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पातालभ थ्रागस्यहम् ।
राजमार्गान्नाध्यायनिधिविनम् ।

THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI,
WITH THE
COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RAJA
AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.
BY
RAJENDRALALA MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E.
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PREFACE.

The doctrine of Pessimism as evolved by Schopenhauer and developed by Hartmann created quite a sensation in Europe. The novelty, the bold generalizations, the closeness and vigour of ratiocination with which it was set forth, endowed it with qualities which could not but attract attention and claim consideration. But, carefully analysed, it does not appear to have any pretension to novelty or originality to which its admirers lay claim.

The doctrine of evil as inseparable from the world is nearly as old as humanity. It was the dread of evil that drove the primitive man to seek the shelter of superhuman power, and laid the foundation of religion. There would have been no religion if there had been no dread of evil, here or hereafter. Nor would philosophy have had its birth had not the necessity arisen to discriminate between good and evil. Morality, too, presupposes a differentiation between that which is proper and that which is improper—of a consciousness, however vague and undefined, of future reward and punishment. Doubtless the doctrine assumes constant and unalloyed evil, and not a mixture of good and evil; but in so doing it only places the evil in the present condition, and transfers the
good to a hereafter, in a hazy, cloudy, dubious, undefined way, but does not absolutely deny it.

The preëminence of the unconscious Will is the most important element of the doctrine; and it, too, under the names of Freewill, Máyá, Buddhi, and the like, has occupied men's mind and played its part in philosophy from a pretty remote period of antiquity.

Then comes the repugnance to worldly attractions, love, affection and joy; and under the form of asceticism it is almost as old as civilized man.

The denial of the existence of God is an assumption of no modern date; it unquestionably preceded the formation of human ideas about Divine Providence; and the assumption about the objectification of Will forms the corner-stone of the doctrine of Patanjali.

It might be said that, if thus the leading tenets of the Pessimist doctrine be old, their association into a compact and complete system is not so, and that in this respect it may well claim the full meed of praise for its originality. This, however, cannot be conceded. Even as are its tenets, so is it in its entirety as a system. What Schopenhauer enunciated in his 'World as Will and Idea' (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung) in 1819, and Hartmann worked out in his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (Philosophie der Unbewussten) in 1869, is no other than the nihilist philosophy of Buddha put forth in a modern European garb, or, as an able writer puts it, a system "little more than Buddhism vul-
garised." It is the farthest from my wish to assert that the two German philosophers have surreptitiously, or deliberately, borrowed their system from the Indians: it is almost certain that Schopenhauer at the beginning of this century had no knowledge of any Buddhist Philosophy, and Hartmann, working on the model of his predecessor, had, probably, no occasion to consult the texts of the Sunyaváda system of the Buddhists as accessible to him in meagre abstracts in European languages. The similitude may be—nay, most probably is—purely accidental, the result of human mind set to thinking in a particular line of ideas arriving at the same conclusion; but it exists, and is as clear as possible, and that is all that is here intended to be emphasized.

The system of S'ákya Buddha is a modification of a more ancient and more fully developed doctrine—that of Kapila, as known under the name of Sánkhyá. Thoroughly logical in its scheme of ratiocination, the Sánkhyá enunciates that there is no proof of the existence of a Supreme Divinity, and therefore leaves it entirely out of consideration in its scheme of primal causation. Its words, as summarised in the text book of the school, but which is obviously of a much later date than Kapila, are, Is'varásiddheh: "It is not proved that there is a God." (Sánkhyá, Aph. I, 92.) The idea is more fully developed and argued in a subsequent part of the work (Vide infra, pp. 31f). S'ákya Buddha, less logical but more bold, adopted this idea in a positive form, instead of keeping the question open by admitting only the want of
dialectic demonstration. Schopenhauer does the same without any reserve, describing theism as “a tradition of the nursery.”

The next subject is Soul or the vitalizing and conscious principle of life. Kapila’s theory recognises its existence, assuming a separate soul for each living being. Buddha did the same. These souls are uncreate and eternal, never coming to an end. Buddha acknowledged and, indeed, made them the basis of his system, but practically, though not in so many words, he denied them absolute eternity, for his theory of Nirváṇa assigned them an ultimate and final goal after many transmigrations in sunytá, vacuity or nihility. It may be that his Nirváṇa did not extend to absolute nihility, for there is nothing authentic and unquestionable in his sayings; but his immediate followers, who developed the Maháyána school, announce it in unmistakable terms, and for the purposes of the present comparison this is enough. The German philosopher goes a step further, and insists on the absolute negation of Soul. His words put in English are, “there is no psyche;” but unable to dispense with it altogether, he supplies its place by an “unconscious will” which plays the part of Soul. Practically this amounts to admitting Soul, but divesting it of its consciousness and eternity.

In the Sánkhya system, the category next after Soul is Pradhána, or Nature, having inherent in it the threefold qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or as the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya defines it, “the equilibrium of the three qualities,”
PREFACE.

(‘triguna-sámyam’). The terminology is archaic, but it implies the sum-total of the laws and forces of nature, which regulate the course of the phenomenal world. Buddha availed himself of this category to the full, and Schopenhauer does the same, using only modern terms in conformity with the physical science of the day.

The next is Intellect. It is common to all the three systems under notice, and alike unconscious in all. The Sánkhyaśas call it Mahat, the Buddhists Buddhi, and Schopenhauer Will, "the Reality, the absolute Existence, the Ultimate Fact, the universal and fundamental essence of all activities, both of the organic and the inorganic world, the primordial thing whence we and everything proceed." In the Yoga system, the term used is chitta, which, in the following pages, has been rendered into 'thinking principle;' but would have been as well—nay more pointedly—expressed by will.

Kapila assigned real substantiality to matter. What the primitive Yogis thought about it we know not. Patanjali is silent on the subject in his Yoga aphorisms; but in his Mahábháshya he admits an absolute reality of it. He raises the question by saying, yadi távad guñasamudáyo dravyam, "if you hold matter to be the aggregate of qualities," (IV, 1.) and then refutes the theory, Buddha's idea of Sunyatá necessitated the same theory in a more prominent manner. He could not admit absolute reality to any thing, and as the inevitable nihilistic consequence of his creed, matter had to assume the character of a phantasmal play of mental phenomenality—
The Vedánta took it up after him, Berkeley worked it out in England in the early part of the last century, and Schopenhauer has done the same in our own days.

As already stated the theory of evil—constant, ever-present evil in everything mundane,—is common to all the three schools. Kapila designed his system with the express object of removing "the threefold pain" which is inherent in existence (Aph. I). Buddha's dread of the ever-recurring pain of birth, existence, decay, and death, drove him to the shelter of nihility, and the Pessimists of our day look upon pain as constant and inherent in worldly existence. The Yogís, who represent a section of the Sánkhyas, sum up the fruit of worldly existence by the significant remark, "to the discriminating all are verily painful." (Yoga, II, 15.) According to Hartmann "the world is so bad that it had better not exist, and that it is steadily becoming worse."

Nor are the means devised for the removal of this evil different. Perfect knowledge, attainable by hard, unremitting study amidst the most rigorous asceticism and self-mortification, and total renunciation of the pleasures of the world, is the only remedy accessible to man. Neither Kapila nor Buddha would have any other, and Schopenhauer, after dwelling on the miseries of existence, and showing that even suicide was not enough to put a stop to them, asks, "Whence then is deliverance to come?" and the answer given is "In knowing that the world is radically and essentially bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for
that old affirmation of the Will to live; it leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of Will, that true Nirvāṇa in which there is no more Will, therefore no longer an ideal presentation, or a real world."

In so far the correspondence is as close as possible in works set apart by an interval of considerably over four and twenty centuries—between Buddhism of the 6th century before Christ and the Pessimism of our own times. A learned writer describes Pessimism as the "goal of modern thought" in Europe. If so, that "goal" was reached in India over four and twenty centuries ago.

Nor should the limit be set there. It is impossible to believe that Sāṅkhyaism, like Minerva, issued forth in all its perfection at once. It is but natural to suppose that many ontological and biological questions, such as God, soul, mind, primary causation, &c., must have formed the theme of speculation and enquiry from a long anterior period, to prepare the Indian mind for the conception and reception of so recondite a system as the Sāṅkhya. Kapila could not have conceived and brought it forth, had not his predecessors discussed and made themselves familiar with such philosophical ideas. There must have existed many doctrines, many dogmas, many theories to afford him the necessary materials to work out his scheme. Even as Bacon's *Novum Organum* was not the spontaneous generation of a novel thought, but the crystallization or solidification of ideas which
were extant at the time in a more or less undefined, nebulous way, so was Kapila's Sánkhya. Various phases of philosophic thought were well known and current in his time, and his was the master mind which put them together to create a complete system. The bricks existed, and Kapila was the architect who used them in constructing a novel edifice.

How long before the time of Kapila metaphysical dogmas had currency among the Hindus we know not for certain; but the remarkable hymn in the Rig Veda which discusses whether entity or non-entity existed before creation (X, 129) carries us to a remote period of antiquity beyond which we cannot speculate. The reference in the Sáma Veda to a Yati who condemned sacrifices, and whose wealth was transferred to Bhrigu, is equally germane to the point. According to the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa some such Yatis were punished by being thrown before jackals. In the Aranyaka period of Vedic history, these rationalistic speculations and metaphysical controversies were of frequent occurrence, and the Upanishads have preserved for us the substance of some of the orthodox speculations on the subject. They afford us traces also of the heterodox dogmas which they were intended to combat. Kautsa was the leader of one of the rationalistic schools, and he is named by Yáska. Jábála was an atheist, and his name occurs in the Upanishads. Páṇini alludes to atheists, sceptics, fatalists, and revilers of the Vedas. It may be taken for granted without any offence to reason that these heterodox people did entertain many dog-
mas in opposition to the received exposition of primal causation and other recondite doctrines of the Hindu faith. They could not have been heterodox if they had not adverse theories to propound; and they must have been met by counter theories to keep up the antagonism. One may go further and assume that these disputes led to the development of adverse schools of thought which have since been overthrown by later developments. The earliest Vedic cultus was purely ritualistic. It embraced prayers and peace-offerings—prayers in set forms, and peace-offerings in the form of sacrifices accompanied by libations of spirituous liquors. Those who reviled the Vedic religion opposed it principally on the ground of the futility, cruelty and unmeaning character of the offerings. The atheists, pure and simple, denounced the whole system as false. This, however, was a purely destructive course, and not calculated to win the multitude in its favour. Mere negation suggests the idea of the doctrine of Metrodorics, the Epicurean, which had for its main object the stomach. Society needed some check to vice by holding up a threat of future retribution, and absolute negation of divine providence and future life did not provide it. Besides, a future state being admitted, a preparation for it in the present state was felt a necessity, and a large majority of the opponents, therefore, appealed to self-torture and meditation for aid.

Meditation as a means of communion with the Divinity was known long before the date of the Sánkhya. Indeed, in all ancient forms of religion,
meditation occupies a prominent place as a religious exercise. In the Rig Veda the Gāyatrī enjoins the meditation of the divine light which vivifies the solar luminary as the most sacred act of devotion, and that meditation occurs in endless forms in the rituals of all subsequent sects and systems. This meditation is called Dhyāna, the word used in the Gāyatrī being the verb dhīmahi "may we meditate." Now, this Dhyāna cannot be performed without fixing the mind on one particular object after abstracting it from worldly cares and enjoyments, and this fixation is called Dhāranā, or steadfastness. The abstraction necessarily implies some amount of asceticism and austerity, and this is called in the Vedas Tapas. A man must foreswear all worldly enjoyments before he can fix his mind on one unworldly object, and the fixation must take place before he can begin a meditation. Austerity, therefore, forms the first step in the process; fixation or steadfastness the second; and meditation the third; and all these exercises have enjoyed a halo of sanctity from a remote period of antiquity. No Rishi could live without his hermitage; none without performing Tapas; none without steadfast devotion; none without his meditation. These are the essential attributes of a Rishi. It would be a contradiction in terms to suppose a Rishi could be so, without them. They suggest the idea of communion with something superhuman, and create a feeling of mysterious awe and veneration in the mind of the common herd. At first the object of meditation was of course the Divinity in some form
or other; but atheistic philosophers soon found it practicable to dispense with that object, and they converted the objective thought to a subjective one, and thus produced the highest meditation of the Sānkhyas, a meditation in which the mind meditates on itself, or, as the philosophers of this class express it, on nothing. The next step was to dispense with the eternity of matter, to reduce it to a phantasmal character. The mind was all in all, and there was no necessity for an eternal co-ordinate, and this is the dogma of the Buddhists and the Vedāntists. None of these, however, dispensed with individual soul. That formed an integer in all the leading systems of early Indian philosophy. Nay, more, in order to provide for a future state of retribution, it was necessary to develop or retain the system of metempsychosis. It was seen that neither virtue nor vice always brought on its deserts in this life, and the necessity for a next life became unavoidable; and if the soul was to have a next corporeality of some kind to bear the deserts, there was nothing to hinder the transmigration many times. It may shock European ideas of the present day to be told of metempsychosis; but between worldly life, purgatory, and eternal hell-fire, or heaven on the one hand and metempsychosis on the other, dispassionate and unsophisticated logic will readily yield the palm to the latter. An English lady was once shocked at the sight of a Hindu lady with her nose bored for a nose-ring. She said, "how barbarous is this custom of yours, dear sister, of boring the nose?" "I fail," replied the Hindu, "to perceive the difference, Madam, between boring the two ears and
boring the nose." The Hindu controversialist may adopt this line of argument and ask, the matter not being susceptible of positive proof without the aid of revealed religion, "logically what is the difference between three corporealities and a dozen or more?"

But, however that be, all the ancient leading schools of India accepted metempsychosis, and the grand object they had in view was to devise the means for putting a stop to the ever-lengthening and never-ending chain of transmigration. And so long that was kept prominently before the masses, most of whom keenly felt, as they do now, and will always do, what Schelling calls "that sadness which cleaves to all finite life," the system propounded, however otherwise discordant in doctrinal points, had a fair chance of success, as a proselytising system, particularly if it were favourable to peace and welfare in this present existence.

Buddhism was peculiarly well-adapted for this purpose. It was the most attractive in its moral and social phases. No system of human religion has propounded a more perfect course of morality, humanity, mercy, and sympathy. The universal benevolence it preached could not but exert a potent influence on the mind of the people. At a time when sacrifices of animals by hundreds were everyday practices, and those sacrifices were often effected by driving wooden spikes into the heart of writhing victims, the dogma of total abstinence from all sacrifices and uniform mercy to all creatures could not but produce a marked revulsion of feeling against the current religion, and to draw large numbers of
men to the standard of the new faith. The doctrines of equality of man and of non-recognition of caste also contributed very largely to recommend it to the favour of those who had been for a long time ground down by caste rules. The result was wholesale conversions of the lower and the middle classes of the people in all parts of India—so much so as to make Buddhism the leading religion of the country. The intellectual classes, the men of leading and light, also appreciated these moral and social advantages, and were willing to accept them. They perceived, however, the worm in the flower, and were shocked by the sight. The atheism which forms the basis of Buddhist philosophy never obtruded itself on the perception of the multitude. It was unknown to them, and they cared not at all to understand its true purport. But the intelligent few felt it, and wished to avoid it. Even professed Buddhists could not always tolerate it, and many were the attempts made to gloss over it, or to supplant it in an insidious way so as to divest the system of its atheism without injuring it in its constitution. The Ais'variaka system of the Buddhists was the outcome of one of these attempts, and the Vedânta and the Yoga systems with their various Gitá, Tántric and Purânic modifications represent the results of Hindu attempts at reconciling the higher philosophy of Kapila and Buddha with a theistic religion.

It is not my object here to enter into the vexed question of the chronology of these different systems. It would take more time and space than what are
at my disposal now. It is necessary, however, to state that in appealing to the Sánkhya, I appeal to the doctrine, and not to its text-books. There is abundant evidence, both in Hindu and Buddhist works of unquestionable antiquity and authenticity, of the Sánkhya and the Yoga systems having been current before the time of Buddha. The most prominent part of the exercise of those systems involved the most rigorous self-mortification, and that mortification was currently practised with the utmost rigour before the time of Buddha. Buddha himself notices this. According to the Lalita-Vistara:

"While at Uruvilvá, Sákya called to mind all the different forms of penances which people at his time were in the habit of submitting to, and which they thought raised the mind above all carnality. 'Here,' he thought, 'am I born in the Jambudvipa, among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption (ādhimukti), crowded by Tirthikas with diverse wishes, and at a time when their faculties are wriggling in the grasp of the crocodile of their carnal wants. Stupid men, who seek to purify their persons by divers modes of austerity and penance, and inculcate the same! Some of them cannot make out their mantras. Some lick their hands. Some are uncleanly. Some have no mantras. Some wander after different sources. Some abstain from fish and flesh-meat. Some mind not the annual duties. Some abstain from spirit and the water of chaff. Some beg alms from one, three, five, or seven tribes. Some indulge in tubers, fruits, mosses, kuśa grass, leaves, cow's dejecta, frumenty, curds, clarified butter, molasses, and unbaked cakes. Some wash the body of charioteers, parrot-flyers, and news-purveyors. Some dwell in villages, or in woods for their livelihood. Some adore cows, deer, horses, hogs, monkeys, or elephants. Seated at one place in silence, with their legs bent under them, some attempt greatness. Some speak to only one person, others to seven. Some eat once in a day and night, some once on alternate days, and some
at intervals of four, five, or six days; some once in a fortnight, performing a chándráyāna. Some put on themselves the feathers of vultures or owls. Some, seated on a board or a munjá mat, wear bark, kuśa grass, valvaja grass (*Eleusine Indica*), or blankets of camels' hair, or of goat's wool, or of hair, or hides. Some sleep more or less in wet clothes. Some sleep on ashes, gravel, stones, boards, thorny grass, or pestles, with the face downwards, in a hut or the bare ground. Some wear one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven pieces of cloth; others go naked, making no distinction between fit and unfit places. Some have long hair, nails, beard, and matted hair, and wear bark. Some live upon a single meal of a mixture of sesamum and rice. Some smear themselves with ashes, cinders from altars, dust, or clay. Some carry on their persons and in their hands down, munja grass, hair, nails, raga, mud, or a cocoanut-shell alms-bowl. Some drink hot water, or rice-water, or fountain water, or water preserved in earthen jars. Some carry on them cinders, metals, astringent things, three sticks, skulls, alms-bowls, bones or swords, and by these means they hope to attain to immortality, and pride themselves on their holiness. By inhaling smoke or fire, by gazing at the sun, by performing the five fires, resting on one foot, or with an arm perpetually uplifted, or moving about on the knees, some attempt to accomplish their penance. Some seek salvation by killing themselves by entering into a mass of lighted chaff or charcoal, or by suppressing their breath, or by roasting one's self on (hot) stones, or by entering any fire or water, or ascending in the air. The syllables "om," "vashat," "svadhá," "sváhá," as also, blessings, hymns, lighting of the sacred fire, invocations, repetitions of mystic mantras teaching of the Vedas (lit. mantras), or fancying the image of a divinity in one's mind, afford means of purification to many. Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahmá, Indra, Rudra, Víshnu, Deví, Kumára, Mátri, Kátyáyaní, Chandra, Áditya, Váishravaña, Varúña, Vásava, Aśvina, Nága, Yaksha, Gandharva, Ásura, Garuḍa, Kinnara, Mahoraga, Rákshasa, Pṛeta, Bhúta, Kushmánḍa, Párshada, Gaṇapati, Devarshi, Brahmaraśi, or Rájarshi. Some select some of them, others resort to the earth, the water, heat, the air or the ether. Mountains, rivers, fountains, tanks, lakes, long narrow sheets of water (taḍágas), oceans, vats, ponds, wells, trees, lotuses, herbs, creepers,
grasses, stumps, pastures, cremation grounds, courtyards, and bowers afford asylums to others. Houses, columns, stones, pestles, swords, bows, axes, arrows, spears, and tridents, are the objects of salutation to some. In curd, butter, mustard, barley, garlands, darbha grass, jewels, gold and silver, some seek their welfare. Thus do these Tirthikas, dreading the horrors of mundane life, seek their shelter. Some seek heaven and salvation in their offspring, and resolutely apply to them. They all follow the wrong road; they fancy that to be the true support which is untrue; they hold evil to be good, and the impure to be pure. I shall then commence that kind of vow and penance by which all hostile sects shall be overpowered. To persons deluded by works and sacrifices, I shall show the destruction of all works and sacrifices. To Devas, perceivable by meditation, as also to those who become manifest in divers forms, I shall exhibit a meditation by which they may be overpowered."—My Buddha-Gayā, pp. 24, et seq.

The meditations he practised were all in accord with the rules of the Yoga system, and even their technical names were the same. These facts demonstrate the antiquity of the Sānkhya and the Yoga doctrines; but this cannot be said of the text-books of those systems as we have them before us now. They are obviously of a later date than Buddha, and this may safely be predicated of all the six leading texts of Hindu Philosophy. The Sānkhya Sūtra quotes the Vais'eshika by name in two places (A. I., 25 and VI, 35), and refutes the doctrine of the Vedānta Sūtra. The Yoga Sūtra takes for granted the twenty-five categories of the Sānkhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost verbatim. The Vais'eshika Sūtra recognises the Nyāya as well as the Sānkhya. The Nyāya Sūtra refutes the doctrines of the Vedānta, and of the Sānkhya. The Mimāṃsā either directly or practically
PREFACE. by the mode of its refutation of adverse doctrines recognizes the pre-existence of all the others, not excepting Buddhism. It also quotes Badari, a teacher, and Bádarāyaṇa, probably a grandson of Badari, and author of the Vedānta Sūtras or later Mīmāṃsā, as also of a commentary on the Yoga Sūtra. The Vedānta in its turn refutes adverse doctrines of all the five, and thereby admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled only by the supposition that the different dogmas and the schools which cherished them existed for a long time before the dogmas were written down in the aphoristic form in which we have them now. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation for a long time. There might have been also text-books before, but they were set aside by the very complete systems which the new texts produced, and in the new systems the refutation of adverse opinions very naturally included all the theories which were prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not the theories only of the time when the original dogmas were first promulgated. This is also obvious in other ways. In the case of the Sānkhya Sūtra, though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahmā, we find it refers to an "ancient teacher" (A'chárya, A. V, 31), and to "venerable preceptors" (A. VI, 69). Sanandana and Pañchaśīkha are cited by name (V, 32, and VI, 69). Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to A'surī, who is described both as a brother and a pupil of the teacher. A'surī imparts it to Pañchas'ikha, who is, according
to the Purāṇics, again a brother. This Pañchas'ikha, again, according to the Mahābhārata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sāṅkhya doctrine to that king of Mithilā. Had Kapila written the Śūtra he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an Āchārya.

In the Vedānta Śūtra, Bādarāyaṇa, the author, is several times named in the third person (I, 3, 26; I, 3, 33; III, 2, 41; III, 4, 1, 8, 19; IV, 3, 15, IV, 4, 7, 12). This is usually explained by the statement that a pupil wrote down the teachings of the saint. Colebrooke, arguing on these facts, came to the conclusion that the text-books are much later than the saints whose names they bear. Referring to the Sāṅkhya he says "the text of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by I's'varakrishna,—and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Pañchas'ikha who had been himself instructed by A'surí, the pupil of Kapila." (Essays, I, p. 93). Professor Cowell accepts this opinion in its entirety; he says "The Śūtras, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The Śūtras mutually refer to each other; thus, those of the Sāṅkhya school, which in itself I should consider
one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedánta tenets. They expressly mention the Vais'eshika in I. 25, V. 85; for the Nyaya cf. V, 27, 86, and for the Yoga I, 93.” (Colebrooke's Essays, I, 354.) This is also the opinion at which I have arrived after a careful consideration of the bearings of the question; in short, my conviction is that the Sútras were written, like the Institutes of Manu and many other Hindu works, long after the date of their putative authors.

As regards the Yoga, the doctrine is described to be as old as Brahmá, and the text-book to be the work of Patanjali, who, says the commentator, “compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them” (p. 4). That such is really the case, is obvious from the fact of the Yoga which Patanjali inculcates being identically the same which the Sánkhya accepted as the only means of salvation. It might be argued that the Sánkhya adopted the theory of the 25 principles, from the Yoga of Patanjali, and did not lend it to him. But the arguments against this theory are overwhelming. In the first place had Patanjali initiated the theory of the Tattvas he would have for certain defined them, and not left them to be inferred. He is very careful in his definitions, and he would never have left so vital an element of his system to be inferred. But following the Sánkhya no necessity was felt by him for any definition. It cannot be said that his Tattvas were different from those of the Sánkhyas, for that would make the necessity for a definition even more
imperative. Secondly, the author of the Mahābhāṣṣya cannot possibly be proved to have lived before Kapila, or his doctrine. The learned Professor M. M. Kunte, in his "Vicissitudes of Aryan Civilization," has combated, with great tact and ability, the arguments usually put forth to fix the date of Patanjali; and it may be admitted that individually each argument as put forth by Goldstücker and others admits of refutation, and I may add that a long chain of weak arguments is not stronger than any of its links. Still the coincidence of a number of names of a given period is one which in Indian history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, however, one's attention to the text-book only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that Patanjali has contented himself by tacking a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic model, without in any way blending the two ideas into any homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the Hindus call it Sēś'vara Sānkhya, or Sānkhya cum deo, as opposed to the former which is Niris'vara Sānkhya, or Sānkhya sine deo.

The cardinal difference between the two rests on their theistic and atheistic belief, but as already stated, it makes no difference in their systems. Isolation of soul from thinking principle is the end sought in either case, and meditation in Samādhi is the only means available. The believer in the existence of the Godhead assumes that divine grace facilitates the end sought, but he does not dispense with Samādhi, and his belief, therefore, is of no material importance.
"In less momentous matters," as noticed by Colebrooke, "they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali's Yoga-sūstra is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions." (Essays I, p. 265.)

And we have enough in these facts and reasons to infer that the Yoga text-book is posterior to the Sānkhya text-book, and that both the text-books are later than Buddha; but that the doctrines of the two schools are very old. Any how these are the immediate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha, and indirectly of the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

The Yoga, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage. In this case the relation is direct and more intimate. The eternity of soul is recognised by both; both look to a course of gradual progress which has perfection for its goal; both admit the existence of soul in higher and higher stages; both recognise the possibility of man's commanding departed souls to come down, to become visible, and to hold converse with him; both pretend by regulation of breath and other exercises to attain occult powers of the most
transcendental kind. The details and the rationale of exercise may be different in minor points, and a few of the dogmas such as the "material reality" of soul according to the spiritualists, and its pure spirituality according to the Yogis, may be apparently contradictory; but substantially the two are as closely related as two systems separated by a gap of five and twenty centuries can well be. The cardinal theory, that "the body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals" but it is not so in the case of the adept, is evidently the same in both. "We can see only what comes before the windows of our body, we can take cognizance of what is brought within its bars. The adept has found the key of his prison, and can emerge from it at pleasure. In other words, the adept can project his soul out of his body to any place he pleases." The whole system in either case is based on this doctrine, and even a cursory study of the 3rd chapter of the work now presented to the public in an English dress will, I believe, fully bear out this statement.

The name of the Yoga system as we now have it is Yogánus'ásana, or 'the Institutes of the Yoga.' This name, however, is rarely used, the work being better known as the Yoga-s'ástra or 'the science of Yoga,' or Yoga-sútra, the 'Aphorisms of the Yoga.' According to the commentary, commonly assigned to Vyásá, one name of the work would appear to be Sánkhya pravachana, or 'an exposition of the Sánkhya.' The words of the colophon are Pátanjala-yoga-s'ástre sánkhya-pravachane, which may be translated into, in Patanjali's science of the Yoga, the Sá'nkhhyá pravachana.
Vyāsa, however, if he be the author of the exegesis, which I do not believe to be the case, must have used the term simply to imply that it is a text-book on the Sānkhya system, and not to indicate the specific name of the work, for in his remarks on the first aphorism he distinctly says, "the name of the work is Yogānusāsana," (Yogānusāsanam nāma sāstram). Following this exegesis Colebrooke says: "the title of Sānkhya-pravachana seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali's Yoga-sāstra." (Essays I, p. 244). In short, Yogānusāsana is the specific, and Sānkhya-pravachana the descriptive, name of the work. Anyhow it is obvious that the Yoga is recognised from an early period as a work on Sānkhya.

The Yoga text as we now have it comprises a total of 194 short, succinct aphorisms, divided into four chapters or quarters (paḍas). The first contains 51 aphorisms, devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of meditation, and is entitled Samādhi-pāda. The second is called Sādhuna-pāda, or the quarter on the exercise of meditation and its requirements, and contains 55 aphorisms. The third is called Vibhūti-pāda, and treats of the various occult powers which may be derived by the exercises enjoined in it. It is of the same extent as the second. The name of the fourth chapter is Kaivalya-pāda, and it gives an exposition of the nature and character of the isolation or detachment of soul from worldly ties, which is the object and aim of the exercises and meditations recommended. It is limited to 33 aphorisms.
The work opens with a definition of the term *Yoga*. It is derived from the root *yuj*, which means both "to join" and "to meditate." Some accept the first meaning, explaining it in the technical sense to imply the joining of the mind to the object of thought. Others prefer the second, but that makes no material difference in the purport. The technical meaning of the word as used in the text is a derivative one. Instead of giving prominence to the joining, it implies the detachment which that joining occasions. The definition is, "the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle." This suppression, however, need not be absolute in order to make the word applicable. It is used to imply all stages of abstraction of the thinking principle from worldly cares with a view to centre it in the peculiar meditation which serves to effect that abstraction. The word is of very ancient date. It occurs several times in the Rig Veda, but not in the technical sense. In the time of Buddha, six centuries before the era of Christ, it had acquired its technical meaning to perfection, and as Buddha, according to the view of the case set forth above, borrowed it from the followers of the Sánkhyya school, it may safely be assumed that it dates from long before the age of Buddha. In fact, the *Tapas* of the Vedic Rishis got the more expressive name of Yoga at a later period, and Kapila and his followers gave it prominence in their system by making it the sole means of salvation. Many other works have since used it to indicate communion with the divinity in some way or other, and the Bhagavad-
gītā takes thirteen out of its eighteen chapters to be each a treatise on a separate kind of Yoga. The names are: 2, Sānkhya Yoga; 3, Karma Yoga; 4, Jñāna-karma Yoga; 5, Karma-sannyāsa Yoga; 6, Dhyāna Yoga; 8, Tāракabrahma Yoga; 9, Rāja-guhyā Yoga; 10, Vibhūti Yoga; 12, Bhakti Yoga; 13, Kshetra-kshetrajña Yoga; 14, Gunatraya Yoga; 15, Purushottama Yoga; 18, Sannyāsa Yoga. In fact, every phase of devotion is described as a form of Yoga. The Tantras have a great number of others, and many variations of those named above, but they need not be noticed here.

The definition of the text suggests immediately the question, what are the functions that have to be suppressed? These must first be known before they can be overcome. The author, therefore, proceeds to describe them. They are said to be fivefold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. These, directly or indirectly, comprise all the functions to which the thinking principle can possibly be directed. The means of suppressing these functions are next described. They include, (a) exercise, or "effort constantly made to keep the thinking principle in its functionless state," (xiii,) and (b), dispassion, or "the consciousness of being their subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects," (xv). The details of these are reserved for consideration in the next chapter.

The exercises and dispassion result in Yoga, of which there are two kinds, a conscious and an unconscious one. The former is that which is attended
by argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism or self-consciousness; the latter is devoid of such attendants. As long as the thinking principle argues what is good and what is bad; as long as there is deliberation as to the nature of the object of thought; as long as a person engaged in meditation feels a sense of joy; or as long as he retains a sense of his own individuality, (self-consciousness), he is said to be in a conscious state of meditation. This is, in the technical language of the school, Savijasamādhi or "seeded meditation," because there is in it some nucleus on which the mind is centered. When, by arduous and long-continued exercise, this seed is lost, and the mind remains divested of all thought, a mere state of consciousness without an object, it becomes seedless, nirvīja, or perfect, and this is the *sumnum bonum* which the Yogi exerts to attain. When this is attained, the bondage of the world, of transmigration, is entirely severed, and the soul is declared to be *isolated* or free.

The expedients aforesaid are always and imperatively necessary—nothing can be attained without them; but their action can be expedited by another means, and that is "Devotion to God." This devotion is absolute resignation of one’s self to the Divinity. In the language of the commentator, “it is thorough worship of God. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one’s actions to him, the preëminent guide.” This devotion is the means by which the theism of the current Hinduism is reconciled with the philosophy of
the school. Kapila did not care for this reconciliation, and his system, therefore, did not stand in need of a Divine Providence; but his atheism being repulsive to the thinking portion of mankind, Patanjali avails himself of it to give a theistic character to his system. It will be noticed, however, that he makes his Divinity one of several means to an end, and not the end sought. The God he invokes is defined to be "a particular soul which is untouched by affliction, works, deserts, and desires," one who is existent, but not the avowed Creator and preserver of the universe. His name is I's'vara or "the ruler," and that may imply providence, but nothing is said on this subject. In two successive aphorisms, He is described as one "in whom the seed of the omniscient attains infinity," (xxv,) and "who is the instructor of even all early ones, for, He is not defined by time (xxvi)."

The indicator of this Divinity is the syllable Om, called Praṇava, and it is by repeating it and reflecting on its meaning that the different states of meditation can be easily attained. The author could have scarcely put God and his name to a more subordinate position.

Turning now to the obstacles which stand in the way of the Yogi in the satisfactory accomplishment of his meditation, the author enumerates what they are, and suggests the means of overcoming them. The obstacles, or causes of distraction, are disease, langour, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability in the stage obtained (A. xxx);
and these are attended by pain, distress, trembling, and oppressive inspiration and expiration (xxxI). These tend to make the thinking principle unsteady, or unfit for meditation, and have, therefore, to be sedulously overcome. The means for overcoming them are various. The habit of concentrating the mind on one particular principle is the most efficacious, (xxxII,) and it is to be supplemented by cheerfulness, benevolence, compassion, complacency, and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue, and vice (xxxIII). It may be effected also by a system of regulation of breath, called Prāṇāyāma, which is supposed to exert a powerful influence in steadying the thinking principle, and warding off disease and other obstacles (cf. p. 41). Although this regulation of breath is a necessary element in all the earlier or lower forms of the Yoga, one is specially called the Yoga of breathing, and technically called Ḥaṭha-yoga, from the letters ha and tha, meaning the sun and the moon, which are the mystic names of inspiration and expiration. This form is particularly esteemed for its efficacy in procuring occult powers. When the habit of meditation has considerably advanced, and the Yogi is able to realize sensuous objects in his meditation, or when the mind is thereby so illumined, it is of itself sufficient to ward off tribulations. Meditation in the passionlessness of accomplished Yogis might also effect this (xxxvII). Reliance on dreams, or on the object of one's fancy, is, likewise, an efficacious remedy.

The author then enters into a more elaborate classification of the Yoga. The twofold division first
pointed out does not suffice fully to indicate the various shades of difference which the seeded form assumes under different circumstances, and to each of these shades he assigns a different name, and defines its nature. In course of this, he points out the theory of the mind becoming the object it thinks upon (xli), in other words that intense thought creates objects, or becomes objective. This is the basis on which the occult powers described in a subsequent chapter are founded. The seedless form is one and simple, and it is the _ultimatum_ sought by the Yoga.

The second chapter is devoted to the details of the exercises necessary for the performance of the Yoga, and is therefore called _Kriyā-yoga_ or "practical Yoga." In its earliest and simplest state practical Yoga is accomplished by a strict observance of asceticism, by the muttering of a mantra a great number of times at stated periods every day, and by devotion to God. The object of these observances is to weaken afflictions and give firmness to meditation. Afflictions arise from attachment to worldly affairs, and asceticism is the best antidote for them, and the practice of repeating a mantra for a long time serves to steady the mind.

The reference to afflictions suggests the question, what are they? They are ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life, or 'the Will to live' as Hartmann designates it. Some of these are subtile, others gross, (iii). The former are to be counteracted by acting against their natural bent, (x) and the latter by meditation, (xi).
The afflictions are described to be the root of all evil. They give rise to works, and works leave behind their stock of residua to be worked out in a subsequent birth, and in that subsequent birth other works are performed, and they leave their residua, and so on, the chain is never brought to an end. For instance, ignorance leads to the commission of a sin; the retribution for that sin comes in the next existence; while that desert is being borne in that existence another sin is committed through ignorance; that necessitates another birth for its retribution, and the series never breaks. And what is true of ignorance is equally so of the other afflictions. Nor does the rule apply only to sins; it applies equally to virtuous deeds. For instance, if instead of a sin a virtuous work be performed, its deserts have to be enjoyed in another existence, and the course proceeds exactly as in the case of sin. In fact, every work, whether right or wrong, has its apportioned desert, and it must be borne in a corporeal existence, and the succession of birth, decay, and death must, in the ordinary course of things, recur over and over again without a limit. The fruits may be joy or suffering according as the cause is virtue or vice, but to the discriminating they are invariably painful, (xv). They are, also inevitable, and must be borne. An act once performed must bear its fruit, and in so far there is no remedy. One may, however, avoid doing those works which bear fruit, and thereby break the spell, and the maxim is therefore laid down that only those pains are avoidable which are not yet come, (xvi).
The question then arises, what should one do to abstain from works, and avoid their consequences? and the object of the Yoga is to devise the means through which the abstinence may be effected.

In order to explain the rationale of the course by which the evil is to be brought to an end, the author next enters into an explanation of the mutual relation of Intellect and Soul. Intellect is called a spectacle, and it is said “to be of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is for the purpose of experience and emancipation,” (xviii). It exists solely for the purpose of Soul, (xxi). Soul is called the spectator; “it is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas,” (xx). When these two are in conjunction through ignorance (and it is ignorance which brings them into conjunction) they produce life and its consequences, (xvii) or as the text puts it “the apprehension of the nature of the contact, power, and the lordship of power,” (xxii) i.e., Soul thinks it is the experiencer and Intellect thinks it is the experiencer. Now, when the light of knowledge dispels the false impression the conjunction is dissolved. Intellect ceases to think that it is the experiencer, and Soul gives up the idea of its experience, and the ignorance is removed. In other words, the conjunction being removed Soul is isolated, and there is a period put to further birth and suffering. Now, ignorance being the sole cause of the conjunction, the great object is to remove that ignorance, and
this is to be effected by discriminative knowledge, or that which will rightly appreciate the true character of the relation which exists between Soul and Intellect. This knowledge then is what is to be sought, and the means are now provided by which it may be attained.

The knowledge in question passes through seven stages before it becomes perfect (xxvii). The first stage is that in which a person feels that "the knowable has been known by me." (2) He next feels that "there is nothing remaining to be known." (3) The conviction then arises that "my afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome." (4) This is followed by the belief that "discriminative knowledge has been attained by me." These four suffice to effect what is technically called "liberation from work," (Kārya-vimukti), for when these have been acquired there is no more impulse or wish left to perform works. These are followed, in course of progress, by three more successive convictions. These are,—1st "my intellect has accomplished its purpose;" 2nd, "the three qualities have finished their dominion over me, and can no longer affect me;" 3rd, "my meditation has been identified with my soul," that is the Intellect has merged into the Soul. These three are called "intellectual liberation" (Chitta-vimukti). The last is called isolation (Kai-valya), on the attainment of which the Soul is believed to be perfectly liberated.

In order to bring on this consummation the Yogi should apply himself to improve his understanding so
as to make it completely devoid of impurities. To 
effect this improvement eight means are recommended,
and these are technically called 1, Restraint; 2,
Obligation; 3, Posture; 4, Regulation of birth;
5, Abstraction; 6, Steadfastness; 7, Contemplation;
and, 8, Meditation (xxix). Of these the first in-
cludes five negative acts, viz., abstention from (1)
slaughter, (2) falsehood, (3) theft, (4) incontinence,
and (5) avarice; and the second five positive acts,
namely, (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) pe-
nance, (4) study, and (5) devotion to the Lord. These
two classes of acts are called mahávratas, or acts of
primary asceticism. They are obligatory on all classes
of the community, whether householders or ascetics,
and none should neglect them. Slaughter is in se
sinful, and none should commit it, whether he be a
householder or a hermit. Falsehood and theft are sins
of the same gravity, and should therefore be shunned
by all. Incontinence &c., are likewise reprehensible,
and none should be guilty of them. Nor can a
virtuous and peaceful life be secured simply by these
restraints; it is necessary that one should keep himself
free from filth, both material and moral; that he
should be contented with his lot and not rapine;
that he should submit to penance for his sins and
for curbing his passions; that he should study the
Vedas, and be devoted to the service of God. No
one can be a good citizen who does not practice
these restraints and obligations, and therefore they
are recommended to all classes of the community.
And if they are good and necessary for ordinary
people, they must *ipso facto* be so for the Yogi, who aspires to rise above the common herd. Nay, to him they are most imperative, for none can prepare himself for the Yoga who does not especially attend to them, as the first step in his career. The advantages of observing these restraints and obligations are described at some length; but they call for no remark here.

Restraint and obligation being thus common to both householders and Yogis the third of the eight means becomes the first special act of exercise to which a Yogi has to apply himself; this is the assumption of particular postures, which are conducive to the fixation of the thinking principle to any object to which it may be directed. No one can settle himself down for meditation while walking, or running, or doing something unconnected with his main object, and some particular postures are, therefore, deemed essential. The text contents itself by saying that it should be firm and pleasant (XLVI), and entail the least effort (XLVII); but it does not describe any particular posture as the most beneficial. Commentators, however, have supplied the omission, and described a great number of them, some of them most painful and difficult of assumption, (*cf.* pp. 102f.).

When the Yogi has assumed one of the prescribed postures, he should begin the fourth exercise, the regulation of his breath. This consists in drawing the breath through one nostril; retaining the air for some time in the chest; and then throwing it out
through another nostril. The details of this process will be found on pp. 42f.

This process of breathing should be followed by the fifth exercise, the abstraction of the organs from their ordinary natural functions. As long as they are engaged in their own works, they do not allow the thinking principle to settle down for the act of meditation, and consequently prove obstructive. To overcome them, or to draw them away from works, is an essential preliminary. When they are abstracted, they merge into their primary cause, the thinking principle, and cease to disturb it.

All these five acts of Restraint, Obligation, Posture, Regulation of breath, and Abstraction are accessories or necessary adjuncts to Yoga, for without them no Yoga can be performed; but they form no essential part of the Yoga itself. Even all the five existing together would not constitute Yoga, though without them as preliminaries no Yoga can be effectual. These are, therefore, called "practical Yoga," or "accessories to the Yoga," but not Yoga. The last three, on the other hand, are essential constituents of the Yoga, and are therefore called "intimates" or antarangas. These three include Steadfastness (Dhāraṇā), Contemplation (Dhyāna), and Meditation (Samādhi); and the third chapter opens with a description of these. "Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place," (L). As an exercise, it is of little moment to what object the thinking principle is applied: so long the thinking principle remains unswervingly attached to it, without for a
moment thinking of anything else, it is Steadfastness. When the understanding is brought to bear upon this fixation and the two act in unison the result is Contemplation (II), i.e., when the thinking principle thinks intelligently and steadfastly on an object it is Contemplation. Again when this contemplation is so intense that it loses all idea of its own identity, and enlightens solely one object, it is Meditation or Samādhi. The definition given points to something much more intense than what the English word meditation ordinarily conveys; it implies a state of extacy or cataleptic trance when both the body and the mind are dead to all external impressions, and the thinking principle is completely drowned in the special object of its thought, or in itself, but as the degree of intensity is not fixed and is admitted to vary considerably under different circumstances, I have used the word meditation as the most convenient and conveying the nearest idea of the mental act indicated by the Sanskrit term. When these three follow successively or are united, they have the common name of Sañyama. How this union is to be effected, or how this Sañyama is to be performed, is nowhere described at length; but it may be directed to diverse objects, internal and external, and, when duly and thoroughly performed, results in the most extraordinary occult powers.

A subject is the correlative of the three qualities of tranquillity, enlivening and latency, and as each quality becomes ascendant the subject varies; and these variations may be produced by the power of
Sañyama, apart from ordinary mundane causes. Hence the efficacy of the Sañyama in producing occult powers. Sañyama, however, should not be applied indiscriminately to all purposes. The proper rule is to follow the stages of perfection successively attained by a Yogi, i.e., it should not be applied to a subtile object, until it has been practised and perfected with regard to gross objects. In other words, it should be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of a Yogi is divided. Unless this is done no fruition follows (vi).

The occult powers, called Siddhis, derivable by the practice of the Sañyama are the most astounding possible. By it one may know the past and the future, the circumstances connected with his former existences, as well as the day and hour of his death. He may know what is in the mind of another person, or the meaning of the cries of animals. He may make himself or others invisible to bystanders, contract friendship with whomsoever he likes, or attain other superhuman powers. He may acquire a knowledge of things that are ordinarily too subtile, or too remote, for human observation, or so intercepted as not to be visible. He can observe the details of regions situated far away from the earth; of the stars and planets, their dispositions and their motions. He can have occular knowledge of spiritual phenomena. He may know what is going on inside his body; subdue his hunger and thirst; or make his body so firm as none can shake it. It is possible for him, too, to make departed spirits visible, and to converse with them.
He can attain superhuman intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction. He may project his own soul into another's body, and then bring it back into his own. He can travel with the quickness of the mind through air or through water, and go wheresoever he lists.

When most of these powers have been attained and a Yogi is in a forward state for absolute perfection, the gods envy his success, and try to divert him from his onward course. They place temptations in his way in the forms of handsome women, great wealth, and other worldly objects of value, and thereby lead him astray (LI). In this they play the part of Mára in the Buddhist legends, and of Satan in the Bible. Great care and determination are necessary to rise above such temptations. According to the Tantras when temptations fail, resort is had to frightful forms, tigers, lions, serpents, ogres and the like, which threaten instant destruction to the Yogi. But if they are met by firm resolve, they are always ultimately overcome.

Great as are these and such like powers, of which a great many are described in the text, they are not the objects which a Yogi should seek. They are the results of his meditations, and they indicate the success he is gradually attaining, and the progress he is making towards his goal; but they are not that goal. The highest power is, even like the lowest, a part of the "seeded" or discriminative meditation. These powers are, nevertheless, of value, as they enhance the power of the understanding, and in their perfection result in the all-saving knowledge, tárakjñāna,
which makes manifest the relation between the thinking principle and Soul, and brings on the "seedless meditation." They are thus of use in consummating the isolation of Soul—the sumnum bonum which the Yoga promises to its votaries.

The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of such metaphysical topics as bear on the nature and character of Isolation. It opens by saying that special faculties may result from five different causes, (1). Some of them are described to be due to birth; such as the power of flying, or living in water, or with suspended animation for protracted periods. These are specific peculiarities of particular genera of animals which may be acquired by being born in such genera, and are not common to all living beings. Others are due to herbs, such as the effect of drugs in arresting sleep, hunger, or the like, or making the flesh proof against heat, or poison, or cold. Others, again, are due to certain incantations or mantras which are universally believed by the Hindus to have very extraordinary powers. Austerity or asceticism in the same way is credited with the power of enabling people to acquire special faculties. Of course, the tangible faculties in this case are not faculties strictly so called, but the effect of habit. And lastly, Samádhi is believed to produce the same results, and these are what have been described in the preceding chapter. The first four causes do not concern the author, and, therefore, no further notice is taken of them. The last is intimately connected with the question at issue, and great pains are taken to meet such objec-
tions as might be started against the theory of Samádhi being the cause of special faculties. The objections are assumed to proceed from opponents, and the Sútras supply the replies. In the second and the third aphorisms, an opponent is made to deny causality to Samádhi, inasmuch as it has no influence on the body, and bodily changes are known to have been produced in this life. The explanation given is that the materials of the body undergo change of their own accord, and merit resulting from Samádhi subserves only to remove all obstructions from their way. This is illustrated by the example of the husbandman, who removes the inequalities on the surface of a field in order to lead water to where it is wanted, and the water then flows of its own accord, or in obedience to the laws of gravitation. This satisfies the opponent, who thereupon, shifts his ground, and, admitting the possibility of the materials changing by themselves, raises the question as to how thinking principles, which are immaterial, can be so produced. Yogis pretend that they can, each of them, animate a number of bodies at the same time, and it is necessary that, for such a purpose, each body should have a separate thinking principle, and the questions raised are how is it provided? and how is the unity of the creating one preserved? The theory of spontaneous change in materials cannot explain this, and the reply given is that such thinking principles are emanations or scintillations from the creating one, and are therefore subordinate to it, acting in accord with the will of the creator, even as the different organs of the
body act in accordance with the will of the mind, (xiii—v).

The possibility of Samádhi producing occult powers being thus settled, the question next comes as to the nature of those powers—are they of the same character as those produced by other causes? or are they different? The reply is that they are different, (vi). The faculties produced by the other causes are intimately connected with former births; the residua of former births are the active principles which animate them; whereas the faculties produced by Samádhi have no such background. They are spontaneous, and do not produce those after-consequences which the others do.

This leads to the classification of works leading to residua into four groups. Some are described to be white or meritorious; some are black or vicious; some are partly black and partly white; while others are neither black nor white. The first three groups belong to ordinary life, and leave behind residua; the last pertains to Yogís, and are not calculated to leave any remnant behind, (vii).

The after-consequences of ordinary works are two-fold, instinct, and kind, age and experience. The theory is that every work, every sensation, every form of experience leaves on the thinking principle an impress of its own, and such impressions, accumulating in course of a lifetime, become the stock of residua which, though for the time being latent, are susceptible of revival by proper stimulants in subsequent existences. (cf. p. 26—174). This
revival is Instinct, i.e., instead of believing Instinct to be spontaneous, self-evolved, intuitive reason, as European philosophers describe it, (cf. p. 175,) Yogis take it to be the fruit of the remembrance of former experience, revived by particular circumstances. These residua are also the causes of rewards and punishments in subsequent lives, and the rewards and punishments are represented by kind, age and experience; kind implying birth into higher or lower grades according to merit or demerit; age the span of life in such existences, which is prolonged or reduced according to one’s deserts; and experience sensations of pleasure or pain. Confining his attention here to Instinct, the author describes that the residua producing Instinct do not revive invariably but according to circumstances, even after breaks caused by dissimilar births, (viii). Nor do such breaks, produced by dissimilar births, localities, or times lead to any breach in the relation of cause and effect existing between residua and instinctive manifestations, (ix), inasmuch as the result manifests itself invariably at the first favourable moment.

The theory of residua as above propounded is open to the grave objection that it does not provide for the manifestation of instinctive action at the first birth when no residua can be predicated; but the author obviates it by assuming eternity of desires and consequently of the universe. That which is eternal can have no beginning, and consequently there is no room left for a first birth, (x). This involves a regressus in infinitum, but, assuming matter and the universe to be eternal, it is not objectionable, or illogical. More-
over, the necessity of keeping God apart from creation, renders the theory of eternity of the universe unavoidable. Admit God to be the creator, the necessity arises of making Him engage in work and derive its fruit; deny it, the universe must be accepted as self-evolved, and the theory of nothing comes from nothing not allowing of such an assumption, the author is driven to the only alternative left, that of eternity.

The opponent who raised the first objection now turns round and argues that if eternity be predicated of desires, how can they be removed? and if they are not removed the chain of transmigration will ever lengthen and never come to an end, and no redemption is possible, so that the performance of the Yoga for the sake of liberation from the fetters of repeated existence would be futile. To this the author replies by saying that the cause of desire is ignorance of the true nature of things; its effect is the body and its longings and their consequences; its asylum is the thinking principle; and its object is worldly enjoyment, and if these can be made inert or functionless, they would cease to produce their fruits; and if they ceased there would be no root left in re the individual in which they are made functionless to produce new residua, and consequently he would be free, (xi).

But, says the opponent, the thinking principle is ever changing under diverse influences, it cannot be in one existence what it was before, and consequently there is no unity, and therefore the theory of oneness, of omne ens est unum, is lost. This argument is met
by the theory of archetypes. Every category is eternal, all things are eternal, nothing is really created, or absolutely destroyed, and what we call creation or destruction is simply change of attributes, and in the case of the thinking principle it is nothing more. When it changes its present condition, it reverts to its former condition, or assumes a new one, but its unity is never lost, (xii). This is the theory of the moderate nominalists or conceptionalists, with their univer-
salia ad rem, universalia in re, and universalia post rem. Change having been admitted above, the author proceeds to account for it. It is produced by the three qualities acting either on the subject, or on the object, or on both, (xiii). The action, however, is not simultaneous, only one of the qualities is predominant at a time, and therefore there is no diversity in the two, (xiv). This leads to the question are sensibles the causes of sensation? or sensations the causes of sensibles? The first idea is in accord with every-day experience. Sensation usually takes place when there is a sensible present to produce it. The relation of the two as cause and effect is, however, not constant, and under different circumstances the same sensible produces simultaneously very different sensations, and the simultaneous production of different effects by one cause is illogical and impossible. The commentator illustrates this by appealing to the different effects produced by a single handsome woman on amorous males, her rivals, and ascetics. He might have gone further, and adverted to representative sensations as distinct from presentative
ones. In fact, as Professor Müller, in his 'Elements of Physiology' (Baly's Translation, p. 1059), has observed, "external agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves." Sensations, too, remain on the sensorium after the sensibles producing them have been removed. Nor can sensation be the cause of sensible, or, in the language of the commentator, "if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle, then there would be nothing besides, when that thinking principle would be occupied with one particular thing." It cannot be said that the ideal presentation of things would be created and maintained by other thinking principles while one thinking principle is occupied with a particular thing, for in that case many diverse causes would be made to produce one effect. Applied to the world the inference would be that one world is the effect of many diverse causes, and, that not being possible, the alternative would be that the world is causeless. The solution afforded is that there is no relation of cause and effect between the two; they are eternal and move in different paths (xv); and their action upon each other is regulated by the triad of qualities, one or other of which predominate for the time and produce its effects. Patanjali is exceedingly brief and enigmatical, but his object is the refutation of the theory of ideal presentation as opposed to real substantiality of matter, i.e., of the Vivartavāda doctrine of the Vedānta.

The preception above produced is still incomplete.
The thinking principle may undergo modification and assume the shape of the object presented to it, but it cannot, being unconscious, intelligently perceive what it sees, (xvii). The intelligent principle has still to be infused into it, and this is done by Soul. The reflection of the Soul acting on it makes it perceive directly what is presented to it. It is accordingly said that a thing is known or unknown according as there is a reflection of the Soul, or the absence of it, in the thinking principle, (xvi).

An objection is now raised to the effect that under the circumstances above stated, there being no stability in the thinking principle, knowledge derived by perception could not be constant. The reply given is that since the real perceiver, the Soul, is immutable, knowledge which depends on it must necessarily be constant. Inasmuch, however, as the thinking principle can undergo only one modification at a time, and the Soul perceives only that modification, and not the outside world, there can be only one perception at a time: two diverse ideas cannot arise simultaneously, (xix).

The objector is still unsatisfied. To obviate the necessity of calling in the agency of Soul, he suggests a multiplicity of thinking principles, saying let one perception or thinking principle be perceived by another. This, however, says the author, cannot be, for the second perception would require a third, and so on, and that would lead to a regressus in infinitum. There would, moreover, be no certainty, for in calling one idea to mind a host would arise, and there would
be nothing to show which is the particular idea that has been invoked, or is necessary to the elucidation of the perception at hand.

There is yet another objection to urge. Accepting that perception cannot be helped by one cognition cognizing another, the opponent suggests that in life persons always express the opinion of their knowing things, and how can this take place unless the thinking principle possessed self-illuminative powers? This is met by saying that the thinking principle, assuming the form of the immutable soul, attains the light of intelligence, and is then able to understand its own cognitions, (xxi); and the conclusion arrived at is that when the thinking principle is modified on the one hand by soul and on the other by objects of cognition, it is sufficient for all purposes of understanding, (xxii). The commentator here anticipates a number of other objections, and disposes of them according to the theory of the Yoga. (Cf. p. 197).

These explanations, however, are not enough. There is yet a lingering suspicion that the thinking principle has a will of its own, and this suspicion is developed in the form of a question as to what motive the thinking principle can have in engaging itself in its various functions? Naturally inert, it can have no object of its own, and in performing its functions it must be acting without a motive, and as nothing is done without a motive, the inference would be that it has a will of its own, and it gratifies that will by acting as it does. This suspicion is set at rest by the remark that since it acts in conjunction with others,
its object must be to subserve another's purpose, and that another is soul, (xxiii). The commentator explains that such conjunct action for another's purpose without any consciousness on the part of the actors is possible, as we see it in the organs of sense, which act for the purposes of the mind without knowing that they are doing so. The Śāṅkhya-kārikā adduces the example of milk, an unintelligent substance, secreting for the nourishment of the calf. (Cf. v.'s lvii to lx). The example of the cart carrying saffron for the use of man is also generally appealed to.

Soul is described as the witness, spectator and experiencer of the actions of nature. Conscious and always present in the body, it cannot but witness what takes place in it. This is the idea which Fichte assigns to mind, when he says, it is, "as it were an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there," (Morell, II, p. 95). But since soul has no action or desire of any kind, and as it is, moreover, eternal and immutable, how can it be said to have a purpose of its own, which the thinking principle has to subserve? This is a crucial question, and the answer given is practically an evasion. The premises are admitted, but it is said that, inasmuch as it is a shadow of the soul that sensitizes the thinking principle, and that shadow feels and observes, by indiscriminate use of language we call the soul to be the experiencer and witness, (cf. p. 194). The service done is, in the same way, service done to the shadow
and not to the reality, and the benefit derived goes to nature or Prakṛiti, which is entertained and ultimately relieved of all sense of pain, and not to soul, which is painless and ever free.

Patanjali now turns to the effect of the theory and practice propounded. When a person has duly gone through the course of practice enjoined and acquired the knowledge promised, all false notions that he before had on the subject of life subside, (xxiv), and his thinking principle is bowed down by the weight of knowledge and commencing isolation, (xxv). Worldly thoughts, however, still break out occasionally, (xxvi), and these should be carefully repressed in the same way in which afflictions and obstructions were originally overcome, (cf. II, xxviii). When this repression is effected, perfect knowledge rises in the thinking principle, and entirely sweeps away all remnants of afflictions and residua of former works, (xxviii—xxx). All obscurations are removed; the triad of qualities in regard to the individual concerned ceases from undergoing further change, (xxxI); and the moment at last arrives when the qualities, having retired to rest, become defunct, and the soul abides solely in its own essence. This is isolation or salvation which is the aim and object of the Yoga doctrine, (xxxxI). This isolation is absolute and eternal, and the soul in regard to which it has been attained remains free for evermore.

Following the order of the text, the above summary does not afford a consecutive statement of the leading points of the Yoga system of theology and
metaphysics, and inasmuch as the dissertations on
the Yoga now available in the English language are
brief, obscure, and not unoften misleading and in-
correct, it would not be amiss to attempt here a
categorical resumé. The cardinal dogmas are, as
already above stated, taken from the Sánkhya system,
but there are differences, and the importance attached
to some of them, in their mutual coöperation is
markedly distinctive. The leading tenets of the
Yogís are:

1st. That there is a Supreme Godhead who is
purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflic-
tions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om,
and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to
Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation;
but He does not directly grant it. Nor is He the
father, creator, or protector of the universe, with
which He is absolutely unconnected.

2nd. That there are countless individual souls
which animate living beings, and are eternal. They
are pure and immutable; but by their association
with the universe they become indirectly the experi-
cencers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable
embodied forms in course of ever recurring metemp-
sychoses.

3rd. That the universe is uncreate and eternal.
It undergoes phenomenal changes, but, as a noumenon,
it is always the same. In its noumenal state it is
called Prakriti or nature; it is always associated with
the three qualities or active forces called goodness,
foulness, and darkness. Matter as an integral part of
the universe is, likewise, eternal, though subject to modifications like the world. Strictly speaking the modifications of matter produce the phenomenal world which is composed of it.

4th. That next to soul there is a noumenon called Chitta, or the thinking principle, or mind in its most comprehensive sense. It is subject to the three qualities aforesaid, and undergoes various modifications according to the prevalence of one or other of those qualities. It is essentially unconscious or unintelligent, but it becomes conscious or intelligent by the reflection of, or association with, soul, which abides close by it. It also receives through the organs of sense shadows of external objects, and thereupon modifies itself into the shapes of those objects. The consciousness reflected on it makes it think that it is the experiencer of all worldly joys and sorrows. In reality, however, it is merely the spectacle of which soul is by proxy (its shadow) the spectator. It is closely allied to Buddhi or intellect of the Sāňkhya system, but it plays a much more important part in the system, than what Buddhi does, partaking as it does the parts of both Prakṛti and Buddhi in a prominent degree, and also of self-consciousness. It occupies the position of Will of the modern Pessimist system.

5th. That the functions of the thinking principle are five-fold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory, and that these functions are produced by the prevalence of one or other of the three qualities.

6th. That, like the universe, all sensible objects
have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When one object changes into another, it is merely a modification of its form, and the form assumed, when destroyed, passes on to some other form, but it ultimately reverts to its noumenal or primary state.

7th. That phenomena, as results of modifications of noumena, are real and not phantasmal.

8th. That sensibles are not the direct causes of sensations, nor sensations the causes of sensibles; but that the thinking principle receives impressions of sensibles under the influence of one or other of the three qualities, and the result is regulated by that influence. The influence extends both to sensations and to sensibles.

9th. That the thinking principle being changeable, constancy of knowledge is due to the immutability of the soul, and that no perception can take place until the thinking principle is made conscious by the soul.

10th. That impressions produced on the thinking principle leave on it certain residua (avarmo of Aristotle) which are causes of intuitions, desires, new births, and further experiences.

11th. That desires are the origin of pain in this world.

12th. That the universe being eternal, desires are likewise eternal, and it is needless therefore to enquire when residua first arose to create desires.

13th. That mundane existence is thus associated with pain, and it is the duty of every one to rise above that pain.
14th. That the pain may be finally overcome or removed only by withdrawing the thinking principle from its natural functions.

15th. That the withdrawal in question can be effected by constant and sedulous observance of certain prescribed restraints, obligations and steadfast meditation.

16th. That in the course of the exercises above referred to, the adept attains extraordinary occult powers.

17th. That when that withdrawal is complete and absolute, the soul is completely isolated from the world, and that when that isolation is attained, it is liberated from all liability to future transmigration. And this is the isolation, liberation, emancipation, or final beatitude which should be the great object and aim of human existence.

The general impression regarding the nature of the Yoga doctrine, has been hitherto exceedingly unfavourable among Anglo-oriental scholars. It is mystical, it is fanatical, it is dreadfully absurd, are among the mildest charges brought against it. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall is so disgusted with its tenets that in a fit of virtuous indignation he says, "As few of the twenty-eight Yoga works which have fallen under my inspection are at present read, so, one may hope, few will ever again be read, either in this country or by curious enquirers in Europe. If we exclude the immundities of the Tantras and of the Káma-s'ástra, Hindu thought was never more unworthily engaged than in digesting into an economy the fanatical vagaries
of theocracy. Not less, it is observable, have the Yogins of India transcended than they have anticipated the quietistic delirations of Bonaventura, de Sales, Saint Theresa, and Molinos," (Contributions, p. xi). Other writers, if not equally denunciative, are still very severe in the tone of their criticisms. I believe this is due principally to the subject not having been carefully studied. The subject is dry—exceedingly so—and the enigmatical form in which it is presented in the text-books is not conducive to any interest being created in its favour. Generally speaking Indian scholars do not study it, and the few ascetics and hermits who do seldom associate with the world. Pāṇḍits, when called upon to explain, frequently, if not invariably, mix up the tenets of Patanjali's Yoga with those of the Tantras, the Purāṇas, the Tantric Sañhitās, the Pāncharātras, and the Bhagavadgītā—works which have very dissimilar and discordant tenets to inculcate. Some of the later avowedly Yoga works are, moreover, exceedingly allegorical and mystical in their descriptions, and in them the purport of the instruction is buried in a mass of absurdity. Practices, too, have been inculcated in them which are certainly repulsive. (Cf. pp. 103, 117). In judging, however, of the nature of Patanjali's doctrine it is unfair to associate it with the vagaries of fanatical, deluded mendicants, or with the modifications and adaptations which it has undergone in the hands of the Tāntrics and the Purāṇics.

The tenets of Patanjali are all that concern the
critic, and the summary of them given above will show to the unbiassed enquirer that they are closely similar to those enunciated by some of the greatest metaphysicians of ancient Greece. The similitude is in some cases so close that I would not be surprised to see some enterprising dialectician, intent upon proving everything good in India to be of European origin, demonstrate that the whole system has been nefariously copied from Greek philosophers. The tenets may not be the best of their kind—some of them are unquestionably futile,—but they are certainly, not such philosophic desperadoes as to commit outrages on the chastity of our thoughts, or so vile as to make us join in the hope so fervently expressed by Mr. Hall that the works which treat of them may not again be read by the curious enquirer. If the history of the human mind be a fit subject for study, if it be desirable to compare the progress of metaphysical knowledge among different nationalities at different times in different places, if the civilization of the Hindus be an object of enquiry, we should rather earnestly desire that the works should be thoroughly examined, and not neglected, and that without in any way pledging ourselves as their defenders. There is no reason to doubt that such enquiry will not only be useful to history, but reflect credit on the grasp of the intellect of the ancient Indian sages who matured the doctrine.

It would take more space than what I have at my disposal to go through all the tenets seriatim, and show their relation to European theories, but it may
be generally observed that even the most faulty dogmas do not, on sufficient examination, appear to be so bad as they are represented to be by hasty and adverse critics. The theory of isolation is certainly very startling, but it was the logical outcome of the conception of the absolute perfection of the Godhead reacting on the Upanishad doctrine of resolution into the Divine essence.* The Bhagavadgîtâ thus sums up the Upanishad idea:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{He who all paths stops up, and in the heart} \\
\text{Confines the mind, shuts up the breath within} \\
\text{The head, adopts a firm devotion, utters} \\
\text{The single syllable "Om"—the Soul Supreme,} \\
\text{And thinks of me, and goes, abandoning} \\
\text{The body thus, reaches the goal supreme.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Zelang's Translation, p. 52.)

This idea, however, involves the necessity of additions to, and abstractions from, Divine perfection. The theory is that the human soul is specifically distinct from, though generically the same with, the Divine one, and as the two dissimilars cannot melt into one, they must always remain separate, and as joy, felicity, bliss and the like imply activity and enjoyment,—a concrete heaven inconsistent with the theory of final rest,—the Yogis obviate all philosophic and logical difficulties by contenting themselves with isolation, without predicating it with joy or bliss.

The threefold division of the intellectual man into purusha, chitta and ahankâra is the counterpart of νοῦς, ψυχή and σώμα of Plato and other ancient

* Dr. Weber probably refers to this Upanishad theory, and not to the Purânas as stated on page 208.
**PREFACE.**


The theory of Prakṛiti, a noumenal absolute of the phenomenal world, or nature in the abstract, has been a stumbling-block to many Europeans, and the allegorical way in which it is frequently described, is certainly often misleading. Even among Hindus it has given rise to many frivolous and absurd stories. In the main, however, it seems to accord very closely with some of the latest European speculations on the subject. It is no other than the *physis* or plastic nature of Cudworth, which has been designed to avoid fortuitousness on the one hand and God's constant interposition on the other. Morell, in his 'History of modern Philosophy' (I, p. 208) commenting on one of the latest German systems, that of Herbarts, says:

'The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following:—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we immediately perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not portray to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the reality, therefore, is not the thing as...
a whole, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus, the further we analyze, the further does the idea of reality recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation.'

Dr. Kay, in his remarks on this passage, observes—

'This "essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation" —this which the European analyst arrives at as "the last result of the analysis" —is what the Saṅkhya expositor, proceeding, "more Indico," synthetically, lays down as his first position. This is Kapila's múloprakṛiti—the "root of all"—"the radical producer" —that which, variously modified, constitutes all that the 'soul' takes cognizance of. This primordial essence—among the synonyms for which, given in our text-book, are the 'undiscrete' avyakta, the 'indestructible' akshara, that 'in which all generated effect is comprehended' pradhānaka, &c., is the 'absolute' of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Shelling's views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147, Vol. II) is 'not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in the mind.' So, according to Kapila, "From Nature issues Mind, and thence self-consciousness.'" (Benares Magazine, Vol. III, pp. 284ff.)

This Prakṛiti is believed to be unintelligent, and yet it is described to be acting for another's purpose, and this has often been stigmatized as a specimen of Indian absurdity. This theory, however, is exactly what Cudworth entertains in regard to his plastic nature, which, he says 'doth never consult nor deliberate;' 'it goes on in one constant unrepeating tenor from generation to generation; it acts artificially and for sake of ends, but itself understands
not the ends which it acts for.' 'It acts neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor blindly, but must be concluded to act fatally, magically, and sympathetically.' (‘True Intellectual System of the Universe,’ B. I., Cap. III, 37.)

Again, Prakṛiti and necessarily matter are eternal, says the Yogi, and in the sense in which he predicates eternity, i.e., to noumena as distinct from phenomena, we have nothing more preposterous than the “eternal verities” of the European philosophers of even our own times—verities which even the Godhead cannot undo, such as the conception of a triangle invariably including two right angles. To such archetypical eternities few can object from a pure philosophic standpoint, apart from revealed systems of religion.

The two most repellent dogmas of the system are its faith in metempsychosis and its theory about occult powers, and even these have found defenders in quarters where they were least expected; and, carefully considered, they do not seem to be so absurd as one would at first glance suppose.

Extravagant as are the ideas regarding the occult powers, and purely imaginary as, at least, some of them doubtless are, it is worthy of note that belief in such powers was almost universal in the ancient world, and well-authenticated reports are not wanting to show that some of them were attainable. Mental prescience has manifested itself on many occasions. Mesmeric and other electric conditions of the body are now objects of scientific research; and they are well-known
to produce extraordinary phenomena. Many facts have been brought to light which show that physical causes may be, particularly in unsophisticated states of society, easily mistaken for occult powers. Sir David Brewster's theory of the objective projection upon visual organs of a subjectively conceived image may account for a good many occurrences which strike the mind of the masses with wonder, and appear as the result of superhuman agency. Many psychological conditions, which are known to arise and produce startling results, but the true nature of which has not yet been fully and scientifically examined and ascertained, would account for some so-called occult occurrences. But in the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to separate the wheat from the tares—to discriminate between what powers were really attained or attainable by Yogis and what they fancied they would attain by persevering in their practices. Doubtless the pretensions of the European psychics of the day are to a considerable extent false and fraudulent; still there are among them some good men and true, and their researches carried on on catholic, honest and scientific principles will hereafter bear some good fruit, and the time will then come to enquire how far the Yogis had anticipated them. In the meanwhile all that need be said is that the extravagance of some of their pretensions should not make us spurn the Yogis as all knaves and charlatans, and their psychical system wholly false and fatuous. Such a principle of action, however necessary and prudent in shifting the merits of a lawsuit, and even then under certain
restrictions, would be intolerable in history. If some obviously false, or improbable, or unprovable, statements in any author would justify our rejecting the whole of his testimony there would be no ancient author left whose testimony could be accepted, and I know not how few of our modern authors would escape the condemnation. No Yogi myself, nor any-wise interested in the doctrine, all I feel in the cause of truth is, that there should, for the present, be a suspension of judgment, and the materials afforded by the Yogis should be subjected to examination and analysis.

As regards metempsychosis something has already been said, (ante, p. xiii.) It is a doctrine which even Plato thought fit to adopt, and much might be said in favour of it which cannot be readily disproved; but I shall content myself here with a quotation.

Perhaps the ablest metaphysician who ever came to India from England was the late Rev. Dr. Kay, principal of the late Bishop's College. His strong Christian convictions did not by any means make him an indulgent critic of adverse faiths, but in commenting on the doctrine of metempsychosis as affording a solution of the question of the origin of evil, he says:

'The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindu theory on the great question of the "origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffer-
ing evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—and then there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing; it follows (argue the Hindus) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis; and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other.

If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp the conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same stand-punkt as the Hindu, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the regressus in infinitum here involves any absurdity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindu. We try to make the Hindu give up the tenet—and we do well:—but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe—short of the primal mystery of "Being" itself. The Hindu’s explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him so—
but we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The "origin of evil" has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the goodness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials—rather it furnishes the substance of all the trials—of our faith. This we have to teach—but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every Missionary among the Hindus. We quote from the Preface (p. 12) of his 'Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.'

"The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scripture-accounts of 'sin entering the world, and death by sin;' whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to account for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the first evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a creator, by tracing them up to the first pair."

(Benares Magazine, III, pp. 286f.)

Elsewhere the same writer, speaking generally, observes, 'it may somewhat tend to check the mischievous consequences attendant on bluntly regarding any current and influential Hindu doctrine, that happens not to accord with our accustomed notions, as being self-evidently frivolous and effete, if it can be shown that the conceptions involved in the doctrine are still influential in directing the current of speculation in Europe, in quarters where that current runs (or is supposed to run) deepest.' (Opus cit., pp. 283f.)
To turn now to the life of Patañjali. The brief notices to be met with of him in Sanskrit works are so legendary and contradictory that little can be made of them to subserve the cause of history. He was a great scholar and unrivalled philologist of his time, and the life of every great man was, in ancient times, so encrusted with the supernatural that it is difficult to remove the covering, and come to the truthful core. Rev. J. Ward, citing the Rudrayāmala Tantra, the Vrihannandikēśvara Purāṇa, and the Padma Purāṇa, describes him to have been born in the Ilāvrata Varsha, where his father Angirā and his mother Satī resided, and that, immediately on his birth, he made known things past, present, and future. He married Lolupā, whom he found on the north of Sumeru, in the hollow of a "Vata" tree, and is said to have lived as a mendicant to a great age. Being insulted by the inhabitants of Bhōta-bhaṇḍāra, while engaged in religious austerities, he reduced them to ashes by fire from his mouth.' (Hindus, II.)

There occurs in the Sankshepa-s'ankara-jaya of Mādhava A'chārya a story, according to which the Devas, on one occasion, repaired to Mahādeva, and besought his aid in saving the world from the baneful doctrines which Baudhās and other heretics had widely disseminated among men. The god vouchsafed to them a kind reply, and it was arranged that certain chief divinities would from time to time appear on earth as Jaimini, Vyāsa, Patañjali, and S'ankara, and, uprooting all heresies, preserve the true religion from pollution. It fell to the lot of Vishnū and S'ankarshaṇa alias Ananta
to depute a portion of themselves to be born as Patanjali,* and Mahádeva himself appeared as S'ankara.† The only value of this story for historical purposes is the admission that Patanjali appeared on the earth long after it had been overrun by the Buddhists. Mádhava A'chárya of the 14th century is no authority for what happened sixteen hundred years before him, but the tradition in his time was that Patanjali was born long after Buddha in order to inculcate theism, and this supports the opinion expressed on page xxiii to the effect that the Yoga doctrine as we have it in Patanjali's work is of post Buddhist origin. It is in favour, too, of the deductions made by Goldstücker and others regarding the age of Patanjali from casual historical allusions in his great work, the Mahábháshya, entirely undermining, as it does, the arguments of Professor Kunte as given in his 'Vicissitudes of Aryan civilization.' It is true that the Yoga-sūtra does not anywhere refer to Buddhism, and it is not easy to accept the theory of Professor Cowell that the relegation of benevolence (maitri), which occupies a prominent place in the Buddhist system, to an ancillary or subordinate position in the Yoga is a direct allusion to Buddhism, (Sarvadarsana-sangraha, p. 273,) for benevolence as an element of religious observance is

* मध्यमं कामसमुदायमुषातो स्वेच्छे तैः।
अवनौधास्ते मनो सदमपरमस्ते॥ १।४।।
मुनीभुजना सुधिपासिः वेदांकाश्चतो भिन्तः॥
धियमः शान्तकामकरिष्णानासनीयते नेत्रसः। १।४॥
† वतीन्द्रं भद्ररोगाभिविधाने भविष्याय यद्वेतः॥
सदस्याः सम्बन्धिः साधुपर्तनुमानिसः। ॥ ४॥
common to all systems of religion, and reference
to it cannot be taken as an unmistakable test; but
apart from them, I believe, I have produced suffi-
cient evidence to show that Patanjali cannot reason-
ably be believed to have lived before Buddha. Ananta
is represented in the form of a many-hooded serpent,
and, as an emanation of that serpent, Patanjali is fre-
frequently indicated by the homonym phani or ‘serpent,’
(cf. p. 1).

The references given of Patanjali in his Mahá-
bháshya entirely upsets the statements made in Mr.
Ward’s notice. The sage describes himself as the
son of one Gouiká, not Sati, and his place of birth was
the eastern country, whereas Ilárvata is said in the
Puráñas to lie to the north of the Himálaya. These
facts are thus given by Goldstücker in his essay on
Páñini:

‘Of the lineage of Patanjali all the knowledge I possess is, that
the name of his mother was Gouiká. It occurs in the last words
of Patanjali on a Káriká to Páñini. Of more importance, how-
ever, is the information he gives us of having resided temporarily
in Káshmir, for this circumstance throws some light on the inter-
est which certain kings of this country took in the preserva-
tion of the great commentary.

‘His birthplace must have been situated in the east of India, for
he calls himself Gonardiya; and this word is given by the Kášiká
in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patanjali’s birth-
place had therefore the name of Gonárda. But that he is one of
the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence.
Kaiyyaṭa calls him on several occasions Ačháryadesiya. If we
interpreted this word according to Páñini’s rules V, 3, 67 and 68, it
would mean “an unaccomplished teacher;” but as there is not the
slightest reason for assuming that Kaiyyaṭa intended any irony or
blame when he applied this epithet to Patanjali, it is necessary to
render the word by the teacher "who belongs to the country of the Achárya." Now, since Kaiyyata also distinctly contrasts áchárya as the author of the Várttikas, with Acháryadesíya, the latter epithet can only imply that Patanjali was a countryman of Kátyá- yana. Kátyáyana, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school; Kaiyyata, therefore, must have looked upon Patanjali also as belonging to it.

'Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhaṭṭo- jí Díksita on the Phít-sútras which I have quoted above. For when this grammarian tells us that the eastern grammarians attribute the accent in question of sáha to Páñini's rule VI, 3, 78, we find that it is Patanjali himself who gives us this information, and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other authorities.' (Goldstücker's Páñini, p. 237.)

Meagre as these notes on the life of Patanjali are, they are of unquestionable authority, and we must rest content with them. In the 'Indian Antiquary' (IX, p. 308), Professor Max Müller has a note on the travels of I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim, who visited India at the close of the 7th century, and therein mention is made of a Sanskrit grammatical work under the name of Juni or Chuni. The learned professor shows on very good arguments that the work could be no other than the Mahábháshya, and then very pertinently asks, "Is this (Juni) possibly a name connected with Goniká, the mother of Patanjali, who calls himself Goñikáputra, or with Gonarda, his supposed birthplace, from which he takes the name of Gonardíya?" Few who have studied the subject would hesitate to respond in the affirmative to the first question.

In a note on a Páli inscription from Bhárhat, published in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for March 1880, I have quoted a
great number of instances to show that in India metronymics were used to indicate illegitimacy, or the forsaking of a child by its father. If this theory of mine be tenable, the use of Gonikaputra in the case of Patanjali would suggest a bar sinister in his scutcheon. Under that supposition it would be futile to enquire about his genealogy. If Napoleon said, 'my genealogy begins with the battle of Austerlitz,' Patanjali might well appeal to his Mahábháshya as the root of his family tree.* Professor Weber, however, has been at some pains to find a genealogical tree for him. In his 'History of Indian Literature' he has several remarks with reference to Patanjali in connection with the Vedic Kápya Patamchala. He says, on page 137, 'Again, though only in the Yájnavalkíya-kánda, we have mention of a Kápya Patamchala of the country of the Madras as particularly distinguished by his exertions in the cause of Bráhmanical theology; and in his name we cannot but see a reference to Kapila and Patanjali, the traditional founders of the Sánkhya, and Yoga systems.' This is modified in a subsequent remark, (p. 223,) in which it is said, 'The name of Patanjali (we should expect Pát.) is certainly somehow

* Professor Weber refers to a tradition which, he says, 'identifies Pingala with Patanjali, the author of Mahábháshya and the Yoga-sútra,' but he justly adds, it 'should answer for itself; for us there exists no cogent reason for accepting it.' ('Hist. Indian Literature,' p. 231.)

