

This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at http://books.google.com/


Bibliotheca Indica




Bilt. Ind. 1. 70

.

.





4

BIBLIOTHECA INDICA;

Collection of Priental Works

PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. New Series, No. 462.

पातञ्जलं यागसूचम्। राजमार्त्तखाखद्यत्तियद्वितम् ।

THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI,


COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RAJA AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

RAJENDRALALA MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E. FASCICULUS I.

CALCUTTA :

PRINTED BY J. W. THOMAS, AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS, and published by the Asiatic society, 57, park street.

1881.



BIBLIOTHECA INDICA;

NEW SERIES.

Nos. 462, 478, 482 and 491-492.

THE

YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI

WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RÁJÁ

AND

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

RÁJENDRALÁLA MITRA, LL. D., C. I. E.

PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL.

CALCUTTA : PRINTED BY J. W. THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION 1 BESS. 1883.

-

Digitized by Google

.

.

.

CONTENTS.



Page

Preface,	•••	•••		•••	ii
Index,	•••	***	•••	•••	xciii
Addenda et Corrigenda,			•••	•••	cxxiii
Bhoja's Introduction,			•••	•••	1
Translation of text and commentary, Chapter I,				•••	8
Ditto, Cha	opter II,	***	•••	•••	59
Addendum t	o ditto,	•••	•••	•••	117
Translation of text and commentary, Chapter III,					121
Ditto, Chapter IV,			•••	•••	168
Appendix. A descriptive list of works extant on the					
Yoga system of Philosophy,			•••	218	
Sanskrit text of Yoga-sútra and its commentary,					٦

.

• • • • • • ••• • • • • · · • ... • • • • • • • • • ••• . . . • - • · · • , · , . . . • • ۰ • . . .

The doctrine of Pessimism as evolved by Schopenhauer and developed by Hartmann created quite a sensation in Europe. The novelty, the bold generalizations, the closeness and vigour of ratiocination with which it was set forth, endowed it with qualities which could not but attract attention and claim consideration. But, carefully analysed, it does not appear to have any pretension to novelty or originality to which its admirers lay claim.

The doctrine of evil as inseparable from the world is nearly as old as humanity. It was the dread of evil that drove the primitive man to seek the shelter of superhuman power, and laid the foundation of religion. There would have been no religion if there had been no dread of evil, here or hereafter. Nor would philosophy have had its birth had not the necessity arisen to discriminate between good and evil. Morality, too, presupposes a differentiation between that which is proper and that which is improper-of a consciousness, however vague and undefined, of future reward and punishment. Doubtless the doctrine assumes constant and unalloyed evil, and not a mixture of good and evil; but in so doing it only places the evil in the present condition, and transfers the good to a hereafter, in a hazy, cloudy, dubious, undefined way, but does not absolutely deny it.

The preëminence of the unconscious Will is the most important element of the doctrine; and it, too, under the names of Freewill, Máyá, Buddhi, and the like, has occupied men's mind and played its part in philosophy from a pretty remote period of antiquity.

Then comes the repugnance to worldly attractions, love, affection and joy; and under the form of asceticism it is almost as old as civilized man.

The denial of the existence of God is an assumption of no modern date; it unquestionably preceded the formation of human ideas about Divine Providence; and the assumption about the objectification of Will forms the corner-stone of the doctrine of Patanjali.

It might be said that, if thus the leading tenets of the Pessimist doctrine be old, their association into a compact and complete system is not so, and that in this respect it may well claim the full meed of praise for its originality. This, however, cannot be conceded. Even as are its tenets, so is it in its entirety as a system. What Schopenhauer enunciated in his 'World as Will and Idea' (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*) in 1819, and Hartmann worked out in his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (*Philosophie der Unbewussten*) in 1869, is no other than the nihilist philosophy of Buddha put forth in a modern European garb, or, as an able writer puts it, a system "little more than Buddhism vul-

iv

garised." It is the farthest from my wish to assert that the two German philosophers have surreptitiously, or deliberately, borrowed their system from the Indians: it is almost certain that Schopenhauer at the beginning of this century had no knowledge of any Buddhist Philosophy, and Hartmann, working on the model of his predecessor, had, probably, no occasion to consult the texts of the Sunyaváda system of the Buddhists as accessible to him in meagre abstracts in European languages. The similitude may be-nay, most probably is-purely accidental, the result of human mind set to thinking in a particular line of ideas arriving at the same conclusion; but it exists, and is as clear as possible, and that is all that is here intended to be emphasized.

The system of S'ákya Buddha is a modification of a more ancient and more fully developed doctrinethat of Kapila, as known under the name of Sánkhya. Thoroughly logical in its scheme of ratiocination, the Sánkhya enunciates that there is no proof of the existence of a Supreme Divinity, and therefore leaves it entirely out of consideration in its scheme of primal causation. Its words, as summarised in the text book of the school, but which is obviously of a much later date than Kapila, are, I's'varásiddheh: "It is not proved that there is a God." (Sánkhva, Aph. I, 92.) The idea is more fully developed and argued in a subsequent part of the work (Vide infra, pp. 31f). S'ákya Buddha, less logical but more bold, adopted this idea in a positive form, instead of keeping the question open by admitting only the want of dialectic demonstration. Schopenhauer does the same without any reserve, describing theism as "a tradition of the nursery."

The next subject is Soul or the vitalizing and conscious principle of life. Kapila's theory recognises its existence, assuming a separate soul for each living being. Buddha did the same. These souls are uncreate and eternal, never coming to an end. Buddha acknowledged and, indeed, made them the basis of his system, but practically, though not in so many words, he denied them absolute eternity, for his theory of Nirvána assigned them an ultimate and final goal after many transmigrations in sunyatá, vacuity or nihility. It may be that his Nirvána did not extend to absolute nihility, for there is nothing authentic and unquestionable in his sayings; but his immediate followers, who developed the Maháyána school. announce it in unmistakable terms, and for the purposes of the present comparison this is enough. The German philosopher goes a step further, and insists on the absolute negation of Soul. His words put in English are, "there is no psyche;" but unable to dispense with it altogether, he supplies its place by an "unconscious will" which plays the part of Soul. Practically this amounts to admitting Soul, but divesting it of its consciousness and eternity.

In the Sánkhya system, the category next after Soul is *Pradhána*, or Nature, having inherent in it the threefold qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or as the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya defines it, "the equilibrium of the three qualities,"

vi

('triguna-sámyam'). The terminology is archaic, but it implies the sum-total of the laws and forces of nature, which regulate the course of the phenomenal world. Buddha availed himself of this category to the full, and Schopenhauer does the same, using only modern terms in conformity with the physical science of the day.

The next is Intellect. It is common to all the three systems under notice, and alike unconscious in all. The Sánkhyas call it *Mahat*, the Buddhists *Buddhi*, and Schopenhauer Will, "the Reality, the absolute Existence, the Ultimate Fact, the universal and fundamental essence of all activities, both of the organic and the inorganic world, the primordial thing whence we and everything proceed." In the Yoga system, the term used is *chittva*, which, in the following pages, has been rendered into 'thinking principle;' but would have been as well—nay more pointedly—expressed by will.

Kapila assigned real substantiality to matter. What the primitive Yogís thought about it we know not. Patanjali is silent on the subject in his Yoga aphorisms; but in his *Mahábháshya* he admits an absolute reality of it. He raises the question by saying, *yadi* távad guṇasamudáyo dravyam, "if you hold matter to be the aggregate of qualities," (IV, 1.) and then refutes the theory, Buddha's idea of Sunyatá necessitated the same theory in a more prominent manner. He could not admit absolute reality to any thing, and as the inevitable nihilistic consequence of his creed, matter had to assume the character of a phantasmal play of mental phenomenality—

" — A fleeting show For man's illusion given."

The Vedánta took it up after him, Berkeley worked it out in England in the early part of the last century, and Schopenhauer has done the same in our own days.

As already stated the theory of evil-constant. ever-present evil in everything mundane,-is common to all the three schools. Kapila designed his system with the express object of removing "the threefold pain" which is inherent in existence (Aph. I). Buddha's dread of the ever-recurring pain of birth, existence, decay, and death, drove him to the shelter of nihility, and the Pessimists of our day look upon pain as constant and inherent in worldly existence. The Yogís, who represent a section of the Sánkhyas, sum up the fruit of worldly existence by the significant remark, "to the discriminating all are verily painful." (Yoga, II, 15.) According to Hartmann "the world is so bad that it had better not exist, and that it is steadily becoming worse."

Nor are the means devised for the removal of this evil different. Perfect knowledge, attainable by hard, unremitting study amidst the most rigorous asceticism and self-mortification, and total renunciation of the pleasures of the world, is the only remedy accessible to man. Neither Kapila nor Buddha would have any other, and Schopenhauer, after dwelling on the miseries of existence, and showing that even suicide was not enough to put a stop to them, asks, "Whence then is deliverance to come?" and the answer given is "In *knowing* that the world is radically and essentially bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for

that old affirmation of the Will to live; it leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of Will, that true *Nirvána* in which there is no more Will, therefore no longer an ideal presentation, or a real world."

In so far the correspondence is as close as possible in works set apart by an interval of considerably over four and twenty centuries—between Buddhism of the 6th century before Christ and the Pessimism of our own times. A learned writer describes Pessimism as the "goal of modern thought" in Europe. If so, that "goal" was reached in India over four and twenty centuries ago.

Nor should the limit be set there. It is impossible to believe that Sánkhyaism, like Minerva, issued forth in all its perfection at once. It is but natural to suppose that many ontological and biological questions, such as God, soul, mind, primary causation, &c., must have formed the theme of speculation and enquiry from a long anterior period, to prepare the Indian mind for the conception and reception of so recondite a system as the Sánkhya. Kapila could not have conceived and brought it forth, had not his predecessors discussed and made themselves familiar with such philosophical ideas. There must have existed many doctrines, many dogmas, many theories to afford him the necessary materials to work out his scheme. Even as Bacon's Novum Organum was not the spontaneous generation of a novel thought, but the crystallization or solidification of ideas which

were extant at the time in a more or less undefined, nebulous way, so was Kapila's Sánkhya. Various phases of philosophic thought were well known and current in his time, and his was the master mind which put them together to create a complete system. The bricks existed, and Kapila was the architect who used them in constructing a novel edifice.

How long before the time of Kapila metaphysical dogmas had currency among the Hindus we know not for certain; but the remarkable hymn in the Rig Veda which discusses whether entity or nonentity existed before creation (X, 129) carries us to a remote period of antiquity beyond which we cannot speculate. The reference in the Sáma Veda to a Yati who condemned sacrifices, and whose wealth was transferred to Bhrigu, is equally germane to the point. According to the Aitareya Bráhmana some such Yatis were punished by being thrown before jackals. In the A'ranyaka period of Vedic history, these rationalistic speculations and metaphysical controversies were of frequent occurrence, and the Upanishads have preserved for us the substance of some of the orthodox speculations on the subject. They afford us traces also of the heterodox dogmas which they were intended to combat. Kautsa was the leader of one of the rationalistic schools, and he is named by Yáska. Jábála was an atheist, and his name occurs in the Upanishads. Pánini alludes to atheists, sceptics, fatalists, and revilers of the Vedas. It may be taken for granted without any offence to reason that these heterodox people did entertain many dogmas in opposition to the received exposition of primal causation and other recondite doctrines of the Hindu faith. They could not have been heterodox if they had not adverse theories to propound; and they must have been met by counter theories to keep up the antagonism. One may go further and assume that these disputes led to the development of adverse schools of thought which have since been overthrown by later developments. The earliest Vedic cultus was purely ritualistic. It embraced prayers and peace-offerings-prayers in set forms, and peaceofferings in the form of sacrifices accompanied by libations of spirituous liquors. Those who reviled the Vedic religion opposed it principally on the ground of the futility, cruelty and unmeaning character of the offerings. The atheists, pure and simple, denounced the whole system as false. This, however, was a purely destructive course, and not calculated to win the multitude in its favour. Mere negation suggests the idea of the doctrine of Metrodorics, the Epicurean, which had for its main object the stomach. Society needed some check to vice by holding up a threat of future retribution, and absolute negation of divine providence and future life did not provide it. Besides, a future state being admitted, a preparation for it in the present state was felt a necessity, and a large majority of the opponents, therefore, appealed to self-torture and meditation for aid.

Meditation as a means of communion with the Divinity was known long before the date of the Sánkhya. Indeed, in all ancient forms of religion,

meditation occupies a prominent place as a religious exercise. In the Rig Veda the Gáyatrí enjoins the meditation of the divine light which vivifies the solar luminary as the most sacred act of devotion, and that meditation occurs in endless forms in the rituals of all subsequent sects and systems. This meditation is called Dhyána, the word used in the Gáyatrí being the verb dhimahi "may we meditate." Now, this Dhyana cannot be performed without fixing the mind on one particular object after abstracting it from worldly cares and enjoyments, and this fixation is called Dháraná, or steadfastness. The abstraction necessarily implies some amount of asceticism and austerity, and this is called in the Vedas Tapas. A man must foreswear all worldly enjoyments before he can fix his mind on one unworldly object, and the fixation must take place before he can begin a meditation. Austerity, therefore, forms the first step in the process; fixation or steadfastness the second; and meditation the third; and all these exercises have enjoved a halo of sanctity from a remote period of antiquity. No Rishi could live without his hermitage; none without performing Tapas; none without steadfast devotion : none without his meditation. These are the essential attributes of a Rishi. Tt would be a contradiction in terms to suppose a Rishi could be so, without them. They suggest the idea of communion with something superhuman, and create a feeling of mysterious awe and veneration in the mind of the common herd. At first the object of meditation was of course the Divinity in some form

or other; but atheistic philosophers soon found it practicable to dispense with that object, and they converted the objective thought to a subjective one, and thus produced the highest meditation of the Sánkhyas, a meditation in which the mind meditates on itself, or, as the philosophers of this class express it, on nothing. The next step was to dispense with the eternity of matter, to reduce it to a phantasmal character. The mind was all in all, and there was no necessity for an eternal co-ordinate, and this is the dogma of the Buddhists and the Vedántists. None of these, however, dispensed with individual soul. That formed an integer in all the leading systems of early Indian philosophy. Nay, more, in order to provide for a future state of retribution, it was necessary to develop or retain the system of metempsychosis. It was seen that neither virtue nor vice always brought on its deserts in this life, and the necessity for a next life became unavoidable: and if the soul was to have a next corporeality of some kind to bear the deserts, there was nothing to hinder the transmigration many times. It may shock European ideas of the present day to be told of metempsychosis; but between worldly life, purgatory, and eternal hellfire, or heaven on the one hand and metempsychosis on the other, dispassionate and unsophisticated logic will readily yield the palm to the latter. An English lady was once shocked at the sight of a Hindu lady with her nose bored for a nose-ring. She said, "how barbarous is this custom of yours, dear sister, of boring the nose ?" "I fail," replied the Hindu, "to perceive the difference. Madam, between boring the two ears and

boring the nose." The Hindu controversialist may adopt this line of argument and ask, the matter not being susceptible of positive proof without the aid of revealed religion, "logically what is the difference between three corporealities and a dozen or more?" But. however that be, all the ancient leading schools of India accepted metempsychosis, and the grand object they had in view was to devise the means for putting a stop to the ever-lengthening and neverending chain of transmigration. And so long that was kept prominently before the masses, most of whom keenly felt, as they do now, and will always do, what Schelling calls "that sadness which cleaves to all finite life," the system propounded, however otherwise discordant in doctrinal points, had a fair chance of success. as a proselytising system, particularly if it were favourable to peace and welfare in this present existence.

Buddhism was peculiarly well-adapted for this purpose. It was the most attractive in its moral and social phases. No system of human religion has propounded a more perfect course of morality, humanity, mercy, and sympathy. The universal benevolence it preached could not but exert a potent influence on the mind of the people. At a time when sacrifices of animals by hundreds were everyday practices, and those sacrifices were often effected by driving wooden spikes into the heart of writhing victims, the dogma of total abstinence from all sacrifices and uniform mercy to all creatures could not but produce a marked revulsion of feeling against the current religion, and to draw large numbers of

men to the standard of the new faith. The doctrines of equality of man and of non-recognition of caste also contributed very largely to recommend it to the favour of those who had been for a long time ground down by caste rules. The result was wholesale conversions of the lower and the middle classes of the people in all parts of India-so much so as to make Buddhism the leading religion of the country. The intellectual classes, the men of leading and light, also appreciated these moral and social advantages, and were willing to accept them. They perceived, however, the worm in the flower, and were shocked by the sight. The atheism which forms the basis of Buddhist philosophy never obtruded itself on the perception of the multitude. It was unknown to them, and they cared not at all to understand its true purport. But the intelligent few felt it, and wished to avoid it. Even professed Buddhists could not always tolerate it, and many were the attempts made to gloss over it, or to supplant it in an insidious way so as to divest the system of its atheism without injur. ing it in its constitution. The Ais'varika system of the Buddhists was the outcome of one of these attempts, and the Vedánta and the Yoga systems with their various Gitá, Tántric and Puránic modifications represent the results of Hindu attempts at reconciling the higher philosophy of Kapila and Buddha with a theistic religion.

It is not my object here to enter into the vexed question of the chronology of these different systems. It would take more time and space than what are at my disposal now. It is necessary, however, to state that in appealing to the Sánkhya, I appeal to the doctrine, and not to its text-books. There is abundant evidence, both in Hindu and Buddhist works of unquestionable antiquity and authenticity, of the Sánkhya and the Yoga systems having been current before the time of Buddha. The most prominent part of the exercise of those systems involved the most rigorous self-mortification, and that mortification was currently practised with the utmost rigour before the time of Buddha. Buddha himself notices this. According to the Lalita-Vistara :--

"While at Uruvilvá, Sákya called to mind all the different forms of penances which people at his time were in the habit of submitting to, and which they thought raised the mind above all carnality. 'Here,' he thought, 'am I born in the Jambudvípa, among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption (*adhimukti*), crowded by Tírthikas with diverse wishes, and at a time when their faculties are wriggling in the grasp of the crocodile of their earnal Stupid men, who seek to purify their persons by divers wants. modes of austerity and penance, and inculcate the same ! Some of them cannot make out their mantras. Some lick their hands. Some are uncleanly. Some have no mantras. Some wander after different sources. Some abstain from fish and flesh-meat. Some mind not the annual duties. Some abstain from spirit and the water of chaff. Some beg alms from one, three, five, or seven tribes. Some indulge in tubers, fruits, mosses, kuśa grass, leaves, cow's dejecta, frumenty, curds, clarified butter, molasses, and unbaked cakes. Some wash the body of charioteers, parrot-flyers, and news-purveyors. Some dwell in villages, or in woods for their livelihood. Some adore cows, deer, horses, hogs, monkeys, or elephants. Seated at one place in silence, with their legs bent under them, some attempt greatness. Some speak to only one person, others to seven. Some eat once in a day and night, some once on alternate days, and some

at intervals of four, five, or six days; some once in a fortnight, performing a chándráyana. Some put on themselves the feathers of vultures or owls. Some, seated on a board or a munjá mat, wear bark, kuśa grass, valvaja grass (Eleusine Indica), or blankets of camels' hair, or of goat's wool, or of hair, or hides. Some sleep more or less in wet clothes Some sleep on ashes, gravel, stones, boards, thorny grass, or pestles, with the face downwards, in a hut or the bare ground. Some wear one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven pieces of cloth ; others go naked, making no distinction between fit and unfit places. Some have long hair, nails, beard, and matted hair, and wear bark. Some live upon a single meal of a mixture of sesamum and rice. Some smear themselves with ashes. cinders from altars, dust, or clay. Some carry on their persons and in their hands down, munja grass, hair, nails, rags, mud, or a cocoanut-shell alms-bowl. Some drink hot water, or rice-water, or fountain water, or water preserved in earthen jars. Some carry on them cinders, metals, astringent things, three sticks, skulls, almsbowls, bones or swords, and by these means they hope to attain to immortality, and pride themselves on their holiness. By inhaling smoke or fire, by gazing at the sun, by performing the five fires, resting on one foot, or with an arm perpetually uplifted, or moving about on the knees, some attempt to accomplish their penance. Some seek salvation by killing themselves by entering into a mass of lighted chaff or charcoal, or by suppressing their breath, or by roasting one's self on (hot) stones, or by entering any fire or water, or ascending in the air. The syllables "om," "vashat," "svadhá," sváhá," as also, blessings, hymns, lighting of the sacred fire, invocations, repetitions of mystic mantras teaching of the Vedas (lit. mantras), or fancying the image of a divinity in one's mind, afford means of purification to many. Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahmá, Indra, Rudra, Vishņu, Deví, Kumára, Mátrí, Kátyáyaní, Chandra, Aditya, Vaisravana, Varuna, Vásava, Aśvina, Nága, Yaksha, Gandharva, Aśura, Garuda, Kinnara, Mahoraga, Rákshasa, Preta, Bhúta, Kushmánda, Párshada, Ganapati, Devarshi, Brahmarshi, or Rájarshi. Some select some of them, others resort to the earth, the water, heat, the air or the ether. Mountains, rivers, fountains, tanks, lakes, long narrow sheets of water (tadágas), oceans, vats, ponds, wells, trees, lotuses, herbs, creepers,

grasses, stumps, pastures, cremation grounds, courtyards, and bowers afford asylums to others. Houses, columns, stones, pestles, swords, bows, axes, arrows, spears, and tridents, are the objects of salutation to some. In curd, butter, mustard, barley, garlands, darbha grass, jewels, gold and silver, some seek their welfare. Thus do these Tirthikas, dreading the horrors of mundane life, seek their shelter. Some seek heaven and salvation in their offspring, and resolutely apply to them. They all follow the wrong road; they fancy that to be the true support which is untrue; they hold evil to be good, and the impure to be pure. I shall then commence that kind of vow and penance by which all hostile sects shall be overpowered. To persons deluded by works and sacrifices, I shall show the destruction of all works and sacrifices. To Devas, perceivable by meditation. as also to those who become manifest in divers forms, I shall exhibit a meditation by which they may be overpowered."-My Buddha-Gayá, pp. 24, et seq.

The meditations he practised were all in accord with the rules of the Yoga system, and even their technical names were the same. These facts demonstrate the antiquity of the Sánkhya and the Yoga doctrines; but this cannot be said of the text-books of those systems as we have them before us now. They are obviously of a later date than Buddha, and this may safely be predicated of all the six leading texts of Hindu Philosophy. The Sánkhya Sútra quotes the Vais'eshika by name in two places (A. I., 25 and VI, 35), and refutes the doctrine of the The Yoga Sútra takes for granted Vedánta Sútra. the twenty-five categories of the Sánkhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost verbatim. The Vais'eshika Sútra recognises the Nyáya as well as the Sánkhya. The Nyáya Sútra refutes the doctrines of the Vedánta, and of the Sánkhya. The Mímáñs'a either directly or practically

by the mode of its refutation of adverse doctrines recognises the pre-existence of all the others, not excepting Buddhism. It also quotes Badari, a teacher, and Bádaráyana, probably a grandson of Badari, and author of the Vedánta Sútras or later Mimáñs'á, as also of a commentary on the Yoga Sútra. The Vedánta in its turn refutes adverse doctrines of all the five, and thereby admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled only by the supposition that the different dogmas and the schools which cherished them existed for a long time before the dogmas were written down in the aphoristic form in which we have them now. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation for a long time. There might have been also text books before, but they were set aside by the very complete systems which the new texts produced, and in the new systems the refutation of adverse opinions very naturally included all the theories which were prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not the theories only of the time when the original dogmas were first promulgated. This is also obvious in other ways. In the case of the Sánkhva Sútra, though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahmá, we find it refers to an "ancient teacher" (A'chárya, A. V, 31), and to "venerable preceptors" (A. VI, 69). Sanandana and Panchas'ikha are cited by name (V, 32, and VI, 69). Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to A'surí, who is described both as a brother and a pupil of the teacher. A'surí imparts it to Panchas'ikha, who is, according

to the Puránics, again a brother. This Panchas'ikha, again, according to the Mahábhárata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sánkhya doctrine to that king of Mithilá. Had Kapila written the Sútra he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an A'chárya.

In the Vedánta Sútra, Bádaráyana, the author, is several times named in the third person (I, 3, 26; I, 3, 33; III, 2, 41; III, 4, 1, 8, 19; IV, 3, 15, IV, 4, 7, 12). This is usually explained by the statement that a pupil wrote down the teachings of the saint. Colebrooke, arguing on these facts, came to the conclusion that the text-books are much later than the saints whose names they bear. Referring to the Sánkhya he says "the text of the Sánkhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by I's'varakrishna,-and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Panchas'ikha who had been himself instructed by A'surí, the pupil of Kapila." (Essays, I, p. 93). Professor Cowell accepts this opinion in its entirety; he says "The Sútras, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The Sútras mutually refer to each other; thus, those of the Sánkhya school, which in itself I should consider

XX

one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedánta tenets. They expressly mention the Vais'eshika in I. 25, V. 85; for the Nyaya cf. V, 27, 86, and for the Yoga I, 93." (Colebrooke's Essays, I, 354.) This is also the opinion at which I have arrived after a careful consideration of the bearings of the question; in short, my conviction is that the Sútras were written, like the Institutes of Manu and many other Hindu works, long after the date of their putative authors.

As regards the Yoga, the doctrine is described to be as old as Brahmá, and the text-book to be the work of Patanjali, who, says the commentator, "compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them" (p. 4). That such is really the case, is obvious from the fact of the Yoga which Patanjali inculcates being identically the same which the Sánkhya accepted as the only means of salvation. It might be argued that the Sánkhya adopted the theory of the 25 principles, from the Yoga of Patanjali, and did not lend it to him. But the arguments against this theory are overwhelming. In the first place had Patanjali initiated the theory of the Tattyas he would have for certain defined them.and not left them to be inferred. He is very careful in his definitions, and he would never have left so vital an element of his system to be inferred. But following the Sánkhya no necessity was felt by him for any definition. It cannot be said that his Tattvas were different from those of the Sánkhyas, for that would make the necessity for a definition even more

imperative. Secondly, the author of the Mahábháshya cannot possibly be proved to have lived before Kapila, or his doctrine. The learned Professor M. M. Kunte, in his "Vicissitudes of Aryan Civilization," has combated, with great tact and ability, the arguments usually put forth to fix the date of Patanjali; and it may be admitted that individually each argument as put forth by Goldstücker and others admits of refutation, and I may add that a long chain of weak arguments is not stronger than any of its links. Still the coincidence of a number of names of a given period is one which in Indian history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, however, one's attention to the text-book only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that Patanjali has contented himself by tacking a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic model, without in any way blending the two ideas into any homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the Hindus call it Sés'vara Sánkhya, or Sánkhya cum deo, as opposed to the former which is Nirís'vara Sánkhya, or Sánkhya sine deo.

The cardinal difference between the two rests on their theistic and atheistic belief, but as already stated, it makes no difference in their systems. Isolation of soul from thinking principle is the end sought in either case, and meditation in Samádhi is the only means available. The believer in the existence of the Godhead assumes that divine grace facilitates the end sought, but he does not dispense with Samádhi, and his belief, therefore, is of no material importance.

xxii

"In less momentous matters," as noticed by Colebrooke, "they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali's Yoga-s'ástra is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions." (Essays I, p. 265.)

And we have enough in these facts and reasons to infer that the Yoga text-book is posterior to the Sánkhya text-book, and that both the text-books are later than Buddha; but that the doctrines of the two schools are very old. Any how these are the immediate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha, and indirectly of the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

The Yoga, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage. In this case the relation is direct and more intimate. The eternity of soul is recognised by both; both look to a course of gradual progress which has perfection for its goal; both admit the existence of soul in higher and higher stages; both recognise the possibility of man's commanding departed souls to come down, to become visible, and to hold converse with him; both pretend by regulation of breath and other exercises to attain occult powers of the most

Digitized by Google

transcendental kind. The details and the rationale of exercise may be different in minor points, and a few of the dogmas such as the "material reality" of soul according to the spiritualists, and its pure spirituality according to the Yogís, may be apparently contradictory; but substantially the two are as closely related as two systems separated by a gap of five and twenty centuries can well be. The cardinal theory, that "the body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals" but it is not so in the case of the adept, is evidently the same in both. "We can see only what comes before the windows of our body, we can take cognizance of what is brought within its bars. The adept has found the key of his prison, and can emerge from it at pleasure. In other words, the adept can project his soul out of his body to any place he pleases." The whole system in either case is based on this doctrine, and even a cursory study of the 3rd chapter of the work now presented to the public in an English dress will, I believe, fully bear out this statement.

The name of the Yoga system as we now have it is *Yogánus'ásana*, or 'the Institutes of the Yoga.' This name, however, is rarely used, the work being better known as the *Yoga-s'ástra* or 'the science of Yoga,' or *Yoga-sútra*, the 'Aphorisms of the Yoga.' According to the commentary, commonly assigned to Vyása, one name of the work would appear to be Sánkhya pravachana, or 'an exposition of the Sánkhya.' The words of the colophon are Pátanjala-yoga-s'a'stre sánkhyapravachane, which may be translated into, in Patanjali's science of the Yoga, the Sa'nkhya pravachana.

xxiv

Vyása, however, if he be the author of the exegesis, which I do not believe to be the case, must have used the term simply to imply that it is a text-book on the Sánkhya system, and not to indicate the specific name of the work, for in his remarks on the first aphorism he distinctly says, "the name of the work is Yogánus ásana," (Yogánus'ásanam náma s'ástram). Following this exegesis Colebrooke says : "the title of Sánkhyapravachana seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali's Yoga-s'ástra." (Essays I, p. 244). In short, Yogánus'ásana is the specific, and Sánkhyapravachana the descriptive, name of the work. Anyhow it is obvious that the Yoga is recognised from an early period as a work on Sánkhya.

The Yoga text as we now have it comprises a total of 194 short, succinct aphorisms, divided into four chapters or quarters (pa'das). The first contains 51 aphorisms, devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of meditation, and is entitled Samádhi-páda. The second is called Sudhuna-páda, or the quarter on the exercise of meditation and its requirements, and contains 55 aphorisms. The third is called Vibhútipáda, and treats of the various occult powers which may be derived by the exercises enjoined in it. It is of the same extent as the second. The name of the fourth chapter is Kaivalya-páda, and it gives an exposition of the nature and character of the isolation or detachment of soul from worldly ties, which is the object and aim of the exercises and meditations recommended. It is limited to 33 aphorisms.

The work opens with a definition of the term Yoga. It is derived from the root yuj, which means both "to join" and "to meditate." Some accept the first meaning, explaining it in the technical sense to imply the joining of the mind to the object of thought. Others prefer the second, but that makes no material difference in the purport. The technical meaning of the word as used in the text is a derivative one. Instead of giving prominence to the joining, it implies the detachment which that joining The definition is, "the suppression of the occasions. functions of the thinking principle." This suppression, however, need not be absolute in order to make the word applicable. It is used to imply all stages of abstraction of the thinking principle from worldly cares with a view to centre it in the peculiar meditation which serves to effect that abstraction. The word is of very ancient date. It occurs several times in the Rig Veda, but not in the technical sense. Tn the time of Buddha, six centuries before the era of Christ, it had acquired its technical meaning to perfection, and as Buddha, according to the view of the case set forth above, borrowed it from the followers of the Sánkhya school, it may safely be assumed that it dates from long before the age of Buddha. In fact, the Tapas of the Vedic Rishis got the more expressive name of Yoga at a later period, and Kapila and his followers gave it prominence in their system by making it the sole means of salvation. Many other works have since used it to indicate communion with the divinity in some way or other, and the Bhagavad-

xxvi

gítá takes thirteen out of its eighteen chapters to be each a treatise on a separate kind of Yoga. The names are: 2, Sánkhya Yoga; 3, Karma Yoga; 4, Jņána-karma Yoga; 5, Karma-sannyása Yoga; 6, Dhyána Yoga; 8, Tárakabrahma Yoga; 9, Rájaguhya Yoga; 10, Vibhúti Yoga; 12, Bhakti Yoga; 13, Kshetra-kshetrajna Yoga; 14, Guṇatraya Yoga; 15, Purushottama Yoga; 18, Sannyása Yoga. In fact, every phase of devotion is described as a form of Yoga. The Tantras have a great number of others, and many variations of those named above, but they need not be noticed here.

The definition of the text suggests immediately the question, what are the functions that have to be suppressed ? These must first be known before they can be overcome. The author, therefore, proceeds to describe them. They are said to be fivefold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. These, directly or indirectly, comprise all the functions to which the thinking principle can possibly be directed. The means of suppressing these functions are next described. They include, (a) exercise, or "effort constantly made to keep the thinking principle in its functionless state," (XIII,) and (b), dispassion, or "the consciousness of being their subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects," (xv). The details of these are reserved for consideration in the next chapter.

The exercises and dispassion result in Yoga, of which there are two kinds, a conscious and an unconscious one. The former is that which is attended by argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism or self-consciousness: the latter is devoid of such attendants. As long as the thinking principle argues what is good and what is bad; as long as there is deliberation as to the nature of the object of thought: as long as a person engaged in meditation feels a sense of joy; or as long as he retains a sense of his own individuality, (self-consciousness), he is said to be in a conscious state of meditation. This is, in the technical language of the school, Savijasamádhi or "seeded meditation," because there is in it some nucleus on which the mind is centered. When, by arduous and long continued exercise, this seed is lost, and the mind remains divested of all thought, a mere state of consciousness without an object, it becomes seedless, nirvija, or perfect, and this is the summum bonum which the Yogí exerts to attain. When this is attained, the bondage of the world, of transmigration, is entirely severed, and the soul is declared to be *isolated* or free.

The expedients aforesaid are always and imperatively necessary—nothing can be attained without them; but their action can be expedited by another means, and that is "Devotion to God." This devotion is absolute resignation of one's self to the Divinity. In the language of the commentator, "it is thorough worship of God. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to him, the preëminent guide." This devotion is the means by which the theism of the current Hinduism is reconciled with the philosophy of the school. Kapila did not care for this reconciliation, and his system, therefore, did not stand in need of a Divine Providence; but his atheism being repulsive to the thinking portion of mankind, Patanjali avails himself of it to give a theistic character to his system. It will be noticed, however, that he makes his Divinity one of several means to an end, and not the end sought. The God he invokes is defined to be "a particular soul which is untouched by affliction, works, deserts, and desires," one who is existent, but not the avowed Creator and preserver of the universe. His name is I's'VARA or "the ruler," and that may imply providence, but nothing is said on this subject. In two successive aphorisms, He is described as one "in whom the seed of the omniscient attains infinity," (xxv,) and "who is the instructor of even all early ones, for, He is not defined by time (XXVI)." The indicator of this Divinity is the syllable OM, called Pranava, and it is by repeating it and reflecting on its meaning that the different states of meditation can be easily attained. The author could have scarcely put God and his name to a more subordinate position.

Turning now to the obstacles which stand in the way of the Yogí in the satisfactory accomplishment of his meditation, the author enumerates what they are, and suggests the means of overcoming them. The obstacles, or causes of distraction, are disease, langour, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability in the stage obtained (A. xxx);

and these are attended by pain, distress, trembling, and oppressive inspiration and expiration (XXXI). These tend to make the thinking principle unsteady, or unfit for meditation, and have, therefore, to be sedulously The means for overcoming them are overcome. various. The habit of concentrating the mind on one particular principle is the most efficacious, (XXXII,) and it is to be supplemented by cheerfulness, benevolence, compassion, complacency, and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue, and vice (XXXIII). It may be effected also by a system of regulation of breath, called Pránáyáma, which is supposed to exert a powerful influence in steadying the thinking principle, and warding off disease and other obstacles (cf. p. 41). Although this regulation of breath is a necessary element in all the earlier or lower forms of the Yoga, one is specially called the Yoga of breathing, and technically called Hatha-yoga, from the letters ha and tha, meaning the sun and the moon, which are the mystic names of inspiration and expiration. This form is particularly esteemed for its efficacy in procuring occult powers. When the habit of meditation has considerably advanced, and the Yogí is able to realize sensuous objects in his meditation, or when the mind is thereby so illumined, it is of itself sufficient to ward off tribulations. Meditation in the passionlessness of accomplished Yogís might also effect this (XXXVII). Reliance on dreams, or on the object of one's fancy, is, likewise, an efficacious remedy.

The author then enters into a more elaborate classification of the Yoga. The twofold division first

XXX

pointed out does not suffice fully to indicate the various shades of difference which the seeded form assumes under different circumstances, and to each of these shades he assigns a different name, and defines its nature. In course of this, he points out the theory of the mind becoming the object it thinks upon (XLI), in other words that intense thought creates objects, or becomes objective. This is the basis on which the occult powers described in a subsequent chapter are founded. The seedless form is one and simple, and it is the *ultimatum* sought by the Yoga.

The second chapter is devoted to the details of the exercises necessary for the performance of the Yoga, and is therefore called *Kriyá-yoga* or "practical Yoga." In its earliest and simplest state practical Yoga is accomplished by a strict observance of asceticism, by the muttering of a mantra a great number of times at stated periods every day, and by devotion to God. The object of these observances is to weaken afflictions and give firmness to meditation. Afflictions arise from attachment to worldly affairs, and asceticism is the best antidote for them, and the practice of repeating a mantra for a long time serves to steady the mind.

The reference to afflictions suggests the question, what are they? They are ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life, or 'the Will to live' as Hartmann designates it. Some of these are subtile, others gross, (III). The former are to be counteracted by acting against their natural bent, (x)and the latter by meditation, (xI). xxxii

PREFACE.

The afflictions are described to be the root of all evil. They give rise to works, and works leave behind their stock of residua to be worked out in a subsequent birth, and in that subsequent birth other works are performed, and they leave their residua, and so on, the chain is never brought to an end. For instance, ignorance leads to the commission of a sin; the retribution for that sin comes in the next existence: while that desert is being borne in that existence another sin is committed through ignorance; that necessitates another birth for its retribution, and the series never breaks. And what is true of ignorance is equally so of the other afflictions. Nor does the rule apply only to sins; it applies equally to virtuous deeds. For instance, if instead of a sin a virtuous work be performed, its deserts have to be enjoyed in another existence, and the course proceeds exactly as in the case of sin. In fact, every work, whether right or wrong, has its apportioned desert, and it must be borne in a corporeal existence, and the succession of birth, decay, and death must, in the ordinary course of things, recur over and over again without a limit. The fruits may be joy or suffering according as the cause is virtue or vice, but to the discriminating they are invariably painful, (xv). They are, also inevitable, and must be borne. An act once performed must bear its fruit, and in so far there is no remedy. One may, however, avoid doing those works which bear fruit, and thereby break the spell, and the maxim is therefore laid down that only those pains are avoidable which are not yet come, (XVI).

The question then arises, what should one do to abstain from works, and avoid their consequences ? and the object of the Yoga is to devise the means through which the abstinence may be effected.

In order to explain the rationale of the course by which the evil is to be brought to an end, the author next enters into an explanation of the mutual relation of Intellect and Soul. Intellect is called a spectacle, and it is said "to be of the nature of illumination. action, and rule: it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is for the purpose of experience and emancipation," (XVIII). It exists solely for the purpose of Soul, (XXI). Soul is called the spectator; "it is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas," (xx). When these two are in conjunction through ignorance (and it is ignorance which brings them into conjunction) they produce life and its consequences, (XVII,) or as the text puts it "the apprehension of the nature of the contact, power, and the lordship of power," (XXII) i. e., Soul thinks it is the experiencer and Intellect thinks it is the experiencer. Now, when the light of knowledge dispels the false impression the conjunction is dissolved. Intellect ceases to think that it is the experiencer, and Soul gives up the idea of its experience, and the ignorance is removed. In other words, the conjunction being removed Soul is isolated, and there is a period put to further birth and suffering. Now, ignorance being the sole cause of the conjunction, the great object is to remove that ignorance, and

xxxiv

this is to be effected by discriminative knowledge, or that which will rightly appreciate the true character of the relation which exists between Soul and Intellect. This knowledge then is what is to be sought, and the means are now provided by which it may be attained.

The knowledge in question passes through seven stages before it becomes perfect (XXVII). The first stage is that in which a person feels that "the knowable has been known by me." (2) He next feels that "there is nothing remaining to be known." (3) The conviction then arises that "my afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome." (4) This is followed by the belief that "discriminative knowledge has been attained by me." These four suffice to effect what is technically called "liberation from work," (Kárya-vimukti), for when these have been acquired there is no more impulse or wish left to perform works. These are followed, in course of progress, by three more successive convictions. These are,-1st "my intellect has accomplished its purpose;" 2nd, "the three qualities have finished their dominion over me, and can no longer affect me;" 3rd, "my meditation has been identified with my soul," that is the Intellect has merged into the Soul. These three are called "intellectual liberation" (Chitta-vimukti). The last is called isolation (Kaivalya), on the attainment of which the Soul is believed to be perfectly liberated.

In order to bring on this consummation the Yogí should apply himself to improve his understanding so

as to make it completely devoid of impurities. To • effect this improvement eight means are recommended. and these are technically called 1, Restraint; 2, Obligation; 3, Posture; 4, Regulation of birth; 5. Abstraction: 6. Steadfastness: 7. Contemplation: and, 8, Meditation (XXIX). Of these the first includes five negative acts, viz., abstention from (1) slaughter, (2) falsehood, (3) theft, (4) incontinence, and (5) avarice; and the second five positive acts, namely, (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) penance, (4) study, and (5) devotion to the Lord. These two classes of acts are called mahávratas, or acts of primary asceticism. They are obligatory on all classes of the community, whether householders or ascetics, and none should neglect them. Slaughter is in se sinful, and none should commit it, whether he be a householder or a hermit. Falsehood and theft are sins of the same gravity, and should therefore be shunned Incontinence &c., are likewise reprehensible, by all. and none should be guilty of them. Nor can a virtuous and peaceful life be secured simply by these restraints; it is necessary that one should keep himself free from filth, both material and moral; that he should be contented with his lot and not rapine: that he should submit to penance for his sins and for curbing his passions; that he should study the Vedas, and be devoted to the service of God. No one can be a good citizen who does not practice these restraints and obligations, and therefore they are recommended to all classes of the community. And if they are good and necessary for ordinary

people, they must *ipso facto* be so for the Yogí, who aspires to rise above the common herd. Nay, to him they are most imperative, for none can prepare himself for the Yoga who does not especially attend to them, as the first step in his career. The advantages of observing these restraints and obligations are described at some length; but they call for no remark here.

Restraint and obligation being thus common to both householders and Yogís the third of the eight means becomes the first special act of exercise to which a Yogi has to apply himself; this is the assumption of particular postures, which are conducive to the fixation of the thinking principle to any object to which it may be directed. No one can settle himself down for meditation while walking, or running, or doing something unconnected with his main object, and some particular postures are, therefore, deemed essential. The text contents itself by saying that it should be firm and pleasant (XLVI), and entail the least effort (XLVII); but it does not describe any particular posture as the most beneficial. Commentators, however, have supplied the omission, and described a great number of them, some of them most painful and difficult of assumption, (cf. pp. 102f.).

When the Yogí has assumed one of the prescribed postures, he should begin the fourth exercise, the regulation of his breath. This consists in drawing the breath through one nostril; retaining the air for some time in the chest; and then throwing it out

xxxvi

through another nostril. The details of this process will be found on pp. 42f.

This process of breathing should be followed by the fifth exercise, the abstraction of the organs from their ordinary natural functions. As long as they are engaged in their own works, they do not allow the thinking principle to settle down for the act of meditation, and consequently prove obstructive. To overcome them, or to draw them away from works, is an essential preliminary. When they are abstracted, they merge into their primary cause, the thinking principle, and cease to disturb it.

All these five acts of Restraint, Obligation, Posture, Regulation of breath, and Abstraction are accessories or necessary adjuncts to Yoga, for without them no Yoga can be performed; but they form no essential part of the Yoga itself. Even all the five existing together would not constitute Yoga, though without them as preliminaries no Yoga can be effectual. These are, therefore, called "practical Yoga," or "accessories to the Yoga," but not Yoga. The last three, on the other hand, are essential constituents of the Yoga, and are therefore called "intimates" or antarangas. These three include Steadfastness (Dháraná). Contemplation (Dhyána), and Meditation (Samádhi); and the third chapter opens with a description of "Steadfastness is the confinement of the these. thinking principle to one place," (L). As an exercise, it is of little moment to what object the thinking principle is applied: so long the thinking principle remains unswervingly attached to it, without for a

PREFACE.

moment thinking of anything else, it is Steadfast-When the understanding is brought to bear ness. upon this fixation and the two act in unison the result is Contemplation (II), i. e., when the thinking principle thinks intelligently and steadfastly on an object it is Contemplation. Again when this contemplation is so intense that it loses all idea of its own identity, and enlightens solely one object, it is Meditation or Samádhi. The definition given points to something much more intense than what the English word meditation ordinarily conveys; it implies a state of extacy or cataleptic trance when both the body and the mind are dead to all external impressions, and the thinking principle is completely drowned in the special object of its thought, or in itself, but as the degree of intensity is not fixed and is admitted to vary considerably under different circumstances, I have used the word meditation as the most convenient and conveying the nearest idea of the mental act indicated by the Sanskrit term. When these three follow successively or are united, they have the common name of Sañyama. How this union is to be effected, or how this Sañyama is to be performed. is nowhere described at length; but it may be directed to diverse objects, internal and external, and, when duly and thoroughly performed, results in the most extraordinary occult powers.

A subject is the correlative of the three qualities of tranquillity, enlivening and latency, and as each quality becomes ascendant the subject varies; and these variations may be produced by the power of Sañyama, apart from ordinary mundane causes. Hence the efficacy of the Sañyama in producing occult powers. Sañyama, however, should not be applied indiscriminately to all purposes. The proper rule is to follow the stages of perfection successively attained by a Yogí, *i. e.*, it should not be applied to a subtile object, until it has been practised and perfected with regard to gross objects. In other words, it should be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of a Yogí is divided. Unless this is done no fruition follows (v1).

The occult powers, called Siddhis, derivable by the practice of the Sañyama are the most astounding possible. By it one may know the past and the future, the circumstances connected with his former existences, as well as the day and hour of his death. He may know what is in the mind of another person, or the meaning of the cries of animals. He may make himself or others invisible to bystanders, contract friendship with whomsoever he likes, or attain other superhuman powers. He may acquire a knowledge of things that are ordinarily too subtile, or too remote, for human observation, or so intercepted as not to be visible. He can observe the details of regions situated far away from the earth; of the stars and planets, their dispositions and their motions. He can have occular knowledge of spiritual phenomena. He may know what is going on inside his body; subdue his hunger and thirst; or make his body so firm as none can shake it. It is possible for him, too, to make departed spirits visible, and to converse with them.

PREFACE.

He can attain superhuman intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction. He may project his own soul into another's body, and then bring it back into his own. He can travel with the quickness of the mind through air or through water, and go wheresoever he lists.

When most of these powers have been attained and a Yogí is in a forward state for absolute perfection, the gods envy his success, and try to divert him from his onward course. They place temptations in his way in the forms of handsome women, great wealth, and other worldly objects of value, and thereby lead him astray (LI). In this they play the part of Mara in the Buddhist legends, and of Satan in the Bible. Great care and determination are necessary to rise above such temptations. According to the Tantras when temptations fail, resort is had to frightful forms, tigers, lions, serpents, ogres and the like, which threaten instant destruction to the Yogí. But if they are met by firm resolve, they are always ultimately overcome.

Great as are these and such like powers, of which a great many are described in the text, they are not the objects which a Yogí should seek. They are the results of his meditations, and they indicate the success he is gradually attaining, and the progress he is making towards his goal; but they are not that goal. The highest power is, even like the lowest, a part of the "seeded" or discriminative meditation. These powers are, nevertheless, of value, as they enhance the power of the understanding, and in their perfection result in the all-saving knowledge, tárakjnána,

xl

PREFACE.

which makes manifest the relation between the thinking principle and Soul, and brings on the "seedless meditation." They are thus of use in consummating the isolation of Soul—the *summum bonum* which the Yoga promises to its votaries.

The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of such metaphysical topics as bear on the nature and character of Isolation. It opens by saying that special faculties may result from five different causes, (1). Some of them are described to be due to birth: such as the power of flying, or living in water, or with suspended animation for protracted periods. These are specific peculiarities of particular genera of animals which may be acquired by being born in such genera, and are not common to all living beings. Others are due to herbs, such as the effect of drugs in arresting sleep, hunger, or the like, or making the flesh proof against heat, or poison, or cold. Others, again, are due to certain incantations or mantras which are universally believed by the Hindus to have very extraordinary powers. Austerity or asceticism in the same way is credited with the power of enabling people to acquire special faculties. Of course, the tangible faculties in this case are not faculties strictly so called, but the effect of habit. And lastly, Samádhi is believed to produce the same results, and these are what have been described in the preceding chapter. The first four causes do not concern the author, and, therefore, no further notice is taken of them. The last is intimately connected with the question at issue, and great pains are taken to meet such objections as might be started against the theory of Samádhi being the cause of special faculties. The objections are assumed to proceed from opponents, and the Sútras supply the replies. In the second and the third aphorisms, an opponent is made to deny causality to Samádhi, inasmuch as it has no influence on the body, and bodily changes are known to have been produced in this life. The explanation given is that the materials of the body undergo change of their own accord, and merit resulting from Samádhi subserves only to remove all obstructions from their way. This is illustrated by the example of the husbandman, who removes the inequalities on the surface of a field in order to lead water to where it is wanted, and the water then flows of its own accord, or in obedience to the laws of gravitation. This satisfies the opponent, who thereupon, shifts his ground, and, admitting the possibility of the materials changing by themselves, raises the question as to how thinking principles, which are immaterial, can be so produced. Yogis pretend that they can, each of them, animate a number of bodies at the same time, and it is necessary that, for such a purpose, each body should have a separate thinking principle, and the questions raised are how is it provided? and how is the unity of the creating one preserved? The theory of spontaneous change in materials cannot explain this, and the reply given is that such thinking principles are emanations or scintillations from the creating one, and are therefore subordinate to it, acting in accord with the will of the creator, even as the different organs of the

body act in accordance with the will of the mind, (III-v).

The possibility of Samádhi producing occult powers being thus settled, the question next comes as to the nature of those powers—are they of the same character as those produced by other causes? or are they different? The reply is that they are different, (vI). The faculties produced by the other causes are intimately connected with former births; the residua of former births are the active principles which animate them; whereas the faculties produced by Samádhi have no such background. They are spontaneous, and do not produce those after-consequences which the others do.

This leads to the classification of works leading to residua into four groups. Some are described to be white or meritorious; some are black or vicious; some are partly black and partly white; while others are neither black nor white. The first three groups belong to ordinary life, and leave behind residua; the last pertains to Yogís, and are not calculated to leave any remnant behind, (VII).

The after-consequences of ordinary works are two-fold, instinct, and kind, age and experience. The theory is that every work, every sensation, every form of experience leaves on the thinking principle an impress of its own, and such impressions, accumulating in course of a lifetime, become the stock of residua which, though for the time being latent, are susceptible of revival by proper stimulants in subsequent existences. (cf. p. 26-174). This revival is Instinct, *i.e.*, instead of believing Instinct to be spontaneous, self-evolved, intuitive reason, as European philosophers describe it, (cf. p. 175.) Yogís take it to be the fruit of the remembrance of former experience, revived by particular circumstances. These residua are also the causes of rewards and punishments in subsequent lives, and the rewards and punishments are represented by kind, age and experience : kind implying birth into higher or lower grades according to merit or demerit; age the span of life in such existences, which is prolonged or reduced according to one's deserts; and experience sensations of pleasure or pain. Confining his attention here to Instinct, the author describes that the residua producing Instinct do not revive invariably but according to circumstances, even after breaks caused by dissimilar births, (VIII). Nor do such breaks, produced by dissimilar births, localities, or times lead to any breach in the relation of cause and effect existing between residua and instinctive manifestations, (IX), inasmuch as the result manifests itself invariably at the first favourable moment.

The theory of residua as above propounded is open to the grave objection that it does not provide for the manifestation of instinctive action at the first birth when no residua can be predicated; but the author obviates it by assuming eternity of desires and consequently of the universe. That which is eternal can have no beginning, and consequently there is no room left for a first birth, (x). This involves a *regressus in infinitum*, but, assuming matter and the universe to be eternal, it is not objectionable, or illogical. More-

xliv

over, the necessity of keeping God apart from creation, renders the theory of eternity of the universe unavoidable. Admit God to be the creator, the necessity arises of making Him engage in work and derive its fruit; deny it, the universe must be accepted as self-evolved, and the theory of nothing comes from nothing not allowing of such an assumption, the author is driven to the only alternative left, that of eternity.

The opponent who raised the first objection now turns round and argues that if eternity be predicated of desires, how can they be removed? and if they are not removed the chain of transmigration will ever lengthen and never come to an end, and no redemption is possible, so that the performance of the Yoga for the sake of liberation from the fetters of repeated existence would be futile. To this the author replies by saying that the cause of desire is ignorance of the true nature of things; its effect is the body and its longings and their consequences; its asylum is the thinking principle; and its object is worldly enjoyment, and if these can be made inert or functionless, they would cease to produce their fruits; and if they ceased there would be no root left in re the individual in which they are made functionless to produce new residua, and consequently he would be free, (XI).

But, says the opponent, the thinking principle is ever changing under diverse influences, it cannot be in one existence what it was before, and consequently there is no unity, and therefore the theory of oneness, of omne ens est unum, is lost. This argument is met

by the theory of archetypes. Every category is eternal. all things are eternal, nothing is really created, or absolutely destroyed, and what we call creation or destruction is simply change of attributes, and in the case of the thinking principle it is nothing more. When it changes its present condition, it reverts to its former condition, or asumes a new one, but its unity is never lost, (XII). This is the theory of the moderate nominalists or conceptionalists, with their universalia ad rem, universalia in re, and universalia post rem. Change having been admitted above, the author proceeds to account for it. It is produced by the three qualities acting either on the subject, or on the object, or on both, (XIII). The action, however, is not simultaneous, only one of the qualities is predominant at a time, and therefore there is no diversity in the two, This leads to the question are sensibles the (XIV). causes of sensation? or sensations the causes of sensibles? The first idea is in accord with every-day experience. Sensation usually takes place when there is a sensible present to produce it. The relation of the two as cause and effect is, however, not constant, and under different circumstances the same sensible produces simultaneously very different sensations, and the simultaneous production of different effects by one cause is illogical and impossible. The commentator illustrates this by appealing to the different effects produced by a single handsome woman on amorous males, her rivals, and ascetics. He might have gone further, and adverted to representative sensations as distinct from presentative

In fact, as Professor Müller, in his 'Elements ones. of Physiology' (Baly's Translation, p. 1059), has observed, "external agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves." Sensations, too, remain on the sensorium after the sensibles producing them have been removed. Nor can sensation be the cause of sensible, or, in the language of the commentator, "if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle, then there would be nothing besides, when that thinking principle would be occupied with one particular thing." It cannot be said that the ideal presentation of things would be created and maintained by other thinking principles while one thinking principle is occupied with a particular thing, for in that case many diverse causes would be made to produce one effect. Applied to the world the inference would be that one world is the effect of many diverse causes, and, that not being possible, the alternative would be that the The solution afforded is that world is causeless. there is no relation of cause and effect between the two; they are eternal and move in different paths (xv); and their action upon each other is regulated by the triad of qualities, one or other of which predominates for the time and produce its effects. Patanjali is exceedingly brief and enigmatical, but his object is the refutation of the theory of ideal presentation as opposed to real substantiality of matter, *i. e.*, of the Vivartaváda doctrine of the Vedánta.

The preception above produced is still incomplete.

The thinking principle may undergo modification and assume the shape of the object presented to it, but it cannot, being unconscious, intelligently perceive what it sees, (XVII). The intelligent principle has still to be infused into it, and this is done by Soul. The reflection of the Soul acting on it makes it perceive directly what is presented to it. It is accordingly said that a thing is known or unknown according as there is a reflection of the Soul, or the absence of it, in the thinking principle, (XVI).

An objection is now raised to the effect that under the circumstances above stated, there being no stability in the thinking principle, knowledge derived by perception could not be constant. The reply given is that since the real perceiver, the Soul, is immutable, knowledge which depends on it must necessarily be constant. Inasmuch, however, as the thinking principle can undergo only one modification at a time, and the Soul perceives only that modification, and not the outside world, there can be only one perception at a time: two diverse ideas cannot arise simultaneously, (XIX).

The objector is still unsatisfied. To obviate the necessity of calling in the agency of Soul, he suggests a multiplicity of thinking principles, saying let one perception or thinking principle be perceived by another. This, however, says the author, cannot be, for the second perception would require a third, and so on, and that would lead to a *regressus in infinitum*. There would, moreover, be no certainty, for in calling one idea to mind a host would arise, and there would

xIviii

Digitized by Google

be nothing to show which is the particular idea that has been invoked, or is necessary to the elucidation of the perception at hand.

There is yet another objection to urge. Accepting that perception cannot be helped by one cognition cognizing another, the opponent suggests that in life persons always express the opinion of their knowing things, and how can this take place unless the thinking principle possessed self-illuminative powers? This is met by saying that the thinking principle, assuming the form of the immutable soul, attains the light of intelligence, and is then able to understand its own cognitions, (XXI); and the conclusion arrived at is that when the thinking principle is modified on the one hand by soul and on the other by objects of cognition, it is sufficient for all purposes of understanding, (XXII). The commentator here anticipates a number of other objections, and disposes of them according to the theory of the Yoga. (Cf. p. 197).

These explanations, however, are not enough. There is yet a lingering suspicion that the thinking principle has a will of its own, and this suspicion is developed in the form of a question as to what motive the thinking principle can have in engaging itself in its various functions? Naturally inert, it can have no object of its own, and in performing its functions it must be acting without a motive, and as nothing is done without a motive, the inference would be that it has a will of its own, and it gratifies that will by acting as it does. This suspicion is set at rest by the remark that since it acts in conjunction with others,

PREFACE.

its object must be to subserve another's purpose, and that another is soul, (XXIII). The commentator explains that such conjunct action for another's purpose without any consciousness on the part of the actors is possible, as we see it in the organs of sense, which act for the purposes of the mind without knowing that they are doing so. The Sánkhya-káriká adduces the example of milk, an unintelligent substance, secreting for the nourishment of the calf. (*Cf.* **v.**'s LVII to LX). The example of the cart carrying saffron for the use of man is also generally appealed to.

Soul is described as the witness, spectator and experiencer of the actions of nature. Conscious and always present in the body, it cannot but witness what takes place in it. This is the idea which Fichte assigns to mind, when he says, it is, "as it were an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there," (Morell, II, p. 95). But since soul has no action or desire of any kind, and as it is, moreover, eternal and immutable, how can it be said to have a purpose of its own, which the thinking principle has to subserve? This is a crucial question, and the answer given is practically an evasion. The premises are admitted, but it is said that, inasmuch as it is a shadow of the soul that sensitizes the thinking principle, and that shadow feels and observes, by indiscriminate use of language we call the soul to be the experiencer and witness, (cf. p. 194). The service done is, in the same way, service done to the shadow

Digitized by Google

and not to the reality, and the benefit derived goes to nature or Prakriti, which is entertained and ultimately relieved of all sense of pain, and not to soul, which is painless and ever free.

Patanjali now turns to the effect of the theory and practice propounded. When a person has duly gone through the course of practice enjoined and acquired the knowledge promised, all false notions that he before had on the subject of life subside, (XXIV), and his thinking principle is bowed down by the weight of knowledge and commencing isolation, (xxv). Worldly thoughts, however, still break out occasionally, (XXVI), and these should be carefully repressed in the same way in which afflictions and obstructions were originally overcome, (cf. II, XXVIII). When this repression is effected, perfect knowledge rises in the thinking principle, and entirely sweeps away all remnants of afflictions and residua of former works. (XXVIII-XXX). All obscurations are removed; the triad of qualities in regard to the individual concerned ceases from undergoing further change, (XXXI); and the moment at last arrives when the qualities, having retired to rest, become defunct, and the soul abides solely in its own essence. This is isolation or salvation which is the aim and object of the Yoga doctrine, This isolation is absolute and eternal, and (XXXIII). the soul in regard to which it has been attained remains free for evermore.

Following the order of the text, the above summary does not afford a consecutive statement of the leading points of the Yoga system of theology and metaphysics, and inasmuch as the dissertations on the Yoga now available in the English language are brief, obscure, and not unoften misleading and incorrect, it would not be amiss to attempt here a categorical resume. The cardinal dogmas are, as already above stated, taken from the Sánkhya system, but there are differences, and the importance attached to some of them, in their mutual coöporation is markedly distinctive. The leading tenets of the Yogís are:

1st. That there is a Supreme Godhead who is purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om, and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation; but He does not directly grant it. Nor is He the father, creator, or protector of the universe, with which He is absolutely unconnected.

2nd. That there are countless individual souls which animate living beings, and are eternal. They are pure and immutable; but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable embodied forms in course of ever recurring metempsychoses.

3rd. That the universe is uncreate and eternal. It undergoes phenomenal changes, but, as a noumenon, it is always the same. In its noumenal state it is called *Prakriti* or nature; it is always associated with the three qualities or active forces called goodness, foulness, and darkness. Matter as an integral part of PREFACE.

the universe is, likewise, eternal, though subject to modifications like the world. Strictly speaking the modifications of matter produce the phenomenal world which is composed of it.

4th That next to soul there is a noumenon called Chitta, or the thinking principle, or mind in its most comprehensive sense. It is subject to the three qualities aforesaid, and undergoes various modifications according to the prevalence of one or other of those qualities. It is essentially unconscious or unintelligent, but it becomes conscious or intelligent by the reflection of, or association with, soul, which abides close by it. It also receives through the organs of sense shadows of external objects, and thereupon modifies itself into the shapes of those objects. The consciousness reflected on it makes it think that it is the experiencer of all worldly joys and sorrows. In reality, however, it is merely the spectacle of which soul is by proxy (its shadow) the spectator. It is closely allied to Buddhi or intellect of the Sánkhya system, but it plays a much more important part in the system, than what Buddhi does, partaking as it does the parts of both Prakriti and Buddhi in a prominent degree, and also of self-consciousness. It occupies the position of Will of the modern Pessimist system.

5th. That the functions of the thinking principle are five-fold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory, and that these functions are produced by the prevalence of one or other of the three qualities.

6th. That, like the universe, all sensible objects

have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When one object changes into another, it is merely a modification of its form, and the form assumed, when destroyed, passes on to some other form, but it ultimately reverts to its noumenal or primary state.

7th. That phenomena, as results of modifications of noumena, are real and not phantasmal.

8th. That sensibles are not the direct causes of sensations, nor sensations the causes of sensibles; but that the thinking principle receives impressions of sensibles under the influence of one or other of the three qualities, and the result is regulated by that influence. The influence extends both to sensations and to sensibles.

9th. That the thinking principle being changeable, constancy of knowledge is due to the immutability of the soul, and that no perception can take place until the thinking principle is made conscious by the soul.

10th. That impressions produced on the thinking principle leave on it certain residua ($a_{Va\mu\nu\eta\sigma\iotas}$ of Aristotle) which are causes of intuitions, desires, new births, and further experiences.

11th. That desires are the origin of pain in this world.

12th. That the universe being eternal, desires are likewise eternal, and it is needless therefore to enquire when residua first arose to create desires.

13th. That mundane existence is thus associated with pain, and it is the duty of every one to rise above that pain.

liv

14th. That the pain may be finally overcome or removed only by withdrawing the thinking principle from its natural functions.

15th. That the withdrawal in question can be effected by constant and sedulous observance of certain prescribed restraints, obligations and steadfast meditation.

16th. That in the course of the exercises above referred to, the adept attains extraordinary occult powers.

17th. That when that withdrawal is complete and absolute, the soul is completely isolated from the world, and that when that isolation is attained, it is liberated from all liability to future transmigration. And this is the isolation, liberation, emancipation, or final beatitude which should be the great object and aim of human existence.

The general impression regarding the nature of the Yoga doctrine, has been hitherto exceedingly unfavourable among Anglo-oriental scholars. It is mystical, it is fanatical, it is dreadfully absurd, are among the mildest charges brought against it. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall is so disgusted with its tenets that in a fit of virtuous indignation he says, "As few of the twenty-eight Yoga works which have fallen under my inspection are at present read, so, one may hope, few will ever again be read, either in this country or by curious enquirers in Europe. If we exclude the immundities of the *Tantras* and of the *Káma-s'ástra*, Hindu thought was never more unworthily engaged than in digesting into an economy the fanatical vagaries of theocracy. Not less, it is observable, have the Yogins of India transcended than they have anticipated the quietistic delirations of Bonaventura, de Sales, Saint Theresa, and Molinos," (Contributions, p. XI). Other writers, if not equally denunciative, are still very severe in the tone of their criticisms. I believe this is due principally to the subject not having been carefully studied. The subject is dry-exceedingly so-and the enigmatical form in which it is presented in the text-books is not conducive to any interest being created in its favour. Generally speaking Indian scholars do not study it, and the few ascetics and hermits who do seldom associate with the world. Pandits, when called upon to explain, frequently, if not invariably, mix up the tenets of Patanjali's Yoga with those of the Tantras, the Purápas, the Tantric Sañhitás, the Pancharátras, and the Bhagavadgítá-works which have very dissimilar and discordant tenets to inculcate. Some of the later avowedly Yoga works are, moreover, exceedingly allegorical and mystical in their descriptions, and in them the purport of the instruction is buried in a mass of absurdity. Practices, too, have been inculcated in them which are certainly repulsive. (Cf. pp. 103, 117). In judging, however, of the nature of Patanjali's doctrine it is unfair to associate it with the vagaries of fanatical, deluded mendicants, or with the modifications and adaptations which it has undergone in the hands of the Tántrics and the Puránics.

The tenets of Patanjali are all that concern the

critic, and the summary of them given above will show to the unbiassed enquirer that they are closely similar to those enunciated by some of the greatest metaphysicians of ancient Greece. The similitude is in some cases so close that I would not be surprised to see some enterprising dialectician, intent upon proving everything good in India to be of European origin, demonstrate that the whole system has been nefariously copied from Greek philosophers. The tenets may not be the best of their kind-some of them are unquestionably futile,-but they are certainly, not such philosophic desperadoes as to commit outrages on the chastity of our thoughts, or so vile as to make us join in the hope so fervently expressed by Mr. Hall that the works which treat of them may not again be read by the curious enquirer. If the history of the human mind be a fit subject for study, if it be desirable to compare the progress of metaphysical knowledge among different nationalities at different times in different places, if the civilization of the Hindus be an object of enquiry, we should rather earnestly desire that the works should be thoroughly examined, and not neglected. and that without in any way pledging ourselves as There is no reason to doubt that their defenders. such enquiry will not only be useful to history, but reflect credit on the grasp of the intellect of the ancient Indian sages who matured the doctrine.

It would take more space than what I have at my disposal to go through all the tenets seriatim, and show their relation to European theories, but it may be generally observed that even the most faulty dogmas do not, on sufficient examination, appear to be so bad as they are represented to be by hasty and adverse critics. The theory of isolation is certainly very startling, but it was the logical outcome of the conception of the absolute perfection of the Godhead reacting on the Upanishad doctrine of resolution into the Divine essence.* The Bhagavadgítá thus sums up the Upanishad idea :

'He who all paths stops up, and in the heart

'Confines the mind, shuts up the breath within

'The head, adopts a firm devotion, utters

'The single syllable "Om"-the Soul Supreme,

'And thinks of me, and goes, abandoning

'The body thus, reaches the goal supreme.'

(Telang's Translation, p. 52.)

This idea, however, involves the necessity of additions to, and abstractions from, Divine perfection. The theory is that the human soul is specifically distinct from, though generically the same with, the Divine one, and as the two dissimilars cannot melt into one, they must always remain separate, and as joy, felicity, bliss and the like imply activity and enjoyment,—a concrete heaven inconsistent with the theory of final rest,—the Yogís obviate all philosophic and logical difficulties by contenting themselves with isolation, without predicating it with joy or bliss.

The threefold division of the intellectual man into purusha, chitta and ahankára is the counterpart of vors, ψ_{NXY} and $\sigma_{O\mu\alpha}$ of Plato and other ancient

• Dr. Weber probably refers to this Upanishad theory, and not to the Puránas as stated on page 208.

lviii

European authors. (Plato, Timæus, Aristotle, Politics.)

The theory of Prakriti, a noumenal absolute of the phenomenal wor.d, or nature in the abstract, has been a stumbling-block to many Europeans, and the allegorical way in which it is frequently described, is certainly often misleading. Even among Hindus it has given rise to many frivolous and absurd stories. In the main, however, it seems to accord very closely with some of the latest European speculations on the subject. It is no other than the ϕ_{vorts} or plastic nature of Cudworth, which has been designed to avoid fortuitousness on the one hand and God's constant interposition on the other. Morell, in his 'History of modern Philosophy' (I, p. 208) commenting on one of the latest German systems, that of Herbarts, says :

'The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following :---When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we immediately perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not pourtray to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly. we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the reality, therefore, is not the thing as.

PREFACE.

a whole, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus, the further we analyze, the further does the idea of *reality* recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation.'

Dr. Kay, in his remarks on this passage, observes-

'This "essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation"-this which the European analyst arrives at as "the last result of the analysis"-is what the Sankhya expositor, proceeding, "more Indico," synthetically, lays down as his first position. This is Kapila's mulaprakriti-the "root of all"-" the radical producer"-that which, variously modified, constitutes all that the 'soul' takes cognizance of. This primordial essence-among the synonymes for which, given in our text-book, are the 'undiscrete' avyakta, the 'indestructible' akshara, that 'in which all generated effect is comprehended' pradhánaka, &c., is the 'absolute' of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Shelling's views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147, Vol. II) is 'not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in the mind." So, according to Kapila, "From Nature issues Mind, and thence self-consciousness."' (Benares Magazine, Vol. III, pp. 284f.)

This Prakriti is believed to be unintelligent, and yet it is described to be acting for another's purpose, and this has often been stigmatized as a specimen of Indian absurdity. This theory, however, is exactly what Cudworth entertains in regard to his plastic nature, which, he says 'doth never consult nor deliberate;' 'it goes on in one constant unrepeating tenor from generation to generation; it acts artificially and for sake of ends, but itself understands PREFACE.

not the ends which it acts for.' 'It acts neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor blindly, but must be concluded to act FATALLY, magically, and sympathetically.' ('True Intellectual System of the Universe,' B. I., Cap. III, 37.)

Again, Prakriti and necessarily matter are eternal, says the Yogi, and in the sense in which he predicates eternity, i. e., to noumena as distinct from phenomena, we have nothing more preposterous than the "eternal verities" of the European philosophers of even our own times—verities which even the Godhead cannot undo, such as the conception of a triangle invariably including two right angles. To such archetypical eternities few can object from a pure philosophic standpoint, apart from revealed systems of religion.

The two most repellent dogmas of the system are its faith in metempsychosis and its theory about occult powers, and even these have found defenders in quarters where they were least expected; and, carefully considered, they do not seem to be so absurd as one would at first glance suppose.

Extravagant as are the ideas regarding the occult powers, and purely imaginary as, at least, some of them doubtless are, it is worthy of note that belief in such powers was almost universal in the ancient world, and well-authenticated reports are not wanting to show that some of them were attainable. Mental prescience has manifested itself on many occasions. Mesmeric and other electric conditions of the body are now objects of scientific research; and they are well-known

to produce extraordinary phenomena. Many facts have been brought to light which show that physical causes may be, particularly in unsophisticated states of society, easily mistaken for occult powers. Sir David Brewster's theory of the objective projection upon visual organs of a subjectively concieved image may account for a good many occurrences which strike the mind of the masses with wonder, and appear as the result of superhuman agency. Many psychological conditions, which are known to arise and produce startling results, but the true nature of which has not yet been fully and scientifically examined and ascertained, would account for some so-called occult occurrences. But in the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to separate the wheat from the tares-to discriminate between what powers were really attained or attainable by Yogís and what they fancied they would attain by persevering in their practices. Doubtless the pretensions of the European psychics of the day are to a considerable extent false and fraudulent; still there are among them some good men and true, and their researches carried on on catholic, honest and scientific principles will hereafter bear some good fruit, and the time will then come to enquire how far the Yogís had anticipated them. In the meanwhile all that need be said is that the extravagance of some of their pretensions should not make us spurn the Yogís as all knaves and charlatans, and their psychical system wholly false and fatuous. Such a principle of action, however necessary and prudent in shifting the merits of a lawsuit, and even then under certain

lxii

restrictions, would be intolerable in history. If some obviously false, or improbable, or unprovable, statements in any author would justify our rejecting the whole of his testimony there would be no ancient author left whose testimony could be accepted, and I know not how few of our modern authors would escape the condemnation. No Yogí myself, nor anywise interested in the doctrine, all I feel in the cause of truth is, that there should, for the present, be a suspension of judgment, and the materials afforded by the Yogís should be subjected to examination and analysis.

As regards metempsychosis something has already been said, (*ante*, p. xiii.) It is a doctrine which even Plato thought fit to adopt, and much might be said in favour of it which cannot be readily disproved; but I shall content myself here with a quotation.

Perhaps the ablest metaphysician who ever came to India from England was the late Rev. Dr. Kay, principal of the late Bishop's College. His strong Christian convictions did not by any means make him an indulgent critic of adverse faiths, but in commenting on the doctrine of metempsychosis as affording a solution of the question of the origin of evil, he says:

'The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindu theory on the great question of the "origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffering evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—and then there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing; it follows (argue the Hindus) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis; and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other.

'If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp the conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same stand-punkt as the Hindu, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the regressus in infinitum here involves any absurdity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindu. We try to make the Hindu give up the tenet-and we do well :-- but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe-short of the primal mystery of "Being" itself. The Hindu's explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him sobut we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The "origin of evil" has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the goodness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials—rather it furnishes the substance of all the trials—of our faith. This we have to teach but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every Missionary among the Hindus. We quote from the Preface (p. 12) of his 'Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.'

'The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scriptureaccounts of 'sin entering the world, and death by sin;' whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to account for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the *first* evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a creator, by tracing them up to the *first* pair.'" (Benares Magasine, III, pp. 286f.)

Elsewhere the same writer, speaking generally, observes, 'it may somewhat tend to check the mischievous consequences attendant on bluntly regarding any current and influential Hindu doctrine, that happens not to accord with our accustomed notions, as being self-evidently frivolous and effete, if it can be shown that the conceptions involved in the doctrine are still influential in directing the current of speculation in Europe, in quarters where that current runs (or is supposed to run) deepest.' (Opus cit., pp. 283f.)

To turn now to the life of Patanjali. The brief notices to be met with of him in Sanskrit works are so legendary and contradictory that little can be made of them to subserve the cause of history. He was a great scholar and unrivalled philologist of his time, and the life of every great man was, in ancient times, so encrusted with the supernatural that it is difficult to remove the covering, and come to the truthful core. Rev. J. Ward, citing the Rudrayámala Tantra, the Vrihannandikes'vara Purána, and the Padma Purána, describes him to 'have been born in the Ilávrata Varsha, where his father Angirá and his mother Satí resided, and that, immediately on his birth, he made known things past, present, and future. He married Lolupá, whom he found on the north of Sumeru, in the hollow of a "Vata" tree, and is said to have lived as a mendicant to a great age. Being insulted by the inhabitants of Bhota-bhandára, while engaged in religious austerities, he reduced them to ashes by fire from his mouth.' (Hindus, II.)

There occurs in the Sankshepa-s'ankara-jaya of Mádhava A'chárya a story, according to which the Devas, on one occasion, repaired to Mahádeva, and besought his aid in saving the world from the baneful doctrines which Bauddhas and other heretics had widely disseminated among men. The god vouchsafed to them a kind reply, and it was arranged that certain chief divinities would from time to time appear on earth as Jaimini, Vyása, Patanjali, and S'ankara, and, uprooting all heresies, preserve the true religion from pollution. It fell to the lot of Vishnu and S'ankarshana alias Ananta

lxvi

Digitized by Google

to depute a portion of themselves to be born as Patanjali,* and Mahádeva himself appeared as S'ankara.* The only value of this story for historical purposes is the admission that Patanjali appeared on the earth long after it had been overrun by the Buddhists. Mádhava A'chárya of the 14th century is no authority for what happened sixteen hundred years before him, but the tradition in his time was that Patanjali was born long after Buddha in order to inculcate theism, and this supports the opinion expressed on page xxiii to the effect that the Yoga doctrine as we have it in Patanjali's work is of post Buddhist origin. It is in favour, too, of the deductions made by Goldstücker and others regarding the age of Patanjali from casual historical allusions in his great work, the Mahábháshya, entirely undermining, as it does, the arguments of Professor Kunte as given in his 'Vicissitudes of Aryan civilization.' It is true that the Yoga-sútra does not anywhere refer to Buddhism, and it is not easy to accept the theory of Professor Cowell that the relegation of benevolence (maitri), which occupies a prominent place in the Buddhist system, to an ancillary or subordinate position in the Yoga is a direct allusion to Buddhism, (Sarvadars ana-sangraha, p. 273,) for benevolence as an element of religious observance is

- * मध्यमं कांड अम दर्तु मनुद्रातीः मयेव तीः । खवनीयां ग्रतां मूमी सङ्घषेषपतझण्डी ॥ १। ५१। मुनीमूला मुदापाछि योगकाण्ड छती खिती ॥ खन्निमं ज्ञानका छन्नू दरिस्त्रामीति देवताः । १। ५१।
- † यतीन्द्रः शङ्करोनाला भविष्यामि महीतने । सद्दत्रया भवन्तोऽपि मानुभी तनुमाश्रिताः ॥ ४३

common to all systems of religion, and reference to it cannot be taken as an unmistakable test; but apart from them, I believe, I have produced sufficient evidence to show that Patanjali cannot reasonably be believed to have lived before Buddha. Ananta is represented in the form of a many-hooded serpent, and, as an emanation of that serpent, Patanjali is frequently indicated by the homonym *phani* or 'serpent,' (cf. p. 1).

The references given of Pata<u>nj</u>ali in his Mahábháshya entirely upsets the statements made in Mr. Ward's notice. The sage describes himself as the son of one Goniká, not Satí, and his place of birth was the eastern country, whereas Ilávrata is said in the Puránas to lie to the north of the Himálaya. These facts are thus given by Goldstücker in his essay on Pánini:

'Of the lineage of Patanjali all the knowledge I possess is, that the name of his mother was *Goniká*. It occurs in the last words of Patanjali on a Káriká to Pánini. Of more importance, however, is the information he gives us of having resided temporarily in *Káshmár*, for this circumstance throws some light on the interest which certain kings of this country took in the preservation of the great commentary.

'His birthplace must have been situated in the east of India, for he calls himself *Gonardiya*; and this word is given by the Kášiká in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patanjali's birthplace had therefore the name of *Gonarda*. But that he is one of the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence. Kaiyyata calls him on several occasions $\Lambda'cháryadeśiya$. If we interpreted this word according to Pánini's rules V, 3, 67 and 68, it would mean "an unaccomplished teacher;" but as there is not the slightest reason for assuming that Kaiyyata intended any irony or blame when he applied this epithet to Patanjali, it is necessary to

lxviii

2

PBEFACE.

render the word by the teacher "who belongs to the country of the Achárya." Now, since Kaiyyata also distinctly contrasts áchárya as the author of the Várttikas, with Acháryadeśiya, the latter epithet can only imply that Patanjali was a countryman of Kátyá. yana. Kátyáyana, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school; Kaiyyata, therefore, must have looked upon Patanjali also as belonging to it.

'Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhattojí Díkshita on the Phit-sútras which I have quoted above. For when this grammarian tells us that the *eastern* grammarians attribute the accent in question of *saha* to Pánini's rule VI, 3, 78, we find that it is *Patanjali* himself who gives us this information, and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other authorities.' (Goldstücker's *Pánini*, p. 237.)

Meagre as these notes on the life of Patanjali are, they are of unquestionable authority, and we must rest content with them. In the 'Indian Antiquary' (IX, p. 308), Professor Max Müller has a note on the travels of I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim, who visited India at the close of the 7th century, and therein mention is made of a Sanskrit grammatical work under the name of Juni or Chuni. The learned professor shows on very good arguments that the work could be no other than the Mahábháshya, and then very pertinently asks, "Is this (Juni) possibly a name connected with Goniká, the mother of Patanjali, who calls himself Gonikáputra, or with Gonarda, his supposed birthplace, from which he takes the name of Gonardíya?" Few who have studied the subject would hesitate to respond in the affirmative to the first question.

In a note on a Pálí inscription from Bhárhat, published in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for March 1880, I have quoted a

great number of instances to show that in India metronymics were used to indicate illegitimacy, or the forsaking of a child by its father. If this theory of mine be tenable, the use of Gonikáputra in the case of Patanjali would suggest a bar sinister in his scutcheon. Under that supposition it would be futile to enquire about his genealogy. If Napoleon said, 'my genealogy begins with the battle of Austerlitz,' Patanjali might well appeal to his Mahábhashya as the root of his family tree.* Professor Weber, however, has been at some pains to find a genealogical tree for him. In his 'History of Indian Literature' he has several remarks with reference to Patanjali in connection with the Vedic Kápya Patamchala. He says, on page 137, 'Again, though only in the Yájnavalkíya-kánda, we have mention of a Kápya Patamchala of the country of the Madras as particularly distinguished by his exertions in the cause of Bráhmanical theology; and in his name we cannot but see a reference to Kapila and Patanjali, the traditional founders of the Sánkhya, and Yoga systems.' This is modified in a subsequent remark, (p. 223,) in which it is said, 'The name of Patanjali (we should expect Pat.+) is certainly somehow

• Professor Weber refers to a tradition which, he says, 'identifies Pingala with Patanjali, the author of Mahábháshya and the Yoga-sútra,' but he justly adds, it 'should answer for itself; for us there exists no cogent reason for accepting it.' ('Hist. Indian Literature,' p. 231.)

↑ This grammatical correction has been suggested apparently with a view to make Patanjali a derivative of Patamchala to prop the theory of relationship.

lxx

connected with that of the Patamchala Kápya of the land of the Madras, who appears in the Yájnavalkíyakánda of the Satap. Br. It occurs again (see below p. 737) as the name of the author of the Yoga-sútras.' On page 236, we are told that, 'Kapila, again, can hardly be unconnected with the Kápya Patamchala whom we find mentioned in the Yájnavalkya-kánda of the Vrihad A'ranyaka as a zealous representative of the Bráhmanical learning.' This is repeated on page 284,-- 'Kápya Patamchala, with whom Kapila ought probably to be connected.' It is difficult to make out from these extracts a consistent account of what the real or actual theory is. In the first extract a single individual, Kápya Patamchala, is split into two persons, Kapila and Patanjali, and that as certainly as the phrase 'we cannot but see' can imply. In the second extract the Vedic personage is said to be 'certainly' connected with Patanjali only, and in the third we are told that the same individual can 'hardly be unconnected' with Kapila. In the fourth the phrase 'can hardly be unconnected' is replaced by 'ought probably to be connected.' No reason is assigned for the first two conjectures, but for the 3rd and the 4th the reason assigned is that Kápya Patamchala was 'a zealous representative of the Bráhmanical learning.' It happens, however, that Kapila was an atheist, who repudiated the existence of the Godhead, saying 'there is no proof that such a being existed,' and it is difficult to conceive how the relationship should be established on the ground of Kápya having been 'a zealous representative of the Hindu learn-

ing,' unless we admit that Hindu learning consisted It is obvious that the learned professor in atheism. has been led away entirely by phonetic resemblance, unless he should urge, which is not at all likely, that it is an ex cathedra opinion, without any reason to back it. Kápya has the letters k and p and so has Kapila, and Patamchala sounds very like Patanjali, and therefore he evidently concludes they are the same. This is a line of argument, however, which I cannot help thinking, is, to use the language of the learned Professor, 'of a very curious kind.' It reminds me, I must frankly confess, the ratiocination of Fluellen by which that jovial Welsh Captain proved the identity of Macedon and Monmouth. Had that flighty logician been reminded in the present case of the absence in Kápya of the letter l of Kapila, and of j of Patanjali in Patamchala, I can easily conceive how he would have completely dumb-foundered his antagonist with the pithy remark : 'Why, I pray you, is not pig great? the pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations.' I have nothing to show that Patanjali was not connected with Kápya by the father's or the mother's or some other side, in family or race, but I firmly hold that we have at present no proof worth the name in support of the conjecture.

The son of a Bráhman priest, and devoted to literary studies and ascetic practices from early life, Patanjali had little to do which could afford incidents fit for historical record, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that we have no account left of his career. He was

lxxii

doubtless married and probably the father of a family. but we know nothing about those points. The only memorials of his life are his literary works,-his great commentary on the grammar of Pápini and the Yoga-It is impossible to speak in too high terms of sútra. It is the noblest monument of profound the first. erudition, of keen critical acumen, of unrivalled philological perception, which has been left to us by any ancient scholar in any part of the world, and well may the Hindus be proud of the heritage that has been bequeathed to them by their renowned ancestor. The second forms the theme of this essay. There is an A'ryyú-panchásáti on the Vaishnava theory of the relation between soul and nature which is also ascribed The work has been published in the Benares to him. ' Pandit,' No. 50. He wrote also a work on medicine, but it is no longer extant. It would seem that he was, likewise, the author of a treatise on grammatical desiderata under the title of Ishtis, and also certain supplementary notes on the rules of Sanskrit grammar (Vártikas), but these exist now only in the form of quotations in the Mahábhúshya. The manner in which they are cited in the 'great commentary' suggests the idea that at one time they had separate existences, but they are not met with now as a separate work.

To turn now to the Bibliography of the Yoga doctrine. The leading text is, as already stated, the *Yogánus'ásana*, but its different topics have been elaborated and expounded in a great number of subsequent treatises, and its literature is now represented by a large mass of writings. In 1859, Mr. Hall, in his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' collected the names of 28 separate works. But recent researches carried on under the auspices of the Government of India enable me now to put in the Appendix a list including no less than 150 names. It is probable that further researches will bring to light the texts of several other works. It must be admitted. however, that while Mr. Hall's list was compiled by a single individual after himself examining all the Mss. named, thereby obviating all risks of error, mine is a compilation from meagre reports, and it is likely, therefore, that there will be found in it. mistakes of diverse kinds. Sanskrit works have many aliases, and it is possible that in some cases—probably very few-of works unknown to, and unseen by, me I have recorded the same work under two or three I have included, too, a few works which treat names. of varieties of the Yoga, the Tántric and Puránic forms of it, and not confined myself solely to the doctrine of Patanjali. The differences in some cases are so slight, that it was not possible for me, without carefully reading the works, to mark the distinctions. On the whole, however, I believe the new list will be found useful.

In preparing my list I have followed an alphabetical arrangement, a chronological one with anything like accuracy not being practicable in the present state of our information on the subject. If the Yoga-s' ástrasútra-pátha, attributed to Yájnavalkya, be really his, it

lxxiv

ŧ

is the oldest treatise known on the Yoga doctrine. Yájnavalkya lived long before Patanjali, and the Bháshya especially cites his name to prove that the Yoga doctrine was current from a much anterior period than the Yoga-sútra, which was compiled for the benefit of novices; but as I have not yet seen it, I can say nothing on the subject. Adverting to the work, Mr. Hall says, 'It is alleged that they (the aphorisms of Yajnavalkya) were noted down by Baudháyana, as they were orally delivered by S'ukra to Yájnavalkya. Hence they are ascribed to S'ukra, who here has the epithet of Mahákavi. This work possibly deserves a closer examination than I can at present give it : but, it is, I suspect, of comparatively recent origin, and of little worth in any point of view.' (Contributions, p. 18.)

Passing it over for the present I come to the work of Patanjali, the Yoga-sútra alias the Yogánus' ásana or the Sánkhya-pravachana. It has the benefit of a host of commentaries, explaining its tenets from different standpoints. The most ancient of these commentaries is generally believed to be the one which is known under the different names of Yogabháshya, Pátanjala-bháshya, and Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. It is held in high estimation by the Pandits of this country. It has the advantage, too, of two exegeses by eminent scholiasts, one by Váchaspati Mis'ra, and the other by Vijnána Bhikshu. It labours, however, under the disadvantage of being of doubtful authenticity as regards the name of its author. It has been twice printed, once lxxvi

at Benares, edited by Bhairavadatta Dvivedí, and once at Calcutta, along with the gloss of Váchaspati Mis'ra, edited by Pandit Jívánanda Vidyáságara, in 1874 (Samvat 1929.) I have also seen upwards of a dozen Mss. of it of different dates: but in the colophon of none of these have I met with the author's name. This is a remarkable omission, inasmuch as it is rarely that the author's name, where known, is dropped out from the colophon of a Sanskrit MS. The tradition is pretty common and old that Vyása, the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahábhárata, is the author of it. This tradition has been generally accepted by European writers, and it has the support of the two well-known and respectable exegesists named above. Váchaspati Mis'ra in his gloss (tiká) on the commentary (bháshya) says. "Saluting the saint Patanjali, I attempt a short, clear exposition (vyákhyá), pregnant with meaning, on the commentary expounded by Veda-vyása."* The authority, however, of this writer is not, in matters connected with historical facts of olden times, of much There were two writers of this name. weight. One of them was a legist, and, according to the colophon of his S'udráchára-chintámani, court Pandit of Mahárájá Harináráyana, of Mithilá, and Harináráyana lived in the middle of the 16th century. The other lived between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and commented both on the Yoga and the S'ankhya texts, as well as on the Vedánta-sútras. Adverting to him

> * नला पतञ्च खिन्दर्षि वेदयासेन भाषिते। सङ्चिप्तसारवकचा भाषे बाख्या विधास्त्रते॥

Mr. Hall says, 'Váchaspati's exact age has not yet been discovered. But he is mentioned, as are Udayana and Prasastapáda, in the Nyáyasára-vichúra of Bhatta Rághava, which was written in the Saka year 1174 or A. D. 1252; and he quotes from Bhoja, who was reigning in A. D. 1042.'* (Sánkhya-sára, p. 40.)

Vijnána Bhikshu dates from a much later time. According to Mr. Hall, 'in all probability, Vijnána lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. There is some slight ground, however, for carrying him back still further. His nationality is unknown; and so is his civil appellation even; for Vijnána Bhikshu is, without question, the style of a devotee.' (Sánkhya-sára, pp. 37f.)

He continues, 'In the *Prayogaratna*, a work on the sixteen sacraments, by Náráyana Bhatta, son of Rámes'vara Bhatta, its author says, that he was assisted,

* This date is incorrect. It refers to the last Bhoja, whereas the Bhoja quoted must be the elder one, and elsewhere constructively admitted to be so by Mr. Hall himself. In the Preface to his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' he observes, ' that two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever was the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court; and the astrological compilation known as the Rájamártanda, and thus called in honour of him, may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work, so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate he came long after the date of the Sarasvatikanthábharana; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet of Ranarangamalla.' (Contributions, p. viii.)

lxxviii

PREFACE.

in preparing it, by Ananta Díkshita, son of Vis'vanátha Díkshita. The father of one of Vijnána's disciples, Bhává-ganes'a Díkshita, was Bhává-vis'vanátha Díkshita; and, if the latter was one with Vis'vanátha Díkshita, and if Bhává-ganes'a Díkshita was brother of Ananta Díkshita, we are enabled to form a pretty correct estimate as to the time of Vijnána Bhikshu. For Náráyana Bhatta's youngest brother's second son, Raghunátha Bhatta, dates his *Kála-tattva-vivechana* in Samvat 1677 or A. D. 1620: Vijnána may be placed fifty or sixty years earlier.' But whatever the times of Vijnána Bhikshu and Váchaspati Mis'ra, it is futile to expect from such authors any precision as to the identity of a person who lived many centuries before them.

The name Vyása may be right enough, but there is nothing whatever to show that this Vyása was the same with the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahábhárata. In the Mahábhárata every epigraph gives the name of Vyása, and there is no reason why it should be omitted in the commentary. Then Vyása lived at a remote period of antiquity, in the beginning of the Kali Yuga according to Indian belief. and his classification and division of the Vedas existed long before the time of Patanjali, for we have unmistakable proofs of the existence of the classification in Pánini, Yáska, the Prátis'ákhyas, and other works of a much earlier date than that of the Yoga aphorisms, and it is impossible to reconcile the idea that he should be the author of an exegesis which could not have had a raison d'étre before the Yoga-sútra was

composed in the 2nd or 3rd century before the Christian era. That exceesis quotes, too, authorities which are of a more recent date than that of Vyása. The evidence of style is often a suspicious one, but no one who has any knowledge of the Sanskrit language will for a moment think it possible that he who wrote the Mahábhárata could be the author of the Bháshva under notice. Compared with the works of leading scholiasts, the Bháshya appears to be the production of a third class writer. It certainly cannot be compared with the 'great commentary' of Patanjali, or with the equally renowned exegesis of S'ankara on the Vedánta aphorisms, or with the commentary of Sabara Svámí on the Mímáñsá; and, whatever his age, Vyása was by the unanimous testimony of the Hindus a far superior author and scholar to Patanjali, or Sabara, or S'ankara. Fairly good though it be, there is a looseness, an indecision, a want of logical precision, in the Bháshya which are incompatible with the universal estimate of Vyása's learning and scholarship. Bhojadeva treats it with withering sarcasam. Without naming it, but obviously aiming at it, he says, 'all commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number,' (p. 2). It may be that Bhoja had to justify his attempt at a new commentary by throwing discredit on his predecessors, but his remarks are not al-

together unauthorised. The invocation at the beginning of the Bháshya is also against its authenticity. No work of the leading Rishis which has come down to us contains any such invocation, and Vyása would be the last to pray to Mahádeva in the way in which that divinity has been invoked in the Bháshya. The tone of the Bháshya is that of a third class mediæval scholium, and I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that it is not the work of the digester of the Vedas. Tts author may have borne the name of Vyása, a common family name even to this day, but he was not the digester of the Vedas nor older than the latest ancient times, or, more probably, the early middle ages.

The next commentary I have to notice is the Rájamártanda, of which a complete English translation is now offered to the public. It is not so ambitious It styles itself a vritti or gloss, whereas as the last. the other is a Bháshya or commentary. It is mainly explanatory, when the other is discursive. It is modest in tone, when the other is dictatorial. Its author sets forth his object in writing the work by saying, 'Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons,' (p. 2). And he has faithfully carried out his resolution. He has interpreted all the leading words of his text, and given a very fair explanation of the meaning of his author, and the purport and bearing of his doctrine. It is, perhaps, not always quite so full in philosophical matter as its predecessor, but it

lxxx

certainly omits nothing of importance for a correct understanding of the text.

It is generally taken for granted by Indian writers that Bhoja, king of Dhárá, who flourished in the middle of the 11th century, was the author of the exegesis; but the opinion is not tenable. Doubtless the colophon of the exegesis names Maharájádhirája Bhojadeva as its author, but there have been many Bhojas in India, (cf. my 'Indo-Aryans,' II, pp. 385f,) and it does not show which is the sovereign meant: it certainly does not announce that this Bhoja was the hero of the Bhojaprabandha and a sovereign of Dhárá in the century named. The title assigned him in the introduction to the work is Ranarangamalla, and this, as far as we know, was not borne by the Bhoja of the 11th century. The former is, moreover, described in the introduction to have written three works, a grammatical treatise on the government of words, a medical memoir under the title of Rájamrigánka, and the gloss under notice, and none of these is attributed by the Bhojaprabandha to its hero. On the other hand, that hero is known to have written or published in his name a work on judicial astrology as bearing on Smriti rites, under the name of Rájamártanda, and it is impossible to imagine that he assigned the same name to his exegesis on the Yoga aphorisms. Two such dissimilar works could not have been published under one common name. And even if one believed such a nomenclature to be possible or probable, the question would arise, how is it that in the introduction to the Yoga, the astrological work is altogether

left out of record? The astrological work is several times the size of the Yoga exegesis, and otherwise of considerable importance; it has been very largely quoted by subsequent writers, and it is not at all probable that an author, or his encomiast, who was particular in noticing the meagre and poor medical treatise should overlook it. It might be said that it was composed after the composition of, and therefore could not be included in, the Yoga gloss, but that would be a simple assumption without any proof, a mere begging of the question. That the Rájamártanda is not a generic, but a specific, name is evident from the fact of an exegesis on the S'ánkhya bearing the name of Rájávártika, which is believed to have been dedicated to Ranarangamalla. It is probable, therefore, that our author is the Bhoja of the 10th century, who was also a king of Dhárá. Adverting to him, Mr. Hall says, "That two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever were the case with the later, was interested in literature. I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court, and the astrological compilation known as the Rájamártanda and thus called in honour of him may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate, he came long after the date of the Saras vati-kanthabharana; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet, Ranarangamalla.' (Contributions, p. viii.)

Of the other commentaries on the Yoga-Sútra, the works of Bhavadeva, Nágojí Bhaṭṭa, Bhává-gaṇes'a, Udayankara, Nages'a Bhaṭṭa, Náráyaṇa Bhikshu, Sadás'iva, Rámánanda Tírtha, Mahádeva, Ananta, S'ankara, Umápati Tripáṭhí, and Kshemánanda, may be cited as samples. They are all inferior in importance to the work of Bhoja, and call for no special remark here.

The same may be said of the other works named in my list. Some of them treat of the various practices which Yogís resort to to acquire occult powers; while others describe modified forms of the doctrine of Patanjali, suited to Vaishnava, Sáiva, and Sákta forms of worship, so as to lead the individual soul, in its longing for salvation, to subsidiance in, or union with, the Divinity.

Among the works of the first group the most popular and noted is the Hatha-pradipiká or Hatha-It comprises 395 stanzas, divided into 4 dipiká. chapters or lessons, (Upades'a), the first treating of postures, the second of regulation of breath, the third of gesticulation or mudrús, and the fourth of Samádhi. Its author is one Chintámani, son of Sahajánanda, but this name of his was what he got when living as a householder. On his becoming a hermit he took the name of S'vátmáráma, and received the title of Yogíndra, and is now generally known by the name of S'vátmárama Yogíndra. He makes a great mystery of the theme of his work. He says, "By Yogis wishing for perfection, this science should be carefully kept in secret, for it is most efficient when

kept secret, and worthless when disclosed."* Like the alchemists of old, he indicates simple things by roundabout metaphorical names, and enjoins that none but adepts should know anything of his subject. This book is named Hatha vidyá, or the science of the letters ha and tha, ha meaning the sun and tha the moon. This sun again stands for the breath inspired, and the moon for the breath expired, and the ultimate meaning of Hatha vidyá is thus the science of inspiration and expiration. Although by profession and habit a recluse who had thoroughly abandoned the world and its attractions. Svátmáráma, indulges at times in language of a grossly carnal type. Thus in one place he says, "let beef be eaten and the immortal arrack (váruní) be drunk every day. I reckon him who does so, to be a kulína (a noble householder); the rest are destrovers of their nobility." + Here beef gomáñsa stands for the tongue, which should be reverted and made to touch the palate, and váruní means the breath which passes over this reverted tongue. Again: "Let the vouthful chaste widow be ravished on the land between the rivers Ganges and Yamuná; it is the highest glory of Vishnu."[‡] Here the two rivers are the two nostrils, and the widow is the breath which is to be forcibly suppressed for a time. This style of

- * इत्विद्या परं गाेष्या योगिना सिडिसिक्सा। भवेद्वीर्थ्यवनी गुन्ना निर्वीर्थ्या नु प्रकाश्तिना॥
- † गोनांच भचयेक्रिसं पिवेदनरवादणीं। क्रुजीनं तमचं मन्ये इतरे कुछवासकाः ॥
- मे जङ्गायमणयोर्मधोवाखरखासपस्तिनीं । वखात्वारेव ग्टकियागढिष्णेः परमं पर्द॥

allegory and mystery is adopted by a great many mediæval writers on the Yoga. At the beginning of the work, the author has given a list of thirty renowned Yogís who had practised the science in question. At the head of these appear A'dinátha, who is generally identified with S'iva, who is believed to be the first and most renowned of Yogís. The work has been made the subject of comment by several writers, among whom Brahmánanda, the author of the Jyotsná, is reckoned to be the ablest.

It would seem that the Yoga doctrine was, at a very early period, translated to Persia, and disseminated in some form or other among different sects. The Sapásiyáns obtained it in its entirety. They believed on efficacy of discipline and austerity; they assiduously practised the regulation of breath enjoined in the Yoga; they divided the stages of their progress in meditation in the same way as the Yogís did; they held the highest meditation to be a state of trance identically the same as the Samádhi; they claimed occult powers* of the same nature and character as

• 'Of these illustrious personages they have many miraculous and mysterious deeds: such as, in the upper world, hiding the sun'a disk; causing him to appear at night; making the stars visible in the day-time: and in this lower world, walking on the surface of water; making trees productive out of season; restoring verdure to dried up wood; causing trees to bow down their heads; also showing themselves between heaven and earth in the form of lightning; and such like: and, in the animated world metamorphosing animals; rendering themselves invisible to men; appearing under various shapes and forms: some of which wonders have been recorded in the Barmgah-i-durvcshi-khushi. They relate that these great perlxxxvi

PREFACE.

did the Yogis; they were familiar with the idea of the possibility of the soul at will passing from one body into another; they believed in metempsychosis; and, if they looked upon union with the Supreme Divinity as the summum bonum of their faith, they but accepted one of the several forms of the Yoga, different doubtless from the Isolation of Patanjali, but not independent of it. (Cf. Dabistán I, pp. 5f.) It is, however, not known whether the system of Sapásiyáns was founded upon any translation of a Sanskrit Yoga work, or on oral communica-Some of the Sapásiyáns admitted their obligation. tion to Hindustán, but their text-books, the few and imperfect ones that are still accessible, have not yet been sufficiently examined to throw light on the question. The close relationship existing between the two systems, even in the use of technical terms, preclude the idea of spontaneous growth, and the avowed posteriority of the Persian doctrine leaves no doubt of its Indian origin; but as at present advised, we are not in a position to spot the exact text from which it was derived.

Of interpretations of the Yoga system in foreign languages the earliest appears to be an Arabic version of the text of Patanjali. The work is no longer

sonages were to such a degree enabled to divest themselves of corporeal elements that they quitted the body at pleasure; also that they had acquired from the court of heaven the knowledge of all sciences, whether known or occult, and *consequently* had the power of exhibiting such wonderful works; having rendered, by the efficacy of their austerities, elementary matters subject to themselves." (*Troyer and Shea's Dabistán i Muzahib*, II, pp. 107*f*.)

Digitized by Google

extant, but the testimony in favour of its having once existed is unquestionable. Abu Réhán al Niráni, in his Tárikh-ul Hind, which formed a part of his famous Kánún-i-Mas'údi (A. D. 1025-36), says, 'I have translated into Arabic two Indian works, one discusses the origin and quality of things which exist and is entitled Sánkhya, the other is known under the title of Patanjali, which treats of the deliverance of the soul from the trammels of the body. These two works contain the chief principles of the Indian creed.' (Elliot's Historians, I, p. 99; Journal Asiatique, IV serie, tom. IV, p. 121; Reinaud's Fragments Arabs et Persans.) It does not appear that any Persian version of Patanjali was ever taken in hand in the time of Akbar and his successor, when so many Sanskrit works were rendered into that language. There is, however, an abstract of the Yoga doctrine in the Dabistán-i-Muzaháb of Mahsin-i Fáni. That author flourished in the middle of the 17th century. and, during a long residence at Allahabad as the Chief Judge (Sudder), collected a great deal of information on the subject. Depending evidently on oral information, he could not avoid gross mistakes in his account of the philosophy, but in regard to the details of Yoga exercises and the occult powers he has compiled as reliable an exposition as could be expected from such a source. He notices Gorakhanátha and several other celebrated saints, and states that he had seen some Yogis possessed of wonderful occult powers, but he does not name Pataniali. (cf. Shea and Troyer's Translation, II, pp. 123f.)

lxxxviii

PREFACE.

In English the first attempt to give an account of the Yoga doctrine was made by Ward in his account of the Hindus, but it did not produce any satisfactory result. Colebrooke's resume in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, is much more philosophic in spirit and faithful in details, but Colebrooke took it up only casually in connexion with his essay on the S'ankhya, and did not notice much more than the first chapter of the work. Taylor, in the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavadgitá, supplies the Krivá-yoga with considerable fulness, and Windischmann's account, though brief, is tolerably good. In 1853 Dr. Ballantyne published a translation of the first two chapters of the Yoga-sútra with extracts from the commentary of Bhojadeva, and from it abstracts of the Yoga system have been compiled by Dr. K. M. Banerjea, and Rev. Mr. Mullins. The translation of Ballantyne was completed, in a disjointed way, by Pandit Govindaram Sástrí in the pages of a Benares magazine called the "Pandit." The two fragments have lately been printed together by the Theosophical Society of Bombay. The text with an original commentary together with an English translation is now being printed in the Saddarsana-chintaniká of Bombay, and an abstract of the text occurs in Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-sangraha. An account of Yoga practices may also be seen in a pamphlet by Nabinchandra Pál, published at Benares.

Little need be said in praise of Dr. Ballantyne's work. The profound learning and thorough conservancy with Hindu philosophy which that learned

scholar brought to bear on his undertaking, enabled him to produce a very accurate reproduction of the original. In his anxiety, however, to be accurate he had occasion to resort too frequently to parenthetical clauses, and they resulted in confused sentences, involving much trouble in understanding them. His extracts from the commentary are particularly amenable to this objection. The extracts, moreover, are somewhat disjointed.

When the Asiatic Society of Bengal first proposed to publish an edition of the Yoga-sútra with the commentary of Bhojadeva, I undertook to reprint Dr. Ballantyne's translation with such additions as would complete the work. I soon found, however, that my work placed beside his produced a very patchy appearance, and his parenthetical style was not desirable for a proper and easy understanding of the text. I preferred, therefore, to translate the whole in my own way. The aphorisms will be found to be as closely literal as the idiom of the English language would admit of, and the commentary a fair reproduction of the spirit, sense and wording of the original, without being a verbatim reproduction.

Much difficulty has been felt in the treatment of the technical terms. Philosophical terms in the English language have not yet arrived at that fixity and firmness which would preclude possible variations. Different writers assign different values to even wellestablished terms, and their latitude is frequently varying; and such as they are, they are not exact equivalents of Sanskrit words, which in their turn vary

in meaning under different circumstances and in the hands of different writers. There are instances, too, of Sanskrit terms whose literal significations are very different from the philosophical ideas they are intended to convey, and in dealing with them, the translator has either to sacrifice precision of rendering for the sake of intelligibility, or intelligibility for the sake of precision. In the following pages I have borrowed the terms mostly from Colebrooke's translation of the Sánkhya-kariká, translating a few myself, and transliterating the Sanskrit terms in some cases. My reasons I have explained as far as I could in my notes.

When I undertook the task I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogí; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Pandit in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupillage under Hindu rules-living in his hut and ever following his footsteps-to which I could not submit. I had, therefore, to depend on my own knowledge of the Sanskrit language to arrive at the meaning of Patanjali, availing myself frequently of the aid of my learned friend Professor Mahes'achandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, for the solution of difficulties. I had the assistance, too, of Professor Kámákhyánátha Tarkaratna, of that College, both in revising the text and in translating it. Both the Professors are distinguished

N yáya scholars, and Pandit Mahes achandra commands a deep knowledge of the Sánkhya, and with their aid, I believe, I have been able to avoid gross misinterpretations of the text, though I cannot flatter myself with the idea that I have been able always satisfactorily to expound the meaning of Patanjali.

Manuscripts of the Yoga-sútra are common enough in Bengal, but I have not met with any particularly old, or exceptionally correct text. In carrying the text and commentary through the press, I had the use of the following codices :

A. From the Asiatic Society's Library, yellow paper 13×11 inches, bound in a 4to. volume. Bengali character. Lines, 27 on a page. Incorrect.

B. From the Sanskrit College of Calcutta, yellow paper, 17×4 inches, puthi form. Folia, 35. Character, Bengali. Generally correct.

C. From ditto, Káshmírí paper, $10 \times 4\frac{1}{2}$ inches. Folia, 69. Character, well-written Nágarí. Date, Samvat, 1850. Generally correct.

D. From the Benares College, Káshmírí paper, 11×5 inches. Folia, 30. Character, Nágari. Incorrect and incomplete.

E. From Professor Mahes'achandra Nyáyaratna, Calcutta, yellow paper, 15×4 inches. Folia, 55. Character, Bengali. Generally correct. First chapter revised.

G. Ballantyne's reprint annexed to his translation.

H. From Bombay, copied for me from a MS. belonging to the Government collection preserved in

the office of the Director of Public Instruction. Generally correct.

I. From my family Library, a quarto volume in Bengali. Corrupt and little used.

In the text of Patanjali, no variation of any note has been met with in the above codices. The work appears to have been preserved with every care, as may be presumed from the circumstance of its having enjoyed the benefit of a host of commentaries and glosses. The commentary of Bhoja has not been so correctly preserved. There are many differences of reading in the different codices. But on the whole the differences are not so material as would justify the assumption of different recensions, or produce any marked changes in the meaning of the author.

8 MANIKTOLLAH, January 28, 1883.

xcii

INDEX.

				Page
Abháva, privation, absence,	•••	•••	10, 37,	86
Abhávapratyayá, conception witho	ut a substr	atum,		12
Abhinivesha, tenacity of life, or w	ill to live,	•••	•••	67
Abhyantara-vishaya, the inner sphe	re of life,	•••	•••	113
Abhyhása, exercise or repeated appl	ication to a	a work 1	3, 14, 20,	40
Abstraction, an accessory of Yoga	91, defined	, 114, fr	uit of,	115
Accessories of Yoga, 91,	•••	•••	•••	14
Achára-paddhati,	•••	•••	•••	218
Adarsa, vision, produced by medita	tion,		• * •	150
Adhibhautika, material, or physical	l,	•••	•••	142
Adhidaivika, supernatural, or trans	cendental,	•••	•••	142
Adhigama, right knowledge,		•••	•••	37
Adhimátra, excessive, a measure of	ardour,	•••	27,	95
Adhva, time, condition,	•••		•••	129
Adhyavasáya, intellect,	•••		•••	6
Adinátha,		•••		219
Adiyámala, a Tantra,	•••	•••	•••	117
Adrishța, fate, unseen cause,	•••			16
Afflictions, defined, 11, subtile, 97,	gross, 63,	cessation	1 of,	204
Agama, scriptural testimony,	•••	•••	10, 11,	42
Age, duration of life, cause of,		•••	• • •	70
Agni, fire, invocations to,	•••			31
Agnisára, a form of purification,	•••			118
Ahińśá, nonslaughter, a duty,		•••		92
Aikántika, absolute, a nature of ise	olation,	•••	•••	208
Aiśvarya, supremacy, an occult por	wer,	•••	•••	121
Aitihya, oral communication, a for	m of proof	,	•••	10
Ajapá-gáyatri.purascharaņa-paddh	ati,		•••	218

.



.

•

				Page
Ajnána, ignorance, defined,	•••	•••	•••	64
Akalpita, nonfictitious, natural,	•••	•••		156
Akása, ether,	•••	•••		154
Akrama, instantaneous, a character	of true	knowledge,		165
Akuśida, nonaspirant, not wishing	for fruit	s,		203
Alabdha-bhúmikatva, unattainmen	t of any	stage of Yo	ga,	38
Alambana, object of desire,	•••	••••		179
Alasya, idleness, an obstacle to Yo	ga,	•••		38
Alinga, indissoluble, defined,	•••	•••	53,	54
Aloka, light,	•••	•••		125
Amanaska,	•••	•••	•••	218
Amitra, absence of an enemy, frien	dship,	•••		64
Anáditva, beginninglessness, uncrea	ate,	•••		178
Anágatádhvan, unmanifest or ante	cedent co	ondition,		129
Ananta, endless,	•••	•••	•••	96
Ananta Sarmá,		•••	223,	225
Anántarya, uninterruptibility,	•••	•••	•••	177
Anásaya, without any residua,		•••		173
Anashta, active in operation, not de	estroyed,			84
Anavachchhinna, irrespective,	•••	•••		93
Anavasthitatva, instability in any a	stage,	•••		38
Angamejayatva, trembling, a distra	ction,	•••	•••	39
Animá, molicularity, an occult pow	er,]	1, 121,	157
Antara, internal, a form of purifica	tion,	•••		94
Antaranga, intimate, or essential pa	irt,	•••	88,	126
Antardhauti, washing of the intest	ines,	•••	•••	117
Anu, directly, without an intervent	ion,	•••		82
Anumána, inference, a form of proc	of,	•••	10,	56
Anumodita, abetted,	•••	•••	•••	95
Anusásana, an exposition, an institu	ıte,	•••	3,	4
Anuśrava, Veda, scriptures,	•••			15
Anuśravika, scriptural,	•••	•••	14,	16
Anvaya, conjunction, co-operation,		•••	128,	157
Anvayatva, concomitance	•••		•••	159
Anyatákhyátí, distinctive knowledg	çe,		•••	160
Anyatva, diversity	•••		•••	135

- 286.

