Bayerische [ल DigitalisierungsZentrum StaatsBibliothek Digitale Bibliothek Kapila ‘The Smkhya aphorisms of Kapila with extracts from Vijéna Bhiksus Commentary, transl. by J. R. Ballantyne Calcutta 1865 Signatur: A.or. 20-39 Nutzungsbedingungen Bitte beachten Sie folgende Nutzungs- bedingungen LL Die Dateien werden Ihnen nur fil persdnliche, nichtkommerzielle Zwecke zur Verfligung ९८ 2. Nehmen Sie keine automatisierten Abfragen 3. Nennen Sie die Bayerische Staatsbibliothek als Eigentiimerin det Vorlage 4. Bei der Weiterverwendung sind Sie selbst fiir die Einhaltung von Rechten Dritter, 2B, Usheberrechten, verantwortlich. Usage Guidelines Please observe the following usage guide- lines: LL. The files are provided for personal, non- ‘commercial purposes only Refiuin from automated querying 3. Attribute ownership of the original to the Bavarian State Library 4. In using the files, its your own responsibility tw observe the rights of third parties, e.g. 01 a regulations. ०. of dl) (39 <36635255320019 <36635255320019 Bayer. Staatsbibliothek = OCIETY OF BENGAL HYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA WITH EXTRACTS FROM = ‘TRANSLATED BY R. BALLANTYNE, LL. D. ___- FASOICULUS 1. hs CALCUTTA: ; PRINTED BY ©. ए. LEWIS, AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS 1862 : ? SANSKRIT WORKS PUBLISHED, 1N THE NEW SERIES. The Vais‘eshika Siitras, with Commentaries, by Pandita Jaya Narayana Tarkapanchanana. Complete in five Fase. Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10. . The Sandilya Sttras with Sw: 153; wara’s Commentary. Edited by Dr. J. R. Ballantyne, LL. D. come lete in one Fase. No. 11. The Kaushitaki-Brahmana pps ishad with S‘ankarénanda’s Com- mentary, edited with a ion by E. B. Cowell, M. A, Complete in two Fasciculi, Nos. 19 and 20. A translation of the 8 ae Siddhanta and Siddhénta S‘iromani, by Pandita क्प Deva i, under the superintendence of Arch- deacon Pratt. Nos. 1, 13 and 28. SANSERIT WORKS IN PROGRESS. The Das‘a Rapa with the exposition of Dhanika. Edited by F. 1. Hall, D. C. L. Fase. 1. IL. Nos. 12, and 24. ah a Pancharétra. Edited by Rev. K. M. Banerjea. Fasc. . No. 17. The Kavyadars’a of Sri Dandin, edited, with a commentary, by Pandita Premachandra Tarkabagisha, Fasc. I, No. 80, BIBLIOTHECA INDICA; COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. New Series. Nos, 32 & 81. -++@@ ० THE SA’NKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA, WITH EXTRACTS FROM VIJNA’NA BHIKSU’S COMMENTARY, TRANSLATED BY J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL. D. a ee aa eee CALCUTTA : PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS. 1865, ea REGIA. wOWACE NSIS. THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA. अथ चिविधद्‌खाल्न्तनिद्त्निर्यन्तपुरुषाथः॥ ९॥ 404. 1.—Well, the complete cessa- tion of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man. (3 € न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्िनिडृन्तेरप्यनुवृत्तिद शनात्‌॥ ₹॥ क Eee Aph, 2.—The effectuation of this num, is not to be attained by [complete cessation of pain] is not [to + be expected] by means of the visible [—means of obviating evil, such as wealth, &.—], for we see [—on the loss of wealth, &c.—] restoration [of the misery and evil] after [its temporary] cessation. > ९ प्रायिक त्मतोकारवत्तत्रतोकारचष्टनात्युर्षाथत्वम्‌ ॥ २ ॥ The question whether the Aph, 3.—[Let us consider the doubt ¢ (4 that] the soul’s desire [the cessation of means, pain—may result] from [recurrent and sustained] exertions for the obviation [of pain], as in the case of the obviation of daily hunger ; B The summum bonum, 2 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms, Book I. TATA सच््वासम्भवाद्ेयः TATUM: 118 Aph, 4.—This [method of pallia- tives], is to be. rejected by those who are versed in evidence, because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the appliances]. 9 me € oN उत्कषाद्‌ पि मेक्तस्य VAT TA HN ५॥ Scriptural evidence in fa Aph. 5.—Also [an inferior method OWN EF MN lee of riddance from “ the ills that flesh is heir to,”’ ought not to be adopted] because of the pre-eminence of Liberation [from ‘ Bondage,’—as proved] by the text [of scripture declaratory] of the pre-eminence above all else [—of Liberation, as the effectual remedy]. अविशेषश्चाभयोः॥ ९ ॥ 404. 6.—And there is no difference between the two, {no difference in the applicability of liberation, as the remedy, on either of the suppositions, which we shall now consider, viz., that the bondage is essential or that it is adventitious. ] न खभावतो बद्स्य मेाक्तसाधनेपदे शविधिः॥ 9 १ ता अ Aph. 7.—There were no rule in the else the means would not enjoining of means for the liberation ee cg of one bound essentially, [—because, —to explain the meaning by an illustration,—“jire cannot be liberated from its heat which is essential to it,—since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists.’’] सखभावस्यानपायित्वाद ननुष्ठानलक्तणमप्रामाण्यम्‌ | < II Scripture would be nuga- Aph, 8.—Since an essential nature ति imperishable; unauthoritativeness, betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against This suggestion negatived, An objection met. The Chief End of Man. 3 the seripture, instructing us to get free from pain, if pain were essential to humanity :—and this is out of the question,— Scripture being assumed here, as in all others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth]. न= नाशक्योपदेशविधिरूपदिटे AIST: I ९ ॥ An impracticable injunc- Aph. 9.—There is no rule where + something impossible is enjoined; though it Je enjoined, it is no injunction [^ but only the sem- ९८९८९ of an injunction ; because it stands to reason that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity.’’] = शुक्तपट वद्धोजवच्वत्‌ ॥ Yo Il A 004 न ध वः Aph. 10.—If [some one says]—as Mist bi apk remaceonly, in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [—-something essential may be not irremoveable; then he will find his answer in the next aphorism. The doubter is supposed to argue—“ the destruction even of what is essential (—in spite of what is stated under Aph. 7—) ts seen; as for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul even though it were essential. So too there may be (without any impropriety) the enjoinment of the means thereof.’”] शतयद्धवा नुह्वाभ्यां नाशक्योपदेशः॥ १९ ॥ _si sn न 104. 11.—Since both perceptible- property may be hidden but ness and [subsequent] non-percepti- not removed, bleness may belong to some power {which is indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined (when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible. “In regard even to the two examples mentioned in Aph. 10, people do not give an injunction for the positive destruction of something essential, which is indestruc- 2B 4 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. tible. Why do we say this? Because in these two instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power,—the powers, namely, of appearing white, and of germinating,—there are merely the manifestation and afterwards the hiding of the whiteness, &c., but not the removal of the whiteness or of the power of germination ;—because—that is to say—the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, in the case of the dyed cloth,—and by the will of the Yog/—the possessor of supernatural powers,—in the case of the roasted seed.”—An example more in accordance with modern views, when the Scientist has superseded the Yog¢, would be that of Chlorine—with its suffocating odour hidden by union with Sodium in culinary salt, but ready to reappear—fresh in its inde« structibility—on the addition of Sulphuric Acid and black Oxide of Manganese. But the destruction of Bondage is enjoined ;— hence it cannot be essential to man. ‘ Wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some adherent cause, he rejects the various supposable causes, viz., Time &c.’’] न कालयोगते व्यापिने PTY सवंसम्बन्धात्‌ ॥ ९९॥ श कवक Aph. 12.—Not from connection with 1. of the time [does bondage befall the soul], be- = cause this, all-pervading and eternal, is eternally associated [with a//, and not with those alone who are in bondage]. ena न देशयोगते SAAT I! १३॥ Place, for the same reason, Aph. 18.—Nor [does bondage arise} ५५ from connection with place either, for the same reason. Ay नावस्थाते देदधमेत्वात्तस्याः॥ १४॥ The soul is not kept in 404. 14.—Nor [does the bondage न by its being condi. of the soul arise] from its being con- ‘ ditioned [by its standing among cir- Soul’s Bondage reflectional only. 5 cumstances that clog it by limiting it], because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul but] the Jody. असङ्ग STARA इति ॥ १५॥ 4014. 15.—Because this soul is [un- associated with any conditions or cir- cumstances that could serve as its bonds:—it is] absolute. (‘The word 2८ here shows that it, i. ९, the assertion conveyed in the aphorism, is a reason,—the construction, with the pre- ceding aphorism, being this, that, sézce the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the Jody to be conditioned.’’] ९ (८ न क्मणान्यधमेत्वाद्‌तिप्रसक्तंश्च ॥ १९ ॥ The fruit of works belongs 014. 16.—Nor [does the bondage ग of soul arise] from any work, because these are the property of another, [viz., the mind,] and because it [the bondage] might be eternal [if the case were as you imagine; for, “if through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated”—through some acts of some one else.] ga 0. विचिचभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधमेत्वे ॥ १७ ॥ Why it is that the bondage Aph. 17.—If it were the property - must belong to the soul, and of any other, then there could not be a Rte eres diverse experience, [—“ there could be The soul is absolute. no such different experience as one man’s experiencing pain and another man’s not,” for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of mind but of sow’ that men are held by Kapila to be numerically different ;—“ therefore it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul also. And this (pain that belongs to the soul) is in the shape merely of a reflection of the pain” that attaches to its own attendant organism]. निबन्धना प्रछतिनिबन्धनाच्चेन्न तस्यापि पारतन्त्यम्‌॥ १८ ॥ 4 wie tae Pecla Aph. 18.—If [you say that the diate cause of the souls goul’s bondage arises] from Nature as + its cause, [then I say] no,—[because] 6 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. that also isa dependent thing, [—‘ because that also, i. ९. Na- ture also, is dependent (—for its power of seemingly binding or influencing soul—) on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism.” ‘Therefore, since Nature can be the । cause of bondage only as depending on something else (—i. e. on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism), through this very sort of conjunction it follows that the bondage is reflec- tional,—like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire,” —water being held to be essentially cold, and only to seem hot while the heat continues in conjunction with it]. न नित्यशुदधबद्मुक्तखभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादतेत्‌ ॥ १९ ॥ Wiad अः Aph. 19.—But not without the tion of its bondage to the conjunction thereof [i. e. of Nature] „+ is there the connection of that [i. ९, of pain] with that [viz. the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence,—[while the bondage of the soul is reflec. tional—and not inherent in it either essentially or adventitiously. “ For if bondage were produced by the conjunction (of the soul) with nature, as colour is produced by heating (—in the case of a jar of black clay which becomes red in the baking—), then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom,”’—as the red colour remains in the jar after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished,—whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs १८५८ without the China-rose, ceases on the removal thereof. ^^ Next he rejects certain causes of [the soul’s] bondage preferred by others.’’] नाविद्याते ऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात्‌ ॥ Pe II The Veddntic tenet on this Aph, 20.—Not from Ignorance, too, point disputed. [does the soul’s bondage, as the Vedantin holds, arise], because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding,—[for “ the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed.’’] । The Vedanta confuted. 7 =~ e वस्तत्वे सिद्रान्तदानिः॥ 22 II i 04. 21.—If it [‘Ignorance’] be The Veddntin cannot evade ¢ the objection without stultify- [asserted by you to be] a reality, then द there is an abandonment of the [Ve- dantic] tenet [by you who profess to follow the Vedanta]. विजानोयदेतापत्तिखच ॥ २९॥ 1 १५ otmaiiok atic 404. 22.—And [if you assume the objection without conced- = + Ignorance’ to be areality, then] there are any would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing. “ For the followers of the Veddnta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind with soul nor through there being something of a different kind.”] विरु्धाभयदपा चत्‌ ॥ ९३॥ Whe. क Aph, 23.—If [the Ved4ntin alleges, allege that ‘Ignorance’ is at regarding ‘Ignorance,’ that] it is in त the shape of both these opposites, [—then we shall say Nay, for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism]. € ५०५९ न तादक्पद्‌ाथाप्रतीतेः ॥ २४ ॥ (1 404. 24.—[To the suggestion that thing at once real and un- ‘Ignorance’ is at once real and unreal, real, : + we say] no,—because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal], ° nA AN न वयं TET eA वेशेषिकादिवत्‌॥ ९५॥ Aph. 25.—[Possibly the Vedéntin dantin is bound to avoid self- may remonstrate—] ‘We are not contradiction, ‘ # asserters of any Six Categories like the Vais'eshikas and others’ [—like the Vais'eskikas who arrange all 8 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. things under six heads, and the Naiydyitas who arrange them under sixteen ;—“ therefore we hold that there is such a thing —unknown though it be (to people in general) —as ^ Ignorance’ which is at once real and unreal, or (if you prefer it) which differs at once from the real and the unreal (—see Veddnta-sdra §21—), because this is established by proofs,” scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gautama’s scheme of argumentative exposition,—see Nydéya Aphorisms, Aph. 35. This Vedantic pretence of evading the objection by disallowing the categories of the Nydya, he disposes of as follows.] अनियतत्वे पि नायैक्तिकस्य संदा ऽन्यथा बालान्म- त्तादि समत्वम्‌ ॥ २९ ॥ The self-contradictory is Aph, 26.—Even although this be not altogether inadmissible. compulsory [that the categories be reck- oned six or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent, else we come to the level of children and madmen and the like :— [for, “let there be no system of categories, still, since deing and not-being are contradictory, it is impossible for any disciples to admit, merely on your worship’s assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent,—contrary to all fitness; otherwise we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like ;—such is the meaning.”’] नानादिविषयेपरागनिमित्तके ऽप्यस्य ॥ २७ ॥ he heretical theory. of a 4014. 27.—[The bondage] thereof, succession of momentary 0b- moreover, is 707 caused by any influ- jects from all eternity, as ४ ९ causing the soul’s bondage, ence of objects from all eternity, [as aan those imagine who assert that there exist external objects, of momentary duration individually, each being, however, replaced by its fac-simile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration, and so that by the influence of these the bondage of the soul is occasioned:] Teretical Theories refuted. 9 न बाद्यान्तरयेरूपर ज्यापरच्ञकभावेा ऽपि STITT नात्‌ सुघ्नसख्यपारलिपुचस्थयारिव । रेट ॥ प aber Aph, 28. Also between the external tt is not. and the internal there is not the rela- tion of influenced and influencer, because there is a local separa- tion, as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pdtaliputra, [—and, “in the opinion of these (persons whose theory we are at present objecting to), the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place, like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pataliputra ;— such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call ‘influence’ (vdsand) is seen only when there is conjunction,—such as that of madder and the cloth (—to which it gives its colour—) or that of flowers and the flower-basket (—to which they impart their odour.”) And if these heretics reply ‘ The influence of objects (on the soul) may be asserted, because there 7s a contact with the object, inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses according to your worship,” then we declare as follows. ] इयोरेकदेशलभापरागान्न व्यवस्था ॥ २८ ॥ 0 ooket the Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the Free soul would be equally gsoul’s bondage should arise] from an liable to bondage. 8 प : influence received in the same place [where the object is, because, in that case,] there would be no distinction between the two [—the bond and the free,—the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as liable to come across objects as any other—]. > अद्टबलाचेत्‌ | Be Il The heretic's attempted Aph, 30. It [the heretic, wishing to defence, save his theory, suggests that a differ- 10 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. ence between the two cases—does exist] in virtue of the wnseen [—i. e. of merit and demerit,—then he will find his answer in the next aphorism. We suppose the heretic to argue—* But then, granting that they (the free soul and the bound) are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality, yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen”—i.e. from the merit or demerit of this or that soul,—the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter with impunity the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced.] ba ~ ba 4 इयेरेककालायोगादुपका्ापकारकभावः ॥ २९ ॥ Each back must bear its Aph, 31. They [—the soul to-day +++ and the soul to-morrow, on your theory of momentary duration,] cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time; [—*‘that is to say, since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time (—believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that objects momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls also is of a like description—), there is positively no such relation (between the soul at one time and its successor at another) as that of deserver and bestower (or transmitter of its merits or demerits) ; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects taking effect on a patient (—say the soul of to-day—) occasioned by the ^ unseen’ (merit or demerit) belonging to an agent”? (—say the soul of yesterday—), which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different indivi- dual.] qaaaafefa चेत्‌ ॥ Se II Whether merit may or may Aph. 32. Tf [the heretic suggests that] not be imputed. the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard toason, [—then he will find his reply by looking The Theory of Incessant Flux. 11 forward. The heretic—admitting the principle that the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent—may urge that ५८ 88 the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son,—such as that (ceremony—see Colebrooke’s Hindi Law, vol. 3, p. 104 —celebrated) in anticipation of conception,—which (no doubt) belongs to the father (who performs the ceremonies to propitiate the gods),—in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer (—say the soul of to-day—) through the merit or demerit that belongs even to a different subject (—say the soul of yesterday—) : such is the meaning” of the heretic. He refutes this by showing that the illustration is not a fact.] = £6 नासति fe तच स्थिर एक्‌ आत्मा या गभाधानादिना GABAA ॥ दे ॥ This will not help the here« Aph, 33. [Your illustration proves tic’s argument. nothing,] for on ¢haé theory [of you heretics], there is no one permanent soul which could be conse- crated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c. [—i. e. “on thy theory moreover the benefit of the son, by means of the performance of the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not even take place,—because, on that theory there is not one (self-identical) soul, continuing from the time of conception to birth, which could be consecrated (by the ceremonies in ques- tion) so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth (—such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young bréhman would not be a fit subject if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted—) ; and thus your illustration is not a real one” on your own theory ;—(it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact.) “And according to my theory also your illustration is not a fact, seeing that it 2s possible that the benefit to theson should arise from the merit deposited in the son by means of the cere- mony regarding the son, for it is animplied tenet (of my school) that it (the soul) is permanent (in its self-identity,—so that it is c 2 12 The Sdukhya Aphorisms. Book I. a conceivable depositary of merit), and there is the injunction’ of Manu—ch. 2. v. 26.—, with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the assumption of the possibility of imputed righteousness]. खिरकायीसिद्धः चणिकत्वम्‌॥ ३४॥ 1 toidign oo weap 4ph. 84. Since there is no such not be momentary and sore- thing as a permanent result [—may अ, some other argue on the heretical view], —the momentariness [of bondage also is to be admitted. ^ And thus the position fallen back upon is, that bondage need have no cause at all. And this is the application of the argument— viz.— (1) Bondage, &c., is momentary :— (2) Because it exists :—and (3) Every thing that exists is momentary, as the -apex of the lamp-flame, or the like. And (—continues the heretic—) this (reason—viz. ‘ exis- tence’—) does not extend wnduly (—as you may object—) to the case of (what you choose to regard as a permanent product, such as) a jar or the like, because ¢hat also (in my opinion) is like the subject in dispute (in being momentary),—this being precisely what is asserted in the expression ‘Since there is no such thing as a permanent result.’ ””] न प्रत्यभिज्ञावाधात्‌॥ २५॥ क ee Aph, 35. Nay—[we reply to these proves that things are not heretics,—things are 707 momentary in END: their duration], for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition :—[“ in fact nothing is momentary, because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument to yours taken from such facts of recognition as ‘ What I saw,—that same do I touch,’—(an argument which may be fully stated as follows) —viz. Things are not momentary. 13 (1) Bondage, &c., is a permanent thing (—not a momentary thing—) ; ` (2) Because it exists :—and (3) Every thing that exists is a permanent thing,—as a jar, or the like.”] शुतिन्धायविरोाधाच ॥ ३६ ॥ छा अः Aph, 36. And [things are not mo- ry is contradicted by Scrip- mentary] because this is contradicted See BEE FHF: by Scripture and by reasoning :—[“ that is to say,—nothing is momentary, because the principle that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this—viz. ‘ All this, O ingcnuous one, was antecedently existing,’—and by such scriptural and other arguments as this, viz. ‘How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?’ °? ] दृष्टान्तासिेशच ॥ 9 ॥ The heretic’s illustrationis 400, 37. And [we reject the argu- not a truth. ment of this heretic] because his in- stance is not a fact :—[‘ that is to say,—the principle of the momentariness of all things is denied, because this momentary character does not in fact belong to such instances as the apex of the lamp-flame (on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization) :—moreover thou quite errest in regard to momen- tariness in that instance from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants (really included in a duration the ‘latens processus’ of which thou failest to discern). Moreover if the । momentary duration of things be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there ४5 no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, because it is proved to bea reality by the fact that otherwise there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect (— 14 The Stnkhya Aphorisms, Book I. and who therefore sets in operation the causes adapted to its production). With reference to this he declares as follows.” J— युगपज्नायमानयोनं कायकारणभावः ॥ रेट ॥ a eh. Aph, 38. It is not between two causal relation is not ‘ ध ह between things that arise si- things coming simultaneously into ex- multaneously. ड ५ istence that the relation of cause and effect exists,— [for, let us ask,—“ does the relation of product and material cause exist between the earth and the jar as simul- taneously coming into (their supposed momentary) existence, or as successive? Not the first,—because there is nothing to deter- mine that, and because we should not in that case find the man who wants a jar operating with earth, &c., (with a view to the jar’s subsequent production.) Neither is it the last,—in regard to which he declares as follows.’’] पूवापाये उन्तरायेगात्‌ ॥ ३९ ॥ _ A product cannot survive Aph. 89. Because when the antece- tte substantial cause, dent departs, the consequent is incom- petent [either to arise or to survive it.] तद्भावे तद योगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ॥ Bo ‘ Aph, 40. Moreover not, [on the 0 theory of the momentary duration of ठ 1. र things be mo- things, can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect,] because while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder. [‘‘ To com- plete the aphorism we must say,—‘ moreover, (on the theory objected to) there can be no ‘such relation as that of cause and ` effect, because at the time when the antecedent exists, the conse- quent cannot co-exist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.’ The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives——that while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of nega- The External known Presentatively. 15 tives—that when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists:—and these two (conditions—on your theory—) cannot be, because, since things (in your opinion) are momentary in their duration, the two (—viz., the substance and the product —), inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, belong to opposite times,”’—(and cannot therefore co-exist,—for the product—according to you—does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined. But then the heretic may say —do not let the co-existence of substance and product be insisted upon as indispensable to the causal relation between the two,— but) “let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, as it belongs to the instrumental cause, in respect merely of its antecedence. To this we reply as follows.’’] £ bos पूवभावमातरे न नियमः ॥ ४१॥ व Aph. 41. If there were merely an- does not distinguish the Mat- = ८८८८९१९९, then there would be no deter- ter from the Instrument, न प ५ mination [of a substantial or material cause as distinguished from an instrumental cause; but—as we need scarcely remind you—, “that there is a distinction between substantial and instrumental causes, the whole world is agreed. Other heretics say—‘ Since no thing exists except Thought, neither does Bondage, any more than the things of a dream. Therefore it has xo cause, for it is absolutely false” He rejects the opinion of these” as follows]. न विज्ञानमात्रं बाद्यप्रतोतिः ॥ ४९॥ Wa isis, de wildeae oF Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists, Intuition for the Externalas because there is the intuition of the well as the Internal. 3 4 external :—[“ that is to say—the reali- ty is not Thought alone, because external objects also are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.” ‘ But then (these heretics may rejoin)—‘ From the example of intuitive perception in dreams (cf. Butler’s Analogy, Part I. ch. I.), we find this (— 16 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. your supposed evidence of objective reality—) to exist even in the absence of objects !? To this we reply.’’] ~ et तद्भावे तदभावाच्छन्यं तदि ॥ ४२॥ The denial of the external Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one ~+ does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void [—i. e. nothing exists at all. =^ Why? Because if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist. For it is intuition that proves the objective, and if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought also would not establish the existence of thought.” “Then Ze¢ the reality be a mere void ;—and therefore the search- ing for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a void is all :—with such a proposal (as recorded in the next aphorism) does (some one who may claim the title of) the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition.”’] शून्यं avd भावे विनश्यति वस्तुध्त्वादिनाशस्य ॥ 8 ॥ 0 Gn tingth 4007. 44. The reality is the void; of asserting sheer Nihilism. what is, perishes,—because to perish is the habit of things :—[‘ The void alone (—says this prince of heretics,—or the fact that nothing exists at all—) is the reality (—or the only truth—). Since every thing that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst (of any beginning and ending), has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal and not real. Therefore who can be bound by what ?—this (question) is what we rest upon.” “ The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is ^ because to perish is the habit of things, — because to perish (or vanish into nothing) is the very nature of things. But nothing continues after quitting its own xature (—so that nothing could continue if it ceased to perish),—such is the meaning.’”’] b. He rejects [this heretical view.] Nihilism denied. 1 अपवाद्‌ मात्रमनुद्धानाम्‌ ॥ ४५॥ Nihilism denied, as the in- Aph. 45. This is a mere counter- discerplible is indestructible. assertion of unintelligent persons— [41. e., of blockheads,—a mere idle counter-assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable Jecause it exists; (and such an assertion is idle) because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish. But what need of many words? It is not the fact that even products perish, for, just as by the cognition that ‘ the jar is old’ [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so too by such a cognition as this that ‘the jar has passed away,’ it is only settled that the jar, or the like, in the condition of having passed away, still 25.77] उभयपक्समानत्तेमत्वाद यमपि ॥ BE ॥ न्क) 4014. 46. Moreover this [nihilistic ilism is open to the ‘ ड same objections as both the theory is not a right one] because it 9 and the Ideal has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before by the fact of recognition, (—which is at least as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things), and the intuition of the external,—see Aphs. 35 and 42. “ Moreover as for the opinion which is accepted by these (here- tics)—viz. ‘Let the mere void (of absolute nonentity) be the soul’s aim andsummum bonum, since herein consist at once the cessation of pain (—which cannot continue when there is abso- lutely zothing)—and also the means thereof (—since there can be no further means required for the removal of any thing if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist),’—this too can hardly be,—so he declares as follows’’]. © अपुरूषाथेतवमुभयथा ॥ ४७ ॥ प 0 4014. 47. In neither way [—whether hilation. as a means or as an end—] is this [an- nihilation] the soul’s aim, [— because the whole world agrees D 18 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms, Book I. that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide an i¢,—that is to say, because (¢hey hold, while) you do not hold, that there is a permanent soul,’—see Aphs. 833—in respect of which the liberation or beatification should be possible or even predicable]. न गतिविशेषात्‌ ॥ ४८ ॥ It is by no movement that Aph. 48. Not from any kind of motion - the soul gets into bondage. __[sych as its entrance into a body— does the soul’s bondage result as some have imagined]. निष्क्रियस्य तद सम्भवात्‌ ॥ Be ॥ What is all-pervading does Aph, 49. Because this is impossible not change place. for what is inactive [—or, in other words, without motion, as the soul is, because all-pervading,—and therefore incapable of changing its place]. AAA घटादिवत्‌ समानधमोपत्तावपसिद्ान्तः ॥ Ye ॥ Were the soul limited it Aph, 50. [We cannot admit that the might be perishable. soul is other than all-pervading, because] by being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &., [in being made up of parts, and hence destructible, ] there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishable- ness]. गतिग्रुतिरणुपाधियेगादाकाशवत्‌ ॥ ५९ ॥ Soul moves not, any more Aph, 51. The [Vedic] text regard- than Space. ing the motion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable only] because of the junction of an attendant, as in the ease of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar. ^ Since there are such proofs of the soul’s unlimitedness as the declaration that ‘It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,’ the text regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining (not to the soul but) to an atten- dant ;”—-viz. Nature], The Soul’s bondage. 19 © ५ न HAUT AHA ॥ YP ॥ 7 त te Aph, 52. Nor moreover [does the ae soe of any merit or bondage of the soul result from the is merit or demerit arising] from works, because these belong not thereto,—see Aph. 16]. ^ अतिप्रसा्तिरन्यधमल्वे ॥ YR Il Else bondage might cling Aph, 58. If the case were otherwise even to the emancipated, [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul] might extend unduly [even to the emancipated, for the same reasons as those stated under Aph. 16]. निगुणादिभरुतिविराधशेति ॥ ५४ ॥ Aph, 54, And this [opinion that A single text of scripture the bondage of the soul arises from upsets equally all the hereti- नः १ os soul's rela- any of these causes alleged by the heretics] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities ;—and so much for that point. (The case then stands thus, that “the immediate cause of the bondage of the soul is just the conjunc. tion of Nature and of the soul.’””] तद्योगो ऽष्यविवेकान्न VATA | ५५॥ क boa Aph. 55. Moreover the conjunction age affects not the emanci- thereof [viz. of Soul and Nature,] does pee not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated], nor is there a parity [in this respect between the emancipated and the unemancipated, as the heretics object there must be]. नियतकारणात्तद्चछित्तिध्वीन्तवत्‌ ॥ ५९॥ a ee . Aph, 56. The removal of it [viz. ‘on-discrimination is re- PS Oe : ff moveable by discrimination non-discrimination—] is to be effected want: by the necessary means, just like dark- ness, [which is removed by light alone]. D2 20 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य TSA दानम्‌॥ WO | The discrimination of Na- Aph. 57. Since the non-discrimina- ture, as other than soul, in- tion of other things [such as the body, १ the human understanding, &c., from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place on the cessation of that Nature, [from which, the body, the human understanding, &e., arise. ‘The state of the case is this; as, when the soul has been discriminated from dody, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other properties—the effects of the body (which is the substantial cause of its own properties), —so, by parity of reasoning,—from the departure of the cause— when soul, in its character of wnalterableness &c., has been dis- criminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of (the soul’s being any of) the products thereof (i. e. of Nature), such as the ‘ understanding’ and the like, which have the character of being modifications (of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is athing unalterable). ^ But then (some one may say)—if we admit the soul’s bondage (at one time) and its freedom (at another), and its discrimination (at one time) and its non-discrimination (at another), then this is in contradiction to the assertion (in Aph. 19) thatit is ^ ever essen- tially a pure and free intelligence :’—and it is in contradiction to such texts as this—viz.,—‘ The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction (of the soul), nor production (of it), nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter (of any work), nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it indeed liberated’ —(seeing that that cannot de- sire or obtain liberation, which was never ound). This charge of inconsistency he repels as follows.’’] ASS न तु aed चित्तस्थितेः॥ ५८ ॥ The मनवो नं Aph, 58.—It is merely verbal, and merely verbal. not a reality, [this so-called bondage of the soul,] since it [the bondage] resides in the mind [and not in The Discrimination of Soul and Nature. Q1 the soul :—for “ since bondage &c. all reside only in the mind (and not in the soul), all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal— i. ९. it is ‘ vox et praeterea nihil,’—because it is merely a reflection like the redness of (pellucid) crystal (when aChina-rose is near it) ; but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is zo contradiction to what had been said before,””—as the objector would insinuate. ] युक्तितो ऽपि न बाध्यते दिद्मूढवदपरोकताहते ॥ ye ॥ Aph, 59.—Moreover it [the non-dis- The truth must be directly discerned, and not merely CYimination of Soul from Nature—] is accepted on the ground of ti १ a Tashan कः not to be removed by argument, as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cogni- tion [—i. e. without his directly perceiving how the points of the compass really tie——to which immediate perception ‘ testimony’ or ‘inference’ may conduce, but the necessity of which these media or instruments of knowledge cannot supersede. A man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the ¢estimony of a friend that it 7s white ; but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness. ^ Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination (of soul from Nature), the next thing to be set forth is—what is meant by the ^ discrimination,’ here referred to ;” and “this being the topic, in the first place since, only if soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore—that ‘instrument of right know- ledge’ (pramdna) which establishes the existence of these (two imperceptible realities) is first to be set forth.”] अचान्तुषाणामनमानेन बेधो धूमादिभिरिव TH? ॥ ९०॥ The evidence for things Aph, 60.—The knowledge of things imperceptible. imperceptible is by means of Inference, 22 The Sdukhya Aphorisms. Book I. as that of fire [when not directly perceptible] is by means of smoke, &c. [^ Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is (true, but yet is) not established by ‘ Inference,’ is established by Revelation ;—but since ‘Inference’ is the chief (among the instruments of knowledge) in this (the Sankhya) System, ‘Inference’ only is laid down (in the aphorism) as the chief thing,—but Revelation is not disregarded” in the Sankhya sys- tem,—as will be seen at Aph. 87. ^ He next exhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect (among these severally), prepa- ratorily to the argument that will be afterwards stated.”] संत्चरजसमसां साम्यावस्था प्रतिः प्रकतेर्मदान्‌ भद- ते SUR ऽदङ्गारात्यञ्च तन्माचाणि उभयमिन्दि यं तन्मा- तेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पच्चविंशतिर्गणः॥ ९९ ॥ The twenty-five realities Aph. 61.—Nature (prakriti) is the enumerated. state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) Passion (rajas) and Darkness (tamas); from Nature ([pro- ceeds] Mind (mahat), from Mind Self-consciousness (uhankéra), from Self-consciousness the five Subtile Elements (¢anmdtra), and both sets [external and internal] of Organs (indriya), and from the Subtile Elements the Gross Elements (s¢hiila-bhita). [Then there is] Soul (purusha) :—such is the class of twenty-five. (“The ‘state of equipoise’ of the three things called ^ Goodness’ &c., is their being neither less nor more (—one than another—), that is to say the state of not being (developed into) an effect (in which one or other of them predominates) :—and thus ‘Nature’ is the triad of ‘ Qualities’ (guna) distinct from the products (to which this triad gives rise);—such is the complete meaning.” “ These things, viz. ‘ Goodness’ &., (though spoken of as the three Qualities), are not ‘ Qualities’ (guna) in the Vais’eshika sense of the word, because (the ‘ Qualities’ of the Vais'eshika system havethemselves xo qualities,—see Kanada’s 16th Aph.—while) ८१०४८ have the qualities of Conjunction, Dis- The twenty-five realities. 23 junction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c. In this Sainkhya sys- tem, and in Scripture, the word ‘ Quality’ (guna) is employed (as the name of the three things in question) because they are subservient to Soul (and therefore hold a secondary rank in the scale of being), and because they form the cords (—which the word guna also signifies—), viz. ‘ Understanding’ &c., which consist of the three (so called) ‘ Qualities,’ and which dind as a (cow or other) brute-beast, the Soul.” ‘Of this (Nature) the principle called ‘the great one’ (mahat), viz. the principle of ‘Understanding’ (buddhi), is the product. ‘ Self-consciousness’ is a conceit (of separate personality). Of this there are two products, (1) the ‘Subtile Elements’ and (2) the two sets of ‘Organs.’ The ‘Subtile Elements’ are (those of) Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of ‘ Organs,’ through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the ‘Subtile Elements’ are the five ‘Gross Elements.’ But ‘ Soul’ issomething distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five,—the aggre- gate of things :—that is to say, besides these there is nothing.’’ “ He next, in several aphorisms, declares the order of the infer- ring” the existence of these principles—the one from the other]. सखूलात्यच्चतन्मा चस्य ॥ ६२ II The existence of the ^ Sub- Aph, 62.—[The knowledge of the poet rere lad existence] of the ‘Subtile Elements’ is [by inference] from the ‘Gross Ele- ments ;’—[for “ Earth, &c., the ‘Gross Elements,’ are proved to exist by Perception ; and thereby (—i. e. from that Perception, —for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gautama’s 5th Aphorism—) are the ‘Subtile Elements’ inferred—(the arotxéa ०7०५८९८७ of Empedocles) ;—and so the application (of the process of inference to the case) is as follows :— (1). The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit (of simplification, or of the atomic), consist of things (—Subtile Elements, or Atoms,—) which have distinct 24 The Sdukhya Aphorisms. Book I. qualities, (—the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour, and so of the others) : (2). Because they are gross :—and (3). (Everything that 15 gross is formed of something less gross, or in other words more subtile,) as jars, webs, &c.,”—the gross web being formed of the less gross threads, and so of the others. | बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तश्चादङ्कारस्य ॥ ६२ ॥ And thence that of self: Aph. 63.—[The knowledge of the १4. existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference] from the external and internal [organs] and these [^ Subtile Elements’—mentioned in Aph. 62. “ The application (of the process of inference to the case) is in the following (some- what circular) manner :— (1). The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness :— (2). Because they are products of Self-consciousness :— (3). Whatever is not so (—i. e. whatever is mot made out of Self-consciousness—) is not thus (—i. e. is not a product of Self- consciousness)—as the Soul—which, not being made up there- of, is nota product of it.” ^ But then if it be thus (i. 6. if it be, as the Sdénkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on ‘Understanding,’ or ‘Intellect,’ or ‘ Mind,’—the jirst product of ^ Nature’—see Aph. 61—,) then (some one may object, that,) since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the pot- ter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disap- pear on the beatification of the potter whose ‘ understanding’ then surceases ; and this (—the objector may go on to say—) is not found to be the case, because another man (after the beatification of the potter) recognizes that ‘This is that same jar (which you may remember was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance.)’ In reply to this we say “Say not so,—because, on one’s beatifi- cation, there is an end of only those modifications of his inter- 1100 these realities are inferred. 25 nal organ or ‘Intellect’? which could be causes (as the jar no longer can be) of the emancipated soul’s experiencing (either good or ill), but not anend of the modifications of intellect in general, nor (an end) of intellect altogether ;’—-so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter surceases on his beatification:—but we may go further and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the ‘ intellect’? of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows :—‘ Or (as Berkeley sug- gests in his Principles of Human Knowledge, ch. vi.) let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like continue to exist, and not the Self-consciousness of the potter,”—who may lose his Self-consciousness,—whereas the Deity the sum of all life—Hiranya-garbha (see Veddnta-s'ara 62,) never loses His Self-consciousness while aught living con- tinues. } तेनान्तःकर णस्य ॥ €8 ॥ And thence that of In- 404. 64.—[The knowledge of the teltect. existence] of Intellect is [by inference] from that [Self-consciousness—“ That is to say,—by inference from (the existence of) ‘ that’—viz. Self-consciousness—which is a product, there comes the knowledge of ‘ Intellect’ (4uddhi)— the great ‘inner organ’ (antahkarana) and hence called ‘the great one’ (mahat),—(the existence of which is recognised) ` under the character of the cause of this (product—viz. Self-con- sciousness). And so the application (—again rather circular— of the process of inference to the case) is as follows :— (1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment (or mind), (2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment (—proceeding in the Cartesian order of ‘cogito, ergo sum,)’— and 26 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book 1, (3) Whatever is not so (—i. e. whatever is not made out of judgment or mental assurance—), is not thus (i. e. is not a product of mental assurance—) as the Soul” (which is not made out of this or anything antecedent.) ~ ततः प्रकतेः॥ ९१५॥ And thence that of Na- Aph, 65.—[The knowledge of the tare. existence] of Nature is [by inference] from that [‘Intellect.’] = [८ The application (of the process of inference to the case) is as follows :— (1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections, —of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness :— (2) Because, whilst it is a product (and must therefore have arisen from something consisting of that which it itself now consists of), it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—and (3) (Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these,) as lovely women, &c. For, an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and therefore (is known to be mainly made up of or) partakes of the quality of ‘Goodness ;’ the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and therefore partakes of. the quality of ‘ Foulness;’ and she who is separated (and perhaps forgotten), occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of ‘Darkness.’” ^ And the appro- priate refutation (of any objection) in this case is (the principle) that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be (in every case) in conformity with the qualities of the cause.’’] e iv GRANTS RT Il ६९॥ The argument for the exist. Aph. 66.—[(The existence] of Soul ence of Soul. [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature or any of its similarly unintelligent products. = ^ But the application (of the argument in this particular case is as follows) :— Nature and Soul uncreated. 27 (1) The thing in question—viz. Nature, the ‘Great one,’ and the rest (of the aggregate of the unintelligent),—has, as its fruit (or end), the (mundane) experiences and the (eventual) liberation of some other than itself ;— (2) Because it is a combination (or compages) ;—and (3) (Every combination,) as a couch or a seat, or the like,” (is for another’s use, not for its own, and its several component parts render no mutual service).] LN ५ मूले मलाभावाद मूलं मूलम्‌ ॥ ९७॥ Argument for the eternity Aph. 67.—Since the root has no of Nature. root, the root [of all] is root-less, [that is to say, there is no other cause of Nature, because there would be a regressus in infinitum if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause, and so on without end.] पारम्पयेऽप्येकच परिनिषठेति संज्ञामाचम्‌॥ ६८ ॥ The employment of the term 404. 68—Even if there be a succes- 0 न 9 sion, there is a halt at some one point, merely to debar regressus in infinitum. and so it is merely a name, [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of things under the name of ‘Nature.’ “ Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum if there were a succession of causes —another cause of Nature, and another cause of that one again,— there must be at last a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one uncaused, eternal thing ;— therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency (pra-kriti) —for this word prakriti (usually, and conveniently, rendered by the term Nature,) is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the 700." | in समानः प्ररतेदयाः ॥ ९८ ॥ व buds lait Aph, 69.—Alike in respect of Nature uncreated. and of both [Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence. | E2 28 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book J. अधिकारि ैविध्यान्न FAA || ७०॥ All do not profit by the = 404. 70,—There is no rule [or neces- 4 मनुः lied of ८ sity that a// should arrive at thetrath—] that are fully amenable to because those who are privileged [to नसी engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions [—* through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these—by the dull, the (Sankhya) arguments are frustrated (and altogether set: aside) by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Baud- dhas, &०. By the mediocre, they (are brought into doubt, or, in other words,) are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the reverse (of what these persons employ them to prove), or by arguments which are not true; (—see the section on Fallacies in the Tarka-sangraha). But it is only the best of those privileged that reflect in the manner that has been set forth (in our exposition of the process of reflection which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature) ;—such is the import. But there is no rule that ad? must needs reflect in the manner so set forth forth ;—such is the literal meaning.” ] मदद्‌ाख्यमाद्यं कायें तन्मनः 11 ७१ ॥ By‘the Great गल is Aph. 71.—That first product [of the meen Primal Agent, Nature,] which is called ‘the Great one, is Mind. [‘‘ Mind’ (manas) is so called because its function is ‘thinking’ (manana). By ‘thinking’ is here meant ^ judging’ (nis‘chaya) :—that of which this is the function is ‘intellect? (suddhi) ;—and that is the first product— that called ‘ the Great one’ (mahat).’”’] ; चरमो SERTE 11 OF I The relation of Self-con- Aph. 72.—‘ Self-consciousness,’ 18 क So eee that which is subsequent [to Mind, “That is to say, ‘ Self-consciousness’ is the next after the ^ Great one’” Since ‘Self-consciousness’ is that whose function is a Nature the sole cause. 29 conceit (which brings out the Zyo in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would else have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature—the formless Objective)—it therefore follows that the others (among the phenomena of mundane exist- ence) are effects of this (Self-consciousness) ;—and so he declares as follows’’]. : = तत्कायत्वमुत्तरषाम्‌ । 93 ॥ All products, save Mind, Aph. 73.—To the others it belongs result from Self-consciousness. = {0 he the products thereof [—i. e. of Self-consciousness]. MATA ACT TRA ऽप्यएुवत्‌ ॥ ७४ 11 bite: क, १ 404. 74.—Moreover, mediately, cause of Mind, is mediately through that [i. e. the ‘great one’ iia Min! catia Aph. 72—], the first [cause—viz. Na- ture—] isthe cause [of all products], as is the case with the Atoms, [—‘‘for in the theory of the Vais‘seshikas, the Atoms are the cause of the jar or the like, only [mediately] through combinations of two atoms, and so on.” = ^ But then, since both Nature and Soul too are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation’s commencing? In regard to this he declares as follows.’’] (4 = _ ~न ~ ~ Tafa दयारेकतरस्य दाने न्यतरयागः ।। ७५ ॥ Why Nature is the sole 404. 75.—While both [Soul and ore Nature] areantecedent [to all products], since the one [viz. Soul] is devoid of this [character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two [—viz. Nature. ^ But (some one may say)—let A¢oms alone be causes, since there is no dispute (that ¢hese are causal). In reply to this he says’’]. + XY परिच्छिन्नं न सवापादानम्‌।1 ७६ ॥ ८. the theory of @ plas. Aph, 76.—What is limited cannot tic Natureis preferable to 106 the substance of all things, [८४8 that of Atoms. $ 8 yarn cannot be the (material) cause of 30 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. a jar ;—therefore it would (on the theory suggested) be neces- sary to mention separate causes of all things severally, and it is simpler to assume a single cause; therefore Nature alone is the cause,’—‘ and he alleges scripture in support of this,” as follows]. तदुत्यत्तिशरुतेश्च 11 ७७ 11 Scripture declares in fa- Aph, 77.—And [the proposition that si ada Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of scripture that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [for “Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as ‘ From Nature the world arises,’ &९. ‘But then (some one may say), a jar which antecedently did not exist, is seen to come into existence ;—let, then, antecedent non-existence be the cause (of each product), since this is an invariable antecedent,’”’—(and hence a cause— ‘the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,’ if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted.) To this he replies] नावस्तुने वस्तुसिद्धिः 11 ७८ 11 Aph. 178.-4 thing is not made out of nothing ; [—“ that is to say,—it is not possible that out of nothing—i. e. out of a nonentity—a thing should be made—i. ९. an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the world also would be unreal.” Well, “let the world too de unreal,—what harm is that to ws? (—if any ask—) he therefore declares as follows.”’] अनाधाद्‌ दुष्टकारणजन्यलाच्च MAA |1 ७८. ॥ Reasons why the world is Aph. 79.—It [the world] is not un- ॥ be epee Maree real, because there is no fact contradic- tory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes [—leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed. ‘ When there is the notion, in regard to a shell (of a Ex nihilo nihil fit. The world is not unreal. 31 pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver), that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the (subsequent and more correct) cognition that this is xo¢ silver. But, in the case in question (—that of the world regarded as a reality—), no one ever has the cognition, ‘This world is 70८ in the shape of an entity,’—by which (cognition—if any one ever really had such —) its being an entity might be opposed.” ‘ And it is held that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause,—e. g. some one’s cognition of a (white) conch-shell.as yellow, through such a fault as the jaundice (which depraves his eye-sight). But, in the case in question (—that of the world regarded as a reality—), there is no such (temporary or occasional) depravation (of the senses), because all, at all times, cognize the world as a reality ; therefore the world is zo¢ an unreality.” “But then (some one may suggest)—/e¢ nonentity be the (substantial) cause of the world, still the world will not (necessarily therefore) be unreal. In regard to this he declares as follows.”’] भावे तद्योगेन ४ तदभावात्कुतस्तरां त- ; ॥ Ge ll क 4404. 80.—If it [—the substantial is something, and of nothing cause—] be an entity, then this would श be the case [that the product should be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith :—but if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case {that the product should be real] since ¢ is a nonentity [like the cause with which it is united in the relation of identity] ?— “But then (—a follower of the Mémdnsd may say), since (it would appear that) nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let works alone be the cause of the world ;—what need have we of the hypothesis of ‘ Nature? To this he replies.”] £ न न कमण उपाद्‌ानलायगत्‌ || ८१॥ Action cannot serve as @ Aph, 81.—Nay,—for works are not कर adapted to be the sudstantial cause (of 32 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. any product.) [‘ Granting that ‘the unseen’ (merit or demerit arising from actions) may be an instrumental cause (in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent), yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the substantial cause (of any product), and our theories ought to show deference to our experience.” न But then (some one may say)—since Liberation can be obtained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for (our troubling ourselves about) Nature ? To this he replies.’’] नानुखविकादपि afar: साध्यत्वेनाठत्तियोगाद पुर घार्थत्वम्‌ ॥ FF II Salvation is not tobe ob- 04. 82.—The accomplishment tained by ritual observances. thereof [i, e. of Liberation] is not, moreover, through scriptural rites:—the chief end of man does not consist in this [that is gained through such means] ; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acés, [and is therefore a product and not eternal], there is [still left impending over the ritualist] the liability to repetition of births. तच प्राप्रविवेकस्यानावरत्तिगरुतिः ॥ TR ॥ In regard to the attain- 40. 83.—There is scripture for it penagp heart teat ‘wit, that he who has attained to discrimina- the Sinkya. tion in regard to these [i. e. Nature and Soul] has no repetition of births; [for “there is a text declaring that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinc- tion, there shall be no repetition of births;—the text—viz.— ^ He does not return again,’ &c.’””] (1 जलाभिषे ma) Sees कवन्न जा्यविमेएकः ॥ ८४ | Pain can only lead to pain, Aph, 84,—From pain [occasioned, भक e. g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer,—and not /ideration from pain], as there is not relief from chilliness by effusion of water. [For, “if Li- Evidence. 33 काम्ये ऽकाम्ये ऽपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात्‌ 1 ८५॥ The character of the end APh. 85.—[Liberation cannot arise contemplated makes no dif- from acts] because, whether the end Serence in regard to the tran- छ ध F sitoriness of what is effected be something desirable or undesirable, ty orks [—and we admit that the motive of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim,—] this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of acts [and therefore not eternal but transitory, “ because it is a produc- tion.””] And “ the text which declares that works done with- out desire are instruments of Liberation, has reference to knowledge (which, I grant, may be gained by such means), and Liberation comes through knowledge,—so that these works are instruments of Liberation mediately ;’ [—but you will recollect that the present enquiry regards the immediate cause]. निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमाचं परं न समानत्वम्‌ ॥ ८९॥ The right means effect Li- Aph. 86.—Of him who is essenti- Yeration once forall, ally liberated, his bonds having abso- lutely perished, it [i. e. the fruit of his saving knowledge] is absolute :—there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a tem- porary sojourn in Paradise,—only to return again to earth. Well, “it has been asserted (in Aph. 61) that there is a class of twenty-five {things which are realities) :—and since these cannot be ascertained (or made out to be true) except by proof, therefore he displays this,’—i. e. he shows what he means by proof]. दयोरेकतरस्य TURE: प्रमा तत्सा- धकतमं यत्तत्‌ ॥ ८७॥ Aph. 87.—The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect] nor in one or other of them, is ‘right notion’ (pramd). What is in the highest degres F What és meant by evi- 34 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. productive thereof [—i. e. of any given ‘right notion’], is that, [—i. e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pra- mdna). ‘Not lodged’—i. e. not deposited in ‘one rightly cognizing’ (pramdtri),—in short, not previously got at. The ‘discrimination,’ i. e. the ascertainment (or right apprehen- sion) of such a thing or reality, is ‘right notion’ :—and whe- ther this be an affection ‘of both’—i. e. of Intellect and also of Soul (as some hold that itis), or of only one or other of the two (as others hold), either way, that ‘which is in the highest degree productive’ of this ‘right notion’ is (what we term proof or) evidence (pramdna). Such is the definition of evidence in general,—the definition of its several species falling to be considered hereafter. “It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ (when speaking of the result of evidence) the expressions ‘not previously known’ (which excludes things remembered), and ‘reality’ (which excludes mistakes and fancies), and ‘discrimination’ ”’ which excludes doubt. And “in regard to this (topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge), if ‘right notion,’ is spoken of as located in the Soul, then the proof or evidence is an affection of the Intellect. If on the other hand, the ‘ right notion’ is spoken of as located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection (of that, the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul), then it (the proof or evidence—or whatever we may choose to call that from which ‘ right notion’ results), is just the conjunction of an organ (with its appropriate object,—such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception—), &c. But if both the Soul’s cogni- tion, and the affections of the Intellect, are spoken of as (cases of). ‘right notion,’ then both of these aforesaid (—the affection of the Intellect in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other case —) are (to receive the name of) proof (pramana). You are to understand that when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as ‘ evidence,’ it is only as being mediately’? the sources of Perception defined. 35 right knowledge. ‘How many kinds of proofs then are there? To this he replies.’’] चिविधं प्रमाणं तत्सदो सर्वसिद्वेनाधिक्यसिद्धिः ॥ ८८ | There are three kinds of 401. 88.—Proof is of three kinds :— evidence. there is no establishment of more, be- cause if these be established then all [that is true] can be established [—by one or other of these three proofs, viz., ‘ sense’ (pratyaksha), ‘the recognition of signs’ (anumdna), and ‘tes- timony’ (s‘abda), to the exclusion of ‘comparison’ which is reckoned in the Ny4ya a specifically distinct source of know- ledge, &c.] RGAE स॒त्तदाकारोल्ञेखि ANT तत््त्यक्चम्‌॥ ८९ ॥ Aph. 89.—Perception (pratyaksha) is that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof [—as water assumes the form of the vessel into which Perception defined. it is poured—]. योगिनामबाद्यप्रल्क्ततवान्न दोषः।। ९० ॥ Aph. 90.—It is not a fault, [in the Miso च pete Be definition, that it does not apply to 4. perceptions of the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga,} because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception, [since the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the external organs of sense. But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect, the real justification of the definition in question is next stated]. लोनवसतुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धादाऽदोषः 11 ९२ ॥ Aph. 91.—Or, there is no fault [in But the definition does ap- रः 4 ply to the perceptions of the the definition] because of the conjunc- da tion, with causal things, of that [mys- tical mind] which has attained exaltation [—“ since the mind F 2 36 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book I. of the Yogi, in the exaltation gained from the habitude pro- duced by concentration, does come into conjunction with things (as existent) in their causes,” whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses. And “here the word rendered ‘causal’ (lina) denotes the things, not in conjunction (with the senses), alluded to by the objector :—for we, who assert that effects ewist (from eternity in their causes before taking the shape of effects, and likewise in these same causes when again resolved into their causes), hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that hence its conjunction (with the mind of the mystic or the clairvoyant) is possible.” ‘But then (some one may say—still this (definition) does not extend to the Lord’s per- ceptions, because, since these are from everlasting, they can- not result from (emergent) conjunction. To this he replies’’]. ई ्ररासिद्धः। ९२९।॥ That any ° दमा दम is Aph. 92.—[This objection to the mot proved, definition of Perception has no force] because it is not proved that there is a Lord (is’wara) ; [but observe that this demurring to there being any ‘ Lord,’ is merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of certain partisans (who hold an opinion not recognised by the major- ity) ; therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is ‘because it is not proved that there is a Lord,—but not the expression ‘ because there is no Lord.’ And further, “ on the implication that there is a ‘Lord,’ what we mean to speak of (in our definition of Perception—in Aph. 89—) is merely the being of the same kind with what is produced by con- junction” of a sense-organ with its object,—and the percep- tions of the ‘Lord’ may be of the same kind with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same source, | That any Lord exists, is not proved. 87 सुक्तबदयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥। ५२ ॥ त म र 411. 93.—[And further] it is not proof that there is any proved that He [the ‘Lord’] exists, a because [whoever exists must be either free or bound, and] of free and bound, He can be neither the one nor the other. उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम्‌ ॥ ८४ ॥ 411. 94.—[Because] either way He would be inefficient, [—since, if He were free, He would have no desires which (as compulsory motives, would) instigate Him to create; and, if He were bound, He would be under delusion ;—He must be (on either alternative,) unequal to the creation, &c., of this world. ^ But then (it may be asked,) if such be the case, what be- comes of the scripture texts which declare the ‘Lord?’ To this he replies.”] मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासा सिद्वस्य A ९५॥ The import of the texts Aph. 95.—[The scriptural texts which speak of the‘ Lord.’ काला make mention of the ‘ Lord,’ are] either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognised [deities of the Hindi pantheon. But then, if God be nothing but the Soul, and if Soul does nothing, then “what is heard (in scripture—viz.—) the fact that it (viz. Soul) is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the case,— The force of the dilemma. for, in the world, we speak of government only in reference to modifications (preceded and determined) by resolutions (that so and so shall take place), &c. To this he replies’’]. तत्सन्निधाना द्धिष्टाठत्वं मणिवत्‌ € ६ 1 Soul, like the loadstone, Aph. 96.—The governorship there- hes 4 by ^ but of [1. 6. of Soul over Nature] is from aby. . . . : + its proximity [thereto,—not from its resolving to act thereon—], as is the case with the gem [—the 38 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book I. load-stone—in regard to iron. For, if it were alleged that its (Soul’s) creativeness or its governorship were through a resolve (to create or to govern,) then this objection would apply ;— but (itis not so—for) by us (Sdnkhyas) it is held that the Soul’s governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from its proximity (to Nature)—“ as is the case with the (load-stone) gem ;”’—for “as the gem, the load-stone, is attracted by iron, merely by proximity, without resolving (either to act or to be acted upon), so by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle called the ‘ Great One’ (or Mind—see Aph. 61). And in this alone consists (what we speak of as) its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it :”’—and thus it is declared (in some one of the Puranas)—“ As the iron acts whilst the gem (the loadstone) stands void of volition, just so the world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is that there is in the Soul both agency (seemingly), and non-agency (really) :—it is not an agent, inasmuch as it is devoid of voli- tion; and it is an agent, merely through approximation” to Nature]. विशेषकार्यष्वपि जोवानाम्‌ ॥ ९७ 11 In like manner Embodied Aph. 97.—In the case of individual Ses Re ar ens products also, [the apparent agency || of animal souls [is solely through proximity. But then (some one may say), if there were no eternal and omniscient ‘ Lord,’ then, through the doubt of a blind tradition (in the absence of an intelligently effective guardianship), the Vedas would cease to be an authority—(a possibility which, of course, can- not be entertained for an instant). To this he replies’’]. oN; ba N“N सिद्ूपवेोद तवादाक्याथापदे शः 1 ८ ॥ त Aph. 98. The declaration of the any ‘Lord’ to authenticate texts or sense |of the Veda, by ^ Brahma for example], since he knows the truth—[is authoritative evidence. ‘But then if Soul, by Inference and Testimony. 39 its simple proximity (to Nature) is an overruler in a secondary sense only of the term, (—as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained that actually, and literally, the iron draws the magnet,—) then who is the primary (or actual) overruler (in the creation of the world) ? In reference to this he says’’]. अन्तःकरणस्य तदुञज्वलिनलाज्ञादवद्धिष्टाठ- BAN ९९ ॥ 2 ia tw ihe shape of 8 Aph. 99.—The internal organ, internal organ that Nature through its being enlightened thereby प {[—i. ९. by Soul—] is the over-ruler, —as is the iron [in respect of the magnet. ‘ The internal organ, i. e. the understanding, is the over-ruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, (as it does fancy) by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in (and contemplate itself in) Soul ;—‘ just as the iron’—that is to say—as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws (the magnet) in consequence of its mere proximity,” and so acquiring magnetism by Magnetic Induction]. He now, (having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception), gives his definition of an induction (anu- mana). = प्रतिबन्धदशः प्रतिबद्वन्ञानमनमानम्‌ 11 १०० ॥ Aph. 100.—The knowledge of the oi aes connected [e. g. fire] through per- ception of the connection [e. g. of fire with smoke] is infer- ence. पे > $ ¶ आघ्रापद्‌ शः शब्दः ।। १०१ ॥ Aph. 101.—Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence—] is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed]. Valid Testimony defined. 40 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book I. nN उभयसिद्वः प्रमाणात्तदुपदेशः 11 Yee I Why the kinds of उण. Aph. 102.—Since the establishment dence have been here set of [the existence of] both [soul and Sorth. ५ not-soul] is by means of evidence,— the declaration thereof [1. 6. of the kinds of evidence, has been here made. And “among these (several kinds of proof) he now describes that one by which especially—viz. by a proof which is one kind of inference—Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively’’]. सामान्यते दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ ९०२ ॥ The existence of Soul and Aph. 103.—The establishment of Nature argued from analogy. oth [Nature and Soul] is by analogy [the necessity of axes for cutting, leading us, analogically, to the necessity of Senses for perceiving,—which Senses are products of Nature ; and, again, that houses, and other structures, exist not for themselves, leading us to the conclusion that Nature, which is a compound thing, is not designed for itself but for something different, viz. Soul. ‘But then (some one may say)—since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, (and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul,) there should constantly be experience (whether of pleasure or of pain), and hence no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies’’]. nN चिद्वसाने भोगः 11 १०४ ॥ When it is that experience Aph. 104,—Experience [whether +~ of pain or pleasure] ends with [the discernment of] Thought— [or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature. “By ‘Thought’ is meant Soul. Experience (whether of pain or pleasure) ceases on the discerning thereof. As ‘antecedent non-existence,’ though devoid of a beginning, (—see Tarkasangraha §92) surceases (—when the thing an- tecedently non-existent begins to be—), so eternal Nature (—eternal as regards the absence of any beginning—) con- tinues (no further than) till the discernment of the difference Soul neither acts nor experiences. 41 (between Nature and Soul) :—so that experience (whether of pain or pleasure) does not at all times occur :—such is the state of the case.”” But some one may say—if Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it must follow (—which seems unrea- sonable—) that another is the experiencer of (the results of) the acts done by one different. To this he replies”). © hae NSN FRAG फलोपभेगो ऽन्नाद्यवत्‌ 11 १०५॥ The fruit of the action is Aph. 105.—The experience of the not always the agent’s. fruit may belong even to another than the agent, as in the case of food, &c., [—for, “as it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz. the master, to enjoy the fruit thereof (—i. e. the fruit of the cook’s actions—), so is the case here.” But, “having stated this exoteric principle, he next declares his own doctrine” on the point]. अविवेकादा तत्सदः कतुः फलावगमः 1 १०६ 11 That Soul acts and experi- Aph. 106.—Or [—to give a better ences is an error. account of the matter than that given in Aph. 105—], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent [—soul being mistaken for an agent—] has the fruit [of the act, is a wrong notion. For “the soul is neither an agent nor a patient, but, from the fact that the Great Principle (—the actual agent—) is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent.” And “ it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul that this takes place,—i. ९. that the conceit takes place that it is the agent that experiences the fruit ;”—whereas the ac- tual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experi- ence neither pain not pleasure]. x नाभयच्च TATRA ॥ १०७ ॥ Soul is really neither agent Aph. 107.—And when the truth is nor experiencer. told, there is neither. [^ ‘When the truth is told’ (and discerned), i. ९, when, by means of evidence, G 42 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book T. Nature and Soul are perceived (in their entire distinctness one from the other), ‘ there is neither’—i. e. neither the condition (as regards soul) of an agent nor a patient.” “Having thus discussed (the topic of) evidence, he next states the distribution of the object-matter of evidence’’] विषये ऽविषये ऽप्यतिदू रादेदनेापादानाभ्या- मिन्दरियस्य 11 १०८ ॥ Wud पज Aph. 108.—[A thing may be] an certain circumstances may be object [perceptible] and also [at an- EE TOE, ati time] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of {conjunction of the sense with the thing] or [on the other hand] an appliance of the sense [to the thing. To explain the ^ &c.,’ and exemplify the causes that may prevent the con- junction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark that—“ it is in consequence of great distance that a bird (flying very high up) im the sky is not perceived :—(then again) in consequence of extreme proxi- mity the collyrium located in the eye (is not perceived by the eye itself) :—a thing placed in (the inside of, or on the opposite side of,) a wall (is not perceived) in consequence of the obstruction :—from distraction of mind the unhappy, or other (agitated person), does not perceive the thing that is at his side (—or under his very nose—) :—through its subtilty an Atom (is not perceived) :—nor is a very small sound when overpowered by the sound of a drum:—and 80 on.” Now “how,” or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerat- ed,—“ comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this he declares”’]. A सोच्छयात्तदनुपलब्धिः ।। ९०९ ॥ 