† This grammatical correction has been suggested apparently with a view to make Patanjali a derivative of Patamchala to prop the theory of relationship.
connected with that of the Patamchala Kápya of the land of the Madras, who appears in the Yájñavalkýya-káṇḍa of the Satap. Br. It occurs again (see below p. 737) as the name of the author of the Yoga-sūtras.' On page 236, we are told that, 'Kapila, again, can hardly be unconnected with the Kápya Patamchala whom we find mentioned in the Yájñavalkya-káṇḍa of the Vṛihad Aśānyaka as a zealous representative of the Brāhmaṇical learning.' This is repeated on page 284,—'Kápya Patamchala, with whom Kapila ought probably to be connected.' It is difficult to make out from these extracts a consistent account of what the real or actual theory is. In the first extract a single individual, Kápya Patamchala, is split into two persons, Kapila and Pataṇjali, and that as certainly as the phrase 'we cannot but see' can imply. In the second extract the Vedic personage is said to be 'certainly' connected with Pataṇjali only, and in the third we are told that the same individual can 'hardly be unconnected' with Kapila. In the fourth the phrase 'can hardly be unconnected' is replaced by 'ought probably to be connected.' No reason is assigned for the first two conjectures, but for the 3rd and the 4th the reason assigned is that Kápya Patamchala was 'a zealous representative of the Brāhmaṇical learning.' It happens, however, that Kapila was an atheist, who repudiated the existence of the Godhead, saying 'there is no proof that such a being existed,' and it is difficult to conceive how the relationship should be established on the ground of Kápya having been 'a zealous representative of the Hindu learn-
ing,’ unless we admit that Hindu learning consisted in atheism. It is obvious that the learned professor has been led away entirely by phonetic resemblance, unless he should urge, which is not at all likely, that it is an ex cathedra opinion, without any reason to back it. Kāpya has the letters $k$ and $p$ and so has Kapila, and Patamchala sounds very like Patanjali, and therefore he evidently concludes they are the same. This is a line of argument, however, which I cannot help thinking, is, to use the language of the learned Professor, ‘of a very curious kind.’ It reminds me, I must frankly confess, the ratiocination of Fluellen by which that jovial Welsh Captain proved the identity of Macedon and Monmouth. Had that flighty logician been reminded in the present case of the absence in Kāpya of the letter $l$ of Kapila, and of $j$ of Patanjali in Patamchala, I can easily conceive how he would have completely dumb-founded his antagonist with the pithy remark: ‘Why, I pray you, is not pig great? the pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations.’ I have nothing to show that Patanjali was not connected with Kāpya by the father’s or the mother’s or some other side, in family or race, but I firmly hold that we have at present no proof worth the name in support of the conjecture.

The son of a Brāhman priest, and devoted to literary studies and ascetic practices from early life, Patanjali had little to do which could afford incidents fit for historical record, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that we have no account left of his career. He was
doubtless married and probably the father of a family, but we know nothing about those points. The only memorials of his life are his literary works,—his great commentary on the grammar of Pāṇini and the Yoga-sūtra. It is impossible to speak in too high terms of the first. It is the noblest monument of profound erudition, of keen critical acumen, of unrivalled philological perception, which has been left to us by any ancient scholar in any part of the world, and well may the Hindus be proud of the heritage that has been bequeathed to them by their renowned ancestor. The second forms the theme of this essay. There is an A'ryyā-panchāśāti on the Vaishnava theory of the relation between soul and nature which is also ascribed to him. The work has been published in the Benares 'Pandit,' No. 50. He wrote also a work on medicine, but it is no longer extant. It would seem that he was, likewise, the author of a treatise on grammatical desiderata under the title of Ishṭis, and also certain supplementary notes on the rules of Sanskrit grammar (Vārtikas), but these exist now only in the form of quotations in the Mahābhāṣya. The manner in which they are cited in the 'great commentary' suggests the idea that at one time they had separate existences, but they are not met with now as a separate work.

To turn now to the Bibliography of the Yoga doctrine. The leading text is, as already stated, the Yogāñus'āsana, but its different topics have been elaborated and expounded in a great number of subsequent treatises, and its literature is now represented
by a large mass of writings. In 1859, Mr. Hall, in his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' collected the names of 28 separate works. But recent researches carried on under the auspices of the Government of India enable me now to put in the Appendix a list including no less than 150 names. It is probable that further researches will bring to light the texts of several other works. It must be admitted, however, that while Mr. Hall's list was compiled by a single individual after himself examining all the Mss. named, thereby obviating all risks of error, mine is a compilation from meagre reports, and it is likely, therefore, that there will be found in it mistakes of diverse kinds. Sanskrit works have many aliases, and it is possible that in some cases—probably very few—of works unknown to, and unseen by, me I have recorded the same work under two or three names. I have included, too, a few works which treat of varieties of the Yoga, the Tántric and Puránic forms of it, and not confined myself solely to the doctrine of Patanjali. The differences in some cases are so slight, that it was not possible for me, without carefully reading the works, to mark the distinctions. On the whole, however, I believe the new list will be found useful.

In preparing my list I have followed an alphabetical arrangement, a chronological one with anything like accuracy not being practicable in the present state of our information on the subject. If the Yoga-sástra-sútra-pátha, attributed to Yájnavalkya, be really his, it
is the oldest treatise known on the Yoga doctrine. Yajnavalkya lived long before Patanjali, and the Bhāshya especially cites his name to prove that the Yoga doctrine was current from a much anterior period than the Yoga-sūtra, which was compiled for the benefit of novices; but as I have not yet seen it, I can say nothing on the subject. Adverting to the work, Mr. Hall says, 'It is alleged that they (the aphorisms of Yajnavalkya) were noted down by Baudhāyana, as they were orally delivered by S'ukra to Yajnavalkya. Hence they are ascribed to S'ukra, who here has the epithet of Mahākavi. This work possibly deserves a closer examination than I can at present give it: but, it is, I suspect, of comparatively recent origin, and of little worth in any point of view.' (Contributions, p. 18.)

Passing it over for the present I come to the work of Patanjali, the Yoga-sūtra alias the Yogānus'āsana or the Sānkhya-pravachana. It has the benefit of a host of commentaries, explaining its tenets from different standpoints. The most ancient of these commentaries is generally believed to be the one which is known under the different names of Yoga-bhāshya, Pātanjalai-bhāshya, and Sānkhya-pravachana-bhāshya. It is held in high estimation by the Pandits of this country. It has the advantage, too, of two exegeses by eminent scholiasts, one by Vāchaspati Mis'rā, and the other by Vijñāna Bhikshu. It labours, however, under the disadvantage of being of doubtful authenticity as regards the name of its author. It has been twice printed, once
at Benares, edited by Bhairavadatta Dvivedi, and once at Calcutta, along with the gloss of Vāchaspāti Mis'rā, edited by Paṇḍit Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, in 1874 (Samvat 1929.) I have also seen upwards of a dozen Mss. of it of different dates; but in the colophon of none of these have I met with the author's name. This is a remarkable omission, inasmuch as it is rarely that the author's name, where known, is dropped out from the colophon of a Sanskrit MS. The tradition is pretty common and old that Vyāsa, the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahābhārata, is the author of it. This tradition has been generally accepted by European writers, and it has the support of the two well-known and respectable exegesists named above. Vāchaspāti Mis'rā in his gloss (ṭīkā) on the commentary (bhaṅghya) says, "Saluting the saint Patanjali, I attempt a short, clear exposition (vyākhyā), pregnant with meaning, on the commentary expounded by Veda-vyāsa."*

The authority, however, of this writer is not, in matters connected with historical facts of olden times, of much weight. There were two writers of this name. One of them was a legist, and, according to the colophon of his S'udrdchāra-chintāmani, court Paṇḍit of Mahārājā Harinārāyaṇa, of Mithilā, and Harinārāyaṇa lived in the middle of the 16th century. The other lived between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and commented both on the Yoga and the S'ankhya texts, as well as on the Vedānta-sūtras. Adverting to him

* मला पतन्चरिष्ठ्रि वेदव्यासेः भाषिते |
सङूचिग्स्यातवङ्थेा भाष्ये aren frurea ॥

दक्षिणकरौणस्वामी भाषी बाङ्गान्व निघास्कते॥
Mr. Hall says, ‘Vāchaspati’s exact age has not yet been discovered. But he is mentioned, as are Udayana and Prasastapāda, in the Nyāyasāra-vichāra of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, which was written in the S‘aka year 1174 or A. D. 1252; and he quotes from Bhoja, who was reigning in A. D. 1042.’* (Sānkhyasāra, p. 40.)

Vijnāna Bhikṣu dates from a much later time. According to Mr. Hall, ‘in all probability, Vijnāna lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. There is some slight ground, however, for carrying him back still further. His nationality is unknown; and so is his civil appellation even; for Vijnāna Bhikṣu is, without question, the style of a devotee.’ (Sānkhyasāra, pp. 37f.)

He continues, ‘In the Prayogaratna, a work on the sixteen sacraments, by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Rāmes‘vara Bhaṭṭa, its author says, that he was assisted,

* This date is incorrect. It refers to the last Bhoja, whereas the Bhoja quoted must be the elder one, and elsewhere constructively admitted to be so by Mr. Hall himself. In the Preface to his ‘Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,’ he observes, ‘that two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever was the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court; and the astrological compilation known as the Rājamārtanda, and thus called in honour of him, may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work, so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate he came long after the date of the Sarasvatikanṭhābharaṇa; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet of Ranaraṅga-malla.’ (Contributions, p. viii.)
in preparing it, by Ananta Dikshita, son of Vis'vanátha Dikshita. The father of one of Vijnána's disciples, Bhává-gañes'a Dikshita, was Bhává-vis'vanátha Dikshita; and, if the latter was one with Vis'vanátha Dikshita, and if Bhává-gañes'a Dikshita was brother of Ananta Dikshita, we are enabled to form a pretty correct estimate as to the time of Vijnána Bhikshu. For Náráyana Bhaṭṭa's youngest brother's second son, Raghunátha Bhaṭṭa, dates his Kála-tattva-vivechana in Samvat 1677 or A. D. 1620: Vijnána may be placed fifty or sixty years earlier. But whatever the times of Vijnána Bhikshu and Váchaspati Mis'ra, it is futile to expect from such authors any precision as to the identity of a person who lived many centuries before them.

The name Vyásā may be right enough, but there is nothing whatever to show that this Vyásā was the same with the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahábhárata. In the Mahábhárata every epigraph gives the name of Vyásā, and there is no reason why it should be omitted in the commentary. Then Vyásā lived at a remote period of antiquity, in the beginning of the Kali Yuga according to Indian belief, and his classification and division of the Vedas existed long before the time of Patanjali, for we have unmistakable proofs of the existence of the classification in Páñini, Yáśka, the Prátiṣákhyaśas, and other works of a much earlier date than that of the Yoga aphorisms, and it is impossible to reconcile the idea that he should be the author of an exegesis which could not have had a raison d'être before the Yoga-sútra was
composed in the 2nd or 3rd century before the Christian era. That exegesis quotes, too, authorities which are of a more recent date than that of Vyāsa. The evidence of style is often a suspicious one, but no one who has any knowledge of the Sanskrit language will for a moment think it possible that he who wrote the Mahābhārata could be the author of the Bhāshya under notice. Compared with the works of leading scholiasts, the Bhāshya appears to be the production of a third class writer. It certainly cannot be compared with the 'great commentary' of Patañjali, or with the equally renowned exegesis of S'ankara on the Vedānta aphorisms, or with the commentary of Sabara Svāmī on the Mīmāṃsā; and, whatever his age, Vyāsa was by the unanimous testimony of the Hindus a far superior author and scholar to Patañjali, or Sabara, or S'ankara. Fairly good though it be, there is a looseness, an indecision, a want of logical precision, in the Bhāshya which are incompatible with the universal estimate of Vyāsa's learning and scholarship. Bhojadeva treats it with withering sarcasm. Without naming it, but obviously aiming at it, he says, 'all commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number,' (p. 2). It may be that Bhoja had to justify his attempt at a new commentary by throwing discredit on his predecessors, but his remarks are not al-
together unauthorised. The invocation at the begin-
ning of the Bháshya is also against its authenticity. No work of the leading Rishis which has come down to us contains any such invocation, and Vyása would be the last to pray to Mahádeva in the way in which that divinity has been invoked in the Bháshya. The tone of the Bháshya is that of a third class mediæval scholium, and I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that it is not the work of the digester of the Vedas. Its author may have borne the name of Vyása, a common family name even to this day, but he was not the digester of the Vedas nor older than the latest ancient times, or, more probably, the early middle ages.

The next commentary I have to notice is the Rájamártaṇḍa, of which a complete English translation is now offered to the public. It is not so ambitious as the last. It styles itself a vritti or gloss, whereas the other is a Bháshya or commentary. It is mainly explanatory, when the other is discursive. It is modest in tone, when the other is dictatorial. Its author sets forth his object in writing the work by saying, 'Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons,' (p. 2). And he has faithfully carried out his resolution. He has interpreted all the leading words of his text, and given a very fair explanation of the meaning of his author, and the purport and bearing of his doctrine. It is, perhaps, not always quite so full in philosophical matter as its predecessor, but it
certainly omits nothing of importance for a correct understanding of the text.

It is generally taken for granted by Indian writers that Bhoja, king of Dhārā, who flourished in the middle of the 11th century, was the author of the exegesis; but the opinion is not tenable. Doubtless the colophon of the exegesis names Maharājādhirāja Bhojadeva as its author, but there have been many Bhojas in India, (cf. my 'Indo-Aryans,' II, pp. 385f,) and it does not show which is the sovereign meant: it certainly does not announce that this Bhoja was the hero of the Bhojaprabandha and a sovereign of Dhārā in the century named. The title assigned him in the introduction to the work is Ranarangamalla, and this, as far as we know, was not borne by the Bhoja of the 11th century. The former is, moreover, described in the introduction to have written three works, a grammatical treatise on the government of words, a medical memoir under the title of Rājamouska, and the gloss under notice, and none of these is attributed by the Bhojaprabandha to its hero. On the other hand, that hero is known to have written or published in his name a work on judicial astrology as bearing on Śṛtī rites, under the name of Rājamārtanda, and it is impossible to imagine that he assigned the same name to his exegesis on the Yoga aphorisms. Two such dissimilar works could not have been published under one common name. And even if one believed such a nomenclature to be possible or probable, the question would arise, how is it that in the introduction to the Yoga, the astrological work is altogether
left out of record? The astrological work is several times the size of the Yoga exegesis, and otherwise of considerable importance; it has been very largely quoted by subsequent writers, and it is not at all probable that an author, or his encomiast, who was particular in noticing the meagre and poor medical treatise should overlook it. It might be said that it was composed after the composition of, and therefore could not be included in, the Yoga gloss, but that would be a simple assumption without any proof, a mere begging of the question. That the Rájamártanda is not a generic, but a specific, name is evident from the fact of an exegesis on the S'ánkhya bearing the name of Rájávártika, which is believed to have been dedicated to Ranarangamalla. It is probable, therefore, that our author is the Bhoja of the 10th century, who was also a king of Dhárá. Adverting to him, Mr. Hall says, "That two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever were the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court, and the astrological compilation known as the Rájamártanda and thus called in honour of him may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate, he came long after the date of the Saras vati-kaṇṭḥábharaṇa; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet, Raṇarangamalla." (Contributions, p. viii.)
Of the other commentaries on the Yoga-Sūtra, the works of Bhavadeva, Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, Bhāvā-gaṇeśa, Udayankara, Nagesa Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇa Bhikshu, Sadāśīva, Rāmānanda Tirtha, Mahādeva, Ananta, S'ankara, Umāpati Tripāṭhi, and Kshemānanda, may be cited as samples. They are all inferior in importance to the work of Bhoja, and call for no special remark here.

The same may be said of the other works named in my list. Some of them treat of the various practices which Yogis resort to to acquire occult powers; while others describe modified forms of the doctrine of Patanjali, suited to Vaishņava, Śaiva, and Śākta forms of worship, so as to lead the individual soul, in its longing for salvation, to subsidence in, or union with, the Divinity.

Among the works of the first group the most popular and noted is the Haṭha-pradīpikā or Haṭhadīpikā. It comprises 395 stanzas, divided into 4 chapters or lessons, (Upadesa), the first treating of postures, the second of regulation of breath, the third of gesticulation or mudrās, and the fourth of Samādhi. Its author is one Chintāmaṇi, son of Sahajānanda, but this name of his was what he got when living as a householder. On his becoming a hermit he took the name of S'vātmārāma, and received the title of Yogindra, and is now generally known by the name of S'vātmārama Yogindra. He makes a great mystery of the theme of his work. He says, "By Yogis wishing for perfection, this science should be carefully kept in secret, for it is most efficient when
kept secret, and worthless when disclosed."* Like the alchemists of old, he indicates simple things by round-about metaphorical names, and enjoins that none but adepts should know anything of his subject. This book is named Haṭha vidyā, or the science of the letters ha and tha, ha meaning the sun and tha the moon. This sun again stands for the breath inspired, and the moon for the breath expired, and the ultimate meaning of Haṭha-vidyā is thus the science of inspiration and expiration. Although by profession and habit a recluse who had thoroughly abandoned the world and its attractions, Svātmārāma, indulges at times in language of a grossly carnal type. Thus in one place he says, "let beef be eaten and the immortal arrack (vārunī) be drunk every day. I reckon him who does so, to be a kulīna (a noble householder); the rest are destroyers of their nobility."† Here beef gomāṇa stands for the tongue, which should be reverted and made to touch the palate, and vārunī means the breath which passes over this reverted tongue. Again: "Let the youthful chaste widow be ravished on the land between the rivers Ganges and Yamunā; it is the highest glory of Vishnu."‡ Here the two rivers are the two nostrils, and the widow is the breath which is to be forcibly suppressed for a time. This style of

* खठदविद्या पर गाप्या श्रीमदा शिवबिष्कण ।
बनेहैमैणो गुणा विनांश्या नु प्रकाशित ॥
† गोमांसं भ्येच्धित्यं पिवेदमरवादणीं |
गोमांसं भ्येच्धित्यं पिवेदमरवादणीं |
‡ गोमांसं भ्येच्धित्यं पिवेदमरवादणीं |
कुसीं मथवं समयं रतने कुसीं मथवाना।
allegory and mystery is adopted by a great many mediæval writers on the Yoga. At the beginning of the work, the author has given a list of thirty renowned Yogis who had practised the science in question. At the head of these appear Adinátha, who is generally identified with Siva, who is believed to be the first and most renowned of Yogis. The work has been made the subject of comment by several writers, among whom Brahmánanda, the author of the Jyotiná, is reckoned to be the ablest.

It would seem that the Yoga doctrine was, at a very early period, translated to Persia, and disseminated in some form or other among different sects. The Sápsiyanas obtained it in its entirety. They believed in efficacy of discipline and austerity; they assiduously practised the regulation of breath enjoined in the Yoga; they divided the stages of their progress in meditation in the same way as the Yogis did; they held the highest meditation to be a state of trance identically the same as the Samádi; they claimed occult powers* of the same nature and character as

* Of these illustrious personages they have many miraculous and mysterious deeds: such as, in the upper world, hiding the sun's disk; causing him to appear at night; making the stars visible in the day-time; and in this lower world, walking on the surface of water; making trees productive out of season; restoring verdure to dried up wood; causing trees to bow down their heads; also showing themselves between heaven and earth in the form of lightning; and such like: and, in the animated world metamorphosing animals; rendering themselves invisible to men; appearing under various shapes and forms: some of which wonders have been recorded in the Barmgh-i-durveshi-kushí. They relate that these great per-
did the Yogis; they were familiar with the idea of the possibility of the soul at will passing from one body into another; they believed in metempsychosis; and, if they looked upon union with the Supreme Divinity as the sumnum bonum of their faith, they but accepted one of the several forms of the Yoga, different doubtless from the Isolation of Patanjali, but not independent of it. (Cf. Dabistán I, pp. 5f.) It is, however, not known whether the system of Sāpāsiyāns was founded upon any translation of a Sanskrit Yoga work, or on oral communication. Some of the Sāpāsiyāns admitted their obligation to Hindustán, but their text-books, the few and imperfect ones that are still accessible, have not yet been sufficiently examined to throw light on the question. The close relationship existing between the two systems, even in the use of technical terms, preclude the idea of spontaneous growth, and the avowed posteriority of the Persian doctrine leaves no doubt of its Indian origin; but as at present advised, we are not in a position to spot the exact text from which it was derived.

Of interpretations of the Yoga system in foreign languages the earliest appears to be an Arabic version of the text of Patanjali. The work is no longer

sonages were to such a degree enabled to divest themselves of corporeal elements that they quitted the body at pleasure; also that they had acquired from the court of heaven the knowledge of all sciences, whether known or occult, and consequently had the power of exhibiting such wonderful works; having rendered, by the efficacy of their austerities, elementary matters subject to themselves.”

(Troyer and Shea’s Dabistán i Muzahib, II, pp. 107f.)
extant, but the testimony in favour of its having once existed is unquestionable. Abu Réhán al Nirâni, in his Târikh-ul Hind, which formed a part of his famous Kânûn-i-Masûdi (A. D. 1025-36), says, 'I have translated into Arabic two Indian works, one discusses the origin and quality of things which exist and is entitled Sânkhya, the other is known under the title of Patanjali, which treats of the deliverance of the soul from the trammels of the body. These two works contain the chief principles of the Indian creed.' (Elliot's Historians, I, p. 99; Journal Asiatique, IV serie, tom. IV, p. 121; Reinaud's Fragments Arabes et Persans.) It does not appear that any Persian version of Patanjali was ever taken in hand in the time of Akbar and his successor, when so many Sanskrit works were rendered into that language. There is, however, an abstract of the Yoga doctrine in the Dabistân-i-Muzahâb of Mahsin-i Fâni. That author flourished in the middle of the 17th century, and, during a long residence at Allahabad as the Chief Judge (Sudder), collected a great deal of information on the subject. Depending evidently on oral information, he could not avoid gross mistakes in his account of the philosophy, but in regard to the details of Yoga exercises and the occult powers he has compiled as reliable an exposition as could be expected from such a source. He notices Gorakhnâtha and several other celebrated saints, and states that he had seen some Yogis possessed of wonderful occult powers, but he does not name Patanjali. (cf. Shea and Troyer's Translation, II, pp. 123f.)
In English the first attempt to give an account of the Yoga doctrine was made by Ward in his account of the Hindus, but it did not produce any satisfactory result. Colebrooke's resumé in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, is much more philosophic in spirit and faithful in details, but Colebrooke took it up only casually in connexion with his essay on the S'áñkhya, and did not notice much more than the first chapter of the work. Taylor, in the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavadgitá, supplies the Kriyá-yoga with considerable fulness, and Windischmann's account, though brief, is tolerably good. In 1853 Dr. Ballantyne published a translation of the first two chapters of the Yoga-sútra with extracts from the commentary of Bhojadeva, and from it abstracts of the Yoga system have been compiled by Dr. K. M. Banerjea, and Rev. Mr. Mullins. The translation of Ballantyne was completed, in a disjointed way, by Pandit Govindaram Sástrí in the pages of a Benares magazine called the "Pandit." The two fragments have lately been printed together by the Theosophical Society of Bombay. The text with an original commentary together with an English translation is now being printed in the Saddarsana-chintaniká of Bombay, and an abstract of the text occurs in Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-sangraha. An account of Yoga practices may also be seen in a pamphlet by Nabinchandra Pál, published at Benares.

Little need be said in praise of Dr. Ballantyne's work. The profound learning and thorough conservancy with Hindu philosophy which that learned
scholar brought to bear on his undertaking, enabled him to produce a very accurate reproduction of the original. In his anxiety, however, to be accurate he had occasion to resort too frequently to parenthetical clauses, and they resulted in confused sentences, involving much trouble in understanding them. His extracts from the commentary are particularly amenable to this objection. The extracts, moreover, are somewhat disjointed.

When the Asiatic Society of Bengal first proposed to publish an edition of the Yoga-sūtra with the commentary of Bhojadeva, I undertook to reprint Dr. Ballantyne’s translation with such additions as would complete the work. I soon found, however, that my work placed beside his produced a very patchy appearance, and his parenthetical style was not desirable for a proper and easy understanding of the text. I preferred, therefore, to translate the whole in my own way. The aphorisms will be found to be as closely literal as the idiom of the English language would admit of, and the commentary a fair reproduction of the spirit, sense and wording of the original, without being a verbatim reproduction.

Much difficulty has been felt in the treatment of the technical terms. Philosophical terms in the English language have not yet arrived at that fixity and firmness which would preclude possible variations. Different writers assign different values to even well-established terms, and their latitude is frequently varying; and such as they are, they are not exact equivalents of Sanskrit words, which in their turn vary
in meaning under different circumstances and in the hands of different writers. There are instances, too, of Sanskrit terms whose literal significations are very different from the philosophical ideas they are intended to convey, and in dealing with them, the translator has either to sacrifice precision of rendering for the sake of intelligibility, or intelligibility for the sake of precision. In the following pages I have borrowed the terms mostly from Colebrooke's translation of the Sánkhya-karikā, translating a few myself, and transliterating the Sanskrit terms in some cases. My reasons I have explained as far as I could in my notes.

When I undertook the task I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogi; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Paññit in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupillage under Hindu rules—living in his hut and ever following his footsteps—to which I could not submit. I had, therefore, to depend on my own knowledge of the Sanskrit language to arrive at the meaning of Patanjali, availing myself frequently of the aid of my learned friend Professor Mahes'achandra Nyāyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, for the solution of difficulties. I had the assistance, too, of Professor Kāmākhyañātha Tarkaratna, of that College, both in revising the text and in translating it. Both the Professors are distinguished
Nyáya scholars, and Paññit Mahes'achandra commands a deep knowledge of the Sánkhya, and with their aid, I believe, I have been able to avoid gross misinterpretations of the text, though I cannot flatter myself with the idea that I have been able always satisfactorily to expound the meaning of Patanjali.

Manuscripts of the Yoga-sūtra are common enough in Bengal, but I have not met with any particularly old, or exceptionally correct text. In carrying the text and commentary through the press, I had the use of the following codices:


G. Ballantyne's reprint annexed to his translation.

H. From Bombay, copied for me from a MS. belonging to the Government collection preserved in
the office of the Director of Public Instruction. Generally correct.

I. From my family Library, a quarto volume in Bengali. Corrupt and little used.

In the text of Patanjali, no variation of any note has been met with in the above codices. The work appears to have been preserved with every care, as may be presumed from the circumstance of its having enjoyed the benefit of a host of commentaries and glosses. The commentary of Bhoja has not been so correctly preserved. There are many differences of reading in the different codices. But on the whole the differences are not so material as would justify the assumption of different recensions, or produce any marked changes in the meaning of the author.

8 Maniktollah, }

January 28, 1883.
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THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Gañeśa. May that semi-corporeal union* of Śiva and his spouse (Śivā) by the recollection of which man enjoys isolation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal Śiva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ which besets mankind.

3. That unprecedented work§ of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (Purusha) from nature (Prakriti) to be Yoga∥ (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

* A fit of jealousy, according to the Kālikā Purāṇa, had caused a temporary separation between Śiva and his spouse Durgā. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Separation of the human soul from all association with nature. Vide p. 207.

‡ Viz., 1st, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. Vide Wilson's Sākhya-kārikā, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

∥ A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment of, lit. disunion from (viyoga), the world is a conditio sine qua non to the Yogi, which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is separation from sensuous objects is the union or dissolution of the thinking principle in its original source.

¶ Patanjali is believed to have been an incarnation of Ananta, and the title indicates that idea. Vide Introduction, p. lxvii.
even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness
of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills
the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they
prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Ranaraṅgamalla,* who,
like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his
speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work
on the government of words, who has commented on Patanjali,
and written on medicine a treatise called the Rājamṛigāṅka†—
may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of
their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to
understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they
dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the
meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and
inappropriate dissertations without number.‡

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mysti-
fying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting
the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage
Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

* A title of Bhoja.
† All these works of Bhoja are still extant.
‡ “Commentators each dark passage shun—
And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun.”
St. Jerome “not versions but inversions.”
Italian, Traduttori traditori “Translators traitors.”
“Surrender rather than render;
Not turning, but overturning.”
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Salutation to Ganeśa. May that semi-corporeal union* of Śiva and his spouse (Sivá) by the recollection of which man enjoys emancipation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal Śiva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ (which besets mankind.)

3. That unprecedented§ work of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (Purnaḥa) from nature (Prakṛiti) to be Yoga|| (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

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* A fit of jealousy, according to the Kālikā Purāṇa, had caused a temporary separation between Śiva and his spouse Durgā. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Escaping from transmigration in one of four different ways, all implying equality with the Divinity in some way or other. These are: 1st, Sārāhī, or the enjoyment of equal supremacy with the Divine Soul; 2nd, Sālokya, or getting abode in the same region with the Divinity; 3rd, Sānyāśa, or the merging of the human into the divine, from intimate union; and 4th, Sārāyya, or obtaining of the form of the Divinity. The 3rd is also indicated by the term Kaivalya, the word used in the text. It means abstraction or separation from nature and the products thereof.

‡ Viz., 1st, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. Vidā Wilson’s Sāṅkya-kārikā, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

¶ A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment lit. disunion (viyoga) from the world is a condicio sine qua non to the Yoga which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is abstraction from sensuous objects is concentration in the Divinity.

|| Various causes have been assigned for this title of Patanjali. Vīda Introduction.
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even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Raṇaraṇgamalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patañjali, and written a treatise on medicine called the Rājamrigāṅka†—may they prosper.

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And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun."
St. Jerome "not versions but inversions."
Italian, Traduttori traditori "Translators traitors."
"Surrender rather than render;
Not turning, but overturning."
Now, an exposition of the Yoga (is to be made).

This aphorism explains the subject of the work, the object with which it is written, and the relation (it bears to the subject). (The word) "Now"* (atha) suggests (that) a (distinct) topic (here commences), and it serves also as a benediction.

(The word) Yoga means 'union,' or the application of the mind to abstract contemplation, from the root yog "to meditate." An "exposition" (anusśāsana) is that whereby something is expounded or described through its characteristic marks, its real nature, its distinctive divisions, its causes and effects. (The two words Yoga and anusśāsana form the compound) Yoganusśāsana, (which means) "an exposition of the Yoga." This is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this work (of Patanjali).

Yoga, with the means of performing it and its fruit, constitutes the subject, that being treated of in this Institute. The object of the work is the explanation of the subject, and the fruit thereof is the emancipation obtainable by the Yoga. The relation of the work is the connection which exists between that which treats, and the subject treated of, (or the Institute and its subjects). The connection between Yoga, the subject, and its effect, which is emancipation (Kaivalya), or the means and the end, is also its relation. The substance of this is—that in the work are described the instruments of performing the Yoga which is its subject—that Yoga the accomplishment of which leads to the consummation of emancipation called Kaivalya.

[Dr. Ballantyne has rendered the word Yoga into "concentration." That English word, however, in its ordinary signification, does

* Dr. Ballantyne's text has athātah "now then."
APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

not convey anything like a fair idea of what Yoga means. The word meditation would have been more appropriate, but even that does not convey all the ideas which the Sanskrit term has been made to comprehend. A perfect English equivalent is not to be had, and I prefer, therefore, to use the original term to coining a new one. The commentator so explains the word Anus’ásana as to convey the idea that it is a verbal noun intended to explain the purport of the work. The commentary named Pátnjalabhráshya takes it along with the word Yoga to be the specific name of the work. (Yogáns’ásanam náma Jástram). If this be accepted, and it appears to be the most appropriate, the aphorism should be rendered into, “Now, the (work called) Yogáns’ásana, (will be expounded)” Váchspatí Miśra, the annotator on the last named work, and Viññána-bhikshu in his Vártika, take notice of this subject. They also raise the question about the origin of the doctrine. They hold that Patanjali was not the originator of the doctrine, for it has existed from creation, and Híranya-garbhá was the first performer of the Yoga; but that he was merely the compiler of the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them. Nánú híranya-garbha yogasya kartá nányah purádana iti yogáyána-valkya-smrítih, katham pátnjáler yogá-stáritvamityás’átkya sútrakárená anus’ásanamityuktaṁ, s’ishṭasyánus’ásanaṁ.]

Now what is this Yoga? To this the author replies:—

II.

Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.

“Thinking principle” (chitta) is of the form of goodness without a taint. “Functions” (vritti) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. “Yoga” or meditation is described to be the “suppression” (niródha), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of
the tendency outward, of the functions in question. This suppression is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—restless activity, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity (kshipta) is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (mūḍha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Rákshasas), ghosts (Pis’chas), &c. Voluptuousness (vikshipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness (sattva), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c, in a disorderly way is this: notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this: that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, viz., concentration and suppression, that in which
the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable.

(The most important word in the aphorism is chitta which has been rendered into "thinking principle" by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word manas "mind," and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy — i.e., "that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills." (Taylor, *Elements of Thought," "or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned," (Harris, *Hermes*, p. 227)—he is right. In the Sāńkhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart manas has been used in the same sense (Mahādīkhyamādyam kāryam tanmanakah, I, 71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sāńkhya aphorisms the word chitta does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyāya. The Vedāntists use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhi (Vedānta-sūtra). Its equivalent in the Sāńkhya is Adhyāvāsāya, which is synonymous with Buddhi. (Adhyāvāsāyo buddhiḥ, II, 13). It is called Mahat "the great one," because "it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole." (Mahattvam svetara-sakalakārya-vyāpakatvan-mahaśvāryāchcha.) It is mati "understanding," because every thing is understood by it, (manyati anayā); khyāti "familiar knowledge;" jñāna, and prajñā. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by chitta is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sāńkhya does, and by say-
the tendency outward, of the functions in question. The form is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. That suppression being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—unquietness, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thence the condition of unquietness (kṣipta) is induced by the access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, and Titans, sons of Danu &c. Addiction to evil action without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (mudha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Rákhasas) and ghosts, (Pišáchas) &c. Voluptuousness (vikṣipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness, (sattva), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes active (or desirous); by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression having an excess of the quality of the goodness and foulness, successively placed, are reckoned fit for that.

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CHAPTER FIRST.

ing that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (Vṛitti-niruddhāt tatiṣṭdhiḥ, III, 31). Thus Vāchaspati Miśra—chitta-s'abdenāntahkaranam buddhimupalakshayati. According to the order of creation prakṛiti comes first, thence chitta, thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtile organs &c., and this both according to the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense.

The next word is vṛitti. I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into “functions.” The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness. In so far they are allotropic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijnāna Bhikshu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which prakṛiti is the materiality. (Pa- rināmarūpam jagadupādānakatvantu-prakṛitivā. Pariṇāma or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying “they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions.” Vijnāna Bhikshu calls it transformation of Prakṛiti, (prakṛitivirūpam). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne’s use of the term “modification” affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive.

The last word is nirodha, which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same.

The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The Pātanjala-bhāṣya points this out by saying that since the word sarva “all” has not been used before vṛitti “functions,” the form of Yoga in which there is a distinct recognition is also Yoga. (Sarvasabdāgraḥanāt samprajnātopi Yogah). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification.]
Now the author of the Sūtras, wishing to describe the words chitta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word chitta.

III.

Then (i.e. at the time of meditation) there is abidance of the spectator in its own form.

"Then," at that time, the soul, as "the spectator," (drashti) "abides" remains in its own form, which is simple intelligence (and nothing more). The meaning is this: that on knowledge being fully developed, there being no shadow of any sensuous object cast on the thinking principle, and the egotism of one's self, which is the actor, being gone, and intellect being fit for liberation, the soul abides or obtains location in Buddhi which is its own form.

[The spectator is the soul which, abiding in the body, and influenced by the thinking principle, beholds what is done by the organs, but does not partake of the pleasures and pains resulting from their action, and in the state of Yoga the functions beingstopped there is the spectator without any spectacle to behold. This spectator is the soul.]

What then is the form (of the soul) when waking (or active, i.e. other than in a state of meditation)? To this he replies:

IV.

At other times it is in the same form as its functions.

"At other times"—i.e., at times other than that of meditation. Its "functions" are those the characteristics of which will hereafter be described (A. V.) "In the same form" means to consist of it. The purport is this. Even as the functions, involving pleasure, pain and bewilderment, manifest themselves, so does the soul i.e., it appears so to itself. If so, it follows that that object, in which, in the state of modification produced by concentration, the power of understanding finds its own form, and which
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being influenced by the functions of the senses resolves itself into worldly objects, and the soul appears manifest in the forms thereof, as the moon reflected in the moving ripples on the water, appears as if it were (itself) moving, is the thinking principle chitta.

[It is a dogma of the Hindu metaphysicians that the thinking principle or intellect assumes the form of the object perceived. And the aphorism explains that when that principle is immersed in complete Yoga it perceives itself and nothing more, but when it is active and influenced by external objects it assumes the forms of its excitants].

To explain the term function, (the third word in A. II,) the author says:—

V.

The functions are fivefold, (and they are either) painful or not painful.

The "functions" (vritti) are certain modifications of the thinking principle. The word panchatayi (five-fold) is formed by the addition of the affix tayap (Panini v. ii. 42), and implies that the totality of the forms of the functions constitutes the form-bearer, and the functions severally are the forms thereof. The five functions are what are meant.

How are they? They are painful or not painful. "Those that are involved in sufferings of the kind about to be described are painful; those that are the reverse of these are not painful."

[This aphorism is a verbatim copy of Kapila's aphorism 38, Book II. It only propounds what are to be explained in subsequent aphorisms].

The five functions are to be described after being named.

VI.

(The functions of the thinking principle are) right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory.

Of these the author gives the definitions successively.
VII.

Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony.

Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge.

"Perception" (pratyaksha) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic.

"Inference" (anumāna) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it.

A trustworthy word is "testimony," (āgama).

[Pramāṇa means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, i.e., evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Sākhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Sākhya-kārikā they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiyāyikas, however, reckon four kinds, viz., perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (śabda). The Vedāntāś follow this latter, and the Mīmāṃskas recognise six, viz., perception (pratyaksha), presumption (arthāpatti), proportion (sambhava), privation (abhāva), comprehension (pralibha), and oral communication (aitikya).

The word used for perception is pratyaksha, which means "that which is seen," but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception,
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"evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." For testimony Patanjali gives ágama, which means the Vedas, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym áptarachana "reliable words"; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony.

Having thus described the function of right notion the author speaks of Misconception.

VII.

Misconception is incorrect notion, (or a notion) which abides in a form which is not that of its object.

"Misconception" (viparyaya) is a notion of something in respect of which it really is not; as the notion of silver in mother-o'pearl. "Which abides in a form which is not that of its object" is to say a notion which does not abide in that form which is its (real) form (in respect of which the notion is entertained). It amounts to this, that the notion does not reveal the real form of the thing. Doubt (sañsaya) founded on the notion whether a thing abides in its proper form or not, such as whether a particular object seen is a man or the stump of a tree, is also a Misconception.

To describe the function of Fancy, he says:

IX.

Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words, but of which (there is) no object (corresponding in reality).

Knowledge dependant on words is sabda-jñána. That which follows it, is sabda-jñánánupáti (the epithet used to define Fancy, which in the text has been translated by the word "notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words"). Such a notion without reference to the real character of an object
is "Fancy." Thus the words, "the intelligence of the soul (purusha) is its own form." Here a notion is assumed by admitting a distinction as in the notion produced by the possessive case in the phrase "the blanket of Devadatta," though it does not really exist, for in fact the soul is intelligence itself (and there is no distinction between it and its intelligence, or of possessor and the possessed).

["In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief; among these fancy next
Her office holds; of all eternal things
Which the five watchful senses represents
She forms imagination's airy shapes,"
Paradise Lost, B. V.]

In order to declare what Sleep is, he says:

X.

Sleep is that function (of the thinking principle) which has for its object the conception of nothing.

Of that function which is based on the conception of nothing the name is as aforesaid (abhâvaprâtyayâ.) Hence it follows that "Sleep" (nîdrâ) is that function (of the thinking principle) which takes place on the quitting of all objects, in consequence of the quality of darkness always preceding it. That this is a function (of the thinking principle and not a mere blank) is proved by our seeing that one recollects (on arising from a sound sleep) that "I slept pleasantly," which could not have happened without a consciousness of it, (and no memory can exist of that which is not). Hence it is a function.

In order to describe Memory, he says:

XI.

Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognised.
"The not letting go" (asaṃpramāṇa) or not allowing to escape from our intellect an object which has once been recognised through (proper) evidence is "Memory" (smṛti).

Of the five functions Evidence, Misconception, and Fancy belong to the waking state. When any of these, from vividness of impression, becomes perceptible (in sleep), it is a Dream (svāpna.) But Sleep of itself has no cognisable object. Memory again is dependent on Evidence, Misconception, Fancy or Sleep.

[Bishop Hall says, "Memory is the great keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been." It is said to be dependant on Evidence, Misconception, &c., because the impressions it preserves are the productions of those causes.]

Having thus described the functions (of the thinking principle), in order to explain the suppression (the fourth word in A. II,) of these with the means thereof, he says:

XII.

The suppression of these (functions is effected) by Exercise and Dispassion.

"Exercise" (abhyāsa) and Dispassion" (vairāgya) will be defined in the aphorisms about to be given. The repression by these (Exercise and Dispassion) of the functions of the thinking principle which have the form of revealing, energizing and regulating, is "suppression" (nirodha). What is meant is the placing of the functions, which from their turning inwards have ceased to dwell on external objects, in the thinking principle, which is their original cause, and of which they are but potential attributes.

Aversion from sensuous objects is produced by "Dispassion" resulting from a knowledge of the evil influence of those objects (on the thinking principle), and confirmed steadfastness is acquired by "Exercise," which makes it a source of happiness and quiet; and by the (conjoined effect of the) two the functions of the thinking principle are suppressed.
Exercise is the (repeated) effort that it (the thinking principle) shall remain in its functionless state.

Sthiti or "functionless state" is that condition of the thinking principle in which it abides in its own (original) form, free from all functions; and the effort or endeavour (repeated) again and again to bring it to that condition is "Exercise" or abhyāsa.

He next mentions a special character of that (Exercise).

It is again a firm ground attained by proper devotion for a long time unintermittingly.

It (Exercise) is a firm ground, i.e., it becomes steadfast, or acquires firmness, by being assiduously attended to for a long time unremittingly with an excess of regard. The meaning is that it tends to firmness.

He now mentions the definition of Dispassion (A. XII.)

The consciousness of being the subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects is Dispassion.

Objects are of two kinds, "Perceptible" (drishta) and "Scriptural" (dnus'raavi̤ka). The Perceptible is that which may be apprehended here (on earth), such as sound and other objects (perceptible through the organs of sense). The Scriptural is that which exists in the regions of the Devas or elsewhere (where it cannot be grasped by carnal organs). *
That which is heard (anus'ráyate) from the mouth of a preceptor is anus'ráva or the Veda. What comes to our knowledge from (i.e., from the Veda) is what is meant by "one heard of" ánus'rávika. Giving up all eagerness for these two classes of objects, on account of their becoming distasteful at the end, the reflection which ensues (in the thinking principle) to the effect that these are my subjects, but I am not their slave, is called Dispassion (Vairágya.)

[The word Vairágya (dispassion) is formed of the privative prefix vi, and rágā, 'affection,' 'prepossession,' 'love,' 'desire,' the meaning being, in the technical sense in which it is used here, absence of desire for enjoyable objects. The absence, however, should not be accidental, as in the case of a child or of a stolid person where, owing to want of development of certain organs, it results without effort, but the fruit of due deliberation, and a conviction that the objects are not worth having, and that the desire for them should be suppressed.

The word vas'ikāra-saunjñā literally means "consciousness of being able to subjugate," in this instance the passions; but the commentators take it to be a mere indifference or apathy, neither affection nor hatred. Thus the Pátanjala Bháshya: "devoid of hatred and desirability" (heyopádeya-sunyá); and Váchaspati Miśra explains the phrase by the words "a sense of indifference having neither attachment nor hatred" (ásatgadvesharahitá upekshábuddhik).

The word rendered into 'perceptible' is drishtā 'seen;' but, as illustrated by commentators, it means all worldly objects of sense; they may not be perceptible owing to excessive distance, extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, &c., (Sákhya-káríkā. V. VII.), still they are perceptible on this earth under some circumstance or other, and therefore included in the term. The Pátanjala Bháshya illustrates the term by naming women, food, drink, and power, (striyonnapánamaiśvaryamiti). Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "seen," which is its lexicographical meaning, but which is quite
inadmissible here. Wilson, following Colebrooke, renders it into "temporal" which conveys the right technical meaning, but it becomes inappropriate under certain circumstances, as when we have to deal with adrishta, the antonym of drishta, in which case non-temporal would be unmeaning, for the word implies fate or what has not yet happened but may happen; the unseen is in that case the best.

The Sanskrit term for Scriptural is ánuśravika, which means "that which has been heard from another," but it has not been used in that sense here. As the commentators show, the secondary meaning of ánuśrava is the Veda, which is also called śruti, or "that which has been heard," and the object is to imply those rewards which the Veda promises to the performer of sacrifices &c. Colebrooke uses the synonym 'revealed.' The Patanjala Bhāṣya takes the rewards to mean heaven, rudimental body, and dissolution into nature (svargavaiśeṣkahapra-kritilayah). Thus the dispassion implies not only indifference to worldly enjoyments and objects, but the same feeling also in regard to celestial and other forms of pleasure derivable by the performance of the rites enjoined in the Veda. The pleasures, both of this world and of the next, are equally temporary, and therefore should not be desired by one who longs for emancipation. Thus in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā: "The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, inefficual, for it is impure; it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others." (Wilson's Sāṅkhya-kārikā, p. 13).

In fact it amounts to the moral imperturbability of Pyrrho.

A peculiarity in it is to be described.

XVI.

Carried to the extent of indifference to the qualities it is the highest, as it is (then) conducive to a knowledge of God.

"It" i.e., "Dispassion." "Highest" (para) the most estimable. The first degree of "Dispassion" (A. XV) has regard to (ordinary) objects; the second, has regard to the (three) qualities, and it is
cive to a knowledge of the distinction between the product qualities and the (nonproduced) soul, from its extreme conduciveness to the perfect suppressive meditation.

[The object of this aphorism is to divide Dispassion into two kinds; one referring to enjoyable objects and called visaya-vairágya, and the other to qualities, i.e., to the knowledge of the relation between the discrete and the indiscrete, (vyaktávyaktadhar-makerbhyoviraktah). The latter is described to be the highest, or most estimable, because it is more valuable than the former, in the attainment of the final object. The word para is the leading term in the Aphorism, and stands by itself, being predicated by what follow. But Dr. Ballantyne has subordinated it, by reducing it into a predicate. He says "This carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the qualities." This is obviously not the right meaning.]

Having thus stated the nature of Yoga, the author (next) mentions the differences existing between the nature of that kind of it in which there is consciousness (samprajñáta) and that in which consciousness is lost (asamprajñáta).

XVII.

Conscious, because it is attended with argumentation, deliberation, joy and egoism.

The word "meditation" (samádhi) is understood to be present after the word conscious to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.

That which makes manifest without any doubt or error, i.e., makes thoroughly manifest, the exact nature of the object pondered is "Conscious meditation," (samprajñáta samádhi). Samádhi or meditation is a kind of pondering (bhávaná). The suppression or exclusion of every function (of the thinking principle) except that which relates to the subject pondered is Conscious or Discriminative meditation; it is the same with "Seeded meditation" —savíja-samádhi. And from there being distinctions of argumentation, &c., it is of four kinds, (namely) 1st, the "Argumentative" (savílárka); 2nd,
the "Deliberative" (savichāra); 3rd, the "Joyous" (sānanda); and 4th, the "Egoistic" (sāsmīta). "Pondering" is the taking again and again into the thinking principle of any particular object to the exclusion of all other objects. The object to be pondered is of two kinds; the Godhead (is'vara), and the categories or principles (talāvās). The last again are of two kinds according as they are "irrational" or "rational." The irrational are the twenty-four; the rational is the soul.

Among these (the four kinds of meditation), when accepting the gross elements and the organs as the objects, pondering is carried on with reference to which is antecedent and which is consequent, and the relation of the words to their meanings, it is called 'Argumentative meditation' (savitartha-samādhi). Should this pondering, however, be independent of the idea of their antecedence and their sequence and the relation between their names and meaning, it would be called "Non-argumentative" (nirvitartha). When pondering is engaged in with reference to something subtle, as the subtile elements and the internal organ, and to their qualities in relation to space, time, &c., it is "Deliberative" (savichāra). But should this pondering be in regard to those subjects themselves, without reference to their relation to time and space, and simply as substrata of qualities, it is said to be "Non-deliberative" (nirvichāra). What have been described up to this time are called Tangible Forms. (Grāhya-samāpatti.)

When the quality of goodness of the Internal Organ tinctured with a little of the qualities of foulness and darkness is pondered, then consciousness being under the influence of qualities and the quality of goodness, which is full of the manifestation of happiness, becomes enlivened, the meditation becomes "Joyous" (sānanda). In this (kind of) meditation those of confined intellect who do not perceive the other (i.e., last of the twenty-five principles, or the chief soul) are indicated by the word "bodiless" (videka), because they have risen above their body and egotism. This is the Acceptance Form. (Grāhāna-samāpatti.)
Next, the pondering which has the pure quality of goodness untainted by foulness and darkness for its object, is called Egoistic or ontric meditation, (saśmita), because in it, from the enlivening of the intellectual power, the quality of goodness, which is the object of the pondering, is disregarded and its existence alone is perceived. It should not be supposed that there is no difference between this Ontric meditation and egotism, because where the Internal Organ knows objects with the use of (the word) I (ि.े., with a knowledge of the distinction between itself and the object before it) it is egotism. But when mere existence is alone manifest in the thinking principle merged in nature from its reverse action resulting from its tendency inwards, it is egoism. In this (last kind of) meditation when contented (beings) do not perceive the Supreme Soul, and their mind is merged in its true cause, they are described to be Prakritilaya 'resolved into nature.'

Of the persons, who enter into pondering, knowing the Supreme Soul, the manifestation of intelligence is called the Form of the taker, Grihitṛi-samāptti.

Even in the argumentative meditation all the four kinds exist potentially, and successively as each is abandoned the others remain, and all these four kinds are Conscious meditation, or that which has a distinct recognition, samprajñāta-samādhikī.

Meditation is described to be of two kinds, 1st, that which is carried on with a clear understanding of the object reflected upon as distinct from the meditator; and 2nd, that in which no such distinction obtains and the intellect is merged in the soul. In the former, the subject of the aphorism, there are argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism, when the objects meditated upon are irrational objects, such as the first twenty-four of the twenty-five categories of the Sāňkhya system which the Yoga school adopts; and they may not exist when the rational soul is the object. The first or Argumentative form applies to gross matter; and the second or the Deliberative applies to subtile matter. In both these the quality of goodness plays a subordinate part. When that quality attains ascendancy the meditation becomes "Joyous;" and it
ceases to have connection with the body, or technically becomes dis-embodied. When it prevails without any taint of the foul and the dark qualities, the thinking principle is then believed to have merged into primæval nature. This is, however, not the highest reward, for it does not put an end to transmigration: on the evolution of creation from nature, the merging ceases, and there is again a separation. It will be noticed that the first two forms, the Argumentative and the Deliberative, have their negatives the Non-argumentative and the Non-deliberative; and these four form a class called the tangible forms.

The next is the "Joyous" kind in which the sense of the existence of the body is lost, and this is called the "acceptance form." In this there is no negative form, nor is there any such distinction in the next kind, the "Egoistic," in which every thing is identified with the self. This is called the "acceptor" form. In all these six kinds of pondering, there is, it will be perceived, a distinct recognition or consciousness of individuality, and hence they all come under the term Conscious. When this consciousness is lost, we come to the next class which forms the theme of the next aphorism.

The author now describes that form of meditation in which consciousness is lost, asamprajñāta.

XVIII.

The other is that in which the residua are ended, preceded by the exercise of thought as regards the cause of rejection.

By viráma is meant that whereby rejection takes place, i. e., the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation &c., (A. XVII). Pratyaya, "thought," added to viráma, "cause of rejection," produces the compound expression viráma-pratyaya. Exercise (abhyāsa) is reiteration of the idea in the thinking principle. In this condition of exercise, constantly rejecting with a nega-
tive, "not this, not this," whatever ideas spring up, the result is the other or Unconscious meditation, or that in which there is no distinct consciousness, which has nothing left, and in which the residua are ended. It is the opposite of the former kind, and it is asamprajñāta-samādhi. In this condition there is nothing to be known, and therefore it is called Unconscious, undiscriminating, or seedless meditation (nirvīja).

Now, there are four modifications of the thinking principle, waking, commencing meditation, concentration, and suppression of thought. Thereof (A. II) the waking state belongs to the two conditions of the thinking principle described as restlessness and mischievous ignorance. The quality of goodness being on the ascendant in the condition described as voluptuousness, it is that of commencing meditation. Concentration and absolute suppression are the final conditions. Each condition has its residua. Thereof, those residua which are present in the waking state are destroyed by those that are produced by the condition of commencing meditation, and those that are brought forth by the condition of commencing meditation, are destroyed by those due to the condition of concentration. The residua of the condition of concentration are destroyed by those of suppression. Even as lead melted with gold destroys the dross of gold as well as itself, so do the residua of the condition of suppression consume both themselves as well as the residua of the condition of concentration.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Saṅskāra, and it is just the one which has unfortunately not been explained either in the commentary of Bhoja, or in the Pāñjala Bhāṣya. In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the Nyāya it occurs frequently in three different senses, viz., velocity (vega), thinking (bhāvanā), and elasticity (ṣṭhitisthāpaka). (Tarka-saṅgraha). Adverting to the second meaning the Bhāṣāparichchheda, says: "Saṅskāra, called thinking, (bhāvanā) resides in sentient beings; and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty
which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition.”

(Bhávanákhya stusanskáro jívavrittiratindryah.
Upekshánatmakastasya nischayah káraṇam bhavet.
Smarane pratyabhijnáyámámapyasau heturuchyate.)

Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Roer in his translation of the Bháshá-parichchheda, for there it is described to be the cause of memory, and not memory itself. It is not sensation, nor impression, for it is not transient, but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the sensorium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be, nor eternal as the ancient Greek philosophers supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballantyne renders it into “self-reproduction of thought;” but there is nothing like “self-reproduction” in it; for it is said to be revived by external stimuli, and not by its own effort. It is something then—a trace, a mark, a cellule, a psychograph—which perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect, to be revived afterwards under particular circumstances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell (‘Mental Philosophy,’ p. 95) “When a given mental impression is produced upon us, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not absolutely lost; for, if proper conditions occur, the impression is renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be something deposited within us which subsists permanently, and which is equally there, whether it be at any moment the immediate object of our consciousness or not. This something, then, we term a residuum, using the expression, it will be observed, without implying any theory on the subject whatever.” The Sanskrit counterpart of this residuum is Sañskára. Every sensation, every impression, every perception, every idea, nay, every dream, leaves its trace behind, and the traces or residua so obtained constitute the sum total of
our experience, and these are सांस्काराः. According to Indian philosophers these remain not only all life through, but even in subsequent states of existence, and they are, therefore, believed to be the cause of our instincts. The new-born infant takes to its mother's breast from the sanskāra it has in its mind from its experience in a former existence.

The next word is sēsha, and it, too, has not been fully defined by the commentators. It means 'remainder' 'balance,' or 'end.' Compounded with sanskāra the meaning is that in which the remainders are the sanskāras, or that in which the sanskāras are ended, or brought to a close. Bhoja accepts the second meaning, and he illustrates it by saying that in the state of Unconscious meditation in its perfection all previous sanskāras or residua of former conditions, as well as those of the perfect state, are destroyed, even as in the process of cupellation, lead melted with gold not only destroys the dross existing in impure gold, but also itself, leaving nothing behind. Thus the Unconscious meditation is seedless or has no object whatever for contemplation. The Pāñjala Bhāṣyā takes a different view. According to it, in the Unconscious stage all functions are set at rest and the residua alone remain behind. (Sarva-vṛttiprātyastamaya-sanskārā-śeshah nirodhah.) And Vāchśpatī Miśra emphasizes this by adding the word "alone"—sanskāras alone remain—(sanskāra-mātra śeshah.) This contradiction may be explained by supposing that the Pāñjala-bhāṣyā has in view a meditation from which there is awaking, while Bhoja describes the final meditation from which there is no further waking; for he admits that in the earlier stages of the Unconscious meditation there are residua peculiar to it. Yogis admit that people do wake from the Unconscious meditation, and that that meditation is often practiced, and in such cases the sanskāras must remain in a latent state to be revived by proper stimuli on waking. It is difficult satisfactorily to decide to what condition Patanjali himself referred to. The way in which he has used the word śesha would suggest the idea that he has been correctly interpreted in the Pāñjala Bhāṣyā. See A. L. at the end of the chapter.
The state of Unconscious meditation above described is subject to the condition precedent, that there should be repeated acts of contemplation or exercise of thought amounting to a habit, as regards the necessity of rejecting all causes of disturbance. Without it the final stage cannot be acquired. This exercise of thought, however, forms a part of the Unconscious stage, and is totally unconnected with the Conscious form. Vāchaspati Miśra says—‘the first word in the aphorism (which I have rendered into 'preceded by the exercise of thought regarding the cause of rejection,' and for the sake of idiom put at the end of the sentence) describes the means, and the other two define the nature of the meditation in question' (pūrvapaderupaśyakathamamuttarābhīyam cha svarūpa-kathamam). Dr. Ballantyne has mistaken the purport of the word, and made it the conditio precedent. His version is “The one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose;—the other [—independent of any fresh antecedent—] is in the shape of the self-reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects.]” After what has been stated above, it is obvious that this version is not tenable. It may be added that it is not at all usual with authors of Sūtras to repeat in a subsequent sūtra what has been already explained in a previous one.]

Having thus stated the distinctions and the nature of Yoga, and having briefly mentioned the method of performing it, the author proceeds to speak of those methods more fully.

**XIX.**

Of (the meditative states attained to by the two classes of aspirants technically called) the Unembodied and the Resolved into nature, the world is the cause.

The “unembodied” (vīdeka) and the “resolved into nature” (prakṛitilaya) have been described in the aphorism on the argumentative and other forms of meditations (A XVII, pp. 18 f.)
CHAPTER FIRST.

Of their meditation the world is the cause. The word bhava-prataya is formed of bhava 'world' and prataya 'cause.'

The meaning is this: that such persons, from their entrance into the world (on account of their deserts), become participants of similar (inadequate) meditation. Not being conscious of ultimate reality, for them this is a mere exercise of the Yoga. Hence, exertion should be made for the knowledge of the ultimate reality and in the contemplation thereof, with a view to the attainment of deliverance. This is the object for which this has been said.

(In the commentary on aphorism XVII, among the conditions of Conscious meditation disembodiedness and resolution into primeval nature have been pointed out as high. Here the object is to show that those results are secondary, and of the earth earthy. They do not secure the ultimate end of Yoga. They are accordingly meditations, of which the world or Prakriti is the cause. They are, nevertheless, desirable exercises as preparatory to the state in which the ultimate reality is revealed.)

Of others:—

XX.

(In the case) of others this (meditation) is preceded by Inclination, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.

"Of others" i. e., of Yogis, other than (those who have been described as) "the disembodied" and "the resolved in nature." "Preceded by inclination" &c.; that meditation which has śraddhā &c. as the first means, is called śraddhādipūrvaka. These, inclination and the rest, act successively as the means and the end, i. e. they serve as the means or instruments for the Conscious meditation. Thereof "Inclination" (śraddhā) is approbation in favour of the Yoga. "Energy" (vīrya) is strenuous exertion. "Memory" (smṛiti) is not letting out what is once cognised. (A. XI, p. 12.) "Meditation" (samādhi) is intentness on a single point.
"Discernment" (praṇjā) is thorough understanding of that which is to be known. Now, he who has "Inclination" gets "Energy," or becomes persevering in favour of Yoga. In the condition of "Energy" comes "Memory" of former states, in which the thinking principle meditates; and the thinking principle which has meditated knows thoroughly what it has thought upon. All these are the expedients of the Conscious form of meditation. From the (frequent) exercise of that meditation and from extreme dispassion Unconscious meditation ensues.

[This aphorism explains the practices which should be adopted by the neophyte in the first stage of his career as a Yogī. He must have Inclination for the exercise he cannot then undertake. The Inclination then, must be followed by Energy, or active exertion. Then there should be Memory of what he has learnt. Next, there should be frequent exercise of Meditation of some being or other to bring on the habit for it. And, lastly, there should be clear Discernment of what should be done and what should be avoided.]

Of the Yogīs possessing the above mentioned expedients he next describes the sub-divisions according to the different expedients they adopt (for the attainment of their object).

XXI.

Proximate for the ardently impetuous.

(To complete the aphorism the words:) "The attainment of the state of meditation" are required to be supplied. "Impetuous" (sāñvega), energetic exertion for the execution of a work. "Ardent" (tivra), excessively, in a high degree. On the part of those who are thus ardently impetuous, the attainment of Meditation is "proximate" (āsanna). The fruition of Meditation is also proximate, i.e., quickly accomplished.

[Having in the preceding aphorism pointed out the practices to be adopted by Yogīs, the author in this lays special stress on the necessity for ardent application. A lukewarm feeling is not enough for immediate or early fruition. The application should be "ardently impetuous" to ensure quick reward.]

Who are then ardently impetuous? To this he replies.
XXII.

There is a further distinction, from there being the mild, the moderate, and the excessive.

There are specific distinctions among those who adopt these expedients, from the mild and other expedients being different. The divisions of the expedients are "mild" (mita), "moderate" (madhya), and "excessive" (adhimastra). These are severally threefold, from their being severally subdivided into "the mildly impetuous," "the moderately impetuous" and "the excessively impetuous." And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of Yogis. The mild expedients are (severally) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The moderate expedients are (also) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The excessive expedients are (likewise), "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." And great endeavours should be made for the attainment of the "ardently impetuous" form of the excessive method. So much for the declaration of the distinctions of Yogis.

The object of this aphorism is to classify Yogis into different orders according to their respective arduousness. Some are mildly, others moderately, and others ardently disposed, and so each group forms an order. Again in their mildness and the rest there may be degrees varying from mildness to moderateness and ardency, and so each of the three orders has three sub-divisions, making a total of nine groups. The injunction is that Yogis should exert to pass through the several orders as quickly as possible, so that the attainment of the final stage may not be delayed.

Now he mentions an easy expedient, distinct from the preceding expedients.
XXIII.

Or by devotion to God.

"God" (Pārāra) will be described presently (A. XXIV). "Devotion" (pranidhāna) is a form of resignation to Him. It is thorough worship of Him, and the consignment of all one's actions to Him. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to Him, the preëminent guide, is "devotion," pranidhāna. This is an important means of meditation and of its fruition.

[In this aphorism the author departs from the Sāṅkhya system, by introducing devotion to God as a facile and ready means of attaining the end. God, however, is not made the end, but the means to an end of which He forms no integral portion. The theory of resignation or dedication of the fruits of all actions to Him, is evidently borrowed from the Bhakti system in which it plays the most important part. In entire reliance on the providence of the Godhead, the Bhakta wishes for no fruition whatever. Whatever he does is for the service of the Divinity, and He in His mercy is to grant whatever He thinks proper. In the Bhagavad Gitā this is made the cardinal point of faith, (IX, 27,) and there it appears quite consistent; but in the Yoga system Kapila found no necessity for it, and Patanjali adopts it as a sort of compromise to give a theistic character to his system; but it plays only a very subordinate part.]

It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (XXIX).

XXIV.

God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires.
Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (kleśha). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (karma), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the Sūtras), as also what are mixed, i.e., partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are "deserts" (vipāka). They are kind, age and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (āsaya). "Untouched," (aparamrishta,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (Purusha-visesha), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (Īśvara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness. This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom and almightiness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakṛiti and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Īśvara. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the Yogī, by the reflection of the soul, known; but such is not the case with Īśvara. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Īśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by Sūtric means (such as the Yoga, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor
is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Iśvara. Derived from the root Iś, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is purusha, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (ātme) in the body (pūre); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but as the dualism indicated by European philosophers between soul or animal life (प्रण) and spirit, or rational life (प्राण) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedantic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and, to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Acharya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahāpāśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as Śiva,—the Vaishnavas as Puru-
Those things which afflict are “afflictions” (kleśah). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. “Works” (karma), such as are enjoined or prohibited (in the Śāstras), as also such as are mixed, i.e., partly one and partly the other. What ripens out of those works are “deserts” (vipāka). They are the results of actions, such as caste, existence, and enjoyment. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (āsaya). “Untouched,” (aparāmrīṣṭa,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). “Particular soul” (puruṣa-viśeṣa), who is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. “God” (Īśvara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of troubles does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the troubles abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the troubles in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to His sempeternal greatness in the quality of goodness. This greatness is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependant, His wisdom and greatness are not mutually dependant, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that greatness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakṛiti and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Īśvara. In ordinary beings, the thinking principle is modified into pleasure, pain and delusion, but in the body of the Yogi, being touched by the reflection of the thinking principle (in its purity) it becomes known as reflected. Such is not the case with Īśvara. He is, by reason of His eternity, always solely of the quality of goodness and super-excellence; he exists as the object (of our meditation). Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Īśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by Śāstric means (such as the Yoga &c.). In His case, however, being always in that
condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Īśvara. Derived from the root Īś, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is puruṣa, which means aman, or the soul of a man—that which abides (shete) in the body (pure); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but in philosophical works it is always used for soul, and to preserve the spirit of the text I have accepted that word. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedāntic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and to avoid trouble uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the incidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achārya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

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shottoma,—the followers of the Puráñas as the great Father (Brahmá),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mimánsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Chárvákas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyáyas as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarman,—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Śiva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?"—(Cowell’s Kusumánjali, p. 2.)

For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough; but it is not absolutely correct. The Chárvákas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kápilas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved. Kapila, in the Sáňkhya aphorisms says, “It is not proved that there is a God.” (Iśvārāsvēdheh I. 92.) This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballantyne’s translations of the aphorisms on the subject.

Aph. 2.—Not from its [—the world’s—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—i. e., by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,—[“by works alone, which are indispensable,”—and if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

Aph. 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for
"if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.”].

Aph. 5.—Or ["if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely"] a technical term ["for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneeness and the having an unobstructed will"].

Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, ["and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered."—"Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not properties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply,—as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative"].

Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. "In regard to the latter alternative he says"].

Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; ["that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c. ;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown"].
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Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [—"in the first place, there is not sense-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable;" as he proceeds to show].

Aph. 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken;—"and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion" that every product should have had an intelligent maker].

Aph. 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world's] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord].” (Sákhya Aphorisms, pp. 114ff.)

I should add here that some Kápilas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says "The existence of such a Lord is a settled point," (III, 5 and 7), meaning by "such" an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is in no sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedánta Sútra treats of this subject; but it is too long to be quoted here.

The Pátrajñala Bhashya points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus: "If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones? (Not so.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God. Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God—He is sempeternally emancipated and sempeternally the Lord.” Kaivalyam práptáh staśri santi cha bahavah kevalinah. Te hi trini bandhanáh chhitvá kaivalyam
In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity.

In that God the seed of omniscience, as also of parvitude and magnitude and of knowledge of the knowers of the past, the future &c., attains its "infinity," (niratisaya)* or highest perfection. Being the source like a seed it is called seed (vija). It is well known that of the qualities of parvitude and magnitude, which have degrees, there is an absolute perfection. Thus, the perfection of parvitude is seen in atoms, and that of magnitude in the sky. In a similar manner knowledge and other manifest attributes of the thinking principle compared with each other must somewhere attain the highest perfection, and wherever they are in the highest perfection, that is God. Although from the general character of this inference no precise being is proved, yet in the Sástras His omniscience and other qualities may be precisely learnt.

But how does He, without any impulse of His own, cause the union and separation of Prakriti and Purusha? Such a doubt should not be entertained. Being merciful, He finds in His mercy to creation the impulse. His impulse is the wish "I shall rescue all creation (from pain) at the periodical minor and great pralayas." What ever is desirable to one, is his impulse.

[The logical force of this aphorism is not apparent. It is a mere assertion, and can scarcely be taken as a proof, as the Commentator puts it forwaryd to be. He himself felt the difficulty, and escaped out of it by appealing to the authority of the Sástra.

* Niratisaya, limitness, greatness, or infinity.
The Sástra here referred to is the Sákhya, and the P. Bháshya quotes a passage from the work of Panчасákhya which shows that “the first knower, lord, and great sage, with a view to creation, in his mercy taught this science to the enquirer Suri.” Mdivivánimáphatamadhishtháya kárnyáta bhágaván paramarshi rásuraye jijásumánáya tantram pravácheti. The first knower is Kapila, who, being an incarnation of Vishnu, obtained the science from Sayambhu or Maheśvara.

Having thus described the identity and proof of the existence of God, the author refers to His greatness.

XXVI.

He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not defined by time.

Even of the primary creators such as Brahmá and others, he is the “instructor,” or preceptor, because “He is not defined by time,” for He has no beginning, while the others are so defined, having a beginning.

[The word guru has been translated “instructor” in accordance with the text, and after the commentator who supplies the equivalent upadeshtá. It may be more appropriately rendered into “noblest” or “greatest,” as it would make the reason assigned, undefined by time, more consistent, for want of beginning, or being not circumscribed by time, does not imply tuition. The object of the explanation, however, is to refer to the first tutor Maheśvara to whom reference has been made in the last note. In the P. Bháshya no equivalent is given of the word, but the sense is explained by the word yatháśya sargasyádau prakarsha-gatyásiddhah, tathá-tikránta-sargásivapi pratyetavyah.

Váchaspati Miśra explains the term by prakarsha “superior:” na vartate prakarsháyam gatiḥ práptih pratyetavya ágamát tadanena prabandhena bhágaváníśvaro darśitah.

In giving the purport of the aphorism he uses the words: Samprati bhávataḥ brahmádibhyah viśeshamáha.]
Having thus described the greatness of God, the author now supplies His indicator, with a view to help people in their devotion.

XXVII.

His indicator is the Praṇava.

Of theĪśvara thus described, the "indicator," name, expressive word, whereby one is thoroughly (pra=prakarsena) lauded (nu) or praised, glorified, or hymned is—praṇava, which is the same with the syllable Om. (The sentence indirectly gives the derivation which is pra = "excessive" and nu = "to laud," whence Praṇava). Between the two (the name and the being denominated) the relation of the indicator and the indicated is eternal. This is conventionally expressed, but not produced by any one; (it is the same) as in the case of a father and his son, when one points out the existing relation (by saying) "this is the father, and this is the son," (though the relationship exists from before, and is not produced by the saying.)

[Pranava is the technical name of Om, and the injunction is that that syllable should be frequently muttered. Care is taken to show that the relation between the indicator Om and the indicated God is eternal and not produced by man, and the example of the father and son explains what is intended. The Vedas, the Upanishads and all Hindu works recommend the same process, accepting the term as the most sacred name of the Divinity. See Chhāndogya Upanishad, Chapter I. In two short notes, published in the 'Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal' for 1865, pp. 46—208, I take the word to be the Indianized form of the Hebrew Amen and the English Amen.]

His adoration is next enjoined.

XXVIII.

Its repetition and the reflection on its meaning (should be made).
"Its," i. e., of the Pranava, consisting of three and a half instants, "Repetition" (japa), pronouncing it in due order, and the "Reflection" (bhávana), the perception repeatedly of the God indicated by it, are the means of concentration of the thought in it. Hence, for the accomplishment of meditation (samádhi) the Pranava should be repeated, and its meaning reflected upon by a Yogi. This is declared.

[Om is ordinarily declared to be a compound of the letters ख (a) ड (u) and म (m), which supply the three instants, and the conversion of the m into the nasal mark * supplies the half instant. In prosody the word is a long syllable, but in modulated reading or recitation its prosodical quantity is a protracted circumflex sound.]

The fruit of such adoration is next described.

XXIX.

Thence the right knowledge of the reverted perception, and the removal of obstacles.

From that repetition and that reflection the right knowledge of the "reverted perception" (pratyakchétaná) is effected in the case of Yogís. That "perception" (chétaná) or power of seeing, which turns towards its own internal organ, withdrawing itself from (or in opposition to worldly) objects, is called "reverted perception" (pratyak "turning back," chétaná "perception") and a "right knowledge" (adhigama) of it is thereby acquired. The "removal" (abháva), i. e., the counteraction of the power of the obstacles about to be described is also effected.

[The natural function of the senses is to extend outwards, in order to receive the impressions of external objects and carry them to the sensorium, but that being suppressed by the Yogi, the senses turn inwards and find their object within, and therefore the function is called reversed, or reflex. The object of this round-about way of description is to say that the senses hold communion exclusively with the soul.]
Now, a doubt arising as to what are the obstacles? he says:—

XXX.

Disease, Langour, Doubt, Carelessness, Idleness, Worldly-mindedness, Mistaken notions, Unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and Instability therein; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles.

These nine, impelled by the force of foulness and darkness, become the causes of "distractions," i.e., by these enemies to concentration the thinking principle is disturbed. Of the nine:—

(1) "Sickness" (vyádhí) is fever and the like, resulting from disordered humours.
(2) "Langour" (stánána) is an indisposition of the thinking principle to work.
(3) "Doubt" (saññáya) is the disposition of the thinking principle which relies on both sides of a question, as whether Yoga is practicable or not.
(4) "Carelessness" (pramáda) is a disposition not to exert, or indifference in performing meditation.
(5) "Idleness" (álasya) is a heaviness of the body and of the thinking principle, which is the cause of want of interest in matters relating to Yoga.
(6) "Worldly-mindedness" (aviráti) is the inclination of the thinking principle to enjoy the pleasures of the world.
(7) "Mistaken notion" (bhrántidarsana) is wrong perception, such as taking a bit of mother-o'pearl to be silver.
(8) "Unattainment of any stage" (alabdha-bhúmikatva) is not attaining, for some cause or other, a particular stage of abstraction.
(9) "Instability" (anavasthitatva) is the condition in which the thinking principle having attained a stage cannot abide in it.

These being opposed to the practice of concentration of meditation, are called "obstacles," (antáráyáh).

To shew that there are other causes which produce distraction of the mind, he says:—
XXXI.

Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expiration are the companions of distractions.

Whenever from any cause distractions are produced then pain &c., come on. Thereof—

(1) "Pain" (dukkha) is a modification of the foulness of the thinking principle; it is characterised by pain, which living beings exert to remove.

(2) "Distress" (daurmansya) is the agitation of the mind proceeding from external or internal causes.

(3) "Trembling" (aṅgajaytva) is the shaking of the body which causes unsteadiness in the posture (of a Yogi).

(4) "Inspiration" (śvāsa) is a drawing in of the external air. The expulsion of the air from the lungs is "expiration" (prasvāsa).

These existing along with the (other) distractions, should be removed by the exercise and dispassion already described; (A. XII) and therefore they are noticed here.

[Pain here referred to is described in the Patañjala Bhāṣya as of three kinds: mental, physical and supernatural. That which affects the mind without touching the body is mental, that which proceeds from disorders in the body is physical, and that which proceeds from evil spirits &c., is supernatural. The Sāṅkhya Karika notices all the three. (Wilson’s Sāṅkhya Kārikā, p. 2.)

The Patañjala Rahasya gives pīḍā ‘disease’ as the equivalent of Dukkha.]

Another expedient for overcoming the obstacles with their accompaniments is now being pointed out.

XXXII.

For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle.
For the "prevention" (pratishesha) or obstruction of those distractions, let there be "exercise" (abhyaśa) or repeated application of the thinking principle to some one selected "principle," (tattva), from the force resulting from which arise the condition of concentration, and thereby the distractions subside.

[In former aphorisms meditation has been declared to be of two kinds: conscious and unconscious, or seeded and seedless. The object here is to inculcate the necessity of constant exercise of the first, or the seeded form, to steady the mind, and prepare it for the more arduous and difficult phase in which there should be no object upon which to meditate, or the state in which, in the language of Wordsworth, "thought is not." The highest form of conscious meditation is intelligent communion with the soul, but this too is not at once practicable, and the instruction is that any one of the twenty-five categories may be taken up for meditation, so that the mind may be trained to the habit of concentrating itself at any one point at pleasure, and of remaining in that state of concentration without fatigue.]

Now he describes another expedient with advertence to certain works which help to purify the thinking principle.

XXXIII.

The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice.

"Friendliness" (maitrī) disposition to be friendly. "Compassion," (karunā) mercy. "Complacency" (muditā) to be pleased. "Indifference" (upekṣhā) to feel neither pleasure nor pain. These feelings should be felt, in due order, for the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the sinful. Thus, to the happy one should be friendly, (saying) "blessed is their happiness;" and not be envious to them. For persons in grief he should show mercy, and desire how to relieve them from their grief, and not remain indifferent to their suffering. To the virtuous, with a view to encourage virtue, he should express satisfaction, and not be envious of them (say-
ing) "Forsooth, are these virtuous"? For the vicious a feeling of indifference should be practised, neither encouraging nor hating them. In the aphorism, the word "happiness" &c. are intended to stand for persons possessing those qualities. These feelings of friendliness &c., producing cheerfulness in the thinking principle, easily bring on the condition of Samádhi. These acts are external (and not intrinsic parts of the Samádhi). Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful in the calculation of alligation, &c., (but are not in themselves integral parts of the main object), so the feelings of friendship, &c., antagonistic to envy, passion &c., producing cheerfulness, prepare the thinking principle for the conscious form of Samádhi. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerfulness induced, effects the concentration of the mind (to one object).

[The Aphorism suggests a second expedient that of cheerfulness. Unless the mind is cheerful it cannot be steady, and this cheerfulness is to be brought on by friendliness towards the happy, compassion for those who are in distress, complacency in regard to virtue, and indifference in respect to vice. Indifference in respect to vice might at first sight appear a very mild feeling, but hatred, detestation or other strong manifestation of feeling towards vice would mar cheerfulness, and itself be a cause of pain and unsteadiness; hence it is avoided.]

He points out another expedient.

XXXIV.

Or by expulsion and retention of the breath.

"Expulsion," (prachchhardana) means the throwing out of the air from the lungs in a fixed quantity through a special effort. "Retention" (vidháraṇa) is the restraint, or stoppage of the motion of breath for a certain limited time. That stoppage is effected by two acts—by filling the lungs with external air, and by retaining therein the inhaled air. Thus the threefold pránapáyáma, including the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention of breath, fixes the thinking principle to one point of
concentration. All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of the breath—there being always a correlation of breath and mind in their respective functions—the breath when overcome by stopping all the functions of the organs, effects the concentration of the thinking principle to one object. The Agama proclaims its power of destroying all defects thus: “All obstructive functions are caused by faults.” Hence, by its destroying faults, it becomes effectual in producing concentration of the mind.

[The definition of “retention” (vidhārana) by the terms “stoppage of motion” (gativichchheda) is obviously faulty, but as the aphorism refers to “retention” immediately after the “expulsion” (prachchhardana) and the attempt to retain the breath after it has been fully expired would be futile, it is necessary to inspire before the breath can be retained, and the commentator is obliged to include that act along with the retention. The Pāṇṭajala Bhāṣya calls the retention to be Prāṇāyāma (vidhārana prāṇāyamaḥ), and in the Sāṅkhya Sūtra this meaning is accepted. It is, however, not the generally accepted meaning. All other Yogic and Tāntric works regard the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention performed in specific order, to constitute the Prāṇāyāma. The order is not always the same. Some have expiration first, inspiration next, and retention last. Others place inspiration first, retention next, and expiration last. The word mātrāpraṇāna in the commentary, which I have rendered into “fixed quantity,” has been rendered into svālpa or “little” or “slowly” in the Pāṇṭajala Bhāṣya; but it does not express the true technical meaning. The object of the mātrā is to imply a fixed period of time. According to the Skanda Purāṇa a mātrā is equal to the time required in one breathing, (Eka śrāsamapi mātrā prāṇāyāme nigadyate), and to imply that this breathing must be natural, the Yoga-chintāmani adds that this breathing should be during sleep (when there is no violent effort). Nidrāvasangatasya puṣṇo yāvatkālenaikaśvāso gacchhate gacchhami cha tāvatkālaprāṇāyāmasya mātrelychchate.) And this
period is equal to two and a half palas. (Śrddha svāsa palad-vayātakah kālak, prāṇāyāma kāla siddhak.) The pala here means the period occupied by a twinkling of the eye. The mātra is obviously taken as a unit, and of these from 1 to 24 are devoted to a prāṇāyāma according as it is inferior, middling, or superior. The mode of reckoning the time to be devoted to each act is regulated in one of two ways; 1st, by so many repetitions of the syllable Om, or the mystic mantra of the performer, or the specific mystic syllables (vīja) of that mantra; 2nd, by turning the thumb and the index finger of the left hand round the left knee a given number of times. The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A Vaishnava in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the Vija mantra once while expiring, 7 times while inspiring, and 20 times while retaining. A Sākta repeats the mantra 16 times when inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation, and the capacity of the performer. As a general rule it may be said that longer is the retention the more proficient becomes the Yogi. The usual mode of performing the Prāṇāyāma is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place the ring-finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring-finger and the thumb, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the Prāṇāyāma, and it may be repeated after short intervals according to choice for hours. The object avowed of this performance is the steadying of the mind. The Hatha-dīpikā philosophises on this by saying, “by the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves; when that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogi becomes firm as the trunk of a tree; therefore the wind should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body so long it is called living. Death is the exit of that breath, therefore it should be stopped.”
Elsewhere the text asserts that this Prāṇāyāma is conducive both to health and longevity, and all minor works on Yoga and the Tantras generally expatiate at great length on the sanitary and the therapeutical advantages of practising it regularly at stated times. The Haṭha-dīpikā, in one place, says, “all diseases disappear in him who devotes himself to the Prāṇāyāma; without it in the state of practising Yoga every kind of disease arises.”

(Prāṇāyāmādyuktana sarvaroga kshayo bhavet, ayuktābhyaśa- yogena sarvaroga samudbhavaḥ. The idea seems to have travelled to the far West, and the spiritualists in America have accepted it as a recognised maxim of their system. Many spiritualists practice this Prāṇāyāma under the name of “deep breathing,” and A. J. Davis, one of their apostles, in his “Harbinger of Health” (pp. 52-53), gives the following directions for curing diseases through its means.

