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THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI,
WITH THE
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AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.
BY
RAJENDRALAL MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E.
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PREFACE.

The doctrine of Pessimism as evolved by Schopenhauer and developed by Hartmann created quite a sensation in Europe. The novelty, the bold generalizations, the closeness and vigour of ratiocination with which it was set forth, endowed it with qualities which could not but attract attention and claim consideration. But, carefully analysed, it does not appear to have any pretension to novelty or originality to which its admirers lay claim.

The doctrine of evil as inseparable from the world is nearly as old as humanity. It was the dread of evil that drove the primitive man to seek the shelter of superhuman power, and laid the foundation of religion. There would have been no religion if there had been no dread of evil, here or hereafter. Nor would philosophy have had its birth had not the necessity arisen to discriminate between good and evil. Morality, too, presupposes a differentiation between that which is proper and that which is improper—of a consciousness, however vague and undefined, of future reward and punishment. Doubtless the doctrine assumes constant and unalloyed evil, and not a mixture of good and evil; but in so doing it only places the evil in the present condition, and transfers the
good to a hereafter, in a hazy, cloudy, dubious, undefined way, but does not absolutely deny it.

The preëminence of the unconscious Will is the most important element of the doctrine; and it, too, under the names of Freewill, Máyá, Buddhí, and the like, has occupied men's mind and played its part in philosophy from a pretty remote period of antiquity.

Then comes the repugnance to worldly attractions, love, affection and joy; and under the form of asceticism it is almost as old as civilized man.

The denial of the existence of God is an assumption of no modern date; it unquestionably preceded the formation of human ideas about Divine Providence; and the assumption about the objectification of Will forms the corner-stone of the doctrine of Patanjali.

It might be said that, if thus the leading tenets of the Pessimist doctrine be old, their association into a compact and complete system is not so, and that in this respect it may well claim the full meed of praise for its originality. This, however, cannot be conceded. Even as are its tenets, so is it in its entirety as a system. What Schopenhauer enunciated in his 'World as Will and Idea' (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung) in 1819, and Hartmann worked out in his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (Philosophie der Unbewussten) in 1869, is no other than the nihilist philosophy of Buddha put forth in a modern European garb, or, as an able writer puts it, a system "little more than Buddhism vul-
garised.” It is the farthest from my wish to assert that the two German philosophers have surreptitiously, or deliberately, borrowed their system from the Indians: it is almost certain that Schopenhauer at the beginning of this century had no knowledge of any Buddhist Philosophy, and Hartmann, working on the model of his predecessor, had, probably, no occasion to consult the texts of the Sunyavāda system of the Buddhists as accessible to him in meagre abstracts in European languages. The similitude may be—nay, most probably is—purely accidental, the result of human mind set to thinking in a particular line of ideas arriving at the same conclusion; but it exists, and is as clear as possible, and that is all that is here intended to be emphasized.

The system of Śākya Buddha is a modification of a more ancient and more fully developed doctrine—that of Kapila, as known under the name of Śāṅkhya. Thoroughly logical in its scheme of ratiocination, the Śāṅkhya enunciates that there is no proof of the existence of a Supreme Divinity, and therefore leaves it entirely out of consideration in its scheme of primal causation. Its words, as summarised in the text book of the school, but which is obviously of a much later date than Kapila, are, *Isvarāśiddheḥ*: “It is not proved that there is a God.” (Śāṅkhya, Aph. I, 92.) The idea is more fully developed and argued in a subsequent part of the work (*Vide infra*, pp. 31f). Śākya Buddha, less logical but more bold, adopted this idea in a positive form, instead of keeping the question open by admitting only the want of
dialectic demonstration. Schopenhauer does the same without any reserve, describing theism as "a tradition of the nursery."

The next subject is Soul or the vitalizing and conscious principle of life. Kapila's theory recognises its existence, assuming a separate soul for each living being. Buddha did the same. These souls are uncreate and eternal, never coming to an end. Buddha acknowledged and, indeed, made them the basis of his system, but practically, though not in so many words, he denied them absolute eternity, for his theory of Nirvāṇa assigned them an ultimate and final goal after many transmigrations in sunyatā, vacuity or nihility. It may be that his Nirvāṇa did not extend to absolute nihility, for there is nothing authentic and unquestionable in his sayings; but his immediate followers, who developed the Mahāyāna school, announce it in unmistakable terms, and for the purposes of the present comparison this is enough. The German philosopher goes a step further, and insists on the absolute negation of Soul. His words put in English are, "there is no psyche;" but unable to dispense with it altogether, he supplies its place by an "unconscious will" which plays the part of Soul. Practically this amounts to admitting Soul, but divesting it of its consciousness and eternity.

In the Sāṅkhya system, the category next after Soul is Pradhāna, or Nature, having inherent in it the threefold qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or as the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣhya defines it, "the equilibrium of the three qualities,"
PREFACE.

(‘triguna-samyam’). The terminology is archaic, but it implies the sum-total of the laws and forces of nature, which regulate the course of the phenomenal world. Buddha availed himself of this category to the full, and Schopenhauer does the same, using only modern terms in conformity with the physical science of the day.

The next is Intellect. It is common to all the three systems under notice, and alike unconscious in all. The Sânkhyas call it Mahat, the Buddhists Buddhi, and Schopenhauer Will, "the Reality, the absolute Existence, the Ultimate Fact, the universal and fundamental essence of all activities, both of the organic and the inorganic world, the primordial thing whence we and everything proceed." In the Yoga system, the term used is chitva, which, in the following pages, has been rendered into 'thinking principle;' but would have been as well—nay more pointedly—expressed by will.

Kapila assigned real substantiality to matter. What the primitive Yogis thought about it we know not. Patanjali is silent on the subject in his Yoga aphorisms; but in his Mahâbhâshya he admits an absolute reality of it. He raises the question by saying, yadi tâvad guñasamudáyo dravyam, "if you hold matter to be the aggregate of qualities," (IV, 1.) and then refutes the theory, Buddha's idea of Sunyatâ necessitated the same theory in a more prominent manner. He could not admit absolute reality to any thing, and as the inevitable nihilistic consequence of his creed, matter had to assume the character of a phantasmal play of mental phenomenality—
PREFACE.

"— A fleeting show
For man’s illusion given."

The Vedánta took it up after him, Berkeley worked it out in England in the early part of the last century, and Schopenhauer has done the same in our own days.

As already stated the theory of evil—constant, ever-present evil in everything mundane,—is common to all the three schools. Kapila designed his system with the express object of removing “the threecold pain” which is inherent in existence (Aph. I). Buddha’s dread of the ever-recurring pain of birth, existence, decay, and death, drove him to the shelter of nihility, and the Pessimists of our day look upon pain as constant and inherent in worldly existence. The Yogis, who represent a section of the Sánkhyas, sum up the fruit of worldly existence by the significant remark, “to the discriminating all are verily painful.” (Yoga, II, 15.) According to Hartmann “the world is so bad that it had better not exist, and that it is steadily becoming worse.”

Nor are the means devised for the removal of this evil different. Perfect knowledge, attainable by hard, unremitting study amidst the most rigorous asceticism and self-mortification, and total renunciation of the pleasures of the world, is the only remedy accessible to man. Neither Kapila nor Buddha would have any other, and Schopenhauer, after dwelling on the miseries of existence, and showing that even suicide was not enough to put a stop to them, asks, “Whence then is deliverance to come?” and the answer given is “In knowing that the world is radically and essentially bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for
that old affirmation of the Will to live; it leads to a
negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which,
completed by means of asceticism and mortification,
must attain that perfect freedom of Will, that true
Nirvāṇa in which there is no more Will, therefore
no longer an ideal presentation, or a real world."

In so far the correspondence is as close as possible
in works set apart by an interval of considerably
over four and twenty centuries—between Bud-
dhism of the 6th century before Christ and the
Pessimism of our own times. A learned writer
describes Pessimism as the "goal of modern thought"
in Europe. If so, that "goal" was reached in India
over four and twenty centuries ago.

Nor should the limit be set there. It is im-
possible to believe that Sānkhyaism, like Minerva,
issued forth in all its perfection at once. It is but
natural to suppose that many ontological and biolo-
gical questions, such as God, soul, mind, primary causa-
tion, &c., must have formed the theme of speculation
and enquiry from a long anterior period, to prepare
the Indian mind for the conception and reception
of so recondite a system as the Sānkhya. Kapila
could not have conceived and brought it forth, had
not his predecessors discussed and made themselves
familiar with such philosophical ideas. There must
have existed many doctrines, many dogmas, many
theories to afford him the necessary materials to work
out his scheme. Even as Bacon's Novum Organum
was not the spontaneous generation of a novel thought,
but the crystallization or solidification of ideas which
were extant at the time in a more or less undefined, nebulous way, so was Kapila's Sánkhya. Various phases of philosophic thought were well known and current in his time, and his was the master mind which put them together to create a complete system. The bricks existed, and Kapila was the architect who used them in constructing a novel edifice.

How long before the time of Kapila metaphysical dogmas had currency among the Hindus we know not for certain; but the remarkable hymn in the Ríg Veda which discusses whether entity or non-entity existed before creation (X, 129) carries us to a remote period of antiquity beyond which we cannot speculate. The reference in the Sáma Veda to a Yati who condemned sacrifices, and whose wealth was transferred to Bhrigu, is equally germane to the point. According to the Aitareya Bráhmana some such Yatis were punished by being thrown before jackals. In the A'rányaka period of Vedic history, these rationalistic speculations and metaphysical controversies were of frequent occurrence, and the Upanishads have preserved for us the substance of some of the orthodox speculations on the subject. They afford us traces also of the heterodox dogmas which they were intended to combat. Kautsa was the leader of one of the rationalistic schools, and he is named by Yáśka. Jábála was an atheist, and his name occurs in the Upanishads. Páśini alludes to atheists, sceptics, fatalists, and revilers of the Vedas. It may be taken for granted without any offence to reason that these heterodox people did entertain many dog-
mas in opposition to the received exposition of primal causation and other recondite doctrines of the Hindu faith. They could not have been heterodox if they had not adverse theories to propound; and they must have been met by counter theories to keep up the antagonism. One may go further and assume that these disputes led to the development of adverse schools of thought which have since been overthrown by later developments. The earliest Vedic cultus was purely ritualistic. It embraced prayers and peace-offerings—prayers in set forms, and peace-offerings in the form of sacrifices accompanied by libations of spirituous liquors. Those who reviled the Vedic religion opposed it principally on the ground of the futility, cruelty and unmeaning character of the offerings. The atheists, pure and simple, denounced the whole system as false. This, however, was a purely destructive course, and not calculated to win the multitude in its favour. Mere negation suggests the idea of the doctrine of Metrodories, the Epicurean, which had for its main object the stomach. Society needed some check to vice by holding up a threat of future retribution, and absolute negation of divine providence and future life did not provide it. Besides, a future state being admitted, a preparation for it in the present state was felt a necessity, and a large majority of the opponents, therefore, appealed to self-torture and meditation for aid.

Meditation as a means of communion with the Divinity was known long before the date of the Sánkhya. Indeed, in all ancient forms of religion,
meditation occupies a prominent place as a religious exercise. In the Rig Veda the Gáyatrí enjoins the meditation of the divine light which vivifies the solar luminary as the most sacred act of devotion, and that meditation occurs in endless forms in the rituals of all subsequent sects and systems. This meditation is called Dhyána, the word used in the Gáyatrí being the verb dhímaḥi "may we meditate." Now, this Dhyána cannot be performed without fixing the mind on one particular object after abstracting it from worldly cares and enjoyments, and this fixation is called Dhárāṇḍ, or steadfastness. The abstraction necessarily implies some amount of asceticism and austerity, and this is called in the Vedas Tapas. A man must forego all worldly enjoyments before he can fix his mind on one unworldly object, and the fixation must take place before he can begin a meditation. Austerity, therefore, forms the first step in the process; fixation or steadfastness the second; and meditation the third; and all these exercises have enjoyed a halo of sanctity from a remote period of antiquity. No Rishi could live without his hermitage; none without performing Tapas; none without steadfast devotion; none without his meditation. These are the essential attributes of a Rishi. It would be a contradiction in terms to suppose a Rishi could be so, without them. They suggest the idea of communion with something superhuman, and create a feeling of mysterious awe and veneration in the mind of the common herd. At first the object of meditation was of course the Divinity in some form
or other; but atheistic philosophers soon found it practicable to dispense with that object, and they converted the objective thought to a subjective one, and thus produced the highest meditation of the Sânkhyas, a meditation in which the mind meditates on itself, or, as the philosophers of this class express it, on nothing. The next step was to dispense with the eternity of matter, to reduce it to a phantasmal character. The mind was all in all, and there was no necessity for an eternal co-ordinate, and this is the dogma of the Buddhists and the Vedântists. None of these, however, dispensed with individual soul. That formed an integer in all the leading systems of early Indian philosophy. Nay, more, in order to provide for a future state of retribution, it was necessary to develop or retain the system of metempsychosis. It was seen that neither virtue nor vice always brought on its deserts in this life, and the necessity for a next life became unavoidable; and if the soul was to have a next corporeality of some kind to bear the deserts, there was nothing to hinder the transmigration many times. It may shock European ideas of the present day to be told of metempsychosis; but between worldly life, purgatory, and eternal hell-fire, or heaven on the one hand and metempsychosis on the other, dispassionate and unsophisticated logic will readily yield the palm to the latter. An English lady was once shocked at the sight of a Hindu lady with her nose bored for a nose-ring. She said, "how barbarous is this custom of yours, dear sister, of boring the nose?" "I fail," replied the Hindu, "to perceive the difference, Madam, between boring the two ears and
boring the nose." The Hindu controversialist may adopt this line of argument and ask, the matter not being susceptible of positive proof without the aid of revealed religion, "logically what is the difference between three corporealities and a dozen or more?" But, however that be, all the ancient leading schools of India accepted metempsychosis, and the grand object they had in view was to devise the means for putting a stop to the ever-lengthening and never-ending chain of transmigration. And so long that was kept prominently before the masses, most of whom keenly felt, as they do now, and will always do, what Schelling calls "that sadness which cleaves to all finite life," the system propounded, however otherwise discordant in doctrinal points, had a fair chance of success, as a proselytising system, particularly if it were favourable to peace and welfare in this present existence.

Buddhism was peculiarly well-adapted for this purpose. It was the most attractive in its moral and social phases. No system of human religion has propounded a more perfect course of morality, humanity, mercy, and sympathy. The universal benevolence it preached could not but exert a potent influence on the mind of the people. At a time when sacrifices of animals by hundreds were everyday practices, and those sacrifices were often effected by driving wooden spikes into the heart of writhing victims, the dogma of total abstinence from all sacrifices and uniform mercy to all creatures could not but produce a marked revulsion of feeling against the current religion, and to draw large numbers of
men to the standard of the new faith. The doctrines of equality of man and of non-recognition of caste also contributed very largely to recommend it to the favour of those who had been for a long time ground down by caste rules. The result was wholesale conversions of the lower and the middle classes of the people in all parts of India—so much so as to make Buddhism the leading religion of the country. The intellectual classes, the men of leading and light, also appreciated these moral and social advantages, and were willing to accept them. They perceived, however, the worm in the flower, and were shocked by the sight. The atheism which forms the basis of Buddhist philosophy never obtruded itself on the perception of the multitude. It was unknown to them, and they cared not at all to understand its true purport. But the intelligent few felt it, and wished to avoid it. Even professed Buddhists could not always tolerate it, and many were the attempts made to gloss over it, or to supplant it in an insidious way so as to divest the system of its atheism without injuring it in its constitution. The Ais’variaka system of the Buddhists was the outcome of one of these attempts, and the Vedánta and the Yoga systems with their various Gitá, Tántric and Puránic modifications represent the results of Hindu attempts at reconciling the higher philosophy of Kapila and Buddha with a theistic religion.

It is not my object here to enter into the vexed question of the chronology of these different systems. It would take more time and space than what are
at my disposal now. It is necessary, however, to state that in appealing to the Sánkhya, I appeal to the doctrine, and not to its text-books. There is abundant evidence, both in Hindu and Buddhist works of unquestionable antiquity and authenticity, of the Sánkhya and the Yoga systems having been current before the time of Buddha. The most prominent part of the exercise of those systems involved the most rigorous self-mortification, and that mortification was currently practised with the utmost rigour before the time of Buddha. Buddha himself notices this. According to the Lalita-Vistara:

"While at Uruvilvá, Sákya called to mind all the different forms of penances which people at his time were in the habit of submitting to, and which they thought raised the mind above all carnality. 'Here,' he thought, 'am I born in the Jambudvípa, among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption (ádhímúkti), crowded by Tirthikas with diverse wishes, and at a time when their faculties are wriggling in the grasp of the crocodile of their carnal wants. Stupid men, who seek to purify their persons by divers modes of austerity and penance, and inculcate the same! Some of them cannot make out their mantras. Some lick their hands. Some are uncleanly. Some have no mantras. Some wander after different sources. Some abstain from fish and flesh-meat. Some mind not the annual duties. Some abstain from spirit and the water of chaff. Some beg alms from one, three, five, or seven tribes. Some indulge in tubers, fruits, mosses, kuśa grass, leaves, cow's dejecta, frumenty, curds, clarified butter, molasses, and unbaked cakes. Some wash the body of charioteers, parrot-flyers, and news-purveyors. Some dwell in villages, or in woods for their livelihood. Some adore cows, deer, horses, hogs, monkeys, or elephants. Seated at one place in silence, with their legs bent under them, some attempt greatness. Some speak to only one person, others to seven. Some eat once in a day and night, some once on alternate days, and some
at intervals of four, five, or six days; some once in a fortnight,
performing a chánḍráyana. Some put on themselves the feathers
of vultures or owls. Some, seated on a board or a munjá mat, wear
bark, kuśa grass, valvaja grass (Eleusine Indica), or blankets of
camels' hair, or of goat's wool, or of hair, or hides. Some sleep
more or less in wet clothes Some sleep on ashes, gravel, stones,
boards, thorny grass, or pestles, with the face downwards, in a
hut or the bare ground. Some wear one, two, three, four, five,
six, or seven pieces of cloth; others go naked, making no distinction
between fit and unfit places. Some have long hair, nails, beard, and
matted hair, and wear bark. Some live upon a single meal of a
mixture of sesamum and rice. Some smear themselves with ashes,
cinders from altars, dust, or clay. Some carry on their persons and
in their hands down, munjá grass, hair, nails, rags, mud, or a
cocoanut-shell alms-bowl. Some drink hot water, or rice-water, or
fountain water, or water preserved in earthen jars. Some carry on
them cinders, metals, astringent things, three sticks, skulls, alms-
bowls, bones or swords, and by these means they hope to attain to
immortality, and pride themselves on their holiness. By inhaling
smoke or fire, by gazing at the sun, by performing the five fires,
resting on one foot, or with an arm perpetually uplifted, or moving
about on the knees, some attempt to accomplish their penance. Some
seek salvation by killing themselves by entering into a mass of lighted
chaff or charcoal, or by suppressing their breath, or by roasting one's
self on (hot) stones, or by entering any fire or water, or ascending in
the air. The syllables "om," "vashat," "svadhá," "sváhá," as also,
blessings, hymns, lighting of the sacred fire, invocations, repetitions of
mystic mantras teaching of the Vedas (lit. mantras), or fancying the
image of a divinity in one's mind, afford means of purification to many.
Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahmá, Indra, Rudra, Vishnu,
Deví, Kumára, Mátri, Kátyáyaní, Chandra, Áditya, Vaiśravana, Varúṇa,
Vásava, Áśvina, Nága, Yaksha, Gandharva, Ásura, Garuḍa, Kinnara,
Mahoraga, Rákhbasa, Preta. Bhúta, Kusumáṇḍa, Párshada, Gaṇapati,
Devarshi, Brahmarshi, or Rájarshi. Some select some of them,
others resort to the earth, the water, heat, the air or the ether.
Mountains, rivers, fountains, tanks, lakes, long narrow sheets of water
(tadágas), oceans, vats, ponds, wells, trees, lotuses, herbs, creepers,
The meditations he practised were all in accord with the rules of the Yoga system, and even their technical names were the same. These facts demonstrate the antiquity of the Sánkhya and the Yoga doctrines; but this cannot be said of the text-books of those systems as we have them before us now. They are obviously of a later date than Buddha, and this may safely be predicated of all the six leading texts of Hindu Philosophy. The Sánkhya Sútra quotes the Vais'eshika by name in two places (A. I., 25 and VI, 35), and refutes the doctrine of the Vedánta Sútra. The Yoga Sútra takes for granted the twenty-five categories of the Sánkhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost verbatim. The Vais'eshika Sútra recognises the Nyáya as well as the Sánkhya. The Nyáya Sútra refutes the doctrines of the Vedánta, and of the Sánkhya. The Mimáns'á either directly or practically
by the mode of its refutation of adverse doctrines recognises the pre-existence of all the others, not excepting Buddhism. It also quotes Badari, a teacher, and Bādarāyaṇa, probably a grandson of Badari, and author of the Vedánta Sūtras or later Mimāṃsā, as also of a commentary on the Yoga Sūtra. The Vedánta in its turn refutes adverse doctrines of all the five, and thereby admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled only by the supposition that the different dogmas and the schools which cherished them existed for a long time before the dogmas were written down in the aphoristic form in which we have them now. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation for a long time. There might have been also text-books before, but they were set aside by the very complete systems which the new texts produced, and in the new systems the refutation of adverse opinions very naturally included all the theories which were prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not the theories only of the time when the original dogmas were first promulgated. This is also obvious in other ways. In the case of the Sānkhya Sūtra, though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahmā, we find it refers to an “ancient teacher” (A'chárya, A. V, 31), and to “venerable preceptors” (A. VI, 69). Sanandana and Pañchaśikha are cited by name (V, 32, and VI, 69). Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to A'surí, who is described both as a brother and a pupil of the teacher. A'surí imparts it to Pañchaśikha, who is, according
to the Purānics, again a brother. This Pañchasīkha, again, according to the Mahābhārata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sāňkhya doctrine to that king of Mithilā. Had Kapila written the Sūtra he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an A'chārya.

In the Vedánta Sūtra, Bádarāyaṇa, the author, is several times named in the third person (I, 3, 26; I, 3, 33; III, 2, 41; III, 4, 1, 8, 19; IV, 3, 15, IV, 4, 7, 12). This is usually explained by the statement that a pupil wrote down the teachings of the saint. Colebrooke, arguing on these facts, came to the conclusion that the text-books are much later than the saints whose names they bear. Referring to the Sāňkhya he says "the text of the Sāňkhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by Iś'varakrīshṇa,—and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Pañchasīkha who had been himself instructed by A'surί, the pupil of Kapila." (Essays, I, p. 93). Professor Cowell accepts this opinion in its entirety; he says "The Sūtras, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The Sūtras mutually refer to each other; thus, those of the Sāňkhya school, which in itself I should consider
one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedánta tenets. They expressly mention the Vaiséshika in I. 25, V. 85; for the Nyaya cf. V, 27, 86, and for the Yoga I, 93.” (Colebrooke’s Essays, I, 354.) This is also the opinion at which I have arrived after a careful consideration of the bearings of the question; in short, my conviction is that the Sútras were written, like the Institutes of Manu and many other Hindu works, long after the date of their putative authors.

As regards the Yoga, the doctrine is described to be as old as Bráhma, and the text-book to be the work of Patanjali, who, says the commentator, “compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them” (p. 4). That such is really the case, is obvious from the fact of the Yoga which Patanjali inculcates being identically the same which the Sánkhya accepted as the only means of salvation. It might be argued that the Sánkhya adopted the theory of the 25 principles, from the Yoga of Patanjali, and did not lend it to him. But the arguments against this theory are overwhelming. In the first place had Patanjali initiated the theory of the Tattvas he would have for certain defined them, and not left them to be inferred. He is very careful in his definitions, and he would never have left so vital an element of his system to be inferred. But following the Sánkhya no necessity was felt by him for any definition. It cannot be said that his Tattvas were different from those of the Sánkhyas, for that would make the necessity for a definition even more
imperative. Secondly, the author of the Mahá-
bhāshya cannot possibly be proved to have lived
before Kapila, or his doctrine. The learned Professor
M. M. Kunte, in his "Vicissitudes of Aryan Civiliza-
tion," has combated, with great tact and ability,
the arguments usually put forth to fix the date of
Patanjali; and it may be admitted that indivi-
dually each argument as put forth by Goldstücker
and others admits of refutation, and I may add that
a long chain of weak arguments is not stronger than
any of its links. Still the coincidence of a number
of names of a given period is one which in Indian
history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental.
Confining, however, one's attention to the text-book
only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to
perceive that Patanjali has contented himself by
tackling a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a
positively atheistic model, without in any way blend-
ing the two ideas into any homogeneity or consistency.
Hence it is that the Hindus call it Sēs'vara Sānkhya,
or Sānkhya cum deo, as opposed to the former which
is Niris'vara Sānkhya, or Sānkhya sine deo.

The cardinal difference between the two rests on
their theistic and atheistic belief, but as already stated,
it makes no difference in their systems. Isolation of
soul from thinking principle is the end sought in either
case, and meditation in Samádhi is the only means
available. The believer in the existence of the God-
head assumes that divine grace facilitates the end
sought, but he does not dispense with Samádhi, and
his belief, therefore, is of no material importance.
"In less momentous matters," as noticed by Colebrooke, "they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali’s Yoga-sūtra is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions." (Essays I, p. 265.)

And we have enough in these facts and reasons to infer that the Yoga text-book is posterior to the Sāṇkhya text-book, and that both the text-books are later than Buddha; but that the doctrines of the two schools are very old. Any how these are the immediate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha, and indirectly of the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

The Yoga, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage. In this case the relation is direct and more intimate. The eternity of soul is recognised by both; both look to a course of gradual progress which has perfection for its goal; both admit the existence of soul in higher and higher stages; both recognise the possibility of man’s commanding departed souls to come down, to become visible, and to hold converse with him; both pretend by regulation of breath and other exercises to attain occult powers of the most
transcendental kind. The details and the rationale of exercise may be different in minor points, and a few of the dogmas such as the "material reality" of soul according to the spiritualists, and its pure spirituality according to the Yogıs, may be apparently contradictory; but substantially the two are as closely related as two systems separated by a gap of five and twenty centuries can well be. The cardinal theory, that "the body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals" but it is not so in the case of the adept, is evidently the same in both. "We can see only what comes before the windows of our body, we can take cognizance of what is brought within its bars. The adept has found the key of his prison, and can emerge from it at pleasure. In other words, the adept can project his soul out of his body to any place he pleases." The whole system in either case is based on this doctrine, and even a cursory study of the 3rd chapter of the work now presented to the public in an English dress will, I believe, fully bear out this statement.

The name of the Yoga system as we now have it is Yogánus'ásana, or 'the Institutes of the Yoga.' This name, however, is rarely used, the work being better known as the Yoga-s'ástra or 'the science of Yoga,' or Yoga-sútra, the 'Aphorisms of the Yoga.' According to the commentary, commonly assigned to Vyása, one name of the work would appear to be Sánkhya pravachana, or 'an exposition of the Sánkhya.' The words of the colophon are Pátañjala-yoga-s'ástre sánkhya-pravachane, which may be translated into, in Patanjali's science of the Yoga, the Sa'íkhhyya pravachana.
Vyāsa, however, if he be the author of the exegesis, which I do not believe to be the case, must have used the term simply to imply that it is a text-book on the Sānkhya system, and not to indicate the specific name of the work, for in his remarks on the first aphorism he distinctly says, "the name of the work is Yogānus'āsana," (Yogānus'āsanam nāma s'āstram). Following this exegesis Colebrooke says: "the title of Sānkhya-pravachana seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali's Yoga-s'āstra." (Essays I, p. 244). In short, Yogānus'āsana is the specific, and Sānkhya-pravachana the descriptive, name of the work. Anyhow it is obvious that the Yoga is recognised from an early period as a work on Sānkhya.

The Yoga text as we now have it comprises a total of 194 short, succinct aphorisms, divided into four chapters or quarters (pa'das). The first contains 51 aphorisms, devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of meditation, and is entitled Samādhi-pāda. The second is called Sādhana-pāda, or the quarter on the exercise of meditation and its requirements, and contains 55 aphorisms. The third is called Vibhūti-pāda, and treats of the various occult powers which may be derived by the exercises enjoined in it. It is of the same extent as the second. The name of the fourth chapter is Kaivalya-pāda, and it gives an exposition of the nature and character of the isolation or detachment of soul from worldly ties, which is the object and aim of the exercises and meditations recommended. It is limited to 33 aphorisms.
The work opens with a definition of the term Yoga. It is derived from the root yuj, which means both “to join” and “to meditate.” Some accept the first meaning, explaining it in the technical sense to imply the joining of the mind to the object of thought. Others prefer the second, but that makes no material difference in the purport. The technical meaning of the word as used in the text is a derivative one. Instead of giving prominence to the joining, it implies the detachment which that joining occasions. The definition is, “the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.” This suppression, however, need not be absolute in order to make the word applicable. It is used to imply all stages of abstraction of the thinking principle from worldly cares with a view to centre it in the peculiar meditation which serves to effect that abstraction. The word is of very ancient date. It occurs several times in the Rig Veda, but not in the technical sense. In the time of Buddha, six centuries before the era of Christ, it had acquired its technical meaning to perfection, and as Buddha, according to the view of the case set forth above, borrowed it from the followers of the Sâñkhya school, it may safely be assumed that it dates from long before the age of Buddha. In fact, the Tapas of the Vedic Rishis got the more expressive name of Yoga at a later period, and Kapila and his followers gave it prominence in their system by making it the sole means of salvation. Many other works have since used it to indicate communion with the divinity in some way or other, and the Bhagavad-
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gítá takes thirteen out of its eighteen chapters to be each a treatise on a separate kind of Yoga. The names are: 2, Sánkhyā Yoga; 3, Karma Yoga; 4, Jñána-karma Yoga; 5, Karma-sannyása Yoga; 6, Dhyána Yoga; 8, Tárákabrahma Yoga; 9, Rája-guhya Yoga; 10, Vibhúti Yoga; 12, Bhakti Yoga; 13, Kshetra-kshetrajña Yoga; 14, Guñatraya Yoga; 15, Purushottama Yoga; 18, Sannyása Yoga. In fact, every phase of devotion is described as a form of Yoga. The Tantras have a great number of others, and many variations of those named above, but they need not be noticed here.

The definition of the text suggests immediately the question, what are the functions that have to be suppressed? These must first be known before they can be overcome. The author, therefore, proceeds to describe them. They are said to be fivefold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. These, directly or indirectly, comprise all the functions to which the thinking principle can possibly be directed. The means of suppressing these functions are next described. They include, (a) exercise, or "effort constantly made to keep the thinking principle in its functionless state," (xiii,) and (b), dispassion, or "the consciousness of being their subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects," (xv). The details of these are reserved for consideration in the next chapter.

The exercises and dispassion result in Yoga, of which there are two kinds, a conscious and an unconscious one. The former is that which is attended
by argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism or self-consciousness; the latter is devoid of such attendants. As long as the thinking principle argues what is good and what is bad; as long as there is deliberation as to the nature of the object of thought; as long as a person engaged in meditation feels a sense of joy; or as long as he retains a sense of his own individuality, (self-consciousness), he is said to be in a conscious state of meditation. This is, in the technical language of the school, Savija-samādhi or "seeded meditation," because there is in it some nucleus on which the mind is centered. When, by arduous and long-continued exercise, this seed is lost, and the mind remains divested of all thought, a mere state of consciousness without an object, it becomes seedless, nirvīja, or perfect, and this is the summum bonum which the Yogi exerts to attain. When this is attained, the bondage of the world, of transmigration, is entirely severed, and the soul is declared to be isolated or free.

The expediens aforesaid are always and imperatively necessary—nothing can be attained without them; but their action can be expedited by another means, and that is "Devotion to God." This devotion is absolute resignation of one's self to the Divinity. In the language of the commentator, "it is thorough worship of God. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to him, the preëminent guide." This devotion is the means by which the theism of the current Hinduism is reconciled with the philosophy of
the school. Kapila did not care for this reconciliation, and his system, therefore, did not stand in need of a Divine Providence; but his atheism being repulsive to the thinking portion of mankind, Patanjali avails himself of it to give a theistic character to his system. It will be noticed, however, that he makes his Divinity one of several means to an end, and not the end sought. The God he invokes is defined to be "a particular soul which is untouched by affliction, works, deserts, and desires," one who is existent, but not the avowed Creator and preserver of the universe. His name is Is'vara or "the ruler," and that may imply providence, but nothing is said on this subject. In two successive aphorisms, He is described as one "in whom the seed of the omniscient attains infinity," (xxv,) and "who is the instructor of even all early ones, for, He is not defined by time (xxvi)."

The indicator of this Divinity is the syllable Om, called Praṇava, and it is by repeating it and reflecting on its meaning that the different states of meditation can be easily attained. The author could have scarcely put God and his name to a more subordinate position.

Turning now to the obstacles which stand in the way of the Yogi in the satisfactory accomplishment of his meditation, the author enumerates what they are, and suggests the means of overcoming them. The obstacles, or causes of distraction, are disease, langour, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability in the stage obtained (A. xxx);
and these are attended by pain, distress, trembling, and oppressive inspiration and expiration (xxxI). These tend to make the thinking principle unsteady, or unfit for meditation, and have, therefore, to be sedulously overcome. The means for overcoming them are various. The habit of concentrating the mind on one particular principle is the most efficacious, (xxxII,) and it is to be supplemented by cheerfulness, benevolence, compassion, complacency, and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue, and vice (xxxIII). It may be effected also by a system of regulation of breath, called Pránáyáma, which is supposed to exert a powerful influence in steadying the thinking principle, and warding off disease and other obstacles (cf. p. 41).

Although this regulation of breath is a necessary element in all the earlier or lower forms of the Yoga, one is specially called the Yoga of breathing, and technically called Haṭha-yoga, from the letters ha and ṭha, meaning the sun and the moon, which are the mystic names of inspiration and expiration. This form is particularly esteemed for its efficacy in procuring occult powers. When the habit of meditation has considerably advanced, and the Yogi is able to realize sensuous objects in his meditation, or when the mind is thereby so illumined, it is of itself sufficient to ward off tribulations. Meditation in the passionlessness of accomplished Yogis might also effect this (xxxVII). Reliance on dreams, or on the object of one's fancy, is, likewise, an efficacious remedy.

The author then enters into a more elaborate classification of the Yoga. The twofold division first
pointed out does not suffice fully to indicate the various shades of difference which the seeded form assumes under different circumstances, and to each of these shades he assigns a different name, and defines its nature. In course of this, he points out the theory of the mind becoming the object it thinks upon (xli), in other words that intense thought creates objects, or becomes objective. This is the basis on which the occult powers described in a subsequent chapter are founded. The seedless form is one and simple, and it is the ultimatum sought by the Yoga.

The second chapter is devoted to the details of the exercises necessary for the performance of the Yoga, and is therefore called Kriyá-yoga or "practical Yoga." In its earliest and simplest state practical Yoga is accomplished by a strict observance of asceticism, by the muttering of a mantra a great number of times at stated periods every day, and by devotion to God. The object of these observances is to weaken afflictions and give firmness to meditation. Afflictions arise from attachment to worldly affairs, and asceticism is the best antidote for them, and the practice of repeating a mantra for a long time serves to steady the mind.

The reference to afflictions suggests the question, what are they? They are ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life, or 'the Will to live' as Hartmann designates it. Some of these are subtile, others gross, (iii). The former are to be counteracted by acting against their natural bent, (x) and the latter by meditation, (xi).
The afflictions are described to be the root of all evil. They give rise to works, and works leave behind their stock of residua to be worked out in a subsequent birth, and in that subsequent birth other works are performed, and they leave their residua, and so on, the chain is never brought to an end. For instance, ignorance leads to the commission of a sin; the retribution for that sin comes in the next existence; while that desert is being borne in that existence another sin is committed through ignorance; that necessitates another birth for its retribution, and the series never breaks. And what is true of ignorance is equally so of the other afflictions. Nor does the rule apply only to sins; it applies equally to virtuous deeds. For instance, if instead of a sin a virtuous work be performed, its deserts have to be enjoyed in another existence, and the course proceeds exactly as in the case of sin. In fact, every work, whether right or wrong, has its apportioned desert, and it must be borne in a corporeal existence, and the succession of birth, decay, and death must, in the ordinary course of things, recur over and over again without a limit. The fruits may be joy or suffering according as the cause is virtue or vice, but to the discriminating they are invariably painful, (xv). They are, also inevitable, and must be borne. An act once performed must bear its fruit, and in so far there is no remedy. One may, however, avoid doing those works which bear fruit, and thereby break the spell, and the maxim is therefore laid down that only those pains are avoidable which are not yet come, (xvi).
The question then arises, what should one do to abstain from works, and avoid their consequences? and the object of the Yoga is to devise the means through which the abstinence may be effected.

In order to explain the rationale of the course by which the evil is to be brought to an end, the author next enters into an explanation of the mutual relation of Intellect and Soul. Intellect is called a spectacle, and it is said "to be of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is for the purpose of experience and emancipation," (xviii). It exists solely for the purpose of Soul, (xxi). Soul is called the spectator; "it is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas," (xx). When these two are in conjunction through ignorance (and it is ignorance which brings them into conjunction) they produce life and its consequences, (xvii), or as the text puts it "the apprehension of the nature of the contact, power, and the lordship of power," (xxxii) i.e., Soul thinks it is the experiencer and Intellect thinks it is the experiencer. Now, when the light of knowledge dispels the false impression the conjunction is dissolved. Intellect ceases to think that it is the experiencer, and Soul gives up the idea of its experience, and the ignorance is removed. In other words, the conjunction being removed Soul is isolated, and there is a period put to further birth and suffering. Now, ignorance being the sole cause of the conjunction, the great object is to remove that ignorance, and
this is to be effected by discriminative knowledge, or that which will rightly appreciate the true character of the relation which exists between Soul and Intellect. This knowledge then is what is to be sought, and the means are now provided by which it may be attained.

The knowledge in question passes through seven stages before it becomes perfect (xxvii). The first stage is that in which a person feels that "the knowable has been known by me." (2) He next feels that "there is nothing remaining to be known." (3) The conviction then arises that "my afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome." (4) This is followed by the belief that "discriminative knowledge has been attained by me." These four suffice to effect what is technically called "liberation from work," (Kārya-vimukti), for when these have been acquired there is no more impulse or wish left to perform works. These are followed, in course of progress, by three more successive convictions. These are,—1st "my intellect has accomplished its purpose;" 2nd, "the three qualities have finished their dominion over me, and can no longer affect me;" 3rd, "my meditation has been identified with my soul," that is the Intellect has merged into the Soul. These three are called "intellectual liberation" (Chitta-vimukti). The last is called isolation (Kai-valya), on the attainment of which the Soul is believed to be perfectly liberated.

In order to bring on this consummation the Yogi should apply himself to improve his understanding so
as to make it completely devoid of impurities. To effect this improvement eight means are recommended, and these are technically called 1, Restraint; 2, Obligation; 3, Posture; 4, Regulation of birth; 5, Abstraction; 6, Steadfastness; 7, Contemplation; and, 8, Meditation (xxix). Of these the first includes five negative acts, viz., abstention from (1) slaughter, (2) falsehood, (3) theft, (4) incontinence, and (5) avarice; and the second five positive acts, namely, (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) pene-
nance, (4) study, and (5) devotion to the Lord. These two classes of acts are called mahāvratas, or acts of primary asceticism. They are obligatory on all classes of the community, whether householders or ascetics, and none should neglect them. Slaughter is in se sinful, and none should commit it, whether he be a householder or a hermit. Falsehood and theft are sins of the same gravity, and should therefore be shunned by all. Incontinence &c., are likewise reprehensible, and none should be guilty of them. Nor can a virtuous and peaceful life be secured simply by these restraints; it is necessary that one should keep himself free from filth, both material and moral; that he should be contented with his lot and not rapine; that he should submit to penance for his sins and for curbing his passions; that he should study the Vedas, and be devoted to the service of God. No one can be a good citizen who does not practice these restraints and obligations, and therefore they are recommended to all classes of the community. And if they are good and necessary for ordinary
people, they must *ipso facto* be so for the Yogi, who aspires to rise above the common herd. Nay, to him they are most imperative, for none can prepare himself for the Yoga who does not especially attend to them, as the first step in his career. The advantages of observing these restraints and obligations are described at some length; but they call for no remark here.

Restraint and obligation being thus common to both householders and Yogis the third of the eight means becomes the first special act of exercise to which a Yogi has to apply himself; this is the assumption of particular postures, which are conducive to the fixation of the thinking principle to any object to which it may be directed. No one can settle himself down for meditation while walking, or running, or doing something unconnected with his main object, and some particular postures are, therefore, deemed essential. The text contents itself by saying that it should be firm and pleasant (xlvi), and entail the least effort (xlvii); but it does not describe any particular posture as the most beneficial. Commentators, however, have supplied the omission, and described a great number of them, some of them most painful and difficult of assumption, (*cf*. pp. 102f.).

When the Yogi has assumed one of the prescribed postures, he should begin the fourth exercise, the regulation of his breath. This consists in drawing the breath through one nostril; retaining the air for some time in the chest; and then throwing it out
through another nostril. The details of this process will be found on pp. 42f.

This process of breathing should be followed by the fifth exercise, the abstraction of the organs from their ordinary natural functions. As long as they are engaged in their own works, they do not allow the thinking principle to settle down for the act of meditation, and consequently prove obstructive. To overcome them, or to draw them away from works, is an essential preliminary. When they are abstracted, they merge into their primary cause, the thinking principle, and cease to disturb it.

All these five acts of Restraint, Obligation, Posture, Regulation of breath, and Abstraction are accessories or necessary adjuncts to Yoga, for without them no Yoga can be performed; but they form no essential part of the Yoga itself. Even all the five existing together would not constitute Yoga, though without them as preliminaries no Yoga can be effectual. These are, therefore, called "practical Yoga," or "accessories to the Yoga," but not Yoga. The last three, on the other hand, are essential constituents of the Yoga, and are therefore called "intimates" or antarangas. These three include Steadfastness (Dhāraṇa), Contemplation (Dhyāna), and Meditation (Samādhi); and the third chapter opens with a description of these. "Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place," (L). As an exercise, it is of little moment to what object the thinking principle is applied: so long the thinking principle remains unswervingly attached to it, without for a
moment thinking of anything else, it is Steadfastness. When the understanding is brought to bear upon this fixation and the two act in unison the result is Contemplation (II), i.e., when the thinking principle thinks intelligently and steadfastly on an object it is Contemplation. Again when this contemplation is so intense that it loses all idea of its own identity, and enlightens solely one object, it is Meditation or *Samādhi*. The definition given points to something much more intense than what the English word meditation ordinarily conveys; it implies a state of extacy or cataleptic trance when both the body and the mind are dead to all external impressions, and the thinking principle is completely drowned in the special object of its thought, or in itself, but as the degree of intensity is not fixed and is admitted to vary considerably under different circumstances, I have used the word meditation as the most convenient and conveying the nearest idea of the mental act indicated by the Sanskrit term. When these three follow successively or are united, they have the common name of *Sañyama*. How this union is to be effected, or how this Sañyama is to be performed, is nowhere described at length; but it may be directed to diverse objects, internal and external, and, when duly and thoroughly performed, results in the most extraordinary occult powers.

A subject is the correlative of the three qualities of tranquillity, enlivening and latency, and as each quality becomes ascendant the subject varies; and these variations may be produced by the power of
Sañyama, apart from ordinary mundane causes. Hence the efficacy of the Sañyama in producing occult powers. Sañyama, however, should not be applied indiscriminately to all purposes. The proper rule is to follow the stages of perfection successively attained by a Yogi, i.e., it should not be applied to a subtle object, until it has been practised and perfected with regard to gross objects. In other words, it should be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of a Yogi is divided. Unless this is done no fruition follows (vi).

The occult powers, called Siddhis, derivable by the practice of the Sañyama are the most astounding possible. By it one may know the past and the future, the circumstances connected with his former existences, as well as the day and hour of his death. He may know what is in the mind of another person, or the meaning of the cries of animals. He may make himself or others invisible to bystanders, contract friendship with whomsoever he likes, or attain other superhuman powers. He may acquire a knowledge of things that are ordinarily too subtle, or too remote, for human observation, or so intercepted as not to be visible. He can observe the details of regions situated far away from the earth; of the stars and planets, their dispositions and their motions. He can have ocular knowledge of spiritual phenomena. He may know what is going on inside his body; subdue his hunger and thirst; or make his body so firm as none can shake it. It is possible for him, too, to make departed spirits visible, and to converse with them.
He can attain superhuman intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction. He may project his own soul into another's body, and then bring it back into his own. He can travel with the quickness of the mind through air or through water, and go wheresoever he lists.

When most of these powers have been attained and a Yogi is in a forward state for absolute perfection, the gods envy his success, and try to divert him from his onward course. They place temptations in his way in the forms of handsome women, great wealth, and other worldly objects of value, and thereby lead him astray (li). In this they play the part of Mára in the Buddhist legends, and of Satan in the Bible. Great care and determination are necessary to rise above such temptations. According to the Tantras when temptations fail, resort is had to frightful forms, tigers, lions, serpents, ogres and the like, which threaten instant destruction to the Yogi. But if they are met by firm resolve, they are always ultimately overcome.

Great as are these and such like powers, of which a great many are described in the text, they are not the objects which a Yogi should seek. They are the results of his meditations, and they indicate the success he is gradually attaining, and the progress he is making towards his goal; but they are not that goal. The highest power is, even like the lowest, a part of the "seeded" or discriminative meditation. These powers are, nevertheless, of value, as they enhance the power of the understanding, and in their perfection result in the all-saving knowledge, tārakjñāna,
which makes manifest the relation between the thinking principle and Soul, and brings on the "seedless meditation." They are thus of use in consummating the isolation of Soul—the *sumnum bonum* which the Yoga promises to its votaries.

The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of such metaphysical topics as bear on the nature and character of Isolation. It opens by saying that special faculties may result from five different causes, (1). Some of them are described to be due to birth; such as the power of flying, or living in water, or with suspended animation for protracted periods. These are specific peculiarities of particular genera of animals which may be acquired by being born in such genera, and are not common to all living beings. Others are due to herbs, such as the effect of drugs in arresting sleep, hunger, or the like, or making the flesh proof against heat, or poison, or cold. Others, again, are due to certain incantations or mantras which are universally believed by the Hindus to have very extraordinary powers. Austerity or asceticism in the same way is credited with the power of enabling people to acquire special faculties. Of course, the tangible faculties in this case are not faculties strictly so called, but the effect of habit. And lastly, Samádhi is believed to produce the same results, and these are what have been described in the preceding chapter. The first four causes do not concern the author, and, therefore, no further notice is taken of them. The last is intimately connected with the question at issue, and great pains are taken to meet such objec-
tions as might be started against the theory of Samádhi being the cause of special faculties. The objections are assumed to proceed from opponents, and the Sútras supply the replies. In the second and the third aphorisms, an opponent is made to deny causality to Samádhi, inasmuch as it has no influence on the body, and bodily changes are known to have been produced in this life. The explanation given is that the materials of the body undergo change of their own accord, and merit resulting from Samádhi subserves only to remove all obstructions from their way. This is illustrated by the example of the husbandman, who removes the inequalities on the surface of a field in order to lead water to where it is wanted, and the water then flows of its own accord, or in obedience to the laws of gravitation. This satisfies the opponent, who thereupon, shifts his ground, and, admitting the possibility of the materials changing by themselves, raises the question as to how thinking principles, which are immaterial, can be so produced. Yogis pretend that they can, each of them, animate a number of bodies at the same time, and it is necessary that, for such a purpose, each body should have a separate thinking principle, and the questions raised are how is it provided? and how is the unity of the creating one preserved? The theory of spontaneous change in materials cannot explain this, and the reply given is that such thinking principles are emanations or scintillations from the creating one, and are therefore subordinate to it, acting in accord with the will of the creator, even as the different organs of the
body act in accordance with the will of the mind, (iii—v).

The possibility of Samādhi producing occult powers being thus settled, the question next comes as to the nature of those powers—are they of the same character as those produced by other causes? or are they different? The reply is that they are different, (vi). The faculties produced by the other causes are intimately connected with former births; the residua of former births are the active principles which animate them; whereas the faculties produced by Samādhi have no such background. They are spontaneous, and do not produce those after-consequences which the others do.

This leads to the classification of works leading to residua into four groups. Some are described to be white or meritorious; some are black or vicious; some are partly black and partly white; while others are neither black nor white. The first three groups belong to ordinary life, and leave behind residua; the last pertains to Yogís, and are not calculated to leave any remnant behind, (vii).

The after-consequences of ordinary works are two-fold, instinct, and kind, age and experience. The theory is that every work, every sensation, every form of experience leaves on the thinking principle an impress of its own, and such impressions, accumulating in course of a lifetime, become the stock of residua which, though for the time being latent, are susceptible of revival by proper stimulants in subsequent existences. (cf. p. 26—174). This
revival is Instinct, *i.e.*, instead of believing Instinct to be spontaneous, self-evolved, intuitive reason, as European philosophers describe it, (cf. p. 175,) Yegis take it to be the fruit of the remembrance of former experience, revived by particular circumstances. These resi-dua are also the causes of rewards and punishments in subsequent lives, and the rewards and punishments are represented by kind, age and experience; kind implying birth into higher or lower grades according to merit or demerit; age the span of life in such existences, which is prolonged or reduced according to one's deserts; and experience sensations of pleasure or pain. Confining his attention here to Instinct, the author describes that the resi-dua producing Instinct do not revive invariably but according to circumstances, even after breaks caused by dissimilar births, (viii). Nor do such breaks, produced by dissimilar births, localities, or times lead to any breach in the relation of cause and effect existing between resi-dua and instinctive manifestations, (ix), inasmuch as the result manifests itself invariably at the first favourable moment.

The theory of resi-dua as above propounded is open to the grave objection that it does not provide for the manifestation of instinctive action at the first birth when no resi-dua can be predicated; but the author obviates it by assuming eternity of desires and consequently of the universe. That which is eternal can have no beginning, and consequently there is no room left for a first birth, (x). This involves a *recessus in infinitum*, but, assuming matter and the universe to be eternal, it is not objectionable, or illogical. More-
over, the necessity of keeping God apart from creation, renders the theory of eternity of the universe unavoidable. Admit God to be the creator, the necessity arises of making Him engage in work and derive its fruit; deny it, the universe must be accepted as self-evolved, and the theory of nothing comes from nothing not allowing of such an assumption, the author is driven to the only alternative left, that of eternity.

The opponent who raised the first objection now turns round and argues that if eternity be predicated of desires, how can they be removed? and if they are not removed the chain of transmigration will ever lengthen and never come to an end, and no redemption is possible, so that the performance of the Yoga for the sake of liberation from the fetters of repeated existence would be futile. To this the author replies by saying that the cause of desire is ignorance of the true nature of things; its effect is the body and its longings and their consequences; its asylum is the thinking principle; and its object is worldly enjoyment, and if these can be made inert or functionless, they would cease to produce their fruits; and if they ceased there would be no root left in re the individual in which they are made functionless to produce new residua, and consequently he would be free, (x1).

But, says the opponent, the thinking principle is ever changing under diverse influences, it cannot be in one existence what it was before, and consequently there is no unity, and therefore the theory of oneness, of omne ens est unum, is lost. This argument is met
by the theory of archetypes. Every category is eternal, all things are eternal, nothing is really created, or absolutely destroyed, and what we call creation or destruction is simply change of attributes, and in the case of the thinking principle it is nothing more. When it changes its present condition, it reverts to its former condition, or assumes a new one, but its unity is never lost, (xii). This is the theory of the moderate nominalists or conceptionalists, with their universalia ad rem, universalia in re, and universalia post rem. Change having been admitted above, the author proceeds to account for it. It is produced by the three qualities acting either on the subject, or on the object, or on both, (xiii). The action, however, is not simultaneous, only one of the qualities is predominant at a time, and therefore there is no diversity in the two, (xiv). This leads to the question are sensibles the causes of sensation? or sensations the causes of sensibles? The first idea is in accord with every-day experience. Sensation usually takes place when there is a sensible present to produce it. The relation of the two as cause and effect is, however, not constant, and under different circumstances the same sensible produces simultaneously very different sensations, and the simultaneous production of different effects by one cause is illogical and impossible. The commentator illustrates this by appealing to the different effects produced by a single handsome woman on amorous males, her rivals, and ascetics. He might have gone further, and adverted to representative sensations as distinct from presentative
ones. In fact, as Professor Müller, in his 'Elements of Physiology' (Baly's Translation, p. 1059), has observed, "external agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves." Sensations, too, remain on the sensorium after the sensibles producing them have been removed. Nor can sensation be the cause of sensible, or, in the language of the commentator, "if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle, then there would be nothing besides, when that thinking principle would be occupied with one particular thing." It cannot be said that the ideal presentation of things would be created and maintained by other thinking principles while one thinking principle is occupied with a particular thing, for in that case many diverse causes would be made to produce one effect. Applied to the world the inference would be that one world is the effect of many diverse causes, and, that not being possible, the alternative would be that the world is causeless. The solution afforded is that there is no relation of cause and effect between the two; they are eternal and move in different paths (xv); and their action upon each other is regulated by the triad of qualities, one or other of which predominates for the time and produce its effects. Patanjali is exceedingly brief and enigmatical, but his object is the refutation of the theory of ideal presentation as opposed to real substantiality of matter, i.e., of the Vivartavāda doctrine of the Vedānta.

The preception above produced is still incomplete.
The thinking principle may undergo modification and assume the shape of the object presented to it, but it cannot, being unconscious, intelligently perceive what it sees, (xvii). The intelligent principle has still to be infused into it, and this is done by Soul. The reflection of the Soul acting on it makes it perceive directly what is presented to it. It is accordingly said that a thing is known or unknown according as there is a reflection of the Soul, or the absence of it, in the thinking principle, (xvi).

An objection is now raised to the effect that under the circumstances above stated, there being no stability in the thinking principle, knowledge derived by perception could not be constant. The reply given is that since the real perceiver, the Soul, is immutable, knowledge which depends on it must necessarily be constant. Inasmuch, however, as the thinking principle can undergo only one modification at a time, and the Soul perceives only that modification, and not the outside world, there can be only one perception at a time: two diverse ideas cannot arise simultaneously, (xix).

The objector is still unsatisfied. To obviate the necessity of calling in the agency of Soul, he suggests a multiplicity of thinking principles, saying let one perception or thinking principle be perceived by another. This, however, says the author, cannot be, for the second perception would require a third, and so on, and that would lead to a regressus in infinitum. There would, moreover, be no certainty, for in calling one idea to mind a host would arise, and there would
be nothing to show which is the particular idea that has been invoked, or is necessary to the elucidation of the perception at hand.

There is yet another objection to urge. Accepting that perception cannot be helped by one cognition cognizing another, the opponent suggests that in life persons always express the opinion of their knowing things, and how can this take place unless the thinking principle possessed self-illuminative powers? This is met by saying that the thinking principle, assuming the form of the immutable soul, attains the light of intelligence, and is then able to understand its own cognitions, (xxi); and the conclusion arrived at is that when the thinking principle is modified on the one hand by soul and on the other by objects of cognition, it is sufficient for all purposes of understanding, (xxii). The commentator here anticipates a number of other objections, and disposes of them according to the theory of the Yoga. (Cf. p. 197).

These explanations, however, are not enough. There is yet a lingering suspicion that the thinking principle has a will of its own, and this suspicion is developed in the form of a question as to what motive the thinking principle can have in engaging itself in its various functions? Naturally inert, it can have no object of its own, and in performing its functions it must be acting without a motive, and as nothing is done without a motive, the inference would be that it has a will of its own, and it gratifies that will by acting as it does. This suspicion is set at rest by the remark that since it acts in conjunction with others,
its object must be to subserve another’s purpose, and that another is soul, (xxiii). The commentator explains that such conjunct action for another’s purpose without any consciousness on the part of the actors is possible, as we see it in the organs of sense, which act for the purposes of the mind without knowing that they are doing so. The Sánkhya-káríká adduces the example of milk, an unintelligent substance, secreting for the nourishment of the calf. (Cf. v.’s lvii to lx). The example of the cart carrying saffron for the use of man is also generally appealed to.

Soul is described as the witness, spectator and experiencer of the actions of nature. Conscious and always present in the body, it cannot but witness what takes place in it. This is the idea which Fichte assigns to mind, when he says, it is, “as it were an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there,” (Morell, II, p. 95). But since soul has no action or desire of any kind, and as it is, moreover, eternal and immutable, how can it be said to have a purpose of its own, which the thinking principle has to subserve? This is a crucial question, and the answer given is practically an evasion. The premises are admitted, but it is said that, inasmuch as it is a shadow of the soul that sensitizes the thinking principle, and that shadow feels and observes, by indiscriminate use of language we call the soul to be the experiencer and witness, (cf. p. 194). The service done is, in the same way, service done to the shadow
and not to the reality, and the benefit derived goes to nature or Prakṛiti, which is entertained and ultimately relieved of all sense of pain, and not to soul, which is painless and ever free.

Patanjali now turns to the effect of the theory and practice propounded. When a person has duly gone through the course of practice enjoined and acquired the knowledge promised, all false notions that he before had on the subject of life subside, (xxiv), and his thinking principle is bowed down by the weight of knowledge and commencing isolation, (xxv). Worldly thoughts, however, still break out occasionally, (xxvi), and these should be carefully repressed in the same way in which afflictions and obstructions were originally overcome, (cf. II, xxviii). When this repression is effected, perfect knowledge rises in the thinking principle, and entirely sweeps away all remnants of afflictions and residua of former works, (xxviii—xxx). All obscurations are removed; the triad of qualities in regard to the individual concerned ceases from undergoing further change, (xxxI); and the moment at last arrives when the qualities, having retired to rest, become defunct, and the soul abides solely in its own essence. This is isolation or salvation which is the aim and object of the Yoga doctrine, (xxxIII). This isolation is absolute and eternal, and the soul in regard to which it has been attained remains free for evermore.

Following the order of the text, the above summary does not afford a consecutive statement of the leading points of the Yoga system of theology and
metaphysics, and inasmuch as the dissertations on
the Yoga now available in the English language are
brief, obscure, and not unoften misleading and in-
correct, it would not be amiss to attempt here a
categorical resume. The cardinal dogmas are, as
already above stated, taken from the Sánkhya system,
but there are differences, and the importance attached
to some of them, in their mutual coöperation is
markedly distinctive. The leading tenets of the
Yogís are:

1st. That there is a Supreme Godhead who is
purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflic-
tions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om,
and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to
Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation;
but He does not directly grant it. Nor is He the
father, creator, or protector of the universe, with
which He is absolutely unconnected.

2nd. That there are countless individual souls
which animate living beings, and are eternal. They
are pure and immutable; but by their association
with the universe they become indirectly the experi-
encers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable
embodied forms in course of ever recurring metemp-
psychoses.

3rd. That the universe is uncreate and eternal.
It undergoes phenomenal changes, but, as a noumenon,
it is always the same. In its noumenal state it is
called Prakriti or nature; it is always associated with
the three qualities or active forces called goodness,
foulness, and darkness. Matter as an integral part of
the universe is, likewise, eternal, though subject to modifications like the world. Strictly speaking the modifications of matter produce the phenomenal world which is composed of it.

4th. That next to soul there is a noumenon called Chitta, or the thinking principle, or mind in its most comprehensive sense. It is subject to the three qualities aforesaid, and undergoes various modifications according to the prevalence of one or other of those qualities. It is essentially unconscious or unintelligent, but it becomes conscious or intelligent by the reflection of, or association with, soul, which abides close by it. It also receives through the organs of sense shadows of external objects, and thereupon modifies itself into the shapes of those objects. The consciousness reflected on it makes it think that it is the experiencer of all worldly joys and sorrows. In reality, however, it is merely the spectacle of which soul is by proxy (its shadow) the spectator. It is closely allied to Buddhi or intellect of the Sánkhya system, but it plays a much more important part in the system, than what Buddhi does, partaking as it does the parts of both Prakriti and Buddhi in a prominent degree, and also of self-consciousness. It occupies the position of Will of the modern Pessimist system.

5th. That the functions of the thinking principle are five-fold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory, and that these functions are produced by the prevalence of one or other of the three qualities.

6th. That, like the universe, all sensible objects
have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When one object changes into another, it is merely a modification of its form, and the form assumed, when destroyed, passes on to some other form, but it ultimately reverts to its noumenal or primary state.

7th. That phenomena, as results of modifications of noumena, are real and not phantasmal.

8th. That sensibles are not the direct causes of sensations, nor sensations the causes of sensibles; but that the thinking principle receives impressions of sensibles under the influence of one or other of the three qualities, and the result is regulated by that influence. The influence extends both to sensations and to sensibles.

9th. That the thinking principle being changeable, constancy of knowledge is due to the immutability of the soul, and that no perception can take place until the thinking principle is made conscious by the soul.

10th. That impressions produced on the thinking principle leave on it certain residua (αναμνησία of Aristotle) which are causes of intuitions, desires, new births, and further experiences.

11th. That desires are the origin of pain in this world.

12th. That the universe being eternal, desires are likewise eternal, and it is needless therefore to enquire when residua first arose to create desires.

13th. That mundane existence is thus associated with pain, and it is the duty of every one to rise above that pain.
14th. That the pain may be finally overcome or removed only by withdrawing the thinking principle from its natural functions.

15th. That the withdrawal in question can be effected by constant and sedulous observance of certain prescribed restraints, obligations and steadfast meditation.

16th. That in the course of the exercises above referred to, the adept attains extraordinary occult powers.

17th. That when that withdrawal is complete and absolute, the soul is completely isolated from the world, and that when that isolation is attained, it is liberated from all liability to future transmigration. And this is the isolation, liberation, emancipation, or final beatitude which should be the great object and aim of human existence.

The general impression regarding the nature of the Yoga doctrine, has been hitherto exceedingly unfavourable among Anglo-oriental scholars. It is mystical, it is fanatical, it is dreadfully absurd, are among the mildest charges brought against it. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall is so disgusted with its tenets that in a fit of virtuous indignation he says, "As few of the twenty-eight Yoga works which have fallen under my inspection are at present read, so, one may hope, few will ever again be read, either in this country or by curious enquirers in Europe. If we exclude the immundities of the Tantras and of the Káma-sástra, Hindu thought was never more unworthily engaged than in digesting into an economy the fanatical vagaries
of theocracy. Not less, it is observable, have the Yogins of India transcended than they have anticipated the quietistic delirations of Bonaventura, de Sales, Saint Theresa, and Molinos,” (Contributions, p. xi). Other writers, if not equally denunciative, are still very severe in the tone of their criticisms. I believe this is due principally to the subject not having been carefully studied. The subject is dry—exceedingly so—and the enigmatical form in which it is presented in the text-books is not conducive to any interest being created in its favour. Generally speaking Indian scholars do not study it, and the few ascetics and hermits who do seldom associate with the world. Pândits, when called upon to explain, frequently, if not invariably, mix up the tenets of Patanjali’s Yoga with those of the Tantras, the Puráñas, the Tantric Sañhitás, the Pañcharátras, and the Bhagavadgítá—works which have very dissimilar and discordant tenets to inculcate. Some of the later avowedly Yoga works are, moreover, exceedingly allegorical and mystical in their descriptions, and in them the purport of the instruction is buried in a mass of absurdity. Practices, too, have been inculcated in them which are certainly repulsive. (Cf. pp. 103, 117). In judging, however, of the nature of Patanjali’s doctrine it is unfair to associate it with the vagaries of fanatical, deluded mendicants, or with the modifications and adaptations which it has undergone in the hands of the Tántrics and the Puránics.

The tenets of Patanjali are all that concern the
critic, and the summary of them given above will show to the unbiassed enquirer that they are closely similar to those enunciated by some of the greatest metaphysicians of ancient Greece. The similitude is in some cases so close that I would not be surprised to see some enterprising dialectician, intent upon proving everything good in India to be of European origin, demonstrate that the whole system has been nefariously copied from Greek philosophers. The tenets may not be the best of their kind—some of them are unquestionably futile,—but they are certainly, not such philosophic desperadoes as to commit outrages on the chastity of our thoughts, or so vile as to make us join in the hope so fervently expressed by Mr. Hall that the works which treat of them may not again be read by the curious enquirer. If the history of the human mind be a fit subject for study, if it be desirable to compare the progress of metaphysical knowledge among different nationalities at different times in different places, if the civilization of the Hindus be an object of enquiry, we should rather earnestly desire that the works should be thoroughly examined, and not neglected, and that without in any way pledging ourselves as their defenders. There is no reason to doubt that such enquiry will not only be useful to history, but reflect credit on the grasp of the intellect of the ancient Indian sages who matured the doctrine.

It would take more space than what I have at my disposal to go through all the tenets seriatim, and show their relation to European theories, but it may
be generally observed that even the most faulty dogmas do not, on sufficient examination, appear to be so bad as they are represented to be by hasty and adverse critics. The theory of isolation is certainly very startling, but it was the logical outcome of the conception of the absolute perfection of the Godhead reacting on the Upanishad doctrine of resolution into the Divine essence.* The Bhagavadgītā thus sums up the Upanishad idea:

'He who all paths stops up, and in the heart
'Confines the mind, shuts up the breath within
'The head, adopts a firm devotion, utters
'The single syllable "Om"—the Soul Supreme,
'And thinks of me, and goes, abandoning
'The body thus, reaches the goal supreme.'

(Telang's Translation, p. 52.)

This idea, however, involves the necessity of additions to, and abstractions from, Divine perfection. The theory is that the human soul is specifically distinct from, though generically the same with, the Divine one, and as the two dissimilars cannot melt into one, they must always remain separate, and as joy, felicity, bliss and the like imply activity and enjoyment,—a concrete heaven inconsistent with the theory of final rest,—the Yogis obviate all philosophic and logical difficulties by contenting themselves with isolation, without predicking it with joy or bliss.

The threefold division of the intellectual man into purusha, chitta and ahankāra is the counterpart of νοῦς, ψυχή and σώμα of Plato and other ancient

* Dr. Weber probably refers to this Upanishad theory, and not to the Purāṇas as stated on page 208.
European authors. (Plato, Timæus, Aristotle, Politics.)

The theory of Prakṛiti, a noumenal absolute of the phenomenal world, or nature in the abstract, has been a stumbling-block to many Europeans, and the allegorical way in which it is frequently described, is certainly often misleading. Even among Hindus it has given rise to many frivolous and absurd stories. In the main, however, it seems to accord very closely with some of the latest European speculations on the subject. It is no other than the quies or plastic nature of Cudworth, which has been designed to avoid fortuitousness on the one hand and God's constant interposition on the other. Morell, in his 'History of modern Philosophy' (I, p. 208) commenting on one of the latest German systems, that of Herbarts, says:

'The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following:—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we immediately perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not portray to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the reality, therefore, is not the thing as.
a whole, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus, the further we analyze, the further does the idea of reality recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation.'

Dr. Kay, in his remarks on this passage, observes—

' This "essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation"—this which the European analyst arrives at as "the last result of the analysis"—is what the Saṅkhya expositor, proceeding, "more Indico," synthetically, lays down as his first position. This is Kapila’s mūlaprakṛiti—the "root of all"—"the radical producer"—that which, variously modified, constitutes all that the ‘soul’ takes cognizance of. This primordial essence—among the synonyms for which, given in our text-book, are the ‘undiscrétte’ avyakta, the ‘indestructible’ akṣara, that ‘in which all generated effect is comprehended’ pradhānaka, &c., is the ‘absolute’ of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Shelling’s views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147, Vol. II) is ‘not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in the mind.” So, according to Kapila, “From Nature issues Mind, and thence self-consciousness.”'

(Benares Magazine, Vol. III, pp. 284ff.)

This Prakṛiti is believed to be unintelligent, and yet it is described to be acting for another’s purpose, and this has often been stigmatized as a specimen of Indian absurdity. This theory, however, is exactly what Cudworth entertains in regard to his plastic nature, which, he says ‘doth never consult nor deliberate;’ ‘it goes on in one constant un repeating tenor from generation to generation; it acts artifi- cially and for sake of ends, but itself understands
not the ends which it acts for.' 'It acts neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor blindly, but must be concluded to act fatally, magically, and sympathetically.' (‘True Intellectual System of the Universe,’ B. I., Cap. III, 37.)

Again, Prakṛiti and necessarily matter are eternal, says the Yogi, and in the sense in which he predicates eternity, i. e., to noumena as distinct from phenomena, we have nothing more preposterous than the "eternal verities" of the European philosophers of even our own times—verities which even the Godhead cannot undo, such as the conception of a triangle invariably including two right angles. To such archetypical eternities few can object from a pure philosophic standpoint, apart from revealed systems of religion.

The two most repellent dogmas of the system are its faith in metempsychosis and its theory about occult powers, and even these have found defenders in quarters where they were least expected; and, carefully considered, they do not seem to be so absurd as one would at first glance suppose.

Extravagant as are the ideas regarding the occult powers, and purely imaginary as, at least, some of them doubtless are, it is worthy of note that belief in such powers was almost universal in the ancient world, and well-authenticated reports are not wanting to show that some of them were attainable. Mental prescience has manifested itself on many occasions. Mesmeric and other electric conditions of the body are now objects of scientific research; and they are well-known
to produce extraordinary phenomena. Many facts have been brought to light which show that physical causes may be, particularly in unsophisticated states of society, easily mistaken for occult powers. Sir David Brewster's theory of the objective projection upon visual organs of a subjectively conceived image may account for a good many occurrences which strike the mind of the masses with wonder, and appear as the result of superhuman agency. Many psychological conditions, which are known to arise and produce startling results, but the true nature of which has not yet been fully and scientifically examined and ascertained, would account for some so-called occult occurrences. But in the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to separate the wheat from the tares—to discriminate between what powers were really attained or attainable by Yogis and what they fancied they would attain by persevering in their practices. Doubtless the pretensions of the European psychics of the day are to a considerable extent false and fraudulent; still there are among them some good men and true, and their researches carried on on catholic, honest and scientific principles will hereafter bear some good fruit, and the time will then come to enquire how far the Yogis had anticipated them. In the meanwhile all that need be said is that the extravagance of some of their pretensions should not make us spurn the Yogis as all knaves and charlatans, and their psychical system wholly false and fatuous. Such a principle of action, however necessary and prudent in shifting the merits of a lawsuit, and even then under certain
restrictions, would be intolerable in history. If some obviously false, or improbable, or unprovable, statements in any author would justify our rejecting the whole of his testimony there would be no ancient author left whose testimony could be accepted, and I know not how few of our modern authors would escape the condemnation. No Yogí myself, nor any-wise interested in the doctrine, all I feel in the cause of truth is, that there should, for the present, be a suspension of judgment, and the materials afforded by the Yogís should be subjected to examination and analysis.

As regards metempsychosis something has already been said, (ante, p. xiii.) It is a doctrine which even Plato thought fit to adopt, and much might be said in favour of it which cannot be readily disproved; but I shall content myself here with a quotation.

Perhaps the ablest metaphysician who ever came to India from England was the late Rev. Dr. Kay, principal of the late Bishop's College. His strong Christian convictions did not by any means make him an indulgent critic of adverse faiths, but in commenting on the doctrine of metempsychosis as affording a solution of the question of the origin of evil, he says:

'The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindu theory on the great question of the "origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befalls any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffer-
ing evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—and then there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing; it follows (argue the Hindus) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis; and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other.

If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp the conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same stand-punkt as the Hindu, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the regressus in infinitum here involves any absurdity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindu. We try to make the Hindu give up the tenet—and we do well;—but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe—short of the primal mystery of "Being" itself. The Hindu's explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him so—
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but we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The "origin of evil" has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the goodness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials—rather it furnishes the substance of all the trials—of our faith. This we have to teach—but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every Missionary among the Hindus. We quote from the Preface (p. 12) of his 'Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.'

'The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scripture-accounts of 'sin entering the world, and death by sin'; whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to account for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the first evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a creator, by tracing them up to the first pair.'" (Benares Magazine, III, pp. 286f.)

Elsewhere the same writer, speaking generally, observes, 'it may somewhat tend to check the mischievous consequences attendant on bluntly regarding any current and influential Hindu doctrine, that happens not to accord with our accustomed notions, as being self-evidently frivolous and effete, if it can be shown that the conceptions involved in the doctrine are still influential in directing the current of speculation in Europe, in quarters where that current runs (or is supposed to run) deepest.' (Opus cit., pp. 283f.)
To turn now to the life of Patañjali. The brief notices to be met with of him in Sanskrit works are so legendary and contradictory that little can be made of them to subserve the cause of history. He was a great scholar and unrivalled philologist of his time, and the life of every great man was, in ancient times, so encrusted with the supernatural that it is difficult to remove the covering, and come to the truthful core. Rev. J. Ward, citing the Rudrâyāmala Tantra, the Vrihannandikes'vara Purāṇa, and the Padma Purāṇa, describes him to 'have been born in the Ilāvrata Varsha, where his father Angirá and his mother Satí resided, and that, immediately on his birth, he made known things past, present, and future. He married Lolupá, whom he found on the north of Sumeru, in the hollow of a "Vaṭa" tree, and is said to have lived as a mendicant to a great age. Being insulted by the inhabitants of Bhọṭa-bhaṅḍāra, while engaged in religious austerities, he reduced them to ashes by fire from his mouth.' (Hindus, II.)

There occurs in the Sankshepa-s'ankara-jaya of Mádhava A'chárya a story, according to which the Devas, on one occasion, repaired to Mahádeva, and besought his aid in saving the world from the baneful doctrines which Baudhhas and other heretics had widely disseminated among men. The god vouchsafed to them a kind reply, and it was arranged that certain chief divinities would from time to time appear on earth as Jai-mini, Vyása, Patañjali, and S'ankara, and, uprooting all heresies, preserve the true religion from pollution. It fell to the lot of Vishṇu and S'ankarshaṇa alias Ananta
to depute a portion of themselves to be born as Patanjal, and Mahádeva himself appeared as S’ankara.† The only value of this story for historical purposes is the admission that Patanjali appeared on the earth long after it had been overrun by the Buddhists. MÁdhava A’chárya of the 14th century is no authority for what happened sixteen hundred years before him, but the tradition in his time was that Patanjali was born long after Buddha in order to inculcate theism, and this supports the opinion expressed on page xxiii to the effect that the Yoga doctrine as we have it in Patanjali’s work is of post Buddhist origin. It is in favour, too, of the deductions made by Goldstücker and others regarding the age of Patanjali from casual historical allusions in his great work, the Mahábháshya, entirely undermining, as it does, the arguments of Professor Kunte as given in his ‘Vicissitudes of Aryan civilization.’ It is true that the Yoga-sútra does not anywhere refer to Buddhism, and it is not easy to accept the theory of Professor Cowell that the relegation of benevolence (maitrî), which occupies a prominent place in the Buddhist system, to an ancillary or subordinate position in the Yoga is a direct allusion to Buddhism, (Sarvadars ana-sangraha, p. 273,) for benevolence as an element of religious observance is
common to all systems of religion, and reference to it cannot be taken as an unmistakable test; but apart from them, I believe, I have produced sufficient evidence to show that Patanjali cannot reasonably be believed to have lived before Buddha. Ananta is represented in the form of a many-hooded serpent, and, as an emanation of that serpent, Patanjali is frequently indicated by the homonym phani or 'serpent,' (cf. p. 1).

The references given of Patanjali in his Mahábháshya entirely upsets the statements made in Mr. Ward's notice. The sage describes himself as the son of one Gosiá, not Satí, and his place of birth was the eastern country, whereas Ilávrata is said in the Puráñas to lie to the north of the Himálaya. These facts are thus given by Goldstücker in his essay on Páñini:

'Of the lineage of Patanjali all the knowledge I possess is, that the name of his mother was Gosiá. It occurs in the last words of Patanjali on a Káriká to Páñini. Of more importance, however, is the information he gives us of having resided temporarily in Káshmir, for this circumstance throws some light on the interest which kings of this country took in the preservation of the great commentary.

'His birthplace must have been situated in the east of India, for he calls himself Gonardiya; and this word is given by the Káriká in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patanjali's birthplace had therefore the name of Gonarda. But that he is one of the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence. Kaiyyáta calls him on several occasions Acháryadéśiya. If we interpreted this word according to Páñini's rules V, 3, 67 and 68, it would mean 'an unaccomplished teacher;' but as there is not the slightest reason for assuming that Kaiyyáta intended any irony or blame when he applied this epithet to Patanjali, it is necessary to
render the word by the teacher "who belongs to the country of the Achārya." Now, since Kaiyyaṭa also distinctly contrasts āchārya as the author of the Vārttikas, with Āchāryadeśiya, the latter epithet can only imply that Patanjali was a countryman of Kātyāyana. Kātyāyana, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school; Kaiyyaṭa, therefore, must have looked upon Patanjali also as belonging to it.

'Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhaṭṭojī Dīkshita on the Phiṭ-sūtras which I have quoted above. For when this grammarian tells us that the eastern grammarians attribute the accent in question of saha to Pāṇini's rule VI, 3, 78, we find that it is Patanjali himself who gives us this information, and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other authorities.' (Goldstücker's Pāṇini, p. 237.)

Meagre as these notes on the life of Patanjali are, they are of unquestionable authority, and we must rest content with them. In the 'Indian Antiquary' (IX, p. 308), Professor Max Müller has a note on the travels of I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim, who visited India at the close of the 7th century, and therein mention is made of a Sanskrit grammatical work under the name of Juni or Chuni. The learned professor shows on very good arguments that the work could be no other than the Mahābhāshya, and then very pertinently asks, "Is this (Juni) possibly a name connected with Gonikā, the mother of Patanjali, who calls himself Gonikāputra, or with Gōnarda, his supposed birthplace, from which he takes the name of Gōnardīya?" Few who have studied the subject would hesitate to respond in the affirmative to the first question.

In a note on a Pāli inscription from Bhārhat, published in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for March 1880, I have quoted a
great number of instances to show that in India metronymics were used to indicate illegitimacy, or the forsaking of a child by its father. If this theory of mine be tenable, the use of Gõnikáputra in the case of Patañjali would suggest a bar sinister in his scutcheon. Under that supposition it would be futile to enquire about his genealogy. If Napoleon said, 'my genealogy begins with the battle of Austerlitz,' Patañjali might well appeal to his Mahābhāshya as the root of his family tree.* Professor Weber, however, has been at some pains to find a genealogical tree for him. In his 'History of Indian Literature' he has several remarks with reference to Patañjali in connection with the Vedic Kāpya Patamchala. He says, on page 137, 'Again, though only in the Yājñavalkhya-kānda, we have mention of a Kāpya Patamchala of the country of the Madras as particularly distinguished by his exertions in the cause of Brāhmanical theology; and in his name we cannot but see a reference to Kapila and Patañjali, the traditional founders of the Sánkhya, and Yoga systems.' This is modified in a subsequent remark, (p. 223,) in which it is said, 'The name of Patañjali (we should expect Pāt.†) is certainly somehow

* Professor Weber refers to a tradition which, he says, 'identifies Pingala with Patañjali, the author of Mahābhāshya and the Yoga-sūtra,' but he justly adds, it 'should answer for itself; for us there exists no cogent reason for accepting it.' ('Hist. Indian Literature,' p. 231.)

† This grammatical correction has been suggested apparently with a view to make Patañjali a derivative of Patamchala to prop the theory of relationship.
connected with that of the Patamchala Kápya of the land of the Madras, who appears in the Yájnavalkiya-kāṇḍa of the Satap. Br. It occurs again (see below p. 737) as the name of the author of the Yoga-sūtras.' On page 236, we are told that, 'Kapila, again, can hardly be unconnected with the Kápya Patamchala whom we find mentioned in the Yájnavalkya-kāṇḍa of the Vṛihad A'raṇyaka as a zealous representative of the Brāhmaṇical learning.' This is repeated on page 284,—'Kápya Patamchala, with whom Kapila ought probably to be connected.' It is difficult to make out from these extracts a consistent account of what the real or actual theory is. In the first extract a single individual, Kápya Patamchala, is split into two persons, Kapila and Patanjali, and that as certainly as the phrase 'we cannot but see' can imply. In the second extract the Vedic personage is said to be 'certainly' connected with Patanjali only, and in the third we are told that the same individual can 'hardly be unconnected' with Kapila. In the fourth the phrase 'can hardly be unconnected' is replaced by 'ought probably to be connected.' No reason is assigned for the first two conjectures, but for the 3rd and the 4th the reason assigned is that Kápya Patamchala was 'a zealous representative of the Brāhmaṇical learning.' It happens, however, that Kapila was an atheist, who repudiated the existence of the Godhead, saying 'there is no proof that such a being existed,' and it is difficult to conceive how the relationship should be established on the ground of Kápya having been 'a zealous representative of the Hindu learn-
ing,' unless we admit that Hindu learning consisted in atheism. It is obvious that the learned professor has been led away entirely by phonetic resemblance, unless he should urge, which is not at all likely, that it is an ex cathedra opinion, without any reason to back it. Kāpya has the letters k and p and so has Kapila, and Patamchala sounds very like Patañjali, and therefore he evidently concludes they are the same. This is a line of argument, however, which I cannot help thinking, is, to use the language of the learned Professor, 'of a very curious kind.' It reminds me, I must frankly confess, the ratiocination of Fluellen by which that jovial Welsh Captain proved the identity of Macedon and Monmouth. Had that flighty logician been reminded in the present case of the absence in Kāpya of the letter l of Kapila, and of j of Patañjali in Patamchala, I can easily conceive how he would have completely dumb-founded his antagonist with the pithy remark: 'Why, I pray you, is not pig great? the pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations.' I have nothing to show that Patañjali was not connected with Kāpya by the father's or the mother's or some other side, in family or race, but I firmly hold that we have at present no proof worth the name in support of the conjecture.

The son of a Brāhman priest, and devoted to literary studies and ascetic practices from early life, Patañjali had little to do which could afford incidents fit for historical record, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that we have no account left of his career. He was
doubtless married and probably the father of a family, but we know nothing about those points. The only memorials of his life are his literary works,—his great commentary on the grammar of Pāṇini and the Yoga-sūtra. It is impossible to speak in too high terms of the first. It is the noblest monument of profound erudition, of keen critical acumen, of unrivalled philological perception, which has been left to us by any ancient scholar in any part of the world, and well may the Hindus be proud of the heritage that has been bequeathed to them by their renowned ancestor. The second forms the theme of this essay. There is an A'rryā-panchāsāti on the Vaishāvaya theory of the relation between soul and nature which is also ascribed to him. The work has been published in the Benares 'Paṇḍit,' No. 50. He wrote also a work on medicine, but it is no longer extant. It would seem that he was, likewise, the author of a treatise on grammatical desiderata under the title of Ishṭis, and also certain supplementary notes on the rules of Sanskrit grammar (Vaṭikās), but these exist now only in the form of quotations in the Mahābhāshya. The manner in which they are cited in the 'great commentary' suggests the idea that at one time they had separate existences, but they are not met with now as a separate work.

To turn now to the Bibliography of the Yoga doctrine. The leading text is, as already stated, the Yogānus'asana, but its different topics have been elaborated and expounded in a great number of subsequent treatises, and its literature is now represented
by a large mass of writings. In 1859, Mr. Hall, in
his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibli-
ography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' collected
the names of 28 separate works. But recent re-
searches carried on under the auspices of the Govern-
ment of India enable me now to put in the Appendix
a list including no less than 150 names. It is pro-
bable that further researches will bring to light the
texts of several other works. It must be admitted,
however, that while Mr. Hall's list was compiled by
a single individual after himself examining all the
Mss. named, thereby obviating all risks of error,
mine is a compilation from meagre reports, and it
is likely, therefore, that there will be found in it
mistakes of diverse kinds. Sanskrit works have many
aliases, and it is possible that in some cases—probably
very few—of works unknown to, and unseen by, me
I have recorded the same work under two or three
names. I have included, too, a few works which treat
of varieties of the Yoga, the Tántric and Puráńic
forms of it, and not confined myself solely to the
document of Patanjali. The differences in some cases
are so slight, that it was not possible for me, without
carefully reading the works, to mark the distinctions.
On the whole, however, I believe the new list will be
found useful.

In preparing my list I have followed an alphabe-
tical arrangement, a chronological one with anything
like accuracy not being practicable in the present state
of our information on the subject. If the Yoga-s'ástr-
sútra-pátha, attributed to Yájnavalkya, be really his, it
is the oldest treatise known on the Yoga doctrine. Yajñavalkya lived long before Patanjali, and the Bhāshya especially cites his name to prove that the Yoga doctrine was current from a much anterior period than the Yoga-sūtra, which was compiled for the benefit of novices; but as I have not yet seen it, I can say nothing on the subject. Adverting to the work, Mr. Hall says, 'It is alleged that they (the aphorisms of Yajñavalkya) were noted down by Baudhāyana, as they were orally delivered by S’ukra to Yajñavalkya. Hence they are ascribed to S’ukra, who here has the epithet of Mahākavi. This work possibly deserves a closer examination than I can at present give it: but, it is, I suspect, of comparatively recent origin, and of little worth in any point of view.' (Contributions, p. 18.)