400. 109.—Her [1. €. Nature’s] imperceptibleness arises from her sub- tilty, [and “ by ‘ subtilty’ is meant the fact of being difficult to The subtilty of Nature. Nature, not Atoms. 43 ` investigate, not (—as a Naiydéyika might perhaps here prefer understanding the term—) the consisting of Atoms,—for Nature is (not atomic, in the opinion of the Saénkhyas, but) all-pervasive.”’ “ How then (it may be asked) is (the existence of) Nature determined? To this he replies”). ८ क, कायेद शनात्तदुपलब्धेः 11 ११० ॥ Nature inferred from the Aph. 110.—[ Nature exists] because व her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions [‘‘ which have the three Qualities,” —see Aph. 61.,—and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these three constituents are held to exist from eternity]. वादि विप्रतिपत्तेस्तद सिद्धिरिति चेत्‌ 11 १११॥ क teat a Aph. 11 [you throw out the evistence of Nature by the doubt that] it [—viz. the existence of (+ Nature—] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views,—the Naiyd- yikas asserting that atoms are the cause of the world, and the Veddntins that Brahma is the cause,—then he retorts as follows]. तथा SHAT EM एकतरसिद्ेनापलापः।। ११९॥ Mutual denials settle no- Aph. 112.—But since thus each ae [doctrine] is established in the opi- nion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive. “If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the oppo- nent, then (look you) there is dissent against the other side too,—so how should it be established ?” ‘Well then (—the opponent may say—), let (the inference of) cause from effect be granted, how is it that this (cause) is Natwre—and nothing else (—such as Atoms, for instance) ? 10 this he replies’’] ५४ 44 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. चिविधविरोधापत्तेः ॥ १९१४ ॥ ital tia क Aph. 113. Because [if we were sis consistent with what up- +o infer any other cause than Nature] ११ we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit. For “if the character of cause (of all things around us) belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognisable in the world ;”—because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect which did not exist in the cause,— and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms. “ He. next repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed (antecedently) or of what did not exist—at least potentially—Aph. 117.] न~ नासदुत्यादो SFA ॥ VV I What never existed will Aph. 114.,—The production of what भकः is no entity, as a man’s horn, does not take place. उपाद्‌ाननियमात्‌ ॥ ११५॥ A product cannot be of 401. 115.—Because of the rule नः that there must be some material [of which the product may consist. ‘ And only when both are extant is there from the presence of the cause the presence of the effect :—otherwise everywhere, and always, every effect might be produced,’’—the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous. = ^^ This he insists upon as follows’’] 0 सवेच TAT स्वीसम्भवात्‌ | WE I Else any thing might occur Aph. 116.—Because every thing क is not possible every where, always, [which it might be if materials could be dispensed with. “ And for the following reason also, he declares, there is no produc- tion of what existed not” antecedently]. Production only manifestation. 45 शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्‌ ॥ १९७ ॥ Effects pre-exist potential- Aph. 117.—Because itis that which + + + aaa is competent [to the making of any- thing] that makes what is possible [as a product of it. ^^ For the being the material (of any future product) is nothing else than the fact of (being it potentially, i. e. of) having the power to be the product ; and this power is nothing else than the product’s condition as that of what has not yet come to pass ;—therefore, since ‘that which has the power,’ viz., the cause, makes the product which is ‘ capable’ (of being made out of it), it is not of any nonentity that the production takes place ;” but of an entity—whose esse antecedently was possi- bility]. कारणभावाच ॥ AS II The product is nothing | Aph. 118.—And because it [the else than the cause. product—] is [nothing else than] the cause [in the shape of the product]. + (अक न भावे AAA ॥ ११९ Ul A doubt whether that which Aph. 119.—If [it be alleged that] és can be said to become. there is no possibility of that becom- ing, which already is—{then the answer will be found in the next aphorism]. नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धने व्यवदाराव्यवदारो ॥ १९० ॥ Prodaciton ॐ जव winds 407. 120.—Nay, [—do not argue festation, and so of the oppo- that what is cannot become,—for] the + employment and the non-employment [of the term ‘ production’] are occasioned by the manifestation [or non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced or not. “ Ag the whiteness of white cloth which had become dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., so, by the operation of the potter is the pot brought into manifestness ; —whereas, on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden,” and 46 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book 7. no longer appears as a pot. “And ‘ manifestation’ (is no fiction of ours, for it) is seen ;—for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milk ing; of the statue, that resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of shelled rice from rice in the husk, by threshing; &c.’”’ And “therefore the employment or non-employment of the term the production of an effect are dependent on manifestation—dependent on the manifesta- tion of the effect :—that is to say,—the employment of the term production is in consequence of the manifestation (of what is spoken of as produced), and the non-employment of the term production is in consequence of there being no mani- , festation (of that which is therefore not spoken of as pro- duced),—but (the employment of the term production is) not in consequence of that becoming an entity which was not an entity.” But “if (the employment of the term) production is occasioned by (the fact of) manifestation, by what is occasion- ed the employment of the term destruction 2 To this he re- plies’”’]. नाशः ATTA 11 १९१॥ an is meant by destruc. | Aph. 121.—Destruction [of any : thing] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced, as when, by the blow of a mallet, a jar is resolved into its cause,—i. e. into the particles of clay which constituted the jar, But some one may say—“ if there were only a reso- lution (of a product into that from which it arose), a resur- rection (or zadtyyeveova) of it might be seen, and this is not seen :—well (—we reply—) it is not seen by blockheads, but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth (—as when burned to ashes) :—and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree ;andthis (successively) changes intothe shape of flower, fruit, and thread (spun again fromthe fruit of the What is meant by destruction. 47 cotton-plant). So is it with all entities.” But ‘‘ pray—(some one may ask)—is this manifestation (that you speak of under Aph. 119) something real, or something not real ? If it be some- thing real (and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be) then all effects (during this constant manifestation) ought con- stantly to be perceived ; and if it be not real, then there would be a non-existence of all products [in the absence of all mani- festation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real and] there must be [in order to give rise to it] another mani- festation, and of this another, [—seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation,—on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause], and thus we havea regressus in infinitum. To this he replies.” पारम्प्यताऽन्वेषणा बोजाङ्कुरवत्‌ | १९२ ॥ How manifestation may Aph. 122.—You are to understand occur without being anentity. that successively, as is the case with seed and plant, [—manifestation may generate manifestation from eternity to eternity. ^ Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations, still there is no fault, for there is no starting point,—as is the case with seed and plant,””—which people may suppose to have served from eternity as sources one to another reciprocally]. न उत्पत्निवद्ाऽद्‌षः ॥ १९२ ॥ The objections to the theory 411. 123.—Or, [at all events, our of manifestation retorted. theory of ‘ manifestation’ is as] blame- less as [your theory of] ‘ production’ :—[for let us ask, “ pray —is production produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this (production of production) there must be production ; —so that there is a regressus in infinitum, (such as you allege against our theory). If it be not produced, then, pray is this because it is un-real, or because it is eternal? If because it is un-real, then production never is at all, so that it should चै 48 The Sénkhya” Aphorisms. Book. I. never be perceived, (as you allege that it is). Again, if (pro- duction is not something produced) because it is eternal, then there should be at all times the production of (all possible) ` effects,—(which you will scarcely pretend is the case). Again, if you say,—since ‘ production’ itself consists of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production (of produc- tion) ?—then, in like manner, (J ask,)—-since ‘ manifestation’ itself consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation (of manifestation)? The view which you hold on this point is owrs also,”—and thus every objection stated or hinted under Aph. 121., is capable of being retorted]. देतुमद नित्यमव्यापि afar लिङ्गम्‌ ॥ १२४ II The characters common to 401. 124.—[A product of nature all products. is] caused, un-eternal, mutable, not all-pervading, multitudinous, dependent, mergent. a. ‘ Caused’—i. €. having a cause. ‘ Un-eternal,’—i. e. de- structible. ‘ Not all-pervading,’ i. €. not present everywhere. ^ Mutable’—i. e. distinguished by the act of leaving (one form) and assuming (another form). It (the soul) leaves the body it had assumed, (and probably takes another) ; and bodies, &c., move (and are mutable, as is notorious). ‘ Multitudinous’—i. e., in consequence of the distinction of souls, (—each man —e. g. having a separate body. ‘ Dependent’—i. e. on its cause. Mergent,—that is to say, it (i. e. each product, in due time,) is resolved into that from which it originated. But some one may say—“ if realities be the twenty-five (which the _Sénkhyas enumerate—see Aph. 60—and no more), pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely nothing ?—(if you say that they are so) then you give up what you see—in order to save a hypothesis, with which that which you see is irreconcilasle. To this he replies.’’] Qualities in the Nydya and Sdnkhya. 49 आच््स्यादभेदते बा गुणसामान्यादेसत्सिदिः प्रधान- व्यपदेशाद्या 11 १९५ ॥ The qualities of the Nyé Aph. 125.—There is the establish- ate implied in the term ment of these, [24 ‘ Qualities’ of the Nydya, which you fancy that we do not recognise because we do not explicitly enumerate them, ] either by reason that these ordinary qualities [—as contradis- tinguished from the three Qualities of the Sénkhya—] are in reality nothing different ; or [—to put it in another point of view—] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature [—in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied]. EN ~ चिगणाचेतनत्वादि इयोः ॥ १९६ ॥ Tha. 9 Aph. 126.—Of both [Nature and her Nature and her products. products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities and that they are irrational—[is the common property]. प्रोद्यप्रोतिविषादाैगुंणनामन्योन्य FIR 11 १२७ ॥ In what the three Quali- Aph. 127.—The Qualities differ in व character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms severally the Qualities present themselves]. RO Ne ९, AX ९, लघ्वादिधमरन्योन्यं साधम्यं वेधम्यं च गुणानाम्‌ ॥ १२८ ॥ In what respects the Qua- Aph, 128.—Through Lightness and lities agree as well as differ. other habits, the Qualities mutually agree and differ: [—i. e. “throughthe characters of Light- ness, Restlessness, and Heaviness,—the Qualities differ. Their agreement is through what is hinted by the expression ‘and other” And this consists in their mutually predominating (one over the other from time to time), producing each other, consorting together, and being reciprocally present (—the one in the other—), for the sake of the soul.” = ^ By the ex- घ्र 50 The Sankhya Aphorisms. Book. I. pression (—in Aph. 124—) ‘caused,’ &c., it was declared that the ‘Great one,’ or Mind, &c., are Products. He states the proof of this]. उभयान्यतवात्कायत्वं मदद्‌देध॑रादि M1 १९९. ॥ Proof that Mind, 4०, are Aph. 129.—Since they are other products. than both [Soul and Nature—the only two uncaused entities—], Mind, and the rest, are products, as is the case with a jar or the like. [‘‘He states another reason.’’] परिमाणात्‌ ॥ १२०॥ Aph. 130.—Because of their mea- sure, [which is a limited one, Mind and the rest are products ; whereas the only two that are un- caused, viz. Nature and Soul, are unlimited]. समन्वयात्‌ ॥ १३१॥ Aph. 131.—Because they conform [to Nature. Mind and the rest are products, “because they will (follow and) correspond with Nature, i. e., because the Qualities of Nature are seen in all things :” and it is a maxim that what is in the effect was deriv- A second proof. A third proof. ed from the cause, and implies the cause]. क, शक्तितशचेति ॥ ९२९ ॥ न । Aph. 132.—And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught, as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron that it is made of]. तद्वाने प्रकतिः पुरुषा वा ॥ १२३॥ Converse proof of the Aph. 133.—On the quitting there- ५ of [—quitting the condition of pro- duct—], there is Nature or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself. ^^ Product or not-product,—such is the pair of alternatives. ‘On the quitting Proofs that Mind, Sc. are products. 51 thereof,’—i. ९. when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product,—Mind and the rest (of necessity) enter into Nature or Soul,”’—these two alone being not-products. But perhaps some one may say ^ Mind and the rest may exist quite inde- pendently of the pair of alternatives (just mentioned). In regard to this he declares as follows’’]. ~ तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्छत्वम्‌ ॥ १२४॥ Mind and the rest would not Aph. 134.—If they were other than be at all, if neither product these two they would be void [—see- nor not-product, ४ F fox ing that there is nothing self-existent besides Soul and Nature. = ^ Well now, (some one may say,) why should it be under the character of a product that Mind and the rest are a sign of (there being such a principle as) nature? They may be (more properly said to be) a sign merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies’’]. कायात्कारणानुमानं ASE ॥ १३५ II What kind of causes can Aph. 135.—The cause is inferred be inferred from their effects, from the effect [—in the case of Na- ture and her products—], because it accompanies it. [‘ That (other relation, other than that of material and product, which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,) may indeed be where the nature (or essence) of the cause is not seen in the effect, as (is the case witl:) the inference—from the rising of the moon—that the sea is swollen (into full tide,—rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur ^ apart from’ the rising of the moon, yet here the cause—moon-rise —is not seen in the effect—tide; and consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect). But in the present case, since we see in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the H 2 52 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. cause ts inferred from the effect. ‘Because it accompanies it’?—i. e. because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature,” i.e. Nature herself actually present, as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar actually present in the jar. But it may still be objected,—“ if it be thus, then let that prin- ciple itself—the ‘Great one,’ or Mind,—be the cause of the world :—what need of Nature 2 To this he replies”). अव्यक्तं चिगुणा्लिङ्गात्‌ |! १२६ II Bow (0 Aph, 136.—The undiscrete, [Nature, भ must be inferred] from its [discrete and dissoluble] effect, [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature. ‘ ‘It goes to dissolution’—such is the import of the term linga, here rendered ‘ effect.’ From that (dissoluble effect),—viz. the ‘ Great’ principle, or Mind, —in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the ‘Great’ principle, in the shape of ascertainment (or distinct intellection), is limited (or discrete), and perishable is established by direct observation. Therefore (—i. e. since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,) we infer that into which it is resolvable,’—in other words its “cause,—here analogously termed lingin, since ^ effect? had been termed linga. = ^^ But then, (some one may say,) still some- thing quite different may be the cause (of all things) ;—what need of this Nature of yours? In regard to this he remarks as {0110087 ] . तत्कायेतस्तत्पिद्धेनापलापः ॥ VSI! Why Nature, and nothing Aph. 137.—There is no denying else, must be the root of all. that it [—Nature—] is because of its effects ; [—for, “is the cause of this (world) a product or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being (with equal propriety to be assumed to be) the case with its cause, there would be a regressus in infinitum. If effects be from any root (—to which there is nothing antecedent—), then this is that” to which we give the name of Nature]. The Soul. 53 सामान्येन विवादाभावात्‌ धर्मवन्न साधनम्‌ ॥ १३८ ॥ It is not from any effect Aph. 138.—[The relation of cause 0 and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul], because, as is the case with [the disputed term] ‘ merit,’ there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing, [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute. ^ The dispute is (not as to Soul’s being, but) as to its peculiarity (of being),—as (whether it be) multi- tudinous or sole, all-pervading or not all-pervading, and so forth, Just as in every (philosophical system or) theory there is no dispute as to (there being something to which may be applied the term) ‘ merit’ (dharma), for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind” of thing,—such as sacrifices according to the Mimdnsa creed, or good works according to the Nydéya,— which shall be held to involve ‘merit.’ But some one may say—‘ Souls are nothing else than the body and its organs, &c. ; —what need of imagining anything else ? To this he replies’’]. शरोरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान्‌ ॥ १३९ ॥ Aph. 139.—Soul is something else than the body, &c. Materialism scouted, संदतपरार्थतवात्‌ ॥ We ॥ The discerptible is subser- Aph. 140.—Because that which is भ ४ combined [and is therefore discerp- tible,] is for the sake of some other [not discerptible. ‘ And that which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a regressus in infinitum ; combin- edness (—involving discerptibleness—) exists occultly in Na- ture as well as the rest, because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof]. 94 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. विपर्य चिगुणादि विपययात्‌ ॥ १४१।। Soul presents no symptom Aph. 141.—[And Soul is something of being material. else than the body, &c.], because there is [in Soul] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c. [—i. e., “because they are 10४ seen in 107? | . अधपिष्ठानाच्वेति ॥ १४२ ॥ Another proof that soul is Aph. 142.—And [Soul is not mate- hes Mat rial] because of its superintendence [over Nature. “ For a superintendent is an intelligent being, and Nature is unintelligent.’’] d भात्तीभावात्‌ ॥ १४२ Il Aph. 143.—And [Soul is not mate- rial] because of its being the ex- periencer. [It is Nature that is experienced ;—the experi- encer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not (really) an experiencer, still the assertion (in the aphorism) is made because of the fact that the reflection of the Intellect befals it,’—and thus makes it seem as if it ex- perienced :—see Aph. 58. Well, “ efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this (for the benefit) of the Soul or of Nature,”’—since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer ?] A, वल्यां a को प्रवृत्तेः ॥ १४४ ॥ For Soul, not Nature, is Aph, 144.—[It is for Soul and not liberation wanted. for Nature,] because the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities,—a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature not. For “the very essence of Nature cannot depart from it (so as to leave it in the state of absolute solitary isolation contemplated,) for the three Qualities are its very essence, (the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind) ; and because it would thus prove to be not eternal (—while in reality it is eternal.) The isola- Another proof. Nature of the Soul. 55 tion (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflectional (and not constitutive—see Aph. 58—) and that is Soul’’]. जडप्रकाशायोागात्‌ प्रकाशः ॥ १४५ ॥ Aph. 145.—Since light does not per- tain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, The nature of the Soul. which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest. “Tt is a settled point that the unintelligent is not a light— (it is not self-manifesting). If Soul also were unintelligent (—as the Naiydyikas hold it to be in substance—knowledge being by them regarded not as its essence or substratum but as one of its qualities—-), then there would need to be another light for it ;—and, as the simpler theory, let Soul itself consist essentially of light.” ‘And there is scripture (in support of this view :—for example the two following texts from the Vrihaddranyaka Upanishad) :—‘ Wherewith shall one distin- guish that wherewith one distinguishes all this (world) ?? ‘Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer ?’” But the Naiyayika may urge— let Soul be unintelligent {in its substance], but having Intelligence as its attribute. Thereby it manifests all things, but it is not essentially intelli- gence. To this he replies”]. निगएतवान्न निगुणत्वान्न चिद्भमौ । १४६ ॥ Aph. 146.—It [Soul] has not In- telligence as its attribute, because it is without quality. [ He declares that there is a contradic- Soul has no quality. tion to Scripture” in the view which he is contending against. | श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्त त्रत्यत्तवाधात्‌ ॥ १४७ ॥ 1 Liga: eskteass Aph. 147.—There is no denial [to than supposed intuition. be allowed] of what is established by Scripture, because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this {i. e. for the existence of qualities in the Soul] is confuted [by 56 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book I. the scriptural declaration of the contrary. ‘ The text—‘ For this Soul is un-companioned,’ &c., would be confuted if there were any annexation of qualities” to Soul :—and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment]. PIMA AAA ॥ १४८ ॥ Aph. 148.—[If soul were unintelli- gent] it would not be witness [of its own comfort] in profound [and dream- less] sleep, &c. [‘‘ But that this is not the case (may be infer- red) from the phenomenon that ‘I slept pleasantly, &c’ By the ‘&c.’ (in the aphorism) dreaming is included.” = ^^ The Vedantins say that ‘soul is one only’; and so, again, ^ For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish :--- ¢ Being one (only), it is divided (into a seeming multitude) by Nature (s'akti)—i. e.—Illusion (mdyd),—but not through its own essence, (—to which there does not belong multiplicity).’ In regard to this he says as follows.’’] जन्मादिव्यवस्ातः पुर्षबङ्त्वम्‌ ॥ १४९ ॥ Aph. 149.—From the several allot- 2 is a multiplicity १ mont of birth, &८., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred. “If soul were one only, then when one is born, all would be born, &९.]. उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायाग आकाशस्येव घटा- दिभिः । १५०॥ Aph. 150.—[The Vedantins say The view of the Vedanta that) there being a difference in its on this point, = Argument against the soul's being unintelligent. investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly] to the one [Soul], as is the case with Space by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy. But the argument, though partially stating a truth, does not prove the non-plurality of Soul. “ As Space Plurality of Souls. 57 is one, (and yet) in consequence of the difference of adjuncts, —jars, &c.—when the jar is destroyed, it is (familiarly) said ‘the jar’s space is destroyed’—(for there then no longer exists a space marked out by the jar) ;—-so also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of cor- poreal limitation, on the destruction thereof (—i. e. of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body—), it is merely a way of talking (to say) ‘The soul has perished.’ (This indeed is so far true that there is really no perishing of the soul, but then it is true) also on the hypothesis that there are many souls; (and it must be true,) otherwise, since soul is eternal (—without beginning or end—as both parties agree—), how could there be the appointment of birth and death ?”’] उपाधिभिद्यते न तु ARTA १५९ II Aph. 151.—The investment is differ- "9 of the 1०44 छण [—according to the Vedéntins—], but not that to which this belongs [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen. ‘ ‘The investment is different-—(—there are diverse bodies, of John, Thomas, &c.); ‘ that to which this belongs’ —i. e. that (Soul) to which this investment (of body in all its multiplicity) belongs,’ is not different (—but is one only—) ; such is the meaning. And (now consider), in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else,—because this (if it were evidence of a thing’s being destroyed) would present itself where it ought not—(the destruction of Devadatta e. g. presenting itself as a fact when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not for that reason to be assumed to be dead) ;—and on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the (fact that the Vedénta makes an) imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident, since Bondage and Liberation do not (and cannot) belong (simultaneously) to one. But the conjunction and (simultaneous) non-conjunction of the sky I 58 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. I. (or space) with smoke, &c., (of which the Veddntin may seek to avail himself as an illustration,) are not contradictory, for Conjunction is not pervasion ;” (—whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation affecting another portion, as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree without being in conjunction with the stem]. एवमेकत्वेन परिवतेमानस्य न विसद्रधमीध्यासः | १५२९॥ The Sénkhya is free from Aph. 152.—Thus [—i. €. by taking the tas of absurdity to the Sénkhya view—] there is no im- which the Vedanta is open. a €. 9 putation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinite- ly extended monad. “ But (the—Vedantin may contend)—we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different, as—e. g.—Nature’s character as an agent (is attri- buted) to soul—which is one other (than Nature). To this he 76168] . अन्यधर्मत्वेऽपि AAT AAAS CAAT ॥ WS I Aph. 153.—Fven though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [—that it really possesses such—] is not established by the imputation, because it [Soul] is one [absolutely simple unqualified entity. The no- tion “that Soul is an agent is a mistake, because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation (of agency to Soul) is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real.” ‘But (the Vedantin may say)—then thus there will be an opposition to the scripture,—for according to that —‘Brahma is one without a second ;—there is nothing here diverse ;—death after death does he (—deluded man—) obtain who here sees as it were a multiplicity.’ To this he replies”). Imputation is not proof. Souls generically one, numerically plural. 59 MAAN जातिपरत्वात्‌ ॥ १५९ ॥ (9 of Seid Aph. 154.—There is no opposition त a speaking of it gene- to the scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul], because the reference [in such texts] is to the genus [or to Soul in general. “By genus we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature ;—and it is to this alone that the texts about the non- duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness (of Soul,—meaning by its indivisibleness the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts—) because there is no motive” for viewing Soul as thus indivisible. ^ But then (—the Vedéntin may rejoin—) Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, (and that each is at once bound and free). To this he re- 11687]. विदितवन्धकारणस्य दश्वा ATTA ॥ १५५ ॥ 411. 155.—Of him [1. e. of that व of Bond- soul] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he really was not bound even when he seemed to be so. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage, may be typified by Don Quixote hanging in the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for his life, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground. Well, rejoins the Vedantin, ^^ Bondage (—as you justly observe—) is dependent on non-perception (of the truth), and is not real :— it is a maxim that non-perception is removed by perception :— and, on this showing, we see the (force of the) reasoning on the hypothesis that soul is one, but not on that of Soul’s being multitudinous. ‘To this he replies’’.] 12 = 60 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. I. AACE VIMAITATA: ॥ QUE Ul Aph. 156.—Nay—because the blind do not see can those that have their eyesight not perceive? [There are many arguments (in support of the view) of those who assert that souls are many,” though you do not see them. ] देवादिः on EN MASATA TA नादतम्‌ 11 १५७ ॥ Aph. 157.—Vémadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the scriptures, therefore] non-duality is not [asserted in the same scriptures in the Vedan- tic sense. = ^^ [7 the Puranas, &c., we hear ‘ Vamadeva has been liberated,’ ‘ Suka has been liberated,’ and so on. If Soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place on the libera- tion of one, the scriptural mention of a diversity (of separate and successive liberations) would be self-contradictory.” But the Vedantin may rejoin—‘on the theory that Souls are many,—-since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees all having been liberated, there should be a universal void :— but on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct,”’—which, the Vedantin flatters him- self, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sankhya. To this he replies.] x अनाद्‌ावद्य यावद भावाद्वविष्यदप्येवम्‌ ॥ १५८ ॥ 401. 158.—Though it [—the world—] has been from eternity, since there, up to this day, has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future also [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore. ‘Though the world has been from eternity, since up to this day we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof (in support) of the view that there will be Liberation” of all Souls so as to leave a void]. He jeereth the Veddntin. Scripture proof that Souls are many. As it has been, so will it be, Plurality of Souls is Seripture Doctrine. 61 इ दानोमिव सर्वच ना्यन्ताच्छेदः ॥ WE ॥ The siveom of mundane Aph. 159.—As now [things are, things will flow on for ever. == 80] everywhere [will they continue to go on;—hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things. ‘ Since souls are (in number) without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be (as a necessary consequence) a cutting short of the world. As now, so every where,—i. €. in time to come also,—there will be Liberation, but not therefore an absolute cutting short (of the world), since of this the on-flowing is eternal.” Moreover, ‘‘on the theory also that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct we should find a universal void,— so that the doubt is alike (in the application to either view). Just as there might be an end of all things on the successive liberation of many souls, so since all adjuncts would cease when (the fruit of) works (—this fruit being in the shape of Soul’s association with body as its adjunct—) came to an end, the world would become the void,” on the Veddnta theory as well as on the Sdénkhya one. Ifthe Ved4ntin says “ there will not be a void, because adjuncts are (in number) endless ; then it is the same on the theory that Souls are many too ;— for while those get liberated who become knowing (in regard to the fact that Nature and Soul are different), there will not be a void, because there is everlastingly no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.” But some one may ask—‘“is Soul essentially bound or free? If (essentially) bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation ;—for if it (the essence) departed, then it (Soul) would (cease with the cessation of its essence and) not be eternal. If (on the other hand, you reply that itis essentially) free, then meditation, and the like, (which you prescribe for the attainment of liber- ation) is unmeaning. To this he replies.’’] 62 The Sdnkkya Aphorisms. Book I. a AIM WAV ॥ १६० Il Rouble dese des Boagh st Aph. 160.—It [Soul] is altogether may seem bound inall sorts free, [but seemingly] multiform [or of ways. ff # different in appearance from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound. “ It is not bound, nor is it liberated, but it is ever free; (see Aph. ~ 19). But the destruction of ignorance (as to its actual free- dom) is effected by meditation, &c.,”’ which are therefore not unmeaning, as alleged under Aph. 159. “It has been de- clared that Soul is a witness. Since it is a witness (—some one may object—) even when it has attained to discriminating (between Nature and Soul), there is no Liberation,—(Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity but some- thing combined with the character of a spectator or witness.) To this he replies.’’] अक्तसम्बन्धाल साक्षित्वम्‌ ॥ १६१ ॥ क Aph. 161.—It [Soul] is a witness through its connection with sense- organs [—which quit it on Liberation]. नित्यमुक्तत्वम्‌ ॥ YER II ; Aph. 162.—[The nature of Soul is] constant freedom, [—“ that is to say, it is positively always devoid of the Bondage called Pain, because Pain, and the rest, are modifications of Understands ing,”—which is a modification of Nature, from which Soul The real condition of Soul. is really distinct]. = BETAS ॥ Ves ॥ Aph, 163.—And finally [the nature of the Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure alike. = ^ By ‘indifference’ is meant inaction.” But some one may say— the fact of Soul’s being an agent is declared in Scripture :—how is this (—if, as you say, it be not an agent)? To this he replies]. Soul's indifference. The real condition of Soul. 63 sree चित्सान्निध्याचचित्सान्निध्यात्‌। १६४ ॥ Hind क Wéeokon Aph. 164.—Its [—Soul’s—fancy of] agent, is yet spoken ofassuch. Yeing an agent is from the proxi- mity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect. [Its ‘being an agent’—i. e. its, Soul’s, fancy of being an agent, is ‘from the proximity of Intellect,’—i. e. from the influence of Nature,’—see Aph. 19—of which Intellect—see Aph. 61— is a modification. ‘The repetition of the expression ^ from the proximity of Intellect’ is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion :—for thus do we see (practised) in the scriptures,”’—e. g. where it is said in the Veda—* Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again.” ‘So much, for the First Book—that on the (topics or) object-matter (of the Sankhya system).”’] 64 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book IT. BOOK II. INTRODUCTION. (‘Tue object-matter (of the Institute) has been set forth (in B. I.). Now, in order to prove that it is uot the Soul that undergoes the alterations (observable in the course of things), he will tell diffusely in the Second Book how the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. There too the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. Therefore, according to the verses :—‘‘ Whoso rightly knows its changes, and the Primal Agent [Nature], and Soul the eternal, he, thirsting no more, is emancipated,”—we remark that, with reference to the character, &c., of Emancipation, all the three (things mentioned in these verses) require to be known. And here, in the first place, with advertence to the consideration that if Nature, which is unintelligent, were to create without a motive, we should find even the emancipated one bound, he states the motive for the creation of the world.] विमुक्तमोक्ताथं खाथं वा प्रधानस्य ॥ 9 Aph. 1.—Of Nature [the agency, or the becoming a maker, is] for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently] eman- cipated, or else for [the removal of] itself. [‘‘ The expression ‘the becoming a maker’ is borrowed from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. Nature makes the world for the sake of removing the pain, which is really a shadow, belong- ing to the Soul which is in its very nature free from the bonds of pain,—or (—to explain it otherwise—) for the sake of The motive for creation. Creation incessant. 65 removing pain (connected) by means of but a shadowy link ; or (on the other hand) itis ‘for the sake of itself,’—that is to say, for the sake of removing the actually real pain (which consists) of itself.” ‘‘ Although experience (of good and ill) also, as well as Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet Emancipation alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the princi- pal one.” ^ But then if creation were for the sake of Eman- cipation, then, since Emancipation might take place through creation once for all, there would not be creation again and again :—to which he replies.’’] विरक्तस्य तस्िदधः ॥ २॥ Aph. 2.—Because this (Emancipa. tion] is [only] of him that is devoid of passion, [“ emancipation does not take place through creation once for all, but it is (the lot only) of him that has been extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth, death, sickness, &c.; and therefore (successive creation goes on) because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul:—such is the meaning.” “He tells the reason- why dispassion does not take place through creation once for 21.77 | न श्रवणमाचात्‌ तिद्िद्धिरनादिवासनाया TATA ॥ 8 11 Force of the foregoing Aph. 3.—It is not effected by the ११५९५१६ mere hearing, because of the forcible- ness of the impressions from eternity. [‘‘ Even the hearing (of scripture, in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul is enounced,) comes (—not to all alike, but only—) through the merit of acts done in many births (or successive lives). Even then, dispassion is not established through the mere hearing, but through direct cognition ; and direct cognition does not take place suddenly, because of the forcibleness of false impressions that have existed from eternity,—but (the required direct cognition takes place) through the completion: K Successive ereation why. 66 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book IT. of Concentration, and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration (—see Yoga Aphorisms, B. II.) ;—therefore only after many births does dispassion and Emancipation take place at any time of any. one at all:—such is the meaning. He states another reason for the continuous flow of creation.’’] वङ्कग्टेत्यवदा प्रत्येकम्‌ ॥ ४॥ Another reason For conti- Aph. 4.—Or as people have sever- १४०४९ creation. ally many dependent [on them, as wife, children, &., so also the Qualities, have to emanci- pate innumerable Souls severally. Therefore, however many Souls may have been emancipated, the on-flow of creation takes place for the emancipation of other Souls,—for Souls are (in number) without end.” ‘But why is it asserted that Nature alone creates, when, by the text ‘From that or this Soul, proceeded the Ether,’ &c., it is proved that Soul also creates ? 0 this he replies.’’] परछतिवास्तवे च पुरुषस्याध्याससिद्धिः॥। ५॥ Aph. 5.—And since it [the charac- ter of creator] belongs really to Nature, it follows that it is fictitiously attributed to Soul. [^ But how is it laid down that Nature’s creativeness is real, since we are told (in scripture) that creation is on a level 5 with a dream? To this he replies.’’] ३ न AAAS: ॥ ६ ॥ The reality of Nature's Aph. 6.—Since it is proved from धि the products, [‘‘ for products are real, inasmuch as they produce impressions and exhibit acts.” The reality of external things is established here just as it is by Nature, not Soul, creates, Locke, who says “I think God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me; since by their different application I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain (artha), which is one great concernment of my present state.’ These existing products being admitted, the Soul no creator. 67 Sankhya argues that they must have a cause ;—and, as this cause means neither more nor less than something creative, whatever proves the existence of the cause, ‘proves, at the same time, its creative character]. चेननादेशन्नियमः कण्टकमोक्तवत्‌। ७ ॥ Aph. 7.—The rule is with reference Who escape nature. . 8 to one knowing,—just as escape from a thorn, [—for “as one and the same thorn is not a cause of pain just to him who, being ^ one knowing,’ i. e., aware of it, escapes from that same, but actually is so in respect of others, —so Nature also is escaped just by ‘one knowing,’—one aware,—one who has accomplished the matter ;—just to him does it not consist of pain; but to others, who are not know- ing, it actually is a cause of pain ;—such is the ‘rule,’— meaning the distribution.” ware fa तििद्धिनाच्स्येनायेदादवत्‌।। ८ ॥ Soul not creative, though Aph. 8.—EKven though there be con- associated with what isso. == junction [of Soul] with the other [viz. Nature], this [power of giving rise to products] does not exist in it [Soul] immediately,—just like the burning action of iron. [‘ Even though there be conjunction with Nature, there belongs to Soul no creativeness ‘immediately,’ i. e., directly. An illustration of this ir, ‘like the burning action of iron’ :—as iron does not possess directly a burning power, but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through the fire conjoined with it;—such is the meaning. But in the example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an alter- ation of both, for this is proved by sense-evidence; but in the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted for by the modification of one only, there is cumbrousness in postu- lating the modification of both ;—because, otherwise, by the conjunction of the China-rose, it might be held that the colour of the crystal was changed.”’] K 2 68 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book IT. रागविरागयेयौगः सुष्टिः॥ < ॥ 401. 9.—When there is passion or dispassion, there is concentration [in the latter case, and] creation [in the former. ^ When there is passion, there is creation; and when there is dispassion, Creation when. , there is ‘ concentration,’ i. e., the abiding (of Soul) in its own nature ;—in short, emancipation.’’] मदद्‌ादिक्रमेण पच्चभूतानाम्‌ ॥ Yo ॥ 407; 10.—In the order of Mind, &c., [is the creation] of the five ele- ‘ments [—or of the material world]. TTI ~> ¢ . a त्‌ खष्टनषामत्माथ ACA 11 AQ Il Nature's products not for Aph. 11.—Since creation is for the themealves. sake of Soul, the origination of these [products of Nature] is not for their own sake. दि क्रालावाकाशदिभ्यः॥ १९॥ Relative time and space Aph. 12.—[Relative] Space and whence. Time [arise] from the Ether, &c., [but “the Space and Time which are eternal (and absolute), those two, being the sowrce of the Ether, are really sorts of qualities of Nature ;—therefore it is consistent that Space and Time should be all-pervading. But the Space and Time which are limited, these arise from the Ether, through the conjunction of this or that (limiting) object.” ‘Now he exhibits, in their order, through their nature and their habits, the things mentioned (in Aph. 10) as in the order of Mind, &c.’’] अध्यवसाये बुद्धिः ॥ १२॥ Aph. 13.—Intellect is judgment. |^ ‘Intellect’ is a synonyme of the Great Principle (or Mind,—see B. I. 71) ; and ‘judgment,’ called also ascertainment, is its peculiar modification ;» such Order of creation. Mind or Intellect defined. Nature of Space and Time. 69 is the meaning ;—but they are set forth as identical,—because a property, and that of which it is the property, are indivisi- ble. And it is to be understood that this Intellect is ‘ Great,’ because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because it is of great power.” ‘ He mentions other properties also of the Great Principle.”] ९. मादि तत्कायं धमादि ॥ १४॥ Aph. 14,—Merit, &९., are products of it, [for “ Merit, Knowledge, Dis- passion, and (supernatural) Power, are formed out of intellect, —not formed of self-consciousness (uhankdra), because intel- Products of intellect. lect alone (and not self-consciousness), is a product of super- lative Purity,”—without admixture of Passion and Darkness. “ But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of demerit, in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle, &., be accounted for? ‘To this he replies’’]. मददुपरागादिपरोतम्‌ ॥ १५॥ व त तक Aph. 15.—The Great one [—Intel- tellect. lect—] becomes reversed through ad- jacent tincture, [i.e., “through being tinged by Passion and Darkness, it also becomes ‘reversed’ i. e., vile, with the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and want of (supernatural) Power.” ^ Having characterised the Great Principle, he defines its product—Self-consciousness”’]. अभिमानाऽदद्भारः ॥ १६ ॥ Aph. 16.—Self-consciousness is a conceit, [— what makes the Ego, as a potter (makes a pot),—the thing (called) the internal instrument (anta’karana) ; and this, inasmuch as a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible, is spoken of as ‘a conceit (viz. of personality,’) in order to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification. Only when a thing has been determined by intellect (—i.e., by an act of judg- Self-consciousness. 70 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book: II. ment—see Aph. 13—), do the making of an Ego, and the making of a Meum, take place”’]. ५ ¢ : एकाद शपच्चतन्माचं तत्कार्यम्‌ | १७ ॥ Products of Self-conscious- Aph. 17.—The product of it [viz. “4 of Self-consciousness] is the eleven [organs], and the five Subtile Elements, [but “‘among these he mentions a distinction’’]. ~ e ern dD सा्तिकमेकादशकं प्रवतेते FRHATSSHITIA | ९८ ॥ Aph. 18.—The eleventh, consisting of [the principle of] Purity, proceeds from modified Self-consciousness. [‘‘ The ‘eleventh,’ i. e., the campleter of the eleven, viz., the Mind, (or ‘the internal organ,’ which is not to be con- founded with ‘the great one’ called also Intellect and Mind), alone among the set consisting of sixteen [Aph. 17] consists of Purity :—therefore it is produced from Self-consciousness ‘modified,’ i. e., pure;—such is the meaning. And hence, too, itis to be reckoned that the ten organs are from the Passionate Self-consciousness, and the Subtile Elements from the Dark Self-consciousness’’]. वमंद्धियनङद्धियैरान्तरमेकाद शकम्‌ ॥ १९ ॥ Aph. 19.—Along with the organs of action and the organs of under- standing, another isthe eleventh. [‘‘ The organs of action are five, the vocal organ, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generative organ; and the organs of understanding are five, those called the organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Along with these ten, ‘another,’ viz., the Mind, is ¢ the eleventh,’ i. e., is the eleventh organ.’’] ¢ दङ्गारिकत्वश्ुतेम भोतिकानि I २०॥ Aph. 20.—They [the organs] are | not formed of the Elements, because there is scripture for their being formed of Self-consciousness. The Mind whence. Of the Organs. The Nydya view rejected, Order of development. 71 देवतालयश्रुतिनारम्भकस्य ॥ २९॥ Aph. 21.—The text regarding ab- sorption into deities is not [declara- tory] of an originator, [—for although a thing, e. g., a jar, when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being resolved into its originator, viz., into earth,—yet ^^ we see the absorption of a drop of water into what notwithstanding is not its originator, viz., the ground,” and such is the absorp- tion into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did not originally emanate. | तदुत्यत्तिश्ुतेविनाशद नाच ॥ ९९ 11 4111. 22.—[No organ is eternal as some hold the mind to be], because we have scripture for their beginning to be, and because we see their destruction, [—for ‘‘we are certified of their de- structibleness by the fact that, in the conditions of being aged, &c., the mind also, like the sight and the rest, decays.’’] अतोन्धियमिन्दियं यान्तानामधिष्ठाने ॥ Fe 11 thie. Siensé- nob stb. be “OON> Aph, 23.—The Sense is supersen- Sounded with its site. suous, [it being the notion] of mis- taken persons [that the Sense exists] in [identity with] its site [—Sight, e. g., in identity with the eye-ball]. ई A text explained. No organ eternal. शक्तिभेदेऽपि भेद सिद्ध नैकलम्‌ ॥ be 11 All the organs not one 401, 24.—Moreover, a difference organ. being established if a difference of powers be conceded, there is not a oneness [of the organs. ^ Eyen by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to one single organ, the diversity of organs is established, be- cause the powers are the organs.’ And if you say “there is something unphilosophical in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from one single Self-consciousness,—he replies’’]. “I to The Sankhya Aphorisms. Book II. न कल्यनाविरोधेः प्रमाणदृष्टस्य 1 २५॥ Theovatioal नन 417. 25.—A theoretical objection cannot spect facts, ^ is not [of any weight] in the case of what is matter of ocular evidence. उभयात्मकं AA 1 २६ 1! Diversified operation of Aph. 26.—The Mind identifies itself ind. with both [‘ the organs of intellection and of action,’’—as he proceeds to explain]. गुणपरिणामभेद्‌ान्नानात्रमवस्थावत्‌ ॥ PO 11 Aph, 27.—By reason of the varie- ties of transformation of [which] the Qualities [are susceptible], there is a diversity [of their pro- duct the Mind], according to circumstances. ([For, “as one single man supports a variety of characters, through the force of association,—being, through association with his beloved, a lover,—through association with one indifferent, indifferent, —and, through association with some other, something other, —so the Mind also, through association with the organ of How this happens. vision, or any other, becomes various, through its becoming one with the organ of vision, or any other,—by its being (thereby) distinguished by the modification of seeing, or the like.’’] खपादिरसमलान्त उभयाः ॥ RE ॥ 411. 28.—Of both [sets of organs the object is that list of things] begin- ning with Colour, and ending with the dirt of Taste, [—“‘ mean- ing by the ^ dirt’ of the tastes of food, &c., ordure, &c.,” into which the food, consisting of the quality Taste, &c., is partly transformed]. What the organs deal with, Mind the ^ Sensus Communis.’ 73 द्रषटुतवादि रात्मनः करणत्वमिद्धियाणाम्‌ | २९ ॥ The Orgone and their por- Aph. 29.—The being the seer, &c., + belongs to the Soul; the instrumen- tality belongs to the Organs, [—“‘ for as a king, even without himself energizing, becomes a warrior through his instrument, his army, by directing this by orders simply,—so the Soul, though quiescent, through all the organs, of vision, &c., be- comes a seer, a speaker, and a judger, and the like, merely through the proximity called ‘ Conjunction,’—because it moves these as the loadstone” does the iron, without exerting any effort]. चया्णां खालस्षण्यम्‌ ।। 80 1 Differences in the internal Aph. 30.—Of the three [internal 29०१५८ organs, meaning here (1) Intellect, (2) Self-consciousness, and (3) the Mind], there is a diversity among themselves, [‘‘ the aspect of Intelligence being atten- tion,—of Self-consciousness, conceit [of personality],—of the Mind, decision and doubt]. MATA: प्राणाद्या वायवः पच्च ॥ BY ॥ character कन 2 the Aph. 31.—The five airs, Breath, three. &c., are the modification, in common, of the [three internal] instruments; [—“‘ that is to say, the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known as ‘airs,’ because of their circulating as the air does,—these (animal spirits) are the joint or common ‘ modification,’ or kinds of altered form, ‘ of the instruments,’ i. e., of the triad of internal instruments.” And “ the opinion is not ours, as it is that of the Vaiseshikas, that the modifications of the organs take place successively only, and not simultaneously ;— 80 he next tells us” ] . L 74 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book. IT. ~ ~ HAN GHATY Ale: ॥ Be ।। Sense-impressions, प. not Aph. 32.—The modifications of the १९ organs take place both successively and simultaneously. इत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः ज्िष्टा्किष्टाः 1 देर ॥ The ideas which constitute Aph. 33.—The modifications [of the the sorta understanding, which are to be shown to be the cause of the world, and] which are five, are [some of them] painful and [others] not painful, [and “that the modifications are of five sorts, is declared by Patanjali’s aphor-. ism,”—see Yoga Aphorisms B. I., 6]. He acquaints us with the nature of Soul. x तन्निवृत्तावुपश्णन्तापरागः खस्थः 11 २8 ॥ Aph. 34.—On the cessation thereof [viz., of mundane influences], its tinc- ture ceasing, it [Soul] abides in itself, [—“that is to say, during the state of repose of these modifications, it (the Soul), the reflection of these having ceased, is abiding in itself,—being at other times also, as it were, in isolation, (—though seemingly not so). And to this effect there is a triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga,” viz. B. I., 2, 3, and 4]. कुसुमवच्च मणिः । २५ ॥ 411. 35.—And as [by] a flower the gem, [—i. e., “as the gem called rockerystal, by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus, becomes red,—not abiding in its own state,—and, on the removal thereof, becomes colourless,—abiding in its own state,—in like manner” is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction of the Qualities. ^ But then (it may be asked), by whose effort does the aggregate of the organs come into operation, since Soul is motionless, and since it is denied that there is any Lord (or Demiurgus) ? To this he replies’’] Soul's relation thereto. This illustrated. The Organs. 75 पुरुषां करणोद्धवाऽप्यदोन्ञासात्‌ ॥ ३९६ ॥ What moves the Organs Aph. 36.—The Organs also [—just fo operates as Nature energizes—] arise, for tho sake of Soul, from the development of desert, [which, we repeat, “belongs entirely to the investment,”’—the Soul not really possessing either merit or demerit. = ^ He mentions an instance of a thing’s spontaneously energizing for the sake of another’’]. = WAIT ॥ BO ॥ Aph. 37.—As the cow for the calf [‘‘ quite spontaneously distils milk, and awaits no other effort, just so, for the sake of the master, An illustration. Soul, the Organs energize quite spontaneously ; such is the meaning. And it is seen that, out of profound sleep, under- standing of its own accord wakes प)" |. करणं चयोद्‌ शविधमवान्तरभेद्‌ात्‌ ॥ BE ॥ Ee अ 411. 38.—Organ is of thirteen sorts, through division of the subor- dinates, [‘‘ ‘ division of the subordinates’ having reference to the fact that it is understanding which is the principal organ.” “But then, understanding (it seems) alone is the principal instrument in furnishing its object (of emancipation) to Soul, and the instrumentality of the others is secondary,—in this case what is meant by secondariness ?””—why are they said to be instrumental at all? He replies]. इन्द्रियेषु साधकतमत्वगुणएयेगात्‌ कुगारवत्‌ | ३९ ॥ Efficiency of the organs Aph. 39.—Because the quality of be- whence. ing most efficient, is conjoined with the organs,—as in the case of an axe. = [^ The quality of the (principal) organ, the understanding, in the shape of being most efficient, on behalf of soul, exists derivatively in the (other derivative) organs ; therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen kinds ;—such is the connexion with the L 2 76 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book II. preceding aphorism.” ‘“‘As in the case of an axe.’ As, although the blow itself, since it is this that puts an end to our non-possession of the result, is the principal efficient in the cutting, yet the axe also is an efficient, because of its close proximity to the being the principal efficient ;—so here also :— such is the meaning. He does not here say that Self-con- sciousness is secondarily efficient,—meaning to imply that it is one with the internal organ. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal, he says] 1 ys “Oo दयोः प्रधानं मने। लोकवद्र्वगेषु । Be Pre-eminent efficiency of Aph. 40.—Among the two [the गि external and the internal organs] the principal is Mind, just as, in the world, among troops of dependents. [^ ^ Among the two,’ viz., the external and the internal, ‘Mind,’ i. e., understanding simply, is ‘the princi- pal,’ 1. e., chief ;—in short is the immediate cause j—because it is it that furnishes Soul with its end;—just as, among troops of dependents, some one single person is the prime minister of the king, and the others, governors of towns, &e., are his subordinates ;—such is the meaning.” And it must be carefully observed that “here the word ‘ Mind’ does not mean the third internal organ” spoken of in Aph.. 30, but Intellect, or ‘the Great One.’] अव्यभिचारात्‌ ॥ ४९॥ Reason why Understand: Aph. 41.—[And Intellect is the ing ts the principal. principal or immediate and direct effi- cient in Soul’s emancipation,] because there is no wandering away,—[“ that is to say, because it (understanding) pervades all the organs,—or because there is no result apart from it”’]. तथाशेषसंस्काराधारत्वात्‌ ॥ ४२॥ 401. 42.—So too because it [the understanding] is the depository of all the self-continuant impressions, [“ and not the Sight, &e., Another reason. The Great One, why so called. 77 or Self-consciousness, or the Mind; else it could not happen that things formerly seen, and heard, &., should be remem- bered by the blind, and deaf, &c.’’]. सत्यानुमानाच ॥ 88 I! Aph. 43.—And because we infer _ this [its pre-eminence] by reason of its meditating: [‘ for the modification of thought called ‘ medita- tion’ is the noblest of all the modifications (incident to Soul or pure Thought—whose blessedness or state of emancipation itis to have no modification at all), and the Understanding itself, which, as being the depository thereof, is further named Another reason. Thought (chitta,—from the same root as chintéd—), is nobler than the organs whose modifications are other than this.”— ^ But then suppose that the modification ‘ meditation’ belongs only to the Soul (—suggests some one). ‘To this he replies’”]. सम्भवेन्न खतः ॥ ४४॥ 21400 not. ०9 41/11. 44.—It cannot be of its own in Soul, nature, [—“ that is to say, meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially, because of the immobility” of Soul,—whereas ‘ meditation’ is an effort. आपेक्तिको गुणप्रधानभावः क्रियाविशेषात्‌॥ ४५॥ An organ may be relative: Aph. 45.—The condition [—as re- ly principal and secondary. == gards Soul’s instruments—] of second- ary and principal is relative, because of the difference of function, [—e. g., “in the operations of the Sight, &c., the Mind is principal; and in the operation of the Mind, Self- consciousness, and in the operation of Self-consciousness, In- tellect is principal,” or precedent. ‘But then, what is the cause of this arrangement, viz., that of this (or that) Soul, this (or that) Intellect alone, and not another Intellect, is the instrament ? With reference to this he says’’]. 78 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. IT. जि तत्कमाजितत्वात्‌ तदर्थमभिचष्टा लोकवत्‌ I BE II Each one reaps as he hath Aph. 46.—The energizing [of this १९५९ or that Intellect] is for the sake of this [or that Soul], because of its having been purchased by the works [or deserts] of this [or that Soul],—just as in the world. [* Asin the world (or in ordinary affairs), whatever axe, or the like, has been purchased by the act, €. g., of - buying, by whatever man,—the operation of that (axe, or the like), such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man (who purchased it) :—such is the meaning. The import is, that, therefrom is the distributive allotment of instruments” inquired about, under the preceding aphorisms. And we must again repeat that “although there is no act in Soul, because it is immoyveable, still, since it is the means of Soul’s experience, it is called the act of Soul, just like the victories, &c., of a king (which are really the acts of his servants), because of Soul’s being the owner” of the results of acts, as the king is of the results of the actions of his troops. And “in order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he sums up,” as follows. ] समानकर्मयोगे FS: प्राधान्यं लोकवल्ञोकवत्‌ ॥ ४७ ॥ Aph. 47.—Admitting that they [— the various instruments of Soul, all] equally act, the pre-eminence belongs to Intellect,—just as in the world, just as in the world, [— because, that is to say, it is just as the pre-eminence, in the world, belongs to the prime minister,—among the rulers of towns, and the rest, even although there be no difference in as far as regards their being (all alike workers) for the sake of the king. Therefore, in all the institutes, is Intellect alone celebrated as ‘the great one.’ The repetition (viz., ‘just asin the world, just as in the world,’) implies the completion of the Book”). Summing up. RAR nen BOOK III. INTRODUCTION. [From this forward, the gross product of Nature, the great elements and the duad of bodies, are to be described ; and thereafter the going into various wombs, and the like, (this description being given) with a view to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one’s engag- ing upon the means of knowledge; and thereafter, with a view to perfect freedom from passion, all the means of know- ledge are to be told: so the Third Book commences.’’] अविशेषादिशेषारम्भः ॥ १॥ Aph. I.—The origination of the diversified [world of sense] is from that which has no difference, [—i. e., “from that in which there exists not a distinction in the shape of calmness, fierce- ness, dulness, &c.,—viz., the Subtile Elements, called ‘ the The elements whence. five somethings simply ;’—from this (set of five) is the origi- nation of ‘the diversified, —(so called) from their possessing a difference in the shape of the calm, &c.,—viz., the gross, the great Elements:—such is the meaning. For the fact of consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the calm, and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater and less, &c., in the gross Elements only, not in the Subtile——because these, since they have but the one form of the calm, are mani- fest to the ‘concentrated’” practitioners of meditation, but: to no others. “So then, having stated, by composing the preceding Book, the origin of the twenty-three Principles, he states the origination, therefrom, of the duad of bodies’’]. 80 The Sénkkya Aphorisms. Book IIT. तस्माच्छ रोरस्य ॥ २॥ (व Aph. 2.—Therefrom [i. e., from the twenty-three Principles, there is the origination. of] the Body [or pair of Bodies, the Gross and the Subtile. ‘Next he proves that mundane existence could not be accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty-three Principles’’]. तद्दीजात्‌ संखटतिः ॥३॥ Aph. 3—From the seed thereof is mundane existence :—[“ ‘thereof,’ 1. e., of the Body ;—‘ from the seed,’ i. e., from the Subtile one, as its cause, in the shape of the twenty-three Principles, —is ‘mundane existence,’ i. e., do the going and coming of Soul take place ;—for it is impossible that, of itself, there should be a going, &c., of that which, in virtue of its all- pervadingness, is immovable:—such is the meaning. For Soul, being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles, only by means of that investment migrates from Body to Body, with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works’’]. आविवेकाच प्रवतनमविशेषाणएाम ॥ 8 ॥ वि exits HR Aph. 4.—And till there is discrimi- श nation, there is the energizing of these which have no differences, [for ‘ of all Souls whatever, devoid of the differences of being Lord or not Lord, &c., (—though seemingly possessed of such differences,—) ‘ energizing,’ i. e., mundane existence, is inevitable just till there is discrimina- tion (of Soul from its seeming investments), and it does not continue thereafter’’]. उपभेगादितरस्य ॥५॥ Aph. 5.—Because of [the necessity of] the other’s experiencing, [1. e., because of the necessity ‘that the other,’ i. e., that that (Soul) which does not discriminate, should experience the fruit of its own (reputed) acts’’]. Mundane emwistence whence. The reason of this. The gross and subtile bodies. 81 सम्प्रति परिमुक्तो दाभ्याम्‌ ।।६॥ _ Soul's bondage only seem- Aph. 6.—It [Soul] is now quite mg. free from both; [—“ ‘now,’ i. e., during the time of mundane existence, Soul is really free ‘from both,’ i. e., from the pairs, viz., cold and heat, pleasure and pain, &e.”’]. e o मातापिढजं YI प्रायश TATA तथा ॥ ७ ॥ The gross and Subtile Bo- Aph. 7.—The Gross [Body] usually dies distinguished. arises from father and mother; the other one is not 80 :—[“ the Gross one arises from father and mother ‘ usually,’ i. e., for the most part,—for there is mention also of a Gross Body not born of a womb ;—and ‘the other,’ 1. 6. the Subtile Body, is ‘not so,’ i. e., does not arise from a father and mother, because if arises from creation, &c.” “He next decides the question—through disguise by which one, of the Bodies—Gross and Subtile,—the conjunction of the pairs (pleasure and pain, &c.,) with Soul takes place”). 0 क ह. क पूवात्यत्तेसत्कायत्वं भोगादेकस्य नेतरस्य ॥ ८ ॥ Which of the bodies is the Aph. 8.—To that which arose ante- cause of Soul's bondage. cedently it belongs to be that whose result is this,—because it is to the one that there belongs fruition, not to the other: [—that is to say, “ to have pleasure and pain as its effect (reflected in Soul), belongs to that Subtile Body alone whose origin was ‘antecedent,’ i. e., at the commencement of the creation (or annus magnus). Why ?— because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs to only ‘the one,’ i. e., the Subtile Body, but not to ‘the other,’ i. e., the Gross Body, because all are agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in a body of earth’’]. a ॐ सप्रद शेकं लिङ्गम्‌ ॥ ९ ॥ The Subtile Body how ००१. Aph. 9.—The seventeen, as one, stituted. are the Subtile Body. [‘‘ The Subtile Body, further, through its being container and contained, is M 82 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book TI. twofold. Here the seventeen (—to be just mentioned—), mingled, are the Subtile Body ; and that, at the beginning of a creation, is but one, in the shape of an aggregate (—as the forest, the aggregate of many trees, is but one—): such is the meaning. The seventeen are the eleven organs, the five Subtile Elements, and Understanding. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding.” ‘ But (one may ask) if the Subtile Body be one, then how should there be diverse experi- ences accordingly as Souls are numerically distinct from one another? ‘To this he replies’’]. व्यक्तिमेद्‌ः HATA ॥ १०॥ अ 226. Aph. 10.—There is distinction of dividuals, individuals through diversity of de- sert; [—for “although at the beginning of the creation (or annus magnus), there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape of that investment (—of Soul,—see Veddnta-sdra Aph. 62— named) Hiranya-garbha, still, subsequently moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals,—a plurality parti- tively in the shape of individuals,—as at present there is, of the Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in the shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &. He tells the cause of this, saying, ‘through diversity of desert,’— meaning through actions, &c., which are causes of the expe- riences of other animal souls.” = ^^ But then, on this showing, since the Subtile one alone, from its being the site of fruition, is (what ought to be denoted by the term) Body, how is the term Body applied to the Gross one? To this he replies’’] तद्धिष्ठाना्रये SS ARISTA FATS! ॥ ११॥ Why the gross Body is Aph. 11.—Because of its being ap- called ५ Body. plied to it [—viz., to the Subtile one], it is applied to the Body which is the tabernacle of the abid- ing thereof. The subtile body. 83 न खातन्त्यात्‌ AEA कायावचचि चवच् ॥ १९॥ The Subtile Body depen- Aph. 12.—Not independently [can dent on:the gross body. the Subtile Body exist], without that [Gross Body],—just like a shadow and a picture :—[“ that is to say,—the Subtile Body does not stand independently, ‘without that,’ i.e., without a support; as a shadow, or as a picture, does not stand without a support. And so, having abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go to another world, it is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body, to serve as its tabernacle :—such is the import.” ‘ But then (it may be said), of the Subtile Body, since it is limited substance, as the Air, or the like, let the ther (or Space), without its being attached to anything, be the site,—it is purposeless to suppose anything else :—to this he replies’’]. on bat मूतेतवेऽपि न VHF AATTA तरणिवत्‌ 11 १३॥ Woe ५ 00 Aph. 13.—Nay,—even though it rial support. be limited,—because of its association with masses,—just as the sun; [—for since, just like the sun, it consists of liyht—it is inferred to be associated with a mass. All lights,—the sun and the rest—are seen only under the circumstances of association (of the luminiferous imponderable) with earthy substances ; and the Subtile Body consists of ‘ Purity,’ which is Light,—therefore it must be associated with the Elements’’]. अणुपरिमाणं तत्छतिश्रतेः ॥ १४ ॥ ies कः ce 14.—It is of कठ mage tude, for there is scripture for its acting: [^ It? the Subtile Body, is ‘of atomic magnitude,’ 1. e., limited,—but not absolutely an atom, because it is declar- ed to have parts. Wherefore ?—‘ for there is scripture for its acting,’—i. e., because there is a text about its acting. When a thing is all-pervading, it cannot act, (action being motion) : but the proper reading is ‘ because there is scripture for its moving.’ 2? | m 2 84 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book. III. ASFAAIAAT ॥ WY Il Aph. 15.—And because there 18 scripture for its being formed of food. ९ =+, ५७ परषां संखटतिलिङ्गानां पकारवद्राज्नः ॥ VE ॥ Why the Subtile Body mi- Aph. 16.—The mundane existence (+ of Subtile Bodies is for the sake of Soul,—just like a king’s cooks: [that is to say,—as the cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king, so the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul.” Another proof of this. “The Subtile Body having been discussed in respect of all its peculiarities, he next discusses the Gross Body so also”’]. A, ~ पाच्चभातिके SE ॥ १७॥ Aph. 17.—The Body consists of the five elements. चातुभातिकमित्येके ॥ ९८ ॥ Aph. 18.—Some say that it consists of four elements, [—alleging this “with the import that the Ether does not originate” any- thing]. रेकभोतिकमित्यपरे i १९९. ॥ Aph. 19.—Others say that it con- _ sists of one element, [^ meaning that the body is of Earth only, and the other elements are merely nourishers. Or ‘of one element’ means of one or other ele- ment :”’—see the Rosicrucian doctrine in the Tarka-sangraha, § 18, &c]. न सांसिद्धिकं Sarai परल्ेकादशेः 11 Re I Intellect not the result of Aph. 20.—Intellect is not natural organization. [—a natural result of organization—] because it is not found in them severally ; [‘ that is to say,— The Gross Body whence, Another opinion. Another opinion. Intellect not the result of Organization. 85 since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements, intellect is not natural to the Body which consists of the Elements, but is adventitious’’]. प्पञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च ॥ २९॥ Aph, 21.—And [if the Body had intellect natural to it] there would not be the death, &c., of anything, [“ for death, profound sleep, &c., mean the body’s being non-intelligent ;—and this, if it A further argument. were by its own nature intelligent, would not take place,— because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the thing remains.” ^ Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion (in Aph. 20), viz., ^ because it is not found in them severally,’ —he repels 177] . x ~ fize न, मद्‌ शक्तिवचचेत्‌ प्रलेकपरिदृष्ट AS तदुद्गवः ॥ Pe I An illustrative objection Aph, 22.—If you say that [Intellect disposed of. results from organization, and that] it is like the power of something intoxicating, [the ingredients of which separately have no intoxicating power, we reply, that] this might arise, on conjunction, if we had seen in each [ele- ment something conducive to the result. “If it had been seen in each [constituent], its appearance in the compound might have had place. But in the case in question, it is not the case that it is seen in each. Therefore, in the illustration (of something intoxicating resulting from mixture), it being established, by the Institutes, &c., that there is in each -ingre- dient a subtile tendency to intoxicate, it is only settled that, at the time when these combine, there will be a manifestation of the (latent) power of intoxicating ;—but in the thing illus- trated, it is not established by any proof whatsoever, that there is intelligence, in a subtile (or undeveloped) state, in the elements separately.” In Aph. 16, “it was stated that the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul :—in regard to this, he tells, in two aphorisms, by what operation 86 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book IT. dependent on the birth of the Subtile Bodies, which means their transmigrations into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul are accomplished” |. STAAL ॥ २३॥ Purpose of the Subtile Aph. 23.—From knowledge [ac- Body's taking a gross one. == quired during mundane existence, comes] salvation—[soul’s chief end]. बन्धो विपर्ययात्‌ 88 1 Aph. 24.—Bondage [which may be Bondage whence. 9 £ 1 viewed as one of the ends which soul could arrive at only through the Subtile Body], is from mis- conception. नियतकारणत्वान्न सर्‌ चयविकल्य ॥ २५॥ . 25.—Since this [viz., know- Knowledge has neither co- Aph aR Si a his [v Sin ¢ operater nor substitute, in ledge] is the precise cause [of libera- liberating Soul. = ` $ ड ५ क) र tion], there is neither association [of anything else with it, e. g., good works], nor alternativeness, [e. g., of good works in its stead]. खम्रजागराभ्यामिव मायिकामायिकाभ्यां नेभयोर्मक्तिः पुरुषस्य ॥ २६ ॥ Aph. 26.—The emancipation of soul does not depend on both [knowledge and works, or the like], just as [any end that one aims at is not obtained] from dream and from the waking state, [to- gether or alternatively,—which are severally] illusory and not illusory. [^ But even if it be so (—may some one say—), there may be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of the truth, with that knowledge which is termed Worship of (the One all-constitutive divine) Soul,—since there is no illu- soriness in this object of Worship. To this he replies’’] This illustrated, Worship. 87 इतरस्यापि नात्यन्तिकम्‌ ॥ २७ 1 Mate ocosception.of tla Aph. 27.—Kven of that other [the All is faulty. object of worship just mentioned], it [—the non-illusoriness—] is not complete, [‘‘ because ima- ginary things also enter into (our conception of, and overlie, and disguise) the object of worship—the (One all-constitutive) Soul.” ‘And he next tells us in what part of it—is the illusoriness of the (object of) Worship” just referred to]. सद्धस्पितेऽप्येवम्‌ ॥ SE ॥ Whore कम applies. Aph, 28.