“First, if your weakness be general, and the blood is loaded with cold matter, lay flat down on your back, and, while breathing deep, and slow, and uniformly, will yourself to become healthy—in your feet and hands, in your knees and elbows, in your hips and shoulders, in your bowels and liver, in your lungs and brain! The heart will take care of itself. In cases where the weakness is generally distributed, all you are required to practice (while so prostrated and respiring) is the art of concentrating your Will and desires simultaneously on the extremeties first; then work upward and inward progressively; and when, in the lapse of ten minutes of steady, deep breathing, you have reached the brain, repeat the process in the ascending scale, as indicated in the manner aforementioned.

“By this Pneumogastric treatment of yourself, you will receive spiritual strength from the air—nothing is more certain! When, by practice, you can breathe deeply and heroically, and at the
same time put your Will upon the restoration of the general system, the art of fixing your mind upon some particularly diseased part will become less and less difficult. *Consumptive persons*, by simply breathing profoundly, and willing systematically, *may enlarge their chests and lungs beyond the possibilities of disease*. Persons of cold temperature, with irregular habits and bad practices, may "right about face" and become harmoniously healthy. Learn to depend upon yourself—use the infallible remedies of Nature—and, in spite of priest or doctor, you will 'pass from death unto life.'

"**TIME OF EXERCISES.**—In acquiring this psychological power over the destinies of your bodily state, and in becoming a Self-healing Institution, whether home or abroad—it may be necessary to practice (either while on your back, or standing, or walking, or riding,) perhaps three times in each twenty-four hours. Never just before meals, nor soon subsequent to them; but the true time is when chilification is going on; about 90 or 120 minutes after eating. The spirit world will aid you, by forming a secret conjunction with the *pneumogastric* conductor. It is certain, gentle sufferer; do not permit yourself to doubt. Nothing is too good in Nature, in matter, in spirit, or in truth."

In pointing out another expedient, he foreshadows the conscious form of meditation.

**XXXV.**

*Or cognition resulting from sensuous objects may be the cause of steadiness.*

"Of the mind" (*manasah* is understood to) complete the sentence. "Sensuous objects" (*vishaya*) are odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, and that in which these reside as objects is *vishayavati*, the cognition whereof causes the steadiness of the mind. Thus, by directing the thinking principle to the tip of the nose, the cognition of spiritual odour is effected. In the same way the cognition of taste may be effected at the tip of the tongue, the cognition of colour at the forepart of the palate, the cognition of touch at the
middle of the tongue, and the cognition of sound at the root of
the tongue. Thus the cognition of spiritual sense-objects result-
ing through one or other of those organs becomes the cause of
the concentration of the mind. This is to encourage Yogis in
the belief that the Yoga has a fruit.

[By this commentary the meaning of the text remains perfectly
unintellegible to the uninitiated. The reason is, the commen-
tator takes for granted that the rudimentary principles of Yoga
are known to his readers. The purport is that in the act of
Prāṇāyāma (as explained in A. XXXIV) when the Yogī directs his
mind to the tip of his nose &c., he derives in the places mentioned a
sense of those objects which is ordinarily acquired by their natural
organs, and having done so, he feels no inclination to exercise
those natural organs, and his mind settles down into undisturbed
contemplation of the object to which he directs his mind. The
commentator uses the word divya for which I use "spiritual" as
the equivalent. The P. Rahasya uses alaukika or "supernatural"
as the equivalent. The word prarūtta in the text has been taken
by the P. Bhasya to be equal to sañvit or cognition. In the
commentary above and elsewhere the word manas mind has been
sometimes used for chitta, thinking principle].

He describes another expedient of the same kind.

XXXVI.

Or a sorrowless extremely luminous (disposition
being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking
principle).

(The sense of the aphorism must be completed) by the terms,
"disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking
principle."

The word "lumen" (jyotis) means the manifestation (of the
quality) of goodness. When it exists in its fulness, in any disposi-
tion it is called "extremely luminous" disposition (jyotismati).
"Sorrowless" (viśoka) is that disposition in which the power result-
ting from the exercise of the delightfully pure element (goodness)
has removed the grief which is produced by the quality of foulness. It steadies the thinking principle. The purport of this is this:—when the thinking principle is in the quality of goodness located in the cup of the lotus heart as on the waveless milky ocean, and the sensuous functions are all destroyed by the light of knowledge, the steadiness of the thinking principle results as a matter of course.

[Briefly, the purport is that when the thinking principle is totally griefless, and manifest in the extreme refulgence of the quality of goodness, it is steady, and has no cause for vacillation.]

In course of pointing out another expedient, he describes the object of the conscious form of meditation—or discriminate meditation.

XXXVII.

Or. the thinking principle taking a passionless object (becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness).

The phrase "becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness" is understood to complete the sentence.

"The Passionless" (vītarāga) are those who have abandoned all longings for sensuous objects, and their thinking principle, which has destroyed all pain, by being made the object of thought, becomes the cause of steadiness.

[The next expedient is the making the thinking principle of those who have overcome all passions the object of contemplation. Vāchāspti Miśra explains this by saying "the passionless are Kṛishṇa Dvāipāyana and others. To make their thinking principle the object of thought is to rely thereon. Vītarāgah Kṛishṇadvāipāyana prabhūtāya. Teshām chittam tadeśvaravālam-banam, tenopāraktaṁiti."

He describes another expedient of this kind.

XXXVIII.

Or reliance on knowledge resulting from dream or sleep.
"Dream" (śvāpṇa) is the perception by the thinking principle alone of the soul's agency when the functions of the external organs are dormant. "Sleep" (nīdra) has been already defined (A. X). The knowledge which results from "reliance" thereon, i.e., reliance on dream or reliance on sleep, produces steadiness of the thinking principle.

[Although sleep has been defined to be absence of consciousness, the Yogis believe absence of consciousness to be a kind of knowledge. (See. A. X,) Vāchārpatī Miśra gives an illustration to show how the beatific vision of an image of Maheśvara may, on waking, tend to steady the thinking principle in the contemplation of any particular object. Perfectly sound sleep of which on waking we know only that we have slept well and nothing more, is also favorable to steadiness in the same way, perfect calmness of the mind being thereby produced.]

Different men having different tastes, Yogis may affect each a different expedient according to choice, and by meditating thereon attain his object (scil. steadiness of mind). To establish this he says—

XXXIX.

Or by meditating according to one's fancy.

By thinking on anything according to choice, whether external, as the moon, or internal, as a plexus of arteries, the thinking principle becomes steadied.

[The object of this aphorism is to show that by constantly reflecting on any object of choice, the habit is acquired of keeping the thinking principle confined to one object. The choice of course does not extend to carnal objects, for they would tend to excite, instead of allaying, the passions. The moon, or the sun, or other similar object has no such tendency, and certain plexuses within the chest and the abdomen which are believed to be the seats of the thinking principle, are held particularly beneficial in producing steadiness.]

Having thus described the different methods, he proceeds to point out what the fruit thereof is.
CHAPTER FIRST.

XL.

His mastery extends from the minutest atom to the limit of infinite magnitude.

Having by these means acquired steadiness of the thinking principle, the Yogi, by thinking on minute objects, acquires unfailing "mastery" (vaśikāra) over the minutest atoms, i.e., his thinking principle is not baffled even by the reflection of the most minute objects, such as the minutest atoms. In the same way, the reflection of big objects, like the sky &c., to infinite magnitude, never causes any disturbance of the thinking principle, i.e., it becomes independent everywhere. Such is the meaning.

[The purport is obvious. When steadiness is once fully acquired, the thinking principle acquires mastery over every thing, and nothing can baffle it. The result of this perfect nature is transcendental power over all material and spiritual objects; of this full illustrations will follow in Chapter III. The P. Bhāshya adds that when the thinking principle of the Yogi is perfect in this respect, it does not any longer care for the appliances of exercise elsewhere enjoined. Tadvaśikārāt paripūrṇam yoginaśchittham na punaraññhasakrītan parikarmāpekshate iti.]

What becomes of the condition of the thinking principle purified by these methods, he now proceeds to describe.

XLI.

To him of overpowered faculties, there are a concentration and a consubstantiation in (matters relating to) the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, as in a transparent gem.

He, whose faculties have been overpowered, is "of overpowered faculties" (kshinavrītti). With reference to him there is, in regard to the objects of his faculties, no distinction about the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, and there result a "concentration" and a "consubstantiation." Tatātihatvā is concentration in it, (ekāgratā). "Consubstantiation" (tadānīa-
natvā) is becoming of it, for when the thinking principle is lowered, (or reduced in its carnal functions in the way described,) the object of meditation attains superiority. The meaning is, that such a condition (samāpatti), or modification to that form, results.

Of this an example is given. In the case of "a transparent gem" or clear rock-crystal jewel, whatever colour it dwells upon, the same it obtains. In the same way in the transparent, clear thinking principle the form of the object thought of is imposed.

Although the text gives the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, but, according to the order of precedence, the terms should be understood to stand as if written "perceptible, means of perception, and perceiver," for first the meditation is directed to the perceivable; then it is devoted to the perception; and then it is confined to the perceiver, which is mere egoism; for in the case of the soul alone there can be no thinking. Even so, the thinking principle tinged by a substantial or a subtle object of perception assumes its character. In this sense the condition is implied also to the perceived.

[The word kshīna in the text means weakened, but this weakness is not general; according to the P. Rahasya it is confined to those subjects which are not thought of, the power remaining in full force in connexion with the special object of thought: kshīna-vṛttēḥ ātābanavishayātirikta - vishayaniśāna - vṛtti-sunyaśya. Tatsthatva literally being in a thing, ‘there,’ and sthā ‘to be reposited;’ but the commentator gives the equivalent concentration, ēkāgraṭā. Tadanjanatva is literally being tinged thereby, and the stock illustration of the crystal being coloured red by the shoe-flower placed in it is adduced; but the commentator prefers the equivalent tanmayatva "being of that substance." He is, however, not singular in these interpretations. The P. Bhāṣya amplifies the explanation by adding that when the soul, as agent or perceiver, is made the object of thought, the thinking principle becomes manifest in the special form of that soul, and when the emancipated soul is thought upon the think-
CHAPTER FIRST.

The argumentative is that which is influenced by the fancy of word, meaning, and understanding.

That which is perceivable by the organ of hearing, or is an explosion or bursting of sound (śphota), is (technically sound or) "word" (śabda). "Meaning" (artha) is (the sense conveyed by the word indicating) a genus (such as the cow or the horse). "Understanding" (jñāna) is a function of the intellect in which the quality of truth prevails (in preference to the other two qualities). "Fancy" (vikalpa) has been already defined (A. IX) "Affected" (saṁkirna) influenced by them, i.e., by the three, words &c. That modification, in which the three (words &c.) are apparent in an undefined fanciful shape, (i.e., their relations are doubtful in the mind), as the word gau "a cow," meaning a cow, and conveying the notion of a cow, is called "argumentative," (savitarka.)

[The conditions adverted to in the preceding aphorism are fourfold, and thereof the first is called argumentative, inasmuch as in that condition the thinking principle fancies or doubtfully accepts a thing without positive discrimination of the relations between a word or its meaning and the idea conveyed by it. The P. Bhāṣṭya explains it by saying, "Gau is the word, a cow is its meaning, and the idea is that of a cow, and accepting these distinct positions in an undivided form." Gauriti śabdo Gaurityartho Gauriti jñānamityavibhāgena vibhaktānāmāpi grahanam drīṣṭam. The P. Rahasya puts it more clearly by saying "when on hearing the word there is a doubt as to whether the gau is a word, or it is
a meaning, or it is an understanding. Gauriti s'abde s'route sati gauriti s'abde vā gaurityartho vā gauriti jñānam vā evamvikalpah.

(See p. 18.) This is an inferior condition.

The word sphoṭa, which I have rendered into "bursting," is the technical name of the sound which is eternal, and of which spoken words are but manifestations. The theory of some grammarians is that words are eternal, and they become manifest when spoken. Dr. Ballantyne, in his essay on Hindu Philosophy, has given a full account of this dogma.

The opposite of it or the non-argumentative is next described.

XLIII.

That is non-argumentative in which, on the dissolution of memory, the meaning alone without any definite identity is apparent.

When the memory of words and of their meaning has subsided, and the shape rises manifest and distinctly graspable, excluding the sense of understanding, and appearing as if devoid of a definite identity, it is "non-argumentative."

[The P. Bhāshya explains the purport thus: when the intellect, intent upon the form of the object of acceptance, forsakes the accepting understanding which is like itself, and becomes solely of the form of the object, i.e., it becomes of the form of the object accepted, it is non-argumentative. Grāhyasvarūpoparatā prajñā svamiva prajñārūpam grahanātmakam tyaktā padārthamaṭrasvarūpā grāhyasvarūpāpanneva bhavati sā nirvītarakā samāpatti.]

To indicate varieties of it, he says:

XLIV.

By this the deliberative and the non-deliberative as pertaining to subtle objects are also described.

"By this," i.e., by the explanation about the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions, the deliberative (savichārād)
CHAPTER FIRST.

and the non-deliberative (nirvichárá) conditions have been described. How are the latter? "Subtile objects," (sukshmavisaya)—"subtile" rudimentary matter and the organs are so called. By this the former two propositions are made to refer to gross objects. They are dependant on gross matter, whether connected with the ideas of words, meaning, and understanding (as in the case of the argumentative form,) or without them (as in the non-argumentative form.) "The deliberative" (savichárd) is that which is an abstract notion defined by place, time, quality, &c. "The non-deliberative" (nirvichárá) is that in which the abstract notion is manifest as a mere substratum of quality, perfectly independent of all ideas of place, time, quality, &c. These refer to subtile objects.

The object aimed at is to assign the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions to gross matter, and the deliberative and the non-deliberative to subtile objects. The distinction seems to be purely technical, implying only slight differences.

To explain how far this subtile object extends, he says:

XLV.

This subtile objectivity terminates in the indissoluble.

What has been described about the object of the deliberative and the non-deliberative conditions being subtile objectivity extends to the indissoluble. That which does not merge into anything, nor indicates or implies anything is the "Indissoluble" (aliṅga) or First Principle (nature, Prakṛiti), and subtile objectivity extends to that limit. Now in the resolution of qualities, there are four stages, viz., 1, defined character, (viśishta liṅga); 2, undefined character (aviśishtaliṅga); 3, mere character (liṅgamátra); 4, devoid of character, or indissoluble, (aliṅga). The objects of defined character are the (gross) elements. Those of undefined character are the subtile elements and the organs. Mere character is indicative of the Intellect; and devoid of character, the First Principle. Hereby it is said that there is nothing more subtile than the First Principle.
[The word *liṅga* has been defined to be that which indicates or characterises, a mark or sign which is inseparable from it, and, I believe, the word character is its nearest equivalent. The First Principle or Prakṛiti is called *aliṅga* or that which is without an indicator, because by itself it does not specifically indicate anything, and is the subtlest of the categories, and there is nothing more subtle. "It may be urged," argues the P. Bhāshya, "that the soul is more subtle than the first principle, but, though it is true that the characterless (*aliṅga* or Prakṛiti) is more subtle than the characterised, still the same cannot be the case with the soul, since the soul is not the material but the instrumental cause of character, and therefore the utmost limit of subtility must rest with the First Principle." *Nanvastipurushah sukshma iti. Saityam yathā liṅgāt param aliṅgasya saukshmyam, nachāivam-prushasya, kintu liṅgasya anvayikāraṇam purushabhaṅgav hetuḥ bhavati, atah pradhāne saukshmyam niratītām vāyākhyātām."

He now points out the necessity for these mental conditions.

**XLVI.**

These verily constitute meditation with a seed.

"These verily," i. e., the conditions above described, exist with a seed or object. "With a seed," (*savija*) means conscious meditation, (or Samādhi having a distinct recognition,) because such meditations have always something to rest upon.

[These four conditions have been already described in the commentary on Aphorism XVII, and call for no further remarks here.]

Now, these (conscious conditions) maturate into the non-deliberative condition, and therefore he describes the fruit thereof.

**XLVII.**

In the purity of the non-deliberative (condition) there is intellectual contentment.
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"Non deliberativeness" has been already defined. (Aph. XLIV). "Purity" (vaisāradya) means freedom from dirt. The non-argumentative condition is superior to the argumentative. To that the deliberative which has a subtile object in view, (is superior). Again, the non-deliberative, which has no object in view, is superior to the preceding. When by rigorous practice "purity," as the condition of freedom from dirt, is attained "intellectual contentment" results, i. e., the thinking principle, being free from pain and longing, becomes fit to flow in an even course. This is the purity of the thinking principle, abidence in which is steadfastness (Aph. XXXII).

[The four conditions are graded in due order, and the last is declared to be the best of them, because in the highest purity of that condition there is perfect intellectual contentment, in which one can behold all knowledge like one seated in the palace of wisdom can look, as from the top of a mountain, upon groaning mortals below on earth, without being in any way disturbed. Prajñāprāsādamāruhya aśochyah s'ochatojanān, Bhūmishtániva s'aśaa thak sarvān prajñanupasyati.]

He next explains what happens when this condition is attained.

XLVIII.

In that condition knowledge becomes truth-supporting.

That "knowledge" (prajñā) which supports the "truth" (rita) or reality, and never permits it to be covered by misconception (A. VIII) is "truth-supporting" (ritambhara), and in the condition (aforesaid) this is acquired. With the light of that knowledge the Yogi perceives everything in its true character, and acquires the highest Yoga.

[In the next aphorism it will be shown that this perfect knowledge is the same with the transcendental power of knowing things, independently of the ordinary means of ascertaining truth.]

Its distinction from other forms of knowledge is now to be explained.
XLIX.

The knowledge which results from testimony and inference is general, (and differs from this) which has a specific object (in view).

"Testimony" (०'रुतां) is knowledge founded on sacred texts. "Inference" (anumána) has been already defined (Aph. VII).

The knowledge which results from these two has generals for its object, since neither words nor characteristic signs are able, like the organs of sense, to convey a knowledge of particularities. While this knowledge (the one under notice), resulting from the purity (fullness) of the non-deliberative condition, is distinct from them, inasmuch as it has a speciality for its object. When one is in the condition of this knowledge, the truth of all subtile, intercepted, and remote objects becomes manifest in a clear form. The advice is, that for this reason it is proper that every exertion should be made by Yogis for the attainment of this knowledge.

[The transcendental powers referred to above are here described to be the power of observing things which are so subtile, or so intercepted, or so remote that they cannot be observed by the ordinary appliances of perception.]

He now describes the fruit of this knowledge.

L.

The residuum of this is opposed to all other residua.

"The residuum" (sā́nskára Aph. XVIII) which is produced by that knowledge, obstructs all other residua, whether arising during worldly condition or during meditation, i.e., it renders them incapable of achieving their respective works. Since the residua produced by knowledge being absolute, are more powerful, they are able to preclude all residua resulting from non-absolute knowledge. The purport is that for this reason that absolute knowledge should be exercised.
CHAPTER FIRST.

[The purport of this and of the next aphorism has already been explained in the comments on aphorisms XVII and XVIII.]

Having thus described conscious meditation, he now explains the un-conscious form of meditation, (Aph. XVIII).

LI.

On the removal of this also, everything being removed, there is meditation without a seed.

"Of this," i.e., of conscious meditation. "Removal" (nirodha) is dissolution. On its dissolution all functions of thought melting into their causes, and the mere residua which arise in this state being also rejected by the conviction "this is not, this is not," meditation without a seed becomes manifest. On this being accomplished the soul (purusha) becomes pure, and abides solely in its own nature.

[The P. Bhdshya explains the aphorism thus: "That meditation is not only antagonistic to the impressions of the Samadhi state, but also to the residua left by those impressions. But how do the residua of the suppressed (nirodha) state remove the residua of the meditative state? By the influence of the duration of the suppressed state the existence alone of the impressions produced by the suppressed thinking principle is perceptible. As the thinking principle then merges into its own natural form along with all the impressions of the waking, the meditative, the suppressed and the isolated states, their residua can no longer be antagonistic to the natural state of the thinking principle, nor the causes of its (separate) existence. And since the thinking principle, divested of its functions, along with the residua of the isolated state, is suppressed, and in that suppression the soul resides in its own form, it is called pure and liberated.

Now in this (chapter) have been described Yoga, the subject of the work (A. I), its definition by the words the cessation of the thinking principle (A. II), exercise (XIII), dispassion (XV), the
nature of the two means and their varieties (XVI, the conscious and the un-conscious forms of Yoga, the inferior and superior Yoga (XVII—XVIII), the various means of exercising Yoga, easy means of accomplishing it (XIX—XXIII), definition of God (XXIV), his proof (XXVIII), greatness (XXVI), indicator (XXVII), mode of worship (XXV), and its results (XXIX), the perturbations of the thinking principle (XXX), and the pains thereon consequent (XXXI), the means of obviating them by study and benevolence (XXXII-XXXIII), regulation of breath (XXXIV), condition preceding the conscious and un-conscious meditations (XXXV), meditation with a seed, mental afflictions (XLI), their definitions (XLII-XLIV—XLV), their fruits (XLVI—XLVIII), their object (XLIX), and meditation without a seed (LI). Thus is the Yoga chapter explained.

[The above summary has not been translated literally. The original is interrupted by a number of participles and explanatory words which have been omitted as they would have served only to make an uncommonly long sentence very much involved.]

This is the end of the first quarter or Yoga chapter of the commentary entitled Rājamārtanda on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
CHAPTER SECOND.

May the three-eyed Lord of the universe, by whom has been disclosed the several means of obtaining the occult powers of the difficultly-achievable Yoga, be favourable to the attainment of the desired object!

Having in the first chapter explained the Yoga for those whose thoughts are collected, together with the means thereof, the author now, anticipating the question what should be the practice of the means for the achievement of the Yoga for those whose thoughts are in a waking (worldly) state, describes the Kriyá-yoga (practical Yoga), with a view to establish the mode of accomplishing it.

[This chapter is designed for persons who have not obtained control over their passions, but who are nevertheless desirous of practising those works which are calculated to train them for the performance of the highest branches of the Yoga, and to enable them to acquire supernatural powers (riddhis). Inasmuch as this training can be attained only through active exercise of certain duties, and those duties form the topic of this chapter, the chapter is called Kriyá-yoga or "Practical Yoga."]

I.

Asceticism, muttering, and resignation to God constitute the Practical Yoga.

"Asceticism" (tapas) is the observance of the fasts called Krichchhra, Chándráyana and the like enjoined in another Sástra (Dharma-sástra). "Muttering" (sádhya) is the inaudible repetition of particular mantras preceded by the Prānava, (i. e., the syllable Om). "Resignation to God" (I'évāra-pranidhána) is the dedication to the Supremely Venerable all one's works, without
any concern for their fruits. These, it is said, are the Practical Yoga.

[This aphorism defines what Practical Yoga is. It includes the three acts of Asceticism, Muttering, and Resignation to God. The first includes all those acts of fasting and the like which the Smṛiti ordains for the mortification of the flesh. In this sense tapas would be best rendered by religious austerity or self-denial, but the examples given are included under the head of penance. The Yogīs do not exclude any of them, nor, except in the form of seats &c., add any new form of penance. The Kṛichkhra named in the commentary is by some believed to be the same with the Prājāpatya, and by others with the Sāntapana. The first is effected by eating once a day for three days in the morning, then once in the night for three days, then subsisting for three days on food given, unasked, as alms, and lastly fasting for three days. The fast is absolute, and not even a mouthful of water is allowed to be drunk. The second is effected by living for six days on the five products of the cow and water in which kuśa grass has been steeped, and absolutely fasting on the 7th day. The Chāndrāyana has several varieties, but all of them are regulated by the moon’s age, the food being daily reduced by one mouthful from the first day, till on the newmoon no food is taken, and then on the next day beginning with one mouthful the full allowance is got on the day of the fullmoon. These penances are ordained for particular heinous sins. In citing their names it is not the object of the commentator to enjoin that these particular penances should be regularly practised, but simply to cite examples. The Hāthadīpikā enjoins some forms of asceticism suited to the Rāja-yoga. The object is, there should be constant mortifying of the flesh so as to subdue its longings.

Muttering, like the last, is a part of the Smṛiti ritual, largely dwelt upon in the Tantras. Every householder has a particular mantra which he is required to repeat for a certain number of times every day, the number varying from twelve to many thousands according to choice. The muttering is so done as not to be audible to a bystander, but in a manner so that each repe-
tition may be clear and distinct, and fit to be counted by the mutterer. The P. Bhāshya and the P. Rakasya add that sādhvyāya implies either the muttering of a mantra, or the study of that sāstra which relates to emancipation. Pranavādi-pavitrānām japo mokshastraādhyayanam vá.

Resignation to God (prāṇidhāna) has been already explained on p. 28.

These are essentially necessary as preliminary practices, but they do not constitute the Yoga itself.

(To the question) of what use are these, he replies:

II.

It is for the purpose of the contemplation of Samādhi and for weakening afflictions.

“Afflictions” (kleśāh) will be presently described (II, iii.) To “weaken them” is to make them unfit for their respective works. “Samādhi” (meditation) has been already explained (I, xx.) Its “contemplation” (bhāvanā) is repeated cogitation of it in thought. That Yoga which has these contemplation and weakening for its purpose (arthā), object, is so called (kriyā-yoga). What is said is this: These mortifications, &c. when practised, weakening the afflictions of the ignorance residing in the thought, become accessories to Samādhi. Therefore the advice is that the Yogi should first turn his attention to this Practical Yoga.

[The purport of this aphorism has been already anticipated in the remarks on the last preceding Aphorism.]

It has been said (above that the Practical Yoga is wanted) for the purpose of weakening the afflictions, and what those afflictions are he now describes.

III.

Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions.
"Afflictions" (kleśāh) are the five, ignorance, &c., which will be (presently) described. These, being of an obstructive character, i.e., producing distress, become the object of the term affliction. These, abiding in the thinking principle, strengthen the modifications of the (three) qualities which constitute mundane existence.

[Here the names of the afflictions are given, but their definitions are reserved for subsequent discussions. The reason why they are called "afflictions," is explained to be that they tend to promote those modifications of the thinking principle which the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness tend to for worldly purposes. In other words, those functions which attach the mind to the world are afflictions, because they stand in the way of emancipation.]

Although all these are equally afflicting, nevertheless ignorance, being the source (of all of them), is the chief, and to establish this he says:

IV.

Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.

"Ignorance" (avidyā) is delusion; it is in fact the assumption of that being the soul which is not soul. It is the "field" (kṣetra), or ground of production, of those which follow, i.e., egoism and the rest, and each of them may be in one of the four conditions of dormancy, &c. Wherever the reverse-idea-producing ignorance becomes weak, there egoism and the other afflictions are not seen to arise, for it is seen that where the mistaken notion exists there they arise, it follows, therefore, that ignorance is their source.

The "dormant, weak, intercepted or simple." Of these afflictions those which, existing in the thinking principle, do not, owing to the absence of an exciting cause, produce their
effect, are called "dormant" (prasupta), asleep. Thus in childhood. Though residing in a child in the form of instincts those afflictions do not, from want of co-operation of an exciting cause, flare up.

Those afflictions are said to be "weak" (tanu) which, becoming overpowered in their effort to perform their respective functions by their mutually contradictory inclinations, reside in the thinking principle in the form of instincts, but are not able to carry on their work without the aid of numerous auxiliaries. This is the case in the practising Yogi (who being engaged in one particular contemplation does not allow the afflictions to disturb his thoughts. They are in him, but in a condition of weakness produced by their non-indulgence).

Those afflictions are said to be "intercepted" (vichchhinna) which remain with their powers overcome by a particularly potent passion, as desire when the prevailing passion is aversion, or aversion when the prevailing passion is desire: being mutually opposed to each other, they cannot dominate at the same time, (one must for the time intercept the other).

Afflictions are said to be "simple" (udāra) when, having their auxiliaries beside them, they carry on their respective functions. This is the case of the waking condition of those who follow not the ways of the Yoga.

Each of these four (afflictions) has ignorance for its root, and is also attended by it, for nowhere are the afflictions found existing by themselves as opposed to, or independent of, the attendant. When that ignorance, a mere falsehood, is removed by thorough knowledge, these afflictions, like roasted seeds, never sprout again. It follows that these are both rooted in, and attended by, ignorance; hence they are all implied by ignorance. The conclusion is that as all these afflictions are calculated to produce distractions of the thinking principle, it is the foremost duty of the Yogi to exert for their removal.

[In A. III the afflictions have been described to be five in number. In this the author shows that four of them owe their
origin, and are subject, to ignorance. He also shows that they are always present, though not always active. The causes of their want of activity are described to be dormancy, weakness and interception.

He now defines ignorance.

V.

Ignorance is the assumption of that which is non-eternal, impure, painful and non-soul, to be eternal, pure, joyous and soul.

The assumption of a thing being what it is not, is "ignorance" (avidya). That this is its general definition follows from its distinctions as pointed out (in the aphorism). Thus the assumption of eternity in the non-eternal water jar and the like is ignorance. In the same way, the assumption of purity in impure objects, like the body and so forth, that of joy in pain, and that of the soul in the body (which is not soul, are results of ignorance). By these is explained the mistake of confounding vice with virtue and the useless with the useful.

[The P. Bhâshya argues that although the word avidya is formed of the privative particle a with vidya "knowledge," it does not mean simple absence of knowledge, but a conception distinct and the opposite of it, and illustrates it by the examples of amitra and agoshpada, the former of which, though formed of a (absence) and mitra "a friend," does not mean the absence of a friend, but an enemy, and the latter, formed of a and goshpada "the footprint of a cow," does not mean the absence of the footprint of a cow, but a country. Tasyás chamitrágoshpada-vadavastu sa taltvam viññeyam, yathá námitro mitrábhávo na mitramátram, kintu tañcirudhakå sapatnah, yathá vágoshpadam na goshpadábhávo na goshpadamátram, kintu deva eva, tábhjāmanyat vastantaram, evamvidyā na pramánam na pramáyábhávacah, kintu vidyáviparitam jñánántaramavidyeti.]

With a view to explain egoism, he says:
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VI.

Egoism is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

"The power that sees" (drik-sakti,) is the soul (Purusha).

"The power of seeing" (darsana-sakti) is the internal organ produced by the quality of goodness unaffected by the qualities of foulness and darkness. What is said is, that the assumption of the two extremely different things,—the one being the enjoyer and the other the enjoyed,—the active and the inert,—being the same is egoism (asmitā). Thus, when nature (prakriti), though really devoid of the power of enjoying and of intelligence, fancies "I am the enjoyer," "I am the intelligent," the blunder is the affliction called egoism.

[The internal organ is a modification of the quality of goodness, which marks the distinction between itself and the things around it. In this state it is egotism; but when that internal organ ceases to perform this function, and only a sense of mere existence is felt in the thinking principle without any distinction of the self and the things around it is egoism. This definition was anticipated by the commentator in his remarks on A. xvii chapter I, (p. 19) and the author gives it here.]

He defines desire.

VII.

Desire is dwelling on pleasure.

"Dwelling on pleasure" (suhkānusāyī) is lying on pleasure. The longing or thirst for pleasure on the part of him who had experienced it before, and is impelled by its remembrance, is the affliction called desire (rāga).

[The root śī is "to sleep" or "lie down," and literally the translation of anusāyī should be the sleeper, or that which lies on something, but idiomatically I prefer dwelling, as it conveys more clearly the idea intended by the author. Obviously he means the
dwellling on, or keeping alive in the mind, the idea of some object or other. Anusaya means "to follow" or "to pursue," and that would afford a very appropriate rendering of the term here, but in the next aphorism it has been used with reference to pain, and as no one pursues pain knowing it to be pain, that rendering cannot be adopted. It is true the word also means "repentance," and it may be assumed that the author has used the word in two different senses in the two aphorisms, but such an assumption would be unjustifiable in dealing with definitions. The author, in his aphorisms, has nowhere evinced any leaning for rhetoric or verbal ornament, and it is very unlikely that he should use the same word in two consecutive aphorisms in two contradictory senses, when his object is to make things clear, and not to confound.

He next defines aversion.

VIII.

Aversion is dwelling on pain.

"Pain" (dukhha) has been already defined, (C.I, xxxi). That which one, having experienced it, and remembering it, is averse to its means as undesirable, is the affliction called "aversion" (dvesha).

[Three of my MSS. has pratikula-lakshnam for uktalakshanam. If that reading be adopted, the meaning would be "Pain is of an opposite nature," i. e., in the case of pleasure there is a longing or thirst to get the object, while in that of pain, the feeling is the reverse, or avoiding to get it.]

He now defines tenacity of life.

IX.

Tenacity of life is an attachment to the body which relates to the residua of one's former life, even on the part of the wise.
The fear arising from the memory of pain from death endured in a former life prompts the constant wish, "May I not be separated from the body and its objects," and the attachment to the body resulting therefrom, an attachment which exists without an inducing cause, in all beings from Brahmā to an earthworm, is the affliction called "Tenacity of life." (Abhini-vesha.) Thus, it is afflicting in the waking or mundane state. These afflictions should at the outset be destroyed by the Yogi by the exercise of concentration of the mind to one point.

[The only doubtful word in the aphorism is the first. It is formed of the three words, sva "one's own," rasa literally "wish," and vāhī, "that which carries:"—"that which carries or keeps in current one's wish." The commentators have, however, not rendered it so. Without giving a synonym of rasa, the P. Bhāshya uses the word vāsanā in its place (maranaduhkhānubhavādiyam vāsaneti), and that word is the equivalent of sañskāra, which I have rendered into residua. In this way the term svarasavahī means 'that which carries the residua of one's former life.' It proceeds from the memory of former experience, and since no one has in this life experienced the pain of death, it must follow that the fear of death must be the result of the unconscious memory of the experience of a former state of life—and this fear is the cause of attachment to life.]

Since it is not practicable to remove these afflictions without first knowing what they are, the author, having described their names (II, 111) fields, (I, iv) divisions, (II, iv) and characteristics, (II, v to ix,) now explains the division of the means of destroying them, according as they are gross or subtile.

X.

These, the subtile ones, should be avoided by an adverse course.

Those are "subtile" (suksha) afflictions which exist in the form of residua, but have not assumed a modification in the
form of active work. They are to be avoided (heya), eluded, by an adverse course (pratiprasava) or reflex modification. When the thinking principle, with its residua, has accomplished its course and entered into egoism, which is its source, how can these, (afflictions,) being rootless, exist?

[The five afflictions aforesaid are described under two heads, subtile and gross. They are subtile when they exist in the form of residua, i. e., they exist potentially, but are latent. They become gross when they break out into active operation. Now, the latent ones are to be overcome by an adverse course. The natural course is to allow them to manifest themselves through the stimuli of external objects; but if the thinking principle be directed inwards towards egoism, the course of action is adverse to the natural tendency of the residua; and, in the absence of stimuli, they cannot manifest themselves. They cannot sprout, and are, therefore, compared in the P. Bhashya to roasted seeds.]

He next describes the means for the destruction of the gross (afflictions).

XI.

Their functions should be avoided by meditation.

The functions of these afflictions in active operation, which manifest themselves in the form of pleasure, pain, and delusion, should be “avoided,” destroyed, by meditation characterised by the concentration of the thinking principle on a single point. These, being gross, are suppressed by the mere exercise for the purification of the thinking principle, even as dense thick dirt on cloth and the like is removed by mere washing, while that which is subtile in it requires heating and other (arduous) means.

[The means of suppressing the gross afflictions, or those afflictions which are in active operation, is meditation, or confining the thinking principle to one action, and focussing it there to the exclusion of all other objects. The difference lies in this—that in the case of latent afflictions the thinking principle
is directed inward, and no opportunity is given to the latent ones to become active; and in the case of gross ones or those which are in active action, the thinking principle is confined to one object, and thereby all others are excluded. In the one case a desire is repressed by turning away from it, and keeping the thinking principle occupied with another, and in the other no opportunity is given for external stimuli to excite the latent wishes.

The illustration given shows that the subtile ones are more difficult to repress than the gross ones.

Having thus defined the true character of the afflictions he, with a view to explain the residua of works, says:

XII.

The residua of works have affliction for their root, and are felt (either) in this manifest birth, (or) in the unmanifest one.

By the term "residua of works" (karmās'aya) the nature of the residua is explained, for all works are of the form of residua. By (the phrase) "Have affliction for their root" (kles'amūlah) their cause is indicated, for of good or evil works the afflictions are the cause. By (the phrase) "felt in this manifest birth, or in the unmanifest one," the fruition is described. What is felt in the present existence is called "felt in this manifest birth" (drīṣṭajanma-vedanīyah); that which is to be felt in another existence is called "felt in an unmanifest one," (adṛṣṭajanma-vedanīyah). Thus, some virtuous actions, such as the worship of the gods and the like performed with excessive ardour, produce fruits even in this life in the form of kind, age, or experience. Thus, to Nandis'vara, through the influence of his worshipping the lord Maheśvara, change of kind was secured even in this life. Similarly to Viśvāmitra and others kind and age accrued through the force of penance. In the case of some kind alone is changed. Thus in the case of Nahusa and others performing vicious acts with excessive ardour kind alone was changed. So Urvasī was
metamorphosed into a creeper in the garden of Kártikeya. Thus is the rule to be explained distributively or collectively.

[The leading word in this aphorism is karmásaya. Formed of karma “works” and ásaya “virtue and vice,” it implies the results which follow from the performances of works. The word ásaya has been accepted in aphorism 24, chapter I, to be the equivalent of vásaná and saúskára, and for the sake of concordance, and in accordance with the commentators, I render it here in that sense, inasmuch as the results do not manifest immediately, but remain latent to even a second or subsequent life in the form of residua.

The works are described to have afflictions for their root, because all works proceed from ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity for life, technically called the five afflictions, (II, iiii). No work can be performed unless impelled by one or other of these five, and so they are the roots of the residua that are left behind. The fruits of these residua are borne either collectively or singly, and at different times, either in this life or in a subsequent one, and the commentator cites instances to prove this. The story of Nandíśvara becoming a demigod occurs in the Vrīhannandikesvara Purāṇa. The Rámáyaṇa and some of the Purānas give the story of Vis’vámitra, a Kshatriya by birth, becoming a Bráhmaṇa. The Mahábhárata relates the story of Nahusa being changed into a snake by a curse. The story of Urvasí’s becoming, like another Daphne, a creeper, occurs in the drama of Vikramorvasí.]

Now he describes the varieties and distinctions of the residua of works with their fruits.

XIII.

The root existing, the deserts are kind, age, and experience.

The “root” (múla) is the afflictions aforesaid. As long as the afflictions are not removed, the deserts (vipáka), fruition of works,
good and evil, follow in the form of kind, age, and experience. "Kind" (jāti) means being a man or some other being. "Age" (āyus) is always remaining in the same body. "Experience" (bhoga) means sense objects, the senses, and consciousness of pleasure and pain, according as it is accepted in the passive, instrumental, or abstract sense.

The purport of this is this: That as the residua of works repositioned in the thinking principle from time without a beginning, attain maturity, so they, according to their measure, lead to fruition in the form of kind, age, and experience. The afflictions existing with their roots uncut, the residua of works become the originators of deserts. Even as unhusked Sāli paddy, like unroasted seeds, are able to germinate, but husked grains, like roasted seeds, cannot, so the residua of works, un parted from the afflictions, become the germinators of deserts; though such is not the case when the afflictions are removed, or the residua are reduced to the condition of roasted seeds.

[The first difficult word in the aphorism is jāti. Its meaning is obvious enough, but I call it difficult because I can find no satisfactory equivalent for it in the English language. It is formed of the root jan 'to be born,' and means that which is born; but in philosophy it is used to imply species in a very comprehensive sense. It means caste, i.e., distinction of family; or species, that is one distinct from another, as several species in a genus or order; or broader distinctions than what is implied by species; as also the broadest distinctions which naturalists indicate by the term kingdom. The examples given show that the word jāti equally applies to the change of caste, as in a Kshatriya becoming a Brāhman; or to that of species, as in a man becoming a demigod; or to that of a kingdom as in a woman becoming a creeper: I know of no such comprehensive term in the English language. Dr. Ballantyne uses rank, but I doubt if the change of a woman into a creeper or a stone, the change could be idiomatically described as one of "rank." Colebrooke uses
"birth," but the change may take place without a regular birth. For the sake of English idiom the best course would be to use different equivalents under different circumstances, but that would upset the line of argument of the author. Genesis appears to bear close approximation to जाति, and kind is its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In using "kind" as the equivalent, I use what appears less liable to objection than others, but it is by no means a good one.

The second word आयु has been so explained by the commentator as to imply longevity, but the word means simply "age" or "duration of life," which may be long or short according to circumstances:—a meritorious work leading to prolongation of existence in a particular body, whereas a vicious one tending to shorten the span of life.

The third word is भोग, which Dr. Ballantyne renders into "enjoyment;" but inasmuch as here it means the endurance of pain as well as the delectation of pleasure, I prefer "experience," which covers both.

The purport of the aphorism is that the fruition of works leads according to circumstances to change of body into a higher or lower grade, to the prolongation or reduction in the span of life, and to the experience of pleasure or pain.

The P. Bhashya thus explains the time of fruition: "The deserts are of three sorts, kind, age and experience. In regard to them the questions are discussed, 1st, Is one work the cause of one birth, or is it the cause of many births? 2nd, Are many works the causes of many births or of one birth?

One work is not the cause of one birth. Why so? Because there would be no regularity in the fruition of the remainder of innumerable works accumulated from time without a beginning along with a recent work. The objection would also be there would be no inducement for people (to perform many works). Therefore it is wrong.

Nor is one work the cause of many births. Why? Because if out of many works each work was to be the cause of many births,
there would be want of time for the fruition of all the remaining deserts. Therefore it, too, is wrong. Nor can many works be the cause of many births. Why? Because it is not possible for many births to happen simultaneously, and consequently it must be said to happen successively, and then the objection before urged (about want of time) would apply. It follows then that the diverse stock of residua of virtuous and vicious actions performed from birth to death remains in a dominant or a dominated form, and on a death taking place it becomes the cause of a birth, being itself liable to destruction on another stock becoming dominant.''

The above described kind, &c. being the fruits of works, the author, in order to show that they produce fruition according to the works which are their cause, says:

XIV.

They have joy or suffering for their fruit, according as their cause is virtue or vice.

"Joy" (kláda) is pleasure, and "suffering" (paritápa) is pain. Those which have joy and suffering for their fruits are so called, (i.e., by the term kláda-paritápa-pkaláh).

"Virtue" (punya) is fortunate action, and the reverse of it is "vice" (apunya). Those which have virtue or vice for their cause are so called (by the compound term punyāpunya-hetutva).

What is said is this:—those works which proceed from virtuous actions yield joyful fruition in kind, age, and experience. Those which result from vice have painful fruitions.

[The meaning is obvious, and calls for no remark.]

To all ordinary beings the fruition is thus of two kinds; but to the Yogi all are painful; to show this, he says:

XV.

To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of the adversity of the actions of (the three)
qualities, and of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.

The meaning is, that to the "discriminating" (viveki) who has had experience of the afflictions, &c., all manifest sense objects are painful, like tasteful food infused with poison, and therefore should be known as adverse to him, since the thoroughly experienced Yogi feels oppressed by even the slightest pain. Even as the eyeball feels the acutest pain from the mere touch of a fibre of wool which the other organs do not, so the discriminating Yogi is distressed by even very slight pain.

To explain why it should be so, he says, "because of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua." Inasmuch as the longing for objects of enjoyment increases in the same ratio in which they are enjoyed, and the pain proceeding from their non-attainment is unavoidable, therefore pain always follows pleasure, and there is nothing but pain. This is the pain of sequence (parināma-duhkhatva).

Again, since even in the enjoyment of pleasing objects there is always a feeling of aversion against that which is antagonistic to them, anxiety cannot be eluded even while in the enjoyment of pleasures. This is the "pain of anxiety" (tāpaduhkhatalā).

"Pain of residua" (sanskaraduhkkha). The sensation of pleasure, or of pain, arises in the presence of a desirable or an undesirable object, and a corresponding residuum is left on the field (of the thinking principle), and since from such a residuum a corresponding sensation is produced, and since from a great number of such residua the mundane condition is never cut short, therefore all residua are painful.

"From adversity of the action of the qualities" (guna-pritti-virodhát). The effects of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, manifesting in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, being mutually overpowering or overpowered, are hostile to each other. They are everywhere connected with pain, hence they are painful.
What is said is this:—To the discriminating who is anxious to obviate pain to the utmost and absolutely, all the four causes above described, appear in the form of pain, and hence all deserts are said to be of the form of pain.

[The object of this aphorism is to establish that everything connected with worldly life is painful, and Yogis should, therefore, shun them all. To prove this, it is first shown that all joyous actions are followed by pain. (The word parināma in the text here is used for sequence or result, and not modification as in most other places.) There must be a change after the enjoyment of pleasure, and as there is an increase of desire from enjoyment there must be frequent disappointments, and they inflict pain. Even in the act of enjoyment there is always a dread of something that may disturb it, and so it is not unalloyed. Then all actions and all impressions leave behind residua in the field of the thinking principle, and they revive sensations of pleasure and pain. And lastly, the three qualities are adverse to each other, and therefore they create disturbances and cause pain. The conclusion is a state of pessimism, from which the only relief is to be had by totally cutting oneself off from all worldly affairs. This pessimism forms the basis of all the leading systems of Indian philosophy, and is not unknown in Europe. According to Hartmann, “if we balance our pleasures and pains, the latter greatly exceed the former.” Schopenhauer goes further, and assigns a negative nature to pleasure, which is very much the same as the doctrine of Leibnitz who assigns a privative character to pain. He holds that “all pleasure causes an exhaustion of the nervous processes, and are in themselves indirect, resulting from the cessation or intermission of pain, and seldom emerges into consciousness, whereas pain eo ipso generates consciousness.” He asks, “what, for instance, are all the pleasures of health, of youth, of freedom, of sufficient means? Are they anything but the absence of sickness, of old age, of slavery, of poverty? and is not work itself an evil? How great misery does it entail upon the toiling masses of
our fellow countrymen? Does any one work of his own free will?" He adds, "no amount of pleasure can compensate for any degree of pain." Again, "human life oscillates between pain and ennui, which states are indeed the ultimate elements of life." Hartmann holds pleasure and pain to be "qualitatively similar, and only different in quantity." (Philosophie des Unbewussten). Socrates aptly describes pleasure and pain to be "fastened together from one crown." (Plato, Phædo.) Poets generally revel in the pleasures of this world, but Byron, one of the greatest among them, says—

"Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er thy days from anguish free;
And know, whatever thou hast been,
'Tis something better—not to be."

The question then arises whence is the deliverance to come? and an able writer thus summarises the answer of the pessimists. "In knowing that the world is radically and necessarily bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for that old affirmation of the Will to live. It leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of the Will, that true nirvāṇa, in which there is no more Will, and therefore no longer an ideal presentation or a real world." (Westminster Review, XLIX, 128.) This is almost the very language of Kapila.

Since pain, residua, works, and the fund of deserts, as aforesaid, are produced by Ignorance, and since Ignorance is of the form of false knowledge, and should be destroyed by perfect knowledge, and since perfect knowledge is that which decides what should be rejected and the cause thereof, and what should be approved and its cause, he says this by way of explanation:

XVI.

Avoidable is the pain not yet come.
CHAPTER SECOND.

Inasmuch as the past is gone (and cannot be recalled), and that which is being experienced cannot be avoided, that worldly pain which has not yet come (but may come) is what should be avoided. This is what is said here.

[The word heya is derived from the root ād 'to quit,' and means both that which should be shunned and that which can be avoided. The English equivalent has not this double sense, but it affords the nearest approach to the Sanskrit term. The injunction is, since the past and the present are beyond control, exertion should be made to preclude the possibility of future pain. Dr. Ballantyne is quite right in rendering the aphorism into "what is to be shunned is pain not yet come," but when heya is used as an adjective, this phrase "that which is to be shunned," is too lumbering to be used with convenience. Avoidance-worthy conveys the exact meaning, and is more easy of manipulation, but it too is lumbering. A single term is wanted, and, not knowing any English word of the kind, I use what appears to me to approach the nearest to the original, without being its exact equivalent.]

He now describes the cause of the avoidable.

XVII.

The conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle is the cause of the avoidable.

The "spectator" (ādriśṭā) is the soul of the form of intelligence. The "spectacle" (ādṛṣṭya) is the principle of understanding (intellect). The conjunction, "sānīyoga, i.e., coming into the relation of the enjoyer and that which is to be enjoyed, of these two, without due discrimination, is the "cause," (hetu) producing agent, of the "avoidable," (heya) which is pain resulting from the modifications of the qualities, and that is the world. The meaning is that on the cessation of that conjunction worldliness subsides.

[In this aphorism "the avoidable" is used to imply the affairs of the world. Those affairs result from the conjunction or
interaction of the soul and the intellect, and inasmuch as worldliness is invariably associated with pain, and that pain cannot be suppressed as long as that worldliness lasts, and for the sake of emancipation worldliness should be avoided, that which is to be avoided is here called the avoidable, or the avoidance-worthy. The word sañyoga means conjunction, but here a mere reflection of the soul is what is meant. The reflection results from propinquity. There is never an actual contact.]

Having described the conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle, he now explains the nature, the function, and the motive of the spectacle.

XVIII.

The spectacle is of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is the purpose of for experience and emancipation.

"Illumination" (prakāśa) is the nature of the quality of goodness. "Action" (kriyā) in the form of exertion, is that of foulness. "Rule" (sthiti), in the form of regulation, is that of darkness. That which has illumination, action and the rest for its essential nature is so called, (i.e., by the term prakāśa-kārya-sthiti-śīlam). By this the nature of the spectacle is defined.

"It is of the form of the elements and the organs" (bhūten-driyātmakam). The "elements" (bhūtas) are, according as they are gross or subtile, the earth, &c. and the rudiments of odour, &c. The "organs" (indriya) are threefold, according as they are the organs of sense, the organs of action, and the internal organ. That of which these two (the elements and the organs), in the forms of the preceptor and the precept, are the natural modifications, not different from its own form, is called "of the form of the elements and the organs." By this its action is also described.

"Experience" (bhūga) has been already defined, (II, xiii). "Emancipation" (apavarga) is the cessation of worldliness result-
ing from discriminative knowledge. That which has these two, (bhoga and apavarga) for its “object” (arthā) or requirement, is the spectacle. This is the meaning.

[There would be no spectacle if there was not in it a power of manifestation, i.e., of illumination, or light. Without some action, too, it could not be manifest; and to be manifest it must have some rule or order. Hence the three are described to be the three essentials of its existence, or in other words its nature. The esoteric interpretation of this is that the spectacle is essentially the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, which must be in action to produce spectacle. It is of the form of the elements and the organs. The organs could not alone produce spectacles, nor would the elements produce spectacles if there were no organs to perceive them and communicate them to the intellect. The independent existence of the two, unconnected with each other, would also fail to produce a spectacle. They must be brought together to do so, and therefore it is that the spectacle is described to be of the nature of illumination, and of the form of the elements and the organs. The purport of this round-about expression is that the intellect is the spectacle when it is acted upon by the elements and the organs, or the elements and the organs are modified in the form of the intellect. The word used in the text is démd, and it is explained to be a modification not different from its natural form or identity (svarupābhinnah parināmāh. What this natural form is is not apparent. Obviously the natural form of the intellect, or Buddhi, would be the meaning, but from what follows, Prakṛiti would seem to be what is meant. I shall notice this lower down, (A. xix, xxi).

The motive or object of the spectacle is twofold,—it ministers to our enjoyment, and it may be made to help us in our endeavours to attain emancipation from the bondage of the earth.

The word sthiti means fixity or abidance, but the Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudi explains it to mean rule, regulation, or order. Had there been no order or rule, illumination and action would be continuous, and there would be no cessation or break. It is the
intervention of darkness that causes the break or order of the manifestation of light and action; this is implied by sthiti. It implies the quality of darkness.]

To describe the phases of this spectacle in its various conditions, in the forms of modifications which should be known as fit to be avoided, he says:

XIX.

The specific, the unspecific, the solely mergent, and the immergent are the divisions of the qualities.

"The divisions of the qualities," i.e., their specific conditions, should be known to be four—this is enjoined. Thereof the "specific" (viṣesha) are the gross elements and the organs. The "unspecific" (apiṣesha) are the subtile elements and the internal organ. The "solely mergent" (īśyamātra) is intellect. The "immergent" (alinyga) is the unmanifest or undiscrete, i.e., Prakṛiti. This is what is said. Since the relation everywhere of this undiscrete of the form of the three qualities is necessary to be known at the time of commencing knowledge, the four divisions are defined.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain that the spectacle assumes different forms under different circumstances. It is "specific" or well-defined when it refers to the elements and the organs. It is "unspecific" or undefined when related to the subtile elements and the internal organ or the mind. It is "solely mergent" or mere thought when it refers to the intellect or the thinking principle. And it is "immergent" or unmanifest or undiscrete when referring to Prakṛiti. Here Prakṛiti is included as one of the forms or phases of the spectacle, though in the commentary on the seventeenth aphorism the spectacle has been defined to be the intellect or the principle of understanding (buddhitattva). This inconsistency is explained away by saying that the intellect is but a modification of Prakṛiti, and, inasmuch as its primary form is Prakṛiti, the spectacle must include
Prakṛiti. The words used in explaining the term ātmā in the commentary on the last aphorism—"a modification not different from its primary form," (svarāpābhinnah pariṇāmah)—supports this inference. This is, apparently, different from the doctrine of Kapila who assigns 23 out of the 25 categories to the spectacle, leaving out the soul and Prakṛiti; but in reality there is no difference, except in the phraseology, as will be shown in the twenty-first aphorism.

The four terms have been differently rendered by different translators. The terms used above have been taken from Colebrooke and Wilson's 'Sāṇkhya Kārikā.' Mr. Davies, in his 'Hindu Philosophy,' adopts the first two, but for "mergent" uses "attributive," and for "immergent" its negative. Dr. Ballantyne uses "diverse," "non-diverse," "merely resolvable" and "irresolvable." In translating aphorism 45 of Book I, I have rendered these words collectively with the subject, liṅga, into "defined character," "undefined character," "mere character" and "devoid of character."

Since the detestableness of spectacle must be first known, and it having been described along with its conditions, to show what should be accepted, the spectator, the author now says:

XX.

The spectator is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas.

"The spectator" (dṛṣṭā) is soul. He is "absolute sentience" (dṛṣīmātra), sensation only. The object of using the term "absolute" (mātra) is to preclude the idea of the quality and the qualified, (i. e. he is himself sensation and not possessed of sensation). Some explain sensation to be an attribute of soul.

He, the spectator, ‘though pure,’ (śuddhapi), i. e. although existing by himself in his own essence, being above all liability to modification and the like, “directly beholds intellected ideas.” "Intellected ideas" (pratyayas) are knowledge tinctured by
worldly objects. "Directly" (anu), without any intervention, or without any medium, he beholds (paśyati).

What is said is this. Soul attains his spectatorship by his proximity to intellect, which alone is tintured or influenced by passing objects.

[The soul is sentience only, i.e., it consists of sentience and nothing more. In this condition it is absolutely pure, being unalloyed by any other object. It, nevertheless, directly beholds intellected ideas, or is the percipient, of all ideas without any intervention. This is effected by its proximity to the intellect, which receives the impressions of the outer world. The act of modification or change which perception implies is effected in the intellect, and does not extend to the soul. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of maintaining the immutability and perfect purity of the soul, for the admission of change would destroy its immutability and absolute purity.]

To show that soul alone is the experiencer, he says:

XXI.

Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle.

"Spectacle" (dṛṣṭya) has been defined above (II, xviii). 'Its soul' (ātmā) is its true nature. It, "the soul of the spectacle," is required for "his purpose," for the purpose of consummating the experiencership of soul to the exclusion of all selfish ends. Pradhāna in activity does not work with a view to attain any aim of its own, but to accomplish the experiencership of soul.

[The meaning is that the true nature of the spectacle acts solely to accomplish the purpose of soul, and not for any purpose of its own, for it has none such. It will be noticed that the text says it is the soul of the spectacle, and not the spectacle itself, that subserves the purpose of soul, and the question arises what is its soul? The word used in the text is ātmā, which means soul, i.e., the soul of the spectacle subserves the purpose of the soul of a living being. The commentator explains ātmā by svarūpa "its own natural form,"
or true nature. In the commentary on A, xix, he uses the words svarūpābhinnah pariṇāmaḥ, or "a modification not different from its primary form," neither of which carries us directly to what is meant. It is obvious, however, from the use of the word Pradhāna—Prakṛiti in the commentary on the aphorism under notice, which in activity, is said, "not to work with a view to attain any aim of its own," that the "soul of the spectacle" is but another form of expression for Prakṛiti. That Prakṛiti in activity is the spectacle is abundantly evident in the leading works of the Sāṅkhya system. Thus, in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā:

"For the sake of soul's wish, that subtle person exhibits (before it) like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence." (Verse उन्न). Again, "as a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul." (Verse ५४). Again: "Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of the ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities." (Verse ४५). Again "he desists because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation." (Verse ५६). Similarly the Sāṅkhya Sūtra: "Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart carrying saffron (for the sake of its master)." (Ballantyne, III, वश्या). Again, "just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energising, desist, because of the end having been attained (in the shape of soul's aim)." (Ibid. III, ५५). Nor is there any inconsistency in this, for intellect does not differ from Prakṛiti except in being in activity; and "soul," "true nature," "original shape of the intellect," and other similar expressions must imply Prakṛiti or nature, and nothing else. This will explain the remarks made in the note on Aphorisms xvii and xix.

Commenting on the passages quoted from the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, Mr. Davies observes, "Beautiful as poetry, but not very
philosophic, nor in direct harmony with other parts of the Sāńkhya philosophy. Kapila, or Iśvara Krishṇa, forgets that nature (Prakṛiti) has no personality, no powers, no volition, and no consciousness," (p. 95.) This is not fair towards Iśvara Krishṇa, who provides for such criticism by saying, "as the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the development of nature causes the liberation of soul;" (Verse lix;) and Kapila cites the unintelligent cart carrying saffron for its owner.]

If the accomplishment of the experience of soul be thus the only aim, then, on the accomplishment of that object, Prakṛiti, having no other object in view, should cease to be active, and the cessation of all modification in it, itself being pure, (i. e., having the three qualities in equipose) all spectators should be free, and it would follow that the world would be cut short. Suspecting such a consequence, he says:

XXII.

Destroyed in the case of him whose purpose has been attained, she is still active, for she is common to others besides him.

Although she (Prakṛiti—nature) becomes "destroyed" (nashṭa), devoid of action, in the case of some one soul which has attained its purpose, (kritārtha), by experiencing the world till the manifestation of discriminative knowledge, yet she, being common to all souls, remains active (anashṭa) in other cases. It follows that Prakṛiti, being common to all experiencers, can never be totally destroyed, nor can the emancipation of one imply the emancipation of all. This is what is meant.

[The conclusion arrived at in the next preceding aphorism, to the effect that on knowledge being attained, Prakṛiti ceases to act, and becomes functionless, is calculated to suggest the idea that her cessation from her action would apply to all souls, so that on one soul attaining emancipation all souls would be free, there being no active ministering Prakṛiti to keep them supplied with
external impressions. This, however, is not the case. The destruction, or cessation, of action, is confined to the particular soul concerned. When a soul has, through discriminative knowledge, attained his aim he ceases to be influenced by Prakṛiti, and quod that soul Prakṛiti is destroyed; but as regards other souls which have not attained their aims she remains fully active; and this is indicated by the paradox "though dead, still she is alive:" naksṭopyanāśhātam. This is the natural consequence of nature being one, and souls many. The P. Bhāṣyā explains the reason by saying that the contact of the quality to the qualified is without a beginning; dharmāṇām anādīsaṅyogītāt dharmamātṝānām apya anādīsaṅyogah.

Having described spectacle and spectator he proceeds to describe their conjunction.

XXIII.

Conjunction is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the inherent power and the lordship of power.

He defines it through its function. "Inherent power" (svāṅkṣṭ) is the nature of the spectacle. "Lordship of power" (svāṁśakṣṭ) is the identity of the spectator. That "conjunction" (saṅyoga) which is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the two, existing correlated as the knowable and the knower, is the natural condition of the relation of the experience and the experiencer, and no other. Nor is their conjunction of a different character from their respective natures, which are eternal and all pervading. The character of the experience as the experience and of the experiencer as the experiencer is established from time without a beginning, and that is the conjunction.

[The purport of this is that there is an inherent relation between the experience as experienceable, and the experiencer as experiencer from time without a beginning; that is, this relation is not casual or adventitious, produced at particular times by particular causes,
but natural and always existing. This relation of the two is indicated by the term sañyoga or conjunction, and this conjunction or the natural relation of the two is the cause of worldliness. As will be explained afterwards, the conjunction is not actual or material, but a mere reflection of the one on the other.]

He now describes its cause

**XXIV.**

Its cause is ignorance.

That which has been described before (II, iv) as "ignorance" (avidya), having the nature of doubt and delusion, is the cause of the conjunction which has the form of indiscriminateness.

[The object of the text is to say that ignorance is the cause of the conjunction of soul with intellect, and that conjunction produces indiscriminateness, or the want of power on the part of soul to distinguish between itself and intellect, and the failure to do so leads to the feeling of the pleasures and afflictions of the world being borne by it. When the differences of the two are distinguished, the conjunction dissolves, and soul is free. Dr. Ballantyne has been misled by the presence of the word Aeya in the preamble of the following aphorism into the supposition that that word is a part of the aphorism under notice, and having incorporated it he has interpreted it as such. The word, however, has been cited with reference to its use in a preceding aphorism.]

The avoidable (hýa) is the objective of the verb to avoid (hó), and to explain what that avoidance is, he says:

**XXV.**

From its absence there is absence of conjunction, and that is, avoidance. Thereupon results the isolation of the spectator.

"Its," i.e., of ignorance. On its "absence" (abháva), i.e., on its being irradiated by perfect knowledge which is its essential
opposite, the effect of the conjunction ceases, or is absent, and this absence is called "avoidance" (hána). The meaning is this: it is not, practicable to separate ignorance like an embodied object, but, on discriminative knowledge being produced, this conjunction, which has indiscriminitativeness for its cause, it of itself ceases, and this is its avoidance (hána). That which is an avoidance of the conjunction, is assumed to be an "isolation" (kaivalya) of the eternally isolated soul. In this way the nature, cause, and effect of the conjunction is explained.

[The meaning is that when ignorance is irradicated by a right apprehension of its relation to soul, its relation with soul ceases, and this surcease makes the solitary eternal soul isolated from ignorance and its consequences, and the soul remains isolated, as is its nature. All my MSS. give the reading "of eternally isolated" (nityakaivalyasya,) but Dr. Ballantyne, has found a different version; his text has nityam kevalasya, which would give the meaning "there is eternal isolation of the solitary or isolated"—kevalasya nityam kaivalyam. The isolation is in either case assumed to be everlasting, and hence this isolation is believed to be final deliverance from bondage.

The word kaivalya is derived from kevala, "alone," and "isolation" appears to be its most appropriate rendering; but, inasmuch as this isolation takes place by withdrawing or detaching the soul from the phenomeral world, Colebrooke and Wilson use "abstraction." The Sánkyatattva-kaumudi defines it to be "absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must, therefore, be something different from intellect and the rest which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a separation form their own essence." (S'astranám maharshánám divya-lochanánám cha kaivalyam chátyantikadukkha-trayaprasama-lakshanam na buddhyádinám sambhavati, te hi dukkhátmakáh katham svabhávádibhik mochayitum ōkyánti.) Vijnána Bhikshu defines it in the same way, and calls it absolute extirpation of pain (dukkhátyantikochchhedah). Any way, it is the final reward
of the knowledge advocated and the practice of meditation enjoined in this system of philosophy.]

Now, by way of describing the means of avoidance he points out the cause of the acceptable.

XXVI.

The means of avoidance is the manifestation of undisturbed discriminative knowledge.

"Discriminative knowledge" (viveka) is the name of the knowledge (which shows) that qualities are distinct from soul. Its "manifestation" (khyāti) is the means (upāya) or cause of the "avoidance" (hāna) or rejection of the visible. How should this be? It should be "undisturbed," (aviplavā). That which has no interruptions, or breaks or repeated intervals of waking from meditation, is called undisturbed.

The purport of it is this: on the dissolution of ignorance, from the contemplation of that which is adverse to it, the cessation of all ideas of relationship, agency, &c., the vanishing of the dirt of foulness and darkness, and the refluent modification of the intellect, the reflection of soul on intellect is called discriminative knowledge. And by the constant or uninterrupted prevalence of it the function of the spectacle ceases, and this is isolation.

[The object of the aphorism is twofold; 1st, to point out the means of avoiding the avoidable, 2nd, to indicate, by implication what should be accepted. The means of avoiding the avoidable, that is ignorance, is the cultivation of discriminative knowledge without any break or interruption. Light and darkness cannot exist conjointly, light must always destroy darkness, and as discriminative knowledge is light, and ignorance darkness, the one disappears on the other becoming manifest. Were, however, the light to be fitful, or interrupted, there would be certain periods of light and others of darkness, and to preclude this the injunction is added that the light "should be undisturbed" or uninterrupted.
CHAPTER SECOND.

The second object is implied, but not pointed out. If continuous light is necessary it follows as a matter of course that that is what should be accepted.

Having described the enlightenment which takes place in the soul on the taking place of discriminative knowledge, he defines the nature of the discriminative knowledge.

XXVII.

Of that there are, up to its utmost stage, seven kinds of enlightenment.

"Of that," i.e., of the produced discriminative knowledge, the "enlightenment" (prajñā), with the understanding of what should be known is, to its "utmost stage," (prāntabhūmi) i.e., to the stage of Samādhi, along with all its accessories, of seven kinds.

Thereof four are liberation from work, viz., (1) The knowable has been known by me. (2) There is nothing remaining to be known. (3) My afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome. (4) Knowledge has been acquired by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me. Thus, in these states, by rejecting all other conceptions, these kinds of understanding are produced. This understanding, which is pure knowledge regarding work, is called liberation from work.

Intellectual liberation is of three kinds, viz., (1) my intellect has accomplished its purpose. (2) The qualities have finished their domination over me; like stones fallen from the crest of a mountain they cannot go back to their place; for, tending to dissolution in their own cause, and there being a want of the original cause which is ignorance, and in the absence of a motive, how can there be springing up of the evil ones? (3) And my meditation has been identified with my soul. Such being the case I am existing in my real nature. These three kinds are intellectual liberation. Thus, on the springing up of this sevenfold knowledge to the utmost stage (of meditation) the soul is said to be isolated.
The knowledge which is the aim and object of this system of philosophy is, according to its different states of perfection, classed under two heads; one relating to works, and the other to intellect. The first of these two heads is then divided into four, and the second into three sub-heads, making altogether seven stages. The lowest stage is that in which the Yogi feels that he has known all that has to be known. The next is that in which he, in addition to the first, feels that he has nothing more to learn. In the third there is, in addition to the first two, the conviction, that all impediments to knowledge have been destroyed, and there is nothing more to destroy. These three lead to the conviction that the full amount of discriminative knowledge has been acquired, and this constitutes the fourth. All these refer to external nature, and since they are connected with the active creation or works, they are called liberation from work. The second group refers exclusively to the intellect or the thinking principle. The convictions, 1st, that the intellect has done its office by pointing out the distinction between soul and nature; 2nd, that the qualities which govern the functions of the intellect have lost their influence; and 3rd, that the intellect has merged in the soul, refer to the relation of the intellect to the soul, and as the conviction is that the intellect has lost its power on the soul, therefore, it is called intellectual liberation. All these, it will be perceived, are dependant upon judgment, or consciousness of the effects of certain actions, and therefore relate to conscious or seeded meditation. (Cf. B. I, A. 17.) The function of deliberation or judgment resulting from ratiocination is in every instance present, and the ideas of, I, me, and mine, govern the whole. But when the judgment is brought to this final stage there is nothing more to do, and then follows the unconscious condition which is absolute isolation.

Having described that the cause of discriminative knowledge is the cessation of conjunction, he now explains what are the means of its origin.
On the decay of impurity through the practice of the accessories of the Yoga, there is an illumination of the understanding till discriminative knowledge (results).

"The accessories of the Yoga" (Yogāṅga) are what will be presently described, (xxix.) "The practice" (anushṭhāna) thereof is the intelligent exercise of the same till discriminative knowledge results. "On the decay of impurity," (asuddhi-kshaya), i.e., on the decline of the impurity which is of the form of afflictions of the character of an envelope to the manifestation of the thinking principle, whatever "Illumination of the understanding" (jñānadipti) takes place, greater or less, by the modification of the principle of goodness till the time of the manifestation of the discriminative knowledge, the same becomes the cause of that manifestation: this is the meaning.

[The commentary explains the aphorism in a roundabout way. The purport is that by the practice of certain exercises the impurities which surround the thinking principle are gradually destroyed, and as they are destroyed so there results a gradual enlightenment which culminates, on perfect maturity, in discriminative knowledge.]

The decay of impurity by the practice of the accessories of the Yoga having been thus described, the question arises what are those accessories? (To this question) he replies.

Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation are the eight accessories.

Some of these being directly beneficial to profound meditation are intimate accessories, such as devotion, &c. Others subserve profound meditation by eradicating hesitation and adverse
feeling of slaughter, &c., such as restraint, obligation, &c. Among them posture and the rest are successively subservient (to samādhi). Thus on the acquisition of posture there is steadiness in the regulation of breath. The successive ones are to be explained in the same way.

[These eight are classed under two heads, 1st, general or extrinsic, and, 2nd, special or intrinsic. The first two are general, because they are obligatory at all times; the other six are intrinsic, because they subserve the purpose of the Yoga, but are not otherwise necessary. What these eight are will be explained in the following aphorisms.]

He now successively explains their nature.

XXX.

Restraint includes abstinence from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and avarice.

"Slaughter" (ahiṣṭā) is work which requires the destruction of life; it is the root of all evils, and its absence is "non-slaughter," (ahiṣṭa). As slaughter should be avoided at all times, its absence implied by non-slaughter is first mentioned.

"Veracity" (satya) is conformity in mind and speech with fact.

"Theft" (steya) is forcibly taking another's property; and its absence is "non-theft" (asteya).

"Continence" (brahmacharya) is subjugation of carnality.

"Non-avarice" (aparigraha) is the non-acceptance of objects for the promotion of enjoyment.

These five, non-slaughter, &c., are indicated by the term yama, restraints, and reckoned as accessories to Yoga.

[These restraints figure prominently in all Hindu systems, and are by no means peculiar to the Yoga. They obtain equal prominence among the Jains and the Buddhists; the latter call them Paramitās. Using the term restraint, for Yama, I have found it necessary for the sake of English idiom and uniformity of expression to use the roundabout form of abstinence from false-
hood, &c., instead of the direct positive terms veracity (satya), &c., which the text employs. They form the ground-work without which no religious superstructure is possible.]

He points out a peculiarity of these.

XXXI.

These are the great austerities of all stages, irrespective of kind, locality, time, and compact.

"Kind" (jāti), such as Brāhmaṇhood (conf. ante, p. 71). "Locality" (deśa), such as particular sacred pools, &c. "Time" (kāla), such as the fourteenth lunation and the like. "Compact" (samaya), the requirement of a Brāhmaṇa, &c. These are called the great austerities (mahāyātras). They are imperative in all conditions or stages of the thinking principle, "irrespective" (anavachchhinna) of these four conditions of kind, &c., i.e., it does not mean that "I shall not kill a Brāhmaṇa," "I shall not kill any one in a sacred pool," "I shall commit no slaughter on the 14th lunation," "I shall not kill except for gods, Brāhmaṇas, &c.," implying four specific conditions, but that "I shall not for any purpose whatsoever, kill any one at any place, at any time." The others should be explained in the same way. Thus, when these practices are universal, without any qualification, they are called "great austerities." Their interrupted observance is not so.

[The purport is that these restraints should be observed with reference to all kinds of being, at every place, at all times, and under every circumstance, without any qualification whatsoever. The object of advertting to "compact" is to leave no room for religious sacrifices, such as the Vedas enjoin. They are, in the estimation of the Yogi, as objectionable as unauthorised slaughter.]

He next describes obligation.

XXXII.

The obligations are purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord.
"Purification" (saucha) is of two kinds, external and internal. External (váhya) means the washing of the body with earth, water, &c. The internal (antara) is the washing, by means of friendliness and the like, of all dirt from the thinking principle. "Contentment" (santosha) contentedness. The others have already been explained. These, purification and the rest, are indicated by the term niyama, "obligation."

[These obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise. They must be attended to very carefully as much to prepare oneself for the performance of the Yoga, as for the well-being of ordinary worldly life.]

How these are accessories to the Yoga, he next explains.

XXXIII.

By the exclusion of the questionable the thought of its opposite (is acquired).

(Those things which) cause doubts or questioning are "questionables" (Vitarka), and these, including slaughter and the like, are inimical to the follower of Yoga. When they are obstructed or excluded by the thought of their opposites, then Yoga becomes easily achievable, and the restraints and obligations consequently become accessories to Yoga.

[The restraints keep one from the performance of certain questionable acts, and the obligations train one habitually to avoid the questionables, and thereby the thinking principle is prepared for undisturbed concentration in the performance of the Yoga. The restraints and the obligations necessarily become accessories to the Yoga, and are therefore so called.]

Now he successively describes the natures, the distinctions, the varieties, the causes, and the fruits of the questionables.

XXXIV.

The questionables are slaughter and the rest. (Whether) they are done, caused to be done, or abetted; (whether) preceded by longing, anger or delu-
sion; (whether) slight, moderate or excessive; they have pain and ignorance for their endless fruits. Hence (the necessity) of the thought of opposites.

The aforesaid slaughter and the rest are first divided into three kinds, viz., done, caused to be done, and abetted. Thereof those which are accomplished by oneself are “done” (krita). Those which follow from orders to the effect “do them,” “they should be done,” are caused to be done kirita). Those which, on being accomplished by others, are encouraged by (the saying) “well done, well done,” are “abetted” (anumodita). These three forms are described to prevent mistakes respecting them; otherwise a dull-witted person might fancy, “the slaughter has not been completed by me, so no fault rests on me.”

To indicate their causes he says, “proceeded by longing, anger, or delusion.” Although longing and anger are first noticed, yet since delusion, which is characterised by its accepting that to be soul which is not soul, the source of all pains, and since longing and anger arise from distinctions about differences of relation as to one’s own or another, delusion should be known to be the root, i.e., all faults proceed from antecedent delusion. “Longing” (lobha) is thirst. “Anger” (krodha) is an inflammatory function of the thinking principle, which sets aside all sense of discrimination about what is proper and what is improper. Each of these is threefold, according as it is distinguished by being done, caused to be done, &c., and slaughter and the rest are divisible into these according as they are caused by delusion, &c.

They are again divided into three kinds according as they are “mild, moderate, and excessive.” “Mild,” (manda) are slow, i.e., neither excessive nor moderate. The “moderate” (madhyama) are neither mild nor excessive. The “excessive” (adhimättra) are ardent, neither mild nor moderate.

Thus there are nine kinds, and these being three-fold the total becomes twenty-seven. Again, of the mild &c., each being divisible according as it is mild, moderate and excessive, becomes
threefold. The combination to be made as it becomes appropriate; thus mildly mild (mridu-mridu) "mildly moderate" (mridu-madhya), "mildly ardent," (mridu-tivra).

Their fruits he describes (by the words) "having pain and ignorance for endless fruits." Pain (dukkha) is a function of the quality of foulness, manifesting itself in the form of repugnance. "Ignorance" (ajnána) is false knowledge in the form of doubt or error. Their fruits are indicated by (the compound term) duhkhaajñánánanta-phaléh. From such pain and ignorance proceed "endless" (ananta) unintermitting fruit. What is enjoined is that these should be overcome by the Yogi, who has known their nature, cause, &c. by thinking on their opposites.

[The works condemned by the restraints and the obligations have been lumped together under the name of questionable (Vi¢ar-ka) for easy treatment, and then their natures, distinctions, varieties and fruits are generally described. They call for no explanatory remark.]

In order to explain how perfections arise successively by ardent exercise of these (duties) he says:

XXXV.

When non-slaughter is confirmed (there is) near him abandonment of enmity.

In the neighbourhood of him who is confirmed in non-slaughter there is "abandonment of enmity" (vairatyága), or harmless abidance even on the part of the naturally cruel, such as of serpents and mungooses. The meaning is, those that are addicted to injury, give up their injurious nature.

[The purport is obvious. When the restraint from slaughter has been acquired there cannot exist any feeling of enmity, and, naturally hostile individuals, having acquired it, live in peace and harmony, like serpents and mungooses, which are naturally hostile to each other, and yet under the influence of the virtue may dwell together without injuring each other.]
He next describes what becomes of him who practices veracity.

XXXVI.

In the confirmed in veracity (there is) asylum of the fruit of works.

"Works" (kriyāḥ) are the sacrifices, which, when performed, yield the fruits heaven, &c. The Yogi who practices veracity rises to such greatness that he attains the fruits without performing those works, and at his bidding they may be attained by any one soever, without performing those works. Such is the meaning.

[Veracity or abstinence from falsehood is here described to be as meritorious as the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Vedas; i.e., by practising veracity with unswerving faith one acquires the same merit which the sacrifices yield, and that without its being tainted by the cruelty which attends sacrifices. The P. Bhāshya explains that he becomes virtuous, and as a virtuous person attains heaven (which is the reward of virtuous works), and his speech becomes fruitful. (Dhārmika bhūyā iti bhavati. Dhārmikak svargam prapnūhīti svargam prāpnoti, amoghaśya vāg-bhavati.]

He now describes the reward of him who abstains from theft.

XXXVII.

Jewels from all sides approach him who is confirmed in abstinence from theft.

When a Yogi practices abstinence from theft, and that abstinence rises to a high pitch, jewels from all sides come to him without his wishing them.

[The object here is to show that what may be acquired with great trouble by theft, may be had unsought by scrupulous abstinence from theft.]

The fruit of continence he next describes.
XXXVIII.

Attainment of vigour in confirmed continence.

Whoever steadfastly practices continence obtains, on its attaining its highest pitch, "vigour" (vīrya), or manly power comes in him. Conservation of manly vigour is continence, and on its attaining a high degree, vigour comes in plenty in the body, the organs and the mind.

[The meaning is that there is always a loss of vigour by incontinence, and therefore the Yogi should abstain from it in order to conserve his vigour.]

He next points out the fruit of non-covetousness.

XXXIX.

On non-covetousness being confirmed there is conscience of all about births.

The word kathantā is the abstract form of katham 'what,' or 'what all about,' and janma-kathantā means all about births, and the full knowledge thereof is its "conscience" (sambodha). The meaning is that he knows all about the questions, "What was I in a former birth? Who was I? What did I do?"

Covetousness is not confined to objects of enjoyment; it extends to the soul's desire to have a body, for that too is covetousness, since the body is needed for enjoyment. And such being the case, the knowledge of principles cannot prevail, while the inclinations are disposed outwards from the excess of the quality of foulness. Now, when on giving up all desire for the body and the rest, an indifference is attained, then to the indifferent being, devoid of foulness, an acquaintance with all past and future existences becomes a cause of thorough knowledge.

[The reward here spoken of is transcendent; it enables the observer of abstinence from all covetousness to see by his mental eye all that has happened to him in former births, and what will happen hereafter.]

Having thus described the perfections of the restraints, he now describes the obligations.
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XL.

From purity (proceed) loathing for one's own members, and non-intercourse with others.

For him who practises purity there is a "loathing" (jugupsā) or detestation produced for even the members of his own body from discrimination of their nature and cause. (The idea then is) "This body is impure, no fondness for it should be cherished." And for the same reason there results a "non-intercourse," (asaṁsarga) absence of relationship, or avoidance of mixing with "others," (paraih), i.e., with other embodied persons. This is the meaning. How can he who loaths his own body from perceiving its this or that fault, wish to have intercourse with other bodies of the same description?

[The purity as defined in the commentary on A, xxxii. (p. 94) is obviously confined to contact with dirt and consciousness of the body being naturally impure. Here the latter phase is magnified to the extent of making the embodied loath his own body, and à fortiorari all bodies.]

He describes other fruits of purity.

XLI.

Moreover, purification of goodness, complacency, concentration, subjugation of the organs, and fitness for beholding soul.

(The words) "are produced" are required to complete the sentence. "Goodness" (sattva) consists of light, joy, &c. Its purification, is its not being oppressed (or overcome) by the qualities of foulness and darkness. "Complacency" (saumanasya) is mental satisfaction from non-perception of distress. "Concentration" (ekāgratā) is fixedness of the thinking principle on any sensuous object to which it may be directed. "Subjugation of the organs" (indriyajaya) is the abidance in themselves of the organs diverted from their objects. "Fitness of behold-
"Ātmādarsanayogyatva" is the adaptation of the thinking principle to do so on the manifestation of knowledge. To one who is practised in purity these, purification of goodness and the rest, successively manifest themselves. Thus, from purity comes purification of goodness; from purification of goodness, complacency; from complacency, concentration; from concentration, subjugation of the organs; from subjugation of the organs, fitness to behold soul.

[This aphorism is the sequel of the preceding one; it enumerates advantages in addition to those previously described. The advantages noted are of obvious import.]

