १९१ ॥ Ue साध्यविशिषटे च परामशा गुणा भवेत्‌।

` RD सादग्नुदधिसत्‌ भमेदुपमिते गुणः ॥ LER

METALS योग्यतायास्तात्प्थस्याथवा प्रमा । गुणः स्याद्‌ भमभिन्नम्तु WTA TA प्रमा ॥ VRE अथवो ततप्रकारं ASLO AAMT |

सिद्धा ° तथाणन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गरख्ापि देतत्वसिद्धेः । एवं wa प्रति गाभावः कारशमित्यस्वापि qavare | wa दोषाः के इ्याकाङ्घगयामाइ । पिक्तेति। कचित्‌ fernfaaa पिकं राषः। कचिच्न्द्रादेः खन्पप- रिमारभमे दू रलं gra: । कचि वंभारगभमे मण्डू कवखाच्ननमित्येवं दोषा भ्राम्तिजनका Care: WLR अथय के गृणा इत्याकाङ्खगयां प्रत्यक्षर कमा गणान्‌ दर्थयति । प्रत्ये लिति vere विेषण्ठवद्‌- fatuafaadt ae: अमुमिते साध्यवति साध्यव्याण- वैजिष्वन्नानं ACh । एवमगेऽणुद्यः॥ ९२९॥९९२॥ wat जिरूपयति । भ्रमभिलमिति॥ ९९३ ॥ गग यज प्रुक्तिरजतयोारिमे रजते इति ज्ञानं जातं सज रजतांतेऽपि प्रमान स्यात्‌ aie wafer

९६८ भाषा" तत्‌ प्रमा न प्रमा नापि भमः स्यान्निविंकस्पवा ॥१२४॥

क > I Ae NL A ~~ १. १1

सिद्ध ° arate अतं रहं । अथवेति तददिभेग्यक्र तत्रका- रकं जानं प्रमा cad: । दना and! येन समन व्येन तदक तेनं सम्बन्धेन asta तेन सम्बन्धेन तत्मकारकलं areal तेम कपालादै संयोगादिना चरा- fama नातिष्याङ्गिः॥ एव सति निध्विकम्पकं प्रमा म' स्थात AS सप्रकारकलाभावार्‌ चरत आह । न प्रमेति॥ नम oa कपिंम॑यागज्नानं अमः स्यात्‌ प्रमाचय्या- fafa 31 न । प्रतियागिव्यधिकर णमया गा भाववति VAIS BAAN न च SI संयागाभावाव- च्छेदकावच्छेद्‌म संयागज्नामं भ्रमे मध्यात्‌ तच संया- गाभावस्य प्रतियाणिष्यमिकरणलामभावादितिं वाच्यं । तज म॑यागाभावावच्छेदकावच्छेदन संयोागज्नामस्य MAA! णकणस्यागनुगमात्‌ | लदष्ानमुगमेऽपिन ofa: 1 ९९२४ ॥ प्रमाल्सिति । मीमांसका हि ward खता णाद fafa वदभ्ति। तत Tet मते WTS खंप्रकाशद््‌- पलात्‌ तज्तरानप्रामाण्ं तेनेव THA दूति भटाना मते आनमतीखियं । ज्ञानजन्या ज्ञातता प्रव्यका। तया च श्ानमनुमोयते ॥ मुरारिमित्राणां मतेऽनु- waaay जनं wma) सर्व॑वाभपि मते सज्ल्ागवि-

१९८

fagre षयकज्चानेन तज्त्ानप्रामाण्यं गद्यते | विषयमिर्प्यं डि ज्ञानं * । रता ज्ामवित्तिवे्ो विषयः । तन्मतं दूष- यति। न ear याद्ाभिति। संभयेति। यदि ज्रान- प्रामाण्यं WAT यद्यं खात्‌ तदाऽभ्यामदग्रात्पल्श्चाने agar न स्पात्‌ । तत्र डियदि भानं ओतं तदा Ware श्चातमेवेति कथं dwa: । यदि aw न शातं तद्ध्डिज्ञानाभावात्‌ कथं संशयः । was आमप्रामा्मनु मेयं | तथा डि दृद ज्ञानं प्रमा सम्बा- दिप्रटृज्तिजनकलार्‌ यन्नैवं aad चथाऽप्रमा । इदं एयिवीलप्रकारकं ज्ञानं प्रमा । गन्धवति एथिवोलप्रका- रकशागलात्‌ । एवं इदं HITT प्रमा | खेदवति भलवप्रकारकन्नामलात्‌ ॥ न च VAT कथं जात- fafa वाच्यं । एथिवीलप्रकारकलस् खते anata | तत्र गन्धवद्िभेव्यकलस्यापि सुग्रलात्‌। तत्मकारक- तलावच्छिस्लतद्ररिभरेव्यकलं परंन ररद्यते। सं्रयाग्रो- धात्‌ ॥ भ च प्रमालसं साध्यस्छ प्रडिद्धिः कथमिति वाच्यं | दद्‌भ्नानप्रमालस्य खता याद्यलात्‌॥ मच म्रका- रभेदेन ॒म्रामाण्यभेदाद्‌ घरल्वति घटरलप्रकारादेः कथं प्रशिड्रिति वाच्यं । घरलप्रकारकवत्वस्य afan- .

^ विषयविषयताकमियतखविषयताकप्रन्यचकः wala: | नुभिति- प्रकारस्तु we विषयविषयताकप्रत्यथकं विवयाविवयकप्रत्यकानिव- अत्वे सति ्रत्यचाविषयलादि्यमुमानं । श्रानप्रत्यचस्‌। विषयविषयले भ्रमाश्मिति भावः

१९०

fegre BRAG च खत UMA! घटस्व च पुष्व॑मुपथित- त्वाद्‌ चर विनेग्यकं घटल्प्रकारकमिति जाने प्रामाष्ठख बाधकाभावः । व्यवसायपरन्तु WATE) Tt Te |` तज सं्रयभामशोषक्ते संग्रयसेतापपन्तेः। किश्चाभ्याम- carat ठतीयागुष्यवस्षायादिना waves खत एव OUI प्रयमोनव्यवसायपरं म ॒तद्वारकतवभिर्तिं करयते सं्रयानुरोधात्‌ ॥ जथ प्रामाण्यानुभिततै प्रा- माण्रगरे ग तस्य विषयनमिखयद्पताथै aa प्रामा- प्रे वाच्यः । सेाऽणमेमित्यमरेरेति फलमुखी का- रणमुखी वा नानवस्तेति चेश । अण्रीताप्रामाण्य- इक सेव निखयरूपलात्‌। यत्र च wraradnagsa परं प्रामाण्णामुमितेरपेचाया aire प्राभाष्त्रानु- मितिरित एव स्वज तंन संशयः । कचित्‌ काख- ` मुंपखितेः तचिद्िभेषरर््णारितः कचिदिषयानारम- ्ारादिति सक्गेपः॥ मनु seat ज्ञानानां यथाथै- त्वात्‌ ममालच्णे तदितेव्यकल्वं fates ain ग च रङ्गे रजतार्चिनः प्रसिभ्ंमजन्या ग सात्‌ तव मते yaaa ary aa fe रोधाधौमस्व परोव्षिंनि खनन्तोपख्ितरजतमेद्‌ा ग्रस्त Beara | ama तु विजिष्ट्नागस्य wary तदेव कारणं | अस्तु वा ततापि भेदाग्रर एव कारणमिति। ग asst या स्थाति: मनवति। रजतप्रत्यलक।रणस्छ रजति

१९९ भाषा० प्रमालं न खते ATG] संशयानुपर्पत्तितः ॥ १२५ ॥

सिद्धा ° कर्षस्याभावात्‌। रङ्गे रजतवुद्धेरनु पपत्तेरिति चेत्न । सत्यरजतख्ले welt प्रति fafronrra रेतुतायाः क्तप्तलात्‌। अन्यत्रापि तत्कष्पनात्‌ ॥ न च सम्बादिप्र- oat तत्कारणं विषम्बादिग्रटत्ता त॒ मेदाः का- रणमिति वायं । साघवात्‌ प्रृत्तिमात्रे तद्य इत॒ल- HUTT । दरत्यश्च रङ्गे रजतलविशिष्टमुद्यन्‌रोधेन जानखप्तणाप्रत्यामन्तिकण्यमेऽपि ग तिः । फलम्‌ख- ` शरवस्तादाषलात्‌। किञ्च यद्‌ रङ्गरअतयेारिमे रते दति भानं जातं तत्र म कार्णबाघोऽपि। पिच aa रङ्गरजतयोरिमे THATH इति wet aware युगपत्मटृन्तिनिदृत्ती ख्यातां । TH रङ्गमेद ग्रहे रजते रजतभेद ग्रे ऽन्ययाख्यातिभयात्‌ । AAA TH रद्ध RaW रजते रभतभेदाग्रदस्य च सत्चात्‌। TINT रङ्गे रजतभेराग्रदस्य रजते रद्गभेदाग्ररस्य च TATA किंञ्चान्‌भितिं प्रति मेदाग्रदस्य देत॒ले ways afz- व्या्यधूमवद मेद्‌ा्दाद्‌ अनुमितिनिववाधा । यरि च विजष्टन्चानं कारणं तद्‌ाऽयागेालकं बह्किव्याणधुम- ज्ञानमनुमित्यनुरोधाद्‌ा पतितं । शत्यं अन्यथा स्याता प्रत्यचमेत्र प्रमाणं । TH रजततया जानामीत्यमृभवा- दितिसक्घेपः ॥९२१५॥ |

१९६ भाषा व्यमिचारस्यायहाऽपि PTAA TTA | देतुव्धपनिय रे तकः कचित्‌ MRA TT ॥ ९९९ ॥

षिङ्धा पूरे aifremt agers म afin इत्य तसतं द्यति । व्यभिचारस्येति । व्यभिंसाराणहः सद- सारग्रदश्च व्यात्िगहे कारणमिंत्ययः । य्यभिचार- शरस्य व्या्निगरहप्रतिबन्धकलात्‌ तदभावः कारणं । अन्वयव्यतिर्काभ्यां षरसारग्रदस्यापिं Wear 1 war- ging म कारणं । वयभिचारास्णूत्तौ सषृद्नेऽपि कचिद्‌ व्या्भिग्रहात्‌। कचिद्‌ व्यभिचारब्रङ्ाविधूनन- दारा याद्गमुपयुज्यते । यत्रतु शयेोद्‌अनादपि wer नापैति wa विपक्वाधकतक्तेाऽपेकितंः । तथापि बङ्किविररिष्छपि धुमः सादिति यद्या भवति तदा सा वद्धिधूमयोः कायंकारणभावस प्रतिसन्धा नाक्निव- tat यद्ययं afer म स्यात्‌ ATT धूमवान्‌ न खात्‌ | कारणं विना seine: । यङि कचित्‌ कारणं वि- नापि भविष्यति अरेतुक एव वा भविष्यतीति तत्रा- शद्धा भवति तदा साव्याघातादपसरणीया। यदि कारणं विना कायै खात्‌ लदा पुमां TRAE: भाजनस्य नियमत उपादानं waa न ख्यादिति। यत्र खलल एव शद्धा मावतरति तच न ARTETA त- दिदमकतं तवः कचित्‌ शदनिवक्तक इति॥ ९९९ 1.

wale

fagre

१९९ साध्यस्य व्यापका यत॒ रेतारव्यापकसतथा |

इदानीं परकोयव्यात्िग्रहप्रतिबन्धार्थमुपाधिं नि- शूपयति । साध्यस्येति । साध्यलाभिमतव्यापकले सति साधमलाभिमताव्यापक Tare: ममु स श्यामा भिच्रा- तनयलाद्‌ Cas भाकपाकजलं गाषाभिः Way तख साध्यव्यापकलाभावात्‌। रा मलस घटादावपि उत्वात्‌। एवं वायुः Was: Wire दत्य BATT ae गापाधिः खात्‌ । प्रत्यचलस्म्मात्मादिषु Wary तच सूपाभावात्‌ । एवे eat विनाशौ जन्यलाद्‌ इव्यव भावल arate: स्याद्‌ fanfraa प्रागभावे ब- स्वात्‌ ॥ तच. च भावलाभावादिति चेन । यद्धग्रा- वङिलसाध्यष्यापकल्वं agarafequruararqaafa- auameata । मित्रातमयलावच्छिनण्ा मलस्य. व्या- पाकं जाकपाकजवं। एवं वदद व्यलावच्छिंप्रत्यचलस्य व्यापकमुद्भू तरूपवक््ं विद्र यलावच्छिन्नमाधनस्याव्या- wag) एवं war fant जन्यलादित्यत्र जन्यलाव-

च्छिश्नसाष्यव्यापकं * भावं | agar तु Vary at घ्री

मासि । यदवच्छिन्नस्य साध्यख व्यापकं तदवच्छिन्नस्य साधनस्याव्यापकं किञ्चित्‌ aa व्यभिचारिणि

णी

* काकः maa मिजातनयलादू दत्याद्‌ {वपि भिचातनयत्वाव- feqminay qiqged waged दूति qed Wat

९९४ भाषा सं Sanat निष्कपौऽयं MEAT ॥ Le It BA साध्यसमानाधिकरणा, VITA | VARTA येषां खसाध्यव्यमिचारिता ॥ १९८ ॥ व्यभिचार स्यानुभानभुपाधेसतु प्रयोजनं

fagre श्रत उपाध्ययिकरणं यत्छाध्याधिकरणं यचापाधि- we साथ्यव्यभिकवारजिरूपकमधिकरणं तदरन्यतरला- वच्छिन्रस्य साध्य word साधनस्य चाव्यापकलमु- a: सम्भवतीति ॥ cee ll अत एव लच्यमपि शूपमेतद्भुमारेख दयति 1 aq इति॥ खषाष्टेति । खै उपाधिः खञ्च साध्यश्च ara aaralfaraftar tay: ॥ es ॥ उपाेदषकतावीजमाह । व्यभिचारस्येति। उपा- सियभिकषारंण wear उपाधेः प्रयो- जनमित्यर्थ॑ः । तेयाहि यत्र श्ुदधमाष्यव्यापक उपा- भिस शएद्धेनापाधिव्यसिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानु- भानं । यथा yaary वकेरित्थारे वहि धूम्यभि- चासो आरधन्समेव्यभिचारिलाद्‌ इति व्यापकव्यभि- afar व्याणव्यमिचारावण्यकलात्‌। यचरंतु किञ्चि- डं वच्छिम्रसाध्यव्यापक उपाधिखात तड्‌ ेवति उपा- चिव्यभिचारेण साध्यवयभिचारानुमानं । यथा way मितरातमयथलाद्‌ ta मित्रातनयलतवं श्ामवव्यभि-

११५

भाषा शन्दापमानयेनेव प्रथक्‌ प्रामाण्यमिष्यते ॥ Ree ॥ अनुभानगतार्थत्वादिति वेभेषिक मतं

fagre चारि । सिज्ातनये शाकपाकजवव्यभिवारिलादिति। वाधामुश्रीतपरेतरस्ठ साध्यव्यापकतायाहकम्रमाणाभा- धात्‌ खययाघातकलाच नेपाधिः। वाघेोश्रतस्त पक्ते- तर उपाधिभ॑वत्येवे । थर वङ्किरमष्डः रतकलार्‌ इ- प्यारा HAIG aC UAT aac: | यच भाथ्यव्यापकवादिके efecwma स सन्दिग्धापाधिः। पषे- परस्तु घल्दिग्धापाधिरपि भेद्धावनीयः केयकमम्प्- दायानृरोधादिति ॥ केचिन्तु अप्रतिप्लोत्यापनमुपा- fond) तथाहि श्रयागेलकं भूमवदङेरियारा v- थागालकं धूमाभाववद्‌ ्राद्ैन्धनाभावाद्‌ इति सम- faraway इत्यश्च साधमव्यापकाऽपि कविदुपा- far, यथा करक्रा एयिवी कटिमसंयागवक्वारित्यारो areata ॥ ग चाच खरूपषदुपाधिरेव दूष- शमिति वां । सन्व॑रापापेदूषण्णभ्तरसाङ्‌य्यात्‌ | अत च साध्यव्यापकपकाटत्तिरुपाभिरिति वद्म्ति। षब्दा- पमामंयारिति॥ ९१९ ॥ वेगेषिकाणां मते प्रत्यकमनुमाभेञच्च प्रमाणं बन्द- प्रमानयोरमुमानविधयेव yrare । तथा fe cae गामभ्याजेत्यारि पदानि ैदिकपदानि वा तात्पर्य

f

१९६

भाषा तन्न सम्यगविना व्यापिनं शब्ादिबेधेत ॥ १४० ॥

देविध्यन्तु भवेद्‌ HATTA |

aI Jaina iin Ad tt he eee सिद्धा* विषयस्मारितपदार्यसंमर्गज्नानपुरव्वकानि श्राकाङ्कादि-

मत्पद्‌कदम्बलाद्‌ घटमागयेतिपद्‌ कद्‌ स्ववत्‌ । यद्या ` एते want मिथः संमर्गवन्तः योग्यतादि मत्पदाप- स्धापितलात्‌ ताद waza) दृष्टान्तेऽपि इष्टका wavy साध्यसिद्धिरिति । वं गवयव्यल्धिप्रत्यक्ाम- vat गवयपदं गवयलप्र भ्तिभिभित्त कं * अमति ₹त्य- मारे RTI प्रयुज्यमानान्‌ | चथा गोपदं गाल- प्रटस्तिनिमित्तकं । यद्धा गवयपदं सप्रटस्िमिमितक साधपद्लाद्‌ इत्यनु मानेन पलधम्मताबलाद्‌ गवयलप्र- ठम्तिमिमित्त कं भासते तमातं दूषयति । तन्नं सम्यभिति।

` विना anfirart जन्दादिते बेघ्रस्यानुभविकलात्‌ |

म fe सर्य॑ज शव्द्‌अवणाद्यनन्रं Strat मानम सोति । faq wir weed यदि व्या्िन्ञानं करुते तद्‌ सर्गव जांनुभितिखतसे पद्‌ ज्ञानं कर्ययिला ग्द एव किं न खीक्रियत इति ॥ ९४० ॥

डे विषयमिति ` अगमाम हि विविधं केवलान्वयि- कंवलव्यतिरे कयन्वयव्यतिरेकिमेदात्‌ ॥ तताषदिपत्तः कवलान्वयी । यथया जेयं ` अभिेयादित्यारा । तत हि wide जेयलाद्‌ विपचाघ्वं ॥ मनु eat

+ भनच्वागच्छित्रेण्‌क्यमित्यय tt

१९७ भाषा० अन्वयव्याप्निसक्तेव व्यतिरेकादथोच्यते ॥ १४९१ ॥ साध्याभावव्यापकातव त्वभावस्य AAA |

fagre धषौाणां arawara कवसान्वय्यसिद्धिरिति चेन्न । व्याट कलस्य सर्गव॑साधारण्ये तरोव कवलागन्वयिलात्‌ ॥ किञ्च ठमिमदतव्यस्ाभावाप्रतियागितं कवलाग्व- fat । तख गगणाभावादोा प्रषिद्धं ॥ wees: केवलव्यतिरेकी । यथा एयिवी cater भिद्यते गन्धवच्वादिल्यादा । aa fe जलादित्रयादभभेदख् पुम्येमनिखिततया भि्ितमाध्यवतः सपचख्ाभाव इति ॥ सत्सपत्तविपराऽग्बयव्यतिरेकी । यया वड्किमान्‌ धुमारिल्यादरोा | तत्र wea महानसाद्‌ ATES जल- दारय सत्वादिति nee i

तज व्यतिरेकिणि व्यतिरेकव्याक्िन्ानं arc तदथ afataenfi fafa. साध्याभावव्यापकलं ₹लभावस्य यद्धवेद्‌ दति । साध्याभावव्यापकोभूता- भावप्रतिये गिलभित्ययः । wat are. येन सम्ब- aa aa येग रूपेण व्यापकता शृते तत्छम्बन्धा- वच्छिन्नप्रतियागिताकतङ मा वच्छिन्ाभाववकान्नामाद्‌ यत्छम्बन्धेन यद्ध ावच्छिन्नस्य व्याप्ता श्यते त- त्‌सम्बन्धावच्छिननप्रतियेगिताकतङ््‌ रा वच््छिन्नाभावद्य सिद्धिः । इत्यश्च यज विग्रेषणतादि सम्बन्येनेतरलष्याप-

९९८ भाषा अरथापततेसु नेभेच प्रमाणान्तरतेष्यते ॥ ९४९ ॥

fagre aed गन्धाभावे दधते तत्र गन्धाभावाभावेनेतरल्ा- त्यन्ताभावः सिष्यति। यत्रतु तादात्यसम्नन्धेनेतरव्या- पकता गद्यते तत्र तादात्यमम्नन्सेनेतरस्याभावः सि- च्यति।म एवान्यान्याभावः॥ एवं यज संयागसम्बन्धेम धूमं प्रति भंयागषम्नन्भेम वद्ेव्यापकता waa तत भ॑याग- सम्नन्धावच्छिन्निप्रतियागिताक्वद्यभावेन wee सं योागमम्नन्धावच्छिनप्रतियागिताकधूसाभावः सिध्यति, अच्च व्यतिरोकष्या्चियरे व्यतिरेकसदसारज्नानं का- TH केचितु व्यतिरेकमरहसचारेणान्यव्याभ्भिरव गह्यते मतु वतिरेकव्या्चिज्ञानं कारणं । यज व्यत्तिरेकमह- साराद्मात्तिप्रडसतत्रं व्यतिरेकीत्युच्यते। सा्वप्रभिहिम्त घटादावेव जायतां पञ्चात्‌ एयिवीलावच्छदेन साध्यत इति azfa tt अथापजेख्िति । waft प्रमाणान्तरं मन्यन्ते Rat तथाहि यज gaze ज्रतवष॑जीविलं जातिः- ास्ताद वगतं जोर्विमोा way प्रत्यक्ञाद्‌वमतं तत शतवर्षंजोवितलान्ययानु पपत्मा वहिःभल्लं॑करुणते तद्‌- नुमामेम गतार्येलान्नेग्यते तथादि जीविल afe:- सत्वण्रहषत्वाम्यतर WHA । तजान्यतरसिदधा जायमामायां TETRA इहिःसत्वममुमिते भामते,

१९५

भाषाः व्यतिरकव्याशनिवृद्या चरिताथा हिसा यतः Sry जगतामेव काम्य धर्मण जन्यते ॥ १४३ ॥ अधग्मजन्यं दुःखं स्यात्‌ प्रतिकूलं स चेतस | निदःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तञक्चानाद्‌वं जायते ॥ १४४॥

fagte एवं पमा Sarat feat a a" Wale aaa ` भाजनव्याप्यवावगमाद्धाजनं सिध्यति । दिवाभाजन- - at रात्रिभोजनं मिध्यति । अभावप्रत्यक्तष्यान्‌भ- विकलाद्गुपलमाऽपि म प्रमाणान्तरं ।: किश्चानु- | पलम्भस्याश्षानस्य VIA ्ञानाकरणकतात्‌ प्रत्यक्षं । ` भानस VIA तु तत्रा्यनुपलमान्तरापेकतेत्यगवग्धा । चेष्टापि प्रमाणान्तरं न। तस्याः सद्धतयादकन्न्द्‌- micas लिणादि समशीललाच्छन्द एवाम्तभौवात्‌। यचतुव्याष्यादिग्हसचामुमितिरेवेति ॥ १४९॥ सुखं निरूपयति । war जगतामेव काम्यं घर्मोण जन्यः. इति। काम्यमभिलाषविषयः | धर्जति घर्म॑विन Waar काययकारणभाव इत्ययः Way दुःखन्निरूपयति । श्रधर्ंति । welds cada काय॑कारणभाव wae: । प्रतिकूलमिति दुःखल- waza सर्वषां खाभाविकविषय इत्यर्यः ॥ weet निरूपयति । निदुंःखल इति ॥ ९४४ ॥

९९० भाषाः TST त तदुपाये ख्धादिशोषायत्वधीर्यदि। .. ` Peeler छतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारोच्छा च या भवेम्‌ ॥ १४५॥ तद्रतुः कतिसाध्ये्टसाधनत्वमतिरभषेम्‌ । maa RCRA स्पात्‌ प्रतिबन्धिका ॥ १४९॥

सिद्धा इच्छा fe फलविषयिष्ठी उपायविषयिणी च। फलन्तु सुखं दुःखाभावश्चं । ततर weet प्रति फल- wrt कारणं । अतं एव खतः पुरूषायैः समावति) यज्त्रामं ay खटत्तितयेव्यते म खतः पुरुषाय इति Wasa । इतरे च्छानधीनेच्छाविषयतवं फलिता sts । उपायेख्छां परतोष्टमाधनताश्ानं कारणं ॥ चिकी्वंति । हतिसाष्यलप्रकारिका रतिसाधयक्रिया- विषयिषीच्छ! चिकोषा । पाकं हत्या साधथामीतिं तद्नुभवात्‌ ULE

चिकीर्षा ` प्रति रतिषाष्यताक्नाममिष्टमाधमता- ज्ागच्च कारणे । aa एव sat रतिसाथध्यताभा- | कानन चिकीर्षा ॥ वलवरिति | बलवद्िष्टमाधमताश्ारम aa प्रतिबन्धकं । अता मंधुविषसंएकान्नभाजमे न खिकीषा । swage: प्रतिबन्धकं दग्थन्ये॥ १४६॥

कस्यसिगमत इतिं।बलवदनिष्टाजमकलतन्नाभंकार- अमित्य्यः। तिसाष्यतान्नागारि मता बरवद्निष्टषा-

भाषाः

fagte

९९९

दिष्टसाधनताबुद्धिभवेद्‌ toe कारणं ॥ १९४७॥ प्रचरन्ति निव््निश्च तथा जीवनकारणं |

एवं प्रयततरैविध्यं तान्तिकेः परिदर्भिंतं ॥ ९४८ ॥ Ratt छतिसाध्येष्ट साधनत्नमतिसथा। `

धमता श्चा नश्रूल्यस्य बणवद्‌ निष्टाजनकल्व ज्ञानं विनापि चिकीषायां Beara कस्छचिक्मत दृत्यस्रसेा दर्भिंतः।॥ देषं भिखूपयति। दिष्टमाधनतेति। दुःखापाय- विषयकं दषं प्रति दिष्टसाधनताशानं कारणमित्यंयः। गलवदिष्टमाधनताज्ञानस्च प्रतिबन्धकं । तेन मान- रोयकदुः खजनके पाकादौ म देषः॥ १४७ ॥

aa निद्ध्पयति । प्रटनिखेति । प्रठत्तिनिट्ति- जीवगयोानियन्नमेद्‌ात्‌ प्रयल्नस्तिविध cad: wesc

चिकर्षत्यादि । मधुविषर्बषएटकाक्नमाजमादौ बल- वद निष्टागुबन्धित्ेन चिकीषाभावानश्न प्रड्िरिति

भावः। हतिषाथ्तान्नानादिव मखलवद्‌ निष्टाननुवन्िल-

जाभमपि खतग्तान्वययतिरेकात्‌ प्रतता कारणमि- त्यपि वद्न्ति ॥ काय्य॑ताज्नागं प्रवर्तकमिति गरवः ।

age ज्ञानस्य प्रका जननीयायां चिकोरषातिरिक्रं

मापेकितमस्ति। मा च रतिंसाष्यताज्नागसाध्या। दच्छा- याः स्वप्रकार प्रकारकधोखाध्यतवमियमात्‌। Fant हि रंतिमाच्यत्प्रक।रिक्डां । तच afar -प्रकार-

१९९

fagre सतकारकजागं चिकीषायां तद्वारा waa चरतः 4 विष्टसासनताज्ञामं wa रेतः । रत्यमाष्येऽपि प्रह- WII: कत्यसाध्यताज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकमिति Baqi तद्‌- भावापेक्चया छतिसाध्यताश्ञानख SAAT | न च दइया- रपि Waa Arca मनु त्तेऽपि मधुविषसंष्ह्ना- qa चेत्यवन्द्ने च प्रटत्यापल्तिः कायैताज्ञान- सत्वादिति चेन्न । खविगेषणएव जा प्रतिमन्धानजन्यकार्यं- ATH प्रव्नंकलात्‌ । काम्ये हि यागपाकाडौ का- ममा खविगेषणं । any बलवद्निष्टाननुबस्थिकाम्ब- साधमनाश्चानेन RAAT | ततः प्रततिः । दत्त भोजने न प्रवर्तते। तदान कामनायाः पुरूषविभेषण- arian जित्य च शाषारिकं परुषविभेषणं । तेन भचादिभागाधीनक्ृतिषाध्यताज्ञानात्‌ तच wea: ay तद्पे्या लाघवेन बलवरदनिष्टागमुबन्धीष्टमा- धनताविषयकका्यताज्ञानमेव ary बलवदनि- एाननुबसिलश्च इृष्टारपत्तिनान्तरीयकदुः खाधिकदुः- खाजनकलवै बलवद्ष्टविषयदुः खाजनकलं वेति चेन्न । दृटसाघनलकतिसाध्यवयोयुंगपन््ात॒मगरकयलात्‌। सा-` ` प्यलसाधनत्येोर्विरोधाद्‌ अखिद्धस्य तु awd सि- स्य च साधनलं। मच एकमेकेमेकदा fegafigy Waa तस्मात्‌ काणमेदादुभयं ज्ञायते Hay लाघवेन मखवद्निष्टाननुबन्पी्टसाघनले सति afar

१९२

fagre मख्य Waar न च माध्यलमाधमवयोर्विरोाघः। यद्‌ा- कदाचित माष्यत्साधनत्यारविराधात्‌। एकदासा- ्यलसाधमतयाश्चाज्ञानात्‌॥ नवीनास्तु ममेदं कतिमा- ष्यमिति आनं न प्रवत्तंकमनागतेष्टसख न्राततमगक्यलात्‌। किन्तु agra पुंसः छतिभाष्यं यदिष्टं तादृ शलं au प्रतिखन्धाय aa प्रवर्तते तेनादमकामस्य तत्‌- साधनताज्ञानवतसदुपकरएवतः पाकः छतिसाश्वसा- इूशयारमितिप्रतिमन्धायं पाके प्रवर्तत case । खकग्ितलिष्यादिप्रटत्तौ Bat कामेद्धेदादिना स- THIEL च तद्भावात्‌। UT ara) तद्‌ानीभिष्ट- साधमलादरिभ्नानं प्रवर्त॑कं।तेन भावियावराञ्ये मालस्य

। म प्रत्तिः। acre छतिाध्यवाश्नानात्‌। एवं zat भोजने ग प्रवर्तते। तद्‌ानीमिष्टमाघनलाज्ञानात्‌।-प्रव- कंते च रोगदूषितचिन्ता विषादिभवणे। तदानों बल- वर्निष्टाननुबन्धिलन्चागात्‌॥ म चास्तिकस्यागम्बागम- angus कथं बलवद निष्टाननुयन्िवबुद्धि- .. मंरकसाधनलन्नानादिति वाच्यं । उत्कटरागाङि्ना मरकषाघनताधीनमिरोधमात्‌। SATA तु एतिमाथ्य- ताशन्नानाभावान्र चिकीषीप्रटत्ती । किन्विष्टसाधनता- भागादिच्छामाच। रतिश्च प्रटन्तिरूपा बाध्या । तेन नीवमयोानियत्रसाप्ये प्राण्यञ्चकसश्चारे न wala: | Wy प्रवक्ञंकलानु राधादिपेरपि तावागयैः। त्यश्च

१२४

सिद्धा ° विश्वजिता asia इत्यादौ यत्र फलं न श्रुयते तत्रापि खगैः फलं aw | TITTY: सन्ध्या मुपाचीतेत्थारे इ्टानुत्पन्तेः प्रतिः कथं ॥ ग चार्थवारिकं ब्रह्मले- कादि प्रत्यवायाभावेा वा फलमिति वाच्यं । तथा सति काम्यले नित्यत्रान्यापन्तेः। कामनाभावेऽकरणापकेय। इत्यञ्च फलश्रतिछजाथैवाद्मा जिति चेन्न । गह- णश्राद्धांरो नित्यलनेमिभ्िकव्यारिव weary काम्यलर्मैमिग्सकल्व योरिव नित्यवकाम्यलयारष्विरोा- धात्‌ ॥ न च कामनाभावेऽकरणापन्निः | जिकालस- वपाटाद्‌ाविव कामनामद्धावस्यैव BMA ॥ मनु वेद मेधितकाययेताज्ञानात्‌ wala: समावतीति चेन्न | दष्टसापधनलमश्ाय ताद्श्रकार्यताश्नानसर्खेणापि — परे रसम्भवात्‌ ugha पण्डापूव्वफलमिति तदपि म। कामनाभावे COTTA SAN | ATR TT ल्वाथेवादिकफलमेव राजरिसचन्यायात्‌ कर्प्यतामन्यया प्रटत्यगुपपन्तेः । तेन । |

wa कोचिद्‌पा सस्य दुरितस्य wea अनुत्पत्तिं तथा चान्ये प्रत्यवायस्य मन्ते ॥ | Wa | | सन्ध्यामुपामतेये तु सततं भ॑सितत्रताः | | विधूतपापा यान्ति रह्मलाकमनागयं॥ एवं ।