				Page.
Apána, the air which descen	ds from the	naval do	wn to the	
great toe,	•••	•••		158
A paránta, final end, death,	••	•••		14
Aparigraha, non-avarice, a Yo	za duty,	•••	•••	92
A pavarga, emancipation,	•••	•••	•••	78
Aprati-sankramá, nontransatio	nal, eternally	the sam e	,	192
Aptavachana, reliable testimon	y,	•••	•••	17
Apunya, vice, opposed to virtu	e,	•••	•••	73
Apúrana, making up,	•••	•••		170
Argumentative, a form of med	itation,	•••	•••	51
Arhats, refuted,		•••	•••	215
Arishța, portent,	•••	•••	•••	142
Aristotle,	•••	•••	•••	130
Artha, purpose, aim, or object,	•••	•••	51, 61,	187
Arthápattí, presumption, or in	ference from	context, s		
proof,	•••	•••	•••	10
Arthavatva, fruition,	•••	•••	157,	159
Asamprajnáta, meditation in wł	nich consciou	sness is los		21
Asampramosha, the not letting				13
Ksana, posture defined,				102
Asanádhyáya,	•••	•••		218
Asanna, proximate,	•••	•••	26, 102,	105
Asañsarga, non-intercourse,	•••	•••	••••	99
Aśaya, desire, will, 🛛	•••	•••	29,	70
Asceticism, a duty of practical	Yoga,		•••	59
Ashtánga-hridaya,	•••	•••	•••	218
Ashtánga-yoga,	•••	•••	•••	218
Asiatic Society of Bengal, Proc	ceedings of t	be,	•••	36
Aśisha, intense desire, 🛛	•••	•••	•••	178
Asmitá, egoism,	•••	•••	65,	159
Aśraya, substratum, 🛛	•••	•••		179
Asteya, nontheft,	•••		•••	92
Asuddhikshaya, decay of imput	rity,	•••		91
Aśváda, guastation,	•••	•••	•••	150
Atitádhvan, postcedent conditi	on,	•••	•••	129
Atmá, soul,		•••	30, 81,	82

12

.

۰.

Digitized by Google

xcvi

				Page
Atmadarsana-yogyatva, fitne	ess for beholding	ng soul,	•••	100
Atmáráma,	•••		•••	219
Atyantika, final, a character	of isolation,	•••	•••	208
Austerity, fruit of,	•••	•••	•••	101
Avarana, covering,	•••	•••	14,	204
Avarice, abstinence from 92,	fruit of abstin	nence from,	•••	98
Avasthápariņáma, change of	relation,	•••	•••	133
Aversion, an affliction 61, de		•••	•••	66
Avidyá, ignorance,	•••	6	2, 64,	8 6
Aviplavá, undisturbed,	•••	•••		88
Avirati, worldly-mindedness	,	•••	•••	38
Avisesha, unspecific, a chara	cter of quality,	,	•••	80
Avisishta-linga, undefined or	uspecific chara	icter,	•••	53
Avyapadisya, latent,	•••	•••	134,	161
Ayus, age, a fruit of residua	b ,	•••	•••	71
	В.			
Bain, Dr. Mental and Mora	l Science,	•••	•••	175
Bala Sástrí,	•••		•••	223
Ballantyne, Dr. J. R., 3, 6,	7, 15, 17, 22,	24, 30, 31, 7	71, 72,	
77, 81, 83, 85, 86,			•••	87
Bandha, gesticulation, or po	stures of parti	icular kinds,	121,	109
Bhadra, a kind of posture,	•••	•••	•••	102
Bhadrásana, a kind of postu		•••	•••	103
Bhagavadgitá, the, quoted,	•••	•••	174,	208
Bhásáparichcheda, the, quot	æd,	•••	21,	22
Bhavadeva Miśra, 221, 224,			•••	22 6
Bháváganesa Díkshita,	•••	• / •	•••	224
Bhávaná, thinking,	•••	17, 2	21, 37,	61
Bhavánísaháya,	•••	•••	•••	224
Bhavaprataya, caused by th	e world,	25, 2 0		217
Bhoja, 2, 7, 21, 23, 58, 7	1, 78, 79, 116,	129, 144, 14	5, 147,	
2			148,	167
Bhúmi, stages of Yoga,	•••	•••	***	126
Bhútanátha, lord of creatio	n, a name of S	šiva,	•••	121
Bhútas, elements,	•••		•••	78

T

xcvii

					Page
Bible, the,	•••	•••	•••	•••	163
Brahma,	•••	•••		•••	211
Brahmá,	•••	•••	•••	31, 35,	67
Brahmachaitanya Yati	,		•••	•••	222
Brahmacharya, contine	ence,	•••		•••	92
Brahmánanda, commen	atator of H	atha-pra	dípiká,	102,	2 20
Brahmarandhra, an ape				l, 146,	147
Brahmayámala, a Tant		•••		•••	117
Breathing, regulation	of,	•••	•••	•••	41
Buddhi, intellect,	•••		•••	6,	8
Buddhi-tattva, the pri	nciple of un	nderstand	ling,	•••	80
Buddhists, the,		•••		92, 154,	211
Byron, quoted,	•••	•••	•••	•••	76
		.			
Carelessness, an obstac	- ·	•••	•••	•••	38
Chakra, wheel, a part of		n body,	•••	•••	145
Chándráyana, a form o	• •	•••	59,	60, 100,	101
Chárvákas, a sect of a	•	•••	•••	•••	31
Cheerfulness, an exerci	se,	•••	•••	•••	30
· • • ·	•••	•••	•••	•••	74
Chhándogya Upanisha	-	•••	•••	••	36
Chháyápurushávabodha	1 ,	•••	•••	•••	218
Chintámaņi,		•••	•••	•••	219
Chit, see Chiti,	•••	•••	•••	•••	
Chiti, soul,	•••	•••	•••	•••	192
Chitta, thinking princi	-				201
Chittavahá, nerves th	rough which	ch the	thinking	principle	
travels,	•••	•••	•••	•••	152
Cicero, on eternal exem	•	•••	•••	•••	130
Cloud of Virtue, a res			•••	•••	2 0 3
Cognition, how produc			f-illuminat	ive, 190,	
not able to perceive	another cog	nition,	•	••	188
Colebrooke, Mr.,	•••	•••	7, 16, 7	l, 81, 87,	207
Conception, anubhava,		•		•••	179
Contemplation, an acce	ssory of Yo	ga, 91, d	efined,		128

,

)

		٠	٠
xcv	1	1	1

			Page
Contentment, an obligation 93, fruit of,	•••	•••	900
Contents of Yoga-sútra, Chap. I, 57;	C. II, 116; C.	III,	
167 ; C. IV,	•••		217
Continence, an obligation, 93, fruit of,			98
Cousin, M., opinion on nihilism,	•••	•••	2 08
Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-sangra	h a,	211,	215
Cowell's Kusumánjali, quoted,	•••	•••	31

D.

Daņda, staff-like, a posture,			102
Dandadhauti, purification with the stalk o	f a plant,		119
Dandásana, staff-like posture,	•••	102,	108
Dantadhauti, washing of the teeth,		•••	117
Danu, mother of a class of evil beings,	•••	•••	5
Daphne, becoming a creeper,	•••	•••	70
Darsana-śakti, the power of seeing,	•••	•••	65
Dattátreya,	•••	218,	223
Dattátreya Sañhitá,		•••	218
Daurmansya, distress of mind, a cause of	distraction,	•••	89
Davies, Mr.,	81, 8	3, 207,	208
Davis, Harbinger of Health,	•••	•••	44
Deliberative and nondeliberative meditation	ons, .,,	•••	5 2
Deśa, locality, situation,	93, 11	2, 121,	164
Desire, an affliction, 61, defined,	65, e	eternal,	178
Devisiñha Deva,	•••	•••	229
Devotion, an obligation,	•••	•••	93
Dhanuh, a kind of posture,	•••	•••	102
Dhanurásana, bow posture,		•••	104
Dháraná, steadfastness,	114, 121, 12	2, 123,	125
Dharma, property, virtue,	•••	134,	203
Dharmamegha, Cloud of Virtue, a medit	ation,	•••	203
Dharmapariņáma, modification of proper	t y,		133
Dharma-śástra, law-books,		•••	59
Dharmí, substratum of quality,	•••	•••	134
Dhauti, washing, a mode of purification,	•••	•••	117

-

				Page
Dhruva, Polar star,	•••	•••		144
Dhyána, contemplation,		•••	123, 124,	125
Dírghá, protracted, a kind of bre	athing,	•••		112
Discernment, precedes samádhi,		•••	•••	25
Discriminative knowledge, how n	nanifested,	•••		88
Disease, an obstacle to Yoga,	•••	•••		38
Dispassion, defined,	•••	14,	its effect,	16
Distractions, companions of,	•••	•••	38,	3 9
Diti, mother of Daityas,			•••	5
Divyaśrotra, superperfect organ o	of hearing,	•••	•••	154
Dosha, residua of work,		•••		213
Doubt, an obstacle to Yoga,		•••		38
Drashtá, the spectator, soul,		8, 14, 1	5, 16, 77,	81
Drik-sakti, the power that sees,				65
Drišimátra, absolute sentience,				81
Driśya, spectacle,			77,	82
Duhkha, pain, a cause of distract	ion.		39, 66 ,	96
Durgá,	····		•••	1
Dvaipáyana, Krishna,			•••	47
Dvesha, aversion, an affliction, def			•••	66
,,,,,,,,,,,	,			
	E.			
Egoism, an affliction, 61, defined,		•••	•••	65
Ekágratá, concentration of the mi		•••	49, 50,	09
	-			

Ekágratá, concentration of the mind,		49, 50,	09	
Energy, an antecedent to meditation,		•••	•••	25
Enlightenment, its varieties,	•••	•••	•••	89
Exercise, defined,	•••	•••	•••	14
Experience, cause of,	•••	•••	•••	70
Expiration of the breath,	•••	•••	•••	39

F.

.

Falsehood, abstinence from,	a restraint,		•••	92
Fancy, defined,	•••	 .	•••	11
Functions, defined, 5, their	number and	names, 9,	their sup-	
pression how effected,	•••		•••	13

xcix

G.

Page

Gaņeśa, prayer to,		•••	•••	1
Garímá, excessive pondrosity, an			121,	157
Gati, flow of the breath in breat	-		111,	144
Gaudapada, quoted,		•••	,	207
Gheranda,			•••	218
Gheranda Sañhitá, the,			05, 177,	219
God, devotion to, 28, defined,			•	
symbol, 36, effect of devotion		•••	36,	37
Godávara Miśra,		•••		224
Gomukha, cow's mouth, a postu	re,	•••	102,	104
Gorakshanátha, numeration of pe		102, a Yo	ogí, 219,	
220, 222, 224,	•••	•••		225
Goraksha-sátaka,		•••	•••	219
Grahana, perception,	•••	•••	•••	159
Grahana-samápatti, acceptance fo	orm, a result	of medit	ation,	18
Grahayámala, a Tantra,	•••	•••	•••	117
Gráhya-samápatti, tangible form	, a result of	meditatio	on,	18
Grihitri-samápatti, the form of	the taker, a	result of	medita-	
tion,		•••	•••	19
Guņákara Mis'ra,	•••		•••	224
Gupta, a kind of posture,	•••	•••		102
	H.			
Hall, Bishop, quoted,	•••			13
Hamilton, Sir William, quoted,	•••		•••	129
Hána, avoidancy,	•••	•••	7,	88
Harichara,			•••	225
Hariśańkara Mis'ra,		•••	222,	227
Harris, quoted,			•••	6
Hartmann's Philosophie der Unl	bewussten,	•••	75,	67
Hasti-nishidana, seated elephant	, a posture,			102
Hatha-dípiká or pradípiká, a wo		breathing		
60, 105, 102, 109, 219, tíká 2		··· ·	•••	219
Hatha-yoga, the Yoga of breath	ung,	•••	102,	117
Hatha-ratnávalí,	•••			219

.

-

:

, ,

.

				Page
Hatha-sañketa-chandrik	á,		•••	219
Hatha-yoga,		•••	•••	219
dhirája,	••• •••			219
sangraha, .	••• •••	•••	•••	219
țíl	ká,	•••	•••	219
——— viveka,	•••	•••		219
Hermes, quoted,	••• •••			6
Heya, avoidable,	••• •••	•••	68,	77
Hiñśá, slaughter, should	l be avoided, 9	2, fruit of	abstinence	
from,	••• •••			96
Hiranyagarbha,	••• •••			4
Hláda, joy, a fruit of w	or k,	•••		73
Hriddhauti, washing of	the stomach, a	mode of pur	ification,	117
	I.			
Idleness, an obstacle to 2				38
Ignorance, an affliction, 6		 r afflictions	69 dafaad	64
Inclination, <i>śraddhá</i> in f		amicuons,	•	0± 25
Incontinence, abstinence	• •	1.00	•••	25 92
Indissoluble state, alingo	•	 lition fruit (.f 00	92 53
Indriya, organs, of three		1100, 11410 (
Indriyajaya, subjugation	•	•••	•••	78
Inspiration, a Yoga prac			•••	99
Instability in any stage,		•••	•••	39
Isána, Siva, a prayer to,		•••	•••	38 100
Tsitá, supremacy, an occ		•••	•••	168
Isitva, supremacy, an oc		•••	•••	121
Isolation, 161, 166, its p	-	••• ta definition		158
Iśvara, Godhead, 18, 28,			. ,	208
Péropole - i chao		•••	•••	36
Tśvara-praņidhána, resig	nation to God	a Vora dut	•••	84
return bradianana, reale	nation to dou,	a roga dut	ý •••	89
7.1 17 66 65 18 1	J.			
Jainas, the 31, 92, their			•••	215
Jalandhara or Jálandhar	abandha, a for	m of gesticul	lation, 105,	107
Jalavastí, washing of the	e fundament w	ith water,	a form of	
purification, .	•• •••	•••		119

ci

				Page
lect mantra				87
residua,	•••		71, 93,	164
•••		•••	•••	153
	•••	•••	•••	220
cognition, 6	, 51, 1	.84, 185,	•••	204
•••	•••	•••	•••	220
n of the und	erstar	ding, 91, 7	Tippana,	220
•••	· • •	•••		226
•••	•••	•••	•••	2 20
•••	•••	•••	185,	204
	•••	•••	•••	73
sult of purit	ty,	•••	•••	99
n the crown	of th	e head,	•••	146
uminous dis	spositi	ion,	•••	46
•••	•••	•••	•••	220
	residua, cognition, 6 n of the und sult of puri- n the crown	 cognition, 6, 51, 1 n of the understan sult of purity, n the crown of th	residua, cognition, 6, 51, 184, 185, n of the understanding, 91, 7 	residua, 71, 93, cognition, 6, 51, 184, 185, of the understanding, 91, Tippana, sult of

K.

Kaivalya, isolation of the soul f	from Natare,	1, 3, 87, 1	62, 206,	207
Kálabheda, distinction of time,	,	•••		133
Káliká Purána,	•••		•••	1
Kámávasáyitá, fulfilment of de	sires, an occ	ult power,	•••	121
Kámávasáyitva, fulfilment of d	lesires,	•••	•••	158
Kanthakúpa, throat-well, a sea		•••	•••	145
Kapálabháti, purification of th	e head by pa	rticular m	odes of	
breathing,	•••		117,	120
Kapila, 6-9, 14, 28, 80, 31, 33,	35, 76, 81,	84, 102, 20)1, 209,	220
Kapila-gitá,		•••	•••	220
Karmáśaya, residua of works,	•••	•••	69,	70
Kártikeya, son of Siva,	•••	•••	•••	70
Karuņá, compassion, a Yoga vi	rtue,	•••	•••	4 0
Káya, body, its control,	•••	•••	140,	155
Káyasampat, excellence of bod	y, a Yoga ex	cellence,		158
Káyavyúha-yoga, multiplicatio	n of bodies,	•••	•••	72
Kedárakalpa,	•••	•••		220
Khechari, a form of gesticulati	on,		106,	107
Khechari-vidyá,	•••	•••		228

			Page
Khyátí, manifestation of knowledge	,	6,	80
Kind, cause of, 70, how produced,	•••	•••	169
Kleśáh, afflictions which disturb Yo	ga, 29, 61,		62
Knowables, minimised,	•••	•••	204
Krama, succession or course, 163, 20)5,	•••	206
Kramányatva, diversity of succession	on,	•••	135
Krauncha-nisídana, the posture of t	he seated hero	n,	102
Krichchhra, a form of penance, .	•• •••	59,	60
Kripáráma,	••• •••		220
Krishna, black, a class of work, .		47,	173
Krishnanátha,	•• •••	224,	225
Kriyá, action,	••• •••	78,	97
Kriyá-yoga, Yoga discipline,	•• •••	59,	61
Krodha, anger, an obstacle to Yoga	,	•••	95
Kshaya, decay of ignorace,	•••	••••	130
Kshemendra Díkshita,	••• ···		220
Kshínavrittí, of overpowered facult	ies,	•••	49
Kshipta, unquietness, effect of foul	ness,	•••	5
Kukkuța, fowl, a posture,	••• ••	• •••	102
Kukkutásana, fowl seat a Yoga pos	ture,	• •••	104
Kulamani Sukla,		• •••	224
Kumbhaka, the function of stoppin	g the breath	inside, 112,	113
Kúrma, tortoise, a posture,	•••	. 102,	146
Kúrmásana, tortoise posture,	••• ••		104

L.

Laertius, Diogenes,	•••	•••		130
Laghíma, extreme lightness, an o	ccult pov	ver, 121,	•••	157
Lakshanaparínáma, modification o	of time,	•••	•••	183
Langour, an obstacle to Yoga,	•••	•••	•••	38
Laukikí, a mode of purification,	•••	•••	117,	119
Laya-yoga,	•••	•••	•••	2 20
Leibnitz, opinion quoted,	•••	•••	•••	75
Líñgamátra, solely mergent,	•••	•••	53,	53
Lobha, longing, an obstacle to Y	oga,	•••	•••	25

.

ciii

×

.

Madhupratíka, honey drops, a resu	lt of San	nádhi,	•••	60
Madhya, moderate intensity of me	ditation,	•••	•••	27
Madhyama, moderate intensity of	meditati	on,	•••	95
Mahábandha, a kind of posture,	•••	•••	105,	106
Mahábhárata,		•••	•••	70
Mahádeva,	•••	•••	219,	225
Mahámudrá, a form of gesticulati	on,	•••	105,	1 0 9
Mahápásupatas, a sect of Saivas,	•••		•••	30
Mahárámáyana,	•••	•••	•••	220
Mahásiddhis, great perfections,	•••	•••	•••	158
Mahat, defined,	•••	•••		210
Mahávedha, a kind of gesticulatio	n,	•••	135,	106
Mahávideba, great incorporeal, a	result of r	neditation,	. 	155
Mahávratas, great austerities, wha	t are they	· · · ·	•••	93
Maheśa,	•••	•••	•••	220
Maheśa-sañbitá,	•••			2 20
Maheśvara		•••	35 49,	69
Mahimá, illimitability, unlimited :	reach of	organs, an	occult	
power,	•••		•••	158
Maitri, friendliness or benevolence,	a Yoga	virtue,		40
Manas, mind,		6,	45, 46,	114
Manda, mild intensity of meditati	on,	•••	•••	95
Manojavitva, quickness as of min		lt power,		160
Mára, sin personified,	•••	•••		163
Márkaņdeya,	•••	•••	•••	221
Mathiká, cell for Yogi's dwelling,	•••	•••	•••	109
Mathuránátha Sukla,	•••	219, 22	20, 224,	2 26
Mati, intellect,	•••	•••	•••	6
Mátra, absolute,	•••	•••		81
Mátrápramána, fixed quantity,	•••	•••		42
Matsyanátha, a great Yogi,	•••		102.	101
Matsyanáthásana, a posture,	•••			104
Mayúra, peacock, a kind of postur	•0			102
	,	•••		104
Mayúrásana, peacock posture,		•••	 •••	102

--

•

ъ

,

a

Maliation	• • • •				Page
Meditation, conscious					
fications, 24, 25, 26	, 27, special	means, 2	8, 101, ac		
of, defined, 124, sta		•••	•••	126,	127
Memory, defined, 12, a	ittendant on	consciou	s meditati	on,	2 5
Meru, mountain, the,	•••	•••	•••	•••	143
Milton, quoted,	•••	•••	•••	•••	175
Mímáñsakas, Ritualist	is 10, 31, th	eir opinio	n refuted,	•••	214
Minanátha,	•••	•••	•••	•••	220
Misconception, a funct			principle, d	lefined, .	11
Mistaken notions, an o			•••	•••	38
Mitra, Sanskrit Buddh					154
Modification, defined,	7, suppressiv	re, 127, m	editative, 1	1 30, con-	
centrative, 131, of	property, &c	., 182 its	diversity,	135, it s	
termination,	•••	•••	•••		205
Moksha, defined,	•••	•••	•••	•••	218
Moments, their success	sion,	•••	•••	•••	206
Morell, Dr., quoted,	•••	•••	•••	•••	22
Mridu, mild, a measure			•••	•••	27
Mridu-madhya, mildly				•••	96
Mridu-mridu, mildly n	nild, a meas	are of end	ergy,	•••	96
Mridu-tivra, mildly ar			ergy,		96
Mudha, bewildered, an				•••	5
Muditâ, complacency,	a Yoga virtu	ıe,	•••	•••	40
Mudrá, gesticulation,	•••	•••	10	05, 10 6 ,	109
Mudrá-prakás'a,	•••	•••	•••	•••	220
Mukta, a kind of postu	1 r0,	•••	•••	•••	102
Mula-bandha, a kind of	f posture,	•••	•••	105,	107
Mulaśodhana, purificat	ion of the re	ctum,	•••	117,	119
Muttering, of mantra	59, fruit of,	•••	•••	•••	101
	N	r .			
Nábhi, navel, a point o	f Yoga, med	litation,			145
Nádi-jnána-dípiká,			•••	•••	220
Nágárjuna,	•••	•••	•••	•••	225
Nágojí Bhatta,		•••	•••	•••	221
Nahusa, a pious hermit	,	•••	•••	69,	70

					Page
Naiyáyikas, followers of	the Nyáya	doctrine	, 10, their c	opinion	
refuted,	•	•••	•••	•••	218
Nandiśvara, a pious perso	n,	•••	69, 70, 16	9, 170,	171
Náráyaņa,	••	•••	•••	•*•	207
Náráyana Bhikshu, .	••	•••	•••	•••	226
Náráyana Tírtha,	•	•••	•••	•••	221
Nashța, destroyed,	•	•••	•••	•••	84
Navaratnákara,	•	•••	•••		2 20
Nayanánanda Siddha,	•	•••	•••	•••	222
Netí, thread, used for put	rification,	•••	•••	117,	119
Nidrá, sleep, one of th	e function	ns of the	thinking	princi-	
ple,		•••	•••	12,	48
Nimitta, merit, cause of	residua,	•••	•••	•••	170
Nirodhapariņáma, suppre	ssive modi	fication,	•••	•••	128
Nirupakrama, non-deliber	rate,	•••	•••		141
Niruttara, a Tantra,	•	•••			117
Nirvichárá, non-deliberat	ive medits	tion,	•••	58,	18
Nirvíja, seedless meditati	on,	•••			72
Nirvitarka, non-argumen	tative med	litation,	•••	•••	18
Niyama, obligation, a Yo	ga duty,	•••	•••		94
Non-argumentative medi	tation,	•••	•••	•••	52
Nyása, contemplation, .	••	•••	•••		148
Nyáya, a system of Phile		•••	•••	6, 21,	81
	0	•			
Objects, their unity, 182,	their rela	tion to th	inking prin	ciple, .	182
Obligation, an accessory					93
Obstacles to meditation,	•	•••		•••	88
Occult powers, eight ki of time, 136, of cry of a of another's mind, 139, 140, of final end, 141	nimals, 18 of the art	7, of form to make	er existence oneself in	es, 183, visible,	
142, of powers of eleph			- •	- ·	
of regions and stars,			-	•	

structures, 145, of the art of subjugating hunger, 145, of firmness, 146, of vision of spirits, 146, of everything, 147, of

cvi

ł

the thinking principle, 148, of soul, 148, of attaining perfection of organic powers, 150, of the means by which a thinking principle enters a different body, 151, of rising superior to obstacles, 153, of the means of attaining effulgence, 153, of perfection of hearing, 154, of travelling in ether, 155, of the destruction of covering of light, 155, of the conquest of elements, 156, of attenuation and indestructibility of its qualities, 157, of excellence of body, 158, of the conquest of organs, 159, of the conquest of nature, 150, of omniscience, 160, of Isolation, 161, of discrimination, 163, of innate distinction, 164, its character, ...

Ρ.

Padma, lotus, a kind of posture,		•••		102
Padmásana, a kind of posture,	•••	•••	102,	103
Pain, defined, 39, its causes, 78, ho	w avoide	ed	76,	77
Pal, N. C., treatise on the Yoga,	***			109
Paley, Mr., definition of instinct,		•••	•••	175
Panchasikha, one of the expounder	rs of the	Sánkhya s	ystem, .	85
Panchatayi, fivefold, explained,	•••			9
Páņini, a grammarian,	•••	•••	•••	9
Paradise Lost, quoted,	•••		•••	12
Parártha, another's object,		•••	•••	149
Parásara, a renowned Yogí,	•••	•••	•••	224
Parináma, change, see modification,	,	•••	7, 75,	205
Pariņáma-dubkhatva, pain of seque	ence,	•••	•••	7∔
Paritápa, suffering, proceeds from a	residua,	•••	•••	73
Páschátya, future,	•••			170
Pátanjala-bháshya, 4, 7, 15, 16, 21,	, 2 3, 33,	35, 39, 42,	46, 50,	
51, 52, 57, 61, 64, 67, 68, 72, 96	, 102, 1 2	3, 124, 12	8, 131,	
132, 144, 147, 176, 207, 208,		•••	•••	221
abhinava-bháshya,	•••	• • •		221
rahasya,	•••	89, 46, 50,	51, 61,	221
Sútra-bháshya,	•••		•••	221
țíki,	•••	•••		2 21
vyákhyá,		•••	•••	221

Page

165

cvii

	٠	٠	•
C▼	ľ	ľ	1

					Page
Pátanjala-vártika,	•••			•••	221
vritti,	•••	•••	•••	•••	221
Patanjali, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6,				1.147.	
j, _, _, _, _, , ,	,,,	, ,	167, 201, 20		225
Pavana-vijaya,		•••	,		221
Penance, an obligation,			•••	•••	93
Perfections, how produ					168
Pída, disease, an obstac	-		•••	•••	89
Piśáchas, ghosts,			•••	•••	5
Plato, opinion noticed,				6, 129,	130
Posture, 91, defined,		ous kind		•	
cessful, 110, fruit of,		•••	•••	•••	111
Prachchhardana, expul			•••	41,	42
Practical Yoga, defined		-			61
Pradhána, nature,			82, 8	3, 160,	148
Pradhánajaya, conques			•••		160
Prádurbháva, prevalenc		•••	•••	•••	128
Prájápatya, a penance,	•	•••			60
** * * * * *	•••	•••	61, 26,	55, 89,	125
Prákámya, irresistible	will,	•••	•••	121,	158
Prakása, illumination,	·	•••	•••	78,	114
Prakriti, nature, 1, 7,	25, 29, 34,	53, 54, (65, 79, 80, 8	31, 83,	
84, 85, 170, 201, 201		•••	•••	•••	216
Prakritilaya, resolution	into natu	ю,		91,	24
Pramáda, carelessness,	an obstacle	· ·	•••	•••	88
Pramána, right notion,				•••	10
Prána, breath,			•••	153,	156
Pranava, symbol of th	e divinity.	•••		36, 37,	59
Pránáyáma, regulation					
44, 46, 111, 112, 11					114
Pranidhána, devotion t	•		•••	28.	61
Prántabhúmi, utmost a	-		•••		89
Prápti, accessibility,					
mahimá,	•••				121
Prasántaváhitá, tranqu	il flow of	thought.			130
Prasupta, dormant,	•••	••••	•••		63
- /					

•

٦

3

				Page
Prasvása, expiration of breath,	•••	•••	•••	89
Pratibha, comprehension,	•••	1	lo, 147,	150
Pratiprasava, adverse course, regre	ession,	•••	68,	206
Pratishedha, prevention,	•••	•••	•••	40
Pratiyogí, counterpart,	•••	•••	•••	206
Pratyáhára, abstraction,	•••		•••	115
Pratyakchetaná, reverted perceptio	, ac	•••		87
Pratyaksha, perception,	•••	•••	•••	10
Pratyaya, thought, understanding,	, 20,	128, 182, 18	37, 189,	81
Pravibhága, distinction,	•••	•••	•••	187
Pravritti, cognition,	•••	•••	•••	46
Pravritti-bheda, diverse tendency,	•••	•••	•••	172
Punya, virtue,	•••	•••	•••	73
Púraka, filling in, of breath,	•••	•••	•••	112
Puránas, their definition of God, 2	B1, seven	n regions,	•••	144
Purification, an obligation, 98, fru	uit of , 9 9), various mo	des of,.	117
Púrnánanda,	•••	•••	•••	225
Purusha, soul,	1, 12	2, 29, 80, 84,	57, 65,	148
Purusha-visesha, particular soul,	•••	••1	•••	29
Purushottoma, God,	•••	•••	80,	81
Pyrrho, his moral imperturbabilit	у,	•••	•••	16
(રૂ.			
Qualified, its conditions,			•••	181
Qualities, their character, 80, their	r division) ,	•••	181
Questionables, their exclusion, 9		-	14, their	
fruit,	•••	•••		95
	R.			
Rága, desire,				65
Raghavánanda,	•••	•••	•••	221
Rájamártanda, name of a comm	enterv	on the You	····	
58, 116, 167, 217,	J	-		221
Rájamrigáńka, a treatise on medio	··· vine	•••	•••	221
Rajas, foulness, one of the three	-	 F nature	•••	5
Rája-yoga, a form of Yoga practic		•	 60,	221
Tenle-10Ee a totat of 10Ee black	~~,	•••	ω,	arai L

cix

					Page
Rákshasas, demons,	•••	•••	•••	•••	5
Ráma,	•••	•••	•••	•••	222
Rámachandra Parámah	lañsa,	•••	*		221
Ramachandra Siddha,	•••	•••	•••	•••	222
Rámánada Sarasvatí,	•••		•••	•••	224
Rámánanda Tírtha,	•••	•••	219, 221, 22	8, 226,	2 27
Ramásańkara,		•••	•••		2 26
Rámastavarája,	•••	•••	•••		221
Rámáyana, an epic poe	m,	•••	•••	•••	70
Rámeśvara Bhațța,	•••	•••	•••		223
Raņarangamalla, a title	e of Bhoja,	•••	•••	•••	2
Rechaka, expulsion of	breath,	•••	•••	•••	112
Regulation of breath,	91, enjoin	ed, 11	1, described, 1	112, its	
varities, 113, fruit o	-				114
Reichenbach, notices el	ectric flames		•••		154
Reid, Mr., definition of	perception	10, w	orks quoted,		175
Residua defined, stock	of, 69, fr	uit of,	70, 78, how	7 mani-	
fested, 174, its conti	nuity, 176, d	eternal	, 178, how de	structi-	
ble, 179, formed dur	•		•	•••	201
Resignation to God, a	-	-	•••	59,	28
Resolved into nature, a	result of S	amádh	i,		24
Restraint, an accessory	, 91, defined	l, 92, it	s importance,		93
Riddhi, supernatural po		•••	•••	59,	121
Right notions, defined,		•••		•••	10
Rita, truth,			•••	•••	55
Ritambhará, truth-sup	porting,	•••			55
Roer, Dr. E., quoted,		•••	•••	•••	22
Rudrayámala, a Tantra	.	•••	•••	•••	117
Rúpa, shape,	•••	•••	•••		140
Ruta, cry of animals,	•••		•••	••	137
	é				
	2	3.			
S'abda, word,	•••	•••	•••	10, 51,	137
jnána, knowled			vords,	•••	11
S'abdatanmátra, the ru	diment of s	ound,	•••	•••	154
Sadáchára-prakaraņa,	•••	•••	•••	•••	222

INDEX.

٠

٠

٠

r.

					Page
Sadánanda,		•••	•••	•••	220
Sadásiva,	•••	•••	•••		22 6
Sádhyáya, muttering,	•••	•••	•••	59, 61,	101
Saivas, the follower of	Siva,	•••	•••	•••	80
S'aktichálana, a form o	of gesticulat	ion,		105, 108,	109
S'ákya Buddha, flames	issuing from	n his body,	•••	•••	154
Sálambana, along with	its object,	•••	•••	•••	189
Samádhi meditation, 1	7, 25, 86, 4	1, 54, 57, 61	l, 89,	101, 128,	
124, 125, 167, 168, 1	169,	•••	•••		178
parináma, mec	litative mod	ification,	•••		131
prakarana,	•••	•••	•••	•••	222
Samána, air which sur	rounds the s	tomach,	•••	158,	154
Samápattí, condition,	•••		•••		50
Samarasára-śvarodaya,	•••	•••	•••	•••	228
Samasansthána, evenly	poised,	•••	•••		100
Sambhava, proportion,	•••	•••	•••	•••	18
Sambodha, conscience,	•••		•••	•••	98
Samprajnáta, conscious	,	•••	•••	•••	17
Samprajnáta-samádhi,	conscious m	editation,	•••	17, 19,	122
Samprayoga, applicatio	n,	•••	•••		115
Sánanda, joyous,		•••	•••	•••	18
Saugatas, Buddhists,	•••		•••	•••	81
Sañjama, exercise of st	eadfastness,	contemplat	ion a	nd medita-	
tion,	•••	•••	•••	•••	127
Sankara,	•••	•••	•••	225,	226
A'chárya,	•••	•••	•••	218, 219,	222
Sánkhya, a system of I	philosoph y ,	6, 7, 1	0, 85,	112, 207,	211
káriká,	•••	10, 15,	16, 39), 83, 207,	2 08
pravachana,	•••	•••	•••	•••	222
bha	ishya,	•••	•••	•••	222
sútra,	•••	•••	•••	3 3, 42,	83
tattva-kaumud	i, a commen	tary on the	Yoga	-sútra, 79,	87
— yoga-dípiká,	•••	•••	•••		222
Sánkirna, affected,	•••	•••	•••		51
Saumanasya, complace	ncy,	•••	•••	•••	99
Sañsaya, doubt, defined	l,	•••	•••	11,	88

_

•

cxi

				Page
Sañskára, residuum, 🛛	•••	21, 22,	23, 56, 67,	70
Sanskáraduhkha, pain of residua,	•••	•••		74
S'ánta, tranquil,	•••		182, 13 4,	161
Santapana, a penance,	•••		•••	60
Santosha, contentment, a Yoga obli	igation,		•••	94
Sañvega, impetuous, a measure of	energy,	•••	•••	26
Sañvit, cognition,	•••	•••	•••	46
Sañyama, 121, defined, 125, fruit of	f, 125 , ho	ow to be	employed	
126, 128, producing various occu	lt power	в, 136,	137, 138,	
139, 140, 141, 142, 148, 144, 14	45, 146, 1	147, 148	, 149, 150,	
153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 158	9, 160, 10	62, 168,	164, 165,	
			167, 169,	173
Sañyoga, conjunction,	•••		78, 85	86
Saptabhumiká-vichára,	•••	•••		222
Sáragítá,	•••	•••		222
Sárasamuchchaya,	•••	•••	•••	222
S'arírabandha, corporeal bondage,	•••		•••	151
Sarvabhávádhishthátritva, suprema	cy over a	ll condit	tions,	161
Sarvajnatritva, omniscience,		•••	•••	161
Sarvárthatá, multifunctionality,	•••	•••	•••	130
Sarváthávishayatva, superobjectivit	у,	•••	•••	165
Sarvavishaya, omniobjective,	•••			165
Sásmitá, egoistic,	•••	•••	18,	19
Satan, his representative,	•••			163
Sattva, quality of goodness,	•••	4	5, 99, 148,	149
Satya, veracity, a Yoga obligation,	•••	•••	92,	93
S'aucha, acts of washing, or purific	ation,	•••	94,	117
Sava, corpse, a kind of posture,	• • •	•••		10 2
Savichárá, deliberative meditation,	•••		18,	53
Savíja, with a seed,	•••		•••	54
Savíja-samádhi, seeded meditation,	•••	•••	•••	17
Savitarka, argumentative,	•••	•••	17,	51
Savitarka-samádhi, argumentative n	neditatio	n,	•••	18
Sayambhu, S'iva,	•••		•••	85
Schopenhauer, quoted,	•••	•••	•••	75
Seeded meditation,	•••	•••	•••	54
Seedless meditation,	•••	•••	57,	127

•

					Pag
Seneca, quoted,	•••	•••	•••	•••	13
Shatchakra,	•••	•••	•••	•••	222
dhyána-paddhai	i,,	•••	••	•••	223
Shatkarma, sixfold w	ork,	•••	•••	•••	11
Siddha, perfect,	•••	•••	•••	•••	10
Siddhákhaņda,		•••	•••	•••	22
Siddhánta-paddhati,	•••	•••	••••	•••	22
Siddhásana, a posture	,	•••	•••	•••	10
Siddha-siddhánta-pad	dhati,	•••	•••	•••	22
Siddhis, perfection,		100, 12	21, 142, 1	151, 158,	16
Siñha, lion, a Yoga p	osture,	•••	•••	•••	10
Sinhásana, a Yoga po	sture,	•••	•••	103,	104
Sitkrama, throwing o		through the n	ostrils,	•••	120
Siva, the God so name	ed, 1, 30,	81, 102, 219, 2	20, 221, 2	222, 228,	220
Sivá, wife of Siva,	•••	•••	•••		1
Sivananda Sarasvatí,		•••		•••	22
S'iva-sañhitá,	•••	•••	•••	117,	223
ţiká,	•••	•••	•••	••••	222
Skanda Purána,		•••		•••	42
Slaughter, abstinence :	from 92,	fruit of abstin	ence from	n, 🗪	92
Sleep, defined,	•••	•••	•••	•	12
Smriti, law-books,	•••	•••	18	, 25, 60,	128
Socrates, opinion quot	ed,	•••		•••	76
Sopakrama, anticipato	ry, or dee	signed,	•••	•••	141
Sopáśraya, self-reliant,	-		•••	•••	102
Spectacle, its nature, 7		ject, 82, its acti	ion, 84, i	ts cause,	86
Spectator, defined, 81,					
prevented,	•		•••		88
Sphota, bursting of so	und,	•••	•••		51
Sraddhá, inclination, a		dent of Yoga,		•••	25
Frávaņa, audition, an		• ·			150
S'rídharánanda Yati,	•				221
S'rikrishna S'ukla,	•••				225
Frotra, organ of heari	ng.				154
S'ruta, testimony,		•••			56

	Page
Steadiness, how acquired, 45, 46, 47, 48, advantage thereof,	49
Stewart, Dugald, quoted,	175
Sthalavasti, purification of the fundament by seating firmly on	
dry land,	119
Sthámnab, celestial gods,	162
Sthira, firm,	102
Sthiti, abidance, rule, 14, 78, 79,	80
Sthitisthápaka, elasticity,	21
Sthula, gross,	157
St. Jerome,	2
Study, a Yoga obligation,	93
Styána, langour, an obstacle to Yoga,	88
Subject, a correlative of qualities,	184
Suddhi, purification,	166
Suffering, cause of,	73
Sukha, pleasant,	102
S'ukhánuśayi, dwelling on pleasure,	65
S'ukla, white, a class of works,	173
S'ukla-krishna, white black, a class of works,	173
S'ųkra, 225,	226
Súkshma, subtile, a form of breathing, 67, 143, 157,	112
Súkshmavisaya, subtile objects,	53
Summary of the Yoga-sútra, 57, 116, 167,	227
Sundaradeva,	219
Súnya, vacuity,	127
Suppressive modification, see modification,	
Svábhása, self-illuminative, 188, 189, implies self-conscious-	
ness,	189
Svádhyáya, inaudibly repeating a great many times any se-	
lected mantra,	101
Svámišakti, lordship of power,	8 5
Svapna, dream, defined, 13,	49
Svarasaváhi, that which carries the residua of one's former	
life,	67
Svarodaya,	222
Svarúpa, nature, 82, 157,	159

Digitized by Google

>

INDEX.

.

•

,

-					Page
Svása, inspiration,	•••	•••	•••	•••	8 9
Svaśakti, inherent pov	ver,		•••	•••	85
Svastika, a mystic dia	gram, .		•••		102
Svastik isana, a postur	æ,	•••		102,	103
Svátmáráma,	•••	•••	•••	•••	219
		Т.			
Tadajnanatva, consuba	stantiation,	•••	•••	49,	50
Tadátmána, to consist	of,	· •••	•••	•••	181
Tamas, darkness, one	of the three	qualitie		•••	5
Tanmátra, matter, nor	umenal,		•••	•••	157
Tanmayatva, being of	that substa	ance,			50
Tantras, the,	•••		44, 117,	120, 147,	163
Tántric rituals,	•••		•••	•••	105
Tanu, weak,	•••		•••		63
Tápaduhkhatá, pain o	E anxiety,	•••	•••	•••	74
Táraka, emancipator,	•••	•••		147,	165
Tarka-sangraha, a trea	tise on Sáñ	khya pł	nilosophy,	•••	21
Tatsthatva, concentrat	tion in it,	•••	•••	49,	50
Tattvárnava-tíká,		•••	•••	•••	223
Tattva-pancháśika, Y o	oga-chintá,				223
Tattvas, principles,	•••			18, 40,	182
Tattvávabodhaka,	•••	•••	•••	•••	223
Tattva-vindu-yoga,	•••		•••		223
Taylor's Elements of	Thought,	•••		•••	6
Temptations, to be ave	oided,	•••		•••	162
Tenacity of life, define	ed,	•••	•••		66
Theft, abstinence from	n, 92, fruit	of absti	inence from,	•••	97
Thinking principle, 4, i	ts modificat	ion, 127	', its tranquil	it y, 130 ,	
how multiplied, 17	1, its unit	y of pu	rpose, how p	reserved,	
172, meditation-born	n, its charact	ter, 173,	its modificat	ion, 180,	
its functions, how	known, 18	6, canno	t direct itse	lf to two	•
objects at once, 189,	, not self, 2	01, its r	efluence,	•••	2 01
Tiberghien's Essai des	Connoissan	ice huma	ane,	•••	13Ó
Tirthaśiva,	•••	•••	•••	•••	228
Titans, their moral peo	culiarity,	•••		•••	5

.

cxvi

INDEX.

Tivra, ardent, a measure of energy, 26 Tráţaka, a form of purification, 117, 120 Trembling, an obstacle to Yoga, 39 U. Udána, vital air which ascends to the beads, 89 Udára, simple, 63 Udaya, enlivenment, of a feeling, 80 Udayana A'chárya, 80 Udayañkara, 105 Uddíjánabandha, a kind of posture, 107 Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves, 112, 118 Udita, enlivened, 132, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 35 Upadeshtá, instructor, 30, Upanishads, the, noticed, 30, Uparága, modification, change of form, 102 103 Upasargas, obstacles, <td< th=""><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>Page</th></td<>					Page
Tráţaka, a form of purification, 117, 120 Trembling, an obstacle to Yoga, 39 U. U. Udána, vital air which ascends to the beads, 153 Udára, simple, 68 Udaya, enlivenment, of a feeling, 180 Udayana A'chárya, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 105 Uddíyánabandha, a kind of posture, 107 Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves, 112, 118 Udita, enlivened, 182, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 112, 118 Udita, enlivened, 219, 221 Unattainment of a stage, 35 Upadeshtá, instructor, 36, 35 Upamána, comparison, 30, 35 Upanishads, the, noticed,	Tivra, ardent, a measure of energy,		•••	•••	26
Trembling, an obstacle to Yoga, 89 U. Udána, vital air which ascends to the heads, 153 Udára, simple, 63 Udaya, enlivenment, of a feeling, 130 Udaya, enlivenment, of a feeling, 130 Udayana A'chárya, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 105 Uddíyánabandha, a kind of posture, 107 Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves, 112, 118 Udita, enlivened, 182, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 182, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 219, 221 Unattainment of a stage, 35 Upadeshtá, instructor, 30, 35 Upamána, comparison, 30, 35 Uparága, modification, change of form,	•		•••	117,	120
U. Udána, vital air which ascends to the beads,	•	•••	•••		89
Udána, vital air which ascends to the heads, I.53 Udára, simple, 63 Udaya, enlivenment, of a feeling, 130 Udayana A'chárya, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 227 Uddíyána, a kind of posture, 105 Uddýána, a kind of posture, 107 Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves, 112, 118 Udita, enlivened, 132, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 132, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 219, 221 Unattainment of a stage, 48 Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice, 24 Upadeshtá, instructor, 30, 35 Upamána, comparison, 10 Upanishads, the, noticed, 151 <	-				
Udára, simple, 63 Udáya, enlivenment, of a feeling, 130 Udayana A'chárya, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 80 Udayañkara, 227 Uddíyánabandha, a kind of posture, 105 Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves, 112, 113 Udita, enlivened, 112, 113 Udita, enlivened, 182, 184, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 129, 221 Unattainment of a stage, 48 Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice, 10 Up	U	•			
Udaya, enlivenment, of a feeling, 130 Udayana A'chárya, 30 Udayañkara, 30 Udayañkara, 30 Udayañkara, 30 Udayañkara, 227 Uddíyánabandha, a kind of posture, 105 Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves, 112, 118 Udita, enlivened, 132, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 48 Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice, 10 Upam	Udána, vital air which ascends to t	he heads,	•••	•••	153
Udayana A'chárya, 80 Udayaňkara, 80 Udayaňkara, 227 Uddíyána, a kind of posture, 105 Uddýánabandha, a kind of posture, 107 105 Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves, 112, 118 Udita, enlivened, 132, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 132, 134, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 219, 221 Unattainment of a stage, 48 Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice, 24 Upadeshtá, instructor, 10 Upanána, comparison, 10 Upanishads, the, noticed, 185 Upasargas, obstacles, 151 Urvaší, a celestial courtesan, 67, 70 103 Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture, </td <td>Udára, simple,</td> <td>•••</td> <td>•••</td> <td>•••</td> <td>63</td>	Udára, simple,	•••	•••	•••	63
Udayańkara,227Uddíyána, a kind of posture,105Uddíyánabandha, a kind of posture,107Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves,112,118Udita, enlivened,132, 134,Unápati Tripáthí,132, 134,Unattainment of a stage,48Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice,24Upadeshtá, instructor,Upamána, comparison,10Uparága, modification, change of form,185Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvaší, a celestial courtesan,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Udaya, enlivenment, of a feeling,	•••	•••	•••	130
Uddíyana, a kind of posture,105Uddíyánabandha, a kind of posture,107Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves,112,113Udita, enlivened,182, 184,161Umápati Tripáthí,182, 184,161Umápati Tripáthí,219,221Unattainment of a stage,48Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice,24Upadeshtá, instructor,10Upamána, comparison,10Upanása, stale,10Upanása, obstacles,151Urvaší, a celestial courtesan,67,70Ushtranishídana, seated camel, a posture,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Udayana A'chárya,	•••		•••	80
Uddívánabandha, a kind of posture,107Uddívánabandha, a kind of posture,107Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves,112,112,113Udita, enlivened,Umápati Tripáthí,Unattainment of a stage,Unattainment of a stage,Upadeshtá, instructor,Upamána, comparison,Upamána, comparison,Uparága, modification, change of form,101Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvaší, a celestial courtesan,102,Utána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Udayankara,	•••	•••	•••	227
Udgháta, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves,112,113Udita, enlivened,112,113,Unattainment of a stage,	Uddíyana, a kind of posture,	•••	•••	•••	105
112, 113 Udita, enlivened, 182, 184, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 219, 221 Unattainment of a stage, 48 Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice, 48 Upadeshtá, instructor, 85 Upamána, comparison, 10 Upanáshads, the, noticed, 10 Uparága, modification, change of form, 185 Upasargas, obstacles, 151 Urvaší, a celestial courtesan, 67, 70 Ushtranishídana, seated camel, a posture, 102, 103	Uddíyánabandha, a kind of postur	θ,	•••	•••	107
Udita, enlivened, 182, 184, 161 Umápati Tripáthí, 219, 221 Unattainment of a stage, 48 Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice, 24 Upadeshtá, instructor, 85 Upamána, comparison, 10 Upanáshads, the, noticed, 10 Uparága, modification, change of form, 185 Upasargas, obstacles, 151 Urvaší, a celestial courtesan, 67, 70 Ushtranishídana, seated camel, a posture, 102, 103	Udgháta, striking of the vital air	against a	plexus	of nerves,	
Umápati Tripáthí,219,221Unattainment of a stage,48Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice,24Upadeshtá, instructor,35Upamána, comparison,10Upanishads, the, noticed,30,35Uparága, modification, change of form,185Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvaší, a celestial courtesan,67,70Ushtranishídana, seated camel, a posture,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	-			112,	118
Unattainment of a stage,48Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice,24Upadeshtá, instructor,35Upamána, comparison,10Upanishads, the, noticed,30,35Uparága, modification, change of form,185Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvaší, a celestial courtesan,67,70Ushtranishídana, seated camel, a posture,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Udita, enlivened,	•••	•••	132, 134,	161
Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice,24Upadeshtá, instructor,35Upamána, comparison,10Upanishads, the, noticed,30,35Uparága, modification, change of form,185Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvasí, a celestial courtesan,67,70Usbtranishídana, seated camel, a posture,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Umápati Tripáthí,	•••	•••	219,	221
Upadeshtá, instructor, 35 Upamána, comparison, 10 Upanishads, the, noticed, 30, 35 Uparága, modification, change of form, 185 185 Upasargas, obstacles, 151 Urvasí, a celestial courtesan, 67, 70 Usbţranishídana, seated camel, a posture, 102, 103 Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture, 102 103	Unattainment of a stage,	•••	•••	•••	48
Upamána, comparison,10Upanishads, the, noticed,30,Uparága, modification, change of form,185Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvaší, a celestial courtesan,67,70Ushtranishídana, seated camel, a posture,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Unembodied, a condition produced	by Yoga p	practice	»,	24
Upanishads, the, noticed,30,35Uparága, modification, change of form,185Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvasí, a celestial courtesan,67,70Ushtranishídana, seated camel, a posture,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Upadeshtá, instructor,	•••	•••	•••	85
Uparága, modification, change of form,185Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvaší, a celestial courtesan,67,70Usbţranishídana, seated camel, a posture,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Upamána, comparison,	•••	•••	•••	10
Upasargas, obstacles,151Urvasí, a celestial courtesan,67,Usbţranishídana, seated camel, a posture,102,103Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture,102	Upanishads, the, noticed,	•••	•••	30,	35
Urvaši, a celestial courtesan, 67, 70 Ushţranishidana, seated camel, a posture, 102, 103 Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture, 102	Uparága, modification, change of f	iorm,	•••	•••	185
Usbtranishídana, seated camel, a posture, 102, 103 Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture, 102	Upasargas, obstacles,	•••	•••		151
Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a posture, 102	Urvasí, a celestial courtesan,	•••	•••	67,	70
	Ushțranishídana, seated camel, a p	osture,	•••	102,	103
Uttána-kúrmakásana, upset tortoise posture, 104	Uttána-kúrmaka, upset tortoise, a	posture,	•••	•••	102
	Uttána-kúrmakásana, upset tortoi	se posture,	•••	•••	104

v.

Váchaka, indicator,	•••	•••		137
Váchaspati Miśra,	4, 7, 15, 23,	24, 35, 47,	48,	207
Vahiranga, stranger, accessory, no	t essential,	•••	•••	127
Vabishkarana, a form of purification	on,	·••	•••	118
Váhya, external,		•••	•••	94
vishaya, the outer sphere,		•••		118
Vaisáradya, purity from dirt,	•••	•••	•••	55

1

-

INDEX.

٦

•.

,

Veinfang dispession				18,	Page 14
Vairágya, dispassion, Vairatyága, abandonme	 nt of anmi	•••	•••		<u>96</u>
Vaisesbikas, their opini		• ·	•••	•••	211
Vaishnavas, the followe			•••	•••	30
		iu,	•••	•••	108
Vajrásana, a posture,	···	 	•••	•••	108
Vajrasañhananatva, ada		raness,	•••	105	
Vajroni, a kind of gest	iculation,	•••	•••	105,	108
Vámadeva,	•••	•••	•••		220
Vamanadhauti, drinkin	g a large (quantity of	water a	ind then	110
vomitting it out,	•••	•••	•••	•••	119
Varaņa, covering,	•••	•••	•••	•••	170
Várisára, a mode of pu	rification,	•••	•••	•••	118
Varņaprabodha,	•••	•••	•••	•••	223
Vártá, olfaction, an occ	-	•••	•••	•••	150
Vartamánádhvan, prese		-	•••		129
Vásadhauti, washing w	ith a piece	of cloth, a k	ind of p	purifica-	
tion,	•••	•••	•••	•••	119
Vásaná, desires produce	ed by residu	а,	•••	70,	174
Vaśikára, controul,	•••	•••	•••	49,	161
Vaśikára-sanjná, consc	iousness of	being able t	to subju	zate,	15
Vaśishtha, a saint,	•••	•••	•••	102,	226
Vaśishtha-sára,	•••	•••	•••	•••	223
Vásishthíya-gúdártha,	•••	•••	•••		223
Vaśitá, subjugation,	•••	•••	•••	•••	121
Vasitva, subjection,		•••	•••		158
Vasti, a kind of purific	eation,	•••	•••	•••	117
Vástisodhana, purificat	ion of the f	fundament,	•••	•••	119
Vasudevendra,		•••	•••		218
Vátakrama, a kind of p	ourification,	•••	•••	•••	120
Vátasára, a kind of pu		•••			118
Vedaná, taction, an oco	•	•••		•••	150
Vedánta-sára, a treatis		dánta.			6
Vedánta-sútra, aphoris				•••	88
Vedántists, the followers of the Vedanta-sútra, 10, their doc-					
trine refuted,				212.	213
Vedas, the,		11.30	36.97.1	.01, 178,	174
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•••	, _U ,		,,	1 13

cxviii

INDEX.

				Page
Vega, velocity,	•••	•••	•••	21
Veracity, defined, 92, its fruit,	•••	•••		97
Vibhishiká, frights,			•••	163
Vibhútis, occult powers,		•••		121
Vichchheda, interruption,	•••	•		111
Vichchhinna, intercepted,				63
Videha, unembodied,	•••			24
Videha-mukti,		•••		223
Vidhárana, retention,	•••	•••	41,	42
Vidyá, knowledge,	•••	•••	•••	64
Vidyáranya Svámí,	•••			2 20
Víja, seed,		•••	•••	34
Vijnána, perception, knowledge,		•••	•••	184
	on the Y	loga-sútra, 4	17, 87,	
123, 221, 225,	•••	•••	•••	226
Vikalpa, fancy, defined, 11, its eff	ect,			51
Vikaranabháva, uninstrumental p	erception	,		16 0
Vikramorvasí, a drama,	•••		•••	70
Vimarsa, opinion refuted,	•••	, •••		216
Vipáka, deserts, of works,	•••	•••	29,	70
Viparita-karani, a kind of gesticu	ilation,	•••	105,	108
Viparyaya, misconception, a funct		e thinking pr	inciple,	11
Viprakrishta, remote,	, •••		•••	143
Vira, heroic, a kind of posture,	•••	•••		102
Virama, cause of rejection,			•••	20
Virásana, heroic posture,	•••	•••		103
Vireśvaránanda,	•••	• • •	•••	225
Virtue, cloud of,	•••	•••	203,	204
Vírya, energy,	•••	•••	25,	98
Visayavairágya, dispassion for wo	rldly obj	ects, asceticis	sm,	17
Viśesha, specific,	· •••			80
Vishaya, sensuous objects,		•••		45
Vishayavatí, that in which worldl	y objects	reside,	•••	45.
Vishnu, born as Kapila,	•••		•••	85
Visishța linga, defined character,	•••	· • • •	•••	53
Viśoka, sorrowless perfection,	•••	 •••	46,	16 L

~

r

				Page
Viśokasiddhi, sorrowless perfection	on,	•••	•••	16L
Viśvakarman, celestial artificer, a	name of	God,	•••	31
Viśvámitra,	•••		70, 168,	170
Visveśvaradatta,	•••	•••	•••	226
Vítarága, the passionless,	•••	•••	•••	47
Vitarka, questionable,		•••	91 ,	96
Viveka, discriminative knowledge	θ,		88,	228
——— martaņļa, …	•••			223
Vivekí, discriminating,	•••	•••		74
Viyoga, disunion,	•••			1
Vrajabhushana,	•••	•••	•••	219
Vrihannandikesvara Purána,	•••	•••	•••	70
Vrindávana S'ukla,	•••	•••	225,	227
Vritti, functions,	•••	•••	4, 7, 9,	150
Vyádhi, sickness,	•••	•••		88 .
Vyankata A'chárya,	•••	•••	•••	242
Vyána, a vital air that pervades	the whole	body,	•••	53 1
Vyása,	•••		222,	222
Vyavahita, intercepted,	•••	•••	•••	148
Vyúha, disposition,	•••	•••	144,	145
Vyutkrama, a form of purificati	on,		•••	120
Vyutthána, state of waking,	•••	··· ·	128,	157
- ·	w.	•		
Weber, Dr. A., his idea of isolat	ion,	•••	•••	208
Westminster, Review, quoted,	•••	•••	•••	76
Wilson, Dr. H. H., quoted,	7, 16,	89, 81, 87, 1	44, 207,	208
Wordsworth, quoted,	•••	•••	•••	40
Work, its varieties,	•••	•••	•••	I73
Worldly-mindedness, an obstacle	to Yoga,	•••		38
	Y.		•	
Yájnavalkya,	•••	1	.02, 223,	224
gítá,	••••	•••		223
Yama, restraints, or discipline,	•••	•••	•••	92
Yoga, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 24,		. 46. 55. 57		
60, 61, 63, 91, 92, 94, 102				
123, 125, 125, 127, 142, 147,				
	. ,		205,	208

-

					Page
Yoga-bháshya-krama,	•••	•••	•••	•••	223
Yogá-bhyásalakshana,	•••	•••	•••	•••	223
Yoga-chandra-tíká,			•••	•••	228
chandriká,	•••		•••	•••	223
—— chintámani,	•••	•••	•••	42, 223,	224
tippana,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
- darpana-tíká,			•••	•••	224
drishti-svádhyáys	ly l	•••	•••	•••	224
grantha,	•••	• • •	•••	•••	224
tíká,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
kalpadruma,		•••	•••	•••	224
kalpalatá,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
Yogá-khyána,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
Yoga-mahimá,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
mani-prabhá,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
manjari,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
Yogánga, the accessori	es of	the Yoga,	•••	•••	91
Yogánusásana,		•••	•••	•••	4
vritti,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
Ygga-nyása,	•••	••••	•••	•••	224
pradípa,	•••	•••	•••	•••	224
prakaśa-tiká,	•••	•••	•••	•••	225
praveśa-vidhi,	•••	••	•••	•••	225
ratnákara,	•••		•••	•••	225
ratna-samuchchay	ya,	•••	•••	•*•	225
—— ratnávalí,	•••	•••	•••	•••	225
Yogásana-lakshana,	•••	•••	•••	•••	225
Yoga-sangraha,	•••	•••	•••	•••	225
țíká,	•••	•••	•••	•••	2 25
sára,	•••	•••	•••	•••	225
sára-sangraha,	••.	•••	•••	•••	225
śástra,	•••	•••	•••	•••	225
sástra-sútrapátha	,	•••	•••	•••	225
—— śástrá-vachuri,	•••	•••	•••	•••	225
siddhanta-paddha	ti,	•••	•••	•••	225
síkhopanishad,	•••	•••	•••		225