Passing it over for the present I come to the work of Patanjali, the Yoga-sūtra alias the Yogānus’āsana or the Sāṅkhya-pravachana. It has the benefit of a host of commentaries, explaining its tenets from different standpoints. The most ancient of these commentaries is generally believed to be the one which is known under the different names of Yoga-bhāshya, Pātanjala-bhāshya, and Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāshya. It is held in high estimation by the Pandits of this country. It has the advantage, too, of two exegeses by eminent scholiasts, one by Vāchaspati Mis’ra, and the other by Vijnāna Bhikshu. It labours, however, under the disadvantage of being of doubtful authenticity as regards the name of its author. It has been twice printed, once
at Benares, edited by Bhairavadatta Dvivedí, and once at Calcutta, along with the gloss of Váchaspáti Míśra, edited by Paññít Jívánanda Vidyáságara, in 1874 (Samvat 1929.) I have also seen upwards of a dozen Mss. of it of different dates; but in the colophon of none of these have I met with the author’s name. This is a remarkable omission, inasmuch as it is rarely that the author’s name, where known, is dropped out from the colophon of a Sanskrit MS. The tradition is pretty common and old that Vyása, the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahábhárata, is the author of it. This tradition has been generally accepted by European writers, and it has the support of the two well-known and respectable exegesists named above. Váchaspáti Míśra in his gloss (tiká) on the commentary (bháshya) says, “Saluting the saint Patanjali, I attempt a short, clear exposition (vyákhya), pregnant with meaning, on the commentary expounded by Veda-vyása.”* The authority, however, of this writer is not, in matters connected with historical facts of olden times, of much weight. There were two writers of this name. One of them was a legist, and, according to the colophon of his S’udrdchára-chintámaṇi, court Paññít of Mahárájá Harináráyaṇa, of Mithilá, and Harináráyaṇa lived in the middle of the 16th century. The other lived between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and commented both on the Yoga and the S’ankhya texts, as well as on the Vedánta-sútras. Adverting to him

* नमः पतन्त्रकिंचिै वेदविषयं भाषिते।
रक्ष्यति धर्मविहर्षे भाष्ये बाख्य निषादेते॥
Mr. Hall says, 'Váchaspati's exact age has not yet been discovered. But he is mentioned, as are Udayana and Prasastapáda, in the Nyáyására-vichára of Bhaṭṭa Rághava, which was written in the S'aka year 1174 or A. D. 1252; and he quotes from Bhoja, who was reigning in A. D. 1042.'* (Sánkhya-sára, p. 40.)

Vijnána Bhikshu dates from a much later time. According to Mr. Hall, 'in all probability, Vijnána lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. There is some slight ground, however, for carrying him back still further. His nationality is unknown; and so is his civil appellation even; for Vijnána Bhikshu is, without question, the style of a devotee.' (Sánkhya-sára, pp. 37f.)

He continues, 'In the Prayogaratna, a work on the sixteen sacraments, by Nárayaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Rámes'vara Bhaṭṭa, its author says, that he was assisted,

* This date is incorrect. It refers to the last Bhoja, whereas the Bhoja quoted must be the elder one, and elsewhere constructively admitted to be so by Mr. Hall himself. In the Preface to his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' he observes, 'that two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever was the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court; and the astrological compilation known as the Rájamártanda, and thus called in honour of him, may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work, so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate he came long after the date of the Sarvasvatśaṅkhábharaṇa; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet of Ranarānga-malla.' (Contributions, p. viii.)
in preparing it, by Ananta Dīkshita, son of Vis'vanātha Dīkshita. The father of one of Vijnāna's disciples, Bhāvā-gaṇeśa Dīkshita, was Bhāvā-vis'vanātha Dīkshita; and, if the latter was one with Vis'vanātha Dīkshita, and if Bhāvā-gaṇeśa Dīkshita was brother of Ananta Dīkshita, we are enabled to form a pretty correct estimate as to the time of Vijnāna Bhikshu. For Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's youngest brother's second son, Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa, dates his Kāla-tattva-vivechana in Samvat 1677 or A. D. 1620: Vijnāna may be placed fifty or sixty years earlier.' But whatever the times of Vijnāna Bhikshu and Vāchaspati Miśra, it is futile to expect from such authors any precision as to the identity of a person who lived many centuries before them.

The name Vyāsa may be right enough, but there is nothing whatever to show that this Vyāsa was the same with the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahābhārata. In the Mahābhārata every epigraph gives the name of Vyāsa, and there is no reason why it should be omitted in the commentary. Then Vyāsa lived at a remote period of antiquity, in the beginning of the Kali Yuga according to Indian belief, and his classification and division of the Vedas existed long before the time of Patanjali, for we have unmistakable proofs of the existence of the classification in Pāṇini, Yāska, the Prātis'ākhyaśas, and other works of a much earlier date than that of the Yoga aphorisms, and it is impossible to reconcile the idea that he should be the author of an exegesis which could not have had a raison d'être before the Yoga-sūtra was
composed in the 2nd or 3rd century before the Christian era. That exegesis quotes, too, authorities which are of a more recent date than that of Vyása. The evidence of style is often a suspicious one, but no one who has any knowledge of the Sanskrit language will for a moment think it possible that he who wrote the Mahábhárata could be the author of the Bháshya under notice. Compared with the works of leading scholiasts, the Bháshya appears to be the production of a third class writer. It certainly cannot be compared with the ‘great commentary’ of Patañjali, or with the equally renowned exegesis of S’ankara on the Vedánta aphorisms, or with the commentary of Sabara Svámi on the Mímáñsá; and, whatever his age, Vyása was by the unanimous testimony of the Hindus a far superior author and scholar to Patañjali, or Sabara, or S’ankara. Fairly good though it be, there is a looseness, an indecision, a want of logical precision, in the Bháshya which are incompatible with the universal estimate of Vyása’s learning and scholarship. Bhojadeva treats it with withering sarcasm. Without naming it, but obviously aiming at it, he says, ‘all commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number,’ (p. 2). It may be that Bhoja had to justify his attempt at a new commentary by throwing discredit on his predecessors, but his remarks are not al-
together unauthorised. The invocation at the beginning of the Bhâshya is also against its authenticity. No work of the leading Rishis which has come down to us contains any such invocation, and Vyása would be the last to pray to Mahádeva in the way in which that divinity has been invoked in the Bhâshya. The tone of the Bhâshya is that of a third class mediæval scholium, and I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that it is not the work of the digester of the Vedas. Its author may have borne the name of Vyása, a common family name even to this day, but he was not the digester of the Vedas nor older than the latest ancient times, or, more probably, the early middle ages.

The next commentary I have to notice is the Râjamártaṇḍa, of which a complete English translation is now offered to the public. It is not so ambitious as the last. It styles itself a vṛitti or gloss, whereas the other is a Bhâshya or commentary. It is mainly explanatory, when the other is discursive. It is modest in tone, when the other is dictatorial. Its author sets forth his object in writing the work by saying, 'Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patañjali for the edification of intelligent persons,' (p. 2). And he has faithfully carried out his resolution. He has interpreted all the leading words of his text, and given a very fair explanation of the meaning of his author, and the purport and bearing of his doctrine. It is, perhaps, not always quite so full in philosophical matter as its predecessor, but it
certainly omits nothing of importance for a correct understanding of the text.

It is generally taken for granted by Indian writers that Bhoja, king of Dhárá, who flourished in the middle of the 11th century, was the author of the exegesis; but the opinion is not tenable. Doubtless the colophon of the exegesis names Maharájádhirája Bhojadeva as its author, but there have been many Bhojas in India, (cf. my 'Indo-Aryans,' II, pp. 385f,) and it does not show which is the sovereign meant: it certainly does not announce that this Bhoja was the hero of the Bhojaprabhanda and a sovereign of Dhárá in the century named. The title assigned him in the introduction to the work is Ranarangamalla, and this, as far as we know, was not borne by the Bhoja of the 11th century. The former is, moreover, described in the introduction to have written three works, a grammatical treatise on the government of words, a medical memoir under the title of Rájamrigánka, and the gloss under notice, and none of these is attributed by the Bhojaprabhanda to its hero. On the other hand, that hero is known to have written or published in his name a work on judicial astrology as bearing on Smriti rites, under the name of Rájamártanda, and it is impossible to imagine that he assigned the same name to his exegesis on the Yoga aphorisms. Two such dissimilar works could not have been published under one common name. And even if one believed such a nomenclature to be possible or probable, the question would arise, how is it that in the introduction to the Yoga, the astrological work is altogether
left out of record? The astrological work is several times the size of the Yoga exegesis, and otherwise of considerable importance; it has been very largely quoted by subsequent writers, and it is not at all probable that an author, or his encomiast, who was particular in noticing the meagre and poor medical treatise should overlook it. It might be said that it was composed after the composition of, and therefore could not be included in, the Yoga gloss, but that would be a simple assumption without any proof, a mere begging of the question. That the Rājāmārtanda is not a generic, but a specific, name is evident from the fact of an exegesis on the Sāṅkhya bearing the name of Rājavārtika, which is believed to have been dedicated to Ranarangamalla. It is probable, therefore, that our author is the Bhoja of the 10th century, who was also a king of Dharā. Adverting to him, Mr. Hall says, "That two Bhajas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever were the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court, and the astrological compilation known as the Rājāmārtanda and thus called in honour of him may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate, he came long after the date of the Sarasvatī-kanṭhābharana; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet, Raṇarangamalla.' (Contributions, p. viii.)
Of the other commentaries on the Yoga-Sūtra, the works of Bhavadeva, Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa, Bhāvā-ganēśa, Udayankara, Nages’a Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇa Bhikshu, Sadāśiva, Rāmānanda Tīrtha, Mahādeva, Ananta, S’an:kara, Umāpati Tripāṭhi, and Kshemānanda, may be cited as samples. They are all inferior in importance to the work of Bhoja, and call for no special remark here.

The same may be said of the other works named in my list. Some of them treat of the various practices which Yogis resort to to acquire occult powers; while others describe modified forms of the doctrine of Patanjali, suited to Vaishnava, Sāiva, and Śākta forms of worship, so as to lead the individual soul, in its longing for salvation, to subsidence in, or union with, the Divinity.

Among the works of the first group the most popular and noted is the Haṭha-pradīpikā or Haṭha-dīpikā. It comprises 395 stanzas, divided into 4 chapters or lessons, (Upaḍes’a), the first treating of postures, the second of regulation of breath, the third of gesticulation or mūḍrās, and the fourth of Samādhi. Its author is one Chintāmaṇi, son of Sahajānanda, but this name of his was what he got when living as a householder. On his becoming a hermit he took the name of Śvātmārāma, and received the title of Yogindra, and is now generally known by the name of Śvātmārama Yogindra. He makes a great mystery of the theme of his work. He says, “By Yogis wishing for perfection, this science should be carefully kept in secret, for it is most efficient when
kept secret, and worthless when disclosed.”* Like the alchemists of old, he indicates simple things by round-about metaphorical names, and enjoins that none but adepts should know anything of his subject. This book is named Haṭha vidyā, or the science of the letters ha and ṭha, ha meaning the sun and ṭha the moon. This sun again stands for the breath inspired, and the moon for the breath expired, and the ultimate meaning of Haṭha-vidyā is thus the science of inspiration and expiration. Although by profession and habit a recluse who had thoroughly abandoned the world and its attractions, Svātmārāma, indulges at times in language of a grossly carnal type. Thus in one place he says, “let beef be eaten and the immortal arrack (vāruni) be drunk every day. I reckon him who does so, to be a kulina (a noble householder); the rest are destroyers of their nobility.”† Here beef gomāṇa stands for the tongue, which should be reverted and made to touch the palate, and vāruni means the breath which passes over this reverted tongue. Again: “Let the youthful chaste widow be ravished on the land between the rivers Ganges and Yamunā; it is the highest glory of Vishnu.”‡ Here the two rivers are the two nostrils, and the widow is the breath which is to be forcibly suppressed for a time. This style of

* सचिनिया परं नाया वैभिनिसा विभिन्निस्पत्ता |
उदद्धिवेष्ठीहूँ गुप्ता विभिनि० नू प्रकाशिता |
† नौमांचे भवैवेश्वरीं दिबेदसरसालीः |
कुल्लीं ततवं सथे दस्ते कुल्लाांसां |
‡ नाबाधुग्नथे मथे बालवधासांनी |
वशाक्तारेष सदाप्राप्तियोऽसि: सरसं परं
allegory and mystery is adopted by a great many mediæval writers on the Yoga. At the beginning of the work, the author has given a list of thirty renowned Yogís who had practised the science in question. At the head of these appear A’dinátha, who is generally identified with S’íva, who is believed to be the first and most renowned of Yogís. The work has been made the subject of comment by several writers, among whom Brahmánanda, the author of the Jyotaná, is reckoned to be the ablest.

It would seem that the Yoga doctrine was, at a very early period, translated to Persia, and disseminated in some form or other among different sects. The Sa-pásiyán obtained it in its entirety. They believed on efficacy of discipline and austerity; they assiduously practised the regulation of breath enjoined in the Yoga; they divided the stages of their progress in meditation in the same way as the Yogís did; they held the highest meditation to be a state of trance identically the same as the Samádhi; they claimed occult powers* of the same nature and character as

* 'Of these illustrious personages they have many miraculous and mysterious deeds: such as, in the upper world, hiding the sun's disk; causing him to appear at night; making the stars visible in the day-time: and in this lower world, walking on the surface of water; making trees productive out of season; restoring verdure to dried up wood; causing trees to bow down their heads; also showing themselves between heaven and earth in the form of lightning; and such like: and, in the animated world metamorphosing animals; rendering themselves invisible to men; appearing under various shapes and forms: some of which wonders have been recorded in the Barmgah-i-durveshi-khushi. They relate that these great per.
did the Yogis; they were familiar with the idea of the possibility of the soul at will passing from one body into another; they believed in metempsychosis; and, if they looked upon union with the Supreme Divinity as the *sumnum bonum* of their faith, they but accepted one of the several forms of the Yoga, different doubtless from the Isolation of Patanjali, but not independent of it. (*Cf.* *Dabistán* I, pp. 5f.) It is, however, not known whether the system of Sapásiyáns was founded upon any translation of a Sanskrit Yoga work, or on oral communication. Some of the Sapásiyáns admitted their obligation to Hindustán, but their text-books, the few and imperfect ones that are still accessible, have not yet been sufficiently examined to throw light on the question. The close relationship existing between the two systems, even in the use of technical terms, preclude the idea of spontaneous growth, and the avowed posteriority of the Persian doctrine leaves no doubt of its Indian origin; but as at present advised, we are not in a position to spot the exact text from which it was derived.

Of interpretations of the Yoga system in foreign languages the earliest appears to be an Arabic version of the text of Patanjali. The work is no longer

sonages were to such a degree enabled to divest themselves of corporeal elements that they quitted the body at pleasure; also that they had acquired from the court of heaven the knowledge of all sciences, whether known or occult, and *consequently* had the power of exhibiting such wonderful works; having rendered, by the efficacy of their austerities, elementary matters subject to themselves.”

(*Troyer and Shea’s Dabistán i Muzahib*, II, pp. 107f.)
extant, but the testimony in favour of its having once existed is unquestionable. Abu Réhán al Niráni, in his Tárikh-ul Hind, which formed a part of his famous Kánún-i-Masúdi (A. D. 1025-36), says, 'I have translated into Arabic two Indian works, one discusses the origin and quality of things which exist and is entitled Sánkhya, the other is known under the title of Patanjali, which treats of the deliverance of the soul from the trammels of the body. These two works contain the chief principles of the Indian creed.' (Elliot's Historians, I, p. 99; Journal Asiaticque, IV série, tom. IV, p. 121; Reinaud's Fragments Arabs et Persans.) It does not appear that any Persian version of Patanjali was ever taken in hand in the time of Akbar and his successor, when so many Sanskrit works were rendered into that language. There is, however, an abstract of the Yoga doctrine in the Dabistán-i-Muzaháb of Mahsin-i Fáni. That author flourished in the middle of the 17th century, and, during a long residence at Allahabad as the Chief Judge (Sudder), collected a great deal of information on the subject. Depending evidently on oral information, he could not avoid gross mistakes in his account of the philosophy, but in regard to the details of Yoga exercises and the occult powers he has compiled as reliable an exposition as could be expected from such a source. He notices Gorakhanátha and several other celebrated saints, and states that he had seen some Yogis possessed of wonderful occult powers, but he does not name Patanjali. (cf. Shea and Troyer's Translation, II, pp. 123f.)
In English the first attempt to give an account of the Yoga doctrine was made by Ward in his account of the Hindus, but it did not produce any satisfactory result. Colebrooke's resumé in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, is much more philosophic in spirit and faithful in details, but Colebrooke took it up only casually in connexion with his essay on the Sáňkhya, and did not notice much more than the first chapter of the work. Taylor, in the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavadgíta, supplies the Kriyá-yoga with considerable fulness, and Windischmann's account, though brief, is tolerably good. In 1853 Dr. Ballantyne published a translation of the first two chapters of the Yoga-sútra with extracts from the commentary of Bhojadeva, and from it abstracts of the Yoga system have been compiled by Dr. K. M. Banerjea, and Rev. Mr. Mullins. The translation of Ballantyne was completed, in a disjointed way, by Pańdit Govindaram Sástrí in the pages of a Benares magazine called the "Pandit." The two fragments have lately been printed together by the Theosophical Society of Bombay. The text with an original commentary together with an English translation is now being printed in the Saddarsana-chintaniká of Bombay, and an abstract of the text occurs in Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-sangraha. An account of Yoga practices may also be seen in a pamphlet by Nabinchandra Pál, published at Benares.

Little need be said in praise of Dr. Ballantyne's work. The profound learning and thorough conservancy with Hindu philosophy which that learned
scholar brought to bear on his undertaking, enabled him to produce a very accurate reproduction of the original. In his anxiety, however, to be accurate he had occasion to resort too frequently to parenthetical clauses, and they resulted in confused sentences, involving much trouble in understanding them. His extracts from the commentary are particularly amenable to this objection. The extracts, moreover, are somewhat disjointed.

When the Asiatic Society of Bengal first proposed to publish an edition of the Yoga-sūtra with the commentary of Bhojadeva, I undertook to reprint Dr. Ballantyne’s translation with such additions as would complete the work. I soon found, however, that my work placed beside his produced a very patchy appearance, and his parenthetical style was not desirable for a proper and easy understanding of the text. I preferred, therefore, to translate the whole in my own way. The aphorisms will be found to be as closely literal as the idiom of the English language would admit of, and the commentary a fair reproduction of the spirit, sense and wording of the original, without being a verbatim reproduction.

Much difficulty has been felt in the treatment of the technical terms. Philosophical terms in the English language have not yet arrived at that fixity and firmness which would preclude possible variations. Different writers assign different values to even well-established terms, and their latitude is frequently varying; and such as they are, they are not exact equivalents of Sanskrit words, which in their turn vary
in meaning under different circumstances and in the hands of different writers. There are instances, too, of Sanskrit terms whose literal significations are very different from the philosophical ideas they are intended to convey, and in dealing with them, the translator has either to sacrifice precision of rendering for the sake of intelligibility, or intelligibility for the sake of precision. In the following pages I have borrowed the terms mostly from Colebrooke's translation of the Sánkhya-kariká, translating a few myself, and transliterating the Sanskrit terms in some cases. My reasons I have explained as far as I could in my notes.

When I undertook the task I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogô; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Panḍit in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupillage under Hindu rules—living in his hut and ever following his footsteps—to which I could not submit. I had, therefore, to depend on my own knowledge of the Sanskrit language to arrive at the meaning of Patañjali, availing myself frequently of the aid of my learned friend Professor Mahes'achandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, for the solution of difficulties. I had the assistance, too, of Professor Kámákhýánátha Tarkaratna, of that College, both in revising the text and in translating it. Both the Professors are distinguished
Nyáya scholars, and Paúdit Mahès'achandra commands a deep knowledge of the Sánkhya, and with their aid, I believe, I have been able to avoid gross misinterpretations of the text, though I cannot flatter myself with the idea that I have been able always satisfactorily to expound the meaning of Patanjali.

Manuscripts of the Yoga-sútra are common enough in Bengal, but I have not met with any particularly old, or exceptionally correct text. In carrying the text and commentary through the press, I had the use of the following codices:


G. Ballantyne's reprint annexed to his translation.

H. From Bombay, copied for me from a MS. belonging to the Government collection preserved in
the office of the Director of Public Instruction. Generally correct.

I. From my family Library, a quarto volume in Bengali. Corrupt and little used.

In the text of Patanjali, no variation of any note has been met with in the above codices. The work appears to have been preserved with every care, as may be presumed from the circumstance of its having enjoyed the benefit of a host of commentaries and glosses. The commentary of Bhoja has not been so correctly preserved. There are many differences of reading in the different codices. But on the whole the differences are not so material as would justify the assumption of different recensions, or produce any marked changes in the meaning of the author.

8 Maniktollah, }

January 28, 1883. }
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Notes:
- steadiness
- anyatva
- out
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- Perfections
- body
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- the author
(Sanskrit)

1  सन्निर्देशः
2  परिचारकः
3  विषया
4  भावा
5  चर्चा
6  विनिर्देशः
7  'चारणः'
8  खासः
9  रेखायः
10  चर्चाधातृः
11  अवाकः
12  संस्कृतः
13  परमावधः
14  अध्यादेशः
15  चर्चाधातृः
16  विनिर्देशः
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THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Gaṅeśa. May that semi-corporeal union* of Śiva and his spouse (Śivā) by the recollection of which man enjoys isolation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal Śiva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ which besets mankind.

3. That unprecedented work§ of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (Purusha) from nature (Prakṛti) to be Yoga|| (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

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* A fit of jealousy, according to the Kālikā Purāṇa, had caused a temporary separation between Śiva and his spouse Durgā. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Separation of the human soul from all association with nature. Vide p. 207.

‡ Viz., lat, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. Vide Wilson's Sākhya-kārikā, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

¶ A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment of, lit. disunion from (sīyoga), the world is a conditio sine qua non to the Yogi, which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is separation from sensuous objects is the union or dissolution of the thinking principle in its original source.

¶ Patanjali is believed to have been an incarnation of Ananta, and the title indicates that idea. Vide Introduction, p. lxvii.
even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Raṇaraṇāgamalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patañjali, and written on medicine a treatise called the Rājamṛigāṅka†—may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.‡

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patañjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

---

* A title of Bhoja.
† All these works of Bhoja are still extant.
‡ "Commentators each dark passage shun—
   And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun."
St. Jerome "not versions but inversions."
Italian, Traduttori traditori " Translators traitors."
"Surrender rather than render;
Not turning, but overturning."
THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Ganeśa. May that semi-corporeal union* of Śiva and his spouse (Sivá) by the recollection of which man enjoys emancipation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal Śiva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ (which besets mankind.)

3. That unprecedented§ work of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (Puruṣa) from nature (Prakṛiti) to be Yoga|| (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

* A fit of jealousy, according to the Kālikā Purāṇa, had caused a temporary separation between Śiva and his spouse Durgā. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Escaping from transmigration in one of four different ways, all implying equality with the Divinity in some way or other. These are: 1st, Śrāvakā, or the enjoyment of equal supremacy with the Divine Soul; 2nd, Śākya, or getting abode in the same region with the Divinity; 3rd, Śānyā, or the merging of the human into the divine, from intimate union; and 4th, Śānyā, or obtaining of the form of the Divinity. The 3rd is also indicated by the term Kaivalya, the word used in the text. It means abstraction or separation from nature and the products thereof.

‡ Viz., 1st, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. Vide Wilson’s Sāṅkya-kārikā, p. 2.

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|| A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment lit., disunion (viyoga) from the world is a condition sine qua non to the Yoga which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is abstraction from sensuous objects is concentration in the Divinity.

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7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting its inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patañjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

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St. Jerome "not versions but inversions."
Italian, Traduttori traditori "Translators traitors."
"Surrender rather than render; Not turning, but overturning."
CHAPTER FIRST.

Now, an exposition of the Yoga (is to be made).

This aphorism explains the subject of the work, the object with which it is written, and the relation (it bears to the subject). (The word) "Now"* (atha) suggests (that) a (distinct) topic (here commences), and it serves also as a benediction.

(The word) Yoga means 'union,' or the application of the mind to abstract contemplation, from the root yug “to meditate.” An “exposition” (anusāsana) is that whereby something is expounded or described through its characteristic marks, its real nature, its distinctive divisions, its causes and effects. (The two words Yoga and anusāsana form the compound) Yoganusāsana, (which means) "an exposition of the Yoga.” This is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this work (of Patanjali).

Yoga, with the means of performing it and its fruit, constitutes the subject, that being treated of in this Institute. The object of the work is the explanation of the subject, and the fruit thereof is the emancipation obtainable by the Yoga. The relation of the work is the connection which exists between that which treats, and the subject treated of, (or the Institute and its subjects). The connection between Yoga, the subject, and its effect, which is emancipation (Kaivalya), or the means and the end, is also its relation. The substance of this is—that in the work are described the instruments of performing the Yoga which is its subject—that Yoga the accomplishment of which leads to the consummation of emancipation called Kaivalya.

[Dr. Ballantyne has rendered the word Yoga into “concentration.” That English word, however, in its ordinary signification, does

* Dr. Ballantyne's text has athātah "now then."
not convey anything like a fair idea of what Yoga means. The word meditation would have been more appropriate, but even that does not convey all the ideas which the Sanskrit term has been made to comprehend. A perfect English equivalent is not to be had, and I prefer, therefore, to use the original term to coin a new one. The commentator so explains the word Anus'ásana as to convey the idea that it is a verbal noun intended to explain the purport of the work. The commentary named Pátanjalabháshya takes it along with the word Yoga to be the specific name of the work. (Yogánus'ásanam náma Sástram). If this be accepted, and it appears to be the most appropriate, the aphorism should be rendered into, "Now, the (work called) Yogánus'ásana, (will be expounded)." Váchaspati Miśra, the annotator on the last named work, and Vijñána-bhikshu in his Pártika, take notice of this subject. They also raise the question about the origin of the doctrine. They hold that Patanjali was not the originator of the doctrine, for it has existed from creation, and Híranya-garbha was the first performer of the Yoga; but that he was merely the compiler of the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them. Namu hiranyagarbho yogasya kartá nányah purátana iti yogiyána-valkyasmríteh, katham patanjaler yoga-sástrivamityás'áthkya sútrakáreṇa anus'ásanamityyuktam, s'ishtasḥyánus'ásanam.)

Now what is this Yoga? To this the author replies:—

II.

Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.

"Thinking principle" (chitta) is of the form of goodness without a taint. "Functions" (vríti) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. "Yoga" or meditation is described to be the "suppression" (nirodha), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of
the tendency outward, of the functions in question. This suppression is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—restless activity, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity (kshipta) is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (mūdha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Rākshasas), ghosts (Pisāchas), &c. Voluptuousness (vikshipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness (sattva), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c, in a disorderly way is this: notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this: that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, viz., concentration and suppression, that in which
the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable.

[The most important word in the aphorism is chitta which has been rendered into "thinking principle" by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word manas "mind," and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy — i.e., "that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills." (Taylor, Elements of Thought) "or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned," (Harris, Hermes, p. 227)—he is right. In the Sāṅkhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart manas has been used in the same sense (Mahādākhyamādyam kāryam ātmanām, I, 71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sāṅkhya aphorisms the word chitta does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyāya. The Vedāntists use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhī (Vedānta-sūtra). Its equivalent in the Sāṅkhya is Adhyāvasāya, which is synonymous with Buddhī. (Adhyāvasāyo buddhiḥ, II, 13). It is called Mahat "the great one," because "it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole." (Mahattvam svetara-sakalakārya-vyāpakatvan-mahāikvāryāchcha.) It is mati "understanding," because every thing is understood by it, (manyati anayā); khyāti "familiar knowledge;" jñāna, and prajñā. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by chitta is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sāṅkhya does, and by say-
the tendency outward, of the functions in question. The form is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. That suppression being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—unquietness, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Therewith the condition of unquietness (kshipta) is induced by the access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, and Titans, sons of Danu &c. Addiction to evil action without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (mudha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Rakshasas) and ghosts, (Pišáchas) &c. Voluptuousness (vikshipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness, (sattva), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes active (or desirous); by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression having an excess of the quality of the goodness and foulness, successively placed, are reckoned fit for that.

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ing that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (Vṛitti-nirodhat tatsiddhik, III, 31). Thus Vāchaspatsi Miśra—chitta-s'abdenántakaranam buddhimupalaksakayati. According to the order of creation prakṛiti comes first, thence chitta, thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtle organs &c., and this both according to the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense.

The next word is vṛitti. I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into "functions." The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness. In so far they are allotropic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijnāna Bhikshu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which prakṛiti is the materiality. (Pariñāmarupam jagadupadānakalvantuprakṛitivam.) Pariñāma or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying "they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions." Vijnāna Bhikshu calls it transformation of Prakṛiti, (prakṛitivirūpam). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne's use of the term "modification" affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive.

The last word is nirodha, which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same.

The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The Pātanjala-bhāṣya points this out by saying that since the word sarva "all" has not been used before vṛitti "functions," the form of Yoga in which there is a distinct recognition is also Yoga. (Sarvasabdāgraṭanat samprajñātopi Yogah). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification.]
Now the author of the Sūtras, wishing to describe the words *chitta-vṛtti-nirodhah*, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word *chitta*.

III.

Then (*i.e.* at the time of meditation) there is abidance of the spectator in its own form.

"Then," at that time, the soul, as "the spectator," (*dṛṣṭā) "abides" remains in its own form, which is simple intelligence (and nothing more). The meaning is this: that on knowledge being fully developed, there being no shadow of any sensuous object cast on the thinking principle, and the egotism of one's self, which is the actor, being gone, and intellect being fit for liberation, the soul abides or obtains location in Buddhi which is its own form.

[The spectator is the soul which, abiding in the body, and influenced by the thinking principle, beholds what is done by the organs, but does not partake of the pleasures and pains resulting from their action, and in the state of Yoga the functions being stopped there is the spectator without any spectacle to behold. This spectator is the soul.]

What then is the form (of the soul) when waking (or active, *i.e.* other than in a state of meditation)? To this he replies:

IV.

At other times it is in the same form as its functions.

"At other times"—*i.e.*, at times other than that of meditation. Its "functions" are those the characteristics of which will hereafter be described (A. V.) "In the same form" means to consist of it. The purport is this. Even as the functions, involving pleasure, pain and bewilderment, manifest themselves, so does the soul *i.e.*, it appears so to itself. If so, it follows that that object, in which, in the state of modification produced by concentration, the power of understanding finds its own form, and which
being influenced by the functions of the senses resolves itself into worldly objects, and the soul appears manifest in the forms thereof, as the moon reflected in the moving ripples on the water, appears as if it were (itself) moving, is the thinking principle chittha.

[It is a dogma of the Hindu metaphysicians that the thinking principle or intellect assumes the form of the object perceived. And the aphorism explains that when that principle is immersed in complete Yoga it perceives itself and nothing more, but when it is active and influenced by external objects it assumes the forms of its excitants].

To explain the term function, (the third word in A. II,) the author says:—

V.

The functions are fivefold, (and they are either) painful or not painful.

The "functions" (vr̥tti) are certain modifications of the thinking principle. The word panchatayi (five-fold) is formed by the addition of the affix tayap (Pāṇini v. ii. 42), and implies that the totality of the forms of the functions constitutes the form-bearer, and the functions severally are the forms thereof. The five functions are what are meant.

How are they? They are painful or not painful. "Those that are involved in sufferings of the kind about to be described are painful; those that are the reverse of these are not painful."

[This aphorism is a verbatim copy of Kapila's aphorism 33, Book II. It only propounds what are to be explained in subsequent aphorisms].

The five functions are to be described after being named.

VI.

(The functions of the thinking principle are) right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory.

Of these the author gives the definitions successively.
VII.

Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony.

Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge.

"Perception" (pratyaksha) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic.

"Inference" (anumāna) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it.

A trustworthy word is "testimony," (āgama).

[Pramāṇa means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, i.e., evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Sāṅkhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiyāyikas, however, reckon four kinds, viz., preception (pratyaksha), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (śabda). The Vedāntīs follow this latter, and the Mīmāṃskas recognise six, viz., perception (pratyaksha), presumption (arthāpatti), proportion (sambhava), privation (abhāva), comprehension (pratibha), and oral communication (aitiḥkya).

The word used for perception is pratyaksha, which means "that which is seen," but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception,
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"evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." For testimony Patanjali gives ágama, which means the Vedas, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym áptarachana "reliable words"; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony].

Having thus described the function of right notion the author speaks of Misconception.

VIII.

Misconception is incorrect notion, (or a notion) which abides in a form which is not that of its object.

"Misconception" (viparyaya) is a notion of something in respect of which it really is not; as the notion of silver in mothero'pearl. "Which abides in a form which is not that of its object" is to say a notion which does not abide in that form which is its (real) form (in respect of which the notion is entertained). It amounts to this, that the notion does not reveal the real form of the thing. Doubt (saññaya) founded on the notion whether a thing abides in its proper form or not, such as whether a particular object seen is a man or the stump of a tree, is also a Misconception.

To describe the function of Fancy, he says:

IX.

Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words, but of which (there is) no object (corresponding in reality).

Knowledge dependant on words is sabda-jñána. That which follows it, is sabda-jñánánupáti (the epithet used to define Fancy, which in the text has been translated by the word "notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words"). Such a notion without reference to the real character of an object.
is "Fancy." Thus the words, "the intelligence of the soul (purusha) is its own form." Here a notion is assumed by admitting a distinction as in the notion produced by the possessive case in the phrase "the blanket of Devadatta," though it does not really exist, for in fact the soul is intelligence itself (and there is no distinction between it and its intelligence, or of possessor and the possessed).

["In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief; among these fancy next
Her office holds; of all eternal things
Which the five watchful senses represents
She forms imagination's airy shapes,"

Paradise Lost, B. V.]

In order to declare what Sleep is, he says:

X.

Sleep is that function (of the thinking principle) which has for its object the conception of nothing.

Of that function which is based on the conception of nothing the name is as aforesaid (abhávapraptayá.) Hence it follows that "Sleep" (niidrá) is that function (of the thinking principle) which takes place on the quitting of all objects, in consequence of the quality of darkness always preceding it. That this is a function (of the thinking principle and not a mere blank) is proved by our seeing that one recollects (on arising from a sound sleep) that "I slept pleasantly," which could not have happened without a consciousness of it, (and no memory can exist of that which is not). Hence it is a function.

In order to describe Memory, he says:

XI.

Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognised.
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"The not letting go" (asampramoha) or not allowing to escape from our intellect an object which has once been recognised through (proper) evidence is "Memory" (smriti).

Of the five functions Evidence, Misconception, and Fancy belong to the waking state. When any of these, from vividness of impression, becomes perceptible (in sleep), it is a Dream (svapna.) But Sleep of itself has no cognisable object. Memory again is dependent on Evidence, Misconception, Fancy or Sleep.

[Bishop Hall says, "Memory is the great keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been." It is said to be dependant on Evidence, Misconception, &c., because the impressions it preserves are the productions of those causes.]

Having thus described the functions (of the thinking principle), in order to explain the suppression (the fourth word in A. II,) of these with the means thereof, he says:

XII.

The suppression of these (functions is effected) by Exercise and Dispassion.

"Exercise" (abhyāsa) and Dispassion" (vairāgya) will be defined in the aphorisms about to be given. The repression by these (Exercise and Dispassion) of the functions of the thinking principle which have the form of revealing, energizing and regulating, is "suppression" (nirodha). What is meant is the placing of the functions, which from their turning inwards have ceased to dwell on external objects, in the thinking principle, which is their original cause, and of which they are but potential attributes.

Aversion from sensuous objects is produced by "Dispassion" resulting from a knowledge of the evil influence of those objects (on the thinking principle), and confirmed steadfastness is acquired by "Exercise," which makes it a source of happiness and quiet; and by the (conjoined effect of the) two the functions of the thinking principle are suppressed.
[The purport of this aphorism has been given by Kapila in six aphorisms, 31 to 36 of Book III.]

With a view to describe Exercise, he says:

XIII.

Exercise is the (repeated) effort that it (the thinking principle) shall remain in its functionless state.

Sthiti or "functionless state" is that condition of the thinking principle in which it abides in its own (original) form, free from all functions; and the effort or endeavour (repeated) again and again to bring it to that condition is "Exercise" or abhyāsa.

He next mentions a special character of that (Exercise).

XIV.

It is again a firm ground attained by proper devotion for a long time unintermittingly.

It (Exercise) is a firm ground, i.e., it becomes steadfast, or acquires firmness, by being assiduously attended to for a long time unremittingly with an excess of regard. The meaning is that it tends to firmness.

He now mentions the definition of Dispassion (A. XII.)

XV.

The consciousness of being the subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects is Dispassion.

Objects are of two kinds, "Perceptible" (drishti) and "Scriptural" (ānusravīka). The Perceptible is that which may be apprehended here (on earth), such as sound and other objects (perceptible through the organs of sense). The Scriptural is that which exists in the regions of the Devas or elsewhere (where it cannot be grasped by carnal organs). *
That which is heard (anusrāyate) from the mouth of a preceptor is anusrava or the Veda. What comes to our knowledge therefrom (i.e., from the Veda) is what is meant by "one heard of" anusravika. Giving up all eagerness for these two classes of objects, on account of their becoming distasteful at the end, the reflection which ensues (in the thinking principle) to the effect that these are my subjects, but I am not their slave, is called Dispassion (Vairāgya).

[The word Vairāgya (dispassion) is formed of the privative prefix vi, and rāga, 'affection,' 'prepossession,' 'love,' 'desire,' the meaning being, in the technical sense in which it is used here, absence of desire for enjoyable objects. The absence, however, should not be accidental, as in the case of a child or of a stolid person where, owing to want of development of certain organs, it results without effort, but the fruit of due deliberation, and a conviction that the objects are not worth having, and that the desire for them should be suppressed.

The word vasīkāra-saṇjña literally means "consciousness of being able to subjugate," in this instance the passions; but the commentators take it to be a mere indifference or apathy, neither affection nor hatred. Thus the Pāṇḍita Bhāṣya: "devoid of hatred and desirability" (heypādeya-sunyā); and Vāchaspāti Miśra explains the phrase by the words "a sense of indifference having neither attachment nor hatred" (āvastugadvesharaḥhitā upekshābuddhiḥ).

The word rendered into 'perceptible' is drishṭa 'seen'; but, as illustrated by commentators, it means all worldly objects of sense; they may not be perceptible owing to excessive distance, extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, &c. (Sādhkhyā-kārikā. V. VII.), still they are perceptible on this earth under some circumstance or other, and therefore included in the term. The Pāṇḍita Bhāṣya illustrates the term by naming women, food, drink, and power, (strikānnapāhanaiśvaramīti). Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "seen," which is its lexicographical meaning, but which is quite
inadmissible here. Wilson, following Colebrooke, renders it into "temporal" which conveys the right technical meaning, but it becomes inappropriate under certain circumstances, as when we have to deal with adrishta, the antonym of drishta, in which case non-temporal would be unmeaning, for the word implies fate or what has not yet happened but may happen; the unseen is in that case the best.

The Sanskrit term for Scriptural is anuśravika, which means "that which has been heard from another," but it has not been used in that sense here. As the commentators show, the secondary meaning of anuśrava is the Veda, which is also called śruti, or "that which has been heard," and the object is to imply those rewards which the Veda promises to the performer of sacrifices &c. Colebrooke uses the synonym 'revealed.' The Patañjala Bhāṣyā takes the rewards to mean heaven, rudimental body, and dissolution into nature (svargavaidehyaprabhrtilayah). Thus the dispassion implies not only indifference to worldly enjoyments and objects, but the same feeling also in regard to celestial and other forms of pleasure derivable by the performance of the rites enjoined in the Veda. The pleasures, both of this world and of the next, are equally temporary, and therefore should not be desired by one who longs for emancipation. Thus in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā: "The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others." (Wilson's Sāṅkhya-kārikā, p. 13). In fact it amounts to the moral imperturbability of Pyrrho.

A peculiarity in it is to be described.

XVI.

Carried to the extent of indifference to the qualities it is the highest, as it is (then) conducive to a knowledge of God.

"It" i. e., "Dispassion." "Highest" (para) the most estimable. The first degree of "Dispassion" (A. XV) has regard to (ordinary) objects; the second, has regard to the (three) qualities, and it is
cive to a knowledge of the distinction between the product qualities and the (nonproduced) soul, from its extreme conduciveness to the perfect suppressive meditation.

[The object of this aphorism is to divide Dispassion into two kinds; one referring to enjoyable objects and called visayavairāgya, and the other to qualities, i.e., to the knowledge of the relation between the discrete and the indiscrete, (vyaktāvyaktadharmakebhoviraktah). The latter is described to be the highest, or most estimable, because it is more valuable than the former, in the attainment of the final object. The word para is the leading term in the Aphorism, and stands by itself, being predicated by what follow. But Dr. Ballantyne has subordinated it, by reducing it into a predicate. He says "This carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the qualities." This is obviously not the right meaning.]

Having thus stated the nature of Yoga, the author (next) mentions the differences existing between the nature of that kind of it in which there is consciousness (samprajñāta) and that in which consciousness is lost (asamprajñāta).

XVII.

Conscious, because it is attended with argumentation, deliberation, joy and egoism.

The word "meditation" (samādhi) is understood to be present after the word conscious to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.

That which makes manifest without any doubt or error, i.e., makes thoroughly manifest, the exact nature of the object pondered is "Conscious meditation," (samprajñāta samādhi). Samādhi or meditation is a kind of pondering (bhāvanā.) The suppression or exclusion of every function (of the thinking principle) except that which relates to the subject pondered is Conscious or Discriminative meditation; it is the same with "Seeded meditation"—savāja-samādhi. And from there being distinctions of argumentation, &c., it is of four kinds, (namely) 1st, the "Argumentative" (savitaraka); 2nd,
the "Deliberative" (sāvichāra); 3rd, the "Joyous" (sānanda); and 4th, the "Egoistic" (sāsmīta). "Pondering" is the taking again and again into the thinking principle of any particular object to the exclusion of all other objects. The object to be pondered is of two kinds; the Godhead (iśvara), and the categories or principles (tattvas). The last again are of two kinds according as they are "irrational" or "rational." The irrational are the twenty-four; the rational is the soul.

Among these (the four kinds of meditation), when accepting the gross elements and the organs as the objects, pondering is carried on with reference to which is antecedent and which is consequent, and the relation of the words to their meanings, it is called 'Argumentative meditation' (savitarka-samādhi). Should this pondering, however, be independent of the idea of their antecedence and their sequence and the relation between their names and meaning, it would be called "Non-argumentative" (nirvītarka).

When pondering is engaged in with reference to something subtle, as the subtle elements and the internal organ, and to their qualities in relation to space, time, &c., it is "Deliberative" (sāvichāra). But should this pondering be in regard to those subjects themselves, without reference to their relation to time and space, and simply as substrata of qualities, it is said to be "Non-deliberative" (nirvīchāra). What have been described up to this time are called Tangible Forms. (Grāhyā-samāpatti.)

When the quality of goodness of the Internal Organ tinctured with a little of the qualities of foulness and darkness is pondered, then consciousness being under the influence of qualities and the quality of goodness, which is full of the manifestation of happiness, becomes enlivened, the meditation becomes "Joyous" (sānanda). In this (kind of) meditation those of confined intellect who do not perceive the other (i.e., last of the twenty-five principles, or the chief soul) are indicated by the word "bodiless" (videha), because they have risen above their body and egotism. This is the Acceptance Form. (Grāha-samāpatti.)
CHAPTER FIRST.

Next, the pondering which has the pure quality of goodness untainted by foulness and darkness for its object, is called Egoistic or ontric meditation, (saśmita), because in it, from the enlivening of the intellectual power, the quality of goodness, which is the object of the pondering, is disregarded and its existence alone is perceived. It should not be supposed that there is no difference between this Ontric meditation and egotism, because where the Internal Organ knows objects with the use of (the word) I (i.e., with a knowledge of the distinction between itself and the object before it) it is egotism. But when mere existence is alone manifest in the thinking principle merged in nature from its reverse action resulting from its tendency inwards, it is egoism. In this (last kind of) meditation when contented (beings) do not perceive the Supreme Soul, and their mind is merged in its true cause, they are described to be Prakritilaya ‘resolved into nature.’

Of the persons, who enter into pondering, knowing the Supreme Soul, the manifestation of intelligence is called the Form of the taker, Grihitri-samāptti.

Even in the argumentative meditation all the four kinds exist potentially, and successively as each is abandoned the others remain, and all these four kinds are Conscious meditation, or that which has a distinct recognition, samprajñāta-samādhi.

[Meditation is described to be of two kinds, 1st, that which is carried on with a clear understanding of the object reflected ed upon as distinct from the meditator; and 2nd, that in which no such distinction obtains and the intellect is merged in the soul. In the former, the subject of the aphorism, there are argumenta- tion, deliberation, joy, and egoism, when the objects meditated upon are irrational objects, such as the first twenty-four of the twenty-five categories of the Sāṅkhya system which the Yoga school adopts; and they may not exist when the rational soul is the object. The first or Argumentative form applies to gross matter; and the second or the Deliberative applies to subtile matter. In both these the quality of goodness plays a subordinate part. When that quality attains ascendancy the meditation becomes ‘Joyous%;’ and it
ceases to have connection with the body, or technically becomes disembodied. When it prevails without any taint of the foul and the dark qualities, the thinking principle is then believed to have merged into primæval nature. This is, however, not the highest reward, for it does not put an end to transmigration: on the evolution of creation from nature, the merging ceases, and there is again a separation. It will be noticed that the first two forms, the Argumentative and the Deliberative, have their negatives the Non-argumentative and the Non-deliberative; and these four form a class called the tangible forms.

The next is the "Joyous" kind in which the sense of the existence of the body is lost, and this is called the "acceptance form." In this there is no negative form, nor is there any such distinction in the next kind, the "Egoistic," in which every thing is identified with the self. This is called the "acceptor" form. In all these six kinds of pondering, there is, it will be perceived, a distinct recognition or consciousness of individuality, and hence they all come under the term Conscious. When this consciousness is lost, we come to the next class which forms the theme of the next aphorism.]

The author now describes that form of meditation in which consciousness is lost, asamprajñāta.

XVIII.

The other is that in which the residua are ended, preceded by the exercise of thought as regards the cause of rejection.

By virāma is meant that whereby rejection takes place, i. e., the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation &c., (A. XVII). Pratyaya, "thought," added to virāma, "cause of rejection," produces the compound expression virāma-pratyaya. Exercise (abhyāsa) is reiteration of the idea in the thinking principle. In this condition of exercise, constantly rejecting with a nega-
tive, "not this, not this," whatever ideas spring up, the result is the other or Unconscious meditation, or that in which there is no distinct consciousness, which has nothing left, and in which the residua are ended. It is the opposite of the former kind, and it is asamprajñāta-samādhi. In this condition there is nothing to be known, and therefore it is called Unconscious, undiscriminative, or seedless meditation (nirviṣā).

Now, there are four modifications of the thinking principle, waking, commencing meditation, concentration, and suppression of thought. Thereof (A. II) the waking state belongs to the two conditions of the thinking principle described as restlessness and mischievous ignorance. The quality of goodness being on the ascendant in the condition described as voluptuousness, it is that of commencing meditation. Concentration and absolute suppression are the final conditions. Each condition has its residua. Thereof, those residua which are present in the waking state are destroyed by those that are produced by the condition of commencing meditation, and those that are brought forth by the condition of commencing meditation, are destroyed by those due to the condition of concentration. The residua of the condition of concentration are destroyed by those of suppression. Even as lead melted with gold destroys the dross of gold as well as itself, so do the residua of the condition of suppression consume both themselves as well as the residua of the condition of concentration.

(The most important word in the aphorism is Saṅskāra, and it is just the one which has unfortunately not been explained either in the commentary of Bhoja, or in the Pāñjala Bhāṣyā. In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the Nyāya it occurs frequently in three different senses, viz., velocity (vega), thinking (bhāvanā), and elasticity (sthitisthāpaka). (Tarka-saṅgraha). Adverting to the second meaning the Bhāvanāparichchheda, says: "Saṅskāra, called thinking, (bhāvanā) resides in sentient beings; and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty
which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition.”
(Bhávanákhya-stu sanskáro jívavrittratíndryah.
Upekshánátmakastasya nischayah káraṇam bhavet.
Smarane pratyabhijnáyáámapyasaú heturuchyate.)

Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Roer in his translation of the Bháshá-paríchchheda, for there it is described to be the cause of memory, and not memory itself. It is not sensation, nor impression, for it is not transient, but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the sensorium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be, nor eternal as the ancient Greek philosophers supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballantyne renders it into “self-reproduction of thought;” but there is nothing like “self-reproduction” in it; for it is said to be revived by external stimuli, and not by its own effort. It is something then—a trace, a mark, a cellule, a psychograph—which perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect, to be revived afterwards under particular circumstances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell (‘Mental Philosophy,’ p. 95) “When a given mental impression is produced upon us, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not absolutely lost; for, if proper conditions occur, the impression is renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be something deposited within us which subsists permanently, and which is equally there, whether it be at any moment the immediate object of our consciousness or not. This something, then, we term a residuum, using the expression, it will be observed, without implying any theory on the subject whatever.” The Sanskrit counterpart of this residuum is Sañskára. Every sensation, every impression, every perception, every idea, nay, every dream, leaves its trace behind, and the traces or residua so obtained constitute the sum total of
our experience, and these are *saṅskāras*. According to Indian philosophers these remain not only all life through, but even in subsequent states of existence, and they are, therefore, believed to be the cause of our instincts. The new-born infant takes to its mother's breast from the *saṃskāra* it has in its mind from its experience in a former existence.

The next word is *śesha*, and it, too, has not been fully defined by the commentators. It means 'remainder' 'balance,' or 'end.' Compounded with *saṅskāra* the meaning is that in which the remainders are the *saṅskāras*, or that in which the *saṅskāras* are ended, or brought to a close. Bhoja accepts the second meaning, and he illustrates it by saying that in the state of Unconscious meditation in its perfection all previous *saṅskāras* or residua of former conditions, as well as those of the perfect state, are destroyed, even as in the process of cupellation, lead melted with gold not only destroys the dross existing in impure gold, but also itself, leaving nothing behind. Thus the Unconscious meditation is seedless or has no object whatever for contemplation. The *Pātanjala Bhāṣṭya* takes a different view. According to it, in the Unconscious stage all functions are set at rest and the residua alone remain behind. (*Sarva-vṛitti-pratystamaya-saṅskāra-śesah nirodah.*) And Vāchaspati Miśra emphasizes this by adding the word "alone"—*saṅskāras* alone remain—(*saṅskāra-mātra śesha.*) This contradiction may be explained by supposing that the *Pātanjala-bhāṣṭya* has in view a meditation from which there is awaking, while Bhoja describes the final meditation from which there is no further waking; for he admits that in the earlier stages of the Unconscious meditation there are residua peculiar to it. Yogis admit that people do wake from the Unconscious meditation, and that that meditation is often practiced, and in such cases the *saṅskāras* must remain in a latent state to be revived by proper stimuli on waking. It is difficult satisfactorily to decide to what condition Patanjali himself referred to. The way in which he has used the word *śesha* would suggest the idea that he has been correctly interpreted in the *Pātanjala Bhāṣṭya*. See A. L. at the end of the chapter.
The state of Unconscious meditation above described is subject to the condition precedent, that there should be repeated acts of contemplation or exercise of thought amounting to a habit, as regards the necessity of rejecting all causes of disturbance. Without it the final stage cannot be acquired. This exercise of thought, however, forms a part of the Unconscious stage, and is totally unconnected with the Conscious form. Váchaspati Miśra says—“the first word in the aphorism (which I have rendered into ‘preceded by the exercise of thought regarding the cause of rejection,’ and for the sake of idiom put at the end of the sentence) describes the means, and the other two define the nature of the meditation in question” (púrvapaderupáyakathanamuttarábhyam cha svarúpa-kathanaṁ). Dr. Ballantyne has mistaken the purport of the word, and made it the conditio precedent. His version is “The one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose;—the other [—independent of any fresh antecedent—] is in the shape of the self-reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects].” After what has been stated above, it is obvious that this version is not tenable. It may be added that it is not at all usual with authors of Sútras to repeat in a subsequent sútra what has been already explained in a previous one.

Having thus stated the distinctions and the nature of Yoga, and having briefly mentioned the method of performing it, the author proceeds to speak of those methods more fully.

XIX.

Of (the meditative states attained to by the two classes of aspirants technically called) the Unembodied and the Resolved into nature, the world is the cause.

The “unembodied” (vídeka) and the “resolved into nature” (prakṛitilaya) have been described in the aphorism on the argumentative and other forms of meditations (A XVII, pp. 18 f.)
Of their meditation the world is the cause. The word bhava-prataya is formed of bhava 'world' and prataya 'cause.'

The meaning is this: that such persons, from their entrance into the world (on account of their deserts), become participators of similar (inadequate) meditation. Not being conscious of ultimate reality, for them this is a mere exercise of the Yoga. Hence, exertion should be made for the knowledge of the ultimate reality and in the contemplation thereof, with a view to the attainment of deliverance. This is the object for which this has been said.

[In the commentary on aphorism XVII, among the conditions of Conscious meditation disembodiedness and resolution into primeval nature have been pointed out as high. Here the object is to show that those results are secondary, and of the earthy. They do not secure the ultimate end of Yoga. They are accordingly meditations, of which the world or Prakṛtī is the cause. They are, nevertheless, desirable exercises as preparatory to the state in which the ultimate reality is revealed.]

Of others:—

XX.

(In the case) of others this (meditation) is preceded by Inclination, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.

"Of others" i.e., of Yogīs, other than (those who have been described as) "the disembodied" and "the resolved in nature." "Preceded by inclination" &c.; that meditation which has śraddhā &c. as the first means, is called śraddhādipūrvaka. These, inclination and the rest, act successively as the means and the end, i.e. they serve as the means or instruments for the Conscious meditation. Thereof "Inclination" (śraddhā) is approbation in favour of the Yoga. "Energy" (vīrya) is strenuous exertion. "Memory" (smṛtī) is not letting out what is once cognised. (A. XI, p. 12.) "Meditation" (samādhi) is intentness on a single point.
"Discernment" (prajñā) is thorough understanding of that which is to be known. Now, he who has "Inclination" gets "Energy," or becomes persevering in favour of Yoga. In the condition of "Energy" comes "Memory" of former states, in which the thinking principle meditates; and the thinking principle which has meditated knows thoroughly what it has thought upon. All these are the expedients of the Conscious form of meditation. From the (frequent) exercise of that meditation and from extreme dispassion Unconscious meditation ensues.

[This aphorism explains the practices which should be adopted by the neophyte in the first stage of his career as a Yogi. He must have Inclination for the exercise he cannot then undertake. The Inclination then, must be followed by Energy, or active exertion. Then there should be Memory of what he has learnt. Next, there should be frequent exercise of Meditation of some being or other to bring on the habit for it. And, lastly, there should be clear Discernment of what should be done and what should be avoided.]

Of the Yogis possessing the above mentioned expedients he next describes the sub-divisions according to the different expedients they adopt (for the attainment of their object).

XXI.

Proximate for the ardently impetuous.

(To complete the aphorism the words:) "The attainment of the state of meditation" are required to be supplied. "Impetuous" (sañvega), energetic exertion for the execution of a work. "Ardent" (tivra), excessively, in a high degree. On the part of those who are thus ardently impetuous, the attainment of Meditation is "proximate" (ásanna). The fruition of Meditation is also proximate, i.e., quickly accomplished.

[Having in the preceding aphorism pointed out the practices to be adopted by Yogis, the author in this lays special stress on the necessity for ardent application. A lukewarm feeling is not enough for immediate or early fruition. The application should be "ardently impetuous" to ensure quick reward.]

Who are then ardently impetuous? To this he replies.
XXII.

There is a further distinction, from there being the mild, the moderate, and the excessive.

There are specific distinctions among those who adopt these expedients, from the mild and other expedients being different. The divisions of the expedients are "mild" (mṛidu), "moderate" (madhya), and "excessive" (adhimátra). These are severally threefold, from their being severally subdivided into "the mildly impetuous," "the moderately impetuous" and "the excessively impetuous." And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of Yogís. The mild expedients are (severally) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The moderate expedients are (also) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The excessive expedients are (likewise), "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." And great endeavours should be made for the attainment of the "ardently impetuous" form of the excessive method. So much for the declaration of the distinctions of Yogís.

[The object of this aphorism is to classify Yogís into different orders according to their respective arduousness. Some are mildly, others moderately, and others ardently disposed, and so each group forms an order. Again in their mildness and the rest there may be degrees varying from mildness to moderateness and ardency, and so each of the three orders has three sub-divisions, making a total of nine groups. The injunction is that Yogís should exert to pass through the several orders as quickly as possible, so that the attainment of the final stage may not be delayed.]

Now he mentions an easy expedient, distinct from the preceding expedients.
XXIII.

Or by devotion to God.

"God" (Īśvara) will be described presently (A. XXIV). "Devotion" (prāṇidhāna) is a form of resignation to Him. It is thorough worship of Him, and the consignment of all one's actions to Him. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to Him, the preeminent guide, is "devotion," prāṇidhāna. This is an important means of meditation and of its fruition.

[In this aphorism the author departs from the Sāṅkhya system, by introducing devotion to God as a facile and ready means of attaining the end. God, however, is not made the end, but the means to an end of which He forms no integral portion. The theory of resignation or dedication of the fruits of all actions to Him, is evidently borrowed from the Bhakti system in which it plays the most important part. In entire reliance on the providence of the Godhead, the Bhakta wishes for no fruition whatever. Whatever he does is for the service of the Divinity, and He in His mercy is to grant whatever He thinks proper. In the Bhagavad Gītā this is made the cardinal point of faith, (IX, 27,) and there it appears quite consistent; but in the Yoga system Kapila found no necessity for it, and Patanjali adopts it as a sort of compromise to give a theistic character to his system; but it plays only a very subordinate part.]

It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (XXIX).

XXIV.

God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires.
Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (kleśa). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (karma), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the Sāstras), as also what are mixed, i.e., partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are "deserta" (vipāka). They are kind, age and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (āsaya). "Untouched," (aparāmrishṭa,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (Purusha-viśeṣa), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (Īśvara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness. This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom and almightiness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakṛiti and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Īśvara. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the Yogī, by the reflection of the soul, known; but such is not the case with Īśvara. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Īśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by Sāstric means (such as the Yoga, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor
is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Īśvara. Derived from the root Īśe, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is purusha, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (skele) in the body (puro); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but as the dualism indicated by European philosophers between soul or animal life (Ψυχή) and spirit, or rational life (Πνεύμα) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedāntic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achārya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahāpāśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as Sīva,—the Vaishnava as Puru-
Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (kleśah). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (karma), such as are enjoined or prohibited (in the Sástras), as also such as are mixed, i. e., partly one and partly the other. What ripens out of those works are "deserts" (vipáka). They are the results of actions, such as caste, existence, and enjoyment. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (ásaya). "Untouched," (aparámrishta,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (purusha-viśesha), who is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (Īśvara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of troubles does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the troubles abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the troubles in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to His sempeternal greatness in the quality of goodness. This greatness is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependant, His wisdom and greatness are not mutually dependant, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that greatness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakṛiti and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Īśvara. In ordinary beings, the thinking principle is modified into pleasure, pain and delusion, but in the body of the Yogí, being touched by the reflection of the thinking principle (in its purity) it becomes known as reflected. Such is not the case with Īśvara. He is, by reason of His eternity, always solely of the quality of goodness and super-excellence; he exists as the object (of our meditation). Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Īśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by Sástric means (such as the Yoga &c.). In His case, however, being always in that
condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

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The next word is purusaka, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (śhete) in the body (pure); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but in philosophical works it is always used for soul, and to preserve the spirit of the text I have accepted that word. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedāntic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and to avoid trouble uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the incidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Acharya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

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shottoma,—the followers of the Purāṇas as the great Father (Brahmā),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mīmāṁsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Chārvākas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyāya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarma,—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Śiva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?"—(Cowell's Kusumānjali, p. 2.)

For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough; but it is not absolutely correct. The Chārvākas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kápiḷas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved. Kapila, in the Sáṅkhya aphorisms says, "It is not proved that there is a God." (Īśvarásiddheh I. 92.) This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballantyne's translations of the aphorisms on the subject.

 Aph. 2.—Not from its [—the world's—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—i.e., by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,—["by works alone, which are indispensable,"—and if we do make the additional and cumbersome supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

 Aph. 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

 Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for
"if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.”].

Aph. 5.—Or ["if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely"] a technical term ["for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will”].

Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, ["and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered.”—"Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not properties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply, —as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative”].

Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. "In regard to the latter alternative he says”].

Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; ["that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c. ;-therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown”].
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Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [—“in the first place, there is not sense-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable;” as he proceeds to show].

Aph. 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken;—“and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as ‘Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,’ the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion” that every product should have had an intelligent maker].

Aph. 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world’s] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord].” (Śāṅkhya Aphorisms, pp. 114ff.)

I should add here that some Kāpilas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says “The existence of such a Lord is a settled point,” (III, 5 and 7), meaning by “such” an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is in no sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedānta Śūtra treats of this subject; but it is too long to be quoted here.

The Pāṇṭanjala Bhāṣya points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus: “If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones? (Not so.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God. Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God—He is sempeternally emancipated and sempeternally the Lord.” Kaivalyam prāptākṣtarthi saṁti cha bhāva-vah kevalinah. Te hi triṇi bandhanām ṣhhitvā kaivalyam
práptáh; iśvarasya cha tat sambando na bhuto na bháví. Yathá
muktasya púrvabandhakoṭih prajñāyate naivamiśvarasya. Yathá
vá prakriticinasyottarā bandhakoṭih sambhāvyate naivamiśvara-
sya; sa tu sādeva muktah sadevesvarah.]

Having described the identity of God, the author next produces
a proof that such a being exists.

XXV.

In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity.

In that God the seed of omniscience, as also of parvitude and
magnitude and of knowledge of the knowers of the past, the future
&c., attains its "infinity," (niratisaya)* or highest perfection.
Being the source like a seed it is called seed (vīja). It is well
known that of the qualities of parvitude and magnitude, which
have degrees, there is an absolute perfection. Thus, the perfection
of parvitude is seen in atoms, and that of magnitude in the sky.
In a similar manner knowledge and other manifest attributes of
the thinking principle compared with each other must somewhere
attain the highest perfection, and wherever they are in the
highest perfection, that is God. Although from the general
character of this inference no precise being is proved, yet in the
Sástras His omniscience and other qualities may be precisely
learnt.

But how does He, without any impulse of His own, cause the union
and separation of Prakriti and Purusha? Such a doubt should
not be entertained. Being merciful, He finds in His mercy to
creation the impulse. His impulse is the wish "I shall rescue all
creation (from pain) at the periodical minor and great pralayas."
What ever is desirable to one, is his impulse.

[The logical force of this aphorism is not apparent. It is a
mere assertion, and can scarcely be taken as a proof, as the Com-
mentator puts it forward to be. He himself felt the difficulty,
and escaped out of it by appealing to the authority of the Sástra.

* Niratisaya, limitness, greatness, or infinity.
CHAPTER FIRST.

The Śāstra here referred to is the Śākhya, and the P. Bhāshya quotes a passage from the work of Pañchāśīka which shows that "the first knower, lord, and great sage, with a view to creation, in his mercy taught this science to the enquirer Suri." Adividvānnirmāṇachittamadhisthāya kārynāt bhagavān paramarshi rāsuraye jijnāsumānāya tantram pravācheti. The first knower is Kapila, who, being an incarnation of Viśṇu, obtained the science from Sayambhu or Maheśvara.]

Having thus described the identity and proof of the existence of God, the author refers to His greatness.

XXVI.

He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not defined by time.

Even of the primary creators such as Brahmā and others, he is the "instructor," or preceptor, because "He is not defined by time," for He has no beginning, while the others are so defined, having a beginning.

[The word guru has been translated "instructor" in accordance with the text, and after the commentator who supplies the equivalent upadेशṭā. It may be more appropriately rendered into "noblest" or "greatest," as it would make the reason assigned, undefined by time, more consistent, for want of beginning, or being not circumscribed by time, does not imply tuition. The object of the explanation, however, is to refer to the first tutor Maheśvara to whom reference has been made in the last note. In the P. Bhāshya no equivalent is given of the word, but the sense is explained by the word yathāsya sargasyādau prakarsha-gatyāsiddham, tathātikrānta-sargādīsvari pratyetavyah.

Vāchaspati Miśra explains the term by prakarsha "superior:" na vartate prakarshāya gatiḥ práptih pratyetavya ágamát tadanena prabandhena bhagavāníśvaro darśitah.

In the purport of the aphorism he uses the words: Samprati bhávatah brahmádibhyah viśesamáha.]
Having thus described the greatness of God, the author now supplies His indicator, with a view to help people in their devotion.

XXVII.

His indicator is the Praṣṇava.

Of the Īśvara thus described, the "indicator," name, expressive word, whereby one is thoroughly (pra = prakarṣeṇa) lauded (nu) or praised, glorified, or hymned is—praṣṇava, which is the same with the syllable Om. (The sentence indirectly gives the derivation which is pra = "excessive" and nu = "to laud," whence Praṣṇava). Between the two (the name and the being denominated) the relation of the indicator and the indicated is eternal. This is conventionally expressed, but not produced by any one; (it is the same) as in the case of a father and his son, when one points out the existing relation (by saying) "this is the father, and this is the son," (though the relationship exists from before, and is not produced by the saying.)

[Praṣṇava is the technical name of Om, and the injunction is that that syllable should be frequently muttered. Care is taken to show that the relation between the indicator Om and the indicated God is eternal and not produced by man, and the example of the father and son explains what is intended. The Vedas, the Upanishads and all Hindu works recommend the same process, accepting the term as the most sacred name of the Divinity. See Chhāndogya Upanishad, Chapter I. In two short notes, published in the 'Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal' for 1865, pp. 46—208, I take the word to be the Indianized form of the Hebrew Ṡman and the English Amen.]

His adoration is next enjoined.

XXVIII.

Its repetition and the reflection on its meaning (should be made).
"Iśa," i.e., of the Praṇava, consisting of three and a half instants, "Repetition" (japa), pronouncing it in due order, and the "Reflection" (bhāvana), the perception repeatedly of the God indicated by it, are the means of concentration of the thought in it. Hence, for the accomplishment of meditation (samādhi) the Praṇava should be repeated, and its meaning reflected upon by a Yogi. This is declared.

[Om is ordinarily declared to be a compound of the letters ओ (a) उ (u) and ऐ (m), which supply the three instants, and the conversion of the m into the nasal mark म supplies the half instant. In prosody the word is a long syllable, but in modulated reading or recitation its prosodial quantity is a protracted circumflex sound.]

The fruit of such adoration is next described.

XXIX.

Thence the right knowledge of the reverted perception, and the removal of obstacles.

From that repetition and that reflection the right knowledge of the "reverted perception" (pratyakchetanā) is effected in the case of Yogis. That "perception" (chetanā) or power of seeing, which turns towards its own internal organ, withdrawing itself from (or in opposition to worldly) objects, is called "reverted perception" (pratyak "turning back," chetanā "perception") and a "right knowledge" (adhiṣṭana) of it is thereby acquired. The "removal" (abhāva), i.e., the counteraction of the power of the obstacles about to be described is also effected.

[The natural function of the senses is to extend outwards, in order to receive the impressions of external objects and carry them to the sensorium, but that being suppressed by the Yogi, the senses turn inwards and find their object within, and therefore the function is called reversed, or reflex. The object of this round-about way of description is to say that the senses hold communion exclusively with the soul.]
Now, a doubt arising as to what are the obstacles? he says:—

XXX.

Disease, Langour, Doubt, Carelessness, Idleness, Worldly-mindedness, Mistaken notions, Unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and Instability therein; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles.

These nine, impelled by the force of foulness and darkness, become the causes of "distractions," i.e., by these enemies to concentration the thinking principle is disturbed. Of the nine:—

1. "Sickness" (vyādhi) is fever and the like, resulting from disordered humours.

2. "Langour" (sthyāna) is an indisposition of the thinking principle to work.

3. "Doubt" (saṃśaya) is the disposition of the thinking principle which relies on both sides of a question, as whether Yoga is practicable or not.

4. "Carelessness" (pramāda) is a disposition not to exert, or indifference in performing meditation.

5. "Idleness" (ālasya) is a heaviness of the body and of the thinking principle, which is the cause of want of interest in matters relating to Yoga.

6. "Worldly-mindedness" (avirati) is the inclination of the thinking principle to enjoy the pleasures of the world.

7. "Mistaken notion" (bhṛntidasana) is wrong perception, such as taking a bit of mother-o'pearl to be silver.

8. "Unattainment of any stage" (alabdha-bhūmikatva) is not attaining, for some cause or other, a particular stage of abstraction.

9. "Instability" (anavasthitatva) is the condition in which the thinking principle having attained a stage cannot abide in it.

These being opposed to the practice of concentration of meditation, are called "obstacles," (antārāyāḥ).

To shew that there are other causes which produce distraction of the mind, he says:—
XXXI.

Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expiration are the companions of distractions.

Whenever from any cause distractions are produced then pain &c., come on. Thereof—

(1) "Pain" (duḥkha) is a modification of the foulness of the thinking principle; it is characterised by pain, which living beings exert to remove.

(2) "Distress" (daurmanṣya) is the agitation of the mind proceeding from external or internal causes.

(3) "Trembling" (aṭṭamejāyṛva) is the shaking of the body which causes unsteadiness in the posture (of a Yogi).

(4) "Inspiration" (śvāsa) is a drawing in of the external air. The expulsion of the air from the lungs is "expiration" (prasvāsa).

These existing along with the (other) distractions, should be removed by the exercise and dispassion already described; (A. XII) and therefore they are noticed here.

[Pain here referred to is described in the Pāṇṭanjala Bhāṣya as of three kinds: mental, physical and supernatural. That which affects the mind without touching the body is mental, that which proceeds from disorders in the body is physical, and that which proceeds from evil spirits &c., is supernatural. The Sāṅkhya Karika notices all the three. (Wilson’s Sāṅkhya Kārikā, p. 2.)

The Pāṇṭanjala Rahasya gives pīḍā ‘disease’ as the equivalent of Duḥkha.]

Another expedient for overcoming the obstacles with their accompaniments is now being pointed out.

XXXII.

For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle.
For the "prevention" (pratishedha) or obstruction of those distractions, let there be "exercise" (abhyāsa) or repeated application of the thinking principle to some one selected "principle," (tattva), from the force resulting from which arise the condition of concentration, and thereby the distractions subside.

[In former aphorisms meditation has been declared to be of two kinds: conscious and unconscious, or seeded and seedless. The object here is to inculcate the necessity of constant exercise of the first, or the seeded form, to steady the mind, and prepare it for the more arduous and difficult phase in which there should be no object upon which to meditate, or the state in which, in the language of Wordsworth, "thought is not." The highest form of conscious meditation is intelligent communion with the soul, but this too is not at once practicable, and the instruction is that any one of the twenty-five categories may be taken up for meditation, so that the mind may be trained to the habit of concentrating itself at any one point at pleasure, and of remaining in that state of concentration without fatigue.]

Now he describes another expedient with advertence to certain works which help to purify the thinking principle.

XXXIII.

The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice.

"Friendliness" (maitrī) disposition to be friendly. "Compassion," (karunā) mercy. "Complacency" (muditā) to be pleased. "Indifference" (upekṣhā) to feel neither pleasure nor pain. These feelings should be felt, in due order, for the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the sinful. Thus, to the happy one should be friendly, (saying) "blessed is their happiness," and not be envious to them. For persons in grief he should show mercy, and desire how to relieve them from their grief, and not remain indifferent to their suffering. To the virtuous, with a view to encourage virtue, he should express satisfaction, and not be envious of them (say-
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ing) "Forsooth, are these virtuous"? For the vicious a feeling of indifference should be practised, neither encouraging nor hating them. In the aphorism, the word "happiness" &c. are intended to stand for persons possessing those qualities. These feelings of friendliness &c., producing cheerfulness in the thinking principle, easily bring on the condition of Samádhi. These acts are external (and not intrinsic parts of the Samádhi). Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful in the calculation of alligation, &c., (but are not in themselves integral parts of the main object), so the feelings of friendship, &c., antagonistic to envy, passion &c., producing cheerfulness, prepare the thinking principle for the conscious form of Samádhi. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerfulness induced, effects the concentration of the mind (to one object).

[The Aphorism suggests a second expedient that of cheerfulness. Unless the mind is cheerful it cannot be steady, and this cheerfulness is to be brought on by friendliness towards the happy, compassion for those who are in distress, complacency in regard to virtue, and indifference in respect to vice. Indifference in respect to vice might at first sight appear a very mild feeling, but hatred, detestation or other strong manifestation of feeling towards vice would mar cheerfulness, and itself be a cause of pain and unsteadiness; hence it is avoided.]

He points out another expedient.

XXXIV.

Or by expulsion and retention of the breath.

"Expulsion," (prāchchhardaṇa) means the throwing out of the air from the lungs in a fixed quantity through a special effort. "Retention" (vidháraṇa) is the restraint, or stoppage of the motion of breath for a certain limited time. That stoppage is effected by two acts—by filling the lungs with external air, and by retaining therein the inhaled air. Thus the threefold prāṇā-yāma, including the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention of breath, fixes the thinking principle to one point of
concentration. All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of the breath—there being always a correlation of breath and mind in their respective functions,—the breath when overcome by stopping all the functions of the organs, effects the concentration of the thinking principle to one object. The Agama proclaims its power of destroying all defects thus: "All obstructive functions are caused by faults." Hence, by its destroying faults, it becomes effectual in producing concentration of the mind.

[The definition of "retention" (vidhāraṇa) by the terms "stoppage of motion" (gativichchheda) is obviously faulty, but as the aphorism refers to "retention" immediately after the "expulsion" (prachchhardana) and the attempt to retain the breath after it has been fully expired would be futile, it is necessary to inspire before the breath can be retained, and the commentator is obliged to include that act along with the retention. The Pāṭanjala Bhāṣya calls the retention to be Prānāyāma (vidhāraṇa prānāyamak), and in the Śāṅkhya Sūtra this meaning is accepted. It is, however, not the generally accepted meaning. All other Yogic and Tāṇtric works regard the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention performed in specific order, to constitute the Prānāyāma. The order is not always the same. Some have expiration first, inspiration next, and retention last. Others place inspiration first, retention next, and expiration last. The word mātrāpramāṇa in the commentary, which I have rendered into "fixed quantity," has been rendered into svalpa or "little" or "slowly" in the Pāṭanjala Bhāṣya; but it does not express the true technical meaning. The object of the mātrā is to imply a fixed period of time. According to the Skanda Purāṇa a mātrā is equal to the time required in one breathing, (Eka śrāva-mapi mātrā prānāyāme nigadyate), and to imply that this breathing must be natural, the Yoga-chintāmaṇi adds that this breathing should be during sleep (when there is no violent effort). Nidrāvasangataśya puñyo yāvatkālekaśvāso gachchhatyāgachchhati cha tāvatkālaprānāyamasya mātreṇyucyate.) And this
period is equal to two and a half palas. (Sāṛddha svāsa palad-vayātmakah kālak, prāṇāyāma kāla siddhak.) The pala here means the period occupied by a twinkling of the eye. The mātrā is obviously taken as a unit, and of these from 1 to 24 are devoted to a prāṇāyāma according as it is inferior, middling, or superior. The mode of reckoning the time to be devoted to each act is regulated in one of two ways; 1st, by so many repetitions of the syllable Om, or the mystic mantra of the performer, or the specific mystic syllables (vīja) of that mantra; 2nd, by turning the thumb and the index finger of the left hand round the left knee a given number of times. The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A Vaishnava in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the Vīja mantra once while expiring, 7 times while inspiring, and 20 times while retaining. A Śākta repeats the mantra 16 times when inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation, and the capacity of the performer. As a general rule it may be said that longer is the retention the more proficient becomes the Yogi. The usual mode of performing the Prāṇāyāma is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place the ring-finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring-finger and the thumb, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the Prāṇāyāma, and it may be repeated after short intervals according to choice for hours. The object avowed of this performance is the steadying of the mind. The Haṭṭha-dīpikā philosophises on this by saying, “by the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves; when that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogi becomes firm as the trunk of a tree; therefore the wind should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body so long it is called living. Death is the exit of that breath, therefore it should be stopped.”
APPHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

(“Chale vate chalam chittam niśchale niśchalam bhavet, Yogi
stihanutvamānati tato váyumnī rodhayet. Yávad váyuk sthito
dhe tabajjivananuchyate, Marañam tasya nishkrántistato váyum
nirondhayet.”)

Elsewhere the text asserts that this Prāṇāyāma is conducive
both to health and longevity, and all minor works on Yoga and
the Tantras generally expatiate at great length on the sanita-
tary and the therapeutic advantages of practising it regularly at
stated times. The Haṭha-dipikā, in one place, says, “all diseases
disappear in him who devotes himself to the Prāṇāyāma; without
it in the state of practising Yoga every kind of disease arises.”
(Prāṇāyāmādiyuktena sarvaroga kshayo bhavet, ayuktáthyágna-
yogena sarvaroga samuddhavah. The idea seems to have travelled
to the far West, and the spiritualists in America have accepted
it as a recognised maxim of their system. Many spiritualists
practice this Prāṇāyāma under the name of “deep breathing,”
and A. J. Davis, one of their apostles, in his “Harbinger of
Health” (pp. 52-53), gives the following directions for curing
diseases through its means.

“First, if your weakness be general, and the blood is loaded
with cold matter, lay flat down on your back, and, while breath-
ing deep, and slow, and uniformly, WILL YOURSELF TO BECOME
HEALTHY—in your feet and hands, in your knees and elbows, in
your hips and shoulders, in your bowels and liver, in your lungs
and brain! The heart will take care of itself. In cases where the
weakness is generally distributed, all you are required to practice
(while so prostrated and respiring) is the art of concentrating
your Will and desires simultaneously on the extremities first;
then work upward and inward progressively; and when, in the
lapse of ten minutes of steady, deep breathing, you have reached
the brain, repeat the process in the ascending scale, as indicated
in the manner aforementioned.

“By this Pneumogastric treatment of yourself, you will receive
spiritual strength from the air—nothing is more certain! When,
by practice, you can breathe deeply and heroically, and at the
same time put your Will upon the restoration of the general system, the art of fixing your mind upon some particularly diseased part will become less and less difficult. *Consumptive persons*, by simply breathing profoundly, and willing systematically, may *enlarge their chests and lungs beyond the possibilities of disease*. Persons of cold temperature, with irregular habits and bad practices, may "right about face" and become harmoniously healthy. Learn to depend upon yourself—use the infallible remedies of Nature—and, in spite of priest or doctor, you will 'pass from death unto life.'

"Time of Exercises.—In acquiring this psychological power over the destinies of your bodily state, and in becoming a Self-healing Institution, whether home or abroad—it may be necessary to practice (either while on your back, or standing, or walking, or riding,) perhaps three times in each twenty-four hours. Never just before meals, nor soon subsequent to them; but the true time is when chillification is going on; about 90 or 120 minutes after eating. The spirit world will aid you, by forming a secret conjunction with the *pneumogastric* conductor. It is certain, gentle sufferer; do not permit yourself to doubt. Nothing is too good in Nature, in matter, in spirit, or in truth."

In pointing out another expedient, he foreshadows the conscious form of meditation.

XXXV.

Or cognition resulting from sensuous objects may be the cause of steadiness.

"Of the mind" (*manasah* is understood to) complete the sentence. "Sensuous objects" (*vishaya*) are odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, and that in which these reside as objects is *vishayavati*, the cognition whereof causes the steadiness of the mind. Thus, by directing the thinking principle to the tip of the nose, the cognition of spiritual odour is effected. In the same way the cognition of taste may be effected at the tip of the tongue, the cognition of colour at the forepart of the palate, the cognition of touch at the
middle of the tongue, and the cognition of sound at the root of the tongue. Thus the cognition of spiritual sense-objects resulting through one or other of those organs becomes the cause of the concentration of the mind. This is to encourage Yogis in the belief that the Yoga has a fruit.

[By this commentary the meaning of the text remains perfectly unintelligible to the uninitiated. The reason is, the commentator takes for granted that the rudimentary principles of Yoga are known to his readers. The purport is that in the act of Prāṇāyāma (as explained in A. XXXIV) when the Yogi directs his mind to the tip of his nose &c., he derives in the places mentioned a sense of those objects which is ordinarily acquired by their natural organs, and having done so, he feels no inclination to exercise those natural organs, and his mind settles down into undisturbed contemplation of the object to which he directs his mind. The commentator uses the word divya for which I use “spiritual” as the equivalent. The P. Rahaga uses alaukika or “supernatural” as the equivalent. The word prarūtti in the text has been taken by the P. Bhasya to be equal to saṁvitt or cognition. In the commentary above and elsewhere the word manas mind has been sometimes used for chitta, thinking principle].

He describes another expedient of the same kind.

XXXVI.

Or a sorrowless extremely luminous (disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle).

(The sense of the aphorism must be completed) by the terms, “disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle.”

The word “lumen” (jyotis) means the manifestation (of the quality) of goodness. When it exists in its fulness, in any disposition it is called “extremely luminous” disposition (jotismati). “Sorrowless” (viśoka) is that disposition in which the power resulting from the exercise of the delightfully pure element (goodness)
has removed the grief which is produced by the quality of foulness. It steadies the thinking principle. The purport of this is that when the thinking principle is in the quality of goodness located in the cup of the lotus heart as on the waveless milky ocean, and the sensuous functions are all destroyed by the light of knowledge, the steadiness of the thinking principle results as a matter of course.

[Briefly, the purport is that when the thinking principle is totally griefless, and manifest in the extreme refulgence of the quality of goodness, it is steady, and has no cause for vacillation.]

In course of pointing out another expedient, he describes the object of the conscious form of meditation—or discriminate meditation.

XXXVII.

Or the thinking principle taking a passionless object (becomes the cause of the mind’s steadiness).

The phrase “becomes the cause of the mind’s steadiness” is understood to complete the sentence.

“The Passionless” (vītarāga) are those who have abandoned all longings for sensuous objects, and their thinking principle, which has destroyed all pain, by being made the object of thought, becomes the cause of steadiness.

[The next expedient is the making the thinking principle of those who have overcome all passions the object of contemplation. Vāchaspāti Miśra explains this by saying “the passionless are Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana and others. To make their thinking principle the object of thought is to rely thereon. Vītarāgāḥ Kṛishṇadvaipāyana prabhītayah. Teshām chittam tadevāvalam-banam, tenoparaktamiti.]

He describes another expedient of this kind.

XXXVIII.

Or reliance on knowledge resulting from dream or sleep.
"Dream" (svapna) is the perception by the thinking principle alone of the soul's agency when the functions of the external organs are dormant. "Sleep" (niré) has been already defined (A. X). The knowledge which results from "reliance" thereon, i.e., reliance on dream or reliance on sleep, produces steadiness of the thinking principle.

[Although sleep has been defined to be absence of consciousness, the Yogis believe absence of consciousness to be a kind of knowledge. (See. A. X.) Váchaspati Miśra gives an illustration to show how the beatific vision of an image of Maheśvara may, on waking, tend to steady the thinking principle in the contemplation of any particular object. Perfectly sound sleep of which on waking we know only that we have slept well and nothing more, is also favorable to steadiness in the same way, perfect calmness of the mind being thereby produced.]

Different men having different tastes, Yogis may affect each a different expedient according to choice, and by meditating thereon attain his object (scil. steadiness of mind). To establish this he says—

XXXIX.

Or by meditating according to one's fancy.

By thinking on anything according to choice, whether external, as the moon, or internal, as a plexus of arteries, the thinking principle becomes steadied.

[The object of this aphorism is to show that by constantly reflecting on any object of choice, the habit is acquired of keeping the thinking principle confined to one object. The choice of course does not extend to carnal objects, for they would tend to excite, instead of allaying, the passions. The moon, or the sun, or other similar object has no such tendency, and certain plexuses within the chest and the abdomen which are believed to be the seats of the thinking principle, are held particularly beneficial in producing steadiness.]

Having thus described the different methods, he proceeds to point out what the fruit thereof is.
CHAPTER FIRST.

XL.

His mastery extends from the minutest atom to the limit of infinite magnitude.

Having by these means acquired steadiness of the thinking principle, the Yogi, by thinking on minute objects, acquires unfailing “mastery” (vaśikāra) over the minutest atoms, i.e., his thinking principle is not baffled even by the reflection of the most minute objects, such as the minutest atoms. In the same way, the reflection of big objects, like the sky &c., to infinite magnitude, never causes any disturbance of the thinking principle, i.e., it becomes independent everywhere. Such is the meaning.

[The purport is obvious. When steadiness is once fully acquired, the thinking principle acquires mastery over every thing, and nothing can baffle it. The result of this perfect nature is transcendantal power over all material and spiritual objects: of this full illustrations will follow in Chapter III. The P. Bhāṣya adds that when the thinking principle of the Yogi is perfect in this respect, it does not any longer care for the appliances elsewhere enjoined. Tadvaśikārāt paripūrṇam yoginaśchittam na punarabhyāsakritam parikarmāpekshate iti.]

What becomes of the condition of the thinking principle purified by these methods, he now proceeds to describe.

XLI.

To him of overpowered faculties, there are a concentration and a consubstantiation in (matters relating to) the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, as in a transparent gem.

He, whose faculties have been overpowered, is “of overpowered faculties” (kṣiṇavṛtti). With reference to him there is, in regard to the objects of his faculties, no distinction about the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, and there result a “concentration” and a “consubstantion.” Tatsthātvā is concentration in it, (ekāgratā). “Consubstantiation” (tadāṇia-
natva) is becoming of it, for when the thinking principle is lowered, (or reduced in its carnal functions in the way described,) the object of meditation attains superiority. The meaning is, that such a condition (samápatti), or modification to that form, results.

Of this an example is given. In the case of “a transparent gem” or clear rock-crystal jewel, whatever colour it dwells upon, the same it obtains. In the same way in the transparent, clear thinking principle the form of the object thought of is imposed.

Although the text gives the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, but, according to the order of precedence, the terms should be understood to stand as if written “perceptible, means of perception, and perceiver,” for first the meditation is directed to the perceivable; then it is devoted to the perception; and then it is confined to the perceiver, which is mere egoism; for in the case of the soul alone there can be no thinking. Even so, the thinking principle tinged by a substantial or a subtle object of perception assumes its character. In this sense the condition is implied also to the perceived.