The fruit of exercising contentment.

**XLII.**

From contentment, (proceeds) superlative felicity.

From contentment becoming excessive such internal felicity arises for the Yogi, as cannot be equalled by the pleasures of external objects, even to the extent of a hundredth part of it.

[The meaning is obvious.]

The fruit of austerity.

**XLIII.**

Through austerity results the perfection of the body and the organs, from decay of impurity.

Through the decay of impurity of the form of distress and the like by the exercise of austerity there arises in the mind a "perfection" (siddhi) or superiority of the body and the organs. The meaning is this, the afflictions of the thinking principle decay by the performance of Chándráyaṇa and other fasts. From that decay the organs acquire the power of perceiving the minute, the hidden, and the remote, and the body (the power of assuming) at pleasure the form of a molecular, or great magnitude.
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[Briefly the purport of the aphorism is that by attaining perfection in austerity, a Yogi acquires transcendental powers; his organs are then able to grasp all kinds of objects, whether they be so minute as not to be ordinarily perceivable by the senses, or so hidden as not to be accessible to the senses, or so remote as to be beyond their range.

The reference to the Chándráyána is a mere illustration, the object is to imply austerity generally, and not to such only as are enjoined as penances. The object is not penance or expiation for sins committed, but the general mortification of the flesh.]

The fruit of muttering.

XLIV.

Through muttering results the cognition of the desiderated deity.

On the perfection of "muttering" (sádhyáya) characterised by the repetition or the like of a selected mantra, there results a cognition on the part of the Yogi of the deity desiderated: the meaning is that that deity becomes visible to him.

[The word svádhyáya means the study of the Vedas, but here it is used in the technical sense of muttering or inaudibly repeating a great many times any selected mantra. This is closely analogous to the counting of the rosary.]

The fruit of contemplating on the Lord.

XLV.

Meditation is completed through the contemplation of the Lord.

Whoever is thus devoted to the Lord, in him "meditation" (samádhi) of the kind described (C I A L.) becomes manifest, because that Divine Lord, being pleased, excites meditation by removing all obstructive affictions (from the way).

[The theistical character of Patanjali's doctrine is here established by the admission that the divinity may, when contem-
plated, help to promote the object of the Yoga. Kapila repudiates the idea.

Having described the restrictions and the obligations, he now proceeds to describe posture.

XLVI.

Posture (is that which is) firm and pleasant.

"Posture" (āsana) is that whereby one sits, such as Padmāsana, Dandāsana, Svastikāsana, &c. When that seat becomes "firm" (sthira) or devoid of agitation, and "pleasant" (sukha) or not uncomfortable, then it is reckoned as an accessory of the Yoga.

[The word āsana ordinarily implies the material adapted for sitting upon, such as a rug, a mat, a board, a chair, or the like, but here it has been used for particular modes or attitudes of sitting, and therefore I have translated it into posture and not seat. The aphorism recommends such postures as ensure steadiness and comfort; but the postures as described in other works do not convey to a worldly understanding any such idea. Brahmānanda, in his commentary on the Haṭhapradipikā, says that Vaśishtha, Yājñavalkya and other ancient sages had described 84 postures as appropriate for Yogīs, and that Siva, the greatest of Yogīs, was their author. He adds that Gorakshanātha, a Yogī of a later date, but of great renown, reckoned the total number of appropriate postures at 84,00,000. (Chaturasi-tīlakshāṇī cha taduktam Gorakshanāthena.) Of the 84 some are common, some are more important. Svātmārāma, in the Haṭhapradipikā, describes ten as "more important" for the performance of the Haṭhayoga. These are called, 1, Svastika; 2, Gomukka; 3, Vīra; 4, Kūrma; 5, Kukkuṭa; 6, Uttāna-kūrmakā; 7, Dhanuḥ; 8, Matyanātha; 9, Mayūra; 10, Sava. The most important ones are: 1, Siddha alias Mukta alias Gupta; 2, Padma; 3, Sinha; 4, Bhadra alias Goraksha. The P. Bhāṣya does not enter into any detail, but names the following as examples, viz., 1, Padma or lotus; 2, Vīra or heroic; 3, Bhadra or decent; 4, Svastika or the mystic diagram so called; 5, Danda or staff-like; 6, Sopāraya or self-reliant; 7, Paryākṣa or bedstead-like; 8, Krauṣṭha-nisidana or like the posture of the seated heron; 9, Hasti-nishidana or seated elephant; 10, Uṣṭra-
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nishidana or seated camel; 11, Samasansthána or evenly poised. The following are brief accounts of the ways in which the postures are assumed.

1. Padmásana. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby; the chin should be bent down on the chest; and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called Padmásana, and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases.*

2. Virásana. Place each foot under the thigh of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture Virásana.†

3. Bhadrásana. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the feet and this is Bhadrásana.‡

4. Svastikásana. Sitting straight with the feet placed under the (opposite) thighs is called Svastikásana.§

5. Dandisana. Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed extended on the legs.||

6. Sinhásana. Let the ankles be placed under the testes, the left ankle on the right side of the suture (the mesian line) and the right on the left side of the suture; let the hands placed on the knees, and the fingers extended; let the mouth be wide open, and the sight be directed to the tip of the nose while one is in deep contem-
plation; and it will produce the lion posture *Siṅhāsana*, the adored
of all Yogis.*

7. Put the right ankle on the left side of the chest, and similarly
the left ankle on the right side, and the posture will be *Gomukha*,
or of the shape of a cow's mouth.†

8. Closing the anus with the two ankles crossed while the mind is
under control, produces, say the knowers of Yoga, the tortoise pos-
ture, *Kūrmāsana*.‡

9. Having established the lotus posture, if the hands be passed
between the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as to lift
the body aloft, it will produce the Fowl seat, *Kukkutāsana*.§

10. Having assumed the fowl posture, should the two hands be
placed on the sides of the neck it would make the posture like that of
the tortoise upset; it is called upset tortoise posture, *Uttānakūrmakā-
sana*.||

11. Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw them to the
ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is called the bow posture,
*Dhanurāsana*.¶

12. Place the right foot on the roof of the left thigh, surround
the right knee with the left foot, and sit with the body twisted, and
it will result in the *Matsyanāthāsana* or posture *Matsyanātha*.**
13. **Mayūrásana.** Hold the earth with both hands placing the elbows on the sides of the navel, and keep the body erect like a staff: this is called the Mayūrásana or peacock posture.*

14. **Siddhásana.** Place the left ankle on the membrum virile, and thereupon put the right ankle, and it completes the Siddhásana.†

Besides these A’sanas, Yogis have a great many postures or gestures which they reckon under the name of Mudrá, to which, however, no mention is made here in the text. In Tántric rituals the technical difference between an A’sana and a Mudrá depends upon the organs employed. An A’sana or seat is by its very nature connected with the disposition of the lower limbs, whereas the Mudrá depends upon the motion of the upper limbs; and in the Tantras all symbols produced by twining the fingers or placing the hands in particular positions are recognised as Mudrás. The Yogis have also some Mudrás of the same kind; but in their more important Mudrás the distinction is entirely lost sight of, and hands and feet alike come into play to produce the A’sanas as well as the Mudrás. The great and most remarkable distinctive character of the Mudrás appears, however, to be its connection with the regulation of breath. The Gheraṇḍa Saṁhitā describes in all twenty-five Mudrás, and the Hādhāripikā recognises ten of these as the most important “in warding off decay and death,” (jaraṁaraṇaṁāsanam.) These are — 1 Mahāmudrā; 2, Mahābandha; 3, Mahāvedha; 4, Khechari; 5, Uḍḍiyāna; 6, Mūlabandha; 7, Jalandhara; 8, Viparita-karani; 9, Vajroṇi; 10, Sakti-cchālana.† The following are brief descriptions of these gesticulations and of the advantages to be derived from them:

1. **Mahāmudrā.** Pressing the perineum by the heel of the left foot, the right foot should be extended, and then held fast by the two
hands. Then closing the throat the wind should be held above. Even as a snake struck by a staff stretches like a staff, so the coiled S’akti (breath) suddenly becomes straight, for then she is in a state of dying in the two nostrils. Then the wind should be discharged steadily, but not forcibly. The wisest of the wise call this Mahámudrā.*

2. Mahábandha. Let the heel of the left foot be put under the perineum, and the right foot on the left thigh, and, having drawn in breath, let the chin be pressed hard on the chest, and the wind be held fast in the heart. After holding the wind as long as one is able, let it be slowly expired. When the expiration is complete, let the operation be repeated on the right side. (This shows that the breath in the first instance should be drawn by the left nostril.)†

3. Mahávedha. While performing the Mahábandha should the Yogi effect the suppression of the breath in the Khechari style by closing the passage of the wind by the throat Mudrā, and then, putting the hands evenly on the ground, drive the wind slowly towards the buttocks, it is Mahávedha. ‡
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4. **Khechari.** When the tongue is reversed and pressed into the hollow of the head and the sight is fixed at a spot in the middle of the two eyebrows, the posture is called *Khechari.*

5. **Uddiyana-bandha** is that posture in which the wind flies upwards by the susumné vessel from the right side of the belly above the navel.

6. **Mulabandha.** When the heel is pressed against the perineum, the anus is contracted, and the Apána wind is by force directed upwards, it is *Mulabandha.*

7. **Jālandhara-bandha.** When the throat is contracted and the chin is pressed hard on the chest it is *Jālandhara* posture, the destroyer of decay and death.

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* Sanskrit text follows.*
8. *Viparitakarani.* Place the sun (expiratory air) above, just below the hard palate, and the moon (inspiratory air) below, just above the navel, and the *Viparitakarani* is completed. It promotes hunger, &c., &c. *

9. *Vajroni.* The exercise by which the several secretions are drawn upwards is so called.†

10. *Saktichālana.* Seated in the Vajrásana posture, let the feet be held firm by the hands and the anus be pressed by the heels, then putting the air in motion by the bellows of the chest, let it be suddenly stopped, and, contracting the forehead, let the wind be

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* [Translation note]
† [Translation note]
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directed that way for two mūhūrtas and when it comes to the susumnā vessel, stop it and this is S'aktichālana. (Loosely translated.)

According to some the Bandhas, on distinct form the Mudrās. (Cf. N. C. Pál's treatise on the Yoga.)

Treating of a system of philosophy Patanjali has not thought proper to enter into details, regarding age, sex, caste, food, dwelling, &c. as bearing upon Yoga, but other works supply information about them to a considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom may not be unfitly added here. The first question that would arise would be—who are fit to perform the Yoga? On this subject the Hatha-pradīpikā fixes no limit. It says, "by the practice of Yoga, everyone may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, or very old, or diseased, or decrepit." The next point is the selection of a proper place. "A small monastery, a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated in an out-of-the-way place where there is no danger within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire and water, in a country abounding in food and free from danger of wars and the like, where religion prevails, in a thriving kingdom," is the most appropriate. The cell or mathikā should have a small door and no window; it should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high steps and low descents; it should be smeared with cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole surrounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoiding all anxieties, the Yogi should follow the path pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of

* अवरोद्धा चारण च चारण भवेत् ॥
कः प्रेमवेदिका प्रेमोऽपि प्रेमेऽपि ॥
श्राद्धत्तां तद्यथात् प्रेमोऽपि प्रेमेऽपि ॥

dशरीरं चारणं च चारणं च चारणं च चारणं च ॥
हस्तमुक्तं तद्यथात् प्रेमोऽपि प्रेमेऽपि ॥
मयं प्रेमवेदिका प्रेमोऽपि प्रेमेऽपि ॥

† यवा च सन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव अस्वकृष्णसन्यस्तव}
the Yoga. He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, and vain disputation. His food should consist of wheat, sáli rice, barley, śhashti rice (or that which matures in six days), the syáma and the nivára grains, milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, múng pulse, and water," and all soothing sweet things in a moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat and too much salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed or acrid substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as to leave one-fourth of his appetite unaspeased.†

He describes the means of making the seat firm and pleasant.

XLVII.

Through slightness of effort and attainment of the infinite.

The construction of the sentence is that through slightness of effort and through attainment of the infinite the seat becomes firm and pleasant. When the wish is formed, 'I shall adopt this posture,' and that posture is accomplished even with "slightness of effort," i. e., without difficulty, and when the thinking principle is reposited in the infinity of space or the like, and by understanding it becomes of it, then from absence of the body and of egotism the posture does not become painful. When this control over posture is accomplished agitations of the body and such other obstructives to meditation do not arise.

† मूर्त्त चार्मिके रेखे तुतिते निःप्रसरे! 
चालकसानपण्यां निवारेंगियाज्ञविष्ये! 
रेखो मनाकामे नायतम सवर्णिना! 
अंगपंचार्णरसगुणवर्मो बालुचिन्तियं यथा 
स्थै जामवर्तकियं समस्तितं निःस्वेश्यं निर्गु! 
भारो संधपदेदिकुपवर्मो जानार्वपेक्षित्सा निःस्वेश्यं निर्गु! 
गार्त्से तस्मात्तत्तज्ञां सच्चिदिन्द संविनेत्ता सिहिति! 
* जैष्मानिकृष्याबिकृष्यासंबन्धानां चानांवर्त्तकियातित्तिनिःसिंहिति! 
रुचिरासारकपहनिर्दिष्टामार्कम स्रुविदिदिम्युद्यसं यथा यथा! 
दुर्योगमर्दरसर्वोपिज्ञविनेत्त! 
मृणादिपदितीविमितारशं यथातः! 
वहितादिपदितीविमितारशं यथातः! 
ञ्ज्ञातसंभीत्यश्यानोमितां मितासां यथा! 
श्रीमद्यमंनिर्दितकुमारोपिन्यचं सन्ति! 
शय्या जातमकंपदच्ििरं प्राकारसंवेहितं 
प्राणे मंडपवेदिपकपदच्िरं प्राकारसंवेहितं 
मेथमधाण्डियववाहिकन्यभनानं खीराग्यस्ंडनवनीतखितामचनि! 
भण्यते शिषसंभीत्यं मिताहारः ख उश्यते ॥ 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः! 
आज्ञादिसंभासद्पितनङुरत् कार पिष्ाकडिग्यर एएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः!
CHAPTER SECOND.

[The object here is to point out that when by practice one becomes able to assume any position at will, without any difficulty, and, adverting to the dogma that the thinking principle assumes the form of the object it thinks of, when by thinking on any infinite object, such as the sky, it becomes itself infinite, it feels no pain or uneasiness in assuming any posture, however painful it may otherwise be. The means of attaining firmness of seat thus are practice and the contemplation of boundless objects.]

A fruit thereof when accomplished.

XLVIII.

Thereupon non-embarrassment by the pairs.

The meaning is that on the control of posture being accomplished, the Yogi is no longer oppressed or embarrassed by the pairs, i.e., cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and the like.

[This is the ultimate fruit of attaining perfection in assuming the different postures above adverted to.]

Having thus described how to control the postures he describes regulation of breath.

XLIX.

On its being accomplished the regulation of breath (which is) interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration.

On posture becoming firm that auxiliary of the Yoga which is regulation of breath and of which firmness of posture is the cause, should be practised.

How is it characterized by the interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration? Inspiration and expiration have been already defined (B. I. A. xxxiv.) The "interruption" (vichchheda) or stoppage of the twofold "flow" (gati) or current in places outside and inside produced by means of expelling or filling of the breath is called Prāṇāyāma or regulation of breath.
[Here the true Práyáñáyáma is accepted to be the interruption or break in the flow of the breath. The inspiration and the expiration are the functions of which the stoppage is the most effectual act for the attainment of perfect meditation. It is called kumbhaka, or quiescence, and the longer it is sustained the more proficient becomes the Yogi. When perfect control has been attained in this respect, the Yogi can live buried under earth for months and years without performing any organic function whatever.]

For its better understanding, he describes its nature after showing its distinctions.

L.

That, again, is an external, an internal, and a stationary function; it is divided by place, time, and number; it is protracted or subtile.

The "external function" of breath is expiration, or expulsion of the breath outward (rechaka). The "internal function" is inspiration or filling in (púraka). The function of stoppage inside is kumbhaka. Because the vital air at that time remains quiescent or motionless, as water in a jar, (kumbha) therefore that condition is called kumbhaka.

This regulation of breath is of three kinds, according as it is specialised by space (des'a), "time" (kála), and "number" (sátkhyá). It is also "protracted" (dírgha), or "subtile" (sukhama). It is specialised by place, as (when we say) "twelve distant from the nose," meaning as far as twelve fingers from the nose. It is specialised by time, as (when we say) "of the duration of thirty-six instants." It is specialised by "number," when (we say) "many times done."

By these inspirations and expirations the first udgháta is produced, and to know this a numeral figure has to be used. Udgháta is the striking of the head by the wind propelled upward from the navel.
CHAPTER SECOND.

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the Prāṇāyāma. It is an operation which includes the three functions of inspiration, quiescence, and expiration. The breath must be drawn in first before it can be retained within; the retention cannot last long, and so after a time there must be an expiration. The first and the third, however, are regulated by the capacity of the lungs, and by the time necessary for the expulsion of a given quantity of air, and cannot be much modified, and the second alone, therefore, concerns the Yogi most, for he can control it to a considerable extent, and hence it is held to be the most important element of the Prāṇāyāma; not oftener, as in the last preceding aphorism, it alone is described as the Prāṇāyāma. The threefold operation is specialized by the time devoted to each operation, by the extent of space from which the breath is drawn, by the number of times it is repeated, by the period for which it has been practised, and by the subtlety or grossness of the operation.

The operation of udghāta is mysterious. I cannot find out from any work or person how the internal air is made to strike particular internal organs.]

Having described the three members of the regulation of breath, he, with a view to enunciate a fourth, says:—

LI.

The fourth is dependant on the recognition of the outer and the inner spheres.

"The outer sphere" (vāhya-vishaya) of the breath extends far as twelve (fingers) from the nose. The "inner sphere" (ābhyaantara-vishaya) is represented by the heart, the navel and the like. That quiescence or stoppage of motion, (which ensues) on recognising or taking into consideration these two is the "fourth" regulation of breath (prāṇāyāma). Its difference from the third form, called kumbhaka, is this: The latter without taking any note of the outer and the inner spheres suddenly assumes quiescence,
like a lotus falling on a hot stone, while this is a stoppage which results from a recognition of the two spheres. This, like the preceding, should be known to be divisible according to place, time and number.

[This is purely intellectual, and involves no change in the order of the operation. It is the same operation, but performed intelligently.]

He now describes the fruit of the fourth kind.

LII.

Thereby is removed the covering of light.

"Thereby," i.e., by that fourth form of regulation of breath, the "covering" (āvarāṇa) of the form of afflictions which envelope the "light" (prakās'ā) which is the thinking principle abiding in the quality of goodness, is destroyed. This is the meaning.

[The purport is that this fourth form of Prānāyāma is specially useful in removing all those ideas of pain and suffering which are ordinarily associated with the thinking principle.]

Another fruit.

LIII.

The mind's fitness for steadiness.

"Steadiness" (dārāṇā) will be defined presently (B. Ⅲ, A. 1.) The mind (manas), divested of its defects through the instrumentality of these forms of regulation of breath, remains fixed to whatever it is applied, and does not suffer from distractions.

(Here the word manas has been used as a synonym of chitta, thinking principle).

He gives the definition of abstraction.

LIV.

Abstraction is the assumption by the senses of the original nature of the thinking principle, from want of application to their respective objects.
CHAPTER SECOND.

That by which the senses are abstracted, or from a feeling of opposition, withdrawn from their respective objects, is Abstraction (*pratyāhāra*). How that may be effected is thus explained. Of vision and the other senses the respective objects are form and the rest. "Application" (*samprayoga*) to them is advancing towards them. The want of such advance is the forsaking of them and abiding in their original nature. When that forsaking is effected the senses become the imitators of the original nature of the thinking principle. Since the senses follow the thinking principle as do bees their king, they all become of its nature. Thus when the thinking principle is subdued these become abstracted.

[The natural tendency of the senses is outwards, towards the objects which are designed for their entertainment, and the great object of the Yoga is to divert them from those objects, in order to bring them to a focus in the thinking principle. When this is effected they cease to act, and are restored to the natural state of the thinking principle of which they are emanations. That natural state, again, is quiescence, and consequently the senses become quiescent, and this is their abstracted state.]

Having described abstraction, which is the imitation of the nature of the thinking principle by the senses, he now describes the fruit of the act.

LV.

Thence the complete subjugation of the senses.

The meaning is—that by the practice of abstraction the senses come so completely under control that do not proceed, according to their natures, outwards to their respective objects even when excited thereto.

[The chapter opened by enquiring, what the exercise of the Yoga was, and having described in detail that exercise with all its concomitants, it now closes by describing the fruit of that exercise. The fruit is complete subjugation of the senses.]
Thus then has been described the practical exercise of the Yoga which forms the theme of the first chapter. The practical Yoga is first defined (1), then follow its use (11), in the weakening of the afflictions (111), its origin from ignorance (1v), the definition of ignorance (v), do. of afflictions (vi to ix), means of obviating them (x and xi), works, their sources and fruit (xii to xiv), afflictions, their character and why and how they are to be got rid of (xv to xxvii), discriminative knowledge (xxviii to xlvi), postures, &c., (xlvii to lxxi), and the advantages thereof (lxxx to cxxv). [Not literally translated, but only the substance of the commentary is given here for reasons elsewhere assigned, p. 58.]

Now this Yoga, through restraints and obligations, assumes the form of a seed, which sprouts through postures and regulation of breath, flowers through abstraction, and bears fruit through contemplation, retention and meditation, and these are explained in this chapter on exercise.

This is the end of the second quarter, or the quarter on practice, of the commentary entitled Rājamārtanda on Patanjali's institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
The note on Aphorism xxxii on page 94 is calculated to mislead unwary readers. The remark that purification and other obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise, is quite correct with reference to the text. The obligations are as imperative on Yogis as they are on householders, and none should neglect them; but purification is here taken in its ordinary acceptation, and does not refer to certain peculiar acts of washing or Saucha which some Yogis, particularly the followers of the Hatha Yoga, recommend. They hold that ordinary washings &c., are not enough. They have accordingly devised complicated, and in some respects very repulsive, forms of purification, which they regard as absolutely necessary as preparatory steps towards the attainment of fixity of seats. These they describe under the collective name of Shatkarma or "sixfold work," as they are reckoned under six different names. These names are—I, Dhauti; II, Vasti; III, Neti; IV, Laukiki; V, Trataka, and VI, Kapalabhati. These are variously subdivided by the Gheranda Sañhitā, the Niruttara Tantra, the A'diyāmala the Brahmayāmala, the Grahayāmala, the Rudrayāmala, the Sivasañhitā, and other Tantras. I shall follow the first in the following notes:

I. Dhauti means washing, and it is known under four different names according to the parts of the body to which it is applied. These are, 1st, Antardhauti or washing of the intestines; 2nd, Dantadhauti or washing of the teeth; 3rd, Hriddhauti or washing of the stomach; and 4th, Mulasodhana or washing of the rectum.

The first is effected in four different ways, viz., (a) by contracting the mouth in the form of a crow's bill, and drawing in a full draft of air into the intestines, where it is retained for a time and
then thrown out. As wind is the means of washing in this case it is called Vātasāra. (b) By drinking a large quantity of water up to the throat, and then forcing it down so as to expel it by the lower orifice.† This is called Vārisāra. I know not how this can be effected, but to the occultist everything is possible. (c) By stopping the breath and then striking the navel a hundred times against the vertebral column.‡ This is called Agnisāra. (d) By taking in air through the mouth contracted into the form of a crow’s bill, retaining it in the intestines for an hour and a half, and then expelling it through the lower orifice.§ (Vakhkaraṇa.)

2nd. The Dental washing includes the purification of the teeth, the tongue, the two ears, and the foramen on the crown of the head.|| For the teeth a dentrifice of catechu or clean earth is recommended as appropriate.†† For the tongue scraping with the index, the middle and the ring fingers is held sufficient.** For the ears, rubbing the orifices with the index and the ring fingers,†† and for the foramen
on the crown of the head rubbing with the thumb are enough.*

3rd. The purification of the stomach is effected in three ways: 1st, by passing the tender leaf-shoot of a plaintain, or a turmeric plant, or a cane, through the mouth into the stomach, and, after shaking it drawing it out (Daṇḍadhauti); 2nd, by drinking a large quantity of water and then vomiting it out (Vamandhauti); 3rd, by swallowing a strip of cloth three inches wide and fifteen cubits long and then drawing it out (Vāsadhauti).†

4th. The purification of the rectum (mulasodhana) is effected by washing the part with water aided by a finger or the stalk of a turmeric plant.‡

II. The purification of the fundament (Vastisodhana) is effected by repeatedly contracting the fundament while seated firmly in water up to the navel (jalavasti) or on dry land (sthalavasti).§

III. Neti is the technical name of thread, a span length of which is passed through the nostrils and drawn out from the mouth with a view to purify the nostrils.||

IV. Lauki Ki Yoga is the practice of shaking or swinging the
intestines repeatedly from one side to the other.*

V. For the purification of the eyes, the recommendation is that the eyes should be fixed on one point, the tip of the nose for instance, without permitting any twinkling, until tears flow in abundance. This is called Trátaka.†

VI. Under the last head of Kapálabháti, three practices are recommended: 1st, drawing the air through the left nostril and expelling it by the right, and then reversing the operation, and performing it alternately several times, (Váta krama); 2nd, drawing in water by the nostrils and throwing it out by the mouth, (Vyútt krama); 3rd, by sucking up water by the mouth and throwing it out by the nostrils, (S'útt krama).‡

The Tantras describe several other modes of purification, and suggest many variations in the rules above quoted; but it is not worth while to quote them, particularly as first class Yogis denounce all such purifications as quite unnecessary, if not actually futile.

* चम्मेवेगे तुष्टच चामथेुपपाखंदे।
कामच रससको रेंड्रनकसबकः॥
† विमेषाश्वेषकं पतन्ति जारकं रेचयेत्‌।
पित्ताश्व रेचयेत्‌ पित्ताश्व रेचयेत्‌॥
‡ रुद्रच्छुर्देह्रावं रैद्येत्‌ पित्ताश्व रैद्येत्‌।
पित्ताश्व पुरापित्ताश्व पुरापित्ताश्व रैद्येत्‌॥
पूरम् रैद्येत्‌ वेदान्त ग्रहेत्‌ सूक्ष्म रैद्येत्‌।
एवमवेदनिवारणयेत्‌ कपालर्यायेत्‌॥
साभायां वालसा वुपवृट्तिकं रैद्येत्‌।
पारं पारं वालसायेत्‌ वेदसेनवेदनिवारणयेत्‌॥
कवया वालसायेत्‌ वालसायेत्‌ रेचयेत्‌॥
एवमवेदनिवारणयेत्‌ कामदेशवेगो भवेत्‌॥
न जायते वारणं जारं मेय प्रतापयेत्‌।
भवेत्‌ स्वभावं वारणं निवारणयेत्‌॥
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(Continued on third page of cover.)
May Bhútanátha, (the lord of elements,) by the thought of whose lotus feet, the occult powers of Animá and the rest are attained by thinkers, be to our prosperity!

With a view to describe the three accessories of the Yoga, Dháraná, &c., already referred to, (C. II A. xxix) and to explain the external, the internal, and other Siddhis, Patanjali begins this chapter, adverting first to the explanation of the term Sañyama.

[The occult powers (vibhútis) are the following: 1, animá, "molicularity," extreme minuteness, or parvitude, or invisibility; 2, Laghimá, "extreme lightness," levity, tenuity, or incorporeality; 3, Prápti, "accessibility," or touching anything at will, as touching the moon with the tip of one's finger; 4, Prákámya, "wilfulness," or irresistibility of will, fulfilment of every wish; 5, Garimá, "excessive pondrosity," magnitude, or illimitable bulk; 6, I’sitá "sovereignty," or supreme dominion over animate and inanimate nature; 7, Va’sitá, "subjugation," the power of changing the course of nature; 8, Kárnavasáyitá, "self-control," or the power of suppressing all carnal longings. These are also indicated by the term riddhi, and also by siddhi or perfections. Inasmuch, however, as siddhi is applied to other perfections it is sometimes qualified by the term mabhá. The powers are also indicated by the terms bhútí and aiśvarya.]

Thereof, he describes the nature of steadfastness.

I.

Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place.

"To one place" (deśe), i.e., in the navel-wheel, the tip of the nose, or the like. "Confinement" (bandha) of the thinking
principle is making the thinking principle steady (on one object) by excluding (the thought of) all other objects. This (confinement to one place) is called Dhārānā or the steadfastness of the thinking principle.

The meaning is this:—The Yogi, who has purified his internal organ by benevolence and other acts of refining the thinking principle, who has accomplished the restraints and the obligations, who has acquired mastery over his postures, who has subdued the vital airs, who has abstracted himself from the field of the senses, who has conquered the pairs (cf. C. II A. xlviii), should, in a quiet place, and in an erect posture, by fixing it to one object, such as the tip of the nose, produce steadfastness of the thinking principle for the practice of discriminate meditation.

(The preliminary obligations and restraints having been accomplished, and the habit of assuming the various kinds of seats having been acquired, the Yogi should engage himself in training his thinking principle so as to be able to keep it unswervingly steady to any object to which he may wish to direct it; and this unswerving fixity is called Dhārānā, or steadfastness. This steadfastness cannot be acquired without a substratum. There must be some object to which the thinking principle can be applied, whether it be the tip of the nose, or a plexus of nerves in the belly, or the crown of the head, or the ether, or the sky, for without it, in the preliminary stage, the thinking principle would be wandering. And inasmuch as there must be a substratum, the steadfastness of thinking produced by it comes under the head of discriminate meditation (samprajñāta-samādhi). (C. I A. xvii.) Practically it is a state of steady, immovable abstraction, but the word abstraction would be an indirect and not a direct definition of Dhārānā, inasmuch as abstraction gives prominence to the act of withdrawing or separating, leaving the result of the act in the background, whereas Dhārānā gives prominence to the fixation of the thinking principle to one point, leaving the separation or withdrawing from other things to be tacitly implied.
The P. Bhāṣyā defines "Dhāranā to be the fixation of the function of the thinking principle on the navel-wheel, or on the lotus of the heart, or on the light in the head, or on the tip of the nose, or on the point of the tongue, or on such other place, or on some external object." (Nābhirakhre hridaya-pundarikke murdhni jyotishī nāśikāgre jñānavāgra-ityādhiṣu des'ēṣhu vāyhe vā vishaye chittasya vṛtāmakatreyā bandha iti bandho dhāranā.) The "external object" of the commentator is explained by Vijnāna Bhikṣu to mean the image of a divinity.

Having defined steadfastness, with a view to define contemplation he says:

II.

Contemplation is unison there of the understanding.

"There," in that place where the thinking principle is confined. "Of the understanding" (pratyayasya) of the knowledge. Whatever unison (or harmonious blending) is obtained through the instrumentality of avoiding untoward modifications, and what knowledge constantly arises through dependance on that on which steadfastness is reposed, is called "contemplation" (dhyāna).

The word dhyāna is usually translated into meditation, for it implies that profound and abstract consideration which brings its object fully and undisturbedly before the mind. Inasmuch, however, as there is deliberation and consideration in this act, contemplation appears to me to be a more appropriate equivalent, the highest state of contemplation, which is Samādhi, being indicated by the term meditation.

The P. Bhāṣyā defines Dhyāna to be "an even current of thought undisturbed by other thoughts." (Sadriśa pravāka-pratyayāntaretāparāmrisho dhyānam.)

He now describes meditation, the last or highest member of the Yoga.
III.

When that (contemplation), existing as if without its own identity, enlightens solely one object, it is meditation.

"When that," i.e. contemplation as defined above (A. 11). When "solely one object" is enlightened, i.e., when the object produced by application to the form of an object, negating all other forms of consideration, and the thought appears as if devoid of its own identity, it is called "meditation" (samādhi). That which brings the mind together thoroughly, (samyag-ādhiyate), i.e., brings it to one centre by avoiding all disturbing causes, is Samādhi.

[The P. Bhāṣya defines Samādhi to be "that in which contemplation so realizes the form of the object contemplated as to make its own identity, as it were, void from the prevalence of the nature of the contemplated object. (Dhyānameva dhyeyakāra-nirbhāsam pratyayātmakena svarūpena sunyamiva yadā bhavati dhyeya-svabhāvāves'at tadā samādhiri-tyuchyate). As stated in the foregoing note, Samādhi is only a more advanced state of contemplation than Dhyāna. In the latter the ideas of other objects besides the one contemplated are subdued and kept down, but not entirely suppressed; but in the former it is so complete that not only exteraneous ideas are suppressed, but even the distinction between the thinking and the thought are lost, so that the former, as it were, merges into the latter, and nothing but thought remains. Such being the case, the body ceases to be influenced by external stimuli, and a state of catalepsy or trance is produced. Hence it is that Samādhi is not unfrequently translated into trance or catalepsy. Catalepsy, however, takes note of only the cessation of the organic functions, leaving unnoticed the state of the thinking principle, whereas Samādhi brings the intensity of the thinking to the fore, without caring for the organic functions, and the English equivalent used should therefore convey this idea. Medi-
CHAPTER THIRD.

In order to supply for use in his work a technical term for the three constituents above described, he says:

IV.

The three together constitute Sañyama.

In this Sāstra the application of the three operations of contemplation, (āhyāna) steadfastness (dhāranā), and meditation (Samādhi), to one object is indicated by the use of the term Sañyama.

[The word Sañyama is formed of the intensive particle sam prefixed to yama "restraint," and means vow, binding or confinement, and in this work indicates the absolute restriction of one's self to the practice of the three means of accomplishing the Yoga. In connexion with the ceremonial of the Smṛti, it is used to indicate the day preceding that of the rite itself, because on that day the performer has to place himself under certain restrictions about food, drink, and occupation, the nature of which varies according to the character of the rites. The word is defined with a view to prepare it for subsequent use as a technical term for the three most important acts of Yoga.]

The fruit thereof.

V.

From success thereof comes the light of understanding.

"Thereof," i. e., of Sañyama. "From success" from its becoming similar (i. e., freely blending with each other so as to be the same) by practice. "Understanding" (prajñā), i. e., the nature of the object to be known. The "Light" (āloka), (understanding) expands. The meaning is—that which has to be known becomes thoroughly manifest.
The purport is obvious. When a person is proficient in performing the threefold acts of Sañyama, he attains the light of understanding, or the power of knowing thoroughly the nature of the object to which he directs his attention.

Its application.

VI.

It is to be applied according to its stages.

According to "its," i.e., of the Sañyama, "Stages" (bhúmi), it should be applied to the varying conditions of grossness and subtileness of the substratum of the function of the thinking principle. The Sañyama should be practised in a higher stage after subduing or attaining proficiency, or knowing thoroughly, the lower stages of the thinking principle, for the fruition is not effected by practicing the Sañyama in the highest stage without first bringing into control the lower ones.

[The subject matter of this aphorism is a mere detail: it is the rule that Sañyama should not be attempted for the higher stages of perfection until after it has been practised in the lower stages, i.e., it is to be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of the Yogi is divided. See C. II A. xxvii.]

A doubt having arisen why in the chapter on the appliances (C. II) he should have described only five after naming the eight members of the Yoga, and omitted three, the author says:

VII.

The three are more intimate than the former.

"Than the former," i.e., of restrictions and other members of the Yoga, which are the appliances of meditation in a secondary degree. (C. II A. xxix.) The three members, steadfastness, &c., "are intimate" (antarāñga, lit. akin,) to discriminate meditation, since they establish the true character of meditation.
[In C. II A. xxix. the accessories of the Yoga have been described to be restraint, obligations, postures, regulation of breath, devotion, steadfastness, contemplation, and meditation. Of these the first five are subsidiary or ancillary to, and the last three integral parts, lit. members of the body of, the Yoga, and this idea is developed in the aphorism under notice by the statement that the former are strangers and the latter intimates. The first five only prepare a person for the performance of the Yoga, but the last three constitute the Yoga, for without them there can be no discriminate Yoga having a specific object of thought.]

To point out that it is nevertheless a stranger compared to another, he says:

VIII.

It is still a stranger to the seedless.

"To the seedless" (nirvijasya), i.e., to the meditation which depends on nothing, or carries on pondering with reference to vacuity. To it the threefold members of the Yoga are strangers, (vahiraṅga,) because they are only secondarily subservient.

[Having in the next preceding aphorisms described the last three of the eight members of the Yoga, to be essential to the Yoga, the author makes a distinction, by saying that though they are essential in the case of discriminate meditation, or that in which there is a specific object of thought, they are not so when the Yogi, rising above all specific objects, makes vacuity (s'ūnya) the object of his pondering. This form of meditation is called "seedless" (cf. C. I, A. lxxi), and it needs no aid and can derive no help from steadfastness, contemplation and objective meditation.]

Having now clearly explained the subject of Sañjama, wishing to disclose the nature of perfection of the different members of Yoga, he describes successively the three modifications.

IX.

The suppressive modification is the moment of conjunction of the thinking principle with suppres-
sion on the overthrow and success of the twofold residua of waking and suppression.

"Waking" (vyutthāna) includes the three conditions of agitation, bewilderment, and voluptuousness. "Suppression" (nirodha) is that modification of the thinking principle in which the quality of goodness becomes a part of it, or retires to it. When successively the "overthrow" (avibhava) and success "prevalence" (prādurbhāva) of the residua of the two, i.e., of the waking and the suppressive conditions, are produced, then at the moment of "suppression," the conjunction (auvaya) which takes place from the thinking principle having then both functions is called "suppressive modification" (nirodhaparināma). "Overthrow" is the condition of incapacity to perform work, there being a contempt for it. "Prevalence" is the condition of manifestation in the present condition. The meaning is this:—When the residua cognate to waking are pacified, and the residua of suppression are prevailing and the thinking principle appears connected with both from its being the substratum of quality, then that state is indicated by the word suppressive modification (nirodhaparināma).

Although there is no stillness of the thinking principle when affected by the functions of the qualities, nevertheless this modification is called still or motionless.

[Having explained the exact position of the threefold exercise of Sañyama, the author now proceeds to describe what follows that exercise, and in doing so first defines three terms, and the first of them is suppressive modification (nirodhaparināma). This is defined to be the time when all the residua of the waking state being overthrown, the thinking principle begins to be worked by the residua of the suppressive state; it is the moment of transition from the one condition to the other that the term indicates. The P. Bhāṣya thus defines the term: "the residua of the waking state are the attributes of the thinking principle, but they are not intelligent. The residua of suppression, produced by the intelligence of the suppressive state, are also the
attributes of the thinking principle. On the overthrow and the
success of the two, the residua of the waking state are put down,
those of the suppressive state rise up, and there is then a correla-
tion of the thinking principle, and the changes, thus constantly
occurring in a thinking principle is suppressive modification.”
(Vyutthána-saíiskáráschittdharmá na te pratayátmaká iti,
pratyaya-niruddháa niruddháa nirodhasaíiskárá aapi chittdharm-
máh, tayorabhíbha-prádurbhávau vyutthána-saíiskárá hiyante
nirodha-saíiskárá ádhiyante, nirodhakshañam chittamaveti tad
ekasya chittdsyav pratikshañamidam saíiskáráyathátvam nirodha-
parinamah.)

In explaining the text, Bhoja uses a term which, as playing
an important part in subsequent explanations, requires a few
words of comment. The word is vartamánddhvan, a compound
of vartamáu “present” and adhvan “a road,” but here “time”
(adhvas’abda kálahvachanah,) which I have rendered into “present
condition.” The theory is that every image, shape, or idea
exists from eternity in a latent form; circumstances make it
manifest, and when those circumstances are overcome it reverts
to its former condition. The first 18 andgatddhvan, or the un-
manifest or antecedent condition; the second or what we see is
the varlamánddhvan, or the present condition; and the third 18
atitáddhvan, or the postcedent condition, which is reversion to the
first condition. The image existed in the marble in a latent
condition; the sculptor brings it to its present condition, and
when it is broken it passes on to its postcedent condition. This
theory is the same which prevailed in Greece in ancient times.
Thus, says Sir William Hamilton: “Plato agreed with the rest of
the ancient philosophers in this—that all things consist of matter
and form; and that the matter of which all things were made,
existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed
that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist,
without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he
gave the name of ideas. In the Platonic sense, then, ideas were
the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the

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phenomenal or ectypal world.” So Tiberghien, (Essai des Con-
noissance humaine, p. 207,) “Seneca considered ideas, according
to Plato, as the eternal exemplars of things, Cicero as their
form, Diogenes Laertius as their cause and principle, Aristotle as
substances.”

The word sañskāra, which, for the sake of uniformity, I have
rendered into residua, would have been more pointed here if
translated into idea.

The fruit thereof.

X.
Its tranquil flow from residual habit.

“Its,” of the thinking principle, “tranquil flow” (pras'ánta-
váhitá) is produced by the residua of the suppression aforesaid.
The meaning is, from voluptuousness being removed the thinking
principle flows in its own modification.

[The advantage derived from the suppressive modification is
that, when it is attained, the thinking principle becomes tranquil,
and abides in its own nature, that is, it is no longer subject to
agitation from the prevalence of the adverse qualities of foul-
ness and bewilderment.]

Having described suppressive modification, he now defines
meditative modification.

XI.
The destruction of multifunctionality and enliven-
ment of concentration of the thinking principle is
meditative modification.

“Multifunctionality” (sarvárthañá) is the quality of voluptu-
ousness of the thinking principle, which results from its
accepting many objects from its versatility. When one object is
depended upon there is a similar modification, and it is “concen-
tration,” and that too is a quality of the thinking principle. The
“destruction” and “enlivenment” (kshaya and udaya) of the
two are successive, i.e., the destruction or extreme overthrow of
the quality of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or full mani-
festation of the quality of concentration are successive. The condition in which there is a junction of the two in the thinking principle, when it has the quality of goodness in excess, is called "meditative modification" (samādhi-parināma). This is distinct from the former, (i. e., suppressive meditation). In the former there are the overthrow and the prevalence of the two residua, i. e., the contempt for the nature of the former waking residua and the prevalence in an unsubdued state of the latter or the residua of suppression. In this, however, there is destruction and full enlivenment. Destruction is entrance into the condition beyond that of reproduction, of the voluptuousness of multifunctionality, from extreme hatred. Enlivenment of the quality of concentration is its manifestation in the present condition.

[Suppressive modification as defined in A. IX, is confined to the point of time when the waking state passes on to the suppressive state; but in the meditative modification, there is a farther advance. The waking state has then been entirely overcome, and the meditative state is in full prevalence. The one is the commencement, and the other the consummation, of the condition of meditation. The P. Bhāṣya explains this by saying "multifunctionality is an attribute of the thinking principle, so is concentration; the meaning is there is destruction or disappearance of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or manifestation of concentration." (Sarvārthatā chittadharmaḥ ekāgratā chittadharmaḥ, sarvārthatāḥ kahayastirobhāva ityarthāḥ, ekāgratāyā udaya āvirbhāva ityarthāḥ.) Briefly this is a higher state of concentration.]

The third or the concentrative modification.

XII.

The concentrative modification of the thinking principle is that in which both the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are equally recognized.
Unity of idea is a special function of the abstracted thinking principle. "Tranquil" (संता) is that which has entered the postcedent condition. "Enlivened" (उदित) is manifestation in the present condition. From the thinking principle being in a collected state, the two are equal, and from their object being one, are similar cognitions (प्रत्यये). When the collected thinking principle abides correlated with both it is called concentrative modification.

[In the suppressive modification the worldly state is just passing away, and the meditative state is just commencing, and the thinking principle is becoming tranquil; in the meditative state the first stage is passed, and concentration is in prevalence or fully enlivened; and when the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are in full play, the condition is called the concentrative modification. The P. Bhāṣya explains this by saying, "of the controlled thinking principle, the first cognition is tranquillity, and the next after it is a similar one that of enlivenment, and the thinking principle in meditation is correlated to both, in the same way" (समाहिते-चित्तस्य पुर्वं-प्रत्यये संता उत्तरस्ते-सद्रिषा उदितः समाध्ये-चित्तमुख्ये-रावु-गतम पुनस्ताताईवा). As in the last case so here, we have in this an advance over the last preceding condition.]

Having described the forms of the modification of the thinking principle, he assigns them to other subjects.

XIII.

By this the modifications of property, time, and relation in elements and organs have been described.

"By this," i.e., by the threefold exposition of the modifications of the thinking principle (A. ix, xi, xii.). "In elements," (भृःस्च) both the gross and the subtile. "In the organs" existing severally as Intellect, organs of function, and internal organ. It is to be understood that the three modifications of property, time, and relation have been described (by the above aphorisms).
CHAPTER THIRD.

When, on the cessation of a former property, the subject undergoes the modification of another property, even as the subject clay, forsaking the form of an undefined mass, assumes another property, that of a jar, it is called the modification of property (Dharmaparināma). The "modification of time" (Lakṣaṇa-parināma) (is thus indicated)—when that jar, giving up its antecedent condition, assumes its present condition, or forsaking it, takes up its postcedent condition. The modification of relation (Avasthāparināma) is the correlation of the jars, in the first and the second conditions, for the train of the functions of qualities is always moving, and does not remain unchanging for even a moment.

[This aphorism applies the theory of eternity of ideas enunciated in the three preceding aphorisms to things in general. The object is to show that even as in ideas, latency, manifestation, and disappearance follow successively, so in the thinking principle ideas appear and disappear under particular circumstances without radically changing its original nature. Change in matter is not absolute, nor radical conversion of one thing into another, but a modification of property, or of time, or of relation. A mass of clay converted into a jar is a change of property, and not of the radical elements of clay. This change is next altered by time, as the breaking of a jar into potsherds; and there is a further change going on in its condition, and the new jar of yesterday is not the same with the jar we see today, for there has been some change in it since yesterday, for change is constant and cannot be retarded for a moment. The first change is called Dharmaparināma, the modification of property. The second is Lakṣaṇaparināma, the modification of time. The word lakṣaṇa ordinarily means a sign or character, but it has been explained by commentators to mean time (kālabheda). The third is Avasthāparināma or change of relation.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what the property is, he defines the nature of the propertied, i.e., the subject.
The subject is the correlative of the qualities of tranquillity, enlivening, and latency.

"The tranquil" (sántah) (qualities) are those which, having performed their respective functions, have entered the postcedent condition. "The enlivened" (uditàh) qualities are those which, forsaking the antecedent condition, perform their functions in the present condition. "The latent," (avyapadesyah) qualities are those which, abiding potentially, do not produce action. Thus everything is comprised in everything, and so on. By the word property (dharma) is implied that simple potentiality which abides distinctly correlated as effect and cause. Whatever proceeds and admits of correlation with that threefold quality is called the "propertied" (dharmt) which is the subject of tranquillity, enlivening and latency. Thus gold, giving up the quality of the form of a necklace and assuming that of the form of a svasti-ka cross, still appears as a golden form, i.e., when in these slightly different characters the subject appears as a common property, it is subject, but when it abides as a distinct mode it is a property, and therefore it is described as the correlative of qualities.

[Properties do not always exist in the same form in the same way. Sometimes they are tranquil, at others active, or enlivened, and sometimes latent, and these properties are called dharma, and the thing with which they are correlated is the "propertied," or the substratum of qualities, or Dharma—that which has the Dharma. A thing cannot be called a subject until it is correlated to a property, and a property ceases to be so when it qualifies nothing. On the other hand, by change of relation a subject may become a property and a property a subject—a subjective law or its objective outcome.]

To remove the doubt as to how a single (propertied) subject undergoes many modifications he says:
The diversity of succession is the cause of the versatility of modifications.

Krama or "succession" of property as defined above and anyatva, "diversity," which is every moment visible, make the compound Kramanyatva, (which has been rendered into "diversity of succession" in the text). And that is the "cause" (hetu), mark, or indicator of the (anyatva) or multiplicity or diversity of the modifications aforesaid. The meaning is this: Constant motion or succession, as from powdered earth into clay mass, thence flattened plates, thence a jar, shows the manifest form of the versatility of modifications. And whatever the motion in the subject of the modifications of time and condition, the same should be understood to be the argument in support of the versatility of modification. For certain all conditions appear constantly changing by constant motion, and the versatility of modification from constant mutability is thereby established. Of all mutable objects, like the thinking principle and the rest, some qualities are grasped by perception, such as pleasures, conditions and the like, and some are known by inference, such as fate, residuum, power, &c., and the propertied subject not being distinct from property is to be explained in the same way.

[Both the text and the commentary explain the subject in a very roundabout way. The purport is that the diversity of phenomena in the versatile world, is due to constant motion, or uninterrupted succession of changes. The three qualities are never at rest, they are flowing in a constant round of changes, and every change brings on some change of property, for were not properties to change, there would be no perceivable change. And the thinking principle, associated directly with the functions of the three qualities, must accordingly with these changes, be the agent of a multiplicity of functions, and that is its multifunctionality. The changes under notice are either perceivable
by the senses, organs, or felt by the mind, but in both cases they apply to the thinking principle.]

Now, with a view to describe Siddhi (perfection) by showing the object of the Sañyama already described, he says:

XVI.

The knowledge of the past and the future is acquired by Sañyama over the threefold modification.

The threefold modification resulting from distinctions of attribute, time and relation has been already described. By the Sañyama, i.e., by practising the controls aforesaid in connexion with this object, Yogis acquire a full knowledge of the past and the future. The purport is this: When a Yogi, knowing that in any given subject this is the attribute, this is the time, this is the relation, and it having performed its work in the present condition has entered the postcedent condition, performs the Sañyama by surmounting the obstructions, he knows everything, all that is passed, or that is to happen, because from the manifestation of the pure quality of goodness in the thinking principle, he then constantly rejects all obstacles caused by ignorance to the power of perceiving the purport of all and everything. When by these means all obstacles have been set aside, then, through concentration, the power of perceiving the property of all and everything becomes manifest as in a stainless mirror.

[Having explained the rationale of the action of the thinking principle on worldly objects, the author now proceeds to describe the effect of Sañyama on that action, and the occult powers which may be derived by that exercise. The first occult power or perfection noticed is the power of knowing the past and the future. This is acquired by directing the Sañyama to the threefold changes described in A. xiii, i.e., by meditating about them till the light of truth rises in the thinking principle of the Yogi and makes everything manifest.]

He describes another kind of perfection.
XVII.

A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and knowledge (arises) from indiscriminate understanding. By Sañyāma with due discrimination, (is acquired an understanding) of the cry of all creatures.

A "word" (śabda) is a sound formed of letters joined in a fixed order, perceptible by the organ of hearing, and always conveying the same, single, distinct meaning; or it is a mere explosive sound having in it no fixed order, but still intelligible to cultivated understanding. In either case it forms words and sentences, for both are adapted to convey a fixed meaning. "Meaning" (arthā) implies kind, quality, action, &c. "Understanding" (pratyāya) is knowledge, or the function of the intellect in which it assumes the form of the object (implied). By accepting in our intellect these naturally distinct word, meaning and understanding as one, there is confusion. Thus, in saying "bring a cow," the meaning is a cow (go), belonging specifically to the species cow, and having dewlap, &c.; the word is the indicator; and the understanding is the appreciation of it; and all these are grasped without any distinction. It is not used with a clear perception of the word cow being the indicator, the meaning being what is indicated by the word, and the understanding that which accepts the two; and if one is asked what is the meaning? what is the word? what is the understanding produced by it? he gives only one answer to all the questions by saying 'a cow.' Were he not to conceive all these to be identical, how could he give the same answer to all the questions? In this state he who makes the "distinction," (pravibhāga) that the essential nature of a word is that it is the indicator (vāchaka), that of its meaning is the indicated, and that of the understanding is making it manifest, and, making this distinction, places himself in Sañyāma about it, acquires the knowledge of the cry (rūta) or word of all creatures, including feral and domestic quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, &c., i.e.
he knows with what particular motive a specific sound has been made by a particular animal.

[Words are correlated with meanings, and meanings with ideas. When sounds are reduced to speech there is a fixed relation between their constituents, and this relation is fixed by orthography and syntax; but when, in the cry of an animal for instance, this relation of sounds does not appear to be so fixed, it is not to be understood that there is no such relation, for without it the sounds could not convey meaning and idea. And the relation being admitted, it must follow that the cry of animals, which are intended to convey ideas, must have some such relation, and this relation can be learnt by directing the Sañyama to it. Ergo when the Sañyama is accomplished, the Yogi who performs it is able to understand the meaning of the cries of animals.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XVIII.

A knowledge of former existence by making the residua apparent.

Twofold are the residual impressions of the thinking principle. Some are simply productive of memory; others are the causes of the deserts, kind, life, and enjoyment, called virtue and vice. When Sañyama is performed in regard to these residua, the performer, enquiring into his former actions to the effect—thus has that object been perceived by me, thus has that act been performed by me, remembers all the past by the mere reflection, the residua being by themselves excited without any separate stimulants, and gradually visibly sees in the self-excited residua the kind, &c., experienced in former existences.

[As explained in A. xviii, C. I., the residual impressions are of a twofold character. One class of them produce memory, that is when excited by a stimulus, the impressions which lie latent in the mind become vivid, even as an action done in childhood and afterwards entirely forgotten, is brought up in the mind many years after by the sight of the locality or other circumstance]
connected with it. Involuntary impressions received in dreams and the like are also so produced. The second class of impressions are those which bring on the desert of works; they are perfectly involuntary, and are mostly residua of former existences. By applying Sañyama to these, they are excited and become visible to the Yogi, and thereby he is able to know the events of his former existences.

Another form of perfection.

XIX.

With reference to cognition, a knowledge of another's thinking principle.

"Cognition" (pratyaya) as indicated by some characteristic sign, such as the complexion and the like, of others. When a Yogi has performed the Sañyama with reference to it, he attains a knowledge of another's thinking principle. The meaning is, that one's own thinking principle, by entering the thinking principle of another, comes to know all its attributes, whether it is excited or otherwise.

[The principle explained above applies also to the thinking principles of other persons. The Sañyama applied to them brings them within the range of the understanding of the Yogi. The theory being that the thinking principle which thinks upon a thing assumes the form of that thing, it follows that the mind of the Yogi performing the Sañyama becomes the mind thought of, and thereby knows it.]

He now describes a peculiarity in the knowledge of other thinking principles.

XX.

(But) not along with its object, that not being the object (of the thinker).

But he is not able to know another's thinking principle (in the text represented by the pronoun it) "along with its object" (sálambana), i.e., along with the object to which it is directed,
because none of the characteristics of the object is made the
subject (of the Sañyama). From the characteristic of the object not
being reflected upon the thinking principle alone of another is
known, but not that it is blue or yellow, because Sañyama cannot
be directed to that which has not been made the object of it, and
there can be no recognition where it is not made the object.
Hence another thinking principle along with its object is not
cognizable, the object not being taken into account. Now, the
qualities of the thinking principle will be included. When con-
templation is made as to what is the object, then from that
Sañyama a knowledge of the whole subject is acquired.

[This aphorism qualifies the sense of the next preceding one.
It says that by thinking on the thinking principle of another
one can know it, but not its objects, unless those objects are
also included. When they are included the knowledge is per-
fect.]

He describes another perfection.

XXI.

From Sañyama with reference to the shape of the
body, the power of vision being benumbed, and the
correlation of light and sight being severed, there is
disappearance.

The "body" (kåya) is the human frame, and its shape (rûpa) is
that quality of it which is perceptible by the eye. The meaning
is—of such a body such is the shape. Through Sañyama the power
of the eye to perceive things becoming 'benumbed' (stambha),
i.e., obstructed through contemplation with reference to that
shape, and "the correlation of light and sight being severed," i. e.,
the luminousness of the eye which proceeds from the quality of
goodness being "severed," or rendered incapable of performing its
function, there is a disappearance of a Yogi, i.e., none can see him.
By this it should be known that the disappearance of sounds
&c. is also implied, i.e., by this exposition of the means of the
disappearance of shape, &c., the disappearance of sounds, &c., the objects of the ears, &c., is described.

[Objects are perceivable by the light which the quality of goodness throws on them, but if this light be withdrawn by the quality of goodness being confined in the thinking principle, they cease to be so. Accordingly, when a Yogi performs Sañyama with reference to his body or any part of it he withdraws therefrom the quality of goodness, and the body or the part of it so acted upon ceases to have the quality of perceptibility, and the Yogi becomes invisible, inaudible, &c. When an object has no power of visibility in it, it necessarily becomes invisible. This is how the Yogi makes himself invisible.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XXII.

Works are deliberate and non-deliberate, and by Sañyama about them a knowledge of the final end; or by portents.

Life is the consequence of former works. They are of two kinds, "deliberate" and "non-deliberate." Thereof the "deliberate" or anticipatory (sopakrama) is that in which there is an anticipation of consequences in the attempt to produce a result, as in the spreading of wet cloth in a hot place in order that it may dry quickly. The reverse of the former is the "non-deliberate" (nirupakrama), as the leaving the same cloth in a lump in a cool place where it may dry after a long time. Whoever performs Sañyama with reference to these two kinds of work, (enquiring) 'whether my work will mature quickly or slowly,' in him, through firm contemplation, a knowledge of the final end is produced. "Final end" (aparánta) is the separation of the body from the soul, i.e., death. A "knowledge of it," i.e., 'at such a time, at such a place my death shall happen,' he acquires with certainty.
"Or by portents" (arishtatabhyasa). Portents are of three kinds, spiritual (ādhyātmika), material, (ādhibhautika) and supernatural (ādhidaivika). The spiritual is that (which is conveyed in a spiritual way, as) when one with the ears closed does not hear the sound of the vital air in the stomach, or such like (the said sound being ordinarily audible). The material is the sudden sight of a frightful human form, or the like. The supernatural is the accidental sight of invisible things, such as paradise, &c. By them one knows the time of death. Although knowledge may be acquired through portents by other than Yogīs, it is in their case general and doubtful. In the case of Yogīs, on the other hand, the time and place being certain, the perception is as certain as actual sight.

[The efficacy of this Siddhi depends upon the precision with which the events of past existences are realised in the mind by reviving their residua through the power of Sañyama. When their memory is perfect, one can easily calculate which of his former acts will bring on death within a short time, and which are destined to retard it. It will be seen that in the Yoga system residua or deserts play the part of fate, and if the nature of the residua be known, one knows his fate.] In order to explain the perfection acquired by the purifying processes (Chap. I, A. xxxii, p. 40) he says:

XXIII.

In friendliness, superhuman powers.

By performing Sañyama in regard to friendliness, mercy, complaisance, and indifference, super-human powers are acquired with reference to them, i.e., in the performer friendliness, mercy, and complaisance attain such great excellence as to enable him to contract friendship with all (persons).

[The sense is obvious, and needs no comment.] He describes another kind of perfection.
XXIV.

In powers, the powers of the elephant and the like.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the powers of the elephant and the like, powers like those of the elephant, &c., become manifest in the Yogi. The meaning is this: He who performs Sañyama in regard to the power of the elephant, the force of the wind, or the vigour of the lion, wishing it to be in him, becomes possessed of those powers.

[As obvious as the purport of the last preceding aphorism.]

Another perfection.

XXV.

From contemplation of the light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowledge (is acquired) of the subtile, the intercepted and the remote.

The light of the extremely luminous disposition has already been described. (C. I, A. xxxvi). The "light" is that which expands the manifestation of the quality of goodness. From "contemplation" (nyása) of all things appertaining to it, i. e., from thinking of the objects irradiated by it, a knowledge is produced, in one's own internal organ and the organs of sense endowed with special power, of the "subtile" (sūkṣhma) such as atoms, &c., of the "intercepted" (vyavahita), as mines under the earth, and of the remote (viprakṛṣṭa), as the elixir of life existing on the other side of the Meru mountain.

[The clear light of the quality of goodness is what is meant by "the light of the extremely luminous disposition."]

Another perfection of a similar description.

XXVI.

From Sañyama in the sun, a knowledge of regions.

He who performs Sañyama with reference to the manifest sun, obtains a definite knowledge of whatever regions and towns exist in the seven spheres, including the terrine, the aérial, and the celestial. In the preceding aphorism the subject is the
manifestation of the quality of goodness, here it is material, that is the distinction.

[The *P. Bhashya* gives a long account of the seven principal regions and their subsidiaries, taken from the Purāṇas, but it is not worth quoting. In Wilson's Vishnū Purāṇa the details are given at length.]

Another perfection by means of reliance on material manifestation.

**XXVII.**

In the moon, a knowledge of the disposition of the stars.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the moon, a knowledge is derived of the disposition (*vṛyāha*), or the order of arrangement, of the starry luminaries. As the stars lose their light on the manifestation of the sun, Sañyama with reference to the sun cannot suffice to afford a knowledge of the stars, therefore a different means is (here) ordained.

[The reason given why the Sañyama with reference to the sun does not suffice to give an idea of the arrangement of the stars and planets appears ludicrous. Bhoja cannot have seen a star in day light. The *P. Bhashya* does not refer to it.]

Another perfection.

**XXVIII.**

In the Polar star, a knowledge of their motion.

A knowledge is produced of the "motion" (*gati*) of the particular time and position of each of the stars by performing Sañyama with reference to the Polar star (*Dhruva*), the chief, the fixed star. This is a star, that is a planet, this is the period within which it will reach a particular constellation,—all these are known. What is said is that this is the fruit of knowing their times.

[The *P. Bhashya* adds that the Sañyama applied to the firmament above suffices the purpose. (*Urdhva-vimāneśu kṛi-
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sanyamastāni vijānīyāt). It is not obvious why Bhoja has omitted this.

After having described perfections regarding externals, he now attempts to describe internal perfections.

XXIX.

In the navel-wheel, a knowledge of the disposition of the body.

A knowledge is acquired by the Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to the "wheel" (chakra) of sixteen radii which exists in the middle of the body, and is called "navel" (nābhī), of the "disposition" (vyūha) obtaining in the body of fluids, excrements, humours, tubes, &c. What is said is this—the navel-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes, therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body.

[Down to the last aphorism the effect of Sañyama applied to external objects formed the theme of comment; now the author turns to objects situated within the body. The first is the navel-wheel, which is said to have sixteen radii. How this idea got into currency I cannot make out. Ancient Hindus must have seen the human abdomen dissected, and having seen it, it is impossible to imagine, how they conjured up the idea of a wheel with sixteen radii. There must be some recondite metaphor involved in this, but I know not what it is.]

Another perfection.

XXX.

In the throat-well, the subdual of hunger and thirst.

The well in the throat is "throat-well" (kañṭhakūpa). It is a pit or well-like place (and therefore called a well) behind and below the tongue and palate. By the contact of the vital airs with it (the sensations of) hunger and thirst are produced. The hunger
and thirst of the Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to that well, are subdued. The streams of the vital airs being satisfied below the uvula, this kind of perfection is accomplished.

[The throat-well is the pharynx where the air from the mouth and that from the cavity of the nostrils meet.]

Another perfection.

XXXI.

Firmness in the tortoise tube.

Firmness of the mind is acquired by performing Sañyama with reference to the tube, called the "tortoise" (kūrna), which is situated below the throat-well. The meaning is—that on the mind entering that spot there happens no vacillation, in other words, such a firmness of the body is produced that no one can cause it to shake.

[The tortoise tube is the lower part of the larynx including the bronchi.]

Another perfection.

XXXII.

In the coronal light, vision of perfected ones.

In the skull there is an aperture called Brahma-randhra. It is called "light" (jyotih) because it is the site of light. Even as the spreading effulgence of a jewel in a closed room collects at the keyhole, so the light of the quality of goodness in the heart spreading collects at that aperture. And by the performance of Sañyama in it by Yogis, those perfected ones, or celestial beings, who dwell in the space between the earth and the sky and are invisible to ordinary people, become visible, i.e., Yogis see them, and hold converse with them. This is the meaning.

[The point at the crest of the frontal bone remains open in childhood when the parietal bones are not sufficiently developed; at maturity this opening is closed; but, its existence having once been proved, it is believed to exist always, and is called Brahma-
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Randhra. Life is said to depart through this aperture in certain cases, and spiritually it is reckoned to be the most important part of the body. In the Tantras it is referred to with great reverence.

This is the only aphorism in the Yoga system which may be assumed as recognising the truth of the spiritual manifestations of modern European spiritualists; the rationale, however, is entirely different.

He now describes the means of becoming all-knowing.

XXXIII.

Or from Pratibha, everything.

Pratibhā is that knowledge which is independent of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved. By performing Sañyama with reference to it this Pratibhā knowledge, called Tāraka or emancipator, which results before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, arises. Even as the light which becomes apparent before the rising sun, so this Tāraka, or knowledge of everything before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, becomes apparent. When this is the case, the Yogi can know everything without resource to any particular Sañyama.

[The P. Bhāṣya explains the word Pratibha by the phrase Pratibham nāma tārakam, which may mean the Morning Star, the one which is visible a little before sunrise, or that it is an emancipator. Patanjali, perhaps, referred to the star, as the light of that star prepares the way for the illumination of the universe by the sun; but Bhoja, having set a limit to external objects at the close of the 28th aphorism, is compelled to take the Pratibhā to be something different. According to his definition, it is a sort of instinct, or intuition, "the knowledge which is independant of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved." He has, nevertheless, been obliged to preserve the relation of the star to the sun by referring to the illumination resulting from sunrise. The
morning star is not, like the Polar star, always the same, different planets serving its place at different times, and this uncertainty must have told against the material meaning being accepted as the right one. Whether the practising Yogi should think on the morning star, or intuition is a question which I cannot decide, but Bhoja has obviously the best of the argument.

Another perfection.

XXXIV.

In the heart, a consciousness of the thinking principle.

"Heart" (ārdaya) is a particular part of the body. The locale of the internal organ is within a small, inverted lotus placed in that part of the body. By performing Sañyama with reference to it, a knowledge of the thinking principle of one's own and of another person is obtained, i.e., the Yogi comes to know all the residua in his own thinking principle, as well as the passions, &c., in other thinking principles.

[The description of the heart is obviously rhetorical. As the seat of the thinking principle it is described as the most appropriate spot to which attention should be directed to know it thoroughly.]

Another perfection.

XXXV.

Experience is an undefined conception of the quality of goodness and the soul, which are totally unconnected. From Sañyama for its own object, and not for another's object, proceeds a knowledge of the soul.

"The quality of goodness" (sattva) is a particular modification of nature (pradhāna); it is characterised by illumination and joy. 'Soul' (purusha) is the experiencer in the form of a ruler. From the distinction of the experiencer and the experience,—
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of the rational and the irrational—there is total unconnection between the two, i. e., they are separate. "A conception" of the two without any distinction, not knowing them distinctly, is experience. Hence whatever consciousness of pleasure and pain is felt by the quality of goodness assuming itself to be the master is experience. Goodness having no object of its own, its work is for "another's object," (parártha), i. e., for the object of the soul. That which is distinct from it is its "own object," (svártha); which is reliance on the true nature of the soul, or the connection of the shadow of the soul with the quality of goodness (sattva) devoid of egotism. By the performance of Sañyama in that connection, a knowledge of the object of the soul is derived, i. e., the soul knows reliant perception to be in this way dependant on the quality of goodness. Nor does there arise any difficulty about the soul, the knower, becoming the object of knowledge, for the objection will be met by the argument of knowability (i. e., that which is the knower cannot be the knowable); because the knower and the knowable are quite contrary.

[The soul is the experiencer of joys and sorrows; it experiences them by its being reflected on the intellect, which is the immediate experiencer. The two are essentially different; one is sentient, the other inert; one the enjoyer, the other the enjoyed. An association of the two is brought about by the former being reflected on the latter, and then the former experiences what is produced in the latter. The latter, however, being irradiated by the former, acts the part of the agent or actor, and whatever it thereby feels is called enjoyment. This feeling, however, is for another's purpose, i. e., for the purpose of the soul, its own purpose being the merging in that soul. In the one case it works for another, and falsely imagines itself to be the actor, and in the other it acts with a view to attain its own end. When Sañyama is performed with this discrimination and with the object of knowing the soul, the knowledge is acquired.]

He now describes the fruits of this Sañyama.
XXXVI.

Thence proceed intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction.

"Thence," from performing Sañyama in the said quality of goodness, or practising it; even in the waking state these faculties are produced. Thereof "intuition" (Prātibha) is the knowledge already described (A. xxx11r) on the manifestation of which minute objects become visible.

"Audition" (Srāvana) is the knowledge produced in the organ of hearing. Therefrom the highest celestial sound, or that which is produced in the heaven, becomes audible.

"Taction" (Vedanā) is the knowledge produced by the organ of touch. That by which is known that a thing exists (vidyati anayā) is Vedanā; it is a Tantric term which has been used here. Therefrom proceeds the knowledge of such celestial things as are subjects of touch.

"Vision" (Ādarśa) is that knowledge which is produced by the organ of sight. Whereby is seen (dris'yati) or perceived thoroughly what every form is, is ādarśa. When it is in its full development a knowledge of celestial forms is produced by it.

"Gustation" (Āsvāda) is the knowledge produced by the organ of taste. That by which a thing is tasted (āsvādati aneneti) is āsvāda, and on its full development a perception of celestial taste is produced.

"Olfaction" (Vārtā) is the sensation of smell. In Tantric terminology the word vrītti means the organ of smelling; that in which resides (varittate) the objects of smell (is vrītti) and that which proceeds from that organ of smell is Vārtā, i. e., the sensation of smell. When that becomes fully developed celestial smells become perceptible.

[This aphorism explains the collateral advantages of performing Sañyama with reference to the soul. These advantages are superior or transcendental powers in the organs of sense. Nor
are those powers confined to the meditative state; when once acquired, they are retained permanently, and even in his ordinary worldly waking state the Yogi can exercise them, so that in his ordinary faculties he becomes infinitely superior to common mortals.

Of these different fruits he now describes the respective provinces.

XXXVII.

These are obstacles in the meditative condition (but) perfections in the waking state.

"These," the different fruits described above. In the state of meditation they are "obstacles," (upasargas,) hindrances, disturbers, because from joy, wonder, &c., resulting therefrom, meditation becomes relaxed. In the state of waking (vyuhdna), i. e., in the ordinary state of life, they are, however, perfections (siddhayah), because then they yield desirable fruits.

[The perfections described are of the world worldly, required for worldly purposes, but useless for higher meditation, i. e., for meditation having isolation for its aim. Nor are they simply useless, but positively obstructive, for they interfere with the even tenor of calm meditation. In the waking state they may be gratifying, and, indeed, they are useful only in that state, but apart from it they are not wanted.]

He describes another perfection.

XXXVIII.

From slackness of the cause of bondage and from a knowledge of the process, the entrance of the thinking principle into another body.

The consciousness which results of the experiencer and the experience, acting from the constant relation existing between the soul and the intellect residing inside the body and from pervasion, is called corporeal bondage (sarirabandha). When through medita-
tion the cause of bondage, which is work in the twofold form of virtue and vice, becomes slack, or attains attenuity, and when a Yogi knows the process, i.e., the way in which the thinking principle issues from the heart through the organs towards worldly objects, knowing full well this is the tube called chittavaha through which the thinking principle circulates, and it differs thus from the tubes through which the vital airs and the rest circulate, and also knows the passages in his own body and that of others, he can enter, by the passage through which the thinking principle circulates, into the body of another, whether it be dead or alive. The thinking principle, after entering another body, follows the bent of the senses even as honey-bees follow the queen bee, (lit. king bee). And the Yogi who has entered another body uses it as his own body. Since work is the cause of circumscribing the fruition of the pervading soul and the thinking principle, if that circumscription be weakened or destroyed by meditation, fruition may result everywhere from the independence of the thinking principle.

[The transfer of one's own soul into another body plays a prominent part in the legendary lore of India, and the idea was not unknown at one time in Europe. How this transfer is effected is explained in this aphorism. The bondage of the soul to the body is due to works and their deserts, works having been performed their deserts must be borne by the soul in association with the body; but when through meditation the residua of works are obliterated and the bond is loosened, and the Yogi knows the way in which the soul goes out and comes into a body, he can, at will, make the soul travel by that way and enter another body, whether dead or alive, and again, at will, withdraw it from that body, and bring it back to its own. And wherever the soul rests there it works upon the organs, and enjoys their experiences, or in other words, the organs follow the soul as do working bees their queen.]

Another perfection.
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XXXIX.

From subdual of Udána, ascension and detachment from water, mud, thorns, &c.

The simultaneous waking, like the flaming up of burning chaff, of the functions (of the body) is indicated by the phrase vital air, (Jivana), and from differences of action, that vital air is indicated severally by the terms Prána, Apána, &c. Thereof one form of air is called Prána, because it passes (pranayāṇat) from the heart through the mouth and the nostrils. That air which descends (apanayāṇat) from the navel down to the great toe is called Apána. Another is called Samána, because, surrounding the navel, it permeates everywhere (samantānnyāṇat). Another is called Udána, because it ascends from the back of the neck to the head (unnayāṇat). Another air pervades the whole body, and is called Vyána, because it circulates over the whole body, (vyāpya nayāṇat). From the subdual of the Udána, through Sañyama, the other airs being suppressed and the tendency being upwards, the Yogi does not suffer from "water," i.e., in large rivers, &c., nor from large collections of "mud," (kardama,) bogs, nor from sharp "thorns" (kañṭaka), i.e., from his lightness he rises, like a floss of cotton, even when drowned in water or the like.

[The body is kept alive by five vital airs, and of these that which is called Udána is characterised by its tendency to rise upwards. Now, by making Sañyama in reference to it the tendency of the other airs are overcome, and the whole body tends upwards, consequently there is no gravitation, and the Yogi is neither drowned in water, nor submerged in a bog. The attenuity of his body at the time is such that it cannot be pierced by a thorn.]

XL.

From subdual of Samána, effulgence.

From the "subdual" (jāyāt) of the air called Samána which surrounds the fire (of the stomach), i.e., by bringing it under...
control through Sañyama, that unprotected fire ascends, and the Yogi appears effulgent as if flaming in glory.

[The stomach is the seat of the fire which keeps up the heat of the body and consumes food; and this fire is surrounded and kept in its place by the air called Samána. Such being the theory, it follows that when by Sañyama the air in question is overcome or rendered inapt in its special function, the fire, from its natural tendency upwards, should rise up and escape from the body in lambent flames of glory. The Buddhists, who developed the Yoga system to its utmost limit, declare that the crown of the head, the space between the eyebrows, the mouth and the shoulders are the places whence these flames usually issue. In the Sanskrit Buddhist literature of Nepal these flames are frequently described as issuing from the person of Sákya Buddha, whenever he immersed himself in a profound meditation, and in ancient sculptures images of Buddha are often represented with these flames occupying the place of halo, nimbus, aureola, or glory of European art. A physical cause for these flames may be found in the electric flames which have been noticed by Reichenbach on the persons of highly electric tendency under certain conditions. Of course it is an open question as to whether Yogis had seen such electric flames and derived their descriptions therefrom, or drawn them from their fancy.]

Another perfection.

XLI.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the organ of hearing and ether, a superperfect organ of hearing.

“Organ of hearing” (Srotra) is that organ which perceives sound, and is produced by egotism. “Ether” (Ākāśa) is sky, the result of the subtle rudiment of sound (Sabdatanmátra). The “relation” (sambandha) between the two is that of the site and the situated. The Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to it attains a superperfect organ of hearing (Divyasrotra), and
becomes able to hear simultaneously subtile, intercepted, and distant sounds.

[The ether is the product of the rudiment of sound; and the organ of hearing is dependant on it for the performance of its function; and if the relation between the two be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to ether, the performer obtains the power of knowing it under all circumstances.]

Another perfection.

XLII.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the body and ether, travelling in ether, from acquisition of levity, like that of cotton.

The "body" (kāya), is the form made of the five elements. By performing Sañyama with reference to the relation which exists between the body and ether which yields space (for objects to abide in) a levity, like that of cotton and the like, is effected, i.e., they become alike. Having effected this and attained the levity, the Yogi, walking at will over water, or on a spider's web, or on the rays of the sun, at his choice travels on ether.

[The rationale of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last; the body is kept down by the ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it.]

Another perfection.

XLIII.

The function independent of external functions is the great incorporeal. Therefrom the destruction of the covering of light.

That mental function which is out of the body, i.e., independent of it, is named the "great incorporeal" (Mahāvideha), because it is exclusive of the stedfastness of the relation between the body and egotism. "Therefrom," from Sañyama performed with reference to it, the destruction of the covering of light is
effected, i.e., the covering consisting of afflictions, works, &c., which obstruct the light of the thinking principle centered in the quality of goodness alone, is removed. The meaning is this:

The external functions of the thinking principle which result from the body and egotism are called factitious (kalpita). When, abandoning the feeling of body and egotism, there arises an independent (or self-reliant) mental function it is non-fictitious (akalpita). By performing Sañyama with reference to it, all taints in the thinking principle of the Yogi are removed.

[The covering produced by the qualities of foulness and darkness prevent the true light of the quality of goodness from being seen to perfection. If that covering be removed the vision is perfect. When retiring under this covering, which is no other than consciousness under the name of egotism, the mind entertains factitious ideas, and produces factitious works, which are consequently false. Divested of this covering it works differently, and whatever it produces is real. Sañyama performed with reference to the relation existing between the body and egotism removes the covering, and thereby cleanses the thinking principle.]

Having thus described the different forms of perfection, including anterior destruction of objects, posterior destruction of objects, and the middle condition; having also explained the knowledge of the externals, regions, &c., of the internals, the formation of the body, of the powers of friendliness, &c., which effect particular objects; having, further, described the conditions of internal and external organs and such like expedients for meditation, as also the conditions of the vital airs, Prāṇa, &c., and other perfections for producing stedfastness in the thinking principle and earnestness in meditation; he now, with a view to point out the various means for the perfection of the seeded and the seedless meditations for the visual inspection of the soul, says,

XLIV.

From Sañyama with reference to grossness, nature, subtlety, concomitance and fruition, conquest of the elements.
By performance of Sañyama with reference to the five specific conditions or qualities, such as grossness, &c., of the five elements, earth, &c., the conquest of the elements is effected, i. e., the elements become subservient. Thereof "grossness" (sthula) implies the specific forms in which the elements are perceived. "Nature" (svarūpa) implies respectively their effects, such as smell, viscidity, heat, impulsion, and impenetrability. "Subtlety" (sukshma) implies successively the subtile conditions which are the causes of the elements: these are the subtile or rudimentary forms of matter (tanmātra). "Concomitancy" (anvaya) includes the qualities of shape, disposition, and existence, which are everywhere seen to co-exist. "Fruition" (arthavatva) is that power in the qualities which lead to enjoyment and emancipation. Thus, by performing Sañyama in regard severally to the five elements, nature and conditions aforesaid, the Yogi conquers the elements. This is to be done in this way,—first in the gross form, next in the subtile form. To the performer of Sañyama in this order, nature and the elements become fullfillers of desires, even as cows follow calves.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain the advantages derivable from the performance of Sañyama with reference to the five elements. The elements brought under control subserve the wants and wishes of the controller, even as cows subserve the acquirements of calves by following them wherever they ramble.] He now describes the fruit of this conquest over the elements.

XLV.

Therefrom proceed attenuation, &c., as also excellence of body and the indestructibility of its qualities.

(1) "Attenuation" (animā) the attainment of the form of atoms (molecularity).

(2) "Levity" (laghimā) attainment of lightness like that of a floss of cotton.

(3) "Ponderosity" (garimā) attainment of great weight.
(4) "Illimitability," (mahimá) attainment of greatness, or the power of touching the moon or the like with the tip of one's finger.

(5) "Irresistible will" (prákámya) non-frustration of desires.

(6) "Supremacy" (isílva) highest authority over the body and the internal organ.

(7) "Subjection" (vasílva) prevailing everywhere, i.e., the elements being subservient to him do not disobey his behests.

(8) "Fulfilment of desires," (kávásáyítva) accomplishing one's desire everywhere, i.e., in whatever object a desire is formed, the Yogi becomes accomplished in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it.

These, attenuations, &c., as accessories to meditation, become prevalent in Yogis on their conquering the elements. Thus by attaining molecularity he can enter into (the substance of) a diamond. The other cases should be explained in the same way. These eight qualities, attenuation, &c., are called great perfections, (mahásiddhí). "Excellence of body" (káyasampat), which will be presently described, is also obtained. "The indestructibility of its qualities," means that the shape and the other qualities of that body are not liable to destruction by any means. Neither does fire burn its shape, nor wind dry it up, and so on.

[The exact nature of the advantages to be derived from Saññyama with reference to the elements, not having been described in the next preceding aphorism, the author supplies the omission in this aphorism. The advantages are the eight siddhí or perfections an account of which has already been given on page 121. They include many of the perfections described in separate aphorisms. I fail to perceive any marked distinction between the 5th and the 8th. The explanation of the 8th given on p. 121 is Tántric.]

He next explains what excellence of the body is—

**XLVI.**

Colour, loveliness, might, and adamantine hardness constitute the excellence of the body.
"Colour, loveliness, and might" are well-known. "Adaman-tine hardness" (vajrasanhananatva) means that hardness is produced in one's body like that of the diamond. These are the excellences that become manifest in the body.

[While yearning for the severance of all bondage to worldly objects, the Yogis cannot get over the natural love which ties the mind to the body. The body is one's own, and it is always desirable to have it in a perfect state of beauty, and the means are here provided to give it perfection. Of course it is introduced here as the effect of a particular kind of Sañyama, and not as a thing to be desiderated.]

Having thus explained the excellence of the body, he now describes the conquest of the organs by one who has attained his (proper) stage.

