ह. १।||॥॥।५|१।। ~ & ~ ` commentary Laem als Original parts of Vedantin ... 41 32 20.61> Harvard College Library THE BEQUEST OF Chars RLanma, PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT 1880-1926 + er, 214 ए Digitized by Google Digitized by Google kan men ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY THE ORIGINAL PARTS OF VEDANTIN MAHADEVA’S COMMENTARY = ON THE SAMKHYA SUTRAS TRANSLATED WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON THE AGE AND ORIGIN OF THE SAMKHYA SYSTEM BY RICHARD GARBE. CALCUTTA. PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS. 1892. An * ^ ote Trhdl 23 > 2.८ Jae ५५ io j ¢ f ` ध ९ ९ ५ y a fae ARVARD ति UNIVERSITY: LIBRARY 9/2. 4 TO PROFESSOR ALBRECHT WEBER THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED AS A TOKEN OF HIGH ESTEEM AND GRATITUDE. Digitized by Google INTRODUCTION.' —e— The starting-point of an inquiry into the age and origin of the SAmkhya philosophy is the question of its relation to Buddhism. Tradition regards the Samkhya system as older than Buddha and even as the source from which the most celebrated of all In- dians has derived his doctrine. Lately, however, two eminent scholars have raised their voices against the correctness of this tradition, viz.. Max Miller (Chips I. 227 seq.) and Oldenberg (Buddha, translated by W. Hoey, 92 note), both of whom declared their inability to detect any definite similarities between the two sys- tems. Though, in my opinion, these two scholars are not right in doubting Buddha’s dependence on Kapi- la, it is their unquestionable merit to have shown that the traditional view has not hitherto been sufficiently proved, and to have invited discussion on the ques- tion. All elder savans, Colebrooke (Misc. Ess.* I. 240), Hodgson (Journal As. Soc. Beng. III. 4:28), Burnouf (Introduction 4 l’histoire du Bouddhisme In- dien 211, 455, 511, 521, 522), Wilson (Works, ed. Rost, II. 346), Lassen (Indische Alterthumskunde* I. 995-998), Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Premier Mé- moire sur le Sankhya 493 seq.) and others founded the connection between the Samkhya philosophy and 1 The greater part of this introduction is a translation of a con- tribution to the ‘Abhandlungen der KG6niglich Bayerischen Aka- demie der Wissenchaften, I. Cl. XIX. Bd. III. Abth.’ il INTRODUCTION. Buddhism on arguments of the most general nature or on such arguments which no longer hold good at the present time when we possess more original documents of Buddhism and know the Samkhya doctrines better. Professor Weber, too, who regards the Samkhya phi- losophy as the oldest of the existing systems and Bud- dhism as having been originally only a form of the Samkhya doctrine (History of Ind. Lit., transl. by Man and Zachariae,’ 235 seq., 165), will, I suppose, not think it superfluous to adduce further argu- ments for the pre-buddhistic age of the SAmkhya system and for Buddha’s dependence on the same.’ ~ Of more recent authors on the subject, John Davies — (Sankhya Karika p. 8) has nothing to support the coherence of the two systems but that “in each knowledge and meditation took the place of religious rites.” Barth (Religions of India? 116) says doubt- fully: ‘Evidently (?) the two systems have grown up side by side, and have borrowed mutually from one another. We question, however, whether the true origin of Buddhism is to be sought in this quarter.” L. von Schroeder (Pythagoras und die In- der 69 seq., Indien’s Literatur und Cultur 257 seq., 684 864.) tries to prove the dependence of Buddha on Kapila’s views by alleging three points in which both agree: the elimination of the notion of God, the as- sumption of a multitude of individual souls, and the conception of absolute liberation of the soul from the bonds of. the material world as the highest aim. The first of these three arguments—which, by the bye, has often been advanced—may be admitted as passable, INTRODUCTION. iil but not as cogent, because it is weakened by the arguments which Max Miller has adduced (Chips I. 229), and because the tendency of doing without the notion of God is also met with elsewhere in India. The second argument, the assumption of a multitude of individual souls on both sides, proves nothing; for this assumption was natural with all Indians who did not confess the monism of the VedAnta philosophy. And, besides, this agreement of Buddhism with the Samkhya doctrine is not even a perfect one, since Buddha denied a permanent psychic substance (Ol- denberg 252 seq.), and hence did not acknowledge the soul in the same sense as the SAmkhyas. The third argument, when stated in that general way, will not stand the test better; for, except the materialism of the Charvikas, there is not one Indian system which does not regard the liberation of the soul from the bonds of the material world as the highest aim of hu- man effort. In short, if the imternal probability of the Buddhistic legends in which Kapila and Paii- chasikha are mentioned as predecessors of Buddha’, is 1 Professor Ernst Leumann writes to me in a letter, dated 12th May 1892, that the Jaina legend, too, places Kapila before the time of Buddha and Mahavira, mentioning him along with Rishabha, Bharata and Marichi, who are, of course, persons incorporated from Brahmanical tradition. The passage which comes into considera- tion is, as I am kindly informed by Prof. Leumann, Avasyaka- chirni ITI. 250-252 (on Avasyaka-niryukti III. 153>). Marichi, it is stated there, had induced Kapila to renounce the world, but Kapila, though getting Asuri as a disciple, did not know what to teach ; after his death, however, he was born again as a god and imparted the Samkhya doctrine to Asuri from the air. Sa cha 1V INTRODUCTION, not rated very high nor regarded as a sufficient. testi- mony for the priority of the Samkhya system, then the question regarding the relation between Bud- _dhism and Simkhya philosophy still remains an open one. He who undertakes to examine this question and does not want to lose his way in the mist, has to re- nounce an idea which has been sometimes expressed, viz., that the original system of Kapila may have been essentially different and simpler than that which is: contained in the later documents handed down to us. The SAmkhya system has not undergone any remark; able alteration from the time of the definitive redaction of the Mahabharata to that of the composition of our. methodical text-books, and no important change could have taken place earlier; the whole character of this system, which is self-consistent and evidently the work. of one man, speaks against this assumption. In order to keep solid ground under our feet, we have, there- fore, simply to compare the SAamkhya documents as extant at present with the original records of Bud- dhism or with Oldenberg’s excellent elaboration of them. If we do this, we will have less chance of meeting with coincidences in points of general nature than with coincidences in details; for whether Bud- ` dha has borrowed from the Samkhya system, or Kapila from Buddhism, the borrower has at any rate given up fundamental conceptions; and under these cir- cumstances we can only expect that a connection will tatra darsayaty avyakta-prabhavam vyaktam, chaturvimsati-prakd- ram jndnam prakdsayati. INTRODUCTION. V eventually betray itself chiefly tn detatle. Besides, such similarities will be conclusive not only in the case of the Abhidharma, or the metaphysics of the Bud- dhists, as Max Miller seems to think (Chips 227), but even more in that of external peculiarities which are retained involuntarily in the mode of expression. But, for therest, everyone will agree with Max Miller, when he says ९. c.: “Such similarities would be invaluable. They would probably enable us to decide whether Buddha borrowed from Kapila or Kapila from Buddha, and thus determine the real chronology of the philosophical literature of India, as either prior or subsequent to the Buddhis‘ era.”’ To these words I bave only to add the wish that the subsequent series of coincidences, observed by me, may satisfy Max Miiller’s demand for ‘ definite similarities.’ In accordance with the preceding remark I advance an example of a mere external coincidence which seems to me to deserve especial notice : 1. Buddha’s predilection for classifying even abstract notions is shown to usin pedantic enumerations which are constantly found in his sermons : the fivefold cling- ing to the earthly, the sacred eightfold path, the twelve-part knowledge (Oldenberg 128, 129), the eight- fold abstinence (Oldenberg 383 note), the fourfold on- ward effort and the like (Oldenberg 287: ‘ Virtues and vices have their number: ... there are five powers and five organs of moral life. Hereticals and unbe- lievers also know the five impediments and the seven elements of illumination, but Buddha’s disciples alone know, how that cing becomes a dix, and this seven a fourteen’’). 2 vl INTRODUCTION. Exactly the same peculiarity offers itself in the Sam- khya system which has got its name from the enumera- tion of the principles’ and perhaps also from the parti- cular predilection for clothing abstract notions into the garb of dry numerical proportions. We often meet in the Samkhya writings with the threefold pain, (६. e., with the pain due to one’s self, to other beings and to supernatural influences) and once (Aniruddha on Sitra II. 1) with the twenty-onefold pain; we find the five- fold affections (8018 II. 33), the fourfold indifference (Tattvakaumudi on Kaérik4 23, Aniruddha on 80119 II. 1), the fourfold ignorance (Paiichasikha in Vy4sa’s Yogabhashya 11. 5; cf. FE. E. Hall, Sankhya-Sara, Preface p. 24 note), the fiftyfold intellectual creation (Karik& 46), the twenty-eightfold inability (Karik4 49, 80४18 III. 38, 42), the ninefold acquiescence (Karika 50, Sitra III. 39, 43), the eightfold perfection (K4- 1118 51, 802 IIT. 40, 44) and even the sixty-twofold error (8012 III. 41), subdivided into the eightfold ‘obscurity,’ the eightfold ‘illusion,’ the tenfold ‘ great illusion,’ the eighteenfold ‘ darkness’ and the eighteen- fold ‘utter darkness’ (K4rik4 48, commentaries to 80 tra III, 41). And if we cast a glance into the Tat- tvasamasa, we find among the twenty-five short 88110. khya Sdtras only seven in which the notion indicated is not determined numerically. I think that this remarkable coincidence cannot be explained merely by the general predilection of the 1 Compare especially the quotations from the Mahabharata, given by F. E. Hall, Sankhya-Sara, Preface p. 6 note. INTRODUCTION. Vil Indians for systematizing, but that in this case we must acknowledge the continuity of a peculiar scholastic method. If then we ask who has trans- mitted this dry method of teaching to the other, whether Buddha to Kapila or Kapila to Buddha, we are evidently referred by the object itself to Kapila, the founder of the enumerative philosophy. 2. Although it is the aim of all philosophical systems of India to liberate man from the pains of human ex- istence in this or that way, yet the idea that this life is a life of pain is nowhere so well developed as in the Samkhya philosophy. If we open the text- books of the orthodox schools, we find that they all make, in the first aphorism, a kind of decla- ration about the contents in the usual way without any pessimistic savour; the two principal works of the SAmkhya school only, the Kariké and the 80. tras, make an exception ; for they begin both with the word duhkha. ^^ Because of the trouble that comes from the threefold pain there exists the desire to know the means of removing it’’, such is the commence- ment of the K4rika, and 8078, I. 1 runs thus: ‘* Well, the absolute cessation of the threefold pain is the absolute aim of Soul.” This pessimistic tone on which the Samkhya doctrine is tuned sounds loudest and ful- lest in 80.28 VI. 7, 8: ‘‘ Nobody is happy any- where’. (The opponent contests this with a hint at 1 According to the reading of Aniruddha. Vijiianabhikshnu, the Vedantist, moderates this strong sentence characteristically by re- moving the negative particle: ‘For [only] somewhere someone is happy.” Vili INTRODUCTION. experience which shows that there is joy also, but gets the reply :) “Since this joy also is mingled with pain, the discriminative reckon it as pain.” We are, moreover, entitled to establish the pessimism of the Samkhyas with quotations from the works of the Yoga system, since this—a mere complement, — worked out of the Samkhya philosophy - is in congruity with the views of its original in all points which do not refer to the Yoga-praxis or to the personality of God. With perfect right the Yoga Sitras bear the same name as the Samkhya 80728, viz. Sdmkhya-pravachana. It is, therefore, genuine SAmkhya doctrine, what we read in Yoga Sitra II. 15: ^ To the discriminating every- thing is painful,” or what the holy Jaigishavya says, in Vy4sa’s old and excellent commentary on Yoga Si- tra III. 18: “Whatever I have experienced, born over and over again among gods and men, all ८05 was nothing but pain.”' Here we have not only a mere 1 The discourse of Jaigishavya with Avatya is interesting enough to deserve a translation in extenso : That knowledge which springs from discrimination was obtained by the holy Jaigishavya who—in consequence of the immediate perception of the impressions [left in his internal organ ]—beheld the series of his changing existences in ten great mundane periods. Then said the holy Avatya who assumed a [gross] body [for the sake of this discourse]: ^ Since the Sattva of your internal organ is unsuppressed [by Rajas and Tamas] on account of your merit (bhavyatvdt) and since, therefore, you behold the pain, caused by being born in hell and in the form of brutes in ten great mun- dane periods, what have you, born over and over again among gods and men, discerned as predominant, joy or pain?” Jaigi- shavya replied to the holy Avatya: “Since the Sattva of my in- INTRODUCTION. ix similarity, but a complete sameness with the Bud- dhistic view of the world; and though this coinci- dence does not offer a handle to find out to which of the two systems priority belongs, still it is an important link of that chain which unites Buddha with Kapila.’ 3. ‘ Buddha discredited the sacrificial system; he censured with bitter irony the knowledge of Vedic scribes as sheer folly, if not as shameless swindle,” Oldenberg 172. But the chief ground on which the Vedic ceremonial was abominated by that man ternal organ is unsuppressed [by Rajas and Tamas] on account of my merit, and since, therefore, I behold the pain, caused by being born in hell and in the form of brutes in ten great mundane periods, I know this: Whatever I have felt, born over and over again among gods and men, allthis was nothing but pain.” The holy Avatya said: ^ Are the power over Nature and the highest joy of acquiescence which you, sublime one, have attained, also reckoned by you as pain?” The holy Jaigishavya replied: “This is called the highest joy of acquiescence only in com- parison with the joy arising from objects, [but] it is nothing but pain in comparison with the isolation [of the liberated soul]. This [highest acquiesence] is a condition of the Sattva of the internal organ and belongs [as such! to the three constituents ; [and] the feeling of anything belonging to the three constituents is to be classed with that which is to be given up.”’ 1 T am here in strict opposition to Barth who says (Religions of India* 116): “It (४. e., the Samkhya system) is especially very little given to sentiment, and it cannot be from it that the pessim- ism was derived which is stamped so deeply on all the conceptions of Buddha.” The department of feelings and sentiments, it is true, is much neglected in all orthodox systems ; but if any of them is comparatively ‘given to sentiment,’ it is the Saimkhya sys. tem. x | INTRODUCTION. whose first commandment it was ‘ not to hurt any liv- ing being,’ was the performance of bloody sacrifices, required by the Brahmanical ritual. Now it is known that the SAmkhya system likewise objects to the Vedic sacrificial rites in Kariké 2 and in the 80198 I. 82—85. This coincidence would not be of considerable importance, but for the fact that ‘impurity’ stands first among the reasons which bring the sacrifices down to the level of the world- ly means for the suppression of pain. Doubtless the commentators are right in explaining ‘impurity’ by the immolation of animals, which is regarded as a guilt under any circumstances and as necessarily con- ducive to undesired consequences, although the sacri- ficer may attain his wishes by his 01811005." The idea with regard to this point is, therefore, the same in the SAamkhya system as in Buddhism, but it must be noticed that the Samkbyas consider the ritual—though not as a means for the attainment of the highest aim—still as useful, in spite of the demerit inherent in the sacrifice. This is ascertained from the words of the ancient Samkhya teacher Paii- chasikha which are preserved in Vyasa’s Yogabh4shya 1 Professor Leumann, in his letter mentioned in p. III note, refers me to a remarkable passage which dates at least from the beginning of our era, viz., to a Sloka preserved in the Avasyaka- niryukti VIII. 195 (208 in Professor Weber’s ‘ Verzeichniss der Sanskrit—und Prakrit-Handschriften der Ko6nigl. Bibliothek zu Berlin’ IT. 751, line 22). It 18 said there that compassion towards animals (pdninam dayd) has been the quintessence of Kapila’s doctrine. INTRODUCTION. xl II. 13," and partly in the SAmkhya-tattva-kaumudi to Karikaé 2. In rejecting the sacrifices absolutely, Buddha holds the more advanced stand-point, com- pared with which the less decided view of the Samkhya philosophy has, in all probability, a title to priority. 4. Another noteworthy coincidence seems to me to be found in the fact that both systems object to that self-torture which was always esteemed highly in India as a means of liberation. Our records report, it is true, that Buddha had recognized the fruitless- ness of self-torture in his own person, but it will hardly be possible to decide whether this is a legend or an account of a real fact. Oldenberg, though inclined to the latter opinion, prominently mentions in pages 108, 109, all the arguments which support the other side of the alternative. At any rate the Saémkhya philosophy maintains the same stand-point in 80018 III. 33 (84 according to Vijianabhikshu), which is literally repeated VI. 24: sthirasukham dsa- nam “The posture [of one engaged in meditation must be] steady and pleasant.”” These words are cer- tainly based on ancient tradition, for they form also 1 Sydt svalpah samkarak, sa-parihérah sa-pratyavamarshah kuga- lasya nd ’pakarshdyd ’lam. Kasmdt? Kusalam hi me bahv anyad astt, yatrd ’yam dvdpa-gatah svarge 'py apakarsham alpam karishya- tii.e. “There may be a slight admixture [of guilt in the sacrifice ; but this! is to be averted [by atonements, or, if it is not averted, its consequences are easily] to be endured; [therefore] it is not able to diminish the delight [gained by means of the meritorious . acts]. Why [not]? So much [more] delight falls tomy share on the other hand, that this [admixture of guilt], inherent [in my merit, | will cause me [only] little harm even in heaven.” Xi INTRODUCTION. Yogasfitra II. 46. This is very important, as the Yoga-praxis has matured in later times a great number of postures which cannot have been any- thing but uneasy even for Indian Joints. 5. When Oldenberg says in page 251 that ‘“ the spe- culation of the Brahmans apprehended being in all be- coming, that of the Buddhists, becoming in all appa- rent being,’’ he means by ‘speculation of the Brah- mans’ that of the Vedanta; for the Samkhya sys-- tem is in regard to this point, too, in perfect agree- ment with Buddhism. The whole world with every- thing in it—the souls only excepted—, ४. e. all that belongs to Prakriti in the opinion of the Saémkhyas, does not possess any more characteristic quality than that of constant becoming and change (parindmi-ni- tyatva). Now, it is a merit of Oldenberg to have em- phatically pointed out the fact (p. 212) that primitive Buddhism does not yet know the often mentioned speculations on the nothingness of the world, but that, on the contrary, the idea of nothingness belongs only to the later metaphysics of the Buddhists. The world of objects is, therefore, considered to be real by Bud- dha as well as by Kapila (cf. 8012 I. 79, VI. 52); and this world of objects comprehends also the psychic organs and states according to the systems of both. As, in the Samkhya philosophy, even the highest in- ternal processes, like thinking, volition, judging, etc., are mechanical functions of Matter, which are not to be ascribed to the Atman, but must be known to be andtman, so Buddha teaches, too, that vedand, saznd, ` omwmw A vinidnam ‘ sentiments, conceptions and cognition ° are INTRODUCTION. Xill anatld (=andtman). In the important chapter Ma- havagga I. 6, which treats of this question, and which has been brought by Oldenberg —not rightly, as I presume—in connection with the doctrine of the Brah- man-Atman, professed by the Upanishads, the result of the reflection is that we must say even about ०९. dand, 524, vinndnam: n’ etam mama, n’ es0’ham - asmi, na me so attdé “That is not mine, that am not I, that is not my Self.” From Oldenberg’s work, p. 215 note, I conclude that this is a standing formula in the Buddhistic canon. The * conviction that the Self of man cannot be- long to the world of evolution” (Oldenberg 215) is expressed with nearly literal conformity in SAmkhya Kariké 64: “So from the study of the principles arises the conclusive...... knowledge: nd ’smi, na me, nd ’ham.” The importance of this close coincidence which appears even in the mode of expression is not lessened by the fact that the Samkhya philosophy and Buddha differ in their conception of the Atman itself. Again Buddha who denies that Soul is a consistent entity maintains the more radical stand- point which as such is most probably posterior to that of the Samkhya system. 6. On this difference of the conception of the Atman depends also the extraordinarily slight difference which exists between the highest aim of human effort in the Samkhya philosophy and the Nirvana of Buddhism. The liberation of the Atman is, according to Kapila’s doctrine, its complete isolation from Matter, ६, e., even from all psychic processes and states, an eternal ab- 3 1 INTRODUCTION. solute existence, void of pain and sorrow, but also void of joy and happiness. In short, the SAmkhyas divest the liberated Atman of self-consciousness. If this idea is combined with Buddha’s doctrine of the inconstancy of the Atman, we arrive at the Nirvana which—in spite of all reflections of the oldest एप्त. | dhistic records on its undiscernibility—was originally nothing else, nor could be anything else, but the nega- tion of existence. | 7. I have already, in my German translation of the Samkhya-pravachana-bhashya, on page 228, note 2, pointed out the peculiar figurative way in which the different stages of acquiescence (twshti) are named, viz.: water, wave, flood, rain, excellent water, most excellent water, crossing, happy crossing, perfect crossing (pdra, supdra, pdrapdra). Add to this the synonymous denominations of the first three perfec- tions (stddht): tdra, sutdra, tdratdra. All Samkhya commentaries have preserved these strange denomina- tions with unessential variants’, beginning with Gau- १8.६१० who has found them in ‘another compendium’ (s'dstrdntara, commentary on 1 41114. 50), Wilson (SAamkhya K4riké p. 155) does not know what to do with these expressions which, in his opinion, have quite dif- ferent meanings, than they usually bear, in this con- nection ; he regards them as ‘ slang or mystical nomen- ! sunetra, in Gaudap&da’s commentary, will certainly not mean ‘a beautiful eye,’ as Wilson, Samkhya Karika p. 155 supposes, but it will be a synonyme of supdra; ndrika (‘feminine’ according to Wilson) is probably deformed out ofa derivation of nadé; and sutamas seems to be a corruption of sutdéra. INTRODUCTION. xv clature’ and ends his remarks on them with these words: ‘No explanation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption.” Thus all commentators of the K4rik4s as well as of the Sutras find themselves here before a riddle which they do not even try to explain, while they believe they are able to expound everything else. This speaks in favour of the assumption that these obscure words represent a very old tradition which has become totally unintelli- gible. I have no doubt that these denominations are based on the same metaphor which is current in Bud- dhism, viz., on that of passing over the ocean of mun- dane existence into the harbour of liberation. The ‘acquiescences’ of the Samkhya-system are, as preli- minary stages of liberation, compared with smooth waters which facilitate the passage of those who have reached them. While exhibiting these coincidences’, I have several times pointed out the probability that the views of Bud- dhism may be regarded as the outcome of the cor- responding SAmkhya doctrines; but this point still re- quires a more explicit and universal confirmation. The unadulterated SAmkhya doctrine was, by nature, originally intended to be the property of a limited school only; the doctrine of Buddha, however, was from the beginning meant for a much wider circle. 1 An investigation into the relation between Jinism and Sam- khya philosophy would be supplementary to my disquisition. I would therefore refer the reader to Barth’s work (Religions of India* 146) where an important coincidence of these two systems is noticed. Xvi INTRODUCTION. Now, as the above-mentioned coincidences bring the question whether Buddhism developed from the S4m- khya philosophy or the latter from the former, pro- -minently before us, it will be well for us to consider the internal improbability of the founder of a con- sistent philosophical system collecting his materials from a religion which leaves the most important questions open, because they do not serve any prac- tical purpose. To suppose this amounts to an inver- sion of the natural course of mental development. On the other hand, all becomes comprehensible and in- telligible, if we accept that Buddha lived under the influence of a special philosophical system, that its view of the world was the starting-point from which he proceeded in his contemplations, and that he took from it what appeared to him to be useful for the conversion and enlightenment of the masses. Who- ever is familiar with Indian literature will not offer, against this, the objection that all our Samkhya docu- ments—even the oldest which are contained in the Upanishads and in the Mah4bharata—are consi- derably younger than Buddhism, and that possibly not a single passage, treating of Samkhya doctrines, will be producible from the pre-buddhistic Indian li- terature.. The question why the Brahmanical litera- 1 The three gunds being the most original property of the Sam- khya system, one would feel tempted to see the earliest mention of a fundamental view of our system in a verse of the Atharvave- da, 10. 8. 43: pundarikam nava-dvdram tribhir gunebhir dvritam ; and, in fact, Muir and Weber have explained the verse in this sense, as I learn from Scherman’s book ‘ Philosophische Hymnen INTRODUCTION. Xvi ture begins to take notice of our system only in comparatively recent times and not earlier will be discussed below ; at present I may be allowed to refer to the following point. If the afore-mentioned arguments prove the connection of Buddhism with the Samkhya philosophy and the priority of the latter, some further coincidences will have to be added which would be susceptible of receiving a dif- ferent explanation under other circumstances. In my opinion such views as belong equally to the Ve- danta and to the Samkhya system must be derived from the latter and not from the former, if they are met with also in Buddhism.* For instance the idea aus der Rig- und Atharva-Veda-Sanhita’ (Strassburg, London 1887) p. 62. Scherman himself follows the opinion of the St. Petersburg Dictionary according to which the meaning of guna has nothing to do here with the philosophical sense the SAmkhyas give to the word, and I do the same. The meaning of pundarika becomes clear from Chhandogya Upanishad 8. 1. 1, where the word is glossed by veéman (cf. also Taittiriya Aranyaka 10. 10. 3), and nava-dvdram veéma is, of course, the human body (cf. Maha- bharata 5. 1070). In our passage from the Atharvaveda this is described as ‘enveloped by three cordg, (४. ९. in three different ways), whereby skin, nails and hair and nothing else can be intended.—Professor Roth, in reply to my request to communi- cate to me Sayana’s explanation of this passage, kindly informed me that the tenth book is missing in Shankar Pandit’s edition of Sayana’s commentary on the Atharvaveda. 2 Exactly the opposite result is arrived at by Edmund Hardy ‘Der Buddhismus nach alteren Pali-Werken’ (Miinster 1890) p. 24, where he declares—without, however, properly discussing such an important question— : ‘Hence itis also not in the Samkhya system of Kapila nor in any other system, but only in the doctrine XVili INTRODUCTION. that a special kind of ‘ignorance ’—as the ultimate cause of metempsychosis—drives the individuals from one existence into the other, and the employment of some technichal expressions besides. Among the latter, one has especially struck me, of which the Simkhyas as well as the Buddhists make a free use, vtz., samskara- samkhara. With the Samkhyas, samskdra means ‘ disposition,’ the existence of which is explained by the impressions left in the internal organ by events, perceptions, sensations, etc. (even in previous exis- tences). The avidyd-samskara, ‘the innate disposition to ignorance,’ ४. €. to confounding Matter with Soul, 18 the root of all evil... Buddha employs the word samkhdara in other senses, it is true, but in such a va- riety of senses that the principal meaning of the Bud- dhistic term may very well be considered as connected with the use of the word samskdra in the Samkhya philosophy. Samkhdra means (according to Oldenberg 242, Edmund Hardy 163) ‘conformation,’ then ‘ every- thing that is,’ and particularly ‘ that which makes the existing what it is.’ This last meaning which appears especially in the expression samkhdruppatti ‘ arising of the brahman-diman, that we must look for the starting-point of Buddhism.” It is, however, not my intention to show that Buddhism at its inceptiou was not at all influenced by the Vedic culture, especially by that derived from the older Upanishads, but to point out that it drew its materials principally from the Samkhya system. The Vedic culture might have contributed to the rise of Buddhism to the same extent as those popular views which are called ‘1’indouisme populaire’ by Senart. ५ Cf. especially Anirnddha’s commentary on Sitra IT. 1, page 90, line 9-18 of the present volume. INTRODUCTION. xix according to the respective conformations’ seems to me to be so closely related to the idea of ‘ disposition ’ that I do not hesitate to derive the different Bud- dhistic meanings of the word directly from this notion. Professor Weber considers the SAamkhya to be the oldest of the existing systems, and I follow this opinion so far as I, too, am convinced that the doc- trines of.no other school have been presented in syste- matic form as early as those of the SAamkhya philo- sophy. The other systems as such certainly have been founded in post-buddhistic time and not earlier. But this judgment must be different, if we advert to the fundamental ideas; for there can be no doubt in my opinion that the idealistic doctrine of the Upanishads regarding the Brahman-Atman—a doc- trine which has grown from the Veda and which is the nucleus and centre of the later Vedanta system —is an older product of philosophical thinking than the leading ideas of the other systems. Apparently the foundation of the SAmkhya philosophy is to be sought in a reaction against the propagation of the - consistent idealism which began to be proclaimed with enthusiasm. To the mythical and fabulous accounts of Kapila’s person, birth-place and region of activity that are con- tained in the 02114 01191218, in the Purdnas and else- where, as little value 18 to be attached as to those statements about Kapila in the north-buddhistic nar- rative of the settling of the S’ékyas in KapilavAstu.? 1 See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 11 seg., and also Divyé- vadina, ed. by Cowell-Neil, p. 548. If any mention of Kapila xx INTRODUCTION. Nor am I able to accept the conclusions which Weber (History of Ind. Lit.? 137, 236, 284, Indische Studien I. 434) draws from the similarity of sound of the names of: Kapila and Kapya Patamchala (in the Bri- 0881811 ए 212, Upanishad). The only reliable tradition appears to be that connected with the name of Kapila- vastu which means ‘ Kapila’s residence.’ The place was evidently named after the great sage in his honour; but it is not known whether he was born there or lived there. It may have been the principal scene of his activity, it may also be a town built later on in that region. At any rate, if we are allowed to assume that the Saémkhya system was regarded as authoritative at Kapilavastu and its environs, this explains most naturally why the founder of Bud- dhism, who was born there, relied on that system.’ There is another point of importance in perfect ac- cordance with this view. The home of Buddhism had, as is shown by Oldenberg in a lucid manner,— though it was already inhabited by Aryans at the time when the Vedic culture was developed—ac- cepted this peculiar culture from the western peoples only at a comparatively recent time, and had, at any rate even in the sixth century before Christ, not nearly so much been imbued with it as those countries in which the Brahmanical community arose. The ori- gin of the Simkhya system appears in the proper be found in the Pali Pitakas, it would, of course, deserve greater attention. By the bye, I write Kapilavastu, because Kapilavastu seems to me to be a wrong transliteration of the Original Pali Kapilavatthu. 1 Cf, Weber, Indische Studien I. 430. INTRODUCTION. | xxi light only, when we understand that in those regions of India which were little influenced by Brahmanism the first attempt had been made to explain the riddles of the world and of our existence merely by means of reason. Forthe Samkhya philosophy is, in its es- sence, not only atheistic, but also inimical to the Ve- da. All appeals to S’ruti in the SAamkhya texts lying before us are subsequent additions; we may al- together remove the Vedic elements, grafted upon the system, and it will not in the least be affected thereby. ‘The Samkhya philosophy had been origin- ally, and has remained up to the present day, in its real contents, unvedic and independent of the Brahmanical tradition. In the Mahabharata, XII. 18702, the Vedas are mentioned as something separ- ate from Siémkhya, Yoga, Paichardtra and Pas upata, and, in verse 18711, Siémkhya and Yoga are described as two very ancient systems (saudtane dve) by the side of ‘all Vedas’ 2. e., Samhitaés, Brahmanas, Aran- yakas and Upanishads). Here we certainly meet with a tradition of that contrast which once had really existed. That the Samkhya philosophy appears in later times among the orthodox systems, is not to be won- dered at; the fact proves that this system, on account of its sober lucidness, has stood its ground against Ve- dantic supernaturalism, and that consequently the Brahmans have adopted it, owing to their great abili- ty of appropriating all intellectual elements of impor- tance; as they have, for instance, incorporated into the body of their doctrines the religion of the Bha- gavatas or Pancharatras which was originally equally 4 Xxli _ INTRODUCTION. unvedic. The least nominal acknowledgment of the Veda and of the prerogatives of the Brahmans was surely sufficient for a system passing as orthodox; and if the Buddhists had not refused to acknowledge -the authority of the Vedas and of the Brahmans, they might, without any essential alteration of their doc- trines, have become a Brahmanical sect, and Buddha a Rishi, like his predecessor Kapila... From this view the fact that the SAamkhya doctrines, in spite of their high antiquity, are met with in the Brahmanical literature not earlier than in the well-known passages of the Katha, Maitri, S’vetasvatara, 12128108, and other younger Upanishads, becomes comprehensible. The whole subject will be treated more fully in the first chapters of my work on the SAmkhya philosophy, where I intend especially to refute the idea which sometimes finds expression that there exists a connec- tion between the cosmogonical theories of the Vedas and the Samkhya doctrine of evolution. The former are popular mythology, and the latter is the result of philosophical investigation based on an inductive method of argument. For this and other reasons I maintain also that the Prakriti (primitive Matter) of the Samkhya system has nothing to do with the primordial water of the Vedic mythology which either itself produces the world, or from which the creator produces it (Rigveda X. 129. 3,4; VI. 50. 7; X. 80. 10; 82.6; 121. 7,8; Atharvaveda lV. 2. 6; X. 7. 10; Taittiriya Samhita 5.6.4.2; 7.1.5.1; S’ata- 1 Even so, Buddha has come to be regarded as an Avatara of Vishnu in the wild syncretistic speculations of the modern Hindus. INTRODUCTION. XXlll patha Brahmana 11. 1. 6. 1, 2; 14. 8.6.1 and very frequeutly elsewhere; cf. Weber, Indische Studien IX. 2, 74, Scherman, Philosophische Hymnen p. 6—9). When I prepared the edition of the two Samkhya texts’ the translation of which I lay before the public herewith, I had the conviction that no manuscript of the Aniruddhavritti was existing in the India Of- fice Library, since Mr. F. E. Hall, on page VI of his edition of Ballantyne’s Samkhya Aphorisms (London 1885) does not mention a MS. belonging to the I. O. L., when speaking of the MSS. of Aniruddha’s work which were within his reach. I omitted for this reason to make an inquiry, and I must confess that this was a fault of mine. On the receipt of my edition, however, Dr. R. Rost informed me to my surprise of the existence of such a MS. in the library under his charge, and kindly placed the same at my disposal. An examination of this MS. showed that my regrettable neglect had fortunately not caused any very serious detriment to my edition of the Ani- ruddhavritti, and that the loss that had been incurred might easily be repaired in this volume. Three or four passages which were susceptible of improvement by consulting that MS. have been corrected in notes appended to this translation, and all the varie lec- tiones are added at the end. The MS. is numbered 2044, and has 69 leaves. It is legibly and correctly written in Devanagari cha- 1 Published in the Bibl. Ind. in 1888. XX1V - INTRODUCTION. racter, and dated Samvat 1875, 2. e., 1819 A. D. It belongs to the same class as the MS. which is marked Bin my edition. This is ascertained by the fact that, according to my counting, these two MSS. have 165 readings in common which differ from the text of my edition, while the I. 0. L. MS. shares only in 58 readings of this kind with A, C, or AC. On pages VII—IX of the preface to my edition of Aniruddha’s commentary, various arguments were advanced to show that Aniruddha lived about 1500 A.D. This conclusion has, in the most desirable manner, been confirmed by a notice in R. G. Bhan- darkar’s Report on the search for Sanskrit Manu- scripts in the Bombay Presidency during the year 1883-84 (Bombay 1887), p. 82. Here we are in- formed that a commentary on S‘atananda’s Bhasvati- karana has been composed by Aniruddha, son of Bha- vasgarman and grandson of Mahaéarman, and that. the author gives in this work the year 1520 (Samvat, or 1464 A. D.) as the date of his birth, and the 31st year of his life (or 1495 A. D.) as the time when he wrote this astronomical commentary. The proper name Aniruddha is of such rare occurrence that there is no probability of the astronomer and the philosopher being two different contemporaneous persons. The time of Vedantin Mahadeva, however, whom I have tentatively placed about 1600 A. D. is really the end of the seventeenth century. For I learn from Aufrecht’s admirable Catalogus Catalogorum p. 436 —and could have learned earlier from Professor We- ber’s equally admirable Verzeichniss der Sanskrit- INTRODUCTION. xxv und Prakrit-Hand-schriften der Kéniglichen Biblio- thek zu Berlin II. (1886) No. 1524, p. 113—that our ` Mahadeva, the pupil of Svayamprakaééa Tirtha (or ° Sarasvati, or ° Ananda Sarasvati), composed his Vishnusahasranima-tika in 1694 A. D. I leave the translations and explanations contained in this volume to the judgment of Sanskrit scholars without a word either of recommendation or of ex- tenuation. I must, however, gratefully acknowledge my obligations to my learned friend Pandit Hara- praséd Shastri, M.A., of Calcutta, who in spite of his many official engagements kindly undertook to read a proof of this work. His services were most valu- able to me in two ways. He corrected my English, and made numerous ingenious suggestions which led to the improvement of my translation in many places. As Pandit Harapras&d is not only an excellent Sans- kritist but also one of the few native scholars who fully appreciate the European method of scientific research, I could not have secured better assistance. Ké6nigsberg i/Pr. R. GARBE. Digitized by Google ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, TRANSLATED. BOOK I. SALUTATION TO THE HOLY 60^ 264 ! Om ! Salutation to the primordial cause of developed Matter | Having worshipped the remover of obstacles (Ganefa), Vishnu, Siarya, Sarasvati, Lakshmi, Ganga, and the great Lord (S'iva), I begin to compose the commentary.? Man, forsooth, devotes himself to the doctrine of liberation ` 7 consequence of indifference [to worldly pleasures and pains]. Indifference is twofold, that caused by sorrow and the like, and that resulting from the extinction of the demerit of former existences. In this sense, Scripture says: “On which day soever he becomes indifferent, on that day he should renounce the world.”’ And he who has devoted him- self to the doctrine [aforesaid] becomes liberated in conse- quence of the higher indifference (para-vairdgya).* So says Patanjali: “The consciousness of being the subjugator in one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scrip- tural objects, is indifference. That [indifference] is the higher one which is freedom from thirst after the constitu- tive powers (guna), which [freedom] results from the know- ledge of Soul” (१ ०९४७४ 1. 15, 16). To teach this higher * Aniruddha’s commentary is a vritti, while Vijianabhikshu has composed a bhdshya. The difference is this: a vritti isa commentary which gives the accepted and traditional interpretation, while one can put in new interpreta- tions ina bhdshya. > The latter of the two kinds of indifference, described above, is intended. 2 +" 4 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 1. indifference, the very compassionate great sage Kapila who desired to save the world composed the first aphorism, when beginning the doctrine of liberation. Om! Salutation to [the Lord] who consists of existence, think- ing and delight ! Having acquainted myself with Aniruddha’s commentary and having understood the Samkhya doctrine, Mahadeva, called the Ved&ntist, draws up the quintessence of the [said] commentary. The great sage Kapila, desirous of saving the world, seeing that the knowledgé of the excellence of the fruit is, through the long- ing [which it engenders] for the fruit, the cause of [people’s] devoting themselves to the means [by which the fruit is attained], describes the excellence of the fruit: 1. ‘Well, the absolute cessation of the threefold pain is the absolute aim of Soul. ‘Well’ (atha), this [word] serves as an auspicious omen, but it does not denote subsequence to any action, because [६6 idea of] subsequence is out of place on account of Scripture which says: ^ On which day etc.’! Besides, the utterance of an auspicious word is befitting at the beginning of an undertaking; and the word atha is to be found in use 88 expressing an auspicious omen : “The word om and the word atha, these two broke through Brah- man’s throat and came out in times of yore; therefore both of them are auspicious.” As for the ‘threefold pain,’ the bodily and the mental are jreckoned as] one, because they are comprised in ‘that due to one’s self’ (ddhydtmika) ; the [pain] due to the beings [of outer world, the ddhibhautika] is that which is caused by beasts, birds and the like; the [pain] due to supernatural influences 2 Cf. the introduction to this aphorism.—The word atha does not here mean ‘after something ’, because what follows after the word atha is not subsequent to anything, but is the absolute beginning of a new thing. ॥, 1.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 3 (ddhidaivika) is that which is caused by planets, १९०१००४ and the like. ‘But then, do not these cease of their own accord, as pains last [only] two or three moments?” To this [the author] gainsays [the word] ‘absolute.’ Not the cessation of some special pains is intended, but that of [everything] which belongs to the genus pain. For the cessation of the future [pains] also is what is meant by the word ‘absolute.’ Merit, wealth, pleasure and liberation are human aims, but the [first] three are not absolute, because of their evanes- cent character [and] because of their being [the same as} 28 [10688 arising from [perceptible] objects. [The state] of liberation, however, is not so, because [liberation] is eternal, being nothing else but Light [which is the essence of Soul]. Therefore it is said: ‘the absolute aim of Soul.’ ‘Let the cessation of pain be Soul’s aim ; still, as this is attained to already by visible and easy means, what sober man will betake himself to the restraint of the thinking organ and to other difficult means! which are to be obtained from the Institutes and to be applied with success [only] by the toil of many successive births? So it is said: “If you find honey [in a hole] of the Arka-tree [on your way], why will you go to the [००४] mountains ? The desired thing being at hand, what sensible man will take pains [to obtain it] ?’’? For the case is this: medicines and other [remedies] bring on the cessation of bodily pains; beautiful women, delicate food and the like bring on the cessation of mental pains; different ways, taught by those who declare the contents of the Institutes of polity, cause the cessation of the pains due to the beings [of the outer world]; propitiatory ceremonies (sdnti), gems, spells and the like [viz., amulets, diagrams etc.], cause the cessation of pains due to supernatural in- ee 2 Viz., gravana-manana-nididhydsandds. 9 This Sloka occurs in the S’abarabhashya to the Mim&amesasitra 1, 2. 4 and in the Simkhyatattvakaumudi in the Vritti to Karika 1. 4 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [1. 1. fluences.” With reference to this [objection] the second aphorism [declares]: The word ‘ well’ serves as a benediction.—The absolute cessation of the threefold pain, viz., of that due to one’s self, of that due to the beings [of the outer world] and of that due to supernatural influences,—7?. ¢., the cessation characterized by the non-revival of [anything] which belongs to the genus pain—is the absolute aim of Soul; that is to say, itis the highest among the four aims of Soul [or human aims], merit, wealth, pleasure and liberation; because the [first] three are transitory, whereas liberation, ४. e., the said cessation, is not transitory. This is the meaning. As regards those [different kinds of pain], the pain due to one’s self is bodily and mental. The bodily one is caused by disturbances of the windy, bilious and phlegmatic humours, the mental one is produced by love, choler, lust, delusion, envy and the like ; both are due to one’s self because of their being appeasable by inner remedies; there- fore, people denote either by the term inner [pain]. The one due to the beings [of the outer world] is caused by beasts, birds, plants and the like, the one due to supernatural influences by planets etc. People denote these two kinds by the term outer [pain]. ‘But then, let the aforesaid cessation be the absolute aim of Soul; still, what reason is there for betaking one’s self to a doc- trine which is the cause of the knowledge of truth, z. e., of the cognizance of the difference between Matter! and Soul? For, as there exist medicines etc. for the cure of bodily pains, beautiful wo- men, delicate food etc. for that of mental pains, [remedies] taught in the Institutes of polity, such as residing in safe places etc., to cure the pains due to the beings [of the outer world], and gems, spells, powerful herbs etc., to cure the pains due to supernatural in- fluences—T(all these remedies] being easily attainable—, it will be hard to find somebody who might betake himself to that very difficult knowledge of truth which is to be gained [only] by the toil of many successive births, and, therefore, [still] harder to * Sattva ‘the first of the three constituents (guna) of [primitive] Matter (prakriti)’ is sometimes used in the sense of prakriti (pars pro toto). I. 2, 3.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 5 find somebody who might devote himself to a doctrine [for ‘that purpose].” To this [the author] replies: 2. This is not effected by visible [means], because even after the cessation the recurrence is seen. We do not say that the cessation [of pain] simply is Soul’s aim, but [we mean] the cessation of [its] arising [again]. And pain does not necessarily cease in consequence of [the application of] medicines etc. $ or, if [the pain] ceases some- how, there is no certainty that another would not be again. Let [even] the cessation of pain [be obtainable by visible means]; still, this is not Soul’s aim, because such obviating must be undertaken again andagain. Therefore [the author] utters [the following aphorisms] This is not effected, ५४. e., the absolute cessation of pain is not effected, by visible [means], that is to say: by the aforesaid medi- cines etc. Why [not]? Because—‘ immediately’ is to be sup- plied—after the cessation, 7. e., after the cessation of pain, its recurrence 18 seen, ४. e., the arising [again] of something belonging to the genus pain is seen. The meaning is this: not by the afore- said remedies a cessation of pain is [brought about] which is characterized by the non-revival of pain, because, though this or that pain may have been destroyed by this or that remedy, the arising of other pains is seen. Therefore, the knowledge of truth is to be sought for, though it be not easily obtainable. «९ But then, granted that the cessation of future pains is not [to be effected] by medicines etc., applied formerly ; still, if the obviating is undertaken again and again, the cessation of future pains may take place also.” [The author] apprehends [that this line of argument may be taken by an opponent] : 3. ‘As hunger is daily obviated, Soul’s aim [may be attained] by practising the obviation of it [viz., of pain].” “Ags Soul’s aim [is attained], in the case of one satisfied, 6 ANIRUPDHA’S COMMENTARY. [I. 3, 4. by daily eating excellent food etc. for the sake of obviating hunger, so Soul’s aim [may be attained] by the constant obviation by medicines etc. for the sake of the cessation of pain,” [The author] states his dogma: ‘Whenever pain shall arise, it is to be obviated; and thus the cessation of pain is Soul’s aim; as, whenever there is hunger, one must eat, and, in this case,] the cessation of hunger in the eater is Soul’s aim.” [The author] establishes his dogma: 4. Because they are not always to be had, and because, even if they were to be had, the existence is still possible, [such an aim] must be rejected by those who are experienced in logical proofs. For there are not physicians [nor medicines] etc. to be had in every place nor at all times; and, even if they were to be had, the absolute cessation of the threefold pain would not take place. For desire etc. must necessarily exist be- cause of [the existence of] the body, and experience teaches ((drishtam) that.no one possessing a body is happy. There- fore, this Soul’s aim [mentioned by the opponent] must be rejected by those who are acquainted with logical proofs, and that [aim] which is attainable by [our] philosophy must be accepted. [The author] mentions another reason: For there are not physicians etc. in every place and at all times. .*Even if they were to be had’ means: even if physicians etc. were at hand, ‘ because the existence is still possible’: because the existence of pain is still possible. For pain cannot with cer- tainty be cured even by physicians and the like, with medicines etc. Moreover, when bodily or some other pain has departed, there may still exist that which is mental or of some other kind ; so that there is no complete liberation from pain [attainable by I. 4—6. } ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 7 this method]. Therefore, such a Soul’s aim must be rejected by those who are experienced in logical proofs. [The author] mentions another reason : 5. Also because of the superiority of liberation, in accordance with Scripture which teaches [its] superiority to all [686]. Further, it is known that the cessations of the three kinds of pain are superior to each other, and that liberation is superior to all [of them], because it is eternal and one and identical with the removal of all pains.! And then, there is no such philosophical system in which liberation is not Soul’s aim; and, [likewise, it is a universal dogma that] liberation is not simply the cessation of pain (caused) by medicines etc. Hence [your—the opponent’s— objections do not seem to be meant very earnestly, but] your doctrine will be the same as ours. Therefore [the author] Says : One ought not to strive for the removal of this or that pain by these or those means, because liberation is superior [to all other cessations of pain] on account of being eternal and identical with the removal: of all pains. As Scripture also teaches the superiority [of liberation]: to all [else]: ‘There is nothing higher than the gaining [the isolation] of Soul,” one ought to strive only for the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [1. ९, of liberation ]. ‘But then, if the word ‘ liberation ’ is used, it is [to be] under- stood ‘from bondage.’ Now, is this bondage essential or adventi- tious ? In the former case, it cannot be destroyed ; in the latter, it will perish by itself. Of what use, then, is the knowledge of truth ?” To this [objection the author] answers : 6. And there is no difference in both [cases]. ग TI, e., the céssation of a mental pain may be superior to the cessation of a physical pain, etc., but the cessation of all pains is superior to all other cessations. ॥ 8 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. | I. 6—8. Only if [an opponent’s] own opinion is proved to be correct, the opinion of his adversary may be censured, but not otherwise. And thus it is said: ५५ पर 1616 one mistake is common to both, the refutation also is the same; the one is not to be asked [by the other] in the discussion of such an object.’’? ५८ Does the instruction about the means for liberation refer to one bound essentially, or is the case different ?’? With regard to this [question the author] says: Whether bondage be essential or adventitious, makes no differ- ence as to the necessity of striving for liberation. We can tell both how to account for bondage and liberation, [and we shall do so immediately]. This is the sense. Now, in order to demonstrate the nature of bondage and liber- ation, [the author] gives at first the arguments contradictory to bondage’s being essential : 7. The enjoining of the means for the liberation of one bound essentially would be impracticable. Because, [if one bound essentially could be liberated,! the essence would perish, ४, ¢., the perishing of the real nature would take place, [which is an impossibility]. And it is said: “In reality (vastusthityd) there is neither bondage, nor, in the ab- sence of it, liberation ; both are created by ignorance, [but really] both are nothing.” This [the author] confirms : 8. Since the essential nature is imperishable, [Scripture] would be unauthoritative, inasmuch as [its injunctions] could not be executed. 2 The meaning of this verse, applied to the case in question, is the follow- ing. The Samkhya says: ^" If my system can be charged with such a mistake, yours is subject to the same treatment, whether you be a Vedantist or a Naiydyika etc.; to what purpose, then, do we dispute?’ Aniruddha’s ex- planation is based on the supposition that the opponent is not a Charvaka. I, 8—11.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 9 Since bondage could not vanish, if it were eternal by nature, the execution {of Scripture’s injunctions] for the sake of its destruction would [in that case] be impossible. ५५ [ए प्(] somebody may teach something impossible, too, in order to deceive [others], as for instance: ‘ [Come along, I shall show you a man who holds] hundred herds of ele- phants on his finger’s end.’” To this [objection the author] replies : 9. The enjoining of something impossible 18 impracticable ; though [such a thing] be enjoined, it is no [real] injunction. [This 18] clear. [The author] ponders an objection : 10. If [somebody says:] ^“ As in the case of the white cloth and of the seed,”— “The destruction even of the essential nature is seen, as for instance, in the case of a cloth, the whiteness [is de- stroyed] by dies or [dirt], and [the germinating power of] the seed by the production of the sprout.” [The author] states his doctrine : 11. [As such cases are to be accounted for) by the appearance and non-appearance of some power, nothing impossible is enjoined, [when somebody is told to make some power or quality disappear]. Since the [eternal] existence of [all] products is estab- lished, the whiteness! of the cloth is not destroyed, but fonly] overcome by dies or [dirt], and it appears again in consequence of the washing. Likewise, by the production of the sprout [the germinating power of] the seed is not ग The whiteness of cotton is a product of water, air and light. 2 10 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 11—14. destroyed, but [only] overcome; its appearing again, how- ever, is not seen because of the heterogeneousness of the thing.! ‘But then, the Self may not be bound essentially, but it will be bound by Time.” To this [objection the author] replies : 12. Not from the connection with Time, because the omnipresent and eternal is associated with all. This* [opinion of the opponent] could be [correct], if this [Self] were sometimes connected with Time and sometimes not. [But this is known not to be the case,] because the eternal and omnipresent [Self] is subject to the association with all time. It is called ‘ eternal’ because of the asso- ciation [of Soul] with all time; the word ‘ omnipresent’ is added to no perceptible purpose (sampdtdydtam) on account of the following aphorisms being brought into consider- ation. ८ [The Self] will be bound by Space.” To this [objection the author] replies : 18, Nor from the connection with Space either, for that very reason. Because the omnipresent and eternal [Self] is associated with all Space. ‘Then it will be bound in consequence of a condition.” To this [the author] replies : 14. Not 7) consequence of a condition, because this is a property of the body. ‘This,’ 2. ¢., condition. ‘ Because [this] is a property of the body’ is [only] an elliptical argumentation; [in reality there are many reasons against this allegation, and] the main point is: because [Soul] is invariable. + A bad subterfuge ! 9 Ayam, viz., pakshah. I, 15—17.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 11 ‘(But such] a condition will belong to the Self also.” To this [the author] replies : 15. Nothing adheres to this Soul. ‘Nothing adheres to this Soul’ is a passage in Scrip- ture (cf. Brih. Up. 4. 8. 16; ; this would be untrue, [if the opponent’s opinion that Soul also may be conditioned were correct]. “(The Self] may be bound by the works.” This [the author] refutes : 16. Not by the works, because these are the property of another, and because there would be an extension beyond limits. Because the Self is void of qualities, the works are not the property of the Self, [but of the eternal organ]. ^ But” [the opponent goes on to object] “it [the Self] will be bound by the works, though these be the property of an- other.” This is not correct; for nothing is imposed on one thing by the property of another, because [in that case] the variety of the universe could not be accounted for,' and ‘because there would be an extension beyond limits’, 7. «., even the liberated Selfs would be subject to being bound [again], the difference [of every soul from the owner of the works] being all the same; (and thus there would bea state of things which is desired not even by the opponent}. (The author] states another argument contradictory [to the opponent’s view] : 17. There could not be diverse experience, [if Soul were bound by works!, while these are the property of another. 1 I. €. Everything ought to be homogeneous, if there were a transition of qualities from one thing to the other. 12 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 17—19. As is known, some are happy and some are miserable. Now, there is nobody by whom works conducive to happiness or works conducive to pain have not been done in the be- ginningless series of mundane existences. If [therefore] effects were produced in one by the property [४ ९.) by the merit and demerit] of another, all ought to be either happy or miserable. «५ [ Still, ] effects may be produced in one by the property of another, and Matter may be the regulator. Bondage will belong to that soul for which it is operating.”’ To this [the author] replies: 18. If [you say: ‘‘ Bondage'] is caused by Matter,” [I gainsay thereto]: No, that also is de- pendent on another. Because Matter also is omnipresent and, therefore, equally associated with all souls, a regulation [of bondage and liberation] cannot be [effected simply by Matter] without works. Hence that also is dependent on works. And the reason contradictory to this [viz., to work’s being the cause of bondage] has been stated [in aphorism 16] < Tf the Self’s bondage 18 not caused by Matter etc. [wiz., by Time, Space, conditions or works], and if it does not belong [to Soul] essentially, then instruction in the doctrine of liberation is useless.”” ‘To this [the author] replies : 19. [The Self] which 18, by nature, eternally pure, intelligent and free, does not stand in connection with this, when there is no connection with that. ‘Pure,’ ४, e., void of qualities ; ‘intelligent,’ 2. ¢., clear [as a crystal, £, e., not tainted by the affections of the internal organ]; ‘does [not] stand in connection with this,’ z. €, 1 Supply baddhatdé and compare the end of Vijianabhikshu’s commentary on this aphorism. 1. 19—21.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 18 ‘does [not] stand in connection with bondage; ‘ when there 18 no connection with that,’ ६, e., when there is no connection with Matter. Without non-discrimination bondage never belongs to the Self, but from non-discrimination springs the egotizing delusion (abhimana) that there is bondage. And this [delusion], forsooth, is to be removed by instruction in four] doctrine. “Then its (the Self’s] bondage will be [produced] by ignorance.” To this [the author] replies : 20. Nor from ignorance either, since bondage cannot be [caused] by a non-entity. For ignorance is either anterior or posterior non-existence of knowledge. In both cases it is a non-entity, and by a non-entity the bondage of an entity, as the Self is, cannot be [caused]. Therefore, the sentence ‘ bondage is [caused] by ignorance’ is merely an expression, [but] not (an exact statement of} truth. “Let ignorance be [neither anterior nor posterior non- existence of knowledge, but simply] something different from knowledge and an entity.” To this (objection, made by a follower of S’ankara, the author] replies : But if [a Sankara declares] ignorance [to] be an entity, [the author] says : 21. If [you declare ignorance to] be an entity, [your] doctrine is given up. For us (Saémkhyas] ignorance, indeed, [might be real; but] if it were real, it could not be destroyed, and hence there would be no liberation. But for [you,] the asserters of non-duality, ignorance cannot be real, [as you admit only one reality, vz., Soul]. For [us and other] asserters of duality, however, a real thing that is without beginning cannot perish, and, therefore, [such] an instruction [as given by you] is idle. 14 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [I. 22, 28. (The author] adduces another argument against [the Opponent] : [This is] clear. 22, And a duality of heterogeneous things would | offer itself. If ignorance [18 declared by you to] be real and without a beginning, then [you must admit that] it is eternal and coordinate with the Self. And if itis not the Self [which it cannot be according to your doctrine], then there exists a duality of heterogeneous things. < वला such may be the state of [all] other things; but ignorance will [form an exception and] be perishable, though real and without a beginning.”” This [the opposing S’an- kara] says [in the following aphorism] : For those [viz., the adherents of Sankara] hold that there is neither a duality of homogeneous nor of heterogeneous things, [while the Simkhyas accept both, a plurality of homogeneous souls and a duality of heterogeneous things, 9 e., of Soul and Matter]. [The author] ponders a [fresh] objection [of the same op- ponent] : 23. If it [be said to] have the nature of both these opposites,— ‘‘(Ignorance] may have the nature of [both things] op- posite to each other, ९ ¢., it may be without beginning, [able to cause the bondage of Soul and, therefore, an entity] as well as perishable and, therefore, having the character of {a non-entity, 2. ¢., of] antecedent non-existence {of know- ledge j.” [To this objection the author] gives the [following] answer : ‘“Tgnorance is not real—else a duality of heterogeneous things would offer itself—nor unreal either, because its effects are per- 1, 24—26. } ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 15 ceived; bat it is real as well as unreal.” If [the Sdnkara says 80, he gets the following reply]: 24, No, because such a thing cannot be ima- gined. Such a thing is imagined nowhere, by nobody and never. ‘If [it were] so {as you Samkhyas assert], to which predicament do Matter and [your] other [principles] belong, as they are different from the six categories [of the Vai- éeshikas] ¢ With reference to this [question the author] declares : 25. Weare not asserters of six categories, like the Vais’eshikas, etc. [This is] clear. “If [you say that] there is no definite number of cate- gories, how [is it that you state] twenty-five principles 9" With reference to this [question the author] declares :! By the word ‘etc.’ the Naiydyika is meant; for he is the as- serter of sixteen categories, 26. Though there is no definite [number], the absurd is not to be accepted; else we should be equal to children, madmen and the like, We do not say that there are only six categories, but we do not, nevertheless, accept what is not proved by argu- ments; else we should be like children and madmen. And thus [it is said]: ‘‘[Even] on account of the word of an authority the great gods do not fall down from heaven ; [only] that sentence which is proved by arguments is to be accepted by me and by others who are like you.” ग There is the following connection between this introduction and apho- rism 26: Although we say that twenty-five principles will explain the phe- nomena of the world, we admit that there is no definite number of categories and consider the Vaiseshikas as decidedly unreasonable. 16 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. {1. 27, 28. _ [The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Buddhists : 27. Likewise, its [bondage] is not caused by a beginningless influence of the objects. ५८ ८ Tts,’ 2. ९.; the Self’s, bondage will be caused by the be- ginningless [series of] impressions that are produced by the objects: this [doctrine of the Buddhists] is not [true]. Firstly, for ws there exists no connection of the Self with any impression, and, therefore, bondage cannot be [through such an influence. On the other hand] according to the theory of the Buddhists there is no permanent Self, and, therefore, an impression, too, cannot last such a long time! [9.8 bondage exists] ; hence, who 18 bound ? ‘The continuity of [momentary] Selfs will be bound by the continuity of impressions [which proceed] from the in- fluence of the external things.” To this [fresh objection of the Buddhist the author] replies : 28. Again, between the external and the inter- nal there is not the relation of influenced and in- fluencer because of the local separation, as [there is no such relation] between the nhabitant of Srughna and that of Pataliputra. If (the following] should be said [by the Buddhist]: “Between the sun and a vessel filled with water [10 which the sun reflects}, the relation of influenced and influencer is also seen,” [we reply:] There [in the example] the in- fluence proceeds from the connection with the rays, kere [in our case] there is no sach connection.—If (the Buddhist goes on objecting: ‘“‘ The connection exists] by means of the impressions,” [we say :] No! since these do not last a suffi- 2 Because there would be no recipient (4éraya). I, 28- 80. ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, 17 ciently long time,! how can there be a connection ?—If [he declares that the influence is exerted} on the continuity (aforesaid, we reply £] If [the Self] to which you ascribe this continuity (samtdnin) is (regarded by you 881] distinct (from the continuity], you abandon your doctrine [of the momentariness of the Self, because you acknowledge a per- manent Self implicitly]. Or is [the Self regarded by you 88] not distinct (from the continuity]? Still, something must be done by it [to bring forth the continuity]. Such doing, however, is impossible, as (the Self] is momentary {in your opinion]. And if you deny this doing, of what use 18 (your stating] such a thing* which is equal to a non-entity 9 ५५ Granted that the influence on the internal is not [effec- ted] by impressions. [But], as the Self is omnipresent, the in- fluence will take place in consequence of the Self’s connection with some external place.”” To this {the author) replies :— 29. For both there would be no distinction, if the influence were received in some special place. For the asserters of one (all-pervading] Self [the S’énkaras] there cannot be a distinction [between the liberated and the bound soul under these circumstances], because the influ- ence would be always received and hence no liberation [could take place]. For [us and other] asserters of a multiplicity of Selfs, however, there cannot be [such] a distinction [on the said supposition], since all [souls} would be connected with all objects, and, therefore, the same perception would arise [in all souls] simultaneously. [The author] ponders a [fresh] objection : 30. If [the Buddhist says: “This distinction may be] occasioned by the invisible [power],”’— 1 Cf, the commentary to the preceding aphorism. 9 Viz., the samtdnin. 3 18 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [I. 30—83. “Though in consequence of the constant connection [with all objects] perception becomes everywhere possible, still, when a perception arises by means of the invisible [power of merit and demerit,] belonging to this or that [soul], this [invisible power] is the cause of that [perception]. There- fore, perception does not extend to everything [simultaue- ously, and so the distinction of bound and liberated souls ‘is not set aside by our doctrine].” [The author] offers the refutation [of this objection]: 81. This is an abstract of a portion in the Bauddha chapter of the Sarva- darSanasamgraha, as I have already stated in the Preface to the edition of the Aniruddhavyitti, p. VIII. Myr. Gough’s translation of that passage is far from being clear. 20 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [. 85—37. length elsewhere and, therefore, it is not diseussed here in a detailed manner. ~ 2 (The author] adduces another argument against [the Buddhist]: 386. And because it is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning. Scripture teaches that there is a [permanent] soul which enjoys what must be enjoyed in later births, and reasoning {teaches}: if works do not bear fruits to be enjoyed [here- after], who, forsooth, will betake himself to performing them? ‘{But] we see” [the opponent objects] “that com- passionate people act [for others] without expectation [of reward.” To this we reply:] No, for even in this case they gain merit themselves by bestowing [benefits] on others, and, though it be not their intention to obtain merit, this will be a means for their liberation. [The author] adds a further argument against [the Buddhist’s theory ]: 87. And because the example is not valid. Since [from your standpoint] everything forms part of the subject under discussion (paksha), you cannot allege an example, [as you have done in aphorism 82; and, there- fore, there is really no base for arguing with you. And] if [you say that everything] does not form part [of the subject which is being discussed ], the very! [thing you ex- cept] is a permanent one, [and by admitting such exception you abandon your doctrine of the momentariness of all things]. ^< But then, the momentariness of that also [which we except and which may serve as example] may be proved by some other reason.’’ Even in this case the example would not be valid [on account of the want of parallelism]. 1 Sa, viz., apravishf{drthah or °vishayah. I. 38, 39.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 21 {The author] teaches [now], that, [in contrast with the Buddhist’s doctrine in aphorism 34), practical efficiency is impossible on the theory of the momentary duration [of all things]: 88. The relation of cause and effect cannot exist between two things coming simultaneously into existence, [. e., between that thing which is characterized by itself [wiz., the cause] and its practical efficiency [viz., its effect], if [the former did not exist previously to the latter, but] if both came simultaneously into existence, like the left and the other (the right] horn [of the cow]. This is for rather will be] explained frequently [in the present volume]. ‘‘The relation of cause and effect will simply be a conse- quence of the existing in prior and subsequent time.” To this [fresh objection of the Buddhist the author} replies: Does the relation of cause and effect [or product] exist between the clay and the jar, as simultaneously coming into existence, or as successive ? The former is not the case, because there is no reason in favour of this side of the alternative (vinigamaka), and because, [if this were true,] it would not be fit for a man who wants a jar, to operate with clay etc. Nor is the latter the case, as [the author] says [in the following aphorism | : 39. Because, when the prior departs, the subse- quent cannot arise. It might be so, [as you say], if [the prior] did place some surplus {into the subsequent]. This, [however,] is impos- sible [on your theory], since [you declare that everything] is momentary.! + According to the Sdmkhya doctrine, the product is nothing else but the material cause in a different condition (avasthd). 