[The word kshīna in the text means weakened, but this weakness is not general; according to the P. Rahasya it is confined to those subjects which are not thought of, the power remaining in full force in connexion with the special object of thought: kshīna-vertteh ādambanavishayātirikta - vishayaniśūpita - vṛtti-sunyasya. Tatosthatva is literally being in a thing, tat ‘there,’ and sthā “to be reposed”;’ but the commentator gives the equivalent concentration, ekāgratā. Tadanjanatva is literally being tinged thereby, and the stock illustration of the crystal being coloured red by the shoe-flower placed in it is adduced; but the commentator prefers the equivalent tannayatva “being of that substance.” He is, however, not singular in these interpretations. The P. Bhāshya amplifies the explanation by adding that when the soul, as agent or perceiver, is made the object of thought, the thinking principle becomes manifest in the special form of that soul, and when the emancipated soul is thought upon the think-
ing principle becomes of its special form. Grihitripurushálambanoparaktam grihitripurushasamápannam grihitripurusha-svarúpákáreṇa nirbhásate. Tathá muktapurushálambanoparaktam muktapurushasamápannam muktapurushasvarúpákáreṇa nirbhásate.]

Having explained the conditions, he now points out its fourfold differences (in three aphorisms.)

XLII.

The argumentative is that which is influenced by the fancy of word, meaning, and understanding.

That which is perceivable by the organ of hearing, or is an explosion or bursting of sound (śphota), is (technically sound or) “word” (śabda). “Meaning” (arthā) is (the sense conveyed by the word indicating) a genus (such as the cow or the horse). “Understanding” (jñāna) is a function of the intellect in which the quality of truth prevails (in preference to the other two qualities). “Fancy” (vikalpa) has been already defined (A. IX) “Affected” (saṅkirna) influenced by them, i.e., by the three, words &c. That modification, in which the three (words &c.) are apparent in an undefined fanciful shape, (i.e., their relations are doubtful in the mind), as the word gau “a cow,” meaning a cow, and conveying the notion of a cow, is called “argumentative,” (savitaraka.)

[The conditions adverted to in the preceding aphorism are fourfold, and thereof the first is called argumentative, inasmuch as in that condition the thinking principle fancies or doubtfully accepts a thing without positive discrimination of the relations between a word or its meaning and the idea conveyed by it. The P. Bhāshya explains it by saying, “Gau is the word, a cow is its meaning, and the idea is that of a cow, and accepting these distinct positions in an undivided form.” Gauriti śabdo Gaurityartho Gauriti jñánamityavibhágena vibhaktánāmapi grahanam dṛishtam. The P. Rahasya puts it more clearly by saying “when on hearing the word there is a doubt as to whether the gau is a word, or it is
a meaning, or it is an understanding. Gauriti s'abde s'rute nati gauriti s'abdo vá gaurityartho vá gauriti jñānam vá evamvikalpah. (See p. 18.) This is an inferior condition.

The word sphoṭa, which I have rendered into “bursting,” is the technical name of the sound which is eternal, and of which spoken words are but manifestations. The theory of some grammarians is that words are eternal, and they become manifest when spoken. Dr. Ballantyne, in his essay on Hindu Philosophy, has given a full account of this dogma.] The opposite of it or the non-argumentative is next described.

XLIII.

That is non-argumentative in which, on the dissolution of memory, the meaning alone without any definite identity is apparent.

When the memory of words and of their meaning has subsided, and the shape rises manifest and distinctly graspable, excluding the sense of understanding, and appearing as if devoid of a definite identity, it is “non-argumentative.”

[The P. Bhāṣya explains the purport thus: when the intellect, intent upon the form of the object of acceptance, forsakes the accepting understanding which is like itself, and becomes solely of the form of the object, i.e., it becomes of the form of the object accepted, it is non-argumentative. Grāhyasvarūpaparaktā prajñā evamiva prajñārūpam grāhāntamakam tyaktā padārtha-mātrasvarūpa grāhyasvarūpāpanneva bhavati sā nirvilarkā samāpatti.]

To indicate varieties of it, he says:

XLIV.

By this the deliberative and the non-deliberative as pertaining to subtile objects are also described.

“By this,” i.e., by the explanation about the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions, the deliberative (sāvichārād)
and the non-deliberative (nirvichárd) conditions have been described. How are the latter? "Subtile objects," (sukshmavaisya)—"subtile" rudimentary matter and the organs are so called. By this the former two propositions are made to refer to gross objects. They are dependent on gross matter, whether connected with the ideas of words, meaning, and understanding (as in the case of the argumentative form,) or without them (as in the non-argumentative form.) "The deliberative" (savichárd) is that which is an abstract notion defined by place, time, quality, &c. "The non-deliberative" (nirvichárd) is that in which the abstract notion is manifest as a mere substratum of quality, perfectly independent of all ideas of place, time, quality, &c. These refer to subtile objects.

[The object aimed at is to assign the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions to gross matter, and the deliberative and the non-deliberative to subtile objects. The distinction seems to be purely technical, implying only slight differences.]

To explain how far this subtile object extends, he says:

XLV.

This subtile objectivity terminates in the indissoluble.

What has been described about the object of the deliberative and the non-deliberative conditions being subtile objectivity extends to the indissoluble. That which does not merge into anything, nor indicates or implies anything is the "Indissoluble" (aliṅga) or First Principle (nature, Prakṛti), and subtile objectivity extends to that limit. Now in the resolution of qualities, there are four stages, viz., 1, defined character, (viśishṭa liṅga); 2, undefined character (aviśishṭaliṅga); 3, mere character (liṅgamātra); 4, devoid of character, or indissoluble, (aliṅga). The objects of defined character are the (gross) elements. Those of undefined character are the subtile elements and the organs. Mere character is indicative of the Intellect; and devoid of character, the First Principle. Hereby it is said that there is nothing more subtile than the First Principle.
[The word *liṅga* has been defined to be that which indicates or characterises, a mark or sign which is inseparable from it, and, I believe, the word character is its nearest equivalent. The First Principle or Prakṛiti is called *aliṅga* or that which is without an indicator, because by itself it does not specifically indicate anything, and is the subtlest of the categories, and there is nothing more subtle. “It may be urged,” argues the P. Bhāshya, “that the soul is more subtle than the first principle, but, though it is true that the characterless (*aliṅga* or Prakṛiti) is more subtle than the characterised, still the same cannot be the case with the soul, since the soul is not the material but the instrumental cause of character, and therefore the utmost limit of subtlety must rest with the First Principle.” *Nanvasti purushah sukshma iti. Satyam yathā liṅgat param aliṅgasya saukshmyam, nacháivam-purushasya, kintu liṅgasya anvayi-kāraṇam purusho na bhavati hetustu bhavatiti, atah pradháne saukshmyam niratisay-\-am vyákhyátam.*]

He now points out the necessity for these mental conditions.

**XLVI.**

These verily constitute meditation with a seed.

“These verily,” *i.e.*, the conditions above described, exist with a seed or object. “With a seed,” (*sāvīja*) means conscious meditation, (or Samādhi having a distinct recognition,) because such meditations have always something to rest upon.

[These four conditions have been already described in the commentary on Aphorism XVII, and call for no further remarks here.]

Now, these (conscious conditions) mature into the non-deliberative condition, and therefore he describes the fruit thereof.

**XLVII.**

In the purity of the non-deliberative (condition) there is intellectual contentment.
"Non deliberativeness" has been already defined. (Aph. XLIV). "Purity" (vaisáradya) means freedom from dirt. The non-argumentative condition is superior to the argumentative. To that the deliberative which has a subtle object in view, (is superior). Again, the non-deliberative, which has no object in view, is superior to the preceding. When by rigorous practice "purity," as the condition of freedom from dirt, is attained "intellectual contentment" results, i. e., the thinking principle, being free from pain and longing, becomes fit to flow in an even course. This is the purity of the thinking principle, abidance in which is steadfastness (Aph. XXXII).

[The four conditions are graded in due order, and the last is declared to be the best of them, because in the highest purity of that condition there is perfect intellectual contentment, in which one can behold all knowledge like one seated in the palace of wisdom can look, as from the top of a mountain, upon groaning mortals below on earth, without being in any way disturbed. Prajnáprásádamáruhka as'ochyah s'ochatojanán, Bhúmíshthániva s'aiasthak sarváh prájñónupasyati.]

He next explains what happens when this condition is attained.

XLVIII.

In that condition knowledge becomes truth-supporting.

That "knowledge" (prajná) which supports the "truth" (rita) or reality, and never permits it to be covered by misconception (A. VIII) is "truth-supporting" (ritambhará), and in the condition (aforesaid) this is acquired. With the light of that knowledge the Yogi perceives everything in its true character, and acquires the highest Yoga.

[In the next aphorism it will be shown that this perfect knowledge is the same with the transcendental power of knowing things, independently of the ordinary means of ascertaining truth.]

Its distinction from other forms of knowledge is now to be explained.
XLIX.

The knowledge which results from testimony and inference is general, (and differs from this) which has a specific object (in view).

"Testimony" (śrutā) is knowledge founded on sacred texts. "Inference" (anumāna) has been already defined (Aph. VII). The knowledge which results from these two has generals for its object, since neither words nor characteristic signs are able, like the organs of sense, to convey a knowledge of particularities. While this knowledge (the one under notice), resulting from the purity (fulness) of the non-deliberative condition, is distinct from them, inasmuch as it has a speciality for its object. When one is in the condition of this knowledge, the truth of all subtile, intercepted, and remote objects becomes manifest in a clear form. The advice is, that for this reason it is proper that every exertion should be made by Yogis for the attainment of this knowledge.

[The transcendental powers referred to above are here described to be the power of observing things which are so subtile, or so intercepted, or so remote that they cannot be observed by the ordinary appliances of perception.]

He now describes the fruit of this knowledge.

L.

The residuum of this is opposed to all other residua.

"The residuum" (saṅskāra Aph. XVIII) which is produced by that knowledge, obstructs all other residua, whether arising during worldly condition or during meditation, i.e., it renders them incapable of achieving their respective works. Since the residua produced by knowledge being absolute, are more powerful, they are able to preclude all residua resulting from non-absolute knowledge. The purport is that for this reason that absolute knowledge should be exercised.
CHAPTER FIRST.

[The purport of this and of the next aphorism has already been explained in the comments on aphorisms XVII and XVIII.]

Having thus described conscious meditation, he now explains the un-conscious form of meditation, (Aph. XVIII).

LI.

On the removal of this also, everything being removed, there is meditation without a seed.

"Of this," i.e., of conscious meditation. "Removal" (nirodha) is dissolution. On its dissolution all functions of thought melting into their causes, and the mere residua which arise in this state being also rejected by the conviction "this is not, this is not," meditation without a seed becomes manifest. On this being accomplished the soul (purusha) becomes pure, and abides solely in its own nature.

[The P. Bhāṣya explains the aphorism thus: "That meditation is not only antagonistic to the impressions of the Samādhi state, but also to the residua left by those impressions. But how do the residua of the suppressed (nirodha) state remove the residua of the meditative state? By the influence of the duration of the suppressed state the existence alone of the impressions produced by the suppressed thinking principle is perceptible. As the thinking principle then merges into its own natural form along with all the impressions of the waking, the meditative, the suppressed and the isolated states, their residua can no longer be antagonistic to the natural state of the thinking principle, nor the causes of its (separate) existence. And since the thinking principle, divested of its functions, along with the residua of the isolated state, is suppressed, and in that suppression the soul resides in its own form, it is called pure and liberated."]

Now in this (chapter) have been described Yoga, the subject of the work (A. I), its definition by the words the cessation of the thinking principle (A. II), exercise (XIII), dispassion (XV), the
nature of the two means and their varieties (XVI, the conscious and the un-conscious forms of Yoga, the inferior and superior Yoga (XVII—XVIII), the various means of exercising Yoga, easy means of accomplishing it (XIX—XXIII), definition of God (XXIV), his proof (XXVIII), greatness (XXVI), indicator (XXVII), mode of worship (XXV), and its results (XXIX), the perturbations of the thinking principle (XXX), and the pains thereon consequent (XXXI), the means of obviating them by study and benevolence (XXXII-XXXIII), regulation of breath (XXXIV), condition preceding the conscious and un-conscious meditations (XXXV), meditation with a seed, mental afflictions (XLI), their definitions (XLII-XLIV—XLV), their fruits (XLVI—XLVIII), their object (XLIX), and meditation without a seed (LI). Thus is the Yoga chapter explained.

[The above summary has not been translated literally. The original is interrupted by a number of participles and explanatory words which have been omitted as they would have served only to make an uncommonly long sentence very much involved.]

This is the end of the first quarter or Yoga chapter of the commentary entitled Rājamārtanda on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
CHAPTER SECOND.

May the three-eyed Lord of the universe, by whom has been disclosed the several means of obtaining the occult powers of the difficultly-achievable Yoga, be favourable to the attainment of the desired object!

Having in the first chapter explained the Yoga for those whose thoughts are collected, together with the means thereof, the author now, anticipating the question what should be the practice of the means for the achievement of the Yoga for those whose thoughts are in a waking (worldly) state, describes the Kriyá-yoga (practical Yoga), with a view to establish the mode of accomplishing it.

[This chapter is designed for persons who have not obtained control over their passions, but who are nevertheless desirous of practising those works which are calculated to train them for the performance of the highest branches of the Yoga, and to enable them to acquire supernatural powers (riddhis). Inasmuch as this training can be attained only through active exercise of certain duties, and those duties form the topic of this chapter, the chapter is called Kriyá-yoga or "Practical Yoga."]

I.

Asceticism, muttering, and resignation to God constitute the Practical Yoga.

"Asceticism" (tapas) is the observance of the fasts called Krichchhara, Chándráyana and the like enjoined in another Sástra (Dharma-sástra). "Muttering" (sádhyáya) is the inaudible repetition of particular mantras preceded by the Prañava, (i.e., the syllable Om). "Resignation to God" (I'évara-pranidhána) is the dedication to the Supremely Venerable all one's works, without
any concern for their fruits. These, it is said, are the Practical Yoga.

[This aphorism defines what Practical Yoga is. It includes the three acts of Asceticism, Muttering, and Resignation to God. The first includes all those acts of fasting and the like which the Smṛiti ordains for the mortification of the flesh. In this sense tapas would be best rendered by religious austerity or self-denial, but the examples given are included under the head of penance. The Yogīs do not exclude any of them, nor, except in the form of seats &c., add any new form of penance. The Kṛchchhara named in the commentary is by some believed to be the same with the Prājāpatya, and by others with the Sāntapana. The first is effected by eating once a day for three days in the morning, then once in the night for three days, then subsisting for three days on food given, unasked, as alms, and lastly fasting for three days. The fast is absolute, and not even a mouthful of water is allowed to be drunk. The second is effected by living for six days on the five products of the cow and water in which kuśa grass has been steeped, and absolutely fasting on the 7th day. The Chāndrāyana has several varieties, but all of them are regulated by the moon's age, the food being daily reduced by one mouthful from the first day, till on the newmoon no food is taken, and then on the next day beginning with one mouthful the full allowance is got on the day of the fullmoon. These penances are ordained for particular heinous sins. In citing their names it is not the object of the commentator to enjoin that these particular penances should be regularly practised, but simply to cite examples. The Haṭhadāpikā enjoins some forms of asceticism suited to the Rāja-yoga. The object is, there should be constant mortifying of the flesh so as to subdue its longings.

Muttering, like the last, is a part of the Smṛiti ritual, largely dwelt upon in the Tantras. Every householder has a particular mantra which he is required to repeat for a certain number of times every day, the number varying from twelve to many thousands according to choice. The muttering is so done as not to be audible to a bystander, but in a manner so that each repe-
tition may be clear and distinct, and fit to be counted by the mutterer. The P. Bhāskya and the P. Rahasya add that sādhyāya implies either the muttering of a mantra, or the study of that sāstra which relates to emancipation. Pranavādi-pavitrānām japamokshaśastrādhyayanam vá.

Resignation to God (pranidhāna) has been already explained on p. 28.

These are essentially necessary as preliminary practices, but they do not constitute the Yoga itself.]

(To the question) of what use are these, he replies:

II.

It is for the purpose of the contemplation of Samādhi and for weakening afflictions.

"Afflictions" (kleśāk) will be presently described (II, iii.) To "weaken them" is to make them unfit for their respective works. "Samādhi" (meditation) has been already explained (I, xx.) Its "contemplation" (bhāvanā) is repeated cogitation of it in thought. That Yoga which has these contemplation and weakening for its purpose (artha), object, is so called (kriyā-yoga). What is said is this: These mortifications, &c. when practised, weakening the afflictions of the ignorance residing in the thought, become accessories to Samādhi. Therefore the advice is that the Yogi should first turn his attention to this Practical Yoga.

[The purport of this aphorism has been already anticipated in the remarks on the last preceding Aphorism.]

It has been said (above that the Practical Yoga is wanted) for the purpose of weakening the afflictions, and what those afflictions are he now describes.

III.

Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions.
"Afflictions" (*klesāh*) are the five, ignorance, &c., which will be (presently) described. These, being of an obstructive character, i.e., producing distress, become the object of the term affliction. These, abiding in the thinking principle, strengthen the modifications of the (three) qualities which constitute mundane existence.

[Here the names of the afflictions are given, but their definitions are reserved for subsequent discussions. The reason why they are called "afflictions," is explained to be that they tend to promote those modifications of the thinking principle which the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness tend to for worldly purposes. In other words, those functions which attach the mind to the world are afflictions, because they stand in the way of emancipation.]

Although all these are equally afflicting, nevertheless ignorance, being the source (of all of them), is the chief, and to establish this he says:

IV.

Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.

"Ignorance" (*avidyā*) is delusion; it is in fact the assumption of that being the soul which is not soul. It is the "field" (*ksetra*), or ground of production, of those which follow, i.e., egoism and the rest, and each of them may be in one of the four conditions of dormancy, &c. Wherever the reverse-idea-producing ignorance becomes weak, there egoism and the other afflictions are not seen to arise, for it is seen that where the mistaken notion exists there they arise, it follows, therefore, that ignorance is their source.

The "dormant, weak, intercepted or simple." Of these afflictions those which, existing in the thinking principle, do not, owing to the absence of an exciting cause, produce their
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effect, are called "dormant" (prasupta), asleep. Thus in child-
hood. Though residing in a child in the form of instincts those
afflictions do not, from want of co-operation of an exciting cause,
flare up.

Those afflictions are said to be "weak" (tānu) which, be-
coming overpowered in their effort to perform their respective
functions by their mutually contradictory inclinations, reside in
the thinking principle in the form of instincts, but are not able
to carry on their work without the aid of numerous auxiliaries.
This is the case in the practising Yogī (who being engaged in
one particular contemplation does not allow the afflictions to
disturb his thoughts. They are in him, but in a condition of
weakness produced by their non-indulgence).

Those afflictions are said to be "intercepted" (vichchhinna)
which remain with their powers overcome by a particularly
potent passion, as desire when the prevailing passion is aversion,
or aversion when the prevailing passion is desire: being mu-
tually opposed to each other, they cannot dominate at the same
time, (one must for the time intercept the other).

Afflictions are said to be "simple" (udāra) when, having their
auxiliaries beside them, they carry on their respective functions.
This is the case of the waking condition of those who follow not
the ways of the Yoga.

Each of these four (afflictions) has ignorance for its root, and
is also attended by it, for nowhere are the afflictions found
existing by themselves as opposed to, or independent of, the
attendant. When that ignorance, a mere falsehood, is removed
by thorough knowledge, these afflictions, like roasted seeds, never
sprout again. It follows that these are both rooted in, and attended
by, ignorance; hence they are all implied by ignorance. The
conclusion is that as all these afflictions are calculated to produce
distractions of the thinking principle, it is the foremost duty of
the Yogī to exert for their removal.

[In A. III the afflictions have been described to be five in
number. In this the author shows that four of them owe their
origin, and are subject, to ignorance. He also shows that they are always present, though not always active. The causes of their want of activity are described to be dormancy, weakness and interception.

He now defines ignorance.

V.

Ignorance is the assumption of that which is non-eternal, impure, painful and non-soul, to be eternal, pure, joyous and soul.

The assumption of a thing being what it is not, is "ignorance" (avidyā). That this is its general definition follows from its distinctions as pointed out (in the aphorism). Thus the assumption of eternity in the non-eternal water jar and the like is ignorance. In the same way, the assumption of purity in impure objects, like the body and so forth, that of joy in pain, and that of the soul in the body (which is not soul, are results of ignorance). By these is explained the mistake of confounding vice with virtue and the useless with the useful.

[The P. Bhāṣya argues that although the word avidyā is formed of the privative particle a with vidyā "knowledge," it does not mean simple absence of knowledge, but a conception distinct and the opposite of it, and illustrates it by the examples of amitra and agoshpada, the former of which, though formed of a (absence) and mitra "a friend," does not mean the absence of a friend, but an enemy, and the latter, formed of a and goshpada "the footprint of a cow," does not mean the absence of the footprint of a cow, but a country. Tasyās chāmitrāgoshpada-vadavastu sa tatvam viṣayām, yathā nāmitro mitrābhāvo na mitramātram, kintu tadciruddhah sapatnah, yathā vāgoshpadaṁ na goshpadābhāvo na goshpadamātram, kintu desa eva, tābhīṣamanyat vastvālram, evamāvidyā na pramāṇaṁ na pramāṇābhāvaṁ, kintu vidyāvaparītām jyāntaraṁavādyeyi.]

With a view to explain egoism, he says:
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VI.

Egoism is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

"The power that sees" (drīk-śakti,) is the soul (Purusha). "The power of seeing" (darsana-śakti) is the internal organ produced by the quality of goodness unaffected by the qualities of foulness and darkness. What is said is, that the assumption of the two extremely different things,—the one being the enjoier and the other the enjoyed—the active and the inert,—being the same is egoism (asmītā). Thus, when nature (prakṛti), though really devoid of the power of enjoying and of intelligence, fancies "I am the enjoier," "I am the intelligent," the blunder is the affliction called egoism.

[The internal organ is a modification of the quality of goodness, which marks the distinction between itself and the things around it. In this state it is egotism; but when that internal organ ceases to perform this function, and only a sense of mere existence is felt in the thinking principle without any distinction of the self and the things around it is egoism. This definition was anticipated by the commentator in his remarks on A. xvii chapter I, (p. 19) and the author gives it here.]

He defines desire.

VII.

Desire is dwelling on pleasure.

"Dwelling on pleasure" (sukhānuśayī) is lying on pleasure. The longing or thirst for pleasure on the part of him who had experienced it before, and is impelled by its remembrance, is the affliction called desire (rāga).

[The root śī is "to sleep" or "lie down," and literally the translation of anusāyī should be the sleeper, or that which lies on something, but idiomatically I prefer dwelling, as it conveys more clearly the idea intended by the author. Obviously he means the
dwellings on, or keeping alive in the mind, the idea of some object or other. Anuṣaya means "to follow" or "to pursue," and that would afford a very appropriate rendering of the term here, but in the next aphorism it has been used with reference to pain, and as no one pursues pain knowing it to be pain, that rendering cannot be adopted. It is true the word also means "repentance," and it may be assumed that the author has used the word in two different senses in the two aphorisms, but such an assumption would be unjustifiable in dealing with definitions. The author, in his aphorisms, has nowhere evinced any leaning for rhetoric or verbal ornament, and it is very unlikely that he should use the same word in two consecutive aphorisms in two contradictory senses, when his object is to make things clear, and not to confound.]

He next defines aversion.

VIII.

Aversion is dwelling on pain.

"Pain" (dukkha) has been already defined, (C. I, xxxi). That which one, having experienced it, and remembering it, is averse to its means as undesirable, is the affliction called "aversion" (dvesha).

[Three of my MSS. has pratikūla-lakshṇam for ukta-lakṣṇam. If that reading be adopted, the meaning would be "Pain is of an opposite nature," i. e., in the case of pleasure there is a longing or thirst to get the object, while in that of pain, the feeling is the reverse, or avoiding to get it.]

He now defines tenacity of life.

IX.

Tenacity of life is an attachment to the body which relates to the residua of one's former life, even on the part of the wise.
The fear arising from the memory of pain from death endured in a former life prompts the constant wish, “May I not be separated from the body and its objects,” and the attachment to the body resulting therefrom, an attachment which exists without an inducing cause, in all beings from Brahmá to an earthworm, is the affliction called “Tenacity of life.” (Abhini-vesha.) Thus, it is afflicting in the waking or mundane state. These afflictions should at the outset be destroyed by the Yogi by the exercise of concentration of the mind to one point.

[The only doubtful word in the aphorism is the first. It is formed of the three words, *sva* “one’s own,” *rasa* literally “wish,” and *váhi*, “that which carries”—“that which carries or keeps in current one’s wish.” The commentators have, however, not rendered it so. Without giving a synonym of *rasa*, the P. Bháshya uses the word *vásaná* in its place (*marana-duhkhanubhavádiyam vásaneti*), and that word is the equivalent of *sañskára*, which I have rendered into residua. In this way the term *svarasaváhi* means ‘that which carries the residua of one’s former life.’ It proceeds from the memory of former experience, and since no one has in this life experienced the pain of death, it must follow that the fear of death must be the result of the unconscious memory of the experience of a former state of life—and this fear is the cause of attachment to life.]

Since it is not practicable to remove these afflictions without first knowing what they are, the author, having described their names (II, 111) fields, (I, 1v) divisions, (II, 1v) and characteristics, (II, v to ix,) now explains the division of the means of destroying them, according as they are gross or subtile.

X.

These, the subtile ones, should be avoided by an adverse course.

Those are “subtile” (*súkshma*) afflictions which exist in the form of residua, but have not assumed a modification in the
form of active work. They are to be avoided (heya), eluded, by an adverse course (pratiprasava) or reflex modification. When the thinking principle, with its residua, has accomplished its course and entered into egoism, which is its source, how can these, (afflictions,) being rootless, exist?

[The five afflictions aforesaid are described under two heads, subtle and gross. They are subtle when they exist in the form of residua, i. e., they exist potentially, but are latent. They become gross when they break out into active operation. Now, the latent ones are to be overcome by an adverse course. The natural course is to allow them to manifest themselves through the stimuli of external objects; but if the thinking principle be directed inwards towards egoism, the course of action is adverse to the natural tendency of the residua; and, in the absence of stimuli, they cannot manifest themselves. They cannot sprout, and are, therefore, compared in the P. Bhāṣṭya to roasted seeds.]

He next describes the means for the destruction of the gross (afflictions).

XI.

Their functions should be avoided by meditation.

The functions of these afflictions in active operation, which manifest themselves in the form of pleasure, pain, and delusion, should be “avoided,” destroyed, by meditation characterised by the concentration of the thinking principle on a single point. These, being gross, are suppressed by the mere exercise for the purification of the thinking principle, even as dense thick dirt on cloth and the like is removed by mere washing, while that which is subtle in it requires heating and other (arduous) means.

[The means of suppressing the gross afflictions, or those afflictions which are in active operation, is meditation, or confining the thinking principle to one action, and focussing it there to the exclusion of all other objects. The difference lies in this—that in the case of latent afflictions the thinking principle
CHAPTER SECOND.

is directed inward, and no opportunity is given to the latent ones to become active; and in the case of gross ones or those which are in active action, the thinking principle is confined to one object, and thereby all others are excluded. In the one case a desire is repressed by turning away from it, and keeping the thinking principle occupied with another, and in the other no opportunity is given for external stimuli to excite the latent wishes.

The illustration given shows that the subtile ones are more difficult to repress than the gross ones.]

Having thus defined the true character of the afflictions he, with a view to explain the residua of works, says:

XII.

The residua of works have affliction for their root, and are felt (either) in this manifest birth, (or) in the unmanifest one.

By the term "residua of works" (karmās'aya) the nature of the residua is explained, for all works are of the form of residua. By (the phrase) "Have affliction for their root" (kles'amulah) their cause is indicated, for of good or evil works the afflictions are the cause. By (the phrase) "felt in this manifest birth, or in the unmanifest one," the fruition is described. What is felt in the present existence is called "felt in this manifest birth" (driśṭajanma-vedaniyah); that which is to be felt in another existence is called "felt in an unmanifest one," (adriśṭajanma-vedaniyah). Thus, some virtuous actions, such as the worship of the gods and the like performed with excessive ardour, produce fruits even in this life in the form of kind, age, or experience. Thus, to Nandis'vara, through the influence of his worshipping the lord Maheśvara, change of kind was secured even in this life. Similarly to Viśvāmitra and others kind and age accrued through the force of penance. In the case of some kind alone is changed. Thus in the case of Nahusa and others performing vicious acts with excessive ardour kind alone was changed. So Urvas'ī was
metamorphosed into a creeper in the garden of Kártikeya. Thus is the rule to be explained distributively or collectively.

[The leading word in this aphorism is karmásaya. Formed of karma "works" and ásaya "virtue and vice," it implies the results which follow from the performances of works. The word ásaya has been accepted in aphorism 24, chapter I, to be the equivalent of vásaná and sañskára, and for the sake of concordance, and in accordance with the commentators, I render it here in that sense, inasmuch as the results do not manifest immediately, but remain latent to even a second or subsequent life in the form of residua.

The works are described to have afflictions for their root, because all works proceed from ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity for life, technically called the five afflictions, (II, 111). No work can be performed unless impelled by one or other of these five, and so they are the roots of the residua that are left behind. The fruits of these residua are borne either collectively or singly, and at different times, either in this life or in a subsequent one, and the commentator cites instances to prove this. The story of Nandísvara becoming a demigod occurs in the Vrihannandikesvara Puráña. The Rámáyana and some of the Puráñas give the story of Visvámitra, a Kshatriya by birth, becoming a Bráhmaña. The Mahábhárata relates the story of Nahusa being changed into a snake by a curse. The story of Urvaśi's becoming, like another Daphne, a creeper, occurs in the drama of Vikramorvaśi.]

Now he describes the varieties and distinctions of the residua of works with their fruits.

XIII.

The root existing, the deserts are kind, age, and experience.

The "root" (múla) is the afflictions aforesaid. As long as the afflictions are not removed, the deserts (vápakha), fruition of works,
good and evil, follow in the form of kind, age, and experience. "Kind" (jāti) means being a man or some other being. "Age" (āyus) is always remaining in the same body. "Experience" (bhoga) means sense objects, the senses, and consciousness of pleasure and pain, according as it is accepted in the passive, instrumental, or abstract sense.

The purport of this is this: That as the residua of works reposited in the thinking principle from time without a beginning, attain maturity, so they, according to their measure, lead to fruition in the form of kind, age, and experience. The afflictions existing with their roots uncut, the residua of works become the originators of deserts. Even as unhusked Sāli paddy, like unroasted seeds, are able to germinate, but husked grains, like roasted seeds, cannot, so the residua of works, unparted from the afflictions, become the germinators of deserts; though such is not the case when the afflictions are removed, or the residua are reduced to the condition of roasted seeds.

[The first difficult word in the aphorism is jāti. Its meaning is obvious enough, but I call it difficult because I can find no satisfactory equivalent for it in the English language. It is formed of the root jan 'to be born,' and means that which is born; but in philosophy it is used to imply species in a very comprehensive sense. It means caste, i.e., distinction of family; or species, that is one distinct from another, as several species in a genus or order; or broader distinctions than what is implied by species; as also the broadest distinctions which naturalists indicate by the term kingdom. The examples given show that the word jāti equally applies to the change of caste, as in a Kshatriya becoming a Brāhman; or to that of species; as in a man becoming a demigod; or to that of a kingdom as in a woman becoming a creeper: I know of no such comprehensive term in the English language. Dr. Ballantyne uses rank, but I doubt if the change of a woman into a creeper or a stone, the change could be idiomatically described as one of "rank." Colebrooke uses
"birth," but the change may take place without a regular birth. For the sake of English idiom the best course would be to use different equivalents under different circumstances, but that would upset the line of argument of the author. Genesis appears to bear close approximation to jāti, and kind is its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In using "kind" as the equivalent, I use what appears less liable to objection than others, but it is by no means a good one.

The second word āyus has been so explained by the commentator as to imply longevity, but the word means simply "age" or "duration of life," which may be long or short according to circumstances:—a meritorious work leading to prolongation of existence in a particular body, whereas a vicious one tending to shorten the span of life.

The third word is bhoga, which Dr. Ballantyne renders into "enjoyment;" but inasmuch as here it means the endurance of pain as well as the delectation of pleasure, I prefer "experience," which covers both.

The purport of the aphorism is that the fruition of works leads according to circumstances to change of body into a higher or lower grade, to the prolongation or reduction in the span of life, and to the experience of pleasure or pain.

The P. Bhāṣṭya thus explains the time of fruition: "The deserts are of three sorts, kind, age and experience. In regard to them the questions are discussed, 1st, Is one work the cause of one birth, or is it the cause of many births? 2nd, Are many works the causes of many births or of one birth?

One work is not the cause of one birth. Why so? Because there would be no regularity in the fruition of the remainder of innumerable works accumulated from time without a beginning along with a recent work. The objection would also be there would be no inducement for people (to perform many works). Therefore it is wrong.

Nor is one work the cause of many births. Why? Because if out of many works each work was to be the cause of many births,
there would be want of time for the fruition of all the remaining deserts. Therefore it, too, is wrong. Nor can many works be the cause of many births. Why? Because it is not possible for many births to happen simultaneously, and consequently it must be said to happen successively, and then the objection before urged (about want of time) would apply. It follows then that the diverse stock of residual of virtuous and vicious actions performed from birth to death remains in a dominant or a dominated form, and on a death taking place it becomes the cause of a birth, being itself liable to destruction on another stock becoming dominant."

The above described kind, &c. being the fruits of works, the author, in order to show that they produce fruition according to the works which are their cause, says:

XIV.

They have joy or suffering for their fruit, according as their cause is virtue or vice.

"Joy" (bláda) is pleasure, and "suffering" (paritápa) is pain. Those which have joy and suffering for their fruit are so called, (i.e., by the term bláda-paritápa-phaláh).

"Virtue" (punya) is fortunate action, and the reverse of it is "vice" (apunya). Those which have virtue or vice for their cause are so called (by the compound term punyapunya-hetutva).

What is said is this:—those works which proceed from virtuous actions yield joyful fruition in kind, age, and experience. Those which result from vice have painful fruitions.

[The meaning is obvious, and calls for no remark.]

To all ordinary beings the fruition is thus of two kinds; but to the Yogi all are painful; to show this, he says:

XV.

To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of the adversity of the actions of (the three)
qualities, and of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.

The meaning is, that to the “discriminating” (viveki) who has had experience of the afflictions, &c., all manifest sense objects are painful, like tasteful food infused with poison, and therefore should be known as adverse to him, since the thoroughly experienced Yogi feels oppressed by even the slightest pain. Even as the eyeball feels the acutest pain from the mere touch of a fibre of wool which the other organs do not, so the discriminating Yogi is distressed by even very slight pain.

To explain why it should be so, he says, “because of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.” Inasmuch as the longing for objects of enjoyment increases in the same ratio in which they are enjoyed, and the pain proceeding from their non-attainment is unavoidable, therefore pain always follows pleasure, and there is nothing but pain. This is the pain of sequence (parināma-dukhkatva).

Again, since even in the enjoyment of pleasing objects there is always a feeling of aversion against that which is antagonistic to them, anxiety cannot be eluded even while in the enjoyment of pleasures. This is the “pain of anxiety,” (tāpādukkhatā).

“Pain of residua” (sanskāradukkha). The sensation of pleasure, or of pain, arises in the presence of a desirable or an undesirable object, and a corresponding residuum is left on the field (of the thinking principle), and since from such a residuum a corresponding sensation is produced, and since from a great number of such residua the mundane condition is never cut short, therefore all residua are painful.

“From adversity of the action of the qualities” (guna-vritti-virodhā). The effects of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, manifesting in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, being mutually overpowering or overpowered, are hostile to each other. They are everywhere connected with pain, hence they are painful.
What is said is this:—To the discriminating who is anxious to obviate pain to the utmost and absolutely, all the four causes above described, appear in the form of pain, and hence all deserts are said to be of the form of pain.

[The object of this aphorism is to establish that everything connected with worldly life is painful, and Yogis should, therefore, shun them all. To prove this, it is first shown that all joyous actions are followed by pain. (The word parinäma in the text here is used for sequence or result, and not modification as in most other places.) There must be a change after the enjoyment of pleasure, and as there is an increase of desire from enjoyment there must be frequent disappointments, and they inflict pain. Even in the act of enjoyment there is always a dread of something that may disturb it, and so it is not unalloyed. Then all actions and all impressions leave behind residua in the field of the thinking principle, and they revive sensations of pleasure and pain. And lastly, the three qualities are adverse to each other, and therefore they create disturbances and cause pain. The conclusion is a state of pessimism, from which the only relief is to be had by totally cutting oneself off from all worldly affairs. This pessimism forms the basis of all the leading systems of Indian philosophy, and is not unknown in Europe. According to Hartmann, "if we balance our pleasures and pains, the latter greatly exceed the former." Schopenhauer goes further, and assigns a negative nature to pleasure, which is very much the same as the doctrine of Leibnitz who assigns a privative character to pain. He holds that "all pleasure causes an exhaustion of the nervous processes, and are in themselves indirect, resulting from the cessation or intermission of pain, and seldom emerges into consciousness, whereas pain eo ipso generates consciousness." He asks, "what, for instance, are all the pleasures of health, of youth, of freedom, of sufficient means? Are they anything but the absence of sickness, of old age, of slavery, of poverty? and is not work itself an evil? How great misery does it entail upon the toiling masses of
our fellow countrymen? Does any one work of his own free will?" He adds, "no amount of pleasure can compensate for any degree of pain." Again, "human life oscillates between pain and ennui, which states are indeed the ultimate elements of life." Hartmann holds pleasure and pain to be "qualitatively similar, and only different in quantity." (Philosophie des Unbewussten). Socrates aptly describes pleasure and pain to be "fastened together from one crown." (Plato, Phædo.) Poets generally revel in the pleasures of this world, but Byron, one of the greatest among them, says—

"Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er thy days from anguish free;
And know, whatever thou hast been,
'Tis something better—not to be."

The question then arises whence is the deliverance to come? and an able writer thus summarises the answer of the pessimists. "In knowing that the world is radically and necessarily bad, such knowledge leaves no ground for that old affirmation of the Will to live. It leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of the Will, that true nirvāṇa, in which there is no more Will, and therefore no longer an ideal presentation or a real world." (Westminster Review, XLIX, 128.) This is almost the very language of Kapila.

Since pain, residua, works, and the fund of deserts, as aforesaid, are produced by Ignorance, and since Ignorance is of the form of false knowledge, and should be destroyed by perfect knowledge, and since perfect knowledge is that which decides what should be rejected and the cause thereof, and what should be approved and its cause, he says this by way of explanation:

XVI.

Avoidable is the pain not yet come.
Inasmuch as the past is gone (and cannot be recalled), and that which is being experienced cannot be avoided, that worldly pain which has not yet come (but may come) is what should be avoided. This is what is said here.

[The word keya is derived from the root ká 'to quit,' and means both that which should be shunned and that which can be avoided. The English equivalent has not this double sense, but it affords the nearest approach to the Sanskrit term. The injunction is, since the past and the present are beyond control, exertion should be made to preclude the possibility of future pain. Dr. Ballantyne is quite right in rendering the aphorism into "what is to be shunned is pain not yet come," but when keya is used as an adjective, this phrase "that which is to be shunned," is too lumbering to be used with convenience. Avoidance-worthy conveys the exact meaning, and is more easy of manipulation, but it too is lumbering. A single term is wanted, and, not knowing any English word of the kind, I use what appears to me to approach the nearest to the original, without being its exact equivalent.]

He now describes the cause of the avoidable.

XVII.

The conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle is the cause of the avoidable.

The "spectator" (drishtā) is the soul of the form of intelligence. The "spectacle" (drśya) is the principle of understanding (intellect). The conjunction," sānyoga, i.e., coming into the relation of the enjoyer and that which is to be enjoyed, of these two, without due discrimination, is the "cause," (hetu) producing agent, of the "avoidable," (keya) which is pain resulting from the modifications of the qualities, and that is the world. The meaning is that on the cessation of that conjunction worldliness subsides.

[In this aphorism "the avoidable" is used to imply the affairs of the world. Those affairs result from the conjunction or
interaction of the soul and the intellect, and inasmuch as worldliness is invariably associated with pain, and that pain cannot be suppressed as long as that worldliness lasts, and for the sake of emancipation worldliness should be avoided, that which is to be avoided is here called the avoidable, or the avoidance-worthy. The word sañyoga means conjunction, but here a mere reflection of the soul is what is meant. The reflection results from propinquity. There is never an actual contact.]

Having described the conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle, he now explains the nature, the function, and the motive of the spectacle.

XVIII.

The spectacle is of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is the purpose of for experience and emancipation.

"Illumination" (prakāśa) is the nature of the quality of goodness. "Action" (kriyā) in the form of exertion, is that of foulness. "Rule" (sthiti), in the form of regulation, is that of darkness. That which has illumination, action and the rest for its essential nature is so called, (i.e., by the term prakāśa-kārya-sthiti-śilam). By this the nature of the spectacle is defined.

"It is of the form of the elements and the organs" (bhūlemdriyātmakam). The "elements" (bhūlas) are, according as they are gross or subtile, the earth, &c. and the rudiments of odour, &c. The "organs" (indriya) are threefold, according as they are the organs of sense, the organs of action, and the internal organ. That of which these two (the elements and the organs), in the forms of the preceptor and the precept, are the natural modifications, not different from its own form, is called "of the form of the elements and the organs." By this its action is also described.

"Experience" (bhoga) has been already defined, (II, xiii). "Emancipation" (apavarga) is the cessation of worldliness result-
CHAPTER SECOND.

ing from discriminative knowledge. That which has these two, (ākogā and apavarga) for its "object" (arthā) or requirement, is the spectacle. This is the meaning.

[There would be no spectacle if there was not in it a power of manifestation, i.e., of illumination, or light. Without some action, too, it could not be manifest; and to be manifest it must have some rule or order. Hence the three are described to be the three essentials of its existence, or in other words its nature. The esoteric interpretation of this is that the spectacle is essentially the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, which must be in action to produce spectacle. It is of the form of the elements and the organs. The organs could not alone produce spectacles, nor would the elements produce spectacles if there were no organs to perceive them and communicate them to the intellect. The independent existence of the two, unconnected with each other, would also fail to produce a spectacle. They must be brought together to do so, and therefore it is that the spectacle is described to be of the nature of illumination, and of the form of the elements and the organs. The purport of this round-about expression is that the intellect is the spectacle when it is acted upon by the elements and the organs, or the elements and the organs are modified in the form of the intellect. The word used in the text is ātmā, and it is explained to be a modification not different from its natural form or identity (svarupābhinnah parināmak. What this natural form is is not apparent. Obviously the natural form of the intellect, or Buddhī, would be the meaning, but from what follows, Prakṛiti would seem to be what is meant. I shall notice this lower down, (A. xix, xxi).

The motive or object of the spectacle is twofold,—it ministers to our enjoyment, and it may be made to help us in our endeavours to attain emancipation from the bondage of the earth.

The word sthiti means fixity or abidance, but the Sākhya-tattva-kaumudi explains it to mean rule, regulation, or order. Had there been no order or rule, illumination and action would be continuous, and there would be no oeeation or break. It is the
intervention of darkness that causes the break or order of the manifestation of light and action; this is implied by sthitī. It implies the quality of darkness.]

To describe the phases of this spectacle in its various conditions, in the forms of modifications which should be known as fit to be avoided, he says:

XIX.

The specific, the unspecific, the solely mergent, and the immergent are the divisions of the qualities.

"The divisions of the qualities," i. e., their specific conditions, should be known to be four—this is enjoined. Thereof the "specific" (vīśeṣa) are the gross elements and the organs. The "unspecific" (avīśeṣa) are the subtile elements and the internal organ. The "solely mergent" (liṅgamātra) is intellect. The "im mergent" (aliṅga) is the unmanifest or undiscr e, i. e., Prakṛiti. This is what is said. Since the relation everywhere of this undiscr e of the form of the three qualities is necessary to be known at the time of commencing knowledge, the four divisions are defined.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain that the spectacle assumes different forms under different circumstances. It is "specific" or well-defined when it refers to the elements and the organs. It is "unspecific" or undefined when related to the subtile elements and the internal organ or the mind. It is "solely mergent" or mere thought when it refers to the intellect or the thinking principle. And it is "im mergent" or unmanifest or undiscr e when referring to Prakṛiti. Here Prakṛiti is included as one of the forms or phases of the spectacle, though in the commentary on the seventeenth aphorism the spectacle has been defined to be the intellect or the principle of understanding (buddhītalīva). This inconsistency is explained away by saying that the intellect is but a modification of Prakṛiti, and, inasmuch as its primary form is Prakṛiti, the spectacle must include
Prakṛiti. The words used in explaining the term ātmā in the commentary on the last aphorism—"a modification not different from its primary form," (svārūpābhinnah pariṇāmah)—supports this inference. This is, apparently, different from the doctrine of Kapila who assigns 23 out of the 25 categories to the spectacle, leaving out the soul and Prakṛiti; but in reality there is no difference, except in the phraseology, as will be shown in the twenty-first aphorism.

The four terms have been differently rendered by different translators. The terms used above have been taken from Colebrooke and Wilson's 'Śāṅkhya Kārikā.' Mr. Davies, in his 'Hindu Philosophy,' adopts the first two, but for "mergent" uses "attributive," and for "immargent" its negative. Dr. Ballantyne uses "diverse," "non-diverse," "merely resolvable" and "irresolvable." In translating aphorism 45 of Book I, I have rendered these words collectively with the subject, liṅga, into "defined character," "undefined character," "mere character" and "devoid of character."

Since the detestableness of spectacle must be first known, and it having been described along with its conditions, to show what should be accepted, the spectator, the author now says:

XX.

The spectator is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas.

"The spectator" (dṛaśkā) is soul. He is "absolute sentience" (dṛiśimātra), sensation only. The object of using the term "absolute" (mātra) is to preclude the idea of the quality and the qualified, (i.e. he is himself sensation and not possessed of sensation). Some explain sensation to be an attribute of soul.

He, the spectator, 'though pure,' (śuddhopi), i.e. although existing by himself in his own essence, being above all liability to modification and the like, "directly beholds intellected ideas."

"Intellected ideas" (pratyayās) are knowledge tinctured by
worldly objects. "Directly" (anu), without any intervention, or without any medium, he beholds (paśyati).

What is said is this. Soul attains his spectatorship by his proximity to intellect, which alone is tinctured or influenced by passing objects.

[The soul is sentence only, i.e., it consists of sentence and nothing more. In this condition it is absolutely pure, being unalloyed by any other object. It, nevertheless, directly beholds intellected ideas, or is the percipient, of all ideas without any intervention. This is effected by its proximity to the intellect, which receives the impressions of the outer world. The act of modification or change which perception implies is effected in the intellect, and does not extend to the soul. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of maintaining the immutability and perfect purity of the soul, for the admission of change would destroy its immutability and absolute purity.]

To show that soul alone is the experiencer, he says:

XXI.

Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle.

"Spectacle" (dṛiṣṭya) has been defined above (II, xviii). 'Its soul' (ātmā) is its true nature. It, "the soul of the spectacle," is required for "his purpose," for the purpose of consummating the experiencership of soul to the exclusion of all selfish ends. Pradhāna in activity does not work with a view to attain any aim of its own, but to accomplish the experiencership of soul.

[The meaning is that the true nature of the spectacle acts solely to accomplish the purpose of soul, and not for any purpose of its own, for it has none such. It will be noticed that the text says it is the soul of the spectacle, and not the spectacle itself, that subserves the purpose of soul, and the question arises what is its soul? The word used in the text is ātmā, which means soul, i.e., the soul of the spectacle subserves the purpose of the soul of a living being. The commentator explains ātmā by svarūpa "its own natural form,"
or true nature. In the commentary on A, xix, he uses the words svarūpābhinnah parināmah, or "a modification not different from its primary form," neither of which carries us directly to what is meant. It is obvious, however, from the use of the word Pradhāna—Prakṛiti in the commentary on the aphorism under notice, which in activity, is said, "not to work with a view to attain any aim of its own," that the "soul of the spectacle" is but another form of expression for Prakṛiti. That Prakṛiti in activity is the spectacle is abundantly evident in the leading works of the Sāńkhya system. Thus, in the Sāńkhya-kārikā:

"For the sake of soul's wish, that subtle person exhibits (before it) like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence." (Verse xlvi). Again, "as a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul." (Verse lxix). Again: "Generous nature, endowed with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of the ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities." (Verse lx). Again "he desists because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation." (Verse lxvi). Similarly the Sāńkhya Sūtra: "Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart carrying saffron (for the sake of its master)." (Ballantyne, III, lviii). Again, "just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energising, desist, because of the end having been attained (in the shape of soul's aim)." (Ibid. III, lxix). Nor is there any inconsistency in this, for intellect does not differ from Prakṛiti except in being in activity; and "soul," "true nature," "original shape of the intellect," and other similar expressions must imply Prakṛiti or nature, and nothing else. This will explain the remarks made in the note on Aphorisms xvii and xix.

Commenting on the passages quoted from the Sāńkhya-kārikā, Mr. Davies observes, "Beautiful as poetry, but not very
philosophic, nor in direct harmony with other parts of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Kapila, or Iśvara Krishṇa, forgets that nature (Prakṛti) has no personality, no powers, no volition, and no consciousness,” (p. 95.) This is not fair towards Iśvara Krishṇa, who provides for such criticism by saying, “as the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the development of nature causes the liberation of soul;” (Verse LIX;) and Kapila cites the unintelligent cart carrying saffron for its owner.]

If the accomplishment of the experience of soul be thus the only aim, then, on the accomplishment of that object, Prakṛiti, having no other object in view, should cease to be active, and the cessation of all modification in it, itself being pure, (i. e., having the three qualities in equipose) all spectators should be free, and it would follow that the world would be cut short. Suspecting such a consequence, he says:

XXII.

Destroyed in the case of him whose purpose has been attained, she is still active, for she is common to others besides him.

Although she (Prakṛiti—nature) becomes "destroyed" (nāṣṭa), devoid of action, in the case of some one soul which has attained its purpose, (kritārtha), by experiencing the world till the manifestation of discriminative knowledge, yet she, being common to all souls, remains active (anāṣṭa) in other cases. It follows that Prakṛiti, being common to all experiencers, can never be totally destroyed, nor can the emancipation of one imply the emancipation of all. This is what is meant.

[The conclusion arrived at in the next preceding aphorism, to the effect that on knowledge being attained, Prakṛiti ceases to act, and becomes functionless, is calculated to suggest the idea that her cessation from her action would apply to all souls, so that on one soul attaining emancipation all souls would be free, there being no active ministering Prakṛiti to keep them supplied with
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external impressions. This, however, is not the case. The destruction, or cessation, of action, is confined to the particular soul concerned. When a soul has, through discriminative knowledge, attained his aim he ceases to be influenced by Prakṛiti, and quod that soul Prakṛiti is destroyed; but as regards other souls which have not attained their aims she remains fully active; and this is indicated by the paradox “though dead, still she is alive:” naśkṛtopyanāśkram. This is the natural consequence of nature being one, and souls many. The P. Bhāṣya explains the reason by saying that the contact of the quality to the qualified is without a beginning; dharmānāṁ anādaśaṁyogat dharmamātrāḥ

ātmaṁanādaśaṁyogat.

Having described spectacle and spectator he proceeds to describe their conjunction.

XXIII.

Conjunction is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the inherent power and the lordship of power.

He defines it through its function. “Inherent power” (evaśakti) is the nature of the spectacle. “Lordship of power” (svāmiśakti) is the identity of the spectator. That “conjunction” (saṁyoga) which is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the two, existing correlated as the knowable and the knower, is the natural condition of the relation of the experience and the experiencer, and no other. Nor is their conjunction of a different character from their respective natures, which are eternal and all pervading. The character of the experience as the experience and of the experiencer as the experiencer is established from time without a beginning, and that is the conjunction.

[The purport of this is that there is an inherent relation between the experience as experiencesable, and the experiencer as experiencer from time without a beginning; that is, this relation is not casual or adventitious, produced at particular times by particular causes,
but natural and always existing. This relation of the two is indicated by the term sañyoga or conjunction, and this conjunction or the natural relation of the two is the cause of worldliness. As will be explained afterwards, the conjunction is not actual or material, but a mere reflection of the one on the other.]

He now describes its cause

XXIV.

Its cause is ignorance.

That which has been described before (II, iv) as "ignorance" (avidyā), having the nature of doubt and delusion, is the cause of the conjunction which has the form of indiscriminateness.

[The object of the text is to say that ignorance is the cause of the conjunction of soul with intellect, and that conjunction produces indiscriminateness, or the want of power on the part of soul to distinguish between itself and intellect, and the failure to do so leads to the feeling of the pleasures and afflictions of the world being borne by it. When the differences of the two are distinguished, the conjunction dissolves, and soul is free. Dr. Ballantyne has been misled by the presence of the word kṣyā in the preamble of the following aphorism into the supposition that that word is a part of the aphorism under notice, and having incorporated it he has interpreted it as such. The word, however, has been cited with reference to its use in a preceding aphorism.]

The avoidable (kṣyā) is the objective of the verb to avoid (ādā), and to explain what that avoidance is, he says:

XXV.

From its absence there is absence of conjunction, and that is, avoidance. Thereupon results the isolation of the spectator.

"Its," i.e., of ignorance. On its "absence" (abhāva), i.e., on its being irradiated by perfect knowledge which is its essential
opposite, the effect of the conjunction ceases, or is absent, and this absence is called “avoidance” (hāna). The meaning is this: it is not, practicable to separate ignorance like an embodied object, but, on discriminative knowledge being produced, this conjunction, which has indiscriminitativeness for its cause, it of itself ceases, and this is its avoidance (hāna). That which is an avoidance of the conjunction, is assumed to be an “isolation” (kaivalya) of the eternally isolated soul. In this way the nature, cause, and effect of the conjunction is explained.

[The meaning is that when ignorance is irradiicated by a right apprehension of its relation to soul, its relation with soul ceases, and this suface makes the solitary eternal soul isolated from ignorance and its consequences, and the soul remains isolated, as is its nature. All my MSS. give the reading “of eternally isolated” (nityakaivalyasya,) but Dr. Ballantyne, has found a different version; his text has nityam kevalasya, which would give the meaning “there is eternal isolation of the solitary or isolated”—kevalasya nityam kaivalyam. The isolation is in either case assumed to be everlasting, and hence this isolation is believed to be final deliverance from bondage.

The word kaivalya is derived from kevala, “alone,” and “isolation” appears to be its most appropriate rendering; but, inasmuch as this isolation takes place by withdrawing or detaching the soul from the phenomeral world, Colebrooke and Wilson use “abstraction.” The Sāṅkyatattva-kaumudi defines it to be “absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must, therefore, be something different from intellect and the rest which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a speration form their own essence.” (Sāstrānām maharshānām dīnaya-kochanānām cha kaivalyam chātyantika-duhkha-trayaprasama-lakshanam na buddhyādinām sambhavati, te hi duhkhatmakāh katham svabhāvādibhiḥ mohayitum śakyanti.) Vijnāna Bhikshu defines it in the same way, and calls it absolute extirpation of pain (dukkhātyantikochchhedah). Any way, it is the final reward
of the knowledge advocated and the practice of meditation enjoined in this system of philosophy.]

Now, by way of describing the means of avoidance he points out the cause of the acceptable.

XXVI.

The means of avoidance is the manifestation of undisturbed discriminative knowledge.

"Discriminative knowledge" (viveka) is the name of the knowledge (which shows) that qualities are distinct from soul. Its "manifestation" (khyāti) is the means (upāya) or cause of the "avoidance" (hāna) or rejection of the visible. How should this be? It should be "undisturbed," (avīplavā). That which has no interruptions, or breaks or repeated intervals of waking from meditation, is called undisturbed.

The purport of it is this: on the dissolution of ignorance, from the contemplation of that which is adverse to it, the cessation of all ideas of relationship, agency, &c., the vanishing of the dirt of foulness and darkness, and the refluent modification of the intellect, the reflection of soul on intellect is called discriminative knowledge. And by the constant or uninterrupted prevalence of it the function of the spectacle ceases, and this is isolation.

[The object of the aphorism is twofold; 1st, to point out the means of avoiding the avoidable, 2nd, to indicate, by implication what should be accepted. The means of avoiding the avoidable, that is ignorance, is the cultivation of discriminative knowledge without any break or interruption. Light and darkness cannot exist conjointly, light must always destroy darkness, and as discriminative knowledge is light, and ignorance darkness, the one disappears on the other becoming manifest. Were, however, the light to be fitful, or interrupted, there would be certain periods of light and others of darkness, and to preclude this the injunction is added that the light "should be undisturbed" or uninterrupted.
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The second object is implied, but not pointed out. If continuous light is necessary it follows as a matter of course that that is what should be accepted.]

Having described the enlightenment which takes place in the soul on the taking place of discriminative knowledge, he defines the nature of the discriminative knowledge.

XXVII.

Of that there are, up to its utmost stage, seven kinds of enlightenment.

"Of that," i. e., of the produced discriminative knowledge, the "enlightenment" (prajñā), with the understanding of what should be known is, to its "utmost stage," (prāntalabhūmi) i. e., to the stage of Samādhi, along with all its accessories, of seven kinds.

Thereof four are liberation from work, viz., (1) The knowable has been known by me. (2) There is nothing remaining to be known. (3) My afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome. (4) Knowledge has been acquired by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me. Thus, in these states, by rejecting all other conceptions, these kinds of understanding are produced. This understanding, which is pure knowledge regarding work, is called liberation from work.

Intellectual liberation is of three kinds, viz., (1) my intellect has accomplished its purpose. (2) The qualities have finished their domination over me; like stones fallen from the crest of a mountain they cannot go back to their place; for, tending to dissolution in their own cause, and there being a want of the original cause which is ignorance, and in the absence of a motive, how can there be springing up of the evil ones? (3) And my meditation has been identified with my soul. Such being the case I am existing in my real nature. These three kinds are intellectual liberation. Thus, on the springing up of this sevenfold knowledge to the utmost stage (of meditation) the soul is said to be isolated.
[The knowledge which is the aim and object of this system of philosophy is, according to its different states of perfection, classed under two heads; one relating to works, and the other to intellect. The first of these two heads is then divided into four, and the second into three sub-heads, making altogether seven stages. The lowest stage is that in which the Yogi feels that he has known all that has to be known. The next is that in which he, in addition to the first, feels that he has nothing more to learn. In the third there is, in addition to the first two, the conviction, that all impediments to knowledge have been destroyed, and there is nothing more to destroy. These three lead to the conviction that the full amount of discriminative knowledge has been acquired, and this constitutes the fourth. All these refer to external nature, and since they are connected with the active creation or works, they are called liberation from work. The second group refers exclusively to the intellect or the thinking principle. The convictions, 1st, that the intellect has done its office by pointing out the distinction between soul and nature; 2nd, that the qualities which govern the functions of the intellect have lost their influence; and 3rd, that the intellect has merged in the soul, refer to the relation of the intellect to the soul, and as the conviction is that the intellect has lost its power on the soul, therefore, it is called intellectual liberation. All these, it will be perceived, are dependant upon judgment, or consciousness of the effects of certain actions, and therefore relate to conscious or seeded meditation. (Cf. B. I, A. 17.) The function of deliberation or judgment resulting from ratiocination is in every instance present, and the ideas of, I, me, and mine, govern the whole. But when the judgment is brought to this final stage there is nothing more to do, and then follows the unconscious condition which is absolute isolation.]

Having described that the cause of discriminative knowledge is the cessation of conjunction, he now explains what are the means of its origin.
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XXVIII.

On the decay of impurity through the practice of the accessories of the Yoga, there is an illumination of the understanding till discriminative knowledge (results).

"The accessories of the Yoga" (Yogāṅga) are what will be presently described, (xxix.) "The practice" (anushṭhāna) thereof is the intelligent exercise of the same till discriminative knowledge results. "On the decay of impurity," (āsuddhi-ḥkṣaya), i.e., on the decline of the impurity which is of the form of afflictions of the character of an envelope to the manifestation of the thinking principle, whatever "Illumination of the understanding" (jñānadiṭṭi) takes place, greater or less, by the modification of the principle of goodness till the time of the manifestation of the discriminative knowledge, the same becomes the cause of that manifestation: this is the meaning.

[The commentary explains the aphorism in a roundabout way. The purport is that by the practice of certain exercises the impurities which surround the thinking principle are gradually destroyed, and as they are destroyed so there results a gradual enlightenment which culminates, on perfect maturity, in discriminative knowledge.]

The decay of impurity by the practice of the accessories of the Yoga having been thus described, the question arises what are those accessories? (To this question) he replies.

XXIX.

Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation are the eight accessories.

Some of these being directly beneficial to profound meditation are intimate accessories, such as devotion, &c. Others subserve profound meditation by eradicating hesitation and adverse
feelings of slaughter, &c., such as restraint, obligation, &c. Among them posture and the rest are successively subservient (to samādhi). Thus on the acquisition of posture there is steadiness in the regulation of breath. The successive ones are to be explained in the same way.

[These eight are classed under two heads, 1st, general or extrinsic, and, 2nd, special or intrinsic. The first two are general, because they are obligatory at all times; the other six are intrinsic, because they subserve the purpose of the Yoga, but are not otherwise necessary. What these eight are will be explained in the following aphorisms.]

He now successively explains their nature.

XXX.

Restraint includes abstinence from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and avarice.

"Slaughter" (kīnāḍa) is work which requires the destruction of life; it is the root of all evils, and its absence is "non-slaughter," (aṁkīnāḍa). As slaughter should be avoided at all times, its absence implied by non-slaughter is first mentioned.

"Veracity" (satya) is confirmity in mind and speech with fact.

"Theft" (steya) is forcibly taking another's property; and its absence is "non-theft" (asteya).

"Continence" (brahmacharya) is subjugation of carnality.

"Non-avarice" (aparigraha) is the non-acceptance of objects for the promotion of enjoyment.

These five, non-slaughter, &c., are indicated by the term yama, restraints, and reckoned as accessories to Yoga.

[These restraints figure prominently in all Hindu systems, and are by no means peculiar to the Yoga. They obtain equal prominence among the Jains and the Buddhists; the latter call them Pāramitās. Using the term restraint, for Yama, I have found it necessary for the sake of English idiom and uniformity of expression to use the roundabout form of abstinence from false-
hood, &c., instead of the direct positive terms veracity (satya), &c., which the text employs. They form the groundwork without which no religious superstructure is possible.]

He points out a peculiarity of these.

XXXI.

These are the great austerities of all stages, irrespective of kind, locality, time, and compact.

"Kind" (jāti), such as Brāhmaṇhood (conf. ante, p. 71). "Locality" (deśa), such as particular sacred pools, &c. "Time" (kāla), such as the fourteenth lunation and the like. "Compact" (samaya), the requirement of a Brāhmaṇa, &c. These are called the great austerities (mahávrata). They are imperative in all conditions or stages of the thinking principle, "irrespective" (anavachekhinna) of these four conditions of kind, &c., i.e., it does not mean that "I shall not kill a Brāhmaṇa," "I shall not kill any one in a sacred pool," "I shall commit no slaughter on the 14th lunation," "I shall not kill except for gods, Brāhmaṇas, &c.," implying four specific conditions, but that "I shall not for any purpose whatsoever, kill any one at any place, at any time." The others should be explained in the same way. Thus, when these practices are universal, without any qualification, they are called "great austerities." Their interrupted observance is not so.

[The purport is that these restraints should be observed with reference to all kinds of being, at every place, at all times, and under every circumstance, without any qualification whatsoever. The object of adverting to "compact" is to leave no room for religious sacrifices, such as the Vedas enjoin. They are, in the estimation of the Yogi, as objectionable as unauthorised slaughter.]

He next describes obligation.

XXXII.

The obligations are purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord.
"Purification" (śauucha) is of two kinds, external and internal. External (vāhyā) means the washing of the body with earth, water, &c. The internal (antarā) is the washing, by means of friendliness and the like, of all dirt from the thinking principle. "Contentment" (santosha) contentedness. The others have already been explained. These, purification and the rest, are indicated by the term niyama, "obligation."

[These obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise. They must be attended to very carefully as much to prepare oneself for the performance of the Yoga, as for the well-being of ordinary worldly life.]

How these are accessories to the Yoga, he next explains.

XXXIII.

By the exclusion of the questionable the thought of its opposite (is acquired).

(Those things which) cause doubts or questioning are "questionables" (Vitarka), and these, including slaughter and the like, are inimical to the follower of Yoga. When they are obstructed or excluded by the thought of their opposites, then Yoga becomes easily achievable, and the restraints and obligations consequently become accessories to Yoga.

[The restraints keep one from the performance of certain questionable acts, and the obligations train one habitually to avoid the questionables, and thereby the thinking principle is prepared for undisturbed concentration in the performance of the Yoga. The restraints and the obligations necessarily become accessories to the Yoga, and are therefore so called.]

Now he successively describes the natures, the distinctions, the varieties, the causes, and the fruits of the questionables.

XXXIV.

The questionables are slaughter and the rest. (Whether) they are done, caused to be done, or abetted; (whether) preceded by longing, anger or delu-
sion; (whether) slight, moderate or excessive; they have pain and ignorance for their endless fruits. Hence (the necessity) of the thought of opposites.

The aforesaid slaughter and the rest are first divided into three kinds, viz., done, caused to be done, and abetted. Thereof those which are accomplished by oneself are "done" (kriüta). Those which follow from orders to the effect "do them," "they should be done," are caused to be done kirita). Those which, on being accomplished by others, are encouraged by (the saying) "well done, well done," are "abetted" (anumodita). These three forms are described to prevent mistakes respecting them; otherwise a dull-witted person might fancy, "the slaughter has not been completed by me, so no fault rests on me."

To indicate their causes he says, "proceeded by longing, anger, or delusion." Although longing and anger are first noticed, yet since delusion, which is characterised by its accepting that to be soul which is not soul, the source of all pains, and since longing and anger arise from distinctions about differences of relation as to one's own or another, delusion should be known to be the root, i.e., all faults proceed from antecedent delusion. "Longing" (lobha) is thirst. "Anger" (krodha) is an inflammatory function of the thinking principle, which sets aside all sense of discrimination about what is proper and what is improper. Each of these is threefold, according as it is distinguished by being done, caused to be done, &c., and slaughter and the rest are divisible into these according as they are caused by delusion, &c.

They are again divided into three kinds according as they are "mild, moderate, and excessive." "Mild," (manda) are slow, i.e., neither excessive nor moderate. The "moderate" (madhyama) are neither mild nor excessive. The "excessive" (adhimatra) are ardent, neither mild nor moderate.

Thus there are nine kinds, and these being three-fold the total becomes twenty-seven. Again, of the mild &c., each being divisible according as it is mild, moderate and excessive, becomes
threefold. The combination to be made as it becomes appropriate; thus mildly mild (mṛdu-mṛdu) "mildly moderate" (mṛdu-madhyā), "mildly ardent," (mṛdu-tīvra).

Their fruits he describes (by the words) "having pain and ignorance for endless fruits." Pain (dukkha) is a function of the quality of founlness, manifesting itself in the form of repugnance. "Ignorance" (ajñāna) is false knowledge in the form of doubt or error. Their fruits are indicated by (the compound term) dukkhajñānänanta-phañāk. From such pain and ignorance proceed "endless" (ananta) unintermitting fruit. What is enjoined is that these should be overcome by the Yogi, who has known their nature, cause, &c. by thinking on their opposites.

[The works condemned by the restraints and the obligations have been lumped together under the name of questionable (Vitar-ka) for easy treatment, and then their natures, distinctions, varieties and fruits are generally described. They call for no explanatory remark.]

In order to explain how perfections arise successively by ardent exercise of these (duties) he says:

XXXV.

When non-slaughter is confirmed (there is) near him abandonment of enmity.

In the neighbourhood of him who is confirmed in non-slaughter there is "abandonment of enmity" (vairatya), or harmless abidance even on the part of the naturally cruel, such as of serpents and mungooses. The meaning is, those that are addicted to injury, give up their injurious nature.

[The purport is obvious. When the restraint from slaughter has been acquired there cannot exist any feeling of enmity, and, naturally hostile individuals, having acquired it, live in peace and harmony, like serpents and mungooses, which are naturally hostile to each other, and yet under the influence of the virtue may dwell together without injuring each other.]
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He next describes what becomes of him who practices veracity.

XXXVI.

In the confirmed in veracity (there is) asylum of the fruit of works.

"Works" (kriyāḥ) are the sacrifices, which, when performed, yield the fruits heaven, &c. The Yogi who practices veracity rises to such greatness that he attains the fruits without performing those works, and at his bidding they may be attained by any one soever, without performing those works. Such is the meaning.

[Veracity or abstinence from falsehood is here described to be as meritorious as the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Vedas; i.e., by practising veracity with unswerving faith one acquires the same merit which the sacrifices yield, and that without its being tainted by the cruelty which attends sacrifices. The P. Bhāshya explains that he becomes virtuous, and as a virtuous person attains heaven (which is the reward of virtuous works), and his speech becomes fruitful. (Dhārmika bhūyā iti bhavati. Dhārmikak svargam praṇuhūti svargam práṇaṇṭi, amoghāya vāg-bhavati.)]

He now describes the reward of him who abstains from theft.

XXXVII.

Jewels from all sides approach him who is confirmed in abstinence from theft.

When a Yogi practices abstinence from theft, and that abstinence rises to a high pitch, jewels from all sides come to him without his wishing them.

[The object here is to show that what may be acquired with great trouble by theft, may be had unsought by scrupulous abstinence from theft.]

The fruit of continence he next describes.

13
Attainment of vigour in confirmed continence.

Whoever steadfastly practices continence obtains, on its attaining its highest pitch, "vigour" (vīrya), or manly power comes in him. Conservation of manly vigour is continence, and on its attaining a high degree, vigour comes in plenty in the body, the organs and the mind.

[The meaning is that there is always a loss of vigour by incontinence, and therefore the Yogi should abstain from it in order to conserve his vigour.]

He next points out the fruit of non-covetousness.

On non-covetousness being confirmed there is conscience of all about births.

The word kāthanta is the abstract form of katham 'what,' or 'what all about,' and jānma-kāthanta means all about births, and the full knowledge thereof is its "conscience" (sambodha). The meaning is that he knows all about the questions, "What was I in a former birth? Who was I? What did I do?"

Covetousness is not confined to objects of enjoyment; it extends to the soul's desire to have a body, for that too is covetousness, since the body is needed for enjoyment. And such being the case, the knowledge of principles cannot prevail, while the inclinations are disposed outwards from the excess of the quality of foulness. Now, when on giving up all desire for the body and the rest, an indifference is attained, then to the indifferent being, devoid of foulness, an acquaintance with all past and future existences becomes a cause of thorough knowledge.

[The reward here spoken of is transcendental; it enables the observer of abstinence from all covetousness to see by his mental eye all that has happened to him in former births, and what will happen hereafter.]

Having thus described the perfections of the restraints, he now describes the obligations.
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XL.

From purity (proceed) loathing for one's own members, and non-intercourse with others.

For him who practises purity there is a "loathing" (jugupsá) or detestation produced for even the members of his own body from discrimination of their nature and cause. (The idea then is) "This body is impure, no fondness for it should be cherished." And for the same reason there results a "non-intercourse," (asañsarga) absence of relationship, or avoidance of mixing with "others," (paraik), i.e., with other embodied persons. This is the meaning. How can he who loaths his own body from perceiving its this or that fault, wish to have intercourse with other bodies of the same description?

[The purity as defined in the commentary on A, xxxii. (p. 94) is obviously confined to contact with dirt and consciousness of the body being naturally impure. Here the latter phase is magnified to the extent of making the embodied loath his own body, and a fortiori all bodies.]

He describes other fruits of purity.

XLI.

Moreover, purification of goodness, complacency, concentration, subjugation of the organs, and fitness for beholding soul.

(The words) "are produced" are required to complete the sentence. "Goodness" (sattva) consists of light, joy, &c. Its purification, is its not being oppressed (or overcome) by the qualities of foulness and darkness. "Complacency" (saumanasya) is mental satisfaction from non-perception of distress. "Concentration" (ekágratá) is fixedness of the thinking principle on any sensuous object to which it may be directed. "Subjugation of the organs" (indriyajaya) is the abidance in themselves of the organs diverted from their objects. "Fitness of behold-
ing soul" (atmadarsanayogyatva) is the adaptation of the thinking principle to do so on the manifestation of knowledge. To one who is practised in purity these, purification of goodness and the rest, successively manifest themselves. Thus, from purity comes purification of goodness; from purification of goodness, complacency; from complacency, concentration; from concentration, subjugation of the organs; from subjugation of the organs, fitness to behold soul.

[This aphorism is the sequel of the preceding one; it enumerates advantages in addition to those previously described. The advantages noted are of obvious import.]

The fruit of exercising contentment.

XLII.

From contentment, (proceeds) superlative felicity.

From contentment becoming excessive such internal felicity arises for the Yogi, as cannot be equalled by the pleasures of external objects, even to the extent of a hundredth part of it.

[The meaning is obvious.]

The fruit of austerity.

XLIII.

Through austerity results the perfection of the body and the organs, from decay of impurity.

Through the decay of impurity of the form of distress and the like by the exercise of austerity there arises in the mind a "perfection" (siddhi) or superiority of the body and the organs. The meaning is this, the afflictions of the thinking principle decay by the performance of Chândráyaña and other fasts. From that decay the organs acquire the power of perceiving the minute, the hidden, and the remote, and the body (the power of assuming) at pleasure the form of a molecular, or great magnitude.
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[Briefly the purport of the aphorism is that by attaining perfection in austerity, a Yogī acquires transcendental powers; his organs are then able to grasp all kinds of objects, whether they be so minute as not to be ordinarily perceivable by the senses, or so hidden as not to be accessible to the senses, or so remote as to be beyond their range.

The reference to the Chāndrāyāna is a mere illustration, the object is to imply austerity generally, and not to such only as are enjoined as penances. The object is not penance or expiation for sins committed, but the general mortification of the flesh.]

The fruit of muttering.

XLIV.

Through muttering results the cognition of the desiderated deity.

On the perfection of "muttering" (sādhyāya) characterised by the repetition or the like of a selected mantra, there results a cognition on the part of the Yogī of the deity desiderated: the meaning is that that deity becomes visible to him.

[The word svādhyāya means the study of the Vedas, but here it is used in the technical sense of muttering or inaudibly repeating a great many times any selected mantra. This is closely analogous to the counting of the rosary.]

The fruit of contemplating on the Lord.

XLV.

Meditation is completed through the contemplation of the Lord.

Whoever is thus devoted to the Lord, in him "meditation" (samādhi) of the kind described (C I A L.) becomes manifest, because that Divine Lord, being pleased, excites meditation by removing all obstructive afflictions (from the way).

[The theistical character of Patanjali's doctrine is here established by the admission that the divinity may, when contem-
plated, help to promote the object of the Yoga. Kapila repudiates the idea."

Having described the restrictions and the obligations, he now proceeds to describe posture.

XLVI.

Posture (is that which is) firm and pleasant.

"Posture" (ásana) is that whereby one sits, such as Padmásana, Danḍásana, Svastikásana, &c. When that seat becomes "firm" (sthira) or devoid of agitation, and "pleasant" (sukha) or not uncomfortable, then it is reckoned as an accessory of the Yoga.

[The word ásana ordinarily implies the material adapted for sitting upon, such as a rug, a mat, a board, a chair, or the like, but here it has been used for particular modes or attitudes of sitting, and therefore I have translated it into posture and not seat. The aphorism recommends such postures as ensure steadiness and comfort; but the postures as described in other works do not convey to a worldly understanding any such idea. Brahmánanda, in his commentary on the Haṭhapradipikā, says that Vaśishtha, Yájñavalkya and other ancient sages had described 84 postures as appropriate for Yogis, and that Siva, the greatest of Yogis, was their author. He adds that Gorakshanátha, a Yogi of a later date, but of great renown, reckoned the total number of appropriate postures at 84,000,000. (Chaturasītīlakshāṇī cha taduktam Gorakshanāthena.) Of the 84 some are common, some are more important. Svátmárama, in the Haṭhapradipikā, describes ten as "more important" for the performance of the Haṭhayoga. These are called, 1, Svasti; 2, Gomukha; 3, Víra; 4, Kúrma; 5, Kukkuṭa; 6, Uttána-kúrmaka; 7, Dhanu; 8, Matyañátha; 9, Mayúra; 10, Sava. The most important ones are: 1, Siddha alias Mukta alias Gupta; 2, Padma; 3, Siśha; 4, Bhadra alias Goraksha. The P. Bháṣhya does not enter into any detail, but names the following as examples, viz., 1, Padma or lotus; 2, Víra or heroic; 3, Bhadra or decent; 4, Svasti or the mystic diagram so called; 5, Daṇḍa or staff-like; 6, Sopāraya or self-reliant; 7, Paryāśka or bedstead-like; 8, Krauścha-nisidana or like the posture of the seated heron; 9, Hasti-nishidana or seated elephant; 10, Uṣṭra-
CHAPTER SECOND.

nishidana or seated camel; 11, Samasansthána or evenly poised. The following are brief accounts of the ways in which the postures are assumed.

1. Padmásana. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby; the chin should be bent down on the chest; and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called Padmásana, and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases.*

2. Virásana. Place each foot under the thigh of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture Virásana.†

3. Bhadrásana. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the feet and this is Bhadrásana.‡

4. Svastikásana. Sitting straight with the feet placed under the (opposite) thighs is called Svastikásana.§

5. Danaśasana. Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed extended on the legs.||

6. Sinhásana. Let the ankles be placed under the testes, the left ankle on the right side of the suture (the mesian line) and the right on the left side of the suture; let the hands placed on the knees, and the fingers extended; let the mouth be wide open, and the sight be directed to the tip of the nose while one is in deep contem-

* बासोकपि द्विवदन्त धुरतं धुरताय धातुं तथा
   द्विकपि परिचितं भवन्ति धुरतं काराय धरति

† द्वितिकपिरं विद्वानं विद्वानं ध्वनिः करार्यं धरति

‡ द्वितिकपिरं विद्वानं विद्वानं ध्वनिः करार्यं धरति

§ द्वितिकपिरं विद्वानं विद्वानं ध्वनिः करार्यं धरति

|| द्वितिकपिरं विद्वानं विद्वानं ध्वनिः करार्यं धरति
plation; and it will produce the lion posture Siṅhāsana, the adored of all Yogis.

7. Put the right ankle on the left side of the chest, and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the posture will be Gomukha, or of the shape of a cow’s mouth.†

8. Closing the anus with the two ankles crossed while the mind is under control, produces, say the knowers of Yoga, the tortoise posture, Kūrmāsana.‡

9. Having established the lotus posture, if the hands be passed between the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as to lift the body aloft, it will produce the Fowl seat, Kukkuṭāsana.§

10. Having assumed the fowl posture, should the two hands be placed on the sides of the neck it would make the posture like that of the tortoise upset; it is called upset tortoise posture, Uttānakūrmāsana.||

11. Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is called the bow posture, Dhanurāsana.¶

12. Place the right foot on the roof of the left thigh, surround the right knee with the left, foot, and sit with the body twisted, and it will result in the Matsyanāthāsana or posture Matsyanātha.**

† गुस्सै च हर्षसाधः दीवमयाः पांचंशे शिवीत्।

‡ दिबो दिबो मन्त्रश्रुतम् देषस्वस्तम नन्दिके॥

चतुरी तु ज्ञानीः संसाराय सार्वस्ति दंतप्रा च।

वाज्येऽश्च निरूपेतं बायाप द्रुकाचित।।

विष्णुर्भिः तस्येन वृक्षनां नेत्रिष्ठिते॥

†† चतुरीं दिबोमन्त्रम् ग्रंथापि निरूपेतं।

दिबोण्डि तथा ज्ञातं सत्यां सोशादित।।

‡‡ गुस्सैं विधवा मुक्षाय वृक्षस्य च मन्त्रविधत॥

कुष्ताचर्यः नैविद्यविन्दु श्रोत्तिः बिजु।।

§ प्राप्तायन्त विश्ववेण्या वाज्येऽपि विधत।।

विष्णुर्भिः ज्ञातं बायाप द्रुकाचित।।

कुष्टाचर्यः नैविद्यविन्दु श्रोत्तिः बिजु।।

¶ पाराकुटैं तु पारिक्षतं मुखौल ज्ञातां।

विष्णुर्भिः श्रोत्तिः बिजु।।

** वाज्याया निरूपितविधाः ज्ञातार्थविंश्चितवाच।

प्रत्येकात् पत्तं परिवर्तिताः चोपाद्याय विनिष्ठायं तत्॥
13. Mayūrásana. Hold the earth with both hands placing the elbows on the sides of the navel, and keep the body erect like a staff: this is called the Mayūrásana or peacock posture.*

14. Siddhásana. Place the left ankle on the membrum virile, and thereupon put the right ankle, and it completes the Siddhásana.†

Besides these Āsanas, Yogās have a great many postures or gestures which they reckon under the name of Mudrā, to which, however, no mention is made here in the text. In Tāntric rituals the technical difference between an Āsana and a Mudrā depends upon the organs employed. An Āsana or seat is by its very nature connected with the disposition of the lower limbs, whereas the Mudrā depends upon the motion of the upper limbs; and in the Tantras all symbols produced by twining the fingers or placing the hands in particular positions are recognised as Mudrās. The Yogās have also some Mudrās of the same kind; but in their more important Mudrās the distinction is entirely lost sight of, and hands and feet alike come into play to produce the Āsanas as well as the Mudrās. The great and most remarkable distinctive character of the Mudrā appears, however, to be its connection with the regulation of breath. The Gheraṇḍa Saṅhitā describes in all twenty-five Mudrās, and the Haṭhadipikā recognises ten of these as the most important "in warding off decay and death," (jarāmaraṇanaśanam.) These are — 1 Mahāmudrā; 2, Mahābandha; 3, Mahāvedha; 4, Khecharī; 5, Uḍḍiyāna; 6, Mūlabandha; 7, Jalandhara; 8, Viparita-karani; 9, Vajroli; 10, Saktichālana.‡ The following are brief descriptions of these gesticulations and of the advantages to be derived from them:

1. Mahāmudrā. Pressing the perineum by the heel of the left foot, the right foot should be extended, and then held fast by the two

* विद्यमानस्य कर्माचेत तस्मृणेऽप्रायितां विचारां 
   उच्छःस्याद्यवनिः स्मरणेषितस्य वद्विनि पीठं 
† सेवदुपार विशिष्टं एवं मुष्ठं तथा गर्गितं
   गुणस्वरूपं विशिष्टं विद्यायसत्विं भवेतु
‡ वस्मुश्च मधवामास्वरूपं चेष्टितं
   उच्छःस्याद्यवनिः विशिष्टं चेष्टितं
   वर्ती विप्रोताः स्वंकृती विशिष्टां च
   वर्तिव विस्मादं वर्तिप्रस्ताववर्तिः
hands. Then closing the throat the wind should be held above. Even as a snake struck by a staff stretches like a staff, so the coiled S'akti (breath) suddenly becomes straight, for then she is in a state of dying in the two nostrils. Then the wind should be discharged steadily, but not forcibly. The wisest of the wise call this Mahá mudrá.∗

2. Mahábandha. Let the heel of the left foot be put under the perineum, and the right foot on the left thigh, and, having drawn in breath, let the chin be pressed hard on the chest, and the wind be held fast in the heart. After holding the wind as long as one is able, let it be slowly expired. When the expiration is complete, let the operation be repeated on the right side. (This shows that the breath in the first instance should be drawn by the left nostril.)†

3. Mahávedha. While performing the Mahábandha the Yogi effect the suppression of the breath in the Khechari style by closing the passage of the wind by the throat Mudrá, and then, putting the hands evenly on the ground, drive the wind slowly towards the buttocks, it is Mahávedha.‡
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1. Khechari. When the tongue is reversed and pressed into the hollow of the head and the sight is fixed at a spot in the middle of the two eyebrows, the posture is called Khechari.*

5. Uḍḍiyānabandha is that posture in which the wind flies upwards by the susumna vessel from the right side of the belly above the navel.†

6. Mūlabandha. When the heel is pressed against the perineum, the anus is contracted, and the Apāna wind is by force directed upwards, it is Mūlabandha.‡

7. Jālandharabandha. When the throat is contracted and the chin is pressed hard on the chest it is Jālandhara posture, the destroyer of decay and death.§

* चेष्टी । चपाति सिकेर िकता प्रविष्टि निथतीरतम ।
    नजोरांतेताहिंदृश्या अति चेष्टी ।
    नेदरातासनारोऽरोऽह वभां नानेिथतेनाचाय ।
    या धार्म्येन धार्म्येन धार्म्यिति तद्विच वेष्टिणिष्ठ: ।
    ज्ञानीयर्मं ववसं द्विषिष्ठसरििविपिनं ।

† भगीयालमवः: वभोवेन चुल्पाकाया: राष्टविवीचरीते वसः ।
    ताहादुसुवचापजीवेन वेष्टिणिष्ठ: धम्मयः: ।
    णुस्त्रायुन्मुखस्वयानः सताभासः ।
    ज्ञातायां तदेव सारः वभोबिश्वेषिष्ठः ।
    दः दधिरवित्ततां नारेिथतेनात्तु ।
    ज्ञातायांं ध्रुवीः वभोवतुराश्विष्ठः ।

‡ वानिभावेन धवीयेन वैनालातुपयुव्वेदुः ।
    वणामुखानाद्वा सुधेनस्विधीसः ।
    बचेियाविष्ठयः बचेियं चषटेन वाह्यः ।
    वानाधेन लार्कामुनः प्रवेशः ।

§ वभोवेन: वभोवेन चुल्पाकाया: राष्टविवीचरीते वसः ।
    वभोवतुराश्विष्ठ: वराश्विष्ठ: ।
8. *Viparitakaraṇī.* Place the sun (expiratory air) above, just below the hard palate, and the moon (inspiratory air) below, just above the navel, and the *Viparitakaraṇī* is completed. It promotes hunger, &c., &c.