**XLVII.**

From the performance of Sañyama with reference to perception, nature, egoism, concomitance, and fruition, (proceeds) the conquest of the organs.

"Perception" (grahana) is the function of the organs directed to their (respective) objects. "Nature" (svarépa) is ordinary manifesting power. "Egoism" (asmila) is consciousness. "Con-comitance" (anwayatva) and "fruition" (arthavatva) as explained above (A. xlv, p. 157). By performing Sañyama with reference to these five conditions of these organs the Yogi becomes the conqueror of his organs.

[The five conditions of these organs include 1st, their nature, i.e., their power of making objects manifest; 2nd, their function when in active operation; 3rd, their consciousness of being active; 4th, their concomitance or relation to each other or mutual interdependence; and 5th, their fruition or the result they produce. If all these conditions be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to them, the organs necessarily come under complete control.]

The fruit thereof.
XLVIII.

Therefrom proceed quickness as of mind, uninstrumental perception, and the conquest of nature.

"Quickness as of mind" (manojavitva) is the attainment by the body of extreme quickness of motion like that of the mind. "Uninstrumental perception" (vikarana bhava) is the accomplishment of the functions of the organs without the aid of the body. "Conquest of nature" (pradhanajaya) is bringing everything under subjection. These perfections are attained by those who have overcome their organs. In this science these are called honey-drops (madhupratika). Even as every drop of honey has its taste, so each of these is tasteful, and therefore they are honey-drops.

[The advantage of having control over the organs as described in the last preceding aphorism is, that the Yogi is then able to perceive things without the aid of his material organs, and to do so with the quickness of the mind, i.e., instantaneously. He also acquires mastery over nature in every way. The nature here referred to is the Pradhana of the Sankhya categories, the highest of the twenty-five, next only to soul.]

Having described the conquest of the (external) organs, he now points out the conquest of the internal organ.

XLIX.

Supremacy over all conditions and omniscience, the moment the distinctive knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul (is attained).

The knowledge of the distinction between the quality of goodness and the soul which results from performing Sañyama with reference to the modification of pure goodness, is "distinctive knowledge" (anyatakhyati). From the subsidence, through the influence of the Sañyama, of the conception about the qualities being agents the Yogi, who are in that condition, attain in their meditation supremacy over all conditions and omniscience.
“Supremacy over all conditions” (sarvabhāvādikṣhṭātritva) is the attainment of power like a master over all modifications of qualities. “Omniscience” (sarvajñātritva) is correct knowledge of those qualities as they exist in calm, (sānta,) enlivened, (udita,) and latent (avyapadisyā) conditions. In this science this perfection is called “sorrowless perfection” vis'okasiddhi, while those that have been described before are indicated by the term vas'īkāra (control).

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the effect of getting control over the mind or the internal organ. That control enables the Yogi to perceive the difference between the quality of goodness and the soul, and endows him with absolute mastery over all conditions of existence and thorough omniscience. The omniscience directly refers to the conditions of the three qualities, but indirectly to all and everything in the universe. Everything in the universe depends upon the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, and those qualities are either in a calm state, or in a state of excitement, or latent; and if one comes to know their conditions he necessarily knows all and everything that proceeds from them. This state of supreme knowledge is called Vis'oka or sorrowless perfection, for when it is attained there cannot possibly be any cause for pain or sorrow; whereas in the perfections previously described there is always some room for sorrow, or longing of some kind or other. The latter ensure control over the things they refer to, and the control is more or less perfect according to circumstances, and they are fitly called Vas'īkāra or ‘control.’ They do not, however, secure absolute immunity from pain, and this necessitates the marked distinction in the designations.]

Next he describes another stage.

L.

From indifference even to this (perfection) through destruction of the seed of evils, (results) isolation.
When the Yogi becomes indifferent even to that sorrowless perfection, then ignorance, the seed of the evils such as passion, & c., being destroyed by the root, "isolation," (kāvalya,) absolute cessation of pain, results, i.e., on the termination of the influence of the qualities the soul is restored, placed permanently, in its own state.

[Nor is the sorrowless perfection the ultimatum. When the Sañyama is exercised freely it produces an indifference in the mind in regard to it, and this indifference destroys ignorance, the root of all evil, and leads to isolation, or the detachment of soul from the bondage of worldly ties.]

He now points out the means of remaining in this meditation.

LI.

Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evils recurring.

There are four classes of Yogis; viz., 1st, those practisers of the Yoga on whom the light is just shedding; 2nd, Ritambharas, or those who possess the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3rd, those who have conquered the elements and the organs; 4th, those who have exceeded all objects of contemplation. Thereof, to those who have attained the fourth meditation, when the seven surrounding stages of knowledge have been attained, and the final stage of 'honeyed knowledge' has been interviewed, the celestial (sthdninah) gods become tempters, i.e., they offer presents of handsome women, elixir vitae, &c. With such temptations no association should be made, nor any encouragement be given to them. From association there is a fall into the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. With regard to them therefore both association and encouragement should be renounced.

[When the Yogi attains the last described sorrowless stage, he is exposed to a great danger. The gods envy his high excellence, but, unable to exercise open enmity, they try to divert him from
his purpose by insidious means. They place temptations in his way, offer him handsome women, inexhaustible wealth, long life, and so forth to bring him back to the ways of the world, and thereby frustrate his purpose of attaining isolation. They act the part of Satan in the Bible and of Māra in the Buddhist system. In Hindu legends Indra is the chief god who envies men who are about to rise superior to carnal weakness, and the means he employs are the courtezans of his court, who descend on earth and tempt all Yogīs by their celestial charms. According to the Tantras when such temptations fail, resort is made to fear. Frightful forms of all kinds assail the Yogī when he is engaged in his meditations; venomous serpents hiss around him; tigers prowl about him; ogres come with wide open mouth to devour him. These are, in the technical language of the Yoga system, called Vibhīṣikā. The lukewarm yield to these, break their meditation, and are lost; the determined take no note of them, and attain their object. It is believed that these frightful forms never do any actual mischief; their object is to frighten, to put to test the determination and firmness of the Yogī, and not to do any positive harm. The advice given in the Tantras is not to give any encouragement to such temptations, nor to be depressed or frightened by the dangers which become manifest. Firmness suffices to overcome them. The text here does not refer to frightening.

In connexion with the manifestation of this fruitful understanding, he describes a means besides the Sañyamas above described.

LII.

From Sañyama with reference to the course of moments (proceeds) an understanding born of discriminative knowledge.

“Moment” (kṣaṇa) is the smallest division of time, which can no further be reduced in quantity. “Course” (krama) the suc-
cessive modifications of such moments of time. By performing Sañyama with reference to the course of moments, the aforesaid understanding of discriminative knowledge results. The meaning is this: This is a moment of time, it is subsequent to another, therefore the first is antecedent to this. For him who has performed Sañyama with reference to this course, interview with the minutest is effected in the course of a moment, and so is the interview effected of the subtile nature. This is manifestation of discriminative knowledge.

[The next step of the Yogi is to perform Sañyama with reference to the progress of time, and when this is accomplished, discriminative knowledge becomes thoroughly manifest.]

He now applies this Sañyama to a special subject.

LIII.

Therefrom results the knowledge of the difference between two similars when that difference is not marked out by kind, character and habitat.

"Kind, character, and habitat" (játi, lakšhana, des'a) are the means of differenciation of things. Sometimes "kind" (játi) is the cause of distinction; as this is a cow, this is a buffalo. When the kind is the same, "character" (lakšhana) may be the cause of distinction; as this is spotted, this is tawny. Where kind and character are alike, the cause of distinction may be "habitat," (des'a); thus with two emblic fruits of the same size and colour, one may be of one country and the other of another. There are again cases in which distinction cannot be determined, as particles of white earth of one country. When Sañyama is performed to ascertain distinctions in the last class of cases, a knowledge of distinction is produced, and by its exercise distinctions of even the exceedingly subtile categories may be perceived. What is said is this: When distinctions cannot be ascertained by any other means they, including a knowledge of such
distinctions in the subtile categories, may be known through this Sañyama. 

[This aphorism explains what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Under ordinary circumstances discrimination is made by attention to kind, character and habitat. But this is not possible in the case of the subtile categories which are not amenable to such tests. For them Sañyama is the only means, and it should be brought to bear upon them. When the Sañyama is accomplished, the power of discriminating them is fully acquired, and this is discriminative knowledge.]

To explain the name, object, and nature of the aforesaid knowledge resulting from discrimination, he says.

LIV.

The knowledge resulting from discrimination is emancipating, omni-objective, semper-objective, instantaneous.

The knowledge which results from the power of the aforesaid Sañyama at the last stage is "emancipating" (Tāraka). That whereby Yogis are ferried over the unfathomable ocean of the world has the significant name of Tāraka, (the emancipating). He describes its object; it is a "omni-objective" (sarva-vishaya); all categories from the Mahat downward are its objects, and therefore it is omni-objective. Its characteristic is its semper-objectivity (sarvathāvishayatva). That which has for its objects the categories in all conditions, whether gross or subtile, in all their modifications, and existing in all forms, is always semper-objective. Another characteristic of it is "instantaneousness" (akrama). Being finally modified it has to make no progress in accepting two, three or one form, hence "instantaneous," i.e., (a Yogi in this stage) perceives everything at once, like an emblē fruit in the palm of one's hand.

[The discriminative knowledge aforesaid is here more fully explained. It grasps all the categories and therefore the whole
universe. It makes them its object at all times, and its knowledge is never absent. It acts instantaneously, because it has the whole thing before it, and needs no process of observation and reticulation to come to an understanding. And everything being known by it, it effects emancipation, for emancipation means true knowledge.]

He now says what results from this emancipating knowledge proceeding from discrimination.

LV.

On the purification of the quality of goodness and of soul becoming equal, (there results) isolation.

"The quality of goodness and soul" have already been defined. When their purification becomes equal there is isolation. The "purification" (s'uddhi) of the quality of goodness of the thinking principle is effected when, on the cessation of the assumption of agency, it merges into its first cause. The purification of soul is the absence of its factitious enjoyment. When the two are equally purified (in this way), isolation is effected with regard to the soul, i. e. it is emancipated.

[The thinking principle ordinarily fancies itself to be the agent of all work, i. e., it is conscious of being the actor in all cases, and this is its natural function; but when this feeling is removed by discriminative knowledge, it reverts to its primary original condition, and ceases to cherish any idea of its being the actor, and this is its purification. Similarly soul, though itself devoid of action, is always engaged in an unnatural factitious enjoyment of the fruits of work by its association with the thinking principle, and when that association is removed it is purified. And this double purification, the cessation of the thinking principle from fancying itself the actor and consequent submersion into its original cause, and the removal of the association between the soul and the thinking principle, effects the isolation or separation of the soul from all attachments, and this is emancipation from the bondage of the world.]
Thus have been described in this chapter the three principal components of the Yoga, (I—III); their collective name Sañyama, (iv); the merits of that Sañyama, (v—x); the three modifications of things, the antecedent, the middle, the postcedent conditions, (xi—xvi); the Siddhis (xvii); the external perfections giving knowledge of regions (xviii—xxviii); the internal perfections, giving knowledge of the organization of the body (xxix—xl); the organs (xl); the stages of control of matter and organizations (xl—xlvi); the means of attaining discriminative knowledge, the emancipating knowledge, the highest Samadhi (xlix—l); the subsidence of the thinking principle in its primary cause and isolation (l—liv). These are the subjects described in this chapter on perfections. (Condensed as before.)

This is the end of the third quarter, or the quarter on perfections, of the commentary, entitled Rájamártanda, on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

I adore that solitary, unborn Is'ána who is made up solely of thinking principle and bliss, and by whose fiat isolation is produced without (the aid of) any special means.

Now the author commences the chapter on Isolation with a view to establish by inferential arguments and by refutation of errors resulting from mistaken convictions, the true nature of Isolation. And by showing that the perfections aforesaid result from birth and various other causes, he demonstrates that they appear with the help of the power resulting from the practice of Samádhi in former births and from causes in this life from the time of birth. Further, with a view to afford assurance that no harm is done to Samádhi which may be achieved in course of many births, and to prove the preeminence of the completion of Samádhi as also for the consummation of the isolating Yoga, he says:—

I.

The Perfections are produced by birth, herb, incantations, austerity, or Samádhi.

Some perfections are caused by birth, as the power of flying in the air and the like in birds, or the perfected qualities of knowledge manifesting themselves immediately after birth, as in the great sage Kapila and others. Perfections from herbs—as firmness of the boy, &c. produced by the use of elixirs in Pátála and such like places. Perfections from incantations—as ascent in the air by the repetition of particular mantras. Perfections from austerity—as in the case of Visvámitra and others. Perfections from Samádhi—as already described in the preceding chapter.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

These perfections result in those persons who have destroyed pain in previous births; hence, as in the case of perfection by Samádhi, so in the case of others, the real cause is the practice of Samádhi in former births; incantations, &c. are merely instruments.

[The word *Siddhi* comes from the root *sāh* 'to accomplish,' and means something accomplished. Transcendental powers attainable by the performance of Sañyama, are perfections accomplished by special means and therefore called Siddhis or perfections; and having used that English equivalent elsewhere I have thought fit, for the sake of uniformity, to use it in the above aphorism. It is, however, not fully expressive here. Special powers, or faculties would have been much more expressive and to the point, the purport of the aphorism being that some faculties are derived from birth, some from herbs, some from incantations, some from the practice of austerities, and some from Samádhi. This general principle is laid down with a view to prepare the way to what follows.]

It might be contended that since in Nandíś'vara and others the change of kind, &c., were effected in this life, how can you then establish the causality of the practice of Samádhi in previous lives? In reply to this, he says:

II.

Change of kind (results) from transmutation of the material cause.

The "change of kind," &c., in Nandíś'vara and others in this life (were produced) by "the transmutation of material causes" (*prakṛityapūrāt*). Future materials (or materials which are ordinarily produced in a subsequent life, come up and), produce in this life the transmutations, i.e., they change themselves into other kinds.

[The general principle having been laid down in the first aphorism that special faculties are produced by five causes, the question arises, how does the body, which is produced by birth, change even in this life, the material cause remaining unaltered,
and the Samádhi performed in a previous life no thaving effected any change at birth? The reply is that Samádhi is not the material but an instrumental cause, and it prepares the way for the selfmutation of the material cause.

Prakriti is here used in the sense of material cause, or the materials of which the body is made up. Āpuraṇa is to fill up. The two words together mean “the materials fill up,” i.e., they undergo the necessary transmutations to change one kind into another. The purport is that even in this life the materials of the body may so change as to convert a Bráhmana’s body into a divine one, as in the case of Nandíśvara, or a Kshatriya body into a Bráhmana one, as in the case of Visvámitra, and consequently the exception taken to the argument put forth in the first aphorism to the effect that “birth, &c. are causes of perfection” is not tenable. By the use of the word púshchalya, ‘future’, the commentator means that the changes which in ordinary course would take place in a future life, take place in exceptional cases in this life.

It may be argued that merits, demerits, &c., are in such cases seen to be resulting (in this life when their fruits would not under the theory be liable to manifestation), how can we then attribute to them causality in the transmutation of the material cause in this life? To this the author says:

III.

In the mutation of the material cause merit is non-efficient: from it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.

“Merit” (nimitta), virtue, &c. In the transformation of the material cause merit is non-efficient, for a cause cannot be set in motion by an effect. Where then is there the operation of virtue, &c.? To this he says: “From it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.” “From it,” from the performance of virtuous acts, &c., proceeds “the piercing” (bheda) or destruction of whatever “covering” (varana) obstruc-
tion, such as vice, &c., exists, the two being mutually antagonistic, and the obstruction being destroyed, the material causes themselves become effective in their desiderated work. This he illustrates by an example. "As in the case of a husbandman." Even as a husbandman or farmer, wishing to carry water from one field to another, pierces only the obstacle to the flow of water, and that being pierced, water itself assumes the modification of expansion, without any exertion on the part of the husbandman to the expansion of water, so should be understood to be the case with regard to virtue, &c.

[Following the line of argument adopted in the preceding aphorism, the author shows that virtue, &c., are not the immediate causes of the change which takes place when a Brāhmaṇ becomes a god, as in the case of Nandīśvara, but that they serve the subsidiary purpose of removing the obstacles which stand in the way of the change, and the change takes place by itself. The illustration given puts this very clearly. The husbandman does not make the water flow, he only removes the obstacles, and then the water flows by itself from its own inherent tendency to follow the law of gravitation.]

When a Yogi, who has a mastery over the cardinal principles, with a view to enjoy at once the fruits of his actions, from the perception of his own superior transcendental powers, wishes to assume many bodies at the same time, whence does he derive many thinking principles (to vitalize those bodies)? In reply to this question the author, says:

IV.

The created thinking principles (proceed) solely from egoism.

The thinking principles which animate the bodies created by a Yogi, proceed through his will solely from their original cause, i.e., from egoism. They emanate at once as sparks from a fire.

[Among the perfections mentioned in chapter III the power of multiplying one's own body, so as to produce many where there is one, is not mentioned, but here it is taken for granted that
an accomplished Yogi possesses this power, and that he does produce them to effect quickly his emancipation by simultaneously performing in many bodies those works which promote his end, and the question is raised as to how does a Yogi, who creates many bodies and himself animates them all, provide a thinking principle for each of them? The answer given is that through his will he makes his egoism send forth the needful, even as a fire sends forth sparks from itself. This multiplication of bodies is called Kārayuṣa Yoga or the Yoga of many bodies.]

Then, how do numerous thinking principles, having diversity of objects, produce one effect? To this, he replies:

V.

In the diverse tendency of the many the impelling thinking principle is one.

"In the diverse tendency" (pravṛttibhede) or multifunctionality of the many thinking principles the one thinking principle of the Yogi is the impelling force or actuator, because it is the ruler, and therefore there is no difference of object. The meaning is—that as in its own body the mind directs the eyes, the hands, &c., according to its will, from its being the ruler, so does it in the other bodies.

[In the preceding aphorism the question having been solved as to how a single individual can provide thinking principles for many bodies, the question arises as to how can many thinking principles act in concert and preserve the unity of the creator? If this unity be not admitted, there would be so many independent individuals, each following the bent of his own mind, and the idea of one individual acting as many without any loss of individuality, would be lost. This doubt is removed by the explanation that the thinking principles provided to the many are in reality one, and entirely controlled by the primary thinking principle, of which they are mere scintillations.]

The thinking principle which belongs to the perfections resulting from birth, &c., are produced by the same five causes,
and yet the thinking principle produced by Samádhi is distinct from the others. To show this he says:

VI.

Thereof the meditation-born one is without any residua.

"The meditation-born" (dhyánaja) thinking principle or that which is produced by Samádhi, is, among the five, the one which is "without any residua" (anásaya), i.e., without any residua of (former) work. This is the meaning.

[Thinking principles are said to be of five kinds, because they proceed severally from birth, herbs, incantation, penances, and meditation (A.1). The word used (ja), means "born," but the object is not to imply that the thinking principles are actually born of herbs, incantations, &c., but to indicate the training, habit of thought, disposition or impurities which it acquires under the five different circumstances. The first four are said to depend on the residua of former works, and the last to have nothing to rest upon, it being self-supporting, i.e., not resulting from the residua of any former work.]

To show that the thinking principle of the Yogi is distinct in its work, even as it is distinct from other thinking principles in being devoid of pain, &c., he says:

VII.

The work of a Yogi is neither white nor black: those of others are of three kinds.

That work which produces good fruit, such as sacrifices, &c., is "white" (śukla). That which produces a bad result, such as Bráhmapícide, is "black" (kríṣṇa). That which is mixed up of the two, is white-black (śukla-kríṣṇa). Thereof, the white work belongs to wise people, to those who are engaged in charity, asceticism, the study of the Vedas, &c.; the black belongs to the vicious; and the white-black (or mixed kind) to ordinary men. As regards Yógís, who have performed the Sañyáma, work is of a
different character to these: their work produces no fruit, for they undertake it after renouncing all desire for fruition.

[In the first three kinds of work fruition is inseparable. The wise give alms, perform penances, read the Vedas, display their benevolence, &c. &c. and derive the fruits thereof; the vicious commit wicked actions and suffer for the same; ordinary mortals are sometimes engaged in good actions and sometimes in bad ones, and suffer or enjoy accordingly. The Yogis, who renounce the fruits of all actions, can neither suffer nor enjoy from what they do, and hence their work is declared to be distinct from the works of others. They are, in the language of the Bhagavadgítā, like the lotus-leaf which, lying on water or having water on it, is never wetted.]

Now he describes the fruit of such works.

VIII.

Thence proceeds the manifestation of the residua which are suitable to its fruition.

Now, the residua of works produce two sorts of fruits, one sort being memory only, and the other, kind, age, and experience. Thereof, those residua which have for their fruition kind, age, and experience which are derivable in one or many births, have already been described above (p. 69). Of those the only fruit of which is memory, the manifestation proceeds from the same works. Even as work produces a body, whether as a Deva, or a human being, or a lower animal, so does it by its maturity lead to a corresponding manifestation of residua (vásanā). The meaning is this. Should a celestial or other body once acquired by a certain work be acquired even after the interposition of a hundred other births the memorial residua of the former state will manifest themselves again. Their memory revives according to circumstances, even when residing in other regions. In the intermediate states, though existing, they remain in a latent condition. Nor do the residua produced in course of existence in hell and other places become evident then.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

[For the sake of verbal fidelity I have used memory as the equivalent of the Sanskrit term Smrīti of the commentary; but the object aimed at is not memory in its ordinary signification, but the remembrance in one life of appetites, desires, and affections of a preceding one. These results manifest themselves in, what in European philosophy is called, instinct. They are remembrances, because they arise without any conscious purpose, though they are not without consciousness. European philosophers, who do not recognise transmigration, finding Instinct to be opposed to Reason, take it to be something distinct from it—a distinct faculty. In its widest signification it extends to living beings in general—to plants as well as to animals,—but for psychological purposes it is limited by Dugald Stewart to Appetites, Desires, and Affections. Butler changes Desires into Passions, but without any material change of purport. Dr. Bain says "Instinct is untaught ability," (Mental and Moral Science, Bk. III, c. IV), and this is amplified by Hamilton into "an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge." (Reid's Works, p. 761 a.) Paley has "a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction." Milton calls it "Reason discursive or intuitive." These definitions have been summed up into "untaught ability," "untaught propensity," "unconscious purpose." It is opposed to Habit, which is the result of tuition and exercise, and distinct from Reason, which presupposes argumentation and deliberation. The memory of our text is Instinct as defined above; but our author does not recognise spontaneity in anything, nor purpose independent of Reason. He attributes the etiology of Instinct to residua left in the thinking principle by rational action, and the said residua lie dormant till they are made vivid in a subsequent life. Habits leave their residua exactly in the same way as other actions, and they not only become manifest in the next life, but also in the progeny, as in the cases of pointers and other animals. In short, according to our author, Reason is one and the sole faculty of all knowing, the only principle of certain...
ty, and it manifests itself as Reason or Instinct differently under different circumstance. Anyhow, the meaning of our author will be best understood by replacing his Memory by Instinct.

The aphorism under notice explains the fruit of work as manifested by Instinct. Having already described that work leads to two kinds of fruit, Instinct and deserts, or in his language memory and kind, age and experience, he now says that Instinct does not manifest itself uniformly at every successive birth, but according to circumstances when it is needed in subsequent lives, even after many interruptions, the residua for it remaining dormant during such interruption. Thus, a man born in the next life as a dog having no occasion for his human instincts, acts as a dog, but twenty or more generations after, when he is again born as a man, his early instincts revive, and he acts according to them. This is the theory which the aphorism explains by saying that residua manifest themselves in conformity to the fruition of work. When a work entails existence as a serpent, those residua become manifest which are appropriate to such an existence, but not those which are appropriate for other forms of life. In other words, residua remain dormant or in a potential state until the necessary excitants are in operation. The S. P. Bhāṣya, explains this by saying, "when a celestial work is in fruition, it does not become the cause of manifestation of the residua of infernal, brutal or human states; it then enlivens only those residua which are conformable to a celestial existence."

(\textit{Na hi daivam karma vipachyamānām nāraka-tiryaḥ-manushya-vāsanād bhiyakti-nimittam bhavati kintu daivānugnā evāyam vāsanā vyajante). The purport is that each kind of existence brings to light its own appropriate residua.)

Doubt having been produced of there existing any causal relation in these residua, he establishes it by saying:

IX.

From the uniformity of memory and residua there is uninterruptibility of relation, even after breaks by caste, locality and time.
Of worldly beings transmigrating in diverse forms, when one, after experiencing one form, attains that form again after an interruption of a thousand other births, the residua of impressions appropriate to that state, which had been formed at the first birth and had become latent from want of the necessary conditions, become manifest on the attainment of that suitable state. Thus, there is, notwithstanding breaks caused by caste, locality and time, an "uninterruptibility" (ánantarya) or continuity in producing their own necessary fruit of memory. How so? “From the uniformity of memory and residua.” Thus, on the performance of a work there is produced a deposit of residuum on the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, and that is the germ of the fruits of heaven, hell, &c.; or it is the residua of works such as sacrifices &c. It exists as a latent power, or as a power of the actor in relation to experience and experience. From these residua proceeds memory, from memory the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and from that experience again come residua, memory, &c. It is true that where memory and residua are different there is, from want of uninterruptibility, a difficulty in producing a relation of cause and effect; but in our case here, where impressions become residua, and residua merge into memory, and they reside in concord in one thinking principle, the relation of cause and effect is not difficult or hard of effectuation.

[According to the preceding aphorism the residua of former births are the causes of manifestation of certain effects; but, since concomitancy is necessary between cause and effect while the intervention of many dissimilar births between two similars causes an interruption, it may be argued that residua are not the causes of memory, as alleged. This objection is met by saying that the memory remains, and therefore sequence is obviously not broken. The memory of sucking the teats on the part of an infant returns after many births, whenever that infant is again born as a human being, though it does not manifest itself when the same infant is born as a bird or a serpent, and it shows
that the memory is not lost. Hence the relation of cause and effect is not broken.]

Admitting the uninterruptibility of residua, and their relation as cause and effect, it may be asked when an impression first takes place is it caused by residua, or without a cause? To solve this doubt, he says:

X.

There is no beginning about them, because of the eternity of desire.

"About them," i.e., about or in regard to residua. "No beginning" (anāditva), that which has no commencement. The meaning is, these have no beginning. How? "Because of the eternity of desire." This "desire" (āśīra) or longing of an intensely delusive character—(manifesting itself in such wishes as) 'may the means of effecting my pleasure be always mine; may there never be a separation between me and them'—is the cause of residua, and that being eternal there is no beginning. This is the meaning. What is meant is this: From the proximity of the cause the tendency of the functions of impressions and residua cannot be checked, and the thinking principle, from its expansible and contractile character, pierced by the impressions, residua and the like, modifies itself when it attains each appropriate existence.

[The theory of Instincts being the result of action in former lives is open to the grave objection that it does not account for Instinct in the first instance. A being born for the first time should have, according to the theory, no Instinct. The initial impression must therefore be causeless, and so there is no reason to admit that residua are the causes of effect, i.e., of birth, age and experience. This objection is met in this aphorism by saying that Desire is eternal, and therefore there is no necessity for a beginning. Desire is essential to existence; there would be no existence if there was no Desire; and that Desire produces residua, and so there is no break in the course of eternity.
opponent wished to expose the fallacy of the argument regarding residua being the cause of Intuition by showing that there could be no residua at the first start, and the author accepts a regressus in infinitum to surmount the difficulty. According to him the universe had no beginning and will never end, and therefore there is no occasion to seek a beginning.]

From their infinity it being doubtful that the residua can ever be destroyed, he points out the means of destroying them.

XI.

Since they are agglomerated by cause, effect, substratum and support, their absence would produce the absence of the others.

Conception (anubhava) is the cause of residua; desire, &c., are the causes of conceptions; and of them the cause is ignorance. Thus is (ignorance) both the immediate and the mediate "cause" (hetu). "Effect" (phala) is body, memory, &c. "Substratum" (ādraya) is the intellectual principle. "Support" (ālambana or object of desire) is the same for both conceptions and residua. Now, since these infinite residua are collected by these cause, effect, substratum and support, when they are absent, i.e., when they may be likened to roasted seeds, on their being burnt by knowledge and Yoga, there being no root left, the residua cannot sprout, nor lead to action, and thus they are destroyed.

[Now the question is raised, how can one undo that which is eternal? and the answer given is—since desires proceed from, or are the sum total of, cause, effect, substratum and support, one has to remove those conditions which produce desires, and that removal ipso facto removes desires. The removal is effected by the aid of Yoga. Yoga knowledge parches cause, effect, substratum, and support by exposing their real nature, and when so parched, they become, like roasted seeds, unfit for germination, and their destruction follows as a matter of course. Of course this is limited to the individual who effects the parching, and does not extend to the world at large.]
It may be questioned, that since the thinking principle is being constantly destroyed, and there is a difference in their relation as cause and effect from their want of simultaneity between residua and their effects, how can there be a unity? To prove the unity, he says:

**(The thinking principle) exists in its proper nature; the past and the future (result) from differences in the condition of qualities.**

The (possibility of) production of things which are absolutely non-existent is unreasonable, from their want of relation to existence. Nowhere has there been any relation to existence in the horns of a hare.

In the case of a nonentity as an effect, with what design can causes proceed to act? None enters into action for a false object, and it being opposed to entity there is no relation of nonentity to it. When truth attains its own identity, how can it become baseless and untrue? The meaning is, it cannot accept an antagonistic form. Hence from there being no possibility of the destruction of existence, and from the impossibility of the origin of non-existence, the qualified, convertible by qualities, always remains in one form. The qualities, alone, change into their threefold conditions. Attaining each condition, the qualified forsakes its original form, and, remaining in the present condition, attains the state of objects of enjoyment. Hence in this science are established the distinctions of the past and future conditions of qualities, and of their relation to each other as cause and effect. Hence, too, the same thinking principle is made to exist as the qualified until isolation, and none can prevent it.

**[The removal suggested in the preceding aphorism suggests the idea of destruction; but that is not possible. Nothing can proceed from non-existence, and no existence can be absolute non-existence, and the difficulty is solved by referring to the**
doctrines explained in A. 14 C. III which recognizes a threefold condition of existence, the antecedent, the postcedent, and the present. Matter is eternal, and remains always an existence; but its conditions vary; accordingly when the present condition of a thing is destroyed, the thing reverts to one or other of its two other conditions, and the parching of the seeds implies their resolution into the antecedent condition. This is the theory of Moderate Nominalism or Conceptualism with its threefold condition of Universalia ante rem, as thoughts in the mind of God; Universalia in re, as the essence (quiddity) of things; and Universalia post rem, as concepts. The text looks to thoughts or ideas or plastic types without reference to God.

He now describes of what forms these qualified and the qualities are.

XIII.

They are individualised or subtile, and consist of qualities.

The qualities and the qualified described above are divided into the individualised and the subtile. The "qualities" (gunāḥ) are of the forms of goodness, foulness, and darkness. "To consist of" (tadātmānāḥ) is to be of that nature, or to be modified to that form: this is the meaning. Since there is seen a concomitance in all persons, both externally and internally, through goodness, foulness, and darkness in the forms of pleasure, pain and delusion, of individuals and conceptions, and since it is found that which is concomitant is also its modified form, as in the case of jars which are concomitants of earth are also modified forms of earth, therefore the modification of qualities is evident.

[The simple proposition in this aphorism is that all attributes are mere modifications of the three primary qualities. Circumstances may make them subtile or gross, but, whether one or the other, they consist of nothing but the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness modified in some one form or another. They are mere modes of being, but not radically different beings.]
Apprehending the doubt that if all these three qualities be the chief causes everywhere, how can we talk of one qualified (or one substratum of quality) ? he says:

XIV.

From unity of modification (results) unity of a thing.

Although there are three qualities, yet their modification into the member and the membered, (in some cases goodness becoming the membered, in some cases foulness, and in others darkness,) being one, "unity" (tattva) or oneness is admitted. Thus, in the examples this is the earth, this is the air, &c., (in which unity is observed, for earth is a modification of darkness, and air of foulness.)

[The purport is that as only one modification can take place of the thinking principle at a time, the unity of a thing is never disturbed. The thinking principle under similar circumstances changes exactly in the same way, and no difference can possibly result. In other words, as the three qualities can be only separately ascendant, one at a time, the simultaneous perception of the effects of all the three cannot be effected; and this meets the objection raised in the preamble.]

Had objects existed distinct from cognition it would be proper to talk of the unity or multiplicity of objects, but when cognition itself from the influence of residua existing in the relation of cause and effect, appears in different shapes, how can you say so? In reply to this question, he says:

XV.

Even in the sameness of object, the course of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking principle.

"Of the two," of the cognition and the cognizable, the course is distinct, follow different or separate roads. How so? From diversity of thinking principles even in the sameness of object.
Even in similar things, as the attainment of women and the like, differences of thinking are noticeable in different observers from the resulting sensations of pleasure, pain and delusion. Thus, on beholding a beautiful and attractive woman, pleasure is felt by an amorous person, enmity by her rival, and disgust by an ascetic. And since these different kinds of feeling arise from one object there can be no agency in the thing itself. If it be said that object is the effect of our thinking principle only, the object would appear in one form only. Also, if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle then there would be no other thing extant when that thinking principle would be occupied with one thing. (If it be said) be it so, we deny it. For how could that thing then be beheld by many others? And since it is so beheld, it cannot be an effect of the thinking principle. If it be said that it is created by many at the same time, the reply would be that there would be a difference between a work produced by many, and a work produced by one. And if the difference be not admitted, then there being difference of cause without a difference of effect, the universe would be either causeless, or uniform. What is said is this: should there be no difference of effect when the causes are different, then the whole universe resulting from many causes would either be of one form, or not following the different causes, be causeless from its independence (of the causes). And if it is so (it may be asked) why does it not, being made of the three qualities, produce in the same percipient the sensations (simultaneously) of pleasure, pain and delusion? The case is not so. Even as the object consists of three qualities, so is the thinking principle made up of three qualities, and in its perception of objects, merits and demerits are accessory causes, and from their prevalence or depression results the manifestation of the thinking principle in such and such (varying) forms. Thus in the presence of a woman near an amorous person, his thinking principle, disposed towards merit through the influence of the quality of goodness, becomes full of pleasure. From the co-operation of the quality of foulness, which is auxiliary to vice,
for all rival wives, it becomes painful. Similarly from the co-operation of the quality of darkness, which is attended by ardent vice, it becomes to angry rival wives the cause of delusion. Hence the cognizable object is independent of cognition, and consequently cognizable and cognition, being contradictory in their natures, cannot bear the relation of cause and effect. Thus it being possible without any difference in the cause for the existence of a difference in effect from their relation, the independence of cognition from the object is established.

[The question discussed in the preceding aphorism raises a doubt as to whether perception is due to objects or to the cognitive power. It cannot be said that objects produce perception, for in that case a given object would always and everywhere produce the same sensation, as a given cause cannot produce dissimilar effects. A handsome woman should be a handsome woman to all beholders, without a distinction. In the world this is, however, not the case. A woman produces very dissimilar feelings in different beholders, and she, as the object, cannot therefore be said to be the cause of perception. On the other hand, the thinking principle cannot be the cause, for if you accept it to be one in all persons, it, as a cause, cannot produce different effects; and if you accept it to be different in different individuals, dissimilar causes would lead to one uniform result, which is impossible. The solution offered is that thinking principle and object are different, but inasmuch as both are governed by the three qualities, the prevalence of a particular quality at a particular time in the thinking principle produces a difference in the perception of an object. The “diversity of the thinking principle” in the text implies a diversity in its condition as regards the state of the qualities working within it. The argument here is the same which European philosophers discuss with reference to sensations and sensibles; and the optional use of jñāna and vijnāna by our author shows that he means cognition or sensation and perception, and not the higher knowledge elsewhere indicated by the
word \textit{jnána}. I have used for it cognition after Mr. Jardine, who defines it as "a general name which we may apply to all those mental states in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object." (\textit{The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition}, p. 1). The object to which this \textit{jnána} or cognition is applied is \textit{jneya} or cognizable, which is just the same with \textit{idea} as used by Locke, who says, "it is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by \textit{phenomena, notion, species}, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Idea, however, has been used in so many varying senses by European metaphysicians that I have thought it safe to confine myself to \textit{cognizable} or \textit{object}, as least likely to cause misconceptions. The theory of eternity of matter is here made the basis of the argument.

Since a cognition, being an illuminator, is by nature perceptive, and the object, being susceptible of illumination, is by nature perceivable, why should cognition not perceive and recollect all things simultaneously? With a view to remove such doubt, he says:

\begin{center}
\textbf{XVI.}
\end{center}

A thing is known or unknown from its dependence on its change of form in the thinking principle.

"Its" of the object. "From its change of form" (\textit{uparágát}). From its producing forms in the thinking principle, an external object becomes known or unknown. The meaning is this: in the attainment of their production all things depend on the conjunction of their causes. The production of the cognition of a blue or other colour depends on the accessory cause of the form being brought forward as an object through the passage of the organs of sensation; perception being impossible without the object, since there is no correlation. Hence, by whatever object is the form of cognition modified, that object is brought
into cognition, i.e., that object becomes known. That which does not give its shape (to the thinking principle) is held to be unknown. Similarly, recollection is produced of that object which, having been known before, has left residua in the mind, and which residua, excited by a similar object, acting as the accessory cause, brings it to our knowledge. Hence, neither cognition, nor memory is constant everywhere, nor is there any inconsistency.

[The argument mooted in the last aphorism is further developed by saying that the effect of the qualities is transmitted to the thinking principle through the object seen, and the thinking principle is thereby modified differently under different circumstances. The qualities act from two different directions, first in the thinking principle apart from the object, and next in the object, and through it in the thinking principle. A man in a passion has the quality of foulness prevalent in him, and then that foulness affects everything he sees, though it is not foul; and when all the qualities are calm in him, he sees a foul action, and the foulness of that action enters within him and tinges his thinking principle from without.]

To remove the doubt that since the perceiving soul does not perceive a yellow colour when it perceives a blue, there is liability of its assuming, like the thinking principle, different shapes, or being modified from its being at times the perceiver, he says:

**XVII.**

The functions of the thinking principle are always known, for its presiding soul is unmodifiable.

All the functions of the thinking principle—characterised as they are by proofs, misconceptions, &c.,—are "always," i.e., at all times, known to its percipient soul, since it is unmodifiable, or wanting in liability to change from its being of the form of the intellect (chidrūpa). Were it mutable, the constant perceptibility of those functions would not follow, the mutability
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being (necessarily) occasional. The meaning is this. The soul of the form of intellect always remaining as the presiding principle, and its intimate associate, the pure element, the thinking principle, being also always present, by whatever object it (the latter) is modified in shape there is the probability of that object being always brought into contact with the shadow of the former (soul, chit); and such being the case it is established that there is constant perceptibility, and never can there be any apprehension of change.

[Having explained the relation of cognition to cognizables, and the rationale of the process by which things become known or unknown, the author proceeds to explain how it is that the thinking principle, which, under the circumstances alleged, is always changing and assuming new forms, should still be able to know different objects, or have the power of understanding. The thinking principle is admitted to be in se unconscious, and is itself undergoing constant modifications, and cannot therefore exercise intelligence, and be itself the cause of knowledge. But, says the author, its presiding soul is constant and immutable, and associated with that soul it derives reflected intelligence, and by its aid it is always able to know whatever external object casts its shadow on it. In other words, though the thinking principle is itself unconscious, it derives intelligence from the soul which is pure intelligence and absolutely immutable. The P. Bhāskya explains the aphorism by saying, "had the presiding soul been liable, like the thinking principle, to constant mutation, then objects or the functions of the thinking principle would have become, like sounds and other objects, sometimes known and sometimes unknown to it; but constant consciousness (lit. perceptibility) of the mind is indicated by the immutability of its presiding soul." (Yādā chittavat prabhurapi purushah pariṇāmeta tatastadbhavāya chittavrītthayā sabādidivabhavāt jñātabhājāh syuh, sadājñātānvanu manasastatprabhok purushasyāparināmītoamanumāpayati.) This idea is further developed in other commentaries.]

Now it may be said that since the thinking principle itself,
from excess of the quality of goodness, is the illuminant, it can from its self-illumination, illuminate both itself and the object, and the act of perception can thereby be completed, what is the use of the assumption of a separate percipient? To allay this doubt, he says:

XVIII.

It is not self-illuminative, since it is perceptible.

"It," the thinking principle, is not "self-illuminative" (svābhāsa), expositor of itself, but it is perceptible by the soul. How so? Because it is "perceptible." A perceptible is known by a percepient, as in the case of a water-jar or the like. The thinking principle is an object of perception, and therefore it is not self-illuminative.

[The argument in the next preceding aphorism would suggest the idea that the thinking principle, whether directly or indirectly, was itself the perceiver, and that being the case there is no necessity for assuming a separate perceiver. Where one assumption is sufficient, two are not needed. This objection of the opponent is refuted in the aphorism under notice, by saying that the thinking principle cannot be the percipient, or self-illuminative, because it is itself an object of perception. That which is an object of perception cannot itself be percipient; and the commentator illustrates this by citing the example of a water-jar, which, as an object of perception, cannot know itself. The P. Bhāshya elaborates the argument by saying, "Even as the other organs and their objects, such as audition, &c., cannot be self-illuminative from the circumstance of their being perceivables, the mind should be so known. Nor can fire be an example in this instance; for even fire cannot make its own hidden identity visible. Manifestation is seen to result from the conjunction of a manifestator with a manifestable, and such conjunction cannot take place with one's own identity. Besides if the theory of self-illuminativeness of the thinking principle be admitted, it would not be perceptible to any body else." (Yathetarāṇindriya-
ni sabdādayatka drisyatvānna svābhāsāni tathā manopi pratyet-tavyam. Na chāgnirātra drīshṭāntam. Naḥyagnirālmaśvarūpama-prakāsam prakāsya. Prakāsachāyam prakāśya-prakāśaka saṅyoge drīshṭah, na cha svarūpamātreti saṅyodayaṁ kīṃca svābhasam chitthāntyagrahāhameva kasyachiditi.) The illustration of fire becomes appropriate on the assumption that it owes its luminosity to itself. But the luminosity contemplated by the term svābhāsa is knowledge, and not light. In fact, the light of the text can be understood only by substituting for it the word knowledge, throughout the discussion.]

It may be said that the argument here has accepted the proposition, (i.e., it involves a petitio principii), for the perceptibility of the thinking principle has not yet been established. Besides, in men the functions of accepting that which is good and rejecting that which is injurious are made manifest through the consciousness of one’s own intellect; and such feelings as “I am angry,” “I am afraid,” “I have no desire,” cannot be produced without the consciousness of the intellect (and since they are, the agency of the soul is not needed.) To meet this argument, he says:

XIX.

Attention cannot be directed to both at the same time.

The understanding of an object is the establishment of its usefulness by (knowing it to be) this—this is the object which is the cause of pleasure or pain. The understanding of the intellect is the establishment of the use of that object through pleasure or pain in the form of I (or the ego). In the perception of an object two such kinds of understanding cannot be effected at the same time, for there is a contradiction. There is no possibility of effecting two contradictory actions simultaneously, and therefore it is not possible to perceive “both,” i.e., cognition and cognizable at the same time. Hence, it is laid down that the thinking principle is not self-illuminative. Further, even if
two such actions could be accomplished, their fruits could not result, for there cannot be an apprehension of the two fruits, because the thinking principle being directed outwards to grasp an object cannot know itself. The result is confined only to the object, and not to itself. This is the meaning.

[The opponent again comes to the charge, and says that the intellect or understanding may supply the place of the soul, for the thinking principle may see, and the intellect may decide about the nature of the sight. The author demurs to this by saying two such functions cannot take place simultaneously, or the thinking principle cannot see and argue at the same time. The sensation of hunger is first felt, and then its nature discussed. The thinking principle must undergo two modifications, once to feel, and then to consider, and these it cannot undergo at once; so these two acts can never take place simultaneously, and consequently it cannot be said that the thinking principle is alone sufficient to account for consciousness and knowledge: a separate cause must be assigned for these two feelings, and that cause is the soul. The P. Bhâṣya pithily disposes of the question by saying, “It is not possible to behold one’s own self and another at the same time, for it leads to the theory of the momentarists who hold action, effect and cause to be the same.” (Na chaikasmin kshane svapararúpa-vadháranam yuktam, kshanikavádino yad bhavanam saíva kriyá tadeva cha kárákamityabháyupagamah.) The meaning of the aphorism is simply that the thinking principle cannot perform the two acts of perception and self-knowing at the same time, and therefore it is obvious that it cannot by itself be the cause of intelligence.]

Let it be admitted that a cognition cannot be self-perceptive, still may it not be perceived by another cognition? Assuming such a question, he says:

XX.

If one cognition be the perceptible of another, there would be an excessiveness of cognitions to
cognitions, and also a confusion of memory.

If one cognition could cognize another, then that cognition being itself unintelligent and unable to illuminate another, we must assume a third cognition and for it another, and so on and a thing could not be perceived in the whole lifetime of a man. Nor can an object be known when the cognition remains unknown.

It leads also to "confusion of memory." On a particular colour or a taste being produced in a cognition there would arise an endless series of cognitions to perceive it, and when the residua left by a former cognition would attempt to recall it to memory there would arise, from there being no break in the ideas of cognitions and objects, cognitions and memories simultaneously, and hence, it being impossible to make out with reference to what object the recollection has arisen, there would be a confusion of memory, i.e., it would not be known that this is the memory of colour and this is the memory of taste.

[The explanation above given leaves the door open to the assumption that one cognition may perceive another, and thus obviate the necessity of assuming the agency of the soul, i.e., each individual may have many cognitions which co-operate with each other in producing knowledge of a particular object. To preclude this theory, the author brings forward the argument of regressus in infinitum. If one cognition could perceive another, we would require a third to perceive the second, and so on, and there would be no end to the chain. It would, he urges, also lead to a confusion of memory, for on one idea being called to memory all its attendant ideas would arise to infinity, and it would be impossible to determine which is the particular idea that has been revived.]

The question may then be asked, if, in the absence of self-perceptive power in cognitions (buddhi), one cognition cannot be known by another, how do we use the idea this is the perception of an object? To remove this doubt, he expounds his conclusion.
XXI.

The intellection of its own cognition takes place when it takes its form through the non-transitional soul.

"Soul" (purusha), being of the form of intelligence, is called chiti (intellect). It is "non-transitional" (apratisāṅkramā), that which has no transition or passing into another place is so called: by this is meant that it does not mix with anything. In the modification of the member and the membered, the (three) qualities, (as members) in passing into the qualified or membered, assume their forms, and in the world atoms, moving on, produce the forms of objects; but the power of intellection (i.e., soul) does not do so, because it always retains its own form, inasmuch as it exists in itself. Hence when the thinking principle, being near it, assumes its shape, intellection takes place; and when the soul, by its contact with the function of the thinking principle being endowed with understanding, cognizes, then the knowing of the thinking principle of its own self takes place.

[The soul never undergoes any modification, but by its reflection on the thinking principle that principle derives its intelligence, and that intelligent state is therefore said to be attained through the non-transitional soul. It is then chiti or intelligence, because for the time being it has intelligence in it, and this is explained by the commentator. When the thinking principle in its intelligent state assumes the form of an object, it is able to know its own notions. The P. Bhāṣya explains the text by saying, "unmodifiable is the power of experiencing; it is also non-transitional. On its reflection falling on the excessively modifiable (the thinking principle) the functions of the latter reflect on it. Thereupon people call it the function of understanding from its imitating the function of the thinking principle enlivened by intelligence, though it is devoid of the function of understanding." (The force of the argument here depends upon the distinction made between intelligence and the function of understanding, for the soul, though intelligence itself, does not exercise any...}
CHAPTER FOURTH.

function.) (Aparināminī hi bhoktrikātkiraṇapratisaṭkramā cha
parināminyatyarthe pratisaṭkranteyav tadavruttimanupatati, tasyāt-
cha prāptachaitanyopagraharupayā buddhirvitteranukārimātra-
tayā buddhirvityaviśişṭā hi jñānavṛttirākhyāyate).

Pandit Govindadeva Śāstri, following some later commenta-
tors, explains the text so as to mean that the soul itself under-
goes the modification. The earlier and more reliable commenta-
tors, however, do not accept that meaning, and as the sequel
shows them to be right I have accepted their interpretation.

To show that thus the self-perceptive thinking principle, being
able to perceive all objects, becomes fit for all purposes, he says:

XXII.

The thinking principle, modified by the knower and
the knowable, is (able to perceive) all objects.

"The knower" (drashtā) is soul. To be modified by it is to seem
to be of its form from its propinquity. To be modified by the
knowable, is to undergo the modification of assuming the form of
the (object) perceived. When this (double modification) takes
place, then it becomes able to perceive all objects. Even as a trans-
parent crystal, or a mirror, or the like is fit to receive the reflection
of all images, so the quality of goodness, unstained by foulness
and darkness, is able, from its purity, to receive the reflection of
the soul (chit). Not so foulness and darkness, owing to their
want of purity. The quality of goodness, divested of all asso-
ciation with foulness and darkness, from its being liable to only
one modification, and being able to receive the reflection of
the intelligent soul, remains like a steady lamp-flame till the
attainment of emancipation (moksha). Even as in the vicinity
of a loadstone motion is produced in iron, so in the vicinity of
the intelligent soul manifestible intelligence is reflected on the
quality of goodness. Accordingly, in this system of philosophy
two powers of intelligence are recognized, the eternally present
(nityodita) and the manifestible (abhinyāsa). The eternally
present power of intelligence is soul. The manifestible power of intelligence is the quality of goodness, which derives its power by its contiguity to the former. From extreme propinquity, it, as an intimate friend, effectuates the experiencership of the soul. And as that quality is the resting place of Purusha, the supreme soul, the Sàékhyas, who recognise an actionless Brahma, attribute to it the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion. (The epithets “supreme” and “Brahma” are meaningless here, for the human soul is all that is meant; God as Brahma is not indicated).

Now, though from the extreme abeyance of some one quality and of its prevalence at certain times and in some cases, all the three qualities are constantly modifying in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and the thinking principle is not pure, yet when that principle modifies its form into that pure quality of goodness, which is the essence of work, it attains its perceptibility. The pure primary quality of goodness of the thinking principle, on the one side reflected upon by intelligence or the soul, and on the other covered by the thinking principle modified into the forms of external objects, and becoming conscious from the effect of the reflection of the soul, becomes able to feel pleasure, pain and delusion, though it is devoid of intelligence. Thus the experience, from its extreme propinquity to soul and from want of due discrimination, is said to be of soul, though it is unexperiencing. To this effect has Vindhyavâśi said: “the sufferingness of the quality of goodness is the sufferingness of soul.” Elsewhere it is said. “Even as an image produced by the reflection of a reflected image on a mirror is called a reflection, so the manifestation of the shadow of intelligence, like the intelligence of soul, is implied by the word pratisânkrânti or contact.”

It might be argued that, though the reflection of the ever-modifying may be seen in a transparent body, as a human face in a looking-glass, how can there arise the reflection of the absolutely transparent, all-pervading, unmodifying soul in the comparatively untransparent quality of goodness? To this the reply is—Not knowing the true nature of reflection you
 CHAPTER FOURTH.

have said this. The display of the manifestible power of intelligence in the quality of goodness, by the propinquity of the soul, is called reflection. Even as is that sentient power, abiding in the soul, so does its reflection appear in the quality of goodness.

Again, since it has been said that soul is absolutely pure, how can it be in contact with the (comparatively) untransparent quality of goodness? This argument is not correct, for the contact of the sun and the like (which are highly transparent) is seen in water and the like which are less transparent. If it be said that there can be no contact of that which is undefined, that too would be inconsistent, because we see the all-pervading sky (ākāśa) reflected in a looking-glass, or the like. And such being the case, there can be no objection to the effectuation of the reflection (under notice).

It may be argued that what has been said about there being an apparent or external contact by propinquity of the sentient power with the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, there should be the experience of pain and pleasure on the part of soul, is inconsistent, for how can the quality of goodness of the thinking principle be produced without a modification of Prakṛiti? and for what object should there be a modification of Prakṛiti? To this it is replied, that Prakṛiti has to effectuate soul's experience of the objects of mundane existence, and, its duty being to effectuate the object of soul, the modification is proper.

It may be urged that this is not proved, for the effectuation of the soul's object is impossible. The duty of effectuating soul's object implies the consciousness on the part of Prakṛiti that "it is my duty to effectuate soul's object;" but how can there be such a consciousness on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti? If you admit the consciousness, how will you maintain its unsentience or inertness? The reply to this is that in the two forms of progressive and regressive modification, there are the two natural powers (of progression and regression), and they are called the duty of effectuating soul's purpose. Those powers are natural to the unsentient Prakṛiti. Its progressive modification (anus-
loma-parināma) is the outward one, extending from the intellect to gross matter; while entering through its cause and ending with the annihilation of egoism is its regressive modification, (pratiloma parināma). Hence on the completion of soul's experience, the two natural powers being destroyed, Prakṛiti, having achieved its object, ceases to modify. In performing such duty for soul on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti, there is no inconsistency.

Again, it may be argued, if there be two such powers naturally possessed by Prakṛiti, then why is exertion made for salvation (mokṣha) by those who long for it? and if salvation be no object the science of those who advise it is worthless. The answer is, the relation of soul and Prakṛiti as experiencer and experience is from time without a beginning, and that being the case, when pain is felt on the part of Prakṛiti in action, from the assumption of its being the agent or actor, there arises the desire—"how can there be absolute stoppage of my suffering?" and hence there is a necessity on the part of Prakṛiti for the advice of the science which points out the means of stopping the pain. The substance of the advice of the science is the quality of goodness of the thinking principle as governed by work. In other works on philosophy this has been accepted to be the nature of ignorance (avidyā). That nature, exerting for salvation, relying on the help of the advice of such sciences, obtain the reward called salvation. All works influenced by the (necessary) conjunction of causes attain their own selves, and it is established by proof that of the work called mokṣha, which is acquired by regressive modification, this is the conjunction of causes, because it cannot be attained by any other method. Hence without that cause how can it be effected? It follows, therefore, that the quality of goodness of the thinking principle modified by worldly objects in contact and enlightened by the shadow of soul, conducts, through the conviction of (the reality of) those objects, all worldly affairs. Deluded people, looking at such thinking principle, imagine it and all such thinking principles to be the world. They should be enlightened.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

[Having met all the principal objections to the theory of the thinking principle being 'sensitized into intelligence by a reflection of soul which is intelligence, the author enunciates that the thinking principle, modified on the one hand by the soul and on the other by external objects, is brought into play in every case of sensation. The word used in the text for the double transformation is uparakta, which is a compound of upa 'excess' and ranja 'to colour' or 'tinge,' meaning that the thinking principle is doubly tinged or influenced; and this conveys the true meaning of the text. The P. Bhāshya accordingly cites the example of the crystal vase tinged by the coloured object put in it. Inasmuch as the theory, however, is that the thinking principle assumes the shape of the object in every instance of cognition, and the same epithet is used for the double tinging, it is necessary, for the sake of consistency, to adopt the same phraseology everywhere; I have accordingly used the word modified.

Bhoja, after explaining the text, enters into a long dissertation on the various objections that may be started to the doctrine, and refutes them seriatim. The first and most obvious objection is—how can a shadow of soul produce in an object on which it falls the quality of the original? Soul may be intelligence, but its shadow cannot reasonably be said to convey that intelligence on the object on which it falls. The commentator sees no harm in this, for, says he, such action is manifest in the motion produced in iron by the propinquity of a loadstone. He describes soul's intelligence to be two-fold; one is Nityoditā or always and eternally present, and the other Abhiyaṅgā or manifestible, and it is the latter that sensitizes the thinking principle.

The next argument is, if it be the thinking principle that is sensitized, how can soul be said to be the experiencer? The reply is—that soul is really not the experiencer, but since experience is felt by the agency of its shadow it is in an indiscriminate way called experiencer.

Then the question arises how can reflection take place of
a perfectly transparent object like soul, on a comparatively untransparent object like the thinking principle with the quality of goodness prevalent in it? This is met by saying that the word reflection here simply is the technical name of the influence of soul on the thinking principle.

An argument like the last is raised with reference to the contact of the absolutely pure soul with a comparatively impure thinking principle. This, however, is held possible, as we see the sun reflected in foul water. The contact of that which is illimitable with a finite object is also possible, as in the case of the sky reflected in a mirror.

The objection next urged is that why should Prakṛiti or nature change to produce effects? The answer is, it subserves the purposes of soul. This answer is, however, not enough, for Prakṛiti or nature being unintelligent, cannot have such a consciousness of duty, and act up to it. The reply is that Prakṛiti has two inherent powers in it, that of progression and of regression, and acting under their impulses it subserves the purposes of soul, and therefore there is no inconsistency.

The admission of the two powers aforesaid suggests the objection that, if they be natural they will run their course of their own accord, and there is no use in controlling them. The effect of the regressive action is salvation, and that must come of itself; none needs try for it, and, if so, what is the use of Yoga as a means of salvation? This is met by saying that it is Prakṛiti when in action that feels pain and, wishing to put a stop to that pain, wants to know how to do so, and hence arises the desire for salvation, and the Yoga points out the means of doing so. Without such advice Prakṛiti would go on working for ever.

The P. Bhāṣṭya has not mooted these discussions.] Suspecting that it may be argued that if all purposes are accomplished by a thinking principle of this kind, why should we acknowledge an experiencer of which there is no proof, he gives the proofs (in support of the existence) of the spectator.
XXIII.

It exists for another's purpose, though coloured by uncountable residua, because it operates by association.

"It," the thinking principle, "coloured," i.e., assuming many forms, through the influence of an uncountable number of "residua" (vásaná) (existing in it), effectuates for "another's," i.e., a master's, "purpose" (artha) the work of experience and final reward. How so? "Because it operates by association." "Association" (saññatyā), i.e., by fully joining together, operates to accomplish a purpose. We see that works performed jointly are for another, as in the case of a bed or a chair. The co-operators (in this case) are the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which, modifying in the form of the thinking principle, jointly work for another, and that "another" is soul.

It may be urged that through the force of the example by which the subservience of another's purpose by an embodied stranger, as a bed or a chair or the like, is established, a similar (embodied) stranger may be proved, but you contemplate an unembodied "another," and, the opposite being proved, your argument becomes destructive of the object. The reply is thus given: Although in the example pervasion of the premiss has been accepted as general in regard to effectuating another's purpose, yet on consideration of the specific distinctions of goodness in the qualified, the distinction will be evident, and the position that the experiencer is another is established. Thus, as in inferring the existence of fire in a mountain covered with fuel of a particular kind from the smoke seen there, the inference that fire is produced by fuel and is distinct from other fires is taken for granted, so here in inferring that the specific experience called goodness is for another's purpose. In the same way the experiencing superior is proved to be another of the form of intelligence and isolated. Although he appears as the other and the noblest of all, yet the body is superior to objects resulting from the quality of darkness, because it is manifest, and the asylum of the organs. The organs
are superior to the body; to them the illuminating quality of goodness is superior; and he who is the illuminator is distinct from illumination and of the form of intelligence. How can then there arise this conjunction? (i. e., there is no actual conjunction but a mere shadow).

[The explanations given in previous aphorisms still leave the door-open to the argument that the agency of the soul is redundant and not wanted. If the thinking principle doubly modified as above stated is sufficient for conception, why make the soul the experiencer of worldly joys and sorrows? To this question the reply given is that, though the thinking principle is actuated by innumerable desires resulting from the residua of former works, it nevertheless acts for another's purpose, and not for itself, since it acts by the co-operation of many causes, and not of its own motion. Though there are innumerable residua in it, they cannot work until external agencies are brought to bear upon them, and that shows that the thinking principle has no power of action suo motu. It is unconscious too, so that it can have no will of its own. It acts only when it is worked upon, and this is indicated by the phrase "operates by association." Inasmuch, however, as its action may tend to bring on liberation which is for the good of the soul, it is to be inferred that in its other actions it subserves the gratification of that soul. No line can be drawn between what actions are for the soul and what are not, and logically what is true for a part, i. e., for liberation, must be true for the whole. This idea is expressed in the Śāṅkhya-kārikā by the verse "generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities," (lx). It should be noticed, however, that the functions which are usually attributed to nature or Prakṛiti in the Śāṅkhya are invariably assigned to the thinking principle (chitta) in the Yoga of Patanjali. In fact, in the Yoga system, chitta plays a more-important part than the Buddhi of Kapila, and appertains to itself the character both of Buddhi and Prakṛiti, but the commentator does not mark this distinction. In
his works Kapila frequently refers to Prakṛiti where Patanjali confines himself to Chitta. The action of the unconscious thinking principle for another’s purpose is usually explained by the illustration of the saffron cart, which, unconscious as it is, subserves the purpose of man by bringing him a desirable condiment.

He now proceeds to show by ten aphorisms that the fruit of this philosophy is isolation.

XXIV.

For the knower of the difference there is a cessation of the idea of self in the thinking principle.

Thus the quality of goodness and soul being proved to be distinct, whatever idea exists of his self being the thinking principle, in him who knows them to be distinct, that is the one is different from the other, the same surceases, i.e., the idea ceases of the thinking principle being the actor, knower, and experiencer.

[Having disposed of all metaphysical questions bearing on the subject-matter of his work, the author now reverts to the thesis, how isolation is effected. The metaphysical questions above set forth, when thoroughly understood, enable a person to divest himself of the idea that his self or ego is his thinking principle, and to believe that his soul is the real self. He knows that the thinking principle is unconscious and not his self. The idea, in fact, is altogether set at rest, and his soul is so far freed from the natural wrong belief that the thinking principle is the ego.]

(To the question) what happens when this takes place, he says:

XXV.

Then the thinking principle is turned towards discriminative knowledge, and bowed down by the weight of commencing isolation.

The thinking principle, which was turned outwards by igno...
rance, to derive the fruit of experiencing worldly objects, deflects now towards "discriminative knowledge," (viveka) i.e., turns inward towards the path of discriminative knowledge, and is "bowed down by the weight of coming isolation," (kaivalya-prāgbhāra) i.e., the fruit of isolation, or the commencement of isolation.

[When the belief aforesaid is effected, the thinking principle drops the cosmos, and turns inward to the cultivation of discriminative knowledge, and is overpowered by the sense of isolation which begins to sprout in him.]

Now, by describing the causes of the impediments which occur in the thinking principle flowing towards discrimination, he points out the means of overcoming them.

XXVI.

In the intervals thereof other impressions arise from residua.

"Thereof," i.e., of the thinking principle engaged in meditation. In the "intervals" (chhidreshu), in the void spaces of the thinking principle, whatever "impressions" (jñānāni) or ideas of the waking (or worldly) state arise, the same proceed from the now-fading residua of the former waking state, in the forms of "I," "mine," and the like. What is said is that by means of extirpating the internal organ their avoidance should be effected.

[While isolation is progressing there are opportunities when a person is not actually engaged in meditation, i.e., during the breaks in his meditation, for worldly ideas to sprout from the residua of former existences still clinging to the mind. These are calculated to disturb the process of isolation, and are so far impediments, which should be destroyed.]

He now says that the means of avoidance has already been explained.

XXVII.

The avoidance of these should be (the same) as already described in the case of afflictions.
The avoidance of these should be effected in the same way in which the avoidance of afflictions, ignorance, &c., has been already pointed out (C. II. x—x1). Even as they, scorched by the fire of knowledge, do not, like roasted seeds, sprout in the field of the thinking principle, so are the residua, (rendered infructuose).

[The ideas should be destroyed in the same way as afflictions, for which provision has been made in a previous part of the work, (C. II. x—x1).]

He now describes the means by which a Yogi, on his meditation becoming steady by the non-production of other thoughts in the way aforesaid, may attain excellence.

XXVIII.

On the completion of the series there is produced the meditation (called) the Cloud of Virtue, even in the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of constant discrimination.

"On the completion of the series" (prasañkhyañe), i.e., after careful contemplation of the nature and respective peculiarities of all the categories arranged in due order. On that being accomplished even in the case of the "non-aspirant" (akusida), or one who does not wish for any fruition, there is produced from the appearance of constant discrimination, on the cessation of all foreign thoughts in his thinking principle, the meditation called the Cloud of Virtue. That which showers (mehati) or irrigates profusely the virtue (dharma) which is neither black nor white, (cf. IV, vii,) and which is subservient to the attainment of the summum bonum is the "Cloud of Virtue" (Dharmamegha) By this it is shown that the highest virtue is the cause of knowledge.

[When the series of works enjoined above for the perfection of Yoga meditation have been completed, then there arises in the mind of the performer a meditation called Cloud of Virtue, which means that all virtues are showered on it, even when
it does not wish for them. The sense is that though the Yogi may not wish for any reward, still the reward comes. The word in the text is akusīda, from a meaning negation and kusīda interest, that is disinterestedly. The theory is that the perfection of virtue results spontaneously in a person who completes his Yoga duties as described in the text.

He explains next what results from that Cloud of Virtue.

XXIX.

Thence follows the cessation of afflictions and works.

The meaning is, that on the manifestation of knowledge, their antecedent causes being removed, there is a cessation of the afflictions resulting from ignorance, and of all the works which are, according as they are white, &c., of three kinds. (vii).

[The object of the cloud is now described. On its appearance there results a complete cessation of all afflictions and all works; there is no longer any sense of affliction left in the mind of the Yogi, and he has neither any desire for work, nor any residua of former works left in his mind.]

He next explains what happens on this cessation.

XXX.

Then the knowable becomes small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from all coverings and impurities.

"Coverings" (āvaranāni), are those whereby the thinking principle is covered; they are the afflictions; they are also impurities. Free from them, means devoid of them. From the knowledge (jnāna) becoming free, like the sky bereft of cloud, and "from its infiniteness" (ānautyāt), i.e., from its being without a break, or all-pervading, "the knowable" (jnaya) becomes "small" (alpa), or fit to be counted or grasped. The meaning is, that the Yogi can easily know everything.
The next advantage is that the objects of sense are reduced to a minimum. Knowledge then becomes limitless and free from all impurities and coverings or interruptions; and placed against such knowledge, knowables or cognizables become insignificant, \textit{i.e.}, that knowledge which can grasp everything, finds no difficulty in understanding small matters. Not that there is a reduction in the number or quantity of cognizables, but, placed besides limitless knowledge, they, by comparison, become insignificant."

He then states what takes place after this:

XXXI.

Thereupon takes place the termination of the succession of the modifications of the qualities which have accomplished their end.

Those which have "accomplished" (\textit{kri\texttilde{\iota}}a), completed, soul's purpose or object in the form of experience and emancipation are called \textit{kri\texttilde{\iota}arth\texttilde{\acute{a}}h}, or those which have accomplished their end. The "qualities" (\textit{gu\texttilde{n\acute{a}}h}) are goodness, foulness, and darkness. "Their modifications" (\textit{parin\acute{a}ma}) are their conditions of existence in relation to each other as members and membered, in a progressive or a regressive state to the time of the completion of the purpose of soul. Their "succession" (\textit{krama}) is to be presently described. Its "termination" (\textit{parisam\acute{a}pti}) is its finality, \textit{i.e.}, it does not arise or happen again.

[Proceeding onwards, the next effect of the Yoga is a cessation of the tendency on the part of the qualities to undergo change. The qualities are the most active agents in worldly life, and it is their modifications that produce the various impressions of life, and when they cease to change, there is \textit{ipso facto} a cessation of worldly impressions. It is the duty of Prakr\texttilde{\iota}ti to minister to the purposes of soul, and as the qualities are inherent in Prakr\texttilde{\iota}ti, the qualities may be taken as synonymous with Prakr\texttilde{\iota}ti, and those qualities, having done their work, cease}
from labour. The work of the qualities is said to be two-fold; they have to minister to soul's experience of the world, and then to bring on its emancipation; and when the state above described is attained, the qualities have already accomplished both these works, and, having nothing else left to do, stop work in re the soul concerned.

He now describes the succession above referred to.

XXXII.

The succession is the counterpart of the moment perceptible at the end of the modification.

"Moment" (kshana) is a short amount of time. Its "counterpart" (pratiyogita) is another distinct moment. "Perceptible at the end of the modification" means that which is accepted as the totality after perceiving a number of moments, and this is called the "succession" of moments, for no succession can be perceived in unperceived succession of moments.

[The word "succession" (krama) used in A. XXXI, is explained in this aphorism to mean the following of one moment after another. The object is to say that the lapse of time is reckoned by the succession of one moment after another, though there is no break between them; one totality is divided into many parts only for facility of reckoning.]

He now defines the specific nature of isolation, which is the result.

XXXIII.

Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.

"The regression" (pratiprasava) or the non-production of change on the completion of the regressive (or refluent) modification of the (three) qualities, on the accomplishment of soul's (two-fold) purpose of experience and emancipation is called "isolation" (kaivalya); or, it is the abidance of the thinking
power (soul) solely in its own proper nature, on the cessation of its identification with intellectual functions (or objects).

[Having described the Yoga in all its details, the author concludes the work by announcing the ultimatum to which it leads. This ultimatum is *kaivalya*, and it is defined to result on the reabsorption of the triad of qualities in their original cause, on their having done their duty to soul, or on the abidance of the soul in its own nature without any association with the qualities; that is to say, when it has no longer the thinking principle near it to cause its shadow to fall thereon.

The commentator does not explain the word *kaivalya*. The *P. Bhāṣya*, suggests its meaning by saying "when the power of intelligence becomes alone, and remains always after in that state it is *kaivalya,*" (*chiti-taktireva kevalā tasyāk sadā tathaivāvasthānam kaivalamiti*). It is the same goal which the Śāṅkhyā assigns to its votaries, but it uses, instead of *kaivalya*, the word *apavarga* which, though not radically synonymous, conveys the same idea, that of liberation from the trammels of nature. The Śāṅkhyā-kārikā adopts the term *kaivalya*, and says, "when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final *kaivalya* accomplished," (v. lxxvi). Gaṅdāpāda contents himself by saying, "*kaivalya* is the abstract form of *kevala,*" (kevalabhiññāt kaivalyam). Vāchaspati Mis'ra and Nārāyana take it to mean "exemption from the three kinds of pain," (dukhhatraya-vigamam dukkhavināsām). The lexicographical meaning of *kevala* is 'one,' 'alone,' 'only,' and in the derivative form it means, 'oneness,' 'singleness,' 'solitariness,' 'exclusiveness,' or 'individuality,' i. e., deliverance from the association of nature. Colebrooke translates it into 'deliverance,' and Wilson adds 'liberation.' Mr. Davies, in his translation, prefers 'abstraction.' All these may be resolved into *isolation*, the word used in my version, the idea being that the soul is freed from all association, material, phenomenal, or noumenal.
The epithets 'absolute' (āikāntika) and 'final' (ātyantika) used in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, and the word 'always' (sādā) in P. Bhāṣya show that this isolation is to last for ever, and no future association of any kind is possible. To quote Mr. Davies, "the soul's perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever."

This eternal quietude of the soul after isolation amounts, in the opinion of M. Cousin, to "nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;" but where existence forms the primary condition of the theory, nihilism cannot logically and fairly be predicated. The question is, does the soul exist or not after salvation? and since the Yoga, like many other schools of philosophy, both Indian and European, insists that it does, (cf. Sāṅkhya-sūtra I, 45, 46, 47), there is no room left for a charge of negation against it. Professor Wilson, following the Indian exegetes, more correctly explains the case by saying, "it is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." Professor Weber, in his 'History of Indian literature,' (pp. 238-9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, "one very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine—and one which was more and more exclusively developed as time went on—is the Yoga practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained." To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious, that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how so well-read a scholar, as the learned professor, could have formed this opinion, unless we believe that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his theory from the Bhagavadgītā, and Purānic and Tāntric modifications of Yoga.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

Patanjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul abides after the separation. This condition of philosophic abstraction, however, not being satisfactory to worldly-minded people longing for a peaceful hereafter, a necessity arose for the elaboration of a more concretely blissful scheme, and the modifications above noticed were offered by the Purânis to meet the requirement. They devised other forms, but those require no description here.

This completes the work; but Bhoja takes this opportunity to compare the condition of the soul as described in the Yoga with what other systems propose, and thereby to demonstrate its superiority. The first is the Buddhist doctrine of momentary existence.

Nor is it only in our philosophy that the knower of the field [of action] in its isolated condition is recognised to exist in this form of intelligence; on reflection it will be seen that in other systems of philosophy also it remains in the same form. Now, in the worldly condition soul appears as full of agency, experiencership, and inquisitiveness; if this one soul, the knower of the field, be not admitted to be so, then in the absence of all antecedent and postcedent enquiry in momentary consciousness, (i. e., believing consciousness to be existent only for the time being, which cannot look into the past or the future,) there would be no constant relation between soul and the fruits of works, and the objection would arise of the destruction of that which has been done, and the coming into existence of that which has not been done, (i. e., no desert would follow works done, and desert would result from undone work). Acknowledge him to be the experiencer (of deserts) by whom an act enjoined by the Sūtras is performed, and there will be an inclination on the part of all to perform works for the acceptance or avoidance of good or evil. Since all actions characterised by the desire of avoidance or acceptance are subject to enquiry; since there would be an impossibility for enquiry in the case of mutually distinct moments; (i. e., the
moment when one action is done being distinct from that in which another action is performed); and since in the absence of enquiry there would arise an impossibility for any kind of action to take place, it is established that that which is the agent, experiencer, and enquirer is the soul. In the condition of liberation, there being an absence of all actions characterised by the idea of the acceptable and the acceptor, sentience alone remains behind. That sentience is apparent only as sentience, and not by knowing itself, since the nature of sentience is to perceive objects, and not to perceive itself. Further, when an object is perceived by the thinking power, the idea is "this" (ayam), and when the identity of that power is to be implied, the idea is "I" (aham). Two such mutually discordant actions, characterised as the profluent and the refluent are, cannot be achieved simultaneously, and since the two actions cannot be performed at the same time, soul remains as sentience only. Hence it is reasonable (to believe) that in the liberated condition, when the qualities are defunct, soul remains solely as sentience. In the mundane condition agency, percipiency, inquisitiveness arise in regard to that soul. Besides, there is a relation between Prakriti and soul, which is that of experience and experiencer; it is natural, and exists from time without a beginning. It is due to the prevalence of want of right notion. And that being the case, in the presence of the two powers for the advancement of the object of soul, (cf. IV, xxii), all modifications in the form of Mahat and others take place. And since the power of the soul as the supreme agent, and of casting its quality of sentience on the thinking principle, and of experiencing the result of the conjunction of that reflection, proceed from conjunction (with Mahat), and consequently of the conduct of all enquirable actions, what use is there in other unprofitable agglomeration of fallacies?

[Bhoja does not say that the theory he combats is due to the
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Buddhists, but the dogma of momentary consciousness was prevalent among the Madhyamikas, and hence I infer that he means the Buddhists. The theory is, that all things are momentary, and their cognition is also momentary, produced by the concatenation of complements of unconscious causes, without a permanent intellectual back-ground, (cf. Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-saṅgraha, p. 15). It is refuted by the allegation, that such consciousness could not be made subject to moral responsibility. The consciousness that would perform an action now, would have no relation to the one that had acted before, or to that which would act in the future, and the responsibility of the one could not be transferred to another. There could be no such idea as ego, for the ego of one cognition would not be the ego of another, and yet as ego is the basis of cognition and consciousness, no theory can be valid which repudiates that. There could be under such circumstance no incentive to, nor necessity for, moral action. A permanent individual consciousness is unavoidable, and that is found in the thinking principle enlivened by a reflection of soul.

Again, if, rejecting this course, it be accepted that agency is soul's essential attribute, then arises the admission of its being subject to modifications, and as modifications are non-eternal or temporal, its character as soul is destroyed. Nor can perception of mutually different conditions be effected in one form at the same time; and accordingly, in the condition in which soul is perceived associated with some produced pleasure, can the condition of pain be perceived. Thus the conditions being various, the conditioned must likewise be various, and from variety and modificability there can be neither spirituality nor eternity, (i.e., that which is modifiable cannot also be eternal or spiritual, and eternity and spirituality are essential attributes of soul). Hence it is that those Sāṅkhyaś who believe in a peaceful Brahma, acknowledge soul to remain in the same form both in the mundane and the liberated conditions.

[This is apparently the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, who believe
soul to be the real actor. The objection to this theory is that
action implies change, and if soul be the real actor, it would
be subject to change. The idea of change, however, is, in the
opinion of Patanjali, incompatible with the spirituality and
eternity of soul; it would cease to be soul if it were changeable like
material objects, and therefore this theory is not tenable.]

The theory of the Vedantists, who believe liberation to be
that condition of soul in which it is solely sentience and joy,
is not correct. Joy being the identity of pleasure, and pleasure
being manifested by perceptibles, and perceptibility not being
produced without perception, the doctrine of unity is destroyed
by the admission of the two, the perceptible and the perception.
Again, their saying of cognition itself being the joyous soul
would be prejudiced by the incompatibility of two antagonistic
qualities abiding together. Perception and perceptible cannot
fitly be called one. Again, soul is said by the non-dualists to be
of two kinds, the working or conditioned and the unconditioned
or supreme. But if you admit that form in which the working
soul becomes the experiencer of pleasure and pain, to be also the
form in which it exists as the supreme soul, then the supreme
soul becomes, like the working soul, subject to modifications, and
pertain, the nature of ignorance. If it be said that the ex-
periencership is not direct, but accepted as a present (by the
soul) while remaining as a neutral superior, the case would be the
same as in our system of philosophy.

The assumption about the joyous form (of soul) has already
been refuted. It may be added that if soul be admitted
to be of the character of ignorance, there would be no separate
existence left for working souls, and which should then be the
object of philosophy? Certainly not the unconditioned soul, for
it is eternally free; nor the working soul, for it is (admitted to
be) of the character of ignorance, and thus will result the falsi-
ification of all systems of philosophy. If the creation be admitted
to consist of ignorance, the question would arise, whose igno-
rance is it? It cannot be that of the supreme soul, for it is
CHAPTER FOURTH.

eternally free, and of the form of knowledge. It cannot be of the working soul, for that being without a separate existence, how can it be connected with ignorance? It would be like the admission of horns of a hare (a mere fiction). It might be said that the ignorance of ignorance consists in its not being the subject of demonstration by argument. It may, like the dew on the earth with the rays of the sun (playing on it), melt away under ratiocination, and yet it may be ignorance. This, however, cannot be. Whatever does something must be distinct from, or identical with, something else, and since the agency of ignorance in the development of the universe must be admitted, and admitting it, if ignorance be indeterminate, then nothing whatever will be determinate; even Brahma itself will be liable to be put down as indeterminate, (but if it be described to be determinate, it will cease to be ignorance). It follows then that the form of soul cannot be other than that of a supervisor. This supervisorship is mere sentience only, for there is no evidence of its having any other quality.

[The Vedantic doctrine is refuted on two grounds; 1st, because it involves a duality which the Vedantists themselves repudiate; 2nd, it makes soul liable to be affected by ignorance, thereby destroying its absolute purity, and if we admit that soul may be involved in ignorance then it will become indeterminate, and there would be no certainty about anything.]

It is alleged by the Naiyāyikas and others that soul is sentient, because it becomes so by contact with sentience, and that sentience is produced by the union of soul with its mind. They say that desire, knowledge, exertion and other attributes are produced by the contact of soul during its working condition with mind, and through those qualities, the soul knows itself to be the knower, the agent, and the experiencer. In the state of liberation (moksha), when false notions are suppressed on the suppression of the residua (dosa) which are produced by them, there results an absolute annihilation of the specific attributes, know-
ledge, &c., and soul is acknowledged to reside in its own essential form. This, however, is not a correct assumption, for what would you accept to be the peculiar soulness of the soul in that condition? (You cannot urge that pervasion, immensity, and eternity are its constituents, for) the qualities of pervasion and the rest pertain to ether and others, and to differentiate it from them, some determinate form must have to be admitted. You may say that the specific character of soul is its own speciality (or kind to which it belongs). But this cannot be urged, for such speciality exists in all things, (i.e., everything has its specific distinction as a particular kind). It is necessary, therefore, to admit some other differentiation of the soul, apart from speciality, and this can be effected by admitting its supervisorship, from its being of the form of sentience, and in no other way.

As to what is believed by the Mīmāṃsakas about soul being both worker and work, the position is not tenable. They believe that soul is indicated by the use of the word I, and by the use of I, both the agency and the objectivity of soul are included, (i.e., soul is the ego, and nothing else can be ego, and the soul being the ego, the ego must include both soul and work, for in knowing the soul work must appear to be soul and no other). But this cannot result, because they are of contradictory natures. Agency implies him who measures, while work means that which is to be measured or proved, and the assumption of these two antagonistic qualities cannot be effected in one at the same time. When two antagonistic qualities are assumed, then there can be no unity, as positive and negative, and so are agency and objectivity antagonistic. Should it be said there is no antagonism between agency and objectivity, but there is between agency and instrumentality, we deny it, because the assumption of antagonistic qualities is the same (in either case). Rejecting then the theory of perceivable by the use of I, we hold the soul's supervisorship as proved, and thence its sentience.
The theory of those who hold soul to be finite, defined by the body, and mutable, because it is reckoned among matter, tumbles down as soon as it is started. By the admission of mutability, the sentience form of soul is destroyed, and in the absence of its sentience form, how can there be any spirituality in soul? Hence those who desire to uphold the spirituality of soul must admit its sentience form, and that is its supervisorship.