—Moreover it is in what is fancied that it is thus [illusory ; “in that portion, of the thing meditated, which (portion of it) is fancied by the Mind, (—while it does not exist in reality). For,—the object of worship having been declared in such texts as ‘ All this indeed is Brahma,’ the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion (of the impure conception of ‘ the All’ which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect of) the world.” ‘Then what profit is there in Worship? With reference to this, he declares” as follows}. भावनापचयाच्छुदस्य सवे प्रकृतिवत्‌ | २८ ॥ त of Worship. Aph. 29.—From the achievement of [the worship termed] meditation there is to the pure [Soul] all [power],—just like Nature,—[“ that is to say,—as Nature creates, sustains and destroys,—so also the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by insti- gating Nature, creates, &c.,” [but this is not Liberation—or Soul’s chief end. ‘It having been settled that Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation, he now mentions the means of Knowledge’’]. रागेपदतिष्यानम्‌ ॥ Be I Removal of obstacles to Aph. 30.—Meditation is [the cause knowledge. of] the removal of Desire—[‘ that 88 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book IIT. affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of knowledge”]. ` इत्तिनिराधात्‌ तत्सिद्िः ॥ ३१ ॥ Meditation at what point Aph. 31.—It [Meditation, “ from perfected. the effectuation of which, and not from merely commencing upon it, Knowledge arises,”] is perfected by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind, which ought to be abstracted from all thoughts of anything]. © (6 धारणासनखकमणा तित्सद्धिः॥ ३९॥ । Practices dondaciva "ta nies Aph, 32.—This [Meditation] is per- ditation. fected by Restraint, Postures, and one’s Duties. निरोध्दं विधारणाभ्याम्‌ ॥ ३२ ॥ 411. 33.—Restraint [of the breath] is by means of expulsion and retention. a. That it is ‘of the breath’ is gathered from the notorious- ness [of its being so]. b. He characterises Postures, which come next in order. Restraint of the breath, खिरसुखमासनम्‌ II २४॥ 4111. 34.—Steady, and [promoting] Postures. . i ease, is a [suitable] Posture, [(—“ such as the crossing of the arms”]. GAH AAA SARATTSTAA ॥ २५ ॥ Aph, 35.—One’s Duty is the per- One's duty. $ ५ 4 formance of the actions prescribed for one’s religious order. Knowledge and misconception. 89 वैराग्यादभ्यासाच् ॥ BE I Knowledge, by Concentra- 411. 36.—Through Dispassion and tion, how attained. Practice, [‘‘mere Practice, in the shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, and its instrument Concentration, takes place in the case of the best of those competent” to engage in the matter at all. “Thus has liberation, through knowledge, been expounded. After this the cause of Bondage, Misconception,” declared in the assertion “ Bondage is from Misconception,” is to be expounded ; and first he states the nature of Misconception”]. विपर्ययभेद्‌ा भेदाः पञ्च ॥ ३७॥ Aph. 37.—The kinds of Misconcep- Misconception divided. 4 ¢ E “4 tion are five, [viz., ‘Ignorance, Ego- tism, Desire, Aversion, and Fear of dissolution,—the five men- tioned in the Yoga,”—see Yoga Aphorisms, B. IL., 3] अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा तु ॥ ee ॥ Aph. 38.—But Disability [the cause of Misconception] is of twenty-eight sorts [—as explained in the Yoga]. तुष्टिनैवधा ॥ ३९ ॥ 101. 39.—Acquiescence is of nine The varieties of Disability. Acquiescence. अः सिद्विर्टधा ॥ ४० ॥ 411. 40.—Perfection is of eight Perfections. sorts. न ¢ अवान्तरमभेद्‌; पूववत्‌ ॥ ४१ ॥ Aph. 41.—The subdivisions [of Mis- Their subdivisions. conception] are [such] as [they have been declared] aforetime [न by preceding teachers ;—they are not explained here, for fear of prolixity”]. N 90 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book IIT. एवमितरस्याः [1 ४२॥ 411. 42.—So of the other [wviz. Disability, the divisions, which are twenty-eight, are to be found elsewhere] आध्यात्मिकादिभेद्‌ान्नवधा तुष्टिः ॥ ४२॥ Aph. 43.—Acquiescence is nine- fold, through the distinction of ‘the internal’ and the rest, [and “this aphorism is explained by a memorial verse,” viz., No. 50, which see in Professor Wilson’s edition of the Sinkhya Karikis]. ऊद्दादिमिः सिद्धिः ॥ vv ॥ Aph. 44.—Through Reasoning, &c., [which are its subdivisions,] Perfee- tion [is eight-fold, being divided into Reasoning, &c. ; and “ this also has been explained in a memorial verse,” No. 51, which see in Professor Wilson’s edition. ‘ But then,—how is it said that Perfection consists only of ‘ Reasoning, &c.,’— seeing that it is determined in all the Institutes that the eight Perfections, viz., (the capacity of assuming) Atomic bulk, &c., result from recitations, austerity, meditation, &c.? To this he replies”’]. नेतरादिनरदानेन विना ॥ ey Aph. 45.—Not from any other [than what we have just stated, does real Perfection arise ;—because what does arise therefrom, €. g. Of this further. Acquiescence divided, Perfection divided. The enumeration defended. from austerities, is] without abandonment of something else [viz., Misconception; “therefore that Perfection, since it is no antagonist to mundane existence, is only a semblance of a Perfection, and not real Perfection.” Next, “the indivi- duated creation, which was mentioned concisely in the asser- tion ‘The distinction of individuals arises from the difference of desert,’ is set. forth diffusely”]. The creation and its parts. 91 दैवादिप्रमेदा ॥ ४९॥ क tavths 4111. 46.—[The creation is that] of ८ which the subdivisions are the demons, &८., [and “ this is explained in a memorial verse,” No. 53,— which see in Professor Wilson’s edition]. अब्रह्मस्तम्नपर्यन्तं तत्छते Seclasanra ॥ ४७ ॥ This ereation also for Aph. 47.—From Brahmé down to Soul's sake. a post, for its [Soul’s] sake is creation, till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature, on which Soul’s liberation ensues]. ऊध्वं VPA ॥ ४८ ॥ Aph. 48.—Aloft,—[—above the world of mortals’’] it [the creation] abounds in [the Quality of] Purity. तमोविशला मूलतः ॥ ४९ ॥ 411. 49,—Beneath, [that is to say, under the world of mortals’’] The celestial world, The infernal world, [the creation] abounds in Darkness. मध्ये रजेाविश्णला ॥ ५०॥ Aph. 50.—In this midst [i. ९. in : the world of mortals”] it [the crea- tion] abounds in Passion. [‘‘ But then,—for what reason are there, from one single Nature, creations diverse in having, in excess, purity and the rest? With reference to this he The world of mortals. says.” | cA + ६५ कमंवेचित्यात्‌ प्रधानचष्टा गभद्‌ स्वत्‌ ॥ ५९ ॥ ~ Why कोर operates db Aph. 51.—By reason of diversity १९१०४ of desert is Nature’s [diverse] beha- viour,—just like a born slave, [—“ that is to say,—as of him who is a slave from the embryo state upwards, there are, nN 2 92 The Sankhya Aphorisms. Book III. through the cleverness arising from the habit of being a dependent, various sorts of behaviour, i. e., of service, for the sake of his master,—just so” does Nature serve Soul in various ways. “ But then—if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity (—the element of joy—), then, since Soul’s object is really thereby effected, what need is there of Liberation ? To this he replies”). आवृत्तिसचाप्त्तरात्तरयेनियागाद्वेयः ॥ ५९ ॥ Why Heaven is to be Aph. 52.—Even there, there is re- shunned. turn [to miserable states of existence] ; it is to be shunned by reason of the successive subjections to birth [from which the inhabitants of heaven enjoy no im- munity]. समानं जरामरणादिजं TSA 11 ५३॥ Transitoriness of heavenly dph. 53.—Alike [belongs to all] bliss. the sorrow produced by decay and death :—[‘‘ common to all alike, those that are aloft and those beneath, beginning with Brahma and ending with a stock, is the sorrow produced by decay and death :—therefore more- over is it (heaven) to be shunned.” ‘ What need of more? The end is not effected by absorption into the cause either,— as he tells us” ]. न कारणलयात्‌ AIHA AAAS ATA |! YS II Absorption into Nature Aph. 54.—Not by absorption into ineffectual. the cause is there accomplishment of the end, because, as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again. [In the absence of knowledge of the distinction (between Soul and Nature), when indifference to- wards Mind, &c., has resulted from devotion to Nature, then absorption into Nature takes . place ;—for it is declared— ‘Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature.’ Even through this, i. e., the absorption into the cause, the end is not gained, ^ because there is a rising again,—as in the case Absorption into Nature. 93 of one who has dived.’ As a man who has dived under water rises again, exactly so do Souls, which have been absorbed into Nature, re-appear (at the commencement of a new annus magnus), in the condition of Lords :—because it is impossible that one’s Faults should be consumed without a familiarity with the distinction (between Soul and Nature), in conse- quence of the re-appearance of Passion through the non- destruction of habits, &c.”” ‘ But then,—the cause is not by any one caused to act ;—being independent, then, why does she (Nature) make that grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper ? To this he replies.’’] अकार्यतवेऽपि तद्योगः पारवश्यात्‌ ॥ ५५॥ Natwre free to act, yet Aph. 55.—Though she be not con- gute by BAe: strained to act, yet this is fitting, be- cause of her being devoted to another. [‘‘ Though Nature is ‘not constrained to act,’ not instigated, not subject to the will of another, yet ‘ this is fitting,’ —it is proper that he who is absorbed in her should arise again :—why ?—‘ because of her being devoted to another,’—i. e., because she seeks Soul’s end. The meaning is, that, he who is absorbed in her is again raised up by Nature for the sake of Soul’s end which consists in knowledge of the distinction (between Nature and Sonl). And Soul’s end, and the like, are not constrainers of Nature, but occasions for the energizing of her whose very being is to energize ;—so that there is nothing detracted from her independence.” ‘ He mentions further a proof that Soul rises from absorption into Nature.’”’] वित्‌ ९ स॒ हि सवैवित्‌ सवेकतो । ५९६ ॥ The gain of absorption in- Aph. 56.—[He who is absorbed in- to Nature, to Nature must rise again] for he be- comes omniscient and omnipotent, [‘‘The Lord, the First Spirit?” in a subsequent creation. ‘ But then,—if that be so, it is impossible to deny a Lord,’—which, nevertheless, the Sdnkhyas seem to do ;—to this he replies]. 94 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms.. Book III. ई टशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा 1 ५७ 11 In what sense there isa 401. 57.—The existence of such a ८ Lord is a settled point, [—for quite agreed by all, that there is an emergent Lord, he who had been absorbed into Nature; for the ground of dispute (between the Sdnkhyas and the rest) is altogether about an eternal Lord.” “ He next expounds diffusely the motive for Nature’s creating, which was mentioned only indicatorily in the first aphorism of the Second Book.’’] प्रधानधष्टिः पराथं खतेाऽप्यमेक्तुलादुष्टकुङ्मवद- नवत्‌ ॥ ५८ ॥ Aph, 58.—Nature’s creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontancous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart’s carrying saffron [for the sake of its master. ‘But then,— it is quite impossible that Nature, being unintelligent, should “it is Nature's disinterestedness, be spontaneously a creator,—for we see that a cart, or the like, operates only by reason of the efforts of another. To this he replies.’’] अचेतनत्वेऽपि Aree fed प्रधानस्य ॥ ५९ ॥ Natire’s ७.26. Aph. 59.—Though she be unintelli- tion illustrated. gent, yet Nature acts,—as is the case with milk ;—[* that is to say,—as milk, without reference to men’s efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd,— so Nature, although she be unintelligent, changes into the form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other.” And in regard to this aphorism the commentator observes, “this is not rendered tautological by the aphorism ‘As a cow—for her calf,’—because there the question was only of the operation of instrwments, and because cows ure intelligent.”] _ By means of the exhibition of another illustration, he mentions tho cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid. How Nature acts. 95 © no ka कमवदुरेवा कालादेः । ६० ॥ Aph. 60.—Or as is the case with the acts, [or on-goings], for we sco them, of Time, &c., [‘ the spontaneous action of Nature is Another illustration, proved from what is seen. The action of Time, for example, takes place quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season’s now departing and another’s coming on :—let the behaviour of Nature also be thus,—for the supposition conforms to observed facts.” ‘ But still, a senseless Nature would never energize, or would energize the wrong way,—because of there being (in her case) no such communing as—‘ This is my means of producing experience, &c.’ = ¶0 this he replies.””] सभावाचचेशितमनभिसन्धानाट्त्यवत्‌ ॥ ६९ ॥ ज - Aph. 61.—From her own nature she ‘ature acts from halit, स 3 acts, not from thought,—just like a servant, [—‘ that is to say,—as, in the case of an excellent servant, naturally, just from habit, the appointed and neces- sary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to his. own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from habit alone.’’] cone AMARC! । ६२ ॥ Or through the influence of Aph. 62.—Or from attraction by de- Desert, serts—which have been from eternity. ~ (£ az विविक्तबाधात्‌ खषटिनिडत्तिः प्रधानस्य खदवत्‌ पाके ॥ ६३॥ Nature desists when the Aph. 63.—From discriminative थ क knowledge is there a cessation of Nature’s creating,—just as is the case with a cook when the cooking has been performed. [‘‘ But at that rate, since Nature’s creating ceases through the production of discrimi- native knowledge in the case of a single Soul, we should find all liberated. To this he replies.’’] 96 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book III. इतर इतरवत्‌ तदोषात्‌ II ९४ ॥ Liberation of one involves Aph. 64.—Another [i. €. one devoid nor that of all. of discriminative knowledge] remains like another, [i. e., just like one bound by Nature,—] through her fault, [i. e., through the fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that soul’s aim]. AN ig इयोरेकतरस्य VATA TATA: ॥ ९५ ॥ Aph. 65.—[The fruit of Nature’s ceasing to act,] the solitariness of both [Nature and Soul], or [—which comes to the same thing—] of either, is liberation. [‘‘ But then, how should Nature, having attained indifference, through the mood in the shape of discrimination, on the liberation of a single Soul, again engage in creation for the sake of another Soul? And you are not to say that this is no objection because Nature consists of different portions,—(it is not another Nature but the same,) because we see that, even out of the (mortal) constituents of the liberated person, his dust, &c., things are created for the experience of another. ‘To this he replies.’’] FUSES न विरज्यते WRITS वोरगः॥ ६९ ॥ How Nature affects one Aph. 66.—Moreover [when Nature REO ONCE ET has left off distressing the emanci- pated] she does not desist in regard to her creative influence on another,—just as is the case with the snake [which ceases to be a terror] in respect of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope [which another still mistakes for a snake. ‘And Nature is likened to a snake, because of her disguising Soul, which is likened to a rope. Certain unintelli- gent persons, calling themselves Veddntins, having quite failed to understand that such is the drift of such examples as those of the rope, the snake, &c., suppose that Naturé is an abso- lute nothing, or something merely imaginary. The matters of Liberation consists in what. How Nature acts. 97 scripture, and of the legal institutes, are to be elucidated by means of this or that example offered by the Sénkhyas who assert the reality of Nature ;—it is not the case that the mat- ter is simply established to be as is the example,” the analogy of which is not to be overstrained as if the cases were parallel throughout. ] [3 म, कमेनिमित्तयोगाच्च 11 ९७ ॥ Another consideration why Aph. 67.—And from connection with Nature should act. Desert, which is the cause, [Nature “creates, for the sake of another Soul” than the emancipated one. =^ But then, since all Souls are alike indifferent, inasmuch as they do not desire (Nature’s interference), what is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one, and desist in regard to that one? To this he replies’”’]. Dd नेरपेच्छेऽपि प्रकल्युपकारेऽविवेक निमित्तम्‌ ॥ ६८ ॥ क 1079: Aph. 68.—Though there is [on soul’s + part] this indifference, yet want of discrimination is 116 cause of Nature’s service, [‘‘ Nature, just through [her own] non-discrimination, saying “This is my master,” ‘This is I myself,’—serves Souls (towards their eventual emancipation) by creation, &c. And so, to what Soul, not having discriminated herself therefrom, she has the habit of showing herself, in respect just of that one does Nature energize :—and this it is that determines her.” But “since itis her nature to energize, how can she desist even when discrimination has taken place? To this he replies’’]. नर्तकीवत्‌ प्रवृत्तस्यापि निच्त्तिश्चारिताथ्यात्‌ ॥ ९९ i Nature energizes only till Aph. 69.—Just like a dancer, does ee मः she, though she had been energizing, desist, because of the end’s having been attained; [—for “‘ Nature’s disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul, and not universally. Therefore is it declared that Nature desists, though she had been energizing, when the end has 0 98 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Bool: IIT. been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of Soul’s aim. Just as a dancer, who had been energizing with the view of exhibiting a dance to the spectators, desists on the accom- plishment of this”]. दोषनोधेऽपि नोपसपेणं प्रधानस्य कुलवधूवत्‌ 11 ७० ॥ 401. 70.—Moreover, when her fault is known, Nature does not approach [Soul], just like a woman of good family; [—‘that is to say,—Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul’s having seen her fault,—in her transformations and her taking the shape of pain,—does not again approach Soul ;—‘ just like a woman of good family,’—i. e.,—just as a (frail) woman of good family, ashamed at ascertaining that her fault has been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband.” ‘ But then,— Jf Nature’s energizing be for the sake of Soul, then Soul This illustrated. must be altered by Bondage and Liberation (—and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it to be). To this he replies”’]. नकान्तते बन्धमे कते पुरुषस्याविवेकाडते 11 ७१॥ Aph. 71.—Bondage and Liberation do not belong actually to Soul,—[and would not even appear to be] but for non-discrimination. [^ But, in reality, the aforesaid Bondage and Liberation be- long to Nature alone :—so he asserts :’”] a प्रकतेराच्छस्यात्‌ ससङ्गत्वात्‌ पशुवत्‌ ॥ ७२ ॥ 411. 72.—It really belongs to Nature, through consociation,—like a beast, [i. e., “ through her being hampered by the habits, &c., which are the causes of Pain ;—just asa beast, through its being hampered by a rope, experiences Bondage and Libera- tion :—such is the meaning. | Souls relation to Bondage. Bondage is really Nature's. Nature’s bondage and liberation. 99 पैः सप्तभिरात्मान्‌ TATA प्रधानं काश्कारवदिमेाच यत्येकर्पेण ॥ ७३ ॥ अ 9 - न Aph 73.—In seven ways does Nature liberates herself. bind herself, like the silk-worm ;—in one way does she liberate herself, [—for, ‘by Merit, Dispas- sion, supernatural Power, Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and Want of power,—by habits, causes of Pain, in the shape of these seven, does Nature bind herself with Pain, ‘like the silk-worm,’—i. e., just as the worm that 77181६68 the cocoon bind itself by means of the dwelling which it itself constructs. And that same Nature liberates herself from Pain ‘in one way,’ i. e., by Knowledge alone.” “ But then, that which you assert, viz., that Bondage and Liberation result from Non-discrimination alone, is improper,—because Non-discrimi- nation can neither be quitted nor assumed,—and because, in the world, Pain, and its negative Pleasure, can themselves be neither quitted nor assumed :—otherwise (—if you still insist on retaining the opinion objected to—) there is disparagement of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself (—not leaving it to a commentator—) explains what was asserted in the fourth aphorism’’]. निमित्तत्मविवेकस्य न दृष्ट दानिः । 98 11 Aph. 74,—Non-discrimination is the cause [—not the thing itself—], so that there is no disparagement of sense-evidence, [for ‘ what was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination was only An objection met. the occasion of Bondage and Liberation in souls, and not that Non-discrimination itself was these two; therefore there is no disparagement of sense-evidence,”—for, though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quitted, yet we also see that causes of them can be assumed or quitted. “ He next mentions, among the means conducive to Discrimi- nation, Study, which is the essence of them”’]. ०2 100 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book III. तत्वाभ्यासान्नेति नेतोति त्यागादिवेकसिद्धिः 1 Oy 1 Aph. 75.—Discrimination is per- fected through abandonment [of every- thing]—expressed by a ^ Nay—nay,”—through study of the [twenty-five] Principles, [the student “abandoning, by a ‘Nay—nay,’ in regard to things unintelligent, ending with Nature, the conceit (that Nature, or any of her products, is Soul). All the others [enumerated in the list of means are only supplemental to Study’’]. He states a specialty in regard to the perfecting of Dis- crimination. Means of Discrimination. अधिकारिप्रमेद्‌ान्न नियमः ॥ ७६ ॥ The means not efficacious Aph. 76.—Through the difference everywhere, of those competent [to engage in the matter at all], there is no necessity [that each and every one since there is a division, of those competent, into the sluggish, &c., though study be made, there is no certainty that, in this very birth, Discrimi- nation will be accomplished :—such is the meaning. There- fore each one should, by cleverness in study, acquire for him- self the highest degree of competency :—such is the import”). should at once be successful; for ^ वाधितानुच्या मध्यविवेकतेऽ्युपभागः | ७७ ॥ Imperfect Discrimination Aph. 77.—Since what [Pain] has भमः been repelled, returns again, there comes, even from medium [but imperfect] discrimination, experience [which it is desired to get entirely rid of. “ But sluggish Discrimination (—lower even than the middling variety—), antecedently to direct intuition, consists only of Hearing, Pondering, and Meditating :—such is the division” of Discrimination]. Liberation during life. 101 जोवन्मुक्त्च 11 ७८ ॥ Aph. 78.—And he who living is liberated [‘‘is just in the condition of medium Discrimination.” ‘He adduces evidence for there being some one liberated though still living’’]. x BUSTA TATA ALE: |! ७९ ॥ Aph. 79.—It is proved, by the fact of instructed and instructor, [र that there are such as are liberated during life,—by the mention, in the Institutes, on the subject of Liberation, of the relation of preceptor and pupil :—i. e., because it is only one liberated during life who can [really] be an instructor” in this matter]. AA i ८० ॥ Aph. 80.—And there is scripture [^^ ए there being persons liberated Of Liberation during life. Proof that this may be. Further proof. during 1877]. इतरथान्धपरम्परा 11 ८१॥ Aph. 81.—[And not through mere- ly hearing is one qualified to become an instructor,] otherwise [—“ we should have a blind handing down” of doctrines which would speedily become corrupted or lost. = ^ But then,—when, through Knowledge, one’s works (—which are the cause of mundane existence—) have perished, how can there still be life? To this he replies’”’]. चक्रभमणवद्ुतशरोरः ॥ ८२ ॥ How life is compatible with Aph. 82.—Possessed of a body [the Liberation, emancipated sage goes on living],— just like the whirling of a wheel, [—for as “even on the cessation of the action of the potter, the wheel of itself revolves for some time in consequence of the motal inertia resulting from the previous action; so, after knowledge, A suggestion repelled. 102 The Sankhya Aphorisms. Book III. though actions do not arise, yet, through the self-continuant action of antecedent acts, possessing an energizing body, he remains living yet liberated;” and if he did not, but every one who gained true knowledge were to disappear on gaining it, true knowledge would cease to be handed down orally,— and Kapila probably did not contemplate books, or did not think these a secure depository of the doctrine. ‘‘ But then, since the continuance of experience, &c., is put an end to by that ‘Meditation with distinct recognition of the object,’ which (—see Yoga Aphorisms, B. I. 17—) is the cause of knowledge, how can one retain a body? To this he replies’’]. e oN, ~ संस्कारलेशतस्तत्सिद्धिः 1 ८२ ॥ Difficulty of shufting of Aph. 83.—This [retention of a this mortal coil. body] is occasioned by the least ves- tige of impression, [“ by even the least access of those im- pressions of objects which are the causes of having a body.” Finally, “he sums up the sense of the declarations of the Institute’’]. विवेकान्निःओेषद्‌ःखनिच्रत्त छतछृत्यता नेतरान्न तरात्‌ ॥ ८४ ॥ Aph. 84.—That which was to be done has been done, when entire ces- sation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination ;—not other- wise—not otherwise; [and “so much for the Third Book,— Recapitulation. on Dispassion’’]. 103 BOOK IV. [^ Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognised in the Institute, the means of discriminative knowledge are to be displayed:—so, for this purpose, the Fourth Book is commenced.’’] राजपु चवत्‌ PANTS शत्‌ ॥ ९॥ Soul set right by hearing Aph. 1.—As in the case of the ~ king’s son,—from instruction as to the truth, [comes discrimination between Soul and Nature. “The story here is as follows. A certain king’s son, in consequence of his being born under the (unlucky) star of the tenth pore tion (of the twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided), having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain forester, remains under the idea that ‘I am a forester.’ Having learned that he was alive, a certain minis- ter informs him—‘ Thou art not a forester, thou art a king’s 8011. Just as he immediately, having abandoned the idea of his being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state— saying ‘I am a king,’—so too it (—the Soul—), in conse- quence of the instruction of some kind person—to the effect that ‘Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art thyself a portion thereof,’—having abandoned the idea of being Nature (—or of being anything material or phenomenal—) rests upon its own nature,—saying—‘ Since I am the son of the Deity, I am myself Deity, and not something mundane different there- from.’”’ Next ‘he exhibits another story, to prove that even women, S'vidras, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through a Brahman, by hearing the instructions of a Brahman’’]. 104 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book IV. पिश्चवदन्या्थपद्‌ गेऽपि ॥ ₹॥ Roam whew the instruction Aph. 2.—As in the case of the gob- is not addressed to the hearer. Jin even when the instruction was for the sake of another,—[the chance hearer may be benefited. “Though the instruction in regard to the truth was being delivered, by the divine Krishna, for Arjuna’s benefit, know- ledge of the distinction (between Soul and Nature) was pro- duced in the case of a goblin standing near (and overhearing the discourse) :—and so too it may happen in the case of 01116872]. च्ावृत्तिरसकछलदुपदेशशत्‌ ॥ ३॥ 411. 3.—Repetition [is to be made], if not from once instructing [the end be gained. “That is to say,—a reiteration of instruction also is to be made,—because, in the Ohhdndogya Upanishad, and the like, there is mention of Aruni and the like as having more than once instructed S’wetaketu and others.” Next, “with a view to the removal of desire, he sets forth, with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul’s accompaniments’’], Necessity of inculcation. पितापुचवदुभयोदृ्टतवात्‌ ॥ ४॥ 1 of mundane Aph. 4.—As in the case of father things. and son, since both are seen [—the one to die, and the other to be born. “ That is to say,— Discrimination takes place, through dispassion, in consequence of its being inferred in respect of one self also, that there are death and birth, since these are seen in the case of father and son.” And “he next explains by illustrative stories, the subservients to the perfecting of knowledge in him in whom knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion’’]. Voluntary abandonment. 105 ~ ल्यागविये श्येनवत्‌ सुखदुःखो गाभ्याम्‌ ॥ ५ ॥ A = ^ Aph. 5.—One experiences pleasure Voluntary distinguished ४ ९ f from involuntary abandon. Or pain [alternatively] from [volun- + tary] abandonment or [forcible] sepa- ration ;—as in the case of a hawk, [‘ fora hawk, when he has food before him, if he be driven away by any one, is grieved by being separated from the food; but if of his own accord he leaves it, then he is freed from grief’’]. अहिनि््वैयनोवत्‌॥ ६ ॥ How Sout ought to aban- Aph. 6.—As in the case of a snake don Nature. and its skin: [— that is to say,—as a snake readily abandons its old skin, from knowing that it ought to be quitted ;—just so he who desires liberation should abandon Nature, experienced through a long period, and effete, —when he knows that it ought to be quitted.” And “when abandoned, he should not again accept Nature and the rest ;— so, in regard to this, he says’’]. छिन्नदस्तवदा ॥ 9 ॥ 4011. 7.—Or as an amputated hand ; Its resumption prohibited. # + [—i. e., ‘as no one takes back again an amputated hand,—just so this (Nature), when abandoned, he should not readmit’’] असाधनानुचिन्तनं बन्धाय भरतवत्‌॥ ८ ॥ Duty to be sacrificed to Aph. 8.—What is not a means [of ९०८१८१९; liberation] ought not to be thought about, [as this only conduces] to bondage,—as in the case of Bharata, [—for “that which is not an immediate cause of Discrimination, even though it may be a duty, still is ‘ not to be thought about,’—i. €. intention of the mind towards the performance thereof is not to be made ;—since it is a cause of Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination, —‘as in the case of Bharata,’—that is to say,—as was the case with the great sage Bharata’s cherishing of Dindndtha’s young fawn, though this was in accordance with duty’’]. ए 106 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book IV. asians विराधो रागादिभिः कुमारीशङ्कवत्‌ ।॥ < ॥ ३ Aph. 9.—Through [association Company to be avoided. ec 3 3 with] many, there is obstruction to concentration through Passion, &c.,—as in the case of a girl’s shell-bracelet ; [—so “association is not to be made with many,—~because, when there is association with many, there is disturbance, through the development of Passion, &c., which destroys concentration,—just as a jingling is produced by the mutual contact’ of the shells on a girl’s wrist’’]. ॥ इभ्यामपि तथेव ॥ १०॥ Aph. 10.—Just so also from [the company of] two [—-‘‘there is ob- struction to concentration; therefore one ought to abide alone]. Even that of one. निराशः सुखो पिङ्गलावत्‌ ॥ ११ ॥ Blessedness of those that Aph. 11.—He who is without hope, expect nothing. is happy, just like Pingal4; [—i. e., ‘having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed of the happiness called contentment,’—‘ just like Pingalé,—that is to say,—just as the courtesan, called Pingala, desiring a lover, having found no lover, being despondent, became happy when she had left off hoping.” ^ But then, granting that Pain may cease on the cessation of hope, yet how can there be happiness in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied. That natural happiness, resulting from the predominance of Purity in the mind, which remains obscured by hope, of itself resumes its influence on the departure of hope,—just as is the case with the coolness of water which (supposed natural cool- ness) had been hindered (from manifesting itself) by heat ;— there is not in this case any need of means. And this in reality is what is expressed by the word ‘happiness.’ ?? “ Since it is an obstructor of Concentration, exertion with a view to experience is not to be made, since this may he effected otherwise,—as he next states’’]. Helecticism. 107 ॥ अनारग्मेऽपि परग्रहे TPA सपैवत्‌ 1) १२॥ Pom 8 Apts. a cd m6, be happy] even without exertion, like a serpent —happy in another’s house,—[‘ as it has been said,—‘ The building of a house is painful, and in no way pleasant ;—a serpent, having entered the dwelling made by another (e. g., a rat), does find comfort.’’”? And “from Institutes,—and from preceptors, only the cream is to be accepted, since other- wise it may be impossible to concentrate the attention ;’’—so he next tells us]. बहशास्तगुूपासनेऽपि सारादानं FLITAA ॥ १३॥ 4.10 124 Aph. 13.—Though he devote him- + self to many Institutes and teachers, a taking of the essence [is to be made],—as is the case with the bee,—[“‘as it has been said—‘ From small Institutes and from great, the intelligent man should take from all quarters the essence,—as the bee does from the flowers.’”’ ^ Be the other means what they may, the direct possession of Discrimi- nation is to be effected only by intentness—throngh maintain- ing Meditation,—as he next tells us’’]. 2 दषृकारवन्नेकचित्तस्य VALI ॥ १४ ॥ Aph. 14.—The Meditation is not interrupted of him whose mind is in- tent on one object,—like the maker of arrows; [—for, “as in the case of the maker of arrows, with his mind intent solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of other Intentness on one object. thoughts was not interrupted even by a king’s passing at his side,—so too, of him whose mind is intent on one point, there is in no way an ‘interruption of meditation,’ i. e., a failure to exclude other thoughts’’]. CoN क्तनियमलङ्गनाद्‌ानथक्यं लोकवत्‌ ॥ VY II Rules not to he /ransqress- Aph. 15.—Through transgression of ed with impunity, the enjoined rules, there is failure in the aim,—as in the world: [—“ whatever rule, for the prac- Pp 2 108 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book IV. tisers of Concentration, has been laid down in the Institutes, if it be transgressed, then the end, viz., the perfecting of knowledge, is not effected ;—‘as in the world,’—that is to say, just as, in ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c., in regard to a medicine, or the like, be neglected, the effect thereof will not be obtained”’]. न ५ हो तदिस्मर णेऽपि भेकोवत्‌ | Ve UI Rules must not 2९.०6. Aph. 16.—Moreover if they [the ५) rules] be forgotten,—as in the case of the female frog,—[the end will be lost. ‘ And the story of the female frog is this. A certain king, having gone to hunt, saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. And she, being solicited in marriage by the king, made this stipulation,—‘ When water shall be shown to me by thee, then I must depart.? But on one occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king— ‘Where is water?? The king too, forgetting his agreement, showed her the water. Then she, having become the she-frog Kémaripini, daughter of the king of the frogs, entered the water; and then the king, though he sought her with nets, &c., did not regain her.” ‘He next mentions a story, with reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the teacher, as well as hearing them’’]. नेपदेशश्रवणेऽपि कृतकृत्यता परामशंहते विरे- चनवत्‌ ॥ १७ ॥ Reflection necessary as well Aph. 17.—Not even though instruc- as hearing. tion be heard, is the end gained with- out reflection,—as in the case of Virochana; [—and “by ‘reflection’ is meant such consideration as determines the import of the teacher’s words. Without this, though the in- struction be heard, knowledge of the truth does not neces- sarily follow ;—for it is written that, though hearing the instructions of Prajépati,—Virochana,—out of Indra and Viro- chana,*—erred through the want of reflection’’]. # See Chhdndogya Upanishad. Reflection necessary. 109 दृष्टस्तयेरिन्द्रस्य ॥ १८ 1 Aph. 18.—Of those two [viz , Indra and Virochana], it [viz., reflection] was seen in the case of Indra, [and not of Virochana, on whom the instruction was therefore thrown away]. प्रणतिब्रह्मचर्ापसर्पणानि छत्वा सिद्विर्बह्कालात्‌ तदत्‌ ॥ १८ ॥ 4111. 19.—Having performed rever- Of this further. The process requires time, 5 ence, the duties of a student, and attendance, there is success after a long time,—as in his case ; [that is to say, as in the case of Indra, so in the case of another too, only by having exhibited, towards one’s pre- ceptor, reverence, the study of the Vedas, service, &c., is there ‘success,’ i. e., the development of truth,—not other- wise’”’]. न कालनियमे वामदेववत्‌ II २०॥ i Aph. 20,—There is no determina- The time for the process > ४ 9 may embrace successice states tion of the time,—as in the case of he Vamadeva, [—i. e., “ there is no neces- sity, as regards the time, that, in the arising of knowledge, it must be, e. g., from present causes alone ;—‘ as in the case of Vamadeva,’—that is to say,—as, in consequence of causes pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case of Vamadeva, even when in embryo, so may it in the case of another.” “ But then,—since it is written that the means of know- ledge need be no other than devotion to those [viz., Brahmé, &c.,] who (unlike the Absolute) have Qualities —knowledge may result from this. Why, then, a hard and subtle process of Concentration? To this he replies’’]. 110 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. IV. अध्यसतरूपोपासनात्‌ पारग्र्येण यज्ञोपासकानामिव TE cal क ROE. alles Aph. 21.—Through devotion to gether waprofitable. something under a superinduced form, {attainment or approach towards perfect knowledge takes place] by degrees,—as in the case of those who devote them- selves to sacrifices :—[that is to say— through devotion to the Souls, Brahma, Vishnu, S’iva, &c., under the forms super- induced on them, the perfecting of knowledge takes place ‘ by degrees,’—i. e., by the successive attainment of the world of Brahma, &c.,—or else through the purification of the Good principle, &c., but not directly ;—just as is the case with sacrificers”—whose slaughter of animals, requiring to be ex- piated, throws them back so far, in the road to emancipation. “ He tells us, that, moreover, there is no necessity that the successive rise to the world of Brahma should perfect one’s knowledge’’]. TATA: पच्चाभ्नियेगते HATA: U1 ९९॥ Scriptural proof that hea- Aph. 22.—Moveover, after the at- + tainment of what [—like the world of Brahmaé—] is other [than the state of emancipated soul], there is return [to mundane existence] ; because it is written [in the 5th Prapdthaka of the Chhandogya Upanishad], ‘ From conjunction with the five fires, there is birth.”—&c. He next exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the perfecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free from passion”’]. + ५.५ विरक्तस्य हेयद्ानमुपादे योपादानं दंसरशीरवत्‌ | ररे ॥ Aph. 23.—By him who is free from passion, what is to be left is left, and what is to be taken is taken,—as in the case of the swan and the milk; [-- that is to say,—only by him who is free from passion is there a quitting ‘of what is to be left,’ i. e., Discrimination i/lustrated. Good society. 111 of Nature, &c., and a taking ‘of what is to be taken,’ i. e., of Soul :—as it is only the swan,—and not the crow, or the like,—which, out of milk and water mingled, by means of leaving the unimportant water, takes the valuable milk,” as the Hinds insist it does]. लब्धातिश्ययोगाद्या तदत्‌ ॥ २४ ॥ Bak Gabe. 411. 24.—Or through association with one who has obtained excellence, —just as in the case thereof; [‘‘that is to say,—more- over, from association with him by whom ‘ excellence,’ i. e., excellence in knowledge, has been obtained, the aforesaid (discrimination) takes place,—as in the case of the swan. Just as in the case of Alarka, Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously, merely through association with Dattétreya’’]. न कामचारित्वं रागापदते शुकवत्‌ ॥ २५॥ Danger of unsuitable so- Aph. 25.—Not of his own accord ciety. should one go near one influenced by desire,—just like the parrot ; [—“‘ that is to say, just as the bird called a parrot, by reason of its being exceedingly beauti- ful, does not (—by going near people—) act in a rash manner, through fear of being imprisoned by those who covet it for its beauty.” And next “he states the harm of association with the passionate’’]. गुणयोगाद्द्वः शु कवत्‌ । २६ ॥ ४, Aph. 26.—[Else he may become] bound by conjunction with the cords, —as in the case of the parrot ;—[for “in the case of associat- ing with those persons, he may become bound ‘ by conjunction with the cords,’ i. e., by conjunction with their Desire, &c., (—the Qualities, punningly compared to cords—) just ‘as in the case of the parrot,’—that is to say, just as the bird called a parrot becomes bound by the cords, i. e., the ropes, of the hunter.” So “he determines, by two aphorisms, the means of dispassion”’]. 112 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. = 2५० IV. न भेगाद्रागशन्तिमेनिवत्‌ ॥ २७॥ Aph. 27.—Not by enjoyment is de- sire appeased,—just as in the case of the saint ;—[“ that is to say,—as, in the case of the saint, Saubhari, desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so also in the case of others is it not.” And further—]. + ९ क: दोषदशंनादुभयोः ॥ र्ट ॥ 401. 28.—From seeing the fault of both, [—i. e..—“‘ only from seeing Means of dixpassion. Of this further. the fault, e. g., of being changeable, of consisting of pain, &c., ‘of both, 1. e., of Nature and her productions, does the assuaging of Desire take place,—just as in the case of the saint. For it is written that Saubhari became indifferent to society, just through seeing the evil of society.” And “he tells us that incapacity even to accept instruction attaches to him who is affected by the fault of Desire, &c.]. न मलिनचेतस्युपदेगोजप्ररो SAT 1 २८ ॥ Ayitation excludes instruc- Aph. 29.—Not in the case of him tion. whose mind is disturbed does the seed of instruction sprout,—as in the case of Aja;—[“‘in him whose mind is rendered impure by Passion, &c., not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction ;—‘as in the case of Aja,’ —that is to say, as not a sprout from the seed of instruction, though offered to him by Vasishtha, sprang up in the king named Aja, whose mind was disturbed by grief for his wife. What need of more?—’]. नाभासमाचमपि मलिनदरपणएवत्‌ | २० I 411. 30.—Not even a semblance of this [true knowledge arises in him whose mind is disturbed],—as in the case of a rusty mirror, [for “even superficial knowledge does not arise, from in- Of this further. Heaven not perfect bliss. 113 struction, in one whose mind is impure, through the obstrne- tion caused by its wandering away, e. g., to other objects,— just as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror, through the obstruction caused by the impurities’’]. न ASG ALIA पङ्गजवत्‌ ॥ BY ॥ Knowledge not necessarily 4110. 31.—Nor, even though sprung perfect knowledge. therefrom, is that [knowledge neces- sarily] in accordance with that [instruction, this not having been entirely understood,]—just like the lotus, [that is to say, ‘just as the lotus, though the seed be of the best, is not in accordance with the seed when the swamp is faulty. The mind of the student is compared to the swamp,” in which the lotus-seed was sown. But then,— since Soul’s end is gained by the attainment of supernatural power in the worlds of Brahma, &c., to what purpose is the production of know- ledge, with so much toil, for liberation? To this he replies’’]. न भ्रतियेगेऽपि कछतकृत्यतापास्यसिद्विवदुपास्यसिद्ि- वत्‌ । SP il 1 Aph. 32.—Not, even on the attain- ment of glorification, has that been done which was to be done,—as is the case with the per- fection of the objects worshipped,—as is the case with the per- fection of the objects worshipped,—[for “even though one attain to supernatural power, ‘that has not been done which was to be done,’—i. e., the end has not been gained,—because it is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess :—‘as is the case with the perfection of the object worshipped,’—that is to say, as, though the possession of perfection (so-called) belongs to ‘ the objects worshipped,’ i. e., to Brahma, &c., still that has not been done which was to be done,—since it 18 written that even these, while in the sleep of Concentration, &c., still practice Concentration (—from fear of losing what they have attained to—) :—just in like manner is the case with him who, by the worship of these, has attained to glorifi- cation’’]. 114 BOOK V. [“ The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is begun a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the crude notions of others in regard to his Institute. Here, in the first place, he disposes of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression ९ Well then,’ in the first Aphorism (of Book I.), is purposeless.”’] मङ्गलाचरणं शिष्टाचारात्‌ फलद्‌ शनात्‌ ATTA ॥ १॥ Reasons for ० Benedictory Aph. 1.—The use of a Benediction opening. [is justified] by the practice of the good, by our seeing its fruit, and by scripture. [The word itt is intended to preclude the expectation of any other rea- sons.” “He next repels those who entertain the prima facie view, that what was asserted in the expression ‘ Because it is not proved that there is any Lord’ (—see B. I. Aph. 92.), is not made out, because (forsooth) His existence is proved by his being the giver of the fruits of works.’”’] नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्यत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सदः 11 ₹॥ 4071. 2.—Not from its [the world’s—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—i. e., by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,— [‘‘ by works alone, which are indispensable,”—and if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works]. bia # खापकारादधिष्ठानं लाकवत्‌॥ ३ ॥ The supposed Lord would Aph, 3.—[If a Lord were governor, be selfish. then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with or- dinary governors] in the world. Needlessness of a Lord. Objections to there being a Lord. 115 लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा ॥ ४॥ And therefore not the Lord Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just 1 like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for “if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be some- thing mundane,—just like a worldly lord ;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c’’]. पारिभाषिक वा ॥।५॥ क मक Aph. 5.—Or [* if whilst there exists ginatesin a mistaken express also a world, there be a Lord, then, ^ let yours, like ours, be merely”] a technical term [र णिः that soul which emerged at the com- mencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will’”]. न रागादते तद्िद्िः प्रतिनियतकारणएत्वात्‌॥ € ॥ Onjection to there being a Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] dans, cannot be established without [assum- ing that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indis- pensable cause [of all energizing]. तद्योगेऽपि न नित्यमुक्तः ।। ७ ॥ Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Pas- sion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, (‘and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered.”—* Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature (—not properties of Soul—) or from an influence through proximity This objection further. simply,—as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative”’]. ५2 116 The Sdukhya Aphorisms. Book. V. प्रथानशक्तियेगाचेत्‌ सङ्गापत्तिः ॥ ८ ॥ Objection on one branch of Aph. 8.—If it were from the con- भ junction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. ‘In regard to the latter alternative he says’’] N ba © सत्तामाचचचत्‌ सवश्वयम्‌ I < ॥ Objection on the other Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere branch, existence [of Nature, not in associa- tion, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; [“ that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indiffer- ently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all ex- periencers that Nature produces Mind, &c. ;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown’’]. प्रमाणाभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥ Denial that there is any 111. 10.—It is not established [that real evidence of a Lord. there is an eternal Lord], because there is no real evidence of it, [—‘‘in the first place, there is not sense-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable ;” as he proceeds to show]. सम्बन्धाभावान्नानुमानम्‌ |! ११ ॥ (1 Aph. 11.—There is no inferential lished by inference. proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken ;—“ and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as ‘ Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,’ the fact of invariable concomitancy is not estab- lished, since there is no compulsion” that every product should have had an intelligent maker]. Objections to there being a Lord. 117 अतिरपि प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य ॥ १९॥ Denial that there is scrip- Aph, 12.—Moreover, there is ‘scrip- 4 ture for this [world’s] being the pro- duct of Nature [—not of a Lord. So, leaving this topic, “ he refutes diffusely, by a cluster (of seven aphorisms), the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in (Aph. 20 of) the first section, viz., ‘Bondage does not arise from Ignorance (conjoined with Soul)’ ”’]. नाविद्यागक्तियोगे निःसङ्गस्य ॥ १३॥ 1 Aph. 13.—With that whieh ९४ soli- the solitary, were a contra. tary, there cannot be conjunction of diction. te the power of Ignorance, [and “ since Soul has no association (with anything whatever) it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance.” * But then (it may be replied,)—what is to be asserted is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Igno- rance (which is a negation, or nonentity), and so, since this is no reality, there is no ussociution occasioned thereby. ‘To this he rejoins” ]. तद्योगे तद्िद्वावन्योऽन्याश्रयत्वम्‌ |! 2 1 Aph. 14.—Since the existence of this [alleged negative Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunc- tion, there is a vicious circle, [‘‘i. e., a resting of each on the other alternately, or resting a thing on itself,—in short,—a regressus in infinitum.” And “in reply to the suggestion (of A suggestion repelled, the Naiydyika)—but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the regressus in infinitum is no objection,—he replies’’]. न बोजाङ्कुरवत्‌ सादि संसार श्रुतेः ॥ QU Aph. 15.—It is not as in the case The world has a beginning. त of seed and sprout, for we hear in scripture that the world [— mundane state of souls, consist- ing of all undesirable things, Ignorance, &c.,”] has a begin- 118 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book V. ning; [—“ because we hear in scripture that these cease to exist at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c.” * But then (you Vedantins will say—), according to us Igno- rance is technically so termed, and is not, e. g., in the shape, specified by the Yoga, of supposing what is not soul to be soul; and so, just like your ‘ Nature,’ since this (Ignorance) of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, there is no detriment to the solitariness thereof :—in regard to this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word ‘ Ignorance,’ he objects to it’’]. २७१ विद्याताऽन्यत्व ब्रह्मवाधेप्रसङ्गः ॥ १९ ॥ Soul and knowledge not Aph. 16.—[“ If the meaning of the identical, word ‘Ignorance’ (avidyd) be only ^ otherness than knowledge,’] then Brahma—[“ soul itself”]— would be found to be excluded, [—“ to perish,—through his being annihilable by knowledge,”]—since He is other than knowledge. ay BATT नेष्फल्यम्‌ ॥ V9 UI Knowledge, not excluding Aph. 17.—Were there not exclu- (4 were regulieds: sion [^ the existence by ignorance by knowledge,] then there would be resultlessness, [—“ be- cause of its not debarring Ignorance,” which is the only result competent to knowledge. ‘ He censures the other alterna- tive,” that knowledge might exclude Soul]. विद्याबाध्यत्वे जगतेऽप्येवम्‌ ॥ ९८ ॥ On the Vedanta theory the Aph. 18.—If [on the other hand] world ought to vanish. it [Ignorance] meant the being ex- cludable by Knowledge, it would be predicable in like manner of the world also, [—for, ‘‘if, on the other hand, the being excludable by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, be what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case ‘the world,’ the whole mundane system, Nature, Mind, &c., would also in like manner be Ignorance; and so, the whole system of things being Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by The Veddnta theory. 119 one man’s knowledge, the world should become invisible to others also’’]. nN तद्रपत्वे सादित्वम्‌ ॥ १९ ॥ The Vedénta theory self- Aph. 19.—If it [Ignorance] were + of that nature [i. 6.) “ suppose it to be the case that to be Ignorance means simply the being exclud- able by Knowledge, still] it would have had a commencement, [^^ for such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in souls (—as held by Vedantins, see Aph. 15—), but must have had a commencement ; for it is proved by such texts as ^^ Con- sisting of knowledge alone,” &c., that at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge alone. Therefore it is settled that there is no other Ignorance than that stated in the Yoga system, and this is a property of the understanding, not of the soul.” Now, “by a cluster of (six) aphorisms he clears up the primf facie view of an opponent in regard to that which was stated in the same Book (—Book V., Aph. 2—), that Nature’s energizing is due to desert’’]. aman a न धर्मापलापः प्रतिकार्य बेदिव्यात्‌ ॥ Re I Aph. 20.—There is no denying desert, [on the ground of its being no object of sense, because it is inferred,”] because of the Desert is undeniable. diversity in the operations of Nature [—accommodating one person and inconveniencing another,—which would otherwise be unaccounted for]. श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभिसतत्सिदिः ॥ २९ ॥ 4111. 21.—It [the existence of De- his. sili + sert] is established by scripture, by tokens, &c. न नियमः प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात्‌ ॥ BP ॥ Sonse-eridence not the only 4110. 22.—There is here no neces- kind of evidence. sity [that a thing of which there is 120 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. no sense-evidence must be non-existent,’—] because there is room for other proofs. उभयचाप्येवम्‌ 11 २३ I Aph. 23.—It is thus, moreover, in Demerit as certain as merit. é ४ ४ both cases,—[“ the evidence applies to Demerit just as it does to Merit’’]. अथात्‌ सिदि्ेत्‌ समानमुभयेः ॥ ९९ ॥ Aph. 24.—If the proof be from an The proof of each the same. ४ a 4 argument [८771 this shape, viz., that otherwise an injunction would be unaccounted for ; but there is none such in respect of demerit,—so how can scriptural or logical argument be extended to demerit? If any one says this, it is not so, since the token exists”] alike in respect of both, [^ 1. e., of both merit and demerit :—because prohibitory injunctions, such as ‘ He should not approach another’s wife,’ betoken demerit’’]. €^ + iv अन्तःकरणधमत्व धमादोनाम्‌ | २५ II Aph. 25.—It is of the internal or- gan [—not of soul—] that Merit, &c., [‘‘ the ^ &c.,’ including all those that are stated in the Vuis'e- Merit, §c., inhere in what. shila Institute as peculiar qualities of soul,’’] are the properties. [To the objection that the existence of an internal organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is debarred by scripture, he replies. ]— गुणदोनां च नाल्यन्तबाधः ॥ २६ ॥ The Qualities exist, though Aph. 26.—And the existence of the not in soul. Qualities [—“ Purity, &c., and their properties, happiness, &c., and their products also, Mind, &c.,”] is not absolutely debarred [by scripture. ‘ They are not to be denied as existences; but it is to be altogether denied that they belong to soul, just as we deny that heat The Chdrvdka opinion discussed. 121 (—in red hot iron—) belongs to the iron.” ‘In regard to the doubt,—why, again, may we not deny them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words sleep, wish, &c.?—he says. ””] पच्चावयवयेगात्‌ सुखसंवि्तिः 11 २७ ॥ न 401. 27.—By a conjunction of the five members [of an argumentative statement], we discern that Happiness exists :—[and “here, in order to get a particular subject of his assertion, he takes happiness alone, one portion of the matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter :—but the better reading is, ‘we discern that Happiness, Sc., exist.’ The five members of an argumentative statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Synthesis (of the two premises), and Conclusion ; and he means that by the ^ conjunction,’ 1. e., the combination, of these, all things, happiness, &c., are proved to exist. And the employment (of the argument) is this :— ‘Pleasure is real ;— Because it produces motion in something ;— Whatever produces motion in anything is real,—as are sentient beings ; And pleasure produces motion in things, as in horripilation, &e. ; Therefore it is real.” “The Chaérvdka next doubts whether there be any evidence other than sense-evidence, since (he contends) there is no truth in the assertion (of an inductive conclusion) that such and such is pervaded by such and such, &c.’’]. न सछङ्भृदणात्‌ सम्बन्धसिद्धिः ॥ PE ॥ The validity of inference Aph. 28.—Not from once apprehend- qvastioned, ing [concomitance of a supposed token and thing betokened], is a connection, [i. e., a pervadedness or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened] established ;—[‘and frequency (of the same apprehension) R 122 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. follows (the rule of the single apprehension, just as a thousand times nothing amounts to nothing) ;—therefore (argues the sceptic) since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference, This he clears up’’}. नियतघ्मसादित्यमुभयेरेकतरस्य वा NH ॥ Re Aph, 29.—Pervadedness is a con- stant consociation of characters, in the case of both, or of one of them ;—[“ ^ Consociation of characters,’ i. e., consociation in the fact of being characters (or properties of something) :—in short concomitancy. And so we mean, that, that concomitancy is ‘ pervadedness,’ (furnish- ing solid ground for inference) which is absolutely non-errant, whether in the case of both, predicate and reason, or in the case of the reason only. ‘Of both’ is mentioned with refer- ence to the case of ‘equal pervadedness’ (—e. g., every equilateral triangle is equiangular, and conversely every equi- angular triangle is equilateral). And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confutation (or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it); so that there is no impos- sibility in apprehending ‘ pervadedness’” and of inferring on the strength of it]. न तच्वान्तरं वस्तुकल्यनाप्रसक्तेः ॥ २० ॥ 1 Aph. 30.—It [Pervadedness] is not tional principle. [as some think,—see Aph. 31]—an additional principle [over and above the twenty-five, B. I. Aph. 61,] for it is unsuitable to postulate entities [‘‘ preeter rationem’”’]. “This point cleared up. is निजशत्यु्वमित्याचायाः |! २१ II Aihaterodox opinion + Aph. 31.—But [certain] doctors say garding.’ Peroadednass:' that it [Pervadedness] is [another principle,—in addition to the twenty-five—], resulting from the power of the thing itself. [These “other teachers assert The Panchas’ikha’s opinion discussed. 123 that ‘ Pervadedness’ is positively a separate principle, in the shape of a species of power generated by the native power of the ‘pervaded.’ But (they continue) ‘ Pervadedness’ is not simply a power of the (pervaded) thing itself,—else it would exist wherever the thing is, (—which ‘ pervadedness does not do,) for even smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point of its origination], is not attended by fire. And, by going into another place, that power is put an end to; there- fore (—contend these teachers—) there is no over-extension in the above-stated definition ;—for, according to our doctrine, the smoke (which betokens fire) is to be specialized as that which is at the instant of origination.” ९ आधेयशक्तियोग इति पञ्चशिखः Ney ॥ Opinion of the Pancha Aph. 32,—The Panchas‘ikha says ०१४५०, that it (‘ Pervadedness’) is the posses- sion of the power of the sustained :—[for, says the Pancha- s‘ikha, ^^ pervadingness is the power which consists in being the sustainer, and ‘ Pervadedness’ is the having the power which consists in being the sustained,—for Intellect and the rest are treated as being pervaded (or invariably attended) by Nature, &c.,”—and this just means that each product in succession is sustained by what preceded it in the series. “But then, why need a ‘ power of the sustained’ be postu- lated ?—let ^ Pervadedness’ be simply an essential power of the thing pervaded. To this the Panchas ikha replies ’’]. न खूपशक्तिनिंयमः पुनवीद प्रसक्तेः ॥ २३९ ॥ The Panchas'itha's reply Aph. 33.—The relation is not an i a ia essential power, for we should have [in that case] a tautology, [‘‘ because, that is to say, just as _ there is no difference between ‘ water-jar’ and ‘jar for water,’ so also there is none in the case of ‘Intellect’ and ‘ what is Pervaded’” by Nature, of which Intellect consists. And “he himself explains the ‘ Tautology’ ”’]. R 2 124 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book V. ban ©. विशेषणानथक्प्रसुकतेः ॥ २४ ॥ Aph. 34,—Because we should find the distinction unmeaning, [as Intel- lect does not differ from Nature at all except as does the sus- tained from the sustainer. ‘‘ He (the Panchas‘ikha) mentions another objection’’]. पल्नवादिष्वनुपपत्तेखच ॥ २५॥ Aph. 35.—And because it [perva- dedness] would not be reconcileable in buds, &c.,—[“for buds, &c., are invariably attended (at their origination) by trees, &c.; but this cannot be called simply an essential power in the bud, because, since the essen- tial power (—that which belongs to the bud of being a bud—) does not depart even in the case of an amputated bud, we should even then find it attended (by the tree which, however, no longer accompanies it). But the power (see Aph. 32, which consists in having the character) of the ‘ sustained,’ is des- troyed at the moment of amputation, so that there is no ‘ Per- vadedness’ then,”’—‘ But then what ?—the Panchasikha says that ^ Pervadedness’ is not a result of any essential power. Then, since smoke is not sustained by fire (—see Aph. 32— where he contends that ‘sustainedness’ is what really ex- presses pervasion—), it would turn out that it (viz., smoke) is not (as token and betokened) accompanied by fire. So, with reference to this, he says’’]. अआधघेयशक्तिसिद fsa: समानन्या- यात्‌॥ BE ॥ Reply, that this would prove Aph. 36.—Were it [thus] settled "ॐ that it is a power of the ‘ sustained,’ then by the like argument, its dependence on an essential power, as pretended by the heterodox doctors referred to in Aph. 31, might be proved also,—and thus the argument The reason why. A further reason. Sound and sense. : 125 proves nothing as it proves too much. “It was with a view to substantiating what was stated (in Aph. 27), viz., ‘The Qualities, and the rest, are established (as realities) by the employment of the five-membered (form of argumentative ex- position),’ that he has repelled, by an exposition of ^ Pervaded- ness,’ the objection to Inference as evidence (—or as a means of attaining right notions). Now, in order to establish the fact that words, of which the five-membered (exposition) con- sists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others to a word’s being a means of right knowledge, in the shape of (the objection of) its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words’’]. = वाच्यवाचकभावः सम्बन्धः WTA ॥ 89 I Aph. 37.—The connection between Sound and sense. ८ word and meaning is the relation of expresser and expressed. [‘‘ 70 the ‘meaning’ belongs the power termed expressibleness,—to the ‘ word’ the power termed expression ;—simply this is their ‘ connection,’—their inter- relation as it were. From one’s knowing this (connection between a given word and ‘meaning), the meaning is sug- gested (or raised in the mind) by the word.”’] चिभिः सम्बन्धसिद्धिः ॥ रेट ॥ Aph. 38.—The connection [between Sense of words how learnt. 1 ; र a word and its sense] is determined by three [means,—“ by means of these three, viz., information from one competent (to tell us the meaning), the usage of the old man (whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe what actions ensue in consequence,—see the Sdhitya Darpana, Aph. 11—), and application to the same thimg which has a familiar name,”—whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym]. : xc © न काय नियम उभयथा ट्‌ शनात्‌ ॥ Be ॥ तथभव ond कमः Aph. 39.—There is no restriction tions. [‘‘no necessity that this apprehension 126 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. of the meaning of a word, should be restricted] to what is to be done—[“should occur only in the case of something (directed) to be done,’’]—because we see it both ways, [i. e., “in (the secular life and dealings of) the world, we see the usage of the old man, &c., in regard to what is not to be done (—being something already extant—) also, as well as in regard to what is to be done”’]. लाके BTA TIANA: 1 ४०॥ Sctiniurali aad. य Aph. 40.—He who is accomplished sense of words the same. in the secular [connection of words with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda. न चिभिरपारूषेयत्वाहेदस्य तदर्थस्यातीद्धिय- त्वात्‌ ॥ 82 ॥ 4111. 41.—Not by the three [means mentioned in Aph. 38, objects some one, can the sense of the Veda be gathered], because the Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses, \ ९. न यज्ञाद्‌: खद पते धमलतवं वशि्यात्‌ 11 ४९॥ 411. 42.—Not so, [what is meant by the Veda is not something trans- A ००५४८, This cleared up. cending the senses],—because sacrificings, &c., are in them- selves merit, pre-eminently ; [‘‘ and sacrificings, &c., since they imply wishings, &c., (of which we are perfectly conscious,) are not something transcending intuition. But the nature of merit (which the objector alleges to transcend intuition) does not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacrificings, &c., whence what is enjoined in scripture need be beyond intui- tion.” And “he repels also what has been asserted, that, inasmuch as it (the Veda) is superhuman, there can be no information from any competent person” in regard to its import]. The Veda not eternal. 127 निजशक्तिव्यतयत्या व्यवच्छिद्यते ।। 8s ॥ Knowledge of the Veda Aph. 43.—The natural force [of the traditional: terms in the Veda] is ascertained through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively transmit the knowledge. ^ But still, how can there be appre- hension of the sense of scriptural terms in the case of Gods, fruits (of actions), &c., which transcend sense? ‘To this he replies’’}. न, [अ योग्धायोग्येषु प्रतोतिजनकलत्वात्‌ तत्सिद्धिः ।। ४४ ॥ Intelligibility of the Veda Aph. 44.—This really takes place, >. because they [viz., the words] give rise to knowledge both in the case of things adapted [to sense] and things not adapted. 9 ४४ न नित्यं वेदानां कायत्वशरुतेः 11 ४५ ॥ Eternity of the Veda Aph. 45.—The Veda is not from य eternity, for there is scripture for its being a production. a ५ 9 न पोरषेयत्वं तत्क तुः पुरुषस्याभावात्‌ |i ४६ ॥ Aph. 46.—They [the Vedas] aro not the work of [the Supreme] Man, because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being possibly] their maker. [^ Supply ‘because we deny that there isa Lord.’”? And “ adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he 88.8.77 | The Lord not the author. x सुक्तासुक्तयारयेग्यतवात्‌ ॥ 89 ॥ Who are not authors of | Aph. 47.—Since both the liberated ९ Weems is unsuited [to the work, by his indif- ference], and the unliberated [by his want of power, neither of these can be author of the Vedas. “Then in that case, since they are not the work of (the Supreme) Man, it follows that they are eternal. To this he replies’’]. 128 The Sankhya Aphorisms. Book V. A a नाधोरषेयत्वाज्नित्यत्वमद्कुरादिवत्‌ ॥ ४८ ॥ Aph. 48.—As in the case of sprouts, &c., their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man. [^ But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &९. are produc- tions, we must infer that they are the work of (the Supreme) Man. To this he replies.’’] vy तेषामपि तद्योगे दृष्टबाधादि प्रसक्तिः i ४८ ॥ Aph. 49.—Were this the case with these also, [viz., that vegetables are works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c., [for ‘it is seen in the world, as an invariable fact, that what- ever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend,”’—for we see no embodied Supreme Man, to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth could be referred. ‘“ But then, since they were uttered by the Primal Man, the Vedas moreover are really the work of (the Supreme) Man :—to this he replies’’]. यसिन्नदृ्टेऽपि छतबुदिरुपजायते तत्यैरषेयम्‌ I Yo II Only what is voluntary is Aph. 50.—That [only] 13 Man’s @ work. work, in respect of which, even be it something invisible, an effort of understanding takes place, [i. e., a consciousness that Thought preceded.” = ^^ Thus it has been remarked that a thing is not Man’s work merely though its having been uttered by Man:—for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man’s work (or voluntary act). But what need to speak of antecedence of Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed of themselves from the Self-existent, through the force of fate, unpreceded by thought. Therefore they are not (a Su- preme) Man’s work.” ‘But then, in that case, since they are not preceded by a correct: knowledge of the sense of the sen- tences, like the speech of a parrot the Vedas also can convey no right knowledge. To this he replies’’] An illustration. Plants denied to be works. The Vedas their own evidence. 129 निजश्तयभिव्यक्तेः खतः प्रामाण्यम्‌ ॥ ५९ ॥ The Vedas their own evi- Aph. 51.—They are self-evidently Grae: conveyers of right knowledge, from the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly. ‘The authoritativeness of the whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as its being based on the accurate knowledge of the enouncer, but quite spontaneously ;—because—as for 2 its ‘own,’ i. e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, —thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations (which produce the result promised), and in the medical scrip- ture (—the following of which leads to cures—), &c. And so there is the aphorism of the Nydya (B. II. 68),—* And the fact of its being a cause of right knowledge, like the invoca- tions and the medical scripture,’ &c.” ‘In regard to the proposition (laid down in Aph. 26, viz.,) ‘And the existence of the Qualities is not absolutely debarred,’ there was alleged, and expounded (under Aph. 27) syllogistically, one argument, —viz., by the establishing the existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another argument in respect of that’? same proposition]. नासतः ख्यानं SWFA | YR 1 Cognition is evidence of Aph. 52.—There is no Cognition of existence. the non-existent,—such as a man’s horn; [so that not only is the existence of pleasure, &c., proved by the reasoning (under Aph. 27), it is proved also by mere consciousness. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely nonentities, even the consciousness could not be accounted for ; —because there is no cognizing of a man’s horn, and the like,’ which have no existence at all. = ^^ But then, (interposes the Naiydyika,) if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be absolutely real; and then, in the expression ‘not absolutely debarred’ (—in Aph. 26—), the word ‘ absolutely’ is (super- fluous, and hence) unmeaning. To this he replies’’]. 8 180 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book. V. न सते TIS ॥ ५३॥ The Qualities, 4०, not ab- Aph. 53.—It is not of the real [that solutely reals there is here cognizance], because ex- clusion is seen [of the Qualities,—‘“ for we see that they are excluded (—and not admitted to exist—) at the time of des- truction (of the mundane system), &c.” = ^ But then, even on that showing (interposes the Vedantin, jumping at the admis- । sion—),—let the world be different both from ‘ real,’ and ‘unreal,’ in that case also the denial (in Aph. 26) of its being absolutely unreal is quite justifiable,”—and, moreover, in strict accordance with Vedantic doctrine. To this he replies]. नानि्वंचनोयस्य तदभावात्‌ ॥ ५४ ॥ 0 adwiiiea 76s Aph. 54.—It is not of what cannot Jected. be [intelligibly] expressed [that there is cognizance]—because there exists no such thing; [—“ and there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of such a thing as is not to be expressed as either ^ existing’ or ^ not existing ;’ “because there exists no such thing,’—i. e., because nothing is known other than what exists or what does not exist :— such is the meaning. The import is,—because it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen.” “But what then !—on that showing, do you really approve of (the Ny4ya notion of) ‘cognizing otherwise’ (—or our fancying that nature to belong to one—which belongs to an- other) ? He replies—Nay’’]. नान्यथाख्यातिः खवचेोव्याघातात्‌ ।। ५५ ॥ Aph. 55.—There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one which belongs to another] ,—because your proposition is self-destructive. [‘‘ The meaning is, that this also is not proper to be said, viz., that one thing appears under the character of another thing (—e. g., a rope under the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken in the dusk),—‘ bécause your proposition is self-destructive.’ Of A Nydya view rejected, Qualities not absolutely real. 131 another nature (e. g., snakehood), in a different thing (e. g., a rope), equivalence to a man’s horn is (what is virtually) ex- pressed by the word ‘ otherwise’ (—than the truth,—both a man’s horn and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake being alike otherwise than real) ;—and (yet) its cognition (thus) otherwise is asserted (—as if that could be, cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized—) ! Hence your proposition is self-destructive ;—for even those who contend for ^ cognizing otherwise’ (४8 one mode of cogni- tion) declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impos- sible.” Now, ‘ expounding what he had said above, (in Aph. 26), ^ not absolutely debarred,’ he sums up his doctrine.” ¢ सदसत्ख्यातिबाधावाधात्‌ ॥ ५९ ॥ 1 Aph. 56.—They [the ^ Qualities’ are Summing up. 2 ड cognized rightly and wrongly, through their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise. “There is non-denial as far as regards their existing at all,— because all things (—and things are made up of the ‘ Quali- ties’-—) are eternal; but there is denial relatively, in Soul, of all things,—just as is the case with the redness, &c., in webs, &c.,”” which may have no redness without its following that redness altogether and everywhere is nonexistent. ‘ This investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, having incidentally presented itself in this connection, is set forth at the end of it’’]. प्रतोल्यप्रतीतिभ्यां न स्फारात्मकः शब्दः 1 ५७ ॥ The Yoga theory of speech Aph. 57.—A word does not consist rejected. of [what the Yogas call] the “ex- presser” (spho{a), by reason both of cognizance [—which would disprove the existence of such imaginary thing—], and non-cognizance [—which would in like manner disprove it. “Tt is held by the Yogas that there exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible unit, the word,—such as ‘jar, &c.,—(which they call) the ‘expression ;’ just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else s 2 132 The Sdikkya Aphorisms. Book V. than the parts, the body, neck, &c.;—and that particular sound, termed a word, is called the ‘ expresser,’ because of its making apparent the meaning :—such a word (—we Sdnkhyas assert in opposition to the Yogas—) is without evidence (of its existence). - Why ?—‘ by reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance’ (—as thus) ;—Pray is that word (which you choose to call the ^ expression’—) cognized or not? On the former alternative, what need of that idle thing (—the sup- posed, ‘ expression ??