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BIBLIOTHECA INDICA :
COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. New Serizs, Nos. 965, 986, 1017, 1055, 1091 anp 1157 oe T T 1 CLOKAVARTTIKA TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSKRIT WITH EXTRACTS FROM
THE COMMENTARIES OF SUCARITA MISRA (THE K@sik@) ann PARTHA SARATHI MISRA (THE Nydyarainakara).
C0) mae eee Sw =o oa —— [~ ~) यय =e [व ~= a ae — i SE ———s eee =a [=-= [~ क ययः eee —— — aa प्य य,
||
चच MDCCXLVI-MDCCXCN
BY GANGANATHA JHA, M.A.,
PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT, MUIR CENTRAL COLLEGE, ALLAHABAD.
CALCUTTA: PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS AND PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY, 57, PARK STREET. 1907.
EA
1
CLOKAVARTIKA.
The theory of the extraneous character of authoritativeness (38) The theory refuted (47) ee vee Notion of unauthoritativeness due to extraneons influences (53) Three forms of unanuthoritativeness (54) Sas ह Excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of unauthoritativeness (65-66) Absence of an Anthor safeguards the Veda against all reproach (68) Only human assertions dependent npon other Pramdnas(71) =, ००. The authoritativeness of Pramdzas does not lie in their compatiblity with one another (78) ae a sit a The falsity of a Conception explained (86) ५३ Inference not applicable to Veda (89) =... i oe Undispnted anthority of the Veda (95-96) Veda not due to human origin (97-98) Falsity due to non-productiveness of conceptions (101-102) ‘Pratyayita’ explained (102-103) Force of the word ‘ Va’ (109-10) No omniscient person (111) ... Inference and Sense-perception not applicable to objects in the future (115) Veda not the work of an Omniscient Antbor (120) Scriptures composed by human beings not fully anthoritative (122) No gronnds for assuming the existence of an omniscient person (132) i The character of the Veda itself does not lend support to the theory of an Omniscient Anthor (149) ... Absnrdity incnrred in denying the anthority of the Veda (154) The sentence ^ Nanvavidusham, Sc., explained (155 स The Buddhistic Scriptures false, becanse composed by human beings ( 169) The sentence ‘ Nanu s¢émdnyatodrshtam, Sc., explained (174-75) s ‘Na, anyatwat’ explained (175) oes - ‘Na hi anyasya, Sc., explained (181-82) Arguments in support of the authenticity of the Veda (184) ‘ Pratyakshastu, ¥c., explained (187) Full signification of the word ‘ Dharma,’ (190) Other meanings refuted (195-96) be No Apérva apart from a potentiality of the Sacrifice (197) Objections based upon the significance of the word ‘ Codand’ (201) Reply to these : Godand cannot be restrioted to positive activity only (200) Cadand refers to Injunctions as well as Probibitions (215-16) Two kinds of consequences following from Sacrifices (221-22) Action not prohibited cannot be sinful (232-83) Result not always similar to the Action (235-36) ५ Vedic Injunctions and Prohibitions the only means of knowing Dharma and Adharma (242-43) sae Utilitarian theory of Virtue not tenable (246-47) Nor tlie ‘ Conscience ’ theory (247-48) Saorifioial Slanghter not sinful (259) ae 7, hes ‘ Oyéna’ 88011066 sinful, because resulting in the death of a person (267) Interpretation of the Sutra justified (277-78)
Page.
CONTENTS, 111
Page Stiitra ITI— Declaration of the subject-matter ०९५ sis x 67 Declaration of the snbject-matter of the Treatise (1-2 a si 67 Sttra IV—
Sense-perception not the means of knowing Dharma... sis 68-112
The Sétra cannot be taken as embodying a definition of Sense-percep=- tion (1) ae ide ak see sae 68
Change of reading proposed by the Vrtti, with a view to make it a 16 पाषा definition (13) .. ०५५ ५५१ oF se ae 69 Trae meaning of the Sétra (20) nes ००५ ae sae 70 Sense-perception not applicable to Dharma (36) es ese ua 19 Necessity of the word ‘sat’ (36) ae ies eas wo 73 The particle ‘sam’ (88-39)... . ses se ००० 74 Functioning of the senses explained (44) 458 हः न 74 The words ‘ purusha’ and ‘indriya’ (52) ms ४9 sa 76 ˆ Buddhijanma,’ (58-54) o eo tai os 76 Why Sense-perception is not applicable to Dharma (59) ks ee 77 Self-recognition not the true resnlt of Praména (79) ss os 80 Inference, &c., preceded hy Sense-perception (87)... ” ,„ 8४ Inference not applicable to Dharma (99) ह so 84 Analogy ,, se ध (100) ss sek 85 Apparent Inconsistency not applicable to Dharma (101-102)... es 85 Veda the only means of knowing Dharma (108) ae a si 86 Inference is based npon Senso-perception (111) dia ai ae 87 Védanta theory controverted (114-116)... ise ५ 81 Abstract perception of an object (118-19) A ८ ai 88 3 —How made Concrete (120) __... su ६७ ss 88 Cognition of Class cannot be inferential (138) aes ५५५ “as 92 Samavdya (148)... nee “sie „ 94 Mixed functioning of various sense-organs (159) =... ies as 96 The numbers of Senses only Five (169) ge sis 98 Exclusive ohjects of the Sense-organs differentiated (170) १ ९ 98
Cognition of objects not in the form of identification with their verhal expressions (172) ००. eve ००५ ove ist 98 Cognition of objects independent of verbal expressions (176)... we =: 99
The class ` cow ’ not cognised always in the form of the word ‘cow’(180)... 100 Apparent identity of the Word, the Idea, and the Object explained (183) ... 100
Imposition of the form of the word on the object is impossible (183) a | AO Words not independent of the material forms of objects (193) 102
In the expression ‘blne lotus,’ there can be no absolute non-difference between a particular blueness and a particular lotus (197) = ,,, ` LOS
Another reason against the imposition of the forms of words पतत objects (200) ,.. fag re ०० 104 Until the object is known, the Word cannot give any idea of it (203) ‘ae ee Te ‘es 5
Objects do not depend upon words (205) “+e
CLOKAVARTIKA.