[This is the theory of the Arhatas or Jains. (Cf. Cowell and Gough’s Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha.)]

Some fancy soul to be of the form of the actor. They believe that the action of knowing, which results in the presence of a perceptible object, has for its fruit the cognition of that object; and in that cognition as the fruit, the true form of soul, being of the form of illumination, becomes manifest; and objects being perceptible, the soul becomes the perceptor; for it is produced in some such form as “I know the pot,” (in which “I” is the perceptor, “know” is the cognition of the form of illumination, and the “pot” is the perceptible object). The cause of action is for certain the actor, and therefore actorship and experiencership constitute the form of soul. This, however, is inconsistent. (If cognitions be the root),—the question arises, Does the actorship of those cognitions arise simultaneously, or successively? If you say, that the actorship is simultaneous, then its actorship shall cease a moment after. If you say, it happens successively, it cannot be predicated of that which is uniform, (i.e., soul). If you say the actorship of soul is effected always in one or the same form, then that one form being always present, all fruits would become of one form. If the actorship be multiform, then there would be mutability, and there being mutability, there can be no form of sentienceness. It follows that those who believe in soul’s sentienceness, should not maintain its direct actorship. The way in which the actorship of the uniform, eternal, sentient soul is proved by us, is the most consistent.
Those who by such arguments maintain that the self-manifest soul becomes the perceptor through the cognition of objects, will find their refutation by the same line of argument.

Some hold that the reasoning (vimarsa) form of soul is its sentience form, (i.e., its sentience is no other than its reasoning power). They say that the sentience form of soul cannot be ascertained without reasoning; the sentience form is said to be distinct from the inert, and without reasoning it cannot be defined, and without reasoning, there is nothing left behind. This is, however, untenable. Reasoning is the discussion which has the form of "this, thus, and so," (i.e., every process of ratiocination involves the assumption of something like this, this is, this is not, thus it is, thus it is not, it is so, it is not so, and without them there can be no reasoning,) and that cannot arise without egoism (or consciousness), and when reasoning is brought to bear on soul it is brought into cognition in the form "I am of this form," and thus the soul, the subject of discussion, being brought to light by the word I, no advance is made beyond a fancy, and fancy is a form of conviction, which is the function of the intellect, and not of sentience. But as sentience, uniform and eternal, remains always in one shape, there can be no entrance of egotism into it. It follows then, that this assumption of reasoning in the soul is a mistaken assumption of the intellect for soul, and not a knowledge of the identity of the self-manifest soul, the great soul.

Thus in no system of philosophy can the form of soul be ascertained by any means, without admitting its supervisorship. Supervisorship implies sentience form, which is distinct from inertness. Because it exists supervising in the form of sentience, therefore it derives the quality of experience (in objects), and that which is supervised by sentience becomes fit for worldly usage. And such being the case, other systems of philosophy, if they decline to accept what we have said about the isolation of soul as resulting on the cessation of the functions of Prakṛiti after it has accomplished its duty have no
resource. It has, therefore, rightly been said that isolation is the abidance of the sentient power in its own form after withdrawing its shadow from all functions.

The sources of perfections, (i); the manner in which the transmutation of material causes are effected, (ii); the mode in which merit cooperates in this process, (iii); the origin of created thinking principles, (iv); their relation to their original source, (v); the superiority of Samādhi-born thinking principle, (vi); the nature of various kinds of work, (vii); the conformity of works to residua, (viii); their invariable relation, (ix); the eternity of desires, (x); their nature and susceptibility to destruction, (xi); the relation of the thinking principle to works, (xii); the natures of the qualities and the qualified, (xiii); unity of things proceeding from unity of modification, (xiv); the relation of cognition to cognizables, (xv); the process of cognition, (xvi); its permanence, (xvii); thinking principle not self-illuminative, (xviii); it cannot be directed to two things at the same time, (xix); multiplicity of cognitive power not admissible, (xx); how it perceives its self, (xxi); how it is made fit for all purposes, (xxii); its subserviency to another's purpose, (xxiii); progress of isolation, (xxiv—xxxii); nature of isolation, (xxxiii)—these are the subjects treated of in this chapter on isolation. [Only the substance of the commentary has been given here, for reasons explained before.]

He, who is the asylum of fame and majesty, whose orders are received on the crowns of their diadems, by kings prostrate at his feet in acts of service and salutation, the lotus of whose mouth having been attained by the goddess of speech, she became uncommonly proud, even he, the auspicious Bhoja, lord of the earth, composed these notes on the aphorisms of the lord of serpents.

This is the end of the fourth quarter, or the quarter on isolation, of the commentary entitled Rājamārtanda, on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

25
APPENDIX.

A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF WORKS EXTANT ON THE
YOGA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Abbreviations.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>B. G. C.</td>
<td>Bühler's Guzarat Catalogue.</td>
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<td>Bh. D. M. C.</td>
<td>Catalogue of the Bhāū Dāji Memorial.</td>
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<td>Bh. R.</td>
<td>Bhandarkar's Report, 1881-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. C.</td>
<td>Hall's Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>K. C. P. C.</td>
<td>Kielhorn's Central Provinces Catalogue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. N.</td>
<td>Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit MSS.</td>
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<td>N. W. P. C.</td>
<td>North Western Provinces Catalogue.</td>
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<td>N. W. P. &amp; O. C.</td>
<td>and Oudh Catalogue.</td>
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<td>O. C.</td>
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1. **A'chárapaddhati.** Duties and exercises of Yogís. By Basudevendra. B. G. C. IV.

2. **Ajapágayatri-puráscharana-paddhati.** Use of the Gayatři in Yoga meditation. By Śāṅkara A'chárya. H. C.

3. **Amanaska.** On steadfastness of the mind. N. W. P. C. V.


5. **Ashtáńga-hṛidaya-sańhitá.** Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. B. G. C. IV.

6. **Ashtáńga-yoga.** Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. By Śaṅkara A'chárya. B. G. C. IV.


31. Kapila-gitā. Dissertations on the importance of Yoga meditations and the mode of performing them. by Kapila. M. N. IV.
34. Laya-yoga. Yoga emancipation. B. G. C. IV.
35. Mahā-rāmāyaṇa alias Vaśishṭha rāmāyaṇa. A version of the history of Rāma distinct from that of Vālmīki and designed especially to expound the principles of the Yoga doctrine. M. N. VI.
38. Nāḍī-ṛṇāna-dīpakā. On the knowledge of the arteries or nerves bearing on the Yoga. M. N. I.


45. Patanjala-sūtra-bhāshya. A commentary on Patanjali’s Yoga-sūtra. By Bhavadeva Mis'ra, Mahāmahopādhyāya. Probably the same with No. 42. M. N. V, and VI.


Śaṅkhya-pravachana, vide Yoga-sútra.
Śaṅkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Vide Pátañjala-bháshya.
59. Saptabhumiká-vichára. The seven stages of perfection of Yogis. B. G. C. IV.
60. Saragítá. On Yoga breathing, probably an extract from a Puráṇa. By Vyása. H. C.
61. Sárasamúchchaya alias Yoga-sárasaṅgraha. The leading tenets of the Yoga. By Harisevaka Mis'ra. M. N. II.
62. Šaṭchakra. The six principal parts of the body which should be meditated upon. B. G. C. IV.
63. Šaṭchakra-dhyána-paddhati. Meditation on six particular parts of the body. By Bráhmachaitanya Yati. K. P. R. 1881.
67. Śiva-saṅhitá. On the Yama, Niyama and other observances of the Yoga system; alleged to be an extract from the Skanda-puráṇa. By Śíva. N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. and O. C. VI., B. G. C. IV., H. C.
69. Svarodaya. Yoga breathing. (Probably only on divination from the flow of breath). By Vyása. B. G. C. IV.
73. Tattvavindu-yoga. On a peculiar form of Yoga. By Síva. N. W. P. C. I.
74. Tattva-vindu-yoga. Defining the various divisions of the Yoga. By Rámechandra Paramaháäsá. H. C.
75. Varṇa-prabodha. A treatise on the Yoga. By Dattátreya. H. C.
76. Vás'ishthá-sára. An abridgment of the Yoga-vás'ishthá Rámáyana, containing only its metaphysical portion. By Tirtha-síva. M. N. III.
78. Videha-muktádi-kathana. "It handles sundry tenets on the Yoga craze." H. C.
80. Yájñavalkya-gíta alias Yájñavalkya-yoga. "A poem in commendation of the Yoga." By Yájñavalkya. H. C.


91. Yoga-dṛṣṭiśvādhyāya. (Contents not known). Bh. D. M. C.


100. Yogānusāsana-vṛitti or Yoganusāsana-sūtra-vṛitti. A commentary on the Yoga-sūtra. By Bhāvā Gaṇes'a Dīkshita. N. W. P. C. I., H. C.


122. Yoga-s’ikshā. By Harīchara. B. G. C. IV.
136. Yoga-tattvā. The principles of the Yoga doctrine. B. G. C. IV.
Yoga-vāsishṭha. Vide No. 35.
140. Yoga-vichāra. The nature of the Yoga doctrine. An extract from the Kāśikhandā. B. G. C. IV.
APPENDIX.

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षौगोशाय नमः ।

पातंजलं योगसूत्रम् ।
राजमार्गेश्वरखड़ाखड़सिद्धिसहितम् ।

देशादूरे प्रेमः सब त्योर्यं तनोतु व: ।
दुःखापमपि वसत्सत्ष्या जन: कैलासम्युते ॥ ९ ॥
विविधा यथापि दुःखानि यदुखसारणस्यां ॥
प्रधानिः यथा विलयं में स्तम: श्रीमात्यम् ॥ २ ॥
पतंगसिद्धवेषमिः: कालपूव्वा जयवशी ।
पुष्पक्ष्योत्विंशोग्यापि प्रेम दुखसिद्धिता च ॥ ॥
अपलिः: वाक्ष: फाशिंशुदितमहः-
स्वरमं: शोमिस्कारलिथ: ।
विभावमानः: चत्तं मांसिः या: ।
स्तमां वदानुन्दमतान्ति कुत्ते ॥ ४ ॥
श्रीग्रामसत्यसारसिद्धांदिवधता पातंजले कुर्वता
द्रुमिः राजमार्गशास्नमां विवधता ॥
वाक्षेवा चयापृष्टा भागश्यत: च अतन्तम् वैधिके ।
वाक्षेवानां मूलः: फणश्यत् भावं यहेनादृत शुद्धि
सुपर्फर्णसमवेतस्वं जमत्युश्यसा ॥ ५ ॥
क्षतिग्रस्त नानादीपते यथायोगस्यां बतिस्तवे ।

अन्तः पतश्चलिमुने। विंटतिमयेय-।

अथ योगानुसारसनम् ॥ १॥

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† जनात: दत्तश्चालनसे दति C पुस्तकादः।

‡ वृषज्ञप्रतिपदातिरि बिचिन्तितपुस्तकादः।

§ सुभाषग्रामस्वरूपमा क्रियापदोपयोगाय । सप्तत्र्य तथा । तथा समस्तो- 

उत्सर्गस्तु उत्सर्गादान ।

|| विशेषधातिपुस्तकादः गानापुस्तकादः। वालकबनेरायायाये ना!
तथा योगश्रूः कैश्य रत्न। ब्राह्मणपत्रिषिस्योऽपि निरस्तः: प्रतिपश्चाप्रतिपतादस्ति । भावसङ्गः: वाचनाः, प्रभुपुष्करण योगश्रूः तपस्वलं च कैश्य वादयथाप्रसणनभावः। एतत्र भवति, यथाप्राप्त योगश्रूः साधनानि बालोऽपि, नवश्राण्यानां योगः कैश्यानं पञ्चसुत्पादः-यत्निः॥ ॥

तथा योगश्रूः रत्न मवातः प्राप्त ॥

योगश्रवण्तिनिरोधः॥ ॥

'विनाश' निर्वाणपरिप्र्दाधारत्र प्राप्तः: 'हस्तः' अवश्यः-भावपरिप्र्दाधारत्र। 'निरोधः' बहुमुखपरिप्र्दाधारितिविवेकदीरकः सुयुक्तः प्रतिक्लामपरिप्र्दाधारे मृदुःकारे। कांक्षारे 'ग्रह', इत्या-क्षाव्यः। व च निरोधः सहस्रां विषाण भस्मीः। वर्णप्राप्नां धर्मः: कदाचितः काश्यान्त्रुवाचविवर्णित । तत्र विनाश, भूष्ण, विनाशं, एकांभ, निबुधम्, हुति विनाश भूमयः: विनाशावसा-विशेषः। तत्र विनाश, रजश जहेकाेदिरं: बहुमुखनिक्षत्रिः सुखु:। 

तथा योगश्रवण्तित्वरिषिस्योऽपि निरस्तः: प्रतिपश्चाप्रतिपतादस्ति । भावसङ्गः: वाचनाः, प्रभुपुष्करण योगश्रूः तपस्वलं च कैश्य वादयथाप्रसणनभावः। एतत्र भवति, यथाप्राप्त योगश्रूः साधनानि बालोऽपि, नवश्राण्यानां योगः कैश्यानं पञ्चसुत्पादः-यत्निः॥ ॥

* इति केत्तठा निर्माणपरिप्र्दाधारान्तः साधिति वज्रपुस्कलसम्बन्धः पाठः।
† झाणार्जुन स्तूमुः च विनाशावसारः।
‡ वस्मौमान्यिति । चिन्तामणिलम्बः।
तम्रको नेत्रारी

...
के दरे अ
माभावात् कट्टनाक्षरधामनाहो वेदमोक्षसंविद्यमान, युद्धावावः
झूठेयावासां ज्ञातिमोक्षी नः‌ ॥

युद्धावावां तक मियत्वमिहाय

दृष्टिसाक्ष्यमितिरन। ॥ ॥

‘दृष्टिः’ धोनध्वज्यिन्न काने, दृष्टियो या क्षणमाध्यक्षकः।
ताभि: ‘क्षणं’ तद्भवम्। शमर्य, वाक्रुषो दृष्टम: सुख-पुक-भासायिकः। प्रातुभशिष्य, ताहसूप एव वंदिते शयाबन्धः
pुशः। प्रतीतेन तदेवं, विश्वभकाण्डया परिषद्ये बस्नि विक्रमः।
वस्मिन्तुः प्रतिदानं भवति, विक्रमेऽस्मिन्त्रिदिरेषां विशगा-
कारेषां परिषद्ये पुष्यनसदाकार इव परिमाध्ये, यथा जलवरणः
चाणु चक्षुशाचित्र प्रतिभान्ते, तात्सं ॥ ॥

दृष्टिपदः वाक्शासामाः।

दृश्यः पञ्चत्थः प्रितास्तिताः:न ॥ ॥

‘दृश्यः’ विस्मित परिशामविशेषः। दृश्यतुस्मुद्रप्रक्षायाय-
विनो या ज्ञतवरणा दृश्यायान्तरयम्। प्रतिभायाय।
पञ्च दृश्यः। कीर्त्यः: ‘प्रितास्तिताः’। हेतैवस्मिन्त्रायामकाराकाणाः।
प्रिताः, तद्विपरीता: ‘प्रिताः’। ॥ ॥

* प्रतीतेदेव दृष्टिपदः B चिन्तितपुष्याते नातिः।
+ विविद्धाणेदेव दृष्टिपदः B चिन्तितपुष्यावाअः।
† विष्ट्य अविष्ट्य दृष्टिपदः B चिन्तितपुष्यावाअः। विष्ट्य अविष्ट्य
धर्म: P चिन्तितपुष्यावाअः।
पातन्नले एतदकं भवति, रजसः प्रदृक्षिरुपं, तमसा परापकारनिरतं,
सुखमयं भवतीति। एतास्तिखयिन्तावस्था न समाधानुपयोगः।
एकायनिरुद्धोऽयं व भयोगेपयोभिन्यावित्वत् येोगेपयोभिन्यावितः
यत् तस्यात्कर्षेणेक्तरे दे येोगेश्चिदचिक्सायेः
मृतमिति दयेव्धैतययेन प्रदशं। यत् तस्यात्कर्षेणेक्तरे दे येोगेपयोभिन्यावितः
देयोरेकायनिरुद्धये भरूमिकयोयेदधित्तखेकायतारूपः
समाधावृपयोगं व येोगेपयोभिन्यावितः। अनलवेच्या सत्वादिक्रमव्य॒त्करमे}
प्रायः, इयारपि रजसः प्रयमसुपादां। यावन्न पटति दर्ता तावन्निटत्निनं
मयेवेव्धैतययेन प्रदशं। चित्रमाय्येन भवति, एकाये बहिटत्तेनिरोधः,
सव्वार्सां टन्तीनां ससंख्कारार्णा प्रविलय दति। श्नयारेव उन्यायागस्य
सम्भवः ॥ २ ॥

ददानो खवनकारचिन्तानि वयाख्यातुकामः
प्रथमं चिक्षदं वर्ततुः खरूपेऽवस्थानम्‌ ॥

तदा दृश्यः खरूपेऽवस्थानम्‌ ॥ ३॥

‘दृश्यः’ पुष्यस्य, तस्य नामे, ‘खरूपे’ चिक्षाचूर्ततायम्,
‘वस्थान’ खितस्य: भवति। अया भवमयः, जयविोवाक्ष्यात्सिद्धार्थुः—

* परियुक्तकामाय्यतेन दृश्यः दिलितपुस्तकपाठः।
† रचायनिरवं लेबिंगित्वै छिन्तायस्यकामः।
प्राविशय्य मात्रावध अन्यायित्वं। प्रेत्यकाराधिकारितः संघटितगतयां तिनमहिमानित। ॥ ३ ॥

सतिसात्यमहिमितरः ॥ ४ ॥

‘ह्वत्र’ ते गार्त्यधिकारिन् काले, ह्वत्यो या व्यवस्थाश्च च।
ताभि: ‘सत्यः’ तद्रपलं। विषयण: याहूऽस ह्वत्य: सुख-रुक्ष-मोर्नास्तिकः।
प्रादुर्बलिनि, ताहूऽपूऽ एव संवेद्येन व्यवहारिनः
पुष्चः। प्रतिवनस्। तदेवं, चक्षुचेकित्यात् विषयेन विशेष:।
सत्य: ‘सत्यः’ प्रतिवन्वतः अवस्थि, चक्षुशैर्याधितिहारिणो विषयी-
कारे विषयेन परिषेधे पुष्चकराकार एव परिभाषेतुः, वथेष जलस्याः
चलस्य चक्षुविश्वास्वित्त प्रतिवार्तेत्, तथां ॥ ६ ॥

सत्यत: यश्चत: ज्ञानस्मिन्। ॥ ॥

‘ह्वत्र’ भिन्न विषयार्थविवेचनः। व्यासकुमारसत्यविवेचनः
विबद्ध यथा अवश्चहूऽ सत्यविवेचनात् तथप्रतिशः। एतत्मां भवतिः।
पश्च तदाः च। कौश्यः ‘ज्ञानस्मिन्’। लोकविवेचनार्थविवेचनातः
‘ज्ञानस्मिन्’, तवपरिवर्त: ‘विज्ञानस्मिन्’, ॥ ॥

* प्रतीयते तत्ततपत: B चिन्तितपुश्चको गापि।
† विविधाच्यो तति B चिन्तितपुश्चको।
‡ किदः ज्ञानस्मिन् तति B चिन्तितपुश्चको। किदः ज्ञानस्मिन् च
तति F चिन्तितपुश्चको।
पातन्नले चारा साधनं सुखसाधनेष्येव शब्दादिषु। एतत्र देवा-गाम्। एतदुःखगति, रजसा श्रापनिषत, तस्मात् प्राप्तकारितमात्, वचनं सुखमयं फिवं भवतीतिः। एतास्िंसंस्करता वसा न समाधानुपयोगिनः। एकायननिबहृते द्वे व वस्तोत्तरङ्गोत्सरमव-शितलात् समाधानुपयोगं भजेते। वस्त्राधिकारयुतकोच स्वयम-गायः, व्रतारपि राजसमघोरतमुखे तदवः राजः प्रथम-सुपादानः। यावच प्रथमनिर्दर्षता नाबलिष्ठसिनं भजते दर्शयत-भिन्नतिः देयोर्द्धयोग्येन प्रदर्शनः। यावच नेतराः पदातु प्रदर्शनः। यत्र तखोक्षकर्मणाः द्वे भवी योगव्योगान्यावितः अन्याय-स्वारेरिकानिवधुधोर्भूमिकान्यवाचनोहतातः। परिनामः यायः। किंतुं भवति, एकावे बाधित्रधेरोधः, निन्द्वः सुस्थानं दलितयां वस्त्राधिकारयाः प्रविष्ट हृदः। अन्यायोरेव भ्रम्य-चिलाग्नियः सवाहः।॥ ॥

ददानीं खजकारचित्न –ठन्ि-निराधपदानि व्यासातुकाः। प्रथमं सिन्धरं प्राप्ते ।

तदा क्रुः खरुपेवस्मानः॥ ॥

'क्रुः' पुषक्रसः, तस्िन् काले, 'खऽषे' चिताचार्चनपतावाम्, 'श्रव्यानं' श्वरीम् भवति। च्रयमथः, जात्यविवेकवारे ग्रहेऽथः।

* परंपाःसुखसाधनेवेत्रति य चिक्षितपुस्तकाः।
† यायाधिकरेव लेष्मिति ब चिक्षितपुस्तकाः।
गुप्तादन्यस्यन्तः काले, यादृशः श्रयमथेः, यादृशः प्रतीयते।
प्रतीयते इतिपाठः चिङितपुस्तके मासि |
किम इति ठ तविङितपुखतकपाठः।
प्रमाश्य-विपय्यय-विकळ-निद्रा-स्रृत्यः ॥ ६ ॥

चारा कर्येद चदगमारः

प्रत्यक्षानुमानां प्रमाणाः ॥ ७ ॥

अचातिप्रसिद्धलवात्‌ प्रमाणां ास्त्रकारेण मेदनिरूपणेनैवाव-

लक्लच्छ्य, न एक्‌ हतम्‌ । प्रमाल्लणम्‌ अवि-

सवादिन्नान, तत्करण प्रमाणमिति । इद्विद्वारेण वाद्यवसख्पं

रागात्‌ तद्विषया सामान्यविशेषात्मनेऽथेस्य विशेषावधारण-

प्रधाना af. 'nae' । ग्ट्ीतसम्बन्धािङ्गात्‌ लिङ्गिनः सामा-

न्यात्मनाध्ववसायः "अनुमान । श्राप्तवचनम्‌ ATT ॥ ७ ॥

एवं प्रमाणएरूपां afi व्याख्याय विपय्ययरूपामाद |

fart मिथ्यान्नानमतद्रुपप्रतिषठम्‌ ॥ ८ ॥

अतथाण् तेऽयं तयेोत्यद्यमानं ज्ञानं 'faa', यथा wf

कायां cram । अतद्रुपप्रतिष्ठम्‌' इति । verde यदुं ग

'afet, रूपे प्रतिष्ठते, तस्यार्थस्य यत्‌ पारमार्थिकं शूप न तत्‌

प्रतिभास्यतीति धावत्‌ । शंश्योऽणद्रुषपरतिष्टलात्‌ "मिथ्याश्चाभं

यथा स्ाणवा पुरुषा वेति ॥ ८ ॥

विपय्ययेग भिद्याश्यानमतस्यप्रतिष्ठम्‌ ॥ ८ ॥

प्रत्याहार्ते इत्यः तच्छन्यप्रमाणां शान्त 'विपय्यय;', यथा प्रकि-

कार्यां रजत्यां । 'अतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम्‌' हति । तत्याश्य यदृप्य न

तसिन् रूपे प्रतिमिते, तत्याश्य यत् पारमार्थिकं रूपं न तत्‌

प्रतिभास्यतीति धावत्‌ । इवायोऽणद्रुषपरतिष्टलात्‌ "भिद्याश्याम',

थथα खाणे पुषके वेति ॥ ८ ॥

विकळस्तनिं वाख्यात्मारः

* इत्तयः समुपदश्टन्ते ति ए श्विहितपुखकषपाटः।

† उपरक्तवस्तविक्धप्रमासंनामिति ए त्विङितप कपाटः |

‡ प्रमाखलच्छ्येति F चिहितपुस्तकपाठः |
शब्दशालानुपाती वस्तुवृक्षो विक्रमः स ॥ ६ ॥

शब्दशिविनितं ग्नां 'शब्दशाल', तद्वरुत्तिनितं शीर्षं वक्त्र व 'शब्दशालीनानुपाती', 'वासु', तद्वरुत्तिनितं शीर्षं शब्दशालानुपातीं योऽध्यवसायं संब्दशालीनानुपाती श्रव्यसंबंधितं देवदत्तकम्। तदनृपतितं शीलं यस्स स शब्दन्नानुपाती गागुपाती", AGA, तथालम्बितमाळम योऽध्यवसायः सः 'विक्रमः', द्युच्यते। यथा पुरुषस्य चेतन्यं खरूपमित्यज देवदन्लस्य कम्बल इतिवद्वशत्रब्दजनिते श्रव्यसंबंधितो भेदशालिवाचिगृहार-माणं स्मार्याय वर्षायातः। वस्तुतः चेतन्यसेव पुजस्: ॥ ७ ॥

गिद्रा बाष्यातमाणः।

अभावप्रत्यायाधिकारिनां श्रविनिन्द्रा ॥ १० ॥

'अभावप्रत्यायः' 'अश्वकम्' यथा हस्ते: तथायः। एतस्य भवति, तथाशुद्धिजवाससमससंयुक्तान्तरब्दमध्ये विश्वविश्वविपरिवर्धायेण प्रवर्तते 'हस्तसे' एताने गिद्रा। श्रव्यमवोपसाधितिशाक्तिनिर्देशनात् शृद्‌स्ताव्याब्धविशतिकारणामुपपेक्षायात्मानं ।। १० ॥

शार्यं बाष्यातमाणः।

श्रुतुविषयास्मात्माणं स्मृतिः ॥ ११ ॥

प्रमाणेन 'श्रुतुविषयः' 'विषयवक्त्र' यथा 'श्रुत्वमाणं' संशकाराः।
पातळे यागद्नर दारेण अवशिष्यमि तः 'विहार'! तल प्रभाखविपरग्थयं विकिपिग्वा जायस्थाः। त एव वधानुभवबलात् प्रत्यायमाणस्तदा खघ्रः। निद्रा लसवेदमाविचर्य। सुतिस प्रमाणाविद्यंविकिन्द्रमिन्ना॥९॥

एवं हस्तियोख्याश्वे पायां विन्देऽभ्यं वाक्यात्माः।

अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः॥ १२॥

एवं इन्तायोख्याय सापायं निरोधं व्याख्यातुमाह।

छअभ्यासवेराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः॥ १२॥

अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां वच्यमाणस्तदा। ताभ्यां तासां प्रकाशप्रार्जिताभ्येः विसल्सनोऽयत निरोधम यत् 'निरोध.'। कितुं भवति, ताभ्यां विनिर्दितविनिवेदनामकाणां कालार्यवेव एव

यने श्रीतिविपयज्ञानसमुः। तत विराज्यावदिर्जनजन वैराजेष

तदविषुखुमुयावते। अभासेन च सुखजनक्रान्तवायुप्रदेशनदारेण।

झूठ वैर्यमुयावते द्वाराभ्यं भवति विनितिनिरोधः॥ ९॥

अभ्यासं व्याख्यातुमाह।

* तदन्ति A, D चिन्तितपुस्तकांव्याख्यातः।
† प्रचलितपुस्तक इति B चिन्तितपुस्तकांव्याख्यातः।
‡ विनिर्दितविनिवेदनामकाणां वरः चिन्तितपुस्तकांव्याख्यातः।

या तु जीवनप्रार्जितविनिवेदनामकाणां वरः चिन्तितपुस्तकांव्याख्यातः।

संसारप्रागः-भाराविनिवेदनामकाणां वरः चिन्तितपुस्तकांव्याख्यातः।

क्षेत्रादिविनिवेदनामकाणां वरः चिन्तितपुस्तकांव्याख्यातः।

अभ्यासवैराग्ये विषयवेष्टिनिद्राय विषयशास्त्रीयादिवेष्टिनिद्राय विषयवेष्टिनिद्राय विषयवेष्टिनिद्राय विषयवेष्टिनिद्राय विषयवेष्टिनिद्राय विषयवेष्टिनिद्राय विषयवेष्टिनिद्राय विषयवेष्टिनिद्राय।

या तु कैवल्यप्रागभाराधीनक्रान्तिसिद्धाश्च तथ वैराजेष्वर्येक्षिततापच्च राधः॥ ९॥

अभ्यासं वाक्यात्माः।
१ पादे ९५. खचम्‌।
तच स्थिती यज्ञोपवासः || १३ ||
द्रृतिराधिस्थित विनित्तेव खडःपरिणिष्ठ: परिणाम: ‘खिरिः’ तथा
‘यज्ञ’ उक्ताः, पुनःपुनःस्थापनेन वेतिष्ठित विनिबेशनम् ‘श्वासः’;
द्युच्चते || १३ ||
तथेव विशेषमाधि।
स तु दीर्घकालंनैरतर्थसत्कारसेविताः हदभृद्धि: ||
॥ १४ ॥
बालकानं ‘नैरतर्थादराविद्ध्यन्’ वेदमानः: ‘हदभृद्धि:’
खिरे भवति, द्राक्षै भवतीवर्ध्यः || ९४ ||
वैराग्यश्च महेश्माधि।
हद्धानुमुक्तविविधयविद्वेष्या वशिकारसत्कारविकार: वैराग्यम् || १५ ॥

dwivisho vishayo drṣṭa śraṇumuktvikṣaḥ. 'drṣṭa.' idaivaipabhavamaṇa:
bhavate: devolokāde 'śraṇumuktvike.' śraṇumukte guhaśubandhaved-v
ēve bade: tat śrṣga: 'śraṇumuktvike.' tadeśeyakāte 'vishayo.'
pariṇāmaviśvavānalāte vigaṭaguhṣa, 'ya 'vāshīkārārāja' sthitē
tat bhavate

* devoloke sthit F puṣṭakapāda:।
† tato bhavate sthit B, C chintatpuṣṭakapāda:। tat śrṣga: śrṣga
sthit F puṣṭakapāda:।
† vigaṭaragākhete B, D chintatpuṣṭakapāda:।
वशा नाघों वस्त्र दृश्य वोक्य विसा, तत् 'वैराग्यम' उच्चते
॥ १८॥

तथेऽव विशेषमाहि।

तत् परं पुरुषस्यात्मेनुष्येवत् यथां ॥ १८॥

‘तत्’ वैराग्यं, ‘परं’ अज्ञातं। प्रथमं वैराग्यं विषयविषयं, विन्यानु
गुणविषयसुपुष्पवण्पुष्पविक्षेतरेऽरं भवति निरोधपमाधिश्चर्यानु
क्रमानं वात्॥ १८॥

एवं योगस्य सङ्कुचित च ममप्राप्तममेकवेदमानामः।

वितकविचारानन्दास्मितानुगमात् सम्मानः॥ १७॥

समाधिरिति ग्रेवः। सम्यक्संश्चयविपर्यवर्त्तितलेन प्रक्षायते
प्रकर्षण ज्ञाते भावस्य सङ्कुचं च च च सम्प्राप्ताः। समाधिभोवः
विवेचनं। धेयानिरितिकविपर्याये निरर्थायाः सम्प्राप्ताः विज्ञानमा
प्रिति यात्। वितकविचारानन्दानुगमात् सम्मानः॥ १७॥

सम्यक्संश्रयविपर्यायमादेति एव चिड्टितपुस्तकपाठः।

विभाग इति च पुस्तकपाठः। उत्पन्नगुविवेकख्यातेरेव भवतोति
प्रज्ञकपाठहः।

सम्यक्संश्रयविपर्यायमादेति ए चिड्टितपुस्तकपाठः।

विभाग इति च पुस्तकपाठः।
Safa पुमः caffe. भाव्यश्च feu शैशरंसतप्ानि च ।
तान्यपि च feat जड़ाजडमेदात्‌ । शडामि चतु्विध्रतिः ।
पुरुषः* । aw यदा भाग्छतेद्धियाफि स्युलानि विषत्वेनादाध
पृल्वोपरागुसन्धानेन बरष्टाथीकेखसमोशेभ च भावना प्रवर्तंते, तदा
सवितकंः समाधिः । भ्रसिलेवावणम्बने पुष्यीपरामुसन्धानणन्दारौसेशं
शरएन्यलेन? यदा भावना प्रवर्तते, तदा निर्वितकैः। तस्माचाम्तःकरण-
विषयमभाणम्बर तस्य रेशकालघष्मावच्छटेन॥ वदा भावमा
yaad, तशा शविचारः। तस्िन्नेषावलम्बने रे्कालधम्मो वच्छ
विना धर्िभाज्राधभासितलेन भावना क्रियमाणा निविचारं शयु
च्यते । एवं पर्यन्तः समाधिपार्श्वमापतिरिति ध्यादिपतेैः।
बद्रा तु
रजसनोलेब्रवमुहम्मलःकारणवच भाष्टेत, तदा गुषभावातः विष्क्षः
सुखप्रकाषमयस्य सत्वस्य भाव्यमानस्याद्रेकात्‌ सानन्दः समाधिभवति ।
अतिरेव समाधिः ते बदुध्वत्यकलानान प्रधानपुष्पवचयः न प्रक्षति,
ते विगतदेशाक्षारधारे विदेशमवव्वाचा: । द्वय एछ्छवमापानि: ।
तत: परं रजसलोकेिश्रागिभासं मुद्द्र्क सचचासनवीनिषया ता प्रवर्तते
भावान, तस्तान्म ग्रामङ्ग सचच नयग्भावाविष्कोमेकात्‌ भ्रमामा-

* जडः पुस्तक हरि A पुकष्काराः परमवच न सलिीिन: ।
† वचेि F पुस्तकाराः।
‡ ग्रामवर्षाब्देनेति C पुकष्काराः। ग्रामवर्षाब्देन वरेिति
F पुकष्काराः।
§ ग्रामवर्षाब्देनेति C पुकष्काराः।
|| सम्मिरकासचर्मब्देनेति F पुकष्काराः।
¶ ग्रामवर्षापतिरिनुशत हरि E विक्रित पुकष्काराः।

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चावसेषवेन समाधिः साक्षित रत्नायते। न च चच्चारासतयो-रोगेऽ: भ्रमणी:, ब्रह्मचार्याकारकर्ममविषयेन विषयांवेदवते वैश्वदार:, वषणार्थोन्ये भ्रमकोष्ठपरिशालने प्रत्येकीने वेद क्षतानामक्षमवन्माति वाचिता। चावसेषवेन समाधिः चे जनपरितेषां परमात्माने दुर्दशैं न प्रभावते तेषां वेदान्तं वर्णार्ते न वेदान्तं वर्णार्ते चेतां वेदान्तं वर्णार्ते चेतां वेदान्तं वर्णार्ते। चे पर्याय स्वात्मा भावनायां प्रवर्तनेन नेतानिन्य विवेकात्मिनेत्रपनन्तिनिमित्तुपयथयातात। तत विकारं श्रमादाने भवन्तोऽप्तेऽस्मितोऽप्तेः प्रतिलामपरिणामेन प्रङ्गृतिलीने सन्तामाच्यभाति साऽसिता। श्रस्तिन्नेव समाध ये छतपरितेाषाः परमात्मानं परुषं न तेषां चेतसि खकारणे लयसुपगते ते प्रक्ष्णितथा रत्नायते। चे परं पुनः घाता भावनायां प्रवर्तते नेतानिन्य विवेकात्मिनेत्रपनन्तिनिमित्तुपयथयातात। तत विकारं श्रमादाने भवन्तोऽप्तेऽस्मितोऽप्तेः प्रतिलामपरिणामेन प्रङ्गृतिलीने सन्तामाच्यभाति साऽसिता। श्रस्तिन्नेव समाध ये छतपरितेाषाः परमात्मानं परुषं न तेषां चेतसि खकारणे लयसुपगते ते प्रक्ष्णितथा रत्नायते।

अर्थमभाषात्मानः।

विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासपूर्वकं संकारभेदोऽन्यः॥ १८॥

विरम्यतेनेनति 'विरमः' वितकादिशिनात्वागः। विरामश्चार्यमे

प्रत्ययेऽति 'विरामप्रत्ययः', तस्य 'अभ्यासः' पौन्तेन भेदिने

विनिवेशनं, तत्र या कारिन्त्र दुस्सिद्धरति तस्मां नेति नेतीति

नैरन्तर्यों पथार्थसम्म भावयोगविश्वासतस्माधिः। 'संख्यारोऽपेऽति,'

'अन्यः' तदर्शणः, अर्थमभाषाम् दशवं। न तत्र किंवदेशं सम्प्र

श्याते द्वारथस्मात्तो निर्विन्नः: समाधि:। उषिङ्ग च तस्मिन्तिनिविष्ठ

परिक्षः। युज्यानं, समाधिप्रार्थः। एकात्ता, निरोधश्च। तत्र

* संख्यारविशेषेष्योऽन्तः द्वितीय युज्यानं।
† तत्पूर्वेन: समाधातसमाधिचिन्तति द्वितीय युज्यानं परस्त्वं न समीचीनः।
‡ संख्यारविशेषेष्योऽन्तः द्वितीय युज्यानं।
§ समाधाविभेदोऽन्तः द्वितीय युज्यानं।
१ पादे दौर थरम्। १९

चिन्मुडे चिन्मुडी युद्धां। विचिन्नमिति: चतुर्दशकां वमाधिपया- रथः। एकायतातिनिज़् छ पर्यायानभली। प्रतिपरिणामश्च संख्यारा।।

तत्तथा युद्धाजिनिता: संख्यारा। वमाधिपया: संख्यारेणिः।

तद्नाशिकायताः। निराधारणितेरकायताः: संख्यारा: हस्तमः।

यथा: सुवर्णस्वरुपां भ्रात्मानं श्रीकमात्रां: सुवर्णस्वरुप

निर्देशित्ति, एवेराकायताजिनिताः संख्याराः निरोधाः: खात्रागस्व

निर्देशित्ति॥ ९८॥

तद्रेषु योगश्च खयमें: यज्ञपेणपायस्माभिधाय विशये:पार्थ

निदं हति, एवभेदायताजनिताः सः निदंदन्ति॥ ९८॥

भवप्रत्ययो विदेशप्रकृतिलिखितामनाम॥ १५॥

'विदेशः', 'प्रकृतिलिखितः', छ विदेशप्रकृतिलिखितामनाम व्यस्ताः।

तेवा: वमाधिः 'भवप्रत्ययः', भवः संवरः छ एव प्रत्ययः: कारण अस्त्र अस्त्र

स 'भवप्रत्ययः'। चम्बरः। यावर्धमानाः एव संवरः: ते तथा-

विधिमाधिपयाः भवसि। तेषा पत्रिचार्यगानां योगाभ्यासाः।

अतः परत्चार्यगानां तद्भवानायां सुवर्णिकासेन हन्तः॥ विधेय इत्येत-

द्यनुपदिष्टम॥ १५॥

तदन्येषां

* श्रीसवं खयमाकामाज्यिति F पुस्तकाध्यूः।
† खसर्वोधाकामाधिकर दृशि E, G पुस्तकाध्यूः।
‡ मन्त्रानु यज्ञ दृशि D, G पुस्तकाध्यूः।
सन्तानोऽनेत्रस्य समाधिलाभ इति रेसाम्। २०॥

विदेशमकानिष्ठानिष्ठेनिष्ठानि थेिनिनां, श्रद्धायुपर्वस्, श्रद्धायः
पुणे उपाय यथाभव श्रद्धायुपर्वस्। तेऽव श्रद्धायः ऋग- दुपायोपवमानान: सम्भाष्टस्थ यामधेशपार्वती प्रतिप- 
भावः। तथा सदद्धा यागविद्याधित्षात्तः योगिनां, अद्भादिपृष्वकः,
एव्वं उपाया यस्य स श्रद्धायुपर्वस्। तेऽव अद्भादिपृष्वकः
‘स्वतः’ श्रुनुख्तासम्प्रसेवः। ‘समाधि’ एकाप्ता। ‘श्रद्धा’ प्रवान- 
विवेकः। तथा श्रद्धावते वीर्ने जायते, यागविद्याधित्षात्तः
भावति। ब्राह्मचार्याः प्राणायामु प्रक्षु मृत्त्वं सतित्वजायते। तत-भाष- 
कात् चेतः समाधीपयात्। समाधिवर्धितान्त: भाय्यवस्त्र्विजानाति।
त एवं सम्भाष्टस्थायुषवेधपार्वः। तत्ताध्यायान्त प्राच येरामाहात- 
स्त्रमप्रसातः। ॥ २०॥

अकौंसायनां थेिनिनास्यप्रेवेदाम् भेजानाति।

तीव्रवागीणामामास्तः। ॥ २१॥

समाधिलाभ इतिभिषेषः। ‘थेिनि,’ थेिनिनिसाधयोपायनां, तेवर्म श्रीस्वव, ‘थेिनि,’ थेिनिनिमाजानोपायनां, तेवर्म यस्य इति
समाधिलाभस्य भवति, श्रीनेत्र नियमवभिद्धयते। ॥ २१॥

के तेऽव तीव्रवागाः द्रव्यत भाषु।

* समाधिलाभ इति C, F, G पुस्तकायांथेयेव यस्य
‘तीत्रसंवेगा इति’ इति पाठः। वच चुन्ने समाधि-
शास्त्र इति पाठस्त थोमायान: समाधिलाभ इति गृह इति
चतुर्वेदयापिस्सेव भवित्वस्य 
निष्ठित निष्क्रियते।

† तेवर्म समाधिभस्यति जाम इति D पुस्तकायांथेयेव
ऋदुमध्याधिमाचत्वात्‌ तत्पि विशेषः ॥ २२ ॥

तेभः उपायेभ्यः मुद्रादिभेदभिन्तेभ्य उपायवरतां ‘विशेष:’, भवति ।
‘मुद्राधिमाचार्यः’, शतपारंपरः। ते प्रत्येक मुद्राधिमाचार्यः मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः, मध्याधिमाचार्यः,
वासनाख्याः संस्काराः। तैः "wore? जिष्बपि कालेषु न due "परूषविषेषः wane पुरुषेभ्यो विशिष्यत दति विशेषः। शखर" देशनशीलः*, दष्छामाजेण सकलजगद्‌द्धरणक्षमः। यद्यपि सर्नवामात्मना क्तश्ादिस्पशा नास्ति तथापि चित्तगतकेशावुपदिश्चते। यथा योड़तूल जयपराजया स्वामिनः। प्रक्षा तु चित्विपि कालेवु तथार्थवधिरकर्ममंतः केशादिपरामणिन् नास्तीत् । विवशषण एव महानग- 

* दग्रानशील इति ^ पुस्तकपाठः परन्त्वयं ग समीचीनः।
† न च तयारिति C, F पृलक्षदयपाठः।
एवमीश्वरस्य सचरूपप्रमाणाभिधाय प्रभाववाय || २५ ॥

tस्थिति भगवति, वर्ण्यक्षः यत 'वीज' चतुर्विनिनागागतादिप्राय
पश्चातः* महत्स्व, मूर्तिविद्यामिभ वीजः, तत् 'तच', 'निरतिशयं'
कालः प्राथः। दूर्यति किं अवलम्बादीनां धर्मार्था भाविनामां
काश्चातः। चत्वा परमाणावलम्बनाकारः कर्मतीमहस्त्रोः
भगवतिः काष्ठां प्राप्न ।
नमस्ति य भगवान्माणाभिधाय परिश्रमानां विशेषाय वीजः, तत् 'वीज' 
काष्ठां प्राप्न ॥
श्राद्यानां कष्णां ब्रह्मादीनां गुरः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥ २५ ॥
$१९६$ wage यागद्धवै

जात्यायुर्भौगा:। श्रापक्षिपिया कालं हि तत्त ॥
वानान्न्या:। संक्षरः। तिः। 'श्रापरामस्वः' चिन्मण्डि कालः न संक्षरः।
'पुन्न्यविशेषः' न्योः। पुन्न्यवेठ्यो विशिष्टत दिति विशेषः। 'उपरः'
ईश्वरग्रीः। ईश्वरमात्ाः सकलसञ्जनद्वृध्वरणमः। यथैपि तर्केन-
मायानां कृष्णदिर्गृही नास्थि तथापि चिन्मंगस्वायुपदिष्ठते।
यथा चोर्गत्तैं जयपरत्वी मामिनः। चर्क तु चिन्मण्डि कालः
तथाविदेशः चिन्मण्डिरामांगे सामीतः। विशिष्टक एव भगवान:-
न्यायः। तस्खः तथाविदेशः विद्यार्थनादेः वचनेत्तिखः। वचनेत्तिख-
शाखः प्रश्चात्साधारादेः। न चानयोः। श्रापक्षिपिये तिरीतेताराममः,
परस्परपापातः। ते देश श्रापक्षिपिये ईश्वरस्य वर्त्त्वा चानाराधिकः।
तथाविदेशः स्वेच्छे चानाराधिणे विवेचनः। प्रश्चात्साधारादेः}
यथैसात्ते न एद्यकामणे सुखः
दुःखः विद्यार्थके विद्यार्थस्य नास्थि तथापि चानाराधिणे
शरीरेन प्रतिरहितः। तस्ख च वापाप्याभिव्याग्यमाये सत्यः। जीवनेशु
द। तयाविधेन सत्यानादिरेव सम्बन्धः। प्रतिपुरुषसंयोगमे
वियोगवेश्वररूपानुष्ठानमानुष्ठाने प्राणिनां सुखं
दुःखमेहतया विपरित्यात्। नेवमीश्वरः।
तस्ख भूल एव शाल्लिकः परिमाण जल्याहारानादिभिसम्बन्धेन भूलं
तया चत्वारिणः। चन्त: पुष्पान्वित्वमाध्यमः ॥ एवधः। अक्षामः
पुः: कृष्णदिर्गृहीः। जीवनेशुपुरुषायुपिन्तः। अक्ष: पुः: वर्त्त्वे
तथाविदेशः अक्षामानुष्ठानेण। न प्रेयरामानैतामवंतः। तै: तुख्यानो
भिप्रामायानात्। कार्येंद्रानानुष्ठाने। उक्षामानुष्ठाने च एव
कल्याद्यं: ॥ एव ईश्वरः। तचेति कार्येत्ता॑धि: न्युष्ठानः। ॥$२४$ ॥

* **ईश्वरानन्दोऽर्थत्व** A नुक्षान्या: परस्परं न सामीचीनः।
† **न च नियोगिरि C.**, पुःक्षामानैतामः।
एवमीश्वरसः सर्वप्रमाणभिधाय प्रमाणमात्।
तत्त्व निरतिशयं सर्वभवावन्तं॥ २५॥

तस्मः भवति, सर्वद्रव्यमेऽन्तः वीजः चतुर्मात्रात् आत्मात्वा विश्वात्। यद्यपि स्वात्मकः वीजः, तत तत् निरतिशयं कार्यः प्राप्तः।

तस्य भूतस्य अनात्मानं सर्वस्वहर्षर्कः बोधिता च। यथा पर्यायान्त्वकादाय च परस्यमहत्त्वः।

एव भागायोः विचित्रातेऽविक्रमानं परिकीर्तितमः। कार्यक्षिरसादुर्यात्स्यावस्य काष्ठां प्राप्तं।

तत्त्वा प्राप्तसःस्त्रानnt अत्यति आत्मान्तिज्ञानात्त्वेऽन्तः।

तस्य कारुणिकलाद्य तानुयह एव प्रयोजनं। कल्प-प्रलयमशाप्रलयेषु विश्वेत्तरत्वमात्रत्वमात्रात्त्वमात्रात्।

एवमीश्वरसः सर्वप्रमाणभिधाय प्रभावमात्।

स एव पूर्वेवापिं गुहः कालेनानवङ्कृद्दात।॥ २६॥

काणानां सत्त्वानां ब्रह्मादेवस्य, 'गुहः' उपदेश्या, चतः 'सः',

* चतुर्मात्रात्वात्त्वसाध्यवल्लभितम् B, C, D, E पुस्तकां पाठः।
† अन्तःप्रभावसाध्यायतितिः A, E पुस्तकाः।
‡ निरतिशयाद्वादश्यन्तीति D पुस्तकाः।
‘कलेन’, गावस्थित च ग्रामादित्वात्। तेवा पुरोङ्गाबिजावर्ता धीरेनां अवच्छेदः॥ २६ ॥

एवं प्रभावशुद्धा उपायमेकोपाय वाचकमाह।

तत्त्व वाचकः प्रश्नः॥ २७ ॥

द्वारा तहसुक्रस्य धीरेन्द्रस्य, ‘वाचकः’ भविष्याय।* प्रकरणं गूढः क्षणं अनेन नैति कृत्तिती या ‘प्रश्नं’ चोऽदारः। तथेतर्थ वाचवाचकार्यादित्तिः निन्दः। सहेतर्थ प्रकाशते, न हृ एविनेन निन्दः। च अतिकृतियो अविकर्ष्यानस्य सम्बन्धः। समस्याब्रह्मां नित्यतयैतर्थ एविनेन प्रकाशते॥ २७ ॥

उपायमाह।

तत्त्वप्रश्नप्रच्छेदयावनम्॥ २८ ॥

‘तत्’ साधृभिंमार्ग धीरेन्द्रस्य प्रश्नः, ‘जपः’ च अध्वूतिश्रवः, तदाध्वूत्तरसः

श्रवः ‘भावः’ पुनः पश्चिमतिथिः विविधेः, एकायुताय उपायः।

अतः समाधिब्रह्मारे चोरीनया प्रश्नः जपः, तदविश्वास्य भवनीयः।

इतियुक्तं भवति॥ २८ ॥

उपायमाह।: फलमाह।

तत्: प्राच्यक्षेत्रनाधिगोनेऽप्यत्तेत्रराथरायाभावः। ॥ २९ ॥

तस्मात् प्रश्नप्रवट्नात् तदविश्वास्य च चोरिः: प्राच्यक्षेत्रनाधिगे-

* वाचकेऽभविष्याय: प्रश्नम बोधते दत्त A, D पुक्तशब्दयापः।
† तदर्थे इति भवत्व भवनीय हि B, D पुस्तशब्दयापः।
‡ धीरेनार्गेऽप्यत्तेत्रराथरायाभाव हि A, C, D, F पुक्तशब्दशुचयापः।
९ पादे १० चरम्।

गम्,'" भवति। विषयपाठिकृतः खान्तःकर्णाभिमुखमध्यति,
या 'खेतना' दृष्टिसिद्धि,' ह्या 'प्रत्यक्षेतना', तथा 'श्रविका ह्यान,
भवति। 'कषारात्' वच्चरणाः, कतवां 'तन्मथा' श्रिक्रिमिक, भवति। ॥ ६॥

तथ के कषारातः॥ रत्नाश्रयाघामासः।

व्याधि-खान-संश्य-प्रमादालस्याविरिति-ञानिदर्शन-नालाभुमिकत्वानविशिष्टवानि बिषविशिष्टपल्लितारा-
याः। ॥ ३०॥

नभीते रजस्तमाबलात्। ब्रवर्तानामा: 'चित्तविशिष्ठा', 'भवति,
सैौ्रेकायविरोधिकृतां विशिष्टं दत्त्वः। तत् 'व्याधि' धातु-
वैविशिष्टिको व्यास्यः। 'खान्तः' ब्रह्मण्डः चिन्त्यन। उभिको-
चालमण्ड। बिषान्त 'संश्यः', चेप: खान्या वा न बेति।। 'प्रमादः:
अष्टुकाश्रुक्ति, समाधिवाधने चैतिष्टिवे यासः। चातुर्यः कायविष्ट-
थेगुलं, चेप: विशिष्टेऽप्रसर्याधिकारे हेतुः। 'श्रविति।' चिन्त्यन

* प्रविष्टि चेतनागम इति C, D पुस्तकचार्यपाठः।
† खान्तःकर्णाभिमुखमध्यति या दृष्टिसिद्धि B पुस्तकचार्यपाठः। खान्तः-
कर्णाभिमुखमध्यति या खेतना डृष्टिसिद्धि A, C पुस्तकचार्यपाठः।
खान्तःकर्णाभिमुखमध्यति प्रविष्टि चेतना दृष्टिसिद्धि A, C पुस्तकचार्यपाठः।
‡ ध्य तैस्ते तेनक्रराति इति C, E पुस्तकचार्यपाठः।
§ विषयकः चिन्त्यन इति A, C पुस्तकचार्यपाठः।
|| उभिको चालमण्डस्तिति C पुस्तकचार्यपाठः। परन्तुम न समाधिसाधने।
¶ चेप: साध्य: खान्या न बेति A, C पुस्तकचार्यपाठः।
विश्वविद्येयोगात्मका गद्धे ॥ "आन्तरिकतः" प्रति विद्वानो रज्जल-
बद्द्वतिः विप्रयोगाः । "स्थानध्यानमिकलं" कुर्सित्र्यो गुणित्यात्
स्माद्धितदेशस्मोत्तप्पाः । "स्थानविकालं" स्मावाज्जायामायिः
स्माद्धित्यो विचिन्त त्यावधात्ता । त-एते समाधेर्नकायाथ्
यथायोगं प्रतियक्षाणां 'स्थानारायणः', दत्तं उच्चते ॥ २० ॥

विष्णुविचारकारकान्यन्यनकायान् प्रतियक्षानां

दुःख-दौर्म्यान्यस्मिनयज्ञ-श्रास-प्रसादसा विश्वेषसम्

भवः ॥ २१ ॥

दुर्बिश्वेषाधिकारिकान्यन्यान् प्रतिपादयितृमाद |
तत् 'दुःखं' विचिन्त रागजं ॥ परिश्रमं: रागाधारणः: चन्द्रारात्
प्रासितान्यपापाताय प्रत्यक्षोऽण दौर्म्यं । 'दौर्म्यं' वार्ता
कारणे-न्याये दौर्म्यं । 'दौर्म्यस्य' श्रास्त्रात्मानः कारणे-न्याये
बाधकः । प्राणो दौर्म्यं वायुमाधात्त वा: 'श्रासः'** । यत्रीकः
वायुः निःखारयति ॥ रतिः श्रासः । त एते विचेषः ॥ च वर्तमाना

* विश्वविद्येयोगात्मका गद्धे दत्तं 'स्म्यन्यप्राघः: ।
† रज्जलबद्द्वतिः 'स्म्यन्यप्राघः: ।
‡ स्मावाज्जायामायिः 'स्म्यन्यप्राघः: ।
§ विचित्रतत्वपरितिः 'स्म्यन्यप्राघः: ।
|| चिन्ता 'स्म्यन्यप्राघः: ।
¶ 'वायुमाध्यान्यप्राघः: ।
** 'प्राणस्य वायुमाध्यान्यप्राघः: ।
|| 'विचित्रततिः 'स्म्यन्यप्राघः: ।
¶¶ 'विचित्रततिः 'स्म्यन्यप्राघः: ।
यथादिताग्यामभ्यास-वेराग्याभ्चां निरोद्धव्या इत्येषामुपदेशः ॥

तेषां विचेपाणां 'प्रतिवेधाथे' निबिधायः, 'एकायान् कस्मिन्-इत्यादिनम्, 'तत्वे', 'श्रव्यः', चेष्ट: पुन: पुनर्विनिवेशणं कुर्यात्।

तदद्वादृश्यविनिवेशणकायतायां प्रशासनपल्लितो विचेप: ॥ ३२ ॥

द्वादशी विचारकारणापादकपरिकर्धकथनपुरुषकपायामारसाखः।

मैत्री-कष्टा-सुदितोपेक्षायां सुखदुःखश्रव्याविधायां भावानातिक्षितप्रसाददनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

'मैत्री' चैत्यायाँ 'कष्टा' द्रष्‌। 'सुदिता' हर्षः। 'चपेचा' चौदावीयः। एता चालायं सुखितेषु, दुःखितेषु, पुण्यवत्‌, अष्टक्षमूः भावेत्।

तादाहि सुखितेषु वाचायं सुखितभिति मैत्री कुर्यात् लीलाः। दुःखितेषु कर्म नु हर्षायं दुःखितलकिविषयः श्रमिति कुर्यात् कुर्यात् न तात्त्वकः।

पुण्यवत्‌ पुण्यस्नानां श्रव्याविधिः विदेशः। अष्टक्षमू चौदावीयेत्‌ भावेत्‌ नागुमेदन न देवः। सुखुदमनिवेश्यासम्भवः प्रतिपादिता:। तदेवं मैत्रे चौदावीयः पुनः पुनः-पुनः भावानातिक्षितप्रसाददनम् ॥

* चित्रसंपादनां परविकर्धकथणाम्याविधानम् ॥
† परिकर्धकां प्रसादप्राप्तेऽन्य चित्र हति E, D पुस्तकापाद: ॥
‡ चित्रमिश्रिताः सतीति D पुस्तकापादः ॥
प्रक्षेध-विधारणार्थे वा प्रायश्चित्तः \( \text{२४} \)

'प्रक्षेधं' चतु प्रत्यक्ष वायोः प्रथमविध्विषांशमायमप्राप्तेऽनुपत्तिः। 'विधारणं' मात्राप्रमाणेव प्राणस्वरूपम्। स्मरतिविशेषः।

सब्ज तथा कार्यं प्रकारां, वाद्यस्याग्निर्गमनं, पूर्तित्वा वायुं वै जगते विरोधेन। तदेवं रेषकपूर्वककुम्भकभेदेन जिविधः प्राणायामः

समस्तकारिकानं च क्लिष्ट्यमेषरतायां गिबश्नाति । सव्वासामिद्धियत निधिप्राणायां खुखव्यपारे परस्परमेकयोगं

प्राणः समस्तेग्ियदन्तिनिराधारेश वित्तद्यैकारं भवति । समस्तदेषक्यकारिवं चास्यागमे श्रुयते, दष-व्रायस्वते । श्रता दोाषनिररणद्वारेणास्यैकारं सामथ्यं। \( \text{९४} \)

ददानीसंपायांतरदर्थनेपरुपेण सम्प्रज्ञातस्य समाधेः पवर्ग करोति।

* बिद्धेपसुत्पादयत इति A, D वस्त्रायांप्रति।
† पूर्वांशः करेतातीति B पुज्यअयापः।
विश्वयवती वा प्रद्धतितव्या स्थितिनिबन्धनी॥३५॥

मनसं हति वाक्ष्यशेषः। विश्वया गम्भर-रस-रूप-रूपाभि: ते
विध्वने पहलेन यथा: वा 'विश्वयवती', 'प्रद्धति:', मनस: सीधे
करोति। तथा इ नावाये चतुः धारयते विश्वयवतीबिद्वद्भायते।
तातुष्णेव जिन्दारे यथायतः। तात्ये रूपवसितः। जिन्दारे सर्वं-
धन्तः। जिन्दां वल्लिद्धवसितः। तत्रेव तत्तद्विद्वीयद्वारे तत्त्वं
वाक्ष्याद्विद्मेव विश्वयाय खाद्यमाना धन्तः विषयेकाव्यायां चेतु-
भवति, चतुः यः भाषण परिष्ठति योगिनः समाधायोपाध्याय।॥
॥ ३६॥

एवविनियोजियायानरमाणः

विशेकां वा ज्योतिषाति॥३७॥

प्रद्धतितव्या विषया स्थितिनिबन्धनीति वाक्ष्यशेषः। ज्योति: वाक्ष्य
चालिक: प्रकाश्च चतुः, व प्रकाशो भाषाद्विद्बिन्दुवांवः विद्वद्वे
यथा: वा 'ज्योतिषाति', प्रद्धति:। 'विशेकां' विन्द: चुखमयं-
बलभायज्ञानाः सोः रजःपरिणामः यथा: वा, केतु: स्थिति-
निबन्धनी। प्रयोगः: चुखद्वयुगमधः प्रशान्तनाशोहेनेऽदिरिष्यः
विषमचन्द्र सम्भायनः: प्राक्काताकः स्वर्णस्यपिनिरिष्ये केतु: केष्वर्यं-
भवति॥ ३६॥

उपास्यानरप्रद्धनद्वारे चुखमयासवात्त्व समाधेविषयं विषयं॥

वीतरागविषयं वा चिन्तं॥३७॥

मनसं: स्थितिनिबन्धनं भवतीति वाक्ष्यशेषः। 'वीतराग:'
परियज्ञिविषयज्ञिविषयः, तथा यत् ्'सिला,' परिषद्धकवर्त तदालम्बनीः, पिता: सिलिनेतृध्वन्ति || ३७ ||
एवविध्वसियायायाप्रमाणः।

स्मानिन्द्रा-श्रावलम्बनं वा || ३८ ||
प्रजाक्षितविषयज्ञिविषयः नागार्दः, पिता: भांकलम्बनः: \[\ldots\]
'सिला,' निद्रा-स्तुभज्ञिविषयः । तदालम्बनं स्तुभज्ञिविषयः, निद्रा-स्तुभज्ञिविषयः । 'श्रानु,' श्रावलम्बनः, पिता: सिलिनेतृध्वन्ति || ३८ ||

नागार्दःत्व ग्रान्ति यथ मही सिलिनेतृध्वनि योगिनः: सिला भवति । तथा यानेपापी भवतिः ।

यशाभिमत् प्राणीन तथा || ३९ ||
यशाभिमते वशस्त्री वानृ वशस्त्री दृष्टे, भावमाने साध्वतिः प्रतितिः ॥ ३९ \[\ldots\]
एवे परमादेशः प्रदर्शितः वायुविद्यायाप्रमाणः।

परमायु-परममत्स्य वशीकारः || ४० ||
परमायु-परममत्स्य वशीकारः योगिनः: स्तुभज्ञिविषयज्ञिविषयः ।
'वशीकार,' प्रतिचाराचारः, जायते, कशितः परमायु-परममत्स्य यथा विषयेऽत्तैः । एवं स्तुभज्ञिविषयज्ञिविषयः भावमाने न कशितः प्रतिचाराचारः जायते, कशितः प्रतिचाराचारः जायते, कशितः प्रतिचाराचारः ॥ ४० ||

* प्रयाधार्यायाप्रमाणः।
† स्तुभज्ञिविषयज्ञिविषयः।
१ पादें ४२ खमर्

द्विधरभिजातस्येव धारणे विहितेनां-भाष्ये
तस्मि-तद्भाष्यं विनिष्ठन्ति: || ४२ ||

छीशदत्तेरभिजातस्येव मणेत्त्यन्ति-ग्राद्यषु
तव््-तदश्ननतासमापत्तिः ॥ ४९१ ॥

चीणा टृनये ae सः (लीणटत्तिः', तस, "यदी दढ-यषण-ग्राहयषु'
श्रातो द्िय-विषयेषु, "तत्य-तदश्ननतासमापन्ति�', भवति । 'तत्यर्ति
तच्चैकायता | 'aga' तन्मयत्वं, sensed चित्ते विषयस्य भावय
मानदधवोत्कषः। तथाविधा समापत्ति� तद्रुपपरिणाम्ये भवतीतवधः।
हृष्टान्ताः। 'श्रभिजातस्ये रणेः', इति यथा श्रभिजातस्य" निष्ठ्यस्य,
खाटिकः;। तत्तद्रुपायवशाचन्त्रपरायन्तापत्तिः। एवं श्रभिजातस्य
निष्ठ्यस्य चित्त्यस्य भाष्यान्तिः तत्तद्धानीवर्तित्तूर्वविद्यानागान्त्रपरायन्तापत्तिः। चयापि
यशी-यषण-यासोबित्यूर्वनम्, तथापि भभिभाष्यान्तस्य यशी-यषण-
यासोबित्यूर्वनम् बेद्वस्य। चत: प्रथमं धारणिनित्त्य समाधिश्वतो
यशीनिहितास्तस्क्षितामाचारपूर्वे यशीनिहिते, केवलय पुरवशय यशी-तु-
भाष्यान्तित्सवनां। तत्यथ यशीनिहितास्तस्क्षितामाचारपूर्वे चित्त्य तत्य समापत्ति
भवति। एवं यथाय यशीनिहिते च समापत्ति बेद्वस्य || ४६ ||

ददानीसुक्राया एव समापत्तेश्वीत्यादि-मादि* ।

शब्दर्थ-श्राण-विकल्पः सङ्कीर्त्यो सविचित्तः || ४२ ||

श्रेणिबङ्कीत्यायाः: चोटेः वा "ब्रह्म"। चर्यः। जातिः।।
'श्राणं' वच्च्चापादानं मुहिद्वहत्तिः। 'विकल्पः' जातिः। तैः,'सङ्कीर्त्यो',

* चुभुविधिवाशिति C पुश्यापादः।
वसासेते ब्रह्माद्यक्ष्यः परसाराधारेण विकस्वप्पेशः प्रतिप्रकाशः,
गौरिश्रीमेतः, मौरियर्गः, मौरिश्रार्कः, त्वादेनाकारेण या
‘ब्रजिका’, समापनिनिरुपेते।॥ ४२ ॥

श्रृद्धेविनिर्वितः निर्बंधितां निर्वितकांमाह।

स्मृतिपरियुज्जी स्वरुपस्येवार्थार्थमपनिर्भरोता निसीधिकाः॥ ४३ ॥

वेदार्थसारितिशिष्याथि, प्रत्युदितिलामाप्याकारसतिमाहितियथा भागः
भूतानन्दकलेन ‘स्वरुपस्या द्वार’, ‘निर्बंधिकाः’, समापति:॥ ४४ ॥

भेदान्तरं प्रतिप्रकाशितमाह।

एतेऽव सविचारानिनिर्विचारा च स्वरुपविषया व्याख्याता॥ ४५ ॥

‘एतेऽव’ ब्रजिकां निर्बंधिकाः च समापत्या, ‘सविचारानिन्विचारा च व्याख्याता’
किंतु ‘स्वरुपविषया’ स्वरुपस्येकेक्ष्रिताः। विषयो चल्या तथोमः
एतेऽव पूर्वजः स्वरुपविषयं प्रतिप्रकाशतः भवति, वि सत्तेन भद्रार्थानामान श्रव्यार्थ-श्वान-विकस्वप्पितवेने
तद्रशिक्षितकलेन पुढः। देशकालाध्यक्षविषयः: स्वरुपाः प्रतिभाषति
चल्या च च ‘ब्रजिकाः’। देशकालाध्यक्षविषयां ध्विशांषमाचार्या

* समापतिस्वच्छत हृति E पुस्तकांपादः।
† चाराद्यक्ष्यायेनिति H पुस्तकांपादः।
‡ तत्तत्त्वानाद्यक्ष्यानिति F पुस्तकांपादः।
§ द्विद्यार्थ-विकस्वप्पितवेने द्विद्यार्थ-विकस्वप्पितवेनेनिति H पुस्तकांपादः।
विचार-निविचारोऽत्पत्ति: समाप्तचर्येन् "स्रव्यविख्यातम्", जयं। न कविकातृते न वा किंवदिष्किस्मति गमयमणीती् 'प्रकारः' प्रथां, नत्यादन्ते स्रव्यविख्यातम्। तथा हि गुणानेन परिभाषे कवारि पवार्थि, विशिष्टशिविष्ट, विक्रमर्त, निविष्टविष्टित। विशिष्टलिङ्गं भवानि। कृतिकोविष्टलिङ्गं नथाये कविलिङ्गिकारि। निर्माणं बुधः। प्रकारं प्रभाविनिति। भात: परं सवामगीयुक्तं भवनि।४५॥

एतायं समाप्तीयां प्रकटे प्रयोजनमात्।

ता एव समाधिः समाधिः। ४६॥

'ता एव' जक्क्रेण: समाप्नवः, यस बौद्ध भालशुनेन वर्तत् द्रात् 'समाधिः' समाधिः, समाधिः, द्रातुतः, समाधिः सां समाधिः। ४६॥

धष्टवायां समाप्तीयां निविचारशक्तिलारायाः निविचाराराः फलमा।

निविचारवेशारयें अध्यात्मप्रसादः। ४७॥

'निविचारश्च याक्षात्' 'वेशारयं' निविचारं। सन्तोंकों खूँस-
विषयामपेत्र निर्विशिष्टकृत: प्राधान्यं। तत्रांपि स्वाभविषयात् विशिष्टकृत:। तत्रांपि निर्विशिष्टप्रकृत्य विशिष्टकृत:। तत्रांपि निर्विशिष्टकृत:। प्रक्षेत्रम्भाध्याघातः 'वैद्याधि' नैसर्गिके वति, 'श्रव्याधि-प्रक्षेत्राः', विनं अन्वयवाच्यार्यतं विशिष्टप्रवाख्यातं अवति। एतदेव विनं वैद्याधि, वत्सित्तुः दादीः॥ ४७॥

तस्मिन वति किं भवतीतः।

छडातभर तथ प्रक्षेत्र॥ ४८॥

“छडत” तथं विभिन्न कदाचिदपि न विपर्यधिनेष्क्षायते, वा 'छडातभर', 'प्रक्षेत्र', तस्मिन वति, भवतीतः। तस्मात प्रक्षेत्रे वाकारं च च तथावतः पथानं योगी प्रक्षेत्रं योगं प्राप्तः॥ ४८॥

प्रक्षेत्र: प्रक्षेत्रानुि वैज्ञानिक:।

श्रुतानुमानप्रक्षेत्रभायामन्यविषया विशेषचर्यात्॥ ॥ ४५॥

'श्रुत' श्रागम्यां, 'श्रुतानुमानं' उक्षाक्षरं, तार्क्यं तथा जानते प्रक्षेत्रं सा सामान्यविषया। न च श्रव्यक्षिीयोरितित्रिधिविधिविषयविशेषप्रत्ययं शाम्यं। इत्य पुरानेविशाराध्यादेशसुपूर्वः। प्रक्षेत्र तार्क्यं विविधाः।

* प्रक्षेत्र अथप्रक्षेत्रात् B पुस्करपातः।
† प्रक्षेत्रप्रक्षेत्रादिति B पुस्करपातः।
‡ तस्याः प्रक्षेत्राय इरसदिति F पुस्करपातः।
§ श्रुतानुमानप्रक्षेत्राः सामान्यविषया इरश H पुस्करपातः। परन्तु न सामीचीनः।

॥ शिविशाराध्यादेशसुपूर्वः B, E पुस्करपातः।
विशेषविशेषज्ञानः। चस्त्रां दि प्रश्नां खड़ा-वजित-विशेषज्ञानामपि विशेषः खटूनैव श्चेष्ट प्रतिव्याख्याते। अतः चस्त्रां दि प्रश्नां चेगिना परः प्रयत्नः कर्त्तव्य दशुपदान्त्रः भवति॥ ४८॥
चस्त्रां: प्रश्नाकाः: फलमाहः।

तत्: संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी॥ ५०॥

तथा प्रश्ना जनितः च: "संस्कारः;" चछार्याय बुद्धाजानां दत्तांत्रिकां संस्कारानां प्रतिव्याख्यातः, खच्छार्यकर्षणामानां करो-नीतांपि। यथालक्षणपतिता तथा जनितः संस्कारा बलवत्तात् प्रततः-बुधप्रभासानां दत्तांत्रि संस्कारानां वानितं भक्तवती। अतःसेव प्रश्ना-सम्बन्धित्युत्तमः भवति॥ ५०॥

एवं सम्प्रक्षातन्त्रमाधिमाधिकायांगमान्तं कष्टमाह।

तत्थापि निरोधे सवर्णनिरोधाधिकारितः समाधिः॥

"तत्थापि" सम्प्रक्षातन्त्रापि, "निरोधे" प्रविष्टा, सति, "सवर्णाव" बिस्तारसीनां, खच्छार्य प्रविष्टादात् या संस्काराभासा हस्तिदेवते, तस्तां तत्त्वं नेति नेति हे तस्तं पश्चात् पश्चात् निरोधानां "निरोधाय: समाधिः", भाविभवति। बसिन्स सति पुरुषः: खच्छार्यातन्त्रः; प्रविष्टाय: भवति॥

तदचाधिङ्कस्य योगस्य लकणं, चिन्तारत्तिरूपः निरोधपदानाश्च या-
विस्तरेणोपायाम्‌

सहित्सवः

कर्मनां, महाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजादप्रमेयतः

भाषाप्रमाणोपायांतः

कालोपायात्

विस्तरेणोपायाः

कार्यानेकतः

एवं विवेकार्यायांतः

महाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजादप्रमेयतः

विस्तरेणोपायाः

कार्यानेकतः

एवं विवेकार्यायांतः

प्रथमः

भाषाप्रमाणोपायांतः

कालोपायाः

विस्तरेणोपायाः

कार्यानेकतः

एवं विवेकार्यायांतः

प्रथमः
तदेवं प्रथमे पादे समाहितचित्तस्य सोपायं योगमभिधाय
dयुत्थितचिन्नस्यापि कथसुपायायाप्रभेदिः योगः
बाधितासुपायातिति तत्काधानाग्नि प्रतिपादनाय क्रियायोगमाः

तपः-खाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः || १ ||

'तप:' ब्राह्मारोपितं कश्च चाक्रायमादि \ 'खाध्याय:'
प्रशंपूर्णाः मन्त्राणां जपः। 'द्विप्रणिधानान् कर्मक्रियाणां तस्मिन्
परम्परेते वलिपि प्रकरणां सम्बन्धे। एतानि क्रियायोग वातुच्छते। || ९ ||

समाधिभावनाय: ज्ञेष्टनूकरार्थयेश्वरम् || २ ||

'क्रिया:' कव्यामाः। तेषां 'तपूकरण' खकार्थकरणमार्थवभः।
'समाधि:' जालमधः। तस्म 'भावना' चेतिति पुनः पुनानिवेशं।
स: 'सन्त:' प्रथोलजं वशः व तथा:। एतदृशं भवति। एते तपः-
प्रधुपत्यायेश्वरमानासिकतानिवधारीन् लोपान् श्रिपिंडमाध्यः
समाधिपारकारतां भजने। तस्कार्त प्रथमत: क्रियायोगार्थाधानपरेष
धोगान्सा भवित्वस्िमुपाधिं। || २ ||

क्रियायोगार्थकरार्थवभं तत्के क्रिया वातुच्छत भाष।
अविद्या-राग-देषाभिनिवेशः पञ्च ॥ ३ ॥

‘अविद्या’ अविद्याभाष्यमार्गमानः पञ्च ॥ २ ॥

‘अविद्या’ मोहः, ज्ञातन्त्रात्माभिमान दृष्टि यावत्। या ‘ले’ प्रसवःतनु-विच्छिन्नोदाराणं। अविद्याकृति क्षत्युज्ञानमेवः प्राधान्यं प्रति पादयितुमाश। अविद्या घेवसुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्तादिमेरेन चतुर्विषमिः।

संस्कारलच्चणमिति त पुस्तकपाठः।

प्रसूत-तनु-विच्छिन्नोदाराणां प्रसुत-तनु-विच्छिन्नोदाराणां

संसारलक्षणं* गुणपरिणामं द्यन्ति ॥

सत्यपि अविद्यायाः प्राधान्यं प्रति पादयितुमाश।

अविद्याकृति क्षत्युज्ञानमेवः प्राधान्यं प्रति पादयितुमाश।

अविद्या घेवसुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्तादिमेरेन चतुर्विषमिः। अविद्या घेवसुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्तादिमेरेन चतुर्विषमिः।

* संस्कारलच्चणमिति B पुस्तकपाठः।
† संस्कारलच्चणमिति B पुस्तकपाठः।
† संस्कारलच्चणमिति B, C पुस्तकपाठः।
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F युस्किसमः।

† दिभाषानस्स्नात्मविवायायाभितिः B, C, E युस्किसमः।

§ अतिकृतानि प्रतिभास इति त युस्किसमः।
५. मो पावक्षले वारेकाहेचा वाहन पाहून सस्कारलच्छगामात ४ पुखूकपाठः |
† स्थितमेव मुलमविद्याया इति B पुस्तकपाठः |
† खेळाडकलसहजाय्यभेदेनेति B, C पुस्तकपाठः |
ग सखकार्थमारथ BAT: यथाग्यासवते हि यागिनः। ये केनचिद्‌ बलवता क्ले्ेनाभिग्डतशक्रयस्तष्ठन्ति। यथा देषावस्थां रागः, रागावस्थार्यां वा देषः। न ज्ञनोऽ: परस्यविवहुथोऽयुङ्गपत् यथागत रूपानि। ते 'खळारा:', ये प्रासवनकारिसविधयः सन बीं काथ्यम्-भिन्निकेश्यामिनि। यथा सर्वदेव थोऽपरिपिण्येन अवस्थान्नरायणां।

एवं प्रथेयं चतुर्धिकारायमिपि मूलभूतलेन खिताथ्यविधायविधिवेंन प्रतीयते। न हि कृषिदिपि कोषानां विपर्याध्यध्यनिरप्रेष्युपाराणां खङ्गुपुपष्मन्ते। तस्याभ्य सम्भवतात्मायामिविधायां समर्थक्षणेन निवर्तितां दशुऽवोजकध्यानां एवं न कालु प्रेरोस्ततिति अन्वितानिहिन्तलभविद्यास्वस्त्रेषौ निस्तीते। यथा: सर्वव्याध्यविधाय-देशबाजः। सर्वध्यायः कोषार्नां बिनविचिकारिलता थोऽगिना प्रथमस्ते ततःस्थे यथा: कर्तव्य होति || ४ ||

अनित्यास्तिथिनमाविधाया खङ्गमाघारः।

अनित्यामुि-दुःखानामसु नित्य-कुि-सुखाम-कालातिरविधाया || ५ ||

अतिस्कंप्तप्रभावतः: २ 'अविधाय', होति अनित्याया: सामान्यलक्षणः। तस्या एव भेददित्यपादः। 'अनित्यायु' घटाविधिः, नित्याभामानः।

* कृत्याध्यविधायाभिस्मिति B युङ्गकपाठः।
† विपर्याध्यध्याऺ्यविधायाभिस्मिति B, E। विपर्याध्यध्यायतिरप्रेरिस्मिति F युङ्गकपाठः।
† नित्याभामानविधिविधायाभिस्मिति B, C, E युङ्गकपाठः।
§ अविधायाभिस्मिति धति A युङ्गकपाठः।
हृदयं देवासन्नाः

सुखानुश्यौ रागः

धनुषानुश्ये देषः
दुःखं 'नन्दात्यकः सः “द ष्रलक्तणः अरभिनिवेश्य नैं। स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽपि तन्वनुबन्धोऽभिनिवेशः॥ ॥

पूर्वजनानुभागतसृजनुभववाणाबलादि॥ भयरूपः समुपजयमाँश; अरीरविषयादिभिम्म वियोगो माभूवित्यादिभ्रेष्टाः अर्थान निन्दातः तन्वनुबन्धः; सवोवाहमे््हापय्यैे निमिन्नं विना प्रवन्त॑माः श्रभिनि।

ते प्रतिप्रसवहेयः सूज्या: ॥ १० ॥

* प्रतिकूललच्छखमिति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
† अभिनिवेशमेखल विदुषोऽपि तन्वनुबन्धः ब्रह्माण्डः।
‡ अभिनिवेशमे््हापय्यैे निमिन्नं विना प्रवन्त॑माः श्रभिनि।
§ तथा क्ष्योविभिन्न असित C पुस्तकपाठः। अयमेव पाठा भाव्यकारेल छतः।
¶ पूर्वजनानुभागतसृजनुभववाणाबलादि H पुस्तकपाठः।
|| पूर्वजनानुभागतसृजनुभववाणाबलादि H पुस्तकपाठः।
†† अभिनिवेशमे््हापय्यैे निमिन्नं विना प्रवन्त॑माः श्रभिनि।
‡‡ प्रतिज्ञापायमाद्ेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
ते ‘ख़ायः’, केपः, चेत वायुवत्पेवायविता ग देशिरूपः परिशालमारसमो। ‘ते’, ‘प्रतिसमेश’ प्रतिवमपरिशालमेन, ‘हेयः’ तथावा। सखारणाख्याताया हताया स्वाभिन चिन्य यद्र प्रचिन्त भवति, तदा खुशीया निर्मूङ्यानां स्ववः॥९०॥

खुशानां हानापायमाः।

अनन्देयास्तदुलतः॥११॥

तेषां क्रमाणामारकार्यायां या: पुखुः:खोनाहासिकः।

‘हस्यः’, ता: ‘इन्द्रविसिंकापतासुशः, ‘हेयः’ स्तववः इतः।

पिनपरिक्षाध्यायानां वृक्षलातः तथां निर्देशसम्भवति, यथा वस्त्रादृशः चन: खृष्टः भवः प्राथाक्षामाशुचैव निवर्तते। यथा तद्र ख़ायः ग त्वेकद्याप्वेदाननप्रशस्तिनिर्विम्भिर्ना निवर्तितयां ब्रजाते॥ १२॥

वें क्रमानां तत्तमोविभाय कर्माघ्रान्याभिनाधाताहः।

ज्योश्मूः: कर्माघ्रायो दशावज्ञानावेदनायः॥१२॥

‘कर्माघ्रायः’, दयानेव तथा ख़ायः मन्नमितिः, यतो वायुवत्पेव कर्माशि। ‘ज्योश्मूः’, दयानेव कार्याभिनितस्ति, यत: कर्माण ख़ाय्या-प्रभानार्केन खोष्ट एव निख्यविन। ‘दशावज्ञानावेदनायः’,† दयानेव पशुसूः। अभिवेदि अश्व अनुभवविचः: ‘दशावज्ञानावेदनायः’॥