9. *Vajroli.* The exercise by which the several secretions are drawn upwards is so called.†

10. *Saktichālana.* Seated in the Vajrāsana posture, let the feet be held firm by the hands and the anus be pressed by the heels, then putting the air in motion by the bellows of the chest, let it be suddenly stopped, and, contracting the forehead, let the wind be

† बायोली। सेन्थोऽन बलानारोऽपि बोलिकः मिथिकलंवा।
बशीरोऽं व बंधामति ग देन्ने विशिष्ठास्।
सथेद्वय जोऽकु जोऽ मोक्षाय।
बेचिरोऽपि बंधामति ग देन्ने विशिष्ठास्।
नरीलोऽपि बंधामति ग देन्ने विशिष्ठास्।
सथेद्वय जोऽकु जोऽ मोक्षाय।
पुत्रवाप्वा उक्तीमिचिसाम्यात।
पशुऽन्यानं पुरोक्षः वसाय।
पशुऽन्यानं पुरोक्षः वसाय।
बायोली। सेन्थोऽन बलानारोऽपि बोलिकः मिथिकलंवा।
बशीरोऽं व बंधामति ग देन्ने विशिष्ठास्।
सथेद्वय जोऽकु जोऽ मोक्षाय।
बेचिरोऽपि बंधामति ग देन्ने विशिष्ठास्।
नरीलोऽपि बंधामति ग देन्ने विशिष्ठास्।
सथेद्वय जोऽकु जोऽ मोक्षाय।
पुत्रवाप्वा उक्तीमिचिसाम्यात।
पशुऽन्यानं पुरोक्षः वसाय।
पशुऽन्यानं पुरोक्षः वसाय।
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directed that way for two muhúrtas and when it comes to the susumná vessel, stop it and this is Saktichálanan. (Loosely translated.)

According to some the Bandhas, on distinct form the Mudrás. (Cf. N. C. Pál's treatise on the Yoga.)

Treating of a system of philosophy Patanjali has not thought proper to enter into details, regarding age, sex, caste, food, dwelling, &c. as bearing upon Yoga, but other works supply information about them to a considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom may not be unfitly added here. The first question that would arise would be—who are fit to perform the Yoga? On this subject the Haṭha-pradípiká fixes no limit. It says, "by the practice of Yoga, every one may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, or very old, or diseased, or decrepit."† The next point is the selection of a proper place. "A small monastery, a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated in an out-of-the-way place where there is no danger within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire and water, in a country abounding in food and free from danger of wars and the like, where religion prevails, in a thriving kingdom," is the most appropriate. The cell or mathiká should have a small door and no window; it should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high steps and low descents; it should be smeared with cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole surrounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoiding all anxieties, the Yogi should follow the path pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of

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* कंति ब्रह्मणं पार्वत्करमां धार्मिक्यं ।
  कुबेरस्वयमदि च कर्म तत्र प्रवीणेऽति ॥
  ब्रह्मणेनिबोधयामि धार्मिक्यं च कुबेराः ॥
  कुर्यादृश्यां भवाः कुबेरीभाष्यमेवथेत ॥
  मानारक्षस्य कुर्यां तु कुबेराः पराजयेन ॥
  सत्यावशेषस्य तथा वत्सर्यं कुतः ॥
  कुर्यादृश्यमेव निमेष्यं पराजयादशीः ॥
  जन्मात्मायने किंचिदमः कुक्षायां कुक्षा ॥
  तेन कुष्ठिजी तस्मा दुःखाया मुख्यं मुखं ॥
  अज्ञातं नामां प्राणार्यं दुःखां वेषस्य सतः ॥

† द्रव्यं कृषितमन्दिबश्वाय आदिमातुमेरुपल्लिक्यं नं ।
  अभ्यासनां शिवसाध्येति धर्मयोगम् तन्नित्तः ॥
the Yoga. He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, and vain disquisitions. His food should consist of wheat, sáli rice, barley, śhaśti rice (or that which matures in six days), the ayáma and the nivára grains, milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, múng pulse, and water,” and all soothing sweet things in a moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat and too much salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed or acrid substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as to leave one-fourth of his appetite unappeased.

He describes the means of making the seat firm and pleasant.

XLVII.

Through slightness of effort and attainment of the infinite.

The construction of the sentence is that through slightness of effort and through attainment of the infinite the seat becomes firm and pleasant. When the wish is formed, ‘I shall adopt this posture,’ and that posture is accomplished even with “slightness of effort,” i.e., without difficulty, and when the thinking principle is reposed in the infinity of space or the like, and by understanding it becomes of it, then from absence of the body and of egotism the posture does not become painful. When this controul over posture is accomplished agitations of the body and such other obstructives to meditation do not arise.

* दुराश्यां शाब्दिके दृष्ट दृष्टिच्छ विक्रमणे ।
वास्मुखश्चाक्ष्यां प्रणायामितवजने ।
ब्रह्मचारिणीनाश्च धातत्त्व वर्षोत्तिला ।
अस्तश्चारस्तत्त्वविवरं नासुरस्यार्द्धं व धामु
मयेश्च नमयान्तिक्ष्यारस्कमं निःमृक्ष्यान्तिन्न ।
वामेश्च संवन्धित्न्विवरं नासुरस्यान्तिन्न ।
मैथि योगसन्ध्या उन्मुखिन्तु विसंचितानाथान्तिन्न ।
ि नेत्रेश्चाहस्यसंसारसेवनाचर्माचर्मानां चाराध्योपितान्तिक्षमान्तिन्न ।
वृत्तिमदहस्यसंसारसेवप्रयोगानां सत्त्वदितिस्य मदव्ययो च यज्ञवर्षयो च 
दुराश्यां शाब्दिके दृष्ट विन्स्थानन्तिन्न ।
मैथि योगसन्ध्यान्तिक्षमान्तिन्न च तथाय ॥
विज्ञानव्यवस्थान्तितितत्त्वं नेत्रादरेक्तितितत्त्वं नमस्थानान्तिन्न ॥
मैथि योगसन्ध्यान्तिक्षमान्तितितर्यां तथाय ॥

† वृत्तिमदहस्यसंसारसेवप्रयोगानां सत्त्वदितिस्य मदव्ययो च यज्ञवर्षयो च 
दुराश्यां शाब्दिके दृष्ट विन्स्थानन्तिन्न ।
मैथि योगसन्ध्यान्तिक्षमान्तितितर्यां तथाय ॥
विज्ञानव्यवस्थान्तितितत्त्वं नेत्रादरेक्तितितत्त्वं नमस्थानान्तितितर्यां ॥
मैथि योगसन्ध्यान्तिक्षमान्तितितर्यां तथाय ॥
[The object here is to point out that when by practice one becomes able to assume any position at will, without any difficulty, and, adverting to the dogma that the thinking principle assumes the form of the object it thinks of, when by thinking on any infinite object, such as the sky, it becomes itself infinite, it feels no pain or uneasiness in assuming any posture, however painful it may otherwise be. The means of attaining firmness of seat thus are practice and the contemplation of boundless objects.]

A fruit thereof when accomplished.

XLVIII.

Thereupon non-embarrassment by the pairs.

The meaning is that on the control of posture being accomplished, the Yogi is no longer oppressed or embarrassed by the pairs, i.e., cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and the like.

[This is the ultimate fruit of attaining perfection in assuming the different postures above adverted to.]

Having thus described how to control the postures he describes regulation of breath.

XLIX.

On its being accomplished the regulation of breath (which is) interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration.

On posture becoming firm that auxiliary of the Yoga which is regulation of breath and of which firmness of posture is the cause, should be practised.

How is it characterised by the interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration? Inspiration and expiration have been already defined (B. I. A. xxxiv.) The "interruption" (vichakheda) or stoppage of the twofold "flow" (gati) or current in places outside and inside produced by means of expelling or filling of the breath is called Prāṇāyāma or regulation of breath.
[Here the true Práyñáyáma is accepted to be the interruption or break in the flow of the breath. The inspiration and the expiration are the functions of which the stoppage is the most effectual act for the attainment of perfect meditation. It is called kumbhaka, or quiescence, and the longer it is sustained the more proficient becomes the Yogi. When perfect control has been attained in this respect, the Yogi can live buried under earth for months and years without performing any organic function whatever.]

For its better understanding, he describes its nature after showing its distinctions.

L.

That, again, is an external, an internal, and a stationary function; it is divided by place, time, and number; it is protracted or subtile.

The “external function” of breath is expiration, or expulsion of the breath outward (rechaka). The “internal function” is inspiration or filling in (puraka). The function of stoppage inside is kumbhaka. Because the vital air at that time remains quiescent or motionless, as water in a jar, (kumbha) therefore that condition is called kumbhaka.

This regulation of breath is of three kinds, according as it is specialised by space (desa), “time” (kála), and “number” (sañkkhyá). It is also “protracted” (dúrgha), or “subtile” (sukh-ma). It is specialised by place, as (when we say) “twelve distant from the nose,” meaning as far as twelve fingers from the nose. It is specialised by time, as (when we say) “of the duration of thirty-six instants.” It is specialised by “number,” when (we say) “many times done.”

By these inspirations and expirations the first udgháta is produced, and to know this a numeral figure has to be used. Udgháta is the striking of the head by the wind propelled upward from the navel.
CHAPTER SECOND.

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the Prānāyāma. It is an operation which includes the three functions of inspiration, quiescence, and expiration. The breath must be drawn in first before it can be retained within; the retention cannot last long, and so after a time there must be an expiration. The first and the third, however, are regulated by the capacity of the lungs, and by the time necessary for the expulsion of a given quantity of air, and cannot be much modified, and the second alone, therefore, concerns the Yogi most, for he can controul it to a considerable extent, and hence it is held to be the most important element of the Prānāyāma; not unoften, as in the last preceding aphorism, it alone is described as the Prānāyāma. The threefold operation is specialized by the time devoted to each operation, by the extent of space from which the breath is drawn, by the number of times it is repeated, by the period for which it has been practised, and by the subtlety or grossness of the operation.

The operation of udghāta is mysterious. I cannot find out from any work or person how the internal air is made to strike particular internal organs.]

Having described the three members of the regulation of breath, he, with a view to enunciate a fourth, says:

LI.

The fourth is dependant on the recognition of the outer and the inner spheres.

"The outer sphere" (vāhya-vishaya) of the breath extends far as twelve (fingers) from the nose. The "inner sphere" (ābhya-vishaya) is represented by the heart, the navel and the like. That quiescence or stoppage of motion, (which ensues) on recognising or taking into consideration these two is the "fourth" regulation of breath (prānāyāma). Its difference from the third form, called kumbhaka, is this: The latter without taking any note of the outer and the inner spheres suddenly assumes quiescence,
like a lotus falling on a hot stone, while this is a stoppage which results from a recognition of the two spheres. This, like the preceding, should be known to be divisible according to place, time and number.

[This is purely intellectual, and involves no change in the order of the operation. It is the same operation, but performed intelligently.]

He now describes the fruit of the fourth kind.

LII.

Thereby is removed the covering of light.

"Thereby," i.e., by that fourth form of regulation of breath, the "covering" (ávarana) of the form of afflictions which envelope the "light" (prakás'a) which is the thinking principle abiding in the quality of goodness, is destroyed. This is the meaning.

[The purport is that this fourth form of Pránáyáma is specially useful in removing all those ideas of pain and suffering which are ordinarily associated with the thinking principle.]

Another fruit.

LIII.

The mind's fitness for steadiness.

"Steadiness" (dhrárañá) will be defined presently (B. III, A. 1.) The mind (manas), divested of its defects through the instrumentality of these forms of regulation of breath, remains fixed to whatever it is applied, and does not suffer from distractions.

(Here the word manas has been used as a synonym of chitta, thinking principle).

He gives the definition of abstraction.

LIV.

Abstraction is the assumption by the senses of the original nature of the thinking principle, from want of application to their respective objects.
CHAPTER SECOND.

That by which the senses are abstracted, or from a feeling of opposition, withdrawn from their respective objects, is Abstraction (pratyāhāra). How that may be effected is thus explained. Of vision and the other senses the respective objects are form and the rest. "Application" (samprayoga) to them is advancing towards them. The want of such advance is the forsaking of them and abiding in their original nature. When that forsaking is effected the senses become the imitators of the original nature of the thinking principle. Since the senses follow the thinking principle as do bees their king, they all become of its nature. Thus when the thinking principle is subdued these become abstracted.

[The natural tendency of the senses is outwards, towards the objects which are designed for their entertainment, and the great object of the Yoga is to divert them from those objects, in order to bring them to a focus in the thinking principle. When this is effected they cease to act, and are restored to the natural state of the thinking principle of which they are emanations. That natural state, again, is quiescence, and consequently the senses become quiescent, and this is their abstracted state.]

Having described abstraction, which is the imitation of the nature of the thinking principle by the senses, he now describes the fruit of the act.

LV.

Thence the complete subjugation of the senses.

The meaning is—that by the practice of abstraction the senses come so completely under control that do not proceed, according to their natures, outwards to their respective objects even when excited thereto.

[The chapter opened by enquiring, what the exercise of the Yoga was, and having described in detail that exercise with all its concomitants, it now closes by describing the fruit of that exercise. The fruit is complete subjugation of the senses.]
Thus then has been described the practical exercise of the Yoga which forms the theme of the first chapter. The practical Yoga is first defined (1), then follow its use (ii), in the weakening of the afflictions (iii), its origin from ignorance (iv), the definition of ignorance (v), do. of afflictions (vi to ix), means of obviating them (x and xi), works, their sources and fruit (xii to xiv), afflictions, their character and why and how they are to be got rid of (xv to xxvii), discriminative knowledge (xxviii to xlvi), postures, &c., (xlvii to lxxi), and the advantages thereof (lxxii to lv). [Not literally translated, but only the substance of the commentary is given here for reasons elsewhere assigned, p. 58.]

Now this Yoga, through restraints and obligations, assumes the form of a seed, which sprouts through postures and regulation of breath, flowers through abstraction, and bears fruit through contemplation, retention and meditation, and these are explained in this chapter on exercise.

This is the end of the second quarter, or the quarter on practice, of the commentary entitled Rājamārtanda on Patanjali's institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
ADDENDUM.

The note on Aphorism xxxii on page 94 is calculated to mislead unwaried readers. The remark that purification and other obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise, is quite correct with reference to the text. The obligations are as imperative on Yogis as they are on householders, and none should neglect them; but purification is here taken in its ordinary acceptation, and does not refer to certain peculiar acts of washing or Saucha which some Yogis, particularly the followers of the Haṭhayoga, recommend. They hold that ordinary washings &c., are not enough. They have accordingly devised complicated, and in some respects very repulsive, forms of purification, which they regard as absolutely necessary as preparatory steps towards the attainment of fixity of seats. These they describe under the collective name of Shaṭ karma or “sixfold work,” as they are reckoned under six different names. These names are—I, Dhauti; II, Vasti; III, Neti; IV, Laukiki; V, Trāṭaka, and VI, Kapālabhāṭi.* These are variously subdivided by the Gheranda Saṅhita, the Niruttara Tantra, the A’diyāmala the Brahmayāmala, the Grahayāmala, the Budrayāmala, the Sivaśaṅhita, and other Tantras. I shall follow the first in the following notes:

I. Dhauti means washing, and it is known under four different names according to the parts of the body to which it is applied. These are, 1st, Antardhauti or washing of the intestines; 2nd, Dantadhauti or washing of the teeth; 3rd, Hṛiddhauti or washing of the stomach; and 4th, Mūlasodhana or washing of the rectum.†

The first is effected in four different ways, viz., (a) by contracting the mouth in the form of a crow’s bill, and drawing in a full draft of air into the intestines, where it is retained for a time and

* नौतिरेषित्यक्ष्या मैति: पौरीष्य जात्मक तथा ।
बपाशुभाविष्यमणि पत्रकार्यां नृत्त्वहन ॥
† जन्मान्निरतििशीर्षीयौहैतिद्विश्वेत्येङ्घः ।
बौरसिप श्वार्यां हर्म सदन कुमानु निपिषेः !
then thrown out.* As wind is the means of washing in this case it is called Vātasāra. (b) By drinking a large quantity of water up to the throat, and then forcing it down so as to expel it by the lower orifice.† This is called Vāriśāra. I know not how this can be effected, but to the occultist everything is possible. (c) By stopping the breath and then striking the navel a hundred times against the vertebral column.‡ This is called Agnisāra. (d) By taking in air through the mouth contracted into the form of a crow's bill, retaining it in the intestines for an hour and a half, and then expelling it through the lower orifice.§ (Vahikarana.)

2nd. The Dental washing includes the purification of the teeth, the tongue, the two ears, and the foramen on the crown of the head.|| For the teeth a dentifrice of catechu or clean earth is recommended as appropriate.¶ For the tongue scraping with the index, the middle and the ring fingers is held sufficient.** For the ears, rubbing the orifices with the index and the ring fingers,†† and for the foramen
on the crown of the head rubbing with the thumb are enough.

3rd. The purification of the stomach is effected in three ways: 1st, by passing the tender leaf-shoot of a plaintain, or a turmeric plant, or a cane, through the mouth into the stomach, and, after shaking it drawing it out (Daṇḍādhauti); 2nd, by drinking a large quantity of water and then vomiting it out (Vamandhauti); 3rd, by swallowing a strip of cloth three inches wide and fifteen cubits long and then drawing it out (Vāsadhauti).

4th. The purification of the rectum (mūlasodhana) is effected by washing the part with water aided by a finger or the stalk of a turmeric plant.

II. The purification of the fundament (Vāstisodhana) is effected by repeatedly contracting the fundament while seated firmly in water up to the navel (jvalavasti) or on dry land (ethalavasti).

III. Neti is the technical name of thread, a span length of which is passed through the nostrils and drawn out from the mouth with a view to purify the nostrils.

IV. Laukiki Yoga is the practice of shaking or swinging the

* हवायुष्मन द्रेष्टा सार्थचेतसारभवस्य।
† रहस्यद्वं सत्यन्यासायद्वं सब्रवं य च।
‡ व्यस्मयो चाचाविषयं हनुमं पूनः प्रवचित: दुर्गः।
§ निम्पये च चाचाविषयं चाचाविषयं निम्पये।
|| पीतकुसक्कु द्रेष्टम् स्वयमाऩुखिनार्यिष्य च।
| प्रभुन चाचाविषयम् सरिषयम् पुनः पूनः।
| अनन्तरग्रामस्यायुण्याय वालाहुण्यायतायायतः।
| आकृष्टं व्रतार्चं दशत्वादिदिहारके च।
| वाटां पद्ममोचनेन चाचाविषयं प्रवचित:।
| अविनायः वायुमग्निश्चतेस्त व्यायावतेः।
| निम्पयं च चाचाविषयं चाचाविषयं निम्पयं।
intestines repeatedly from one side to the other.*

V. For the purification of the eyes, the recommendation is that the eyes should be fixed on one point, the tip of the nose for instance, without permitting any twinkling, until tears flow in abundance. This is called Trāṭaka.†

VI. Under the last head of Kapālabhāti, three practices are recommended: 1st, drawing the air through the left nostril and expelling it by the right, and then reversing the operation, and performing it alternately several times, (Vyākrama); 2nd, drawing in water by the nostrils and throwing it out by the mouth, (Vyūtkrama); 3rd, by sucking up water by the mouth and throwing it out by the nostrils, (Śīkrama).‡

The Tantras describe several other modes of purification, and suggest many variations in the rules above quoted; but it is not worth while to quote them, particularly as first class Yogis denounce all such purifications as quite unnecessary, if not actually futile.

* लम्बाते लम्बाते भाष्येदासार्यांशिष्या:।
सम्बन्धोऽखरवेच्या रंगवानस्विर्यांश्च।।
† दुर्दृष्टिः प्रतार्के बांधके प्राप्तेऽपि अति:।
‡ ख्यातो यथाभिधा रंगसायेऽपि पिच्छनानुपा।
पिच्छनानुपीवलो धृतश्चिः रंगसायेऽपि।
पूरवं रंगसु धोतिः देशमेऽपि आर्येऽपि।
एतत्सम्बन्धेऽपि विषः च विचारयेऽपि।
एतत्सम्बन्धेऽपि विषः च विचारयेऽपि।
एतत्सम्बन्धेऽपि विषः च विचारयेऽपि।
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CHAPTER THIRD.

May Bhútanátha, (the lord of elements,) by the thought of whose lotus feet, the occult powers of Animá and the rest are attained by thinkers, be to our prosperity!

With a view to describe the three accessories of the Yoga, Dháraná, &c., already referred to, (C. II A. xxix) and to explain the external, the internal, and other Siddhis, Patanjali begins this chapter, adverting first to the explanation of the term Sañyama.

[The occult powers (vibhútis) are the following: 1, animá, "molicularity," extreme minuteness, or parvitude, or invisibility; 2, Laghimá, "extreme lightness," levity, tenuity, or incorporeality; 3, Prápti, "accessibility," or touching anything at will, as touching the moon with the tip of one's finger; 4, Prákámya, "wilfulness," or irresistibility of will, fulfilment of every wish; 5, Garimá, "excessive pondrosity," magnitude, or illimitable bulk; 6, Istáî “sovereignty,” or supreme dominion over animate and inanimate nature; 7, Vaśitá, "subjugation," the power of changing the course of nature; 8, Kámasáyitá, "self-controul," or the power of suppressing all carnal longings. These are also indicated by the term riddhi, and also by siddhi or perfections. Inasmuch, however, as siddhi is applied to other profections it is sometimes qualified by the term mahá. The powers are also indicated by the terms bhúti and aiśvarya.]

Thereof, he describes the nature of steadfastness.

I.

Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place.

"To one place" (desê), i. e., in the navel-wheel, the tip of the nose, or the like. "Confinement" (bandha) of the thinking
principle is making the thinking principle steady (on one object) by excluding (the thought of) all other objects. This (confinement to one place) is called Dhāraṇā or the steadfastness of the thinking principle.

The meaning is this:—The Yogi, who has purified his internal organ by benevolence and other acts of refining the thinking principle, who has accomplished the restraints and the obligations, who has acquired mastery over his postures, who has subdued the vital airs, who has abstracted himself from the field of the senses, who has conquered the pairs (cf. C. II A. xlviii), should, in a quiet place, and in an erect posture, by fixing it to one object, such as the tip of the nose, produce steadfastness of the thinking principle for the practice of discriminate meditation.

(The preliminary obligations and restraints having been accomplished, and the habit of assuming the various kinds of seats having been acquired, the Yogi should engage himself in training his thinking principle so as to be able to keep it unswervingly steady to any object to which he may wish to direct it; and this unswerving fixity is called Dhāraṇā, or steadfastness. This steadfastness cannot be acquired without a substratum. There must be some object to which the thinking principle can be applied, whether it be the tip of the nose, or a plexus of nerves in the belly, or the crown of the head, or the ether, or the sky, for without it, in the preliminary stage, the thinking principle would be wandering. And inasmuch as there must be a substratum, the steadfastness of thinking produced by it comes under the head of discriminate meditation (samprajñāta-samādhi). (C. I A. xvii.) Practically it is a state of steady, immovable abstraction, but the word abstraction would be an indirect and not a direct definition of Dhāraṇā, inasmuch as abstraction gives prominence to the act of withdrawing or separating, leaving the result of the act in the background, whereas Dhāraṇā gives prominence to the fixation of the thinking principle to one point, leaving the separation or withdrawing from other things to be tacitly implied.
CHAPTER THIRD.

The P. Bhāṣyā defines "Dhāranā to be the fixation of the function of the thinking principle on the navel-wheel, or on the lotus of the heart, or on the light in the head, or on the tip of the nose, or on the point of the tongue, or on such other place, or on some external object." (Nābhichakre hridaya-pundarike mūrdhni jyotishī nāsikāgre jāhāgra-iṭyāddhū des'echu váhye và vishaye chittasyā vrittimātreṇa bandha iti bandho dhāranā.) The "external object" of the commentator is explained by Vijnāna Bhikshu to mean the image of a divinity.

Having defined steadfastness, with a view to define contemplation he says:

II.

Contemplation is unison there of the understanding.

"There," in that place where the thinking principle is confined. "Of the understanding" (pratyayasya) of the knowledge. Whatever unison (or harmonious blending) is obtained through the instrumentality of avoiding untoward modifications, and what knowledge constantly arises through dependance on that on which steadfastness is reposed, is called "contemplation" (dhyāna).

The word dhyāna is usually translated into meditation, for it implies that profound and abstract consideration which brings its object fully and undisturbedly before the mind. Inasmuch, however, as there is deliberation and consideration in this act, contemplation appears to me to be a more appropriate equivalent, the highest state of contemplation, which is Samādhi, being indicated by the term meditation.

The P. Bhāṣyā defines Dhyāna to be "an even current of thought undisturbed by other thoughts." (Sadriśa pravākā-pratyayántarenáparāmpriśto dhyānam.)

He now describes meditation, the last or highest member of the Yoga.
III.

When that (contemplation), existing as if without its own identity, enlightens solely one object, it is meditation.

"When that," *i.e.* contemplation as defined above (A. ii). When "solely one object" is enlightened, *i.e.*, when the object produced by application to the form of an object, negating all other forms of consideration, and the thought appears as if devoid of its own identity, it is called "meditation" (*samádhi*). That which brings the mind together thoroughly, (*samyag-ádhíyate*), *i.e.*, brings it to one centre by avoiding all disturbing causes, is Samádhi.

[The *P. Bháshya* defines Samádhi to be "that in which contemplation so realizes the form of the object contemplated as to make its own identity, as it were, void from the prevalence of the nature of the contemplated object. (*Dhyánameva dhyeyákára-nirbhásam pratyayátmakena svarúpeṇa synyamiva yadá bhavati dhyeya-svabhávávase át tadá samádhiru-tyuchyate*). As stated in the foregoing note, Samádhi is only a more advanced state of contemplation than Dhyána. In the latter the ideas of other objects besides the one contemplated are subdued and kept down, but not entirely suppressed; but in the former it is so complete that not only exteraneous ideas are suppressed, but even the distinction between the thinking and the thought are lost, so that the former, as it were, merges into the latter, and nothing but thought remains. Such being the case, the body ceases to be influenced by external stimuli, and a state of catalepsy or trance is produced. Hence it is that Samádhi is not unfrequently translated into trance or catalepsy. Catalepsy, however, takes note of only the cessation of the organic functions, leaving unnoticed the state of the thinking principle, whereas Samádhi brings the intensity of the thinking to the fore, without caring for the organic functions, and the English equivalent used should therefore convey this idea. Medi-
tation it is true does not give the measure of the intensity, but since that intensity varies greatly under different circumstances, meditation is by itself enough for ordinary use.]  

In order to supply for use in his work a technical term for the three constituents above described, he says:

IV.

The three together constitute Sañyama.

In this Sástra the application of the three operations of contemplation, (dhyána) steadfastness (dhárana), and meditation (Sámadhi), to one object is indicated by the use of the term Sañyama.

[The word Sañyama is formed of the intensive particle sam prefixed to yama "restraint," and means vow, binding or confinement, and in this work indicates the absolute restriction of one's self to the practice of the three means of accomplishing the Yoga. In connexion with the ceremonial of the Smr̥ti, it is used to indicate the day preceding that of the rite itself, because on that day the performer has to place himself under certain restrictions about food, drink, and occupation, the nature of which varies according to the character of the rites. The word is defined with a view to prepare it for subsequent use as a technical term for the three most important acts of Yoga.]

The fruit thereof.

V.

From success thereof comes the light of understanding.

"Thereof," i. e., of Sañyama. "From success" from its becoming similar (i. e., freely blending with each other so as to be the same) by practice. "Understanding" (prajñā), i. e., the nature of the object to be known. The "Light" (áloka), (understanding) expands. The meaning is—that which has to be known becomes thoroughly manifest.
[The purport is obvious. When a person is proficient in performing the threefold acts of Sañyama, he attains the light of understanding, or the power of knowing thoroughly the nature of the object to which he directs his attention.]

Its application.

VI.

It is to be applied according to its stages.

According to "its," i. e., of the Sañyama, "Stages" (bhúmi), it should be applied to the varying conditions of grossness and subtleness of the substratum of the function of the thinking principle. The Sañyama should be practised in a higher stage after subduing or attaining proficiency, or knowing thoroughly, the lower stages of the thinking principle, for the fruition is not effected by practicing the Sañyama in the highest stage without first bringing into controller the lower ones.

[The subject matter of this aphorism is a mere detail: it is the rule that Sañyama should not be attempted for the higher stages of perfection until after it has been practised in the lower stages, i. e., it is to be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of the Yogi is divided. See C. II A. xxvii.]

A doubt having arisen why in the chapter on the appliances (C. II) he should have described only five after naming the eight members of the Yoga, and omitted three, the author says:

VII.

The three are more intimate than the former.

"Than the former," i. e., of restrictions and other members of the Yoga, which are the appliances of meditation in a secondary degree. (C. II A. xxix.) The three members, steadfastness, &c., "are intimate" (antarāṇga, lit. akin,) to discriminate meditation, since they establish the true character of meditation.
CHAPTER THIRD.

[In C. II A. xxix. the accessories of the Yoga have been
described to be restraint, obligations, postures, regulation of
breath, devotion, steadfastness, contemplation, and meditation.
Of these the first five are subsidiary or ancillary to, and the last
three integral parts, lit. members of the body of, the Yoga, and this
idea is developed in the aphorism under notice by the statement
that the former are strangers and the latter intimates. The first
five only prepare a person for the performance of the Yoga, but
the last three constitute the Yoga, for without them there can be
no discriminate Yoga having a specific object of thought.]

To point out that it is nevertheless a stranger compared to
another, he says:

VIII.

It is still a stranger to the seedless.

"To the seedless" (nirvijasya), i.e., to the meditation which
depends on nothing, or carries on pondering with reference to
vacuity. To it the threefold members of the Yoga are strangers,
(vahirana), because they are only secondarily subservient.

[Having in the next preceding aphorisms described the last
three of the eight members of the Yoga, to be essential to the
Yoga, the author makes a distinction, by saying that though
they are essential in the case of discriminate meditation, or that
in which there is a specific object of thought, they are not so when
the Yogi, rising above all specific objects, makes vacuity (stunya)
the object of his pondering. This form of meditation is called
"seedless" (cf. C. I, A. LXI), and it needs no aid and can derive no
help from steadfastness, contemplation and objective meditation.]

Having now clearly explained the subject of Sañjama, wishing
to disclose the nature of perfection of the different members of
Yoga, he describes successively the three modifications.

IX.

The suppressive modification is the moment of
conjunction of the thinking principle with suppres-
sion on the overthrow and success of the twofold residua of waking and suppression.

"Waking" (nyutthāna) includes the three conditions of agitation, bewilderment, and voluptuousness. "Suppression" (nirodha) is that modification of the thinking principle in which the quality of goodness becomes a part of it, or retires to it. When successively the "overthrow" (avibhava) and success "prevalence" (prādurbhāva) of the residua of the two, i.e., of the waking and the suppressive conditions, are produced, then at the moment of "suppression," the conjunction (anvaya) which takes place from the thinking principle having then both functions is called "suppressive modification" (nirodhaparināma). "Overthrow" is the condition of incapacity to perform work, there being a contempt for it. "Prevalence" is the condition of manifestation in the present condition. The meaning is this:—When the residua cognate to waking are pacified, and the residua of suppression are prevailing and the thinking principle appears connected with both from its being the substratum of quality, then that state is indicated by the word suppressive modification (nirodhaparināma).

Although there is no stillness of the thinking principle when affected by the functions of the qualities, nevertheless this modification is called still or motionless.

[Having explained the exact position of the threefold exercise of Sañyāma, the author now proceeds to describe what follows that exercise, and in doing so first defines three terms, and the first of them is suppressive modification (nirodhaparināma). This is defined to be the time when all the residua of the waking state being overthrown, the thinking principle begins to be worked by the residua of the suppressive state; it is the moment of transition from the one condition to the other that the term indicates. The P. Bhāṣya thus defines the term: "the residua of the waking state are the attributes of the thinking principle, but they are not intelligent. The residua of suppression, produced by the intelligence of the suppressive state, are also the
attributes of the thinking principle. On the overthrow and the success of the two, the residua of the waking state are put down, those of the suppressive state rise up, and there is then a correlation of the thinking principle, and the changes, thus constantly occurring in a thinking principle is suppressive modification."

(Vyutthâna-saṅskārāschittadharma na te pratyayātmakā iti, pratyaya-nirodhena niruddhā nirodhasaṅskārā api chittadharmā, tayorabhīhavā-prādurbhāva vyutthāna-saṅskārā hiyante nirodha-saṅskārā udhiyante, nirodhakshaṇam chittamaveti tad ekasya chittasya pratiśānaśamidam saṅskārânyathātvam nirodha-paṇīnamah.)

In explaining the text, Bhoja uses a term which, as playing an important part in subsequent explanations, requires a few words of comment. The word is vartamānādhvan, a compound of vartamān "present" and adhvan "a road," but here "time" (adhvas'abda kālavarīkāh,) which I have rendered into "present condition." The theory is that every image, shape, or idea exists from eternity in a latent form; circumstances make it manifest, and when those circumstances are overcome it reverts to its former condition. The first is anāgatādhan, or the unmanifest or antecedent condition; the second or what we see is the vartamānādhan, or the present condition; and the third is atidhvan, or the postcedent condition, which is reversion to the first condition. The image existed in the marble in a latent condition; the sculptor brings it to its present condition, and when it is broken it passes on to its postcedent condition. This theory is the same which prevailed in Greece in ancient times. Thus, says Sir William Hamilton: "Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this—that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. In the Platonic sense, then, ideas were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the
phenomenal or ectypal world.” So Tiberghien, (Essai des Con-
noissance humaine, p. 207,) “Seneca considered ideas, according
to Plato, as the eternal exemplars of things, Cicero as their
form, Diogenes Laertius as their cause and principle, Aristotle as
substances.”

The word saṅskāra, which, for the sake of uniformity, I have
rendered into residua, would have been more pointed here if
translated into idea.]
The fruit thereof.

X.

Its tranquil flow from residual habit.

“Its,” of the thinking principle, “tranquil flow” (pras’ánta-
vāhīta) is produced by the residua of the suppression aforesaid.
The meaning is, from voluptuousness being removed the thinking
principle flows in its own modification.

[The advantage derived from the suppressive modification is
that, when it is attained, the thinking principle becomes tranquil,
and abides in its own nature, that is, it is no longer subject to
agitation from the prevalence of the adverse qualities of foul-
ness and bewilderment.]

Having described suppressive modification, he now defines
meditative modification.

XI.

The destruction of multifunctionality and enliven-
ment of concentration of the thinking principle is
meditative modification.

“Multifunctionality” (sarvārthatā) is the quality of voluptu-
ousness of the thinking principle, which results from its
accepting many objects from its versatility. When one object is
depended upon there is a similar modification, and it is “concen-
tration,” and that too is a quality of the thinking principle. The
“destruction” and “enlivenment” (kṣaya and utaya) of the
two are successive, i.e., the destruction or extreme overthrow of
the quality of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or full mani-
festival of the quality of concentration are successive. The condition in which there is a junction of the two in the thinking principle, when it has the quality of goodness in excess, is called "meditative modification" (samādhi-parināma). This is distinct from the former, (i.e., suppressive meditation). In the former there are the overthrow and the prevalence of the two residua, i.e., the contempt for the nature of the former waking residua and the prevalence in an unsubdued state of the latter or the residua of suppression. In this, however, there is destruction and full enlivenment. Destruction is entrance into the condition beyond that of reproduction, of the voluptuousness of multifunctionality, from extreme hatred. Enlivenment of the quality of concentration is its manifestation in the present condition.

[Suppressive modification as defined in A. ix, is confined to the point of time when the waking state passes on to the suppressive state; but in the meditative modification, there is a farther advance. The waking state has then been entirely overcome, and the meditative state is in full prevalence. The one is the commencement, and the other the consummation, of the condition of meditation. The P. Bhāshya explains this by saying "multifunctionality is an attribute of the thinking principle, so is concentration; the meaning is there is destruction or disappearance of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or manifestation of concentration." (Sarvārthaḥ chittadharmaḥ ekāgratā chittadharmaḥ, sarvārthāḥ kṣayaustirobhāva ityarthāḥ, ekāgratāyā udaya ávibhāva ityarthāḥ.) Briefly this is a higher state of concentration.]

The third or the concentrative modification.

XII.

The concentrative modification of the thinking principle is that in which both the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are equally recognized.
Unity of idea is a special function of the abstracted thinking principle. "Tranquil" (śānta) is that which has entered the postcedent condition. "Enlivened" (udita) is manifestation in the present condition. From the thinking principle being in a collected state, the two are equal, and from their object being one, are similar cognitions (pratyayas). When the collected thinking principle abides correlated with both it is called concentrative modification.

[In the suppressive modification the worldly state is just passing away, and the meditative state is just commencing, and the thinking principle is becoming tranquil; in the meditative state the first stage is passed, and concentration is in prevalence or fully enlivened; and when the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are in full play, the condition is called the concentrative modification. The P. Bhāṣya explains this by saying, "of the controlled thinking principle, the first cognition is tranquillity, and the next after it is a similar one that of enlivenment, and the thinking principle in meditation is correlated to both, in the same way" (samāhita-chittasya pūrva-pratyayāḥ śānta uttarastata-sadriśa udilah samādhī-chittamubhaye-ranugatam punasthāvā). As in the last case so here, we have in this an advance over the last preceding condition.]

Having described the forms of the modification of the thinking principle, he assigns them to other subjects.

XIII.

By this the modifications of property, time, and relation in elements and organs have been described.

"By this," i. e., by the threefold exposition of the modifications of the thinking principle (A. ix, xi, xii.). "In elements," (bhūteṣhu,) both the gross and the subtile. "In the organs" existing severally as Intellect, organs of function, and internal organ. It is to be understood that the three modifications of property, time, and relation have been described (by the above aphorisms).
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When, on the cessation of a former property, the subject undergoes the modification of another property, even as the subject clay, forsaking the form of an undefined mass, assumes another property, that of a jar, it is called the modification of property (Dharmaparinâma). The "modification of time" (Lakshana-parinâma) (is thus indicated)—when that jar, giving up its antecedent condition, assumes its present condition, or forsaking it, takes up its postcedent condition. The modification of relation (Avasthâparinâma) is the correlation of the jars, in the first and the second conditions, for the train of the functions of qualities is always moving, and does not remain unchanging for even a moment.

[This aphorism applies the theory of eternity of ideas enunciated in the three preceding aphorisms to things in general. The object is to show that even as in ideas, latency, manifestation, and disappearance follow successively, so in the thinking principle ideas appear and disappear under particular circumstances without radically changing its original nature. Change in matter is not absolute, nor radical conversion of one thing into another, but a modification of property, or of time, or of relation. A mass of clay converted into a jar is a change of property, and not of the radical elements of clay. This change is next altered by time, as the breaking of a jar into potsherds; and there is a further change going on in its condition, and the new jar of yesterday is not the same with the jar we see to day, for there has been some change in it since yesterday, for change is constant and cannot be retarded for a moment. The first change is called Dharmaparinâma, the modification of property. The second is Lakshana-parinâma, the modification of time. The word lakshana ordinarily means a sign or character, but it has been explained by commentators to mean time (kālabheda). The third is Avasthâparinâma or change of relation.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what the property is, he defines the nature of the propertied, i.e., the subject.
XIV.

The subject is the correlative of the qualities of tranquillity, enlivening, and latency.

"The tranquil" (sántáh) (qualities) are those which, having performed their respective functions, have entered the postcedent condition. "The enlivened" (udiláh) qualities are those which, forsaking the antecedent condition, perform their functions in the present condition. "The latent," (avyapadesyáh) qualities are those which, abiding potentially, do not produce action. Thus everything is comprised in everything, and so on. By the word property (dharma) is implied that simple potentiality which abides distinctly correlated as effect and cause. Whatever proceeds and admits of correlation with that threefold quality is called the "propertied" (dhrmi) which is the subject of tranquillity, enlivening and latency. Thus gold, giving up the quality of the form of a necklace and assuming that of the form of a svasti-ka cross, still appears as a golden form, i.e., when in these slightly different characters the subject appears as a common property, it is subject, but when it abides as a distinct mode it is a property, and therefore it is described as the correlative of qualities.

[Properties do not always exist in the same form in the same way. Sometimes they are tranquil, at others active, or enlivened, and sometimes latent, and these properties are called dharma, and the thing with which they are correlated is the "propertied," or the substratum of qualities, or Dharmi—that which has the Dharma. A thing cannot be called a subject until it is correlated to a property, and a property ceases to be so when it qualifies nothing. On the other hand, by change of relation a subject may become a property and a property a subject—a subjective law or its objective outcome.]

To remove the doubt as to how a single (propertied) subject undergoes many modifications he says:
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XV.

The diversity of succession is the cause of the versatility of modifications.

*Krama* or "succession" of property as defined above and *anyatva*, "diversity," which is every moment visible, make the compound *Kramányatva*, (which has been rendered into "diversity of succession" in the text). And that is the "cause" (*ketu*), mark, or indicator of the (*anyatva*) or multiplicity or diversity of the modifications aforesaid. The meaning is this: Constant motion or succession, as from powdered earth into clay mass, thence flattened plates, thence a jar, shows the manifest form of the versatility of modifications. And whatever the motion in the subject of the modifications of time and condition, the same should be understood to be the argument in support of the versatility of modification. For certain all conditions appear constantly changing by constant motion, and the versatility of modification from constant mutability is thereby established. Of all mutable objects, like the thinking principle and the rest, some qualities are grasped by perception, such as pleasures, conditions and the like, and some are known by inference, such as fate, residuum, power, &c., and the propertied subject not being distinct from property is to be explained in the same way.

[Both the text and the commentary explain the subject in a very roundabout way. The purport is that the diversity of phenomena in the versatile world, is due to constant motion, or uninterrupted succession of changes. The three qualities are never at rest, they are flowing in a constant round of changes, and every change brings on some change of property, for were not properties to change, there would be no perceivable change. And the thinking principle, associated directly with the functions of the three qualities, must accordingly with these changes, be the agent of a multiplicity of functions, and that is its multifunctionality. The changes under notice are either perceivable]
by the senses, organs, or felt by the mind, but in both cases they apply to the thinking principle.]

Now, with a view to describe Siddhi (perfection) by showing the object of the Sañyama already described, he says:

XVI.

The knowledge of the past and the future is acquired by Sañyama over the threefold modification.

The threefold modification resulting from distinctions of attribute, time and relation has been already described. By the Sañyama, i.e., by practising the controul aforesaid in connexion with this object, Yogis acquire a full knowledge of the past and the future. The purport is this: When a Yogi, knowing that in any given subject this is the attribute, this is the time, this is the relation, and it having performed its work in the present condition has entered the postcedent condition, performs the Sañyama by surmounting the obstructions, he knows everything, all that is passed, or that is to happen, because from the manifestation of the pure quality of goodness in the thinking principle, he then constantly rejects all obstacles caused by ignorance to the power of perceiving the purport of all and everything. When by these means all obstacles have been set aside, then, through concentration, the power of perceiving the property of all and everything becomes manifest as in a stainless mirror.

[Having explained the rationale of the action of the thinking principle on worldly objects, the author now proceeds to describe the effect of Sañyama on that action, and the occult powers which may be derived by that exercise. The first occult power or perfection noticed is the power of knowing the past and the future. This is acquired by directing the Sañyama to the threefold changes described in A. xiii, i.e., by meditating about them till the light of truth rises in the thinking principle of the Yogi and makes everything manifest.]

He describes another kind of perfection.
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XVII.

A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and knowledge (arises) from indiscriminate understanding. By Sañyama with due discrimination, (is acquired an understanding) of the cry of all creatures.

A "word" (śabda) is a sound formed of letters joined in a fixed order, perceptible by the organ of hearing, and always conveying the same, single, distinct meaning; or it is a mere explosive sound having in it no fixed order, but still intelligible to cultivated understanding. In either case it forms words and sentences, for both are adapted to convey a fixed meaning. "Meaning" (arthā) implies kind, quality, action, &c. "Understanding" (pratyaya) is knowledge, or the function of the intellect in which it assumes the form of the object (implied). By accepting in our intellect these naturally distinct word, meaning and understanding as one, there is confusion. Thus, in saying "bring a cow," the meaning is a cow (gō), belonging specifically to the species cow, and having dewlap, &c.; the word is the indicator; and the understanding is the appreciation of it; and all these are grasped without any distinction. It is not used with a clear perception of the word cow being the indicator, the meaning being what is indicated by the word, and the understanding that which accepts the two; and if one is asked what is the meaning? what is the word? what is the understanding produced by it? he gives only one answer to all the questions by saying 'a cow.' Were he not to conceive all these to be identical, how could he give the same answer to all the questions? In this state he who makes the "distinction," (pravibhāga) that the essential nature of a word is that it is the indicator (vāchaka), that of its meaning is the indicated, and that of the understanding is making it manifest, and, making this distinction, places himself in Sañyama about it, acquires the knowledge of the cry (ruta) or word of all creatures, including feral and domestic quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, &c., i. e.,
he knows with what particular motive a specific sound has been made by a particular animal.

[Words are correlated with meanings, and meanings with ideas. When sounds are reduced to speech there is a fixed relation between their constituents, and this relation is fixed by orthography and syntax; but when, in the cry of an animal for instance, this relation of sounds does not appear to be so fixed, it is not to be understood that there is no such relation, for without it the sounds could not convey meaning and idea. And the relation being admitted, it must follow that the cry of animals, which are intended to convey ideas, must have some such relation, and this relation can be learnt by directing the Sañyama to it. Ergo when the Sañyama is accomplished, the Yogi who performs it is able to understand the meaning of the cries of animals.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XVIII.

A knowledge of former existence by making the residua apparent.

Twofold are the residual impressions of the thinking principle. Some are simply productive of memory; others are the causes of the deserts, kind, life, and enjoyment, called virtue and vice. When Sañyama is performed in regard to these residua, the performer, enquiring into his former actions to the effect—that has that object been perceived by me, thus has that act been performed by me, remembers all the past by the mere reflection, the residua being by themselves excited without any separate stimulants, and gradually visibly sees in the self-excited residua the kind, &c., experienced in former existences.

[As explained in A. xviii, C. I., the residual impressions are of a twofold character. One class of them produce memory, that is when excited by a stimulus, the impressions which lie latent in the mind become vivid, even as an action done in childhood and afterwards entirely forgotten, is brought up in the mind many years after by the sight of the locality or other circumstance]
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connected with it. Involuntary impressions received in dreams and the like are also so produced. The second class of impressions are those which bring on the desert of works; they are perfectly involuntary, and are mostly residua of former existences. By applying Sañyama to these, they are excited and become visible to the Yogi, and thereby he is able to know the events of his former existences.

Another form of perfection.

XIX.

With reference to cognition, a knowledge of another’s thinking principle.

"Cognition" (pratyaya) as indicated by some characteristic sign, such as the complexion and the like, of others. When a Yogi has performed the Sañyama with reference to it, he attains a knowledge of another’s thinking principle. The meaning is, that one’s own thinking principle, by entering the thinking principle of another, comes to know all its attributes, whether it is excited or otherwise.

[The principle explained above applies also to the thinking principles of other persons. The Sañyama applied to them brings them within the range of the understanding of the Yogi. The theory being that the thinking principle which thinks upon a thing assumes the form of that thing, it follows that the mind of the Yogi performing the Sañyama becomes the mind thought of, and thereby knows it.]

He now describes a peculiarity in the knowledge of other thinking principles.

XX.

(But) not along with its object, that not being the object (of the thinker).

But he is not able to know another’s thinking principle (in the text represented by the pronoun it) "along with its object" (sálamohana), i. e., along with the object to which it is directed,
because none of the characteristics of the object is made the subject (of the Sañyama). From the characteristic of the object not being reflected upon the thinking principle alone of another is known, but not that it is blue or yellow, because Sañyama cannot be directed to that which has not been made the object of it, and there can be no recognition where it is not made the object. Hence another thinking principle along with its object is not cognizable, the object not being taken into account. Now, the qualities of the thinking principle will be included. When contemplation is made as to what is the object, then from that Sañyama a knowledge of the whole subject is acquired.

[This aphorism qualifies the sense of the next preceding one. It says that by thinking on the thinking principle of another one can know it, but not its objects, unless those objects are also included. When they are included the knowledge is perfect.]

He describes another perfection.

XXI.

From Sañyama with reference to the shape of the body, the power of vision being benumbed, and the correlation of light and sight being severed, there is disappearance.

The "body" (kāya) is the human frame, and its shape (rūpa) is that quality of it which is perceptible by the eye. The meaning is—of such a body such is the shape. Through Sañyama the power of the eye to perceive things becoming 'benumbed' (stambha), i.e., obstructed through contemplation with reference to that shape, and "the correlation of light and sight being severed," i.e., the luminousness of the eye which proceeds from the quality of goodness being "severed," or rendered incapable of performing its function, there is a disappearance of a Yogi, i.e., none can see him. By this it should be known that the disappearance of sounds &c. is also implied, i.e., by this exposition of the means of the
disappearance of shape, &c., the disappearance of sounds, &c., the objects of the ears, &c., is described.

[Objects are perceivable by the light which the quality of goodness throws on them, but if this light be withdrawn by the quality of goodness being confined in the thinking principle, they cease to be so. Accordingly, when a Yogí performs Sañyama with reference to his body or any part of it he withdraws therefrom the quality of goodness, and the body or the part of it so acted upon ceases to have the quality of perceptibility, and the Yogí becomes invisible, inaudible, &c. When an object has no power of visibility in it, it necessarily becomes invisible. This is how the Yogí makes himself invisible.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XXII.

Works are deliberate and non-deliberate, and by Sañyama about them a knowledge of the final end; or by portents.

Life is the consequence of former works. They are of two kinds, "deliberate" and "non-deliberate." Thereof the "deliberate" or anticipatory (sopakrama) is that in which there is an anticipation of consequences in the attempt to produce a result, as in the spreading of wet cloth in a hot place in order that it may dry quickly. The reverse of the former is the "non-deliberate" (nirupakrama), as the leaving the same cloth in a lump in a cool place where it may dry after a long time. Whoever performs Sañyama with reference to these two kinds of work, (enquiring) 'whether my work will mature quickly or slowly,' in him, through firm contemplation, a knowledge of the final end is produced. "Final end" (aparánta) is the separation of the body from the soul, i.e., death. A "knowledge of it," i.e., 'at such a time, at such a place my death shall happen,' he acquires with certainty.
"Or by portents" (ārishtedhyavas). Portents are of three kinds, spiritual (ādhyātmika), material, (ādhibhautika) and supernatural (ādhidaivika). The spiritual is that (which is conveyed in a spiritual way, as) when one with the ears closed does not hear the sound of the vital air in the stomach, or such like (the said sound being ordinarily audible). The material is the sudden sight of a frightful human form, or the like. The supernatural is the accidental sight of invisible things, such as paradise, &c. By them one knows the time of death. Although knowledge may be acquired through portents by other than Yogīs, it is in their case general and doubtful. In the case of Yogīs, on the other hand, the time and place being certain, the perception is as certain as actual sight.

[The efficacy of this Siddhī depends upon the precision with which the events of past existences are realised in the mind by reviving their residua through the power of Saṅyāma. When their memory is perfect, one can easily calculate which of his former acts will bring on death within a short time, and which are destined to retard it. It will be seen that in the Yoga system residua or deserts play the part of fate, and if the nature of the residua be known, one knows his fate.]

In order to explain the perfection acquired by the purifying processes (Chap. I, A. xxxiii, p. 40) he says:

XXIII.

In friendliness, superhuman powers.

By performing Saṅyāma in regard to friendliness, mercy, complaisance, and indifference, super-human powers are acquired with reference to them, i. e., in the performer friendliness, mercy, and complaisance attain such great excellence as to enable him to contract friendship with all (persons).

[The sense is obvious, and needs no comment.]

He describes another kind of perfection.
XXIV.

In powers, the powers of the elephant and the like.

By performing Sānyāma with reference to the powers of the elephant and the like, powers like those of the elephant, &c., become manifest in the Yogi. The meaning is this: He who performs Sānyāma in regard to the power of the elephant, the force of the wind, or the vigour of the lion, wishing it to be in him, becomes possessed of those powers.

[As obvious as the purport of the last preceding aphorism.]

Another perfection.

XXV.

From contemplation of the light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowledge (is acquired) of the subtile, the intercepted and the remote.

The light of the extremely luminous disposition has already been described. (C. I, A. xxxvi). The “light” is that which expands the manifestation of the quality of goodness. From “contemplation” (nyāsa) of all things appertaining to it, i.e., from thinking of the objects irradiated by it, a knowledge is produced, in one’s own internal organ and the organs of sense endowed with special power, of the “subtile” (śūkṣma) such as atoms, &c., of the “intercepted” (nyavahita), as mines under the earth, and of the remote (vīprakrishṭa), as the elixir of life existing on the other side of the Meru mountain.

[The clear light of the quality of goodness is what is meant by “the light of the extremely luminous disposition.”]

Another perfection of a similar description.

XXVI.

From Sānyāma in the sun, a knowledge of regions.

He who performs Sānyāma with reference to the manifest sun, obtains a definite knowledge of whatever regions and towns exist in the seven spheres, including the terrine, the aerial, and the celestial. In the preceding aphorism the subject is the
manifestation of the quality of goodness, here it is material, that
is the distinction.

[The P. Bhåshya gives a long account of the seven principal
regions and their subsidiaries, taken from the Puråpas, but it is
not worth quoting. In Wilson’s Vishnu Puråna the details are
given at length.]

Another perfection by means of reliance on material mani-

XXVII.

In the moon, a knowledge of the disposition of
the stars.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the moon, a know-
ledge is derived of the disposition (vyåha), or the order of
arrangement, of the starry luminaries. As the stars lose their
light on the manifestation of the sun, Sañyama with reference to
the sun cannot suffice to afford a knowledge of the stars, there-
fore a different means is (here) ordained.

[The reason given why the Sañyama with reference to the
sun does not suffice to give an idea of the arrangement of the
stars and planets appears ludicrous. Bhoja cannot have seen a
star in day light. The P. Bhåshya does not refer to it.]

Another perfection.

XXVIII.

In the Polar star, a knowledge of their motion.

A knowledge is produced of the “motion” (gati) of the par-
ticular time and position of each of the stars by performing
Sañyama with reference to the Polar star (Dhruva), the chief,
the fixed star. This is a star, that is a planet, this is the period
within which it will reach a particular constellation,—all these are
known. What is said is that this is the fruit of knowing their
times.

[The P. Bhåshya adds that the Sañyama applied to the
firmament above suffices the purpose. (U’rddha-vimåneshu krta-
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saṅyamastāni viśāṇīyāt). It is not obvious why Bhoja has omitted this.]

After having described perfections regarding externals, he now attempts to describe internal perfections.

XXIX.

In the navel-wheel, a knowledge of the disposition of the body.

A knowledge is acquired by the Yogi who has performed Saṅyama with reference to the "wheel" (chakra) of sixteen radii which exists in the middle of the body, and is called "navel" (nābhi), of the "disposition" (vyūha) obtaining in the body of fluids, excrements, humours, tubes, &c. What is said is this—the navel-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes, therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body.

[Down to the last aphorism the effect of Saṅyama applied to external objects formed the theme of comment; now the author turns to objects situated within the body. The first is the navel-wheel, which is said to have sixteen radii. How this idea got into currency I cannot make out. Ancient Hindus must have seen the human abdomen dissected, and having seen it, it is impossible to imagine, how they conjured up the idea of a wheel with sixteen radii. There must be some recondite metaphor involved in this, but I know not what it is.]

Another perfection.

XXX.

In the throat-well, the subdual of hunger and thirst.

The well in the throat is "throat-well" (kaṇṭha-kūpa). It is a pit or well-like place (and therefore called a well) behind and below the tongue and palate. By the contact of the vital airs with it (the sensations of) hunger and thirst are produced. The hunger
and thirst of the Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to that well, are subdued. The streams (of the vital airs) being satisfied below the uvula, this kind of perfection is accomplished.

[The throat-well is the pharynx where the air from the mouth and that from the cavity of the nostrils meet.]

Another perfection.

XXXI.

Firmness in the tortoise tube.

Firmness of the mind is acquired by performing Sañyama with reference to the tube, called the "tortoise" (kúrma), which is situated below the throat-well. The meaning is—that on the mind entering that spot there happens no vacillation, in other words, such a firmness of the body is produced that no one can cause it to shake.

[The tortoise tube is the lower part of the larynx including the bronchi.]

Another perfection.

XXXII.

In the coronal light, vision of perfected ones.

In the skull there is an aperture called Brahma-randhra. It is called "light" (jyotík) because it is the site of light. Even as the spreading effulgence of a jewel in a closed room collects at the keyhole, so the light of the quality of goodness in the heart spreading collects at that aperture. And by the performance of Sañyama in it by Yogís, those perfected ones, or celestial beings, who dwell in the space between the earth and the sky and are invisible to ordinary people, become visible, i. e., Yogís see them, and hold converse with them. This is the meaning.

[The point at the crest of the frontal bone remains open in childhood when the parietal bones are not sufficiently developed; at maturity this opening is closed; but, its existence having once been proved, it is believed to exist always, and is called Brahma-
CHAPTER THIRD.

randhra. Life is said to depart through this aperture in certain cases, and spiritually it is reckoned to be the most important part of the body. In the Tantras it is referred to with great reverence.

This is the only aphorism in the Yoga system which may be assumed as recognising the truth of the spiritual manifestations of modern European spiritualists; the rationale, however, is entirely different.]

He now describes the means of becoming all-knowing.

XXXIII.

Or from Prátibha, everything.

Prátibhā is that knowledge which is independent of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved. By performing Sañyama with reference to it this Prátibha knowledge, called Tāraka or emancipator, which results before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, arises. Even as the light which becomes apparent before the rising sun, so this Tāraka, or knowledge of everything before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, becomes apparent. When this is the case, the Yogi can know everything without resource to any particular Sañyama.

[The P. Bhashya explains the word Prátibha by the phrase Prátibham náma tārakam, which may mean the Morning Star, the one which is visible a little before sunrise, or that it is an emancipator. Patanjali, perhaps, referred to the star, as the light of that star prepares the way for the illumination of the universe by the sun; but Bhoja, having set a limit to external objects at the close of the 28th aphorism, is compelled to take the Pratibhá to be something different. According to his definition, it is a sort of instinct, or intuition, "the knowledge which is independant of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved." He has, nevertheless, been obliged to preserve the relation of the star to the sun by referring to the illumination resulting from sunrise. The
morning star is not, like the Polar star, always the same, different planets serving its place at different times, and this uncertainty must have told against the material meaning being accepted as the right one. Whether the practising Yogi should think on the morning star, or intuition is a question which I cannot decide, but Bhoja has obviously the best of the argument.]

Another perfection.

XXXIV.

In the heart, a consciousness of the thinking principle.

"Heart" (*kriyāya*) is a particular part of the body. The locale of the internal organ is within a small, inverted lotus placed in that part of the body. By performing Sañyama with reference to it, a knowledge of the thinking principle of one's own and of another person is obtained, *i.e.*, the Yogi comes to know all the residua in his own thinking principle, as well as the passions, &c., in other thinking principles.

[The description of the heart is obviously rhetorical. As the seat of the thinking principle it is described as the most appropriate spot to which attention should be directed to know it thoroughly.]

Another perfection.

XXXV.

Experience is an undefined conception of the quality of goodness and the soul, which are totally unconnected. From Sañyama for its own object, and not for another's object, proceeds a knowledge of the soul.

"The quality of goodness" (*nattva*) is a particular modification of nature (*pradhīna*); it is characterised by illumination and joy. 'Soul' (*purusha*) is the experiencer in the form of a ruler. From the distinction of the experiencer and the experience,—
CHAPTER THIRD.

of the rational and the irrational—there is total unconnection between the two, i. e., they are separate. "A conception" of the two without any distinction, not knowing them distinctly, is experience. Hence whatever consciousness of pleasure and pain is felt by the quality of goodness assuming itself to be the master is experience. Goodness having no object of its own, its work is for "another's object," (parártha), i. e., for the object of the soul. That which is distinct from it is its "own object," (svárátha); which is reliance on the true nature of the soul, or the connection of the shadow of the soul with the quality of goodness (satva) devoid of egotism. By the performance of Sañyama in that connection, a knowledge of the object of the soul is derived, i. e., the soul knows reliant perception to be in this way dependant on the quality of goodness. Nor does there arise any difficulty about the soul, the knower, becoming the object of knowledge, for the objection will be met by the argument of knowability (i. e., that which is the knower cannot be the knowable); because the knower and the knowable are quite contrary.

[The soul is the experiencer of joys and sorrows; it experiences them by its being reflected on the intellect, which is the immediate experiencer. The two are essentially different; one is sentient, the other inert; one the enjoyer, the other the enjoyed. An association of the two is brought about by the former being reflected on the latter, and then the former experiences what is produced in the latter. The latter, however, being irradiated by the former, acts the part of the agent or actor, and whatever it thereby feels is called enjoyment. This feeling, however, is for another's purpose, i. e., for the purpose of the soul, its own purpose being the merging in that soul. In the one case it works for another, and falsely imagines itself to be the actor, and in the other it acts with a view to attain its own end. When Sañyama is performed with this discrimination and with the object of knowing the soul, the knowledge is acquired.]

He now describes the fruits of this Sañyama.
XXXVI.

Thence proceed intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction.

"Thence," from performing Sañyama in the said quality of goodness, or practising it; even in the waking state these faculties are produced. Thereof "intuition" (Prátiḥṣa) is the knowledge already described (A. xxxiii) on the manifestation of which minute objects become visible.

"Audition" (Srāvana) is the knowledge produced in the organ of hearing. Therefrom the highest celestial sound, or that which is produced in the heaven, becomes audible.

"Taction" (Vedanā) is the knowledge produced by the organ of touch. That by which is known that a thing exists (vidyati anayā) is Vedanā; it is a Tantric term which has been used here. Therefrom proceeds the knowledge of such celestial things as are subjects of touch.

"Vision" (Ādarśa) is that knowledge which is produced by the organ of sight. Whereby is seen (dṛśyati) or perceived thoroughly what every form is, is ādarśa. When it is in its full development a knowledge of celestial forms is produced by it.

"Gustation" (Āsvāda) is the knowledge produced by the organ of taste. That by which a thing is tasted (āsvādati aneneti) is āsvāda, and on its full development a perception of celestial taste is produced.

"Olfaction" (Vārta) is the sensation of smell. In Tantric terminology the word vṛitti means the organ of smelling; that in which resides (varittate) the objects of smell (is vṛitti) and that which proceeds from that organ of smell is Vārta, i.e., the sensation of smell. When that becomes fully developed celestial smells become perceptible.

[This aphorism explains the collateral advantages of performing Sañyama with reference to the soul. These advantages are superior or transcendental powers in the organs of sense. Nor
are those powers confined to the meditative state; when once acquired, they are retained permanently, and even in his ordinary worldly waking state the Yogi can exercise them, so that in his ordinary faculties he becomes infinitely superior to common mortals.]

Of these different fruits he now describes the respective provinces.

XXXVII.

These are obstacles in the meditative condition (but) perfections in the waking state.

"These," the different fruits described above. In the state of meditation they are "obstacles," (upasargas) hindrances, disturbers, because from joy, wonder, &c., resulting therefrom, meditation becomes relaxed. In the state of waking (vyuḥkāna), i.e., in the ordinary state of life, they are, however, perfections (siddhayah), because then they yield desirable fruits.

[The perfections described are of the world worldly, required for worldly purposes, but useless for higher meditation, i.e., for meditation having isolation for its aim. Nor are they simply useless, but positively obstructive, for they interfere with the even tenor of calm meditation. In the waking state they may be gratifying, and, indeed, they are useful only in that state, but apart from it they are not wanted.]

He describes another perfection.

XXXVIII.

From slackness of the cause of bondage and from a knowledge of the process, the entrance of the thinking principle into another body.

The consciousness which results of the experience and the experience, acting from the constant relation existing between the soul and the intellect residing inside the body and from pervasion, is called corporeal bondage (sarirabandha). When through medita-
tion the cause of bondage, which is work in the twofold form of virtue and vice, becomes slack, or attains attenuity, and when a Yogi knows the process, i.e., the way in which the thinking principle issues from the heart through the organs towards worldly objects, knowing full well this is the tube called chittavahā through which the thinking principle circulates, and it differs thus from the tubes through which the vital airs and the rest circulate, and also knows the passages in his own body and that of others, he can enter, by the passage through which the thinking principle circulates, into the body of another, whether it be dead or alive. The thinking principle, after entering another body, follows the bent of the senses even as honey-bees follow the queen bee, (lit. king bee). And the Yogi who has entered another body uses it as his own body. Since work is the cause of circumscribing the fruition of the pervading soul and the thinking principle, if that circumscription be weakened or destroyed by meditation, fruition may result everywhere from the independence of the thinking principle.

[The transfer of one’s own soul into another body plays a prominent part in the legendary lore of India, and the idea was not unknown at one time in Europe. How this transfer is effected is explained in this aphorism. The bondage of the soul to the body is due to works and their deserts, works having been performed their deserts must be borne by the soul in association with the body; but when through meditation the residua of works are obliterated and the bond is loosened, and the Yogi knows the way in which the soul goes out and comes into a body, he can, at will, make the soul travel by that way and enter another body, whether dead or alive, and again, at will, withdraw it from that body, and bring it back to its own. And wherever the soul rests there it works upon the organs, and enjoys their experiences, or in other words, the organs follow the soul as do working bees their queen.]

Another perfection.
CHAPTER THIRD.

XXXIX.

From subdual of Udána, ascension and detachment from water, mud, thorns, &c.

The simultaneous waking, like the flaming up of burning chaff, of the functions (of the body) is indicated by the phrase vital air, (Jívána), and from differences of action, that vital air is indicated severally by the terms Práña, Apána, &c. Thereof one form of air is called Práña, because it passes (prápanyánát,) from the heart through the mouth and the nostrils. That air which descends (apápanyánát) from the navel down to the great toe is called Apána. Another is called Samána, because, surrounding the navel, it permeates everywhere (samantáannáyanát). Another is called Udána, because it ascends from the back of the neck to the head (unmányánát). Another air pervades the whole body, and is called Váyána, because it circulates over the whole body, (vápyána náyanát). From the subdual of the Udána, through Sañyáma, the other airs being suppressed and the tendency being upwards, the Yogi does not suffer from "water," i.e., in large rivers, &c., nor from large collections of "mud," (kárdama,) bogs, nor from sharp "thorns" (kañčaka), i.e., from his lightness he rises, like a floss of cotton, even when drowned in water or the like.

[The body is kept alive by five vital airs, and of these that which is called Udána is characterised by its tendency to rise upwards. Now, by making Sañyáma in reference to it the tendency of the other airs are overcome, and the whole body tends upwards, consequently there is no gravitation, and the Yogi is neither drowned in water, nor submerged in a bog. The attenuity of his body at the time is such that it cannot be pierced by a thorn.]

XL.

From subdual of Samána, effulgence.

From the "subdual" (jáyát) of the air called Samána which surrounds the fire (of the stomach), i.e., by bringing it under
control through Sañyama, that unprotected fire ascends, and the Yogi appears effulgent as if flaming in glory.*

[The stomach is the seat of the fire which keeps up the heat of the body and consumes food; and this fire is surrounded and kept in its place by the air called Samána. Such being the theory, it follows that when by Sañyama the air in question is overcome or rendered inapta in its special function, the fire, from its natural tendency upwards, should rise up and escape from the body in lambent flames of glory. The Buddhists, who developed the Yoga system to its utmost limit, declare that the crown of the head, the space between the eyebrows, the mouth and the shoulders are the places whence these flames usually issue. In the Sanskrit Buddhist literature of Nepal these flames are frequently described as issuing from the person of S'akya Buddha, whenever he immersed himself in a profound meditation, and in ancient sculptures images of Buddha are often represented with these flames occupying the place of halo, nimbus, aureola, or glory of European art. A physical cause for these flames may be found in the electric flames which have been noticed by Reichenbach on the persons of highly electric tendency under certain conditions. Of course it is an open question as to whether Yogís had seen such electric flames and derived their descriptions therefrom, or drawn them from their fancy.]

Another perfection.

XLI.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the organ of hearing and ether, a superperfect organ of hearing.

"Organ of hearing" (Śrotra) is that organ which perceives sound, and is produced by egotism. "Ether" (Ākāśa) is sky, the result of the subtle rudiment of sound (Śabdatanmātra). The "relation" (sambandha) between the two is that of the site and the situated. The Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to it attains a superperfect organ of hearing (Divyasrotra), and
becomes able to hear simultaneously subtile, intercepted, and distant sounds.

[The ether is the product of the rudiment of sound; and the organ of hearing is dependant on it for the performance of its function; and if the relation between the two be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to ether, the performer obtains the power of knowing it under all circumstances.]

Another perfection.

XLII.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the body and ether, travelling in ether, from acquisition of levity, like that of cotton.

The "body" (káya), is the form made of the five elements. By performing Sañyama with reference to the relation which exists between the body and ether which yields space (for objects to abide in) a levity, like that of cotton and the like, is effected, i.e., they become alike. Having effected this and attained the levity, the Yógí, walking at will over water, or on a spider's web, or on the rays of the sun, at his choice travels on ether.

[The rationale of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last; the body is kept down by the ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it.]

Another perfection.

XLIII.

The function independent of external functions is the great incorporeal. Therefrom the destruction of the covering of light.

That mental function which is out of the body, i.e., independent of it, is named the "great incorporeal" (Mahávidéha), because it is exclusive of the steadfastness of the relation between the body and egotism. "Therefrom," from Sañyama performed with reference to it, the destruction of the covering of light is
affected, i.e., the covering consisting of affictions, works, &c., which obstruct the light of the thinking principle centered in the quality of goodness alone, is removed. The meaning is this: The external functions of the thinking principle which result from the body and egotism are called factitious (kalpita). When, abandoning the feeling of body and egotism, there arises an independent (or self-reliant) mental function it is non-fictitious (akalpita). By performing Sañyama with reference to it, all taints in the thinking principle of the Yogi are removed.

[The covering produced by the qualities of foulness and darkness prevent the true light of the quality of goodness from being seen to perfection. If that covering be removed the vision is perfect. When retiring under this covering, which is no other than consciousness under the name of egotism, the mind entertains factitious ideas, and produces factitious works, which are consequently false. Divested of this covering it works differently, and whatever it produces is real. Sañyama performed with reference to the relation existing between the body and egotism removes the covering, and thereby cleanses the thinking principle.]

Having thus described the different forms of perfection, including anterior destruction of objects, posterior destruction of objects, and the middle condition; having also explained the knowledge of the externals, regions, &c., of the internals, the formation of the body, of the powers of friendliness, &c., which effect particular objects; having, further, described the conditions of internal and external organs and such like expedients for meditation, as also the conditions of the vital aire, Prāṇa, &c., and other perfections for producing stedfastness in the thinking principle and earnestness in meditation; he now, with a view to point out the various means for the perfection of the seeded and the seedless meditations for the visual inspection of the soul, says,

XLIV.

From Sañyama with reference to grossness, nature, subtlety, concomitance and fruition, conquest of the elements.
CHAPTER THIRD.

By performance of Sañyama with reference to the five specific conditions or qualities, such as grossness, &c., of the five elements, earth, &c., the conquest of the elements is effected, i.e., the elements become subservient. Thereof "grossness" (sthula) implies the specific forms in which the elements are perceived. "Nature" (svārūpa) implies respectively their effects, such as smell, viscidity, heat, impulsion, and impenetrability. "Subtlety" (sūkṣhma) implies successively the subtle conditions which are the causes of the elements: these are the subtle or rudimentary forms of matter (tanmātra). "Concomitancy" (anvaya) includes the qualities of shape, disposition, and existence, which are everywhere seen to co-exist. "Fruchtition" (arthavatva) is that power in the qualities which lead to enjoyment and emancipation. Thus, by performing Sañyama in regard severally to the five elements, nature and conditions aforesaid, the Yogi conquers the elements. This is to be done in this way,—first in the gross form, next in the subtle form. To the performer of Sañyama in this order, nature and the elements become fullfillers of desires, even as cows follow calves.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain the advantages derivable from the performance of Sañyama with reference to the five elements. The elements brought under control subserv the wants and wishes of the controller, even as cows subserve the requirements of calves by following them wherever they ramble.]

He now describes the fruit of this conquest over the elements.

XLV.

Therefrom proceed attenuation, &c., as also excellence of body and the indestructibility of its qualities.

(1) "Attenuation" (animā) the attainment of the form of atoms (molecularity).

(2) "Levity" (laghimā) attainment of lightness like that of a floss of cotton.

(3) "Ponderosity" (garimā) attainment of great weight.
(4) "Illimitability," (mahimā) attainment of greatness, or the power of touching the moon or the like with the tip of one's finger.
(5) "Irresistible will" (prákámya) non-frustration of desires.
(6) "Supremacy" (isītva) highest authority over the body and the internal organ.
(7) "Subjection" (vāśītva) prevailing everywhere, i.e., the elements being subservient to him do not disobey his behests.
(8) "Fulfilment of desires," (kāmāvasāyītva) accomplishing one's desire everywhere, i.e., in whatever object a desire is formed, the Yogi becomes accomplished in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it.

These, attenuations, &c., as accessories to meditation, become prevalent in Yogis on their conquering the elements. Thus by attaining molecularity he can enter into (the substance of) a diamond. The other cases should be explained in the same way. These eight qualities, attenuation, &c., are called great perfections, (mahāsiddhis). "Excellence of body" (kāyasampat), which will be presently described, is also obtained. "The indestructibility of its qualities," means that the shape and the other qualities of that body are not liable to destruction by any means. Neither does fire burn its shape, nor wind dry it up, and so on.

[The exact nature of the advantages to be derived from Sañyāma with reference to the elements, not having been described in the next preceding aphorism, the author supplies the omission in this aphorism. The advantages are the eight siddhis or perfections an account of which has already been given on page 121. They include many of the perfections described in separate aphorisms. I fail to perceive any marked distinction between the 5th and the 8th. The explanation of the 8th given on p. 121 is Tāntric.]

He next explains what excellence of the body is—

XLVI.

Colour, loveliness, might, and adamantine hardness constitute the excellence of the body.
"Colour, loveliness, and might" are well-known. "Adaman-
tine hardness" (vajrasaṅkhananatva) means that hardness is
produced in one's body like that of the diamond. These are the
excellences that become manifest in the body.

[While yearning for the severance of all bondage to worldly
objects, the Yogīs cannot get over the natural love which ties
the mind to the body. The body is one's own, and it is always
desirable to have it in a perfect state of beauty, and the means
are here provided to give it perfection. Of course it is introduced
here as the effect of a particular kind of Saṅyama, and not as a
thing to be desiderated.]

Having thus explained the excellence of the body, he now
describes the conquest of the organs by one who has attained
his (proper) stage.

XLVII.

From the performance of Saṅyama with reference
to perception, nature, egoism, concomitance, and frui-
tion, (proceeds) the conquest of the organs.

"Perception" (graḥaṇa) is the function of the organs directed
to their (respective) objects. "Nature" (svarāpa) is ordinary
manifesting power. "Egoism" (asmītā) is consciousness. "Con-
comitance" (anwayatva) and "fruition" (arthavatva) as explained
above (A. xlv, p. 157). By performing Saṅyama with re-
ference to these five conditions of these organs the Yogī becomes
the conqueror of his organs.

[The five conditions of these organs include 1st, their nature,
i. e., their power of making objects manifest; 2nd, their
function when in active operation; 3rd, their consciousness of
being active; 4th, their concomitance or relation to each other or
mutual interdependence; and 5th, their fruition or the result
they produce. If all these conditions be brought under control
by performing Saṅyama with reference to them, the organs
necessarily come under complete control.]

The fruit thereof.
XLVIII.

Therefrom proceed quickness as of mind, uninstrumental perception, and the conquest of nature.

"Quickness as of mind" (manojāvitva) is the attainment by the body of extreme quickness of motion like that of the mind. "Uninstrumental perception" (vikaraṇa bhāva) is the accomplishment of the functions of the organs without the aid of the body. "Conquest of nature" (pradhānajaya) is bringing everything under subjection. These perfections are attained by those who have overcome their organs. In this science these are called honey-drops (madhupratītha). Even as every drop of honey has its taste, so each of these is tasteful, and therefore they are honey-drops.

[The advantage of having control over the organs as described in the last preceding aphorism is, that the Yogi is then able to perceive things without the aid of his material organs, and to do so with the quickness of the mind, i.e., instantaneously. He also acquires mastery over nature in every way. The nature here referred to is the Pradhāna of the Sāṁkhya categories, the highest of the twenty-five, next only to soul.]

Having described the conquest of the (external) organs, he now points out the conquest of the internal organ.

XLIX.

Supremacy over all conditions and omniscience, the moment the distinctive knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul (is attained).

The knowledge of the distinction between the quality of goodness and the soul which results from performing Saṅyama with reference to the modification of pure goodness, is "distinctive knowledge" (anyatākhyāti). From the subsidence, through the influence of the Saṅyama, of the conception about the qualities being agents the Yogīs, who are in that condition, attain in their meditation supremacy over all conditions and omniscience.
CHAPTER THIRD.

"Supremacy over all conditions" (sarvabharadvashishthastrata) is the attainment of power like a master over all modifications of qualities. "Omniscience" (sarvarjnasrotavva) is correct knowledge of those qualities as they exist in calm, (sauta,) enlivened, (udita,) and latent (anyapadisa) conditions. In this science this perfection is called "sorrowless perfection" visokasiddhi, while those that have been described before are indicated by the term vastikara (control).

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the effect of getting control over the mind or the internal organ. That control enables the Yogi to perceive the difference between the quality of goodness and the soul, and endows him with absolute mastery over all conditions of existence and thorough omniscience. The omniscience directly refers to the conditions of the three qualities, but indirectly to all and everything in the universe. Everything in the universe depends upon the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, and those qualities are either in a calm state, or in a state of excitement, or latent; and if one comes to know their conditions he necessarily knows all and everything that proceeds from them. This state of supreme knowledge is called Visoka or sorrowless perfection, for when it is attained there cannot possibly be any cause for pain or sorrow; whereas in the perfections previously described there is always some room for sorrow, or longing of some kind or other. The latter ensure control over the things they refer to, and the control is more or less perfect according to circumstances, and they are fitly called Vastikara or 'control.' They do not, however, secure absolute immunity from pain, and this necessitates the marked distinction in the designations.]

Next he describes another stage.

L.

From indifference even to this (perfection) through destruction of the seed of evils, (results) isolation.
When the Yogi becomes indifferent even to that sorrowless perfection, then ignorance, the seed of the evils such as passion, &c., being destroyed by the root, "isolation," (kāvalya,) absolute cessation of pain, results, i.e., on the termination of the influence of the qualities the soul is restored, placed permanently, in its own state.

[Nor is the sorrowless perfection the ultimatum. When the Sañyama is exercised freely it produces an indifference in the mind in regard to it, and this indifference destroys ignorance, the root of all evil, and leads to isolation, or the detachment of soul from the bondage of worldly ties.]

He now points out the means of remaining in this meditation.

LI.

Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evils recurring.

There are four classes of Yogis; viz., 1st, those practisers of the Yoga on whom the light is just shedding; 2nd, Ritambharas, or those who possess the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3rd, those who have conquered the elements and the organs; 4th, those who have exceeded all objects of contemplation. Thereof, to those who have attained the fourth meditation, when the seven surrounding stages of knowledge have been attained, and the final stage of 'honeyed knowledge' has been interviewed, the celestial (sthānīnaḥ) gods become tempters, i.e., they offer presents of handsome women, elixir vitae, &c. With such temptations no association should be made, nor any encouragement be given to them. From association there is a fall into the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. With regard to them therefore both association and encouragement should be renounced.

[When the Yogi attains the last described sorrowless stage, he is exposed to a great danger. The gods envy his high excellence, but, unable to exercise open enmity, they try to divert him from
his purpose by insidious means. They place temptations in his way, offer him handsome women, inexhaustible wealth, long life, and so forth to bring him back to the ways of the world, and thereby frustrate his purpose of attaining isolation. They act the part of Satan in the Bible and of Mára in the Buddhist system. In Hindu legends Indra is the chief god who envies men who are about to rise superior to carnal weakness, and the means he employs are the courtesans of his court, who descend on earth and tempt all Yogis by their celestial charms. According to the Tantras when such temptations fail, resort is made to fear. Frightful forms of all kinds assail the Yogi when he is engaged in his meditations; venomous serpents hiss around him; tigers prowl about him; ogres come with wide open mouth to devour him. These are, in the technical language of the Yoga system, called Vibhīshikā. The lukewarm yield to these, break their meditation, and are lost; the determined take no note of them, and attain their object. It is believed that these frightful forms never do any actual mischief; their object is to frighten, to put to test the determination and firmness of the Yogi, and not to do any positive harm. The advice given in the Tantras is not to give any encouragement to such temptations, nor to be depressed or frightened by the dangers which become manifest. Firmness suffices to overcome them. The text here does not refer to frightening.]

In connexion with the manifestation of this fruitful understanding, he describes a means besides the Sañyamas above described.

LII.

From Sañyama with reference to the course of moments (proceeds) an understanding born of discriminative knowledge.

"Moment" (kṣaṇa) is the smallest division of time, which can no further be reduced in quantity. "Course" (krama) the suc-
cessive modifications of such moments of time. By performing Sañyama with reference to the course of moments, the aforesaid understanding of discriminative knowledge results. The meaning is this: This is a moment of time, it is subsequent to another, therefore the first is antecedent to this. For him who has performed Sañyama with reference to this course, interview with the minutest is effected in the course of a moment, and so is the interview effected of the subtile nature. This is manifestation of discriminative knowledge.

[The next step of the Yogi is to perform Sañyama with reference to the progress of time, and when this is accomplished, discriminative knowledge becomes thoroughly manifest.]

He now applies this Sañyama to a special subject.

LIII.

Therefrom results the knowledge of the difference between two similars when that difference is not marked out by kind, character and habitat.

"Kind, character, and habitat" (játi, lakshanā, des'a) are the means of differentiation of things. Sometimes "kind" (játi) is the cause of distinction; as this is a cow, this is a buffalo. When the kind is the same, "character" (lakshanā) may be the cause of distinction; as this is spotted, this is tawny. Where kind and character are alike, the cause of distinction may be "habitat," (des'a); thus with two emblic fruits of the same size and colour, one may be of one country and the other of another. There are again cases in which distinction cannot be determined, as particles of white earth of one country. When Sañyama is performed to ascertain distinctions in the last class of cases, a knowledge of distinction is produced, and by its exercise distinctions of even the exceedingly subtile categories may be perceived. What is said is this: When distinctions cannot be ascertained by any other means they, including a knowledge of such
distinctions in the subtle categories, may be known through this Sañyama.

[This aphorism explains what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Under ordinary circumstances discrimination is made by attention to kind, character and habitat. But this is not possible in the case of the subtle categories which are not amenable to such tests. For them Sañyama is the only means, and it should be brought to bear upon them. When the Sañyama is accomplished, the power of discriminating them is fully acquired, and this is discriminative knowledge.]

To explain the name, object, and nature of the aforesaid knowledge resulting from discrimination, he says.

LIV.

The knowledge resulting from discrimination is emancipating, omni-objective, semper-objective, instantaneous.

The knowledge which results from the power of the aforesaid Sañyama at the last stage is “emancipating” (Tāraka). That whereby Yogis are ferried over the unfathomable ocean of the world has the significant name of Tāraka, (the emancipating). He describes its object; it is a “omni-objective” (sarva-vishaya); all categories from the Mahat downward are its objects, and therefore it is omni-objective. Its characteristic is its semper-objectivity (sarvathāvishayatva). That which has for its objects the categories in all conditions, whether gross or subtle, in all their modifications, and existing in all forms, is always semper-objective. Another characteristic of it is “instantaneousness” (akrama). Being finally modified it has to make no progress in accepting two, three or one form, hence “instantaneous,” i.e., (a Yogi in this stage) perceives everything at once, like an embibe fruit in the palm of one’s hand.

[The discriminative knowledge aforesaid is here more fully explained. It grasps all the categories and therefore the whole
universe. It makes them its object at all times, and its knowledge is never absent. It acts instantaneously, because it has the whole thing before it, and needs no process of observation and reticulation to come to an understanding. And everything being known by it, it effects emancipation, for emancipation means true knowledge.]

He now says what results from this emancipating knowledge proceeding from discrimination.

LV.

On the purification of the quality of goodness and of soul becoming equal, (there results) isolation.

"The quality of goodness and soul" have already been defined. When their purification becomes equal there is isolation. The "purification" (suddhi) of the quality of goodness of the thinking principle is effected when, on the cessation of the assumption of agency, it merges into its first cause. The purification of soul is the absence of its factitious enjoyment. When the two are equally purified (in this way), isolation is effected with regard to the soul, i.e. it is emancipated.

[The thinking principle ordinarily fancies itself to be the agent of all work, i.e., it is conscious of being the actor in all cases, and this is its natural function; but when this feeling is removed by discriminative knowledge, it reverts to its primary original condition, and ceases to cherish any idea of its being the actor, and this is its purification. Similarly soul, though itself devoid of action, is always engaged in an unnatural factitious enjoyment of the fruits of work by its association with the thinking principle, and when that association is removed it is purified. And this double purification, the cessation of the thinking principle from fancying itself the actor and consequent submersion into its original cause, and the removal of the association between the soul and the thinking principle, effects the isolation or separation of the soul from all attachments, and this is emancipation from the bondage of the world.]
Thus have been described in this chapter the three principal components of the Yoga, (i—III); their collective name Sañyama, (iv); the merits of that Sañyama, (v—x); the three modifications of things, the antecedent, the middle, the post-ecedent conditions, (xi—xvi); the Siddhis (xvii); the external perfections giving knowledge of regions (xviii—xxviii); the internal perfections, giving knowledge of the organization of the body (xxix—xli); the organs (xli); the stages of control of matter and organizations (xli—xlvi); the means of attaining discriminative knowledge, the emancipating knowledge, the highest Samadhi (xlvi—l); the subsidence of the thinking principle in its primary cause and isolation (l—liv). These are the subjects described in this chapter on perfections. (Condensed as before.)

This is the end of the third quarter, or the quarter on perfections, of the commentary, entitled Rājamārtanda, on Patanjali’s Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

I adore that solitary, unborn Isána who is made up solely of thinking principle and bliss, and by whose fiat isolation is produced without (the aid of) any special means.