					Page
Yoga-sikshá,		•••	•••	•••	225
sútra,		•••		•••	225
sútrártha-dipíká,			•••	•••	225
sútra-ţíká,	•••	•••	•••		225
tippana,	•••	•••		225,	226
vritti,	•••		•••		226
tippan	1 a,	•••	•••	•••	226
taranga,	•••	•••	•	•••	2 2 6
—— tárávali,	•••	•••	•••	•••	226
tattva,		•••	•••	•••	226
varņana,	•••	•••	•••	•••	226
vártika,	•••	•••	•••	•••	226
—— váśishtha,	•••	•••		•••	226
țíká,	•••	•••	•••	•••	226
—— vichára,	•••	•••	•••	•••	226
víja,	•••	•••		•••	226
vindu-țippana,	•••	•••	•••		226
vishaya,	•••		•••	•••	226
vivaraņa,	•••		•••	•••	226
—— viveka,	•••	•••	•••	•••	227
țíká,	•••			•••	2 27
vritti-sangraha,	•••	•••	•••	•••	227
Yogeśárnava,	•••	•••		•••	227
Yoginí-hridaya,		•••	•••		227
Yogopadeśa,	•••	•••		•••	224

~~~~~

٠

.


•

•

•

Digitized by Google

è



# ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

| Page         | vii           | lin                                                                        | . 15      | for   | chittva        | read              | chitta     |                                         |
|--------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-------|----------------|-------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>- - -</b> |               |                                                                            | 27        | •     |                |                   |            | the theory                              |
|              | "             | , " 27 " some theory in a more <i>read</i> the theory<br>of unreality in a |           |       |                |                   |            |                                         |
|              | xiv           |                                                                            | 0         |       | alternative    | •                 |            | _                                       |
|              | XIV           | "                                                                          | 8         | "     | -              | »                 | resource   |                                         |
|              | "             | **                                                                         | 20        |       | its object is  | -                 | •••        | nt, read 118                            |
|              |               |                                                                            |           | C     | bject is world | • • •             | -          |                                         |
|              | XXXV          | "                                                                          | 4         | "     | birth          | "                 | breath     |                                         |
|              | "             | "                                                                          | 24        | "     | rapine         | "                 | repine     |                                         |
|              | <b>x</b> lvii | ,,,                                                                        | 26        | "     | produce        | ,,                | produce    |                                         |
|              | lxii          | "                                                                          | <b>29</b> | "     | Such a         | "                 | If it did  | •                                       |
|              | lxxx          | "                                                                          | 6         | after | · Bháshya, ad  | ld Vyása i        | himself is | s the author                            |
|              |               |                                                                            |           | of    | a different s  | ystem of          | Philosop   | by, and one                             |
|              |               |                                                                            |           | ca    | nnot reasons   | ably supp         | ose that   | he would                                |
|              |               |                                                                            |           | co    | ndescend to    | expound           | the text-  | book of an                              |
|              |               |                                                                            |           | 80    | lverse school. |                   |            |                                         |
|              | "             | "                                                                          | 11        | after | this day; a    | dd, as a j        | footnote,  | Brahmany <b>a</b>                       |
|              |               |                                                                            |           | - Ti  | irtha had a pu | pil named         | Vyása, wl  | ho wrote the                            |
|              |               |                                                                            |           | T     | átparya-chand  | <i>Iriká</i> on t | he Vedá    | nta Sútra.                              |
|              | 17            | "                                                                          | 1         | for   | cive           |                   | conduciv   |                                         |
|              | 19            | "                                                                          | 18        | ,,    | samáptti       |                   | samápat    |                                         |
|              | 43            | "                                                                          | 25        | "     | thum           | ,,                | thumb      |                                         |
|              | 61            | "                                                                          | 80        | "     | word           | ,,                | phrase     |                                         |
|              | 77            | "                                                                          | 24        | "     | drishtá        |                   | drashţá.   |                                         |
|              | 78            |                                                                            | 15        |       | the purpose of |                   | •          | urpose of                               |
|              | 83            | "                                                                          | 9         | "     | n              |                   | in         | arpose of                               |
|              | 91            | "                                                                          | 28        | "     | devotion       | 37                | steadfas   | + = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = |
|              | 96            | "                                                                          | 20<br>80  | "     |                | »<br>Im heatile   |            |                                         |
|              | 80            | "                                                                          | ðV        | "     | and naturall   | •                 |            |                                         |
|              |               |                                                                            |           |       | -              |                   |            | even natur-                             |
|              |               |                                                                            |           |       | •              | -                 |            | side those                              |
|              |               |                                                                            |           |       | who have       | acquired          | 10         |                                         |

Digitized by Google

ccxxiv

.

· ·

#### ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

| , 11                                    | 4,   | 20-2         | 1"    | steadiness              | "    | steadfastness                           |
|-----------------------------------------|------|--------------|-------|-------------------------|------|-----------------------------------------|
| 13                                      | 5,,  | 8            | "     | (anyatva)               | "    | anyatva                                 |
| 15                                      | 2,,  | 27           | "     | out                     | "    | out of,                                 |
| 15                                      | 8°,, | 1            | after | attainment of greatness | add  | or unlimited reach<br>of organs such as |
| 16                                      | 4 "  | <b>25</b> -2 | 7 for | country                 | read | situation                               |
| 16                                      | 8 "  | 16           | "     | the perfections         | "    | Perfections                             |
| ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, | , ", | 22           | ,,    | boy                     | "    | bod <b>y</b>                            |
| 17                                      | 5,,  | 28           | ,,    | eteology                | "    | etiology                                |
| 17                                      | б"   | 7            | "     | he                      | "    | the author                              |

.

,

•

# (Sanskrit.)

.

| १ष्ठं      | पङ्किः          | শয়ৰ                        | ग्रबं                               |
|------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| ٩          | ٩               | सत्युत्तिमिः                | सित्य् <b>क्ति</b> भिः              |
| L.         | ۶.              | परिंचासाय                   | परिंचासायां                         |
| E          | ę               | বিহ্য                       | ৰিৰ্যা                              |
| १०         | 18              | <b>शावना</b>                | भावना                               |
| ११         | ٩               | শ্বভাগি                     | बरानि                               |
| 22         | •               | म्टेबी <b>त</b>             | र्यशैव                              |
| १२         | ९               | नासच                        | <b>वास</b> च                        |
| १२         | 8               | निराध                       | निरोध                               |
| 24         | ٦               | ' ৰস্যাঃ'                   | ' चार्याः'                          |
| ŧ٢         | <b>₹-११</b>     | <b>ন্যা</b> ন               | स्यान                               |
| ١C         | १•              | रेकाम                       | रेकाय                               |
| २०         | १०              | यद्वाधात्                   | <b>यदाधा</b> त्                     |
| 99         | <b>t K</b>      | <b>वी</b> यसा <b>यः</b>     | वीयमानः                             |
| १२         | 8, <b>4</b> ,4, | ৩ খন্দিন্                   | मंबित्                              |
| <b>6</b> 8 |                 | परसाम्बनः                   | परसाखनः                             |
| <b>९</b> ७ | N.              | তন্দ্র ।                    | छक्तां तत् चलिज्ञपर्यंश्वानं ।      |
| <b>8</b>   | •               | सालिकः                      | <b>सास्त्रिकः</b>                   |
| 75         | •               | <b>नुव</b> संवित्           | <b>तुव</b> संवित्                   |
| 8.         | 24              | निर्विष्टं                  | निर्दिष्ठं                          |
| 8V.        | ۲.              | क्तेमा,                     | केगाः,                              |
| ۶Ę         | e               | 'লাৰহীয়ি'                  | 'ল্লাৰহীয়িং'                       |
| 80         | 9               | प्रवायामस्त्रीयां           | प्रादायामखेय्य                      |
| <b>X</b> • | १२              | संग्र <b>यविपय्यैास</b> रपं | <b>संग्र</b> वविपय्यास <b>रू</b> मं |
| N.P        | ١.              | 'त्रभाषयं',                 | 'त्रध्राचय्यं'                      |
| 24         | १२              | सरपं                        | सद्पं                               |
| x0         | •               | प्रवायामानभिषाय             | प्राचायासामसिषाय                    |
| x.o        | १व              | प्रवायासात्                 | प्राचायासात्                        |
| И́н        | ۲               | प्रबाबामिः                  | प्रायासः                            |

----

# ccxxvi Addenda et corrigenda.

| ĸe         | ۲. | द्यानवतिरेवेन              | <b>बागयतिरेके</b> व           |
|------------|----|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 99         | ۲  | 1 मं                       | <b>ग्रे</b> यं                |
| <b>(</b> = | •  | <b>ম</b> আঁমিয় <b>ৰ</b> ল | सम्बद्धारम्                   |
| (e         | 0  | <b>भनेनाभिप्रावेनेवेन</b>  | <b>चनेनामिप्रावेचेवेय</b>     |
| 00         | 2  | वविद्यानुदयः               | <b>ৰ্</b> ষিতান <b>ু</b> ৰ্ব: |
| 90         | 2  | भेक्त्रप्रमात्             | भाकृरूपलात्                   |
| ٤•8        | 24 | विवेवापण्याहोत्तरपि        | विवेवाग्रहणादमाक्तरपि         |

# THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

#### INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Ganesa. May that semi-corporeal union\* of S'iva and his spouse (S'ivá) by the recollection of which man enjoys isolation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal S'iva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold paint which besets mankind.

3. That unprecedented work § of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (*Purusha*) from nature (*Prakriti*) to be Yoga ((true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

§ Lit., saying.

<sup>•</sup> A fit of jealousy, according to the Káliká Purána, had caused a temporary separation between S'iva and his spouse Durgá. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

female. Other causes have been assigned for this union. † Separation of the human soul from all association with nature. *Vide* p. 207.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>‡</sup> Viz., lst, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. *Vide* Wilson's Sáñkhya-káriká, p. 2.

A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment of, lit. disunion from (*visoga*), the world is a conditio sine qua non to the Yogi, which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is separation from sensuous objects is the union or dissolution of the thinking principle in its original source.

<sup>¶</sup> Patanjali is believed to have been an incarnation of Ananta, and the title indicates that idea. *Vide* Introduction, p. lxvii.

#### INTRODUCTION.

even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.<sup>‡</sup>

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

+ All these works of Bhoja are still extant.
+ Commentators each dark passage shun—

1 "Commentators each dark passage shun— And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun." St. Jerome "not versions but inversions." Italian, *Traduttori traditori* "Translators traitors." "Surrender rather than render ; Not turning, but overturning."

2

٢

<sup>\*</sup> A title of Bhoja.

# THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

#### INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Ganesa. May that semi-corporeal union\* of Siva and his spouse (Sivá) by the recollection of which man enjoys emancipation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings !

2. We praise that eternal Siva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold paint (which besets mankind.)

3. That unprecedented work of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (*Purusha*) from nature (*Prakriti*) to be Yoga (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes, ¶ which are

‡ Viz., 1st, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. *Vide* Wilson's Sáñkya-káriká, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment lit. disunion (viyoga) from the world is a conditio sine qua non to the Yoga which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is abstraction from sensuous objects is concentration in the Divinity.

¶ Various causes have been assigned for this title of Patanjali. Vide Introduction.

1

enu

<sup>•</sup> A fit of jealousy, according to the Káliká Purána, had caused a monorary separation between Siva and his spouse Durgá. On their reconcitation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

The matrix is the product of the product of the state of the state of the product of the produc

#### INTRODUCTION.

even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Ranarangamalla,\* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patanjali, and written a treatise on medicine called the Rájamrigánka† may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning fo their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.<sup>‡</sup>

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mistifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting its inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons.



<sup>•</sup> A title of Bhoja.

<sup>+</sup> All these works of Bhoja are still extant.

Commentators each dark passage shun— And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun,"
 St. Jerome "not versions but inversions." Italian, *Traduttori traditori* "Translators traitors."
 "Surrender rather than render; Not turning, but overturning."

### CHAPTER FIRST.

## Now, an exposition of the Yoga (is to be made).

This aphorism explains the subject of the work, the object with which it is written, and the relation (it bears to the subject). (The word) "Now"\* (*atha*) suggests (that) a (distinct) topic (here commences), and it serves also as a benediction.

(The word) Yoga means 'union,' or the application of the mind to abstract contemplation, from the root yug "to meditate." An "exposition" (anus'ásana) is that whereby something is expounded or described through its characteristic marks, its real nature, its distinctive divisions, its causes and effects. (The two words Yoga and anus'ásana form the compound) Yoganus'ásana, (which means) "an exposition of the Yoga." This is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this work (of Patanjali).

Yoga, with the means of performing it and its fruit, constitutes the subject, that being treated of in this Institute. The object of the work is the explanation of the subject, and the fruit thereof is the emancipation obtainable by the Yoga. The relation of the work is the connection which exists between that which treats, and the subject treated of, (or the Institute and its subjects). The connection between Yoga, the subject, and its effect, which is emancipation (*Kaivalya*), or the means and the end, is also its relation. The substance of this is—that in the work are described the instruments of performing the Yoga which is its subject that Yoga the accomplishment of which leads to the consummation of emancipation called *Kaivalya*.

[Dr. Ballantyne has rendered the word Yoga into "concentration." That English word, however, in its ordinary signification, does

<sup>•</sup> Dr. Ballantyne's text has athátah "now then."

not convey anything like a fair idea of what Yoga means. The word meditation would have been more appropriate, but even that does not convey all the ideas which the Sanskrit term has been made to comprehend. A perfect English equivalent is not to be had, and I prefer, therefore, to use the original term to coining a new one. The commentator so explains the word Anus' ásana as to convey the idea that it is a verbal noun intended to explain the purport of the work. The commentary named Pátanjalabháshya takes it along with the word Yoga to be the specific name of the work. (Yogáns'ásanam náma s'ástram). If this be accepted, and it appears to be the most appropriate, the aphorism should be rendered into, "Now, the (work called) Yogánusásana, (will be expounded)." Váchaspati Miśra, the annotator on the last named work, and Vijnána-bhikshu in his Vártika, take notice of this subject. They also raise the question about the origin of the doctrine. They hold that Patanjali was not the originator of the doctrine, for it has existed from creation, and Hiranyagarbha was the first performer of the Yoga; but that he was merely the compiler of the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them. Nanu hiranyagarbao yogasya kartá nányah purátana iti yogiyájnavalkyasmriteh, katham patanjaler yoga-śástritvamityás'afikya sútrakárena anus ásanamítyuktam, s'ishtashyánusásanam.)]

Now what is this Yoga? To this the author replies :---

#### II.

Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.

"Thinking principle" (chitta) is of the form of goodness without a taint. "Functions" (vritti) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. "Yoga" or meditation is described to be the "suppression" (nirodha), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of

the tendency outward, of the functions in question. This suppression is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are-restless activity, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity (kshipta) is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (múdha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Rákshasas), ghosts (Pis'áchas), &c. Voluptuousness (vikshipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness (sattva), and is observable in the Devas. Tt amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c. in a disorderly way is this : notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this : that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, viz., concentration and suppression, that in which

:

the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable.

[The most important word in the aphorism is chitta which has been rendered into "thinking principle" by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word manas "mind," and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy -i. e., "that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills," (Taylor, Elements of Thought,) " or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned," (Harris, Hermes, p. 227)-he is right. In the Sáfikhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart manas has been used in the same sense (Mahadákhyamádyam káryam tanmanah, I, 71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sánkhya aphorisms the word *chitta* does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyáya. The Vedántísts use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhi (Vedánta-sára). Its equivalent in the Sánkhya is Adhyavasáya, which is synonymous with Buddhi. (Adhyavasáyo buddhih, II, 13). It is called Mahat "the great one," because "it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole." (Mahattvam svetara-sakalakárya-vyápakatvan-mahaiśvaryáchcha.) It is mati " understanding," because every thing is understood by it, (manyati anayá) ; khyáti "familiar knowledge;" jnána, and prajná. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by chitta is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sánkhya does, and by savCHAPTER FIRST.

cancel

the tendency outward, of the functions in question. The form is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking That suppression being common to all the condiprinciple. tions of the thinking principle is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are-unquietness, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of unquietness (kshipta) is induced by the access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, and Titans, sons of Danu &c. Addiction to evil action without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (múdha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Rákshasas) and ghosts, (Pisáchas) &c. Voluptuousness (vikshipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness, (sattva), and is observable in the Devas. Tŧ amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes active (or desirous); by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression having an excess of the quality of the goodness and foulness, successively placed, are reckoned fit for that.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c. in a disorderly way is this : notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this : that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, *viz.*, concentration and suppression, that in which

Digitized by Google

 $\mathbf{5}$ 

the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their impressions. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable.

[The most important word in the aphorism is chitta which has been rendered into "thinking principle" by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word manas "mind," and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy -i. e., "that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills," (Taylor, Elements of Thought,) " or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned," (Harris, Hermes, p. 227)-he is right. In the Sánkhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart manas has been used in the same sense (Mahadákhyamádyam káryam tanmanah, I, 71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sánkhya aphorisms the word chitta does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyáya. The Vedántís use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhi (Vedanta-sa'ra). Its equivalent in the Sánkhya is Adhyavasáya which is synonymous with Buddhi. (Adhyavasáyo buddhih, II, 13). It is called Mahat "the great one," because "it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole." (Mahattvam svetara-sakalakárya-vyápakatvan-mahaiśvaryáchcha.) It is mati "understanding," because every thing is understood by it, (manyati anayá); Khyáti "familiar knowledge;" jnána, and prajná. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by chilta is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sánkhya does, and by say-

Digitized by Google

ing that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (*Vritti-nirodhát tatsiddhih*, III, 31). Thus Váchaspati Miśra—chitta-s'abdenántahkaranam buddhimupalakshayati. According to the order of creation prakritri comes first, thence chitta, thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtile organs &c., and this both according to the Sáńkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense.

The next word is *vritti*. I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into "functions." The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness. In so far they are allotropic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijnána Bhikshu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which *prakriti* is the materiality. (*Parinámarúpam jagadupádánakatvantu-prakrititvam*.) *Parináma* or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying "they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions." Vijnána Bhikshu calls it transformation of Prakriti, (*prakritivirúpam*). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne's use of the term "modification" affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive.

The last word is *nirodha*, which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same.

The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The *Pátanjala-bháshya* points this out by saying that since the word sarva "all" has not been used before vritti "functions," the form of Yoga in which there is a distinct recognition is also Yoga. (Sarvasabdágrahanát samprajnátopi Yogah). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification.]

#### APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

Now the author of the Sútras, wishing to describe the words *chitta-vritti-nirodhah*, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word *chitta*.

#### III.

Then (*i. e.* at the time of meditation) there is abidance of the spectator in its own form.

"Then," at that time, the soul, as "the spectator,"  $(drasht\dot{a})$ "abides" remains in its own form, which is simple intelligence (and nothing more). The meaning is this: that on knowledge being fully developed, there being no shadow of any sensuous object cast on the thinking principle, and the egotism of one's self, which is the actor, being gone, and intellect being fit for liberation, the soul abides or obtains location in Buddhi which is its own form.

[The spectator is the soul which, abiding in the body, and influenced by the thinking principle, beholds what is done by the organs, but does not partake of the pleasures and pains resulting from their action, and in the state of Yoga the functions beingstopped there is the spectator without any spectacle to behold. This spectator is the soul.]

What then is the form (of the soul) when waking (or active, *i. e.* other than in a state of meditation)? To this he replies:

#### IV.

At other times it is in the same form as its functions.

"At other times"—*i. e.*, at times other than that of meditation. Its "functions" are those the characteristics of which will hereafter be described (A. V.) "In the same form" means to consist of it. The purport is this. Even as the functions, involving pleasure, pain and bewilderment, manifest themselves, so does the soul *i. e.*, it appears so to itself. If so, it follows that that object, in which, in the state of modification produced by concentration, the power of understanding finds its own form, and which being influenced by the functions of the senses resolves itself into worldly objects, and the soul appears manifest in the forms thereof, as the moon reflected in the moving ripples on the water, appears as if it were (itself) moving, is the thinking principle *chitta*.

[It is a dogma of the Hindu metaphysicians that the thinking principle or intellect assumes the form of the object perceived. And the aphorism explains that when that principle is immersed in complete Yoga it perceives itself and nothing more, but when it is active and influenced by external objects it assumes the forms of its excitants].

To explain the term function, (the third word in A. II,) the author says :---

#### V.

The functions are fivefold, (and they are either) painful or not painful.

The "functions" (vritti) are certain modifications of the thinking principle. The word *panchatayi* (five-fold) is formed by the addition of the affix *tayap* (Pánini v. ii. 42), and implies that the totality of the forms of the functions constitutes the form-bearer, and the functions severally are the forms thereof. The five functions are what are meant.

How are they? They are painful or not painful. "Those that are involved in sufferings of the kind about to be described are painful; those that are the reverse of these are not painful."

[This aphorism is a verbatim copy of Kapíla's aphorism 33, Book II. It only propounds what are to be explained in subsequent aphorisms].

The five functions are to be described after being named.

#### VI.

(The functions of the thinking principle are) right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory.

Of these the author gives the definitions successively.

2

### VII.

Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony.

Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge.

"Perception" (*pratyakska*) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic.

"Inference" (anumána) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it.

A trustworthy word is "testimony," (ágama).

[Pramána means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, *i. e.*, evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Sáńkhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Sáńkhya-káriká they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiyáyikas, however, reckon four kinds, viz., preception (pratyaksha), inference (anumána), comparison (upamána), and testimony (śabda). The Vedántís follow this latter, and the Mímáńskas recognise six, viz., perception (pratyaksha), presumption (arthápatti), proportion (sambhara), privation (abháva), comprehension (pratibha), and oral communication (aitihya).

The word used for perception is *pratyaksha*, which means "that which is seen," but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception,

4

"evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." For testimony Patanjali gives ágama, which means the Vedas, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym áptarachana "reliable words"; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony].

Having thus described the function of right notion the author speaks of Misconception.

#### VIII.

Misconception is incorrect notion, (or a notion) which abides in a form which is not that of its object.

"Misconception" (viparyaya) is a notion of something in respect of which it really is not; as the notion of silver in mothero'pearl. "Which abides in a form which is not that of its object" is to say a notion which does not abide in that form which is its (real) form (in respect of which the notion is entertained). It amounts to this, that the notion does not reveal the real form of the thing. Doubt (sañsaya) founded on the notion whether a thing abides in its proper form or not, such as whether a particular object seen is a man or the stump of a tree, is also a Misconception.

To describe the function of Fancy, he says :

# IX.

Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words, but of which (there is) no object (corresponding in reality).

Knowledge dependant on words is *śabda-jnána*. That which follows it, is *śabda-jnánánupáti* (the epithet used to define Fancy, which in the text has been translated by the word "notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words"). Such a notion without reference to the real character of an object is "Fancy." Thus the words, "the intelligence of the soul (*purusha*) is its own form." Here a notion is assumed by admitting a distinction as in the notion produced by the possessive case in the phrase "the blanket of Devadatta," though it does not really exist, for in fact the soul is intelligence itself (and there is no distinction between it and its intelligence, or of possessor and the possessed).

["In the soul

Are many lesser faculties, that serve Reason as chief; among these fancy next Her office holds; of all eternal things Which the five watchful senses represents She forms imagination's airy shapes,"

Paradise Lost, B. V.]

In order to declare what Sleep is, he says :

#### X.

Sleep is that function (of the thinking principle) which has for its object the conception of nothing.

Of that function which is based on the conception of nothing the name is as aforesaid (*abhávapratyayá*.) Hence it follows that "Sleep" (*nidrá*) is that function (of the thinking principle) which takes place on the quitting of all objects, in consequence of the quality of darkness always preceding it. That this is a function (of the thinking principle and not a mere blank) is proved by our seeing that one recollects (on arising from a sound sleep) that "I slept pleasantly," which could not have happened without a consciousness of it, (and no memory can exist of that which is not). Hence it is a function.

In order to describe Memory, he says :

# XI.

Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognised.

"The not letting go" (asampramosha) or not allowing to escape from our intellect an object which has once been recognised through (proper) evidence is "Memory" (smriti).

Of the five functions Evidence, Misconception, and Fancy belong to the waking state. When any of these, from vividness of impression, becomes perceptible (in sleep), it is a Dream (srapna.) But Sleep of itself has no cognisable object. Memory again is dependent on Evidence, Misconception, Fancy or Sleep.

[Bishop Hall says, "Memory is the great keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been." It is said to be dependent on Evidence, Misconception, &c., because the impressions it preserves are the productions of those causes.]

Having thus described the functions (of the thinking principle), in order to explain the suppression (the fourth word in A. II,) of these with the means thereof, he says:

### XII.

The suppression of these (functions is effected) by Exercise and Dispassion.

"Exercise" (abhyása) and Dispassion" (vairágya) will be defined in the aphorisms about to be given. The repression by these (Exercise and Dispassion) of the functions of the thinking principle which have the form of revealing, energizing and regulating, is "suppression" (nirodha). What is meant is the placing of the functions, which from their turning inwards have ceased to dwell on external objects, in the thinking principle, which is their original cause, and of which they are but potential attributes.

Aversion from sensuous objects is produced by "Dispassion" resulting from a knowledge of the evil influence of those objects (on the thinking principle), and confirmed steadfastness is acquired by "Exercise," which makes it a source of happiness and quiet; and by the (conjoined effect of the) two the functions of the thinking principle are suppressed. [The purport of this aphorism has been given by Kapila in six aphorisms, 31 to 36 of Book III.]

With a view to describe Exercise, he says :

#### XIII.

Exercise is the (repeated) effort that it (the thinking principle) shall remain in its functionless state.

Sthiti or "functionless state" is that condition of the thinking principle in which it abides in its own (original) form, free from all functions; and the effort or endeavour (repeated) again and again to bring it to that condition is "Exercise" or *abhyása*.

He next mentions a special character of that (Exercise).

# XIV.

It is again a firm ground attained by proper devotion for a long time unintermittingly.

It (Exercise) is a firm ground, *i. e.*, it becomes steadfast, or acquires firmness, by being assiduously attended to for a long time unremittingly with an excess of regard. The meaning is that it tends to firmness.

He now mentions the definition of Dispassion (A. XII.)

# XV.

The consciousness of being the subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects is Dispassion.

Objects are of two kinds, "Perceptible" (drishta) and "Scriptural" (ánus'ravika). The Perceptible is that which may be apprehended here (on earth), such as sound and other objects (perceptible through the organs of sense). The Scriptural is that which exists in the regions of the Devas or elsewhere (where it cannot be grasped by carnal organs). That which is heard (anus'rúyate) from the mouth of a preceptor is anus'rava or the Veda. What comes to our knowledge therefrom (i. e., from the Veda) is what is meant by "one heard of" ánus'ravika. Giving up all eagerness for these two classes of objects, on account of their becoming distasteful at the end, the reflection which ensues (in the thinking principle) to the effect that these are my subjects, but I am not their slave, is called Dispassion (Vairágya.)

1

[The word Vairágya (dispassion) is formed of the privative prefix vi, and rága, 'affection,' 'prepossession,' 'love,' 'desire,' the meaning being, in the technical sense in which it is used here, absence of desire for enjoyable objects. The absence, however, should not be accidental, as in the case of a child or of a stolid person where, owing to want of development of certain organs, it results without effort, but the fruit of due deliberation, and a conviction that the objects are not worth having, and that the desire for them should be suppressed.

The word vas'ikára-sanjná literally means "consciousness of being able to subjugate," in this instance the passions; but the commentators take it to be a mere indifference or apathy, neither affection nor hatred. Thus the Pátanjala Bháshya: "devoid of hatred and desirability" (heyopádeya-sunyá); and Váchaspati Miśra explains the phrase by the words "a sense of indifference having neither attachment nor hatred" (ásafgadvesharahitá upekshábuddhik).

The word rendered into 'perceptible' is drishta 'seen;' but, as illustrated by commentators, it means all worldly objects of sense; they may not be perceptible owing to excessive distance, extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, &c., (Sáúkhya káriká. V. VII.), still they are perceptible on this earth under some circumstance or other, and therefore included in the term. The Pátanjala Bháshya illustrates the term by naming women, food, drink, and power, (striyonnapánamaiśvaryamiti). Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "seen," which is its lexicographical meaning, but which is quite inadmissible here. Wilson, following Colebrooke, renders it into "temporal" which conveys the right technical meaning, but it becomes inappropriate under certain circumstances, as when we have to deal with *adrishta*, the antonym of *drishta*, in which case *non-temporal* would be unmeaning, for the word implies fate or what has not yet happened but may happen; *the unseen* is in that case the best.

The Sanskrit term for Scriptural is *ánuśravika*, which means "that which has been heard from another," but it has not been used in that sense here. As the commentators show, the secondary meaning of *ánuśrava* is the Veda, which is also called śruti, or "that which has been heard," and the object is to imply those rewards which the Veda promises to the performer of sacrifices &c. Colebrooke uses the synonym 'revealed.' The Patanjala Bháshya takes the rewards to mean heaven, rudimental body, and dissolution into nature (svargavaidehyaprakritilayah). Thus the dispassion implies not only indifference to worldly enjoyments and objects, but the same feeling also in regard to celestial and other forms of pleasure derivable by the performance of the rites enjoined in the Veda. The pleasures, both of this world and of the next, are equally temporary, and therefore should not be desired by one who longs for emancipation. Thus in the Sáńkhya-káriká: "The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others." (Wilson's Sánkhya-káriká, p. 13). In fact it amounts to the moral imperturbability of Pyrrho.]

A peculiarity in it is to be described.

# XVI.

Carried to the extent of indifference to the qualities it is the highest, as it is (then) conducive to a knowledge of God.

"It" i. e., "Dispassion." "Highest" (para) the most estimable. The first degree of "Dispassion" (A. XV) has regard to (ordinary) objects; the second, has regard to the (three) qualities, and it is ł

cive to a knowledge of the distinction between the product qualities and the (nonproduced) soul, from its extreme conduciveness to the perfect suppressive meditation.

[The object of this aphorism is to divide Dispassion into two kinds; one referring to enjoyable objects and called *visayavairágya*, and the other to qualities, *i. e.*, to the knowledge of the relation between the discrete and the indiscrete, (*vyaktávyaktadharmakebhyoviraktah*). The latter is described to be the highest, or most estimable, because it is more valuable than the former, in the attainment of the final object. The word *para* is the leading term in the Aphorism, and stands by itself, being predicated by what follow. But Dr. Ballantyne has subordinated it, by reducing it into a predicate. He says "This carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the qualities." This is obviously not the right meaning.]

Having thus stated the nature of Yoga, the author (next) mentions the differences existing between the nature of that kind of it in which there is consciousness (samprajnáta) and that in which consciousness is lost (asamprajnáta).

# XVII.

Conscious, because it is attended with argumentation, deliberation, joy and egoism.

The word "meditation" (samádhi) is understood to be present after the word conscious to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.

That which makes manifest without any doubt or error, *i. e.*, makes thoroughly manifest, the exact nature of the object pondered is "Conscious meditation,"(samprajnáta samádhi). Samádhi or meditation is a kind of pondering(bhávaná.) The suppression or exclusion of every function (of the thinking principle) except that which relates to the subject pondered is Conscious or Discriminative meditation; it is the same with "Seeded meditation"—savíja-samádhi. And from there being distinctions of argumentation,&c.,it is of four kinds, (namely) 1st, the "Argumentative" (savitarka); 2nd, the "Deliberative" (savichára); 3rd, the "Joyous" (sánanda); and 4th, the "Egoistic" (sásmita). "Pondering" is the taking again and again into the thinking principle of any particular object to the exclusion of all other objects. The object to be pondered is of two kinds; the Godhead (is'vara), and the categories or principles (tattvas). The last again are of two kinds according as they are "irrational" or "rational." The irrational are the twenty-four; the rational is the soul.

Among these (the four kinds of meditation), when accepting the gross elements and the organs as the objects, pondering is carried on with reference to which is antecedent and which is consequent, and the relation of the words to their meanings, it is called 'Argumentative meditation' (savitarka-samádhi). Should this pondering, however, be independent of the idea of their antecedence and their sequence and the relation between their names and meaning, it would be called "Non-argumentative" (nirvitarka). When pondering is engaged in with reference to something subtile. as the subtile elements and the internal organ, and to their qualities in relation to space, time, &c., it is "Deliberative" (savichára). But should this pondering be in regard to those subjects themselves, without reference to their relation to time and space, and simply as substrata of qualities, it is said to be "Non-deliberative" (nirvichára). What have been described up to this time are called Tangible Forms. (Gráhya-samápatti.)

When the quality of goodness of the Internal Organ tinctured with a little of the qualities of foulness and darkness is pondered, then consciousness being under the influence of qualities and the quality of goodness, which is full of the manifestation of happiness, becomes enlivened, the meditation becomes "Joyous" (sánanda). In this (kind of) meditation those of confined intellect who do not perceive the other (*i. e.*, last of the twenty-five principles, or the chief soul) are indicated by the word "bodiless" (videha), because they have risen above their body and egotism. This is the Acceptance Form. (Grahana-samápatti.)

Next, the pondering which has the pure quality of goodness untainted by foulness and darkness for its object, is called Egoistic or ontric meditation, (sasmita), because in it, from the enlivening of the intellectual power, the quality of goodness, which is the object of the pondering, is disregarded and its existence alone is perceived. It should not be supposed that there is no difference between this Ontric meditation and egotism, because where the Internal Organ knows objects with the use of (the word) I (i. e., with a knowledge of the distinction between itself and the object before it) it is egotism. But when mere existence is alone manifest in the thinking principle merged in nature from its reverse action resulting from its tendency inwards, it is egoism. In this (last kind of) meditation when contented (beings) do not perceive the Supreme Soul, and their mind is merged in its true cause, they are described to be Prakritilaya 'resolved into nature.'

Of the persons, who enter into pondering, knowing the Supreme Soul, the manifestation of intelligence is called the Form of the taker, *Grihitri-samáptti*.

Even in the argumentative meditation all the four kinds exist potentially, and successively as each is abandoned the others remain, and all these four kinds are Conscious meditation, or that which has a distinct recognition, samprajuáta-samádhi.

[Meditation is described to be of two kinds, 1st, that which is carried on with a clear understanding of the object reflected ed upon as distinct from the meditator; and 2nd, that in which no such distinction obtains and the intellect is merged in the soul. In the former, the subject of the aphorism, there are argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism, when the objects meditated upon are irrational objects, such as the first twenty-four of the twenty-five categories of the Sánkhya system which the Yoga school adopts; and they may not exist when the rational soul is the object. The first or Argumentative form applies to gross matter; and the second or the Deliberative applies to subtile matter. In both these the quality of goodness plays a subordinate part. When that quality attains ascendancy the meditation becomes "Joyous;" and it ceases to have connection with the body, or technically becomes disembodied. When it prevails without any taint of the foul and the dark qualities, the thinking principle is then believed to have merged into primæval nature. This is, however, not the highest reward, for it does not put an end to transmigration : on the evolution of creation from nature, the merging ceases, and there is again a separation. It will be noticed that the first two forms, the Argumentative and the Deliberative, have their negatives the Nonargumentative and the Non-deliberative; and these four form a class called the *tangible forms*.

The next is the "Joyous" kind in which the sense of the existence of the body is lost, and this is called the "acceptance form." In this there is no negative form, nor is there any such distinction in the next kind, the "Egoistic," in which every thing is identified with the self. This is called the "acceptor" form. In all these six kinds of pondering, there is, it will be perceived, a distinct recognition or consciousness of individuality, and hence they all come under the term Conscious. When this consciousness is lost, we come to the next class which forms the theme of the next aphorism.]

The author now describes that form of meditation in which consciousness is lost, asamprajnáta.

# XVIII.

The other is that in which the residua are ended, preceded by the exercise of thought as regards the cause of rejection.

By viráma is meant that whereby rejection takes place, *i. e.*, the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation &c., (A. XVII). *Pratyaya*, "thought," added to viráma, "cause of rejection," produces the compound expression viráma-pratyaya. Exercise (abhyása) is reiteration of the idea in the thinking principle. In this condition of exercise, constantly rejecting with a nega3

tive, "not this, not this," whatever ideas spring up, the result is the other or Unconscious meditation, or that in which there is no distinct consciousness, which has nothing left, and in which the residua are ended. It is the opposite of the former kind, and it is asamprajnáta-samádhi. In this condition there is nothing to be known, and therefore it is called Unconscious, undiscriminative, or seedless meditation (nirvíja).

Now, there are four modifications of the thinking principle, waking, commencing meditation, concentration, and suppression of . thought. Thereof (A. II) the waking state belongs to the two conditions of the thinking principle described as restlessness and mischievous ignorance. The quality of goodness being on the ascendant in the condition described as voluptuousness, it is that of commencing meditation. Concentration and absolute suppression are the final conditions. Each condition has its residua. Thereof, those residua which are present in the waking state are destroyed by those that are produced by the condition of commencing meditation, and those that are brought forth by the condition of commencing meditation, are destroyed by those due to the condition of concentration. The residua of the condition of concentration are destroyed by those of suppression. Even as lead melted with gold destroys the dross of gold as well as itself, so do the residua of the condition of suppression consume both themselves as well as the residua of the condition of concentration.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Sańskára, and it is just the one which has unfortunately not been explained either in the commentary of Bhoja, or in the PátanjalaBháshya. In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the Nyáya it occurs frequently in three different senses, viz., velocity (vega), thinking (bhávaná), and elasticity (sthitisthápaka). (Tarka-saſgraha). Adverting to the second meaning the Bhásáparichchheda, says: "Sañskára, called thinking, (bhávaná), resides in sentient beings; and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition." (Bhávanákhyástu sanskáro jívavrittiratíndryah.

# Upekshánátmakastasya nischayah káranam bhavet. Smarane pratyabhij<u>n</u>áyámapyasau heturuchyate.)

Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Roer in his translation of the Bháshá-parichchheda, for there it is described to be the cause of memory, and not memory itself. It is not sensation. nor impression, for it is not transient, but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the sensorium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be, nor eternal as the ancient Greek philosophers supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "self-reproduction of thought;" but there is nothing like "self-reproduction" in it; for it is said to be revived by external stimuli, and not by its own effort. It is something then-a trace, a mark, a celule, a psychograph-which perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect, to be revived afterwards under particular circumstances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell ('Mental Philosophy,' p. 95) "When a given mental impression is produced upon us, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not absolutely lost; for, if proper conditions occur, the impression is renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be something deposited within us which subsists permanently, and which is equally there, whether it be at any moment the immediate object of our consciousness or not. This something, then, we term a residuum, using the expression, it will be observed, without implying any theory on the subject whatever." The Sanskrit counterpart of this residuum is Sañskára. Every sensation, every impression, every perception, every idea, nay, every dream, leaves its trace behind, and the traces or residua so obtained constitute the sum total of

our experience, and these are Sanskáras. According to Indian philosophers these remain not only all life through, but even in subsequent states of existence, and they are, therefore, believed to be the cause of our instincts. The new-born infant takes to its mother's breast from the *sanskára* it has in its mind from its experience in a former existence.

The next word is s'esha, and it, too, has not been fully defined by the commentators. It means 'remainder' 'balance,' or 'end.' Compounded with sanskára the meaning is that in which the remainders are the sanskáras, or that in which the sanskáras are ended, or brought to a close. Bhoja accepts the second meaning, and he illustrates it by saying that in the state of Unconscious meditation in its perfection all previous sanskáras or residua of former conditions, as well as those of the perfect state, are destroyed, even as in the process of cupellation, lead melted with gold not only destroys the dross existing in impure gold, but also itself, leaving nothing behind. Thus the Unconscious meditation is seedless or has no object whatever for contemplation. The Pátanjala Bháshya takes a different view. According to it, in the Unconscious stage all functions are set at rest and the residua alone remain behind. (Sarva-vrittipratyastamaya-sañskáraśeshah nirodhah.) And Váchaspati Miśra emphasizes this by adding the word "alone"-sañskáras alone remain-(sanskára-mátra śeshah.) This contradiction may be explained by supposing that the Pátanjala-bháshya has in view a meditation from which there is awaking, while Bhoja describes the final meditation from which there is no further waking; for he admits that in the earlier stages of the Unconscious meditation there are residua peculiar to it. Yogis admit that people do wake from the Unconscious meditation, and that that meditation is often practiced, and in such cases the sañskáras must remain in a latent state to be revived by proper stimuli on waking. It is difficult satisfactorily to decide to what condition Patanjali himself referred to. The way in which he has used the word *sesha* would suggest the idea that he has been correctly interpreted in the Pátanjala Bháshya. See A. L. at the end of the chapter.

The state of Unconscious meditation above described is subject to the condition precedent, that there should be repeated acts of contemplation or exercise of thought amounting to a habit, as regards the necessity of rejecting all causes of disturbance. Without it the final stage cannot he acquired. This exercise of thought, however, forms a part of the Unconsious stage, and is totally unconnected with the Conscious form. Váchaspati Miśra ' preceded by the exercise of thought regarding the cause of rejection,' and for the sake of idiom put at the end of the sentence) describes the means, and the other two define the nature of the meditation in question" (púrvapaderupáyakathanamuttarábhyam cha svarúpa-kathanam). Dr. Ballantyne has mistaken the purport of the word, and made it the conditio precedent. His version is "The one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose ;---the other [---in-dependent of any fresh antedecent-] is in the shape of the selfreproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects.]" After what has been stated above, it is obvious that this version is not tenable. It may be added that it is not at all usual with authors of Sútras to repeat in a subsequent sútra what has been already explained in a previous one.]

Having thus stated the distinctions and the nature of *Yoga*, and having briefly mentioned the method of performing it, the author proceeds to speak of those methods more fully.

#### XIX.

Of (the meditative states attained to by the two classes of aspirants technically called) the Unembodied and the Resolved into nature, the world is the cause.

The "unembodied" (videha) and the "resolved into nature" (prakritilaya) have been described in the aphorism on the argumentative and other forms of meditations (A XVII, pp. 18 f.)

24

a.

CHAPTER FIRST.

Of their meditation the world is the cause. The word bhavaprataya is formed of bhava 'world' and pratyaya ' cause.'

The meaning is this: that such persons, from their entrance into the world (on account of their deserts), become participators of similar (inadequate) meditation. Not being conscient of ultimate reality, for them this is a mere exercise of the Yoga. Hence, exertion should be made for the knowledge of the ultimate reality and in the contemplation thereof, with a view to the attainment of deliverance. This is the object for which this has been said.

[In the commentary on aphorism XVII, among the conditions of Conscious meditation disembodiedness and resolution into primæval nature have been pointed out as high. Here the object is to show that those results are secondary, and of the earth earthy. They do not secure the ultimate end of Yoga. They are accordingly meditations, of which the world or Prakrití is the cause. They are, nevertheless, desirable exercises as preparatory to the state in which the ultimate reality is revealed.] Of others :---

#### XX.

(In the case) of others this (meditation) is preceded by Inclination, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.

"Of others" *i. e.*, of Yogís, other than (those who have been described as) "the disembodied" and "the resolved in nature." "Preceded by inclination" &c.; that meditation which has *śraddhá* &c. as the first means, is called *śraddhádipúrvaka*. These, inclination and the rest, act successively as the means and the end, *i. e.* they serve as the means or instruments for the Conscious meditation. Thereof "Inclination" (*śraddhá*) is approbation in favour of the Yoga. "Energy" (*vírya*) is strenuous exertion. "Memory" (*smriti*) is not letting out what is once cognised. (A. XI, p. 12.) "Meditation" (*samádhi*) is intentness on a single point. "Discernment"  $(praj\underline{n}\dot{a})$  is thorough understanding of that which is to be known. Now, he who has "Inclination" gets "Energy," or becomes persevering in favour of Yoga. In the condition of "Energy" comes "Memory" of former states, in which the thinking principle meditates; and the thinking principle which has meditated knows thoroughly what it has thought upon. All these are the expedients of the Conscious form of meditation. From the (frequent) exercise of that meditation and from extreme dispassion Unconscious meditation ensues.

[This aphorism explains the practices which should be adopted by the neophyte in the first stage of his career as a Yogí. He must have Inclination for the exercise he cannot then undertake. The Inclination then, must be followed by Energy, or active exertion. Then there should be Memory of what he has learnt. Next, there should be frequent exercise of Meditation of some being or other to bring on the habit for it. And, lastly, there should be clear Discernment of what should be done and what should be avoided.]

Of the Yogís possessing the above mentioned expedients he next describes the sub-divisions according to the different expedients they adopt (for the attainment of their object).

# XXI.

# Proximate for the ardently impetuous.

(To complete the aphorism the words :) "The attainment of the state of meditation" are required to be supplied. "Impetuous" (sañvega), energetic exertion for the execution of a work. "Ardent" (tivra), excessively, in a high degree. On the part of those who are thus ardently impetuous, the attainment of Meditation is "proximate" (ásanna). The fruition of Meditation is also proximate, *i. e.*, quickly accomplished.

[Having in the preceding aphorism pointed out the practices to be adopted by Yogís, the author in this lays special stress on the necessity for ardent application. A lukewarm feeling is not enough for immediate or early fruition. The application should be "ardently impetuous" to ensure quick reward.]

Who are then ardently impetuous? To this he replies.

# XXII.

There is a further distinction, from there being the mild, the moderate, and the excessive.

There are specific distinctions among those who adopt these expedients, from the mild and other expedients being different. The divisions of the expedients are "mild" (mridu), "moderate" (madhya), and "excessive" (adhimátra). These are severally threefold, from their being severally subdivided into "the mildly impetuous," "the moderately impetuous" and "the excessively impetuous." And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of Yogís. The mild expedients are (severally) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The moderate expedients are (also) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The excessive expedients are (likewise), "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." And great endeavours should be made for the attainment of the "ardently impetuous" form of the excessive method. So much for the declaration of the distinctions of Yogís.

[The object of this aphorism is to classify Yogís into different orders according to their respective arduousness. Some are mildly, others moderately, and others ardently disposed, and so each group forms an order. Again in their mildness and the rest there may be degrees varying from mildness to moderateness and ardency, and so each of the three orders has three sub-divisions, making a total of nine groups. The injunction is that Yogís should exert to pass through the several orders as quickly as possible, so that the attainment of the final stage may not be delayed.]

Now he mentions an easy expedient, distinct from the preceding expedients.

#### XXIII.

# Or by devotion to God.

"God" (Iśvara) will be described presently (A. XXIV). "Devotion" (pranidhána) is a form of resignation to Him. It is thorough worship of Him, and the consignment of all one's actions to Him. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to Him, the preëminent guide, is "devotion," pranidhána. This is an important means of meditation and of its fruition.

[In this aphorism the author departs from the Sánkhya system, by introducing devotion to God as a facile and ready means of attaining the end. God, however, is not made the end, but the means to an end of which He forms no integral portion. The theory of resignation or dedication of the fruits of all actions to Him, is evidently borrowed from the Bhakti system in which it plays the most important part. In entire reliance on the providence of the Godhead, the Bhakta wishes for no fruition whatever. Whatever he does is for the service of the Divinity, and He in His mercy is to grant whatever He thinks proper. In the Bhagavad Gítá this is made the cardinal point of faith, (IX, 27,) and there it appears quite consistent; but in the Yoga system Kapila found no necessity for it, and Patanjali adopts it as a sort of compromise to give a theistic character to his system; but it plays only a very subordinate part.]

It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (XXIX).

#### XXIV.

God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires.

Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (klesah). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. " Works" (karma), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the S'ástras), as also what are mixed, *i. e.*, partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are "deserts" (vipáka). They are kind, age and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (ásaya). "Untouched," (aparámrishta,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (Purusha-višesha), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (I'svara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness. This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom aud almightiness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakriti and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Isvara. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the Yogi, by the reflection of the soul, known; but such is not the case with Isvara. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Isvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by S'ástric means (such as the Yoga, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor

is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is I' is vara. Derived from the root I', it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is purusha, which means a man, or the soul of a man-that which abides (shete) in the body (pure); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but as the dualism indicated by European philosophers between soul or animal life  $(\Psi v_{\chi \eta})$  and spirit, or rational life (Ilvevua) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedántic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and, to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achárya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus :

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápáśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as S'iva,—the Vaishnavas as Puru-

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER FIRST.

Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (klesah). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (karma), such as are enjoined or prohibited (in the S'ástras), as also such as are mixed, *i. e.*, partly one and partly the other. What ripens out of those works are "deserts" (vipáka). They are the results of actions, such as caste, existence, and enjoyment. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (ásaya). "Untouched," (aparámrishta,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (purusha-viśesha), who is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (Iśrara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of troubles does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the troubles abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the troubles in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to His sempeternal greatness in the quality of goodness. This greatness is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependant, His wisdom and greatness are not mutually dependant, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that greatness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakriti and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Isvara. In ordinary beings, the thinking principle is modified into pleasure, pain and delusion, but in the body of the Yogí, being touched by the reflection of the thinking principle (in its purity) it becomes known as reflected. Such is not the case with Isvara. He is, by reason of His eternity, always solely of the quality of goodness and super-excellence; he exists as the object (of our meditation). Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Isvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by S'ástric means (such as the Yoga &c.). In His case, however, being always in that

29

condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Isvara. Derived from the root Is, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is *purusha*, which means a man, or the soul of a man-that which abides (shete) in the body (pure); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but in philosophical works it is always used for soul, and to preserve the spirit of the text I have accepted that word. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedántic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and to avoid trouble uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the incidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achárya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu It runs thus : works.

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápáśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as Siva,—the Vaishnavas as Puru-

30

shottoma,—the followers of the Puránas as the great Father (Brahmá),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed, the Mímáñsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Chárvákas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyáya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarman,)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Síva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?"—(Cowell's Kusumánjali, p. 2.)

For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough; but it is not absolutely correct. The Chárvákas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kápilas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved. Kapila, in the Sáńkhya aphorisms says, "It is not proved that there is a God." (Is'varásiddheh I. 92.) This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballantyne's translations of the aphorisms on the subject.

Aph. 2.—Not from its [—the world's—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—*i. e.*, by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,— ["by works alone, which are indispensable,"—and if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

Aph. 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for

"if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord ;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c."].

Aph. 5.—Or ["if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely"] a technical term ["for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will"].

Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, ["and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered."—"Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not properties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply, —as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative"].

Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. "In regard to the latter alternative he says"].

Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; ["that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c. ;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown"].

Digitized by Google

Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [--" in the first place, there is not sense-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable;" as he proceeds to show].

Aph. 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord]. because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken ;---" and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion" that every product should have had an intelligent maker].

Aph. 12.-Moreover, there is scripture for this [world's] being the product of Nature [-not of a Lord]." (Sánkhya Aphorisms, pp. 114*f*.)

I should add here that some Kápilas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says "The existence of such a Lord is a settled point," (III, 5 and 7), meaning by "such" an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is in no sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedánta Sútra treats of this subject; but it is too long to be quoted here.

The Pátanjala Bháshya points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus : "If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones? (Not so.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God. Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God-He is sempeternally emancipated and sempeternally the Lord." Kaivalyam práptáhstarhi santi cha bahavah kevalinah. Te hi trini bandhanám chhitvá kaivalyam 5

práptáh ; iśvarasya cha tat sambando na bhuto na bháví. Yathá muktasya púrvabandhakotih prajnáyate naivamiśvarasya. Yathá vá prakritilinasyottará bandhakotih sambhávyate naivamiśvarasya ; sa tu sadeva muktah sadeveśvarah.]

Having described the identity of God, the author next produces a proof that such a being exists.

#### XXV.

# In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity.

In that God the seed of omniscience, as also of parvitude and magnitude and of knowledge of the knowers of the past, the future &c., attains its "infinity," (niratisaya)\* or highest perfection. Being the source like a seed it is called seed (rija). It is well known that of the qualities of parvitude and magnitude, which have degrees, there is an absolute perfection. Thus, the perfection of parvitude is seen in atoms, and that of magnitude in the sky. In a similar manner knowledge and other manifest attributes of the thinking principle compared with each other must somewhere attain the highest perfection, and wherever they are in the highest perfection, that is God. Although from the general character of this inference no precise being is proved, yet in the S'ástras His omniscience and other qualities may be precisely learnt.

But how does He, without any impulse of Hisown, cause the union and separation of Prakriti and Purusha? Such a doubt should not be entertained. Being merciful, He finds in His mercy to creation the impulse. His impulse is the wish "I shall rescue all creation (from pain) at the periodical minor and great pralayas." What ever is desirable to one, is his impulse.

[The logical force of this aphorism is not apparent. It is a mere assertion, and can scarcely be taken as a proof, as the Commentator puts it forward to be. He himself felt the difficulty, and escaped out of it by appealing to the authority of the S'ástra.

• Niratisaya, limitness, greatness, or infinity.

34

The S'ástra here referred to is the Sáfkhya, and the P. Bháshya quotes a passage from the work of Panchasikha which shows that "the first knower, lord, and great sage, with a view to creation, in his mercy taught this science to the enquirer Suri." *Adividvánnirmánachittamadhishtháya kárunyát bha*gaván paramarshi rósuraye jijnásumánáya tantram pravácheti. The first knower is Kapila, who, being an incarnation of Vishnu, obtained the science from Sayambhu or Maheśvara.]

Having thus described the identity and proof of the existence of God, the author refers to His greatness.

#### XXVI.

He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not defined by time.

Even of the primary creators such as Brahmá and others, he is the "instructor," or preceptor, because "He is not defined by time," for He has no beginning, while the others are so defined, having a beginning.

[The word guru has been translated "instructor" in accordance with the text, and after the commentator who supplies the equivalent upadeshtá. It may be more appropriately rendered into "noblest" or "greatest," as it would make the reason assigned, undefined by time, more consistent, for want of beginning, or being not circumscribed by time, does not imply tuition. The object of the explanation, however, is to refer to the first tutor Maheśvara to whom reference has been made in the last note. In the P. Bháshya no equivalent is given of the word, but the sense is explained by the word yathásya sargasyádau prakarsha-gatyásiddhak, tathátikránta-sargádisvapi pratyetavyak.

Váchaspati Miśra explains the term by prakarsha "superior:" na vartate prakarshásya gatih práptih pratyetavya ágamát tadanena prabandhena bhagaváníśvaro daršitah.

In giving the purport of the aphorism he uses the words : Samprati bhávatah brahmádibhyah viśeshamáha.] Having thus described the greatness of God, the author now supplies His indicator, with a view to help people in their devotion.

# XXVII.

# His indicator is the Pranava.

Of the Isvara thus described, the "indicator," name, expressive word, whereby one is thoroughly (pra=prakarshena) lauded (nu)or praised, glorified, or hymned is—pranava, which is the same with the syllable Om. (The sentence indirectly gives the derivation which is pra = "excessive" and nu = "to laud," whence Pranava). Between the two (the name and the being denominated) the relation of the indicator and the indicated is eternal. This is conventionally expressed, but not produced by any one; (it is the same) as in the case of a father and his son, when one points out the existing relation (by saying) "this is the father, and this is the son," (though the relationship exists from before, and is not produced by the saying.)

[Pranava is the technical name of Om, and the injunction is that that syllable should be frequently muttered. Care is taken to show that the relation between the indicator Om and the indicated God is eternal and not produced by man, and the example of the father and son explains what is intended. The Vedas, the Upanishads and all Hindu works recommend the same process, accepting the term as the most sacred name of the Divinity. See Chhándogya Upanishad, Chapter I. In two short notes, published in the 'Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal' for 1865, pp. 46-208, I take the word to be the Indianized form of the Hebrew *Aman* and the English Amen.]

His adoration is next enjoined.

# XXVIII.

Its repetition and the reflection on its meaning (should be made).

"Its," *i. e.*, of the Pranava, consisting of three and a half instants, "Repetition" (*japa*), pronouncing it in due order, and the "Reflection" (*bhávana*), the perception repeatedly of the God indicated by it, are the means of concentration of the thought in it. Hence, for the accomplishment of meditation (*samádhi*) the Pranava should be repeated, and its meaning reflected upon by a Yogí. This is declared.

[Om is ordinarily declared to be a compound of the letters  $\P$ (a)  $\blacksquare$  (u) and  $\blacksquare$  (m), which supply the three instants, and the conversion of the m into the nasal mark  $\bullet$  supplies the half instant. In prosody the word is a long syllable, but in modulated reading or recitation its prosodial quantity is a protracted circumflex sound.]

The fruit of such adoration is next described.

>

### XXIX.

Thence the right knowledge of the reverted perception, and the removal of obstacles.

From that repetition and that reflection the right knowledge of the "reverted perception" (pratyakchetaná) is effected in the case of Yogís. That "perception" (chetaná) or power of seeing, which turns towards its own internal organ, withdrawing itself from (or in opposition to worldly) objects, is called "reverted perception" (pratyak "turning back," chetaná "perception") · and a "right knowledge" (adhigama) of it is thereby acquired. The "removal" (abháva), i. e., the counteraction of the power of the obstacles about to be described is also effected.

[The natural function of the senses is to extend outwards, in order to receive the impressions of external objects and carry them to the sensorium, but that being suppressed by the Yogí, the senses turn inwards and find their object within, and therefore the function is called reversed, or reflex. The object of this roundabout way of description is to say that the senses hold communion exclusively with the soul.] Now, a doubt arising as to what are the obstacles ? he says :--

# XXX.

Disease, Langour, Doubt, Carelessness, Idleness, Worldly-mindedness, Mistaken notions, Unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and Instability therein; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles.

These nine, impelled by the force of foulness and darkness, become the causes of "distractions," *i. e.*, by these enemies to concentration the thinking principle is disturbed. Of the nine :---

(1) "Sickness" (vyádhi) is fever and the like, resulting from disordered humours.

(2) "Langour" (styána) is an indisposition of the thinking principle to work.

(3) "Doubt" (sañśaya) is the disposition of the thinking principle which relies on both sides of a question, as whether Yoga is practicable or not.

(4) "Carelessness" (pramáda) is a disposition not to exert, or indifference in performing meditation.

(5) "Idleness" (álasya) is a heaviness of the body and of the thinking principle, which is the cause of want of interest in matters relating to Yoga.

(6) "Worldly-mindedness" (avirati) is the inclination of the thinking principle to enjoy the pleasures of the world.

(7) "Mistaken notion" (*bhrántidarsana*) is wrong perception, such as taking a bit of mother-o'pearl to be silver.

(8) "Unattainment of any stage" (alabdha-bhúmikatva) is not attaining, for some cause or other, a particular stage of abstraction.

(9) "Instability" (anavasthitatva) is the condition in which the thinking principle having attained a stage cannot abide in it.

These being opposed to the practice of concentration of meditation, are called "obstacles," (antáráyáh).

To shew that there are other causes which produce distraction of the mind, he says :---

38

# XXXI.

Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expiration are the companions of distractions.

Whenever from any cause distractions are produced then pain &c., come on. Thereof-

(1) "Pain" (*duhkha*) is a modification of the foulness of the thinking principle; it is characterised by pain, which living beings exert to remove.

(2) "Distress" (daurmansya) is the agitation of the mind proceeding from external or internal causes.

(3) "Trembling" (afgamejaytva) is the shaking of the body which causes unsteadiness in the posture (of a Yogí).

(4) "Inspiration" (śvása) is a drawing in of the external air. The expulsion of the air from the lungs is "expiration" (praśvása).

These existing along with the (other) distractions, should be removed by the exercise and dispassion already described; (A. XII) and therefore they are noticed here.

[Pain here referred to is described in the Pátanjala Bháshya as of three kinds: mental, physical and supernatural. That which affects the mind without touching the body is mental, that which proceeds from disorders in the body is physical, and that which proceeds from evil spirits &c., is supernatural. The Sáākhya Karika notices all the three. (Wilson's Sáākhya Káriká, p. 2.)

The Pátanjala Rahasya gives pídá 'disease' as the equivalent of Duhkha.]

Another expedient for overcoming the obstacles with their accompaniments is now being pointed out.

# XXXII.

For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle.

For the "prevention" (*pratishedha* )or obstruction of those distractions, let there be "exercise" (*abhyása*) or repeated application of the thinking principle to some one selected "principle," (*tattva*), from the force resulting from which arise the condition of concentration, and thereby the distractions subside.

[In former aphorisms meditation has been declared to be of two kinds: conscious and unconscious, or seeded and seedless. The object here is to inculcate the necessity of constant exercise of the first, or the seeded form, to steady the mind, and prepare it for the more arduous and difficult phase in which there should be no object upon which to meditate, or the state in which, in the language of Wordsworth, "thought is not." The highest form of conscious meditation is intelligent communion with the soul, but this too is not at once practicable, and the instruction is that any one of the twenty-five categories may be taken up for meditation, so that the mind may be trained to the habit of concentrating itself at any one point at pleasure, and of remaining in that state of concentration without fatigue.]

Now he describes another expedient with advertence to certain works which help to purify the thinking principle.

## XXXIII.

The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice.

"Friendliness" (maitri) disposition to be friendly. "Compassion," (karuņá) mercy. "Complacency" (muditá) to be pleased. "Indifference" (upekshá) to feel neither pleasure nor pain. These feelings should be felt, in due order, for the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the sinful. Thus, to the happy one should be friendly, (saying) "blessed is their happiness;" and not be envious to them. For persons in grief he should show mercy, and desire how to relieve them from their grief, and not remain indifferent to their suffering. To the virtuous, with a view to encourage virtue, he should express satisfaction, and not be envious of them (sayCHAPTER FIRST.

ing) "Forsooth, are these virtuous"? For the vicious a feeling of indifference should be practised, neither encouraging nor hating them. In the aphorism, the word "happiness" &c. are intended to stand for persons possessing those qualities. These feelings of friendliness &c., producing cheerfulness in the thinking principle, easily bring on the condition of Samádhi. These acts are external (and not intrinsic parts of the Samádhi). Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful in the calculation of alligation, &c., (but are not in themselves integral parts of the main object), so the feelings of friendship, &c., antagonistic to envy, passion &c., producing cheerfulness, prepare the thinking principle for the conscious form of Samádhi. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerfulness induced, effects the concentration of the mind (to one object).

[The Aphorism suggests a second expedient that of cheerfulness. Unless the mind is cheerful it cannot be steady, and this cheerfulness is to be brought on by friendliness towards the happy, compassion for those who are in distress, complacency in regard to virtue, and indifference in respect to vice. Indifference in respect to vice might at first sight appear a very mild feeling, but hatred, detestation or other strong manifestation of feeling towards vice would mar cheerfulness, and itself be a cause of pain and unsteadiness; hence it is avoided.]

He points out another expedient.

# XXXIV.

# Or by expulsion and retention of the breath.

"Expulsion," (prachchhardana) means the throwing out of the air from the lungs in a fixed quantity through a special effort. "Retention" (vidhárana) is the restraint, or stoppage of the motion of breath for a certain limited time. That stoppage is effected by two acts—by filling the lungs with external air, and by retaining therein the inhaled air. Thus the threefold pránáyáma, including the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention of breath, fixes the thinking principle to one point of

6

concentration. All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of the breath—there being always a correlation of breath and mind in their respective functions,—the breath when overcome by stopping all the functions of the organs, effects the concentration of the thinking principle to one object. The Agama proclaims its power of destroying all defects thus: "All obstructive functions are caused by faults." Hence, by its destroying faults, it becomes effectual in producing concentration of the mind.

[The definition of "retention" (vidhárana) by the terms "stoppage of motion" (gativichchheda) is obviously faulty, but as the aphorism refers to "retention" immediately after the "expulsion" (prachchhardana) and the attempt to retain the breath after it has been fully expired would be futile, it is necessary to inspire before the breath can be retained, and the commentator is obliged to include that act along with the retention. The Pátanjala Bháshya calls the retention to be Pranáyáma (vidhárana pránáyamah), and in the Sánkhya Sútra this meaning is accepted. It is, however, not the generally accepted mean-All other Yogic and Tántric works regard the three acts of ing. expiration, inspiration and retention performed in specific order, to constitute the Pránáváma. The order is not always the same. Some have expiration first, inspiration next, and retention last. Others place inspiration first, retention next, and expiration last. The word mátrápramána in the commentary, which I have rendered into "fixed quantity," has been rendered into svalpa or "little" or " slowly" in the Pátanjala Bháshya ; but it does not express the true technical meaning. The object of the mátrá is to imply a fixed period of time. According to the Skanda Purána a mátrá is equal to the time required in one breathing, (Eka śrásamapi mátrá pránáyáme nigadyate), and to imply that this breathing must be natural, the Yoga-chintámani adds that this breathing should be during sleep (when there is no violent effort). Nidrávasangatasya puñso yávatkálenaikasváso gachchhatyágachchhati cha távatkálapránáyámasya mátretyuchyate.) And this

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER FIRST.

period is equal to two and a half palas. (Sárddha svása paladvayátmakah kálah, pránáyáma kála siddhah.) The pala here means the period occupied by a twinkling of the eye. The mátrá is obviously taken as a unit, and of these from 1 to 24 are devoted to a pránáváma according as it is inferior, middling, or superior. The mode of reckoning the time to be devoted to each act is regulated in one of two ways; 1st, by so many repetitions of the syllable Om, or the mystic mantra of the performer, or the specific mystic syllables (vija) of that mantra; 2nd, by turning the thumb and the index finger of the left hand round the left knee a given number of times. The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A Vaishnava in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the Víja mantra once while expiring, 7 times while inspiring, and 20 times while retaining. A Sakta repeats the mantra 16 times when inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation, and the capacity of the performer. As a general rule it may be said that longer is the retention the more proficient becomes the Yogí. The usual mode of performing the Prápáyáma is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place the ring-finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring-finger and the thum, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the Pranáyáma, and it may be repeated after short intervals according to choice for hours. The object avowed of this performance is the steadying of the mind. The Hatha-dipika philosophises on this by saying, "by the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves; when that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogí becomes firm as the trunk of a tree; therefore the wind should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body so long it is called living. Death is the exit of that breath, therefore it should be stopped."

("Chale váte chalam chittam niśchale niśchalam bhavet, Yogi sthánutvamápnoti tato váyumni rodkayet. Yávad váyuh sthito dehe tabajjívanamuchyate, Maranam tasya nishkrántistato vayum nirodhayet.")

Elsewhere the text asserts that this Pránáyáma is conducive both to health and longevity, and all minor works on Yoga and the Tantras generally expatiate at great length on the sanitary and the therapeutic advantages of practising it regularly at stated times. The Hatha-dápiká, in one place, says, "all diseases disappear in him who devotes himself to the Pránáyáma; without it in the state of practising Yoga every kind of disease arises." (Pránáyámádiyuktena sarvaroga kshayo bhavct, ayuktábhyásayogena sarvaroga samudbhavah. The idea seems to have travelled to the far West, and the spiritualists in America have accepted it as a recognised maxim of their system. Many spiritualists practice this Pránáyáma under the name of "deep breathing," and A. J. Davis, one of their apostles, in his "Harbinger of Health" (pp. 52-53), gives the following directions for curing diseases through its means.

"First, if your weakness be general, and the blood is loaded with cold matter, lay flat down on your back, and, while breathing deep, and slow, and uniformly, WILL YOURSELF TO BECOME HEALTHY—in your feet and hands, in your knees and elbows, in your hips and shoulders, in your bowels and liver, in your lungs and brain ! The heart will take care of itself. In cases where the weakness is generally distributed, all you are required to practice (while so prostrated and respiring) is the art of concentrating your Will and desires simultaneously on the extremeties first; then work upward and *inward* progressively; and when, in the lapse of ten minutes of steady, deep breathing, you have reached the brain, repeat the process in the ascending scale, as indicated in the manner aforementioned.

"By this Pneumogastric treatment of yourself, you will receive *spiritual* strength from the air—nothing is more certain ! When, by practice, you can *breathe* deeply and heroically, and at the same time put your Will upon the restoration of the general system, the art of fixing your mind upon some particularly diseased part will become less and less difficult. Consumptive persons, by simply breathing profoundly, and willing systematically, may enlarge their chests and lungs beyond the possibilities of disease. Persons of cold temperature, with irregular habits and bad practices, may "right about face" and become harmonially healthy. Learn to depend upon yourself—use the infallible remedies of Nature—and, in spite of priest or doctor, you will 'pass from death unto life.'

"TIME OF EXERCISES.—In acquiring this psychological power over the destinies of your bodily state, and in becoming a Selfhealing Institution, whether home or abroad—it may be necessary to practice (either while on your back, or standing, or walking, or riding,) perhaps three times in each twenty-four hours. Never just before meals, nor soon subsequent to them; but the true time is when chilification is going on; about 90 or 120 minutes after eating. The spirit world will aid you, by forming a secret conjunction with the *pneumogastric* conductor. It is certain, gentle sufferer; do not permit yourself to doubt. Nothing is too good in Nature, in matter, in spirit, or in truth."]

In pointing out another expedient, he foreshadows the conscious form of meditation.

#### XXXV.

Or cognition resulting from sensuous objects may be the cause of steadiness.

"Of the mind" (manasah is understood to) complete the sentence. "Sensuous objects" (vishaya) are odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, and that in which these reside as objects is vishayavati, the cognition whereof causes the steadiness of the mind. Thus, by directing the thinking principle to the tip of the nose, the cognition of spiritual odour is effected. In the same way the cognition of taste may be effected at the tip of the tongue, the cognition of colour at the forepart of the palate, the cognition of touch at the middle of the tongue, and the cognition of sound at the root of the tongue. Thus the cognition of spiritual sense-objects resulting through one or other of those organs becomes the cause of the concentration of the mind. This is to encourage Yogís in the belief that the Yoga has a fruit.

By this commentary the meaning of the text remains perfectly unintellegible to the uninitiated. The reason is, the commentator takes for granted that the rudimentary principles of Yoga are known to his readers. The purport is that in the act of Pránáyáma (as explained in A. XXXIV) when the Yogí directs his mind to the tip of his nose &c., he derives in the places mentioned a sense of those objects which is ordinarily acquired by their natural organs, and having done so, he feels no inclination to exercise those natural organs, and his mind settles down into undisturbed contemplation of the object to which he directs his mind. The commentator uses the word divya for which I use "spiritual" as the equivalent. The P. Rahasga uses alaukika or "supernatural" as the equivalent. The word *pravritti* in the text has been taken by the P. Bhasya to be equal to sanvit or cognition. In the commentary above and elsewhere the word manas mind has been sometimes used for chitta, thinking principle].

He describes another expedient of the same kind.

# XXXVI.

Or a sorrowless extremely luminous (disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle).

(The sense of the aphorism must be completed) by the terms, "disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle."

The word "lumen" (jyotis) means the manifestation (of the quality) of goodness. When it exists in its fulness, in any disposition it is called "extremely luminous" disposition (iyotismati). "Sorrowless" (viśoka) is that disposition in which the power resulting from the exercise of the delightfully pure element (goodness) [Briefly, the purport is that when the thinking principle is totally griefless, and manifest in the extreme refulgence of the quality of goodness, it is steady, and has no cause for vacillation.]

In course of pointing out another expedient, he describes the object of the conscious form of meditation—or discriminate meditation.

# XXXVII.

Or the thinking principle taking a passionless object (becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness).

The phrase "becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness" is understood to complete the sentence.

"The Passionless" (vitarága) are those who have abandoned all longings for sensuous objects, and their thinking principle, which has destroyed all pain, by being made the object of thought, becomes the cause of steadiness.

[The next expedient is the making the thinking principle of those who have overcome all passions the object of contemplation. Váchaspati Miśra explains this by saying "the passionless are Krishna Dvaipáyana and others. To make their thinking principle the object of thought is to rely thereon. Vítarágák Krishnadvaipáyana prabhritayah. Teshám chittam tadevávalambanam, tenoparaktamiti.]

He describes another expedient of this kind.

# XXXVIII.

Or reliance on knowledge resulting from dream or sleep.

"Dream" (svapna) is the perception by the thinking principle alone of the soul's agency when the functions of the external organs are dormant. "Sleep" (nidrá) has been already defined (A. X). The knowledge which results from "reliance" thereon, *i. e.*, reliance on dream or reliance on sleep, produces steadiness of the thinking principle.

[Although sleep has been defined to be absence of consciousness, the Yogís believe absence of consciousness to be a kind of knowledge. (See. A. X.) Váchaspati Miśra gives an illustration to show how the beatific vision of an image of Maheśvara may, on waking, tend to steady the thinking principle in the contemplation of any particular object. Perfectly sound sleep of which on waking we know only that we have slept well and nothing more, is also favorable to steadiness in the same way, perfect calmness of the mind being thereby produced.]

Different men having different tastes, Yogis may affect each a different expedient according to choice, and by meditating thereon attain his object (*scil.* steadiness of mind). To stablish this he says—

# XXXIX.

Or by meditating according to one's fancy.

By thinking on anything according to choice, whether external, as the moon, or internal, as a plexus of arteries, the thinking principle becomes steadied.

[The object of this aphorism is to show that by constantly reflecting on any object of choice, the habit is acquired of keeping the thinking principle confined to one object. The choice of course does not extend to carnal objects, for they would tend to excite, instead of allaying, the passions. The moon, or the sun, or other similar object has no such tendency, and certain plexuses within the chest and the abdomen which are believed to be the seats of the thinking principle, are held particularly beneficial in producing steadiness.]

Having thus described the different methods, he proceeds to point out what the fruit thereof is.

## XL.

His mastery extends from the minutest atom to the limit of infinite magnitude.

Having by these means acquired steadiness of the thinking principle, the Yogí, by thinking on minute objects, acquires unfailing "mastery" (vaśikára) over the minutest atoms, *i. e.*, his thinking principle is not baffled even by the reflection of the most minute objects, such as the minutest atoms. In the same way, the reflection of big objects, like the sky &c., to infinite magnitude, never causes any disturbance of the thinking principle, *i. e.*, it becomes independent everywhere. Such is the meaning.

[The purport is obvious. When steadiness is once fully acquired, the thinking principle acquires mastery over every thing, and nothing can baffle it. The result of this perfect nature is transcendantal power over all material and spiritual objects: of this full illustrations will follow in Chapter III. The P. Bháshya adds that when the thinking principle of the Yogí is perfect in this respect, it does not any longer care for the appliances of exercise elsewhere enjoined. Tadvaśikárát paripúrnam yoginaśchittam na punarabhyńsakritam parikarmápekshate iti.]

What becomes of the condition of the thinking principle purified by these methods, he now proceeds to describe.

# XLI.

To him of overpowered faculties, there are a concentration and a consubstantiation in (matters relating to) the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, as in a transparent gem.

He, whose faculties have been overpowered, is "of overpowered faculties" (kshinavritti). With reference to him there is, in regard to the objects of his faculties, no distinction about the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, and there result a "concentration" and a "consubstantion." Tatsthatva is concentration in it, (ekágratá). "Consubstantiation" (tadania-7 *natva*) is becoming of it, for when the thinking principle is lowered, (or reduced in its carnal functions in the way described,) the object of meditation attains superiority. The meaning is, that such a condition (*samápatti*), or modification to that form, results.

Of this an example is given. In the case of "a transparent gem" or clear rock-crystal jewel, whatever colour it dwells upon, the same it obtains. In the same way in the transparent, clear thinking principle the form of the object thought of is imposed.

Although the text gives the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, but, according to the order of precedence, the terms should be understood to stand as if written "perceptible, means of perception, and perceiver," for first the meditation is directed to the perceivable; then it is devoted to the perception; and then it is confined to the perceiver, which is mere egoism; for in the case of the soul alone there can be no thinking. Even so, the thinking principle tinged by a substantial or a subtile object of perception assumes its character. In this sense the condition is implied also to the perceived.

[The word kshina in the text means weakened, but this weakness is not general; according to the P. Rahasya it is confined to those subjects which are not thought of, the power remaining in full force in connexion with the special object of thought: kshína-vritteh álambanavishayátirikta - vishayanirúpita - vrittisunyasya. Tatsthatva is literally being in a thing, tat ' there,' and sthá "to be reposited ;" but the commentator gives the equivalent concentration, ekágratá. Tadanjanatva is literally being tinged thereby, and the stock illustration of the crystal being coloured red by the shoe-flower placed in it is adduced; but the commentator prefers the equivalent tanmayatva " being of that substance." He is, however, not singular in these interpretations. The P. Bháshya amplifies the explanation by adding that when the soul, as agent or perceiver, is made the object of thought, the thinking principle becomes manifest in the special form of that soul, and when the emancipated soul is thought upon the think-

**5**0

ing principle becomes of its special form. Grihitripurushálambanoparaktam grihitripurushasamápannam grihitripurusha-svarúpákáreņa nirbhósate. Tathá muktapurushálambanoparaktam muktapurushasamápannam muktapurushasvarúpákáreņa nirbhásate.]

Having explained the conditions, he now points out its fourfold differences (in three aphorisms.)

## XLII.

The argumentative is that which is influenced by the fancy of word, meaning, and understanding.

That which is perceivable by the organ of hearing, or is an explosion or bursting of sound (sphota), is (technically sound or) "word" (sabda). "Meaning" (artha) is (the sense conveyed by the word indicating) a genus (such as the cow or the horse). "Understanding" (jnána) is a function of the intellect in which the quality of truth prevails (in preference to the other two qualities). "Fancy" (vikalpa) has been already defined (A. IX) "Affected" (saākirna) influenced by them, *i. e.*, by the three, words &c. That modification, in which the three (words &c.) are apparent in an undefined fanciful shape, (*i. e.*, their relations are doubtful in the mind), as the word gau "a cow," meaning a cow, and conveying the notion of a cow, is called "argumentative," (savitarka.)

[The conditions adverted to in the preceding aphorism are fourfold, and thereof the first is called argumentative, inasmuch as in that condition the thinking principle fancies or doubtfully accepts a thing without positive discrimination of the relations between a word or its meaning and the idea conveyed by it. The P. Bháshya explains it by saying, "Gau is the word, a cow is its meaning, and the idea is that of a cow, and accepting these distinct positions in an undivided form." Gauriti śabdo Gaurityartho Gauriti jnánamityavibhágena vibhaktánámapi grahanam drishtam. The P. Rahasya puts it more clearly by saying "when on hearing the word there is a doubt as to whether the gau is a word, or it is a meaning, or it is an understanding. Gauriti s'abde s'rute sati gauriti s'abdo vá gaurityartho vá gauriti jnánam vá evamvikalpah. (See p. 18.) This is an inferior condition.

The word *sphota*, which I have rendered into "bursting," is the technical name of the sound which is eternal, and of which spoken words are but manifestations. The theory of some grammarians is that words are eternal, and they become manifest when spoken. Dr. Ballantyne, in his essay on Hindu Philosophy,

has given a full account of this dogma.]

The opposite of it or the non-argumentative is next described.

# XLIII.

That is non-argumentative in which, on the dissolution of memory, the meaning alone without any definite identity is apparent.

When the memory of words and of their meaning has subsided, and the shape rises manifest and distinctly graspable, excluding the sense of understanding, and appearing as if devoid of a definite identity, it is "non-argumentative."

[The P. Bháshya explains the purport thus: when the intellect, intent upon the form of the object of acceptance, forsakes the accepting understanding which is like itself, and becomes solely of the form of the object, *i. e.*, it becomes of the form of the object accepted, it is non-argumentative. Gráhyasvarúpoparaktá prajná svamiva prajnárúpam grahanátmakam tyaktá padárthamátrasvarúpá gráhyasvarúpápanneva bhavati sá nirvitarká samápatti.]

To indicate varieties of it, he says :

# XLIV.

By this the deliberative and the non-deliberative as pertaining to subtile objects are also described.

"By this," *i. e.*, by the explanation about the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions, the deliberative (*savickárá*)

CHAPTER FIRST.

and the non-deliberative (nirvichárá) conditions have been described. How are the latter? "Subtile objects," (sukshmavisaya)— "subtile" rudimentary matter and the organs are so called. By this the former two propositions are made to refer to gross objects. They are dependant on gross matter, whether connected with the ideas of words, meaning, and understanding (as in the case of the argumentative form,) or without them (as in the non-argumentative form.) "The deliberative" (savichárá) is that which is an abstract notion defined by place, time, quality, &c. "The nondeleberative" (nirvichárá) is that in which the abstract notion is manifest as a mere substratum of quality, perfectly independent of all ideas of place, time, quality, &c. These refer to subtile objects.

[The object aimed at is to assign the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions to gross matter, and the deliberative and the non-deliberative to subtile objects. The distinction seems to be purely technical, implying only slight differences.]

To explain how far this subtile object extends, he says :

### XLV.

This subtile objectivity terminates in the indissoluble.

What has been described about the object of the deliberative and the non-deliberative conditions being subtile objectivity extends to the indissoluble. That which does not merge into anything, nor indicates or implies anything is the "Indissoluble" (aliaga) or First Principle (nature, Prakriti), and subtile objectivity Now in the resolution of qualities, extends to that limit. there are four stages, viz., 1, defined character, (visishta lifiga); 2, undefined character (avisishtalifiga); 3, mere character (lifigamátra); 4, devoid of character, or indissoluble, (alifaa). The objects of defined character are the (gross) elements. Those of undefined character are the subtile elements and the Mere character is indicative of the Intellect; and organs. devoid of character, the First Principle. Hereby it is said that there is nothing more subtile than the First Principle.

The word *linga* has been defined to be that which indicates or characterises, a mark or sign which is inseperable from it. and, I believe, the word character is its nearest equivalent. The First Principle or Prakriti is called alinga or that which is without anindicator, because by itself it does not specifically indicate anything, and is the subtlest of the categories, and there is nothing more subtile. "It may be urged," argues the P. Bháshya, "that the soul is more subtile than the first principle, but, though it is true that the characterless (alinga or Prakriti) is more subtile than the characterised, still the same cannot be the case with the soul, since the soul is not the material but the instrumental cause of character, and therefore the utmost limit of subtility must rest with the First Principle." Nanvasti purushah sukshma iti. Satyam yathá lifiqát param alifiqasya saukshmyam, nacháivam-purushasya, kintu lifigasya anvayí-káranam purusho na bhavati hetustu bhavatíti, atah pradháne saukshmyam niratisayam vyákhyátam.]

He now points out the necessity for these mental conditions.

## XLVI.

# These verily constitute meditation with a seed.

"These verily," *i. e.*, the conditions above described, exist with a seed or object. "With a seed," (*savija*) means conscious meditation, (or Samádhi having a distinct recognition,) because such meditations have always something to rest upon.

[These four conditions have been already described in the commentary on Aphorism XVII, and call for no further remarks here.]

Now, these (conscious conditions) maturate into the non-deliberative condition, and therefore he describes the fruit thereof.

## XLVII.

In the purity of the non-deliberative (condition) there is intellectual contentment.

"Non deliberativeness" has been already defined. (Aph. XLIV). "Purity" (vaisáradya) means freedom from dirt. The non-argumentative condition is superior to the argumentative. To that the deliberative which has a subtile object in view, (is superior). Again, the non-deliberative, which has no object in view, is superior to the preceding. When by rigorous practice "purity," as the condition of freedom from dirt, is attained "intellectual contentment" results, *i. e.*, the thinking principle, being free from pain and longing, becomes fit to flow in an even course. This is the purity of the thinking principle, abidence in which is steadfastness (Aph. XXXII).

[The four conditions are graded in due order, and the last is declared to be the best of them, because in the highest purity of that condition there is perfect intellectual contentment, in which one can behold all knowledge like one seated in the palace of wisdom can look, as from the top of a mountain, upon groaning mortals below on earth, without being in any way disturbed. Prajnáprásádamáruhya asochyah sochatojanán, Bhúmishthániva sailasthah sarván prájnonupasyati.]

He next explains what happens when this condition is attained.

# XLVIII.

In that condition knowledge becomes truth-supporting.

That "knowledge" (prajná) which supports the "truth" (rita) or reality, and never permits it to be covered by misconception (A. VIII) is "truth-supporting" (ritambhará), and in the condition (aforesaid) this is acquired. With the light of that knowledge the Yogí perceives everything in its true character, and acquires the highest Yoga.

[In the next aphorism it will be shown that this perfect knowledge is the same with the transcendental power of knowing things, independently of the ordinary means of ascertaining truth.]

Its distinction from other forms of knowledge is now to be explained.

# XLIX.

The knowledge which results from testimony and inference is general, (and differs from this) which has a specific object (in view).

"Testimony" (s'ruta) is knowledge founded on sacred texts. "Inference" (anumána) has been already defined (Aph. VII). The knowledge which results from these two has generals for its object, since neither words nor characteristic signs are able, like the organs of sense, to convey a knowledge of particularities. While this knowledge (the one under notice), resulting from the purity (fulness) of the non-deliberative condition, is distinct from them, inasmuch as it has a speciality for its object. When one is in the condition of this knowledge, the truth of all subtile, intercepted, and remote objects becomes manifest in a clear form. The advice is, that for this reason it is proper that every exertion should be made by Yogís for the attainment of this knowledge.