Page. It is the form of the object that is cognised through the Word, which cannot suppress it (206) a 4५ इ , 105 If verbal forms were imposed upon words, the meaning of the word ‘hasta would differ from that of the word ‘kara’ (208) ... ००९ we 108 The Imposition theory would falsify all Inference and Verbal Testi- mony (213) ००५ ५९५ us ve 106 The form of the Object not dependent upon Word (215) fi « 106 The relationship between Words and Objects is eternal (219)... ० 106 In the case of Proper Names also, the words are eternal: it is only their particular application that has a beginning in time (224) =... ,, 108 Denotativeness of words not always due to Convention (226) 108 Conventional restriction explained (228) ०५. -* 109 The factors of Memory and Perception explained (230-31) me „० 109 Sense-perception precisely explained (236-37) eee is . 110 Cognitions undefined only so long 88 words are not found (245-46) 11 It is the Classes of Objects and their various relationships (as expressed in inferential arguments) that are amenable to Sense-perception, which would not be possible if Perceptive Cognition were always undefined (247-48) ... 111 The name of ‘Sense-perception’ applicable to only such cognitions as follow directly from Sense-contact (255) 112 Sutra V.— Authoritativeness of Injunction ... see wa sls ooo 113-408 Section 1: Vértika proper on the S#tra र, oes ६ ve {12-16 Dharma not amenable to any other Means of 10166 (2) = ,,, “is 219 Injunction, the only meang of knowing if (8) a a ५ 114 Necessity of having recourse to Injunction (14) tea ies “oe 918 SEcTION 2: Introduction to the Vrition the Sitra ... ००५ 116-19 Transposition of the words ‘tat’ and ‘sat’ in Sitra (4), makes it a defini- tion of Sense-peroeption (19-20) ee ek es "1.0 Section 3: Nirdlambanavdda ... ‘ee ‘ive tee ee 119-48 Necessity of the Disoussion (1-3) ie ‘ei ae ew 119 Reality of External Objects (4) न “as ee „5 119 ^ Samurti Reality ’ synonymous with ‘ falsity’ (8-9) ... my pee 126 Pleasures of Heaven not similar to Dreams (11)... ie + ` 120 Diversity of opinion among various 8610118 of the Bauddhas {14-16) 120 Two kinds of Denia! of External Objects (17-18)... 121
CONTENTS,
The Idealistic Position Expounded (20-22) : ०५९ The Reply given by the Bhashya held by some people to be in-
adequate (28-29) aa aes os ie The Reply otherwise explained (30) ae ae Se es Necessity of the Reality of the External Word (32) ... ५९ ००, Denial of the Reality of Conceptions renders even the Bauddha tenet un-
tenable (34) ee ace ne न इ Impossibility of Inference, if objecte not real (35) =... ot une Denial of the reality of external objects ie self-contradictory (53) vie Superfluity of the Idealistic Argument (60) se ९९६ one Cognitions are without substratum only at the time of their actual appear-
ance (63) ०, eee ००५
If Cognitions were always without substratum they would never be amen ahle to Inferential Argumentation (65-66) ६ wee
Universally recognised Distinctions between Virtue and Vice, Teacher and Pupil, &o., would not be possible, if there were no reality in objects (72-73) ‘ व
Idealism contradicted by facts of ordinary experience (74) see
If all Ideas are false, there ie universal negation (74-75)
Counter-argument against Idealism (79-80) eis
Certain eelf-contradictions in the ldealistic theory (81-82) ४६
If Idealism be accepted, all systems of Philosophy are equally {2156 (85-87
There conld he no distinction between false dream cognition and true waking
cognition, both being equally unreal (88-89) oe ००१ ००७ No Yogic faculty oan supply the necessary explanation (93-94) ... ००५ Another eelf-contradiction in the Idealistio theory (99-100) a ०५९
The Middle Term of the Idealistio Argument is one that 18 not recognised by the other party (101-102) ee es
The Middle Term of the Argument contradictory and the Instance incom patible (106-107) ०५५
The causes of certain common delusions explained (109-13) a
Only mistaken cognitions can he said tobe devoid of real substratum (117-19) as vis dee ०५७ is
No Instance of Dissimilarity mentioned in the Idealistic Argument (121-22)
The Mention of such an Instance wonld involve a double negation, ४.९.) an affirmation—which would be impossible if no objects existed (124-25)
A reasoning to be effective muet be acceptahle to both parties (130-31)
The Argument brought forward by the Idealist shonld contain nothing that he does not accept to be true (143) ai me sea ae:
That whioh is now held to be unreal could never have been real (156) oy
No reality can proceed from a reasoning that is unreal (159)...
The Chief Elements in the reasoning of the Idealist are admittedly nnreal (168)
Worldly activity not explicable by mere Idea (169) ve No specification of Vasand possible (178-79) ae ४ No proof for the existence of 2०५१, (180-81) aos aa
72547025, even if extant, could never bring about offects in a serial order (192-93) eee aac ५०४ ५५४ ove 99४
CLOKAVARTIKA.
Page. It is only a permanent sonl that can eerve as the substratum of Vasana@s (199-200) ; ०० ** we 147 Buddha propounded the Idealsitic theory with the sole view of turning the minds of men away from wordly objects (202) —«s. ००७ ,,„ 148 Section 4: Qunyavada ase ५, one se 1+ 148-82 Inferential Idealistic arguments exponnded in detail (2—63) oe No difference between the shape of the Cognition and the Cognised (6) ... 148 It is only that which is cognised that can have an existence (7) ,,५, 148 The sbape cognised cannot belong to the external object (9) = ,,, .. 149 The character of the Cogniser cannot be attributed to the Object (13) ‘en 49 The real character of Cognitions is absolutely pure, and it is only ever- continning Vésands that make it appear in diverse forms (15-17) as, 14 Another reason for attributing the form to Cognitions (21) re 150 Otherwise the Cognition conld not appear prior to the comprehension of the Ohjects (25) ue >~ 450 Third Argnment to show that the form belongs to Cognitiong (32) ०, 151
The form of the Object cannot be said to be imposed npon the Cognition (35) 151 The form cannot he held to be a property of the contact of the Cognition
with the Object (42) ध ve २ vet. "102 Any such Contact not possible in the case (48) we „०, 152 The Idea and the Object both cannot have the same form (55) we 185 Refutation of the above arguments (64-263) dee ए Idea cannot be both the Cogniser and the Cognised (64 eee fon 190
The case of Self is different—It oan be both—This fact explained (67) i ^ 190 There is often an idea of the Cognisable Object without that of the Cognising
Idea (79) ee a Eos «056 The comprehension of the Object alone, or of the Idea alone, oannot be ex-
plained on the mere ground of Capability or Incapability (95) ce Las The difference between Object and Idea not oue of Time and Form
only (100) si (१ कि ave ४. 1600 Predicability and Knowability explained (103) ध ee js ©6159 No absolute difference between any two objects (105) Te . 160 Cognition being one, the difference in conceptions 18 due to a diversity among
objects (116) ... my ae 161 A single object never cognised as both Comprehender and Comprehend-
ed (120) ae ५ 161 Duality of Existence—Comprehender and Comprehended—fully establish
ed (129) Ae ७१७ wet अ ae se 102 No Apoha [00881016 (136) a Sas sie bis we 164 Reasons against the assumption of Apoha (137) + : 2s ` 164
The character of Idea belongs to the Comprehonder only (148-49) ०, 165
CONTENTS.
Ideas cannot have, among themselves, the relation of the Conceived and the Means of Conception (149-50) ५५३ ° । Peculiar cansal relationship between the Object and the Idea (151-52)
Their sequence does not constitute causality (154-55)
Simultaneity of Cause and Effect not possible (156-57)
The object comprehended by Memory (159-61) ५
The Past can never be the object of Sensnous Perception (161-62)
The Past Conception cannot be comprehended either as the Comprehended or the Comprehender { 163-64) ‘es
A Conception cannot have the duplicate character of the Comprehender and the Comprehended (168-69) wns 4 + ns
Ideas appearing in the same series cannot have the relation of Canse and Effect, or that of impression and Impressed (171-72 bee ae
The Comprehended must be different from the Com prehender (174-75)
The Idea cannot comprehend itself (175-76)
No duplicate capability in Conceptions (177-79) ma ses oe No Conception comprehended hy itself (180-81) sis oe on Existence of Objects not explicable without Ideas (182) sas
An Tdea always depends npon something else for its comprehension (184)...
The Element of Rememhrance in subseqnent Cognitions is mistaken (192)...
Series of Cognitions explained (193) a
Remembrance could not helong to every one of the Cognitions in a series (195)
Cognitions are not the objects of Conceptian (197)
Proximity and Relativity do not belong to Conceptions (200)
Cognitions appear even in the ahsence of Impressions; and as such no causal efficiency belongs to these latter (203)
Incorrect Cognitions, explained (207)
Forms—dreamt अ~~ © otherwise—cannot be attributed to Cognitions (209)
Falsity of Dream-Cognition Explained (210) i
Certain delusions explained (212-13) ५ TP १ aes
Different Ideas with regard to the same object explained (214) ..,
Comprehension of contradictory forms with regard to the same object explained (219) : : ; ८
In ordinary experience an Haternal object is never cognised in the form of the Internal (229) 8 oe os Pe
Reason for proving beforehand that the comprehension of the Object pre- cedes that of the Idea (241) ।
No recognition of the Idea apart from the forms of Ohjects (246-47)
Specialities of Time and Place, &., serve to explain all apparent discrep- ancies in comprehensions (253)
No agency of Vésand possible (256-58)
Absence of Hxternal Objects not proved by any of the recognised Pramanas (259-61
Atoms not being comprehensible by themselves, their aggregates mnst be admitted to be the real objects of comprehension (262) ies
Vil Page. 165 166 166 166 167 167
168
181
181
Vill CONTENTS.