१९५

fagre दश्याददरहः arg for: प्रीतिमावहन्‌।

दत्थादिकमेव फलगस्त ॥ न च पिटप्रीतिः कथं

` फलं व्यधिकरणलादिति वाच्यं | गयाश्राद्धादावित्र खट्‌ श्ठत्व सम्बन्धेमेव फलजमकलस्य कचित्‌ कम्यनात्‌ । अत एवोक्तं जास्तदितफलमनुष्ठानतेा Cai tf) fazat qn a ae खर्गफलं यावन्नि- त्यमेमित्तिकागुष्ठानस्य सामान्यतः खगंफलकन्पमात्‌ पण्डापु्वार्थपरटृक्तिञ्च न सम्भवति । न डि तत्छुख- दुः खाभाववत्‌ खतः पुरुषार्थः । न वा ततूमाधनं + प्रत्यवायानुत्पक्तौ कथं प्र्तिरिति चेत्‌। इत्थं । यथा | दि भिव्यते प्रत्यवायाभावसिष्ठति aca az- भावः | एवं प्रत्यवायाभावस्य सत्त्रे दुःखप्रागमावसत्तं तदभावे तदभाव दति यागसेमसाधारणकारणताया दुःखप्रागभावै प्रत्यपि सृवचलात्‌। एवमेव भायञ्चि- स्यापि दुःखप्रागभावहेतुतमिति॥ ननु मं कलनं भकसयेरित्यच विष्यं कथं नजथान्वयः | दष साधमला- भावस्य रतिसाष्यलाभावस् च माधयिततमश्रक्यता- fafa Var तत्र वाधादिष्टसाधमत्वं रतिभाध्यत्श्च म विष्यथैः fey बलवद्निष्टाममुवन्धिलमातरं तदभावञ्च as बाध्यते | श्रवा बलवद निष्टान बन्धोष्टसाधमलवे सति शतिसाध्यलं विष्यः । तदभावख नजा मोाष्यमानेो विगिष्टाभावा विजेगष्यवति विशेषणाभावे विश्राम्यति ॥

® 4

१३९

fagre नमु ष्येनेगाभिचरम्‌ यजेतेत्यत्र कथं बलव॑दजिष्टानमुव- . सितम: । wre मरणानकुखव्यापारस्य faa गरकणाधनलात्‌ ॥ ग च वैधलान्निषेध दति वायं । अभिचारे प्राय्िक्तोपदब्रात्‌ ॥ न ष मरणानुकूल- . च्यापारमाचरं यदि fear तदा खङ्कार RIANA हिंषकतापन्तिगलखद्रान्नभक्तणजन्यमरणे खात्मवधि- त्वापन्तिखेति वास्यं । मरणोदश्कत्वस्यापि विेषण- त्वात्‌ । अत एव सप्तमीतेलान्यक्गख न feared | अन्यो- द श्कचिक्तनाराचहतत्राहमणस्य तु वाचनिकं प्राच- क्तमिति Wa) श्येनवारणायादृष्टादारकलेम वि- Wega । अत एव काशोमरणाद्य्थृतज्निवपूजादेरपि a रिषालं ॥ म च माखावारणजनकरोव. feara Bag म तया किन्तु तश्नन्यापुल्वेमिति वां । व्वद्ाघातेन ब्राह्मणे व्रखपाकपरम्परया aa feer- त्वानापक्तेः । कंचिन्तु aaa ftarad नं तु मरणं । श्येन जन्यखद्रघातादिचू्पा fear अमिसारपदाथेः। तस्य च पापञजमकलं । अतः शेनस्य Fara wer जनकत्वेऽपि अ्रथिमणापं प्रतिसन्धाय सना भ प्रव- Wat ॥ आचाग्ास्तु आक्ताभिप्रायो विष्यर्थः। पाकं कुर्याद्‌ wat आज्ञानिरूणे च्छावाचिलाचिस्माच- सटच्छावाचिलं साघवात्‌ । wy खगंकामा यञेते- त्याह यागः खग॑कामहतिसाध्यतयाऽभीष्ट इत्यथैः। तत

९९५

भाषा" उपादानस्य चौध्यक् प्रवृत्तो जनकं भवेत्‌ ॥ ९४९ ॥ frafrg भवेद्‌ देषाद्‌ दिष्टसाधमताधियः।

सिद्धा ° आरपरष्टलेनेष्टमाधनलादि कमनुमाय प्रवन्तंते। कलं ्न-

WITT तदभावान्न Waa | यस्तु वेदे पारषेयतलं anaifa तं भ्रति विधिरेव aryl दव afi: g- मायाः dara मामं ॥ न च कर्त॑सारणं वाधकः। कपि- सकणाद्‌ादिकमारभ्या्पर्ययम्तं कठसरणस्यैव प्रतीोय- मागलात्‌। अन्यया WaT AI RATA: । मश्व कटेखारणमस्तीति चेदेदेऽपि छन्दांमि जञ्जिरे तस्मा- दित्यादिकर्तंखरणमस्येव । एवं प्रति मन्वनारं चेषा Afra विधीयत इत्यपि द्षट्यं॥

MITT भगवाम्‌ वेदो गोतस्लया परा ।

faarer wfiqarat: सकोारोाऽसय म कारकाः ॥ इति वेदस्य भतिमात्रे॥ म च पोरूपेयलभरमादि- समावार्प्रामाण्छं स्त्रादिति वाच्यं । निव्यसमैज्नतेन भिरषलात्‌। अत एवं पुरुषाम्तरभरमादि सम्भवान्न कपिलारेः aya वेदस्य । किञ्च वथानामेवानित्यलस्य षच्छमाणत्वात्‌ सुतरां sada वेदरसानित्यल- fafa ॥ उपादान खेति । उपादामस्य समवायिकार- णस्याध्यत्ं प्रथं waar कारणमिति॥ ९४९ it

दिष्ठसाधभतान्ञागस्य दुःखमाघनविषयकनिदन्तिं

T

९९८ भाषा" यज जीवनयोनिसतु TATA भवेत्‌॥९४०॥ SRR प्राणसचारकारणं परिकी तितं * । see गुरुत स्यात्‌ प्रथिव्यादि दये तु तत्‌॥१५९॥ afaa तदनित्यं स्यान्नित्ये नित्यमुदादतं | तदेवासमवायि स्यात्‌ पतनाय तु कमणि ॥ ९५९॥ सासिद्विकदरवत्वंस्यान्नेभित्तिकभथापरं |

~ ~~~ सिद्ध ० प्रति जनकल मन्वयव्यतिरेकाद वधारितमिति भावः ॥ यत्न इति । जीवनयोामियन्ना यावष्नीवन मनु वन्ते |

स Warr tl ९५४० it लज प्रमाश्माइ । BAT प्रा्सध्चारकारणथं परिकोन्तिंतमिति। माणषद्चारो चि efter: urate: प्रयत्नसाध्यः। इत्यश्च प्रा्सश्चारख यल्लसा्यत्रानुमा- मान्‌ प्रत्यच्यलख वाधाचातीख्िययन्नसिडिः | म चव लीवनयेएनि प्रयन्नः ॥ गरलं निरूपयति । अती-

` द्दियमिति ॥ २५९६. ५

अनिष्ये qyater तहु रल मनित्यं | नित्ये पर- भाकतो नित्यं । गरल मित्यनुवन्तते । तहं असमवायि अममवाचिकारणं । पतने भ्रा्पतने TU: WLR Ut दर ववन्निरूपयति। साँसिद्धिकमिति। द्र वलं दिविध

=

# तत्‌ प्रकीरितमिति पाडानारः |

ace

१९५८ भाषाः स।सिद्रिकन्तु सलिले द्वितयं FATE ॥ १५३॥ परमा जले नित्यमन्यत्रानित्यमुच्यते) नैमित्तिवां वह्धियोगात्तपनोयघुतादिषु ॥ wen द्रवत्वं स्यन्दने देतुनिभित्तं UAT तत्‌ । सेदो जले स॒ नित्याऽणावनिल्योऽवयविन्यसे॥ wy tt तैलान्तर तत्‌प्रकषाद्‌ द चनस्यानुङ्खलना |

fagre सांसिडधिकं मेमित्तिकश्चेति। दिती नेमित्तिकं पर- माणाविति॥९५द्‌ ॥ sacar दर्‌ वलं नित्यं waa एिंवीपर- माण्वारै जलद्मणकाद च दरवलमभित्यं । कुरचिन्ने- जसि कुत्रचित्‌ एयिष्याश्च गेमिस्तिकं zat तज का षा afafaariaciafa ॥ नेमिततिकमिति। वङ्कीति पदनेजाऽर्चकं। तया च तेजःसंयागाभभिषंया- गजन्यं नेमित्तिकं द्रवलं । ae सुवसादिरूपे ante चुतजतुप्ररुतिषएथि्यां ada इत्यथः ॥ ९५४॥ द्रवत्वं स्यन्दने Vafifard सङ्गरे तु तदिति रेतुरिति श्रसमवायिकारणमित्ययः | ay’ सक्तका- दिस॑येागविभेषे agad खेदमहितमिति argais तेन द्रुतसुव्णीदौमां म age ॥ सेहं निरूपयति । जके इति । जण वेत्यथ; । अशा सेदः ॥ ९५५ ॥ नमु एथिव्यामपि तेलसते उपलभ्यते | नं चाभ

१४०

MMe GRA Fics खितिखापकभावने ॥ १५६ ॥ मूर्तमाचरे तु मेगः स्यात्‌ कमज वेगजः कचित्‌ । यितिस्थापकसंस्कार) शिते! कचितुर्प्वपि॥ १५७॥ अगन्दियाऽसै विकषेयः कचित्‌ खन्देऽपि कारणं

fagre गलोयः#॥ तथा सति द दमप्रातिकुष्यं खादत ares तैलाम्तरे तत्‌प्रकर्षीाद्‌ इनस्यागुकूणतेति । तत्‌प्रक्षात्‌ से हप्रक्षात्‌। तेल उपखभ्यमानसेडाऽपि जलीय एव। तस प्रशष्टलाद्‌ ग्रेरागुकू्ं | way हि जलं afi माज्रयतीति भावः॥ संखारजिख्पयति । संखारेति। वेगख्िं तिख्वापकभावमामेदात्‌ संस्छारस्तिविध cay- येः ॥ ९५९ ॥

quart त वेगः खात्‌ awa वेगजः whe

दिति। कर्मजवेगजभेरादेगेा दिविध card! । were fe नादमजनितेन कर्मणा वेगा जन्यते । तेन ख प्व BATTS UT wa । एवमपि । विना चख वेगं कश्मंणः कर्मरप्रतिबन्धकलात्‌ yaaa उरक त्पस्तिञ्च ग सात्‌ । यत्र वेगवता कपाशेनं safe घटे वेगे जन्यते स वेगजो वेगः ॥ खिति्यापक cfs आङृष्टश्ाखादीनां कपित्यागे ° पुमम॑ममस् खिंतिखा- पकसाध्यलात्‌ । कचिदिति । way लित्यादिषुखि- faut कं चिगमन्यको तदप्रमाणमिति भावः ॥९५७॥

* ofc इति साधु ॥

भावा०

fagte

१४१

भावनाख्यस्तु संस्कारो MAP AMR ॥ ९५८ ॥ खपेक्तानात्मकसतस्य निश्चयः कारणं WAT | सारणे प्र्यभिश्रायामप्यसे SATA ॥ १५८ ॥

अधा श्वितिख्यापकः । कचिद्‌ आरुषटभाखारौ ॥ ware इति nyc

तस्य VATS | उपेलात्मकश्चागात्‌ संग्कारामु- TATA TOM । तत्‌संशयात्‌ संस्कारानु- त्पत्तेनिंसय रत्यक्तं । तेनेपेक्ान्यमिखयलेन dart प्रति देतुतेति भावः॥ ननु सारं प्रद्युपेान्यमि श्चयलेम tad मेनापेलादिखरे ग सारणं Tag संस्कार भरति जागतेनैव हेतु तास्विति चेन्न । विनिगमनावि- रदेणापि संस्कारं प्रति उपेक्लान्यनिख्चयलेन खेतर्तायाः िद्धलात्‌ । किञ्च उपेचास्यले संस्कारकस्नाया गङ्‌ लात्‌ dart प्रति चोपे्ान्यलेन रेतुतायाः fag- लात्‌ ॥ तत्र प्रमाणं दर्शंयति । सरणे प्रष्यभिज्ञाया- म्यत रेतुरुच्यते इति । wa संस्कारः सरणं प्रत्यभिन्नागश्चं जमयति | aa: संस्कारः कर्प्यते | विना व्यापारं wires सरणारि नममा सा मच्यात्‌। खखव्यापाराम्यतराभावे कारखलवासम्मवात्‌ ॥ भ चं परत्यभिश्चां अरति warierca Waa मरत्यभि- श्राया; संस्कारजन्दत्वेन खतिलापत्िरिति are |

१४९ भाषा" धम्माधम्रावदृ्टं स्याद्‌ WH स्वगा दे साधन। TFTA यागादि व्यापारः VATA TEIN got

fegre चरप्रयोजकलात्‌ । परे त॒ जनुदुडूखस्छारात्‌ प्रत्य

भिन्नानुदचादुदुद्धयंस्कारस्र Warner तज्त्‌ख- रषखेव प्रत्यभिन्नं प्रति Fad कल्यत cars: ॥ १५२ ॥ |

aqe निरूपयति । wtruadifafar aarfea- कखसुखानां खर्गखाधनीभूतत्ररोरादीनाश्च साधनं ` wal Cas तजर Nard cWlagqares यागादीति। यागादिव्यापारतया डि wal: seqa) अन्यया या- गादीनां fat विनष्टतया जिव्यापारतया चकाला- मारभाविखर्गजनकलं न स्तौत्‌ तदुकरमाचार्यः।

fara werard न कम््ातिश्यं विनाद्ति॥

मनु यागध्व॑स एव व्यापारं; BNL न प्रतियोनित- ङंषयारेकत्राजनकन्वं। ws aya मानाभावात्‌ ॥ ` म च स्वदते फला मनं ममते चर मफलस्यापूर्यनान- sara तयालमिति वाच्यं । कालविन्रेषस्य qear- रिलाद्‌ can आड । ayrartfa । ayTarre: fe खगंजमकलेऽगनानां जलसंयागष्वंषानां व्यापा- रलमपेष्येकमपू sea लाघवादिति भावः i १.६०॥

भाषा०

fagte

+:

धसरनाशाजलस्पशादि ना नाग्यस्त्वसा मतः| अधर्मी नरकादीनां देतुनिन्दितकम्बजः ॥ १६९॥ प्रायश्चित्तादि नाश्याऽ सै MATA ल्मे गुणे |

नमु ष्वेसाऽपि म यापारोऽम्हु॥ न च नियौ पारस्य चिरष्वरास्य कथं कारणत्वमिति are: अन- न्यथाभिदडमियतपूर्॑व्तिलख तत्रापि ward । च्रवय- afeaqaatia fe चचुःसंयोागारेः कारणलं न तु as काय्येकालद्त्तिल्मिव समवायिकारणस्य का- रणलमित्यत आह । कमांनात्राजलस्प्रारिना नान्न war मत इति। यदि fe श्रपु्ये न स्यात्‌ तदा क्ांगाजाजलसश्नादिना ATI wala न स्यात्‌। म

fe. तेन यागादिना प्रतिबन्धो वा कन्तुः शक्यते ।

तस्य पूव्वेमेवं दतलादिति ॥ एतेन देवतापरीतिरेव फजमित्यपासं '। गङ्खासतानाङा wa देवताप्रीते- रसमवात्‌ । रेवातायासेतमलेऽपि ततरोतेरनुद ए- त्वात्‌ । प्रीतेः सुखख ूपलेन विष्णु प्रीत्यारो तदषम- वात्‌ । जन्यसुखारे सजाभावात्‌। तेन विष्णुप्रीतिजन्य- त्वेन पराभिमतखगेादिरेव fafa waa ॥ quar मरकादीमां रेतजिंन्दितिकर्षज दतिः नरक- बुःखादिमकलदुःखानां मारकिशरीरादीमाञ्च सा- धममधम्ं इत्ययः ॥ ९६९॥

माणमाइ । Mra Sa । MATA

| | ९४४ भाषा° KAT तु वासनाजन्यो भ्ानादपि विनण्यतः ॥ १९९ ॥

सिद्धार त्विमे गुणाविति। यरि इध्मा भं eq तदा

भाय्चित्नादिमाश्छतवं न ख्यात्‌ । न हि तेन ब्रह्महन- मादीनां are: प्रतिषन्धा वा विधातुं wats तस्य पृम्वविनष्टलादिति भावः । जीवेति । ई खरस walr- धौभावारिति भावः ॥ दमा तु वासमाजन्येा ज्ना- माद्पि विन्त xf cat wearer) वास- मेति । wit wife कते सुरतदुष्कूतकम्बेषी ग फलायालमिति भावः । ज्रागादपीत्यपिना भाग- परिः ॥ गनगु ANTS कथं UTA अकल LaTyN चीयते val कल्यकारि तेर पीति वष- विरोधात्‌ । cay त्वज्नानिना रिति काच- ata सकलकष्णां भागेन चय इति चेन्न । तच मा- ne वेद्‌ बोभितनाश्रकोा पलकितलात्‌ | कथमन्यथा प्रा- यञिन्तादिना क्लां नाचः । तदुक्तं । ज्ानाभ्निः waar aay शूयते च। लीयन्ते wre कम्ाकि तस्मिन्‌ दृष्टे परावरेश्ति॥ ननु त्लभ्नानिनसतर् अरीरावखानं सुखदुःखादि चष म स्यात्‌ wer च सर्म्वषां कमणां माग्रादिति ta प्रारसेतर कर्मणामेव नान्रात्‌ । तज्षच्छरौरमागजमकं हि यत्कं तत्‌ ATTA तद्भिप्रायमेव नाभुक्रमिति. वचनमिति ॥ ९६२९॥

[यनः क यी =i) eas -- a ee ee ~~ —— न्म. _ ei, Ai, ce _ कि _ _ _ यय य सिया „~ ~ --- यः =

९४१५

भाषा” शब्दा ष्वनिश्च षर्ण॑शच श्ठदङ्गादिभवो ध्वनिः कण्ठसंयोगादिजन्धा TUG कादयो मताः॥ WII सर्व्वः शब्दो GPT BATA ZH | | धीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्यत्तिसतु कीर्तिता ॥ १९४॥ RTA AU HATTA । उत्यन्नः क। विनष्टः क इति FRC ET ॥ ९९५॥

fagre. शब्दं निरूपयति । wear wafry adg दद्म दिभवे ष्वभिः। कण्ठसंयागादि जन्या are काद्या मताः Wat war नभाडन्तिः Randy शाते डति ॥ मभाटन्िराकाशचसमवेतः ॥ दूरस्थश्रब्दस्याग्रद- ware । Bafa ॥ ननु खरङ्गाथवच्छेदेनात्पनन weg BTA कथमुत्यत्तिरत IW वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन aqufas की्तितेति। sara aferufea- वच्छिाऽन्यः शब्द स्तेमेव शब्देन जन्यते । तेन चापरं स- gras: । एवं क्रमेण ओ्रातरात्यन्न ख्यात दति ॥९६२॥ १६४ ॥.

कद्‌ म्बकारकन्या यावुत्यत्तिः कस्यसिग्मते इति। ्रा- UME दभदिच THE उत्प्न्ते। ततश्चान्ये TH- अब्दा उत्पद्यन्त इति भावः । असिम्‌ A गारवादुक्र कस्यचिन््रते इति ॥ नमु शब्दस्य नित्यता दुत्पत्तिः कथ-

+ क द्‌ भ्मनारूकति पाठामोारः ॥

१४९ भाषा सोऽयं कं इति बुद्धिस्‌ साजात्यमवलम्नते | तदृवोषधमित्यादो सजानीयेऽपि दशनात्‌ ॥ VE It दति ओमद्ामद्ोपाध्यायविद्यानिवासभड्ाचाय्सत AAT UATE AAT भाषाप- रिच्छेद। समाप्तः॥ * ॥

fugre मत आह । उत्पन्नः को विनष्टः क षति भद्धेरनिव्य- Afar भष्दानामुत्पादविभान्रप्रत्ययध्ालिलाद्‌नित्यल- मित्यर्थः ॥ ९६५ ॥ | नमु ख एवायं ककार दत्यादिप्रत्यभिन्नानाच्छ ष्दानां fad । इत्यं चात्पाद्विनाञ्नबुद्धिभ्रमरूपा ` चेत्यत श्राह । सोऽयं क ईति बुद्धिस्त साजात्यमवल- | - wd, तरेप्राषधमित्याशि सजातीयेऽपि दशनादिति। तज प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य तत्‌सजातीयलं विषये म ततद waar विषयः । उक्हप्रतीतिविराषात्‌ | इत्यश्च दया- रपि art रमलभिति॥ ननु सजातीयलं सोऽयमिति अरत्यभिन्नायां area इति कुत्र दृष्टमित्यत are "देवेति । यदौषधं मया कृतं तदेवान्येनापि कत- । भित्यादिद्शंनादिति ara: yaa tl दति ओमहामरापाष्यायविद्याजिवासभङहावायं- पुतथीयुतविश्चनाथपञ्चागनभडाचाव्यविरचिता षि- द्ान्तमक्रावली संपूण ven

we

भाषापरिष्छरे दस्य WERT | भहा परय अदाद शत्र R Re यविप्नष्वस विप्नतध्वंस tz 6 anafancan समवायिकारजतं EY ठ BAR BAR ९4 R गजकम्ममात् गुखकम्म माच ge १९।१९ त्रसेचाष्यदि Waa ed श ANTAL RIAL ed a खल्व ‘wae 8९ ge नेग वेशि WE कः naa nad ६५ ३ ated arg oc Re Catal पद्नन्य <c tz द्गते! दम्पत्यो > १८ मैवेपत्त नेवेपपत्तेः ed UR गष्यत्व Kaa €= Rt, दित्वदि दित्वादि Ure श CUA एथकत्व १९९ Re पाटलीपुवात पाटलीषुत्रात्‌ १९० Re क्रचित्‌ कचित्‌ १९८ . ayaa बह्यभावेनः RR श्‌ काट्‌ाचित कद्‌ाचित्‌ १४९ श साचन साधम्‌ त Vee श AWA SAT AWA SAT

Digitized by Google

भाषापरिक्छेदस्य frases |

Wet WHI" मङ्गलाचरगं ,.......... ee a CC CC. | 1 श अव्यविभामः ,,.,................ 39 8 गुलविभागः Berens 4. 9 काम्मविभागः! oo. ek cee eee ere rT सामान्यनिरूपश ,,......... 0 rT | पिशगेषभिरूपकं ..,,...,..... व ,,. ७ समवायपरिच्यः. ,,.......०००...००.००..०.०.. ७ च्भावकविभागः ,......... <

डति पदार्यविभागकयनं प्रयममागः।

SMITA MTU AME RUT ,.......- ९०

कारमलद्याशं ९९

कारमविभामः ,........ eee 8९ >» N ्न्ययासिखिलचलविभामा ..... ere | गर्स्येव समवायिकाशगत्वकचनं. .,........... uC समवायिकारणस्य गुगकम्ममाचकत्तितं ..... nC | जिखदव्यभित्रामामासितत्वकयनं :...........१4

ति सप्तपर्ायानां साधम्न्धादिकयमं दितीयभामः। एथिवोजिशू्पसं ,,...,...००००.... 0 \ 4 एयिवोविभामः = ® @ ® ७ @ ७ 9 @ 9 त RO देरेन्दियविषयक्रथनंः .......... भ WHAT ,,...... cece ee Lenawee RO ry, तेजानिरूपमं eee eee eee ,०...१०

वायुगिर्पयं ,,...५००००१११००००००००. १

५ @ MAK APY

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INTRODUCTION.

In the following introduction to ह translation of the Bhisha Pari- echdéda,* one of the most celebrated works of the Nyfya philosophy, it has been my endeavour to subject the logic of the Nyéya, as well as the leading idens of this and the Vaiséshika systems, to a critical re- view, in order to bring the discussion about the merits of the philo- sophical reserrches of the Hindus more toa point. Colebrooke’s ex- position of those systems, though foundcd on the ablest and most exact researches, as well in a philosophical as in a critical point of view, does not suffice for this: purpose, as itis a mere abstract from the works of those schools, aud docs not enter upon the discussion of the position they are to hold as systems of philosophy.

It is well known, how difficult it is to write a history of ancient [ताक only a few strictly historical records having been left to us by the Hlindus themselves. ‘Tho saine difficulty obtains with regard to the history of their philosophy, as in the mind of the Hindus philosophy was associated with the idea of being raised above change, and no regard therefore paid to the social and intellectual condition of the time, in which lived the founder of a system or his successors who more _ * T have translated Dhésha, in deviation from its ordinary sense ^ speech,” by ^ categories of the Nyfyn philosophy ;’’ for Dhisha means here evidently not १ speech” in general, which would give no sense whatever, but * Nyfya Bhasha,”’ apeech in the Nyhya, that is to say the philosophical language or terms of the Nyfya, In the Sabde Kalpa Druma, ‘ Bhfsha’”? (under the head of Dhfsha Pariechéda) has the meaning of Paribhashe, which Is explained by the authoritative language of the teachers which considers the meanings of the words (१9५8१६8). This sense 9& ९९९8 essentially with the rendering which I huve given,

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Introduction.

evcloped it. Still it is not impossible to write a history of Indian hilosophy, if it be limited to the task of tracing the gradual develop- ient of philosophical principles and modes of thinking, without ference to a strict chronological order; for the internal nature of a octrino will point out its more ancient or modern date. At the same me we must admit, that even in this attempt, we can only partially wcceed. The doctrines even of those who are considered as the fuunders [ (€ different schools, bear the marks of a far advanced progress in rstematical arrangement, and must therefore have been the result of a mg series of preceding philosophical enquiries.* Tlence it would he reposterous to expect, that we should be able to discover the first steps f their researches. We, however, decline here embarking upon a istorical research of such a kind, believing, that under the present ircumstances, when only so few of their philosophical works have

* Lassen’s Indische Alterthumskunde, vol. ii. p. 477. His (Panial’s) text-book yntinned to be the norm of the whole fullowing time, and the labours of his 8९46. ‘sors were limited to the task to nerrow or amplify his rules or more luctdly to ‘range them. From his work the same effect results, as from other pursuits of 1e Hindus on the ficld of scicnce. By a person of superior talent the labours of is predecessors were rendered more perfect and brought to a close; he united them 1 a system of rules, or Satras, which he condensed as much as possible. This ex- osition remained the standard of all Jater times, and formed the foundation for the rcceeding teachers of the same science, whose eflurts were in general dirccted to 1e correct explanation and elucidation as well as to the emendation aud perfection f the fundamental work, and by whum tho science was carried to a higher degice nly as to its extent, but not as to its contents. We may discover a double motive, ‘om which this manner of exposition took its rise. First, the sum total of the esults which hud becn gained, should be condensed in the shortest form and hence he learning by rote facilitated... = = Secondly, this mode of exposition rendered the nderstanding of the text difficult and often impossible, unless it was accompanied y on explanation. Such an explanation was st the disposal of the teachers, and by heir guidance alone the pupils were able to comprehend the obscure aense of the sxt-books. The Brdhmans, the only possessors of the sciences, thus secured fur hemselves the privilege of communicating them only to those whom they thought rorthy of this information, and of preventing the other castes from an initiation with hem. It is only in this sense that a secret doctrine of the Brahmans can be ad- litted. From the circumstance, that for each single science text-books of this kind rere generally acknowledged as standards, it was a consequence, that the works of he first founders aud of the predecessors of the person who brought a science to esfection, were forgotten and freqnentiy lost.

faye ea मः

Introduction. itt

been published, nnd in general so many more materials are required for the task than we can boast to possess, it is more important to place an original work of Hindu philosophy before the public, ind to examine the principles under which it has been constructed; For this end we consider the Nyéyn in that shape, which it has acquired by its amalgamation with the doctrines of the Vaiséshika, since ` we are of Colebrooke's opinion, that both sprang from the same root, aud are but branclies of the same school ; the one being directed more to the explanation of material, the other of logical forms.*“Or to state it more exactly,—fo the Nyf&ya belong the logical doctrines of the forms of syllogisms, terms and propositions ; to the Vniséshika the systematical explanation ‘of the categories (the simplest metaphysical idens) of the metaphysical, physical, and psychical notions, ‘which notions are hardly touched upon in Goutama’s (the supposed foander of the Nydyn) Stitras. They differ in their statement of the several modes of proof; the Nydyn asserting four modes of proof—from per: ception, inference, annlogy, and verbal communication ; the Vaiséshika adinitting only the two first ones.

The name of logic, usually applied to the Nyéya, does not correctly define it. It does not treat of the theory of syllogisms and the notions connected with them, as its direct object, but only as a component part of its investigation. It rather aspires to the distinction of giving a complete system of philosophy, based upon the most elementary. meta- physical notions, and thie division dedicated to the explanation of syl- logistical forms, is not even more explicitly treated than other parts of the system. To call the Nyfyn logic, would be the same as to assign this name to the philosophy of Aristotle. There is no doubt, however, that the Ny&ya has first among the philosophical systems of the Hindus thoroughly examined the art of reasoning, and shaped it into its present form. Ilence it gained such ascendancy among the learned Hindus, that all of them, however they may devinte from other doctrines of the Nydya, refer toit as to their standard in logic, and deem its study _ necessary for the purpose of giving a firm basis to their reasoning.

` © Vid. Colebrooke's Miscell. Essays, Vol. +, p. 261. ॥

+ The view above given, was based upon the Sitras of Gautama, without a re- ference to a work of the Velséshika school. [ have since compared the Sitras of Kayéda and found my view completely confirmed.

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iv Introduction.

It is indeed one of the principal merits of the Nyfya, that its pro- gress is marked by an admirably exact division of the topics, treated in it, and in this respect it is not only superior to all other systems of the Hindus, but even modern philosophy might, with advantage, atudy it on account of its clearness and exactness. Though none of its inves- tigations bas been carried on to a satisfactory end, the Ny4éya has, with the means at its command, fully described the circle within which it moved. We must at the same time admit, that notwithstanding its exactness, there is one inherent fault in its exposition, viz. the neglect of all analytical method, ह fault of all systems of the Iindus, which has, perhaps, more than any thing else, contributed to the narrow limits of their mental horizon. This fault, which, however, it shares with many other expositions of philosophy, for instance, to mention a cele- brated name, with Spinoza’s system, is rather a fault of exposition than of the system itself; for no synthesis (in science) is possible without analysis, and having well understood the leading notions of a system, we can easily trace the analytical way by which they were obtained. This apparent absence of analysis in the constraction of the philosophi- cal systems of the Hindus is the reason why so many enquirers have done injustice to their philosophical talent. For want of a clear analysis, unable to understand the aphorisms of the Hindu schools, composed in a Ianguage in form as well as in thought, foreign to them, they thought the philosophical productions of many centuries and of an ingenious people, a web of either abstruse or puerile notions. On a closer exami- nation we shall come to a juster opinion of them, and although we find a limit as well in the range as the depth of their enquiries, we shall come to piace them among the nations which advanced the intellectual progress of mankind.

That Hindu philosophy will, however, have any great influence upon the development of European philosophy and mediately of European civilization, must be denied. Why should-this be the case? Although we must admit, that the philosophical researches of the Hindus are as worthy of attention as those of the Greeks, atill it is at the first glance evident, that the philosophical works of the former are unfit to be transferred to another soil, while those of the latter will have always the same influence upon every rising generation in every clime and age. This difference lies not so much in the development of the system

Introduction. | v

as in the form. Yottare compelled to think by reading the works of the - Greeks, they introduce you into the process of their thoughts, and by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until you _atrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of theif systems, from which point it is easy either to look back upon the way you have made or to advance further. The Hindus, on the other hand, are dog- matical, They commence synthetically with a statement of their principles, yet do not condescend to unfold the train of thought which has led tothem. Ience it is impossible for any one to understand their writings who has not previously, to a considerable degree, been practised in philosophical enquiries. The punishment howerer of this mystery and exclusion is the want of interest, felt in the study of their writings. Tlie same doctrines which might have been instrumental in enlightening thousands, are now forgotten, or in the possession of a few who are hardly able to comprehend them.