[The transcendental powers referred to above are here described to be the power of observing things which are so subtile, or so intercepted, or so remote that they cannot be observed by the ordinary appliances of perception.]

He now describes the fruit of this knowledge.

## L.

# The residuum of this is opposed to all other residua.

"The residuum" (sañskára Aph. XVIII) which is produced by that knowledge, obstructs all other residua, whether arising during worldly condition or during meditation, *i. e.*, it renders them incapable of achieving their respective works. Since the residua produced by knowledge being absolute, are more powerful, they are able to preclude all residua resulting from nonabsolute knowledge. The purport is that for this reason that absolute knowledge should be exercised.

Digitized by Google

[The purport of this and of the next aphorism has already been explained in the comments on aphorisms XVII and XVIII.]

Having thus described conscious meditation, he now explains the un-conscious form of meditation, (Aph. XVIII).

#### LI.

On the removal of this also, everything being removed, there is meditation without a seed.

"Of this," *i. e.*, of conscious meditation. "Removal" (*niro-dha*) is dissolution. On its dissolution all functions of thought melting into their causes, and the mere residua which arise in this state being also rejected by the conviction "this is not, this is not," meditation without a seed becomes manifest. On this being accomplished the soul (*purusha*) becomes pure, and abides solely in its own nature.

[The P. Bháshya explains the aphorism thus: "That meditation is not only antagonistic to the impressions of the Samádhi state, but also to the residua left by those impressions. But how do the residua of the suppressed (nirodha) state remove the residua of the meditative state? By the influence of the duration of the suppressed state the existence alone of the impressions produced by the suppressed thinking principle is perceptible. As the thinking principle then merges into its own natural form along with all the impressions of the waking, the meditative, the suppressed and the isolated states, their residua can no longer be antagonistic to the natural state of the thinking principle, nor the causes of its (separate) existence. And since the thinking principle, divested of its functions, along with the residua of the isolated state, is suppressed, and in that suppression the soul resides in its own form, it is called pure and liberated."]

Now in this (chapter) have been described Yoga, the subject of the work (A. I), its definition by the words the cessation of the thinking principle (A. II), exercise (XIII), dispassion (XV), the 8

nature of the two means and their varieties (XVI, the conscious and the un-conscious forms of Yoga, the inferior and superior Yoga (XVII—XVIII), the various means of exercising Yoga, easy means of accomplishing it (XIX—XXIII), definition of God (XXIV), his proof (XXVIII), greatness (XXVI), indicator (XXVII), mode of worship (XXV), and its results (XXIX), the perturbations of the thinking principle (XXX), and the pains thereon consequent (XXXI), the means of obviating them by study and benevolence (XXXII-XXXIII), regulation of breath (XXXIV), condition preceding the conscious and un-conscious meditations (XXXV), meditation with a seed, mental afflictions (XLI), their definitions (XLII-XLIV—XLV), their fruits (XLVI—XLVIII), their object (XLIX), and meditation without a seed (LI). Thus is the Yoga chapter explained.

[The above summary has not been translated literally. The original is interrupted by a number of participles and explanatory words which have been omitted as they would have served only to make an uncommonly long sentence very much involved.]

This is the end of the first quarter or Yoga chapter of the commentary entitled Rájamártanda on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.



# CHAPTER SECOND.

May the three-eyed Lord of the universe, by whom has been disclosed the several means of obtaining the occult powers of the difficultly-achievable Yoga, be favourable to the attainment of the desired object !

Having in the first chapter explained the Yoga for those whose thoughts are collected, together with the means thereof, the author now, anticipating the question what should be the practice of the means for the achievement of the Yoga for those whose thoughts are in a waking (worldly) state, describes the  $Kriy\acute{a}$ -yoga (practical Yoga), with a view to establish the mode of accomplishing it.

[This chapter is designed for persons who have not obtained control over their passions, but who are nevertheless desirous of practising those works which are calculated to train them for the performance of the highest branches of the Yoga, and to enable them to acquire supernatural powers (*riddhis*). Inasmuch as this training can be attained only through active exercise of certain duties, and those duties form the topics of this chapter, the chapter is called Kriyá-yoga or "Practical Yoga."]

I.

Asceticism, muttering, and resignation to God constitute the Practical Yoga.

"Asceticism" (tapas) is the observance of the fasts called Krichchhra, Chándráyana and the like enjoined in another S'ástra (Dharma-śástra). "Muttering" (sádhyáya) is the inaudible repetition of particular mantras preceded by the Praņava, (i. e., the syllable Om). "Resignation to God" (I'śvara-praṇidhána) is the dedication to the Supremely Venerable all one's works, without any concern for their fruits. These, it is said, are the Practical Yoga.

[This aphorism defines what Practical Yoga is. It includes the three acts of Asceticism, Muttering, and Resignation to God. The first includes all those acts of fasting and the like which the Smriti ordains for the mortification of the flesh. In this sense tapas would be best rendered by religious austerity or self-denial, but the examples given are included under the head of penance. The Yogis do not exclude any of them, nor, except in the form of seats &c., add any new form of penance. The Krichchhra named in the commentary is by some believed to be the same with the Prájápatya, and by others with the Sántapana. The first is effected by eating once a day for three days in the morning, then once in the night for three days, then subsisting for three days on food given, unasked, as alms, and lastly fasting for three days. The fast is absolute, and not even a mouthful of water is allowed to be drunk. The second is effected by living for six days on the five products of the cow and water in which kuśa grass has been steeped, and absolutely fasting on the 7th day. The Chandrayana has several varieties, but all of them are regulated by the moon's age, the food being daily reduced by one mouthful from the first day, till on the newmoon no food is taken, and then on the next day beginning with one mouthful the full allowance is got on the day of the fullmoon. These penances are ordained for particular heinous sins. In citing their names it is not the object of the commentator to enjoin that these particular penances should be regularly practised, but simply to cite examples. The Hathadípiká enjoins some forms of asceticism suited to the Rája-yoga. The object is, there should be constant mortifying of the flesh so as to subdue its longings.

۵

Muttering, like the last, is a part of the Smriti ritual, largely dwelt upon in the Tantras. Every householder has a particular mantra which he is required to repeat for a certain number of times every day, the number varying from twelve to many thousands according to choice. The muttering is so done as not to be audible to a bystander, but in a manner so that each repe-

Digitized by Google

tition may be clear and distinct, and fit to be counted by the mutterer. The *P. Bháshya* and the *P. Rahasya* add that sádhyáya implies either the muttering of a mantra, or the study of that s'ástra which relates to emancipation. *Pranavádi-pavilrá*nám japo mokshas'ástrádhyayanam vá.

Resignation to God (*pranidhána*) has been already explained on p. 28.

These are essentially necessary as preliminary practices, but they do not constitute the Yoga itself.]

(To the question) of what use are these, he replies :

# II.

It is for the purpose of the contemplation of Samádhi and for weakening afflictions.

"Afflictions" (kleśáh) will be presently described (II, III.) To "weaken them" is to make them unfit for their respective works. "Samádhi" (meditation) has been already explained (I, xx.) Its "contemplation" (bhávaná) is repeated cogitation of it in thought. That Yoga which has these contemplation and weakening for its purpose (artha), object, is so called (kriyá-yoga). What is said is this : These mortifications, &c. when practised, weakening the afflictions of the ignorance residing in the thought, become accessories to Samádhi. Therefore the advice is that the Yogí should first turn his attention to this Practical Yoga.

[The purport of this aphorism has been already anticipated . in the remarks on the last preceding Aphorism.]

It has been said (above that the Practical Yoga is wanted) for the purpose of weakening the afflictions, and what those afflictions are he now describes.

# III.

Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions.

"Afflictions" (kleśáh) are the five, ignorance, &c., which will be (presently) described. These, being of an obstructive character, *i. e.*, producing distress, become the object of the term affliction. These, abiding in the thinking principle, strengthen the modifications of the (three) qualities which constitute mundane existence.

[Here the names of the afflictions are given, but their definitions are reserved for subsequent discussions. The reason why they are called "afflictions," is explained to be that they tend to promote those modifications of the thinking principle which the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness tend to for worldly purposes. In other words, those functions which attach the mind to the world are afflictions, because they stand in the way of emancipation.]

Although all these are equally afflicting, nevertheless ignorance, being the source (of all of them), is the chief, and to establish this he says :

# IV.

Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.

"Ignorance" (avidyi) is delusion; it is in fact the assumption of that being the soul which is not soul. It is the "field" (kshetra), or ground of production, of those which follow, *i. e.*, egoism and the rest, and each of them may be in one of the four conditions of dormancy, &c. Wherever the reverse-idea-producing ignorance becomes weak, there egoism and the other afflictions are not seen to arise, for it is seen that where the mistaken notion exists there they arise, it follows, therefore, that ignorance is their source.

The "dormant, weak, intercepted or simple." Of these afflictions those which, existing in the thinking principle, do not, owing to the absence of an exciting cause, produce their effect, are called "dormant" (prasupta), asleep. Thus in childhood. Though residing in a child in the form of instincts those afflictions do not, from want of co-operation of an exciting cause, flare up.

Those afflictions are said to be "weak" (tanu) which, becoming overpowered in their effort to perform their respective functions by their mutually contradictory inclinations, reside in the thinking principle in the form of instincts, but are not able to carry on their work without the aid of numerous auxiliaries. This is the case in the practising Yogí (who being engaged in one particular contemplation does not allow the afflictions to disturb his thoughts. They are in him, but in a condition of weakness produced by their non-indulgence).

Those afflictions are said to be "intercepted" (vichchinna) which remain with their powers overcome by a particularly potent passion, as desire when the prevailing passion is aversion, or aversion when the prevailing passion is desire: being mutually opposed to each other, they cannot dominate at the same time, (one must for the time intercept the other).

Afflictions are said to be "simple" (*udára*) when, having their auxiliaries beside them, they carry on their respective functions. This is the case of the waking condition of those who follow not the ways of the Yoga.

Each of these four (afflictions) has ignorance for its root, and is also attended by it, for nowhere are the afflictions found existing by themselves as opposed to, or independent of, the attendant. When that ignorance, a mere falsehood, is removed by thorough knowledge, these afflictions, like roasted seeds, never sprout again. It follows that these are both rooted in, and attended by, ignorance; hence they are all implied by ignorance. The conclusion is that as all these afflictions are calculated to produce distractions of the thinking principle, it is the foremost duty of the Yogí to exert for their removal.

[In A. 111 the afflictions have been described to be five in number. In this the author shows that four of them owe their origin, and are subject, to ignorance. He also shows that they are always present, though not always active. The causes of their want of activity are described to be dormancy, weakness and interception ]

He now defines ignorance.

# v.

Ignorance is the assumption of that which is noneternal, impure, painful and non-soul, to be eternal, pure, joyous and soul.

The assumption of a thing being what it is not, is "ignorance" (avidyi). That this is its general definition follows from its distinctions as pointed out (in the aphorism). Thus the assumption of eternity in the non-eternal water jar and the like is ignorance. In the same way, the assumption of purity in impure objects, like the body and so forth, that of joy in pain, and that of the soul in the body (which is not soul, are results of ignorance). By these is explained the mistake of confounding vice with virtue and the useless with the useful.

[The P. Bháshya argues that although the word avidyá is formed of the privative particle a with vidyá "knowledge," it does not mean simple absence of knowledge, but a conception distinct and the opposite of it, and illustrates it by the examples of amitra and agoshpada, the former of which, though formed of a (absence) and mitra "a friend," does not mean the absence of a friend, but an enemy, and the latter, formed of a and goshpada "the footprint of a cow," does not mean the absence of the footprint of a cow, but a country. Tasyás chámitrágoshpadavadavastu sa tattvam vijneyam, yathá námitro mitrábhávo na mitramátram, kintu tadvirudhah sapatnah, yathá vágoshpadam na goshpadábhávo na goshpadamátram, kintu des'a eva, tábhyámanyat vastvantaram, evamavidyá na pramánam na pramánábhávah, kintu vidyáviparítam jnánántaramavidyeti.]

With a view to explain egoism, he says :

# LIST OF BOOKS FOR SALE

AT THE LIBRARY OF THE

# ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL,

# No. 57, PARK STREET, CALCUTTA,

AND OBTAINABLE FROM

THE SOCIETY'S LONDON AGENTS, MESSRS. TRÜBNER & CO.

57 AND 59, LUDGATE HILL, LONDON, E. C.

## BIBLIOTHECA INDICA.

# Sanskrit Series.

| Chaitanya-chandrodaya, Nátaka, 3 fasci                                         | 1    | 14  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|
| Srauta Sútra, As'valáyana, 11 fasci                                            | 6    | 14  |
| Látyáyana, 9 fasci                                                             | 5    | 10  |
| S'ankara Vijaya, 3 fasci                                                       | 1    | 14  |
| Dasa-rúpa, 3 fasci                                                             | 1    | 14  |
| Kanshitaki Brahmanopanishad, 2 fasci.                                          | 1    | 4   |
| Sánkhya-sára, 1 fasci.<br>Lalita-vistara, 6 fasci.                             | 0    | 10  |
| Lalita-vistara, 6 fasci.                                                       |      | 12  |
| Translation, 1 fasci.                                                          | 1    | 0   |
| ", "Translation, 1 fasci<br>Taittiriya Bráhmana, 24 fasci                      | 15   | 0   |
| Taittiríya Sañhitá, 31 fasci.                                                  | 19   | 6   |
| Taittiriya Aranyaka, 11 fasci.                                                 |      | 14  |
| Maitri Upanishad, 3 fasci.                                                     | 1    | 14  |
| As'valáyana Grihya Sútra, 4 fasci                                              | 2    | 3   |
| Mimáñsá Darsana, 15 fasci                                                      |      | 6   |
| Tándya Bráhmana, 19 fasci.                                                     |      |     |
| Gopatha Bráhmana, 2 fasci.                                                     |      |     |
| Atharvana Upanishads, 5 fasci                                                  |      |     |
| Agni Purána, 14 fasci.                                                         | 8    | 12  |
| Sáma Veda Sañhitá, 37 fasci.                                                   | 23   | 13. |
| Gopála Tápaní, 1 fasci                                                         | 0    | 10  |
| Nrisiñha Tápaní, 3 fasci                                                       | -1   | 14  |
| Chaturvarga Chintámani, 36 fasci                                               | 22   | 8   |
| Gobhilíya Grihya Sútra, 12 fasci.                                              |      | 8   |
| Pingala Chhandah Sútra, 3 fasci                                                | C.F. | 14  |
| Taittiriva Prátis'ákhiva 3 fasci.                                              | 1    | 14  |
| Taittiríya Prátis'ákhiya, 3 fasci.<br>Prithiráj Rásu, by Chand Bardai, 4 fasci | 2    | - 8 |
| " " Translation, Part II, 1 fasci                                              | 1    | .0  |
| Rajatarangini,                                                                 | 4    | 0   |
| Rájatarangini,                                                                 | 40   | 0   |
| Purána Sangraha,                                                               | 1    | 0   |
| Páli Grammar, 2 fasci                                                          | 1    | 4   |
| Aitareva Aranvaka of the Rig Veda, 5 fasci.                                    | 3    | 2   |
| Chhandogya Upanishad, English, 2 fasci                                         | 1    | 4   |
| Sánkhya Aphorisms, English, 2 fasci.                                           | 1    | 4   |
| Sáhitya Darpana, English, 4 fasci                                              | 2    | 8   |
| Brahma Sútra, English,                                                         | 1    | 0   |
| Kátantra 6 fasci                                                               | 6    | 0   |
| Kámandakíya Nítisára, 4 fasci. (Fasci. 1, out of stock.)                       | 2    | 8   |
| Bhamati Staset                                                                 | 5    | 0   |
| Aphorisms of Sándalya, English, Fasci. 1.,                                     | 0    | 10  |
| Vavu Purána, 6 fasci.                                                          | 3    | 12  |
| Vayu Purána, 6 fasci                                                           | 7    | 0   |

| Prakrit Lakshanam, fasci. 1., Rs. | 1 | 8  | l |
|-----------------------------------|---|----|---|
| Nirukta, 2 fasci                  | 1 | 4  |   |
| Vishnusmriti, fasci. 1.,          | 0 | 10 |   |

# Arabic & Persian Series.

| Dictionary of Arabic Technical Terms, 20 fasci., complete,            | 25 | 0  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|
| Risálah-i-Shamsiyah, (Appendix to Do. Do.),                           | 1  | 4  |
| Fihrist Túsí, 4 fasci                                                 | 3  | 0  |
| Nukhbat-ul-Fikr,                                                      | 0  | 10 |
| Futúh-ul-Shám, Wáqidí, 9 fasci                                        | 5  | 10 |
| Futúh-ul-Shám, Azadí, 4 fasci                                         | 2  | 8  |
| Maghází of Wáqidí, 5 fasci                                            | 3  | 2  |
| Isabah, 28 fasci., with supplement,                                   | 20 | 14 |
| Táríkh-i-Fírúz Sháhí, 7 fasci.                                        | 4  | 6  |
| Táríkh-i-Baihaqí, complete in 9 fasci.                                | 5  | 10 |
| Muntakhab-ut-Tawárikh, vols. I. II. and III., complete in 15 fasci    | 9  | 6  |
| Wís o Rámín, 5 fasci                                                  | 2  | 3  |
| Iqbálnámah-i-Jahángírí, complete in 3 fasci                           | 1  | 14 |
| 'Alamgirnámah, 13 fasci., with index,                                 | 8  | 2  |
| Pádsháhnámah, 19 fasci., with index,                                  | 11 | 14 |
| Muntakhab-ul-Lubáb, by Kháfí Khán, 19 fasci., with index,             | 12 | 12 |
| Aín-i-Akbarí, Persian text, 4to., 22 fasci                            | 27 | 8  |
| Ain-i-Akbari, English translation by H. Blochmann, M. A., vol. I,     | 12 | 4  |
| Farhang-i-Rashidi, 14 fasci., complete,                               |    | 8  |
| Nizámí s Khiradnámah-i-Iskandarí, 2 fasci. complete,                  | 2  | 0  |
| Akbarnámah, 17 fasci. with Index,                                     | 20 | 0  |
| Maáşir-i-'Alamgirí, by Muhammad Sáqí, complete, 6 fasci., with index, | 3  | 12 |
| Haft Asmán, history of the Persian Masnawi,                           | 1  | 4  |
| Tabaqát-i-Náçiri, English translation, by Raverty, 10 fasci           | 10 | 0  |
| Tabaqát-i-Náçirí, Persian text, 5 fasci.                              | 3  | 2  |
| History of the Caliphs (English Translation), 6 fasci.                | 6  | 0  |

#### MISCELLANEOUS.

Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal from vols. XII to XX, 1843-51, to Subscribers at Re. 1 per number and to non-subscribers at Re. 1-8 per number; vols. XXIV, XXVI, XXVII, 1855, 1857-58, and vols. XXX, XXXIII to XLIX, 1861, 1864-80, to Subscribers at 1-8 per number and to non-subscribers at Rs. 2 per number.

| Asiatic Researches, vols. VI. to XI. and vols. XIII. XVII. XIX. and XX.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |     |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---|
| each,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 10  | 0 |
| Do. Do. Index,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 6   | 0 |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 2   | 0 |
| of Arabic and Persian Manuscripts,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 1   | 0 |
| Tibetan Dictionary,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 10  | 0 |
| Grammar,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 8   | 0 |
| Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts, 14 fasci                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 14  | 0 |
| Istiláhát-i-Súfiyah. Edited by Dr. A. Sprenger, 8vo                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 1   |   |
| Jawámi' ul-'ilm ir-riyází, 168 pages with 17 plates, 4to.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 2   |   |
| Aborigines of India, by B. H. Hodgson,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 3   |   |
| Examination and Analysis of the Mackenzie Manuscripts, by the Rev. W. Taylor,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 2   |   |
| Han Koong Tsew, or the Sorrows of Han, by J. Francis Davis,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | ĩ   |   |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |     | 0 |
| and just a commentary out the start for an a start the start start start and |     | 0 |
| Analysis of the Sher Chin, by Alexander Csoma de Körös,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |     | 0 |
| Khazánat-ul-'ilm,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |     |   |
| Sharáyat-ul-Islám,<br>Anís-ul-Musharrihín,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 100 | 0 |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 3   | 0 |
| Catalogue Raisonné of the Society's Sanskrit MSS. Part I, Grammar                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 2   | 0 |
| Moore and Hewitson's Descriptions of New Indian Lepidoptera, Part I, with                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |     |   |
| 3 Coloured Plates,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 6   | 0 |

# BIBLIOTHECA INDICA;

# Collection of Priental Works

PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. New Series, No. 478.

# पातञ्जलं यागसूचम्।

राजमार्त्तखाखादत्तिमहितम् ।

THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI, WITH THE COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RAJA AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

BY RAJENDRALALA MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E. FASCICULUS II.

# CALCUTTA :

PRINTED BY J. W. THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS. AND PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY, 57, PARK STREET. 1882.

# LIST OF BOOKS FOR SALE

AT THE LIBRARY OF THE

# ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL,

# No. 57, PARK STREET, CALCUTTA,

AND OBTAINABLE FROM

# THE SOCIETY'S LONDON AGENTS, MESSRS. TRÜBNER & CO. 57 and 59, Ludgate Hill, London, E. C.

BIBLIOTHECA INDICA.

#### Sanskrit Series.

|     |                                                           |      | Rs. | As, |  |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|-----|--|
| 1.  | Atharvana Upanishads, Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each               |      | 3   | 2   |  |
| 2.  | Asvaláyana Grihya Sútra, Fasc. I-IV @ /10/ each           |      | 2   | 8   |  |
| 3.  | Agni Parána, Fasc. I-XIV @ /10/ each                      |      | 8   | 12  |  |
| 4.  | Aitareya Aranyaka of the Rig Veda, Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each  |      | 3   | 2   |  |
| 5.  | Aphorisms of Sándilya, Fasc. I                            | -    | -8. | 10  |  |
| 6.  | Aphorisms of the Vedánta, Fasc. III-XIII @ /10/ each      |      | 6   | 14  |  |
| 7.  | Brahma Sútras, Fasc. I                                    | 1    | 1   | 0   |  |
| 8.  | Bhámatí, Fasc. I-VIII @ /10/ each                         |      | 5   | 0   |  |
| 9.  | Brihat Aranyaka Upanishad, Fasc. II-IV, VI-X @ /10/ each  |      | 5   | 0   |  |
| 10. | Ditto English Translation, Fasc. II-III @ /10/ each       |      | 1   | 4   |  |
| 11. | Brihat San hitá, Fasc. I-III, V-VII @ /10/ each           | - 10 | 3   | 14  |  |
| 12. | Chaitanya-Chandrodaya Nátaka, Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each     |      | 1   | 12  |  |
| 13. | Chaturvarga Chintámani, Fasc. I-XXXVII @ /10/ each        |      | 23  | 4   |  |
| 14. | Chhándogya Upanishad, Sanskrit Fasc. I and IV @ /10/ each | 1946 | 1   | 4   |  |
| 15. | Ditto English, Fasc. I and II @ /10/ each                 | 1    | 1   | 2   |  |
|     | (Continued on third name of comm )                        | 100  |     |     |  |

Continued on third page of cover.)

Egoism is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

"The power that sees" (drik-śakti,) is the soul (Purusha). "The power of seeing" (darsana-śakti) is the internal organ produced by the quality of goodness unaffected by the qualities of foulness and darkness. What is said is, that the assumption of the two extremely different things,—the one being the enjoyer and the other the enjoyed—the active and the inert, being the same is egoism (asmitá). Thus, when nature (prakriti), though really devoid of the power of enjoying and of intelligence, fancies "I am the enjoyer," "I am the intelligent," the blunder is the affliction called egoism.

[The internal organ is a modification of the quality of goodness, which marks the distinction between itself and the things around it. In this state it is egotism; but when that internal organ ceases to perform this function, and only a sense of mere existence is felt in the thinking principle without any distinction of the self and the things around it is egoism. This definition was anticipated by the commentator in his remarks on A. XVII chapter I, (p. 19) and the author gives it here.]

He defines desire.

## VII.

# Desire is dwelling on pleasure.

"Dwelling on pleasure" (sukhánuśayi) is lying on pleasure. The longing or thirst for pleasure on the part of him who had experienced it before, and is impelled by its remembrance, is the affliction called desire (rága).

[The root  $\acute{si}$  is "to sleep" or "lie down," and literally the translation of *anus'ayi* should be the sleeper, or that which lies on something, but idiomatically I prefer dwelling, as it conveys more clearly the idea intended by the author. Obviously he means the

dwelling on, or keeping alive in the mind, the idea of some object or other. Anuśaya means "to follow" or "to pursue," and that would afford a very appropriate rendering of the term here, but in the next aphorism it has been used with reference to pain, and as no one pursues pain knowing it to be pain, that rendering caunot be adopted. It is true the word also means "repentance," and it may be assumed that the author has used the word in two different senses in the two aphorisms, but such an assumption would be unjustifiable in dealing with definitions. The author, in his aphorisms, has nowhere evinced any leaning for rhetoric or verbal ornament, and it is very unlikely that he should use the same word in two consecutive aphorisms in two contradictory senses, when his object is to make things clear, and not to confound.]

He next defines aversion.

## VIII.

# Aversion is dwelling on pain.

"Pain" (duhkha) has been already defined, (C. I,  $\mathbf{x}\mathbf{x}\mathbf{x}\mathbf{x}$ ). That which one, having experienced it, and remembering it, is averse to its means as undesirable, is the affliction called "aversion" (dvesha).

[Three of my MSS. has *pratikúla-lakshnam* for *ukta-lakshnam*. If that reading be adopted, the meaning would be "Pain is of an opposite nature," *i. e.*, in the case of pleasure there is a longing or thirst to get the object, while in that of pain, the feeling is the reverse, or avoiding to get it.]

He now defines tenacity of life.

# IX.

Tenacity of life is an attachment to the body which relates to the residua of one's former life, even on the part of the wise.

66

The fear arising from the memory of pain from death endured in a former life prompts the constant wish, "May I not be separated from the body and its objects," and the attachment to the body resulting therefrom, an attachment which exists without an inducing cause, in all beings from Brahmá to an earthworm, is the affliction called "Tenacity of life." (*Abhini*vesha.) Thus, it is afflicting in the waking or mundane state. These afflictions should at the outset be destroyed by the Yogí by the exercise of concentration of the mind to one point.

[The only doubtful word in the aphorism is the first. It is formed of the three words, sva "one's own," rasa literally "wish," and vákí, "that which carries :"—" that which carries or keeps in current one's wish." The commentators have, however, not rendered it so. Without giving a synonym of rasa, the *P. Bháshya* uses the word vásaná in its place (maranaduhkhánubhavádiyam vásaneti), and that word is the equivalent of saūskára, which I have rendered into residua. In this way the term svarasaváhí means 'that which carries the residua of one's former life.' It proceeds from the memory of former experience, and since no one has in this life experienced the pain of death, it must follow that the fear of death must be the result of the unconscious memory of the experience of a former state of life—and this fear is the cause of attachment to life.]

Since it is not practicable to remove these afflictions without first knowing what they are, the author, having described their names (II, III) fields, (I, IV) divisions, (II, IV) and characteristics, (II, V to IX,) now explains the division of the means of destroying them, according as they are gross or subtile.

# X.

These, the subtile ones, should be avoided by an adverse course.

Those are "subtile"  $(s \acute{u} k s h m a)$  afflictions which exist in the form of residua, but have not assumed a modification in the

form of active work. They are to be avoided (*heya*), eluded, by an adverse course (*pratiprasava*) or reflex modification. When the thinking principle, with its residua, has accomplished its course and entered into egoism, which is its source, how can these, (afflictions,) being rootless, exist?

[The five afflictions aforesaid are described under two heads, subtile and gross. They are subtile when they exist in the form of residua, *i. e.*, they exist potentially, but are latent. They become gross when they break out into active operation. Now, the latent ones are to be overcome by an adverse course. The natural course is to allow them to manifest themselves through the stimuli of external objects; but if the thinking principle be directed inwards towards egoism, the course of action is adverse to the natural tendency of the residua; and, in the absence of stimuli, they cannot manifest themselves. They cannot sprout, and are, therefore, compared in the *P. Bháshya* to roasted seeds.]

He next describes the means for the destruction of the gross (afflictions).

## XI.

# Their functions should be avoided by meditation.

The functions of these afflictions in active operation, which manifest themselves in the form of pleasure, pain, and delusion, should be "avoided," destroyed, by meditation characterised by the concentration of the thinking principle on a single point. These, being gross, are suppressed by the mere exercise for the purification of the thinking principle, even as dense thick dirt on cloth and the like is removed by mere washing, while that which is subtile in it requires heating and other (arduous) means.

[The means of suppressing the gross afflictions, or those afflictions which are in active operation, is meditation, or confining the thinking principle to one action, and focussing it there to the exclusion of all other objects. The difference lies in this—that in the case of latent afflictions the thinking principle is directed inward, and no opportunity is given to the latent ones to become active; and in the case of gross ones or those which are in active action, the thinking principle is confined to one object, and thereby all others are excluded. In the one case a desire is repressed by turning away from it, and keeping the thinking principle occupied with another, and in the other no opportunity is given for external stimuli to excite the latent wishes.

The illustration given shows that the subtile ones are more difficult to repress than the gross ones.]

Having thus defined the true character of the afflictions he, with a view to explain the residua of works, says :

# XII.

The residua of works have affliction for their root, and are felt (either) in this manifest birth, (or) in the unmanifest one.

By the term "residua of works" (karmás'aya) the nature of the residua is explained, for all works are of the form of residua. By (the phrase) " Have affliction for their root" (kles'amúlah) their cause is indicated, for of good or evil works the afflictions are the cause. By (the phrase) "felt in this manifest birth, or in the unmanifest one," the fruition is described. What is felt in the present existence is called "felt in this manifest birth" (drishtajanmavedaniyah); that which is to be felt in another existence is called "felt in an unmanifest one," (adrishtajanma-vedaniyah). Thus, some virtuous actions, such as the worship of the gods and the like performed with excessive ardour, produce fruits even in this life in the form of kind, age, or experience. Thus, to Nandís'vara, through the influence of his worshipping the lord Maheśvara, change of kind was secured even in this life. Similarly to Viśvámitra and others kind and age accrued through the force of penance. In the case of some kind alone is changed. Thus in the case of Nahusa and others performing vicious acts with excessive ardour kind alone was changed. So Urvas'i was

metamorphosed into a creeper in the garden of Kártikeya. Thus is the rule to be explained distributively or collectively.

[The leading word in this aphorism is karmáśaya. Formed of karma "works" and áśaya "virtue and vice," it implies the results which follow from the performances of works. The word áśaya has been accepted in aphorism 24, chapter I, to be the equivalent of vásaná and sañskára, and for the sake of concordance, and in accordance with the commentators, I render it here in that sense, inasmuch as the results do not manifest immediately, but remain latent to even a second or subsequent life in the form of residua.

The works are described to have afflictions for their root, because all works proceed from ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity for life, technically called the five afflictions, (II, III). No work can be performed unless impelled by one or other of these five, and so they are the roots of the residua that are left behind. The fruits of these residua are borne either collectively or singly, and at different times, either in this life or in a subsequent one, and the commentator cites instances to prove this. The story of Nandíśvara becoming a demigod occurs in the Vrihannandikeśvara Purána. The Rámáyana and some of the Puránas give the story of Vis'vámitra, a Kshatríya by birth, becoming a Bráhmana. The Mahábhárata relates the story of Nahusa being changed into a snake by a curse. The story of Urvasi's becoming, like another Daphne, a creeper, occurs in the drama of Vikramorvaśi.]

Now he describes the varieties and distinctions of the residua of works with their fruits.

# XIII.

The root existing, the deserts are kind, age, and experience.

The "root"  $(m \, i l a)$  is the afflictions aforesaid. As long as the afflictions are not removed, the deserts  $(vip \, i k a)$ , fruition of works,

Digitized by Google

good and evil, follow in the form of kind, age, and experience. "Kind" (játi) means being a man or some other being. "Age" (áyus) is always remaining in the same body. "Experience" (bhoga) means sense objects, the senses, and consciousness of pleasure and pain, according as it is accepted in the passive, instrumental, or abstract sense.

The purport of this is this: That as the residua of works reposited in the thinking principle from time without a beginning, attain maturity, so they, according to their measure, lead to fruition in the form of kind, age, and experience. The afflictions existing with their roots uncut, the residua of works become the originators of deserts. Even as unhusked S'áli paddy, like unroasted seeds, are able to germinate, but husked grains, like roasted seeds, cannot, so the residua of works, unparted from the afflictions, become the germinators of deserts; though such is not the case when the afflictions are removed, or the residua are reduced to the condition of roasted seeds.

[The first difficult word in the aphorism is játi. Its meaning is obvious enough, but I call it difficult because I can find no satisfactory equivalent for it in the English language. It is formed of the root jan 'to be born,' and means that which is born; but in philosophy it is used to imply species in a very comprehensive sense. It means caste, *i. e.*, distinction of family; or species, that is one distinct from another, as several species in a genus or order; or broader distinctions than what is implied by species; as also the broadest distinctions which naturalists indicate by the term kingdom. The examples given show that the word játi equally applies to the change of caste, as in a Kshatríva becoming a Bráhman; or to that of species; as in a man becoming a demigod; or to that of a kingdom as in a woman becoming a creeper: I know of no such comprehensive term in the English language. Dr. Ballantyne uses rank, but I doubt if the change of a woman into a creeper or a stone, the change could be idiomatically described as one of "rank." Colebrooke uses

"birth," but the change may take place without a regular birth. For the sake of English idiom the best course would be to use different equivalents under different circumstances, but that would upset the line of argument of the author. Genesis appears to bear close approximation to  $j\acute{a}ti$ , and kind is its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In using "kind" as the equivalent, I use what appears less liable to objection than others, but it is by no means a good one.

The second word dyus has been so explained by the commentator as to imply longevity, but the word means simply "age" or "duration of life," which may be long or short according to circumstances :—a meritorious work leading to prolongation of existence in a particular body, whereas a vicious one tending to shorten the span of life.

The third word is *bhoga*, which Dr. Ballantyne renders into "enjoyment;" but inasmuch as here it means the endurance of pain as well as the delectation of pleasure, I prefer "experience," which covers both.

The purport of the aphorism is that the fruition of works leads according to circumstances to change of body into a higher or lower grade, to the prolongation or reduction in the span of life, and to the experience of pleasure or pain.

The *P. Bháshya* thus explains the time of fruition: "The deserts are of three sorts, kind, age and experience. In regard to them the questions are discussed, 1st, Is one work the cause of one birth, or is it the cause of many births? 2nd, Are many works the causes of many births or of one birth?

One work is not the cause of one birth. Why so? Because there would be no regularity in the fruition of the remainder of innumerable works accumulated from time without a beginning along with a recent work. The objection would also be there would be no inducement for people (to perform many works). Therefore it is wrong.

Nor is one work the cause of many births. Why? Because if out of many works each work was to be the cause of many births. there would be want of time for the fruition of all the remaining deserts. Therefore it, too, is wrong. Nor can many works be the cause of many births. Why? Because it is not possible for many births to happen simultaneously, and consequently it must be said to happen successively, and then the objection before urged (about want of time) would apply. It follows then that the diverse stock of residua of virtuous and vicious actions performed from birth to death remains in a dominant or a dominated form, and on a death taking place it becomes the cause of a birth, being itself liable to destruction on another stock becoming dominant."]

The above described kind, &c. being the fruits of works, the author, in order to show that they produce fruition according to the works which are their cause, says:

### XIV.

They have joy or suffering for their fruit, according as their cause is virtue or vice.

"Joy" (*kláda*) is pleasure, and "suffering" (*paritápa*) is pain. Those which have joy and suffering for their fruits are so called, (*i. e.*, by the term *kláda-paritápa-pkalák*).

"Virtue" (punya) is fortunate action, and the reverse of it is "vice" (apunya). Those which have virtue or vice for their cause are so called (by the compound term punyápunya-hetutva).

[The meaning is obvious, and calls for no remark.]

To all ordinary beings the fruition is thus of two kinds; but to the Yogí all are painful; to show this, he says:

### XV.

To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of the adversity of the actions of (the three) 10 qualitics, and of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.

The meaning is, that to the "discriminating" (viveki) who has had experience of the afflictions, &c., all manifest sense objects are painful, like tasteful food infused with poison, and therefore should be known as adverse to him, since the thoroughly experienced Yogí feels oppressed by even the slightest pain. Even as the eyeball feels the acutest pain from the mere touch of a fibre of wool which the other organs do not, so the discriminating Yogí is distressed by even very slight pain.

To explain why it should be so, he says, "because of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua." Inasmuch as the longing for objects of enjoyment increases in the same ratio in which they are enjoyed, and the pain proceeding from their non-attainment is unavoidable, therefore pain always follows pleasure, and there is nothing but pain. This is the pain of sequence (*parinámaduhkhatva*).

Again, since even in the enjoyment of pleasing objects there is always a feeling of aversion against that which is antagonistic to them, anxiety cannot be eluded even while in the enjoyment of pleasures. This is the "pain of anxiety," (tápadukkhatá).

"Pain of residua" (sanskáradukkka). The sensation of pleasure, or of pain, arises in the presence of a desirable or an undesirable object, and a corresponding residuum is left on the field (of the thinking principle), and since from such a residuum a corresponding sensation is produced, and since from a great number of such residua the mundane condition is never cut short, therefore all residua are painful.

"From adversity of the action of the qualities" (gunavrittivirodhát). The effects of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, manifesting in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, being mutually overpowering or overpowered, are hostile to each other. They are everywhere connected with pain, hence they are painful.

What is said is this :--To the discriminating who is anxious to obviate pain to the utmost and absolutely, all the four causes above described, appear in the form of pain, and hence all deserts are said to be of the form of pain.

The object of this aphorism is to establish that everything connected with worldly life is painful, and Yogís should, therefore, shun them all. To prove this, it is first shown that all joyous actions are followed by pain. (The word parináma in the text here is used for sequence or result, and not modification as in most other places.) There must be a change after the enjoyment of pleasure, and as there is an increase of desire from enjoyment there must be frequent disappointments, and they inflict pain. Even in the act of enjoyment there is always a dread of something that may disturb it, and so it is not unal-Then all actions and all impressions leave behind loved. residua in the field of the thinking principle, and they revive sensations of pleasure and pain. And lastly, the three qualities are adverse to each other, and therefore they create disturbances and cause pain. The conclusion is a state of pessimism, from which the only relief is to be had by totally cutting oneself off from all worldly affairs. This pessimism forms the basis of all the leading systems of Indian philosophy, and is not unknown in Europe. According to Hartmann, "if we balance our pleasures and pains, the latter greatly exceed the former." Schopenhauer goes further, and assigns a negative nature to pleasure, which is very much the same as the doctrine of Leibnitz who assigns a privative character to pain. He holds that "all pleasure causes an exhaustion of the nervous processes, and are in themselves indirect, resulting from the cessation or intermission of pain, and seldom emerges into consciousness, whereas pain eo ipeo generates consciousness." He asks, "what, for instance, are all the pleasures of health, of youth, of freedom, of sufficient means? Are they anything but the absence of sickness, of old age, of slavery, of poverty? and is not work itself an evil? How great misery does it entail upon the toiling masses of our fellow countrymen? Does any one work of his own free will?" He adds, "no amount of pleasure can compensate for any degree of pain." Again, "human life oscillates between pain and ennui, which states are indeed the ultimate elements of life." Hartmann holds pleasure and pain to be "qualitatively similar, and only different in quantity." (*Philosophie des Unbewussten*). Socrates aptly describes pleasure and pain to be "fastened together from one crown." (*Plato, Phædo.*) Poets generally revel in the pleasures of this world, but Byron, one of the greatest among them, says—

> "Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen, Count o'er thy days from anguish free; And know, whatever thou hast been, "Tis something better—not to be."

The question then arises whence is the deliverance to come? and an able writer thus summarises the answer of the pessimists. "In knowing that the world is radically and necessarily bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for that old affirmation of the Will to live. It leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of the Will, that true nirvána, in which there is no more Will, and therefore no longer an ideal presentation or a real world." (*Westminster Review*, XLIX, 128.) This is almost the very language of Kapila].

Since pain, residua, works, and the fund of deserts, as aforesaid, are produced by Ignorance, and since Ignorance is of the form of false knowledge, and should be destroyed by perfect knowledge, and since perfect knowledge is that which decides what should be rejected and the cause thereof, and what should be approved and its cause, he says this by way of explanation :

# XVI.

Avoidable is the pain not yet come.

Inasmuch as the past is gone (and cannot be recalled), and that which is being experienced cannot be avoided, that worldly pain which has not yet come (but may come) is what should be avoided. This is what is said here.

The word heya is derived from the root há ' to quit,' and means both that which should be shunned and that which can be avoided. The English equivalent has not this double sense, but it affords the nearest approach to the Sanskrit term. The injunction is, since the past and the present are beyond control, exertion should be made to preclude the possibility of future pain. Dr. Ballantyne is quite right in rendering the aphorism into "what is to be shunned is pain not yet come," but when keya is used as an adjective, this phrase "that which is to be shunned," is too lumbering to be used with convenience. Avoidance-worthy conveys the exact meaning, and is more easy of manipulation, but it too is lumbering. A single term is wanted, and, not knowing any English word of the kind, I use what appears to me to approach the nearest to the -original, without being its exact equivalent.]

He now describes the cause of the avoidable.

### XVII.

The conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle is the cause of the avoidable.

The "spectator" (driskta) is the soul of the form of intelligence. The "spectacle" (drisya) is the principle of understanding (intellect). The conjunction," sañyoga, i. e., coming into the relation of the enjoyer and that which is to be enjoyed, of these two, without due discrimination, is the "cause," (hetu)producing agent, of the "avoidable," (heya) which is pain resulting from the modifications of the qualities, and that is the world. The meaning is that on the cessation of that conjunction worldliness subsides.

[In this aphorism "the avoidable" is used to imply the affairs of the world. Those affairs result from the conjunction or interaction of the soul and the intellect, and inasmuch as worldliness is invariably associated with pain, and that pain cannot be suppressed as long as that worldliness lasts, and for the sake of emancipation worldliness should be avoided, that which is to be avoided is here called the avoidable, or the avoidance-worthy. The word sañyoga means conjunction, but here a mere reflection of the soul is what is meant. The reflection results from propinquity. There is never an actual contact.]

Having described the conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle, he now explains the nature, the function, and the motive of the spectacle.

#### XVIII.

The spectacle is of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is the purpose of for experience and emancipation.

"Illumination" (prakáša) is the nature of the quality of goodness. "Action" (kriyá) in the form of exertion, is that of foulness. "Rule" (sthiti), in the form of regulation, is that of darkness. That which has illumination, action and the rest for its essential nature is so called, (i. e., by the term prakáša-káryasthiti-śilam). By this the nature of the spectacle is defined.

"It is of the form of the elements and the organs" ( $bh \dot{u} ten-driy \dot{a} tmakam$ ). The "elements" ( $bh \dot{u} tas$ ) are, according as they are gross or subtile, the earth, &c. and the rudiments of odour, &c. The "organs" (indriya) are threefold, according as they are the organs of sense, the organs of action, and the internal organ. That of which these two (the elements and the organs), in the forms of the preceptor and the precept, are the natural modifications, not different from its own form, is called "of the form of the elements and the organs." By this its action is also described.

"Experience" (bhoga) has been already defined, (II, XIII). "Emancipation" (apavarga) is the cessation of worldliness result-

ing from discriminative knowledge. That which has these two, (*bhoga* and *apavarga*) for its "object" (*artha*) or requirement, is the spectacle. This is the meaning.

[There would be no spectacle if there was not in it a power of manifestation, i. e., of illumination, or light. Without some action, too, it could not be manifest; and to be manifest it must have some rule or order. Hence the three are described to be the three essentials of its existence, or in other words its nature. The esoteric interpretation of this is that the spectacle is essentially the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, which must be in action to produce spectacle. It is of the form of the elements and the organs. The organs could not alone produce spectacles, nor would the elements produce spectacles if there were no organs to perceive them and communicate them to the intellect. The independent existence of the two, unconnected with each other, would also fail to produce a spectacle. They must be brought together to do so, and therefore it is that the spectacle is described to be of the nature of illumination, and of the form of the elements and the organs. The purport of this roundabout expression is that the intellect is the spectacle when it is acted upon by the elements and the organs, or the elements and the organs are modified in the form of the intellect. The word used in the text is *átmá*, and it is explained to be a modification not different from its natural form or identity (svarupábhinnah parinámah. What this natural form is is not apparent. Obviously the natural form of the intellect, or Buddhi, would be the meaning, but from what follows, Prakriti would seem to be what is meant. I shall notice this lower down, (A. XIX, XXI).

The motive or object of the spectacle is twofold,—it ministers to our enjoyment, and it may be made to help us in our endeavours to attain emancipation from the bondage of the earth.

The word *sthiti* means fixity or abidance, but the *Sánkhya-tattva-kaumudi* explains it to mean rule, regulation, or order. Had there been no order or rule, illumination and action would be continuous, and there would be no cessation or break. It is the intervention of darkness that causes the break or order of the manifestation of light and action; this is implied by *sthiti*. It implies the quality of darkness.]

To describe the phases of this spectacle in its various conditions, in the forms of modifications which should be known as fit to be avoided, he says:

# XIX.

The specific, the unspecific, the solely mergent, and the immergent are the divisions of the qualities.

"The divisions of the qualities," *i. e.*, their specific conditions, should be known to be four—this is enjoined. Thereof the "specific" (viśeska) are the gross elements and the organs. The "unspecific" (aviśeska) are the subtile elements and the internal organ. The "solely mergent" (lingamátra) is intellect. The "immergent" (alinga) is the unmanifest or undiscrete, *i. e.*, Prakriti. This is what is said. Since the relation everywhere of this undiscrete of the form of the three qualities is necessary to be known at the time of commencing knowledge, the four divisions are defined.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain that the spectacle assumes different forms under different circumstances. It is "specific" or well-defined when it refers to the elements and the organs. It is "unspecific" or undefined when related to the subtile elements and the internal organ or the mind. It is "solely mergent" or mere thought when it refers to the intellect or the thinking principle. And it is "immergent" or unmanifest or undiscrete when referring to Prakriti. Here Prakriti is included as one of the forms or phases of the spectacle, though in the commentary on the seventeenth aphorism the spectacle has been defined to be the intellect or the principle of understanding (buddhitattva). This inconsistency is explained away by saying that the intellect is but a modification of Prakriti, and, inasmuch as its primary form is Prakriti, the spectacle must include

Prakriti. The words used in explaining the term álmá in the commentary on the last aphorism—"a modification not different from its primary form," (svarúpábhinnah parinámah)—supports this inference. This is, apparently, different from the doctrine of Kapila who assigns 23 out of the 25 categories to the spectacle, leaving out the soul and Prakriti; but in reality there is no difference, except in the phraseology, as will be shown in the twenty-first aphorism.

The four terms have been differently rendered by different translators. The terms used above have been taken from Colebrooke and Wilson's 'Sáńkhya Káriká.' Mr. Davies, in his 'Hindu Philosophy,' adopts the first two, but for "mergent" uses "attributive," and for "immergent" its negative. Dr. Ballantyne uses "diverse," "non-diverse," "merely resolvable" and "irresolvable." In translating apherism 45 of Book I, I have rendered these words collectively with the subject, *linga*, into "defined character," "undefined character," "mere character" and "devoid of character."]

Since the detestableness of spectacle must be first known, and it having been described along with its conditions, to show what should be accepted, the spectator, the author now says:

# XX.

The spectator is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas.

"The spectator" (drashta) is soul. He is "absolute sentience" (drisimatra), sensation only. The object of using the term "absolute" (matra) is to preclude the idea of the quality and the qualified, (*i. e.* he is himself sensation and not possessed of sensation). Some explain sensation to be an attribute of soul.

He, the spectator, 'though pure,' (*suddhopi*), *i. e.* although existing by himself in his own essence, being above all liability to modification and the like, "directly beholds intellected ideas." "Intellected ideas" (*pratyayas*) are knowledge tinctured by

worldly objects. "Directly" (anu), without any intervention, or without any medium, he beholds (pasyati).

What is said is this. Soul attains his spectatorship by his proximity to intellect, which alone is tinctured or influenced by passing objects.

[The soul is sentience only, *i. e.*, it consists of sentience and nothing more. In this condition it is absolutely pure, being unalloyed by any other object. It, nevertheless, directly beholds intellected ideas, or is the percipient, of all ideas without any intervention. This is effected by its proximity to the intellect, which receives the impressions of the outer world. The act of modification or change which perception implies is effected in the intellect, and does not extend to the soul. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of maintaining the immutability and perfect purity of the soul, for the admission of change would destroy its immutability and absolute purity.]

To show that soul alone is the experiencer, he says :

# XXI.

Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle.

"Spectacle" (driśya) has been defined above (II, XVIII). 'Its soul' (átmá) is its true nature. It, "the soul of the spectacle," is required for "his purpose," for the purpose of consummating the experiencership of soul to the exclusion of all selfish ends. Pradhána in activity does not work with a view to attain any aim of its own, but to accomplish the experiencership of soul.

[The meaning is that the true nature of the spectacle acts solely to accomplish the purpose of soul, and not for any purpose of its own, for it has none such. It will be noticed that the text says it is the soul of the spectacle, and not the spectacle itself, that subserves the purpose of soul, and the question arises what is its soul? The word used in the text is  $\acute{a}tm\acute{a}$ , which means soul, *i. e.*, the soul of the spectacle subserves the purpose of the soul of a living being. The commentator explains  $\acute{a}tm\acute{a}$  by svarúpa "it own natural form,"

CHAPTER SECOND.

In the commentary on A, xix, he uses the or true nature. words svarúpábhinnah parínámah, or "a modification not different from its primary form," neither of which carries us directly to what is meant. It is obvious, however, from the use of the word Pradhána-Prakriti in the commentary on the aphorism under notice, which in activity, is said, " not to work with a view to attain any aim of its own," that the "soul of the spectacle" is but another form of expression for Prakriti. That Prakriti n activity is the spectacle is abundantly evident in the leading works of the Sáńkhya system. Thus, in the Sáńkhya-káriká : "For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it) like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence. with the aid of nature's influence." (Verse XLII). Again, "as a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul." (Verse LIX). Again : "Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of the ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities." (Verse LX). Again "he desists because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation." (Verse LXVI). Similarly the Sáfikhya Sútra: "Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,-for she is not the experiencer,-just like a cart carrying saffron (for the sake of its master)." (Ballantyne, III, LVIII). Again, "just like a dancer. does she, though she had been energising, desist, because of the end having been attained (in the shape of soul's aim)." (Ibid. III, LIX). Nor is there any inconsistency in this, for intellect does not differ from Prakriti except in being in activity; and "soul," "true nature," "original shape of the intellect," and other similar expressions must imply Prakriti or nature, and nothing else. This will explain the remarks made in the note on Aphorisms xv11 and X1X.

Commenting on the passages quoted from the Sáfikhya-káriká, Mr. Davies observes, "Beautiful as poetry, but not very philosophic, nor in direct harmony with other parts of the Sáńkhya philosophy. Kapila, or I'śvara Krishņa, forgets that nature (*Prakriti*) has no personality, no powers, no volition, and no consciousness," (p. 95.) This is not fair towards I'śvara Krishņa, who provides for such criticism by saying, "as the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the development of nature causes the liberation of soul;" (Verse LIX;) and Kapila cites the unintelligent cart carrying saffron for its owner.]

If the accomplishment of the experience of soul be thus the only aim, then, on the accomplishment of that object, Prakriti, having no other object in view, should cease to be active, and the cessation of all modification in it, itself being pure, (*i. e.*, having the three qualities in equipose) all spectators should be free, and it would follow that the world would be cut short. Suspecting such a consequence, he says:

# XXII.

Destroyed in the case of him whose purpose has been attained, she is still active, for she is common to others besides him.

Although she (*Prakriti*—nature) becomes "destroyed" (*nashta*), devoid of action, in the case of some one soul which has attained its purpose, (*kritártha*), by experiencing the world till the manifestation of discriminative knowledge, yet she, being common to all souls, remains active (*anashta*) in other cases. It follows that Prakriti, being common to all experiencers, can never be totally destroyed, nor can the emancipation of one imply the emancipation of "all. This is what is meant.

[The conclusion arrived at in the next preceding aphorism, to the effect that on knowledge being attained, Prakriti ceases to act, and becomes functionless, is calculated to suggest the idea that her cessation from her action would apply to all souls, so that on one soul attaining emancipation all souls would be free, there being no active ministering Prakriti to keep them supplied with external impressions. This, however, is not the case. The destruction, or cessation, of action, is confined to the particular soul concerned. When a soul has, through discriminative knowledge, attained his aim he ceases to be influenced by Prakriti, and quod that soul Prakriti is destroyed; but as regards other souls which have not attained their aims she remains fully active; and this is indicated by the paradox "though dead, still she is alive:" nashtopyanashtam. This is the natural consequence of nature being one, and souls many. The P. Bháshya explains the reason by saying that the contact of the quality to the qualified is without a beginning; dharminám anádisañyogát dharmamátránámapyanádisañyogah.]

Having described spectacle and spectator he proceeds to describe their conjunction.

# XXIII.

Conjunction is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the inherent power and the lordship of power.

He defines it through its function. "Inherent power" (svasakti) is the nature of the spectacle. "Lordship of power" (svasakti) is the identity of the spectator. That "conjunction" (sañyoga) which is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the two, existing correlated as the knowable and the knower, is the natural condition of the relation of the experience and the experiencer, and no other. Nor is their conjunction of a different character from their respective natures, which are eternal and all pervading. The character of the experience as the experience and of the experiencer as the experiencer is established from time without a beginning, and that is the conjunction.

[The purport of this is that there is an inherent relation between the experience as experienceable, and the experiencer as experiencer from time without a beginning; that is, this relation is not casual or adventitious, produced at particular times by particular causes,

but natural and always existing. This relation of the two is indicated by the term  $sa \tilde{n} y o ga$  or conjunction, and this conjunction or the natural relation of the two is the cause of worldliness. As will be explained afterwards, the conjunction is not actual or material, but a mere reflection of the one on the other.]

He now describes its cause

#### XXIV.

# Its cause is ignorance.

That which has been described before (II, IV) as "ignorance" (*avidyá*), having the nature of doubt and delusion, is the cause of the conjunction which has the form of indiscriminateness.

[The object of the text is to say that ignorance is the cause of the conjunction of soul with intellect, and that conjunction produces indiscriminateness, or the want of power on the part of soul to distinguish between itself and intellect, and the failure to do so leads to the feeling of the pleasures and afflictions of the world being borne by it. When the differences of the two are distinguished, the conjunction dissolves, and soul is free. Dr. Ballantyne has been misled by the presence of the word *keya* in the preamble of the following aphorism into the supposition that that word is a part of the aphorism under notice, and having incorporated it he has interpreted it as such. The word, however, has been cited with reference to its use in a preceding aphorism.]

The avoidable (heya) is the objective of the verb to avoid  $(h\dot{a})$ , and to explain what that avoidance is, he says :

### XXV.

From its absence there is absence of conjunction, and that is, avoidance. Thereupon results the isolation of the spectator.

"Its," *i. e.*, of ignorance. On its "absence" (abháva), *i. e.*, on its being irradicated by perfect knowledge which is its essential

CHAPTER SECOND.

opposite, the effect of the conjunction ceases, or is absent, and this absence is called "avoidance" (hána). The meaning is this: it is not, practicable to separate ignorance like an embodied object, but, on discriminative knowledge being produced, this conjunction, which has indiscriminitativeness for its cause, it of itself ceases, and this is its avoidance (hána). That which is an avoidance of the conjunction, is assumed to be an "isolation" (kairalya) of the eternally isolated soul. In this way the nature, cause, and effect of the conjunction is explained.

[The meaning is that when ignorance is irradicated by a right apprehension of its relation to soul, its relation with soul ceases, and this surcease makes the solitary eternal soul isolated from ignorance and its consequences, and the soul remains isolated, as is its nature. All my MSS. give the reading "of eternally isolated" (*nityakaivalyasya*,) but Dr. Ballantyne, has found a different version; his text has *nityam kevalasya*, which would give the meaning "there is eternal isolation of the solitary or isolated"—*kevalasya nityam kaivalyam*. The isolation is in either case assumed to be everlasting, and hence this isolation is believed to be final deliverance from bondage.

The word]kaivalya is derived from kevala, "alone," and "isolation" appears to be its most appropriate rendering; but, inasmuch as this isolation takes place by withdrawing or detaching the soul from the phenomeral world, Colebrooke and Wilson use "abstraction." The Sáńkyatattva-kaumudí defines it to be "absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must, therefore, be something different from intellect and the rest which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a speration form their own essence." (Sástránám maharshánám divyalochanánám cha kaivalyam chátyantikaduhkha-trayaprasamalakshanam na buddhyádinám sambhavati, te hi duhkhátmakáh katham svabhávádibhih mochayitum śakyanti.) Vijnána Bhikshu defines it in the same way, and calls it absolute extirpation of pain (duhkhátyantikochchhedah). Any way, it is the final reward of the knowledge advocated and the practice of meditation enjoined in this system of philosophy.]

Now, by way of describing the means of avoidance he points out the cause of the acceptable.

# XXVI.

The means of avoidance is the manifestation of undisturbed discriminative knowledge.

"Discriminative knowledge" (viveka) is the name of the knowledge (which shows) that qualities are distinct from soul. Its "manifestation" (khyáti) is the means (upáya) or cause of the "avoidance" (hána) or rejection of the visible. How should this be? It should be "undisturbed," (aviplavá). That which has no interruptions, or breaks or repeated intervals of waking from meditation, is called undisturbed.

The purport of it is this: on the disolution of ignorance, from the contemplation of that which is adverse to it, the cessation of all ideas of relationship, agency, &c., the vanishing of the dirt of foulness and darkness, and the refluent modification of the intellect, the reflection of soul on intellect is called discriminative knowledge. And by the constant or uninterrupted prevalance of it the function of the spectacle ceases, and this is isolation.

[The object of the aphorism is twofold; 1st, to point out the means of avoiding the avoidable, 2nd, to indicate, by implication what should be accepted. The means of avoiding the avoidable, that is ignorance, is the cultivation of discriminative knowledge without any break or interruption. Light and darkness cannot exist conjointly, light must always destroy darkness, and as discriminative knowledge is light, and ignorance darkness, the one disappears on the other becoming manifest. Were, however, the light to be fitful, or interrupted, there would be certain periods of light and others of darkness, and to preclude this the injunction is added that the light "should be undisturbed" or uninterrupted. The second object is implied, but not pointed out. If continuous light is necessary it follows as a matter of course that that is what should be accepted.]

Having described the enlightenment which takes place in the soul on the taking place of discriminative knowledge, he defines the nature of the discriminative knowledge.

#### XXVII.

Of that there are, up to its utmost stage, seven kinds of enlightenment.

"Of that," *i. e.*, of the produced discriminative knowledge, the "enlightenment" (prajná), with the understanding of what should be known is, to its "utmost stage," (prántabhúmi) *i. e.*, to the stage of Samádhi, along with all its accessories, of seven kinds.

Thereof four are liberation from work, viz., (1) The knowable has been known by me. (2) There is nothing remaining to be known. (3) My afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome. (4) Knowledge has been acquired by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me. Thus, in these states, by rejecting all other conceptions, these kinds of understanding are produced. This understanding, which is pure knowledge regarding work, is called liberation from work.

Intellectual liberation is of three kinds, viz., (1) my intellect has accomplished its purpose. (2) The qualities have finished their domination over me; like stones fallen from the crest of a mountain they cannot go back to their place; for, tending to dissolution in their own cause, and there being a want of the original cause which is ignorance, and in the absence of a motive, how can there be springing up of the evil ones? (3) And my meditation has been identified with my soul. Such being the case I am existing in my real nature. These three kinds are intellectual liberation. Thus, on the springing up of this sevenfold knowledge to the utmost stage (of meditation) the soul is said to be isolated.

[The knowledge which is the aim and object of this system of philosophy is, according to its different states of perfection, classed under two heads; one relating to works, and the other to The first of these two heads is then divided into intellect. four, and the second into three sub-heads, making altogether seven stages. The lowest stage is that in which the Yogí feels that he has known all that has to be known. The next is that in which he, in addition to the first, feels that he has nothing more to learn. In the third there is, in addition to the first two, the conviction, that all impediments to knowledge have been destroyed, and there is nothing more to destroy. These three lead to the conviction that the full amount of discriminative knowledge has been acquired, and this constitutes the fourth. All these refer to external nature, and since they are connected with the active creation or works, they are called liberation from work. The second group refers exclusively to the intellect or the thinking principle. The convictions, 1st, that the intellect has done its office by pointing out the distinction between soul and nature; 2nd, that the qualities which govern the functions of the intellect have lost their influence; and 3rd, that the intellect has merged in the soul, refer to the relation of the intellect to the soul, and as the conviction is that the intellect has lost its power on the soul, therefore, it is called intellectual liberation. All these, it will be perceived, are dependant upon judgment, or consciousness of the effects of certain actions, and therefore relate to conscious or seeded meditation. (Cf. B. I, A. 17.) The function of deliberation or judgment resulting from ratiocianation is in every instance present, and the ideas of, I, me, and mine, govern the whole. But when the judgment is brought to this final stage there is nothing more to do, and then follows the unconscious condition which is absolute isolation.]

Having described that the cause of discriminative knowledge is the cessation of conjunction, he now explains what are the means of its origin.

### XXVIII.

On the decay of impurity through the practice of the accessories of the Yoga, there is an illumination of the understanding till discriminative knowledge (results).

"The accessories of the Yoga" (*Yogáfiga*) are what will be presently described, (XXIX.) "The practice" (anushthána) thereof is the intelligent exercise of the same till discriminative knowledge results. "On the decay of impurity," (aśuddhikshaya), i. e., on the decline of the impurity which is of the form of afflictions of the character of an envelope to the manifestation of the thinking principle, whatever "Illumination of the understanding" (jnánadipti) takes place, greater or less, by the modification of the principle of goodness till the time of the manifestation of the discriminative knowledge, the same becomes the cause of that manifestation: this is the meaning.

[The commentary explains the aphorism in a roundabout way. The purport is that by the practice of certain exercises the impurities which surround the thinking principle are gradually destroyed, and as they are destroyed so there results a gradual enlightenment which culminates, on perfect maturity, in discriminative knowledge.]

The decay of impurity by the practice of the accessories of the Yoga having been thus described, the question arises what are those accessories? (To this question) he replies.

### XXIX.

Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation are the eight accessories.

Some of these being directly beneficial to profound meditation are intimate accessories, such as devotion, &c. Others subserve profound meditation by eradicating hesitation and adverse feelings of slaughter, &c., such as restraint, obligation, &c. Among them posture and the rest are successively subservient (to samádhi). Thus on the acquisition of posture there is steadiness in the regulation of breath. The successive ones are to be explained in the same way.

[These eight are classed under two heads, 1st, general or extrinsic, and, 2nd, special or intrinsic. The first two are general, because they are obligatory at all times; the other six are intrinsic, because they subserve the purpose of the Yoga, but are not otherwise necessary. What these eight are will be explained in the following aphorisms.]

He now successively explains their nature.

# XXX.

Restraint includes abstinence from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and avarice.

"Slaughter"  $(hi\bar{n}s'\dot{a})$  is work which requires the destruction of life; it is the root of all evils, and its absence is "non-slaughter,"  $(ahi\bar{n}s\dot{a})$ . As slaughter should be avoided at all times, its absence implied by non-slaughter is first mentioned.

"Veracity" (satya) is confirmity in mind and speech with fact.

"Theft" (steya) is forcibly taking another's property; and its absence is "non-theft" (asteya).

"Continence" (brahmacharya) is subjugation of carnality.

"Non-avarice" (aparigraha) is the non-acceptance of objects for the promotion of enjoyment.

These five, non-slaughter, &c., are indicated by the term yama, restraints, and reckoned as accessories to Yoga.

[These restraints figure prominently in all Hindu systems, and are by no means peculiar to the Yoga. They obtain equal prominence among the Jains and the Buddhists; the latter call them Páramitás. Using the term restraint, for Yama, I have found it necessary for the sake of English idiom and uniformity of expression to use the roundabout form of abstinence from false-

hood, &c., instead of the direct positive terms veracity (satya), &c., which the text employs. They form the ground work without which no religious superstructure is possible.]

He points out a peculiarity of these.

# XXXI.

These are the great austerities of all stages, irrespective of kind, locality, time, and compact.

"Kind" (játi), such as Bráhmanhood (conf. ante, p. 71). "Locality" (deśa), such as particular sacred pools, &c. "Time" (kála), such as the fourteenth lunation and the like. "Compact" (samaya), the requirement of a Bráhmana, &c. These are called the great austerities (mahávratas). They are imperative in all conditions or stages of the thinking principle, "irrespective" (anavachchhinna) of these four conditions of kind, &c., i. e., it does not mean that "I shall not kill a Bráhmana," "I shall not kill any one in a sacred pool," "I shall commit no slaughter on the 14th lunation," " I shall not kill except for gods, Brahmanas, &c.," implying four specific conditions, but that "I shall not for any purpose whatsoever, kill any one at any place, at any time." The others should be explained in the same way. Thus, when these practices are universal, without any qualification, they are called "great austerities." Their interrupted observance is not so.

[The purport is that these restraints should be observed with reference to all kinds of being, at every place, at all times, and under every circumstance, without any qualification whatsoever. The object of adverting to "compact" is to leave no room for religious sacrifices, such as the Vedas enjoin. They are, in the estimation of the Yogi, as objectionable as unauthorised slaughter.]

He next describes obligation.

# XXXII.

The obligations are purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord.

"Purification" (*saucha*) is of two kinds, external and internal. External (vahya) means the washing of the body with earth, water, &c. The internal (*antara*) is the washing, by means of friendliness and the like, of all dirt from the thinking principle. "Contentment" (*santosha*) contentedness. The others have already been explained. These, purification and the rest, are indicated by the term *niyama*, "obligation."

[These obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise. They must be attended to very carefully as much to prepare oneself for the performance of the Yoga, as for the wellbeing of ordinary worldly life.]

How these are accessories to the Yoga, he next explains.

# XXXIII.

By the exclusion of the questionable the thought of its opposite (is acquired).

(Those things which) cause doubts or questioning are "questionables" (*Vitarka*), and these, including slaughter and the like, are inimical to the follower of Yoga. When they are obstructed or excluded by the thought of their opposites, then Yoga becomes easily achievable, and the restraints and obligations consequently become accessories to Yoga.

[The restraints keep one from the performance of certain questionable acts, and the obligations train one habitually to avoid the questionables, and thereby the thinking principle is prepared for undisturbed concentration in the performance of the Yoga. The restraints and the obligations necessarily become accessories to the Yoga, and are therefore so called.]

Now he successively describes the natures, the distinctions, the varieties, the causes, and the fruits of the questionables.

# XXXIV.

The questionables are slaughter and the rest. (Whether) they are done, caused to be done, or abetted; (whether) preceded by longing, anger or delu-

sion; (whether) slight, moderate or excessive; they have pain and ignorance for their endless fruits. Hence (the necessity) of the thought of opposites.

The aforesaid slaughter and the rest are first divided into three kinds, viz., done, caused to be done, and abetted. Thereof those which are accomplished by oneself are "done" (krita). Those which follow from orders to the effect "do them," "they should be done," are caused to be done k irita). Those which, on being accomplished by others, are encouraged by (the saying) "well done, well done," are "abetted" (anumodita). These three forms are described to prevent mistakes respecting them; otherwise a dull-witted person might fancy, "the slaughter has not been completed by me, so no fault rests on me."

To indicate their causes he says, "proceeded by longing, anger, or delusion." Although longing and anger are first noticed, yet since delusion, which is characterised by its accepting that to be soul which is not soul, the source of all pains, and since longing and anger arise from distinctions about differences of relation as to one's own or another, delusion should be known to be the root, *i. e.*, all faults proceed from antecedent delusion. "Longing" (lobha)) is thirst. "Anger" (krodha) is an inflammatory function of the thinking principle, which sets aside all sense of discrimination about what is proper and what is improper. Each of these is threefold, according as it is distinguished by being done, caused to be done, &c., and slaughter and the rest are divisible into these according as they are caused by delusion, &c.

They are again divided into three kinds according as they are "mild, moderate, and excessive." "Mild," (manda) are slow, *i. e.*, neither excessive nor moderate. The "moderate" (madhyama) are neither mild nor excessive. The "excessive" (adhimátra) are ardent, neither mild nor moderate.

Thus there are nine kinds, and these being three-fold the total becomes twenty-seven. Again, of the mild &c., each being divisible according as it is mild, moderate and excessive, becomes threefold. The combination to be made as it becomes appropriate; thus mildly mild (mridu-mridu) "mildly moderate" (mridu-madhya), "mildly ardent," (mridu-tivra).

Their fruits he describes (by the words) "having pain and ignorance for endless fruits." Pain (duhkha) is a function of the quality of foulness, manifesting itself in the form of repugnance. "Ignorance" (ajnána) is false knowledge in the form of doubt or error. Their fruits are indicated by (the compound term) duhkhajnánánanta-phaláh. From such pain and ignorance proceed "endless" (ananta) unintermitting fruit. What is enjoined is that these should be overcome by the Yogí, who has known their nature, cause, &c. by thinking on their opposites.

[The works condemned by the restraints and the obligations have been lumped together under the name of questionable (*Vitarka*) for easy treatment, and then their natures, distinctions, varieties and fruits are generally described. They call for no explanatory remark.]

In order to explain how perfections arise successively by ardent exercise of these (duties) he says:

# XXXV.

When non-slaughter is confirmed (there is) near him abandonment of enmity.

In the neighbourhood of him who is confirmed in nonslaughter there is "abandonment of enmity" (vairatyága), or harmless abidance even on the part of the naturally cruel, such as of serpents and mungooses. The meaning is, those that are addicted to injury, give up their injurious nature.

[The purport is obvious. When the restraint from slaughter has been acquired there cannot exist any feeling of enmity, and, naturally hostile individuals, having acquired it, live in peace and harmony, like serpents and mungooses, which are naturally hostile to each other, and yet under the influence of the virtue may dwell together without injuring each other.] He next describes what becomes of him who practices veracity.

# XXXVI.

In the confirmed in veracity (there is) asylum of the fruit of works.

"Works" (kriyáh) are the sacrifices, which, when performed, yield the fruits heaven, &c. The Yogí who practices veracity rises to such greatness that he attains the fruits without performing those works, and at his bidding they may be attained by any one soever, without performing those works. Such is the meaning.

[Veracity or abstinence from falsehood is here described to be as meritorious as the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Vedas; *i. e.*, by practising veracity with unswerving faith one acquires the same merit which the sacrifices yield, and that without its being tainted by the cruelty which attends sacrifices. The *P. Bháshya* explains that he becomes virtuous, and as a virtuous person attains heaven (which is the reward of virtuous works), and his speech becomes fruitful. (*Dhármika bhûyá iti bhavati. Dhármikah svargam prapnuhíti svargam prápnoti, amoghásya vágbhavati.*)]

He now describes the reward of him who abstains from theft.

### XXXVII.

Jewels from all sides approach him who is confirmed in abstinence from theft.

When a Yogí practices abstinence from theft, and that abstinence rises to a high pitch, jewels from all sides come to him without his wishing them.

[The object here is to show that what may be acquired with great trouble by theft, may be had unsought by scrupulous abstinence from theft.]

The fruit of continence he next describes.

# XXXVIII.

# Attainment of vigour in confirmed continence.

Whoever steadfastly practices continence obtains, on its attaining its highest pitch, "vigour" (virya), or manly power comes in him. Conservation of manly vigour is continence, and on its attaining a high degree, vigour comes in plenty in the body, the organs and the mind.

[The meaning is that there is always a loss of vigour by incontinence, and therefore the Yogí should abstain from it in order to conserve his vigour.]

He next points out the fruit of non-covetousness.

# XXXIX.

On non-covetousness being confirmed there is conscience of all about births.

The word kathantá is the abstract form of katham 'what,' or 'what all about,' and janma-kathantá means all about births, and the full knowledge thereof is its "conscience" (sambodha). The meaning is that he knows all about the questions, "What was I in a former birth? Who was I? What did I do?"

Covetousness is not confined to objects of enjoyment; it extends to the soul's desire to have a body, for that too is covetousness, since the body is needed for enjoyment. And such being the case, the knowledge of principles cannot prevail, while the inclinations are disposed outwards from the excess of the quality of foulness. Now, when on giving up all desire for the body and the rest, an indifference is attained, then to the indifferent being, devoid of foulness, an acquaintance with all past and future existences becomes a cause of thorough knowledge.

[The reward here spoken of is transcendental; it enables the observer of abstinence from all covetousness to see by his mental eye all that has happened to him in former births, and what will happen hereafter.]

Having thus described the perfections of the restraints, he now describes the obligations.

#### XL.

From purity (proceed) loathing for one's own members, and non-intercourse with others.

For him who practises purity there is a "loathing" (jugupsá) or detestation produced for even the members of his own body from discrimination of their nature and cause. (The idea then is) "This body is impure, no fondness for it should be cherished." And for the same reason there results a "non-intercourse," (asañsarga) absence of relationship, or avoidance of mixing with "others," (paraih), i. e., with other embodied persons. This is the meaning. How can he who loaths his own body from perceiving its this or that fault, wish to have intercourse with other bodies of the same description?

[The purity as defined in the commentary on A, XXXII. (p. 94) is obviously confined to contact with dirt and consciousness of the body being naturally impure. Here the latter phase is magnified to the extent of making the embodied loath his own body, and à fortiorari all bodies.]

He describes other fruits of purity.

#### XLI.

Moreover, purification of goodness, complacency, concentration, subjugation of the organs, and fitness for beholding soul.

(The words) "are produced" are required to complete the sentence. "Goodness" (sattva) consists of light, joy, &c. Its purification, is its not being oppressed (or overcome) by the qualities of foulness and darkness. "Complacency" (saumanasya) is mental satisfaction from non-perception of distress. "Concentration" (ekágratá) is fixedness of the thinking principle on any sensuous object to which it may be directed. "Subjugation of the organs" (indriyajaya) is the abidance in themselves of the organs diverted from their objects. "Fitness of beholding soul" (*átmadareanayogyatva*) is the adaptation of the thinking principle to do so on the manifestation of knowledge. To one who is practised in purity these, purification of goodness and the rest, successively manifest themselves. Thus, from purity comes purification of goodness; from purification of goodness, complacency; from complacency, concentration; from concentration, subjugation of the organs; from subjugation of the organs, fitness to behold soul.

[This aphorism is the sequel of the preceding one; it enumerates advantages in addition to those previously described. The advantages noted are of obvious import.]

The fruit of exercising contentment.

### XLII.

# From contentment, (proceeds) superlative felicity.

From contentment becoming excessive such internal felicity arises for the Yogi, as cannot be equalled by the pleasures of external objects, even to the extent of a hundredth part of it.

[The meaning is obvious.]

The fruit of austerity.

#### XLIII.

Through austerity results the perfection of the body and the organs, from decay of impurity.

Through the decay of impurity of the form of distress and the like by the exercise of austerity there arises in the mind a "perfection" (siddhi) or superiority of the body and the organs. The meaning is this, the afflictions of the thinking principle decay by the performance of Chándráyana and other fasts. From that decay the organs acquire the power of perceiving the minute, the hidden, and the remote, and the body (the power of assuming) at pleasure the form of a molecular, or great magnitude. [Briefly the purport of the aphorism is that by attaining perfection in austerity, a Yogí acquires transcendental powers; his organs are then able to grasp all kinds of objects, whether they be so minute as not to be ordinarily perceivable by the senses, or so hidden as not to be accessible to the senses, or so remote as to be beyond their range.

The reference to the Chándráyana is a mere illustration, the object is to imply austerity generally, and not to such only as are enjoined as penances. The object is not penance or expiation for sins committed, but the general mortification of the flesh.]

The fruit of muttering.

### XLIV.

Through muttering results the cognition of the desiderated deity.

On the perfection of "muttering" (sádhyáya) characterised by the repetition or the like of a selected mantra, there results a cognition on the part of the Yogí of the deity desiderated: the meaning is that that deity becomes visible to him.

[The word *svádhyáya* means the study of the Vedas, but here it is used in the technical sense of muttering or inaudibly repeating a great many times any selected mantra. This is closely analogous to the counting of the rosary.]

The fruit of contemplating on the Lord.

# XLV.

Meditation is completed through the contemplation of the Lord.

Whoever is thus devoted to the Lord, in him "meditation" (samádhi) of the kind described (CIAL.) becomes manifest, because that Divine Lord, being pleased, excites meditation by removing all obstructive afflictions (from the way).

[The theistical character of Patanjali's doctrine is here established by the admission that the divinity may, when contemplated, help to promote the object of the Yoga. Kapila repudiates the idea.]

Having described the restrictions and the obligations, he now proceeds to describe posture.

## XLVI.

# Posture (is that which is) firm and pleasant.

"Posture" (ásana) is that whereby one sits, such as Padmásana, Dandásana, Svastikásana, &c. When that seat becomes "firm" (sthira) or devoid of agitation, and "pleasant" (sukha) or not uncomfortable, then it is reckoned as an accessory of the Yoga.

[The word *ásana* ordinarily implies the material adapted for sitting upon, such as a rug, a mat, a board, a chair, or the like, but here it has been used for particular modes or attitudes of sitting, and therefore I have translated it into posture and not seat. The aphorism recommends such postures as ensure steadiness and comfort; but the postures as described in other works do not convey to a worldly understanding any such idea. Brahmánanda, in his commentary on the Hathapradipika, says that Vasishtha, Yajnavalkya and other ancient sages had described 84 postures as appropriate for Yogís, and that Siva, the greatest of Yogis, was their author. He adds that Gorakshanátha, a Yogí of a later date, but of great renown, reckoned the total number of appropriate postures at 84,00,000. (Chaturasitílaksháni cha taduktam Gorakshanáthena.) Of the 84 some are common, some are more important. Svátmáráma, in the Hathapradipiká, describes ten as "more important" for the performance of the Hathayoga. These are called, 1, Svastika; 2, Gomukka; 3, Víra; 4, Kúrma; 5, Kukkuța; 6, Uttána-kúrmaka; 7, Dhanuh; 8, Matsyanátha; 9, Mayúra; 10, Sava. The most important ones are: 1, Siddha alias Mukta alias Gupta; 2, Padma; 3, Siñha; 4, Bhadra alias Goraksha. The P. Bháshya does not enter into any detail, but names the following as examples, viz., 1, Padma or lotus; 2, Vira or heroic; 3, Bhadra or decent; 4, Svastika or the mystic diagram so called ; 5, Danda or staff-like ; 6, Sopásraya or self-reliant ; 7, Paryańka or bedstead-like; 8, Krauńcha-nisidana or like the posture of the seated heron; 9, Hasti-nishidana or seated elephant; 10, Ushtra-

nishidana or seated camel; 11, Samasansthána or evenly poised. The following are brief accounts of the ways in which the postures are assumed.

1. Padmásana. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby; the chin should be bent down on the chest; and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called Padmásana, and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases.\*

2. Virásana. Place each foot under the thigh of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture Virásana.<sup>+</sup>

3. Bhadrásana. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the feet and this is Bhadrásana.<sup>‡</sup>

4. Svastikásana. Sitting straight with the feet placed under the (opposite) thighs is called Svastikásana.§

5. Dandásana. Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed extended on the legs. $\|$ 

6. Sinhásana. Let the ankles be placed under the testes, the left ankle on the right side of the suture (the mesian line) and the right on the left side of the suture; let the hands placed on the knees, and the fingers extended; let the mouth be wide open, and the sight be directed to the tip of the nose while one is in deep contem-

- \* वासेक्परि द्धिणच चरणं संख्याप्य वासं तथा द्त्त्वोरूपरि पश्चिमेन विधिना छला कराभ्यां हढं। चकुछे इट्ट्ये निधाय चिवुकं नासाप्रमासीकाये-देतद्वााधिविनाग्रकारि यसिनां पग्नासनं प्राच्यते॥
- † एकपादं तर्धैकखिम् विस्थयेदुर्दाण सिंतं। ्रतरिस्नंस्तृया चादं वीरासनमितीरितं॥
- ‡ गुइफों। च ष्टवइस्याधः सीवन्याः पार्श्वयोः चिपेत्। स्वगृइर्फ तथा स्वे दचगुरुफन दण्डि पार्श्वपादे। च पाहिस्यां दढं वद्धा सुनिखर्छं। भद्रासनं भवेदेतत् सर्व्ववाधिविनाग्रनं॥
- ५ ज्ञानूर्व्धेारमारे सम्यक् झला पादतको उमे । ऋजुकायः समासीमः खस्तिकं तन् प्रचचते ॥
- अपविक्र सिंहाङ्खिको सिंहगुइफो स्मिसिहजङ्गेदपादी प्रषाय द्खायनमभ्यवेष् ।

plation; and it will produce the lion posture Sinhásana, the adored of all Yogís.\*

7. Put the right ankle on the left side of the chest, and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the posture will be *Gomukha*, or of the shape of a cow's mouth.<sup>+</sup>

8. Closing the anus with the two ankles crossed while the mind is under control, produces, say the knowers of Yoga, the tortoise posture, Kúrmásana.<sup>‡</sup>

9. Having established the lotus posture, if the hands be passed between the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as to lift the body aloft, it will produce the Fowl seat, *Kukkutásana*.§

10. Having assumed the fowl posture, should the two hands be placed on the sides of the neck it would make the posture like that of the tortoise upset; it is called upset tortoise posture, *Uttánakúrmaká*sana.

11. Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is called the bow posture, *Dhanurásana*.¶

12. Place the right foot on the roof of the left thigh, surround the right knee with the left, foot, and sit with the body twisted, and it will result in the *Matsyanáthásana* or posture *Matsyanátha*.\*\*

- गुइको च दृषषस्याधः शीवन्धाः पार्श्वयोः चिपेत् । द्वित्रे स्वगुरूफन् द्वगुष्दन् स्वते ॥ पत्ने तु जान्वाः संस्थाप्य साङ्ग्रसाः संप्रसार्थ्य च । बाङ्गवक्को निरीचेत नासापं सुसमाडितः । सिंड्रसनं भवेदेतन् पुजितं योगिपुडन्वैः ॥
- † स्वे द्विणगृङ्खन् ष्ठेषार्श्वं नियानवेत्। द्विणेऽपि तथा स्वं गेम्सं गेम्माछति ॥
- 1 गुदं गिदध्य गृदफाभ्यां खुत्लमेल समादितः । द्वर्माछनं भवेदेतदिति ये।गविदेा विदुः ॥
- ५ पद्मासनम्, संख्याप्य जानूर्व्वे।रमरे करें। निवेध्य भूमे। संख्याप्य व्यानस्थं कुकुटासनं ॥
- इक्टुटावनवस्त्रे देस्थां चम्मध कॅन्ररां।
   यसिन कुर्यावर्णानीभवेदुणानकूर्यांकं॥
- ¶ पादाङ्ग्रेष्टी तु पाकिश्वां स्टडीला त्रवत्तावधि । धनराक्षेयं कुर्य्यादन्राधनम्खते ॥
- \*\* बार्मे। बसू लापितदचपादं जाने। वेचिवे छितवामपादं। प्रस्टचा तिष्ठेत् परिवर्गिताङः जीमतस्त्रमाचे। दिनमाधनं तन् ॥

13. Mayúrásana. Hold the earth with both hands placing the elbows on the sides of the navel, and keep the body erect like a staff: this is called the Mayúrásana or peacock posture.\*

14. Siddhásana. Place the left ankle on the membrum virile, and thereupon put the right ankle, and it completes the Siddhásana. +

Besides these A'sanas, Yogis have a great many postures or gestures which they reckon under the name of Mudrá, to which, however, no mention is made here in the text. In Tántric rituals the technical difference between an A'sana and a Mudrá depends upon the organs employed. An A'sana or seat is by its very nature connected with the disposition of the lower limbs, whereas the Mudrá depends upon the motion of the upper limbs; and in the Tantras all symbols produced by twining the fingers or placing the hands in particular positions are recognised as Mudrás. The Yogis have also some Mudrás of the same kind; but in their more important Mudrás the distinction is entirely lost sight of, and hands and feet alike come into play to produce the A'sanas as well as the Mudrás. The great and most remarkable distinctive character of the Mudrá appears, however, to be its connection with the regulation of breath. The Gheranda Sanhitá describes in all twenty-five Mudrás, and the Hathadípiká recognises ten of these as the most important "in warding off decay and death." (jarámarananáśanam.) These are - 1 Mahámudrá; 2, Mahábandha; 3, Mahávedha; 4, Khecharí; 5, Uddíyána; 6, Múlabandha: 7. Jalandhara; 8. Viparita-karaní; 9. Vajroní; 10. S'aktichálana.<sup>†</sup> The following are brief descriptions of these gesticulations and of the advantages to be derived from them :

1. Mahámudrá. Pressing the perinæum by the heel of the left foot, the right foot should be extended, and then held fast by the two

- \* घरामयद्य करद्ववेन तत्कुर्परखापितनाभिपार्चः । जवासनेादखवदुत्थितः स्नात् मयूरमेतत् भवदन्ति पीठं ॥
- † सेट्ठादुपरि विन्यस्य स्वं नुबखं तथा। मुब्दानरच निचिष्य सिदासनमिदं भवेत्॥
- में संदासुडा सद्दावभोतदावेधय खेचरी। अच्चीयानं सूखवभोवभोजालभरानिधः ॥ करणी विपरीताखा वजोणी मलिपाखनं। ददं दि सुडादगवं जरातरचनामनं ॥ 14

hands. Then closing the throat the wind should be held above. Even as a snake struck by a staff stretches like a staff, so the coiled S'akti (breath) suddenly becomes straight, for then she is in a state of dying in the two nostrils. Then the wind should be discharged steadily, but not forcibly. The wisest of the wise call this *Mahámudrá*.<sup>•</sup>

2. Mahábandha. Let the heel of the left foot be put under the perinæum, and the right foot on the left thigh, and, having drawn in breath, let the chin be pressed hard on the chest, and the wind be held fast in the heart. After holding the wind as long as one is able, let it be slowly expired. When the expiration is complete, let the operation be repeated on the right side. (This shows that the breath in the first instance should be drawn by the left nostril.)†

8. Mahávedha. While performing the Mahábandha should the Yogí effect the suppression of the breath in the Khecharí style by closing the passage of the wind by the throat Mudrá, and then, putting the hands evenly on the ground, drive the wind slowly towards the buttocks, it is Mahávedha.<sup>1</sup>

- मदामुद्रा। पाइमूखेन वासेन योनि चंपीच द्विणं। प्रधारित पदं छला कराम्यां चारवेदुणं ॥ कच्च वर्भ चमारीय चारवेदायुमूर्द्धतः। यथा दच्छदतः चर्पादच्डाकारः प्रजायते ॥ चटा द्युद्धता तथा द्रक्तिः कुच्छछी चढ्छा मवेत् । तदा छा मरणग्रस्ता जायते द्विपुढावया ॥ तकः ग्रवैः ग्रवैरेव रेदवेव्रैव वेततः। मदासुद्राच देनैव वद्कि विषुषोत्तमाः ॥
- महाबन्धः । पान्धिं वामसा पादसा योनिकाने नियोजवेतृ । वासोक्परि संस्थाप्य द्विषं चरपं तथा । पूर्णित्वा तत्तोवायुं इट्ये चिनुवं ढढं । निष्मीय वायुसाकुभा ननेामधे निवाजयेत् ॥ वारयित्वा यवासलि रेचयेदनिष्ठं प्रनैः । स्वाङे तु समन्यसा दयाङ्गे पुनरम्बस्वेत् ॥
- मचावेधः । मचावन्धसितोयोगी छत्ना पूर्त्रमेकधीः । बायूगां मतिमाधत्य निरुतं कच्छमुझ्या ॥ छमचखयुगैा सूसी स्थिची छत्ताइयेच्च्नैः । पुटद्दयमति सम्य वायुः ब्युरति मध्य सः ॥

4. *Khechari.* When the tongue is reversed and pressed into the hollow of the head and the sight is fixed at a spot in the middle of the two eyebrows, the posture is called *Khechari.*\*

5. Uddiyda a bandha is that posture in which the wind flies upwards by the susumná vessel from the right side of the belly above the navel.<sup>+</sup>

6. Múlabandha. When the heel is pressed against the perinæum, the anus is contracted, and the Apána wind is by force directed upwards, it is Múlabandha.<sup>‡</sup>

7. Jálandharabandha. When the throat is contracted and the chin is pressed hard on the chest it is Jálandhara posture, the destroyer of decay and death.§

> बानस्त्र्याग्निसम्बर्भाजायते चायताय वै । स्तावस्था समुखन्ना ततावाय् विरेषयेत् । मचावेषेऽयसम्बाधान्मचासिबिधदायम् ।

- चेचरी । कपाखडुपरे विका प्रविद्य विपरीतम । भुवेारमार्गताइहिम् झा मवति चेचरी ॥ चेदनाचाखनादो दैंः कछां ज्ञमेपायर्ववेगावत् । सा यावत् भूमधं खुगति तदा चेचरीखिदिः ॥ ग्रजीपपनिमं ज्रजं छतीद्र्याखम्यपनिर्माष्ठं ।
- † उच्चीयानवन्भः । वन्भोवेग खुनुसायाः प्राहासूच्चीयते यतः । तखादुच्चयनाच्चोऽयं वाजिभिः समुदाच्चतः ॥ उच्चीर्गं क्वदेतं च्यानुष वन्भोऽभिषीयते ॥ उद्दे पचिनं तानं नामेरुद्धेंच कारवेत् । उच्चीयानोच्चसे वन्भोद्धत्युमात्रक्वेस्ररी ॥
- पार्ष्विभानेन सम्पीय वानिसाकुषयेदुनुदं। षपानमूर्द्धसाडाण्य सूख्यन्थोऽभिषीयते ॥ षथोत्रतिमपानं ने फर्द्धनं कुरते वस्तात्। षाकुषनेन तं प्राऊर्म्द्रदन्थे हि वोगिनः ॥
- S जासगरमगः । कच्छनाड्डचा पुर्देये खापयेविषुकं दढं । बनोवालगराखीऽयं जरासत्य्विवासकः ॥

8. Viparitakaraní. Place the sun (expiratory air) above, just below the hard palate, and the moon (inspiratory air) below, just above the navel, and the Viparitakaraní is completed. It promotes hunger, &c., &c.\*

9. Vajroní. The exercise by which the several secretions are drawn upwards is so called.<sup>+</sup>

10. Saktichálana. Seated in the Vajrásana posture, let the feet be held firm by the hands and the anus be pressed by the heels, then putting the air in motion by the bellows of the chest, let it be suddenly stopped, and, contracting the forehead, let the wind be

\* जर्द्ध नामेरघछा छोकर्द्ध भानुरधः ग्रग्री । कर्णी विपरीताख्या गुववाक्येन स्रथते ॥ नित्यमभ्यासमुझस्य जंडराग्निविवर्डिनी । षाचारीवऊसंख्या सम्पाद्यः साधकस्य ष ॥ ष्वस्पाचारे(यदि भवेदग्निर्द्छति तत्वणत् । षघ्याचारिराचेद्धिक मभ्यवेष दिने दिने । वस्तितं पर्सितचैव षद्धाणे द्याते । मासमावण् योनित्यमभ्यवेत् स तु काखनित् ॥

† वच्चोषी । खेण्ड्या वर्षमानोऽपि योगोक्तै नियमैर्विना । वच्चोषी ये विवानाति स योगे सिविमाकनः ॥ तव वसुद्धं वच्चे दुत्तेभं यस्य कस्यचित् । चीरचैवं दितीयन् नारी च वगवर्णनी ॥ केष्टनेन ग्रनैः स्यनूर्वाकुखनमभवेत् । पुरुषेऽप्रयवा नारी वच्चोशेशिविमाप्रयात्॥ पुरुतः ग्रसुनाचेव फुल्कार्र वच्चकष्टरें । ग्रनैः ग्रनैः प्रकुर्व्शेत वायुभचारकारकात् ॥ वारीभागे पतदिन्दु मध्यायेनीर्द्धमाघरत् । चलिसच निव्वं विण्डुम्ब्रमाछ्य रचयेत् ॥ अच्ची जिच्च मिष्ट्य दर्ग्योगमयस्याव ॥ वच्चोषी मेथुना दूर्व जीपुंसेाः साइस्टेपत् । चारीमियाः स्वचेनेव कुक्तमापारदेाः चहात ॥

directed that way for two muhúrtas and when it comes to the susumná yessel, stop it and this is S'aktichálana. (Loosely translated.)\*

According to some the *Bandhas*, on distinct form the Mudrás. (Cf. N. C. Pál's treatise on the Yoga.)

Treating of a system of philosophy Patanjali has not thought proper to enter into details, regarding age, sex, caste, food, dwelling, &c. as bearing upon Yoga, but other works supply information about them to a considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom may not be unfitly added here. The first question that would arise would be-who are fit to perform the Yoga ? On this subject the Hathapradipiká fixes no limit. It says, "by the practice of Yoga, every one may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, or very old, or diseased, or decrepit." † The next point is the selection of a proper place. "A small monastery, a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated in an out-of-the-way place where there is no danger within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire and water, in a country abounding in food and free from danger of wars and the like, where religion prevails, in a thriving kingdom," is the most appropriate. The cell or mathiká should have a small door and no window; it should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high steps and low descents; it should be smeared with cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole surrounded by Dwelling in such a place, avoiding all anxieties, the Yogí a wall. should follow the path pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of

- \* सति वकासने पादे कराश्यां धारयेषुढं। मुझ्फदेश्वभीपे च कर्ष्त न प्रपीड् येत्॥ बचाधनेखितोयोगी चालयिता च कुछलीं। कुर्यादननार भक्षां कुछलीभाष्ठा नेाघयेत्॥ भानेाराकुचन कुर्यात् कुछली चालयेत्ततः। स्त्युवक्कनतस्थापि तस्य स्त्यभयं कुतः ॥ कुष्ठर्भद्रथपर्य्यनं निर्भयं चालनाद्सी। कर्द्धमाष्टस्वते विधित् सुष्डमायां समुद्रता ॥ तेन कुछलिनी तस्याः सुष्टमाया सुखं भुवं। जद्दांत तस्वात् प्राचायं सुच्मां त्रजति सतः ॥
- † युवा बुद्धे।तिषुदोवा साधिते। हुर्वकीऽपि वा। स्राधान, छिदिनाप्रीति चम्वेयोगेषु तन्द्रित् ॥

the Yoga. He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, and vain disputations. His food should consist of wheat, sáil rice, barley, shashti rice (or that which matures in six days), the syama and the nivara grains, milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, mung pulse, and water," and all soothing sweet things in a moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat and too much salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed or acrid substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as to leave one-fourth of his appetite unappeased.<sup>+</sup>

He describes the means of making the seat firm and pleasant.

XLVII.

Through slightness of effort and attainment of the infinite.

The construction of the sentence is that through slightness of effort and through attainment of the infinite the seat becomes firm and pleasant. When the wish is formed, 'I shall adopt this posture,' and that posture is accomplished even with "slightness of effort," *i. e.*, without difficulty, and when the thinking principle is reposited in the infinity of space or the like, and by understanding it becomes of it, then from absence of the body and of egotism the posture does not become painful. When this controul over posture is accomplished agitations of the body and such other obstructives to meditation do not arise.

- \* सुराव्ये घार्षिके देग्रे दुभिचे निरूपहरे । घनुःप्रमाषपय्यं मां शिकाग्रिव्यस्तवर्षिते ॥ दवानो सठिकामधे खातयं इठयेगिता । खल्पद्वारसरंप्रवर्गविवरं नात्युवनीचं च यत् स्रस्ये ज्ञेासयसंह्रस्तिसर्खं निःशेषयद्यं सितं । वाच्चे संडपवेदिङ्कपद्यिरं प्रादारसंवेदितं प्राक्तं योगसठस्य स्वरूसिदं सिर्वेर्डठाम्यासिमिः ।
- ने ग्रोष्ट्रमग्राखियवगढिकग्रोभनानां चीराज्यचंडनवनीतधितामधृति । ग्रुडिपठेलकपञ्चादिवपद्यमाकं मुद्रादिदिवमुद्वं च यतीन्द्रपष्टं॥ ग्रुखिरधमधुराचारचनुष्ट्रांगविवर्जितः । मुख्यते श्रिवसंत्रीत्ये मिताचारः स उच्यते ॥ कदचतीच्त्राखवणाखरीतगाकं सैविरितैस्तत्विधर्षप्रमस्त्रान् । चाजादि गांस द्वितन कुस्तत्व केस्र पिखाकदिमुस्र ग्रजादमयय्यताज्ञः ॥

110

Digitized by Google

۰.

[The object here is to point out that when by practice one becomes able to assume any position at will, without any difficulty, and, adverting to the dogma that the thinking principle assumes the form of the object it thinks of, when by thinking on any infinite object, such as the sky, it becomes itself infinite, it feels no pain or uneasiness in assuming any posture, however painful it may otherwise be. The means of attaining firmness of seat thus are practice and the contemplation of boundless objects.]

A fruit thereof when accomplished.

#### XLVIII.

Thereupon non-embarrasment by the pairs.

The meaning is that on the control of posture being accomplished, the Yogí is no longer oppressed or embarrased by the pairs, *i. e.*, cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and the like.

[This is the ultimate fruit of attaining perfection in assuming the different postures above adverted to.]

Having thus described how to controul the postures he describes regulation of breath.

#### XLIX.

On its being accomplished the regulation of breath (which is) interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration.

On posture becoming firm that auxiliary of the Yoga which is regulation of breath and of which firmness of posture is the cause, should be practised.

How is it characterised by the interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration? Inspiration and expiration have been already defined (B. I. A. XXXIV.) The "interruption" (vichchheda) or stoppage of the twofold "flow" (gati) or current in places outside and inside produced by means of expelling or filling of the breath is called Pránáyáma or regulation of breath. [Here the true Práynáyáma is accepted to be the interruption or break in the flow of the breath. The inspiration and the expiration are the functions of which the stoppage is the most effectual act for the attainment of perfect meditation. It is called *kumbhaka*, or quiescence, and the longer it is sustained the more proficient becomes the Yogí. When perfect controul has been attained in this respect, the Yogí can live buried under earth for months and years without peforming any organic function whatever.]

For its better understanding, he describes its nature after showing its distinctions.

#### L.

That, again, is an external, an internal, and a stationary function; it is divided by place, time, and number; it is protracted or subtile.

The "external function" of breath is expiration, or expulsion of the breath outward (*rechaka*). The "internal function" is inspiration or filling in (*púraka*). The function of stoppage inside is *kumbhaka*. Because the vital air at that time remains quiescent or motionless, as water in a jar, (*kumbha*) therefore that condition is called *kumbhaka*.