Page. SEcTION 5: Inference en ah Ey ove 182-207 There can be no doubt as to the validity of Inference as = means of Knowledge (1) ... ee ६ 182 Definition of Inference explained (2) = ,^* i. tas ve 182 The oognisance of Invariable Concomitance (12-13) ... : 183 Grounde for the falsity of Ideas (18-19) ... » 184 The object of Inference is the Minor Term ag qualified by the Major Term (27) er oe en = 286 The word ‘asannikrshté’. explained (55-56) 190 Contradiction of Sense-perception explained (59-60) .. a == 190 Ae » Verbal Testimony (61-62) ae .. 190 a » Analogy (65-66) re — a sa 191 ‘3 , Apparent Inconsistency (66-68) ,,., 30 191 The expreseion ‘perception of one member’ (iu the Bhaehya) explained (75-76) hes tee oon ०० ४०. = 199 Different forms of the contradiction of the Middle Term (79-80) se : 198 Reason and Doubt precluded from the Definition (83-85) ee a. 198 Canees of Donbt (83-85) ae sees. Oe Viruddhatéa—Contradictory character of the Middle Term--explained (96) 195 Other Contradictions explained (101-102) a ० 196 Similarity and Diesimilarity of the Predicate (107-108) oi wen LOE Digcrepancies of the Instance (114-16)... ००५ ic. 499 Neceseity of the recognition of the negative relationship of the Middle Term with the negative of the Major Term ५ ee ,,, 199 Necegsity of Negative Inatances (131-32) , 200 Real significance of the expression “‘ Senge-perceived relation” (140-42) ... 201 Sémanya as a Distinct Entity—neceseary for Inference (148-88) ai 2206 The character and cognition of the Middle Term (163, &c.) श 211 Any dieorepancy in the perception of a * sémdnya’ destroys the cogency of all means of right notion (172) ae oh ४६ "205 2666106 of Sémdanya in the visible objects also (181) ae sa, 206 SEcTION 6: On Words one sue rr on ,,.207- Necessity of defining Verbal Authority in general (1-9) she Le A207 Verha! Authority cannot be included in Inference (15) Ss ,., 209 Difference hetween the two [0068866 (22-28) re =a .. 210 Arguments in favour of the identity of both (35-37) ioe oe coke Various refutations of these Arguments (38) a. se ,, 218 Difference between ordinary human aggertion and Scriptural deolara- tions (47) 4६ ६ ह the sue BES The Self-validity of Verbal Authority (58) ee: ० . 214 Verbal Authority not based on Inference (64.98) =... ves
Necessity of accepting * word’ ae an independent means of knowledge ... 214
CONTENTS, 1X
Page SECTION 7 Analagy ,** ति इ aie soe 222-232 Operation of ‘ Analogy’ explained (1-2) ... ५०० ae ० 220 The validity of ‘ Analogy ` (4-5) er as <. oe 298 Similarity, a positive entity (18) ००७ ००७ eee sen 220 Different kinds of Similarity (20) ००७ vee ०५९ ww 22 Similarity something wholly different from the Properties on which it is based (21) व zs tee a fo eee The similarity of twins explained (22-23) vos ००० it “eee Similarity different from the Classes {26} es eae we 226 ४9 amenable to Ssnse-perception (34) a Bi oe ed Ti exists in its entirety in each member (35) Sus - ०» 297 The object of Analogy (37) ... aie oe soe oe 27 This object not amenable to any other means of knowledge (38) ster eal, Semblances of Similarity (40) see es see we 227 Analogy is not Inferenca (43-44) १ ce . 228 Uses of Analogy as a distinct means of knowledge (52) Su we 229 Suction 8: Apparent Inconsistency eis eee a o1. 200-43 Case of tbe operation of Apparent Inconsistenoy ... ies ६. 240 Examples (2) ate ise cee wee ais ww. 230 Apparent Inconsistenoy not the same as Inference (8-9) ons we शा 9; 5 », included in Negation (86) see ०० 284 ४ in Vsrbal Authority (51) ... je? 2237 The example not explicable by Senss-psrception (60) ०५५ ०, 238 ध 4 », Analogy (74) me sas w. 240 Uses of Apparent Inconsistency in Mimansa (87) ss १०५ ,,, 242 Section 9: On Negation ve sai ie sas 243-52 Cases of the Operation of Negation as a Means of Knowledge (2) ०, 249 Difference between Negation and Senss-perception, &o. (17)... 245 The functioning of Negation pursly Mental (27)... Ss ove 24 Differenoe between Negation and Inference (29). = ,,* + ०० 247 Bauddha Objaction: ^“ ०6 Non-appearance of Sense-perception, &¢., would form the Middle Term”—Reply to this (88-39)... ee » 248 How Negation can be a Means of Cognition (45) = = Sa ons, 200 Negation a distinct means of Cognition (54-55) eae — oo. 261 Other so-called Means of Cognition included in the six herein enumerat- ed (57) ००७ ५५७ ०५० ल ^ ... 251 Section 10: On Citrakshépa ... ive oe ट 252-54 < 116 Citra 82९71068 cannot bring abont cattle,” &e., and bence they are untrue (2-3) ध ak ००९ eae ०० ,० 26
2
7014 १2 प
Page.
The arguments in favour of this condemnation eee = | ० 262 From Analogy, the falsity shown to belong to the passages dealing with the
Agnihotra, &c., also (15)... on oo tes eve 269
Section 11: On Sambandhakshépa ace १०० ove 254-261
The truthfal character of Vedic passages based upon their eternality (1) .. 254 Eternality of the relationship between Words and their Denotations (4-5) ... 254
Objections against this: no sort of relationship possible (6-10) ... ee. 255 These objections met (11-12) 9 evr we 25 The different methods of the comprehension of this relationship (21-24) ... 257 “The words cannot have any denotativeness, prior to the recognition of the relatiouships” (33) ase ove 8 we 259 Such denotativeness shown hy Usages (34) ० we 259 he Cognition of the said relationship is only an accessory in the compre- hension of the meanings of words (42) se न 200 “There cannot he any natural relationship between the Word and its signification” (45) ies ses Pe eee en. 261 BEcTION I2: On Sphota ove owe evs wee . 261-81 Consideration of the nature of the word (1) ele sist oe) BOGE Coguition of the word hy means of Sense-perception (4) wee 20
The name ‘ Word’ applicable, even before the comprehension of Meaning (8) 262 No Constitnent parts of Letters (18) ६४ ca sie ०9 266 The Letter Coguisable of Sense-percaption (14) १९ ove ees, 220 There is only one individual of each Letter (18) ies 263 Diversity only apparent—due to the diversity in the degrees of effort (25)... 265 No such Class as ‘ gatva” possible (27)
ete eee ees 265 No similar denial of the Class ‘Cow’ possible (35) ... mer ws 200 Perversities of Perception 08.00४ affect onr Conclusions (£1-44) ०० 268 The expression ‘ Avarnakula” explained (49) = cae ० 269 Accents are merely different forms helonging to the same Letter (57-58)... 270 No suoh Class as ‘ gocabdatva’ (66) eis oat ane ee y The idea of the sameness of the Word dne to the identity of component letters (67) ove ०५५ ००७ इ... Gate
Instances of gradaal operations leading to a common result (74) ०० 273 Applicability of the Present Tense to the functioning of the Word (80) ... 274 The whole Word oan signify what its parts cannot (86) are 275- Objection—“ No denotative potency inhering in the parts, there could he
none in the whole” (87-88) ee ite see a 2176 This ohjection applies to the Sphota theory also (91) se +~ . 25 More Assnmptions necessary for the Spheta theory than for the 1770511.