Now the author commences the chapter on Isolation with a view to establish by inferential arguments and by refutation of errors resulting from mistaken convictions, the true nature of Isolation. And by showing that the perfections aforesaid result from birth and various other causes, he demonstrates that they appear with the help of the power resulting from the practice of Samádhi in former births and from causes in this life from the time of birth. Further, with a view to afford assurance that no harm is done to Samádhi which may be achieved in course of many births, and to prove the preeminence of the completion of Samádhi as also for the consummation of the isolating Yoga, he says:—

I.

The Perfections are produced by birth, herb, incantations, austerity, or Samádhi.

Some perfections are caused by birth, as the power of flying in the air and the like in birds, or the perfected qualities of knowledge manifesting themselves immediately after birth, as in the great sage Kapila and others. Perfections from herbs—as firmness of the boy, &c. produced by the use of elixirs in Pátála and such like places. Perfections from incantations—as ascent in the air by the repetition of particular mantras. Perfections from austerity—as in the case of Visvámitra and others. Perfections from Samádhi—as already described in the preceding chapter.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

These perfections result in those persons who have destroyed pain in previous births; hence, as in the case of perfection by Samádhi, so in the case of others, the real cause is the practice of Samádhi in former births; incantations, &c. are merely instruments.

[The word Siddhi comes from the root sikh ‘to accomplish,’ and means something accomplished. Transcendental powers attainable by the performance of Sañyama, are perfections accomplished by special means and therefore called Siddhis or perfections; and having used that English equivalent elsewhere I have thought fit, for the sake of uniformity, to use it in the above aphorism. It is, however, not fully expressive here. Special powers, or faculties would have been much more expressive and to the point, the purport of the aphorism being that some faculties are derived from birth, some from herbs, some from incantations, some from the practice of austerities, and some from Samádhi. This general principle is laid down with a view to prepare the way to what follows.]

It might be contended that since in Nandíśvara and others the change of kind, &c., were effected in this life, how can you then establish the causality of the practice of Samádhi in previous lives? In reply to this, he says:

II.

Change of kind (results) from transmutation of the material cause.

The “change of kind,” &c., in Nandíśvara and others in this life (were produced) by “the transmutation of material causes” (prakṛitydpúrát). Future materials (or materials which are ordinarily produced in a subsequent life, come up and), produce in this life the transmutations, i. e., they change themselves into other kinds.

[The general principle having been laid down in the first aphorism that special faculties are produced by five causes, the question arises, how does the body, which is produced by birth, change even in this life, the material cause remaining unaltered,
and the Samádhi performed in a previous life no having effected any change at birth? The reply is that Samádhi is not the material but an instrumental cause, and it prepares the way for the selfmutation of the material cause.

Prakṛti is here used in the sense of material cause, or the materials of which the body is made up. Āpūraṇa is to fill up. The two words together mean "the materials fill up," i.e., they undergo the necessary transmutations to change one kind into another. The purport is that even in this life the materials of the body may so change as to convert a Brāhmaṇa's body into a divine one, as in the case of Nandīśvara, or a Kshatriya body into a Brāhmaṇa one, as in the case of Visvámitra, and consequently the exception taken to the argument put forth in the first aphorism to the effect that "birth, &c. are causes of perfection" is not tenable. By the use of the word pāśchātya, 'future', the commentator means that the changes which in ordinary course would take place in a future life, take place in exceptional cases in this life.

It may be argued that merits, demerits, &c., are in such cases seen to be resulting (in this life when their fruits would not under the theory be liable to manifestation), how can we then attribute to them causality in the transmutation of the material cause in this life? To this the author says:

III.

In the mutation of the material cause merit is non-efficient: from it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.

"Merit" (nimitta), virtue, &c. In the transformation of the material cause merit is non-efficient, for a cause cannot be set in motion by an effect. Where then is there the operation of virtue, &c.? To this he says: "From it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman." "From it," from the performance of virtuous acts, &c., proceeds "the piercing" (bheda) or destruction of whatever "covering" (varana) obstruc-
tion, such as vice, &c., exists, the two being mutually antagonistic, and the obstruction being destroyed, the material causes themselves become effective in their desiderated work. This he illustrates by an example. "As in the case of a husbandman." Even as a husbandman or farmer, wishing to carry water from one field to another, pierces only the obstacle to the flow of water, and that being pierced, water itself assumes the modification of expansion, without any exertion on the part of the husbandman to the expansion of water, so should be understood to be the case with regard to virtue, &c.

[Following the line of argument adopted in the preceding aphorism, the author shows that virtue, &c., are not the immediate causes of the change which takes place when a Brāhmaṇ becomes a god, as in the case of Nandīśvāra, but that they serve the subsidiary purpose of removing the obstacles which stand in the way of the change, and the change takes place by itself. The illustration given puts this very clearly. The husbandman does not make the water flow, he only removes the obstacles, and then the water flows by itself from its own inherent tendency to follow the law of gravitation.]

When a Yogi, who has a mastery over the cardinal principles, with a view to enjoy at once the fruits of his actions, from the perception of his own superior transcendental powers, wishes to assume many bodies at the same time, whence does he derive many thinking principles (to vitalize those bodies)? In reply to this question the author, says:

IV.

The created thinking principles (proceed) solely from egoism.

The thinking principles which animate the bodies created by a Yogi, proceed through his will solely from their original cause, i.e., from egoism. They emanate at once as sparks from a fire.

[Among the perfections mentioned in chapter III the power of multiplying one's own body, so as to produce many where there is one, is not mentioned, but here it is taken for granted that
an accomplished Yogi possesses this power, and that he does produce them to effect quickly his emancipation by simultaneously performing in many bodies those works which promote his end, and the question is raised as to how does a Yogi, who creates many bodies and himself animates them all, provide a thinking principle for each of them? The answer given is that through his will he makes his egoism send forth the needful, even as a fire sends forth sparks from itself. This multiplication of bodies is called Kayaruyba Yoga or the Yoga of many bodies.]

Then, how do numerous thinking principles, having diversity of objects, produce one effect? To this, he replies:

V.

In the diverse tendency of the many the impelling thinking principle is one.

"In the diverse tendency" (pravritihed) or multifunctionality of the many thinking principles the one thinking principle of the Yogi is the impelling force or actuator, because it is the ruler, and therefore there is no difference of object. The meaning is—that as in its own body the mind directs the eyes, the hands, &c., according to its will, from its being the ruler, so does it in the other bodies.

[In the preceding aphorism the question having been solved as to how a single individual can provide thinking principles for many bodies, the question arises as to how can many thinking principles act in concert and preserve the unity of the creator? If this unity be not admitted, there would be so many independent individuals, each following the bent of his own mind, and the idea of one individual acting as many without any loss of individuality, would be lost. This doubt is removed by the explanation that the thinking principles provided to the many are in reality one, and entirely controlled by the primary thinking principle, of which they are mere scintillations.]

The thinking principle which belongs to the perfections resulting from birth, &c., are produced by the same five causes,
and yet the thinking principle produced by Samādhi is distinct from the others. To show this he says:

VI.

Thereof the meditation-born one is without any residua.

"The meditation-born" (dhyānaja) thinking principle or that which is produced by Samādhi, is, among the five, the one which is "without any residua" (anāśaya), i.e., without any residua of (former) work. This is the meaning.

[Thinking principles are said to be of five kinds, because they proceed severally from birth, herbs, incantation, penances, and meditation (A. r). The word used (jā), means "born," but the object is not to imply that the thinking principles are actually born of herbs, incantations, &c., but to indicate the training, habit of thought, disposition or impurities which it acquires under the five different circumstances. The first four are said to depend on the residua of former works, and the last to have nothing to rest upon, it being self-supporting, i.e., not resulting from the residua of any former work.]

To show that the thinking principle of the Yogi is distinct in its work, even as it is distinct from other thinking principles in being devoid of pain, &c., he says:

VII.

The work of a Yogi is neither white nor black: those of others are of three kinds.

That work which produces good fruit, such as sacrifices, &c., is "white" (śukla). That which produces a bad result, such as Brāhmaνicide, is "black" (kṛṣṇa). That which is mixed up of the two, is white-black (śukla-kṛṣṇa). Thereof, the white work belongs to wise people, to those who are engaged in charity, asceticism, the study of the Vedas, &c.; the black belongs to the vicious; and the white-black (or mixed kind) to ordinary men. As regards Yogīs, who have performed the Sañyama, work is of a
different character to these: their work produces no fruit, for they undertake it after renouncing all desire for fruition.

[In the first three kinds of work fruition is inseparable. The wise give alms, perform penances, read the Vedas, display their benevolence, &c. &c. and derive the fruits thereof; the vicious commit wicked actions and suffer for the same; ordinary mortals are sometimes engaged in good actions and sometimes in bad ones, and suffer or enjoy accordingly. The Yogis, who renounce the fruits of all actions, can neither suffer nor enjoy from what they do, and hence their work is declared to be distinct from the works of others. They are, in the language of the Bhagavadgítá, like the lotus-leaf which, lying on water or having water on it, is never wetted.]

Now he describes the fruit of such works.

VIII.

Thence proceeds the manifestation of the residua which are suitable to its fruition.

Now, the residua of works produce two sorts of fruits, one sort being memory only, and the other, kind, age, and experience. Thereof, those residua which have for their fruition kind, age, and experience which are derivable in one or many births, have already been described above (p. 69). Of those the only fruit of which is memory, the manifestation proceeds from the same works. Even as work produces a body, whether as a Deva, or a human being, or a lower animal, so does it by its maturity lead to a corresponding manifestation of residua (तासनी). The meaning is this. Should a celestial or other body once acquired by a certain work be acquired even after the interposition of a hundred other births the memorial residua of the former state will manifest themselves again. Their memory revives according to circumstances, even when residing in other regions. In the intermediate states, though existing, they remain in a latent condition. Nor do the residua produced in course of existence in hell and other places become evident then.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

[For the sake of verbal fidelity I have used memory as the equivalent of the Sanskrit term Smṛiti of the commentary; but the object aimed at is not memory in its ordinary signification, but the remembrance in one life of appetites, desires, and affections of a preceding one. These results manifest themselves in, what in European philosophy is called, instinct. They are remembrances, because they arise without any conscious purpose, though they are not without consciousness. European philosophers, who do not recognise transmigration, finding Instinct to be opposed to Reason, take it to be something distinct from it—a distinct faculty. In its widest signification it extends to living beings in general—to plants as well as to animals,—but for psychological purposes it is limited by Dugald Stewart to Appetites, Desires, and Affections. Butler changes Desires into Passions, but without any material change of purport. Dr. Bain says "Instinct is untaught ability," (Mental and Moral Science, Bk. III, c. IV), and this is amplified by Hamilton into "an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge." (Reid’s Works, p. 761a.) Paley has "a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction." Milton calls it "Reason discursive or intuitive." These definitions have been summed up into "untaught ability," "untaught propensity," "unconscious purpose." It is opposed to Habit, which is the result of tuition and exercise, and distinct from Reason, which presupposes argumentation and deliberation. The memory of our text is Instinct as defined above; but our author does not recognise spontaneity in anything, nor purpose independent of Reason. He attributes the eteology of Instinct to residua left in the thinking principle by rational action, and the said residua lie dormant till they are made vivid in a subsequent life. Habits leave their residua exactly in the same way as other actions, and they not only become manifest in the next life, but also in the progeny, as in the cases of pointers and other animals. In short, according to our author, Reason is one and the sole faculty of all knowing, the only principle of certain]
ty, and it manifests itself as Reason or Instinct differently under different circumstance. Anyhow, the meaning of our author will be best understood by replacing his Memory by Instinct.

The aphorism under notice explains the fruit of work as manifested by Instinct. Having already described that work leads to two kinds of fruit, Instinct and deserts, or in his language memory and kind, age and experience, he now says that Instinct does not manifest itself uniformly at every successive birth, but according to circumstances when it is needed in subsequent lives, even after many interruptions, the residua for it remaining dormant during such interruption. Thus, a man born in the next life as a dog having no occasion for his human instincts, acts as a dog; but twenty or more generations after, when he is again born as a man, his early instincts revive, and he acts according to them. This is the theory which the aphorism explains by saying that residua manifest themselves in conformity to the fruition of work. When a work entails existence as a serpent, those residua become manifest which are appropriate to such an existence, but not those which are appropriate for other forms of life. In other words, residua remain dormant or in a potential state until the necessary excitants are in operation. The S. P. Bhāṣṭya, explains this by saying, "when a celestial work is in fruition, it does not become the cause of manifestation of the residua of infernal, brutal or human states; it then enlivens only those residua which are conformable to a celestial existence."

(Na hi daivam karma vipachyamānam nāraka-tīryaṁ-manushya-vāsanā-bhīvyakti-nimittam bhavati kintu daivānugunā evāsyavāsanā vyajante). The purport is that each kind of existence brings to light its own appropriate residua.)

Doubt having been produced of there existing any causal relation in these residua, he establishes it by saying:

IX.

From the uniformity of memory and residua there is uninterruptibility of relation, even after breaks by caste, locality and time.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

Of worldly beings transmigrating in diverse forms, when one, after experiencing one form, attains that form again after an interruption of a thousand other births, the residua of impressions appropriate to that state, which had been formed at the first birth and had become latent from want of the necessary conditions, become manifest on the attainment of that suitable state. Thus, there is, notwithstanding breaks caused by caste, locality and time, an "uninterruptibility" (ánantaryā) or continuity in producing their own necessary fruit of memory. How so? "From the uniformity of memory and residua." Thus, on the performance of a work there is produced a deposit of residuum on the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, and that is the germ of the fruits of heaven, hell, &c.; or it is the residua of works such as sacrifices &c. It exists as a latent power, or as a power of the actor in relation to experience and experiencer. From these residua proceeds memory, from memory the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and from that experience again come residua, memory, &c. It is true that where memory and residua are different there is, from want of uninterruptibility, a difficulty in producing a relation of cause and effect; but in our case here, where impressions become residua, and residua merge into memory, and they reside in concord in one thinking principle, the relation of cause and effect is not difficult or hard of effectuation.

[According to the preceding aphorism the residua of former births are the causes of manifestation of certain effects; but, since concomitancy is necessary between cause and effect while the intervention of many dissimilar births between two similars causes an interruption, it may be argued that residua are not the causes of memory, as alleged. This objection is met by saying that the memory remains, and therefore sequence is obviously not broken. The memory of sucking the teats on the part of an infant returns after many births, whenever that infant is again born as a human being, though it does not manifest itself when the same infant is born as a bird or a serpent, and it shows
that the memory is not lost. Hence the relation of cause and
effect is not broken.]

Admitting the uninterruptibility of residua, and their rela-
tion as cause and effect, it may be asked when an impression first
takes place is it caused by residua, or without a cause? To
solve this doubt, he says:

X.

There is no beginning about them, because of the
eternity of desire.

"About them," *i.e.*, about or in regard to residua. "No
beginning" (*anādītva*), that which has no commencement. The
meaning is, these have no beginning. How? "Because of the
eternity of desire." This "desire" (*āsītha*) or longing of an in-
tensely delusive character—(manifesting itself in such wishes as)
'may the means of effecting my pleasure be always mine;
may there never be a separation between me and them'—is the
cause of residua, and that being eternal there is no beginning.
This is the meaning. What is meant is this: From the
proximity of the cause the tendency of the functions of impres-
sions and residua cannot be checked, and the thinking principle,
from its expansible and contractile character, pierced by the
impressions, residua and the like, modifies itself when it attains
each appropriate existence.

[The theory of Instincts being the result of action in former
lives is open to the grave objection that it does not account for
Instinct in the first instance. A being born for the first time
should have, according to the theory, no Instinct. The initial
impression must therefore be causeless, and so there is no reason
to admit that residua are the causes of effect, *i.e.*, of birth, age
and experience. This objection is met in this aphorism by saying
that Desire is eternal, and therefore there is no necessity for a
beginning. Desire is essential to existence; there would be no
existence if there was no Desire; and that Desire produces
residua, and so there is no break in the course of eternity. The
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opponent wished to expose the fallacy of the argument regarding residua being the cause of Intuition by showing that there could be no residua at the first start, and the author accepts a regressus in infinitum to surmount the difficulty. According to him the universe had no beginning and will never end, and therefore there is no occasion to seek a beginning.]

From their infinity it being doubtful that the residua can ever be destroyed, he points out the means of destroying them.

XI.

Since they are agglomerated by cause, effect, substratum and support, their absence would produce the absence of the others.

Conception (anubhava) is the cause of residua; desire, &c., are the causes of conceptions; and of them the cause is ignorance. Thus is (ignorance) both the immediate and the mediate “cause” (hetu). “Effect” (phala) is body, memory, &c. “Substratum” (āśraya) is the intellectual principle. “Support” (ālambana or object of desire) is the same for both conceptions and residua. Now, since these infinite residua are collected by these cause, effect, substratum and support, when they are absent, i.e., when they may be likened to roasted seeds, on their being burnt by knowledge and Yoga, there being no root left, the residua cannot sprout, nor lead to action, and thus they are destroyed.

[Now the question is raised, how can one undo that which is eternal? and the answer given is—since desires proceed from, or are the sum total of, cause, effect, substratum and support, one has to remove those conditions which produce desires, and that removal ipso facto removes desires. The removal is effected by the aid of Yoga. Yoga knowledge parches cause, effect, substratum, and support by exposing their real nature, and when so parched, they become, like roasted seeds, unfit for germination, and their destruction follows as a matter of course. Of course this is limited to the individual who effects the parching, and does not extend to the world at large.]
It may be questioned, that since the thinking principle is being constantly destroyed, and there is a difference in their relation as cause and effect from their want of simultaneity between residue and their effects, how can there be a unity? To prove the unity, he says:

XII.

(The thinking principle) exists in its proper nature; the past and the future (result) from differences in the condition of qualities.

The (possibility of) production of things which are absolutely non-existent is unreasonable, from their want of relation to existence. Nowhere has there been any relation to existence in the horns of a bare.

In the case of a nonentity as an effect, with what design can causes proceed to act? None enters into action for a false object, and it being opposed to entity there is no relation of nonentity to it. When truth attains its own identity, how can it become baseless and untrue? The meaning is, it cannot accept an antagonistic form. Hence from there being no possibility of the destruction of existence, and from the impossibility of the origin of non-existence, the qualified, convertible by qualities, always remains in one form. The qualities, alone, change into their threefold conditions. Attaining each condition, the qualified forsakes its original form, and, remaining in the present condition, attains the state of objects of enjoyment. Hence in this science are established the distinctions of the past and future conditions of qualities, and of their relation to each other as cause and effect. Hence, too, the same thinking principle is made to exist as the qualified until isolation, and none can prevent it.

[The removal suggested in the preceding aphorism suggests the idea of destruction; but that is not possible. Nothing can proceed from non-existence, and no existence can be absolute non-existence, and the difficulty is solved by referring to the
doctrin explained in A. 14 C. III which recognizes a threefold condition of existence, the antecedent, the postcedent, and the present. Matter is eternal, and remains always an existence; but its conditions vary; accordingly when the present condition of a thing is destroyed, the thing reverts to one or other of its two other conditions, and the parching of the seeds implies their resolution into the antecedent condition. This is the theory of Moderate Nominalism or Conceptualism with its threefold condition of *Universalia ante rem*, as thoughts in the mind of God; *Universalia in re*, as the essence (quiddity) of things; and *Universalia post rem*, as concepts. The text looks to thoughts or ideas or plastic types without reference to God.

He now describes of what forms these qualified and the qualities are.

XIII.

They are individualised or subtile, and consist of qualities.

The qualities and the qualified described above are divided into the individualised and the subtile. The "qualities" (*gundh*) are of the forms of goodness, foulness, and darkness. "To consist of" (*tadántmánah*) is to be of that nature, or to be modified to that form: this is the meaning. Since there is seen a concomitance in all persons, both externally and internally, through goodness, foulness, and darkness in the forms of pleasure, pain and delusion, of individuals and conceptions, and since it is found that which is concomitant is also its modified form, as in the case of jars which are concomitants of earth are also modified forms of earth, therefore the modification of qualities is evident.

[The simple proposition in this aphorism is that all attributes are mere modifications of the three primary qualities. Circumstances may make them subtile or gross, but, whether one or the other, they consist of nothing but the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness modified in some one form or another. They are mere modes of being, but not radically different beings.]
Apprehending the doubt that if all these three qualities be the chief causes everywhere, how can we talk of one qualified (or one substratum of quality)? he says:

XIV.

From unity of modification (results) unity of a thing.

Although there are three qualities, yet their modification into the member and the membered, (in some cases goodness becoming the membered, in some cases foulness, and in others darkness,) being one, "unity" (tattva) or oneness is admitted. Thus, in the examples this is the earth, this is the air, &c., (in which unity is observed, for earth is a modification of darkness, and air of foulness.)

[The purport is that as only one modification can take place of the thinking principle at a time, the unity of a thing is never disturbed. The thinking principle under similar circumstances changes exactly in the same way, and no difference can possibly result. In other words, as the three qualities can be only separately ascendant, one at a time, the simultaneous perception of the effects of all the three cannot be effected; and this meets the objection raised in the preamble.]

Had objects existed distinct from cognition it would be proper to talk of the unity or multiplicity of objects, but when cognition itself from the influence of residua existing in the relation of cause and effect, appears in different shapes, how can you say so? In reply to this question, he says:

XV.

Even in the sameness of object, the course of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking principle.

"Of the two," of the cognition and the cognizable, the course is distinct, follow different or separate roads. How so? From diversity of thinking principles even in the sameness of object.
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Even in similar things, as the attainment of women and the like, differences of thinking are noticeable in different observers from the resulting sensations of pleasure, pain and delusion. Thus, on beholding a beautiful and attractive woman, pleasure is felt by an amorous person, enmity by her rival, and disgust by an ascetic. And since these different kinds of feeling arise from one object there can be no agency in the thing itself. If it be said that object is the effect of our thinking principle only, the object would appear in one form only. Also, if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle then there would be no other thing extant when that thinking principle would be occupied with one thing. (If it be said) be it so, we deny it. For how could that thing then be beheld by many others? And since it is so beheld, it cannot be an effect of the thinking principle. If it be said that it is created by many at the same time, the reply would be that there would be a difference between a work produced by many, and a work produced by one. And if the difference be not admitted, then there being difference of cause without a difference of effect, the universe would be either causeless, or uniform. What is said is this: should there be no difference of effect when the causes are different, then the whole universe resulting from many causes would either be of one form, or not following the different causes, be causeless from its independence (of the causes). And if it is so (it may be asked) why does it not, being made of the three qualities, produce in the same percipient the sensations (simultaneously) of pleasure, pain and delusion? The case is not so. Even as the object consists of three qualities, so is the thinking principle made up of three qualities, and in its perception of objects, merits and demerits are accessory causes, and from their prevalence or depression results the manifestation of the thinking principle in such and such (varying) forms. Thus in the presence of a woman near an amorous person, his thinking principle, disposed towards merit through the influence of the quality of goodness, becomes full of pleasure. From the co-operation of the quality of foulness, which is auxiliary to vice,
for all rival wives, it becomes painful. Similarly from the co-operation of the quality of darkness, which is attended by ardent vice, it becomes to angry rival wives the cause of delusion. Hence the cognizable object is independent of cognition, and consequently cognizable and cognition, being contradictory in their natures, cannot bear the relation of cause and effect. Thus it being possible without any difference in the cause for the existence of a difference in effect from their relation, the independence of cognition from the object is established.

[The question discussed in the preceding aphorism raises a doubt as to whether perception is due to objects or to the cognitive power. It cannot be said that objects produce perception, for in that case a given object would always and everywhere produce the same sensation, as a given cause cannot produce dissimilar effects. A handsome woman should be a handsome woman to all beholders, without a distinction. In the world this is, however, not the case. A woman produces very dissimilar feelings in different beholders, and she, as the object, cannot therefore be said to be the cause of perception. On the other hand, the thinking principle cannot be the cause, for if you accept it to be one in all persons, it, as a cause, cannot produce different effects; and if you accept it to be different in different individuals, dissimilar causes would lead to one uniform result, which is impossible. The solution offered is that thinking principle and object are different, but inasmuch as both are governed by the three qualities, the prevalence of a particular quality at a particular time in the thinking principle produces a difference in the perception of an object. The “diversity of the thinking principle” in the text implies a diversity in its condition as regards the state of the qualities working within it. The argument here is the same which European philosophers discuss with reference to sensations and sensibles; and the optional use of jñāna and vijñāna by our author shows that he means cognition or sensation and perception, and not the higher knowledge elsewhere indicated by the
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word ज्ञान. I have used for it cognition after Mr. Jardine, who defines it as "a general name which we may apply to all those mental states in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object." ('The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition,' p. 1). The object to which this ज्ञान or cognition is applied is ज्ञेय or cognizable, which is just the same with idea as used by Locke, who says, "it is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phenomena, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Idea, however, has been used in so many varying senses by European metaphysicians that I have thought it safe to confine myself to cognizable or object, as least likely to cause misconceptions. The theory of eternity of matter is here made the basis of the argument.

Since a cognition, being an illuminator, is by nature perceptive, and the object, being susceptible of illumination, is by nature perceivable, why should cognition not perceive and recollect all things simultaneously? With a view to remove such doubt, he says:

XVI.

A thing is known or unknown from its dependence on its change of form in the thinking principle.

"Its" of the object. "From its change of form" (uparāgat). From its producing forms in the thinking principle, an external object becomes known or unknown. The meaning is this: in the attainment of their production all things depend on the conjunction of their causes. The production of the cognition of a blue or other colour depends on the accessory cause of the form being brought forward as an object through the passage of the organs of sensation; perception being impossible without the object, since there is no correlation. Hence, by whatever object is the form of cognition modified, that object is brought

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into cognition, i.e., that object becomes known. That which does not give its shape (to the thinking principle) is held to be unknown. Similarly, recollection is produced of that object which, having been known before, has left residua in the mind, and which residua, excited by a similar object, acting as the accessory cause, brings it to our knowledge. Hence, neither cognition, nor memory is constant everywhere, nor is there any inconsistency.

[The argument mooted in the last aphorism is further developed by saying that the effect of the qualities is transmitted to the thinking principle through the object seen, and the thinking principle is thereby modified differently under different circumstances. The qualities act from two different directions, first in the thinking principle apart from the object, and next in the object, and through it in the thinking principle. A man in a passion has the quality of foulness prevalent in him, and then that foulness affects everything he sees, though it is not foul; and when all the qualities are calm in him, he sees a foul action, and the foulness of that action enters within him and tinges his thinking principle from without.]

To remove the doubt that since the perceiving soul does not perceive a yellow colour when it perceives a blue, there is liability of its assuming, like the thinking principle, different shapes, or being modified from its being at times the perceiver, he says:

XVII.

The functions of the thinking principle are always known, for its presiding soul is unmodifiable.

All the functions of the thinking principle—characterised as they are by proofs, misconceptions, &c., are "always," i.e., at all times, known to its percipient soul, since it is unmodifiable, or wanting in liability to change from its being of the form of the intellect (chidhrīpa). Were it mutable, the constant perceptibility of those functions would not follow, the mutability
being (necessarily) occasional. The meaning is this. The soul of
the form of intellect always remaining as the presiding principle,
and its intimate associate, the pure element, the thinking principle,
being also always present, by whatever object it (the latter)
is modified in shape there is the probability of that object
being always brought into contact with the shadow of the
former (soul, chit); and such being the case it is established
that there is constant perceptibility, and never can there be
any apprehension of change.

[Having explained the relation of cognition to cognizables,
and the rationale of the process by which things become known or
unknown, the author proceeds to explain how it is that the thinking
principle, which, under the circumstances alleged, is always chang-
ing and assuming new forms, should still be able to know different
objects, or have the power of understanding; The thinking
principle is admitted to be in se unconscious, and is itself under-
going constant modifications, and cannot therefore exercise intelli-
gence, and be itself the cause of knowledge. But, says the author,
its presiding soul is constant and immutable, and associated with
that soul it derives reflected intelligence, and by its aid it is always
able to know whatever external object casts its shadow on it. In
other words, though the thinking principle is itself unconscious,
it derives intelligence from the soul which is pure intelligence
and absolutely immutable. The P. Bhåskya explains the aphorism
by saying, “had the presiding soul been liable, like the thinking
principle, to constant mutation, then objects or the functions
of the thinking principle would have become, like sounds and
other objects, sometimes known and sometimes unknown to it; but
constant consciousness (lit. perceptibility) of the mind is
indicated by the immutability of its presiding soul.” (Yadi
chittavat prabhurapi purushah parinameta tatastadvishayah chitta-
vrîttayah sabdâdîvishayanat jñâtâjñâtâh syuh, sadajñâtavantu
manasastatprabhok purushasyaparinâmîtvamanumâpayati.) This
idea is further developed in other commentaries.]

Now it may be said that since the thinking principle itself,
from excess of the quality of goodness, is the illuminant, it can from its self-illumination, illuminate both itself and the object, and the act of perception can thereby be completed, what is the use of the assumption of a separate percipient? To allay this doubt, he says:

XVIII.

It is not self-illuminative, since it is perceivable.

"It," the thinking principle, is not "self-illuminative" (svābhāsa), expositor of itself, but it is perceivable by the soul. How so? Because it is "perceivable." A perceivable is known by a percipient, as in the case of a water-jar or the like. The thinking principle is an object of perception, and therefore it is not self-illuminative.

[The argument in the next preceding aphorism would suggest the idea that the thinking principle, whether directly or indirectly, was itself the perceiver, and that being the case there is no necessity for assuming a separate perceiver. Where one assumption is sufficient, two are not needed. This objection of the opponent is refuted in the aphorism under notice, by saying that the thinking principle cannot be the percipient, or self-illuminative, because it is itself an object of perception. That which is an object of perception cannot itself be percipient; and the commentator illustrates this by citing the example of a water-jar, which, as an object of perception, cannot know itself. The P. Bhāshya elaborates the argument by saying, "Even as the other organs and their objects, such as audition, &c., cannot be self-illuminative from the circumstance of their being perceivables, the mind should be so known. Nor can fire be an example in this instance; for even fire cannot make its own hidden identity visible. Manifestation is seen to result from the conjunction of a manifestator with a manifestable, and such conjunction cannot take place with one's own identity. Besides if the theory of self-illuminativeness of the thinking principle be admitted, it would not be perceivable to any body else." (Yathetarāṇīndriya-
ni "abidâdayat'ha drîstvatvâna svâbhâsanâ tathâ manopi pratyetvatvam. Na châgniratra drîsh'tântam. Nâhyagnirâmasvarâpama-prakâsam prakâsaya'ti. Prakâsâchâyam prakâsya-prakâsaka sañyoge drîsh'tah, na cha svarâpamâtresti sañyoyah kînchâ svâbhâsam chittamityagrâhyameva kasyachiditi.) The illustration of fire becomes appropriate on the assumption that it owes its luminosity to itself. But the luminosity contemplated by the term svâbhâsa is knowledge, and not light. In fact, the light of the text can be understood only by substituting for it the word knowledge, throughout the discussion."

It may be said that the argument here has accepted the proposition, (i.e., it involves a petilio principii), for the perceptibility of the thinking principle has not yet been established. Besides, in men the functions of accepting that which is good and rejecting that which is injurious are made manifest through the consciousness of one's own intellect; and such feelings as "I am angry," "I am afraid," "I have no desire," cannot be produced without the consciousness of the intellect (and since they are, the agency of the soul is not needed.) To meet this argument, he says:

XIX.

Attention cannot be directed to both at the same time.

The understanding of an object is the establishment of its usefulness by (knowing it to be) this—this is the object which is the cause of pleasure or pain. The understanding of the intellect is the establishment of the use of that object through pleasure or pain in the form of I (or the ego). In the perception of an object two such kinds of understanding cannot be effected at the same time, for there is a contradiction. There is no possibility of effecting two contradictory actions simultaneously, and therefore it is not possible to perceive "both," i.e., cognition and cognizable at the same time. Hence, it is laid down that the thinking principle is not self-illuminative. Further, even if
two such actions could be accomplished, their fruits could not result, for there cannot be an apprehension of the two fruits, because the thinking principle being directed outwards to grasp an object cannot know itself. The result is confined only to the object, and not to itself. This is the meaning.

[The opponent again comes to the charge, and says that the intellect or understanding may supply the place of the soul, for the thinking principle may see, and the intellect may decide about the nature of the sight. The author demurs to this by saying two such functions cannot take place simultaneously, or the thinking principle cannot see and argue at the same time. The sensation of hunger is first felt, and then its nature discussed. The thinking principle must undergo two modifications, once to feel, and then to consider, and these it cannot undergo at once; so these two acts can never take place simultaneously, and consequently it cannot be said that the thinking principle is alone sufficient to account for consciousness and knowledge: a separate cause must be assigned for these two feelings, and that cause is the soul. The P. Bhāṣya pithily disposes of the question by saying, "It is not possible to behold one's own self and another at the same time, for it leads to the theory of the momentarists who hold action, effect and cause to be the same." (Na chaikasmin kshane svapararūpā-vadhāraṇam yuktam, kshanikavādino yad bhavanam saiva kriyā tadeva cha kāraṇamātthiyabhyanagamah.) The meaning of the aphorism is simply that the thinking principle cannot perform the two acts of perception and self-knowing at the same time, and therefore it is obvious that it cannot by itself be the cause of intelligence.]

Let it be admitted that a cognition cannot be self-perceptive, still may it not be perceived by another cognition? Assuming such a question, he says:

XX.

If one cognition be the perceptible of another, there would be an excessiveness of cognitions to
cognitions, and also a confusion of memory.

If one cognition could cognize another, then that cognition being itself unintelligent and unable to illuminate another, we must assume a third cognition and for it another, and so on and a thing could not be perceived in the whole lifetime of a man. Nor can an object be known when the cognition remains unknown.

It leads also to "confusion of memory." On a particular colour or a taste being produced in a cognition there would arise an endless series of cognitions to perceive it, and when the residua left by a former cognition would attempt to recall it to memory there would arise, from there being no break in the ideas of cognitions and objects, cognitions and memories simultaneously, and hence, it being impossible to make out with reference to what object the recollection has arisen, there would be a confusion of memory, i.e., it would not be known that this is the memory of colour and this is the memory of taste.

[The explanation above given leaves the door open to the assumption that one cognition may perceive another, and thus obviate the necessity of assuming the agency of the soul, i.e., each individual may have many cognitions which co-operate with each other in producing knowledge of a particular object. To preclude this theory, the author brings forward the argument of regressus in infinitum. If one cognition could perceive another, we would require a third to perceive the second, and so on, and there would be no end to the chain. It would, he urges, also lead to a confusion of memory, for on one idea being called to memory all its attendant ideas would arise to infinity, and it would be impossible to determine which is the particular idea that has been revived.]

The question may then be asked, if, in the absence of self-perceptive power in cognitions (buddhi), one cognition cannot be known by another, how do we use the idea this is the perception of an object? To remove this doubt, he expounds his conclusion.
XXI.

The intellection of its own cognition takes place when it takes its form through the non-transitional soul.

"Soul" (purusha), being of the form of intelligence, is called chiti (intellect). It is "non-transitional" (apratisaṅkramā), that which has no transition or passing into another place is so called: by this is meant that it does not mix with anything. In the modification of the member and the membered, the (three) qualities, (as members) in passing into the qualified or membered, assume their forms, and in the world atoms, moving on, produce the forms of objects; but the power of intellection (i.e., soul) does not do so, because it always retains its own form, inasmuch as it exists in itself. Hence when the thinking principle, being near it, assumes its shape, intellection takes place; and when the soul, by its contact with the function of the thinking principle being endowed with understanding, cognizes, then the knowing of the thinking principle of its own self takes place.

[The soul never undergoes any modification, but by its reflection on the thinking principle that principle derives its intelligence, and that intelligent state is therefore said to be attained through the non-transitional soul. It is then chiti or intelligence, because for the time being it has intelligence in it, and this is explained by the commentator. When the thinking principle in its intelligent state assumes the form of an object, it is able to know its own notions. The P. Bhāṣya explains the text by saying, "unmodifiable is the power of experiencing; it is also non-transitional. On its reflection falling on the excessively modifiable (the thinking principle) the functions of the latter reflect on it. Thereupon people call it the function of understanding from its imitating the function of the thinking principle enlivened by intelligence, though it is devoid of the function of understanding." (The force of the argument here depends upon the distinction made between intelligence and the function of understanding, for the soul, though intelligence itself, does not exercise any
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function.) (Aparināminī hi bhoktriṇaktirapratisaṅkrāmā cha pariṇāmyaṁyartho pratisaṅkrānteva tadvṛttimanupatati, tasyāt-
cha prāptachaitanyopagrahaṁ karuṇāyā buddhikriyārthatanukāriṁatra-
tayā buddhikriyāvaiśitsīśtā hi jñānavruttirākhyaṁyate).

Paṇḍit Govindadeva Śāstrī, following some later commentators, explains the text so as to mean that the soul itself undergoes the modification. The earlier and more reliable commentators, however, do not accept that meaning, and as the sequel shows them to be right I have accepted their interpretation.

To show that thus the self-perceptive thinking principle, being able to perceive all objects, becomes fit for all purposes, he says:

XXII.

The thinking principle, modified by the knower and the knowable, is (able to perceive) all objects.

"The knower" (drasṭā) is soul. To be modified by it is to seem to be of its form from its propinquitv. To be modified by the knowable, is to undergo the modification of assuming the form of the (object) perceived. When this (double modification) takes place, then it becomes able to perceive all objects. Even as a transparent crystal, or a mirror, or the like is fit to receive the reflection of all images, so the quality of goodness, untrammled by foulness and darkness, is able, from its purity, to receive the reflection of the soul (chit). Not so foulness and darkness, owing to their want of purity. The quality of goodness, divested of all association with foulness and darkness, from its being liable to only one modification, and being able to receive the reflection of the intelligent soul, remains like a steady lamp-flame till the attainment of emancipation (moksha). Even as in the vicinity of a loadstone motion is produced in iron, so in the vicinity of the intelligent soul manifestible intelligence is reflected on the quality of goodness. Accordingly, in this system of philosophy two powers of intelligence are recognized, the eternally present (nityodita) and the manifestible (abhinyanita). The eternally

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present power of intelligence is soul. The manifestible power of intelligence is the quality of goodness, which derives its power by its contiguity to the former. From extreme propinquity, it, as an intimate friend, effectuates the experiencership of the soul. And as that quality is the resting place of Purusha, the supreme soul, the Sāṅkhya, who recognise an actionless Brahma, attribute to it the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion. (The epithets "supreme" and "Brahma" are meaningless here, for the human soul is all that is meant: God as Brahma is not indicated).

Now, though from the extreme abeyance of some one quality and of its prevalence at certain times and in some cases, all the three qualities are constantly modifying in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and the thinking principle is not pure, yet when that principle modifies its form into that pure quality of goodness, which is the essence of work, it attains its perceptibility. The pure primary quality of goodness of the thinking principle, on the one side reflected upon by intelligence or the soul, and on the other covered by the thinking principle modified into the forms of external objects, and becoming conscious from the effect of the reflection of the soul, becomes able to feel pleasure, pain and delusion, though it is devoid of intelligence. Thus the experience, from its extreme propinquity to soul and from want of due discrimination, is said to be of soul, though it is unexperiencing. To this effect has Vindhyavāsī said: "the sufferingness of the quality of goodness is the sufferingness of soul." Elsewhere it is said. "Even as an image produced by the reflection of a reflected image on a mirror is called a reflection, so the manifestation of the shadow of intelligence, like the intelligence of soul, is implied by the word pratisaṅkrānti or contact."

It might be argued that, though the reflection of the ever-modifying may be seen in a transparent body, as a human face in a looking-glass, how can there arise the reflection of the absolutely transparent, all-pervading, unmodifying soul in the comparatively untransparent quality of goodness? To this the reply is—Not knowing the true nature of reflection you
have said this. The display of the manifester power of intelligence in the quality of goodness, by the propinquity of the soul, is called reflection. Even as is that sentient power, abiding in the soul, so does its reflection appear in the quality of goodness.

Again, since it has been said that soul is absolutely pure, how can it be in contact with the (comparatively) untransparent quality of goodness? This argument is not correct, for the contact of the sun and the like (which are highly transparent) is seen in water and the like which are less transparent. If it be said that there can be no contact of that which is undefined, that too would be inconsistent, because we see the all-pervading sky (ākāśa) reflected in a looking-glass, or the like. And such being the case, there can be no objection to the effectuation of the reflection (under notice).

It may be argued that what has been said about there being an apparent or external contact by propinquity of the sentient power with the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, there should be the experience of pain and pleasure on the part of soul, is inconsistent, for how can the quality of goodness of the thinking principle be produced without a modification of Prakṛiti? and for what object should there be a modification of Prakṛiti? To this it is replied, that Prakṛiti has to effectuate soul’s experience of the objects of mundane existence, and, its duty being to effectuate the object of soul, the modification is proper.

It may be urged that this is not proved, for the effectuation of the soul’s object is impossible. The duty of effectuating soul’s object implies the consciousness on the part of Prakṛiti that “it is my duty to effectuate soul’s object;” but how can there be such a consciousness on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti? If you admit the consciousness, how will you maintain its unsentience or inertness? The reply to this is that in the two forms of progressive and regressive modification, there are the two natural powers (of progression and regression), and they are called the duty of effectuating soul’s purpose. Those powers are natural to the unsentient Prakṛiti. Its progressive modification (annu-
loma-parināma) is the outward one, extending from the intellect to gross matter; while entering through its cause and ending with the annihilation of egoism is its regressive modification, (pratiloma parināma). Hence on the completion of soul's experience, the two natural powers being destroyed, Prakṛiti, having achieved its object, ceases to modify. In performing such duty for soul on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti, there is no inconsistency.

Again, it may be argued, if there be two such powers naturally possessed by Prakṛiti, then why is exertion made for salvation (moksha) by those who long for it? and if salvation be no object the science of those who advise it is worthless. The answer is, the relation of soul and Prakṛiti as experience and experience is from time without a beginning, and that being the case, when pain is felt on the part of Prakṛiti in action, from the assumption of its being the agent or actor, there arises the desire—"how can there be absolute stoppage of my suffering?" and hence there is a necessity on the part of Prakṛiti for the advice of the science which points out the means of stopping the pain. The substance of the advice of the science is the quality of goodness of the thinking principle as governed by work. In other works on philosophy this has been accepted to be the nature of ignorance (avidyā). That nature, exerting for salvation, relying on the help of the advice of such sciences, obtain the reward called salvation. All works influenced by the (necessary) conjunction of causes attain their own selves, and it is established by proof that of the work called moksha, which is acquired by regressive modification, this is the conjunction of causes, because it cannot be attained by any other method. Hence without that cause how can it be effected? It follows, therefore, that the quality of goodness of the thinking principle modified by worldly objects in contact and enlightened by the shadow of soul, conducts, through the conviction of (the reality of) those objects, all worldly affairs. Deluded people, looking at such thinking principle, imagine it and all such thinking principles to be the world. They should be enlightened.
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[Having met all the principal objections to the theory of the thinking principle being sensitized into intelligence by a reflection of soul which is intelligence, the author enunciates that the thinking principle, modified on the one hand by the soul and on the other by external objects, is brought into play in every case of sensation. The word used in the text for the double transformation is uparaka, which is a compound of upa 'excess' and ranja 'to colour' or 'tinge,' meaning that the thinking principle is doubly tinged or influenced; and this conveys the true meaning of the text. The P. Bhāshya accordingly cites the example of the crystal vase tinged by the coloured object put in it. Inasmuch as the theory, however, is that the thinking principle assumes the shape of the object in every instance of cognition, and the same epithet is used for the double tinging, it is necessary, for the sake of consistency, to adopt the same phraseology everywhere; I have accordingly used the word modified.

Bhoja, after explaining the text, enters into a long dissertation on the various objections that may be started to the doctrine, and refutes them seriatim. The first and most obvious objection is—how can a shadow of soul produce in an object on which it falls the quality of the original? Soul may be intelligence, but its shadow cannot reasonably be said to convey that intelligence on the object on which it falls. The commentator sees no harm in this, for, says he, such action is manifest in the motion produced in iron by the propinquity of a loadstone. He describes soul's intelligence to be two-fold; one is Nityodita or always and eternally present, and the other Abhivyasa or manifestible, and it is the latter that sensitizes the thinking principle.

The next argument is, if it be the thinking principle that is sensitized, how can soul be said to be the experiencer? The reply is—that soul is really not the experiencer, but since experience is felt by the agency of its shadow it is in an indiscriminate way called experiencer.

Then the question arises how can reflection take place of
a perfectly transparent object like soul, on a comparatively untransparent object like the thinking principle with the quality of goodness prevalent in it? This is met by saying that the word reflection here simply is the technical name of the influence of soul on the thinking principle.

An argument like the last is raised with reference to the contact of the absolutely pure soul with a comparatively impure thinking principle. This, however, is held possible, as we see the sun reflected in foul water. The contact of that which is illimitable with a finite object is also possible, as in the case of the sky reflected in a mirror.

The objection next urged is that why should Prakṛiti or nature change to produce effects? The answer is, it subserves the purposes of soul. This answer is, however, not enough, for Prakṛiti or nature being unintelligent, cannot have such a consciousness of duty, and act up to it. The reply is that Prakṛiti has two inherent powers in it, that of progression and of regression, and acting under their impulses it subserves the purposes of soul, and therefore there is no inconsistency.

The admission of the two powers aforesaid suggests the objection that, if they be natural they will run their course of their own accord, and there is no use in controlling them. The effect of the regressive action is salvation, and that must come of itself; none needs try for it, and, if so, what is the use of Yoga as a means of salvation? This is met by saying that it is Prakṛiti when in action that feels pain and, wishing to put a stop to that pain, wants to know how to do so, and hence arises the desire for salvation, and the Yoga points out the means of doing so. Without such advice Prakṛiti would go on working for ever.

The P. Bhāṣṭya has not mooted these discussions.]

Suspecting that it may be argued that if all purposes are accomplished by a thinking principle of this kind, why should we acknowledge an experiencer of which there is no proof, he gives the proofs (in support of the existence) of the spectator.
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XXIII.

It exists for another's purpose, though coloured by uncountable residua, because it operates by association.

"It," the thinking principle, "coloured," i.e., assuming many forms, through the influence of an uncountable number of "residua" (vásaná) (existing in it), effectuates for "another's," i.e., a master's, "purpose" (artha) the work of experience and final reward. How so? "Because it operates by association." "Association" (saññatya), i.e., by fully joining together, operates to accomplish a purpose. We see that works performed jointly are for another, as in the case of a bed or a chair. The co-operators (in this case) are the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which, modifying in the form of the thinking principle, jointly work for another, and that "another" is soul.

It may be urged that through the force of the example by which the subservience of another's purpose by an embodied stranger, as a bed or a chair or the like, is established, a similar (embodied) stranger may be proved, but you contemplate an unembodied "another," and, the opposite being proved, your argument becomes destructive of the object. The reply is thus given: Although in the example pervasion of the premiss has been accepted as general in regard to effectuating another's purpose, yet on consideration of the specific distinctions of goodness in the qualified, the distinction will be evident, and the position that the experiencer is another is established. Thus, as in inferring the existence of fire in a mountain covered with fuel of a particular kind from the smoke seen there, the inference that fire is produced by fuel and is distinct from other fires is taken for granted, so here in inferring that the specific experience called goodness is for another's purpose. In the same way the experiencing superior is proved to be another of the form of intelligence and isolated. Although he appears as the other and the noblest of all, yet the body is superior to objects resulting from the quality of darkness, because it is manifest, and the asylum of the organs. The organs
are superior to the body; to them the illuminating quality of goodness is superior; and he who is the illuminator is distinct from illumination and of the form of intelligence. How can then there arise this conjunction? (*i.e.*, there is no actual conjunction but a mere shadow).

[The explanations given in previous aphorisms still leave the door-open to the argument that the agency of the soul is redundant and not wanted. If the thinking principle doubly modified as above stated is sufficient for conception, why make the soul the experimenter of worldly joys and sorrows? To this question the reply given is that, though the thinking principle is actuated by innumerable desires resulting from the residua of former works, it nevertheless acts for another’s purpose, and not for itself, since it acts by the co-operation of many causes, and not of its own motion. Though there are innumerable residua in it, they cannot work until external agencies are brought to bear upon them, and that shows that the thinking principle has no power of action *suo motu*. It is unconscious too, so that it can have no will of its own. It acts only when it is worked upon, and this is indicated by the phrase “operates by association.” Inasmuch, however, as its action may tend to bring on liberation which is for the good of the soul, it is to be inferred that in its other actions it subserves the gratification of that soul. No line can be drawn between what actions are for the soul and what are not, and logically what is true for a part, *i.e.*, for liberation, must be true for the whole. This idea is expressed in the Sáňkhya-káriká by the verse “generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities,” (lx). It should be noticed, however, that the functions which are usually attributed to nature or Prakṛti in the Sáňkhya are invariably assigned to the thinking principle (*chitta*) in the Yoga of Patanjali. In fact, in the Yoga system, chitta plays a more important part than the Buddha of Kapila, and appertains to itself the character both of Buddhi and Prakṛti, but the commentator does not mark this distinction. In
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his works Kapila frequently refers to Prakṛiti where Patañjali confines himself to Chitta. The action of the unconscious thinking principle for another’s purpose is usually explained by the illustration of the saffron cart, which, unconscious as it is, subserves the purpose of man by bringing him a desirable condiment.]

He now proceeds to show by ten aphorisms that the fruit of this philosophy is isolation.

XXIV.

For the knower of the difference there is a cessation of the idea of self in the thinking principle.

Thus the quality of goodness and soul being proved to be distinct, whatever idea exists of his self being the thinking principle, in him who knows them to be distinct, that is the one is different from the other, the same surceases, i.e., the idea ceases of the thinking principle being the actor, knower, and experiencer.

[Having disposed of all metaphysical questions bearing on the subject-matter of his work, the author now reverts to the thesis, how isolation is effected. The metaphysical questions above set forth, when thoroughly understood, enable a person to divest himself of the idea that his self or ego is his thinking principle, and to believe that his soul is the real self. He knows that the thinking principle is unconscious and not his self. The idea, in fact, is altogether set at rest, and his soul is so far freed from the natural wrong belief that the thinking principle is the ego.]

(To the question) what happens when this takes place, he says:

XXV.

Then the thinking principle is turned towards discriminative knowledge, and bowed down by the weight of commencing isolation.

The thinking principle, which was turned outwards by igno-
rance, to derive the fruit of experiencing worldly objects, deflects now towards "discriminative knowledge," (viveka) i. e., turns inward towards the path of discriminative knowledge, and is "bowed down by the weight of coming isolation," (kaivalya-prāgabhāra) i. e., the fruit of isolation, or the commencement of isolation.

[When the belief aforesaid is effected, the thinking principle drops the cosmos, and turns inward to the cultivation of discriminative knowledge, and is overpowered by the sense of isolation which begins to sprout in him.]

Now, by describing the causes of the impediments which occur in the thinking principle flowing towards discrimination, he points out the means of overcoming them.

XXVI.

In the intervals thereof other impressions arise from residua.

"Thereof," i. e., of the thinking principle engaged in meditation. In the "intervals" (chhidreshu), in the void spaces of the thinking principle, whatever "impressions" (jñānāni) or ideas of the waking (or worldly) state arise, the same proceed from the now-fading residua of the former waking state, in the forms of "I," "mine," and the like. What is said is that by means of extirpating the internal organ their avoidance should be effected.

[While isolation is progressing there are opportunities when a person is not actually engaged in meditation, i. e., during the breaks in his meditation, for worldly ideas to sprout from the residua of former existences still clinging to the mind. These are calculated to disturb the process of isolation, and are so far impediments, which should be destroyed.]

He now says that the means of avoidance has already been explained.

XXVII.

The avoidance of these should be (the same) as already described in the case of afflictions.
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The avoidance of these should be effected in the same way in which the avoidance of afflictions, ignorance, &c., has been already pointed out (C. II. x—xi). Even as they, scorched by the fire of knowledge, do not, like roasted seeds, sprout in the field of the thinking principle, so are the residua, (rendered infructuose).

[The ideas should be destroyed in the same way as afflictions, for which provision has been made in a previous part of the work, (C. II. x—xi).]

He now describes the means by which a Yogi, on his meditation becoming steady by the non-production of other thoughts in the way aforesaid, may attain excellence.

XXVIII.

On the completion of the series there is produced the meditation (called) the Cloud of Virtue, even in the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of constant discrimination.

"On the completion of the series" (prasañkhyañe), i.e., after careful contemplation of the nature and respective peculiarities of all the categories arranged in due order. On that being accomplished even in the case of the "non-aspirant" (akusida), or one who does not wish for any fruition, there is produced from the appearance of constant discrimination, on the cessation of all foreign thoughts in his thinking principle, the meditation called the Cloud of Virtue. That which showers (mehati) or irrigates profusely the virtue (dharma) which is neither black nor white, (cf. IV, vii, ) and which is subservient to the attainment of the summum bonum is the "Cloud of Virtue" (Dharmamegha) By this it is shown that the highest virtue is the cause of knowledge.

[When the series of works enjoined above for the perfection of Yoga meditation have been completed, then there arises in the mind of the performer a meditation called Cloud of Virtue, which means that all virtues are showered on it, even when
it does not wish for them. The sense is that though the Yogi may not wish for any reward, still the reward comes. The word in the text is *akusīda*, from *a* meaning negation and *kusīda* interest, that is disinterestedly. The theory is that the perfection of virtue results spontaneously in a person who completes his Yoga duties as described in the text.]

He explains next what results from that Cloud of Virtue.

**XXIX.**

Thence follows the cessation of afflictions and works.

The meaning is, that on the manifestation of knowledge, their antecedent causes being removed, there is a cessation of the afflictions resulting from ignorance, and of all the works which are, according as they are white, &c., of three kinds. (vii).

[The object of the cloud is now described. On its appearance there results a complete cessation of all afflictions and all works; there is no longer any sense of affliction left in the mind of the Yogī, and he has neither any desire for work, nor any residua of former works left in his mind.]

He next explains what happens on this cessation.

**XXX.**

Then the knowable becomes small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from all coverings and impurities.

"Coverings" (*āvaraṇāṇi*), are those whereby the thinking principle is covered; they are the afflictions; they are also impurities. Free from them, means devoid of them. From the knowledge (*jñāna*) becoming free, like the sky bereft of cloud, and "from its infiniteness" (*ānāntyāt*), i. e., from its being without a break, or all-pervading, "the knowable" (*jneya*) becomes "small" (*alpa*), or fit to be counted or grasped. The meaning is, that the Yogī can easily know everything.
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[The next advantage is that the objects of sense are reduced to a minimum. Knowledge then becomes limitless and free from all impurities and coverings or interruptions; and placed against such knowledge, knowables or cognizables become insignificant, i.e., that knowledge which can grasp everything, finds no difficulty in understanding small matters. Not that there is a reduction in the number or quantity of cognizables, but, placed besides limitless knowledge, they, by comparison, become insignificant.]

He then states what takes place after this:

XXXI.

Thereupon takes place the termination of the succession of the modifications of the qualities which have accomplished their end.

Those which have "accomplished" (kṛita), completed, soul's purpose or object in the form of experience and emancipation are called kṛitārthāk, or those which have accomplished their end. The "qualities" (guṇāk) are goodness, foulness, and darkness. "Their modifications" (parināma) are their conditions of existence in relation to each other as members and membered, in a progressive or a regressive state to the time of the completion of the purpose of soul. Their "succession" (krama) is to be presently described. Its "termination" (parisamāpti) is its finality, i.e., it does not arise or happen again.

[Proceeding onwards, the next effect of the Yoga is a cessation of the tendency on the part of the qualities to undergo change. The qualities are the most active agents in worldly life, and it is their modifications that produce the various impressions of life, and when they cease to change, there is ipso facto a cessation of worldly impressions. It is the duty of Prakṛiti to minister to the purposes of soul, and as the qualities are inherent in Prakṛiti, the qualities may be taken as synonymous with Prakṛiti, and those qualities, having done their work, cease]
from labour. The work of the qualities is said to be two-fold; they have to minister to soul's experience of the world, and then to bring on its emancipation; and when the state above described is attained, the qualities have already accomplished both these works, and, having nothing else left to do, stop work in re the soul concerned.]

He now describes the succession above referred to.

XXXII.

The succession is the counterpart of the moment perceptible at the end of the modification.

"Moment" (kshana) is a short amount of time. Its "counterpart" (pratiyogi) is another distinct moment. "Perceptible at the end of the modification" means that which is accepted as the totality after perceiving a number of moments, and this is called the "succession" of moments, for no succession can be perceived in unperceived succession of moments.

[The word "succession" (krama) used in A. xxxi, is explained in this aphorism to mean the following of one moment after another. The object is to say that the lapse of time is reckoned by the succession of one moment after another, though there is no break between them; one totality is divided into many parts only for facility of reckoning.]

He now defines the specific nature of isolation, which is the result.

XXXIII.

Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.

"The regression" (pratiprasava) or the non-production of change on the completion of the regressive (or effluent) modification of the (three) qualities, on the accomplishment of soul's (two-fold) purpose of experience and emancipation is called "isolation" (kaivalya); or, it is the abidance of the thinking
power (soul) solely in its own proper nature, on the cessation of its identification with intellectual functions (or objects).

[Having described the Yoga in all its details, the author concludes the work by announcing the ultimatum to which it leads. This ultimatum is kāivalya, and it is defined to result on the reabsorption of the triad of qualities in their original cause, on their having done their duty to soul, or on the abidance of the soul in its own nature without any association with the qualities; that is to say, when it has no longer the thinking principle near it to cause its shadow to fall thereon.

The commentator does not explain the word kāivalya. The P. Bhāṣya, suggests its meaning by saying "when the power of intelligence becomes alone, and remains always after in that state it is kāivalya," (chiti-taktireva kevalā tasyāk sadā tathaiva vasthānam kāivalamiti). It is the same goal which the Sāṁkhya assigns to its votaries, but it uses, instead of kāivalya, the word apavarga which, though not radically synonymous, conveys the same idea, that of liberation from the trammels of nature. The Sāṁkhya-kārikā adopts the term kāivalya, and says, "when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final kāivalya accomplished," (v. lxxvii). Gauḍapāda contents himself by saying, "kāivalya is the abstract form of kevala," (kevaladhāvāt kāivalyam). Vāchaspāti Miśra and Nārāyaṇa take it to mean "exemption from the three kinds of pain," (dukkhatraya-vigamam dukkhavanāsam). The lexicographical meaning of kevala is 'one,' 'alone,' 'only,' and in the derivative form it means, 'oneness,' 'singleness,' 'solitariness,' 'exclusiveness,' or 'individuality,' i. e., deliverance from the association of nature. Colebrooke translates it into 'deliverance,' and Wilson adds 'liberation.' Mr. Davies, in his translation, prefers 'abstraction.' All these may be resolved into isolation, the word used in my version, the idea being that the soul is freed from all association, material, phenomenal, or noumenal.
The epithets 'absolute' (aikántika) and 'final' (átyantika) used in the Sáňkhya-kárika, and the word 'always;' (sadá) in P. Bháshya show that this isolation is to last for ever, and no future association of any kind is possible. To quote Mr. Davies, "the soul's perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever."

This eternal quietude of the soul after isolation amounts, in the opinion of M. Cousin, to "nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;" but where existence forms the primary condition of the theory, nihilism cannot logically and fairly be predicated. The question is, does the soul exist or not after salvation? and since the Yoga, like many other schools of philosophy, both Indian and European, insists that it does, (cf. Sáňkhya-sútra I, 45, 46, 47), there is no room left for a charge of negation against it. Professor Wilson, following the Indian exegetes, more correctly explains the case by saying, "it is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." Professor Weber, in his 'History of Indian literature,' (pp. 238-9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, "one very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine—and one which was more and more exclusively developed as time went on—is the Yoga practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained." To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious, that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how so well-read a scholar, as the learned professor, could have formed this opinion, unless we believe that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his theory from the Bhagavadgítá, and Puránic and Tántric modifications of Yoga.
Patanjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul abides after the separation. This condition of philosophic abstraction, however, not being satisfactory to worldly-minded people longing for a peaceful hereafter, a necessity arose for the elaboration of a more concretely blissful scheme, and the modifications above noticed were offered by the Purāṇics to meet the requirement. They devised other forms, but those require no description here.

This completes the work; but Bhoja takes this opportunity to compare the condition of the soul as described in the Yoga with what other systems propose, and thereby to demonstrate its superiority. The first is the Buddhist doctrine of momentary existence.]

Nor is it only in our philosophy that the knower of the field [of action] in its isolated condition is recognised to exist in this form of intelligence; on reflection it will be seen that in other systems of philosophy also it remains in the same form. Now, in the worldly condition soul appears as full of agency, experiencership, and inquisitiveness; if this one soul, the knower of the field, be not admitted to be so, then in the absence of all antecedent and postcedent enquiry in momentary consciousness, (i.e., believing consciousness to be existent only for the time being, which cannot look into the past or the future,) there would be no constant relation between soul and the fruits of works, and the objection would arise of the destruction of that which has been done, and the coming into existence of that which has not been done, (i.e., no desert would follow works done, and desert would result from undone work). Acknowledge him to be the experiencer (of deserts) by whom an act enjoined by the Śāstras is performed, and there will be an inclination on the part of all to perform works for the acceptance or avoidance of good or evil. Since all actions characterised by the desire of avoidance or acceptance are subject to enquiry; since there would be an impossibility for enquiry in the case of mutually distinct moments; (i.e., the
moment when one action is done being distinct from that in which another action is performed); and since in the absence of enquiry there would arise an impossibility for any kind of action to take place, it is established that that which is the agent, experiencer, and enquirer is the soul. In the condition of liberation, there being an absence of all actions characterised by the idea of the acceptable and the acceptor, sentience alone remains behind. That sentience is apparent only as sentience, and not by knowing itself, since the nature of sentience is to perceive objects, and not to perceive itself. Further, when an object is perceived by the thinking power, the idea is "this" (ayam), and when the identity of that power is to be implied, the idea is "I" (aham). Two such mutually discordant actions, characterised as the profluent and the refluvent are, cannot be achieved simultaneously, and since the two actions cannot be performed at the same time, soul remains as sentience only. Hence it is reasonable (to believe) that in the liberated condition, when the qualities are defunct, soul remains solely as sentience. In the mundane condition agency, percipiency, inquisitiveness arise in regard to that soul. Besides, there is a relation between Prakṛiti and soul, which is that of experience and experiencer; it is natural, and exists from time without a beginning. It is due to the prevalence of want of right notion. And that being the case, in the presence of the two powers for the advancement of the object of soul, (cf. IV, xxii), all modifications in the form of Mahat and others take place. And since the power of the soul as the supreme agent, and of casting its quality of sentience on the thinking principle, and that of experiencing the result of the conjunction of that reflection, proceed from conjunction (with Mahat), and since the consciousness of agency and experience of the intellect proceeds from the influence of sentience on the intellect, and consequently of the conduct of all enquirable actions, what use is there in other unprofitable agglomerations of fallacies?

[Bhoja does not say that the theory he combats is due to the
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Buddhists, but the dogma of momentary consciousness was prevalent among the Mādhyamikas, and hence I infer that he means the Buddhists. The theory is, that all things are momentary, and their cognition is also momentary, produced by the concatenation of complements of unconscious causes, without a permanent intellectual back-ground, (cf. Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarśana-sastra, p. 15). It is refuted by the allegation, that such consciousness could not be made subject to moral responsibility. The consciousness that would perform an action now, would have no relation to the one that had acted before, or to that which would act in the future, and the responsibility of the one could not be transferred to another. There could be no such idea as ego, for the ego of one cognition would not be the ego of another, and yet as ego is the basis of cognition and consciousness, no theory can be valid which repudiates that. There could be under such circumstance no incentive to, nor necessity for, moral action. A permanent individual consciousness is unavoidable, and that is found in the thinking principle enlivened by a reflection of soul.

Again, if, rejecting this course, it be accepted that agency is soul's essential attribute, then arises the admission of its being subject to modifications, and as modifications are non-eternal or temporal, its character as soul is destroyed. Nor can perception of mutually different conditions be effected in one form at the same time; and accordingly, in the condition in which soul is perceived associated with some produced pleasure, can the condition of pain be perceived. Thus the conditions being various, the conditioned must likewise be various, and from variety and modificability there can be neither spirituality nor eternity, (i.e., that which is modifiable cannot also be eternal or spiritual, and eternity and spirituality are essential attributes of soul). Hence it is that those Sāṅkhya-s who believe in a peaceful Brahma, acknowledge soul to remain in the same form both in the mundane and the liberated conditions.

[This is apparently the theory of the Vaisēṣikas, who believe
soul to be the real actor. The objection to this theory is that action implies change, and if soul be the real actor, it would be subject to change. The idea of change, however, is, in the opinion of Patanjali, incompatible with the spirituality and eternity of soul; it would cease to be soul if it were changeable like material objects, and therefore this theory is not tenable.]

The theory of the Vedantists, who believe liberation to be that condition of soul in which it is solely sentience and joy, is not correct. Joy being the identity of pleasure, and pleasure being manifested by perceptibles, and perceptibility not being produced without perception, the doctrine of unity is destroyed by the admission of the two, the perceptible and the perception. Again, their saying of cognition itself being the joyous soul would be prejudiced by the incompatibility of two antagonistic qualities abiding together. Perception and perceptible cannot fitly be called one. Again, soul is said by the non-dualists to be of two kinds, the working or conditioned and the unconditioned or supreme. But if you admit that form in which the working soul becomes the experiencer of pleasure and pain, to be also the form in which it exists as the supreme soul, then the supreme soul becomes, like the working soul, subject to modifications, and pertain, the nature of ignorance. If it be said that the experiencership is not direct, but accepted as a present (by the soul) while remaining as a neutral superior, the case would be the same as in our system of philosophy.

The assumption about the joyous form (of soul) has already been refuted. It may be added that if soul be admitted to be of the character of ignorance, there would be no separate existence left for working souls, and which should then be the object of philosophy? Certainly not the unconditioned soul, for it is eternally free; nor the working soul, for it is (admitted to be) of the character of ignorance, and thus will result the falsification of all systems of philosophy. If the creation be admitted to consist of ignorance, the question would arise, whose ignorance is it? It cannot be that of the supreme soul, for it is
eternally free, and of the form of knowledge. It cannot be of the working soul, for that being without a separate existence, how can it be connected with ignorance? It would be like the admission of horns of a hare (a mere fiction). It might be said that the ignorance of ignorance consists in its not being the subject of demonstration by argument. It may, like the dew on the earth with the rays of the sun (playing on it), melt away under ratiocination, and yet it may be ignorance. This, however, cannot be. Whatever does something must be distinct from, or identical with, something else, and since the agency of ignorance in the development of the universe must be admitted, and admitting it, if ignorance be indeterminate, then nothing whatever will be determinate; even Brahma itself will be liable to be put down as indeterminate, (but if it be described to be determinate, it will cease to be ignorance). It follows then that the form of soul cannot be other than that of a supervisor. This supervisorship is mere sentience only, for there is no evidence of its having any other quality.

[The Vedantic doctrine is refuted on two grounds; 1st, because it involves a duality which the Vedantists themselves repudiate; 2nd, it makes soul liable to be affected by ignorance, thereby destroying its absolute purity, and if we admit that soul may be involved in ignorance then it will become indeterminate, and there would be no certainty about anything.]

It is alleged by the Naiyāyikas and others that soul is sentient, because it becomes so by contact with sentience, and that sentience is produced by the union of soul with its mind. They say that desire, knowledge, exertion and other attributes are produced by the contact of soul during its working condition with mind, and through those qualities, the soul knows itself to be the knower, the agent, and the experiencer. In the state of liberation (moksha), when false notions are suppressed on the suppression of the residua (dosha) which are produced by them, there results an absolute annihilation of the specific attributes, know-
ledge, &c., and soul is acknowledged to reside in its own essential form. This, however, is not a correct assumption, for what would you accept to be the peculiar soulness of the soul in that condition? (You cannot urge that pervasion, immensity, and eternity are its constituents, for) the qualities of pervasion and the rest pertain to ether and others, and to differentiate it from them, some determinate form must have to be admitted. You may say that the specific character of soul is its own speciality (or kind to which it belongs). But this cannot be urged, for such speciality exists in all things, (i.e., everything has its specific distinction as a particular kind). It is necessary, therefore, to admit some other differentiation of the soul, apart from speciality, and this can be effected by admitting its supervisorship, from its being of the form of sentience, and in no other way.

As to what is believed by the Mīmāṃsakas about soul being both worker and work, the position is not tenable. They believe that soul is indicated by the use of the word I, and by the use of I, both the agency and the objectivity of soul are included, (i.e., soul is the ego, and nothing else can be ego, and the soul being the ego, the ego must include both soul and work, for in knowing the soul work must appear to be soul and no other). But this cannot result, because they are of contradictory natures. Agency implies him who measures, while work means that which is to be measured or proved, and the assumption of these two antagonistic qualities cannot be effected in one at the same time. When two antagonistic qualities are assumed, then there can be no unity, as positive and negative, and so are agency and objectivity antagonistic. Should it be said there is no antagonism between agency and objectivity, but there is between agency and instrumentality, we deny it, because the assumption of antagonistic qualities is the same (in either case). Rejecting then the theory of perceivable by the use of I, we hold the soul's supervisorship as proved, and thence its sentienceless.
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The theory of those who hold soul to be finite, defined by the body, and mutable, because it is reckoned among matter, tumbles down as soon as it is started. By the admission of mutability, the sentience form of soul is destroyed, and in the absence of its sentience form, how can there be any spirituality in soul? Hence those who desire to uphold the spirituality of soul must admit its sentience form, and that is its supervisorship.

[This is the theory of the Arhatas or Jains. (Cf. Cowell and Gough’s Sarvadarsana-sadgraha.)

Some fancy soul to be of the form of the actor. They believe that the action of knowing, which results in the presence of a perceptible object, has for its fruit the cognition of that object; and in that cognition as the fruit, the true form of soul, being of the form of illumination, becomes manifest; and objects being perceptible, the soul becomes the perceptor; for it is produced in some such form as “I know the pot,” (in which “I” is the perceptor, “know” is the cognition of the form of illumination, and the “pot” is the perceptible object). The cause of action is for certain the actor, and therefore actorship and experiencership constitute the form of soul. This, however, is inconsistent. (If cognitions be the root),—the question arises, Does the actorship of those cognitions arise simultaneously, or successively? If you say, that the actorship is simultaneous, then its actorship shall cease a moment after. If you say, it happens successively, it cannot be predicated of that which is uniform, (i.e., soul). If you say the actorship of soul is effected always in one or the same form, then that one form being always present, all fruits would become of one form. If the actorship be multiform, then there would be mutability, and there being mutability, there can be no form of sentiencefulness. It follows that those who believe in soul’s sentiencefulness, should not maintain its direct actorship. The way in which the actorship of the uniform, eternal, sentient soul is proved by us, is the most consistent.
Those who by such arguments maintain that the self-manifest soul becomes the perceptor through the cognition of objects, will find their refutation by the same line of argument.

Some hold that the reasoning (vimarsa) form of soul is its sentience form, (i.e., its sentience is no other than its reasoning power). They say that the sentience form of soul cannot be ascertained without reasoning; the sentience form is said to be distinct from the inert, and without reasoning it cannot be defined, and without reasoning, there is nothing left behind. This is, however, untenable. Reasoning is the discussion which has the form of "this, thus, and so," (i.e., every process of ratiocination involves the assumption of something like this, this is, this is not, thus it is, thus it is not, it is so, it is not so, and without them there can be no reasoning,) and that cannot arise without egoism (or consciousness), and when reasoning is brought to bear on soul it is brought into cognition in the form "I am of this form," and thus the soul, the subject of discussion, being brought to light by the word I, no advance is made beyond a fancy, and fancy is a form of conviction, which is the function of the intellect, and not of sentience. But as sentience, uniform and eternal, remains always in one shape, there can be no entrance of egotism into it. It follows then, that this assumption of reasoning in the soul is a mistaken assumption of the intellect for soul, and not a knowledge of the identity of the self-manifest soul, the great soul.

Thus in no system of philosophy can the form of soul be ascertained by any means, without admitting its supervisorship. Supervisorship implies sentience form, which is distinct from inertness. Because it exists supervising in the form of sentience, therefore it derives the quality of experience (in objects), and that which is supervised by sentience becomes fit for worldly usage. And such being the case, other systems of philosophy, if they decline to accept what we have said about the isolation of soul as resulting on the cessation of the functions of Prakṛiti after it has accomplished its duty have no
resource. It has, therefore, rightly been said that isolation is the abidance of the sentient power in its own form after withdrawing its shadow from all functions.

The sources of perfections, (i); the manner in which the transmutation of material causes are effected, (ii); the mode in which merit cooperates in this process, (iii); the origin of created thinking principles, (iv); their relation to their original source, (v); the superiority of Samādhi-born thinking principle, (vi); the nature of various kinds of work, (vii); the conformity of works to residua, (viii); their invariable relation, (ix); the eternity of desires, (x); their nature and susceptibility to destruction, (xi); the relation of the thinking principle to works, (xii); the natures of the qualities and the qualified, (xiii); unity of things proceeding from unity of modification, (xiv); the relation of cognition to cognizables, (xv); the process of cognition, (xvi); its permanence, (xvii); thinking principle not self-illuminative, (xviii); it cannot be directed to two things at the same time, (xix); multiplicity of cognitive power not admissible, (xx); how it perceives its self, (xxi); how it is made fit for all purposes, (xxii); its subserviency to another's purpose, (xxiii); progress of isolation, (xxiv—xxxii); nature of isolation, (xxxiii)—these are the subjects treated of in this chapter on isolation. [Only the substance of the commentary has been given here, for reasons explained before.]

He, who is the asylum of fame and majesty, whose orders are received on the crowns of their diadems, by kings prostrate at his feet in acts of service and salutation, the lotus of whose mouth having been attained by the goddess of speech, she became uncommonly proud, even he, the auspicious Bhoja, lord of the earth, composed these notes on the aphorisms of the lord of serpents.

This is the end of the fourth quarter, or the quarter on isolation, of the commentary entitled Rājamārtanda, on Patañjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
APPENDIX.

A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF WORKS EXTANT ON THE YOGA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Abbreviations.
B. G. C.       Bühler’s Gujarát Catalogue.
Bh. D. M. C.   Catalogue of the Bháú Dájí Memorial.
Bh. R.         Bhandárkar’s Report, 1881-2.
H. C.          Hall’s Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems.
K. C. P. C.    Kielhorn’s Central Provinces Catalogue.
K. P. R.       Kunte’s Punjab Report, 1881.
M. N.          Mitrá’s Notices of Sanskrit MSS.
N. W. P. C.    North Western Provinces Catalogue.
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O. C.          Oudh Catalogue.

3. Amanaska. On steadfastness of the mind. N. W. P. C. V.
5. Ashtáńga-hrídaya-sańhitá. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. B. G. C. IV.
6. Ashtáńga-yoga. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. By Sáńkara A’chárya. B. G. C. IV.


31. Kapila-gitā. Dissertations on the importance of Yoga meditations and the mode of performing them. by Kapila. M. N. IV.
34. Laya-yoga. Yoga emancipation. B. G. C. IV.
35. Mahā-rāmāyaṇa alias Vaśishtha rāmāyaṇa. A version of the history of Rāma distinct from that of Vālmīki and designed especially to expound the principles of the Yoga doctrine. M. N. VI.
38. Nādi-jñāna-dīpikā. On the knowledge of the arteries or nerves bearing on the Yoga. M. N. I.
APPENDIX.


45. Patañjala-sūtra-bhāsya. A commentary on Patañjali's Yoga-sūtra. By Bhavadeva Misra, Mahāmahopādhyāya. Probably the same with No. 42. M. N. V, and VI.