This regulation of breath is of three kinds, according as it is specialised by space (des'a), "time" (kála), and "number" (safkhyá). It is also "protracted" (dírgha), or "subtile" (sukhma). It is especialised by place, as (when we say) "twelve distant from the nose," meaning as far as twelve fingers from the nose. It is specialised by time, as (when we say) "of the duration of thirty-six instants." It is specialised by "number," when (we say) "many times done."

By these inspirations and expirations the first udgháta is produced, and to know this a numeral figure has to be used. Udgháta is the striking of the head by the wind propelled upward from the navel.

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the Pránáyáma. It is an operation which includes the three functions of inspiration, quiescence, and expiration. The breath must be drawn in first before it can be retained within; the retention cannot last long, and so after a time there must be an expiration. The first and the third, however, are regulated by the capacity of the lungs, and by the time necessary for the expulsion of a given quantity of air, and cannot be much modified, and the second alone, therefore, concerns the Yogí most, for he can controul it to a considerable extent, and hence it is held to be the most important element of the Pránáváma; not unoften, as in the last preceding aphorism, it alone is described as the Pránáyáma. The threefold operation is specialized by the time devoted to each operation, by the extent of space from which the breath is drawn, by the number of times it is repeated, by the period for which it has been practised, and by the subtility or grossness of the operation.

The operation of *udgháta* is mysterious. I cannot find out from any work or person how the internal air is made to strike particular internal organs.]

Having described the three members of the regulation of breath, he, with a view to enunciate a fourth, says :---

#### LI.

The fourth is dependant on the recognition of the outer and the inner spheres.

"The outer sphere"  $(v \dot{a} h y a - v i s h a y a)$  of the breath extends far as twelve (fingers) from the nose. The "inner sphere"  $(\dot{a} b h y antara$ v i s h a y a) is represented by the heart, the navel and the like. That quiescence or stoppage of motion, (which ensues) on recognising or taking into consideration these two is the "fourth" regulation of breath  $(pr \dot{a} n \dot{a} y \dot{a} m a)$ . Its difference from the third form, called kumbhaka, is this: The latter without taking any note of the outer and the inner spheres suddenly assumes quiescence, like a lotus falling on a hot stone, while this is a stoppage which results from a recognition of the two spheres. This, like the preceding, should be known to be divisible according to place, time and number.

[This is purely intellectual, and involves no change in the order of the operation. It is the same operation, but performed intelligently.]

He now describes the fruit of the fourth kind.

#### LII.

#### Thereby is removed the covering of light.

"Thereby," *i. e.*, by that fourth form of regulation of breath, the "covering" (*ávarana*) of the form of afflictions which envelope the "light" (*prakás'a*) which is the thinking principle abiding in the quality of goodness, is destroyed. This is the meaning.

[The purport is that this fourth form of Pránáyáma is specially useful in removing all those ideas of pain and suffering which are ordinarily associated with the thinking principle.]

Another fruit.

#### LIII.

#### The mind's fitness for steadiness.

"Steadiness" (dháraná) will be defined presently (B. III, A. I.) The mind (manas), divested of its defects through the instrumentality of these forms of regulation of breath, remains fixed to whatever it is applied, and does not suffer from distractions.

(Here the word manas has been used as a synonym of chitta, thinking principle).

He gives the definition of abstraction.

#### LIV.

Abstraction is the assumption by the senses of the original nature of the thinking principle, from want of application to their respective objects.

That by which the senses are abstracted, or from a feeling of opposition, withdrawn from their respective objects, is Abstraction (*pratyáhára*). How that may be effected is thus explained. Of vision and the other senses the respective objects are form and the rest. "Application" (*samprayoga*) to them is advancing towards them. The want of such advance is the forsaking of them and abiding in their original nature. When that forsaking is effected the senses become the imitators of the original nature of the thinking principle. Since the senses follow the thinking principle as do bees their king, they all become of its nature. Thus when the thinking principle is subdued these become abstracted.

[The natural tendency of the senses is outwards, towards the objects which are designed for their entertainment, and the great object of the Yoga is to divert them from those objects, in order to bring them to a focus in the thinking principle. When this is effected they cease to act, and are restored to the natural state of the thinking principle of which they are emanations. That natural state, again, is quiescence, and consequently the senses become quiescent, and this is their abstracted state.]

Having described abstraction, which is the imitation of the nature of the thinking principle by the senses, he now describes the fruit of the act.

#### LV.

Thence the complete subjugation of the senses.

The meaning is—that by the practice of abstraction the senses come so completely under controul that do not proceed, according to their natures, outwards to their respective objects even when excited thereto.

[The chapter opened by enquiring, what the exercise of the Yoga was, and having described in detail that exercise with all its concomitants, it now closes by describing the fruit of that exercise. The fruit is complete subjugation of the senses.] Thus then has been described the practical exercise of the Yoga which forms the theme of the first chapter. The practical Yoga is first defined (I), then follow its use (II), in the weakening of the afflictions (III), its origin from ignorance (IV), the definition of ignorance (V), do. of afflictions (VI to IX), means of obviating them (X and XI), works, their sources and fruit (XII to XIV), afflictions, their character and why and how they are to be got rid of (XV to XXVII), discriminative knowledge (XXVIII to XIVI), postures, &c., (XLVII to LII), and the advantages thereof (LIII to LV). [Not literally translated, but only the substance of the commentary is given here for reasons elsewhere assigned, p. 58.]

Now this Yoga, through restraints and obligations, assumes the form of a seed, which sprouts through postures and regulation of breath, flowers through abstraction, and bears fruit through contemplation, retention and meditation, and these are explained in this chapter on exercise.

This is the end of the second quarter, or the quarter on practice, of the commentary entitled *Rájamártanda* on Patanjali's institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

\_\_\_\_\_

#### ADDENDUM.

The note on Aphorism XXXII on page 94 is calculated to mislead unwary readers. The remark that purification and other obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise, is quite correct with reference to the text. The obligations are as imperative on Yogís as they are on householders, and none should neglect them; but purification is here taken in its ordinary acceptation, and does not refer to certain peculiar acts of washing or Saucha which some Yogís, particularly the followers of the Hathayoga, recommend. Thev hold that ordinary washings &c., are not enough. They have accordingly devised complicated, and in some respects very repulsive, forms of purification, which they regard as absolutely necessary as preparatory steps towards the attainment of fixity of seats. These they decribe under the collective name of Shatkarma or "sixfold work," as they are reckoned under six different names. These names are-I., Dhauti; II, Vasti; III, Neti; IV, Laukiki; V, Trátaka, and VI, Kapálabháti.\* These are variously subdivided by the Gheranda Sañhitá, the Niruttara Tantra, the A'diyámala the Brahmayámla, the Grahayámala, the Rudrayámala, the Sivasañhitá, and other Tantras. I shall follow the first in the following notes :

I. Dhauti means washing, and it is known under four different names according to the parts of the body to which it is applied. These are, 1st, Antardhauti or washing of the intestines; 2nd, Dantadhauti or washing of the teeth; 3rd, Hriddhauti or washing of the stomach; and 4th, Mulasodhana or washing of the rectum.+

The first is effected in four different ways, viz., (a) by contracting the mouth in the form of a crow's bill, and drawing in a full draft of air into the intestines, where it is retained for a time and

- \* धौतिर्वसिखया नेतिः स्त्रीविकी भाडकं तथा। कपास्त्रभातिर्यतानि पट्कर्यापि सताचरेत्॥
- † चन्त्र्धेतिदेनधीतिइंदीतिर्मुखग्रेधमम् । धीतं चतुर्विधां जना घढं इर्ध्वन् निर्माखं ॥

then thrown out.<sup>\*</sup> As wind is the means of washing in this case it is called Vátasára. (b) By drinking a large quantity of water up to the throat, and then forcing it down so as to expel it by the lower orifice.<sup>†</sup> This is called Várisára. I know not how this can be effected, but to the occultist everything is possible. (c) By stopping the breath and then striking the navel a hundred times against the vertibral column.<sup>‡</sup> This is called Agnisára. (d) By taking in air through the mouth contracted into the form of a crow's bill, retaining it in the intestines for an hour and a half, and then expelling it through the lower orifice.§ (Vahiskaraṇa.)

2nd. The Dental washing includes the purification of the teeth, the tongue, the two ears, and the foramen on the crown of the head. $\parallel$ For the teeth a dentrifice of catechu or clean earth is recommended as appropriate.¶ For the tongue scraping with the index, the middle and the ring fingers is held sufficient.\*\* For the ears, rubbing the orifices with the index and the ring fingers,  $\dagger \dagger$  and for the foramen

- \* कावचचुन्दासेन पितेहायुं ग्रनैः ग्रनैः । चास्रयेदुदर पचाहकौना रेचयेच्नैः ॥
- † आवष्यं पूरयेदारि वक्तेग च पिवेच्छनैः। चालयेदुदरेचैव चोदरादेचयेद्धः ॥
- माभिपण्चिं सेदष्ठ हे ग्रतवारच कारचेत् । चग्निचारनेवा धौतिचेंतिनां येगविदिरा । उदरासयकं त्यक्का जठराग्निं प्रवर्षयेत् ॥
- काकीमुद्रां ग्रेाधयिता पूर्यदुदर्रं मदत् ।
   धार्यदर्वयामन् चाखयदेखेलका ।
   रथा चौतिः परा नोष्ण न प्रकाक्षा कदाचन ॥
- इन्म्यू जिङ्ग्म् रग्भ कर्ष्ययायेः । बपाखरग्भ पर्धेता दन्मधौतिर्विधीयते ॥
- बाद्रिए रचेनाच सत्तिकया च ग्राडया। माळ्यवेदनामुखच यावस् किल्विषमाचरेत् ॥
- \*\* तर्ळानीमधर्मानामा चङ्चलिवयये।त्रतः । देग्रयेद्रसमिधे तुमार्ळ्ययेवन्त्रिकामूसम् । इर्लेः वनैमार्ळ्ययिता कपादे।पं निवारयेत ॥
- †† तर्कन्धनामिकाचे। जान्मार्क्तचेत् कर्षरम्ध्र चे। नित्यसम्यासचाजेन नाड्ग्लरं प्रकाश्च चेत् ॥

on the crown of the head rubbing with the thumb are enough.\*

Srd. The purification of the stomach is effected in three ways: 1st, by passing the tender leaf-shoot of a plaintain, or a turmeric plant, or a cane, through the mouth into the stomach, and, after shaking it drawing it out (*Dandadhauti*); 2nd, by drinking a large quantity of water and then vomitting it out (*Vamandhauti*); 3rd, by swallowing a strip of cloth three inches wide and fifteen cubits long and then drawing it out (*Vásadhauti*).<sup>†</sup>

4th. The purification of the rectum (múlas'odhana) is effected by washing the part with water aided by a finger or the stalk of a turmeric plant.<sup>‡</sup>

II. The purification of the fundament (Vástišodhana) is effected by repeatedly contracting the fundament while seated firmly in water up to the navel (*julavasti*) or on dry land (*sthalavasti*).§

III. Neti is the technical name of thread, a span length of which is passed through the nostrils and drawn out from the mouth with a view to purify the nostrils.

IV. Laukiki Yoga is the practice of shaking or swinging the

- \* टदाष्ट्रधेन द्वेष मार्ळ्यदेहाखरग्भवम् । † रभादखं चरित्रादखं वेषद्खं तथैव च । च्वाधे चालयिता तु पुनः प्रत्याचरेच्हनैः ॥ भोजनाने पिवेदारि चावष्टपूर्वितं सुधीः । फर्द्धदिर्ष्टं चषं छता तळाछं वमयेत् पुनः । वित्यमभ्यासयोगेऽयं वफपित्तं निवारयेत् ॥ चतुरङ्खविद्यारं रूष्ट्रावलं प्रनेर्ययेत् । पुनः प्रत्याचरेदेतत् प्रोचते धौतिवर्षांवम् ॥ † गीवसल्या करवेव समाप्रकविद्यांत वर्षा
- पीतमूलस्य दण्डेन मध्यमाहुझिनापि वा। यसेन चाछयेद् गुद्धं वारिका च पुनः पुनः ॥

۰.

- § माभिमग्नजवेषायुं न्यसवामत्कटासनम्। चाकुचनं प्रसारच जलवर्षि समाचरेत् । वस्तिं पचिमागानेन चालयिवा ग्रनैरधः । चचिनीसुइया पायुमाकुचयेत् प्रसारयेत् ॥
- वितखिमानं रूचार्य्यन नारानके प्रवेगयेत्। सुखाविर्गमयेत् पद्यात् प्राप्यते नेतिकर्यकम्॥

intestines repeatedly from one side to the other.\*

V. For the purification of the eyes, the recommendation is that the eyes should be fixed on one point, the tip of the nose for instance, without permitting any twinkling, until tears flow in abundance. This is called  $Trátaka.\dagger$ 

VI. Under the last head of Kapálabháti, three practices are recommended: 1st, drawing the air through the left nostril and expelling it by the right, and then reversing the operation, and performing it alternately several times, (Vátakrama); 2nd, drawing in water by the nostrils and throwing it out by the mouth, (Vyutkrama); 3rd, by sucking up water by the mouth and throwing it out by the nostrils, (S'ítkrama).<sup>‡</sup>

The Tantras describe several other modes of purification, and suggest many variations in the rules above quoted; but it is not worth while to quote them, particularly as first class Yogís denounce all such purifications as quite unnecessary, if not actually futile.

| * | <b>चनम्द्रवेगे तुन्दच आ</b> म | येदुभपार्च्च दीः । |
|---|-------------------------------|--------------------|
|   | सर्वरागा <b>तिपनीप दे</b>     | रानसविवर्डमम्॥     |
|   | • • • • ·                     |                    |

- † निमेषेम्प्रेषकं त्यत्ना स्टब्स उच्च विरीखयेत्। यावद्यूहि पतनि नाटकं प्रे।चते वृधैः ॥
- ‡ इँढ्या पूरयेद्वायं देखयेत् पिक्वला पुनः। पिकल्या पूरयिता पुनचन्द्रे न देवयेत् ॥ पूरकं देखकं छत्ना वेगेन न तु खाल्लयेत् । एवसभ्यासयोगेन कफदोर्थं जिवारयेत् ॥ नासाव्यां खल्मसेक खेखदोर्थं निवारयेत् ॥ घीत्कात्य पीला वक्के नासानाई विंरेषयेत् । एवसभ्यासयोगेन कामदेवसमे भवेत् ॥ न खायवे वार्डक्श्च जरा नैव प्रजायवे । भवेर खब्ब्ल्ट्रेड्य कफदोर्णं निवारयेत् ॥

| 16. |                                                                                                               | Rs.  | 0       | 10 |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|---------|----|
| 17. | Daśa Rúpa, Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                                            |      | 1       | 14 |
| 18. | Gopatha Bráhmana, Fasc. I and II @ /10/ each                                                                  |      | 1       | 4  |
| 19. | Gopála Tápaní, Fase. I                                                                                        |      | 0       | 10 |
| 20. | Gobhilíya Grihya Sútra, Fasc. I-XII @ /10/ each                                                               |      | 7       | 8  |
| 21. | Hindu Astronomy, Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                                      |      | 1       | 14 |
| 22. | Tśá Kena Katha Praśna Munda Mándukya Upanishads, Fasc. VI                                                     |      | 0       | 10 |
| 23. | Kátantra, Fasc. I-VI @ 1/ each                                                                                |      | 6       | 0  |
| 24. | Kathá Sarit Ságara, English, Fasc. I-X @ 1/ each                                                              |      | 10      | 0  |
| 25. | Lalita Vistara, Fasc. I-VI @ /10/ each                                                                        |      | 3       | 12 |
| 26. | Ditto English, Fasc. I-II                                                                                     |      | 2       | 0  |
| 27. | Maitri Upanishad, Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                                     |      | 1       | 14 |
| 28. | Mímámsá Darşana, Fasc. II—XVI @ /10/ each                                                                     |      | 9       | 6  |
| 29. | Márkandeya Purána, Fasc. IV-VII @ /10/ each                                                                   |      | 2       | 8  |
| 30. | Nrisimha Tápaní, Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                                      |      | 1       | 14 |
| 31. | Nirukta, Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each                                                                                |      | 3       | 2  |
| 32. | Nárada Pancharátra, Fasc. I, III-IV @ /10/ each                                                               |      | 1       | 14 |
| 33. | Nyáya Darsana, Fasc. I and III @ /10/ each                                                                    |      | 1       | 4  |
| 34. | Nítisára, or, The Elements of Polity, By Kámandaki, Fasc. II-                                                 | IV   |         |    |
|     | (Fase. I out of stock)                                                                                        |      | 1       | 14 |
| 35. | Piñgala Chhandah Sútra, Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                               |      | 1       | 14 |
| 36. | Prithiráj Rásau, Fasc. I-IV @/10/ each                                                                        |      | 2       | 8  |
| 37. | Ditto English, Fasc. I                                                                                        |      | 1       | 0  |
| 38. | Páli Grammar, English, Fasc. I and II @ /10/ each                                                             |      | 1       | 4  |
| 39. | Prákrita Lakshanam, Fasc. I                                                                                   |      | 1       | 8  |
| 40. | Rig Veda, Vol. I, Fasc. IV                                                                                    |      | 0       | 10 |
| 41. | Srauta Sútra of Apastamba, Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                            |      | 1       | 14 |
| 42. | Ditto Aśvaláyana, Fasc. I—XI @/10/ each                                                                       |      | 6       | 14 |
| 43. | Ditto Látyávana Fasc. I—IX @ /10/ each                                                                        |      | 5       | 10 |
| 44. | Sáma Veda Samhitá, Fasc. I—XXXVII @ /10/ each                                                                 |      | 23      | 2  |
| 45. | Sahitya Darpana, Fasc. I-IV @ /10/ each                                                                       |      | 2       | 8  |
| 46. | Sáfikhya Aphorisms of Kapila, Fasc. I and II @ /10/ each                                                      |      | 1       | 4  |
| 47. | Súrya Siddhánta, Fase. IV                                                                                     |      | 0       | 10 |
| 48. | Sarva Darsana Sangraha, Fasc. II                                                                              |      | 0       | 10 |
| 49. | Sañkara Vijaya, Fasc. II and III @ /10/ each                                                                  |      | 1       | 4  |
| 50. | Sáňkhya Pravachana Bháshya, English, Fasc. III                                                                | ••   | 0       | 10 |
| 51. | Sáňkhya Sára, Fasc. I                                                                                         |      | 0       | 10 |
| 52. |                                                                                                               | ••   | 6       | 14 |
| 53. |                                                                                                               | **   | 15      | 0  |
| 54. | Ditto Samhitá, Fasc I—XXXII @ /10/ each<br>Ditto Prátišákhya, Fasc. I—III @ /10/ each                         |      | 20<br>1 | 0  |
| 55. |                                                                                                               | ••   |         | 14 |
| 56. |                                                                                                               | **   | 1       | 4  |
| 57. | Ditto Aitareya S'vetáśvatara Kena I'sá Upanishads, English, Fa                                                | isc. | 1       |    |
| 20  | I and II @ /10/ each                                                                                          |      | 11      | 4  |
| 58. | Tándyá Bráhmana, Fasc. I—XIX @ /10/ each                                                                      |      | 11 7    | 14 |
| 59. | Uttara Naishadha, Fase. I—XII @ /10/ each<br>Váyn Purána, Vol. I, Fase. I—VI; Vol. II, Fase. I—II @ /10/ each |      | 5       | 8  |
| 60. | Vayu Furana, Vol. 1, Fasc. 1-VI, Vol. 11, Fasc. 1-11 @ /10/ each<br>Vishnu Smriti, Fasc. I-II @ /10/ each     | **   | 1       | 4  |
| 61. | Yoga Sútra of Patanjali, English, Fasc. I—II                                                                  | ••   | 1       | 12 |
| 62. | Toga outra or Latanjan, English, Lator L II                                                                   |      | -       |    |

#### Arabic and Persian Series.

| 1.   | 'Alamgirnámah, with Index, Fasc. I-XIII @ /10/ each        |                 | 8   | 2  |
|------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----|----|
| 2.   | Kín-i-Akbarí, Persian text, Fasc. I-XXII @ 1/4 each        |                 | 27  | 8  |
| 3.   | Ditto English Translation, Vol. I (Fase. I-VII)            |                 | 12  | 4  |
| 4.   | Akbarnamah, with Index, Fasc. I-XX @ 1/4 each              |                 | 25  | 0  |
| 5.   | Bádsháhnámah with Index, Fasc. I-XIX @ /10/ each           | 3.2 11 2.5      | 11  | 14 |
| 6.   | Beale's Oriental Biographical Dictionary, pp. 291, 4to.    | and a little of |     | 8  |
| 7.   | Dictionary of Arabic Technical Terms and Appendix, Fas     | sc. I-XX        | I@  |    |
| 8100 | 1/4 each                                                   |                 | 26  | 4  |
| 8    | Farhang-i-Rashídí (complete), Fasc. I-XIV @ 1/4 each       |                 | 17  | 8  |
| 9.   | Fihrist-i-Túsí, or, Túsy's list of Shy'ah Books, Fasc. I-1 | IV @ /12/       |     | õ  |
| 10.  | Futúh-ul-Shám Waqidí, Fasc. I-IX @ /10/ each               |                 | . 5 | 10 |
| 11.  | Ditto Azádí, Fasc. I-IV @ /10/ each                        |                 | 2   | 8  |
| 12.  | Haft Asmán, History of the Persian Masnawi, Fasc. I        |                 | 1   | 4  |
| 13.  | History of the Caliphs, English, Fasc. I-VI @ 1/ each      | 0.00            | 6   |    |


| 14.        |                                                                                                                                              | Rs. | 1   | 14 |
|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|----|
| 15.<br>16. | Isabáh, with Supplement, Fasc. I—XXX @ /12/ each<br>Maghází of Wáqidí, Fasc. I—V @ /10/ each                                                 |     | 22  | 82 |
| 17.        | Montakhab-ul-Tawarikh, Fasc. I-XV @ /10/ each                                                                                                |     | 9   | 6  |
| 18.        | Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, Fasc. I-XVIII @ /10/ each, and Fasc. XI                                                                                  |     | 10  |    |
| 19.        | with Index @ /12/<br>Mu'ásir-i-'Alamgirí (complete), Fasc. I—VI @ /10/ each                                                                  |     | 12  | 0  |
| 20.        | Nukhbat-ul-Fikr, Fasc. I                                                                                                                     |     | 0   | 10 |
| 21.        | Nizámí's Khiradnámah-i-Iskandarí, Fasc. I and II @ 1/ each<br>Suyúty's Itqán, on the Exegetic Sciences of the Koran, with Supplement         | **  | 2   | 0  |
| 22.        | Fasc. II—IV, VII—X @ 1/4 each                                                                                                                | 14  | 8   | 12 |
| 23.        | Tabagát-i-Násirí, Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each                                                                                                      |     | 3   | 2  |
| 24.<br>25. | Ditto English, Fasc. I—XIV @ 1/ each<br>Táríkh-i-Fírúz Sháhi, Fasc. I—VII @ /10/ each                                                        |     | 14  | 06 |
| 26.        | Táríkh-i-Baihaqí, Fasc. I-IX @ /10/ each                                                                                                     |     | 5   | 10 |
| 27.        | Wis o Rámín, Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each                                                                                                           | ••  | 3   | 2  |
|            | ASIATIC SOCIETY'S PUBLICATIONS.                                                                                                              |     |     |    |
| 1.         | ASIATIC RESEARCHES. Vols. VII-XI; Vols. XIII and XVII, a                                                                                     | nd  | 1   | 24 |
|            | Vols. XIX and XX @ 10/ each<br>Ditto Index to Vols. I—XVIII                                                                                  | ••  | 90  | 0  |
| 2.         | PROCEEDINGS of the Asiatic Society from 1865 to 1869 (incl.) @ /4/ 1                                                                         | ber |     |    |
|            | No.; and from 1870 to date @ /8/ per No.                                                                                                     |     |     |    |
| 3.         | JOURNAL of the Asiatic Society for 1843 (12), 1844 (12), 1845 (12), 18<br>(5), 1847 (12), 1848 (12), 1849 (12), 1850 (7), @ 1/ per No. to Su | ih- |     |    |
|            | (5), 1847 (12), 1848 (12), 1849 (12), 1850 (7), @ 1/ per No. to Suscribers and @ 1/8 per No. to Non-Subscribers; and for 1851 (              | 7), |     |    |
|            | 1857 (6), 1858 (5), 1861 (4), 1864 (5), 1865 (8), 1866 (7), 1867 (<br>1868 (6), 1869 (8), 1870 (8), 1871 (7), 1872 (8), 1873 (8), 1874 (     | 6), |     |    |
|            | 1868 (6), 1869 (8), 1870 (8), 1871 (7), 1872 (8), 1873 (8), 1874 (<br>1875 (7), 1876 (7), 1877 (8), 1878 (8), 1879 (7), 1880 (8), @ 1/8 1    | ber |     |    |
|            | No. to Subscribers and @ 2/ per No. to Non-Subscribers.                                                                                      |     |     |    |
|            | N. B. The figures enclosed in brackets give the number of Nos. in en<br>Volume.                                                              | ich |     |    |
|            | General Cunningham's Archaeological Survey Report for 1863-64 (Ex                                                                            | tra |     |    |
|            | No., J. A. S. B., 1864)<br>Theobald's Catalogue of Reptiles in the Museum of the Asiatic Soci-                                               |     | 2   | Q  |
|            | (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1868)                                                                                                               |     | 2   | 0  |
|            | Catalogue of Mammals and Birds of Burmah, by E. Blyth (Extra N                                                                               | 0., |     |    |
|            | J. A. S. B., 1875)<br>Sketch of the Turki Language as spoken in Eastern Turkestan, Part                                                      | iï. | 4   | 0  |
|            | Vocabulary, by R. B. Shaw (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1878)                                                                                     |     | 4   | 0  |
|            | A Grammar and Vocabulary of the Northern Balochí Language, by<br>L. Dames (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1880)                                     | м.  | 4   | 0  |
|            | Introduction to the Maithilí Language of North Bihár, by G. A. Griers                                                                        | on, |     |    |
|            | Part I, Grammar (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1880)                                                                                               | ••  | 2   | 0  |
| 4.         | Aborigines of India, by B. H. Hodgson<br>Analysis of the Sher Chin, by Alexander Csoma de Körös                                              |     | 3   | 0  |
| 5.         | Anis-ul-Musharrihin                                                                                                                          |     | 3   | 0  |
| 7.         |                                                                                                                                              | ••  | 21  | 0  |
| · 8.<br>9. | Examination and Analysis of the Mackenzie Manuscripts by the R                                                                               | ev. |     | U. |
|            | W. Taylor                                                                                                                                    |     | 2   | 0  |
| 10.        |                                                                                                                                              | **  | 1   | 8  |
| 12         | Ináyah, a Commentary on the Hidayah, Vols. II and IV @ 16/ each                                                                              |     |     | õ  |
| 13.        |                                                                                                                                              |     | 2   | 0  |
| 14.<br>15. | Khizánat-ul-'ilm                                                                                                                             | **  | 40  | 0  |
| 16.        | Moore and Hewitson's Descriptions of New Indian Lepidoptera, Par                                                                             | ιI, |     |    |
| 17         | with 3 coloured Plates, 4to                                                                                                                  |     | 6   | 0  |
| 17.<br>18. |                                                                                                                                              |     | 4   | 0  |
| 19.        | Tibetan Dictionary                                                                                                                           |     | 10  | 0  |
| 20<br>21   | Ditto Grammar<br>Vattodaya, edited by LtCol. G. E. Fryer                                                                                     |     | 82  | 0  |
|            |                                                                                                                                              |     |     |    |
|            |                                                                                                                                              |     |     | 1  |
|            | Name of Somelant Manuacounts Page VI for Loook                                                                                               |     | 3.0 |    |

## **BIBLIOTHECA INDICA;**

Or Prois

Collection of Priental Works

PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. New Series, No. 482.



# पातज्जलं यागस्त्रम्।

राजमार्त्तण्डाखादत्तिमहितम् ।

THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI,

WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RAJA AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

BY

RAJENDRALALA MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E.

FASCICULUS III.

#### CALCUTTA :

PRINTED BY J. W. THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS. AND PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY, 57, PARK STREET.

1882.

# LIST OF BOOKS FOR SALE

#### AT THE LIBRARY OF THE

# ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL,

## No. 57, PARK STREET, CALCUTTA,

#### AND OBTAINABLE FROM

## THE SOCIETY'S LONDON AGENTS, MESSRS. TRÜBNER & CO. 57 and 59, Ludgate Hill, London, E. C.

#### BIBLIOTHECA INDICA.

#### Sanskrit Series.

| 1.  | Atharvana Upanishads, (Sanskrit) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each                                                             |     | Rs. | As. |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|
| 2.  | Asvalayana Grinya Sutra, (Sans.) Fase I-IV @ (10/1                                                                 |     | 3   | 2   |
| 3.  |                                                                                                                    |     | 2   | 8   |
| 4.  | Aitareya Aranyaka of the Rig Veda, (Sans.) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each                                                   |     | 8   | 12  |
| 5.  |                                                                                                                    |     | 3   | 2   |
| 6.  | Aphorisms of the Vedánta, (Sans.) Fasc. III—XIII @ /10/ each                                                       |     | 0   | 10  |
| 7.  | Brahma Sútras, (English) Fasc. I                                                                                   |     | 6   | 14  |
| 8.  | Bhámatí (Sans.) Fase I-VIII @ /10/ sech                                                                            |     | 1   | 0   |
| 9.  | Brihat Aranyaka Upanishad, (Sans.) Fasc. II-IV, VI-IX @ /10/ e                                                     |     | 6   | 0   |
| 10. | Ditto (English) Fasc. II-III @ /10/ each                                                                           | ach | 4   | 6   |
| 11. | Brihat Samhitá, (Sans.) Fasc. I-III, V-VII @ /10/ each                                                             |     | 1   | 4   |
| 12. | Chaitanya-Chandrodaya Nátaka, (Sans.) Fasc. II—III @ /10/ each                                                     |     | 3   | 12  |
| 13. | Chaturvarga Chintámani, (Sans.) Fasc. 11-111 @ /10/ each<br>Chhéndogya Unorichad (Sans.) Fasc. 1-XXXIX @ /10/ each |     | 1   | 4   |
| 14. | Chhándogya Upanishad, (Sanskrit) Fasc. I and IV @ /10/ each                                                        |     | 24  | 6   |
| 15. | Ditto (English) Fasc. I and IV @ /10/ each<br>Categories of the Nrive Philosephile II @ /10/ each                  |     | 1   | 4   |
| 16. | Categories of the Nyáya Philosophy, (Sans.) Fasc. II                                                               |     | 1   | 4   |
| 17. | Dasa Rúpa, (Sans.) Fasc. I—III @ /10/ each                                                                         |     | 0.  | 10  |
| 18. | Gopatha Bráhmana, (Sans. & Eng.) Fasc. I and II @ /10/ each                                                        |     | 1   | 14  |
| 19. | Gopála Tápaní, (Sans.) Fasc. I                                                                                     |     | 1   | 4   |
| 20. | Gobhilíya Grihya Sútra, (Sans.) Fasc. I-XII @ /10/ each                                                            |     | 0   | 10  |
| 21. | Hindu Astronomy, (English) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                                 |     | 7   | 8   |
| 22. | Tsa Kena Katha Prasna Munda Mandahan II (@ /10/ each                                                               |     | 1   | 14  |
| 23. | Isá Kena Katha Prasna Munda Mándukya Upanishads, (Sans.) Fasc.<br>Kátantra, (Sans.) Fasc. I-VI @ 1/ each           | VI  | 0   | 10  |
|     | ranning (camp) rabbi 1- v1 (@ 1/ each                                                                              |     | 6   | 0   |

(Continued on third page of cover.)

#### CHAPTER THIRD.

#### CHAPTER THIRD.

May Bhútanátha, (the lord of elements,) by the thought of whose lotus feet, the occult powers of Animá and the rest are attained by thinkers, be to our prosperity !

With a view to describe the three accessories of the Yoga, Dháraná, &c., already referred to, (C. II A. XXIX) and to explain the external, the internal, and other Siddhis, Patanjali begins this chapter, adverting first to the explanation of the term Sañyama.

[The occult powers (vibhútis) are the following : 1, animá, "molicularity," extreme minuteness, or parvitude, or invisibility ; 2, Laghimá, "extreme lightness," levity, tenuity, or incorporeality; 3, Prápti, "accessibility," or touching anything at will, as touching the moon with the tip of one's finger; 4, Prákámya, "wilfulness," or irresistibility of will, fulfilment of every wish; 5, Garimá, "excessive pondrosity," magnitude, or illimitable bulk ; 6, I'śitá " sovereignty," or supreme dominion over animate and inanimate nature; 7, Vasitá, "subjugation," the power of changing the course of nature; 8, Kámávasáyitá, "self-controul," or the power of suppressing all carnal longings. These are also indicated by the term riddhi, and also by siddhi or perfections. Inasmuch, however, as siddhi is applied to other profections it is sometimes qualified by the term mahá. The powers are also indicated by the terms bhúti and aiśvarya.]

Thereof, he describes the nature of steadfastness.

#### I.

Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place.

"To one place" (deśe), i. e., in the navel-wheel, the tip of the nose, or the like. "Confinement" (bandha) of the thinking 18

principle is making the thinking principle steady (on one object) by excluding (the thought of) all other objects. This (confinement to one place) is called *Dháraná* or the steadfastness of the thinking principle.

The meaning is this:—The Yogí, who has purified his internal organ by benevolence and other acts of refining the thinking principle, who has accomplished the restraints and the obligations, who has acquired mastery over his postures, who has subdued the vital airs, who has abstracted himself from the field of the senses, who has conquered the pairs (cf. C. II A. XLVIII), should, in a quiet place, and in an erect posture, by fixing it to one object, such as the tip of the nose, produce steadfastness of the thinking principle for the practice of disoriminate meditation.

[The preliminary obligations and restraints having been accomplished, and the habit of assuming the various kinds of seats having been acquired, the Yogí should engage himself in training his thinking principle so as to be able to keep it unswervingly steady to any object to which he may wish to direct it; and this unswerving fixity is called Dháraná, or steadfastness. This steadfastness cannot be acquired without a substratum. There must be some object to which the thinking principle can be applied, whether it be the tip of the nose, or a plexus of nerves in the belly, or the crown of the head, or the ether, or the sky, for without it, in the preliminary stage, the thinking principle would be wandering. And inasmuch as there must be a substratum, the steadfastness of thinking produced by it comes under the head of discriminate meditation (samprajuáta-samádhi). (C. I A. XVII.) Practically it is a state of steady, immovable abstraction, but the word abstraction would be an indirect and not a direct definition of Dháraná, inasmuch as abstraction gives prominence to the act of withdrawing or separating, leaving the result of the act in the background, whereas Dháraná gives prominence to the fixation of the thinking principle to one point, leaving the separation or withdrawing from other things to be tacitly implied.

The *P. Bháshya* defines "Dháraná to be the fixation of the function of the thinking principle on the navel-wheel, or on the lotus of the heart, or on the light in the head, or on the tip of the nose, or on the point of the tongue, or on such other place, or on some external object." (Nábhichakre hridaya-pundaríke múrdhni jyotishi násikágre jíhvágra-ityádishu des'eshu váhye vá vishaye chittasya vrittimátrena bandha iti bandho dháraná.) The "external object" of the commentator is explained by Vijnána Bhikshu to mean the image of a divinity.]

Having defined steadfastness, with a view to define contemplation he says :.

#### II.

Contemplation is unison there of the understanding.

"There," in that place where the thinking principle is confined. "Of the understanding" (*pratyayasya*) of the knowledge. Whatever unison (or harmonious blending) is obtained through the instrumentality of avoiding untoward modifications, and what knowledge constantly arises through dependance on that on which steadfastness is reposed, is called "contemplation" (*dhyána*).

[The word *dhyána* is usually translated into meditation, for it implies that profound and abstract consideration which brings its object fully and undisturbedly before the mind. Inasmuch, however, as there is deliberation and consideration in this act, contemplation appears to me to be a more appropriate equivalent, the highest state of contemplation, which is Samádhi, being indicated by the term meditation.

The P. Bháshya defines Dhyána to be "an even current of thought undisturbed by other thoughts." (Sadris'a pravákapratyayántarenáparámrishto dhyánam.)]

He now describes meditation, the last or highest member of the Yoga.

#### III.

When that (contemplation), existing as if without its own identity, enlightens solely one object, it is meditation.

"When that," *i. e.* contemplation as defined above (A. II). When "solely one object" is enlightened, *i. e.*, when the object produced by application to the form of an object, negating all other forms of consideration, and the thought appears as if devoid of its own identity, it is called "meditation" (samádhi). That which brings the mind together thoroughly, (samyag-ádhíyate), *i. e.*, brings it to one centre by avoiding all disturbing causes, is Samádhi.

[The P. Bháshya defines Samádhi to be "that in which contemplation so realizes the form of the object contemplated as to make its own identity, as it were, void from the prevalence of the nature of the contemplated object. (Dhyánameva dhyeyákára-nirbhásam pratyayátmakena svarúpena sunyamiva yadá bhavati dhyeya-svabháváves át tadá samádhirityuchyate). As stated in the foregoing note, Samádhi is only a more advanced state of contemplation than Dhyána. In the latter the ideas of other objects besides the one contemplated are subdued and kept down, but not entirely suppressed; but in the former it is so complete that not only exteraneous ideas are suppressed, but even the distinction between the thinking and the thought are lost, so that the former, as it were, merges into the latter, and nothing but thought remains. Such being the case, the body ceases to be influenced by external stimuli, and a state of catalepsy or trance is produced. Hence it is that Samádhi is not unfrequently translated into trance or catalepsy. Catalepsy, however, takes note of only the cessation of the organic functions, leaving unnoticed the state of the thinking principle, whereas Samádhi brings the intensity of the thinking to the fore, without caring for the organic functions, and the English equivalent used should therefore convey this idea. Meditation it is true does not give the measure of the intensity, but since that intensity varies greatly under different circumstances, meditation is by itself enough for ordinary use.]

In order to supply for use in his work a technical term for the three constituents above described, he says:

#### IV.

#### The three together constitute Sañyama.

In this Sástra the application of the three operations of contemplation, (dhyána) steadfastness (dháraná), and meditation (Samádhi), to one object is indicated by the use of the term Sañyama.

[The word Sañyama is formed of the intensitive particle sam prefixed to yama " restraint," and means vow, binding or confinement, and in this work indicates the absolute restriction of one's self to the practice of the three means of accomplishing the Yoga. In connexion with the ceremonial of the Smriti, it is used to indicate the day preceding that of the rite itself, because on that day the performer has to place himself under certain restrictions about food, drink, and occupation, the nature of which varies according to the character of the rites. The word is defined with a view to prepare it for subsequent use as a technical term for the three most important acts of Yoga.]

The fruit thereof.

#### V.

From success thereof comes the light of understanding.

"Thereof," *i. e.*, of Sañyama. "From success" from its becoming similar (*i. e.*, freely blending with each other so as to be the same) by practice. "Understanding" (prajnå), *i. e.*, the nature of the object to be known. The "Light" (aloka), (understanding) expands. The meaning is—that which has to be known becomes thoroughly manifest. [The purport is obvious. When a person is proficient in performing the threefold acts of Sañyama, he attains the light of understanding, or the power of knowing thoroughly the nature of the object to which he directs his attention.]

Its application.

#### VI.

It is to be applied according to its stages.

According to "its," *i. e.*, of the Sañyama, "Stages" (*bhúmi*), it should be applied to the varying conditions of grossness and subtileness of the substratum of the function of the thinking principle. The Sañyama should be practised in a higher stage after subduing or attaining proficiency, or knowing thoroughly, the lower stages of the thinking principle, for the fruition is not effected by practicing the Sañyama in the highest stage without first bringing into controul the lower ones.

[The subject matter of this aphorism is a mere detail: it is the rule that Sañyama should not be attempted for the higher stages of perfection until after it has been practised in the lower stages, *i. e.*, it is to be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of the Yogí is divided. See C. II A. XXVII.]

A doubt having arisen why in the chapter on the appliances (C. II) he should have described only five after naming the eight members of the Yoga, and omitted three, the author says:

#### VII.

#### The three are more intimate than the former.

"Than the former," *i. e.*, of restrictions and other members of the Yoga, which are the appliances of meditation in a secondary degree. (C. II A. XXIX.) The three members, steadfastness, &c., " are intimate" (*antarafiga*, lit. akin,) to descriminate meditation, since they establish the true character of meditation.

[In C. II A. XXIX. the accessories of the Yoga have been described to be restraint, obligations, postures, regulation of breath, devotion, steadfastness, contemplation, and meditation. Of these the first five are subsidiary or ancillary to, and the last three integral parts, lit. members of the body of, the Yoga, and this idea is developed in the aphorism under notice by the statement that the former are strangers and the latter intimates. The first five only prepare a person for the performance of the Yoga, but the last three constitute the Yoga, for without them there can be no discriminate Yoga having a specific object of thought.]

To point out that it is nevertheless a stranger compared to another, he says:

#### VIII.

It is still a stranger to the seedless.

"To the seedless" (*nirvijasya*), *i. e.*, to the meditation which depends on nothing, or carries on pondering with reference to vacuity. To it the threefold members of the Yoga are strangers, (*vahirafiga*,) because they are only secondarily subservient.

[Having in the next preceding aphorisms described the last three of the eight members of the Yoga, to be essential to the Yoga, the author makes a distinction, by saying that though they are essential in the case of discriminate meditation, or that in which there is a specific object of thought, they are not so when the Yogi, rising above all specific objects, makes vacuity (s'únya) the object of his pondering. This form of meditation is called "seedless" (cf. C. I, A. LXI), and it needs no aid and can derive no help from steadfastness, contemplation and objective meditation.]

Having now clearly explained the subject of Sañjama, wishing to disclose the nature of perfection of the different members of Yoga, he describes successively the three modifications.

#### IX.

The suppressive modification is the moment of conjunction of the thinking principle with suppression on the overthrow and success of the twofold residua of waking and suppression.

"Waking" (vyutthána) includes the three conditions of agitation, bewilderment, and voluptuousness. "Suppression" (nirodha) is that modification of the thinking principle in which the quality of goodness becomes a part of it, or retires to it. When successively the "overthrow" (avibhava) and success "prevalence" (prádurbháva) of the residua of the two, i. e., of the waking and the suppressive conditions, are produced, then at the moment of "suppression," the conjunction (anvaya) which takes place from the thinking principle having then both functions is called "suppressive modification" (nirodhaparináma). "Overthrow" is the condition of incapacity to perform work, there being a contempt for it. "Prevalence" is the condition of manifestation in the present condition. The meaning is this :-- When the residua cognate to waking are pacified, and the residua of suppression are prevailing and the thinking principle appears connected with both from its being the substratum of quality, then that state is indicated by the word suppressive modification (nirodhaparináma).

Although there is no stillness of the thinking principle when affected by the functions of the qualities, nevertheless this modification is called *still* or *motionless*.

[Having explained the exact position of the threefold exercise of Sañyama, the author now proceeds to describe what follows that exercise, and in doing so first defines three terms, and the first of them is suppressive modification (*nirodhaparináma*). This is defined to be the time when all the residua of the waking state being overthrown, the thinking principle begins to be worked by the residua of the suppressive state; it is the moment of transition from the one condition to the other that the term indicates. The *P. Bháshya* thus defines the term: "the residua of the waking state are the attributes of the thinking principle, but they are not intelligent. The residua of suppression, produced by the intelligence of the suppressive state, are also the attributes of the thinking principle. On the overthrow and the success of the two, the residua of the waking state are put down, those of the suppressive state rise up, and there is then a correlation of the thinking principle, and the changes, thus constantly occurring in a thinking principle is suppressive modification." (Vyutthána-sañskáráśchittadharmá na te pratyayátmaká iti, pratyaya-nirodhena niruddhá nirodhasañskárá api chittadharmáh, tayorabhibhava-prádurbhávau vyutthána-sañskárá híyante nirodha-sañskárá ádhíyante, nirodhakshanam chittamanveti tad ekasya chittasya pratikshanamidam sañskárányathátvam nirodhaparinamah.)

In explaining the text, Bhoja uses a term which, as playing an important part in subsequent explanations, requires a few words of comment. The word is vartamánádhvan, a compound of vartamán "present" and adhvan "a road," but here "time" (adhvas'abda kálavachanah.) which I have rendered into " present The theory is that every image, shape, or idea condition." exists from eternity in a latent form; circumstances make it manifest, and when those circumstances are overcome it reverts to its former condition. The first is anágatádhvan, or the unmanifest or antecedent condition ; the second or what we see is the vartamánádhvan, or the present condition; and the third is atitudhvan, or the postcedent condition, which is reversion to the first condition. The image existed in the marble in a latent condition; the sculptor brings it to its present condition, and when it is broken it passes on to its postcedent condition. This theory is the same which prevailed in Greece in ancient times. Thus, says Sir William Hamilton : "Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this-that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. In the Platonic sense, then, ideas were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the

17

.

phenomenal or ectypal world." So Tiberghien, (Essai des Connoissance humane, p. 207,) "Seneca considered ideas, according to Plato, as the eternal exemplars of things, Cicero as their form, Diogenes Laertius as their cause and principle, Aristotle as substances."

The word sañskára, which, for the sake of uniformity, I have sendered into residua, would have been more pointed here if translated into idea.]

The fruit thereof.

#### X.

Its tranquil flow from residual habit.

"Its," of the thinking principle, "tranquil flow" (pras'ántaváhitá) is produced by the residua of the suppression aforesaid. The meaning is, from voluptuousness being removed the thinking principle flows in its own modification.

[The advantage derived from the suppressive modification is that, when it is attained, the thinking principle becomes tranquil, and abides in its own nature, that is, it is no longer subject to agitation from the prevalence of the adverse qualities of foulness and bewilderment.]

Having described suppressive modification, he now defines meditative modification.

#### XI.

The destruction of multifunctionality and enlivenment of concentration of the thinking principle is meditative modification.

"Multifunctionality" (sarvárthatá) is the quality of voluptuousness of the thinking principle, which results from its accepting many objects from its versatility. When one object is depended upon there is a similar modification, and it is "concentration," and that too is a quality of the thinking principle. The "destruction" and "enlivenment" (kshaya and udaya) of the two are successive, *i. e.*, the destruction or extreme overthrow of the quality of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or full mani-

CHAPTER THIRD.

festation of the quality of concentration are successive. The condition in which there is a junction of the two in the thinking principle, when it has the quality of goodness in excess, is called "meditative modification" (samádhi-parináma). This is distinct from the former, (i. e., suppressive meditation). In the former there are the overthrow and the prevalence of the two residua, i. e., the contempt for the nature of the former waking residua and the prevalence in an unsubdued state of the latter or the residua of suppression. In this, however, there is destruction and full enliven-Destruction is entrance into the condition beyond that of ment. reproduction, of the voluptuousness of multifunctionality, from extreme hatred. Enlivenment of the quality of concentration is its manifestation in the present condition.

.

[Suppressive modification as defined in A. IX, is confined to the point of time when the waking state passes on to the suppressive state; but in the meditative modification, there is a farther advance. The waking state has then been entirely overcome, and the meditative state is in full prevalence. The one is the commencement, and the other the consummation, of the condition of meditation. The P. Bháśhya explains this by saying "multifunctionality is an attribute of the thinking principle, so is concentration; the meaning is there is destruction or disappearance of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or manifestation of concentration." (Sarvárthatá chittadharmah ekágratá chittadharmah, sarváratáyáh kshayastirobháva ityarthah, ekágratáyá udaya ávirbháva ityarthah.) Briefly this is a higher state of concentration.]

The third or the concentrative modification.

#### XII.

The concentrative modification of the thinking principle is that in which both the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are equally recognized. Unity of idea is a special function of the abstracted thinking principle. "Tranquil" (śánta) is that which has entered the postcedent condition. "Enlivened" (udita) is manifestation in the present condition. From the thinking principle being in a collected state, the two are equal, and from their object being one, are similar cognitions (pratyayas). When the collected thinking principle abides correlated with both it is called concentrative modification.

[In the suppressive modification the worldly state is just passing away, and the meditative state is just commencing, and the thinking principle is becoming tranquil; in the meditative state the first stage is passed, and concentration is in prevalence or fully enlivened; and when the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are in full play, the condition is called the concentrative modification. The *P. Bháshya* explains this by saying, " of the controlled thinking principle, the first cognition is tranquillity, and the next after it is a similar one that of enlivenment, and the thinking principle in meditation is correlated to both, in the same way" (samáhita-chittasya púrva-pratyayak śánta uttarastat-sadríśa uditah samádhi-chittamubhayo-ranugatam punastathaiva). As in the last case so here, we have in this an advance over the last preceding condition.]

Having described the forms of the modification of the thinking principle, he assigns them to other subjects.

#### XIII.

By this the modifications of property, time, and relation in elements and organs have been described.

"By this," *i. e.*, by the threefold exposition of the modifications of the thinking principle (A. IX, XI, XII.). "In elements," (*bhúteshu*,) both the gross and the subtile. "In the organs" existing severally as Intellect, organs of function, and internal organ. It is to be understood that the three modifications of property, time, and relation have been described (by the above aphorisms).

When, on the cessation of a former property, the subject undergoes the modification of another property, even as the subject clay, forsaking the form of an undefined mass, assumes another property, that of a jar, it is called the modification of property (Dharmaparináma). The "modification of time" (Lakshana-parináma) (is thus indicated)-when that jar, giving up its antecedent condition, assumes its present condition, or forsaking it, takes up its postcedent condition. The modification of relation (Avastháparináma) is the correlation of the jars, in the first and the second conditions, for the train of the functions of qualities is always moving, and does not remain unchanging for even a moment.

[This aphorism applies the theory of eternity of ideas enunciated in the three preceding aphorisms to things in general. The object is to show that even as in ideas, latency, manifestation, and disappearance follow successively, so in the thinking principle ideas appear and disappear under particular circumstances without radically changing its original nature. Change in matter is not absolute, nor radical conversion of one thing into another, but a modification of property, or of time, or of relation. A mass of clay converted into a jar is a change of property, and not of the radical elements of clay. This change is next altered by time, as the breaking of a jar into potsherds; and there is a further change going on in its condition, and the new jar of yesterday is not the same with the jar we see to day, for there has been some change in it since yesterday, for change is constant and cannot be retarded for a moment. The first change is called Dharmaparináma, the modification of property. The second is Lakshanaparináma, the modification of time. The word lakshana ordinarily means a sign or character, but it has been explained by commentators to mean time (kálabheda). The third is Avastháparináma or change of relation.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what the property is, he defines the nature of the propertied, i. e., the subject.

#### XIV.

The subject is the correlative of the qualities of tranquillity, enlivening, and latency.

"The tranquil" (sántáh) (qualities) are those which, having performed their respective functions, have entered the postcedent "The enlivened" (uditáh) qualities are those which, condition. forsaking the antecedent condition, perform their functions in the present condition. "The latent," (avyapadesyáh) qualities are those which, abiding potentially, do not produce action. Thus everything is comprised in everything, and so on. By the word property (dharma) is implied that simple potentiality which abides distinctly correlated as effect and cause. Whatever proceeds and admits of correlation with that threefold quality is called the "propertied" (dharmi) which is the subject of tranquillity, enlivening and latency. Thus gold, giving up the quality of the form of a necklace and assuming that of the form of a svastika cross, still appears as a golden form, *i. e.*, when in these slightly different characters the subject appears as a common property, it is subject, but when it abides as a distinct mode it is a property, and therefore it is described as the correlative of qualities.

[Properties do not always exist in the same form in the same way. Sometimes they are tranquil, at others active, or enlivened, and sometimes latent, and these properties are called *dharma*, and the thing with which they are correlated is the "propertied," or the substratum of qualities, or *Dharmi*—that which has the *Dharma*. A thing cannot be called a subject until it is correlated to a property, and a property ceases to be so when it qualifies nothing. On the other hand, by change of relation a subject may become a property and a property a subject—a subjective law or its objective outcome.]

To remove the doubt as to how a single (propertied) subject undergoes many modifications he says:

#### ·xv.

The diversity of succession is the cause of the versatility of modifications.

Krama or "succession" of property as defined above and anyatva, "diversity," which is every moment visible, make the compound Kramányatva, (which has been rendered into "diversity of succession" in the text). And that is the "cause" (hetu), mark, or indicator of the (anyatva) or multiplicity or diversity of the modifications aforesaid. The meaning is this: Constant motion or succession, as from powdered earth into clay mass, thence flattened plates, thence a jar, shows the manifest form of the versatility of modifications. And whatever the motion in the subject of the modifications of time and condition. the same should be understood to be the argument in support of the versatility of modification. For certain all conditions appear constantly changing by constant motion, and the versatility of modification from constant mutability is thereby established. Of all mutable objects, like the thinking principle and the rest, some qualities are grasped by perception, such as pleasures, conditions and the like, and some are known by inference, such as fate, residuum, power, &c., and the propertied subject not being distinct from property is to be explained in the same way.

[Both the text and the commentary explain the subject in a very roundabout way. The purport is that the diversity of phenomena in the versatile world, is due to constant motion, or uninterrupted succession of changes. The three qualities are never at rest, they are flowing in a constant round of changes, and every change brings on some change of property, for were not properties to change, there would be no perceivable change. And the thinking principle, associated directly with the functions of the three qualities, must accordingly with these changes, be the agent of a multiplicity of functions, and that is its multifunctionality. The changes under notice are either perceivable by the senses, organs, or felt by the mind, but in both cases they apply to the thinking principle.]

Now, with a view to describe Siddhi (perfection) by showing the object of the Sañyama already described, he says:

#### XVI.

The knowledge of the past and the future is acquired by Sañyama over the threefold modification.

The threefold modification resulting from distinctions of attribute, time and relation has been already described. Bv the Sañyama, i. e., by practising the controuls aforesaid in connexion with this object, Yogís acquire a full knowledge of the past and the future. The purport is this : When a Yogi, knowing that in any given subject this is the attribute, this is the time, this is the relation, and it having performed its work in the present condition has entered the postcedent condition, performs the Sañyama by surmounting the obstructions, he knows everything, all that is passed, or that is to happen, because from the manifestation of the pure quality of goodness in the thinking principle, he then constantly rejects all obstacles caused by ignorance to the power of perceiving the purport of all and everything. When by these means all obstacles have been set aside, then, through concentration, the power of perceiving the property of all and everything becomes manifest as in a stainless mirror.

[Having explained the rationale of the action of the thinking principle on worldly objects, the author now proceeds to describe the effect of Sañyama on that action, and the occult powers which may be derived by that exercise. The first occult power or perfection noticed is the power of knowing the past and the future. This is acquired by directing the Sañyama to the threefold changes described in A. XIII, *i. e.*, by meditating about them till the light of truth rises in the thinking principle of the Yogí and makes everything manifest.]

He describes another kind of perfection.

#### XVII.

A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and knowledge (arises) from indiscriminate understanding. By Sañyama with due discrimination, (is acquired an understanding) of the cry of all creatures.

A "word" (sabda) is a sound formed of letters joined in a fixed order, perceptible by the organ of hearing, and always conveying the same, single, distinct meaning; or it is a mere explosive sound having in it no fixed order, but still intelligible to cultivated understanding. In either case it forms words and sentences, for both are adapted to convey a fixed meaning. "Meaning" (artha) implies kind, quality, action, &c. " Understanding" (pratyaya) is knowledge, or the function of the intellect in which it assumes the form of the object (implied). By accepting in our intellect these naturally distinct word, meaning and understanding as one, there is confusion. Thus, in saying "bring a cow," the meaning is a cow (go), belonging specifically to the species cow, and having dewlap, &c.; the word is the indicator; and the understanding is the appreciation of it; and all these are grasped without any distinction. It is not used with a clear perception of the word cow being the indicator, the meaning being what is indicated by the word, and the understanding that which accepts the two; and if one is asked what is the meaning? what is the word ? what is the understanding produced by it ? he gives only one answer to all the questions by saying 'a cow.' Were he not to conceive all these to be identical, how could he give the same answer to all the questions? In this state he who makes the "distinction," (pravibhága) that the essential nature of a word is that it is the indicator (váchaka), that of its meaning is the indicated, and that of the understanding is making it manifest, and, making this distinction, places himself in Safiyama about it, acquires the knowledge of the cry (ruta) or word of all creatures, including feral and domestic quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, &c., i. e.,

,

Digitized by Google

he knows with what particular motive a specific sound has been made by a particular animal.

[Words are correlated with meanings, and meanings with ideas. When sounds are reduced to speech there is a fixed relation between their constituents, and this relation is fixed by orthography and syntax; but when, in the cry of an animal for instance, this relation of sounds does not appear to be so fixed, it is not to be understood that there is no such relation, for without it the sounds could not convey meaning and idea. And the relation being admitted, it must follow that the cry of animals, which are intended to convey ideas, must have some such relation, and this relation can be learnt by directing the Sañyama to it. Ergo when the Sañyama is accomplished, the Yogí who performs it is able to understand the meaning of the cries of animals.]

He describes another form of perfection.

#### XVIII.

A knowledge of former existence by making the residua apparent.

Twofold are the residual impressions of the thinking principle. Some are simply productive of memory; others are the causes of the deserts, kind, life, and enjoyment, called virtue and vice. When Sañyama is performed in regard to these residua, the performer, enquiring into his former actions to the effect—thus has that object been perceived by me, thus has that act been performed by me, remembers all the past by the mere reflection, the residua being by themselves excited without any separate stimulants, and gradually visibly sees in the self-excited residua the kind, &c., experienced in former existences.

[As explained in A. XVIII, C. I., the residual impressions are of a twofold character. One class of them produce memory, that is when excited by a stimulus, the impressions which lie latent in the mind become vivid, even as an action done in childhood and afterwards entirely forgotten, is brought up in the mind many years after by the sight of the locality or other circumstance

connected with it. Involuntary impressions received in dreams and the like are also so produced. The second class of impressions are those which bring on the desert of works; they are perfectly involuntary, and are mostly residua of former existences. By applying Sañyama to these, they are excited and become visible to the Yogí, and thereby he is able to know the events of his former existences.]

Another form of perfection.

#### XIX.

With reference to cognition, a knowledge of another's thinking principle.

"Cognition" (*pratyaya*) as indicated by some characteristic sign, such as the complexion and the like, of others. When a Yogí has performed the Sañyama with reference to it, he attains a knowledge of another's thinking principle. The meaning is, that one's own thinking principle, by entering the thinking principle of another, comes to know all its attributes, whether it is excited or otherwise.

[The principle explained above applies also to the thinking principles of other persons. The Sañyama applied to them brings them within the range of the understanding of the Yogí. The theory being that the thinking principle which thinks upon a thing assumes the form of that thing, it follows that the mind of the Yogí performing the Sañyama becomes the mind thought of, and thereby knows it.]

He now describes a peculiarity in the knowledge of other thinking principles.

#### XX.

(But) not along with its object, that not being the object (of the thinker).

But he is not able to know another's thinking principle (in the text represented by the pronoun it) "along with its object" (sálambana), i. e., along with the object to which it is directed, because none of the characteristics of the object is made the subject (of the Sañyama). From the characteristic of the object not being reflected upon the thinking principle alone of another is known, but not that it is blue or yellow, because Sañyama cannot be directed to that which has not been made the object of it, and there can be no recognition where it is not made the object. Hence another thinking principle along with its object is not cognizable, the object not being taken into account. Now, the qualities of the thinking principle will be included. When contemplation is made as to what is the object, then from that Sañyama a knowledge of the whole subject is acquired.

[This aphorism qualifies the sense of the next preceding one. It says that by thinking on the thinking principle of another one can know it, but not its objects, unless those objects are also included. When they are included the knowledge is perfect.]

He describes another perfection.

#### XXI.

From Sañyama with reference to the shape of the body, the power of vision being benumbed, and the correlation of light and sight being severed, there is disappearance.

The "body"  $(k \dot{a} y a)$  is the human frame, and its shape  $(r \dot{u} p a)$  is that quality of it which is perceptible by the eye. The meaning is—of such a body such is the shape. Through Sañyama the power of the eye to perceive things becoming 'benumbed' (stambha), *i. e.*, obstructed through contemplation with reference to that shape, and "the correlation of light and sight being severed," *i. e.*, the luminousness of the eye which proceeds from the quality of goodness being "severed," or rendered incapable of performing its function, there is a disappearance of a Yogi, *i. e.*, none can see him. By this it should be known that the disappearance of sounds &c. is also implied, *i. e.*, by this exposition of the means of the disappearance of shape, &c., the disappearance of sounds, &c., the objects of the ears, &c., is described.

[Objects are perceivable by the light which the quality of goodness throws on them, but if this light be withdrawn by the quality of goodness being confined in the thinking principle, they cease to be so. Accordingly, when a Yogí performs Sañyama with reference to his body or any part of it he withdraws therefrom the quality of goodness, and the body or the part of it so acted upon ceases to have the quality of perceptibility, and the Yogí becomes invisible, inaudible, &c. When an object has no power of visibility in it, it necessarily becomes invisible. This is how the Yogí makes himself invisible.]

He describes another form of perfection.

## XXII.

Works are deliberate and non-deliberate, and by Sañyama about them a knowledge of the final end; or by portents.

Life is the consequence of former works. They are of two kinds, "deliberate" and "non-deliberate." Thereof the "deliberate" or anticipatory (sopakrama) is that in which there is an anticipation of consequences in the attempt to produce a result, as in the spreading of wet cloth in a hot place in order that it may dry quickly. The reverse of the former is the "non-deliberate" (nirupakrama), as the leaving the same cloth in a lump in a cool place where it may dry after a long time. Whoever performs Sañyama with reference to these two kinds of work, (enquiring) 'whether my work will mature quickly or slowly,' in him, through firm contemplation, a knowledge of the final end is produced. "Final end" (aparánta) is the separation of the body from the soul, *i. e.*, death. A " knowledge of it," *i. e.*, 'at such a time, at such a place my death shall happen,' he acquires with certainty. "Or by portents" (arishtebhyvas). Portents are of three kinds, spiritual ( $\dot{a}dhy\dot{a}tmika$ ), material, ( $\dot{a}dhibhautika$ ) and supernatural ( $\dot{a}dhidaivika$ ). The spiritual is that (which is conveyed in a spiritual way, as) when one with the ears closed does not hear the sound of the vital air in the stomach, or such like (the said sound being ordinarily audible). The material is the sudden sight of a frightful human form, or the like. The supernatural is the accidental sight of invisible things, such as paradise, &c. By them one knows the time of death. Although knowledge may be acquired through portents by other than Yogís, it is in their case general and doubtful. In the case of Yogís, on the other hand, the time and place being certain, the perception is as certain as actual sight.

[The efficacy of this Siddhí depends upon the precision with which the events of past existences are realised in the mind by reviving their residua through the power of Sañyama. When their memory is perfect, one can easily calculate which of his former acts will bring on death within a short time, and which are destined to retard it. It will be seen that in the Yoga system residua or deserts play the part of fate, and if the nature of the residua be known, one knows his fate.]

In order to explain the perfection acquired by the purifying processes (Chap. I, A. XXXIII, p. 40) he says:

# XXIII.

# In friendliness, superhuman powers.

By performing Sañyama in regard to friendliness, mercy, complaisance, and indifference, super-human powers are acquired with reference to them, *i. e.*, in the performer friendliness, mercy, and complaisance attain such great excellence as to enable him to contract friendship with all (persons).

[The sense is obvious, and needs no comment.]

He describes another kind of perfection.

### XXIV.

# In powers, the powers of the elephant and the like.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the powers of the elephant and the like, powers like those of the elephant, &c., become manifest in the Yogí. The meaning is this: He who performs Sañyama in regard to the power of the elephant, the force of the wind, or the vigour of the lion, wishing it to be in him, becomes possessed of those powers.

[As obvious as the purport of the last preceding aphorism.] Another perfection.

## XXV.

From contemplation of the light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowledge (is acquired) of the subtile, the intercepted and the remote.

The light of the extremely luminous disposition has already been described. (C. I, A. xxxvi). The "light" is that which expands the manifestation of the quality of goodness. From "contemplation" ( $ny \dot{a}sa$ ) of all things appertaining to it, *i. e.*, from thinking of the objects irradiated by it, a knowledge is produced, in one's own internal organ and the organs of sense endowed with special power, of the "subtile" ( $s\dot{u}kshma$ ) such as atoms, &c., of the "intercepted" (vyavahita), as mines under the earth, and of the remote (viprakrishta), as the elixir of life existing on the other side of the Meru mountain.

[The clear light of the quality of goodness is what is meant by "the light of the extremely luminous disposition."]

Another perfection of a similar description.

#### XXVI.

From Sañyama in the sun, a knowledge of regions.

He who performs Sañyama with reference to the manifest sun, obtains a definite knowledge of whatever regions and towns exist in the seven spheres, including the terrine, the aërial, and the celestial. In the preceding aphorism the subject is the manifestation of the quality of goodness, here it is material, that is the distinction.

[The P. Bháshya gives a long account of the seven principal regions and their subsidiaries, taken from the Puránas, but it is not worth quoting. In Wilson's Vishņu Purána the details are given at length.]

Another perfection by means of reliance on material manifestation.

#### XXVII.

In the moon, a knowledge of the disposition of the stars.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the moon, a knowledge is derived of the disposition (vyiha), or the order of arrangement, of the starry luminaries. As the stars lose their light on the manifestation of the sun, Sañyama with reference to the sun cannot suffice to afford a knowledge of the stars, therefore a different means is (here) ordained.

[The reason given why the Safiyama with reference to the sun does not suffice to give an idea of the arrangement of the stars and planets appears ludicrous. Bhoja cannot have seen a star in day light. The *P. Bháshya* does not refer to it.]

Another perfection.

### XXVIII.

In the Polar star, a knowledge of their motion.

A knowledge is produced of the "motion" (gati) of the particular time and position of each of the stars by performing Sañyama with reference to the Polar star (Dhruva), the chief, the fixed star. This is a star, that is a planet, this is the period within which it will reach a particular constellation,—all these are known. What is said is that this is the fruit of knowing their times.

[The P. Bháshya adds that the Sañyama applied to the firmanent above suffices the pupose. (U'rddha-vímáneshu krita-

sañyamastáni vijá<u>n</u>íyát). It is not obvious why Bhoja has omitted this.]

After having described perfections regarding externals, he now attempts to describe internal perfections.

## XXIX.

In the navel-wheel, a knowledge of the disposition of the body.

A knowledge is acquired by the Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to the "wheel" (*chakra*) of sixteen radii which exists in the middle of the body, and is called "navel" (*nábhi*), of the "disposition" (*vyúha*) obtaining in the body of fluids, excrements, humours, tubes, &c. What is said is this—the navel-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes, therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body.

[Down to the last aphorism the effect of Sañyama applied to external objects formed the theme of comment; now the author turns to objects situated within the body. The first is the navelwheel, which is said to have sixteen radii. How this idea got into currency I cannot make out. Ancient Hindus must have seen the human abdomen dissected, and having seen it, it is impossible to imagine, how they conjured up the idea of a wheel with sixteen radii. There must be some recondite metaphor involved in this, but I know not what it is.]

Another perfection.

#### XXX.

In the throat-well, the subdual of hunger and thirst.

The well in the throat is "throat-well" (kanthakúpa). It is a pit or well-like place (and therefore called a well) behind and below the tongue and palate. By the contact of the vital airs with it (the sensations of) hunger and thirst are produced. The hunger

and thirst of the Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to that well, are subdued. The streams (of the vital airs) being satisfied below the uvula, this kind of perfection is accomplished.

[The throat-well is the pharynx where the air from the mouth and that from the cavity of the nostrils meet.]

Another perfection.

### XXXI.

## Firmness in the tortoise tube.

Firmness of the mind is acquired by performing Safiyama with reference to the tube, called the "tortoise" ( $k \acute{u} rma$ ), which is situated below the throat-well. The meaning is—that on the mind entering that spot there happens no vacillation, in other words, such a firmness of the body is produced that no one can cause it to shake

[The tortoise tube is the lower part of the larynx including the bronchí.]

Another perfection.

### XXXII.

In the coronal light, vision of perfected ones.

In the skull there is an aperture called *Brahma-randhra*. It is called "light" (*jyolik*) because it is the site of light. Even as the spreading effulgence of a jewel in a closed room collects at the keyhole, so the light of the quality of goodness in the heart spreading collects at that aperture. And by the performance of Sañyama in it by Yogís, those perfected ones, or celestial beings, who dwell in the space between the earth and the sky and are invisible to ordinary people, become visible, *i. e.*, Yogís see them, and hold converse with them. This is the meaning.

[The point at the crest of the frontal bone remains open in childhood when the parietal bones are not sufficiently developed; at maturity this opening is closed; but, its existence having once been proved, it is believed to exist always, and is called Brahma-

randhra. Life is said to depart through this aperture in certain cases, and spiritually it is reckoned to be the most important part of the body. In the Tantras it is referred to with great reverence.

This is the only aphorism in the Yoga system which may be assumed as recognising the truth of the spiritual manifestations of modern European spiritualists; the *rationale*, however, is entirely different.]

He now describes the means of becoming all-knowing.

### XXXIII.

### Or from *Prátibha*, everything.

**Pratibhá** is that knowledge which is independent of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved. By performing Sañyama with reference to it this **Prátibha** knowledge, called **Táraka** or emancipator, which results before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, arises. Even as the light which becomes apparent before the rising sun, so this **Táraka**, or knowledge of everything before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, becomes apparent. When this is the case, the Yogí can know everything without resource to any partioular Sañyama.

[The P. Bhúshya explains the word Prátibha by the phrase Prátibham náma tárakam, which may mean the Morning Star, the one which is visible a little before sunrise, or that it is an emancipator. Patanjali, perhaps, referred to the star, as the light of that star prepares the way for the illumination of the universe by the sun; but Bhoja, having set a limit to external objects at the close of the 28th aphorism, is compelled to take the Pratibhá to be something different. According to his definition, it is a sort of instinct, or intuition, "the knowledge which is independant of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved." He has, nevertheless, been obliged to preserve the relation of the star to the sun by referring to the illumination resulting from sunrise. The morning star is not, like the Polar star, always the same, different planets serving its place at different times, and this uncertainty must have told against the material meaning being accepted as the right one. Whether the practising Yogí should think on the morning star, or intuition is a question which I cannot decide, but Bhoja has obviously the best of the argument.]

Another perfection.

#### XXXIV.

In the heart, a consciousness of the thinking principle.

"Heart" (kridaya) is a particular part of the body. The locale of the internal organ is within a small, inverted lotus placed in that part of the body. By performing Sañyama with reference to it, a knowledge of the thinking principle of one's own and of another person is obtained, *i. e.*, the Yogí comes to know all the residua in his own thinking principle, as well as the passions, &c., in other thinking principles.

[The description of the heart is obviously rhetorical. As the seat of the thinking principle it is described as the must appropriate spot to which attention should be directed to know it thoroughly.]

Another perfection.

### XXXV.

Experience is an undefined conception of the quality of goodness and the soul, which are totally unconnected. From Sañyama for its own object, and not for another's object, proceeds a knowledge of the soul.

"The quality of goodness" (sattva) is a particular modification of nature (pradhúna); it is characterised by illumination and joy. 'Soul' (purusha) is the experiencer in the form of a ruler. From the distinction of the experiencer and the experience,—

CHAPTER THIRD.

of the rational and the irrational-there is total unconnection between the two, i. e., they are separate. "A conception" of the two without any distinction, not knowing them distinctly, is experience. Hence whatever consciousness of pleasure and pain is felt by the quality of goodness assuming itself to be the master is experience. Goodness having no object of its own, its work is for "another's object," (parártha), i. e., for the object of the soul. That which is distinct from it is its "own object," (svártha); which is reliance on the true nature of the soul, or the connection of the shadow of the soul with the quality of goodness (sattva) devoid of egotism. By the performance of Sañyama in that connection, a knowledge of the object of the soul is derived, i. e., the soul knows reliant perception to be in this way dependant on the quality of goodness. Nor does there arise any difficulty about the soul, the knower, becoming the object of knowledge, for the objection will be met by the argument of knowability (i. e., that which is the knower cannot be the knowable); because the knower and the knowable are quite contrary.

[The soul is the experiencer of joys and sorrows; it experiences them by its being reflected on the intellect, which is the immediate experiencer. The two are essentially different; one is sentient, the other inert; one the enjoyer, the other the enjoyed. An association of the two is brought about by the former being reflected on the latter, and then the former experiences what is produced in the latter. The latter, however, being irradiated by the former, acts the part of the agent or actor, and whatever it thereby feels is called enjoyment. This feeling, however, is for another's purpose, *i. e.*, for the purpose of the soul, its own purpose being the merging in that soul. In the one case it works for another, and falsely imagines itself to be the actor, and in the other it acts with a vew to attain its own end. When Sañyama is performed with this discrimination and with the object of knowing the soul, the knowledge is acquired.]

He now describes the fruits of this Sañyama.

## XXXVI.

Thence proceed intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction.

"Thence," from performing Sañyama in the said quality of goodness, or practising it; even in the waking state these faculties are produced. Thereof "intuition" (*Prátibka*) is the knowledge already described (A. XXXIII) on the manifestation of which minute objects become visible.

"Audition" (Srávana) is the knowledge produced in the organ of hearing. Therefrom the highest celestial sound, or that which is produced in the heaven, becomes audible.

"Taction" (Vedaná) is the knowledge produced by the organ of touch. That by which is known that a thing exists (vidyati anayá) is Vedaná; it is a Tantric term which has been used here. Therefrom proceeds the knowledge of such celestial things as are subjects of touch.

"Vision" ( $\dot{A}dar\dot{s}a$ ) is that knowledge which is produced by the organ of sight. Whereby is seen (dris'yati) or perceived thoroughly what every form is, is  $\dot{a}dar\dot{s}a$ . When it is in its full development a knowledge of celestial forms is produced by it.

"Gustation" (Asváda) is the knowledge produced by the organ of taste. That by which a thing is tasted (*ásvádati* aneneti) is ásváda, and on its full development a perception of celestial taste is produced.

"Olfaction" (Vartá) is the sensation of smell. In Tántric terminology the word *vritti* means the organ of smelling; that in which resides (*varttate*) the objects of smell (is *vritti*) and that which proceeds from that organ of smell is Vártá, *i. e.*, the sensation of smell. When that becomes fully developed celestial smells become perceptible.

[This aphorism explains the collateral advantages of performing Sañyama with reference to the soul. These advantages are superior or transcendental powers in the organs of sense. Nor are those powers confined to the meditative state; when once acquired, they are retained permanently, and even in his ordinary worldly waking state the Yogí can exercise them, so that in his ordinary faculties he becomes infinitely superior to common mortals.]

Of these different fruits he now describes the respective provinces.

## XXXVII.

These are obstacles in the meditative condition (but) perfections in the waking state.

"These," the different fruits described above. In the state of meditation they are "obstacles," (upasargas,) hindrances, disturbers, because from joy, wonder, &c., resulting thereform, meditation becomes relaxed. In the state of waking (vyulhána), *i. e.*, in the ordinary state of life, they are, however, perfections (siddhayah), because then they yield desirable fruits.

[The perfections described are of the world worldly, required for worldly purposes, but useless for higher meditation, *i. e.*, for meditation having isolation for its aim. Nor are they simply useless, but positively obstructive, for they interfere with the even tenor of calm meditation. In the waking state they may be gratifying, and, indeed, they are useful only in that state, but apart from it they are not wanted.]

He describes another perfection.

4

## XXXVIII.

From slackness of the cause of bondage and from a knowledge of the process, the entrance of the thinking principle into another body.

The consciousness which results of the experiencer and the experience, acting from the constant relation existing between the soul and the intellect residing inside the body and from pervasion, is called corporeal bondage (s'arírabandha). When through medita-

tion the cause of bondage, which is work in the twofold form of virtue and vice, becomes slack, or attains attenuity, and when a Yogi knows the process, *i. e.*, the way in which the thinking principle issues from the heart through the organs towards worldly objects, knowing full well this is the tube called chittavahá through which the thinking principle circulates, and it differs thus from the tubes through which the vital airs and the rest circulate, and also knows the passages in his own body and that of others, he can enter, by the passage through which the thinking principle circulates, into the body of another, whether it be dead or alive. The thinking principle, after entering another body, follows the bent of the senses even as honey-bees follow the queen bee, (lit. king bee). And the Yogi who has entered another body uses it as his own body. Since work is the cause of circumscribing the fruition of the pervading soul and the thinking principle, if that circumscription be weakened or destroyed by meditation, fruition may result everywhere from the independence of the thinking principle.

[The transfer of one's own soul into another body plays a prominent part in the legendary lore of India, and the idea was not unknown at one time in Europe. How this transfer is effected is explained in this aphorism. The bondage of the soul to the body is due to works and their deserts, works having been performed their deserts must be borne by the soul in association with the body; but when through meditation the residua of works are obliterated and the bond is loosened, and the Yogi knows the way in which the soul goes out and comes into a body, he can, at will, make the soul travel by that way and enter another body, whether dead or alive, and again, at will, withdraw it from that body, and bring it back to its own. And wherever the soul rests there it works upon the organs, and enjoys their experiences, or in other words, the organs follow the soul as do working bees their queen.]

Another perfection.

## XXXIX.

From subdual of Udána, ascension and detachment from water, mud, thorns, &c.

The simultaneous waking, like the flaming up of burning chaff, of the functions (of the body) is indicated by the phrase vital air, (Jivana), and from differences of action, that vital air is indicated severally by the terms Prána, Apána, &c. Thereof one form of air is called Prána, because it passes (pranayanát,) from the heart through the mouth and the nostrils. That air which descends (apanayanát) from the navel down to the great toe is called Apána. Another is called Samána, because, surrounding the navel, it permeates everywhere (samantánnayanát). Another is called Udána, because it ascends from the back of the neck to the head (unnayanát). Another air pervades the whole body, and is called Vyana, because it circulates over the whole body, (vyápya nayanát). From the subdual of the Udána, through Sañyama, the other airs being suppressed and the tendency being upwards, the Yogí does not suffer from "water," i. e., in large rivers, &c., nor from large collections of "mud," (kardama,) bogs, nor from sharp "thorns" (kantaka), i. e., from his lightness he rises, like a floss of cotton, even when drowned in water or the like.

[The body is kept alive by five vital airs, and of these that which is called Udána is characterised by its tendency to rise upwards. Now, by making Sañyama in reference to it the tendency of the other airs are overcome, and the whole body tends upwards, consequently there is no gravitation, and the Yogí is neither drowned in water, nor submerged in a bog. The attenuity of his body at the time is such that it cannot be pierced by a thorn.]

## XL.

From subdual of Samána, effulgence.

From the "subdual" (*jayát*) of the air called Samána which surrounds the fire (of the stomach), *i. e.*, by bringing it unler 20

control through Sañyama, that unprotected fire ascends, and the Yogí appears effulgent as if flaming in glory.<sup>9</sup>

The stomach is the seat of the fire which keeps up the heat of the body and consumes food; and this fire is surrounded and kept in its place by the air called Samána. Such being the theory, it follows that when by Sañyama the air in question is overcome or rendered inapt in its special function, the fire, from its natural tendency upwards, should rise up and escape from the body in lambent flames of glory. The Buddhists, who developed the Yoga system to its utmost limit, declare that the crown of the head, the space between the eyebrows, the mouth and the shoulders are the places whence these flames usually issue. In the Sanskrit Buddhist literature of Nepal these flames are frequently described as issuing from the person of S'ákya Buddha, whenever he immersed himself in a profound meditation, and in an cient sculptures images of Buddha are often represented with these flames occupying the place of halo, nimbus, aureola, or glory of European art. A physical cause for these flames may be found in the electric flames which have been noticed by Reichenbach on the persons of highly electric tendency under certain conditions. Of course it is an open question as to whether Yogís had seen such electric flames and derived their descriptions therefrom, or drawn them from their fancy.]

Another perfection.

## XLI.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the organ of hearing and ether, a superperfect organ of hearing.

"Organ of hearing" (Srotra) is that organ which perceives sound, and is produced by egotism. "Ether" ( $\dot{A}k\dot{a}\dot{a}$ ) is sky, the result of the subtle rudiment of sound (Sabdatanmátra). The "relation" (sambandha) between the two is that of the site and the situated. The Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to it attains a superperfect organ of hearing (Divyas'rotra), and

becomes able to hear simultaneously subtile, intercepted, and distant sounds.

[The ether is the product of the rudiment of sound; and the organ of hearing is dependant on it for the performance of its f unction; and if the relation between the two be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to ether, the performer obtains the power of knowing it under all circumstances.]

Another perfection.

### XLII.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the body and ether, travelling in ether, from acquisition of levity, like that of cotton.

The "body" (k dy a), is the form made of the five elements. By performing Sañyama with reference to the relation which exists between the body and ether which yields space (for objects to abide in) a levity, like that of cotton and the like, is effected, *i. e.*, they become alike. Having effected this and attained the levity, the Yogí, walking at will over water, or on a spider's web, or on the rays of the sun, at his choice travels on ether.

[The *rationale* of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last; the body is kept down by the ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it.]

Another perfection.

### XLIII.

The function independent of external functions is the great incorporeal. Therefrom the destruction of the covering of light.

That mental function which is out of the body, *i. e.*, independent of it, is named the "great incorporeal" (*Mahávideha*), because it is exclusive of the stedfastness of the relation between the body and egotism. "Therefrom," from Sañyama performed with reference to it, the destruction of the covering of light is effected, *i. e.*, the covering consisting of afflictions, works, &c., which obstruct the light of the thinking principle centered in the quality of goodness alone, is removed. The meaning is this: The external functions of the thinking principle which result from the body and egotism are called factitious (*kalpita*). When, abandoning the feeling of body and egotism, there arises an independent (or self-reliant) mental function it is non-fictitious (*akalpita*). By performing Sañyama with reference to it, all taints in the thinking principle of the Yogí are removed.

[The covering produced by the qualities of foulness and darkness prevent the true light of the quality of goodness from being seen to perfection. If that covering be removed the vision is perfect. When retiring under this covering, which is no other than consciousness under the name of egotism, the mind entertains factitious ideas, and produces factitious works, which are consequently false. Divested of this covering it works differently, and whatever it produces is real. Sañyama performed with reference to the relation existing between the body and egotism removes the covering, and thereby cleanses the thinking principle.]

Having thus described the different forms of perfection, including anterior destruction of objects, posterior destruction of objects, and the middle condition; having also explained the knowledge of the externals, regions, &c., of the internals, the formation of the body, of the powers of friendliness, &c., which effect particular objects; having, further, described the conditions of internal and external organs and such like expedients for meditation, as also the conditions of the vital airs, Prána, &c., and other perfections for producing stedfastness in the thinking principle and earnestness in meditation; he now, with a view to point out the various means for the perfection of the seeded and the seedless meditations for the visual inspection of the soul, says,

## XLIV.

From Sañyama with reference to grossness, nature, subtlety, concomitance and fruition, conquest of the elements.

By performance of Sañyama with reference to the five specific conditions or qualities, such as grossness, &c., of the five elements, earth, &c., the conquest of the elements is effected, i. e., the elements become subservient. Thereof "grossness" (sthula) implies the specific forms in which the elements are perceived. "Nature" (svarúpa) implies respectively their effects. such as smell, viscidity, heat, impulsion, and impenetrability. "Subtlety" (súkshma) implies successively the subtile conditions which are the causes of the elements: these are the subtile or rudimentary forms of matter (tanmátra). "Concomitancy" (anvaya) includes the qualities of shape, disposition, and existence, which are everywhere seen to co-exist. " Fruition" (arthavatva) is that power in the qualities which lead to enjoyment and emancipation. Thus, by performing Sañyama in regard severally to the five elements, nature and conditions aforesaid, the Yogí conquers the elements. This is to be done in this way,-first in the gross form, next in the subtile To the performer of Sañyama in this order, nature and form. the elements become fulfillers of desires, even as cows follow calves.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain the advantages derivable from the performance of Sañyama with reference to the five elements. The elements brought under control subserve the wants and wishes of the controller, even as cows subserve the acquirements of calves by following them wherever they ramble.]

He now describes the fruit of this conquest over the elements.

### XLV.

Therefrom proceed attenuation, &c., as also excellence of body and the indestructibility of its qualities.

(1) "Attenuation" (animá) the attainment of the form of atoms (molecularity).

(2) "Levity" (laghimá) attainment of lightness like that of a floss of cotton.

(3) "Ponderosity" (garimá) attainment of great weight.

(4) "Illimitability," (makimá) attainment of greatness, or the power of touching the moon or the like with the tip of one's finger.

(5) "Irresistible will" (prákámya) non-frustration of desires.

(6) "Supremacy" (is itva) highest authority over the body and the internal organ.

(7) "Subjection" (vas'itva) prevailing everywhere, i. e., the elements being subservient to him do not disobey his behests.

(8) "Fulfilment of desires," (kámávasáyitva) accomplishing one's desire everywhere, *i. e.*, in whatever object a desire is formed, the Yogí becomes accomplished in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it.

These, attenuations, &c., as accessories to meditation, become pevalent in Yog's on their conquering the elements. Thus by attaining molecularity he can enter into (the substance of) a diamond. The other cases should be explained in the same way. These eight qualities, attenuation, &c., are called great perfections, (mahásiddhis). "Excellence of body" (káyasampat), which will be presently described, is also obtained. "The indestructibility of its qualities," means that the shape and the other qualities of that body are not liable to destruction by any means. Neither does fire burn its shape, nor wind dry it up, and so on.

[The exact nature of the advantages to be derived from Sañyama with reference to the elements, not having been described in the next preceding aphorism, the author supplies the omission in this aphorism. The advantages are the eight siddhis or perfections an account of which has already been given on page 121. They include many of the perfections described in separate aphorisms. I fail to perceive any marked distinction between the 5th and the 8th. The explanation of the 8th given on p. 121 is Tántric.]

He next explains what excellence of the body is-

### XLVI.

Colour, loveliness, might, and adamantine hardness constitute the excellence of the body.

"Colour, loveliness, and might" are well-known. "Adamantine hardness" (vajrasañhananatva) means that hardness is produced in one's body like that of the diamond. These are the excellences that become manifest in the body.

[While yearning for the severance of all bondage to worldly objects, the Yogis cannot get over the natural love which ties the mind to the body. The body is one's own, and it is always desirable to have it in a perfect state of beauty, and the means are here provided to give it perfection. Of course it is introduced here as the effect of a particular kind of Sañyama, and not as a thing to be desiderated.]

Having thus explained the excellence of the body, he now describes the conquest of the organs by one who has attained his (proper) stage.

### XLVII.

From the performance of Sañyama with reference to perception, nature, egoism, concomitance, and fruition, (proceeds) the conquest of the organs.

"Perception" (grahana) is the function of the organs directed to their (respective) objects. "Nature" (svarúpa) is ordinary manifesting power. "Egoism" (asmitá) is consciousness. "Concomitance" (anvayatva) and "fruition" (arthavatva) as explained above (A. XLIV, p. 157). By performing Sañyama with reference to these five conditions of these organs the Yogí becomes the conqueror of his organs.

[The five conditions of these organs include 1st, their nature, *i. e.*, their power of making objects manifest; 2nd, their function when in active operation; 3rd, their consciousness of being active; 4th, their concomitance or relation to each other or mutual interdependance; and 5th, their fruition or the result they produce. If all these conditions be brought under control by performing Safiyama with reference to them, the organs necessarily come under complete control.]

The fruit thereof.

### XLVIII.

Therefrom proceed quickness as of mind, uninstrumental perception, and the conquest of nature.

"Quickness as of mind" (manojavitva) is the attainment by the body of extreme quickness of motion like that of the mind. "Uninstrumental perception" (vikarana bháva) is the accomplishment of the functions of the organs without the aid of the body. "Conquest of nature" (pradhánajaya) is bringing everything under subjection. These perfections are attained by those who have overcome their organs. In this science these are called honey-drops (madhupratika). Even as every drop of honey has its taste, so each of these is tasteful, and therefore they are honeydrops.

[The advantage of having control over the organs as described in the last preceding aphorism is, that the Yogí is then able to perceive things without the aid of his material organs, and to do so with the quickness of the mind, *i. e.*, instantaneously. He also acquires mastery over nature in every way. The nature here referred to is the *Pradhána* of the Sáñkhya categories, the highest of the twenty-five, next only to soul.]

Having described the conquest of the (external) organs, he now points out the conquest of the internal organ.

# XLIX.

Supremacy over all conditions and omniscience, the moment the distinctive knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul (is attained).

The knowledge of the distinction between the quality of goodness and the soul which results from performing Sañyama with reference to the modification of pure goodness, is "distinctive knowledge" (anyatákhyáti). From the subsidence, through the influence of the Sañyama, of the conception about the qualities being agents the Yogís, who are in that condition, attain in their meditation supremacy over all conditions and omniscience.

Digitized by Google

"Supremacy over all conditions" (sarvabhávádhishthátritva) is the attainment of power like a master over all modifications of qualities. "Omniscience" (sarvajnatritva) is correct knowledge of those qualities as they exist in calm, (sánta,) enlivened, (udita,) and latent (avyapadisya) conditions. In this science this perfection is called "sorrowless perfection" vis'okasiddhi, while those that have been described before are indicated by the term vas'íkára (controul).

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the effect of getting controul over the mind or the internal organ. That controul enables the Yogi to perceive the difference between the quality of goodness and the soul, and endows him with absolute mastery over all conditions of existence and thorough omniscience. The omniscience directly refers to the conditions of the three qualities, but indirectly to all and everything in the universe. Everything in the universe depends upon the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, and those qualities are either in a calm state, or in a state of excitement, or latent; and if one comes to know their conditions he necessarily knows all and everything that proceeds from them. This state of supreme knowledge is called Vis'oka or sorrowless perfection, for when it is attained there cannot possibly be any cause for pain or sorrow; whereas in the perfections previously described there is always some room for sorrow, or longing of some kind or other. The latter ensure controul over the things they refer to, and the controul is more or less perfect according to circumstances, and they are fitly called Vas ikára or ' controul.' They do not, however, secure absolute immunity from pain, and this necessitates the marked distinction in the designations.]

Next he describes another stage.

## $\mathbf{L}$ .

From indifference even to this (perfection) through destruction of the seed of evils, (results) isolation.

When the Yogí becomes indifferent even to that sorrowless perfection, then ignorance, the seed of the evils such as passion, &c., being destroyed by the root, "isolation," (kawalya,) absolute cessation of pain, results, *i. e.*, on the termination of the influence of the qualities the soul is restored, placed permanently, in its own state.

[Nor is the sorrowless perfection the ultimatum. When the Sañyama is exercised freely it produces an indifference in the mind in regard to it, and this indifference destroys ignorance, the root of all evil, and leads to isolation, or the detachment of soul from the bondage of worldly ties.]

He now points out the means of remaining in this meditation.

## LI.

Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evils recurring.

There are four classes of Yogís; viz., 1st, those practisers of the Yoga on whom the light is just shedding; 2nd, Ritambharas, or those who possess the knowledge which holds to the truth; Srd, those who have conquered the elements and the organs; 4th, those who have exceeded all objects of contemplation. Thereof, to those who have attained the fourth meditation, when the seven surrounding stages of knowledge have been attained, and the final stage of 'honeyed knowledge' has been interviewed, the celestial (stháninah) gods become tempters, *i. e.*, they offer presents of handsome women, elixir vitæ, &c. With such temptations no association should be made, nor any encouragement be given to them. From association there is a fall into the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. With regard to them therefore both association and encouragement should be renounced.

[When the Yogí attains the last described sorrowless stage, he is exposed to a great danger. The gods envy his high excellence, but, unable to exercise open enmity, they try to divert him from CHAPTER THIRD.

his purpose by insidious means. They place temptations in his way, offer him handsome women, inexhaustible wealth, long life, and so forth to bring him back to the ways of the world. and thereby frustrate his purpose of attaining isolation. Thev act the part of Satan in the Bible and of Mára in the Buddhist system. In Hindu legends Indra is the chief god who envies men who are about to rise superior to carnal weakness, and the means he employs are the courtezans of his court, who descend on earth and tempt all Yogis by their celestial charms. According to the Tantras when such temptations fail, resort is made to fear. Frightful forms of all kinds assail the Yogí when he is engaged in his meditations; venomous serpents hiss around him; tigers prowl about him; ogres come with wide open mouth to devour him. These are, in the technical language of the Yoga system, called Vibhishiká. The lukewarm yield to these, break their meditation, and are lost; the determined take no note of them, and attain their object. It is believed that these frightful forms never do any actual mischief; their object is to frighten, to put to test the determination and firmness of the Yogí, and not to do any positive harm. The advice given in the Tantras is not to give any encouragement to such temptations, nor to be depressed or frightened by the dangers which become manifest. Firmness suffices to overcome them. The text here does not refer to frightening.]

In connexion with the manifestation of this fruitful understanding, he describes a means besides the Sañyamas above described.