saka (94) i es 1 ie are ० “216 The Cognition of the 1४8४ letter of the word is the cause of that of the
meaning ef the whole word (96) ar ies ey ९ Mee
क
CONTENTS. Kt
Page. No assumption of an intermediary Savskdra necessary (97) ee ue, 2279 The assumption of an imperceptible factor in the process is necessary for the Sphota theory also (104) te ae si Ste. 20 Simultaneity of letters oomposing a word may be admitted on the ground of thair eternality and omnipresencs (107) es ae eee 1 Various theoriss as to the cognition of ths Word as a whols (111) bie en Mental recognition of the Word as one component whols admitted by all (113) or Bhs ११५ oe 277 But the Word as a wholes cannot be cognissd apart from the constituent letters (118) ,,. eee tee ca) 2/0 The idea of the Word as one, explained (121) ‘ss ve ae 5279 The Sphota theory makes the agenoy of the words towards the denotation of its meaning, the subordinate factor (127) aes ae er 20 The Sawskéra, if any, must bse regardsd as forming part of the dsnotative process of the Word {180} ... se ००५ we 280 The Sphefa cannot indicate the meaning (183) iss es . 280 Section 13 : On Abkrti ४५; See ० भ ,..281-9 Necessity of establishing the fact of the word denoting the Akrti (Class) (1) 281 “ Akrtt” = Class (3) क ie 289 Commonality is necessary for the collective idea of a number of things (4) 282 All objects are recognised in two forme—as Individuals, and as belonging to a Class made up of certain other Individuals (5) .., ai ००» 282 Mutnal dependence between Class and Individnal (9) Ges -. 283 Both Class and Individual necessary eee sv wn ००, 288 No such 1455 as ‘ Vastutva ’ (21-23) ee : ee 285 Classes restricted to distinct individuals, through natnral capabilities (28) 286 Relationship between Class and Individual purely natnral (31-32) co 28४ Individuals do not signify Classes (84) .. ons 287 Withont Class, Verbal Testimony and Inference, &c., conld not function as means of right knowledgs (39) ses ; — 288 The Class ‘Cow’ applies only to snch animals as are endowed with the dewlap, &c.,—sxplained (45) ५ = ,,, 289 Fixity of relation bstween Class and Individuals based upon Direct Sense- perception (48) ०७७ . ०० -. 290 The Class not identical with the Individual (52-55) ... eve wo. शा The Class as a whole 18 of Uniform Character (56-57) ee i. - 99 Class does not consist of similarity among Individuals (65) = ,,, we 993 Secrion 14: On Apoha (1 ५७५ vee see 295-328 Class admitted by ths Apohist (1) aoe se ७४9 ,,, 295 There is no positive sntity in the form of Negation (2) a eee 295 The abstract forms of objects cannot be in the form of Negations (3) we 295
All non-cows cannot be negatived by an Individual Cow (5) nae ००, 296
xi
CLOKAVARTIKA. Partial Non-Negation not compatible with General Negation (7) ००७ The generic property of ‘cowness’ is the only means of having an idea of Cow in general (10) ००५ ००५ oes Signification of ^ Non-Brahmanahood” explained as consisting of ‘ Manhood as apart from the Brahmanas’ (18) क ee eee eve All negations reat in Positive Entities (35) oes vee Usage not based tipon Ultimate Entities—like the Atom (86) ... ee The idea with reference to the denotation of words always appears in the shape of a real positive entity (89) tie ०५ ००९ ere We do not recognise any Ideas as mere Negations (41) oes ००७
The Mimaisaka’s Classes being distinct positive entities, are different from another; the Apohist’s Classes, in the form of Negations, must be
identical with one another (44-45) wis ००५ A postulating of differences among them wonld necessitate the admission of positive entities (46) oe ees 4 eas ००५
No diverse 42060748 possible (50) aoe ae 99७ The Apohist conld not distinguish the Cow from the Horse,—both heing Negations of the Elephant (55) _ ie ‘ive Soe ose No definite cognition of difference among Individnal Animals possible for the Apohist (65-66) ons eee 4 : ace Verbal Testimony and Inference not applicable to the case of Apoha, which is devoid of positive relationships (73-74) ats vr The Rejection of Non-Cow would apply to the Cow as well as to the Horse (76) oc ee ie ns sis Rejection of Non-Cow is not amenable the Senses or to Inference (78-79) Persons not having any notions of Negation, are fonnd to have ideas of the Cow : this fact not explicable by the Apohist (80) ses The denotahility of any object by ‘ Non-Cow’ cannot be explained (81-82) The admission of the Cow as an independent postive entity, to serve as the object of the negation by Apoha; then the assumption of this latter wonld be absolutely useless (84-85) is $ ae Two negative entities cannot be related as the Container and the Con- tained (85-86) ,, ‘ ००७ ee How relationship possible between the Negative Apeha and a Positive Entity (86-87) ... ०१ ५०७ aes ००७ ००१ No cognition of Apoha actuslly found to be produced from snch words as ‘horse’ and the like (88-89) ई = ४९ In the case of the word ‘ Entity’ the Apoha conld not but be in the form of the negation ‘non-entity’; and this donble negative wonld constitute a Positive Entity (95-96) ae tc we eae a No Vdsana possible, with regard to a negative entity (100) Apoha never actually cognised as significant (106-107) 3 क No ides of Positivity 0881016 with regard to the Apoha (118-14) ae The Apchist cannot explain the relationship expressed by ‘blue lotus’ (115-17) ००७ oes ५५७ He could not explain the expression ‘ San ghatah’ (121-22) TP + Apoha cannot form the denotation of words, because it refers to Individuals (128) १५५ ove ००५
Pogé. 296
297 298 301 302 302 303 303
304 308
305 307 808
309 310
310 811 311 311 311 312 313 313 315 316
316 817
319
CONTENTS. 3111
Page. Specially as no such intervening factor as ‘ Apohavativa’ is possible (129-80) 3519 No implication of the Apohas possible (133) oF aes 9. 20 No gender, &९., could apply to the Apaha (135) ००४ ioe क, The individual ia not implied by the Apoha (136)... we» 320 The Apohas of gender, &c., oonld not be the object of Speeification (1387) .. 321 In. the case of Verbs, there 18 no notion of Negation (139) 9 4 Ook There can be no negation in a donble negative (140) are 321 Mutual Interdependence involved in basing Apoha upon the mutnal negation of objects (147) aes ८ a ०० we 892 Nou-Negation of the Class cannot be postulated (149-50) ee oe O22 The Apohist cannot explain ‘ Rajnah purushah’ (157) ००९ eve 324 A negation cannot have properties (163) ose von, - 310 Naiyayika argument againat Apoha not tenable (165) ५३ we 36 Refutation of Apoha must be based upon usage (176) ote oe 328 Section 15: Vanavada vee ००१ a oes 0 329-47 The parts of the Cow are related to the Class, through the Individual (1)... 329 The parts are not Manifesters of the Claas (4) wen eae ee 329 They bring about the Idea of the Class (7) ves ००७ we 330 Various nsages based upon ideas of Clara (15) vei ae eo. 331 Meaning of the word ‘ Akrti’ (16) nie Bue fea jon Ook It cannot mean Shape (17)... te ००५ nas ०० 332 Specification of Class dne to peculiarities of colour, &c. (26-27)... ०, 833 Class inhering in each Individnal is perceived by the Senses (30-31) we 3354 The Class manifested by the Individual (43) ae aes scx, “S36 The idea of ‘‘ Cow” not based upon individual Cows (45) ve ee 336 Object of the idea of ^ Cow” (46) see a0 eee a. PSL The Class ‘ Cow’ ia one only (47) ae ie aoe ae 321 Idea of ‘Cow’ not based upon Similarity (48) eee 0 ० ` 937 Single idea of clags ‘ Cow ’ not false (49) : wee we 387 Citing of the instance of ‘ Forest’ not irrelevant (50) ¢ 337 The idea of Singleness with reference to the ‘ Forest’ explained—First Ex- planation (55-62) भ tr ave oe 389 The single word ‘ Forest’ can apply to a number of trees (64) Seg Se: The compatibity of singularity (of ‘ Forest’) with plurality (of trees) (65)... 841 Second explanation of Singlenees of Forest (63-69) ... nee . «41 Other explanations of the word ‘ vana’ (66) ie ee ०, 341 Third Explanation of the singleness of ‘ Forest’ (69-70) eee we 334 Fourth त 5 (70-71) x, ,, 843 Substrate of the idea of ‘Cow’ (73-74) ent 4 ०० 8438 Whole not absolutely different from its parts—as Class not different from the constituent individuals (75-76) re ag ध ०० 348 The idea of ‘Cow’ not due to the conglomeration of the various parta of its body (82-83) ... bes ००५ sis ००५ we 345
The fact of words denoting one or many objects fixed by Convention (86-89) 346
र CLOKAVARTIKA.