Among the general metaphysical notions, the notion of substance is the most important one, as upon it all other notions are either founded or are closely connected with it, and whatever may be the solution of all other metaphysical problems, it must be influenced by the notion of substance. |

Substances are, according to the Nysya, the substrata of qualities and actions,* a definition, which is the right one, as the basis of further in- vestigation—it is the right one, because founded on experience. Sub- stance, we add, is in so far the substratum of qualities and actions, as the existence of qualities and actions depends upon the existence of substance ; if quality were independent of another, it could not represent another, whose quality itis. The existence of substance must there- fore be absolute, that is to say, not dependent upon the existence of another; for in this cnse, it would be comprehended, not by the notion of substance, but by that of quality. And consequently, to think the idea of substance by any uotions including dependance, is a contradic- tion. This contradiction (of comprehending substance under the notion of quality, and therefore of dependance) was committed by the Nyf&ya by the distinction between eternal and non-eternal substances, because the

* Or rathor of qualities alone according to the mod ern school of the Nyfya. The definition, that substances are the substrata of qualities and actions, belongs to १८११६११. ।

vi Introduction.

existence of the latter is not independent. In the notion of eternal substance, however, the true notion of substance is included, which is to be independent of time and cause |

Another question is, how a substance is united with its qualities ? That a substance should have qualities, appears matter of course, and to question it, shows a vast progress in metaphysical thinking. Al- thaugh the Nyfya entered not expressly into the discussion of this sub- ject, it must have felt its weight, as they found it necessary to invent a contrivance for such a connexion. A substance is, according to them, united with its qualities by a relation, called intimate relation, which is something real, and is neither in substances, nor qualities, nor actions. We do not intend here to analyze this notion any further (stating, how- ever, that the difficulty is not really removed by it,*) but we turn to a third point in the notion of substance. Substance, according to the Nyfya, is not only united with its qualities by the relation, just men- tioned, but all substances are united with the general notion of sub- stance, and single substances in the same way with the notion of their own class. This general notion is rather a common property; for it does exist, independent of the mind which may conceive. it, in the substances (also in qualities and actions) themsclves, and is even etertial in eternal substances, not eternal iin transient ¢ubstances. This stotion exactly corresponds with that of the so-called realists among the scholastic philosophers, who maintained the reality of general notions. Duns Scotus, for instance, asserted, that general properties (notions) were not only in objects potentid, but actd, and that generality was not only formed by the understanding, but that it existed previously to the mental conception per se asa reality, viz., the quiddity itself, which was

* For if it is necessary, that qualities require some link to unite them with sub- atances, It isalso necessary, that this link should be united with them by a similar link, and so on. The difficulty, as regards the connection of qualities, ie briefly atated, thus. The existence of qualities ia dependent apon the existence of the sub- stance, whose qualities they are, but not vice versa. Substance in accordance to its notion, ia independent of qualities. Substence therefore is something of itself, and also something on which qualities are dependent, and in this latter respect it fa not substance, which is to be independent of qualities. That is to say, the notion of substance in this form 16 contradictory, and should be abandoned for a notion which ie consistent.

6

Introduction. vii

indifferent to general or individual existence. A cause, however, was required to remove this indifference, viz. another more extensive quiddity, closely united with the first, and with the principle of indivi- duity. (afterwards called haecceity.)* |

In one point the Ny&yn went a step in advance of most of the anci- ent systems of philosophy, viz., in its assumption, that the special qualities of substances are effects ; for instance earth is the intimate (or material) cause of शाल), the soul of knowledge, &c. ‘They were no doubt urged to this assumption by the contradiction, which arises, if beside substance, a quality which is necessary and therefore belongs (० the quale of the substance, is admitted. If quality is an effect of substance, its existence is evidently derived, and the contradiction re- moved. Although, however, this hypothesis is a step in advance, it is not the complete solution of the difficulty ; for here again the question will arise, how it is possible, that a substance can become n cause, that ` is, produce something, which is foreign to itself.

Substances, as before said, according to the Nyfya, are either eter- nal or non-eternal. Eternal are space, time, ether, soul, and the atoms of mind, earth, water, fire, and air. Non-eternal are all compounds, or the things which we actually perceive, aud which must have a cause of their existence. Thus substances are divided into those which are with- out cause, and those whith have a cause.

There are three causes ;—1!. The cause of intimate relation, or material cause, as yar is the material cause of cloth ;—2. The proximate eause, or the actual union of the parts which are to form a compound ; —and 3. The instrumental cause, viz. the cause by which this union is effected.

This is similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, who admitted four causes ; a material cause, a moving cause, a formal cause, and an end cause. The instrumental cause includes Arisotle’s formal, moving, and end causes.

The notion of causality is certainly well considered, and infinitely su- petior to the notions which other Indian systems formed of it; for there are already made some steps in advance towards the proper discussion of this notion, if a difference in causes is acknowledged. In the enume- ration of causes—the cause of motion appears to have been omitted ; it is,

* Vid. Tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie, Vierte Aufl. p. 256.

+ 1111 Introduction.

however, contained in the notion of instrumental causality. All activity according to the Nyéya is limited to motion, acts of the mind being considered by them as qualities, and as all actions abide in substances, we must think every substance as a cause of motion (viz. the Inst: cause), They did not, however, discuss, whether motion was necessary to all substances, or only to some or to one, that is to say, whether there is a primum mobile or not; they did not discuss the question, whether or not different motions require different causes; nor did they Instly enter into an explanation of the notion itself.* They appear in fact not ४० have been aware of the intriusic difficulties of the idea of causality, which undoubtedly is one of the most difficult metaphysical notions.t The contradictions in the notion of cause and effect appear with special force to apply to such causes, by which a change in the qualities of a substance is effected, as chemical, animal, and psychical effects. Such effects are, however, denied by the Nyfya. Material causes must be understood as only the substrata, or thé materials for a new union, as ~ for instance, the two halves from which 8 pot is produced, are the ma- terial cause of the pot. There are therefore no real changes, but only changes of the accidental form, which substances may assume in their connexion with others ; and there should not be changes at all we add. Every compound substance, according to the Ny4ya, is ultimately pro- duced from simple substances. Simple substances, however, are eternal, and all their qualities are also eternal. If this is the case, there is also

* The contradictions which Zeno found in the idea of motion, are well known, and without fully acknowledging their weight, it is impossible to obtsin a correct notion of it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and endeavoured to remove Zeno's objections to this notion. How important it is, correctly to define this notion, is evident even from the influence, which it exercised ‘on the Nyfya, where motion is considered as an act, and even as the only act.

t Vide Sext. Emp. Adv. mathem. in Ritter’s History of Philos. Vol. iv. p. 339. That .cause could not be later than effect, is evident ; but also the effect cannot be Jater than the cause ; for if a0, the cause, being antecedent to the effect, would be without effect, and a cause withont effect, is a contradiction. And if the effect would be consequent to the cause, it would be, when the cause Is no more, therefore an effect without cause. Both therefore must be necessarily together. If this be con- ceded, then there Is the difficulty, why the one more than the other is producing (or cause)... These are only pert of the difficulties, and without solving them, the objections made against causality, sre quite just.

Introduction. ix

no change of qualities in any compound substances, because by any con: nexion between them, different from an accidental relation, they would assume changes, contradictory to the notion, under which they are con- ceived. As the Nydya, however, admits an actual change in compound substances, in which qualities, not to be met with in the simple substan- | ces, are produced, and moreover admits a compound, in which there is a comparatively firm connexion of the parts with each other, it has deviated from its notion of causality, and is hence guilty of the contradiction which it first endeavoured to escape. Notwithstanding these deficien- cies of the Nyfya, we still maintain, that it approached nearer than any ` other Hindu system, to the true notion of causality, causality being, according to Pantheistic, not less than to skeptical idea, a product of habit in the association of our ideas. In passing from the gencral metaphysical (ontological) to more special investigations (comprehending natural philosophy and psycho- logy), we tnny first observe, that the snme cledrness obtains in the latter 88 inthe former, Existence, or rather that which éxists (ro dvrws ov, in its connexion with material and immaterial phenomena, is much more distinctly conceived than in other systems of the Hindus, We find in- deed the eame material. clements as in the Intter; viz., eatth, water, light, air, and ether, and also the same qualities ; but while in all others they are only generally described, here there is made an attempt to ex- plain the special phettomena ns well as the sources of our perception of them, or in one word, we find here the basis of observation, and of the first lineaments of the consequent reflection upon the results of that ob- servation. We meet here also with the first remarks about space and lime, and even with some correct notions of their nature, and although both of them are placed among the substances, we must not forget the intrinsic diMficulties of this subject, which in our times only has been more satisfactorily investigated by Kant, Fichte, and Ierbart. The error of considering space and time as substances, is a consequence of the notion the Nyfyn had formed of substance, viz. as the substrate of qualities and actions, This idea would, indeed, have been correct, had the no- tion of existence been preserved. The Védénta certainly had a mucli more exact iden of existence, maintaining, that which exists (ro cvrws dv) must be simply existent, without any attribute whatever, and should strictly not be even considered by a plurality of notions. The Védénta, ९

x ' Introduction.

however, by denying the reality of phenomena, had nothing to explain; while the Nyfya, retaining the crude notions, given by observation, had no principles whereby to explain them. The most intereating point in this part of the system is the investigation into the nature of matter, an investigation which was indeed entered into by other Hindu systems, yet not with the same success, ‘I'he Véddnta, for instance, teduced the objects of the senses, or the things composed of the gross eleméhts, to elements which are finer and iinperceptible to the senses, undotthtedly for the same reasons as the Nyfya, viz. because the origin, the changes, and the destruction of the material things compelled the mind to fix the notion of existence upon some other natures, not affect- ed by those conditions. But according to the Védéuta, the simpler elements are only simple, because they are unmixed with others, As regards spice, however, no reduction was made, and their view on this point is very like the doctrine of Anaxagoras, who also started from an original identity of the elements witli space. Thé Védanta indeed did not confine its thoughts to those elements, but proceeded to the suppo- sition of a substance, in which there is no difference whatever, but for what reason this supposition was here maile, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory reply, and as regards the principal point, space filled out by mattet, it was not even touched upon. Thé Nyfya, on the other hand, has examined matter undet this point of view, and arrived at the theory of atoms,* in the same way as Leucippus and Democritus. It proceeded even further. With Léucippus and Democritus atoms have some, though imperceptible, extetit, and also different figures and mo-

# It Is estonishing, that the Nyfyatkes made the supposition of such a substance

as the ether, which, like apace and time, is pervading and Infinite. It is not space itself, but ४ kind of matter, filling out space, and can therefore be distinguished from it merely by a lets dcgred of density. Ifso, the consequence shottld have been, that it was aled cotnpdedd of parts, the last elements of which are atoine. instead of this, other is some thing analogons to space, by ite being Infinite, and yet Alling out an infinite space, In fect it appears, they ashumed this notion of ether only historicelly, or as a part of the views on matter which had been formed pre.

viously to them. The doctrine of the five elements (ether, air, fire, water and:

earth) is one of the most ancient hypotheses of ladian philosuphy. It is taught

olready 19 the Upanishads, and probably more ancient even than the doctrine of `

the soul. Hence it passed over into thé different syatems, vis. the Véddnte, Sénkhya and NySya, modified according to the different views they held of substance. |

अ~ क ~

Introduction. xi

tions, while the Nyéya held them to be absolute units of space, without any dimensions ahd motions, that is, mathematical points as regards space. They are eternal and wuchangeable, aud while they are without cause themselves, they are the cause of the material univetse. They ate imperceptible to the senses, and the knowledge of them is obtained by inference. |

` The system of Democritus is throughout a crude materialism. The ` Inst elements of existence are with him atoms which have no qualities whatever beside form atl motion. The soul itself is merely a com- pound of round atoms, and a deity is of course impossible. A theory of atoms of such a kind is contradictory in its principle, and in its re- sults lends to an annihilation of truth in general. The Nyfya is vastly superior to Democritus’ theory ; for atoms are first conceived in their real notion as units of matter without any extent, aud secondly the theory of atoms forms only a subordinate part of their researches.

, The same clearness and to a certain degree comprehensiveness is met with in their psychological enquiries. ‘The faculties of the soul and its relations to the material things and other objects of knowledge, are . methodically described. The Nyéya draws a marked line between matter and spirit, by distinctly stating the notions, under which either is perceived.

The soul hns, according to the Nyaya, qualities, opposite to the quali- ties of the substances perceived by the senses, and is therefore distinet from these substances, that is to say, as regards special qualities ; for ‘as to qualities, ascribed to substances as far as they are substances, both must of course agree. Qualities of the soul are the emotions and desires, volition and aversion, ete. and knowledge. Kuowledge is pro- duced by intellect, which is one of the qualities (faculties) of the soul, Intellect is again fourfold, itis perception, inference, analogy and verbal knowledge. Perception (viz. perception generally, as well of cxternal as of internal objects), is the source from which all other knowledge flows, or rather, without objects of perception the other faculties of intellect have no materials to work upon. All knowledge, that is. per- ceived, is perceived through a medium, through an instrument, by which the soul is in communion either with objects from without or from withinitself, External objects are perceived through five external senses, these being in contact with the mind, while internal objects, and

c 2

ॐ | Introduction.

by them the soul, are only perceived through the inind. The doe: `

trine of the communication of the soul with external objects is very curious and interesting, not only because it is original, but because it shows a remarkable acuteness in overcoming difficullies, met with in every system, which considers substances riot only as individual beings, but also as a common essence that exists, although dependent upon the individual substances. To perceive individual external substances, and their properties in common with others, it is necessary that the inter- course of the senses with the external objects should take place accord- ingly, tlint is to say, that individual substances should he perceived by the connexion of the senses with these individual substances, and the common properties by the connexion of the senses with these common

properties, Substances are then perceived in their different rela-

tions, viz. first, in the relation of this individual substance and this individual quality, or of this individual substance and this individual act; further, in the relation, which this individual substance has

with its class (general essence) or with its generality; and lastly, in-

the relation, which this individual quality or this individual act of thid individual substance has with its class or generality

This, however, is not sufficient; for a full comprehension, there are required also general notions, corresponding with those relations. A tree for instance would not be perceived, without the general notion of a tree, by which 8 tree at any place and at any time is percelved. This शालम्‌ notion requires again a kind of special knowledge, by which the general notion of a tree is referred to a certain tree. This kind of knowledge, though corresponding with the relations of all substances, which have both general and special properties, and though (impli- citly) contained in every object of perception, still differs from the gene- ral properties of the things. ‘It is a conception of the soul, produced by its own activity. This knowledge then is internal perception, that is to say, it is not produced by inference, or analogy, or verbal commu: ‘nication, but it is immediate and complete, as all knowledge by percep- tion. Every perception of external objects then, according to thia ex- position, is based upon two elements, an external and an internal, or a8 these expressions do not exactly represent their notions, an immediate

6

and mediate, an objective and ideal knowledge, In the same way are the |

objects of the soul perceived, vis. ite different qualities, as aversion;

Introduction. xiii

volition, &c. are called. Though the soul is the object of the mind, it is not directly perceived by it, hut is inferred from its qualities. It is not necessary here to explain the other faculties of intellect, viz. in- ference, comparison, and verbal communication, as they are discussed in another part of this paper. We here only add, that they must be con- sidered as parts of the quality of knowledge, or, as we would express it, as modified operations of one and the same activity of the soul

The mind, by which all knowledge is perceived, is not 8 quality or Faculty of the soul itself, but an independent substance, atomic in its nature.* [ence only a single perception or idea is at one time perceived by the soul

The soul itself is eternal, and therefore so also are its qualities, we should say, also its knowledge, although this knowledge be not perceiv- ed by the soul itself. It is at the snme time every where, not, however, as an infinite soul, as the universal soul of the Védinta, where all things constitute the pervading soul, be it even a ‘piece of matter, though bound by ignorance to a state of apparent material existence, but in the same way as space and time are connected with every thing. There is a general soul, and there are individual souls. The general soul haa - the snme qualities with the individual souls, with the exception of aver- sion, pleasure, pain, merit and demerit, because these qualities would involve imperfections. The iudividual soul is subject to the law of transtnigration, and happiness and misery are the consequences of its good or bad actions. It is, however, possible for the individual soul to ‘emerge from the vicissitudes of worldly existence by the attainment of true knowedge.

Sere it is necessary to point out what place the notion of the general soul or the deity (Fswora, the Ruler) holds in the system of the Nydya. |

The Véddnta denies a personal deity. There is a supreme soul, but this soul is all in all, individual souls aré emanations from it, as sparks from fire, and are essentially identical with it. Nature in its first elements as well as in its development depends upon it. The

* How Is mind united with the soul? Not by any act of either; for they are independent of each other. They are united by something without them, vis. by the power of God, in the same way, as atoms are united with each other ; for these latter, although the material causes of compound substances, are not causes of their connexion.

xiv ss Introduction.

Védénta in fact destroys the distinctions between God and nattire; every distinction is delusion, and there is nothing but one all-pervading, knowing and blissful being, and even such distinctions as of existence, knowledge, bliss, are not real distinctions, they are but contrivances to approach to the true idea of the One.—If thereis nothing but existence, but knowledge, but truth, there should be no difference whatever, and least of all any delusion, on the contrary, there is with man almost nothing but delusion; only few approach the true notion of God, and but inadequately; in most men there is only difference found, and nature is altogether opposed to it. Nay, this is not only the case in the last emanation of this deity, but if we comprehend nature in its principle, where all differences of substance, quality, form, &c. dis- appear, if we comprehend it as dependent upon the soul, it is ignorance, that is to say, indiscrete matter, it is non-existence, non-knowledge, &९. but this, Proteus-like being, of which it cannot be said, that it ex- ists, nor, that it १०९३ not exist, is to be placed upon the soul, to be under- stood by it. This is to say: in theory the Védinta acknowledges but one principle, the infinite soul, in fact, however, two, soul and non-soul, ignorance or matter.

With reference to God, the Sénkhya js divided into two sects, the theistical and the atheistical.* `

* Col. M, E. pp. 251-2. God, Fowara, the supreme ruler according to Pétanjall, isa soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected by the ills with which they ard beset, unconcerned with good or bad deeds snd their. consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In him is the atmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythology) himeelf in. finite, unlimited by time.

Kapila, on the other hand, denies an Fewara, ruler of the world by volition, alleging, that there is no proof of God's existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed. He acknowledges, indeed, a being fesu- ing from nature, who fe intelligence absolute, source of all individual intelligences avd origin of other existences succcssively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, that the treth of such an Fewara is demonstrated, the Creator of worlds, in such sense of creation; for “ the existence of effects,” he says, ^ is dependent upon consciousness, not upow Tewara,” dud, ‘‘ alleles Is from the great principle.” Yet, that being 5 finite, having a beginning and an end, dating from the grand de- velopment of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an Infinite being, creator and gulder of the universe by volition, Kapliia positively

denies. 8८8 aleo Wilson’s Sénkhya Kérike,'pp. 166 to 168.

Introduétion. xv

Kapila denied altogéther a deity; the Yewara whom he admits, is Only a finite being; for although he assumes a being, whose intelli- gence is absolute, yet this being issnes from nature, and is again to terminate int nature, It is very much to be regretted, that of 74001. jali’s doctrine nothing as yet has been published. It is difficult to form an exact iden of his being from the words, quoted by Colebrooke. According to them he has some attributes of the deity ; he is of the titmost omniscience, iufinite, unlimited by time; but how he is con- nected with the creation and ruling of the universe, it is impossible to conceive. If his doctrine in other points agrees with the athelstical Sénkhya, all the development of the world in its different forms is-indes pendent of him; for it is the necessity of nature, that certain emanas tions are issuing from it, and returning to it after certain periods. It would rather appear, that he is a kind of Epicurean deity, blissful in himself and unconcerned with the affairs of the world.

The Nydyn is essentially theistical. According to them, God is per- tonal, He is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere know- ledge, mere bliss, but he is a substauce, of which existence, &c. are attributes | for it is impossible to think of existence, knowledge, &c., without refetring them toa subject which exists, which has knowledge; &e. 11९.19 not the supreme soul of the Védanta which is the whole tniverse, but distinguished as well from the world as from finite spirits, Ile is not a mere emanation from nature, as Kapila asserted, but alto- gether different from nature, and self-existent. [eis also-not,.as ap- pears to be Patanjali’s opinion, a merely omniscient being ; but ho is of infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, and nature could not exist in- dependent.of त God, or could exist only without order, harmony and object. And this idea is not ouly a fortuitous addition to the system, but one of its chief springs; for all the substances in the world, with- ont God, remain tnconnected. There may be atoms, but they do not constitute a world, they are solitaty, unconnected, without any apparent difference; of themselves they have no action, produce no effects, and not even the simplest compound of two atoms can arise from them alone, much Icss a compound of a certain form and for certain objects, not the world int its unity, harmony, and infinite variety of forms. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conseience, without enjoyment, without development and without a final end, fot

xvi ` Introduction.

they are not united with mind, the tastrument, by which they are con- nected with the world, among themselves and with the creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who by his infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervading harmony of the world. This argument for the existence of a deity is eseentinlly teleological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the world as to its form, not as to its matter.

The Ny&ya approaches most closely of all ind systems the Chris- tian notion of God, as its deity is an infinite spirit and at the same time personal, as it is wholly distinct from matter, and the creator and ruler of the universe.

1८ would be superfluous to point out the marked distinction, drawn here between body and soul. Though a higher development of philo- sophy may destroy the distinctions between soul and matter, that is, may recognise matter, or what is perceived as matter, as the same with the soul (as for instance, Leibnitz did), it is nevertheless certain, that _ no true knowledge of the soul is possible, without first drawing a most decided line of demarcation between the phenomena of matter and of the soul. In the Nydya there is even an approximation to the doctrine, that soul and: matter are as to their principles one and the same, viz. itt the theory of atoms, according to which atoms are the negation of space. From this notion we may draw the inference, which has not been drawn by the Nyfya, it is true, but which would have been only a necessary consequence from the premises, that matter, being a compound of atoms, is only a phenomenon, as regards its extension through space. Where then is here shown the difference between the sont and the true substratum of matter? Let us seo then, what is the soul? The soul is different from matter, as this Inst is perceived by the senses as extended through space. This distinction is true, but further to conclude, that the soul is also differcrit from matter in its real nature, where matter is not extended, is certainly hasty, and does not follow from the premises. What then is the soul according to them? It is all-pervading, infinite, like ether, spate and time. This answer, though far from satisfactory, shows, that they felt the difficulty in determining the notion of the soul, when their other notions had undergone a decided alteration.— The most peculiar notion in their psychological theory is the existence of

_ Introduction, = vil of the hind tudependent of soul, although most intimately connected with it; for througlt the mind only the soul perceives, as well its own qualities, as the qualities of external substances. How could the Nyéya have made a supposition in which the contradiction is so evident? For it is ensy to conclude, that if the mind is independent, ite perception is also independent. If the mind perceives, this perception is not in the soul, and if this perception is in the soul, it is not perceived. The soul then has knowledge, which is not real knowledge, because not perceived, and the mind has no knowledge, though it perceives.

We may solve this difficulty at least in some way. The mind was first undoubtedly considered as an internal sense according to the ana- logy of external senses, in order that there be a unity of perception, and that, as the external objects are perceived through different media, the objects of the soul be perceived through an analogous internal medium, a supposition, which has also been made in modern (English) philosophy. So far the Nydya might have considered the miud as an internal seuse, but they met with a difficulty, which was not felt in the same intensity by modern philosophers, If knowledge be per- ceived by the soul through the medium of the mind (the internal serise), why is it not always present in the mind? why does it disappear and give place to other objects of perception, etc. f Locke was surprised. at the narrowness of the human mind, without being able to account for it; the Ny4ya in endeavouring to account for it, invented an inde- Pendent substance, the mind, which is an atom, and according to its atomic nature only able to represent or to perceive one object at one and the same time

This, I think, is the solution of the difficulty, and though it is cer- tainly only an evasion, because its supposition creates greater difficulties | than the former one, it still gives evidence of a spirit of enquiry in the school

In comparing the psychological theory of the Nydya with more modern doctrines (with the exception of the latest period) we must admit, that in a metaphysical point of view there is no great difference between them. The same objections are to be made to either, the doctrine of faculties being involved in the same contradictions as that of qualities. In either case, if you are to explain, what the soul is, you have to state, what it is, independent of its qualities or faculties, and

D

xvill | ‘Introduction.

aso to enumerate the latter, Your explanation will thus point out a quale, which is not a unity, but something defined by a varicty of no- tions. - This, however, is not the place to discuss the matter, and we trished only to remind the reader, that modern philosophy in this respect cannot boast to have advanced one single step beyond that of the Hindus, that is to say, in the metaphysic of the soul, although it would be absurd to deny, that modern psychology, as to the observation of psychical phenomena, has made rapid strides towards perfection.

In passing over to the strictly logical enquiries of the Ny4ya, we have to premise, that we canhot view them with the same satisfaction, and although we may make ample allowance for the different furms of language, in which they are explained, we are compelled to confess, that they are neither exact nor complete. | ¶९ Nyéya has treated the logical topics in the inverse order of that adopted by us, viz. first inference, then ideas, and Iastly propositions. This order is followed, not in consequence of a different method of ar- rangement, but in consequence of the subjects being based upon different ` grounds, and flowing from different sources. Logic might undoubtedly be treated analytically and commence with the exposition of syllogisti- cal forms. Considering argument as a fact, we might analyse various arguments, and proceeding to their elements, that is to propositions, gradually arrive at ideas or notions. But the Nydya, far from following such an analytical course, holds inference to be a quality (or modification ofa quality), different from the quality of forming names and notions, and discusses inference before verbal knowledge, evidently with the purpose of showing, that the latter in some way depends upon the former.

_ We, however, treat these doctrines in their common order, with no other intention than to make ourselves better understood. । . Verbal knowledge is one of the divisions of intellect. The first act or the first condition of understanding words, is the forming of the name! A name 8 corresponding to a certain object, and this object is connected with the name by the power of the name. A name which has such a power, isa word. ‘The clear and distinct knowledge of what is implied in a word, is produced by a third act, and is the meaning of a word. This Intter is in fact identical with idea o¢ notion, as is evident from the examples given, as for instauce, a tree isa thing which has toot, stem, branches, leaves, eto. ।

Introduction. xix

रिट again is the order perverted, the name {s certainly not the first operation, and the object to be named, the second, but just the reverse; There must he objects to be named, and though we may admit, that the clear iden of a subject often succeeds a name, still the object, of which the notion is formed, is the first, and we must assert, that what precedes the notion, also precedes the name.

The enquiry, how ideas are formed from a variety of similar objects, belongs to psychology, and however interesting this question otherwise may be, logic has nothing to do with the psychical process, by which ideas are produced. If this were the case, we might still have to wait for n logic, as a psychological theory has not yet been established to general satisfaction, while logic as a science has been complete for more than two thousand years. By the considering first of the names aud after- wards of the corresponding notions, the real character of a notion has been at least obscured. From the given examples we see, that a notion, instead of being defined by the genus, under which it is contained, and the specific difference, is explained by a genus, which is distant from it by anumber of intervening notions (for instance, genus of tree—thing) and by a specific difference, which besides its own difference, enumerates properties which it partakes with others (for iustance root, stem, leaves, etc.==specific difference). 7

The meaning of 2 word or iden, ought to have been considered in its connexion with other ideas, as made up by genus and differentia spe- cifica, and as excluded from them by their compatible, contrary, and contradictory opposition. Ilete, however, are genus and species raised to categories under the names of generality and particularity, being there the common properties of substances, qualities, and acts, while the opposition of ideas or terms is treated in the seventh category, that of negation. Negation is the category which arises, if the categories are mutually denied of each other. It is the mutual difference of the categories and therefore the same with logical opposition. Negation is again of four kinds, mutual negation, antecedent negation, (negation of a thing, that is to be,) emergent negation (destruction) and absolute negation. Of them antecedent and emergent negations are not logical, but metaphysical negations, viz. the relations which a thing may have with regard to its origin or cessation in time. Mutual negation corresponds to contrary opposition (oppositio contraria) of terms. For iustance

४ 2

2X ‘Antroduction.

black is the negation of white, of red, &c. and vicé vers; here the one is not denied in an absolute, but ina relative manner. Absolute nega- tion* would correspond to contradictory opposition (oppositio contra- dictoria) as is evident from an allusion to it in the explanation of a nega- tive inference. Here it ts said, that a notion is the negation of its abso- Inte non-existence, for instance cloth is the negation of its absolute non-existence, non-cloth, or A== Non—Non— A, that is to say, A ie the negation of what is in contradictory opposition to A.

From this arrangement then did not only result an imperfect exposi- tion of the logical relations among idens, but an iinportant metaphysical error, by which logical relations of ideas are considered as real proper- ties of substances.

In finding the logical treatment of notions by no means satisfactory, we may at the same time observe, that there are many valuable remarks on some psychological and grammatical relations of ideas which we do not recollect to have found elsewhere. ‘These we have given in a note to the text, where this subject is explained.

A proposition to convey a distinct meaning, must, according to the

Nyéya, have four qualities : + J. Contiguity, which, according to some, is the uninterrupted succes- sion of the words pronounced in a sentence, 90 that for instance, the first word of it be not pronotinced in the present moment, and the next half an hour afterwards, according to others, the arrangement of the words according to their grammatical connexion, for instance, that a preposition be placed together with the word which depends upon it, and not witli a word, to which it does not refer.

2. Consistency, or the mutual agreement of the words, according to their sense, 90 that contradictory terms be not connected.

3. Structure, or the grammatical (terminations) forms of the words, which correspond in their meanings (for instance, that the verb agrees with the subject in number and person.)

. © There ts a difference of opinion in the Nyfya with reference to absolute nega- ton. Some appear to conceive it merely as a negation of present existence, others as the negation of a contradictory notion. In this lest sense Colebrooke understood it, (Mis. Essays, Vol. I. p. 288,) and this la also the interpretation of the Miminen. (Wileon’s Sénkhya Kerika, p. 19.) That the author of the [नीच Paricchéda adopted also this sense, appears to me evident from the above explanation:

Introduction. oll

4. Intention, that is, the meaning which the speaker wishes to con- vey hy a sentence.

There again the lugical characteristics of a proposition have been omitted, as all those points, with the exception perhaps of consistency, belong to the grammatical structure of a sentence.

The logical explanation of propositions, as a matter of course, passes over any grammatical form a proposition may assume ; it treats only of the relation between two idens, and its simple question is, whether two ideas can’ be connected or not

It is evident, that in this way neither quantity, nor modality of pro- positions could have been discovered. We might, however, dispense with them, as these forms are not strictly logical; but not even the division of propositions according to their quality has been made by the Nyfya. ~The theory of ideas and propositions is the wenkest point in the logic of the Nysya; they are more successful in explaining the form of argu- ments; for though the theory of syllogism is far from exact and com- plete, we must admit, that they understood the general character of a syllogism. | -

According to Gautama a complete syllogism contains five members (Avayava = proposition). 1. The proposition (pratijng, that which is to be proved by the argument). 2. The reason, argument (hétu) 3. Tho instance (Uddharaya, drishtanta). 4. The application (upa- nayn). 5. The conclusion (nigamana), for instance :

1. This hill is fiery,

2. For it smokes,

3. What smokes is fiery, as for instance, a culinary hearth 4. This hill smokes,

5. Therefore it is fiery.

The modem school of the Nydya reduced the syllogism to three, and even to two members, and this last reduction appears to have been most generally adopted,* as it isin the Tarka Sangraha and Bhfsha

* Colebrooke (Mis. Essays, Vol. I. p. 292), adverted only to Gautama’s Sétras, and not to a more modern work of the Nyéya, when be asserted, that the regu- lar syllogiem of the NySya consisted of five members. The morern school of the Nyfye (vide Dr. Daliantyne’s Lectures on the Tarka Sangraha, p. 31), declares the five membered form rhetorical in distinction from its logical form, which con- tains only two members. Dr. Ballantyne hee clearly pointed this out in bis trea.

xxii Introduction.