## LII.

From Sañyama with reference to the course of moments (proceeds) an understanding born of discriminative knowledge.

"Moment" (kshana) is the smallest division of time, which can no further be reduced in quantity. "Course" (krama) the successive modifications of such moments of time. By performing Sañyama with reference to the course of moments, the aforesaid understanding of discriminative knowledge results. The meaning is this: This is a moment of time, it is subsequent to another, therefore the first is antecedent to this. For him who has performed Sañyama with reference to this course, interview with the minutest is effected in the course of a moment, and so is the interview effected of the subtile nature. This is manifestation of discriminative knowledge.

[The next step of the Yogi is to perform Sañyama with reference to the progress of time, and when this is accomplished, discriminative knowledge becomes thoroughly manifest.]

He now applies this Sañyama to a special subject.

#### LIII.

Therefrom results the knowledge of the difference between two similars when that difference is not marked out by kind, character and habitat.

"Kind, character, and habitat"  $(j\acute{a}ti, lakshann, des'a)$  are the means of differenciation of things. Sometimes "kind"  $(j\acute{a}ti)$  is the cause of distinction; as this is a cow, this is a buffalo. When the kind is the same, "character" (lakshana) may be the cause of distinction; as this is spotted, this is tawny. Where kind and character are alike, the cause of distinction may be "habitat," (des'a); thus with two emblic fruits of the same size and colour, one may be of one country and the other of another. There are again cases in which distinction cannot be determined, as particles of white earth of one country. When Sañyama is performed to ascertain distinctions in the last class of cases, a knowledge of distinction is produced, and by its exercise distinctions of even the exceedingly subtile categories may be perceived. What is said is this: When distinctions cannot be ascertained by any other means they, including a knowledge of such distinctions in the subtile categories, may be known through this Sañyama.

[This aphorism explains what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Under ordinary circumstances discrimination is made by attention to kind, character and habitat. But this is not possible in the case of the subtile categories which are not amenable to such tests. For them Sañyama is the only means, and it should be brought to bear upon them. When the Sañyama is accomplished, the power of discriminating them is fully acquired, and this is discriminative knowledge.]

To explain the name, object, and nature of the aforesaid knowledge resulting from discrimination, he says.

### LIV.

The knowledge resulting from discrimination is emancipating, omni-objective, semper-objective, instantaneous.

The knowledge which results from the power of the aforesaid Sañyama at the last stage is "emancipating" (Táraka). That whereby Yogís are ferried over the unfathomable ocean of the world has the significant name of Táraka, (the emancipating). He describes its object; it is a "omni objective" (sarva-vishaya); all categories from the Mahat downward are its objects, and therefore it is omni-objective. Its characteristic is its semperobjectivity (sarvathávishayatva). That which has for its objects the categories in all conditions, whether gross or subtile, in all their modifications, and existing in all forms, is always semperobjective. Another characteristic of it is "instantaneousness" (akrama). Being finally modified it has to make no progress in accepting two, three or one form, hence "instantaneous," *i. e.*, (a Yogí in this stage) perceives everything at once, like an emblic fruit in the palm of one's hand.

[The discriminative knowledge aforesaid is here more fully explained. It grasps all the categories and therefore the whole universe. It makes them its object at all times, and its knowledge is never absent. It acts instantaneously, because it has the whole thing before it, and needs no process of observation and retiociation to come to an understanding. And everything being known by it, it effects emancipation, for emancipation means true knowledge.]

He now says what results from this emancipating knowledge proceeding from discrimination.

#### LV.

On the purification of the quality of goodness and of soul becoming equal, (there results) isolation.

"The quality of goodness and soul" have already been defined. When their purification becomes equal there is isolation. The "purification" (s'uddhi) of the quality of goodness of the thinking principle is effected when, on the cessation of the assumption of agency, it merges into its first cause. The purification of soul is the absence of its factitious enjoyment. When the two are equally purified (in this way), isolation is effected with regard to the soul, *i. e.* it is emancipated.

[The thinking principle ordinarily fancies itself to be the agent of all work, *i. e.*, it is conscious of being the actor in all cases, and this is its natural function; but when this feeling is removed by discriminative knowledge, it reverts to its primary original condition, and ceases to cherish any idea of its being the actor, and this is its purification. Similarly soul, though itself devoid of action, is always engaged in an unnatural factitions enjoyment of the fruits of work by its ass ciation with the thinking principle, and when that association is removed it is purified. And this double purification, the cessation of the thinking principle from fancying itself the actor and consequent submersion into its original cause, and the removal of the association between the soul and the thinking principle, effects the isolation or separation of the soul from all attachments, and this is emancipation from the bondage of the world.]

Thus have been described in this chapter the three principal components of the Yoga, (I-III); their collective name Sañyama, (1v); the merits of that Sañyama, (v-x); the three modifications of things, the antecedent, the middle, the postcedent conditions, (xI-xvI); the Siddhis (xVII); the external perfections giving knowledge of regions (xVIII-xXVIII); the internal perfections, giving knowledge of the organization of the body (xxIx-xII); the organs (XII); the stages of controul of matter and organizations (xII-xIVIII); the means of attaining discriminative knowledge, the emancipating knowledge, the highest Samadhi (xIIx-I); the subsidence of the thinking principle in its primary cause and isolation (I-IIv). These are the subjects described in this chapter on perfections. (Condensed as before.)

This is the end of the third quarter, or the quarter on perfections, of the commentary, entitled Rájamártanda, on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

# CHAPTER FOURTH.

I adore that solitary, unborn Is an who is made up solely of thinking principle and bliss, and by whose fiat isolation is produced without (the aid of) any special means.

Now the author commences the chapter on Isolation with a view to establish by inferential arguments and by refutation of errors resulting from mistaken convictions, the true nature of Isolation. And by showing that the perfections aforesaid result from birth and various other causes, he demonstrates that they appear with the help of the power resulting from the practice of Samádhi in former births and from causes in this life from the time of birth. Further, with a view to afford assurance that no harm is done to Samádhi which may be acheived in course of many births, and to prove the preeminence of the completion of Samádhi as also for the consummation of the isolating Yoga, he says :--

I.

The Perfections are produced by birth, herb, incantations, austerity, or Samádhi.

Some perfections are caused by birth, as the power of flying in the air and the like in birds, or the perfected qualities of knowledge manifesting themselves immediately after birth, as in the great sage Kapila and others. *Perfections from herbs*—as firmness of the boy, &c. produced by the use of elixirs in Pátála and such like places. *Perfections from incantations*—as ascent in the air by the repetition of particular mantras. *Perfections from austerity*—as in the case of Vis'vámitra and others. *Perfections from Samádhi*—as already described in the preceding chapter. These perfections result in those persons who have destroyed pain in previous births; hence, as in the case of perfection by Samádhi, so in the case of others, the real cause is the practice of Samádhi in former births; incantations, &c. are merely instruments.

[The word Siddhi comes from the root sish 'to accomplish,' and means something accomplished. Transcendental powers attainable by the performance of Sañyama, are perfections accomplished by special means and therefore called Siddhis or perfections; and having used that English equivalent elsewere I have thought fit, for the sake of uniformity, to use it in the above aphorism. It is, however, not fully expressive here. Special powers, or faculties would have been much more expressive and to the point, the purport of the aphorism being that some faculties are derived from birth, some from herbs, some from incantations, some from the practice of austerities, and some from Samádhi. This general principle is laid down with a view to prepare the way to what follows.]

It might be contended that since in Nandís'vara and others the change of kind, &c., were effected in this life, how can you then establish the causality of the practice of Samádhi in previous lives? In reply to this, he says:

### II.

Change of kind (results) from transmutation of the material cause.

The "change of kind," &c., in Nandís'vara and others in this life (were produced) by "the transmutation of material causes" (prakrityápúrát). Future materials (or materials which are ordinarily produced in a subsequent life, come up and), produce in this life the transmutations, *i. e.*, they change themselves into other kinds.

[The general principle having been laid down in the first aphorism that special faculties are produced by five causes, the question arises, how does the body, which is produced by birth, change even in this life, the material cause remaining unaltered,

and the Samádhi performed in a previous life no thaving effected any change at birth? The reply is that Samádhi is not the material but an instrumental cause, and it prepares the way for he selfmutation of the material cause.

**Prakriti** is here used in the sense of material cause, or the materials of which the body is made up. Apúrana is to fill up. The two words together mean "the materials fill up," *i. e.*, they undergo the necessary transmutations to change one kind into another. The purport is that even in this life the materials of the body may so change as to convert a Bráhman's body into a divine one, as in the case of Nandís'vara, or a Kshatríya body into a Bráhmana one, as in the case of Vis'vámitra, and consequently the exception taken to the argument put forth in the first aphorism to the effect that " birth, &c. are causes of perfection" is not tenable. By the use of the word páśchútya, ' future', the commentator means that the changes which in ordinary course would take place in a future life, take place in exceptional cases in this life.]

It may be argued that merits, demerits, &c., are in such cases seen to be resulting (in this life when their fruits would not under the theory be liable to manifestation), how can we then attribute to them causality in the transmutation of the material cause in this life? To this the author says:

### III.

In the mutation of the material cause merit is non-efficient: from it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.

"Merit" (*nimitta*), virtue, &c. In the transformation of the material cause merit is non-efficient, for a cause cannot be set in motion by an effect. Where then is there the operation of virtue, &c.? To this he says: "From it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman." "From it," from the performance of virtuous acts, &c., proceeds "the piercing" (*bkeda*) or destruction of whatever "covering" (*varana*) obstruetion, such as vice, &c., exists, the two being mutually antagonistic, and the obstruction being destroyed, the material causes themselves become effective in their desiderated work. This he illustrates by an example. "As in the case of a husbandman." Even as a husbandman or farmer, wishing to carry water from one field to another, pierces only the obstacle to the flow of water, and that being pierced, water itself assumes the modification of expansion, without any exertion on the part of the husbandman to the expansion of water, so should be understood to be the case with regard to virtue, &c.

[Following the line of argument adopted in the preceding aphorism, the author shows that virtue, &c., are not the immediate causes of the change which takes place when a Bráhman becomes a god, as in the case of Nandís'vara, but that they serve the subsidiary purpose of removing the obstacles which stand in the way of the change, and the change takes place by itself. The illustration given puts this very clearly. The husbandman does not make the water flow, he only removes the obstacles, and then the water flows by itself from its own inherent tendency to follow the law of gravitation.]

When a Yogí, who has a mastery over the cardinal principles, with a view to enjoy at once the fruits of his actions, from the perception of his own superior transcendental powers, wishes to assume many bodies at the same time, whence does he derive many thinking principles (to vitalize those bodies)? In reply to this question the author, says:

#### IV.

The created thinking principles (proceed) solely from egoism.

The thinking principles which animate the bodies created by a Yogí, proceed through his will solely from their original cause, *i. e.*, from egoism. They emanate at once as sparks from a fire.

[Among the perfections mentioned in chapter III the power of multiplying one's own body, so as to produce many where there is one, is not mentioned, but here it is taken for granted that an accomplished Yogí possesses this power, and that he does produce them to effect quickly his emancipation by simultaneously performing in many bodies those works which promote his end, and the question is raised as to how does a Yogí, who creates many bodies and himself animates them all, provide a thinking principle for each of them? The answer given is that through his will he makes his egoism send forth the needful, even as a fire sends forth sparks from itself. This multiplication of bodies is called Káyaryúba Yoga or the Yoga of many bodies.]

Then, how do numerous thinking principles, having diversity of objects, produce one effect? To this, he replies:

v.

In the diverse tendency of the many the impelling thinking principle is one.

"In the diverse tendency" (*pravrittibhede*) or multifunctionality of the many thinking principles the one thinking principle of the Yogí is the impelling force or actuator, because it is the ruler, and therefore there is no difference of object. The meaning is—that as in its own body the mind directs the eyes, the hands, &c., according to its will, from its being the ruler, so does it in the other bodies.

[In the preceding aphorism the question having been solved as to how a single individual can provide thinking principles for many bodies, the question arises as to how can many thinking principles act in concert and preserve the unity of the creator? If this unity be not admitted, there would be so many independent individuals, each following the bent of his own mind, and the idea of one individual acting as many without any loss of individuality, would be lost. This doubt is removed by the explanation that the thinking principles provided to the many are in reality one, and entirely controlled by the primary thinking principle, of which they are mere scintillations ]

The thinking principle which belongs to the perfections resulting from birth, &c., are produced by the same five causes,

and yet the thinking principle produced by Samádhi is distinct from the others. To show this he says :

VI.

Thereof the meditation-born one is without any residua.

"The meditation-born" (*dhyánaja*) thinking principle or that which is produced by Samádhi, is, among the five, the one which is "without any residua" (*anásaya*), *i. e.*, without any residua of (former) work. This is the meaning.

[Thinking principles are said to be of five kinds, because they proceed severally from birth, herbs, incantation, penances, and meditation (A. 1). The word used (ja), means "born," but the object is not to imply that the thinking principles are actually born of herbs, incantations, &c., but to indicate the training, habit of thought, disposition or impurities which it acquires under the five different circumstances. The first four are said to depend on the residua of former works, and the last to have nothing to rest upon, it being self-supporting, *i. e.*, not resulting from the residua of any former work.]

To show that the thinking principle of the Yogí is distinct in its work, even as it is distinct from other thinking principles in being devoid of pain, &c., he says :

#### VII.

The work of a Yogí is neither white nor black : those of others are of three kinds.

That work which produces good fruit, such as sacrifices, &c., is "white" (*śukla*). That which produces a bad result, such as Bráhmanicide, is "black" (*krishna*). That which is mixed up of the two, is white-black (*śukla-krishna*). Thereof, the white work belongs to wise people, to those who are engaged in charity, asceticism, the study of the Vedas, &c.; the black belongs to the vicious; and the white-black (or mixed kind) to ordinary men. As regards Yogís, who have performed the Sañyama, work is of a different character to these: their work produces no fruit, for they undertake it after renouncing all desire for fruition.

[In the first three kinds of work fruition is inseparable. The wise give alms, perform penances, read the Vedas, display their benevolence, &c. &c. and derive the fruits thereof; the vicious commit wicked actions and suffer for the same; ordinary mortals are sometimes engaged in good actions and sometimes in bad ones, and suffer or enjoy accordingly. The Yogís, who renounce the fruits of all actions, can neither suffer nor enjoy from what they do, and hence their work is declared to be distinct from the works of others. They are, in the language of the Bhagavadgítá, like the lotus-leaf which, lying on water or having water on it, is never wetted.]

Now he describes the fruit of such works.

### VIII.

Thence proceeds the manifestation of the residua which are suitable to its fruition.

Now, the residua of works produce two sorts of fruits, one sort being memory only, and the other, kind, age, and experience. Thereof, those residua which have for their fruition kind, age, and experience which are derivable in one or many births, have already been described above (p. 69). Of those the only fruit of which is memory, the manifestation proceeds from the same works. Even as work produces a body, whether as a Deva, or a human being, or a lower animal, so does it by its maturity lead to a corresponding manifestation of residua (vásaní). The meaning is this. Should a celestial or other body once acquired by a certain work be acquired even after the interposition of a hundred other births the memorial residua of the former state will manifest themselves again. Their memory revives according to circumstances, even when residing in other regions. In the intermediate states, though existing, they remain in a latent condition. Nor do the residua produced in course of existence in hell and other places become evident then.

[For the sake of verbal fidelity I have used memory as the equivalent of the Sanskrit term Smriti of the commentary; but the object aimed at is not memory in its ordinary signification, but the remembrance in one life of appetites, desires, and affections of a preceding one. These results manifest themselves in, what in European philosophy is called, instinct. They are remembrances, because they arise without any conscious purpose, though they are not without consciousness. European philosophers, who do not recognise transmigration, finding Instinct to be opposed to Reason, take it to be something distinct from it—a distinct faculty. In its widest signification it extends to living beings in general-to plants as well as to animals,-but for psychological purposes it is limited by Dugald Stewart to Appetites, Desires, and Affections. Butler changes Desires into Passions, but without any material change of purport. Dr. Bain says "Instinct is untaught ability," (Mental and Moral Science, Bk. III, c. IV), and this is amplified by Hamilton into "an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge." (Reid's Works, p. 761a.) Paley has "a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction." Milton calls it "Reason discursive or intuitive." These definitions have been summed up into "untaught ability," "untaught propensity," "unconscious purpose." It is opposed to Habit, which is the result of tuition and exercise, and distinct from Reason, which presupposes argumentation and deliberation. The memory of our text is Instinct as defined above; but our author does not recognise spontaneity in anything, nor purpose independent of Reason. He attributes the eteology of Instinct to residua left in the thinking principle by rational action, and the said residua lie dormant till they are made vivid in a subsequent life. Habits leave their residua exactly in the same way as other actions, and they not only become manifest in the next life, but also in the progeny, as in the cases of pointers and other animals. In short, according to our author, Reason is one and the sole faculty of all knowing, the only principle of certain,

ty, and it manifests itself as Reason or Instinct differently under different circumstance. Anyhow, the meaning of our author will be best understood by replacing his Memory by Instinct.

The aphorism under notice explains the fruit of work as manifested by Instinct. Having already described that work leads to two kinds of fruit, Instinct and deserts, or in his language memory and kind, age and experience, he now says that Instinct does not manifest itself uniformly at every successive birth, but according to circumstances when it is needed in subsequent lives, even after many interruptions, the residua for it remaining dormant during such interruption. Thus, a man born in the next life as a dog having no occasion for his human instincts, acts as a dog, but twenty or more generations after, when he is again born as a man, his early instincts revive, and he acts according to them. This is the theory which the aphorism explains by saying that residua manifest themselves in conformity to the fruition of work. When a work entails existence as a serpent, those residua become manifest which are appropriate to such an existence, but not those which are appropriate for other forms In other words, residua remain dormant or in a of life. potential state until the necessary excitants are in operation. The S. P. Bháshya, explains this by saying, "when a celestial work is in fruition, it does not become the cause of manifestation of the residua of infernal, brutal or human states; it then enlivens only those residua which are conformable to a celestial existence." (Na hi daivam karma vipachyamánam náraka tiryafi-manushyavásanábhivyakti-nimittam bhavati kintu daivánuguná evásya vásaná vyajante). The purport is that each kind of existence brings to light its own appropriate residua.]

Doubt having been produced of there existing any causal relation in these residua, he establishes it by saying:

IX.

From the uniformity of memory and residua there is uninterruptibility of relation, even after breaks by caste, locality and time.

Of worldly beings transmigrating in diverse forms, when one, after experiencing one form, attains that form again after an interruption of a thousand other births, the residua of impressions appropriate to that state, which had been formed at the first birth and had become latent from want of the necessary conditions, become manifest on the attainment of that suitable state. Thus, there is, notwithstanding breaks caused by caste, locality and time, an "uninterruptibility" (ánantarya) or continuity in producing their own necessary fruit of memory. How so? "From the uniformity of memory and residua." Thus, on the performance of a work there is produced a deposit of residuum on the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, and that is the germ of the fruits of heaven, hell, &c.; or it is the residua of works such as sacrifices &c. It exists as a latent power, or as a power of the actor in relation to experience and experiencer. From these residua proceeds memory, from memory the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and from that experience again come residua, memory, &c. It is true that where memory and residua are different there is, from want of uninterruptibility, a difficulty in producing a relation of cause and effect; but in our case here, where impressions become residua. and residua merge into memory, and they reside in concord in one thinking principle, the relation of cause and effect is not difficult or hard of effectuation.

[According to the preceding aphorism the residua of former births are the causes of manifestation of certain effects; but, since concomitancy is necessary between cause and effect while the intervention of many dissimilar births between two similars causes an interruption, it may be argued that residua are not the causes of memory, as alleged. This objection is met by saying that the memory remains, and therefore sequence is obviously not broken. The memory of sucking the teats on the part of an infant returns after many births, whenever that infant is again born as a human being, though it does not manifest itself when the same infant is born as a bird or a serpent, and it shows

that the memory is not lost. Hence the relation of cause and effect is not broken.]

Admitting the uninterruptibility of residua, and their relation as cause and effect, it may be asked when an impression first takes place is it caused by residua, or without a cause? To solve this doubt, he says:

### X.

There is no beginning about them, because of the eternity of desire.

"About them," i. e., about or in regard to residua. "No beginning" (anáditva), that which has no commencement. The meaning is, these have no beginning. How? "Because of the eternity of desire." This "desire" (ásisha) or longing of an intensely delusive character-(manifesting itself in such wishes as) 'may the means of effecting my pleasure be always mine; may there never be a separation between me and them'-is the cause of residua, and that being eternal there is no beginning. This is the meaning. What is meant is this: From the proximity of the cause the tendency of the functions of impressions and residua cannot be checked, and the thinking principle. from its expansible and contractile character, pierced by the impressions, residua and the like, modifies itself when it attains each appropriate existence.

[The theory of Instincts being the result of action in former lives is open to the grave objection that it does not account for Instinct in the first instance. A being born for the first time should have, according to the theory, no Instinct. The initial impression must therefore be causeless, and so there is no reason to admit that residua are the causes of effect, *i. e.*, of birth, age and experience. This objection is met in this aphorism by saying that Desire is eternal, and therefore there is no necessity for a beginning. Desire is essential to existence; there would be no existence if there was no Desire; and that Desire produces residua, and so there is no break in the course of eternity. The

opponent wished to expose the fallacy of the argument regarding residua being the cause of Intuition by showing that there could be no residua at the first start, and the author accepts a regressus in infinitum to surmount the difficulty. According to him the universe had no beginning and will never end, and therefore there is no occasion to seek a beginning.]

From their infinity it being doubtful that the residua can ever be destroyed, he points out the means of destroying them.

#### XI.

Since they are agglomerated by cause, effect, substratum and support, their absence would produce the absence of the others.

Conception (anubhava) is the cause of residua; desire, &c., are the causes of conceptions; and of them the cause is ignorance. Thus is (ignorance) both the immediate and the mediate "cause" (hetu). "Effect" (phala) is body, memory, &c. "Substratum" (ásraya) is the intellectual principle. "Support" (álambana orobject of desire) is the same for both conceptions and residua. Now, since these infinite residua are collected by these cause, effect, substratum and support, when they are absent, *i. e.*, when they may be likened to roasted seeds, on their being burnt by knowledge and Yoga, there being no root left, the residua cannot sprout, nor lead to action, and thus they are destroyed.

[Now the question is raised, how can one undo that which is eternal? and the answer given is—since desires proceed from, or are the sum total of, cause, effect, substratum and support, one has to remove those conditions which produce desires, and that removal *ipso facto* removes desires. The removal is effected by the aid of Yoga. Yoga knowledge parches cause, effect, substratum, and support by exposing their real nature, and when so parched, they become, like roasted seeds, unfit for germination, and their destruction follows as a matter of course. Of course this is limited to the individual who effects the parching, and does not extend to the world at large.] It may be questioned, that since the thinking principle is being constantly destroyed, and there is a difference in their relation as cause and effect from their want of simultaneity between residua and their effects, how can there be a unity? To prove the unity, he says:

## XII.

(The thinking principle) exists in its proper nature; the past and the future (result) from differences in the condition of qualities.

The (possibility of) production of things which are absolutely non-existent is unreasonable, from their want of relation to existence. Nowhere has there been any relation to existence in the horns of a hare.

In the case of a nonentity as an effect, with what design can causes proceed to act? None enters into action for a false object, and it being opposed to entity there is no relation of nonentity to it. When truth attains its own identity, how can it become baseless and untrue? The meaning is, it cannot accept an antagonistic form. Hence from there being no possibility of the destruction of existence, and from the impossibility of the origin of non-existence, the qualified, convertible by qualities, always remains in one form. The qualities, alone, change into their threefold conditions. Attaining each condition, the qualified forsakes its original form, and, remaining in the present condition, attains the state of objects of enjoyment. Hence in this science are established the distinctions of the past and future conditions of qualities, and of their relation to each other as cause and effect. Hence, too, the same thinking principle is made to exist as the qualified until isolation, and none can prevent it.

[The removal suggested in the preceding aphorism suggests the idea of destruction; but that is not possible. Nothing can proceed from non-existence, and no existence can be absolute non-existence, and the difficulty is solved by referring to the doctrine explained in A. 14 C. III which recognizes a threefold condition of existence, the antecedent, the postcedent, and the present. Matter is eternal, and remains always an existence; but its conditions vary; accordingly when the present condition of a thing is destroyed, the thing reverts to one or other of its two other conditions, and the parching of the seeds implies their resolution into the antecedent condition. This is the theory of Moderate Nominalism or Conceptualism with its threefold condition of Universalia ante rem, as thoughts in the mind of God; Universalia in re, as the essence (quiddity) of things; and Universalia post rem, as concepts. The text looks to thoughts or ideas or plastic types without reference to God.]

He now describes of what forms these qualified and the qualities are.

### XIII.

They are individualised or subtile, and consist of qualities.

The qualities and the qualified described above are divided into the individualised and the subtile. The "qualities" (gundh) are of the forms of goodness, foulness, and darkness. "To consist of" (taddimdnah) is to be of that nature, or to be modified to that form: this is the meaning. Since there is seen a concomitance in all persons, both externally and internally, through goodness, foulness, and darkness in the forms of pleasure, pain and delusion, of individuals and conceptions, and since it is found that which is concomitant is also its modified form, as in the case of jars which are concomitants of earth are also modified forms of earth, therefore the modification of qualities is evident.

[The simple proposition in this aphorism is that all attributes are mere modifications of the three primary qualities. Circumstances may make them subtile or gross, but, whether one or the other, they consist of nothing but the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness modified in some one form or another. They are mere modes of being, but not radically different beings.] Apprehending the doubt that if all these three qualities be the chief causes everywhere, how can we talk of one qualified (or one substratum of quality) ? he says :

### XIV.

From unity of modification (results) unity of a thing.

Although there are three qualities, yet their modification into the member and the membered, (in some cases goodness becoming the membered, in some cases foulness, and in others darkness,) being one, "unity" (*tattva*) or oneness is admitted. Thus, in the examples this is the earth, this is the air, &c., (in which unity is observed, for earth is a modification of darkness, and air of foulness.)

[The purport is that as only one modification can take place of the thinking principle at a time, the unity of a thing is never disturbed. The thinking principle under similar circumstances changes exactly in the same way, and no difference can possibly result. In other words, as the three qualities can be only separately ascendant, one at a time, the simultaneous perception of the effects of all the three cannot be effected; and this meets the objection raised in the preamble.]

Had objects existed distinct from cognition it would be proper to talk of the unity or multiplicity of objects, but when cognition itself from the influence of residua existing in the relation of cause and effect, appears in different shapes, how can you say so? In reply to this question, he says:

# XV.

Even in the sameness of object, the course of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking principle.

"Of the two," of the cognition and the cognizable, the course is distinct, follow different or separate roads. How so? From diversity of thinking principles even in the sameness of object. Even in similar things, as the attainment of women and the like, differences of thinking are noticeable in different observers from the resulting sensations of pleasure, pain and delusion. Thus, on beholding a beautiful and attractive woman, pleasure is felt by an amorous person, enmity by her rival, and disgust by an ascetic. And since these different kinds of feeling arise from one object there can be no agency in the thing itself. If it be said that object is the effect of our thinking principle only, the object would appear in one form only. Also, if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle then there would be no other thing extant when that thinking principle would be occupied with one thing. (If it be said) be it so, we deny it. For how could that thing then be beheld by many others? And since it is so beheld, it cannot be an effect of the thinking principle. If it be said that it is created by many at the same time, the reply would be that there would be a difference between a work produced by many, and a work produced by one. And if the difference be not admitted, then there being difference of cause without a difference of effect, the universe would be either causeless, or uniform. What is said is this : should there be no difference of effect when the causes are different, then the whole universe resulting from many causes would either be of one form, or not following the different causes, be causeless from its independence (of the causes). And if it is so (it may be asked) why does it not, being made of the three qualities, produce in the same percipient the sensations (simultaneously) of pleasure, pain and delusion? The case is not so. Even as the object consists of three qualities, so is the thinking principle made up of three qualities, and in its perception of objects, merits and demerits are accessory causes, and from their prevalence or depression results the manifestation of the thinking principle in such and such (varying) forms. Thus in the presence of a woman near an amorous person, his thinking principle, disposed towards merit through the influence of the quality of goodness, becomes full of pleasure. From the co-operation of the quality of foulness, which is auxiliary to vice, for all rival wives, it becomes painful. Similarly from the co-operation of the quality of darkness, which is attended by ardent vice, it becomes to angry rival wives the cause of delusion. Hence the cognizable object is independent of cognition, and consequently cognizable and cognition, being contradictory in their natures, cannot bear the relation of cause and effect. Thus it being possible without any difference in the cause for the existence of a difference in effect from their relation, the independence of cognition from the object is established.

[The question discussed in the preceding aphorism raises a doubt as to whether perception is due to objects or to the cognitive power. It cannot be said that objects produce perception, for in that case a given object would always and everywhere produce the same sensation, as a given cause cannot produce dissimilar effects. A handsome woman should be a handsome woman to all beholders, without a distinction. In the world this is, however, not the case. A woman produces very dissimilar feelings in different beholders, and she, as the object, cannot therefore be said to be the cause of perception. On the other hand, the thinking principle cannot be the cause, for if you accept it to be one in all persons, it, as a cause, cannot produce different effects; and if you accept it to be different in different individuals, dissimilar causes would lead to one uniform result, which is impossible. The solution offered is that thinking principle and object are different, but inasmuch as both are governed by the three qualities, the prevalence of a particular quality at a particular time in the thinking principle produces a difference in the perception of an object. The "diversity of the thinking principle" in the text implies a diversity in its condition as regards the state of the qualities working within it. The argument here is the same which European philosophers discuss with reference to sensations and sensibles; and the optional use of *inána* and *vijnána* by our author shows that he means cognition or sensation and perception, and not the higher knowledge elsewhere indicated by the

word jnána. I have used for it cognition after Mr. Jardine, who defines it as "a general name which we may apply to all those mental states in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object." ('The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition,' p. 1). The object to which this jnana or cognition is applied is jneya or cognizable, which is just the same with idea as used by Locke, who says, "it is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phenomena, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Idea, however, has been used in so many varying senses by European metaphysicians that I have thought it safe to confine myself to cognizable or object, as least likely to cause misconceptions. The theory of eternity of matter is here made the basis of the argument.]

Since a cognition, being an illuminator, is by nature perceptive, and the object, being susceptible of illumination, is by nature perceivable, why should cognition not perceive and recollect all things simultaneously? With a view to remove such doubt, he says:

### XVI.

A thing is known or unknown from its dependence on its change of form in the thinking principle.

"Its" of the object. "From its change of form" (uparágát). From its producing forms in the thinking principle, an external object becomes known or unknown. The meaning is this: in the attainment of their production all things depend on the conjunction of their causes. The production of the cognition of a blue or other colour depends on the accessory cause of the form being brought forward as an object through the passage of the organs of sensation; perception being impossible without the object, since there is no correlation. Hence, by whatever object is the form of cognition modified, that object is brought

into cognition, *i. e.*, that object becomes known. That which does not give its shape (to the thinking principle) is held to be unknown. Similarly, recollection is produced of that object which, having been known before, has left residua in the mind, and which residua, excited by a similar object, acting as the accessory cause, brings it to our knowledge. Hence, neither cognition, nor memory is constant everywhere, nor is there any inconsistency.

[The argument mooted in the last aphorism is further developed by saying that the effect of the qualities is transmitted to the thinking principle through the object seen, and the thinking principle is thereby modified differently under different circumstances. The qualities act from two different directions, first in the thinking principle apart from the object, and next in the object, and through it in the thinking principle. A man in a passion has the quality of foulness prevalent in him, and then that foulness affects everything he sees, though it is not foul; and when all the qualities are calm in him, he sees a foul action, and the foulness of that action enters within him and tinges his thinking principle from without.]

To remove the doubt that since the perceiving soul does not perceive a yellow colour when it perceives a blue, there is liability of its assuming, like the thinking principle, different shapes, or being modified from its being at times the perceiver, he says:

### XVII.

The functions of the thinking principle are always known, for its presiding soul is unmodifiable.

All the functions of the thinking principle—characterised as they are by proofs, misconceptions, &c.,—are "always," *i. e.*, at all times, known to its percipient soul, since it is unmodifiable, or wanting in liability to change from its being of the form of the intellect (*chidrúpa*). Were it mutable, the constant perceptibility of those functions would not follow, the mutability

being (necessarily) occasional. The meaning is this. The soul of the form of intellect always remaining as the presiding principle, and its intimate associate, the pure element, the thinking principle, being also always present, by whatever object it (the latter) is modified in shape there is the probability of that object being always brought into contact with the shadow of the former (soul, ckit); and such being the case it is established that there is constant perceptibility, and never can there be any apprehension of change.

[Having explained the relation of cognition to cognizables, and the rationale of the process by which things become known or unknown, the author proceeds to explain how it is that the thinking principle, which, under the circumstances alleged, is always changing and assuming new forms, should still be able to know different objects, or have the power of understanding. The thinking principle is admitted to be in se unconscious, and is itself undergoing constant modifications, and cannot therefore exercise intelligence, and be itself the cause of knowledge. But, says the author, its presiding soul is constant and immutable, and associated with that soul it derives reflected intelligence, and by its aid it is always able to know whatever external object casts its shadow on it. In other words, though the thinking principle is itself unconscious, it derives intelligence from the soul which is pure intelligence and absolutely immutable. The P. Bháshya explains the aphorism by saying, "had the presiding soul been liable, like the thinking principle, to constant mutation, then objects or the functions of the thinking principle would have become, like sounds and other objects, sometimes known and sometimes unknown to it; but constant consciousness (lit. perceptibility) of the mind is indicated by the immutability of its presiding soul." (Yadi chittavat prabhurapi purushah parinameta tatastadvishayá chittavrittayah sabdádivishayavat jnátájnáláh syuh, sadájnátatvantu manasastatprabhoh purushasyáparinámitvamanumápayati.) This idea is further developed in other commentaries.]

Now it may be said that since the thinking principle itself,

from excess of the quality of goodness, is the illuminant, it can from its self-illumination, illuminate both itself and the object, and the act of perception can thereby be completed, what is the use of the assumption of a separate percipient? To allay this doubt, he says:

# XVIII.

# It is not self-illuminative, since it is perceptible.

"It," the thinking principle, is not "self-illuminative" (svábhása), expositor of itself, but it is perceptible by the soul. How so? Because it is "perceptible." A perceptible is known by a percepient, as in the case of a water-jar or the like. The thinking principle is an object of perception, and therefore it is not self-illuminative.

[The argument in the next preceding aphorism would suggest the idea that the thinking principle, whether directly or indirectly, was itself the perceiver, and that being the case there is no necessity for assuming a separate perceiver. Where one assumption is sufficient, two are not needed. This objection of the opponent is refuted in the aphorism under notice, by saying that the thinking principle cannot be the percipient, or selfilluminative, because it is itself an object of perception. That which is an object of perception cannot itself be percipient; and the commentator illustrates this by citing the example of a waterjar, which, as an object of perception, cannot know itself. The P. Bháshya elaborates the argument by saying, "Even as the other organs and their objects, such as audition, &c., cannot be self-illuminative from the circumstance of their being perceivables, the mind should be so known. Nor can fire be an example in this instance; for even fire cannot make its own hidden identity visible. Manifestation is seen to result from the conjunction of a manifestator with a manifestable, and such conjunction cannot take place with one's own identity. Besides if the theory of self-illuminativeness of the thinking principle be admitted, it would not be perceptible to any body else." (Yathetaránindriyáni śabdádayaścha drišyatvánna svábhásáni tathá manopi pratyetavyam. Na chágniratra drishtántam. Nahyagnirátmasvarúpamaprakášam prakášayati. Prakášašcháyam prakášya-prakášaka sañyoge drishtah, na cha svarúpamátresti sañyoyah kincha svábhásam chittamityagráhyameva kasyachiditi.) The illustration of fire becomes appropriate on the assumption that it owes its luminosity to itself. But the luminosity contemplated by the term svábhása is knowledge, and not light. In fact, the *light* of the text can be understood ouly by substituting for it the word knowledge, throughout the discussion.]

It may be said that the argument here has accepted the proposition, (*i. e.*, it involves a *petitio principii*), for the perceptibility of the thinking principle has not yet been established. Besides, in men the functions of accepting that which is good and rejecting that which is injurious are made manifest through the consciousness of one's own intellect; and such feelings as "I am angry," "I am afraid," "I have no desire," cannot be produced without the consciousness of the intellect (and since they are, the agency of the soul is not needed.) To meet this argument, he says:

#### XIX.

Attention cannot be directed to both at the same time.

The understanding of an object is the establishment of its usefulness by (knowing it to be) this—this is the object which is the cause of pleasure or pain. The understanding of the intellect is the establishment of the use of that object through pleasure or pain in the form of I (or the ego). In the perception of an object two such kinds of understanding cannot be effected at the same time, for there is a contradiction. There is no possibility of effecting two contradictory actions simultaneously, and therefore it is not possible to perceive "both," *i. e.*, cognition and cognizable at the same time. Hence, it is laid down that the thinking principle is not self-illuminative. Further, even if two such actions could be accomplished, their fruits could not result, for there cannot be an apprehension of the two fruits, because the thinking principle being directed outwards to grasp an object cannot know itself. The result is confined only to the object, and not to itself. This is the meaning.

[The opponent again comes to the charge, and says that the intellect or understanding may supply the place of the soul, for the thinking principle may see, and the intellect may decide about the nature of the sight. The author demurs to this by saying two such functions cannot take place simultaneously, or the thinking principle cannot see and argue at the same time. The sensation of hunger is first felt, and then its nature discussed. The thinking principle must undergo two modifications, once to feel, and then to consider, and these it cannot undergo at once; so these two acts can never take place simultaneously, and consequently it cannot be said that the thinking principle is alone sufficient to account for consciousness and knowledge : a separate cause must be assigned for these two feelings, and that cause is the soul. The P. Bháshya pithily disposes of the question by saying, "It is not possible to behold one's own self and another at the same time, for it leads to the theory of the momentarists who hold action, effect and cause to be the same." (Na chaikasmin kshane svapararúpávadháranam yuktam, kshanikavádino yad bhavanam saiva kriyá tadeva cha kárakamityabhyupagamah.) The meaning of the aphorism is simply that the thinking principle cannot perform the two acts of perception and self-knowing at the same time, and therefore it is obvious that it cannot by itself be the cause of intelligence.]

Let it be admitted that a cognition cannot be self-perceptive, still may it not be perceived by another cognition? Assuming such a question, he says:

# XX.

If one cognition be the perceptible of another, there would be an excessiveness of cognitions to cognitions, and also a confusion of memory.

If one cognition could cognize another, then that cognition being itself unintelligent and unable to illuminate another, we must assume a third cognition and for it another, and so on and a thing could not be perceived in the whole lifetime of a man. Nor can an object be known when the cognition remains unknown.

It leads also to "confusion of memory." On a particular colour or a taste being produced in a cognition there would arise an endless series of cognitions to perceive it, and when the residua left by a former cognition would attempt to recall it to memory there would arise, from there being no break in the ideas of cognitions and objects, cognitions and memories simultaneously, and hence, it being impossible to make out with reference to what object the recollection has arisen, there would be a confusion of memory, i. e., it would not be known that this is the memory of colour and this is the memory of taste.

[The explanation above given leaves the door open to the assumption that one cognition may perceive another, and thus obviate the necessity of assuming the agency of the soul, *i. e.*, each individual may have many cognitions which co-operate with each other in producing knowledge of a particular object. To preclude this theory, the author brings forward the argument of *regressus in infinitum*. If one cognition could perceive another, we would require a third to perceive the second, and so on, and there would be no end to the chain. It would, he urges, also lead to a confusion of memory, for on one idea being called to memory all its attendant ideas would arise to infinity, and it would be impossible to determine which is the particular idea that has been revived.]

The question may then be asked, if, in the absence of selfperceptive power in cognitions (buddhi), one cognition cannot be known by another, how do we use the idea this is the perception of an object? To remove this doubt, he expounds his conclusion.

XXI.

The intellection of its own cognition takes place when it takes its form through the non-transitional soul.

"Soul" (purusha), being of the form of intelligence, is called chiti (intellect). It is "non-transitional" (apratisafikramá), that which has no transition or passing into another place is so called : by this is meant that it does not mix with anything. In the modification of the member and the membered, the (three) qualities, (as members) in passing into the qualified or membered, assume their forms, and in the world atoms, moving on, produce the forms of objects; but the power of intellection (*i. e.*, soul) does not do so, because it always retains its own form, inasmuch as it exists in itself. Hence when the thinking principle, being near it, assumes its shape, intellection takes place; and when the soul, by its contact with the function of the thinking principle being endowed with understanding, cognizes, then the knowing of the thinking principle of its own self takes place.

[The soul never undergoes any modification, but by its reflection on the thinking principle that principle derives its intelligence, and that intelligent state is therefore said to be attained through the non-transitional soul. It is then chiti or intelligence, because for the time being it has intelligence in it. and this is explained by the commentator. When the thinking principle in its intelligent state assumes the form of an object, it is able to know its own notions. The P. Bháshya explains the text by saying, "unmodifiable is the power of experiencing; it is also non-transitional. On its reflection falling on the excessibly modifiable (the thinking principle) the functions of the latter reflect on it. Thereupon people call it the function of understanding from its imitating the function of the thinking principle enlivened by intelligence, though it is devoid of the function of understanding." (The force of the argument here depends upon the distinction made between intelligence and the function of understanding, for the soul, though intelligence itself, does not exercise any

function.) (Apariņáminí hi bhoktrišaktirapratisafikramá cha pariņáminyatyarthe pratisafikránteva tadvrittimanupatati, tasyáścha práptachaitanyopagraharupáyá buddhivritteranukárimátratayá buddhivrityavišishtá hi jnánavrittirákhyáyate).

Pandit Govindadeva Sástrí, following some later commentators, explains the text so as to mean that the soul itself undergoes the modification. The earlier and more reliable commentators, however, do not accept that meaning, and as the sequel shows them to be right I have accepted their interpretation.]

To show that thus the self-perceptive thinking principle, being able to perceive all objects, becomes fit for all purposes, he says:

#### XXII.

The thinking principle, modified by the knower and the knowable, is (able to perceive) all objects.

"The knower" (drashta) is soul. To be modified by it is to seem to be of its form from its propinquity. To be modified by the knowable, is to undergo the modification of assuming the form of the (object) perceived. When this (double modification) takes place, then it becomes able to perceive all objects. Even as a transparent crystal, or a mirror, or the like is fit to receive the reflection of all images, so the quality of goodness, unstained by foulness and darkness, is able, from its purity, to receive the reflection of the soul (chit). Not so foulness and darkness, owing to their want of purity. The quality of goodness, divested of all association with foulness and darkness, from its being liable to only one modification, and being able to receive the reflection of the intelligent soul, remains like a steady lamp-flame till the attainment of emancipation (mokska). Even as in the vicinity of a loadstone motion is produced in iron, so in the vicinity of the intelligent soul manifestible intelligence is reflected on the quality of goodness. Accordingly, in this system of philosophy two powers of intelligence are recognized, the eternally present (nityoditá) and the manifestible (abhivyafigá). The eternally

Digitized by Google

present power of intelligence is soul. The manifestible power of intelligence is the quality of goodness, which derives its power by its contiguity to the former. From extreme propinquity, it, as an intimate friend, effectuates the experiencership of the soul. And as that quality is the resting place of *Purusha*, the supreme soul, the Sáfikhyas, who recognise an actionless Brahma, attributo to it the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion. (The epithets "supreme" and "Brahma" are meaningless here, for the human soul is all that is meant: God as Brahma is not indicated).

Now, though from the extreme abeyance of some one quality and of its prevalence at certain times and in some cases, all the three qualities are constantly modifying in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and the thinking principle is not pure, yet when that principle modifies its form into that pure quality of goodness, which is the essence of work, it attains its perceptibility. The pure primary quality of goodness of the thinking principle, on the one side reflected upon by intelligence or the soul, and on the other covered by the thinking principle modified into the forms of external objects, and becoming conscious from the effect of the reflection of the soul, becomes able to feel pleasure, pain and delusion, though it is devoid of intelligence. Thus the experience, from its extreme propinguity to soul and from want of due discrimination, is said to be of soul, though it is unexperiencing. To this effect has Vindhyavásí said : "the sufferingness of the quality of goodness is the sufferingness of soul." Elsewhere it is said. "Even as an image produced by the reflection of a reflected image on a mirror is called a reflection, so the manifestation of the shadow of intelligence, like the intelligence of soul, is implied by the word pratisankránti or contact."

It might be argued that, though the reflection of the evermodifying may be seen in a transparent body, as a human face in a looking-glass, how can there arise the reflection of the absolutely transparent, all-pervading, unmodifying soul in the comparatively untransparent quality of goodness? To this the reply is—Not knowing the true nature of reflection you

Digitized by Google

have said this. The display of the manifestible power of intelligence in the quality of goodness, by the propinquity of the soul, is called reflection. Even as is that sentient power, abiding in the soul, so does its reflection appear in the quality of goodness.

Again, since it has been said that soul is absolutely pure, how can it be in contact with the (comparatively) untransparent quality of goodness? This argument is not correct, for the contact of the sun and the like (which are highly transparent) is seen in water and the like which are less transparent. If it be said that there can be no contact of that which is undefined, that too would be inconsistent, because we see the all-pervading sky (dkdsa) reflected in a looking-glass, or the like. And such being the case, there can be no objection to the effectuation of the reflection (under notice).

It may be argued that what has been said about there being an apparent or external contact by propinquity of the sentient power with the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, there should be the experience of pain and pleasure on the part of soul, is inconsistent, for how can the quality of goodness of the thinking principle be produced without a modification of Prakriti? and for what object should there be a modification of Prakriti? To this it is replied, that Prakriti has to effectuate soul's experience of the objects of mundane existence, and, its duty being to effectuate the object of soul, the modification is proper.

It may be urged that this is not proved, for the effectuation of the soul's object is impossible. The duty of effectuating soul's object implies the consciousness on the part of Prakriti that "it is my duty to effectuate soul's object;" but how can there be such a consciousness on the part of the unsentient Prakriti? If you admit the consciousness, how will you maintain its unsentience or inertness? The reply to this is that in the two forms of progressive and regressive modification there are the two natural powers (of progression and regression), and they are called the duty of effectuating soul's purpose. Those powers are natural to the unsentient Prakriti. Its progressive modification (anu - *loma-parináma*) is the outward one, extending from the intellect to gross matter; while entering through its cause and ending with the annihilation of egoism is its regressive modification, (*pratiloma parináma*). Hence on the completion of soul's experience, the two natural powers being destroyed, Prakiti, having achieved its object, ceases to modify. In performing such duty for soul on the part of the unsentient Prakiti, there is no inconsistency.

Again, it may be argued, if there be two such powers naturally possessed by Prakriti, then why is exertion made for salvation (moksha) by those who long for it? and if salvation be no object the science of those who advise it is worthless. The answer is, the relation of soul and Prakriti as experiencer and experience is from time without a beginning, and that being the case, when pain is felt on the part of Prakriti in action, from the assumption of its being the agent or actor, there arises the desire-" how can there be absolute stoppage of my suffering ?" and hence there is a necessity on the part of Prakriti for the advice of the science which points out the means of stopping the pain. The substance of the advice of the science is the quality of goodness of the thinking principle as governed by work. In other works on philosophy this has been accepted to be the nature of ignorance (aviduá.) That nature, exerting for salvation, relying on the help of the advice of such sciences, obtain the reward called salvation. All works influenced by the (necessary) conjunction of causes attain their own selves, and it is established by proof that of the work called moksha, which is acquired by regressive modification, this is the conjunction of causes, because it cannot be attained by any other method. Hence without that cause how can it be effected? It follows, therefore, that the quality of goodness of the thinking principle modified by worldly objects in contact and enlightened by the shadow of soul, conducts, through the conviction of (the reality of) those objects, all worldly affairs. Deluded people, looking at such thinking principle, imagine it and all such thinking principles to be the world. They should be enlightened.

Having met all the principal objections to the theory of the thinking principle being sensitized into intelligence by a reflection of soul which is intelligence, the author enunciates that the thinking principle, modified on the one hand by the soul and on the other by external objects, is brought into play in every case of sensation. The word used in the text for the double transformation is uparakta, which is a compound of upa 'excess' and ranja 'to colour' or 'tinge,' meaning that the thinking principle is doubly tinged or influenced; and this conveys the true meaning of the text. The P. Bháshya accordingly cites the example of the crystal vase tinged by the coloured object put in it. Inasmuch as the theory, however, is that the thinking principle assumes the shape of the object in every instance of cognition, and the same epithet is used for the double tinging, it is necessary, for the sake of consistency, to adopt the same phraseology everywhere: I have accordingly used the word modified.

Bhoja, after explaining the text, enters into a long dissertation on the various objections that may be started to the doctrine, and refutes them *seriatim*. The first and most obvious objection is—how can a shadow of soul produce in an object on which it falls the quality of the original? Soul may be intelligence, but its shadow cannot reasonably be said to convey that intelligence on the object on which it falls. The commentator sees no harm in this, for, says he, such action is manifest in the motion produced in iron by the propinquity of a loadstone. He describes soul's intelligence to be two-fold; one is *Nityoditá* or always and eternally present, and the other *Abhivyaílgá* or manifestible, and it is the latter that sensitizes the thinking principle.

The next argument is, if it be the thinking principle that is sensitized, how can soul be said to be the experiencer? The reply is—that soul is really not the experiencer, but since experience is felt by the agency of its shadow it is in an indiscriminate way called experiencer.

Then the question arises how can reflection take place of

Digitized by Google

a perfectly transparent object like soul, on a comparatively untransparent object like the thinking principle with the quality of goodness prevalent in it? This is met by saying that the word reflection here simply is the technical name of the influence of soul on the thinking principle.

An argument like the last is raised with reference to the contact of the absolutely pure soul with a comparatively impure thinking principle. This, however, is held possible, as we see the sun reflected in foul water. The contact of that which is illimitable with a finite object is also possible, as in the case of the sky reflected in a mirror.

The objection next urged is that why should Prakriti or nature change to produce effects? The answer is, it subserves the purposes of soul. This answer is, however, not enough, for Prakriti or nature being unintelligent, cannot have such a consciousness of duty, and act up to it. The reply is that Prakriti has two inherent powers in it, that of progression and of regression, and acting under their impulses it subserves the purposes of soul, and therefore there is no inconsistency.

The admission of the two powers aforesaid suggests the objection that, if they be natural they will run their course of their own accord, and there is no use in controlling them. The effect of the regressive action is salvation, and that must come of itself; none needs try for it, and, if so, what is the use of Yoga as a means of salvation? This is met by saying that it is Prakriti when in action that feels pain and, wishing to put a stop to that pain, wants to know how to do so, and hence arises the desire for salvation, and the Yoga points out the means of doing so. Without such advice Prakriti would go on working for ever.

The P. Bháshya has not mooted these discussions.]

Suspecting that it may be argued that if all purposes are accomplished by a thinking principle of this kind, why should we acknowledge an experiencer of which there is no proof, he gives the proofs (in support of the existence) of the spectator.

# XXIII.

It exists for another's purpose, though coloured by uncountable residua, because it operates by association.

"It," the thinking principle, "coloured," *i. e.*, assuming many forms, through the influence of an uncountable number of "residua" (vásaná) (existing in it), effectuates for "another's," *i. e.*, a master's, "purpose" (artha) the work of experience and final reward. How so? "Because it operates by association." "Association" (sañhatya), *i. e.*, by fully joining together, operates to accomplish a purpose. We see that works performed jointly are for another, as in the case of a bed or a chair. The cooperators (in this case) are the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which, modifying in the form of the thinking principle, jointly work for another, and that "another" is soul.

It may be urged that through the force of the example by which the subservience of another's purpose by an embodied stranger, as a bed or a chair or the like, is established, a similar (embodied) stranger may be proved, but you contemplate an unembodied "another," and, the opposite being proved, your argument becomes destructive of the object. The reply is thus given : Although in the example pervasion of the premiss has been accepted as general in regard to effectuating another's purpose, yet on consideration of the specific distinctions of goodness in the qualified, the distinction will be evident, and the position that the experiencer is another is established. Thus, as in inferring the existence of fire in a mountain covered with fuel of a particular kind from the smoke seen there, the inference that fire is produced by fuel and is distinct from other fires is taken for granted, so here in inferring that the specific experience called goodness is for another's purpose. In the same way the experiencing superior is proved to be another of the form of intelligence and isolated. Although he appears as the other and the noblest of all, yet the body is superior to objects resulting from the quality of darkness. because it is manifest, and the asylum of the organs. The organs are superior to the body; to them the illuminating quality of goodness is superior; and he who is the illuminator is distinct from illumination and of the form of intelligence. How can then there arise this conjunction? (*i.e.*, there is no actual conjunction but a mere shadow).

[The explanations given in previous aphorisms still leave the door-open to the argument that the agency of the soul is redundant and not wanted. If the thinking principle doubly modified as above stated is sufficient for conception, why make the soul the experiencer of worldly joys and sorrows? To this question the reply given is that, though the thinking principle is actuated by innumerable desires resulting from the residua of former works, it nevertheless acts for another's purpose, and not for itself, since it acts by the co-operation of many causes, and not of its own motion. Though there are innumerable residua in it, they cannot work until external agencies are brought to bear upon them, and that shows that the thinking principle has no power of action suo motu. It is unconscious too, so that it can have no will of its own. It acts only when it is worked upon, and this is indicated by the phrase "operates by association." Inasmuch, however, as its action may tend to bring on liberation which is for the good of the soul, it is to be inferred that in its other actions it subserves the gratification of that soul. No line can be drawn between what actions are for the soul and what are not, and logically what is true for a part, i. e., for liberation, must be true for the whole. This idea is expressed in the Sáfkhya-káriká by the verse "generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities," (LX). It should be noticed, however, that the functions which are usually attributed to nature or Prakriti in the Sánkhya are invariably assigned to the thinking principle (chitta) in the Yoga of Patanjali. In fact, in the Yoga system, chitta plays a more important part than the Buddhi of Kapila, and appertains to itself the character both of Buddhi and Prakriti, but the commentator does not mark this distinction. In

200

Digitized by Google

his works Kapila frequently refers to Prakriti where Patanjali confines himself to Chitta. The action of the unconscious thinking principle for another's purpose is usually explained by the illustration of the saffron cart, which, unconscious as it is, subserves the purpose of man by bringing him a desirable condiment.]

He now proceeds to show by ten aphorisms that the fruit of this philosophy is isolation.

# XXIV.

For the knower of the difference there is a cessation of the idea of self in the thinking principle.

Thus the quality of goodness and soul being proved to be distinct, whatever idea exists of his self being the thinking principle, in him who knows them to be distinct, that is the one is different from the other, the same surceases, i. e., the idea ceases of the thinking principle being the actor, knower, and experiencer.

[Having disposed of all metaphysical questions bearing on the subject-matter of his work, the author now reverts to the thesis, how isolation is effected. The metaphysical questions above set forth, when thoroughly understood, enable a person to divest himself of the idea that his self or ego is his thinking principle, and to believe that his soul is the real self. He knows that the thinking principle is unconscious and not his self. The idea, in fact, is altogether set at rest, and his soul is so far freed from the natural wrong belief that the thinking principle is the ego.]

(To the question) what happens when this takes place, he says:

#### XXV.

Then the thinking principle is turned towards discriminative knowledge, and bowed down by the weight of commencing isolation.

The thinking principle, which was turned outwards by igno-26 rance, to derive the fruit of experiencing worldly objects, deflects now towards "discriminative knowledge," (viveka) i. e., turns inward towards the path of discriminative knowledge, and is "bowed down by the weight of coming isolation," (kaivalyaprágbhára) i. e., the fruit of isolation, or the commencement of isolation.

[When the belief aforesaid is effected, the thinking principle drops the cosmos, and turns inward to the cultivation of discriminative knowledge, and is overpowered by the sense of isolation which begins to sprout in him.]

Now, by describing the causes of the impediments which occur in the thinking principle flowing towards discrimination, he points out the means of overcoming them.

#### XXVI.

In the intervals thereof other impressions arise from residua.

"Thereof," *i. e.*, of the thinking principle engaged in meditation. In the "intervals" (*chhidreshu*), in the void spaces of the thinking principle, whatever "impressions" (*jnánáni*) or ideas of the waking (or worldly) state arise, the same proceed from the now-fading residua of the former waking state, in the forms of "I," "mine," and the like. What is said is that by means of extirpating the internal organ their avoidance should be effected.

[While isolation is progressing there are opportunities when a person is not actually engaged in meditation, *i. e.*, during the breaks in his meditation, for worldly ideas to sprout from the residua of former existences still clinging to the mind. These are calculated to disturb the process of isolation, and are so far impediments, which should be destroyed.]

He now says that the means of avoidance has already been explained.

# XXVII.

The avoidance of these should be (the same) as already described in the case of afflictions.

202

The avoidance of these should be effected in the same way in which the avoidance of afflictions, ignorance, &c., has been already pointed out (C. II. x— $x_I$ ). Even as they, scorched by the fire of knowledge, do not, like roasted seeds, sprout in the field of the thinking principle, so are the residua, (rendered infructuose).

[The ideas should be destroyed in the same way as afflictions, for which provision has been made in a previous part of the work, (C. II.  $x-x_1$ ).]

He now describes the means by which a Yogí, on his meditation becoming steady by the non-production of other thoughts in the way aforesaid, may attain excellence.

### XXVIII.

On the completion of the series there is produced the meditation (called) the Cloud of Virtue, even in the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of constant discrimination.

"On the completion of the series" (prasafkhyáne), i. e., after careful contemplation of the nature and respective peculiarities of all the categories arranged in due order. On that being accomplished even in the case of the "non-aspirant" (akusída), or one who does not wish for any fruition, there is produced from the appearance of constant discrimination, on the cessation of all foreign thoughts in his thinking principle, the meditation called the Cloud of Virtue. That which showers (mehati) or irrigates profusely the virtue (dharma) which is neither black nor white, (cf. IV, VII,) and which is subservient to the attainment of the summum bonum is the "Cloud of Virtue" (Dharmamegha) By this is shown that the highest virtue is the cause of knowledge.

[When the series of works enjoined above for the perfection of Yoga meditation have been completed, then there arises in the mind of the performer a meditation called Cloud of Virtue, which means that all virtues are showered on it, even when it does not wish for them. The sense is that though the Yogi may not wish for any reward, still the reward comes. The word in the text is *akusida*, from *a* meaning negation and *kusida* interest, that is disinterestedly. The theory is that the perfection of virtue results spontaneously in a person who completes his Yoga duties as described in the text.]

He explains next what results from that Cloud of Virtue.

# XXIX.

Thence follows the cessation of afflictions and works.

The meaning is, that on the manifestation of knowledge, their antecedent causes being removed, there is a cessation of the afflictions resulting from ignorance, and of all the works which are, according as they are white, &c., of three kinds. (VII).

[The object of the cloud is now described. On its appearance there results a complete cessation of all afflictions and all works; there is no longer any sense of affliction left in the mind of the Yogí, and he has neither any desire for work, nor any residua of former works left in his mind.]

He next explains what happens on this cessation.

# XXX.

Then the knowable becomes small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from all coverings and impurities.

"Coverings" (*ávaraņáni*), are those whereby the thinking principle is covered; they are the afflictions; they are also impurities. Free from them, means devoid of them. From the knowledge (jnána) becoming free, like the sky bereft of cloud, and "from its infiniteness" (*ánantyát*), *i. e.*, from its being without a break, or all-pervading, "the knowable" (jneya) becomes "small" (alpa), or fit to be counted or grasped. The meaning is, that the Yogí can easily know everything.

[The next advantage is that the objects of sense are reduced to a minimum. Knowledge then becomes limitless and free from all impurities and coverings or interruptions; and placed against such knowledge, knowables or cognizables become insignificant, *i. e.*, that knowledge which can grasp everything, finds no difficulty in understanding small matters. Not that there is a reduction in the number or quantity of cognizables, but, placed besides limitless knowledge, they, by comparison, become insignificant.]

He then states what takes place after this :

### XXXI.

Thereupon takes place the termination of the succession of the modifications of the qualities which have accomplished their end.

Those which have "accomplished" (krita), completed, soul's purpose or object in the form of experience and emancipation are called kritártháh, or those which have accomplished their end. The "qualities" (gun dh) are goodness, foulness, and darkness. "Their modifications" (parináma) are their conditions of existence in relation to each other as members and membered, in a progressive or a regressive state to the time of the completion of the purpose of soul. Their "succession" (krama) is to be presently described. Its "termination" (parisamápti) is its finality, *i. e.*, it does not arise or happen again.

[Proceeding onwards, the next effect of the Yoga is a cessation of the tendency on the part of the qualities to undergo change. The qualities are the most active agents in worldly life, and it is their modifications that produce the various impressions of life, and when they cease to change, there is *ipso facto* a cessation of worldly impressions. It is the duty of Prakriti to minister to the purposes of soul, and as the qualities are inherent in Prakriti, the qualities may be taken as synonymous with Prakriti, and those qualities, having done their work, cease from labour. The work of the qualities is said to be two-fold; they have to minister to soul's experience of the world, and then to bring on its emancipation; and when the state above described is attained, the qualities have already accomplished both these works, and, having nothing else left to do, stop work *in re* the soul concerned.]

He now describes the succession above referred to.

### XXXII.

The succession is the counterpart of the moment perceptible at the end of the modification.

"Moment" (kshana) is a short amount of time. Its "counterpart" (pratigogi) is another distinct moment. "Perceptible at the end of the modification" means that which is accepted as the totality after perceiving a number of moments, and this is called the "succession" of moments, for no succession can be perceived in unperceived succession of moments.

[The word "succession" (*krama*) used in A. XXXI, is explained in this aphorism to mean the following of one moment after another. The object is to say that the lapse of time is reckoned by the succession of one moment after another, though there is no break between them; one totality is divided into many parts only for facility of reckoning.]

He now defines the specific nature of isolation, which is the result.

## XXXIII.

Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.

"The regression" (*pratiprasava*) or the non-production of change on the completion of the regressive (or refluent) modification of the (three) qualities, on the accomplishment of soul's (two-fold) purpose of experience and emancipation is called "isolation" (*kaivalya*); or, it is the abidance of the thinking

power (soul) solely in its own proper nature, on the cessation of its identification with intellectual functions (or objects).

[Having described the Yoga in all its details, the author concludes the work by announcing the ultimatum to which it leads. This ultimatum is *kaivalya*, and it is defined to result on the reabsorption of the triad of qualities in their original cause, on their having done their duty to soul, or on the abidance of the soul in its own nature without any association with the qualities; that is to say, when it has no longer the thinking principle near it to cause its shadow to fall thereon.

The commentator does not explain the word kaivalya. The P. Bháshya, suggests its meaning by saying "when the power of intelligence becomes alone, and remains always after in that state it is kaivalya," (chiti-saktireva kevalá tasyák sadá tathaivávasthánam kaivalamiti). It is the same goal which the Sánkhya assigns to its votaries, but it uses, instead of kaivalya, the word apavarga which, though not radically synonymous, conveys the same idea, that of liberation from the trammels of nature. The SáAkhya-káriká adopts the term kaivalya, and says, "when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final kaivalya accomplished," (v. LXVIII). Gaudapáda contents himself by saving, "kaivalya is the abstract form of kevala," (kevalabhávát kaivalyam). Váchaspati Mis'ra and Náráyana take it to mean " exemption from the three kinds of pain," (duhkhatraya-vigamam duhkhavinásam). The lexicographical meaning of kevala is 'one,' 'alone,' 'only,' and in the derivative form it means, 'oneness,' isingleness,' solitariness,' exclusiveness,' or 'individuality,' i. e., deliverance from the association of nature. Colebrooke translates it into 'deliverance,' and Wilson adds 'liberation.' Mr. Davies, in his translation, prefers 'abstraction.' All these may be resolved into isolation, the word used in my version, the idea being that the soul is freed from all association, material, phenomenal, or noumenal.

The epithets 'absolute' (aikántika) and 'final' (átyantika)used in the Sáńkhya-káríká, and the word 'always,' (sadá) in *P. Bháshya* show that this isolation is to last for ever, and no future association of any kind is possible. To quote Mr. Davies, "the soul's perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever."

This eternal quietude of the soul after isolation amounts, in the opinion of M. Cousin, to "nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme ;" but where existence forms the primary condition of the theory, nihilism cannot logically and fairly be predicated. The question is, does the soul exist or not after salvation? and since the Yoga, like many other schools of philosophy, both Indian and European, insists that it does, (cf. Sánkhya-sútra I, 45, 46, 47), there is no room left for a charge of negation against it. Professor Wilson, following the Indian exceptes, more correctly explains the case by saying, "it is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." Professor Weber, in his 'History of Indian literature,' (pp. 238-9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, "one very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine-and one which was more and more exclusively developed as time went on-is the Yoga practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained." To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious, that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how so well-read a scholar, as the learned professor, could have formed this opinion, unless we believe that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his theory from the Bhagavadgítá, and Puránic and Tántric modifications of Yoga.

Patanjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul abides after the separation. This condition of philosophic abstraction, however, not being satisfactory to worldly-minded people longing for a peaceful hereafter, a necessity arose for the elaboration of a more concretely blissful scheme, and the modifications above noticed were offerred by the Puránics to meet the requirement. They devised other forms, but those require no description here.

This completes the work; but Bhoja takes this opportunity to compare the condition of the soul as described in the Yoga with what other systems propose, and thereby to demonstrate its superiority. The first is the Buddhist doctrine of momentary existence.]

Nor is it only in our philosophy that the knower of the field [of action] in its isolated condition is recognised to exist in this form of intelligence; on reflection it will be seen that in other systems of philosophy also it remains in the same form. Now. in the worldly condition soul appears as full of agency, experiencership, and inquisitiveness; if this one soul, the knower of the field, be not admitted to be so, then in the absence of all antecedent and postcedent enquiry in momentary consciousness, (i. e., believing consciousness to be existent only for the time being, which cannot look into the past or the future,) there would be no constant relation between soul and the fruits of works, and the objection would arise of the destruction of that which has been done, and the coming into existence of that which has not been done, (i. e., no desert would follow works done, and desert would result from undone work). Acknowledge him to be the experiencer (of deserts) by whom an act enjoined by the S'ástras is performed, and there will be an inclination on the part of all to perform works for the acceptance or avoidance of good or evil. Since all actions characterised by the desire of avoidance or acceptance are subject to enquiry ; since there would be an impossibility for enquiry in the case of mutually distinct moments; (i. e., the

moment when one action is done being distinct from that in which another action is performed); and since in the absence of enquiry there would arise an impossibility for any kind of action to take place, it is established that that which is the agent, experiencer, and enquirer is the soul. In the condition of liberation, there being an absence of all actions characterised by the idea of the acceptable and the acceptor, sentience alone remains behind. That sentience is apparent only as sentience, and not by knowing itself, since the nature of sentience is to perceive objects, and not to perceive itself. Further, when an object is perceived by the thinking power, the idea is "this" (ayam), and when the identity of that power is to be implied, the idea is "I" (aham). Two such mutually discordant actions, characterised as the profluent and the refluent are, cannot be achieved simultaneously, and since the two actions cannot be performed at the same time, soul remains as sentience only. Hence it is reasonable (to believe) that in the liberated condition, when the qualities are defunct, soul remains solely as sentience. In the mundane condition agency, percipiency, inquisitiveness arise in regard to that soul. Besides, there is a relation between Prakriti and soul, which is that of experience and experiencer; it is natural, and exists from time without a beginning. It is due to the prevalence of want of right notion. And that being the case, in the presence of the two powers for the advancement of the object of soul, (cf. IV, XXII), all modifications in the form of Mahat and others take place. And since the power of the soul as the supreme agent, and of casting its quality of sentience on the thinking principle, and that of experiencing the result of the conjunction of that reflection, proceed from conjunction (with Mahat), and since the consciousness of agency and experiencership of the intellect proceeds from the influence of sentience on the intellect, and consequently of the conduct of all enquirable actions, what use is there in other unprofitable agglomeration of fallacies?

[Bhoja does not say that the theory he combats is due to the

Buddhists, but the dogma of momentary consciousness was prevalent among the Mádhyamíkas, and hence I infer that he means the Buddhists. The theory is, that all things are momentary, and their cognition is also momentary, produced by the concatenation of complements of unconscious causes, without a permanent intellectual back-ground, (cf. Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-sangraha, p. 15). It is refuted by the allegation, that such consciousness could not be made subject to moral responsibility. The consciousness that would perform an action now, would have no relation to the one that had acted before, or to that which would act in the future, and the responsibility of the one could not be transferred to another. There could be no such idea as ego, for the ego of one cognition would not be the ego of another, and yet as ego is the basis of cognition and consciousness, no theory can be valid which repudiates that. There could be under such circumstance no incentive to, nor necessity for, moral action. A permanent individual consciousness is unavoidable, and that is found in the thinking principle enlivened by a reflection of soul.]

Again, if, rejecting this course, it be accepted that agency is soul's essential attribute, then arises the admission of its being subject to modifications, and as modifications are non-eternal or temporal, its character as soul is destroyed. Nor can perception of mutually different conditions be effected in one form at the same time; and accordingly, in the condition in which soul is perceived associated with some produced pleasure, can the condition of pain be perceived. Thus the conditions being various, the conditioned must likewise be various, and from variety and modificability there can be neither spirituality nor eternity, (*i. e.*, that which is modifiable cannot also be eternal or spiritual, and eternity and spirituality are essential attributes of soul). Hence it is that those Sáńkhyas who believe in a peaceful Brahma, acknowledge soul to remain in the same form both in the mundane and the liberated conditions.

[This is apparently the theory of the Vais'es' uikas, who believe

soul to be the real actor. The objection to this theory is that action implies change, and if soul be the real actor, it would be subject to change. The idea of change, however, is, in the opinion of Patanjali, incompatible with the spirituality and eternity of soul; it would cease to be soul if it were changeable like material objects, and therefore this theory is not tenable.]

The theory of the Vedantists, who believe liberation to be that condition of soul in which it is solely sentience and joy, is not correct. Joy being the identity of pleasure, and pleasure being manifested by perceptables, and perceptibility not being produced without perception, the doctrine of unity is destroyed by the admission of the two, the perceptible and the perception. Again, their saying of cognition itself being the joyous soul would be prejudiced by the incompatibility of two antagonistic qualities abiding together. Perception and perceptable cannot fitly be called one. Again, soul is said by the non-dualists to be of two kinds, the working or conditioned and the unconditioned or supreme. But if you admit that form in which the working soul becomes the experiencer of pleasure and pain, to be also the form in which it exists as the supreme soul, then the supreme soul becomes, like the working soul, subject to modifications, and pertain, the nature of ignorance. If it be said that the experiencership is not direct, but accepted as a present (by the soul) while remaining as a neutral superior, the case would be the same as in our system of philosophy.

The assumption about the joyous form (of soul) has already been refuted. It may be added that if soul be admitted to be of the character of ignorance, there would be no seperate existence left for working souls, and which should then be the object of philosophy? Certainly not the unconditioned soul, for it is eternally free; nor the working soul, for it is (admitted to be) of the character of ignorance, and thus will result the falsification of all systems of philosophy. If the creation be admitted to consist of ignorance, the question would arise, whose ignorance is it? It cannot be that of the supreme soul, for it is eternally free, and of the form of knowledge. It cannot be of the working soul, for that being without a seperate existence, how can it be connected with ignorance? It would be like the admission of horns of a hare (a mere fiction). It might be said that the ignorance of ignorance consists in its not being the subject of demonstration by argument. It may, like the dew on the earth with the rays of the sun (playing on it), melt away under ratiocination, and yet it may be ignorance. This, however, cannot be. Whatever does something must be distinct from, or identical with, something else, and since the agency of ignorance in the development of the universe must be admitted, and admitting it, if ignorance be indeterminate, then nothing whatever will be determinate; even Brahma itself will be liable to be put down as indeterminate, (but if it be described to be determinate, it will cease to be ignorance). It follows then that the form of soul cannot be other than that of a supervisor. This supervisorship is mere sentience only, for there is no evidence of its having any other quality.

[The Vedantic doctrine is refuted on two grounds; 1st, because it involves a duality which the Vedantists themselves repudiate; 2nd, it makes soul liable to be affected by ignorance, thereby destroying its absolute purity, and if we admit that soul may be involved in ignorance then it will become indeterminate, and there would be no certainty about anything.]

It is alleged by the Naiyáyikas and others that soul is sentient, because it becomes so by contact with sentience, and that sentience is produced by the union of soul with its mind. They say that desire, knowledge, exertion and other attributes are produced by the contact of soul during its working condition with mind, and through those qualities, the soul knows itself to be the knower, the agent, and the experiencer. In the state of liberation (moksha), when false notions are suppressed on the suppression of the residua (dosha) which are produced by them, there results an absolute annihilation of the specific attributes, knowledge, &c., and soul is acknowledged to reside in its own essential form. This, however, is not a correct assumption, for what would you accept to be the peculiar soulness of the soul in that condition? (You cannot urge that pervasion, immensity, and eternity are its constituents, for) the qualities of pervasion and the rest pertain to ether and others, and to differentiate it from them, some determinate form must have to be admitted. You may say that the specific character of soul is its own speciality (or kind to which it belongs). But this cannot be urged, for such speciality exists in all things, (*i. e.*, everything has its specific distinction as a particular kind). It is necessary, therefore, to admit some other differentiation of the soul, apart from speciality, and this can be effected by admitting its supervisorship, from its being of the form of sentience, and in no other way.

As to what is believed by the Mímáñsakas about soul being both worker and work, the position is not tenable. They believe that soul is indicated by the use of the word I, and by the use of I, both the agency and the objectivity of soul are included, (i. e., soul is the ego, and nothing else can be ego. and the soul being the ego, the ego must include both soul and work, for in knowing the soul work must appear to be soul and no other). But this cannot result, because they are of contradictory natures. Agency implies him who measures, while work means that which is to be measured or proved, and the assumption of these two antagonistic qualities cannot be effected in one at the same time. When two antagonistic qualities are assumed, then there can be no unity, as positive and negative, and so are agency and objectivity antagonistic. Should it be said there is no antagonism between agency and objectivity, but there is between agency and instrumentality, we deny it, because the assumption of antagonistic qualities is the same (in either case). Rejecting then the theory of perceivable by the use of I, we hold the soul's supervisorship as proved, and thence its sentienceness.

Digitized by Google

6

The theory of those who hold soul to be finite, defined by the body, and mutable, because it is reckoned among matter, tumbles down as soon as it is started. By the admission of mutability, the sentience form of soul is destroyed, and in the absence of its sentience form, how can there be any spirituality in soul? Hence those who desire to uphold the spirituality of soul must admit its sentience form, and that is its supervisorship.

[This is the theory of the Arhatas or Jains. (G. Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-safigraha.]

Some fancy soul to be of the form of the actor. They believe that the action of knowing, which results in the presence of a perceptible object, has for its fruit the cognition of that object; and in that cognition as the fruit, the true form of soul, being of the form of illumination, becomes manifest; and objects being perceptible, the soul becomes the perceptor; for it is produced in some such form as "I know the pot," (in which "I" is the perceptor, "know" is the cognition of the form of illumination, and the "pot" is the perceptible object). The cause of action is for certain the actor, and therefore actorship and experiencership constitute the form of soul. This, however, is inconsistent. (If cognitions be the root),-the question arises, Does the actorship of those cognitions arise simultaneously, or successively? If you say, that the actorship is simultaneous, then its actorship shall cease a moment after. If you say, it happens successively, it cannot be predicated of that which is uniform, (i.e., soul). If you say the actorship of soul is effected always in one or the same form, then that one form being always present, all fruits would become of one form. If the actorship be multiform, then there would be mutability, and there being mutability, there can be no form of sentienceness. It follows that those who believe in soul's sentienceness, should not maintain its direct actorship. The way in which the actorship of the uniform, eternal, sentient soul is proved by us, is the most consistent.

Those who by such arguments maintain that the self-manifest soul becomes the perceptor through the cognition of objects, will find their refutation by the same line of argument.

Some hold that the reasoning (vimarsa) form of soul is its sentience form, (i. e., its sentience is no other than its reasoning They say that the sentience form of soul cannot be power). ascertained without reasoning; the sentience form is said to be distinct from the inert, and without reasoning it cannot be defined, and without reasoning, there is nothing left behind. This is, however, untenable. Reasoning is the discussion which has the form of "this, thus, and so," (i. e., every process of ratiocination involves the assumption of something like this, this is, this is not, thus it is, thus it is not, it is so, it is not so, and without them there can be no reasoning,) and that cannot arise without egoism (or consciousness), and when reasoning is brought to bear on soul it is brought into cognition in the form "I am of this form," and thus the soul, the subject of discussion, being brought to light by the word I, no advance is made beyond a fancy, and fancy is a form of conviction, which is the function of the intellect, and not of sentience. But as sentience, uniform and eternal, remains always in one shape, there can be no entrance of egotism into it. It follows then, that this assumption of reasoning in the soul is a mistaken assumption of the intellect for soul, and not a knowledge of the identity of the self-manifest soul, the great soul.

Thus in no system of philosophy can the form of soul be ascertained by any means, without admitting its supervisorship. Supervisorship implies sentience form, which is distinct from inertness. Because it exists supervising in the form of sentience, therefore it derives the quality of experience (in objects), and that which is supervised by sentience becomes fit for worldly usage. And such being the case, other systems of philosophy, if they decline to accept what we have said about the isolation of soul as resulting on the cessation of the functions of Prakriti after it has accomplished its duty have no resource. It has, therefore, rightly been said that isolation is the abidance of the sentient power in its own form after withdrawing its shadow from all functions.

The sources of perfections, (1); the manner in which the transmutation of material causes are effected, (11); the mode in which merit cooperates in this process, (III); the origin of created thinking principles, (1V); their relation to their original source, (v); the superiority of Samádhi-born thinking principle, (VI); the nature of various kinds of work, (VII); the conformity of works to residua, (VIII); their invariable relation, (IX); the eternity of desires, (X); their nature and susceptibility to destruction, (XI); the relation of the thinking principle to works, (XII); the natures of the qualities and the qualified, (XIII); unity of things proceeding from unity of modification, (XIV); the relation of cognition to cognizables, (xv); the process of cognition, (xvi); its permanence, (xvii); thinking principle not self-illuminative, (XVIII); it cannot be directed to two things at the same time, (XIX); multiplicity of cognitive power not admissable, (xx); how it perceives its self. (XXI); how it is made fit for all purposes, (XXII); its subserviency to another's purpose, (XXIII); progress of isolation, (XXIVxxxII): nature of isolation, (xxXIII)-these are the subjects treated of in this chapter on isolation. [Only the substance of the commentary has been given here, for reasons explained before.]

He, who is the asylum of fame and majesty, whose orders are received on the crowns of their diadems, by kings prostrate at his feet in acts of service and salutation, the lotus of whose mouth having been attained by the goddess of speech, she became uncommonly proud, even he, the auspicious Bhoja, lord of the earth, composed these notes on the aphorisms of the lord of serpents.

This is the end of the fourth quarter, or the quarter on isolation, of the commentary entitled Rájamártanda, on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

25

### APPENDIX.

#### A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF WORKS EXTANT ON THE YOGA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Abbreviations.

| B. G. C.              | Bühler's Guzarat Catalogue.                                  |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bh. D. M. C.          | Catalogue of the Bháü Dájí Memorial.                         |
| Bh. R.                | Bhandárkar's Report, 1881-2.                                 |
| <b>H</b> . C.         | Hall's Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of |
|                       | the Indian Philosophical Systems.                            |
| <b>K</b> . C. P. C.   | Kielhorn's Central Provinces Catalogue.                      |
| K. P. R.              | Kunte's Punjab Report, 1881.                                 |
| M. N.                 | Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit MSS.                             |
| N. W. P. C.           | North Western Provinces Catalogus.                           |
| N. W. P. & O. C.      | ,, ,, ,, and Oudh Catalogue.                                 |
| <b>O</b> . <b>C</b> . | Oudh Catalogue.                                              |
| Op. C.                | Oppert's Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in Southern India.       |
|                       |                                                              |

1. A'chárapaddhati. Duties and exercises of Yogís. By Basudevendra. B. G. C. IV.

2. Ajapágáyatrí-puráscharana-paddhati. Use of the Gáyatrí in Yoga meditation. By S'áńkara A'chárya. H. C.

3. Amanaska. On steadfastness of the mind. N. W. P. C. V.

4. Asanádhyáya. On postures appropriate for Yogís. Op. C. I.

5. Ashtánga-hridaya-sañhitá. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. B. G. C. IV.

ô. Ashtáfiga-yoga. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. By S'afikara Achárya. B. G. C. IV.

7. Cháyápurushávabodhana. Knowledge of souls. Op. C. I.

8. Dattátreya sañhitá *alias* Dattátreya-yoga, or Dattátreya Sástra. A Tantra on the performance of Yoga. By Dattátreya. M. N. I, Op. C. I., B. G. C. IV.

Digitized by Google

#### APPENDIX.

9. Gheranda Sañhitá. A Tantra on the mode of performing the Yoga form of S'ákta worship. By Gheranda. M. N. I., N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. C. IV.

10. Goraksha-s'ataka *alias* Jnána-s'ataka. A century of verses on the performance of Yoga. By Gorakshanátha. N. W. P. C. I., M. N. I., H. C., B. G. C. IV., K. C. P. C.

11. Goraksha-s'ataka-tiká. A commentary on the Gorakshas'ataka. By S'ańkara. N. W. P. C. I.

12. Goraksha-s'ataka-tippana. Notes on the Gorakshas'ataka. By Mathuránátha S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

13. Hatha-dípiká alias Hatha-pradípiká. On Hatha and Rája Yogas. by Sátmáráma alias Atmáráma. M. N. I and II., N. W. P. C. I., H. C., K. C. P. C.

14. Hatha-pradípiká. On Hatha-yoga. By Chintámani. B. G. C. IV.

15. Hatha-pradípiká-tíká. A commentary on the Hathapradípiká which treats on the Ashtánga-yoga. By Vrajabhúshana. N. W. P. C. I.

16. Hatha-pradípiká-tíká. A commentary on the Hathapradípiká. By Mahádeva. N. W. P. C. I.

17. Hatha-pradípiká-tíká. A commentary on the Hathapradípiká No. 13. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

18. Hatha-pradípiká-tippana. Notes on Hatha-pradípiká, describing, Yama, Niyama, Dháraná, Dhyána, and Samádhi. By Umápati. N. W. P. C. I.

19. Hatha-ratnávalí. On the suppression of the breath as a Yoga exercise. N. W. P. C. V.

20. Hatha-sańketa-chandriká. On the performance of the Hatha-yoga. By Sundaradeva. N. W. P. C. V., H. C.

21. Hatha-yoga. On the performance of Hatha-yoga. By Adinátha. B. G. C. IV., K. C. P. C.

22. Hatha-yoga-dhirája. On the exercises necessary for Hatha-yoga. By S'iva. N. W. P. C. I.

23. Hatha-yoga-dhirája-tíká. A commentary on the Hathayoga-dhirája. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C I. 24. Hatha-yoga-viveka. On the performance of the Hathayoga. By Vámadeva. N. W. P. C. I.

25. Hatha-yoga-sangraha. The elements of the Hathayoga. By Mathuránátha Sukla. N. W. P. C. I.

26. Jnánámrita. A poem on the duties of Yogís. By Gorakshanátha, disciple of Mínanátha. H. C.

27. Jnánámrita-tippana. Notes on the Jnánámrita. By Sadánanda. N. W. P. C. I.

28. Jnána-yoga-khanda. Knowledge as an element of Yoga exercise. Op. C. I.

29. Jívanmukti-viveka *alias* Jívanmukti-prakarana. Emancipation during terrestrial existence. By Vidyáranya Svámí. M. N. IV.

30. Jyotsná alias Hatha-dípiká-tíká. A commentary on the Hatha-dípiká of Svátmáráma. By Brahmánanda. M. N. IV.

31. Kapila-gitá. Dissertations on the importance of Yoga meditations and the mode of performing them. by Kapila. M. N. IV.

32. Kedára-kalpa. Yoga practices. K. C. P. C.

33. Khechari-vidyá. Yoga exercises for attaining occult powers. By Siva. B. G. C. IV.

34. Laya-yoga. Yoga emancipation. B. G. C. IV.

35. Mahá-rámáyana *alias* Vasishtha rámáyana. A version of the history of Ráma distinct from that of Válmíki and designed especially to expound the principles of the Yoga doctrine. M. N. VI.

36. Mahes'a-sañhitá. By Mahes'a. K. P. R. 1881.

37. Mudrá-prakáśa. A treatise on Hatha-yoga, describes Mahámudrá, Nabhomudrá, Uddiyana, &c. By Kripáráma. N. W. P. C. I.

38. Nádi-jnána-dípiká. On the knowledge of the arteries or nerves bearing on the Yoga. M. N. I.

39. Nava-ratnákara alias Nava-yoga-kallola. A treatise explanatory of Yoga-sútra. By Kshemánanda Díkshita. H. C. Pátanjala-sútra vide Yoga-sútra.

220

40. Pátanjala-bháshya *alias* Sáfkhya-pravachana-bháshya. A well-known exegesis on the Yoga-sútra. By Vyása. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

41. Pátanjala-bháshya-vártika. A commentary on the Pátanjala-bhásya. By Vijnána Bhikshu. N. W P. C. I., H. C.

42. Pátanjalíyábhinava-bháshya. Commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra. By Bhavadeva Mis'ra. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

43. Pátanjala-rahashya. Notes on parts of the Pátanjalasútra-bháshya. By S'rídharánanda Yati. N. W. P. C. I, H. C.

44. Pátanjala-rahashya. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Rághavánanda. K. C. P. C.

45. Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya. A commentary on Patanjali's Yoga-sútra. By Bhavadeva Mis'ra, Mahámahopádhyáya. Probably the same with No. 42. M. N. V, and VI.

46. Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya-vyákhyá. A commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra-bháshya. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

47. Pátanjala-sútra-tíká. A short commentary on the Pátanjala-sútra. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

48. Pátanjala-sútra-vritti. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Náráyana Tírtha. K. C. P. C.

49. Pátanjala-sútra-vritti *alias* Pátanjala-vritti-bháshya-chháyá-vyákhyá. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Nágojí Bhatta. K. C. P. C., H. C.

50. Pátanjala-vritti. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Umápati Tripáthi. O. C. XIII.

Pátanjala-yoga-sútra vide Yogánusásana. Op. C. I.

51. Pavana-vijaya. On the nature of Pránáyáma (suppression of breath) and rules how to perform it. By S'iva. N. W. P. C. I., H. C., M. N. I., B. G. C. IV.

52. Rájamártanda alias Yoga-sútra-vritti. A eommentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Bhojadeva. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

53. Rája-yoga. On the performance of the Rája-yoga. By Rámachandra Paramahañsa. B. G. C. IV.

54. Rámastavarája. Describes Yoga meditation in the course of a hymn to Ráma. Op. C. I.

55. Sadáchára-prakaraņa. Duties of Yogís. By S'afikara Achárya. M. N. II.

56. Samádhi-prakarana. On Yoga meditation. Op. C. I.

57. Samarasára-s'varodaya. On the regulation of breath and divination from the flow of breath. By Ráma. B. G. C. IV.

Sáfikhya-pravachana, vide Yoga-sútra.

S'áfkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Vide Pátanjala-bháshya.

58. S'áfikhya-yoga-dípiká. On the performance of the Yoga. Op. C. I.

59. Saptabhúmiká-vichára. The seven stages of perfection of Yogís. B. G. C. IV.

60. Saragítá. On Yoga breathing, probably an extract from a Purána. By Vyása. H. C.

61. Sárasamúchchaya alias Yoga-sárasafigraha. The leading tenets of the Yoga. By Harisevaka Mis'ra. M. N. II.

62. Shatchakra. The six principal parts of the body which should be meditated upon. B. G. C. IV.

63. Satchakra-dhyána-paddhati. Meditation on six particular parts of the body. By Bráhmachaitanya Yati. K. P. R. 1881.

64. Siddhanta-paddhati. Rules for Yoga practices. By Gorakshanátha. Bh. D. M. C.

65. Siddha-siddhánta-paddhati. On metempsychosis according to the Yoga doctrine. By Nityánanda Siddha. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

66. Siddha-khanda. Occult powers. By Rámachandra Siddha. B. G. C. IV.

67. Siva-sañhitá. On the Yama, Niyama and other observances of the Yoga system; alleged to be an extract from the Skanda-purána. By S'iva. N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. and O. C. VI., B. G. C. IV., H. C.

68. S'íva-sañhitá-tíká. Notes on the S'íva-sañhitá. By Sadánanda. N. W. P. C. I.

69. Svarodaya. Yoga breathing. (Probably only on divination from the flow of breath). By Vyása. B. G. C. IV.

222

70. Tattvávabodhaka. Commentary on the Tattvávabodha. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