Page. Section 16: Sambandhakshépaparihara a ०१७ ve «. 847-74 Propriety of the introdaction of the question of the relationship of Word and Meaning (1) ००५ aes one eve bas 347 Relationship of name and named cannot determine the comprehension of the meaning of the Word (5)... des ००० ove ee 348 Nor is the relationship one of Invariable Concomitance (7) sine we 348 The question of relationship has heen hrought forward with a view to the ascertainment of its eternality or non-eteruality (10) een ee 349 Denctation of words not based pimarily npon Conventional Rules (12) ww. 349 The denotation of words based upon the Class (25-26) ०७५ ove 352 The necessity of assuming Potency (29) ... see Ree wwe 353
If the relation were not eternal, all men could not comprehend the word(30) 353 The process of the transference of the knowledge of world-relationa (41) ... 855
Thia knowledge cannot be based upon Conventional Rules (42) ... ०, 855 The world could have had no beginuing in time (47) ००७ =+ 9590 No personal Creator of the world possible (47-59)... ase ,,„ 356 The Veda conld not have proceeded from any Creator (61) 9० we 358 Explanation of those Vedic passages which speak of ‘ Creation’ (61) we 358 No proofs for admitting a ‘ Pralaya’ (68)... ee eae ००» 3859 Arguments in favour of the Creative agency combated (74-86) ... ee. 360 So functioning of the Sankhya “ Attributes” possible (87) ash ee 3863 The bondage of souls not due to any actions lying latent in themselves (89) 363 Knowledge cannot be the canse cf Deliverance (94-106) oe 364 The Eternal Character of Deliverance based npon ita Negative Character(107) 367 The nature of Deliverance (108) sae Sy vr (1१ Methed of chtaining Deliverance (110) ... fee इ i SOL The existence of a Creator is an untenable as that of an Omniscient Person (114-16 ००५ प a . 368 The verbal relationships of the Proper Name (120) .., 369 The verbal relationship distinguished from those of the Common Name (122-23) (र, es aes oe 369 Eternality of the relationship based upon the eternality of Words and Mean- ings (136-27)... + त ,.. ॐ Process of comprehending the Meaning of a Word (140-42) = ,,, we. 374 Section 17: Citrakshépaparihara oe bis es 1870-81 Falsity of the premises bronght forward against the theory of sacrifices bringing about results (1) ... ase 4 sso © 875 Passages laying down euch results do not lay down immediateneas of their appearance (2) ... one ०० oe - 279 The non-applicability of Sense-perception does not vitiate the validity of Verbal Authority (4-5) ६ see ses ००५ os 349 Even in ordinary actions resulis do not follow immediately after them (7)... 377
The fact of only some people possessing cattle, shows that it is the result of the Citr@ Saorifice performed hy them in their previous birth (13) 30. S18 Results not due to mere chance (18) we ay ae ., 379
CONTENTS, xV
Page. The Naiydyika theory of immediate seqnence of the result as untenable as the “ Chance” theory (22) ae sae ,,, 380
The non-appearance of the resnlis due to impediment in their appearance (26) 881
Section 18: Atmavada ६; bis ae : ,„ 382 The Soul connected with the sacrificial implements, through the Body (1)... 382
Denial of Son] makes the whole Veda open to objection (3) are w» 382 The Soul ie different from the Body and is eternal (7) sae ० 388 Objections against the eternality of the Soul(8) = ,,, set oo» 383 Reply to above (13) ave vet sa ae ,०, 38% People are always oognisant of the fact of a certain result as apppearing
from a certain action (15) ... en ses se ta 064 The Sonl’s liability to modification does not mean its destruction (22) «» 3885 No absolute destruction of the Soul is possible (23) ०. B00
The character of Doer and Enjoyer helong to the Person, the Soul continuing
throughout the various modificationa (29) = a ww 387 The ^" Series”? of Ideas as held by the Banddha not tenable (33) ०.५ 387 Tt is not possible for mere “Ideas’’ to trausfer themselves into another body
at rebirth (69) ... >> eee bee sey, WORE No intermediate subtle body is possible (62) se ae oo 893 Even if snch e body existed, no Ideas could euter into it (64) ० 3893 Ideas cannot exist in the Embryo (65) ... 9 Te ०० 393 Potentiality of 10688 cannot exist in the Seuse-organs (68) oe on 394 The first Idea of Man after birth caunot be proved to he the product of any
foregoing idea (70) ove Site ste oe ove 394 A Person, or Soul,*alone could bear within himself the potentialities of
Idea (73) ar ote ३६ a 4० oe 395 Motion is not the only form of action: Hence Soul oan be the performer of
Sacrifices (74) ... २ soe eee ae 2300 The Person is the doer of all Beings and Ideas (76) bee 395 The Body, &c., could have no actions except those that helonged to the Soul
(78) sais + aa ०० „० 396 Even in regard to one and the same action, the operation of several Souls
ie not necessarily ideutical (85-86) ... ३२३ eve sees SOE.
The Ego does not become affected hy any action except his own (89) = ` 39 In the case of the Measure laid down with reference to the sacrificial post, we must take it as referring to the size of his hady (90) ave ow 398 The Vatgéshika arguments for the existence of Soul pnt forward (92-101) ... 398 These arguments refuted by the Bauddha (101-106) ... me -- 400 The argumenta of the Bhaéshya: The 80] is directly coguisable by the
notion of ¢ I (107) eee eee eee ete ses 4,01 Intelligence cannot helong to material things (111-12) ca we 402 The Knower cannot he & mere Idea (115-16) ee sae ०० «408
The ^“ Series ” of Ideas caunot he the object of the recognition of ‘I’ (120)... 404 Impressions oan briug about.a recognition only in the case of the previous cognising ‘I’ being the same as the present ‘I’ (124-25). ००» 404
XV1 CLOKAVARTIKA.
Page.
Such notions ag‘ I am fat’ must be regarded as misconceptions (127) Se. 05
Ths Sense-organs are always spoken of as different from ‘1’ (128) ०० 405 The idea of ‘My Soul’ is dus to the Cognition being distinct from the
Soul (1380) i ००७ ००० me ०१७ ww. 405
Refutation of arguments against tha Existence of Soul (137-39) - ०० 407 In the Knowing of Soul, ons must supplement the Veda with the
Bréhmanas (140) seg ts se ०० 407
The Soul is self-luminous (142): Hence it is not perceived by other 80०18 (148) 407 One Soul is cognised by another by an observance of its Actions (145) ००, 408 The Soul is impsrigshable (147) av ave oes ०० 408
sutras VI—XXIII.