—For)—by what collection of letters, distinguished by a particular succession, this (‘ expression’) is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. But on the latter alternative (viz., that it is not cognized), the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an ‘expression, which is not cognized. Therefore the hypo- thesis of an ‘expresser’ is useless.” ‘The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted before (—under Aph: 45—) :—now he contradicts also the eternity of letters.’’] न शब्दनित्यत्वं कार्यताप्रतोतेः ॥ ५८ ॥ The eternity of letters Aph. 58.—Sound is not eternal, be- denied. cause we perceive it to be made :—[so —‘it is not proper to say (as the Mimdnsakas say) that letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e. g., that ‘This is that same © ;’ for they are proved to be non-eternal, by the cognition, e. g., that ‘(the sound of) © has been pro- duced :’—such.is the meaning. And the recognition has refer- ence to the homogeneousness with that (one which had been previously heard) :—for, otherwise, it would turn out that a jar, and the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is recognised’’]. He ponders a doubt. परवेसिडसत््वस्याभिव्यक्तिदोपिनेव घटस्य ॥ ५९ ॥ Aph. 59.—[But then, some one may say,] there is [in the case of sounds] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled,—as [the manifestation] of a [pre-existent] jar by a A doubt. Sound not eternal. 133 lamp ; [and so “of Sound, whose existence was previously a fact, the manifestation—through noise, &c.,—that alone is the object in the cognition of its production (—which you speak of in कासि repels this’’]. सत्कायसिद्वान्तश्चत्‌ सिडइसाधनम्‌ ॥ ६०॥ Aph. 60.—If the dogma of pro- ducts being real [is accepted by you], then this is a proving of the already proved, [—for ^“ say that ‘ manifestation’ means the taking of a present condi- tion by means of rejecting an un-arrived (or future) condition, then this is our dogma of the reality of products (—B. L., 113) ; and such an eternity belongs to all products (—not specially to Sownd—), so that you are proving the already proved (or conceded) ; such is the meaning. And if, ‘ mani- festation’ is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then we should find (—on your theory—) that jars, &c., also are eternal ; because it would be proper (on that theory—) that the object in the perception of production, by the operation of the causes (—the potter, &c.—), should be that of knowledge only,” and just as the jar is shown by the lamp, not made by it, so the jar must be only shown by the potter. New “an objection, not previously mentioned, is to be adduced; therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced”’—having been already handled १ 3. I., 149]. x वति नादेतमात्मने लिङ्गात्‌ तद्वद प्रतीतेः । ६९ ॥ Non-duality of Soul de- Aph. 61.—Non-duality of Soul is nied on grounds of Inference. not,—for its distinctions are cognised through signs, [—‘ by the sign that one quits Nature (or escapes from the mundane condition), while another does not quit it, &c.” “ But in regard to the non-distinction, between Soul and not-Soul, asserted in the texts ‘ All this is Soul only,’ ‘All this is Brahm only,’ he tells us how there is even sense- evidence destructive of this” allegation that there is no duality at all]. The doubt disposed of. if you 134 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. नानात्मनापि प्रल्यक्तनाधात्‌ ॥ ६२ ॥ Non-duality denied on Aph. 62.—Moreover, there is not 0 [non-difference of Soul] from not-Soul, because this is disproved by sense-evidence, [—‘‘ because, if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also not be different from ajar and a web,—since the jar, €. g., would not be other than the web which (by hypothesis) is not other than the Soul :—and this is excluded by sense-evidence, which constrains us to apprehend a distinction” between a jar and a web]. x ay नेभाभ्यां तेनेव 11 ६३॥ 411. 63.—Not between both [— Soul and not-Soul,—is there non- difference],—for that same [couple of reasons given in Aphs. 61 and 62. ^ But then, in that case, what is the drift of such texts as, ‘ All this is Soul alone?’ To this he replies”]. अन्यपरत्वमविवेकानां तच ॥ ९४ ॥ , : Aph. 64.—There it is for the sake Scripture accommodates it- self to human frailty of un» of something else, in respect of the derstanding. The reasons combined. undiscriminating, [—“ i. e., the obser- vation is (designed to be) provocative of meditation. For in the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the experienced and the experiencer, are re- garded as indifferent,” —and Scripture humours the worldling’s delusion, with a view to eventually getting him out of it. “ He declares that, according to the asserters of (there being nothing existent but) a Single Soul, there could be no material cause of the world’’]. N\ ° ° नात्माविद्या नेभयं जगदुपाद्‌ानकारणं निःसङ्ग त्वात्‌ ।। ६४५ ॥ = Aph. 65.—Neither Soul, nor Ignor- The Vedanta system sup- : plies no material for the ance, nor both, can be the material a cause of the world,—because of the solitariness [of Soul. For “the soul alone, or Ignorance Nonduality denied. 135 lodged in the soul, or both together—like a pair of jar-halves (conjoined in the formation of a jar)—, cannot be the material of the world,—‘ because of the solitariness of the soul. For things undergo alteration only through that particular con- janction which is called ^ association ;—hence the (ever) soli- tary soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot serve as a material cause:—nor can it do so by means of (association with) Ignorance either, because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitari- ness. Moreover, that the two together should be the material is impossible, even as it is that either severally should be the material, just ^ because of the solitariness ;’—such is the mean- ing. And if you choose that Ignorance shall subsist as a sub- stance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment of the non-duality” which you Veddntins contend for. ‘He himself (at B. I., 145) decided that the soul consists of light (or knowledge). In regard to this he repels the primi facie view,—founded on the text ‘ Brahm is reality, knowledge, and joy,’—that the essence of the soul is joy also’’]. A ANC नेकस्यानन्द चिद्र पत्वे दयोभदात्‌ ॥ ९६ ॥ Soul not joy and know- Aph. 66.—The two natures, joy and ledge both, knowledge, do not belong to one,— because the two are different, [—“‘a single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence,—because, since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are different.” ‘ But then, in that case, what becomes of the text, that it (Soul) consists of joy ? To this he replies” ]. निवृत्ते दुःखनिव्त्तगाणः ॥ ६७ ॥ A Vedénta term explained Aph. 67.—Metaphorical [is the word away, joy, in the sense] of the cessation of pain, [—for “the word ‘joy,’ im the scriptural expression which means really the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. This is stated in the maxim ‘ Pleasure is the departure of both 136 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. pain and pleasure.’””? And “he states the cause of this meta- phorical employment”’]. विमुक्ति प्रशंसा मन्दानाम्‌ ॥ ६८ ॥ Why the term was used. in Aph. 68.—It is [as] a laudation of he ta ad emancipation, for the sake of the dull, [that the scripture lauds, as if it were joy, the emancipation, consisting in the cessation of pain, which (cessation) is the essence of the soul ;”—for the soul is such joy as consists in the absence of pain. Next, “in order to justify perfectly the demonstration already given (—in B. III., 14, 15, &c.—) of the internal organ, he repels the primd facie view that the Mind is all-pervading”’] न ae मनसः करणएत्वादि न्दियत्वाद्या 1 ९८ II The Mind not all-pervad- Aph 69.—The Mind [-“ meaning ing. the totality of the internal instru- ments,”—] is not all-pervading,—for it is an instrument, [‘‘as a saw, or the like, is,”] and because it is moreover an organ. UMAATHAAA ॥ ७०॥ ४ 411. 70.—[The Mind is not all- Proof of this. A (1: ५ pervading], for it is moveable,—since there is scripture regarding the motion ; [—“ that is to say,— since, inasmuch as there is scripture regarding the going of the Soul (—which, being all-pervading, cannot go—) into another world, it is settled that itis its adjunct, the internal organ, that is moveable, and so it cannot be all-pervading. ‘In order to prove that it is a product, he repels also the opinion that the Mind is without parts”). न निभागत्वं तद्योगाह्वरवत्‌ ॥ ७१ ॥ Aph. 71.—Like a jar, it [the Mind] is not without parts, because it comes in contact therewith [i. e., with several Senses simultaneously. “The word ‘therewith’ refers to ‘ organ,’ which occurs in a preceding aphorism (69). The Mind is not without parts, The Mind has parts. The mind not all-pervading. 137 because it comes in contact simultaneously with several sense- organs ; but, like a jar, it is of medium size (—neither infinite nor atomic—), and consists of parts.” ‘ And it is to be understood that the internal organ when in the state of a cause (and not modified and expanded, e. g., into knowledge, which is its product—) is indeed atomic.’’] म, ९ प्रकतिपुरुषयोरन्यत्‌ सवेमनित्यम्‌ ॥ ७९॥: 0 ~ E . N Sean til said Aph. 72. Everything except Na- ture and Soul is uneternal. न भागलामे भोगिने निभागत्वश्ुतेः 11 8 11 Soul and Nature not made Aph. 73.—No parts [from the pre- up of parts. sence of which in the discerptible one might infer destructibility] are found in the Experiencer,—for there is scripture for its being without parts, [for there are such texts as ‘without parts, motionless, quiescent, unobjec- tionable, passionless.’” ‘ It has been stated that Emancipa- tion is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, he repels the opinions of others in regard to Emancipation” ]. क्तमति ¢ ay ¢ नानन्दाभिव्यक्तिम्‌क्तिनिधेमत्वात्‌ | ७४ ॥ A view of Emancipation Aph. 74.—Emancipation is not a disputed. development of joy, because there are no properties [in Soul “in the shape of joy”]. ox) AS, न विशेषगुणाच्छित्तिस्तदत्‌ ॥ ७५ ॥ Lae EN Aph. 75.—Nor, in like manner, is 4 it the excision of special qualities [९८ because there are no properties” in Soul]. न विशेषगतिर्निष्छियस्य ॥ ७६॥ Aph. 76.—Nor [is Emancipation] any particular going of that [Soul “to the world of Brahma,”] which is motionless [and there- A third view disputed. fore does not go]. 138 The Sdnkhyu Aphorisms. Book V. TAIT: शणिकत्वादि दोषा 11 ७७॥ Aph. 77.—Nor is it [Emancipation] the removal of the influence of [in- tellectual] forms,—because there is the objection that this would be momentary, &c. [For, “the opinion of the Nihilist, that the Soul consists of momentary knowledge, that Bondage is the modifying thereof by objects, and that emancipation is the destruction of the influence thereof called Memory,—is inadmissible, because through the fault of momentariness, &c., such emancipation (as merely momentary like all else,) is not the Soul’s aim.’’] ' न सवीच्छित्तिरपुरुषाथत्वादि दोषात्‌ 11 ७८ ॥ 1111. 78.—Nor is it [Emancipation] destruction of all, for this has among other things the fault of not being the Soul’s aim :—[“ the entire destruction also of the Soul, which consists of know- ledge, is not emancipation,—because, among other reasons, we do not see in the world that the annihilation of the soul is the soul’s aim”’]. A fourth view disputed. A fifth view disputed. एवं शएन्यमपि ॥ ७९ ॥ Aph. 79.—So too the Void [—“ the annihilation of the whole universe consisting of cognition and the cognizible, is thus also not emancipation, because Soul’s aim is not effected by Soul’s annihilation’’]. A sixth view disputed, संयोगाश्च वियोगान्ता इति न देश्णदिलाभेाऽपि ॥ ८० ॥ Aph. 80.—And conjunctions termi- nate in separations, therefore it is not the acquisition of lands, &., [that is Emancipation ; for, “ from its perishability, possessorship is not emancipation’’]. A seventh view disputed. Wrong views of Emancipation. 139 न भागियोगे भागस्य 11 ८१॥ वान Aph. 81.—Nor is it [Emancipa- tion] conjunction of the Part with the Whole ;— [Emancipation is not absorption of ‘the part,’ i. e., the Soul, into ‘the Whole,’ i. e., that of which it is (on the view in question) a part, viz., the Supreme Soul,—for the reason assigned (in Aph. 80) viz.,—‘ conjunctions terminate is separation,’ and because we do not admit a Lord, (B. I. 92), and because thus self-dissolution is not Soul’s aim’’] नाणिमादि योगोऽप्यवश्य्भावित्वात्‌ तदुच्छित्तेरितर- योगवत्‌ ॥ ८९॥ Aph. 82.—Nor is it [Emancipation] moreover conjunction with the power of becoming as small as an atom, &c., since, like other con- A ninth view disputed. junctions, the cessation of this must necessarily take place. ban नेन््रादिपद योगोऽपि तदत्‌ ॥ ८३॥ =, Aph. 83.—Nor, just as in that case A tenth view disputed. {of other superhuman powers, such as assuming atomic bulk,] is it [Hmancipation] moreover con- junction with the rank of Indra, &c., [^ by reason of perish- ” of this as well as the others. He next “repels ableness, the objection of an opponent to what has been stated (under B. I., 61), that the Organs are products of Self-conscious- 1168877] . न भ्रतप्रछतित्वमिद्धियाणामादद्कारिकल्वश्रुतेः 1 ८४ ॥ 411. 84.—The Organs are not form- ed of the Elements [as the Naiyéyikas assert], because there is scripture for their being derived from The organs whence. self-consciousness. = [^^ Holding to the opinion that Power, &c., also are principles, he repels the determination of categories [insisted upon by] his [various sects of] opponents, and the notion that Emancipation comes through a mere knowledge of these” categories. ] ¶ 2 140 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. पदार्थनियमस्तदं bay न षरपद्‌ाथनियमस्तद्दाधान्मुक्तिः ॥ ८५॥ | The categories of the Vai- Aph. 85.—The rule of six categories seshika objected to. is not [the correct one], nor does Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith, [as the Vais‘eshikas maintain]. षोडशगदिव्वप्येवम्‌ ॥ TE II Aph. 86.—So too is it in the case And those of the Nydya, &c. ड 7 ए of the Sixteen, [categories of the Nydya], &c. रै नाणुनिल्यता तत्कायत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ८७ ॥ The eternity of Atoms ५४ Aph. 87.—[The five Elements being soriplurul, products, as declared in ए. I., Aph. 61,] Atoms are not eternal [as alleged in the Nydya], for there is scripture for their being products ; [and “ although that text of scripture is not now seen by us, because it has disappeared in the lapse of time, &c., yet it is to be inferred from the words of the doctors, and from the statement of Manw’” in Ch. I. v.27. “ But then, how can an Atom, which is without parts, be a product ?—To this he replies”’] ५ न निभागत्वं कायत्वात्‌ ॥ टट ॥ The scripture decisive of Aph. 88.—Since it is a product, it the question. is not without parts,—[“ that is to say,—since the fact, established by scripture, of their being products, cannot be otherwise accounted for, the (so-called) Atoms of Earth, &c , are not without parts.” = ^^ He repels the objection of the Nihilist, that direct cognizance of Nature or Soul is impossible because (forsooth) the cause of a thing’s being directly cognizible is colour’’]. न र्पनिबन्धनात्‌ प्रत्यक्षनियमः ॥ ८< ॥ 471. 89.—There is 70 necessity A cavil disposed of. क व अ. that direct cognition should have colour as its cause :—[“ it is no rule that to be directly cogni- Dimension and genus. 141 zable should result from colour only (—or other object of sense—) as the cause,—because direct cognition may result from Merit, &c., also,’—e. g., mystical practices, and so forth. “Well, if that be the case, pray, is the dimension of an Atom (on the consideration of which the Naiydyikas rear certain speculations) a reality or not? With reference to this he decides the question of dimension” as follows]. न परिमाणचातुर्विष्यं दाभ्यां तद्योगात्‌ ॥ ९०॥ 1 Aph. 90,—There are not four varieties of dimension, because those can be accounted for by two :—[“ there are not four kinds of dimen- sion, viz., small, great, long, and short,—but there are only two sorts,—‘ because those can be accounted for by two,’— that is to say, the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two, the atomic (or positively small) and the great ;— such is the meaning. For the short and the long are merely subordinate kinds of the dimension called great,—else we should have, e. g., no end of dimensions—in the shape of the crooked, &c.” ^ He rebuts the Nihilist’s denial of genera,” as follows]. नित्यत्वे N 2 अनित्यत्वेऽपि स्थिरतायेगात्‌ प्रल्यदि ज्ञानं सामा- न्यस्य I! <१॥ Genus proved by recogni- Aph. 91,—Though these [indivi- tion. duals]“be un-eternal, recognition, as being associated with constancy, is of the genus. न तद्पलापस्तसमात्‌ ॥ ९२॥ Aph. 92.—Therefore it [genus] is not to be denied.—[“ But then, (it may be said,) recognition is to be accounted for simply by And not to be denied, a nonewistence, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing (recognized) ,—and let this be what is meant by the word ^ genus’ :—to this he replies”’]. 142 The Sdul:kya Aphorisms. Book V. ? नान्यनिृत्तिरूपतवं भावप्रनीतेः ॥ ९३ II soit ५ Aph. 93.—It [genus] does not con- Genus positive, not negative. tenes = i sist in the exclusion of something else, because it is cognized as an entity ;—[‘ because ‘ This is that same’ is the cognition of something positive ;—for otherwise the only thing cognized would be ^ This 13 not a non-jar.’” “But still, recognition may be caused by likeness :—To this he replies.” न तच्वान्तरं VS VATA: 11 ८४ ॥ व quot) at न 4111. 94.—Likeness is not a sepa- principle: rate principle, for it is directly appre- hended [as one manifestation of ‘Community.’ ^ Likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.,”’—the likeness of a fair face to the moon, e. g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasureable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either. ‘ The conjecture—let likeness be just a pecu- liar power, and not (a modified aspect of) Community,—he repels.’’] निजशत्तयभिव्यक्तिवी वैशिश्ात्‌ तदुपलमेः 11 ९५ ॥ Aph. 95.—Nor is it [likeness] a manifestation of something’s own power, because the apprehension of it is different [‘ from the apprehension of a power :—for the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing ;—the cogni- tion of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cogni- tion of a correlative, as is the case with the cognition of a non- existence,—so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous.” “But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be merely that they have (all alike) the name, €. g., of jar :—to this he replies.”’] Nor a peculiar power. Likeness discussed. 143 न स॒जज्ञासञन्ञसम्बन्धेऽपि ॥ ८६ ॥ Wor ४ 2 Aph. 96.—Nor moreover is it [like- mamas and tengs, ness] the connection between name and named, [because he who does not even know the con- nection between a name and the thing named, may yet cognize a likeness” e. g., between two jars. | न सम्बन्धनित्यतेाभयानित्यलात्‌ ॥ ८७ ॥ Aph. 97,—That connection = [0९- tween name and named] is not eter- nal, since both [the correlatives] are uneternal, [—‘‘ how then should there be, through that, the likeness of a departed thing How it cannot be so. in a thing present?” ‘ But then,—though the correlatives be uneternal, let the relation be eternal,—what is to hinder this ?—to this he replies.’’] नातः सम्बन्धा धमिग्रादकमानवाधात्‌ ॥ «८ ॥ Another suggestion repell- Aph. 98.—The connection is not so ed. [—not eternal—], for this reason, viz., because this is excluded by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing; [i. e., the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term. For ^ Connection exists only where disjunction is incidentally possible,—because otherwise there is no room for the supposition of connection, the case being accounted for, just by the natural state of the matter. And this incidental disjunction is impossible if connection be eter- nal ;—therefore connection is not eternal.’ = ^^ But on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal (connec- tion called) Co-inherence between those two eternals a Quality and thing qualified,””—which Co-inherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nydya. To this he replies.) न समवायेऽस्ि प्रमाणाभावात्‌ ॥ ८८ ॥ The Category of Intimate Aph. 99.—There is so such thing as Relation rejected. Co-inherence, [such as the Naiyayikas 144 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. ` insist upon,] for there is no evidence of it. [‘ But then, (it may be said,) the evidence of it is the perception that some- thing is qualified (or conjoined with a quality which inheres in it), and the unaccountableness otherwise of the cognition of something as qualified. To this he replies.”’] उभयचाप्यन्यथासिदधेनं प्रलसमनुमानं वा ॥ १०० ॥ Aph. 100.—Neither perception nor inference [is evidence for the existence of Co-inherence], since, as regards both alike, [*i. e., the perception of qualifiedness and the inferring of it,’””] the case is otherwise disposed of, [“ viz., just by the natural state (of the thing and its qualities), so neither of the two (—percep- tion and inference—) is evidence for (the imaginary category called) Co-inherence.” ‘It is a tenet that from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and Soul takes place, and thence results creation. In regard to that there is this objection of the atheists, that, ‘ Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation; everything is momentary ; where it arises—even there it perishes ;—therefore there is no motion This argued. inferrible from conjunction (of anything) with another place,— (the fruit, for instance, which appears to reach the ground, not being that fruit—no longer existent—which appeared to drop from the tree).’?- To this he replies.”’] नान्‌मेयत्वमेव क्रियाया नेदिष्टस्य तत्तदतेारेवा- परासप्रतोतेः ॥ ९०१ ॥ Motion is matter of per- Aph. 101.—Motion is not a matter ception. of inference, for he who stands near has direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to. [८ In Book Second the different opinions merely were men- tioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth, —hbut no particular one was settled. In regard to this ques- tion he denies the view of an opponent.” | Subtile and Gross body. 145 (र १4 रौरं क न पाच्चभतिकं NOC बह्नासुपादानायोगात्‌ ॥ ९४९ ॥ ; Aph. 102.—The Body does not The Body is of earth only. त consist of five elements, because many [heterogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material, [—and the Sdnkhya opinion is that, whilst there is but one material, the material of every Body is earth]. न स्थूलमिति नियम आतिवादिकस्यापि विद्य- मानल्ात्‌ ॥ १०२ ॥ There is a Sublile as well Aph. 103.—It [the Body] is not ata Gross Body. necessarily the Gross one, for there is also the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one. [^ Senses, (—the organ of vision, for example,—) distinct from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In order to demonstrate this point, he refutes the opinion that the senses reveal what they do not reach to.”’] नाप्रपतप्रकाशकत्वमिन्दियाणामप्रपेः PAMRAT ॥ १०४॥ धक Aph. 104.—The senses do not reveal and ०९८८८. what they do not reach to,—because of their not reaching, or because [else] they might reach everything ; [—“ for we do not see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach to ;—and because, if they wero to reveal what they do not reach to, we should find them revealing all things,—those walled off, and the like. There- fore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of connection with the distant sun, &c. :—such is the import. And the instruments reveal the objects just by delivering the object to the soul,—for they are themselves unintelligent,—as a mirror reveals the face ;—or, in other words, their revealing an object is just their taking up an image of the object.” ^ He repels the conjecture—but then, in that case, the opinion (of the Naiydyika) that the sight is luminous is quite right,— for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance in the form of rays.’’] 146 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. न तेजाऽपसर्पणात्‌ तेजसं FATS TT! ॥ १०५ ॥ The Sight not formed of Aph. 105.—Not because Light glides Light. [—and the Sight does so too—] is the Sight luminous [or formed of Light] because the thing is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications [to be now explained. ‘The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous on the ground that light is seen to glide ;—Why ?—hecause, just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modi- fication :—such is the meaning. For, as the vital air, without having parted from the body, glides out, ever so far, from the end of the nose, under the modification called breathing, (and thus smells a distant flower,)—just so the Sight, though a non-luminous substance, without quitting (connection with) the body, instantly darts o:f (—like the protruded feeler of a polyp—) toa distant object, such as the sun, by means of the species of change called modification.” ‘ But what is the proof that there is any such modification ? To this he replies’’]. प्ाप्ताथेप्रकाशलिङ्गादत्तिसिद्धः ॥ १०६ ॥ म Aph. 106.—By the sign of the dis- sig ध. ae play of the attained object, the [exist- scat ce dati ence of the] modification [which could alone account for that display] is proved. [^ पठ shows us the nature of the modification, to account for the going—though without parting from the Body.”] भागगुणएणभ्यां तच्चान्तरं इत्तिः सम्बन्धाथं सै तोति ॥ १०७ ॥ Aph. 107.—The ‘ modification’ is another principle than a fragment or a quality [of the Sight or other sense], because it is for the sake of connection that it glides forth:—[‘ the modification is not a fragment of the Sight, or other sense,—a part dis- joined like a spark,—nor a quality, e. g., Colour,—for this Of the theory further. Connection between sense and object. 147 reason, viz., ‘because it is for the sake of connection that it glides forth ;’—but, whilst being a portion thereof, the modifi- cation is something else than a fragment or a quality. For if there were disruption,—connection of the sun, &c., with the Sight, would not take place,—and if it were a quality, the motion called ‘gliding forth,’ would be unaccountable ;’— for a quality cannot move by itself. ^^ But if thus the ‘modi- fications’ are substances, how is the term ‘ modification’ applied to the qualities of intellect, in the shape of Desire, &८. ? To this he replies’”’]. न द्रव्यनियमसतद्यागात्‌ ॥ १०८ ॥ व 90.29 Aph. 108.—It [the term ‘ modifica- qualities as well as substances. tion?) ig not confined to substances, because it is etymological [—not technical,—and applies ety- mologically toa quality as well. ‘Since it is also stated in scripture that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur whether the texts are perhaps to be applied distributively according to the difference of particular worlds. In regard to this he says’’]. A देशमेदेऽप्यन्धपादानतास्रद्‌ादि वन्नियमः I Yor ॥ The materials of the or- Aph. 109.—Not though there be a gans everywhere the same. difference of locality, is there a differ- ence in the material [of which the organs are formed] ; the rule is as with the like of us: [—“‘not through difference of place, as the world of Brahmé and the like, is it also the fact that the organs have any other material than self-conscious- ness ; but the rule is, that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness, as is the case, e. g., with us who live in this terrestrial world ; for we hear (in scripture) of only one Subtile Body (made up of the organs) transmigrating through the different localities.” ‘ But then, at that rate, how is the text relating to the materiality (of the organs) to be accounted for? To this he replies’’]. u 2 148 The Sankhya Aphorisms. Book V. ~ निमित्तव्यपद्‌ णात्‌ तड्ापदेशः ॥ ११०॥ 1 Aph. 110.—The mention thereof ed for. [-of materiality as if belonging to the organs,—] is because there is [intended to be made there- by a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause: (“that is to say,—there is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is but concomitant,—with a view to indicating its importance ; just as fire is (spoken of as arising) from fuel, (—which fuel is a necessary concomitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire—) ; hence are they (the organs) spoken of as being formed of the Elements. For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Ele- ment, are the Organs, the Sight, &c.,—formed from the accom- panying Self-consciousness,—capable of existing ;—just as fire, in reliance on an earthly support, results from the attendant Light” or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone]. ऊवाजाण्डजजरायुजेद्धि्नसाङ्कल्पकसां सिद्धिकं चेति न नियमः ॥ ११९ ॥ Aph. 111.—The heat-born, egg- born, womb-born, vegetable, thought- born, and spell-born,—such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body,—though a rough and customary one. “It was stated before, that Body has only one Element as its mate- rial. In this same connection he observes discriminatively as follows”’]. aq एथिवयुपाद्ानमसाधारण्यात्‌ ARIAT: पवेवत्‌ ॥ ARE I Aph. 112.—In all [Bodies] Earth is the material :—in consideration [how- Varieties of Gross Bodies. The material of Bodies. ever] of some speciality, there is the naming as this or that [other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body,] asin the preceding case [treated under Aph, 110, “ of the materiality of the Organs’’]. The Gross Body. 149 न TUR प्राणत्वमिन्दियशक्तितस्तदिपद्ेः 11 AVS I Tha aibal air wah the eae Aph. 113.—The vital air is not, [on fersal ofthe -Bouy: the allegation that it is “ the principal thing in the Body,” to be considered] the constitutor of the Body, because it [the vital air, or spirit,] subsists through the power of the organs, [and “does not subsist in the absence of the organs :—therefore, since, in a dead Body, in consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is not the constituent of the Body.” “But then, at that rate, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even with- out the vital air :—to this he replies”. = ९ भोक्तुरधिष्ठानाहगायतननिमाणमन्यथा पतिभाव- प्रसङ्गात्‌ ॥ ११४॥ Soul essential to a living Aph. 114.—The site of experience Body. [viz., the Body] is constructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul], other- wise should we find putrefaction, [—‘‘ and thus, by the several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a concomitant cause of the Body, through the sustaining of it.” ^ But then, (it may be said) it is only the vital air itself that can be the superintender, because it is this which operates,— not the Soul, since ध is motionless, and since there is no use in the superintendency of what does not operate. To this he replies’’]. खेत्यदारा खाम्यधिष्ठितिर्गकान्तात्‌ ॥ ११५ ॥ The soul“ acting by other's Aph. 115.—Through a servant, not actions.” directly, is superintendence [exer- cised] by the master, [—and “in the constituting of the Body, ‘superintendence,’ in the shape of energizing, is not ‘directly,’ i. e., immediately, (exercised) ‘ by the master,’ i. e., by Soul,—but through its servant, in the shape of the vital airs ;—just as in the case of a king’s building a city.” “It 150 The Sdukhya Aphorisms. Book V. was stated befere (B. II. Aph. 1,) that Nature’s (exertion) is for the emancipation of the already free. In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this,—viz., ‘How can the soul be eternally free when we see it bound ?’—with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says’’]. समाधिसषृततिमेाक्ेषु TRSIAT ॥ ११९॥ Aph. 116.—In Concentration, pro- found sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul] consists of Brahm : [—but “ then what is the difference of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies’”’]. न इयोः समोजमन्यच तद्कतिः ॥ ११७॥ व्ण कदे taparfect Aph. 117.—In the case of the two, वक [९८ viz., concentration and profound sleep”’] it [“ the identity with Brahm”] is with a seed, [‘‘i. e., associated with some cause of Bondage” or re-appearance in the mundane state] : in the case of the other [“i. e., in eman- cipation,”] this [cause] is absent, [—“ this is the distinction.” ^ But then,—Concentration and profound sleep are evident,— but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This objection of the atheist he repels’’]. ~ A Salta चयस्यापि दृष्टत्वान्न तु दा ॥ AWE II The reality of Emancipa- Aph. 118.—But there are not the tion. two [only, viz., Concentration and profound sleep,] because the triad also [emancipation inclu- sive] is evident, just as are the two. [‘‘ The meaning is, that since Emancipation also is ^ evident,’ i. e., is inferrible, through the example of Concentration and profound sleep, there are not two, viz., profound sleep and Concentration only,—but Emancipation also really is. And the argument is thus :— the quitting’ of that identity with Brahm which (identity) exists during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through the force of the faults, Desire, &c., lodged in the mind; and Soul ever free. Perfect and imperfect emancipation. 131 if this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c.,— and it is just this that is Emancipation.” = ^ But then (—sug- gests some one, with reference to Aph. 117—), granting that, even notwithstanding the existence of the ‘seed’ (or source of return to the mundane state) called Memory, a mental modification after the form of any object does not arise during concentration, inasmuch as Memory is (then) dulled (or dead- ened) by apathy, yet in profound sleep since Memory prevails there will really be cognition of objects,—consequently it is not proper to say that there is identity with Brahm during profound sleep. To this he replies.’’] वासनयानथंख्यापनं दोषयोगेऽपि न निमित्तस्य प्रधानवाधकत्वम्‌ | ११८ ॥ Memory inactive during Aph. 119.—There is not the revela- profound sleep. tion, by memory, of an object likewise during the conjunction of a [more potent] fault [—such as sleep—] ; the secondary cause does not debar the principal : {—-Thus, “as in the case of apathy, so also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep, Memory does not reveal its own objects,—does not remind us of its objects. For the ‘secondary,’ the subordinate, Memory, cannot defeat the more potent fault of Sleep :—such is the meaning. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless,—incompetent to produce its effects :’—and so there is nothing in this to prevent identification of soul with Brahm during profound sleep any more than during apathetic Concentration. ‘It was stated in the Third Book (Aph. 83), that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while yet living, is in conse- quence of a mere vestige of impression. To this it is objected as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the (alleged person) emancipated during life, just as in the case of the like of us,—(and this experience continuous) even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object :—now this 152 The Séukkya Aphorisms. Book V. is unaccountable (on the hypothesis of his really being eman- cipated), because the antecedent impression is annihilated exactly on its having produced the first (instant of) experience, and because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as knowledge debars it,—just as is the case with Merit. To this he replies.”’] एकः संस्कारः करियानिवतकेा न तु प्रतिक्रियं संस्कार- AIT बह्कंल्यनाप्रसक्तेः | १२० ॥ & tes Aph. 120.—A single impression An objection met—to the possibility of emancipation in [suffices to generate and] lasts out the किः experience ;—but there are not differ- ent impressions—one to each [instant of] experience,—else we should have a postulation of many [—where a single one may suffice. ‘In like manner in the case of the whirling of the potter’s wheel, the self-continuant principle, called motal inertia, is to be regarded as only one,—continuing till the completion of the whirling”’] न aaafefaaal इसगल्मलतोषधिवनसखतिणएवो रुधादीनामपि भोक्तभागायतनलं पूववत्‌ ॥ १९९ ॥ The Vegetable organism Aph. 121.—Knowledge of the exter- really a Body. nal is not indispensable [to constitute a Body] ; trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [‘ which have internal con- sciousness’”’] are also sites of experiencer and experience,— just as in the former case, [the former case—meaning the putrescence already mentioned of the Bodies of men, &c., which takes place in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer (the living soul).—Just in the same way does withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &८. And to this effect there is scripture”’] HAA ll We I Law as well as scripture Aph 122.—And from the legal in- १0१ stitutes [may the same fact be infer- red that, vegetables haye bodies and are conscious. “ But Different kinds of bodies. 153 then, from the fact of trees, &c., also being thus conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. To this he replies’’]. न देदमाचतः कर्मीधिकारितं रगिच्य AA: 11 Ves 1 Vegetables sot moral Aph. 123.—Not merely through a agente: Body is there susceptibility of Merit and Demerit,—for the scripture tells us the distinction,— [^ because we are told in scripture that the liability results from the being distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like” [animal Body, not vegetable]. And “ showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds’’]. चिधा चयाणां व्यवसा क्मदे SATS देभय- SEE ॥ १२४ ॥ Body of three principal Aph. 124.—Among the three [—i. hinds. e., among those highest, lowest, and intermediate,—all living beings,—] there is a threefold distri- bution,—the Body of merit, the Body “of experience, and the Body of both. [* Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the pre-eminent sages, a Body of experience to Indra and others, and a Body of both to the royal sages. Here the division is (not exhaustive, but) into three, because of the pre-eminence of these,—for otherwise we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience’—like Indra. ‘He mentions also a fourth Body.”] न किंच्िद्प्यनुशयिनः 11 १२५ ॥ । Aph. 125.—Not any one of these 4 moreover is that of the apathetic, [for “the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three; such as was that of Dattatreya, Jadabharata, and others’’]. 