71. Tattvárnava-tíká. Short commentary on the Tattvárnava. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

72. Tattva-panchás'ika-yoga chintá. An epitome of Yoga practices Bh. R., 1881-82.

73. Tattvavindu-yoga. On a peculiar form of Yoga. By Siva. N. W. P. C. 1.

74. Tattva-vindu-yoga. Defining the various divisions of the Yoga. By Rámchandra Paramahañsa. H. C.

75. Varņa-prabodha. A treatise on the Yoga. By Dattátreya. H. C.

76. Vás'ishtha-sára. An abridgment of the Yoga-vás'ishtha Rámáyana, containing only its metaphysical portion. By Tirthas'iva. M. N. III.

77. Vás'ishthiya-gudhártha. A commentary on the Vás'ishthasára. By Ditto. M. N. III.

78. Videha-muktádi-kathana. "It handles sundry tenets on the Yoga craze." H. C.

79. Vivekamártaņda. Eight couplets on the primary doctrine of the Yoga. By Rámes'vara Bhaţţa. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

80. Yájnavalkya-gítá alias Yájnavalkya-yoga. "A poem in commendation of the Yoga." By Yájnavalkya. H. C.

81. Yoga-bháshya-krama. Notes on Vyása's commentary. O. P. C. I.

82. Yogábhyása-lakshana. Directions for performing Yoga. Op. C. I.

83. Yoga-chandra-tíká. A commentary on the Yoga-chandra. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I., M. N. I.

84. Yoga-chandriká. By Ananta S'armá. M. N. Vol. II.

85. Yoga-chintámani. On Rája-yoga. By Bálasástrí Gadge. O. P. C. I., N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. and O. C. VI.

86. Yoga-chintámani. On Rája-yoga. By Sívánanda Sarasvati. B. G. C. IV., H. C. 87. Yoga-chintámani. On Hatha-yoga. By Godávara Mis'ra. N. W. P. C. V., K. P. R., 1881.

88. Yoga-chintámani-țippaņa. Notes on the Yoga-chintámaņi. By Bhavání-saháya. N. W. P. C. I.

89. Yoga-darpana-tíká. Notes on the Yoga-darpana. By Bhavadeva. N. W. P. C. I.

90. Yoga-darpana-tíká. A commentary on the Yoga-darpana. By Krishnanátha. N. W. P. C. I.

91. Yoga-drishti-svádhyáya. (Contents not known). Bh. D. M. C.

92. Yoga-grantha. A treatise on Yoga with a commentary. By Vyańkatáchárya. N. W. P. C. V.

93. Yoga-grantha-tíká. A treatise on the Yoga-grantha, with a commentary. By Guņákara Mis'ra. N. W. P. C. V.

94. Yoga-kalpadruma. Instructions for performing Yoga. By Kulamani S'ukla. N. W. P. C I.

95. Yoga-kalpalatá. Explanations of various Yoga tenets. By Mathuránítha S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

96. Yogákhyána. A treatise on Yoga. By Yájnavalkya. N. W. P. C. I.

97. Yoga-mahimá. Merit of performing Yoga. By Gorakshanátha. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

98. Yogamani-prabhá. A commentary on the Yogamani. By Rámánanda Saraśvati. M. N. VI., H. C.

99. Yoga-manjarí. On the practice of Yoga. Op. C I.

100. Yogánus ásana-vritti or Yoganus'ásana-sútra-vritti. A commentary on the Yoga-sútra. By Bhává Ganes'a Díkshita. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

101 Yoga-nyása. Dedication of certain parts of the body in course of meditation. Op C. I.

102. Yogopades'a. Principles of the Yoga. By Parás'ara. B. G. C. IV.

103. Yoga-pradipa. On the practice of Yoga. By Devisiñha Deva. B. G. C. IV.

224

104. Yoga-prákás'a-tíká. A commentary on the Yoga-prakás'a. By Krishnanátha. N. W. P. C. I.

105. Yoga-praves'avidhi. On commencing Yoga practices. B.G. C. IV.

106. Yoga-ratnákara. By Vires'varánanda. M. N. IV.

107. Yoga-ratna-samuchchaya. On the pratice of Yoga. Op. C. I.

108. Yoga-ratnávalí. (Contents not known). By Nágárjuna. Bh. D. C. M. C.

109. Yogásana-lakshana. On postures. B. G. C. IV.

110. Yoga-sangraha. On the practice of Yoga. Op. C. I.

111. Yoga-safigraha. On Hatha-yoga. By S'rikrishna S'ukla. N. W. P. C. J.

112. Yoga-safigraha-tíká. A commentary on the Yoga-safigraha. By Púrnánanda. N. W. P. C. I.

113. Yoga-sára. The principal elements of Yoga. Op. C. I.

114. Yoga-sára-sangraha. A manual of Yoga practice. By Vijnána Bhikshu. N. W. P. C. I., H. C., K. C. P. C.

115. Yoga-sarávalí. On the practice of Yoga. Op. C. I.

116. Yoga-sástra. Notes on the Yoga-sútra. M. N. VI.

117. Yoga-sútra *alias* Yogánusásana or Sáfkhya-pravachana. Original text of the Yoga doctrine. By Patanjali. N. W. P. C. I.

118. Yoga śástra sútra-pátha. "A set of aphorisms on theocracy." By S'ukra. H. C.

119. Yoga-sástrávachúri. (In Prákrit). Bh. D. M. C.

120. Yoga-siddhánta-paddhati. On the practice of Yoga. By Gorakshanátha. B. G. C. IV.

121. Yoga-s'ikhopanishad. A Upanishad on Yoga. Op. C. I.

122. Yoga-s'ikshá. By Harichara. B. G. C. IV.

123. Yoga-sútrártha-dípiká or Chandrika. A commentary on the Yog-sútra. By Ananta. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

124. Yoga-sútra-tíká. By Sańkara. N. W. P. C. I.

125. Yoga-sútra-tíká. By Mahádeva. N. W. P. C. I.

126. Yoga-sútra-tippana. Notes on the Yoga-sútra. By Vrindávana S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I. 127. Yoga-sútra-țippana. Ditto. By Jnánánanda. N. W. P. C. I.

128. Yoga-sútra-țippana. Ditto. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

129. Yoga-sútra-vritti. By Sadás'íva. N. W. P. C. I.

130. Yoga-sútra-vritti-gudhártha-dyotaka. By Náráyana Bhikshu. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

131. Yoga-sútra-vritti tippana. Notes on the Yoga-sútravritti. By Bhavadeva. N. W. P. C. I.

13?. Yoga-taranga. Practice of Yoga meditation. By Vis'ves'varadatta. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

133. Yoga-tarafiga. Practice of Yoga meditation. By Ramás afkara. N. W. P. C. I.

134. Yoga-tárávalí. On the practice of Rája-yoga. By Sáňkara Achárya. M. N. Vol. IV.

135. Yoga-tárávalí. On the practice of Rája-yoga. By S'uka. B. G. C. IV.

136. Yoga-tattva. The principles of the Yoga doctrine. B. G. C. IV.

137. Yoga-varnana. On the practice of the Hatha-yoga. By Mathuránátha-S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

138. Yoga-vártíká. A commentary on Vyása's Yoga-bháshya. By Vijnána Bhikshu. N. W. P. and O. C. VI.

Yoga-vásishtha. Vide No. 35.

139. Yoga-vásishtha-tíká. A commentary on the Yogavásishtha. Op. C. I.

140. Yoga-vichára. The nature of the Yoga doctrine. An extract from the Kás'ikhanda. B. G. C. IV.

141. Yoga-víja. The essence of Yoga practices. By S'iva N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

142. Yoga-vindu-tippana. Notes on the Yoga-vindu. By Bhavadeva. N. W. P. C. I.

143. Yoga-vishaya. The object of Yoga. By Márkandeya. B. G. C. IV.

144. Yoga-vivarana. A description of Yoga practices. By Vasishtha. M. N. I.



145. Yoga-viveka. Knowledge of the Yoga system. By Haris'ankara. N. W. P. C. I.

146. Yoga-viveka. An account of Yoga. By Vrindávana Sukla. N. W. P. C. I.

147. Yoga-viveka-tíká. A commentary on the Yoga-viveka of Harisáńkara. By Rímánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

148. Yoga-vritti-sángraha. An abstract of the Vritti of Bhojarája. By Udayankara. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.

149. Yoges'árnava. On the practice of Yoga. Op. C. I.

150. Yoginí-hridaya. Tántric Yoga. Op. C. I.

Digitized by Google

•

•

| 24.        | Kathá Sarit Ságara, (English) Fasc. I-X @ 1/ each                                                                         | Rs.            | 10       | 0          |
|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------|------------|
| 25.        | Lalita Vistara, (Sans.) Fasc. I-VI @ /10/ each                                                                            |                | 3        | 12         |
| 26.        | Ditto (English) Fasc. I—II                                                                                                |                | 2        | 0          |
| 27.        | Maitri Upanishad, (Sans. & English) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                               |                | 1        | 14         |
| 28.        | Mímámsá Darşana, (Sans.) Fasc. II-XVI @ /10/ each                                                                         | STREET, CO     | 9        | 6<br>8     |
| 29.        | Markandeya Purána, (Sans.) Fasc. IV-VII @ /10/ each                                                                       |                | 21       | 14         |
| 30.        | Nrisinha Tápaní, (Sans.) Fasc. I—III @ /10/ each<br>Nirukta, (Sans.) Fasc. I—VI @ /10/ each                               | 19.00          | 3        | 12         |
| 31.        | Nárada Pancharátra, (Sans.) Fasc. I, III-IV @/10/ each                                                                    | and the second | ĩ        | 14         |
| 32.<br>33. | Nyaya Darşana, (Sans.) Fasc. I and III @ /10/ each                                                                        | 20152          | î        | 4          |
| 34.        | Nitisára, or, The Elements of Polity, By Kámandaki, (Sans.) Fase. 1                                                       | I-IV           | 1        | 14         |
| 35.        | Piñgala Chhandah Sútra, (Sans.) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each.                                                                  |                | 1        | 14         |
| 36.        | Prithiráj Rásau, (Sans.) Fasc. I-IV @ /10/ each                                                                           |                | 2        | 8          |
| 37.        | Ditto (English) Fasc. I                                                                                                   | -              | 1        | 0          |
| 38.        | Páli Grammar, (English) Fasc. I and II @ /10/ each                                                                        |                | 1        | 4          |
| 39.        | Prákrita Lakshanam, (Sans.) Fase. I                                                                                       |                | 1        | 8          |
| 40.        | Rig Veda, (Sans.) Vol. I, Fasc. IV                                                                                        |                | 02       | 10<br>8    |
| 41.        | Srauta Sútra of Apastamba, (Sans.) Fase. I-IV @ /10/ each                                                                 |                | 6        | 14         |
| 42.        | Ditto Aśvaláyana, (Sans.) Fasc. I—XI @ /10/ each                                                                          |                | 5        | 10         |
| 43.        | Ditto Látyáyana (Sans.) Fasc. I—IX @ /10/ each<br>Sáma Veda Sanhitá, (Sans.) Fasc. I—XXXVII @ /10/ each                   |                | 23       | 2          |
| 44.        | Sáhitya Darpana, (English) Fasc. I-IV @ /10/ each                                                                         | ( and )        | 2        | 8          |
| 46.        | Sáñkhya Aphorisms of Kapila, (English) Fasc. I and II @ /10/ ea                                                           | ch             | 1        | - 4        |
| 47.        | Súrya Siddhánta, (Sans.) Fasc. IV                                                                                         |                | 0        | 10         |
| 48.        |                                                                                                                           |                | 0        | 10         |
| 49.        | Sankara Vijava, (Sans.) Fasc. II and III @ /10/ each                                                                      |                | 1        | 4          |
| 50.        |                                                                                                                           |                | 0        | 10         |
| 51.        | Stellbra Sara (Sang) Fage I                                                                                               |                | 0        | 10         |
| 52.        | Taittiríya Aranyaka, (Sans.) Fasc. I-XI @/10/ each                                                                        |                | 6        | 14         |
| 53.        | Taittiríya Aranyaka, (Sans.) Fasc. I—XI @/10/ each<br>Ditto Bráhmana (Sans.) Fasc. I—XIV @/10/ each                       |                | 15<br>20 | 0          |
| 54.        | Ditto Samnita, (Sans.) rasc 1-AAAII (@/10/ each                                                                           |                | 1        | 14         |
| 55.        | Ditto Prátišákhya, (Sans.) Fasc. I—III @ /10/ each<br>Ditto and Aitareya Upanishads, (Sans.) Fasc. II and III@ /10        | / each         | i        | 4          |
| 56.<br>57. | Ditto and Aitareya Upanishads, (Sans.) Fasc. 11 and 111@/10<br>Ditto Aitareya S'vetášvatara Kena Tsá Upanishads, (English | ) Fase.        | -        | Cherry Con |
| 01.        | I and II @ /10/ each                                                                                                      |                | 1        | 4          |
| 58.        | Tindy's Brohmana (Sans) Fase I-XIX @ /10/ each                                                                            | -              | 11       | 14         |
| 59.        | Uttara Naishadha, (Sans.) Fasc. II-XII @ /10/ each                                                                        |                | 6        | 14         |
| 60.        | Uttara Naishadha, (Sans.) Fasc. II—XII @/10/each<br>Váyu Purána, (Sans.) Vol. I, Fasc. I—VI; Vol. II, Fasc. I—II (        | @ /10/         | 1        |            |
|            | each                                                                                                                      |                | 5        | 0          |
| 61.        | Vishnu Smriti, (Sans.) Fasc. I-II @ /10/ each                                                                             |                | 1        | 4          |
| 62.        | Yoga Sútra of Patanjali, (Sans. & English) Fasc. I-III @ /14/ e                                                           | acn            | 2        | 10         |
|            | Arabic and Persian Series.                                                                                                |                |          |            |
|            |                                                                                                                           | 1 1 2 1        | 8        | 2          |
| 1.         | 'Alamgirnamah, with Index, (Text) Fasc, I-XIII @ /10/ each                                                                |                | 27       | 8          |
| 2.         | A'in-i-Akbari, (Text) Fasc. I—XXII @ 1/4 each<br>Ditto (English) Vol. I (Fasc. I—VII)                                     | 1.5            | 12       | 4          |
| 3.         | Akbarnámah, with Index, (Text) Fasc. I-XX @ 1/4 each                                                                      |                | 25       | õ          |
| 4.         | Bádsháhnámah with Index, (Text) Fasc. I-XIX @ /10/ each                                                                   |                | 11       | 14         |
| 5.         | Beale's Oriental Biographical Dictionary, pp. 291, 4to, thick                                                             | paper,         |          | 1 4 3      |
| 0.         | @ 4/12 thin paper                                                                                                         |                | 4        | 8          |
| 7.         | Dictionary of Arabic Technical Terms and Appendix, Fasc. I-I                                                              | IXI@           | -        |            |
|            | 1/4 each                                                                                                                  |                | 26       | 4          |
| 8.         | Farhang-i-Rashidi (Text), Fasc. I-XIV @ 1/4 each                                                                          |                | 17       | 8          |
| 9.         | Fihrist-i-Túsí, or, Túsy's list of Shy'ah Books, (Text) Fasc. 1-                                                          | -11 @          | 2        | 0          |
|            | /12/ each                                                                                                                 |                | 35       | 10         |
| 10.        | Futúh-ul-Shám Waqidi, (Text) Fasc. I-IX @ /10/ each                                                                       |                | 2        | 8          |
| 11.        | Ditto Azádi, (Text) Fasc. I—IV @ /10/ each<br>Haft Asmán, History of the Persian Masnawi. (Text) Fasc. I                  |                | ĩ        | 4          |
| 12.        | Hait Asman, History of the Tersian Mashawi, (Text) Pase. I                                                                | 14             | 6        | õ          |
| 13.        | History of the Caliphs, (English) Fasc. I-VI @ 1/ each<br>Iqbálnámah-i-Jahángírí, (Text) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each          | 1              | 1        | 14         |
| 14.        | Işabáh, with Supplement, (Text) Fasc. I-XXX @ /12/ each                                                                   |                | 22       | 8          |
| 16.        | Maghází of Wágidí, (Text) Fasc. 1-V (a) /10/ each                                                                         |                | 3        | 2          |
| 17.        | Muntakhab-ul-Tawarikh, (Text) Fasc. I-XV @ /10/ each                                                                      |                | 9        | 6          |
|            |                                                                                                                           |                |          |            |

Digitized by Google

| 18. | Muntakhab-ul-Lubáb, (Text) Fasc. I-XVIII @ /10/        | each, and H          | asc.  |    |     |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------|----|-----|
|     | XIX with Index @ /12/                                  |                      | 1.000 | 12 | 0   |
| 19. | Mu'áşir-i-'Alamgírí (Text), Fasc. I-VI @ /10/ each     | A Destruction of the |       | 3  | 12  |
| 20. | Nukhbat-ul-Fikr, (Text) Fasc. I                        | and and the second   |       | 0  | 10  |
| 21. | Nizámí's Khiradnámah-i-Iskandarí, (Text) Fasc. I and   | II @ 1/ each         |       | 2  | 0   |
| 22. | Suyúty's Itgán, on the Exegetic Sciences of the Koran, | with Supplem         | ent,  |    |     |
|     | (Text) Fasc. II-IV, VII-X @ 1/4 each                   |                      |       | 8  | 12  |
| 23. | Tabagát-i-Násirí, (Text) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each         | 19 miles             | 193   | 3  | 2   |
| 24. | Ditto (English) Fasc. I-XIV @ 1/ each                  |                      |       | 14 | . 0 |
| 25. | Táríkh-i-Fírúz Sháhi, (Text) Fasc. I-VII @ /10/ each   |                      |       | 4  | 6   |
| 26. | Táríkh-i-Baihaqí, (Text) Fasc. I-IX @ /10/ each        | 1.11                 |       | 5  | 10  |
| 27. | Wis o Rámín, (Text) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each              | 1000                 |       | 3  | 2   |
|     |                                                        |                      |       |    |     |

#### Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts, Fasc. I-XVI @ 1/ each ...

.. 16

#### ASIATIC SOCIETY'S PUBLICATIONS.

| ι. | ASIATIC | RESEARCHES. | VII-XI; |  | XVII, | and |  |
|----|---------|-------------|---------|--|-------|-----|--|
|    |         |             |         |  |       |     |  |

#### Index to Vols. I-XVIII

- Ditto 2.
- Ditto Index to Vols. I—XVIII ... ... ... PROCEEDINGS of the Asiatic Society from 1865 to 1869 (incl.) @ /4/ per No. ; and from 1870 to date @ /8/ per No. JOURNAL of the Asiatic Society for 1843 (12), 1844 (12), 1845 (12), 1846 (5), 1847 (12), 1848 (12), 1849 (12), 1850 (7), @ 1/ per No. to Subscribers and @ 1/8 per No. to Non-Subscribers; and for 1851 (7), 1857 (6), 1858 (5), 1861 (4), 1864 (5), 1865 (8), 1866 (7), 1867 (6), 1868 (6), 1869 (8), 1870 (8), 1871 (7), 1872 (8), 1873 (8), 1874 (8), 1875 (7), 1876 (7), 1877 (8), 1878 (8), 1879 (7), 1800 (8), 1881 (7), @ 1/8 per No. to Subscribers and @ 2/ per No. to Non-Subscribers. 3.


| N. B. | The | figures | enclosed | in | brackets | give | the | number | of | Nos. | in | each |
|-------|-----|---------|----------|----|----------|------|-----|--------|----|------|----|------|
| Volu  | me. |         |          |    |          |      |     |        |    |      |    |      |

|     | General Cunningham's Archaeological Survey Report for 1863-64 (Extra     |    |    |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|
|     | No., J. A. S. B., 1864)                                                  | 2  | 1  |
|     | Theobald's Catalogue of Reptiles in the Museum of the Asiatic Society    |    |    |
|     | (Extra No., J. A S. B., 1868)                                            | 2  | 0  |
|     | Catalogue of Mammals and Birds of Burmah, by E. Blyth (Extra No.,        |    |    |
|     | J. A. S. B., 1875)                                                       | 4  | 1  |
|     | Sketch of the Turki Language as spoken in Eastern Turkestan, Part II,    |    |    |
|     | Vocabulary, by R. B. Shaw (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1878)                 | 4  | C  |
|     | A Grammar and Vocabulary of the Northern Balochi Language, by M.         |    |    |
|     | L. Dames (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1880)                                  | 1- | C  |
|     | Introduction to the Maithili Language of North Bihar, by G. A. Grierson, |    |    |
|     | Part I, Grammar (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1880)                           | 2  | 6  |
| 4.  | All is the fully by D H Hadasan                                          | 3  | -  |
| 5.  |                                                                          | 3  | 6  |
| 6.  |                                                                          | 2  | 1  |
| 7.  |                                                                          | 1  | 6  |
| 8.  |                                                                          |    |    |
| -   | W. Taylor                                                                | 2  | C  |
| 9.  | Han Koong Tsew, or the Sorrows of Han, by J. Francis Davis               | 1  | 5  |
| 10. | Istiláhát-us-Súfíyah, edited by Dr. A. Sprenger, 8vo                     | 1  | 6  |
| 11. |                                                                          | 2  | 1  |
| 12  |                                                                          |    | i. |
| 13. |                                                                          | 4  | 6  |
| 14. |                                                                          | 0  | C  |
| 15. |                                                                          |    |    |
|     | Parts I-II, with 5 coloured Plates, 4to. @ 6/ each 1                     | 2  | C  |
| 16. | Purána Sangraha, I (Markandeya Purana), Sanskrit                         | 1  | 5  |
| 17. |                                                                          | 4  | 6  |
| 18. |                                                                          | 0  | 6  |
| 19  |                                                                          | 8  | 6  |
| 20. |                                                                          | 2  | 5  |
|     |                                                                          |    |    |


DOUBLE NUMBER.

Do/

# BIBLIOTHECA INDICA;



PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. New Series, Nos. 491-492



# पातञ्जलं येागसूचम् । राजमार्त्तखाखटत्तिमहितम् ।

THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI, WITH THE COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RAJA AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

BY

RAJENDRALA'LA MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E. FASCICULUS IV & V.

#### CALCUTTA :

PRINTED BY J. W. THOMAS, AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS. AND PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY, 57, PARK STREET.

1883.

### LIST OF BOOKS FOR SALE

AT THE LIBRARY OF THE

ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL,

#### No. 57, PARK STREET, CALCUTTA,

#### AND OBTAINABLE FROM

### THE SOCIETY'S LONDON AGENTS, MESSRS. TRÜBNER & CO.

57 AND 59, LUDGATE HILL, LONDON, E. C.

#### BIBLIOTHECA INDICA.

#### Sanskrit Series.

|     |                                                                  |     | A.410 * | 23.8+ |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|-------|
| 1.  | Atharvana Upanishads, (Sanskrit) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each           |     | 3       | 2     |
| 2.  | Aśvaláyana Grihya Sútra, (Sans.) Fasc. I-IV @ /10/ each          | 100 | 2       |       |
| 3.  | Agni Purána, (Sans.) Fasc. I-XIV @ /10/ each                     |     | 8       | 12    |
| 4.  | Aitareya Aranyaka of the Rig Veda, (Sans.) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each |     | 3       | 14    |
| 5.  | Aphorisms of Sándilya, (English) Fasc. I                         |     | 0       | 10    |
| 6.  | Aphorisms of the Vedánta, (Sans.) Fasc. III-XIII @ /10/ each     |     | 6       | 14    |
| 7.  | Brahma Sútras, (English) Fasc. I                                 |     | 1       | 0     |
| 8.  | Bhámatí, (Sans.) Fasc. I-VIII @ /10/ each                        |     | 5       | 0     |
| 9.  | Brihat Aranyaka Upanishad, (Sans.) Fasc. II-IV, VI-IX @ /10/ es  | ch  | 4       | 0     |
| 10. | Ditto (English) Fasc, II—III @ /10/ each                         |     |         | 0     |
| 11. | Brihat Samhitá, (Sans.) Fasc. I-III, V-VII @ /10/ each           |     |         | 10    |
| 12. | Chaitanya-Chandrodaya Nátaka, (Sans.) Fasc. II-III @ /10/ each   |     |         | 12    |
| 13. | Chaturvarga Chintámani, (Sans.) Fasc. I-XL @ /10/ each           |     | 25      | 4     |
| 14. | Chhándogya Upanishad, (Sanskrit) Fase. IV                        |     | 20      | 0     |
| 15. | Ditto (English) Fasc. II                                         |     | 0       | 10    |
| 16. | Categories of the Nyáya Philosophy, (Sans.) Fasc. II             |     | 0       | 10    |
| 17. | Daśa Rúpa, (Sans.) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                       | 2.  | 0       | 10    |
| 18. | Gopatha Bráhmana, (Sans. & Eng.) Fasc. I and II @ /10/ each      |     | -       | 14    |
| 19. | Gopála Tápaní, (Sans.) Fasc, I                                   |     | 1       | 4     |
| 20. | Gobhilíya Grihya Sútra, (Sans.) Fasc. I-XII @ /10/ each.         |     | 0       | 10    |
|     | Hindu Astronomy, (English) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each               |     | 7       | 8     |
| 21. | Isá Kena Katha Praśna Munda Mándukya Upanishads, (Sans.) Fasc.   | vi  | 1       | 14    |
| 22. | Kátantra, (Sans) Fasc. I-VI @ 1/ each                            | 11  | 0       | 10    |
| 23. | Matanina, (build) 1 abor 1 ( abor 1 ) bach                       |     | 6       | 0     |

Contnued on third page of cover.)

### श्रीगरोशाय नमः।

-0\$@\$0--

# पातञ्जलं योगसूत्रम् ।

राजमार्चग्राखाद्यात्तिसहितम्।

- 4000

देहाईयोग: ग्रिवयो: स त्रेयांसि तनेातु व: । दुष्पापमपि यत्सरया जनः कैवस्यमञ्जुते ॥ ९ त चिविधान्यपि दुःखानि यदनुसारणान्नृणाम् । प्रयान्ति बद्दी विखयं तं सुमः प्रिवमव्ययम् ॥ २ ॥ पतम्त्रसिसुनेरुक्तिः काण्यपूर्वे। जयत्यसै। । पुम्प्रक्रयोर्विचोगेऽपि चेाग इत्युदिता यया॥ १ 🛚 जयन्ति वाचः फणिभर्त्तुरन्तर-खुरत्तमःस्रोमनित्राकरलिषः । विभाव्यमानाः सततं मनांसि याः सतां सदानन्दमयानि कुर्व्वते ॥ ४ ॥ प्रब्दानामनुषासनं विद्धता पातखले कुर्छता हमिं राजस्त्रगाङ्कमञ्ज्ञमपि च व्यातम्पता वैद्यके । वाक्चेतेावपुषां मलः फणस्तां भर्चेव येनेाइत-3 स्रस्य श्रीरणरङ्गमसनृपतेर्वाचे जयन्दुञ्च्यलाः ॥ ५ ॥ 3 1

दुर्वेछं यदतीव तदिजहति खष्टार्थमत्युकिभिः स्वष्टार्थेव्वतिविस्तृतिं विद्धति बर्चेः समासादिकैः । खखानेऽनुपयेागिभिञ्च बङ्ठभिर्जस्पैर्भभमाम्वते त्रोत्वणामिति वस्तुविभ्नवहृतः सर्व्वेऽपि टीकाहृतः ॥ 🍕 ॥ जत्मृत्र्य विसारसुदस्य विकल्पमालं \*फल्गुप्रकाश्रमवधार्यं च सम्यगर्थाम्। श्रम: पतझलिमुने†र्विष्टतिर्मयेय-मातन्यते बुधजनप्रतिवेाधष्ठेतुः ‡ ॥ ७ ॥

### श्वय यागानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

ग्रनेन सुचेष ग्रास्त्रस्व समन्धाभिधेयप्रधाजनान्धाख्यायन्ते । १'न्नच'ग्रन्दीऽधिकारसेातका मङ्गलार्थच । युक्तिः 'सेागः' समाधानं, युजयमाधा । अनुभिष्यते व्याखायते खचणखरूपभेदापायफलेर्चेन॥ तत् 'भनुश्वासनं'। द्यागस्थानुश्वासनं 'धागानुश्वासनं'। तत् आत्रा− स्तपरिसमाप्तेरधिकृतं वेाद्वयमित्यर्थः । तत्र प्रास्तस्य युत्पादकतया योगः ससाधनः सफलोः।भिधेयः, तद्युत्पादनञ्च फलं, व्युत्पादि−

\* यह्याप्रकामनिति 🛦 पहराप्रकारनिति B चिक्रितमुक्तकपाठः ।

† खन्तः पतन्नविमते इति C पुक्तकपाठः ।

‡ बुधजनप्रतिपत्तिष्ठेतुरिति B चिक्रितपुरत्तकपाठः । § मूलप्रकृतग्रब्दः वर्षा व्यक्ति व्यक्ति वाश्वा कोडी छतः सर्वेत्र । स च समस्ती-

ऽसमक्तच रहीतः ।

C चित्रितपुंत्तकपाठः ।

॥ जन्त्रयभेदेापायप्रजेयेंनेति नानापुक्तकपाठः । जन्त्रयभेदेापायेयेंनेति

तम्स योगया कैंवच्चं फलं। प्राखाभिम्नेययोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिषादक-भावखबणः यम्पत्रः, श्वभिधेयख येजन्म तत्फलव्य व कैंत्रस्वस्य साध्यसाधनभावः। एतदुर्मं भवति, थुत्पाद्यस्य थ्रोगस्य साधनानि प्रालेष प्रदर्श्वको, तत्नाधनसिद्वा य्रोगः कैंवच्यास्थं फल्लसुत्पादन्न यतोति ॥ ९ ॥

तच केा चेग इत्यत माइ।

### यागञ्चित्तवत्तिनिराधः ॥ २ ॥

'चित्तस्थ' निर्धाखवत्त्वपरिणामरूपस या: 'ग्रन्नाय' प्रक्राङ्गि-आवपरिणामरूपासावां " 'निरोध:' वर्षिर्मुखपरिणतिविच्छेदादन्त-र्मु सतया प्रतित्वामपरिणामेन स्वस्नकारणे स्वय: 'योग:', इत्या-ड्यायते । व च निरोध: वर्ज्ञावां चित्तस्य भ्रमीनां ! वर्ज्ञप्राणिनां धर्माः कदाचित् कस्याच्चिङ्गुमावाविर्भवति । तच चिप्तं, सूहं, विचिग्तं, एकाग्रं, निइड्रम् इति चित्तस्य भ्रमयः चित्तस्यावस्या-विग्नेवा: । तच चिप्तं, रजय उद्देकादस्थिरं; वर्डिर्मुखतया सुखदु:-खादिविषयेषु कच्पितेषु व्यवचितेषु यन्तिचित्तषु वा रजया प्रेरितं। तच बदैव दैत्यदत्तवादीनाम् । मूढं, तमस्र चद्रेकात् कत्याकत्य-विभ्रागमन्तरेष काधादिभिर्विषद्वक्तात्येच्वेव नियमितं । तच वदैव रज्ञ:पिमाचादीनाम् । विचिन्नं, सत्त्वोद्वेकाद्वेग्निक्वेन परिइतदु:ख-

<sup>\*</sup> इत्तरेा निर्मनसत्त्वपरियामरूपात्तासामिति वज्जपुत्तनसमातः पाठः।

<sup>+</sup> खबारबे हति 🔺 चिक्रितपुक्तमवाठः ।

<sup>1</sup> बत्तोगामिति C चिक्रितमुब्तमपाठः ।

E Calbagan

Digitized by Google

्रस्र ५**सन् ३४ खे. खरूपे' विकालरू**पतायाम्,

# ्द् रक्ष **संक्रेउक्सानम् ॥ ३॥**

गर का र र २ कर देखा होके विरोधपदाणि व्याखातुकाम:

 अन्ते असते. एववा उद्यान्दर्भ, तमसा परापकार कितं,
 अन्ते असते. एववा उद्यान्ते का विद्यावित्तावसा न का का अन्ते अस्ते का विद्यानि स्वादिकमयुत् क्रमे तथमकि अन्तर अन्ते अस्ति का दिकमयुत् क्रमे तथमकि अन्तर अन्ते अस्ति का दिकमयुत् क्रमे तथमकि अन्तर अस्ति उद्याने स्वादिकमयुत् क्रमे तथमकि अन्तर अस्ति उद्याने स्वादिक्यात् प्रदर्भनं । अन्तर देवे के किस्ते देवित्तादित प्रतात प्रदर्भनं । अन्तर देवे के किस्ते देवित्तादित प्रतात स्वाद अन्तर देवे के किस्ते देवित्तादित प्रतात प्रदर्भनं । अन्तर देवे के किस्ते देवित्तादित प्रतात स्वाति प्रत्याने । अन्तर के किस्ते देवित्तादित्यातिति प्रत्याने । अन्तर के कार्य देवित्तादित्यातिति प्रत्याने । अन्तर के कार्य देवित्तादिति प्रत्याने स्वाद अन्तर कर्य के किस्ते देवित्तादति । प्रत्योरित स्वाने अन्तर कर्य

### रात्मुके बाजबूचे

्यम्भायनेकरे अवादिषु अहलं। तथ बहेव देश-

माभावात् कर्दनामिमाननिवृत्तौ जेन्कुरुपन्दिमास, बुद्धावासायः खरूपेशावखानं खितिमंक्तीति । ३ ॥

युत्यानदत्रायां तस किं सरूपमित्वार ।

È

51

12

i=

z

तः

A

¢

Ţ

4

F

1

### हत्तिसाइप्यमितर्च । ४ ।

'इतरच' चोनादन्यस्त्रिन् काले, उत्तयो या वस्त्रमासस्वरूषाः, ताभिः 'सारूष्यं' तद्रूपून्वं। त्रयमर्घः, यादृक्षो दृत्तचः सुख-उुःस-नेग्धात्मिकाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, तादृगूप एव संवेद्यते व्यवद्वर्दभिः पुरुषः। प्रतीयते तदेवं, यस्मिन्नेकाग्रतया परिएते वस्तुनि चिच्छ्नेः† स्वस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठानं भवति, यस्मिंसेन्द्रियदत्तिदारेए विषया-कारेए परिएते पुरुषस्तदाकार इव परिभाव्यते, यथा जस्तरक्षेषु पत्नसु चन्द्रस्रस्तिव प्रतिभाषते, तचित्तं ॥ ४ ॥

वृत्तिपदं वाखातुमाइ ।

### टत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्तिष्टाऽक्तिष्टाः‡ ॥ ५ ॥

'खत्तयः' चित्तस्य परिणामविश्वेषाः । दत्तिससुदायरूपद्यावय-विनेा या त्रवयवरूपा दृत्तयसादपेखया तथपप्रत्ययः। एतदुनं भवति । पश्च दृत्तयः। कीदृम्धः । 'क्रिप्टाऽक्रिप्टाः' । क्रेडिर्वच्चमापजवण्णेराकान्ताः 'क्रिप्टाः', तद्विपरीताः 'त्रक्रिप्टाः', ॥ ५ ॥

- \* प्रतीयते इतिपाठः B चिक्रितपुच्चने गाँचि ।
- + विवित्तचित्ते इति B चिक्रितपुक्तमपाठः ।
- 1 বিতা অবিতা হবি B বিটিনপুৰাৰদাক। বিদা পৰিদাৰ্থ হবি P বিক্ৰিয়খ্যাৰদাক।

साधनं\* सुखसाधनेव्वेव क्रव्दादिषु प्रष्टत्तं । तच सदैव देवा-नाम् । एतदुक्तं भवति, रजसा प्रष्टत्तिर्पं, तमसा परापकारनिरतं, सत्त्वेन सुखमयं चित्तं भवतीति । एतासिस्तवित्तावस्ता न समाधा-वुपयोगिन्य: । एकायनिरुद्धरूपे<sup>†</sup> दे च सत्त्वोत्त्वर्धे स्वमाधान् स्वितलात् समाधावुपयोगं भजेते । सत्त्वादिकमव्युत्क्रसे लयमभि-प्राय:, दयोरपि रजस्तमचेारत्यन्तहेयलं तदर्थं रजस: प्रथम-सुपादानं । यावस्त प्रष्टत्तिर्द्धिता तावस्तिष्टत्तिर्गं प्रकाते दर्शयितु-सिति दयोर्थत्ययेन प्रदर्शनं । सत्त्वस्य त्वेतदर्थं पञ्चात् प्रदर्शनं । यत् तस्रोत्कर्षेणेत्तरे दे स्टमी योगोपयोगिन्याविति ज्वनयो-देयोरेकायनिरुद्धयोर्भूमिकयोर्यसित्तस्त्वेकायतारूपः परिणामः स योगः । किसुक्तं भवति, एकाये बर्झ्विर्त्तर्निरोधः, निरुद्धे सर्व्वासां वत्तीनां संस्काराणां प्रविखय इति । ज्वनयोरेव स्रत्यो-र्थागस्य सम्भवः ॥ २ ॥

द्दानीं स्रचकारश्वित्त-ष्टत्ति-निरेाधपदानि व्याख्यातुकामः प्रथमं चित्तपदं व्याचष्टे ।

### तदा द्रष्टुः खरूपेऽवस्थानम् ॥ ३॥

'द्रष्टुः' पुरुषस्य, तसिन् काले, 'सरूपे' चिमाचरूपतायाम्, 'ग्रवस्थानं' स्थितिः भवति । ग्रयमर्थः, उत्पन्नविवेकस्थातेश्वित्यदु-

† रकायनिराज्जे त्वेवमिति B चिक्रितपत्तकपाँठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> परिष्टतदुःखसाधनेव्वेव इति म चिक्रितमुक्तकपाठः।

माभावात् कर्टवाभिमाननिटत्ती प्रेामुकपरिणामाय, बुद्धावात्मनः खरूपेणावखानं खितिर्भवतीति ॥ ३ ॥

युत्यानदशायां तख किं खरूपमित्याइ ।

### र्शत्तिसारूप्यमितर्च ॥ ४ ॥

'इतरच' योगादन्यसिन् काले, उत्तयो या वत्त्यमाण्लचणाः, ताभिः 'सारूप्यं' तद्रूपलं। त्रयमर्थः, यादृग्शो उत्तयः सुख-दुःख-नेग्रात्मिकाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, तादृगूप एव संवेद्यते व्यवद्दर्वभिः पुरुषः। प्रतीयते\* तदेवं, यसिन्नेकाग्रतया परिणते वस्तुनि चिच्छक्तेः† स्वस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठानं भवति, यसिंखेन्द्रियदत्तिदारेण विषया-कारेण परिणते पुरुषस्तदाकार इव परिभाव्यते, यथा जलतरङ्गेषु पलस्म चन्द्रस्वस्तनिव प्रतिभाषते, तचित्तं ॥ ४ ॥

वृत्तिपदं वाखातुमाइ ।

### टत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्तिष्टार्ऽक्तिष्टाः ॥ ५ ॥

'हत्तयः' चित्तस्य परिणामविश्वेषाः । हत्तिषसुदायरूपस्यावय-विनेा या त्रवयवरूपा हत्त्तयस्तद्पेचया तयप्प्रत्ययः। एतदुक्तं भवति। पद्य हत्तयः। कीदृश्यः। 'क्तिष्टाऽक्तिष्टाः'। क्रोग्वेत्त्व्यमाणस्वर्ण्णेराकान्ताः 'क्तिष्टाः', तद्दिपरीताः 'त्रक्तिष्टाः', ॥ ५ ॥

- \* प्रतीयते इतिपाठः B चिक्रितपुच्तके गच्चि ।
- + विविक्तचित्ते इति B चिक्रितपुत्तकपाठः।
- ‡ রিন্তা অরিন্তা হনি B चिंक्रितपुक्तकपाठः। রিন্তা অর্জিন্তাৰ হনি F चিক্নিবুক্তকपाठः।

साधनं सुखसाधनेव्वेव प्रब्हादिषु प्रष्टत्तं । तथ सदैव देवा-नाम्। एतद्क्तं भवति, रजसा प्रष्टत्तिरुपं, तमसा परापकारनिरतं, सचेन सखमयं चित्तं भवतीति । एतासिंससित्तावस्ता न समाधा-वुपयोगिन्यः । एकायनिइद्धरूपे दे व वत्तीत्कर्षाद्यथोत्तरमव-स्वितलात् समाधावपयोगं भजेते। सत्तादिकमव्यत्कमे लयमभि-प्रायः, द्वेारपि रजसमेरेारत्यमहेयलं तदर्थं रजसः দ্বঘন-सुपादानं। यावस्र प्रदृत्तिदर्भिता तावस्त्रिष्टत्तिर्नं प्रकाते दर्भयित-मिति दयोर्थत्ययेन प्रदर्भनं। सत्तस लेतदर्धं पश्चात् प्रदर्भनं। यत तस्रोत्कर्षेणेत्तरे दे स्वमी योगेापयोगिन्याविति अनयो-र्दयोरेकायनिरुद्वयोर्भूमिकयोर्यश्वत्तर्खेकायतारूपः परिणामः Ŧ किसुन्नं भवति, एकाग्रे बर्डिहर्त्तीर्भरोधः, निरुद्धे चेाग: । सर्वासां हत्तीनां ससंस्काराणां प्रविसय इति । जनयोरेव भूम्यो-चींगसा समावः ॥ २ ॥

ददानीं स्रपकारस्वित्त-दृत्ति-निरेाधपदानि व्याखातुकामः प्रथमं चित्तपदं व्याचर्षे ।

# तदा द्रष्टुः खरूपेऽवस्थानम् ॥ ३॥

'द्रष्टुः' पुरुषस्थ, तस्मिन् कार्खे, 'सरूपे' चिमाचरूपतायाम्, 'ग्रवस्थानं' स्थितिः भवति । ग्रयमर्थः, उत्पन्नविवेकस्थातेसित्सडू-

<sup>\*</sup> परिइतदुःखसाधनेव्वेव इति म चिक्रितपुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> रकायनिराद्धे त्वेवमिति B चिक्रितपत्तकपाठः ।

माभावात् कर्टवाभिमाननिष्टत्ते। प्रोम्पुकपरिणामाय, बुद्धावात्मनः खरूपेणावखानं खितिर्भवतीति ॥ ३ ॥

युत्यानदशायां तख किं खरूपमित्याइ ।

### र्शत्तिसारूप्यमितर्च ॥ ४ ॥

'इतरच' योगादन्यसिन् काले, उत्तयो या वच्चमाण्सचणाः, ताभिः 'सारूप्यं' तद्रूपलं । त्रयमर्थः, यादृग्यो टत्तयः सख-दुःख-नेग्रात्मिकाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, तादृग्रूप एव संवेद्यते व्यवद्दर्वभिः पुरुषः । प्रतीयते स्तदेवं, यसिन्नेकाग्रतया परिणते वस्तुनि चिच्छकेः स्वस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठानं भवति, यसिंखेन्द्रियद्यत्तिदारेण विषया-कारेण परिणते पुरुषस्तदाकार इव परिभाव्यते, यथा जलतरङ्गेषु पलस्म चन्द्रस्वस्तन्वि प्रतिभाषते, तचित्तं ॥ ४ ॥

ष्टत्तिपदं वाखातुमाइ ।

### टत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्तिष्टाऽक्तिष्टाः‡ ॥ ५ ॥

'हत्तयः' चित्तस्य परिणामविश्वेषाः । हत्तिसमुदायरूपस्यावय-विनेा या त्रवयवरूपा हत्तयस्तदपेचया तयपप्रत्ययः। एतदुक्तं भवति। पश्च हत्तयः। कीदृस्तः। 'क्तिष्टाऽक्तिष्टाः'। क्तेश्वेर्वद्यमाणस्वचण्रेराकान्ताः 'क्तिष्टाः', तद्दिपरीताः 'त्रक्तिष्टाः', ॥ ५ ॥

- \* प्रतीयते इतिपाठः B चिक्रितपुच्तने गच्ति ।
- † विविक्तचित्ते इति B चित्रितपुक्तनपाठः।
- ‡ জিন্তা অজিন্তা হলি B चिङ्गितपुक्तकपाठः। क्रिस्टा অक्तिस्टाय হলি F चिङ्गितपुक्तकपाठः।

ता एव पद्य वृत्तयः ममुद्दिम्ब व्यास्थायन्ते" । प्रमाग-विपर्य्यय-विकल्प-निद्रा-समृतयः ॥ ६ ॥ श्रामां क्रमेण जजणमाद ।

प्रत्यश्वानुमानागमाः प्रमार्णानि ॥ ७ ॥

त्रचातिप्रसिद्धलात् प्रमाणानां श्रास्त्रकारेण भेदनिरूपणेभैवात-गतलास्त्रचणस्य, न प्रथक् तस्रचणं इतम् । प्रमासत्तचणम्, श्वति-संवादिद्यानं, तत्करणं प्रमाणमिति । इन्द्रियदारेण वाद्यवस्त्रप-रागात् चित्तस्य तदिषया सामान्यविशेषात्मनेाऽर्थस्य विशेषावधारण-प्रधाना दृत्तिः 'प्रत्यच्चं' । ग्रहीतसम्बन्धासिङ्गात् सिङ्गिनः सामा-न्यात्मनाध्ववसायः 'त्रनुमानं' । श्वाप्तवचनम् 'त्रागमः' ॥ ७ ॥ एवं प्रमाणरूपां दृत्तिं व्यास्थाय विपर्ययरूपामाइ ।

# विपर्ययो मिष्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् ॥ ८ ॥

त्रतयाभ्रतेऽघे तथात्पद्यमानं ज्ञानं 'विपर्थयः', यथा ग्रुकि-कायां रजतज्ञानं। 'त्रतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम्' इति । तस्तार्थस्य थट्रूपं न तस्निन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठते, तस्तार्थस्य यत् पारमार्थिकं रूपं न तत् प्रतिभाषयतीति थावत्। संग्रयोऽप्यनद्रूपप्रतिष्ठलात् 'मिष्याज्ञानं', यथा स्वार्णुवा पुरुषे। वेति ॥ ५ ॥

विकल्पटत्तिं वाखातुमाइ।

‡ प्रमाबनच्चबस्थेति F चित्रितपुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>\*</sup> खत्तयः समुपदर्श्वन्ते इति B चिडितपुराकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> उपरत्तवकुविषयप्रमाबानामिति ह चिक्रितपुराकपाठः।

# भ्रब्द्भानानुपाती वस्तुभ्रम्धो विकल्पः ॥ ८ ॥

मन्दजनितं ज्ञानं 'मन्दज्ञानं', तदनुपतितुं प्रीखं यस्त स 'मन्दज्ञा-नानुपाती', 'वस्तुनः', तचालमनपेचमाणे चेऽध्ववसायः सः 'विकस्पः', इत्युच्चते । यथा पुरुषस्त चैतन्यं स्वरूपमित्यच देवदत्तस्य कम्मस इतिवत्मन्दजनिते ज्ञाने षद्व्या चेऽध्यवसितेा भेदस्तमिद्दाविद्य-मानमपि समारोप्य वर्चतेऽध्यवसायः\* । वस्तुतस्तु चैतन्यमेव पुरुषः ॥ ८ ॥

निद्रां वाखातुमाइ।

# अभावप्रत्ययाखम्बना रुत्तिर्निद्रा ॥ १० ॥

'म्रभावप्रत्ययः' 'म्राखम्ननं' यस्ता हक्तेः सा तथोका। एतउ्क्रं भवति, था सन्ततसुद्रिकत्वाक्तमसः<sup>†</sup> समस्तविषयपरित्यागेन प्रवर्त्तते 'हक्तिः' सा 'निट्रा'। श्रस्तास्तः सुखमहमस्ताप्रसिति स्तर्तिनिर्द्र्णनात् स्तरेस्रानुभवस्यतिरेकेनानुपपत्तेर्हेक्तित्वं ॥ ९०॥

स्रतिं वाखातुमाइ।

# भारत्विषयासम्प्रमेाषः समृतिः ॥ ११ ॥

प्रमाखेन 'चनुभूतसा' 'विषवसा' योऽयं 'चबम्प्रमाधः' संस्कार-

- \* समारोप्याध्यवसाय इति म चिक्रितपुत्तकपाठः ।
- † समनातः समुद्रितात्वात्तमसः इति ७ चिक्रितषुसावपाठः ।
- ‡ अस्थाचेति G चिक्रितपुस्तकपाठः।

दारेण बुद्बाबुपारेाद्दः, सः 'स्वतिः'। तच<sup>\*</sup> प्रमाणविपर्य्यविकल्पा जाग्रदवस्थाः। त एव यदानुभवबस्नात् प्रत्यचायमाणास्तदा<sup>†</sup> स्वप्नः। निद्रा लयंवेद्यमानविश्वया। स्वतिस प्रमाणविपर्य्ययविकल्पनिद्रानि-मित्ता॥ ९९॥

एवं हत्तीर्थाखाय सेापायं निरोधं वाखातुमाइ ।

# त्रभ्यासवैगाग्याभ्यां तन्त्रिराधः ॥ १२ ॥

<sup>1</sup>'त्रभ्यासवैराग्ये' वच्छमाणसच्चणे । ताभ्यां तासां प्रकाम्मप्रष्टत्तिः नियमरूपाणां १ चित्ता द्यतीनां, यत् प्रतिइननं सः 'निरोधः' । किसुकं भवति, तासां विनिष्टत्तवाद्याभिनिवेम्नानामन्तर्सुखनया स्वकारण एव चित्ते मक्रिरूपतयावस्तानम् । तत्र विषयदेाषदर्भनजेन वैराग्ग्येस तद्देसुख्यसुत्पाद्यते । त्रभ्यासेन च सुखजनकम्नानप्रवाद्यप्रदर्भनदारेण दृढं सौर्थ्यसुत्पाद्यते । त्रभ्यासेन च सुखजनकम्नानप्रवाद्यप्रदर्भनदारेण दृढं सौर्थ्यसुत्पाद्यते इत्याभ्यां भवति चित्त्तष्टत्त्तिनिरोधः ॥ ९ २ ॥

श्रभ्यामं व्याखातुमाइ ।

1 चित्तनदोनामेाभयते। वाहिनों वहति कच्याखाय वहति पापाय घ। या तु कैवच्यप्राग्भाराविवेकविषयनिम्ना सा कच्याखवहा। संसारप्राग्-भाराविवेकविषयनिम्ना पापावहा। तत्र वैराग्येख विषयखोतस्तिनी क्रियते, विवेकदर्श्वनाभ्यासेन कच्याखचेत उत्पादाते, इत्युभयाधीनच्चित्तवत्ति-रेक्षिः। सभ्यासंवैराग्ये इत्यादि B चिङितपुद्धकपाठः। रष तु साक्ल्यप्रवचन-भाष्यपाठः बेखकप्रमादादाई्ण् सक्ते नीतः।

§ प्रकाशप्रवत्तिष्ठश्मनरूपार्खामिति B चिक्रितपुस्तकपाठः।

|| सुखजननाशान्तप्रत्ययप्रवाइप्रदर्शनदारेबेति F पुस्तनावाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> तदचेति A, D चिक्रितपुक्तवादयपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> प्रत्यच्छोपमान इति B चिक्रितपुक्तकपाठः ।

### तच स्थिता यत्नोऽभ्यासः ॥ १३ ॥

यत्तिरहितस्य चित्तस्य स्वरूपनिष्ठः परिणामः 'स्थितिः' तस्यां 'यत्नः' उत्साहः, पुनःपुनस्तथालेन चेतमि विनिवेशनम् 'त्रभ्यासः', इत्युच्यते॥ ९ ३ ॥

तखैव विशेषमाइ ।

# स तु दीर्घकाखनैरन्तर्थसत्कारसेवितेा दृढभूमिः ॥ ॥ १४ ॥

बज्जकाल 'नैरन्नर्थेणादरातिश्वयेन च चेव्यमान: 'दृढम्द्रमिः' स्विरेा भवति, दार्व्याय प्रभवतीत्वर्थः ॥ ९४ ॥

वैराग्यख खचणमाद ।

दृष्टानुअविकविषयवित्वष्णस्य वश्रीकारसञ्ज्ञा वैरा-ग्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

दिविधो विषये। दृष्ट त्रानुत्रविकञ्च। 'दृष्टः' इहैवेापसभ्यमानः म्रब्दादिः । देवलेाकादैाः 'त्रानुत्रविकः'। त्रनुत्रूयते गुरुसुखादित्यनु-त्रवेा वेदः तत त्रागतः† 'त्रानुत्रविकः'। तयार्दयोरपि 'विषययेाः' परिणामविरसलदर्भनात् विगतगर्द्धस्य,<sup>‡</sup> या 'वभीकारसञ्ज्ञा' ममैते

\* देवलाको इति म पुस्तकपाठः ।

† ततोऽधिगत इति B, C चिङ्गितपुक्तकदयपाठः । तत च्यागतः ज्ञात इति F पुक्तकपाठः ।

‡ विगतरागस्थेति B, D चिंक्रितपुक्तनदयपाठः ।

2

वम्या\* नाइनेषां वम्य इति चेाऽगं विमर्भः,† तत् 'वैराग्यम्' उच्चते ॥ ९ ५ ॥

तस्वैव विग्रेषमाइ ।

20

# तत् परं पुरुषस्यातेर्गु खवैतव्प्यम् ॥ १६ ॥

'तत्' वैराग्यं, 'परं' जलाष्टं। प्रथमं वैराग्यं विषयविषयं, दितीयन्तु गुर्णविषयसुत्यचगुणपुरुषविवेवस्थातेरेव<sup>‡</sup> भवति निरोधसमाधेरत्य-न्तानुकूलतात् ॥ ९ ६ ॥

एवं योगस्य स्वरूपसुका सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातरूपभेदमाइ? ।

# वितर्कविचारानन्दासितानुगमात् सम्प्रज्ञातः ॥१७॥

समाधिरिति ग्रेषः । सम्यक् संग्रयविपर्य्ययरद्तित्वेन प्रज्ञायते प्रकर्षेण ज्ञायते भाव्यस स्वरूपं येन स 'सम्प्रज्ञातः'। समाधिर्भाव-नाविग्रेषः । ध्येयातिरिक्रसकखटत्तिनिरोधः सम्प्रज्ञातः स्वीजसमा-धिरिति याक्त् । स वितर्कादिभेदात् चतुर्विधः । सवितर्कः, सविचारः, सानन्दः, सास्मितस्व । सावना च भाव्यस्य विषयान्तर्यरिद्वारेष

\* वग्रीकारसंचा मैते वग्धा इति F पुस्तकपाठः।

† विभाग इति म पुक्तमपाठः ।

‡ उत्पन्नपुरुषख्यातेरेव भवतीति B चिक्रितपुस्तकपाठः । उत्पन्नगुरुपुरुष-विवेकख्यातेस्तद्भवतीति D पुस्तकपाठः । उत्पन्नगुर्श्वविवेकख्यातेरेव भवतोति F प्रसन्नपाठः ।

🖇 सम्प्रज्ञातभेदरूपमाहेति B चिक्रितपुत्तकपाठः ।

|| चात्मन इति D पुक्तक्रपाठः ।

चेत्रचि पुनः पुनर्भिवेशनं। भाव्यघ्व दिधा। द्रैयरसामानि च। तान्यपि च दिधा जड़ाजड़भेदात् । चडानि चतुर्विष्ठतिः । चजडः पुरुषः \*। तच<sup>†</sup> यदा महाश्वतेन्द्रियाणि खूलानि विषयलेनादाय पूर्व्वापरानुसन्धानेन प्रब्दार्थी क्षेत्रसमेहिन! च भावना प्रवर्त्तते, तदा यवितर्कः यमाधिः। श्रसिम्नेवावसम्मने पूर्व्वापरानुबन्धानग्रव्हार्थीसेश्व श्रुत्याबेन? यदा भावना प्रवर्त्तते, तहा निर्वितर्कः । तमाचामाः कर्ण-खरूणं सत्त्वं विषयमालम्बा तस्य देश्वकालधर्मावच्छे देन। चदा मावना भवर्त्तते, तहा शविचार:। तसिस्त्रेवावसम्बने देशकासधर्मावच्छेई विना धर्मिमात्रावभाषितलेम भाषना क्रियमाणा निर्वित्रार हत्य-चते । एवं पर्यंन्तः समाधिर्याद्वसमापत्तिरिति ध्यपदिग्यते । वदा तु रजसमाखेत्रान्विद्धमनाःवरणवत्त्वं भाष्वते, तदा गृषभावात् चिष्कृतेः सुखप्रकाम्रमयस सत्तस भाव्यमानसोट्रेकात् सानन्दः समाधिर्भवति । भसिमेव समाधी ये बद्धधतयसत्त्वान्तरं प्रधानपरुषरूपं न पग्धनि, ते विगतदेधाइद्वारलात् विदेध्यब्दवाच्याः । इयं यइण्यमापत्तिः । ततः परं रजसनेतिशानभिभ्रतं रहुद्वं सत्तनासम्बनीखत्य या प्रवर्त्तते भावना, तखां गाञ्चस सत्तस न्यग्भावाचिक्कोरहेकात् सत्तामा-

- \* जड़ः पुरुष इति 🛦 प्रसम्पाठः परन्वयं न समीचीनः ।
- † यत्रेति म पुत्तकपाठः ।
- ा प्रब्दार्धा संख्यसम्भेदेगेति C पुस्तनापाठः । प्रब्दार्धा से खसम्भेदेन यदेति
  - F पुद्धवापाठः ।
- ५ प्रव्दोक्षेखन्द्रम्थलेनेति ० मुत्तकपाठः ।
- || सर्व्वदेशकालधर्मावच्छेदेनेति F पुसाकपाठः ।
- ¶ ग्राह्मसमापत्तिरिख्यत इति E विक्रितपुक्तकषाठः।

चावबेषलेन समाधिः सासित इत्युच्चते । न च त्रइङ्कारासितवो-रभेदः बङ्कनीयः, यता यचान्तः करणमइमित्युवेखेन विषयान् वेदयते सेाइङ्कारः, यचान्तर्भुखतया प्रतिखामपरिणासेन प्रडातिलीने चेतवि सत्तामाचमवभाति साऽसिता । त्रसिस्वेव समाधा ये डतपरिताषाः परमात्मार्ग पुरुषं न पग्धन्ति तेषां चेतवि खकारणे खयसुपगते ते प्रडातिखया इत्युच्चन्ते । ये परं पुरुषं ज्ञाला भावनायां प्रवर्त्तने तेषामियं विवेकच्यातिर्य्रहीतसमापत्तिरित्युच्चते । तच सवितर्कसमाधा चतस्रोऽप्यवच्याः ब्रक्तिरूपतयावतिष्ठन्ते, तत एकैकस्रास्त्रागे उत्तरो-नरा इति चतुरवस्त्रीयम् सम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिः ॥ ९७ ॥

श्रसम्प्रज्ञातमाइ।

# विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासपूर्व्वकः संस्तारग्रेषेान्यः \*॥१८॥

विरम्यते अनेनेति 'विरामः' वितर्कादिणिन्नात्यागः । विरामचाम्रो प्रत्ययचेति 'विरामप्रत्ययः', तस्य 'त्रभ्यासः' पैानः पुन्येन चेतसि विनिवेग्रनं, तच या काचित् टत्तिरुझसति तस्यां नेति नेतीति नैरन्नर्येण पर्य्युदसनं तत्पूर्व्वका अस्प्रज्ञातसमाधिः† 'संस्कार प्रेषः',<sup>‡</sup> 'श्रन्यः' तदिखचणः, ज्रसम्प्रज्ञात इत्यर्थः । न तच किश्विदेधं सम्प्र-ज्ञायते इत्यसम्प्रज्ञातो निर्वीजः समाधिः । इष्ट् श्व विधिचित्तस्य परिणामः । व्युत्यानं, समाधिप्रारस्थः, एकायता, निरोधद्य । तच

§ समाधाविद्वेति D पुरतकपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> संख्तारविग्रेषेन्य इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> तत्पूर्व्वकः सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिरिति B पुखकपाठः परक्वयं न समीचीनः।

<sup>‡</sup> संब्लारविग्रेष इति E पुच्चकपाठः ।

चित्रमूढे चित्तभूमी खुत्यानं। विचित्तभूमिः बच्चोद्रेकात् बमाधिप्रा-रस्राः । एकायतानिरुद्धे तु पर्यन्तभुमी । प्रतिपरिणामश्च ग्रंस्काराः । तत्र खुत्यानजनिताः ग्रंस्काराः बमाधिप्रारस्राजैः ग्रंस्कारेईन्यने । तज्जाश्वैकायताजैः । निराधजनितैरेकायताजाः ग्रंस्काराः खरूपञ्च इन्यते । यथा सुवर्णवम्नखितं भ्रायमानं सीयकमात्मानं सुवर्णमलञ्च निर्देष्टति, एवमेकायताजनितान् ग्रंस्कारान् निरोधजाः स्नात्मानञ्च निर्देष्टनि ॥ ९ ८ ॥

तदेत्रं योगस्य खरूपभेदं सञ्जेपेणेपायञ्चाभिधाय विसरेणेापार्य योगाभ्यासप्रदर्शनपूर्व्वकं वक्रुसुपक्रमते ।

### भवप्रत्यये। विदेइप्रहातिखयानाम् ॥ १८ ॥

'विदेहाः', 'प्रहातिखयाः', च वितर्कादिर्स्तामकास्त्रचे व्याख्याताः। तेषां समाधिः 'भवप्रत्ययः', भवः संसारः स एव प्रत्ययः कारणं यख स 'भवप्रत्ययः'। त्रयमर्थः। त्राविर्भूतमाचे† एव संसारे ते तथा-विधसमाधिभाजेा भवन्ति । तेषां परतत्त्वादर्धनात् योगाभ्यासेाऽयं। त्रतः परतत्त्वज्ञाने तद्भावनायाद्य सुक्तिकामेन यत्नः<sup>‡</sup> विधेय इत्येत-दर्थसुपदिष्टम्॥ ९ ८ ॥

तदन्येषान्तु ।

- \* भ्रीसकं खयमात्मानमिति म पुक्तकपाठः ।
- † चाविर्भूताधिमात्र इति E, G पुक्त बयपाठः ।
- ‡ मद्दान् यत्न इति D, G पुराक्रपाठः ।

## अबावीर्यसृतिसमाधिप्रज्ञापूर्व्वक इतरेषाम् ॥ २०।

विदेइप्रहातिखयव्यतिरिकानां चेगिनां, अद्वादिपूर्ध्वकः, अद्वादयः पूर्व्वे उपाया यख स अद्वादिपूर्व्वकः । ते स अद्वादयः क्रमा-दुपायोपेयभावेन प्रवर्त्तमानाः सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेरुपायतां प्रतिप-धन्ते । तत्र 'अद्वा' योगविषये चेतसः प्रसादः । 'वीयें' उत्साइः । 'स्टतिः' अनुभ्दतासम्प्रसावः । 'समाधिः' एकायता । 'प्रज्ञा' प्रज्ञात-व्यविवेकः । तत्र अद्वावता वीर्थे जायते, योगविषये उत्साइवान् भवति । सेत्साइस्य पाद्यात्यासु भूमिषु स्टतिरूपजायते । तत्स्सर-णात् चेतः समाधीयते । समाहितचित्तस्व भाव्यं सम्यग्विजानाति । त एते सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधेरुपायाः । तस्ताम्यासात् पराच वैराग्याद्वक-त्यसम्प्रज्ञातः ॥ २०॥

अक्रीपायवतां चागिनासुपायभेदात् भेदानाइ ।

#### तीव्रसंवेगानामासचः \* ॥ २१ ॥

समाधिलाभ इतिग्रेषः । 'संवेगः' कियाहेतुर्दृढतरः संस्कारः, सः 'तीव्रः', येषामधिमाचोपायानां, तेषां 'त्रायन्न.,' समाधिलाभः,<sup>†</sup> समाधिफलद्यासन्नं भवति. ग्रीघ्रसेव निष्पद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ २९ ॥

के ते तीव्र संवेगा इत्यत आह ।

\* समाधिकाभ इति C, F, G पुक्तकत्र येषु पाठः। यत्र सूत्रे समाधि-जाभ इति पाठक्तत्र टीकायां समाधिकाभ इति ग्रेव इति पाठे। नाक्ति। तथा च समाधिकाभग्रब्देन खन्यतरस्यकस्य यत्र कुत्राप्यवग्र्यमेव भवितव्य-मिति निखोयते।

† तेवां समाधिर्भवति जाभ इति D मुज्जनपाठः ।

## बदुमध्याधिमाचत्वात् ततेापि विग्रेषः ॥ २२ ॥

तेभ्यः उपायेभ्येा स्टदादिभेदभिम्नेभ्य उपायवतां 'विश्वेषः', भवति । 'स्टदुर्मध्येाऽधिमार्चः', इत्युपायभेदाः । ते प्रत्येकं स्टटुर्धवेग-मध्यधंवेग-तीत्रधंवेगभेदात् चिविधाः । तद्गेदेन च नव योगिनेा भवन्ति । स्टटुपायः, स्टटुर्धवेगः, मध्यधंवेगः, तीव्रधंवेगञ्च । मध्येापायः, स्टटु-धंवेगः, मध्यधंवेगः, तीव्रधंवेगञ्च । त्रधिमाचेापायः, स्टटुर्धवेगः, मध्यधंवेगः, तीत्रधंवेगञ्च । त्रधिमाचेापायः, तीव्रधंवेगः, स्थयधंवेगः, तीत्रधंवेगञ्च । त्रधिमाचेापायः क्रिंचेगे मद्दान् यक्रः कर्त्तय इति भेदेापदेश्वः ॥ २२ ॥

इदानीमेतद्पायविखचणं सुगमसुपायान्तरमाइ ।

### ईश्वरप्रणिधानादा ॥ २३ ॥

'ई.खरः' वच्चमाणसत्त्रणः, 'प्रणिधानं' तच भक्तिविभेषः। विभिष्ट-सुपायनं सर्व्वकियाणामपि तचार्पणं। विषयसुखादिकं फलमनिच्छन्\* सर्व्वाः क्रियासस्मिन् परमगुरावर्पयति, तत् 'प्रणिधानं'। समाधेस्तत्-फललाभस्त च प्रदृष्ट उपायः ॥ २ ३ ॥

र्रयरस प्रणिधानात् समाधिसाभ इत्युनं। तचेश्वरस सरूपं, प्रमाणं, प्रभावं, वाचकं, उपासनाक्रमं, तत्फलच्च क्रमेण वक्रुमाद्द। इत्तेशकर्माविपाकाश्य्यैरपरान्टष्टः पुरुषविग्रेष ईश्वरः॥ ॥ २४॥

क्तिम्बन्तीति 'क्तेगाः' त्रविद्यादयो वच्चमाणाः। विद्ति-प्रतिसिद्ध-व्यामित्ररूपाणि 'कर्म्बाणि'। विपच्चन्त इति 'विपाकाः' कर्मफलानि

<sup>\*</sup> मुलमनिच्छुरिति C, F मुल्तकहयपाठः ।

#### पातञ्चले येागसूत्रे

जात्यायुर्भागाः । त्राफलविपाकात् चित्तभूमी घेरत इति 'त्रप्रयाः' वासनाख्याः संस्काराः । तैः 'त्रपराम्टष्टः' चिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पष्टः। 'पुरुषविग्रेषः' अन्येभ्यः पुरुषेभ्ये। विश्विष्यत इति विग्रेषः । 'ईम्बरः' ईग्रमग्रीसः\*, दुच्छामाचेण सकलजगदुद्धरणचमः। यद्यपि सर्वेषा-मात्मनां क्रेग्रादिस्पर्गे। नास्ति तथापि चित्तगतसेषासुपदिस्थते। यथा योद्धगता जयपराजया खामिनः । श्रख तु चिष्वपि कालेषु तथाविधेऽपि क्रेगादिपरामर्गे। नासीत्यतः स विखचण एव भगवा-नीयरः । तस्य च तथाविधमेयर्यमनादेः मत्त्वोत्कर्षात् । मत्त्वोत्कर्ष-सास प्रकृष्टज्ञानादेव। न चानयोः जीनैस्वर्ययोरितरेतरात्रयलं, परस्परानपेचलात्। ते दे शानेश्वर्थे ईश्वरसचे वर्त्तमाने श्रनादि-भटते। तथाविधेन सत्त्वेन तखानादिरेव सम्बन्धः, प्रहतिपुरुषसंयोग-वियोगयोरी खरेच्छा यतिरेकेनानुपपत्तेः । यथेतरेषां प्राणिनां सुख-दुःखमेाइतया विपरिणतं चित्तं निर्मले सात्तिके धर्मात्मप्रस्थे योगि-गरीरे प्रतिमंकान्तं चिच्छायामंकान्ते: मंवेद्यं भवति, नैवमीश्वरख। तस्य केवस एव सात्त्विकः परिणाम उत्कर्षनाननादिसम्बन्धेन भेग्य-तया व्यवस्थितः । श्रतः पुरुषान्तरविसत्तचणतया स एवेश्वरः । सुन्नात्मनः पुनः क्षेत्रादिसंयोगसेसेः शास्त्रोक्तेस्पायैर्निवर्त्ततः, त्रस्य पुनः सर्व्वदेव तथाविधलात्र सुकातातुत्खलं। न चेत्रुराणामनेकलं, तेषां तुत्खलेपि भित्राभिप्रायलात् कार्यस्त्रेवानुपपत्तेः । उत्कर्णापकर्षयुक्रले य एव उत्कष्टः स एव ई.खरः तचैव काष्ठाप्राप्तलादेश्वर्थ्यस्य ॥ २४ ॥

\* ई्रग्रानग्रील इति ▲ पुक्तकपाठः परन्वयं न समीचीनः । † न च तथारिति ८, F पुक्तकदयपाठः । एवमीश्वरस्य सरूपमभिधाय प्रमाणमाइ ।

### तच निरतिश्यं सर्व्वचवीजं ॥ २५ ॥

तस्मिन् भगवति, सर्व्वज्ञलस्य यत् 'वीजं' त्रतीतानागतादिग्रह-णस्याणुलं\* मइत्तञ्च, मूललाद्दीजमिव वीजं, तत् 'तच', 'निरतिभ्रयं' काष्ठां प्राप्तं । दृष्टा दि त्रणुलमइत्तादीनां<sup>†</sup> धर्माणां सातिभयानां काष्ठाप्राप्तिः । यथा परमाणावणुलस्याकाभे च परममइत्तस्य । एवं ज्ञानादयोऽपि चित्तधर्माखारतम्येन परिदृग्ध्यमानाः कचिच्चिर-तिभ्रयतामापादयन्ति<sup>‡</sup> यच चैते निरतिभयाः स ईत्र्यरः । यद्यपि सामान्यमाचेऽनुमानस्य पर्य्यवसितलास्त विभ्रेषावगतिः सभ्भवति, तथापि भात्तादस्य सर्व्वज्ञलादयो विभ्रेषा त्रवगन्तस्याः । स च स्वप्रयोजनाभावे कथं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः संयोगवियोगावापादयतीति नाभ्रह्वनीयं । तस्य कार्डणिकलाङ्चतानुयइ एव प्रयोजनं । कस्प-प्रखयमहाप्रखयेषु निःभेषान् संसारिण उद्धरियामीति तस्याध्यवसायः। यद्यस्टेष्टं तन्तस्य प्रयोजनमिति ॥ २ ५ ॥

एवमीश्वरख खरूपं प्रमाणश्चाभिधाय प्रभावमाइ ।

स एष पूर्व्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥ २६ ॥ त्राद्यानां स्रष्टूणां ब्रह्यादीनामपि, 'गुरुः' उपदेष्टा, यतः 'सः',

\* कातीतानागतादियहवस्यास्यत्वनिति B, C, D, E पुत्तकानां पाठः ।

- † खल्पत्वमइत्त्वादीनामिति A, E पुस्तकपाठः । रवमंत्र सर्व्वत्र खगु-ग्रब्दस्थाने खल्पग्रब्दथवद्यारः ।
- ‡ निरतिश्चयतामासादयन्तीति D मुक्तकपाठः।
  - 3

जात्यायुर्भागाः । आफलविपाकात् चित्तभूमी ग्रेरत इति 'अग्रयाः' वासनाख्याः संस्काराः । तैः 'त्रपराम्टष्टः' चिम्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृष्टः। 'पुरुषविग्रेषः' श्रन्येभ्यः पुरुषेभ्येा विश्रिष्यत इति विश्वेषः । 'ईम्बर' ईश्वनशीलः\*, दुक्कामाचेण सकलजगदुद्धरणचमः । यद्यपि सर्वेधा-मात्मनां क्रेग्रादिस्पर्गें। नास्ति तथापि चित्तगतसेषासुपदिस्वते। यथा योद्धगती जयपराजयी खामिनः । श्रस तु चिष्वपि कालेषु तथाविधेऽपि क्लेणादिपरामर्णे नास्तीत्यतः स विखचण एव भगवा-नीयरः । तस्य च तथाविधमेश्वर्यमनादेः मत्त्वोत्कर्षात् । मत्त्वोत्कर्ष-सास प्रकृष्टज्ञानादेव। न चानयोः जानैसर्ययोरितरेतराम्रयवं, परस्परानपेक्तलात्। ते दे ज्ञानैश्वर्थे ईश्वरसचे वर्त्तमाने श्रनादि-भटते। तथाविधेन सत्त्वेन तखानादिरेव सम्बन्धः, प्रहतिपुरुषसंयोग-वियोगयोरी खरेच्छा यतिरे केनानुपपत्तेः । यथेतरेषां प्राणिनां सुख-दःखमेाहतया विपरिणतं चित्तं निर्मले सात्त्विके धर्मात्मप्रखे योगि-ग्ररीरे प्रतिमंत्रान्तं चिच्छायामंत्रान्ते: संवेद्यं भवति, नैवमीश्वरस्य। तस्य केवस एव सात्त्विकः परिणाम उत्कर्षनाननादिसम्बन्धेन भाग्य-तया व्यवस्थितः । त्रतः पुरुषान्तरविखचणतया स एवेश्वरः । सुकातानः पुनः क्रेगादिसंयोगसीसीः गालोकौरूपायैर्निवर्त्तितः, त्रस्य पुनः सर्व्वदैव तथाविधलात्र सुकातातुत्खलं। न चेत्रराणामनेकलं, तेषां तुख्यलेपि भित्राभिप्रायलात् कार्यस्वैतानुपपत्तेः । उत्कर्षापकर्षयुक्तले य एव उल्लष्टः स एव ई.खरः तचैव काष्ठाप्राप्तलादे खर्यस्य ॥ २४ ॥

Digitized by Google

<sup>\*</sup> ईप्रानग्रील इति A पुक्तकपाठः परन्वयं न समीचीनः । † न च तथारिति C, F पुक्तकद्वयपाठः ।

- 3
- ग्रब्दस्याने खल्पग्रब्दखवहारः । 1 निरतिश्वयतामासादयन्तीति D पुक्तवापाठः।
- † चस्पत्यमचत्त्वादीगामिति A, E पुस्तकपाठः। रवमंत्र सर्व्वत्र चया-

\* खतीतानागतादिग्रहग्रस्थाख्यत्वमिति B, C, D, E पुस्तकानां पाठः ।

स एष पूर्व्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥ २ई ॥ त्राद्यानां स्रष्टूणां ब्रह्यादीनामपि, 'गुरू:' उपदेष्टा, यत: 'स:',

एवमी खर्च खरूपं प्रमाण श्वाभिधाय प्रभावमाइ ।

तसिन् भगवति, सर्व्वज्ञलस्य यत् 'वीजं' ग्रतीतानागतादिग्रह-णखाणुलं महत्तच, मूललादीजमिव वीजं, तत् 'तत्र', 'निरतिघयं' काष्ठां प्राप्तं। दृष्टा दि त्रणुलमद्दत्त्वादीनां<sup>†</sup> धर्मार्णा सातिधयानां काष्ठाप्राप्तिः । यथा परमाणावणुलस्थाकाग्रे च परममहत्त्वस्त्र। एवं ज्ञानाद्योऽपि चित्तधर्मासारतम्येन परिद्रुव्यमानाः कचित्रिर-तिभयतामापादयन्ति यत्र चैते निरतिभयाः स ई.खरः । यद्यपि सामान्यमाचेऽन्मानस्य पर्य्यवसितलास्त विभ्रेषावगतिः सम्भवति, तथापि प्रास्तादस्य सर्व्वज्ञलादयो विग्रेषा त्रवगन्तवाः । स च खप्रयोजनाभावे कथं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः संयोगवियोगावापाद्यतीति नाम्रद्भनीयं। तस्य कारूणिकत्वाझूतानुग्रह एव प्रयोजनं। कल्प-प्रखयमहाप्रखयेषु निःश्वेषान् संसारिण उद्धरियामीति तस्याथ्यवसायः। यद्य खेष्टं तत्तस्य प्रयोजनमिति॥ २५॥

एवमीश्वरस्य सारूपमभिधाय प्रमाणमाइ ।

# तच निर्तिश्रयं सर्व्वज्ञवीजं ॥ २५ ॥

१ पादे २६ सूत्रम्।

पातच्चकी येगगसूचे

'काखेन', नावच्छिद्यते चनादित्वात् । तेषां पुनरादिमचाददि काखेनावच्छेदः॥ २ ६ ॥

एवं प्रभावमुक्ता उपासनेापयेागाय वाचकमाइ ।

#### तस्य वाचकः प्रखवः ॥ २७ ॥

इत्यसुक्रखरूपख ईखरख, 'वाचकः' श्रभिधायकः ।\* प्रकर्षेष नूयते खरयतेऽनेनेति नैाति खीतीति वा 'प्रणवः' श्रोद्धारः । तथास वाच्यवाचकभावसचण्यसम्बन्धेा नित्यः सद्धेतेन प्रकाम्यते, न तु केनचित् क्रियते, यथा पिढ्रपुचथोर्विद्यमानः सम्बन्धेाऽस्तायं पिता श्रस्तायं पुच इति केनचित् प्रकाम्यते ॥ २७ ॥

खपायनमाइ ।

#### तज्जपस्तदर्धभावनम् ॥ २८ ॥

'तस्व' साईचिमाचस्व प्रणवस्व, 'जपः' यथावदुचारणं, तदास्यस्वे-म्वरस्व 'भावनं' पुनः पुनस्वेतसि विनिवेग्रनं, एकायताया उपायः। श्रतः समाधिसिद्धये योगिना प्रणवेा जयः, तदर्थस्व भावनीयः† इत्युकं भवति ॥ २ ८ ॥

खपासनायाः फलमाइ।

ततः प्रत्यक्चेतनाधिगमेाऽप्यन्तरायाभावश्च<sup>‡</sup> ॥ २९ ॥ तस्राज्यपात् तदर्थभावनात् च योगिनः 'प्रत्यक्चेतनाधि-

१च

<sup>\*</sup> वाचकाऽभिधायकः प्रयव खोङ्कार इति A, D पुस्तकदयपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> तदर्थं ई. श्वरच भावनीय इति B, D पुक्तकदयपाठः।

<sup>‡</sup> चेतनागमेाऽन्तराया भाव इति A, C, D, F पुस्तकचतुद्धयपाठः।

गमः', \* भवति । विषयप्रातिकूच्चेन खान्तःकरणाभिसुखमञ्चति, या 'चेतना' दृक्इक्तिः, † सा 'प्रत्यक्चेतना', तखाः 'त्रधिगमः' ज्ञानं, भवति । 'त्रन्तरायाः' वच्छमाणाः, तेषां 'त्रभावः' इक्तिप्रतिबन्धः, भवति ॥ ९ ८ ॥

त्रय के बन्तराया: इत्याग्रहायामाइ।

व्याधि-स्थान-संशय-प्रमादाखस्याविरति-भ्रान्तिदर्श-नाखन्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविश्वेपास्तेऽन्तरा-याः ॥ ३० ॥

मत्रैते रजसमाबसात् प्रवर्त्तमानाः 'चित्तविस्तेपाः', श्रे भवन्ति, तैरेकार्यावरेाधिभिश्चित्तं विचिप्यते इत्यर्थः । तत्र 'व्याधिः' धातु-वैषम्यनिमित्तो ज्वरादिः । 'स्यानं' त्रकर्क्षस्ता चित्तस्य । उभयकेा-व्यासम्बनं॥ विद्यानं 'संग्रयः', योगः साध्या वा न वेति<sup>¶</sup> । 'प्रमादः' त्राननुष्ठामग्रीस्ता, समाधिसाधने त्रीदासीन्यं । 'त्रासस्य' कायचित्त-योर्गुरूलं, योगविषये प्रवृत्त्यभावे क्षेतुः । 'ग्रविरतिः' चित्तस्य

\* प्रत्वक्चेतनागम इति C, D पुक्तकदयपाठः ।

† खान्तः करबाभिमुखमच्चति या दक्षाक्तिरिति B मुक्तकपाठः । खान्तः-करबाभिमुखमच्चति या चेतना दक्षाक्तिरिति A, C मुक्तकदयपाठः । खान्तः करबाभिमुखमच्चति प्रत्यक् चेतना दक्चेतना तखाधिगम इति D मुक्तकपाठः ।

- § चित्तस्य विच्तेपा इति A, C पुत्तवदयपाठः ।
- || उभवनेाग्रालम्बनमिति C पुत्तलपाठः । परन्वयं न समीचीनः ।
- ¶ येगाः साध्यः खादा न वेति A, C पुक्तकदयपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> चाध को तेऽन्तराया इति c, E पुत्तकडयपाठः ।

पस्तवाचयपाठः ।

\*\* प्राबो यदाद्यं वायुमाश्वसिति स श्वास इति B पुस्तकपाठः ।

- 🕂 निश्वसितीति ▲, B, D पुस्तवत्रयपाठः। # ते रतेर्विचेपेरिति ▲, F मुक्तकदयपाठः । रतेर्विचेपेरिति B, E, D
- || चित्तस्य रजस इति 🛽 पुत्तनापाठः ।

१ चासनमनस्पेर्ययेारिति ▲ पुक्तकपाठः ।

- § विच्चेपेम्बेतेषु इति C, E, F पुस्तकत्रयपाठः ।
- ‡ जव्यायामपीति E पुस्तकपाठः ।
- † रजतवदितीति ▲ पुक्तकपाठः ।
- \* विषयसम्प्रयागार्ची गर्ड इति C पुक्तकपाठः ।

कुतसिमिमित्तादुत्पन्नेषु वित्तेपेस्वेते? दुःखादयः प्रवर्त्तमो । तत्र 'दु:खं' चित्तस्य रागजः॥ परिणामः बाधनालचणः, यदाधात् प्राणिनस्तदपघाताय प्रवर्त्तनो । 'दैार्मनस्वं' वाद्याभ्यन्तरैः कारण्मे नचेा देखिंग। 'त्रङ्गनेजयलं' सर्व्वाङ्गीनेा वेपषुः त्रासनस्वैर्थ्यस्व $^{
m N}$ बाधकः । प्राणे यदान्नं वायुमाचामति सः 'श्वासः'\*\*। यत्कीछां वायुं निःघारयति<sup>††</sup> स 'प्रयासः'। त एते विचेपैः‡ सइ वर्त्तमाना

दुःख-दौर्मनस्याक्रमेजयत्व-श्वास-प्रश्वासा विश्वेपसइ-सुवः ॥ ३१ ॥

चिभविचेपकारकानन्यानप्यमारायान् प्रतिपादयितुमाद्द ।

विषयसम्प्रयोगात्मा गई:\*। 'धान्तिदर्शन' शुक्तिकायां रजतल-वदिति विपर्ययद्यानं । 'त्रलस्मामकलं' कुतसित् निमित्तात् समाधिश्व मेरसाभोऽसम्प्राप्तिः । 'श्रमवस्थितलं' सन्धावस्त्रायामपि<sup>‡</sup> समाधिश्वमा चित्तस तवाप्रतिष्ठा । त-एते समाधेरेकाग्रतायाः यचायोगं प्रतिपचलात् 'त्रम्तरायाः', इति उच्चते ॥ ३० ॥

यथोदिताभ्यामभ्याम-वैराग्याभ्यां निरोद्धया इत्येषासुपदेशः॥ ३९॥ सेापद्रवविचेपप्रतिषेधार्थसुपायान्तरमाह ।

#### तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः ॥ ३२ ॥

तेषां विचेपाणां 'प्रतिषेधार्थं' निषेधार्थं, 'एकस्मिन् कसिांसि-दभिमते, 'तत्त्वे', 'त्रभ्यासः', चेतसः पुनः पुनर्व्विनिवेग्रनं कुर्य्यात्। यदुबलात् प्रत्युदितायामेकाग्रतायां प्रग्रमसुपयान्ति विचेपाः ॥ ३२॥

इदानीं चित्तसंस्तारापादकपरिकर्मकथनपूर्व्वकसुपायान्तरमाइ\* ।

मैची-करुणा-मुद्तिापेश्वाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यवि-षयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

'मैची' मैाहाईं। 'करुणा' छपा। 'सुदिता' इर्षः। 'छपेचा' श्रौदाषीन्यं। एता यधाक्रमं सुखितेषु, दुःखितेषु, पुण्धवसु, श्रपु-ण्धवसु च भावयेत्। तथादि सुखितेषु साध्वेषां सुखिल-मिति मैंचीं कुर्यात्न लीर्थां। दुःखितेषु कयं नु नामैषां दुःखि-लविसुक्तिः खादिति छपामेव कुर्यात् न ताटस्थं। पुण्धवसु पुण्धा-नुमेादनेन इर्षं कुर्यात् न तु किमेते पुण्धवन्त इति विद्वेषं। श्रपुण्धवसु चैादासीन्यमेव भावयेत् नानुमोदनं न देषं। सूचे सुखदुःखादिश्रम्देसादन्तः प्रतिपादिताः। तदेवं मैद्यादिपरिकर्मणा चित्ते प्रमीदति! सुखेन समाधेराविभीवो भवति। परिकर्म चैतदाद्यं

- \* चित्तसंस्कारापादकं परिकर्म्मकचनमुपायान्तरमाहिति C, E मुस्तक-द्वयपाठः ।
- † परिकर्मेंबा प्रसादेापायेन चित्त इति E, D पुत्तकदवयाठः ।
- ‡ चित्तप्रसादे सतीति D पुस्तवपाठः ॥

कर्म । यथा गणिते मिस्रकादिव्यवहारगणितनिष्यसये सङ्कलितादि-कर्म, उपकारकलेन प्रधानकर्मनिष्यत्तये प्रभवति, एवं देषरागादि-प्रतिपचभ्रतमैष्यादिभावनया ससुत्पादितप्रसादं चित्तं सम्प्रज्ञात-समाधियेग्यं सन्पद्यते । रागदेषावेव सुख्यतया भेदसुत्पादयतः । ते। चेत् समूखसुन्पूलिते। खातां तदा प्रसन्नलात् मनचेा भवत्येवे-काग्रता ॥ ३ ३ ॥

उपायान्तरमाइ ।

#### प्रच्छईन-विधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य ॥ ३४ ॥

'प्रच्छईनं' यत् कौष्टस्य वायोः प्रयत्नविष्ठेषाम्माणाप्रमाणेन वहि-निःसारणं। 'विधारणं' माचाप्रमाणेनेव प्राणस्थायासः गतिविच्छेदः। स च दाभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यां, वाद्यस्यान्तरापूरणेन, पूरितस्य वायोस्त्रांव निरोधेन । तदेवं रेचकपूरककुभाकभेदेन चिविधः प्राणायासः चित्तस्य स्थितिमेकायतायां निवधाति । सर्व्वासामिन्द्रियटत्तीनां प्राणप्रदत्तिपूर्व्वकलात् मनःप्राणयोः स्वस्वयापारे परस्परमेकयोग-चेमलाज्जीयमाणः प्राणः समसोन्द्रियटत्तिनिरोधदारेष चित्तस्वेक्ता-यतायां प्रभवति । समस्तदेाषचयकारित्वं चास्यागमे श्रूयते, देाष-छतास्य स्वी विचेपटत्तयः । श्रता दोषनिईरणदारेणास्वेकायतायां सामर्थं ॥ ३४ ॥

ददानीसुपायान्तरदर्शनोपचेपेण सम्प्रधातस्य समाधेः पूर्वरङ्गं करोति<sup>†</sup> ।

<sup>\*</sup> बिच्चेपमुत्पादयत इति A, D पत्तलद्वयपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> पूर्व्वाज्नं करोतीति B पुस्तवापाठः।

### विषयवती वा प्रहत्तिरुत्यका स्थितिनिबन्धनी ॥ ३५ ॥

मनस इति वाक्यभ्रेषः । विषया गन्ध-रस-रूप-स्पर्भ-प्रब्झाः ते विद्यको फललेन यस्याः सा 'विषयवती', 'प्रयत्तिः', मनसः स्वैर्थ्यं करोति। तथा हि नासाये चित्तं धारयतेा दिव्यगन्धसम्बिदुपजायते। तादृम्धेव जिझाये रससम्बित्। ताल्पये रूपसम्बित्। जिझामध्वे स्पर्भ-सम्बित्। जिझामूले भ्रब्दसम्बित्। तदेवं तत्तदिन्द्रियदारेए तस्निं-सम्बिन् दिव्ये विषये जायमाना सम्बित् चित्तस्वैकायतायां हेतु-र्भवति, द्वसि योगस्य फल्समिति योगिनां समात्वासार्यादनात्॥ ॥ ३ ५ ॥

एवंविधमेवेापायान्तरमाइ ।

विश्रोका वा ज्योतियाती ॥ इ.६ ॥

प्रवत्तिरूत्पचा चित्तस्य खितिनिवन्धिनीति वाक्यभ्रेषः । ज्योतिः-भ्रम्देन सात्तिकः प्रकाम उच्चते, स प्रभस्ते। श्वयानतिमयवांस्व विद्यते यस्याः सा 'च्योतिम्रती', प्रवत्तिः । 'विभ्रोका' विगतः सुखमय-सत्त्वाभ्यासवस्ताच्छोको। रजःपरिणामे। यस्याः सा, चेतसः स्थिति-निवन्धिनी । त्रयमर्थः इत्पद्मस्युटमध्ये प्रभान्तकस्नोखचीरोद्धिप्रस्थं चित्तसत्त्वं सक्षावयतः प्रज्ञाखेाकात् सर्व्यवत्तिपरिचये चेतसः स्थीर्थ-सुत्पद्यते ॥ ३ ६ ॥

अपायान्तरप्रदर्भनदारेण सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेर्व्षिषयं दर्भयति ।

### वीतरागविषयं वा चित्तं ॥ ३७ ॥

मनसः स्थितिनिवन्धनं भवतीति वाक्यग्रेषः । 'वीतरागः'

परित्यक्रविषयाभिखाषः, तद्य यत् 'चित्तं,' परिचतक्वेश्रं तदाखमनी-इतं, चेतमः खितिहेतुर्भवति ॥ ३७ ॥

एवंविधमेवेापायान्तरमाइ ।

#### खप्र-निद्रा-ज्ञानावलम्बनं वा ॥ इट ॥

प्रत्यसमितवाद्वोन्द्रियटत्तेर्मनोमाचेण्वे यच भोकृलमात्मनः सः 'खप्रः'। 'निद्रा' पूर्व्वीकलचणा\* । तदासम्मनं खप्रासम्मनं, निद्रा-सम्मनं वा 'द्यानं', त्रासम्बामानं, चेतसः स्थितिं करोति ॥ ३ ८ ॥ नानार्हाचितात् प्राणिनां यस्मिन् कस्मिंखिदस्तुनि थोगिनः त्रद्धा भवति । तस्य धानेनापि भवतीष्टसिद्धिरिति प्रतिपादयितुमाइ ।

#### यथाभिमतथ्यानादा ॥ ३८ ॥

यथाभिमते वस्तुनि वाह्ये चन्द्रादौ, त्रभ्यम्तरे नाड़ीचकादेी वा भाव्यमाने चेतः स्थिरं भवति<sup>†</sup> ॥ ३८ ॥

एवसुपायान् प्रदर्श्व फलप्रदर्शनार्धमाइ।

### परमाखु-परममहत्त्वान्तो ऽस्य वश्रीकारः ॥ ४० ॥

एभिरूपायैश्वित्तस्य स्वैर्थ्यं भावयतेा योगिनः स्त्रस्तविषयभावना-दारेण परमाग्वन्तः 'वधीकारः' त्रप्रतिघातरूपः, जायते, कचित् परमाणुपर्य्यन्ते सत्त्र्से विषयेऽस्य मनेा न प्रतिइन्यत इत्यर्थः । एवं स्यूलमाकाधादिपरममद्दत्त्वपर्य्यन्तं भावयतेा न कचित् चेतसः प्रतिघात उत्पद्यते सर्व्वत्र स्वातन्त्रंग्र भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४०॥

**₹8** 

<sup>\*</sup> पूर्व्वमेवेाझलद्यायेति म पुत्तनपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> स्थिरीभवतीति E पुक्तकपाँठः । चेतःस्थितिभैवतीति H पुक्तकपाठः ।

# एवमेभिरूपायैः संक्रतस्य चेतसः कीदृग्रूपं भवतीत्याद्र । स्रीखटत्तेरभिजातस्येव मणेर्यचीतट-यद्दल-याद्मोषु तत्स्थ-तद्ज्जनतासमापत्तिः ॥ ४१ ॥

चीण दत्तयो यख सः 'चीणदत्तिः', तख, 'ग्रहीव-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येषु' त्रात्मेन्द्रिय-विषयेषु, 'तत्ख-तदच्चनतासमापत्तिः', भवति । 'तत्त्खालं' तचैकाग्रता । 'तदच्चनलं' तनायलं, न्यग्भ्रते चित्ते विषयस्य भाव्य-मानस्यैवेात्कर्षः। तथाविधा 'समापत्तिः' तद्रूपपरिणामेा भवतीत्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तमाइ । 'त्रभिजातस्वेव मणेः', इति यथा 'त्रभिजातस्व' निर्भंखस्थ, स्कटिकमणेः, तत्तद्रूपात्रयवग्रात्तत्त्रूपतापत्तिः । एवं त्रभिजातस्व निर्भंखस्य चित्तस्य तत्तद्भावनीयवस्त्रपरागात्तत्त एवं त्रभिजातस्य विर्धाव्य-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येस्वित्युक्तं, तथापि श्वमिकाक्रमवग्रात् ग्राह्य-ग्रहण-ग्रहीव्य-ग्रहण-ग्राह्येस्वित्युक्तं, तथापि श्वमिकाक्रमवग्रात् ग्राह्य-ग्रहण-ग्रहीव्यन्ति बाद्ध्या यतः प्रथमं ग्राह्यनिष्ठ एव समाधिस्तते। ग्रहणनिष्ठस्ततेाऽस्मितामात्ररूपे। ग्रहीव्तनिष्ठः, वेवलस्य पुरुषस्य ग्रहीतु-भाव्यलासम्भवात् । ततश्व स्यूलस्रद्धाग्राद्योपरक्तं चित्तं तत्र समापत्रं भवति । एवं ग्रहणे ग्रहीतरि च समापन्नं बाद्धयं ॥ ४९ ॥

इदानीसुक्ताया एव समापत्तेश्चतुर्व्विधभेदमाद्द\* ।

# ग्रब्दार्थ-ज्ञान-विकल्पैः सङ्कीर्षा सवितर्का ॥ ४२ ॥

त्रोचेन्द्रियग्रह्मः स्फोटरूपेा वा 'भ्रव्दः' । 'श्रर्थः' जात्यादिः । 'ज्ञानं' सन्तप्रधाना सुद्धित्टत्तिः । 'विकन्पः' उन्नसत्तचणः । तैः 'सङ्घीर्णा',

4

<sup>\*</sup> चतुर्विधलमाहेति c युक्तनपाठः ।

यस्थामेते क्रम्दादयस्तयः परसराध्याचेन विकस्परूपेष प्रतिभाधन्ते, गारितिग्रब्दः, गौरित्यर्थः, गौरितिज्ञानं, इत्यनेनाकारेष सा 'सवितर्का', समापत्तिरित्युच्यते ॥ ४ २ ॥

अन्नखचणविपरीतां निर्वितर्कामाइ।

स्मृतिपरिशुद्वा स्वरूपश्रन्येवार्थमाचनिर्भाता नि-र्व्वितर्का॥ ४३॥

भन्दार्थस्वतिप्रविखये, प्रखुदितस्पष्टयाद्वाकारप्रतिभाषितया व्यग्-श्वतज्ञानयत्त्वेन† 'खरूपप्रूत्या दव', 'निर्व्वितर्का', यमापत्तिः ॥॥ ३ १॥ भेदान्तरं प्रतिपादचितुमाद ।

रतयैव सविचारा निर्व्विचारा च स्वत्सविषया व्या-स्थाता ॥ ४४ ॥

'एतसैव' सवितर्कया निर्व्वितर्कया च समापत्त्या, 'सविचारा निर्व्वि-चारा च व्याख्याता'। कीदृभी 'सत्त्वाविषया' सत्त्वास्तन्मा नेन्द्रियादिः<sup>‡</sup> विषयेा यखा सा तथे।क्ता। एतेन पूर्व्वेखाः खूखविषयलं प्रतिपादितं भवति, सा दि मद्दाभ्दताखम्बना भ्रद्धार्थ-भ्रान-विकल्पसद्दितलेन तद्रद्दितलेन च? । देभकाखधर्माद्यवच्छिन्नः सत्त्वोऽर्थः प्रतिभाति यद्यां सा 'सविचारा' । देभकाखधर्मादिरदितेा धर्मिमाचतया

<sup>\*</sup> समापत्तिरुचत इति E पुत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> ज्ञानांग्रत्वेनेति म मुक्तकपाँठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> तन्माचान्तः करबमिति F प्रत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>§</sup> ग्रब्दार्थ-विवर्त्यावयत्वेन ग्रब्दार्थ-विवर्त्यरहितत्वेनेति H प्रत्तकपाठः।

सचोार्थसमात्रेन्द्रियरूपः प्रतिभाति यसां सा 'निर्किंसारा'। त्रसा एव सत्याविषया: ॥ ४४ ॥ किं पर्यमाः सत्यो। विषय इत्याद।

### स्ट्रह्मविषयत्वञ्चासिङ्गपर्य्यवसानं ॥ ४५ू ॥

सविचार-निर्विचारयोः समापत्त्योर्थत 'सुद्धविषयत्वं', उन्नं । न कचिल्लीयते न वा किञ्चिलिङ्गयति गमयतीति 'त्रजिङ्गं' प्रधानं, तत्पर्थमं सुचाविषयलं। तथा हि गुणानां परिणामे चलारि पर्वाणि, विश्विष्टलिङ्गं, चविश्विष्टलिङ्गं, खिङ्गमात्रं, त्रसिङ्गचेति । विश्विष्टलिङ्गं भूतानि । श्रविश्विष्ठलिङ्गं तमाचेन्द्रियाणि । सिङ्गमाचं बुद्धिः । त्र खिङ्गं प्रधानमिति । नातः परं स्रद्ममस्तीत्युक्तं भवति ॥ ४ ५ ॥ ण्तासां समापत्तीनां प्रकृते प्रयोजनसाह ।

#### ता एव\* सवीजः समाधिः ॥ ४६ ॥

'ता एव' उन्नखच्णाः समापत्तचः, सह वीजेन त्रालम्बनेन वर्त्तत इति 'सवीजः' सम्प्रज्ञातः समाधिः, इत्युच्चते, सर्व्यासां सा-सम्बनतात् ॥ ४ ६ ॥

त्राचेतरामां समापत्तीनां निर्व्धित्रारफखकलात्† निर्व्धित्रारायाः फलमार ।

## निर्व्विचारवैशारचे ऋध्यात्मप्रसादः ॥ ४७ ॥

'निर्व्विचार्सं व्याखातं। 'वैग्नार्ट्य' नैर्क्स्टं। सवितर्की खुल-

- - \* स्त्रे टीकायाच रता रवेति E पुक्तकपाठः।
  - + निर्विचारायाः प्रचलादिति छ पुच्चक्याठः ।

२७

विषयामपेच्छ निर्व्धितर्कायाः प्राधान्यं। तताऽपि स्वच्चाविषयायाः सविचारायाः। तताऽपि निर्व्धिकच्परूपाया निर्व्धिचारायाः। तच्छाम्तु निर्व्धिचारायाः प्रक्तष्टाभ्यासवग्रात्<sup>†</sup> 'वैग्रारचे' नैर्मच्चे सति, 'त्रध्यात्म-प्रसादः', ससुपजायते, चित्तं क्लेग्रवासनारहितं खिरप्रवाहयाग्र्यं भवति। एतदेव चित्तच्य वैग्रारचं, यत्खितौ दार्क्यं ॥ ४७ ॥ तस्मिन् यति किं भवतीत्याइ।

#### चतमारा तच प्रज्ञा॥ ४८॥

"चतं" सत्यं बिभर्त्ति कदाचिदपि न विपर्य्ययेणाच्छाद्यते, सा 'च्हतसारा', 'प्रज्ञा', तस्मिन् सति, भवतीत्यर्थः। तस्माच प्रज्ञालेकात्<sup>‡</sup> सर्व्वं यथावत् पग्यन् योगी प्रकष्टं येागं प्राप्नोति ॥ ४८ ॥

#### त्रखाः प्रज्ञान्तराद् वैलचण्यमाद ।

#### त्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यामन्यविषया विश्वेषार्थत्वात् ॥ ॥ ४८ ॥

'श्रुतं' श्रागमज्ञानं, 'श्रनुमानं' उक्तसचर्ण, ताभ्यां या जायते प्रज्ञा सा सामान्यविषया । न दि मञ्दलिङ्गयारिन्द्रियवदिग्रेषप्रतिपत्तौ सामर्थ्ये। इयं पुनर्निर्व्धिचारवैभारद्यससुपेता॥ प्रज्ञा ताभ्यां विसल्ल्णा

|| निर्विचारवैग्रारद्यसमुद्भवेति B, E पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> तस्या चापीति B पुत्तवापाठः।

<sup>†</sup> प्रक्तराभ्यासनमादिति B युक्तमपाठः ।

t तस्यास्त प्रज्ञाया इति F मुद्धनगठः।

<sup>5</sup> श्रोतानुमानप्रचाभ्यां सामान्यविषया इति म पुक्तकपाठः । परन्त्ययं न समीचीनः ।

विश्वेषविषयलात्। त्रासां हि प्रज्ञायां सत्त्वा-व्यवहित-विप्रक्तष्टानामपि विश्वेषः स्फुटेनैव रूपेण प्रतिभाषते। त्रतसाखां हि प्रज्ञायां येागिना परः प्रयत्नः कर्त्तव्य इत्युपदिष्टं भवति॥ ४८॥

श्रयाः प्रश्वायाः फलमार ।

#### तज्जः संस्तारोऽन्यसंस्तारप्रतिबन्धी ॥ ५० ॥

तया प्रज्ञया जनितः यः 'संस्कारः,' सेाऽन्यान् युत्यानजान् समाधिजांस्व\* संस्कारान् प्रतिवधाति, खकार्य्यकरणाचमान् करो-तीत्यर्थः। यतसत्त्वरूपतया तया जनिताः संस्कारा वखवत्त्वात् स्रतत्त्व-रूपप्रज्ञाजनितान् संस्कारान् बाधितुं ग्रक्तुवन्ति । स्रतस्तासेव प्रज्ञा-मभ्यसेदित्युक्तं भवति ॥ ५०॥

एवं सम्प्रज्ञातसमाधिमभिधायासम्प्रज्ञातं वक्तुमाइ।

#### तस्यापि निरोधे सर्व्वनिरोधान्तिर्वीजः समाधिः ॥ ॥ ५१ ॥

'तस्यापि' सम्प्रज्ञातस्थापि, 'निरेाधे' प्रविखये, सति, 'सर्व्वासां' चित्तवत्तीनां, खकारणे प्रविखयाद्या या संस्कारमाचा टत्तिरूदेति, तस्यां तस्यां नेति नेति केवलं पर्यंदसनात्<sup>†</sup> 'निर्व्वीजः समाधिः', श्राविर्भवति। यस्मिन् सति पुरुषः खरूपमाचनिष्ठः<sup>†</sup> इ.इ.द्वो भवति॥

तद्वाधिकृतस्य योगस्य सत्त्रणं, चित्तवृत्तिनिरेाधपदानाञ्च व्या-

- + पर्य्यदर्भगदिति B पुस्तकपाठः ।
- ‡ सरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठ इति B पुत्तवपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> तत्त्वज्ञानसमाधिजांखेति म पुत्तकपाठः ।

स्थानं, प्रश्वास-वैराग्यसचणं, तस्त्रोपावदयस्व<sup>\*</sup>, सरूपं भेदश्वाभिधाय बम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातभेदेन योगस्थ सुख्यासुख्यभेदसुक्ता योगाभास-प्रदर्शनपूर्व्वकान् विस्तरेणोपायान् प्रदर्श्व सुगमोपावप्रदर्श्वनपरतवा रैप्ररस्थ सरूप-प्रमाप-प्रभाव-वाचकोापासनाक्रम-तन्पस्सानि निर्णीय चित्तस्य विचेपांस्वत्सदसुवस्य दुःखादीन् विस्तरेषः च तन्प्रतिषेधोपा-यानेकतत्त्वाभ्यासमैत्र्यादीन् प्राणायामादीन् सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातपूर्व्व-रङ्गश्वतविषयवतीप्रदृत्तिरित्यादीनास्त्यायोपषंदारदारेण समापत्ती: सलचणाः फल्सदिताः<sup>†</sup> सासविषयसदितास्रोक्ता सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञा-तयोद्दपसंदारमनिधाय सवीजपूर्व्वका निर्व्वीजः समाधिरनिद्धित इति व्याक्रते। योगपादः<sup>‡</sup> ॥ ५९ ॥

इति श्रीमद्दाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्तण्डा-भिधायां पातच्चबयोगबास्तवत्तौ योगपाद: प्रचम: ॥ ॰ ॥

\* अभ्यास-बैराग्योपायदक्होति B पुस्तनमाठः ।

- † बच्चयामलसहिता इति B मुलाकपाठा ।
- ‡ खाखाते। वागमर इति ह पुकाक्पाठः ।

#### ऋव दितीयः पादः ।

ते ते दुष्पुापयागर्द्धामद्भये येन दर्शिताः ।

उपायाः स जगन्नाचस्व्यचेाऽस्तु प्रार्थितान्नये॥ ९ ॥

तदेवं प्रथमे पादे समाहितचित्तस्य सोपायं योगमभिधाय युत्यितचित्तस्प्रापि कयसुपायाभ्यासपूर्व्वका योगः साध्यतासुपयातीति तत्साधनानुष्ठानप्रतिपादनाय क्रियायोगमाष्ठ ।

### तपः-स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः ॥ १ ॥

'तपः' श्वास्ताम्तरोपदिष्टं छच्छ्रं पान्द्रायनादि । 'खाध्यायः' प्रखवपूर्वाणां मन्त्राणां जपः । 'ईत्यरप्रशिधानं' सर्व्वक्रियाणां तस्मिन् परमगुरौ फखनिरपेचतचा समर्पणं । एतानि क्रियायोग इत्युच्चते ॥९॥ स किमर्थ इत्यत न्त्राष्ठ ।

## समाधिभावनार्थः क्लेग्रतनू करणार्थय ॥ २ ॥

'क्कोग्राः' वच्चमाण्पाः । तेषां 'तणूकरणं' खकार्थ्यकरण्प्रतिसन्भः । 'धमाधिः' जन्नखचणः । तस्य 'भावना' चेतसि पुनःपुनर्निवेग्ननं । सः 'त्रर्थः' प्रयोजनं यस्य स तथेकाः ॥ एतदुक्तं भवति । एते तपः-प्रस्टतयेाऽभ्यस्यमानास्विक्तगतानविद्यादीन् क्तेज्ञान् भिषित्वीखुर्ज्यन्तः समाधेरूपकारकर्तां भजन्ते । तस्नात् प्रथमतः क्रियायेागावधानपरेण योगिना भवितव्यसित्युपदिष्टं ॥ २ ॥

क्रीमननूकरकार्चनित्युकां तत्र के क्रीमा इत्यत आह।

#### त्रविद्याऽसिता-राग-देषाभिनिवेशाः पत्र क्लेशाः॥ ॥ ३॥

'क्तेग्राः' श्रविद्यादयो वद्त्यमाणलत्त्रणाः पञ्च। ते बाधनालत्तर्षं परितापसुपजनयन्तः क्तेग्रग्रब्दवाच्या भवन्ति। ते द्दि चेतसि प्रवर्त्त-मानाः संसारलत्त्रणं\* गुणपरिणामं द्रढयन्ति ॥ ३ ॥

सत्यपि सर्व्वेषां तुन्धे क्षेत्रवे मूलस्टतलादविद्यायाः प्राधान्यं प्रति-पादयितुमाइ ।

#### त्र्विद्या श्वेचमुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्त-तनु-विच्छिन्नोदाराखां। ॥ ४॥

'ग्रविद्या' मोइ:, ग्रनात्मन्यात्माभिमान इति यावत्। सा 'चेत्रं' प्रस्वस्ट्रमि:, 'उत्तरेषां' ग्रस्मितादीनां प्रत्योकं प्रसुप्तादिभेदेन चतुर्व-धानां। ग्रते। यचाविद्या विपर्य्ययज्ञानरूपा ग्रिपिली भवति, तच क्रेग्रानां ग्रस्मितादीनां नेाद्भवे। दृग्धते, विपर्य्ययज्ञानसद्भावे च तेषासु-द्भवदर्ग्रनात् स्थितमेव मूललमविद्यायाः<sup>†</sup> । 'प्रसुप्त-तनु-विस्किन्नोदा-राणां', इति तच ये क्रेग्रास्चित्तस्ट्रमा स्थिताः प्रवेश्वकाभावे स्वकार्य्य नारभन्ते, ते 'प्रसुप्ताः', इत्युच्धते। यथा बाल्यावस्त्रायां । बालस्य इ वासनारूपेण स्थिता ग्रपि क्रेग्राः प्रवेश्वक्षस्वहकार्य्यभावेनः नाभिव-च्यन्ते। ते 'तनवः', ये स्रस्प्रतिपचभावनया ग्रिथिलीक्षतकार्य्यसम्पाद-नग्रकयो वासनाविग्रेषतया चेतस्थवस्थिताः प्रस्रतां सामगीमन्तरेण

<sup>\*</sup> संस्तार बच्च गमिति B पुक्त कपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> स्थितमेवं मूलमविद्याया इति B पुस्तकपाठः।

<sup>‡</sup> खबेाधकसङ्कार्यभावेनेति B, C मुखकपाठः।

•

#### ERRATA.

|            |          |                | (San               | skrit.)   | )                       |  |
|------------|----------|----------------|--------------------|-----------|-------------------------|--|
| Page 2     | line 1 f | or 1           | त्युत्तिभिः        | read      | सित्युक्तिमिः           |  |
| 5          | 1        | " <sup>1</sup> | <b>बरिणामाय</b>    | "         | परिणासायाँ              |  |
| 8          | 8        | "              | ৰিম্যা             | .23       | विषया                   |  |
| 10         | 14       | •••            | सावना              | "         | भावना                   |  |
| 11         | 2        |                | ন্দ্রানি           | "         | चडानि                   |  |
| 12         | 7        | <i></i><br>,,  | म्ट्रीत            | ,,        | ररीह                    |  |
| 12         | 2        |                | नास च              | ""        | मामच                    |  |
| 10         | -<br>4   | ,,<br>,,       | निराच              | "         | লিবাষ                   |  |
| "<br>16    | ĩ        |                | व्ययाः             | **        | वागयाः                  |  |
| 10         | 6-11     | "              | ন্থান              | 7)        | स्यान                   |  |
|            | 10       | "              | यदाचात्            | 23        | ৰহাধান্                 |  |
| 20         | 10<br>15 | ,,             | जीयसाबः            |           | जीयमा गः                |  |
| 22         |          | <b>33</b>      | जावनारू<br>सम्मित् | <b>39</b> | संवित्                  |  |
| 23         | 4,5,6,7  | "              |                    | <b>"</b>  | परसाखनः                 |  |
| 24         | 16       | *              | परसाम्बन           |           | जहां तत् चलिइपर्यवसावं। |  |
| 27         | 5        | 33             | ভন্না।             | >>        |                         |  |
| (English.) |          |                |                    |           |                         |  |
| Page 2     | line 11  | for            | fo                 | read      | of                      |  |
| 1          |          | ັ່ນ            | word               | "         | phrase                  |  |
| 1          | 7 " 1    |                | cive               | "         | conducive.<br>thumb     |  |
| 4          | 3 , 25   | <b>3</b> 2     | thum               | "         |                         |  |

. F पुत्तकपाठः । † निष्याच्चानरूपायामविद्यायामिति B, C, E पुत्तकपाठः । ﴿ અतस्मिंत्तदिति प्रतिभास इति A पुत्तकपाठः ।

5

- सब्तार जच्च गामात अ पुक्त नपाठः ।
   स्थितमेवं मूलमविद्याया इति अ पुक्त नपाठः ।
   सबेाधकसङ्घनार्थभावेनेति अ, с पुक्त नपाठः ।

पातञ्चले ये।गसूचे

,

Ċ

**२**२

न खकार्थमारश्चुं चमाः। यथाभ्यासवतेा दि योगिनः। ते 'विच्छिचाः', ये केनचिद् बखवता क्वेग्रेनाभिश्वतप्रक्रयसिष्ठन्मि। यथा देवावस्त्रायां रागः, रागावस्त्रायां वा देषः। न द्मनयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोर्थुगपत् सन्भवे।ऽस्ति । ते 'छदाराः', ये प्राप्तषद्दकारिषचिधयः स्तं स्तं कार्य्यम-भिनिर्वर्त्तयन्ति । यथा सर्व्वदेव येगगपरिपन्थिनेा युत्यानदग्रायां\* । एषां प्रत्येकं चतुर्व्धिानामपि मूस्त्रात्रत्वेन स्त्रिताप्यविद्याऽन्वयित्वेन प्रतीयते । न दि कचिदपि क्वेग्रानां विपर्य्यान्वयनिरपेचरूपाणां<sup>†</sup> सिर्ह्यात्रेवां चतुर्व्धिानामपि मूस्त्रात्रत्वेन स्त्रिताप्यविद्याऽन्वयित्वेन प्रतीयते । न दि कचिदपि क्वेग्रानां विपर्य्यान्वयनिरपेचरूपाणां<sup>†</sup> सिर्ह्यास्त्रयत्रे । तस्त्राच्च मिथ्यान्धतायामविद्यायां<sup>‡</sup> सम्यक्**द्यानेन** निवर्त्तितायां दग्धवीजकच्पानां एषां न कचित् प्रराद्योऽस्तीति त्रविद्यानिमित्तत्वमविद्यान्वयस्त्रेषां निस्त्रीयते । त्रतः सर्व्वेऽप्यविद्याव्यप-देग्रभाजः । सर्व्वेषाच्च क्वेग्रानां चित्तविचेपकारित्वात् येगिना प्रयमसेव तरुच्छेदे यत्नः कर्त्तय इति ॥ ४ ॥

श्वविद्याया सत्त्रणमाद्य।

## श्वनित्याश्रुचि-दुःखानात्मसु नित्य-शुचि-सुखात्म-खातिरविद्या॥ ५ ॥

श्वतसिंखत्प्रतिभासः १ 'श्वविद्या', इति श्वविद्यायाः सामान्यलचणं। तस्त्रा एव भेदप्रतिपादनं। 'श्वनित्येषु' घटादिषु, नित्यलाभिमानः

- ‡ मिर्ष्याच्चानरूपायामविद्यायामिति B, C, E पुत्तकपाठः ।
- 🖇 चतसिंत्त्तदिति प्रतिभास इति ∆ पुत्तवपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> खुत्पादनदग्रायामिति B पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> विपर्थ्या ब्रेरपेचा बामिति B, E। विपर्था सान्यय निरपेचा बामिति F पुत्तकपाठः ।

त्रविद्येत्युच्चते । एवम् 'ग्राइचिषु' कायादिषु, उइचित्राभिमानः। 'दुःखेषु' च विषयेषु, सुखलाभिमानः" । 'चनात्मनि' प्ररीरे, चात्म-लाभिमानः†। एतेनापुखे पुद्धक्षेतेाऽनर्धे चार्यक्षेत्री व्याख्यातः॥ ५॥

त्रस्मितां व्याख्यातुमार ।

### हग्दर्भनण्त्त्वोरेकात्मतैवास्मिता ॥ ई ॥

'दूक् शक्तिः' पुरुषः । 'दर्शनशक्तिः' रजस्तमेाभ्यामनभिश्वतः सात्विकः परिषासेाऽन्तःकरण्इूपः । तयोर्भेग्यभोकृत्वेन जडाजडत्वेन-बात्यन्तं भिन्नयोः 'एकताभिमानः 'त्रस्मिता', इत्युच्यते । यथा प्रहातिर्वस्तुतः कर्त्तृत्न-भोकृत्वरहितापि कर्त्यद्दं भोक्काइमित्यभिमन्यते, बेाऽयमस्मितास्त्रो विपर्यासः क्रेशः ॥ ६ ॥

रागख सचणमाइ।

#### सुखानुशयी रागः ॥ ७ ॥

सुखमनुभेते इति 'सुखानुभयी',सुखज्ञख सुखानुस्मृतिपूर्वंक: सुख-साधनेषु विष्णारूपो गई: 'रागसंज्ञः" क्षेण: ॥ ७ ॥

देवस सचणमार ।

#### दुःखानुश्रयी देषः ॥ ८ ॥

- \* सुखाभिमान इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
- † खात्माभिमान इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।
- ‡ रजस्तमाभ्यामनभिधान इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
- § सुखानुभये। राग इति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः।
- || गर्व्वा रागसंज्ञव इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।
- ¶ दुःखानुग्रयाे देव इति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः।

'दुःसं' उन्नत्तचर्ण। \* तदभिज्ञस्य तदनुस्मृतिपूर्व्यकः तसाधनेव्वन-भिषमता रोऽयं निन्दात्मकः † सः 'डेवलचणः क्वेत्रः ॥ म् ॥

श्रभिनिवेश्वस सत्तर्णमाद<sup>‡</sup> ।

#### स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽपि तम्बनुबन्धोऽभिनिवेशः ।॥ ॥ ९ ॥

पूर्वजन्मानुभुतमरणदुःखानुभववाधनावखात्<sup>॥</sup> भयरूपः ससुपजा-यमानः ग्ररीरविषयादिभिर्मम वियोगो माभूदित्यन्वदं ग्ररीरानुबन्ध-रूपः सर्व्यस्वैवाद्यमेर्जन्त्रिपर्यम्ते<sup>ण</sup> निमित्तं विना प्रवर्त्तमानः 'ग्रभिनि-वेत्राख्यः क्रोज्ञः । तदेवं खुत्यानख क्रोत्रात्मकलात् एकाग्रताभ्यासेन\*\* प्रथमं क्रोत्राः परिदर्त्तव्याः ॥ ८ ॥

न चाज्ञातानां तेषां परिदारः व्रक्षः कर्त्तुमिति तज्ज्ञानाय तेषां उद्देशं चेचं विभागं सत्त्र्णं<sup>††</sup> चाभिधाय स्पूलस्त्रच्मभेदभिन्नानां तेषां प्रद्वाणेापायविभागमाद्द<sup>11</sup>।

### ते प्रतिप्रसवहेयाः स्ट्रसाः ॥ १० ॥

| * प्रतिकूलनचा बिमिति B, C, E पुत्तकपाठः ।                 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| † चनभित्रसता या निन्दा इति हे पुत्तकपाठः ।                |
| ‡ च्वर्भिनिवेग्रमाहेति H पुक्तकपाठः ।                     |
| § तथा रूजोऽभिनिवेग्न इति C पुक्तकपाठः। खयमेव पाठे। भाष्य- |
| कारिय छतः ।                                               |
| पूर्व्वेजन्मानुभवमरखदुःखानुभववासनावलादिति H पुस्तकपाठः ।  |
| ¶ सर्व्वस्वास्ततेक्रेस्नपर्यन्तमिति H पुक्तकपाठः ।        |
| ** एकाग्रताभ्यासकामेनेति C, E, प्रत्तकपाठः ।              |
| 🕂 विभागजद्यबमिति E पुस्तकपाठः ।                           |
| 11 प्रहरतापायमाहेति B, C, E पत्तकपाठः ।                   |

ते 'सुद्धाः', क्वेग्राः, चे वासनारूपेषावखिता न टत्तिरूपं परिषाममारभनो । 'ते', 'प्रतिप्रसवेन' प्रतिखेामपरिषासेन, 'हेचाः' त्यनव्याः । खत्कारणासितायां छतार्थं सवासनं चित्तं यदा प्रविष्टं भवति, तदा कुतस्तेषां निर्मूखानां सन्भवः ॥ ९०॥

खूसानां दानेापायमाद ।

#### ध्यानहेयास्तदुवत्तयः ॥ ११ ॥

तेषां क्रेणनामारथकार्थ्याणां याः सुखदुःखमेाहात्मिकाः 'खत्तयः', ताः, 'धानेनैव चित्तैकाग्रतासत्त्रणेन, 'हेयाः' हातव्या इत्यर्थः । चित्तपरिकर्ष्याभ्यासमाचेण्वे स्यूकलात् तासां निटत्तिर्भवति, यथा वद्तादौ वनः स्यूस्ता मस्तः प्रचासनमाचेण्वे निवर्त्तते । यसु तच स्रूद्धाः स तैसीद्दपायद्त्त्तापनप्रस्टतिभिरेव निवर्त्तयितुं प्रकाते ॥ ९९ ॥

एवं क्रेग्रानां तत्त्वमभिधाय कर्माग्रयस्थाभिधातुमाइ! ।

### क्तेश्रमूसः कर्माशयो दृष्टादृष्टजम्मवेद्नीयः ॥ १२ ॥

'कर्म्पाण्रयः', इत्यनेन तस्य खरूपमभिद्तिं, यतेा वासनारूपाच्येव कर्म्पापि । 'क्षेण्रमूखः', इत्यनेन कारण्यमभिद्तिं, यतः कर्म्पणं ग्रुभान ग्रुभानां क्षेणा एव निमित्तं । 'दृष्टादृष्टजव्यवेदनीयः',‡ इत्यनेन फल्लसुप्तं । श्रस्मिन्नेव जव्यनि श्रनुभवनीयः 'दृष्टजव्यवेदनीयः'१ ।

<sup>\*</sup> खप्रदत्तिरूपमिति B, E पुक्तवपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> कर्म्भाग्रयमभिधातुमाहेति म युक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> दृखवेदनीय इति B, E पुक्तकपाँठः। जन्मवेदनीय इति C पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>§</sup> दृखवेदनीय इति E पुत्तकपाठः । जन्मवेदनीय इति C पुत्तकपाठः ।

जम्मामरानुभवनीयः 'त्रदृष्टजम्मवेदनीयः'। तथादि कानिषित् पृष्यानि कर्म्माणि देवताराधनादीनि तीव्रयंवेगेनैव छतानि इद्दैव जम्मनि फर्झ जात्यायुर्भेगम्बचणं प्रयच्छन्ति, यथा नन्दीसरस्य भगवस्महेस्वराराधन-बसादि हैव जम्मनि जात्यादयो विभिष्टाः" प्रादुर्भूताः। एवमन्येषां विश्वामित्रादीनां तपःप्रभावाज्जात्यायुषी । केषाद्विज्जातिरेव, यथा तीव्रसंवेगेन दुष्टकर्मछतां नड्ठषादीनां जात्यन्नरपरिणामः, जर्म्यसास्व कार्त्तिकेयवने सतारूपतयां । एवं व्यस्तसमस्तरूपत्वेनं यथायोगं थोज्यं ॥ ९ २ ॥

दनानीं कर्माण्यय खभेदभिम्नं फलमाइ।

## सति मूखे तद्दिपाकेा जात्यायुर्भागाः ॥ १३ ॥

'मूलं उन्न सचणाः क्वेगाः, तेव्वनभिश्वतेषु' यसु, कर्मणां कुप्रला-कुत्रसरूपाणां 'विपाकः' फसं, 'जात्यायुर्भागाः' भवन्ति । 'जातिः' मनुव्यत्वादिः । 'त्रायुः' चिरकासं ग्ररीरसम्बन्धः । 'भोगाः' विषयाः इन्द्रियाणि सुखदुःखसंविच, कर्म्यकरणभावसाधनव्युत्पत्त्या? भोग-प्रब्द्रस्य । इदमच तात्पर्थं चित्तभूमौ त्रनादिकालसञ्चिताः कर्म्यवासना वथा यथा पाकसुपयान्ति, तथा तथा गुणप्रधानभावेन स्तिता जात्यायुर्भागसच्चणं स्त्रकार्थमारभन्ते ॥ ९ ३ ॥

<sup>\*</sup> जात्यायुर्भागविश्रिष्टा इति B, C, E पुत्तवपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> बतारूपा तथेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> यक्तसमक्तवेनेति B, E पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>§</sup> जर्म्मकर्बमावयुत्पच्चेति H पुच्तकपाठः।

कर्मु लमाइ । ते ह्लाद-परितापफलाः पुख्यापुख्य हेतुत्वान् ॥ १४ ॥

'इादः' सुखं, 'परितापः' दुःखं, झाद-परितापौ फखे येषां 'ते'

तथोकाः । 'पुर्खं' कुत्रखं कर्ब, तद्विपरीतं 'चपुर्खं', ते पुर्खापुर्खे

कारणे चेषां तेषां भावखखात् । एतदुक्तं भवति, पुष्यकर्ष्मारआ

जात्यायुर्भागा सादफलाः । ऋपुष्यकर्षारव्याः परितापफलाः॥ ९ ४ ॥

एतस प्राणिमाचापेचया देविधं, योगिनस्त सर्व्वं दु:खमित्याद्य।

परिणाम-ताप-संस्कारदुःखैर्गुणटत्तिविरोधाच सर्व्व

जन्नानां कर्मफलले जात्यादीनां खकारणकर्मानुवारेण कार्थ-

36

परिज्ञातक्लेग्रादिविवेकस्य परिदृष्यमानं सकलमेव भोगसाधनं सविषस्तादस्रवत्<sup>‡</sup> 'दुःखमेव' प्रतिक्रूलवेदनीयमेवेत्यर्थः। यस्तादत्यन्ता-भिजातः १ चोगी दुःखलेग्रेनाणुद्विजते॥ । यथाऽचिपाचमूर्णातम्नुसर्ग्र-माचेथेव महतों पीडामनुभवति नेतरदङ्ग, तथा विवेकी खख्यदुखा-विरञ्चते । कथमित्याइ 'परिणाम-ताप-संस्कार-नुषङ्गेनाऽपि<sup>¶</sup>

- \* पुख्यापुख्यच्चेतुपालत्वादिति E मुक्त कपाठः ।
- † दुःखमेव सब्वें विवेकिन इति E पुक्तकपाठः ।
- ‡ सविषाज्ञवदिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

दुःखमेव | विवेकिनः ॥ १५ ॥

- § यस्मादत्यन्ताभिज्ञात इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।
- || दुःखलेग्रेनाम्यूदिजत इति B, E पुक्तकपाठः ।
- ¶ खल्पदुःखानुसम्बन्धेनापीति c पुत्तकपाठः । सुखदुःखानुबन्धेनापीति в, E प्रत्लकपाठः।

38

दुः खेः' । विषयाणासुपशुच्यमानानां यथायथं गर्द्धाभिट द्वे सदप्राप्ति-इतस्व दुःखस्वापरिष्टार्थ्यलात् दुःखाक्तरसाधनला चास्वेव दुःखरूपतेति 'परिणामदुःखलं । उपशुच्यमानेषु सुखमाधनेषु तत्प्रतिपत्थिनं प्रति देषस्व धर्कदैवावस्वितलात् सुखानुभवकास्तेऽपि तापदुःखं दुष्परिष्ठा-रमिति 'तापदुःखता । 'संस्कारदुःखलं स्वाभिमतानभिमतविषयय-निधाने सुखमंबित् दुःखमंविषोपजायमाना तथाविधमेव स्वचेने संस्कारमारभते, संस्काराच पुनस्तथाविधमंविदनुभव इत्यपरिमित-संस्कारोत्पत्तिद्वारेण संघारानुष्कदेदात् धर्व्यस्वेव दुःखलं । 'गुण्ट-त्तिविरोधाष्व' इति, गुण्णनां सलरजस्तमयां या टत्तयः सुखदुः-खमेष्टक्र्पाः परस्परमभिभाव्याभिभावकत्वेन विरुद्धा जायन्ते, तायां सर्व्यवे दुःखानुबन्धाद् दुःखलं । एतदुक्तं भवति । ऐकान्तिकीं त्रात्य-मिलकीम्च दुःखनिदत्तिमिष्क्रतेा विवेकिन उक्तरूपकारणचतुष्टयं यावत् सर्व्वे विषया दुःखरूपतया प्रतिभान्ति । तस्कात् सर्व्यकर्मविपाकोा दुःखरूप एकेयुक्तं भवति ॥ १ ५ ॥

तदेवसुक†क्केग्र-कर्माग्रय-विपाकराग्रेरविद्याप्रभवलात् भ्रविद्यायास्व मिथ्याज्ञानरूपतया सम्यग्ज्ञानेाच्छेद्यलात् सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य च ससाध-नहेयोपादेयावधारणरूपलात्तदभिधानायाह ।

## ह्रेयं दुःखमनागतं ॥ १६ ॥

<sup>\*</sup> तत्प्रतिबन्धनं इति E पुक्तकपाठः। तत्परिपञ्चिनमिति C पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> तदेवमुक्तस्थेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः । रतदेवमुक्तस्य G पुस्तकपाठः ।

पत्तकपाठः । † इत्युक्तमितीति म पुक्तकपाठः।

\* व्यतिक्रान्तत्वादिति H पुस्तकपाठः। निष्ट्र्वान्तत्यादिति E, C, अ

इति । 'भूतानि' स्यूलसत्त्रभेदेन पृथियादीनि गन्धतनावादीनि च । 'इन्द्रियाणि' बुद्बीन्द्रिय-कर्मान्तःकरणभेदेन चिविधानि । ভময-मेतद् गाह्य-ग्रहणरूपं 'त्रात्मा' खरूपाभिन्नः परिणामः, यस तत्

पवर्गार्थं हुग्धं ॥ १८ ॥ 'प्रकाग्रः' सत्त्वस्य धर्मः । 'क्रिया' प्रटत्तिरूपा रजसः । 'स्थितिः' नियमरूपा तमयः । ताः प्रकाशक्रियाखितयः 'श्रीलं' खाभाविकं रूपं, यख तत् तथाविधं, इति खरूपमख निर्द्धिं। 'भूतेन्द्रियातानं',

নমার। प्रकाश-क्रिया-स्थितिशीसं सूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भागा-

वृत्तिर्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ९७ ॥ द्रष्टु-दृष्ययोः संयोग इत्युक्तं, तत्र दृष्यस्य स्वरूपं कार्थं प्रयोज-

'द्रष्टा' चिद्रूपः पुरुषः । 'दृग्धं' बुद्धितत्त्वं । तथोरविवेकख्यातिपूर्व्व-के। चेा जी 'संचेगः' भेग्यभेाकृलेन समिधानं, सः, 'हेयख' दुःखस गुणपरिणामरूपद्ध संसारस, 'हेतु:' कारणं, तलिष्टत्त्या संसारनि-

## द्रष्ट्-हज्ययाः संयोगा हेयहेतुः ॥ १७ ॥

हेयहेतुमाइ ।

तमेव संसारदुःखं हातव्यमित्युनां भवति । १ ६ ॥

श्वतस्थातिकामालात्\* त्रमुभ्रयमामस्य त त्यकुमप्रकालात् त्रमाम-

6

'द्रष्टा' पुरुषः। 'दृत्रिमात्रः' चेतनामात्रः‡। मात्रयइणं धर्मि-धर्मानिरासार्थं। केचिद्धि चेतनामात्मनेा धर्ममिच्छन्ति। सः 'ग्रुढो-

> \* इत्युक्तं भवतीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । † वक्तुमाहेति C, E पुस्तकपाठः । ‡ चेतनमात्र इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

द्रष्टा हशिमाचः गुर्बाऽपि प्रत्ययानुपग्धः ॥ २० ॥

## एवं डेयलेन दृग्यस प्रथमं ज्ञातव्यलात् तदवस्त्रासहितं व्यास्त्रा-योपादेयं द्रष्टारं व्याकर्त्तुमाह<sup>†</sup> ।

चिगुणरूपस्ताव्यकस्त्रान्वयित्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानादवम्यं ज्ञातव्यवेन वागकाले चलारि पर्व्वाणि निर्द्धिानि ॥ ९८ ॥

'गुणानां', 'पर्श्वाणि' त्रवस्थाविष्ठेषाञ्चलारः, ज्ञातव्याः, इत्युपदिष्टं भवति। तत्र 'विग्रेषाः' सद्दास्ट्रतेन्द्रियाणि। 'त्रविष्ठेषाः' तन्मात्रा-न्तःकरणे। 'सिङ्गमात्रं' सुद्धिः। 'त्रसिङ्गं' त्रव्यकां, इत्युकां\*। सर्व्यत्र

# विशेषाविशेष-सिङ्गमाचासिङ्गानि गुरूपर्व्वाणि॥ ॥ १८ ॥

व्यलात् श्रवस्ताः कथयितुमाद् ।

तथाविधं, इत्यनेन कार्थ्यमस्रोकं। 'भोगः' कथितसर्वणः। 'म्रपवर्गः' विवेकस्थातिपूर्व्विका संसारनिष्टत्तिः। तौ भोगापर्व्गा 'म्रधैंः' प्रयो-जनं, यस्र तत् तथाविधं 'दृग्धं', इत्यर्थः ॥ ९ ५ ॥

तख च द्र्रग्यस नानावस्वारूपपरिसामात्मकस्व इेवलेन ज्ञात-

२ पादे २• सूचम्।

ऽपि' परिणामित्वाद्यभावेन खप्रतिष्ठोऽपि, 'प्रत्ययानुपम्सः'। 'प्रत्ययाः' विषयेापरकानि ज्ञानानि, तानि 'त्रनु' त्रव्यवधानेन प्रतिसंकामाद्य-भावेन, पम्बति । एतदुक्तं भवति । जातविषयेापरागायासेव बुद्धे सन्निधानमाचेणेव पुरुषख द्रष्ट्रत्वमिति ॥ २० ॥

स एव च भोक्तित्वाइ ।

#### तदर्थ एव\* हुश्यस्यात्मा ॥ २१ ॥

'दृम्यस्थ' प्रागुकलचण्रस्य, 'चात्मा' यत् स्वरूपं, सः 'तदर्थः' तस पुरुषस्य भोकृलसम्पादानं नाम स्वार्थपरिद्वारेण प्रयोजनं । न दि प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तमानमात्मनः किच्चित् प्रयोजनमपेच्य प्रवर्त्तते, किन्तु पुरुषस्य भोकृलसम्पादनायेति<sup>†</sup> ॥ २९ ॥

यद्येवं पुरुषस्य भोगसम्पादनसेव प्रयोजनं<sup>‡</sup>, तदा? सम्पादिते तसिांसत्त्रिष्युयोजनं विरतव्यापारं स्थात् , तसिांस्य परिणामग्नूत्वे ग्रुद्धलात् सर्व्वे द्रष्टारेा बन्धरहिताः स्तुः । ततस्य संसारेाच्हेद इत्यान्नद्भाष्ट ।

हतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तद्न्यसर्व्वसाधार एत्वात् । ॥ २२।

यद्यपि विवेकख्यातिपर्थम्तात् भोगसम्पादनात् कमपि 'छतार्थे', पुद्दषं, 'प्रति', 'तत्', 'नष्टं' विरतव्यापारं, तथापि 'सर्व्वपुद्दवसाधा-

<sup>\*</sup> स तदर्थ रवेति B, E पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> भोगं सम्पादयामीतीति G, H पुक्तनपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> यदिदं पुराषस भागसम्पादनं तरेव प्रयाजनमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

<sup>§</sup> तदानीमिति B, E पुत्तकपाठः।

रएत्वात् म्रन्यान् प्रति 'म्रनष्टव्यापारं म्रवतिष्ठते\*। म्रतः प्रधानस्य सकलभोकृषाधारएत्वात् न कदाचनापि<sup>†</sup> विनाग्नः, एकसुक्री वा न सर्व्वसुक्तिप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तं भवति॥ २२॥

दृग्ध-द्रष्टारी वाखाय संयोगं वाखातुमाइ ।

# ख-खामिशक्त्वीः खरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः ॥२३॥

कार्यदारेणाख खत्तर्ण करोति। 'खप्रक्रिः' दृष्यख खभावः । 'खामिग्रक्रिः' ट्रष्टुः खरूपं। तयेार्दयोरपि मंवेद्य-मंवेदकलेन व्यव-स्थितयोर्या 'खरूपेापखव्धिः', तखाः कारणं यः 'मंयोगः', म च महजभोग्य-भोकृभावखरूपात्रान्यः। न दि तयेार्नित्ययेार्यापकयोख खखरूपादतिरिक्रः कखित् मंयोगः । यदेव भोग्यख भाग्यलं, भोकुद्य भोकृलं त्रनादिसिद्धं म एव मंयोगः॥ ९ ३॥

तस्वापि कारणमाइ।

### तस्य हेतुरविद्या<sup>‡</sup> ॥ २४ ॥

या पूर्व्वं विपर्थासात्मिका सेाइरूपा 'त्रविद्या', व्याख्याता, सा 'तस्त्र' त्रविवेकस्थातिरूपस्त संयोगस्त, कारणं॥ २४॥

हेयं हानकियाकर्मेाचाते किम्पुनसाद्वानमित्याह? ।

- † न कदाचिदपीति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । न कथस्विदपीति C पुस्तकपाठः ।
- ‡ खाख हेतुरविद्येति B, E पुस्तकपाठः । तस्य हेतुईं यमविद्येति G पुस्तकपाठः । परन्वीदग्रपाठस्य सप्तखादग्रं पुत्तकेष्वसम्बात् भाष्यज्ञ-दनुद्रुतत्वाच न समीचीनत्वं ।
- § किं पुनर्द्दानसित्याद्वेति B, E पुत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> खनछमव्यापारमवतिषठत इति 🛦 पुक्तकपाठः ।

### तदभावात् संयागाभावा हानं तद्दृग्रेः कैवच्चं ॥ ॥ २५ ॥

'तस्थाः' त्रविद्यायाः सरूपविरुद्धेन सम्यग् भ्वानेनेान्यू लितायाः, योऽयं 'त्रभावः', तस्मिन् सति, तत्कार्य्यस्य 'संयोगस्थ', त्रपि 'त्रभावः', तत् 'हामं' इत्युच्यते । त्रयमर्थः नैतस्य मूर्त्तद्रस्थवत् परित्यागेा युज्यते, किन्नु जातायां विवेकस्थातावविवेकस्थाति-परित्यागेा युज्यते, किन्नु जातायां विवेकस्थातावविवेकस्थाति-निमित्तः" संयोगः खयसेव निवर्त्तत इति तस्य हामं । यदेव च संयोगस्य हामं 'तत्', एव नित्यकैत्रस्यस्थापि† पुरुषस्थ 'कैवस्धं', व्यप-दिम्यते । तदेवं संयोगस्य खरूपं‡ कारणं कार्य्यभ्वाभिद्वितं ॥ २ ५ ॥

श्रय द्वानेापायकथनदारेण उपादेयकारणमाद्य ।

# विवेकस्थातिरविश्ववा इानोपायः ॥ २६ ॥

त्रन्ये गुणाः त्रन्यः पुरुष इत्येवंविधस्य 'विवेकस्य', 'स्थातिः' प्रस्था, सा 'द्दानस्य' दृष्यपरित्यागस्य, 'उपायः'? कारणं। कीदृत्री 'श्वविश्ववा' न विद्यते विश्वमा विष्क्रेढोऽन्तरान्तरा∥ व्युत्यानरूपेा धस्थाः सा 'त्रविश्ववा'।

इदमच ताल्पर्यं। प्रतिपचभावनावखात् चविद्याप्रविखये विनि-

- † निष्यं बोवन्तस्थेति म पुक्तनपाठः ।
- ‡ तदेवं दृष्यस्य संयागसरूपमिति B, E पुत्तकपाठः।
- § दुःखपरित्वागसेगाय इति B, E पुक्तकपाठः।
- ॥ खनारातमनेति E पुत्तनपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> अविवेकनिमित्त इति B, G पुरतकपाठः ।

हत्तज्ञादल कर्टलाद्यभिमानाया रअखनेामखानभिश्वताया बुद्धेरन्त-र्झुखाया था चिच्छायासंक्रान्तिः सा विवेकख्यातिरित्युच्यते । तखाञ्च सन्ततमविच्छेदेन प्रवृत्तायां\* दुम्बस्याधिकारनिष्टत्तेर्भवलेव कैवस्यं ॥ ॥ २ ६ ॥

उत्पन्नविवेकस्थाते:† पुरुषस वादृत्री प्रज्ञा भवति, तां कथयन् विवेकस्थातेरेव स्वरूपमाइ ।

तस्य सत्तधा प्रान्तभूमौ प्रज्ञा ॥ २७ ॥

'तस्य' उत्पन्न विवेकज्ञानस्य, ज्ञातव्यविवेकरूपा 'प्रज्ञा', 'प्रान्तभूमाे' सकलसालम्बनसमाधिभ्दमिपर्य्यन्तं, सप्तप्रकारा भवति ।

तच कार्थ्यविसुक्तिरूपा चतुःप्रकारा। ज्ञातं मया ज्ञेयं। न ज्ञातव्यं किञ्चिदस्ति । चीषा मे क्रेणा, न मे किञ्चित् चेतव्यमसि । श्रधिगतं मया ज्ञानं, प्राप्ता मया विवेकस्थातिः । इतिप्रत्ययान्नर-परिहारेष तस्थामवस्त्रायामीदृग्धेव प्रज्ञा जायते । ईदृग्री प्रज्ञा कार्थविषयं निर्मालं ज्ञानं कार्थ्यविसुक्तिरित्युच्यते ।

चित्तविसु किस्तिविधा । चरितार्था मे मुद्धिः । गुणाच छता-धिकाराः गिरित्रिखरनिपतिता इव गावाणे। न पुनः स्तितिं यास्त्रन्ति, स्वकारणे प्रखयाभिसुखानां मेाद्दाभिधानमूलकारणा-भावाचिष्ण्र्योजनलाचामीषां कुतः प्ररेाद्दः । स्वात्मीभ्दतच मे समाधिः । तस्मिन् सति स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठोऽद्दमिति । ईद्दृष्ठी चिःप्रकारा चित्तविसुक्तिः ।

† उद्भूतविवेक्रखातेरिति ८, ह पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>\*</sup> सन्ततत्वेग प्रबत्तायामिति H, C पुत्तवपाठः ।

तदेवमीदृम्यां सप्तविधायां प्रान्तश्चमिप्रज्ञायासुपजातायां पुरुषः केवल इत्युच्चते ॥ २०॥

विवेकख्याति: संयोगाभावे हेतुरित्युकं\*। तखाखत्पत्ती किं निमित्तमित्यत त्राह ।

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुह्विश्वये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेक-स्वातेः ॥ २८ ॥

'योगाङ्गानि वच्छमाणानि । तेषां 'त्रनुष्ठानात्' ज्ञानपूर्व्वकाद-भ्यासात्, 'त्राविवेकख्यातेः', 'त्राइद्धिचये' चित्तसत्त्तस्य प्रकाज्ञाव-रणसत्तणक्कोत्ररूपाइइद्विचये,† या 'ज्ञानदीन्निं' तारतस्येन सात्त्विकः परिणामः, विवेकख्यातिपर्यंन्तः‡ स तखाः ख्यातेर्हेतुरित्यर्थः ॥ ॥ २ ४ ॥

े योगाङ्गानुष्ठानाद्ऽद्धिचय इत्युक्तं, कानि पुनस्तानि योगाङ्गा∽ नीति तेषां उद्देणमाइ ।

यम-नियमासन-प्राणायाम-प्रत्याहार-धारणा-ध्यान-समाधयोऽष्टावज्ञानि॥ २८॥

इष्ठ कानिचित्समाधेः साचादुपकारकलेनामाराष्णक्वानि? यथा 'धारणादीनि । कानिचित् प्रतिपचस्टतद्विंसादिवितर्केान्यूखनदारेण

<sup>\*</sup> इत्युक्तं भवतीति B, E पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>+</sup> कीप्रस्यामुडिद्यय इति B, E मुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>ू</sup> विवेकख्यातिपूर्व्वेक इति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>§</sup> बन्तरङ्गानीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

समाधेरपकुर्वेनि, यथा 'यम-नियमादयः । तत्रासनादीनामुत्तरा-नरमुपकारकलं यथा सत्यासनजये प्रणायामस्यैर्थं । एवसुत्तर-णापि योर्ज्य ॥ १८॥

कमेण एवां खरूपमाइ।

### श्रहिंसा-सत्याक्तीय-ब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः ॥ ३० ॥

तच प्राणवियोगप्रयोजनयापारे। हिंसा । सा च सर्व्वानर्थहेतः । तदभावः 'त्रहिंगा' । हिंगायाः गर्व्वकालगेव† परिहार्यलात् प्रधमं तदभावरूपाया श्रहिंगाया निर्देगः । 'मत्यं' वाक्मनमयोर्चयार्थलं! । स्रोयं परखापहरणं। तदभावः 'च्रसीयं'। 'ब्रह्मचय्यें' उपखरंयमः। 'त्रपरिग्रह:' भोगसाधनानामखीकरणं? । त एते<sup>||</sup> श्रहिंसादय: पश्च

'यमग्रब्दवाच्याः योगाङ्गलेन निर्हिष्टाः ॥ ३० ॥

ण्यां विश्वेषमाष्ठ ।

# रते जाति-देश-काल-समयानवच्छिनाः सार्व्वभौ-ममहाव्रतम् ॥ ३१ ॥

'जातिः' ब्राह्मणलादिः। 'देग्नः' तीर्थादिः। 'कालः' चतुर्द्वंश्वादिः।

\* न्याय्यमिति अ मुक्तकपाठः ।

- † सर्व्वं प्रकारेग्रेवेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।

- ‡ वाक्वनसेार्यथार्थं लमिति B, E पत्तनपाठः।

¶ रते लिति B, E मुस्तकपाठः ।

- § खाखीकार इति C, E प् क्लाकपाठः।
- || तत्र ते खहिंसादय इति B, E पुक्तकपाठः ।

तदेवमीदृग्यां अप्तविधायां प्रान्तश्चमिप्रज्ञायासुपजातायां पुरुषः नेवल इत्युच्चते ॥ २०॥

विवेकस्वातिः संयोगाभावे हेतुरित्युक्तं\*। तस्यास्त्रत्यत्ती किं निमित्तमित्यत त्राइ।

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादगुडिश्विये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेक-स्वातेः ॥ २८ ॥

'योगाङ्गानि वच्छमाणानि । तेषां 'त्रनुष्ठानात्' ज्ञानपूर्व्वकाद-भ्यासात्, 'त्रातिवेकख्यातेः', 'त्राइद्धिचये' चित्तसत्तस्य प्रकात्राव-रणसत्तणक्तेग्ररूपाइइद्विचये,<sup>†</sup> या 'ज्ञानदीप्तिं' तारतम्येन सात्तिकः परिणामः, विवेकख्यातिपर्य्यन्तः<sup>‡</sup> स तखाः ख्यातेर्हेतुरित्यर्थः ॥ ॥ २ प्र ॥

े चेागाङ्गानुष्ठानादग्रुद्धिचय इत्युकं, कानि पुनस्तानि चेागाङ्गा-नीति तेषां उद्देणमाद्द।

्यम-नियमासन-प्राणायाम-प्रत्याहार-धारणा-ध्यान-समाधयोऽष्टावज्जानि॥ २८॥

दूष्ट कानिचित्समाधेः साचादुपकारकलेनान्तराप्यक्वानि? यथा 'धारणादीनि । कानिचित् प्रतिपच्छतद्विंसादिवितर्के क्यूलनदारेष

<sup>\*</sup> इत्युक्तं भवतीति B, E पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>+</sup> कोग्रेसायजित्तचय इति B, E मुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> विवेनख्यातिपूर्व्वंत इति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>§</sup> खन्तरङ्गानीति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

समाधेरुपकुर्व्वकि, यथा 'यम-नियमादयः । तत्रासनादीनासुक्तरेा∹ क्तरसुपकारकलं यथा सत्यासनजये प्रणायामखेर्थ्यं । एवसुक्तर-जापि येाज्यं\* ॥ २ ८ ॥

क्रमेण एषां खरूपमाद ।

### श्रहिंसा-सत्यास्तेय-ब्रह्मचर्य्यापरिग्रहा यमाः ॥ ३० ॥

तच प्राणविधोगप्रयोजनयापारे। हिंसा । सा च सर्व्वानर्थहेतुः । तदभावः 'च्रहिंसा' । हिंसायाः सर्व्वकाखसेव<sup>†</sup> परिहार्य्यलात् प्रथमं तदभावरूपाया त्रहिंसाया निर्द्देग्नः । 'सत्यं' वाच्चनसयोर्यथार्थलं<sup>‡</sup> । खेयं परस्तापहरणं । तदभावः 'च्रस्तेयं' । 'ब्रह्मचर्य्यं' उपस्वसंयमः । 'च्रपरिग्रहः' भोगसाधनानामस्तीकरणं? । त एते<sup>॥</sup> त्रहिंसादयः पद्य 'यमग्रब्दवाच्याः योगाङ्गलेन निर्द्दिष्टाः ॥ ३० ॥

एषां विश्वेषमाद ।

# रते जाति-देश-काख-समयानवच्छिनाः सार्व्वभौ-ममहाव्रतम् ॥ ३१ ॥

'जातिः' ब्राह्मणलादिः। 'देग्नः' तीर्थादिः। 'कालः' चतुर्द्वं श्वादिः।

\* न्याय्यमिति अ पुक्तनपाठः ।

- † सर्व्वं प्रकारेग्रेवेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
- ‡ वाक्मनसेार्यधार्थंत्वमिति B, E पुक्तकपाठः ।
- § खखीकार इति c, E पुत्तकपाठः ।
- || तत्र ते चहिंसादय इति B, E पुक्तकपाठः ।
- ¶ रते त्विति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।

'समयः' बाह्यषप्रयोजनादिः । एतैयतुर्भिः 'घनवच्छिन्नाः', पूर्व्वेका प्रहिंसादयो यमाः सर्व्यासु जित्यादिषु चित्तभूमिषु भवाः 'मद्दावर्त' इत्युच्चते । तद् यथा ब्राह्यणं न इनिव्यामि, तीर्धे कंचन न इनिव्यामि, चतुर्द्भ्यां न इनिव्यामि, देव-ब्राह्यणाद्यर्थयतिरेकेष न इनिव्यामी-त्येवंचतुर्विधावच्छेदय्यतिरेकेण कच्चित् कचित् कदाचित् कसिंसिद्य्यर्थे न इनिव्यामीत्यनवच्छिन्नाः । एवं सत्यादिषु यथायोगं योज्यं । इत्यमनियतीभूताः ! सामान्येमैव प्रदत्ताः मद्दाव्रतमित्युच्यते, न पुनः परिच्छिन्नावधारणं ॥ ३९ ॥

नियममाइहे।

श्रीष-सन्तोष-तपः-स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रनिधानानि निय-माः ॥ ३२ ॥

'ग्नोपं', दिविधं वाद्यमान्तरञ्च। वाद्यं ख्व्व्वखादिभिः कायादि-प्रचालनं । श्रान्तरं मैत्र्यादिभिश्चित्तमलानां प्रचालनं । 'सन्तोषः' तुष्टिः। ग्रेषाः प्राग्वे कतव्याख्यानाः॥। एते ग्रीचादयः 'नियमक्ष्ट्-वाच्याः॥ ३२॥

कचमेवां चागाङ्गलमित्यत त्राइ।

- \* देवत्राध्ययप्रयोजनयतिरेकेग कमपीति B, C, E युक्तकपाठः ।
- † इत्यमनियतीज्ञता इति म मुक्तकपाठः ।
- ‡ न पुनः परकीयास्प्रप्रादिधारसमिति ▲ पुस्तकपाठः।
- § नियमानाइति ▲ पुक्तकपाठः ।
- ॥ प्रागेव व्याखाता इति अ, С, छ पुक्तकपाठः। भूतव्याखाना इति अक्तकपाठः।

### वितर्कंबाधने प्रतिपश्चभावनं ॥ ३३ ॥

वितर्क्यन्त इति 'वितर्काः' येागपरिपन्थिनेा हिंसादयः। तेषां 'प्रतिपचभावने सति, यदा बाधा भवति,\* तदा येागः सुकरो भवतीति भवत्येव यमनियमानां येागाङ्गलं॥ ३३॥

इदानीं वितर्काणां खरूपं भेदं प्रकारं कारणं फलच्च क्रमेणाइ ।

# वितर्का हिंसादयः इत-कारितानुमेदिता जेाभ-क्रोध-मेाइपूर्व्वका स्टदु-मध्याधिमाचा दुःखाज्ञानान-न्तफला इति प्रतिपन्तभावनम् ॥ ३४॥

एते पूव्वोकाः 'हिंसादयः', प्रथमं विधा भिद्यन्ते 'छत-कारितानुमेदितभेदेन । तत्र खयं निष्पादिताः 'छताः'। खुद कुर्व्विति प्रयोजकव्यापारेण ससुत्पादिताः 'कारिताः'। प्रत्येन क्रियमाणाः साधु साध्वित्यङ्गीष्ठताः<sup>†</sup> 'त्रनुमेदिताः'। एतच चैविध्यं परस्परव्यामेाइनिवारणायोाच्यते<sup>†</sup> । त्रन्यथा मन्दमतिरेवं मन्येत न मया खयं हिंसा छतेति नास्ति मे देाष इति। एतेषां कारण-प्रतिपादनायाह, 'खेाभ-क्रोध-मेाइपूर्व्वकाः', इति। यद्यपि खेाभः क्रोधः प्रथमं निर्द्धिः? तथापि सर्वक्रेग्रानां मेाइस्यानात्मन्यात्मा-

<sup>\*</sup> यदि बाधा भवतीति E, A, D, F पुत्तकपाठः । यथा बाधा भवतीति C पुत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> साध्विव्यक्शीक्तता इति 🛽 पुक्तवपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> मेाइनिवार बायेाच्यत इति B, E मुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>§</sup> ब्रोभः प्रथमं निर्द्धि इति G पुक्तकपाठः ।

भिमानलचणस निदानलात् तसिन् सति खपरविभागपूर्व्यकलेन खेाअ-क्रोधादीनामुद्भवात्\* मूखलमवसेयं । साइपूर्व्विका ग्रवी देाषजातिरित्यर्थः । 'लेाभः' दृष्णा । 'क्रोधः' क्रत्याकृत्यविवेवो-म्प्रलक: प्रज्वलनात्मकञ्चित्तधर्मः । प्रत्येकं क्वतादिभेदेन चिप्रकारा श्रपि हिंसादया साहादिकारणलेन जिधा भिद्यन्ते। तेषासेव पुन-रवस्त्राभेदेन चैविध्यमाइ 'सट्द्-मधाधिमाचाः'। 'स्टदवः' सन्दा न तीवाः नापि मध्यमाः । 'मध्याः' न मन्दा नापि तीवाः । 'त्रधि-मात्राः' तीव्राः, न मध्या नापि मन्दाः । इति नव भेदाः ! इत्वं . चैविध्ये सति सप्तविंग्रतिभेवति । स्टदादीनामपि प्रत्येकं स्टर-मधाधिमात्रभेदात् चैविधं समावति। तत् यथायोगं योज्यं। तद् यथा स्टुस्टरुः स्टुमधाे स्टर्तीव इति । एषां फलमाइ 'दःखा-ज्ञानानन्तफलाः', इति । 'दुःखं' प्रतिकूलतयावभाषमानेा राजय-चित्तधर्मः । 'त्रज्ञानं' मिथ्याज्ञानं संग्रयविपर्यासरूपं! । ते दःखा-ज्ञाने 'त्रनन्तं' ऋपरिच्छित्रं, 'फलं', येषां ते तथाकाः । इत्यं तेषां खरूप-कारणादिभेदेन? ज्ञातानां प्रतिपत्तभावनया योगिना परि-हारः कर्त्तेच दत्युपदिष्टं भवति ॥ ३४ ॥

् एषामभ्यासात् प्रकर्षे गच्छतामनु निष्पादिन्यः सिद्धये। यथा भवन्ति, तथा क्रमेण प्रतिपादयितुमाइ ।

<sup>\*</sup> समुद्भवादिति B, E पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> इत्येवं नव भेदा इति B, C, E पुत्तकपाठः।

<sup>‡</sup> संग्रयविपर्य्ययरूपमिति o पुत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>§</sup> खरूपादिभेदेनेति म पुक्तकपाठः।

## अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां\* तत्सनिधौ वैरत्यागः॥ ३५ू ॥

'तस्वाहिंगां भावयतः, 'यत्निधाे',† यइजविरेाधिनामप्यद्विनतु-स्नादीनां 'वैरत्यागः' निर्मत्वरतयावस्त्रानं भवति। हिंसारता हिंस्रलं परित्यजन्तीत्यर्थः ॥३ ५॥

सत्याभ्यासवतः किं भवतीत्याइ ।

#### सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाग्रयत्वम् ॥ ३६ ॥

कियमाणा दि 'किया:' यागादिका:, फलं' खगादिकं, प्रयच्छनि। तस्य तु सत्याभ्यासवतेा यागिनः तथा सत्यं प्रक्तव्यते, यथा श्रक्तता-यामपि कियायां यागी फलमाप्नेाति<sup>‡</sup>। तदचनाद् यस्य कस्यचित् कियामकुर्व्यते।ऽपि कियाफलं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ३ ६ ॥

त्र स्तेयाभ्यासवतः फलमाइ ।

### श्वस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्व्वरत्नोपस्थानम् ॥ ३७ ॥

'त्रास्तेयं', यदाऽभ्यसति योगी तदा तस्य प्रकर्षात् निरभिसास-स्थापि 'सर्व्वतादिग्भ्यः? 'रत्नान्युपतिष्ठन्ते॥ ३७॥ ब्रह्मचर्य्याभ्यासस्थापि फलमाइ।

#### ब्रह्मचर्य्यप्रतिष्ठायां वोर्य्यलाभः ॥ ३८ ॥

- \* सूत्रे, बहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायामितिपाठः ७ पुक्तके नाक्ति।
- † उत्तो, सन्निधावितिपाठः G पुक्तके नाक्ति ।
- ‡ फलमात्र्यतीति B, C, E पुत्तवपाठः।
- § सर्व्वता दिक्स्यानीति ७ पुरत्तकपाठः।

भिमागलचणस निदागलात् तसिन् यति खपरविभागपूर्वकलेग खेाभ-क्रोधादीनामुद्भवात्\* मूललमवर्षेयं । मेाइपूर्व्विका गर्वी दे ाषजातिरित्यर्थः । 'खाभः' वृष्णा । 'क्रोधः' क्रत्याकृत्यविवेके-म्प्रलकः प्रज्वलनात्मकञ्चित्तधर्भः । प्रत्येकं क्वतादिभेदेन चिप्रकारा त्रपि हिंसादया माहादिकारणलेन चिधा भिद्यन्ते। तेषामेव पुन-रवखाभेदेन चैविध्यमाइ 'स्टदु-मधाधिमाचाः'। 'स्टदवः' मन्दा न तीवाः नापि मध्यमाः । 'मध्याः' न मन्दा नापि तीवाः । 'त्रधि-माचाः' तीवाः, न मध्या नापि मन्दाः । इति नव भेदाः ! । इत्वं चैविध्ये सति सप्तविंग्रतिभेवति । स्टढादीनामपि प्रत्येकं स्टर-मधाधिमाचभेदात् चैविधं समावति। तत् यथायोगं योज्यं। तद् यथा म्टदुम्टरुः म्टदुमधाे म्टर्तीव इति । एषां फलमाइ 'दःखा-ज्ञानानन्तफलाः', इति । 'दु:खं' प्रतिकूलतयावभासमाने। राजस-चित्तधर्मः । 'त्रज्ञानं' मिथ्याज्ञानं संग्रयविपर्यासरूपं! । ते दःखा-ज्ञाने 'त्रनन्तं' ऋपरिच्छित्रं, 'फलं', येषां ते तथाकाः । इत्यं तेषां खरूप-कारणादिभेदेन? ज्ञातानां प्रतिपत्तभावनया चागिना परि-हारः कर्त्तेच दत्युपदिष्टं भवति ॥ ३४ ॥

एषामभ्यासात् प्रकर्षं गच्छतामनु निष्पादिन्यः सिद्धये। यथा भवन्ति, तथा क्रमेण प्रतिपादयितुमाइ ।

<sup>\*</sup> समुद्भवादिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> इत्येवं नव भेदा इति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>‡</sup> संग्रयविपर्य्ययरूपमिति ७ पुत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>\$</sup> खरूपादिभेदेनेति H पुक्तवपाठः।

## अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां \* तत्सनिधौ वैरत्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

'तस्ताहिंगं भावयतः, 'मन्निधाे', म्वह्जविरेाधिनामप्यहिनकु-सादीनां 'वैरत्यागः' निर्मत्सरतयावस्त्रानं भवति । हिंसारता हिंस्नलं परित्यजन्तीत्यर्थः ॥३ ५॥

सत्याभ्यासवतः किं भवतीत्याइ ।

#### सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाग्रयत्वम् ॥ ३६ ॥

कियमाणा दि 'किया:' यागादिका:, फलं' खर्गादिकं, प्रयच्छन्ति। तस्य तु सत्याभ्यासवतेा यागिनः तथा सत्यं प्रक्तव्यते, यथा त्रक्रता-यामपि कियायां यागी फलमाप्नेाति<sup>‡</sup>। तदचनाद् यस्य कस्यचित् कियामकुर्व्यते।ऽपि कियाफलं भवतीत्यर्थः॥ ३ ६ ॥

त्रखेयाभ्यासवतः फलमाइ ।

### श्वस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्व्वरत्नोपस्थानम् ॥ ३७ ॥

'त्रासेयं', यदाऽभ्यसति योगी तदा तस्य प्रकर्षात् निरभिसास-स्यापि 'सर्व्वतादिग्भ्यः? 'रत्नान्युपतिष्ठन्ते॥ ३७॥ ब्रह्मचर्य्याभ्यासस्यापि फलमाइ।

## ब्रह्मचर्य्यप्रतिष्ठायां वोर्य्यलाभः ॥ इट ॥

- \* सूत्रे, खचिंसाप्रतिष्ठायामितिपाठः ७ पुक्तके नाक्ति।
- † खत्तौ, सन्निधावितिपाठः ७ पुक्तके नाक्ति ।
- ‡ फलमात्र्यतीति B, C, E पुत्तवपाठः।
- § सर्व्वता दिक्स्यानीति ७ पुरत्तकपाठः।

थः किल 'ब्रह्मचयं', त्रभ्यखति, तस तत्प्रकर्षात्रिरतिन्नयं 'वीर्षें' सामर्थं त्राविर्भवति । वीर्यंनिरोधो हि ब्रह्मचर्थं तस प्राकर्षा<del>ख्-</del> रीरेन्द्रियमनःसु वीर्थं प्रकर्षमागक्कति ॥ ३८ ॥

श्रपरिग्रहाभ्यासख फलमाइ।

# त्रपरिग्रहस्थैर्ये जन्मकयन्तासम्बोधः ॥ ३९ ॥

कचमित्यस्य भाव: 'कचन्ता' । जन्मन: कचन्ता 'जन्मकचन्ता'। तस्या: 'सम्बोध:' सम्यग्ज्ञानं । जन्मान्तरे केाऽहमासं कीदृग्न: बिं कार्य्यकारीति जिज्ञासायां सर्व्वमेव सम्यग्जानातीत्यर्थ: ।

न केवलं भोगसाधनपरिग्रइ एव परिग्रइः । किन्तु यावदात्मनः भरीरपरिग्रहोऽपि परिग्रहः भोगसाधनलाच्छरीरख । तस्मिन् सति रागानुबन्धात्\* वहिर्मुखायामेव प्रष्टत्ती न तात्त्विकज्ञानप्रार्युभावः । यदा पुनः भरीरादिपरिग्रहनैरपेच्छेण माध्यस्थ्यमवलम्बते तदा मध-खख रागादित्यागात् सम्यग्ज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येव पूर्व्वापरजयसम्बोधः ॥ ॥ इ८ ॥

उका यमानां सिद्धयः । श्रथ नियमानाइ ।

# शौचात् स्वाङ्गजुगुमा परैरसंसर्गः ॥ ४० ॥

यः 'ग्रोंचं भावयति, तस्य 'खाङ्गेव्वपि कारणखरूपपर्थालेाचन-दारेण 'जुगुपाा' घृणा, ससुपजायते। त्राइउचिरयं कायः नाचाग्रइः! कर्त्तव्य इत्यसुनेव हेतुना 'परे:' त्रन्येस्व कायवद्भिः, 'त्रसंसर्गः' सम्पर्काः

Digitized by Google

<sup>\*</sup> रागानुसन्धादिति H पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>+</sup> मास्य सङ्ग्रह इति E पुस्तकपाठः।

भातः\* संसर्गपरिवर्ज्जनमित्यर्थः । यः किख खमैव कार्य जुगुपाते तत्तद-वद्यदर्भनात् स कथं परकीयैस्तथाश्वतैः कार्यैः संसर्गमनुभवति ॥४०॥

ग्रीचसीव फलान्तरमाइ।

# किच्च सत्त्व शुद्धि-सौमनस्यैकाग्रतेन्द्रियजयात्मदर्भन-येाग्यत्वानि च ॥ ४१ ॥

भवन्तीति<sup>‡</sup> वाक्य भ्रेष: । 'सत्त्वं' प्रकाभ्रसुखाद्यात्मर्क? । तस्व 'इटुद्धिः' रजस्तमाभ्यामनभिभवः । 'सौमनस्थं' खेदाननुभवेन मानसी प्रीतिः । 'एकायता' नियतेन्द्रियविषये॥ चेतसः स्प्रैर्थं । 'इन्द्रिय-जयः' विषयपराक्नुखानामिन्द्रियाणां स्वात्मन्यवस्थानं । 'त्रात्मदर्भने' विवेकस्व्यातिरूपे, चित्तस्य 'याग्यत्वं' । भौचाभ्यासवत एते सत्त्वग्रुद्धा-द्यः क्रमेण प्रार्युभेवन्ति । तथा दि भौचात् मत्त्वग्रुद्धिः<sup>भ</sup> । सत्त्वग्रुद्धेः सौमनस्यं । सौमनस्यादेकायता\*\* । एकायतायाः<sup>††</sup> इन्द्रियजयः । इन्द्रियजयादात्मदर्भनयोग्यतेति ॥ ४९ ॥

यन्तोषाग्यायख फलमाइ।

#### सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः ॥ ४२ ॥

- \* संसर्गाभाव इति H पुस्तकपाठः ।
- † किच्चेतिपाठः नवखादर्भपुक्तकेषु नाक्ति, परन्तु भाष्यकारेब छतः ।
- ‡ सम्भवन्तीतीति H पुक्तकपाठः।
- § प्रकाग्रसखाद्यात्मकत्वनिति B, E, C पुस्तकपाठः।
- || नियतविषये इति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः ।
  - ग्रौ चात् सत्त्व शुद्धि दितिपाठः ४, в, с, D, E, H पुद्ध केष नास्ति । 'सौमनस्यादेकायामिति G पुद्ध कपाठः ।
    - रेकायग्रादिति ७ पुक्तकपाठः ।

यः किस 'ब्रह्मचयं', त्रभ्यस्रति, तस्य तत्प्रकर्षात्रिरतिष्ठयं 'वीर्थे' सामर्थं त्राविर्भवति । वीर्थनिरोधो हि ब्रह्मचर्थं तस्य प्राकर्षाच्छ-रीरेन्द्रियमनःसु वीर्थं प्रकर्षमागच्छति ॥ ३८ ॥

श्रपरिग्रहाभ्यासख फलमाइ।

# त्रपरिग्रहस्थैर्ये जन्मकयन्तासम्बोधः ॥ ३९ ॥

कचमित्यस्य भावः 'कचन्ता'। जन्मनः कचन्ता 'जन्मकचन्ता'। तस्याः 'सम्बोधः' सस्यग्ज्ञानं। जन्मान्तरे केाऽइमासं कीदृष्णः किं कार्य्यकारीति जिज्ञासायां सर्व्वसेव सम्यग्जानातीत्यर्थः ।

न केवलं भोगसाधनपरिग्रह एव परिग्रहः । किन्तु यावदात्मनः प्ररीरपरिग्रहेाऽपि परिग्रहः भेागसाधनलाच्छरीरस्य । तस्मिन् सति रागानुबन्धात्\* वद्दिर्मुखायासेव प्रवत्ती न तात्त्विकज्ञानप्रार्युभीवः । यदा पुनः प्ररीरादिपरिग्रहनेरपेच्छेण माध्यस्थ्यमवलम्बते तदा मध्-स्वस्य रागादित्यागात् सम्यग्ज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येव पूर्व्धापरजक्षसम्बोधः ॥ ॥ इ.८ ॥

जका यमानां सिद्धयः । श्रथ नियमानाइ ।

# शीचात् खाङ्गजुगुमा परेरसंसर्गः ॥ ४० ॥

यः 'श्रोपं भावयति, तस्त 'स्ताङ्गेम्वपि कारणस्तरूपपर्यासेगन-दारेण 'जुगुपाा' घृणा, समुपजायते। श्रश्ड्यिरयं कायः नाचाग्रः<sup>†</sup> कर्त्तव्य इत्यसुनैव हेतुना 'परेैः' श्रन्यैश्व कायवद्भिः, 'श्रसंसर्गः' सम्पर्का-

<sup>\*</sup> रागानुसन्धादिति म पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> माख सङ्ग्रह इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

भावः \* संसर्गपरिवर्ज्जनमित्यर्थः । यः किल खमेव कायं जुगुपाते तत्तद-वद्यदर्भनात् च कथं परकीयैस्तथास्रतैः कायैः संसर्गमन्भवति ॥ ४ ॰ ॥

ग्रौचस्वैव फलान्तरमाइ।

# किञ्च + सत्त्व शुद्धि-सौमनस्यैकायतेन्द्रियजयात्मदर्भन-येाग्यत्वानि च ॥ ४१ ॥

भवन्तीति<sup>‡</sup> वाक्यभ्रेष:। 'सन्तं' प्रकाभसुखाद्यात्मकं?। तस्त 'इइद्धिः' रजस्तमाभ्यामनभिभवः । 'सौमनस्रं' खेदाननुभवेन मानसी प्रीतिः । 'एकाग्रता' नियतेन्द्रियविषये∥ चेतमः स्वैर्थे । 'इन्द्रिय-जयः' विषयपराक्तुखानामिन्द्रियाणां खात्मन्यवखानं । 'त्रात्मदर्शने' विवेकस्थातिरूपे, चित्तस्य 'थेाग्यलं'। श्रौचाभ्यासवत एते सत्त्वग्रा ह्या-दयः क्रमेण प्रार्ट्भवन्ति । तथा दि भौषात् सत्तव्युद्धिः<sup>॥</sup> । सत्तवयुद्धेः षौमनस्यं। सौमनस्यादेकायता \*\*। एकायतायाः †† इन्द्रियजयः। इन्द्रियजयादात्मदर्भनयोग्यतेति ॥ ४९ ॥

बन्तोषाभ्यासस्य फलमाइ।

#### सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः ॥ ४२ ॥

- \* संसर्गाभाव इति म पुक्तकपाठः ।
- † किच्चेतिपाठः नवखादर्भपुक्तकेषु नाक्ति, परन्तु माध्यकारेब छतः ।
- t सम्भवन्तीतीति H पुक्तवपाठः।
- § प्रकाश्रसुखाद्यात्मकत्वनिति B, E, C पुस्तकपाठः।
- || नियतविषये इति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः ।
- ¶ ग्रोचात् सत्त्वमुद्धिरितिपाठः A, B, C, D, E, H पुस्तकेव नास्ति।
- \*\* सौमनस्यादेकाय्यमिति G पुस्तकपाठः।
- 🕂 रेकायग्रादिति G युक्तकपाठः ।

यः किस 'ब्रह्मचयं', त्रभ्यस्रति, तस्र तत्प्रकर्षात्रिरतिक्रयं 'वीर्थ्ये' षामर्थ्यं त्राविर्भवति । वीर्थ्यनिरेाधो दि ब्रह्मचर्थ्यं तस्र प्राकर्षाच्छ-रीरेन्द्रियमनःसु वीर्थ्यं प्रकर्षमागच्छति ॥ ३८ ॥

श्वपरिग्रहाभ्यासख फलमाइ।

42

# श्रपरिग्रहस्थैर्ये जन्मकथन्तासम्बोधः ॥ ३९ ॥

कचमित्यस्थ भावः 'कचन्ता'। जन्मनः कचन्ता 'जन्मकचन्ता'। तस्याः 'सम्बोधः' सम्यग्ज्ञानं। जन्मान्तरे कोऽइमार्ध कीदृग्रः किं कार्य्यकारीति जिज्ञासायां सर्व्यमेव सम्यग्जानातीत्यर्थः ।

न केवलं भोगसाधनपरिग्रह एव परिग्रहः। किन्तु यावदात्मनः ग्ररीरपरिग्रहेाऽपि परिग्रहः भेागसाधनताच्छरीरस्य। तस्मिन् सति रागानुबन्धात्\* वहिर्मुखायासेव प्रवत्ती न तात्त्विकज्ञानप्रार्ड्भावः। यदा पुनः ग्ररीरादिपरिग्रहनैरपेच्छेण माध्यस्थ्यमवस्तम्ते तदा मध्य-स्वस्य रागादित्यागात् सम्यग्ज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येव पूर्व्धापरजस्तसमोधः॥ ॥ ३८ ॥

उका यमानां सिद्धयः । श्रथ नियमानाइ ।

# श्रीचात् खाङ्गजुगुपा परेरसंसर्गः ॥ ४० ॥

यः 'ग्रोंचं भावयति, तख 'खाङ्गेव्वपि कारणखरूपपर्थाखेाचन-दारेण 'जुगुपा' घृणा, समुपजायते। त्रग्नुतिरयं कायः नाचाग्रद्दः! कर्त्तव्य इत्यमुनैव हेतुना 'परेः' त्रन्येश्व कायवद्भिः, 'त्रमंमर्गः' सम्पर्का-

- \* रागानुसन्धादिति म पुक्तकपाठः।
- † माख सङ्रुष इति E पुस्तकपाठः ।

भावः\* संसर्गपरिवर्ज्जनमित्यर्थः । यः किख खमेव कार्य जुगुपाते तत्तद-वद्यदर्धनात् स कथं परकीयैस्तथास्ट्रतेः कार्यैः संसर्गमनुभवति ॥ ४ ० ॥

श्रीचसीव फलान्तरमाइ।

# किच्च सत्त्वग्रुडि-सौमनस्यैकाग्रतेन्द्रियजयात्मदर्भन-येाग्यत्वानि च ॥ ४१ ॥

भवन्तीति<sup>‡</sup> वाक्य भ्रेषः । 'सत्तं' प्रकाभ्रसुखाद्यात्मकं? । तस्व 'इइद्रि:' रजस्तमाभ्यामनभिभवः । 'सौमनस्यं' खेदाननुभवेन मानसी प्रीति: । 'एकायता' नियतेन्द्रियविषये॥ चेतसः स्वैर्थ्यं । 'इन्द्रिय-जयः' विषयपराक्नुखानामिन्द्रियाणां स्वात्मन्यवस्थानं । 'द्रात्मदर्भने' विवेकस्थातिरूपे, चित्तस्य 'योग्यलं' । भौचाभ्यासवत एते सत्त्वइड्रा-द्यः क्रमेण प्रार्युभवन्ति । तथा हि भौचात् सत्त्वइड्राट्राः । सत्त्वइड्राट्र सौमनस्यं । सौमनस्यादेकायता \* । एकायतायाः <sup>††</sup> इन्द्रियजयः । इन्द्रियजयादात्मदर्भनयेाग्यतेति ॥ ४९ ॥

यन्तोषाभ्यायख फलमाइ।

#### सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः ॥ ४२ ॥

- \* संसर्गाभाव इति म पुक्तकपाठः ।
- † किच्चेतिपाठः नवखादर्भ्रपुरूकेषु नास्ति, परन्तु माध्यकारेग छतः ।
- ‡ सम्भवन्तीतीति H पुक्तवपाठः।
- § प्रकाश्रसखाद्यात्मकत्वमिति B, E, C पुस्तकपाठः।
- || नियतविषये इति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः ।
- ¶ भ्रोचात् सत्त्वमुद्धिरितिपाठः A, B, C, D, E, H पुस्तकेष नास्ति ।
- \*\* सौमनस्यादेवायामिति G पुत्तवपाठः ।
- 🕂 रेकायग्रादिति ७ पुक्तकपाठः ।

'धन्तोषप्रकर्षेण" योगिनस्तथाविधमान्तरं सुखमाविर्भवति यस वाद्यं विषयसुखं प्रतांग्रेनापि न समानं भवति ! ॥ ४ २ ॥

तपमः फलमाइ।

#### कायेन्द्रियसित्तिरभुत्तिस्रयात्तपसः ॥ ४३ ॥

'तपः समभ्यस्यमानं चेतसः क्षेत्रादिखचणार्युचिचयदारेण्? 'कायेन्द्रियाणां', 'सिद्धिं उत्कर्षे त्रादधाति॥ ।

त्रयमर्थः । चान्द्रायणादिना चित्तक्तेत्रवयः । तत्वयादिन्द्रियाणं सन्ध-व्यवद्दित-विप्रक्तष्टदर्श्वनादिषामर्थ्यमाविर्भवति,कायस्य यथेस्क्रम-णुमद्दत्त्वादीनि ॥ ४ ३ ॥

खाधायख फलमाइ।

## स्वाध्यायादिष्टदेवतासम्प्रयागः ॥ ४४ ॥

श्वभिग्रेतमन्त्रजपादिखचणे 'खाध्याचे प्रक्तव्यमाणे, चोगिनः 'इष्टया त्रभिग्रेतया, 'देवतया, 'सम्प्रचोगः', भवति । सा देवता प्रत्यवीभवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४४ ॥

र्रयरप्रणिधानस्य फलमाइ ।

#### समाधितिबिरी खरप्र शिधानात् ॥ ४५ ॥

- ‡ भवतीत्ययं पाठः अ पुक्तवो नाक्ति ।
- § कोग्रादिलच्चगाश्र बिच्चयदारे गेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
- || आपादयतीति B, C, E पुस्तमपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> सन्तेषप्रकर्धे इति c पुस्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> सममिति H, G युक्तकपाठः।

'ई खरे थे। ऽयं भक्तिविश्वेषखखात् 'समाधेः' उक्तलचणस्य, त्राविर्भावेा भवति । यस्नात् स भगवानीखरः प्रसन्नः सन्नन्तरायरूपान् क्रेशान् परिइत्य\* समाधिसुद्वोधयति ॥ ४५ ॥

यम-नियमानुत्ता श्रासनमाइ।

#### तच + स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ४ई ॥

त्राखते त्रनेनेति 'त्रायनं' पद्मायन-दण्डायन-खस्तिकायनादि । तद् यदा 'स्थिरं' निष्कम्पं, 'सुखं' त्रनुद्वेजकं भवति, तदा योगा-ङ्गतां भजते ॥ ४६ ॥

तस्वैव स्थिरसुखलापन्चर्धमुपायमादः।

#### प्रयत्नग्रैथिन्यानन्धसमापत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४७ ॥

तदासनं 'प्रयत्नग्रेधिखेन', 'त्रानन्त्यसमापत्त्या', च स्थिरं सुखं भवतीति सम्बन्धः ।

यदा यदासनं बभ्रामीति इच्छां करोति तदा प्रयक्षश्रौथिच्छेऽप्य-क्वेभ्रेनैव तदासनं निष्पद्यते । यदा त्राकाशादिगते त्रानन्धे चेतसः समापत्तिः क्रियते त्रवधानेन तादात्यमापद्यते, तदा देदाइड्वारा-भावास्तासनं दुःखजनकं भवति । त्रसिंखासनजये सति समाध्यन्त-रायस्तता न प्रभवन्त्यङ्गसेजयलादयः ॥ ४०॥

तखैवानुनिष्पादितख फलमाइ।

\* अपद्वति G प्त्तकपाठः।

† तत्रेति ग्रब्दः ▲, B, C, D, E, F, G पुक्तकेषु नाक्ति। परन्तु भाष्य-कारेब छतः।

‡ चनुदेजनीयमिति G पुक्तनपाठः ।

XX

# तते। दन्दानभिघातः ॥ ४८॥

तसिन्नामनजये मति 'दन्दे:' श्रीतोष्ण-नुत्तृण्णादिभिः, छागी नाभिइन्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ४ ८ ॥

श्रासनजयानन्तरं \* प्राणायाममाइ।

तसिन् सति श्वास-प्रश्वासयार्गतिविच्छेदः प्राखा-यामः ॥ ४८ ॥

श्रामनस्वैर्थे 'मति', तन्निमित्तकः प्राणायामसवणे। योगाङ्गविभेषः श्रनुष्ठेये। भवति । कोदृग्नः 'श्वामप्रश्वामयोर्गतिविच्छेदसवणः । श्वाम-प्रश्वामौ कृतसवण्णे । तयोर्द्वेधा रेचक-पूरकद्वारेण<sup>†</sup> वाद्या-भ्यन्तरेषु स्थानेषु 'गतेः' प्रवाइस्थ, 'विच्छेदः' धारणं, 'प्राणायामः', उच्चते ॥ ४८ ॥

तखेव सुखावगमाय विभज्य खरूपं कथयति! ।

स तुवाद्याभ्यन्तरस्तम्भदत्तिर्देशकाखसद्ध्याभिः परि-डप्टो दीघेस्रस्रः ॥ ५० ॥

'वाह्यदत्तिः श्वाचेा रेचकः । श्रन्तर्वत्तिः प्रश्वासः पूरकः । श्रन्त-सासवित्तिः कुस्तकः । तस्निन् जलमिव कुस्ते निञ्चलतया प्राण्णः श्रवस्त्राप्यन्ते? इति कुस्तकः ।

§ प्रायोऽवस्थाप्यत इति C पुत्तनपाठः।

<sup>\*</sup> खासनजयादनन्तरमिति ७ पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> तथास्तिधा रेचब-पूरबकुम्भकदारेबेति A, D, F, G पुसावपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> दर्श्रयतीति B, C. È पुत्तकपाठः।

चिधिाऽयं प्राणायामः 'देग्रेन, 'काखेन, 'बद्ध्या चोपलचितः 'दीर्घस्तव्यसंग्रको भवति। देन्नेनेापलचिता यथा नासादादत्रान्तादौ नासामारस्य दादग्राङ्गुलिपर्थन्तमित्यर्थः । काखेनोपलचिता थथा घट्-चित्रत्याचाद्रिप्रमाणः \*। सद्ध्यया उपलचिता थथा दयता वारान्छतः †। एतावद्भिः खामप्रचासैः प्रथम उद्दातः ‡भवति । एतञ्ज्ञानाय सद्ध्यायदण-सुपान्तं । उद्दातो नाभिमूलात् प्रेरितस्य वायोः ज्ञिरस्थभिद्दननं ॥ ५ ० ॥ भोन् प्रणायामानभिधाय चतुर्थमभिधातुमाइ ।

## वाद्याभ्यन्तरविषयाश्चेपी चतुर्थः ॥ ५१ ॥

प्राप्तस्य 'वाद्वो विषयः' नामादादत्रान्तादिः। 'श्राभ्यम्तरो विषयः' इदयनाभिचकादिः । ते दौ विषयौ श्राखिप्य' पर्याखेग्ध्य यः सम्भ-रूपेा गतिविच्छेदः स 'चतुर्थः', प्राप्तायामः । दृतीयस्मात् कुक्ष-कास्वादयमस्य विग्नेषः । स वाद्याभ्यन्तरविषयावपर्युंग्लोच्ध सड्सा तन्नोपर्खनिपतितजलजन्याचेन युगपत् सम्भटच्या निष्यद्यते । श्रस्य तु विषयदयाचेपका निरोधः । श्रयमपि पूर्य्यवत् देन्न-काल-सद्धाभि-दपर्खचितेा द्रष्टयः ॥ ५९ ॥

पतुर्विधद्याख पालमाइ।

### ततः श्रीयते प्रकाशावरणम् ॥ ५२ ॥

'ततः' तस्नात् प्रणायामात्, 'प्रकात्रस्व' चित्तसत्त्वगतस्व, यत् 'त्रावरणं' क्रेन्नरूपं, तत् 'चीयते' विनम्धतीत्यर्थः ॥ ५२ ॥

फलान्तरमाइ।

<sup>\*</sup> धङ्विंग्रतिमात्रादिग्रमाब इति B पुरूषपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> रतान् वारान् इत इति B पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> G पुसाने सर्वत्र उद्दात इत्वत्र उदात इति पाठः ।

<sup>8</sup> 

#### धारणासु च वाग्यता मनसः ॥ ५३ ॥

'धारणाः' वच्चमानलचणाः"। तासु प्रणायामैः चीणदेाषं मनेग यच यच धार्थ्यते, तच तच खिरं भवति न विचेपं भजते॥ ५ू ३ ॥ प्रत्याहारख लचणमाह ।