22 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 40, 41. {The author] elucidates this : 40. Moreover, [this is] not [correct], because, while the one exists, the other cannot be, and the two keep always asunder, Moreover, the relation of cause and effect cannot exist [on your theory] for the following reason: at the time, when the relation between the cause and its result [manifests it- self to us], the effect cannot exist [in your opinion], because the two [must] always keep asunder, [if things are mo- mentary]. But let alone [the argument of] practical effi- ciency [of the cause]; itis altogether improper [for you] to use such expressions as ‘this is the cause, this is the effect.’! | “But then, the existence of the cause at the time [of the existence | of the product is to no purpose; [the nature of a cause] will be [determined] by the mere existence in prior time.” To this [the author] replies : 41. If [causality] consisted merely in priority, there would be no determination. ° Does (that kind of causality which you accept] pertain to something belonging to a different continuity or to the same continuity [of momentary existences as the product]? If [you say] “to something belonging to a different continuity,” there would be an extension beyond limits ; and if {you say] “to something belonging to the same continuity,’ there would be [on your theory] an absolute (niranvaya) destruction [of the cause before the product arises]. Hence this [supposed cause belonging to the same continuity] would 1 Tatha hi: yo jandti, sa vyavaharati; na ca kdrya-kdranayor ekakdla- vurtamdnatvam bhavad-avasthdydm asti, tena kdrya-kdrana-jiidnamp na dbhavi- shyati, Pandit. I, 41, 42. | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 23 be equal to [a cause] belonging to a different continuity, and, for this reason, there would be no determination [of the material cause of this or that product]. And that no connection exists [between cause and product], is [expressly] declared [by you]. ‘¢But we see that even a non-entity can be the cause, as for instance, when a buffalo or another [animal] dies after the shot of an archer. [In this case, only] after [the death of the buffalo, the archer] is the agent with regard to the death of the [animal] wounded by the arrow ; (but if the wounded buffalo does not die or if it is not hit upon, the archer is simply a shooter. Therefore, we deny that there is a cause for the archer’s being the killer of the animal.” To this objection we reply:] No, because in this case also there is a connection [of the killer] with the death [of the animal] through the action [of the former, viz., through the ‘shooting J. It was said [by the Buddhistic opponent in the introduc- tion to aphorism 28], that bondage results from the influence of the external things. [This assertion having been dis- proved, the author] refutes [now the Yogachdra-Buddhist] who asserts that Thought only exists, (vijiidna-vddin) [and who rises in opposition by saying : | ‘‘ But an external thing, too, does not exist, since the [whole] world consists of Thought.” 42. Not Thought alone, because of the concep- tion of the external. The world is not Thought alone. If it were so, there could be [only] the conception ‘I am a jar,”! but not ‘ This 18 a jar.’ If [the opponent objects: ^^ The latter conception may arise] from a special impression,” [फल reply:] No, since, on the theory that external things do not exist, there 1 Because Thought is the essential nature of the Self (dtmasvaripa). 24 ANIRUDDHA’S8 COMMENTARY. [1. 42. can be no impression [having the form] of a jar, how is [the existence of] a special [impression possible]? Moreover, {we must ask:] Is the cause of [your supposed] impression again nothing but a (pure] impression [or disposition], or is it the impression [left by a previous perception] of something external? If you accept the latter,! then there 18 something besides [Thought], and, therefore, this very object is the external thing [we declare to be existent]. = ^ But” [the Opponent says] “there is no external object, because a whole which is distinct from its parts does not exist, that is to say: because the parts and the whole are one on account of being perceived as one.” [To this we reply: Sometimes |] the whole moves, when a part moves [f. ९०५ a tree shaken by a storm; but sometimes] the whole does not move, while a small part [moves, f. i., a tree touched by a mild wind]. By perceiving [the latter, viz.,] that [the whole] does not move, [while parts move], opposite properties are attributed {to the whole and to its parts], whence follows that [the two] are distinct and, therefore, not one. Likewise, [other] arguments may be adduced against [the identity of the whole with its parts, for example:] that [the part] is dyed [f. «, in the case of a cloth], or covered [f. ५. in the case of the human body], or belonging to a special place [f. ५. in the case of a tree some twigs of which reach into the neighbour- ing compound] etc.,? while [the whole] is not so. [But] granted [even] that the whole be not [something distinct from its parts], still [the existence of] the external objects is not to be denied, because an aggregate of atoms [—to use the term of the Vaiseshikas—| is apprehended as extensive. {To this the १ ०९१८०४7४ opposes again by saying:] ^^ No, 2 The answer to the former side of the question is not found sooner than on page 24, line 5 of my edition: vdsanaiveti pakshe. 2 Adi means, among other things, tatkdlatvud-’tatkdlatva ; an example for this possibility may be a cow which has been destroyed and of which only the horns are left. 1. 42.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 25 for the atom can be inferred only from the whole, [that is to say,]| from the product; [and] if this does not exist, [as we assert], from what is [the atom] to be inferred? [More- over], since the atoms are beyond the reach of the senses, and their aggregate has no additional property whatever given to it, the conception ‘this [aggregate] is extensive’ is an erroneous one, and hence [we say:] ‘The world is Thought 91016. 2 With regard to these [objections] we declare: [All this is wrong], because, [as we have shown, ] the whole and its parts are distinct [from one another]. Again, as the two are different, the whole [viz., the tree] does not tremble, while some parts do so; but only where the majority of the parts does tremble, there the whole trembles. The same conclusion is to be arrived at also in the case of the contrariety of [the state of being] dyed and not dyed, etc. Therefore, [the existence of] the external object is an established fact.—And if you accept (the former side of the alternative propounded page 24, line 3, viz., that the cause of your supposed impression is again] nothing but a [pure] impression [or disposition, quite in- dependent from any external object], the perception [of everything | would always arise.! “Asa perception without objects is excluded by experi- ence (adar§andt), even perception does not exist on account of the non-existence of the objects.”’ This the asserter of the [absolute] void (sénya-vddin) says [in the following aphorism | :9 ‘From the example of the perception of what appears in dreams, * That is to say: if the efficiency of a certain dispositiun were not dependent on an external object, the time of the perception would be deter- mined by nothing. 2? Only Aniruddha ascribes Sttra 43 to the S’ankaka, the three other com- mentators consider it as spoken by the Saiddhantika. 4, 26 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, (T. 48—45. it follows that [perception] is possible even in the absence of objects.” With reference to this [objection the author] says: 43. ‘Since, as the one does not exist, the other [too] does not, there is the void then.” «८ 81066, as the objects do not exist, perception [too] does not, there is the [absolute] void. [Anud,] if some one declares that [perception] may have itself for its object, this is contradicted by the argument that the same thing cannot be subject as well as object (kartri-karma-virodha).” 44. ‘The void is the reality; the positive per- ishes, because perishing is the character of things.” ५ [7 the reality were of a positive nature, the reality would perish, because the positive perishes. In this case there would be no liberation. ‘ Because perishing is the character of things,’ 2. ¢., because things necessarily perish.” [106 author] justifies [now his doctrine]: 45. [This 18] a mere denial by unintelligent persons, [What the opponent says:] ^ Non-existence does not perish,” is a mere assertion, but not truth. ‘ Unintelligent persons’ are those who do not know the institutes of philo- sophy. [The objection is easily confuted by the following reasons: firstly,] because prior non-existence 18 seen to perish ; [secondly,] because the positive does not perish, as the [eternal] existence of [all] products is settled; [thirdly] because even, if [the opponent] uses the word ‘perishing’ in the sense of ‘disappearing, Matter and Soul do not perish. “But” [an orthodox philosopher may remark] “ there is no non-existence at all! Why, then, do you ponder over its perishing and non-perishing?” [170 this we reply:] How, then, does the perception arise ‘ there is no jar on the I, 45.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 27 ground’? If [you say that such perception] reste on the ground [simply], the perception of the non-existence of the jar ought to obtain [in the same manner] even [at the time], when the ground is possessed of the jar, since the ground [itself] remains in the same condition. [And] if [you object to this and declare :] ‘‘ The perception of the non-existence [of the jar] rests on the pure ground; when the jar is pre- sent, there is no purity,” [we must ask:] Is [this] purity simply the essential nature of the ground, or something dif- ferent from it? If [you say that] it is simply the essential nature, then this does exist even at the time when the jar is present, and, therefore, {then also] there ought to be the perception of the [jar’s] non-existence. And if you accept that [purity] is something different, this very thing is [our] non-existence.— Then” [the opponent goes on disputing } *‘you speak of the [jar’s] non-existence, when the ground is solitary; it is not solitary in the presence of the jar; where is the reason for speaking of non-existences ? ” This is not [proper; for let us ask:] Does ‘solitariness’ mean the being [only] one numerically, or does it mean something else? Now, the being [only] one numerically does obtain also when the ground is possessed of the jar; and if you accept that [solitariness] is something else, this very thing is [our] non-existence, [ which, by the bye, cannot be denied for the following reason : | if there were no hetero- geneousness of objects, [४ ¢., if the difference of existence and non-existence did not hold good], there could be no heterogeneousness of cognition. [ Another objection is raised now :] ^^ But, as a connection between the existent and the non-existent is not [possible], how can the perception of a non-existent thing take place P As, for example, the perception ‘this is a jar’ follows from the fact that the jar is observed, when it stands in connec- tion with the senses (indriydnvaya), and that it is not observed, when there is no connection [with the senses, क 28 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, [1. 45—47. indriya-vyatireka |—so the perception of a non-existent thing, too, ought to have the [same] cause, [that is to say: the perception of the non-existence of the jar ought to depend- on the connection of the senses with the said non-existence ; and such connection is impossible, because the senses are existent.”” To this we reply : ] The cause, forsooth, is to be determined from our acquaintance with the facts, but facts taught by experience cannot be denied [by means of apri- oristic speculations]. Again, since we are not asserters of a certain number of categories, some sort of connection adequate [to produce the perception of a non-existence } might well take place [in our opinion]. What harm is that to us? Hence non-existence is. {The author] alleges another argument: 46. This, too, because it shares in the fate of the two [other] doctrines. ‘This’ theory of the [absolute] void, ‘too,’ must be re- jected, because it shares in the fate of the doctrine that everything is momentary (cf. aph. 34), and in that of the doctrine that Thought alone exists (cf. apk. 42). As [the theory of] the momentariness was refuted by recognition through sense-perception [in aph. 35], and [the theory of the sole existence of] Thought by the perception of the ex- ternal things [in aph. 42], just so this theory of the [abso- lute] void, too, must be rejected, because we apprehend all things entirely by perception. [The author] states another argument against [this nihi- listic doctrine]: 41. There can be no Soul’s aim, in both ways. | If [you say that] the void is non-existence, what sensible man might endeavour after non-existence! {[And, therefore, in this case] the use of such positive expressions as ‘ Liber- I, 47—50. | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 29 ation is Soul’s aim’ would be unmeaning. Or is the void {in your opinion] something different from the existent as well as from the non-existent? As such a thing is contradicted by experience, also [in this case] there could be no Soul’s aim. In order to confute the asserter of the [absolute] void (thoroughly, the author] mentions the doctrine of the Jainas who hold that the Self is of the same extension as the body : 48. Itis not, because of the special kind of wandering.’ The void is not the reality, because the void cannot wander. And the wandering [of the soul] 18 learned [from the inati- tutes]. And so Scripture* says: ^ Yama pulled out by force the soul being as big as a thumb” (Mahabh. 8. 16763), ^ By bad deeds it goes to hell, by good deeds it goes to heaven, by knowledge it goes to Brahman’s world.” This [view which is superior to the nihilistic theory, but, nevertheless, not absolutely true, the author] refutes [in the following aphorism ]: 49. Because this {wandering} is impossible in the case of the [soul which 18 | immovable. {This is} clear. [The author] explains now the immovability [of the soul]: 50. If it were limited, likea jar etc., 1 would 1 TI. e., the void is not, because a special kind of wandering is ascribed to the Self which, for this reason, is declared by the Jainas to be of bodily extension. 2 It is very strange that Aniruddha declares a quotation from the Mahé: bharata as S’rati. | 80 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 50, 51. come under the same conditions; and this 18 a false doctrine, Jars and the like are limited and, [therefore,] movable. If {the soul] existed under the same conditions as these [things], it would be perishable; hence [the theory of the Jainas ] is a false doctrine. Moreover, at the time of trans- migration into another birth, the soul must [in the opinion of the Jainas] contract or expand, according as it assumes the bodily extension of an elephant or of a worm; for this reason it would consist of parts and, therefore, be not eternal. ५८ But thus you are in contradiction with the scriptural passage where [the soul is said to be as] big asa thumb etc. (Mahabh. 38. 16763).” To this [objection the author] replies : 51. Also the scriptural passages about the wan- dering are [to be understood] on account of the conjunction with an Upadhi, like [the motion of] the space. As the idea that the space within a jar moves, when [in reality only] the jar moves, depends on a special Upadhi, viz., on the jar or something like it,—just so the conception that the Self wanders depends on its being determined by the body etc. [viz. by the internal organ and by the senses]. “What 18 the use of [stating] an Upadhi? The differ- ence [of the liberated and of the bound soul] will [simply] result from the diversity of the works.” To this [the author | replies : Since the Self is unlimited according to the authority [of the Bhagavadgita 2. 24]: ‘Eternal, omnipresent and constant etc.,” the scriptural passages about the wandering [of the soul] are to be explained as meaning a wandering which belongs to the Upadhi. 7. 51--53.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 81 Moreover, [this is the right explanation], because we learn that the wandering [in question] depends on Matter, from the follow- ing scriptural verse : ५५ As, when 8 jar is carried, the space enclosed in the jar [seems to move], while [in reality only] the jar is carried, but not the space,—just so is the soul which may be compared with the ether [or space,” Brahmabinddpanishad 18], and, among others, from the following traditional verse : ‘‘Matter does the works, the nature of which it is to bear joyfal and sorrowful fruits ; and Matter, wandering through the three worlds at its will, enjoys [these fruits, too.” MahAbh. 12, 113076, 11808a] It has already been denied above [in aph. 16] that bondage is caused by works, in the shape of enjoined or forbidden actions. Now [the author] rejects also {the opinion that] it [bondage] arises from works, in the shape of their invisible power : 52. Not from works, too, because these are not the property of it [४ e., of the soul]. It would be so, {as you say], if works were the property of the Self. But the Self has no property whatever, because it is without qualities. ‘‘ Works, [however,} will be its property! What con- tradicts [that theory]?” Thereupon (the author] replies: 53. Amongst other [reasons], the scriptural pas- sages which declare that [the Self] is without qualities etc. will be contradicted. The scriptural passage ‘ For nothing adheres to this soul ’ (Brihadéranyakopanishad 4. 3.16) is, [for instance, ] opposed [to this view]. ८ Granted [then] that [works] be not the property of the Self, [8४111] the special kind of motion {by which the Self wanders into other worlds and other mundane existences ] may be [brought about] as well by [works, though they be] the property of another [that is to say: of the internal organ]; $2 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 54, 55. for the Self, being omnipresent, stands in connection with everything (and, therefore, also with the constraining power instilled in to the inner organ by works].” To this (the author | replies : 54. There would be an extension beyond limits, if [the binding power] were the property of another. Since the connection with everything [mentioned by you] belongs equally {to the bound and to the liberated soul], bondage would attach to the liberated souls, too, [according to your supposition J. < एप then, you also accept a distribution of merit and demerit [in such a manner that both are associated with the bound soul, but not with the liberated]; [and, besides, ] experience teaches that the bound endeavours! after libera- tion. [Hence,] as your doctrine on this [subject] will be the same as ours, we agree [with one another].” To this {the author] replies: 55. In spite of that association there is no agreement, because of non-discrimination. Though [we accept both] an association [of the bound soul] with merit and demerit, [the two doctrines are] not of the same character, ‘because of non-discrimination ° {from which that association arises according to our opi- nion]. If the association of the Self with merit and demerit were real, then [our two doctrines] would be alike; but as [we teach that] there exists [only], in consequence of non-discrimination, the delusion of the Self’s being associated with merit and demerit, where is an agreement [between us both]! ८८ Granted that bondage results from non-discrimination ; still, [I suppose], we concur [both] in acknowledging that 1 Which endeavouring is caused by merit won by previous good actions. I. 56.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 33 merit serves the purpose of the destruction of non-discri- mination. Else bondage would be everlasting.” To this [६16 author] replies : 56. The removal of it depends on a fixed cause, like that of darkness. If that which has been ascertained as the cause of some- thing by positive and negative argumentation, could be wanting [occasionally at the arising of the respective pro- duct], there would be absolutely no reliance [on anything ].1 As light [alone] is [competent] to destroy darkness, thus also, in our case, the destruction of non-discrimination is [brought about] by discrimination [alone, and not by merit, as you believe]. And if we acknowledge that merit serves the purpose of [promoting] discrimination, what harm is that [to our theory]? For this can well be done by merit, though it belongs to Matter, [or more specially, to the jnternal organ ]. What is this thing, called darkness? Some? say: “ Dark- ness is a non-entity.”’ Thisis not [true], because we per- ceive 1४ in a positive form (vidhi-mukha-pratiteh) [and say ‘darkness comes, darkness disappears,’ and not ‘ 1176 dis- appears, light comes’ in that sense]. With reference to the opinion that {darkness] is a non-entity, [let us ask:] Is it prior or posterior non-existence of light? If [the opponent says,] ‘‘Prior non-existence ;”’ then [we reply:] As, when a jaris produced, the prior non-existence of the jar is destroyed, just so [in our case], when light appears, there ought to be the notion that ‘the prior non-existence of light is destroyed’; [in reality, however, such notion does not exist, * I. €. nobody would be able to determine the cause of anything. 2 Viz., the Naiyayikas and Vaiseshikas, whereas the followers of the Mimamsa, Vedanta, Sdimkbhya and Yoga systems declare darkness to bo an entity (९4६४०). | 84 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 56. on the other hand we think ‘darkness is gone.’ Moreover, ] since there is the prior non-existence of the future light [also], when the present light exists, [even at this time ] darkness ought to continue undestroyed [which is not the case, as everybody knows]. ‘“ Then,” [says the opponent, ] ८८ 1४ is posterior non-existence [of light].” As, however, this is imperishable, darkness ought to be perceived [even] in the presence of a new light, just as [even] after the production of a new jar the posterior non-existence of a destroyed jar continues. But [as regards] reciprocal non-existence, [this] subsists regularly between two [positive] things [and, there- fore, between light and darkness also; and so that cannot be an argument to prove darkness to be a non-existence ].} That [{darkness] be absolute non-existence [of light], is not to be supposed, because this is fallacious (dushtatvdt). The same is taught [in the following verses : ] ‘“Non-existence of light is not darkness; this is the common opinion of the old teachers, as we learn from the Puranas that blackness is a quality of the shadow,’ [and only positive things have qualities]. For, according as a lamp is far or near, the shadow is huge or small, [and according as the former is stationary or not, the latter] moves or does not move ; [besides, | it follows the body. [All this] could not be, if [the shadow] were not a real thing; [for it is only to such things that these qualities belong ].” But the tenet ‘ darkness is an entity’ follows [already] from the fact that [darkness] is perceived, [because a perception is only possible,] when there is an entity. (The opponent objects:] ‘Things are seen [only] in the pre- sence of light; how can, therefore, [something] be seen in the absence of 127 [To this we reply:] This is simply the heterogeneousness {of darkness from all other 1 For anyo’nydbhdva is nothing else but bheda. > The shadow is considered as a kind of darkness (tamo-viéesha). * The opponent means that, if darkness were a real thing, it could only be seen by light. I. 56, 57?.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 35 real things; the latter are only seen by light, while it is the nature of the former not to be visible by light]. As an- owl sees without standing in need of light, just so the perception of darkness does not require any light, because this is the peculiarity of the thing. Hence {darkness}! is @ special colour which is imparted and seen where a cover {veils light]. Some, however, hold, that [darkness] is [not a colour, but] a substance different [from the nine sub- stances of the Naiydyikas]. In tkis sense it is said: ^ Darkness, forsooth, is moving, black, and distinct as far or near [in time and space]; as it has qualities different from the qualities of the acknowleged® [nine substances}, it must be distinguished from those nine.” But whether [darkness] be a quality or a substance, this does no harm to our theory, because we are not asserters of a special number of categories. Still, what we state, is, that [darkness] is not a non-entity. «५ ‰ 0प have said that liberation results from discrimina- tion. Then liberation ought to devolve upon everybody, because the discrimination of jars, clothes etc. is made by all of us.” To this [the author] replies: 57. Since the non-discrimination of other things [results] from the non-discrimination of Matter, [the one] is abandoned, if the other is abandoned. Matter is the root of all [products]. From the non-dis- crimination of that [from Soul] the non-discrimination of {all] other things [from Soul] arises. Now, these things may be discriminated from each other or they may not be; liberation and bondage do not depend thereon, but on the 2 Ayam, viz., paddrthah. 2 Nihspargatudn na prithivy ap tejo vayuh, repavattvan शयुं ' {0 dik kila dtma manag ce'ty-tdi, Pandit. 36 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 57—59. discrimination and non-discrimination of Matter [from ` Soulj. ‘If the other is abandoned,’ ¢. ¢., if the non-discri- mination of Matter is abandoned, the non-discrimination of all things is abandoned, for the reason aforesaid. “Granted that liberation results from discrimination ; [still], is this [discrimination] connected with the Self or not? If {you say that] it is connected with the Self, then the invariableness of the Self is given up; [and] if [you say that] it is not connected, then [your theory is to be charged with] an extension beyond limits.”? To this [the author] replies : 58. But [this is] a mere expression, no reality, since it resides in the thinking organ. ‘It is connected with the Self’ is, however, a mere ex- pression; [for] a real connection does not exist. [ एप] though there is no connection, still, since discrimination _ resides in the thinking organ, there exists the delusion that discrimination dwells in the Self, on account of the proxi- mity [of the Self] to the thinking organ. This we shall explain [in detail later on]. ८ Let the discriminative knowledge result from the mere hearing [of the truth], to what purpose is the immediate (aparoksha) cognition which can be attained [only] by the toil of many births?’ To this {the author] replies: 59. [Non-discrimination] is not removed even by argument, as in the case of one mistaken in the line of direction, without immediate [cognition]. {This 18] clear. ‘<[ According to your doctrine] there is [a series of mate- rial principles} beginning with primitive Matter, and these are transformed successively into the ‘great one’ [7. ¢., the judging organ] etc. But we see nothing [of this process].”’ T'o this [the author] replies : I. 60, 61.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 87 60. Imperceptible things are apprehended by inference, as a [hidden] fire by means of the smoke etc. It would be so [88 you say, ४, 6.3 imperceptibleness would be a sufficient reason for denying the existence of any- thing], if sense-perception alone were a means of cogni- tion (11711672) and not inference and [testimony, too]. For primitive Matter and the following [material principles] are, though invisible, proved by means of inductive (sdmda- nyato drishta) inference. (The author] states now the order of creation of those things among which primitive Matter is the first : 61. Primitive Matter is the state of equipoise of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; from primitive Matter [proceeds] the ‘great one’; from the ‘great one,’ the egotizing organ; from the egotizing organ, the five rudiments and the two kinds of senses; [then follow] the gross elements. These, together with Soul, form the series of the twenty-five. Although primitive Matter is the state of equipoise of the three [constituents], still, the word ‘primitive Matter’ is also conventionally! used to denote every one [of these] severally.* The ‘great one’ is the judging principle; the ‘egotizing organ’ is [the substratum of] the egotizing delu- sion; the ‘five rudiments’ are [the substrata of] sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The ‘two kinds of senses’ are (1) the external, viz., the five senses [or faculties] of action, ४. ¢., the faculties of 1 Sdmketikah = Sdstra-paribhishdnusdrena, Pandit. > I havo not met with a single passage in the Samkbya works where prakyits is used in this sense. 38 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTAEY. [I. 61, 62.- speaking, walking, taking, secretion and generation, and the five senses of perception, 7. e., the faculties of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling ; (2) the internal [ sense, called] manas. The ‘gross elements’ are. ether, air, fire, water and earth; these must be known to have arisen from the five rudiments. The word ‘gross’ implies that [the rudiments] are to be estimated as subtile elements. The soul is mentioned [in our aphorism] to complete the number, but not with reference to the order of creation, because the Self is eternal. With a .view [to show how] the respective causes are to be inferred from the products, [the author] inverts now the order: The three [constituents], Sattva etc., are sabstances, because they possess the qualities of lightness etc. To denote these, the word guna (‘constituent ' and ‘a factor of secondary importance °) is employed, because they are the implements of soul. Primitive Matter, now, is nothing but these [three constituents], and not another thing forming their receptacle, since it will be said [in aph. VI. 39]: ‘“Sattva and the others are not properties of it, because it consists of them.” The ‘state of equipoise’ is the reverse of a combination in which one is less or more than another, that is to say: the state of being not developed into a product. And thus the definitive meaning is this: primitive Matter consists of the three constituents as long as these are not [transformed into] products. This, however, is [only] the definition of mila- prakritt [or ‘the radical form which is the root of all’]; prakriti [or ‘radical form ’] in general is to be defined as the material cause of another principle. [The author] teaches now the order in which [the enumerated principles] are to be inferred [from each other] : 62. The five rudiments [are inferred] from the gross [elements]. The cognition of the five rudiments is [arrived at by in- 1. 62—G6. ] ANIKUDDHA’S COMMENPARY, 39 ference] from their product, the five gross elements, which are, according to the difference of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, conducive to delight, pain or apathy.! 63. The egotizing organ from the external and internal [senses as well as] from these [rudiments]. The cognition of the egotizing organ is [arrived at] from its products which are the external and internal senses as well as these five rudiments. 64. The internal organ from that. The cognition of the internal, ¢. ९.) of the judging [or de- ciding] organ [buddhi, is arrived at] ‘ from that,’ 7. ¢., from its product, the egotizing organ. 65. Primitive Matter from that. The cognition of primitive Matter is [arrived at] ‘from that,’ 7. e., from its product, the ‘ great’ principle. 66. Soul from the fact that the combined is for the sake of another. The cognition of Soul is not [arrived at, by any means, in a manner similar to that of the preceding aphorisms, 2. e., not J from primitive Matter’s being a product [of Soul. This would be a totally wrong supposition,] because primitive Matter is eternal, and Soul cannot be [material] cause. But primitive Matter exists for the sake of another, because it is a combined [substance], 7. 6.» because it consists of the three constituents. And this other is the soul. Therefrom the cognition of it [results]. This [soul] must be declared to be uncombined, from fear of a regressus in infinitum. < But primitive Matter will have some cause [neverthe- less].” To this [the author] replies : * These qualities which do not yet belong to the ‘rudiments’ characterize the gross elements as products. 40 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [1. 67—69. 67. Since there is no root for the root, the root- less is the root. Since the material principle which is the root [of all] has no root or cause, just this rootless cause is the root. This is [our] primitive Matter. (The author] states the reason for that: 68. Though there be a succession [of causes], there must be a halt at one point; and so [primitive Matter] is a mere name, If there were another cause of primitive Matter, and another cause of that one, again, [and so on], there would be the fault of a regressus in infinitum. Therefore, a root which has no cause must be accepted at last. Nothing else but this [extreme point] is what we call ‘primitive Matter.’ It would, however, be a superfluous complication (gaurava) to accept more than the twenty-five principles [enumerated in aph. 61]. «< [ एप] since primitive Matter is invisible, how can this be ascertained as the [first] cause? [Why do’nt you ac- knowledge the atoms as such?]” To this [objection made by a Vaiseshika or Naiyayika, the author] replies : 69. [The fault पात| with primitive Matter concerns equally both of us. Both, the teacher and the opponent, are in the same con- dition. As, though an atom is invisible, the atoms are inferred [by you], because their qualities [colour, taste etc.] are seen in jars and the like, just so also in our case primi- tive Matter, consisting of three constituents, is inferred as * Supply १०९१५८१ according to Aniruddha’s view. I. 69- 71.) ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, 41 the cause [by us], since we see that the nature of three consti- tuents belongs to the world. For an affectionate wife gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore, shows the nature of Sattva; by ill behaviour she causes pain, and shows, as such, the nature of Rajas; by separation she causes apathy, and shows then the nature of Tamas. Thus all things are to be regarded. <“ [{ liberation resulted from the cognition of the difference [between Matter and Soul, as you say], then liberation ought to arise [immediately ] from the mere hearing of [the truth as propounded in] the institutes. And thus it is not {in reality], because we see [1४ daily life] that the one {attains liberation] quickly, the other after a long time [and many never].” To this [the author] replies: 70. Since the capable are of three kinds, there is no rule, Those who are capable {of receiving instruction] are of three kinds because of the difference of the excellent, mediocre and inferior. Their difference results from the difference of ignorance and of the other cooperating fac- tors,! while the difference of these [again] results from the difference of the invisible power [of merit and de- merit]. Therefore, there is no [such] rule that [the liberation of everybody must take place] in consequence of the mere hearing. “The causal connection has been taught above in Sitra [61]: ‘From primitive Matter [proceeds] the ‘great one’ [ete.],’ but ०० succession [will be intended there].” This error [the author] sets aside [in the following aphorism]: 71. The first product is that called the ‘ great one’; this is the thinking organ. 2 I, ¢., asmitd, rdga, dvesha, abhinivega ; cf. III. 37, 6 42 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. {I. 71—75. The first product of primitive Matter is the ‘great’ principle or judging organ, [also called] thinking organ,! because thinking [is its function}. 72. The egotizing organ is the subsequent. The immediately following product of the judging organ is the egotizing organ. 73. The others are products of that ‘The others,’ 2. e., the eleven senses and the five rudiments, are products of the egotizing organ. Mediately, also the [gross] elements, the products of the rudiments, are called products of that ‘But then, if it is thus (7. e., if you declare the visible world to be a product of the egotizing organ], you abandon your doctrine that the world is a product of primitive Matter.” To this [objection of the Vaiseshikas the author] replies 74. It is the first cause, through that mediately as 18 the case with the atoms, As [according to the Vaiseshikas] a jar which is the {immediate} product of a lump of clay, has the atoms for its cause mediately, just so also [our] primitive Matter is the principal cause [of all products mediately ]. ८८ 81066 primitive Matter and Soul are [both] eternal, which [of the two] is the cause of the creation’s commence- ment?” With regard to this [question the author] replies: 75. While both are antecedent, since the one lacks [this character], it belongs to the other. Something has not the character of the cause simply on 2 Manas is not used technically here; cf, Vijianabhikehu’s commentary on this aphorism. I. 75—77.) ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 43 account of being antecedent (to the product], but [only, if the causal connection is established] by positive and negative argumentation.! Now, among the two, ‘the one,’ & €. the soul, lacks the qualification of being the cause since Scripture teaches its invariableness. Hence ‘the other,’ ६, ९.) primitive Matter, possesses the character of the { first] cause. «८ But, ] since (the existence of] the atoms is not disputed, let these alone be the cause.” To this [objection, raised by 2 Vais’eshika, the author] replies: 76. Being limited, they cannot be the material [cause] of everything. That which is limited cannot be the material [cause] of everything ; as yarn cannot be the cause of a jar. There- fore, it would be necessary [according to your theory] to ascribe a separate cause to every special thing. And [in Our opinion] it is simpler to accept one single cause. [The author] alleges Scripture to [corroborate] this : 77. And because of Scripture which says that [the world] proceeded therefrom. ~The reason [for the world’s being a product of primitive Matter] has [duly] been stated at first{inaph. 75]. Besides, Scripture says that primitive Matter is the cause of the world, in the passage ‘‘The world arises from primitive Matter.” ० [ एप] experience teaches that a jar which previously did not exist comes into existence. Let, [therefore,] prior non-existence be the cause [of each product], since this invariably precedes [the arising of everything].”’ To this [the author] replies: » Kim tu pérvabhdve sats yasya vastunah sative yad utpadyate, yadabhdve cha notpadyate, tat prati tad vastu kéranam, Pandit. 44 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [I. 78—80. 78. A thing does not proceed from nothing. A real thing does not arise from something unreal. As experience teaches that the product is of the same descrip- tion as the cause, the world, too, would be unreal [according to your Opinion }. < Let the world, too, be unreal; what harm is that to us?” To this [remark, made by a follower of S’ankardch4arya, the author | replies : 79. [The world] is not unreal, because there is no confutation, and because it is not the result of a faulty cause. When there is the [wrong] notion that a [piece of] mother of pear! be silver, [this opinion regarding the existence of] the silver 18 confuted by the [subsequent correct] notion ‘This is not silver.’ But, in our case, nobody ever has the notion ‘This world has not the character of something real,’ by which [notion] the reality [of the world] might , be confuted. Again, if something is the result of a faulty cause, we are convinced that it is false; as, for instance, somebody’s perception of a [white] conch-shell as yellow which results from the fault of jaundice [by which the eye-sight is damaged] etc.' But, in our case, such a depra- vity [of the senses] 18 quite out of the question, because the cognition of the world is genuine with all and always. Hence the world is not unreal. ८८ But then, let something unreal be the [first] cause ; still the world will net be unreal.”? With reference to this [ob- jection the author] says: 80. If something real [is the cause], this is 1 Adi may be interpreted by the following superstition mentioned in some Vedanta and Nydya books. If the eye 18 besmeared with the grease of a frog, a straight cane is seen in the shape of a serpentine line, _ I, 80- 82.) ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 45 established by the connection with that; [but] if something unreal [were the cause], how could this be, since it would be unreal ? If something real is the material cause, then, according to the maxim that the product has the qualities of the cause, ‘this is established,’ ४, ९, the reality of the product is established, ‘by the connection with that,’ ९ ९. by [the product’s} connection with the reality [of the cause. But] if something unreal [were the first cause], then the world, {too}, could not be real; and ‘since it would be unreal,’ that is to say: since the world would be necessarily unreal, ‘how could this [7. ¢., the world’s reality] be?’ For the unreal cannot have the character of the real. ‘‘Let work alone be the cause of the world; what is the use of inventing primitive Matter?” To this objection [raised by a Mimamsaka, the author] replies: The comparative [kutastardm is employed in the aphorism] in the sense of the positive [kutas]. 81. No; for work cannot be material [cause]. The invisible power [of merit and demerit arising from works] may be the causa effictens; but we never see that merit and demerit are the causa materialis. Since liberation results from the discriminative knowledge of primitive Matter and Soul, primitive Matter must be accepted. “‘Since liberation is attainable already by undertaking the things enjoined in the Veda, what is the use of [dis- cerning] primitive Matter?” To this [the author] replies: 82. This does not result even from scriptural (means. What is gained thereby] is not Soul’s aim, because it is brought about [by works], and, there- fore, [the performer] is exposed to returning. ‘Scriptural [means]’ are those which are learned from 46 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 82—84. [Scripture, 2. €,» from] the Veda, viz., sacrifices and the like. Even from [the application of] these liberation does not result, ‘because [what is gained thereby} is brought about [by works], and, therefore, [the performer] is exposed to returning.’ Since [liberation as supposed by you] is a pro- duct [of actions] and as such not eternal, the liberated would be exposed to a continuance of new mundane existences. Hence this is not Soul’s aim. [The author] shows now what is [really] Soul’s aim: 83. Scripture says that he who has attained to discrimination in respect to these does not return. Scripture says that [only he who has attained to discrimi- nation ‘in respect to these,’ 7. ¢., in respect to primitive Matter and Soul, does not return in consequence of his discri- minative knowledge. This scriptural passage is [the last clause of the Chhandogya Upanishad]: ‘‘ He does not return again.” [The author] alleges an argument against the opposite opinion : [According to. Mahadeva, the word ¢atra in the aphorism does not mean ‘in respect to these,’ but ‘there.’ | ‘There,’ £ €.) in Brahman’s world. The scriptural passage [alluded to] is: “‘ He does not return again.”—[Discrimination is the real cause of liberation], since in the following verse : «५ All these [will be] united with Brahman, when the time of the dissolution of the world (pratisamchara) has come. At the end of the last [mundane period] they enter the highest abode, having purified their souls.” a stress is to be laid (svarasa) on the expression ‘having puri- fied their souls ’(kritétman,=‘ having attained to discrimination’). ‘What, then, is the fruit of work like?” This [the author] says [in the following aphorism] : 84. From pain comes pain, as relief from cold is not [effected] by affusion of water. I, 84, 85. ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 47 If liberation were to be brought about by [ritual] works, then, since such works comprehend pain [caused to the vic- tims], liberation, too, being the product of these [actions], would involve pain. At least, since [such a liberation] must perish, there would be pain at last. For relief from cold is not [imparted] to one afflicted by cold through affusion of water, but, rather, only [more] cold [is occasioned]. “The fact, [however,] that something is brought about by works [in general] does not bring on pain; but the rea- son {for the fruit’s being painful] is the being brought about by works which are undertaken with a special desire; for works undertaken without any desire are means for [the attainment of] liberation. Thus Scripture says: “Some sages, wishing for wealth, went to death by their works with their children; but other sages who [had no wishes, but] were given to meditation obtained the highest immortality through [ritual } works.’”* With reference to this [view, the author] declares: 85. Since it is equally brought about [by works], whether these be undertaken with or without desire,— Granted that what 18 brought about by works, undertaken without desire, be not painful; still, though there is a difference between works done with desire and such done withoat desire, the fact that liberation [as accepted by you] is brought about by works remains the same. Since [such a liberation] would be perishable because of being brought about [by actions], there would be pain again. And the scriptural passage [quoted by you] which says that works done without desire are means for (the attainment of] libera- tion, refers to knowledge [which is promoted by such works]. 1 This S’ruti is found, with slight variations, in the SAmkhya-Tattvakau- mudi to Kariké 2. 48 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [T. 85—87. And, as liberation results from knowledge (cf. III. 28), these { works] are mediately means of liberation. ०५ [ 8०४] if liberation results from the knowledge of the difference between Matter and Soul, [as you accept], still [this liberation, too,] may be perishable, and, therefore, mundane existence may begin again. Hence [you] the teacher and [I] the opponent are [equally exposed to] the same [objection ].””> With regard to this [remark the au- thor] declares : 86. [Nothing positive falls] to him who 18 libera- ted definitively, [but] only the absolute destruction of bondage; hence there is no parity. There is [only] the destruction of bondage in the case of ‘him who 18 liberated definitively,’ ४, ९, essentially. Bon- dage is non-discrimination. By the removal of it non-dis- crimination is destroyed, 7. ९. f{absolutely] annihilated. Now, since the annihilation of non-discrimination is a [de- 01176] posterior non-existence, how can there be a return of mundane existence, and {how can you talk of] a parity [in regard to our two doctrines |? It has been taught [in aph. 61] that there is a set of twenty-five [principles]; and, since this is not to be ascer- tained except by proof, {the author] explains now what this [९ e., proof] is: 87, The determination of something which has not [previously] been in connection with both nor with one of the two [others] is right cognition. What is most conducive to that, is the thing in question [%. €.) ‘proof’ or rather ‘means of know- ledge `], I. 87, 88.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 49 ‘With both,’ 4. ¢., with the eventual [association existing between] sense and object, that is to say: with perception! ; ‘nor with one of the two [others]’ 4. ¢., [neither] with an eventual characteristic sign [leading to inference] nor with 8 scriptural declaration, that is to say: [neither] with in- ference nor with testimony.—‘The determination of some- thing which has not [previously] been in [such a] connec- tion’ means ‘the determination of a thing [previously] not determined,’ ४, ¢., ‘right cognition’ (pram4) or ‘right notion’ (pramiti) or ‘result’ [of perception, inference or testimony]. Hereby is explained what is called [else] ‘a means of knowledge by which one arrives at an unknown thing.’—[The clause:] ‘what is most conducive to nght cognition, is proof [or rather: means of knowledge]’ is the general definition of pramdna. ‘‘How many means of knowledge are there?” To this [the author] replies : 88. There are three different means of know- ledge; since, if these are established, everything can be ascertained, no more are to be established. Perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumdna), and testi- mony (s‘abda) are the means of knowledge. [To this a Mim4msaka objects:] ‘ What, are analogy (upamdna), self- evidence (arthdpattt), non-existence (abhdva), proportion (sambhava), and tradition (aztihya) [no means of know- ledge] 9 With reference to this it is declared [in the aphorism]: ‘ Since, if these are established,’ etc. [That is to say :] Means of knowledge are assumed in order to determine what is cognoscible. Now, since, if [our] three different means of knowledge are established, there results [from these] 2 The locative case is dependent on asamnikrish{a as well as the genitive case. 7 50 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [I. 88, 89. the ascertainment of [everything] which is cognoscible [ac- cording to your opinion] through all [those] means of know- ledge (enumerated by you], ‘no more are to be established’ as distinct means of knowledge. For those [means which you accept besides] are contained in [our] three means of knowledge; [the former] are brought under [our three heads] by great teachers in their proper place: [those of your additional means] by which a cognition is obtained so that this cognition exists when there is a contact between the senses and the object, and that this cognition does not exist when there 18 no such contact,'—belong to perception, etc. Therefore only a further nominal distinction is made [by you], and hence no means of knowledge are to be established in addition [to our three]. (The author] gives now the special definitions : 89. Perception is that cognition which results from the connection [with the objects] and repre- sents their form By [the expression] ‘which results from the connection’ inference and testimony are excluded. ‘ Which represents their form’ means ‘ which represents the form of jars [etc.]’. Such [a cognition] is perception. [This definition] includes also that perception which distinguishes the details (savi- kalpaka). The Buddhists, however, declare that perception is only that [cognition] which does not distinguish the details (nirvikalpaka), [and give the following definition : ] «© What is free from combination (kalpand) and not exposed to mistake is called perception.2 Combination is that ap- prehension by which [an object] is joined with its name, 1 Viz., abhdva and partly upamdna. 2 Adi means that arthdpatti, sambhava and partly wpamdna belong to anu- médna, and that aitihya is either s’abda or no pramdna at all. 8 Nyayabindu (edited by P. Peterson in the Bibl. Ind.), first chapter, line 3. I. 89.} ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 51 genus etc.! And, since there is such [a combination] in the case of [a cognition] which distinguishes the details, this {kind of cognition] is no perception, [no] means of right knowledge.” This is not [correct; for] perception is [everything] which is produced by the faultless totality of the factors required for the production of an immediate cognition. This is of both kinds: not distinguishing and distinguishing the details. The clear understanding (sam- wd) of name, genus etc., {is not brought about by combi- nation, as the Buddhists suppose], but arises from memory, {and memory is roused]—through the medium of the awakening of the impressions [left previously in the internal organ|—by the likeness [of a thing perceived now to a thing perceived in former times]. Since, therefore, something additional accedes [to the nirvikalpaka perception through memory], the special name savikalpaka [is given to per- ception in this case]. And no fault whatever nor a defect in the totality of factors [mentioned above] is occasioned by memory. | [The Buddhist objects:] «^ But then, [a perception dis- tinguishing the details] 18 no means of right knowledge, because it is associated with memory.”’ [To this we reply :] Ob, how cunning! An accompanying [cause] deprives [ac- cording to your opinion] a means of right knowledge of its power! Thus it is said: “Though the name [of the thing we perceive] is remembered, this does not disparage the nature of the perception; for this [viz., the name] is unconcerned [in the perception] and unable to veil the essence of the thing which bears the name. That apprehension, too, is [universally ] considered as perception, by which the thing is after- wards determined as to its properties, its genus and the like.’’® 1 I.e. with its colour, extension and other attributes; ndma-jdty-ddi is employed in the technical Nydya-definitions of savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka, cf. Nydyakosa under the latter word. ॐ The second verse is quoted also in the Samkhyatattvakaumudi to Karik& 27, and partly, in a different connection, in the SAmkhyapravachanabhashya to aphor, 11, 32. 52 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 1. 90, 91. ‘‘Your definition of perception is not [correct], because it does not extend to the perception of the Yogins [who are able to see things past and future].” To this [the author replies] : 90. There is no fault, because the perception of the Yogins is not an external one. Our definition refers only to the external perception of daily life, but the perception of the Yogin is neither exter- nal! nor; belonging to daily life. Therefore the fault of being not extensive enough does not [attach to our de- finition. Or, even the perception of the Yogin ४ included in our definition! This other possibility of looking at the subject {the author] states [in the following aphorism] 91. There is no fault, because he who has at- tained supernatural power is in connection with things being in the state of the cause. Since products remain always existent, even that which is destroyed, 7. ©, dissolved into its cause, exists in the state of the past; likewise, a thing to come exists in its cause in the state of the future. Now, the Yogin who has attained supernatural power is, by the assistance of the merit produced by the Yoga-praxis, in [immediate] con- nection with primitive Matter and therefore, with all space, all time and [all objects]. Hence the fault of being not extensive enough does not [attach to our definition |७ % [But] your definition does not apply to the perception of the Lord.” To this objection [made by a Naiydyika or Vaigeshika, the author] replies [that the remark is quite insignificant], > Kim tv dntaram, antakkarana-mdirena, Pandit. I, 92, 93.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 53 92. Because the existence of a Lord cannot be proved. If there were a proof for the existence of a Lord, then your scruple in regard to his perception would be justified. But such [a proof] does not exist. If [the opponent de- clares: “The proof [for the Lord’s existence] is [the con- clusion] that the earth, for instance, must have a maker, because it is a product,” [then we deny this and ask]: Is the [Lord whom you infer] corporeal or not [in your opi- 210]? Both ways he cannot be the maker. ([And, besides, the argumentation] of the Vaiseshikas by means of the notion ‘ product’ is [only] a seeming one; [for the existence of a maker is not to be inferred from the existence of a product]. This has been explained in a very detailed man- ner somewhere else.! [The author] states another reason (for his tenet that there is no Lord] : 98. Heis not provable, because he cannot be either of the two: bound or liberated. Is the [Lord whose existence you assume] bound or liberated? A bound [soul] cannot be the Lord, because of its association with merit and demerit; nor can a liberated [soul] be the maker, because no perception, no desire to act, and no exertion would be [possible in this case. And since every being is either bound or liberated], the existence of a Lord cannot be proved. “Then,” [the Vaiseshika objects,] ^^ € may be different [from both], ९ ९. liberated in life-time (;tvan-mukta).” [To this we reply: If the Lord were] of such a kind, he would be unparalleled and the only specimen of a species, [in which case there is no basis whatever for argumentation]. 2 Viz. in the writings of the Pirvamimamaa. 54 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [I. 94, 95. [The author] states the same [in the following aphorism]: 94. Both ways he could not be the maker of real things. The explanation of this aphorism has [already | been given {in the preceding commentary]. << (If it were] thus, ther such scriptural passages as ‘ For he is omniscient, the maker of all things’ would be con- tradicted.” ‘With reference to this [objection the author] declares : [The existence of] a Lord is inferred by our adversaries only from his being the maker of the creation. On account of [this] declara- tion the expression ‘of real things,’ [used] here [viz. in aph. 94], is to be understood as meaning ‘ of the creation.’ 95. [They are] glorifications of the liberated Self or of him who has attained supernatural powers by his devotion. ‘Of the liberated Self’ means ‘ of him whose Self is, in a manner, liberated, because he is free from passions and the like,’ but not ‘ of him who is liberated [in the highest sense],’ since such [a soul] would be unable to resolve upon something, to act etc. The glorification of such [a person by Scripture] is for the purpose of supporting the ceremonial prescripts. ‘Or of him who has attained supernatural powers by his devotion,’ that is to say: The glorification of the Yogin who has attained supernatural powers, 7. e., who has acquired the faculty of assuming atomic smallness etc., by his devotion, is for the purpose of supporting [and en- couraging] the [Yoga-] praxis. _ “ [But] non-intellectual {Matter] cannot be productive without the superintendence of an intellectual being.” Even therefrom the existence of a Lord is not to be inferred, as the [author] says [in the following aphorism] : [षी नो _ लान I, 95—97.)} ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 55 Some passages in Scripture and tradition, having in view to state that the liberated Self, 7. ¢., the isolated Self, is what must be known, praise that [Self] as the Lord merely on account of its proximity (to Matter]; while other [passages] praise him who has attained supernatural powers by his devotion, 2. e., a non-eter- nal Lord, on account of his secondary eternity, etc., in behalf of [people’s] attainment to supernatural powers through devotion directed to [such a Lord’s] eternity, etc. ‘“‘Of what kind is the superintendence [of the soul]?” This [the author] declares: 96. The superintendence is [accepted] on ac- count of the proximity thereto, as in the case of the crystal. As, when a crystal in which a body reflects is moved, while the body does not move, there is the misconception that the body moves, just so, since the Self reflects in Matter, [४ ¢., in the internal organ] ‘on account of the proximity thereto,’ the agency, experiencing and superin- tending of Matter is erroneously ascribed to the Self. Hence the mistake that the soul be the superintendent. And so [it is said in the Bhagavadgita 3.27] : “The works are altogether done by the constituents of Matter ; only he who is beguiled by the egotizing organ fancies: Iam, [1.¢., - my Self is] the agent.” “If the soul is not the superintendent, then there would be actions, as eating etc., [also] in the case of a dead body.” To this [objection the author] replies: 97. The empirical souls [are the agents], in re- gard to individual actions, too. The empirical soul comprises the judging organ ete., [1. e. the egotizing organ and the senses| and is connected with the [vital] air; but the empirical soul is not the [pure] Self. Only these empirical souls are the agents, in regard to 56 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 97—99. individual actions, as eating etc., too. For the [pure] Self is invariable. “If there is no cognition in the Self, [there is none at all]; how can, [therefore,] an instruction [be given] for the sake of any cognition ?’’ With reference to this [objection, made by a Naiydyika,! the author] declares: 98. The instruction about the sense of the doc- trines [is given], because [the internal organ] appre- hends the right meaning. The word ‘the internal organ’ is to be supplied from the following aphorism, or [to be actually joined with this one, so that] there is one aphorism ending with the words vakydrthopadego ’ntahkaranasya. This way* [we get] the following sense: Since the internal organ [in the form of] the ‘ great one’—[and not the Self]—apprehends the right meaning, 1. ९.3 the actual meaning, the instruction about the sense of the doctrines [18 given by the teachers]. And from the fact that the soul reflects in this [internal organ] results the delusion that it be [the soul] which apprehends. [The author] elucidates this : 99. The internal organ is the superintendent, because it is enlightened by that; asis the case with the iron. The internal organ is the superintendent because the reflec-' tion of the soul falls upon the internal organ and, in conse- quence, [the latter] fancies to be intellectual on account of 1The Naiydyikas hold that every cognition, perception etc., takes place in the Self, through the mediation of the atomic internal sense (manas). But according to the Samkhyas, the Self is not cognitive, but objectless cognition or thinking. Every perception, sensation or individual cognition takes place in the internal organ mechanically and unconsciously, and is only brought to consciousness by the Self. ॐ Tena, 1, 6.) evam dvartanena or ekasitratvena, Pandit. I. 99, 100.1 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 57 its being enlightened by the intellectual essence of that [viz., of the soul}. ‘As 18 the case with the iron,’ ४, ¢., as the magnetic iron, though inactive, attracts by its mere proximity. {The author] gives now the definition of inference : As the iron is made red-hot by a special connection with fire, just so the internal organ is enlightened by the soul through a spe- cial connection which is the cause of the reflection, and therefore becomes, in @ manner, intellectual and distinct from [all] other non-intellectual things; as such it is the avtual (anupacharita) superintendent through its volition etc. This is the sense. As, however, the first creation [which proceeded from primitive Matter immediately] took place without a resolution, no actual (mukhya) superintendent was required for that, [but the impulse was given by the association of primitive Matter with Soul, so that this association may be regarded as a figurative (upacharita) superintendent]. Hence it is said in the Kirmapurana [in the last verse of the 4th Adhyaya]: ‘‘In this way the creation by primitive Matter has been briefly described by me; this one took place without aresolution. Learn now the creation of Brahman!” Such [scriptural passages], however, as “ That intended” (Chhandogya Upanishad 6. 2. 3) are somehow to be explained so that [primitive Matter] was on the point of [changing into] products, analogously to [the use of the desiderative stems], as for instance: ‘The bank will fall down, [४, ¢., is on the point of doing so].’ That is the meaning.! 100. Inference is the knowledge of the connect- ed on the part of him who kuows the connection. Inference is the knowledge of the invariable concomitant [vydpaka, £. e. according to the usual Nydya-example ‘ of fire,’ which knowledge] proceeds from the knowledge of the invariably concomitated [vydpya, ४, e., ‘of smoke’], on the + Cf, Vijfiénabhikshu’s commentary on I. 96, 8 68 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [I. 100, 101. part of him who knows the inseparableness [of both]. In this [definition] are included: the positive [reason,! anva- yin |,” the excluding [reason, vyatirekin],> the [reason] which may be stated positively as well as negatively (anvaya- vyatirekin)*, [besides, the inference] which is based on some- thing previously known (pirvavat), which is based on some- thing excluded (s’eshavat), and which is inductive (sédmdé- nyato drishta). Moreover, the definitions of [other] teachers are contained in that [given here]. And so [it is said]: ‘What is connected with the thing to be inferred, and what is universally known as existing in that which is characterized by this {invariable concomitance, vydpti], and what does not exist, when that does not exist, this is the characteristic sign (7५0८) leading to inference (anumdpaka).” {The author] gives now the definition of testimony: ‘Connection’ means ‘invariable concomitance’; ‘ connected’ means ‘ what is possessed of this [invariable concomitance, 7. e., vydpya|’ as well as ‘what determines the same, [४. 6.) the vyd- paka].’® 101. Testimony is the instruction by one trust- worthy. 2 Hetu=vydpya. > F. i. idam vadchyam, vastutvdt ‘This may be named, because it is a real thing.’ In this case vastutva is the vydpya, and vdchyatva 18 the vydpaka; the vydpti would be: yatra-yatra vastutvam, tatra-tatra vdchyatvam., = 7, i. prithivy anya-dravyebhyo bhinnd, gandhavattvdt ‘ Earth is something distinct from all other things, because it is possessed of smell. In this case gandhavattva is the vydpya, by which earth is separated from everything that is not earth ; anya-dravyebhyo bheda is the vydpaka. * F. i. dhiémo vahni-jidnasya hetuh ‘Smoke is the reason why an invisible fire is known to exist.’ This may be expressed positively as well as nega- tively: yatra-yatra dhimah, tatra-tatra vahnih and yatra-yatra vahnyabhavah, tatra-tatra dhadmébhdvah. 6 Yasya vydptih, sa vydpti-niripakah, (i. e., vydpakah); yasmin vydptir vartate, tad vydpyam, Pandit. Mahadeva declares both to ‘be pratibaddha, while Aniruddha regards only the vydpaka as such. I. 101-108.] ANrRuDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 59 Testimony is the instruction by one trustworthy, but it is not [necessarily ] something made by a trustworthy [per- son], because the Veda is not the work of a person. And this fact we shall state in aphorism [46] of the fifth book: “They are not the work of a person... S’abda (‘testi- mony’) is used [here] in the sense of the cause [of know- ledge, that is to say: it denotes the last of the three means thereof], but s’abda is [also employed in the sense of} the fruit, ४. ९.; [of] the knowledge produced by s’abda,! since the effect may be figuratively denoted by [the word which expresses] the cause. The tenets of the Buddhists, etc., [४ e., of the Jainas and Charvakas] are not true, because they contradict the Veda, and, therefore, they are (only ] seeming [testimony]. ९८ ए 0प्ा, doctrine has been laid down for the sake of dis- criminating between primitive Matter and Soul; but there is no means by which the existence of these two may be established.”? To this [objection raised by a Charvéka, the author ] replies : 102. Both are established by a means of know- ledge ; [hence] there is the instruction about them. Primitive Matter and Soul are established, ४, ¢., [their existence 18] known by a means of knowledge to be described [presently] ; hence the instruction for the sake of discri- minating between them is justified. “Of what kind is this means of knowledgeP”? With regard to this [question the author] says: 108. Both are established by induction. Since primitive Matter is invisible, [we must infer ४8 follows : ] ~ ~क 1 In which case, however, it is better to say édbdam (jfidnam). 60 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 103, 104. 1. What is a product, is possessed of the qualities of the eause, [४ 6.» the peculiarity of the product is conditionate by the qualities of the cause] ;! 2. and the product [in question, viz., the whole empirical world} has the nature of the three constituents. 3. Hence follows, by means of an inductive inference, the existence of primitive Matter [being the totality of the constituents } Since the Self is likewise invisible, its existence is [to be} established [by the following inductive inference]: 1, What[ever] is combined, is for the sake of some other; 2. henee there must be something uncombined which is the ‘ other’ (with regard to the whole material world that consists of combinations; and this is the Self]. Thus [the author] will declare [himself in I. 140:] ^ Be- cause the combined is for the sake of some other.” ८८ [ एप, ] as Matter is eternal and active by nature [in the service of Soul], there should be always some experience, and, therefore, no liberation.” To this [objection the author | replies : 104, Experience ends with thought. ‘Thought’ means the Self. Experience ends with the discrimination of that [from Matter]. As prior non-exis- tence, though beginningless, perishes [when the thing pre- viously non-existent comes into existence], so the creative- ness of eternal Matter ceases with [the attainment to] discriminative knowledge. Here[somebody objects : ] ^ This holds good [only] in the case of non-existence, but not with regard to something existent.” [To this we reply : ] No! Non-existence is not a necessary condition for the [cessation 2 Cf. Vijidnabhikshu’s commentary on I, 62: kdrana-guna-kramena kdrya- gunotpatteh. 2 Sdmdnyena= sdményato drishten’ ’numdnena. I. 101--106.] awnrtRuDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 61 of something eternal], because we know that posterior non- existence does not [cease]. But if [you say:] ‘This will be regulated by [facts] as seen,” [we answer:] This 1s so in our case, too. ५ [{ Matter is active and Soul experiencing, then it would be the case that the one experiences [the results] of the work done by the other.” To this [objection the author ] replies : 105. Even another than the agent may enjoy the result, as in the case of food. As the cook prepares the food etc., and [another] who has not prepared it, viz., the master, enjoys the result, so it is also in our case. ^ But the master may be [regarded as] the maker, because (the action] is done for him, [just as the king is regarded as conqueror, while the soldiers fight for him.” To this we reply: Quite right!] Also in the case in question the creativeness of Matter is intended for the Self. Having propounded this customary doctrine, [the author] states now his own: 106. Or, since this follows from non-discrimina- tion, there is the [wrong] notion that the fruit belongs to [the soul which is erroneously regarded as] the agent. The soul is neither agent nor experiencer; but the delu- sion that [the soul] be the agent results from the fact that [the real agent, viz.,] the ‘ great principle’ is reflected in it. ‘Or, ... from non-discrimination ’ means ‘from the incapa- city of discriminating between Matter and Soul.’ ‘Since this follows’ means ‘ since the delusion that the enjoyment of the fruit belongs to [the soul which is misconceived as] the agent follows (therefrom ].’ 62 ANIRUDDHA’s coMMENTARY. = [1, 106—108. [The author] states now the opposite of this [miscon- ception ] : Or [the aphorism may be explained in the following manner!] : From non-discrimination follows [the delusion] that Soul be the agent; therefrom results the [wrong] notion that the fruit be- longs to Soul as to the agent, in accordance with [the maxim] ‘the experiencer is the same as the agent.’ 107. Nor [do] both, when the truth is seen. When the truth is known by discrimination, both [do] not [belong to Soul], neither agency nor experiencing. Having described the means of knowledge, [the author] states now the rule regarding the objects of knowledge : 108. [A thing may be] an object or not an object, according as the senses fail on account of excessive distance, etc., or apply [to the thing]. [A thing] is an object, when the senses apply to it, ४, e., are in connection with it, [but it is] not an object, when the senses fail, 7. e., are not in connection with it. This want of connection results from the inadequacy [of the senses | on account of excessive distance, €{९.* In consequence of excessive distance, a bird [flying] in the sky is not per- ceived; in consequence of great proximity, the collyrium ap- plied to the eye-[lashes is not]; in consequence of inter- position of objects, a thing located on the other side of a wall [18 not]; in consequence of inattention, a person affected by grief, etc., does not perceive a thing placed at his side; in consequence of its subtilty, a minute particle [is not perceived]; in consequence of being overpowered, [ f. ¢.] by the sound of a drum, the sound of a conch [is not], etc. 1 Differently from Vijianabhikshu’s explanation previously copied by Maha- deva. The following interpretation has been obviously borrowed from Aniruddha’s commentary. 2 Of. Samkhyakériké 7. 1. 108—111.] ANIRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 63 “For what reason is primitive Matter imperceptible?” To this [the author] replies: ‘ Applying ’ means connection ; ‘ failing’ means want of it. 109. On account of subtilty it is imperceptible. ‘Subtilty’ means the being difficult to conceive, but not the being of atomic extension; because primitive Matter is omnipresent. “‘How, then, is [the existence of] primitive Matter ascer- tained 9? To this [objection, made by a Vaiseshika, the author | replies : 110. Because it is apprehended by the behold- ing of [its] products. As (the Vaiseshikas] gather [the existence of] the atoms from the beholding of jars [and the like], so we apprehend primitive matter by the beholding of the products which have the nature of the three constituents. Some [the Vedantists] teach that Brahman 18 the cause of the world; others [the Vaiseshikas and Naiydyikas], that the atoms are its cause; [and our] ancient teachers say that primitive Matter is its cause. With reference to this[diver- sity of opinions the author] brings forward a doubt: Because [the existence of] it is proved by the beholding of [its] products, viz., of the ‘ great one’ and of the other [material princi- ples]. ‘*But some teach that Brahman is the cause of the world; others, that the atoms are; how, then, can primitive Matter be proved [to be the cause] ?” This doubt [the author] ponders [in the following aphorism] : 111. If [somebody objects:] ‘“Itis not estab- lished, because of the contradiction of [other teach- ers, |" — 64 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 111—118. ‘It is not established’ means: [the existence of] primitive Matter is not established. | [1106 author] states his doctrine: ‘It,’ 7. ©. primitive Matter. [The author] who is of the opinion that there is no fault what- ever in inferring the cause from the product, confutes [this objec- tion] : 112. Still, the establishing of the other by the beholding of the one is not to be denied. If my opinion were disproved simply by the contradiction of the opponents, there is [my] contradiction against the opinion of the adversaries, too; how could, therefore, that be established? If an opinion is proved by the inseparableness of the cognition of the invariable concomitant from the cog- nition of the invariably concomitated, then this holds good with my [tenet], too; hence my inference from the products [in aphorism 110] is not to be denied. «Granted that the cause 18 [to be inferred] from the pro- ducts; [but] how [can you prove] that this [cause] is pri- mitive Matter?’’