* खार्यदितिरुपमिति B, E पुखःपाठः।
† कर्माघ्रापरिभाषयस्यापेति ह पुखःपाठः।
‡ दशावज्ञानाय हिति B, E पुखःपाठः। कर्मांवेदनाय हिति C पुखःपाठः।
§ दशावज्ञानाय हिति E पुखःपाठः। कर्मांवेदनाय हिति C पुखःपाठः।
जातायुभागविद्वारः। ‘कस्ततुष्णन्यावेदनीयः’। तथाति कानिष्ठतः पुनःचानि
कक्षाणि देवताराधानार्थानि तीव्रविकेत्यथा ज्ञातानि दृश्यव ज्ञातानि वलं
जातायुभागविस्मरण प्रक्षण, यथा नन्दिनीर्सच भगवदबाहुराधानं
बलादिवैव ज्ञातानि ज्ञातायुभागविविद्या विज्ञानं प्रदुर्भिता।।
एवम्बे वीरस्वरूपो तथा विद्वानस्वरूपानि तपः: प्रभावात्यायष्टौ।
केशवक्षितानमेव, यथा तीव्रविेस्वरूपो विडयानां ज्ञातायुभागविपरिष्ठाँ,
ज्ञातायुभागविकानेन ज्ञातायुभागविपरिष्ठाँ।।
एव वहनसमस्वरूपेऽस विद्वानस्वरूपेऽस विद्वानस्वरूपेऽस
थायं ॥ १३ ॥

इनानि कर्कशयश्च समेद्विनि पापमाथः।

सति मूलं सतियादि जातायुभागविद्वारः। ॥ १३ ॥

‘मूलं ज्ञातायुभागविद्वारः।’ केशवेऽ तत्वनविभुतेऽदुः पञ्च, कष्ट्यानि
ज्ञातायुभागविद्वारः।’ ‘विपकः’ फलं, ‘जातायुभागविद्वारः’ भवन्ति।
‘जातिः’ भवन्ति।।
‘बोगा:’ विश्वासः श्रीरस्यमन्यः।।
‘भोगा:’ विश्वासः
देवताराधानं विषुद्धुक्ततिः, कर्मकारश्वाकाचार्यविश्वाचार्यपणाऽभोगं
भवानुष्ठाः। दृश्यै तात्त्विक चिन्त्यविषयः: कर्मकालम
रथायथा चतुर्धपार्थ तथा गुप्तराधानभावेः।।
जातायुभागविस्मरण यथाभावात्मकं लक्षणं ॥ १३ ॥

* जातायुभागविद्वारः। दति B, C, E पुस्करमातः।
† जातायुभागविद्वारः। दति B, E पुस्करमातः।
‡ जातायुभागविद्वारः। B, E पुस्करमातः।
§ जातायुभागविद्वारः। H पुस्करमातः।
दे उक्रानां कर्मांस्य जायांद्रियां सकारणकार्यावरेच कार्य-कर्मांमादः।

ते छादः-परितापफलाः पुण्यापुण्यशेतुत्वान्। ॥ ९४ ॥

'छादः' सुखं, 'परितापः' दुःखं, छाद-परितापी फले चेष्टा 'ते' तथोऽः। 'पुण्यं' खुश्यं कर्मी, तद्विपरीतं 'शुपुण्यं', तेन पुण्यपुण्य कार्ये चेष्टा तेषा भावसानात्। एततु मुः भवति, पुण्यक्षयार्थमा जायायुभृमाणा छादफलाः। शुपुण्यक्षयार्थमा: परितापफलाः॥ ९४ ॥

एतत् प्राणिमाजापेच्या हैविधं, चेष्टा श्रेष्ठ चेष्टा दुःखमिथ्यातः।

परिशास-ताप-संक्षारदुःखेपियिमन्नविलिभे किरे दुःखेष्येपियिमन्नविलिभे संक्षारदुःखेयेपियिमन्नविलिभे दुःखेपियिमन्नविलिभे। ॥ १५ ॥

परिशासन्नकोविरागविकृतिविनिवेदनं धारायुभिषेक्ष्ठयां विभूताश्चित्स्कारदं खुश्यायुभिषेक्ष्ठयां विभूताश्चित्स्कारदं। ॥ ४६ ॥

परिज्ञातक्षेत्रांसिद्धे परिदेवन्यां सकलेऽवो भोगार्थां सविषान्नवेति। यस्मादन्ताभिन्नात इति पुस्तकपाठः।
दुःखः। विषयाणासुपसुव्यमानानं विषयां गौद्यमिदुःखप्रति
जस्तः दुःखारिषार्यां लात् दुःखारिषार्यांलात्
डुःखप्रति ‘परिणामदुःखम्।’
पुस्तकपाठः १२, १४, १६ पुस्तकपाठः। तस्मात्
धीरुपा। निष्ठाणथोपामना तथाविधेयसु
श्रविद्यायाः।
भ्रमभ्रमविषयसंबंधविषयसंबंधविषयसंबंधविषयसंबंधविषयसंबंध
तत्प्रितिबन्धनं इति। तत्प्रितिबन्धनं इति ॥ २४॥
प्रकाश-क्रिया-स्थितिशीलं भूतेन्दियात्मकं भेागा-
पवर्गायीं हस्यं। १८ ॥

'प्रकाश :' विरच्छ धर्मः। 'क्रिया' प्रवतिति-रुपः। 'स्थिति: निधिमहोप: तमसः। ततः। प्रकाशक्रियाविषयः 'शिल्प' शामाभविकं श्रुपः, चचः काराविधं, दृष्टि खरपमशा निधिं। 'भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं', दृष्टि। 'हृदयथि' यूच्छुन्नागभेदेन प्रक्याविषयविधानं नगहमाधिमाधिः। १ ॥

'दशन्या: युद्धक्रिया-कषडकथानिः कारणमभेदेन जिविधानि । उभय मेतद्‌ ग्राद्य-यदणरूपं `श्रात्मा' खङूपाभिन्नः. परिणामः, यस्य ततः

* निम्नक्रियाविषयिति E, C, A पुस्तकपाठः। निम्नक्रियाविषयिति H पुस्तकपाठः।
† विन्दुसमितिति H पुस्तकपाठः।
तथाविधं, इत्यनेन भोगः कथितखंलणः। "श्रववमेः" विबेकस्यातिपृन्विका संसारमिषत्तिः। तौ भोगापवगे "तपणं, यस्य तत्‌ तथाविधं 'गाइ', इत्यथैः ॥ ९८ ॥

विशेषाविशेष-विलक्कमः चालिङ्कानि गुप्तपवर्भाषः॥ ॥ १८ ॥

'गुणानं', 'पर्वशिष्यी' विवेकविवेकवालाः, सात्त्विकं, द्विगुणविष्त्र अवति। तत् "विबेकः" महाभुतेनेकाराणि। "विबेकः" तनासानस्तः कर्षणे। "विलक्कमः" बुद्धि। "अविलक्कमः" अविलक्कम, द्विगुणं। वर्षच विगुणचर्चावथायुक्तिविलन प्राथमिक्षानाध्यायां वातभीतने वधाकारे चालारी पवर्भाय शिर्षः द्वितिः॥ १८ ॥

एवं इत्येवं दृश्यस्य प्रयमं श्रावयानात् तववर्त्तिष्ठस्य व्याख्यायां चोपां श्रावकारं चाकर्षणमाः ॥

क्रिया दशिमाचारः युक्तिपिप्रत्ययानुपायः॥ ॥ २० ॥

"क्रिया" युक्तः। "क्रियाकाचारः" चेतनामाणः। मात्रापदं धर्मि-धर्मिनिराख्य चेतनामाणो धर्मिनिराख्य । "क्रिया-"

* द्वितिः भवति ति, B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
† वक्माहेति C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ चेतनामाण इति E पुस्तकपाठः।
४२ विषयोपरि ज्ञानानि, तानि प्रतिसंकामाचचावेन, पश्चाति एततुम्म भवति। जातविषयोपरागायायेव जाति पञ्चधानामाचे वृहदमुद्रधुरलिङ्गमेव॥ २०॥

तद्ध्वयं हस्यस्वाभा। ॥ २१॥

‘रूपस्य’ प्रामुख्यायायाये, ‘धारा’ यत् खरूपं, व: ‘तद्ध्वयं’ तथा पुद्धेस्वभोगसम्पादने नां खरूपपरिभाषेय प्रथेयायायें। न वि प्रधानं प्रवर्तमानमात्रमः विकत्वित प्रथेयङ्गमेश्च विनस्ते, तिनु पुद्धेस्व भोगसम्पादनायें॥ २२॥

यथेऽव पुद्धेस्व भोगसम्पादनेव प्रथेयायायें, तदाः सम्पादिते तत्तिस्वतिस्वपरिभाषेय प्रित्वायायायाय खरूपं, तत्तिस्व परिभाषेय प्रामुख्यायायेव प्रवर्तते धर्मेऽव भूलसम्पादनं नास्वपि तद्ध्वयं एवेति।

तत्सिधि प्रति नद्ध्वयायायं तद्ध्वयस्वस्वाधारप्रसाधाराः॥ ॥ २३॥

यथापि विवेकाध्यात्मकायायाय भोगसम्पादनात्तमपि ‘तत्सिधि’, पुद्धेस्य ‘प्रति’, ‘तत्’, ‘नत्’ विरत्वायायाय, तत्यायि ‘रूपपुद्धेस्वाधार-’

* स तद्ध्वयं दर्शेति, B, E पुलास्वायायः।
† मेस्व सम्पाद्यायायामोति, G, H पुलास्वायायः।
‡ यद्रें श्रीपुद्धेस्व भूलसम्पाद्याय तदेव प्रसाधारिति, B, E पुलास्वायायः।
§ तदानिमिति, B, E पुलास्वायायः।
रम्भलात् प्रश्नान् प्रति 'अनन्दस्माप्ती भवतिष्रते'। भत: प्रधानस्य
कलमोक्ताधारणमात्राय न किलितापि विनायः, एकजुना वा
न स्वर्गसुखिरेष्टः इत्युक्तं भवति॥ २ ॥

युक्त-दृष्टारी वाक्यन्त्र संयोगम् वाक्यातुभाष्

स्म-स्वामिश्रत्वोऽऽहुः श्रुतपदलिपिहेतुः संयोगः॥२३॥

काय्यद रेणान्स्य सच्चान् करोति। 'श्रावनि:' दृश्यान् खभावः।
स्म-स्वामिश्रत्वोऽऽहुः। तथोऽथैव प्रथेश-वरेदकलेन अवज्ञातोऽथैव 'श्रुतपदलिपिः', तत्सः कारणम् च: 'संयोगः', व स
च वस्रिःभोग्य-भोगज्ञानाभूतं श्रवणपादित्यमग्नः। न च तथोऽथैव भोगज्ञानेऽपकपोक्यद्
श्रवणपादित्यमग्नः। कथित् संयोगः। यात्र भोगज्ञानेऽपकपोक्यद्
भोजक्षु भोजक्षु अनादिभिः। एव संयोगः॥ २ ॥

तत्सः कारणमहाः

तस्य हेतुरविषः॥ २४॥

या पूणेः विष्मा्यास्मिका भोजोऽऽहुः 'हविषः', वाक्यान्, सा
'तस्य' प्रविशेकस्यात्तिक्षु पदवी संयोगः, कारणम॥ २ ॥

हेतुं धान्यमियायांक्षिते किमुनास्तुदानिष्ठाः॥

* बनन्नमण्डायापायुस्मतिष्ठत धति अ युक्तमानः।
† न कााजिस्यपति ब, इ: युक्तमानः। न तज्जिस्यपति ओ युक्तमानः।
‡ धार इतुरविषयति ब, इ: युक्तमानः। तस्य हेतुरविषयति ओ युक्तमानः।
§ च वस्रिः द्वादशमानां युक्तमानः। वस्रिः द्वादशमानां युक्तमानः।
||संयोगमानिष्ठाः ब, इ: युक्तमानः।
तद्भावात् संयोगाभावाये राहुष तद्वरेण जैवित्यं ॥ २५ ॥

‘तसखा’ अविभाय: सख्तपरिवहन समग्र शान्तनार्यूपिताया:।
चोपे ‘श्रास्त’, तस्मि शति, तत्काव्रेख ‘संयोगाल्य’, श्री ‘श्रास्त’; तत ‘शान्त’ हुकुमाते। भयमर्य: घेतसं शूरविश्वेत्
परिवाधो पुनरपि जिम ज्ञातायं विपेकस्याता विपेकाद्वितिनिन्दिन:।
स्माओ: सख्तेव निर्णयं दति तसख सान्तं। यदेव च
संयोगाल्य हां ‘तस’, एव नित्यकेतस्यापि पुनर्भव चैवथ, चयप-
विस्तार्यते। तदेव संयोगानुस्पदतिः कारणं कार्याद्वितिनित्यं ॥ २६ ॥

भग्नानामयाय च विज्ञानकारणमादः।
विपेकश्चातीर्भवेऽद्विनामनार्य च सानायाम ॥ २१ ॥

पञ्च गुणाः पञ्च: । पुङ्ख द्वेषविचेत् ‘विपेकश्च,’ ‘शान्ति’
विकार, या ‘शान्त’ द्रृष्टिपरिवाध, ‘उपाय’ । कोद्वधी
‘भविषय’ न विधिते विधयो विबेकेऽरुपानार्यालर्य:। कुलाच्छेदः
शान्त: या ‘शान्तिः’।

दक्षा तत्परं। प्रतिसंबाधनात्मात् अविभायाभिनेव विनिष

* अविभायनिष्ठ सति B, G पुस्तकपाठः।
† तिथिः चैत्यकालः H पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ तदेव संयोगस्य परिवाधिः B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ दुःखात् शान्तिपरिवाधिः B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
|| ध्रुवाभिनिष्ठे E पुस्तकपाठः।
तत्त्वज्ञान-कर्तवाच्यमिलापाः। रजस्मातः प्राप्तसम्भवताः सुभोगता यथा विषायांशालिनः या विज्ञानानितिरितुष्टेः। तथायथ बनातबविद्वाें हृदयसः प्राप्तसावः हृदयमार्गाणिमानिधित्वीभवलेव कैवः॥

उत्पादुतिदेवतेः। पुष्पसः वाहुः प्रसा भविष्यति, तां कथयन्। विज्ञानानिदेवतेः खरुपप्रांन।

तस्य सन्दर्भा ग्राहामृम्मव प्रसा॥ २७॥

"तस्य" उत्तम विवेकार्णस्य, भात्तविवेकस्य प्रसा, 'प्रसा', 'ग्राहामृम्मवः' सुकलस्तायात्मनसमयानिश्चरितोपदेः, शप्तप्रकाराः भविष्यति।

तत्र कार्यस्तुविद्या वस्तुप्रकारः। शानतम यथा यथवः। ज शानते विशिष्टदिकः। बहुः से कृता, न ने विशिष्टे चेतवायः।

विषाधिनं धम्मं धम्मवां प्रसा मया विज्ञानाति:। इत्यमयथानमरपरिष्ठे। तस्यावसायामीधुर्येव प्रसा जाते:। एव्वी प्रसा कार्यस्तुविद्या विशिष्टम शानां कार्यस्तुविद्या विज्ञाते।

प्रस्ताविष्ठुविद्या। वारितायाः से बुधः। गुणाय ज्ञानाधिकारः। गिरिविखररनिष्ठिता वव धावायो न पुनः विति प्रायस्ये। खानिरार्येष प्रवचारसिद्धान्नेत्रामान्त्यामिनीयां कुत: प्ररोचः। खानीहरुर्य से बमाधि:। तथान वति सरकारतिस्तोषिन्तिति। एव्वी स्त्रिप्रकाराः प्रस्ताविष्ठुविद्या।

* समतलेन प्रदत्तायानिधित्वति H, C पुष्पकलापः।
† उद्दयविवेकाश्चातेरितिति C, E पुष्पकलापः।
नवेसमीर्ग्यां वसतिविधायां प्रान्नभूतिस्मार्गाधारः सुप्रभाताः पुद्भ: 
प्रेतखल द्यतुष्टे ॥ २७ ॥

विषेकख्याति: योगङ्गामे श्येतुरित्युमः ॥ तत्रासः तत्त्वसं भिन 

निमित्तिकर्य भाच ।

योगङ्गानुवादादसुधिर्ये श्याद्तीमिराविभेक- 
ख्याते: ॥ २८ ॥

'योगङ्गानि कल्लमायानि। तेषा 'वन्ददानात' श्यानप्रधावर- 
भ्यात्, 'श्राविभेकख्याते', 'श्राविख्रिवथे' चिन्तकलखः प्रकाशाव- 
रण्णलक्ष्मेशस्तुप्राशिविन्दुः' या 'श्याद्तीमः' तारतम्येन चालिकः 
परिषामः, विभेकख्यातिपथ्यकः ॥ तस्य ख्यातेश्चतुरित्युमः ॥

योगङ्गानुवादादसुधिर्ये द्यिकः, कानि पुनःश्री योगङ्गान- 
मीति तेषा जिमश्माह ।

यम-नियमासन-प्रात्यायाम-प्रत्याधार-धारामा-ध्यान- 
समाधयोऽस्तावय्यानि ॥ २९ ॥

इह कानिष्ठिमानि: सादापुरकविस्तारार्श्यानि 'तथा 
धर्मशाद्तीमः' कानिष्ठ त्व त्रतिप्रमुखमिश्रितिस्मादिवितकम्युपालनः 

* हस्तांभवन्तिनि ब, E पुस्तकपाठः।
† सोग्नास्वाधिस्य दति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ विभेकख्यातिपूर्वकः दति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ न्तरशङ्करान्तिनि B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
ममाधिपक्षेऽभिन्नतः यथा 'यम-नियमादयः। तत्राधिपक्षाग्नातिसरो- 
परस्परकारकम् यथा महानवनजे प्रशासनकृतेऽ। एवमुनर- 
चापि श्रीवर्धनः॥ २५॥

क्रमेण एवं अद्वैपमाः।

श्रीविष्णु-सत्यास्तेव-ब्रह्मचर्यप्रतिग्रहः यमः॥ ३०॥

तत्र प्रारम्भिणयोग्योजनवाच: ब्रह्मः। या ये यमान्येऽहः।

tदभावः 'श्रीविष्णु'। ब्रह्माया: श्रीविष्णुः ग्रहोऽहः परिहया ययाति 
तदावकः परिहयाति:। तदभावः 'श्रीविष्णु'। ब्रह्मचर्यमः।
‘अर्थः' भोगवाहनान्योक्तिकारणः। त एते॥ श्रीविष्णुदायः पशु 
‘यमान्यः' बोगाधानान्योक्तिकारणः। त एते॥ ३०॥

एवं विशेषमाः।

एते जाति-देश-काल-समयानवबिंशः। सार्वभौ- 
ममचारतः॥ ३१॥

‘जाति:' त्रांषालादिः। 'देश:' तारादिः। 'काल:' चतुर्दशादिः।

* न्यायमिति स पुस्तकपाठः।
† सर्वप्रारंभेऽवेति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ वास्तवतयायांवेति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ अयति C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
∥ तत्र ते अर्थाद्वाद्वादि इत्यति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
¶ एते इति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
योगांगानुष्ठानादशुहिष्ये क्रान्तिप्रवेक-ख्यातेः ॥ २७ ॥

विषेकस्यातिः संयोगाभावे रेतुरि्युक्ं । तस्यास्दरत्पत्तो किं मिमित्यत | तथाः ख्यातेः ॥ रट ॥

योगांगानि कच्यमाणानि । तेषां ‘श्रष्टद्धित्वे’ शान्तपृव्वेकाद-भासात्, ‘श्रष्टद्धित्वे’ विनासलोक प्रकाशव-रणवषयन्तिहिंदुक्विचारिः, त्या ‘शान्तदीर्घ’ तारतमेन शालिकः परिशामः, विवेकख्यातिपर्यण्मः ॥ तथाः खातेः ठूलेहरित्वर्दः: ॥ ॥ २८ ॥

योगांगानुष्ठानादशुहिष्ये क्रान्तिप्रवेक-ख्यातेः ॥ २८ ॥

यम-नियमासन-प्राकायाम-क्रयाडार-धारकश्च-धानो-समाधयो-प्रकाशवकारिः ॥ २८ ॥

म भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे भाषायकारकारकाराशक्तिं यथा ‘धारणदीर्घ’ कानिकित्वमाधिगे ।

* एकुं भवतीति B, E पुस्तकपादः ।
† क्रीयारूपिकार इति B, E पुस्तकपादः ।
‡ विवेकख्यातिपुरुषः इति B, C, E पुस्तकपादः ।
§ अन्तर स्वातन्त्र भवतीति B, C, E पुस्तकपादः ।
र्यम-नियमादयः। तजासनादौनामुरो। एवसुर-चापि चार्जुः॥ २८॥
क्षणं एवं ख्यातपाठः।

शहिसा-सत्यास्तेय-ब्रह्मचर्यापरिवर्त्तमात्त्वा यमः॥ ३०॥
तच्च्च्च्रब्बविंशेन्मोक्तानवारोत्तरा प्रिया। स च चर्नानवज्जेत:।
तद्भवः। 'शहिसा'। प्रिया: शब्दसाधववार्थ परिश्रमायथ प्रयमं
तद्भवतुपपाया शहिसा निःश्चेष्ट:। 'शदी' वाङ्ककणार्थमायथमेन:।

कों च परमात्माण्या:। तद्भवः। 'सर्वत्र'। 'शहिसा'। चक्षुःस्वंमः।

'शहिसा'। भोगवध्वनामामकृत्तिकहरणं। त एते॥ शहिसादय:। पव
'चमचावाचा:। बोगाङ्कके निहितसः॥ ३०॥

एवाँ विनेतपाठः।

एतेऽधातु-श्रेष्ठ-काल-समयानवाच्छिद्या: सायमेक-ममवहारतम्॥ ३१॥

'धातु:' श्राणवादिः। 'श्रेष्ठ:' नीमादिः। 'काल:' बदुःवादिः।

* व्याकरणतिः C पुस्करपाठः।
† सर्वप्रज्ञारेष्वेति B, C, E पुस्करपाठः।
‡ वाङ्ककणार्थमायथमांविनिति B, E पुस्करपाठः।
§ अश्वन्धर हति C, E पुस्करपाठः।
|| तत्स्व शान्तिवर्तमात्त्व हति B, E पुस्करपाठः।
¶ तत्स्व विनिति एव B, E पुस्करपाठः।
"समयः' ब्राह्मणप्रयोजनादिः। एतेशखचत॒भिः "

अरहिंसादया यमाः चिक्लश्छमिषु भवाः 'aqui'

TUS | तङ्‌ यथा ब्राह्मण ग हनिब्धामि, तीयं कंचन न दनिन्धामि,

wget ग ₹निव्यामि, देव-त्राह्मणा्ययव्यतिरेकेश* न इनिव्ामी-

वयेवंचत विधावच्छेदव्यतिरे केण कञ्चित्‌ कचित्‌ कदाचित्‌ कस्मिंखिदप्षयं

नि हनिव्यामीव्यनवच्छिन्नाः। एवं वत्तादिरु यथायां चोजः 

दत्थमनियतीग्डताः सामान्येभेव प्राः महात्रतमिन्युच्थते, न पनः

परिक्षाराधाराः॥ ३९॥

नियमादेः।

शैष-सन्तोष-तपः-स्वाध्ययेयेर्मांनिधानानि निय- 

माः॥ ३२॥

‘शैष', द्विविध वास्मानारस्य। वास्त्र महेषादिरिः: कायारि-

पिंवाः। ब्राह्मण महेषादिभिष्टिसंसतामाः प्रियाः। 'सन्तोष:'

तृति। शेषः प्रागेव जनायाख्याः॥। एते शैषादयः ‘निम्बायन- 

वाच्यः॥ ३ ३॥

कथलेष्वा योगानिश्चलतम भाष। 

* देशराज्यायोजनाधतिरिदेश जम्पीति B, C, E पुलकाराठः।
† दशमनियरीस्तवा हि H पुस्तकाठः।
‡ न पुनः परमायाख्यादिसाधर्मिति A पुस्तकाठः।
§ नियमानाहेति A पुस्तकाठः।
|| प्रागेव खास्तावा हि B, C, E पुलकाराठः। भूतवब्यास्याना हि H पुस्तकाठः।

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न पादे ८८ उसम्।

वितक्काऐशे प्रतिपक्षभावनं ॥ ३३ ॥

वितक्कीत्र देति ‘वितकाः’ योगपरिपिन्तेन हिंसादयः। तेषां
‘प्रतिपक्षभावने भविः, तदा बाधा भवति,’ तदा योगः सुकारो
भवतीति भवयोव धमनियमानो योगाम्बुवः॥ १ ३ ॥

ददाति वितक्कां खरूपं भेसे प्रकारं कारणं फलेन्द्रक्षमेनाधूः।

वितका हिंसादयः शत-कारिताखुलेदिता लोभ-
क्रोध-भोजपूर्वकः हदु-मध्याध्यमाचा दुःखानान-
नतफलं देति प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

एते पूनेतः ‘हिंसादयः’, प्रथमं जिद्धा भिषणे ‘शत-
कारिताखुलेदितं’ भेदेन। तच स्वाध्य निष्पादितं: ‘शताः’। कुष
कूण्डिति प्रयोजक्यापिरूसः सबुत्पादितं: ‘कारिताः’। यदनेन
क्षिप्यमाणा: शाशु वाधिक्यक्ष्तता: ‘चनुसेरितं’। एततं वैविध्यः
पर्सरस्यामोक्षिन्याभास्यायेन। अन्वया मनदमित्रेवं मनोते
न मया स्वाध्य हिंसा क्षतिति नाशके से देष देति। एततं कारण-
प्रतिपदनयाच्छ, ‘लोभ-कारिता-भोजपूर्वकः’, देति। चदयपि लोभ:
कारित: प्रथमं निर्मितः॥ तथापि वस्तिकृतान्ता लोभानानानन्यायकाः-

* यदि बाधा भवतीति E, A, D, F मुख्यायाः। यथा बाधा भवतीति
  C मुख्यायाः।
† साधविव्यङ्गीसितं देति A मुख्यायाः।
‡ भोजनरिवास्ये।चक्त देति B, E मुख्यायाः।
§ लोभ: प्रथमं निर्मितः॥ देति C मुख्यायाः।
भिमानलक्षणस्य निदानलात्‌ तार्किक च बनि स्पर्शविभागपूर्वकेलने
खूब-कोषाधारिणामुझ्वात्‌ मूलमवसेयं। मौर्यपुर्विका यथा
देशजातिनिरितियः। ‘लेखः’ टृष्णा। ‘कोशः’ ज्यामितिवीरने-
कृत्वा: प्रख्यातनामवृक्षाखतध्याकम्। प्रयोकं हतादिनेवने चिरकारा
श्रुति सिंहास्ये मोहादिकारणेन जिहा भियले। तेषामेव पुनः
स्वस्थानेन चैविचमाच्‍छुटु-मध्याधिमाछाच्। ‘छटुः’ मन्दा ग
तीर्था: नार्य मधिमा:। ‘मधिमा:’ ग मन्दा नार्य तीर्था:। ‘ब्रह्माचाच्।
तीर्था:। ग मधिमा नार्य मन्दा:। दत्त गव भेदाः। दत्त
वैविकेश वलि सत्तविनंतिनेवति। छुटुमधिमाणिः प्रयोकं छुटु-
मध्याधिमाणेन चैविचमासः। चेत्त्व यथायोगं। खत्त्री
विडुङ्कनां मानि मन्दाः। मन्दाः। तीत्राः। मध्याः। ग मध्याः मन्दाः। मध्याः। इति
दत्तः। उत्ताधिमाचाः। उत्ताधिमाचाः। तत्‌ चेत्त्व यथायोगं। खत्त्री
श्रमणानन्तफलाः। इति। ‘अर्ज्जुन’ प्रतिकूलतयावभासमाने राजसन्तितिधियः।
‘ब्रजाचाः’ मय्यास्यां स्थायविवेशप्याः। ते दुःखाने ‘अर्ज्जुन’
अपरिवङ्गः। ‘पलेः’ वेष्यं ते तथोः। इत्यं तेषा
श्रुतार्काकरणादिविनें चैविचमां त्रिपंक्षोरचात्मकायं चोगिनां परिक्रमा
तत्त्वं इत्यथापिन्ते भवति ॥ ४ ॥
एषाभ्यासात्‌ प्रक्षे गच्छतामन्‌ निष्यादिन्यः सिद्धयो चथा
भवन्ति, तथा क्रमेण प्रतिपादित्यमात्राः।
शहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां तत्सन्निधो वैरत्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

'वैरत्यागः' निम॑त्सरतयावस्ानं भवति । हिंसारता रिं खल्व परित्यजन्तीत्ययैः ॥ ३ ५॥

सत्याग्यासवतः फलमाप्नाति।

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयत्वम्‌ ॥ ३६ ||

क्रियमाणा क्रियाः यागादिकाः, "फलं" खगादिकं, प्रयच्छन्ति ।

तस्य त॒ सत्याभ्याखषवता योगिनः तया श्कता-यामपि योगी फलमाप्नाति।

श्रस्तेयाग्यासवतः फलमा।

श्रस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सव्वेरल्नापस्थानम्‌ ॥ ३७ ॥

'शशे, यद्‌ाऽग्यसति यागी तदा तस्य प्रकरणोत्म निरिलास्यापि 'सव्वतेदिगभ्यः £ £रन्नान्युपतिषठन्ते ॥ ३७ ॥

ब्रह्मचयप्रतिष्ठायां वोयलाभः ॥ ३८ ॥
भीमारणवर्धन निदानलाभः तत्त्वात् तर्क निदानविभागपूर्वकः हि भाष-नीपाधारीनामलेखात् मूललमवेशं ि साहसीङ्का यथा देशानातिरिक्तः। 'बेमः' देशः। 'काधः' काधाविवेकोऽथुः: प्रस्तुल्नादकस्वरूपः। प्र्योकणः कनादिभेदेन विषपरायणः धर्म विनाशायो नैवाशाधिकारशालेन निधशा भिननने। तेवासेव पुनः-मलस्थेतन वैविधमाण 'मदु-मध्याधिमाणा।' 'मदुः' मन्द्रा न मत्रा: नापि मध्यमा। 'मध्यमा।' त न मन्द्रा: नापि मन्द्रा। 'बधिभावा।' मत्रा:। न मध्या नापि मन्द्रा।' दति नव भेदाः। 'दवः' वैविधः धर्म निदानविभागम्बिति। क्षडादीनामेति प्रयोकणः क्षडु- मध्याधिमाणभ्रेढात् वैविधः स्वरूपः। तनु यथायोगं श्रेयः। तद्व दवः क्षडुः- क्षडुः मध्या मन्द्रा नापि मदुः। प्रयोकणः क्षडु- नापि मध्यमाणानं प्रतिपक्ताय योगिन्ना परिवर्तः। इतिन्तः तेषां फलमा 'दुःखा-पद्माग्निशालाः,' दति। 'दुःखा' प्रतिकृतिः नापि मध्यमाणानं राजस- ध्वित्तथाः।। 'श्रावणं' तिथिः श्रावणं ज्ञातविधियोऽवर्त्ताः। ते दुःखा- श्रावणे 'श्रावणं' धणरिक्षिः,' पद्मा,' श्रेयः ते तथ्योऽर्थम्। इत्यथा तेषां श्रावण-कारणामिति श्रावणा प्रति- पत्तः कर्मः इतुपित्रित्य भर्गः। ॥ २४ ॥

एषामभ्यासात् प्रक्षं गच्छतामन् निष्पादिन्यः सिद्धं तथा विशेष प्रतिपादितयुमात्।

* समुद्धवार्तित B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
† दबें नव भेदा दति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ संस्कृतविपय्यवश्यप्रमिति G पुस्तकपाठः।
§ भाषारितिमेति H पुस्तकपाठः।
अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां तत्सत्निधो वेरत्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

निमंककुरत्यावेश्नानं भवति । दिखारतां दिखलेन
परित्यागजनीययद: ॥ ३ ।
सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयतम्‌ ॥ ३६ ॥
क्रियमाणा फलात्‌ क्रियाः" गादिकाः, ख गादिकं, प्रयच्छन्ति |
तस्य तु सत्याग्यासवता योगिनः तया सत्थं या, यथा श्रस्त्र-|
यामपि क्रियार्यां योगौ फलमाभ्नाति । तदचनाद्‌ कस्यचित्‌
क्रियामातुव्वताऽपि क्रियाफलं भवतीत्ययः ॥ ३ ॥
श्रस्तेयाभ्यासवतः फलमाः |
श्रस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सव्वेरनापस्थानम्‌ ॥ ३७ ॥
‘सव्वतेयाभ्यसति योगी तदा तस्य प्रक्रियात्
निरिलास्यापि 'श्रव्वतेयाभ्यसि्” छ ‘रम्भानुपपितचने॥ ३७ ॥
ब्रह्मच्याभ्यासस्यापि फलमा |
ब्रह्मचय्प्रतिष्ठायां वोलाभः ॥ ४ ॥
* सूचि, अदिंसाप्रतिष्ायाभितिपाढः ७ नास्ति |
† दत्तौ, शब्दाधिवितिपाढः ७ युक्तके नासिकः
‡ गुलकार्यविनािति B, C, E युक्तकपाठ।
§ सूचि, दिखारतां दिखलेनीययद: ॥ युक्तकपाठ।
धः किल 'गै', 'स्वयं', तस्य 'तितिभवति। वीर्यनिरोधैनिः तस्य ग्राह्याये तितिभवति। वीर्यनिरोधैनिः तस्य 'गै', 'स्वयं', तितिभवति।

अधरिष्यस्तिनैः जन्मव्ययस्मोऽनः || ३८ ||

कथामिद्यस्तृत्वः 'कथन्ता। जननः कथन्ता 'जन्मव्ययस्मोऽनः।

तत्सा: 'स्मोऽद्वियं' सम्यग्जः। अज्ञातं केवलमासं कीर्तिः। विकारकारीः जिस्मायाः कथमेव सम्यग्जः।

न केवलं भोगविध्यपरिवर्तव्य एव परिवर्तवः। किंतु यथावचारः।

प्रशन्तिनिरोगेऽपि परिवर्तः भोगविध्यपरिवर्तव्य एव।

तत्सा: 'रागानुवृत्ति: वहिष्ट्वाखायामः प्रवत्तिः न तात्त्विक्षान्वानुमृचः।

यदा युनः प्रशन्तिनिरोगेऽपि परिवर्तः भोगविध्यपरिवर्तव्य एव।

उक्ता यथामानः सिद्धः। ब्रज नियमानाहः।

श्रीचात् स्वाज्जुग्स्या पररस्सरसः || ४० ||

'श्रीचात् भावम्वति, तस्य 'स्वाज्ञुग्स्या पररस्सरसः ब्रजामिरेव 'अजुपसा' वृणा, सम्यराजाते। प्रत्यक्षार्थं कायः नाजाहंः कर्तव्यं द्युमुनेत्र हेतुं यथा एवः। एवः 'प्रेमः कायविष्यः। 'प्रशंसकः' सम्यः।

* रामाश्रयस्मातितः || पुस्करपः।
† सम्य सकृतः हति || पुस्करपः।
भावः संसगीपरिवश्णनमिल्यथैः। यः किल खमेव कायं अगण्एते तन्तदवद्यदशरेनात्‌ स कथं परकीयैस्तयाग्छतेः कायं संसर्गमनुभवति ॥ ४ ° ॥

विषयजयादात्मदशेनयाग्यतेति ॥ ४९ ॥

सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः ॥ ब्रह्मलोकस्थितिः नवमीति पुस्तकपाठः।
यः किंच ‘भ्रान्त्य’, भ्रमयति, तस्य तत्प्रकर्षानिर्तिविषय ‘वैसीं’ 
सामायं भ्रान्त्यं प्रदिव्यवतं। वैश्यं निरावशो हि भ्रान्त्यं तस्य प्राकर्षांसा 
रीरेद्धियमं:। वैश्यं प्रकर्षांग्रृहतं॥ ३८॥

अपरियांहेंयां जन्मकथनायान्वितं रीरेद्धियमं:॥ ३७॥

कथमियांत्व भान्तं: ‘कथनं’। जन्मन: कथनं ‘जन्मकथनं’।
तस्य: ‘सम्बोधं’ सम्गः। जन्मानेये कौशमांकं कोः:। तिं 
कार्यारीति निन्दायाप्यथे विभेद सम्गाणानात्यांथः।।

न केवलं भोगाधानपरियह एव परियह। किन्तु धार्माकध: 
श्रीपरियांसत्य: परियह: भोगाधानालयीकरूं। तस्मान्वति 
रागानुसारूं वस्तुं निष्कायायुक्तेऽप्रवेशी न तालिकायनमपुभाव।।
यद्य: पुन: श्रीरादिपरियांपितेष्वेः माध्यमवस्त्रवहते तदा मध्
खला रागानुसारूंक्तमा यमानां भोगाधानालयी युक्ते। पृतिपरार्थतिरिमोऽः॥

उक्रे यमानां सिद्धं। श्रथ नियमानाः।

श्रीचातृ स्थानां घुष्या परैरसांसरं।॥ ४०॥

य: ‘श्रौिं भावयति, तस्य ‘स्थानं:’ कारणण्यांरपक्योंनालोचन 
दारेण ‘घुष्या’ घुषे, साधुपरिाते। श्रौिचिरं कायं: नाचार्य:।
कर्तव्य राद्युष्मानेकृतुं घुष्या ‘परिः’। श्रौिंसंसरं। कायविभः। ‘श्रौिसंसरं’ सम्पक्षो-
भावः संगमपरिवर्जननिरिक्तः। बः किर मनेव कार्य जगुपते तत्तद- 
वचारदशेनात् च चार्य परकीयेताहाते: कार्ये: संगमनुभवति॥४०॥
श्रीचक्षुविन फलान्तरमातः।

किल सच्चिद-सौमन्स्यकैक्यतेन्द्रियज्ञयामद्धर्षन- 
योग्यत्वानि च॥ ४१॥

भवन्तितः। वाक्षरेषः। ‘सच्च’ प्रकाशशुकायात्सकयः। तस्मात्
‘मुद्दा’ रजसङ्गमारधमामाभवः। 'सौमन्स्य' खेदान्वनमेव मानवी धातः।
‘एकायता’ नियतेन्द्रियविभवः वेशतः कैलयः। ‘द्विविध- 
जयः’ विद्यपरस्कुशानामिन्द्रियानी रातम्यस्त्रायः। ‘आतदर्शने’
विकेकश्तातिशये, विस्तर ‘योग्यतः’। श्रौचाभावन एते चत्चुग्ध्या-
हयः कैलषः माराम्येनि। तथा वि प्रेमात्व चत्चुग्ध्य:॥। चत्चुग्धेः:
शौमन्स्य। शौमन्स्यकैक्यताः॥। एकायताः०।
द्विविधयायाताद्वरस्तान्न्यायेतस्ति॥ ४२॥

वनोभायात्सकः फलान्तरः।

सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः॥ ४२॥

* संगमनीक्षम द्वैतः हृ पुस्तकायातः।
† नियतेन्द्रियविभवः नवस्त्रायात्रुक्तेषु नात्सः, परन्तु माय्याराधम् द्वैतः।
‡ संगमनीक्षम हृ पुस्तकायातः।
§ प्रकाशशुकायांसत्तमिन्निद्रियविभवः B, E, C पुस्तकायातः।
|| नियतेन्द्रियविभवः हृ B, C, E पुस्तकायातः।
†† प्रेमात्व सत्तमिन्द्रियविभवः A, B, C, D, E, H पुस्तकायातः।
** सौमन्स्यकैक्यतांसत्तमिन्तिह G पुस्तकायातः।
††† रेष्याधिकारिन्ति G पुस्तकायातः।
यह किस्म 'शास्त्रकौशल', ज्ञानांतर, तथागत तत्त्वात्मानं चिकित्सातिशयं 'वीर' शास्त्रकौशल चाल्यति। तीर्थनिरौचो नै शास्त्रकौशल तथागत शास्त्रकौशल-रीतिशिल्यमणसु वीर शास्त्रकौशलमाध्यति॥ १५॥

अपरियुक्तश्बा कायात्मक ॥ २८ ॥

अपरियुक्तश्बा जन्मात्मकात्मक ॥ ३२ ॥

कथामित्रोपत् भावः 'कथा'। जन्मान्तरे कथयन्ता 'हात्र'।
तो 'सम्बोधः' समस्यामं। जन्मान्तरे बोलयन्ता कीर्तुः जिन्हें कार्यकारीति जिस्यामायं सर्वस्य शास्त्रमाध्यति॥

ने भोगोपरियुक्त एव परियुक्तः। किंतु भोगाधिकार: प्रतिश्रुतं श्रीरित्युक्तायपियुक्त: भोगाधिकारभोगाधिकारत्रिश्रृणु घटि
रागानुबन्धात् विद्याधिकार: प्रतिश्रुती न तात्त्विकशास्त्रारुपात्मकः।
यदापु: स्त्रीसोपरियुक्त: प्रतिश्रुती माध्यमवल्लमते तदा मध्य-२८ ॥

खस्य रागादिल्थागात्र समस्यात्मकात्मकमहेतुभैवत्येव पृष्ठापरियुक्तात्मक:॥ ३८॥

जयमानसः चिदुः। प्रय निर्माणावः। ॥ ४० ॥

श्रीचालन् खाङ्गजुगुप्ता परैसंगं। श्रीचालन् खाङ्गजुगुप्ता परैसंगं॥ ४०॥

यह भावयति। तस्म खाङ्गजुगुप्ता करणाःनन्दत: नावाकारः
कर्तव्य द्रष्यात्मकः श्रीस्मुनेते हेतुता। यदापुः कर्तव्यः नानाश्रयः।
भावः* संग्रामपरिवर्त्यनमिद्यर्थः। यदिः किञ्चि खमे जयं संग्राममिज जुगुष्टे तथादवशद्रशनात् स कर्मं परत्वायुयशायत: कार्यं। संग्रामनुभवति।** ॥ ४ ॥

श्रीचक्षुवै फलान्तरमाह।

किञ्चि सत्यशुद्धि-सौमनस्यादेक्षले कार्ययजयात्मदशने-भासिद्धानापािन च ॥ ४१ ॥

भवन्तीति: वाक्यशेषः। 'चर्च' प्रकाशुखायानामकी। तत्तस्मि

'भृद्धि:' राजसोभामननन्मनस्यं। 'सौमनस्यं' बेलानुभवन मानवी

प्रीति:। 'एकायता' नियतेशुजियविरितिवेचं। ग्नयं। 'हेतुक्य-जयः' विषयवाक्यानेन विनियन्ति वाक्यम्।

'वाचकानेन' विशेष्यणाश्रयाना कत्वकायर्यां खामनबर्मानन।

'भांवद्रव्य' विशेष्यपारायामासिद्धी साधनव्यक्तान।

तथा तिः प्रौचाषात चल्लुक्त:। चल्लुक्त: श्रीममन्त:।

'सौमनस्यं' श्रीममनस्यादेक्षायिन च। इद्याययजयात्मदशने-भासिद्धानापािन च ॥ ४४ ॥

सन्तोषाभ्यासस्य फलमाह।

सन्तोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः। ॥ ४२ ॥

* संस्कृतमं इति H पुस्तकपाठः।
† फुटेरत्तियः नव्यायार्द्रपुस्तकसे पाक्षिक: प्रवक्तात्तियः।
‡ देखलरतियः H पुस्तकपाठः।
§ संस्कृतमं इति H पुस्तकपाठः।
|| नियतविरितिपति: इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
†† श्रौचाषात् सत्यशुद्धिविरितियः B, C, D, E, H पुस्तकपाठः।
** किञ्चि सत्यशुद्धि-सौमनस्यायानापािन च।
†† देखलरतियः G पुस्तकपाठः।
सन्तोषप्रकर्षणं चोगिनचत्याविभमानं सुखमाविभवति प्रजा 
वाणिण्यस्थूलं प्रति ज्ञातिनापि न ज्ञाताम् भवति। ॥ ४२ ॥

तप: फलमापः

कायेन्द्रियसिद्धिरसुझियातपसः ॥ ४३ ॥

तपः समध्यानं चेतः कैव्यादिश्चत्याविभवद्यावेशः
कायेन्द्रियण, ‘विस्थित उत्तरम् आद्यादि’।

विधः: साक्षायादिणा विनिविषयः। तत्त्वादिन्द्रियाचारान्
सङ्क्षेपित-विभाग्य-विभिन्नाविद्यामध्यमोऽविभवति, कायस्य यथेष्टस्
पुमसङ्ख्यादीनि ॥ ४४ ॥

साध्यायां फलमापः

साध्यायादिवैत्तात्सम्यथः ॥ ४४ ॥

दिभितस्य का: दिविश्च धनियाचे, साध्याचे प्रकाशाचे, चोगिनः
‘देय’ द्विभितया, ‘देवतया, देयम्’, भवति। वा देयता
प्रकाशीवनीयः। ॥ ४४ ॥

देयसरसर्पाणां फलमापः।

समाधिसिद्धीरसर्परसर्पाणातात् ॥ ४५ ॥

* सम्भास्य प्रकर्षणं हलि C पुस्करापाधः।
† समस्तिति H, G पुस्करापाधः।
‡ भावकेव्यं प्रापः G पुस्करापाधः।
§ सोरादिश्चत्याविभमायातपसः B, C, E पुस्करापाधः।
|| बाजाश्चित्ति B, C, E पुस्करापाधः।
यदा बोधीते धर्मेऽद्धत समाधिमुद्दोधयति ॥ ४५ ॥
तस्य स्म मनस्सु हृदमाणी भवति ॥ ४६ ॥

प्रयाणश्रीयानन्दयस्मापतिभायम ॥ ४७ ॥

तरासनं "प्रयलणेयिल्येनः, "श्रानन्यसमापत्याः, च स्थिरं सुखं भवतीति सम्बन्धः ।
...

* अपनायति G पुस्तकपाठः।
† तदेति प्रब्ल: A, B, C, D, E, F, G पुस्तकोऽन्तिव ॥ वर्णम् भाष्य-बारेमा शुद्धः।
‡ ब्राह्मणीयभिति G पुस्तकपाठः।
ततो इन्द्रानि प्रभावः ॥ ४८ ॥
तस्मिन सति श्रास्त्र-प्रश्रास्योगितिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः ॥ ४९ ॥

स तु वाच्याभ्यास्तमभिभंत्रिदेशकालसकालाभिमेघः परिपूर्णो द्विग्येश्चः ॥ ५० ॥

वाच्याभ्यास्तमभिभंत्रिदेशकालसकालाभिमेघः परिपूर्णो द्विग्येश्चः ॥ ५० ॥

* श्रास्त्रभवन्तिकाल सूत्रावधि ॥ ५७ ॥
† तथा सङ्केतिकार चृस्त्र-पूर्वाकालसकालाभिमेघः ॥ ५१ ॥
‡ श्रास्त्रभवन्तिकाल सूत्रावधि ॥ ५१ ॥
§ प्राणायामभवन्तिकाल सूत्रावधि ॥ ५१ ॥
विविधां प्राणायामः 'दैवेन, 'काश्रेण, 'श्रावणं चोपचारणं:
‘दीर्घकङ्कःसो भवति। दैवेनापविषयः च नायारायामानादौं
नायारायामः द्वारस्यसुप्रतेक्षार्थियिः। कार्तिकोपविषयः च वस्त्र
विविधारायामामासः।'श्रावणं उपविषयः च द्वन्द्वं वाराणसः।]
रताविसः श्रायस्मात्: प्रथम उद्वातः: भवति। रताविसः श्रावणं सुपारसः
सुपारसः। उदातसानात् श्रायस्मात्: वििस्मिहििनं येत।
माभिमृकत् प्रणायामानभिधाय चतुथमभिधातुमाइ |
वायाभ्यातिविषयाभिधीष्मि चतुर्थं: || ५१ ॥

प्राणस्य ष्वा द्या विषयः 'नायारायामानादौं। 'रायनविषयः"
इध्यानाभिचक्रादिः। तै दौ विषयः 'भाषौ। वायाभ्यातिविषयः 
विभेषः: 'चतुर्थं: ', प्राणायामः। वायाभ्यातिविषयः 'भाषौ
कालादयमानाभिधाय चतुर्थं: निरोधः। अयमपि श्रायस्मात्: श्रायस्मात्: 
वायाभ्यातिविषयः मृत्यु: || ५९ ॥

चतुर्विधस्यास्थि प्रणायामात्: || ५२ ॥

तत: चैत्यते प्रणायासारसः || ५२ ॥

‘तत्,’ चैत्यते प्रणायासारसः, 'प्रणायासः' विनयचा प्रारम्भं, तत्
'चावरण' होस्त्रपुर्यः, तत् 'चैत्यते' विनयचा प्रारम्भं: || ५२ ॥

फळान्तरामः
धारणासुं च बौद्धता मनसः ॥ ५१ ॥
‘धारणा.’ वच्यमानकल्पः। तासु प्रणायामि: चुन्द्रस्यं मनो चच चच धार्यते, तच तच खिरं भवितः न विचिेयं भजते। ॥ ५२ ॥
प्रयाहारस्य लक्षणमां ।
स्वस्वियसार्याधाराशी वितिस्य स्वरुपानुका- द्वेद्विद्रयाशी प्रयाहारः ॥ ५३ ॥
इद्दियाणि खसखविषयेभ्यः प्रव्याहियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया प्रत्याहारः। इति तेन ‘स्वरूपानुका.’
इद्दियाणि खसखविषयेभ्यः प्रव्याहियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया प्रत्याहारः। इति तेन ‘स्वरूपानुका.’
इद्दियाणि खसखविषयेभ्यः प्रव्याहियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया प्रत्याहारः। इति तेन ‘स्वरूपानुका.’
इद्दियाणि खसखविषयेभ्यः प्रव्याहियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया प्रत्याहारः। इति तेन ‘स्वरूपानुका.’
इद्दियाणि खसखविषयेभ्यः प्रव्याहियन्ते प्रतिकूलतया प्रत्याहारः। इति तेन ‘स्वरूपानुका.’
श्रेयोऽन्त्यायार्यते सोऽन्त्यात्‌ केशरतनुकरणः बुद्धिमने कारणं
फलशः कन्मेणा भेदं कारणं उदत्स्मादीनां परस्यरमुपकार्यपकारकभावेन उदा-
मभिधायोपादानकारणभूताया विबेकस्यातेः कारण्तानामन्तरक्गवरिरङ्गभावेन स्थितानां
योगाङ्गानां यमादीनां खरूपं फलसहितं न्तानां चासनादीनां परस्यरमुपकार्यपकारकभावेनावस्ितानां उद
मभिधाय परस्परलनणएकारणपुष्वेकं! फलमभिहितं |
तदयं योगा यमनियमादिभः प्राप्तवीजभावः। श्रासनप्राणेरङरुरितः। प्रत्याहारे पुष्पितः
ष्यानधारणासमाधिभिः फलिव्यतीति याख्यातः साधनपादः |
दति महाराजाधिराजस्रीभोजेविरितिताय राजमार्गस्वाभिधाया पातलखोग्यांश्रावं सुख्युल्लौ तिलीयः धाधनपादः। ॥५॥

* योगानामिति G पुस्तकपादः।
† प्रवक्षणन्दयामार्गपव्यूहानिति B, C, E पुस्तकपादः। परस्परचली-
न्दयामार्गपव्यूहानिति G पुस्तकपादः।
†† कुसुमित दति G पुस्तकपादः।
†‡ चित्रधारायासमाधिमिति H पुस्तकपादः।
पातंडके येषोऽभूमिे

दत्तीयः पादः ।

चतुर्दशप्रकरणादिशिवमारिविभवतः ।

भवन्ति भाविनामयु भूतनाथः व भूतचे II

तदेवं पुर्णाहूं धारणाकृत्व निर्णेतुं चंयमध्याभिधानापूर्वः

वायुक्षण्डारिविशिष्टतिपादताम् चतुर्विनुपपितमे।

तथ धारणाथः । खूपमाह ।

देशबन्धितस्य धारणायः

‘देश’ नामिक्षनामपादः । निर्णयं ‘वर्षा’ विषयान्तरिपरि-

हारः चतुर्विन्न निर्णयं । निर्णयं ‘वर्षा धारणा’, भवते ।

वधमञ् । नामाविशिष्टस्वरक्षेत्रप्रक्षेत्राविभिन्नताः करणे चतुर्विन्न-

बन्धकं जिताने जितानेन परिष्किर्तानाविभिन्न धारणामध्ये

वता जिताने जितानेन स्तरिष्किर्तानाविभिन्न धारणामध्ये

तथ धारणामाह ।

तथ प्रत्यार्पणात्मका धारणं ॥ २ ॥

‘तथ’ तात्पयस्य देशात् वर्षा निर्णयं । तथापि धारणम ।

* चिन्तामणिति धुर्यकषायः ।
† सधिस्त्रूपं दति B, E पुस्तकपाठः ।
ह पारे ५ GIF! qt

था 'एकतानता' विषयपरिषामपरिहारदारेण यदेव धारणया -
माखम्बनीडतं तदालम्नतयैव निरम्रमुत्पन्तिः, खा en', उच्यते ॥

॥ २ ॥

चरमं योगाङ्ग समाधिमाह |

तद्वार्यार्यां निन्दिनां खरूपश्रृंखलाय समाधि: ॥

॥ २ ॥

'तदेव' उनस्मृतं धारां। यज 'प्रधानमाजनिपभं' परम्परायां खरूप -
माखम्बनीडतं तदालम्नतयैव निरम्रमुत्पन्तिः। बन्धुद्वार्यां खरूपश्रृंखलाय 'खरूपश्रृंखलाय', उ ापधते,
स 'समाधि', दत्तुद्वार्यां। सम्यगाधियां एकाधिकार्यियां विवेकनन्द -
परिश्राय यज मन: व 'समाधि' ॥ २ ॥

जलवर्धक योगामुख्य व्यवहाराय खरूपश्रृंखलेत तानिकां वर्गं -
करुणामात ।

चयणेक्षां संयमः ॥ ४ ॥

एकधार्यां निवेंतं धारण-धारण-समाधिमाह सिद्धसंयममाहां खरूपश्रृंखलधारकारसंयममाहां
'खरूपश्रृंखलाय' श्रेयो वायरोगियां ॥ ४ ॥

तस्य फलमा |

तज्जयात् प्रज्ञांकः ॥ ५ ॥

तस्य संयमस्य | "जयात्' अभ्यासेन साम्योत्पादना \{} साम्यविकरान् ॥ प्राप्तायाः' ॥

* 'खरूपश्रृंखलाय श्रीम्बिहीत इ। पुरवर्तमः ॥
† संयमसंयमां हृति B, E पुरवर्तमः ॥
‡ शामोत्पादनादिति H पुरवर्तमः ॥
शास्त्रविवेकसूत्रपायाः। 'श्लेष्ट।' प्रधरो भवति। प्रशा सर्वं
सम्मगभास्यपत्येयः॥ ५ ॥
तत्त्वोपयोगमाधं।
तत्त्व भूमिषु विनियोगः॥ ६ ॥
'तत्त्व' संयममः, 'भूमि' स्फूतसमवालमभद्रेन विनामुः।
चित्तंतनिषु, 'विनियोगः', कर्तव्यः। धरामधरः चिन्हभूमिं
जितं जिताम श्लेष्याऽभूमी संस्करं कार्यः। न श्रायमनावती-
हतारभूमिं उत्तरां भूमी संस्करं कर्तव्यः। फलभाग्यभवितः॥ ७ ॥
शाक्षात् प्रयागात्यायामः पद्धारं सचं विधाय चायां
कर्म न इत्तमियावक्ष्या॥

शयमतमयं पूर्वभेः॥ ८ ॥
'पूर्वभेः' यमादिभ्यो योगाङ्गेभ्यो: पारस्येष समाधेधकार-
केभ्यः। धारणादियोगाङ्गं गतमकामत्तमस्थ चमथे: 'शातम', समा-
धिख्यवंशिपाणिनागानात्॥ ७ ॥
तत्त्वापि समाध्यम्यं वहिरङ्गमाधं।

tद्द्यं वहिरङ्गं निब्धीर्जयः॥ ८ ॥

'निब्धीर्जयः' निरालम्बः प्रूथाभवनासपर्यायायायाम चमथे:।
एतद्यं योगाङ्गचं, 'वहिरङ्गं', पारस्येषंकारकानात्॥ ८ ॥

* प्राध्ये भवतीति। पुस्तकपाठः।
† अवशिष्यान्ति। पुस्तकपाठः।
द्योऽ पादे ९

भूतान-निरोधांश्च काम अन्याधिकरणत्वाकामः निरोधांश्च चिन्तान्विते निरोधपरिशासः ॥ ५ ॥

‘भूतान’ विद्व-मूढ-विद्वतः भूतिः। ‘निरोध’ प्रादुर्भावान्त च विद्वतः। तत्थिर ‘भूतान-निरोधान्तः’ चै जनिको ‘सांकारां तयार्थाः’ अन्याधिकरणोऽपि ‘भूतान-प्रादुर्भावः’, यदा भवतः।

‘भूतान’ न्यूत्यान्त चार्यविलिङ्गां शैवः। ‘निरोध:’ भूतानां अन्याधिकरणां च निरोध:। तदा निरोध:।

‘सांकारां तयार्थाः’ अन्याधिकरणोऽपि ‘भूतान-प्रादुर्भावः’ विनविलिङ्गां अन्याधिकरणोऽपि। तदा तयार्थाः।

यदा भवतः। तदा च ‘श्रवण-क्रिया-निरोधान्तः’ चेतब:। निरोधान्तः च विद्वतः। तदा च निरोधपरिशासः।

यदविना जनिता ‘सांकारणां सांकारान्तः’ न निरोधान्तः। तदा च निरोधपरिशासः।

तत्र निरोधपरिशासः ॥ ५ ॥

तत्त्व प्रणालबाहितं संस्कारात् ॥ १० ॥

‘तत्त्व’ केतव: ज्ञानितेजसंस्कारात्, ‘प्रणालबाहिता’, भवति।

परिशासनविद्वत्वात्प्रणालबाहितां परिशासनाणी विन्दुभावह्विद्वत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

निरोधपरिशासनां विद्वत्वात् सामाधिपरिशासः ॥

* सिद्धारामाधुर्द्रति D पुस्तकावः ।
पात्राध्येय नैकाम्याय: चच्चैद्वै चिन्तस समाधिपरिखामः॥ १०॥

'चर्चार्थम्' सबलश्रावाकरसमज्ञात्व, चिन्तस विचेषः धर्मः।
एकसिद्धवाक्यसम्बन्धे सरुषपरिणामिता 'एकाश्वता'," शार्यः चिन्तस
धर्मः। तत्वार्थायाम् 'चच्चैद्वै'। 'सबलाध्यस्ताणुस्या धर्मः
'चर्चा' ध्यानमभवः। 'एकाश्वताञ्च धर्मः साधवानों चिन्तस्य
विचेषः': 'चिन्तस' चक्रविचर्थं, चन्द्रविरुध्यत्वानां 'समाधिपरिखामः',
रङ्गायते।

'पूर्वाध्य' परिशिष्टायान्विते विशेषः। ततं संख्यार्थानां
सर्णेमं -सारभूमिता। पूर्वाध्य युत्साहनसंख्याश्रयस्यान्विते
विशेषः। चतुर्थ स्नेहस्मेर्थकर्माद्वियोजनमविभिन्नविविधविविधवानां
'पूर्वाध्य' चब्युत्स्वविविधः। सम्पाद्यात्तासंख्यायायान्वित्यादि
चतुर्थनीतिध्वनिस्य 'समाधिपरिखाम्', इत्युच्यते च।

संख्यार्थेच विशेषः। एकसमायो ठभिविके षः। त्राः
"रक्षायितमुत् पुस्तकपाठः
† तदपोति पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ शुव्यानसंख्यायेति पत्र, ¢ पुख्तकपाठः।

शालासिद्धी तुल्यप्रत्ययौ चिन्तस विपक्षात्परिखामः॥

॥ ११॥

समाधिपरिखाम पिन्म: 'चिन्तस', एकमिथः ठनिविषेषः। 'बाना':
अतीतमध्वानं प्रविद्टः। वग छदितः' वन्तमानेऽध्येनि श्णुरितः।
द्वापि शमादितचिन्तत्वेन 'छे एकरूपाखम्बमनेग, तेज ।
 squeez । उभयचापि खमादहितस्यैव फेर । यत्‌ सः !एकाग्तापरिणामः इल्य॒ष्यते ॥ ९२ ॥

चिन्तपरिणामेक्ररूपमन्यच्रातिदिश्न्नाह ।
रतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धम्बे-लक्षणावस्थापरिशोधामा आ- 
ख्याताः* ॥ १३ ॥

'एतेन वविविधानेन विचरिताण्यं विचरिताण्यं । 'भर्तेषु' खूब-खजो१।
रज्जचेषु' बुंधुक्षीलेषु: करणेषु धमेनान्वितेपुः । 'धर्म-खचांवस्था-
भेदेन विचित्र: परिणामी वख्यातोऽवगल्पव:।

अवक्षितासः धर्मविषः पुर्वाधिकान्तसिः सधवान्तापरिनिर्वायिनी धर्मविषः; वया धचांवस्था 
परिणाम: पिकङ्कितनिष्ठिप्रतिविध्यानें घटस्थ: 
धचांवस्थापरिणाम:ः ॥ १३ ॥

तत्परिणामेच्छस्यार्थः यो धर्मस्य प्रथमस्थः सदा: 
गृणन्तं नापरिणममानं चणमप्यासते भ. ॥ ॥

धर्मचिन्तनालयवस्थापरिशोधामा आ- 
ख्याताः* ॥ १३ ॥

धर्मचिन्तनालयवस्थापरिशोधामा आ- 
ख्याताः* ॥ १३ ॥

धर्म-खचांवस्थापरिणाम:ः ॥ १३ ॥

धर्म-खचांवस्थापरिणाम:ः ॥ १३ ॥

धर्म-खचांवस्थापरिणाम:ः ॥ १३ ॥

धर्म-खचांवस्थापरिणाम:ः ॥ १३ ॥
गुरु के रूप में धर्मार्थों धिर्मणों ललनमादः।
तथा सान्तोदितायपदेशायनुपाती धर्मी+ ॥ १४॥

‘माना:’ ये जलस्यव्यापारा जनीतं धन्य्यनुप्रविष्टा:। ‘बदिता:’
ये जनागतमध्यानं परित्यज्य कस्मानो छब्बि जलस्यव्यापारं कुर्मणि।
‘धर्मपदेशा:’ ये बलिकृपेष खिता चय्यं न कर्मणे। यथा
सब्बे धर्माङ्ककमित्येवमादे:। नियतकार्थकारणपदपत्या धोयताना,
प्राचिनो धर्मायपेव धर्मरसेणान्विते। तं चित्वधमपि धर्मौ
प्राप्तज्ञातहुमावन्ते जनानिन्यं खिकरोति, य: ‘सान्तोदितायपदेश
ायपदेशायनुपाती धर्मी:’ इत्युष्यते, यथा सुवनं रक्षकुपथसब्बिपदत
धागीने खलिकच्छातान्तपरियहे सर्वरकुपथतयासुवन्मान। तेषु
धर्मायु कथ्यकुर्मज्ञाने खलिकुपथया जामायात्मणा धर्मरकुपथतया
विशेषाध्यायानान्यसंख्यसमुपातिलेखावत्ते ॥ १ ॥

एकस्य धिर्मण: कथमनेके परिणामा धत्याग्नयामपेतुमाद।

कमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यते हेतुः ॥ १५॥

* तत्पर्यं धर्मायपयापनं पुरसकेषु नार्क। परन्तु भाष्यकारेन
धर्मायपयापनं परिणाममात्रान्तु धमाभिगतिः तथेव धर्म्यपत्यं।
† “धर्ममेति भाष्यदीर्घ: प्रतिपदेश धर्मी:” इत्ययं भाष्यपादः
जनानं सुविदेषायमादीपत्याध्येयं धर्मायपयापनं इत्युष्यते। परन्तु न समी
पिरि भाष्यपादे वार्त्तनकारार्णालोकनार्का भाष्यमध्ये परिग्रहितताल्लुः।
† तेषा यथा कस्मानं सांतादितायपदेशायनुपात ८ पुस्तकापादः। तेषा
सब्बे सांतादितायपदेशायनुपात ६ पुस्तकापादः।
§ सुविदाहुपथसभिपरिलेखेनेति ३ पुस्तकापादः।
परिश्रम चयसंयमादतीतानागतां || १६ ॥

धम्म लक्तणावस्थाभेदेन यत्‌ "परिश्रमनयं उक्र। तच "खंयमात्‌'।

परिश्रमच्यसंयमादतीतानागतां || १६ ॥

धम्म लक्तणावस्थाभेदेन यत्‌ "परिश्रमच्य जतज। तच 'संयमात्'
गन्नु वादन्यं धर्मार्थायण्यूध्यायेन लघूमात्रः।

तथसः श्रान्तादितायथर्दश्यस्याभ्यासतापाती धन्मात्रः॥१४॥

‘श्रान्ता’ च श्रान्तक्षणपारामाण्यते। धन्मात्रः।

‘श्रान्तादितायथर्दश्यस्याभ्यासतापाती धन्मात्रः।

तद्विधिमणि भवेः श्रान्तक्षणपारामाण्यते। धन्मात्रः।

दश्यस्याभ्यासतापाती धन्मात्रः।

श्रान्तादितायथर्दश्यस्याभ्यासतापाती धन्मात्रः॥१५॥

तचेतिपदं अस्मिन्यषज्ञदगरपु तकेषु मासि। परन्तु वचनम्।

ये श्रान्तक्षणपारामाण्यते। धन्मात्रः।

तद्विधिमणि भवेः श्रान्तक्षणपारामाण्यते। धन्मात्रः।

परश्रायणते श्रान्तक्षणपारामाण्यते। धन्मात्रः॥

ध्रमिणः एकस्य धर्मिणः कथमनेकं परिणामा दत्या्रङ्ामपनेतुमाः॥

कणान्यं परिषाधामान्यते हेतुः।॥१५॥
द्वाराध्याशुभकालकानां वः 'कमः', ततथ तत्तु प्रतिच्चयं 'क्रियायं', परिरेकाश्च तत्त्वमानं, 'परिश्रमक्ष' ज्वललक्ष्यम्, 'नवनी' नागाधिको, 'हेतुः' सिद्धं सापकं भवति। अभावस्यः। वोत्त्य निर्धारणः,
कण्ठांतु मन्त्यिण्डक्तः कपालानि तैत्रि घाट दस्त्यं रूपः
परिरेकाः परिश्रमक्षाव्यापरिश्रमक्षा च कमः क्षणेनेत्र नायेन
परिश्रमक्षान्य गमोऽवगम्यः। संवर्य एव च भावा निथतेव निफऽः प्रतिच्चयं परिश्रमक्षाः: परिरेकाः चतः हिस्तु क्रमान्य नायेन
परिश्रमान्य बनान्य। चिस्नान्यां संबंध्याः परिश्रमान्य बनान्य: केरितु धर्मः
प्रक्षेपणोत्पन्ननं, चत्या सुखादयः संज्ञानादयः । रेखेका-
वोनादयःकार्यादयः, चत्या धर्मां-संज्ञार-श्रवस्त्रम:। धर्माश्चास-
भिन्नता॥ संबंध्याः॥ १५॥

रामसुक्क्ता संयमस्य विश्वाप्रक्षेपणार्थे चिस्नाः प्रतिपाद-
प्रतिच्छेदः॥

परिश्रमक्षायसंयमादत्तीतानागतः॥ १६॥

धर्म-सचीनाश्च भवेदेन यत् 'परिश्रमचं भूम| ततच 'संयस्मात्'

* पुर्वः एव चेति H पुस्तकानां।
† वलः सिरधं क्रमान्यं क्रमान्यान्य H पुस्तकानां।
‡ विश्वासीनामति H पुस्तकानां।
§ कर्मां-संज्ञार-श्रवस्त्रम: इति B, E पुस्तकानां।
|| धर्माश्चास भिन्नभिन्नता H पुस्तकानां।
*** प्रदर्शिततमाछेिति B, C, E पुस्तकानां।
ऋग्वैदिक  विवेचने  

माया मार्गे, पुरुषोक्ति वंचक्तम कर्षणा, ‘पार्वतीनागमानना’, 
प्रोगिन: षडगतिमन्वयिति। दुधम नात्योः। शनिन्: अयोध्यि जर्म 
भक्ति, देव सत्तोः, देवस्तना पाणागामाध्यमा: समेता वर्णाने 
ध्यान खं ध्यापां धिष्याचारीतसम्भवां प्रभवानीतीवयं परिणितवचे
पत्त्यव वदि फंभम करौति, तदा यथा जिसकु रिमनिकानामपूजयं वा 
तताध्य कोौ वानाति। धर्मितसहि गुप्तलक्ष्मकारिकपतात्। 
धर्मायपामालामत्वाधिविनिष्ठितविकेरवबंधं परिमितयं। वदा तु 
केवलपात्यबिनेया: परिमितयं। तदा निश्चीयभवाद्यकः स्वर्याय- 
स्वरघ्नस्येकीपात्याधिविनिष्ठितबिनेया। ॥ ९६ ॥

विभागसाराधि।

श्रव्दच्छ-प्रत्ययाननातत्तेतराध्यासात् संज्ञस्यतप्र- 
विभागसाराधि। संवभुवतत्त्वानं ॥ १७ ॥

‘ब्रह्मः’ श्रीचेतिथातया निष्पकतामयीता निष्पैकार्यंतिपक्ष- 
विषया: यथि वा नमस्तिः: स्कोदायाः प्रानि: श्रीचेतिथातया 
संवभुवतत्त्वानं। तयोऽकारं पशुद्रमो वाक्यश्च। 
तयोऽकारं पशुद्रमो वाक्यश्च।

नामयाध्यासात् संज्ञस्यतप्र- 
विभागसाराधि। संवभुवतत्त्वानं ॥ १७ ॥
ह पादे १८°। तान विनाशम्। केवल ब्रह्मः, विमित्र शालानिति द्रष्ट: सर्वे-
वेकःपमेवोस्तरं दस्ततिः गौरिति। व धशेरकपताः न प्रतिपद्यते
कथेशरकपसुनतः प्रवत्क्षति। एतत्रुंत्वविविहीं चोजयं 'प्रविभागः',
इति शबरसः तत्च यदापक्षः नाम। इदमध्रवख यदाचारः। इति शवसक
शतः प्रकाशसः। दृति प्रविभागान्विधाय तस्मिन् प्रविभागो यः 'संय-
महस्यति, तस्मां 'सर्वंद्वा भवतानां भव-पद्य-पति-पारेष्पादीनां चत
'हतः' व: शब्रः। तत्त्वार्गः। गनेनारामयनेनेने प्राणिमाथः सः
समाचारित्य दृति शब्रे ज्ञाति।। ९॥

विद्वानः॥

संस्कारसाधारानं करण्या पूर्वं जातिबनाः॥ १८॥

द्विविधानिफः वायस्मार्गः। 'संस्कारः। केवल धर्माधिनोत्वः-
इनः। केवलचारणभूगचन्द्रविपाकेनववः। यथा धर्माधिक्रमः।
तेषु संस्कारः यदा श्रायं करेति। एवं मम वेदार्शनमुक्तः। एवं
मवः श्राव्य निष्क्रियार्थेति पूर्वेश्च सर्वसमन्नुसन्धानो भावयवै
प्रवेदक्षमारेव। शर्ममयी शारति। केवल वाणात्
कतेदुवसूरथे विवाहितः॥ 'पूर्वांक्तमानुष्टानं जात्वार्ये श्रघः
ज्ञाति।। ९॥

* सव्यभीतमेवातारमिति ए पुष्करपातः।
† बदलीति ह पुष्करपातः।
‡ तत्वनिश्चितः दृति ह पुष्करपातः।
§ द्विविधानिफः ए पुष्करपातः।
¶ साधारणस्य संस्कारेष्बः ब, च, ए पुष्करपातः।
पातञ्जले ये ग्रन्थ के इस पृष्ठ का निम्नलिखित है:

"विष्णु उपनिषदः"

"प्रत्ययसः परिचित्तस्यानं दश महैति
‘प्रत्ययस’ परिचितसः केनचिन्तक्षमात्राभावसि विष्णु रूपेनान्तः
यदा संयमं करोति तदा ‘परकीयस’ चिन्तसः भावः उत्पद्यते
वराहस्य चिन्तसः वीतर्गन्तव वेति परिचितगतान्तर्गतापि सवानेव धर्माय
भागातीयतः

तस्मात् परिचित्तस्यानं विशेषमानाः

न तत् सांस्कृतम तस्माविषययोधुतवात्
‘तस्य’ परसः वचितस्य ‘तत्’, ‘सांस्कृत’ लक्ष्याय स्वत: अऽ
‘व’, प्रकटेत भावः
श्रद्धैव परिचित्तस्य विशेषमाह‘

न तत् सांस्कृतमः तस्माविषययोधुतवात्
‘तस्य’ परसः, वचितस्य ‘तत्’, ‘सांस्कृत’ लक्ष्याय स्वतः

विष्णु उपनिषदः"

"कायरूपसंयमात्रः द्रामाशक्तिकि च चन्द्र: प्रकाशायां
योगेष्ठर्तर्वानं

* प्रथमस्य एति च युक्तपादः
† यथार्थस्य कामामुक्तियोगभाष्यपाठः काश्याम्मदितायमहाभाष्यपाठः
‡ प्रथमं यस्य परिचित्तस्यएति पुख्तकपाठः
§ प्रत्ययस्य एति एव काश्याम्मदितायमहाभाष्यपाठः
काय: श्रीरं। तथा 'उपं' चजुर्देश्व्रूणि गुणः। तस्मिन् काये द्रवं रूपमिति \* 'संयमात', तथा उपं चजुर्देश्व्रूणि चजुिनं चव् यथा 'श्री', तथा: 'भावो: भावसंवर्णाम् प्रतिवन्धे। चचुःप्रकाशाःश्रयोऽने',
'चचुः,' 'प्रकाशः' बलप्रवर्णी: तथा 'श्रयोऽने' चचुिनं चव् यपाराभावे। योगिन: 'वाच्यादीना', भवति। न शैवायायायकः चब्धत चवः।
एतेन श्रवणवत्त्वानुभुः बेदितवः। एतेन रुपानवत्त्वानुभुः प्रदेशकेन श्रवणां श्रवणवत्त्वानुभुः च: भवति।
॥ २९॥

विविधानसमाधी।

सापकम निश्चितमच्छ कस्य ततुसंयमाद्वरणानातानामरिष्टेयो च। ॥ २२॥

श्रायुन्वीपकं यत् पूर्वसंतं 'कस्य', तद्विप्रारम्बः। 'श्रायुन्वीपकं' निश्चितमच्छ। तत्र 'श्रायुन्वीपकं' यत्र फलजनानाथ वहेष्ट्वेनोऽनुवाद्यं कार्यारूपाभिमुखेन वर्तते। यथा उच्चारिष्टेय: प्रशाशीतादिरवाश: शीघ्रेव मुखयति। उक्रविपरीतं 'निश्चितमच्छ'। यथा तदेवाद्यदावाश। संयमिति-

* तस्मिन्नास्त्यस्मिन् काये रूपमिति ि चिनितमुक्तस्मादः। तश्चिन्नास्त्यस्मिन् काये रूपमिति ि पुस्तकात:।
† ि चिनितमुक्तस्मादः 'प्रतेत्तु श्रवणनाथायवास' द्रवं पार: तुष्ट्वादिरेभ यव्यायमिति। परस्यं सनाचीतः, उक्रविपरीतं कार्यारूपाभिमुखेन भाष्याय पुस्तके भाष्यानार्यान्तातात्व। तत्र वाचस्पतिसिद्धां 'प्रतेत्तु' द्रित भाष्याय तिष्ठत भाष्याय विष्ठत भाष्यायमरिष्टेय: श्रवणवत्त्वानुभुः श्रवणाद्रितात्वात्। यथा तदेवाद्यवाश: पुस्तके चव् भवनार्यान्ततातातः।
मनुष्यारं विरेण ग्राम्यति। श्रिसिंह विविध वर्ण यथा: 'संयमं करोति, किं मम कर्त्ते श्रीविबांकं किं विमिवाक्षिन्यों अन्नद्राकारं 'अपराधानां', अश्रोत्यान्ते। 'अपराधि': श्रीवियोग:। तथीत 'द्वानं'। श्रूवसिः काले श्रुवसिः देवं मम श्रीवियोगों अविवक्तीति निरंगं बालति। 'श्रादेश्यो वा'। भारितानि विनियोगस्वित्वार्य श्राधार्यकाष्ठार्य विनियोगस्वित्वार्य कार्यं। तताधिकार्यं विद्याधिकार्यं विधानं श्राथाद्धिकाधिदेविकाधिभातिके। तजाध्याद्धिकाभि।

परिकर्मनिष्यादिताः प्रतिपादयितुमार। ॥ ४२ ॥

मैथ्यादिपु बलानि ॥ ४३ ॥

'कैं-कहणा-सुदितोपेक्षाय यो विन्यं: संयम: तस्य 'बलानि',

परिकर्मनिष्यादिताः: प्रतिपादयितुमार ॥ ४२ ॥

लिखतकरामाः
वेशेपु इतिबलायायिनि || २४ ||

इत्याविषयमानि 'वेशेपु', वातसंयमस्य इत्याविषयमानि शार्मेतः। तद्रथमः। वातस्य इतिबले वायुवेगेऽपि वा तम्याविषयायि संयमां करोति, तत्तत्त्वादििपां मृत्युम वातस्य अनुवर्तनीलः। || २४ ||

विद्यानारायानां

प्रसुन्याचार्यान्यासात् द्रव्य-व्यविहित-विप्रवक्यायानां+ || २५ ||

'प्रसुन्याचार्यान्यासात् द्रव्य-व्यविहित-विप्रवक्यायानां+ || २५ ||

प्रसुवय होक्त: 'शास्त्रोऽसौ 'श्रालोकः' साचिकप्रकारप्रसरः। तस्य निविषेष्यु 'श्रालोकः' तथा विषयायि भावायायि, तस्य निखिलेषु विषयेऽ'विषाध' शास्त्रार्थं निघारे:। 'विषाध' नेय्या वार्त्तार्थिणो रथायादे:। 'शास्त्र', जत्यथे: || २५ ||

एतसमान्यं सिद्यान्तर्माइ || २६ ||

सिद्यान्तर्माइ भवनन्तर्माइ || २७ ||

* तम्याविषय:पुस्तकपाठः।
† श्रवण-व्यवहित-विप्रवक्यायान्यासात् E गुप्तपाठः।
‡ सार्वज्ञाप्रमाणः H पुलसपाठः।
§ भावार्थेऽः H पुलसपाठः।
|| प्रकाशन्त्रिकातिपाठमेवः H पुलसपाठः।
¶ निधानादेरिह पुस्तकपाठः।

10
'स्वयं' प्रकाशमये, य: बनयं करोति, तस्म: सत्समु: भृवः:-
प्रभृतियु लोकेषु चानि 'भवनाथि नयश्विश्रेष्टाभि शुरार्थि, तेषु
वधावस्थि 'श्रान', उत्पति त्रो वालिकाप्रकाश श्राखननमयोऽसु त: भृतिक दृशि: ॥ २६ ॥

भृतिकप्रकाशनान्तरालम्बनारेश्वरेव शिखसेराणाः ॥

चन्द्र तारार्षुख्रानां ॥ २७ ॥

'तारानं' ज्वोतिषां, य: 'बुध' विशिष्टसन्निवेशः, तत्सिन्
'शन', शत्यांथमस्थि 'श्रान', उत्पति त्रो श्रालिकप्रकाशि
तारानं, श्रार्थ्यांपक्षान्त्यां न शक्तोति भवितैति प्रशुपापायो-
उभिज्ञि: ॥ २७ ॥

शद्य तदगतिस्रानं ॥ २८ ॥

'स्वयं' विशिष्टसन्निवेशः, य: अम्लायि शत्यांथमस्थि दारायि
था 'गति', प्रयोक्ते तियतकाला नियमांशि: च तस्म: 'श्रान',
उत्पति त्रो श्रान यां यहं दशता कालेन द्वस मार्शिमरी नाचम
भाषिि दी श्रान शाननीयाय:। द्वस कालसञ्जननोऽध्यादियः
भावति ॥ २८ ॥

वाक्या: विद्वत्री: प्रतिमाजनत्र: विद्वत्री: प्रतिपादितमुपकस्मते ।

नाभिष्करे कायवृश्चकां ॥ २८ ॥

वार्षिकमध्यमां 'नाबिष्करे यथ: गोडारण 'बक', तत्सिन् द्वध-
शंघमस्य योगिनः, 'कायगते घोषै 'यूहो:' विषिर्द रघु-मख-धातु-नायादीनामवाचिस्य, तच 'ज्ञान', ज्ञातविषे। इदसुक्रं भवति।

गामिष्टं ब्रह्मस्य मध्यस्य कस्य प्रसन्नावान नायादीर्मनी सूक्ष्मभवति।

अतवधा गतावधानेन समयः चक्रविभूतिः च च च भवद्वाधारति।

कष्ठे गले घोषः "कण्ठकूपः" जिग्रास्य-तन्त्रस्यादामुः कण्ठकूप संयमस्य।

प्राणायामिभक्ते लिङ्गस्य नारदेनामः सतस्वः सन्निवेशः समयः च च।

कण्ठकूपस्य अधस्तात् या जिग्रास्य, कण्ठकूपस्य अधस्तात्।

कष्ठे गले कूपः "कण्ठकूपः" जिग्रास्य-तन्त्रस्यादामुः कण्ठकूप संयमस्य।

प्राणायामिभक्ते लिङ्गस्य नारदेनामः सतस्वः सन्निवेशः समयः च च।

कष्ठे गले कूपः "कण्ठकूपः" जिग्रास्य-तन्त्रस्यादामुः कण्ठकूप संयमस्य।

प्राणायामिभक्ते लिङ्गस्य नारदेनामः सतस्वः सन्निवेशः समयः च च।

कष्ठे गले कूपः "कण्ठकूपः" जिग्रास्य-तन्त्रस्यादामुः कण्ठकूप संयमस्य।

प्राणायामिभक्ते लिङ्गस्य नारदेनामः सतस्वः सन्निवेशः समयः च च।

कष्ठे गले कूपः "कण्ठकूपः" जिग्रास्य-तन्त्रस्यादामुः कण्ठकूप संयमस्य।

प्राणायामिभक्ते लिङ्गस्य नारदेनामः सतस्वः सन्निवेशः समयः च च।

कष्ठे गले कूपः "कण्ठकूपः" जिग्रास्य-तन्त्रस्यादामुः कण्ठकूप संयमस्य।

प्राणायामिभक्ते लिङ्गस्य नारदेनामः सतस्वः सन्निवेशः समयः च च।
प्रातिभाषा सबे || ३३ ॥

विष्कारे मनोभावसम्बन्धितं द्रागुप्तचरियं
शाम प्रतिभा। तत्त्वं संवेदने हिन्दीमाने 'प्रातिभ' विवेकत्वाते:
पूर्वभावि तारकं शार्म, उदासे॥ । चयोद्वेष: शवितः॥ पूर्वं प्रभा
प्रादुर्भवति। तददिवेकखाते: पूर्वं तारकं 'पर्यविश्व शानमावि-
भवति। कात्तिकृति संवेदनाराज्य:सबे जानातीवर्ष:॥ ३.९॥

पूर्वाराजमान ।

हद्ये चित्संवित् || ३४ ॥

'हद्यं' पः रीत्रसं प्रदेशविशेषः। तस्मादिहरावस्य नुसचमृतरीकालभन्ने

* कृष्णिकारं रस्त्रविशेषं सहस्तं अति पा॥
† सर्वनिशाबारपोषं ह खुशकामपां
‡ भारतीयसमाहितमिति र खुशकामां
§ उत्पवत् इति र खुशकामां
|| वशेषेनाय सतितदेशिति र खुशकामां
शन्तः करणसत्वस्य  खानं | त्र शतसंयमस्य स्व-परचिनश्चानमुत्यते । खचित्तगताः सव्यार्थः परचित्तग्तांख रागादंन्‌ जाना- ।

ter: ॥ ८ ॥

सिद्धन्तरमाद्‌ |

स्वपुरुषयारत्यन्ताद्कीखयेोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भागः परार्थान्यस्वातः पुरुषन्नानं ॥ ३५ ॥

"सच्च" प्रकाशयुक्तः प्राधानिकः परिणामविशेषः। 'aay.'