## खखविषयसम्प्रयागाभावेऽ चित्तस्य खरूपानुकार-इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः ॥ ५ू४ ॥

दन्द्रियाणि खखविषयेभ्यः प्रत्याद्रियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया त्राद्रियन्ते-ऽस्मिन् इति 'प्रत्याद्वारः' । स च कथं निष्पद्यत इत्याद्द । चतुरा-दीनां इन्द्रियाणां खः खो विषयः रूपादिः । तेन 'सम्प्रयोगः' तदाभिमुख्येन प्रवर्त्तनं । तदभावस्तदाभिमुख्यं परित्यज्य खरूप-मानेऽवखानं । तस्मिन् सति चित्तखरूपमाचानुकारीणीन्द्रियाणि भानेज्यालां । तस्मिन् सति चित्तखरूपमाचानुकारीणीन्द्रियाणि भानेत. यतस्वित्तमनुवर्त्तमानानि मधुकरराजमिव मधुमचिकाः॥, सर्व्वाणीन्द्रियाणि प्रतोयन्ते । श्रतस्वित्तनिरोधे तानि प्रत्याद्दतानि भवन्ति ॥ ५४ ॥

तेषां तत्खरूपानुकारः प्रत्याद्वार उन्नः । फलमाद ।

#### ततः परमा वश्यतेन्द्रियाखाम् ॥ ५५ ॥

- \* वच्चमाखा इति H पुस्तवयाठः।
- † चीबकोग्रमिति C पुस्तकपाठः।
- ‡ स्थिरीभवतीति B, E पुत्तकपाठः ।
- § खविषयासम्प्रयोगे इति B, E पुत्तकपाठः । खखविषयासम्प्रयोगे इति B पुत्तकपाठः ।
- # मधुकरराजनिव मच्चिका इति B, E पुत्तकपाठः । मधुकररायनिव मधुकरमच्चिका इति G पुत्तकपाठः ।

त्रभ्यखमाने इिप्रत्याहारे तथा 'वग्यान्यायत्तानि 'इन्द्रियाणि सम्प-द्यन्ते,यथा वाह्यविषयाभिसुखतां नौयमानान्यपि न यान्तीत्यर्थः॥ ५ ५॥

तदेवं प्रथमपादोत्तलचण्ख योगसाङ्गश्चतं क्रेग्रतनूकरण्फलं कि-यायोगमभिधाय क्रेग्रानासुद्देग्नं कारणं चेत्रं खरूपं फलझोक्ता कर्मणा-मपि भेदं कारणं खरूपं फलझाभिधाय विपाकस खरूपं कारण्झा-भिदितं। ततस्वाज्यलात् क्रेग्रादीनां, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेन त्यागस्याग्रकालात्. ज्ञानस्य च प्रास्तायत्तलात्, ज्ञास्तस्य च हेयाहेयकारणोपादयोपा-दानकारणलेन चतुर्व्यूहलात्, हेयस्य च हानव्यतिरेकेण सरूपानि-ष्यत्तेईानयहितं चतुर्व्यूहलात्, हेयस्य च हानव्यतिरेकेण सरूपानि-ष्यत्तेईानयहितं चतुर्व्यूहलात्, हेयस्य च हानव्यतिरेकेण सरूपानि-ष्यत्तेईानयहितं चतुर्व्यूह स्वस्तकारणयहितमभिधायोपादानकाग्ण-श्वताया विवेकस्थातिः कारणस्त्रतानामन्तरङ्गवहिरङ्गभावेन स्थितानां वोगाङ्गानां यमादीनां सरूपं फलयहितं व्याकृत्य धारणापर्य-न्नानां चायनादीनां परस्परसुपकार्य्यापकारकभावेनावस्थितानां उद्दे-ण्यमभिधाय परस्परसच्रणकार्एपूर्व्यकं† फल्समभिहितं।

तदयं योगे। यमनियमादिभिः प्राप्तवीजभावः । श्रायनप्राणा-यामैरङ्कुरितः । प्रत्याहारेष पुष्पितः: । ध्यानधारणायमाधिभिः? फलिव्यतीति व्याख्यातः साधनपादः ।

इति महाराजाधिराजत्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्चण्डाभि-धायां पातच्चलयोगश्रास्त्रसूचटत्ती दितीयः साधनपादः ॥२॥

<sup>\*</sup> यागानामिति अपुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> प्रत्येकलत्त्तगकारणपूर्व्वमिति B, C, E पुत्तकपाठः । परस्परलत्त्तग-पूर्व्वकभिति G पुत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> कुसुमित इति ७ पुक्तकपाठः।

५ चित्तधारगासमाधिभिरिति म मुक्तकपाठः ।

### श्वव तृतीयः पादः ।

यत्पादपद्मसरणादणिमादिविभ्रतयः।

भवन्ति भाविनामन्तु श्वतनाथः च श्वतये ॥ तदेवं पूर्व्वीहिष्टं धारणाण्डङ्गचयं निर्णेतुं संयमसंज्ञाभिधानपूर्य्वकं वाज्ञाभ्यन्तरादिसिद्धिप्रतिपादनाय खत्त्वयितुमुपक्रमते ।

तत्र धार्णायाः खरूपमाइ।

# देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा\* ॥ १ ॥

'देग्ने' नाभिचकनामायादी । चित्तस 'बन्धः' विषयामारपरि-इारेष यत् चित्तस स्थिरीकरणं। सा 'चित्तस्य धारणा', उच्चते । म्नयमर्थः। मैत्र्यादिचित्तपरिकर्णवासिताम्तःकरणेन यमनियम-वता जितासनेन परिइतप्राणविचेपेण प्रत्याइतेन्द्रिययामेण निर्म्वाधे प्रदेग्ने म्नजुकायेन जितदन्द्रेन योगिना नामायादी सम्प्रज्ञातस्व समाधेरभ्यामाय चेतमः स्थिरीकरणं कर्त्त्रयमिति ॥ ९ ॥

धारणामभिधाय धानमभिधातुमाइ ।

# तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानं ॥ २ ॥

'तन' तस्मिन् देशे यन चित्तं धतं तन । 'प्रत्ययस्य ज्ञानस्य ।

<sup>\*</sup> चित्तधारखेति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>+</sup> तस्मित्रर्थ इति B, E पुत्तकपाठः ।

या 'एकतानता' विसदृप्रपरिणामपरिष्ठारदारेण यदेव धारणाया-मालम्बनीहतं तदालम्बतयैव निरन्तरसुत्पत्तिः, सा 'ध्यानं', उच्चते ॥ ॥ २ ॥

चरमं चागाक्नं समाधिमाइ।

# तदेवार्थमाचनिर्भासं खरूपश्चन्यमिव समाधिः ॥ ॥ ३ ॥

'तदेव' उक्तखचणं ध्यानं । यच 'त्रर्थमाचनिर्भावं' त्रर्थाकारयमावे-बादुद्भूतार्थरूपं, न्यग्रुतज्ञानरूपत्वेन 'खरूपप्रून्यमिव', त्र्यापद्यते, व 'समाधिः', इत्युच्यते। सम्यगाधीयते एकाग्रीक्रियते विचेपान्-परिइत्य यच मनः स 'समाधिः' ॥ ३ ॥

उन्नलचणस्य योगाङ्गचयस्य व्यवद्वाराय खग्राचे तान्त्रिकों संज्ञां कर्नुमार ।

### चयमेकच संयमः ॥ ४ ॥

एकसिन् विषये ध्यान-धारणा-समाधिखबणं जितयं प्रवर्त्तमानं 'संयमसंज्ञया<sup>†</sup> त्रास्ते व्यवद्वियते ॥ ४ ॥

तस फलमार।

### तज्जयात् प्रज्ञाखाकः ॥ ५ ॥

'तस्त संयमस्त । 'जयात्'त्रभ्यासेन साम्यात्पादनात्t । 'प्रज्ञायाः'

- \* खरूपग्र्न्यतामिवेति म पुराषपाठः।
- † संयमसंघ इति B, E पुद्धवपाठः।
- ‡ खात्मोत्पादनादिति म पुच्तः बपाठः ।

ज्ञातस्यविवेकखरूपायाः । 'श्रालेकिः' प्रसरेा भवति\* । प्रज्ञा छंयं सम्यगवभासयतीत्यर्थः ॥ ५ ॥

तखोपयोगमाइ ।

### तस्य भूमिषु विनियागः ॥ ६ ॥

'तस्थ' संयमस्थ, 'भूमिषु' स्पूसद्वस्त्रासम्बनभेदेन स्टितासु<sup>†</sup> चित्तदृत्तिषु, 'विनियेागः', कर्त्त्रेयः । श्रधरामधरां चित्तभ्दमिं जितां जितां ज्ञात्वेात्तरस्तां भूमेा संयमः कार्यः । न द्वयमनात्मी-इताधरस्ट्रमिः उत्तरस्तां भूमेा संयमं कुर्व्वाणः फलभाग् भवति ॥ ६ ॥

माधनपादे चाेगाङ्गान्यष्टावुद्धिय पञ्चानां सत्तर्णं विधाय चयाणां कयं न क्वतमित्यात्रङ्खाइ।

# चयमन्तरङ्गं पूर्व्वेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥

'पूर्व्वेभ्यः' यमादिभ्यो योगाङ्गेभ्यः पारम्पर्थेख समाधेरूपकार-केभ्यः। धारणादियोगाङ्गचयं सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेः 'त्रन्तरङ्गं', समा-धिस्तरूपनिष्पादनात् ॥ ७ ॥

तखापि समाधन्तरापेचया वहिरङ्गलमाइ ।

## तद्पि वहिर्ङ्गं निर्व्वीजस्य ॥ ८ ॥

'निर्म्वीजस्त' निरासम्बनस्त ग्रूस्क्भावनापरपर्यायस्त समाधेः । एतदपि योगाङ्गचयं, 'वहिरङ्गं', पारम्पर्य्येशेषकारकत्वात् ॥ ८ ॥

<sup>\*</sup> प्रसादेा भवतीति D पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> अवस्थितास्ति ह पुक्तकपाठः।

इदानीं योगाङ्गधिद्वीराख्यातुकामः \* मंबमस्य विषयपरिष्ठुद्धिं कर्त्तुं क्रमेण परिणामचयमाइ ।

# ब्युत्यान-निराधसंस्कारयोरभिभव-प्रार्टुर्भावौ नि-राधस्रणचित्तान्वयाे निरोधपरिणामः ॥ ८ ॥

'खुत्यानं' चिप्त-मूढ-विचिप्ताख्यं भूमिषयं । 'निरेाधः' प्रष्ठष्टम-चि खाङ्गितया चेतयः परिणामः। ताभ्यां खुत्यान-निरेाधाभ्यां यौ जनितौ 'संस्कारौ तयेार्यचाक्रमं 'त्रभिभव—प्रादुर्भावौ', यदा भवतः । 'त्रभिभवः' न्यग्भूततया कार्य्यकरणासामर्थ्यनावखानं। 'प्रादुर्भावः' वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि त्रभिव्यकरूपतयावखानं। तदा 'निरोधचणे', 'चित्तस्रोभयदत्तित्वात् 'त्रय्वयः', यः सः 'निरोधपरिणामः', इत्युच्यते ।

भयमर्थः । यदा खुत्यानमंस्काररूपेा धर्मः स्थिरीभूतेा भवति, निरोधमंस्काररूपद्याविर्भवति, धर्मिरूपतया प पित्तसुभयणान्वयि-त्वेनावस्थितं प्रतीयते, तदा स निरोधपरिणामभ्रब्देन व्यवच्रियते । यद्यपि प्रसत्वाद्गुणटक्तस्य पेतसेा निश्वसत्वं नास्ति, तथाप्येवस्भूतपरि-णामः स्यैर्थसुच्यते ॥ ८ ॥

त्रखेव फलमाइ।

## तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्तारात् ॥ १० ॥

'तस्व' चेतसः, उक्तान्त्रिरेाधमंस्कारात्', 'प्रश्नान्तवाहिता', भवति। परिइतविक्तेपतया सदृद्वप्रवाहपरिणामि चित्तं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥९०॥

निरोधपरिणाममभिधाय समाधिपरिणाममाइ ।

\* सिद्धीराख्यातुकाम इति D पुत्तकपाठः ।

सर्व्वार्थतैकाग्रतयोः ऋयोदयौ चित्तस्य समाधिपरि-णामः ॥ ११ ॥

'धम्भार्थता' चखलाझानाविधाऽर्थयइणं, चित्तस्य विचेपेा धर्धः । एकस्निन्नेवावखम्बने सदृप्रपरिणामिता 'एकायता'," सापि<sup>†</sup> चित्तस्य धर्भ: । तयेार्थयाक्रमं 'चयेादयाे' । 'सर्व्वार्थताखचणस्य धर्मस्व 'चयः' ग्रत्यन्तमभिभवः । 'एकायताखचणस्य धर्मस्व प्रादुर्भावेाऽभि-स्वक्तिः । 'चित्तस्य' उद्रिक्तसत्तस्य, ग्रन्वयितयाऽवस्तानं 'समाधिपरि-णामः', इत्युच्यते ।

पूर्वस्नात् परिणामाद्यं विश्वेषः । तत्र संस्कारसम्मण्योर्धसंयो-रभिभव-पार्ड्भावा । पूर्वस्व युत्यानसंस्कारस्रस्पद्य धर्षस्वः न्यग्भावः । उत्तरस्व निरोधसंस्काररूपस्वाङ्गवेाऽनभिश्वतलेनावस्तानं । इह तु चयोदयाविति । सर्म्वार्थतारूपविचेपस्वात्यन्ततिरस्कारादनु-त्पत्तिरतीताध्वनि प्रवेडः चयः । एकाग्रतासचणस्व धर्मस्वोद्भवेा वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि प्रकटलं ॥ ९९॥

हतीयमेकायतापरिणाममाइ।

श्वान्तोदितौ तुच्यप्रत्यया चित्तस्वैकाग्रतापरिखामः । ॥ १२ ॥

समाहितस्वैव 'चित्तस्व', एकप्रत्ययो दृत्तिविद्वेष:। 'ब्रान्तः'

‡ ब्रत्यानसंस्तारस्थेति H, C पुस्तकपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> रकाग्रत्वनिति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> तदयोति म पुक्तकपाठः।

त्रतीतमध्वानं प्रविष्टः । त्रपरख छदितः' वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि खुरितः । दावपि समाहितचित्तलेन 'तुस्तौ' एकरूपासम्बनलेन यदु ग्री, 'प्रत्ययौ' । उभयचापि समाहितस्त्रैव चित्तस्तान्ययिलेनावस्तानं यत् सः 'एकाग्रतापरिणामः', इत्युष्यते ॥ ९ २ ॥

चित्तपरिणामेाकरूपमन्धवातिदिश्ववाद ।

एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्म्स-लक्षयावस्थापरिखामा व्या-खाताः\* ॥ १३ ॥

 'एतेन' चिविधोक्तेन चिक्तपरिणासेन । 'श्वतेषु' ख्रूख-स्रख्मेषु । 'इच्ट्रियेषु' बुद्धिकर्मान्तःकरणभेदेनावस्थितेषु<sup>†</sup> । 'धर्म-खचणावस्था-भेदेन चिविधः परिणासे। व्यास्थाते।ऽवगन्तव्यः ।

त्रवस्तितस्य धर्मिणः पूर्व्वधर्यनिटत्ती धर्मान्तरापत्तिर्धर्मपरि-णामः<sup>1</sup>, यथा व्दत्तचणस्य धर्मिणः पिण्डरूपधर्मपरित्यागेन घटरूप-धर्मान्तरस्तीकारः?, 'धर्मपरिणामः' इत्युच्यते । 'खचण्परिणामः,' यथा तस्वैव घटस्तानागताध्वपरित्यागेन वर्त्तमानाध्वस्तीकारः, तत्परित्यागेन चातीताध्वपरिग्रहः । 'त्रवस्तापरिणामः', यथा तस्वैव घटस्त प्रथमद्वितीययोः सद्दन्नयोर्धर्मस्तचणयोरत्पविलेन । यतस्वसं गुण्यदत्तां नापरिषममानं चण्मम्यासे ॥ ९ ३ ॥

\* धर्मलद्तागावस्थापरिगामे। वास्थात इति o मुखनपाठः ।

† बुद्धित्रम्मेमेदेनावस्थितेखिति E पुरा वपाठः ।

- ‡ परिवाम इति म युक्तकपाठः।
- ५ घटरूपधर्मनाराष्ट्रीबार इति ० पुरावपाठः ।

Digitized by Google

चीनः वात्तिंककारेब उक्तपाठस्य भाष्यमध्ये परिगबितलात् । ‡ तेवां यचा सं सर्व्वात्मकमित्वेवमादय इति म पुस्तकपाठः । तेवां यचा सर्व्वे सर्व्वात्मकमित्वेवमादय इति ८ पुस्तकपाठः ।

५ मुझिकारूपधर्मपरित्वागेनेति ८ पुक्तकपाठः ।

सूत्रान्तगैतलेन परिग्रहीतत्वात् सस्माभिरपि तथैव व्यवस्थापितं। + " येग्यतावस्टिन्ना धर्मिंगः ग्रसिरेव धर्माः " इत्ययं भाष्यपाठः काश्यां सुद्रितयेग्रभाष्यपुक्तके सूत्रान्तगैत रव सुद्रितः। परन्वयं न समी-

# क्रमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुः ॥ १५ ॥

\* तचेतिपदं चसाझव्यवड़ादर्भपुस्तनेषु नास्ति। परन्तु भाव्यकारेव

एकख धर्मिण: कथमनेके परिणामा इत्याण्वद्वामपनेतुमाइ ।

'ज्ञामाः' ये क्रतखखयापारा जतीतेऽध्वन्यऽनुप्रविष्टाः । 'जदिताः' ये ज्रनागतमध्वानं परित्यच्य वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि खखयापारं कुर्व्वन्ति । 'ऋयपदेग्धाः' ये क्रकिरूपेण खिता व्यपदेष्टुं न क्रकान्ते । यथा पर्ज्यं गर्व्वात्मकमित्येवमादयः! । नियतकार्य्यकारणरूपतया योग्यत-पाऽवच्छिन्ना क्रकिरेवेद धर्मग्रम्देनाभिधीयते । तं चिविधमपि धर्म्म ये। जुपतत्यनुवर्त्तते ज्रन्ययिलेन खीकरोति, सः 'प्रान्तोदिताव्यप-देग्धधर्मानुपाती धर्मी', इत्युच्यते, यथा सुवर्धं इचकरूपधर्मपरि-त्यागेन? खस्तिकधर्मान्तरपरियहे सुवर्धरूपतया अन्तर्नमानं । तेषु धर्मेषु कयद्विद्भिन्नेषु धर्मिरूपतया सामान्यात्मना धर्मारूपतया विभ्रेषात्मनाऽवस्थितमनुपातिल्वेनावभाषते ॥ ९४ ॥

गनु केाऽयं धर्म्शौत्यात्रद्य धर्मिणो खज्जणमाइ। तच\* शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्म्सानुपाती धर्म्भी†॥१४॥

पातज्ञकी येगगसूचे

भर्षाणासुकस्वचणानां थः 'क्रमः,' तस्य यत् प्रतिचणं 'प्रन्यत्रं', परिदृश्वमानं, 'परिणामस्थ' उक्रस्वचणस्थ, 'प्रन्यत्रे' नानाविधत्वे, 'हेतुः' सिङ्गं शापकं भवति। ग्रयमर्थः ! योऽयं नियतक्रमः, म्टचूर्णात् स्टत्पिण्डसतः कपासानि तैस्व घट इत्वेत्रं रूपः परिदृश्वमानः परिणामस्थान्यत्नमावेदयति । तस्तिन् एव धर्षिणि यो स्वच्णपरिणामस्थावस्थापरिणामस्य च क्रमः सेाऽप्यनेमैव न्यायेन परिणामान्यत्ने गमकाेऽवगन्तव्यः । सर्व्व एव च\* भावा नियतेमैव क्रमेष प्रतिचणं परिण्ममानाः परिदृश्वन्ते ग्रतः सिद्धं क्रमान्यत्वात् परिणामान्यत्नं । चित्तादीनां सर्व्वेषां! परिण्ममानानां केचित् धर्माः प्रत्येचेणेवापसभ्यन्ते, यथा सुखादयः संस्थानादयस्य । केचिदेका-न्तेनानुमानगम्याः, यथा धर्म-संस्कार-श्रक्तिप्रस्टतयः? । धर्मिणस्था-भिम्नरूपतया॥ सर्व्वचानुगमः ॥ ९५ ॥

इदानीसुत्रस्य संयमस्य विषयप्रदर्भणदारेण सिद्धीः प्रतिपाद-यितुमाद्दग ।

# परिणामचयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानं ॥ १६ ॥

धर्म-खचणावखाभेदेन यत् 'परिणामचयं उन्नां। तच 'संयमात्'

\* पुर्व्व रव चेति म पुस्तकपाठः।

† स्वतः सिद्धं क्रमान्यत्वं क्रमान्यत्वात् परिग्रामान्यत्वमिति H पुस्तकपाठः।

‡ विषयादीनामिति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

§ कर्म-संस्तार-प्रक्तिप्रभ्टतय इति B, E पुस्तकदयपाठः।

|| धर्मिंगच भिन्नाभिन्नरूपतयेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ प्रदर्श्मयितुमाहेति B, C, E पुक्तनेषु पाठः ।

मनु काऽयं धर्मीत्यात्रद्य धर्मिणो समणमाइ। तच\* शान्तोदिताव्यपदेग्यधर्मानुपाती धर्मी†॥१४॥

'ज्ञानाः' ये इतस्वस्वयापारा त्रतीतेऽध्वन्यऽनुप्रविष्टाः । 'उदिताः' ये त्रानागतमध्वानं परित्यञ्च वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि स्वस्वयापारं कुर्वन्ति । 'त्रथ्यपदेग्धाः' ये प्रक्तिरूपेण स्विता व्यपदेष्टुं न ज्ञक्वन्ते । यथा सर्व्यं सर्व्यात्याकमित्येवमादयः ! । नियतकार्य्यकारणरूपतया योग्यत-याऽवच्छिन्ना प्रकिरेवेद्द धर्यप्रब्देनाभिधीयते । तं चिविधमपि धर्य्य ये। उनुपतत्यनुवर्त्तते त्रन्ययित्वेन स्वीकरोति, सः 'प्रान्तादिताव्यप-देग्धधर्यानुपाती धर्मी', इत्युच्चते, यथा सुवर्षं रूपकरूपधर्यपरि-त्यागेन? स्वस्तिकधर्यान्तरपरिग्रहे सुवर्षरूपतया अन्वर्त्तमानं । तेषु धर्येषु कथञ्चिद्भभिन्नेषु धर्मिरूपतया सामान्यात्यना धर्यारूपतया

विश्वेषात्मनाऽवस्थितमनुपातित्वेगावभाषते ॥ १४ ॥

एकख धर्मिणः कथमनेके परिणामा इत्याग्रङ्कामपनेतुमाइ ।

### कमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुः ॥ १५ ॥

\* तर्चतिपदं असाक्षव्यवड़ादर्भपुत्तकेषु नात्ति। परन्तु भाष्यकारेव सूत्रान्तर्गतत्वेन परिग्रद्दीतत्वात् अस्माभिरपि तथैव व्यवस्थापितं।

† '' येाग्यतावच्छिन्ना धर्मिंगः शक्तिरेव धर्माः " इत्ययं भाष्यपाठः काश्यां सुद्रितयेागभाष्यपुक्तके द्वचान्तर्गंत रुव सुद्रितः । परन्वयं न समी-चीनः वाक्तिंककारेब उक्तपाठस्य भाष्यमध्ये परिगबितत्वात् ।

‡ तेषां यथा खं सर्व्वात्मकमित्वेवमादय इति म पुक्तकपाठः । तेषां यथा सम्बं सम्बात्मकमित्वेवमादय इति ८ पुक्तकपाठः ।

५ मुद्रिकारूपधर्म्मपरित्यागेनेति C पुख्तकपाठः ।

भर्षाणासुक्रस्रचणानां थः 'क्रमः,' तस्य यत् प्रतिचणं 'प्रन्यत्रं', परिदृश्वमानं, 'परिणामस्थ' उक्रस्रचणस्थ, 'ग्रन्यत्रे' नानाविधत्ने, 'हेतुः' सिङ्गं ज्ञापकं भवति। ग्रयमर्थः । योऽयं नियतक्रमः, म्टचूर्णात् स्टत्पिण्डसतः कपासानि तैश्च घट इत्येत्रं रूपः परिदृश्वमानः परिणामस्थान्यत्नमावेदयति । तस्तिन् एव धर्मिणि यो स्वर्णपरिणामस्थावस्थापरिणामस्य च क्रमः सेाऽप्यनेमैव न्यायेन परिणामान्यत्ने गमकाेऽवगन्तव्यः । सर्व्य एव च\* भावा नियतेमैव क्रमेष प्रतिचणं परिण्ममानाः परिदृश्वम्ते ग्रतः सिद्धं क्रमान्यत्वात् परिणामान्यत्नं । चित्तादीनां सर्व्वेषां! परिणममानानां केचित् धर्माः प्रत्येचेणेवापसभ्यन्ते, यथा सुखादयः संस्थानादयस्व । केचिदेका-न्तेनानुमानगम्याः, यथा धर्म-संस्कार-प्रक्तिप्रस्टतयः? । धर्मिणसा-भिन्नरूपतया॥ सर्व्वचानुगमः ॥ ९५ ॥

इदानीसुक्रस्य संयमस्य विषयप्रदर्भणदारेण सिद्धीः प्रतिपाद-यितुमाइ<sup>ग</sup>।

# परिणामचयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानं ॥ १६ ॥

धर्म-लचणावखाभेदेन यत् 'परिणामचयं उन्नं। तच 'संयमात्'

‡ विषयादीनामिति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

§ कर्म-संखार-प्रसिधन्टतय इति B, E पुक्तकदयपाठः।

|| धर्मिंगच भिन्नाभिन्नरूपतयेति H पुस्तकपाठः।

¶ प्रदर्श्मयितुमाहेति B, C, E पुखलेषु पाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> पूर्व्व रव चेति म पुस्तकपाठः ।

<sup>👘 🛉</sup> चतः सिद्धं क्रमान्यत्वं क्रमान्यत्वात् परिवामान्यत्वमिति 🗉 पुक्तकपाठः।

तखिम् विषये पूर्व्याकस वंयमद्य करणात, 'चतीतानागतज्ञानं', जोगिनः सम्यगाविर्भवति । इदमण तात्पर्थं । श्रसिन् धर्मिणि श्रवं धर्मः, इदं सखणं, इयमक्सा पाणगनादध्वनः समेत्य वर्त्तमाने उर्ध्वान खं धापारं विधायातीतमध्वानं प्रविन्नतीत्येवं परिहतविचे-पतया यदा संधमं करोति, तदा चन् किद्यिदतिकान्तमनुत्पन्नं वा तत्यव्यं योगी जानाति । धतचित्तसा इड्डूचत्त्यप्रकान्नइपन्नं वा तत्यव्यं योगी जानाति । धतचित्तसा इड्डूचत्त्यप्रकान्नइपन्नं वा तत्यव्यं योगी जानाति । धतचित्तसा इड्डूचत्त्यप्रकान्नइपन्नं वा तत्यव्यं योगी जानाति । धतचित्तसा इड्डूचत्त्यप्रकान्नइपत्नात् हर्म्यार्थयहनसामर्थ्यनविद्यादिभिर्व्यिपेरजचं परिष्ट्रियते । वदा तु तैयीइपायैर्व्विपाः परिष्ट्रियन्ते, तदा निहत्तमसखिधादईस्य सर्थार्थ-इद्दस्यान्तर्थ्यमेकाप्रतायसादाविर्भवति ॥ ९६ ॥

विद्यमारमार ।

# भ्रब्दार्थ-प्रत्ययानामितरेतराध्यासात् सङ्करस्तत्प्र-• विभागसंयमात् सर्व्वभूतरुतन्त्रानं ॥ १७॥

'ग्रब्दः' अोचेन्द्रिययाद्या नियतकमवर्षाता नियतैकार्छप्रतिपत्त्व-वच्छिन्नः। यदि वा क्रमरस्तिः स्कोढात्मा ध्वनिः प्रास्तमंख्रतमुद्धिसद्यः, उभयथापि पदरूपो वाक्यरूपञ्च। तथोरेकार्थप्रतिपत्ती सामर्थ्यात्। 'ग्रर्थः' जाति-गुण-क्रियादिः। 'प्रत्ययः' ज्ञानं विषयाकारा बुद्धि दृत्तिः। 'प्रर्थः' जाति-गुण-क्रियादिः। 'प्रत्ययः' ज्ञानं विषयाकारा बुद्धि दृत्तिः। एषां ग्रन्दार्थज्ञानानां व्यवहारे 'इतरेतराध्यासात्' भिन्नानामपि मुद्ये करूपतासम्पादनात् सद्दीर्धलं। तथाहि गामावस्तेयुक्तः कच्चिद्-गोखचणमर्थं गोलजात्यवच्छिन्नं सास्तादिमत्पिण्डरूपं, इन्द् तदाचकं, ज्ञानच्च तद्याहकमभेदेनैवाध्यवस्त्रति । न लस्त्य गोग्रन्दो वाचकः, प्रयं गोग्रन्दस्त वाच्यः, तथोरिदं साहकं ज्ञावसिति भेदेन व्यवहरति। यथा हि केाऽयमधैंः, केार्य प्रब्दः, किमिदं ज्ञानमिति प्रष्टः सर्व-कैकरूपमेवेात्तरं ददाति गौरिति । स ययेकरूपतां न प्रतिपद्यते कथमेकरूपसुत्तरं प्रयक्तति । एतसिखवस्थिते योऽयं 'प्रविभागः', इदं भ्रव्दस्य तत्तं यदात्तकलं नाम । इदमर्थस्य यदाच्यलं । इदं ज्ञानस्य यत् प्रकाग्रलं । इति प्रविभागं विधाय तसिन् प्रविभागे यः 'संय-मद्वरोति, तस्य 'सर्व्यंषां भ्रतानां स्टग-पर्यु-पत्ति सरीस्टपादीनां यत् 'रुतं' यः भ्रव्दः । तत्र 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । श्रनेनाभिप्रायेनेतेन प्राणिमाऽयं भ्रव्दः समुचारित इति सर्व्यं जानाति ॥ ९७ ॥

सिद्धनारमाइ ।

# संस्कारसाधात्करणात् पूर्व्वजातिज्ञानं ॥ १८ ॥

दिविधासित्तस्थ वामनारूपाः 'संस्काराः। केचित् स्वतिमामोत्पा-दनफलाः। केचित्र्यात्यायुर्भेगलचणविपाकछेतवः यथा धर्माधर्मास्थाः। तेषु संस्कारेषु यदा संयसं करोति, एवं मया सेार्ज्यो जनुभ्रतः, एवं मया सा किया निष्पादितेति पूर्व्वटक्तं सर्व्यमनुषन्दधानेा भावनयैव प्रवेाधकमन्तरेण उद्बुद्धसंस्कारः सर्व्यमतीतं स्नरति। क्रमेण साचात्-क्ततेषूदुद्धेषु संस्कारेषु॥ 'पूर्व्वजयानुभ्रतानपि जास्यादीन् प्रत्यचेण प्रयति॥ ९ म्॥

- ई दिविधाक्तस्थेति E मुक्तकपाठः।
- | साद्यात् कृतेषु संखारे स्विति B, C, E पुत्त केषु पाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> सर्व्वेचेकनेवेात्तरमिति ष्ट पुत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> वदतीति म पुस्तकपाठः।

<sup>‡</sup> रतसिन् स्थिते इति म पुक्तकपाठः।

#### सिद्धमारमाइ।

#### प्रत्ययस्य\* परचित्तज्ञानं † ॥ १८ ॥

'प्रत्ययस्थ' परचित्तस्थ<sup>‡</sup> केनचित्रुखरागादिना सिङ्गेन ग्टहीतस्त । बदा संयमं करोति तदा 'परकीयस्य चित्तस्य 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । सरागमस्य चित्तं वीतरागं वेति परचित्तगतानपि सर्व्वानेव धर्मान् जानातीत्यर्थ: ॥ ९ ८ ॥

त्रखेव परचित्तज्ञानस्य विश्वेषमाद ।

न तत् सालम्बनं तस्याविषयीमूतत्वात् ॥ २० ॥

'तस्थ' परस्थ, यचित्तं 'तत्', 'यालम्नमं' खकीयालम्ननेन यहितं, 'म', प्रकाते ज्ञातुं । ग्रालम्ननस्थ केनचिल्लिङ्गेनाविषयीक्तत्वात् । लिङ्गाचित्तमार्च परस्थावगतं, न तु नीलविषयमस्थ चित्तं, पीत-विषयमिति वा । यच न ग्टहीतं तच संयमस्य कर्त्तुमप्रकावात् । व भवति पर्चित्तस्य या विषयसत्व ज्ञानं । तस्मात् परकीयचित्तं नालम्ननसहितं ग्टद्वाते । तस्मालम्नस्थाग्टहीतलात् । चित्तधर्माः पुनर्ग्टन्नाने एव । यदा तु किमनेनालम्वितमिति प्रणिधानं करोति तदा तत्संयमात् तद्विषयमपि ज्ञानं उत्पद्यते एव ॥ २० ॥

सिद्धनारमाइ ।

#### कायरूपसंयमात्तद्याद्यश्वाक्तिस्तमो चक्षुःप्रकाशासं-येगिऽन्तर्ज्वानं ॥ २१ ॥

- म्यमं यख परचित्तस्थेति c मुक्तकपाठः ।
- \$ प्रत्ययस्त्रेत्वादिस्तत्रं, न तत्सालम्बनमित्यादिस्तत्रच काण्याम्मुदितयाग-भाष्यपुक्तके नाक्ति।

<sup>\*</sup> प्रथमखेति C पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> रतत्त्वत्रं नाध्यामुदितयेग्रभाष्यपुक्तने नाक्ति ।

'कायः' ग्ररीरं । तस्थ 'रूपं' चचुर्याच्चो गुणः । तस्मिन् काये इदं रूपमिति\* 'संयमात्', तस्य रूपस्य चचुर्याच्चत्वरूपा या 'ग्रक्तिः', तस्थाः 'सक्भे' भावनावत्रात् प्रतिबन्धे । 'चचुःप्रकाग्रासंयोगे', 'चचुघः,' 'प्रकाग्रः' सत्त्वधर्मः, तस्य 'त्रसंयोगे' तद्यद्दणस्य व्यापारा-भावे । योगिनः 'त्रम्तर्द्दानं', भवति । न केनचिदयौ दृग्धत इत्यर्थः । एतेन ग्रब्दाद्यन्तर्द्दानसुक्तं वेदितव्यं <sup>†</sup> । एतेन रूपाद्यन्तर्द्दानोपाय-प्रदर्शनेनेव श्रब्दादीनां श्रोचादियाद्याणामन्तर्द्दानं जक्तं भवति ॥ ॥ २९ ॥

ষিদ্ধালাব্যা ।

ं सेापकमं निरुपकमञ्च कर्म्भ तत्संयमादपरान्तज्ञा-नमरिष्टेभ्या वा॥ २२॥

त्रायुर्व्भिपाकं यत् पूर्व्वक्ततं 'कर्षभे', तद्दिप्रकारं, 'सेापक्रमं' 'निरुपक्रमञ्च'। तच 'सेापक्रमं' यत् फलजननाय सहेापक्रमेण कार्य्य-कारणाभिसुख्येन वर्त्तते। यथा उष्णप्रदेग्रे प्रसारितार्द्रवास: ग्रीघ्रमेव ग्रुथ्यति । जक्रविपरीतं 'निरुपकमं'। यथा तदेवार्द्रवास: संवर्त्तित-

† म चिक्रितपुक्तके 'रतेन प्रब्दादान्तर्धानमुक्तं' इत्ययं पाठः सूचाकारेब व्यवस्थापितः । परन्त्वयं न सभीचीनः, उक्तपाठस्य काध्शाममुदितयेग्रभाष्य-पुक्तके भाष्यान्तर्गतत्वात् । तत्र वाचस्पतिभिन्नेव 'रतेनेति' इति भाष्यपाठं विधत्य कायप्रब्दस्पर्धरसगन्धरंयमात् तद्याद्यप्रक्तिक्तम्भे श्रोचलयसन-प्राबप्रकाधासंयोगे तदन्तर्धानमिति सूचमूहनीयं इति भाष्याभिप्रायस्य यद्वितत्वात् । अस्त्रक्तव्यवद्य पुक्तकेषु रूचन्तर्गतत्वाच ।

<sup>\*</sup> तसिः झास्यसिमन् काये रूपमितीति म चिक्रितपुक्तकपाठः । तसिः झ-स्वसिमन् काये रूपमितीति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

मनुष्णदेशे पिरेण क्रोणमेति । त्रसिन् दिविधे कर्णं ि वः 'गंयमं करोति, किं मम कर्भ त्रीत्रविपाकं किं चिरविपाक मिन्धेवं ध्यानदा-द्यात् 'त्रपरान्तज्ञानं', अच्छे त्पचते । 'त्रपरान्तः' त्ररीरवियोगः । तसिन् 'ज्ञानं'। असुसिन् काखे असुसिन् देशे मम प्ररीरवियोगः । तसिन् 'ज्ञानं'। असुसिन् काखे असुसिन् देशे मम प्ररीरवियोगो भविष्यतीति निःगंत्रयं जानाति । 'त्ररिष्टेभ्ये। वा'। ग्ररिष्टानि चि-विधानि त्राधात्मिकाधिदैविकाधिभातिकभेदेन । तत्राधात्मिकानि पिहितकर्श्वः कौष्ठस्य वायोर्घेषं न ग्र्रणोति इत्येवमादीनि । त्राधि-भातिकानि ज्रकसात् विद्यतपुरुषदर्श्वनादीनि । ज्याधिदैविकानि ज्ञकास एव द्रष्टुमग्रक्यस्वर्गादिपदार्थदर्श्वनादीनि । त्रभ्यः प्ररीर-वियोगकासं जानाति । यद्यप्ययोगिनामप्यरिष्टेभ्यः प्रादेण ज्ञानसु-त्पद्यते, तथापि तेषां सामान्याकारेण तत् संग्रयरूपं । योगिनां पुनर्नियतकास्तदेश्वतया प्रत्यच्ववद्यभिषारि ॥ २ २ ॥

परिकर्मानिव्यादिताः सिद्धीः मं प्रतिपादयितुमाद्द ।

# मैव्यादिषु बखानि ॥ २३ ॥

· 'मैची-करूणा-सुदितोपेचासु यो विद्तिः बंयमः तस्व 'बचानि', तार्या मैच्यादीनां सम्बन्धीनि प्रादुर्भवन्ति । मैची-करूणा-सुदिता-सत्त्याऽख प्रकर्षे गच्छन्ति, बचास बर्वस्व मिचनादिकं सम्प्रति-पद्यते ॥ २ ३ ॥

#### सिद्धनारमाइ।

<sup>•</sup> व्यकाख रवेति म मुक्तवपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> परिकर्मानिष्यन्दभूताः सिद्धीरिति मु ८ मुझवदयपाठः ।

#### बखेषु इस्तिबलादीनि ॥ २४ ॥

इस्यादिसम्बन्धिषु 'बलेषु', इतसंयमख इस्यादिवदुबलानि ग्राविभेवन्ति। तदयमर्थ: । यस्मिन् इस्तिबले वायुवेगे सिंहवीर्थी वा तन्मयभावेन\* संयमं करोति, तत्तत्प्रव्यसामर्थ्ययुक्तं सत्त्वमख प्रादुर्भवतीत्यर्थ: ॥ २४ ॥

सिद्धानारमाइ।

### प्रष्टच्याचेाकन्यासात् स्त्रस-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टज्ञानं† ॥ २५ ॥

'प्रवृत्तिर्विषयवती ज्योतिमती च प्रागुका। तस्या योऽमौ 'श्रालोकः' मात्तिकप्रकामप्रमरः,<sup>‡</sup> तस्य निस्तिलेषु विषयेषु 'न्यासात्' तदासितानां विषयाणां भावनातः, १ स्तान्तःकरणेव्विन्द्रियेषु च प्रहाष्ट-मक्तिमापन्नेषु॥ 'स्त्रन्नास्य' परमाखादेः, 'व्यवद्दितस्य' अत्मयन्तर्गतस्य निष्यादेः, <sup>11</sup> 'विप्रहाष्टस्य' मेर्व्यपरपार्श्ववर्त्तिनेा रसायनादेः, 'ज्ञानं', छत्पद्यते ॥ २ ५ ॥

एतत्समानवत्तान्तं सिद्धन्तरमाइ ।

# भुवनन्नानं स्रय्ये संयमात् ॥ २६ ॥

- \* तन्मयोभावेनेति म पुक्तकपाठः।
- † सूचा-व्यवचित-विप्रक्तरार्थज्ञानमिति E पुत्तकपाठः।
- ‡ साच्चिकप्रकाग्र इति छ पुक्तकपाठः ।
- S भावगादिति म पुक्तमपाठः ।
- || प्रद्यद्यासितामापन्नेव्विति H पुक्तकपाठः ।
- ¶ निधानादेरिति म पुक्तकपाठः।
  - 10

'स्वर्थे' प्रकाशमये, यः संयमं करोति, तस्य सप्तमु अर्भुवःस्तः-प्रस्टतिषु खोकेषु यानि 'भुवनानि तत्मचिवेशभाच्चि पुराणि, तेषु यथावदस्य 'द्वानं', उत्पद्यते । पूर्व्वसिन् स्वचे सात्तिकप्रकाष्ट्र श्वाखम्बनतयोक दृष्ट् तु भैातिक द्वति विश्वेषः ॥ २ ६ ॥

भौतिकप्रकात्रान्तराखम्बनदारेण्वे सिद्धन्तरमाद ।

# चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानं ॥ २७ ॥

'ताराणां' ज्योतिषां, यः 'यू इः' विभिष्टमन्त्रिवेभः, तसिन् 'चन्द्रे', इत्तसंयमस्य 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । स्वर्य्यप्रकाभेन इततेजस्कत्वात् ताराणां, स्वर्य्यसंयमात्तज्ज्ञानं न भक्कोति भवितुमिति ष्टयगुपायो-ऽभिहितः ॥ २ ७ ॥

सिद्धनारमाइ ।

### भुवे तद्गतिज्ञानं ॥ २८ ॥

'ध्रुवे' निश्वले च्योतिषां प्रधाने, कृतसंयमस्य तासां ताराणां या 'गतिः', प्रत्येकं नियतकासा नियतदेशा च तस्थाः 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते। इयं तारा त्रयं यहः इयता कालेन इमं राश्विमिदं नचत्रं यास्थति इति सर्व्वं जानातीत्यर्थः। इदं कालज्ञानफसमित्युकां भवति॥ २ प् ॥

वाच्चाः सिद्धीः प्रतिपाद्यान्तराः सिद्धीः प्रतिपादयितुसुपक्रमते ।

#### नाभिचक्रे कायव्यूच्चानं ॥ २८ ॥

बरीरमध्वर्त्ति 'नाभिसंज्ञकं यत् षोड्गारं 'चक्रं', तसिन् इ.त-

र्षयमस्य चेगिनः, 'कायगतेा चोऽमौ 'य्यूहः' विक्रिष्टं रम-मस-धातु-नाद्यादीनामवस्त्रानं, तत्र 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । इदयुकं अवति । गाभित्तकं ग्ररीरस्य मध्यवर्त्ति सर्व्वतः प्रद्धतानां नाद्यादीनां सूसभूतं। त्रतसत्त्र हतावधानस्य समग्रः सस्तिवेग्रो यथावदाभाति\*॥ २८॥

सिद्धन्तरमाइ।

## कण्ठक्रूपे शुत् पिपासानिहत्तिः । ३० ॥

कण्ठे गखे कूपः 'कण्डकूपः' जिज्ञा-तन्त्वोरधस्तात्<sup>†</sup> कूपदव कूपेा गर्च्ताकारप्रदेशः। प्राणादेर्यत्सम्पर्कात् चुत्पिपासादयः प्रार्ड्भवन्ति । तसिन् डातसंयमस्य योगिनः 'चुत्पिपासादयो निवर्त्तन्ते । घण्डिकाध-स्तात् श्रोतसाप्यायमाने<sup>†</sup> तसिन् भाविते भवत्येवंविधा सिद्धिः॥३०॥

सिद्धन्तरमाइ ।

## क्रर्मानाखां स्वैर्थं ॥ ३१ ॥

कण्ठकूपद्याधसात् या 'कूर्मास्था नाड़ी, तस्थां इतसंयमस, चेतगः 'स्वैय्यें', उत्पद्यते । तत्स्वानमनुप्रविष्टस चपसता? न भव-तीत्यर्थः । यदि वा कायस स्वैर्य्यमुत्पद्यते, न केनचित् सन्दयितुं श्रक्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ३९ ॥

सिद्धनारमाइ ।

- \* यथावदाविभेवतीति B, C, E पुक्तकपाठः
- † जिज्ञाचच्चीरधक्तादिति म पुक्तवपाठः।
- ‡ खोतसा धार्थमाब इति म पुस्तकपाठः।
- § चलतेति C प्रत्तकपाठः । चचलतेति H पुस्तकपाठः ।

# मूर्बज्योतिषि सिबदर्शनं । ३२ ।

त्रिरःकपाले ब्रह्मरन्ध्राख्यं छिद्रं प्रकाशाधारत्नात् 'व्योतिः । धथा ग्टहाभ्यन्तरस्वस्य मणेः प्रधरन्ती प्रभा कुद्धिकाविवरप्रदेशे सङ्हते , तथा इदयस्यः सात्तिकः प्रकाशः प्रस्टतस्तच सन्पिण्डिततं भजते । तच इतसंयमस्य, ये द्यावा-प्रथियोरन्तराखवर्त्तिनः 'सिद्धाः' दियाः पुरुषाः, तेषामितरप्राष्ट्रहृष्ण्रानां तस्य दर्श्वनं भवति । तान् पम्यति, तैश्व सन्धाय्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ३२ ॥

बर्व्यात्रले उपायमाइ।

# प्रातिभादा सर्व्व ॥ ३३ ॥

निमित्तानपेचं<sup>†</sup> सनेामाचजन्यसविधंवादकं ट्रागुत्पद्यसानं<sup>‡</sup> ज्ञानं प्रतिभा । तखां संयसे क्रियमाणे 'प्राप्तिभं' विवेकख्याते: पूर्व्वभावि तारकं ज्ञानं, उदेति? । यथोदेव्यतः सवितुः॥ पूर्व्वं प्रभा प्रादुर्भवति । तददिवेकख्याते: पूर्व्वं तारकं 'सर्व्वविषयं ज्ञानमावि-र्भवति । तसिन् सति संयमान्तरानपेचः सम्बं जानातीत्वर्थः ॥ ३ २॥

बिद्धनारमाइ ।

#### हृद्ये चित्तसंवित् ॥ ३४ ॥

'इद्यं' ग्ररीरस प्रदेशविशेष: । तसिकधोमुखस्रत्पपृण्डरीकाभ्यन्तरे

- \* कुद्धिताकारेव सर्व्वप्रदेशे सङ्घटत इति या॰।
- † सर्व्वनिभित्तानपेद्यभिति 🛙 ब्सक्षपाठः।
- ‡ भटिव्यत्पद्यमानमिति D पुस्तंबपाठः ।
- § उत्पद्यत इति छ पुक्तकपाठः।
- | बधादेखति सबितरीति D पुक्तमायाठः ।

श्वनाःकरणमत्त्वस्त्व स्वानं । तत्र हातमंचमस्य ख-परचिक्तज्ञात्रमुत्प-द्यते । खचित्तगताः सर्व्वा वासनाः परचित्तगतांस्य रागादीन् जाना-तीत्यर्थः ॥ ३४ ॥

सिद्धन्तरमाइ ।

सत्त्वपुरुषयेारत्यन्तासङ्कीर्खयाः प्रत्ययाविश्रेषेा भागः † परार्थान्यस्वार्थसंयमात् पुरुषज्ञानं ॥ ३५ ॥

'सत्त्वं' प्रकाष्ठसुखात्मकः प्राधानिकः परिणामविग्रेषः । 'षुरुषः' भोका त्रधिष्ठादृरुपः<sup>‡</sup> । तयोर्भेग्य-भोकृल्वरुपलात् चेतनाचेतनलाच त्रत्यन्तासङ्गीर्धतं भिन्नलमित्यर्थः । तयोर्थः 'प्रत्ययस्थाविग्रेषः' भेदे-नाप्रतिभासनं,१ स भोगः । तस्मात् सत्त्वस्थिव कर्द्धताप्रत्ययेन या रुख-दुःखमंतित् स 'भोगः' सत्तस्य स्वार्थनैरपेच्छेण 'परार्थः' पुरुषार्थः॥ । तस्मादन्या यः 'स्वार्थः' पुरुषस्वरूपमाचालम्बनः, परित्यकाइद्दारे सत्त्वे या चिच्छायामंक्रान्तिः, तच इत्रसंयमस्य 'पुरुषविषयं 'ज्ञानं', उत्पद्यते । तदेवं रूपं स्वासम्मनं ज्ञानं सत्त्वनिष्ठं पुरुषो जानाति । न पुनः पुरुषो ज्ञाताज्ञानस्य विषयभावमापद्यते, ज्ञेयलापत्तेः । ज्ञादृल्ज्ञेयलयोरत्यन्तविरोधात् ॥ २५ ॥

#### त्रखेव संयमख फलमाइ।

<sup>\*</sup> खन्तः कर बस्तेति H युक्त कपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> प्रत्ययाविष्टेषाद् भाग इति H, B, C चिक्रितपुत्तनपाठः । पर्यित-नामनपत्रे सुदितयागसूत्रे पुरुषतत्त्वयाः इति पाठा दृश्यते ।

<sup>‡</sup> भोक्तधिष्ठाहरूप इति B पुराक्तपाठः।

<sup>§</sup> चभेदेन प्रतिभासनमिति D मुक्कपाठः |

<sup>||</sup> पुरुषार्थनिमित्त इति H पुरुषपठः।

# ततः प्रातिभ-श्रावर्ण-वेदनादर्शाखादवार्त्ता जायने ॥ ३६ ॥

'ततः' पुरुषसंयमादभ्यस्यमानात्, युत्यितस्यापि ज्ञानानि जा-यन्ते। तच 'प्रातिभं' पूर्व्योक्तं ज्ञानं, तस्याविर्भवनात् स्वस्वादिक-मर्थं पर्यात । 'त्रावर्षं' त्रोचेन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, तस्याच प्रकष्टं दिव्यं दि-वि भवं क्रन्दं जानाति । 'वेदना' स्पर्ग्वेन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, विद्यतेऽनयेति हत्वा तान्त्रिक्या संज्ञया व्यवच्चियते। तस्यात् दिव्यस्पर्भविषयं ज्ञानं उपजायते। 'त्रादर्भ्र:' चतुरिन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, त्रासमन्तात् दृस्वते ऽनुश्चयते रूपमनेनेति छत्वा, तस्य प्रकर्षाद्विवरूपज्ञानमुत्यचते। 'त्रासादः' रसनेन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, त्रासाद्यद्र्यज्ञानमुत्यचते। 'त्रासादः' रसनेन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं, ज्ञास्ताद्ये इत्ति छत्वा, तस्मिन् प्रकष्टे दिव्यरसमंविद्र्पजायते। 'वार्त्ता' गन्धसंवित्, तं वत्त्तिक्रव्य तान्त्रिक्या परिभाषया धापेन्द्रियमुच्यते, वर्त्तते गन्धविषय इति कत्वा उत्तेर्भ्रायोव्द्र्याज्जाता वार्त्ता गन्धसंवित्, तस्यां प्रद्यस्यमाणायां दिव्यगन्धेऽनुश्र्यते॥ ३ ६ ॥

एतेषां फलविग्रेषानां विषयविभागमाइ! ।

# ते समाधावुपसर्गा व्युत्याने सिद्वयः ॥ ३७ ॥

'ते' प्राक्प्रतिपादिताः फलविभेषाः, 'समाधेः प्रकर्षं मच्छतः?

- † गन्धसंवित्तिरिति म पुस्तमपाठः।
- ‡ विग्रेषविभागमाहेति D पुस्तकपाठः ।
- र् समाधौ प्रकर्ध गण्हतीति D पुत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> तस्याविर्भवादिति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

'जपसगां:' जपद्रवा विघ्नाः" । तत्र इर्ष-विस्नयादिकारफेन समाधिः ग्रिथिलीभवति । 'खुत्याने' पुनर्थवद्दारद्द्रायां, विभ्रिष्टफलदायकलात् 'सिद्धयः', भवन्ति ॥ ३० ॥

सिद्धन्तरमादः ।

# वन्धकारणशैथिच्यात् प्रचारसंवेदनाच चित्तस्य परश्ररीरावेशः । इट ॥

यापकलादात्मचित्तयोर्गियतकर्भवण्चादेव ग्ररीरान्तर्गतयोरेव भो-मू-भोग्यभावेन यत् संवेदनमुपजायते, स एव ग्ररीरवन्ध इत्युच्यते । तत् यदा समाधिवग्रात् 'बन्धकारणं धर्भाधर्भाख्यं कर्म श्रिप्रिली-भवति, तानवमापद्यते । चित्तच्य च थेाऽसा 'प्रचारः' इदयप्रदे-गादिन्द्रियदारेण विषयाभिमुख्येन प्रसरः, तख 'संवेदनं' ज्ञानं दयं चित्तवद्दा नाडी, ज्रनया चित्तं वद्दति, दयम्च प्राणादिवद्दाभ्शे नाड़ीभ्शे विखवणा द्दति खपरग्ररीरयार्थदा सम्चारं जानाति, तदा परकीयं ग्ररीरं स्टतं जीवच्छरीरं वा चित्तं सम्चारदारेण प्रविग्रति । चित्तम्च परग्ररीरे प्रविग्रत् दन्द्रियाप्यनुवर्त्तते, मधुकरराजमिव मधु-मचिकाः! । ज्रतः परग्ररीरप्रविष्टो योगी खग्ररीरेणेव तेन? व्यवद्दरति, यतेा व्यापक्रयास्चित्तपुरुषयोर्भेागसङ्कोचकारणं कर्म, तचेत् समा-धिना चिन्नं तदा खातन्त्रात् सर्व्वचेव भोगनिव्यक्तिः ॥ इ ॥

- † परग्ररीरप्रवेग्न इति D पुस्तनपाठः।
- ‡ मचिका इति D पुक्तकपाँठः।
- ५ सग्रदोरवत्तेनेति "पण्डित"नामकपत्रपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> विद्वनारिया इति म पुक्तनपाठः ।

सिद्धन्तरमाइ ।

#### उदानत्रयाज्ञल-पद्ध-कण्टकादिधसङ्ग उत्कान्तिश्व ॥ ३९ ॥

समसानामिन्द्रियाणां तुषज्वास्तावद् या युगपदुत्यिता दृत्तिः सा जीवनक्रव्दवाच्या। तस्ताः क्रियाभेदात् प्राणापानादिसंक्राभिर्थपदेक्रः । तत्र इदयान्मुखनासिकादारेण वायोः प्रण्यनात् प्राण इत्युच्यते । नाभिप्रदेशात् पादाङ्गुष्ठपर्यन्तमपनयनादपानः । नाभिप्रदेशं परिवेष्ठ्व समन्तान्नयनात् समानः । क्रकाटिकादेशादाश्विरेाद्यत्तेदस्त्रयनादु-दानः । याप्य नयनात् सर्ज्वश्वरीरयापी व्यानः । 'उदानस्य', संयमदा-रेण 'जयात्', इतरेषां वायूनां निरोधा हुर्द्धगामिलेन 'जस्ते' मद्दान-दादी, मद्दति वा कर्द्दमे, तीन्त्णेषु कण्डकेषु वा न मज्जति इति । सघुवान्तूसपिण्डवज्जसादौ निमज्जन्नपि उन्नच्हतीत्यर्थः ! ॥ ३८ ॥

सिद्धन्तरमाइ ।

#### समानजयात् प्रज्वलनं‡ ॥ ४० ॥

त्रग्निमावेक्त व्यवस्थितस्थ 'समानास्थस्य वायोः 'जयात्' संयसेन वग्नीकारात् , निरावरणस्थाग्नेर्इ्हूलात्तेजसा ज्वसत्रिव योगी प्रति-भाति ॥ ४० ॥

सिद्धन्तरमाइ।

- † उपरिगच्छतीत्वर्थं इति E पुक्तमपाठः ।
- 1 समानजयाज्ज्वलनमिति पाठः C चिक्रितपुक्तने काग्र्या सुदितयाग्रभाष्य-पुक्तने च वर्चते ।

<sup>\*</sup> मच्जित्वापीति D पुस्तवपाठः ।

#### श्रीचाकाश्वयीः सम्बन्धसंयमाहिव्यं श्रीचं ॥ ४१ ॥

'श्रोत्रं' प्रब्दयाहकमाहद्वारिकमिन्द्रियं । 'त्राकाग्रं' खोम प्रब्द-तन्मात्रकार्य्यं । तयोः 'सम्बन्धः' देश-देशिभावखत्रणः । तस्मिन् इतसंय-मस्य योगिनः 'दियं श्रोत्रं' प्रवर्त्तते, युगपत् सत्त्व-व्यवहित-विप्रक्तष्ट-षब्दयहणसमर्थं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ ४९॥

सिद्धन्तरमाद ॥

कायाकाश्रयोः सम्बन्धसंयमास्तघुतूखसमापत्तेश्वा-काश्रगमनं ॥ ४२ ॥

'कायः' पाश्चभौतिकं ग्ररीरं। तस्व 'त्राकाभ्रेन अवकाभ्रदायकेन यः 'सम्बन्धः', तच ग्रंयमं विधाय 'खघुनि 'द्रखादेैं। या 'समापत्तिः तन्मयीभावलचणा, तां विधाय प्राप्तात्यन्तलघुभावेा योगी प्रथमं यथाद्ति जले<sup>†</sup> सञ्चरन् क्रमेणोर्णनाभतन्तुजालेन सञ्चरमाण ज्रादि-त्यर्फाभिञ्च विद्दरन् यथेष्टमाकाभे गच्छति ॥ ४२ ॥

सिद्धन्तरमाइ ।

वहिरकस्पिता दृत्तिर्महाविदेहा ततः प्रकाशाव-रणसयः ॥ ४३ ॥

प्रिंतत् 'वहिः', या मनसः प्ररीरनेरपेच्छेष 'हत्तिः', सा 'महा-विदेहा', नाम विगतवरीराहद्वारदार्क्यदारेणेाच्यते । 'ततः' तन्द्रां

> \* खवकाग्रदागादिति म पुराकमाठः । † स्ववीति म पुराकमाठः । 11

#### पातझवी बेागस्त्र

कतात् पंथमान्, 'प्रकाजावरणच्चः' गात्तिकस्य चित्तस्य घः प्रकाज-झस्य यदावरणं क्रेज्रकर्भादि तस्य चयः प्रविखयो भवति । जयमर्थः । जरीराइद्वारे गति या मनचेा वहिर्हत्तिः सा कल्पितेत्युच्यते । यदा पुनः जरीराइद्वारभावं\* परित्यञ्च खातन्त्रेण मनचेा टक्तिः सा ज्रकल्पिता, तस्यां संबमात् योगिनः सर्वे चित्तमलाः चीयन्ते ॥४ ३॥

तदेवं पूर्व्यान्तविषया भ्रपरान्तविषया मध्यभावास सिद्धीः प्रति-पाद्यानन्तरं सुवनञ्चानादिरूपा वाद्याः, कायय्टूहादिरूपा भाभ्य-न्तराः, परिकर्मनिव्यन्नश्वतास 'मैचादिषु वखानि' इत्येवमाद्याः समाधूपयोगिनीसान्तःकरणवहिःकरणखचणेन्द्रियभावाः, प्राणादिवा-युभावास सिद्धीसित्तदार्छाच समाधेः समाम्रासेात्पत्तये प्रतिपास इदानी खदर्धनोपयोगिसवीज-निर्व्वाजसमाधिसिद्धये विविधोपास-प्रदर्धनायाह ।

# स्यूल-स्वरूप-स्रक्षान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमाद्भूतजयः ॥४४॥

पद्यानां प्रथिव्यादीनां अतानां चे पद्यावस्थाविभेषरूपा धर्माः स्यूखलादयः, तच इतसंयमस्य 'अतजयः', भवति, अतानि वस्ता-न्यस्य भवन्तीत्यर्थः<sup>†</sup>। तथादि अतानां परिदुग्धमानं विभिष्टाकारवद्रूपं 'स्यूलं' 'सरूपं' चैषां यथाक्रमं कार्यं गन्ध-म्रेहीण्णता-प्रेरणावकाम-दानसचर्ण। 'स्टक्षं' तु यथाक्रमं स्वतानां कारणलेन‡ व्यस्तितानि गन्धादितन्माचाणि। 'चन्धविनेा गुणाः प्रकाम-प्रदक्ति-सितिरूपतवा

<sup>\*</sup> धरीरादइंभावमिति C पुत्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> भूतान्धवम्धं वक्सानीत्वर्च इति म पुरावपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> बारबभेदेनेति C, H, B मुखबाराठः ।

मर्मचैवान्ययिलेन समुपसभ्यको । 'सर्णवत्त्तं' तेव्वेव गुण्णेषु भोगापवर्गस-म्पादनास्वा अतिः । तदेवं श्वतेषु पद्यसु उन्नसचणावस्थापच्नेषु प्रत्यवस्तं संयमं कुर्वन् योगी श्वतजयी भवति । तद्यचा, प्रचमं स्वूस-रूपे संयमं विश्वाय तद्नु स्ट्रसारूपे इत्येवं क्रमेख तस्त क्वतसंय-मस्य सद्वस्पानुविधायिन्या वर्त्सानुसारिष्य इव गावा श्वतप्रक्रतयो भवन्ति ॥ ४४ ॥

तस्वैव भूतजयस फलमाइ।

ततोऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसम्पत्तवर्मानभिधा-तम्व ॥ ४५ ॥

'म्रणिमा' परमाणुरूपतापक्तिः । स्वचिमा द्वस्वपिण्डवस्तपुलप्राप्तिः । गरिमा गुरूलप्राप्तिः । महिमा महत्तप्राप्तिः म्रङ्गुस्त्रयेण चम्द्रादि-स्पर्धनग्रक्तिः । प्राकाग्यं इच्छानभिषातः । भ्ररीरान्तःकरणेभ्ररत्वं इंग्रित्वं । सम्वेच प्रभविष्णुता वश्चित्वं, सर्व्वाप्टेव श्वताणि भ्रनु-रागित्वात् ने तदुकं नातिक्रामन्ति । कामावसायित्वं सर्व्वच कामा-वसायः, यसिन् विषयेऽस्त कामः इच्छा भवति, तसिन् विषये योगिनेा.वसायो भवति, तं विषयं स्तीकारदारेणाभिसाय-समाप्तिपर्यन्तं नयतीत्यर्थः । तच ते भ्रणिमाद्याः समाध्रुपयोगिनेा भ्रतजयात् योगिनः प्रादुर्भवन्ति । यथा परमाणुत्वं प्राप्ते

- उक्तनच्चबावस्थावस्थिति म पुत्तनपाठः । उक्तनचबावस्थाभि-द्रेखिति F पुत्तनपाठः ।
- + जनगामित्वादिति म पुद्धनपाठः ।

#### \* मने।बदुचमगतिलाभ इति C पुत्तकपाठः ।

तस्य फलमार । ततेा मनेाजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयञ्च 180 गरीरख मनेावदनुत्तमगतिलाभः 'मनेाजविलं'। कायनिरपे-

'गइणं' इन्द्रियाणां विषयाभिसुखी दत्तिः । 'खरूपं' सामान्येन प्रकाशकलं। 'त्रसिता' त्रइङ्गारानुगमः । 'त्रन्ययार्थवच्चे' पूर्व्ववत्। एतेषामिन्द्रियाणामवस्तापञ्चने पूर्ववत् संयमं छत्वा 'इन्द्रियजयी भवति॥ ४७॥

# ग्रहण-स्वरूपास्मितान्वयार्थं वत्त्वसंयमादिन्द्रियजयः 89

'रूप-खावष्य-बखानि' प्रसिद्धानि। 'वज्रसंहननं' वज्रवत् कठिना संइतिरस्य बरीरे भवतीत्यर्थः। इति कायस्थाविर्भूतगुण्यम्यत् ॥ ४ ६ ॥ एवं भूतजयमभिधाय प्राप्तभूमिकस्येन्द्रियजयमाह।

### रूप-लावख्य-बल-वज्रसंइननत्वानि कायसम्पत 1861

कायसम्पदमाइ।

न च वायुः ज्ञोषयति इत्यादि योच्यं ॥ ४ ५ ॥

वज्रादीनामधम्तः प्रविशति । एवं सर्मेण योज्यं । एतेऽण्टिमा-दयोऽष्टी गुणा महाबिद्धय इत्युच्चनी। 'कायबग्पत्' वच्चमाणा, तां प्राप्नोति। 'तद्धर्मानभिषातच' तस कायस ये भर्मा रूपादयसेवा-मभिघातो गाणो नाख सुतखिदपि भवति । नाख रूपमग्निर्द्दति

चाणामिन्द्रियाणां ष्टत्तिखाभः 'विकरणभावः'। सर्व्वक्रित्वं 'प्रधान-जयः। एताः सिद्धयो जितेन्द्रियस्य प्रादुर्भवन्ति। ताख त्रसिन्द्रास्त्रे मधुप्रतीका इत्युच्चन्ते। यथा मधुन एकदेशेऽपि खदते, एवं प्रत्येक-मेताः सिद्धयः खदन्त इति मधुप्रतीकाः ॥ ४ ८ ॥

इन्द्रियजयमभिधायान्तः करणजयमाइ।

## सत्त्व पुरुषान्यताखातिमात्रस्य सर्व्वभावाधिष्ठावत्वं सर्व्वज्ञावत्वत्व ॥ ४८ ॥

तसिन् ग्रुद्धे चालिके परिणामे इतसंयमख या सल-पुरुषयेा-रूत्पद्यते विवेकस्वातिः सा 'त्रन्यतास्थातिः', । गुणानां कर्द्वलाभि-मानग्रिधिलीभावस्वरूपात्तन्माद्दाक्यात्\* तत्रैव स्थितस्य योगिनः 'सर्व्वभावाधिष्ठाद्वत्वं', 'सर्व्वज्ञाद्वलञ्च', समाधेर्भवति । सर्व्वेषां गुण-परिणामानां भावानां स्वामिवदाक्रमणं 'सर्व्वभावाधिष्ठाद्वत्वं' । तेषामेव ग्रान्तोदिताव्यपदेग्धधर्भत्वेन स्थितानां यद्यावदिवेकज्ञानं 'सर्व्वज्ञाद्वत्वं' । एषा च असिन् ज्ञास्त्रे परस्तां वज्ञीकारसंज्ञायां प्राप्तायां विज्ञोका नाम सिद्धिरित्युच्यते ॥ ४८ ॥

क्रमेण भ्रमिकान्तरमाइ।

## तहैराग्याद्पि दोषवीजसयं कैवच्यं ॥ ५० ॥

तस्वामपि विश्वोकायां सिद्धाे यदा वैराग्यसुत्पद्यते योगिनः, तदा तस्नात् 'दोषाणां' रागादीनां, यत् 'वीजं' च्रविद्या, 'तस्वाः'

ભ

<sup>\*</sup> कर्टनाभिमानग्रिखित्तीभावसरूपया तन्मयतयेति C पुत्तकपाठः ।

पातझवे ये।मस्त्रे

'बये' निर्कूखने, 'कैवखं' चात्यन्तिकी दुःखनिष्टत्तिः । पुरुषख गुचा-नामधिकारपरिषमाप्तेः\* खरूपनिष्ठलं† ॥ ५ • ॥

श्वसिन्नेव समाधी सित्युपायमार ।

खान्युपनिमन्त्रणे<sup>‡</sup> सङ्ग-सायाकरणं पुनरनिष्टप्रस-ज्ञात् ॥ ५१॥

चलारो धोगिने। भवन्ति । तचाभ्यासवान्प्रष्टचनमाच च्योतिः प्रथमः । चतस्भरप्रज्ञः दितीयः । भूतेन्द्रियजयी व्यतीयः । चति-ज्ञान्तभावनीयचतुर्धः । तच चतुर्थस्य समाधेः प्राप्तसप्तविधप्रान्त-भूमिप्रज्ञस्य चन्द्रां मधुमतीसंज्ञां<sup>॥</sup> श्वमिं साचात्कुर्व्यतः 'स्तानिने। देवा उपनिमन्द्रयितारे। भवन्ति, दिव्यक्तीरसायनादिकसुपढौक-चन्ति । तस्तिन् 'उपनिमन्द्रणे', नानेन 'सङ्गः', कर्त्तम्यः, नापि 'स्रयः', । सङ्गकरणे पुनर्विषयभोगे निपतति । स्रयकरणे हत-हात्यमात्मानं मन्यमाने। न समाधायुस्तइते । चतः सङ्ग-स्रयये।सेन वर्ज्यनं कर्त्तम्यं ॥ ५९॥

भयामेव प्रसम्बतायां विवेकस्वाती पूर्व्याक्रसंयमयतितिह-सुपायानारमाइ ।

- \* अधिकारसमाप्तेरिति B, C पुच्चमपाठः।
- † सरूपप्रतिश्ठर्वामति B, C पुक्तकपाठः।
- t साम्युपनिमन्त्रवे इति H पुत्तनपाठः ।
- \$ ज्ञतानारप्रच इति म मुखावयाठः।
- ॥ प्राप्तसप्तविधभूमिप्रत्वयस्थेति म मुक्तकपाठः।
- न मधुमतीं प्रश्वामिति म पुराषपाठः ।

4

#### स्रखतत्कमयाः संयमाहिवेकं जानं । ५२ ।

'चणः' सर्व्यानयः काखावयवः । यद्य कखा प्रतिभन्तुं न प्रकाते । तथातिधानां काखचणानां यः 'क्रमः' पौर्व्यापर्येण परिणामः, तभ 'संयमात्' प्रागुन्नं 'तिवैकर्ज द्वानं', उत्पद्यते । भ्रयमर्थः । भ्रयं काख-चणे। आग् काखचणादुत्तरः, भ्रयमस्मात् पूर्वं इत्येवंतिभे क्रले क्रतसंयमस्मात्यन्तसूच्चे ऽपि चणक्रमे यदा भवति साचात्कारः, तदा भ्रन्यद्पि सूच्चां मद्दादि साचात्करोतीति विवेकद्वानेात्पत्तिः॥ ५ २॥ भ्रस्येव संयमस्य विषयतिभेषोपचेपणायाद्यां ।

जाति-लह्यण-देश्रैरन्यतानवच्छेदात्तुत्वयोक्ततः प्रति-पत्तिः ॥ ५३ ॥

पदार्थानां भेदहेततः 'जाति खचण-देशा भवन्ति । कचिद्भेदहेतुः 'जातिः', यथा गौरियं महिषीयमिति । जात्या तुख्ययोः 'खचणं', भेदहेतुः, यथा इयं कर्व्युरा इयमरूणेति । जात्या खचणेन चाभिन्न-घोर्भेदहेतुः 'देशः', दृष्टः, यथा तुख्यप्रमाणयोरामलकयोर्भिन्नदेश-खितयोः । यव पुनर्भेदोऽवधारयितुं न शक्यते, यथैकदेश्वखि-तयोः डुक्तवोः पार्थिवयोः परमाखोः । तथाविधे विषये भेदाय कतसंयमख यदा भेदेन ज्ञानसुपजायते, तदा तदभ्यासात् सुद्धा-ध्यपि तत्त्वानि भेदेन प्रतिपाद्यने । एतदुकं भवति, वच केनचिदु-

‡ विषयविवेनेापयेाममाचेति ० मुसानगठा ।

ł

<sup>\*</sup> चबक्रमयेरिति म पुरावपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> विवेकचानमिति 🗉 पुरावपाठः ।

पार्थन भेदा नावधारचितुं प्रकासम धंधमाद्भवत्येव भेदप्रतिपत्तिः सत्त्वाणां तत्त्वानां ॥ ५ ३ ॥

उक्तस विवेकजन्यचानस मंचां विषयं सभावं यास्यातुमाइ।

तारकं सर्व्वविषयं सर्व्ववाविषयमक्रमञ्चेति विवे-कर्ज ज्ञानं ॥ ५४ ॥

जन्नसंयमवखादन्व्यायां भूमिकायासुत्पन्नं 'ज्ञानं', 'तारकं', इति । तारयत्यगाधात् संसारपयेाधेः योगिनं इत्यान्वर्थिका संज्ञया 'तारकं', इत्युच्यते । त्रस्य विषयमाइ, 'सर्व्वविषयं' इति, सर्व्वाचि तत्त्वानि महदादीनि विषयोऽस्थेति 'सर्व्वविषयं' । स्तभावश्वास्य सर्व्वयाविषयतं । सर्व्वाभिरवस्ताभिः स्यूख-स्रस्तादिभेदेन तैस्तेश्व परिणामैः सर्व्वणाकारेणावस्तितानि तत्त्वानि विषयोऽस्थेति 'सर्व्वघा विषयं' । स्तभावान्तरमाइ । 'त्रक्रमञ्च', इति । निःभ्रेषनानावस्ता-परिषतदित्येकभावग्रहणे नास्य क्रमा विद्यते इति 'स्वक्रमं' । सर्व्व करतलामस्तकवद्युगपत् पश्चतीत्वर्धः ॥ ५४ ॥

त्रसाच विवेकजातात्नारकाख्यज्ञानात् किं भवतीत्याद ।

## सम्त-पुरुषयाः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवच्यं ॥ ५५ ॥

'सन्त-पुरुषौ' अन्नलचणौ । तयोः 'इड्डि्साम्ये कैवस्थं'।

\* संसारसागरादिति म पुत्तवपाठः।

† निःग्रेधनानावस्थापरिवतव्यात्मकमावयङ्खे इति म पुद्धकपाठः । निःग्रेधनानावस्थापरिवतन्यूनाधिकभावयङ्खे इति C पुद्धकपाठः । चित्तयत्तव्या वर्व्वया कर्वत्याभिमाननिष्टत्त्या खकारणेऽनुप्रवेशः इइद्धिः । पुरुषख इइद्धिरप्यरितभागाभावः । इति दयोः समा∽ नायां इइद्वी पुरुषख कैवन्धं उत्पद्यते, माचेा भवतीत्वर्थः ।

तदेवममारङ्गयोगाङ्गच्यमभिधाय तस च मंयमसञ्ज्ञां छला मंयमस विषयप्रदर्भनार्थं परिणामच्यसुपपास मंयमस्त्रोत्पद्यमानाः पूर्व्वामापरामा-मधभावाः सिद्धीरूपदर्ष्वं समाध्यासासेत्पत्तचे वाह्या सुवनज्ञानादिरूपा श्राभ्यम्तरास कायव्यूर्ध्ज्ञानादिरूपाः प्रदर्भ समाध्रुपयोगायेन्द्रियप्राणादिणयपूर्ल्विकाः प्रदर्भ परमपुरुषार्यसिद्धये यथाक्रममवस्त्रासहितस्तत्त्रयेन्द्रिय-सत्त्वजयोद्भवास वाखाय वि-वेकज्ञानेत्पत्तये तांस्तान् उपायान् उपन्यस तारकस सर्व-समाध्वत्सापर्यम्तभवस सरूपमभिधाय तस्त्रमापत्तेः इताधि-कारस्य सित्तसत्त्व स्वकारणानुप्रवेज्ञान् कैवद्यसुत्पत्तते इत्यभि-हिनं इति बाह्यतेा विश्वतिपादः ॥ ५५ ॥

द्वति मद्दाराजाधिराजत्रीभोजदेवविर्णितायां राजमार्ण्तण्डा-भिधार्या पातद्मल्योणत्रास्त्रस्रवटन्ते। विश्वतिपादखृतीयः ॥ ३ ॥

12

#### ऋष चतुर्थः पादः ।

यदान्नयैव कैवल्यं विनेापायैः प्रजायते ।

तसेकमजमीग्रानं चिदानन्दमयं खुमः ॥

इदानीं विप्रतिपत्तिषसुत्यभ्रान्तिनिराकरण्णेन थुत्त्या कैवच्यखरू∽ पावख्यापनाय° कैवच्छपादेाऽयमारभ्यते ।

तत्र याः पूर्व्यसुक्ताः सिद्धयसामां नानाविधजन्मादिकारणप्रति-पादनदारेलैवं वेाधयति, एताः सिद्धयः सर्व्याः पूर्व्वजन्माभ्यस्तमाधि-वसाज्जन्मादिनिमित्तमात्रत्वमात्रित्य प्रवर्त्तन्ते । ततञ्चानेकभवमाध्यस्य समाधेर्न चतिरस्तीत्यात्रासेात्पादनाय समाधिसिद्धेस्च प्राधान्यस्थाप-नार्थं कैवस्त्रोपयोगार्थञ्चाद्य ।

#### जन्मौषधि-मन्त्र-तपः-समाधिजाः सिद्वयः ॥ १ ॥

काश्चन 'जन्मनिमित्ता एव सिद्धयः । यथा पच्छादीनामाकाभ्रे गमनादयः । यथा वा कपिखमइर्षिप्रस्तीनां जन्मसमनन्तरमेव उपजायमाना ज्ञानादयः सांसिद्धिका गुणाः । 'म्रोषधिसिद्धयो यथा पाताखादौ रसायनाद्युपभेागात् ग्ररीरदार्ठ्यादयः । 'मन्त्रसिद्धिर्यथा मन्त्रजपात् केषाच्चिदाकाभ्रगमनादि । 'तपःसिद्धिर्यथा विश्वामिचा-दीनां । 'समाधिसिद्धिर्यथा प्रागेव प्रतिपादिताः । एताः सिद्धयः पूर्व्यजन्मनि चयितक्षेभानामेवेापजायन्ते, तस्मात् समाधिसिद्धाविव

कैवच्य खरूप चापगायेति c पुक्त कपाठः ।



त्रन्यार्था सिद्धीनां समाधिरेव जन्मान्तराग्यस्तः कारणं, मन्त्रादीनि तु निमित्तमाचाणि ॥ ९ <sup>॥</sup>

मनु नन्दीश्वरादीनां जात्यादिपरिणामः श्रस्मिस्नेव जन्मनि दृग्धते तत् कथं जन्मान्तराभ्यस्तसमाधेः कारणलसुच्यते\* इत्या-ब्रह्याइ।

#### जात्यन्तरपरिणामः प्रक्तवापूरात् ॥ २ ॥

ये।ऽयमिहैव जनानि नन्दीश्वरादीनां 'जात्यादिपरिणामः, सः 'प्रकृत्यापूरात्'। पाञ्चात्या एव हि प्रकृतये।ऽस्मिन् जनानि विकारा-नापूरयन्ति जात्यन्तराकारेेेेेण परिषमन्ति॥ २ ॥

मनु धर्माऽधर्मादयखच क्रियमाणा उपखभ्यनो, तत् क्यं प्रह-तीनामापूरणे कारणवमित्याइ।

## निमित्तमप्रयोजनं प्रक्षतीनां वरणभेद्स्तु ततः श्वेचिकवत् ॥ ३ ॥

'निमित्तं' धर्मादि। तत् 'प्रक्ततीनां', त्रर्थान्तरपरिणामे न 'प्रयो-जकं'। न हि कार्य्येण कारणं प्रवर्त्तते । कुच तर्हि तख धर्मादेर्व्यापार इत्याइ। 'वरणभेदखु ततः चेचिकवत्'। 'ततः' तस्सादनुष्ठीयमाना-द्धर्मादेः, यत् 'वरणं' त्रावरकं त्रधर्मादिः, तस्त्रैव विरोधिलात् 'भेदः' चयः, क्रियते, तस्मिन् प्रतिबन्धके चीणे प्रक्वतयः स्वयमभि-मतकार्य्याय प्रभवन्ति । दृष्टान्तमाइ । 'चेचिकवत्', यथा चेचिकः

\* कारगभाव उच्चत इति C पुक्तकपाठः।

El

छत्तविसः केदारात् केदारात्तरं जर्स निनीषुः असप्रतिवन्धक∸ वरणभेदमात्रं करोति, तस्मिन् भिन्ने जसं स्वयमेव प्रसरद्रूपं परिणामं ग्टकाति, न तु जसप्रसरणे तस्म कस्वित् प्रयक्षः । एवं धर्मादेर्वेद्वियं ॥ ३ ॥

थदा साचात्कततत्त्वस्य थेागिनेा युगपत् कर्षफकोपभेागाया-त्मीयनिरतिष्ठयविश्वत्वनुभावात्\* युगपदनेकष्ठरीरनिर्ममित्सा खप-बायते तदा कुतस्तानि चिन्नानि प्रभवन्तीत्याद्य ।

#### निर्मायचित्तान्धसितामाचात् ॥ ४ ॥

योगिनः खर्य निर्मितेषु कायेषु यानि 'चित्तानि', तानि मूच-कारणात् 'त्रस्मितामात्रात्', एव तदिच्छ्या प्रयरन्ति, अग्नेविंख्लुसिङ्का इव युगपत् परिणमन्ति ॥ ४ ॥

ननु बह्दनां चित्तानां भिन्नाभिप्रायलाम्नेककार्य्यकर्द्रलं स्वादि-त्यार ।

### प्रवत्तिभेदे प्रये। जबां चित्तमेकमनेकेषां ॥ ५ ॥

तेषां 'चनेकेषां', चेतमां, 'प्रवत्तिभेदे' व्यापारनानाले 'एकं', वोगिनः 'चित्तं', 'प्रवेाजकं' प्रेरकमधिष्ठाद्वलेन। तेन न भिद्यमतल्वं। चयमर्थः यथा चात्मीये घरीरे मनः चतुःपाखादीनि वधेष्ट प्रेरयत्यधिष्ठाद्वलेन, एवं कायान्तरेखपीति† ॥ ५ ॥

<sup>\*</sup> निरतिग्रयविभूत्यनुभवायैति C पुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> मार्थान्तरेव्वपीतीति B पुक्तमपाठः।

जमाद्प्रिभवलात् सिद्धीनां चित्तमपि तत्प्रभवं पश्चविधसेव श्रता जमाद्प्रिभवात् चित्तात् समाधिप्रभवस्य चित्तस्य वैखचस्यमाद् ।

#### तच ध्यानजमनाश्रयं ॥ ई ॥

'धानजं' समाधिजं यचित्तं, तन् पञ्चसु मध्ये 'ऋनाग्रधं' कर्म-वासनारहितं, इत्यर्थः ॥ ६ ॥

यथेतरचित्तेभ्धे। योगिनचित्तं क्षेग्रादिरहितं विसत्तर्णं तथा कर्मापि विसत्तणमित्याद्द ।

# कर्मात्रुक्तारुष्णं यागिनस्त्रिविधमितरेषां ॥ ७ ॥

प्रसमसम्प्रदं कर्म यागादि ग्रुक्तं। अग्रुभफसगदं ब्रह्मदत्यादि छण्णं। उभयम ही खें ग्रुक्त रुण्णं। तत्र ग्रुक्तं कर्म विचचणानां दान-तपः-स्वाध्यायादिमतां पुरुषाणां। छण्णं कर्म नारकानां। ग्रुक्त-छण्णं मनुव्याणां। 'योगिनान्तु संन्यायत्रतां एवंविधकर्मविपरीत-सच्चणं, तत् फसत्यागानुसन्धानेनैवानुष्ठानात् न किच्चित् फसमार-भते॥ ७॥

श्रस्वैव कर्म्सए: फलमाइ।

## ततस्तद्विपाकानुगुणानामेवाभिव्यक्तिर्वासनानां ॥८॥

इष्ट दिविधाः कर्मवायनाः स्टतिमाचफलाः जात्यायुर्भेगिफलास । तत्र जात्यायुर्भेगिफला एकानेकजन्त्रभवाः \* इत्यनेम पूर्व्वसेव इत-

\* रकानेकजन्मपत्रा इति म मुखबपाठः।

निर्खयाः । यास्तु स्वतिमाचफलास्तासामभिव्यक्तिस्ततः कर्म्भण्ः । येन कर्म्मणा याद्दुक् प्ररीरमारश्वं देव-मनुष्य-तिर्व्यगादिभेदेन\*, तस्त्व विपाकस्व याः 'त्रनुगुणा त्रनुरूपा वासनाः, तासामेव तस्नात् 'त्रभि-यक्तिः', 'वासनानां', भवति । त्रयमर्थः येन कर्म्मणा पूर्व्वं देवता-दिग्ररीरमारश्वं जात्यन्तरग्रतयवधाने पुनस्तथाविधस्त्वेव ग्ररीरस्वारस्प्रे तदनुरूपा एव स्वतिफला वासनाः प्रकटीभवन्ति । खाकान्तरेस्वे-वार्थेषु तस्व स्वत्यादया जायन्ते । इतरास्तु सत्योऽपि न्यग्स्टता-सिष्ठन्ति । न तस्तां दग्नायां नारकादिग्ररीरोपभागभवा वासना श्रभिष्यक्तिमायान्ति ॥ ५ ॥

त्रासामेव वासनानां कार्य्यकारणभावानुपपत्तिमाञ्चङ्घ समर्थ-चितुमाइ ।

इह नानायोनिषु अमतां संपारिणां काचिद्योनिमनुभूय यदा वान्यन्तरसहस्रव्यवधानेन पुनस्तामेव योनिं प्रतिपद्यन्ते, तदा तस्तां पूर्व्यानुभूतायां योनें। तथाविधग्ररीरादिव्यझकापेचया वासना या: प्रकटीभूता त्रासंस्त्रथाविधव्यझकाभावात्तिरोभूता: पुनस्तव्याविध-व्यझकग्ररीरादिसाभे प्रकटीभवन्नि । 'जाति-देग्र-कासव्यवधानेऽपि तासां स्तानुरूपस्तत्यादिफसमाधने 'त्रानन्तर्थ्य' नैरन्तर्थ्यमेव । कुत: ।

\* देवमनुष्यतिर्यंगादिभेदमिति H पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> अयस्त संचासिखन्तीति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

'स्रतिषंस्तारये। रेकरूपलात्'। तथा दि त्रनुष्ठीयमानात् कर्भणश्चित्त-यत्ते वायनारूपः षंस्तारः ययुत्पद्यते, य प पर्गनरकादीनां फलाना-श्वाङ्करीभावः, कर्भणां वा यागादीनां प्रक्रिरूपतयावस्थानं, कर्त्तुर्व्वा तथाविधभाग्यभाकृलरूपं सामर्थ्यं, संस्तारात् स्रतिः, स्रतेश्व सुख-दुःखोपभागः, तदनुभवाच पुनरपि संस्तारस्रत्यादयः । एवद्य यस्य स्रतिसंस्तारादये। भिन्नारूस्रानर्म्याभावे दुर्र्लभः कार्य्यकारण-भावः । त्रस्नाकन्तु यदानुभव एव संस्तारीभवति, संस्तारस्व स्रति-रूपतया परिणमते, तदा एकस्वैव चित्तस्वाऽनुमन्धाव्लेन स्थितलात् कार्य्यकारण्भावे। न दुर्घटः ॥ ८ ॥

भवलानन्तर्थं कार्य्यकारणभावञ्च वासनानां । यदा तु प्रथम-सेवानुभवः प्रवर्त्तते तदा किं वासनानिमित्त उत निर्न्निमित्त इति ग्रद्धां थपनेतुमाइ ।

#### तासामनादित्वमाश्विषो नित्वत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

'तासां' वासनानां। 'त्रनादिलं' न विद्यते त्रादिर्यस्य तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं। त्रासामादिर्नास्तीत्यर्थः । कुतः \* 'त्राग्रिषेा नित्यलात्'। येयमाग्रीर्महामाद्दर्का सदैव सुखसाधनानि मे श्वयासुः मा कदा-चन तैर्भम वियोगेा श्वयादिति यः सङ्कल्पविग्रेषेा वासनानां कारसं तस्य नित्यलादनादिलादित्यर्थः। एतदुक्तं भवति कारणस्य सन्निद्दित-लादनुभवसंस्कारादीनां कार्य्याणां प्रवत्तिः केन वार्य्यते, त्रनुभव-

\* कुत इत्यत खाहेति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

तदभावः ॥ १९॥ वायनानामनुभवे। हेतुः, तखानुभवख रागादयः, तेषामविद्या इति याचात् पारम्पर्य्येष च 'हेतुः'। 'फखं' प्ररीरादि स्मृत्यादि च। 'त्रात्रयः' बुद्धितत्त्वं। 'त्राखम्वनं' यदेवानुभवख तदेव वायनानां। त्रतसैः 'हेतु-फखान्रयाखम्वनैः', त्रनन्नानामपि वायनानां 'संय्हीत-त्वात्', तेषां हेलादीनां 'त्रभावे' ज्ञान-येागाभ्यां दग्धवीजकस्पने विहिते, निर्म्यूखलान् न वायनाः प्ररेाहन्तिः न कार्य्यमारभन्त इति तार्या 'त्रभावः' ॥ ९९॥

पातच्चसे येगाखचे

संस्कारायनुविद्धं संक्वीप-विकावधर्मि चित्तं तत्तदभिवज्जकविपाक-

त्रासामानन्यात् हानं कथं सभावतीत्यात्रद्ध हानेापायमाह ।

हेतु-फलाग्रयालम्बनैः सङ्ग्रहीतत्वादेषामभावे

सामात् तत्फसरूपतया परिषमत इत्यर्थः ॥ १ • ॥

मनु प्रतिचणं चित्तास नघरले।पश्वसेर्वासनानां तत्फलानाध कार्य्यकारणभावेनायुगपद्भावित्वात् भेदे कथनेकलमित्याधक्य एकल-समर्थनायाद्द ।

# त्रतीतानागतं स्वरूपतेाऽक्त्यध्वभेदावर्भाशां ॥ १२॥

इइ त्रत्यन्तमधतां भावानासुत्पत्तिर्न टुक्तिमती तेषां धत्त्वसम-न्धायोगात् । नद्दि ग्रग्रविग्रानादीनां क्रचिदपि सत्त्वसम्बन्धेा दृष्टः । निद्पाख्ये च कार्य्ये किसुद्दिम्ब कारणानि प्रवर्त्तरन् । नद्वसम्तं विष-

\* प्रदेष्ट्रमुपयान्तोति B, F पुरूवदयपाठः ।

€Ę

यमाखेाच्य कश्चित् प्रवर्भते । सतामपि विरोधाम्त्राभावसम्बन्धेऽसि । यत् सरूपेष सन्धवक्ताकं तत् कयं निरूपास्व्यतामभावसरूपताच्च भजते, न विरुद्धं रूपं स्वीकरोतीत्यर्थः । तसात् सतां नाज्ञासम्भवात् प्रसताच्चोत्पत्त्वभावात् तैसौधंसैंस्विंपरिणममानेा धर्मा सदैकरूप एवा-वतिष्ठते । धर्मास्तु ते चध्वकत्वेन व्यवस्थिताः । सस्मिन् सस्मिन्नध्वनि व्यवस्थिताः सरूपं त्यजन्ति, वर्म्तमानेऽध्वनि व्यवस्थिताः केवसं भाग्यतां भजन्ते । तसाद्धर्माणामेव त्रतीतानागताद्यध्वभेदसेनैव च रूपेष कार्यकारणभावाऽस्मिन् दर्भने प्रतिपद्यते, तसादपवर्गपर्य्यन्त-मेकसेव चित्तं धर्मितयानुवर्त्तमानं न निक्रोतुं पार्थते ॥ ९ २ ॥ त ग्रते धर्म-धर्मिषः किंरूपा इत्याइ ।

#### ते व्यक्त-स्रह्मा गुणात्मानः ॥१३॥

य एते धर्म-धर्मिणः प्रोक्ताः 'ते', 'यक्र-स्रच्चभेदेन व्यवस्तिताः । 'गुणाः' सत्तरजस्तमारूपाः । तदात्मानस्तत् स्तभावास्तत्परिणामरूपा इत्यर्थः । वतः सत्तरजस्तमाभिः सुखदुःखमेाइरूपैः सर्व्यासां वाद्या-भ्यन्तरभिन्नानां भावयक्तीनामन्वयाऽनुगमा दृग्धते, यच यदन्वयि तत् तत्परिणामरूपं दृष्टं । यथा घटादया स्टदन्विता स्टत्परिणा-मरूपाः ॥ ९ ३ ॥

यद्येते चयेा गुणाः सर्वंच मूलकारणं, कथनेका धर्माति व्यपदेशः इत्याबद्धाइ ।

Digitized by Google

<sup>\*</sup> चध्वकत्वेन जैकालिकत्वेन व्यवस्थिता इति F पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> न खरूपं खजन्तीति C पुक्तकपाठः ।

संस्काराधनुविद्धं संक्रीच-विकावधर्षि चित्तं तत्तदभिव्यञ्चकविपाक सामात् तत्फलरूपतया परिषमत इत्यर्थः ॥ ९ ● ॥ त्रासामानन्धात् द्दानं कथं सम्भवतीत्यात्रद्य दानेापायमाद ।

# हेतु-फलात्रयालम्बनैः सङ्गृहीतत्वादेषामभावे तदभावः ॥ ११ ॥

वासनानामनुभवे। हेतुः, तस्तानुभवस्त रागादयः, तेषामविद्या इति साचात् पारम्पर्य्येष च 'हेतुः' । 'फखं' बरीरादि स्मृत्यादि च । 'त्रात्रयः' बुद्धितत्त्वं । 'त्राखम्वनं' यदेवानुभवस्त तदेव वासनानां । ज्रतसैः 'हेतु-फखाश्रयाखम्वनैः', ज्रमन्नानामपि वासनानां 'संय्हीत-लात्', तेषां हेलादीनां 'चभावे' ज्ञान-योगाभ्यां दग्धवीजकस्पने विहिते, निर्मूखलात् न वासनाः प्रराेहन्ति<sup>•</sup> न कार्य्यमारभन्त इति तासां 'ज्रभावः' ॥ ९ ९ ॥

ननु प्रतिचणं चित्तस्य नश्वरत्वोपस्वस्वेर्वासनानां तत्फल्लानाञ्च कार्य्यकारणभावेनायुगपद्भावित्वात् भेदे कथ्रसेकलमित्याश्वद्भ एकल-समर्थनायार् ।

# ऋतीतानागतं खरूपतेाऽक्त्यध्वभेदावर्भायां॥१२॥

इद त्रत्यन्तमयतां भावानासुत्पत्तिर्न टुक्तिमती तेषां सत्त्वसम-त्थायोगात् । नद्दि व्वप्रविधानादीनां क्वचिदपि सत्त्वसम्बन्धेा दृष्टः । निद्पाख्ये च कार्थ्ये किसुद्दिम्ब कारणानि प्रवर्त्तरन् । नद्मसम्मं विष-

\* प्रदेष्ट्रमुपयानोति B, F पुरूकदयपाठः ।

यमाले। च कसित् प्रवर्भते । सतामपि विरोधाम्नाभावसम्बन्धे। सि । यत् सरूपेष सन्धसमाकं तत् कथं निरुपाख्यतामभावस्तरूपताम्च भजते, न विरुद्धं रूपं स्वीकरोतीत्यर्थः । तसात् सतां नाम्रासम्भवात् त्रास्ताद्यात्पत्त्वभावात् तैस्तैर्धर्यीर्व्वपरिणममानेा धर्म्या सदैकरूप एवा-वतिष्ठते । धर्मासु ते चध्वकत्वेन व्यवस्तिताः । सस्मिन् ससिन्नध्वनि यवस्तिताः सरूपं त्यजन्ति, न वर्त्तमानेऽध्वनि व्यवस्तिताः केवसं भोग्यतां भजन्ते । तसाद्धर्माणामेव त्रतीतानागताद्यध्वभेदस्तेमैव च रूपेष कार्य्यकारणभावाेऽसिन् दर्यने प्रतिपद्यते, तसादपर्वापर्यम्त-मेकमेव चित्तं धर्मितयानुवर्त्तमानं न निक्रोत्तं पार्थ्यते ॥ ९ २ ॥

त एते धर्म-धर्मिणः किंरूपा इत्याद ।

#### ते व्यक्त-स्वसा गुणात्मानः ॥ १३॥

य एते धर्म-धर्मिणः प्रोकाः 'ते', 'यक-सुच्चभेदेन व्यवस्तिताः । 'गुणाः' सत्तरजस्तमारूपाः । तदात्मानस्तत् स्तभावास्तत्परिणामरूपा इत्यर्थः । यतः सत्तरजस्तमाभिः सुखदुःखमेाइरूपैः सर्व्यासां वाज्ञा-भ्यन्तरभिन्नानां भावयक्तीनामन्वयाऽनुगमा दृग्धते, यच यदन्वयि तत् तत्परिणामरूपं दृष्टं । यथा घटादया स्टदन्विता स्टत्परिणा-मरूपाः ॥ ९ २ ॥

यद्येते चया गुणाः सर्व्वच मूलकारणं, कथनेका धर्माति व्यपदेत्रः इत्याब्रह्याइ ।

<sup>\*</sup> न्यध्वकत्वेन जैकालिकत्वेन व्यवस्थिता इति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> न खरूपं त्वजन्तीति C पुक्तकपाठः ।

# परिखामैकत्वादत्तुतत्त्वं । १४।

यद्येते चये। गुणासायापि तेषामङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनसत्त्रणे यः 'परिणामः' कचित् सत्त्वमङ्गि कचिद्रजः कचिच तम इत्येवंरूपः, तस्य 'एकलात्', 'वस्तुनः, 'तत्त्वं' एकलसुच्यते । यथेयं ष्टचिवी ऋवं वायुरित्यादि ॥ ९ ४ ॥

ननु विद्यानव्यतिरिको सत्यर्थे वस्त्लेकमनेक वा वक्तुं युच्यते चदा विद्यानसेव वासनावण्रात् कार्य्यकारणभावेनावस्थितं तथा तथा प्रति-भाति, तदा कथमेतच्छकाते वक्तुमित्याण्रद्भाष्ट ।

## वत्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्तयार्व्धिविक्तः पन्धाः ॥ १५ ॥

'तथेाः' द्यान-क्रेथथेाः, 'विविक्तः पन्धाः' विविक्रो मार्गभेद इति यावत्। कथं? 'वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्', समाने वस्तुनि ख्यादावुपस-भ्यमाने नानाप्रमादृणां चित्तभेदः सुख-दुःख-सेाइरूपतवा ससुप-सभ्य ते। तथाहि एकस्यां रूपखावष्यवत्थां योषिति उपखभ्यमानार्या सरागस्य सुखसुत्पद्यते, सपत्न्यास्तु देषः, परिव्राजकादे घूँ फोटोकसिन् वस्तुनि नानाविधचित्तीदयात् कयद्यिस्त कार्य्यलं वस्तुनः। एकचित्त-कार्य्यले वस्तु एकरूपतयैवावभासेत्। किस्च चित्तकार्य्यले वस्तुनः यस्य चित्तस्य यद् वस्तु कार्य्यं, तस्तिन् प्रर्थान्तरव्यासक्रे चित्ते तद्दनु न किश्चित् स्थात्। भवलिति चेत्र। तदेव कथमन्यैर्वड्रमिइपखभ्धते। उपखभ्यते च तस्तास्त्र चित्तकार्य्यं। प्रथ युगपद्दड्रभिः चेर्ग्र्याः क्रियते तदा बर्ड्यनिर्भतस्य तस्त्व\* एकनिर्भितादेखच्च्यं स्थात्। र्याद

\* नार्थसेति c पुस्तनपाठः।

वैसल्प नेधते तदा कारणभेदे सति कार्यभेदस्याभावे निईतुक-बेकइत्पं वा खगत् स्वात् । एतदुकं भवति सत्वपि भिन्ने कारणे यदि कार्यसाभेदः तदा समग्रं जगन्नागतिधकारणजन्यसेकरूपं द्यात्, कारणभेदाननुगमात् खातग्व्येण निर्हेतुकं वा खात्। यद्येवं कथं तेन चिगुणातानार्धनेकस्वेव प्रमातुः सुख-दःख-माद्यम-यानि ज्ञानानि जन्यन्ते । मैवं । यथा त्रर्थस्तिगुणसाथा चित्तमपि चिगुणं, तद्य च ऋर्थप्रतिभाषेात्पत्तौ धर्मादयः सहकारिकारणं। तद्भवाभिभववज्ञाचित्तस्य तेन तेन रूपेणाभिव्यकिः । तथा च कामुकस्य सचिहितायां योषिति धर्ममहत्ततं चित्तं सत्तव्याङ्गितया परिणममाणं सुखमयं भवति । तदेवाधर्षंग्रहकारि रजसेाऽङ्गितया दुःखरूपं सपत्नीमाचस्य भवति । तीव्राधर्यांसहकारितया तमसेा-उक्तिन काेपनाया: सपत्या **मेाइमयं भवति । तसादिज्ञान**यति-रिक्रोऽसि गाम्रोऽर्थः !। तदेवं विज्ञानार्थयोः ! तादाव्यविरोधास्त्र कार्य्यकारणभावः । कारणाभेदे मत्यपि कार्य्यभेदे श्रतिप्रसङ्गादिति ज्ञानाद्व्यतिरिक्तलमर्थस्य स्वक्सापितं ॥ ९५ ॥

यद्येनं ज्ञानं प्रकाशकलात् यहण्खभावमर्थस प्रकाश्यलाद्याह्य-खभावः तत् कथं युगपत् बर्व्वानर्थात्र ग्टहाति न सरति चेत्याग्रद्ध परिषारं कर्त्तुमार ।

- \* धमाधमादय इति म पुक्तकपाठः।
- † वाद्यार्थ इति C मुत्तकपाठः ।
- ‡ विज्ञानवक्तुनेरिति F पुक्तकपाठः ।

200

#### तदुपरागापेशित्वाचित्तस्य वस्तु ज्ञाताज्ञातं॥ १ई॥

'तस्थ' प्रर्थस्थ, 'छपरागादाकारसमर्पणात्, चिन्ने वाद्यं 'वस्तु', 'द्यातमज्ञातच भवति । ग्रयमर्थः, सर्व्यः पदार्थः स्वात्मस्वाभे साम-ग्रीमपेचते, नीसादिज्ञानचे।पजायमानं इन्द्रियप्रणास्तिकया समागत-मर्थे।परागं सड्कारिकारण्वलेनापेचते व्यतिरिक्तस्थार्थस्य समन्धाभा-वाद्यद्यीतुमज्ञकालात् । ततच येनैवार्थेन तस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपे।प-रागः छतः तमेवार्थं तज्ज्ञानं व्यवदारयोग्यतां नयति । ततच योऽर्थे। ज्ञात इत्युच्यते । येन चाकारो न समर्पितः सेऽज्ञातलेन व्यवच्चियते । यस्तिंचानुभ्रतेऽर्थे साहम्यादिर्थः संस्कारसुद्वे।धयन् सडकारिकारण्वतां प्रतिपद्यते तस्तिन्नेवार्थे स्वतिहपजायते इति वर्ष्यंच न ज्ञानं, नापि सर्व्यं स्वतिरिति न कचिदिरोधः ॥ ९६॥ यद्येवं प्रमातापि पुरुषो यस्तिन् कास्ते नीसं संवेदयते न तस्तिन् कास्ते पीतं ग्रतयित्तवत्तम्यापि कदाचिद्यदीवर्द्यस्वादा-कारग्रह्ये परिणामिलं प्राप्तमित्याज्ञङ्ख परिइर्म्तुमाइ ।

सदा ज्ञाताश्वित्तवत्त्रायस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्थापरिषा-मात् । १७॥

था एता: 'चित्तस्व', प्रमाख-विपर्श्वयादिरूपा: 'टक्तसंः', ताः 'तत्प्रभोः' तस्व चित्तस्व ग्रद्दीतुः, 'पुरुषस्व', 'सदा' सर्व्वकासमेव, 'ज्ञेयाः, तस्व चिद्रुपतया 'त्रपरिणामात्' परिणामिलाभावादित्वर्थः ।

<sup>\*</sup> इत्तिदिरोध इति F पुद्धकपाठः।

<sup>†</sup> पुरवस्थापरियामित्वादिति वाधीसुत्रितभाष्यपुरावपाठः ।

थद्यमें परिणामी खात्तरा परिणामख काराचित्कलात्तामां चित्त-हत्तीनां बदा ज्ञातलं नेापपद्यते। ग्रयमर्थः, पुरुषख चिद्रुपस सर्दै-वाधिष्ठाव्वलेन व्यवस्थितस्य यदन्तरक्वं निर्भाखं सत्त्वं तस्यापि सर्दैवाव-स्थितलात् तद्येन येनार्येनेापरक्तं भवति तथाविधस्यार्थस्य सर्दैव चिच्छायासंक्रान्तिसद्भावः, तस्यां सत्यां सिद्धं सदा ज्ञाव्टलमिति न कदाचित्परिणामिलाग्रद्भा ॥ ९७॥

मनु चित्तमेव सम्बोत्कर्षाद्यदि प्रकाधकं तदा खपरप्रकाधरूप-लात्\* आत्मानमर्थद्व प्रकाधयतीति तावतैव व्यवद्वारसमाप्तिः किं ग्रद्दीचम्तरेण इत्याधद्वामपनेतुमाइ ।

#### न तत् स्वाभासं दृष्यत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥

'तत्' चित्तं, 'खाभासं' खप्रकाम्नं, न भवति, पुरुषवेद्यं भवतीति द्यावत्। कुतः 'दृम्बलात्', यत् किल दृम्धं तद्दुष्टृवेद्यं, यथा घटादि। दूम्बद्य† चित्तं तस्नान्त्र खाभासं॥ ९ ५ ॥

ननु साध्याविभिष्टोऽयं हेतुः दृम्यलमेव चित्तस्थासिद्धं, किञ्च खबुद्धिमंवेदनदारेण पुरुषाणां हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहाररूपा टक्तयो दृम्यनो, तथाहि जुद्धोऽहं भीतेाऽहं न मे राग दत्येवमाद्या मंविदुद्धे-रसंवेदनान्नेापपन्नेत्यामद्वां निरसितुमाह ।

### एकसमये चोभयानवधारणं ॥ १८ ॥ श्रर्यंस गंवनिरिदनाया व्यवहारयोग्यतापादनं श्रयमर्थः सुख-

<sup>\*</sup> खपरप्रकाग्रकलादिति C प्रत्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> वेद्यचेति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

हेतुर्दुःखहेतुर्वेति । बुद्धेस संवित् सहमित्येवमाकारेष सुखदुःस-रूपतया व्यवहारणमतापादमं। एवंविधस व्यापारदवमर्धप्रत्यचकाले न युगपत्कर्त्तुं क्रकां विरोधात् । न हि विरुद्धयोर्थापारयोर्थुगपस्प्रभ-बेाऽस्ति । त्रतः 'एकसिन् काले, 'जभयस्थ' खरूपशार्थस प, त्रवधारयितुमत्रकातात्र क्तिं खप्रकात्रकमित्युक्तं भवति । किञ्चैवं-विधव्यापारदयं निष्पाद्य फलदयस्यासंवेदनादहिर्मुखतयैवार्थनिष्ठलेन क्तिस्थ खयमसंवेदनात् कर्थनिष्ठमेव फलं न स्वनिडमित्यर्थः ॥९८॥

गनु माभरहुद्धेः खबं ग्रहणं बुद्धमारेण तु भविष्यति इत्या-त्रद्धाह।

# चित्तान्तरदृष्ये बुद्धिबुद्धेरतिप्रसङ्गः सृतिसङ्खरय॥२०॥

चदि हि बुद्धिर्बुद्धमारेण संवेधते तदा सापि बुद्धिः खयमबुद्धा बुद्धान्तरं प्रकाग्रयितुमसमर्थेति तस्या याद्दकं बुद्धान्तरं कच्यनीचं तस्या त्राप्यन्यदित्यवनवस्थानात् पुरुषायुषेणाप्यर्थप्रतीतिर्न स्थात् । नहि प्रतीतावप्रतीतायामर्थः प्रतीतो भवति । स्टतिसङ्करच्च प्राप्नोति । रूपे रचे वा ससुत्पन्नायां बुद्धौ तद्धादिकाणामनन्तानां बुद्धीना-सुत्पत्तेर्बुद्धिजनितैः संस्कारैर्वदा वाद्यस्टतयः क्रियन्ते, तदार्थबुद्धे-रपर्य्यवसनाद् बुद्धिस्ततीनां चुगपदुत्पत्तेः कस्मिन्नर्थे स्टनिरिवसु-त्पत्वेति ज्ञातुमग्रक्यत्वात् 'स्टतिसङ्करः', स्थादियं रूपस्टतिरियं रसस्ततिरिति न ज्ञायेत ॥ २०॥

† स्रतीनां सङ्गर इति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> खरूपसंवेदनाभावादिति c पुस्तकपाठः ।

मनु बुद्धेः खप्रकाञ्चलाभावे बुद्धामारेण धार्धवेदने कथमयं विषयसंवेदनरूषो व्यवहार इत्यात्रद्भ खसिद्धानामाह।

चितेरप्रतिसङ्ग्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ खबुडिसंवेदनं ॥२१॥

पुरुषश्चिद्रूपत्वात् 'चितिः, सा 'मप्रतिसङ्गुमा, न विद्यते प्रतिसङ्गु-नेरुन्यच गमनं यस्थाः सा तथाका चन्येवासङ्घीर्णति यावत्। यथा गुणा मज्जाङ्गिभावस्त्रचणे " परिणाने अङ्गिनं गुणिनसुपसंकामन्ति तद्रूपता-मिवापद्यने, यथा वा स्रोते परमाणवः प्रसरन्तो विषयमारोपयन्ति नैषं चितिग्रक्तिः, तस्थाः सर्व्वदैकरूपतया स्वप्रतिष्ठितम्वेव व्यवस्थितत्वात्। म्रतसासजिधाने यदा सुद्धिसदाकारतामापद्यते चेतनेवेापजायते, सुद्धिटत्तिप्रतिसङ्गान्ता च यदा चित्रूक्तिः सुद्धिटत्त्यवक्त्रिन्तया<sup>†</sup> संवेधते तदा बुद्धेः स्वस्थात्सनेा वेदनं सक्षवतीस्वर्थः॥ २९ ॥

इत्यं सर्चविहितं चित्तं सम्बीर्घयइणमामर्थेन सकलव्यवहारचमं भवतीत्याद ।

# द्रष्ट्-दृश्वोपरक्तं चित्तं सर्व्वार्थं ॥ २२ ॥

'द्रष्टा' पुरुषः, तेन 'छपरक्तं' तखस्तिधाने तद्रूपतामिवापस्नं,<sup>‡</sup> 'दृश्योपरक्तं' ग्टद्दीतविषयाकारपरिणामं, यदा भवति तदा तदेव सर्वार्थयद्दणसमर्थं जायते। यथा निर्मसर्फाटिकदर्पणाद्येव प्रतिविम्न-यद्दणसमर्थं एवं रजखानाभ्यामनभिश्वतं सन्त्वं इड्डूलाचिच्छाया-

<sup>\*</sup> अङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनसन्दाखे इति F युक्तनपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> बुद्धिवत्तिविग्निष्टतया इति म मुक्तकपाठः।

<sup>‡</sup> तंद्रपतामिव प्राप्तमिति म पुस्तकपाठः ।

यहण्डसमधें भवति, न पुनरइड्डलाइजस्तमसी। तत् न्वग्भूत-रजखमोरूपमङ्गितवा सत्तं निश्चसप्रदीपत्रियाकारं सदैवेकरूपतवा परिणममाणं चिच्छायाग्रइणसामर्थादामोचपान्नेरवतिष्ठते । चर्णा श्रयस्तानासनिधाने सौइस चलनमाविर्भवति, एवं चिट्रपयनिधाने यत्तव्याभिवाज्यमभिवाज्यते चैतन्यं। त्रत एवासिन् दर्भने दे चिच्छकी नित्योदिताऽभिवज्ञा च। नित्योदिता चिच्छकिः पृष्त्वः । तसन्ति-धानादभिवकचैतन्यं सत्त्वमभिवज्ञा चिच्छकिः । तदत्वमं सचिहित-लादन्तरक्नं पुरुषस्व भोग्यतां प्रतिपद्यते । तदेव ज्ञान्तवद्यवादिभिः साक्तीः पुरुषस्व परमातानेाऽधिष्ठेयं कर्मानुरूपसुखदुःखभोकृतया व्यप-दिश्वते । यत्तवानानुद्रिक्तलादेकस्यापि गुपास, कदापित्कस्यपिदन्नि-लाचिगुणं प्रतिचणं परिणममानं सुख-दुःख-साहात्मकं न निर्म्श, तत्तचिन् कर्यातारूपे इड्र सत्ते खाकारसमर्पणदारेख संवेदाता-मापादयति । तच्छुद्धमाद्यं चित्तमत्तमेकतः प्रतिसंकानाचिच्छायमन्यते। ग्टहीतविषयाकारेण चित्तेनेापढौकितखाकारं चित्तंकान्तिवखाचेत-नायमानं वास्तवचैतन्याभावेऽपि सुख-दुःखरूपभोगमनुभवति। स एव भोगोऽत्यम्तमात्रिधेन विवेकाग्रहणाङ्गोकुरपि पुरूषस्य भोग इति व्यप-दिग्यते। श्रनेनाभिप्रायेण विन्ध्यवासिनात्रं। "सत्ततपालसेव पुरुष-तप्पलं" इति। श्रन्यत्रापि "विम्ने प्रतिविम्नमानच्छायासदृष्ठच्छायान्त-रोद्भवः प्रतिविम्बन्नब्देनेाच्चते। एवं सत्तेपि पौरुषेयचिच्छायासद्रूत्र-चिच्छायामाराभिवाकिः प्रतिश्रङ्गानित्रिञ्दार्थः"\* । नन् प्रतिविम्ननं

१०४

<sup>\*</sup> प्रतिविम्बग्रब्दार्थ इति C मुस्तकपाठः। चिच्छायाग्रब्दार्थं इति म पत्तकपाठः।

#### स्वाणां स्ची।

प्रहे, पादे, स्वां। प्रहे, पारे, सूचं। **चतीतानागतसित्यादि** 61 ११ वायेन्द्रियसिदिरित्सादि 2 1.8 ę খৰ বানাল্য দেল विष सण्डावीत्यादि Ł 8 \*\* ę **चनित्या ग्रू ची**त्यादि 99 इर्मनाचा बेथें 9 ¥ . चनभूतविषयेत्वादि कराई प्रतीत्वादि ŧ 11 88 ₹. चपरिपचर्य्यमं रत्यादि ज्रमान्धनं परिकासान्धने \*\* • 10 **च**धावप्रत्ययेत्यादि t ٤. चेतुः **{** ŧ **चम्यास्वेराम्वेत्यादि** क्रेम्बर्भविपाकेत्यादि 8 2 22 88 t **च**विद्याचेचेत्सहि क्रेरमुकः वर्षा गणरत्यादि २१ 17 2 8 चविद्याचित्र त्याहि 44 9 चरतला मयारित्यः दि ŧ अखेयप्रतिष्ठायासित्यादि ॥१ २० चरप्रवियामीत्वादि 9 199 बचिंसात्रतिष्ठायासित्वादि ११ 9 रेश जीण्डनेरविज्ञातस्वेवे-**चरिंसासत्याखेवेत्वा हि** -÷. **2**• ন্দাৰি 24 t **र्यरप्रविधानाता** १९ परमस्वद्येत्यादि 22 2 ভ**হাগল** যালচৰ নিযাৰি Re **२१ वम्द्रे तारावूवज्ञानं** ¥ चतवारा तम प्रजा ४क चित्रेरप्रतिस्ट नावा ÷. t रब समये चेस्सया मक्या-र त्यर्मद 1.1 1.1 १९ चिगाम्हरद्वभेषादि 8 2.07 रतयेव सविचारित्याहि जन्मो। राधनन्त्रतपद्रत्यादि ८. ₹\$ t 8.8 रवे जातिदेवेत्यादि २१ वातिदेगकाकेत्यादि 98 ₹ €8 रतेन भूतेन्द्रिवेणित्यादि ६५ ę वातिवचचेत्यादि 11 50 बच्हूरे वृत्यिपात्रानिहत्तिः 📲 ६ कात्यनारपरिवास इत्वादि ८१ 20 क्यांग्रजादयमित्वादि ११ तकि देषित् धरि 8 • રન્ટ

22

तकः चंसार इत्यादि

तज्जपसद्चेभावन

कावरपर्यवस्तवित्यादि ०० ६

**\$** 

Q. 84

का याका जयोरित्यादि

\*\*

81

.....

25

1 1

**₹**8

99

\*\*

99

82

99

19

4+

Ł

٢

\*\*

ę

74

75

₹

٢Ē

| <b>इ</b> डे, पादे, <b>छाप</b> ।     |          |            | ष्टहे, पाई, <b>स्त्यं</b> ।                           |            |  |  |
|-------------------------------------|----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------|------------|--|--|
| तव्ययात् प्रज्ञासीकः १९             | ę        |            | तदा सव्यावरद्मजेत्यादि ११० अ                          | ₹•         |  |  |
| ततः ज्ञतार्थानामित्यादि १११         | 8        | १९         | तदुपरानापेचिनादि-                                     |            |  |  |
| ततः क्लेमकर्ममिटतिः ११•             | 8        | २९         | त्यादि १०० 🛊                                          | *(         |  |  |
| ततः चीयते प्रकामावरचं ४०            | <b>?</b> | <b>X</b> 2 | तदेवार्यमार्वामास-                                    |            |  |  |
| ततः परमा वद्यतेन्द्रियाचा धूझ       | २        | X X        | त्यादि ६१ र                                           | ę          |  |  |
| ततः प्रत्यक्षेतनेत्यादि १८          | و        | २९         | तद्वेराग्यादपीत्यादि म्यू र                           | X•         |  |  |
| <b>ননः प्रातिमत्रावचेत्यादि ৩</b> ০ | R        | 24         | तपः साध्यायेचरित्यादि ११ २                            | ۲          |  |  |
| ततोऽ <b>चिमादिप्रादु</b> भाव        |          |            | तसा प्रमाननवाचितासं-                                  |            |  |  |
| इत्यादि म्ह                         | ę        | 81         | स्तारात् (२ २                                         | ٩.         |  |  |
| तता इन्दानभिषातः ॥ इ                | <b>R</b> | ۳â         | <b>त</b> स्य भूमि <sup>षु</sup> विनिवेातः (९ <b>१</b> | €          |  |  |
| ततो मने।जविवमित्यादि ८४             | ę        | ۶C         | तस्य वाचकः प्रस्वः १८ १                               | 99         |  |  |
| ततखदिपाकेत्यादि ८२                  | 8        | 7          | तसा प्रत्येत्यादि ४५ २                                | 99         |  |  |
| तत्परं पुरुषस्त्रावेरित्यादि १०     | ٩        | 11         | तस्य चेतुरविद्या ४३ २                                 | <b>9</b> 8 |  |  |
| तत्प्रतिवेधार्यमेकतच्चा-            |          |            | तस्तापि निरोध इत्यादि २८ १                            | X٤         |  |  |
| भ्यासः २१                           | ٩        | <b>२</b> २ | तचिन् चति चाचेत्यादि ॥ १ १                            | 8€         |  |  |
| নৰ আসলমনামৰ্থ ৫২                    | 8        | ۲          | ता एव सवीवाः समाधिः २७ १                              | 84         |  |  |
| तन निरतिश्वर्यं सर्वज्ञवीजं१७       | ٦        | <b>₹</b> X | तारकं सर्वविषयसित्यादि मन्न २                         | K 8        |  |  |
| तच प्रत्ययेकतानता ध्यानं १•         | R        | २          | तासामनादिलमित्यादि ८५ ४                               | ٢٠         |  |  |
| तन मानेगदितेत्यादि (१               | ę        | 28         | तीव्रसंवेगामासावः ९४ ९                                | 22         |  |  |
| तन चिता यत्नाऽभ्यासः ९              | ٩        | १२         | वे प्रसित्रसवर्षेयाः स्ट्रकाः २४ २                    | ۹•         |  |  |
| तन खिरतुवनासनं ११                   | २        | 84         | वे यक्तसूचामुदात्मामः ८० ४                            | <b>۶</b> ۲ |  |  |
| तद्पि वर्षिरई निवेणि स १२           | ę        | 5          | ते चमाचानुपचर्मा इत्यादि ७८ २                         | <b>ę</b> o |  |  |
| तदभावात् संयोगाभाव                  |          |            | ते झाद्परितापपाला                                     |            |  |  |
| इत्यादि ४४                          | ۲        | <b>9</b> K | इत्यादि ३८ २                                          | ٤٤         |  |  |
| तद्र्य एव हम्झस्यात्मा ४२           | ₹        | २१         | वयसमारजं पूर्वेभ्यः (२ २                              | ٩          |  |  |
| तद् संख्येयवासनः शिरि-              |          |            | चयमेकच संयसः (१ २                                     | ¥          |  |  |
| त्यादि १०७                          | ¥        | 99         | दुःबद्दीर्मनस्रोत्यादि २० ९                           | <b>₹</b> १ |  |  |
| तदा इष्टुरित्यादि ४                 | ۲        | ę          | दुःवानुमधी द्वेषः २४ २                                | 2          |  |  |
| तदा विवेकनिम्बनित्यादि १००          | 8        | २४         | हरूद्र १४ २                                           | ۲          |  |  |
|                                     |          |            |                                                       |            |  |  |

[2]

# [ 8 ]

| ष्ठहे, पादे, स्तूर्ण।                      |                                                 |   |            | 8                                     | छे, पा       | <b>दे</b> , स्ट | লে।        |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---|------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|------------|
| <b>रहान्</b> त्रविकेत्यादि                 | ۲                                               | ٤ | 2K         | प्रहच्चा को कम्या स <b>ि</b> त्या वि  | 90)          | ę               | <b>?</b> N |
| देश्रवअखित्रस घारवा                        | ٩۰                                              | R | ٩          | प्रमंखाने <b>यकु</b> सी <b>र खे</b> • |              |                 |            |
| इद्या हमिनाच इत्यादि                       | 82                                              | 2 | <b>२</b> • | त्यादि ।                              | ११०          | 8               | २८         |
| <b>ङ्रहृडम्म</b> यारित्याद्दि              | 8 0                                             | ९ | 50         | प्रातिभाद्दा सम्ब                     | 0Į           | ę               | ٩¢         |
| ब्रहुड <b>स्रोपरक्तमित्या</b> दि           | १०ह                                             | 8 | २२         | ৰশৰাংৰ্মীযিআহি-                       |              |                 |            |
| धारणातु च वाग्यता सन                       | सः ४्⊂                                          | ۲ | ¥٩         | ন্যাহি                                | <b>હ</b> ર   | R               | Şc.        |
| धानदेवासद्दुत्तवः                          | ₹₹                                              | १ | ٩٩         | ৰৱীৰ স্বন্ধিৰ জাবীলি                  | 90           | ę               | ₹8         |
| भुवे तद्रतिज्ञार्ग                         | <b>6</b> 8                                      | ę | 29         | त्रस्वययंत्रतिष्ठायां वीय्ये-         | •            |                 |            |
| न तत् चासम्मनसित्या                        | द् 👓                                            | ₹ | <b>₹•</b>  | खाभः                                  | K٩           | ٩               | 9E         |
| न तत् सामार्थ हमालात                       | <b>१ १</b> • १                                  | 8 | ٩٣         | भवप्रत्यये। विदेचेत्यादि              | १२           | ٢               | ١¢         |
| লানিম্বর কাথঅুম্বয়া                       | ৰ ৩৪                                            | ę | ৼৼ         | भुषमञ्चानं स्टर्य्यसंयमात्            | 90           | ę               | २९         |
| <b>त्रिसित्तम</b> प्रये <b>।ज</b> केत्यादि | र २१                                            | 8 | ٩          | মুখঁন্থানিৰি ঘিৰহ মঁগ                 | 0Į           | ę               | <b>२</b> २ |
| नियां इतित्तान्वविता-                      |                                                 |   |            | म्बदुमधेत्यादि                        | <b>Q</b> K   | ۲               | <b>२</b> २ |
| मात्र                                      | <b>८</b> २                                      | 8 | 8          | मैनीवदन्त्यादि                        | ११           | ٩               | <b>१</b> १ |
| निष्विचारवैभारदा रत्य                      | া <b>হি                                    </b> | ٩ | 80         | নীম্মাহিণ মজালি                       | 90           | ۹               | <b>9</b> 9 |
| परसामुपरसमचलाना                            |                                                 |   |            | <b>यथाभिमतधामादा</b>                  | <b>4</b> 8   | ٢               | १८         |
| <b>र्</b> त्यादि                           | <b>4</b> 8                                      | ٩ | 8•         | यमनियमाधनेत्यादि                      | 84           | ۲               | ९९         |
| परिणानतापपंखारित्य                         | ादि २०                                          | ۲ | ર થ        | <b>থা</b> গ <b>খিলত</b> লিনিবায়া     | ę            | ٩               | ٩          |
| परिषामनचेत्याि.                            | (0                                              | ą |            | योगा ज्ञानुष्ठानेत्यादि <u>ः</u>      | 8€           | ٩               | 29         |
| परिशामैकलादकुतज                            | 52                                              | 8 | ٩ ک        | <b>६५छावखेत्यादि</b>                  | 28           | ę               | 84         |
| पुरवार्थग्रन्थानासित्या                    | दि१११                                           | 8 | <b>9</b> 9 | वसुसाम्य इत्यादि                      | 52           | 8               | <b></b>    |
| <b>পন্ধা ম্যানি</b> থাৰি                   | . ¥•                                            | ९ | le         | <b>गचिरकल्पि</b> वेत्यादि             | <u>ک</u> م ا | ę               | 8 <b>R</b> |
| प्रकर्दनविधारकाम्या                        | म-                                              |   |            | वाद्यास्वनरविषयेत्यादि                | K O          | ₹               | K L        |
| त्यादि                                     | १९                                              | ٢ | <b>ছ</b> ৪ | विसर्ववाधन इत्यादि                    | 86           | ۹.              | ęę         |
| <b>प्रत्वचानु</b> मानेत्यादि               | •                                               | ٢ |            | বিমর্কবিত্থাবালব্দরোরি                | दे १०        | ٦               | १७         |
| त्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञा                     | ণ ৩০                                            | ę | ્ય         | वितकांचिंग्रादय इत्या                 | दि ४८        | ۶ ؛             | <b>1</b> 8 |
| प्रसा <b>य</b> विपर्य्यचेत्यादि            | ٩                                               | ٩ |            | विपर्य्यवा निष्यान्नानेत्या           | ৰি ৰ         | 1               | 2          |
| <b>प्रयत्न ग्रैविखेत्यादि</b>              | K K                                             | ٩ | ۲ 84       | विरामप्रत्ययाम्यासेत्याति             | <b>K</b> 19  | 2               | . 1=       |
| <b>ন্নচলি</b> মইন্ন <b>যা</b> জক মিন       | যাহিৎ                                           |   | ı y        | विवेवव्यातिरविषयेत्या                 | दि ॥         | •               | १ २९       |

Digitized by Google

, est

[ 4 ]

ष्ठहे, पादे, खर्च।

ष्टहे, पादे, सूचं।

|                                 | રજ,        | पाद        | , चान         | 1                         | रह, ।       | पाद,     | द्ध्यं।    |
|---------------------------------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------------------|-------------|----------|------------|
| ৰিয়াৰ্মিল ব্ৰোহি               | ٤.2        |            | ९४            | <b>चदाञ्चाताविग</b> टत्तय |             |          |            |
| विग्रेगविग्रेपेत्या <b>दि</b>   | 85         | ۲          | ١e            | হন্দাহি                   |             |          | ١.         |
| विधाका या च्यातिकती             | <b>?</b> ? | ٤          | ••            | सनामादनुत्तवः सुवसाय      | <b>.</b>    | *        | 94         |
| विषयवती देखादि                  | 44         | ۲          | ٩u            | स्वाधिभावताचे इत्याति     |             |          | ج          |
| वीतरात्रविषयं वा खित्र          | <b>9</b> 9 | ٦          | <b>1</b> 2    |                           | N.S.        | •        | 84         |
| रत्यः प्रतम्य रत्यादि           | X          | ۲          | X             | रसानवारात् प्रभाषां       | <b>z.</b>   | ł        | 8.         |
| टत्तिशक् <b>य</b> मितरव         | Ľ          | ٦          | ¥             | सम्बार्थनेकापनयारि-       |             |          |            |
| वाधिस्वानेत्वादि                | ١¢         | ٢          | ٩.            | ন্যান্ধি                  | <b>(</b> )  | ę        | <b>۲</b> ۲ |
| <b>युत्वाननि</b> रीधेत्यादि     | <b>\$</b>  | ٩          | ۲             | द्वानुझ्यी रातः           | 48          | •        | •          |
| भव्दन्नानानुपातीत्यादि          | ٩          | ۲          | ¢             | <b>स्व</b> िषयत्नचेत्यादि | 40          | •        | 88         |
| शब्दार्धभानेत्यादि              | <b>9</b> 8 | ۲          | 88            |                           | •           | -        |            |
| भव्दार्थप्रत्य वेत्यादि         | <b>(</b> F | <b>R</b> . | १०            | त्या बिद्                 | 90          | ę        | <b>२२</b>  |
| <b>शानोदिता</b> वित्यादि        | €#         | Ŗ          | १२            | सान्युपनिमन्त्र इत्यादि   |             | ę        | 22         |
| मीष-सनोगेत्यादि                 | 82         | ۲          | 25            | <b>जूलस</b> रपेत्कादि     | हरु         | ę        | 88         |
| शौषात्वाइसुनुचेत्यादि           | * 49       | ۲.         | 8+            | कृतिपरिग्रवावित्यादि      | 21          | ł        | 58         |
| नदा-वीय्यं-सूतीत्यादि           | 38         | ę          | 49            | समनिद्रेत्यादि            | <b>₹</b> 8  | R        | रेज        |
| नुतानुसानेत्यादि                | 95         | ٢          | <del>8€</del> | सरपगची किंदुवाऽपी-        | -           |          | -          |
| <b>मेा नाका प्रवि</b> दित्यादि  | حو         | Ŧ          | ۶¢            | त्याच्चि                  | ₹¥          | ~        | د          |
| <b>संखारप्राचालरवादि</b> ,      |            |            |               | सः खतिषकामाधाता-          |             |          |            |
| त्यादि                          | ₹€         | R          | 14            | भाव इत्कादि               | K.          | R        | **         |
| स रन पूर्वेवासपीत्यादि          | lo         | ۲          | <b>?†</b>     | ससासिमकोरिकादि            | 85          | <b>२</b> | १२         |
| सति मूख इत्यादि                 | 40         | ٩          | 19            | ল্লাখাৰাহিত্তইণব-         |             |          |            |
| च तु दीर्वकावेत्यादि            | ¢          | ł          | <b>₹#</b>     | त्यादि                    | K.8         | 2        | 88         |
| च तु राषाः भागरे त्यादि         | ¥4         | 4          | <b>L</b> .    | दामनेवां स्तेत्रवदुक्तं   | <b>१</b> •२ |          | e 9        |
| सत्यश्रतिष्ठायामित्वादि         | 44         | <b>R</b>   | 24            | इट्ये विगयंतित्           | ••          | R        | <b>8</b> 3 |
| सचापुर्ग्योरत्य मोत्यादि        | 99         | Ą          | 44            | रेतुप वापकाकामीरि-        |             |          |            |
| समापुर्गवोरित्यादि              | 65         | Ę          | N.K.          | त्यादि                    | ¢ŧ          | 8        | 99         |
| सजापुर् <b>गान्द्री</b> त्यादिः | ef,        | ٩          | ĸ             | ষৰ হুঃৰদল্যবৰ্গ           | ₹€          | ۲        | ۲ę         |
|                                 |            |            | ]             |                           |             |          | ×.         |

2.42

नामानिर्भलख नियतपरिणामछा निर्भखे दृष्टं, यद्या सुखछ द्र्यं हे । आयन्तनिर्भलख थापकख भपरिणामिनः पुरुषख तखाइ निर्भले सले कयं प्रतिविम्न मसुपपद्य ते । उच्चते । प्रतिविम्न नस्य खरूपमनवम-फ्ट्रना भवने इमभ्यधायि । यैव सखगताचा त्रभिख ऋायाखिच्छ के: पुरुष सान्नि धाद भिव्यक्तिः सैव प्रतिविम्न न सुच्च ते । याहु ग्री पुरु-बगता पिच्छ किस्तच्छाया तचाया विभवति । वद्युक मधाकानिर्भलः पुरुषः कयमनिर्मले सत्ते प्रतिसंकामतीति तदय्यनेकान्तिकां । नैर्भाखा-दपक्ष हेऽपि जला दे। त्रादित्यादवः प्रतिम्नंकान्ताः ससुपसभ्यन्ते । बदयुक मपरिच्छित्रख नासि प्रतिसंकान्तिर्ति तदय्युकां । स्थाप-कष्णाका प्रस्त दर्पणादौ प्रतिसंकान्तिर्ह्ताना १ एवं सति न काचि-दनुपपत्तिः प्रतिविम्बदर्भनस्य ॥

णनु सालिकपरिष्णामरूपे बुद्धिसचे पुरुवसविभानादभिवज्ञा-वाखिष्कर्मर्शवादारसंकान्ते। पुरुवस्य दुखरुखरूपे। भोग इत्युकं तदनुपपत्रं, तदेव चित्तसच्चं प्रकृतावपरिषतायां कथं सम्भवति, किमर्यस तस्याः परिष्णामः । तत्रोच्चते<sup>†</sup> । पुरुवस्यार्थीपभोगसम्पादनं तया कर्त्तव्यमतः पुरुवार्धकर्त्तव्यतया तस्या युक्त एव परिषामः ॥

नयनुपपस्नं पुर्देवार्थकर्क्तव्यताया एवामुपपसेः । पुरुषार्थे। मया कर्त्तव्य इत्येवंविधोऽध्यवसायः पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यते।च्यते, जडायाच प्रक्ततेः कचमेवंविधोऽध्यवसायः । श्रसि चेद्ध्यवसायः, कथं जडलं ।

<sup>\*</sup> नियतपरिमाबखेति C पुल्लतपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> तजागादाविति ८ पुच्चकपाउः ।

<sup>‡</sup> अधे। चत इति C पुस्तकपाठः ।

<sup>14</sup> 

भाषोष्यते। भ्रनुखेामप्रतिखेामखचणे परिणामदये यहअं प्रक्रिद्दयमसि, तदेव पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतेष्यते। सा च प्रक्रिएचेतनायाः प्रक्रतेः यहजा एव। तत्र महदादिमहाभूतपर्यंन्तोऽस्था वहिर्सुखतयानुखेामः परिणामः। पुनः स्वकारणानुप्रवेभ्रदारेणास्मितान्तः प्रतिखेामः परिणामः। इत्यं पुरुषस्व भोगपरिसमाप्तेः यहजप्रक्रिदयचयात् छतार्था प्रछतिर्न पुनः परिणाममारभते। एवं विधायाद्य पुरुषार्थकर्त्तव्यतायां जडाया श्रपि प्रक्रतेर्न काचिदनुपपत्तिः॥

मनु यदीदृशी शक्तिः सड्जैव प्रधानस्थास्ति तत् किमर्थं मोचा-विंभिः मोचाय यहाः क्रियते, मोचस्त चानर्थनीयले तदुपदेश्वकस्त शास्त्रस्थानर्थकां । उच्चते । योऽयं प्रक्वतिपुरूषयोरनादिर्भेगय-भोकृभावखचणः सम्बन्धः, तस्तिन् सति व्यक्तचेतनायाः प्रष्ठते: कर्हलाभिमानात् दुःखानुभवे सति कथमियं दुःखनिष्टत्तिरात्य-क्रित्त्वी मम स्थादिति भवत्येवाध्यवषाबः । श्रतेा दुःखनिष्टत्तिरात्य-चितकी मम स्थादिति भवत्येवाध्यवषाबः । श्रतेा दुःखनिष्टत्त्त्रात्य-चोपदेधकश्वास्त्रोपदेश्वापेचास्त्रेव प्रधानस्य । तथाश्वतमेव कर्षानुरूपं बुद्धियत्त्वं श्वास्त्रोपदेश्वस्त्र विषयः । दर्श्वनान्तरेष्वय्येवंविध एवाविद्या-स्त्रभावः शास्त्रोपदेश्वस्त्र विषयः । दर्शनान्तरेष्वयेवंविध एवाविद्या-स्त्रभावः शास्त्रोपदेश्वस्त्र विषयः । दर्शनान्तरेष्वयेवंविध एवाविद्या-स्त्रभावः शास्त्रोपदेश्वस्त्र मोचास्त्रं फल्लमासाद्रयति । सर्व्वाप्येव कार्थाणि प्राप्तायां सामय्यां श्रात्तानं स्त्रभन्ते, त्रस्त च प्रतिसोम-परिणामदारेखिवोत्पाद्यस्त मोचास्त्रस्त्र कार्याय ईदृग्र्येव सामयी प्रमाणेन निश्चिता, प्रकारान्तरेणनुपपत्तेः । श्रतस्तां विना कथं

1.14

<sup>\*</sup> तदर्धिभिदिति F पुस्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> कम्मात्मरूपं वृद्धिसत्त्वमिति C पुरतकपाठः ।

t समग्रायां सामग्रामिति F मुच्तकपाठः ।

अवितुमर्छति। श्रतः खितमेतन् । संक्रान्तविषयोपरागमभिष्यक्र-चिच्छायं बुद्धियत्तं विषयनिखयदारेण समयां खेाकयात्रां निर्व्वा-दृयतीत्येवंविधमेव चित्तं प्रश्वन्तो आन्ताः खर्धवेदनं चित्तं, चित्त-मात्रञ्च जगदित्येवं बुवाणाः प्रतिवाधिता भवन्ति ॥२ २॥

ननु यद्येवंविधादेव चित्तात् सकसम्यवहारनिष्यत्तिः\* कथं प्रमाणग्रूत्यो द्रष्टा श्रभ्युपपद्यते<sup>†</sup> इत्याब्रह्म द्रष्टुः<sup>‡</sup> प्रमाणमाइ ।

तदसद्धोयवासनाभिश्चित्रमपिः परार्थं संइत्यकारि-न्वात्॥ २३॥

'तत्' एतचित्तं, 'यद्भातुमध्रक्याभिः, 'वायनाभिः', 'चिचमपि' नानाइएमपि, 'पराधें' परस्य खामिनेा भोकुर्भेगगपवर्गसत्तत्र प्रध याधयतीति। कुतः, 'संइत्यकारिलात्' संइत्य सम्भूय मिसिला अर्थ-क्रियाकारिलात् । यच संइत्यार्थक्रियाकारि तत्पराधें दृष्टं, यथा ध्रयनायनादि । सत्त-रजस्तमांसि च चित्तखत्तरूपरिणामभाच्चि संइ-त्यकारीणि, अतः परार्थानि । यस्च परः स पुरुषः ॥

ननु च यादृग्रेनभ्रयनासनादिना परेष भरीरवता परार्थलसुपलथं,॥ तहष्टान्तवखेन तादृ म्र एव परः सिर्ध्वति, यादृ मञ्च भवतां परेाऽसंइत-रूपेाऽभिग्रेतसदिपरीतस्य सिद्धेरयमिष्टविघातलद्धेतुःण । जच्चते ।

- 🕴 त्रस्टरीति C पुस्तकपाठः ।
  - § चित्तमपीति C युक्तकपाठः । परन्वयं न समीचीनः ।
  - || पारार्थ्यमुपनव्यमिति F पुत्तनपाठः ।
  - ण अयमिछविद्यातके। हेतुरिति c मुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>\*</sup> सममयवद्वार निर्धत्तिरिति C पुक्तमपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> जभ्युपगम्येत इति C. जभ्युपगन्त्व इति F पुक्तकपाठः ।

- 1 कैवच्यप्रमावमिति ष पुक्तवपाठः ।
- \* प्रतिपादिते इति C पुक्तकपाठः। † बहमसादन्य इत्येवंरूपमिति C पुसब्धाटः ।

तसिम चति किं भवतीत्याद । तदा विवेकनिमं कैवच्यप्राग्भारं ! चित्तं ॥ २५ ॥

#### भावभावना', सा निवर्चते । चित्तमेव कर्न्तु शाल भेंग्रे इत्यभिमाने। निवर्त्तते ॥ २४ ॥

# दन्य इत्येवंइपं, तिस विद्यातचित्तमलखरूपख चित्ते या 'त्रात्म-

विग्रेषदर्शिन आत्मभावभावनानिहत्तिः ॥ २४ ॥ एवं सत्तपुर्वयोरन्यले साधिते रेवसयोर्विग्रेषं पर्यति श्रयमसा-

इरानों प्रास्तफ्यां कैक्वां निर्णेतुं दयभिः सचेदपकमते !

विसत्तव्यध्यिपर्या से ति स्व भोका परः सिधाति । यथा चेन्धनाहते झिखरिषि विखवणाडूमादक्रिरनुमीयमान इतर-वक्रिविस्तर्णसेत्वनप्रभव एव प्रतीयने, एवनिहापि विस्तरप्रस धत्त्वाख्यस्य मोग्यस्य परार्थस्वेऽनूमीयमाने तथाविध एव भोकाऽधि-हाता परचिमाावरूपेाऽसंहतः सिथति । बदि वा तस परलं सर्वेतिहरूसमेंव प्रतीयते, तथापि तामरेखो विषवेभ्य: प्रख्यते प्ररीरं प्रकात्रइपेन्द्रियात्रयात्वात् । तसादपि प्रख्यको इन्द्रियाणि । ततेन रिप प्रहुष्टं सत्तं प्रकाग्नरूपं। तद्यापि यः प्रकाषकः प्रकाम्भविख-चणः च चिद्रूप एव भवतीति कूतखास्य संहतलं ॥ २ २ ॥

tot

यद्यपि सामान्वेन परार्थनमात्रे बान्निर्यद्यीता तथापि सत्तादि-

चदरूाज्ञाननियं वर्द्शियं विषयोपमोगफलं चिक्तमायीत्तदि-दानीं 'विवेकनियं'\* विवेकमार्गमन्नर्सुखं, 'कैवस्त्रप्राग्भारं' कैवस्त्र-फलं, कैवस्त्रप्रारम्भं वा सम्पद्यत इति ॥ २ ५ ॥

त्रसिंख<sup>†</sup> विवेकवाहिनि चित्ते येऽम्तरायाः प्रादुर्भवम्ति तेषां इतुप्रतिपादनदारेण त्यागोपायमाइ।

# तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्तारेभ्यः ॥ २६ ॥

तस्मिन् समाधौ स्थितस्थ, 'हिद्देषु' त्रम्तराखेषु, यानि 'प्रत्ययाम्त-राणि' खुत्यानरूपाणि ज्ञानानि, तानि प्राग्भवेभ्धः खुत्यानानुभ-वजेभ्धः 'संस्कारेभ्धः', त्रहं ममेत्येवंरूपाणि चीयमाणेभ्योऽपि प्रभवम्ति । त्रमःकरणोच्छित्तिदारेण तेषां हानं कर्त्तव्यमित्युकं भवति ॥ २ ६ ॥

इनिापायस पूर्व्वमेवाक इत्याह ।

# हानमेवां स्तेशवदुक्तं॥ २७॥

थया 'क्रेग्रानामविद्यादीनां, दार्ग पूर्व्वसुक्रं, तथा संस्कारणा-मपि कर्त्त्रव्यं। यया ते ज्ञानाग्निना क्रुष्टा दग्धवीजकच्पा न पुन-श्चित्तश्वमौ प्ररोद्यं सभन्ते, तथा संस्कारा श्वपि ॥ २७ ॥

एवं प्रत्ययान्तरानुर्ये खिरीम्द्रते? समाधौ यावृत्रख खोगिन: समाधेः प्रकर्षप्राप्तिर्भवति, तथाविधसुपायमाइ<sup>¶</sup> ।

§ स्थिरीक्त इति F मुक्तकपाठः ।

॥ एतत्पाठः सर्वत्र वर्त्तते, परन्तु उपायमिति न समीचीनं याद्वप्रख योगिन इति पाठेन सङ् विवद्धनात् ।

<sup>\*</sup> विवेकविवग्रमिति E मुक्तकपाठः ।

<sup>†</sup> तसिंचेति म पुक्तनपाठः ।

<sup>‡</sup> प्राह्मनेश्व इति म मुक्तमपाठः।

प्रसङ्घानेष्यकुसीदस्य सर्व्वया विवेकस्थातेर्धर्ममेघः समाधिः ॥ २८ ॥

'प्रवद्धान' यावतां तत्त्वानां यथाक्रमं व्यवखितानां परस्परविस-चण्खरूपविभावनं, तस्मिन् यति 'त्रपि', 'त्रकुषीदस्व' फलमखिप्रोः, प्रत्ययान्तराणामनुद्ये 'धर्म्वप्रकारविवेकख्यातेः' परिग्रेषात् 'धर्ममेघः यमाधिः' भवति, प्रक्तष्टमग्र्क्तकर्ण्यं धर्म्यं परमपुरुषार्थयाधकं मेइति सिद्यतीति 'धर्ममेघः' । त्रनेन प्रक्तष्टधर्मस्वैव ज्ञानहेतुलमित्युपपा-दितं भवति ॥ २ ४ ॥

तसाद्धर्ममेघात् किं भवतीत्याद्द\* ।

220

#### ततः क्तेशकर्मानिहत्तिः ॥ २८ ॥

'क्लेणानामविद्यादीनामभिनिवेणान्तानां, 'कर्षणाञ्च ग्रुक्तादिभे-देन चिविधानां, ज्ञानेादयात् पूर्व्वपूर्वकारणनिटच्या 'निटत्तिः', भवतीत्यर्थः ॥ २ ८ ॥

निटत्तेषु तेषु किं भवतीत्याइ ।

तदा सर्व्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याञ्ज्रेय-मल्पं ॥ ३० ॥

त्रात्रियते चित्तमेभिरिति 'त्रावरणानि' क्रेशाः, त एव 'मसाः', तेभ्यः 'त्रपेतस्र' तदिरहितस्र, 'शानस्र' गतघनगगननिभस्र, 'त्रान-

\* भवतीत्वत चाहेति c पुच्चनपाठः ।

म्यात्' अनवच्छेदात्, 'श्चेयं', 'ग्रब्पं' गणनास्पदं भवति, अक्षेग्रेनैव सर्वे श्चेयं जानातीत्यर्थः ॥ ३० ॥

ततः किमित्याद्य ।

# ततः छतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमात्तिर्गुणानां॥ ३१॥

'हतः' निष्पादितः, भोगापवर्गेखचणः पुरुषार्थः प्रयोजनं यैसे 'हतार्थाः', 'गुणाः' सत्त-रजसमांसि, तेषां 'परिणामः' त्रा पुरुषार्थ-समाप्तेरानुसोम्येन प्रातिखाेम्येन चाङ्गाङ्गिभावावस्थितिखचणः, तस्य योऽयौ 'क्रमः' वच्छमाणः, तस्य परिसमाप्तिः' निष्ठा, न पुनरुद्भव इत्यर्थः ॥ ३९॥

कमस्रोक्तस लचणमाइ।

# श्च राष्ट्रयोगी परिखामापरान्तनिर्याच्चः क्रमः॥३२॥

'चणः' श्रच्पीयान् काखः, तस्य योऽसौ 'प्रतियोगी' एकचणवि-सचणः । 'परिणामापरान्तनिर्गाद्यः' श्रनुभ्रतेषु चणेषु पद्यात् सद्धख-नबुद्धा यो स्टद्यते स चणानां 'क्रमः' उच्चते । न द्यननुभ्रतेषु चसेषु कमः परिज्ञातुं ब्रक्यः ॥ ३२ ॥

इदानों फलभ्रतस कैवस्वसायाधारणं खरूपमाइ।

# पुरुषार्थश्चन्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवच्चं स्वरूप-प्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति ॥ ६३ ॥

समाप्तभोगापवर्गसचणपुरुषार्थानां 'गुणानां', यः 'प्रतिप्रसवः'

प्रसङ्खानेष्यकुसीदस्य सर्व्वया विवेकस्थातेर्धर्ममेघः समाधिः ॥ २८ ॥

'प्रसद्धानं' यावतां तत्त्वानां यथाक्रमं व्यवस्थितानां परसारविस-चणस्वरूपविभावनं, तस्मिन् सति 'श्रपि', 'श्रकुसीदस्स' फलमसिप्रोः, प्रत्ययान्तराणामनुद्ये 'सर्व्यप्रकारविवेकस्थातेः' परिग्रेषात् 'धर्समेघः समाधिः' भवति, प्रद्यष्टमग्र्झ्हद्यणं धर्म्यं परमपुरुषार्थसाधकं मेदति सिद्यतीति 'धर्ममेघः' । श्रनेन प्रद्यप्टधर्मस्यैव ज्ञानहेतुलमित्युपपा-दितं भवति ॥ २ ८ ॥

तसाद्धर्भमेघात् किं भवतीत्याद्द\* ।

220

# ततः क्तेशकर्मानिवत्तिः ॥ २८ ॥

निहत्तेषु तेषु किं भवतीत्याइ ।

तदा सर्व्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याञ्ज्ञेय-मर्ख्यं ॥ ३० ॥

त्रात्रियते चित्तमेभिरिति 'त्रावरणानि' क्रेबाः, त एव 'मखाः', तेभ्यः 'त्रपेतस्र' तदिरहितस्र, 'ज्ञानस्र' गतघनगगननिभस्र, 'त्रान-

\* अवतीत्वत चाहेति c पुचानपाठः ।

म्यात्' श्रमवच्छेदात्, 'श्रेयं', 'ग्रब्पं' गणनास्पदं भवति, श्रक्तेश्रेमैव सर्वे श्वेयं जानातीत्यर्थः ॥ ३० ॥

ततः किमित्याद्य ।

# ततः क्षतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमात्तिर्गुणानां॥ ३१॥

'हतः' निष्पादितः, भोगापवर्गेखचणः पुरुषार्थः प्रयोजनं यैसे 'हतार्थाः', 'गुणाः' सत्त-रजसमांसि, तेषां 'परिणामः' त्रा पुरुषार्थ-समाप्तेरानुसोम्येन प्रातिखाेम्येन चाङ्गाङ्गिभावावस्थितिलचणः, तस्य योऽसौ 'क्रमः' वच्छमाणः, तस्य परिसमाप्तिः' निष्ठा, न पुनरुद्भव इत्यर्थः ॥ ३९॥

क्रमस्रोत्तस्य लचणमाइ।

# श्वरणप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्प्राद्यः क्रमः॥३२॥

'चणः' श्रच्पीयान् काखः, तस्य योऽसौ 'प्रतियोगी' एकचणवि-खचणः । 'परिणामापरान्तनिर्गाद्यः' श्रनुश्वतेषु चणेषु पञ्चात् सद्धख-नबुद्धा यो स्टद्यते स चणानां 'क्रमः' उच्चते । न द्यननुश्वतेषु चषेषु क्रमः परिज्ञातुं ब्रक्यः ॥ ३२ ॥

इदानों फलस्ततस कैवस्प्रसाधारणं खरूपमाइ।

# पुरुषार्थश्चन्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवच्चं स्वरूप-प्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति ॥ ६३ ॥

समाप्तभोगापवर्गस्त्रजणपुरुषार्थानां 'गुणानां', यः 'प्रतिप्रसवः'

प्रतिखेामपरिणामयमाप्ती विकारानुद्भवः, धदि वा चिष्क्रिर्धत्ताखा-रूणनिवृत्ती खरूपमात्रेणावखानं तत् 'कैक्खं' अखते॥

न केवलमसहर्शने चेनज्ञः केव खावखायामेवभूतसिद्र्पः, याबहर्भना-मारेखपि विम्हयमास एवंविधरूपे। अवतिष्ठते । तथाहि संसारदशाया-मात्मा कर्द्वल-भोकृलानुसन्धाद्वन्मयः प्रतीयते । श्रन्यथा थद्ययमेकः चेत्रज्ञस्तथाविधो न खात्तदा ज्ञानचणानासेव पूर्व्वापरानुसन्धानाभावे\* नियतकर्मफलसम्बन्धे न खात्, हतनात्राहताभ्यागमप्रसङ्घ । यदि चेमैव ग्रास्तोपदिष्टमनुष्ठितं कर्म तस्वैव भोकृलं भवेत् तदा द्विता-दित-प्राप्तिपरिहारायां सर्वस प्रष्टति ध्रियेते । सर्वस्वीव स्ववहारस हानापा-दानसचपस्यान् सन्धानेमेव व्याप्तलात् ज्ञानचणानां परसरभेदेनानु-बन्धानग्रह्त्यलात् तदनुबन्धानाभावे‡ कस्त्रचिदपि व्यवहारस्रानुपपत्तेः कर्त्ता भोकानुसन्धाता यः स त्रात्मेति व्यवस्त्राप्यते। मेाचद्रवायान् सकलग्राह्य-ग्राहकलचण्यवहाराभावात् चैतन्यमाचमेव तस्यावश्रिश्वते। तच चैतन्यं चितिमाचलेनेवापपदाते न पुनरात्मधंवेदनेन, यसा-दिषयग्रहणसमर्थलमेव चितेरूपं, नातागाइकलं । तथादि ऋर्थसित्या ग्टह्ममाणः अवमिति ग्टह्मते । खरूपं ग्टह्ममाणमहमिति। न पुन-र्युगपद्दहिर्मुखतान्तर्मुखतालचण्यापारद्रयं परस्परं विरुद्धं कर्म्तुं ग्रकां। त्रत एकसिन् समये व्यापारदयस्य कर्त्तुमग्रकालात् चिद्रूप-तयैवावश्वियते । चतो मोचावस्त्रायां निटत्ताधिकारेषु गुणेषु

\* ज्ञानलक्तवानामेव पूर्व्वापरानुसन्धाव्य्युम्धानां भावे इति ८ पुक्तकपाठः । † इतिहितप्राग्यपरिहारायेति म पुक्तकपाठः ।

र खनुसन्धानाभावे इति C पुक्तवपाठः। तदनुसन्धाचभाव इति F पुराषपाठः।

चिमाच एवात्मावतिष्ठत इत्येवं थुमां । संसारदवायान्तु एवंश्वतस्व कर्ळलं भोकृलमनुसन्धादलम्च धर्वसुपपद्यते । तथाहि योऽयं प्रहत्या यहा-नादिनैंसर्गिकोऽस्य भोग्य-भोकृभावलचषः सम्बन्धः चविवेकस्त्राति-मूसः, तस्मिन् सति पुद्द्वार्धकत्त्रैयतारूपत्रक्तिद्वयसम्भावे या महदा-दिभावेन परिष्कतिस्तर्स्या संयोगे सति यदात्मनोऽधिष्ठाद्वलं चिष्ट्राया-समर्पणसामर्थं, बुद्धिसत्तस्य च सङ्गाकाचिष्ठायाग्रद्दणसामर्थं, चिद-वष्टश्वायास्व मुद्धेर्येाऽयं कर्हल-भोकृलाध्यवसायस्त एव सर्वस्यानुस-न्थानपूर्थकस्य यवहारस्य निष्यत्तेः किमन्यैः फल्गुभिः कल्पनाजासिः ।

यदि पुगरेवस्भूतमार्गवतिरेकेण पारमार्थिकमात्मनः कर्द्धलाद्यङ्गी-कियते, तदाख परिणामिलप्रमङ्गः, परिणामिलाचानित्यले तस्थात्मल-तेव ग स्थान्। ग द्वेकसिम्वेव समये एकेनैव रूपेण परस्ररविरुद्धा-वखानुभवः सम्भवति। तथादि वस्थामवस्थायां त्रात्मसमवेते समुत्पर्क स्रुखे तस्थानुभविद्धलं, न तस्थामेवावस्थायां दुःखानुभविद्धलं। त्रतिऽव-स्थानानालात्तर्भिन्नस्थावस्थावतेापि नानालं, नानालेन च परिणा-मिलाज्ञात्मलं नापि नित्यलं। चत एव ज्ञान्तत्रद्ववादिभिः साद्धौरा-तमनः सदैव संसारदज्ञायां नेाचदण्रायाद्वीकरूपलमङ्गीकियते ।

थे तु वेदान्सवादिन सिदानन्दमयलमाताने। नेर्छं मन्यने, तेवां न युक्तः पचः। तथाहि त्रानन्दस्य सुखस्तरूपलात् सुखस्य र संवेद-मानतयैव प्रतिभाषात् संवेद्यमानलञ्च संवेदेनथतिरेकेषानुपपन्नमिति संवेद्य-संवेदनयोर्द्वयोरभ्युपनमात् प्रदेतहानिः। राथ सुखात्मकलमेव तस्तेास्यते। तत् विरुद्धधर्माध्यासादनुपपन्नं। न हि संवेदनं संवेद्यद्वीकं भवितुमर्इति। किद्याद्वेतवादिभिः कर्षात्म-परमात्मभेदेनात्मा दिविध 15

पातज्ञवे येामसत्रे

जच्चते । तत्र येमैव इपेष सुख-दुःखभोकृवं कर्षातानः, तेमैव रूपेण यदि परमात्वनः छात्तदा कर्बात्ववत्परमात्वनः परिणामिल-मविद्याखभावलञ्च स्थात्। त्रध न साचाङ्गोन्नुलं, किन्तु तदुपटीकि-तसुदासीनतयाधिष्ठावसेन खीकरोति, तदासाइग्रेनानुप्रवेग्न:। आन-न्द्रूपता च पूर्व्वसेव निराहता। किञ्चाविद्याखभावले निःखभाव-लात् कर्मातानां कः शास्त्राधिकारी । न तावस्तित्यनिर्मुकलात् पर-मात्मा, नायविद्यासभावलात् कचात्मा । ततय सकसत्रास्तवैयर्थ-प्रसङ्गः। श्रविद्यामयले च जगताऽङ्गीकियमाणे कस्थाविद्येति विचा-न तावत्परमात्मनः नित्यनिर्मुक्तलात् विद्यारूपलाच । र्य्यते । कर्मात्मनेाऽपि निःखभावतया ग्रद्भविषाणप्रख्यत्वे कष्यमविद्यासम्बन्धः। म्रचोच्चते एतदेवाविद्याया म्रविद्यालं चदविचारणीयलं नाम । यैव चि विचारेण दिनकरकरस्पृष्टनीचारवदिखयसुपयाति, सेवाविद्येत्यु-चते। मैवं। यदस किचित्कार्थं करोति तदवम्धं कुतचिद्भित्रमभिन्नं वा वक्तयं, श्रविद्यायास संसारसच्छप्रपञ्चकार्यकर्हलमवस्यमङ्गीकर्त्तायं, तसिन् सत्यपि यद्यनिर्व्वाच्यलसुच्यते, तदा कस्तरिदपि वाच्यलं न स्थात् ब्रह्मणोऽप्यवाच्यताप्रसन्तिः । तसादधिष्ठात्ररूपताव्यतिरेकेष गान्यदात्मने। इपसुपपद्यते। अधिष्ठाहलञ्च चिद्रूपलमेव तद्यतिरिक्तव्य धर्मस कस्तरित् प्रमाणानुपपत्ते: ।

चैरपि मैचायिकादिभिरात्मा चेतनाधोगाचेतन इत्युच्चते, चेत-गापि तद्य मनःसंयोगजा। तथाहि इच्छा-ज्ञान-प्रथवादयो गुणासद्य

<sup>\*</sup> इष्यत इति C पत्तकपाठः ।

श्ववहारद्वार्था भात्ममनः संयोगादुन्पद्यन्ते। तैरेव प गुणैः खयं द्वाता कर्त्ता भोकेति व्यदिग्यते । मेखर्णायान्तु मिथ्याज्ञाननि-टक्ती तन्मू लानां दोषाणामपि निटक्ते क्षेधां बुद्धादीनां विभेषगुणा-नामत्यन्तोच्छित्तिः खरूपमाचप्रतिष्ठलमात्मनेाऽङ्गीक्ततं । तेषां न युक्तः पचः । यतसाखां द्वार्यां किमात्मन भात्मलं । व्यापकलादयो गुषा त्राकात्रादीनामपि सन्ति । भ्रतसदेखच्च छेनात्मनः किद्यिद्रूप-मवम्यमङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं । भ्रात्मलखच्चण्जातियोग इति चेत् । न । धर्व्यु-स्थैव दि जातियोगः सक्षवति । भ्रते जातिभ्यो वैखचण्यमात्मनेाऽवम्य-मङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं । त्वाधिष्ठाव्य्लं चिद्रूपत्यवे घटते नान्यथा ।

चैरपि मीमां सकीः कर्ष-कर्र्ड प आत्माङ्गीक्रियते । तेषामपि म युक्तः पचः । तथाइि ऋइंप्रत्ययगाद्या आत्मेति तेषां प्रतिज्ञा ऋइं-प्रत्यये च कर्दलं कर्ष्यलच्चात्मन एव । न चैतदिरुद्धलादुपपद्यते कर्द्वलं प्रमादलं, कर्ष्यलच्च प्रेमेयलं । न चैतदिरुद्धधर्षाध्यासा युगप-देकस्य घटते, यदिरुद्धधर्याध्यसं न तदेकं । यथा भावाभावा । विरुद्धे च कदल-कर्ष्यल्योः । नैतद्युक्तं, विरुद्धधर्षाध्यासस्य तुस्थलात् । कस्राद्दंप्रत्ययगाद्धलं परिइत्यात्मनेाऽधिष्ठाद्यलमेवेापपन्नं, तच चेत-नस्वमेव ।

धैरपि द्रव्यपर्यायभेदेनातानेऽव्यापकस्व ग्ररीरपरिमाणस्व परि-णामिलमित्वते, तेषामुत्यानपराइत एव पचः । परिणामिले चिद्रू-पताहानिः । चिद्रूपताभावे किमातान ज्ञातालं । तस्नादातान जातालमिष्क्रता चिद्रपलमेवाङ्गीकर्त्त्रयं तचाधिष्ठाव्लमेव ।

#### पातज्ञवे येामस्त्रे

केचित् कर्त्तृ रूपमेवात्मानमिक्इनि । तथादि विषयमाविष्ये या धानसक्या किया यसुत्पन्ना तसा विषयमंवित्तिः फलं, तसाख प्रस्नरूपायां मंवित्तौ सरूपं प्रकाष्ठरूपतया प्रतिभासते, विषयख पाद्यतया, चात्मा यादकलेन । घटमइं जानामीत्यनेनाकारेक तसाः ससुत्पत्तेः । क्रियायाः कारणं कर्त्तेव भवतीत्यतः कर्टलं तसाः ससुत्पत्तेः । क्रियायाः कारणं कर्त्तेव भवतीत्यतः कर्टलं भौकृलघात्मने रूपमिति । तदनुपपन्नं । यसात्तार्सा संवित्तीनां क्रिं कर्टलं युगपत् प्रतिपद्यते क्रमेष वा । युगपत्कर्टले चढान्तरे तस्य कर्टलं न स्थात् । चय क्रसेण वार्द्र् युगपत्कर्टले चढान्तरे एकेन रूपेष चेत्तस्य कर्टरतं तदा एकख सदैव सन्निहितलान् सर्वं फल्लमैकरूपं स्थात् । चय मानारूपतथा तस्य कर्टन्तं तदा परिणा-नित्त्वं । परिणामित्याच न चिद्रूपत्वं । त्रतचिद्रूपलमात्सन इत्स् क्रिंगे साचात्कर्दलमङ्गीकर्त्तच्यं । यादृष्ठमस्थाभिः कर्टलमात्मानः प्रतिपादितं कूटम्बस्य नित्यस्य चिद्रूपस्थ तदेवेापपन्नं ।

एतेन खप्रकाग्रखाताना विषयमंविणिदारेण पाइकलमभिष्य-ज्यत इति चे बदन्ति, तेण्वेतेनैव निराइताः।

केचिदिमर्भाताकलमातानश्विषायलमिष्क्रनि । ते छाऊर्न वि-मर्ज्ञवातिरेकेण चिद्रूपलमाताने। निरूपयितुं प्रकां । जडात किख वेलचणं चिद्रूपलमुखते । तथ विमर्भवतिरेकेणानिरूप्यमाणं नान्य-चावतिष्ठते । तदनुपपल्नं । इदमित्यमेवंरूपमिति यो विषारः य विमर्भ इत्युखते, व चास्नितार्थ्यतिरेकेश्वेत्यानमेव न सभते । तयादि मात्मन्युपजायमाने। क्मिर्भः म्रहमेवस्थूत इत्यनेनाकारेण वंवेद्यते । ततश्वाद्यंग्रब्द्ससिवस्थात्मस्वचषस्यार्थस्य तत्र स्कुरणाच विकस्यस्य ए-

- ९९≰

तातिकमः। विकल्पद्याध्यवयायात्मा बुद्धिधर्म्यां न चिद्धर्मः। क्रूटख-नित्यलेन चितेः सदैकरूपलाम्नाइंकारानुप्रवेत्रः । तदनेन सविमर्ज्ञल-मात्मनः प्रतिपादवता बुद्धिरेवात्मलेन आग्धा प्रतिपादिता, न प्रकात्रात्मनः परस्य पुरुषस्य स्वरूपमवगतमिति ।

एवं सर्व्वेश्वपि दर्भनेन्वधिष्ठाद्धलं विष्ठाय नान्यदाताने रूपसुप-पद्यते। श्रधिष्ठाद्धलद्भ चिद्रूपलं। तच जडादेवज्वप्त्रभेव। चिद्रूपतया यदधितिष्ठति तदेव भोग्यतां नचति । यच चेतनाधिष्ठितं तदेव सकलव्यवद्यारचोग्यं भवति। एवच्च सति कतकत्वलात् प्रधानस्य यापारनिद्दन्ते यदात्मनः कैवस्त्रमसाभिद्द्रमं तदिष्ठाय दर्भनान्तरा-पामपि नान्या गतिरसि तसादिदमेव युक्तसुत्रं दक्तियारूयप-रीद्दारेष स्ररूपप्रतिष्ठा चितियक्तेः कैवस्थं।

तदेवं सिद्धामारेभ्यो विखचणां सर्व्यसिद्धिमूखभ्रतां समाधिसिद्धि-मभिधाय जात्यमारपरिणामखचण्च च सिद्धिविग्रेषच्य प्रक्तत्यापूरण्मेव कारणमित्युपपाद्य धर्मादीनां प्रतिवन्धकनिष्टत्तिमाच एव सामर्थ-मिति प्रदर्श्व निर्माणचित्तानामस्मितामाचादुद्भव इत्युक्ता तेषाद्य योगिचित्तमेवाधिष्ठानात्मकमिति प्रदर्श्व योगिचित्तच्च चित्तामारवैच-चण्डमभिधाय तत्कर्मणामज्जैकिकलद्योपपाद्य विपाकानुगुणानां वा-सनानामभिव्यक्तिसामर्थ्यं कार्य्यकारणयोद्यकल्यप्रतिपादनेम व्यवहि-तानामपि वासनानामानम्बर्यसुपपाद्य तासामानम्वेपि हेतुफ्खादि-दारेण हानसुपदिग्यातीतादिव्यध्वसु धर्माणां सद्भावसुपपाद्य वि-

\* भाग्यतामेतीति c युक्तकपाठः ।

भागवादं निराक्तय साकारवादं प्रतिष्ठाप्य पुद्वस्य भारतसुक्ता चित्तदारेण सकसव्यवहारनिव्यक्तिसुपपाद्य पुद्वसिद्धौ प्रमाखसुप-दर्घ कैवस्त्रनिर्णयाय दन्नभिः स्त्रें क्रमेणोपयोगिनेाऽर्थानभिधाय प्रास्तान्तरेस्वेतदेव कैवस्त्रमित्युपपाद्य कैवस्त्रस्तर्पं निर्धौतमिति याद्यतः कैवस्त्रपादः ।

> सर्वे यस यत्र:प्रतापवसतेः पादान्तचेवानति-प्रश्वस्वमुकुटेषु मूईस द्धत्यार्ज्ञा धरिषीस्टतः । यदज्जासमवाष गर्ममसमं वाग्देवतापि जिता स त्रीभाजमद्दीपतिः फषिपतेः छचेषु दृन्तिं स्वधात् ॥

इति अीमदाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमार्त्तप्डा-भिधायां पातच्चखयोगत्रास्तवन्ती कैवस्त्रपादच्चतुर्थः । समाप्ता चेर्व पातच्चखयोगस्रच्हन्तिः ॥०॥

Digitized by Google

40

|            | and the second of the second states in the second                                                             |                |     |         |          |
|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-----|---------|----------|
| 24.        | Kathá Sarit Ságara, (English) Fasc. I-X @ 1/ each                                                             | ]              | Rs. | 10      | 0        |
| 25.        | Lalita Vistara, (Sans.) Fasc. I-VI @ /10/ each                                                                |                |     | 3       | 12       |
| 26.        | Ditto (English) Fasc. III                                                                                     | Second and     |     | 2       | 0        |
| 27.        | Maitri Upanishad, (Sans. & English) Fasc. I-III @ /10/                                                        | each           |     | 1       | 14       |
| 28.        | Mímámsá Darsana, (Sans.) Fasc. II—XVI @ /10/ each                                                             |                | • • | 9       | 6        |
| 29.<br>30. | Márkandeya Purána, (Sans.) Fasc. IV-VII @ /10/ each<br>Nrisimha Tápaní, (Sans.) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each       | 0.000          |     | 2       | 8        |
| 31.        | Nirukta, (Sans.) Fasc. I—VI @ /10/ each                                                                       |                | ••  | 1       | 14       |
| 32.        | Nárada Pancharátra, (Sans.) Fasc. III—IV @ /10/ each                                                          | COLORES !!     | ••  | 3       | 12       |
| 33.        | Nyáya Darsana, (Sans.) Fasc. I and III @ /10/ each                                                            |                | ••  | 1       | 4        |
| 34.        | Nítisára, or, The Elements of Polity, By Kámandaki, (Sans.)                                                   | Fase II_I      | v   | 1       | 4        |
| 35.        | Pingala Chhandah Sútra, (Sans.) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                       | 1              |     | 1       | 14       |
| 36.        | Prithiráj Rásau, (Sans.) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each                                                                |                |     | 3       | 2        |
| 37.        | Ditto (English) Fasc. I                                                                                       |                |     | 1       | õ        |
| 38.        | Páli Grammar, (English) Fasc. I and II @ /10/ each                                                            |                |     | 1       | 4        |
| 39.        | Prákrita Lakshanam, (Sans.) Fasc. I                                                                           |                |     | 1       | 8        |
| 40.        | Parásara Smriti (Sans.) Fasc. I<br>Rig Veda, (Sans.) Vol. I, Fasc. IV                                         | and the second | ••  | 0       | 10       |
| 41.        |                                                                                                               | and the second |     | 0       | 10       |
| 42.        | S'rauta Sútra of Apastamba, (Sans.) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ eau                                                      | h              | 1   | 3       | 2        |
| 43.        | Ditto Aśvaláyana, (Sans.) Fasc. I—XI @ /10/ ea<br>Ditto Láţyáyana (Sans.) Fasc. I—IX @ /10/ eac               | ch             | ••  | 6       | 14       |
| 45.        | Sáma Veda Samhitá, (Sans.) Fasc. I-XXXVII @/10/ eac                                                           | n              | ••  | 5       | 10       |
| 46.        | Sáhitya Darpana, (English) Fasc. I-IV @ /10/ each                                                             | en             |     | 23      | 2        |
| 47.        | Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila, (English) Fasc. I and II @                                                       | /10/ each      | -   | 2       | 8        |
| 48.        | Súrya Siddhánta, (Sans.) Fasc. IV                                                                             |                |     | 1 0     | 4        |
| 49.        | Sarva Darsana Sangraha, (Sans.) Fasc. II                                                                      | TO AND THE     |     | õ       | 10<br>10 |
| 50.        | Sankara Vijaya, (Sans.) Fasc. II and III @ /10/ each                                                          | 10000          |     | 1       | 4        |
| 51.        | Sáñkhya Pravachana Bháshya, (English) Fasc. III                                                               |                |     | õ       | 10       |
| 52.        | Sánkhya Sára, (Sans.) Fasc. I                                                                                 |                |     | 0       | 10       |
| 53.        | Suśruta Samhita, (Sans.) Fasc. I                                                                              | a fait with    |     | 0       | 10       |
| 54.        | Taittiríya Áranyaka, (Sans.) Fasc. I                                                                          |                |     | 6       | 14       |
| 55.        | Ditto Brahmana (Sans.) Fasc. I-XXIV @/10/ each                                                                |                |     | 15      | 0        |
| 56.        | Ditto Samhitá, (Sans.) Fase I-XXXII @ /10/ each                                                               |                |     | 20      | 0        |
| 57.        | Ditto Prátišákhya, (Sans.) Fasc. I—III @ /10/ each                                                            |                |     | 1       | 14       |
| 58.<br>59. | Ditto and Aitareya Upanishads, (Sans.) Fasc. II and II<br>Ditto Aitareya Svetášvatara Kena ľšá Upanishads, (I | 1@/10/ eac     | h   | 1       | 4        |
| 00.        | I and II @ /10/ each                                                                                          | engush) ras    | с.  | -       | 100      |
| 60.        | Tándyá Bráhmana, (Sans.) Fasc. I-XIX @ /10/ each                                                              | Service and    |     | 11      | 4        |
| 61.        | Uttara Naishadha, (Sans.) Fasc. II-XII @ /10/ each                                                            | THE SHATTER    | 1   | 11<br>6 | 14<br>14 |
| 62.        | Váyu Purána, (Sans.) Vol. I, Fasc. I-VI; Vol. II, Fasc. ]                                                     | -III @ /10     | i   | 0       | 14       |
|            | each                                                                                                          |                |     | 5       | 10       |
| 63.        | Vishņu Smriti, (Sans.) Fasc. I—II @ /10/ each                                                                 |                |     | 1       | 4        |
| 64.        | Yoga Sútra of Patanjali, (Sans. & English) Fasc. I-IV.                                                        |                |     | 4       | 6        |
|            |                                                                                                               |                |     |         |          |
|            | Arabic and Persian Series.                                                                                    |                |     |         |          |
|            |                                                                                                               |                |     |         |          |
| 1.         | 'Alamgirnámah, with Index, (Text) Fasc. I-XIII @ /10/                                                         | each .         |     | 8       | 2        |
| 2.         | Kín-i-Akbarí, (Text) Fasc. I-XXII @ 1/4 each                                                                  | Sector Party   |     | 27      | 8        |
| 3.         | Ditto (English) Vol. I (Fasc. I-VII)                                                                          |                |     | 12      | 4        |
| 4.         | Akbarnámah, with Index, (Text) Fasc. I-XXII @ 1/4 eac                                                         | h .            |     | 27      | 8        |
| Б.         | Bádsháhnámah with Index, (Text) Fasc. I-XIX @ /10/ e                                                          | ach .          |     | 11 .    | 14       |
| 6,         | Beale's Oriental Biographical Dictionary, pp. 291, 4to,                                                       | thick pape     | r,  |         |          |
| 7.         | @ 4/12; thin paper<br>Dictionary of Arabic Technical Terms and Appendix, Fas                                  | T VVT          | •   | 4       | 8        |
|            |                                                                                                               |                |     | 00      | 100      |
| 8.         | 1/4 each<br>Farhang-i-Rashídí (Text), Fasc. I—XIV @ 1/4 each                                                  |                |     | 26      | 4        |
| 9.         | Fihrist-i-Túsí, or, Túsy's list of Shy'ah Books, (Text) F                                                     | ase T-TV       | •   | 17      | 8        |
|            | /12/ each                                                                                                     |                | e . | 3       | 0        |
| 10.        | Futúh-ul-Shám Waqidi, (Text) Fasc. I-IX @ /10/ each                                                           | in the         |     | 5       | 10       |
| 11.        | Ditto Azádí, (Text) Fasc. I—IV @ /10/ each                                                                    | A Start Start  |     | 2       | 8        |
| 12.        | Haft Asmán, History of the Persian Masnawi. (Text) Fasc.                                                      | Ι.             |     | ī       | 8        |
| 13.        | History of the Caliphs, (English) Fasc. I-VI @ 1/ each                                                        |                |     | 6       | 0        |
| 14.        | Iqbálnámah-i-Jahángírí, (Text) Fasc. I-III @ /10/ each                                                        |                |     | 1       | 14       |
| 15.        | Isabáh, with Supplement, (Text) Fasc. I-XXXI @ /12/ ea                                                        | en .           | •   | 23      | 4        |
| 16.<br>17. | Maghází of Wáqidí, (Text) Fasc. I—V @ /10/ each<br>Muntakhab-ul-Tawáríkh, (Text) Fasc. I—XV @ /10/ each       | and and the    |     | 3       | 2        |
| +11        | and an an an and and and and and and and                                                                      |                | 1   | 9       | 6        |

| 18. | Muntakhab-ul-Lubáb, (Text) Fasc. I-XVIII @ /10/ ea        | ch, and Fas                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | c    |       |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------|
|     | XIX with Index @ /12/                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | . 12 | 0     |
| 19. | Mu'áşir-i-'Alamgiri (Text), Fasc. I-VI @ /10/ each        | E                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | . 3  | 12    |
| 20. | Nukhbat-ul-Fikr, (Text) Fasc. I                           | 44.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | . 0  | 10    |
| 21. | Nizami's Khiradnamah-i-Iskandari, (Text) Fasc. I and II   | @ 1/ each .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | . 2  | 0     |
| 22. | Suyúty's Itgán, on the Exegetic Sciences of the Koran, wi | th Supplemen                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | t,   |       |
|     | (Text) Fasc. II-IV, VII-X @ 1/4 each                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | . 8  | 12    |
| 23. | Tabaqát-i-Násirí, (Text) Fasc. I-V @ /10/ each            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | . 3  | - 2   |
| 24. | Ditto (English) Fasc. I-XIV @ 1/ each                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | . 14 | 0     |
| 25. | Táríkh-i-Fírúz Sháhi, (Text) Fasc. I-VII @ /10/ each      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 4    | 6     |
| 26. | Tarikh-i-Baihaqi, (Text) Fasc. I-IX @ /10/ each           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | . 5  | 10    |
| 27. | Wis o Ramin, (Text) Fase, I-V @ /10/ each                 | and the second s | . 3  | 1 - 9 |

#### ASIATIC SOCIETY'S PUBLICATIONS.

|           | - I TA A T                                                                              |        |     |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-----|
| 1.        | ASIATIC RESEARCHES. Vols. VII-XI; Vols. XIII and XVII, and                                                            |        |     |
|           | Vols. XIX and XX @ 10/ each                                                                                           | 90     |     |
|           | Ditto Index to Vols. I—XVIII                                                                                          | 5      |     |
| 2.        | PROCEEDINGS of the Asiatic Society from 1865 to 1869 (incl.) @ /4/ per                                                |        |     |
|           | No.; and from 1870 to date @ /8/ per No.                                                                              |        |     |
|           | JOURNAL of the Asiatic Society for 1843 (12), 1844 (12), 1845 (12), 1846                                              |        |     |
|           | (5), 1847 (12), 1848 (12), 1849 (12), 1850 (7), @ 1/ per No. to Sub-                                                  |        |     |
|           | scribers and @ 1/8 per No. to Non-Subscribers; and for 1851 (7).                                                      |        |     |
| 2.20      | 1857 (6), 1858 (5), 1861 (4), 1864 (5), 1865 (8), 1866 (7), 1867 (6),                                                 |        |     |
|           | 1868 (6), 1869 (8), 1870 (8), 1871 (7), 1872 (8), 1873 (8), 1874 (8), 1875                                            |        |     |
|           | (7), 1876 (7), 1877 (8), 1878 (8), 1879 (7), 1880 (8), 1881 (7), 1882 (6),                                            |        |     |
|           | @ 1/8 per No. to Subscribers and @ 2/ per No. to Non-Subscribers.                                                     |        |     |
|           | N. B. The figures enclosed in brackets give the number of Nos. in each                                                |        |     |
|           | Volume.                                                                                                               |        |     |
|           | General Cunningham's Archæological Survey Report for 1863-64 (Latra                                                   | T.     |     |
|           | No., J. A. S. B., 1864)<br>Theobald's Catalogue of Reptiles in the Museum of the Asiatic Society                      | 2      |     |
|           | (Extra No., J. A S. B., 1868)                                                                                         | 0      |     |
|           | Catalogue of Mammals and Birds of Burmah, by E. Blyth (Extra No.,                                                     | 2      |     |
|           | J. A. S. B., 1875)                                                                                                    | 4      |     |
|           | Sketch of the Turki Language as spoken in Eastern Turkestan, Part II.                                                 | -      |     |
|           | Vocabulary, by R. B. Shaw (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1878)                                                              | 4      | - 1 |
|           | A Grammar and Vocabulary of the Northern Balochi Language, by M.                                                      |        |     |
|           | L. Dames (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1880)                                                                               | 4      | 1   |
|           | Introduction to the Maithili Language of North Bihar, by G. A. Grierson,                                              |        |     |
|           |                                                                                                                       | 12     | 0   |
|           | Part I, Grammar (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1880)<br>Part II, Chrestomathy and Vocabulary (Extra No., J. A. S. B., 1882) | 4      | 0   |
| 1.        | Aborigines of India, by B. H. Hodgson<br>Anis-ul-Musharrihin<br>Catalogue of Fossil Vertebrata                        | 3      | 0   |
| 5.        | Anis-ul-Musharrihin                                                                                                   | 3      | 0   |
| 6.        | Catalogue of Fossil Vertebrata                                                                                        | 2      | 0   |
| 7.        | Ditto of Arabic and Persian Manuscripts                                                                               | 1      | 0   |
| 8.        | Examination and Analysis of the Mackenzie Manuscripts by the Rev.                                                     | in and |     |
| 0         | W. Taylor<br>Han Koong Tsew, or the Sorrows of Han, by J. Francis Davis                                               | 2      | 0   |
| 9.<br>10. | Taillit the Office had the De A Conserve Day                                                                          | 1      | 8   |
| 11.       | Inayah, a Commentary on the Hidayah, Vols. II and IV, @ 16/ each                                                      | 1      | 0   |
| 12        | Jawami-ul-'ilm ir-riyazi, 168 pages with 17 plates, 4to. Part I                                                       | 32     | 0   |
| 13.       | Khizánat-ul-'ilm                                                                                                      | 2 4    | 00  |
| 14.       | Mahábhárata, Vols. III and IV, @ 20/ each                                                                             |        | 0   |
| 15.       | Moore and Hewitson's Descriptions of New Indian Lepidoptera,                                                          | 30     | 0   |
|           | Deta T TT with 5 salaward Distant the O Alanah                                                                        | 12     | 0   |
| 16.       | The Contraction Description 1 th                                                                                      | 1      | õ   |
| 17.       | Sharaya-ool-Islám                                                                                                     | 4      | 0   |
| 18.       | Tibetan Dictionary                                                                                                    | 10     | 0   |
| 19        | Ditto Grammar                                                                                                         | 8      | ŏ   |
| 20.       | Vattodaya, edited by Lt. Col. G. E. Fryer                                                                             | 2      | 0   |
|           | Notices of Sanchuit Manuscripta Pass I. XVII @ 1/101                                                                  |        |     |
|           | Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts, Fasc. I—XVII @ 1/ each<br>Nepalese Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, by Dr. R. L. Mitra  | 17     | 0   |
|           | repares Dudunist Bansarit Literature, by Dr. R. L. althra                                                             | 1      | 0   |



Digitized by Google

•

•

Digitized by Google

•

• •

·

.

Digitized by Google

.