? To this [the author] replies: |The author] states now the reason for primitive Matter’s being [this | cause 118. Because [else] there would be an incompa- tibility with the threefold. ‘The threefold’ means the constituents, 2, e¢., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. [If there were any other first cause than primitive Matter which we declare to be the aggregate of these,then] there would be an incompatibility with these, 2, e., the world should be void of (the nature of] these [three con- stituents]; and it is seen not to be so. ‘Does the product arise as something which [always] existed, or [is it brought forth] as something which did not exist [previously]?” This doubt (the author] removes: इ, 118--115.| ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, 65 There would be an incompatibility with the joyful, painful and apathetic nature which is observed in the world, if Brahman [or] the atoms were its cause. [The author] states now that the products are already existent, before they arise: 114. Something unreal, as 2 ` man’s horn, does not arise. | [ With reference to this a follower of the Vaideshika and Nyaya systems sets forth an objection:] “A man’s horn and the like is absolutely uureal,! ether and the like [४. 6. Space, Time and the Self] is absolutely real, jars and the like are real as well as unreal; how, therefore, can you bring [such things] on the same level with a man’s horn?” {To this we reply:] This is not [right; for] jars and the like are unreal {in your opinion] at the time of their prior non-existence, a man’s horn and the like is always unreal; what difference, therefore, can there be between the two {according to your theory]? If [you say:] ‘The difference is the fact that the production of jars etc. is seen,” [then we reply :] This very [question, how it 18 that jars arise and a man’s horn does not] is what we are deliberating, and [you give us] this very [question] as answer! How clever! (The author] states the reason, why products are existent {at any time]: 115. Because there must be some material cause [for every product]. | (That is to say:] Because there is a connection of the product with the cause. And a connection is only [possible] between two existing things, [but not between twé6 things of which one exists, while the other does not; hence the product must be somehow existent before the manifesta- 1 Asad-eka-svabhdva = yasyaikah svabhdvo ’sann asti, = asan-mitra-svabhdva, Pandit. 9 66 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [1. 115—118. tion ;] else, [every] product might arise always and every- where. (The author] says the same [in the following aphorism]: 116. Because everything is not produced every- where and always. {This is | clear. ‘‘But, though there 18 no distinction in the character of the material cause [८. e. though all material causes are alike as far as they give rise to some product non-existent before the time of production], still the {cuuse] produces only that which it is competent [to produce]; for the thread is not the cause of the Jar. Why, (therefore, do you say that, according ~ to our opinion,] everything might be produced?” To this (objection, made by the Vaiseshika, the author] replies : ‘Because everything is not produced’; supply: for we see in daily life that everything does not arise. 117. Because [only] the competent produces the possible. [Your remark that the cause produces only that which it is competent to produce, is quite right. But let me ask, with reference to this fact:] Does the competence of the ‘competent’ [cause] stand in relation to the ^ possible’ {product which arises from it], or not? If you admit the former, you must ascribe existence to the < possible’ [product beforeits production]; if you accept the latter, [the possibi- lity of] the arising of a jar from the thread remains unaltered. [The author] states another reason [for his theory]: 118. And because [the product] is the cause. Because the product and the cause are the same. Though [the causal thing]! changes into the form of the jar, it does 1 Supply paddrthah. 1. 118, 119.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 67 not abandon its nature of being clay. And two things of which one is real [६, e. the cause] and the other [accord- ing to the opponent’s opinion] unreal [४, e. the product] cannot be the same. {Objection:] “If both are the same, one might fetch water by means of a lump of clay 2180." [Reply:] It would be so, if an absolute identity existed [between cause and product]; but there is no fault whatever in the theory that diversity as well as identity exists {between them ]. And so it is said: “If (the products] were unreal (before their production], their connection with the causes, which possess reality, would not be [ possi- ble}. And for him who accepts that [the product ] arises unconnected {with the cause], there is no rule [that a special product must come from a special cause ]j.”! ‘Reality does not fall to the non-existent, nor does un_-reality to the existent; this state of these both is known to those who see the truth.” ( Bhagavadgitaé 2. 16.) [The opponent] makes a [fresh] objection: Because the product has the nature of the cause; this is the sense. ‘The cause and the product being identical, it is quite impos- sible that the cause be existent, but the product non-existent [at any time]. The proofs for the identity of the product with the cause have been taught in the Tattvakaumudi [to Karika 9). 119. “If it were the connection of a reality with a reality, you could not speak [as you use to do}.” “Tf production were the connection of a reality, 7. ¢. of an already existing product, with [another] reality, ४, e. with the cause,* then such expressions as ‘the jar will be, arises, has been destroyed’ would be out of place.” 1 This verse is also quoted, as an utterance of the SAmkhyavriddhas, in the Samkhyatattvakaumudi to Karikaé 9, with the varia lectio—asattve ndsti, > Nydya works often exhibit the locative, instead of the instrumental case, in constructions of this kind. 68 -ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [. 119—121. [With reference to this objection, the author] states his doctrine : _ If [the opponent maintains], that [the word] ‘ production’ could not be employed, in case the reality of the product were quite the same even before the ‘production,’ as we use to speak only of the production of something non-existent [until then,—the author] disposes of [this view in the following aphorism] : 120. No, the employment and non-employment of such expressions depend on the manifestation. As the whiteness of a white cloth [which has become] dirty is manifested by the washing or [by the application of drugs], so the jar is manifested by the operation of the potter, and is hidden by a stroke with the hammer. Like- wise, we Observe that the oil is manifested at the sesamum- seeds by pressure, the milk at the cow by milking, the grains at the corn-stalks by threshing, etc. Therefore, the differ- ences in the employment of words as well as in the practical use depend on the manifestation.! _ *[Granted that] production depends on manifestation ; {but] whereon does destruction depend?? To this [the author] replies : 121. Destruction is dissolution into the cause. ` By a stroke with the hammer the dissolution of a jar into its cause [viz. into its constituent parts, is effected] ; thereon depends its destruction, and thereby the differences [in the employment] of words and in the practical use [may be occasioned as well as by the manifestation]. _ [Objection:] “If [destruction were only} dissolution [into the cause], a resurrection might be seen, and this is = 1 For instance: if the 97 18 not manifested, we speak of clay; but if it ig manifested, we call it a jar (fabda-prayoga-bhedau) $ we cannot fetch water with it in the former case, but in the latter (artha-kriyd-bhedaw). 1. 121—123.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 49 [really} not seen.” ([Reply:] It is not seen by the fools, [but] it is seen by the intelligent. For example, when thread is destroyed, it changes into the form of earth, the earth changes into the form of a cotton tree, and this changes into the form of flower, fruit and thread. So itis with all things. «< (Now,] is [your] manifestation real or unreal? If it were real [ ८, 6. always existent according to your theory], then the products ought constantly to be perceived ; if it were unreal, [your doctrine of] the [eternal reality of the products would be set aside. [And if you try to maintain your theory by saying that] there is another manifestation of this one, and, again, another of that one, then we have a regressus an infinitum.” To this [fresh objection of the Vaiseshika the author] replies: 122. Because they follow one another contin- ually, as seed and sprout. May there be a thousand manifestations, still there is no fault, because [the manifestations] have no beginning, as [the continuous succession of] seed and sprout [18 without a beginning] [The author] states another argument 128. Or, there is as little fault [in our theory of manifestation] as in [your theory of] production. ` . Is [your] production produced, or not? If it is produced, we have a regressus in infinitum [as well], because there must be also a production of this one [and 80 on]. If it is not produced, [then let us ask:] Is this the case because of its unreality, or because of its eternity? If because of its unreality, there 18 never any production at all; hence it could never be perceived. If, on the other hand, [you declare that production is not produced] because of its 70 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [T. 128—125. eternity, there would be always the production of [all] products. [Objection:] ^ But as production itself 7s production, to what purpose do you invent another production?” [Reply :] Then it 18 the same with us: as manifestation, too, 7s mani- festation, to what purpose do you invent another manifesta- tion? Your doctrine on this point [%. e. on production] is also ours [ with regard to manifestation]. [The author] states [now] the properties which the pro- ducts of primitive Matter have in common with each other: 124. [They are] caused, inconstant, moving, multitudinous, dependent, mergent. ‘Caused’ means: having a cause, ‘inconstant:’ perishable, ‘moving’: leaving a body assumed [formerly. But this is the sense of ‘ moving’ only as far as the internal organs and ‘the senses are concerned ; for it is known to everybody how] earth, bodies, etc. [४. e. the other elements besides earth] move. ‘Multitudinous’ {are the products of primitive Matter] on account of the distinction of souls; [for each soul requires a separate internal organ, separate senses and a separate body]. ‘Dependent,’ 2 6, on its cause; ‘mergent,’ 2, ¢., dissolving into its cause. ‘If there are [only] twenty-five principles, [as you SAmkhyas teach,] do [our qualities] cognition, pleasure etc., or [our categories] generality and actions not exist? If you say so, you abandon what is taught by experience.” To this [objection of the Vaiseshika the author] replies: ‘The discrete [principles] ’ is to be supplied in this [aphorism], as the subject of which the being caused and the other [qualities] are predicated. 125. Hither because the qualities, generality and the other [categories of the Vais‘eshikas] are directly I. 125, 126.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 71 identical [with our principles], they are established in them, or, because they are implied in the term ‘ pri- mitive Matter.’ The qualities, generality and the other [categories of the Vaiseshikas] are directly, ४ ¢., in their very nature, identical with [our] twenty-four [material] principles, because the definitions of these apply [also to them]. ‘They are estab- lished in them,’ ४, e., they are established, because they are contained in them.! The word ‘or’ intimates another possible explanation. ‘Or, because they are implied in the term primitive Matter,’ 1. ९.) the qualities and the other [categories of the Vaise- shikas] are established [by us], because the qualities etc. are mediately products of primitive Matter, and as such are implied in the term primitive Matter, since product and cause are identical. But it 18 not on account of non-existence that [the categories of the Vaiseshikas] are not [expressly ] mentioned [by us]. (The author] states [now] the properties which are com- mon to primitive Matter and to its products: The word ‘ or’ means ‘and’ [in this aphorism]. 126. Both consist of the three constituents, are non-intellectual ete. What consists of the three constituents, is non-intellectual [as such]. By the word ‘etc.’ is meant that [both] are for the sake of another. ‘Both,’ 7%. ¢., the products and the cause. 1 To explain this in detail: the dravydni of the VaiSeshikas (with the exception of dtman and manas) are contained in the sthila-bhitdni; the gunds and karmdni are dravydndm svaripam ; the simdnyam is dravya-guna-karmandm svariipam ; the vigeshak is contained in sattva, rajas and tamas; the samavdyah is not acknowledged (V. 99). 72 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (I. 127, 128. [The author] says [now] by what properties the three constituents which form the parts of primitive Matter differ from each other : 127. The constituents differ from each other by pleasure, displeasure, dejectedness, etc. " ‘Pleasure’ is joy. By the word ‘etc.’ is meant [in the first case], that Sattva has [besides pleasure] the properties of lightness and illumination.—‘ Displeasure’ is pain. By _ the word ‘etc.’ is meant [in the second case], that Rajas is {not only painful, but also] inciting and unsteady.—‘ Dejec- tedness’ is apathy. By the word ‘etc.’ is meant [in the third case], that Tamas [which causes dejectedness ] is heavy and covering [besides |. Telling the differences of these [constituents, the author] states their common properties, [too], at this opportunity : 128. Through the properties of lghtness etc, the constituents agree with, and differ from each other. | Through lightness, unsteadiness and heaviness: hereby the differences are taught. By the word ‘etc.,’ [however, not only the notions unsteadiness and heaviness, but also] the common properties [of the constituents] are intimated [in our aphorism]; and these are the being for the sake of the souls, and the having the habit of overpowering each other, of modifying each other, and of consorting with each other.! In {aphorism 124] which begins ‘[They are] caused,’ it is taught that the ‘ great one’ and the following [principles] are products. [Now the author] gives the proof thereof: ११5 In this manner he [%. ९. Vijnanabhikshu] has explained [our aphorism]; but another [commentator, 7. €.) Aniruddha] says: 2 Cf. Samkhyatattvakaumudi to Karika 12. 1. 128—133.] AnrRopDHA’s COMMENTARY. 73 [The constituents] differ by the properties of lightness etc., but they agree in having the habit of overpowering each othor, of modifying each other, and of consorting with each other. [The author] gives [now] the proof [of the tenet] that the ‘great one’ and the following [principles] are products : 129. Since they are different from both, the ‘great one’ and the following principles are pro- ducts, as jars and the like. Since they are different from the two eterual [things], primitive Matter and Soul. The rest is clear. {The author] states another reason : 180. Because of [their] measure. Because they are limited, [while primitive Matter and Soul are all-pervading ]. [The author] gives a further argument: 131. Because of their coberency. Because they are perfectly connected with primitive Matter, t. 6.9 because the qualities of primitive Matter are seen in all things. [The author] states the same [in other words]: 182, And, finally, because of the power. Since a product operates [only] through the power of the cause, the ‘great one’ and the following [principles] give rise to their products [only] when primitive Matter fills {them with the power of doing so], as they are weak [by themselves]. Otherwise, they would always produce their products, because it is their nature to operate. {The author] argues [now] from the negative side: 133. If they were not such, they would be pri- mitive Matter or Soul. 10 74 ANIRUDDHA’s comMENTARY. [. 1858--182. There is the alternative: either product or non-product. If the ‘great one’ and the following [principles] were not products, they would belong to primitive Matter or Soul [which are the only two non-products }. ५ [ But] the ‘great one’ and the following [principles ] may not fall under the [said] alternative.’ To this [objec- tion the author ] replies: 184. If they were distinct from these two, they would be void If the ‘great one’ and the following [principles] were distinct ‘from these two,’ £, ¢., from the products as well as from the non-products, they would have the nature of the void, 2. ¢., of a non-entity. ५८ Why shall it be on account of their being products that the ‘great one’ and the following [principles] are a charac- teristic sign [of the existence] of primitive Matter? They may be such a sign merely because of their inseparability {from it].”’ To this (the author] replies: 135. The cause is inferred from the product be- cause of the association with it. It is so [as you say, in such cases] where the nature of the cause is not seen in the [product or] effect, as, for instance, when we infer the swelling of the sea from the rising of the moon. But, in our case, the cause is inferred from the product, because we see the nature of primitive Matter! in the ‘ great one’ and in the following [principles]. ‘ Because of the association with it’ means [what we have just stated as the basis of the inference]: because we see the nature of 1 I. 6. the variability, the being for the sake of the soul, the properties of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, etc. I. 185—137.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 75 primitive Matter in the ‘great one’ and in the following [ principles } <^ Under these circumstances, the ‘great’ principle [itself] may simply be the cause of the world. Wherefore [do you assume] primitive Matter?” To this [the author] replies: A cause is inferred only from the being characterized by the products [or effects], but not from the being quite unconcerned [in them], as is held by our opponents, too. This is the meaning. 136. The undeveloped [is inferred] from the mer- gent which has the nature of the three constituents. Primitive Matter is to be inferred from the mergent—so called, because it dissolves—, ४. e., from the ‘ great’ principle which has the nature of the three constituents. And that the ‘great’ principle, ४. e., [the organ of] determination, is discrete and perishable, we know by perception. From this we infer {a cause] into which it dissolves. “Still, some other thing may be this cause; wherefore shall it be primitive Matter?’ With reference to this (the author J declares : 137. Since its existence follows from its pro- ducts, it cannot be denied. Is the cause of this [universe] a product or not a product? If [you say:] a product, then the cause of it would also be the same, and so we have 8 regressus in infinitum. [But] if [you say: it is] the primordial product, then [we call this ‘cause,’ but not ‘ product,’ and] this very thing is our [pri- mitive Matter].—Since the existence of primitive Matter follows from its products, ४. e., from the products of primitive Matter, it cannot be denied. ‘Granted the existence of primitive Matter, but the exis- tence of Soul cannot be established; for it has no product, {while primitive Matter has).” To this [objection the author] replies : 76 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. FI. 188, 139. 188. Since there is no dispute about the notion as such, just as [the existence of] merit [is not doubt- ed by any one, the relation aforesaid] is not the proof of it. There is, to be sure, no dispute about there being a Self as such; for the dispute is [only] about its peculiarities, whether it be multitudinous or one,! omnipresent or not omnipresent,* etc. Just as [the existence of] merit is not disputed in any system whatever; the opinions disagree {only ] as to the peculiarities of merit.—‘ [The relation afore- said] 18 not the proof of it [t.e. of the Self’s existence] ’ means: the relation of cause and product is not the proof in our case. [Tle author] intends to say [hereby]: I shall allege another proof. ‘The Selfs are simply the bodies, senses and [internal organs]; what is the use of inventing something else?” To this [objection the author] replies: Nobody disputes the experiencer, £. ९.) the thing which forms the subject. ‘lherefore proofs are required only for the sake of establishing the distinction of Soul from the body etc., the eternity and the other [peculiarities of Soul; but no proof is necessary] for the sake of establishing its mere existence, because this is considered as settled by all teachers, [even] by infidels. 189. Soul is distinct from the body, etc. {This 18] clear. [The author] states the reason thereof : 1 The latter is only accepted by the Advaitavddins, while the former is held by the followers of the Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsé, Nydya and Vaiseshika systems as well as by those Vedantists who are not Advaitavadins. % The omnipresence of Soul is maintained in the Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamaa, Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems, and by the Advaitavadins ; it is denied by the other Vedantists, by the Jainas and some heretics besides. 1. 140--142.] aANtRUDDHA’sS COMMENTARY. 77 140. Because the combined is for the sake of some other. That which is combined is for the sake of some other thing which is not combined ; if it were [again } for the sake of some other combined thing, we would have a regressus in infinitum. And combination is, by means of the mutual mixture of the constituents, the cause {of the existence] of the products. Or combination is, [in the secular mode of speaking,] the hardening of fluids.—This [combination], now, exists [already] latently in primitive Matter and [in the internal organs and in the senses}, because else we could not observe combination in their [gross material] products. {The author] explains the same: 141. Because there is the reverse of the three constituents, etc. Because there is the reverse of the three constituents, etc. in Soul, ४, e., because [the nature of] these is not observed [in it]. By the word ‘etc.’ [is meant]: because the other properties of Matter, too, are not observed [in it]. [The author] mentions another reason : By the word ‘etc.’ the non-intellectual nature and the other [qualities of Matter] are intended. 142. And because of the superintendence. For the superintendent is [necessarily] intellectual, and Matter 18 non-intellectual. This is the sense. [The author] gives a further argument: And because [Soul] is the superintendent; this is the sense, Being the superintendent means being the cause of a change by means of a special connection; and a connection takes place only between two different things, [whence follows -the difference between Soul and Matter]. This is the meaning. ee i += नः ~ = 78 ANIRUDDHA’s commeNTAaRY. [I. 143—145. 143. Because it is the experiencer. ` That which is experienced is Matter, the experiencer is Soul. Although the Self 18 not the experiencer [in reality ] on account of its invariableness, still this is said, because the reflection of the internal organ falls on it. ८ Efforts are made for the sake of liberation. Is this done for [the liberation of] the Self or [of] Matter?” To this {question the author] replies: 144. Because the efforts are for the sake of isolation. Since the three constituents are the essential nature of Matter, this essential nature cannot depart [from it], and [besides, this is out of the question], because { Matter] would be uneternal. [Liberation of Matter from the three con- stituents is, therefore, impossible.] Isolation of that [alone | can take place, with regard to which the constituents have the character of Up4dhis; and this is the Self. ‘“What is the nature of this?’ To this [question the author | replies: 145. Light [४. e., intellect], because the non- intellectual and light do not belong together. It is well known that the non-intellectual is not light. If the Self, too, were non-intellectual, another light ought to exist for it, also; and, for the sake of simplicity, let the Self have the nature of light, [7.e, let the Self be nothing but light]. And Scripture [teaches the same, Brihadéranyaka Upanishad 2. 4. 14]: “ By what means shall he know him by whom he knows all this?- By what means, forsooth, shall he know the knower ?” “ Let the Self be non-intellectual, too, [in its essence] and have intellect as an attribute; by means of this [attribute] it manifests the world, but it has not intellect as its essential I. 146- 148. ] = anrruppHaA’s COMMENTARY. 79 nature.” To this [objection, raised by a Vaiéseshika ora Naiy4yika, the author] replies: 146. Since it is void of qualities, it has not im- tellect as an attribute. If the Self were connected with attributes, it would be changeable, and hence no liberation would be [possible }. {The author] declares now that Scripture contradicts this [opinion of the opponent]: [Soul] has not intellect, ४. e., light, as an attribute, but is light. Why? ‘since it is void of qualities,’ ४ ९.) because it does not possess any qualities. The wishes, however, and other [attributes | which we observe, belong to the internal organ alone. This is the meaning. 147. What is established by Scripture is not to be denied. [This must be said], because [Scripture] would be confuted by such perceptions.’ Scripture teaches: ‘“‘For nothing adheres to this soul” (Brihadéranyaka Upanishad 4. 3. 16), ete. Such [passages] would be confuted, if [the soul] were connected with quali- ties. [The author] mentions another argument against [the opponent’s view |: Supply: the freedom [of the soul] from qualities, etc. [४. ९.) its unchangeableness and intellectual nature] are [therefore] well- founded. | 148. It would not be witness at [the time of] . profound sleep, etc. If the Self were non-intellectual, it would not be witness, 1 48 those of the Vaiseshikas and Naiyayikas are who erroneously see qualities in the soul. 80 ANIRUDDHA 78 COMMENTARY. [I. 148, 149. i. €., knower, at [the time of] profound sleep, etc. And this 18 not the case [7. ९. the Self zs witness then], because [the feeling] ‘I slept well’ manifests itself. By the word ‘ete.’ the sleep during which dreams appear is meant. The Vedantists hold that there is only one Self. And thus fit is said]: ५८ 07 the Self is eternal, omnipresent, unchangeable and blameless ; though being one, it is made multitudinous by the power, by Maya, [but] not essentially.”’! With reference to this [the author] declares: Some say that [only] one Self is [to be accepted] for the sake of simplicity. [The author] refutes this opinion : 149. The plurality of souls follows from the diversity of birth, etc. If there were [only] one Self, then all ought to be born, when one is born. {The author] ponders the view of the [Vedantistic] op- ponent : Birth is the association [of the Self] with an aggregate, consist- ing of a new body, [new] senses and [a new internal organ]; death is the separation from this [aggregate]. Because of the diversity, stated in Scripture, of birth and death, of joy and pain, of bondage and liberation, there are many souls. The diversity of birth [is mentioned in the following scriptural passage: ^ One is born in a | good [existence] in consequence of good [deeds, in a] bad [exis- tence ] in consequenee of bad [ deeds,” cf. Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 4.4.5; 5, 2.13], the diversity of bondage and liberation [in the following]: ‘““Those who know this become immortal; but the others suffer pain.” (Brihadaranyaka Up. 4. 4.14; S’vetasvatara Up. 3. 10). 1 This verse occurs in the Lingapurdna, as is seen from the introduction of S’ahkara’s commentary to the S’vetasvatara Upanishad. I. 150, 151. |] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 81 150. ‘(The Self], though one, becomes many, as there is a difference of Upadhis, just as Space [is diversified] by jars and the like.” «५ As there is [really only] one Space, [and, nevertheless, } on account of the difference of the UpAdhis, as jars and the like, when a jar has perished, people use to say: ‘The jar’s space has perished,’—just so, also on the theory of there being [only] one Self, because of the difference of corporeal determination, when this [corporeal determination] has perished, it is nothing but a familiar saying ‘The Self has perished.” Otherwise, [४, ¢, if birth and death were not dependent on the UpAdhis,] how could there be, even on the theory of there being many Selfs, a diversity of birth and death, since the Self 18 [considered as} eternal [by the adher- ents to this theory also]?” (The author) gives his decision : “Then let [the Sclf], if characterized by an Upadhi, be some- thing distinct.” With reference to this [remark of the Vedantist the author] declares :1 151. [According to your opinion] the Upadhi is different, but not its owner [#. ¢., the Self]. {You say that only} the एषतो is different; but the familiar idea of the perishing of the one [५ ¢., of the Self] cannot be (dependent, as you maintain,] on the perishing of the other [४. 6, of the body, simply, if there were not a diversity of Selfs], because an illegitimate extension [of the notion ‘perishing’ would be the inevitable consequence]. And in the theory of there being (only] one Self, some attri- butes which are contradictory to each other are evidently ascribed [to this]; for one and the same cannot be bound 1 Cf, Vijfianabhikshu’s commentary. 11 8४ ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (1. 151—158. and liberated [at the same time]. But [in the illustration, used by the Vedantists, the matter is quite different; for] the [simultaneous] connection and non-connection of Space with smoke or [jars] are not contradictory, because this connection does not exist everywhere. ‘What shall be [proved] hereby?” To this [the author] replies: If the characterized [Self] were distinct [from the pure Self], this would perish through the perishing! of the characterizing [body]. This is the meaning. 152. Thus contradictory attributes are not as- -eribed to [a Self] omnipresent as one. [In our system] contradictory attributes are not ascribed [to the Self, as is done in the Vedanta system]. “‘(But] it is known that even the attribute of one is as- cribed to another, as, for instance, the agency of Matter is to another, ५६,» to Soul.” With regard to this [remark the author] declares : The imputation of joy and pain, ¢. ९. the entering of these [two opposites], which is contradictory, if referred to a [soul] every- where present as one, is not so, if it is thus [as we teach], ४, 6.) if there is a plurality of souls.* This is the sense. ‘But [speaking of joy and pain as entering into Soul], do you not confound [Soul with the material products], since the Self is without attributes, and joy and the like are attributes of the internal organ 6४९. ?' To this [the author] replies: 1098. Though the attribute of another be [ascrib- _—_—__— eee 1 Read °ndéena as one word in my editiun, and of. Vijidnabhikshu’s com- mentary. 9 That is to say: joy and pain may be simultaneously felt by different persons, but not by one. ee ee I, 158, 154. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 88 ed to Soul], its real existence [in Soul] does not follow from the imputation, because [Soul] is single [, e., unconnected]. The agency of Soul is a mistake; for, in this case the non-agency of Soul is true, and the imputation is untrue’ And a connection of the true and the untrue [४. ¢., here: the connection of the untrue agency with the true Soul] does not exist in reality. Birth, death etc. cannot belong to the Self, because nothing adheres to it. ‘But thus [४, e., on your doctrine of the plurality of souls] there would be a contradiction to Scripture. For it is said ८‹ Brahman is one only without a second” (cf. Chhandogya Up. 6. 2.1), ‘“‘ Nothing is different here; from death to death he goes who sees something different here” (cf. Katha Up. 4. 11). To this [objection of the Vedantist the author] replies : (According to Mahadeva’s explanation, aphorism 153 must be translated: Though they are attributes of another, this [diversity] cannot be accounted for by an imputation, because [the Self] is one (only, in the Vedantists’ opinion. | ) Though joy and the like are attributes of the internal organ, the diversity [of one person’s feeling joy and of the other’s feeling pain] cannot [be declared on the theory of the Vedantists] by an imputation on Soul, since the recipient of the imputation is [only | one [according to them]. For, where there is [only] one crystal, a diversity of imputed [colours,| blue, yellow etc., is impossible, [so that we may not say:] ‘This (crystal) is blue, [and] that is yellow.’ In the case of jars’ spaces, however, and of other [limited spaces | which are distinct [from each other] through the difference of the Upiadhis, a diversity of attributes, conditioned by the 70901118, is possible; [and, therefore, the Vedantists ought not to employ this illustration]! This is the meaning. 154. There is no contradiction to Scripture which 1 Cf. Aniruddha’s commentary on I. 161. 84 ANIRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. ([I. 154—157 teaches non-duality, because it means the genus [or sameness of all souls]. [This 18 ] clear. ‘But then, are not bondage and liberation contradictory in one and the same Self for him also who accepts many 3618?” With regard to this [question the author] declares: 155. That state falls to him who knows the cause of bondage, on account of his understanding. To whom the ‘cause of bondage,’ 7. ¢., the non-perception of the distinction between Matter and Soul, is known, to him falls ‘that state,’ 2. e., the state of isolation, ‘on account of his understanding,’ 7. e., on account of his cognition of the (said] distinction. | «५ Bondage [as stated by you] is not real, because it de- pends on the non-perception of a distinction. The reason [thereof] is that non-perception ceases in consequence of perception, And thus we see the truth in the theory of there being [only] one Self, not in that of there being many.” With reference to this [remark of the Vedantist the author] SAYS: 156. From the fact that the blind do not see does not follow non-perception on the part of those who have their eye-sight. Because the blind does not see, shall also he who has his eye-sight not perceive? The sense is: there are many ar- guments in favour of the asserters of the plurality of Selfs. [The author] declares that there are many Selfs for the following [reason | also: 157. Vamadeva and others have been liberated ; [hence] non-duality 1s not. We learn from the Puranas and other (texts] that Vama- 1. 157—159. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 85 deva has been liberated, that 8’uka has been liberated, etc. If there were [only] one Self, all would be liberated on the liberation of one, and thus [such] scriptural passages about the diversity [of liberations} would be confuted. “On the theory of the plurality of Selfs, since some are sometimes liberated in the beginningless flow of mundane existence, all might be gradually liberated, and then there would be a total void; but on the theory of there being [only] one Self, liberation is simply the departure of an Upadhi.” ‘To this [objection of the Vedantist the author] replies : 158. Since [this] has not happened in the be- ginningless [world] until now, the future will also be thus, Since [such] a void has not been seen in the beginningless flow of mundane existence until now, there 18 no proof in favour of the opinion that there will be a [universal] libera- tion [in future times. } {The author] mentions another justification : 159. As [it is not] at present, there will be no absolute cessation at any time. Because of the endless number of Selfs there might well be a gradual liberation [of them], and, yet, there would not be a cessation of mundane existence. As at present, there will be liberation ‘at any time,’ 4. 9.9 in future times also, but, therefore, no absolute cessation, because the flow [of mundane existence] is eternal. On [your] theory, too, that liberation is the departure of an Up4dhi,' the question whe- ther a total void might come, is the same. [For] as the cessation of all things would take place, if many Selfs were gradually liberated, just so the world would become void, if णणीणणणाणगणीीणणणणणणषी मिपि 2 See the introduction to aphorism 168. 86 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, [1, 159—161. all UpAdhis perished on the cessation of all works. If then [४6 Vedantist remarks that] there will be no void because of the endless number of Up4dhis, the same holds good on the theory of the plurality of Selfs, also. And thus [it is said]: “Therefore, though they who know (the truth] are continually liberated, there will be no void, because [the number of] living beings in the world is endless.” ५८ {8 the Self [essentially] bound or free? Ifit is bound, then its essential nature cannot depart, and, therefore, liberation is not [possible, or,] if [the essential nature de- parted, the Self] would [cease to exist, 7. ¢.,] not be eternal. If it is free, then meditation and the other [means enjoined for the sake of liberation] are of no use.” To this [objec- tion the author] replies: 160. It is of such a kind that both states are excluded. | (‘the 26} is neither bound, nor is it being liberated; but it is etenally free, But the destruction of the non-cog- nivion | uf this eternal freedom] is brought about by medi- tatic.:, ete. “Tt is taught [in aphorism 148] that the Self is witness. If it is witness even after the attainment of discriminative knowledge, no liberation is [possible, as the perception of something means bondage].” To this [objection the author] replies : Since, in short, according to Scripture, tradition and logical reasons, both states—that is to say: a distinction of states—are excluded, ४. ९.) are eternally absent [in the Self, this is] of such a kind. 161. In consequence of the connection with organs it is witness. Organs, ¢ €. senses. In consequence of the connection 7. 161—164.] ANrRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY, 87 with these [only the Self] is witness. But where is the connection with the senses, when discrimination [and, hence, liberation is attained }? “Of what nature, then, is the Self at any time?” To this [the author] replies: 162. It is eternally free. [This is] perspicuous. 163. And, finally, unconcerned. {This 18] clear. “‘f But] Scripture teaches the agency of the Self; how is this (to be understood]?” To this [the author] replies: 164. The agency results from the influence, be- cause of the nearness of intellect,—because of the nearness of intellect. The agency of the Self, +. ¢., the delusion of its being the agent, results from the influence of Matter, [and this in- fluence exists] because of the nearness of intellect [४ ९., of the Self, to Matter, ४, ¢., to the modification of Matter in the form of the internal organ]. The repetition [of the words] “because of the nearness of intellect’ indicates the end [of the book], since it is thus seen in Scripture. Here ends the first book, that on the topic [of the system], in the commentary on Kapila’s aphorisms in which the Samkhya philosophy is expounded. The second book begins now with a view to describe the products of primitive Matter, after the description of the topic [in general]. In order to notify that in this my composition there is no indo- pendence at all, the appellation ‘quintessence of the commentary’ has been given (to 1४]. Though writing the words of others, I have 88 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 11. 164. elucidated their sense and made the connection [of the single apho- risms with each other] more perspicuous; thus my labour will not be fruitless. Here ends the first book in the ‘quintessence of the Samkhya commentary,’ composed by Mahadeva who obtained the noble surname ‘the Vedantist’ from the feet of the illustrious Svayam- prakasatirtha. Thus the topic of the system has been described in the first book; but, in order to confirm the unchangeableness of Soul, the manner in which the creation proceeded from primitive Matter will be explained in the second [book] at large. ST BOOK II. 1. [The agency] of primitive Matter is for the sake of the liberation of the [Self] which is [in reali- ty] totally free, or for its own [liberation]. The Self is totally free, inits essence. In order to liberate this from the illusory bondage, primitive Matter produces the world. When pain is created [by Matter], man feels aversion [against it] quite naturally, and, therefore, certain- ly endeavours after liberation [from it]; when pleasure is created [by Matter], this, also, is to be reckoned among the pains, since pleasure is mixed with pain, and, therefore, aversion arises [in this case, also]. This [aversion] or in- difference is of four kinds, (1) the consciousness of the effort {to restrain the senses from the objects], (2) the consciousness of the distinction [between those faults of the internal organ which have already perished, and those which are still ex- istent], (3) the consciousness [of the sole existence] of one [z. e., of the internal] sense, and (4) the consciousness of having subdued [everything].! One must get rid of the future pain® which is of twenty-one sorts, viz., the body, the six senses, the six [different] objects [of these 86868 + the 1 The explanation of the terms yatamdna-samjid etc. has beou taken from the SAamkhyatattvakaumudt to Karika 23; cf. also Yogasitra 1. 15. 2 From Yogasitra 2. 16. 8 I. 6., &2९ ०, sparéa, rapa, rasa, gandha and manaso vishayak (= yad vastu samkalpantyam ‘idam icchdmtti’ vikalpantyam cha ‘idam ittham asts ndsts veti’), Pandit. 12 on 90 | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ II. 1. six perceptions [of these objects], pleasure and pain [ष्वः éfoxyv, £ €.) that pain which is felt immediately]. Among these, the body is pain, because it is the site of pain; the senses, objects and perceptions [are pain], because they are what leads to pain; pleasure is [also pain], because it is followed [or accompanied] by pain; and pain [kxar’ éfoxyv] 18 the chief [pain] which consists of ache, disease and sorrow. The special causes that produce it are ignorance, thirst, [7. 6.3 desire], merit and demerit. Ignorance is mis- conception ; and the disposition to this [ignorance, which is common to all living beings who are not yet liberated] is declared by the sages to be the special cause of the thirst and [of the acquisition of merit and demerit]. Moreover, the getting rid of pain is the absolute cessation of the arising of pain; the means thereof is the cognition of the truth with regard to the Self, because in consequence of this [cognition] ignorance [which is the cause of pain] ceases to exist. And thus it is said: ^“ Verily, the Self must be seen, heard, thought and meditated upon” (Brihadaéranyaka Up. 2, 4. 5 ; 4. 5. 6) 5 “It must be heard from the scriptural words [recited by the teacher], thought on with logical reasons, and—this having been done—continually meditated upon. These are the causes of the per- ception [of the Self] ;'71 “He who knows the Self overcomes grief” (ChhAandogya Up. 7. 1. 8). | This [Self] is of two kinds, viz., the higher and the lower one; and thus it 18 said: “Two Brahmans are to be known, the higher and the lower one”’ (cf. Maitry Up. 6. 22). The higher [Self] 18 characterized by knowledge and divine power, and does not even in the least come in contact with the attributes of mundane existence; it is the Supreme, the 1 This quotation is also found in Vijiaénabhikshu’s introduction to I. 1. 11. 1, 2 ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 91 great God, the omniscient, the creator, because he brings forth everything. How is this to be known? LKEither by inference or by concentration [४, ९.9 Yoga]. The inference is as follows: (1) The perceptible [world] which is the object of the dis- pute must have a cause, (2) Since it exists after not having existed before, (8) As is the case with a picture. {The existence of the Self] in general having been con- ceived from this [inference], the cognition [of it] in parti- cular [is obtained] by the Yoga. The existence of the lower {Self}, ८. 6. of the empirical soul, is established by the fact that [everybody] is sensible of it. Now, the activity of Matter is for the sake of the discriminative knowledge of these two, ९. ९.) of the higher and of the lower [Self]. As for this [activity of Matter], its being for the benefit of another [%. ¢., of the Self] will be stated [in III. 58]. And [what is declared in our aphorism, too, viz., that the agency of Matter] is for its own [liberation, must be understood as follows]: to which soul [Matter] has shown itself in its distinction, with that it has nothing to do any more. [८ But,” some one may ask,] “how can non-intellectual Matter be active?” [To this question we reply:] We see that non-intellectual trees, also, are active through [the production of] fruits, etc. ५८ But then, who are those privileged [to attain] to libera- tion?”? With regard to this [question the author] declares: 2. Because this falls to him (only] who has become indifferent. And thus Scripture says: “And having risen above the desire for sons, above the desire for wealth and above the desire for [other] worlds, they then wander about as men- dicants” (Brihadar. Up. 4. 4. 22), “ Having become quiet, 92 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (II. 2—5. subdued, satisfied, patient and collected, he sees himself in the Self only” (I. c. 4. 4, 28). | ‘Tf liberation takes place in consequence of indifference _ immediately after the hearing [of the truth], then all would be liberated immediately after the teacher’s instruction ; and, as we see, this is not the case.’”? With reference to this [objection the author] says: 8. It does not take place in consequence of the mere hearing, [but] of the aptitude of the begin- ningless disposition. | Liberation is not [obtained] immediately after the hear- ing [of the truth]; but whose beginningless disposition is apt, to him [alone] liberation comes quickly [after the instruc- ` tion], to another late. [The author] mentions another reason: 4, Or, as many servants belong to a single [master |. As, among many servants of a single [master], on account of good service or offence, some are set at liberty, some enjoy the benevolence [of their master] and some are imprisoned, just so Matter is single, and Souls are many. Those who possess a clear discriminative knowledge [obtain liberation] quickly ; those who practise devotion only, in the course of time; the others never. ५८ [ But] bondage does not belong to the Self, since this is unchangeable.” In regard to this [remark the author] declares : 5. And, while it is real in Matter, [only] an im- putation [of it] belongs to the soul. To whom Matter has shown itself, for him Matter is not active [any more; that is to say: this soul] is liberated ; [but] for which soul it is active, on that falls a reflection [of II. 5—7. | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 98 Matter, i. ¢., of the internal organ; but this is] only an imputation, no real [bondage]. And thus [it is said]: “If the Self were, in its essence, foul, impure and subject to altera- tions, there would be no liberation for it even after hundreds of new births.” (Kiirmapurana 2. 2. 12). [The author] gives the proof thereof [४ ¢., of the assertion that the real bondage belongs to Matter] : ease And because of the scriptural texts which teach that the souls are unchangeable and nothing but Thought, those passages in Scripture in which Soul is called ‘the creator’ are merely for the sake of devotion. 6. This is proved from the products. From the perception that there is no interruption [to the arising] of the products of primitive Matter, 7. ९, of the ‘great one,’ etc., it is proved that bondage belongs to Matter. ५ Matter impels all persons to action, because it is active by nature; to what purpose [do you talk so much] about the cognition and non-cognition of the distinction [between Matter and Soulj?” To this [the author] replies: [Supply at] the beginning of this [aphorism]: since these are fit for serving their purpose. (The purport which Mahadeva sees in this aphorism, in accordance with Vijianabhikshu, is a confuta- tion of the opinion that the material world be illusory). 7. There is a restriction regarding the souls, as is the case with the escape from a thorn. As somebody, having seen a thorn, warns some one—but not all people— ६ ^ Don’t go this way!’’, just so there is the following restriction: [Matter] is active with regard to special souls [only], not to every one, because it is able [to influence those souls alone which have not attained to dis- crimination | That bondage does not belong to the Self, was [already]. mentioned [in aphorism 5; the author] states this [again more exactly in the following}: 94 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (II. 7—9. (According to Mahddeva’s explanation, the first part of our aphorism must be thus translated: There 1s a restriction [of Matter] with regard to him who knows.) Chetana means [here] ‘he who knows,’ that is to say: ‘he who possesses the immediate cognition of the distinction [between Matter and Soul}. ‘ With regard to him’ means ‘for him.’ There is a restriction—t. e., non-activity—of Matter, just as there is escape, £, €.) non-production of pain, with reference to him who observes the thorn. For the activity of Matter must be de- clared to be for the sake of liberation from the pain located in it, and this [liberation] takes place, when [Matter] isin connection with a soul which discriminates. For saying that Matter has the nature of pain, we mean but this: [Matter] occasions in Soul the experience of pain, ४. e., a reflection of the painful internal organ. And this [doing of Matter] is at an end, when the experience of pain has ceased on the part of a discriminating soul. The sense is: [Matter] does not operate upon a liberated soul, because it has no object of its own [with that], but only upon the soul which is not yet liberated. 8. In spite of the connection with the other, this is brought about, not immediately, as in the case of the burning of iron. Matter’s operating leads to bondage; [but], in spite of the connection with Matter, [only] the delusion of Soul’ [being subject to] bondage is brought about by the falling of its [४. e., Matter’s] reflection [on Soul]. ‘Not imme- diately,’ 2. ९.9 not really.. ‘Asin the case of the burning of iron,’ 1. ©. as, on touching red-hot iron, one thinks that the iron burns, while [in reality] iron [itself] does not burn, but only in consequence of the connection with fire. ८८ 0 what purpose is creation?’ ‘To this [the author] replies : 9. From desire and indifference proceed concen- tration and creation. II. 9—11.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 95 Experience proceeds from desire, liberation from indiffer- ence. But, [although the author declares only that crea- tion—and hence experience—proceeds from desire, ] in reali- ty indifference also arises from desire, because the faultiness of the object is seen during [the time of] experience; [and indifference leads to concentration J. In the first book in aphorism [61] which begins “...... Sativa, Rajas and Tamas” the twenty-five principles are enumerated $ now, [the author] states the order [of creation ] in detail. 10. After the great one, etc., is [that] of the five [gross] elements." - [‘That’] £, e., the creation. [The author] will teach the order [of the development of the material world in aphorisms 18, 16 and 17]. ८८ [8 [creation] for its own sake or for that of another ?” To this [the author] replies: [The author] teaches [now] the difference of the creative power belonging to the ‘great one’ and to the following [principles], from that creative power which belongs to primitive Matter: 11. Since creation is for the sake of the Self, the creativeness of these is not for their own sake. - Since creation is for the sake of Soul, the creativeness ‘ of these,’ 1. €, of the ‘great one’ and of the following [prin- ciples ], is not for their own sake, ९. ९, [not] egotistic. Since primitive Matter is eternal, it was correct to ascribe to ४ [in II, 1] a creativeness for its own sake; but the ‘great one’ and the following [principles|perish dissolving in their cause, and, therefore, are [only] created [for the sake of Soul, but have no object of their own]. «Space and Time are known; why don’t we find these two 1 Which are the terminal link in the chain of creation. 96 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (II. 11—18. in the enumeration {in I. 61]?” To this [the author] replies : “But then, the existence of Space and Time is established by the universal conception ; for what reason are they not mentioned in the enumeration P”’ To this [the author] replies: 12. Space and Time depend on the ether, etc. According to the difference of this or that Upadhi, the ether is called by the names Space or Time;! therefore these two are contained in the [element] ether. The word ‘etc.’ is added to no perceptible purpose. The ablative [dkasddibhyah is used] in the sense of the locative case. [The author] gives [now] the definition of the ‘great’ {principle or] judging organ: By the word ‘etc.’ the Upadhis are meant, and so the sense [of the aphorism] is: Space and Time arise from these and those Upadhis and from the ether. Though [in reality] Space and Time are nothing but the ether [itself], as characterized by Upadhis, still [the author] here speaks of their arising, in accor. dance with [the opinion of the Vaiseshikas who teach] that the characterized [ether] is distinct [from the pure ether] and that [the former] arises from two things, the characterizing [Upadhis] and their subject. [The author] describes now the ‘great one’ and the following [categories] : 18. The judging organ is [possessed of] ascer- tainment.* ‘It is thus [and not otherwise],’ such decision is meant by ascertainment. 1 That is to say: the ether is called ‘Space,’ when determined by limited substances (as the Dinakari oxplains), and ‘Time,’ when determined by the motion of the sun and the moon. ॐ Cf. the commentary to II. 80. fe eee 11.13—16.] = aniRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 97 “Jn which [of your principles} are merit etc. included?” On this [the author] says: 14. Merit etc. are products of that. Merit, knowledge, indifference and divine power [are in- tended]. By [stating] that these are products of that [7. e., of the judging organ, the opinion of the Naiydyikas and Vaiseshikas] that they are attributes of the Self, is rejected. Since cause and products are not to be separated, it is [thus] shown that [merit etc.] are included [in our ‘judging organ ’}. [The author] states a peculiarity of that: _ 15. The ‘ great one’ becomes the reverse in con- sequence of [noxious] influence. (That is to say: it begets] demerit, ignorance, want of indifference and of divine power. For experience teaches that a diversity of products follows from a diversity of con- comitant [causes]. As a reed-seed [generally] produces the sprout of a reed, but, if concomitated by the connection with fire [¢. ¢., if roasted], produces a plantain-stem,' so the ‘great one,’ if concomitated by Sattva [६ ९.9 on the co-opera- tion of Sattva],? produces merit etc., if concomitated by Tamas, demerit ete. (The author] gives [now] the definition, in appropriate order, of the egotizing organ and of the following [prin- ciples]: 16. The egotizmg organ is [possessed of] de- lusion.’ 1 This nonsense is also found in the Bhamati, as the Pandit informed me. . ‡ The kdrya-ripa Sattva is intended, since the kdrana-rdpa Sattva is the material cause of the judging organ. 3 Cf. the commentary to II. 30, 18 98 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ II. 16—19. The delusion that the [empirical] Ego be [the Self, is in- tended }. [The author] mentions the products of that: 17. The eleven and the five subtile elements are the products of that. The eleven senses and the five subtile elements are the sixteen products of that. ‘¢ How can dead matter and light [४, ¢., the senses as fac- tors of cognition] come from one single cause?” On this [the author] says: 18. The eleven which consist of Sattva arise from the egotizing organ which is a product of mo- dification. From the egotizing organ which is a modification of the ‘great one’ arise the ‘eleven,’ viz., the eleven senses which consist of Sattva, ४, ¢., are produced by the co-operation of Sattva. The subtile elements are produced by the co-opera- tion of Tamas. [The author] teaches that there are three kinds of senses: 19. The internal [sense together] with the fa- culties of action and with the faculties of perception makes eleven. The internal [sense, called] manas, together with the five faculties of action, 2. ¢., of speaking etc., and with the five faculties of perception, ४, e., of smelling etc., makes eleven senses.! | [The Naiydyikas hold that] the senses consist of the ele- ments; in order to reject this [opinion, the author] says: 1 Literally : a sense consisting of eleven; cf., in the commentary on aphor- ism 17, shodafakam tat-kdryam. ह | IT. 20-22.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 99 20. Because Scripture teaches that they are pro- ducts of the egotizing organ, they do not consist of the elements. And because Scripture would be contradicted in that case. This is the sense. [The author] gives another argument : The scriptural passage, however, which says that [the internal 86086 | is formed of food, etc. (Chhandogya Upanishad 6. 5. 4) is to be understood as treating of its being enabled [for ite fanc- tions] by food. 21. Since Scripture teaches the dissolution (of the senses] into the deities, the creative [elements] are not— Tt is a maxim that the products dissolve into their cause. [Now, ] the dissolution [of the senses] into deities is taught in Scripture: “The sight, forsooth, enters into the sun” (cf. Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 3. 2. 13); therefore, the creative elements, ४, €.) [the elements] which are erroneously regarded as creative [by the Naiyayikas], are not the cause [of the senses]. Some say that the senses are eternal. In order to reject this [opinion, the aathor] says: 22. Their arising 13 taught in Scripture, and be cause their destruction is seen. Their arising from the egotizing organ is taught in Scrip- ture, and the destruction, also, of what has arisen, 18 neces- sary. ८८ Since we see that [the senses,] sight etc., have different 100 ANIRUDDH&A’S COMMENTARY. (II. 22—25. powers, the senses are [nothing but] their bodily substrata.””! This [opinion the author] refutes: 28. The sense is supersensuous; [its identifica- tion] with the substratum belongs to mistaken people. The idea that the sense be [identical] with its substratum, 4. €. with the eye-ball etc., [is entertained] by mistaken people [only]. Otherwise, [1. e., if this idea were true,] a man whose ears have been cut off would be unable to hear, and a man whose eyes are affected with a cataract ought to perceive the colours. ““There is [only] one single sense; the diversity depends [merely] on the difference of the Upadhis.”” To this [the author] replies: 24. If the difference is established even by the difference of powers, there is no singleness, Let the difference of the Upadhis be conceded; but a difference of powers [also] must be necessarily stated, and this is a real [difference, not merely dependent on Upddhis] ; hence the diversity [of senses] is also real. “ [But] if something can be explained by singleness sim- ply, the assumption of a multitude is superfluous.”” To this [the author] replies ; The assumption of diverse senses is not superfluous. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism] : 25. A theoretical consideration does not set aside what has been known by proofs. [This is] clear. (The author] gives the definition uf the internal sense: ae. 1 Aindriyakdni = golakdh. II. 25, 27.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 101 [The author] mentions the peculiarities [of the internal sense] : 26. And the internal sense partakesof the nature of both. The internal sense partakes of the nature of the senses of perception and of the faculties of action, because both come into activity through its superintendence.! “‘How can the different senses arise from the single ego- tizing organ?” To this [the author] replies: Since, without the attention of the internal sense, the senses are unable to practise their functions, the internal sense itself is called ‘sense of perception’ as well as ‘faculty of action;’ for Scripture teaches: ‘“‘My internal sense was elsewhere, [therefore] I did not see; my internal sense was elsewhere, [therefore] I did not hear, etc.” (Brihadaranyaka Up. 1. 5. 3). “Tf [all] perception has the nature of a modification of the single internal sense, how is the diversity [to be explained] ?” To this {the author] replies: 27. Diversity proceeds from the difference of the wodifications of the constituents, like conditions. {There are] various [senses] because of the difference of the modifications of the constituents, Sattva etc., which are concomitant [causes] of merit and demerit.* ‘Like con- ditions,’ 2. e., as childhood, youth and old age belong to one single person. (The author] mentions the object of both kinds of senses : ॥ Cf, aphorism 40. 2 The causa efficiens (nimitia-kérana) of the arising of the senses from the egotizing organ (as well as of the production of the whole material world) are merit and demerit. The variety of the senses is conditioned by a concomitant cause or a secondary nimitta-kdrana, as stated in our aphorism, that is to say the senses of perception are produced by the co-operative influence of Sattva the faculties of action by that of Rajas. 102 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (II. 27—30. Sight and the other [senses] are modifications of the constitu- ents, Sattva etc. From the difference of these [senses] proceeds the diversity, 7. e., variety, of perceptions. Though [all] percep- tion is nothing but a modification of the internal sense, we use the expressions ‘[perception] by sight, by hearing etc.’ with respect to the fact that [the perceptions] are produced by sight etc., which [fact] depends on the functions of sight etc.; just as there are [ different] conditions in one single person, leanness, thickness etc., which depend on the use and non-use of this or that food. This is the sense. 28. [The objects] of both begin with colour and end with the excretion of what has been taken. ‘Of both,’ 2 e., of the senses of perception and of the faculties of action. The objects of the senses of perception are colour, taste, smell, feeling and sound; the objects of the faculties of action are speaking, walking, catching, lust and excretion of what has been taken. By the last expres- sion the excrements are meant; with these end [the sensual ` objects]. [The author] teaches the distinction between the Self and the senses : “To whom do the senses render service?” To this question [the author] replies : 29. The Self is the seer etc.’, the senses are the instruments. { This is] clear. [The author] states [now] the mutual distinction between the three internal organs: 30. The three possess their special character- istics. 1 I, ¢., the taster, smeller, feeler and hearer. IT. 30—32. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, 103 The ‘ great one,’ the egotizing organ and the internal sense possess their special characteristics, 1. €. each of them its special characteristic, [viz.] the ‘great one,’ ascertainment, the egotizing, organ, delusion,' and the internal sense, volition. [The author] mentions a property which is common to them : 31. A common function of the organs are the five airs, breath etc. The five airs, breath etc., are sustained by the three {internal} organs [together]. (The author] treats of the functions of [all] organs [ex- ternal as well as internal}: 32. The functions of the senses take place suc- cessively and simultaneously. 6 Successively’ [for instance in the following case]: Having perceived a thief by faint light, (a man at first] examines the object {of his perception] with his sense [7. e., with sight], then he concludes with his internal sense ‘This is a thief,’ then he refers {the matter] to himself (abhimanyate) with his egotizing organ ‘He takes my money away,’ then he determines with his organ of resolution (buddhi) ‘I will catch the thief.’ ‘ Simultaneously’ [for instance in the following case]: Seeing a tiger in the night by the flash of lightning, [a man] runs away instantly. In this case the functions of the four [organs] take place at the same time. Although [different] functions cannot arise at the same time, and hence there is a succession [of mental functions] at this [second event] also (just as at the former], still we say ‘they are simultaneous,’ because they appear to happen [so], as the hundred leaves of the lotus are pierced through [apparently simultaneously ].* oo 1 Cf. IJ. 18 and 16. > The idea is this: There are one hundred petals of the lotus placed one 104 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (fl. 82—35. ‘‘How many functions [of the internal organ] are there ?”’ To this [the author] replies: 88. The functions are fivefold [and either] pain- ful or not painful (= Yoyastitra 1. 5), {These are the following five:] means of right knowledge, error, doubt, sleep and memory (= Yogasiitra 1.6). Means of right knowledge are perception, inference and [apprehen- sion of a] testimony [= Yogasitra 1. 7) ; error 15 misconcep- tion abiding on what is not the [real] form of the object (= Yogasitra 1.8); doubt is a notion which relates to both ` (sides of an alternative]; sleep is a notion which rests on darkness; memory is the knowledge of the past. [All these functions are either] ‘painful,’ ४, ¢., affected with pain, [because] consisting of Rajas and Tamas,—or ‘not painful,’ ४. €. consisting of Sattva, in which case their pain has been burnt (or destroyed]. | [The author] declares [in the following aphorism] that liberation takes place on the cessation of the functions: 34. On their cessation it is released from influ- ences and abides in itself. | On the cessation of the functions,—ignorance, egotism, desire, aversion and attachment to life having been destroyed [by discriminative knowledge—Soul] abides in itself, 7. ¢. | assumes its real nature. [The author] gives an illustration : 385. And as the stone is with respect to the flower. As there is redness in the crystal in consequence of the over the other, and a needle is pushed vertically Gownwards. Its sharp end will pierce all the hundred petals apparently at once, but really iu an im- perceptible succession. II. 85—87.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 105 proximity of the Hibiscus-flower, and [as], on the removal of that, the crystal resumes its own nature, so this [Soul] also [is influenced by the functions of the internal organ, and abides in itself, when it is out of connection with it]. «५ 810९6 the organs [of all individuals] are of the same nature, the sameness of their nature is everlasting, [and so they may cause bondage also to the liberated, again].” To this [the author] replies: 860. The organs also come into actual existence’ for the sake of the [bound] soul, in consequence of the operation of the invisible power (of merit and demerit]. There is no [absolute] sameness, because a difference is [established] by the organs’ coming and not coming into actual existence; and this difference depends on the operation of the invisible power [of merit and demerit], ४. €.) on the fact that [this power] is mightier [in the case of a bound soul than of a liberated soul, and that only in the first case it is able to raise the organs into actual existence]. [The author] gives an illustration : 87. As the cow for [the benefit of] the calf. As, though there is sameness with regard to the being a cow, [only] the wmilch cow nurses the calf, [and not the barren cow, just so, in spite of the sameness of all organs, those only which are raised by the invisible power offer the objects of experience to their soul]. “How many organs are there, the difference of the ex- ternal and internal being taken into consideration?” To this [the author] replies: | _ As for the sake of the calf the cow—this is an elliptic expres- sion for ‘the milk of the cow’—, though non-intellectual, flows down quite spontaneously, and requires no other effort,.., 1 Opposed to potential existence in the cause. 14 106 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (IT. 38, 39. 38. The organs are of thirteen kinds, on account of the subdivisions. Internally : the judging, egotizing and perceptive organs ; external are the ten senses. ^^ How does the nature of an organ belong to the senses ? ” To this [the author] replies : There are three internal organs, the perceptive, egotizing and judging, and ten external: together thirteen organs. “Are the. judging organ and the rest, organs in the same sense, or 18 there any difference?” [The author] declares that there is [a difference]: 39. Because the [property of] being the most effective [instrument] belongs to the senses, as to the axe, As the nature of an organ belongs to the axe, because this is the most effective [instrument in cleaving wood], so it does to the senses also [which are the most effective instru- ment of perception ]. [The author] says what are the offices of the thirteen or- gans:! Since that which is unconnected with the non-attainment of the result is a means of action, the blow itself is the chief means for cleavage ; but the axe is a secondary [means], because the quali- ty of an excellent instrument belongs to it. So the judging organ is the chief organ for Soul’s aim [४, ९. for experience], since it is unconnected with the non-attainment of the result; but the others [४ €.) the egotizing organ, the internal and the external senses], because of possessing the quality of being the most effec- tive instruments for [promoting] Soul’s aim, are ‘ secondary organs’ (amukhyam karanatvam). These two [words] are to be supplied [in the aphorism]. Consequently, the judging organ is the prin- cipal instrument. This is the meaning. 1 Though not directly, since he states in the following aphorism only that the internal sense is the superintendent of the external. IT. 40—43.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 107 ^ But then, the egotizing organ also, since it is distinct from the senses, [just as well] may be the chief organ, and not the judging organ alone.” To this [the author] replies: 40. The chief of both is the internal sense, as [there is one] above the troops of servants in daily life. The internal sense 18 the chief ‘ of both,’ 4. ¢., of the senses of perception ard of the faculties of action, because these come into activity through its superintendence only;! as there is a master above the servants in daily life. (The author] gives an argument [thereof ]: (According to Mah&deva’s view, the first part of our aphorism must be translated: The chief among the two ts the thinking organ). The chief among the two, 7. ¢., the judging and egotizing organs, is the ‘ thinking,’ ४. e., judging organ...... 41, Because it is indispensable [for Soul’s ex- perience | [This 18] clear. {The author] gives a further argument: 42. Moreover, because it is the receptacle of all impressions. । 1366४786 it is known that even [those] impressions [con- tinue to] exist [which have been received] by senses that perished [later on]. [The author] mentions the reason [of what was stated in the preceding aphorism]: 43. And because it is inferred from memory.’ 1 Cf. IL. 26. 9 Vijfianabhikshu’s opinion that smriti be here used in the exceptional mean- ing ‘meditation,’ is to be rejected. 108 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [11. 43—46. The internal sense [as the receptacle of all impressions} is inferred from the well-known fact that memory exists even without the senses, [7. e., after one has been deprived of sight, hearing etc. ] ‘“‘[Let] the Self be the receptacle of the impressions.” To this [the author] replies: 44, They cannot from itself. They cannot proceed from itself, ९, e. from Soul, since this is unchangeable and without qualities. “The nature of an organ being the same [in all senses and internal organs], what is the cause of there being the relation of chief and secondary [organs between them ] 9? To this [the author] replies : 45. The relation of chief and secondary [organs] is relative, on account of the difference of their activity. [This is] perspicuous. | । “[But] the one [४ ९.) the whole set of organs] will not operate without design for the sake of the other [%. e. of the Self].” To this [the author] replies : 46. Their activity is for the sake of this, because it has been acquired by the works of this, as in daily life. The activity, ४ ९, the operation, of the judging and the ` other organs is for the sake of the soul, because it has been acquired by the works of the soul which reflects in the in- ternal organ;' as, in daily life, a slave does service for him by whom he has been acquired. [The author] teaches that the judging organ is superior to all (other organs]: 1 This explanation has been controverted by Vijianabhikshu in his com- mentary on this aphorism. II. ५7. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 109 47. Though the same work belongs [to them], the judging organ is superior, as in daily life—as in daily life. As, in daily life, the prime minister of the kingdom is higher than the mayor of a village, while the king is again higher than he, so the internal sense operates for the sake of the judging organ, and, therefore, the judging organ is superior to all [other instruments of Soul]. ‘Though the same work belongs [to them]’ means: though activity for the sake of Soul belongs in the like manner to all [organs]. The repetition of the words ‘as in daily life’ indicates the end of the book. Though all organs are equally produced [by the same causa eficiens, viz.| by works, the judging organ is superior [to them | for the reasons of its superiority alleged [in the commentary to aphorisms 40—43 ;1 | just so as, in daily life, though the actions of marriage etc. have been equally performed [with different wives of one man], only a single spouse is the principal, because of the excellent qualities which procure her this superiority, and not the other [ wives]. Here ends, in the commentary on Kapila’s aphorisms ex- planatory of the Samkhya system, the second book on the products of primitive Matter. After the description of the products of primitive Matter, the third book begins with a view to [produce] indifference. Here ends the second book in the ‘quintessence of the com- mentary on the explanation of the Samkhya system,’ composed by Mahadeva the Vedantist. After the description of the products of primitive Matter, the third book begins with a view to [pro- duce} indifference. 