On the Eternality of Words .«.. fie sf as 409-485 Reasons for insisting upon the sternality of words (1, 2, etc.) .. „० &‰09 A momentary word is incapable of affording any sense (3) See ०० 409 Objections against the eternality of words (Satras 6-11) ‘ee ee. 410-12 Words are cansed entites (and hence transient) (9)... ००७ ०० 410 9 ठ because thers is a differenos in the same word as pro- nounced by different persons (10) ०७० ००७ eee ००० 410 They are not all-pervading (hence not eternal) (11) १५७ ee 411 They are caused because they are hrought about by offorts (13) w «6. 411 Letters composing words are transient, as they undergo modifications (17) 412 They are transient, as their sound is capable of interception (18) ve 412 Reply to the above objections (Sitras 12-23) saa ase oo 412 All the above arguments are inconclusive (19-20)... ००७ ove 412 Ths word is not accepted by all philosophere to bs due to human efforts (20-22) re os ००७ ove ee ०. 413 As Destruction also is nncansed, the argument urged in 8८४1४ 6 becomes contradictory (29-30) ee ane ००० was oe 44 The perception of Akdsa after an effort does not make it transitory (30-32) oe ar ००७ ००७ she we 414 Various interpretations of the ‘non-sternslity of the word’ put forward and refuted ssi ous ०० ses ०५७ ee 415 Though words have permanent existence, yet they are not always perovived, becauss of the absence of manifesting agencies (40) aie vw. 416
It is by means of a supersensuous power that the utterancs imparts & super- sensuous faculty to the organ of hearing, and thereby it beoomes the
cause of the manifestation of the already-existing word (45) ... oe 417
The Utterance belongs to thse Air, and not to the Organe (49-50) oe «=. 417 Objections: The word being only & changes in the Akaga of the ear, brought wbout by utterance, must belong to the whole of it, and as such be all-
: pervading (56-58) १०४ १०४ ५११ ध oo. 418
CONTENTS. अ ए11
Page. Partial cognition of the word by some people only, is not possible (64-63) ... 420 Above objections answered: Diversity of anditory cognition is due to the diversity in the Hara (65-66) oe if «» 420 The Ear 18 not identical with Akéea (66-67) ie bse . 420 The organio change takes place in the physioal sabstratoam (the tympanum of the ear) ९5 ; ans oe 420 The cognition taking place in the bodily organ, one man’s cognition does not imply cognition by all men (73-75) =... me Ss oo. 42] Similarly one man’s deafness does not imply deafness of all men (76-77)... 422 Similarity of oonditions betweea the Nyaya theory of the Production of words and the Mimanaa theory of their manifestation an ww. 423 Method of Word-cognition explained: the Vaigéshika view (88-90) ... 423 Objections to the Vaicéshika view (90-106) ae we 424 The Sarkhya and Jaina views stated and refuted (106-121)... we 426 The Mimansaka view explained (121-30) .. = ss aie 429 Whatis ‘QOravanendriya’? (130-134)... 430 The argument propouaded in Sutra 7, against Eternality of words fonnd to be inconclasive (155) ie aes ५ ... 434 Objections in Satra 8, met by Sutra 14 (157) sai sie ... 434 Explanation of Sutra 15 (163): answer to 90118 9 ... Sos we 435 3 » 16 (201) + ... 448 2 9 17: answer to Sitra 11 (211) des we 445 ५ ; 18: ‘ Hternality of Words’ (230) Bis ww. 448 The arrangement of letters in words is not ‘caused’ (288) =... 460
‘ Shortness,’ ‘ Length,’ &0., of vowel-soands only mark divisions of time (303) 463 What do you mean by ‘ Non-oteraality’ in the case of words ? (327)
objections ove ध a. ,, 466 Neoessity of assertiog ‘ eternality” of words (356) ... ahi =. "410 It 18 necessary as it implies the eternality of (relations) vc 10 ‘Tdea’ and ‘ Action’ as eternal as the class ‘ word’ and class * action’ (398) 477 Arguments against ‘subtle destructions’ (425) ace $ we 481 Arsuments against non-eteroality, and for Eternality of words 8071106 ap
(443) sf ms a ध ध ... 484
80128 XXIV—XXVI. On Sentence श vi 486—552 Objections against the Hternality of Sentences in general, and of the Veda
in particular (1-110) se a! ee ee .* 486 Reply to the above (110)— ... - ६ aus we 504 Further objections (168-181) ... see see 4५4 os {014 Answered (182-221) ; न so SOLE Chanze of denotation of words explained (222-246) eas 24, 920 Explaoation of Bhavana (247-316) aa see sis we 581
a Vikalpa.-Option (317) aie ss ee oe 542 ¢ Sutra 25 (340) ne ie sis we 546
Sitras XXVII—XXXII. The Veda not the work of an author eae ses Wis 5538—555
CLOKAYV ARTIKA. ALPHABETICAL INDEX.
A
Absence of an author safeguards the Vada against all reproach
Absence of external objects not proved ००५ १०५ Absolute destruction—not 00881018 of the soul ५०५ Abstraot Peroaption—of an objact one ve —how made conorate al ५०५
Action—not prohibited oannot be sinful ५५९ sai —reanlt not alwaya aimilar to it ४९ one Actions—may 108 perishable ०७७ ee ००७
Adharma— Vedio injuootions and prohibitions the only means of knowing it
Agnihotra 0 von tes
Akaca—Ita peroeption after an effort, doaa not make it transitory ...
Akrti—nacessity of eatabliahing the fact of tha word denoting it
—meaning of the word ०१९ ०५१ oe
—it cannot mean shape ae ove ००७
Analogy—not applicable to Dharma i ५५५
—ita object sé we ५०९
—not amenable to any means of knowledge १५९
—not Inference ०५९ are ०१७
—its ०8६8 ne ०१७ ००९ ees
Apoha—not possible... ss ०५५ ५५१ —raason againet its assumption १५१
—never actnally cognised as aignificant ०७९
—no gender, etc., could apply to it ५०१ ia
—the individual is not implied by it... —mutual interdependence iuvolvad in basing it upon objacts deo tos १५। ५५४
Apolias—no divarse Apohas possible are ०७५
—no implioation of Apobaa possible...
—of gander—could not be the object of epecification Apohavattva—is not 0881016 an 9०४ ova Apohist—cannot diatinguish the cow from the Horse
—no definite cognition of difference among Individual Animals possible
for him eon #9 ४ eet Apparent incoosistency—not applicable to Dharma ‘eis —axaniplea of dee ii
—not the same as Inference —inoludad in negation sin —included in Verbal Testimony ..,
Page. 31 181 886 88 88 87 67 471 59 254, Ald, 281 331 332 85 226 227 228 229 164 164 315 320 320
322 303 320 321 319 305
307
85 231 281 234 237
it CLOKAVARTIEA,
Apparent inconsistency—not explicable by Sense-Percep+ion —not explicable by Analogy २१५ —its ases in Mimansa 5७9
Asannikrshté—explainued ees ५०७ vee Atah—meaning of es vee aa ०९९ Atha~—meaning of ००० ove eve Atoms bes ewe ०५७ ae ००९ Avarnakata— explained see ०७१ wee Audibility—-of word-seunda ss ००५ ०९९ Aaditory Akaca ee ००५ eae ००, Auditery ergan—ne movement of it possible ... us —cannot be all-pervading ००९ ५९१ —its modification ... ue eve Authority—ef the Veda questioned ove १०५ —of the Veda undisputed vas १५७ —arguments supporting it ५१५ ०७५ Authoritativeness—the theory of its extraneens character 116 refutation ... ५९१ eos —ite notion due to extraneous influence —its three forms eas —of Injunction ... ०५७ eos B Bath—its negation befere the investigation ef Dharma ..., —its signification ... ae ००९ ave Bauddhas—-diversity of opinion ameng their various sciens —statement and refutation of their theory oe “ Blne Lotns "~ ann aes oe bes —noen-difference between letus and blueness Bhivana~—explained |... wee vee bce -—its three factors vis ४ aus —the object of asingle cognition «. ves Body—no idea could enter it ००५ ave ove —could bave no actions excepting those ef the Soul —ne mementary destruction possible... ५०१ Boudage of souls—net due to any action latent in themselves Buddhijnana eee ०७७ wee ००५
Buddhist Scriptnres—unreliable because compesed by human beings
¢ Capabilit} and incapability aes eee one Canae aud effect—their simultanetty not possible et Causality—not constituted by the sequence ef object and idea Codani—meaning of .,. ५९. one es
=~ ] ]} 097& & word ose eer ७९४
113
14
17 120 428 316 103 631 533 545 393 396 480 363
76
46
188 166 166 21 २2
INDEX.