Paricchéda. In this णित the two premises, vis. major and minor pro- positions are condensed into one premise, of which we shall now give a description:

That a syllogism be correct, two things are required. J, a general proposition, ia which the subject (reason) is invariably connected with a predicate (conclusion), more comprehensive than the subject, and 2, a minor term, with which the subject of the general proposition is connected. That there is this double connexion of the minor term with the reason, and of the reason with the conclusion, is to be decid- ed by consideration, which is the intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as connected with the general predicate or the predi- cate of the conclusion. This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion can only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as deter- ` mined by the eason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion.

For instance: let a mau from former observation krow, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, as for instance on a culinary hearth ;

tive on the Nyfya system, and also in his Lectures on the Nyfya philosophy: He says, (Nyfya aystem of philosophy, p. 5.)

०० Now, In this form of the syllogiem (which we do not find alinded td fn Mr. Colebrooke’s essey), there fe neither more nor less than there Is in the Aristotelic syllogism. Tho wonder would be if there had been. The first formal difference observable is, the wrapping up of the premises in one logical datum, The reason for preferring to regard these as two Inseparable members of a single statement ap- pears to have been thie, that it is only when simaltancously present to the mind, that the premises suggest the inference, and this simultaneousness of odgnizance is secured by combining the two assertions ina period, or sentence, of which the whele becomes intelligible only when tbe last word in it hes been uttered... .. If we sepa- rate the two meihbers of the original datum In the example above cited, we obtain

the following : Whatever smokes, fs fiery ;

The bill smokes, Therefore the hill is fiery 3°’

‘and p.9. To retarn to our text-book. The author tells us, that a man, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred the presence of fire from the perception of smoke, may wish to impart his conviction to another. In other worde having ascertained the truth as a logician, 06 may wiah as a rhetorician, to cstablish it to the satisfaction of somebody else, Here we step distinctly out of the province of logic, and enter that of rhetoric.”’

Introduction. xxiii

let hint sev afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising froin a hill, he will recollect the general proposition, that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Wence the knowldge arises: This bill is possessed of. smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge, this one act, by which there is a progress from one object to a third by a second, is consideration, from which the conclusion arises : This hill is fiery.

This is in its principal points the theory of the Nyfya of the form of the syllogism. It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle. Tho differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two premises are combined into one. The ex- position is certainly not simple, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in their natural form, which is the connexion of two in 2 proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applicd to the conclusion ; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conclusion also should not be stated in a separate sentence, but the whole syllogism should form one sentence, for instance, in the example: This hill, de- termined by smoke, which is determined hy fire, is determined by fire. Yet the difference is only apparent; for the Ny&ya, as Aristotle, con- nects one notion with the other through a third with which the latter is connected, or exchudes it by a third, from which the second is excluded.

The sccond difference is, that the Nyfya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but ८० ` guard against false premises, and for this purpose the consideration was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the preposition was exemplified. Their consideration was therefore not only directed to the logical opera- ` tion of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it, and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctnces of the argument should be the result of one and the same operation, which of course is impossible. |

With the exposition of the form of syllogism the logical theory of the Nyfya is nearly completed. Gantama divided inference into three kinds ; 1, inference of an-effect from a cause, as if rain is inferred from a collection of clouds; 2, inference of a cause from an effect; as if ‘rain is concluded from an increase of the water in a river; and 3, inference from general notions, as if earth is inferred to be a substance from its

xxiv Introduction.

having the quality of smell. This division, it is hardly necessary to remark, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. The modern school of the Nyfya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms; which are: only affirma- tive inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given in illustration, it appears, that the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara and Camestres ; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestres for all general negative ones: Here, however, is their theory finished, and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can enter into.

- It is a remarkable circumstance, that the general form of syllogism should have been found by the indus, and yet that they should not have discovered the different figures and moods, the diversities of which

are the result of mere combination, We think, this deficiency was the _

consequence of two causes especially,—first, of their technical language, which although precise, is yet cumbrous and not comprehensive, and secondly, of their pious regard for every thing traditional, be it in political institutions, in religion, or in science. The Siitras, which are the foundations of their systems, have always reinained text-books, and any discovery that had been made in theory, did not prompt them to attempt a new exposition of scicuce, but gave only occasion to a new interpretation of the school.

The Bhésha Paricchéda itself is a work of the modern Nyfya. The author Viswanétha Panchfnana Bhatta, the son of Vidy4énivésa Bhatta, accompanied the text with a commentary under the title “ Siddhénta Muktavali” (the pearl-wreath of truth), and he is known also by his commentary to Gautama’s Stitras, which benrs the title ‘‘ Nydya Siitra

Vrittf.”” According to the statement of the Pandits he lived about two —

` hundred years ago. The: Bhéstia Paricchéda isa text-book in the schools of the Nyfya in Bengal. There is no Pandit of any repute

who does not know it well, and many know the whole of it by heart.”

And indeed it is admirably adapted for the purpose of introduction into’ the study of the Nyfya philosophy. Itis a succinct exposition of the principal topics of the whole system, and may easily bo committed to- memory. It is written in the well known Anustup metre. The style,

Introduction. अश्र

however, is not poctical at all, but that of the most sobcr prose, and nowhere is the attempt made to combine the graces of imagination with pliilosophical method.

— The course, followed in tlie work, is simple. The author gives first the leading idens of the system, that is, the most comprehensive metaphysical notions, viz. the notions of substance, quality, actin, ge- nerality, particularity, intimate relation and negation. Ile then enu- merates the various substances, qualities, actions, &c. and defines the properties common to all categories as well as those common to more or less of them. After this exposition the different substances in their relations to themselves, to other substances and to their qualities and actions are explained. -In the same way the author discusses the qualities of substances, and his work is finished, when he has treated on the last quality, enumerated at the commencement of his treatise.

The commentary is in thought and Inanguage a very different com- position. It is written with the object of supporting the views of the author and of the school in its controversy with other doctrines, and enters therefore frequeitly into intricate discussions in establishing the fundamental tenets or defending disputed points of the system, and makes use of the whole armory of the sometimes very abstruse technical language of the Nyfya.

This commentary has again been commented upon by Malidéva Bhatts, but I received a MS. of his work.too late to make any other ` ४86 of it than to compare it with the text.*

The Sauscrit text of the Bhfisha Paricchéda was first printed ia Ben- gall characters in 1821, with the addition of a Bengali translation of the text aud of the commentary. The translation of the latter, however, is rather, a paraphrase, as the alterations are somotimes considerable.t

* The MS. tstn the Library of the Sauscrit College of Calcutta, of which, however, I wae for along time not aware, es it is not mentioned in the list of books in that Library, printed in the Sanscrit Catalogue of the Asiatic Society. It has two titles, ** Mahfdéve Bhatta-krita Muktfvall Prakdsa:’’ and the shorter one, ०० Dinakarf Tiké.”” Jn his introduction, the author mentions also the name of his father, Balakrishna.

+ The title fs, * A system of Logic, written in Sunscrit, by the Venerable Sage Boodh, and explained in a Sunscrit commentary by the very learned Viswoneth Tarkalancar, translated into Bengalce by Kashee Neth Turkopunchanun. Cal- eulta, 1821.

K

xxvi Introduction.

Another edition of the Sanscrit text together with the commentary,

appeared in 1827, under the auspices of the Committee of Public In- struction. The text is correct, but not so the commentary. It is full of mistakes, omissions and interpolations. The interpunctation is either faulty or entirely disregarded, and the numbers of the successive Slokas are not attached to the corresponding portions of the commentary, so that an easy reference of the one to the other is impossible. - The present edition has been carefully revised partly by comparison with Mahfdéva Bhatta’s commentary, partly by a reference to the cor- rections in the copy of Jayanfrfyana Tarkapanchénana, the professor of Nydya in the Sanscrit College, which he had the kindness to lend me, and for which I offer my grateful acknowledgments.

The notes which I have added to the translation, are chiefly given for the purpose to elucidate the principal points of the system of the Nyaya, in accordance with the object of this work to contribute to a fair estimate of the merits of Hindu philosophy, and are therefore more copious in such parts as contain the distinguishing featnres of tho Nyfya, for instance, the ontological portions, the doctrine of atoms, their notion of the deity, and their logical theory. They are less copious in portions which contain their explanation of the differences of matter ; for as natural science with the Hindus has hardly made its beginning, their explanation is without any value. I would, however, guard here against the misconstruction, that their failing to explain the phenomena of matter, affected also the correctness of the principles, by which they tried to explain them. Natural science with reference to those phenomena is quite distinct from the philosophical theory for the interpretation of them. Democritus’ explanation of natural phenomena may be entirely false, and still his theory of atoms may be correct, (although it is not in our opinion,) which is at least partly borne out by the fact, that in modern chemistry the theory of atoms has been adopt- ed, although no oné would admit the application of it which Democritus made for the explanation of the phenomena. The cause of this is a double one; first, philosophy is quite distinct from natural science, the latter being based upon observation and experiments, the former upon the relations which notions have among cach other. Secondly, a phi- losophical system may have obtained the true principles for the ex- planation of intellectual and material phenomena, but at the same time =

Introduction. xxvil

not havd fully investigated the intermediate notions which may be necessary for explanation. A hasty application of these principles without due regard to such notions and to the results of natural science, is very apt to throw discredit upon the previous rescarches by which a system arrived at its principles, and also upon philosophy itsclf.

To mark the more the method of the philosophical discussion of the Nyfya, I have generally preferred to give their interpretation in their own words, and therefore made large extracts from the commentary in as literal a translation as possible, which J hope, will be found also useful to the student of the Nyfya in general, as facilitating the read- ing of the commentary and the understanding of the technical language of the Nyfya.

OW © Ee CR Qwest तिक्नोति oo *

DIVISION OF TILE CATEGORIES OF THE NYA’YA PUILOSOPIY.

RA ARRFAAARARRRAARARRARRALRAR IS

SALUTATION: TO GANE’'SA.

1. To Krishna, radiant like the new cloud, the thief of the clothes of the milkmaids, to him, who is the sced of the tree - of the world, be adoration. —

2. ‘There are seven catcgorics,’ substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation.

1. Padértha is explained in verse 13, as that which is object of kuowledge, the commentary adds object of proof, of nomination ; but as this applies to every idea, the definition is too wide, and ought to have becu restricted to the most general objects of knowledge.

I have followed Colebrooke in translating Paddrthn with catégory, although that term somewhat differs from the idea which Aristotle ‘expresses by the same. According to him, categories are the most extensive classes of what is denoted by the simple word (the word iu no connexion with another), Cat. 2. ray card pySeplay obprdonnv Acyo- pdvew Exaarov Hrot balay anpalven.7.A. Ue enumerates ten, viz. essence (०८०८०), quantity (xécov), quality (wolor), relation (xpds कथो, the where (गण), the when (xoré), position (xetoOat), to be possessed of (dev), action (worety), and passion (xdoyew), =

Ritter in his history of philosophy (English Transl. Vol. LI. p. 66) remarks on them: ‘If the categories had been put forward as an accurate and exhaustive division of the modes of being, it would be open to many objections, but Aristotle does not usually ascribe much importance to this enumeration of the most general notions, so that we may regard it as nothing more than an attempt to cxhibit in a clear

n

2 Division of the Categories

light the signification of words taken absolutcly in order to show, low truth and falschood consist id the right or wrong combination of these elements.”

However, as most of Aristotle's categories refer to classes of existence or to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy, the term of category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely adopt it here, viz. as referring to the notions, which express the gencral forins of knowledge, or what is the same, the general modes of existence. It will be interesting to compare the categories of the Nydya with those of Kant, with which they have a curious resemblance.

They are: 1. Quantity. a. Unity. b. Multiplicity. ९. Totality.

2. Quality. 3. Relation.

a. Reality a. Inherence and subsistence (substantia and acvidens).

b. Negation. ४. Causality and dependence (cause and effect).

- 0. Limitation. €, Community (Mutual causality) 4. Modality. a. Possibility (impossibility). b. Existence (non-existence) c. Necessity (accidentalness)

The categories may be divided, according to the commentary, into two classes: into categories of affirmation, and negation, It was, however, hot necessary, expressly to introduce this division in the text; for, the seventh being’ the category of negation, it is self-evident, that the six preceding must be categories of negation. ‘The number of seven cate- gorics is adopted by the Vaiscshikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nydya, as established in the Bhdshyn

Kandda acknowledged only the six first categories, excluding nega- tion. Gautama, the founder of the Nyéya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (categories) soul, body, sense, object of sensed, intellect, mind, activity, fault, condition of the soul after death (transmigration), retribution, pain, deliverance from pain. Two more’ categories, power and similarity, adopted in the Upamdna Chintamani; are contained in the firat six categorics, and must therefore be rejected.

Of the Nydya Philosophy. 3

3—h. Substances’ are carth, water, light, air, ether, time,

ne no ee ee ee ec AA epee SED ae AS ER a ft EY ST SIT

2. ‘The definition of substance* {s to be the substrate of qualities, and to have substantinlity (क, v. 24). To explain this more fully, itis said in the commentary to be the substrate of qualitics either in the relation of intimate union (Samavaya Sambandhn) or in the relation of antecedent negation (Prdgabhéva) that is of future existence. ‘The Intter definition in given to obvinte an objection which may be raised from the condition of substances at the time of their production. When substances are produced, they have according to the Nydya no qualities. If they have no qualities, they are no substances according to the definition, that sub- stances are the substrates of qualities. By the second definition, that they are substrates of qualities either in the relation of intimate union, or of future existence, this objection is removed.

With fegard to substantinlity or the genus of substance the commen- tary remarks: If somebody (this is the atatement of the Charvikas) would say : There is no proof that substantiality isa genus ; for it is not proved by perception, as melted butter or Iack (according to your own admission) have no substantiality,—we contradict, because substantinlity is proved by the necessity, that there should be some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of an effect, or some distinguishing at- tribute of the intimate cause of the connection and separation (between the parts composing a substance). This argument is founded on the btipposition of the Nyfya, that every cause must have some distinguishing attribute (कारकं यत्‌ fs fears qi) under which it is comprehended $ it is a cause, because for instance, it has the general attribute of earth, water, & ९. Substance therefore, as the cause of qualities, for instance earth of smell, must be conceived by the distinguishing attribute of substantiality. The genus substantiality depends therefore uot on per- ception, but on inference ४५

Some suppose, continues the commentary, darkness to be also a sub- stance ; for, they argue, .it is proved by perception, it has colour and ac- tion, and is neither earth nor any of the other substances. Its organ is the eye, at the time that it is without light. This argument is not valid ;

* Kankda gives the following definition of substance, Vid. Veistshika Stra. Ist Adhyaya. 116) Sétra, न्वियामुरूषत्‌ समवायिकार रमिति व्यन्त णुं || Substance is the substrate of qualities and actions, and bas intimate causality.

n 2

4 Division of the Categories apace, soul and mind $ qualities’ are culour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction, priority, and posteriority, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aver- sion, volition, gravity, fluidity viscidity, faculty, fate, (merit and demerit) and sound.

6. There are five actions,* throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding and going.

7. Wandering about, evacuating, trickling, Naming upwards, moving crookedly, are included in going.

8. Generality® is considcred two-fold, extensive and non-

for, darkness being produced by the absence of light, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another substance. The supposition of its colour arises from delusion, as does also the supposition, that it has action, viz., from the cessation of light. If darkness were a separate thing, and not included in the category of negation, as gold is included in light, an infiuitenumber of substances, (vis. in accordance with an infinite number of negations) must be assumed,

3. The definition of quality,* which is given in verse 89, is : Quality 8, whose substrate is substance, and which is without quality and action, that is to say, there is no quality of a quality, nor an action of an action, or the notion of quality would be changed to that of substance. Tho argument, by which it is proved, that quality in a clasd, is the same as that, which proves the same of substance:

4, Action,t according to the Bengalce translation, is the special cate- gory, which in the relation of intimate union is present in a substance which has velocity, or the category, which after a duration of five mo- ments is subject to destruction, viz., at first, there is contact ; 2, Separa- tion; 3, Destraction of a former connection ; 4, A new connection ; 5, Cessation of the action

5. Commentary.—Generality (or class) is intimate union of many

* Kenfda's definition of quality is: qayiadl aya संयानविभागेचकारक्मन- Gy Ufa aegis) A. 1. that is, quality ts sited in substance, has quality snd does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause

† रकद्रग्यभमखं संयोभमिभानेष्वकारर्मनपे यमिति कममर चरू || A. 1. ection be whose site is substance alune, which is without quality, and doed not depend upod conjunction and separation without cause

Of the Nydya Philosophy. फ

extensive. Existence, as including substances, qualitics and actions, is called extensive. 7

9. The class which differs from this is called non-exten- sive; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non- extensive.

10. By its including many things, it is extensive $ by its be- ing included in a more extensive class, it is non-extensive.

in something eternal, or is eternal and the intimate union of many. It is snid, “in something eternal,” because intimate union of many exists also between things in contact. ‘Of many,’’ because intimate union in something clernal exists also in such infinite quantas asthe sky, “ 2 in- fimate union,” because the existence of many in something eternal refers also to absolute negation. Consequently there is no generality or genus, where only one individual exists, or where there is no difference of individuality, or where thero is confusion, or where there is a retrogress in infinitum, or where'an idea is changed to its contrary, or where there is no relation. For instance, the sky forms no class on account of its individuality. The notions of a donkey and of an ass (in Sanscrit the terms: wz! and wwe? are selected, cither of which means ajar) aro ° no class. The notions of clement and form are no class, because the value of these notions is confounded. Generality is no class, because, there is no place of support for it,(it would require a retrogress in infinitum ; for if there is a class of a class, or 8 notion of a notion, there must also be a class of the class of the class and so further) particularity is no class, because it would thus be changed to its contrary. (Particularity by be- coming generality would be the contrary of its notion.) Intimate union is no class, because it is not in the relation of intimate union (in the re- Intion of intimate union arc only substances, qualities and actions).

According to their definition of class only substance, quality, and action, further the general notion of those three, which is reality, the notions of the substances, with the exception of sky, space and time, the notions of the different qualities and actions as well as the notions which are included in them, form generalities or classes. The other four categories are not ‘classcs, but as the Bengalee Translator calls them, Upadhis, titles, general characteristics.

6 Division of the Categories

The ultimate condition of eternal substances is called particu- larity.°

Ht. The connexion of a substance with its componing parts, as of n jar, &c. with its two halves, &c.; further the connexion

of substances with qualities and actions, and lastly the con- `

nexion of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes is called intimate relation.

6. Comm.—The ultimate condition of eternal substances is particit- larity.* The ultimate condition, viz., the condition, which remains ultimately, Inst after all (according to the Bengalee translation, the con- dition which remains until the general conflagration of the world), than which there is no further particularity, that is to say, the condition, abiding in one substance only ; for in compound substances from a jar down to the union of two atoms there is mutual difference, by means of the difference of all their respective parts; but the mutual difference of atoms is particularity ; this is a difference by itself, and a particularity further than this does therefore not exist.

7. Comm.—The relation, of parts with things possessed of parts, of generality with single objects, of qualities with things posscss- ed of qualities, of actions witli objects possessed of actions, is intimato relation. Intimate relation means constant relation. It is proved by the fact, that the intellect, when determined by qualities and action, is in the relation of what is determining aud what is determitied (predi- cate and subject) for it is a determined intellect, as the sentence: The man bears a stick, is the result of a determined intellect. Hence, since in this case neither the relation of contact nor any other relation is possible, intimate relation is proved.

As the Bengalee translation expresses the meaning much niore clearly, I have given it here instead of the explanation of the original. Intimate relation, excluding distinctive relation, is constant relation of only one thing which regulates a condition. Dy the term ‘ constant” the relation of contact is excluded, by the term ० excluding distinctive rela- tion,”’ the relation of distinction, by the term “ which regulates a con-

गसाम।म्यवि शष cfr yaaa tt A. 1. Both, generality and particularity depend

on intellect, The commentator, Sankara Misra adds, °^ generality is the intellect, which is found in many; particularity, which is separated from others.”

Of the Nydya Philosophy. 7

12, 13. Negation’ is two-fold, universal negation and reci- procal negation. ‘Fhe first includes three kinds, antecedent

ee ee ee te meee aoe

relation of identity (the relation, that a thing is to be comprehended under its own notion) is not regulating a condition, by the term “ of only one thing,” the notion of mutual negation. In the relation of contact, is for instance, a jar with the ground. The class of distinc- tion is three-fold, viz. as referring to time, spnce and place. In the distinctive relation of time and space are all things. The distinctive relation of place is agnin two-fold, the distinctive relation of nega- tion, and the distinctive relation of identity (of a thing with itself) The distinctive relation of negation is the site of negation. In the dis- tinctive relation of identity is for instance the notion of the sky with the sky. In the relation of identity remains every thing with itself. In mutual relation is the notion of the jar with the ground.

8. Comm.—Negation is the reciprocal negation of the six cate- gorics, that is to say, negation arises from the six categories, being denied of ench other. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and mutual negation. Universal negation is negation, different from mutual negation, Mutunl negation is the negation of identity. Universal negation is of three kinds, antecedent, emergent, and absolute negation. Anteccdent tegation tsa negation, which is afterwards removed, for instance, if it is snid, in this half a jar is to be produced, there is a ne- gation of the jar, which is to be produced. Emergent negation or de- struction is क negation of what is produced, for instance, in the sentence, in these parts a jar is destroyed, there is a negation in the cause (the parts) subscquent to the production of the effect. Absolute negation is constant universal negation, for instance in the sentence, here is no jor. Were, this objection may be made: Ifa jar or any other thing is removed from a certain place, and again brought back to it, ‘the no- tion of absolute negntion cannot be applied ; for, absolute negation be- ing constant negation, the notion of absolute negation is not produced, when the jar is brought back. Uence they have assumed a fourth kind of negation, referring to the liability of a thing to be produced or de- stroyed, excluding absolute negation. For instance, in the notion: 1 black pot is not red, and a red not black, there is antecedent and

8 Division of the Categories

negation, destruction and absolute negation. The common notion of all seven categorics is object of knowledge,’ and similar ideas. 14.) The five first categorics” are positive, many and in the connection of intimate relation. The three first (substances, qualities, actions) have the attribute of existence ; qualities and the subsequent categories are without qualities and actions.

15. Class (generality), avd the subsequent categories arc considered to be without generality ; causality" isa predicate of all substances which are not atoms (whose measure is not an atom).

emergent, but not absolute negation. ‘The modern school, however, reject this view, because they deny, that a contradiction has been prov- ed; according to their opinion absolute negation is met with in emer- gent as well aa in antecedent negation.

Negation is assumed as a distinct category ; for iu denying it, an in- finite number of negations, corresponding to the things, whose negations they are, would be necessary

9. Object of knowledge, &c. viz. capable of being known, named, proved, &c. .

10. Comm.—The general notion (definition) of substances, qualitica, actions, generalities and particularities is multiplicity, positivencas and connection by intimate relation. Multiplicity is also found in negation ; therefore the distinction of the five is: the state of position in many It is said, “which are in the connection of intimate relation,” and not which have intimate relation, because otherwise the categories of ge- nerality and particularity would be exchided.

11. Comm.—Causality is an attribute of all substances, whose measure is not an atom (पारि माण्ड means, whose measure is an atom.) Or: Atoms, considered as @ measure, have no causality. A substance whose measure is an atom, cannot be the cause of any thing; for a measure commences things, which are included in its notion (as for instance the half of a jar is the measure, from which the jar is produced) but this is impossible in this instance ; for a measure produces a measure, ex- ceeding the measure, contained in its own notion (that is from a mea- surc is produced something greater than itself) hence as the greater is

of the Nydya Philusophy. 9

1G. The notion of the neccasary previous existence of a thing, which has not the fault of superfluous causality," is cnusality.* —

17. Of this three kinds are specified, viz. causality of in- timate relation, of tion-intimate relation (the connexion of thie

produced, if the mensure commences from the grent, so from the infi. nitely small (the atom) would be produced something smaller (more atintom). This is impossible (hence the mensure contained in the cort- junction of two atoms, is not produced from the measure of an atom, but from number). For the same ressun causelity must be deniod of substances which are infinite, further of any class, transcending the senses, and lastly of particularity. (The reason for this is clear; any thing infinite which can be exceeded, must have become finite $ there cannot he any thiug which exceeds the senses more than another thing, both being thought under the same iden, viz. to excced the senses. Particulae are the distinctions of eternal things; they cannot be dis- tingnished by any thing else, because they are the last distinctions.) 12. I give here a note of the Bengali translation, The category, which has not the fault of superfluous causality, and whose existence constantly precedes, is causality, or cause is, hy the existence of non-

* The principal Stitras of Kanda, referring to causality, are: कार कभावात्‌ कायैभावः। Ist Adh. काय्यौमायात्‌ काररू।मायः ॥ ist Adh. कारकपू्रैकः काय्यगुके। दष्टः । 194 Adh. कारकमिति इभे काययम मवाथात्‌ 10th Adb. कारणे समवायात्‌ wanfe | (अरमवाधिकाररशानोति रेषः 11) ) 10th Adh. गयारपे कारकेकायेसमत्रायाइ। 10th Adh.

If there Is no cause, there fs no effect. If there is no effect, there is no cause. The quallty of the effect depends upon the cause.

The cause, which refers to substance, is intimate canse, because substance is in-

timatcly related to effects, (viz. compound substances, qualities and actions.)

Action is a non-intimate cause, because they are intimately related to the cause

(the intimate cauee.) In the name manner are qualities intimately related to substances; therefore they are also non-inlimale causes. Cc

10 Division of the Categories

component parts), and inatrumental causality is mentioned as the third by the followers of the Nyfya philosophy.

18. That from which in its intimate relation an effect is pro- duced ; (for instance thread from which cloth is made,) is causa- lity of intimate relatioii; that which is proximate to this, (the conjunction of the threads) is the second cause, (of non-intimate

elation), and as the third (instrumental causality) must be con- sidered what is different from either, (for instance the Joom of the weaver.) -

19. There are five classes of superfluous causality,” viz.

existence of which the existence or non-existence of an effcct is neces- ‘sary. If there is no thread, there is no cloth ; if there is no conjunction of the two halves of a jar, there is no jar; if there is no virtue, there is no happiness, &c. There are three kinds of causes, intimate, non- intimate and instrumental causes. Such things as, intimately united, ` (that is, such as are in the connection of intimate relation) produce an

- effect, are intimate causes. Two atoms for instance are the cause of a

bi-atomical compound, threads of cloth, the two halves of a jar. Non- intimate is a cause, which is proximate to an intimate cause, that is, which is connected with the intimate cause; for instance the conjunc- tion of two atoms is the proximate cause of the bi-atomical compound, the conjunction of threads of cloth, the conjunction of two halves of a jar. Instrumental is the cause, differing from either ; for instance, the instrumental cause of a jar is the stick, of cloth the loom, of a bi- atomical compound god. It must here also be borne in mind, that an effect may be destroyed either by the destruction of the intimate cause, or by that of the non-intimate cause, as a jar is destroyed by the destruction of the two halves, and a bi-atomical compound by that of the conjunction of the two atoms. The intimate, non-intimate and instrumental causes are called special causes ; God, the omniscience of God, desire, endeavour, time, space, antecedent negation and fate (vir- tue and vice) general causes

13, A cause is called superfluous (w-yenfae:) if, without its co-oper- ation, the effect is produced in another way. Commentary. Faults of auperfluous causality are; 1. ‘The notion, under which the cause is per-

of the Nydya Philosophy. on

Ist.—7he gencral idea (class), under which the former state of a cause is perceived ; 2nd, that the existence or non-existence. of which can only be comprehended by the existence or yon- existence of the cause ; 3rd, that of which the previous existence ts applied to the effect, when its previous existence is already applied to another (effect)

20. Ath, that the existence of which is applied (० the effect because it necessarily precedes the existence of the producer of the effect ; and Sth, that which is superfluous beside the thing whose former existence is necessary.

21,22. Ofthe first class is an example the notion, under which the stick (by which a jar is made) is perccived, of the second the form, &c. of the stick, of the third the cther, of the

ceived, as for instance the idea of a stick (द्‌ खलं the class of a stick) by which (stick) for instance a jar is produced. 2. Such things as cannot be thought of themselves as causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect, but are causcs of the existence or non-existence of an cffect only by means of the real cause, as for instance the shape of a-stick ; (for it cannot be said, that, if this or that shape of a stick is given, the effect, viz. the jar, is given, nor, if this or that shape of क stick is not given, the jar, is also not given.) 3. The application of a cause to an effect, if this cause has been alrendy applied to another effect, for instance, if the ether should be considered as the cause of a jar. The ether could be only the cause of n jar by its being perceived under the notion of ether ; this, however, is the intimate cause of sound, and it is therefore first nken ns the cause of sound, and secondly as the cause of the jar. 4. The ap- plication of a cause to an effect, by which (cause) tho (actual) cause of an effect is produced ; for instance, if the father of the potter would be considered as the cause of the jar; for the potter only is the pro- ducer of the jar. 5. The application of any thing (as cause of an effect) which is not necessary to the production of the effect, ns for instance . the donkey, carrying the carth, &c., of which a jaris made. OF all the kinds of superfluous causality the 128८ alone is necessary, as including the other kinds. | c 2

12 Division of the Categories

fourth the father of the potter, of the fifth the donkey, हट. Among those superfluous causes the Inst alone is necessary (because the others are included in it). ।

23. Intimate causality belongs to substances, non-intimate causality only to qualities and actions.” |

24. Dependence” is the attribute of every thing, save cter-. nal substances. ‘The property of all nine kinds of substances is: to have substantiality and qualities.

25. Earth, water, light, air and mind are the sites of com- prehensive and non-comprchensive generality, form,'* action and velocity.

26. ‘Time, ether, soul and space have the attributes of ubi- quity and infinity.” Of the five clements, viz. earth and the subsequent four substances (water, light, air, and ether), are the first four the sitcs of touch. |

27. The commencement of things takes place in the four first substances. The special qualities of ether and soul" are : limitation to space, and momentary duration.

गी

14, Intimate causality belongs to substances; non-iutimate causality to qualities and actions, that is, intimate-causality is the common attri- bute of substances, non-intimate causality that of qualities and actions. 15. Comm.—Dependence in the common attribute of all things ex- cept eternal substances ; itis to be thought under the idea of intimate re- lation. Eternal things are only dependent on distinctive relation (vide p. 7) as for instance on the relation of time. Eternal substances are atoms, (viz. of air, fire, water, earth) ether, time, space and soul, The common attribute of substances is, substantiality and substrate of qualities. 16. Form (q¥e) is, the measure of which is limited 17. Infinity (परमं Wa) is, the measure of which exceeds every other measure ५ 18. Comm.—The special qualities of the ether and soul ares a stato which does not pervade (is limited), and a state which has only momen- tary duration. (A state which does not pervade is such as is produced only in one part, and is not present in another. And a thing has momentary duration, if in the third moment after its production it is

of the Nydya Philosophy. 13

, 2. Barth, water and light, have the properties of colour, fMuidity and perceptibility by the senges ; earth and water have gravity and taste $ the Muidity of earth and light is a derived one.

29, The soul and the clements have special (contrary) qua- lities; that which is considered the property of the one, is the opposite of the others.

3). The qualities of the air are touch, number, quantity, in- dividuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, ve- Jocity and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and velocity are assigned to light.

3t. Water is the site of 14 qualities, viz. of the eight, before mentioned, and further of velocity, gravity, fluidity, colout, savour nud viscidity. ;

32,33. Earth has the sanme qualities, with the exception of viscidity, and the addition of smell.—The 14 qualitics of the soul are intellect, pleasure, prin, desire, aversion, volition, num- ber, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit. The qualitics of tne and place are number, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction. The same qua- litics together with sound belong to the ether.

34. Those five qualitics, together with intellect, desire and volition are sited in God, the same five qualities, with priority and posteriority and velocity, in the mind.

ems en ae oa cS ननन

deatroyed.) The apecial quality of the ether is sound, which docs not pervade: for it 18 produced in a small part only of the ether, and not found in a different portion. It has only momentary duration; this means, it is destroyed in the third moment, after it has commenced to exist. Becnuse the respective special qualities of pervading substances are destroyed by the same qualities which are afterwards produced, therefore the first sound is destroyed by the second. The same is the ense with knowledge, &c. ; for knowledge is produced in the sow, which is 8 pervading substance, within the limited space of the body, and it is absent in any other part of apace, for instance in the part belonging toa jor. In the same manner knowledge continues only for two moments, and pervading substances are therefore those whose special

14 Division of the Categories

, 36, The varth is the cause of smell (the intimate cause), and the site of the various colours. Savour is of six kinds (sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid and saline), smell two-fold (feagrance and stench), | | € 36, 37. It has three kinds of feel, hot, cold and temperate. It is twofold’® eternal and non-eternal; eternalas considered in its atoms, non-eternal as being composed of parts; this Intter is threefold, organism, organ and object (inorganic matter). 38. Organisms are viviparous, oviparous, engendered in filth and vegelative; organ is the sense of smell; objects are all ` compound substances from the smallest, of two atoms, to the largest, Brambhf’s egg.

qualities are : existence that does not pervade, and momentary duration. The special qualities of earth, &c., are: existence which does pervade, and continuance for a longer time.