1 Not printed in my edition, because borrowed from the S&mkhya-prava- chana-bhashya. BOOK III. 1. The diverse arises from that which is not diverse. The diverse—7. ¢., the gross elements—arises from that which is not diverse, 2. e., from the subtile elements. 2. From that the body. In consequence of the consideration that this consists of flesh, etc., one becomes disgusted [with it].! “The origin [of the body] has been mentioned; [but] on what does [its] destruction depend?’ To this [the author] replies: Supply : [from that] arises [the body] which consists of skin, etc. [The author] states the cause of the production of bodies: 8. The flow of mundane existences depends on the cause of it. The wandering through mundane existences, 2. ९.9 the feontinual} destruction (of the body], depends on the causa [ effictens} of it, ¢ ०, of its arising from the [gross] elements, that is to say: on merit and demerit. “Since it is the essential nature of the elements to be productive,* there ought to be a constant production and, therefore, no liberation.” With reference to this [remark the author] declares : 1 This is not an explanation of aphorism 2, but a general remark on the contents of Book III. 9 Read, with the I. 0. L. manuscript, drambhaka-svabhdvatve. According to the text printed in my edition, the translation should ron thus: “If (this power of merit and demerit] which originates the elements is real [in the highest sense, 4. e., eternal |. 17. 3—5.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 111 The flow of mundane existences—t. 6.; the experience of pleasure and pain, determined by this and that body, etc. [४. ९.» life in dif- ferent conditions |}—depends on the cause of it, ४. e., of the [gross] body, viz. on work or on the subtile [internal] body. “But then, if the subtile elements are constantly productive [of bodies, through the medium of the gross elements], bondage must last for ever.”! In reply to this [remark the author] states the limit : 4. And the activity of those which are not di- verse [continues] till discrimination. Productiveness which is the nature of the subtile elements ends with discriminative knowledge. “If (the subtile elements] are productive for that [soul] which has not attained discrimination, they ought to be so for the 88.106 at [the time of] the great dissolution of the universe also.” To ४1189 [the author] replies: The productiveness of the subtile elements ends with discri- minative knowledge. This is the sense. “But then, if [the subtile elements] are productive for that [soul] which has not attained discrimination, why are they not productive for the same at [the time of] the great dissolution P” To this [question the author] replies: 5. Since the other [४. €. the non-discriminating soul] has consumed [the fruits of its actions]. Since the non-discriminating [soul] has [then] consumed {the fruits of its former actions] and, therefore, does not possess a body at (the time of] the great dissolution, how shall there be experience [then]? For this reason [the subtile elements] are not productive for such [a soul at this time]. ८ But, if [the subtile elements] are uot productive (during. 1 Sarvadé is to be connected with the preceding as well as with the follow- ing word. & Read ity ata dha with the I. 0. L. MS. 112 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (III. 5, 6. the time of the dissolution], from what special cause are they productive again for the non-discriminating [soul, when that time is over]?” With regard to this [question the author] declares : The dissolution [of the universe takes place|, when the other, t. e. the non-discriminating [soul], has consumed [the fruits of its works], ४. e., when this consumption has been completed, and hence the former works which led to experience are annihilated. Since, therefore, there is no experience [then], of what use would be a body [at that time]? This is the meaning. ८ How is it that [the subtile elements] are productive again at [the time of] creation?” To this [the author] replies: 6. It 18 then embraced by two things. [I. ¢.,] by merit and demerit. {That is to say :] the Self which is [still] subject to going and coming [४ ९., to the flow of mundane existences] is even at {the time of] the dissolution of the universe connected with merit and demerit. Therefore [the elements] are productive again for such {a soul at the beginning and during the time of the new creation]. But it is not so, when liberation [has been attained to, the Self then being out of contact with merit and demerit J. ८८ But as liberation is eternal, how can it be dependent on some other thing [7. e., on the means enjoined for the sake of liberation]? To this [the author] replies :! ‘Then,’ £. ¢., at the time of creation; ‘by two things,’ 7. e. by merit and demerit. Parimukta [as Mahadeva reads instead of parishvakta] means ‘bound,’ since [the root much], also when preceded by pari, has the meaning ‘to bind,’ just as when preceded by 4.3 1 The connection between this introduction and aphorism 7 is not very perspicuous, but may be thus understood: the attainment to liberation is obstructed by the association of the Self with the subtile or internal body, and depends on the definitive separation from the same. 2 This bold statement has for its object to press Aniruddha’s interpretation IIT. 6—8.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 118 The sense [of the aphorism, therefore,] is this: Since merit and demerit, after having slept during the dissolution of the universe, rise to bear their fruits at the time of the [new] creation, a body is produced [then again]. In liberation, however, merit and demerit are [totally] annihilated. [The author] states the difference between the gross and the subtile body : 7. The gross [body] is generally engendered by father and mother, not so the other. ` ‘Generally’ 18 said in accordance with experience: (for the gross bodies of the vegetable kingdom do not arise in this manner]. ‘Not so the other,’ ५, ०. the subtile body, because [its production] is not observed. “To which of the two bodies does experience [of pleasure and pain] belong?” To this (the author] replies: ‘Generally’ is said, because some gross [bodies], too, are not engendered by father and mother. ‘Notso’ means: not engen- dered by father and mother. (The author] states [now ] which of the two is prior and which is subsequent, as well as to which of them experience is to be assigned : 8. That which arose first produces this effect, since experience belongs to the one, not to the other. ‘That which arose first’ is the subtile body. Since experience belongs to the one, ४ ७.) to this, [and] not to the other, z. ०.9 to the gross [body, the former] produces this effect. The gross body experiences [pleasure and pain] in a secondary sense [only], because we see that there is no experience in a dead body [%. e., in a gross body from which | the subtile body has parted J. of the aphorism into the text which has been adopted by the other com- mentators, 15 114 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (TTI. 8—10. “Of how many principles 18 the subtile body composed ? ” To this [the author] replies: (According to Mahadeva, who takes pirvotpaiteh as a Karma- dharaya and not as a Bahuvrihi, the aphorism must be thus trans- lated: Since [this] arose first, [that] ४5 a product of this; eapertence belongs etc.). Since the subtile body arose first, the gross body is a product of this. The ablative bhogdt is [employed] in the sense of the no- minative case (!). [Hence] the meaning is this: experience be- longs to the one, ४ e., to the subtile, [and] not to the other, i. e., to the gross [body], because we see that there is no experience in a dead body. [The author] describes the nature of the internal body : 9. The internal body consists of seventeen and one (saptadas'aikam). [Saptadasatkam means] ‘ seventeen and one,’ 4. ¢., eighteen. From these the internal or subtile body arises. The judg- ing, egotizing and perceptive organs, the five subtile ele- ments and the ten senses [are to be understood }. “ Since the subtile body is the same everywhere, how can the dissimilar [gross] bodies of the termites and of the ele- phants arise from 1४2 To this [the author] replies: [ Saptadasaikam] is a collective Dvandva compound, and means ‘seventeen and one.’ The judging, egotizing and perceptive organs, the five subtile elements and the ten senses [form an aggregate which] is called subtile or internal body. ‘Since the subtile body is the same everywhere, how is the dis- similarity of the gross [bodies to be accounted for]?” To this [the author] replies : 10. The distinction of individuals depends on the difference of works [previously done]. ९ This is} plain. IIT. 10—12.] aNiRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 115 «८ [1 the Self is different [from the body], how is [it that) the delusion of the body’s being the Ego [takes place] ?” To this [the author] replies: ‘Individuals’ means gross bodies, ‘distinction’. means diversity. ‘‘ How is [it that] the body is called the Ego?” To this [the author] replies: 11. Since the [subtile] body which is the site of the abiding of that, is called so, [the other] is called 80 [100] Since the [subtile] body which is the site of the abiding of the Self, is [figuratively] called the Self, on account of its experiencing, the [gross] body, [too,] is called the Hgo in consequence of the egotizing delusion. (‘The author] gives an illustration thereof : The word ‘that’ (taf) means the Self [here just as in Vedanta writings]. From previously calling [the subtile hody] the Ego it always follows that [the gross body] is subsequently called the Ego. By employing the word ‘called’ (vdda) [the author] declares that the conception of the identity of the body and the Ego is an error; for the Self is distinct from [either] body. “[Then] let the body alone be the subject of the conception represented by the word ‘ Ego’, because that alone is the Self.” This [objection the author] refutes : 12. Not independently without that, like a shadow and like a picture If, without the Self, the body were [to be] conceived as the Ego, then this conception ought to exist in a dead body [2180]. And it is not so. As there is no shadow without {an object] which intercepts [light, and] no picture without 1 Vijfianabhikshu explains this aphorism quite differently from our two commentators; he accepts three distinct bodies in one individual, while Aniruddha and Mahadeva admit only two. 116 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (IN. 12, 13. a wall, so in our case also [the idea of the Ego cannot exist without the Self]. % [But] the subtile body may be the Self.” To this [the author] replies: ‘Without that,’ 4. ¢., without there being a Self, the body by itself is not the subject of the conception represented by the word Ego, because, [if this were the case,] this conception ought to occur ina dead body [also. The idea of the Ego is impossible without the Self,] as there is no shadow without [an object] which intercepts [light, and] no picture without a wall. [The author] refutes [the opinion] that the subtile body be the Self : | 18. [The subtile body] also is not [the Self], be- ing limited, because it possesses combination, as the sun. (The subtile body] is limited, because it is combined $ it is for the sake of something else, because it is limited; ‘as the sun,’ ४, ¢., as the sun, in spite of its being light, is not the Self! on account of its limitedness. «८ [1670 ] the internal sense may be the Self.” To this (the author] replies: (According to Mah&deva, the aphorism must be translated : Though limited, [the subtile body] ts not [the Self], because etc.) ‘Though limited,’ 8 ९. though active. Hereby the proof for [the existence of] the subtile body is given.—The subtile body also is not the Self, ‘because it possesses combination,’ & 6.) because it is combined, [and] because the being combined invaria- bly implies the being for the sake of something else. The sense is, that the Self is distinct from this [subtile body].—The sun also, 4. e., the light which is seen [by everybody],* is for the sake of something else. | [The author] refutes [the opinion] that the internal sense be the Self: 1 The sun is held to be the Param4iman by the Sauras or sun-worshippers. 9 Apratyaksham pratyaksha-drishfantena sddhyate, Pandit. ITT. 14.} ANIRUDDHA’sS COMMENTARY. 117 14. It is of atomic size, because Scripture speaks of its acting.’ The internal sense is of atomic size, [not all-pervading], because we read in Scripture about its activity. That which is omnipresent and without UpAdhis [s. ¢., the pure Self] is not a sense, and hence [the internal sense] must be called an Upadhi. [An opponent objects:] ‘If a special part, asf. ९४. the auditory passage of the ear, were the [internal perceptive] Upfdhi [of the Self}, then an affection would be received in that only, [but] not elsewhere, and thus [one sensation only], as f. ४. hearing, would be possible. Therefore [the internal sense cannot be of atomic size, but] the whole body must be ealled the [perceptive] Up&dhi [of the Self].” [To this objection we reply :] Still, the reception of the affections by this determination [i. ¢., by the whole of the body] contradicts the conviction of the existence of different local (avydpya) affections [at the same time] as ‘my head aches, while my foot is well.’ [The author] teaches the atomic nature of the internal sense [for that reason also* which is stated in the Nyfya 8018 1. 16, viz.] because [different] sensations do not arise simultaneously. This argument [of the Nyaéya philosophy] is dilated upon at some other place [7. 6, V. 69—71]}. [116 author] mentions another reason: It, +. e., the internal sense, is of atomic size, 4. e., small, because Scripture speaks of its acting, that is to say: because we learn its activity from Scripture, and because the Self is omnipresent {and hence cannot be active]. [The author] says [now] that the internal sense is not the Self 1 Aniruddha treats tat-krits as a compound, while Vijianabhikshu and Mahadeya.make tat the subject of the sentence. 9 I. ., not only, ‘ because Scripture speaks of its acting.’ 118 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (ITI. 15, 16. [for another reason] also, [viz.] because Scripture teaches that it consists of food : 15. Because Scripture teaches that it consists of food. There is a scriptural passage (Chhaindogya Up. 6. 5. 4) for its, ९, ९.) the internal sense’s, consisting of food. By [stat- ing] that it consists of food [1. ¢., that it is strengthened by food] it is shown that [the internal sense] is [invigorated] by [the virtue of] the Soma (drink, sawmyatva]. And being in relation to the Soma (sawmyaiva) means: having the nature of the moon, [%. e., being beloved]. Now, the moon is not the Self (! !). There is [another] passage in Scripture, too: “ Food, forsooth, are the vital airs.” The vital air [or life] must be known to have the nature of the moon [४, e., is very dear to each individual]. The moon has been produced from the internal sense [of the supreme being]. Therefore, the in- ternal sense is atomic, and [hence] not the Self (! !). “Why do the ‘great’ and the following [principles] operate or transmigrate for the sake of the souls?”! To this {the author] replies: - This scriptural passage is (Chhandogya Up. 6. 5. 4): “For the internal sense, my dear, consists of food.” [The author] teaches [now] that the activity of the subtile ele- ments also, just as that of primitive Matter, is for the sake of the souls only : । 16. The transmigration of the internal bodies (linga) is for the sake of the souls, as that of the king’s cooks. 1 The answer to this question is to be taken from the commentary to the following aphorism: vairdgydrtham “in order to produce indifference (with regard to worldly pleasure and pain).” IIL. 16—19.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 119 As the activity [of the internal bodies], so is their trans- migration {for the same purpose]. And since, as long as transmigration lasts, death and pain continue, [on discerning this] one becomes disgusted [with mundane existence ].—*‘ As that of the king’s cooks;’ (the illustration shows merely that every } activity is for the sake of something else. As there 18 a diversity of opinions [with regard to the composition of the gross body, the author] states his own view : ‘Transmigration’ means activity, ‘litga’ the subtile elements. 17. The [gross] body consists of the five ele- ments, {This is] plain. “What diversity of opinions is there (on this point]?” To this [the author] replies : 18, Others say that it consists of four elements. Others except the ether and say that the [gross] body consists of four elements. [The author] mentions a further opinion: 19. Others, that it consists of one element. I. e., that the [gross] body is [formed] of earth [only]. [The author] refutes [now the view] that the body be [possessed] of intellectual nature: [These three aphorisms, 17—19, are] plain. In the latter two [the word] saréram is [to be supplied as] the subject.! [The author] refutes [now the Charvikas] who say: “ Intellect is [nothing but] a property of the elements modified into the form of the body.” 1 As chdturbhautikam and atkabhautikam require a nouter, while dehah in aphorism 17 is masculine. 120 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (TIL. 20, 21. ` 20. Intellect is not natural, because it is not seen in the single [elements]. Since intellect is not seen in the single [constitutive ele- ments], when they are separated, there is no intellect essential [to them]. Therefore itis also not to be supposed that intellect belongs to the [elements], when they are united. For [the example by which the Charvakas try to support their opinion, viz., ] ‘ Animals who have severally the power of | controlling small animals, control even an elephant, when they are united’ [does not apply to the case in question]; for the elements are not 80, [£ ¢., not even a minimum of intellec- tual power is seen in them severally; hence] there is no intellect of the body. (The author] mentions another argument against [the opinion of the Charvakas | [‘ Natural’ means] essential [to the body, or] being a property {ofit]. For [intellect] might then belong to the united [elements], if something [of it] were seen in them severally. 21. And there would be no defunction, ete. If the body were intellectual, there would be no defunc- tion (prapafichatva = pafchatva) or death, because intellect is eternal; and then liberation would be the death of intel- lect also.! | [The author] mentions another argument against [the Charvikas] : (According to the reading of Mahadeva the aphorism must be translated: And there would be no death etc., of the beings of the empirical world.) If the body were intellectual, and if [therefore] it alone were the Self, there would result, for the beings of the empirical world, the impossibility of death—which is [caused] by merit and de- 1 This is to explain the ddi, ‘etc.,’ of the aphorism. IIT, 21, 22.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 121 merit—+t. e. of the separation from the bodies, and—on account of - the word ‘etc.’ [in the aphorism]—of the conjunction with other bodies [also]. And [so] we arrive at [a state of things] which cannot be accepted [by you]; for all [this, ४. ९., death and birth] is proved [by the perception of the whole world}. ८ 48 the many substances composing the intoxicating [drink], though without power severally, produce the intoxicating power, {when they are united], so the united elements become intellec- _;tual.” To this [objection of the Charvakas the author] replies: 22. If [you say: “It is] like the intoxicating power,” [I reply:] This arises in the compound, because it is observed in the single [ingredients] in a subtile state. As the incited power is seen in each single man! in a sub- tile state, while having joined they carry even a huge rock, in consequence of the arising of a great power, [so it is the case with the ingredients of the intoxicating drink]. But a subtile intellect is not likewise observed in the elements severally, so that intellect might exist in the compound, ४, ९.) in the body. What has been denied in aphorism [ 20, “ Intellect is} not natural,” is declared [there] in a negative form [of argu- ment]; a positive form {is stated] in our aphorism ;? there- fore it is not a [superfluous] repetition. Indifference etc. [%. e., hearing and meditating] have been taught as indirect means of liberation; [now the author] teaches the direct means of liberation : As there [in the example] a subtile power is observed in the single [ingredients], the intoxicating power arises, £, €.) is aug- mented, when a compound, ४, ९. a unition, is [formed of them]. [The author] teaches [now] the direct means of liberation: 1 The unusual locative case pratipurushe (instead of pratipurusham) is evidently employed by Aniruddha with regard to drishfa. 2 Notice pratyekddrishteh and pratyeka-paridrishte. 16 122 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. {IIl, 23—25. 23. From knowledge liberation. (This is] clear. [The author] states the reverse : [The author] mentions the cause of bondage : 24, Bondage from error. I. ¢., from ignorance. ५५ [ But] liberation does not result from knowledge alone, since [religious] works, too, are a means of liberation. And thus Scripture says: ‘His knowledge and his works take hold of him, and his acquaintance with former things’ (Brihaddranyaka Up. 4. 4. 2).7 To this [the author} replies : ‘From error’ means: from ignorance. [The author] states [now] the distinction between [the effects of] knowledge and [those of] works : 25. Because of the special causality there is neither combination nor alternativeness. {Hither of the two] is but a special cause: from knowledge proceeds liberation, from works experience. Even where a combination [of knowledge] with disinterested works is mentioned in Scripture, there, too, [the latter are recom- mended simply] for the sake of [promoting] knowledge, [६४१ hence are only indirect means of liberation]; there- fore, [in reality, ] there 18 no [such] combination; nor does the alternative exist, that [liberation] results sometimes from knowledge, sometimes from works. And (to this effect] Scripture [declares] : ‘‘T know that great being of sunlike colour beyond darkness. Only he who knows this passes over death ; there is no other path to go” (S’vetésvatara Up. 8. 8). [706 author] mentions another argument against [the opinion of those who regard religious works as a direct means of liberation J: III, 25—-27.] | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, 123 Knowledge is the cause of liberation, works are not. Therefore on behalf of Jiberation there is neither combination of knowledge and works, nor alternativeness. ‘“‘ Let there be no combination [of knowledge] with works, per- formed with the desire of gaining some advantage, still there may be [combination] with the indispensable [religious duties, performed without any desire].” To this [the author] replies: 26. The liberation of the soul does not proceed from both, as [nothing can be attained] from dream- ing and waking [together]; of which the one is illusory and the other not illusory. Dreaming is illusory, waking is not illusory ; works are like dreaming, knowledge is like waking. Now, two things arising at the same time may be combined, but dreaming and waking are not simultaneous. Therefore, there is no combination of knowledge and works. ‘¢(But] apprehension in the waking state, too, will be unreal like apprehension in dreams, because [both] come under the [same] notion ‘apprehension’.’”” With reference to this [objection the author] declares: Works are illusory, knowledge is not illusory. By these two, {together, ] which belong to different times as dreaming and waking, liberation is not [effected]. Both are never simultaneous, so that there might be a combination [of them]. Indispensable religious works also serve only the purpose of the purification of the think- ing organ, but not that of liberation [directly]. [The author] states [now] that the illusory nature of works does not mean their unreality. It simply means that [works] do not produce everlasting results : 27. Even that of the other is not absolute. Even the unreality of apprehension in dreams is not abso- lute like that of a flower in the sky, nor 18 [such apprehension absolutely] unreal even in the respective Self [into which 124 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. ([III. 27—29. the visions of the internal organ are reflected]; else the notion of {there having been] a dream would not exist. Nor does a dream consist of absolutely unseen [things], but of such objects which have been seen [beforehand] in the waking state. All supernatural powers, [too,] do not fall to the Yogins in consequence of their mere will only, without a visible cause; [for the cause is the Yoga-praxis]. About this [the author] remarks ; (Mahadeva takes api in the sense of ‘ moreover’). Moreover, the result ‘of the other,’ t. e., of works, is not abso- lute [or everlasting]; hence they are called illusory. Hereby it is explained that knowledge is not illusory. [The author] declares [now] that unreality does not belong even to a thing brought about by the mere will of the Yogin: 28. Just so even in the case of what is created by the will. Since people who are like us do not bring about anything by their will [alone], this is impossible to be accomplished by [Yogins] also who are possessed of the merit arising from the Yoga-praxis. Therefore [what the Yogins produce or obtain by their will is really caused by the merit just men- tioned, and hence] not unreal. [The author] states the same [in the following aphorism]: ‘There is no unreality’ has been kept [by the author] in his mind. ‘But, when there is no well-known or visible cause, how can the unreality of that whivh is produced [by the will of the Yogin] be denied ?” To this [the author] replies: 29. Everything falls to the purified,’ in conse- 1 7. ¢., to the Yogin whose internal organ has been purified by medita tion. IIT. 29—31.] ANIRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 125 quence of the intensity of his contemplation, as is the case with primitive Matter. As the ‘great one’ and the following [principles] bring about their products in dependence upon the [next] prece- dent [principle], primitive Matter, however, is independent of anything in bringing about its products, so everything is accomplished by the Yogins in consequence of the intensity of their contemplation, even when there is no [other] visible cause [of the production }. [The author] states [now] that meditation is for the sake of [this] contemplation : To the Yogin who is purified [internally], that is, by re- straint of breath, etc. ‘ Contemplation’ means meditation, ‘ in- tensity’ excess. In consequence of this [powerful meditation} everything is accomplished [by the Yogin, and] no visible cause [besides that] is required for the purpose; that is to say: the Yogin is not, like us and our equals, a man whose will is not ful- filled. ‘As is the case with primitive Matter’ means: so as primitive Matter brings forth the ‘great one’ and its other pro- ducts, quite independently of [any] preceding cause. [The author] describes [now] meditation : 30. Meditation is the removal of desire. From desire, 1. ९.) from the constituent Rajas, proceeds unsteadiness. The removal of this implies steadiness or meditation. ‘““How is this to be effected?” To this [the author] replies : It is the destruction of desire, 7. e., of the constituent Rajas, in short: steadiness. [The author] mentions the means thereof : 81. This is effected by the suppression of the functions. 126 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. ([III. 31—83. The functions {of the internal organ] are the five [enu- merated in the commentary to II. 88, viz.] means of right knowledge, etc. By the suppression of these ‘this is effect- ed,’ ४. e., meditation is effected. ` “ How are these suppressed?” To this [the author] re- plies : The functions are means of right knowledge, etc. By the sup- pression of these meditation is effected. [The author] mentions the means of the suppression of the func- tions : | 32. This is effected by collectedness, posture and observance of the duties. ‘Collectedness’ is keeping the mind steadily directed to the navel or to some other place [as to the nose or to the brow]. ‘Posture’ is sitting straight with the feet placed under the opposite thighs (svastika), or in some other way {according to the prescription of the Yoga S'astra]. Hereby restraint, obligation, regulation of breath and abstraction {of the senses from the objects]! are implied. ‘Observance of the duties’ is performance of those acts which are enjoined for the respective caste.* By these [means] the suppression of the functions is effected. (The author] describes [now] that posture which he approves himself among the various postures : ‘Collectedness’ is keeping the mind steadily directed to the navel or to some other place. [The author] describes posture : 88. The posture [must be] steady and pleasant. Such posture must be chosen, by which steadiness and pleasure are [caused]. 1 Cf. Yogasfitra 2. 29 seg. % This sentence anticipates the content of aphorism 35, Ill. 38—86.] = ANIRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 127 [The author] mentions another means of the suppression [of the functions of the internal organ]: [This 18] clear. [The author] states a further means of the suppression of the functions : 34. The suppression is [promoted] by expulsion and retention. | ‘Expulsion’ is emitting the breath, ‘ retention’ is stop- ping it. These [two] are mentioned elliptically; [for] fill- ing the lungs with breath is to be understood besides. “What is that observance of the duties, [mentioned in aphorism 82]?”’ To this [the author] replies: (Supply at] the beginning [of the aphorism: The suppression] of the functions.—‘ Expulsion ’ is emitting the breath, ‘ retention ’ is stopping it; filling the lungs with breath, too, is implied. The meaning is: by [different] regulations of the breath. (The author] explains [now] what observance of the duties is: 35. Observance of the duties is performance of those acts which are enjoined for the respective reli- gious periods of life. (This is} clear. [The author] mentions another means of the suppression ‘of the functions : | 86. Also by indifference and practice. ‘By indifference’ which is twofold, viz., the lower one, ४ 6. the idea ^ Enough [of all worldly objects]!? and the higher one which is nothing but clearness of [discriminative] knowledge. ‘By practice’ means: by constantly repeated meditation. [The word] ‘also’ indicates that [both things] are to be combined (with the means mentioned above].' 1 Cf. the words cha-kdras’ cha dhdrand-samuchchaydyeti in Vijfidnabhikshu’s commentary on this aphorism. 128 ANIRUDDHA'S COMMENTARY. ([III. 86—41. (The author] states [now] the subdivisions of the func- tions: ‘ By indifference,’ 7. e., by the idea ^^ Enough !”, and by the prac- tice of it. 87. The kinds of error are five. [ Viz.] ignorance or misapprehension, egotism or egotizing delusion, desire or love, hatred or wrath, attachment [to one’s property and to life] or fear [of danger and death]. Here by the object the [conscious] cognition of the object is implied.! [The author} describes inability : 38. Inability is twenty-eightfold. {The author] describes acquiescence : 39. Acquiescence is ninefold. [The author] describes perfection : 40. Perfection is eightfold. Of [these] four [the author] describes [at first] the varie. ties of error. Of [these] four [the author] describes [at first] the subdivi- sions of error : 41, The subdivisions are as formerly.’ The expression ‘as formerly’ means: [they are to be understood as] they have been stated by the ancient teachers. There are [altogether] sixty-two varieties of error. Ignorance, [called also] ‘ obscurity,’ is the notion that primitive Matter, the ‘ great one,’ the egotizing organ or the 1 That is to say, ignorance, egotism, desire, hate and attachment are per se ४११८४१5 or mechanical functions (affections) of the internal organ and, as such, objects of the cognition of the Self by which they are brought to consciousness. > Enumerated, for instance, in Bhojaraja’s commentary on Yogasiitra 3. 45. IIT. 41.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 129 five subtile elements be the Self; this is eightfold, because it refers to eight ( different] objects. The gods, forsooth, are under the delusion that the fa- culty of assuming atomic magnitude and the other [seven supernatural powers!] belong to the Self. This is egotism, [called also] ‘illusion,’ and eightfold, because referring to eight [different] objects. The desire for the five elements [or objects of sense], sounds etc., is [also called] ‘ great illusion,’ and is tenfold, because it has ten objects, [the elements] being either celes- tial or not celestial. {The objects of sense,] sounds etc., are ten [by them- selves; but] they are [to be] combined with the eight super- natural powers,—viz., with the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude, etc.—which are the condition*® [of enjoying the elements in their subtile state]. Now, when these are marred by somebody else, hatred [also called) ‘darkness’ {arises}, which is eighteenfold, because it refers to eighteen objects. Since, forsooth, the gods, while enjoying these [eighteen objects], are disparaged by the demons, [they feel} attach~ ment [to these objects] or fear [of being bereaved of them. This is also called] ‘utter darkness,’ and is eighteenfold, because referring to eighteen objects. Thus [results the number] sixty-two. | [The author] describes the varieties of inability : The subdivisions of error are to be so understood as they have been stated by the ancient teachers. This is as follows. The names of the five [general] kinds of error, [mentioned in ap- 1101870 37], viz. ignorance, egotism, desire, hatred and attachment, 2 Enumerated, for instance, in Bhojaraja’s commentary on Yogasitra ॐ. 45. > Upadhina is ® synonyme of uptdhi which is used by Mahadeva in the same connection p. 128, 1. 13 of my edition. 17 130 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. {111. 41, 42. are ‘obscurity, illusion, great illusion, darkness and utter dark- ness, given in order. Ignorance or ‘obscurity’ is the notion that the indistinct [primitive Matter], the ‘great one,’ the egotizing organ or the five subtile elements, [all of} which are not the Self, be the Self; and this is eightfold, because it refers to eight different objects. ‘The gods who, having obtained the eightfold divine power, are under the delusion of being immortal consider these supernatural faculties of assuming atomic magnitude, etc., as properties of the Self and, [therefore,] as eternal. This is egotism or illusion, and eightfold, because its object is the eightfold divine power. The destre or affection for the five [objects of sense], sounds etc., which are tenfold on account of being either celestial or not celestial, is called ‘great illusion’; it is tenfold, because it has ten different objects. The [objects of sense], sounds etc., are ten and the [super- natural powers], the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude, etc., are eight; since these, when they are obstructed by each other, excite wrath, the hatred which refers to this fact, [also called] ‘darkness,’ is eighteen-fold, because it has eighteen different objects. The gods who, having obtained the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude and the other divine powers, enjoy the objects of sense, sounds etc., are afraid that “ The objects of our enjoyment, sounds etc., and our supernatural faculties of assuming atomic magni- tude, etc., which are the conditions of [enjoying] the former [in their subtile state], might perhaps be disparaged by the demons.” This fear or attachment is called ‘utter darkness,’ and is eightcenfold, because it refers to eighteen different objects. These varieties of error, summed up, are sixty-two. [The author] describes the varieties of inability : 42. 80 are those of the other. ‘Of the other,’ ४ ¢, of inability; ‘so’ means: [the varieties] are multifarious, 7. ¢., twenty-eightfold, [as has been stated in aphorism 38]. The defects of the eleven senses are: Til. 42, 43. } ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 131 ५५ Deafness, leprosy, blindness, want of taste and sinell, dambneas, lameness of hands and feet, impotence, constipation and in- sanity.” [Hence] there are, with reference to these, eleven [inabi- 1168] of the internal organ; [moreover, since] there are nine acquiescences and eight perfections, we have, by inver- sion of these, seventeen [further inabilities] of the internal organ. Thus there are [altogether] twenty-eight. [The author] describes the varieties of acquiescence : The varieties of inability are to be understood just as they have been stated by the ancient teachers. They are: [firstly] the defects of the eleven senses, deafness etc., [secondly, since] there are nine acquiescences and eight perfections, by inversion of these seventeen [direct] defects of the internal organ. Thus the in- ability of the internal organ is of twenty-eight sorts. ‘Want of taste’ means insensibility to taste, ‘lameness of hands’ incapability of catching, ‘constipation’ incapability of secretion, ‘insanity’ non-perception of [any] objects. [The author] describes the varieties of acquiescence : 48. Acquiescence is ninefold, because of the difference of the subjective and the rest. There are four subjective [acquiescences], produced by the notion that what is not the Self be the Self. By the word ‘ the rest’ the five objective (forms of acquiescence] are intended. The first of the [four subjective] acquiescences, named ‘Matter,’ is the following conception: “If liberation re- sults from the discriminative knowledge of Matter, this alone is to be worshipped; what is the use of [discerning] the Self?’ This 18 [also] called ‘ water’ (amdhas). The second acquiescence, named ‘engagement’, is the conception: ^ Even from discriminative knowledge [libera- tion] does not result immediately, since this is not confirmed by experience; but it will be [effected] by engaging in the 132 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (TIL. 43. observance [of renouncing the world].” This is [also] called ‘ wave’ (salzla). The third acquiescence, named ‘Time,’ is the concep- tion: “Even from the [said] observance [liberation] does not result immediately, but it comes in time.” This is [also] called ‘flood’ (ogha). The fourth acquiescence, named ‘luck,’ is the conception: ८८ एषा by the force of Time all do not attain to liberation, but only by good luck [some do].” ‘This is [also] called ‘rain’ (vrishtt).. [These forms of acquiescence are] sub- jective, because they refer to the Self. The [following] five are objective, since they are [caused] by the fivefold abstinence from the objects. The first acquiescence [of this kind, which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain of acquiring objects, is called ‘crossing’ (pdra). The second acquiescence [which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain of preservation, is called ‘happy crossing’ (supdra) . The third acquiescence [which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain, felt by one who apprehends the tran- sitoriness [of all worldly objects] is called ‘ perfect crossing’ (pdra-pdra). The fourth acquiescence [which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain, felt by one who ap- prehends the evils of enjoyment, is called ‘most excellent water’ (anuttamdmbhas). The fifth acquiescence [which takes place], when abstinence results from the pain [of the cognition] that no enjoyment is brought about without the destruction of living beings, is called ‘excellent water’ (uétamambhas). Thus [acquiescence] is ninefold. [The author] describes the varieties of perfection : The acquiescences are of two different sorts, subjective and objective. Of these [two], the subjective, £ 6. those which arise with reference to the Self as distinct from Matter, are four [in number], ‘Matter, engagement, Time and luck’ by namel. + Ndman in a Bahuvrihi compound may serve as a feminine stem, according IIT. 43.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 133 Of these, aquiescence {named | ‘ Matter’ is as follows. When the disciple has learned [in a general way] that the Self is distinct from Matter, there is an acquiescence on his part in consequence’ of the following instruction given by somebody: ^“ The immediate cognition of the distinction verily is a modification of Matter, and Matter alone will effect this. For this reason there is no need of your practising meditation for the purpose; therefore remain simply waiting.” This [acquiescence] is called ‘ water.’ Acquiescence [named] engagement is that acquiescence which results from the following instruction: ‘‘ The cognition of the dis- tinction, though [a] material [process], does not proceed from Matter alone—lest it should occur to everybody and always ; for Matter as such is the same with regard to all. But this {cognition | 18 caused by renouncing the world; therefore you are to engage in renouncing it. There is no need of your practising meditation.” This acquiescence is called ‘ wave.’ Acquiescence [named] ‘ Time’ is that acquiescence which results from the following instruction: ^^ Even the renouncement of the world does not lead to salvation at once, but it must wait its time. Therefore in time success will come to you. There is no need of your anxiety.” This [acquiescence] is called ‘ flood.’ Acquiescence [named] ‘ luck’ is that acquiescence which results from the following instruction: ‘ Even in time all do not attain to liberation, but only by good luck some one or other does. For this reason liberation was obtained by the sons of Madalas& even in their childhood, because they acquired discriminative knowledge merely through their mother’s teaching. Therefore good luck alone is the cause [of liberation, and] there is no other [cause besides ].” This [acquiescence] is called ‘ rain.’ The five objective [forms of acquiescence] arise, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who is under the delusion that primitive Matter, the ‘ great one,’ the egotizing organ and the following [principles, all of] which are not the Self, be the Self. For there are five kinds of abstinence regarding the to Panini 4.1.12; cf. pramoda-mudita-modaména-ndmdnah p. 134, 1. 12 of Mahadeva’s text, 134 | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (III. 43. objects which are five also, viz., sounds etc., [and these kinds of abstinence] proceed from the cognition of the following [five] “evils, viz. the difficulty of their acquisition and preservation, their perishable nature, the evils of their enjoyment and of cruelty [which such enjoyment entails]. On these the [following] five acquiescences are [dependent |. The first acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who takes into consideration the great pain [implied] in the acquiring of garlands of flowers, per- fumes of sandal wood, lovely women and other [objects of en- joyment]. The second acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who is under the following apprehension: ‘‘ Since wealth etc., though acquired, may be lost by the actions of kings, etc., great pain is [required] to preserve it.” The third acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who apprehends transitoriness in this manner: ^^ What has been acquired and preserved with extraordinary efforts perishes when it is enjoyed.” The fourth acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects on the part of one who apprehends the evils of enjoyment thus: ^“ As it is declared [by Mann 2. 94]: ° Desire is by no means appeased by satisfying the desires, just as fire increases only the more by butter [poured into it],” the desires increase in consequence of practising enjoyment, and they cause pain to the desirous one, if the objects [of enjoyment] are not obtained.” The fifth acquiescence takes place, when there is abstinence from the objects through the cognition of the evil of cruelty [when somebody understands] that no enjoyment is possible without the destruction of living beings. These [acquiescences] are called, in order, ‘crossing, happy crossing, perfect crossing, most excellent water and excellent water.’ Thus there are [altogether] nine acquiescences. [The author] describes the varieties of perfection: III. 44. 1 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 135 44. On account of reasoning, etc., perfection 18 eightfold. The first perfection, ४, e., reasoning, reflecting or thinking logically,' is called ‘ passing’ (tdra). The second perfection, t. ¢., learning the words [of the philosophical texts], is called ‘happy passing’ (sutdra). The third perfection, ९, ०. study {of the sense], is called ‘perfect passing’ (¢dratdra). The fourth perfection, 2. e., intercourse with teachers and re- ligious students, is called ‘pleasure’ (ramyaka). The fifth perfection, ४, ९, outward and inward purification,’ is called ‘perpetual joy’ (sadamudita). The sixth perfection, 7. ¢., prevention of pain due to one’s self, is called ‘joyance’ (pramoda). The seventh perfection, ४. ९.9 prevention of pain due to the beings, is called ‘joy’ (mudita). The eighth perfection, 7. ९.) prevention of pain due to supernatural influences,’ is called ‘joyousness’ (modamdna). Thus [per- fection] is eightfold. Krror, inability, acquiescence and perfection, being four in the main, become fifty through their subdivisions. [The author] teaches that perfection is [realized] by abandoning, {in order], the preceding by [getting hold of] the subsequent : On account of the varieties, reasoning etc., perfection is eight- fold. This 18 the sense. These [varieties] are: reasoning, oral instruction, study, the three preventions [of pain], intercourse with friends and purification. They will now be explained in a different order, since the real order of things is considered to be of [more] consequence than the order taught in Scripture, [४ e., * The resolution of devoting one’s self to philosophy seems to be intended, though the other commentators explain #ha in a different way. > The word Déna in other Samkhya texts ;—some interpreters, as Gauda- pada and Vachaspatimisra to Karikaé 51 and Vijfianabhikshu in his comment on our aphorism, take ddna in the sense of giving. ® Cf. the commentary to I. 1. 186 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTAY. (Ill. 44. in Kariké 51]. The first of these perfections truly is study, +. e., learning the mere words of the spiritual sciences from the mouth of the teacher conformably to the established rules; this is called ‘passing.—The second perfection is oral instruction ; and oral instruction means ‘the knowledge of the sense which is produced by the same; it is called ‘happy passing.’—The third is reasoning or reflecting, ५ ९. examining the sense of tradi- tion on the method of reasoning, not contradictory to tra- dition, [in short] what they denominate ‘thinking logically’; this is called ‘perfect crossing.—The fourth is intercourse with friends. One does not believe in a thing, though it be examined logically, as long as one’s opinion is not in accordance with that of teachers, disciples and fellow-students ; therefore intercourse with friends, 7. e., with teachers etc., is necessary; it is called ‘pleasure.’"—The fifth perfection is purification ; and purification (dana) means the clearing of discriminative knowledge, since the word ddna is derived from the [root] dé (daip) which means ‘to clear’; as Patafijali teaches [in Yogasttra 2. 26]: ‘“‘ The means of liberation is the undistracted discriminative knowledge.” [For] undistractedness is clearness, and this is [to be understood 88] the abiding on the clear stream of discriminative knowledge, while [all] doubts and errors together with the impressions [ which they leave in the internal organ] are abandoned. This [clear- ness], however, is not [obtained] without the ripeness of study practised devotedly, uninterruptedly and a long time. There- fore this [study] also is implied in purification [which is] its product. This [fifth perfection] is called ‘ perpetual joy.’ These five are inferior perfections, being the causes [of the re- maining three]; but [those] three are the principal ones, because they are the fruit (of the others], viz., prevention of pain due to one’s self, prevention of pain due to the beings, and prevention of pain due to supernatural influences. These are named, in order, ‘joyance, joy and joyousness.’ Thus, the varieties of error being five, inability being of twenty- eight sorts, acquiescence being ninefold and perfection being eight- fold, there are fifty classes [of mental condition |. [The author] teaches that error, inability and acquiesconce are to be abandoned: III. 45, 46.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 137 45. Not from the other without abandonment of the former. ‘From the other,’ z. ¢., from inability, perfection does not arise, ‘ without abandonment of the former,’ 1. ¢., without abandonment of error. Likewise, perfection does not arise from acquiescence without abandonment of inability. Simi- larly, [perfection does not take place] without abandonment of that, [४. €. of acquiescence }. < Indifference is conditioned by the existence of creation, [because it would otherwise be without an object. Now,] how many different creations are there?” To this [the author] replies : ‘Without abandonment of the former,’ 7. e., of error, inability and acquiescence; ‘from the other’ (ttardt =itarasmdt) means : from non-abandonment.! Supply: the perfections do not arise ; because those [mental conditions] are antagonistic to the perfec- tions. This is the meaning.—itardt is a vedic form [for itarasmdt. The masculine ending] of itara appears [in the compound ttara- hana in the sense of the feminine stem, according to the rule] that a pronoun [which is to express a feminine sense] assumes the masculine form in all dissolvable words (४४८८) 9 [The author] states the difference of creations: 46. It 18 subdivided into the divine, etc. By the word ‘etc.’ [it is indicated that] there are [alto- gether] six different [creations]. And thus [it is said]: 1 Mahadeva strangely ascribes the same sense to the first part of tho aphorism (netarét) as to the latter (itara-hdmena vind). ॐ These vritti’s are 1, krid-anta 2, taddhitdnta (f. १.) itara-maya), 8, samdsa (f.4., the case in question), 4, ekaéesha (~ 4., itaraw=itard itarag cha), 5 sann- ddy-anta-dhatu (f. 4, itarati=itardvad Acharati). Cf. the commentary to Panini 2, 1, 3. The above passage sarvandmno vritti-matre pumvad-bhdvah is taken from the Mahabhashya to Panini 2, 2, 28, as Professor Kielhorn kindly informs me, (Vol. I, p. 429, 1. 9 of his edition). 18 138 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, [III. 46, 47. “In the [world] which begme with the divine (class], mundane = existence, caused by works, is sixfold; god, demon, man, goblin, infernal and beast.!” The vegetables are included in the infernals, [as existence in these two forms is the consequence of former sins]. «५ 81166 Matter has the habit of being active, it will always be creative, and hence there is no liberation.” To this [the author] replies: ‘Creation’ is to be supplied. By the word ‘etc.’ [the two classes] beasts and mankind are meant. The divine [class] is eightfold, since it consists of the beings [in the worlds ] of Brahman, Prajapati and Indra, of the Manes, Gandharvas, Yakshas, Raksha- sas and Pisachas; that of the beasts is fivefold : domestic and wild beasts, birds, reptiles and vegetables (!) ; mankind is single in its class, if the varieties of the different castes, Brahmanhood etc., are not taken into consideration, as the bodily structure is the same in all four castes. This is, in short, the creation of animated beings. ५ 81066 Matter has the habit of being active, it will always be creative; how, then, is liberation [possible]?” To this [the author | replies : 47, From Brahman down to the grass-blade, creation is for its benefit till discrimination. Creation is for its benefit, ४ e., for the soul’s benefit, [that 18 0 88 :] for the sake of liberation. ‘ Till discrimination’ means: that habit of Matter holds good up to [the time of] discriminative knowledge, [and continues further with regard to all non-discriminating souls], since the essential nature is imperishable. “Where and how is creation?” To this [the author] replies : 1 The plural form tiryatchas or a trisyllabical tiriak (the reading of MS. B) may be conjectured. III. 46--51.] animuppHa’s COMMENTARY. 189 Matter is active, by nature, only up to [the time of] discrimina- tive knowledge. ‘‘ Where and how is creation P” This [the author] states: 48. On high it is abundant in Sattva. [I. ९.] in the world of the gods. {The author] describes the creation in the world of the snake-demons : 49. It is abundant in Tamas underneath. [1. e.] in the nether world. [The author] describes the creation in the world of mortals : 50. In the midst it is abundant in Rajas. ‘ Abundant in—’ means: principally consisting of. ‘But then, for what reason does the variety of creation proceed from primitive Matter through the mutual copula- tion of its single constituents?” To this [the author] replies : [Creation] from the aérial world up to that of truth [४. e., to Brahman’s world] is abundant in Sattva; creation ‘ underneath,’ +. e., from the tame beasts down to the vegetables, is abundant in Tamas; in the midst it is abundant in Rajas, because [mankind] engages in performing good and bad deeds, and because it is full of pain. ५८ For what reason does the vartety of creation arise from primi- tive Matter which is one [only] ?” This [the author] states : 51. Because of the variety of works the behavi- our of primitive Matter is like [that of]a born slave. As an intelligent born slave does various work for the sake of his master, so primitive Matter produces the various creation for the sake of the souls ‘ because of the variety of 140 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, (TIT. 52—54, works,’ ¢, ¢., because it appropriates the [diverse] works [of all souls as cause effictentes of its activity ]. «< Since [man] has accomplished his end by ascending to higher and higher worlds, what need is there of liberation {for him]?” To this [the author] replies: Just so as a born slave does various work for the sake of his master. ‘But then, since by the variety [and constant improvement] of works one ascends to higher and higher worlds, what need is there of liberation ?” To this [the author] replies : 52. Return is even there; because of the being subject to successive births it is to be abandoned. Even when higher and higher glorious states of existence have been attained to, there is return to mundane life; therefore, mundane life is to be abandoned. {The author] states the same : Since there is return, even when higher and higher glorious states of existence have been attained to, for this reason mundane life is to be abandoned. 58. The pain which is produced by old age, death, etc. 18 the same. From Brahman down to the grass-blade.! ‘‘ Since [man] has accomplished his end already by dis- solution into the cause, z.e¢., into primitive Matter, what need is there of liberation?” To this [the author] replies: [This 18 | plain. [The author] refutes [the opinion] that the end be accomplished by dissolution into primitive Matter : 54, The end is not accomplished by dissolution * Cf. aphorism 47, Til. 54.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 141 into the cause, since there is a rising [again], as in the case of one having plunged. It would be so, [४8 the opponent thinks], if there were no return [to new existences] for him who has dissolved into primitive Matter. But this is not the case, as we hear of his returning. Thus [it is said]: ‘Those whose meditation is devoted to the senses remain here ten Manu-periods, the worshippers of the elements a full hundred [of such periods |, those of the egotizing organ a thousand, those of the judging organ’ ten thousand, free from sorrow, those whose medita- tion is devoted to the indistinct [primitive Matter] a full hundred of thousands. But if one has advanced [in meditation] to the soul which is devoid of qualities, there is no computation of time [at all].” As somebody who has plunged [into water] for the sake of bathing rises again, so does he who has dissolved into primitive Matter. This is the sense. < 48 bondage does not belong to the Self, because this is eternal, for the same reason it [cannot belong] to primitive Matter, too.” To this [objection the author] replies : Since from the passage ‘“‘ Those whose meditation is devoted to the indistinct [primitive Matter] remain a full hundred of thon- sands [of Manu-periods]” we learn that he who has dissolved into the cause rises again, like one who has plunged [into water]. But from the passage ‘“‘If one has advanced [in meditation] to the soul which is devoid of qualities, there is no computation of time [at all” follows that] there is no returning again [to mundane existence], when liberation is [attained ]. «५ But then, the eternity of primitive Matter and Soul being without any difference, for what reason does creativeness belong to primitive Matter alone (and not to Soul, too]?” To this [the author] replies : 2 Bauddha is used here in the sense of buddhy-updsaka, but by no means in that of ‘ Buddhist.’ | 142 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [111. 55, 56. 55. Though not being a product, it is subject to that, because it is dependent on another. The fact that [primitive Matter] is not a product, [but eternal], is no matter; but (the principal thing is] the dependence on another; and this exists in the case of primitive Matter. Therefore, 81066 [primitive Matter] is subject to this [dependence on another], it is [also] subject to bondage. “Of what nature is this other, 2. ¢., the Self?” To this [the author] replies: | ‘Though not being a product,’ £ ९.) though being eternal, ‘ it is subject to that,’ ४. e., [primitive Matter] is subject to creativeness, ‘because it is dependent on another,’ ४. e., because it is for the sake of another. [The author] refutes the opinion that there be some intellectual superintendent of non-intellectual primitive Matter, and that he be omniscient and omnipotent : 56. For he is omniseient and omnipotent. Such is the egotizing delusion [of the supreme being], be- cause [its Self] is reflected in Matter [%. ¢., in its internal organ which is of a universal character and possessed of all power belonging to Matter]. ‘But the agency [of the supreme being] will be real ; what is the use of inventing a reflection? And thus an [in- dependent] Lord is accepted in the Nyfya philosophy.” To this [objection the author] replies : By the words ‘for he’ simply the category ‘ primitive Matter’ is meant. For primitive Matter [may be called omniscient, because it] can, on account of its changeableness, change into the form of the perceptive functions. This is the meaning. 1 Of course, the perceptive functions of the internal organ which is a product of primitive Matter are intended. ITI. 57, 58.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 143 [The author] states that this alone is the purport of the scrip- tural and [traditional] passages, too, which teach that the Lord is the cause [of the world]: 57. The existence of such a Lord 18 established. If the Lord is [declared to be such] a Self as we accept, we grant his existence; but for [a Lord] as accepted in the Ny4ya philosophy there is no proof. This has been explain- ed in [the commentary to] aphorism [92] of the first book : «८ Because the existence of a Lord cannot be proved.” In aphorism [1] of the second book «^ [The agency of primitive Matter 18] for the sake of the liberation of the [Self] which 18 [in reality] totally free [etc.]’’ it has been declared that the activity of Matter is for its own sake as well as for that of another (7. 6.9 of Soul; but] here the being for its own sake 18 {to be understood] in the figurative sense, [stated in the commentary to IT 1] [Now the author] declares that [this activity is merely for the sake of another: ‘Existence’ means ‘ conviction [of the existence ]’ ; ‘ established ’ means ‘ produced by proofs.’ “To what purpose is Matter active?” To this [question the author] replies : 58. Matter’s creating is for the benefit of an- other, because it does not experience by itself alone, —as the camel carries saffron. We see that even an intellectual being is [sometimes ac- tive for the benefit of another, as the camel carries saffron ; but non-intellectual Matter is merely active for the sake of another [४. e., of Soul], because it does not experience [by itself}. ‘**( But] the activity of an intellectual being [only] is seen, not (that) of non-intellectual [Matter].” To this [remark the author] replies : 144 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (III. 59, 60. ‘For the benefit of another’ méans ‘ for the benefit of Soul.’ Api is [used] in the sense of eva ‘alone,’ [so that] the sense is: ‹ because it does not experience by itself alone.’ Apprehending [the declaration of an opponent] that by the example ‘as the camel [carries] saffron’ the activity of an intel- lectual being only is [proved, the author] says: 59. Though non-intellectual, Matter is active, like milk. As non-intellectual milk comes forth for the benefit of the calf, so Matter [in general] is active for the benefit of Soul. [The author] gives another example : As milk comes forth for the sake of the calf’s growth. [The author] gives another example: 60. Or as works—what is well known—depend on Time, etc. As the work done by the husbandman, the sowing of corn, etc., bears its fruit only after some time, and [since] plants are not conscious beings,' [this example is not open to the same censure as that of the camel]. By the word ‘etc.’ the invisible power [of merit and demerit}* is to be under- stood. ८८ [ एप], as we know, the camel works, because it considers the danger of being beaten, etc., too, while non-intellectual Matter is void of [all] consideration.’”? To this [objection the author] replies : 1 Plants are called acetana here and in the comm. to aph. 62 in contrast with the camel (aph. 58) ; else the vegetable kingdom is considered as cetana or animated. 2 This is the real cause of the fructescence of works. If the husbandman has accumulated a store of good deeds, his crops thrive, while a bad harvest is the consequence of a preponderance of bad deeds. So the activity of primitive Matter, too, or of Matter in general is dependent on Time and on the souls’ merit and demerit. ITI. 60-62.] = aANIRUDDHA’Ss COMMENTARY. 145 (According to Mabadeva’s reading our aphorism must be trans- lated: As work depends on rain or Time, etc.). ‘Work’ means [rural] action, ४, e., sowing. Seeds and the like, sown by the husbandman, change into the form of trees and the like in dependence on rain or in dependence on Time and on the invisible power [of the husbandman’s merit and demerit]. So Matter [in general] also [18 dependent on Time and on merit and demerit]. ८ [But] the camel’s carrying saffron takes place for the fear of being beaten, too; Matter, however, is not intellectual, and there- fore it cannot consider any objects of its own.” To this [objec- tion the author! replies : 61. The activity is by nature, not with a motive, like that of a servant. | As a servant who is a born-slave does his work for his master without any motive merely by nature, so does Matter. [The author] mentions another alternative : For it is well known that a born-slave manages the affairs of his master merely by nature, not with a view to any object of his own. 62. Or, because of the attraction of works, which is without beginning. Since mundane existence [and hence the accumulation of merit and demerit] is without beginning, Matter is active in consequence of the attraction of merit and demerit,! as trees, though void of consciousness, bear fruit by the power of men’s work [४. e., merit]. Repeating [arguments] on account of the great number of arguments does not involve the fault of superfluous repeti- tion. Therefore [the author] says: 2 Cf. the commentary to aph. 60. 19 146 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. ([IIT. 62—64. Since mundane existence is without beginning, Matter, urged by merit and demerit, is active. This is the sense. What is advantageous may be repeated even a hundred times. With this view [the author] declares : 63. In consequence of discriminative cognition Matter’s creation ceases, as [that of] the cook after the cooking, Creation is for the sake of Soul. This ceases in conse- quence of the knowledge of the distinction between Matter and Soul, as the cook desists [from his work], when he has completed his cooking. “<( But] we don’t see that liberation takes place, even when discriminative knowledge has been [acquired] by instruc- tion.” To this [the author] replies: As the cook desists [from his work], when he has completed his cooking. Apprehending [the question]: “Why [is it that] liberation [very often] does not take place, even when discriminative know- ledge has been [attained ?,” the author] declares: 64. The one which is distinct abandons the other, on account of its fault. Liberation does not take place merely by an occasional cognition, but [then only, when] the Self which is distinct from the senses abandons—+t. ¢., sets apart by meditation, etc.—the other, 2. e., Matter ; ‘on account of its fault,’ that is to say: on account of the perception of the unsteadiness and the other faults of Matter. [The author] describes the nature of liberation : (According to Mahadeva’s reading our aphorism must be trans- lated: The one [may be] luke the other, on account of its fault). ‘The one,’ ४. €.) even he who possesses the discriminative know- ledge, [may be] ‘ like the other,’ 1. e., like him who is destitute of III. 64—66.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 147 discriminative knowledge, ‘on account of its [fault]’ ४. ¢., of the fault of discriminative knowledge—which consists in doubts and errors. And thus the meaning is: in order to purify dis- criminative knowledge, one ought to persevere in the study of troth. [The author] describes the nature of liberation : 65. The unconcernedness of both or of the one is salvation. ‘Of both,’ ४, e., of Matter and Soul. The unconcernedness of Matter is the not being active for the discriminating [soul]; the unconcernedness of Soul is the not being attach- ed to Matter. ‘Qf the one’ means: of the Self, because this is the principal [of the two]. ‘‘[But,] if Matter which has the habit of being active could become unconcerned, the liberation of all ought to take place.”” To this (the author] replies: The unconcernedness of Matter is the not being active for the discriminating [soul], that of Soul 18 the not being attached to Matter. ‘Of the one’ means: of the Self, because this is the principal [of the two]. “TBut,] if Matter could become unconcerned [in activity], there would result the liberation of all.” To this [the author] replies : 66. It does not desist, in the like manner, from influencing others by creation, as the snake does in the case of him who has discerned the real character of the rope. [Matter] which has the habit of being active does not become unconcerned [about all souls], because the abandon- ment of the essential nature is a logical impossibility. But, when [Matter] becomes inactive with reference to the dis- criminating [soul], it does not desist, in the like manner, 148 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (III. 66, 67. from influencing creatively, ४, e., from creation with reference to the ignorant. [To desist, virajyate, means:] not to engage in creation. As, where a rope has become [similar to; a snake [in appearance], the snake, 7. 6. the error that there be a snake, ceases in the case of him who has dis- cerned the real character of the rope, but not in the case of him to whom the real character of the rope is [still] unknown. [The author] states the reason thereof : ‘Influencing’ means produeing. Though [ Matter] is unconcern- ed about the knowing [soul], it is [still] active for those which are ignorant. The example is plain. 67. And because of the connection with work which is the motive. Because! in the case of the discriminating [soul] there is no work [that is: no] motive [of Matter’s agency; for] without a seed a sproutis not produced. Scripture also {says, Mundaka Up. 2. 2. 8]: “The fetter of the heart is severed, all doubts are solved, and his works perish, when that is known which is high and low [$ ¢., भा. pervading |.” ५ 81006 the invisible [power of merit and demerit] is a product of the judging organ, there may be the assistance of this invisible [power] in the production of the egotizing organ and of the following [principles ; but] how is a co~ operation of the invisible [power possible], when primitive Matter sets forth its products?’ To this [the author] re- plies : For work is also the motive of creation ; this is declared [in the aphorism]. And this [४ e, work] belongs to the ignorant, not to the knowing [soul], as Scripture teaches: ‘“ And his works perish ” (Mundaka Up. 2. 2. 8). * The following commentary does not explain, but complote the aphorism. III. 66--70.1 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 149 [The author] maintains [his doctrine], though the invisible [power] be not the cause (of the activity of primitive Matter] : 68. Though it be unconcerned, non-discrimina- tion is the motive of the service of primitive Matter. Though primitive Matter be unconcerned about the in- visible [power of merit and demerit], non-discrimination is the co-operative [cause, £. ¢., the causa efficiens of creation ]. [The author] explains the cessation [of the activity] of Matter by an example: Though [primitive Matter] be unconcerned about the invisible [power], non-discrimination is indispensable [as the motive] of the activity of primitive Matter. [The author] explains the cessation [of the activity] of Matter by an example : 69. Asa dancing girl, so also active {Matter]' ceases after the accomplishment of the end. As a dancing girl ceases (from dancing] after the accom- plishment of the wishes of the spectators, so also Matter ceases [from creation] after the accomplishment of Soul’s end by discrimination. ¢ { एप] though having ceased, Matter will begin [again] to be active from some cause or other.” To this [the author } replies : As a dancing girl, when she has shown herself to the assembled spectators, ceases from dancing, so does Matter also. «८ [८०४] like the dancing girl it will begin again to act at some [other] time.” [The author] denies [this]: 70. Likewise, Matter does not approach, when its fault has been perceived, like a woman of good family. 1 Supply pradhdnasya. 160 ANIRUDDHA’sS ComMENTARY. ([IIT. 70—72. When its fault has been known through discrimination, Matter does not approach [Soul] again; as a woman of good family who has been beheld by a man, not akin to her, thinks, [being ashamed] “ He shall not behold me again” and conceals herself. ‘“‘{ But] liberation [can only come] to one who is in bond- age; and both [states] cannot belong to Soul.” To this [ objection the author] replies : And when in consequence of discriminative. knowledge its fault has been perceived, [Matter] does not approach [Soul any more]. This is the sense. Asa woman of good family who is aware “ I have been beheld by a man not akin to me” does not approach that [man]. ‘Bondage and liberation belong to Soul merely through non- discrimination, but not essentially.” This [the author] states : 71. Bondage and liberation do not belong to Soulin reality without non-discrimination. That is to say: [the existence of] bondage and liberation [in Soul] is merely a delusion which arises from non-discri- mination of Matter and Soul. ‘As the illusory must be based on something real,' to whom do bondage and liberation belong in reality?’ To this {the author] replies : ‘In reality ’ means: essentially. [The author] states that both are essential to Matter : 72. [They belong] to Matter directly, because it is subject to association, like a beast. ‘Directly’ means: really, ‘ because it is subject to associa- tion’ ; because it has connection with qualities (quna-yogat) ; as a beast is bound ^ by association,’ £, ¢., by connection with 1 Asf.i.the illusion that mother of pearl be silver presupposes the exis- tence of real silver. III. 72, 78. ] ANIRUDDHA’sS COMMENTARY. 151 ropes (guna-yogat). Therefore bondage and liberation belong to Matter in reality. Bondage is nothing but activity with regard to the non-discriminating; liberation, however, is non-activity with regard to the discriminating [soul]. Hence the logical impossibility of losing the essential nature is not [accepted by us].! ५८ [1 what way does Matter bind itself, and how does it liberate itself?” To this [the author] replies: ‘Directly ’ means: really, ‘ because it is subject to association’ : because of the connection with qualities peculiar to it. Though bondage and liberation pertain to Matter, they are in conjunc- tion with Soul in consequence of the non-cognition of the distinc- tion. This is the meaning. “In how many ways does Matter bind itself?” This [the author | states : 73. In seven ways Matter binds itself, like the silk-worm ; it liberates itself in one way. In seven ways, £ 6.) by merit, indifference, divine power, demerit, ignorance, want of indifference and want of divine power, [Matter] binds [itself]; it liberates [itself] in one way, ८, 6, by knowledge. : “(We are taught by the Karmamimamsa] that experience is [produced] by interested, and liberation by disinterested works. If these are given up, revelation [drishéa, ¢» e., the revealed fruit] 18 lost.” To this [the author] replies: ‘In seven [ways],’ ४. 6.) by merit, indifference, divine power, ignorance, demerit, want of indifference and want of divine power ; ‘in one [way],’ £. 6.9 by knowledge. ‘‘But then, if meditation is practised uninterruptedly for the sake of discriminative knowledge, and if the works which are the cause of liberation are given up, liberation will not take place.” To this [objection, made by a Mimamsaka, the author] replies : 1 Cf. svabhdva-tydga-doshdt in the commentary to aph. 66. 152 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ 111. 74, 75. 74. Non-discrimination is the cause; therefore revelation is not lost. The invisible [power of merit] is a cause of liberation [only] indirectly through the medium of knowledge; the cause of mundane existence, however, (7. ९., of bondage] is non-discrimination, [and by the cessation thereof liberation is attained at once]. Therefore [by giving up all works enjoined in the Karmamimémsa4] revelation [7. ©; the revealed fruit , liberation] is not lost. “And how is discrimination [effected]?” To this [the author ] replies : | The cause of mundane existence is non-discrimination ; for the sake of the cessation thereof one must endeavour after discrimi- native knowledge. Thus there will be no loss of the revealed fruit, ४. 6. of liberation. The fruit [promised in the Karmamim4msa] is liberation by means of the purification of the thinking organ through works. This is called ‘revealed’ [or ‘ revelation ` ]. “How is discrimination [effected] ?? To this [the author] replies : 75. Discrimination results from the study of the principles by ‘Not so! Not so!’ [and] from aban- 00111118. [This is] plain. And [so] Scripture [says, Brihadaran- yaka Up. 8. 9. 26 and elsewhere]: ‘‘That Self is not so, not so; it is incomprehensible, for it is not [to be] compre- hended ; it is indestructible; for it is not [to be] destroyed, etc.” ०० [1 liberation were [effected] by the study of the princi- ples and [by abandoning all material objects], liberation would come to all disciples immediately after the instruction, because study is alike [with all disciples].” To this [the author] replies : III. 75—77.] § ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 153 ‘Not so! Not so!’ From such ‘study of the principles,’ ९. e., from repeatedly considering the Self in its difference from the body, the senses and the other [material principles], and ‘from abandoning,’ ४, 6.) from renouncing the world, ‘discrimination results,’ ४, €. the distinction [between Matter and Soul] becomes manifest. And thus Scripture says: ‘‘ Now follows the teaching ‘Not so! Not so!’” (Brihadar. Up. 2.3.6), and “ Only by renouncing [the world] some attained to immortality.” (Taitti- riya Aranyaka, 10. 10. 3). “ But then, if liberation were [effected] by study through the medium of the arising of discriminative knowledge, it would come to all disciples simultaneously, because there is no difference of study.” To this [the author] replies 76. On account of the difference of the capable there is no necessity. On account of the difference of [mental] power on the part of the excellent, mediocre and inferior, there is no necessity that [all should be liberated] simultaneously. “Tf liberation results from discrimination, how is it that, as we see, the discriminating still experiences?’’ To this [the author] replies: 77. In consequence of the continuance after the removal, experience follows from mediocre discri- mination also. There is no experience in the case of him whose discri- mination is acute for first-rate; but] there 18 experience [not only on the part of the inferior, but] of him also whose discrimination is mediocre; [that is to say: in the case of the mediocre] the impressions [of former experience] alone continue, since in consequence of want of [all] desires [real experience] has been removed by the cognition ‘ Enough [of the objects!’ Thus the mediocre] experiences [only] with the 20 154 ANIRUDDHa’s coMmenraRy, [111. 77-79. sensation ‘I am consuming by my experience that work the fructescence of which has [already] begun.’ 1 [116 author] describes the nature of him whose discri- mination is mediocre : Mediocrity means: being possessed of some residuum of works which have begun to bear fruit and are obstructive to the definitive liberation [for which death is necessary]. From the discrimina- tion of him who possesses such [a residuum of works, follows not only liberation in life-time, but] experience also. Thus [the aphorism] is to be construed. ‘In consequence of the conti- nuance’ means: because [experience], though ‘removed’ [or obstructed] by the absence of desire and aversion, ४, ९.) though not occasioning delight or distress nor producing any wishes, is necessarily existing as the fruit of those works the fructescence of which has [already] begun. And thus there isa great differ- ence between the experience of the discriminating and that of the non-discriminating. This is the meaning. [The author] describes the nature of him whose discrimination is mediocre : 78. And he is liberated in life-time. He is hberated [just] as well as he who is [definitively] liberated [after death], because there is neither desire nor the arising of {fresh} merit [in his case]. Scripture also ‘gays (Brihadar. Up. 4. 4. 12): ““If a man knows the [highest] Self so that he says ‘I am that,’ what wishing [or] from desire for what will he grieve at the body ?” To the [objection] that the liberation of a living [indivi- dual] cannot be proved, [the author] replies what follows: Though [still] living, he is as if [he were] liberated. [The author} gives the proof [of the existence] of one liberated in life-time: 79. This results from the fact that there are instructed and instructors. 1 wparidha is a synonym of prdrabdha, 111. 79--81.] ANIRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 155 He whose discrimination is acute cannot be instructor, because he is not conscious of external [objects any more]; nor can he whose discrimination is inferior be instructor, on account of his ignorance; but the latter is to be instructed. [Only] he whose discrimination is mediocre can be instructor. Hence ‘this results,’ ४ 6, [the existence of individuals, } liberated in life-time, results. [The author] adduces a testimony for this: He who is liberated in life-time cannot be one of those who are to be instructed, because he has no desire or the like; but he [only] whose discrimination is inferior is to be instructed. And thus from the fact that the latter must have an instructor follows [the existence of] liberation in life-time. [The author] adduces a testimony for this: 80. And Scripture has declared: ^^ For the wise, though [still] living, 18 libera- ted from delight and distress.” < [एप] he also whose discrimination is inferior may be instructor.” To this {the author] replies: There are scriptural texts also declaratory of the fact that [only] the wise can be instructor: “ Holding fuel in his hand, [he may go to a teacher} who is learned and abiding in Brahman ' “To that [disciple] who has approached him reverentially, the wise [teacher told the knowledge of Brahman] correctly” (Mundaka Up. 1. 2. 12, 13). {The author] refutes the opposite opinion : 81. Else there would be a tradition [comparable to a row] of blind men [leading each other]. (If a man whose discrimination is inferior could be in- structor], the teacher would be ignorant and the disciple, too, not knowing ! ‘Ag liberation results from knowledge, when there is instruction, one ought to be liberated immediately after 156 ANIRUDDHA’S coMMENTARY. [111 81—83. instruction. To what purpose is the delay?” To this [the author] replies : | How is an ignorant person to be instructed by another ignorant person ? ‘“‘For what reason does the body of the knowing last?” This [the author] states : ` 82. Like the whirling of the wheel, he retains the body. | As, [even] after the removal of the stick, the [potter’s] wheel goes on whirling in consequence of the impulse [given to it formerly], so the discriminating also do not attain liberation in that moment, [when they are instructed], be- cause their work, (7. ¢., the merit and demerit, accumulated by them,] which causes the retention of the body, has not been consumed [then]; but [liberation comes to them not sooner than] after consumption of [all] works by experience and {meditation}. And thus Scripture says: ५५ ए devoting himself [to an ascetic life] man is liberated, but he remains, though liberated, in the body; a jar [also], standing on the middle of the potter’s wheel, goes on whirling, though it is cut off [from the lump of clay ].” Therefore such a person exists who is liberated in life- time. This [the author] declares: As the wheel which is whirled round by the stick goes on whirling, even when the stick has been removed, so even when Matter has ceased from its activity with regard to the discrimina- ting, his body, produced by former work, lasts. This is the sense. “But then, the whirling [of the wheel] may be occasioned by the impulse [given to it formerly,] even when there is no opera- tion with the stick; but [this example does not help to decide the question:] how can there be experience, when there is no desire or the like?” 0 this [objection the author] replies: 83. This results from a minimum of impulse. ITI. 88, 84. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 157 I. ¢., liberation in life-time [or mundane existence of a liberated person} results. ‘“‘When does the highest [or absolute] liberation take place?” To this [the author] replies: The impulse by desire or the like [is to be understood ; and] this is [only] a minimum, that is to say: a seeming desire or the like. From that ‘this results,’ 7. €.) experience results [in the case of one liberated]. Therefore, though [we think we] observe [something like] desire etc. in discriminating persons, this is not [real] desire or the like, but only a seeming desire or the like. This is the meaning. [The author] describes the [definitive] liberation after death : 84. When the cessation of all pain results from discrimination, [man] has accomplished his end; by no other [means]—by no other [means]. When the absolute cessation of the threefold pain has taken place, so that no rest is left, [man] has accomplished his end, since he has [then] attained to the highest [or definitive] liberation. ‘By no other (means],’ 7. ¢., [not] by work [can this be effected]. The repetition of the words ‘by no other [means]’ indicates the end of the book. When those works the fructescence of which has begun are consumed by experience, [and hence] the absolute cessation of the threefold pain, mentioned [in aphorism I. 1], has taken place, [man] has accomplished his end, £. ९.) is liberated. That work is not the cause of liberation, [the author] recapitulates [saying]: ‘by [no] other [means,’ £, €.) not] by work. The form itardt [instead of the regular ttarasmdt] is to be ac- counted for either by the fact that the rule [about the formation of the cases] is not fixed with regard to pronouns, or by the as- sumption of a vedic anomaly. The repetition [of the last words] is for the sake of [indicating] the end of the book. Here ends, in the commentary on Kapila’s aphorisms ex- planatory of the Samkhya system, the third book which 158 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 111. 84. treats of indifference. After indifference [having been ex- plained], the fourth book begins with a view to narratives conducive to the understanding of the disciples. Here ends the third book in the quintessence of the commen- tary, composed by Mahadeva the Vedantist. After indifference [having been explained], the fourth book treats chiefly of narra- tives conducive to the understanding of the disciples. BOOK IV. 1. Asin the case of the king’s son, [discrimina- tion results] from instruction about the truth. A certain king’s son who, being born at the time of [the unlucky constellation ] Ganda, had been banished and adopted as a son by the lord of the foresters, knew only their way of life. Now, after the death of the childless king, having been brought (to the capital) and informed by the ministers : “You are not a forester, you are the king’s son,” he assumed at once, on these words, the behaviour of a king’s son in conequence of his former disposition. Thus instruction is: to be given for the sake of the understanding of those also who are [mentally ] inferior. (The author] mentions another narrative : ‘As a king’s son ceases to be a forester, when recollection comea to him, so does [the ignorance] of him who does not know the Self....’; in consequence of instruction about the truth, given by the teachers in this way, the end is necessarily accomplished. And [so] it is said in the Garudapurdana : ‘‘As some Brahmana who is seized upon by a demon thinks ‘I am a Sidra,’ [but,] when the demoniac possession is gone, knows again that he is a Braéhmana, so the soul which is seized upon by Maya thinks ‘Iam the body,’ [णप] when May& is gone, knows again its nature ‘I am Brahman.’ ” (The author] teaches that liberation arises even from knowledge of the Self [attained] by the way: 2. Asin the case of the imp, even when instruc- tion is for the benefit of another. A certain teacher took his pupil (along with him), saying: “Receive the instruction in a solitary place,” entered the forest and gave him the instruction [there]. This was over- 160 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. ` (IV. 2—4. heard by an imp hidden in the bush, [and so] he also was liberated.—The purport of the passage is that liberation arises even from knowledge of the Self [attained] by the way. {The author] mentions some difference as to [the effect of } this [instruction]: There is the following narrative. While a pupil was being instructed by a certain teacher in a solitary place, his instruction was overheard by some hidden imp, and [so] he, [too,] was liberated. Thus another also becomes liberated in consequence of instruction [given] for the benefit of somebody else. [The author] mentions some difference as to [the effect of] this [instruction] : 3. Repetition [is necessary, because some attain to liberation only] in consequence of frequent in- struction. Liberation may come to those who are of acute in- difference, merely through hearing [the instruction once ; but, ] as the inferior require uninterrupted instruction, repeti- tion is to be made [for their sake]. [The author] mentions another narrative : Liberation is attained by those who are of acute indifference, through hearing the instruction once only, but by the inferior, in consequence of frequent instruction; [therefore the latter] must care for repetition, £ e., for repeated reception [of the instruction]. And for the sake of instruction a [professional] teacher is not indispensable. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism | : 4. As in the case of father and son, because it is apparent to both. A certain Braéhmana who had, because of his poverty, delivered his pregnant wife to her father’s house and had repaired to another country for the acceptance of gifts, returned home after a long time and, seeing his son, did not IV. 4, 5.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 161 know him. The mother of the latter made her husband and her son acquainted [with one another]; hence knowledge came to both of them.—The sense [of this story] is that the knowledge of truth arises without a [professional] teacher even from the instruction given by a friend. [The author] mentions another narrative : ‘Because it is apparent,’ ४, 6.) because the true state of things may be apparent, ‘to both,’ ४. ¢., to the teacher and to the pupil [as well]. There is no restriction about [professional] teachers as regards this knowledge, but instruction may be given by any one who is not mistaken, [and] the fruit [४. ¢, the knowledge of truth] may be obtained by [everybody] who is capable [thereof]. An example of this is ‘the case of father and son.’ The narra- tive runs as follows. A certain poor Brahmana who, having removed his pregnant wife to her father’s house, had repaired to another country, returned after a long time. Seeing his son, he _ did not know ‘This is my own son,’ nor did the son, seeing his father, [know] ‘This is my father.’ Then the husband and the son were informed by the mother in the following way: “This is your son, this is your father.” After that both became happy. [The author] teaches that the joy of mundane existence is to be abandoned, because it is mixed with pain: 5. Like the hawk, one becomes happy by release and afflicted by separation. A young hawk was caught by a certain man and reared with regular food, pieces of sugar, molasses and the like. In time he grew up and was set free in the forest by the man who thought: “ Why should I make him afflicted?” and so the hawk became happy by his release from captivity, [but at the same time] afflicted by his separation from the man. Since in this way joy is intermixed with pain, both are to be abandoned. [The author] mentions another narrative : All people are happy and afflicted, that is to say: possessed of 21 162 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [IV. 5, 6. joy mixed with pain. ‘By release and by separation, like the hawk.’ A young hawk was caught by somebody who went a-hunting, and was reared with food and drink. In time he grew up. Then the hawk was set free in the forest by that [man] who thought: ‘ Why should I make him afflicted by captivity ?” [Now, ] as this [hawk] became happy by his release from captivity, and [at the same time] afflicted by his separation from the man who had reared him, so everybody who derives joy from objects, is afflicted [too]. This is the sense. [The author] states that selfishness, affection, etc. lead to mis- chief : 6. As in the case of the snake’s skin. ‘Skin’ means ‘slough.’—A certain snake, having, at the entrance of its hole, stripped off its slough, and seeing this defiled with dust and mud, was grieved thinking ‘ This is mine,’ and did not abandon it through affection. (The snake] was [then] captured by some snake-charmer! because of the slough [which attracted attention ].—The purport (of this story] is that one should not indulge in selfishness, affection, etc. {The author] mentions another narrative : ‘The snake’s skin’ means ‘the slough of the serpent,’—‘as in the case of this’; that is to say: As a serpent, though having stripped off its slough at the entrance of its hole, does not abandon its interest for that through affection, but is grieved at seeing it defiled with dust and mud, and is, just because of that [slough], captured by some snake-charmer and becomes subject to much suffering,—so does that man [also] who feels affection to the objects. | | An improper act is by no means to be committed, and, if it be committed inconsiderately, an atonement is necessarily to be rendered. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism] : 1 Ahitundika literally ‘he who makes sport with the snake’s mouth,’ the well known performance of the Indian snake-charmer. IV. 7, 8.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 163 7. Or, as in the case of the man whose hands were cut off. A certain ascetic entered the hermitage of his brother and took away fruit and some other things. He was then accost- ed by his brother: ‘ You are a धारा. He said: ^ Mention the penance.” The brother replied: ‘There is no other penance than the cutting off of the hands.” Then (the cul- prit] informed the king [of his crime], and had his hands eut off. Therefore an improper act is not to be committed, and, if it be committed inconsiderately, an atonement is necessarily to be rendered for it. {The author] mentions another narrative: Thus goes the story: A certain ascetic entered the hermitage of his brother and took away fruit, flowers and some otherthings. Then having been ac- costed by his brother: ^ You are a thief,” he replied’ to him: ‘‘Mention the penance.” Thereon (the latter] declared the outting « Off of the hands to be the penance. [The culprit] informed the king quickly, and had his hands cut off. 8. Thinking of what is no means [of liberation] is conducive to bondage, as in the case of Bharata. A king, named Bharata, though he was on the point of being liberated, saw an antelope bringing forth its-young that very moment, and reared the young antelope. [Since then} his mind was directed to this and to nothing else, [and] at the hour of death he breathed his last with his mind fixed upon it. Because of his affection to this [ani- mal] he did not attain to liberation.—The purport [of this story] 18 that one should not indulge in thinking of what 18 noxious (to salvation]. | {The author] teaches that one should not keep company with many: To wit: Bharata reared a young antelope ; his mind was directed 164 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (IV. 8~—11. to this, and to nothing else and he died, thinking only of this even at the hour of death. Therefore he did not attain to libera- tion, but became subject to [a new] mundane existence. This is clear from the Puranas. One should not keep company with many : 9. With many, concentration is hindered, through passion, etc., as in the case of the shells of a girl. [ Association with] many brings about quarrel as a necess- ary consequence, as the shells [on the bracelet) of a girl rattle at each other in consequence of their mutual rubbing. [The author] teaches that one should not keep [company ] even with two: As the shell-bracelets of a girl rattle in consequence of their mutual rubbing, so, when there is association with many, quarrel with each other necessarily arises through passion, etc. There- fore one should not cultivate the society of many. 10. Likewise even by [the association with] two. Because of the faults of conversation, etc. {The author] mentions another narrative : Because the faults of conversation, etc., are possible even in that case. This is the meaning 11. The hopeless is happy, like Pingala, A courtesan, named 17818, was sleepless and suffering pain, because she was waiting (in vain] for the visit of some paramour for the sake of enjoyment. Once, however, re- penting on account of endless suffering she felt disgusted {with her former life] and vowed ‘I shall not do so again.’ Being hopeless, she slept well [henceforward ]. {The author] says that the building of a house leads to pain [too]: “For hope is the greatest pain, hopelessness the greatest bliss. Hence Pingala slept well, as she had given up her hope for a lover.”* IV. 12, 18.] ANIRUDDHA’sS COMMENTARY. 165 (Cf. Mahabharata 12. 6520, 6647). 12. Even without effort [one may be] happy in another’s house, like a snake. [This is] plain. In the institutes there are to be found criticisms with regard to the explanations [of other teachers} and similar things of minor importance. Such [parts] must be passed over. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism]: ‘The building of a house does never cause happiness to men; the snake fares well which enters the house built by another [animal ].” (Cf. Mahabhérata 12. 6649). 13. Though devoting one’s self to many insti- tutes and teachers, one should take the quintessence [only], like the bee. As the bee takes [only] the honey and not the flower, so ignorance is to be passed over by him who endeavours after liberation. “To whom does [real] contemplation belong?” To this {the author] replies : « 006 should take the quintessence from everything, as gold out of rocks,” according to this rule one should accept from the institutes also the quintessence only but should not be bent upon conquering opponents; moreover, one ought to aim only at the calm and at other [virtues], found in the teacher, but not at his occasional passion, hatred and the like. This is the sense. Hence it is said . in the Markandeya [ Purana 41. 19]: ५५ 6 who wanders [now to this, now to that] thirsting “ This is to be known, that is to be known” will not obtain knowledge in thousands of mundane periods.” [The author] teaches that one should aim at concentrated atten- tion : 166 7 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. {1V. 14, 15. 14.. He whose mind is absorbed in one thing does not forfeit contemplation, like the maker of arrows. As the maker of arrows, whose mind was fixed on the arrow [in his hand], did not notice the king passing hard by, so he whose mind is intent upon one thing does not forfeit contemplation {The author] says that observances and the like are not to be broken, [because such things are] for the sake of pu- rifying the Sattva [of the internal organ]: As the maker of arrows whose mind is fixed on the arrow does not perceive the king passing with an army on the road close by him, so he whose mind is absorbed in one thing does not -forfeit contemplation, but another necessarily does. Therefore one should aim at concentrated attention of the mind for the sake of the knowledge of truth 15. By violation of the observances and obliga- tions uselessness [is effected], as in daily life. _ As in daily life all repudiate the violation of agreements made with many, so by violation of the observances, etc. one becomes destitute [of the understanding] of the sense of the Vedas. _ [The author] states that pain necessarily arises [even] from forgetting the knowledge of truth : (According to Mahadeva’s reading the beginning of the aphorism is to be translated: By violation of the enjoined obliga- tions....) ‘By violation,’ ४.९. by non-performance, ‘ of the enjoined,’ ¢. e., acknowledged ‘ obligations,’ such as ablutions and the like, ‘ use- lessness, & €. inefficacy, [is effected]. Supply: of all factors required for the knowledge of truth. The performance of ablu- tions and the like is an accompanying [cause] of the knowledge of truth which is to be produced [directly] by the means of the knowledge of truth. This is the meaning. ‘As in daily life,’ IV. 15, 16.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 167 ¢ e., in the same way as in daily life, when the obligations or stipulations agreed on are violated, even sovereignty and other causes of pleasure become ineffective; [for,] when the stipulations are violated, even sovereignty does not give pleasure because of the sedition of the subjects. [The author] states that pain arises, when the knowledge of truth is forgotten : 16. Even, when this is forgotten, as in the case of the female frog. A certain king who went a-hunting saw a beautiful girl in the forest and asked her: ‘“‘ Who are you?” She re- plied: ^^ am a king’s daughter.” The king said: ^ Yield yourself to me.” She replied: ‘“ Well, but agree to the stipulation that no water shall be shown to me by you.” Having answered: “So it be,” he married her. Thus some time having passed, she, [once on a time] fatigued by sport, asked the king: ^ Where is water?” The king, too, for- getting the stipulation through confusion, showed her water. And she who was the daughter of the king of the frogs became a frog by contact with water. And the king who did not recover her, though he sought her with nets, etc., suffered much pain. Therefore the study of truth is not to be interrupted [The author] mentions another narrative . By [the word] ‘this’ the knowledge of truth is intended, this having been kept in mind. Thus the following narrative is re- ported: A certain king who went a-hunting saw a beautiful girl and having, at the [mere] sight of her, fallen in love with her, asked : ‘‘ Who are you ?” She replied: ‘I am a king’s daughter.” The king said: ^“ Yield yourself to me.” And the king was ac- cepted as husband by her on condition that no water should be shown to her. Thus some time having passed, she, once on a time, being fatigued by sport, said to the king: ‘‘ Where is water ?”’ But the king, since he had forgotten the stipulation, showed her 168 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [1४. 16—18. water. And she, becoming a frog by contact with water, entered the same. The king, however, fell into pain on account of the separation from her. [The author] states that the end is not accomplished by the mere hearing of the instruction, but [that it is accomplished | only by him who, living near the teacher, practises reflection, etc. 17. Though the instruction be heard, one does not accomplish the end without deliberation, like Virochana. Liberation does not follow from the mere hearing, but only from reflection; as [according to Chhandogya Up. 8. 7. 2 seq.] Indra and Virochana went to Brahman’s world for the sake of the knowledge of truth and were instructed by Brahman; Virochana returned home after having heard the knowledge of truth and did not practise reflection, etc. ; therefore he was not liberated; Indra, however, worshipping Brahman, practised reflection for a long time. “And what happened to Indra?” To this [the author] replies : ‘Deliberation’ means reflection and [constant meditation, nididhydsana]. For Virochana, having heard the instruction, went home and did not practise reflection, etc.; therefore he was not liberated. 18. Of these two, it is known [to have come] to Indra, Among these two, the [liberating] knowledge is known {to have come] to Indra. The success resulted, through permanent study, from service done to Brahman, reflection, constant meditation, and immediate perception. ‘‘And how is [this] knowledge obtained ? To this [the author] replies: ‘Of these two,’ ६. €; Indra and Virochana, ‘it is known [to have come] to Indra.’ Supply: the accomplishment of the end. IV. 19, 20.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 169 ‘How was the end accomplished by Indra?” To this [the author | replies: 19. Having practised reverence, the disciple’s duties and attendance, one succeeds after a long time, like him. He who is not reverential and does not perform the dis- ciple’s duties is incompetent [to obtain the liberating know- ledge]. ‘Like him’ means ‘like Indra’; [that is to say :] as knowledge was attained by Indra through devotion to Brahman, so [it may be] by another also through devotion to the teacher. <^ [068 liberation depend on a regulation of [the duration of] time and place? In that case the question of quick or dilatory [accomplishment] becomes impossible.’”? With re- ference to this [remark the author] declares: ‘Attendance’ means ‘living near [the teacher].’ ‘Like him’ [४ e, like Indra], another also [may succeed]; this is to be supplied. | 20. There is no regulation of time as in the case of Vamadeva, There is a regulation of time for devotion, [एण] not for liberation, since we know that Vamadeva was liberated quickly after [the attainment of] the knowledge of truth. _ **When [an object] has been perceived, one may certainly meditate upon it; but the Self has not been seen by any- body ; [and] if it were seen, what need is [there] for medita- tion?” To this [objection the author] replies: ` As to [the effect of] the means [employed], there is no regu- lation of time, whether [it will take place] in this existence or in a future one. For Scripture teaches |Aitareya Up. 4.5] that Vamadeva, even while in the womb, obtained the knowledge in consequence of means, employed in other existences. 22 170 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (1V. 21. ‘“‘But then, there may be meditation upon a [thing] seen; but the Self has not been seen by anybody ; [and] if it were what need is {there] for meditation?’ With regard to this [the author | replies : 21. Mediately in consequence of worshipping it under an imputed form, as in the case of the sacri- ficing worshippers. And, [pray,] by whom has merit been seen? Still, worship by means of sacrifices is [done] for the acquisition of merit, because [at the sacrifices] clarified butter is offered for the gods mediately. In our case also, what form may be im- puted [to the Self] by the teacher, (7. e., whether this be the form of Brahman, Vishnu, Siva, etc.], in consequence of a worship which corresponds to this [form] mediately [by de- grees] the [real] form of that [Self] becomes apparent. And the recollection of things similar to things meditated upon 18 a fact. And thus [it is said]: ५ (1). Something similar [to the thing remembered], (2) the in- visible [power of merit and demerit], (8) thought, and [ (4) the perception of something which is in connection with the thing re- membered*] awaken the seeds of memory ; hence dreams or [Visions } are no exception [to this rule] because these are [produced] by the foroe of [former] impressions.’’* ८८ What need is there for the knowledge of the Self for him who has accomplished his end by arriving at the world of Brahman or at some other [divine world]?” ‘To this [the author] replies ; 2 While it is offered immediately into the fire. * Thus ddya was explained to me by the Pandit: tat-sambandhi jadnam, yathd putra-daréanena matd smaryate. > There would be an utiprasanga with regard tothe rule just stated, if one dreamt something destitute of any similarity or comnection with things per- ceived, thought of, or experienced formerly.—bhdévand is used in the sense of vdsand. LY. 21, 22.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 171 As those who perform sacrifices obtain merit which is invisible, so ‘in consequence of worshipping the form’ or nature which is ‘imputed ’—-*. ¢., taught—‘ mediately,’ ४. ९. by the succession of teachers, the cognition of the real nature of the Self [arises] ; this is to be supplied. Perception [of the object} is not required, for the sake of meditation but [only] knowledge; and this {knowledge of the Self’s existence] is easily obtained through the succession of teachers. This is the meaning. “But then, enough of the knowledge of truth which causes liberation, since the end is accomplished by arriving at Brahman’s world also!” To this [the author] replies: 22. There is return, though one mav have arrived at other [places] in consequence of the connection with the five [sacrificial] fires,’ because of the scrip- tural texts about birth. By means of the Agnihotra and other [ceremonies] one arrives at Brahman’s world, but [every object ]* attained to by works perishes. Therefore there is return [from Brah- man’s world]. To this ‘the scriptural texts about birth’ refer: ^ 48 here on earth the abode which is acquired by works perishes, so doesin the other world the abode which is acquired by good deeds.”” (Chhandogya Up. 8. 1. 6.), “Not by works nor by offspring [nor] by wealth, only by re- nouncement few attained to immortality.” (Taittiriya Aranyaka 10. 10. 3). ‘What is the essential nature of him who has become indifferent?” To this {the author] replies: 2 This unnatural construction of the aphorism by Aniruddha and Mahadeva is caused by their misunderstanding of the term 22707494, about which Chhandogya Up. 5. 4-9 is to be compared. Vijianabhixshu has rightly con nected pafichdgni-yogato with janma-éruteh. > Supply paddrthah. 172 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (IV. 22—24. ‘In consequence of the connection with the five [sacrificial] fires,’ £. e., in consequence of devotion by means of these five fires. ‘Though one may have arrived at other [places ],’ 7. e., though one may have arrived at Brahman’s world, ‘ there is return.’ For what reason ? ‘ Because of the scriptural text about birth,’ ४, e., because in the scriptural text ‘They do not return into this whirl of human existence” (Chhandogya Up. 4. 15. 6) we learn from the apposition ‘this’, that they are born [again] in another human form And this knowledge of truth! comes only to him who has become indifferent. This [the author] states: 23. He who has become indifferent abandons what is to be abandoned and takes what is to be taken, as is the case with the flamingo and the milk. Though all abandon what is to be abandoned and take what is to be taken, still on account of the special object [of our disquisition] mundane existence must be understood as ‘what is to be abandoned,’ and liberation as ‘ what is to be taken.’ | [The author] gives the reason thereof : ‘What is to be abandoned’ is mundane existence, ‘ what is to be taken’ is liberation. ५ For what 16880 ? ' To this [the author] replies : 24. Because of the connection with the obtained superiority, like the same. (I. e.] like the flamingo. [For] the flamingo only [and no other animal] possesses a superior faculty, since it drinks the milk [81016], even when this is mixed [with water], and leaves the latter. So by that person who has obtained superiority, mundane existence is to be abandoned, and liberation is to be taken ^ This is said with reference to the introduction to aphorism 22. IV. 24—26. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 178 [But] liberation will come to him also who has pas- sions.” To this (the author] replies: ‘Like the same’, 7, e., like the flamingo. The meaning [of the aphorism] is this: because, as the flamingo only possesses the faculty of discriminating milk and water, he only who has become indifferent obtains the connection with that superiority by which one discriminates what is to be abandoned and what is to be taken.— The word ‘or’ (vd, which is read by Mahadeva after yogdt) [is used] in the sense of ‘only,’ [and so] ‘of him only who has be- come indifferent’ is [to be supplied at] the beginning [of the aphorism |. 25. He who 18 affected with passions cannot — move according to his inclination,—lke S’uka, He who is affected with passions cannot even move accord- ing to his inclination,! much less obtain liberation ; just as Vy4sa who had passions did not reach liberation, while it came to his son Suka, since he was free from passions. ५५ Whence is bondage?” To this [the author] replies ४ He who is affected with passions cannot even move according to his inclination, much less obtain liberation; this is to be supplied. To him, however, who is free from passions, liberation comes, as to Sukadeva. “Whence is bondage? ”’ To this [the author] replies : 26. Bondage results from the connection with the constituents, as is the case with the parrot. As the bird,* {called] suka ‘parrot,’ incurs bondage on account of the virtues which it possesses (guna-yogdat), so the soul also incurs bondage through its connection with the constituents (guna-yogdt). 2 As a man who would like to travel to a distant country is kept back by his love to wife, children, etc., Pandit. * Pakshi is added, because our commentators take éuka as a proper name in the preceding aphorism. 174 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ 1४. 26—28. < [But] the [liberating] indifference will proceed in time merely from enjoyment; what need is there of knowledge? ” To this (the author] replies: The word guna has a double meaning. As the bird, [called] parrot, is bound [४. e., caught] on account of the virtues which it possesses (guna-yogdat), ०५८. sweet voice and [beauty], so the Self is bound through its connection with the constituents, (guna-yogdt), that is to say: with Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. This is the meaning. Indifference does not proceed from enjoyment [simply], but from the cognition of defects. This [the author] states in the (following | two aphorisms : 27. Appeasement of desires does not follow from enjoyment, as in the case of the holy sages. The desires even of a holy sage are not appeased by enjoy- ment, not to say of others! [Such saints] as Kanva, Saub- hari, and others (are to be understood]. ‘How will indifference arise in people devoted to the objects of sense?’’ To this [the author] replies: 28. From the cognition of the defects of both, ‘Of both,’ £, €.» of the [empirical] Self and of the objects. The defect of the Self which depends on its attachment (to worldly pleasures] is the going to hell and the staying in the womb, etc., [7. e., the coming out of the same to new human or animal existence]; the defect of the objects is their liability to change, their causing disgust, etc. (The author | describes that man who is incapable of being instructed : Even in the case of such holy sages as Saubhari and others ap- peasement of desires did not follow from enjoyment; leave aside therefore the question of people like us! ‘Of both,’ ४, e., of the [empirical] Self and of the objects. The defects of the Self depend on its attachment [to worldly pleasures], the going to hell, the staying in the womb, etc.; those of the objects are liability to change, the causing disgust, etc. IV. 29, 30.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 175 29. The seed of instruction does not shoot in a foul mind, as [it did not] in that of Aja. As the seed does not shoot in a field which is unprepared, so the seed of instruction does not shoot in a mind which is foul on account of desires and the like, ‘As [it did not] in that of Aja,’ ॥, ९, as in [the mind of] the king, named Aja, who was affected with grief at [the death of] his wife, the instruction given by Vasishtha did not make any im- pression. {The author] states that not even a seeming knowledge [arises ] in a mind which 18 foul on account of desires and the like: The shooting of the seed—that is, of instruction—which is the eause [of the knowledge of truth] means the bearing fruit. ‘As {it did not] in that of Aja,’ ¢, e., as in the case of the king, named Aja, who was affected with grief at [the death of] his wife, Vasishtha’s instruction was not capable of [producing] its effect. [The author] states that not evena semblance of knowledge [arises] in a mind which is extremely foul: 30. Not even a mere semblance, as in a foul mirror. As not even something like a semblance of a face! is re- | flected in a foul mirror, so [it is the case with] the know- ledge of the Self, which is produced by Matter, since the Self is reflected in Matter [1. €.» in the internal organ]. ५ But then, let simply the ‘great one’ be the Self, because this has the nature of the cause.” To this [the author] replies : ५८ As the elements, the bodies formed of the elements (bhau- tika), the agency [of the internal organ], and others are products ग Mukhdbhésam is a Bahuvrihi compound. 176 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (IV. 31, 32. of Matter and as such belong to mundane existence, so should liberation too, as it is [also] a product thereof [7. e., of Matter].!” To this [the author] replies: 81. Though it is produced by that, it has not the nature of that; like the lotus, etc.* The product is not the cause, since they are distinct [from one another]; for the lotus is not the clay. [The author] states that even he who has attained to the possession of supernatural powers, viz., of the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude, etc., has not [yet] accomplished his end: As [the lotus], though sprung from the clay, has not the nature of the clay, so [liberation], although produced by Matter, [४. ¢., by knowledge which is an affection of the internal organ], has not the nature of mundane existence, because it is distinct [from that], as it is untouched by pain. “Well, the state of being untouched by pain exists, when the faculty of assuming atomic magnitude and the other supernatural powers are attained.” To this [the author] replies: 82, The end is not accomplished on the attain- ment of supernatural glory, as [it is not] on the suc- cess of those who are to be revered—as [it is not] on the success of those who are to be revered. He who has become perfect through the knowledge of truth, produced by devotion to the teacher, has accomplished 1 Prakritih prathamato bhogam sampidya tato viveka-dvdrd moksham prayo- jayati, Pandit. > I. €. in the opinion of Aniruddha: though the Self is the causa efficiens of the ‘great one,’ the latter has not the nature of the Self, as the lotus has not the nature of the clay from which it has sprang. The ‘etc.’ may be understood, f. ६.) as the fact that the jar has not the nature of the potter who produces it. IV. 32. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 177 his end, for he is not bound to return [to another existence] ; but it is not so on the attainment of supernatural glory, since [in this case] there is a return again. The repetition of the words ‘as [16 18 not] on the success of those who are to be revered’ indicates the end of the book. Because these are bound to return; this is the meaning.—As {the end is not accomplished] on the success, [gained] by kings or other people who are to be revered, ४, e., on the attainment of a high office, etc. For sach [success] is perishable and, therefore, does not imply accomplishment of the end. The repetition [of the last words] manifests the end of the book. Here ends, in the commentary on Kapila’s apho- risms explanatory of the Samkhya system, the fourth book which contains the narratives. After the narratives the fifth book begins with a view to confute the opinions of the opponents. Here ends the fourth book in the quintessence of the Samkhya commentary, composed by Mahadeva. The fifth book begins with a view to turn over the opinions of the opponents. 23 BOOK V. There, [४. e. at the beginning of this new book, some one objects:] ‘An auspicious word is not to be put at the beginning of a literary composition, because it is to no purpose. And this [purposelessness] follows from [the fact] that a composition may not be completed, though an auspicious word be prefixed, and that it may be completed, though [such a word] be not prefixed.” This [the author] refutes : 1. The utterance of an auspicious word [is re- quired], because of the custom of the authorities, because the fruit is seen, and because [a book con- secrated in this way] succeeds. By this is confuted the opinion of those who say: ^^ Since 9 composition may not be completed, though an auspicious word be prefixed, [and] since it may be completed, though [such a word] be not prefixed, what need is there of an auspicious word ? ”’ The non-existence of a Lord has been established above [I. 92]; now [the author] gives the argument [thereof]: ‘Because of Scripture,’! ४. €.) because of scriptural passages [en- joining the practice, the existence of] which [passages] is inferred from the custom of the [ancient] authorities. This is the sense.— [The objection, made by the opponent, is of no importance], 8166 it may be disposed of in the following way. The want of completion [of a composition, in spite of the auspicious word being prefixed], is a consequence of some deficiency in the means requisite [for its completion]; the completion [of a composition, though the auspicious word is missing |, is the consequence of some ४ Mahadeva reads érutitah in the aphorism instead of bhititah. ष. 1, 2.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 179 auspicious action, performed [by the author] in & previous ex- istence. Much power has been displayed by the sages on [the elucidation of] this point. “The products arise from the [ materia] ] cause [४, ९.) from primi- tive Matter], guided by the Lord; for we see, for example, that jars arise from the clay, guided by the potter.” This [the author] refutes : 2. The fruit does not proceed from [the cause], guided by the Lord, since this results from work. If the Lord were an independent creator, he would create even without work, [%. e., regardless of merit and demerit,— which will not be maintained even by the theistic Naiy4- yika opponent]. “But he creates with the co-operation of work, [४ e., with regard to merit and demerit.”? Then] let work alone be [the causa effictens of the fruit]; what need is there of a Lord? ^^ Buta co-operative factor does not set aside the force of the chief cause!” [This maxim 18 not applicable to our case], because the independence [of the Lord] would be annihilated. Moreover, we know by expe- rience that [all activity] is either egotistic or for the sake of others. Now, the Lord has no egotistic aim;' [and] if [you declare that his activity] 18 for the sake of others, [ we reply that] it is unfit to ascribe the painful creation to a benign [Lord]. Besides, an activity which is [exclusively] for the sake of others does not exist, because even by service or the like, bestowed on others, one attains egotistic objects and is active for this reason. Therefore, let work, [९ 6.9 merit and demerit] alone be the causa [efficiens] of the world. This [the author] declares [in the following aphorism]: Does the Lord [in your opinion] create with or without regard to the work [done by man]? Inthe former case let work alone 1 Supply kimchit. 180 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 2—4. [४] not the Lord be the cause; in the latter the independence [of man, ¢ e., his responsibility for his actions] would be null and void! ; [man would not be the maker of his fortune,—which is a logical nonsense for the Hindoo]. Moreover, is the Lord’s activity [according to your doctrine] egotistic or for the sake of others? Not the former, because he is considered as one who has obtained [all] his wishes [and is, therefore, without desires]; nor the latter, because it is unfit to accept that a benign [Lord] engages in creating pain. Moreover, he who guides a [material] cause [does so] merely for his own benefit; this would be true in the case of the Lord also. This the author states: 8. His guidance [would be] on account of his own benefit, as in daily 116. And, in the case of one who is eternal, his own benefit is not possible. ५ [ एप्४] let there be some benefit of hisown! [What harm is there?]”’ To this [the author] replies: The ablative case svopakdrdt denotes the result [or] the reason. ‘*But let there be some personal benefit even in the case of the Lord.” To this [the author] replies: 4. Otherwise [he would be] like the worldly rulers. That is to say, not omniscient. [The author] mentions another argument against [the opponent]: ‘Otherwise,’ ४. e., on the [opponent’s] supposition that there be some personal benefit [even in the case of God]. ‘Like the worldly rulers,’ supply: he would happen to be in the condition of one who has not obtained [all] his wishes. ` > This is the sense of svdtantrya-vighdtahk here, as the context shows, though the same expression was just found in Aniruddha’s commentary to refer to the Lord. =. gs >~ a ~~ ne oS _ न ol ate fe ~~ ~ ~ ~ oe. ह १, 5—7.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 181 [And] if he were different in character from the worldly rulers, the Lord would be merely nominal. This [the author] states: 5. Or nominal. Since the reflection of Matter, [४ ९. of the internal organ] falls [on the Self], on account of the former’s agency the Self 18 [commonly regarded as] the agent; if, therefore, the name ‘ Lord’ [18 given] to that, this is a [mere] term. [The author] states another reason: ‘Or’ (४५) [is here used] in the sense of ‘merely ’ (eva). * For what reason nominal?” To this [the author] replies: 6. Without desire it is not possible, because this is the constant cause. If inseparableness! which is the cause fof inference] had exceptions, there would never be reliance [on conclu- sions of any kind]. Now, desire is the [determinate] causa ( efficiens] of activity; therefore, how can there be a crea- tor of the world without that? And one who is liberated {—as such the Lord must be regarded by you—] has no desire. «८ [ But] there will be desire [even in the case of the Lord].” To this [the author] replies : It is not possible that there be a creator, etc., [7. ९.) & preserver or destroyer] of the world without desire, because creating and desire are in the relation of effect and cause. This is the sense. [The author] states the argument against the supposition of there being desire [in the Lord]: 7. If even he were affected with that, [he would] not [be] liberated for ever. (I. ९.] if even he were affected with desire. * In our case: of desire and activity. Avindbhdva is practically the same as vydpti (yatra-yatra pravrittis, tatra-tatra १५१४४८११). 182 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. | ४. 7—9. “‘(Then] he will be the maker on account of the connection with the power of primitive Matter.”’ To this [{objection, made by a follower of the Yoga-system, the author] replies: _ Even’ (api) [is here used] in the sense of ‘but’ (tu). “He would be” is to be supplied. | 8. If on account of the connection with the power of primitive Matter, there would happen to be a contact. This would happen to be contradictory to[the scriptural passage, Brihadéranyaka Up. 4.3.16]: ‘*For this Soul is void of contact.” ‘(May there be] no contact with primitive Matter; but [the Lord] will be the maker on account of the mere exis- tence, [४ e., of the mere proximity ] of primitive Matter.’ To this [the author] replies : If [the Lord] were the maker on account of the connection with that creative power which resides in primitive Matter, then there would be a contact with primitive Matter; [and] this Scripture contradicts: ‘For this Soul is void of contact’ (Brihadaranyaka Up. 4. 3. 16). With reference, however, to [the opinion that the Lord] be the maker on account of the mere existence of primitive Matter, [the author] declares : | 9. 17 ० account of the mere existence, Lordship would belong to all. As the existence of primitive Matter is without distinction {the same] with regard to all Selfs, Lordship would belong to all Selfs. ‘‘(But] there are proofs of the Lord’s existence. There- fore, how [can you deny it|?” To this [the author] replies: As the existence of primitive Matter is without distinction [the same] with regard to all Selfs, Lordship would belong to all Selfs. er me ` कण OE ~ - - : _ ~~ SEL Oo Secs Gale V. 10—12. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 183 10. Since there is no proof, it is not established. I, e., Since there 18 no proof by perception. “(But] there will be inference.” To this [the author] replies : | “Tt is [not] established,’ ४. e., the Lord’s existence is [not] esta- blished, since it is well known that there is no proof [of it] by perception. [The author] refutes [the assertion that it may be proved by] inference : 11, Because of the want of a connection there is no inference. Since [every] invariable concomitance (vydpti) is based on a perception and such [perception] does not exist [in the case in question], whence shall there be the apprehension of the connection, [termed technically ‘invariable concomit- ance,’ which is the necessary foundation of any inference]? Besides, the apprehension of [such a] connection is not [ pos- sible] in the case of [an object] which is single in its kind.! ८ [ But] there will be the proof by authoritative testimony.” To this [the author] replies : ‘ Because of the want of a connection,’ ४, ¢., because of the want ` of an invariable concomitance. There is no scriptural text teaching that the world be produced by a Lord; on the contrary, there is a passage teaching that it 18 nothing but a product of primitive Matter, viz, ‘‘The one goat....”’ [and simultaneously “the one unborn... ”] (Svetasva- tara Up. 4.5). This [the author] states : 12. Even Scripture is [declaratory] of [the world’s being] a product of primitive Matter. There is [the following passage in] Scripture: ‘The 2 I.¢., inference is based on experience. Therefore, a thing which is invisible and single in its kind, can be no object of inference at all. 184 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ ४. 12—14. world arises from primitive Matter.” Therefore, [all] proofs establishing [the existence of] a Lord are [only] seeming.! Some, (7. e., the followers of Sankaracharyya] say: ‘The Self is the maker on account of the connection with igno- rance.”’ With reference to this [the author] declares : Supply ‘ declaratory.’ Some say: ^“ [The Self] is the maker on account of the connec- tion with the power of ignorance.” This [the author] confutes: 18. What is void of contact cannot have any connection with the power of ignorance. [This is] plain. [The author] mentions another argument against [those Vedantists] : [This is] clear. Moreover : 14. If on the connection [of Soul] with the one the other is established, there is a corculus 22110545. There is the following circulus vitiosus: no creation with- out ignorance, no ignorance without creation. ८ Since [the continuity of ignorance and creation] 18 with- out beginning like that [which exists] between seed and sprout, [our theory is] not [to be charged with] a cerculus vitiosus.”’ ‘To this [the author] replies*: If [in your opinion] the connection [of Soul] with the one, ४. ९.) the connection with activity, is founded on the fact that the con- nection [of Soul] with ignorance is established, there is a circulus ‡ Abhdsa is here used as an adjective, what the Pandit declared to be in accordance with the grammatical rule: dbhisuh dosharthe pum-lingah, dush- tarthe vigeshya-nighnah ; but he was not able to verify this rule. The Sans- krit dictionaries denote 4611450 as a substantive only. * Read ity atrédha with the I. 0. L. manuscript. ४. 14—16.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 185 ottsosus, because {according to your theory] the connection [of Soul} with ignorance is founded on the fact that its activity is established. This is the sense. And [the interdependence of] activity and ignorance is not without beginning. This [the author] declares: 15. Not like the seed and the sprout, because Scripture teaches that mundane existence has a beginning. It would be so [as you declare], if mundane existence were without beginning; but mundane existence has a beginning [after the end of each dissolution of the universe] .! And [thus] Scripture (says] । “The one God whose eyes and month, arms and feet are every- where, who produces heaven and earth, blows at them with his arms and with the wings.®’ (Rigveda. 10. 81. 3). Therefore, there is an interruption to the continuity (of mundane existence] at the [time of the periodical] dis- solution. [The author] describes the nature of ignorance: Since from such scriptural texts as ^ Existent, O beloved one, was that in the beginning, one only, without a second’? (Chhan- dogya Up. 6. 2. 1) we learn that there is no mundane existence at the [time of the] dissolution, mundane existence has a begin- ning. [The author] mentions the argument against [the doctrine of the followers of Sankaracharya who hold] that ignorance is dif- ferent from Brahman: 16. Since, if [ignorance were everything] that is other than knowledge, Brahman would happen to be disproved, [ignorance is not what the Vedantists declare it to be]. * Absolutely, mundane existence is without beginning in the opinion of tha Samkhyas also. * Used to blow ot the fire in the forge of creation. 24 186 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ ४. 16, 17. If [ignorance were everything] that is other than know- ledge, even Brahman, because of its being other than know- ledge (!), would be ignorance; and hence the character of Brahman would be disproved. (The author] mentions another reason : (According to Mahadeva’s reading and interpretation, the aphorism must be translated: If [ignorance] ts other than know- ledge, Brahman would happen to be disproved.) If [what you call] ignorance is other than knowledge, ४. e., than Brahman which is knowledge in its essence, Brahman [itself] would happen to be disproved, because you accept that Brahman is void of the threefold distinction.! If ignorance is different from Brahman, and Brahman also different from ignorance, there happens to be a distinction between the things, ४. e., there is, with regard to this difference, one thing which is to be distinguished ( pratiyogin) and another from which it is to be distinguished (anu- yogin)* ; [in short, in that case there is a duality]. This is the meaning. | Moreover, is ignorance not disproved by knowledge, or is it disproved P With regard to the first [part of this alternative, the author] says: 17. If it is not disproved, there would be fruit- lessness. If ignorance is not disproved by knowledge, there would be simply no knowledge. ५ [ एप] it is disproved!” To this [remark of the Vedan- tist the author] replies : Knowledge would happen to be fruitless. This is the sense. With regard to-the other [part of the alternative mentioned above, the author] says: 1 I, ¢., the distinction which exists in the homogeneous (sajdttya), in the heterogeneous (vijdttya) and in the thing itself (svagata). 9 Yasya prithak-karanam sa pratiyog?, yasmat prithak-karanam so ’nuyogt, Pandit. Cf. Vijiianabhikshu’s introduction to I. 61. १. 18—20.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 187 18. If it is disproved by knowledge, the world, too, would be so. The world, too, would belong to ignorance, [because, in your opinion, the world is disproved by knowledge]. ‘(This is quite right:] the world, too, belongs to igno- rance.” To this [remark of the Vedantist the author] replies : Like ignorance, the world, too, would be disproved. According- ly, the world would not be perceived. This is the meaning. 19. If that had the nature of it, 1t would have a beginning. This ignorance, [2 e., not the ignorance of the every day life] is without beginning. [Now,] if the world had the nature of it, ignorance, (too,] would have a beginning. “Work is not the causa [eficiens] of the world;' merely in consequence of its own nature the world arises.” To this [objection, made by a Charvaka, the author] replies: Besides, if [the world] had the nature of it, [then], on the supposition that a new world arises [regularly after the time. of the dissolution has elapsed], the arising of a new ignorance, too, must be admitted. And hence ignorance would have a beginning. In that case definitive liberation would be impossible. This is the meaning. Now [the author] teaches that merit is the causa [efficiens] of creation : 20. Merit is not to be denied, because of the diversity of the products of Matter. Since Matter is eternal and its essential nature one, the diverse products could not arise, if there were no merit. Therefore, the diversity of the products depends on the difference of merit, [and hence] merit is not to be denied. _ 4 Work is regarded as such by all orthodox systems. 188 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 20—22. . [The author] gives the proofs of the existence of merit: The diversity of the products is not brought about by Matter alone, because its essential nature is one, but by the diversity of merit. By the word ‘merit’ the invisible [power of merit] is here intended. _ And proofs fof the existence] of merit are not wanting. This [the author] states : 21. Its existence follows from Scripture, char- acteristic signs, etc. By ‘Scripture’ the proof, founded on authoritative testi- mony, is intimated, by ‘ characteristic signs’ inference! [is meant], by the word ‘etc.’ the perception of the Yogin is intimated. From these [proofs] follows the existence of merit. “Tf Place and Time are not the eauses, for what reason {does] saffron [grow] in Kasmir [and not in Madhyadeéa, and why] do the buds of the mango come forth in the spring?” This [the author] declares: _ ‘Characteristic sign’ is inference. By the word ‘etc.’ the perception of the Yogin [is intended]. [The author] states that Place, Time, ete. may be [causae effi- cientes | : 22. There is no restriction, because other proofs come into consideration. There is no [such] restriction that the invisible [power of merit] alone be the causa [efficiens]; but [though this] invisible [power] 18 accompanying cause [with regard to the arising of all products], other things, too, are causes, since there are proofs [thereof]. ८८ As we see that mundane existence is painful, the invisi- ble {power} of sun alone may exist.” To this [the author] replies : .4 T, €.) some pleasure, taken as vivdddspada, must have a cause, since it is a product. This cause can be nothing else but merit, acquired formerly. ए. 22—24.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 189 There is no [such] restriction that the invisible [power of merit] alone be the causa [efficiens] ; but other things, too, [are to be regarded as such], because the causal character of other things also comes into consideration through other proofs which acquaint us with the causal character of them. 23, In regard to both, too, it is the same. As we see pleasure also, the invisible [power] of good [works] must [likewise] exist. ५५ Since in the absence of pain we are under the delusion that there be pleasure, the word ‘invisible [power]’ is [at least] chiefly used with reference to that [7. ¢., in the sense of demerit or cause of pain, and only] secondarily in the sense of cause of pleasure.”” To this [the author] replies: (‘In regard to both,’ z €. | in this world and in the other world, ‘it 18 the same,’ ४. e., the pleasure, produced by the invisi- ble power, is pain, or—in other words—pleasure mixed [with pain]. 24, If this follows from the thing,’ it is the same in regard to both. Since this may [simply] be inverted, the case is the same in regard to both. (The author] denies that merit, etc., [४. e., demerit and impressions] be properties of the Self: If pleasure ‘follows,’ ४, ¢., arises, ‘from the thing,’ 7. e., from superhuman objects, as there are celestial women, etc.—supply : in the other world—, and if, moreover, it is [admitted] that (४11 | pleasure is mixed with pain, the case ‘is the same in regard to both,’ 2. €.) in regard to this world and to the other world. For in this world also there are objects existent which are causes of pleasure, but the [invariable] cause as to [the enjoyment of] pleasure is merit; and this, because of its being mixed with [the demerit of] the destruction [of animals], etc., is not able to pro- duce such pleasure which is not mixed with pain, but only such that is mixed with pain. This is the meaning. > That is, in the opinion of Aniruddha: if the opponent considers pleasure’s being the negation of pain as self-evident. 190 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, [V. 2426, [The author] refutes [the opinion of the Naiydyikas] that merit, etc. be properties of the Self : 25. Merit, etc. are properties of the internal organ. I. e., properties of the judging organ. To [the opinion] that they be properties of the Self, Scripture is contradictory which teaches that (the latter] 18 void of contact. “Since we don’t see that the property of one produces something in another, [४ e., since experience forbids to accept that merit and demerit, being properties of the in- ternal organ, can produce pleasure and pain in the Self], it is better [to assume] the non-existence of merit, etc.” To this [the author] replies : Because of the scriptural passage: ^ For this soul is void of contact” (Brihadaranyaka Up. 4. 3. 16). This is the meaning. Some teachers say: ^“ Does the quality reside in the [thing] possessed of the quality or void of the same ? In the former case there would be [the logical fault of] explaining a thing by itself (dimdsraya),1 in the latter a quality could be found also in qualities or [motions].2 Therefore, [the notion] quality is simply disproved, thus also motion, etc.” This [the author] refutes : 26. Qualities, etc. are not disproved absolutely. As earth and the like, because of their being seen, are not disproved absolutely, so also qualities, etc., 2. ¢., properties, etc. [are not to be denied absolutely].—That even the property of one causes a product in another, [—which is declared by the opponent to be impossible—] has been 2 Gunavin kena gunena gunavdn iti prakne svdtmaka-gunena gunavdn ity uttaram ddtavyam, tadd ’tmdérayah (Pandit), an démdéraya, of course, which is not acknowledged as such by the Samkhyas. ॐ Which is confuted in the writings of the Vaiseshikas and Naiyayikas; of., f. ९., Bhashaparichheda 85. ® Dharmddtndm has been added, lest guna be taken in the sense of ‘con- stituents,’ V. 26, 27. ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 191 [already ] explained [with regard to the case in question] by the falling of a reflection of the soul (on the internal organ). In order to deny the tenet that pleasure be [merely] absence of pain, [the author] says: Supply : because they are seen. [The author] mentions the proof [of the existence] of pleasure: 27. The cognition of pleasure results from the connection of the five parts. Although pleasure is established as being of a positive nature by the [immediate] perception of the internal sense, still proof also is given for the understanding of our adversaries.—By the words ‘from the connection of the five parts’ that [kind of] inference which consists of two parts‘ [and which is used by the later Naiydyikas] is set aside. [The five parts of the syllogism are:] proposition, reason, instance, application {of the reason], conclusion.® By means of [a syllogism construed in] this [manner] we discern (1) that [the invariably ooncomitated vydpya] is an attribute of the subject of the conclusion (paksha-dharma- ६४८) ,8 (2) that (the vydpya]} exists in those things in which the invariable concomitant (vydpaka) undoubtedly exists (sapaksha-sativat), (8) that [the vydpya] is excluded from those things from which the vydpaka is also excluded (vipak- 1 For example: 1, parvato vahni-vydpya-dhamavdn asti, 2, tasmdd vahni- man. * A syllogism leading to the cognition of the reality of pleasure is given by Vijfianabhikshu in his commentary to our aphorism. ® Cf. the two explanations of the term paksha-dharmatd in the NyAdya- ०६8. My Pandit gave the definition pakshe vartamdnatvam hetoh (= ०४६. pyasya) which comes to the same thing. As a reason of the reality of pleasure the fact that it is perceived (prattyamdnatvam) may be stated, and so the paksha-dharmatva is in our case: sukhe prattyamdnatvam. 4 In our case: yatra-yatra pratiyamdnatvam, tatra-tatra sattvay (reality), yath ghatddau. Ghatddi is sapaksha of sukha, as mahdnasa is of parvata, when the existence of fire is proved by the smoke. 192 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 27, 28. shad vydvrittih),' (4) that no equally strong reason can be adduced againss the reason which proves the proposition (asatpratipakshatva),® (5) that the vydpya is not such that its object does not exist in the subject of the conclusion ` (abddhita-vishayatva).® [The author] states that invariable concomitance does not follow from once perceiving : The cognition of pleasure, ४, e., the knowledge [of the existence] of pleasure, results from the connection or contact of the internal sense, the parts of which are, as it were, the five [external] senses, [with pleasure] ;* and, accordingly, pleasure is an object of the perception of the internal sense. This 18 the meaning. Some [1. ¢., the Charvakas] say: ^ [8 [what you call] ‘invariable concomitance’ (vydpti) apprehended by perceiving co-existence once or repeatedly? In the first case the invariable concomitance even of fire and donkey could be apprehended, [if these two were, by chance, seen once close to one another], and, accordingly, it would be possible to infer [the existence of] fire also from [the perception of] adonkey. Nor 18 the other [side of the alterna- tive true]; for, though the belonging to [the element] earth and the being scratched by iron are co-existent in a hundred cases, they keep asunder in [the case of] the diamond. Therefore, in- ference cannot be well called a means of right knowledge.” This [the author] refutes: 28. The [constant] connection is not established by once apprehending. 2 ८14 jala-hrade dhdQmasyd ’vartamdénatvam; in our case: éaéa-vishd- १८१०८१५ prattyamdnatvasy4 ’vartamdnatvam. * Yena hetund yat sddhyate, tad-viparitdrtha-sddhakam hetv-antaram vi- dyate, sa hetuh sat-pratipakshah ; tad-bhinnah asat-pratipakshah ; tattvam asat-pratipakshatvam, Pandit. । * Supply hetoh. The object of the reason is that what is to be proved (sidhya), yathd dhimasya vishayo vahnih, or in our case: prattyamdnatvasya vishayo ’stitvam ‘reality is the object of the fact (adduced as reason) that pleasure is perceived.’ + This original interpretation of patichdvayava-yogdt is at least as probable as that given by Aniraddha and adopted hy Vijiaénabhikshu. “~ ee — entre! V. 28, 29.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 193 Because one’s own conviction is contradictory [to this]. And in tbat case an inference might be drawn from the fact that fire and a donkey were once seen [close together]. [But] a conviction of this nature is never formed. “What, {then,] is this invariable concomitance? ” To this [the author] replies: The perception of the coexistence [of two things], accompanied with the non-perception of [their] keeping asunder, causes the apprehension of invariable concomitance; and whether this per- ception is single or repeated is no matter. This is the meaning. ‘The [constant] connection is established’ means: invariable concomitance is apprehended. [ The author ] describes the nature of invariable concomitance : 29. Invariable concomitance is the constant as- sociation with a characteristic property {and belongs either] to both or to the one. | ५0 both,’ [४ ९. to that which proves (sédhana\ and to that which is to be proved (sédhya), as, f. 1.,] to the state of being produced and transitoriness which give an example of reciprocal invariable concomitance (sama-vydptika).} [८ Or] to the one,’ ४, ९.9 to that which proves, as, f. ६.,] to the smoke which gives an example of one-sided invariable concomitance (vishama-vydptika).* And thus [it is said]: ५५ And how can the reason have any convincing power (gamantké- [पी 1 If transitoriness (sédhya) is inferred from the state of being produced (sadhana), the relation may be as well inverted ; either of the two is ‘inva- riably concomitated’ with the other, and so we have the sama-vydpti: yatra-yatra kritakatvam, tatra-tatra’ nityatvam ; yatra-yatrd’ nityatvam, tatra- tatra kritakatvam. 2 For, the existence of fire is inferred from the smoke, but not that of the smoke from fire, because there are fires without smoke. We have in this case an instance of the vishama-vydpti; yatra-yatra dhimah, tatra-tatra vahnih, the vydptr resides in the sddhana only, and not in the sddhya, 25 194 ANIRUDDHA’S OOMMBENTARY. [V9, 30. bala) as long as the correctness (८४४०४९६४) of a caunter-argument (vipaksha) is supposed even in a hundredth part ?”’ - Invariable concomitance is then a new principle {in ad- dition to your twenty-five principles].” This objection [the author ] refutes : ‘Characteristic property ’ means attribute (ddheya).! Invariable concomitance 18 the constant association with an attribute: such is the [grammatical] connection. And this [constant association with an attribute] belongs, in the case of a reciprocal invariable concomitance, to ‘ both,’ z. e., [to the sddhana and to the sddhya, ४.१] to the property of being discernible (prameyatva) and to the property of being denominable (abhidheyatva)* ; while, in [the case of] a one-sided invariable concomitance, this invariable con- comitance belongs to ‘ the one,’ ४. ९.) [to the sdédhana,] f. ४. to the smoke. _ [The author] refutes the opinion that [invariable concomitance} be a new category : 30. It is not a new principle, because there would happen to be the fiction of a thing. Even on the assumption that [invariable concomitance] be a new principle,the fact must be stated thatit is [merely] non-separation [from the sddhana. Therefore] let this [६४९४] alone be [invariable concomitance]; what is the use of the fiction of a thing? [The author] mentions his own opinion: . Even if invariable concomitance [is declared to] be a new principle still, that to which invariable concomitance belongs, is necessarily never separated [from the thing to be proved]. Why shall this alone, [४. e., the being never separated] not be invariable concomitance ? This is the meaning. | 1 For a somewhat different meaning of ddheya see aph. 32 seq. 9 Between these two notions the same relation exists as between the two, mentioned by Aniruddha, viz., kritakatva and anityatua. | V. 31, 32.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 195 31. The teachers, [z. e. 1] declare it to be the becoming manifest' of an innate power. There exists a power which is innate to [f. ९.1] fire and smoke. This is apprehended by the perception of both. This alone is invariable concomitance. [The author] mentions the opinion of a single [teacher]: (According to Mahadeva'’s interpretation the aphorism must be translated: The teachers declare it to be resulting from an innate power ). The teachers say: the constant association with fire, [7. e., the invariable concomitance] which belongs to smoke, results from an innate, 2. €.) inherent, power [of the latter]|.—By the plural [‘ the teachers’ the author] indicates that this is his own opinion. 82. Paiichas'iikha declares it to be the connec- tion with a power imposed [on the things]. | { Paichasikha teaches:] If[invariable concomitance] were ४ power innate (to the things, then] on the perception of an object even [8 man] who is not acquainted [with it] ought to possess the knowledge ‘< this® is efficient in this [or that respect].? But itis not thus [in reality]. Therefore [invariable concomitance] must be declared to be a power imposed (by us on the things]. [Pafichasikha, or the author from Pafichasikha’s stand- point,] gives an argument [thereof] २५ 1 Aniruddha interprets udbhavam by grihyate; cf. the conclusion of his commentary on aphorism 36. 2 This is the sense which our two commentators give to the term ddheya- fakti, differently from—and better than—Vijiidmabhikshu. Cf. especially Mahfadeva to sphorism 36. The individuals apprehending a vydpti impose the connection on the two things in question, as the pitd-putra-sambandha is imposed on two persons by him who is aware of the relation. 