Codana—objections based upon the signification of the word and their refata- tion ०७१ oe see ae ६ ०७१ —cannot be restricted to positive activity only ... au oe —refers to Injunctions and Prohibitions ०९७ Qitra sacrifico—disoussed as Ges —arguments in favour of it... ५११ ५०४ ००५ Citra sacrifice axe ०० १०४ die ove ua Class—its cognition not inferential ६ ave eve ण objects and their relationship amenable to sense-perception vie —its spscification dus to peculiarities of colour, ste ee see —manifested by the individual ove ०५१ ध —mutual relationship with individnals ००७ eos ~—rolationship between it and individual purely natnral न oe — Verbal Testimony and Inference not ths means of right knowledge with- out it eve ०५७ ove १५१ ee ००१ —Fixity of relation between class and individual based upon Direct Sense- Percsption ... १७४ ०५७ ove sé ०० —it is not identical with Individual ... क he न —as a whole is of uniform character... tee ध mY —dces not consist of similarity among Individuals ... ws aoe —ii is admitted hy thse Apohist iss ५४४ see ००१ Class cow—is one only ०५५ a aes ७६ eee —oexplained ... ve iat ०० Gus vee Classes—their restrictions ५०५ 9९ tee nA? ove —Mimansaka view about ,,९ ०७७ tse ००५ Cognisable object and cognising idea ove ००७ ans see Cognised shaps does not belong to external objects ००, sigh Cogniser, its character not attributed to the object eee ००४ ou Cognition of class cannot be inferential ७९० see ५८ Cognition of ohjsots not in the form of identification with theic verbal expres- sions ०५७ see evs ००५ ५५१ ०९९ Cognition of ०60४8 independent of verbal expressions ... bak aoe Cognitions undefined only as long as words are not found te its Cognitions are without substratum only at the time of their actual appearance Cognitions never amenable to Inferential argumentation see ५६ Cognition and cognised vee eee ०० ०५९ ses Cognition—its character . . tes vee ००५ —could not appear prior to the comprehension of objects... isa —forms belong to them... ५० vee tes ose —form of objects cannot be said to bs imposed npon ०० —only one, diversity among objects =, ace —not thse object of conceptions wee —appear in absence of Impressions sn see ies —forms of dream not attributed to it des ०७५ sia — perishable like actions tes vee oe ove Cognition of Apoha—not possible ‘ee diss ivi
Collective denotation—impossibility of sia i set ss
11 Paye.
51-53 88 54 252 252 378
92 111 338 336 283 287
288
290 291 291 293 295 337 289 286 298 156 149 149 92
98 99 111 129 129 148 149-50 150 151 151 161 171 172 173 471 312 503
iv QLOKAVARTIKA,
Component word—cognition of sentence not possible thongh ००७ —itheir meanings are the basis for the comprehension of meanings
nf sentences ५०५ ove ०**
Comprehension of contradictory forma ove ००१ ane
—of objects precedes their idea... ५९१ wee
Comprehender and comprehended vee ५१५ ०५५
—different from each other ०५५ or १०५
—fully established .. १५ ‘es ००९
Comprehender—Idea belongs to him ०५५ eee
Commonality—necessary for the collestive idea of a number of thinge
Compatibility of Singularity with Plurality ... a र
Conoeived and Means of conception, eto, toe ०१. eee
Conception—its falsity explained ... és “as ove
—falsity due to ite non-produotibility ००५ ११९
—not both comprehended and comprehender , ,, ०१५
—no duplicate capahility in ००७ ove eee
—not comprehended by iteelf _... ses sa
—no association among conceptions ००५ Conolusion ... ०५९
eon gee gee
Conjunct words--their cases explained Convention .,
Rules regarding them
ate ५१९१ aes
558 524 346
849 and 355
Reastriotion aes as ; ०५* ies, | LOS
Container and Contained ध is or se 0. ORE
Contradiction—of sense-perception i av ses 190
by Verhal testimony ०७, we 190
Analogy ine ०१ ooo LSE
Apparent Inconsistenoy ०० ,-* 191
—explained ५ sae w 196
Censcience theory—not tenable... nes ies ००७ see 59
Contact of cognition with the objeot evi ‘si ‘a sx 162
Cow ५९४ ५१, ००७ eos 100, 266, 343, 345, 297 and 311
Creation ,,. er ‘és ove ies sas 360
Creative Agency s ane ००५ + ० 860
Qinyavada—its refntation ; ५५५ ve $ oe 1584
Oyéna Sacrifice—sinful | । oes ue ey 62 D
Deliverance ee see os re ae 864, 867
1616106 १ oes ass 137 and 173
Different Ideas 98 regards the same object... sae ses wo. 174
Denotativeness—of wards not due to Convention st ee + 2168
-- 07 worda not prior to relationship ‘ae ध ,,, 259
Denntation of meanings, eto क ,,, 512
Denotative potenoy—neither in part not in whole ६ : we 975
Denial of the reality of Conceptions
ate
1234
INDEX. Vv Puce. Denial of the reality of External objects us wal 127 Destruction au Bae on ne ne we 414 Dharma... se of i 19, 21-26, 21, 23, 49, 50, 59-77, 118 —-usefulness of its investigation ten ००१ ee ०१ 19 —ite definition ८ ave + ५१, 21 —Authority for the mesus of knowing it ove vee 21 —full signification of ... 4; ses + 49 —sense-peroeption not applicable to it ae १४ ००, 77 Discussion—ite necessity ० ०५५ eve ०० 119 Diversity—only apparent ११५ ००७ vee ५१७ ve 268 —of effort .., ०५७ és ‘i wo» 478 Doer and Enjoyer = sid oes 02 ष् >+ “287 Douhle Negative we eae te 4६ र ws 39 Doubt—its causes re esi as sc. 98 Dream—its faleity ee a ons ee ०७१ sa. GES B Ear is not identioal with Akaca .., ais ४ ००, 420 Ego—does not ४०९००१९ effeoted by any action except his own ००७ aa 897 Embryo —ideas cannot exist init ... ae ०१७ ००७ we 898 Entity = ees ee aus ४ न os OLS Eternality of letters and words... en 5६ ००५ १०, 459 Eternality of words—Reasons for and objections againet “os 409-12 Exoellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the charges of un- authoritativeness ००७ vee ०७४ ०, ००७ 31 Existence of oreation—untenable ... sss eee se wo. 318 Existence of soul—refutation of arguments against eee a» 407 External object is never internal ... ae on १०७ set. 10 —its reality and denial ‘ad ०७५ 119, 121 External world—necessity of its reality ise ५ ००७ we 199 Fr Faleity of the premises—urged againet Sacrifices, etc. ... ४ ssn azo Firet idea of man—not the product of foregoing ideas’ ... si ww. 394 Flames ves eee tee wee ११४ we 483 Forest a aes ५ ००० “ee , 384, 341 and 848 Forms of words—explanation of the comprehension of their meanings w 458 G General negation one oes ‘i ००७ ore ०, 296 Gocabdatva—no such class aie 8 ०५५ ser we 232 Gotva—no such class possible ४४६ ‘i Per - ,०* 265 H Hearing—is doe to changes in the bodily organ ४ च ,** 421-28
V1 CLOKAVARTIKA.