57. Samarasāra-s'varodaya. On the regulation of breath and divination from the flow of breath. By Rāma. B. G. C. IV.
Śaṅkhya-pravachana, vide Yoga-sūtra.
Śaṅkhya-pravachana-bhāshya. Vide Pātañjala-bhāshya.
59. Saptabhumikā-vichāra. The seven stages of perfection of Yogis. B. G. C. IV.
60. Saragítā. On Yoga breathing, probably an extract from a Purāṇa. By Vyāsa. H. C.
61. Sārasamuchchhayā alias Yoga-sārasaṅgraha. The leading tenets of the Yoga. By Harisevaka Mis'ra. M. N. II.
62. Shrāchakra. The six principal parts of the body which should be meditated upon. B. G. C. IV.
67. Śiva-saṅhitā. On the Yama, Niyama and other observances of the Yoga system; alleged to be an extract from the Skanda-purāṇa. By Śiva. N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. and O. C. VI., B. G. C. IV., H. C.
68. Ś'iva-saṅhitā-ṭikā. Notes on the Ś'iva-saṅhitā. By Sadānanda. N. W. P. C. I.
69. Svarodaya. Yoga breathing. (Probably only on divination from the flow of breath). By Vyāsa. B. G. C. IV.
73. Tattvāvindu-yoga. On a peculiar form of Yoga. By Śiva. N. W. P. C. I.
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পাতার নম্বর দুই

দুর্বাদ্য দৃষ্টিতে তদ্বজ্জন্তি সাধারণমূলকঃ।
সাধারণজ্ঞানমূলকঃ বিভিন্নতি বাচঃ সমাধানঃ।
চন্দ্রনেবদ্ধোগাসিদ্ধ বজ্রমুর্জকদীর্ঘমুক্তঃ।
তোষ্ণাদ্যাভিনীতি বস্ত্রবিপ্লবঃ বর্ধিতপি রোকায়তঃ।॥ ৬ ॥

কামুজ্য বিনসারবুদ্ধি বিদ্যাবাং
*ফলাপ্রকাশমর্মায় চ সংগ্রাময়াঃ।
ধনঃ পতঙ্গলিমুনি+বিদ্বানেষঃ
মানন্তরে বুধজনগতিরোপনয়ত: ॥ ৭ ॥

অথ যোগানুশাসনম্ ॥ ৯ ॥

অনন্ত দ্বিজে দ্বাকসন সমাধিপ্রবৃত্তিপ্রথিতনাথায়নাচনে।
ত্রু অথ শ্রোত্তরধিকারে শাক্তায়নঃ। চুকি: 'বেগঃ' সমাধানঃ,
চুকমাধি। অনুষ্ঠানে শাক্তায়নে শাক্তায়নেরোপেরোপমুদ্রন।
তত্ত্ব 'নানাধর্ম'। যোগানুশাসনং 'যোগানুশাসন'। তত্ত্ব শ্রোত্র
নিরালে প্রহরাদর্শিতঃ বেদান্তশীলত্বঃ। তত্ত্ব শ্রোত্র বিদ্যাপদন্তা
বোদ: সমাধিঃ বালকিষ্ণবিভিষেক, তথাপি প্রমুক্ত পার্থঃ, বিদ্যানি।

* বুদ্ধাপ্রকাশাল্পতি ক বুদ্ধাপ্রকাশাল্পতি ব চিকিৎসুসমাপতি চ।
† ধনঃ পতঙ্গলিমুনি ক ধনঃ পতঙ্গলিমুনি চ।
‡ বুধজনগতিরোপনয়তি ব চিকিৎসুসমাপতি চ।
§ চন্দ্রনেবদ্ধোগাসিদ্ধ বজ্রমুর্জকদীর্ঘমুক্তঃ প্রাদীকর্মঃ সর্বচঃ। তথাপি শাস্ত্রে-
প্রফুল্ল গথিত।
|| বিদ্বানেরোপেরোপমুদ্রন নাগাপুসসারসঃ। বিদ্বানেরোপেরোপমুদ্রন নাগাপুসসারসঃ। C চিকিৎসুসমাপতি চ।
नास्यो योगस्य कैवल्य साधन।  
शर्कारिधिशेषेऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽঃ

* हस्याय निर्विन्नस्वपरिष्काराक्षुरस्तात्सामिति बजगुस्मयसम्बन्धः पाठः।
† बाजार्येण हृतः एक्षितमनालवधाः।
‡ बसोनानितसं एक्षितमनालवधाः।
तत्त्वज्ञानिके वेदांतेनानुसन्धाने कथाप्रदृष्टेन अध्ययनार्थम्। तत् वेदेन् देशांत्रिकं अनुसन्धाने राज्य रुपानुसन्धानं तस्मान वर्तमानप्रवर्तितं। तत्त्वज्ञानिके तत्त्वावलोकनं अभावम्। तत्त्वज्ञानी मनुष्य संसाराधिकारिष्ठं अभावम्। तत्त्वावलोकनं अनुसन्धाने अन्य ज्ञान्योजनं संसाराधिकारिष्ठं अभावम्।

लोकाधिकारिष्ठं अभावम्। तत्त्वावलोकनं अनुसन्धाने अन्य ज्ञान्योजनं संसाराधिकारिष्ठं अभावम्।
माभवान् कर्त्तव्यार्थांक्ष्यो गृहकृत्यंमुणामवः, बुधानिकान्
स्मिज्ञेरितीमान्तां विनिमयमारीं ॥ २ ॥

युक्तानद्वारः ततः संस्कृतमिन्ताः

प्रतिसाधनांमितरं ॥ ४ ॥

‘तत्र’ वोगदन्वयिद्र कारे, इन्द्रो या वस्माश्चातसः
ताभि: ‘शाक्ष्यं’ तदःपर्। चावर्गः, वालुशो द्वादशः सुख-पुक-मायासिकः। प्रादुर्भवान, ताहुदूप एव संबंधे ते अर्थात्तिबिधम्
पुष्पः। प्रतीयते* तदेव, दशिध्वेकापथा परिणते वस्तु विशेषं विशेषः
स्थिनः कपे प्रतिदासं भवति, विशेषब्रम्हयस्तिधिरायेव विषणा- कारेश परिणते पुष्पदकार इव परिभाष ते, तथा जलस्त्रङ्गेबु
चलमु चन्द्रयविव प्रतिभाषे, ताजं ॥ ४ ॥

प्रतिपदः वाक्यातुमाच।

प्रतियः स्थलतय: शिखास्तिधिता:। ॥ ५ ॥

‘प्रतियः’ विशेष परिवारिस्विनविशेषः। प्रतियवस्थापनप्राप्तीसः
विनो या अत्ववर्ल्प इन्द्रयस्तिधिरायेव तथप्राप्तः। प्रतिपदेन भवति।
पद्ध प्रतियः। कपे: ‘शिखास्तिधिता’। हेश्वरस्तिधिरायसदाराकालः
‘शिखात्’, तत्रस्परोत्त: ‘वालुश’; ॥ ६ ॥

* प्रतीक्षेपः प्रतिपदः B विशेषपुकारे अर्था।
† विशेषस्येन इत्य B विशेषपुकारयान।
‡ शिखः अशिखः हाति B विशेषपुकारयात। शिखा अशिखः
देवि P विशेषपुकारयान।
शाश्वते सुखवापनेवेव श्रमादिकत प्रस्तरं। तथा श्रदेव देवानाम्। एतद्वुष्र भवति, रजस्य प्रहसितकम्, तमस्य परापकारित्वम्, श्रुण्व सुखं मेव चिन्तं भवनिति। एतार्तिशुमदिनासवा न समाधावुपयोगिनः। एकापिनिद्वृत्ते द्वे व श्रीशालक्षणायोगसरसव-शितलान्त् समाधावेक्षेते। श्रुण्वदिनक्रमवतुस्य लयमंभित-प्रायः, द्वीरार्थि रजस्मोपार्थ्यहंतद्वपति तद्वर्धिन् रजस्य प्रयम-शुपादानाः। यथा प्रधुस्तिर्वित्ता तावविशिष्टनिः नक्तरूपार्तिनिः द्वीरार्थिनिः प्रदर्शनाः। श्रुण्व निहद्यं पवात् प्रदर्शनाः। यत् तस्यानश्चेष्टान्तरे देव भवि योगोपयोगयोगान्तिः चन्द्रो-देवमेक्षार्पिनिद्वृत्तीभृमिक्षार्पिनिद्वृत्तीकायातापुः परिश्रामः स च भागः। किस्मं भवति, एकापि बरित्वोपपरेऽविभी, निबद्धेण स्नायुः दलीलां समर्थकाराणेण प्रविष्टिः द्वातिः। चन्द्रोपरेऽव्यो-चांगशा श्रुण्वः॥ २॥

इदारी क्षणकारिष्ट-द्वितीय-विराधपदानि वाक्यानुतानां प्रधानम् फिनपदे वास्ते॥

तदा क्रृ: सबृहेपवासनम्॥ ३॥

‘क्रृ:’ पुरुषः, तत्सिन काशे, ‘सबृहे’ विश्राचधुपधाम, ‘श्रमान’ विशिष्ठाः भवति। प्रयमरः, जपविवेकवाहातेश्चतुष्टु-
माभवान् कार्तलाभिमानिन्द्रसौ प्रायुक्तपरिशाां, बुद्धवाध्यानः
खङ्गेश्वायां निमित्तभविवतीवर्ण। ॥ २ ॥

युत्त्वानद्वारायं तथा किं क्षुपानिक्षां।

तस्मिन क्रियारूपमितर्च ॥ ४ ॥

‘दृश्यं’ थृगमायन्यज्ञ काले, दृश्येऽथ व वध्वमाणलचणः।
ताभि: ‘वाढ़ण’ तन्न्वलं। क्रयमच, यात्रस्यो दृश्य: सुख-सुखः
भोजाभिकः: प्राशुभैति, तार्क्यपुप्प च चेद्यते व्यवहारभि:
पुस्तः। प्रतीयते* तदेवं, वसिष्ठिकोपत्त्या परिष्ठते बद्वपि विच्छकः।
खङ्गेश्वरः यथे प्रतिमां भवति, वसिष्ठिकैत्रिवद्विवारेषां विषयसा-
कारण परिष्ठते पुष्पाक्षःकाराय रघु परिपावते, धना जलित्तरः
चलुः प्रकृतानिश्चित प्रतिमां भवति, तत्त्वं ॥ ५ ॥

दृश्यं पवत्तय: जित्कालिक्षिणः। ॥ ६ ॥

‘दृश्यं’ विषयं परिष्ठमानावेषाः। तस्मिन दृश्याद्यौषधसवारं
विने यथा वध्ववस्पु दृश्याद्यपेचया तथप्रत्ययः। एतद्वें भवति।
पवत्तय: कौट्त्रसः। ‘कित्तानाक्षिणः’। ज्ञांवेंद्रमाणालचणेयानामः
‘कित्ता्’, तद्पिरीतः: ‘चित्ता्’, ॥ ७ ॥

* प्रतीयसे क्रियारो हितिया: दितीयुपस्क्रायो नायि।
† विनानेव दिति: दितीयुपस्क्रायो।
‡ कित्ता जित्कालिक: हिती: दितीयुपस्क्रायो। कित्ता जित्कालिक
हिती: दितीयुपस्क्रायो।
शाखनं सुखावभेलेव्रश्रमादिभु प्रस्तरं. तत च दैव देवानन्म। एतदुः भवति, रचनश्रमसूचि, टामवः प्रपचारणिणि, अतेन सुखमयं सिंतं भवत्तति। एतासिस्विन्यावस्त्र न समाधामुपयोगिनः। एकाधिनिद्रुहूऽं द्रव ब्रह्मचर्योपारमव- खितलात् समाधामुपयोगिनं भवते। ब्रह्मचारिक्षयत्वात् लघुमिन- प्रायः, द्वारापि रजस्मयोपारमवेयं तद्यं रजस् प्रथम- सुपारसं। यथा प्रथतिद्विभित्तिनं ततविद्विभित्तिः प्रकृति द्वेषयत्- मिति द्वेषयं धनेऽपि प्रदशोः। ब्रह्मचारी नेत्रदेश चारात् प्रदशेऽः। यत्व तथोक्षेत्रेऽष्टादशे ब्रह्म धर्मोपदेशिनियन्ति अवन्य- दैविकापिनिद्रुहूऽं ब्रम्हिष्यविवेकशरणेत्तत्तत्वम्। पश्चात्: च श्रीमान् भवति, एकाये बाहरान्नेत्ररायः। निदर्शने वर्ष्णां व्रतीणा वर्षेऽवर्षीयः प्रविश्यं वर्नि। अवन्योरेन धृत्येन- चारात्: स्वाम:॥ २ ॥

द्रार्धां धर्मार्थार्थि-श्री-निरोधपदार्थि व्याख्यातकाम: प्रथमं सन्नपरं भाषे॥

तदा द्रुः स्कृपेतव्याख्यानम्॥ ३॥

'द्रुः' पुरुष, दैवीन काले, 'स्कृपे' ब्रम्हाचर्यदिनायम्। 'श्रव्यानं' शिष्य: भवति। प्रथमः: अत्यंतविवेकशरणेत्तत्तवम्।
माभावान् कटेलाभिमानानिर्दृश्यं प्रेम्युक्तपरिषास्माह्, बुद्धवाचनः
खृष्टपैसवानघं खृशिर्विश्वतीतीति॥ १ ॥

बुद्धानदश्यामं तस्क नंख खृष्टपरिष्यायः

रत्नसारुपायमितरः ॥ ४ ॥

‘द्वरतः’ धोगाद्वस्यिन् काले, द्वारशेषेऽय वाक्यमाणाश्चरणः,
ताभि: ‘वाक्यं’ तद्रपल। अप्रथमः, यादृशो द्वारात् सुख-दुःख-
मोहाध्यक्षः म्याद्वधिनः, नात्रूपयु चब म्याद्वधिने अवधारमाति
पुद्धः। प्रतीयते* तदेवं, धशत्रेकायत्या परिष्टेत यदृशि विचक्षः।
खृष्टपैसवा प्रतिष्ठाय भवति, धशत्रेकायत्या पारिधारणं विनिधनां
प्रति परिष्टेत पुद्धाराकार च परिबर्भयते, यथा जलस्वरूपः
वहस्तु खंडाशिव्राय प्रतिवर्भयते, तत्पि ॥ ५ ॥

रत्नपदं वाक्यावस्थाः

द्वारायः पापत्यः खृष्टाद्वस्थाः:॥ ॥ ४ ॥

‘द्वारायः’ विस्ध्य परिषास्यमित्वेषयः। द्वस्यम्भवःद्वस्यम्भवः
विनेव यत्र अवववाप्रायं द्वाराः परिष्टेऽय तयाप्रायं। एतदुःखं भवति।
पशु द्वारायः कोदृशः। ‘खृष्टाद्वस्थाः’। धशत्रेकायत्या प्रकाश्यं
खृष्टाः’, तद्पिरीतः: ‘खृष्टाः’, ॥ ५ ॥

* प्रतीयते द्रतिपादः विचित्रितपुस्क।
† विचित्रितपुस्कलपितपादः।
†† विचित्रितपुस्कलपितकोपादः।
प्रमाणान्-विपर्यय-विकल्प-निद्रा-मूर्तयः।

चासने कश्चन लोपमासः।

प्रत्यक्षानुमानानि: प्रमाणानि।

चचत्त्रिपरिबंधुत् प्रमाणानि। श्राच्छकारेण श्रीस्विच्छूपेनीवावी गतत्त्वाभासंप्रव, न प्रश्चकृत तत्त्वाने श्रावत्। प्रमाणानु चविष-स्वादिश्नां, तत्त्वाने प्रमाणमिति। रूपियहरुषेष वाक्वलुप-रागात् विषयं तद्विषयवा सामान्यविष्णुवाग्नेते विनिवावधार्प-प्रधाना हृति: 'प्रलेखं'। श्रास्त्वविष्णवाग्नेत् विनिव: साम-न्यासशास्त्रवाक्यान्: 'श्रनुमानं'। श्रास्त्रवनमु 'श्राग्म'।

एवं प्रमाणवः हृति वाक्यं विपर्ययकपमासः।

विपर्ययो विमयाब्द्वमन्त्रत्रप्रतिष्ठव।

प्रत्यपामुतेत्वां तद्नवर्धनमानं भां 'विपर्ययं'; वहा गुप्तिका प्रार्थ्यां राजत्वाणं। 'अन्तरप्रतिष्ठव' हृति:। तत्त्वारूण्य चतुर्यं न तत्सं कृपे प्रतिष्टे, तत्त्वारूण्य चतुर्यं न तत्स प्रतिभाषयतीति वावत। विनिवारस्त्रप्रतिष्ठवत् 'विमयाब्द्वां', वहा सांगुवः युध्धे वेति।

विकारायं वाक्याद्वुमास।

* दत्वः समुपर्यस्माने हृति B चिन्हिकत्पुक्तसाधः।
† उपर्यथाविष्णुविशावमानाकरिति E चिन्हिकत्पुक्तसाधः।
‡ प्रमाणवच्चार्थसिद्धि E चिन्हिकत्पुक्तसाधः।
श्रव्द्धानानुपाती वस्तुमुख्यो विक्रमः।

श्रव्द्धानिं श्रानं ‘श्रव्द्धा’, तद्वुपन्तिं श्रीं श्रां श्रां ‘श्रव्द्धा-
गानुपाती’, ‘श्रव्द्धां’, श्राधामशन्यायभागो श्राध्वरयाय: शां ‘श्रव्द्ध:’,
श्राधुगच्छ। शष्टि पुवर्षा शैव श्राध्वरमिध्य देवदर्शा कमल
श्राधुवन्तः श्रानिं श्र्यां शष्टि श्राणायविराते भेदशास्त्रदारिया
भाषामणि सर्वाराय वर्ने श्राध्वरयायः। वस्तुमुखः शैवन्यायेऽपि
शष्टि:।

गिर्रा आख्यातमाश।

श्राभावप्रश्वायात्माशमशाला दर्तिनिर्द्रा।

श्राभावप्रश्व: ‘श्राशुम’ शष्टि द्वान्तो शय भोजक। शष्टि पुवां
श्राति, श्रां शष्टिद्रुकारणमेवः। श्राध्वरबिषयपरित्यागो श्रान्ति
‘शष्टि’ शां गिर्रा।। श्राणाः श्राध्वरमशास्त्रमिति त्वतिनिद्यन्तात्
श्राणशास्त्रमबवतित्वर्ज्ज्ञमुपपेत्रेञ्ज्ञिन्याः। १० ||

शस्ति आख्यातमाश।

श्रानुवृत्तविषयासमन्नमोः: स्मृति:।

प्राणापेन ‘श्रामुन्तकः’ ‘विषयकः’ शष्टि श्रां ‘श्रास्मृताः’ संक्षार-
प्रभासवेणिराग्याभ्यां निरूपां बाध्यातः।।

* तदर्भः तबः हि किरित्युपकल्याणः॥
† प्रभासगण हि बिनिर्देषुकल्याणः॥
‡ बिनिर्देषानिविवाहस्थानं बाध्याय वस्त्रणां ब्रह्माण्यां विनायकस्वाभावः॥
§ प्रभासवेणिराग्यां विनिर्देशः॥ ॥

तत् ख्यतीं यतोऽध्यातः \| १३ \|

ह्रद्यन्रितिक विषयः खण्डपरिष्ध: परिशम: 'ख्यतिः' तत्शः 'यज्ञः' उक्खः, पुनःपुनःसाध्विलेन वेदांव विनिवेशनम् 'व्याख्याः',
ह्युष्टे \| १४ \|
तस्येव विशेषामाः।

स तु दौर्घोकालर्त्यस्तकारसेवितो हठभूमिः \| २० \|

हठभूमिः 'नेत्रस्वर्याण्यकर्त्तिर्यथे स श्वेतमणि: 'हठभूमि:'
खिरे भवति, दादौय मद्वतीयथे: \| १४ \|
वैराग्यक्ष सचिनामाः।

हठानुरूपविविध्यवित्वाध्याय वशीकारशब्दा वैराग्यम् \| १५ \|

द्विविधो विषयो हठ्ठ्ठ श्रानुरूपविविधः। 'हठ्ठ्ठ:' हठ्ठ्ठ्ठ्ठययवः समाप्तिः। शब्दोऽकारे 'श्रानुरूपविविधः'। श्रानुरूपस्य गुहसुखातिविश्वसे अरुष्येवेबः तत्य श्रागतः 'श्रानुरूपविविधः'। तथोऽहृदेयतिर्यथे 'विषयोऽ'। परिशमविविध्यवित्वाध्यायानात् विगतगृहुः, या 'वशीकारशब्दा' समीते।

* देवोऽको हरि F युक्तवचारः।
† ततोऽपिथम्य हरि B, C चिन्तितपुलक्सः यथः। तत्य श्रागतः श्राव
हरि F युक्तवचारः।
‡ विगतगृहेऽको विह B, D चिन्तितपुलक्सः यथः।


नाइसियो वास्त रति चेहां विसि:। तत् वैराग्यम् उचाते


tथेिव विशेषमािः।

तत् पनं पुरुषक्षार्तेः पुरुषविषयम्। १८॥

तत् वैराग्य, 'पं' दल्लाइ। प्रथमं वैराग्य विषयविषयं, द्वितीयेन गृहविषयवुप्पणुपुष्पविषयविषयपृथ्वीकाळेरे। भवति निरोधावधाबिंधेवात्-ज्ञातुवर्धकािाः॥ १८॥

एवं याग्य सख्यं पुरुषां सम्प्रवातासम्प्रवातमद्धेै।

वितकीविचारानन्दास्मितानुगमात् सम्प्रवात:॥१७॥

समाधिरिति श्रेषः। सम्प्रवातसम्प्रवात्वर्तत्तलेन प्रशायके प्रकरण शायके भावस्क सख्यं चेन व 'सम्प्रवात:'। समाधिरिति श्रेषः। धैयानिर्मितसक्ततनिरिरे: सम्प्रवात: धैर्यसम्ब-प्रितिरिति यानटू। एव वितकीविचारात् चतुर्विभ:। वितके: विचार:, धानट:, यास्मिन:। धावाः प्रभाव॥ विषयावर्तिरिष्टानेचः

* विष्णुस्कारसंधा गैिे वास्त रति F पुलकपाठ:।
† विभाग रति F पुलकपाठ:।
‡ उदयप्रवज्ञातेनेव भवतीति B चिन्तितपुलकपाठ:। उदयप्रवज्ञातेनेव-विभाषणातेवनाटीति D पुलकपाठ:। उदयप्रवज्ञातेव-विभाषणातेव भवतीति F पुलकपाठ:।
§ सम्बाद्यांमद्धे B चिन्तितपुलकपाठ:।
|| भावाः प्रकर: D पुलकपाठ:।
१ पारे २६ वर्षानु.

चेनिन पुऱऱ पुणरिवांगन। भावध विधा। देशरत्नाचि च।
तान्नपूऱ च दिधा बडाजडांबद्दात। सधानी वधाविश्वानतः। 
चक्र: पुराणः। तत्र च बहा महायज्ञतिर्विशानी सूसानी विवेधवेनाधारे
पूर्वारागुभामानेन वर्त्त्तासेवकशैलके म्हणूनगृङ्गे बदरा भावाना प्रवर्तिते, 
तदा विविधः समाधिः। आक्षेपयावासने पूर्वारागुभामानश्च वर्त्त्तासेवके 
वर्त्त्ताने, बदरा भावाना प्रवर्तिते, तदा निर्विषेकः। तथात्तानोऽकः करणः
शुम्ह शुम्ह विवधमालभा तस्म देशकालालघूवष्ट्टेनः। बदरा भावाना
प्रवर्तिते, तदा विविधः। तस्माने देशकालालघूवष्ट्टेन विना
धर्मिनावात्मेनां भावाना प्रक्षेपशाचिनार गंगु- 
ण्याते। एवं पर्यन्त: समाधिप्याद्धामापालिततिः प्रज्ञातिः। 
बदरा तु रज्ज्ज्ज्जकोऽद्गुआविव्युखः करणः भाषये, तदा गुप्तभावाना
विविधः: पुर्वाकामाँगणवस्तु भावासाज्ज्ज्ज्जकेनात् सावन्: समाधिभवति।
आक्षेपयावासने वर्त्त्ताने विधानालधूवष्ट्टेन भावाना
प्रवर्तिते, तदा विविधः। तस्माने देशकालालघूवष्ट्टेन विना
विविधमालभा तस्म देशकालालघूवष्ट्टेनः। द्विते प्रक्षेपमापालितः। 
तत: परं रज्ज्ज्ज्जकोऽद्गुणानाभीतरेः गुढ़े विकमालसनीः तत्वाय: प्रवर्तिते 
भावाना, तत्त्तवं गुप्तभावाना विविधमापालितेन वर्त्त्तानः।

* चक्रः पुराणः हति A पुराणापाठः वर्णवर्णः न सतीशीतः। 
† वनेति F पुराणापाठः। 
‡ प्रद्ध्यावोऽकामापितेनि C पुराणापाठः। प्रद्ध्यावोऽकामापितेन यदेति 
† F पुराणापाठः। 
§ प्रद्ध्यावोऽकामापितेनि C पुराणापाठः। 
|| सम्विदेशकालालघूवष्ट्टेनि F पुराणापाठः। 
¶ ग्रामान्तसमापितिः तपस्या दति E विक्षितपुराणापाठः।
चावेश्वरेन समाधि: शाक्तिः शतुष्ठे। न च चवेश्वराः शाखास्वते-रभेन: ब्राह्मणी�, एतो वधानंकरंमविश्वनेहैन विवाहानं वेदयते वेन्द्रहारः, वधानंसुखतया प्रतिदीपमपरिशाले प्रकाशितोने चेताय व्यामामाक्रमत्वाति शाक्तिः। अभिनव्य समाधीः चे जनपरितेषा: परमार्थतम पुरुषे न प्रक्षणी तेषाचेताय शरारके श्रवणप्रभते तेः प्रकाशितया शतुष्ठे। चे परः पुरुषं शाला भावनायं प्रवत्तने तेषांनिध विशेषार्थानिधेशीधमापपतितिरुत्थेते। तत्र चविपथं यथािश् चतुर्वायखः: ब्रजिष्कृत्यावर्ताणे, तत्र एकेत्थासः उत्सरो-तरा हरि युद्धकोशे यम्भणां: सम्भाषणः समाधिः। ॥ १७ ॥

अष्टमस्मारामातायः।

विराममहत्यांभास्तुर्वर्कः संक्लारंशेषायः।* ॥ १८॥

विरथ्यते सनेतति `विराम': विकरकर्मिरविनायां। विरामायाः प्रायवेशीति `विराममयः', तथा `अभ्यास': पैन: पुनर्वो शेषिः विनिवेशं, तत्र चा कार्यव दृष्टिदर्शति तथां नेति नेतीति नेतरस्बेच प्रवृत्तम तद्वेषः।* अष्टमस्मारामातायः ॥

अष्टमस्मारामातायः। न तत्र किंद्रिकथेश्वरः अष्टमस्मारामातायः। अष्टमस्मारामातायः ॥

* संक्षयविनिवेशयाः हिते E पुस्तकमापः।
† सत्यम्यः सम्भाषासमाधिविभविति B पुस्तकमापः।
‡ संक्षयविशेष हिते E पुस्तकमापः।
§ समाधिविशेषिति D पुस्तकमापः।
विषयमुः क्षमामात्र विशिष्टगमः। विशिष्टगमः: वनोढङ्कातु समाधिप्रभ- 
र्कः। एकायमालानब्रह्मुः तु पवयनमालाम्बः। प्रतिपरिशामसः संस्कृतः।
तत् युत्यानजनिता: संस्कृतः: समाधिप्रभर्वः: संस्कृतीर्थयः।
तत्त्वार्धश्चात्माः। निराधारजनितेनकामतामः: संस्कृतः: खलुप्रत
हन्ते। चतो विश्वकालिनं भावमांग वीरकमाल्यां* सुतिरकालिनं
निर्विरतः, एवंकालिनप्रभर्वः संस्कृतानां निरोधः: खलुप्रत
निर्विरतः॥ १५॥
तदेवः योगश खलुप्रयोः वज्रविपणयावस्था भिधाय विवर्देवपार्थ
योगायामप्रदेशपूर्विकं कषुपक्षमेते।

भवप्रत्ययो विद्वेष्टप्रकालिनिलयानाम्॥ १५॥

'विदेशः', 'प्रजातिषयः', च विकार्यादिकानि क्षेत्रे यथाक्षेतः।
तेवा समाधि: 'भवप्रत्ययः', भव: संवादः: च एव प्रत्ययः: कारणः यथा
व 'भवप्रत्ययः'। तथाऽः। भावनामां एव संवादे ते तथा-
विविधानामिविहार्ये भवति। तेषां परतत्वादेशनात् योगायामप्रत्ययः।
गतः परतत्वानात तद्भवनायाम सुनिकाचेन यथः; † विधेय इत्यतं-
द्वर्ष्यपदिष्ठम्॥ १५॥

तद्वेषायाः।

* श्रीसवं ययमालामालास्मिति F पुस्करपाः।
† व्याकुलावर्गान्त यदि E, G पुस्करपाः।
‡ मस्तान्त यदि D, G पुस्करपाः।
oyer(IF)AY-lireyAF 14TA BHOI:

"Dviteṣṭhiḥ śastraś cāhānto, bhaktiḥ. Prabhuḥ, ucyātāh, kāndavaḥ. 

Tat 'arthaḥ' yogāvivekeṇe bhāṣe: prakāśaḥ. 'viśeṣa' ucyātāh. 

'Saṁādhiś' yuga-yuga-sthāne 'saṁādhiś' eva-kāye. 'prakāśa' prabhavāk-

yāvivekeṇe. 'saṁādhi' prāṇa-vyādhe ke: saṁādhiye. bhāyābhāyābhāvān 

bhavati. bhāyaśravaśa paśaṁśaśa bhūmicuś śāntiḥ prayāyate. tat-spar-

śāveṇe ke: saṁādhiye. saṁmārṣeṇaś ca bhāyābhāyaśc ca śāntiḥ 

abhavati. 

Santarārārāt, parāśa vairāyāsya kaścicuś śāntiḥ prayāyate. tat-spar-

śāveṇe ke: saṁādhiye. saṁmārṣeṇaś ca bhāyābhāyaśc ca śāntiḥ 

abhavati. 

* samādhiḥ kāya C, F, G ucyātāh. prabhuḥ saṁādhiḥ. 

Praśadāraṇo tīrtha-kṣema bhavati. saṁādhi kāya C, F, G ucyātāh. 

Tadā prabhuḥ prabhāmbale bhāvābhāva-bhāvābhāva bhavati. 

† teṣām samādhiḥ śastra 'saṁādhi' D ucyātāh.

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भूमध्याधिमाणवालं ततोपि विशेषः ॥ २२ ॥

तेषम् उपाये भूमध्याधिमाणवालं उपायवर्तं 'विशेषः', भवति।
'भूमध्याधिमाणवालं', रत्नपायेवेदः। ते प्रत्येकं भूमध्याधिमाणवालं-
तीर्थं वेदेतार्थं चिनिधाः। तत्त्वादेव च न कौशिकं भवति।
भूमध्याधिमाणवालं, भूमध्याधिमाणवालं, मध्यवेगः, तीर्थं वेगः। मथोपायः, भूम-
ध्याधिमाणवालं, मध्यवेगः, तीर्थं वेगः। अधिमाणवालं, भूमध्याधिमाण-
वालं, मध्यवेगः, तीर्थं वेगः। अधिमाणवालं तीमि ॥ चं वेगः महान्
थमः कर्माद दृष्टि भेदोपदेशः। ॥ २२ ॥

द्राक्षीनेतरपुयाधिकर्षणं गुणमुद्याधिकारादः।

ईश्वरप्राणिधानाराः ॥ २३ ॥

'ईश्वरः' वज्ञामाणश्च, 'प्राणिधानं' तच भविष्यवेषः। विशिष्ट-
मुपासं सर्वज्ञानामापि तचार्थं। विषयसुखादिकं फलमनिर्णयं
भूसः: किष्याभिनु परममुहार्यणि, तत् 'प्राणिधानं'। समापत्तिः-
फलमनिर्णयं ॥ प्रकटं उपायः। ॥ २३ ॥

ईश्वरसः प्राणिधानात् समाधिकं दृष्टमः। तचेन्द्रसः संवृत्तः,
प्रभावं, प्रभावं, वापकं, उपायसः अर्थं, तत्पक्षं कलेषं वक्तमाहः।
हेमकामीविपकायशीरपराश्रुः: पुरुषविशेषं ईश्वरः ॥

॥ २४ ॥

क्रियान्विति 'हेमः': विषयादेशो वक्तमानः। विषय-अतिविद्वान-
व्याधिशायिण्यं 'कलेषं'। विषयालं दृष्टि 'विपका': कर्मप्रकारः

* प्रचंदनिककुटिलि C, F युक्तकहियाङः।
जातायुभोजनः। चाफक्षिप्पिकाकाण्ड चिजभयूस्म सेरत दृति श्रवणः। वाक्याखा:। कंकालः। तेः। 'श्रवणः' चिजिवि शालेण न संस्कृतः।
'पुष्पविग्रहः' चन्दः। पुष्पविग्रहः विभिन्नत दृति विभेषः। 'देशः' देशग़ेणः।
'क्राक्षमाचीण संक्षिप्तसूत्रमादिः। दशिपि सर्वेष्वाकातः भक्ति निर्माणः। नागेरी तथा
तानती माधवा भक्ति भक्तिपालः। नागेरी तथा विश्वेष वन्भगाः।
यथा यन्त्रतो जयप्राधिया खासिनः। श्रुति तु चिजिवि कालेण न
तायारिहोपनो भक्ति भक्तिरामः। नागीत्वः विश्वेष एव भगवानः।
तसा च तथा चतुर्विश्वधर्माधिनः। मनोक्षेत्राः। मनोक्षेत्राः
शास्त्रः प्रकटारानादेव। न चालाौः। श्रानवंशवथारितेनरास्थायः
परस्परप्रतन्त्वः। तै तेऽद श्रानवंशः देशरवः वर्त्तमाने भनारि
भुजः। तथारिविन मलेन तथानादरिवः सम्बन्धः। प्रकटिपुष्पस्यारागः
विषोषोषोगीरस्वरस्क्यायितेनसागरानुपोषः। चेहरेवर्णः प्राणिः सुकृ
हुः: विषोषोगीरस्वरस्क्यायितेनसागरानुपोषः।
तसा च देशरवः नागीत्वः चारिहोपनो भक्ति भक्तिपालः। नागीत्वः चारिहोप

* देशानमोहिन दृति A पुस्तकमादः। परस्पर न समीचीनः।
† न च तयारिवि C, F पुस्तकमादः।
एवमीशरख सङ्क्यमभिधाय प्रमाणमां रूपमें।

तत्थ निर्तिष्यं सर्व्यद्वीजं। दूषं ।

तभिन्न भगवति, वर्णेक्षुद्ध यत् 'वीजः' चतुर्विभागातिदिद्धुरुस्तुलमण्डवात्रिपुत्रवान् खमण्डवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् वर्णेक्षुद्ध जत् 'तत्थ', 'निर्तिष्यं' कालं प्राणं। दूषं ।

यथा परमाणवपुरुषाकारं स परमपर्वतः।

एवं भागवेदाति विष्णुवाकारं विष्णुवाकारं परिभ्रमणा: कालिबोधनं निर्तिष्यानां कालिश्वराति। यथा परमाणवपुरुषाकारं स परमपर्वतः।

विष्णुवाकारं परिभ्रमणानां कालिबोधनं निर्तिष्यानां कालिश्वराति। यथा परमाणवपुरुषाकारं स परमपर्वतः।

विष्णुवाकारं परिभ्रमणानां कालिबोधनं निर्तिष्यानां कालिश्वराति। यथा परमाणवपुरुषाकारं स परमपर्वतः।

स एष पूर्वेनामविस्मादो: कालनानवच्छेद्यताः।

आवान्ति सहृद्यं ब्रह्मदीदास्यामि, 'गुहं' उपेदा, यत: 'व्।

* चतुर्विभागातिदिद्धुरुस्तुलमण्डवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुखवात्रिपुत्रवान् महसुलमुक...
पातळीते येगदृढ़े

जात्यायुपर्वाना:। भाषानिपातानुसार कर्तव्य देते 'श्रवणः' वाचनाख्या:। संज्ञारा:। ते: 'श्रवणस्थः' विचित्रपि कालेखु न संस्कृता:। 'पुष्पविलेखः' अन्नोऽरः पुष्पवेषो विश्वायत देत विलेखः। 'ईसरः' ईश्वरनीतिः, रूढ्यांमात्र रूढ्यांजगणदुःखरूपः। यदापि शर्वेंद्र-मात्राना कृष्णास्यंशी नास्ति तदापि विनगतभक्तिवाचारुपविष्टे। यथा येत्तुगते जयपराजयों स्वामिनः। रक्षा तु चिन्तापि कालेखु तथाविवेदःपि कृष्णास्यरामरामना नास्तीतयत:। विकर्षण एवं भगवानीयः। तस्माति तथाविवेदः विनुमयनादि:। वनस्पति वर्धायित्वा नेह्वाद्वितीयः।

प्राणिर्यां सुख- दुःखवेश्वरा विपिनार्थ च निरं मानवीशी रहस्यवर्त न ब्रह्मज्ञान:। स्वतं सम्बन्धवत् नैवमीयः। तस्माति तथाविवेदः विनुमयनादि:। वनस्पति वर्धायित्वा नेह्वाद्वितीयः। नेह्वाद्वितीयः न ब्रह्मज्ञान:।

* ईश्वरनीतिः हृति A पुस्तकापां: परस्य्यं न समीचिनः।
† न च तयारिति C, F पुस्तकापां:।
एवमीयरस्त्र सख्रणुभिधाय प्रमाणमास।

तच निर्तिशयं सर्वव्रजविजं ॥ २४।।

तिक्षिनं भगवति, सर्वव्रजवः यत् 'वीजं' तत्तीतावागतादिद्रहानुपत्तं सह्यतं, मूलव्रजामिव वीजं, ततु 'तच', 'निर्तिशयं' काठं प्रार्थ ॥ दृष्टा हि अशुलमस्वर्जार्दीगि । धर्मीणां धातिशयानां काठार्टमि। यथा परमाणवलस्तकावः च वरसमस्वः।

एवं ज्ञानद्योगी बिचारद्वितार्तवेयं परिव्रह्माणं: काशिधर-तिश्चलमापाद्यमि। यथे चैते निर्तिशयं: च देशर:। यथापि तामान्यमाचरेनमाणसं पवंवितततासं विशेषावगतिं सम्भवति, तथापि श्रावस्त्र सर्वव्रजाद्वयं विशेषा अवगत:। च य ज्ञानोजनाभावे कथं प्रजातिपुस्वयं: संयोगार्थोगावापाद्यतीतिः नापदेहीं।

तस्य कात्संकल्पस्ताले एवं प्रयोजनं। कल्य-प्रख्यमहाप्रकोपं निषेधानां संवारिष चतुरियामातिः तस्यायवधायः।

दशस्त्रेऽन्तरं तनस्य प्रयोजनमिति ॥ २५।।

एवमीयरस्त्र सख्रणं प्रमाणशालिभाय प्रभवामास।

स च पूर्ववैमाग्रं गुहः कालेनानविण्ठदातः ॥ २६।।

शाखानं सख्रणं ब्राह्मादीनामपि, 'गुहं' उपदेष्टा, यत: 'श:'.

* तत्तीतावागतादिद्रहानुपत्तं एवं समकामालिभिः B, C, D, E पुलकानां पाठः।
† अशुलस्वर्जार्दीनिभिः A, E पुलकपाठः। एवं मध्य सख्रण चाप-प्रस्तुतं संवारिष चतुरियामातिः।
‡ निर्तिश्चलमापाद्यमि D पुलकपाठः।
‘कालेन’, गावक्तिरते चकाहिलातु. तेवां पुनर्दिसर्ववादर्शे कालेनात्मक्षेत्रे: ॥ २१ ॥

एवं प्रभावसुक्ता उपायनेांपबोगात्वाष्टकमाहः

तत्त्व वाचकः प्रश्नः ॥ २७ ॥

इत्यसुक्तैनुसारे देवराकः, ‘वाचकः’ प्रभिधानः।* प्रकरणः नूतने स्त्रिये क्रियातेन नैति सौतीति वा ‘प्रश्नः’ योगानः। तथेऽर्थ वाचस्ववाचकमाहवचस्वस्मात्मा निदा: सर्सेते प्रकाश्यते, न तु वेगानित निदाते, यथा पितुपच्छोमिश्चमन: समाधिस्वादां पिता अस्त्रायं पुष्य दति केनचिन्तः प्रकाश्यते ॥ २७ ॥

उपायनमाहः।

तत्प्रकर्ष्णदृष्ट्याभावनम् ॥ २८ ॥

‘तत्’ सांहुचिमाध्यमा प्रकर्मः, ‘अपं’ चवावदुष्चारणं, तदाश्वयं-सरस्व ‘शान्तं’ पुनः पुनशृंगस्तिति विनिवेष्टन्तं, एकास्ताया उपायः। अतः समाधिस्वाधृतेऽथ चोकिना प्रश्नोत्तौ अयातः, तदर्शश्च भावनीवः।† इत्युथं भवति ॥ २८ ॥

उपायनामः: फलमात्रः।

तत्: प्रत्यक्षतन्माधिगमास्यन्तरायाभावः † ॥ २८ ॥

तत्त्वात्स्यपत् तदर्शभावनात् ॥ च योगिनः: ‘प्रत्यक्षतन्माधि-

* वाचकोषभिधानः प्रवचन योगारघ दति A, D पुस्तकवेदयादः।
† तदर्शस्य दूरस्त्र भावनीय दति B, D पुस्तकवेदयादः।
‡ चेतनामोगस्यन्तराया भाव दति A, C, D, F पुस्तकवेदतुष्टयादः।
गन्नम्: भवति। विषयमात्रिकुक्षेन खास्तः कर्माभिधिमुखमयति, या वेतना हृद्क्रियः, तथा ऋणगमः। खास्तः, भवति। "अभावाया" वच्चमानसः, तेषां ऋणभावः। श्रवणपतिवमः, भवति॥ ६॥

अभायं के अभावाया॥ दत्तात्रयायामात्।

अभिष-खास-संशय-प्रमाद्वारलिकक्ष-धानिदर्श-नालाभ्युदिक्षानववतिक्षतबनि विषयविशेषप्रेतेन्द्रराया:॥ २॥

वैविद्य राजशेषवालस्त्र प्रवर्तनानां। "विषयविशेषः" ॥ भवति, ये विविध विविधयोगिनिभिन्नविस्तारः। तत् वेतना। धातु-वैविद्यविशेषः। अन्यादिः। खास्तः श्रवणपतिव विषयः। उभयेको-खाससः। विचारः "वंशयः"। देवः खास्तः वा न वेदित। "प्रमादः। अन्नुपादरूप्रेतः। समाधिः ध्यातामाथे। अवलोकि। "अभावः" कायविष्ठ-ध्यातामाथे, ब्रह्माविपृष्टं प्राक्षम्याये भेदः। "तद्विद्या।" विषयः।

* प्रवक्षेत्रतानाम् इति C, D पुष्कायायपादः।
† खास्तः कर्माभिधिमुखमयति या दुध्यातिरितिः B पुष्कायायपादः। खास्तः। कर्माभिधिमुखमयति या चेतना दुध्यातिरितिः A, C पुष्कायायपादः। खास्तः कर्माभिधिमुखमयति प्रवक्षेत्र चेतना दुध्यातिरिति तस्याधिक्य इति D पुष्कायायपादः।
‡ एक ने तेल्लाराया इति C, E पुष्कायायपादः।
§ विषयविशेषः इति A, C पुष्कायायपादः।
|| अभिस्योधानाधिपतिः C पुष्कायायपादः। परम्परायेन समीचीनः।
¶ वेषः साधः। खास्तः वा वेदित A, C पुष्कायायपादः।
विषयवस्थापोगदाम गच्छः। "ञ्ज्ञित्वमेव" प्रकृतिकार्यं रजतस-वदित्वं विपर्ययागां। "ञ्ज्ञातस्मातिकां" कृतसिद्ध गितसिद्ध सभाधिकेनार्थामाहामात्रः। "ञ्ज्ञातस्मातिकां" सभाविषयामाहां गुमाधिकेन विनम्रत्व तत्तत्रान्तिकः। त-एवं समाधिरेखानाथाः। वच्चायोगं प्रतिपड़लात् चर्मारावः। राति उष्णः॥ २०॥

विषयबिचये कारकान्यन्यनस्मारावः प्रतिपादित्वमुः॥

dुःख-दौर्मन्नस्मायन्यन-श्रास-प्रश्नासा विख्ये यस्य भूवः॥ २१॥

कृष्णस्थिरितां दुःखान्युष्णं विचारे यतः। दुःखाबयः प्रवर्तनः।

तत् 'दुःखं' विनम्रत्व रागः॥ परिश्रमः बाधानावशः॥ यददात् प्राणिनादिपपायात् प्रवर्तनः। 'दौर्मन्नस्य' बाधानावशः कारणमे-भन्तु दैहिकः। 'चन्द्रेष्यमपं' सहांडानी वेपुष्यः भाषिकोऽर्थोऽस्मार्कः। प्राणे यदां वामुक्षावभावः 'श्रासः'॥॥ चक्षूस्य वाचुः निधारणायति॥ यथा 'प्रश्नः'। त एते विचारे॥ शृङ्खलाः कवित्वम्}

* विषयसाधनम्यायला गहँ दृष्टि च युक्तसायः।
† रजतसदित्वां दृष्टिम् अयुक्तसायः।
‡ बाधायावपरिवर्त्तां दृष्टि युक्तसायः।
§ विचारे दृष्टिम् क्षत्रियसं कृतस्मातिनी दृष्टिम्।
¶ चन्द्रेष्यमपं दृष्टिम् अयुक्तसायः।
‖ चन्द्रेष्यमचारकोऽर्जितां दृष्टिम् अयुक्तसायः।
** प्राणो यदां वामुक्षावभावः स यास दृष्टि च युक्तसायः।
¶¶ निमित्तिर्वाचः अ, ब, द युक्तसायः।
#### यदैवचिद्विपतिर्वाचः अ, ए, द युक्तसायः।


चतुर्दश्यामवास्तः-वैराग्यावर्गं निरोधक्या इच्छेभावस्पर्धेः: ॥ १ ॥

सूक्ष्मद्वितीयप्रतिवेशधार्यसुपायानन्यरावः ॥

तत्त्रतिवेशधार्यमेकत्सशध्यायः: ॥ २ ॥

तेषाः विशेषणां 'प्रतिवेशधार्यं' निवेशधार्यं, 'एककृत्तं कक्षिं-मिस्ते, 'तत्', 'स्र्यासं', तेनाः पुनः पुनर्निवेशधार्यं कुर्यात्।

चद्वासानं प्रयुक्तिमात्रेयांरत्यं धर्मसुप्रथमम् विवेषाः: ॥ ३ ॥

इदार्थे विचर्यस्यारामपालकपरिक्षकृतम्यान्यपुर्वकसुपायानन्यरावः

मैत्री-कल्याणा-मुद्रस्तोपेक्षायां सुखदः-कपुर्र्यापुप्प्यवि-

ध्यायां भावनातिमित्रप्रसादनम् ॥ ३ ॥

'मैत्री' वैद्याण्। 'कल्याणा' कप। 'स्मदिता' दश। 'स्मेशा' वैद्याण्। एता यथाःसं सुखस्वतं, दुःखस्वतं, पुष्पवस्तु, अपुष्पवस्तु च भावस्थेत।

तत्परं सुखस्वतं शायेर्वा सुखस्वतं सुखस्वतं मैत्रीं क्य्यास्त लीक्या। दुःखस्वतं कर्म नु नामायें दुःखस्वतं सुखस्वतं ना तारस्यं। पुष्पवस्तु पुष्पवस्तु गुणोद्धेर चं कृत्यात्तैं नातरस्यं।

प्रसादादिकृतमि विशेषभेदानुसरं नामं नामायें नामायें न देवं। श्रुवे सुखदः-स्मदितात्त्वास्त्रत्तामें। प्रतिपादिता:। तदेवेव मैत्रीदिपरिक्षणम् चिन्ते। प्रसादितं। श्रुवे समाश्रयविधानो महति। परिक्षणमें वैतदात्रा

* * विचारसंयानापाल्यं परिष्कर्षणसंयानसुपायानन्यरावहेतुं C, E पुष्पवस्तु:-हयात्।
† परिष्कर्षणमें प्रसादादिकृतम् विशेष दशि E, D पुष्पवस्तू:-हयात्।
‡ विचारादितं सत्तिति D पुष्पवस्तू:-हयात्।
घायते सम्बोधिवाचारशास्त्राभ्यासेने बद्धिनाटिक्याते कथां, ज्येष्ठाकशेषांनी प्राधिकायकी निर्णयाते भूषण, एवं देयरागादि-प्रतिपद्धतमैः शास्त्राध्यात्मा बद्धियांत्रिकात् विनं वम्बितात-\vspace{1em}

\vspace{1em}

प्रक्ष्ण्वे-विधार्यां वा प्राधिक इ ३४ इ

'प्रक्ष्ण्वे' चतुः कौँश्च वाचाः: प्रथाविविधावाचाराध्यायमस्य द्रिष्टिनिर्देशां। 'विधार्यां' मात्राध्यायाः वाचार्याध्यायम्: गतिविषेषेऽरुः।

ग ८ द्रार्यां प्रकारां, वाचार्याध्यायां, पूर्विताः वाचार्याध्यायां निर्देशये। तदेव रेषकपूर्वर्त्तकोऽभेदेऽविधिः प्राधिकायम्:

प्रतिशास्त्रानामत्तीर्थदृष्टिः मात्राध्यायां विनिर्देशये। सर्वोपास्तिर्णीयानां प्राणप्रद्धित्तपूर्वकं लोकमात्राः: अवाचाराः पश्चार्येकशङ्कः शेषालक्षायणाम्: प्राण: कस्मिवेद्रहलिनिर्देशार्थेऽविषेषार्थाना-\vspace{1em}

\vspace{1em}

द्वाराघातसारान्तरं नापादेशेऽसम्बन्धाकाशां: पूर्वर्वः निरीक्षितः ।

* विचित्रप्रत्यादेशां विन्यास A, D प्रत्यादेशां: ।

† पूर्वांशः कार्यालीन B पुलक्षणां: ।

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विषयवती वा प्रदत्तिवस्त्र ख्यातिनिवन्धनी \(\text{४५} \) \\
मनव दति वाक्ष्रेषः। विषया गम्भ-रघु-शूप-शहर-अज्ञा: ते विशलके फलमेव यशा: वा ‘विषयवती’, ‘प्रदत्तिः’, मनव: श्रीर्यें करोतिः। तथा हि नागाये विश्व धारयते दिव्यगमनविविदुपजायते। नाशुवेव जिज्ञाये रघुविन्नः। नाथः शूपविन्नः। जिज्ञास्ये सर्वं-निश्चितः। जिज्ञास्ये श्रृपविन्नः। नाथः तत्तदिप्यदार्रे तात्त्व- \\
क्षेत्रः दिये विषये खाय्यागा खर्चितं धिन्देखाकायाताया श्रेष्ठ- \\
भुवितं, चलित योग्यः फलविन्नः योगिनां समाश्वाशेशापादनात्। \\
॥ २ ५ ॥ \\
एवंविधेयोपायाणतरमाथः। \\
विशेषकाः वा ध्योतिवरीयात् \(\text{४६} \) \\
प्रदत्तिवस्त्रा विलखः ख्यातिनिविवन्धनी वाक्ष्रेषः। ध्योति:- \\
श्रेष्ठं बालिक: श्रद्धाः न्यूनते, व श्रद्धाः ख्यातित्रिश्रववाङ्गं विद्यते \\
वश्च वा ‘ध्योतिवरीय’, प्रदत्ति:। ‘विशेषका’ विगतः। घुमयव- \\
स्थायायण्यार्थं रक्षितामः वश्च श्रद्धाः ते, केतवः ख्यातिनिविवन्धनी। \\
प्रथमानं, श्रद्धास्युपमतमये प्रसन्नकाभ्यास्वाभाविरुद्धिं \\
विलखं समानवतः। प्रसन्नकानकात् सम्बन्धितिपरिषमेव केतवः ख्याति- \\
सुपपद्धते। \(\text{४६} \) \\
उपायाणत्रप्रदर्शनदार्रेश समप्रमाणत्र समाधेविविषयं दर्शयति। \\
बीतरागविषयं वा चिन्तं \(\text{४७} \) \\
मनव: ख्यातिनिविवपं भवतीति वाक्ष्रेषः। ‘बीतरागः’
परिष्कारप्रवेशाभिषेकः. तथा यतु 'चिस,' परिष्कारप्रवेशात तदाचायनी-जन्तु, चेतनः स्मिरितेतेंतत्ततः ॥ २७ ॥
एवंविद्यवेधपायाण्यत्तमाः ॥

स्वाभ-निर्वा-शानाजलम्बनं वा ॥ १८ ॥

प्रत्यक्षार्थवाचकङ्गत्रि-क्रियेन्मन्द्रामाचेचित्र च भोजलांकम: ॥
'स्वाभ:' 'निर्वा' पूर्वांकलिप्या ॥ तदाचायनं स्मालकाने, निक्रियाखंबं वा 'शान', शाल्यव्यवार्थ, चेतनः स्मिरित वर्णनात् ॥ २८ ॥

नागास्बसिताः प्राणिनां विश्वास कृत्तिविचरस्वति धोमणिः स्वतः
भवति । तथा धानेगापि भवतीतिस्मिरित्रत्र प्रतिपादान्तत्तमाः ॥

बहारिभमतात्यानां ॥ २९ ॥

बहारिभमते वसन्नि वाच्यो चन्दावार, चचन्तारे नाग्रीकन्द्राई वा
भावमाने चेत: स्मिर भवतिः ॥ २९ ॥
एवसुपायाम् प्रदर्श्यं फलसर्वाक्ष्यत्तमाः ॥

परमायु-परममहंस्चान्तो ५स्य वशीकादः ॥ ४० ॥

प्रभमायुचिन्तिताः सैत्य भावतो योगिनः स्मालकविव्याभवा-
मारेष परमाकाशः 'वशीकाः' चान्तिचात्तक्षः, नायते, कस्मिन
परमार्यन्यानि सूचे विवेश्यां सनोन न प्रतिच्छत दृश्यः ॥
एवं स्मालकाशार्देपरममहंस्चान्त्यां भावतो न कस्मिन चेतः: चान्तिचात
उत्पादते सर्वस्य स्मालकं भवतीत्यथः ॥ ४० ॥

* पूर्वेवनेवंत्यतेयांति इ पुष्करपाः
† स्मिरिभवतीति इ पुष्करपाः चेतः स्मिरिभवतीति इ पुष्करपाः
एवेमेहिंद्राये: संज्ञातिस सेतुः की०हुँ२ भवतीत्वाच।

श्रीपदनेर्भिजातस्येव मणेयेही-ग्रहण-ग्राहेणुष
तस्म-तद्वन्ननासमाप्यति: || ४१ ||

चीणा दृणायेच मः: ‘चीणारतिः’, तस्स, ‘पशीद-पशुण-पाशोणु’
श्रीश्वेत-विषेषेयु, ‘तस्मा-तद्वन्ननासमाप्यति:’, भवति || ‘तस्मा’
त सत्त्वात् || ‘तद्वन्ननावन’ तस्माथं, व्यवहरिते चिने विषयव भाव-
मानखेनोत्यथय:। तथाविधा ‘समाप्तिः’ तद्वन्ननपरिश्येसो भवतीत्वाचः।
चूँतान्नमाहे || ‘भ्रमणात्सने मणे:’, दृति चया ‘भ्रमणात्स’ विषेषेयश, खेरीकमोऽ, ||
तस्मा-पारायवस्थानत्रपतापलयति:। एवं ‘भ्रमणात्स’
विषेषेयश विन्नक्ष तस्मा-पारायवस्थानत्रपतापलयति:। यथापि
पशीद-पशुण-पाशोणुः, तथापि ‘भ्रमणात्सणे’ पशुण-पाशुणीभविति
बेद्वृहं। तदल्लो वसानिन्त्य एव समाधितुभवः
पशुणस्थितकालस्वरुपमणे पशुणविनिधः, वेद्वृहस पुत्रस्व पशुण-
भावाभवानात्। तस्मा शुल्काव्यापहोपरं विन्यः तथा समाप्तिः
भवति || एवं श्रीणी श्रीतत्ति रसमपाच बेद्वृहं || ४२ ||

ददानीशक्याये एव श्रमपाचशुल्काव्यापहोत्यः*।

श्रीमाय-श्रान-विकल्पे: सक्षीर्षा सवितकः || ४२ ||

आर्जेहीर्यायाना: श्लोठपर्वत स्थ मणे || ‘श्रान्’ जात्यादि:।
‘श्रानं’ वसानिधाना मुद्धतासि:। ‘विकल्पा’ जात्यादि:। तै: ‘श्रीर्षा’,

* चतुर्विन्धवलिङ्गित र शुल्कापाचः।
वस्त्रीम्वते महाद्यमयः परस्राधा अन विकल्पयेष शरीरः श्रमिषः, गौरिनयः, श्रमिषः, महिषः, द्रवनेनाकारेः त्या `अविन्तकाः', समापतिविन्तुकृते*॥ ४ ॥

अंकुलाष्विपरीताः निविर्वितः।

स्मृतिपरियुक्तैः स्वच्छस्वन्येवार्यांमाचनिन्हसां नित्विन्तकाः॥ ४३ ॥

ब्रह्मायण्यम्तिप्रविष्ये, प्रत्यक्ततिस्पष्टायाम्भासारमतिभाषितया भवते-भूतशानकलने च `स्वस्वप्रभुवः दृष्टे', नित्विन्तकाः, समापतिः॥ ४ ॥

भेदान्तरं प्रतिपादितयाः।

एतत् क्रिया निविर्विचारः स्वस्वविषयः व्याख्याता॥ ४४ ॥

`एतत् क्रिया निविर्विचारः निविल्कृतकाः स समापतिः, `सविचारः निविर्विचारः स स्वस्वविषयः व्याख्याता'। कोडीय च `स्वस्वविषयः' स्वस्वविषयः निविर्विचारः, निविर्विचारः यथा तथायोक्तः। एतेन पूर्वेऽसः स्वञ्जविषययां प्रतिपादितं भवति, तथा श्रवितार्थाय श्रवयस्मात्वि विकल्पशिष्ठयाने तद्विध्विलने च॥। देशकालाध्यायविचित्रः, स्वञ्जोदयः प्रतिभाभिषक्ये च यथा `सविचारः'। देशकालाध्यायविचित्रः धार्मिकामूलया

* समापतिविन्तुकृत हि E मुखसापाठः।
† चारायस्मातियः H मुखसापाठः।
‡ तथातिस्पमातिष्ठ H मुखसापाठः।
§ श्रवयस्मात्तिविकल्पशिष्ठयाने श्रवयस्मात्तिविकल्पशिष्ठयाने H मुखसापाठः।

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१ पाद ४७ खण्डः। २७

छोर्यस्यदेशस्यमेकलिङ्गस्य: निविदायितं शब्दं ता 'निविदायितं'।

प्रक्षा एवं स्वयम्विदिता: ॥ ५४ ॥

किं परिक्षा: छोर्य विदितं यथार्थः।

स्वयम्विदितवल्लंकालिङ्गस्यवाणः ॥ ५५ ॥

विदितविदित: समाप्त्योर्थं 'स्वयम्विदितं', जनं। न
कविलिङ्गस्य न वा किंविदितस्य गमयनिाति 'कविलिङ्ग' प्रथानं,
तत्पदानं स्वयम्विदितवल्लं। तथा च द्विगुणार्म परिषासे व्यवाहि पर्यावरणं,
विशिष्टसंहितं, चायमिश्रितसंहितं, विज्ञानं, चायमिश्रितसंहितं।
विशिष्टसंहितं इति। अति द्विगुणार्म तत्कालेचक्रियांकं।
विज्ञानं इति।
अव्यायविदितं प्राधान्यातितं। गात: परं स्वयम्विदितं भवति ॥ ५५ ॥

एतायं समाप्तियां भवते प्रथोजनमां

ता एवं सवीयं समाधिः ॥ ५६ ॥

'ता एवं' उक्तज्ञानं: समाप्तचिः: यद्व विज्ञ एकान्यनेन
कर्तित द्वारं 'वयुज्ञ': समाधानं: समाधिः: दृढ्युच्छते, सवीयं शाखा-
खण्डः। ॥ ५६ ॥

चंद्रेवर्त्यां स्वाधिशीलां निविदायितांकलात् निविदायितां

विदिताः।

निविदायिताविदितां अध्यात्मप्रतिमां ॥ ५७ ॥

'निविदायितां वाप्तां। 'वयुज्ञं' निवेष्ठां। नविदितां सङ्कृ।

* छोर्ये ठीकायिता एवरं भवेति E पुस्करमादः।
† निविदायितां: प्राधान्यार्थं E पुस्करमादः।
प्रातापेश्वर निखिलकाय: प्राधानयं। ततैपि स्रवणविषयात्
बविषयात्। ततैपि निखिलकष्णपाया निखिलवामया।
तस्याश्रमं निखिलवामया: प्रश्नभाषाद्रात्। 'वैश्वारणे' नैर्देशं वर्ति, 'अध्याद्व-प्रश्नः';
सनुपत्यायते, तत्तथं अस्वाप्यवानार्थं अस्यप्रवाहं
अवति। एतत्तदेव विनाशैव वैश्वारणः, यात्रिकता दृष्टीं || ४३ ||
तस्याश्रमं वर्ति किं भवनीयमाय।

छलभरा तथ प्रश्नः || ४५ ||

"छलं" सत्यं विभांगं कदाचिदपि न विपर्ययंवेष्टाहार्तेः, या
'छलभरा'; 'प्रश्नं', तस्याश्रमं वर्तिन, भवनीयमायं।
तस्याश्रमं प्रश्नालोकार्तः
सबं चयावनं प्रत्येकं चोगी प्रत्यइं चाचं प्रामीलं || ४५ ||

प्रश्नाः प्रश्नान्तराः वैश्वारणमाय।

श्रुतानुमानप्रश्नभाषान्यविषयं विशेषार्थत्वात् ||

॥ ४५ ॥

'श्रुतं' प्रागमाणं, 'श्रुतानुं' उकबलं, तामवः या जातेत
प्रश्नं तथा सामान्यविषयं। न द्वित्तीयं चारीश्रविध्विद्धमतिपति
यामेत्र। इत्यं पुरानेकिर्मवैश्वारणचिरुपेता। प्रश्नं तामवः विषयसा
विशेषविबधानां। चर्मां व्रत प्रशार्या खण्डमां अवसिष्टां-विस्तारामपि विशेष: स्तुतंनैव रुपेण प्रतिभातेऽ। तत्त्वां व्रत प्रशार्या चेतनागा परः प्रयत्न: कर्मेऽद्विपदं भवति॥ ४८ ॥
चर्मां: प्रशार्या: फलमान॥

तत्त: संस्कारोज्ज्ञायस्मातप्रतिवेदि॥ ५० ॥

tथा प्रशार्या जनितः यः। 'स्वकाः,' चेतना: बुद्धानं बुद्धानं
बमधिख्यास्त संस्कारानु प्रतिभाति, बस्कायकर्षणाचमानू करो-नीव्यः। यत्त्वांचलकपतया तथा जनितः संस्कारा बुद्धवतात अतश-कूपझाताजनितनां संस्कारानु वाहितुं प्रकृतन्ति। अतशाश्वेत प्रशार-मध्येदित्युत्रं भवति॥ ५० ॥
एवं संप्रशास्त्रमधिख्यायाश्चम्प्रशास्त्रं कुमार॥

तथापि निरोध्ये सब्यनिरोधाधानीविजः समाधिः॥ ॥ ५१ ॥

'तथापि' संप्रशास्त्रकार्ये, 'निरोध्ये' प्रविलये, वस्ति, 'सब्यायां' चिन्तमाणी, सब्यारे प्रविलख्या या संस्कारास्त्र दसित्वतेति,
तथां तथां नेति नेति केवलं पर्युपंस्तनाति। 'निर्विजः: समाधि:,
प्राविन्धःः। बस्यनु वस्ति पुरुषः स्वकपमाणिनिः। पुस्कर्ये भवति॥

tद्वाहिपरिपत्रस योगां खण्डम, चिन्तमाणिनिरोधपदानास्त्र यथा-

* तत्त्वांसमाधिख्यांविशेषं ॥ पुस्कर्ये ॥
† पर्युपंस्तनादिति ॥ प्रवद्विनिः ॥
‡ स्वकपमाणिनिः ॥ पुस्कर्ये ॥
ख्यानं, सर्वार्थ-पौराणिकविशेषं, तत्कार्याद्विवक, खसुंपं मेदव्याबिधानं वम्मातानमप्रग्रामातभद्रेण धोमस्य सुख्यासुख्येदसुखा धोमाभाषा-प्रदर्शनपुर्वतेन विश्वरूपौपापायुः प्रदर्श्यं सुममोपायाद्विवपपरत्वा देवनिमिति खसुंप-प्रमाण-प्रभाव-वाचकोपायावात्सन-तत्प्रकारि दिनेश्यं विश्वरूप-प्रदर्शणं संप्रतिग्रहणोपाया-द्वानकतत्त्वाभासीयारीि धोमाभाषायामात्रीि सम्मानातसम्मानपर्यंति-रजस्वलीविवर्तितानि सत्त्वातिवाहीयारं धोमायामात्रीि सम्मानपत्रि: खलकल्पः प्रदर्शनः खसुंपविवर्तिताः स्वयं सम्मानातसम्मानपर्यंति-धोमायामात्रीि सम्मानपत्रि: खलकल्पः प्रदर्शनः खसुंपपर्यंति धोमायामात्रीि सम्मानपत्रि: खलकल्पः प्रदर्शनः}

इति श्रीमद्धराजाधिराजस्वरूप्रेषेदवितिचितवां राजमार्गश्री-भिभायः पात्राभ्योगाश्यान्तरी योगपायः प्रथम: || ३० ||
चत्र द्वितीयः पादः।

ते ते द्रुष्यापथोहारांविसर्जने वेन दण्डिता।

उपायः व जग्नाधार्यस्यस्य प्राचिनार्थे॥ ९॥

तस्मिन्य प्रथमः पादः समाधिभिषक्ताः योपायं धोगमनिधाय व्यतितिष्कमास्ति कथसुपत्याधार्यस्य थेवा थोऽ धातासुपवाल्मीकी तत्साधनानुपालनप्रत्याघातः संस्कारः।

तपः-स्थायायेयस्यप्रानिधानानि क्रियायोगः॥ १॥

‘तप’ ब्राह्मणरोपिः काङ्क्ष चार्यायामादिः। ‘स्थायायः’ प्रशवपूर्वी्यां मन्त्राणां जपः। ‘हस्तप्रशिधानं’ सर्वक्रियां तस्मिन्य परस्मुगृही कस्मिनर्पेत्यत्वा सम्बन्धे। एतानि क्रियायोग द्वारमात्रते॥ १॥

स धिमर्य हत्यं धार्य॥

समाधिभिषक्ताः स्मृतनूकर्षराधर्यं॥ २॥

‘क्रेशा’ वधमाणः। तेषां ‘तप्पुकर्ष’ स्थायायेर्कर्षप्रतिष्कमः।

‘समाधिः’ घटकसृणः। तथा ‘भावाय’ चेति पुनः पुनःनिवेष्टनः।

संस्कारस्य भाष्यप्रयोगः पर्वस्य व तदेकः॥ एततुिं अवति । एते तपः-प्रधड्यवस्थापिनात्मत्ततास्यविकर्ष्ट्रीद्योः लोकाः। श्रीपर्वस्य भाष्यकर्षराधर्यं भगवन्। तस्मात् प्रथमः क्रियायोगाधाराधारते। धोगिनः अवतितस्यस्यसृणः॥ २॥

स्मृतनूकर्षराधर्यसिंधुः तत्त्वे क्रेशा हत्यं धार्य॥
चविवादस्मिता-राग-देशाभिनवेशा: पद्यः क्रिया:।

|| ३ ||

'क्रिया:' चविवादस्मिता वचनापादश्च: पद्यः। ते वाभनाकारं परितापसूपप्रजनधर्म: क्रियापदवर्धणा: भवतः। ते हि चेति प्रवर्तेयः मानः: संछारलचरं गुणपरिशामं क्रयदर्शनः। ॥ २ ॥

यत्रोत्भ कथ्वां तथेऽहे क्रिया मूर्त्तश्चलनदिव्याय: प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादित्यमाः।

चविवादः चेष्टमुल्यरेवं प्रसल्ल-तनु-विच्छिन्नोद्धारायणं।

|| ४ ||

'चविवादः' मोः, चनिन्त्यात्नासभामिन्द्र दत्ति चावतः। या 'चेष्टे' प्रस्वतःकमिः, 'उत्तरेऽयं' चविवादस्मितार्कं प्रयोक्तं प्रस्वतःसादिस्तेन चतुर्वेदिभाः। यते चचाविवादः विपर्ययक्षालया विषिष्ठी भवति, तस्मात् चचाविवादः विपर्ययक्षालया विषिष्ठी भवति, तस्मात् चचाविवादः विपर्ययक्षालया विषिष्ठी भवति, तस्मात् चचाविवादः विपर्ययक्षालया विषिष्ठी भवति, तस्मात् चचाविवादः विपर्ययक्षालया विषिष्ठी भवति, तस्मात् चचाविवादः विपर्ययक्षालया विषिष्ठी भवति। 'प्रसल्ल-तनु-विच्छिन्नोद्धारायण,' दत्ति तथा यथा चविलम्बितमात्र सिद्धता: प्रवेधसंबोधे वेकार्यों नागरमाणः, ते 'प्रसल्ल,' दत्त्वेते। यथा बालाकाव्याः। बालविष्णुवाचकृते प्रसल्ल-तनु-विच्छिन्नोद्धारायण। यथा मिथुन्य तथा ऐतिहासिक वैदेशिक प्रवेश, यथा अन्य बालकाव्याः। बालविष्णुवाचकृते प्रसल्ल-तनु-विच्छिन्नोद्धारायण। यथा मिथुन्य तथा ऐतिहासिक वै�ेशिक प्रवेश, यथा अन्य बालकाव्याः।

* संचारश्चविमिति B युक्तप्रमाणः।
† विशेषतेत्वं भूषणविम्याया दृष्टि B युक्तप्रमाणः।
‡ खेदाभिकासहार्यभावेनेति B, C युक्तप्रमाणः।
ERRATA.
(Sanskrit.)

| Page 2 line 1 for सायुक्तिचिन्द्र: read सायुक्तिचिन्द्र: |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | 1 | परिषाथारण: परिषाथारण: |
| 8 | 3 | विष्णु | विष्णु |
| 10 | 14 | बालरण | बालरण |
| 11 | 2 | वालरण | वालरण |
| 12 | 7 | श्रीरित | श्रीरित |
| 13 | 2 | लोकर | लोकर |
| 16 | 1 | बालरण | बालरण |
| 19 | 6-11 | श्रीम | श्रीम |
| 20 | 10 | बालरात्र | बालरात्र |
| 22 | 15 | आयु | आयु |
| 23 | 4,5,6,7 | घमिल | घमिल |
| 24 | 16 | परस्पल | परस्पल |
| 27 | 5 | चर तन | चर तन |

(English.)

| Page 2 line 11 for fo read of |
|---|---|---|
| 11 | 30 | word phrase |
| 17 | 1 | give conducive |
| 43 | 25 | thumb |

F पुस्तकमादः।
† सिद्धान्तयायामविद्यायामिति B, C, E पुस्तकमादः।
§ बन्धिकेलितिविभाषा इति A पुस्तकमादः।
12

पाल्लेजे योगरूपे

- सखारणशब्दाभाल बुलझपाड़।
+ ख्यातेवं मृतमविधाया इति बुलझपाड़।
+ खरोधकसख्यायेकोवेनेति B, C बुलझपाड़।

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न खकार्यामार्युः चमः। ययाभाल्यतो दि चोगिनः। ते 'विष्णुः',
चे केनचित्व भवतता श्रृण्याभिमानभक्तयंसीखिनः। यया देशवास्यारां
रानः, रागावास्याः वा देवः। न चन्द्रः: परसारविस्तारायुःऽगतः
स्मार्थविज्ञः। ते 'जहलः', चे प्राणक्षकारिविधायः खः खः कार्याचि-
भिन्निविठनः। यया सभ्यदैव देवपरिपश्चना खुलकामद्रायः।
एवां प्रतेकं चतुर्विंदानामपि मूलभूतन शिरस्यविधायानयनोत्तरः
प्रतीती। न दि काविनिदि क्षेस्तां विपश्चयुष्ण्रिक्षर्प्रााँगां ख्रुप्पमुपश्चितः
तस्यां नियाभ्यातायामितिविद्याः। संप्रक्षेत्रने
निर्विश्वेतार देशवासीक्षर्प्रााँगां एवां न काविल प्रधोऽव्यव्सतांति
विद्यानिर्मित्तलक्षणविधायानसुव्यव्सतां निश्चयादि। चत:। सवर्णविद्यायप-
धर्मभाजः। चवर्णावर्ग क्षेत्रां चित्रविशेषकारिवात् चोगिना प्रथमसञ्चे
ततुष्क्षेत्रः यः। करण्य हर्ति दृश्य II 4 II

विद्याया खर्चभाजः।

अनिवासुपिचः-दुःखानामसु नित्य-शुचि-सुखाम-
क्षुतिरविद्या II 5 II

तस्यां निविश्वानुमानिभावः: 'विद्याः', हर्ति विद्याया: बामान्यवचं।
तस्या एव भेदग्रतिपद्धं। 'अनिवामुः' घटाविवः, नियाभिमानः:
पारस्परिक योगदान

एवम् 'त्र्यंतेश्व' काठादिवः, मुखमानमः।
'पुष्करणम' च विषयेः, सुखमानमः।* 'चन्द्रात्मिनि' मरीरे, चाना-सामानमः। एतेनापूर्वे पुष्करायेःनाथः सार्यधसे सार्यधसे वाचातः।।

चान्तमाता वाचातुमाता।

हन्तुर्यंशक्तिरोकातमैववासिन्यता।।

'हृद्र्य्यकि:' पुष्करणः। 'दर्शनक्षिकि:' रजसोमाननभिन्नमः।
क्षिप्रसिद्धिकरणः। तथोदनायोज्यः जजाज्ञवने-पादानं मिहोऽयः। एकतामानं 'शक्तिः', सुधुष्ये। वथा प्रज्ञाविचाराँकर्षुर्वादितापि कथां। भोक्त्राहित्याभिविष्यते,
सोममिनितायो विनिधौ: करोः।।

राजसा विषयमाता।

सुखानुश्रयी राजः।।

सुखमनुष्येति दति 'सुखानुष्यी', राजसा सुखानुष्यीद्विपर्वः। पुष्कर-वाधोऽपि वधानयो गढ़े: 'राजनर्यः।। कष्टः।।

देवसा विषयमाता।

दुःखानुश्रयी देवः।।

* मुखमानम हति B, C, E पुलक्षमातः।
† भाष्मामानम हति B, C, E पुलक्षमातः।
‡ रजसोमाननभिन्नम हति B, E पुलक्षमातः।
§ सुखानुष्यी राज हति B, C, E पुलक्षमातः।
|| मायेः राजसंस्कृत हति B, E पुलक्षमातः।
|| दुःखानुष्यी देव हति B, C, E पुलक्षमातः।
२ पादे १० छलम्।

‘दुःख’ तुषारपं।* नदिभिषेक तदनुगृहितपूर्वकः ताकाठावृणः निषिद्धतः।† व: ‘देवशस्यः क्रोः।॥ १ ॥

अभिनिवेशकः सल्लस्माः।

खरसस्वाही विदुःपपि तमन्नुस्वयोभिनिवेशः॥ ॥ १ ॥

पूर्वजानुभुतमयमुकुटः आह्ववाहवाहवाहः॥ भव्यः: समुपजायमानः। प्रीतिवित्वातिभिंगम् विचलेन् मा भूलितयथा प्रीतिवित्वाते हृदयाकारः। स्वर्गेऽवात्सेवेत्युप्ययेः। निमित्तं बिना प्रवर्तमानः: ‘अभिनि-\n
वेशाखः क्रोः। ततेव यूस्मानः होशात्मकः एकापताभवेन।** धर्मं होः। परिहरन्वः।॥ ५ ॥

न वास्तानां तेवां परिषारः भ्रक्तः करुँदिती तजनुशानाय तेषां उद्देश्यं चेत्रं विभागं खञ्जः।† बाबिनायस् महाश्रेणेभिनिवेशानां तेषां प्रज्ञानायायत्रिभागमाह॥

ते प्रतिप्रसवेद्: स्रुतः॥ १० ॥

* प्रतिश्रुत्यर्चणावधामिति B, C, E पुलकः॥
† अभिनिवेशको या निवद्वा इति B पुलकः॥
‡ अभिनिवेशमार्गस्थलित H पुलकः॥
§ तथा अभिनिवेशकः इति C पुलकः॥ यथावेद पाठोः भाष्य-\n
वारेष स्वम्॥

|| पूर्वजानुभुतमयमुकुटः आह्ववाहवाहवाहादिति H पुलकः॥
† हर्षसेवात्सेवेत्युप्ययेः इति H पुलकः॥
** एकापताभवेन H पुलकः॥
†† विभागावधामिति E पुलकः॥
‡‡ प्रश्ना मार्गादिति B, C, E पुलकः॥
ते ‘खळ्ळा’, कळ्ळा, ते वायनात्येवाषविनं न हस्तिच्छर्म परिषभामारभ्यं । ‘ते’, ‘ग्रहत्रेष्वेः’ ग्रहत्रोमपरिषभामें, ‘हेवा’ तेष्वाः । खलकारणाशितार्थं तत्तां खलसवणं चित्मं ददा प्रविष्टं भवति, तदा कळ्ळानां निर्मूळसानं सघब्ध: ॥ १० ॥

खळ्लानां तानेपायमाण ।

ञ्जानेव्यासद्वेष्यतः ॥ ११ ॥

तेषां कळ्लानामारभाकार्यां या: पुळ्ळुः कनेहास्मिकां: ‘हस्तयं’, ता: ‘ञ्जानेव’ विनेकापमात्यं, ‘हेवा’ हस्तयं दद्य्य: । विनेकापमारभासामाधेशीि खळ्लानं तां निर्मूळसानं भवति, यथा बश्चादि च चन: खळ्लो भव: प्रणालिमाधेशीि निवस्यते । यथा तत्र खळ्ला: ते ‘ञ्जानेव’ पायसाद्वेष्यनमस्मिनभिर्व निवस्यतिः श्रव्यते ॥ १२ ॥

एवं कळ्लानां न्यायद्विधाय कर्माध्यक्षमाध्यस्मिनाः ।

ञ्जेमूळ्ढ: कर्माध्यक्षो दुःखाध्यज्ञानवेदनीयः ॥ १२ ॥

‘कर्माध्यक्षं’, दयनेन तस्य सूत्रममभिसिद्धतं, यतो वायनात्येव दयनेन कर्माध्यक्ष: ‘ञ्जेमूळ्ढ:’, दयनेन कार्यमभिसिद्धतं, यत: कर्माणि पुष्टभवन्ति खळ्लानां कळ्ला एव निबिज्ञनं ‘दुःखाध्यज्ञानवेदनीयः’;† दयनेन पशुपतिः । अभिज्ञेव ज्ञानं अनुवहस्येच: ‘दुःखाध्यज्ञानवेदनीयः’;‡

* कळ्लानामारभाकार्यां या: पुळ्ळुः कनेहास्मिकां: पुळ्ळुः
† कर्माध्यक्षमाध्यस्मिनाः पुळ्ळुः
‡ दयनेन दुःखाध्यज्ञानवेदनीयः पुळ्ळुः
§ दयनेन दुःखाध्यज्ञानवेदनीयः पुळ्ळुः
तथापि कानिष्ठि पुष्करि कर्माधि देवताप्राैग्नादीनि तीर्थये केले विवासायिक प्रक्षणि, यथा नन्दीयुयस भगवानविध्वाराध्यं बलादिवायुष्राणि जायायुभृगस्य विविष्टाः प्रावुमुत्ता। एवमन्येः विष्णुधिप्रलोकं तथ्रभावावाचायुष्णि। केषामित्वा ति, यथा तीर्थये केले बुधकर्षकं ग्नृत्याददिनां जायायापुरस्त्राः हर्मानाश कोनिवेशस्वले षटाक्ष्यपत्राः। एवं यज्ञसानुबुधपैनि वद्याएँ दोहाः॥ १२॥

इनांि कर्मिक्ष्यभः समेद्भिः पुष्करिः

सति मूर्ति तद्वपको जाय्यायुभृगाः॥ १३॥

‘मूलं जान्मदजयः भृग: तैवनभिमहस्ते’ यथा, कर्म्सां सुभस्या-कृषििकांषवावासिः बिपाकः। जाय्यायुभृगाः। भवस्तिः। ‘जाति’ भगुभवानि। ‘चायुः’ विष्णुधियाः प्रारम्भमवः। ‘पोगा:’ विष्णु: द्रवितः दुष्कुतास्वरूपम्, कर्मवर्धान्वधातब्यपपत्ताः पोग-मवक्षा।। रुद्रः तात्वर्रणि विस्तायो मनादिीकावश्चिताः कर्मवास्त्रा यथा यथा पाकसुपथांसि, तथा तथा गुज्ञातिभावेन खिन्ता जाय्यायुभृगस्य ज्ञानायं मण्डलाः॥ १२॥

* जाय्यायुभृगाविशिष्टा हृति B, C, E पुक्कापाठः।
† सन्ताव्या करेति B, E पुक्कापाठः।
‡ यज्ञसानुबुधपैनि B, E पुक्कापाठः।
§ कर्मिक्ष्यभः प्रक्षणिः H पुक्कापाठः।
एकानां कर्मांकले जात्यादीनां सकारात्मकांश्चारिस कार्याकर्षिनां।

ते छाद-परितापसः पुष्यावपुष्येतृत्वान्तः। १४।

‘छादः’ सुखं, ‘परितापः’ दुःखं, छाद-परितापोऽसंयुक्ते चेवं ‘ते’ तयोऽसंयुक्ते। ‘पुष्यः’ दुःखं कर्मोऽसंयुक्तं ‘चपुष्यः’, ‘चपुष्यः’ सुखावपुष्येतृत्वान्तं अतुलं भवति, पुष्यकर्षिनां जात्यादिहोऽसंयुक्तं छादसः। चपुष्यसः कर्षिनः। परितापसः। २४।

एतत् प्राक्रमणाप्येक्षा त्रिविधं, घोषितं सत्यं दुःखिन्यागतः।

परिश्रम-नाय-संक्खार्दुःखेऽप्रितिविरेध行ाच सर्वं दुःखेवं गवितः। १५।

परिश्रमित्वेश्चालिनविशेषं परिश्रमां सशस्त्रस्मिन सोमस्य भोग्याध्यानं शिविरास्मात्स्यतः। दुःखेवं प्रतितत्वालोकन्यामोन्नदेः। यथा बिमात्सान्तान्तरीक्ष्यमान् अहं भोगी दुःखेऽप्रितिप्राप्तिस्वभावं। यथा बिमात्सान्तान्तरीक्ष्यमान् मनोविद्याम विधितं नेतरस्वेदं, तान्तिर विशेषं सकारात्मकां नुस्सुप्रेबिनावतं विरूपते। कथामित्राः ‘परिश्रम-नाय-संक्खारं’

* पुष्यापुष्येतृत्वान्तं E पुष्यकापाटः।
† दुःखेवं सत्यं गवितः E पुष्यकापाटः।
‡ शब्दाष्टम्बविन्दीं H पुष्यकापाटः।
§ यथादानान्ताभित्तिं H पुष्यकापाटः।
|| दुःखेऽप्रितिप्राप्तिः B, E पुष्यकापाटः।
¶ दुःखेऽप्रितिप्राप्तिः C पुष्यकापाटः। दुःखेऽप्रितिप्राप्तिः B, E पुष्यकापाटः।
हुळे: 'विश्वासातुपवषुमाणाना वयायर्ग गद्दूभितुःखश्रापांतः खुळ खुळ खुळ खुळ पतती 'पर्णामदु:खां। उपसुमाणेपु सुखाभानेसु तत्प्रतिपन्नेः प्रति देवसखः स्वेदविविजिन्ता सुखानुभवकाःस्यादि तापदुःख दुःखार्दिशा रसिते 'तापदुःखां। 'संक्षारुःखां स्नानं स्नानमताग्रहितंतविशय्रूपिणे स्वेदार्नविषोपजायमात् तथाविषेषेऽस्वस्यें संक्षारमार्गभे, संक्षाराध पुनस्तायाप्रविष्टियुस्मवधभव दत्तपरिमितं संक्षारोत्पत्तिनिरूपं संबंधारुःखेदेतात् स्वेदक्रम दुःखां। 'गुणेणम- चित्रवर्धाधाः' दृश्, गुणार्दुःखस्मात् वा दृश्: सुखदुःख खोलेषुप्पा: परस्यरमाभवाभवाभकलेन विश्रूवा जावते, तवां स्वेदार्नवारुःखांसुःक्रम दुःखां। एतदि भवति। ऐकानिस्क आय्य- मिन्नकोषः दुःखेतिहसिष्ठते विवेकिन जनाद्यकारणाचारुस्म्य चावतु स्वर्येन विषया दुःखपतया प्रतिभान्तु। तस्नात्स्वेदक्रमविपाकेषु दुःखरूप एवेतुः भवति || १५ ||

तदेवसुवुळे-कामवः-विपाकरोजेशिविप्रववाचलात् श्रविधायां
मिथुशानांश्चतया वयायां नागर्गुवाना देशेश्लात् सम्मतान
खेलणांस्यं स्वाध्योपशेत्वाधारणालास्तदभिधानायां

हेवं दुःखमनागात् || १६ ||

* तत्प्रतिवन्दनम् हरि ए पुलकापादः। तत्प्रतिवन्दनम् हरि ए पुलकापादः।
† तद्वेवसुवुळे ब, ए पुलकापादः। ए गुणकापादः।
भक्तिगुरु अनंताश्चम् समेतस्यमांगां श्रयुमकक्कलात् च नगां-
तमेव संवारुः संवारस्यनस्य हातवचित्र्यां भवति॥ १६॥
हेरेयेलामाः।

दृष्टे-महायोः समेयोः हेरेयेलामाः॥ १७॥

‘दृष्टे’ शिख्रुः पुष्यः। ‘दृष्टे’ पुष्य्यथाः। तन्त्रविदेक्षार्थातीतिपूर्वे-
ब्राह्मणां चालेनी। ‘संयोगाः’ भेयसंगोक्तवेन बलिधानम्, यः, ‘हेरेयेलाः’ दुःखश्रुतां
गुणपरिष्कारकमस्य संवारस्य, ‘हेरेयेलाः’ कारणः, नण्डिहत्तथा संवारस्य-
हस्तिभेवतत्त्वादां॥ १७॥

दृष्टे-हृदयोः संवार दस्युः, तत्र दृष्टे ख्यातं कार्यं प्रयोज-नाधा।

प्रकाश-क्रिया-स्थितिश्रीलां भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं सेगा-पवर्गांहि हस्यं॥ १८॥

‘प्रकाशं’ शिख्रुः पुष्यः। ‘क्रिया’ प्रदत्तिकृपार्जुनः। ‘स्थिति’
निमित्तमश्च पुष्यः। तत: प्रकाशक्रियानविश्वासः। ‘सेव’ ख्यातात्मकार्यं
पुष्यः। तथाविधाः। दृश्यः ख्यातनिशिविधाः। ‘भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं
दृश्यः। ‘भूतालिन’ वृद्धिहिन्दुक्कस्मवेदेन प्रदिष्ठात्तांगीणि गमस्तकावाजार्दीनि यः।
‘दृश्यार्थं’ बुधसिद्धान्त-कार्यस्य: करणमेवेदेन विचिवानि। समव-सेतुबंधु दात्त्री-दानस्यं ‘श्रात्ता’
ख्यातप्राप्तख्यातप्राप्तपरिषामः। परिषामः। चक्षुः तत्

* क्रियानविश्वासार्धिति॥ पुस्तकपाठः। निमित्ततालालादिति E, C, A,
पुस्तकपाठः।
† दुन्दकालतिनि॥ गुलकपाठः।
तथाविधिः द्वयेन कार्येस्मि। 'भोगः' कार्यं भवेद। 'च्यवपः' विशेषातिपूणा शङ्कारीविषयिः। ती भोगार्थः 'चर्धी' प्रयो-जनं, यथा तत्तथाविधत् 'दुःखः', द्वयेन्:। ॥ २० ॥

तथा च 'दुःखः' नास्तवार्थः परिशास्त्रां ज्ञातवायुः। द्वयेन्द्र शास-वालात् अशःः कार्यतिमांसः।

विशेषाविशेषेऽस्मि। 'सिद्धां' लिङ्कः 'लिङ्क' लिङ्कालाः। ब्रह्माः द्वयेनिर्भरते।

'गुणां', 'पञ्चन्ति' अशःविशेषावेशः। भावः, इत्यपि भवति। तथा 'विभेषा' महाभारतेऽवभेषे। 'चित्रविभेषा' तद्विभेषा-भन्तः।

सिद्धामार्थः चुक्तः। 'अलिङ्क' अशः, इत्यपि। सवः सिद्धांश्चकालाभ्यक्ष्मांचिलेन प्रत्येकमानादवथं शास्त्रवेन धोगकाले सिद्धांश्च निधिद्वानि। ॥ २१ ॥

तथा च द्वयेन्द्र शास्त्रवेन प्रथमं शास्त्रवायुः। तद्विभेषासेः अशः-धोपादेयेऽद्वयेन्द्रः धार्मकमाः।

क्रमः हस्तिमाः: मुद्रोपि प्रत्ययानुपस्य:। ॥ २० ॥

'क्रमः' मुद्रः। 'क्रमविभाषा' चेतनामाः। मात्रार्थवर्गः धर्मी-धर्मानिराशीयः। केशिद्वेद चेतनामावर्गमेव धर्मविभेषि। च: 'मुद्रो-
पृष्ठ २१

"तद्रथे यवः हस्यस्यात्मा" २१ ॥

"तद्रथे प्रागुक्तविषयवः, 'थार्था' यत् स्मृत्, य:ः 'तद्रथेः' तस्मां पुर्वस्य भोगप्रकाशवादां नाम स्थायिपरिष्ठारेष भवेऽजाराः। न वि प्रधानं वर्तश्चावानवाच: विस्वतं प्रयोजनविषयः प्रवश्चते, किन्तु पुर्वस्य भोगप्रकाशवादानायेऽति ॥ २१ ॥

चतर्थे पुर्वस्य भोगवादानकेव प्रथोजनाः, तदाः ज्ञािदिते तत्स्थितन्त्र विषयकोणं विचित्रयापरं भास्वा, तत्स्थितं विषयात्मम्बन्धे प्रत्याहाराः चवें तद्धारे बकुरार्ति: चूः। तत्र स्वामरेषस्य द्वायास्वात्शाः।

वल्लाः प्रति नष्ठीमयं तदन्त्यस्यांवास्यार्क्ष्यात्न् ॥ ॥ २२ ॥

यथापि विषयात्मम्बन्धां प्रत्याहारां भोगवादानात् कयपि 'सतार्थे', पुर्वस्य 'प्रति', 'तत्', 'गत्र' विचित्रयापरां, तथापि 'सत्यपुर्वस्याधाः'

* स तद्रथे रक्षेति B, E पुर्वकःादः।
† भेमन स्थापाद्यास्मीयथि G, H पुर्वकःादः।
‡ यदिरं पुर्वस्य भोगप्रकाशवादां तदेव प्रथोजनातिरि B, E पुर्वकःादः।
§ तदानातिरि B, E पुर्वकःादः।
रणनाथ छन्यानुत्र नुति 'अनूपवयापारे धनतिरते'। चतः प्रधानस्थ
वकलभोकृतअधारणणातु न कदाचनापि विनामः; एकमुळौ वा
न स्वर्ण्युतिमिद्रुतम दहुःक भवति॥ २ ॥

हूम्हा-हूम्हारी वाह्याय संयोगः वाह्यातुमाचः

स्व-स्वामिस्त्रत्त्यः स्वरूपोपवतिहेतुः संयोगः॥२३॥

कार्य्यारणेणात्म साधनं करोति। 'स्वामिनि' हूम्हास्वतः स्वाभावः।
'स्वामिनि' वृन्दः स्वरूपः। तद्या|हे|रूपः संयोगः-संवेदकवनेन ध्वनि-
नित्योऽयः 'स्वरूपोपवतिहेतुः', तस्या: कारणं वा 'संयोगः', ब च
वचनभोग-भोगुष्मानस्वरूपात्मानः। न वि तद्या|नित्योऽयः प्रकृतेऽस्मि
स्वरूपदाननिर्णयः काश्य संयोगः। यद्येव भोगयु भोगनेन,
भृजस्य भृजस्य अनाधिपतिः च एव संयोगः॥ २ ॥

तस्यापि कारणमाचः

तस्य हूम्हारंविशा ॥ २४ ॥

वा पूँचे विनायासत्तिका | भृजस्या 'विशा', वाह्याताः, वा
'tस्य' वनिवेकयात्तिक्षः संयोगः, कारणं ॥ २ ॥

तस्य हूम्हारंविशा किंपक्षस्वामितीयाः ॥

* अनूपवयापारमभवतिस्तत्र | द्वि | पुस्करपाठः ।
† न कदाचिन्नि वरति B, E पुस्करपाठः। न च पञ्चिन्नि वरति G पुस्करपाठः।
‡ च स्य हूम्हारंविशा हे B, E पुस्करपाठः। तस्य हूम्हारंविशा इरिति G
पुस्करपाठः। परसः प्रत्येकपाठः सर्वसाधनं अपोवस्थाचारः भवायस-
दुर्विषोऽसाच न समीचीनः।
§ सिं पुस्करंस्विभवति B, E पुस्करपाठः।
तद्भावात् संयोगामावेश स्थानं तहुःः कैवल्यं ||

‘स्थानं’ अविधाया: स्वर्गविद्वेदुः स्थानं शानेनायुविलितायाः, चेदयं ‘वल्लभं’, तस्विन्न यति, तत्कार्यं श्रवणं, आच्छि ‘वल्लभं’, तत् ‘स्थानं’ दृष्ट्रयते । अथार्यं: नैतस्व मूर्तंद्रव्यवत् परियागो पुष्टिते, किंनु अति यथाव विवेकनिरात्साविविवेकनिरात्साविनितिः। चंद्रयं: खलयेव निविर्तित दृष्टि तस्य स्थानं । यथैव पञ्च संयोगार्यं स्तन ‘तत्’, एव नित्यकेन्द्रस्वायत्तं पुष्पः कैवल्यं, वच्च-दिवते । यथैव च संयोगार्यं स्तनं ‘तत्’, एव नित्यकेन्द्रस्वायत्तं पुष्पः कैवल्यं, वच्च-दिवते । यथैव च संयोगार्यं स्तनं ‘तत्’, एव नित्यकेन्द्रस्वायत्तं पुष्पः कैवल्यं, वच्च-दिवते ।

चन्द्र शानेनायुक्तवनश्वारेण उपादेयकारणभावः

विवेकनिश्चित्रविद्वार हृदीययाः ||

चन्द्रे गुणाः: चन्द्रे: पुष्प दशेवंविविधव ‘विवेक’, ‘न्यातिः’