8 Ayam, supply padarthah. 4 Both commentators accept, like Vijiidnabhikshu, that aphorisms 33-35 have been composed, if not by Pajfichasikha directly, at least for the sake of the pratisht{hapana of the definition given in aphorism 32 196 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 82—34. When there is the connection or conjunction with a power imposed [by uson the things, that] association exists [which is technically termed ‘invariable concomitance’]; this is to be sup- plied. And, accordingly, [this] association results [not from an innate power (cf. aph. 31), but from a power imposed [by us].— By the singular ‘ Pafichagikha’ [the author] intimates that this is [only] the opinion of that other [teacher]. On this occasion [ Pafichasikha, or the author from Pajichagikha’s standpoint,] refutes [the opinion] that power be the essential nature of the thing possessed of power : 33. There 18 no [such] rule that power be the essential nature, because there would happen to be a tautology. If power were the essential nature, the expression ‘a powerful wrestler’ would be tautological.! [Pafichasikha, or the author from his standpoint, ] gives another argument: (Mahadeva sees the following sense in the aphorism: There ts no regularity [of coherence] based on an essential power, etc.) Svariipa-gakit ‘essential power’ is [a Karmadhiraya com- pound : | what is essential nature as well as power. Regularity {of coherence], ४. e., invariable concomitance, is not based on that, but on some power which is different [from the essential nature]. With regard to [the opinion] that power be not different [from the essential nature, the author] mentions a refutation [with the words] ‘because there would happen to be a tautology.’ The 86186 is: because [on that theory] a tautology would inhere in such expressions as ‘a powerful incantation,’ etc. 34. Because the adjective [powerful*] would prove unmeaning. 1 I. e., if powerfulness were the essential nature of the wrestler, the adjec- tive ‘ powerful’ would be superfluous, as the adjectives are in such expressions as ‘wet water, hot fire,’ where wet and hot do not denote a power, but the essential nature. 2 Sakta or other adjectives which are sakti-vdchaka. V. 84- 86. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 197 There could be no [such] notion as ‘the powerful Deva- datta,’ but [only the notion] ‘ Devadatta Devadatta {Pafichasikha, or the author from his standpoint] gives a further argument In [such expressions as| ‘ the powerful incantation’ the adjec- tive would be unmeaning, like [the repetition] ‘ Devadatta De vadatta.’ 85. Because this would not suit to leaves and the like.’ Since, in leaves and the like, the essential nature remains {always] in the same condition, the poison could [on the theory controverted here] be expelled [from the infected limb by putting such remedies on it] even without the em- ployment of the incantation [which in reality confers the healing power on the remedy in the commentator’s opinion]. {The author] reconciles [Panchasikha’s definition with his own, given in aphorism 31]: Since the essential nature of leaves and the like is already exis- tent before the employment of the incantation, the poison could be expelled, for example, even without the employment of the incan- tation. If then [somebody objects:] ^ Let there be only the power imposed [on the things]! What isthe use of [stating] an in- herent power? '”, [the author] replies to this: 86. If it were established that it is 8 power im- posed [on the things, the same applies to our defini- tion that it is] the connection with an innate power, because of the same reason. [ Paiichasikha is not right in identifying the notions ° innate power’ and ‘essential nature’; for our expression] ‘innate ग I.¢., if power were the essential nature, no power could be imposed on leaves or the like by incantations. 198 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 36. power ° means [only what the word as Kurmadharaya com- pound signifies}: that which is innate as well as power; but ‘{innate] power’ is not simply ‘essential nature.’ And, accordingly, if it were established that {invariable concomi- tance] is a power imposed [on the things, the same applies to the definition, given by us in aphorism 31, that it is] the connection with an innate power, because the reason is the same. And thus, since the notion ^ power’ is not speci- fied, the same reason [may be alleged in both cases, ] whether {invariable concomitance 18 declared to ४९] the connection with a power imposed [on the things] or the connection with a power innate (to them]. And, [to refute Pafichagikha’s argument in the commentary on aphorism 32,] if some {property] is not apprehended directly on the apprehension of an object, this follows from the fact that the things have manifold powers; as, f.%., the relation between father and 801, though constant, is not apprehended without instruction. Therefore we have said (in aphorism 31] ‘ the becoming mani- fest of an innate power.’ | {The author] denies the identity of word and meaning: (According to Mahadeva the aphorism is to be translated: If the power imposed [on the things] 1s established, the connection with an innate power [1s also established], for the same reason.) As it is established by positive and negative argumentation! and by the institutes, that a power may be imposed on leaves and the like, or on rice and the like,* so it is established by positive and negative argumentation,’ that an [innate] power inheres in all these objects, and [likewise it is established] by the institutes [that an innate power inheres] in all these special actions, [/. ४.) in the action of employing an incantation]. 3 7. &.; yatra-yatra (na) mantra-prayogah, tatra-tatra pallavidindm (n2) vishdpanodakatvam. ‡ The healing power is imposed on leaves, etc., by incantations, the germi- nating power on rice, etc. by earth and humidity. * 7, ६., yatra-yatra (na) mantra-sahakrita-pallavah, tatra-tatra (na) vishdpano- danam. V. 37, 38, ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 199 [The author] denies the identity of word and meaning: 87. The relation of signified and signifying exists between word and meaning. On, the theory of the identity [of word and meaning] even ४ jar ought to be apprehended by hearing, [like the word ‘jar,’ and] even the word ought to be visible for the eye, [like the jar itself, and,] for example, on pronouncing [the word] ‘fire’ a singe of the mouth should take place. [The author] gives the argument thereof : For in the case of the identity even a jar ought to be apprehend- ed by hearing, or the word [‘jar’] by sight, and on pronouncing the word ‘ fire’ a singe of the mouth should take place, etc. [|The author] states the means of learning the sense : 38. Because this relation is established by three [means]. Because the connection between word and meaning (vyué- patir) is learned in three ways. (1) From the instruction by one competent, as “This isa jar.” (2) From the lan- guage and practice (vyavahdra) of the expert, as “ Drive the white cow hither with a stick.” In this case [the know- ledge] of the child! [arises], when it has seen how the expert who got the. order acts in consequence of the word of the expert who gaye the order. (8) From the occurring [of a word, hitherto unknown], together with familiar words in the same sentence; as [a child that] knows [already] the sense of [the words] ‘mango’ and ‘to eat,’ when it hears [the sentence} ‘“‘The bird eats the mango,” then under; stands the word ‘ bird’ [too]. [The author] disposes of [the opinion] that [the appre- hension of] the connection between word and meaning be restricted to something to be done: ` > Grammatically, bdlasya is to be connected with vyutpatti-grahandt. # 200 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 38, 89. By the instruction given by one competent, as “ This is a jar; ” by the language and practice of the expert, as, f.7., ^ Drive the cow hither;” by the occurring [of an unknown word] together with familiar words in the same sentence, as f.1., “ The cuckoo sings sweetly on the mango tree.” [The author] refutes the opinion that the sense of the words [becomes manifest only] in things connected with something to be done : 39. There is no restriction on what is to be done, because it is seen in both cases. The {apprehension of the] connection between word and meaning is seen in the case of something to be done, as «८ Day after day he shall perform the Samdhy& ceremony > [but] itis likewise seen in the case of an established fact, as ^< Hari [Vishnu] is the supreme god among the gods.” For thus the Vedas consist of prescriptions, declarations of the objects,and hymns. (1) The [vedic] prescription is a means of right knowledge (mdhau prémanyam) with regard to the fact that [a work to be done] procures something desired,—which [fact of procuring something desired] toge- ther with the necessity of the performance inheres to one and the same thing.' (2) The [vedic] declaration of the object also is a means of right knowledge, because it supports the power of the prescription and thus mediately incites [us to the performance of the ceremony]. (3) The hymn 8180 18 a means of right knowledge, because it reminds [us] of what is pres- cribed.* What, however, [18 said by the opponent]: ‘‘ Hymns and declarations of the objects are means of right knowledge [only], because they are the causae efficientes of the [human] activity, but ithey do not teach [facts],” is not [right]; 1 I. ९. the prescription teaches that the kdrya, f. i., the Samdhya ceremony, procures something desired, and that this ishtasddhanatdé together with the kdryata inheres in that ceremony. ॐ F.i., the beginning of the Rigveda, agnim ६1९, reminds us of the Agnihotra. V. 39, 40. J ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 201 in their origin, they have the object of {inciting to] activity, but as regards the understanding, they intend stating estab- lished facts.! Therefore, declarations of the objects and hymns are means of right knowledge also, because they teach established facts. ८८ Since the sense of the Veda is transcendent, how can the connection between the [vedic] words and their meaning be apprehended in both [those] cases?’’ To this [the author} replies : | ‘On what is to be done’ means: on things connected with some- thing to be done; ‘restriction’ means: restriction with regard to the sense,—in other words, [the assumption] that the sense [becomes manifest] only in such cases. [This is not right,] for we see that [words] are employed in the case of an established fact as well as in that of something to be done. ‘But then, as regards the Veda, let the sense [become manifest only] in things connected with something to be done.” To this [the author] replies : 40. For he who is conversant with the secular {meanings] understands the sense of the Veda. [It 18 a maxim of the Pirvamimfimsa] that the secular {meanings of the words] are [also] those of the Veda. On account of this equality the connection between word and meaning [is apprehended] here [४ e., in the Veda, ] too. < [४ would be so, if the Veda were the work of a person; but this is not the case.” This [an opponent] declares : Because of the maxim that the secular [meanings] are [also] those of the Veda. This is the sense. (The author] now states the authority of the Veda : 1 क, ‰., the arthavdda ‘yo’ gnihotrena yajate, svargam lokam jayati has, in the first place, the object of recommending the performance of the Agnihotra ; but, since a man will not perform it, unless he has understood the purport, the sentence is also declaratory of the latter. 26 202 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 41, 42. 41. Because the Veda is not the work of a per- son, for three [reasons], and its sense also is trans- cendent.' (The Veda cannot be compiled by a person], because [the existence of] a Lord has been refuted [I. 92, V. 2 seq.], because somebody else could not be([the author, and] be- cause—error being a property of [all] persons—there would not be the conviction of [the Veda’s] being trustworthy, 4. €. because the Veda would prove to be destitute of autho- rity. [And] if the Veda were destitute of authority, there would be no confidence in [the efficiency of] sacrifices, etc. [The author] says (the following] in order to teach the authority of the Veda: The Veda is not destitute of authority, because it is not the work of a person; and this [is so] for three reasons: because {the existence of | a Lord has been refuted, because somebody else could not be [the author, and] because—error being a property of [all] persons—there would not be the conviction of [the Veda’s} being trustworthy. ‘But then, let some special empirical soul be the maker [of the Veda].” Tothis [objection the author] replies: [No,] because ‘its sense,’ ¢, ९.) the sense of the Veda, which teaches that the relation of object and means exists between heaven and sacrifice, etc., is beyond the reach of the senses and [beyond inference]. ‘But then, it is merit of what the Veda treats. And this is not transcendent, since it has the nature of [action, substance and qaality, 88, | f.7., of sacrifice, curds and white colour.” To this [the author] replies : 42. Sacrifices and the like are not merit per se, [but] because of their peculiarity. 4 This 18 understood fankd-prakdrena by Aniruddha and Vijianabhikshn, but siddhdnta-prakdrena by Mahadeva. 2 Aphorism 42 proves, according to Mah&deva,—but refutes, according to Vijiianabhikshu—the atindriyatva of the veddrtha. V. 42, 48. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 208 The peculiarity [of sacrifices and worship] depends on time, place and persons; apart therefrom, they are not merit per se; otherwise, sacrifices and the like would be causes of merit, [even] if they were performed by great sin- ners at an inauspicious time in the country of the barbarians. And this is not the case. ५५ But] the authority of the Veda follows from the per- ‘ception that [even] he who is ignorant [of the meaning of the vedic words] obtains the [desired] fruit [by sacrifices, etc.]. What, therefore, is effected by the conversance [with the meaning of the vedic words]?” To this [the author] replies : Sacrifices and the like as such are not merit, because [in that case] even sacrifices, etc., performed by Siidras, would happen to be merit; but [merit is only that] which is characterized as being a means of [attaining] heaven. And this is transcendent in- deed. For what reason? ‘ Because of their peculiarity.’ For the peculiarity [of the sacrifices] as to competent persons, place, time and [proper performance]! is of consequence only in the respect (ame) that they are means of [attaining] heaven, but not with regard to their being sacrifices, etc., as such. [The author] teaches the use of the conversance [with the meaning of the vedic words] : 43. The mnate sense is discriminated by con- versance, ‘This word is [used ] here inits principal meaning, because it denotes [this or that, and] there in a secondary meaning’ ; ‘this is discriminated [by the said conversance].* “‘ How is the existence of the connection between word and meaning known?” To this [the author] replies: 1 Adi=tti-kartavyatd, Pandit. $ I.e., simply: the right sense of the Veda is apprehended by a correct understanding of the meaning of the vedic words. 204 ANIRUDDHA'S COMMENTARY. | ४. 43—45. The inherent sense of a word, 1. e., 1४8 power of arousing the conception [of something, ९०५१५८८ | ‘is discriminated ’—1. e., determined as being either principal or secondary—‘by conver- sance,’ £. €. by the understanding of the sense. For [a word manifests] its principal reminding power (bodhakatd) with regard to that [object] the conception of which [takes place] directly [after the pronunciation of the word]; but [it manifests] its secondary reminding power with regard to that [object the con- ception] of which [takes place only] through the medium of the original [meaning, sakya=mukhya]. And this [discrimination of the principal and secondary sense] is of practical importance in the case of such rules as ‘‘A vedic verse [or formula] is to be employed only in the principal sense, not in the secondary.” The existence, however, of the sense [innate to words] is to be inferred from the effect [of the employment of words], 7. e., from the conception of the objects.!. This [the author} states : 44. Its existence follows from the fact that [words] produce conceptions, whether [the objects] are evident or not.’ The existence of the connection between word and mean- ing follows from the fact that [words] produce notions, whether the objects are known before or not, ९. ¢., whether they are secular or vedic. {The author] refutes the eternity of the Vedas: ‘Whether [the objects] are evident or not,’ ४. e., whether they are secular or vedic; ‘its existence,’ ४, €.) the existence of the sense [innate to words]. 45. The Vedas are not eternal, because Scrip- ture teaches that they are produced. | At first Scripture says: ‘There was neither day nor 1 F.%, from the conception of a book after the pronunciation of the word ‘ book.’ > Ayogya in the same sense in Aniruddha’s commentary on aphorism 49.. ४. 45—47. | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 205 night (then],” ^ He practised austerity ; from him, having practised austerity, the three Vedas proceeded.” And [be- sides, the non-eternity of the Vedas may be proved by) in- ference from the fact that they are artificial [and must, therefore, have arisen at some time], etc.! By perception also, [९. e., by hearing, ] the letters which are pronounced and perish are apprehended as such (iti) (7. ¢., as non-eternal]. The conception, however, “ This is the same letter ka [as that heard beforehand]”’ refers to the genus.* «८ [एप४], being not eternal, the Vedas must be the work of a person.” To this [the author] replies : Because their non-eternity is inferred from their artificialness which follows from the scriptural passage ‘‘ The three Vedas pro- ceeded”; and because of the perception of production and perish ing in the letters. This [latter also] is to be understood. “ [ But, ] if [the Vedas] are not eternal, they must be the work of a person.” To this [the author] replies: 46. They are not the work of a person, because there is no [such] person [who could be] their maker. The intention [of the author] is: [because the existence of} a Lord has been refuted [1. 92, V. 2 seq. ]. *‘[Then] somebody else will be the maker.” To this [the author | replies : Because [the existence of] a Lord has been refuted. This is the meaning. ^ [Then] let somebody else be the maker.” To this [the author] rephes : 47. No, because neither a liberated nor an un- liberated would be competent. * The ddt may be thus interpreted: Vedd anityah, fabdamayatvdt, Mahd- bhdratddivat. > I. ¢., the same individual ka is not produced again, but another individual ka which belongs to the genus ka. 206 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 47—49. Because a liberated [person] is free from contact and would, therefore, not be competent to be the maker [of the Vedas]; and because an unliberated [person] does not know simultaneously [all things] of which [the Vedas] consist. ५ [ But, ] if [the Vedas] are not the work of a person, then they must be eternal.” To this [the author] replies: Because a liberated [person] 18 free from contact, and an un- liberated [person] does not know merit and [all] the other [consti- tuent parts of the Vedas], and, therefore, [both] are not competent to be their maker. 48. From the fact that something is not the work of a person, its eternity does not follow, as in the case of sprouts and the like. [This 18] clear. ८ [ But] since we must accept (pakshe) that sprouts and = the like, also, [४ ९.५ streams, clouds, etc.,] have a maker, because they are products, a liberated [ person] must be their maker.” To this [the author] replies: For [the relation of] invariable concomitance does not exist between the not being the work of a person and eternity, because {these two properties] are not found together in sprouts and the like [which are not the work of a person and, still, perishable]. [The author] replies [the following] to him who maintains that sprouts and the like, also, must have a maker, because they are products : 49. If these also had one, there would happen to be a contradiction to experience, etc. Since a maker of sprouts and the like is not perceptible, there would be a contradiction to experience. And itisa tenet [of our school] that there is no invisible! maker. By the word ‘etc.’ is indicated that [the relation of] invariable ग Ayogya=apratyaksha, as in aphorism 44. V. 49—51.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 907 concomitance does not exist [between non-eternity and the being produced]. {The author] teaches [now directly] that there is no in- variable concomitance in the case of non-eternity and of the being made by a person: | ‘If [these also] had one,’ +. ९.) a maker, it would contradict the fact known by experience, that they are not produced by a maker. By the word ‘etc.’ [the following counter-argument is intended]: we had to assume, [in that case,] that the being pro- duced by a maker could refer to an imperceptible [creator, an assumption which is not allowed according to the Simkhya view]. The meaning, however, is that the argumentation by means of the notion ‘ product’ is of no use. ५८ What, then, is produced by a maker?” To this [the author] replies : 50. That is the work of a person, with regard to which the notion arises that it has been made, though he be not seen. As is the case with jars and the like, but not with trees and the like. ‘Though he be not seen’ means: though the maker be not seen. {Hence we declare:] all products are not originated by a [personal] maker, but [only] some special products. [The author] refutes [now the opinion of the Naiyayikas] that the being productive of right knowledge (praémdnya) depends on something external : Though ‘he,’ ४. 6.) the maker, be not seen. But in the case of sprouts and the like, the notion that they have been made does not exist, but [the notion] that they have arisen. ‘The work of a person’ means that whick is produced by a maker. 51. [Perceptions, conclusions and Scripture]' are eee 1 Vijidnabhikshu restriots the subject of this aphorism to Scripture. 208 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 51. productive of right knowledge bv themselves, because this is manifested by the innate power. The being productive of right knowledge depends entirely on the totality of factors generating a cognition, ४, e., on the power innate [to perceptions, conclusions and Scripture], and does not require a further auxiliary factor.! [This is said] in view of the arising [of the faculty in question. But] also in view of its cognition,* a power by which the being productive of right knowledge is apperceived necessarily be- longs (autsargiki) to the apprehenders® of the cognition; [that is to say: in this case also there exists an innate power]. Since the being productive of right knowledge is manifested by this [power], it is self-dependent; and [80 it is for another reason also, viz.,] because man engages in ac- tion immediately [after the cognition]. Even where we look for proofs in order to test the being productive of right knowledge for the sake of the destruction of doubts, [this is done only] to remove [eventual] faults, existing in the ९४868१५ [but] not to [obtain] an auxiliary factor. There- fore it is [not the being productive of right knowledge, but 1 As the Naiydyikas hold who declare that the prdmdnya requires regularly, even in the case of conclusions, the following inference: mamo’ tpannam gjndnam pramaé-ripam «sti, saphala-pravritti-janakatvdt. This is taught in many Nydya books, and this is what Aniraddha calls paratah prdményam in the introduction to our aphorism. 2 Svatah prdmdnyam utpadyate, utpatty-anantaram ca jidyate, Pandit. 3 The plural is used on account of the different opinions entertained about this apprehender who is the purusha according to the Simkhya, the sdkshin according to the Vedanta, the samvid according tothe Prabhakara and the anuvyavaséya according to the Nyaya system. 4 I. €., if the accessory inference, accepted by the Naiyayikas, were really drawn, some time ought always to elapse between the cognition and the action based on the same. § I. €., in the senses in case of perception, and in the characteristic signs (linga) in case of inference. ४, 51, 52.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 209 the contrary, ४, 8.) ] the not being productive of right know- ledge which depends on something external [or something different from the tutality of factors, generating a cogni- tion], because in the latter case [not only these factors, but] also some fault! is the cause. (The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Buddhists : Because this—supply ‘ being right knowledge ’—is manifested merely by the innate power, ४. e., merely by the power innate to the factors generating a cognition. The being productive of right knowledge, 7. e., the generation of anything characterized as right knowledge, depends on itself [४. e., on its own factors], but not on an auxiliary factor, by which [latter opinion] in order to [estab- lish] the fact that the Veda is productive of right knowledge, [the objectionable theory of] the Vedas having a competent maker would be necessitated, The having an incompetent maker, however, implies, as a consequence, the not being productive of right knowledge. More [about this subject is to be found] in the great standard works (dkara). [The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Buddhists with regard to such errors as ‘ this [mother of pearl] is silver’ : | 52. There is no conception of the unreal, as f. i., of a man’s horn. | (The opinion of the Buddhists is that in the case of some- body saying about a piece of mother of pearl] ‘this is silver,’ the unreal identity of the mother of pearl with the silver 18 conceived.? This is not [right], because the unreal, as, f. i., a man’s horn, is destitute of any practical efficiency and, therefore, incapable of producing a conception. [The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the followers of [the 21109158 teacher] Prabhakara : What [the Buddhists] teach, ४८२.) that the unreal identity of 2 For a fault in the senses or in the characteristic signs is the para, ४, ९० the jidna-janaka-sdmagri-bhinna. ॐ Pratibhati ‘shines forth’ =jndyate. 27 | 210 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 52, 53. the mother of pearl with the silver is conceived, is not [right], because the unreal, as, f. i, a man’s horn, is destitute of any practical efficiency and, therefore, incapable of producing a con- ception. [The author] refutes {now | the doctrine of the Prabhakaras : 68. (‘The tenet of the Prabhakaras’ 18] not [right], because the disproof of a real [perception] would be seen. [The Pr&bh&karas declare: “If somebody says with re- gard to a piece of mother of pearl] ‘ this is silver,’ [the part] ‘this’ (signifies a right perception] the object of which is before our eyes, {while the part] ‘silver’ [expresses] a recol- lection {of some silver seen formerly]. These are two [ dif- ferent] apprehensions; [and] since the distinction [between the present object of perception and the object of recollec- tion] is not understood, [the deluded person] acts [४. ९.) seizes the supposititious silver.” This is} not [right], because we see that the action [of seizing] follows from an apprehen- sion of the non-distinction {and not from the non-under- standing of the distinction], and because [the conception ‘this is silver ` ] 18 disproved by [the later conception] ‘this is not silver.’ Now, a right perception cannot be disproved ; [for,] if this were [possible,] the perception ‘this is not a jar’ might take place, after the perception ‘this is a jar’ has arisen. [Hence the idea of a right perception is out of place in the case in question. ] [The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Vedantists : The Prabhakaras say: ^" 16 words ‘ this’ and ‘silver’ express two apprehensions, the former [of which] is a perception and the other a recollection, The actioa [of seizing the supposititious 2 According to which the case under discussion is not to be regarded as an apprehension of an unreal state of things bat as a combination of two lifferent true conceptions. V. 53, 54. 1] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 211 silver] follows from the non-understanding of the distinction, [and does] not [take place], when the distinction is understood.” [This is] not [right], because the disproof by means of [the cog- nition] ‘ this is not silver’ 18 seen. More [about this subject may be looked for] elsewhere [४, e., in Nyaya works]. [The author] confutes [now] the doctrine of the Vedantists : 54. [There is] no [conception] of the indescrib- able, because such a thing does not exist. (The Vedantists declare:] ‘Since, if (the supposititious silver] were unreal, there could not be the immediate percep- tion ‘this is silver,’ [and] since, if it were real, there could be no disproof [of this perception], for these [two] reasons {the supposed silver] is different from the real as well as from the unreal, ४, ©, it 18 indescribable. And in this sense {itis said]: ८ If [an imaginary object were real, the apprehension by which it is disproved could not take place, nor could its perception, if it were unreal. [Moreover], it cannot have the nature of both [reality and unreality], because these two are opposites. Whence, therefore, (shall we get] another principle [besides reality, unreality and sim- ultaneous reality and unreality | ?? But as the illusory nature of the empirical world has been estab- lished by the means of knowledge, the authority of these means, perception, etc., is phenomenal [itself]. The scriptural declaration of non-duality, however, which has the character of an instruction about truth, possesses the nature of a means of right knowledge, because of the want of a confutation. Therefore, though being [a part of the] illusory [world], the scrip- tural passages teaching non-duality possess the power of producing a right knowledge of Brahman*. So much has been settled.” This [doctrine and argumentation of the Vedantists] is not [right], because [the imaginary silver] is describable by 4 I. ९. the imaginary object is, according to the Vedantistic view, neither real nor unreal, nor both simultaneously. As a fourth possibility does not ex- ist, the Vedantist declares that nothing can be predicated of that whioh isim- aginary. i | 2 Manata=prdimdyyam. 212 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. V. 54—56.] the very expression ‘ this is silver,’ and because it is [in fact] described as indescribable [by the Vedantists who declare : ‘The object! is] neither real nor unreal.’ [The author] refutes [now] the doctrine of the Ny4ya system ‘Because such a thing does not exist’ means: because [the imaginary object] is described as indescribable [by the Vedantists who declare : | ‘It is neither real nor unreal,’ and, therefore, an indescribable thing does not exist. [The author] confutes [now] the doctrine of the Naiydyikas : 55. The theory that things may appear in a manner different [from their real nature] is not [right], because your own declaration is opposed [to this]. | [The Naiy&yikas teach: “If somebody thinks of a piece of mother of pearl] ‘ this is silver,’ the mother of pearl simp- ly appears under the character of silver.” [This is] not [right], because | the idea] that one thing appears under the character of another is contradicted by the acknowledged doctrine [of the Naiy4yikas] that it is silver superimposed . [by the deluded person] which appears in the case [under discussion J.’ [The author] states his own doctrine: Because your two declarations are contradictory to one another, viz, “The mother of pearl appears under the character of silver ”’ and ^“ Superimposed silver appears in that case.” [The author] states his own doctrine: 56. There is the apprehension of something real and unreal, because it is disproved and not disproved. 4 Supply vishayah or paddrthahk. * The interpunctuation is to be alteredin my edition according to this trans- lation. V. 56, 57.} ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 213 [The erroneous notion] < this is silver’ is real, as far as its object-is something present before our eyes, because it can- not be disproved [88 such ]'; but it is unreal, as far as its ob- ject is silver, because it is disproved [in this respect by the subsequent cognition ‘ this is not silver’]. The truth, there- fore, is that there are two [notions, the one of which is] real and [the other] unreal [The author] refutes [the doctrine of the Yoga philosophy that there 18] a ‘ discloser ° (sphota)* [The erroneous notion] ‘this is silver’ has [also] a real and [not only] an unreal character; for the silver [alone] and not the object present before our eyes is disproved by [the cognition] ‘ this is not silver.’ (The author] refutes [the existence of] the ‘ discloser ’: 57. Because of conception and non-conception a word having the nature of the ‘ discloser’ does not exist. Letters are conceived, [but] a ‘ discloser ’ is not conceived ; hence a word having the nature of the ‘discloser’ does not exist. If the letters do not manifest anything whatever [by themselves], how can the ‘discloser’ manifest something? And if the letters [are supposed to] manifest [something], of what use isthe superfluous ‘discloser’? Let [then] the letters alone manifest [the sense of the words]. Nor does the existence of the ^ discloser’ follow from the variety [of meanings exhibited by tbe letters in their diverse arrange- ment] The non-eternity of the Veda has been stated [in aphorism 45] for the reason that [its eternity] is disproved by percep- ५ Purovarti-vishayatd-’mce kimchij jiinam na baidhyate, Pandit. * Or a verbal unit residing in every word as something distinct from its component letters. The followers of the Yoga system hold that by this sphofa the meaning of every particular word is disclosed to the hearer. 214 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, V. 57—59.] tion.! {Now the author] teaches [in contrast with the Mi- mamsakas] that the letters [too] are not eternal: Letters are conceived, [but] a ‘discloser,’ distinct from the let- ters, is not conceived ; hence no such [internal] word as a ‘dis- closer ’ exists, but the letters alone are [the word ]. And these are not eternal. This [the author] says [inthe fol- lowing aphorism]: 58. Sounds are not eternal, because we know that they are produced. Because we know from perception [४, ¢., hearing] and [by inference] that a sound does not exist [any more] immediate- ly after it has been heard. Otherwise [४, ¢., if this argument were not cogent,| a jar, too, would be eternal. In order to teach that all things, except primitive Matter and Soul, are products, [the author] ponders the [following] doubt: Because we know that [the sound of] the letter ga is produced, etc. [The author] ponders a doubt : 59. [Sound], being a previously existing en- tity’, is manifested as a jar by a lamp.” ५८ As a jar, standing in darkness, is manifested by a lamp, so the letters are manifested by tones. In the absence of these [the letters] seem not to exist, but [they do] not [so] on account of [real] non-existence.” [The author] sets [this doctrine of the Mimamsakas] a- right: [The author] refutes [this] : 1 This argument is not given in the aphorism, but in the commentary on it. > Parva-siddha-sativa is better regarded as a Karmadharaya, though Vijiia- nabhikshu explains it as a Bahuvrihi. ए. 60, 61.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 215 60. Ifthe tenet of the [constant] reality of the products [is meant hereby], you prove what has al- ` ready been proved. If the eternity [of letters or sounds] is taught [by you], while you have recourse to [the idea of} manifestation, and [if] hence [our] tenet of the [constant] reality of the pro- ducts {is accepted by you], then you prove what has already been proved. [The Vedantists declare:} ‘There 18 only one Self; and in this sense [it 18 said] : ‘ As the sky, though being one, appears to be different, as white, blue, etc., so the Self, though being one, [is regarded] as separated individually by misapprehending people’ (Vishnupurana 2. 16. 22). This [the author] confutes : What is the purport of your declaring [the letters or sounds] to be eternal, while you have recourse to [the idea of] manifestation ? [Do you mean that all] products are [constantly] real and never unreal, or, [that] the letters are eternal in the same way as primi- tive Matter and Soul? The former cannot [be your opinion], be- cause this would happen to be [our] doctrine; [and] against the latter [side of the question aphorism 72] will be produced. [The author] opposes against the ( Vedantistic] theory that there 18 only one Self : 61. The Self’s non-duality is not, because its multiplicity is known through signs, Because such [specializing] signs, as old age, death, etc., are ascertained. The multiplicity [of souls] has been stated above [I. 149 | as an established fact, [but] now it is proved, and therefore [our aphorism contains] no superfluous repeti- tion. | “Granted that there is no non-duality of homogeneous Selfs, ४, €.» granted that there are many individual Selfs; but jars and similar things, [declared by you Samkhyas 216 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, [V. 61—63. to be] not Self, will have the nature of the Self, and so there will be [such] non-duality, [that besides the Selfs nothing] heterogeneous exists.” To this [objection the au- thor] replies: । ‘The Self’s non-duality,’ 7. ९.) unity, ‘is 707. Why [not]? Because the multiplicity of Selfs follows from the [specializing] signs, as old age, death, etc. The multiplicity [of souls] has been stated above [I. 149] as a fact, but here it 18 proved, and therefore there is no superfluous repetition | offered in our aphorism]. 62. [The Self is] also not [identical] with the non-Self, because this is disproved by perception. The Self is not one with the non-Self, 7. e., with jars and the like, because jars and the like are seen, as external objects, to be different (from the internal Self]. If [both] were one, jars, etc., would be Selfs, and the Self would be subject to change. ^ [060] there will be an [absolute] non-duality, [so that there are neither] homogeneous nor heterogeneous [entities besides the one Self].”! Tothis [fresh objection the au- thor] replies: The Self 18 also not one with the non-Self, ४, e., with jars and the like, because this is disproved by perception. Moreover : 63. There is no [oneness] with both, for the same reason. 7 | ` 4. 6., Because the difference is seen by an irrefutable per- ception. | «(But even] then [does] the contradiction of Scripture {remain] which teaches non-duality.” To this [last objec- tion of the opponent the author; replies: . 1 The opponent retracts the concession made in the introduction to our aphorism, and means that, if such arguments are produced against the vijd- ttyddvaita, it is safer to retain the absolute advaita. ४. 98-65.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 217 ‘For the same reason,’ ४. e., because this is excluded by percep- tion. There 18 no oneness [of the Self] with both, 7. ¢., neither with the [other] Selfs nor with what is non-Self. The meaning is that such irrefutable perceptions as ‘you are happy,’ ‘I am afflicted,’ ‘this is a jar,’ etc., refute the oneness of the Self, ९ But then, what would be the fate of those scriptural texts which teach non-duality ?” To this [the author] replies: 64. Another sense [appears] there to the undis- criminating. [It is only] to the blind [that] those scriptural passages [appear to] have another sense [than the one ascribed to them by us Samkhyas; in fact] they mean the homogene- ousness [of the Selfs]. [The author] teaches [now] that for the asserters of one Self there can also not be a material cause of the world: There, & ९.) 1 the scriptural passages about the unity of the Selfs which [passages really] teach that the nature of the Selfs is one [and the same everywhere], another sense appears to the undis- criminating, viz., to the fools, 7. ¢., [to them these passages seem to | mean the [absolute] oneness of the Self. This is to be supplied. And so Scripture does not contradict [our doctrine], This is the meaning. Moreover, for the asserters of one Self it is also impossible to ac- cept a material cause of the world. This [the author] teaches [in the following aphorism | : 65. Neither the Self, [nor] ignorance, nor both can be the material cause of the world, because no- thing adheres [to the Self]. The Self cannot be [this] cause on account of its invari- ableness. Ignorance cannot be the cause, since it is unreal $ [and] if [the Vedantists declared it to] be real, they would abandon [their doctrine of] non-duality. Both [together, the Self and ignorance,] cannot be the cause, as no connec- 28 218 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (V. 65, 66. tion exists [between the two, the one being real, the other unreal J. With reference to [the Vedantistic doctrine] that the Self be, in its essence, thought and delight, [the author] de- clares : The Self cannot be [the cause] on account of its invariableness. If ignorance were real, there would happen to be a duality [which is opposed to the theory of the Vedantists]}; if it is unreal, it ean- not be the cause, as the son of a barren wife [or other non-entities are unable to produce anything]. For this very reason both [un- ited] also can not be [the material cause]. [The author] refutes the doctrine that the Self has the nature of thought and delight : 66. One thing cannot have the two natures of delight and thought, because these two are different. Delight means joy, [and] thought knowledge. If [the Self] had the nature of delight and thought, there would happen to be a duality [which contradicts the doctrine of the Vedantists}]. And you cannot say: ‘‘ Delight (as under- stood by us Vedantists] 18 no joy springing from objects, nor is thought that knowledge which depends on an affection [of the internal organ], but [both are] something different, viz., something supernatural”; for, if [these two things] were supernatural, they could not be proved; [and] if they could be proved, there would be a duality because of the existence of the proof. Moreover, is delight [in your opinion] the nature or a property of the Self? Iffyou declare] delight [to] be its property, there would happen to be a duality, and a contradiction to Scripture which teaches that [the Self] is void of qualities, etc. [४. ¢., invariable and indifferent; and] if [you declare] delight [to] be the nature [of the Self, we must ask:] Why is [this] delight [which you describe as something supernatural] not felt during the state of mundane V. 66.) ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 219 existence? If[you reply: .“Itis not felt then,] because 16.18 covered by ignorance,”’ [we gainsay to this:] Since ig- norance is incorporeal, nothing can be covered by it, as {for instance] by walls. ‘ But” {the Vedantist declares] “the sense of the word ‘to cover’ is ‘to overpower,’ [and thus the supernatural delight which is the essential nature of the Self is overpowered by ignorance, as the beaming of the stars is overpowered by sunshine.” To this we reply:] An eter- nal and all-pervading thing [as the Self or its essential na- ture] cannot be overpowered. ([Besides,] as ignorance is il- lusory and the Self real, no connection can exist between these two, because there is no connection between an entity and a non-entity, or because, if such a connection did exist, Scripture which teaches that nothing adheres (to the Self], etc., would be contradicted. And if [you maintain that su- pernatural] delight be felt [sometimes by the Self which is itself such delight in your opinion], you would be in contra- diction with the logical rule that the same thing cannot be object and subject simultaneously.! Moreover, what proof 18 there of the existence of a Self consisting of delight? If [you reply:] ^ What is the use of searching for a proof, as the soul itself has the character of a proof?”’; this is not [right], for in order to establish a proof, you must [be able to] state something which is to be proved [by it]; if there is nothing to be proved, what can be ascertained by the proof? And since (the Self] is not the basis of any act of proving, it is certainly not a proof. Besides, that which has the nature of thought, has not the nature of delight, because these two [things] are different, Nor [can you say] that the identity of the two is to be proved by their supernatural character, because, if they were superna- tural, their invariable concomitance could not be apprehend- 1 Because the Self would then be feeler and felt at the same time. 220 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 66. ed, [and hence there would be no means of discerning their identity]. For these reasons the Self has not a twofold na- ture. And if delight is not felt at [the time of] liberation [as we hold], what is the use of [ascribing] this {delight to the Self? But] if it is felt [by the liberated Self according to your opinion], you must accept [three different things, viz.| the feeler, the feeling and the felt, [४ e., you must give up your doctrine of non-duality]. And as [the word] ° con- templation’ (samadht) is also employed [by you Vedantists} on account of [7. e., to denote] the immediate cognition of the Self, this being only possible as long as the body lasts, how can contemplation exist [at the time of liberation], since the Self [alone] continues to be after the decease of the body? Hence it is a delusion (on your part to believe] that {eternal and supernatural] delight is gained in contempla- tion in consequence of the cessation of all pains; [for] how can delight be felt, when there 18 no body and, therefore, contemplation is at an end? And so it is an error to hold that delight be felt at [the time of] liberation. ५ But what is then the matter with Scripture which speaks of the delight [of the Self]? Thus [it is said]: ‘ He is not afraid of anything who knows the delight of Brahman, before which words, together with the thinking organ turn back, without reaching at it’* (cf. Taitt. Up. 2. 4).” To this {the author] replies : Delight means joy, [and] thought knowledge. ‘Because these two are different,’ viz., in daily life. If [you say] that these [two] are something supernatural, [we reply:] As no proof exists [there- of, the Self’s consisting of both delight and thought] cannot be made out [in this manner]. Moreover, if thought [or intelligence] has the nature of delight, why is this not felt during the state of 4 I. €, which is not to be described by words nor to be apprehended by thoughts. V. 66—63.] ANIKUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 221 mundane existence? If [you १९५९८१४९ : ] ‘ Because it is covered by ignorance,” [let us ask again:| How can this, being uncon- nected [with the Self,] cover [the same? And] if [you are of the opinion that ignorance] is connected [with the Self], you are in contradiction with Scripture which teaches that nothing adheres [to Soul]. Moreover, is delight felt at [the time of] liberation, or not? In the first case [we mustask : | By whom isit felt? If [you say]: ‘ By the Self,” you are guilty of the logical fault of making the same thing, [viz., the Self] subject and object simul- taneously. If, [however, delight is] not [felt by the liberated Self according to your opinion], what is the use of asserting that [the Self] has the nature of delight ? ‘‘ But what is then the fate of the scriptural passage ‘He is not afraid of anything who knows the delight of Brahman’ (cf. Taitt. Up. 2.4)?” To this [the author] replies: 67. [The word ‘delight ’ is] figurative, to denote the cessation of pain. [This is] clear. [The author] mentions another mode [of explanation]: Supply: the appellation ‘ delight.’ [The author] mentions another mode [of explanation] 68. It 18 a commendation of liberation for the sake of the inferior. ‘For the sake of the inferior,’ 2. e., of those who are under the influence of Tamas. ‘ A commendation of liberation,’ ४, ९.» an incitement to activity [viz., to endeavouring after the means of liberation]. [The author] refutes [the opinion] that the internal sense pervades [the whole body] : ‘For the sake of the inferior,’ ४. e., of those who are under the influence of Rajas and Tamas. ‘A commendation of liberation’ means an incitement to activity. 222 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 69, 70. {The author] refutes [the opinion] that the internal sense be pervading : 69. The internal sense is not pervading, because it 18 an instrument or a sense, like an axe, etc., and the sight, etc. The [simultaneous] sensation ‘my head aches, my foot is at ease,’ which [apparently ] intimates that the internal sense pervades [the whole body ]},' 18 [really] occasioned by the fact that the succession [of such sensations] is not apprehended on account of the swift moving [of the internal sense]. It does not follow therefrom that [the internal sense] is per- vading.* । | [The author] gives another argument against [that theo- ry]: Such a sensation, however, as ‘my head aches, my foot is at ease › which, as some [teachers] maintain, proves [by the apparent simultaneousness] that the internal sense pervades [the body], 18 [really] occasioned by the fact that the succession is not appre- . hended on account of the swift moving of the internal sense ; hence it does not follow therefrom that [the internal sense} is pervad- ing. 70. Because it is moveable, [and] because Scrip- ture speaks of its wandering. By the words ‘ because it is moveable’ [the proof by] in- ference is given (for the internal sense’s being not pervad- ing]; by the words ‘ because Scripture speaks of its wander- ing’ [the proof by] testimony is given. ८८ [ But, ] as [the internal sense] 18 only an atom, it will * Cf. the commentary ०011. 14. ® The Samkhyas hold that the manas is madhya-parimdnakam, while the Naiyayikas and Vaiseshikas declare it to be an atom. ४. 70—72. | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 228 have no cause and, therefore, be eternal.” To this objection {of a Naiydyika or Vaiseshika the author] replies: By the words ‘ because it is moveable’ [the proof by] inference is given [for the internal sense’s being not pervading]; by the words ‘ because Scripture speaks of its wandering’ the proof is given for its moveableness. 71. Itis not without parts, since it possesses some, like jars, etc. ‘It is not without parts,’ 2. 6.9 if is not without a cause, ‘since it possesses some,’ 2. é., since it possesses parts. What is its causeP The egotizing organ. As [even] the [so-call- ed] atoms have six [divisions, viz., the upper, under, right, left, front and back] at the same time, it follows that they [too] consist of parts. Therefore the internal sense is, like jars, etc., not eternal, [as eternity belongs only to the indi- visible ] [The author] teaches [now], how the eternal and non- eternal things are to be distinguished : The internal sense is not without a cause, since it possesses one. If [you ask:] ‘‘ What is its cause? ”’, understand, that it is the egotizing organ. Moreover : 72. Everything save primitive Matter and Soul is uneternal. {This is} plain. ८ 31166 Space, Time, etc. [४. ९. ether] are eternal, bow {can you say] that everything [save primitive Matter and Soul] is uneternal, [and for what reason do you ascribe eternity to primitive Matter]?” To this [objection of the Vaiseshika the author | replies : «८ Why is primitive Matter eternal?” To this [the author] re- plies : | | 224 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 78, 74. 73. Parts are not to be found in the whole, since Scripture teaches that it is without parts. Causes! of the whole, ९, e., of primitive Matter which is the cause of the world are not to be found, ‘since Scripture teaches that it is without parts,’ ९. ९. since Scripture says that it, being the principal cause, has no other cause. < Liberation is a manifestation of delight.”” This [declar- ation of a Vedantist the author] refutes: Whereof there are no parts, ४. e., with regard to which there are no causes of the being produced, of that, ४. e., of primitive Matter, no causes are to be found ; ‘ since Scripture teaches that it is with- out parts,’ £. e., since the scriptural passage ^ Know the Maya as the primitive cause” ($ १८४६४. Up. 4. 10) testifies to the existence of a universal primitive cause, and since in [accepting] a cause of primitive Matter we would have a regressus in infinitum. [The author] refutes [now] the opinion that liberation be a manifestation of delight: 74. Liberation is not a manifestation of delight, because there are no properties. Because there is not the relation of property and proprie- tor at [the time of] liberation, [7. ९, because the liberated Self has no properties. And] does this manifestation [ which you accept] exist at all times? Then liberation would ob- tain also during the state of mundane existence. Or is it effected in liberation? Then, on the other hand, there could be no absolute liberation, because [every] positive thing which is an effect (or a product] necessarily perishes. [The author] refutes [now the doctrine of the Naiydyikas and Vaiseshikas] that liberation is the destruction of the special qualities [ascribed to the soul by those systems, viz. in- * To explain the word ‘ parts,’ as parts are the material causes of the whole. V. 74-- 76. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 225 tellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, de- merit and memory!] : Is [that] delight [the manifestation of which you declare to be liberation ] the essential nature of the Self, or something different P In the first case liberation would obtain during the state of mun- dane existence, in the latter no absolute liberation could take place, because [every] positive thing which is an effect necessarily per- ishes. [The author] disposes [now] of the opinion that liberation is the destruction of the special qualities [of the soul]: ` 75. Likewise not the destruction of the special qualities. If you say that the special [qualities of the soul] do not exist {in liberation], you acknowledge [thereby that] the general qualities, [viz., number, quantity, separatedness, con- junction, etc.,* continue even then to belong to the soul]. And thus [the liberated Self would be associated with qua- lities, and hence there would be no absolute liberation. ५५ (16 Self 18 of the same extension as the body; its de- parture from all that 18 called body [%. e., from the subtile as well as from the gross body] 18 liberation.”? This [१०८ trine of the Jainas the author] refutes : ‘Likewise’ means: Liberation 18 not [etc]. Because there is no proof for the opinion that the general qualities [continue to exist at the time of liberation]. Thisisthe sense. [The author] refutes [now] the opinion of the outcasts [४. e., of the Jainas] that the Self has the same extension as the body and that liberation is the constant going upwards of the Self which has departed from the body : 76. Not aspecial wandering of that which is immovable. 2 Cf. Bhashapariccheda 89, 90. > Cf. Bhaéshapariccheda 90, 91. 29 226 ANIRUDDHA’S OOMMENTARY. [V. 76, 77. ‘Liberation is not [effected] by wandering upwards, be- cause Scripture teaches that the Self is void of qualities, mo- tion and properties. [But] how [can you talk of | liberation ? (On your doctrine the Self] cannot even be eternal, since, if changing into [the extension of] the body of an elephant or 8 worm, it must contract or expand and, therefore, consist of parts. (The author] disposes [now] of liberation as explained by the Buddhists [or more specially, by the Vijianavadins | : For if the Self had the extension of the body, it ought, on en- tering the body of an elephant or a worm, to increase or decrease and, therefore, necessarily to be declared to consist of parts; and hence it would not be eternal. For this reason it is proper to ac- cept that the Self is all-pervading. Since it is, as such, immov- able, it cannot wander upwards. This is the meaning. [The author] disposes [now] of liberation as explained by the Buddhists : 77. Not the destruction of the influence of forms, because of the fault of momentariness, etc. Is that [what you call the] ‘form’! [of thought] the es- sential nature of cognition? In this case cognition, too, [the continuity of which is considered by you as the Self] would be destroyed [in liberation, if liberation were what you de- clare it to be; and] who would [then] be liberated? Or is [the ‘form’] an attribute [of cognition]? Then it would constantly perish on account of its momentariness, and even those who are subject to mundane existence would be libera- ted. And if [you say that the Self] 18 not liberated then (2. ¢., at the time of mundane existence | kecause of the power of the { previous] impressions, [we reply: In this case] let libera- tion be simply the destruction of {these previous] impres- 2 Ntla-ptta-ghata-pafddi-samasta-vastu-ripa dkdrak, Pandit. V. 77, 78.) ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 227 gions ; what is the use of (defining it as] the destruction of the influence of forms? By the word, ‘etc.’ [the following is intended]: as [in your opinion] the continuity of pure cog- nitions [z. e., of those cognitions which have not the form of an empirical object] is also perishable, [of] whose libera- tion [can you talk]? {The author] refutes [now the explanation of] liberation, { given] by [another] sect of the Buddhists: ‘The influence of forms’ means: the connection with the ob- 16९४8. The destruction thereof is not liberation for the following among other counter-arguments: because the destruction of each previous connection [of thought] with objects is, on account of the momentariness of all [objects, accepted by you], easily obtainable [or rather a matter of fact] even in mundane existence, [while li- beration must naturally be difficult to obtain]; and because even the Self must be momentary [in your opinion], as the continuity of pure cognitions, too, is momentary [according to your doctrine ; of] whose liberation, [therefore, can you talk] ? [The author] refutes [now] the opinion that liberation is the destruction of everything except the Self: 78. Not the destruction of everything [except the Self], because this is not Soul’s aim, and because of other faults.’ [This is] plain. [The author] refutes [now the Nihilistic doctrine] that the void is liberation : For what sin has the universe committed, so that its destruc- tion were to be sought for [by those who endeavour after libera- tion]? Besides [that theory must be rejected] on account of its impossibility. 1 * Form’ is here equalized to ‘ object,’ because the Vijidnavadins acknow- ledge no external objects, but only notions. ॐ 7. €, because the Samsara is eternal, and because there is no reason for the destruction of everything. 228 - ANIKUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. LV. 79. 79. For the same reasons the void [is] also (not liberation]. [I. e.] because this is not Soul’s aim, etc. By the word ‘etc.’ the impossibility is intimated that anybody will betake himself [to the means of his own destruction. Here the Ni- hilist who denies even the existence of the Self makes the following objection:] ‘Ifa Self is accepted, then aversion (must naturally be felt] against that which is antagonistic to it, and affection for that which is favourable to it; there- fore, as these two are causes of bondage, there would be no liberation.”” Don’t say so! For bondage does not result from affection and aversion as such, but from a species of them, [£ e., from that affection and aversion alone the ob- ject of which is an empirical one]. As according to the doctrine of the Buddhists bondage does not result from the continuity of cognitions as such, since the continuity of pure cognitions [४. e., of cognitions which have no relation to the empirical world] is [in their opinion] a means of libera- tion, so bondage does not resulf from the aversion against that which is antagonistic to the isolation of the Self nor from the affection for the permanent freedom of the Self from Upddhis; on the contrary, [such aversion and affec- tion] are means of liberation. | [Some Taushtikas' teach:] ‘Liberation is dependent on a certain time, place, or work.”’ This [the author] refutes: Because this is not Soul’s aim, and because of other faults; also on account of the [absolute] impossibility. This is the sense. [The author] refutes now [the opinion of worldly people] that liberation is the gaining of excellent garlands of flowers, sandal- wood? and beloved women at some excellent place: 2 Cf. Samkhya-karikaé 50. 9 The powder of which, mixed with water and perfumes, is used to anoint the body and has a cooling effect. V. 80, 81.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 229 80. Nor the gaining of some place, etc., since conjunctions lead to disjunctions. Since the conjunction with a place terminates in disjunc- tion, there would be mundane existence again. By the word ‘etc.’ time and work are also comprised. The conjunction with a [certain] time, too, [must] likewise [come to an end ; that is to say: the same refutation holds good with regard to those who mean that liberation will come at a certain time of its own accord.] And [17 liberation were the fruit] of works, then, since this is perishable, there would be mun- dane existence again. [The followers of Sankaraécharya teach:] = ^ Liberation 18 the conjunction of the part, 7. ¢., of the individual Self, with the whole, ४, e., with Brahman.” This (the author] refutes: [This 18 | clear. [The author] refutes [now the opinion] that liberation is the conjunction of the part, z. e., of the individual soul, with the whole, 2. e., with Brahman : 81. That which is without parts cannot be in conjunction with parts. The individual Self 18 not a part of Brahman, because Brahman has no parts [according to your doctrine. And if a conjunction of the individual Self with Brahman were pos- sible, this} conjunction [also] would terminate in disjunc- tion, and hence bondage would take place again. But if [you say: ‘After the dissolution of the individual soul in Brahman] no disjunction [is possible], as there is no longer a cause of mundane existence,” then let this [non-existence of such a cause] be [liberation] ;' what need is there of in- venting the conjunction of the part [with the whole] ? 1 This is Samkhya doctrine, according to which, however, the cause of mundane existence is only annihilated by discriminative knowledge. 280 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 81—83. ‘‘ Liberation is [the acquisition of] the faculty of assum- ing atomic size [or invisibility] and of other supernatural powers.” With reference to this [opinion the author] declares : (According to Mahadeva’s reading our aphorism is to be trans- lated: [Liberation] is not the conjunction of the part with the whole.) Because no proof exists for the theory that Brahman and the individual soul stand in the relation of whole and part; and _ be- cause [such 8 | conjunction, [if 0881016, ] would terminate in disjunction. 82. Nor [is liberation] the possession of the fa- culty of assuming atomic size, etc., because its loss is inevitable, like the disjunction from [all] other [pos- sessions]. | These [supernatural powers], too, [which can be obtained by the Yoga-praxis] are not eternal, because they are pro- ducts. By the word ‘etc.’ are intended the powers of as- suming extreme lightness [or incorporeality] and extreme heaviness, of reaching at anything,! of an irresistible will, of mastering all beings, of changing the course of nature, and of resorting to any place at one’s mere will. ^< Liberation results from the acquisition of the supreme divine power and rank.” With regard to this [current belief the author] declares: 83. Nor the attainment of the rank of Indra or of another [god], for the same reason. [I. ९.] because this is [likewise] not eternal. ‘‘ The senses consist of the elements.”? This [objection, made by a Naiyayika or Vaiseshika with reference to the SAmkhya doctrine propounded in I. 61, the author] refutes : 2 As touching the moon with the end of one’s finger. क, 88, 84.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 231 [These] two aphorisms [82 and 83] are clear. The author refutes [now the opinion] that the senses consist of the elements : 84, The senses have not their origin in the ele- ments, since Scripture teaches that they spring from the egotizing organ. Thus [it is said, Mund. Up. 2. 1. 3.]: ‘From this' are produced the vital air, the internal and all ex- ternal senses, ether, air, light, water and the earth, the supporter of all.” [The Naiyayikas,] however, say that [the senses] have their originin the elements, because they are under the delusion that that sense by which the cause of a [gross] element, 7. ९, a [particular] rudiment, is apprehended [by a god or a Yogin], has its origin in that [element]. ८८ Liberation results from the knowledge of the six cate- gories.” With regard to this [doctrine of the Vaiseshikas the author] declares: In the word bhita-prakrititvam the suffix tva is added to a Bahuvrihi-com pound. For we learn from the Puranas and other [writings] that the senses are the product of that egotizing organ which has the nature of Sattva, The current saying, however, that [the senses] have their origin in the elements, is brought about by the delusion that that sense by which the cause of a [gross] element, £, ¢., a [particular] rudiment, is apprehended, has its origin in that [element]. The two [following] aphorisms are [intended] for the refutation of the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas that there are six categories and that liberation results from the knowledge of them, and of the 1 Aniruddha misrepresents the purport of the Upanishad which does not here speak of the egotizing organ, but of Brahman. 282 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 85. doctrine of the Naiyayikas that there are sixteen categories and that liberation results from the knowledge of these : 85. The restriction on six categories is not [cor- rect, nor] does liberation result from the cognition of them. | [The categories of the Vaiseshikas are:] substance, quali- ty, action [or motion], generality, particularity and inhe- rence. [These are explained by them in the following man- ner:] Substances are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, the Self and the internal sense. Qualities are colour, taste, smell and touch, number, dimensions, individuality, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, no- tions, joy and pain, desire and aversion, effort, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, impulse [or faculty of reproduction or elasticity], merit, demerit and sound. Actions [or motions] are throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, ex- panding and going. (Cf. Vais. Sitra 1. 1. 4-7, Bhashaparic- cheda 1-5). Generality is [two-fold], higher [extensive] and lower [non-extensive] (cf. Bhashapar. 7-9 and the Upaskara and Vivriti to Vaig. S. 1.2.3). Particularities are [called only] the ultimate [distinctions] abiding in the eternal sub- stances (7. ९.) in space, time, ether, soul, and in the atoms of earth, water, fire and air.|]! (Cf. Bhashap. 9, and the Upas- kara and Vivriti to Vais. 8. 1. 2.6). Inherence is that con- junction of things, known to be never separated, which is the cause of the conviction ‘ here [is this or that inherent]. This restriction [of the Vaiseshikas] is not [correct in our opinion], as we Samkhyas do not acknowledge a restricted number of categories. Nor does liberation result from the cognition of these [six categories], because liberation pro- ceeds only from the knowledge of the Self. ‡ While for all other distinctions different expressions, as bheda, bhinnaiva, etc., are used. > Cf. the quotation in the Upaskara to Vais. Sitra 7. 2, 26. V. 86.]} ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 233 ५८ Liberation results from the knowledge of the sixteen categories.””> With regard to this [doctrine of the Naiyayi- kas the author] declares: 86. The same it is also with the sixteen etc. (The Naiydyikas teach:'] “Final beatitude is attained by the knowledge of the truth about [the following sixteen things:] means of right knowledge, object of right know- ledge, doubt, motive, example, tenet, the members [of a syl- logism], argumentation, ascertainment, discussion, wrangling, cavil, semblance of a reason, unfairness, futility and reason of rebuke (Nydya 80४79 1. 1). ‘Means of right knowledge ’ are perception, inference, analogy and testimony (Ny. 8. 1. 3). ‘Objects of right knowledge’ are soul, body, sense, [sense]-object, cognition, the internal sense, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain and emancipation (Ny. 8. 1. 9). ‘Doubt’ is an uncertain judgment with regard to the par- ticularity [of an object, and arises] 1, from the appearance of properties which are common [and therefore not distinc- tive] or several [such as cannot belong to the same thing], 2, from discrepant opinions, and 8, from unsteadiness of apprehension or non-apprehension (Ny. 8. 1. 28). ‘ Motive’ is that thing for the attainment of which one engages in action (Ny. 8. 1. 24). ‘Example’ is that thing with re- gard to which ordinary people and the investigator entertain the same opinion (Ny.S. 1. 25). ‘Tenet’ is that, the steadi- ness of the acceptance of which, rests on an [authoritative] treatise (Ny. S. 1. 26). This is of four kinds (end of Vatsy4- yana’s commentary on Ny. 9. 1. 26), because there is the following difference: 1, dogma of all systems, 2, dogma peculiar to some system, 3, hypothetical dogma and 4, implied dogma (Ny. S. 1. 27). The ‘members [of a syllo- 1 In translating the following Nyéya 80198 I have made critical use of Dr.. Ballantyne’s translation. Unfortunately, this translation does not extend to the fifth book of the Sitras which is very difficult. 30 234 ANIRODDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 86. gism]’ are 1, proposition, 2, reason, 8, example, 4, appli- cation [of the reason], and 5, conclusion (Ny. 8. 1. 32). ५ Argumentation ’ is reasoning from a demonstration of the cause, for the sake of the knowledge of the truth with re- gard to an object, the real nature of which is not accurately apprehended (Ny. 8. 1. 40). ‘ Ascertainment’ is the deter- mination of an object by pondering on both what is to be said for and against it (Ny. 8, 1. 41). ‘Discussion’ is the maintenance [by two parties] of one side and of the other— based on five-membered [syllogisms],—and consists in the defence [of the proposition] by proofs [on the part of the one disputant] and in the assailing it by reasoning [on the part of the other], while there is no discordance in respect of their [general] tenets (Ny. 8. 1. 42). ‘Wrangling’ consists in defending or attacking [a proposition] with unfairness, futility, or in away such as deserves rebuke, while all de- clarations hold good which have [just] been given [with regard to ‘discussion’] (Ny. 8. 1. 48). ‘Cavil?’ is called this [wrangling], when devoid of [any attempt made for] the establishing of the opposite side of the question (Ny. S. 1. 44). The ‘semblances of a reason’ are 1, the erratic, 2, the contradictory, 8, the equally available on both sides,! 4, that which is in the same case with what is to be proved, and 5, the mistimed (Ny. S. 1. 46). ‘ Unfairness’ is oppos- ing a proposition by means of assuming a different sense (Ny. 8.1. 51). This is of three kinds: 1, unfairness in respect of a term, 2, unfairness in respect of a genus, and 3, un- fairness in respect of a metaphor (Ny. 8. 1. 52). ^ Futility’ is opposition based on similarity or difference of qualities {without regard to the invariableness of association or disso- ciation] (Ny. 8. 1. 59). [There are the following 24 subdivi- sions of futility :] 1, sophistic objection founded on similari- ty of qualities (sddharmya-sama), 2, on difference of qualities 1 Prakarana-sama, the same semblance of a reason which is called sat- pratipaksha in later Nyaya writings. ae ei कि V. 86.1 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 285 (vatdharmya-sama), 3, the sophism that, if two things have one quality in common, their other qualities are also the same (utkarsha-sama), 4, the sophism that, if two things have one quality in common, a different quality missing in one is missed in the other also (apakarsha-sama), 5, the sophism that the qualities of the example belong to the subject of the proposition (varnya-sama), 6, sophistic objection based on confounding the qualities of the example with those of the subject of the proposition (avarnya-sama), 7, the sophism that, if two things possessing a certain quality admit of alternativeness in one respect, they are subject to alternative- ness in other respects also (vikalpa-sama), 8, sophistic objec- tion founded on an example which is in the same predica- ment with what is to be proved (sddhya-sama), 9, that sophism in which the reason coincides with what is to be proved (prapti-sama), 10, that sophism in which there is no con- nection between the reason and what is to be proved (aprdpti- sama), 11, the sophism that even the proof 18 to be proved (prasariga-sama), 12, the sophistic procedure of setting a counter-example without taking notice of the opponent’s example (pratidrishtdnta-sama), 18, sophistic objection found- ed on the not having an origin (anutpatii-sama), 14, that sophism in which a doubt is founded on a special quality common to two things (samchaya-sama), 15, that sophism in which an object is characterized by a quality that is, as a proof, of the same weight pro et contra (prakarana-sama), 16, that sophism in which the validity of a reason 18 disputed, because it does not hold good at the three times (ahetu- sama),! 17, sophistic objection based on self-evidence (arthd- patti-sama), 18, the sophistic objection that everything would be void of distinction, if homogeneousness were in- 1 Read °prakarandhetu’ in my edition with the MSS. AO and the I. 0, L. MS. I have been misled to adopt the wrong reading of MS. B by tho misprint in the edition of the Nydya Daréana (Calcutta 1865) page 266. 286 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ 9. 86. feyred from the accordance of two things in one quality (avifesha-sama), 19, the sophism that either of two essential ly different qualities may belong to one thing, if the differ- ence is founded in the cause of the thing (upapatti-sama), 20, the sophistic objection that the phenomenon has not always the same cause (upalabdhi-sama), 21, sophistic objec- tion founded on the notion of imperceptibleness (anupalabdhi- sama), 22, of eternity (nitya-sama), 28, of non-eternity (anitya-sama), and 24, that sophistic objection in which the fact is passed over that the same effects may take place in consequence of different circumstances (kdrya-sama, Ny. 8, 5. 1. 