19. Comm.—KEarth is two-fold, eternal and non-eternal, eternal in its atoms,* non-eternal, if different from atoms, viz. if consisting of two, three, &c. atoms. Earth, if non-eternal, is composed of parts. |

If it is anid: ‘What evidence is there, that earth is composed of parts ; (viz. a part being already a compound of two, three, &c, atoms) for you obtain the same notion, if any earthly substance, as a jar, is thought to be composed of the totality of the single atoms. Under this supposition you need not fear, that the invisibility of ench single atom ‘implies the invisibility of a jar, &e., which consists of atoms ; because, although each single atom is invisible, yet the totality of them is visible, as from a certain distance. the hairs of the head together are visible, although none of-them-alone is visible. Moreover we arrive at the idea. for instance of one extended great jar, as we arrive at the idea of one great heap of rice.’ | | We reply: If one atom is no object of the senses, a totality of atoms is also beyond the perception of the senses. As to your example,

* acarcuafted ॥ 3.:A. Kan. 8५५. waa निषरोताद्‌ ष्डः॥ 4. A. | An atom is, what exists has no cause, and is without commencement and end 3 an atom 18 contrary to what has a measure (अतः'परमम डा त्‌ अति दोषे च 1)

of the Nydya Philosophy. 15

` 39. Water has white colour; its tnate, and feel, are sweet and cold; it has also viscidity, and its Nuidity is innate.

40. As to its eternity and non-cternity the same holds good as before ; its organisms are not born. Its organ is the tongue ; its objects are the sea, snow and similar substances.

41. Light is hot to the fecl, its colour white, its fluidity not innate, but an effect from some cause ; eternity and non- eternity are attributed to it in the same way os to the carth.

42, 43. Organ is the eye, objects are fire, gold, &c. The feel in the ir is considered as natural; it is temperate, neither hot vor cold; its motion is crooked ; its qualities are touch, &e.

1 eee ee ee we maintain, that a hair, although at a distance, is not beyond the

perception of the senses, because it will be perceived, if brought nearer. Nor can you say, that from a totality of invisible atoms a totality of visible atoms is produced, on the ground, that it is not contradicted by perception ; for visible things are not produced from invisible things ; otherwise heat of the eye for instance would one or the other time become visible. If you say, that a quantity of invisible heat, contained for instance in very heated oil, may produce a visible burniug, we object ; for the visible burning ariscs from the visible parts, con- tained therein.

You can also not maintain, that from the invisible compound of two ntoms the production of a compound of three atoms (which is visible) is impossible ; for we do not say, that the visibility or invisibi- . lity of a thing arises from its own nature but from its necessary canses, as greatness, manifest form, &c. A compound of three atoms for in- stance is visible on account of its greatness, but not ह compound of two atoms, as it has no greatness. ‘This, however, is according to your view, impossible, because there is no greatness in an atom.—As in this manner itis proved, that earthly substances as a jar, are composed of parts (a part, as above alrcady reminded, is a componnd of at least two atoms) so it is clear, that they are not eternal, in consequence of their produc- tion and destruction. And there is no difference between the mountain Méru, and a mustatd seed, because in either there is the same composi- tion of parts after parts. Therefore it is necessary, that there should

16 Division of the Categories

Eternity and nou-eternity are assigned to it as before to the other elements. Its organ fs the skin, which extends over the whole body 3 objects are all substances, intermediate between the vital air and the grent element.

44, 45. The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound organ isthe ear. Though one, it has many titles. Time” is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the aupport of the worlds; it is the cause of the knowledge of

be somewhere an end (in the division of parts). Tosny ; that the point, where the end is obtained, is not eternal, would be to admit the pro- duction of an effect from a thing which is not in the connection of: intimate relation. Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one great thing to another still greater, fiuds its end in the assumption of the sky and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cessation of the progress from a small to a sinaller thing. Thus the necessity of atoms is proved. There is certainly no end of the division, if one has arrived at the compound of three atoms, because a compound of three atoms as an object of the eye, has parts like a jar, &c.; for from the argument, that the parts of a compound of - three atoms have parts on account of its size, like the half of a jar, it is evident, that such a compound has parts. Nor can you say, there is: no necessity for this (for assuming parts of such a small compound as that of three atoms) because many things (atoms) are required to pro- duce a magnitude for so small things. This, however, does not prove the necessity of a continuation of parts after parts, because thercby a regress is infinitum would become necessary.

20. Comm.—Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This is proved by the perception of the “now.” If for instance the perception: here is now a jar, is given, there cxists a union: between the motion of the sun and the jar. This is not conjunction (vide p. 7) or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more things,) but it is a relation of a different kind, which is produced by time.—That time is to be thought under the notion of a substrate, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-general) cause of the perception of priority

of the Nydya Philosophy. 17

priority nnd posteriority ; though one" it hus many names as that of moment, &c. ¦ 46. Space is the cause of the notions of distance and ष्ण mity; it is one and eternal. 47. Though one, it obtains various designations, as enst, west, from the division of its attribute. The soul is governing” the

and posteriority. Or if both definitions are combined: Time is the substrate of the special uvion, which is the non-intimate cause of priority and posteriority

21. Comm.—Although one, it has many names, viz. moment, hour, day, &c., past, futuro and presefit time. Past is the time, whose destruc- tion is present, as yesterday ; future is the time, whose future existence is present, as to-morrow, and present is the time, whose future existence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future momeut, be another moment, be- cause there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be the case at the general conflagration, where also the terms of ‘ moment,” “day,” &c. are applied.

22. Comm.—" The soul is ruling the senses and the body.”—The class of soul is the class, by which the intimate cause of happiness, and unhappiness, &c. is comprehended (or : soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness, &c. and the substantiality of the soul is proved by its being the substrate of the qualities : happiness, unhappi- ness, &c.) [swara (the ruler, God) is thought under the same notion (class) ; but since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to him, he is not subject to happiness or unhappiness ; for we do not adinit the invariablencess of the rule that, that which is a con- sequence from the nature of a thing, will necessarily exist.*

Otheret say: The notion (class) by which the soulf is thought, is not applicable to [swara, as there is no proof for this; yet hence it does not follow, that a tenth substance must be assumed, as the soul is dis-

* Or in other words, for though it ie necessary, that when there 18 an effect, there is aleo ॐ cause, yet It is not necessary, that, when there is a causo, there is invariably an effect. |

+ Probably the ancient Nyfya is meant. ¢ The individual soul.

D

18 ‘Division of the Categories

scnecs and fhe body ; for an organ (instrument) niust possess its agent. ; | . 48. There is no consciousness” in the body, as is proved by its disappearance after death. If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed. .

tinguished from the other substances by the idea: to be subject of knowledge. ‘Is governing the senscs,”” &c., because it successively produces the conscience of the senses and of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: Iknow, Iam happy, &., yet it cannot at first be proved against one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, ete. To prove this, the text says: ‘for an instrument must possess its agent.’” As an instrument, for instance a knife, the instrument for cutting, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed.

23. To show, that the body is not the agent, it is snid iu the tex There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappear- ance of consciousness after death.” If it is maintained : ‘Conscience is knowledge, and this in your opinion is not present in the soul which has obtained liberation. Why should it therefore not just as well be absent in a dead body, because, if life ceases, aleo knowledge ceases 1’ We answer: this is impossible ; for, if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles.

Nor can it be said, ‘that by an impression, produced in a former body, an impression in the second body is produced,’ because this would oblige you to assume an infinite number of impressions.—Further, if con: sciousness were inherent in the body, a child could not commence to take the milk from the breast of its mother; for the cause of this action is the knowledge of what accomplishes the desire, and at that time there does not ¢xist the recollection of any means, accomplishing the desire. According to my opinion the commencement of the action takes then place by the recollection of the causes of the desires, experienced in a former birth. Nor canit be objected : ‘ Well, if this be true, let any body

of the Nydya Philosophy. 19

40. The mind is likewise not the site” of consciousness, because then knowledge and other indernal qualities would remain imperceptible.

recollect any thing else, experienced iu a former birth ;’ for there is no- thing which calls it into recollection. In this instance there is no other means but to admit of fate for the individual sout. If this is the case; the body is without commencement, and also the soul. Hence the eternity of the soul also follows; for what is without beginning, cannot be destroyed.

‘Well, 1९४ us then transfer to the eyes and the other senses the notion of canse and agent with regard to knowledge ; for otherwise no cause is possible.” ‘The answer is: “If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed.” If the eyes and other senses were destroyed, how could, by the absence of the eye, recol- lection remain, as the subject which perceives exists no more, and as it is quite unreasonable, that the same thing should be seen by one, and recollected by another sense, because perception and recollection must ` depend on the same subjcct, as being cause and effect.

24. Comm.—‘ Let then consciousness not belong to the senses (ex- ternal) but be maintained for the eternal mind.’ The answer of the text is: “*The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then know- ledge and other internal qualities would remain imperceptible ;” for as the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if kuowledge, happiness, &c. awere placed in the eternal mind. Low mind is au atom, will afterwards be explained.

If it is snid, (by the Védantists): ‘The soul is knowledge ; for it consciousness is proved by its self-manifestation ; but knowledge of this or that object, happiness, &c. are special forms of it. And because ‘this (special form) has only the existence of a production (भावत्‌; I translated लन्दभावल्यात) its duration is momentary. Further, since the preceding knowledge is the cause of the consequent knowledge, and the former agnin the effect of a preceding, there is even in deep sicep an uninterrupted chain of knowledge down to the time of universal de- struction, as the smell of musk remains in cloth, And hy the com- munication of tho impressions, produced by prior and prior acts of

9 2

20 Division of the Categorics

knowledge, with posterior and posterior acts of knowledge, recollection and similar acts are possible.’

We deny this; for if the object of recolicction is the world, omni- science would he obtained (because knowledge isa product of self mani- festation) ; and if the object is something, there is no proof for the se- cond member of the alternative ; for hence would also follow, that in sound sleep knowledge were manifesting its object.

And if you say, ‘that in this state (in the state of sound slcep) know- ledge remains, but without form,’ we object also; for you cannot prove, that knowledge manifests itsclf, as otherwise such things as a jar, &c. would also be possessed with knowledge.

Nor can you say, ‘that this would answer your purpose ;’ for it is Impossible to reject the perception of a jar and similar things.

If you maintain, ‘that this is a special form of knowledge,’ we would ask, what is that form? Is it distinguishcd from knowledge, we agree with the assumption of something different from knowledge. Is it not distinguished from knowledge, then in accordance with the general notion of knowledge, a jar of blue colour would be the same with one of yellow colour, because by its own nature there is no distinc-

tion of knowledge आ you pretend, ‘that any special property of knowledge, as yellow and blue colour, &c. must be abandoned,’ we object, because the con- trary notions of blue, yellow, &o cannot be predicated of one and the same thing ; otherwise it would be dificult to connect any meaning: with contrary idens.

Nor is there any communication of desires, because the commu- nication of desires even between son and mother is impossible.

You can also not say, ‘that there is a rule for things, that are the causes, and others that are the effects of commuuication,’ because there is no communication of desires.

And if you define ‘ communication to be the production in something else,’ there is agnin a contradiction ; for there is no producer.

If you contend, ‘ that it is produced by another knowledge,’ you must admit another knowledge of the same kind, and so on in infinitum. `

If you think, ‘there is but little contradiction in a momentary kuow- ledge,’ you cannot prove such a knowledge, and your assumption is complicated,

of the Nydya Philosophy. 21

For the same reason consciousness in bodies of momentary duration is rejected, because it has the fault of complication and cannot be demonstrated ; in the-same manner the production of the fruit from. the seed and from collateral causes is evident, so that there is no necd of assmning a epecial form of making, &c.

‘Let the assumption of n momentary knowledge be complicated, yet you must grant, that the ‘soul is eternal knowledge, which cannot he destroyed ; fur the Sruti says: Lo, this is the soul, true knowledge, the infinite Bramha.’

We object nlso to this, because such a knowledge is evidently without object, and because it cannot be proved, that knowledge has no object $ iv this caso it would not have even itself as an object.

Therefore, it has been proved, that the soul is different from knowledge, and that it is eternal.

True knowledge, that is the supreme Brambn, is not found in indivi- dual souls, because they are clearly distinguished from it by knowledge and ignorance, happiness and unhappiness and similar qualities, and in consequence the difference of Iswara is established. Otherwise servie tude and liberation were names without meaning. |

If it be objected : ‘T he snine text of the Véda which explains the difference of Fawara, brings also forward his identity by his indifference $ for it says: ^ Let us strive for the state of indifference, therefore all ig placed upon the soul,” and also: ‘In the state of liberation igudrance is annihilnted.” |

We deny this, beenuse, the difference being eternal (constant) its annihilation is impossible: Admitted even,that the difference is destroyed, a dualism is for this very reason established, and it cannot be 8११, that duality is destroyed. And ns it is well said, that to Bramha in his state without qualities, and therefore without the quality of existence, existence is yct attributed, so it is also well said, that although there ig no duality, still there are two possessed of duality.

If you say, ‘that the absence of unreality which is the place of iden- tity, is there meant with existence,’ we say likewise, that the absence of identity which is the state of two possessed of duality, is meant with duality.

Although every unit is comprehended by the notion of unity, still one is not both, as it is:said : smell is no attribute uf earth aud water,

22 Division of the Categories

which is clear to every body. As regards the passage of the Sruti, establishing the indifference at that time (the time of liberation), it es- tablishes in fact an equality by the removal of tinhappiness, &c., as it may be said, that this Purshita by great prosperity has become a King In this sense it is said in the Sruti: ‘* Ie who is without sin, obtains the supreme state,” meaning equality

God is not the soul which is knowledge and happiness, but the sub- strate of knowledge. In such a sentence as: ^° Bramha is cternal know- ledge and happiness,” the term ‘ knowledge”? means the substrate of kuowledge, by the authority of x passage like this: ‘fe who knows all, is omniscient ;” hence happincss means also a person who is happy. .....

lence is also the doctrine of the Sinkhyns refuted, which is as follows.* Nature, (Prakriti) is the agent ; the soul (Puirusha) remains

क To understand more clearly the argument of the Nydéya against the Sfukhya, I shall briefly state the principles of this doctrine. According to the S&nkhya there are two kinds of substances which are the substrates of all phenomena, nature and soul. Nature (Prakriti) is one and undistinct in its orlginal state, which is incom- prehensible to the senses. As such it is Mala Prakriti, nature as the root of all things. It is productive, and in its productions various. Nature in its state as production is Vikritl, changed, or derived nature. The firet production is intellect (Buddhi) or the great one, Mahat, which as > production of nature has no consclousness.—The soul (Parusha) is manifold, or there are many souls. The soul, as contrery to na ture, is not active, but it is conscious. Accordingly it has no activity In the pro- duction of ideas, which are given to the soul by intellect, and the opinion, as if the soul were an agent, is a mere delusion

The following quotation from Prof, Wilson’s Sfénkhya Kérika will still mere elucidate the subject (p. 16.) ‘see. ANE.—Nature, the root (of all) is no production, Seven principles, the great or intelicctuel one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productivus (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive

Dhfshya. Mala (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradhéna (chicf) from its being the root of seven principles which are productions and productive; such nature is the root. “No production.” It fs not produced from another.. ० °^ Seven principles,’’ —Mahat and the rest, from ite being the great (mahat) element; this is intellect (Buddhi). eeee Tho seven principles are 1. Intellect ; 2. egotism 3—7, the five subtile rudi- ments. These scven are productions and productive, in this manner. Jntellect is produced from the chief one (nature) that again produces egotism, whence jt is productive (prakritl), Egotism as dorived from intellect, is a production; but as it gives origin to the five subtile elements, it is productive, The subtile rudiment.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 23

without stain (that is untouched, neither active nor suffering) as a lotus- leaf by water; but it is conscious. [४ is without causality, bécause there is no difference between cause and effect (cause and efféct arc identical) and hence with the destruction of the effect, that which is like the effect, would also be destroyed. This iden (that the soul is conscious) is necessary, because the perception of consciousness which is found in intellect, would be otherwise impossible. Lutellect is a modification of nature. Intellect is also called greatness and the inter- nal organ. Under the condition, that it (intellect) cxists or not exists, tho soul is subject to transmigration or liberation. Its modification has the form of knowledge through the channel of the senses. If it (this modification of knowledge) is in connection with external things, an with a jar, &c., the perception of agency takes place in the soul, and the perception of consciousucss in the intellect, on the ground, that the difference is perccived. For instance if it is said: °" By me this is ६० be performed 3” the first member of the sentence, ० hy me,’’ meaus tlie per- ception of the soul, which is without reality, because it is the reflcetion of consciousness (in the intellect) by the clearness of the intellect, as the reflection of the face in x looking-glass (is without reality hy the clearness of the looking-glass). The second member : “ this”? means the perception of the object, which by its being modified through the channel of the senses, has reality (truth) ns the unclearness, produced by breathing itpon a looking-glass. The third member: ‘Ie to be performed’’ refers to the performance of business. ence is intellect posscssed of three parts. The connection of the soul (Pirusha) with knowledge, which is a modification of intellect, is called untrue, as is the percep-

of round ts derived from egotism, and fe therefore a production, but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtile element of such as generated from egotiom, isa production, ap giving origin to alr, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of smell fs derived from egotism, and therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and 18 therefore productive. The subtile rudiment of form is a pro- duction from cgotiam; as generating light, It is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from egotism, ts a production ; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the great principle and the rest are productions and pro- ductive. Sixteen are productions; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements; these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term vikéra being the same as vikriti. Soul ts nelther a production nor productive.

~

24 Division of the Categories

` The site” of merit and demerit is perceptible” by its being united with distinguishing qualities.

tion of the face in an unclear looking-glass. What has been said about knowledge, &c., is also true with regard to happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, endeavour, merit and demerit, because they are evidently identical as being effects of intellect ; but intellect is not pos- sessed of consciousness, because it 18 a modification.

` This doctrine of the Sénkhya is refuted on the ground, that consei- ousness is dependent on the same substrate, as action, fate and सगि ment, because there is no proof, that there is another substrate, different from this.

_ Ifyou say, ‘that from such a sentence as: I, who am conscious, am acting, an error of the part of consciousness is possible in consequence of the modification of intellect,’ we reply by asking, whether this is not also possible on the part of the agent. Otherwise, if intellect is eternal, there is no liberation, or, if it is not eternal, there is no transmigration. _ If you further contend, ‘there is no consciousness of intellect, because it is an effect of unconscious nature, as effect and cause are identical,’ we protest, because this has not been shown; there being no proof, that the agent is 8 production; for from the text, that it is without passion, that it has no birth, it follows, that it is without bépinning, and as such it is also without end, as it is unreasonable, that it should be destroyed. Of what use is therefore the assumption of nature (Prakriti) and similar notions f

Nor cau you say, ‘that our opinion does not agree with the passage of the Bhagavadgita saying : “ by the qualitics of nature are everywhere actions done ; the soul, blinded by pride, fancies: I am the agent ;”” fur - its real meaning is: by “nature's,” fate’s, ‘ qualitics,” the qualities, produced by fate, viz. by desire, etc., Iam agent. If this is the case, the intention of the Bhagnavadgt(tn is attained by the words: Ie, who believes the soul to be the sole agent, is liberated. : 25.—* The site,” &c., viz. the soul is the site. If the body were the site of them (merit and demerit, &c.), the consequences of the works, done in a former body, could not be experienced by a later body. 26.—* It is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing

qualities.” The soul becomes perceptible by its being united with its respective special qualities, and not in another way by such an observa- tion: [ know, I do.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 25

60. It can be deduced from activity” and similar pheno- mena, as the charioteer from the motion of the carriage. I¢ is the site (substrate) of egoity, and perceptible only through the mind.

51. It is pervading, and the site of intellect-and other qualities. Tutellect is two-fold, apprehension and remembrance. Apprehension includes: four sorts, viz.

52. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal know- ledge. Perception” cowprehends six kinds, in accordance with the six organs of perception.

63. The object of the nose is smell and the notion of

27.—Comm. ° It can be deduced from activity, &c."’ That thé soul isin another body, is inferred from activity, ete. Activity means here exertion. Ae it has been mentioned before, that knowledge, desire, endeavour, &c. do not exist in the body, and further as exertion implics endeavour, it follows that there is 8 soul which has endeavour, on the ground that there is exertion.

28.—Comm. Perception is the knowledge (apprehension) which is produced by the senses, and the cause of evidence from perception are the senses. Inference is the apprehension, produced by the know- ledge of a general proposition (Vy&pti) and inferential proof is the ap- prehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition, which is the cause of the conclusion. Comparison is the knowledge,’ pro- duced by similarity, and proof by comparison is the knowledge of si- milarity, which is the cause of comparison. Verbal knowledge is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of words, aud proof by verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words, which is the cause of the former.

29.—&c., means the notion of good and bad smell

* Similarly says 1२१०६११; प्रार्‌ापानमिमेषाग्रेवजोवनमनेगतीन्त्ियामरचिकार।ः VITAE TIM TTA ने सि हामि 11 Satr. 4th Adh. The vital aire, which go upwards and downwards, the closing and opening of the eyes, life, the actions of the mind, and the modifications of the other senses, happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, and endeavour are proofs of the soul.

। 1

26 Division of the Categories

smell, etc.” Thus the. object of the tongue ia savour,” and sound that of the car.”

54-55. Object of the eye is proportionate form.” Swhb- stances of such kind (of perceptible greatness) individuality, number, conjunction and disjunction, priority, posteriority, vis- cidity, Nuidity, quantity, action, class, and the relations which are appropriate to the respective objects are perceived by the eye through the contact of light with proportionate form.

56. Substances, perceptible of touch, are objects of the skin; the objects of the eye, with the exception of colour, are also objects of the skin.

57. In the perception of substances is the union of the skin.

with the mind the cause of knowledge. Through the mind are perceptible: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and voli- tion. - 58. A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses.” Proportionate greatness is the cause as regards the perception of the six classes ; organs (in- struments) are the diffcrent senses.

30.—Further, sweetness, &c. a =

31.—Sound, articulate and non-articulate, &c.

32—Proportionate meane fit to be perceived. The same propor- tionale greatness must be admitted also with regard to the objects of ` the other senses. ।

33.—Comm. “A knowledge which is without determination, is र beyond the perception of the senses,” If (for a man who has not the knowledge of a jar) the contact of the eye etc. (with the jar) has taken place, the determined knowledge: ‘This is a jar, viz. determined hy the general notion (class) of a jar, does not exist, because there was not before the knowledge of that, which is determining, viz. the general” knowledge of a jar, &c.; for the cause of a determined knowledge is ano- ther which is determining. For instance at first is produced a kuow- ledge, not determined by the two parts,—that which isto be determin: ed, and that which is determining,—as'a jar and the general notion ' (class) of the jar. Such a knowledge-is without determination, and’ no object of perception ; for from perception it is evident that 1 know

‘of the Nydya Philosophy. 27

60. The connexion of the senses with their objects is éalled intercourse $ this is also six-fold. 1. The perception of things takes place by contact

00. 2. The perception of what is in intimate relation’ with the things, by intimate relation with that which is in contéct.

01. ॐ. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the Inst mentioned relation, (viz. intimate relation with that which isin contact,) by the corresponding intimate relation, (in- timate reintion of that which is intinintely related with that which is in contact.) 4. ‘The perception of sound, by intimate relation. 5. The perception of what is intimately related with sound, by the intimate union with that which is intimately relat- ed, and G. ‘The perception of every negation by particularity.* ` 62. If it takes place, it is perceived, at the place where it happens to be. Tntimate relation’is perceived by particularity.

63. Transcendent intercourse” is three-fold according to its division into intercourse whose character” is general,"* or

the jar. In this perception is knowledge the determination of the soul the jar that of knowledge, and the general notion of jar the determina- tion of the jar. ‘The detcrmination which is in the determination, is call- ed the gencral notion of determination. The knowledge containing the genetal notion of determination, is the cause of the knowledge deter- mined hy determination. For instance in the knowledge without de- termination of a jar is the general notion of a jar not determining. ` Therefore when there is an undetermined knowledge of a jar, there is snot such ह knowledge, as: I know the jar under the geueral notion of the jar, (that is to say, not sucha determined knowledge, by which the soulis determined by knowledge, knowledge by the jar, aul the jae by the general notion of the jar.) 34.—Comm. ^ Transcendent intercourse.” Perception is two-fold

common and transcendent. The intercourse of common perception is of six kinds, which have just been explained. The intercourse of trans- cendent perception is three-fold.

` 35.—Comm, If in this definition the term ^ character’ denotes its

* See note to v. If.

rE 2

28 Division of the Categories

whose character is knowledge, or which is produced by Yoga.

nature (its identity with itself) the meaning is, that the intercourse is of a gencral nature, and this must be understood as the determination ofa de- terminable knowledge which is in connection with any of the senses. For instance, let smoke be in contact with the eye. Hero is smoke the deter- minable knowledge, and the general notion (class) of smoke, which (gene- ral notion) forms the intercourse, is a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever. If it is then said, that such a knowledge is in con- tact with a sense, the consequence would be, that, if a cloud of dust by mistake were apprehended under the notion of smoke, there could not ariso a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever, as in this case with the general notion (class) of smoke no connection of the senses could take pince. According to my (the author's) opinion, however, the cloud of dust is in contact with the eye; the knowledge to be deter- mined is smoke, and the gencral notion of smoke, which is here the de- termination, the intercourse. Its contact with the sense is the common one, which takes place on the part of the external sense. On the part of the mind, however, the intercourse is merely general, and determining the knowledge. Hence if by words any kind of perception of a Pisicha,* &c. has been obtained, the apprehension of all Piséchns is produced. Theterm ‘general’ means here rather the state of similar things, and this is sometimes constant, as the general notion of smoke, &c. some- times not constant, asa jnr, &c. For instance a jar is perceived either int contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with its half. ence arises afterwards the knowledge of all such things, as a jar, either in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with their halves. This must be so understood, that the. intercourse of similar things (of things included in the same notion) depends on the same rela- tion, under which the generality itsclf is comprehended. On the other hand where after the destruction of this jar, &c. a recollection arises of a thing like this jar, there could not, by the intercourse of a general character, tnke place the perception of all things like this jar, because the generality would at that time be not present. Moreover, suppose the knowledge of a jar to be determined by the coutact with any sense. ट does not exist even the next day a contact with the eye, yet there arises a knowledge of similar things, because there is a generality which

* A kind of goblins.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 29

64. The intercourse of things, comprehended ina notion, is called general knowledge. 1८ is required a thing which miani- fests thie or that property produced by this or that sense.”

65. The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse, whore character is know- ledge’.—The intercourse, produced by Yoga, is of two kinds,

determines the knowledge of similar things. Therefore the ^" know- ledge”’ of ^" generality” is the intercourse, and not “ generality.” With this view it is said in the text :

36.—Comm. Intercourse, ‘* whose character is general.’” The term *charncter” means object, and the sense is: intercourse is a knowledge whose object is general.

* But where without the contact of the eye, &c. the knowledge of the common state of similar things (generality) exists, should there not be a perception through the eye of all jars, &c. 7

37.—Comm. To remove this objection, the text says: “ It is required something which manifest this or that property, produced by this or that sense.

The meaning of this ia: When by an external sense through an intercourse of a general character knowledge is to be produced, there is required an object of knowledge, to be produced by one or the other ‘sense, of this or the other generality, with reference to a thing whose generality it is. This object is the contact (ora similar relation) of the light, further the contact of the eye, &c. ence such a knowledge is not produced by the eye for instance, when it is dark.

But ifthe intercourse whose character is knowledge, is an jntercourse, whose nature is knowledge, and if the intercourse whose character is general, is defined in the same way, what difference then is between them f |

38.—Comm. To show this, it is snid in the text: ‘The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse whose character is knowledge.”

Namely an intercourse whose character is general, produces a knowledge of the things upon which it depends; but an intercourse whose character is knowledge, is intercourse of the knowledge with that object to which it refers, (which is comprehended by it.) The mean-

30 Division of the’ Categories

that which belongs to the Yogi who ia perfect, and that which belongs to the Yogi, who strives after perfection.”*

66. The intercourse of the former is n constant manifestation, that of the latter takes place by the assistance of meditation.*° - The intercourse, as regards inference, is consideration,” the (instrumental) cause the knowledge of a subject, invariably con-

ing of thisis: A perception does not become manifest without inter- course. First without an intercourse whose character is general, how could there exist by the mere notion (class) of smoke and fire, an ap- ` prehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever? For this reason an in- tercourse whose character is general, is nccessary. The objection, ‘that it does not matter, whether there is an apprehensionof every smoke ant fire whatsoever,’ is not valid ; for with the visible smoke the connection of fire is indeed perceived, but no other kind of smoke is included therein, and therefore a doubt, whether smoke is invariably connected with fire or not, could in this case not arise. According to my opinion, however, the doubt, whether smoke, in whatever place or time, isto be predicated of fire or not, takes place through the intercourse of general character, by which every smoke whatsoever is comprehended

The objection, ° that on the supposition of an intercourse of general character man would be omniscient, because in the notion of all objects of knowledge every single object of knowledge is included,’ is also unte- nable; for although all objects of knowledge may be known by this notion, yet, there is vo omniscience, because the diffcrences of all ob- jects are not known, ।

Secondly, if no intercourse whose character is knowledge, were assum- ed, how could there be in the knowledge : ‘‘ sandalwood is fragrant,” also the perception of a thing, which is fragrant ? Be knowledge of fragrant things granted through the intercourse whose character is general, but the notion of fragrancy is only possible by an intercourse whose cha - racter is knowledge.

39.—Comm. * Intercourse, produced by Yoga,” that is, a special virtue, produced by the practice of Yoga, (the union of the soul with God by means of abstract contemplation,) in accordance with the evi- dence of the Sruti, the Purfpas and other authorities.

of the Nydya Philosophy. |

nected with a predicate ina general proposition, (The know- Jedge of the Vyfpti.) | `

07. Therenson which is actually known, is not the cause ; in this case, there would be no inference, if the reason had for in- atance not yet arrived, or had been destroyed,

GS. Consideration is the knowledge that a subject in its juvarinble connection with a predicate is united with the place ` of conclusion (Paksha, subject of the conclusion).

The invariable connection of a subject with a predicate in 9 general proposition (Vyfpti) is called the non-connexion of the reason (middle term) with any thing different from the subject of the conclusion, (Paksha, minor term.)

~=

40.—Comm. Manifestation means the perception of all things, medi- tation is the thinking of the mind, which is separated from all objects, 41.—Comm. “ The intercourse as regards inference is consideration.” The special cause (instrumental cause) of an inference is the know- ledge of the invarinhle connection of the subject with the predicate in a gencral proposition, (onfirert,*) and consideration is the intercourse. For instance, let a man who from the smoke ona hearth, etc. has become aware of the invariable connection of smoke with fire, see afterwards any where on a mountain an uninterrupted line of smoke. Ie will then re-

* wifi: (४१६१५). It ts difficult to find an adequate word for this term in English. It means literally, pervading inherence, the Inherent and essential presence of any one thing or property in another, (see Wilson’s Dict.) but {tis used in the Nyfya nad other philosophical systems to denote the logical relation of one notion to ano- ther in a proposition of such a kled, that under circumstances an inference may be drawn from it; or: it is the relation of the subject to the predicate, and vice १९१७६, as the major proposition of a syllogism. The subject of such a proposition is the WIG: the notion, which is pervaded by another (by the predicate) that is to say, which is only a part of the predicate, which is less extensive than the latter, or included in it. The subject is therefore invariably connected with the predicate, and if the former is thought, also the latter ie thought. The predicate is the WITH! the pervading notion; it has 9 greater extent than the subject,aod the lat- ter is only a part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, and if the predicate is thought, the subject is not necessarily thought with it. The Vy&pti is; accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to be connected together, on either part is understood. Farther, the Vyéptiis a proposition, from

32 Division of the Categories

. 69. Or the petception of the identity of the reison with the conclusion (predicate of) which is not connected with anything incompatible with the subject of the conclu- sion. Subject (of conclusion, minor term,) is the certainty of the conclusion where the intention to conclude is not absent.

collect the general proposition, according to which smoke is invariably connected with fire. lence arises the knowledge, this (mountain) is possessed with smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This (the knowledge, that any subjectis connected by the middle term with a general predicate, or the knowledge of the two premises) is considera- tion. lence arises the knowledge, this mountain is fiery, which is an inference. The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived, together with the notion, that it is invariably connected with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. This is denied, in the text; for if the reason (लि डं, sign) were the special cause of the conclusion, then inference could not take placc, if the reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed, because then the reason, the pretended special cause of a conclusion, were not present.

which an Inference can be derived, that Is to say, It must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a syflogism. The names of Vyfpya, Vyfpaka are only used with reference to the general proposition ; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, vis., the Vyfpya (middie term) the name of चतु, reason, argument, or fad, sign, and the Vyfpaka (msjor term) the name of साण्ड, conclasion, predicate of the conclusion. The minor term (the subject of the conclusion) fs called YH: plece (minor term, subject of the conclusion), vis. the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major term, or predicate of the conclusion.—If these names in their literal ecoepta- tion sppesr at firet curious to a European student and totally deviating from those, used in the logical terminology of the west, it must be borne in mind, that their literal sense does not in the least affect their value as logicel terms, snd aleo, that the European names for the same notions are equally figurative, and the names for instance of subordination, co-ordination, subject, predicate, conclusion, &c., but very imperfectly express the logical relation to which they refer. In fact most of these relations are in all languages taken from relations of spece, as almost all terms which are of an abstract nature. As the literal translation of Vyfpti, Vyfpya, &c. might easily lead to false views, 1 have preferred to give their equivalents in the terminology accepted in Europe, |

of the Nydya Philosophy. 33

70.—From the knowledge, that with such a place the reason (iniddle term) is connected, inference is the consequence.