प्रक्ष्ण, या ‘स्थानं’ गृहसिद्धविग्नक, ‘उपायं’ः कारणं । कौशलों
‘अविभव’ न विचािे विविधे विषेुहेंजनाराजस: || कुष्माण्डपो
शातः: या ‘अविभवं’।

drṣṇa तत्पर्यं। प्रतिपभावनास्वात् अविधामषिहेषे विनि-

* अविभेकाविनिस्त दृष्टि B, E पुस्लकारः ।
† चिन्तब वेष्यत्ष्टि B, E पुस्लकारः ।
‡ तदेव दस्सच सवयास्तेपतिः B, E पुस्लकारः ।
¶ दुःखार्ययामानोपय दृष्टि B, E पुस्लकारः ।
|| अवनराजनेति E पुस्लकारः ।
हुन्सशाश्वत-कर्त्त्वलाभिमानाया रजस्मृतिस्चार्याभिनिः धुर्देवनः
सुख्याय च विष्णुवार्षिकानि: या विवेकानिरित्युष्टे। तस्मात
बन्धनमिवविष्णूऽन प्रहस्ताया। हुन्सश्चाः भिक्षानिरित्युष्टे भवेनलेव कैस्यच।
॥ २६ ॥

उपयाचिनिरित्युष्टे: पुरुषो वाद्यरी प्राणां भवति, तां कथयन्
विवेकानिते श्रवणप्रमाध।

तस्मात महात्म्यमी प्राणा। ॥ २७ ॥

‘तस्मा’ उपयाचिनिरित्युष्टे, श्रात्वविवेकानित्युष्टे ‘प्राणा’, ‘प्राणा मी’
विवेकानिते श्रवणप्रमाध। श्रायमानमात्म्यमर्यादिभिपर्यंत, वस्मप्रकाराभवति।

तद्ग्राहणां विवेकानिति । भाषयम् महां चोरं। न
शान्तं भिन्निरिति। चीणा न्येव भक्ष्य, तस्मै भिन्निरिति चीणमपरि।
श्रायमानं महां श्राय, प्राणां महां विवेकानिति:। श्रमीमहायानमपरि
पश्चायामी प्रहस्ताया महायानीकुलमेव प्रश्ना भाष्ये। इहृत्री प्राणा
कार्यविष्णूं निम्बेन शान्तं कार्यविष्णूं भिन्निरित्युष्टे।

वित्तिभुजुस्विन्धिविधा। देरिताया नेव बुद्धि:। गुणाय खलना
दिक्षिता:। निगिरिक्षिणितो त्व गाराणो न पुनः स्थिति
वाच्यमा, खलने प्रख्याधिशुचारां महाक्षादीव्यवासानुसाराः
भावात्त्वश्रुतोरणविराममुक्ते भवेन भौतिक:। श्राणीभूतस्मै
नेव भाष्यमा।। रसायस्थू वन्द्य श्रवणप्रतिद्विधिति। इहृत्री निम्बेन
वित्तिभुजुस्विन्धिविधा।

* सन्ताते० प्रख्याधिशुचारमिति H, C पुश्करापाठः।
† उद्धृतविवेकानितेरिति C, E पुश्करापाठः।
पादश्रेण योगभद्रे

निदेशमेहायो वसतिधरायो प्राणभूमिमिश्रालाचारसुप्रजातायो पुष्येऽ
शेषस्य वत्सायो ः ॥ २७ ॥

विवेकगुणानि संयोगाभाये सेवतिधरियम्। तस्याभास्यपस्य संि
निर्मितिभवत भ्राते।

योगाज्ञानुसारादुरुपज्ञाने शान्तिहिराविवेक-
ख्याते। ॥ २८ ॥

'योगाज्ञानि वच्च्यमनानि। तेषां 'श्रुतात्तु' शान्तपुर्वकार-भावात्, 'शान्तविवेकाये', 'श्रुतात्तु' विचारविमुख प्राकाशाय-रणिल ऋणक्षेत्रप्राकाशाये,† या 'शान्तीसिं' तत्रतम्ये वाचिकः
परिशामः, विवेकगुणातिपर्यः। ॥ तस्या ख्रातेंशुररितियः। ॥

॥ २८ ॥

योगाज्ञानुसारादुरुपज्ञाने दत्तसम्, कौन्तिपुनःकाळ योगाज्ञा-
पूर्वीति तेषां उद्धेरमाणः।

यम-नियमानन-प्राप्तायाम-प्रत्याहार-धाराव-धान-
समाधयोपास्यख्यानि। ॥ २८ ॥

इत्य कौन्तिपूर्वे योगाज्ञानुसारकल्याणराज्ञानि यथा
'धाराधारीनि। कौशिकि प्रतिपक्षमुखिशाश्विद्वितकमन्युकमद्वारे॥

* कौक्षिण्यभवति भ, E पुष्करः।
† कौक्षिण्यभवति भ; E पुष्करः।
‡ विवेकाक्षात्तु भ; E पुष्करः।
§ कौक्षिण्यभवति भ; E पुष्करः।
विमाधिपञ्चकम्। वधा 'वम-निच्छाद्य।। तचासामादीनामसुरो-तरसुपकारकं वधा सत्यावनयो व्रजायामन्त्र।॥ २५॥

क्षेत्र एवं श्रुवमाध॥

अहिंसा-तत्यास्तोय-व्रजाचर्यापरिग्रहा यमा॥ ३०॥

तत्र प्राणविवेगप्रयोजनवापारो तिब्रा। या च सम्मानविष्ठ।।

तद्वा: ‘अहिंसा’। हिंदया: सम्बकाशिवं परिहार्यं लात् प्रयम

तदभव्रपहुच्च अहिंसा निद्रीः। 'सत्य' वाङ्जनयोग्यकार्यार्थिः।

कौथं परस्परं परम। तद्वा: 'श्रोध्यं'। 'व्रजाचर्यं' उपस्थंबमः।

'अपरिल्यः' भोगवािधानामानिकारणं।। त एते॥ अहिंसादय: पश्च

'यमनवस्याचा: योगात्लेन निद्रीः॥ ३०॥

एवार्थ विशेषमाध॥

एतेऽ जाति-देश-काल-समयानविष्ठा: सार्वभूमी-ममवन्तरम॥ ३१॥

'जाति:' व्रजायामन्त्र। 'देश:' तीर्थादिः। 'काल:' चतु्र् यशादिः।

* यायामिति C पुस्करपाठः।
† सम्ब्रह्मारेवैति B, C, E पुस्करपाठः।
‡ वाङ्जनयोग्यार्थार्थिति B, E पुस्करपाठः।
§ सम्मानार्थ हि ति C, E पुस्करपाठः।
|| तत्र ते अहिंसादय हि B, E पुस्करपाठः।
¶ एते तिति B, E पुस्करपाठः।
नतेन्द्रमीरायं वशविधायं प्राक्षाधिपन्नांशसाम्यायुष्याताया पुजयः
केवल इत्यत्थते || २८ ||
विवेकशास्ति: कोवेतामावे शेषुतिरियम्। तस्यास्खऽत्वंती तिनिष्ठमितिः चाहि ।

योगाज्ञानुवादनादमुखिक्षये शान्तदीर्घाविवेक-श्याते: || २८ ||

‘योगाज्ञानि वख्ममाणानि। तेषां ‘सनुप्रानात’ शानपुर्वेक्षकातु-भासतु, ‘शान्तिवेक्षातोऽ,’ ‘शानुप्रानात’ विलस्कास्य प्रकारावसपुनकात्रत्रप्राप्तिः; तथा ‘शान्तदीर्घं’ तात्त्विते श्चाचिक: पौराणिम्, विवेकशास्त्रपरिपेक्षाम्; तथा तस्य: खातेऽहुद्मयित्वम्: ||

|| २८ ||

योगाज्ञानुवादनादमुखिक्षये श्रुतानम्, कान्नि पुमसानि योगाज्ञानीति तेषां उद्देशेऽभा।

यम-नियमासन-प्रार्थियायम-प्रत्यावाहि-धारणा-धारणा-समधियायाध्यावतेः साध्वानि || २८ ||

इद्य तात्त्विकमाझे: साधारकारकवचनानामस्यार्थसाद्वानि तथा
‘धारणादीनि। कालिनिष्ठः प्रतिक्षिततिद्विधानिततोऽकृत्यत्वारैश्

* इद्दुमो भवतीति B, E पुस्कारपाठः।
† कोषस्याउद्धितस्य इति B, E पुस्कारपाठः।
‡ विवेकशास्त्रानविशेष इति B, C, E पुस्कारपाठः।
§ अन्यायानीति B, C, E पुस्कारपाठः।
समाधिहस्पद्वैति, यथा 'यम-नियमकाल:। तज्जनानवद्विगुप्तरौ-फरसुपकारकान्त्र यथा सत्यसननजोऽप्राणायामकैवै। पावनान-\n\nभापि ग्रथादिः॥ ४६॥
\nक्रमें एवं खण्डपमाद:।

अभिसासतत्यास्तेऽम्बूद्धार्थ्यापरिव्रह्या यामा:॥ ३०॥

तत्र प्राणविध्योमप्रयोजनवापारो ब्रह्मा। तसा त्वमान्यायेभु:।
\nतद्भवः 'अभिसा'। ब्रह्माया: वर्णकाश्यपेऽपरिहार्यालात् प्रथम
\nतद्भवाव्रूपाया अभिसाया निहृतमः। 'वर्ण' वाक्यन्योर्यार्याचेदेन।
\nतद्भवः 'प्राप्तेऽ'। 'ब्रह्मचर्यः' उपस्वरूपम:।
\n'अपरिप्राशः' भोगवाधानवामस्यानिर्णयं।।
\nत एते॥ अभिसायद्व: पशू
'यममस्ववा:। योगाणुक्लेन निर्मिता:॥ १०॥
\nएवं विशेषमाद:।

एतेऽ जाति-देशकाष्ठ-समयानवक्षिणः। साधवे-\n\nमम्भावतमेऽ॥ ३१\n
'जाति' ब्राह्मणवादिः। 'देशः' तीर्थादि:। 'काष्ठः' चतुष्काष्ठ्यादि:।

* व्यायामितिः ६ पुस्तकपाठः।
† साध्वप्रकारेिश्रेष्ठिः B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
¶ ब्रह्मचर्यायामस्यायायायायायायायि B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ ध्वानीकार मृः C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
¶¶ तत्र ते अभिसायद्व: मृः B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
¶¶ एते विशेषिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
'समय:' मान्यतावेयोजनाति। एवेत्यथाति: 'समवधिष्ठाना', पूर्वोक्ता वेत्यथार्थमायो च:। यथास्य विवादिते ब्रह्मचर्यातुप्रवेषाय निषिद्धिः। न दिनिवारिः किंतु द्वितीयौऽग्रेश्वररघुनारायणस्य भवति: 'समाधान' देशुयचये। तदुद्भि वेदवेदोऽपि इत्यमात्र तत् निर्देशैः। न दिनिवारि, देशवेदवेदाध्यात्मिकरूपेः न दिनिवारिः। देशवेदवेदवेदवेदाध्यात्मिकरूपेः कृतविश्वासः कृतप्रतिकृतिशिष्टविज्ञानं ध्वस्तमात्र कृतविश्वासः कृतप्रतिकृतिशिष्टविज्ञानं न दिनिवारिः। एवं वयुवैदिक यथायथान्येन चेत्तोऽवै। नित्यविज्ञानायेऽवै। धृतमात्रायेऽवै। ध्वस्तमात्रायेऽवै। धृतमात्रायेऽवै। ध्वस्तमात्रायेऽवै।

नित्यमात्रः।

श्रीकृतांशक्तिपीतस्तपः: साध्वयायेस्वरप्रभाविनानाशनियमान नियमाः।

श्रीवः, द्रविखवघणवर्गाभां वास्तवालकिः। वास्तवालकिः अधिवादिभिः वाश्वादिभिः। अधिवादिभिः अधिवादिभिः। अधिवादिभिः अधिवादिभिः।

नित्यमात्रायेऽवै।

देशवेदवेदप्रयोजनातिरिवेशं कम्पिति B, C, E पुक्तकापाधः।

द्वितीयविनिवासति B पुक्तकापाधः।

प्रागुव ऋविः ऋविः ऋविः पुक्तकापाधः।

प्रागुव ऋविः ऋविः ऋविः पुक्तकापाधः।
वितक्षर्वाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनं ॥ ३३ ॥

वितक्षर्वāने द्रतिः "वितक्षर्!" योगपरिपचित्यो द्रतिः। तेषां
प्रतिपक्षभावने विशिष्ट, यदा बाधा भवति, ॥ तदा योगः सुकृतो
भवतीति भवयोग धमानियमाणं योगाः ॥ ३४ ॥

इदानि वितक्षर्वां खल्डृष्टं भेदः प्रकारं कारणं फलवधः क्रमेश्च।

वितक्षर् द्रतिः। वस्तुका-वाक्यालोकता लोभाः
क्रोध-मोहपूर्वकाः खरु मध्या-धिमाचरा दृश्यानन-नासाः
द्रतिः प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

एते पूर्वांकः "शिवद्रतिः", प्रथमं विघा भिष्यने "शस्त्र-कारितानुसंहित्वः"
तथा खरु हिप्पादितः "सतः"। खुद
कारितानुसंहित्वः प्रशोधकाभापरेः खरुस्त्वादितः "कारिताः"। श्रेष्ठेन
क्रियामणः यथाः वाधिवल्लकाः। "शालुस्त्वादितः"। एतह सैविध्ये
पर्यावरणायायायन्योऽयेर्थेषे। अन्यथा मन्न्त्रविलयेकं मन्येन
न मया खरु हिप्य कर्तितं नाशिके से दृष्टि द्रतिः। एतेऽञ्ज कारण-
प्रशस्तान्यायायाय, "लोभ-क्रोध-मोहपूर्वकाः", द्रतिः। चत्वापि शालम
क्रियाः प्रथमं निषिद्धेऽः तथापि खरुक्षेपानां सेषार्कानाकर्मात्मकाः-

* यदि बाधा भवतीति E, A, D, F मुख्यारम्। यथा बाधा भवतीति
C मुख्यारम्।
† वाधिवल्लकाः द्रतिः A मुख्यारम्।
‡ लोकविश्वासार्थे। खरु द्रतिः B, E मुख्यारम्।
§ शालम् प्रथमं निषिद्ध द्रतिः C मुख्यारम्।
भिमागल्बन्ध निवारनलात् तत्सपूः वधि स्वरविभागपुरुषेकलेन लेख-कोंधार्दीनामुक्तवानुः मूलावर्तेयं। सौरपुर्वतिका सर्व देहां निरतिरित्रमः। ‘लेखा:’ दण्ड। ‘कोणहं’ कस्मात्वतिविवेकोऽकृतः। प्रश्नविभागपुरुषेकलेन जितृकारात् अष्टि विषयं भोजङ्करान्त्येऽविषयं जिए विषयं। तथासिद्ध भुज-रञ्जाभेदेऽन जैविकमािङ्गेऽप्रसादसुः। ‘एक्रः’ मन्द्रा न तीनः नर्म मध्यमः। ‘सम्बंधः’ ग न मन्द्रा नापि तीनः। ‘सम्बंधः’ तीनः, न मध्या नापि मन्द्राः। दति नव भेदा:। दति वैविद्येऽवि वधि वसांविन्तिनभेवंति। वेदार्दीनामपि वायकं घरु-मध्याधिमािङ्गेऽविषयं वसांविन्तिन। तत् यथायेगः येषां। तत् वषय घरुघरुः घरुघरुः दति। एवं फलत्याः ‘दुःखा-शान्तनाूपसः’, दति। ‘दुःखा’ ग्रंवृक्ततत्यवन्थवायमाव्यः राजस्वितिधारमः। ‘शाला’ भिमाभाष्यानं वशविक्षयैः। तेन दुःखा-शान्तनाू अतिरिक्तः, ‘वर्तम’, ग्येयां ते तथ्येकः। दत्त्वं तेषां शङ्कृप-कारणारियेवेत्रेऽविषयं वृत्तानं प्रतिपरिवान्या चोकिना परिधारः। कर्त्योप इत्युपहिर्भेति। ॥ ॥

एषांभायासतः प्रकर्मवा गच्छतामुनु नियापदिनः। विद्योऽधा प्रेमभेवः, तथा कृपेन प्रतिपददित्यमािः।

* समुज्ज्वादित्व B, E गुणकपाठः।
† द्विवेण नव भेदा दति B, C, E गुणकपाठः।
‡ संग्रहवियन्तिर्विमितिः गुणकपाठः।
§ यान्याभिमुखेऽविनः गुणकपाठः।
अधिसार्यग्रन्थाः सत्तुप्रति बैरवायाः ॥ ३५ ॥

तत्त्वाति ‘तत्त्वाति’ भूतावतं: ‘तत्त्वाति’, द्वादशपराधिनामयोऽहिनकु-झालिनां बैरवायां निर्माणसत्यवाक्यान्तभवति। विषयस्ता हिंदूल परिवर्तनीयार्थं ॥ ३६ ॥

सत्यप्रति धारणा कृपाफलाः साधत्वस्त ॥ ३७ ॥

क्रियमाणां स ‘क्रिया’ यागार्थिकः ‘फलं’ खरोदितकं, व्रज्ज्वलनं।
तस्य तु सत्यार्थवदा थेयिन: तथा यथाप्रकथये, वथा च चक्तात-वादपि क्रियायां थेयी फलमाध्यक्तिः। तदःनामु यथा कस्य चित्तु क्रियाकृत्यानांपि क्रियाफलं भवतीयाय: ॥ ३७ ॥

अयोध्याभासयात्: फलमाद ॥

अल्ले मप्रति धारणा संवृत्तेपापयानम् ॥ ३८ ॥

अल्ले मप्रति धारणा संवृत्तेपापयानम् ॥ ३८ ॥

तस्यं थेयां नवा भवति यथा तदा तस्य प्रकाशां निर्मिताय-स्वायते। िरस्तदितिभ:२ ‘वर्षायुपतितम्। ॥ ३८ ॥

व्रज्ञान्याचार्यवाणिष्ठापि फलमाद ॥

प्रवालयादप्रति धारणा घोष्यालाम: ॥ ३८ ॥

* दाने, अधिसार्यार्यग्रन्थार्यमनोदिपत। ग पुस्तकें गार्तिः।
† दत्ते, सन्निधिश्वेतिपत: ग पुस्तकें गार्तिः।
‡ पदमासप्रति व, अ, अ पुस्तकपाद:।
§ सात्येता दिक्कुमार्थिता ग पुस्तकपादः।
भिमानलचार निद्रानलांत तांत्रिक सति स्वप्नविभागपूर्वस्कलेन लेख-नोभार्यानुभुल्लवानुर्व मूलबंबवेंथे। सोश्वतुर्विका चन्द्र देवस्थानतिरियः। 'शेखः' देव्या। 'काल:' क्ष्याक्रशायविवेको-क्षित्कः प्रज्ञनानाभकाशिलधयः। प्रश्नेक घनातिसेदेन चिंत्यकार श्रविवादयो सोश्वादिकारकेलेन जैत्या भिज्जने। तेजारेव पुनः प्रमा भागमेदेन सैवित्यमाख्य 'महु-मध्याधिमाजः'। 'महु:' मन्दा न तीव्रः नारी मध्यमः। 'मध्यः' मन्दा नारी तीव्रः। 'विष्णु-मध्याजः' तीव्रः मध्या नारी मन्दा:। द्विती नवमेदः। द्विती चैविचे शति धारासंगतेष्वतः। घनादिकारमपि प्रश्नेक महु-मध्याधिमाजःमेदानू। चैवित्यमधृवतः। ततु चैविचे धारान्तः चैविचे पञ्चमाः। द्विती धारान्तः महु-धारान्तः धारान्तः। द्विती धारान्तः महु-धारान्तः। एवः पञ्चमाः 'दुःक्षा-श्राननकन्तुकोऽः', द्विती 'दुःक्षा' प्रतिकृतितयात्राभाशयमानो राजस-श्रित्वयः। 'अकार' विष्णुवर्यां वंशकविपर्यायस्वरुः। तेन दुःक्षानुप्रणान्तः 'कालः' अवस्थियः। द्विती तेव्रः श्रान-कारणातिसेदेनः शाताणी प्रतिपचवाभवनाः चेतान बिशेष विशेष द्वृपेयिफः द्वृपेयिफः। ॥ ५ ॥

प्रामान्तायाया प्रकारे गोख्तातमु निश्चितियः चिंत्येऽयो चगइ मधृवति, तथा कस्येष प्रतिपादित्यमादो।

* साधुपादित्य B, E पुस्करमाचः।
† नवसेन्व मव भेदः दृशि B, C, E पुस्करपादः।
‡ संपर्यायःसत्यकारभिंतिग युक्तस्वरुः।
§ अस्त्यर्मादिकेन्द्राति H पुस्करपादः।
चिन्हसाप्रतिष्ठायां* तत्सन्निधी वैरव्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

‘तत्सन्निधीं भावयतः, ‘विनिधी’,† वचनविरोधिनामयजिनिकु-वादीनं ‘वैरव्यागः’ निर्मेकसरत्वावस्था भवित । सिंधारता दिपर्यत् परियजनीवयन्: ॥ ३६ ॥

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलात्रयवत्मः ॥ ३७ ॥

क्रियमाणा चि ‘क्रिया’ यागादिका: ‘फल’ सर्गोदित्रिं, प्रभृतयं । तत्तु हु वयाध्यायवतो थोगिन: तथा यथै प्रकटयं, यथा चकन्ताभ-यामपि क्रियाश्च थेगिं फलमाणीतिः । तदद्वमादु यथाफलग्नितः क्रियामकुञ्ज्ञेतापि क्रियाफलेन भवतीवयन्: ॥ ३७ ॥

अन्तर्यमाण्यवयं वन्देयपुरावयनम् ॥ ३७ ॥

‘वन्देयं’, यद्याध्यायति थेगीं तदा तथै प्रकटायं निरिलहस्य-खार्यं ‘वान्तरे दिमुङ्ख:’ ‘रमाकृपतित्वं’ ॥ ३७ ॥

ग्रन्थर्यामाण्यवयं फलमाण्य: ॥ ३८ ॥

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* कृते, चिन्हसाप्रतिष्ठायामाण्यपत्र: गुर्जको नाश्चि ।
† दत्ते, सम्प्रभृतिमाण्यपत्र: गुर्जको नाश्चि ।
‡ प्रति, चिन्हाध्विमाण्यपत्र: गुर्जको नाश्चि ।
§ सम्प्रभृतिमाण्यपत्रिका गुर्जकपत्र ।
य: किल्ल ‘जस्थान’, सम्बन्धित, तस्मात् तत्प्रकरणार्थितिक ग्‌दीवी शाख्यं श्राववर्तिम्। वार्षिकनिरूपणं चि ब्रह्मचर्यं तस्मात् ग्राभककर्षणार्थि रीरेत्रिष्यमानः। वीर्यं प्रकर्षमाञ्चलितम्॥ २५॥

अपरियथात्यथा फलमाद्॥

अपरियथात्यथैव जन्मकायनतासम्बोधः॥ ३८॥

कथमियथ स्ववः ‘कथ्यत’। जानन: कथ्यता ‘जन्मकायन’।

तथा: ‘सम्पूर्ण’ सम्गुणान। अन्नान्ते कार्त्तकम् कीदृश: वि कार्य्कारीति जन्यस्यायं स्वसैव सम्गुणानात्तिर्थिद्।

न केवलं भोगाधिनन्तरिणी एव परियथस। किंतु धार्मान: श्रीरपरिषिध्यापी परियथसं भोगाधिनन्तरिणी श्रीरकाद्।

तस्मान् वेदि रागानुभवाः। विषुक्षमायासेव प्रहस्तति: न ताल्लुकश्चाचारुभावः।

यदा पुनः श्रीराजशिरियानंिरेष्म नाभमयमवल्लभते तदा वध-पञ्च रागादिश्यामात् सम्गुणानहेतुतंत्रसेव पूर्वीपरज्ञानसम्पदः॥ ३८॥

उष्ण च यमानं चिद्वरः। ग्राथ्य विनयमानाः।

शौचात् स्वात्सङ्गुणा परिवस्यसंगः॥ ४०॥

य: ‘शौचं भावयंति, तस्मात् ‘स्वात्सः’ कारणाःकहंपववोधेन-द्वारेष्यं अभुगस्यूणा, व्रस्यज्ञातेत्। अधुर्चिररं कायः नावायस्यां कर्त्तव्यं इत्यसुस्वते इत्यसुस्वते ‘परेनः’ ज्ञात्वर्य कायविनः। ‘श्रास्यं’ स्वप्पः।

* रामानुभवादिति॥ पुष्करपाठः।
† माया श्रवण तरिते॥ पुष्करपाठः।
भानुः संस्कृतिविद्यानिमित्यः। य विषय खलन वायूं शुभद-विद्वानः। य कथा परदिविता। कायम्। संस्कृतिविद्यानिमित्यः।

सिद्धांतः सत्त्वशुद्धि-सौमनस्येिकायतेनिद्रियज्ञात्मकदर्शन- चेयश्चानि च।

भवन्तिति वाक्यश्रेणः। ‘सच्’ प्रकाशसुक्ष्मायाख्यातः। तथा ‘द्वितीयः’ रजस्यभाष्यणिमित्यः। ‘सौमनस्या’ ब्रह्मसुत्रमेव मानवी प्रीतिः। ‘एकायपा’ नित्येत्तिमित्यः। चेताः सैन्यः। ‘द्वितीय- यथा’ विषयपरामङ्कानानिमित्याणि साध्विकयानि। ‘वाचमुऩि’ विशेषत्वायमङ्कानानिमित्याणि साध्विकयानि। ख्रीयायत्व एते सच्चृद्धायानि। श्रौतायायत्व प्रासः प्रारम्भायती। तथा ती श्रौताय सच्चृद्धायानि। सच्चृद्धायानि। सौमनश्चेत्यकायात्ति। एकायपात्ति। द्वितीययात्ति।

वन्यायायायायानि।

सत्त्वशुद्धिनमः सुखश्चामः।

* संस्कृतिविद्यानि इति H पुस्करपादः।
† नित्येनिविधः नवाध्यादिशुप्लियोऽपि नाल्कि, परस्पर भावाध्यकरेः इति।
‡ सम्भवनीतिति H पुस्करपादः।
§ प्रकाशसुक्ष्मायानिमित्यः B, C, E पुस्करपादः।
|| नित्येनिविधः इति B, C, E पुस्करपादः।
| प्रोक्ताय सच्चृद्धिविद्यापि A, B, C, D, E, H पुस्करपादः।
+ सौमनश्चेत्यकायायानिमित्यः G पुस्करपादः।
* एकायपात्ति। G पुस्करपादः।
उँचोक्षी अन्तरालों

दश: किंतु 'स्नातुक', अभ्यासित, तथा तत्पर्क्वाभिन्नतिरिक्ष्य 'ब्यक्ति' वास्तवकोण 'भाविकता'। वीर्यनिराकार हि ब्रह्मचर्य तथा प्राक्षराष्ट्रीयब्रह्मचर्यान: 'ब्यक्ति' प्रक्षराष्ट्रांगमति॥ १५॥

अपरियधामायस: प्रज्ञामाहि।

अपरियधामायस: 'जन्त्रक्ष्यंतासम्बोधः'॥ १६॥

कथामिथ्य भवः 'कथना'। जन्त्र: कथना 'जन्त्रक्ष्यंतासम्बोधः'।

तत्सा: 'सम्बोधः' स्मांग्नज्ञानेण। जन्त्रानार: केत्यंज्ञाने वा कौमुः: किम् कार्यार्थारीति जित्वा भाषय्यं सम्बोध्यार्थानीतिः॥

न भेदवं भोगाध्यायनायद्व संतोषः। किंतु यथावतः।

शरीरपरिशोधणिक परििघः भोगाध्यायनायद्व रस्मान् भति रागात्मकः विन्तेम्यात्मकेव पञ्चत्सा न ताल्लक्षणाद्रात्मकः॥

यदा पुनः शरीरार्द्विपरिशोधण्यापेक्षा माध्यमवस्थेः तदा मध्य-ब्यक्तिरागात्मकात् सम्बोध्यात्मकेव पूर्वार्ं वज्ञानविद्या॥ ॥ १७॥

इत्या चमारा सिद्धतः! चतुर्य् नियमानानां

श्रीचाचा स्नातुकज्ञज्ञान परासरिसर्ग:॥ ४०॥

दश: 'श्रौतश्वेत्याति, तत्त्व 'स्नातुक्षेप पारिशोधणोद्वारेः ज्ञानिः समुपज्ञाते। श्रीचाचा परासरिसस्मार्थेः नाचारियः कर्तव्य हस्यस्मातैव इत्युतः 'परे,' श्रीस्मार्थेऽकाव्यशः,'श्रीतंगे;' श्लोकोऽति।

* रागात्मकाचार्यः पुस्तकपाठः।
† मासा सप्ताह दशि E पुस्तकपाठः।
भाषा: संस्कृतप्रवृत्तिप्रकाशनमित्यथः। यदि किंतु कार्यां सुन्दरते ततचद-बस्तद्विनात्र तथा काँच परकीवर्त्यानातः कार्यः संस्कृतमनुभवति ॥ ४० ॥
शौचशैव फलानारमाषः।

किंचि सच्चवुचि-सौमनस्यकायतेन्द्रियज्ञातक्षणं-योगत्वाः। च ॥ ४१ ॥

भवकृतिः बाक्यशः। ‘सचि’ प्रकाशसुचवायाद्वाकः। ततथा ‘युद्धः’ रजसोपर्यामनभवः। ‘सौमनस्य’ केदारणनमनम् मानवी प्रीति।। ‘एकान्तः’ नियतेनद्रियविष्ये। वेशः सैन्यः। ‘द्रिष्टिय-ज्ञानः’ विश्वविश्वासानामिनिर्मित्यार्णा वातावरणाः। ‘स्वाप्तर्याणे’
विशेषाद्विनाति, चित्रत् ‘घेयम्’। शौचभाषयत् एते सच्चवुचि-
द्विते: कृपेन अथाभेदः। तथा दिशेऽशौचत्व युद्धः।। युद्धः: 
शौमनस्य। शौमनस्यादेकक्षणं।। एकायताः।। द्रिष्टियज्ञः।
द्रिष्टियज्ञाद्विनात्यादेक्षणयोगत्वाः। ॥ ४१ ॥

सन्तोषादद्वाने: सुखः। ॥ ४२ ॥

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* संस्कृतभाव हि इति। पुस्करकारः।
† किंचि नियतः: नववादमुस्पलाकोष नाशिः, वर्तमान भावाणि एवः।
‡ सम्बन्धीविश्वास हि पुस्करकारः।
§ प्रकाशस्तु समाधानमिति B, E, C पुस्करकारः।
|| नियतविष्ये हि B, C, E पुस्करकारः।
¶ शौचत्व स्वाविष्ययतिपादः A, B, C, D, E, H पुस्करकारः।
** सौमनस्यादेक्षणं हि पुस्करकारः।
†† श्रीयात्मिति G पुस्करकारः।
च: किल्ले 'श्रव्यपव', अखंडत, तस्मा तत्परस्वातिरिक्त 'वीरं'
शामथे नाविर्भवतः। वीर्यनिरेत्रोऽथि ब्रह्मचर्यः तत्क्रांतिस्कृतं,
रीरित्रिक्ष्मःऽऽतु वीरं प्राक्षरभाष्यः।

अपरियोळनां तावस्य अवज्ञ:तः।

अपरियोळनां जलमकायनं तावस्यां:।

कथाभियावः भावः 'कथान्त'। जनान: कथन्या 'जस्कथान्ता'।
तस्मा: 'सम्बोधः' सम्यग्जः। जनानां शोचधनां वीकृतः: किं
कार्यकारिकोत्ति निजःसायोऽवसेव सम्यग्जानातीत्वः।

ग: अलयं भोगावसान्तपरिन्यथे एव परियः। किंतु यात्रामः
श्रीसम्परिन्यथोऽपि परिन्यः गः सचावतः लक्ष्मीरीरखः।
तद्विन्नाधिष्ठि रागानुभावः। वहिभिष्यायामं प्रत्यात्मा न
तार्किकसकारणाभावः।

वा: यदा पुनः श्रीराधिरितवहिर्प्रेष्यं माध्यःपरमवस्तः तदा मध्-
खः रागावियागात् सम्यग्जानेतुर्भववतः पुष्करीवज्जा सम्बोधः।

उत्तरपर्वर्जवेयः।

जन: यमानां विवंतः। जय निम्नानाः।

श्रीचाल्त्स्वाज्ञ्ञुद्गुप्ता परैवर्जसंगः।

ज: 'श्रौच्यः भावतः, तस्मा 'शातृपथि कारकावपपवालोके
द्वारेष्यः 'जुगुस्या' घृष्ण, चचुपुजापते। श्रुतिबिर्यः कायः 
नाचायाः। काव्या रेण्यमुनि उशुं व विषयं 'परे:' श्रवीङ्गः कायविष्णुः। 'सर्वसंगः' स्पष्टः--

* रागानुबंधाचविद्यः पुष्करीवाठः।
† माध्य समुद्र वस्तिः पुष्करीवाठः।
भावः संसारपरिवर्त्योन्मतिः। यथा किष्किष्केव कार्यं सुगृहस्ते तदन्तरचन्द्रनात् कार्यं परक्षेत्रतयाः। कार्यं: संसारसमनुभवति॥४९॥
श्रूचिस्वरं फलान्तरमात्।

किष्किष्किष्किष्कि सत्यशुद्धिः सौमनस्य वैकायतेन्द्रियज्ञयात्मदर्शनः
वा गयत्वानि च॥४१॥

भवनीति वाष्पस्वेयः। ‘चर्चा’ प्रकाशात्तल्लात्कः। तथा
‘हुतुः’ राज्यसेवामण्डलभवः। ‘वौमनस्य’ खोद्रानुभवेन मानवी
प्रीति। ‘एकात्ता’ निधित्तं दृष्टिकोषस्त्रे चेतनः कैयति।
‘हृद्य-जयं’ विषयपरापीयानामित्रियायां सातन्यवस्थानं।
‘श्रामध्रुवं’
विष्णुस्वरुपे, चित्ताचे ‘चोयलं’। शौचाभासवन एते बलचुज्जयं
द्वे काने प्राणवर्षणिः। तथा ति श्रौचतृ बलचुज्जयं प्राणं
वौमनस्य। शौमनाष्ट्वापकायनः।
एकात्तात्त्वः॥॥

इत्यङ्ग्यज्ञादात्मदर्शनन्यायततिः॥४९॥

वनोषाभासश्री फलमाहः।

सन्तोषाद्रुतमः सुखालमः॥४२॥

* संसारभाव इति ॥ पुस्करपातः।
† किष्किष्किष्किष्के नवसाधिपुलकेषु नान्चिः।
‡ सत्यशुद्धिः इति ॥ पुस्करपातः।
§ प्रकाशात्तल्लातकालनिर्विवेधः ॥ पुस्करपातः।
|| निधित्तं इति ॥ पुस्करपातः।
†† श्रौचतृः सत्यशुद्धिः इति ॥ पुस्करपातः।
** सौमनाष्ट्वापकायप्रतिः ॥ पुस्करपातः।
†† एकात्तात्त्वः ॥ पुस्करपातः।
‘कथोपकारणे’ चौगिनिधाताविभमाने सुखमाविभवति चक्षुः विषयसुक्ष श्रतिशिवाच प वसायोऽविभुति ॥ ४२ ॥

तपः: फलमाह ।

कायेन्द्रियसिद्धहुयुक्तवात्मसः ॥ ४३ ॥

‘तपः: समवयस्मानं चेतन: क्षेत्र दिःप्रचायामयाविच्छच्यदारेण; ‘कायेन्द्रियाः’, चिन्तितं उत्तरं आद्याति॥ ।

भ्यमरः: वाक्यायणार्थिन विनिदश्यवः। तत्वादिवम्बिज्ञायार्थः खज्ञा-अवस्तं-विमक्षणदर्शनार्थमार्श्यामाविभवति, कायेख चचेब्रम-पुमण्यावादीनि ॥ ४४ ॥

साधायाय फलमाह ।

साधायादिदृष्टवतातसस्यायः ॥ ४४ ॥

ञ्ज्ञिन्तमक्षपादिवलभो ‘साधारे प्रज्ञायाने, चौगिनः
‘रस्या चभ्यिन्तया, ‘देवतया, ‘सम्यायः’; भवति। त्या देवता
प्रज्ञाबभवतीतयः। ॥ ४४ ॥

देवसरणिधानसः फलमाह ।

समाधिचित्रिरस्वरप्रक्षिपादानात् ॥ ४५ ॥

* समाधिचित्राः हरि C पुस्तकापाठः।
† समसिक न, G पुस्तकापाठः।
‡ भवतीयां पाठः G पुस्तकापाठः।
§ सौरविश्वास्यूपस्वरिचयदारेणिति B, C, E पुस्तकापाठः।
|| वाकादशवाचिति B, C, E पुस्तकापाठः।
भाषाते बोक्षः भविष्यवादसाधार् ‘कमायेः’ प्रियलज्ञानः, अज्ञातः भवति। समाधानः भं भवनानीरः प्रतीचः विश्वस्तरसुकुमारः
क्रियान् परिवर्तेऽ| समाधित्वुल्लोभयति || ४ ५ ||
चन्द्र-नित्यमानुः अश्वन्माहः।
ततः+ सिघोरसुबुधमासनम् || ४६ ||
अस्थिते शुद्धीति ‘अश्वसः’ प्रदायनः-रुक्षान्त-सहख्यातामादि।
ततः यदा ‘सिघर’ निप्पतः, ‘सूख’ चन्द्रेषुगराः| भवति, तदा चोगा-
शर्ता भजते || ४ ६ ||
तस्येव सिघोरसुबुधापत्यसुभुपायमः।
प्रयातसीधियानन्दसमाप्तिभायम् || ४७ ||
तदशनं ‘प्रयातसीधियोऽन’, ‘अश्वन्माप्यक्या’, च सिघरं सूख
भवलीति सम्भवः।

यदा यदाशनं ब्राह्मीति रुक्षा करेति तदा प्रयातसीधियोऽन-
होनेवाद तदशनं नियष्टते। यदा आकाशास्त्रादेवं आनन्दे बहसहः
समाप्तिः जिनं चव्यानेन तात्राम्बायते, तदा देवालयारा-
वायासानं दुषुखजनकं भवति। अश्विन्यासनयथे वती समाधिता-
राजस्थलानं न भ्रमण्यसेरसेवयादि। || ४७ ||
तस्यावानानुप्रयातिरिति फलमाहः।

* अपवाहित: G गुरुकायाः।
† तैनति श्रवः: A, B, C, D, E, F, G गुरुवेषु नारिः। प्रर्द्व भाष्य-
कारेः श्लोः।
‡ चन्द्रेषुगराः श्रविति G गुरुकायः।
ततो इन्द्रानन्दियातः || ४८ ||
तस्मिन्नामजेव भवि 'द्वैः' श्रीतेषा-कुञ्जवादादिभः, शेषामी
गाभिन्यय दच्यः: || ४८ ||
श्रवणज्यानन्देः प्राप्तायामातः।

तस्मिन् सति श्रास्त्र-प्रश्रास्योगमतिविच्छेदः प्राप्तायामः || ४८ ||
श्रवणज्यायं 'सति', तत्विमिलितः प्राप्तायामास्यातः योगाक्षरविभेषः
प्रनुस्यो भवति। कोऽधृतः 'श्रास्त्र-प्रश्रास्योगमतिविच्छेदः' श्रवणज्यायं।
श्रवण-प्रश्रासो ज्ञत्वमेवः तथोऽर्थं रेवक-पूर्वकार्यं वाच्या
अन्तरेऽव श्रवणेऽ 'गते:' प्रवाहक, 'विच्छेदं' धारणं, 'प्राप्तायामं',
उच्चते || ४८ ||
तस्मिन् सुखावमात्र विभज्य खयुं कथयतिम॥

स तु वाच्याभ्यासंगतरस्मादश्राधिकाशस्याभि: परिदेशी दृष्टश्चः || ५० ||

'वाच्याभ्यासं श्रीतेषा रेवकं। श्रास्त्रादितिः प्रश्रासं पूरकं। श्रास्त्र-प्रश्रासीः कुभकः।
तस्मिन् जलमिव कुभे निबधनया प्राप्ताःः
प्रवाहायनले द्विति कुभकः।

* श्रास्त्रनास्यादनलारिति १ पुलकपाठः।
† तथाविभिष्टः रेवक-पूर्वकुञ्जकार्यार्थायेन A, D, F, G पुलकपाठः।
‡ दशमय्यतिः B, C, E पुलकपाठः।
§ प्राप्तायामाश्च द्विति C पुलकपाठः।
দূতে ৫২ বামন।

বিবিধত্ব প্রাণায়ম: 'মেঘন, 'কাখন, 'বস্ত্র চোপলাচিত:
'দীর্ঘত্বায়ন বং ভবতি। মেঘনের চোপলাচিত যন্ত্র বাস্তালিদ্রামান্তাদী নাশামারায় বাস্তালিদ্রামান্তাদীঃ। কাখনের চোপলাচিত যন্ত্র বং বিষ্ণুনারায়ন দিমানায়ঃ। বস্ত্র চোপলাচিত যন্ত্র রয়তো ভাবতন্ত্রঃ।

প্রথম বামন: শাস্তিপ্রাপ্তী: প্রথম ভঞ্জনঃ। ভবতি। প্রথম ভঞ্জনঃ মনানায় সুপার্ণঃ। প্রথম ভঞ্জনঃ সুপার্ণঃ।

লৌক প্রাণায়মানিনিধায় পার্থে মানিনিধায়।

বামনাভ্যন্তরবিষ্ণুশ্লণী চতুর্থ: || ৫২ ||

প্রাণায়ম: 'বামন বিষ্ণু: নাশামারায়ন দিমানায়ঃ। 'বিষ্ণুতরো বিষ্ণু: নাশামানিনিধায়:। তাত দীর্ঘত্বায়ন বামনায়ন বং বামনায়ন পরায়ন: গতি বিষ্ণু: বিষ্ণু: বামনায়ন দিমানায়|| ৫২ ||

তত্ত্বনিষ্ঠায় ভল্লামায়।

তত: শীৈঃ প্রাণায়মানিন: || ৫২ ||

'তত': তদূর্গুণ প্রাণায়মান, 'প্রাণায়ম:' বিষ্ণুতরো বিষ্ণু: বামনায়ন চোপলাচিত: বামনায়ন বিষ্ণু: বামনায়ন বিষ্ণু:। তত: 'শীৈঃ' বিষ্ণু: বিষ্ণু:। || ৫২ ||

ফলান্তসমায়।

* বিষ্ণুনিষ্ঠায়নারায়নায়ন হিতি বুলকাপ্তাই।
† বিষ্ণু নামায়ন হিতি বুলকাপ্তাই।
‡ গুরু ত্রাসিঙ্গুরিহিতি হিতি বুলকাপ্তাই।
धारासात च धारासात मनसः || 53 ||

‘धारणा’ कथ्यमानसवज्ञः। तासु प्रकायामः चीरेश्वरं मनो वच वच धार्यते, तच्च तत्र खिरं भवति न विचेपं बजते। 5.3

प्रयासार्थ लघुपानाः।

लघुविषयसमन्योगार्थवाचरे संक्तस्व लघुपानुकारः द्वेषन्द्रियां प्रयासारः || 54 ||

द्वेषन्द्रियां संक्तविषयेष्ठृत्यां प्रत्यासिकम् प्रति कुलवर्त्य भाषिलितवने‐
प्रक्ष्यिन्नृ हः ‘प्रयासार्।’ 5.6 कथं निःप्रजात द्वाराः। चुरुरा‐
दीनां द्वेषन्द्रियां सः को विश्वायः कुर्पाद्।। तेन ‘संप्रयोगः’
तद्रथिसभस्वत् प्रवर्तनाः। तद्रथावसदाभभुक्षे पार्थवज्य लघुपानो
माधेवाङ्काः। पर्वन्द्र यति चित्तलघुपानाचाँगारीषीस्त्रियां
भावनः। यत्तिन्तमनवसमानानि मधुकराराजिव मधुमचिकाः।भे,
सवैषिस्त्रियाणि प्रतोतनेन। अत्तिन्त्रिनिरोधेऽतानि प्रत्यासिकानि
भवति। 5.4

तेनाऽत्तलघुपानाः प्रयासार उकः || फलमाः।

ततः परमा वस्यतेन्द्रियाषाम् || 55 ||

* वस्यमासः हः 7.2 युक्तोऽपि।
† चीरेश्वरं शर्मितिः C 7.3 युक्तोऽपि।
‡ खिरीभवतीयः B, E 7.4 युक्तोऽपि।
§ लघुविषयसमन्योगेः हः B, E 7.5 युक्तोऽपि। लघुविषयसमन्योगेः हः B 7.6 युक्तोऽपि।
|| मधुकराराजिव मधुमचिका हः B, E 7.7 युक्तोऽपि। मधुकराराजिव मधुमचिकाः हः G 7.8 युक्तोऽपि।
भ्रभास्माने द्वि प्रत्यादेऽ तथा ‘व्यायामध्ये निःश्रीमाणिः सम्बन्धे, यथा वाश्चिभिविभिभिविभिभिभिभि नौयभिन्नार्यभि न धातमिवधे॥ ५ ॥

तदेव यथाधम्मो ज्ञानविधानं योगश्च प्रस्तुतं क्षेत्रन्तरस्थानं क्रियायोगमभिधाय भूमिकामुद्रदेः कारणं चेतस श्रवणं फलदोहता कारणांमपि भेदः कारणं श्रवणं प्रभावाभिधाय केदारं कारणं नार्यां भिन्नस्व।

तत्तताय आवानं भूषणां कदाचित्तं भावनातिरिक्तं वाक्याश्रयकलात। भावमुखसे भावाश्रयकलात। भावसे भावाश्रयकलात। भावसे भावाश्रयकलात। भावसे भावाश्रयकलात। भावसे भावाश्रयकलात। भावसे भावाश्रयकलात। भावसे भावाश्रयकलात।

तद्रथ योगसं वस्मिन्यामधिमि: प्रानवीकावः। श्रावनांवायकामुद्रि:। प्रायावाप्रायकावः।

हस्ति महाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरितायं राजमार्गस्थानविधायं पात्रज्ञानोपेतस्स्मृतिः। द्वितीय: शाखापादः॥ १२॥

* योगानामिति G पुलकपादः।
† प्रतेक्षणचरकायायुपास्मिति B, C, E पुलकपादः। परस्परकरुचीप्रवर्धिनिगुप्षकपादः।
‡ कुसमुन द्वितिक G पुलकपादः।
§ चिन्तामणिसामान्यभिन्निर्विति H पुलकपादः।
छठ तृतीयः पादः ।

चतुर्दशपञ्चर्षांश्यमादिविभंतः ।

भवनिः भविष्यमात् भुतनाथः व भुतचे ि।

तदेव पूर्वोद्धते धारशाचूक्ष्येत् किंतुः संयममार्गियानां पूर्वंकां

वाश्याध्यायाराधिशिक्ष्यमात्रिपादवाय शब्दतिथुपकमयः।

तत्त्वाधारणायं खारस्यायः।

देशस्वर्णभित्तय धारासः॥ १ ॥

'रेषे' नामितकणायायारात् । किन्तु 'भंजः' विषयान्तरपरिष्ठारोित यत्, किन्तु देशस्य दरिकरणं। या शिस्व स्वारण', तत्तते ।

प्रयोगमः। मेधाद्विषितपरिधीवादितामा: करणेन धमनियमः

वत्ताजित्याणेन परिष्ठर्माणांविजेत्य प्रवाहविस्मृतिध्यानाः निम्बांह।

प्रदेशं ज्ञाज्ञायेन ज्ञाज्ञायेन योगिना नाभायादि बुद्धाःवालकं

समाधिअवासाय शेषेः दरिकरणं कर्मायमिति॥ २ ॥

धाराशादिधायां ध्यासकालायः।

तत्त्व प्रत्येकातन्तत्त्व ध्यायं॥ २॥

'तत' तार्कायु देशे॥ व चिन्तं धरतं तत। 'प्रत्येक्य प्राचा'।

* किन्तु पार्वशाय ॥ पृष्ठचपः।
† पवित्रीय द्वनि B, E पृष्ठचपः।
क्षामा 'एकतान्त' विष्णुपरिशिष्टपरिवारदारेिय धर्मधारा- 
मातरमानीह्रं तदाक्षरमचेति निराकरशुपांििः। वा 'धारा', जहेरे ||

|| ॥ ||

रमें वैग्रावं वमाधिनमा िः।

तद्वार्थिमान्तिनिमांसं कहुपप्रृत्याचिनिव समाधिं: ||

|| ॥ ||

'तदेव' अक्षरवं धार्म। वचं 'श्रीमाणिनिमां' श्रीमाणिनिमां -
मात्रुयुतारां, धन्युण्डाणां धन्युण्डाणां 'कहुपप्रृत्याचिनिव', अवस्थििते, 
व 'समाधि', हयुक्ते। सम्यक्षारीयं एकाङ्कोक्ते विचेपान्-
परिव्यय धन मनः। व 'समाधि' || ॥ ||

अक्षरवं शैग्राव्यवस्थ्य व्यवहाराय कहाँ व तास्मिनिं वंशिँं 
कल्पिताः।

स्वतेक्षण संयमः। || ॥ ||

एकहिं न्विषाधु धारणा-धारणा-समाधििख्रं स्वतं प्रवर्जिमारं 
'कंधमंक्ष्मांश्य' ब्रह्म ब्रह्मभिवृहत्ते || ॥ ||

तथा पुष्माम।

तज्जयत् प्रसादोक्तः। || ॥ ||

'तथा कंधमंश्य। 'जानात्' ब्रम्हारण बासोत्पादनात्। || 'प्रसादाः।'

* कहुपप्रृत्याचिनिवेति H पुष्माम।
† संयमवं दति B, E पुष्माम।
‡ बासोत्पादनात्ति H पुष्माम।
शास्त्रविवेकस्य प्रायः। 'शालोकः' पत्रगो भवति। प्रश्न च चाहं स्मगवभाषयतीयथः। ॥ ५ ॥
तद्वपयोगमात्र।
तत् भूमिषु विनियोगः। ॥ ६ ॥
‘तत्’ संयमस्य, ‘भूमिषु’ कुलस्थािािांतमेव विनासुः। विनियोगम्, ‘विनियोगः’ कर्त्यः। चापाराधरं विनासुः। जिसं जित्या श्राब्धोक्षर्वः भृमहा संयमं कायः। न नामवनात्मी-ज्ञाताधरभृमिः ज्ञातर्वः भृमहा संयमं कुला्रश्यः। फलमागु भवति। ॥ ६ ॥
साधनपारे येगाकङ्गचाप्यातुहिः पद्मानां स्चर्षं विधाय चयावः। कर्त्यं न क्रतमितिधाष्ट्राः।
चयसन्तरञ्जः पूव्बेमः। ॥ ७ ॥
‘पूव्बेम्’ चामयिद्वियो येगाकङ्गः। पारस्य्वेशं समाधिद्वपकार-केभः। धारणादियोगाध्येयः समुप्राशातकः समाधे। ‘चन्तरञ्जः’ चामा-भिज्ञाप्रपन्नाधिनात्। ॥ ७ ॥
तद्वपि समाधनरापेष्या विविधरुपमात्र।
तद्वपि विविधरुपः निवविज्ञाः। ॥ ८ ॥
‘निवविज्ञाः’ निराकरणः पूव्बभवनापरपर्यायः। समाधे। ॥ ८ ॥
एतद्वपि येगाकङ्गच्छर्वं, ‘विविधरुपः’ पारस्य्वेशंपकारकलात्। ॥ ८ ॥

* प्रसादेद भवदीति D पुत्रकपाठः।
† अविवर्ताभिःति E पुत्रकपाठः।
पादे १० खण्डः

रूपान्तः थोगानक्षिरंदीरास्काराकारः संबन्धित विचारपरिलेखा न कत्वा। क्रमसेव परिणामाद्विताः।

कुद्यान-निरोधसंस्कारयोगरिब्हव-प्रादुर्भावी निरोधक्षणादानब्धा निरोधपरिशासकः ॥ ५ ॥

‘कुद्यान’ विभ-मूह-विचित्राद्य भविष्यवाणी ‘निरोध’ प्रहक्ष-वच्चाक्षिन्तया वेष्या परिणामः। तत्वां कुद्यान-निरोधार्थिया त्र्या जनितो ‘संक्षारी तत्त्वार्थबाग्नें संभव्य-प्रादुर्भावी’, यदा भवतः।

‘संभव्य’ न्यायभूत्तया कार्यकरणार्यामयेनावस्थान। ‘प्रादुर्भाव’ वर्णनार्येषु भविष्यक्रियाविनावस्थान। तदा ‘निरोधाध्यय:’

‘विन्नवायनदिवसात् “संभव्य”’,यः: ‘निरोधपरिशासकः’,द्विपुष्यते।

अयमथः। यदा कुद्यानसंस्काररूपः धर्मः बिरीमीतः भवति, निरोधसंस्कारप्रवक्षावर्भवति, धार्मिकपत्ततः च विन्नवायनदिवसंविद्य-लेखनावस्थः प्रतीतयते, तदा च निरोधपरिशासकस्य आवक्षितः।

विधेय खललागुणेन सङ्क्षेपा निरीक्षणं नाभितं तथायथवृत्तपरिशासकः। वैधेयसुचितः ॥ ५ ॥

प्रश्नव घटकामाः।

तथां प्रश्नवाविधता संस्कारात् ॥ १० ॥

‘प्रश्न’ बेलशः, उक्ताप्रश्नसंस्कारात्, ‘प्रश्नवाविधिः’, भवति।

परिप्रेक्षयेत्ततथा कृत्त्रूपप्रवाहपरिशासक स्वतं भवनवीयं। ॥ १० ॥

निरोधपरिशासकमभिधाय समाधिपरिशासकमाहै।

* सिद्धरास्कारकुक्तम दृढः ॥ पुस्तकपादः।
सर्वार्धेष्वेतकायायं चतुर्द्यो सितस्य समाधिपरिखमः ॥ ११ ॥

‘सर्वार्धेष्व’ सर्वसाधारंविधार्थ्याया, सितस्य विचेष्ये धर्मः।
एकार्थर्थवाक्यस्ते सदृशंपरिश्रामित ‘एकायता’।* शार्यं सितस्य
धर्मः।। तथगांधर्मः ‘चतुर्द्यो’। ‘सर्वार्धेष्वतार्थवाच्य सितस्य ‘चयः’
घर्गनमध्यभवः। ‘एकायतार्थवाच्य सितस्य प्रादुर्भवोद्वितीयः
प्रथमः। ‘सितस्य’ पठिक्षस्य, चतुर्द्योवाच्यां ‘समाधिपरिखमः’,
रघुच्छये।।

पूर्वार्थका परिश्रामद्वयं विचेष्यः। तथ प्राकृतसाधनसाध्यायं-
रामभव—प्रारुभवी। पूर्वस्य चतुर्द्योवाच्यायं धर्मः।
यागभवः। उत्तरमा विविधसाधनसाध्यायं चतुर्द्यो विद्वानभिभिक्षुमाध्यायः।
१७ ॥ श्येष्वाद्वितीयति। सर्वार्धेष्वर्तविचेष्ये पारस्यानातिरस्ताः
प्रवेषः चयः।। एकार्थार्थवाच्य सितस्ये चतुर्द्यो वर्णनावेक्षणम्
प्रकटं।। १२ ॥

वतीयहेकार्यापरिखमेवः।

शान्तादिति तुल्यप्रत्ययी विचम्येकार्यापरिखमेवः।

१२ ॥

समाधिपरिखेष्व ‘विस्तः’, एकमत्यो द्वितीयवेष्यः। ‘शान्तः’

* शार्यार्थवाच्य ॥ पुष्करपाठः।
† तद्यथः ॥ पुष्करपाठः।
‡ चतुर्द्योवाच्यार्थवाच्य ॥, C पुष्करपाठः।
वर्तमानखालू प्रविष्ट। वर्तमानखालू मृत्यु वर्तमानखालू मृत्युन्निश्चय:।

dhāvapālaṃ suṣṭhaṃ sattau sāraṇāpyāpya, 

'ब्रह्मविन्यासः' वर्तमानखालू मृत्यु वर्तमानखालू मृत्युन्निश्चय:।

'प्रत्ययः'। वर्तमानखालू मृत्यु वर्तमानखालू मृत्युन्निश्चय:।

चरितेऽपि मृत्यु वर्तमानखालू मृत्यु वर्तमानखालू मृत्युन्निश्चय:।

\( \text{र्तेन र्तेनीत्रेशुं परम-सख्याविवाक्षापरिशिष्टाः} \)

\( \text{चरितेऽपि मृत्यु वर्तमानखालू मृत्यु वर्तमानखालू मृत्युन्निश्चय:।} \)

* धर्मविवाक्षापरिशिष्टाः स्त्रास्त्रां विलोकनः 0 मुँहकपयः।

† ब्रह्मविन्यासः सत्तानासृरवस्त्रीतिः 0 मुँहकपयः।

‡ परिशिष्टाः सत्तां 0 मुँहकपयः।

§ गतहर्षभत्वानांवशिष्टाः सत्तां 0 मुँहकपयः।

9
गनु केशरं धर्मीतायामार्ग धर्मिणोऽञ्जनमाय।

तत्त्व* शान्तोदितायामपेश्यधर्मिणानुपातात् धम्मित॥ १४॥

‘शान्ता!’ चष जतुक्षेष्यापारा जण्यात्ष,ध्यय नुभविष्ठ।
‘चित्रणम!’ चष जना जनाभावान परित्यागमानेर्जनानी सत्यार्थाने सुवर्णित।
‘चण्डेश्या!’ च� जनाद्रज्ञान स्थिता स्वपनेन न रक्षये।
बद्ध यथे स्त्रांवलिकारैवत्मादयः। निश्चितार्थकारणेष्यपत्या चोहतः—
चातुर्विच्छेदः शनिरवेश्य धर्मिणेन्द्रानकारिणीते।
तं चिन्न करवे पथं जोगनुमात्याकृतं भृत्यस्यमेव स्वरकारिणीत।
कः ‘शनीयोदितायाम—
पेश्यधर्मिणानुपातात् धम्मित’, रक्षये, तथा सूर्यान रुककुरपधर्मिणे—
सृजनेन वातिक्षणिानान्तरपरिये सूर्यस्यस्वपनानुमानं।
तेषु
धर्मेव कथयेवनुभिरेनु धर्मिणेष्यपत्या शमान्यात्माना धर्मेष्यपत्या
विशेषाद्यानावश्लेषनुपातेऽविश्वेतब्धतात्॥ १४॥

एकत्र धर्मिणः कथमनेको परिणामम् देवताप्राप्तेऽनुमात्॥ १४॥

शमान्यात्मवर्षभांतान्त्रेते श्येनुः॥ १४॥

* तत्त्वेविदम् अन्यां वलिकास्तरं पुजाकरूपं नायि।
परम्पद्र भाष्यारैव
धर्मेनागार्तेन परिषुर्जनेऽतु।
अवानिर्वितौ तथैव वाक्याविवेपत॥
† “वाग्याविचिन्ताय धर्मिण: प्रश्नीरव धम्मि:’ इव धार्मिकां माह्यायामायेपुरूषों धर्माणागार्त एव सुभिरं।
परम्पर्यं न वमणौ—
भाविकारैव उत्तरापातस्य भाष्यायणे परिषुर्जनेऽतु॥
† तेषा वया रसमा वलिकास्तरभावमादय दृश्य H पुजाकरूप:।
तेषा वया
रसमा स्त्रांस्तरभावमादय दृश्य G पुजाकरूप:।
† सूविषाद्यपधन्तत्त्वार्तायामेष्यतिः दृश्य C पुजाकरूप:।
परिशामस्य संयमात्तितानागतां || १११ ||

धन्य-सच्चाद्वाभेदेन यत् 'परिशामस्य ज्ञानं। तत् 'संयमात्'


gautama ksaresamvadyaadhvam paribscho sajanam.

tat* shanatiddhatasyapadyashwabhoomiupati durmee |

’gautama’ deva lasakhwavyapara ya iti, dhanvansuupavihita. ’sthititam’ deva jagatmadbhan parirajyam vyalmere vrinihama kshwavyapara krubhena.

’apadyas’ deva vriniheme Vijrya vishnekhata kshwarte nubhate

vabantatapakarme shaktasve bhruvakshe dharmanravarnavishista.

ladyatatvam prabhu amsam bhruvakshe sriyakwaram bhojana bhikaratya.

nityatapakarmavahavan chaityanubhise bhruvakshe dharmanravarnavishista.

satam chirvishaya dharman bhruvam asi gauravamsam bhruvam bhojana bhikaratya.

vishayatmanwachitmanupamniranabhaye. 14 |

ekaksh dinshen devamadhe evamapadevam.

samayathe parismaranatye hetu. 15 |

* tavaoitpare bahashvarunaardhagunavadavahu navaksh. puratubhavajaren sajanageshvarani parisparsthitivaloh bhasambrandapi tarve bhashwamityata.

† “bharatkash-chash chharsam: vrinihame dharman” devan bhavajara bhaavapalaye samajvavadyam sajanageshvarani ksevam seviyate.

parakshye n sabhesh varna: varnajara bhatapadesa bhashwame paryajavishatam.

† † tavaane varjha van samvahakarmaivaardh bhritm H punashapade. tavaane varjha van samvahakarmaivaardh bhritm C punashapade.

† samvahakarmaivaardh prabuve bhojana bhritm O punashapade.
पाडे १४ खाने।

ध्वानासुद्धाचरणाचे वतः 'कम,' तसय वर्तू अतिक्रमण 'चन्द्रम,' परिश्रामक, 'परिश्रामक' उञ्जस्यसा, 'चन्द्रमे' नानाविभन्ने, 'हेतु' बिखू षापक भवति। अथवयः। बोळं निधि तकमः, रज्जुपाला रत्नपिण्डस: कपालित तैवृ घट दस्येनूतन रूपः परिश्रामक: परिश्रामावत्मावैद्यति। तस्यं प्रत्यहिणी चो 
क्षणपरिश्रामकावत्मावपरिश्रामक च कमः वाल्यवै न्यायेन परिश्रामावन्ते गमरावल्यन्त्यः। सब्यं एव चः भावाः निधिने नेताएव विभेद प्रतिक्रिया परिश्रामकाः परिश्रामाचा शतः चिंतामण्डलात् परिश्रामाच्छः । चिन्नादीना विवेधः परिश्रामाच्छार्कीलित धर्मः 
प्रयोजनेवापवक्ष्यां श्रध्या सुखात्मः संयोगाद्यः। चेष्ट्येत्ता- 
लोकानुमानमयः, यथा धर्मसंस्कार-श्रीक्षणश्चतः। धर्मक्षया- 
भिक्षुपत्यः ॥ वर्ग्यनुगमः ॥ १ ॥

दरागीसुखसः संयमसः विशयार्� getArguments विशीरः प्रतिपादगत्व यितामाः।

परिश्रामकयं संयममाद्वितीयानागतमां ॥ १४ ॥

धर्मसंस्काराचे वर्तू 'परिश्रामकयं जात। तत् 'संयममाः'

* पुरापि देव चेति H पुलक्षपादः।
† बब: सिंहः कमानं ब्रमान्यलात् परिश्रामावत्मावलिति H पुलक्षपादः।
‡ विषयदीर्घानिति H पुलक्षपादः।
§ कार्य-संस्कार-श्रीक्षणश्चतः इति B, E पुलक्षपादः।
¶ धर्मिष्यथिनिति H पुलक्षपादः।
‖ प्रदर्शितसमाहेति B, C, E पुलक्षपादः।
नाशिला निवेदन पूवोमाय संदर्भ प्रकाश, "शतनानागममात्", शोगिम: कर्णनागविने निवेदनम्। रसमध तात्पर्यः। नाशिला अधिष्ठात्र चर्चा। महत्वम्। दृश्यमण्डल। रामायण शाथमाय ग्रन्थमावतः। धृतराष्ट्र विधायानीसम्बन्धम् प्रविष्टवैनीयं परिष्ठलबैराय। पदम्। यदा धर्मम् कर्मात्मकश्चैव अस्ति। तदा यथा जित्वदविज्ञानम् गुणम् वा वानी बोली बानाति। ज्ञातविश्वसम् क्रुद्धत्वमनानां कर्माय। कर्मान्तरण्यात्मविविधलिङ्गेऽपैर्यं पराप्रियते। यदा हृ तेते दुःपापायं विवेचना:। परिव्रस्तरी|, तदा जित्तसमस्तायेऽकृष्णाय सर्वर्थस्थर्याधनेकाहतापविश्वेऽति।

विकस्मार्गमः।

श्रवंद्र—प्रत्ययमानामितेरंतराधासात् संक्षरसत्प्र-विभागसंयंभात् सम्यम्भूतसत्संधानां।

‘श्रवं’ घोषेनित्यसाध्वो निवितकमस्थाप्तमा नियतकार्यंप्रतिस्थ-विश्वेऽ। यथा वा कथािल। बहुस्त्राद्वा ध्वनि:। श्रवंकृतसुखसुखक्रिया:। ज्ञातां विश्ववर्गम्। तथोऽकार्यंप्रतिपन्नी:। शास्त्रात्।

‘श्रवं’ राज्य-रिष्यादि:। ‘प्रत्ययं’ श्रवं विश्वायकारा बुद्धिहृदय:।

धीरां श्रवायमानानां विचारोऽदृश्यतरं धार्मिकाय। श्रवंमर्मात्मक-मुख्येऽविद्ययायं गोस्तवाक्योऽपैर्यं काव्याधिकृतस्मिक्ष्यं, श्रवं तदायकं, श्रान्ति तद्यथाकमेतेज्ज्वायवस्तुति। न लक्ष्मी गोक्ष्ठजो वाचका; च गोक्ष्ठजः वाचका; तथोरितं धीरां श्रवं धार्मिकतां भेदेऽव व्यवहरति।
यथा वि केस्यमां, केस्य ब्रह्मः, जिमिन्द्र शान्मिति प्रश्न: सर्वे-चेताक्षेपावेतर्म् दशात्ति गौरिति। व चेताक्षेपाः न प्रतिपद्धते कथ्येक्षपुण्यसनरां प्रश्न्यति। एतत्समस्विभिः चौद्यं 'श्रविभागः', इत्ये श्रव्यं तच्छ चद्याक्षलं नाम। इदमथं यद्वाच्यन्त। इत्ये श्रव्यं यत् प्रकाशः। दृश्य प्रविभागं विकाश्य तत्र्शिर्य प्रविभागे या: 'चंद्र-मद्द्वृत्ति,' तथा 'वर्षेणा' स्वतान्त 'द्रव-पद्ग-पुच्छ-चरीत्राप्पार्दीना' चन् 'हत' या: ब्रह्मः। तत्र 'श्रान', उत्पादते। जनेनामाध्यायनैतेष प्रणिध्यं चंद्रः सर्वृष्टिर्म दृश्य शर्यणात।॥ ९ ७ ॥

विद्वानरमाच।

संस्कारासङ्क्षात्करणतः पूर्वंजातिशानं ॥ १८ ॥

dिविधाविभिः सर्वाण्डा प्रमाणः 'संस्कारः। केवलं संतिमाणोपय-वन्द्यः। केवलं आयुर्वेदबागपशाविपाककेतव: यथा ध्रुवस्यालखः। येजू संस्कारे पदा वंशम् करते, एवं मध्य चेवार्यमुभत्। एवं मध्य या च्या विश्वासदेते पूर्वंजात्रां पर्वमनुमयधानां भावनाय विवेधाभिन्नरेण उद्यवृत्तं संस्कारः। सर्वमातीं खरत। केनेष बाहार्य-चक्षुषुद्दुः संस्कारे। 'पूर्वंज्ञानुभुतानं जात्यादिन्यु प्रत्येक्ष पर्वमति' ॥ १७ ॥

* सर्वनेशीनेवाधिरतमि ए पुस्तकमाध।
† केदरतिमि ह पुस्तकमाध।
‡ वर्तिमा चिरते दृश्यं ह पुस्तकमाध।
§ विनिधामाध्यतिः ए पुस्तकमाध।
‖ साधारणतेतु पंक्त्यातिः ब, स, ए पुस्तकमाध प्राङ्।
ধ্রুতনারায়ণ।

প্রয়োজ্য পরিচরণ। ॥ ১৮ ॥

'প্রয়োজ্য' পরিচরণে কেনবিষয়ক রাগাগায় বিলুপ্ত মধুভূম।
যদি সংযোগ করতে তদা 'পরকীর্ত্তন চিন্তন 'শ্রান্ত', উদ্যম করি।
নালন্ত চিন্তন বীর্য বন্ধি পরিচরণাদ্যাস্য স্বর্ণালয় ধর্মোপায় জানারিত্যথ: ॥ ১৮ ॥

প্রকাশিত পরিচরণ যৌথ সম্পাদন।

ন তত্ত্ব সালোকন তস্যানুপাধি শ্রুতমাত্র। ॥ ২০ ॥

'তত্ত্ব' পরস্পর, বিচিত্র 'তত্ত্ব', 'সালোকন সাক্ষীযাচরণে বসতি, 'ন', প্রকাশ শান্ত। সালোকন কেনবিষয়ক বিষয়বিদ্যাতে বিলুপ্ত' 
ক্ষেত্রাচার্য পরস্পর গতি র্থ নু নীতিদর্শ্যমান চিন্তন, পৌর- 
বিণিতি বা। যে ন মস্তিষ্ক তত্ত্ব সংযোগ কলেন্দ্রিয়কলাপ।

ন ধার্মিক পরিচরণ তে বিষয়কানু শান্ত। তস্যানু পরকীর্ত্তিন ।
নালন্ত মস্তিষ্ক গতি গতি শান্ত। তস্যানু মস্তিষ্ক মধুভূম।
চিন্তন করিন, পুনর্জাল্পন এব। যদি নু কিম্নের বিচার বিচার।

ধ্রুতনারায়ণ।

কায়-কীর্তন্ত যাহার মস্তিষ্ক চিন্তন প্রকাশ সারাঃ ।
শান্তানন্দান। ॥ ২১ ॥

* প্রথমেষ্টি ও পৃষ্ঠাপট: ।
† চতুষ্কোট্যত সচরামুখতে প্রবণ মানকানন্দ।
‡ প্রথমেষ্টি পথ প্রথমলয় ও পৃষ্ঠাপট: ।
§ প্রথমেষ্টি পথযতী প্রথমেষ্টি পথযতী ও প্রবণ মানকানন্দ।
’कायः’ सरीरः। तथा ‘पुत्र’ चचुर्णास्वो गुणः।। तस्मिन् कायः

dर्मेऽरुपमिति ‘संबन्धमात्’, तस्मा रुपस्य चचुर्णास्नातप्या यथा
‘श्रीकं’, तस्मा: ‘कस्यो’ भाववाचित्वः प्रतिवन्धे। ‘चचुः’प्रकाशासंयोगः’
‘चचुः’ ‘प्रकाशः’ चचुर्णास्नः, तस्मा ‘संयोगः’ तद्वैक्यस्य वायुपारा-
भावे। योगिनः ‘स्त्रावुः’, भवति। न केषाचार्यः क्रुद्ध क्रुद्ध दयायः।
एतेन ब्रह्मचर्यस्यानुभुधे वेदिन्यः।। एतेन द्यायचक्षुनीपावः
प्रदेशेऽनेव ब्रह्मदेवो अक्षोत्सिद्धास्मात्त्वः अन्तं भवति।।
॥ १९ ॥

विभद्यतामाहः।

सेपकम् नित्यप्रकमस्य कथे तत्संयमाद्यपरानान्त्वा-
नमर्यिष्टे यः च॥ २२ ॥

चायुभिष्पां वान प्रपेशातं ‘कस्यः’, तद्विप्रकारः, ‘सेपकम्
‘नित्यप्रकम्य’। तथ ‘सेपकम्’ वान फलजनायथ बहेपकमेष्य कार्यं-
कारणाभिमुखः स्वस्ये। यथा उष्णपदेः प्रश्नानितांवासः श्रीचन्द्रे
ग्रुः चतुत्त्रीत। उजाविकारीं नित्यपकम्।। यथा तदेवाँवासः वसन्तविशे-

* तस्मिन् नित्यपकान्तः काये रुपमितिः प चित्रितपुस्तकापादः। तस्मिन्

ित्यपकान्तः काये रुपमितिः पुस्तकापादः।

† प पुस्तकान्तेऽवतं ‘प्रवेत् श्रवणस्तवाहान्तुत्’ दस्यं पाठः द्वारापारेभो
व्याख्यापितः। परस्यं न समीचीणः। उपायस्य कामाभिमुखित्योगभायो-
पुस्तके भावान्तर्गतवादः। तथ बाणसचाराभिमुखः ‘प्रवेदे’ दि भावापारः
विश्व बाणचक्षुस्यस्य सात्त्वकम्यान्तु तद्रावणश्रित्वा कथे बोधकसन-
ब्राह्मकारान्तिरेतीसे तदन्तर्धागतिः दस्यमुखीं दि भावाभिमुखसक्षे
वान्तर्गतः। प्रक्षार्धवस्य प्रक्षार्धवस्य वाजनागतावादः।
मनुष्यांनाच चिरेण ब्राह्मणत:। प्रसिद्ध विविधे काल्पिक वा: 'बंधनं करोति, किं मन कर्म श्रीश्रवणं किं चिरविपक्षश्रवणं श्राद्-ञात् 'श्रापरामाणं', संयोग्यते। 'श्रापराणा:' श्रीरवियोगः।
तक्षां 'श्राणं'। मस्त्रिन्द्र काले मस्त्रिन्द्रैं देशे मन श्रीरवियोगों भविष्यतीति निःशंकङ्ग जनाति। 'श्रार्थिर्यो वा'। श्रार्थिर्यो विश्वाति प्राथातिकाधिकार्धिविकाधिविकाधिथायमैति। तत्तथाविवाहिनी पितृविवध: कौस्त्हव वायोवाच्यं न द्रष्टोति इत्येवमादि। श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी श्राधि-भैरविनी
तेभ: श्रार्थिर्यो विविधां जागाति। ययत्योगानामयाचिर्थिथ्यः प्राधेन श्राणां तपते, तथापि तेषां समानाकारेण तत् संबंधां
२ २ ||
परिचक्षिणन्याहितिना: चिद्वति। परिच्छेदाद्धितुमाहः॥

मैवायादिपु बखानि॥ २३ ||

"मैष्ट्रि-कहणा-सुदिर्दोपेक्षाय घी विधित: बह्यम: तथां 'बखानि',
तावं मैवायादिपु श्रमयोग: प्रात्तिवन्ति। मैष्ट्रि-कहणा-सुदिर्दोपेक्षाय
स्थायिक प्रकृति गच्छनिः, बह्यम: सर्वेक्ष्या मिष्ठवाचिकं सम्बन्धित:।
परिच्छेदाद्धितुमाहः: चिद्वति॥ २ ३ ||

मनुष्यांकान्तः च नदित ॥ पुकारपाठः।
† परिच्छेदाद्धितुमाहः: चिद्वति॥ २ ३ पुकारपाठः।
বলেষু ইতিবিবাদীনি ॥ ২৪ ॥

ঐত্যাদিত্বমিবন্ধু 'বলেষু', ক্ষতসমমত্তু ইত্যাদিনবদ্ধত্তু চারিভ্রত্তনি। তথ্যমধ্যে: । বলিন ইতিলবে বাধ্যবেণী হিংসবীয়ে না তদ্র্যায়ায়েন* সন্ধাম করোতি, তন্তব্যর্থায়ামুক্ত্যুন ক্ষতমস প্রাপ্তস্বতীয়ায় ॥ ২৪ ॥

 বিভিন্নরসারস ।

প্রস্তাক্ষোধাক্ষ্যাযাত্ত কৃত্ত-যায়ায়ত-বিপ্রক্ষাযাযান ॥ ২৫ ॥

'প্রস্তাক্ষোধাক্ষ্যাযাত্ত জ্যোতির্ভূতি চ প্রাগুকা। তথ্য চোঁটির
'ব্রাহ্মণঃ' বালিবক্ষাযাযান ॥ তথ্য খিলিলে বিষয়ে ব্যাখ্যান 'নাযায়,'
তন্ত্রধিতানে বিষয়াণ্যা ভাবানা, ॥ খান্তকরণে বিভিন্নিত্বে চ প্রক্ষ-রাজ্যাযাযান || 'কৃত্ত-যায়ায়' পরসায়াদে, 'যায়ায়ত' ভ্রূনন্তনত্তক নিয়াদে, ॥ 'বিপ্রক্ষাযান' মেধায়পার্থায় নিয়াদে, 'ক্রান,'
শ্যায়াদে ॥ ২৫ ॥

এইত্তমানসন্তানান বিভিন্নরসারস ।

ভূবনন্তান সূর্য্যে সন্যমাদান || ২৫ ॥

* তথ্যযোগমায়েনেতি হ পুলকজায়।
† কৃত্ত-ব্যাখ্যাত-বিপ্রক্ষাযাযানমিতি এ পুলকজায়।
‡ সারিবক্ষাযাযান ইতি এ পুলকজায়।
§ ভাবাযাযান ই পুলকজায়।
¶ প্রক্ষাযাযানমিতি ই পুলকজায়।
∥ নিবিন্নরসারসাযাযান ই পুলকজায়।
‘सन्त्’ प्रकाशमवे, य: संख्य करौति, तत्का षट्पु भ्रमवः:-
प्रसलिप्तु खोकेश्य धारि ‘भुवनानि’ तत्तत्त्ववेशप्रभासस्य पुराणि, तेषु
विषयाक्रमे ‘शान’, जुधाते। पूर्णिस्नन स्त्री वाचिकप्रकाश
आप्यमनतयोऽथ ् तु भार्तकड़ रत्न विषेषः। ॥ २६ ॥
भार्तिकप्रकाशानारामणजीवे विज्ञारसाह ।

चन्द्रे तारायुस्मानं। ॥ २७ ॥

‘तारारण’ व्योतिशं, य: ‘बुध’ विशिष्यविशेष:, तक्षश्य
‘चन्द्रे’, जटवर्यमक् ‘शान’, जुधाते। तत्त्वप्रकाशेन हलतेष्वकलात्
तारारणां, तत्त्ववर्यमक्ष्यूस्मानं न वक्रोति भवितमिति प्रथ्युपायो-
उभिन्ति। ॥ २७ ॥
विज्ञारसाह ।

भुजे तद्गतिद्वानं। ॥ २८ ॥

‘भुजे’ गिरिसे व्योतिशं प्रधाने, जटवर्यमक्ष्य तारां तारणी
वा ‘गति’, प्रथेषु नियत्तकाँ मत्तत्त्वदेशां च तस्म: ‘शान्’,
जउधाते। द्वयं तार षट्पु: दयं तारान् कालेन द्वयं रांगिनः नचन्म
आप्यमन दृष्टि षट्पु जानानीवधस्य:। द्वयं काल्याणफलविश्वुद्यां
भवति। ॥ २८ ॥

बामा: बिभ्यः प्रतिपादयूतराः। बिभ्यः प्रतिपादविश्वुपकमते।

नाभिस्यकायवृक्षाणं। ॥ २८ ॥

वर्षिम्भव:ः ‘नाभिस्यकायं षट् खोकेरां ‘चक्षु’, तक्षश्य हल-
य पादे १९ छन्म।

खण्डमवः चषुगितः, 'कार्यते चोसै चुः' विषिंगर रक्त-मात-धातु- माण्डायनमानवस्त्रां, तत्र 'श्रान', जयते। देशस्य भवति। नाभिकां श्रृंगरस्त मध्यवस्त्रि संहन: प्रशताण्य नाकाद्यानं मूलभानि। अतत्र ज्ञातवधानस्त समयः शंखवेशो च्यावदाभावति॥ २८॥

विद्यानरमाजः।

कष्टकुपे चुतुपिपासानिहितः॥ ३०॥

कपडे गले कुप: 'कष्टकुप: ' जिस्वा-तन्न्वरधस्ताः क्रापद कुपे गर्वीकारप्रदेभः। प्राणारे पृथ्वीपादायः प्रादुर्वेधणि। तस्मिन् ज्ञातवधानस्त चषुगितः चुतुपिपासादयो निर्मलम्। चषुविशिष्टी- खात् शोताश्चायरमाजः तस्मिन् भाविते भवद्येवविभा विषिंगरः॥ ३०॥

विद्यानरमाजः।

क्रापदनार्यः सैयोः॥ ३१॥

कष्टकुपस्थायक्सात् या 'क्रापदनार्यः' नाडः, तत्कां ज्ञातवधानस्त, 
सेतस्: 'सैयोः', जयते। तस्मिन्नमुनित्तस्था पुष्पताः न भव- 
तीत्यहः। ध्रुव वा कार्यक एशेषेशुरुपण्यते, न स्येनिजत्स सन्दिहिः। 
वक्त क्वच्छ रत्ने॥ ३१॥

विद्यानरमाजः।

* च्यावदाविभववत्तिः B, C, E पुञ्जपाठः।
† जिस्वाेसुर्वाराधस्तिः F पुञ्जपाठः।
‡ व्यक्तस्य भार्यमानम् हक्ति F पुञ्जपाठः।
§ ज्ञातस्य C पुञ्जपाठः। चषुवेशिति H पुञ्जपाठः।

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भूमिक्षोलिति सिद्धार्थनं ॥ १२ ॥

शिरङ्कपाले भ्रामणश्राख्य छिंद्र प्रकाशाधारलात् ‘ब्योति’।
वधा मद्याक्षरक्षर मणि: प्रवर्णी भ्रामकुशिकाविविधका गत्वते, तथा यद्यः: सालिकः प्रकाशः प्रस्तुतकु च शिविष्टिताः
भजते। तत जलसंयमसक, ये धा-ङ्चर्याभरक्षरवत्ते: ‘धिञ्चा’
दिखा: पुष्पाः, तेवासितप्राप्तसङ्क्रामनाः तस्य दर्शनं भवति। तानु
प्रभाति, तैः भ्राम्यनात्र द्वार्यः।। १२ ॥

बर्णश्राख्य उपाधयामः।

प्रातिभाषा तथः ॥ १३ ॥

निमित्तानपेक्षः। मनोमाशजनयमविसंवादस्त्रागुल्यसङ्काः
श्राम प्रथिभा। तथा वंचये निमित्ताये ‘प्रातिभ’ विवेक्याते:
पुष्पभावि तारकं श्राम, उद्धेते।। चढोदेशत: सवितः॥ पूर्णे भ्रामा
प्रादुर्भवति। तद्रज्ञेयातः: पूर्णे तारकं ‘स्वर्णविषयं श्रामसाधने
भवति।’ निमित्ताय शति संयमान्तरानपेक्षः: बर्णे जानातीत्वः।। १३॥

विस्मृतारामः।

हेद्यः चित्सचित्वत् ॥ १४ ॥

‘हेद्यः’ मरीरस प्रदेशविशेषः। नस्तिश्चधोपुस्तकश्रृङ्खलाकाभाषनरे

* कुशिकाविद्वेद सवर्णप्रेमे सार्ण्यत हि वा ॥
† निमित्तानालोकमिश्रित ॥ चुस्त्रामः।
‡ भट्टितंयमान्तरानपेक्षः ॥ पुष्पामः।
§ उदयात हि बुध चुस्त्रामः।
¶ वर्णोदेशसः सवितेदीति ॥ पुष्पामः।
श्रीकाल्पकस्वतः स्वानं। तत्र द्वितियंकः ख-परिव्राजकगुणययते। स्वर्णनांत: सङ्की वाक्यः परिव्राजकर्तारः रागादिनः ज्ञानान् नीतिः॥ १४ ॥

विख्यातरामाः।

शत्तपूर्णहोरत्यन्तात्संज्ञीकृताः प्रत्ययाविशेषे भोगः। पराधान्यन्यसंसारिन्यसंदर्भमात् पुच्छवधानं॥ ३५॥

'शनं' प्रकाशमुक्तातः प्राधान्य: परिप्रेयवृत्ती:। 'शुचि:' भोगा भोजिनमुऽः।। तयोऽर्थं-भोजलीपलावः येनाचेतनलाभं ब्रह्मनात्संज्ञीकृतं भवलमिदंतः। तयोऽर्थं 'प्राधान्याविशेषे:' भोजे-नाप्रतिभावम्; शोभ्यं। तस्मात मद्यमेव कर्त्ता प्रत्येकः या सुख-दु:स्वर्णितं शोभ्यं। तस्मात मद्यमेव कर्त्ता प्रत्येकः या सुख-दु:स्वर्णितं शोभ्यं। 'श्यायं' सब्ज्य वार्यनेत्रप्रेयवेच्यं 'पराधाः:' पुच्छवधाः॥।

तस्माद यथा श्यायं। पुच्छवधाप्रमाणादिस्यः: परित्याङ्काद्वारे तथे यथा विषयायांकर्ता:। तत्र शत्तपूर्णं स्वर्णस्य 'पुच्छवधायं' श्यायं, ज्ञाते।। तदवेद श्यायं। श्यायं श्यायं च विषयविश्वासान्त:। स श्रीकाल्पकस्वतं विषयविश्वासान्त:।

श्रीकाल्पकस्वतं फलमाहः॥ ३५॥

* अन्तःकरणनेतरं H पुच्छवधाः।
† प्रवाहाविशेषातः भोगः वृत्त H, B, C चिन्हपुच्छवधाः: परिव्राज-नामकोपः सुविकार्यमुऽः पुच्छवधानेयः। वृत्ती पाठन: हृदयसि।
‡ भोज्याविशेषायं H पुच्छवधाः।
§ वेदोन प्रतिभासनेत्रमिति D पुच्छवधाः।
|| पुच्छवधानेत्रिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनि H पुच्छवधाः।
ततः प्रातिभ-अावश-बेदनाद्वाराध्वादवासा जायते || ३८ ||

‘ततः’ पुद्दूषबलादम्बरमानान्, बुद्धिनसापि शानानि जाचने। तथ ‘प्रातिभ’ पूर्ववर्त शानं, तस्याविभववानात् खुशारिक-मयं परस्यं। ‘अावश’ श्रोतेरित्रययं शानं, तस्याश प्रक्षणं दिव्यं दिव्यं अभवं ब्रह्म जानाति। ‘बेदना’ खर्दिक्रिययं शानं, विचालनसनमेति कला नान्दिकी वंश्या चवघृतियते। तस्यात् दिव्यसंबोधियं शानं उपजायते। ‘अावशः’ चुपुरिक्रिययं शानं, छासमानन् दूष्टके उभयते हपमाननेती कला, तस्य प्रक्षादिवशब्दानमुपजूते।

‘अावशः’ रथनेक्रिययं शानं, छासाधुते उनमेती कला, तस्यैन प्रक्षणं दिव्यसंबोधियं उपजायते। ‘वासी’ गमधविविठं,ि दर्शिन्यर्धेन नान्दिकी परिभाष्या घामेक्रियनमुपजूते, वर्षने गमधविविध दृश्यं कला पर्सीप्रेरितेश्वादयते वासी गमधविविठं, तस्यं प्रक्षादिवशमाणं दिव्यगोक्तं उभयते || ३६ ||

एतेचं फलविशेषानं विषयविभागमार्थं।

ते समाधायुपसर्गाय सुत्वाने सिद्धयं || ३७ ||

‘ते’ प्राक्ष्य्यप्राप्तिं, फलविशेषाः, ‘समाधिे प्रक्षणं गच्छन्।

* तस्याविभववादिति H पुस्तकापादः।
† गमधविविषिदिति H पुस्तकापादः।
‡ विषयविभागमान्ति D पुस्तकापादः।
§ समाधिे प्रक्षणं मद्दीति D पुस्तकापादः।
‘उपस्पन्नः’ उपद्रव विन्मा।* तत्र दृश्य-विस्तारार्थिकारणेन समाधिः
मिथिलाभवति। ‘सुयाने’ पुनरथ्यवावर्दश्रयाया, विशिष्यपहलदायकलात
‘विषूषः’, भवन्ति॥ १७॥
विषालमार्गः।

बन्धकारणश्रैविष्णुत्र प्रचारसवेदनाच विन्मय
परशरीरवेगः।॥ १८॥

आपकालादाशस्योनिष्ठतकर्थवादेव शरीरार्थतयोगेरो भो-
कु-भोगभावेन यत्र संबेदनस्यवादवते, य एव शरीरबन्ध देयते।
तत् श्रद्धा समाधिविन्मय ‘बन्धकारणं ध्यायोध्याक्षं कर्म शिष्यी-भवति, तानवमाप्यते।
विचित्र च ज्ञाते ‘प्रचारः’ दृश्यमृदे-
शादिन्द्रियदारणेन विष्णुभास्यस्योक्तः, तत्र ‘संबेदनः’ श्रावं दृश्यं
विचारः नार्ती, अन्यत्र विचारं वहति, दृश्य विराज्यविष्णुभास्ये
नार्तीनेष्व विस्तारं दृति खपशरीरस्योर्भवं वस्सरां जानाति, तत्रा
परशश्रीरं मन्त्रं श्रुत्तृच्छारिताय व चिन्तं वस्सराधारणं विनिवशति।
विचारः परशश्रीरं प्रविष्टं दृश्यवाणुवनते, मधुकरार्जुनिविव मधु-
माल्यवः॥ ॥ भवः परशश्रीरप्रविशाय प्रघी खपश्रीरेष्व ते कवी व्यवहरति,
चतुः वायव्योक्तिकुप्स्योभेरवागव्यक्षारणं कर्म, तत्स्ये समा-
धिना चिन्तं तदा ख्यात्वागः सम्बलायो भोगस्वदभिति।॥ १९॥

* विन्मयार्थिः दृति ॥ मुखादायः।
† परशश्रीरप्रविशाय दृति D मुखादायः।
‡ नामकराद्रिः दृति D मुखादायः।
§ खपशश्रीरप्रविशेषतं ‘विषूषः’ नामकवच्चायः।
हिि्न्नमात्रे।
उद्यानहायक-पृष्ठ-कष्टकार्धिसंस्कृत उत्क्रान्तिक ि॥ ३५ ि॥

संस्कृतस्मात वार्ता या मुकुटितन दृष्टि: वा जीवनबाह्या। तथा: कियाभेदात् प्राणायामार्थक संस्कृतबाध्येन्द्र:।
तत् शुद्यानमुखनास्तिकाद्वारेण वायो: प्रथा नात् प्राण द्वयुग्मे।
नाभिस्तेश्च वायु पादाकुश्कवर्त्यं तमयवाद्यान:। नाभिप्रेदेषं परिवेश
समन्ताय्यसम्मान् वयमान:। कीकाठकादेश्चारुकर्णेनस्तहतयादु-
दान:। व्याय नयनात् सर्वश्रीतिवायी व्याय:। 'उद्यानहाय', वंधमद्रा-
रेण 'ज्ञात', दशरावं वाणिा निरोधा तुडुंगामलेन 'ज्ञो' मद्याव-
धारिे, मद्यति वा कहौँ, तीत्त्रेणु कष्टकेषु वा न मद्यति द्वति।
सम्युवादास्तिपेश्वकमंतादौ निमायामचित॥ उद्ध्रुतीलार्थे॥ ३६ ि॥

हिि्न्नमात्रे।

समानज्यात् पृज्ञानस्॥ ४० ि॥

अर्याभृत्य: व्यवस्थितस्य 'समानन्द्वः वायो: 'ज्ञायं' दंस्ति न सहीकारान्, निराभास्तिप्रेक्षुभूिवाणेच्छ अवसिष्य थोगी प्रति-
भावि॥ ४० ि॥

हिि्न्नमात्रे।

* सम्युचापािि: ऐ पुस्तकमात्र॥
† उपरिग्रहिततीवर्थि दृष्टि: ऐ पुस्तकमात्र॥
†† समानज्यामल्लभन्तित्य पाध: ऐ चित्रात्तुकस्ते बातां सूक्ष्मद्विमायभ्याय-
पुस्तकेषु च वर्णये।
श्रीचाकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाहिब्धं स्रीचं \n41 \n
‘श्रोच्छ’ ब्रह्मारकक्षायमाहिब्रह्मारिकिमिद्रियं। ‘श्राकाश’ योम ब्रह्म- 
तद्गाताकाय। तथा। ‘सम्बंधः’ देश-देशिभाववच्छः। तद्गाताः जनमय- 
मक्ख चोगिनः। ‘दिवं श्रोच्छ’ प्रवर्षते, युगपत् देश-देशिभिः। विप्रकुट- 
ब्रह्मराजसमर्थं भवतीतिः। \n41 \n
विद्वान्तरमाह्।

कायाकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाहिष्ठतुससमापतेस्या- 
कायगणमं \n42 \n
‘कायः’ पावभावविकं श्रीरं। तथा। ‘श्राकाशेन श्राब्दकाराद्रामयेन’ 
वः। ‘सम्बंधः’, तच्च संयमं विबाय दशुचः, तद्गातां समापितं 
तद्गातामाहलाभं, तै। विहाय प्रासायमानसुभवेऽ तंगी। प्रयम्य 
प्रयासः अजोः। दशरथः कनेशोभनाभतनुजालेन सर्वराजः आदि- 
कायगणः पिरस्मायसः गण्धति। \n42 \n
विद्वान्तरमाह।

विद्वान्तरमाहः प्रक्षत्वचाविदेशः ततः प्रक्षताव- 
रक्षायः \n43 \n
श्रीरेतु ‘वद्व’, ततंमसः श्रीरेतुपेत्स्येन ‘दशिः’, उ ‘महा- 
विदेशः’ नाम विगतश्रीरेतुरस्त्राणाद्वारं मोचते। ‘ततः’ तद्धां}

* श्रवात्मराजःसिद्धिः \n+ श्रवायेत्वः \n11
प्रातःसुऽ वेणुवर्क्रेषि।

ब्रह्मानं शंभमानं, 'प्रकाशार्थवस्थितः' शारिरिके विनताष्ट्रा ध्रुवंः प्रकाश-
श्राद्ध यदावरं खेलकविष्टि तथा दधि: प्रविष्ट्यो भवति। श्राधमचः।

रीरीलुज्ज्ज्जारे धति तथा मनोरः विविधमन्यि: वा कालेख्युस्ति 
कर्ता । पुनः रेरीलुज्ज्ज्जारभादिः परित्यागः ब्रह्मानेष्म मनोरः दृष्टि: वा
वक्षित्यं, तथा संयमात्रा श्रोती: वर्णं विस्मितां: चीतस्मि: ॥ ॥

तदेवं पुष्पावसिष्या भपरालविष्या मधुभवायु श्रवणं। प्रति-
पाध्यायंलर्थ बुद्धवल्लगादिहः वाचा:ः, काशिकासुद्रेष्या भाषी-
नारः, परिक्षेनविन्यमभुताय श्रवणद्विधा वशादिदुः देवेन्द्रायः:
वामाद्विपिनीविश्वायःकर्षणविदःकरणक्षणेणिनयाभायः; 
प्राणायामकञ्चिश्वरीश्चित्रनदिभाज्य समाधि: प्राणायाभो
बुधबायु श्रवणे श्रमिकृशिईन राङ्गाङ्ग समाधि: प्राणायाभो शार्क द्वारा
श्रवणेवप्रतिपाकः द्वारानी खाद्दगोपायोविनायकजः निम्नवत्थवाच्यिनिवृऽथे 
विविधेयापः 
प्रदर्शनायासः।

शूल-श्वरुप-स्त्राङ्गाब्याख्यायवस्तीं सङ्गमाद्रहुमूलजयः ॥ ॥

पद्माना प्राध्यादीनां भूतानां व पद्मावश्वविविष्ठण स्वा:
शूलाद्यः, तथा ज्ञानवद्धम 'भक्तजयः', भवति, भूतानि वास्तु-
वस्त्र भवनीयः। पञ्चाश्च भूताना परिशुभिन्मानि विभिन्नाकारजां
'शूल' 'श्वरुप' वेशं व यथाऽः कार्या गण्यां गण्यं छेदोज्ज्ज्ज्ज्जां
प्रेयाकाश्च द्रानस्यां। 'शूल' तु यथाऽः भूतानां कारणोऽपि वाच्यखितां वनमाधि 
श्रवणदिल्लाचार्यथ। 'श्रवणदिर्ममा गुष्म: प्रकाश-प्रभुज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज्ज

* प्रतीराध्या भवभिः भरं C पुष्पाकाठः।
† भूतायुण्यभावानाः चालनीयवर्ष हर र्व C पुष्पाकाठः।
‡ चालविस्मिति C, H, B पुष्पाकाठः।
ecidedāvāpyāvān bhāvyābhāvyo.