भोक्रा श्रधिष्ठाढरपः | तयोभाग्य-भोक्रुवरुपत्वात्‌ चेतनादेतनलाख अत्यन्तासद्कीर्षत्वं भिन्नलमित्य्ैः । तयो; ्रत्ययस्या विशेषः, भेद-

अत्यन्तासद्कीखयेोः प्रत्ययाविशेषः। 'पराः' पुरूषार्थः॥ |

तस्मादन्यो यः 'AM? पुरुषसखरूपमाजालम्बनः, परित्यक्ारङूारे सत्वे या चिच्छायासंक्रान्तिः, तच छतसंयमस्य "पुरुषविषयं "ज्ञानं, उत्पद्यते | तदेवं रूपं खालम्ननं ज्ञानं स्वनिष्ठं परुषो जनाति |

भ्ाटरवज्नेयत्योरत्यन्तविरोधात्‌ ॥ २५॥

प्रथाविष्धेषाड्‌ भोग इति घ, ८, ८ चविडधितयुस्तकापाठः | प्डित-

मामकपत्रे सुद्धितयागद्ध च पषसत्वयाः इति पाठो द्छते |

† arafaseen इति ए पुरतकपाठः |

ऽ चऋभेदेन प्रतिभासनमिति 0 षुकूकपाठः।

† परषायेनिमिन् इति ए पुर्टकःपाठः |
तत: प्रातिभ-श्रावः-वेदनाद्वारकावां जायते}

‘तत:’ पुस्तकं भाषायां शासनान्तः, युद्धतांपि श्रावानि जाने। तस्मात् प्रातिभः पूर्वांश श्रावः, तस्तशालिर्वननात् श्लोकार्डाकं मयं परमातः। ‘श्रावः’ श्रोते रिवं श्रावः, तस्मात् प्रक्रियं दिव्यं दिव्यः भवं प्रक्रियं ज्ञानति। ‘वेदना’ शुभेच्छायं श्रावः, विचित्रते ज्ञानति क्षलत तात्सिक्यं वन्यता वर्तिक्यते। तस्मात् दिव्यार्थविश्वार्थं श्रावः उपजायते। ‘श्रावः’ चुरुविरं श्रावः, श्राय्यम्यानं द्वाखं उपस्थवते हृदयने ज्ञानति क्षलत, तथा प्रक्रियायथविद्यमानमुपजायते। ‘श्रावः’ रविविरं श्रावः, श्राय्यम्यानं ज्ञानति क्षलत, तथाच वर्ण चिन्यं दिव्यसंवन्य उपजायते। ‘श्रावः’ गाढ्यम्यानं श्रावः, श्राय्यम्यानं ज्ञानति क्षलत, तथाच प्रक्रियायथविद्यमानमुपजायते। 

एतत्वं विविधविविभागाः विविधविभागास्मिन्।

ते समाधायुपसर्गाः वायुः चिन्यः च।

‘ते’ प्राक्त्रियंपार्श्वः फलविशेषः, ‘समाधि: प्रक्रियं गच्छति।’

* तस्तशालिर्वननाति च पुस्तकाः।
† गाढ्यम्यानं अति च पुस्तकाः।
‡ विविधविभागास्मिनि च पुस्तकाः।
§ 'समाधि: प्रक्रियं गच्छति च पुस्तकाः।
'उपयोगाः' उपद्रवे विलयः। तत्र इत्य-विवर्णावर्तिकार्यकरण समाधिः
मिलिणीभवति। 'हुयाते' पुनर्विकारणायं, विविधस्वलदायककलात्
'चित्रम्', भवन्ति॥ १७॥

विहितनारायणः।

वन्यकाराविश्वस्यायाम् प्रचारसंबिद्वनाथ वित्तस्य
परशरीरारेवहे:।॥ ३८॥

व्यापकलङ्कदात्मचिन्तयोनियुक्त श्रादेव भरीरान्तगंतयारेव भो-
कु-भोगमार्गे यतं संबेदनपुष्पायते, त्र एते श्राबर्म उक्ताति।
तत्र यदा समाधिभवनापति 'वन्यकारां ध्रोधोधोधाभं कर्म विगुः-
भवति, तानवमाप्यते। विन्या कथा च 'प्रवाहः' श्रायसेद्वर्तिकारणारेव
विषयाभिमुखकस्य प्रयाः, तत्त 'संबेदन' श्रां द्वारे द्विविन्या मार्गी, 
अन्यथा चिन्ता विद्रहति, द्रव्य भ्राताद्विषिधाभे
मार्गीयो विविधवृथं इति शुद्रशरीराधीयं क्षत्रारं ज्ञाति, तत्रा
परकथोरीरं उत्तर जीविकारतार वा विचारं श्राशदारारेव विविधाति।
विन्या परशरीरं प्राचार इत्यक्षिण्यासनुवनते, मधुकरार्जुनम श्रुते
मानवितः॥। अथ: परशरीरसंविन्द्रो थोगी स्वारीन्द्रेऽवेत एव ववष्टति,
यतो व्यापकम्यशिशिवपुष्पिण्योंगवहीतादिकारणां कर्मी, 
तत्स्य समाधिनम चिन्ता तत्रा ध्यायनात् वर्मचेत भोगनिष्ठाति:॥ ३८॥

* विद्वद्वारिनयास्ति इति D पुस्तकमात्रा।
† परशरीरारेवहे: इति D पुस्तकमात्रा।
‡ विन्या इति D पुस्तकमात्रा।
§ स्वारीन्द्रेऽवेत 'प्रकटः' गांधारारेव।
सिद्धस्यमं जानािय जानाय न व नाधिमालय वायोः प्रणयनात्‌
परिवेष्ठ नाभिप्रदेः पादाङ्गं नयनात्‌ समान:।
छक्टिकादे रादासरित नयनात्‌ समानः।
वयाप्य नयनात्‌ व्यानः।
नधावन्नुल्पिष्डवश्च निमश्चती: ॥ २९ ॥
सिद्धार्माय ॥
उदानस्य संयमदा - रेण "अयात्" इतरेषां निरोधा दृश्यामिलेन 'से' महान
वे, मदति वा च, ती त्तषु कण्टकं वा न अस्: इति ।
लधघुवान्नुलपिष्डवश्च निमश्चती: ॥ २९ ॥
सिद्धार्माय ॥

समानजयात् प्रज्वलनं ॥ ४० ॥

\* मविवापीति D पुस्तकपाठः।
\* उपरि गच्छती इति E पुस्तकपाठः।
\* समानजयाञ्वलनमिति पाठः C चित्रितपुस्तकेऽबाय्यं सुविद्येदापाबाब्यम्
पुस्तकेऽचरिता:।
श्रीचाकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाहिष्यं श्रीचं इ ४१ ॥

'श्रोत्र' श्रम्याख्यकाशकारिकमिश्रियं। 'श्राकर' थोम श्रम्य-तक्षकार्ये। तयोः। 'श्रम्यर' धेर-धेरिभावसंयमं।। नत्तिमष हालण्य-भाण योगिनः। 'दिवं श्रोत्र' प्रवर्तते, पुगमपू सुस्व-वाृहित-विप्रकट-श्रम्यवयस्मधिृ भवतीयाथः।। ४ १ ॥

विनयनरमाण ॥

कायाकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाहिृतस्तसमापनेश्या-काशगमनं ॥ ४२ ॥

'कायः' पास्यभौतिकं श्रीरं। तथा। 'श्रीकाणेन श्राकाशदायाये' ध्येय। 'श्रम्यर', तथ शमयं विधाय। 'सुचुनि दुईयादिया श्रीमापि: तन्वयीवायसंयमं। तत्र विधाय मात्रायसमुत्पन्नवायो यथाश्रमं नवादास्स तेन। नवस्य समन्ननामतन्नुत्तरनाये स्वरसाय आदि-धारिकार्येश्व विश्वासू यस्तेषामाः गण्यं।। ४ २ ॥

विनयनरमाण ॥

विप्रकल्पितो विद्यमेशाविविद्या। ततः प्रकाशाव-र्याक्ष्यं।। ४ ३ ॥

श्रीरात्म 'वचि', तथ उसमं। श्रीरात्मार्येश्य 'हरि'; तथा। 'नाम-विद्या', नाम विन्यासश्रीरात्मार्येश्यादेवते। 'तत्' तथा।

* श्राकाशायामार्येश्यात्मविदिते ह पुस्पमात:।
† श्रीविदिते ह पुस्पमात:।

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हातान्तः संयमान्, ‘प्रकाशावरषषष:’ शालिकः शिवाशा थः प्रकाशः-प्रकाश बाघ्यारं क्रेस्तकास्वारः तथा एवः प्रतिशोधयो भवति। कथमयः। शरीरात्मकः श्वस्ति या मनस्य विष्ण्विन्निः स्या कार्यनामेवप्रमते। कड़ा पुनः शरीरात्मकः परिययः शातक्षेण मनस्य श्वस्ति या प्रक्षिपता, तस्यां संयमान् शरीरिः सम्बन्धमेवासा: चीयमेव। ॥४॥

तदेव पुरुषालिकाः पुरुषार्थाविषयः मध्यभावाः श्रीम्भोः प्रतिपालनस्तरं दुस्मश्नांगद्विच्यता वाच्यः, काष्ठःदिक्षता श्राह्मवनः, परिवर्त्तनिन्यङ्गमार्थाः ‘रीराविवुः भवानि’ देवधामाः: शान्यायुपयोगिश्रीवान: कर्मन्वितः कर्माणि तत् कार्यावरणवायाः: प्राप्ताविवाद-श्रुभावाः श्रीरीत्वनन्दराशाङ् लाल्ये प्राप्ताः तत्साधनस्तैव प्रतिपाद्य दुहायी श्रद्धानोपयोगिनवातिज्-निर्माणश्चासां बन्धृभावाः: शिर्षीयुपयोगिनदेषा विविधापाख-प्रदनाया।

श्रीव-प्रकाश श्रीवाश्च श्रीवाश्च श्रीवाश्च श्रीवाश्च श्रीवाश्च श्रीवाश्च ॥४॥

पद्धाराः प्रयोगियाः भद्दानं चे पद्धावशाविग्रहणपा ध्यां: श्रीवलाद्यः तत् शान्यमयमः ‘श्रजयः’, भवति, श्रतानि वश्रा-न्यव श्रवानाचायः। तासोः भूतानं परिलक्ष्याविव विविढादापायक्रृपूर्ण ‘शुज्ज’ ‘क्रुप्य’ ‘वीव्य’ ‘क्रुप्य’ धारकां कायकं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं गभ्यं

* श्रद्धाराकेवाविद्वेः C प्रकाशपाठः।
† भूतावशान्यवाशाः श्वसानीबाध्यव हेतु H प्रकाशपाठः।
‡ भारस्तांशेषेऽत्र C, H, B प्रकाशपाठः।
भौगोलिक यथार्थीय शब्दात्मक समझौते। ‘धर्मवर्ण’ तथा गुरु को ग्रामाध्यक्ष-भारुकल्पक संस्कृत:। तद्भव: भौगोलिक पदक्षेप, उक्तिकालायाविवारपेक्षा। प्रात्मक वर्ण वन्यवादी योगी भौतिकीय भविष्य। तथापि, प्रवर्ण खुशी-घृपूं शंख, अनुभवी दुर्गी, दुर्गी काढी तथा जनर्च-मय ब्रह्मानुविधानीये कर्मयोगशारिक द्रव गावः भौतिकताये भविष्य।

तथैव भौतिकता पञ्चमाय दिते।

ततो तिथिमादि प्रादुर्भावः कायतमयमब्रम्हानिधिः

‘भूमिम’ परमाणुपदात्मकाः। भूमिम तत्तवपुष्पयुक्तप्रमाणी।

गर्भमा गुणप्राप्त्र। भूमिम महामात्रा: भ्रुम्कायेण पर्यावर्ति

मात्रेनविश्वसन्नवष्टिः। प्राकाम्यं दक्षानिधिः। बहुराजमांकमेष्टहं

द्रवित्व || 4.4 ||

‘अरणिना’ षरमाणएरुपतापिः। लधिमा द्वलपिष्डवक्षघूलप्राप्तिः।

गरिमा गुरुतवप्राप्तः || 4.5 ||
पातन्मले यागदुजे प्रविशति। एवं रात्रिकालीनां इति। एतेऽखिमा-दयोऽष्टा गुणा महािद्धय द्युष्यन्ते। "काथसम्पदायि" वच्यमाण्णा, प्राप्रोति। तद्धष्यानभिघातख्। तस्य कायस ये ध्यादयसतेवामभिघातो माशो नाख् भवति। रूपमभिरद दति व वायुः शोषयति इत्यादि योग्यं ॥

रूप-लावण्य-बल-वञ्जसंहननाथानि कायसम्यत् ॥

रूप-लावण्य-बलाि ग्रन्थिधािक्षं कायसम्यत्। वञ्जशनं" वञ्जवत् कठिना शरीरं भवतीत्यथैः। इति कायस्मानिरूपमभिधाय ॥

ग्रन-सखरूपास्मितान्त्याथे वच्वसंयमादिन्द्ियजयः ॥

तता मनेजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयख ॥

शरोरं मनेवदनुन्तमगतिलाभः। (मनेजविलं, कायनिरपे-

ततो मनेजविन्वबं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयख ॥

बरीखः मनेजविन्वबं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयख ॥

* मनेजविन्वबं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयख ॥
वाणिज्योगोधितां दशिकां: 'विकरणभावः'। सर्व्रस्त्रितं 'प्रधान-भवः'। एता: बिद्वि जितेष्वितथा प्राधुर्यभिनिः। तात्त्व चक्षुषाणां मधुप्रतीकाः इत्युत्पन्ने। यथा भार्यते एकदेशोपापि भर्तिते, एवं प्रत्येक-नेता: बिद्वि: सन्तोषं दत्ति मधुप्रतीकाः॥ ४५॥

इश्वरियजयमादान्तः करणजयमादान्तः। सत्व-परुषान्यतां तामाचस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठानतः सव्यन्तरत्वम्॥ ४६॥

तत्थित: दधेस सालतिकं परिणामे तसंयमस्य था सत्व-पुरुषयं रुत्पद्यते विवेकख्यातिः सा। 'श्रन्यताख्यातिः, खरूपात्तग्माहाद्यात्* तत्रैव सितस्य याभिनः। सव्यन्त्रां 'सव्यन्त्र' याभिनः।

तस्यामपि विशोकां यदा वर्तमानसुत्पद्यते योगिनः, तदा तस्मात् 'दोषान' रागाधरीगः, यत् 'वीज' अविधा, 'तथा':

* कर्त्ताविभाजिनिदिनीभावसुपरया तस्मात्स्यते ॐ पूज्यपाठः।
‘हवे’ निर्देशने, ‘केल्यां’ प्रायोगिकी सु-विशिष्टित:। पुषवच मुणानां नामाधिकारपरिवर्तनः। खुशपनिधानः॥ ५०॥

चिहाें क्रमांक तथापि सिद्धपाठमातः।

खायुपनिमक्षः१ सज्ज-खायकारणं पुनर्निद्धप्रस्तावः॥ ५१॥

चलारा योगिना भवितः। तथाख्यावानप्रस्तावमाजोत:। प्रायमः। अन्तरारप्रसः॥ द्रितिः। भृतेक्ष्रियत: द्रितः। चति-स्मान्नाख्याननिवृत्तः। तथा चतुर्ब्रह्म समाचे: प्रास्तवविधायातक-भुविष्णुः॥ चतुर्यं मधुमातीक्षः॥ भवितः याचातुकुले। ‘खानिगे देवा सप्तिमक्षकारे भवितः, दिब्यजीवनान्नित्रामुखोवक-बन्धि। तस्य ‘उपनिमक्षः’, नामेन ‘खुळ’, कर्षणं, गाथे ‘खान’। सप्तामे पुनर्निद्धबोधोो निपतति। सयाकरणे खल-खायकारणं मधुमात्रां मध्यमात्रा न खायुपमाक्षः। प्रायः, खल-खायकारणेन वर्णं कर्षणं॥ ५१॥

प्रकाशान्त समाध्यात्मां विहृतेकारो। पूर्वाःहवनांहमाछिरि-

सुपाठमातः।

* बधिकारसामारिति B, C पुस्तकपाठः।
† खुफवालिकारिति B, C पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ खायुपनिमक्षः दृश्य H पुस्तकपाठः।
§ खायुपनिमक्षः ह्यं H पुस्तकपाठः।
‖ प्रास्तवविधायात B, C पुस्तकपाठः।
\( \) मधुमाती प्रायमः H पुस्तकपाठः।
शष्टिलघुक्षमयः

श्रीमानिदेवकृं दासां प्राप्तां।

'चणः': श्रीमान्य: काशीवाचनः। यद्य काशा प्रविष्टमुः न भक्ते।

तत्त्वविद्या काशिक्षणम् य: 'चणः' पौराणिकृत्य परिष्ठामः, तथा

'बंधसात' प्राप्तम् 'तिथिकृतं स्वारं', तत्त्र चतुर्भुजः। चतुर्भुजः: 'चण

काशिक्षणात् काशिक्षणात्तुलः, बलसातां। यद्य: तत्त्वात्रायं चतुर्भुजः च

चतुर्भुजः महादेवि बाह्यारोहणीति विवेकनानायतिः:॥५२॥

श्रीवेण स्मारस्य विषयविशेषोपपण्यपायाः।

आति-लखण-दृश्यार्थतानांस्वेदातुल्योऽकतः प्रति

पति: ॥ ५३॥

पदार्धानां मेद्वेदेन्त: 'आति-लखण-दृश्य भवन्ति । काष्ठं मेद्वेदेन्तु: 'आति',

यथा मौरिन्य विशिष्टेश्वरति। जायता तृणाय: 'लखणः',

मेद्वेदेन्त: यथा द्वंस कल्प। द्वंसणानि। जायता लखणेन कार्यभिषेक

पाण्डेशेतिः: 'दृश्यः', दृश्यः। यथा तृणामान्यरीरमाणकोभिभवन्त्यदेशायतोः।

चतु पुण्योद्वारिणुत्वं न भक्ते, चतुर्विषयकालिक्षितोः। यथा

विवेकविशेषां भेदेण भेदेण भेदायते, तदातत्त्वः सत्त्वायते ॥

श्रवणसौभावं यदं भेदेण सानसु पजायते, तदात तत्त्वात्‌ भेदाय

श्रवणसौभावं यदं भेदेण सानसु पजायते, तदात तत्त्वात्‌ भेदाय।

* शाब्दविवेचनिः युक्तायायाः।
† विवेकदानानिः युक्तायायाः।
‡ विवेकदानानिः युक्तायायाः।
पाणिने बोधे गार्धारितः प्रक्रिया वंधनाद्वर्तवेच मेद्यतिपति: 
स्वाय तत्त्वानि तत्त्वायां "तारकं सर्वविषयं सव्यैविषयमकमश्देति विवे- 
कजं जानं ॥ ४५४।

तारकं संयमबलाद हृद्यायासुत्पल् (तारकः, 
दति | तारयत्यगाधात्‌ संसारयेः* योगिनं करा स्या 
“तारकं”, तथाः "सव्यैविषयं' दति, सव्वाछि 
तत्वानि महदादीनि विषयोऽस्येति शब्बेदिषयं' । सखभावशाख 
सत्वयाविषयलवं । विषय" | खभावान्तरमाइ । "WHAT, इति । निःग्रेषनानावखयापरिवतन्थाकमावयङ्ये इति प पुरतकपाठः |

सक्ष-पुरुषयोः शुद्रिसामी कैबल्यं ॥ ५५।

"सक्ष-पुरुषो' उक्रखचणौ । तथोः "प्रुद्धिसाम्ये Saal' ।

* संसारसागरादिति इ पुस्तकापाठः 
† निमिश्वाग्नावशापरिसंगतमालाक्षक्षायां इति इ पुस्तकापाठः 
निमिश्वाग्नावशापरिसंगतमालाक्षक्षायां इति ० पुस्तकापाठः 

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हितं इति दृष्टि देहोऽसमानाय पुनःपञ्चममिधाय तद्मापन्तेः। रताधिकारस्य चिन्तास्य खकारणामप्रवेषात् केवद्यमुत्यद्यते। दति मद्दाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविर चितायां राजमान्तरश्चलयोगशास्तख्चजटन्तो विश्वतिपादशतर्तयः। ॥ २ ॥

दृष्टि महाराजाधिराजकोौजेदेवविरिचितायां राजमान्सखा-भिधाया पानस्कल्योगशास्त्रक्षणं विभूतिपादशृतीयः। ॥ ३ ॥

विश्वसच्चार सर्वं तृणात्मालाभ्यमविनिट्ठ्ठ्ठा खकारणानुप्रवेषः। पुनः पुनः प्रभागवरिष्ठोराजाधिराजप्राचीनः। दृष्टि दृष्टि देहोऽसमानाय पुनःपञ्चममिधाय तद्मापन्तेः। रताधिकारस्य चिन्तास्य खकारणामप्रवेषात् केवद्यमुत्यद्यते। दति मद्दाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजदेवविर चितायां राजमान्तरश्चलयोगशास्तख्चजटन्तो विश्वतिपादशतर्तयः। ॥ २ ॥

दृष्टि महाराजाधिराजकोौजेदेवविरिचितायां राजमान्सखा-भिधाया पानस्कल्योगशास्त्रक्षणं विभूतिपादशृतीयः। ॥ ३ ॥
धृत चतुर्थः पादः ।

यदाभ्यैैव कैव्यं विनेपालः। प्रजायते।

तन्मूळमामण्डित्वं विदन्तं खमः।

इन्द्रानीं विनािििश्चरेचतुर्मात्रारिकपूश्च कैव्यशृङ्खल-पावकापनाय। कैव्यपाददृष्ट्यमार्थते।

तत्र यथा पूर्वसुमासः चिदुःस्यान्तः नानाविनिरस्याकारणप्रति-पावनद्वारेैैैव वारस्यम्। एततिः: चिदुः। यथा पूर्वस्याध्यक्षसमाधि-लाऴ्या मादिनिमिन्नपावनमार्थस्य वर्णने। तत्राने भरस्याध्यक्षसमाधि-समाधियोऽस्ततः सिद्धयाः वा वर्णनादि योगस्य प्रतिपादनाय समाधिसिद्धेण साधारणाय कैव्यशृङ्खलाय।

अन्नाधि-मन्न-तपः: समाधिजनः। सिद्धयः॥ १॥

कार्य हेमु अथवाहेमु। यथा परमाणुमामाकाः। गमनादेः। यथा वा कार्याधिकायां गम्यते। रघुवनमाना सामान्याः। श्रीविनीचका गुणाः। चौधिसरसन्नो चतुर्मात्रेऽस्य पातालाधृ मण्डलमात्र नानाविनिरस्यायं हरिराण्य परिपाटिते। चौधिसरसन्नो चतुर्मात्रेऽस्य पातालाधृ मण्डलमात्र नानाविनिरस्यायं हरिराण्य परिपाटिते।

कैव्यशृङ्खलापावकापनाय ० पुस्तकपाठः।
नन्दीश्रादीनां जात्यान्तराकारेण परिणखम्॥

नन्दीश्रादिकारणां ध्वन्माऽधग्मादयस्तच क्रियमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते, तत्स कथं तीनामापुरणे कारणमित्थाह इत्यादि॥

निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रकत्याऽस्िन्न जन्मनि विकारामापुरयन्ति जात्यन्तराकारेण परिणमम्॥ ९ ॥

ननु ध्वन्माऽधग्मादयस्तच क्रियमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते, तत्स कथं तीनामापुरणे कारणमित्थाह।

निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रकत्याऽस्िन्न जन्मनि विकारामापुरयन्ति जात्यन्तराकारेण परिणमम्॥ ९ ॥

ननु नन्दीश्रादीनां जात्यादिपरिणामः श्रस्िन्नेव जन्मनि इश्यते तत्‌ कथं जन्मान्तराभ्यस्तसमाः कारणतवसुच्यते।

ननु नन्दीश्रादीनां जात्यादिपरिणामः श्रस्िन्नेव जन्मनि इश्यते तत्‌ कथं जन्मान्तराभ्यस्तसमाः कारणतवसुच्यते।

ननु नन्दीश्रादीनां जात्यादिपरिणामः श्रस्िन्नेव जन्मनि इश्यते तत्‌ कथं जन्मान्तराभ्यस्तसमाः कारणतवसुच्यते।
निम्नोख्यसाग्यसितामाशात् ॥ ४ ॥

तेषां "शरनेेर्षा", मात, श्रटन्तिभेदे' व्यापारनागाले 'या', एर: 'प्रयोजकं' प्रेरकमधिष्टादरलेम। तेन ग भिन्नमतनबं।

अयमथः यथा sata wit मनः चदौःपाण्ादीनि qu प्ररयत्यधिष्ठाटवेन, एवं कायान्तरेव्वपीतिं ॥ ५ ॥

* निरतिगश्यविभत्यनुभवायेति C युक्तचाप: ।
† बाध्यान्तरेष्यपीतीति B युक्तचापः ।
जम्मादिसभवानां चित्रीत्वा चिन्मायिन्ति नामभवं पद्माविधेये।

तच ध्यानमवनाशयं || ६ ||

'ध्यानम्' समाधिजित्य वधिि, तनू पञ्चसु मध्ये 'ध्यानम्' कयः
बायमारसिंहे, दशतः || ६ ||

ध्यानजं' समाधिजं यित, तनु वञ्चसु मध्ये 'ध्यानम्' कयः
वायमारसिंहे, दशतः || ६ ||

य येतरचिन्तेभ्या योगिनिन्तं तथा
कम्ि विखणमित्यायां || ७ ||

अत्तम यागादि भवानां बायमारसिंहे
तच ध्यानजं' समाधिजं यित, तनु वञ्चसु मध्ये 'ध्यानम्' कयः
वायमारसिंहे, दशतः || ६ ||

ततस्तदीपाकानुगुणामेव वाभिव्यक्तिवासनानां || ८ ||

दृह दिविधाः क्षवाखनाः रूतिमाचफलाः जात्थायुभंगफलाः
तजर जात्थायुर्भोगफलाः एकानेकजन्मभवाः || इत्यनेन पुस्तकपाठः |
निर्धारित: । यास्त्र भूतिमाप्नसत्साधाराभिमन्यात: कर्मशः ।
केन कर्मणा यास्त्रूक मृत्युर्मार्गें देव-मनुष्य-निर्धारादिभेदेन:। तृत्या विपाकश्च या: 'भ्रमण-गुणम् भ्रमण-वायुः वायुः: तात्त्वात् भ्रमण-वायुः', 'वायुः', भक्ति । श्रवणंः केन कर्मणा पूर्वं देवतादिरीमार्गें ज्ञानशन्त्वक्ष्या पुनःश्चार्धिभीते मृत्युर्मार्गे तद्रूपम् एव भूतिमाप्नसत्साधाराभिमन्यातः प्रकटीभवन्ति। तेषां वायुः यस्य विपाक: तस्य सत्यादयो जायन्ते। इतराद्व: सत्योऽपि न्यग्निता:। न तस्यं देवः जातिन्तरशतव्यवधाने पुनःतथाविधदौ शरीरस्यारग्मे तदनुरूपाः एव भूतिमाप्नसत्साधाराभिमन्यातः प्रकर्षीभवन्ति।

आसामेव वायुः कार्यार्याभवानुपत्तिमाश्चु श्रमयोऽति चिथुमाह ।

जाति-देश-काल-व्यवहितानाम् यान्त्रिक संस्कारयान्त: ॥ ५ ॥

इह नारायोऽन्तिविर भर्तिन संघारिणाम कान्तिचातीहस्य यदा धान्यकसरसस्वक्ष्याभवानेन पुनःस्वाभी धार्मिक प्रतिपक्षम, तदा तस्य पृथ्वीनुभताथि धारिणा तस्याविभिन्नरीवरीवश्वकार्येन वायुः च च प्रकटीभवन्तः प्रकटोऽन्तः कान्तिचातिकन्तः कार्यान्तः प्रकटीभवन्तः। जाति-देश-कालपक्षनेपि नामां खानुप्पस्वस्वकार्येन एवानन्तयोऽपि नाम: ।

* देवनुभतातिर्योवादिभेदेनित्व: पुक्कपाठः।
† चतुरप्राप्तामतिकन्तः पुक्कपाठः।
‘स्मरितमकारणोऽरेकसुम्पलाम्। तथा हि चनुप्पीयमानात् कर्मणशिष्यः बने वासनाप्राप्तः संकारः। समुस्पर्षेत्। य च समुरकार्त्तिनां पलियाना-धाकुरीभावः। कर्षणां वा जागवारिणां श्रवणिकसल्यवास्वागम्। कर्षणां तत्याविवेकमेवमेकसल्यवास्वागम्। सामथं वचनारूपः संस्कारः समुत्पद्यते, स च सगेनरकादीर्नां फलान-रुपतयथा। नित्यानुभावः नुलपिरुसंकारसुखाद्वृत्तः। एवद्रु एव खर स्मरितमकारणोऽरेकसुम्पलाम् भिन्नालक्षणान्याभावेः। दुर्भवः। कार्यकारण-भावः।।

भवलानन्त्यं कार्यकारणभावेः वासनाः। यदा तु प्रधान-सेवानुभवः प्रवचिते तदा किं वासनानिमित्तं जः निर्बीर्मित्तं हिि श्रद्धा व्यपनेतुमात्।

तासमाननादिलभमार्तियो नित्यावात॥ १०॥

‘तास्’ वासनाः। ‘चनुप्पील’ न विचित्रे चादियत्वं तस्य भावस्था च। चारालान्त्यालीत्यं। कुलः। ‘चाषियो नित्यावात्। चेतमाग्निरुक्तक्कुप्पा धेरूि सुखाधानाम। से भधास्तुः। मा कदाचित। तैहृः तिरंगे भएदित्वं। चक्षुसविशेषं। वासनानां कारसं तस्य नित्यालान्तंदिवलितः। एवत्तष्टं भविति कारणसं चनििलित-लादुनन्त्यभस्मकारणीः। कार्यानां रहस्यः। बेन वायेितः। श्रावन्त् हिित.

* कुल इति भाषित व पुस्तकमाधः।
पातञ्जले योगदाने

बंकाराधुनविवेकं बंडीर्ष-विकार्णगवले विनं तत्तद्भविवेकाकावपककाहातात् तत्त्वपत्थाय परिशयनति द्वयं:॥ ९०॥

शास्त्रानाग्नि वान द्विन सवमचन विकाश्चण्ठी विस्ततं त्दभिव्यश्चकविपाक लाभात्् तत्त्वरूपतया परिणमत॥ ९०॥

वायुगानामुखाये हेतु:, तास्वानुविद्ध रागाः, तेषांविन वलि शाचात् पारम्यं श्रवणं च तेषव:। 'फलं' मृतरादि वृक्षादि:।

'शास्त्रं' बुद्धितव:। 'शास्त्रं' यदेवानुविद्ध यह प्राप्त वालनां।

तत्संति: 'हेतु-फलाश्रयानमवलाएः', चन्दनानामपि वालनां। 'संस्कृतं' चेलादीर्घं 'जवावे' श्यान-वोगाभ्यं दुर्घवीजकक्षां विविद्धं, विद्वदि का वालनम:। 'फलं अपृतं' न कार्यमार्गम दृति तार्थं 'शास्त्रं'॥ ९०॥

नमु प्रत्यक्षे विनुहि नमरोगपथवेष्टकनां तत्त्वसाहार्य कार्यमार्गभावस्य नाम नामायुगपद्वीतिविनात्। भेनेकार्यमार्गानं एकद्वितीयनायां।

अततीतानागांत श्रवणेक्ष्यधमेदास्त्यालिङ्गामां॥ १२॥

प्रत्यक्षाकारणं भावानासुत्पत्तिं दुभक्षातां तेषां स्वचिक्र-भायेनातु। नौदी श्रवितानादीर्घं कार्यान्विति स्वचिक्रयं दुभक्षातु:।

निद्रापाखो च कार्येनिविद्वद्व वाक्ष्यानि प्रवर्तिते। निद्रापाखो चिवः

* प्रवर्तितानामांसोति B, F मूःकार्यपाठः।
यमालेाच्य कथित्‌ नाना | सतामपि विरोाधान्नाभावसम्बन्थाऽस्ि ।
यत्‌ खरूपेण wae तत्‌ कथं निरूपाख्यतामभावखरूपताश्च
भजते, ग रूपं खीकरेातीव्यथेः । तस्मात्‌ स्तां नाजञासम्भवात्‌
असताञ्चोत्पत्वभावात्‌ तसेध्विपरिणममाने च एवावतिष्ठते। धर्मात्र ते गधकलेन व्यवस्थिता।
खस्िन् खस्िनशधनि व्यवस्थिता: खरूपं त्यजन्ति,| वर्ममानेशधनि व्यवस्थिता: केवलं
भेमयता भजने । तस्मादुपासास्मेव गनितानागताध्वयंदेशस्मेव ष
खरूपेण कार्यकारणभावात्‌ खस्िन्न दृष्ट्ये प्रतिपत्ते, तस्मादपवर्मर्मास्मेव-
संस्कृत घरितच्यानुसरणमान न निकोर्तु पार्थे ॥ ।
त एते धर्म-धर्मिण: किंचला द्रत्याः ।

tे व्यञ्ज-हुस्त्रा गुणामानः ॥ ॥
व एते धर्म-धर्मिण: प्रोक्ता: ‘ने’, ‘व्यञ्ज-हुस्त्रामेवन व्यवस्थिता:।
‘गुणा:’ बचर्जननोऽक्षयः । तदाकात्स्तुभावात्स्तपरिप्रयासक्षयः
दृष्ट्येः। वत: बचर्जननोऽस्मि: खुचुदु:खोदुःखः: वर्मिभा वाचा-
व्यक्तिभिन्नां भावनानामस्यथायानुगमे हुस्त्ये, वच वदवधि
तत्‌ तत्परिप्रयासक्षयः कुड़ा। यथा घटादयो महस्यन्ति भ्रम्यप्रयास-
मक्षयः: ॥ ॥

tे च चेत्रे गुणा: वर्मिच मृूकारण, कथमेका धर्मिणि वपदेशः
द्रत्याभिषेक ।

* गधकलेन गजाजिष्यकेन व्यवसििता दति F पृष्ठापार ।
† न खरूपं लजज्ञोति C पृष्ठापार ।

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९६ CARS योगद्धनर
संखाराधन्‌विद्धं संहाय-विकाश्धभ्मि fed त्दभिग्यश्चकविपाक लाभात्‌ ततफलङूपतया परिणमत इत्यर्थः ॥ ९० ॥

AQAA शानं कथं सवतील्याज््य हानापायमाह |
हेतु-फलाश्रयालम्बनैः सङ्गहीतत्वादेयामभावे
तद्भावः || ९९ ||

वासनानामुभेऽ हेतु:, तश्चानुभवतः रागादय:, तेषामविद्या इति वाचात् पारस्यमिय च हेतुः। 'फल' मृतीरादि धृतारादि च।
'वाषयः' बुझितचं। 'वाषयः' यथे वामुभवतः तदेव वासनाः।
अतः हेतु-फलाश्रयालम्बने:, चलनामापि वासनाः 'संघोदित-
लात', तेषा हेतादीर्मान्तत्वादेषाय दशवीजकर्वने
विहिते, निर्मुखता ग वासना: प्रोक्तिनः ग कार्यमारभवत इति
हेतुः 'अभावः' || ९९ ||

मनु प्रतिच्छ विलया नमरमेश्वरेवाहनानां तत्फलानाम
कार्यकारभावेवनैयीयामभावायामत् भेदे कथमेकलमित्याश्रद्य एकल-
मर्ममयनायाः।

अतीतानागतं सहस्पतास्वभवेदास्त्वाहिः ॥ १२॥

इत्र प्रक्षयमयतं भावानासुपत्तिः हुक्कामती तेषा सच्चयम-
भायोगात्। नमि हन्ति विधिमानारूपानां कार्यालिपि सच्चयमनि हृष्टे।
निदपाशे च कार्यां किषुलिखित कार्यानि प्रवर्तिते। ग्याल्मा विष-

* प्रश्लेषुपथाःसोति B, F मुक्तश्रववातः।
धामालोऽय काृतिभव चवमती। शत्रुषः विरोधायामायवधधोऽवकिः।
धम्म ख्यापेग शब्दवार्तां तस्य कर्म गुहापाख्यातमाक्षवधवपाय भवते, न विष्टः कुर्य गरीकरोतीवेवः।  तथेऽत्तदा नानासक्ष्वात्
शब्दताचतवात्वाभावात् तेकोभिभीषितभिभस्मना धर्मी वदेकदृष्टपवव्यावतिहते।
धान्यारुढः ते धागकनेन वयविजिनात्। खाकिन्य खचिरजनानि
वयविजिनात्: खुफख वयविजिनात्। वर्षमानेनाभिनि वयविजिनात्। केवलं
भावातः भजने। तस्मात् नाजासम्भवात् अरसताच्चोत्पत्यमावात्
तैसतधरिपरिणेमाने धर्मी सरेकरूपांवतिष्ठतें। खृस्िन्नध्यनि
व्यवस्थिताः व्यवस्थिताः केवलं भोग्यतां भजने। तस्मादपवर्गमेकोवर्गाः
कार्यकारापावन्तात्स्विसिनिः देवने प्रतिपद्धते, तस्मादपर्यन्तेक-नेकेतस
मेकविष्ठायानुविष्ठाः न निक्रोदां पार्थे। ॥ ९९ ॥
त एते ध्यान-धर्मिः किंच्छपा देवास।

te अव-खाभा गुणात्मानः ॥ १३॥

ey एते ध्यान-धर्मिः मोक्षः। 'ते', 'वन-खन्तायेन वयविजिनात्।
'गुणा': चतरिसमोक्रहुः। तदाकासात्क्षावायात्परिशिक्षिकहुः
दृष्टाः। यतः: चतरिसमोभि: खुश्चुःसेीहुः: वयविजिनाः वान्याः
धान्यारुढाः乏मानाः भावयान्यामाच्छादनबन्धुगमयी देवते, एष धियाधिती
सत्स परिशिक्षिकहुः: ॥ २१ ॥

यद्येते जये गुणा: वर्ज्य मूलकारणम, कथमधामधामिव वपदेरः
देवासाः।

* वधकलेन चैवालिकलेन वयविजिनात हृत F पुक्षपादः।
† न खुफख वजनातीति C पुक्षपादः।
परिख्मालि ॥ १४ ॥

यद्येते वत्स गुणास्थारपि तेषामङ्गां भावगममखचणा यः
परिणामः कचित्‌ वत्स गुणास्थारपि तेषामङ्गां भावगममखचणा यः
१५ ॥

वस्तूसाम्ये विन्दमेरर्यायोऽव्यव्यविचित्र: पञ्चः ॥ १५ ॥

'तयोः' स्मान-शेषयेः, 'विविक्ष: पञ्चः' विविक्षो भार्गवेद दति
बलवत्। यथादेव 'बलवत्। यथादेव 'बलवत्।

उपलब्धते च तस्मान्न चिन्तका । अथ युगपद्वङमिः
कायस्येति पृष्ठकपाठः।
वेसां नेधाते तदा कारणभेदे वति कार्येभेदकार्यार्थे बिशेखकपायस्य वा बुलग्नु स्थायः। एतदुम्भति साध्यपिश्रति कारणे वति कार्येभेदार्थे तदा समप्रगतिजनानविधिकार्यार्थसेवकपायस्य स्थायः, कारणभेदकार्यार्थ कार्यनुमात्तूः स्थायस्य निर्रुक्तम् वा स्थायः। येहेवं कथं तेन चििणात्वाध्याक्षेत्रम् स्मातुः सुख-दुःख-मोहम्यान्यति ज्ञानिन जन्योः। मेवः। यथा च अधर्मचित्तिः गुणस्य पिन्यमि निगुणं, तस्य च अधर्मन्मभास्करकृतो धर्मस्य भवति। ब्रह्मार्थकारर्यः। नातुस्वाभिभावसाधितस्य तेन तेन इपेतिाभिवाहः। तथा च कार्यस्कुषः विनितितन्त्रथाय निमितां धर्मयास्तह्नेचिम चित्रलिङ्कन्त्राः विन्य स्वस्थायितत्वाः परिश्रमां सुखम्य भवति। तदेववार्तोरकारी रुद्रेशोऽनिष्ठतया हुः सुखम्य सप्तमिचित्रमेति भवति। तीव्रवार्तोरकारायित्वा तमेदे-किक्कलेन कौन्तेयः सुपुर्णा सामाधम भवति। तस्वादिििग्नायनोनिन्नतिः रितिकृतिः यथा श्रोतः। तदेवं विश्वार्थकारः। नाताक्यविवधाकारार्थ कार्यकारणभावः। कारणभेदे वति कारणभेदेः अधिश्वस्तततः ज्ञानाद्वितीयतिरिक्तविकल्पस्य व्यवस्थापितं।

यथेकं नायः प्रकाशकालात् वेसार्थार्थसंयुक्त प्रकाशलाब्धस्य वेसार्थार्थसंयुक्त प्रकाशाः तत् कथं युग्मपत्त घनायनयां ग्राहाति न भरति चेदाग्रस्त सृष्टार्थ महर्षाः।

* धर्माधिकारः हति F नुक्ताप्राप्तः।
† बाध्यार्थ हति C नुक्ताप्राप्तः।
‡ विविक्षाविद्यार्थिः हति F नुक्ताप्राप्तः।
तदुपरागापेक्षितवार्तास्य वल्लु रातासातां॥ १६॥

ततः प्रधानं, "उपरागादाकारसमर्पणात्, चिन्ते वाकां 'वशु', प्रधानमात्रं, चिन्तः पदायं: खातासामे धानः शीतमेष्टे, नीलादिन्नानञ्चापलामात्रं द्विभ्रमकारश्रितिका धमागतं तथाप्राप्तेः वस्तृकारकारियासपेपेसत् वातिरिक्तकारीस्य समभासारुपायुस्तानात्। ततः चेनेवार्तिन तथा शानसंबृप्तः राग: ततेव तथार्थां तर्जृहां धवनारोण्यानं वय्यति। ततः चेवार्तिन शान इत्युच्यते। चेन चाकारो न समर्पितः एकाज्ञालीन चा संब्रहितोति। भिक्षानुभुतेः तथा वारुड़ीकरियाः संस्कारसुदृढ्याय वस्तुकारियां संतप्तेः तत्र वाद्कारियाः स्तिसिद्धात्मिसत् श्रयम्थैः स्वः। कात्तलामे सामग्रीमपेक्ते, नीलादिन्नानञ्चोपजायमानं इद्विप्रणालिकया खमागतः तत्र विराजितां चिन्तरितां भवति। यथेन चार्थो न समर्पितः बोगारागः येन मैथुनः तथाय छतः तमेवाथै मयतिति। ततो च यद्येवं प्रमाणापि परुषो यक्षिन्। काले नीलं संवेदयते मात्रस्मिन काले पीतं श्रतञ्चकव्स्यापि कदाचिद्गरस्यादियाकारियाः प्रतिपद्यते द्वारा वस्तृत्वस्य श्रमायते, गापि बर्ष्यन सतितिति न कक्षितिरोधः॥ १६॥

विषयं प्रमाणापि पुष्यो वशानु काले नीलं यवब्रहितोति न तत्प्राप्ता काले पीतं उपविन्यासानांपि कदाचिद्वृहीतकलादा कालग्राण्ये परिशासितमिस्त्रामाहिताब्रक्षतात् परिशुद्धमात्॥

सदा राताश्रितवार्तस्यत्तुष्यभो: पुष्यस्यापरिप्रेयानिर्माताः॥ १७॥

था एता: 'चित्रं', प्रमाण-विपर्यायावर्त्तमाण: 'हस्तं', ता: 'तत्त्वभो: तथा चित्रं चरति: 'पुश्यं', 'द्वां' लक्ष्याकाँवेन, 'श्रयं', तथा चिन्तृपपत्या 'यस्मात्रात्' परिणामस्य लक्षाविक्षेपिष्ठैयः।

* जस्तिरिते दशि: कुलपापा।
† पुष्यस्यापिरापिकारियानिर्मातिः शार्मस्य तदाभ्यासमाब्याः प्रकारः।
बाणीं परिधांभी खात्र या परिशास्त्रां कादारिकलापायतां चिन्ह-नृपतीं यह खात्र वेपप्पते। 

प्रमाणेः, पुष्पश्च चिन्हुपश्च खरेद-विकिंशाठलैंग्यावास्वापूर्वाणि निर्बल्पसि वर्ष तथ्यापि खरेदवाह-खितलात् तदहें चिन्तापेनाप्रयाणि भवति तथाविष्णायांश्रवः खरेद- 

निद्रायांकालसिस्म्यावः, तथा खरेद चिन्हु यह खात्रलामिनि न 

कदाहितिपरिशास्त्रामलम्रूः। १८॥

मनु चिन्तामेव ख्यातकालान्यां प्रकाशकं तदा खरे प्रकाशकालान्यां 

आदिमर्थमेव प्रकाशकान्ती तात्विक व्यवहारसमासि: किं 

प्रहीपनरें देवान्नामगनपेतुमात॥ १८॥

न तत् साभारासं हयान्तात। १८॥

तस् चिन्ता, 'ख्यातां हर्मानां, न भवति, पुष्पपेन भवति 

चावतू। कुन्: 'हुयान्तात,' यत विक्षु दृष्ट्य तदहें भवति: यथा गतार्दि। 

हृदान्त् चिन्त तशश्च खात्रापूः। १८॥

मनु चात्मानविशिष्टां चेतु: हुयान्तेवर्थमेव चिन्ताविशिष्टां, किंच 

खुद्दुक्षदेवदेवेदिवरेण पुष्पश्रृंविनातिसिस्मापिरिशादेक्ष्यः खरेदो 

हृदान्ते, तथापि खुद्दुक्षदेव्य भेताजां न से राग देवान्नामा खंतुदु- 

रसेदेवदेवस्योपसेदान्नादवान्नाकिंत्रिष्तमात॥ १८॥

एकलमये चोभायानविधारं। १८॥

अर्थांशं हंसिनिरर्दूर्या व्यवहारोग्यात्पादमेव प्रमाणे: सुख-

* खरेदप्रकाशकान्तीं कुस्मात्।
* खरेदप्रकाशकान्तीं कुस्मात्।
* खरेदप्रकाशकान्तीं कुस्मात्।
१०२  पात्नले बागे

हैिऱ्यू च प्रविन च सहितोगामकारेः सुवद्-सुपत्या स्वतारस्मातपावार्यां। एवंविध्व वा वापारदमर्गस्यकारेः न दुगपकम् न कां विरोधान्। त एव विन्द्रबोध्यापारबुद्धमपमस्- 

बिंगिः मर व्यवहारसमतापादमं । एवंविधञ्ज्ञो व्यापारदयमर्शप्र्यलकास्े

ग युगपत्कचुः विरोधात्। ग हि विरद्धयोच्यापारवोवृम्भ- 

नांस्ति । श्रतः "एकस्मिन काले, 'वहं' अहंपांचकः प, 

अवधारितमविद्वाचकाः विंस्त्र अवधारार्हविन्द्रधिकुम्ब भस्ति। किमेव- 

विष्णुवराध्याय विन्यास वस्तुवनस्वाविद्वानादस्वानविवर्ध्यवार्गिनिलेख विनेङ्गा धमनववेदनातः। प्रेयनिललोक पल्ल न ध्यनिदिनिवर्। १९।८।।

गणु माधुदुरुः श्रवण प्रश्नो गुह्यारेण शं भविष्यति दयाबन्धाः 

विसानानास्यो बुद्धवुद्धरितप्रसङ्गः स्मृतिसद्दरच॥२० ||

बद्र एव बुद्धवुद्धरितप्रसङ्ग वनिच्छते तदा शापि बुहः: भुष्मादुहा भुजानां प्रकाशितसमस्येवति तस्या वाष्पक भुजानां कवणीवं तस्या भ्रान्तिविद्वान्तथानात। पुद्धधार्येणाश्चायायामीकार्यनेव खार्। 

बाल्य प्रतीतानात्तानामस्य: प्रतीतो भविष्यति। स्तीतिबर्त्तच भाविता। 

चेत रधे वा स्युष्प्याय बुद्री तदवक्षमाकारावमाननाः भुज्ञाना-सात्त्वसेरुवुद्धिजिनति: कसार्विता वायुप्रस्त:। श्रवणी, तदार्शुमे- 

रष्टावम्बनाथु भुज्ञासतीनां भुजपुद्द्वपनो: कस्मित्वां रसिनिर्यु- 

त्योजिति वातमशभवनात् ‘बुद्धवास’।। अदित्य दुपकादित्रों 

रसिनिर्युतिर्तित न व्याघ्रे ॥ २० ॥

* खरूपसं वेदमाभावादिति C पुस्तकपाठः।

† सतीनां सङ्करेऽ दर्शि P पुस्तकपाठः।
पुरुषः "पुरुषः, तेन इति, तत्सज्ञिधाने तत्रुपतामिवापन्नं, "क्रृष्टैः पुरुषः, तेन 'इति, तत्सज्ञिधाने तत्रुपतामिवापन्नं, तदा भवति तदा तदेव वर्षायंपराणवर्षाणिभभवते। यथा निर्वाणस्वायत्तिकरणाय प्रतिविम्बे विने परमाणुविनिर्माणं एव रजस्तमेग्यामनभिग्तं सत्वं शृएद्धलाचिष्डाथा। इति ए पुखकपाठः।
यहणसमथं भवति, न पनरग्रद्धत्वाद्रजस्तमखी। तत् नाग्नत- रजस्नोखपमजित्राय वलं निःश्चायदीपमिखारां वदैवैक्षम्पत्तथा परिषममाणं विष्फायामध्यांमयांदमोच्छारतवतिहेतुं। वचा चयक्तावताधागने वौस्क वणमारविभवति, एवं विरूपंशिराधाने सत्वाभिज्ञामभियज्यश्चैतस्यं। तत् एवानृतं द्रव्ये व विष्फकी नियोदिताभिज्ञा । नियोदिता विष्फकं: पुल्लं। तलस्ति- धानादभिज्ञापैतवं सत्वाभिज्ञाम विष्फकं:। तद्यथा वचनिधित्- लादलार्जुः पुल्लक्ष भोगपीतानां प्रतिवधाते। तदेव ब्यानाध्यायविधि: वाक्सं: पुल्लक्ष परस्परानो। परिषिधियं कर्मणुपुल्लक्षुचुः भोगप्राथ्य वाप- विहंते। वचनान्नुजङ्कवालरेकालपि गुणणा, कदा पिस्किम्ब्रिजङ्क- लाचिन्याणं प्रतिवधां परिषममाणं वृः-दुःख-रचाराणं व गिर्यांं, तननिम्न कर्मान्नुज्जुः पुल्लक्षे बरे संक्षारमयरवाण्डारे रेबेद्वान- भोगप्राप्ति। तलस्तुमाणी विनवमलेवं: प्रतिवधानाध्यायमन्या। दश्वतिवश्याकारेण विनवनापायतिकारां विनवनाध्यायमां सत्वाभिज्ञाताः। बुद्धवर्यानुद्विप्णुपो गुणपुल्लक्षवानुद्विप्रार्थकं भोगदुःखे पुल्लक्षे पुल्लक्षानुद्विप्रार्थकं भोग- विद्विष्णः। बुद्धवर्यानुद्विप्णु॥ अपानाध्यायब्यवाच्यानां। "सत्वयुक्त्वर्यानुद्विप्णुपो मुनी प्रतिनिधानेति। विष्फायामध्यां दृष्टिया:। एवं वंदनेपि पौरुषाययुक्त्वर्यामध्यां- विष्फायामध्यां दृष्टिया:। ख्रिस्तियां भोगप्राप्तिः। वारसवर्यामध्यां दृष्टिया:। ख्रिस्तियां भोगप्राप्तिः।

* प्रतिवधायक्ष्ठः दृष्टि। 
* प्रतिवधायक्ष्ठः दृष्टि।
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नामांगिरश्च गिधपरिप्रभाषकः निर्देशेले धृत्र, चत्रा सूक्ष्म सूर्ये।
एवमाणिरश्च धापकता धापरिप्रभाषकः। पुद्धस्य नश्चार्हिन्द्रो निप्पैरे वि
कांग प्रतिप्रभाषामुल्लष्ट्ये । चत्रात्र। प्रतिप्रभाषकः सूक्ष्ममनव
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घाटा पुरुषः कथानिम्म॑ले सचे प्रतिप्रभाषितः। न्याय वर्ष प्रतिप्र

नगु साविकपरिणामरूपे बुद्धिस पुरुस्निधानादिरूपे।
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पुद्धस्याविमोगमयाधारः तथा कर्मवस्त: पुद्धार्थकर्माभाषा तथा युक्त परिप्र

नमु विश्वसन्धिराधारः पुरुषाये कार्यम पुद्धार्थकर्माभाषास्त्राविभेदाः।
पुरुषस्य संसारस्य एवामुपपन्तेः। पुरुषाये मया
कर्मव मेंतोधानमाधारः पुद्धार्थकर्माभाषाये:।
श्रस्ि चेदध्यवसायः, कथं जडत्वं ||
६.६ Was Awe

श्रजोश्यते । श्रन॒लेमप्रतिलोमलक्षणे परिणामदये west afigaafe,
तदेव पृरुषा्थ॑कन्तव्यतोच्यते | सा च अक्तिरचेतनायाः प्रहृते: TAT एव ।

tच मरदादिमदाग्धतपरयन्तोऽस्या विमु खतयानुलामः परिणामः |

पुनः सकारणानुपरवेदारेणटास्ितान्तः प्रतिलेमः परिणामः | पुनः परिणाममारभते। एव विधायाः पुद्दार्थकर्तव्याताः जहाया च चि

प्रततोग काषिरदनुपपति:।

गनु बदीदुबी ब्रजिङ्ग: बद्धत प्रधानन्यालि ततु विमयी मोचान- विंध्यः। मोचाच याज: जिगते, मोचाच चानायनीयल तुपदेकालक्र त्राख्यानान्यः। उजते। चेन्य प्रकातलपुढायोगराहिमभ्ये-

भोक्राभवश्च: यमन:, तश्चिनु यति ब्रजचेतनाय: प्रकात: कक्षलाभिमागात् दुःखानुमवे यति कव्यमिय दुःखनिषिरायान

निको मस खादिरिन भक्येवात्ववसावः। ज्ञातो दुःखनिषिरुपा- योिपेरक्षाधारापेदशापेसाभ्याय विधाय। दर्षनान्यवेयेवविध एवविधाय-

खभाव: शाब्चेतिग्रिन्ते। च च मोचाच प्रधानमान एवविधायेवे श्राक्षोपढ़ें श्राक्षोपढ़ें श्राक्षोपढ़ें मोचाच्य पायमानयान। ज्ञातेग्देव

कार्यान्य प्रत्ताायां साममाः भावमान लमते, भ्रां च प्रतिलोक-

परिणामदारेवेस्तावाद्य मोचाच्य कार्यां ईशुक्षेव साममी

प्रमाणेन निषिदता, प्रकारनरेणानुपपति। धातस्ता बिना कघं

* तद्ध्विभिन्निं F पुलकरादः।
† कब्राकाल्यं बुक्रान्तितमिति C पुलकरादः।
‡ सम्प्रायः सामयप्रभाविति F पुलकरादः।
भवितुमहेति। श्रतः खितमेतत्‌। संक्रागन्तविषयोपरागममिव्यक्ष-चिच्छछायं बुद्धिसत्वं विषयनिखयदारेण समां सोकया्जां निव्वा-इयतीव्येव विधमेव fed पश्यन्तो waren खसंबेदनं चित्तं, fer arag जगदिव्येवं ब्रुवाणाः प्रतिनेाधिता भवन्ति ॥२२॥

‘तत्’ एतिचि, ‘विधातविधायत्‌, ‘वासनाभिः’, ‘विचित्रपिँ’ नामाकारमपिं, ‘परां’ भरख सामिना भोक्तुभिलगाष्टिऱमधि बाधयतीति। ज्ञतः, ‘बंधवारिलात्’ बंधव श्रृंखला विलिला भविध-विज्ञायाकरिलात्। यथा वष्ट्याधिकारिकरि तपराथः दृष्टं, चता जयकारितारि ल। चत्र-रजस्वला मपि विचित्रवल्कपारिमानमभाच्छि वेश-तथकारिता, जन: पराधानाः। यथा पर: य पुरुषः॥

नं भार्ष्यविापणकाविलानादि वरेप भरिवत्ता पराधीनपुलपिं,॥

तदहस्तान्यार्थः तान्नु एव च पर: विधयति, यायुक्तत भवानि पराधीनपेशावे-भ्रिप्रभभिन्त्रिकधिनिरपायितउपायितौ विधेयमिशिविचारत्रुंदुः॥ ॥ जतिते।

* वस्त्रवषयधारगिर्यस्यतिः। C पुस्करपाटः।
† वा्युगमतिः। C. अष्टुमण्डलमतिः। F पुस्करपाटः।
‡ बोधायिनिः। C पुस्करपाटः।
§ विचित्रपिंति। C पुस्करपाटः। भाष्यश्च न समीचितः।
|| पराधीनपुपातिः। F पुस्करपाटः।
¶ वायुक्तमिश्रितां सूत्तविरितिः। C पुस्करपाटः।
विषयविधिः भावभावनानिजित्यः॥२४॥

eवं सत््वपुरुषयोरं न्यवे साधिते* यस्यो विशेषं पश्ति श्रयमस्ा-

dन्य इत्येवंरूपं, तश्च विज्ञात चित्तसत्वखरूपश्य चित्ते या श्रत्म-

भावभावना, खा निवन्त॑ते । चिन्तमेव कन्तु अस्तं इत्यभिमाने

निवर्तते ues ti

तदा विबेकनिष्ठं कैव्यप्रामाण्यां || चित || २५ ||

* प्रतिपादिते इति C पुस्तकांपाठः
† सत्यसादन्य हृदेवंशयमिति C पुस्तकांपाठः
‡ कैव्यप्रामाण्यामिति P पुस्तकांपाठः
प्रार्थना २७

विद्याज्ञानिं विद्याप्रमोगनां विनामाहीचिदा- दानीं "विज्ञानिर्देशस्त्री" विद्याकोमरमारश्च, "कैवशीर्ष" नाक्या- फलं, कैवशीर्षश्च वा सम्पादु दति || २६ ||

अः वियक्तवाचिनिं विन्ते वेंजाराय: प्रादुर्भवायन्ति तेन्ता देवत्प्रतिपादनवर्णवर्ष्य त्यागोपायमात ।

तस्मिन्दृश्यु प्रतिपादनाराशि संस्कृत्येक्षेत्रे: || २७ ||

तस्विन्य समाधी स्तिताः, किरत्रु प्रस्तायेऽपि, तानि "प्रत्यायता- राशि" यतावतरापि शानांति, तानि प्रागवेशः। यतावतराध- वजेकः, "संस्कृते" अं ममेन्थेठरूपाणि ल्ीयमाणेभ्योऽपि प्रभवन्ति।

शान्ताकरणोच्छिन्तीद्वारं तेषां धर्मं कार्ययुञ्जयुं भवति || २६ ||

शानेराय: पूर्वभेदवेक सरवान।

हानेयां खोशवदुसं || २७ ||

यथा 'कैवशीर्षयान्तरानृरये खिरीवेपुरये' अस्ति श्रवणं न पुन- शिन्दों प्ररोहमुं लभन्ते, तथां संस्कारमुपायमार ।

श्रनःकरणोच्छिन्तीद्वारं तेषां हानं कशं भवति ॥ २६ ||

एवं म्रस्ययान्तरानृरये खिरीश्वे डालतू यादुशरस्व थो गिनः

समाधेः प्रकषैप्रात्निभेवति, तथाविधमुपायमार ।

* विज्ञानिनराणि संस्कारेभ्यः ॥ २६ ॥
† तस्विन्य इति त पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ स्थिरीक्षति इति पुस्तकपाठः।
¶ यथा इति पाठेन सह विडडव्वात्‌ ॥
प्रसूलन्त्वकृते दस्य सव्वथा विशेषलातेखर्ममेघः
समाधि: ॥ २८ ॥

'प्रसूत' यावतां तत्वानं वधाष्ट्रं व्यवस्थितानं परसरिष्य-चुन्सुखपविभावनं, तात्सन्धि तिः 'श्री', 'श्रुत्रीविलक्ष' फलमाध्यमं;
प्रत्यासारामण्डुत्त श्वर्यपकारिविशेषिताः' परिशयात् 'धमीमेघः
समाधि:' भवति, प्रज्ञमण्डक्कर्त्तं धथे परमपवधार्थाध्यायकं मेक्षति
विवेकनीति 'धमीमेघः'। भनेन प्रज्ञमण्डक्कर्त्तं श्वास्वेतलम्निवपपार-ितं भवति ॥ २८ ॥

तस्मादक्रष्ठामेघात् किं भवतीत्वात्।

ततः कोशकम्भनिःति: ॥ २८ ॥

'कोशनामविद्यादीगाभिनिवेशस्मानां, कर्धोश्च स्वकारिकरे
देन जिधधानां, श्वास्यवादः पूर्वपूर्वकारणनिलक्ष्य 'निरृत्ति:',
भवतीत्यक्ष: ॥ २८ ॥

निद्रित्येव तेषु किं भवतीत्वात्।

तद्धा सव्वावरणमलापेतस्य श्वास्यानन्याण्याण्याशिवः
भवति ॥ २० ॥

शृद्धयाने निद्रित्येव भवतीत्रिति 'सव्वावरणि' क्रेवः, त एव 'भवति',
तेषाः 'श्रेष्टश्च' तदिरिष्ट्वत्, 'श्वास्य' गतगगवगनिभिः, 'श्वासः-

* भवतीत्वात् भाषैति: ॥ उक्तवातः।
Patrickes ३२ ॥

ततः किमित्यः ।

ततः छताथानां परिश्रामक्रमसमात्तर्गुणानां ॥ ३१ ॥

'ततः' निप्तादितः, भोगार्गकल्पः पुरुषः प्रायोजनं चैति 'तताथः', 'गुणः:' वत्क-रक्षाकमिः, तेऽवं 'परिश्रामः:' च जुध्यार्ग-भागिरुपस्तोक्तेन ज्ञानिश्चावत्मकस्तिकषिकः, तस्य चोऽजो 'तमः' वक्षमणः, तस्य परिसमाइः' निष्टा, न पुमवह दुहः ॥ ३९ ॥

क्रमस्माय छचपमाच ।

क्रमप्रतियोगी परिश्रामारण्तनियोऽयः क्रमः ॥ ३२ ॥

'चणः' चचीपान् कान्, तस्य चोऽजो 'प्रतियोगी' एकचणविलकुमः। 'परिश्रामारण्तनियोऽयः' जनमभूतेषु चणेषु प्रत्यायः सुधक-हनुम्भा च राश्यते य चचशानः 'तमः' उच्यते । न जनमभूतेषु चणेषु क्रमः परिश्रामाय बणः ॥ ३ ॥

इतरां फलभूतिः कैवःकाष्ठाधाराः सहुपमाच ।

पुरुषार्थ्यश्रुत्यानां गुणान यत्वप्रससः कैवःक्ष सहुप-प्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिकिरिति ॥ ३३ ॥

समाजभोगार्गकल्पसहस्तयां गुणाणां, च: 'प्रतिसवः'
प्रसज्ञानेष्यकुसीदस्य सब्बंशा विवेकखातेर्ध्वेमेधः
समाधिः ॥ २८ ॥

'प्रश्नम' यावतं तत्चानं यथाकम ववशितानं परस्तरिस-चणस्वरूपविभावनं, तद्धनु वति 'श्रीप', 'श्रीकुसीदश' पल्लवसिद्धोऽ|
प्रव्याजनराशानमुद्रे 'सब्बंश्कारववेकखाने: दरिष्यात् 'ध्वेमेध: समाधि:' भवति, प्रकक्रं दक्षकणं धमः परमसुवारथवाधां मेवति
विस्मृतीति 'ध्वेमेधः'। भनेन प्रक्रमसुशंखेव श्वानेतलसिद्धिपपादिन्त भवति ॥ २८॥

ततः: श्रेष्टम्भनिदिति: ॥ २९ ॥

'श्रेष्टम्भनिदिति: श्रेष्टम्भनिदिति:। कार्यरोधादिनामभिनमानां, 'ककेणाच्च वर्णिता, श्वासेन दयात् पृत्वपूव्वंकारणमिटत्या 'र्रए२,
भवतीतथः ॥ २९ ॥

विस्मृतेषु नेषु किं भवतीतथा।

तदा सब्बंश्वानमलापेतस्य श्वानर्यान्त्यास्य-मलयं ॥ ३० ॥

श्रायते विस्मृतिति 'श्रायर्यानिः' क्लो:। न एव 'मलयः',
तेऽऽ: 'वपेत्स' तद्विश्वासतः, 'श्वास' गतसंगमनायित्वः, 'श्वास-

* भवतीतय: चाहेति: C पुस्तकपाठ:।
भधात्‌। 'गणनास्पदं भवति, शक्तथेत्ैः ॥
ततः किमित्‌
ततः ज्ञातायानां परिशामकमसमातिरिगुणानां ॥ ३१॥
’कमत’ निपादितः, भोगायपरलुप्तः पुरुषार्थः प्रयोजनं वैसे
’ज्ञातायानां,’ गुणः। सत्तव्रजस्तमांसिः, तेषां परिशामः। चा पुरुषार्थं-
समाजात्रासुलोकान्त्याम गृहदीघ्वाविविधिकरणः, तता
'कमत' वक्क्षमाणः, तता परिशामात'। निष्ठा, न पुनरुद्व
इति: ॥ ३६॥
क्रमसमाक्षस्य लकणमाह ।
क्षणप्रतियोगी परिशामपरान्तनिग्राद्यः कमः ॥ ३२॥
'हणः' त्र्यापि दानः, तत्स्त्व योऽसौ ‘प्रतियोगी’ एकचलनिक्रमः।
'परिशामपरान्तनिग्राद्यः'। घुष्ठंतुथु मचेषु पवान्त स्वहस
नववस्था यो न दि- पाण्यां’ कमः। तत्स्त्वः, न घुष्ठंतुथु मचेषु
कम: परिशामात्र वक्क्षः ॥ ३२॥
इदानि मुहादेशः कैवःक्रमात्मार्गं लक्ष्ममाह ।
पुरुषार्थश्रुत्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवःक्रमं स्वरूप-
प्रतिष्ठा वा चित्रितक्षिणितं ॥ ३३॥
समाजभोगायपरलुप्तायानां ‘गुणानां’, व: ‘प्रतिप्रसवः’
प्रतिक्लीमपरिणामसमाती विकारानुसारः, यदि वा बिच्छेदीतिस्कामः खळ्चयामानः भावार्थम्यते, समानावस्थानं तत्त् 'केन्द्र' चतुर्थिते॥

न वेदवाचारानुसारे वेदशः: कैव्यावाचारामेववृत्तान्तिकः, प्राविभुज्यानां शरीराध्य प्रस्तुतमानं एवंविधप्रमाणन्तिते। तदापि संसारदर्शायमा वमासा करोल-भोजुसूलमभावनम्या भावार्थः। प्रतीयते। अन्वया वचयमेकः वेदशास्त्रार्थोऽन्तः शान्तदा शान्तकालासेव पूर्वातः सुभाषणामभावार्थः। नियतकृत्यसंवेदनेन न्याय, सहस्राब्दाभायांगमभावस्य। यदि वेदशः शालोपादिसंगुणितः तत्रकर तस्य भोजुल प्रवेशन तदा विषय-विन-प्रासिति-विद्वार्थार्थ्यम् कस्यं प्रहृतिति देकर्ते। तथा कस्यं प्रविभुज्यानान्तः वस्त्रानुसार- द्वारार्थेणशुभांभनेनैव श्रीस्वराम शान्तकालासेव पूर्वातः सुभाषणामभावार्थः। कस्यिरुप्ति वधारामानुष्ठवः भागाः भोजुलमभावाः यः वा शाक्तित प्रवेशार्थः। नौदस्यारामानु शक्तिपान-पाइवकलब्रोमवहाराभावात् तेतन्यमानमेव सत्तवार्थिते।

तथ शैतलान्तः विदितमाक्षेणेकाव्यपदः न पुराणाभौवेदनेन, शस्यार्थिकम्य विदिते, न ब्रह्माधित्यस्यमवखलमेव वति-युक्तः, नामनार्थं। प्रमाणेते शास्त्रस्य इत्यियमाणः। श्रमित्य सङ्कृतः इत्यियमाणः। न पुर- 

युक्तविदितमानुहिततामिति श्वासायोऽध्ययनः। ग्राहकानुसारः विधानेति, न रूपमात्रः श्रावणमाणेति न रूपमात्रः श्रार्थमाणेति। न रूपमात्रः श्रार्थमाणेति। न रूपमात्रः श्रार्थमाणेति।

* शान्तकालासेव पूर्वाकालामेवकालम्या भाव इति C पुक्क्कापाठः।
† बिन्धित्रप्रत्ययार्थार्थिति F पुक्क्कापाठः।
‡ अन्वयासुनामावरे इति C पुक्क्कापाठः। तत्त्वाकालामेव इति F पुक्क्कापाठः।
पदे ८५ । युकं । संख्य-दशज्ञात्वा परिषिद्धाद्वाग्यन्त, परिषिद्धाश्रेष्ठान्त, यो: तत्परिषिद्धावत बहुतोऽप्रयज्ञानम्। सति: सम्बन्धः अविगेकस्वायतः। तस्मिन्‌ सति: योऽयं प्रत्यासमिकाऽस्य भोग्य-भोक्तासनकणः। सति: यत्कारण्यमयम्‌ क्रियते, तदास्य परिणामान्तः, सति: यदाद्मनाऽधिष्टाद्रतलं चिच्छाया-समपेणसामरथ्य, बुद्धिसत्वस्य च सद्याचिच्छायाग्रुणस्य, चिद्‌चीतितकला-भोक्रुलाध्यवखायस्ञत एव सखब्बस्यागुसन्धागपुव्यैकस्य व्यवहारस्य निष्यकेः। तथाहि यस्यामवस्थायां श्रान्तसमवेते समुत्पके सुखे तद्धानृभविदल्व, न तस्या मेवावस्थायां दुःखामुभविढरतव। अरताऽवस्थानामालवाशसदभिनलस्यावस्थावतापि नानालेन च परिणामिलान्नाकमलं नापि। अत: एव ब्रह्मवादिभिः अश्चेऽवस्तै:।

ये तु वेदान्तवादिन्यः मन्नदण्डायां संस्कृत्यासि: । तेषां मेवमेव अत: युकः। तथाहि: श्रान्तस्य सुखस्रूपलात्‌ च सेद्यमानतयैव प्रतिभासात्‌ संवेद्यमाननश्च संवेरेनव्यतिरेकं च अथ वहितमेव तच्छ्याच्यते । तत्‌ विरद्धधम्मीध्यासादन्‌ पपन्ञं । न हि संबेदनं संबेदधि:।
१९१४ पातन्नखे अस। च्यते। तच्छा नैरुपस्ताः। किन्तु तदुपरि-तस्युद्दाति-गति-अतिकालः स्रीम विषयोद्वारम् यदिः। तदेव अविद्यां अविद्याः। न तावद्य मिथ्यानुपर्वः। न तावद्य तन्मादनान व्ययं-प्रभु:। अविद्यामये च असतोऽक्रीयवामे कष्टाविधानीति विषयः। च असतोऽक्रीयवामे कष्टाविधानीति विषयः।

चतुः परमात्मनः स्रीह यदिः विद्यानुपर्वः। न तावद्य तन्मादनान व्ययं-प्रभुः। अविद्यामये च असतोऽक्रीयवामे कष्टाविधानीति विषयः। अविद्यामये च असतोऽक्रीयवामे कष्टाविधानीति विषयः।

आसाक् तदस्य श्यात्। अथ न साचाद्धोक्वं, किन्‌ तदुप किलमु दासीगतयाधिष्ठातैलेन खौकरोाति। तदास्मदकनान प्रवेशः। अराग्गे च अराग्गे च। नेवाविचारः। श्रविद्याख्च संसारशशणप्रपञ्चकाय्यकरढलमवश्यमङ्गी कण्लवय तसखिन्‌ सत्यपि यथ्निव्वाच्यलमुच्यते, तदा कस्यचिदपि नायम। ब्रह्मणोऽप्यवाच्यताप्रसक्िः। तस्मादधि्ठाटरूपताव्यतिरेकेख धर्मस्य कस्यचित्‌।

धेरि श्राविखारिखाठवा शेतावोगापेतन दस्यतरे, शेतावोगापेतन दस्यतरे, शेतावोगापेतन दस्यतरे। तथाचि दश्य-श्राव-प्रधावाद्वो युवायास।

* दश्यत हति ३ पक्षपाठः।
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केचित् कन्त श्पमेवात्मानिच्छन्ति । तथाहि विवथसान्निष्य
था क्रिया ससुत्यन्ना तस्या विषयसविन्तिः वे, तस्याश्च
cलरूपा्थां प्रकार पतया प्रतिभासते, फेहे शादातया,
WIT गाइकत्वेन | घटमहं जानामीत्धमेनाकारोक
तस्या; समुत्पन्नः । क्रियायाः कारणं भवतीतः कर्ताः
भोज्वल्लाकारो इरपायित। तदनुपपन्नं । खास्तात्वाहः बंतिेनींः
कर्तवेन चुगपत प्रतिपदते चर्मवेस वा । चुगपतालोके खास्तारे
tस कर्त्तबं च खान् । धय कर्त्तवेस कर्त्तवेस च चत्तवेस
dरुपेय चेकास कर्त्तवेस तदा एकादसेवा च चिन्तितालाद् चबे
फलोकादायं खान् । धय मानाकुपसा तस कर्त्तवं तदा परिशानिः
परिशानिः ज चिदूपतं । चत्तिकुपसामाण रक्षेभ्रम
स्मिंध्य शाकातकर्मस्विकर्मचन्ते । चाकुपमाधिः: कर्त्तवेसामाण
प्रतिपादितं कुरुस्मिः नित्यसा चिदूपसा तदेवेसप्रांपनं

dतेतन ख्यकाशालगो विशयविशिष्ठारेश धापूलभावं

वेषिदिर्मशाकलमाणस्याशाकलभः । ते ज्ञातां विनमश्येतिरेश
चिदूपसामाण नित्यपिंतं चक्कं । ज्ञातां फिर्च
डेलवायं चिदूपसमुचितं । तथ विशेष्येतिरेशमाणनित्यसमाण
झाल-चालितं । तदनुपपन्नं । इत्यहितमोक्त
dक्रियायहितमोक्त श्रवण । विशार. य
dिमभ इत्युचितं, य चापितात्यतिरेशमेत्यासाणेव न समाते । तथाहि
प्राकनुप्यात्मानो चिन्ते: फक्तेव्युत्त धापूलनाकारेश शविचित् ।
tतथांत्यर्युपस्यालुक्षेपणारेश तथ सुप्राण्य विकेशार्य्
तातिक्रमः। विकण्पञ्चाष्यवसायात्मा खरूपमवगतिः। कूटस्य चितिः सरैकरूपत्याननाषंकारानूप्रवेश्नः। तदनेन खविमशलमात्मनः प्रतिपादयता बुद्धिरेवात्मतेन प्रतिपादिता, न परस्य पुरुषवृद्धप्रसन्नमृति।

एवं भैरवइप द्वन्दनेववियत्तांलं विशाय नायन्यादानो रूपपुप-पचने। अधिग्रहालं विद्वृत्तं। तस भरितेऽसघभेषें। विद्रूपत्या यद्धितिति तदेव भोगतां गच्छति। यथा वेतनानिधिः तस्य शकुक्क्वव्यपालूहयमूं भवति।

न्यायर्वविकरूपमवगतिः। यदधितिष्ठति जैव भोग्यतां गच्छति। एव चेतनाधिष्ठितं तदेव सकुच्यव्यपालूहयमूं भवति।

तदेवं विकारेभै विनयचार्य वर्षीयनुमुखस्तता वयस्विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे प्रवृत्यापुरुषमेव कारणवियपाध्य भरोदारियां विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे तिरक्तेव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे निर्मिति प्रदैव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे प्रवृत्यापुरुषमेव कारणवियपाध्य भरोदारियां विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे तिरक्तेव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे निर्मिति प्रदैव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे प्रवृत्यापुरुषमेव कारणवियपाध्य भरोदारियां विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे तिरक्तेव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे निर्मिति प्रदैव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे प्रवृत्यापुरुषमेव कारणवियपाध्य भरोदारियां विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे तिरक्तेव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे निर्मिति प्रदैव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे प्रवृत्यापुरुषमेव कारणवियपाध्य भरोदारियां विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे तिरक्तेव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे निर्मिति प्रदैव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे प्रवृत्यापुरुषमेव कारणवियपाध्य भरोदारियां विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे तिरक्तेव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे निर्मिति प्रदैव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे प्रवृत्यापुरुषमेव कारणवियपाध्य भरोदारियां विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे तिरक्तेव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे निर्मिति प्रदैव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे प्रवृत्यापुरुषमेव कारणवियपाध्य भरोदारियां विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे तिरक्तेव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे निर्मिति प्रदैव विनिविस्त्रमुखस्वतनसे विनिविस्त्रमुक्कतिः।

* भैरवभयक्ति च पुरुषपाठः।
१६८

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रा शाश्वार्वं केव्यमितिन्याय प्राप्तं कैव्यसुप्धियं निर्मलनिथिं
व्याहतः रसानिधिः एवच्छ यत्नः प्रतापवसतेः पादान्तसेवानति-
प्रथस्तु क्रणाश्चां वान वान्तकार्य \\
यद्यान्तमवाप्य वाम्देवतापि भिताख अणौ जानां श्रीमाणम
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