1). ‘Reasons of rebuke’ are misunderstanding and not understanding at all (Ny. S. 1.60). (Or, more specially, } there are the following [22} reasons of rebuke: 1, the abandoning of a proposed thesis (pratijfd-hdni), 2, the changing of the thesis (pratiyfdntaram), 8, the contradiction between thesis and argument (pratiyfid-virodha), 4, the aban- doning of one’s own thesis, after having heard the opponent’s argument (pratyfd-samnydsa), 5, the alleging of an argument which is different from the required (hetv-antaram), 6, the mentioning of something which is not connected with the object under discussion (arthdntaram), 7, an unmeaning objection (nirarthakam), 8, the non-understanding of the sense of the opponent’s words (avyfdtdrtham), 9, the talking nonsense (apdrthakam), 10, the neglect of the proper order in construing a syllogism (aprdépta-kdlam), 11, the omission of a member in a syllogism (nyiinam), 12, the mentioning of more than one reason or example in a syllogism (adhikam), 18, superfluous repetition (punar-ukiam), 14, the being silent, though an argument has been formally uttered three times by the opponent (ananubhashanam), 15, the non-com- prehending of a sentence, though this has been comprehend- ed by the assembly and formally uttered three times by the opponent (ajfidnam), 16, the being puzzled (apratibhd), 17, flightiness (vikshepa), 18, the acknowledging of a fault in V. 86, 87.1 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 237 one’s Own arguing with the remark that the opponent also is guilty of such a fault (matdnujfid), 19, the neglecting to censure an argument of the opponent which ought to be cen- sured (paryanuyojyopekshanam), 20, the censuring of a fault- less argument of the opponent (niranuyojyanuyoga), 21, an assertion which is in contradiction with one’s own doctrine (apasiddhdnta), and 22, the semblances of a reason (hetv- abhdsa, Ny. 8. 5. 2. 1). This restriction [of the Naiyayikas] that there are [only] so many [categories] is not [correct], nor does liberation result from the cognition of these [sixteen categories]. By the word ‘etc.’ [it must be understood that] other asserters of a restricted number of categories! are also to be refuted. ‘‘There are eternal atoms of four* kinds. As the gross elements have their origin in these, what need is there of [accepting a] primitive Matter?” To this objection [of a Vaiseshika the author] replies: | By the word ‘ etc.’ [it must be understood that] other asserters of a restricted number of categories are also to be refuted. [The author now] disposes of [the opinion] that the world has its origin in eternal atoms of four kinds : 87. The atoms are not eternal, since Scripture teaches that they are products. Since Scripture teaches that everything arose from primi- tive Matter and that anything except primitive Matter and Soul is not eternal, the [so-called] atoms are products and, therefore, neither eternal nor cause [of the world]. And so there are no real atoms. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism |: Because, having learned from Scripture that only primitive Mat- a कका 1 As, f. $. the PaSupatas about whom the Sarvadarsanasamgraha may be consulted. ४ The atoms of ether are excluded here, because ether does not develop into gross matter. 288 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ ए, 87—89. ter and 8०] are eternal, we know that all other things are pro- ducts. This is the sense. [The author] says [now] that the [so-called] atom is not without parts for the same reason, ९ e., because it is a product: 88. They are not without parts, because they are products. That which is a product is not without parts, like a cloth. “Something is apprehended by perception, if it has a manifest colour. [Now,] as the Self is not so, how is it to be apprehended! [and, therefore, to be acknowledged]?” To this [materialistic] objection [the author] replies: Supply: the [so-called] atoms. That which is a product is not without parts, like a jar. [The author] refutes [now the doctrine] that the perceptibleness of a substance depends on a manifest colour: 89. Perceptibleness does not necessarily depend on colour. Since, when you say ‘This bird is here,’ [the expression ‘here’ shows that] space is perceived and hence [this case] disagrees [with the opponent’s rule], perceptibleness does not necessarily depend on a manifest colour. And there is no application [of this rule] to the supernatural perception of the Yogins, which arises from the power of contemplation. [The author] teaches [now] that dimension is not of four kinds, viz., small, great, long, and short, [as the Vaiseshikas hold]: Because space is perceived, when you say ‘ This bird is here.’ [The author] refutes [now the opinion] that dimension 18 four- fold, viz., small, great, lohg, and short: 1 Read, with the I. 0. L. MS., in my edition: udbhata-rdpavattvde ca pratyaksham, १५ ०६१५4 tathe ti, katham pratyaksha? ity ata dha. V. 90, 91.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 289 90. Dimension is not of four kinds, because these can be brought together in two. Because [all] current ideas (about dimension] are account- ed for, if the product is declared to be great and the cause to be 87081]. The other varieties of dimension [long, short, big, thin, etc.] are only subdivisions of these [two]. ८८ [ ए 0प have declared in aph. 72 that everything save pri- mitive Matter and Soul 18 non-eternal. But] genus is eternal, though different from primitive Matter and Soul.”* With reference to this [remark of a Naiyf&yika or Vaiseshika the author ] declares : | Because ‘these,’ ४. e., product and cause, can be explained as : great and small, [respectively, and] the other dimensions may simply be defined as varieties of great and small. ‘‘Genus, though different from primitive Matter and Soul, is eternal.”’ This | objection the author] refutes: 91. Though genus is not eternal, it possesses constancy® and, therefore, is recognized. As the recognition ‘This is the same Devadatta [whom I have seen before,’ which] does not refer to a genus, [but to an individual, is to be accounted for by the constancy of the individual Devadatta], 80 the genus [too], though not eternal, is recognized in the case of the flame [which is always homogeneous] or of similar things [/f.7., water, houses, etc.] on account of its long lasting constancy. [That is to say: the recognition of a genus is quite parallel to that of an individual}. 1 I.e., the product is always of greater extension than the material cause, as f.%., the jar 18 bigger than its raw material, the clay. ॐ Neither prakriti nor purusha are a sdmdmya (or 4८4), but prakrititvam and ° purushatvam are. 8 sthira=chira-kdlam samdna-ripena sthdyin, nitya=na kaddpi dhvamsin, Pandit.—Every genus perishes in the Pralaya in which only primitive Matter and the souls continue to exist. 240 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 91—98. {The author] sets [the opinion of the Buddhists] aside that no genus exists: As the recognition ‘This is the same Devadatta [whom I have seen before, which] does not refer to a genus, but to an individual, depends on the constancy of the individual, so the recognition of the genus, too, is dependent on constancy and not on eternity. 92. It 18 not to be denied for this reason. Genus is not to be denied, because it is recognized, 4. e., because the argument brought forward by the opposing [Buddhist, viz., “there is no genus, as it is nothing but similarity what we apprehend in different individuals ”’] is contradicted by sense-evidence; [that is to say: the word ‘house’ f. 2. is heard to be used, even when the house seen just now is totally different in appearance from those which have been seen formerly |. ‘‘[Genus] is a uniform notion which means exclusion of [all] different things.” To this objection [of a Naiyayika the author] replies: For this reason, 1. €.) because of sense-evidence, it is not to be denied, ४. e., genus is not to be denied. The meaning is: because irrefutable sense-evidence proves [the existence of] the object [under discussion, 2. e., of genus]. [The author] refutes [now the doctrine] that genus is the ex- clusion of [all] different things: 93. It has not the nature of the exclusion of (all] different things, because it is apprehended as positive. If [genus] were of negative nature, a conception ought to be formed, dependent on the recollection of what [the special genus] is not (pratiyogin), but not in a positive man- ner, [98 it 18 really done. That is to say: seeing f. 7. a cow and forming the idea of its genus, I ought, according to V. 93, 94. } ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 2-41 Nyaya doctrine, to think of everything what is not cow and to exclude this]. And so [it is said]: ‘‘That which is non-cow can be excluded [only] when it is esta- 0718160 " and this is nothing but} the negation of [the notion] cow. [In order to compass this negation, however, the notion] cow must be stated at first, which is [simply] denied by the negative particle. But if [the notion] cow is not established, [the notion} non-cow is [also] not; and if the latter is not [known], whence can [the notion] cow be ?” “Recognition will [not] depend [on homogeneousness, but] on similarity.” To this objection {of the Buddhist the author] replies: The genus cow, 1. ४.) has not the nature of the being different from what is non-cow. Why [not]? Because it is apprehended as positive, £. ९.) because it is apprehended as being of positive nature, without the recollection of its antithetic, viz., of what is non-cow. Therefore it is said: (follow the same verses as in Aniruddha’s Commentary). [The author] refutes [now the opinion of the Pribhakaras] that similarity is a principle different [from genus or sameness]: 94. Similarity is not a different principle, as is apprehended by perception. Similarity is the possession of sameness in the greater number of parts, [and] not a principle different [from same- ness], because the conception ‘this [thing] is similar to that’ arises from apprehending, by perception, {an object | which has the greater number of parts just [as another object. ] [The author] mentions another mode [of explanation] : Because [similarity] is apprehended by perception in the form of these or those substances, qualities etc. This is the sense. 1 T. e., We must have arrived at this negative notion, before we can make use of it; and, as it is shown in the following line, the negative notion is not to be had without the previous establishment of the positive. 31 242 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 95. 95. Or [similarity] is the manifestation of an innate quality, because it is apprehended on account of the particularity [of the similar thing]. Things have a peculiarity innate [to them]. This [pecu- liarity ] which becomes manifest, ४, e., which appears as some- thing particular, at the sight of another similar body, is the cause of the apprehension of similarity [expressed in the words] ‘ this is similar.’ But similarity is not a principle different [from sameness }. ‘Similarity is the reason for the cognition of the connec- tion between name and named.> Thus it 18 to be explained.” With reference to this [remark made by a Naiydyika, the author J declares : ‘The manifestation of an innate peculiarity’ means: a manifes- ted innate peculiarity ; ‘manifested’: known as adapted to this or that business; ‘on account of the particularity [of the similar thing]’: on account of its connection with such a peculiar quality ; ‘ because it is apprehended’: because similarity is appre- hended. And thus the meaning [of the aphorism] is this: no- thing but the peculiarity which abides in this or that thing is the object of the perception of similarity [४, 6.) brings about the per- ception of similarity]. 2 Vijfidnabhikshu ascribes a totally different but better sense to this Sitra, as he supplies na from the preceding aphorism. Our two commenta- tors consider it as a definition of similarity siddhdnta-prak4rena, while Vi- jianabhikshu declares it to be the refutation of a wrong definition. * The nijd s’aktt of go f. i. is gotvam. ५ The Pandit gave me the following example, frequently used in Nyaya works: kaéchid grdminah purusho go-pada-tad-artham gavaya-padam cha jinati, kim tu gavaya-paddrtham na jandti. atha kasmdch-chid dranyaka-pu- rushach chrutavdn ‘go-sadrigo bhavati gavaya’ iti. anantaram vanam gach- chhati go-sadrigam cha deham paéyati, tadd tad-vikydrtham smarati prati- padyate cha ‘asty ayam go-sadris'a’ iti, niéchinots cha, yad etaj-jattyo gavaya- padasy4 ’rthak. V. 96, 97.1 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 243 96. Nor is [similarity that by which] the con- nection between name and named [is established]." Similarity is not the reason for the cognition of [this] connection, because [many cases] disagree [with that rule laid down by the Naiy4yikas]; for the connection between name and named is ascertained elsewhere also [7. ९.५ where no similarity exists], from instruction etc. [४, ९9 from dic- tionaries or colloquial use]. Since [the compound samjfd-samjii-sambandhah is not to be understood as a Tatpurusha in the sense of samjfd-sum- jhtinoh sambandhah,* but to be] analyzed as an instrumental [Bahuvrihi in the sense of samjfd-samjiinau parasparam sambadhyete yena], the cognition which apprehends the object [under discussion, ४ ¢., similarity,] is elliptically denoted [by that compound J. [The author] refutes [the opinion) that the connection between word and meaning is eternal. (According to the curious interpretation of Mahadeva, our aphorism is to be translated: Nor is the connection between name and named—) Supply ‘ eternal.’ What need is there of many [words]? The connection between word and meaning is not eternal. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism] : 97. The connection is not eternal, because the two things are perishable. As both, word and meaning, are perishable, how can their connection be eternal ? [The author] refutes [now] the beginninglessness of [any] connection : 1 This explanation of the aphorism is inferior to that given by Vij&ana- bhikshu. * Whioh, however, Vijianabhikshu has every right to do, 244 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ ४. 97—99, [This is} plain. [The author] confutes [now] the theory of the beginningless- ness of [any] connection : 98. No connection is beginningless, because this is excluded by that means of knowledge which acquaints us with the thing [connected]. A present connection can [only] have its origin in motion, and there is no motion of that which is eternal and all-per- vading. The ‘great’ and [all] other [material principles] are not eternal; how can their connection [with one an- other] be eternal? And the Selfs have no connection with these [principles], ४. ०.) with Matter [altogether], because they are void of qualities. Moreover, the connection [of things] will be apprehended by the same means of knowledge [be it perception or inference] by which the things are apprehended; [४. e., as the things themselves, so their con- nection also—discerned by the same means—must be perish- able}. In this manner [the eternity of all connections] is excluded by that means of knowledge which acquaints us with the thing [connected ]. (The author] refutes [the existence of] inherence [which forms a special category with the Vaiseshikas] : Since by a distinct perception! only that connection is esta- blished which depends on the characterizing [/f. ¢., colour and form] and on the characterized [f. ¢., jar], and since such [a connection] is not possible, when there is no characterizing nor characterized thing, it is not proper to accept the eternity of any connection. [The author] refutes [the existence of] inherence: 99. Inherence is not, because there is no proof [of its existence]. 18 {what you Vaiseshikas call] inherence connected or not * Visish{a-prattti = savikalpaka-jadna, Pandit. V. 99, 100.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 245 connected [with those objects to which you ascribe inher- 666] 9 Ifit is not connected, how could it bring some other thing: [f. 7., colour] in connection [with a jar, f. ९. If it is connected, inherence must be declared [to be this very connection], as no other connection is possible. Since for this[inherence which you assume] another [inherence, connecting the first with the respective thing, must be accept- ed] again, and for this [second] another again, [etc.], and since thus there would be a regressus in infinitum, there is no inherence. But [in reality] the conception (sampratibhdsa) {of two things] as inseparable results from the variety of special connections, as [for instance of the connection] of fire with a lump of red-hot iron. ५८ Tf there is no inherence, how are [such] conceptions [of characterized things possible, as] ‘a white cloth,’ ‘ the horse runs,’ ‘thisis a cow*’?” To this (question of the Vaiseshika the author] replies : [The author] demonstrates [now] that there is no proof [of the existence of inherence] : 100. Since with reference to both alike [the re- lation] is to be explained otherwise, perception or inference [are the causes of such conceptions]. Since with reference to both [notions] alike [४. e., to that of the subject and to that of the predicate, the relation] is to be accounted for simply by the fact that this is the na- ture of the thing (téddétmya). Else [those two notions] would not have a common substratum; [f. ९. else the jar could not be the common substratum of the being a jar and of the being blue]. “ Motion is to be inferred [from conjunction and disjunc- tion].” With regard to this [remark the author] declares : ‡ Anyam, supply paddrtham. * In which according to the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas the gotvam inheres, 246 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 100. (According to the reading of Mah&deva our aphorism must be translated: Since in both cases alike [the matter] ts to be ewplained otherwise, neither perception nor inference [prove the existence of in- herence].) [The Vaiseshikas maintain that] there are [two] proofs for [the existence of] inherence, (1) such perceptions as ‘the white jar’ and (2) the [following] inference : (a) a distinct conception has as its object the connection of both, the characterizing and the characterized thing, (6) because [the conception of this connection] is the distinct conception, (c) as, f.2., the conception ‘the man with the staff.’ In both cases alike [the matter] is to be explained otherwise, ‰. ९. simply by the fact that this is the nature of the thing. Such a conception, however, as ‘the cloth is here in the threads, [—which conception is mentioned as an example of inherence by the Vaiseshikas—] is formed by their own imagination alone, [and] does, [therefore,] not prove [the existence of] the thing, [४. ९.» of inherence ; for that idea is wrong, as the cloth is not in the threads, but the threads are the cloth]. Moreover, [we must ask!]: Is [what you call] inherence con- nected [with the respective objects] and does it bring in connection two things which are connected [with one another], or is it discon- nected? In the first case another connection must be assumed for this [connection] also, and thus there would be a regressus in infi- nitum. [And] if [the Vaigeshika objects :] ‘‘ The connection [with the things] is the essential natureof inherence,” [then we reply :] Why [have you] not [given] this [explanation] before [with re- gard to the connection between the characterizing and the charac- terized thing? Thatis to say: why have you not declared al- ready that connection as the essential nature of the thing?] But [as regards the other side of the alternative just propounded, viz., that inherence| be disconnected [with the respective objects], this is [simply] illogical. ‘‘ Motion 18 to be inferred from conjunction with and disjunction 2 Of, Aniruddha’s commentary on aphorism 99. ४, 100, 101.] anrmupDHa’s COMMENTARY. 247 from another place, [but it is] nota matter of sense-evidence, as [we learn from the case of] the motion of the sun.” This opi- nion (the author] refutes [in the following aphorism] : 101. Motion is not to be inferred, because he who is very near has the direct perception of it and of that to which it belongs. Because he who stands near has the direct perception of motion and of that to which motion belongs, {and] because otherwise, [7. e., if this were not averring], the established [proof of] sense-evidence would be contradicted.! If motion were inferred from conjunction and disjunction, then motion ought to be attributed by inference [not only] to the mau who climbs from the root of the tree to its top, [but] to the tree also, since those two, [viz., conjunction and disjunction ] adhere to both [man and tree, alike]. = ^ But,’ [the oppo- nent objects,] ‘“‘since conjunction and disjunction result merely from the motion of the man, why should motion be attributed to the tree?” [To this we reply :] This may [appear to] be true in the beginning, {when we see the man rushing to the tree]; but since [the reason] is not erratic, [z. ©. since there is no case of the production of motion in the tree without conjunction and disjunction], the attribu- tion of motion to the tree by inference from conjunction and disjunction is not excluded [by a mere statement of the fact]. _ Moreover, if there is such [a sensation ] as < my hand trembles’ in the dark, the sensation of the trembling alone*® must be anerror [in your opinion; for conjunction and disjunc- tion by the observation of which alone you mean to be able to state motion are not perceived in the dark]. The motion of the sun, however, [which is mentioned by the opponent as an example of motion known only by inference] is not ap- 1 A stroke of interpunction is to be inserted after badhdt. 9 Kampa-métra-jidnam, na tu samyoga-vibhdga-jndnam, Pandit. 248 ANIRUDDHAa’s COMMENTARY. [४, 101, 102. prehended [by perception] on account of the fault of exces- sive distance or [interposition of other objects ].! “‘The body is formed of the five elements.” With refer- ence to this [opinion the author] declares : ‘He who is very near’ means: he who stands quite near at hand; ‘of it and of that to which it belongs’ means: of motion and of that to which motion belongs. And 80 16 18 not proper to deny the apprehension [of motion by perception]. This is the sense. The motion of the sun, however, is not a matter of sense- evidence, because it is too far off. [The author] refutes [now the opinion] that the body is formed of the five elements: 102. The body does not consist of the five ele- ments, because several things cannot be the material cause, ‘Several,’ 7. €.) heterogeneous. [In reality], however, [the body consists only of one element, viz., earth, and] the four [others] are nothing but instrumental causes, as they bring about the stability [of the body]. And for this reason it is said [in daily life] that [the body] consists of the five elements. ५ A subtile body does not exist, because there is no proof [of its existence].”” With regard to this [materialistic opi- nion the author] declares : Because [several things] cannot have the character of a material cause. This is the sense. Moreover, if the body consisted of the five elements, it ought to be invisible, as the connection of ether with ajar; [just so, in the case of the body also, the connection of ether with earth, water, etc., would be invisible]; for percep- tibleness is restricted to those things which are mixed with what is capable [of being seen }. [The author] states [now] that the body is of two kinds : 1 Of, SAmkhyakérika 7. V. 103.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 249 108. The restriction that there be [only] the gross one is not [correct], because there exists the transporting one, too. Since the thinking organ cannot transmigrate without a substratum, we must attribute a substratum to the thinking organ for the sake of getting to [another body] at [the time of] death. This [substratum] is [called] the transporting (déivdhika) or subtile body. Scripture! also [declares]: ^ Ya- ma pulled out by force the soul being as big asa thumb” (Mahabh. 8. 16763). [The word] purusha ‘soul’ (implies here] the subtle body, in accordance with [its etymology]: in the town (puri), ४, ¢., in the gross body, he is lying (éete).8 ‘The senses bring [even] that to cognition which they do ` not reach to, because a sound is perceived at a distance, and because [even] that which is separated by glass, clouds or crystal, is perceived.” With reference to this [opinion the author] declares : Since the thinking organ cannot transmigrate without a substra- tum, a substratum must be assumed with regard to its wandering into another body. This [substratum] is called the transporting and subtile body. In the passage ‘ Yama pulled out by force the soul being as big as a thumb” (Mahabh. 3. 16763) this [subtile body] is also intended by the word purusha ‘soul,’ in accordance with its etymology : in the town (purt), 7. e., in the gross body, he is lying (Sete). “The restriction that the senses become [only] then active when they reach to [their objects] is not [correct] ; for, though sight is able to go to the place of its objects, because it has the nature of light, this is not the case with hearing and the other [senses]. But sound comes to the seat of hearing in the same manner as the undulating waves [of water,] or as the anthers of a [globulous] > Aniraddha has already shown in his commentary onI. 48 that he is mistaken as to the character of the following quotation, * The usual dreadful Indian etymology of purusha. 32 250 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 108, 104. Kadamba-flower, and is thus apprehended by the ear. Likewise, the odour which abides in a substratum [/f. 7. in farina] comes to the seat of smelling and is thus [apprehended] by the nose. The same is the case with the other [senses,|] too. Such a conception, however, as ‘the sound exists at a distance’ [which seems to intimate that hearing wanders to the place of the sound] is simply an error, or it refers [only] to the sound in its causal form, [but not to the expanding sound].” These and similar opi- nions [of the Naiydyikas, the author] refutes [in the following aphorism] : 104. ` The senses do not bring to cognition what they do not reach to, because of their not reaching, or because they would reach to everything. [The senses] do not bring to cognition those objects which they do not reach to, because! they have the nature of bring- ing to cognition [only] what they reach to. The sense of hearing is connected with sound by means of a function. Glass, however, and the other [substances mentioned by the opponent] do not obstruct the proceeding of sight, because they are transparent. And [so] things are apprehended at a distance by means 0 [proceeding] functions. If, [as we accept, the sense] does not apprehend [an object,] when it does not reach [to it, the facts are explained correctly; for then, ] like something separated by walls, that also which is not separated [in this way, but too far removed from the senses,| cannot be apprehended, because there is no differ- ence between the not reaching on account of [excessive] distance [and the not reaching on account of separation]. But if, [as the opponent assumes, the sense] apprehends [an object] even when it does not reach to it, [the sense] would apprehend everything which exists within the uni- 3 Yat=yasmat, Pandit. ए. 104, 105. ] ANIRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 281 verse, because [the not 16960108 ] 18 the same [with regard to all things |. ‘‘Tf sight is proceeding, then it has the nature of light.” With reference to this [remark of the Naiyfyikas, the author | replies : When the senses do not reach to—7. e,, are not in connection with—an object, they do not bring it to cognition, just ‘ because of their not reaching,’ ४. ¢., because of their disconnection. “ But” [some one objects] “since the senses are all-pervading, such a connection exists [throughout].” To this [our aphorism] answers: ‘Because they would reach to everything,’ and so they would apprehend everything which exists within the universe. There- fore, a connection of another kind [between the senses and their objects] is necessarily [to be accepted]. This 18 the meaning. ८ But, if sight goes as far as the object, then it must have the nature of light, because it possesses excessive velocity.” To this [the author] replies : 105. Not because light glides away, has sight the nature of light, since this is to be explained by the function. {The opinion of the Naiyayikas] that [sight] has the nature of light, because it glides away and reveals [things] even at a distance like light, is adelusion. In reality, however, ‘this 18 to be explained,’—+7. e., that which [18 under discussion and which] we are to understand, [४ ९.५ the proceeding of sight] is to be explained—by a connection mediated through the function [of sight]. ५८ As the function is imperceptible, how is [the existence of] the function established? ’’ To this [the author] replies: From the fact that [sight] ‘glides away,’ ४. e., goes far, like light, [it does] not [follow that] sight [has the nature of light]. ५५ The functions [of sight] proceed according to their nature and reveal those objects with which they come in connection, to him who opens his eyes, [and ] at that place where [they energize] because of the co-operation of the invisible [power of merit].”’ 202 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 105-107. And the [connection, mentioned at the end of Mahadeva’s com- mentary on aphorism 1041] is [what we call] ‘function.’ This [the author] says [in the following aphorism] : 106. The cognition of the objects reached to is the characteristic sign by which [the existence of] the function is established. (This 18] clear. «‘ Has the function the nature of a part [of the sense], as the flame [is a part] of the lamp, or is it some other quali- ty?” To this (the author] replies: {This is] clear. [The author] describes [now] the nature of the function : 107. The function is a principle different from part and quality, because it wanders for the sake of connection. The function which is to be inferred from the effect, [४ ¢., from the acknowledged fact that the senses apprehend dis- tant objects] is a different principle, [¢. ¢., it is neither a part disjoined from, nor a quality of the sense, and it is] pro- duced by the egotizing organ, [the material cause of the senses]; for [according to our doctrine] there is no restrict- ed number of categories. Since a disconnected [object] cannot be apprehended, [the function of the sense] wanders {to it] for that purpose. And so [it is said]: ‘The functions [of sight] proceed according to their nature and reveal those objects with which they come in connection, to him who opens his eyes, [and] at that place where (they energize] because of the co-operation of the invisible [power of merit].’’ ‘How can the motion of wandering belong to the incor- poreal function? ”’ To this [the author] replies : 1 Which is followed immediately by aphorism 106 in Mahadeva’s arrange- ment. V. 107, 108.] | = anirRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 258 The function which is to be inferred from the effect is a different principle produced by the egotizing organ, [but it is] not a part [of the sense] nor a quality either. For we Samkhyas are not asserters of a restricted number of categories. Since that which is brought in connection [only ] by means of words! [and not by the senses] cannot be apprehended, the expression ‘it wanders’ [has been used in the aphorism] in order to [explain] how the appre- hension is brought about. ^ How can the incorporeal function wander?” To this [the author replies : | 108. It is not restricted to substances, because [it depends] on the conjunction therewith. As things are not restricted [in this manner], motion is not restricted to substances only; but where a proof [of the existence of motion] appears, there we acknow- ledge it. Andin the functions motion is recognized [by inference]; for otherwise there would be no apprehen- sion of things. “The senses [may be products of the egotizing organ in this world, but they] will be formed of the ele- ments, [when the individual transmigrates] to other worlds, as a man bitten by a scorpion dies in some country, {and not in others].” To this [objection the author] replies : The restriction that motion belongs to substances only is not [correct]; but where ‘the conjunction therewith,’ 7. e., the conjunction with motion exists, motion is necessarily to be stated. That is to say: where a proof [thereof] appears, there is motion. And the motion of the functions is vouched by the cognition of the objects. Thisis the meaning ^“ The senses will be formed of the elements at other places, as the death of a man bitten by a scorpion [occurs at some place, and not in others].” To this [the author] replies : * And by words all things may be combined; but this is no reason of ap- prehension. 254 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ ४, 109, 110. 109. फला at other places they have not a differ- ent material cause; they are necessarily such as with us and with those who are like us. The invariable rule that the senses are products of the egotizing organ is understood {by every one] in his own person. If there were an exception to this rule, then smoke also might exist without fire, [४ 6.8 no other invariable rule would hold good}. [The author] mentions the reason why [the senses] are spoken of as consisting of the five elements: ‘They have [not] a different material cause’ means: they have [not] their originin the elements. Supply: the senses. But ‘they are necessarily such as with usand with those who are like us,’ £. €.) they are entirely products of the egotizing organ like our senses and those of our equals. [And] thatthe senses are products of the egotizing organ, is an invariable rule which is understood [by every one] in his own person. If there were an exception to this rule, then smoke might also exist without fire. This is the meaning. | «4 [7 the body! has not its origin in the five elements, how is it then that it is spoken of as consisting of the five elements ? › To this [the author] replies : 110. This denotation [is employed], because the concomitant causes are denoted. It 18 [only] denied that the five (elements] are the mate- rial cause [of the senses, but] not, that they are concomitant causes. For this reason, [the senses] are spoken of as con- sisting of the five elements. ‘‘How many varieties of the body are there?” To this {the author] replies : * Mahadeva refers the following aphorism to the whole body and not to the senses alone, as the other commentators do; but he is hardly right, since the panchabhautikatvam of the body has already been denied in aphorism 102. ए, 110--112.] anrruppHa’s COMMENTARY. 265 Because the five elements are denoted as concomitant causes, ‘this denotation [is employed],’ ४. ९. the denotation [of the body] as something consisting of the five elements refers [merely] to the concomitant causes. It 18 [only] denied that [the elements] are the material cause, [but] not, that they are concomitant causes, Thisis the meaning. [The author] mentions [now] the varieties of the body : 111. Since [there are bodies] arising from the heat, from eggs, from the womb, from sprouts, and such as are produced by the [mere] will and by supernatural powers, too, the [usual] restriction is not [correct]. From heat arise mosquitos, etc., from eggs, birds, snakes, etc., from the womb, men, etc., from sprouts, trees, etc. ; by the [mere] will were produced Manu and others, by supernatural powers are produced those [bodies] which are originated by the secret powers of spells, drugs, etc. [1161016] the [usual] restriction that there exist the {first] four [kinds] only, is not [correct]. “Which element is the chief constituent in the body?” To this {the author] replies : [There are, in addition to those bodies which everyone knows, | such as are produced by the [mere] will, 7. ¢., the bodies of Manu and others, [and] such as are produced by supernatural powers, ४, e., those which are originated by the secret powers of spells, drugs, etc. For this reason, the restriction that only four [kinds] exist is not [correct]. 112. In all [bodies] earth is the material cause on account of its special nature. That [other] desig- nation is [to be understood] as before. ‘In all [bodies]’ means: for the most part; for we learn from Scripture that, e.g.,in the world of the sun the bodies consist of light. [But] even there (the luminous parts serve 256 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 112, 118. only to] support the greater quantity of earthy parts, because there would be no experiencing, if [the earthy parts] were less in quantity. ‘As before’ means that all this has [al- ready] been taught [in aphorism 110]. (The author] removes [now] the supposition that, since the vital air is seen in the body, this originates the body : In all bodies the earthy [element is the material cause]. From this special [distinct declaration it follows that light, for instance, serves only to support the earthy parts in the luminous bodies, too, which exist in the world of the sun, etc.; for the earthy parts alone enable [the body] to experience. ‘That [other] designation,’ ४. e., the declaration that the [four] other elements [are causes of the body, too,] is [to be understood | as before, [7. ९.) asin aphorism 110]; that is to say: [the other elements are to be regarded ] as concomitant causes. [The author] refutes [now] the opinion that the vital air is ele- mental air: 113. That which originates the body is not the vital air,’ because this exists through the power of the senses. The elemental air originates the body, but the vital air is not elemental, because Scripture says: ‘ Everything arose from the vital air.” Since [the vital air] lasts as long as the body, the error is [current] that it originates [the body ]. The vital air is [in reality] supported by the power of all senses, and hence ‘this exists,’ £, ¢., the supportance of the vital air exists, as long as the senses [last]. ५५ Does the superintendence of the Self take place, when the body has been produced, or is the production of the body {brought about], when this has begun to be superintended by the Self?” (Of this alternative the author] gives the decision [in the following aphorism] : * The confused explanation which our two commentators give of this apho- rism is decidedly inferior to that offered by Vijianabhikshu. V.118—115.] ^ प्रा्ाफएए्^ 5 COMMENTARY. 257 The air which calls the body into existence is not the vital air, ‘because this exists,’ 2. e., because the vital air exists, ‘ through the power of all senses’, ४. ९. in the form of the power of all senses. The meaning is that the vital air is the common function of the organs,! 114, The abode of experience, [४. ९., the body] is formed [only] in consequence of the superintendence of the experiencer, because otherwise putrescence would take place. [This is] plain. ८८.48 the body has its origin in primitive Matter, [the Self’s] superintendence will be through that.” With reference to this [remark the author] says [in the affirma- tive]: [Supply at] the beginning [of the aphorism]: from the time [of the effusion] of the sperma into the womb. ‘In consequence of the superintendence’ means: in consequence of a special con- nection ; ‘ putrescence’ is stinking. ८ Primitive Matter is like a servant of Soul. [Therfore] let the superintendence be through that—and not independent—from the time of generation.” With reference to this [remark the author] says [in the affirmative] : 115. The superintendence of the master is through the servant, not immediately. As the rank [of the master] is always dependent on non-intellectual servants [or servants having no will of their own, but as these are not able to accomplish works of their own accord], so [in our case also the ruling of Soul over primitive Matter is indispensable; for] by the [mere] super- intendence of non-intellectual primitive Matter the putres- cence [of the growing body] could not be withheld. + Of. II. 31. 33 268 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 115—117. With a view to describe the nature of Brahman, [the author] mentions the analogous state of other [ conditions] : The superintendence of Soul is [practised] through primitive Matter, not immediately; for [Soul] is not confined [to the inte- rior of the body], that is to say: itis existent everywhere. Sup- ply [in the aphorism: the superintendence of Soul alone is] exclu- sive of putrescence. In order to teach by the example of profound sleep that no pain exists in liberation, [the author] says: 116. Incontemplation, profound sleep and liber- ation there is the state of Brahman. (This is not to be understood verbally, but thus:] there is a state analogous to that of Brahman, as no consciousness of external things exists in all these [three conditions], but the state of Brahman is not (arrived at in them alike]. [The author] describes [now] the essential nature of Brahman : ‘The state of Brahman’ means the being unconscious of pain. {The author] states [now] the difference of liberation [from the two other conditions]: 117. The [first] two are affected by the seeds, in the other they are annihilated. The [first] two, 7. ¢., contemplation and profound sleep, are affected by the seeds, ९. 6. by the impressions [left in the internal organ}; the other, ४ ०; liberation, is free from these seeds. | «८ [६18 known [indeed by perception] that one’s object is accomplished, (7. ¢., that freedom from pain is attained] in contemplation and profound sleep, as the functions [of the organs] are oppressed then; but this 18 not the case with liberation.”” To this [objection the author] replies: ‘They are affected by the seeds’ means: by the impressions ए. 117--119.] + बाणणएएप्र+*8 coMMENTARY. 259 [left in the internal organ] which bring on painagain. ‘They are annihilated’ means: those impressions are annihilated. [The author] says [in the following aphorism] that there are proofs for [the existence of] liberation : 118. But not [those] two [only] exist, since all three just as the two are apparent. Since all three are apparent, ४, ९.9 since liberation also is ascertained by Scripture and inference, one’s end is accom- plished [by liberation, too]. ‘But not [those] two [only] exist,’ viz., profound sleep and contemplation. As these two are affected by the seeds, the object(of Soul] is accomplished [by them] in a secondary sense [only, while definitive absence of pain is attained in liberation alone]. «५ As desire and the like are causes of bondage, of what use is [your] arguing with [the notion of] disposition (vasa- nd, or impression, samskdrai P” -To this [question the author] replies : As profound sleep is established by perception, or as contem- plation is established by scriptural testimony, so liberation also is established by the philosophical institutes. And among these, two, viz., profound sleep and contemplation, are no absolute aims of Soul, because they are affected by the seeds; but only liberation is, because it is free from the seeds. This is the meaning. ‘“‘ As desire and the like alone are the causes of bondage, why do you speak of disposition which is only a different, { but] syno- nymous word forimpression?”’ To this [the author] replies: 119. There is the revealment of unreal things by the disposition, in spite of the connection between the faults [and bondage; therefore] not [these alone are causes of bondage]; the efficient cause is ob- structive to the principal thing." 2 Aniruddha and Mahddeva explain this aphorism ina manner which is totally different from the interpretation of Vijiianabhikshu. 260 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [V. 119. You should not say that bondage arises from the faults {desire, aversion, €६९.] alone; [on the contrary, there is] the revealment of unreal things by the disposition [of the inter- nal organ, and thus a misconception is produced. This revealment of unreal things or misconception] is necessarily to be considered [४ cause of bondage.! The said disposition which is] the efficient cause of the faults must be declared to be obstructive to the principal thing, 7. e., to liberation. And [among these two causes of bondage, ] disposition [and faults, the former] is the chief one. “In shooting an arrow or the like, motion arises from that impression (samskdra) which is called impulse, and by mo- tion [another] impulse is [brought about again]. Thus there are many [or a continuance of] impulses.” This [opi- nion the author ] sets aside: ‘In spite of the connection with the faults’ means: though the connection between desire, etc., [and bondage] is [not to be denied ]. ‘The revealment of unreal things by the disposition ’ [of the inter- nal organ] is the [current] apprehension of [the objects ’] agree- ableness and disagreeableness. Supply [here: this is the chief] cause [of bondage]. Therefore not only desire and the like are the causes of bondage, but ‘ the efficient cause,’ 7. €.) the disposition which is also the efficient cause of desire and the like, is obstruc- tive to the principal thing, 7. €.) obstructive to liberation, For this reason one must endeavour after the destruction of the dispo- sition. This is the meaning. ^ In shooting an arrow or the like, motion arises from that im- pression which is called impulse, and that [again] from motion.” (This opinion] that [thus] there are many [continuous] impres- sions [the author] sets aside : ४ For there are no faults at the time of profound sleep or contemplation, but still liberation is not then attained ; hence another cause of bondage must be at work during these states, and this is the faulty disposition of the internal organ. According tothe Samkhya doctrine this disposition is the chief impediment to liberation even in the normal waking state. V. 120, 121.1] anrruppHa’s coMMENTARY. 261 120. A single impression brings about motion, but there are not different impressions in the case of each motion, because the assumption of many would result. On [our] theory that a single impression [effectuates the motion of a missile from beginning to end, we can account for the fact that] an arrow hits the man [aimed at]. This 18 stated [in the aphorism]. But on the [opponent’s] theory that there is a change [of impulse into motion and of motion into impulse], the one (arrow ] hits [1४8 aim] in consequence of a change [of motion] which is now slower, now [quicker ]. In this assumption of many [impulses we see] a superfluous complication. “‘ [But] there is (only ] one object, because there is [only] one perception; for [all] conceptions are indiscriminate ‘(this is] existent, [that is] existent’.” To this [objection, made by a Vijiianavadin, the author] replies: [This is] clear. ९ But there is the perception in daily life that froma single impulse there arises a single motion, [and] therefrom [another] impulse [again].’’ To this [objection the author] replies : 121. There is no restriction with regard to the perception of the external. As the conception ^ [४118 is] existent’ is irrefutable, just so is also the conception of a jar, of a cloth and of [all] other {individual things]. The conception ‘[this is] existent’ refers [only] to the general character. Therefore the re- striction that there be only one (object]' for the perception of the external is not [correct]. ‘‘The body of living beings consists of the five elements. 1 Supply vishayatvam. 262 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. ([V. 121-- 128. Of how. many elements is the vegetable [body] formed?” To this (question the author] replies : There is just as well the perception that many motions arise from a single [impulse]. Henceonly asingle impulse is [accepted by us] for the sake of simplicity. | [The author] extends [now] the rule which holds good with the moving body to the vegetable one: 122. Trees with remarkable flowers, bushes, creepers, annual plants, trees without remarkable flowers, grasses, climbers, etc., are also abodes of ex- perience for an experiencer, as before. ‘As before’? means: since they are abodes of experience (just as the moving bodies, spoken of in aphorism 114], they consist of the five elements.! And that [vegetables] are abodes of experience, is a consequence of special [bad] works, [done] in former existences; for Scripture teaches that the empirical souls come into the condition of residing in vege- tables. For this there is also [the testimony of] tradition. This {the author] states [in the following aphorism]: A climber is a creeper which spreads quickly over the tree. [The author] gives the proof thereof : 128. And because of tradition. [This is] clear, And thus [it is said]: “The Brahmana who, having been saluted, does not give the bene- diction, is born [again] as atree, inhabited by vultures and herons, on a cemetary.” ८५ 6. man becomes a vegetable through sins done by the body, a bird or beast through those of speech, an outcast through mental [sins].” (Manu 12. 9). $$ eee 1 But it deserves notice that the pduchabhautikatvam of the moving body has been expressly denied in aphorism 102. V. 123--125.] aANrIRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. 2698 ८८ [{ trees and the like were bodies, they ought to be capa- ble of [performing meritorious] acts.” To this [objection the author] replies: Because from the two traditional passages, mentioned in Ani- ruddha’s commentary, and from others we learn that these [vege- tables |, too, are bodies. [The author] refutes [now the objection] that trees and the like, if they were bodies, would happen to be capable of [ perform- ing meritorious | acts: 124. -Not simply on the body as such depends the being capable of [performing meritorious] acts, because Scripture teaches the particularity. Even bodies of living beings such as Chandalas, etc., are not capable of [performing meritorious] acts; how much less are vegetables! For [only] particular bodies are capa- ble of [performing such] acts. (The author] mentions [now] the difference of bodies: The meaning (of scriptural passages treating of this subject] is, that [only] he is capable [of performing ceremonies] who has the desire, power and knowledge [that are required] and who is not excluded [by the sacred law ]. [The author] mentions [now] the difference of bodies : 125. There is a threefold distribution with regard to the three: there are acting bodies, experiencing bodies,’ and bodies of both kinds. The acting body belongs to those who are free from desire, because they practise [good] work without bringing the fruit into consideration; the experiencing body belongs to beasts and [plants which suffer most pain]; the acting and experiencing body belongs to those who are given to expe- rience as well as capable of [performing meritorious} acts. 2 I, ¢., bodies which chiefly either act, 4. e., accumulate merit, or experience. 264 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [४, 125—-127. [The author] mentions a fourth body which is not capable of [either, acting or experiencing] : The acting body belongs to those who are free from desire and practising [good] work without regarding the fruit; the expe- riencing body belongs to beasts and [plants], the body of both kinds to those who are given to experiencing as well as to [good] work. {The author] mentions a fourth body : 126. Nothing whatever is [to be ascribed] to the Anus ayin. | “ Know that anugaya means hatred, repentance, and resi- due,” says SAsvata, [the lexicographer, v. 320]. To the Anugayin {or to him of whose works only a residue has remained ], 7. e., to the Yogin, nothing whatever is [to be ascribed ], because he is incapable of anything. [The author] confutes [the opinion] that understanding may be eternal : . Anugaya means a rest of works which have begun [to bear fruit] ; to whom such [a rest only] belongs, is called Anugayin. ‘To him,’! that is: to one knowing, no work whatever is [to be ascribed]. In this manner [our aphorism] must be supplied. One knowing, 2. €.,@ man who consumes the rest [of his merit and demerit] which have begun [४0 bear fruit], is not capable [of doing any work], be it enjoined or forbidden. This is the meaning. Though the knowledge, desire and action belonging to the empirical souls are not eternal, still they may be eternal some- where [else].” To this [theistic objection the author] replies: ` 127. Understanding, etc., are not eternal even in the particular site, [¢. ¢., in the eternal organ of the supposed Lord], like fire. If something which has the nature of an invariable rule 1 Tasya takes up the anugayinah of the aphorism. ४. 127, 128.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 265 [as the non-eternity of understanding, etc.,] could (occasion- ally] not hold good,! there would be no reliance on anything. And thus fire might not be hot in a particular site, [as f. 7.] when taking rise in sandal wood. [The author] mentions another argument against [that opinion]: Even if such a particular site {as the Lord’s internal organ] could be established, still knowledge, etc., would not be eternal there, because from our own knowledge, etc., we learn the invari- able rule (that all these internal functions are transitory]. Other- wise, [४. ९., if exceptions to such rules were possible], fire also, when taking rise in sandal wood, may not be hot. This is the meaning. [The author] states [now] that even [such] a site does not exist: 128. And because [such] a site cannot be estab- lished. {For the following four reasons:] (1) there is no Lord; (2) the Selfs have no properties [and can, therefore, not be the sites of an eternal understanding, etc.}; (8) the properties of Matter are chanzeable; (4) the ‘ great one’ and the other [forms of the internal organ] are not eternal. And pro- perties the site of which is not eternal cannot be eternal [themselves]. For [all] these reasons there is no site of an eternal understanding. | “(The attainment of) supernatural excellence from the power of gems, spells, herbs and austerity is known; but the [attainment of] supernatural powers from the Yoga-praxis is not known [by experience].”’ To this [objection the author] replies : ; I. €.) because [the existence of] the Lord has been refuted [in aphorisms I. 92, V. 2]. LAL, * Or more technically and specially : if the invariable concomitant (vy4paka) *non-eternity’ could deviate from the concomitated (vydpya) ‘ understanding, etc.’ : . . 34 266 ANIRUDDHA’s comMENTaRY. (ए, 129, 130. ‘‘Supernatural excellences produced by the power of gems, spells, herbs and austerity, are known [by experience], but those by the Yoga-praxis are not.” To this [the author] replies : 129. Thesupernatural excellences from the Yoga- praxis are as little to be denied as those from drugs, etc. The supernatural excellence of making one’s self invisible, étc., the faculty of assuming a number of bodies at the same time (kiya-vytiha), of entering the body of some one else (para-pura-pravesa) and the like are known. And since these cannot be got from spells or other things which procure [only] inferior faculties, they are dependent on the Yoga- praxis alune. Hence [the supernatural excellences arising from the Yoga] are not to be denied. | ‘Though intellect is not seen in the single elements, they may, when combined and made into a body, assume intel- lectual nature.” To this [materialistic objection the author replies : ५ Though intellect is not seen in the single elements, it may be [produced], when [the elements] have been changed into the form of a body.” ‘To this [the author] replies: 130. Intellect 18 not [a property] of the ele- ments, because it 18 not observed in them severally, [and, therefore, it does not belong] to the combina- tion, too—to the combination, too. A great power arises, through the association of those things which [singly] possess [only] a very small power, as we see in the case of the association of threads which, though [singly] possessing a very small power, can fetter elephants, {when combined. But, a small quantity of] intellect is not thus [as in the above instance] seen in the elements severally, whereby the production of [the perspicuous] intellect in the ४. 180. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 267 combination might be [accounted for. On the theory of the materialistic opponent] intellect ought to be found in the dead body also, because there is no difference with regard to the combination [of the elements in the case of a dead and of a living body]. Therefore intellect is distinct [from the body]. Though this subject has been [already ] discussed [in aphorism III. 20], it is called to memory [here], because it has been treated of at such a distant place, as an opportunity has arisen. Therefore {our aphorism] is not a superfluous repetition.—The re-iteration of the words ‘to the combina-’ tion, too’ indicates the end of the book. “= ` For where [only] very small power is seen in the individual [constituents], there arises a superior power in the combination, as in the case of the association of threads which, though [singly] possessing a very small power, can fetter elephants, [when com- bined]. In this manner, however, [a small quantity of} intellect. is not seen in the elements severally, whereby the production of [the perspicuous] intellect in the combiriation might be [accounted for]. Though this subject has been [already] discussed [III. 20], it is called [0616] to memory again, because it has been treated of at such a distant place.--The repetition [of the last words} serves to [indicate] the end of the book Here ends, in the commentary on Kapila’s aphor- isms explanatory of the Samkhya philosophy, the ` fifth book in which the opinions of the adversaries have been knocked down. The whole contents of the system having [now] been propounded, the sixth book is begun, after the refutation of the opinions of the adversaries, in order to resume those very contents and to exhibit them in the form of a 1662 ` pitulation of the essential points. ` Here énds the fifth book in the quintessence of the . commentary on the explanation of the Samkhya system, composed by Mahadeva the Vedantist. The sixth book is a recapitulation of the essential points. BOOK VI. In this [book] the subjects treated of beforehand are mostly given in a summarised form. The aphorisms are also mostly clear, | but] sometimes they are commented on. 1. The Self exists, because there is no proof of its non-existence. [This is] clear. About [the existence of] the Self in a general way there is no difference of opinion. [The author] establishes its particular nature ४ 2. Itis distinct from the body and from the other [material things], on account of the variety [of births]. | On the supposition of the identity [of the Self] with the body [a single individ ual] ought to have several Selfs, because of the difference of bodies in childhood, in youth, in manhood and in old age. [And] since [in this case the Self] would perish at the death of the body, the variety of other births could not be ascribed to it. And Scripture [says]: «4 Without hands and feet he runs and takes, without eyes he sees, without ears he hears. He knows everything, but nobody knows him. They call him the supreme, primordial soul” (cf. 8१०४४5१. Up. 3. 19). [The author] mentions another reason : 8. Also on account of the use of the genitive case. 8. 4.1] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 269 There is the [universal] conception ‘my (mama gen.) body,’ and we hear [that] the genitive case [is only employed] where the difference [of the possessor and the possessed] exists. If [the materialist objects: But] there is co-ordination [of the body and the soul] in the notion ‘J am thick’,” (then we reply:] No, [for], since the experiencing [of the Self] depends on the body, that apprehension is occasioned by [the fact of] such [experience] and [to be understood] in a figura- tive sense. ^ [एप] there 18 no difference [between the possessor and possessed ], since we hear [that] the genitive case [is being émployed ] also in [expressions like] ‘ the body of the statue,’ where there is no difference [ between the statue and its body, as there 18 no soul in the statue].” To this [objection the author] replies : This means: on account of the well-considered employment of the words ‘ my body.’ | 4. The comparison with the case of the statue is not [right], because this is excluded by that means of knowledge which acquaints us with the thing. {Your remark is] not [right]; for, since there, [४ ¢., in the case of the statue] we apprehend the identity [of the statue with its body] by mere sense-evidence, [the difference which is, as a rule, expressed by]the genitive is excluded, and hence the use [of that case] is [to be understood] in a figurative sense. [But] in our case [the genitive] is not employed figuratively, as its primary [meaning] is acceptable. “The object [of human exertion] may be attained, when an excess of joy is (secured ; why shall we endeavour after liberation?]” To this [the author] replies: The denotation of the difference [between the Self and the body by way of the employment of the genitive] is not figurative, as it is in the expression ‘ the body of the statue,’ but it [must be taken | 270 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, [ VI. 4—6. in its primary sense. For the figurative sense is excluded [in our case] by perception, inference and scriptural testimony, 7. 8. by evidences which acquaint us with the thing, 7. e., with the Self, or which acquaint us with the difference [of the Self] from the body and [from all] other [material things]; but as for the expression ‘the body of the statue,’ the identity [of the statue with its body | is known by mere sense-evidence. Such [a conception], however, as ‘Iam thin’ [which seems to indicate that thinness or other qualities of the body belong to the Ego or Self] is [only] a delusive supposition of [the Self’s] identity [with the body, produced} by affection [for the latter]. This is the meaning 5. The object is attained on the absolute cessa- tion of pain. Since even an excess of joy is perishable, this does not constitute the attainment of [Soul’s] object; but the absolute cessation of pain does, because there is no recurrence fof pain after that] “What! Will absolute cessation of pain be] Soul’s aim, in spite of the existence of the want uf joy?” With regard to this [question the author] declares: But not through an excess of joy, since this is perishable. 6. Not 80 much longing exists with regard to joy, as affliction 18 [felt] by Soul through pain. Because pain necessarily exists in joy. [And] if pain necessarily exists when there is joy, who will long for joy ? Therefore, [joy ] being greatly mixed with pain, nothing but the cessation of pain is Soul’s aim (The author] says [now] that [even] joy is to be given up: As there is aversion to pain, ४. 6.) 0 the necessary presence of pain even in joy, so much longing does not exist with regard to that little bit of joy which is found even in pain. For joy is VI. 6—9.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 271 mixed with more pain, and therefore there is [really] no longing for joy. This is the meaning. ^ But joy not mixed with pain may belong to somebody at least!” ` To this [objection the author] replies : 7. Nobody is happy anywhere. You may reflect yourself [and you will come to the con- clusion that you are not happy]. ९ [ But] we know through perception that beloved women and the like are causes of joy.” To this [objection the author] replies: - [Supply at] the beginning! [of our aphorism]: ‘ As no joy exists which is not mixed with pain, therefore.’ “Granted that there is an admixture of pain, but joy is an ob- ject of our desire [nevertheless].” To this [the author] replies: 8. Since this [joy] also is mingled with pain, the discriminative reckon it as pain. Our own consciousness is the proof that pain is inherent to the acquisition, loss or [preservation] of wreaths of flowers and other [means of pleasure }. “Joy alone is the highest aim of Soul, but not non-exist- ence (of pain].” To this [materialistic objection the author] replies : Pain surely arises from the acquisition of objects, such as the heavenly paradise, etc., and from fear of their loss. This is the meaning. ‘But experience teaches in daily life that joy alone is Soul’s aim, not non-existence of pain.” To this [objection the author] replies : 9. If [you declare] that [non-existence of pain] is not Soul’s aim, unless there is the gaining of joy 1 The whole sentence is a Bahuvrihi compound and forms the predicate to the omitted subject satram. 272 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ ४1, 9—11. [implied], then this is 710{ 80; for [the aim] is of two kinds. {The aim] of people affected with desires is joy, that of people free from desires is non-existence of pain. ^ Liberation is the destruction of the special qualities [of the soul].”! With regard to this [opinion of the Naiyd4yikas and Vaiseshikas the author] declares With people affected with desires joy is Soul’s aim, but with people free from desires it is non-existence of pain. 10. The Self is void of qualities, because Scrip- ture teaches that nothing adheres to it, etc. If you say that the special qualities [of the Self] do not exist [in liberation], you acknowledge [thereby that] the general qualities [continue even then to belong to the Self];? and so you would be in contradiction with Scripture which teaches that nothing adheres [to the Self], etc., (cf. Brih. Up. 4. 8. 16). “Tf nothing adheres to the soul, how is [it to be under- stood that] heaven is the reward for merit, and hell, for de- merit?” To this [question the author] replies: On the theory that liberation is the destruction of the special qualities you would be bound to acknowledge [that] the general qualities [continue to belong to the Self even in liberation]: and this [acknowledgment] is in contradiction with Scripture. ‘‘ But then, if nothing adheres to the soul, how is it [to be un- derstood] that heaven is the reward for merit, and hell, for de- merit P” To this [the author] replies 11. Though these are properties of another, they are imputed to that [४. e., to Soul] in consequence of non-discrimination 1 Cf. Aniruddha’s introduction to aph. ए. 75. 2 Cf. Aniruddha’s commentary on aph. V. 75. VI. 11--18.] | = anrruppHa’s COMMENTARY. 278 Though {the delight of heaven and the pain of hell] are properties of Matter [४. 6. of the internal body which goes to heaven or hell], still in consequence of non-discrimination between Matter and Soul the reflection of the former falls {on the latter], and so the delusion arises that [it be] the Self [ which] goes to heaven or [hell]. ‘‘Has non-discrimination a beginning or is it without beginning?” To this [question the author] repliés : 12. Non-discrimination is without beginning, because otherwise two counter-arguments would offer. If non-discrimination had a beginning, liberation would obtain before its arising, and bondage after its arising, so that bondage would befall the liberated. This is the first counter-argument. Moreover, as liberation would exist [of itself], when there is prior non-existence of non-discrimina- tion, [every] effort for the sake of the destruction of non- discrimination would be useless. This is the second counter- argument. ५ Being without beginning, is non-discrimination eternal or not eternal?”? To this [question the author] replies: If non-discrimination had a beginning, then liberation would obtain before its arising, and bondage after its arising, so that bondage would fall upon the liberated again. [This is] the first counter-argument. Moreover, as liberation would exist [of itself], when there is non-existence of non-discrimination, [every ] exertion for the sake of the destruction of non-discrimination would be useless. This is the second counter-argument. 13. It cannot be eternal like the Self; other- wise it would be indestructible. [A thing may be] eternal in two ways, [for] the Self 18 invariable and eternal, [but] primitive Matter is changeable and eternal. Non-discrimination is neither of the two, but 35 274 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (VI. 13—16. not eternal, because it perishes. Otherwise, 7. e., if it were eternal, it would be indestructible. ‘ Like the Self’ is an elliptical comparison; [for] ‘like primitive Matter’ is also to be understood. ‘‘Whereby is non-discrimination annihilated?” To this [question the author] replies : It is neither invariable and eternal, as the Self is, nor change- able and eternal, as primitive Matter is. Otherwise, 7. ९.) if it were eternal, it would be indestructible. 14, It is to be annihilated by a fixed cause, like darkness. | I, e., as light annihilates darkness. ९८ What 18 the annihilating factor in our case?” To this [question the author] replies : As light annihilates darkness, so [it is the case] with that. [The author] mentions [now] the factor which annihilates non- discrimination. 15. In our case also the fixed rule follows from positive and negative argumentation. Without any exception [or restriction, avyabhichdrdat] dis- crimination alone is the annihilating factor. ० [8 the Self bound through non-discrimination [alone], or are there other causes of bondage, {009 * To this [question the author] replies: | Supply: [the fixed rule that] discriminative knowledge [alone annihilates non-discrimination ]. 16. Since it cannot be [explained] in any other way, nou-discrimination alone is bondage. [This 18] clear. ८ [ एप] since liberation is a product [viz., of discrimina- tion], it may perish, and so bondage may take place again.” To this [objection the author] replies : VI. 16, 17.1 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 275 Bondage, 7. ९. mundane existence, is declared [here] to be non-discrimination, since the product and the cause may be, figu- ratively, considered identical. [Non-discrimination is, however, properly speaking, the principal cause of bondage ;] but merit, etc., [४. e., demerit, desire, aversion and the dispositions of the internal organ] are accompanying causes. ‘This is the meaning. With reference to the presumption that liberation, being a pro- duct, may perish [again, the author] declares : 17. The liberated is not exposed to a renewed bondage also on account of Scripture which teaches that he does not return. Scripture says: “The Selfis to be known, £ ¢., to be distinguished from Matter; he [who has attained to this discrimination] does not return again [to new mundane existences] 1 ; and there is a logical argument as well, viz., because fonly] a positive product perishes. The cessation of pain, however, has a negative character. [The author] mentions a reason against the opposite opi- 11107 : By the word ‘also’ is brought in [the notion of] liberation produced by discrimination; for the scriptural passages about non-returning, as f.2. ^“ 706 Self is to be known, £. e., to be distinguished from Matter; he [who has attained to this discrimi- nation] does not return again,”! [serve as a proof] for both [what was stated in aphorism 15 and what is stated in our aphorism]. Only a positive product is subject to the necessity of perishing. This is the meaning. [The author] mentions a reason against the opposite opinion : — a > This 18 not a literal quotation from Scripture, but a combination and abridgment of the well-known passages Brih. Up. 2. 4. 5 and Chhind. Up. 8. 18, with a gloss on the former (prakritito vivektavyo). The composition is evidently dependent on the Samkhya-tattva-kaumudi, Vrittito Karika 2. Cf. Aph, ° 182 note 4, 429 note 4. 276 ANIRUDDHa’8 COMMENTARY. [VI. 18, 19. 18. Else it could not be Soul’s aim. Discrimination [could not be] Soul’s aim, [1 bondage might take place again]. [The author] mentions another refutation : [Else liberation could not be Soul’s aim], because it would come to the level of profound sleep and contemplation. [The author] elucidates this : 19. Because there would happen to be no differ- ence between the two. Because the transmigrating and the liberated [soul] would be equally exposed to bondage. ८८ Sickness, etc.,”? are the impediments to concentration. And so [says] Patanjali: ‘Sickness, apathy, doubt, care- lessness, sloth, attachment, erroneous conception, non-at- tainment to any stage, and instability; these distract the thinking organ and are [therefore] impediments [to concen- tration]” (Yogasitra 1. 80). Sickness is fever etc. Apathy is the being incapable of activity. Doubt is the mental state of wavering between the two sides of an alternative. Careless- ness is inattention to contemplation. Sloth is heaviness of the body. Attachment is thirst for objects [of worldly pleasures]. Erroneous conception is wrong notion. Non- attainment to any stage is the not attaining to any stage of contemplation. Instability is the missing in the internal sense of such a stage after having attained to it. Do [now] these [conditions] simply cease to exist in liberation, or do [the liberated] get other conditions?” To this (question the author] replies: ‘ Between the two,’ ४. e., between mundane existence and libe- ration. ‘Do the impediments [to concentration] simply cease to exist in liberation, or do [the liberated] get other conditions?” To this {the author] replies : VI. 20—22. | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 277 20. Liberation is nothing else but the cessation of the impediments, Because on the theory that another condition [is attained in liberation} the invariableness [of the free Self] would be abolished. [The author] concedes also [the admissibility of that theory] and says: The impediments simply cease to exist in liberation, ‘ nothing else’; supply: (no other] condition [is arrived at]. Because with the theory that there is another condition [in liberation] the in- variableness [of the free soul] would be in contradiction; this is the meaning. Those impediments, however, are enumerated by Patafijali [in Yogasitra 1. 30]. [The author] maintains [his theory] in a bold declaration, even in case that another condition [be attained in liberation]: 21. Even therewith [our doctrine] is not incon- sistent. Granted that conditions be attained [in liberation] ; still this does no harm whatever (to our doctrine. For] it is taught [by Scripture] that in liberation there is no return [to mundane life,] and this [exemption from transmigration ] holds good even in case that other conditions [be attained by the liberated soul]. “ Are hearing, thinking and continuous meditation [to be engaged in] by all people alike or not?” To this [question the author] replies : Because Scripture teaches that [the liberated soul] does not return, This is the meaning. (The author] says [now] that there is no such rule that hearing, thinking and continuous meditation must be practised by all: 22. Since the capable are of three kinds, there is no rule. 278 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. | ४1. 22—24. Those who are capable (of reaching salvation] are, indeed, of three kinds, viz., weak, mediocre and prominent. The prominent is liberated in consequence of the mere hearing {of the truth], the mediocre in consequence of both [hearing and thinking), the weak by [practising all] three [means ; but] all are not [required] for everybody. © [The author] mentions another opinion: The capable are either weak, mediocre or prominent. Among these the prominent is liberated in consequence of the mere hearing, the mediocre in consequence of both [hearing and thinking], the weak by [practising all] three [means]. [The author] confirms this: 23. They are for the sake of strengthening the last. The three means are prescribed for the sake of strengthen- ing the last, i. ¢., the weak. Scripture also [says]: “The Self, forsooth, must be seen, heard, thought on, and conti- nually meditated upon ”’ (Brih. Up. 2. 4.5; 4. 5. 