‘अर्थवर्ण’ तताये गृहे भोगापर्वर्तमायुराग्नि। तदेवे भोगतुपं वसुस्वर अक्षरणावस्थापनेदुः प्रत्ययप्रयोग संयमं कुर्व्व्वति चोगीं भूतपूजयो भवति। तत्पराः, प्रामं खुस्ला-रूपे संयमं विभागत तदनु खजस्वे दर्शे हरिकेष तष्ठं कार्यं-मध्यं कस्तुःगुणविभागितो कस्तुःगुणविभागिता भवे गावेभो भूतपूजयो भवति॥ ४४॥

ततौ भूतपूजय पञ्चमात्री।

तततोषिमादिद्रामुस्वः कायस्तप्यस्बृह्मानांभिभाग-तत्तव॥ ४४॥

‘अर्थाः’ परमाणुप्रक्ष्यन्तापति। तततोषिमा त्रिलिपिः पञ्चमोपकारस्त्री।

गुरुमा गृहपालि। महामा महलाखिः अतुःस्वयं सत्समाजी-समाजस्वयं सत्समाजी ॥ प्रकाश्यं दक्षानभिभागः ॥ भूतपूजये दक्षानभिभागः ॥ भूतपूजये दक्षानभिभागः ॥ भूतपूजये दक्षानभिभागः ॥ भूतपूजये दक्षानभिभागः ॥

धर्मि संस्थरुषुता विशिष्टे, संस्थरुषुता भुतानि अनु-भोगतूः तदतुं नातिसामानि। कामावश्यालिं संस्थरुषुता कामावश्यालिं भोगतूः, वातानि विश्वेश्वर कामः दक्षा भवति, तत्सूः विश्वेश्वरे विश्वेश्वरे धोरनों वातवो भवति, ते विश्वेश्वरे विश्वेश्वरे भमातिविरोधानिर्भवाय-समानीत्वार्धं भवनीयः। तते भूतमाहो भमातिविरोधानिर्भवाय- भमातिविरोधानिर्भवाय- भमातिविरोधानिर्भवाय- भमातिविरोधानिर्भवाय।

* कार्यविभागार्थिति H पुष्मणः। कार्यविभागार्थिति H पुष्मणः।

† क्षेत्रप्रसादिति H पुष्मणः।
बसादीनामपणा: प्रविष्ठति। एवं सर्वेष चोख्यं। एतेऽस्विन-द्योहं गुणम महाबिन्दूः द्वृत्तिः। 'कायक्षणः' वच्छमाण्या, तां प्राप्तिः। 'तष्ठोपायमारात्रेः' तत्त्व चावः ते धर्मी रूपादर्शेन्द्रमभिषामतो नामस नाश नूतनिशिरी भवति। नाश रूपमदिर्देहिति न त वायुः। श्रोऽयति द्वादाहि चोख्यं || ४ ५ ||

कायक्षणद्रमाः।

रूप-लायण्य-वल-वजसंघनमचानि कायसम्यत्

|| ४६ ||

'रूप-लायण्य-बलाणि' प्रविष्ठति। 'वजसंघनेन' वलबत्त कठिना वंशनिरस्तु शरीरे भवतीयते:। द्विति कायक्षणविरुगुणसम्यत् || ४ ६ ||

एवं भूतस्यमारात्रेः प्रासादमिनेन्द्रियजनमाः।

प्रहाण-वसूलपासितान्वयाः वस्त्रसंख्यामारिद्विन्द्रियजयः

|| ४७ ||

'प्रहाण' दस्त्रिताः विक्षणअयुक्ती दृष्टि:। 'सहृदय' बासायने प्रकाशकः। 'प्रसन्न' चतवारालुगमः। 'सहृदयाधिकारे' पूर्वार्थः।

प्रत्यालिनित्रितायमवस्त्राप्पणे पूर्वार्थः संवर्म कला 'दस्त्रित्रायी' भवति || ४ ७ ||

तथा फलसमाः।

ततो मनोज्ञविवें विकारामात्र: प्रधानप्रयत्नः || ४ ८ ||

शरीरः मनोवदर्णमारात्रिकाभाष: 'मनोज्ञविवें'। कायविशिष्टे-

* मनोवदर्णमारात्रिकाभाषः दृष्टि ० पुष्कर्णपादः।
त  पारे ५०  श्रेणी  

माणाविन्द्रियाणि  हसीमाब:  ‘विकाराभासः’। शर्वाञ्चल ‘प्रधान- 
वजः। एतत:  विद्वृत्तो  जितेश्वरव्रथः प्रादुर्भवविनि। तात्त्व शब्दिष्टानि 
मधुप्रतीकः कल्याणेऽलो। यथा मधुन एकदेशोऽपि खलरे, एवं प्रधेक- 
नेता:  विद्वृत्तः शब्दना दृश्य मधुप्रतीकः। ॥ ५४ ॥

दर्शिण्यजयमभिधावातः: जलपण्यातः।

सद्य-पुरुषात्मात्साक्षितभन्तर सर्वभावाधिहितानि 
सर्वेषार्थवच्छ  ॥ ५५ ॥

तत्सन  युक्ते  शालिके  परिषादे  'हलवानधमः'  वा  'हल-पुरुषध्रोप- 
दत्तयोऽर्षेति  विवेकसः  तथा 'हलवानात्मानः'। गुणार्थे  कांबालभिव हा- 
माणाविन्द्रियाणि  हसीमाब:  ‘विकाराभासः’। शर्वाञ्चल ‘प्रधान- 
वजः। एतत:  विद्वृत्तो  जितेश्वरव्रथः प्रादुर्भवविनि। तात्त्व शब्दिष्टानि 
मधुप्रतीकः कल्याणेऽलो। यथा मधुन एकदेशोऽपि खलरे, एवं प्रधेक- 
नेता:  विद्वृत्तः शब्दना दृश्य मधुप्रतीकः। ॥ ५६ ॥

र्मेषः भाविकानसरमातः।

तद्दैरायादशि  दोषविजयाय  कृतां  ॥ ५१ ॥

तत्समापि  विशेषका बिल्ले  यदा  वैरामतः  दश्ते  योगिनः,
तदा  तत्समापि  ‘दोषाणि’  रागादीगाः,  चतु  ‘वीं’  अविद्या,  ‘तथा’;

* कांबालभिव हा-माणाविन्द्रियाणि  हसीमाबः  तत्त्ववस्ते  ५४  पुस्तकः।
পাতার নেই বেরকায়

'স্বে' নিবৃত্তব্যে, 'কাজবাং' আধ্যাত্মিক ধৃঢ়কিন্তু:। প্রথমে পুষ্কর-গানধিকারপরিষমাণে। খানুয়নিমন্ত্রণ ইন্ত পুনর্নিদ্ধরণে।। ৫০।।

চালিয়ে যোগ্যতা ক্ষিপ্তা যমেহ।

খানুয়নিমন্ত্রণ। সকল-সাধারণে পুনর্নিদ্ধরণে। মানুষ-সারায় পুনর্নিদ্ধরণে।। ৫১।।


প্রাক্তনের প্রাক্তনের লেকে যোগ্যতা নিষেধিত পুনরায় ও ক্ষিপ্তা যমেহ।

* চালারারামাজাতিরিতি ব, স্বত্ত্বপ্রলোচন ইন্ত।
† খানুয়নিমন্ত্রণ ইন্ত ব, স্বত্ত্বপ্রলোচন ইন্ত।
‡ খানুয়নিমন্ত্রণ ইন্ত ইন্ত ইন্ত।
§ জ্ঞানার্থ-সাধারণ ইন্ত ইন্ত।
|| প্রাক্তনরাশিরামাজাতি ইন্ত ইন্ত।
¶ মনুমানি প্রাক্তনের ইন্ত।
छात्रता\* संयमादिवेवं क्षानं ॥ ५२ ॥

'श्रवणं' कार्यान्यकालवध:। यथा कश्वा प्रविभमरु न भक्ते।
तथाविदानां कार्यान्यकालं स: 'क्षमा' पौर्वार्थयुष्म परिशामः, तथा
'तंयमानं' प्राणं 'वाचकं स्त्रां' उक्तात।। प्रयासः। च च यास-\*कालको: आस्मान कार्यान्यकालस्तरः।
प्रायम्यानु: 'पूर्व द्रव्येऽविदी वक्ते कर्तवं' कर्तवं यद्य भवति याचाक्षारः, तदा
भव्यदिपि श्रुतं महदादिरि याचाक्ष्योत्तिनिह विभेकानावत्यत।। ५२ ॥
प्रकृत तंयमानं विधवाविनिषेधोपचरणायाः।

आति-लक्ष्या-देशैरनयन्तयानवच्छेरातुस्योऽरत: प्रतिपति: ॥ ५३ ॥

पदार्थानां भेदेति: 'आति-सच्चित्या-देशा' भवन्ति। काष्ठसम्बेदेति:
'आति::', यथा गौरिषं महत्वभित्ति। आत्या तुअथः: 'सच्चि:',
भेदेति:। यथा दथं क्षेत्रं द्रमस्मेर्नः। आत्या सच्चिति वाहिनिः-
वोभेदेति: 'देशा:' दृष्ट:। यथा तस्यामाणं वर्तमाणकविविभिन्देशा-
स्थितः।। च च पुन्नरेऽवधारणितं न भक्ते, यथैवक्रमस्य-\*स्वयः: पारिष्ठिचो: परमाचोः। समाविस्ते विवचे भेदाचार धरितममानं यदा भेदेन क्षानपुर्भावते, तदा तद्भव्याकारः
श्रुतंश्च पत्तिनि भेदेन प्रतिपादने। परमुद्रा भवति, च वेदर्थु-\*
पाहें नेवू नावधाररितू भख्यां बंधनामुखवें भेदपितांशीः
खचर्णां तत्तामां ॥ ५.१ ॥

जाकां विवेकज्ञनानाशं कण्ठां विषयं स्मार्यं याक्षांतुमाशः

तारकं स्वैविषयं सर्वव्याविषयमक्रममेऽति विवे
कजं स्वामं ॥ ५.४ ॥

जाकां स्वरमव्यवाद्यां भुमिकायासुपस्वं 'शाख', 'तारक',
दृश्यं। तारयत्यमाधात्र वेशारपोशीः* शोभिनं द्वाध्यक्षिंका वंशया
'तारक', राज्यस्ते। जाखः विवेचमाहं, 'स्वैविषयं' दृश्यं, स्वभावं
तत्तामां महाद्वितीयं विषयोऽशीति 'वर्णविषयं'। स्मार्यं याक्षां
सर्वव्याविषयं। सर्वाभिरव्यामि खेल-खण्डादिरेण तैः
परिषामे। सर्वाभिशारावाङ्कताति तत्तामां विषयोऽशीति 'वर्णवा
विषयं'। स्मार्यं याक्षांतुमाशः। 'अभमक्ष', दृश्यं। गृहःगुणालावशा
परिषपदविवेकाभावप्रत्येकोऽभास्त्रे नास्म क्षे स्विते दृश्यं 'अभमक्ष'। स्मार
गर्तामानक्रमक्षुमुद्युपालु प्रभोऽत्त्यायं ॥ ५.४ ॥

स्मार्यं विवेकात्त्त्यनारकाख्यामानं किं भवतीवाचः

सर्व-पुरुषविषयं: जुबिसाम्ये कैवल्यं ॥ ५.५ ॥

'सर्व-पुरुषविषयं' अभास्त्रे। तयोः। 'शुद्धिक्षाम्ये कैवल्यं'।

* संसारसाग्यान्तिं ह पुक्षज्ञातः |
† गृहःगुणालावशायपिदातात्त्यनारकाख्यारोऽशीति ह पुक्षज्ञातः |
निग्रेओरबालावशायपिदातात्त्यनारकाख्यारोऽशीति C पुक्षज्ञातः |

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ભિનનતરાં વચ્ચેય કદનાલભીમાનનિદ્રાય સાક્ષરોધરનું પ્રવેશ: 

પૂર્વસ્સુ: વાતનાર્યો પૂર્વસ્સુ કેઠવં જયાયે તેમણે ભાવનીત્રયઃ। 

તદેવમંતરાં પયાણગાંધીયાં ભિવાયા તાલા & સંયમતીનહાર જવા 
સંયમત વિવાહપ્રેમનાર્ય પરિયાતમચાલાપાણ સંયમવેદાનધિયાયા: 

પૂર્વસ્સુભાષા-રાજાસાહી: વિજયુદગ્રહનં સંમાધાયાયાયાયા વાખા 
શુભગમાણાદિશ્રુયા ભાવનારાશી કાઢવૃદધાદમિદ્ધ્વા: 

પૂર્વસ્સુ સંમાધાયાયા પયાણગાંધીયાણાદિશ્રુ પૂર્વસ્સુ 

વિજયુદગ્રહનં સંમાધાયાયાયા વાખા વચચ વાજી નોબિલિટીના વિષય- 

હેઠળ તાલાદા વાજી નોબિલિટી 

રત્ન મહારાજાધિરાજજીભોગદેવીજિયાં રાજમાર્જનારાં 

ભિવાયા પાવણ પયાણગાંધીયાં કેઠવં પ્રવેશાયા 

રત્ન ભિવાયાં પાવણ પયાણગાંધીયાં કેઠવં પ્રવેશાયા}

12
अध्याय चतुर्थः पादः ।

यदाजुपृवृ कैवल्यं विनोपाओऽः प्रजायते ।

तस्येकयमुक्ति विद्यानन्दमवं खुमं ॥

द्रागी विविधततितिश्रुत्यमानिनिराकरणं युक्तं कैवल्यकर्म-पावस्यपनायं कैवल्यपादेऽक्षमार्थते ।

तथा या: पूर्ब्बसुः। विद्वुःस्वात्ता नानाविधमानियोविद्वाकरणंविते-पादुन्द्वारेऽवं एवोधयति, एताः विद्वुः शर्या: पूर्व्वसुः सामविभिन्नतामानियोविद्वाकरणंप्रवर्तने। तत्त्वानेक्षबिविधकारणं

समाधेन चतुर्श्रीयाधिशाश्चत्वादनाय। समाधिविद्वाक्ष्य प्राधान्याधिशाश्चत्वादनाय।

न्योत्तरब्रह्म-सन्ध्य-तपः-समाधिजः सिद्ध्यः ॥ १ ॥

कासून ‘जनःनिष्टमा एव विद्वृः। यथा पश्चाद्वृिनामाक्षेरे

गमनाद्यः। यथा वा कौपिलमार्यमाध्यततिभवति। जन्माध्यमवसिद्धियथा

जनाद्यः। चामिक्कुलं गुणः। ‘शिविज्ञानवेदति यथा

पातालादौ रसणायसुपायोत्ति भरीदशः ॥ ‘समाधिविद्वृः शास्त्रविद्वृः

संस्कृतपादः कैवल्यशंकिताशाश्चनाय। ‘तपः-विद्वृः विशेषाभिव-

विधिस्त्रीकृताः ॥ ‘समाधिविद्वृः सार्वेदनीय प्रतिपादितः। एताः विद्वृः

पूर्व्वसुः चामिक्कुलमानिैवेदाय। सत्सात् समाधिविद्वृः

कैवल्यकर्म-पावस्यपनायति ० पुष्करपाठः।
§ पारे १ वर्षम्।

अन्यायं चिद्वीर्म् समाधिरेष्व जन्मान्तराभ्यासं कारणं, मन्नारादीनि
त स्वसिद्धांगां। १ ||

तनु नन्दीश्वराधीनार जात्यादिपरिश्रामं। प्रक्षेप्रेव जन्मानि
दृष्टे तत् कथं जन्मान्तराभ्यासामाये। कारणलक्षणेऽऽत्यां
श्रव्या।

जात्यादिपरिश्रामं: प्रक्षेप्यापूर्णात् || २ ||

चेतनतमिहैव जन्मानि नन्दीश्वराधीनार जात्यादिपरिश्रामं। कथं
प्रक्षेप्यापूर्णात्। पाण्डवः एव ति प्रजात्यादिपरिश्रामं जन्मानि
विकारानापूर्वत्ति जात्यादिपापूर्विः परिश्रमिति। २ ||

गतु धर्मां धर्मां धर्मादस्तऽधर्मानि क्रियाराणक उत्सवभिः, तत् कथं
प्रजनानामापूर्वे कारणमिक्ष्याम।

निमित्तमप्रयोजाम कथं प्रज्ञानां वर्षेमेत्तुत तत:।
शिचिर्क्यात् || ३ ||

‘निमित्त’ धृष्टादिः। तत्त्र प्रज्ञानां, प्रज्ञानापरिश्रामसि न ‘प्रथो-
ज्ञात’। न च ग कार्यं कारणं प्रवरस्ति। कुच तर्थं तत् धर्मादिश्वराधपर
दृष्टाः। वर्षेमेत्तुत तत: शेषिकावः। ‘तत:’ तद्यादुक्तहस्वामाना-
ब्रह्माः। तेने’ वर्षं शारवकं धर्मादिः। तथैव विरोधितात्
‘भेदं’ चयं। प्रशिक्षे, तस्मिन्न प्रजनावज्ञने जीवे प्रज्ञानं: खयमि-
मतकार्याय प्रवेणिते। दृष्टान्तमात्र। ‘शेषिकावः’ चया शेषिकः

* कारणमिक्षा उत्तरभुवाभिः ३ पुष्कसेपाठः।
पातळीचे वेगऱ्याचे

कवीषा: बेदारात बेदारांमध्ये असं निनीः जस्मणोतिथक-वर्णमेदमार्ण करेतात, तत्प्रतिः मिळे असं सजने न प्रवर्तुष्यं परिशंभं मःतानं, न तु जस्मणेचे तथा काशीत् प्रयत:। एवं धर्माच्यास्तहुः॥ १॥

यहा वाचनातिस्तवच्या व्याख्या खुळपत् कर्ष्णनाद्योपभोगायाकर्ष्णनायनिष्ठ्यविभव्युभवात्। युगपदस्तेक्षरीरिनिमित्तां उपाध्याये तत्त्रा कुत्काचाच चिन्यानि प्रभवनीत्याः।

निम्नोखचचितायथासिद्धान्तान्तः॥ ४॥

धारण: सर्वं निर्मितेः कारणं चाँचीं चिन्यानि ‘चिन्यानि’, तां नूत्न-कारणानि ‘अृत्तितमार्णानि’, एष्टं तद्रूप्या प्रवर्तति, प्रभृविषुविषिका एव युगपत् परिशंभनं॥ ४॥

ग्रुः वर्धनम् चिन्यानि भिन्नाभिप्रायवलष्टकार्यं कार्यस्थवयाः।

प्रदत्तमेवे प्रवेधोऽधानं चिन्यमक्षानेक्रष्यां॥ ५॥

तेनां ‘चनेष्यां’, वेषयां, ‘प्रदत्तमेवे’ व्यापवानां चेष्टाः, धारण: ‘सत्तम्।’ ‘प्रददेकं’ प्रेरकमनंधाश्च। तेन न भिखास्तवः॥

प्रयमां: वया चाह्याये प्रतीते मनः चुःपापाचारांति वचेष्टां प्रेरणयथापञ्जलेन, एवं काशीन्यस्पीति॥ ५॥

* निर्मित्यायनिष्ठ्यविभव्युभवायत त्व पुस्तकावः।
† काशीन्यस्पीति त्व पुस्तकावः।
तत्त्वादिन्भव्यानु बिष्कुरिनां बिषमापि ततःभवं पद्यविधानसे
बतो तत्त्वादिन्भवानु बिलातु समाधिभव्यानु सिंच्छ वेषवस्सुभाषाः ।

tतत्त्व ध्यानजस्मनाशणं ई ॥

'ध्यानं' स्थापितसं ज्ञानं, ततः पद्य्सु मधे 'ध्यानं' खाण
बालवनारिनिं, दत्ताः ॥ ६ ॥

धृष्टिरिनाचं योगिनिति स्त्रीमारिति त्रिक्रमं तथा
कर्मापि विलघ्नमिताः ।

क्षयायुक्तः योगिनिक्रियमितिरेशं ॥ ७ ॥

क्रुद्धाक्रमं कर्म चागान्ति द्वारं। शाहुभवानां बहुअश्वादि
ढाणं। तभवथासां ढङ्कृत्राणं। तत्र ढङ्कृत कर्मिव विनिधणां द्रान
तथा-वाक्यायादिनां पुष्पाणं। ढङ्कृत कर्म नारकानां। ढङ्कृत
ढाणं मनवाणां। 'योगिनानु संवासवति एवंतिकस्त्रीविपीत
ढाणं, तत्त्र फळधागानुभवानेवायुघानात् न बिलित्ते फळभार
भते ॥ ७ ॥

विद्वेद् कर्मक: पक्षमान् ।

तात्तस्तस्वपाकानुपुष्पानामेवाभिभ्यस्निविदानानां ॥ ८॥

दूसर दिव्याः कर्माचारणाः खर्तिमाचफलाः जायायुभोगफलाः
तत्र जायायुभोगफला एकानेककालवः ॥ दत्तनेव पूर्वसेव कः

* एकानेककालवः हि ॥ पुष्पमातः ।
निर्धारितः। यासु स्वत्मार्ज्ज्यांकामभियथितिः कर्मण:।
चेप निर्धारत: यासुकृ श्रीरमारस्यं देव-मनुष्य-निर्धारितामित्रेंगः, तस्मा
विपाकः यथा: 'प्रमुखं प्रमुखं वाचनः', तात्खातेव तस्मात् 'श्रमिके-
थानी: ', 'वाचनानां', भूत्ति। यथार्थः: चेप निर्धारत: दूर्व: देवता-
दिम्मरमारस्यं जात्यनरकालध्वजाने पुनःपृथविधेष्वरे श्रीरस्वातः
दद्द्वृत्त: एव स्वतिफलः वाचनः: प्रकटिभवन्ति। देवाकारस्ये-
वार्ष्ण्य: तस्मा स्वत्वादेवो जायने। इतराः स्वायत्त: नवगुढः नव
सिद्धिः। न तस्मा दशाय: नारकालितिरीणेश्वरे मागवा वाचना
श्रमिके नियोज्याणि र् ॥ ८ ॥

श्रमिके वाचनानां कार्यकालाहितानुपपत्तिसिद्धां यथार्थ-
विचरणः।

जाति-द्रेष्टः: काल-व्यवहितानमयानन्त्यं स्मृति-
संख्यायेऽवर्तकहुः:। ॥ ८ ॥

इस नास्त्रोगुणेऽनु समश्चारविषयं काश्चिद्विमुखार्धय यदा
चाल्यकारस्यस्यव्याधानने पुनःसामेव योगिः प्रतिपदने, तस्मात् तस्मा
पूवःनुभूतानां योगी तथाविधश्रीरारुद्धकापेक्षा वाचना यथा:
प्रकटीभवन्त: श्रमिके निर्धारितामाहावाचिते भूत्ति: पुनःपृथविधेष
श्रीरारुद्धकार्धाने प्रकटीभवन्ति। 'जाति-द्रेष्टः: कालकालध्वजानाग्ये
प्रकृति श्राब्दमध्यविधेष्वार्थाध्याने 'श्राब्दम' नीतस्यानें। कुः।

* देवमलुखारितिरिमिति भुरकायाः।
† वाचकालितिरिमिति भुरकायाः।
तासांमनादिल्लिमाशिष्यो नित्यवत्॥ १०॥

\[ * \text{कुल} \text{दक्षिण} \text{आहे} F \text{पूर्णपयादः}! \]
प्रतीतिनां खृप्तपायक्ष्यभेदाधिकारियां।

१२

प्रदीपः सुप्रभावी B, F पुस्तकाश्रयात्।
चन्द्रस्वप्न किष्टत प्रवर्तते। ख्रितापि विरोधाभायमभवनेवमझूँ।
चतुर्थपेष सधवताकं तत् कर्तं निढपाख्यतामभावाख्यातिपतात्
भजते, न विद्वं दुःख ज्ञानकेरोतीवध्यः। तदात् यत्त गाजासम्बन्धात्
चन्द्रतावध्यात्मभावात् तेऽप्चवध्याविलिपायमानो धर्मी ददैकरुपे एवा-
वतिष्ठते। धर्मार्थः ते ज्ञाधकलेन वधोषिताः॥
ख्रिताः ख्रिताधार्मिन्
वधोषिताः: ददैकरुपे ददानी,ः वर्णामेवःधानी वधोषिताः: केवलं
भेयताः भजने। तदार्थात्रोशतां सतीदानांगतादीत्वादेशसनाते ध
कपेष कार्यकारणभवायोविक्रियु दृश्यं प्रतिपद्यते, तदार्थपर्यःस्थाने
शेषेषां पंच धर्मविधानस्तुत्स्मादनं न निधोत्स पार्थ्यते॥ १५॥

t एते धर्मं-धर्मिनं: विक्रियं ददाय॥

tे ज्ञान-ददैकरुपा गुष्यात्मानं॥ १५॥

ey एते धर्मं-धर्मिनं: प्रोक्तं: 'तेन', 'ज्ञान-ददैकरुपा वधोषिताः॥
'गुष्या': शत्रुरत्त्रकोऽपि:। तदात्मानस्यात्माख्यातिपरिश्राविद्याः
दृष्ट्वध्यः। यत: शत्रुरत्त्रकोऽपि:। शत्रुपदेशकोऽपि:। चर्याः वाद्या-
भक्तमिन्नचां भावयत्तावाचार्याचार्यानी दृष्टत्ते, चर्य यद्विचि
तत् तत्त्वातिपरिश्राविद्यां दृष्ट्वे। यथा घटाद्यो धद्देशिता स्तपरिश्राविद्
महेषः॥ १५॥

eyेते चयो गुष्या: चर्याः मूलकारण: कथनेको धर्मिन्ति यष्टेषः

dदायस्वप्नः ॥

* ज्ञाधकलेन चेतासिकलेन वधोषिताः दृष्टि F पुस्तकांपादः।
† न ददैकरुपे ज्ञात्सीति C पुस्तकांपादः।
पात्राणे ये गम्याने

संकारायणविद्यं संक्षेप-विकारानि विना तस्मादलिखितवकारपकः सामात् तत्परलक्षणर्थ परिषमत दयाचे: ॥ ९ ॥

तथामानवन्यान्त् शाम कांबं सचातीत्वायाः षाणोपायाभमाह।

हेतु-पलास्रयासम्बन्धेः सत्कृततितवादेवावामाभवे

तद्भवं: ॥ ११ ॥

वास्नानामानुभवेः हेतुः, तस्मानुभवस्य रागादशः, तेषामविष दृति शाक्तात् पारम्यर्थेषा च ‘हेतुः’। ‘कर’ ब्रह्मार्दि भ्रूणादिः च।

‘कार्यः’ ब्रह्मार्दि। ‘कार्यः’ चतोरुपस्य नवेकवास्नानां।

तत्साहि: ‘हेतु-पलास्रयासम्बन्धेः’, श्रवणनामामि वास्नानां ‘संगतिलान्’, तेषां हेतादीर्घं ‘शिवाये’ ब्राह्म-थोगाम्यं द्वगवीकृत्यं विविधं, निर्मूलवान् ग वास्ना: प्ररोचनम् न कार्यामार्त्तति: दृति

तासां ‘शिवाये’ ॥ १२ ॥

ननु प्रतिच्छं विश्व नवरोपणेवायांना तत्प्रजानां

कार्यकार्यार्थानामवेलोगाम्याः वेंद्रे कथमेकत्वमित्वायाः एकः

समर्थानायाः।

अतीतानागतं सह-प्रतिलोक-विध-रेड्वाइशास्त्रां ॥ १२॥

इह प्रत्यत्तमतां भावानामुतपत्तिः दुक्किमाति तेषांलयम-भायोगातः। नसिं श्रवणार्दिरीयाः बास्तिदिः चत्वारम्येन हुःः।

निबहास्य च कार्येऽक्षेत्र सिद्धिह्यां कार्यायेन प्रवर्ततेन्। गत्तवां विष-
यमालेश्वर कस्तित प्रवर्तते। सतामपि विरोधावाभावमनेभोजिनः।
एतत्र खस्तुःपन समधसतांकं तत् कर्यं निव्यपाख्यातामभावखस्तुपतांशं
भजते, न विद्वं दुःखं दीर्घकरोतीतीं। तस्मात् यतां मानासङ्क्रात
छातार्जुनायत्वभावात् तेनोर्ध्विषिवशिष्णमानो धर्मीं चर्रक्षिप्ने एवान
वनिद्रते। धर्माद्वृत्ते ते धर्मचक्रेण धविष्णाः॥। खस्तुःपन खस्तुःपनेन
धविष्णाः; खस्तुःपन धविष्णाः, तवं धविष्णाः; धविष्णाः धविष्णाः; धविष्णाः
धविष्णाः। तस्मानूर्जवाभासे प्रतीतानागतायाख्यामेकस्व ए
क्रूपेन कार्यार्जनभाभोजिनेन दुःखं न प्रतिपन्द्यते, तस्मानुर्जवाभासे
स्वेकेन्द्र चिन्ता धर्मतात्त्विनावर्मनम् न निक्रोद्यं पावते॥ १२॥

t एते धर्मं-धविष्णं; किंद्रम्यं दुःखाद॥

tे धर्मं-धविष्णं गुणांभानः॥ १३॥

य एते धर्मं-धविष्णं; मोक्षं; 'ते', 'धर्मं-धविष्णं धविष्णाः;।
'गुणाः' वचरजङ्गमोक्षपं;। तदा कायमस्तुभावावस्तुहिस्मिलमहम्
द्वादशः। यतः वचरजङ्गमोःभिः खस्तुःपनोऽःपः; वर्ष्याः वाच्चा-
भक्तिसङ्क्षिप्तां भावाजजीनामस्य जुगमेण हुःस्ते, च यद्यविद
तद्दधिष्णमपमूं दुःखं। चन्द्र चतुर्भौ श्वद्रिष्णा धविष्णाः
धविष्णाः॥ १३॥

यद्यते यथा गुणाः; स्वर्णं मूर्खकारणं, कथमेका धर्मीति धविष्णं
स्वाकारत्।

* धर्मचक्रेन चेतविषिवशिष्णम धविष्णाः हरि ए F पुस्तकापाधः।
† न खस्तुःपन धविष्णाति C पुस्तकापाधः।
পরিষামীসাক্তাজ্ঞানতত্ত্বনির্ণীতি।

প্রথমতে চার গুপ্তাকাশি তেৎসাধাৰ্ণাৰভাবমগনপশ্চাদন যেঃ

'পরিষাম:ী'

কাশী ধনাক্ষা কাশীদ্রু: কাশী তথা ইত্যেবতঃ

তথাকথ একনাম: বলত: তথা একলসুচিতে।

যথেষ্ট প্রথিতী ধর্ম

বায়ুরিত্যাঙ্গ:।

লম্ব বিশ্বাসান্তিরিতে উদয়েঃ বস্ত্রকসানেক বা এক মুখে চন্দ্র

দয়া বিশ্বাসান্ত্বেব বায়ুনাবায়ান কাজ্ঞ্জকারপাঙ্গায়েনাবসিত তথা তথা প্রতিস্ব-ভাষণ্তি

তথা কথিতশ্চকৃতে বুদ্ধির্মীয়স্তার:।

বস্ত্রসাময়ে পিতাম্বেদায়ায়োল্লিন্তিঃ পন্যাঃ।।

তথ্যাঃ। ঘণ্ট-ধৰ্ম্মায়ো: বিকীর্ণ: পন্যাঃ। বিকীর্ণ সার্ধেভ ইতি

ঘাতবতঃ। কথঃ বস্ত্রসাময়ে পিতাম্বেদায়াতঃ সমানে বস্ত্রনি ক্ষাবৃত্তখ-ভর্মানে গানামাল্লভ: পিতাম্বেদ: সুখে-দুঃখে-মোহন্তপত্র স্থব-স্বভাষাঃ।

তাপাস্থি একশো পথারাজারায়া প্রতিস্বত পথারাজাসায়া ধরানাশ সুখসুতেন প্রতঃ গৃহান্ত এপ্রবাহ দেয়াঃ পরিসরাজসমূহেীঃ কালীন বস্তুঃ কাঞ্চনিকারঃ কাঞ্চন কার্য্যাল বস্তুঃ। একাকিনঃ

কার্য্যালে বস্তু একাকিতপ্তায়াবহবচ্ছেন। বিভিন্ন কিল্পকার্য্যালে স্থান:

যথা নিম্ন স্বরূপ ধর্ম কার্য্যালে তামিল অধীনতাবার্ধ: কিন্তু তথ্য ধর্মে

ন বিশ্বাসত্ত ধর্মাঃ। বালবিন্ন প্রেম। তদেব কথাসীৰ্য্যন্তীপ্রসংশ্চৈতেন।

উপলক্ষাদে তথাপাত পিতাৰ্থাঃ। যথ মুক্তপ্রাধ: যেঃপুরোক্ষীতে

নীতি একাগ্রিতাতৃতেন শক্তি তথাৰ। ব্যতি

* কার্য্যালে ভীতৰার্ধঃ।
वेळकिंव मेहते तदा कार्यभेदेन वति कार्यभेदखावादे निर्विषुक- वेलाकिंव व बसानु खानु। एततुकुं भवति सायपि भिने कार्ये वदि कार्यसाहबे: तदा बध्ये जगानात्रिधाकार्यज्ञेनकिंप्रे खानु, कार्यभेदानुसाराद्यानाम सायपि निर्विषुक व खानु।

यथेष्टं कर्ते नेत्र जिंगुणात्मकसाधने अनीकृष्ट प्रसातु: सुख-दुःख-नैतिक- वाती ज्ञानानि जन्यसि। मेवः। यथा चर्च्चित्तुरुषांतः यिसमपि रिभुण्य, तथा च अर्थस्तिभावस्थापनी भवानुद्।* शहस्कारिकारः।

तदुद्भवाभिभवाभिभिषणा तेन तेन इपेशाभिषिक्षः। तथा च प्रासुकभ चक्षिस्तिमायो वोपित धर्मसंस्कृती चिन्त चक्षप्रजाितया परिक्रमायां सुखमयं भवति। तदेर्वर्जस्तिकारि रहसंगोिज्ञतया हृत: सुखमयं सप्तमीचकः भवति। नीवाध्यायवकारितया तमशे- पद्मलेण कोणानां: सप्तका सेवसमयं भवति। तस्मादिश्वानवति- रशीपण्यि वाचार्योवः। तदेवं विज्ञानार्थेभोः। तादायाविरोधावर्ज- कार्यकारिवभावः। कार्यभेदेन सायपिकार्यभेदेन ज्ञनस्वरुपार्धिति ज्ञातुवृत्तिर्निमित्तमयं ज्ञानव्यापितं। ॥ ९ ॥

यथेष्ट्यं स्त्रां प्रकाशकन्यात महाभावान्यं प्रकाशमलावायाध- खानांतः तत्तु कर्ते सुगपत स्वर्णान्यां गङ्गानि न खरसि चेतायश्रृंखला परिवारं कज्ञुमात्।

* धर्मस्वतेायद्वयहं रति F पुस्तकापाठः।
† वाल्मीकि रति C पुस्तकापाठः।
‡ विज्ञानवस्तुसारित रति F पुस्तकापाठः।
तदुपरागापेशिक्षितांत्वस्य वर्तु भाताभातां॥ १८॥

तथा ब्रह्मचर्यः, ‘उपरागादाकरसपरशान्’, चिन्हे वाणं ‘बच्च’, भाताभातान्न भवति। भर्तीमयः, दशाः पदार्थः खाद्यायामे बाह्य-श्रीमपेच्चते, नीलादिक्षणादिकायामानं द्रव्यधिकारिणकायं कहानं-मयापरां बंडकारिकारण्यनेपेच्चते वातिरिक्तकारणां सामाधान-वादुमोहज्ञात्मात्। तत्तथै थैनवार्यन तथा भानं खड्के रागाः। चन्द्रे तमेवाथर्थ नद्वाराणं नवहारयोग्यानां नर्त्त्व। तत्तथै थैनवार्यन भानं रुद्यन्ते। थैन बावरं रुद्यन्ते। थैन बावरं रुद्यन्ते। थैन बावरं रुद्यन्ते। थैन बावरं रुद्यन्ते।

पारस्मिनान्यभूतेर्देव शान्तादिरां। वंदनारुद्धो ओधयनां। बंडकारिकारणां प्रतिपद्धते तक्षिणेऽत्र खलितसपातां दत्त वृहन न भानं, मापि बर्मेक्सु खलितिति न काहिरीरोधः॥ १६॥

वथे वन्म मातापापि पुच्छो खलिन काले नीलं संवेददयते न तक्षिण काले पूर्तं झातिक्षेणाभािपि दकाहिरीपुर्ववृहदपुस्तादि-कारणग्रं धर्मार्थे परिषामिन नातामिज्ञानां परिष्ठतः॥

सदा भाताभातांत्वस्यसात्तप्रभोः। पुच्छस्यापरिशालां-मातः॥ १७॥

ध्य एतहा। ‘पितवा’, प्रमाण-बिप्रथ्यापरिशाला। ‘इतिव’, ता।
‘तत्प्रभो’ तथा ‘पितवा’ श्रीतुः, ‘पुच्छो’, ‘सदा’ बल्कालामेव,
‘श्रीमा’, तथा ‘पितवात्’ अपरिशालां परिषामिलाभावादिर्घयः।

* काहिरीरोध दत्त वथे वथे।
† पुच्छस्यापरिशालापरिशालार्थे नातामिज्ञानां परिष्ठतः।
चढ़ती परिषानी व्यावसायिक कादायित्वासाठी बिन-चट्नीचं व्यावसाय में ने पापले। प्राप्तये, पुढळा चिळुपडळा वदै-वाहिकालालेन व्यावसायिक पद्मारखं निध्याएँ चर्चा तपाशी वदैवाव-ब्रितलाल तयसेन चेंगार्थानेन्यूरांन स्वतित तथाविधायः वदैव विज्ञायांच्या सांगितल्यांवरः, तत्सां चत्या चिल्लुं वदा िनादलमर्यते न कदाचित्तपरिनिर्णायिकांश्च। १७॥

भनु विद्यीमाय व्यावसायाचयाचे प्रकाशकं तदा स्पर्शप्रवक्ष्यप-लाल्ये आयामार्थस्त्र प्रकाशयक्तिनी तात्तुै व्यवस्थासंगमयिते: किं यथार्थतरोप द्वामानाश्रयपनेवमाह।

न नतु स्वामातं हिवालात् १८॥

'तत्' चिन्त, 'स्वामात्' ध्यानप्राप्त, न भवति, पुढळवें चन्तवति व्यावसाय। क्रुत्ते,'कुमालात्',धातु किल्कु बृम्यं तदुद्वें चण्य, चता चटादित्।

चुळस्वरुः चिन्त तथासा स्वामात॥ १८॥

भनु आयामविद्यापिय एवेत: कुमालेव विष्टवाचिन्द्रेय, किक्र खकुंडीसिद्धनि देवारेष्टु पुढळवां विनाशसंगित्विधायः क्रमयो बुंदता, तच्छाच्य कुश्मेंगवं भितितां न ने राग द्वायमाचा विन्दुर्दै-रविद्रान्तिनोपपदेवाच्यं गिरिष्ठुतां॥

एक्रसम्ये चोभायानवधारणं १५॥

प्रर्थ्यां विद्विंशिरितमया व्यवसायप्रयोगवतापार्मण धरये: सुख-


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गनु बुढळे स्यांकाळाबावे बुढळारेरे दायबेदने कथमयं विष्णुमुणेरूनचो वच्छाय द्रयाज्जु श्रवणदानाच।

चित्रे प्रतिष्ठेकुलामात्रयासदाकारचापो खुबबदिसंवेदनं ॥२१॥

पुस्तकेकुलपाल् किंतं; वा ‘‘प्रतिष्ठेकुलम, नव विलाये प्रतिष्ठेकुलपाल्’’ नव.द्याच गमनं कथा: वा तप्याका गनेवाकारीतेचत्र चालत। कथा गुणं प्रकाशिक्षेपाकारे ॥ परिसारे ग्रंथं गुणिनुमुणेरूनकाममति तद्दूरपता-निवापरम, कथा वा केवळे परमात्मा: प्रक्षणी विष्णुमारोपणांनि सैंयं किंतं: च, तत्त्वात्: कर्णकृतत्वाय ख्यातितित्रप्तत्वाय। प्रतिष्ठेकुलाचारी शरदुल्लियारचापो शेतकेवापणाचं, शुभ्रूतिक्रियतिष्ठितला कथा चित्रम: शुभ्रूतिक्रियतिष्ठितला। कवैयं कवैयं तद्दूर साहसत्वः खुबबदिसंवेदनं ॥ २२ ॥

इत्यत्स्रवणविस्तारं किंतं वायुर्मणसंधारार्जुं वक्ष्यवहारार्जुं भवतीद्वास।

द्रुत्रोऽखोपरः किंतं वर्यां ॥ २२ ॥

‘‘किंतं’’ पुस्तक, तेन ‘‘धर्मः’’ तन्महस्तिचारं तद्रूपतामितिवापणं।
‘‘हेम्मेहरं’’ मेडीलिविधिकारचारिकमं, यदा भवति तदा तदेव वर्यांचारपणमां जायते। कथा निर्यातकर्णकृतकर्मविधानसंगतिप्रतिकारकां मृणं भास्मसाध्यां च सभी गृहसाधिकाराश।

* अण्डाक्षातिभाववचमणजीव इति F पुस्तकापादः।
† पुविकिन्तिविखिन्ति इति F पुस्तकापादः।
‡ शाम्मुलाभिभावप्राप्तिहिति F पुस्तकापादः।
यक्षणमध्ये भवति, न पुरवहूँक्रान्तक्रियमात्री। तत्र नग्नभूत-रक्षकोपक्रमसंयुत्तया वलं निवृत्तयादप्रविष्टाकारं बर्तैवैकृत्यकारा परिसमाप्ति विष्णुतपालयात्मांत्रा काराप्रत्यवत्ते। वचना यशुक्तान्त्याधाने सौख्य चक्रनाविवर्तित, एवं चित्रसर्वाधाने सत्याभिषेक्यमयाभिवर्तते वैण्यते। यत्र एवालिका दुन्ये वे भिक्षू निम्पोशंैतत्त्यभिवर्तै। निम्पोशं भिक्षूः पुरुषः। तत्सिद्धिभीमाक्यांतः वस्तुभयाः भिक्षूः। तद्दाय विचित्रित्तसानांस्य पुरुषः भोगाः। तदेव शाश्ववादिवाः।

वालीः पुरुषः परमात्मेऽन्तः भिक्षूः कर्मानुप्रसुखदुःक्षोभोगाः। यथा यथा च। यथावत् भिन्नक्षणाभिषेकितां प्रतिष्ठा परिसमाप्ति चुनु-दुःक्ष-साहसां तत्र गिर्यां, तस्मिन् कर्मानुप्रसुखदुः भोगाः। वैण्यते। तक्षजुमार्गां विचित्रित्त्सानांकक्षणाः। प्रतिष्ठा काराप्रत्यक्षायामन्तः विचित्रित्तसानांस्य परिसमाप्ति चुनु-दुःक्ष-साहसां तत्र गिर्यां, तस्मिन् कर्मानुप्रसुखदुः भोगाः। वैण्यते। तपस्या भिक्षूः पुरुषः। तत्सिद्धिनुयुक्तसानां। प्रतिष्ठा काराप्रत्यक्षायामन्तः विचित्रित्तसानांस्य परिसमाप्ति चुनु-दुःक्ष-साहसां तत्र गिर्यां। न तथा। नृत्तत्त्सानां।

* प्रतिविन्दुमयः हृति C युक्तसापः। विष्णुमयः हृति H प्राक्षणपः।
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<td>सांत्रोपत्रश्रीत</td>
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<tr>
<td>सांत्रोपत्रश्रीत</td>
<td>६२</td>
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</table>
নামাঙ্গনীশচর মিত্রপরিষাধিকার ৰিনয়সাখ্রুষ্ক, চলা দুক্তঃ দূর্লভে।
আবার নিয়ে নিয়ে নামাঙ্গনীশচর মিত্রপরিষাধিকার পুরুষচর তথায় আনিকালে বলে
কাজ প্রতিষ্ঠানপরিষাধিকার বল। যেমন, প্রতিষ্ঠানপরিষাধিকার সৃজন্যযোগ্য ব্যবস্থান, বৈধতাতপ্রস্তুত ব্যবস্থান, বৈধতা পৃথিবীতে প্রতিষ্ঠাতান।
বাহুল্য পুরুষচর প্রতিষ্ঠানপরিষাধিকার হয়। আবার, পুরুষচর প্রতিষ্ঠাতান, বৈধতা প্রতিষ্ঠাতান, বৈধতা পৃথিবীতে প্রতিষ্ঠাতান।

শুদ্ধ বালিকাপরিষাধিকার কর্মের সম্মান পুরুষবিদ্যালয় বস্তুতান বালিকাপরিষাধিকার
বালিকাপরিষাধিকার প্রতিষ্ঠাতান। পুরুষচর পৃথিবীতে সচর তথায় প্রবেশকর্মের প্রতিষ্ঠাতান।

শুদ্ধ পুরুষচর প্রতিষ্ঠাতান এবং প্রতিষ্ঠাতান।

* নিয়মপরিষাধিকার হয় ০ পুরুষপাত:।
† তথ্যপরিষাধিকার হয় ০ পুরুষপাত:।
‡ অধিকার হয় ০ পুরুষপাত:।

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प्रोपृत्यते। एनुमात्मात्मलम्बनं परिशामाबद्धे बहुत्र बखळ्डाळम्नित, तदेव पुरुषार्थ्यसन्त्यायो भाष्य हर्ष ब्रजिंध्यमसृत।

तच भगवादित्साप्तप्रज्ञमनोखा वामसुक्लयत्वाप्नुष्माराम: परिशामः।

पुनः खकार्यपुनप्रज्ञदर्शाराक्षितां: प्रतिज्ञां: परिशामः। दृढः

पुश्चिन्त्य भोगपरिपरमातः बहुमार्जिंध्यवयात् जताया प्रकटिनः पुनः

परिशामार्पये। एवं विषाधायस पुश्चार्यवयात्वाय जताया भविष्य

प्रकटवेये कार्यदुपपति।

नगु यदीतुं क्रिक: बह्ष्यव प्रधानसाैति ततैः किममधे मोक्ष-

रिम्बिनः। मोहाच प्रलय: जिष्टे, मोक्षत चार्यंध्यीयो तदुपर्युक्तः

शाख्यानारकमः । जस्ते। धर्मः प्रज्ञातुपूर्वयोगरांतुज्ञात्मः

भोगभारित्वादेश: बस्मम्, तष्टिनः खति ब्रजिंध्य: प्रकटः

कलवाभिमानात दुःखानुभवे खति खरसम्भिर दुःखनिरीक्षाय-

निकी मस सादिष्टि भक्ष्योवात्वकाः। जस्ते दुःखनिद्रलुपा-

प्रज्ञातुपापोपक्षाम्बापेशायाभावेश्रेष्ठ प्रधानस्य। तथास्तुतेन कर्मोनुसृप्

पुजिंकमला शाख्योपदेशस्य विषय:। दद्यन्ते लेखार्यस्यविभविपि

प्रविष्टः ख्यातीभुज्ये। तथा सैव धर्म: प्रधानमान एवंविषयेष्वा

शाख्योपदेशं बलक्षितमपेश्य मोक्षाय सापमायाधायते। ख्यातीभुजे

कार्यालाक्षणारात्वायां चामायां। जातार्यां भव्यं, शर्षा च प्रतिलो-

परिशामादारेकोत्पातः मोक्षाय सामायी

प्रमाणन निश्चिता, प्रकाशारोपणुपपति। जतायां बिना कर्यं

* तद्धर्मिमतिः F पुरुषस्याः।
† कामात्मकः नुक्षातरस्मितिः C पुरुषस्याः।
‡ सम्प्रायां सामग्रिमातिः F पुरुषस्याः।
भविष्याचैति। ज्ञतः बिनस्तः। तंग्नामातोश्वयरोपरामभिवाका-
विश्वाधिकृत्य विश्वासाथिर्य निभा-ष्रवणीतिविधिधें चिरं भ्रमणे भ्रजातः भ्रम्भेदं चित्रं भिनता-
मान्यता अन्गविविधधें अभावः। अविष्टेऽभिः भवति॥ २ ॥

नमुन ़चिवेदं विवाहं भक्षणशरणमात्राशिः। काहे
प्रामाण्यमत्रो दृष्टा अभयुपधेरे इत्याश्रयः हृदुः प्रमाणशाच।

तदेष्यवासनाभिस्मिषः परार्थ संहोत्यकारित-
त्वाः॥ २३॥

‘तत’ ऐतिहः, ‘घातातुमकाम्यामि,’ ‘वास्तनामी,’ ‘निन्यमपि’
मानाष्ट्रामपि, ‘परार्थ’ यथार्थ भ्रात्रो भोक्तमिगा प्रबलमगातिर्य वाध्याशिती। झूत, ‘प्रति कारलाय’ यथाव भूम्य किलिमा ऋषी-
विवाहकारिलाय। यथा वेदार्थविकारिन तपाराः हृदुः, यथा
ब्रह्मनालाय। वचन-रक्षामार्थिः विवाहार्थपरिवामभार्थ विंग-
दशकारीपि, ज्ञतः परार्धानि। यथा परः व पुष्पः॥

नमुन न यादुष्मणायामान्यामानादिना परेश श्रीरवत्ता परार्थालसुपधेरे,॥
तह्यारामस्ते वादुष्मण एव परः विषयति, यादुष्मण भवता परार्थालसु-
होमस्मिरयत्वकारित्य विवाहतिरिति यथावातैः॥ ३३ ॥
पाल्पूर्वे व्याख्या

षयापि शास्त्राने परार्थकमाने आक्षरितात तथापि चल्करि-विलक्षणसुल्खिर्याद्वेषमहा नतिस्वास एव भोक्ता प्रेरपि विपदा ।
पथा चेमेख्याति िकारिषि िलक्षणाहुमाणार्कितग्रहीणमाण तत्ते-विलक्षणसुल्खिर्याद्वेषमप्रभु एव प्रतीपि, एवमहापि िलक्षणसुल्खिर्याद्वेषमाण नोमयिश्स नरार्थने गौर्वाभांश एव भोक्ताधि-
हाता परार्थकमाणे प्रथंतिः विद्यमाण । बदि वा तत्त परन्तु
समयाविलक्षणव्याम मन्त्रिने, तथापि तामेवो िविचयार्क प्रज्ञाये सूक्ष्मरुपाने
िरक्षीमाणे प्रस्तुतिः । तस्तापि प्रकणी दद्रिवार्थिः । तत्ताने
िुपि प्रकणां एवं प्रकाशमुखपरं । तथापि चः प्रकाशमाणे
िुपि एव भवतीति कुलश्च वंशानि संह्मानि ॥ २१ ॥

इदानी शास्त्राने कैक्य िनयमें दयामिषः चूचैिपनमाणे

विद्यापद्धतिः शास्त्रभाषाभाषानिलिपति ॥ २४ ॥

एवं सचिपुत्राध्याजने वाहिने । सचिपुत्राध्याजने वाहिति चास्त्रभाषाभाषानिलिपति नित्यमाणे
दन्व दलीवपूर्येन,† तथा विद्यापद्धतिस्वल्खकृपपुष्प चित्ते या ‘शास्त्रभाषाभाषा’, या िज्ञाते । धितमव ।
एवं साक्षादवृणि भोक्ताने यद्रमविभासालै निजते ॥ २४ ॥

तस्तानि विद्यापद्धति फिः भवतीतिः ।

तद्वा विद्यापद्धतिः कैक्यप्रारभार्क हद्धिः ॥ २५ ॥

* प्रतिपादिते हद्धि C पुस्कारपाणिः
† शास्त्रभाषाभाषानी प्रवेश्यांमिति C पुस्कारपाणिः
‡ शास्त्रभाषाभाषानी P पुस्कारपाणिः
बांधकामेंतील बिघीरी विविधािमोगवान विनमासीनदि- 
- दासीं 'विशेषमित्र' संविकामतमालसंगीत, 'कैव्यप्रारंभारं' कैव्य- 
- फलं, कैव्यप्रारंभां वा सम्पूर्ण द्रष्टी II २८ II
- श्रीकांत विशेषमोहिनं बिचे वेजीराय: प्रादुर्भवंति तेषां 
- देशप्रतिपादद्वारे सागर पायमान.

तस्सिदुः प्रत्ययान्तरार्थ संस्कारेभू॥ २८॥
- श्रीकांत बमाधू विन्धयः, 'स्नेहं' जमताबिकु, धानी 'प्रत्ययान्त- 
- रार्थ' युतभाष्यपाशि श्रानानि, तांति भ्रागवेभ: हुल्यानाशु- 
- वालुं: 'संस्कारेभू', श्रां ममधेयं वेंत्वभाषि धीरामाणेभोजपि प्रभावंति।
- श्रां:कर्षणोपेन्द्रियवरेण तेषाः दानं वर्त्यत्वीमिवुं भवति II २६ II
- शालाग्रामम पूर्णमेवोऽहास द्वासः

हानेवयां चोरवदुः॥ २७॥
- बद्धा 'कृपामानविशारदीयां, दानं पूर्वकं वुङ्क, तथा संस्कारणा- 
- मया वर्त्ययां। बद्धा ते श्रानाप्रिणा मुष्या दंगवीजत्वा न पुन- 
- विन्धभामो प्रेमसिद्ध लम्फे, तथा संस्कारणा द्रष्टी II २७॥
- एवं प्रत्ययान्तरारुंदुरे दिनेश्वरेतेः बमाधो वादुं भारभू: भोजिनः
- शमाधि: प्रकर्ष्यातिभवति, तययविधसुपायमालः॥
प्रसङ्गानेमात्रकुसौदस्य सत्वं विवेकात्तेऽधर्मं नेमेघः
समाधिः \( \text{॥ २८ ॥} \)

‘प्रक्षणं’ यावतः तत्त्वाणं वधाक्षम वधवक्तिनां परसरित्रिकः \( \text{चन्द्रपिपिविभावं,} \), तत्सन्न वति ‘ब्रह्म’, ‘ब्रह्मविद्ध’ फलमाचिरोः, \( \text{प्रक्षणान्तराणमनुद्वे} \) ‘सत्वप्रकारविवेकात्ते’ परिवेशात् ‘धर्मं नेमेघः वमाधि:’ भवति, प्रक्षणं द्रव्यमण्डल्य धस्यं परसपुष्पाययथावथां मेध्याति \( \text{विश्वनीति} \) ‘धर्में मेघः’। चनेन प्रक्षणं ध्रुवकेश्वर ब्रह्में तथं मन्त्र्यमतुपपरादितं भवति \( \text{॥ २८ ॥} \)

तत्रादन्ते धर्मेयात् \( \text{किं} \) भवतीयात्।

तत: व्यवस्थितिः \( \text{॥ २५ ॥} \)

‘लोकामनविधादिकामनिविशिष्टानां, \( \text{कर्षणस्वा} \) \( \text{कुक्कुलद्वें} \) \( \text{देन विभिन्नानं,} \) श्राद्यादमयू पूर्वपूर्वकारणविद्धस्य ‘विद्धिः’, भवतीयात् \( \text{॥ २५ ॥} \)

निमित्ते तेषु किं भवतीयात्।

तद्भ सत्वावरणमलायेतत्त्व स्वानस्यान्यायेऽर्थं \( \text{॥ ३० ॥} \)

श्राविन्ये विनेमेहितिति ‘श्रावणात्’ क्रेत्रः, \( \text{त} \) \( \text{एव} \) ‘महत्’, \( \text{तेषु:} \) ‘प्रेमेत्त्व’ तदविद्भिषित्व, ‘श्रावण्य’ गतधनगगणनिभय, ‘श्रावण्य’

* \( \text{भवतीयात् च च} \) पुष्करणार:।
यात्रू योगेन्द्र, ‘स्वयं’, ‘बल्ल’ गणनासहूं भवति, योगेन्द्राय वर्षे स्वयं जानातीयते। ॥ २० ॥

ततः किमियाश ।

ततः ज्यादेनान्त परिश्रामक्रमसमासायणां। ॥ २१ ॥

‘क्रम’ नियमार्थिन्ते, भोगापर्गक्षणं पुरुषार्थं प्रयोजनं वैसे ‘ज्यादेनान्त’, ‘शुपाः’ जन्म-रजस्मांसिः, तत् ‘परिश्राम’. च ज्यादेनान्त-समातिरातरतुलोकम् प्रातीतेवेदेन भाजाक्षिभाषाविशिष्टक्षणं, तत्र भोजसी ‘क्रम’ वचनामाः, तस्म परिश्रामि निःस्था, न पुनःज्वर द्वियते। ॥ २१ ॥

क्रमेकाश्रय लक्षणमाश।

क्रमप्रतियोगिः परिश्रामप्रारंभनिःक्रमः ॥ २२॥

‘क्रम.’ भस्मीचाल कालः, तस्म भोजसी ‘प्रतियोगिः’ एकाहंसविशेषार्थं। ‘परिश्रामप्रारंभनिःक्रमः’ भस्मस्याय भस्मसु प्रायान सर्वहनुष्ठात्वा च रस्मात्वा च चणां ‘क्रम’ उच्चत्व । न भस्मस्याय भस्मसु क्रमः परिश्रामान्त्रय विधा। ॥ २२ ॥

दिवानां दस्मतः वैवक्ष्यासाधारां स्वरूपमाश।

पुरुषार्थश्रुत्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः वैवक्ष्य स्वरूप-प्रतिश्रुत्वा वा चित्तिशक्तिरिति। ॥ २३॥

समायप्रभोगापर्गक्षणपुरुषार्थानां ‘गुणानां’, या ‘प्रतिप्रसव’।
प्रसख्यानेयखुसीद्वस वर्ण्या विवेकातेर्ग्रभमेघः
समाधि: || २८ ||

'प्रसख्या' यावतं तत्त्वानं वधारमं ववर्षितानं परसरत्रभ्रम-चण्डकांपविभागं, तांत्रिक वति 'श्री', 'प्रक्ष्यीद्वस' फलमाधिपोः; प्रसख्यानांराणामनुदये 'वर्ण्याकारविवेकाः' परिशेषात् 'धर्मेमेघः
वमाधि:' भवति, प्रसख्यानांकरिण धर्मं परमपुपुष्यार्थानं नीतिति
विशिष्टति 'धर्मेमेघः'. भ्रेमन प्रसख्यानकरिवेभ वामेहेतुलिमितपुप-
दितं भवति || २८ ||

नामाद्वर्धमेघात् किं भवतीव्राहः ॥

तत्: श्रीशंकमनिद्रिति: || २८ ||

'श्रीशंकमनिद्रिति श्रीशंकानामविण्डादीनामभिनविशेषेश्वराः, 'कर्मेष्यकाल मुक्तादिभे-
देव जिविधाराः, श्रीशंकाद्यात् पूर्वपूर्वकारणनिधिः 'निद्रिति:',
भवतीव्राहः. || २८ ||

निद्रितेन तेनु किं भवतीव्राह ॥

तदा सत्त्वोवर्ण्यामसापेतस्य वामेहंनन्यात्याभ्येव-
माध्यं || २० ||

श्रीशंकाये विप्रेमेकमिति 'द्वाराण्यम' क्रेतः, त एव 'मद्याः',
तेन्ति: 'श्रीशंक' तद्विन्द्रहि, 'श्रीमद' गतचगगगनिभिः, 'श्रीम-

* भवतीव्राह वाहेति ३ पुस्तकाय ॥
न्यात' चन्द्रशेषद्रात, 'चंद्र', 'स्वरा' गणनार्थां भवति, चक्रोंनैव वर्ण चें जनातीया: || २० ||

तत: किमिद्यास ||

तत: जहादयानां परिशामकलसमातिनिगुणानां || २१ ||

'क्रम' निपादितः, भोगार्गनार्थाः पुष्पार्थाः प्रयोजनं वैखे 'जहादयाः', 'गुणा' चल-रत्नमांसि, तेषां 'परिशाम' चा पुष्पार्था-चमारिशेषेञ्य मानिसे चा भाष्कर्णिभावाविकात्तिसिरकिः, तस्म चोज्याव 'क्रम' वर्ध्यामाः, तस्म परिशामसिः' गैठा, न पुज्यान् दु:ध्याः || २१ ||

क्रमोऽज्ञात वर्ध्यामाः

क्रमब्रतियोगी परिशामाप्रार्थान्तनिगुणाः क्रम: || २२ ||

'चण' चर्चीयां काष्ठ: तस्म चोज्याव 'प्रतियोगी' एकचनविक ळाः || 'परिशामाप्रार्थान्तनिगुणाः' चन्द्रस्वस्य बर्षेयु पवानं समस्त-मन्दुखा यो स्वस्यां च चणां 'क्रम:' उच्चाते || न च मन्दुह्वनि चर्च्यु क्रम: परिशामां वर्ध्याः || २२ ||

इदानोम पञ्चममस्य कैवल्यार्थाधारां वर्ध्यामाः

पुष्पार्थ्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसव: कैवल्य वर्ध्य-प्रतिष्ठा वा चित्रिकविरिति || २३ ||

वमार्योगार्गनार्थां पुष्पार्थां 'गुणानां', या: 'प्रतिद्वंब'
प्रतिलोमपरिशासनमाही विकारानुज्ञवः, चदि वा जिन्देयांतिस्कर्-
क्यतिविद्यमः। खड़्पमाचरणस्तर्म तन्तू 'कैक्र्य' चचन्ते।

ग नेत्रमयमख्यं नेप्षष्टः कैक्र्यः कविक्ष्यायायामेवक्षतुतिक्षिपुः, बावब्रत्ना-
वारेवसि विन्दुर्क्ष्यमास्य एवंविप्प्याविविद्वसः। तथायति ज्ञानाधिकारमात्रा-
माध्य कङ्कल-भोजुलागुम्बाध्यममः प्रतिविन्दः। नव्या नव्यायेतः
केचक्राचार्यविधो न स्वातदा भाषणयानासेव पूर्वाप्यरुगुम्बाध्यानाभाबे
नियतकष्यत्वमस्य न द्वार, कतचिकाताष्ट्रायम्बाध्यान्यन्यतः। चति
येनेव भाष्योपधिर्मुरुष्टुतं कर्ति सत्त्वेव बोझावण्यं भेरते न तदा तित्सा-हित-
प्रातिविश्वारायमः सद्ध्वं प्रद्दर्णिं हृद्यते। सत्त्वेव कविक्ष्यमास्य गानापा-
द्राँक्षिणक्षुरुगुम्बाध्यानेनेव न्यायातुतः भाषणयानां प्रक्षानः नाग्यानु-
समाधुत्त्वम्बाध्यायः। तद्नुस्थ्रुतमाणाभाबे कक्ष्यत्दुपि कविक्ष्यमास्यपपण्यन्यतः
कर्तिरभाषणाभाबे य यो भास्ति कविक्ष्यते। नेप्षष्टाब्रान्यवानु
सकलमाध्य-पाविक्ष्यमास्यायामायावातिझायमामेव स्तायिं निपुणिः।

तत्त मैत्रयं ध्वितिमाहानेव पपण्यते न पुनराध्यायं कथानेव, खशा-
दिष्ट्वपाध्यायम्बर्तलेवि चितुद्र्यं, भाषणावस्तुवृतः। तथापि ज्ञानीलोका
क्षमायेन भस्मिति मन्त्रेति। खस्त्रूतः महेश्रमामस्मिति। न पुनिः
शुंगपद्धेन्त्वंतुत्तम्बस्तृत्रलेवम्बाध्यायक्षिणं परस्यं विद्वरुणं वचनं
श्रवणं। ज्ञत एकपत्रखणं समयं व्यापारिभक्ष कर्तुम्बस्तृत्रानं विद्वरुणं
तावेवविश्रयते। चति मोहायायां निघृतकार्यारे गुणेः

* भाषणकारानेव पूर्बाप्यरुगुम्बाध्यानां भावे द्विती C पुस्तकाप्रमाणः।
† विन्दुधर्मप्रायायायामेवति F पुस्तकाप्रमाणः।
‡ अगुणाध्याननेव द्विती C पुस्तकाप्रमाणः। तदगुणाध्यायाभाव हेतु F पुस्तकाप्रमाणः।
পার্থে ৪৪: দ্বারকা।

নিম্নালয় এবং নিচে একত্র বাড়িতে দেহী চাঁদনু পুরাতন তং বক্তাত্ত্বিক মহামায়ার মায়ানির্মিত প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলিকে ভোগ-ভোগমায়ার সমস্ত সম্পদের জন্য মায়া-মায়ানির্মিত মহামায়ার প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলির মাধ্যমে তাদের পরিবেশকে সাহায্য করে।

যদি পার্থে মায়ানির্মিত প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলির মাধ্যমে তাদের পরিবেশ সাহায্য করে, তাহলে তাদের পরিবেশকে সাহায্য করে। কিন্তু এই প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলির মাধ্যমে তাদের পরিবেশকে সাহায্য করে না। তাহে তাদের পরিবেশকে সাহায্য করে।

যদি পার্থে মায়ানির্মিত প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলির মাধ্যমে তাদের পরিবেশকে সাহায্য করে, তাহলে তাদের পরিবেশকে সাহায্য করে। কিন্তু এই প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলির মাধ্যমে তাদের পরিবেশকে সাহায্য করে না।
छाते। तत्र चेते रुपेण सुख-दुःखबोधकं कर्मावलम्बः। तेनेव रुपेण यथि परमावलम्बः खासदा कर्मावलक्तपरमावलम्बः परिवाहितविनवाभावस्वव यात्। च न खासाङ्गकृतिः, किंतु तदुपपिताकि-तथुरावीणनवाविभिषातलेन सूक्ष्मोति, नत्ता जिन्नानुपुपिताः। शाश-न्वृपता च पूर्वकर्ती निराला। बिहिश्नविभास्वाबवेने भिन्नवाव-लाभकर्मानां कः भ्राताधिकारी। न तावतिष्ठगर्भवाकारं पर-माध्यमा, बायुविभास्वाबवालाम भृताङ्गा। तत्तथ सकलाभ्यो-प्रकृतः। अविद्यालये च अगोक्तीकृत्वमाणे कः त्राता विधिती विचारे-वध्यते। न तावतपरमावलम्बः निबिन्तंनवालत् विनवालपाच। कः आंदोलनोपिन्मि बिनवाभावस्य श्रविधापर्यतावेने कः नवविधावभमः। अध्ययनर्गो एवेवविधाया श्रविधालं पदविधारणीयं नाम। चेति विचारेण विलिकरकरसुन्दरगर्भविभिक्षतमुपुपिताः, विचारविधेनु-चते। सैवं। यद्यव विशिष्ठकार्यं करोति तदवस्यं नूतनशिल्पसम्भवस्य। वा वाक्यं, श्रविधायाः संवारिज्ञसंप्रस्यार्थवात्सलवात्सलवात्सलवात्सल, तथानु न्यातिः बधिविभिक्षलसूचाते, तदा कः चंदोष सातानां न खात् श्रवाणोपवत्तावत्राधिकारी। तत्ताधिशिष्टस्वाद्यांवतानिद्धे गायत्राखोनो रुपसुपपद्धते। शिस्वतिधावलस्व सिद्धपिते तत्तान्वितिष्ठभ अनुभवं कर्मावलम्बः यमास्त। प्रमांमाहुपपपधः।

धनिर्दीपणो भृताधिकारिनात्मा शैवतायोगाचेतने दर्जयते, शैव-नापि तस्म बनिश्योगशा। तथाचि दश्छा-श्नान-पथवादवो गुणाकाशः

* हथूत दसं ३ वध्यमपाठः।
भाषारूपांत भाषानि:कल्योगादुपयोगे। तैरैव च गुणः खचं शता कर्मो भोजितत अपदिस्थ्ये। मे चर्चारूपांत भिन्नभाषानि-चतुर्दशी तथाज्ञानम् होपाशामपि निद्वृत्सेवच बुद्धार्थीनां विशेषगुणां
नामाल्यातोऽभिनिः स्वरूपमाणात्तिर्मायामाणोऽक्षीकृतां। तेवथा न चुकः पचः। पतलकथानं दृश्यां किमाल्यान भाषां। वापकलाद्वयो गुणा भाषामाणानि विनतः। पतलदैवथिर्ज्ञानम्: किष्टिन्द्र-भवयमन्त्रीकर्त्यं। भाषालिखितभाषार्यो दृश्यं पतल। न। चन्द्र-कौरङ्गै च भाषार्योऽवमिति। प्रतीता जातीयो वैष्णवभाषामाणोऽवम-भवयमन्त्रीकर्त्यं। तत्त्वाकारानं विन्दुःपतैथैव घटते गान्या।

थैरूपि भीमांके: कर्म-कर्त्तर्क भाषामिक्षिते। तेवापि न चुकः: पचः। तथाहि षड्ययङ्गापथानं भाषास्तिकी तेया परिशा चक्र-प्रत्येकं कर्मलांकारिण एव। न चैतिरस्यस्यालुपपस्य चक्रलं प्रतिमालं, कर्मवृक्ष प्रदेशं च। न चैतिरस्यस्यां युग्मयं धैर्यं च। तद्रेकस्य घर्तते, यदिन्नम्नर्योऽसः चुयप- 
क्रेडः घर्तते। चाहतां च कर्मलं-कर्मलं वर्षायां: किस्मं कर्मलं-कर्मलं यथवर्दः। नैतिकोऽसः विद्युद्धिर्यो शुक्लमां ।
तथादृशांत्यवापथां परिशावतानोऽविद्धातलामेपनं, तत्तथ पेशेत- नवेतेन।

थैरूपि ताप्ययोऽविद्धातलामेपनं भ्रीरपिर्यमाणं सः परिमाणवतथालं, तेषामुभायापरावर्ष एव पचः। परिशामिले चिन्द्र- पतलानं। चिन्द्रपतलानं किमाल्यान भाषां। तथादृशामाण भाषामिक्षेन चिन्द्रपतलमेवान्नः उत्तरस्यां तत्त्वाकारानं।
चेष्टितः कर्तृं सुपनेवालागामिस्यमि। तथाचि विवरणविविषये
या स्रानन्यया जिया स्वप्नस्य तथा विवरणविविषयः प्राणं, तथाचि
काल्पनिकः बंवितो स्राण्य रक्षानगर्ललव रक्षानगर्ललव, विवरण
वाच्यतः, चाल्ला चाल्लक्षेण। चतुर्धश जानानीमेजनेगाकरारे
तथा: समुपसे।। प्लायः: कारां नक्तेंव भवतीलात नक्तें
थोराङ्कळागेन इपाविष। तत्तथुपर्यं। वचारात्मः वर्तनानं
कळळं चुगापत त्याविषयः नक्तें वा। चुगापकाळे चाल्ला
तथा कर्णं न नवात।। प्राण कलीम्बः कर्णं तद्वेक्षः न चर्चते।
एकेन क्रुपेश्व चेन्नगः कर्णं तदा प्रत्यूपः स्वेदः वदितिलागः
वर्तेन समन्वकृतः नावात।। प्राण वादारः तथा कर्णं तदा परिषा
मिकळः। परिषामिलाश न विदुषः वर्तमाण: कार्याल्यमाण: रक्ष
प्रति थारतकाङ्कळः महीकळकाङ्कळाऱ्यां। चायुष्मागः: कर्णमाणः
प्रतिपाविषं कुर्ल्पक्ष नियुक्त विदुषः चर्चते।
एतेन स्वप्नकालारः निवर्ण्यविविषदारः वाण्यमहक्यम्
वर्त इति चे ब्रह्म, तेनेचेंतु निरावः।।
सैष्टिरिम्बः आनामाणामाणायुष्मागामिस्यप्रायसि। ते आनामाण वि
विष्णुवानिर्वेष चितृपुलमाणवे निवर्षहिते प्रकाः। जहात् फिल
वेलुक्कं चितृपुललङ्कळे। तस्म विविष्णुनिर्वेषाणिविष्णुमाणां मान्य
छात्तिगळेन। तत्तथुपर्यं। दर्शितमेवनिवर्षहिते वर्तमाण: च
विष्णु इत्युयाते, च भाष्मानिर्वेषाणिविष्णुमाणेन न चर्चते। तथाचि
आनामाणशयामाणः निवर्णः चाबेंव्हृत चल्लनेगाकरारः भवतः।
तत्तथावृत्तः कर्णारः चाष्ट्रात्मः कर्णाण्यारः। तथा चुगापारः विवरणविषये—
तातिज्ञः। विकासाधारणवादाध्यायम् बुद्धिचर्चा न चित्तम्। नूतन- 
निगमनेन चिते: बौद्धभद्रार्थकारानुप्रेयः। तद्वै विवर्मर्गी-
माध्यमः। निरपाधारतः बुधिरेववान्द्रनेव भाष्यया निर्पाधारिताः, न 
प्रकाशादयः। परश्र पुनां स्त्रममवगतिः। 

एवं वर्त्तमानः दृष्टेन्यन्यायान्यं विचारय नाय्यदायान्यं स्त्रममर्य- 
पद्यते। अधिकारस्वतः चित्तूपूर्वं। तथा अक्षरे नाय्यमेव। चित्तृपत्तां 
यद्विधितिषतः तदर्भू भोगर्ताः गबतः। वच चेतोधिषितं नवें 
संक्षेप्यवादार्थमेव। भवति। एवं तत्र वधायुपदाधिषीम् प्रधानसम् 
व्यापारिनेन नवदायः। केवलशास्त्रान्यमेव तविषयावर्मणा-
पार्थमि नामा गतिर्भृता नाय्यदीर्मेव युक्तमुं द्विभाषायुप-
रीत्वार्थेन न्यायप्राप्ति चित्तिषते: केवलम्। 

तदर्भू विम्मचर्यें विस्तरणं वर्त्तमानः चित्तृपत्तां नाय्यदायान्यं नमाधिविष्णु-
मध्यमहायाज्ञवल्लरिप्रार्थमध्यमश्च च चित्तृपत्तां प्रधानसमेव 
कारणमियुपपाधेन धर्मादीनां निर्पाधारिकार्मितां एव शम्यार्थी-
भवति। प्रत्येकप्रत्येकमध्यममियुपपाधेन धर्मादीनां निर्पाधारिकार्मितां 
 प्रधानसमेव। योगिनिस्मे विम्मचर्यें नमाधिविष्णुमध्यममियुपपाधेन 
कारणमियुपपाधेन धर्मादीनां निर्पाधारिकार्मितां। यथाय योगिनिन्यायविष्णुमध्यममियुपपाधेन 
कारणमियुपपाधेन धर्मादीनां निर्पाधारिकार्मितां। यथाय योगिनिन्यायविष्णुमध्यममियुपपाधेन 
कारणमियुपपाधेन धर्मादीनां निर्पाधारिकार्मितां।

* भाव्यतानेति। ० पुनां स्त्रममवगतिः।
पावलजे वेमुळे

श्रावते निरुक्ष शाखारां निरंपण पुंडळ घातमुळे विनिवृत्तर यक्षगंगराणिणिगुप्तानुभाष कुटिलमप्रभाष्ये देवमध्ये कौक्षणिकेन्द्राय दुःखीः सर्व: क्रमेयोपयोगिनोऽधार्मिकाः प्रभाषानिरुक्तारामरेतेऽवेदेकौक्षणिक्युपपाध कौक्षणिक्युप्प्रकाः निर्विवेचनमिति व्याख्यातः कौक्षणिकाः।

सर्वेऽऽयो यथाप्रतापवतेिः पादान्ये खेमापनितः
प्रधानमुक्तेशु मूर्तेशु द्वितीयाः भृतभाषेऽः
द्वारकांसवाय गर्भभाषें वान्देशतापि भिन्तान व श्रीभोजस्यहनाति: पाविति: सर्वेऽऽयो दृश्यं सम्यक्।

श्रीमद्वारांब्रजश्रीमोद्यरकिरितायाः राजमार्गपक्षा
निरीक्षाणयां पातःख्योग्रामांग्रं वतं निरौपाद्वारेः। वभाषा श्रवं
पातःख्योग्रामांग्रं चतुः।।

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