154 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book V. न बुद्ादिनिल्यत्वमा्रयविशेषऽपि वज्िवत्‌ ।। १९६ ॥ Argument against the exis- Aph 126 —Eternity does not [as tence of @ Lord. alleged by those who wish to estab- lish the existence of a Lord] belong to knowledge, &c., even in the case of the particular site [—viz., that of the supposed Lord—], just as is the case with fire, [—‘ that is to say,— just as we infer, from the example of ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire also is not eternal’’]. a आश्रयासिद्धश्च ॥ १९७ ॥ The argument really ex Aph. 127.--.^ त because the site abundantid. [—viz., the supposed Lord—] is un- real, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether know- ledge, &c., may be eternal or not. ^ But then, at that rate, how can it be even conceivable that there should arise Omni- science, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe,—since we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers (—though we do see some—) arising from penance and the rest (of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers) ? To this he replies’”’]. vA . योगसिडयेःऽप्याषधादि सिद्िवन्नापलपनोयाः ॥ १९८ ॥ The height to which asce- Aph. 128.—-The marvellous effects ticism may elevate, of concentration, just like the effects of drugs, &., are not to be gainsaid; [“ that is to say,—by the example of the wonderful virtues of drugs, &c., the super- human powers also of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are established.” And “he refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements,—since this is hostile to the establishment of the existence of Soul’’]. न भरूतचेतन्यं प्रल्ेकाटः सांदल्येऽपि च सांदत्ये- ऽपि च॥ BRE I “Argument against Mate. Aph. 129.—Thought does not be- rialism. long to the Elements, for it is not Argument against Materialism. 155 found in them separately, nor moreover in the state of com- bination,—nor moreover in the state of combination: [— “Thought does not exist in the five Elements even when in the state of combination, because we do not find Thought in them severally at the time of disjunction,’—and there can be nothing in the product which does not pre-exist in the cause]. OO eee 156 BOOK VI. [Havin explained in four Books all the matter of the Institute, and having thoroughly established it by refuting the opinions of opponents in the Fifth Book, now in a Sixth Book he recapitulates the same matter which is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For, by making further what is called a systematic exposition, the learners acquire an undoubting, accurate, and more solid knowledge. ‘Therefore reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault, because the method is that of fixing a stake (by repeated blows) ; and because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced.” ] अस्त्यात्मा नास्ित्वसाधनाभावात्‌ | ९॥ Aph. 1.—Soul is,—for there is no proof that it is not, [—‘ since we are aware of this that ‘I think,’ (‘cogito ergo sum’)—because there is no evidence to defeat this. Therefore all that is to be done is to discriminate it”? from things in general]. देदादिव्यतिरिक्ताऽसे वेचित्यात्‌ ॥ २॥ Aph. 2.—This [soul] is different from the Body, &c., because of hetero- geneousness [or complete difference between the two]. षष्टोव्यपदेश्णद्‌पि ॥ 8 I The usage of language is Aph. 3.—Also because it [the Soul] evidence for this. is expressed by means of the sixth [or possessive] case, [—“‘ for the learned express it by the posses- give case in such examples as ‘This my body,’ ‘This my understanding ;’—for the possessive case would be unaccount- able if there were absolute non-difference” [between the Body, The existence of Soul. Soul is not Body, 4९. Soul’s aim how accomplished. 157 or the like, and the Soul to which it is thus attributed as a possession. ‘But then,—suppose that this also is like the expression ‘ The Soul’s Thought’ (—Soul and Thought being identical—), ^ Réhu’s head’ (—the trunkless Réhu being all head), ^ The statue’s body,’ &c. 10 this he replies’’]. न शिलापचवदर्मियादकमानवाधात्‌ ॥ ४ ॥ क ieoised Ge Aph. 4.—It is not as in the case of the statue, because [^^ when we say ‘the statue’s body,’ there is a mere fiction,” for] there is there a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing, [—sense being the evidence that there is here no body other than the statue— ; “ but in such an expression as ‘My Body,’ there is no contradiction of the evidence, for the contradiction is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul’). अत्यन्तद्‌ःखनिवत्या छतकृत्यता ॥ ५॥ $ Gin: ५ Aph. 5.—Through the entire sur- plished. cease of pain, there is done what was to be done ;—[and if you say, ‘‘ But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the removal of Pain there is cessation of Pleasure also, that cannot be Soul’s aim :’’—to this he replies]. यथा दुःखात्‌ AU पुरुषस्य न तथा सुखादमिलाषः।। € ॥ Pleasure no compensation Aph. 6.—Not such fondness for Sor Pain. pleasure is there to Soul as there is annoyance from Pain, [and so the aversion to Pain, having excluded also the fondness for Pleasure, gives rise to a desire for the cessation of Pain simply ;—so that there is not an equality of gain and loss,” but a clear gain in the desired release]. कुचापि केऽपि सुखोति॥ ७ 11 Pleasure sparingly dis- Aph. 7.—[‘ And pain is multifari- pe ous in comparison of pleasure], for [only] some one somewhere is happy, [—‘ among innumerable 158 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book VI. grasses, trees, brutes, birds, men, &c., very few,—a man, a god, or the like,—are happy’’]. ~ LN तदपि दुःखशवलमिति दुःखपक्ते निःसिपन्ते विवेचकाः ॥ ८ ॥ Aph. 8.—It [Pleasure] also is varie- gated by Pain; therefore the discri- minating cast it into the scale of [and reckon it as so much] * Surgit amari aliquid.’ ‘Pain. € a A सुखलाभाभावाद्परूषाथत्वमिति चेन्न दविध्यात्‌॥ < ॥ _ Cessation of suffering is a Aph. 9.—If you say that this [ces- 704 sation of Pain] is not Soul’s aim, in- asmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure, then it is not as you say,—for there are two kinds [of things desired. ^ For we see amongst men quite a distinct aspiration (—the first—) ‘May I be happy,’—(the second—) ‘May I not be miser- able,’ ”’—and the latter is ow conception of beatitude]. ४ SN निगणत्वमात्मनोाऽसङ्गत्वादि श्तेः ॥ Ye ॥ Aph. 10.—The Soul [—some one A doubt, ड fi may suggest—] has no quality, for there is scripture for its being unaccompanied, [and ^^ there- fore the cessation of Pain (a property which does not belong to it) cannot be Soul’s aim.” = ^^ He clears up the doubt’’). परधर्मत्वेऽपि तत्सिद्धिरविवेकात्‌ ॥ 22 401. 11.—Though it [the Pain] be the property of something else, yet it exists in it [the Soul] through non-discrimination, [—for “though the qualities, pleasure, pain, &c., belong [only] to the Mind, they exist,—i. e., they abide in the shape of a reflec- tion,—in it, viz., in Soul ;—through ^ non-discrimination’ 88 the cause,—that is to say, through the conjunction of Nature with Soul. And this has been expounded in the First Book.” Well, “ the binding of Soul by the qualities (or fetters) arises This cleared up. Non-discrimination from eternity. 159 from non-discrimination, but from what does non-discrimi- nation arise? With reference to this he says’’]. अनादि रविवेकेऽन्यथा STATA U1 १९॥ : Aph. 12.—Non-discrimination [of Two reasons why non-dis- N . "6 crimination must have been Soul from Nature] is beginning-less, SE EERO: because otherwise two objections would present themselves, [—“ for, had it a beginning, then if [1°] it arose quite spontaneously, bondage might befal even the liberated ; and if [2°] it were produced by Desert, &c., there would be a reqressus in infinitum, inasmuch as we should have to search for another (previous instance of) non-discrimination to stand as the cause of that Desert, &c., also.” ‘ But then, if it be without beginning, it must be endless ;—to this he replies’’]. न नित्यः स्याद्‌त्मवद्न्यथानु्छित्तिः 11 १३॥ क | Aph. 13.—It [non-discrimination] from eternity, may be cué cannot be everlasting [in the same were manner] as the soul is, else it could not be cut short [—as we aflirm that it can be. “It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginning-less, in the same way as the soul is; but it is beginning-less in the shape of an on-flow (which may be stopped) ;—for otherwise the cutting short of a beginning-less entity would be unfeasible,”—though the beginning-less antecedent non-entity of a given jar may be readily understood to terminate on the production of the jar]. प्रतिनियतकारणनाश्यत्वमस्य ष्वान्तवत्‌ I १४॥ Aph. 14.—It [Bondage] is annihi- lable by the appropriate cause [discri- mination of Soul from Nature], just as is darkness [annihilable by the appropriate cause, viz., Light]. Bondage how destructible. 160 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book VI. अचपि प्रतिनियमेोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकात्‌॥ १५ ॥ This enforced. Aph. 15.—Here also [—viz., in the case of Bondage and Discrimination, as in the case of Darkness and Light—] there is adaptation, [as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation— [Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not where not]. प्रकारान्तरासम्भवाद्‌विवेक एव बन्धः 11 VE ॥ Aph. 16.—Since it cannot be [ac- counted for in] any other way, it is non- discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage, [‘ which cannot be innate.”’ ‘‘ But then, since liberation also, from its being a product, is liable to destruction ; Bondage should take place over again :—to this he replies’’]. ©. - oN न मुक्तस्य पुनबन्धयेगाऽप्यनाठत्तिश्रुतेः 1 १७॥ Aph. 17.—Further, Bondage does not again attach to the liberated, be- cause there is scripture for its non-recurrence. अपुरूषाथैत्वमन्यथा ॥ १८ ॥ Aph. 18.—Else it [liberation] would not be Soul’s aim [—which it is]. ~ घापत्निरुभयं अविशेषापत्तिर्भयाः ॥ १९ ॥ Aph. 19.—What happened to both would be alike, [if liberation were perishable. ‘That is to say,—there would be no difference between the two, the liberated and the bound, because of their being alike liable to future bondage ; and therefore such (per- ishable emancipation) is not Soul’s aim,”’—but emancipation final and complete. ‘ But then, at that rate, if you acknow- ledge that there is a distinction between the bond and the free, how is it that you have asserted (B. I., Aph. 19) the eternal freedom (of all souls alike?) ‘To this he replies’’]. Bondage not innate. Bondage does not recur. Evidence of this. Force of the evidence. Nature of Liberation. 161 = 0 सुक्तिरन्तरायध्वस्तेन परः ॥ २० ॥ Aph. 20.—Liberation is nothing other than the removal of the obstacle [to the soul’s recognition of itself as free. ‘ But then, at that rate, since Bondage and Liberation are wnreal, Liberation must be contradictory to the texts, &c., which set forth what is Soul’s aim” as some positive and real acquisition, not merely a removal of a screen. He replies]. तचाप्यविरोधः ॥ २९ ॥ 4/1. 21.—Even in that case there 18 no contradiction, [—for “even if Liberation consist [only] in the removal of an obstacle, there is no contradiction in its being Soul’s aim.” “ But, if Libera- tion be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere hearing (of the error which stands in the way),—just as a gold coin on the neck, (which we have sought for in vain while it was) withheld from us by ignorance (of the fact that it has been tied round our neck with a string), is attained (on our being told where it is) :—to this he replies’’]. अधिकारितैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ २९॥ Aph, 22.—This [attainment of Li- beration on the mere hearing of the truth] is no necessity, for there are three sorts of those com- petent [to apprehend the truth,—but not all are qualified to appropriate it on merely hearing it. ‘Not hearing alone is seen to be the cause of knowledge, but there are others also” —as he proceeds to show]. ९९ दाढ्याथसुत्तरेषाम्‌। २३॥ ५ Utility of other means be- 417. 23.—Of others {other means Sasa besides hearing—] for the sake of re- inforcement, [there is need,—as he goes on to show]. ष The nature of liberation. An objection repelled. Another objection repelled. 162 Tha Sankhya Aphorisms. Book V1. सिरसखमासनमिति न नियमः 1 ३४ ॥ Formality in postures not Aph. 24,—There is no [absolute] tmperatice, necessity that what is steady and [pro- moting]| ease, should be a [particular] posture [—such as any of those referred to at B. III., Aph. 34;—i. e., “ there is no necessity that a ‘ posture’ should be the ‘ lotus-posture,’ or the like,—because whatever is steady and (promotes) ease, is a (suitable) ^ posture’ ??] . ध्यानं निर्विषयं मनः ॥ २५॥ The efficient means of Con- Aph. 25.—Mind without an object < is Meditation, [—“ that is to say,— what Internal Organ is void of all modification, that is ‘ Medi- tation,’—i. e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect ;—for it will be declared how Medi- tation effects this” exclusion of the modifications of intellect,— and the means here assume the name of the result. = ^ But then, since Soul is alike whether there be Concentration or non-concentration, what have we to do with Concentration ? Having pondered this doubt, he clears it up’’]. A ANH = न, fen उभयथाप्यविशेषखन्नेवमुपरागनिरेधादिशेषः ॥ २९ ॥ The distinction not with Aph, 26.—If you say that even both outa difference. ways there is no difference, it is not so ;—there is a difference through the exclusion [in the one case] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case. “But how can there exist a tinge in that which is unassociated” with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged to be? To this he replies]. निःसङगेऽप्ुपरागोऽविवेकात्‌ ॥ २७॥ Soul tinged by what’ does Aph, 27.—Though it [Soul] be un- sot belong to Xt. associated, still there is a tingeing [reflectionally] through non-discrimination, [for,—‘‘ though there is not a real tinge in that which is unassociated (with tincture or anything else), still there is as it were a tinge ; Meditation. 163 hence the tinge is treated as simply a reflection by those who discriminate the tinge” from the Soul which it delusively seems to belong to]. जवास्फटिकयोरिव नापरागः किन्त्मिमानः ॥ Pe ॥ Its seeming presence - ex- Aph, 28.—As is the case with the plained; Hibiscus and the crystal [B.I., 19], there is not a tinge, but a fancy [that there is such]. Sd fara ध्यानधारणभ्यासवेराग्यादिमिस्तन्निरोधः ॥ २८ I Aph, 29.—[And as for the afore- said tinge] it is debarred by Medita- tion, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c. लयवितपयेव्याङ्त्येत्याचायाः ॥ २०॥ Aph. 30.—It is by the exclusion of How to be got rid of. The ancient dogma on this potnt, dissolution and distraction,—say the teachers, [—“ that is to say,—through the removal, by means of Meditation, &c., of the Mind’s condition of (being dissolved in) Sleep, and condition of (waking) Certainty, &c., there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition ;—because, on the exclusion of any (real) object, there is the exclusion also of its reflection ;—so say the ancient teachers’’]. न स्थाननियमशित्तप्रसाद्‌ात्‌ |! s2 |! Meditation may take place Aph. 31.—There is no rule about anywhere: localities, for it is from the tranquillity of the Mind [that Meditation, or the like, results; ^^ there- fore such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it.” “ The discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, with an eye to the unchangeableness of Soul, he discusses the cause of the world’’]. = _ न = ४ प्रकतेराद्यापादानतान्येषां कायत्वख्रतेः ॥ BP II Nature the material of the Aph. 32.—Nature is the primal ma- ^ terial, for there is scripture [to the effect] that the others [‘‘ Mind, &c.,”] are products. Y 2 164 The Sénkhya Aphorisms. Book VI. नित्यत्वेऽपि नात्मने येग्यत्वाभावात्‌ ॥ ३३ ॥ Soul not the material of Aph. 33.—Not to Soul does this sa a belong, [viz., to be the material of the world], though it be eternal,—because of its want of suitable- ness,—[for— suitableness to act as material implies the pos- session of qualities, and the being associable :—and by reason of the absence of both of these, Soul, though eternal (—and therefore no product—) cannot serve as material.” = ^ But then, since, from such texts as ‘Many creatures have been produced from Soul,’ we may gather the fact that Soul is a cause, the assertions of an illusory creation, &c., ought not to be accepted :—having pondered this, he replies’’]. खुतिविरोधान्न कुतकापसदस्यात्मलाभः IN २४ ॥ The opposite view unscrip- Aph. 34.—The illogical outcaste म does not gain [a correct apprehension of] Soul, because of the contradictoriness [of his notions] to scripture, [—for—‘“the various views, in regard to Soul’s being a cause, which are conceivable, are all opposed to scrip- ture; therefore the base illogical holders of these have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be under- stood that those also (—e. g., the Naiy4yikas—) who assert that the Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are quite illogical,—these also have no correct knowledge of Soul. And if it be asserted that Soul is a cause (of the world) just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, &c., (—and towards which it stands in the relation of a cause in so far as without the room afforded by it these could not exist—), then we do not object to that,—for, what we deny is only that there is transformation” of Soul, as material, into the world, as product. But, “since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the (material) cause is nothing else than earth, &c., how can Nature be the material of all? To this he replies’’]. Nature the Material cause. 165 bay -पारम्ययऽपि प्रधानानुतरत्तिरणवत्‌ ॥ २५ ॥ Nature the ultimate mate- Aph. 35.—Though but mediately न [the cause of products], Nature is inferred [as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes], just as are Atoms [by the Vaiseshikas]. 9. Lg ¢ सवे च कायंद्‌ शनाद्विभुत्वम्‌ ॥ BE ॥ Aph. 36.—It [Nature] is all-per- vading, because its products are seen everywhere. = [^ But then, only if it be limited, can it be said that ‘ Wherever a product arises, there does it (Nature) go (or act) ;”—for what is unlimited, and fills all space, can find no other space to move into,—“ to this he replies.’’] Nature all-pervading, गतियोगेऽप्याद्यकारणतादानिर एवत्‌ । ३७ ॥ 4111. 37.—Though motion may at- tach to it, this does not destroy its character as ultimate cause,—just as is the case with the Atoms—[“the earthy and other Atoms, according to the opinion of the Vais’eshikas’’]. प्रसिद्वाधिक्यं प्रधानस्य न नियमः ॥ रेट ॥ अ 411. 38.—Nature is something in tute for eight of the substan- addition to the familiarly known [nine प Substances of the Naiy4yikas] :—it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine: “and the argument here is the scriptural declaration that eight (of the pretended primitive substances) are products’—]. £5 सत््वादोनामतद्वमत्वं तद्रूपत्वात्‌ ॥ २९ ॥ Nature consists of the three Aph. 39.—Purity, and the others, पः are not the properties of it, [viz., Na- ture],—because they are its essence, “ because they are what constitute Nature’’]. An objection parried, 166 The Sdénkkya Aphorisms. Book V1. TAWA पुमर्थं षटि प्रधानस्योष्रकुडम- ASAI ॥ ४०॥ Aph. 40.—Nature, though it does not, enjoy [the results of its own ener- gizing], creates for the sake of Soul,—like a cart’s carrying saffron [for the use of its master. See B. III., 58]. कमवेचिव्यात्‌ टशिचिव्यम्‌ I 82 UI Wature treats suck aooord: Aph, 41.—The diversity of creation Nature's disinterestedness. any, Ba + is in consequence of the diversity of Desert. [^ But then,—granting that creation is due to Nature, yet whence is destruction ?—for a contrary couple of results cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he replies.” साम्यवेषम्याभ्यां कायद यम्‌ ॥ ४९॥। Contrary results from त Aph. 42.—The two results are ture how. through equipoise and the reverse of equipoise ;—[for ^^ Nature is the triad of Qualities, Purity, &c.; and their ‘reverse of equipoise’ is their aggregation in excess or defect ; the absence of this (‘reverse of equipoise’) is ‘equipoise ;,—through these two causes two opposite results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from one and the same.” ^^ But then, since it is Nature’s nature to create, there should be the mundane state even after the (discrimi- native) knowledge (which is alleged to put an end to it). To this he replies’’]. विमुक्तवोधान्न खष्टिः प्रधानस्य Bae ॥ ४३॥ Nature's energy does not Aph. 43.—Since [—or when—] the debar emancipation, emancipated has understood [that he never was really otherwise], Nature does not create,—just as in the world [a minister does not toil when the king’s purpose has been accomplished. “ But then, Nature never rests from creating, for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant ;— and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated also Bondage may come again :—to this he replies’’]. ~I Multeity of Soul. 16 नान्योपसपणेऽपि मुक्तापभेगो निमित्ताभा- वात्‌।॥ ४४ ॥ त Aph. 44,—Even though it [Nature] No reason why Nature र 3 i ई should invade the emanci- May invade others [with its creative + influences], the emancipated experi- ences not, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause [—e. g., non-discrimination,—in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature’s invasion. ^ But then,—this arrangement could be possible then only if there were a multiplicity of souls; but that is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul: —having pondered this doubt, he says’’]. Qeaase व्यवस्थातः॥ By! Multeity of Soul proved Aph. 45.—The multeity of Soul is +++ proved by the distribution [announced by the Veda itself “in such texts as ^ whoso understand this— these are immortal, while others experience only sorrow.’ ” “But then,—the distribution of Bondage and Liberation may be through the difference of adjunct :—to this he replies’”’]. उपाधिश्चेत्‌ तलि FASTA ॥ ४९॥ Unity excluded by the sup- Aph, 46.—If [you acknowledge] an Postion Of SOME se adjunct [of Soul], then, on its being established, there is duality, [—upsetting the dogma founded on in Aph. 44. “ But then,—the adjuncts, moreover, consist of ‘Ignorance’ (—which, according to the Vedanta, is no reality—), so that by these there is no detriment to (the Vedantic dogma of) non-duality :—with reference to this doubt he says’’]. दाभ्यामपि प्रमाणएविरेधः ॥ 89 1 The Veddnta cannot evade Aph. 47,—Kven by the two the भ authority is contradicted,—[“even by acknowledging the two, viz., Soul and Ignorance, a contra- 168 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book VI. diction is constituted to the text (which is alleged as) the authority for non-duality’’]. द्ाभ्यामप्यविराधान्न GAA ` च साधकाभा- वात्‌ ॥ ४८ ॥ ए de he Aph. 48.—The prima facie view [of Veddnta tenet implies a con. the Vedanta] is not [to be allowed an any force as an objection], because by [admitting] two [—viz., Soul and Ignorance—], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature] ; and the subsequent [dogma—that one single Soul is the only reality—is not to be allowed], because of the non-existence of a proof,”] which proof, if it did exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality. | प्रकाशतसतत्सिद्ो कर्मकर्टविरेधः ॥ ४८ ॥ Self-manifestation contra- Aph. 49.—[And] in its [Soul’s] dictory. being demonstrated by the light [of itself as you Vedantins say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contra- diction. ‘‘ But then, there is no contradiction here between patient and agent, because it (the Soul), through the property of light which is lodged in it, can itself furnish the relation to itself,—just as the Vais’eshikas declare, that, through the intelligence lodged in it, it is itself an object to itself :—to this he replies’’]. FSAI जड प्रकाशयति FLT ।। Yo ॥ Illuminating function of Aph 50.—This (Soul), in the shape Soul. of Thought, discrepant from the non- intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent [which is discrepant from Soul. ^ But then, at this rate, if duality be established in accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the text declaring non-duality ?—to this he replies” |. The world real. 169. न श्रुतिविरेाधा रागिणां वैराग्याय तसिः । ५९ ॥ 411. 51.—There is no contradiction to scripture [in our view], because that [text of scripture which seems to assert absolute non- duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires, [—and who would be the better for believing in “ the nothingness of the things of time’’]. जगत्सत्यत्वमदुष्टकारणजन्यतवाद्वाधकाभावात्‌ ॥ YR ॥ The world’s reality irre: 411. 52.—The world is real, be- Sragable. cause it results from an unobjection- A salvo for the Vedic view, able cause, and because there is [in Scripture] no debarrer {of this view of the matter. ^ We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the (fancied) yellow- ness of (invariably white) conch-shells, and the like,—inas- much as these are results of the internal organ, &c., when (not normal, but) injured by (i. e., under the injurious influence of) Sleep, &c.:—and this is not (the state of things) in the (waking) Universe in which Mind is the first”? according to B. L, 71. And “he declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent state (at any given instant), but also always”’]. प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात्‌ सदुत्यत्तिः ॥ ५३ ॥ 411. 53.—Since it cannot be in any other way, manifestation [of what- ever is manifested] is of what is real—[I. ९.9 of what previously Creation excluded. existed ; for,—‘ since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed (previously) ina subtile form.” And “ though it is declared that the being the agent and the being the experi- encer belong to diverse subjects, he justifies the distribution (of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul), by two aphorisms”—as follows]. Z 170 The Sdéukhya Aphorisms. Book VI. ASHE HATA पुरुषः ॥ YB UI Aph. 54.—Self-consciousness, not The real agent who, é Soul, is the agent. चिद वसाना भुत्तिसतत्क माजितत्वात्‌ ॥ ५५ ॥ Experience is got rid क 401. 55.—Experience surceases at phen [discrimination of] Soul [as being quite distinct from Nature], since it arises from its [Soul’s] Desert, [—which is not really Soul’s, but which, while non- discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul, just as the fruits of the acts of a king’s ministers are made over to the king. And, “he shows the reason for what was stated before, that surcease of action does not result from goings to the world of Brahmé,”’—as follows]. चन्द्रादि लेकेऽप्यावृत्तिनिमित्तसङ्गावात्‌ ॥ UE UI Paradise no security Aph. 56.—Kven in the world of the agasnat transmigration. moon, &c., there is return [to mun- dane existence], because of there really being a cause [of such return,—*“ snch a cause, viz., as Non-discrimination, Desert, &८. But if you say, “through the ‘counsels of the persons dwelling in these various (super-mundane) worlds, there ought to be no return (to mundane existence) : to this he replies’’]. लेकस्य नोपदेशत्‌ Fale: GAA WO ॥ Aph. 57.—Not by the counsel of [supra-mundane] people is there effec- tuation [of emancipation], just as in the former case, [—the case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors. ‘ But at this rate, what becomes of the text that there is no return from the world of Brahma ?—to this he replies’’]. “0 afee ara afaa t विमुक्ति्ुतिः ॥ ५८ ॥ A salvo for a scriptural Aph. 58.—There is scripture [de- eel claratory] of Emancipation [on going to the world of Brahmé], this [emancipation] being effected This point enforced. Salvoes for scriptural texts. 171 {more readily in that world than in this, but only] by the intermediacy [of the appropriate means. And “he justifies the text of Soul’s going (to the locality where it is to experi- ence), even though it be all-filling,” and can therefore have no place into which to move]. गतिशरुतेश्च व्यापकत्वेऽ्युपाधियोगाङ्गगदेशकाललाभो व्योमवत्‌ ॥ ५९ ॥ Aph. 59.—And, in accordance with the text of its “going,” though it [Soul] is all-pervading, yet, through time, it reaches its place Another. of experience [—or body—], through conjunction with an adjunct,—as in the case of Space; [for, “as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct such a jar,”—when we say “the space occupied by the jar 18 moved to the place to which the jar is carried,’—so is it here. And “he expounds, in two aphorisms, the statement that the site of experience (the body) is formed through the superintendence of the experiencer (Soul) ”—as follows]. अनधिष्ठितस्य पूतिभावप्रसङ्गान्न तत्सिद्धिः 1! ९० ॥ The Body's existence de- Aph. 60.—This [constitution of a pendent on: Bout. body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul], because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent]. ACTA चेद्‌ सम्बदस्य तद्‌ सम्भवाज्नलादिव- SHC FV Desert not the maker of Aph. 61.—If you say that [inde- the Tats pendently of any superintendence] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so,] since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto,—as is the case with [unapplied] water, @ 2 172 The Sdénkhya Aphorisms. Book VI. &e., in respect of a plant. [‘ That is to say,—because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other (elements of the Body), should operate through Soul in the construction of the Body, &c.,—just as it is for water, &c., wnconnected with the seed, to operate through the husbandman, in the production of a plant.” = ^ According to the theory of the Vais’eshikas and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent (in the construction of the Body) in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert ;—but he tells us, that, in his own doctrine, since Desert, &c., are not pro- perties of Soul, the Soul cannot through these be the cause” of the Body]. निगृणत्वात्‌ तद सम्भवाद्‌ दङ्ार धर्मा WA ॥ ६९॥ 410. 62.—For this is impossible {that the Soul should, through its Deserts, 5c., be the cause of Body], because it has no qualities, —for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-con- sciousness [—notof Soul. “ And so, in owr opinion, it is settled that the Soul superintends (in the causing of the body) quite directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything intermediate.” ‘ But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limit- edness of the living soul, which is set forth in scripture, is not a fact. To repel this doubt, he says’’]. विशिष्टस्य जीवत्वमन्वयव्यतिरे कात्‌ ॥ ६२ ॥ अद 120. Aph. 63.—The nature of a living १०१०१८९५ soul belongs to that which is qualified, [—not to Soul devoid of qualities—as is proved] by direct and indirect arguments, [—for, ‘to be a living soul means the being possessed of the vital airs,—and this is the char- acter of the soul distinguished by personality, not of pure Soul,” which is unlimited. ‘ Desiring now to set forth the difference between the products of Mind (or the Great Prin- ciple) and of Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Self-consciousness”’]. Reason for this. The real agent. 173 TESTA TNA RAVAN प्रमाणा- भावात्‌ ॥ ९४॥ 411. 64.—The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-con- sciousness, not dependent on a Lord [such as is feigned by the Vais’eshikas], because there is no proof [of the reality of such. And “by this aphorism is set forth,—as is also established by scripture and the legal institutes,—the creative and the destructive agency of Brahmé and Rudra (respec- The real agent what. tively), due to their adjunct, Self-consciousness” or personality. ^ But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker of the others,—still who is the maker of Self-consciousness ?—to this he replies’’]. अदृटेद्ूतिवत्‌ समानत्वम्‌ ॥ €Y II Aph. 65.—It is the same as in the arising of Desert,—[‘just as at the creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which sets Nature The real agent whence, energizing, results solely from the particular time,—since, if we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite regress,—just so Self-consciousness arises from the time alone as the cause, but there is not another maker thereof also ;—thus are the two cases alike’’]. मदतेऽन्यत्‌ ॥ ६९ ॥ 7८41 Aph. 66.—The rest is from Mind Brahmé S‘iva and Vishnu [the Great Principle. That is to say १ —what is other than the products of Self-consciousness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preservation, &c., results from the Great Principle, be- cause it,—that is to say,—inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having no Conceit, Passion, &c., is moved solely by benevolence towards others. And by this aphorism is declared the character as Preserver, of Vishnu, due to the 174 The Sdnkhya Aphorisms. Book VI. Great Principle as adjunct” of the soul which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve, nor destroy. See Aph. 64. “Tt has been stated before that the relation of Nature and Soul as the experienced and the experiencer is caused by Non- discrimination (of the one from the other). Here—what is Non-discrimination itself caused by ? With reference to this doubt he states that all philosophers in common reject the objection that we should have an infinite regress on the supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination, because this (regress) 18 valid,”—an infinite regress, which is in conformity with the truth, being no sound cause of objection]. करम्निमितः VR Sefaaacaned- ARTA ॥ CO 1 J Rapubcietew Aph. 67.—The relation of possessed quiesced in without detriment and possessor also, if attributed [as it iad i cia is by some] to Desert, in the case of Nature [and Soul], is beginning-less, as is the relation of seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternants]. अविवेकनिमित्ता वा पञ्चशिखः 1 ६८ ॥ Aph. 68.—Or [the case is the same one of a valid infinite regress,] if it [the relation between Nature and Soul] be attributed to Non- discrimination [of soul from Nature], as the Panchas‘ikha [holds]. लिङ्गशरोरनिमित्तका इति सनन्दनाचार्यः ॥ ee ॥ Aph. 69.—[The case is the same] if, as Sanandandcharya does, we attri- bute it [the relation between Nature and Soul] to the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends Soul even during the periodical annihilations of the world. And in conclusion “ he sums up the import of the declarations of the Institute’’]. A second. A third. The Summing up. 17: यदा तदा तदुदधिन्तिः पुरुषार्थसद्‌च्छित्ति Te पार्थः ॥७०॥ ॥ Aph. 70.—Be that the one way or The summing up. 4 the other, the cutting short thereof [—viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul—] is Soul’s aim,—the cutting short thereof is Soul’s aim. ~sJ cr BIBLIOTHECA INDICA; A COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS, ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. SANSKRIT WORKS IN PROGRESS,* IN THE OLD SERIES. The Lazrra Vistata, or Memoirs of the Life and Doctrines of Saxya Sryita, Edited by Babu Rasenpratata Mirra. Already published, Fasciculi 1. II, III. 1४, and ४, Nos, 51, 73, 143, 144 and 145, The Prakrita Grammar of Kramadis’wara. Edited by Babu RAsEnpRaLAra Mitra. The VrepAnra Sv’rras, Commenced by Dr. RbER, and continued by Pandita Rima Narayana Vidyaratna, Published, Fasciculi I. II. III. 1V. V. and VI. Nos. 64, 89, 172, 174, 178 and 184. The Tarrrrriya Sanur of the Black Yajur Veda. Edited by Dr. E, Roger, and एए. B. Cowrit, M. A. Published, Fasciculi I. II. III. 1V. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XI. XIV. XV. and XVI. Nos. 92, 117, 119, 122, 131, 133, 184, 187, 149, 157, 160, 161, 166, 171, 180 and 185. The Tarrtrriya BranMana of the Black Yajur Veda. Edited by Babu RAJENDRALALA Mirra. Published, Fasciculi I. II. IJ]. ए. V. VI. VII. VIII. 1X, उ, and XI. Nos. 125, 126, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 175 and 176. An English Translation of the SAnirya Darpana by Dz. BaLLanryns. * For a list of the Persian and Arabic works in progress, see No. 130 of the Bibliotheca Indica, SANSKRIT WORKS PUBLISHED, IN THE OLD SERIES. < चः, | Former € Price. ; The first two Lectures of the Sauhita of the Rig Véda, १. with the Sear ag of Madhava Acharya, and an ~ Sint = lish translation of the text. Edited by Dr छ. $ Nos. 1 to 4, 400 28048 Ananda i ee eae = Edited by Dr, E. Réer, Nos. 5 to 13, 16 and 18, ...... 1100 6140 An English Translation of the aboye Upanishad and Com- 7 mentary, Nos. 27, 38 and 185... ५... .-***---+* 300 1149. The Chhandogya Uj panied, with the Commen ध S’an- : 4 kara Acharya, and the Gloss of Ananda Giri. ited by प ; यु ae Nos. 14, ध i, 70, ne my as द 600 3120 nglish translation of the Chhan aye panishad of the Sama Veda, by Babu Rajendralala Mitra. Fasciculi ‡ I, and II, Nos. 78 and 181, «oe .cseceseccesssesceee 000 140 The Taittiriya, ^ and S‘wétas‘watara Upanishads with ५८ ; Comment 2s 22:88; and 34,7... 9400 114 The 188, Katha, Pras’na, Mundaka, and Ménd त Upanishads, with Commentary, &c. Edited by aE त । Roer, Nos. 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 81... "< 600 38120 The ‘aittirfya, Aitareya, S’wetas’watara, Kena, 188, a : Katha, Pras’na, Mundaka and शण Upanishads. । Translated from the Original Sanskrit, by Dr. 2. Réer, Nos. 41 and 50, ietalpivoe-o« bone 53ps ८. 1. 140 Division of the Categories of the Nyiya Philosoph; प i a Commentary and an English Translation, by Dr. E, Réer, Nos, 82 and 85,.<.. न 900 10 The त a-Darpana, or Mirror of Composition, by Viswa- ~ ‡ natha Kavirdja, edited by Dr. E. Rier, Nos. 36, 37, 88, 54 J 4.66 ss Gann virae ne nv do ca cneawes owalee €a ks mereeteneemmennennee 400 The Chaitanya Chandrodaya Nataka of Kavikarnapura, Edit- , onde Babu Rajendralél Mitra, Nos. 47, 48 and 80, .... 800 1M4e The Uttara Naishadha Charita, by Sri Harsha, with the + Commentary of Naréyana. Edited by Dr. BH. Réer, Nos. 39, 40, 42, 45, 46, 52, 67, 72, 87, 90, 120, 128 and | OS URS saamiee maine she bceeasianin e's 2G ds 5 olan sore eter nD 7 80 The Sdnkhya-Pravachana-Bhashya. Edited by Fitz- १ Edward Hall, A. M., and to be translated J. R. ae Ballantyne, LL. D. Nos. 94, 97 and 141, .......-...-.. 000 1 140 The Sarvadars‘ana Sangraha; or an Epitome of the dif- ४ ferent systems of Indian Philosophy. By Maédhavachérya, Edited by Pandita I’s’warachandra Vidyasagara. Nos. <~ 68 and 149 Nos. 114, 127, 140, 163, 169, 177 and 188, ,,,,,,०*, 460 9.99 &. octied!