42.—Comm. ^" Consideration is the knowledge, that a ‘Consideration is the knowledge, that a subject in a ina gencral proposition (the reason, the middle term) is united with the suliject of conclusion,’ (terminus minor.)

The knowledge of the determination of the rcason (middle term) which is determined by a gencral predicate, (major term) in connec- tion with the placo (minor term) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be coniprehended itt a double manner, cither, it is the know: ledge, that the subject of the general proposition (the middle term) is connected with the place (subject of conclusion, minor term) of, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of conclusion) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term.) Accordingly the couclusion takes place either from the knowledge, that the subject of the gettcral proposition (middle term) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from which follows that the conclusion (predicate of tho conclusion, major term) is connected with the place, (minor term,) or it takes place from the knowledge, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle tcrm) from which follows, that the place (minot term) is possessed of the conclusion (inajor term.)

Some think: ‘Also from a two-fold considcration efisues the infers ence, that the place, (subject) is possessed of the conclusion (predicate of.) There is (according to them) no necessity for the knowledge, that the mountain is possessed with smoke, which is invariably con- nected with fre. First there is the perception, that the mountait smokes ; further the recollection arises, that smoke is the subject, with which fire is invariably connected. In this case inference evidently takes place from those two acts af knowledge. A knowledge of something (of the Paksha, the minor term) determined by a notion; which is again determined by thé predicate (by a notion, determincd by the Vy4pti,) can never be the cause, but there takes place tho cause by the knowledge, that the place is determined by the general notion of the subject (middle term, for instance 2 mountain determined by the gencral notion of smoke) because this is necessary, and because tho assumption of a knowledge, determined by what is determined (by the general proposition, by tho ककत), has the fault of complication.’

F

34 . Division of the Categories

71.—There sre five semblanccs of a reason, which are called going astray, contradiction, inconclusiveness, cqualization and absurdity. | ` 72.—The fault of going astray is again three-fold, that which is too general, that which is not general enough and non-ex- clusive.

We deny this ; for even if there is no knowlcdge of the general no- tion (the class) of the middlo term (vy4pya, for instance the general notion of fire) the inference takes place from the knowledge, that there is a subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by something (middle term) with which fire for instance is invariably connected. And this assumption is also more simple ; for the cause takes place by the know- ledge, that there is a determination of the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by the predicate of tho general proposition (detcr- mined by the Vy4pti).

Moreover according to your opinion. from the knowledge: “The mountain is smoking,” the inference (the mountain is fiery) should मि low, because there is a knowledge, that the subject of the conclusion (Paksha) is determined by the general notion (class) of smoke, which in this case {5 the gencral notion (class) of the middle term (vypya) but this of course will not be granted by any one.

- And if you further say, ‘the cause is the knowledge that the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) is determined by the general notion of the middle term (vydpya) when perceived together with the predicate of the general proposition’. (फक पृ) the consequence would be, that an inference would ensue, if Chaitra perceived a subject as invariably connccted with a predicate in a general proposition, and Maitra the general notion (attribute, class) in connexion with the subject (of conclusion). .

If you lastly assume, ‘that the perception of the place, determined by a general notion, by A, in conjunction with the perception of the middle term in its invariable connexion with the major term (the middle term, determined by the Vyépti;) by the same A, is the causo of the conclusion, made by this A,’ there would appear an infinite series of causes for the same effect.

According to my opinion, the knowledge of the attribute (middle

bf the Nydya Philosophy. 35

73.—It is too general,” if applied to the subject (of con- clusion) aud to an opposite one, not general cnough,** if ex- cluded from either.

term) of the subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate (major term) with which it is invariably connected, takes place through intimato relation, and produces the conclusion by the same relation. In this case an infinite series of causes is avoided. On the contrary, if it is said, that the knowledge of the middle term as invariably connected with 8 predicate in a gencral proposition (with the major term, as the Vyfpti) and also the knowledge of the general notion (attribute, mid- dlc term) of the subject (of conclusion, minor term, Paksha) are causes, independent of each other, there would be a two-fold state of the tause of the same cffect, and a conclusion would follow from the sen- tences: °" There is smoke, which is invariably connected with fire,”’ and : “The mountain is fiery.” If this is correct, we may say, that if there is a double knowledge, there must be also a determined knowledge, and here at the end of the discussion, where its result is given, o complica- tion is no fault |

(This ison the whole an excellent exposition of the logical rela- tion of the cause of the conclusion. It is here lucidly explained in what manner the three notions of a syllogism are in relation to each other, and also, that the cause of the conclusion is not the middia term, as separated from the major term, but only in its connexion with it. As this is sometimes not attended to, it is not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the same time it is true, that the logi- cal form of a syllogism does not consist of ond premise, and the conclu- sion, but of two premises with the conclusion; for if one reflects as to the form, given by our author, viz. the minor term in connexion with the middle term, which is itself determined by the major term, it is evident, that there are two connexions, viz. of the minor term with the middle, and of this with the major. That is to say, there are two pro- positions or two premises.)

43.—Comm.—Too general is a reason, which abides as well in the subject of the conclusion as in an opposite one. (Subject of the con- clusion is, whete the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountain or a hearth is the subject or the minor,

r 2 .

36 Division of the Calegortes

- 74.—Non-exclusive,” when no other subject (of the conche-

&c. A subject, opposite to the conclasion, is where it docs not abide, for instance, in the example above given, a tank is a subject, opposite to the major term.) : That is to say, the reason is too general, when it abides also in a subject, where the major term is not found. For instance, let a hearth be the subject (minor term), smoke the majot term, and fire the reason, the conclusion would bes the hearth smokes, because itis fiery, which would be false, because the rerson is too gencral ; for fire (the reason) is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for instance, with an iron ball +

(We would not acknowledge this as 8 logical fallacy, which takes place, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises, but as a fallacy extra dictionem, where the matter of the premises is wrong $ for the conclusion follows here from the premises. In this instance the major proposition is wrong, which is: where there is fire there is smoke. The conclusion, howeyer, is quite right as well in form as int matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The . fault would, however, be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been taken for the minor term. . Aathe Nyéya knows only the two first figures of syllogism, and of them only thetwo moods Barbara and Camestres,* we may say, that tho fal, lacy has arisen by the major proposition being special instead of gencral.) ; 44.—Comm.—Non-general is the reason, which has no similar sub- jects of conclusion for the major termt (thet is where the major term has only one subject, or whcre no similar instances can be adduced for the reason.) (Thus says the commentary in explanation of the text,

. * In Darbern, itis hardly necessary to say, there are all three propositions general affirmatives, in Camestres the first a general affirmative, the second a general nega, tive and the third a general negative |

+ This is much more clearly stated in the Tarka Sangraha. 1 quote the passage in Dr: Rallentyne’s translation (Lectures on the Nyfya philosophy, p. 41.) ‘The pretended reason, which applics neither to similar instances nor dissimilar ores, is one devoid of community.”” As, when one says: ^ Sound is eternal, for it had the natare of sound.’’ Now the nature of sound reskica in sound alone, and is no- thing else, whether eternal of uneternal.

~~

of the Nytya Philosophy. 37

sion) is possible. A reason, which docs not abide in the subject (of conclusion) is called contradictory = 75.—Three kinds of inconclusiveness are enumcrated, viz. in-

The latter, however, is here much clearcr thau the former, because the question is not, whether the major is immediately found in the minor but whether it is found there by the means of another term ; in the first éase there would be no necessity for an argument. The example given in the cominentary is: Sound is not cternal, because belonging to the elass of sound. ere is, according to it, no similar instance, in which the reason (the class of sound) and by it the major is found, as the class of sonnd abides only in sound, and no where elec. We should reject this argument at once, as having only two terms; but the Nyéya is obliged to look out for some other appliance, because class is something different from the objects comprehended by it.)

45.—Comm.—Non-exclusive, is a reason, where the major term is the negation of absolute negation (where the major term may be pre- dicated of any other notion). Hereby a general negative is impossible; and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.

(The Bengalee translation gives the following explanation :

**A renson, for which there is only an affirmative, is non-cxclusive, that is to say, a reason, whose subject does not exclude any thing, for instance all, &c. Let all be the subject, (minor term) object of proof the major, and fit to be named the reason. This argument is non-ex- tlusive ; for here cannot be given a similar instance with regard to the subject (minor term) as it can be given in the argument : “ The mountain is fery, because it smokes ;” for here is n similar instance on the part of the subject & hearth, &c. According to the opinion of the moder echool a non-exclusive reason takes place, where the major admits of only an affirmative (that is to say, where the major is not cxcluded from any other notion) for instance in the argument: ‘a jar. is an object of proof, because it can be named.’’) |

(We would not consider either of these conclusions faulty in form, be. cause the middle term is properly connected with either of the extremes. Arenson then goes astray, to state it bricfly, if the reason is too wide, further if it docs not refer to similar instances, and Instly, if it docs not refer to dissimilar ones.)

38 Division of the Categories

conclusiveness on the part of the subject, inconclusivencss front the nature of the reason, and inconclusivencss from limitation. ` 76.— Where there is a jewel hill, for instance, subject of the . conclusion, there is inconclusivencss on the part of the sub- १९८६. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason*' takes place, for instance, if the substantiality of a tank be inferred from its having the quality of smoke.

77.—Inconclusiveness from limitation®® would take place, for

46,—Comm.—" A contradictory reason is one which docs not abide in the subject of conclusion,”’ (minor term) that is to say, a reason, whose negation is the major term (a reason which is the contrary notion of the major term). Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major, and the notion of horse the middle term. Here the reason, the notion of horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore does not admit of an inference.

(Here the fault again is not in the rensoning, but the major premise is wrong ; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictionem.)

47,.—Comm.—1. Inconclusivencss on the part of the subject is there, where the notion of the subject (the minor term) is impossible. For instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill

(IIere also is the conclusion not wrong, the fault tics in the minor premise, where the subject is a notion, not given by experience; andl the fallacy is thercfore one extra dictionem.)

48.—Comm.—2. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason (middle term) takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed (if the reason and the subject exclude each other). Let it for instance be argued that a tank is a thing, because it smokes. Tank (or water in the tank) and smoke aro contrary notions, and smoke cannot thercfore be predicated of a tank. - _ (Here again lies the fault in the minor premise. We observe, that the second kind of inconclusiveness docs not correspond to the first. In the first the minor term was contradictory, and we should thercfure have expected, that in the second the reason would have been contra- dictory.)

of the Nydya Philosophy. 39

instance, if fire should be inferred from blue smoke. Equaliza- ’ q tion,”* is called a consideration fron contradictory reasons.

49.—Comm.—3. Inconclusiveness from limitation (on the part of the invariable connexion with the predicate), This can be two-fold, on the part of the subject, and on the part of the predicate.

a. First on the part of the predicate. This takes place, if the pre- dicate is a contradictory notion. For instance if the inference were made, that the mountain has.a golden fire, the notion of a golden fire (major term) is contradictory

(iIere the major premise is wrong.)

6. Secondly, on the part of the reason. (This takes place, if the reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were the moun- tain is fiery from golden smoke. The fault is here again in the major premise.)

Others say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow, ` as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has blue smoke.

(This division of inconclusiveness is evidently faulty ; for the first kind is inconclusive, because the minor term is contradictory, the second, becnuse the middle and minor terms exclude each other. In the third kind two divisions are mixcd, in the first of which, both the reason and the major term, are considered as contradictory, in the second the renson and major tern are limited in their application by an addition which they ought not to 18९6 (in the example the addition of blue). ` There are accordingly three different divisions confounded. ‘The first proceeds from contradiction in each of the terms. In this would be included the first member of the author’s division, and a and 6 of the third, by which it is complete. The second division proceeds from the contradiction of two of the terms; of this only one part has been given in the second member, viz. where the reason and the minor term cx- clude each other. Of the two other members of this division, the first, where the minor and major terms are contradictory, has not been touched upon, and the sccond, where the reason and the major term are contradictory, has been given in another place, viz. under tlie head of contradictory reasun. Tho third division procceds from limitation,

40 Division of the Categories

` 78.—Absurdity®* is called the crror of stating a subject in which there is nut the conclusion; ns if, for instance, smell would be inferred to be a quality of a jar, because it was ac- cidentally perceived at the time of its production.

79.—If a rustic first sees a Gayal (species of ox), &c. his similar knowledge of cows, &c. is the instrument {0 form his notion of a Gayal , 80.—The recollection of the meaning of a sentence which had been previously pronounced, is called the intercourse in the comparison. The result of comparison is the knowledge of the force of the word Gayal” and similar expressions.

that is to say, where, instead of the notion in its whole extent duly a part of itis connected with the other two notions (in the examples blud smoke, blue fire) , 50.—Comm.—* An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons . An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the considera- tion of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclu- sion (major term) the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connected; as for instance, if at the time of considcration of water, &c. which is invariably connected with the absence of fire, there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.*

51.—Comm.— Absurdity is, if a subject is without thd conclusion,” (which is assigned to it.)

Absurdity takes place, if the conclusion does not abide in the subject (minor term) for instance, if at the time of the production of a jar tho jac is taken as the subject (minor term) and शाली as the conclusion;

* The Tarka Sangraha (B. 1, p. 42.) explains this : a counterbalanced reason ia that along with which there exists another reason which establishes the non-exis- tence of what is to be proved. As if one should arguc, ° Sound fs eternal, because it is audible,’ as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be) it might be argued with equal force on the other side, that ^° Sound be not eternal, because it ib a product, as a jar {8.०

Of the Nyitya Philosophy. 41

81.—The knowledge of words is the special cause. The knowledge of the mennings of words, is here the intercourse,” and the result is verbal knowledge. The knowledge of the power” of words assists in this act.

eee,

there is an absurdity, because at the time of production there is no smell in a jar, इट, for all things are at that tine without smell.

§2.—Comm.— The knowledge of worts* is the special cause ; the knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse and the result is verbal knowledge.” |

The cause of verbal knowledge is wot a word, when actually heard ; for though there be no word spoken, yet there may be verbal know- ledge, for instance, if one who has made a vow not to spenk, writes down a Sloka. *

53.— Comm.— The knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse.” Intercourse is the recollection of the meanings of the words, produced by the words. Otherwise a person who had a knowledge of words, (who heard words) would have verbal knowledge, if he had obtained the meanings of words by perception or any other evidence. (That is to say, if he heard words, the meanings of which were given to him by perception, inference, ete. $ for inatance, if he heard the word ‘ tree,” while at the same time the meaning of it were conveyed to him by his actually secing a tree. There would be two kinds of knowledge, independent of each other, and not verbal knowledge which is produced by words alone.) Mere it must also be understood, that the effects of words are produced by special relation (षक्ति ४) otherwise the effect of the word “jae” for instance, would be the recollection of ether by intimate relation, and there would be accordingly verbal knowledge of the ether.

Special relation is of two kinds, implication (ellipsis) and power.

The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary ; for tiless the power of a word is previously apprehended, there cannot be verbal knowledge from recollection, which depends upon that relation (power

* A word ts a sound which has a power, as for Instance, the power of the sound man’ refers to en animal which has hands, feet, &e. The meaning of a word is the object to which it refers, for inatance, the meaning of the word ^" तटे" is a thing, which has a trunk, branches, leaves, &e.

G

42 Division of the Categories

of a word) althongh there may exist a knowledge of the words (the words may be heard). The recollection of the meaning of the know- ledge of a word tnkes place according to the rule of the knowledge of any object which is in relation ।

Power is the connexion of the meaning of a word with the same word. That by such or such क sound such or such a meaning is un- derstood, depends wpon the will of God. In names, which are at pre- sent given, there is also a power, because the rule: ‘ Let the father on the eleventh day (after the birth of a child) give a name to the child,” depends on the will of God, Ina sign, however, given at present, there is no power. Such is the opinion of some, but the modern school (of the Ny4ynikas) maintain, that the will of God is not the power, but merely will (of man.) fence is also power in a sign, which may be given at present.

The apprehension of power depends upon grammar, comparison, dictionary, the instruction of persons worthy of confidence, actual intercourse, the supplying of the sentence, substitution, and the con- nexion with well-known words.

a, The apprchension of the root, of the inflective base, the dcriva- tive affixes, &c. of a word is produced by grammar; it docs not take place, whenever there is an obstacle, as there is, if, according to the statement of the grammarians, the power of the grammatical termina- tions (tliat is of the verbs and nouns) refers tothe agent. In the sentence: ‘*Chaittra cooks” the termination in °^ cooks”’ is inseparably connected with the agent ‘* Chaittra.”

This connexion, we maintain, does in this case not arise, in conse- quence of its complication ; but in the action (cooks) the power is pro- duced, because this assumption is simple,* for it is manifest, that the action is a determination of Chailtra, .. .. ..

6. The power which takes place by comparison, has been before described.

c. In the same manner power is also apprehended by the diction- ary; if there is, however, any obstacle, it is not apprehended. Thus according to the dictionaries, the adjective terms of “blue,” &c. have power with reference to blue colour and to a thing which has

* According to the grammarians it must be sald: ०" Chaittra, not separated from what fs determined by the action referring to cooking,” while the Nyfyaihas aay 8 ¢*Chalttra, determined hy the action, referring to cooking. ~

of the Nydya Phildsophy. | 43

blue colour; but it is more simple to say, that this ternt by ils power refers to the quality of blue, and by implication to a thing which has. blue colour

d. Or the power is derived from the word of « person, worthy of confidence, if for instance it is said, that the word ० Pika’? (a binck enckoo) is the same as “ Kokila,” the power of the word ‘ Pika’ is apprehended `

९. Or from actual intercourse. If for instance the master wlio i

श grown wp person, orders his servant who is also a grown up person, to bring the jar, and the jar is brought by the latter, a boy who attends to this, hence observes that the action of bringing ह jar is connected with those words. If he further hears: “Take away the jar,’ “ bring the cow,” he wnderstands the power of the term: *‘jar,”” &c., to be brought or to be taken nway, with reference to a jar, &c. in connexion with an Action. - Some say: ^ Under this supposition there is no verbal knowledge in the sentence: ° There isa blue jar on the ground ;” for the power of a jar, &c. is apprehendod by a jar, as connected with an action, and the power of any termination of a verb refers to the understanding of an action, but iv this case there is no connexion of such a kind, and therefore no verbal knowledge 1”

We do not agree, because, although it is at first necessary for brevity’s enke lo admit a power with reference to a jar, as determiucd by action, it is right to omit it afterwards... .. ..

J. Or from supplying the sentence. (This takes place, if in a sen- tence a word has a special meaning, while from other sentences it is known, that the meaning is more general.)

¢, Or from substitution. Substitution means the definition of the ecuse of n word by anotlicr word of the same sense § thus, if for the word belligerous " warlike’ is substituted, the power refers to the word “ warlike.”"+ .. ..

k. Or from the connexion with well-known words, for instance in the sentence: ‘‘ In this mango tree the Pika sweetly sings,’ the power of the word ^^ Pika” is apprehended in this manner. |

* Ifa word has several meanings, there fs a separate power for each of then.

t Im tho original the examples are: ‘ghatea:’’ and ^" halasa,”” either of which means @ jar.

Gc 2

44 - Division of the Categories

Some (the Mimdusikas) maintain: ‘The power of a word refers to the class (notion) and not to the individual, because iti the latter case it would go astray, and require assumptions without end. Aud on the firat supposition there is also a knowledge of the individual, becanse without individuals the knowledge of n class is impossible.’

We deny this, because without assuming a power, the apprehension of an individual does not take place.

Nor does implication (ellipsis) refer to an individual ; for an indivi- dual may be apprehended, although there is no want of apprehension of the literal meaning of क word (an implication is dependent on the circumstance, that a word cannot be comprehended in its literal sense.)

Nor need there be any fear, that by assuming a power, referring to an individual, the fault of an infinite number of hypotheses is com- mitted ; fur we assume one and the same power for all individuals.

Nor is there (by the assumption, that power refers to the individual) a want of extension; for this extension is effected by the class of cow for instance (when 8 cow is the individual).

Moreover, if the power is apprehended for instance in cow, posscssed of power, the force refers to an individual. If on the contrary the power is apprehended for instance in the class of cow, then there would be a recollection of the meaning of a word, determined by the class of cuw, and a verbal knowledgo would bé impossible, because the knowledge of the power by the same determination would be the cause of the recol- lection of the meaning of a word aud of verbal knowledge. Morcover, if the power refers to the class of cow, we must declare, that the clags of the class of cow is the determination of what Is possessed of the power. But the class of cow, which is not in intimate relation to any thing that is not cow, is in intimate relation to all cows. lence your assumption of a determination of the notion of any thing, possessed of power, is complicated, because this notion does not refcr to individual cows ; therefore in order to comprehend this or that individual, posses- sed of this or that class, it is necessary to assume a power, which is founded on individuals, determined hy class and form

A word, possessed of power, 18 either Yaugika, or Radha, or Yoga- ridha, or Yaugika-nidhn

1. A word is Yaugika, if ita meaning is understood by the mcan- ing of its parts; for instance in the word “ giver” (in Sanscrit the ex-

of the Nydtya Philosophy. 45

82.—Implication,” is the relation of a word which has power, nnd it takes place when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal meaning of a word. The cause of understanding क sentence is contiguity, consistency, construc- tion and intention.

—

ainple is Pachaka, cook) ९४८ rool giv (e) expresses the action give, and the termination १९ er” refers tothe agent. And the whole expresses the meanings of the parts, viz. an agent with reference to the action" give.”

2. पतवर is a word, which, independent of the power of its parte, is only understood by the power of the whole, as for instance ‘ go” (cow, for ° go’’ is derived from “ gam,” to go, which does not express the meaning of go,) “ ghatn :”’ (jar) etc.

3. Yogaridha isn word, which, beside the power of its parts, ex- presses a different meaning as a whole, for instance “ Pankaja” (from Panka,” mud, and “ ja,” born) for the word “ Pankaja” means by the power of its parts ‘an agent, born in mud” (which includes any thing, produced in such ह manner) but by its power as a whole a “ wateriily” (that is only one of the things, born in mud)... .. ..

4. Ynugika-nidha is a word, which is understood either by the mean- ing of its parts, or by Ruidhn, for instance Udbhid. The power of the word “ud” refers to upwards, the power of the root ^^ bhid” to cutting. Therefore by its Yaugika power it refers to tree, and by its power of Ridha it refers to any germ, produced from corn.

54.—Comm.—" Implication is the relation of a word, which hans

power, and it takes place, wheu the intention of the speaker is not wnderstood by the literal sense af क word.” + For instance, let the sentence be given : ° Ghosha dwells on the Gan- gt.” If in this ९१६९, with reference to the literal menning of ^" Gangs,” viz. the current, cither the connexion of Ghosha, or the intention of the speaker is not obtained, the meaning of "न bank’ is understood by implication. This implication is the relation of a word which has power. [दल from the knowledge of the connexion of the literal meaning of the current with the bank, 0 recollection of the bank is produced, and hence the meaning of the sentence is understood.

Morcover if the want of connexion alone were the cause of implicn- ‘tion, there would be no tnplication in the sentence: * Let the staffs

46 Division of the Categories

83.—Contignity,”* is called the proximity of wotds.

enter,” because there is uo want of connexion with reference to the en- tering of the staffs. Therefore, because here the entrance of the staffs has no reference to the intention of the speaker, which is the taking of food, the implication refers to the bearers of staffs. In the same manner, in tle sentences ‘ Protect the ghee from the crows’’ the word ‘“‘crow” has an implication to any thing which may injure the ghee, because thie inteution of the spenker refers to the preservation of the ghee generally. In the sanie manner, if it is said: ° The umbrelln- bearers are proceeding ; the word ‘ umbrella-bearers’’ implies the merchants of a caravan.

This latter is called the implication which docs not lose its own meaning (Ajahatsérthé Lakshand, which keeps its own meaning, beside that whiich it obtains from implication) because by the term “ merchants of a caravan’ the bearers of umbrellas as well as (0०86 withott unt. brellas aro understood. ` Moreover, if the want of sense in tho connexion alone were the cause of implication, sometimes the word ° Ganga&” would imply ॥ १५ bank,’’ sometimes the word : ‘* Ghosha,”’ °" fisli,”? &c. and there would be accordingly no rulé. This, however, must be understood: if the connexion of the meaning of a word, possessed of power, is appre, hended by the notion of bank, bank must be apprehended by the no- tion of bank ; if, on the other hand, 1६ is apprehended by the notion of the bank of the GangA, it must be recollected by that notion. There- fore there is no implication in the general notion of an implication, be- cause the general notion is understood without implication. Likewise, there is no power in the general notion of what has power, because any word is able to remind of thé menning of its general notion.

But if there is an implication by the successive connexion of a word, possessed of power, it is called an implicd implication, as for instance in the word ** Dwirépha” (literally, that which has two wings, figurative, ** black bee’’) the connexion of : “‘two-winged,”” refers to ‘‘ Bhramara”’ (black bee) that of “ Bhramara” to black bee; this is an implied implication, .. .. .. ।

55.—Comm.—Contiguity means proximity, viz. the uninterrupted succession of two or more words which have a connexion among each

of the Nydya Philosophy. a7

other. Therefore there is no verbal knowledge in the words: ^" The by inhabited was Dévadatta volenno;” but if by a mistake in the proximity | no mistake in the verbal understanding is the consequence, it does not matter.

‘But in the sentence : =" With umbrella, earrings and clothes adorned is Dévadatta,” the recollection of the second word destroys the recol- lection of the first ; accordingly, as there is an interruption, a recollec- tion of the second word is impossible.’

We do not grant this, as by the impressions of each word until the Inst an uninterrupted recollection of all objects is possible; for as by several kinds of intercourse one aud the same perception arises, so also one and the same recollection arises by several impressions, and the knowledge of the last letter together with the impressions of all words brings all to recollection. Tow could otherwise exist the recollection of any word that has many letters 7

Moreover 3 some say, that, as inn field all pigeons are caught in the same net, so by the recollection of all the meanings of words docs take place the verbal knowledge of all meanings of words, which is correspond- ing to the knowledge of the connexion depending upon the object and verb. Others say : if connected with all such words, as are construed, consistent and contiguous, verbal knowledge of all the words (included in the sentence) takes place; for, they say, after the meaning of the single sentences has been understood, the meaning of the great sentence will be comprehended by the recolicction of the meanings of the words. Ilence the assumption of a total impression of a word, manifesting ‘all the Ictters, has been refuted, because by the apprehension of the last letter, together with the impressions of all the preceding letters which (appre- hension) manifests the word, the word is apprehended. This must be understood, if it is said: °" धीत door,” the meaning of the word is obtained by the knowledge of the word “ close,” but not by the know- ledge of the meaning of such acts as closing, &c., because the actual presence of the meaning of a word, which is produced by a word, is the cause of verbal knowledge. Moreover, as the words denoting action and object, are mutually connected, it is impossible, that there is verbal knowledge without a word, denoting a verb. In the same manner, if it is said: “Of the flowers,” it is necessary to assume: "he is desirous,” because without this the preposition * of’? could not be applied.

48 Division of the Categories

Consistency” is the mutual correspondence of the meanings of the words. £ |

84.—Construction,” ia the selection of such terminations, without which the meaning of a sentence is unintelligible. In- tention,”* is based on the wish of the speaker.

56.—Comm.—Consistency is the connexion of the meaning of one word with that of another. Accordingly there is no verbal knowledge in such sentences as: ‘He sprinkles with 006," because there is no meaning init. If it is objected, ‘ that previously to the verbal knowledge there is nowhere a knowledge of this consistency, because there is not before a meaning of the sentence,’ we reply : there is a knowledge of consistency which is sometimes doubtful, sometimes certain, if there is a recollection of the meanings of the different words. The modern school, however, says, that the knowledge of consistency is no reason of verbal knowledge. If it is said: ‘ Ile sprinkles with fire,” there is no verbal knowledge, because the inconsistency, which is that fire cannot be an instrument in the action of sprinkling, is certainly at obstacle. Because the certainty of its absence is an obstacle only in a know- ledge, which is not produced by common intercourse or by special defects, therefore it is proved, that it is an obstacle with reference to ‘verbal knowledge—although it is not proved, that by the late appear- ance of consistency verbal knowledge is late. ‘ §7.—Comm.—Construction is the connexion of one word with ano- ther, withont which the former has no scnse. The case, denoting agent, has no connexion without the case, referring to action, and with this the former is construed. In fact, however, the proximity of the cascs denoting agent and action, is included in contiguity. Moreover, with reference to the objective casc, for instance of jar, the cause is the knowledge of the termination of the second case. Therefore there is no meaning in such sentences ag: = ° The jar is the accusative casc,”* ‘*o bring is an action.”

58.—Comm.—Intention is the wish of the speaker. Suppose, inten- tion were not a cause of verbal knowledge, and such a sentence as : “Bring the Saindhava”’ (meaning horse and salt) were pronounced, there would sometimes the meaning of ‘ horse,’”’ and sometintes the meaning of “salt,” be obtained. It cannot be said, that the circum-—

of the Nyitya Philosophy. 49

` 85.—The instrument” in the perception of happitiess and | other internal qualities is the mind. The atomic nature of the mind is inferred from the fact that several objects of know- ledge are not perccived by it at one and the same time."

stances, &c. by which the intention is apprehended, are the cause of verbal knowledge, because they are not included tn the definition. And if it is snid, ° that they are included as being the cause of the knowledge of the intention,’ it is simple to say, that the knowledge of the in- tention is the cause. In this manner, God is assumed for the knowledge of the intention with reference to the Védas. [६ must not be said, ‘ that the knowledge of the intention of the teacher is here the cause,’ because at the commencement of the creation there is no tencher. Nor must it be snid: ‘ there is no general conflagration (destruction of the world,) how can therefore be acommencement of creation!’ for a general conflagra- tion is proved by tho Sistra. In the same manner is in the sentence of n parrot the knowledge of the intention of God the cause, but in a vile sentence of the parrot the knowledge of the intention of the spenker.

Others say: If there is a word which has different meanings, the knowledge of the intention is sometimes the cnuse ; moreover, in the mentence of a parrot is also verbal understanding without the know- ledge of the intention, and with reference to the Védas the meaning is apprehended by the discnssions, which are purificd by the eternal Mimfnsn. 7

59.—Comm.—Intellect was divided into two kinds; viz. appre- hension and remembrance (vid. verse 51.) The nature of apprehension has been explained. Remembrance will not be explained, because it is easy to be understood; for the cause of itis a former apprehen- sion. Some say, ‘the class (notion) of apprehension is not causality, but . the class (notion) of knowledge ;* otherwise there would be no remem- brance after a remembrance, because the former impression would be destroyed by the remembrance of the cominon notion. According to my opinion, however, there is by this remembrauce through a new im- pression a new remembrance produced.’ This we cannot grant; where after the remembrance af a perception in its totality the remembrance of

* That [8 to any, apprehension is not the cause of remembrance, but knowledge

in general. || |

50 Division of the Categories

86.—Qualitics” abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions. *

the single objects (constituting a totality) as of cloth, jar, &c. is produc- ed, but so that there is no remembrance of all the objects, there it must be said, that, as the impression of every single remembrance is not de- stroyed, time, or diserise, or the last remembrance is the cause of the destruction of the impression. Accordingly, it cannot be said,.* that a gradual remembrance is impossible,’ nor, ‘that by repeated remembrance, a stronger impression is impossible ;’ for the word ° strong’’ means here what suddenly recalisto mind. It also cannot be said, ‘that the cause is knowledge, as there is no alternative ;” for if the special attribute is assigned, there is no going astray ; but knowledge has the fault of su- perfluous causality, as it is a general attribute. How could otherwise a stick be the cause of a jar by being turned round, and not as well by its being a substance or having colourf Nor must it be said : * There is an apprehension, that the intermediate remembrance will go astray, because the impression is destroyed ;’ for by objecting to assuming an infinite number of impressions and by assuming the destruction of the impres- sion of the last remembrance, a going astray cannot be apprehended.