6). “Which posture is to be chosen among the salvation-pos- ture (svastika) and the others [recommended in the Yoga institutes]? To this [question the author] replies: The last, +. ९.) the weak. Supply: thinking and continuous meditation [are for the] sake of etc. 24. The posture must be steady and pleasant; so there is no restriction. A posture is to be chosen for the sake of steadiness and pleasure. Let it only be of this kind; for there are plenty [of such postures]. । ८८ [8 meditation the concentrated thinking of an object, or is meditation the internal sense without any object?” To this [question the author] replies : ‘So’ [is said] to denote [the preceding sentence as] the reason. There is no restriction on the salvation-posture or the like. VI, 25—27.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 279 [The author] gives [now] the definition of contemplation : 25. Meditation is the internal sense without any object. The word ‘ meditation’ is used here in the sense of con- templation. “As profound sleep and contemplation are both alike, inasmuch as the functions [of the internal organ] are suppres- sed [in them], what difference is there [between the two]? ” To this [question the author] replies : ‘ Meditation ’ means contemplation [The author] mentions [now] the difference of contemplation from profound sleep 26. If [you declare that] there is no difference in both cases, this is not so; the difference follows from the suppression of the influence, The influence consists in the impressions left by the objects [in the internal organ]. The suppression of this [influence] is [effected] in contemplation, {but not in pro- found sleep]. This is to be supplied. “‘{ But] since nothing adheres to the Self and, therefore, no influence can be [exercised on the same], liberation must obtain at all times.” To this [objection the author] replies : Though the fanctions [of the internal organ] are suppressed in both [states] alike, the difference follows from the fact that the impressions left by the objects [in the internal organ]—which {impressions| are [in short] called influence—are suppressed in contemplation, [but not in profound sleep] _ 27, Though nothing adheres [to that], the in- fluence results from non-discrimination From non-discrimination of Matter and Soul the delusion that the Self be influenced results, through the influence 280 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, [ ४1. 27—29. which 18 [in reality] exercised on Matter, (7. ९.) on the inter- nal organ }. | «८ [ (0610 ] does not even the influence really exist?’ To this [question the author] replies: [This is] clear. “Of what kind is the influence?” This [the author] explains {in the following aphorism] : 28. No such influence exists [here] as in the case of the Hibiscus flower and the crystal, but [only] a delusion. As there is a contact between those two [things], a proper influence is [exercised by the Hibiscus flower on the crystal]. But as the Self 18 free from contact, there is no influence as to that, but [only] a delusion; [that is to say:] Since the nature of the egotizing organ is erroneously attributed to the Self, the influence [ 9180, which is really practised on this organ] is ascribed to that. “How is this delusion destroyed?” To this [question the author ] replies : For, as there is a contact between those two things, a proper influence [exists in that ९8.86 | ; but as the Self is free from con- tact, there is no influence with regard to that, but [only] a delu- 8107. 29. It 18 suppressed by meditation, collectedness, constant practice, indifference [to worldly pleasures and pains], etc. By the word ‘ etc.’ contemplation is to be understood. Having [thus] mentioned the individual opinion of some teachers, [the author] states his own doctrine : ‘It is suppressed,’ ४, e., the influence exercised by the objects is suppressed. By the word ‘etc.’ contemplation is meant. (The author] says [now] up to what time meditation, etc., are [required } : VI. 80-32.}] anigupDHA’s COMMENTARY. 281 80. We, the teachers, declare: By the removal of rest and distraction. ‘Rest’ is profound sleep, ‘distraction’ is waking. By the removal of these two [conditions] the egotizing delusion is destroyed “Are meditation, etc., to be practised in places such as caves etc.?”’ To this [question the author] replies: « Rest’ 28 profound sleep, ‘distraction’ is slumber and waking. Till the removal of these three conditions, meditation, etc., are to be engaged in. And for this [purpose] there is no restriction of places. This [the author] says [in the following aphorism] : 31. There is no restriction of places, because [the success depends only] on the tranquillity of the think- ing organ. - Where there is no tranquillity of the thinking organ, there the engagement [in meditation, etc.} is not to be undertaken. _ “Let the egotizing organ and the following [principles] be the material causes [of the visible world]. We don’t stand in need of primitive Matter.” To this [objection the author] replies : Wherever there is tranquillity of the thinking organ, there alone meditation, etc., may be engaged in. There is no restriction of river-banks or other [localities ]. 82, Primitive Matter is the primordial material cause ; for Scripture teaches that the others are pro- ducts. Since Scripture teaches that the egotizing organ and the following [principles] are products, [there must be] a cause of these, too; [and this] is primitive Matter, as we have ‘declared several times 36 282 | ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (VI. 82—34. ‘Since there is no difference between primitive Matter and Soul, inasmuch as both are precedent in time [to all products], which [of the two] is the cause?” To this [question the author] replies: ‘The others,’ ४. ¢., the ‘great one’ and the following [principles]. 33. Not the Self, though it is eternal, because it is not capable [thereof]. The capability of [being material] cause consists in the possession of qualities and in the being in contact with {something]. Now, such [a capability] does not belong to the Self, and therefore primitive Matter is the cause. ८ Since the Self is the intellectual principle, it is proper to ascribe [direct] experiencing and [agency] to that [and] not to non-intellectual Matter.” To this [objection the author] replies: | | The Self is not the material cause; for it does not possess qualities nor is it in contact [with anything]. This is the sense. “The Self is agent and experiencer of its own accord; what is the use of [stating] an influence [exercised] on Matter [7. e., on the material internal organ]? ” This [opinion the author] re- futes : 84. Being in contradiction with Scripture, the mean opinionate does not understand the Self. [This 18] clear. “As we know that the gross elements are products of the rudiments, for what reason is primitive Matter [declared to be} the cause?’ To this [question the author] replies: (Mahadeva discovers a locative apasadasit in our aphorism ; according to this objectionable interpretation the latter part of the aphorism is to be translated: There is no understanding of the Self in the low assembly of opimionate people). ‘ The low assembly,’ ४. ¢., the vile society, consisting ‘ of opinionate peopie. In that the cognition of the Self cannot take place, because —_y-™ =, - च) OS ऋणु ™ VI. 34—37.] aNiRUDDHA’s COMMENTARY. ` 288 [those opinionate people] are in contradiction with Scripture, and because no liberation would be possible, [if their doctrine were true, ४. ¢.,] if [the Self] were agent and [experiencer] of its own accord. For it 18 said: “Tf the Self had the nature of the agent, etc., then you may not strive for liberation; for the essential nature of things, as the heat of the sun, cannot be abolished.” 85. Though mediately, primitive Matter is ope- rating throughout, like the atoms. 9.8 {11 the opinion of the Vuiseshikas] the atoms are mediately the material cause of jars and the like, although these are [directly] products of a lump of clay, so it is also in our {doctrine}. “Is primitive Matter omnipresent or not?” To this {question the author] replies: As [the Vaiseshikas declare] the atoms [to be] mediately the material cause of jars and the like, although these are [directly] products of a lump of clay, so primitive Matter is [the principal cause in our opinion]. This is the sense. 36. Itis omnipresent, because its products are known to exist everywhere. {This is} clear. [The author] mentions an argument against the opposite Opinion: Supply : primitive Matter [is]. [The author] gives a refutation of the opposite opinion: 37. Moreover, if it were subject to wandering, it would be deprived of the character of the primordial cause, like the atoms. ` । ‘Wandering’ means motion; what is subject to it is not omnipresent. If primitive Matter were wandering, it would be a product, as the [so-called] atoms are, but it would not be the primordial cause. | 284 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [VI. 37—39. “If primitive Matter is the material cause, then it must be one of the [nine substances stated by us], because [it is known from daily life that only} a substance is material cause.” To this [objection of a Naiyayika the author] replies : ‘Wandering’ means motion. If [primitive Matter] possessed limitedness which is a [necessary | condition for that, [४. e., for mo- tion], it would be a produet, like the [so-called] atoms. And that the atoms are products, is ascertained somewhere else [viz., V. 87]. 88. Primitive Matter exists in addition to the notorious; there is no restriction. | Primitive Matter exists in addition to the notorious [nine] substances, because there is no restricted number of catego- ries. And material cause is not [what you call] inherent cause, but principal cause; for we do not acknowledge in- herence [which is one of the categories] of the Vaiseshikas. <^ Does primitive Matter consist of the constituents, or are the constituents properties of it?” To this (question the author] replies : We hold that [ primitive Matter] is something in addition to the notorious [substances], because in our opinion there is no such restriction as that [only nine] substances, earth, ‘etc., exist. Sattva and the other [two constituents] are not properties of primitive Matter, but primitive Matter consists of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. This [the author] states [in the following aphorism] : 39. Sativa and the others are not properties of it, because it consists of them, __ I. ¢., because [primitive Matter] is identical [with them]. ‘‘( Every] activity is known to be for the sake of the [9९018] enjoyment, but what is non-intellectual cannot enjoy {anything ; still you maintain that non-intellectual Matter 18 active].” To this [objection the author] replies ‘ Because it consists of,’ ४. ¢., because it is identical with—‘ Sattva and the others,’ ४. e., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, VI. 89-42.] ANIRUDDAA’s COMMENTARY. 285 Since liberation could not take place, if a purposeless activity were to be assumed 40. Matter though not enjoying, creates for the benefit of Soul,—as the camel carries saffron: The explanation of this has been given in the third book in {the commentary on] aphorism [58] which begins ^ Matter’s [creating ....].” < Primitive Matter being one, how is the variety of crea- tion [to be accounted for]? ” To this [question the author] replies : : 41. From the variety of work follows the variety of creation. | Though no difference exists with regard to the causa ma- terialis, there is a diversity [of products} in consequence of the diversity of the causae effictentes, as, though no difference exists with regard to the gold, there 18 the diversity of dia- dems, collars, etc < How are creation and dissolution [brought about] ?” To this [question the author] replies _ [These two aphorisms are] clear. 42. The two effects depend on equipoise, and want of equipoise | Dissolution results from equipoise, 2. ¢., from the changing of [developed] Matter into the state in which [Sattva, Rajas and Tamas] are equal; creation results from want of equi- poise, ९, ९.» from the changing of [undeveloped] Matter into the state in which [the constituents] are unequal, [which changing takes place] through the arising of the ‘ great one’ and of the following [principles] [The author] explains dissolution Dissolution results from the changing of Matter into the state 286 ANIRUDDitA’Ss COMMENTARY. [VI. 42—44. of equality, creation from 1४8 changing into the state of unequal- ness through the arising of the ‘great one’ and of the following [principles]. 43. Having understood that [one] is liberated, Matter does not create [any more], as in daily life. As some one in daily life exerts himself for the sake of liberation from bondage, and, when he is released from bon- dage, becomes indifferent, because he has accomplished his purpose, so does Matter also [with regard to the liberated soul]. | % [ एप, ] since Matter and Soul are [both] omnipresent, there must be a connection [between the two], and therefore experience might occur even in liberation.” To this [objec- tion the author} replies : ‘ Having understood that [one] 18 liberated,’ ४, 6.9 having, as it were, understood that this or that one is liberated, Matter does not create, 4. ¢., operate, [any more] with regard to the liberated [soul]. ‘As in daily life;’ for, [as] somebody exerts himself in daily life for the sake of liberating some one from bondage and becomes indifferent, when [this] liberation has been effected, so does Matter [also]. 44, In spite of the other’s approaching the libe- rated does not experience, because there is no occa- sion. It would be so [as you suppose], if the mere upproaching of the other, ४ ¢., of Matter, did occasion experience. But this is not the case, on the contrary experience is occasioned by something which is to be experienced ; and such [a thing] does not exist in liberation. ‘There is only one Self; and so [it is said]: ‘Only one, vis., the highest Brahman, is real; [everything] else is imaginary. What delusion, what grief can then befall a man, when he perceives the unity { ` (Prabodha-chandrodaya 5. v. 16). me he VI. 44—46. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 287 This [objection, made by a follower of Sankarfcharya, the author ] refutes: (According to Mahfdeva’s interpretation the beginning of our aphorism must be translated: Although [matter] approaches to the other, etc.) ‘ Although [Matter] approaches to the other,’ ४, e., to the bound soul, [that is tosay:] although {Matter still] engages in creat- ing for the sake of that. ‘ Because there is no occasion’ means: because non-discrimination does not exist [in the case of the libera- ted }. 45. The plurality of souls follows from the di- versity ]. This has [already] been expounded in the first book in [the commentary on] aphorism [149] which begins “... from [the diversity of] birth, etc.” And so [it is said] : ५५ 096 male goat [and at the same time: one unborn, 4. ¢., the bound soul] covers with lust the one female goat [and at the same time: the one unborn Matter] which is red, white and black, and which produces manifold offspring resembling herself, while another male goat [or unborn, ४, ९.) the liberated soul] abandons her after having enjoyed her.” (Svet&v. Up. 4. 5). “The diversity [of empirical existence] will depend on the difference of Up&dhis.” To this [fresh objection.of the Vedantist the author] replies : [This 18] clear. 46. Ifthereis an Upadhi, this being establish- ed, a duality is given again. ‘This being established,’ 2. 6. a difference being establish- ed. If the Upadhi is {declared by you to be] illusory, how can the difference [of Upadhis] exist [by which you will account for the diversity of empirical existence]? But if {you consider the Upadhi] real, on that very account a duality is given again. (The author] mentions another refutation : 288 -ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ए], 46—48. ‘This being established,’ ४. ¢., a difference being established. 47. The proofs are incompatible with both. I. 8.3 with the reality and unreality [of the Up4dhi]. If [you say that the Up4dhi)] is real, [you are in contradiction with the scriptural passages which you allege asa proof, and] must give up your doctrine of non-duality. [एप] if [you say that the Updadhi] is unreal, how can the diversity {of empirical existence which is proved by sense-evidence] be regulated [by the Upadhis] ? {But we who profess the Samkhya doctrine] are neither in contradiction with the scriptural passages about non- duality, nor must we give up duality. [This the author] says! (in the following aphorism | ‘With both,’ ४. e., with reality and unreality. If [you say that] the Upadhi is real, this is incompatible with your [own] proof [४, €.) with Scripture] which teaches non-duality. But if [you say that] the Upadhi is unreal, it [viz., the Upadhi] cannot be the regulator of the [actual] diversity, and therefore [this opinion of yours | is incompatible with sense-evidence and | inference, both of] which acquaint us with [the empirical | diversity. With regard to his own opinion, however, [the author] declares: 48. As [our doctrine] is not incompatible with both, there is neither the one nor the other; for no proof exists : The scriptural passages about non-duality have another sense [than that which you ascribe to them], because they mean the homogeneousness [of souls] or are intended for a eulogy, and so [our doctrine of the multiplicity of souls] is not. incompatible with them. And as [we accept that] the Upadhis are real, we must not give up duality, and hence [our doctrine] is not incompatible [with the facts known by 1 Read ce ’ty dha in my edition with B and the I. O. L. manuscript. VI. 48—50. ] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 289 sense-evidence]. Therefore, ‘ there is neither the one,’ 4. ¢., the oneness of the Self, ‘nor the other,’ 7. 6, contradiction between [our doctrine and] Scripture. Since no proof exists for non-duality, this is not [to be regarded as] estab- lished, and, therefore, [each Self] is distinct (from the others]. This is the sense ५८ [ 8९} ] a proof is not missing, [because] the proof [for non-duality ] is manifest by itself.’”’ To this [fresh objection of the Vedantist the author] replies : ‘ There is neither the one,’ z. e., the oneness of the Self, ‘nor the other,’ ४. e., the dependence of the [empirical] diversity on the difference of Upadhis; for no proof exists for either of these two [Vedantistic tenets]. On the contrary, the real multitude of Selfs is [evident] per se; for the scriptural passages declaring the one- ness of the Self refer [only] to the sameness of the nature of [all] Selfs, while the perception of the multitude [of Selfs] apprehends a real multitude and not one which depends on [the connection with | Upadhis, and hence ‘ [our doctrine] is not incompatible [with both ],’ either Scripture or perception. 49. If this [non-duality] were established by self-evidence, we would be in contradiction with the logical rule that the same thing cannot be object and subject simultaneously. {This is] plain. {The author] mentions another refutation : How shall non-duality be known [in your opinion]? By that which is non-Self, or by the Self? The former cannot be, because [that which is non-Self] is non-intellectual ; [and] in the latter case the same thing would be manifested and manifesting, which is a logical impossibility. 50. Being distinct from the non-intellectuai, 37 i 290 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [VI. 50. [the Self] which has the nature of thought mani- fests the non-intellectual. [The Self] which is different from the non-intellectual and has the nature of thought manifests the non-intellectual. [Only] because of its distinction from the non-intellectual it is [declared by the author] to have the nature of [thought or] light, but it is not said that light beits property. There- fore [the Self] is described [by Gaudap4da in his Mandikya 18111६४, 8. 26}: "^ 11018 18 not so, not so,” [viz., in a purely negative,] but not in a positive form. ‘But then [it is your opinion that the Self] has the nature of supernatural light?” [To this question of the Vedantist we reply: No, for] in that case, [supernatural light being unknown,] the apprehension of the invariable concomitance [of the Self and light] would be impossible,' and hence no example [or base of arguing] could be found. “ But” [the Vedantist objects] “this [nature of supernatural light] is perceptible to the Yogin.” ([Reply:] The Yogin who has attained to that stage of concentration in which consciousness is lost does not exhibit any bodily functions caused by knowledge [as speaking /f.7.,],and so there is no mark [from which we could conclude that the Yogin possesses such a knowledge, and much less there is any possibility of obtaining such a knowledge from him]; and that Yogin in whose concentra- tion there is still consciousness exhibits [it is true] the func- tion of speaking and other marks [of knowledge], but from these [very marks] itis [to be] concluded that only mun- dane [and no supernatural] things [are objects of his know- ledge]. And so even he cannot [say: ‘I have perceived by immediate cognition that the Self consists of supernatural light,’ nor can he] describe [ positively] intellect, ४, ¢., think- ing. In this sense [it is said]: * Alaukika-prakdga-rapatve ‘yo-ya dtmd, sa-sa prakdéa-ripa’ iti vydptir na kena-chit pramdnena nirnitd sti, Pandit. VI. 50.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 291 ‘‘Between sugar-cane, milk, molasses, eto., a great difference of sweetness exists ; still this cannot be described even by Sarasvati'”’ (Kavyadaréa 1, 102). So [the Self] is called ‘intellectual’ [only] because it is distinct from [all] which is non-intellectual; not, however, is the [8618] intimate connection with intellect nor its being of intellectual nature [to be inferred from that deno- tation]. For the customary expression ‘supernatural intel- lectual nature’ is also to be accounted for otherwise, vz., by the fact that in the state of unconsciousness [all] affec- tions are suppressed, [and hence the Yogin does no longer per- ceive then any mundane objects. Since, therefore, the Self of the Yogin 18 nof mundane or natural intellect in this stage | of concentration, it is denoted as having the nature of super- natural intellect). In that state [of concentration], how- ever, where consciousness still exists, there is thinking in the form of the affections [of the internal organ], and only for this reason*the expression ‘intellectual nature’ is used [to describe the Self].* In the same way, the declaration that [the Self] has the nature of delight is used in the [purely negative] sense of cessation of pain. If the attribution of the nature of delight [to the Self] had a positive meaning, [as the Vedantists main- tain, then we must ask:] Is this [expression] employed in the sense of joy in general? If this were the case, then there ought to be (1) joy, (2) its experiencing, and (3) an expe- 2 J.¢., 88 inthis case something which is known to everybody cannot be described, so also he who knows the Self is not able to explain how it is. 2 Aniruddha means that the two definitions of the Self as ‘supernatural intellect’? and ‘intellect’ refer to the unconscious and conscious stage of concentration respectively, but that both are not meant verbally. His sur- prising annotations to this aphorism become more and more materialistic.— In the following portion he turns prasangdt against a tenet of the Vedanta philosophy which is objected to by all Samkhyas, vis., that the Self be delight as well as intellect. 292 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ ४1. 50. riencer, because joy which is not experienced is not known [to exist}; hence how could there be non-duality [even in liberation']? Or does ‘ delight’ denote a particular kind of joy, [४. ९. supernatural joy, in your opinion? In this case we reply:] It 18 never found that [one and the same thing} be joyful as well as of intellectual nature. This is [the opinion ] of undiscriminating people only ; but the discrimi- nating are of the following opinion: since [the employ- ment of the word ‘delight’] may, in accordance with ex- perience® (drishtenaiva), be accounted for by [declaring] that it means ‘exclusion {of pain],’ the invention of some- thing supernatural which is not known by experience (adrishta) would be a superfluous complication (gurvi). [Objection :] “If [Soul] were not intellect, there would be no perception of objects.” {Reply:] Not so! As a special combination of gourd, bamboo and strings [called ‘lute,’ vind] is the cause of sounds, but nothing, except this combination of the three, [18 in the cause of their pro- duction], so intellect arises from such a [special] combination of material objects, modified into the form of living beings, though these are equally [with others] formed of the five elements. And if the Self were light, it would also consist 2 This complement is taken from the commentary of Mahddeva who says that in this case the dvaitam would hold good (not only in mundane existence, but also) in liberation. Although the Vedantists do not acknowledge a dvai- tam even in mundane existence, there is at least, in this respect, a discrepanoy of opinions between the Vedantists and the other schools; as regards libe- ration, however, no orthodox philosophical school admits a dvatta. ॐ As, for example, a man who has been deprived of a burden says: “I have become joyful,” and means thereby that his pain has ceased (Pandit). ® This declaration is totally materialistic and in direct contradiction with aphorisms III. 20, 22, V.130. Though Aniruddha, when commenting on these and other aphorisms concerning the nature of Soul, has placed himself on the standpoint of a true Sdmkhya, he betrays his personal belief at the occasion of this lengthy discussion and shows that he is in fact a Charvaka. VI. 50, 51.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, 293 of parts [as, for instance, the light of the sun] and hence be non-intellectual. ५ And thus Scripture would be contradicted, which teaches fin the Nrisimhataépaniya and Rdédmatadpaniya Upanishad passim ] that [Soul] manifests itself through its own light.” To this [objection the author] replies : ‘Having the nature of thought’ means only ‘ being distinct from the non-intellectual,’ but not ‘possessing light as a property.’ Therefore [the Self] is described by the words “‘ Not so, not so” (0. Up. 2. 3. 6), [and] not in a positive form. Likewise, the attribution of delight [to the Self] also means only exclusion of non-delight, but no joy of a positive nature; for [otherwise], since we do not know of any joy which is not being experienced, there would necessarily be an experiencer, etc., [%,¢. the act of experiencing and delight itself], whence a duality [or plurality] would happen to exist even in liberation. [And] if you [Vedan- tists] say that there is some supernatural joy in liberation and that this is manifest, [४. e., felt] by itself, no proof exists for these [assertions |. % But then, scriptural passages [as, for example, Brih. Up. 3. 9. 28] are found [as a testimony] for [the Self’s] having the nature of delight,” [says the Vedantist, but the author] denies this: 51. We are not in contradiction with Scripture, because this is declared in order to [promote] in- difference in those who are affected with desires. Since the non-intellectual, having the nature of the three constituents, is the cause of desires, even the means of right knowledge and the other [logical categories, enumerated in Nyaya Siatra 1.1, viz., objects of right knowledge, doubt, etc.] must be given up, because they belong to the three constituents; and [thus] the [complete] destruction of desires is to be effected.' ‘ Because this is declared [etc.]’ 1 For he who has given up even those things has attained to the highest indifference, to that stage of concentration in which consciousness is lost. 294 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (VI. 51, 52. means: because those scriptural passages which teach that [Soul] manifests itself through its own light, are to be explained in [this] other way. ‘“‘( But], the world being illusory, how can [that scrip- tural testimony] be explained in this other way?” To this [fresh objection of the Vedantist the author] replies : For those who are affected with desires feel desire for joy and indifference to liberation. [We are not in contradiction with Scripture], because for the reason just mentioned ‘ this is declared,’ ४. e., because the Self, though it is [really] not delight, is said— supply: in Scripture—to be delight, in order to [promote] in- difference to [worldly] objects. The scriptural passages about the delight [of Soul] are figurative and mean in reality absence of pain. This is the sense. [The author] declares the world to be real : 52. The world is real, because it is not the re- sult of a faulty cause, and because there is no con- futation.* - The result of a faulty cause is, for example, the percep- tion of a [white] conch-shell as yellow, . [which is caused by the fault of jaundice]. Anda confutation is, [for example, in the case of the wrong notion that a piece of mother-of- pearl be silver, ] the [subsequent correct] notion ‘this is not silver.’ Now, this [world] 18 not 80 [as the imaginary yel- lowness of a conch-shell], because primitive Matter and the following [material principles] are not faulty, nor is there any confutation, because the conception ‘this world is not [real] does not exist. The world is [now] briefly described. Above [the earth] there are [in ascending order seven worlds, called] एए, Bhuvas, Svar, Mahar, Janas, Tapas, and Satya; below {the earth] there are [in descending order seven lower regions, 1 Cf. I: 79. - VI. 59.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 299 called] Mahatala, 4841812, 9181४, Pataéla, Sutala, Vitala, and Atala. In the middle [of the earth] lies the Jambu island; in the middle thereof {the mount] Sumeru ; on this border, in the four quarters, east etc., the [so-called] sup- porting mounts, named Mandara, Gandhamadana, Vipula, and Suparéva. To the south of (the mount Sumeru or] Meru lie the Himélaya mountains {bounding ] the Bharata division for India], the Hemakita mountains [bounding] the Kimpu- rusha division, and the Nishadha mountains [bounding] the Hari division. Tothe north of the Meru lie the Sringin mountains [ bounding) the Kuru division, theS'veta mountains {bounding} the Hiranyaka division, and the Nila mountains [bounding] the Ramyaka division. To the east of the Meru lie the Malyavant mountains [bounding] the Bhadrésva divi- sion. To the west of the Meru lie the Gandhamadana mountains [bounding] the Ketumala division. Below the Meru, [i. ¢., close to it] lies the Ilavrita division. The Jambu island is 100,009 Yojana [in circuit}. This is sur- rounded by the salt sea which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the Saka island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the sea of sugar- cane juice which is of the same extent as that. This 18 surrounded by the Kuéa island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the liquor sea which 18 of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the Krauficha island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the sea of clarified butter which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the 8 8109171 island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the curd sea which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the Plaksha island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the milk sea which is of the same extent as that. This is surrounded by the Pushkara island which is twice as large as that. This is surrounded by the fresh water sea which is of the same extent as that. The [ whole] 296 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [VI. 52—54. world is [at last] bounded on all sides by the wall of the Lokéloka mountains which is the shell of Brahman’s egg, [i. ९. of the world]. Although [the purport of the following aphorism] has been stated above [I. 114, the author] teaches it again, because this is useful to the disciples: For the [wrong] perception ‘the ‘conch-shell is yellow’ is, for example, the result of a faulty cause, [४. e., of jaundice], and is to be confuted by the subsequent correct] perception ‘the conch- shell is not yellow.’ The object of that [first perception] is un- real, but it is not so in the case of the world. This is the meaning. 68. Since the other mode [of explanation] is im- possible, there is [only] the production of what is [always] real. And the other mode fof explanation, that the unreal comes into existence] has been refuted above [in our com- mentary on I. 114}. ८ [The word ahamkdra, ^ egotizing organ’) being evidently derived from aham karomi, ‘Iam active,’ is the egotizing organ the agent, or is the Self denoted by the word aham- kdra, and is this the agent?” To this [question the author] replies : And the other mode [of explanation] has been set aside above. 54. The egotizing organ, not Soul, is the agent. Because Soul is invariable. [The assertion] that action (or motion] and intellect belong to the same subject proves fallacious in such cases as ‘ the tree stands, [shakes,]’ etc. $ {for motion belongs to the tree, but not intellect]. «Though [the fruit of] one work has been consumed, other works will be continually produced, because works arise as long as the body lasts; and so there will be no definitive liberation.’ To this (objection the author] replies: VI. 54, 55.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 297 [By the word] ‘egotizing organ’ the [general] internal organ 18 [here intended |. “But then, even when discriminative knowledge is [attained], the experiencing of joy, etc., is [still] seen. How is this [to be accounted for|?’’ To this [question the author] replies: 55. Experience ends with thought, because it is acquired by its works." From non-discrimination results the acquisition of works {or rather: of merit and demerit], and thereby experience is [brought about]. This ‘ends with thought,’ ४. e., it ends with the cognition of the Self [in its distinction from Mat- ter]. When discrimination has taken place, how can other works be acquired [after that ? And] when no [works, 2. ¢., neither merit nor demerit,] exist [any longer], how can there be experience? [All] works [previously] done are annihilated through [discriminative] knowledge, [and through that] alone. And 80 [it is said :] ‘As a kindled fire reduces the fuel to ashes, O Arjuna, 80 the fire of cognition reduces all works to ashes’ (Bhagavadgita 4. 37). “Only the attainment of the world of the moon or of other [celestial worlds] will be Soul’s aim, because this im- plies an excess [of happiness].” To this [objection the author] replies : (According to Mahaleva’s interpretation our aphorism must be translated: Haperience lasts to the end of thought, because tt ts acquired by those works}. | [ Chid-avasdnd means that] which ‘ lasts to the end,’ 2. e., during the time, ‘ of thought,’ ४, e., of thinking [that] the body, etc., [7. e., the internal organ and the senses, be the Self].4 This means: experience continues as long as the body, etc., appears [to be the Self]. By the word ‘those’ [that kind of works] is intended, 1 I. e., by the works of the [empirical] soul. Cf. I. 104 and IT. 46. 2 This explanation is hardly correct, as chit is not used elsewhere in the sense of sdimsdrika-jnana. 38 298 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. | ४. 55—57. which have begun to bear fruit; for these are present to [the author’s|] mind. Since there is, among others, the following scrip- tural passage: ‘‘So long only is the delay [of emancipation] for him [who knows the Self], as [he thinks} ‘1 shall not be liberated nor attain to salvation’’’ (Chhand. Up. 6. 14. 2), even he who knows [the truth] necessarily experiences the consequences of those works which have begun to bear fruit. This is the meaning. 56. Even in the world of the moon, etc., one returns [to new mundane existences,] since the effi- cient causes exist [even there]. By the word ‘etc.’ Brahman’s and other worlds are to be understood. ‘Liberation will come to him who has repaired to a teacher, in consequence of the mere hearing of the words [of the instruction]; what need is there of thinking, etc. ? ” To this (objection the author] replies : The efficient causes are non-discrimination and the other [faults of the internal organ, affection, aversion, etc. | 57. This does not come to people in consequence of instruction, as [has been stated] before, Only what has been already declared above [I. 70, VI. 22] is declared [here]. Liberation does not fall to the share of the weak in consequence of the mere hearing, but through thinking, etc. Here by restraint, obligation, posture, regula- tion of the breath, abstraction, collectedness, meditation and contemplation are implied (cf. Yogasitra 2. 29). “How is [it] then [that] liberation [is] declared in Scrip- ture to result from mere instruction?” To this [question the author | replies: Liberation does not come to people who are of weak capability in consequence of instruction, ४. e., of the mere hearing; but it must be understood that this takes place so as it has been stated before. The sense is that thinking and constant meditation are (also] required [for that purpose]. rae "== ~ Fe = = = + ८ Nee = pan Soy A ce ey ण VI. 58, 59.1 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY, 299 “‘ How then is [the scriptural declaration] ‘Having heard [the truth] he becomes liberated’ to be accounted for?” To this ques- tion the author] replies : 58. The scriptural passages treating of libera- tion refer to its being effective mediately. Since hearing is the first [means of liberation], the scrip- tural passages treating of liberation [through hearing] refer to its being effective as a mediate cause. ५८ As Matter is omnipresent and as such the cause of the world, so the Self [also] is omnipresent. Therefore, {these two being in the relation of experienced and experiencer, {the Self] ought to experience at all places {and always].” To this [objection the author] replies: The scriptural passages treating of liberation [as taking place], ‘when there 18 this,’! £. e., when there is hearing alone, are [to be accounted for by hearing’s being effective] mediately, or they refer to those who are capable in the highest degree. 59. And as Scripture speaks of its wandering, it reaches place and time of experience, in conse- quence of its connection with the Upadhi, in spite of its omnipresence, as is the case with Space. As [only] in consequence of the connection with such an UpAdhi as a jar or the like the conception arises that the space within a jar moves, when the jar moves, so the [ima- ginary] wandering of the Self which depends on its being determined by the body is effected by the wandering of that. To that place the body goes, where something is to be experienced in consequence of the power of works [previously done], and hence the Self reaches experience [there]. “ [But] if the Self is [declared by you] to be omnipresent and having the nature of thought, cognition ought to obtain 1 Tat-siddhau is taken by Mahadeva in a different sense and construction. 800 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (VI. 59. always, everywhere and with regard to all objects simulta- neously ; and we see [that it is] not so [in reality.” To this objection we reply:}] This [remark] is not [right]. It would be 80 [as you say ], if the Self in its omnipresent nature caused the cognition of affections; this, however, is not the case, but [the Self causes cognitions] only as being determin- ed by the body, etc., [४. e., by the internal organ and by the senses], just as the sun, though light is its essential nature, does not, when standing to the south of the Meru, shed light on its northern part, nor on the southern part, when standing to the north of it, because [the light of the sun] is not omnipresent. But when the accumulation of . works has been consumed by knowledge and by the other {means of liberation] and thereby [the Self] has got rid of the aggregate consisting of the body, etc., then it becomes free from Rajas and Tamas, and omnipresent; and then it does not cause (any longer] the cognition of affections, because it is not subject to changes, but of itself it is [then], in its essence, knowledge of the [whole] universe. And as Space is omnipresent and does not become foul through the local connection with smoke or [soot], but what is determin- ed by the jar or the like, 2. e., everything being inside the jar or the like, is [erroneously] considered foul,! while [in reality] even there, [¢. e., inside the jar] Space is not foul, because dirt does not adhere to this, but this is only a mis- conception of undiscriminating people, since, when the jar is broken, [Space] is not seen to be so, (7. ९. foul],—just so the Self [as such] is omnipresent, [and] neither connection with attributes or [qualities] nor cognition [of affections] belongs to it; but [only], when determined by the body, it is called [^ living or] empirical Self,’ because it is then con- 2 This refers to the Indian custom of preserving a fire by covering it with 8 jar turned upside down. VI. 59.1 ANIKUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 301 nected with life, possessed of air and fire,! and hence in as- sociation with the internal sense. Since Matter is inse- parable from the internal sense, it appears as if [the Self, on account of its association with the internal sense, ] possesses what belongs to Matter [in reality], viz., merit and demerit, [empirical] knowledge and ignorance, joy and pain, etc., [४. ९. apathy, desire and so on, moreover] egotism, the senses and their objects, birth, etc., [2 ¢., childhood, youth, old age and death]. Because of Matter’s being, in its Sat- tva part, [९, e., as internal organ], clear [as a mirror], the Self is reflected in it and [therefore erroneously] attributes to itself agency and the other [qualities] of Matter. [This] delusion, moreover, inheres [only] in that Self which is reflected in Matter, but not in the Self [as such] ; as, though the moon does not tremble, in consequence of the water’s trembling the wrong notion arises that [the moon] trembles, when it is reflected in the water; or as aface which is not foul is nevertheless erroneously considered foul, when it is reflected in a foul mirror. The discriminating, however, who are aware of the isola- tion [of the Self] discern [at first] that the agency, etc., of the Self is illusory, because this is not subject to changes and because nothing adheres toit. But when in consequence of the ripening of meditation the impressions [left in the internal organ] decrease and in this manner the internal sense is dissolved, and then after the [complete] annihilation of those impressions the body perishes and no other body is produced, then the empirical Self is omnipresent, because it has become one and the same with the highest [or pure] Self. 2 Cf, Aniruddha’s commentary on VI: 63. The vital airs and the meta- phorical fire of the stomach are intended. Pandit R&mmiéra explained this passage to me in the following way: kim tu yatrd ’tmd gartrend 'va- chchhidyate, tatra vdyor vahneg cha samyogah ; elat-samyogavdn yo jtvas, tate sambandhena manah-samyogah + tasmdd visish{dtma sivdtme 'ty uchyate. 802 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. (VI. 59, 60. How, therefore, can it then be associated with merit and de- merit, or possess agency and the like? On the contrary, {the emancipated Self] cannot be described with words, and for this reason it is said [in the commentary on aphorism 50] that it has not the nature of supernatural thought and delight ; for it is impossible to teach anything else. ‘‘ Since [the Self] is without a substratum before the pro- duction of the body, it cannot superintend [the formation of the embryo] ; and so the superintendence of the Self [begins], after the production [of the body is completed].” To this {objection the author] replies : ‘In spite of its omnipresence’ the Self attains to the ‘ place and time of experience in consequence of its connection with the Upadhi’, $, e., in consequence of its connection with the body, etc., [viz., with the internal organ and with the senses]. As Space moves apparently, when a jar or the like moves, so the Self also moves apparently, when it is determined by the body, and in this way it becomes possessed of experience which is connected with special places and times. Whence [does this follow]? ‘As Scripture speaks of the wandering’ [of the Self], for example in the passage: ^“ Those who abide in Sattva wander upwards” (Bha- gavadgita 14. 18). 60. Since that which is not superintended is subject to putrescence, this is not to be established. Since antecedence and succession do not bear upon that which is omnipresent and eternal, the superintendence [of the Seif] begins simultaneously with [the first stage of] the production of the body. Therefore ‘ this is not to be estab- lished,’ 7. e., want of superintendence is not to be established, [with regard to any stage of the formation of the body]. And hence putrescence does not affect [the embryo]. “That putrescence does not take place will be merely a consequence of the invisible power [of merit].” To this [ob- jection the author] replies : ~ एष्व ऋ ष्य ee $e = - जः a ee VI. 59—61.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 303 ‘ This is not to be established,’ 7. e., want of superintendence is not to be established. “That putrescence does not take place will be merely a conse- quence of the invisible power [of merit].” To this [the author] replies : 61. If [you say :] ^ Through the invisible power,” [then we declare that] the unconnected is incapable thereof, as water, etc., is with regard to a sprout. Since the invisible power [of merit] without a substratum is incompetent [to exercise any influence], it cannot produce an effect, if it is unconnected with the body ;! just as water does not bring forth a sprout, [if it is out of connection there- with]. By the word ‘etc.’ warmth is to be understvod. ५८ ()0 what substratum do merit and the like abide, so that they [are able to] produce effects?” To this [question the author ] replies: . If [you say:] ‘The Self does not superintend [the formation of the body] from that stage in which this is [mere] sperma; but [the superintendence is effected] through the invisible power [of merit’, then we declare:] No, for ‘the unconnected’ invisible power ‘is incapable thereof,’ 7. ९.) 18 incapable of being [efficient | cause. The sense is this. A connection of the invisible power with that, [४. ९.) with the body which is being formed | is necessarily to be stated; but this [connection] has only the character of a special association, existing between [the invisible power] itself and its substratum, [7. e., the Self], or of something like 1४. The words ‘as water, etc.’ exhibit an example: as water, etc., though [able to] bring forth a sprout, does not bring forth a sprout, if it is un-connected with the seed. 2 And this connection can be mediated by the Self alone; cf. Vijfidnabhik- shu’s and Mahadeva’s commentaries on our aphorism. > ddi means sva-sydmi-bhdva, in which case sva again represents the invisi- ble power and svdmin the Self. = -->- - ऋका >+ ~ pa - कना --> ~ ~~ = 804 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [ VI. 62, 63. 62. These are properties of the egotizing organ, because [the 8] is void of qualities and they can- not, therefore, belong to this, | These, ९, €.» merit and the like, [viz., demerit, desire, aver- sion, etc. ], are properties of the egotizing organ, because the Self is void of qualities and they cannot, therefore, be pro- perties of this. As product and cause are identic, the pro- perties of the [general] internal organ are [here] called pro- perties of the egotizing organ. «५ [8 the Self in its essence empirical soul ? or in some other way?” To this [question the author] replies: These, 7. €.) merit and the like, are properties of the egotizing organ, ‘because the Self is void of qualities and they cannot, there- fore, belong to this,’ ४. e., they cannot abide in this. As product and cause are identic, the properties of the [general] internal or- gan are [here] called properties of the egotizing organ. 63. The characterized [Self] is empirical soul, as follows from positive and negative argumentation. If (the Self] in its essence were empirical soul, its invari- ableness would be given up, because (the empirical soul] is agentand experiencer. ‘As follows from positive and negative arguinentation,’ 7. e.,[—to explain only the positive view—] when there is, in consequence of [the Self’s] being determin- ed by the body, a connection with air and fire!, then [the Self] is characterized by the connection with the senses and then it is [called ‘living ग] empirical soul’. “An empirical soul, having got possession of divine power [through concentration for instance], is [called] the Lord ; this will be the former of the world. And so [it is said :] ‘The lord o Arjuna, is seated in the region of the heart of all 1 Cf. the parallel passage in Aniruddha’s commentary on VI. 59 and note 1 on page 301. _ VI. 63, 64.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 805 beings, whirling round all beings through his wonderfal power [on the wheel of mundane existence, as the manager of a puppet-show does with the puppets] mounted on his apparatus” (Bhagavadgité 18. 61). To this [theistic objection the author] replies ; Empirical soul is [that Self] which is characterized by agency and experiencing, £. e., which is characterized by the body, ete., but it is not [the Self] in its essence, because the invariableness [of the pure Self] would be given up, and because [our doctrine ] “follows from positive and negative argumentation’; for we per- ceive that [only he] is agent and experiencer who is under the de- 18100 that his body is his Self. 64. The egotizing organ is the agent on whom the arising of the products depends ; it is not depen- dent on a Lord, because there is no proof [thereof]. ‘ Because there is no proof [ thereof] ’ means : because there is no knowledge which could be the material [cause] of the world. Moreover, [if the Lord were an empirical soul charac. terized by the possession of divine power, as the opponent maintains, then} he would not be omnipresent [nor able to bring forth alone all products constitutive of the universe], and hence several Lords ought to be assumed ; [thus there would be a state of things which is desired not even by the opponent]. [That reason,] too, [by means of which the theistic oppo- nent attempts to prove that the Lord is the maker of the world,—viz.,] that this must be the work of an intelligent being, because it is a product,—does not always hold good. This [the author] declares [in the following aphorism] : “From primitive Matter [proceeds] the ‘great one’; from the “great one,’ the egotizing organ.” With these words the egotizing organ has been described [in aphorism I.61]. The agent on whom the arising of the products, ४. e., of the rudiments and of the follow- ing [material principles], depends, is identical with that. It ig not 39 806 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [VI. 64, 65. dependent on a Lord, because there is no proof of the assertion that every product without exception must be the work of an intelligent being. [The author] elucidates this : 65. It is the same as with the arising of the in- visible power (of merit and demerit]. Because [the world], like the arising of the invisible power, has not an [intelligent] maker. [For,] if this [invi- sible power], too, had a maker, another (and prior ] arising of invisible power ought to be [accepted as] the accompanying [or efficient cause by which the maker could have been in- duced to effectuate the arising of the present invisible cause ]}, and for that [prior arising] another [prior arising ought to be accepted] again, and so on. In this way there would be a regressus in infinitum. By the fact that mundane existence [considered individually] has a beginning,! its being without a beginning [in consideration of the continuity] is not set aside.* ‘“‘If the egotizing organ is the cause (of the material prin- ciples], is it the cause with regard to the ‘ great one’ also? ” To this [question the author] replies ; (According to Mah&deva’s interpretation the aphorism must be translated: It 25 the same as with the arising of that with regard to which [a maker | 25 not seen). The non-existence of an intelligent maker [of the world] 18 in the same predicament as the arising, ४, e., production, of that with re- gard'to which a maker is not seen, 7. e., of sprouts which come out of the earth, and the like, [7. e., of streams, clouds, etc.]. For in the case of sprouts which come out of the earth, and the like, there is no intelligent maker, because none is perceived. So it is also in the case of the rudiments [and the following material principles]. 2 Cf. Anirndiha’s and Mahddeva’s commentaries on ए, 15. ® Cf. the parallel passage in the comm. on VI. 67 and, as regards the anddé ` ta of the samsdra, the annotations to I. 17, 167, 158, III. 62. VI. 66, 67.] ANIRODDHA’S COMMENTARY. 307 66. That [only] which is different from the ‘ great one’ [is produced by the egotizing organ]. [For] the cause of a thing cannot be the product of the same. ‘Matter is the possessed, Soul is the possessor. Is the connection of these two essential or occasioned by something else? If it were essential, there could be no liberation, be- cause the essential nature does never depart.’’ With reference to this [remark the author] declares: That [only] which is different from the ‘great one’ is produced by the egotizing organ ; for the cause of a thing cannot be the pro- duct of the same. 67. Even if the relation of the possessed and the possessor [which exists] in the case of Matter is occa- sioned by work, still itis without a beginning, like that of seed and sprout (‘Which exists] in the case of Matter’ is an elliptical ex- pression; [for ‘and] of Soul’ is also to be understood. If work is the cause of the connection between the possessed and the possessor, liberation results from the cessation of this con- nection between the possessed and the possessor,'! when [the invisible power of } work has been destroyed by discrimination. By the fact that the uneternal [considered individually] has a beginning, its being without a beginning [in consideration of the continuity] is not set aside,* while the eternal is (of course] without a beginning; hence it is said [in the aphor- ism] that [the relation of Matter and Soul] is without a be- ginning. [The author] mentions another opinion : _ 2 Read sva-suvdmi-sambandhibhdvan with B and the I. O. L. manuscript. १ Cf. the parallel passage in the commentary on V1. 65. 808 ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. [VI. 66—70. ‘[ And] of Soul’ 18 to be supplied. The rest is clear 68. Or it is occasioned by non-discrimination, according to Panchasikha. The relation of the possessed and the possessor’ follows from [the preceding aphorism. ] {The author] mentions the individual opinion of [another] teacher : [The word] aviveka-nimitia is a Bahuvrihi compound. [The author] mentions the individual opinion of [another] teacher : 69. According to Sanandanacharya it is occa- sioned by the internal body. (The internal body] which is called livga, because it dissolves (layandat), is the subtile or transporting body. As long as the subtile body enters into a gross body, [%. e. as transmigration lasts], so long [Soul] is called ‘ bound? in consequence of the connection between the possessed and the possessor. {The author] states [now] his own opinion : As long as there is a subtile body within a gross body, so long are Matter and Soul in that connection which exists between the possessed and the possessor. [The author] states [now] his own opinion : 70. Be it this or that, its destruction is Soul’s aim —its destruction is Soul’s aim. ‘Be it this or that,’—+. ०, be it [effected] by the wearing off of [the invisible power of ] work or by knowledge or in some other way—it is by the destruction of the connection between the possessed and the possessor that the destruction of mun- dane existence [is brought about; this] is Soul’s aim.—The repetition of the words ‘its destruction is Soul’s aim’ indi- cates the end of the book. VI. 70.] ANIRUDDHA’S COMMENTARY. 809 This doctrine of the [eternal] reality of the products has been, it 18 true, exposed above (in the first book]. Since it is, [however, ] taught [here] in the form of a recapitulation of the essential points, this is not a superfluous repetition. The indeclinable words ‘this or that’ refer to the cause. Be the relation of the possessed and the possessor between Matter and Soul owing to this or that cause, it is, at any rate, the cause of bondage, and, therefore its destruction is Soul’s aim. This is my opinion.—The repetition [of the last words] serves to [indicate ] the end of the book. Here ends the sixth book in the commentary on Kapila’s aphorisms explanatory of the Samkhya system; and this work is now complete. [This] commentary on the SAamkhya aphorisms has been composed by the wise Aniruddha, in order to [effect] discrimination in the foolish beings and liberation of the Self, Here ends, in the quintessence of the commentary on the aphorisms explanatory of the Samkhya system, composed by Maha- deva the Vedantist, the sixth book which contains a recapitulation of the essential points. 3.10 1. 2. 2. ® & & po QUOTATIONS IN ANIRUDDHA’S AND MAHADEVA’S COMMENTARIES THAT HAVE BEEN VERIFIED. Passages not cited literally have been marked cf. BHAGAVAnGiTA. Cuuinpoaya UpaNIsHap. 2. 16 An. I. 118. 4. 15. 6 Mah. IV. 22. 2.24 Mah. I. 51. 6. 2.1 Mah. V.15; cf. An. I. 3.27 An. I. 96. 153. । 4,87 An. VI85. | ` | 6. 2.8 Mah. 1. 99. 14. 18 Mah. VI. 59. 6. 5.4 An. Mah. IIT. 15; cf. 18.61 An. VI. 68. Mah. II. 20. 7 6.14.2 Mah. VI. 55. BRAGMABINDU UPANISHAD. 7 1.8 Ap. IL 1. 18 Mah. I. 51. | 8 1.6 An. IV. 22. 8.15.1 An. I. 83; ef. -BrifaDARANYAKA UPANISHAD. An. Mah. VI. 17. 5.3 Mah. II. 26. 8.6 . Mah. III. 7%, Garupa Poraya. 7 VI. 50. One verse Mah. IV. 1. 4,5 (4. 5. 6.) An. II. 1, VI. 28; cf. An. JABALA UPANISHAD. Mah. स. 4.- An. introd. to J. 1 and in 4. 14 An. I. 145. I. 1 (aeeta विरणष्येभददरोव 2.13 ef. An. IT. 21. प्रव्रजेत्‌ , not verified in my 9. 26 An. III. 75. translation). 8. 16 An. I. 53, 147, An. Mah. V. KatHa UPANISHAD. 8, Mah. V. 4.11 cf. An. I. 153. 25 ; cf. An. 1. 15, VI. 10. KAVYADARS A. 4. 2 An. III. 24. 1.102 An. VI. 50. 4. 5 (5. 2.13) cf. Mah. I. 149. 4. 12 An. III. 78. Korma Purana. 4. 14 Mah. IJ. 149. 1. 4. 66 Mah. I. 99. 4. 22, 23 An. II. 2. 2.2.12 An II. 5. ४ > ४ oS 117५4 Porana. One verse An. I. 148. MAHABHARATA. 8. 16768 An. I. 48, An. Mah. V. 103. 12. 6520, 6647 cf. Mah. 1V.11. 12.6649 cf. Mah. IV. 12. 12. 11307b, 11308a Mah. I. 51. See also under Bhagavadgita. MAHABHASHYA. I. p. 429, 1. 9. of Professor Kiel- | horn’s edition Mah. III. 45. Mairri UpanisHab. 6.22 cf. An. LI. 1. MAnpocya KAriki. 3.26 An. VI. 50. MANv. 2.94 Mah. III. 43. 12. 9 An. V. 123. MArkanpetya Purina. 41.19 Mah. IV. 13. Muypaka UPANISHAD. | 1. 8. 12,13 Mah. III. 80, 2. 1. 3 An. V. 84. 2. 2. 8 An. Mah. III. 67. NYAYABINDU. 1, line 3 of Professor Peterson’s edition An. I. 89. NyAva SUrTRAs, 1. 16 An. TID. 14. A number of Sitras An. V. 86. SEL PRaABODHACHANDRODAYA. Act. 5, verse 15 An. VI, 44. RIGVEDA. 10. 81. 3 An. V. 15, S/ASVATA’S GLOSSARY. 320 An. ए. 126, S’VETASVATARA UPANISHAD. ` An. IIT. 25. 0 Mah. I. 149. ` ef, An. VI. 1, 5 Mah. ४. 11, An. VI 45. Mah. V. 73. 00 Taittiniya ARANYAKA. _ 10, 10. 8 An. IV. 22, Mah. III. 75. Tarrrimiya UPANISHAD. — 2.4 cf. An. Mah. V. 66. VAISESHIKA SUTRAS. Some of the principal Sitras An. V. 85. | | Visoyu PURANA. 2. 16. 22 An. V. 60. Yoaa 81.48, . 8-8 ef. An. IT. 33. 1. 15, 16 An. introd to. I }. xd 1. 30 An. VI. 19, Mah. VE. 20. | 2. 26 Mah. IIT. 44. $12 QUOTATIONS WHICH I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO VERIFY.! The numbers refer to the pages and lines of my edition. च्वांकारखाथशब्दख EIA etc. 2. 13. wawerara परं विद्यते 37०४1, 7. 14. अबोभयोः समो दोषः परिद्ारो etc. 8. 3. wafer म बन्धो ऽचि etc. 8. 13. न यात्नवादाञ्नभसो farafer etc. 16. 1. पापेन ace य।ति, पुष्येन ख्याति, च्रानेन Yee याति Srati, 27. 11. म ख भासामभावस्य तमस्त्वं etc. 32. 1. तमः VS TSANG परापरविभागवत्‌ etc. 32. 12. भ्रषानाच्छबव्ञायते Sruti, 41. 3. WY Be ते सवं Sora प्रतिसंचरे otc. Sruti, 44. 3. कमेभिमत्यु्धधयो निषेदुः etc. Sruti, 44. 15. (cf. Simkhya-tattva- kaumudi to Kariké 2). सा fe खथमाशापि seqeat etc. 48. 13. स fe safaqaag wat Srati, 51. 1. नुमेयेग GIT प्रसिडं च etc. 55. 3. त रव fe farang सुच्वमामेष्‌ cic. 84. 4. आदित्यं तै चचगेष्छति Sruti, 97. 2. wey प्राणाः Sruti, 115. 10. (cf. Taitt. Up. 8. 7. 1). देवादौ षडविषख स्यात्षंखारः etc. 135. 9. | दण मन्बमारालोड तिष्ठमोन्द्रियचिन्रकाः etc. 139. 3. ee ee ee 1. Among the following passages, those which are said to ‘have been taken from Sruti are also not found in Colonel Jacob’s Concordance which has lately appeared. It may, therefore, be coucluded that these passages are not real quotations, but statements of scriptural ideas. 313 atawa fe विदन्दषायासाभ्यां fagea Sruti, 154. 9. दोखयेव गरो सुश्येतिष्ठे कक्षो ऽपि etc. Sruti, 155. 9. स्वेतः सारमादग्यादश्लभ्य इव काञ्चनम्‌ 166. 7. सश्रादषटचिनःद्याः खतिनौोजष्य etc. 172. 4. पथानाखजमदुत्पस्यवे Srati, 184. 6. यावचाव्बतिरेकिलयं शतां गेनापि etc. 193. 7. arecraty राणो रासोत्‌ Srati, 202. 11. = “+ “"*. ~ Sah ऽनयत, लसमालपसतेपानाश्वयो वेदा अजायन्त Srati, 202. 11. wR भाधरसंविन्तिमे भागमसतो ऽपि च etc. 208. 3 विडस्ामौरपोश्येत, मोनिषेध्राककख सः etc, 234, 11 | | UIs: प्रसर दरूपाः खरिताषस्य (or walfeaTwea) ete. 243.6; 2५५, 4. = = - प्राणा्सवंमजायत ६०४, 248. 3. ` ‹ ` ot 4 @ अगिवादितख् यी fas खाशिषं etc. 254. 9. Gran कनादिक्पर्ेन्मा agate etc. 276. 9. अना FWA Srati (?), 291. 1. | ie. - 40 314 READINGS IN THE INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY MANUSCRIPT OF THE ANIRUDDHAVRITTI, DIFFERING FROM THE TEXT OF MY EDITION. ate taal Page 1, line 2 खङ्कनिदानाय omitted. 1.5 साधन added with ए. 1.6 डिधा. 1.7 विरजे with A. 2.11 emwrerdq averse with ए. 2.12 तथा च add. with A. 2.14 विनिःक्राग्तो with B, वेन ate with ए. 3.1 fxe instead of feae. 3.6 gearart with A. 3.10 गपरपरया० with B. 8.12 we with AB. 5.4 दुःखानि° with AC, ati. ०. न. 6.10 श्यौ वसन्ति with B. 6.11 वा ४११. with B. 7.12 भविष्यतौत्याद. 8.3 वासन 1. ०, arem 8.4 पथेगुयोष्यः wrute with B. 9.5 न्त्यजाड with B. 10. 4 नन्‌ om. with AC. 10.5 eaare with ए. 10.11 oaaty with B. 10. 14 रत्या. 11.8 compare with 8. 11. 5 खसङ्खो ऽयं you दूति om. with BC. 11.12 सुक्ानामपि i. ०. सुक्रातनामपि. 12. 7 °त्यजाड. 12. 14 त्यज सिदधाममा with B. 17. 1, 2 उपरागः 1. ०, उपरब्योपरञ्कमभावः with B. 17.4 संतानि with AC. 17. 8 वासनाया with AC, 18. 1 ¶्रसब्धवे. 19. 8 omy: fafa: uy aware. 19.6 च चणिके with B. 19. 9 म om. with AC. 20.1 epareacearaitat with BC. 20.16 श्त्यबाद with B. 21.12 इति add. with AC. 22.6 केपाननम्तरमपख्मारादिना मरणात्‌ 1. 0. चेषानन्तरं मडि- ष्यादिमरणशं. 22.7 ACW 1. ०. मरण० and मरण ° 1. ०. मरणे. 22. 14 चेत्‌ 1. ०. @u. 23.4 arg with B. 23. 4, 5 खवयव्यभावाव्‌ i. ०. खवयवातिरिख्या- बयविनै भावात्‌. 28.6. ewer Waa. 23.7 षखतोति with B. 23.12 सदभावाल्द्षानुमानं with 8. 24.2 qom. with B. 24.10, 11 wana fare. 25.11, 12 तस्याप्रच्यवाद्‌ ° i. ०. तस्य सद्धावाद्‌०. 25.14 ° हेतुत्वं 1. ०. Sgr. 26. 6 कतुम्‌ 1. ०. amy. 26.8 ° विष्यति with B. 26.12 °तुखयोमकेमा° १. ०. तुष्यचेमा०. 27.2 हि 80१. with BO, श्एन्वसद्धावः with 8, खभावाय ¡, ०. aera. 27.6 श्न्यवादिनं निराकतु om. with A, 80.7 गत्यजाह. 30,18 गद्डः 1. 0. cyan. 80.13, 14 waetacere with B. 80,14 we: with ए. 81. 6 भाभावद्म i. ०. अभावसख्वम. 31.8 af€ om. 82. 5 भाभावस्वम 1. o. भावस्तम, भाभावे 1.0. भावे with 8. 32.7 सति ०0. withA. 88. 2 tape with B. 35.6 न्न्राणानि 1. ०. न्न्राणद्छानि, 35.8 च 00. with. 35. 11 °मुमानं with B, प्रातिजैम्येनाद with B. 86. 11 संत ° with AC. 37. 10 तथयाश्या ० 1. ०. Fate. 87.12 ofc 010. with B. 38.7 पुष्षविवेक ० with ©. 98. 12 fate i. ०. ऽविश्चा०, 88. 18 earnea i, 0. °माचादिति ग. 39.10 816 aay sorway with B. 40.8 gare. 41. 7 यद्धभा० with ए, काये i. 0. काय, 43.8 इत्यम०1. ०. इत्याम्‌ 44. 9 सत्कायी om. 44,11 ° विमोका, 45.2 ऋषये om. with 28, पर 000. 45.7 गतिः with AB, 46.3 म समवम्‌ 1. ०. समान- wy. 46.6 ब्य with B. 46.9 चानु° with A. 46. 12 eqe with B. 47. 14 चडाद्याका० 1. ०. चडाका०. 47. 14, 48. 1 effauqafy. 48.2 इति 0४. 48. 6 खविकश्यकं नि्विंकस्पकं च. 48. 10 aafee with B. 48.14 werwert fe corrected into ase हि, 49. 12, 18 माब्ापकलादिराषः. 50.8 ज om. with B. 60. 6 we add. before कटेल्ा० 51.8 वैति ००. 52.11 नित्यः with BC. 53.7 गकरणशबस्येतौदमावतं नोयस्‌ with ए. 53.8 the parenthesis om. with BC. 54.1 ब्धः 1. 0 wat. 55.8 यक्रोपटेष्ः. 55 9,10 arqtesafafe ;. ०. म पोदषेयत्बमिति. 55.11 arr गब्द्‌शब्ट्‌ः i. o. श्वानं शब्दः. 55.12 ay इति add. before शाक्षा०. 56.6 caw i. ०. नगक Waa. 56.7 वा). ०. च. 66. 15 wau with B, रवं altered into खव. 57 2 तथाऽदगेनात्‌. 57.4 कमणा with B. 59.4 que io. wae. 59.14 qurae with B, इति om. with AB. 60.9 ग्दकतर० with B. 62.7 wae add. before arate. 62.12 aq om. with B. 63.8 बा om. with B. 68. 10 gdafafa with B. 64.5 न २११. before भावे. 65.4 तष्डस - wife with B. 65.11 विवेके with AB; this has been altered into fateae on the margin, but the correction has been afterwards blotted out again. 66.9 खपि om. with B. 67.7 त्यजति with ©, sfaat om. 68.6 ०मेदतस्त० 1. 0. eye. 69.11 ogeqo with ए. 71.6 ग्नुपुरेख with B. 78.10 esate with AC. 73.11 aq om. with B. 73.18 इत्यादि with B. 74.15 awerfee add. with AC. 75. 1 तेव with ए. 76.2 seat with ए. 76.8 यद्याक्मापि with AC. 80.10 aq add. before पुश्षकटत्व, अजं om., सत्वात्‌ 1. ०. सत्यताव्‌. 81.5 Gare with AC. 82.5 wraraa with B. 82.10 बामरेवादिमुंश्ो नादेतम्‌ has been altered into वामदैवादिसुक्मादंतम्‌. 83.2 इत्यजा. 88. 10 owe} ऽस्य 1. ०. ompR: स्यात्‌ 88. 18 सवै° om. with B. 84.2 g@ with AC, 84.18 इत्यजा with B 87.1 fagwarara with B. 87.6 ofrqqte i. ०. offrqare, 88.2 aay with BC. 88.5 तु 1. ०. "वच ०. 88.15 cewargrarcum. 88.16 AAG with AC. 89. 1 च add. before नौव. 89.2 विवेकेन qrara with ए. 89.11 yea 1. ०. भुलाकमन्येवाव्माने. 90.12 serfas om. with ए. 90.18 पर्ष with the other MSS. 90. 18, 14 ogfutq लध्यासः with AC. 91.9 sma: with B. 98.1 दष्टः with AC. 98.11 q@rfi.o. खाये. 98. 12 sam i.o. am. 94.4 खआादिग्ब्दश्च with B. 95.3 we with BC. 95. 14 रकाद with ए. 96.10 qwatfcaae. 96.11 Qaararatfge with B. 97.9 wfwze om, with ए. 100, 1 ecqqarn with AB. 100.4,5 316 afcatata मलानि 1. ०. swuroedtem: with ए. 101.10 seurate with ए; 102.2 fqretfgrar:. 102.6 खतिरपि arr fe लप्रमाखं with ए. 103.1 eae, 106.9 गइंधामान्च परः with B. 107.5 पुषा with 0. 10% 10 exarequtval (the correct reading). 109.7 ° दित्वत शा. 109.13, 18 कुजोपभोज. 109. 14 quatcwa with ए. 118. 1 dtarete with BC, 118. 9 यद्याश्मनो with B. 115. । ग्मत्पनिरपि with ए. 116.2 qat with AB. 116.10 ofww@@ with ए. 117.14 भषद्चमरशाखयभावख with B; 118.1] swwe with B. 121.1 जाप्रत्पूत्ययस्यापि with 8. . 121. 12,13 wafafzo with B. 123.2 रानोपरति ° with KB. 123.10 श्यानसिखिः om, 124. 1 चरणं with C. 124. 2 Visarga om. with B. 125.9 ° निरोधस्यो- पायमाड with 8. 126.7 qufiqare om. 127.4 owe with B, grafefae with the other MSS. 127.10 efear. 129.5 eqget with A, Visarga om. with ए. 129.9 edeare with A. 130.4 fetter तुदिः om. 135. 7 °प्रमेदाः with A. 185.10 » च्िरेक्ः तथा, but the Visarga is effaced. 135. 11 खावरादोनां with ए. 137.3 खदिकाः with B. 187.4 eae with ए. 187. 4, 5 aaa: कथं with ए. 139.4 चा ° with A. 189. 10,11 गत्या with B. 141.8 fae i. ०. fae with B. 142.9 चान्धारापादि with ए. 143.6 गनिमान० with B. 144. 6 तु om. with ए. 144.11 cat इतरन्न- Wray with ए. 145. 1 न २११. with AB, but afterwards effaced. 145.10 ofartw:. 146.5 om. before waa. 146.6 ome om. with ए, 147. 11 vate io. प्रहछति१. 148. 1 षरहन्नस्यापि with B. 148.2 त्याम्‌ add. before निबवतते. 148.3 पुष्षस्य्मा० 1. ०. पुष्य. 149.17 care with B. 150.4 कोष० with AC. 150.13 इति om. with ए. 151.3 क om: with B. 151.9 नेतोत्यात्मा i. ०. teat. 152..5 विदेकिनां i. ०. विवेकिन. 153.7 qom. with B, 154.3 egfmfefe:. 156. 11 Fate i, ०. We. 1867, 2 ग्या om. with ए, 158.4 पानैरा० with AC. , 160. 6 निःश 161.8, 9 गलात्खस्व with ए. 162. 1 ° जिखवंयनोवत्‌ with the other MSS; 182. 2 निखवेयनो with the other MSS, 162. 5 care: om. with B. 165. § ena with BC. 165.5, 6 प्रतो चमाणा उचिद्रा with ए. 165.14 ane with C. 166.5 ग्यिगा उपविद्या with B. 169.12 wawia: with B. 170 5 eqrercryay with ए. 170.7 qom. 170. 10 गपशप शाग्डत्वा with the other MSS. 171.8 capare with B. 171.14 ख om. with B, डि add, with B after धमेललाभाय. 172. 1 amet with B. 172. 8 च om. with B. 178.15 न्येगादा with ए. . 174. 8 शुकवत्‌ between न and कामसौरिनं with ए. 174.11 गभूतेव i. ०. "भूतैवम्‌. 175. 12 क्राण्ठ०.. 176. 2 ममै- वासाद्यख्च with B. 176. 8 मलिने. 176.9 afet with B. 177.4 दव add. with B. 178.1 ऽपि add, with AC. 178.4 न तथा with AC, 178. 817 10 wetefadere: ` 180.5 पश्यं with ए. 180.6 परार्थं with A, “182: mite 1. ०. कारशस्य. 188.7 प्रभाषानि add. with B. 185.4 earwre (the correct reading). 187.8 we’ with AC. ` 187.14 ° दुह्यत with AC. 188.15 efarq.om. with ए. 191.5 wadd. after अकाले 191.7,8 कयकरथं., 191.14 qortrete with ©. 192.3 सपे with B 193. 4 egrfer wate with the other MSS. 198 गडवात्िप्रनिरिवि 199:3 खथ 1. 0०. यश्च with B. 201. च ०५१. with B. 201.5 e@xez 1. ०, ogee. 202.5 तल्िङेः with AC. :202.11 राजि with AC. .. 208.2 2 wae 208. 4 इत्यजा. 205. 10 प्रमाणानां add. with AC. 206.2 esercw with C. 207.10 @arne with B. 208.12 fadwateary with B. 210; 2 प्रलोतिवशं with B. 211.1011 ofewrn दूति with B, 212.11 owe i, 0. wale with B. 215. 8 नानम्दो 1. ०. खानन्दौी ग. 215. 11, 12 Fenty नाभि i. 0. fawtt गाभिर with ए. 215.12, 15 सत्वल्लान्च तयोः with Be 216. 2 o@tare with AC.. 218. 10 मनो with B. 221.7 कार्यस 1. ०. काये०. 222.8 ofaya with AC. 222.9 ° परिणामिल्रेन has been altered into °परिमाणलन. 223. 8 qwer चणिकलात्‌ with B. 225.10 न भावियोगो भागस्य. 226. 8 गप्रा्भिरेव with €. 227. 4 च 00. .228. 3 (1... with B, परिमाषशथङ्क ० with 8. 228. 5 eq@exwaqo with B. 228,11 रिति ताद with AC. 229. 4 owfage withthe other MSS., fat: with AC. 229. 5 wey om. with ए. 229.14 ° इद्ध ° 1..0. ° जहल. 280. 6, 7 omeps दशा० with AC (the correct reading). : 231. 13 aferita. 231.13 Tat लाख भत्यचं मात्मा तथेति कथे Te दत्यत छा. 282. 7 eehyo i..o. oh 232 11 परिम्मके, 288. 1 काखवश्योग० with ए. 284.9 समेत with AO. 235.6 बङतरार्पागयव with 2, 236.2 owafti.o. र कण्येः. 236. 10 खन्यते sap; 237.4 on the margin: भेमिप्ादकमानाभावादिति gern. 287.8 म खं with the other MSS. 288.3 खमवायो का with the other MSS, 288. 4 प्रतिभासः 1. 0०. संप्रतिभासः. 238.5 af: with the other MSS, 239.13 weaqo 1. ०. प्रत्यस्य. 240.1 gom. 240. 8 न संयोगविभागयोरिति }. o. भान्तिः. 241.9 omfratye 1. ०. °कराप०. 242. 2 ate om., यत्प्राप्तप्रकाश्- कलम्‌ 01. 248. 1 नकर om. with ए. 244. 4 स्फरिताच्स्य with B. 244, 5 बोधकाः with the other MSS. 244,12 gaye. 246. 6 tepare with AB, 246.10 eetaferae with 8. 247. 9,10 ee चान्यदनपभोगात्‌ with ए. 249.8 weadterct with AC. 249.9 afwaa with B. 249.10 निरोधः with AC. 251.14 gem. 251. 16 vatadearcrenfacerfi. 252.10 इषोमे wa with 0. 252. 11 नाना० i. ०. मन्दतरादि° with ए. 252. 14 ° त्यजा. 253.6 खा० 1.०. च. 253. 18 ote with AC. 254. 2 जनग्प्राग्तर० with B. 256.2 इषः with B. 256.11 व्याप्ररूपस्य with 8. 818 256.12 ower खात्‌. 258. 1 एयक twice with B. 258.5 ऽपि add. with B. 268.7 vay Geni. o. wey wer. 258.13 ऽपि add. before चेति. 260 ofeufaam. 260.7 e@wte with B. 260.8 senfy with ए. 261.3 omcawiragifa. 261.5 ewe with B. 261.8 शल्लापुचकव ०. 262.6 न add. before wet. 262.7 faqatereregwate. 263.10 निःचिपके. 268. 10 खन्यथापुदषाधेलसू्‌.. 268. 11 gatare: with B. 269.6 °्जेरादिः with the other MSS. 271.16 बार 1. ०. qe with B. 272.18 faire. 274. ¢ earaifeate. 274.12 प्रसादाभावात्‌- 275.1 किं 1. ०. छतं. 275.6 न्भाविन्न किं with B. 276. 10 aqre Ye. 276. 8 °विराषाल्कुत० 277. 15 agua 1. ०. प्रधानता. 279. 1 बतोयाध्यायै. 280. 10 ofafawge with BC. 282.8 arate. 282.4 *खेत्याद with B. 282.11, 12 उपाधिंसत्यल्य* विराधः om. with B. 284.2 भ्रकाग धेल यक्तम्‌. 284.8 ° पञ्चे with B. 284. 14 ववद्ारादन्धथा° with the other MSS. 285.7 खविवेकानामे °. 985.8 wa add. before eae with ए, °पक्तेर० 1. 0. ०पत्चाव० with ए. 285. 10 यथालाव तमव शानां. 285.11 ofairas with BC. 285.14 qaarra, saaa with C. 287.3 लम्नदोषः. 287.7 este with the other MSS 287. 9 eangaaqam. 287.11 orate. 287.12 etc. always तदम शः with AC. 289.7,8 चिदवसानादादमन्नानावसानलात्‌. 289.13 खअति० with BC. 290.5 eats om. 290.9 पवमेवोक्रम्‌ with AC. 291. 5 ख व्यापक- लात्‌ om. with ए, रवं om. with B. 291.6 wae भोगप्रसङ्खं with B 291. 16 ay om. 292.7 ewe: with B. 292. 11 मिच्येवा ° with AC 292. 18 efeddma@terde. 292.5 °दपेश्रति०. 292.6 ऽपरिणामिलाद्‌ ०. 294.12 न्कारषं with 8. 296. 1 वायुवद्कि ° with B. 296. 2 °सयोगविशि- wy. 297.6 सरकारिल, तस्या GIVI GTA. 298.9 °भाव० om. before संबन्धा, with B, सादिबाव्‌ with B. 299.5 earfea गरोरम्‌. 299. ¢ इति om. with AC. 800.2 वलतः. 3800.6 Gata: add. after surat. | $19 CORRECTIONS OF THE PRESS. p. 2,1. 6 read ‘himself’ instead of ‘ myself.’ 7, ,, 28 } 99 999 ] 11,” 8, 4 blot out the strokes. ,» 68, ,, 13 read littga instead of linga.- » + + 32 gg: «(UAGHhnyabhdvah,, , vahnyabhdevah. » 64, ,, 28 put a comma between ‘ these’ and ‘ then.’ », 67, ,, 16 read ‘ unreality ’ instead of ^ un-reality.’ » 80,,,81 ,, ‘Lingapurapa’ ,, ,, ‘Lingapurdna.’ » 80 + 82 ,, ‘S’ahkara’ » 9 ‘S’ankara,’ १ 94, 5, 27 blot out the bracket. » 95, ,, 28 put a bracket after ‘ principles.’ + 123, ,, 28 read ‘ does’ instead of ‘ doess.’ ») 124, ,, 20 blot out the brackets. » 183, ,, 1 read ‘acquiescence’ instead of ‘ aquiescence.’ +» 160, +, 29 put a colon instead of the semicolon before ‘ because.’ ” 165, 99 23 : only.’ 169, ,, 19 ‘ time.’ 2 1 0, és 2 put a comma after 4 , ware? » % + 22 ‘rule.’ » + + 91 read atiprasanga instead of atiprasanga. » 171, ,, 5 blot out the comma after ‘ required.’ » # 3 6 put a comma after ‘ meditation,’ +» 185, ,, 18 read ‘mouth’ instead of ‘ month,’ 9 3 | १» 32, ‘at’ ” ‘ot.’ », 191, ,, 18 put a comma after ‘ concomitated.’ +» 192, ,, 2read ‘against’ instead of ‘ againss.’ »» 194, at the top read V. 29, 30. 9 +) + 1, 27 put a comma after ‘ principle.’ +> 200, + 34 read fle instead of tle. » 202, ,, 81 ,, fankd ,, >» fankd. » 208, ,,85 + Unga ,, 5, linga. », 216, ,, 18 put ` at the end of the line. 9) 9 9927 read ‘[The multiplicity of souls]’ instead of ‘The multipli- city [of souls] ’. » 219, $ 22:put a comma instead of the semicolon. 9, 293, +, 26 blot out the comma after ‘ which.’ 9» 246, ,, 27 disjoin ‘ nature of.’ ») 257, + 19 read ‘ Therefore’ instead of ‘ Therfore.’ » 259, +, 16 put the words ‘ or impression, samskdra’ in square brackets, » 266, + 26 blot out the comma after ‘ arises.’ », 269, ) 11 read ‘the’ before ‘ possessed.’ 820 p. 276, 1. 13 blot out " after ‘ etc.’ », 282, ,, 38 put ”* after * people-’ », 285, ,, 8 put acomma after ‘ Matter.’ »» 287, +, 12 blot out the bracket after ° diversity.’ » +» ) +, 21 read ‘ Svetasv.’ instead of ‘ Svetasv.’ 9» 291, ,, 33 ,, prasangdt , , # १9. prasangat. 09 297, 99 18 99. 0 ae = । 99 82 0. 9ॐ ॐ 7 99 26 ” ) & 23 ° 99 ]. » 298, ,,24 ,, ‘Hereby’ ,, ,, ‘Here by.’ 303, ,,29 + ‘unconnected » ‘un-connected.’ », 304, + 30 एणं a comma after‘ lord.” _ | [त ६ This list of errata has become regrettably long. I should have been able to secure a greater typographical accuracy to this volume, if I could havé read more than a single proof myself elt See ) त) =+ =+ ~ ~ + ~~ न्ड क Pe re | ~ -~ ~न ~~ -- ~ ॥ har es ~ ++ ih = ir व १ च + भ ५ a TI 4 ~ ~ 4 ऋ, 4 * 9 -+ 5 १५५. „९ oe oy 2: | ॥ क) J १. ॥ ~ tf. ह ~ । ५ + * ^ क + Se SAY # wwe 9 % | =. ~+ ; ५ ; +^ ` hee ` an \ : ey Oe ul छ # + + : att Y । >. ¬ $ . + Tr a ५ ‘ ” fi i क अ ल od | i र - 3 र ॥६। re + (^ aie (1 र) 4 +, 4 5 om oan > ~ न~ 2 = ~ 1 i a oy ; ty i {न | | ५ ay | | | 3 2044 019 032 9 NOTICES DOES NOT EXEMPT THE BORROWER FROM OVERDUE FEES Harvard College Widener Library Cambridge; MAO21 38 (61 7) 495 2413 | : vb न bud WES Var > ee 1 ५16 ^ Cc 3 - 1 are Digitized by ष 0041८ eee O `