60.—Comm.—The existence of mind is proved by the following in- ference. The perception of happiness, &c. takes place by an instru- ment, because the perception is a production, as for instance is the perception by the eye. This instrument is the mind. [६ cannot be said ‘that the perceptions of unhappiness, &c. are produced by other instruments,” because the necessily of only one instrument as cause fur all similar perceptions is evident from its simplicity. Thus the mind is proved as being the substrate of contact, which is the non-intimate cause of unhappiness, &c.

61.—Comm.—" The atomic ‘nature of the mind is proved from the fact, that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time.”

It is clear from apprehension (perception) that various objects of perception, for instance, objects of the eye, of taste, &c. are not at one and the same time produced; for although there may exist an inter- course of the several senses with these objects, yet knowledge is pro- duced by on/y one sense, because the mind is in contact with only one

of the Nydya Philosophy. 01

Materin! qualities” are colour; taste, feel, and smell, priority and posteriority,

sense, and it is not produced (at that time) by any other sense, as the mind is not in contact with it. Therefore if the mind were to bo comprehended by the notion of a pervading substance, it should be connected with every thing; hence (ns this is not the case) it णि. lows, that the mind is not pervading. I¢ must not be said, ‘ that the knowledge of the mind is Inte (successive) because at that time the special fate (merit or demerit) which reminds of knowledge, is also Inte ;’ for, if this were the case, there would be no necessity for as- suming such instruments of knowledge as the cye, &c.

Nor must it be said: ° ow can the narrowness of the mind be re- conciled with the fact, that at one and the same time a knowledge from different senses exists, for instance at the time when one ents a lnrge cake ;’ for the mind is some thing very subtle, and is therefore rapidly in contact with various senses, so that different kinds of know- ledge may arise in the same imperceptible enccession, as the hundred leaves of a lotus arc pierced ; it isa mere delusion, if several kinds of knowledge appear at the samo time.

Nor must it be said, ‘that both (the atomic and pervading nature ` of the mind) is reconciled under the assumption, that the nature of the mind may contract or expand,’ because the assumption of many parts subject to destruction, &c. is complicated, and on the other hand, the assumption of a mind without parts is simple.

62.—Comm.—“ Qualities abide in substances, and are without quali- tics and actions.”

If it is asked, what proof is there for a separate class of quality f The answer is: The causnlity, found iu what is possessed of gene-- rality, different from that (generality) referring to substances and actions,* is determined by some attribute, because causality for a thing which is not determined by some attribute, is impossible ; but neither the class of colour, &c. nor the class of existence is this determination, because in the first case it would not comprehend enough (all other quali-

* To understand this, it must be recollected, that generality (class) abides in sub- gtancen, qualities and actions; the generality therefore, different from the class of substance and action, must be that of quality. n 2

62 ` Division of the Categories

87, 88.—Fluidity, gravity, viscidity and velocity.— Merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect and others of shwilar nature are called immaterial qualities by philosophers.“* Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction are con- sidered qualities of either class.

— 89.—Conjunction and disjunction, the different numbers from two upwards, separatedness found in two things or more, are qualities which abide not in one and the same thing.

a ब~ ~ ties being excluded) and in the second it would comprehend too much, (viz., also substances and actions.) Therefore it is contained in the 24 (qualities) and isthe class of quality.

“Ht abides in substances.” Although it is not its definition: to be dependent on substance, because it would be too wide, as including also action and class, yet it is tight to say: it is whnt is possessed of the class different from existence which class is the determination extending as far as substantiality, because the class of quality is the determination, extending as far as substautinlity, and quality is what is posscssed of this determination. The classes of action and substance are not determina- tions, extending as far as substantiality, because substantiality and action do not abide in the sky, &c. and the class of the class of substance, and the class of generality (class) are no real classcs.

* Without qualities.” Although action, generality, &c. are also without qualitics, yet it must be understood as the absence of qualitics, found in the category which is possessed of generality and different

‘from action; for class and the subsequent three categories have no ge- nerality (class); action is not different from action, and substance is not without qualities. Therefore this definition is not too wide.

० Without actions” is only said to describe it, not to define it, be- cause it would otherwise be too wide, thé cther being also without action.

63.—Material substances are: earth, water, light, air and mind (material according to the Nydya is that the measure of which has a

‘limit, and for this reason, mind which is an atom, is included in it.) ` 64.—Iminaterial qualities are: merit and demerit, memory, sound, _futellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, and endeavour (voli- tion). Immaterial substances are: the sky, time, space and soul.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 53

90.—All the remaining qualitica® abide only in one thing. Special qualitiers™ are: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aver- sion, endeavour, touch, viscidity, original Nuidity,

91.—Fate, memory and sound: General qualities are: number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, derived Muidity.

92. 93.—Gravity and velocity. Number, quantity, separa- tedness, conjunction, and disjunction, priority and poste- riority, Nuidity and viscidity are perceived by two senses.

Sound, colour, taste, smell and touch, are respectively per- ceived by one of the external senses.

94.—Gravity, fate and memory, transcend the perception of the senses. The special qualities of the pervading substances” are not produced by the qualities of any cause.”

65.—Comm.—The remaining qualitics are: colour, taste, touch, measure which is an unit, separatedness, found only in one individual, priority, posteriority, intellcct, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endenvour, gtavity, viscidity, faculty, fate (merit and demerit) and sound. |

66.—The special qualitics of tho earth are: colour, taste, smell and feel; of the water: colour, taste, feel, viscidity and natural finidity ; of the light: colour and feel; of the air: feel; of the sky: sound ; of the soul: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and memory.

67.—Comm.—By two senses, viz. by the eye and the skin.

68.—Comm.—Quulitics of the pervading substances are: intellect, happiness, unliappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, memory, and sound — 69.—Comm.—" They are wot produced by the qualities of any cause.” Colour, smell, &c. depend upon the quality of the cause (for instance the colour, taste, smell and feel of a jar depend upon the same qualitics of the two halves, of which it is formed) the same cannot be admitted with regard to intellect, &c. because there is no cause of the soul, the ether, &c.

54 ` , Divtsion of the Categories

- 95. 96.—Natural colour, taste, smell, fecl, likewise fluidity, viscidity, velocity, gravity, unity, separaledness found in [वा viduals, quantity and elasticity are produced from the quali- ties of causes. Conjunction, disjunction and velocity are effected by actions. |

97.—Colour, taste, smell, touch, quantity, unity, separa- ४९५११९88 found in individuals, viscidity and sound are von-iati- ninte causes,

98.—Special qualities of the soul have only instrumental causnlity. Hot feel, gravity, velocity, fluidity, conjunction and disjunction and the other qualities denoting two extremes, are of two fold causality.”

99.—The special qualities of pervading substances, as well as conjunction and disjunction and other qualities denoting two extremes,* are limited.

100.—Colour is perceived by the eye, it manifests substances, qualities and classes, it is the cause of the perception of the cye, and is white, &c., according to the variety of colours.

101.—It is eternal in the atoms of water and light,” in all other substances it has a cause. Taste is perceived by the tongue; it is various, as swect, bitter etc.

(The special qualities of the soul are only instrumental causes ; for intellect, &c. is not the non-intimate cause of any thing; but the knowledge of what is possible by action is the instrumental cause of the desire of action.)

69.—Comm.— Viz. the instrumental and non-intimate causes.

70.—Comm.—* Colour is eternal in the atoms of water and light,” because it is there from their nature, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, as by the process of cooking another colour is produced.

क The second distich of this versc in the former edition has been omitted, tho whole context showing that it is an interpolation. The same has been clone with = the first distich of verse 68, for the same reason, 20 that the present edition con- tains one verse leas than the former.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 56

102.—Its instrument (organ) is the tongue ; as regards eterni- ty, &c. it is like colour." Smell is perceived by the nose, it is the cause of perception through the nose.

103.— There are two kinds of smell, good and bad.”

Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin.

104.—It is threefold, tepid, cold and warm. Hardness and similar qualities are in the carths with regard to its eternity, the same holds good as above

105.—These™ qualifies as abiding in earth, are produced by cooking, while this is not the case as regards the other ele- ments, The change produced by cooking takes place according to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas” in the single atoms.

. 71.—Comm.—Taste is cternal in the atoms of water, all other taste 18 non-eternal.

72.—Comm.—Smell is non-ctcrnal (because it abides alone in earth, and in the atoms of carth another smell is produced by the process of cooking.)

73.—Comm.—The feel of enrth and air is temperate, of water cold, and of light hot... Feel is eternal in the atoms of water, light and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, (for the same reason as before.)

74.—Comm.—These, viz. colour, taste, smell and fecl. As abiding in carth, they are produced hy a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour; taste, smell and fedl of carth are changed ; not so as abil- ing in water, &c. for although water, &c. bea hundred times boiled, yet rio change of its colour, &c. takes place. The smell and heat of water, on the other hand, are artificial, because they are present or absent by the presence or absence of artificial means, like the cold feel of air and earth..

75.—Comm.—The Vaiséshikas sny, that as to earth the change by the process of cooking tnkes piace in the atoms. Their view is, as follows, As long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of cooking is possible ; but when by the union of fire the com- pound substances have been destroyed, that change takes place in the

66 Division of the Categories

atoms which have become independent of each other. And again by the union of the atoms which have been changed by the process of cooking, 2 production is effected from the compound of two, three, &c. atoms again to a compound of many parts; for by the extraordinary velocity of heat the transition from the destruction of one compound to the production of another is sudden. Then from the destruction of a compound of two atoms by a new production a compound, possessed of shape, &c. is formed in a few moments.

` For the instruction of the student an explanation of this topic Is here given.

The Siitra of the Vaiséshikasis as follows: * Action isa cause which

is independent of conjunction and disjunction :”’ which means, that its consequent state is independent of its antecedent state ; otherwise, as the action also produces the consequent conjunction, there would be the fault of too wide a definition, because the action would depend upon the destruction of the antecedent conjunction. ' If here a disjunction, produced by disjunction, is not acknowledged, nine moments are required. If it.is acknowledged, the disjunction, depending wpon something produces disjunction ; dx¢ if the cause is something independent, action takes place, If there is a disjunction produced by disjunction, as depending upon the time, which is de- termined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first ele- ments of a compound substance commencing perceptible substances (for which a compound of three atoms is required) ten moments are neces- sary. If further the disjunction produced by disjunction depends upon the time or upon part (of a compound) either of which is determined by the destruction of a substance, eleven moments are necessary,

1. Nine moments.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction from another atom, hence the destruction of the con- junction, forming the first elements of a compound substance (which consists of three atoms,) hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue, &c. in the atom, hence 3. the production of the quality of red, &c., hence 4. the action in accordance with the production of the first elements of things, hence 6. disjunction, hence 6. destruction of the former conjunc- tion, hence 7, the conjunction, by which the first elements of a com-

of the Nydya Philosophy. 57

pound are formed, hence 8. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 9. the production of the quality of red, &c.

If it is objected, ° that in the moment, when the quality of blucis de- stroyed, or iu the moment, when the quality of red is produced, there is in the atom the action, in accordance with the production of the first clements of a compound substance ;’ we deny this, because in an atom, previous to the destruction of the action which takes place in an atom that is united with fire, and also previous to the production of a quality, there is no other action with regard to the atom possible ; for we hold the principle, that in a thing where there is an action, no other action is possible, and also, that in a substance without quality an action, iu accurdauce with production of the first elemcnts of substances, cannot take place.

Nor cau in an atom at the same time that the quality of blue, &c. is removed, the quality of red be produced, because the destruction of the antecedent is the canse of the consequent colour, etc.

2. Ten moments. They take place, if by disjunction, depending upon a time, determined by the destruction of the conjunction, form- ing the first elements of a compound substance, another disjunction is effected. :

- From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, which is the element of a compound of two atoms, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, by which the first elements of a compound are formed, hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms and the disjuuction, produced by disjunction, hence 2, the destruc- tion of the quality of blue and the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 3. the production of the quality of red and the consequent conjunc- tion, hence 4. the destruction of the action, produced by the conjunction* of the fire, with regard to the atom, hence 5. the action, in accordance with the production of the first elemeuts of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 6. disjunction, hence 7. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 8. the conjunction, forming the first elements of a componnd substance, hence 9. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 10. the production of the quality of red, &c.

3. Eleven moments.

* Nodanam means @ conjunction, by which no sound is produced. Sce v. 119.

1

58 Division of the Categories

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 1. the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 2. disjunction, produced by disjune- tion, depending upon a time determined by the destruction of a com- pound of two atoms, hence 3. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 4. the consequent conjunction, hence 5. the destruction of the action with reference to the atom, hence 6. the action, forming the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 7. disjunction, hence 8. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 9. the conjunction forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 10. the compound of two atoms, hence 11. the production of the quality of red. One and the same conjunction of fire destroys not the S/xe colour and produces the red colour, as tho intermediate sound destroys the preceding and produces the ‘gubsequent sound ; fur one and the same fire continues not for the whole time. Moreover, if the cause of the production were also the cause of destruction, then, if by the destruction of the colour &c. the fire were also destroyed, the atom would remain for a long time without colonr. If on the other hand, the cause of destruction were also the cause of production, then, if at the production of the red colour the fire (the cause of the production) were destroyed, there tould not be produced the red colour.

If in this manner the action is considered in another atom, the quality is produced in five and more moments.

In five moments. The action takes place in one atom, hence dis- junction, hence destruction of the conjiinction, forming the first ele- ments of a compound substance, and action in another atom, hence de- struction of the compound of two atoms, and disjunction, produced by action in another atom. This is onetime. [1९८९ destruction of blue, &e. and from the disjunction the destruction of the former conjunction. This is the second time. Hence the production of the red, and the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound.: This is the third time. Hence the production of the compound of two atoms, which is the fourth time, and hence the production of the red, which is the fifth time.—If one considers the destruction of the substance at the same time with the action in another atom, then the production of

of the Nydya Philosophy. 59

106.—While the Naiyfyikas affirm," that change is effected पाष in two or more atoms. ‘The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number.”

107.—Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient unity to transient substances."* Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehend- ing intellect,

——

the quality takes place in six moments. In this manner. By tho action in one atoin disjunction takes place in another atom, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound, hence destruction of the comportnd of two atoms, and action ‘in another atom, hence destruction of the blue and disjunction, produced by action in another atom, hence production of the red, and destruction of the former conjunction in another atom, hence conjunction in another atom, henco production of the compound of two atoms, then production of the red. In the same mauner seven moments are required, if one at the time of the destruction of the blue considers the action in another atom, and cight moments, if one considers the production of the red at the same time with the action in another atom.

76.—Comm.—" While the Naiydyikas affirm.”” It is the opinion of the Naiyfyikas, that also in compounds, viz. in compounds of two, three, &c. atoms, change by the process of cooking takes place. Their view is this, As compound substances have pores, the minute parts of fire enter into the inside, and therefore change by the process of cooking is possible, although the parts be retained in the compound. The opinion of Vaiséshikas is complicated, as it assumes the destruction of an infinite number of parts. If this is the case, the recognition १ “ this is that jar,” ` is consistent ; hut where there is no recognition, there we can admit a destruction of the compound.

77.—Comm.—“ The cause as regards the operation of counting, is ~ enlled number.” The cause, viz., the non-intimate cause. ` 78:—Comm.—" Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, {rausient to transient substances.” Eternal substances are the atoms of matcrial substances, further time, space and soul, transient substances for instance a jar, &c. 12

60 - Division of the Categories ; 108.—And they are collectively apprehended in their depen- dance upon more than one object.” The comprehending

intellect being destroyed, those numbers are also destroyed.”

79.—Comm.—“ Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produccd by comprehending intellect, and they are collectively apprehended in their dependance upon more than one object.”

Numbers from two upwards, depending upon the addition of one to one, are produced by comprehending intellect.

Although the relation, indicating the class of two, three, &c. abides for instance in each of two, three, &c. jars &c. yet as there is not a knowledge, that one is two, and further as there is the knowledge, that one is not two, it must be assumed w# relation, indicating the collective apprehension of two, three, &c. which depends upon more than one object.

80.—Comm.—" The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers, (from two upwards) are also destroyed.” First there is the comprehending intellect, then the production of the class of two, &c: then the determining knowledge, viz. the determination of the class of class of two, then the perception determined by the class of two. If the comprehending intellect is destroyed, also the class of two is destroyed. |

Although no other knowledge does continue for three moments, because the special qualities of the respective pervading substances are destroyed by the qualities succeeding to them,* yet it must be assumed, - that the comprehending intellect continues for three moments; other- wise the comprehending intellect wonld be destroyed at the time of determination, and thereby also the class of two, three, &c.; fur there would be no perception of the class of two, because no object were present, and only when it is present, a knowledge is produced by the eye, &c. Therefore it must be assumed, that the perception of the class of two destroys the comprehending intellect.

It must not be asked, ‘how by the destruction of the comprehending ` intellect the class of two, &c. is destroyed,’ becauso at another time there ia no perception of the class of two; for it is clear, that the

* For instance a sound by another, which follows it, or a perception, thought, etc. by a succeeding one.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 61

109.—Comprchending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities.” Quantity is the cause of the opera- tion of measuring.”

110.—Point (atom of space) length, thickness, breadth, nre the differences of quantity ; in transient things it is tran-

sient, in eternal things eternal.”

comprehending intellect is the cause of those numbers, and its de- struction destroys also them. Therefore the class of two, produced by the comprehending intellect of A, is comprehended by the same A.

Nor must it be said, “that the comprehending intellect is the cause of the perception of the class of two,” &c., because it is right for brevity’s sake to assign it as the cause of the class of two, &c.

The comprehending intellect of the Yogis refers to compounds of two atoms, &c. which transcend the perception of the senses. The comprehending intellect of God (Iswara) or of the Yogis abiding in the mundane egg, refers to the atoms at the time of the creation of the world.

81.—Comm.—"* Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities.”

This is the intellect, which apprehends, that this is one, this is one, &c. It must be understood, that, where there is a knowledge of undefined unities, there is produced the number, referring to many, different from two, three, &c. as where there is a forest, an army, &c. This is the opinion of Kandalf-kéra. The Achfryas, however, think, that the class of many, is the class of three, &c. Therefore the class of many includes the class of three, &c. Although the class of three, &c. is included in an army, yet the class of the class of three, etc. is not apprehended, because this would be wrong. If this is the case, the notion is possible, that this army is greater than that, because if the class of many were without number, there could not exist the notion of a comparative and superlative degree.

82.—Comm.—" Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring, viz. the nou-intimale cause

83.—" In transient things it is transient,” viz. in a compound of two atoms, &c. °^ [0 eternal things it is eternal,” viz. is the sky, &c.

62 Division of the Categories

111.—Transient quantity is produced. from number, measure, and heaps. Quantity found in two and more atoms arises from mumber ;"*

112.—As met with in a jae and similar extended things it ariscs from measure; the conjunction of so called loose things, itisaheap. By this (conjunction)

113.—Measure is produced in such things for instance as cotton. If the place, upon which it (the measure) depends, is destroyed, it is also destroyed. Separatedness which is like number” is the cause of the knowledge of separate things.

114.—It cannot be said, that it is included in) mutual nega- tion ; for it is not the same to say, “ this is different from that,” and, ** this is not that.”

115.—Conjunction is called the obtaining of two things un- obtained before. It is threefold, the first kind is produced from the action of one of two ;

84.—Comm.—" Quantity found in two and more atoms.” ‘The mea- sure of one atom is not the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of two atoms, nor a componnd of two atoms the canse with regard to the measure of a compound of three atoms, because a imen- sure produces a measure which is greater than its own kind.* But the measure of a compound of two atoms is not greater than one atom, and the measure of a compound of three atoms has nothing of its own kind ; therefore the non-intimate cause of a compound of two atoms is the number of two in an atom, ‘and of a compound of threo atoms the number of three in a compound of two atoms.

8h.—Comm.— Separatedness which like mumber,” viz. the nout- intimate cause of the knowledge of separatedness is separatcedncss. It २8 like number in its relation to eternal aud transient things ; viz. as the class of unity is cternal in eternal things, and transient in transient things, as transient unity is produced in the sccond moment after fhe production of the thing upon which it depends, and is destroyed, when this is destroyed, so the same must be understood with regard to scparatedness of two, three, &c.

* Vid. p. 8.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 63

116.—The second from the united action of both, the third from conjunction. Of the first is an instance that of the faleon aud the rock.

117.—OF the second, the fighting of two rams $ of the third, the conjunction of the tree and the jar which is prodaced by the conjunction of the tree with one half of the jar.

118.—The conjunction which is effected by action is again two-fold, the one effected by violent, the other by soft motion $ the first is the cause of sound.

119.—The second is not the cause of sound. Disjunction comprehends also three kinds. The one is produced by the action of one, the second by the action of two,

120.—The third by disjunction. This latter is again of two kinds; the one arises by the disjunction of the cause only, the other by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.”

eo eee. ew 7 7 ष

86.—Comm.—With regard to the two first kinds of diajunction, the snme examples aro to be understood as with regard to the two first kinds of conjunction. The third is again two-fold, viz. as produced either by the disjunction of the cause, or by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.

Where there is an action with regard to one half of a jar, there ensues a disjunction of the two halves, hence the destruction of the con- junction forming the jar, hence destruction of the jar, hence by the action, which cousists in the disjunction of the half, the disjunction of the half of the jar from the other part of space, hence a destruction of the conjunction with the other part of space, hence the conjunction with another part of space, hence the destruction of the action.......

Where by an action of the hand, ह separation of the tree and the hand tnkes place, there arises the belief that the tree is also separated from the body. Were in the separation of the body from the tree is the action of the hand not the cause, because they are not at one and the snme piace. Again there is no action in the body, ns the action of a compound is regulated by the actions of each of its parts; there- fore is here produced by the disjunction of cause* and non-cause also a disjunction of effect and non-effect.

* Causc, as it appears, is here the tree.

64 Division of the Categories

12}.—Posteriority and priority are two-fold with regard to time, or to apace, and are only applicable to material bodies.

122.—Pusteriority of place (distance) is perceived from a greater space intervening between the conjunction of the sun, priority (nearness) by the perception of less space.

123.—The non-Intimate cause of them is conjunction of space which is the substrate of them.* Posteriority with regard to time is produced by the knowledge of the anterior existence of the revolutions of the sun,

124.—Priority (recent time) from the knowledge of what succeeded the former. The non-intimate cause of them is the conjunction of thinga which are in time.

125.—If the comprehending intellect were destroyed, pos- teriority and priority would also be destroyed. Intellect has been previously nearly explained

126.—What is left, will now be explained. Knowledge is two-fold, wrong notion and right notion.

127.—A knowledge, which manifests something where this something is not present, is 2 wrong notion.” Of this there are two kinds, mistake and doubt.

128.—The former is the certain knowledge of a thing where uch a thing is not present, as for instance, the notion of the soul in the body, or yellow colour in a shell. |

129.—Doubt™ is a knowledge in question, whether for in--

87.—Comm.—If a knowledge, which manifests something, is trans- ferred to sumething else, and represents itself at the same time as certnin, it is error; for instance, if the knowledge of the soul ia such sentences as: "° [ am reddish,” &c., is transferred to the body, or yel- low colour to a shell.

88.—Comm.—Douht is a knowledge, determined by the contradic- tory absence or presence (of a predicate) in one and the same subject.

* Their substrate is: near or far with regard to space.

of the Nydya Philosophy. Gh

stance a Ching is a mau ora trunk. A knowledge which does not manifest something, where this something is not present, ` but, which manifests this something alone, is certitude.

130.—The apprehension of absence and presence in one aud the same object is doubt. ‘The cause of doubt is the knowledge of a gencral attribute, ९८८.

eee re मी रभम ५ a

(The Bengalce Trausiation explains this as follows: A doubt isa knowledge such as this: Is this n man or a trunk { This kind of donbt is called a doubt of four extremes (चातुष्काटिकं,) because there are fuur extremes, viz. the notions of a man and non-man, and the notions of trunk and non-trunk., ‘Che contradictory notions of presence aud ab- scnee are enlled extremes. If it is questioned, whether the mountain is ficry or not flery, the doubt is, whether one of the two extremes fiery or not fiery abides in the mountain.)

89.—Comm.—There are three causes of doubt.

1. Cause of donbt is the knowledge of a gencral attribute which is found in two extremes, for instance the notion of height, found in trunk aud non-trunk, as if it is doubted, whether this is a trunk or not n trunk.

2. Cause af doubt is a non-genoral (special) attribute. (Non- geucral is a predicate, whichis not found in the subject of the two extremes ;) for instance, if the notion of sound, which is separated from the notions of eternal and non-cternal, (that is the notion of sound is not the gencral notion, under which cternal and non-eternal are com- preliended) is conceived in sound, the doubt arises, whether sowid is eternal or non-eternal. |

3. Cause of doubt is contradiction (of two extremes,) buf nol the contradiction, referring to the mere sound alouc, because a knowledge of a general predicate of sonndd is the enuse of certitude only ; for in- atance, if it is said: Sound is cternal, sound is not eternal, but the knowledge of the two extremes, which is produced by sound. ‘The doubt takes place by the mind.

In the same way, if there is a doubt, that a knowledge is proved, there is also n doubt with regard to the object of the knowledge.

In the same way, if there is a doubt with regard to a subject in its

x |

66 Division of the Categorica

131.—Defect™ produces wrong notion, excellence right no- tion. There are different kinds of defects as bile, distance, &e.

132.—Excellence as regards perception is the intercourse of a sense with what is determinable, determined by its deter- mination. Excellence as regards inference

i _________॒_ ढ्‌ `

s,varinble connexion with x predicate, there is also a doubt with regard to the predicate. But the canse of doubt is the knowledge of a sub- ject, determined by au attribute, or the intercourse of a sense with such n subject.

90.—Cumm.—Defect is the cause of wrong notion, and excellence of right notion. Defects as for instance, bile, &c. are only of a cou- tingent nature; for their causality is established by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya and Vya- tiréka; if the defect is there, the notion is wrong, if tho defect is not there, the notion is not wrong). That excellence is the cause of right notion, on the other hand, is established by simple inference ; for right notion is produced by a cause, different from the general cause of knowledge, because it is a knowledge that is produced, as wrong notion «5. It cannot be said, ‘that the absence of defects is the cause.’ In the sentence, ‘the shell is yellow,” bile is the defect ; from this the right notion of shell is not obtained, because there is no authority to ascribe st more to the one member of the alternative than (0 the other, and it is right to assume a causalily from one excellence in preference to a ` causality from the absence of numerous defects.

Nor can it be said: ‘ Let excellence even be granted, there is no per- ception of white colour ina shell, as bile is an obstacle to it; therefore the causality of the absence of defects, as for instance of bile, is necessary. Of what use is then the assumption of a causality of excellence १ for in this case the causality of excellence is proved by the argument of « general affirmative and negative. In the same way it {8 well said, that the absence of excellence is the cause of error.

What are those defects? “Bile,” &c. Sometimes bile is a defect, when a yellow colour is mistaken for a white one (as in jaundice) sometimes distance, for instance if the moon, suu, &c. by their distance are mistaken for small bodics.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 67

133.—Is the consideration connected with the place (subject of conclusion) which is determined by the conclusion. 1१7 cellence, as regards comparison, is the knowledge of similar objects, derived from words possessed of power.

134.—Excellence as regards verbal knowledge is the right notion of consistency or of the intention. Right notion is a knowledge without error."'

135.—Or right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind and accordingly predicated. A knowledge which is unde- termined, is neither right notion nor error ;

136.—For that which is without determination and determi- nability is not comprehended under any relation. Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt.”

91.—Comm.—" Right kuowlcdge is a knowledge withont error.” As here the objection might be made, that,—if at the perception of silver and tin, both, silver and tin, are considered as silver,—also on the part of the silver a wrong notion is produced, because that knowledge is not free from error, a second definition is given: ‘ Right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind, and accordingly predicated.” Mere it must be understood, that, under which relation the right notion is perceived, under the same relation must be perceived that which is deterinined, and also the determination. Hence it is not against this definition, if a jar, &c. is comprehended by the same conjunction as the two halves of which it is composed, If this is the case, any thing without determination is no right notion, as there is no gencral notion, by which it is determined. A notion which is undetermined, is neither ¢rue, nor false.

92.—Comm.—* Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt.”

Namely, the Mimdnsnkas say, that right notion is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus* a knowledge is a right notion by its

* Col. Misc. Esssyé, Vol. 1. p. 298. Next to him (Bhatta Kumfrflaswami) is a writer usually cited under the title of Gurn, more rarely under the designation of Prabhfkera. [is work I had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present

x 2

68 Division of the Categorice

137.—The cause of the apprehcuston of a general proposition is the non-napprehenksion bf what gocs astray and the apprehen- a own manifestation. (Bengalee Tr. They state the object of knowledge, for instance of a jar, to be three-fold, viz. the jar, the soul, and the knowledge of a jar &c. in connexion with that which is to be proved, because by the means of object of the knowledge, for instance of a jor, first the jar, further the soul, and lastly, the knowledge of the jar 11 connexion with that which is to be proved, form one and the same knowledge, which may be pronounced in the sentence: “1 know the jar,” which means, I have a knowledge, which manifests a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Bhattas* knowledge is beyond the senses; the nation (class) of knowledge, produced by that knowledge (which is ल्क णात्‌ the senges) is perceptible ; by this (notion) knowledge is inferred (B. T. According to the Bhattns knowledge, without determination as well as with determination, is beyond the senses ; but after the knowledge of a jar there arises the notion of what is known with reference to the jar, &c. then the notion of what is known, viz. by me the jar is known, is perceived, and lastly, “1 have a knowledge of a jar,” &c. determined by the notion of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Murérimisens knowledge is obtained by reflection (B. T. the Murarimisras any, that after the knowledge

essay, aud he is known to me chiefly from reference and quotations sasin Maédhava’s summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Kumérilhs, and in the text and commentary of Séetra-dipikh, where his positions are canvassed with those ‘pf numerous other writers,

* Id, $, 297, The annotations (Vértika to the Commentary of the Sdtras of the 3117६088, by Sabaraswhmf) are by Bhat{a Kumécilaswamf, who ta the great authority of the Mimf&nsnk& school, in which he ta emphatically designated by bis title, Bhatts, equivalent to Doctor. Ile frequently expounds and corrects Sabara’s gloss, oftca Aclivers a different interpretation, &c...... 19. 208. Kumérila Bhatia figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India. Ife was predecessor of Sankara Ach&rya, dnd equally rigid in niaintabling the orthodox faith against heretics, who eject the authority of the Védes. 116 is cotisidered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddhe, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy ..... Thé age of Kumfrile, antcrior to Sankara, and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the Bauddhaes, goes back to an antiquity of mach more than a thonsand year.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 69

sion of what docs not go astray 3 sometimes doubt is removed by discussion.”

of a jar, Xe. there is the reflection, I know the jar, by this there is a knowledge, manifesting the knowledge of a jar, &c.)

According td the opivion of all of thet this or the other knowledge is right notion by a knowledge, manifesting this or the other knowledge ; for knowledge is to be ascer(nined by its object; therefore the object is to be known by the knowledge of knowledge, This opinion is blamed in the text: ° Night notion is not perceived by itself,” &e. If right notion of knowledge tere comprehended by itself, there would be no doubt with regard to knowledge, produced by practice; for if in this case knowledge is known, also its right iotion (evidence) is known; hence how could doubt exist? On the other hand, if knowledge is not known, then, in the absence of the knowledge of something determined by an attribute, how can dowbt arise? Therefore right knowledge is an object of inference ; for instance : This knowledge is right notion, because it is produced hy the agreement of those who discuss on it. That, which is not of such a kind, is not of such a kind, 23 wrong notion. For instance : This knowledge, the general notion of earth, is right notion, becnuse the notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of earth, is found in that which has smell. In the same manner this knowledge of water is right notion, because the gencral notion of kuowledge, representing the general notion of water, is found in that which has viscidity,

93.—Comm.—" The cause of the apprehension of a general propo- sition ($ ककत, the invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate) is the non-apprehension of what goes astray, and the apprehension of what does not go astray ; sometimes a doubt is removed by discussion.”

The invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate (Vyfpti) has been before explained, but not the means of its apprehension. This is now done in the text, viz. ‘The cause,” &, Ist, The non-apprehen- sion of what gocs astray* is the cause, since, if this apprehension takes place, the general proposition (Vyfpti) cannot be apprehended. The Apprehension of what docs not go astray (of similar instances) is the

क Vyabhichéra: a reason goes astray, if it is connected with any subject, where

the conclasion (major term) cannot abide. Sahachfra; a renson does not go astray, if it has similar fustances, in which the conclusion abides.

70 Division of the Categories

138.—Specification is an attribute which is contained in the conclusion, but not in the reason.” Its chicf puints will now be explained. |

SSS SASS

cause, as proved by the argument from a general affirmative and a ge- neral negative (Anwaya Vyatiréka, if there are similar instances, there is also the general proposition ; if there are no similar instances, there is no general proposition), Repetition (the repetition of similar instances) is no cause, since, although there be not an apprehension of what gocs astray, yet the gencral proposition (Vyfpti) is sometimes at once appre- hended. Sometimes, however, repetition is required to remove a doubt with reference to what goes astray. Where by repetition the doubt does not disappenr, discussion is required to guard against the con- trary supposition. For instance, if there is a doubt, whether smoke be not also found with something, where there is no fire, this doubt is removed by the consideration, that fire and smoke are in the relation of cause and effect. If this mountain is without fire, it must also be without smoke, because an effect is not without its cause. If it is sometimes without cause, it is an effect without cause. In this case doubt arises, which is to be removed from its obstacle, in such a man- ner: If an effect is without cause, fire is not the invariable means to produce smoke, or food to satisfy hunger. Where doubt does not of itself arise, there discussion is not necessary. With this view it is said in the text; ^" Sometimes doubt is removed by discussion.” *

94.— Comm.—"‘ Specification is an attribute, which is contained in its conclusion, (major term) but not in its reason.” = ° this definition is correct, then in the inference; ° This man is black, because he is the son of Mittré,” the notion of the origin of black colour by her eating bad vegetables, would be no specification, because

* The Bengetce Translator says in illustration of this: For Instance if hearth ie the subject (minor term), smoke the conclusion (major term), and fire the reason (middle term), then is wet fuel the specification with regard to the faulty reason, viz. fire, because it is the condition of smoke, buat not of fire; for where there ie smoke, there is necessarily alao wet fuel; but where there fs fire, there is not (ae- cessarily) wet fuel, as for instance a fiery iron-ball ; on the other hand, if there is a faultless reason, for instance, if mountain is the subject, fire the conclusion, and smoke the reason, there is no specification, because the attribute, which is a conii- tion of the conclusion, is also a condition of the reason.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 71

139.—All admissible specifications abide in the same place with the conclusion. Those, which abide in the same place with the rensou, go astray with regard to the conclusion.

oe

it is not contained in the conclusion ; (black) for blackness is also found in a jar, Xe. |

Further: वष कीर inference : ०९ Air is perceptible’ because it is the site of touch, the notion of proportionate greatness, would be no specifica- tion, because perception takes place also with regard to the soul, &c. where there is no greatnens.

° Nor would the notion of existence (ara@,) be a specification in the inference: ‘Destruction is transient from its being a production,” because the notion of something transient is also in antecedent negation, and here, without any doubt, is not existence.’

We deny this; for the meaning is, that the specification, which is a condition of the conclusion, as determined by this or that attribute, is not a condition of the reason, as determined by the same attribute ; thus for inatance the notion of a production by bad vegetables is the condition of the blackness, which is determined by the notion of son of Mittr&. In the same manner is proportionate greatness the condition of the perception, determined by the notion of external things. Thus in the inference: * Destruction is transient from its: being a produc- tion,” is the notion of existence the condition of the conclusion, as de- , termined by the notion of production.

In a faultless reason, there is no such attribute, viz. something, be- ing 9 condition of a determined conclusion (major term), while it is not a condition of the reason under the same determination. But in a reason which goes astray, one of the two at least takes place, either that the place of the specification, which is also the place of the con- clusion (major term) is the condition of the conclusion and the non- condition of the reason, or that the place, where there is not the specifica- tion, which is also the place, determining the absence of the conclusion, is the condition of the conclusion, and the non-condition of the reason.

95.—Comm.—* Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray.” That is to say, the assumption of specification is neces- sary to infer, that the conclusion goes astray, which takes place by the

72 Division of the Categories

140.—Spccification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray.” It is the opinion of the Vaiséshikas that verbal

Specification going astray. Therefore, where there is a specification which is the condition of a conclusion without any further addition, there by the going astray of the specification which has no further addition, may be concluded also the going astray of the conclusion. For instance, where it is concluded that something smokes, from fire, there fire (ns the reason of smoke) goes astray with regard to smoke, because wet fuel goes astray ; for, if the more comprehensive notion goes nstray, it is necessary that also the more narrow notion gocs astray. But where the specification is of such « kind, as to be a condition of the conclusion (mnjor term). as determined by any attribute (addition) how iusignificant socver, there the inference, that the conclusion gocs astray, follows from the going astray of the specification in a subject, determined by such an attribute (addition,) for instance, if it is infer- red, that this person 18 biack, because he is the son of Mittré, the notion : ० 9 son of Mittra’ gocs astray with regard to binckness, because with regard to the son of Mittr&, goes aslray the specification of क product of bad vegetables.

96.—Comm.—" Verbal knowledge and comparison are not different kinds of proof.”

According to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas there are ouly two kinds of knowledge, viz. perception and inference, verbal knowledge and com- parison being included in the latter ; for auch sentences as: ० Drive the cow away by the stick,” or Védaic sentences, depend upon the know- ledge of the connexion of the meanings of the words, which are re- collected by the object the speaker has in view, because all the words, which form n sentence, have intention, consistency, &c., as in the sentence: °" Bring the jar,”” &c.—Or: These meanings of words are mu- tnally connected, because the words have consistency, &c., like similar meanings of words, The same is the case with regard lo comparison. When a Gayal has been perceived, the word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal,- because the old have attached this menning to it, no other kind of proof being admitted, as the word of cow is the cause of the power with

of the Nydya Philosophy. 79

knowledge and comparison, as included in inference, are not different kinds of proof.

141.—YVhis is not correct, as, independent of inference, verbal. knowledge and comparison are intelligible.

142.—The connexion of the subject with the predicate is two-fold,”’ one positive and the other negatives; the first has been explained, the other will now be explained.

[ ११

reference to what is determined by the notion of cow. Or: The word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal on the ground, that trustworthy people have attached this meaning to it. By this inference the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal is evident, viz. because there is a connexion of a general proposition with a minor term.

This opinion is blamed in the text इ ९८ words : * This is not cor- rect ;” for without the knowledge of a geueral proposition (of the Vyfpti) an understanding is possible from the mere words. There is no proof, . that after the hearing of words a general proposition is ‘nlwnys neces- sary. Moreover, if it is assumed, that a general proposition (ररक) is always required with reference to the understanding of words, why then is it not admitted, that it is necessary to assume a verbal knowledge with reference to the understanding of an inference f

97.—Comm.—" The connexion of the subject with the predicate is twofold.”

Namely, there are three kinds of inference, viz. only affirmative, only negative, and affirmative and negative at the same time.

1. Tho only affirmative kind tnkes place, when there arc no dissi- milar instances with regard to the conclusion (major term, that is to say, when the major term is not excluded from any other notion) for. instance, if it is argued, that something is an object of knowledge, because it can be named ; for here is a dissimilar instance impossible, as every thing is an object of knowledge. .

If itis said, ° that the ण्ण affirmative kind is impossible, because it is_ separated from all other notions’ (that is to say, such a notion is sepn- rated from all other notions, and cannot therefore be connected with all.) We deny this; for what is separated, is common to all, and this is

mn

74 Division of the Categorees

143.—The necessity of the absence of the conclusion where there is an absence of the reason, és the second.”

merely affirmative. Moreover, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether,* &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that ether, space, &c. are not found any where, eo it cannot be proved with regard to such notions as knowledge, &c.) |

2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar subjects (of conclusion) for instance in the inference : Earth id distinguished from all the other elements, becanse it is possessed of smell ;¢ for in this case there ig no similar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.

3. Affirmative aud negative inference take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances (of the conclusion or major term) for instance: This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there aro similar instances, as n hearth, &c., and dissimilar instances, aga Inke, &c.

98.—Comm.—The canse of the negative conclusion is the knowledge of a general negative proposition. (Vyatirékavydpti). For this reason the text defines the notion ofa general negative proposition: ‘ A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion’ (major term) that is to say, 8 general nega- tive is the absence of the reason, which (absence) is included in the absence of the conclusion (major term). Tiere it must be understood, by what connexion, at what place, and by what notion the. more ex- tensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows: by what connexion and notion the more comprehensive notion is compre- hended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be deter- mined. Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distinctive relation, &c. (see p. 7.) there

* Pratiyogi ts that of which there fs a negation (it fs the contradictory oppost- tion to its own negation) for inatance a jar Js the Pratlyog! of the negation of a jar. Apratiyogi ts a thing, of which there 18 no negation, as for Instance space, which is every where, and of which it cannot anywhere be said, there is no space.

t Mere is carth the minor term, the conclusion the distinction from what le different from earth, and the reason smell.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 75

144.—DPresumption* is not considered as another proof, be- cause i¢ is included fn negative inference. Happiness, the object of desire of all worlds, is produced by virtuc.

145.—Unhappiness the effect of vice, is abhorred by all con- scious beings. ‘The desire of happiness and of freedom from unhappiness ariscs from the knowledge of either.”

146.—There is a desire of obtaining the means for those ends (avoiding misery and gaining happiness) if there is knowledge

follows the absolute negation of the notion of the other elements by the negation of the negativn of smell ; but where the more extensive notion of the other clements is comprelitnded by the relntion of identity, there - also is tho negation of the other elements expressed by the relation of identity. This is reciprocal negation. And lastly, when by the relation of conjunction for instance the more extensive notion of fire with regard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, in a tank also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of conjunction. Mere is the caus¢ of the apprehension of the general negative proposition the knowledge of what agrees with a general negative. Others say: ‘ By means of the negative the gencral affirmative is understood, but the knowledge of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative the general proposition is understood, there it is called a negative inference. The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first evident from single things, asa jar, &c. aud afterwards it is established for the notion of earth’ &c.

99.—Comm.—" The desire of freedom from unhappiness and of obtaining happiness arises from the knowledge of either.”

Desire is threefold, viz. the desire whose object is the last end, (summum bomun, which is not the means to accomplish another ob- ject,) the desire whose object isa means (for something else) and the desire of action.

_ 1. The desire whose object is the last end. The last end (we) is ` # Vid. Col. M. BE. Vt. p. 303. Presumption (arth&patti, one of the five modes of proof of the Mimfnsakas) 18 deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is scen, heard, or proven.

m 2

76 Division of the Categories

of these means. The wish to act is the desire determined by what may be accomplished hy action.

147.—The cause of this is the knowledge of what may be accomplished by acts and what may accomplish the object of a desire, ‘The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is au obstacle.”

148.—According to others the cause of the wish to १९४ is the knowledge of what does not produce that abhorrence. The cause of aversion is the knowledge of what accomplishes things that are abhorred. Endeavour is of three kinds according to philosophers, viz. activity, cessation from activity and vital endeavour.

149.—The wish to act, the knowledge of what may be ac-

happiness and freedom from unhappiness. The cause of the desire ef the last end is the knowledge of the same; therefore it is of itself the object of man; for it follows from the definition, that any thing, which, when known, is desired by its own nature, is the object of man, and its full meaning is, that it is the object of a desire, not dependent upon another desire.

2. The desire whose object* is a means (for something else.) The cause of this is the knowledge of what accomplishes an object of «desire.

3. The desire of action is the desire, whose object is an effect to be accomplished by action, which (desire) is determined by the notion of what may be accomplished by action. This depends upon an apprehension such as this: I shall accomplish cooking by action. The cause of the desire of action is the knowledge, that an object may be obtained by action, and the knowledge, that the object of desire may be obtained. Therefore there is no desire of action with reference to rain, because it cannot be obtained by action.

100.—Comm.—" The knowledge, that something is the cause of ait object which is strongly abhorred, is au obstacle.” :

* Tho object of a desire, independent of any other desire, is the last object | this is happiness and deliverance from unhappiness § for both are not desired for the sake of any thing else, but for thelr own sake. An object of a desire, depending upon snother desire, is a secondary object; such are for instance, the fruition of love, cating, the removal of the unhappiness of another, the refraining from desires, &c.

of the Nydya Philosophy. 77

complished by acts and what accomplishes such or such ए desire, and the perception of the material causes produce activity.

150.—Cessation from activity rises from aversion produced by'* the knowledge of what accomplishes abhorred objects.

151.—Vital endeavour ia constant,’ it transcends the per- ception of the senses’ ;

152.—It is the cause of the flux and reflux of the vital airs in the body. Gravity abides in earth and water, it is imper- ceptible to the senses ;

153.—It is transient in what is transient, and eternal in what is eternal. It is the non-intimate cause of the action which is called falling.

154.—Fluidity is twofold, innate and derived from a cause $ the firat abides in water, the second in earth and light ;

165.—In the atoms of water it is eternal, in every other thing transient. Derived fluidity is produced in clarificd butter and similar substances when heated by the union with fire.

156.—Fluidity is the cause of trickling and instrumental cause in n collection (heap). Viscidity abides in water; it is eternal in atoms, non-cternal in a compound.

For instance, there is no desire of action with regard to honey, mixed with poison, because the strong aversion is an obstacle.

(Material or intimate causcs are those substances by means of which n desire is accomplished ; for instance the material causes of a sacrifice are: the presence of ghec, wood, rice, &c.)

101.—Comm.—"* Is constant ;”” which menns, it lasts as long as life does.

102.—Comm.—* It transcends the perception of the senses ; for the flux and reflux of the vital airs, when stronger than usually, is accom- plished by endcavour, for instance a stronger inspiration (this is evident from perception). If this is the case, then from the inference, that the flux of the vital airs is accomplished by endeavour (for there must be a cause of it) and further from the inadmissibility of an endeavour that is perceived (for iu the ordinary function of respiration, &c. it is not perceived) it follows, that the flux of vital airs is accomplished by an

78 Division of the Categortes

167.—By the abundance of this (viscidity) in oil combus- tion is favoured. ‘There are three kinds of faculty, viz. velocity, elasticity and memory.

158.—Velocity abides only in bodies, and is twofold, either produced by action or by velocity.’ Elasticity is according to some only found in carth, according to others iu the four first clements.

159.—It is imperceptible to the senses, and is sometinies the cause of vibratory motion.’ The faculty which has the name of memory, is found only in senticnt beings ; it is impercepti- ble to the senses.

160.—Its cause is certitude without inattention." Memory is called also the cause of remembrance and of recognition.

endeavour, which transcends the perception of the senses. This is vital endeavour.

103.—Comm.—“‘ It is -twofold, either produced by action, or by velocity.” Velocity in an arrow arises from action produced by con- junction without noise, (vid. v. 118,) hence from the destruction of a former action arises another action. In the same manner all the subsequent actions must be considered. And without velocity, since one action is an obstacle to another, the destruction of a former action, and the production of a subsequent one were impossible. Where velocity ia effected hy velocity, for instance, where the velocity in a jar is effected hy the velocity of its half, there is velocity, produced by velocity.

104.—Comm.—Flasticity is proved for instance by the fact, that a branch which is attracted, returns to its former position, when released. The opinion of some, that elasticity abidcs in the four first elements, is not supported by any evidence.

105.—Comm.—" {68 cause is certitude without innttention.” Ifitis ` said : ‘Is certitude, different from inattention, rather uot the canse of remembrance? And if this is the case, ict us say, that knowledge in general is the cause of memory.’

We object; for as there is no authority of assuming an alternative, it is evident, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory. Morcover, with reference to inattention, the assumption of

of the Nydya Philosophy. 79

161.—Fate is twofold, merit and demerit. Merit is the rneans by which heaven, &c. is obtnined.'” [४ is a practice of nblutions in the Gangf, &c. aud of sacrifices, &c.

162,—It is thought perishable by the contact with the water of the Karmanésf.* Demerit is the cause of hell, &c. and is produced by blamable works.

163.—It may be destroyed by expiations, हट, Both qualities abide in living creatures.'" ‘They are produced by desire and destroyed likewise by knowledge.’

EE eran nee eer nr Ree Sn ee ear a Pee ee nee eee , memory is complicated (superfluous) and hence it is proved, that cer Litude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory

The proof of this is gives in the words: ‘ It is called the cause of remembrance and recognition.” That is to say, memory produces re- membrance and recognition 3 therefore memory is assumed, for it is impossible, that a former perception produces, without Intercourse, re- membrance, because a cause is impossible, if it is not in respective in- tercourse with either of the two (remembrance or recognition.) Nor can it be said, ‘that, as memory, determined by the category of identity, is the cause of recognition, remembrance is obtained, because recognition is produced by memory ;’ for there is no cause for this. _

106.—Comm.—" Merit is the meaus by which heaven, &c. is ob- tained.”

That is to say, it is the means of obtaining the happiness of heaven and all other happiness, and of bodies fit to enjoy the happiness of heaven.

107.—Comm.—“ In living crentures,’’ because merit and demerit cannot be assigned to God.

108.—Comm,—" They are produced by desire, and destroyed like- wise by knowledge.

By desire,” that is to sny, if good or bad acts are done by ono who has perfect knowledge, they are of no effect. ‘ Likewise by know- . ledge.’’ = ° Likewise” is snid to indicate enjoyment.

‘But how (it may be objected) can the kuowledge of trath destroy merit and demerit? for this (the destruction of merit and demerit)

* The name of a amall river, which separates the territory of Benarcs, Kasi, from Dibar.—Vid. Lassen’s Tod. Alterth. Vol. 1. p. 130.

80 Division of the Categories

164.—There are two kinds of sound, inarticulate aud arti- culate; the first is produced by a drum, &c. and the latter, as ka and other Ictters, by the contact of the throat with the palate. |

165.—Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perccived, when it is produced in the ला. Some say, its production tnkes place like a succession of waves.

would be contrary to the passage (of the Yogn-shstrn): ‘An action, of which the effect is not experienced (which has not produced its due consequence in the soul of the agent, viz. happiness, if a good action, and unhappiness, if a bad one) does not perish even in a hundred crores of Kalpas.” If this is the case, then tho destruction of merit and demerit takes place in this manner, that a person who knows the truth, experiences the consequenccs of all Ais works at once by all his bodies.” (viz. all the bodies which he is to assume in future births.)

There, however, ‘‘ to experience the consequences of works,” is ouly given as an example of the various ways, in which works are destroyed according to the Védas. .Ilow could otherwise works be destroyed by expiations? &c. It is said (in the Bhagavadgita.) ‘ The fire of know- ledge consumes all works.” And in the Sruti: ‘ All his works perish, when the general and individual souls are known.” _ 17 it is said: ‘In this case there cannot exist for him who knows truth, the state of the body, nor happiness, unhappiness, &c. as by knowledge all works are destroyed,’ we object ; for only the works dif- ferent from those which are commenced, arc destroyed ; for only the work which is the cause of the enjoyment of this or that body, has been commenced. |

109.— Comm.—“ Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear.”

Abiding in the ether, means, that the ether is ils intimate causc. As a sound, when distant, is not perceived, it is said, ‘inthe ear.” As it may be doubted, how क sound, produced in the space determined by , adrum, &c., is produced in the ear, it is said: ‘Its production takes place like a succession of waves,” its sound produces.another, dctermined by a space, external to the first, and the second produces again a third, and so on. In this manner it is perceived, when it is gradually produced in the ear, -

of the Nydya Philosophy. 81

166.—According to others, like the bud of the Kadamba plant.’ From the knowledge," that the letter ka is -pro- duced, and that it is destroyed, non-eternity of sound would follow. |

167.—The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon the perception of gencral knowledge.'” “ This is the medicine,” such and other sentences depend upon general knowledge.

110.—Comm.—" Like the bud of the Kadamba plant.” In this manner: From the first sound ten sounds are produced in the ten di- visions of space. [1९0९6 ten other sounds are produced. As this assumption is complicated, it is said in the text: ‘according to some.”

111.—Comm.—“ From the knowledge,” &e. To remove the objec- tion, that sound is not produced, because it is eternal, it is said: ० From the knowledge,” &c.

112.—Comm.—If it be objected: ‘The eternity of sound follows from the fact, that this letter ka is recognised as that letter ka,’ the text gives the answer: The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon community of class,’ &c. Hfere is the object of recognition, the community of class of this and that object, but not the identity ‘of this and that individual; because it is contrary to the knowledge which has been mentioned. If this is the case, there cannot be a mistake with regard to those two perceptions (viz. sound is not eternal, and this is that sound).

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CONTENTS.

I.—Division of the categories (1 to 8.) 1. Enumeration of the categories, ०००००००० cs cccccccs ccc ce Page 1 2. Division of substance,.. ०००००००० ०००००००० ०००००००.०.०.०००.०.०...„ SG 3. ~ 4. ————~——— actlom, ०००००. ०००००००० ०००००१० ०००००००००००१०००००७ ib. 5. Definition of generality (clase), १००००१०००००००००००००००००००००० 4-5 6. 7. Division of negation, ११००० ०००००० ०००० ००००००००००००००००००. IB

quality, ०७ ct ee 08 Oe ce ००००७०० errr eee et ee 4

particularity, 00 ००७० ७७ ७० ०७०० ७७ OOOH OH OHH SF Oe CO 6

11.—Common and distinguishing characters of the categories (8 fo 12.) 1. Common notion of the categories, .... ccc ccccce ०१००००० ००००. 8 2. Definition of cause, ००००००१ ०००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००. 9 3. Division of cause (into intimate, non-Intimate and instrumental

CAUSES), .0 ७०० ०७०७०७०० ०००७७००० ७० ७० ७७ ०००० ०७००९००० ००००००७७ 9—10

4. Semblance of cause,.. @ @ @@ @ ® e800 @@ 06 080868 @@ =® 82668 Ce 0868 086 10—12

111.—Substance (12 ९० 49.)

A. Substance in general.

Definition of substance, ०००००००० ०००००००० ००१०००० ०११००००००००० 12 Its diviston into material and non-material substances, ०००००००. 45. Common and special qualities of the several substances, ०००००००० 13 B. Special substances. १. Barth, cocccccccccccecc cece cece ०१०००००००००००१०००००००००. 14 2, Water, ००००१०० ०००००० ०१००००० ०००००००० ००००१००० ००००००००००००००० 16 B. Fire, ०००००००० ००७०७ ०००० ०७०००००५ ०००० ०००००००० ००००००००००० 88.

4-010-16 8. Time, ०००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००.6- 6. Soul, oo ce cece cece ००००१००० ०००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००. 17 Proofs of its शाशहात्€ा ० ००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००..००1--25 1६5 mature, coc ०००००००० ०० ७००००००००० sees ०००००००००००००००. 25 Division of intellect (one of its qualities) into apprehension and recollection,.. oe cccecccscccccscccccceese sees cece ceeves 86. a. Apprehension, (p. 25 to 49.) Four kinds of apprehension, perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge, ..ccccccccccesccvcccccssccesvesececs ६6.

ane

Contents.

aa. Perception (25 to 30.)

bb

dd.

Perception by common intercourse. Its division into six kinds,,, 25—26 Perception by transcendent intercourse. Its division fato three

kinds, 28—30 laference (p. 30 to 40.)

a. Regular syllogiem, (p. 30 to 34.)

Intercourse In inference,.... 00 cccccccccccccccececssececc se 30—3E Definition of consideration,.. ०००००००० ००००००००००००००००००००० 31 of the invariable connexion of the subject with the pre- dicate in a general proposition (Vyfpti, major proposition), .. 31 of the minor term in a syllogism (Paksha),.. 2.0.00. 32

of the conclusion, 2. ccccccceescccccescccescccccs 33 8. Fallacy (p. 34—40.) Division of fallacy, .. 2. .ccccccccccscc cc cecece cesses cscces 38 Golng setray, ०००००००० ०००१०० ०००००००० ०००११०००००००००००००५५-ग Contradiction, ०००००००० ०००००००७ ०७००००००१००००००००००००००००. 37 ` व ्रल्मालेषनरदाहटह्ह,० ००००० ००००००००००००००००००००००००००.०.०.....३--39 Equalization, ०० ००००००१० ०००००००० ०० ०००००१००१००००१००१०००००० 39 Absurility, ०००००००० ००००००१० ०००००००० ०००००००००००००००००००. 40 Comparison (p. 40.) Nature of comparinon,...ecccccecccccccecesecccsseetsecces 40 Verbsi knowledge, (p. 41.to 48.) Cause of verbal iio ledges ce cies cenieoss Saseee sii ssencesose 4i

= e

b.

Power of 8 word,..cocccecccccccececccccecsececcccscs cece S44 Implication,.. ०००००१० ०००१०५०००००१००००००००००००००००००००००००५५- ५6 Contiguity, ०१०००१११ ०००००००००००००००००००००००००००००-५6-0 Consistency... ०००००००० ०००००१००००००००००००००१०००००००००. 48 Construction, ०००००००० ०००० ०००००००७ ७०००००० ००००००००००००००० ib. ib.

Intention,.. ७० ०७०७७००० ०७०७०७०७ LE ०७०००७०० SESH ०७००००० ००१०७

Mind, (p. 49.) Tte deacription, coos ७० ७९ ७@ ७० ०० ee ee ee =; 49 Its atomic nature, ७9 ०७७० OS OF ७०७७ OS ७०००७००७ ७००७०७०७ OH THO 66.

Recollection, ००००००७० ७० ००७७ 9००७००० ०००० ०७ ०००००००० ०००५००४ 86.

ब ४ .-- 2५५०0६८४, (50 to 81.)

A.

B. 1.

2. Taste, ee0eeee @@ @ @ @ ॐ @ ४ ७9 ee @@ Oe @ 9 OH SO 08 0H OHHH HH SH OF OES §

Quality in general, (p. 50 to 54.)

Nature of quality, 2. ceccccsscecccegececscs cesses aces cece 60 Materiel qualities, ०००७७०० ००००००००१००००००००००००००००,०००००,०-52 52 53

53—54

Immaterial qualitics, ०००००००० ०००००००० ००००००१० ००१००००००२ Special qualities, ११०००००००००० ०००७९००० ०००००००१०००००००००००. General qualities,.. ०००००००० ००१० १०११०००० ००००००१००००१००००. Speciel qualities, (0. 54 to 81.)

Colour,.. TOYETETETETE Teer ee eee eee ७-# ee

Si. 4—55 »

Contents. 11

3. Smell, ००००००१० ०००७००० ०००७०००० ०००७०७० ०००० ०००००७०० ००००००० 55 4. ध | 6:6 6.4:6565:06- 66 6K 6:08 b wes CaS ies owed Ae Os ORR bskw ROR 65 Qnalities ag effects, ७०७७ ०० @@ ०० @@ ० @ ७9 @@ ०७०७ ० ७०००७ क ०००००००४ 55

Opinion of the Vaiséshiken thereon, ७ ७ ०७ ०० @® erer ere? OY ey * „ 8§6—59 "णीं Nyfyaikss thereon, COC CO oe CeCe ee OD Oe CE ED Ce 59 5. Number, 00 00 000000 08 ०७०० ०क ७9 COOP EE OH OEE OH ODOR CE ० ° ०» 6909-6)

6. Measure, ०० ०००७ ०००००००० ०७०००००० ०००००००००००००००.००..-०.... |) iy

7. Separatcdness, oo. oc cece ०००००००० ००१०००००००७००००००००००.०००. 62 8. Conjunction,.. ०००० ०००००७० ००००७०००००००००००००००००००,०.०.०...6-6 9. Dinjunction, ०००००००० ०००००००० ००००००७ ००००००००००००००००००००० 63 10. Ponteriority,..cccccesccc cc ०००१०००० ०००००००० ००००००००००००० G4 11. Pelarity, ०१०००००० ०० ०००००००० ००१०००० ००००००००००००००००००००० 46.

12. Intellect, (p. 64 to 24.) . a. Wrong notion, (p. 64 to 66.) Mistake, oc ०००००००० cece cece ०७००७००० et 0 cess ०००००७०००००., G4 . Doubt, १०००००० ००१०००० ०००००००० ००००००००००,००००००००००-०.,०,०,,6१-65 Cause of doubt, ०० ०००००००० ०० ०००७०००० ०००३ ०००००००० ७००००००७ 69 Caune of wrong notion, ०००००००० ०० ०००००००० ०००००००० ०००००००. 66 b. Right Notion, (p. 66 to 74.) Caune of right notion, .. oc ccceccce ०००००००० ००००००००००.०..०,..66-- Definition of right notion, ०००१०००० ००००००१००००००००००००००००. 67 Apprehension of a general proposition (Vyfptl,).... 0... 000.0. 69—69 Specificattwn,: ss ss cccic vin os 0s cseiwe oueeos 08- 72 Division of inference into affirmative and negative. Nature of negative inference, ०००००००० ०००००००००००००००,,,,०,.,,०..१३--74

e

oe) wa e

Tlapplinens, ०००००००० ०००००००७ ००००७०० ०००००००० ०००० cece cesses 75: 14. Unbappinens, 2... .cccccccccvcccccsccccccccccccccevesses . Sb, 0904348 76 BGs. A VOOR 06:05 hoes 06566640600 ee oe 00 00 $000.40565646 50 cure 5.

17. Endeavour, ७७ ७० OO 00 ७० 0 ०००७ OO OO OO OOOO OF OS Oe ०० ७०७००७०० 77—78

७, Activity, ०१०००००० ०००००००० cccs cece ००००० ०००००००००००००००. 76 b. cessation from activity, ०००००००० ०००० ०००००००० ०००००००००००००. 77 C. vital endeavonr, ०००००००० ०००००००० ०००० ०००००००० ०० ०००००००... ib, 1B: GIANG) adscsadicwnwiae wees be so ectaewse se dete cece wsiesee ss th. 19. Fluidity, .. 0. ०००० १००१ ०००००००००००००००० ०००००००० ०००००००० ४6. 20. Viscldity, १००० ०००००००० ०० ०००००००० ००००००००००००००००००००००. ६0. 21. Faculty, न ज 2999 द्वध. 98 Ws FIDE (0 Se Seite es we ss 00 08 Sse See eeube sees ६6. त, Meimory,.e ०००००१० ०००००००० ०००० ०००१००० ००००००००००००००००००. ih,

22-23. Fate (merit and demerit,) ....000.ccecccccccccas cece cece ce a7 24. Sound, COCO Oe @@ ७ ® COSHH OS SHEE ७००9 OF OGLE ७० ०० ७ @ re ०००७००७९ 78—8i

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CORRECTIONS AND EMENDATIONS.

Page Line

i. 22, for in read of.

xii, 17, for with read to.

id. 19, for with read to. xiii, 3, for faculties read modifications. xxi. 23, for drishtanta read drishtfintn.

2. 15, for negation read affirmation.

3. 35, for Haq read समव

4. 2 for individuality read sepnratedness.

id. 3, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority id. 4, for volition read endeavour

id. 31, for सं योजतिभागेश्च read Garalemag

$. 18, for with read to.

7, 14, for with read to.

12. 26, for alter earth add and mind.

id. 29, for सदतं reat Ata

18. 7, for individuality read separateduess

id. 8, for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority

id. 16, for volition read endeavour.

id. 22, for volition read endeavour

id. 22, for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority 16. 26, for is read in

id. 35, for priorily and posteriority read posteriority and priority. 17. 1, Jor priority and posteriority read posteriority aud priority. 19. 31, for MIM read लात्‌

23. 28, for such read touch.

26. 4, for individuality read separatedness.

id. 5, for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority. f 1

27. 4, for with read to

44. व Mimausikas read Miminsnkas

81. 1-2, for priority and posteriority read postctiority and priority. 53. 6, for ditto read ditto

td. 8, for ditto read ditto.

१. 17, for ditto read di(to.

54. 1, for natural read innate.

N.B. The translation counts one verse more than the original, as the invocation, , forming the first verse of the former, lins not been taken into the text of the latter.