I Idea—its apparent identity with word and object os —worldly activity not applicable ७७० ५०१ Idea and object ०६४०६ have the same form ... ००९ —cannot be hoth cogniser and 6001860 == ,,* Idea—not comprehender of itself ... ise ‘ee Idea of cow— ००५ ner see Idea of singleness—with reference to forest ... Idea and Action dice oes tee Ideas—their falsity leada to nniversal negatio vee
—neither cause and effect, nor Impreseion and Impressed —existence of ohjecte not explicable withont them —depend on something elee for their conception ...
—grounds for their faleity ... oes ००० —no intimate relation poseible among them ००९ —no association among them ००९ sve —not reoognised as mere negations ove :
—cannot transfer themaclves into other bodies eee Idealistio position—expounded =... ०७९ ene —superfinity of it ००५ “ins Idealism—contradicted aes इ ००५ —involves falsity nf Philosophical systems ibe —connter-arguments againet ००७ site Idealistio theory—oontradicted = ०, ae ००७ —refnted ००७ a or
—no instance of Disaimilarity mentioned in —contains nntrue things ५५५ ०९९ —chief element in ita reasoning ve
—propounded to turn away men’s minds Imposition of the form of words on the object is impoesible
Imposition theory aoe wee १०९ ove Impreeeions i ००९ nee as Incorrect cognitions... ०९७ es ००० Increase or १6५6886 of word-sounds refuted ... ०५५ Individual—neceesary along with Class ua see —does not signify class ... ००४ eee —relation with Apoha ... oon ‘itt Indriya ०० ००७ oes aie ००१ Inference—not applicable to Veda i sie —not applicable to objecte in the futnre ००९ - 71666060 by Sense-perception =, ‘te —not applicable to Dharma es a; —based npon Sense-perception ००७ oes
—impossible, when 02060४8 are not real —es a means of knowledge
—its definition ००५ wes —its object is the minor torm 6
. 336, 337 and 343
Page. 100 143 153 154 168
339 477 130 168 169 170 184 488 489 3(3 392 121 128 130 132 131
@on 1 3 2 -3 5
०". 135-36
38 141 143 148 104 1.6 404 173 445 283 287 319
76
34
38
82
84
87 124 182 182
185
INDEX,
Injunction—the only means of knowing Dharma
necessity of having recourse to it ००७ Instanee—discrepancias of re eee as ~of forest ०९, si isi ००७
~—of gradual operation leading to common Result Intelligence—cannot belong to material things ००० Introduction so ००५ eee eee Invariable Concomitance wee ००० ००७
-- 0 needed for the 801008० of sentences
J
Jain and Sinkhya theory—moving of sound—discussed .,.
K Karoti—its true meaning in “ Gaholam Karoti ” ५०१ Knower—not & mere idea ses eas Knowing of sonl oe ०५ eee ०९९ L Lakshana—its signification ai ee Letters—have no constitnent parts tee Yan ——cognisable by sense-perception ५७५ —only one individnal of each ee --Accents are merely different forms ... ous ~—sameness of words due to their identity ——composing words aro transient an vr —refutation of the above ... ५१५ ees —arguments based upon their changes was M Measure—of sacrificial post Meaning—of a word, comprehended en —of words not mistaken ... exe —of sentences ५१ sia ‘ies Means of cognition enumerated... i > Memory... ००७ ५०५ eee ००५ Memory of Perception—explained ४9 eee Mental recognition of the word ... ०० ००७ Mention of Dissimilarity in the Idealistie Argument... Middle terms ae ००९ aes ०० 11101185 Oastra—its purpose es ore ee
—its connection .., asi re
०० 426
eee 4 3 4 ase 403 sve AOE
22
263
263
-. 268 "= 270 ens 272 we 412 ०० 412 ,०, 443
००» 398 ००, 374 es "ध ०० 561 ste 2268 ०० {6 ०० 109 sac 20 ws 139 198 and 204 oes 2 ०७७ 3
Vu CLOKAVARTIKA.
Mimansaka theory—accords with Panini’s view ००९ 11166066 0118 as eee Mistaken cognitions—devoid of real substratum ००१
Modification—of the soul, not its destruction Momentary word—incapable of affording any senee ois
Motion—not the only form of action ००० ०९ My soul site ae <a ०७५
N Naiyayika argumente against Apoha not tenable ०७७
—theory—unteuable as chance theory Nanu samanyato drshtam, etc.—explained «.. dit
Nanvavidusham eto.—explained ... ०७७
Necessity of negative instances क ५०१
Negation—as a means of kuowledge ous
Negation and Sense-perception... ००७ eee —ite fnuctioning purely mental —and Inference ०* cee ००० —Bauddha objection against negation ००७ —How a means of cognition ०० ५१५ —no positive entity in its form tes ०७७ — Abstract forme of objects not negation ०५९ —cannot have properties ०७० ००७
Negative Apoha—relation with Positive entity impoesible
No apirva apart from a potentiality of the sacrifice ००९
Non-cow—the explanation cannot be explained ove
Non-entity bee ००७ ००५ ०००
Non-eternality—various interpretations eee
— Real and forma] objeotions againat it... Non-negation of the clase—cannot be postulated —cannot have properties ...
Notions—of the word and ite meaning not related ae qualification
0
Object—its apparent identity with Idea and word ‘ies —and Idea cannot have the same form ~—and Idea—their difference ead sak
Omniscient anthor—the character of the Veda itself does not lend support to the
theory of ... ait
Omniscient person—no ground for assuming the exiatence of
Operation of several eouls
P
Past—conception eee ००५ wes one —never the object of sensuous perception
Pu ge. 429 405 138 385 409 395 405
326 380
46
44 200 243 245 247 247 250 250 295 295 326 311
51 311 413 451 465 322 326 490
100 153 159
43 41 397
167 167
INDEX. Parts—not manifesters of the class १०१ ote —bring abont the idea of class ase ००० Parts of the cow ०० use ०१० vee Perishability of 1068 .., ००* ००० vee Perception of one memher ses ows ५०५ Peroeption—ite perversities cannot affeot our conclusions Pleasures of Heaven not similar to dreams ... eee Positive entity ००५ eee ese १०१ Positive entities ०० ९ । eee ०७९ Positivity—no idea possible with regard to Apoha cee Potency—the necessity of asauming it Re eee Potentialities of Ideas—cannot exist in sense-organs ५०१ -- 08 only exist in sonl ००५ Pralaya—no proofs of admitting it wea ०७५ Pramanas—their anthoritativeneas, etc. jan bie —self-recognition not its true result ००१ Pratyayita—explanation of ove ००९ Preclusion of studies other than that of the Veda nes ॥ 3) of all the means of Knowledge from the case of Dharma Predicate—similarity and dissimilarity Sas ver Predicability and Knowability + ००७
Prefixes and Nipatas ... sia Present tenae—application to the funotioning of word ... Proper names eas : Proximity and Relativity a ee ss
Q
Qualification—absent between whiteness and the class cow
Qualification and qualified—this relation absent in the notions of
meaning eee ona ५९५ ०१७ R Raja-purushah oes ००९ ००१ oo Reality of sentencs and its meaning not possible ane Reason and Doubt eve oes ००९ Recognition of idea apart from objects ae ००५ Reoognisability—not enoagh to prove eternality We Regalation of Apoha—must be based upon usage ae Rejection of non-cow—application of oe ००९ Relation—is eternal ... ०७९ ००१ eos Relationsbip—impoasible ies ave —refnted ... woe ote ५०५ —different methods of comprehension १०९
—its cognition in comprehending meanings of words
ibe
Page. 329 330 329 479 192 268 120
००४ 302 and 311
word and its
304 316 353 394 395 369
32
80
56
13
24 197 159 501 274 128 172
490
490
324 486 193 179 476 328 309 353 255 255 257 260
x CLOKAVARTIKA,
Relationship—does not exist between word of its signification
—between word and meaning w. ie —hbetween name and named
—not 88 invariable concomitance eee —qnestion of its eternality or non-eternality Relationship of proper names oe aes ose —-distinguished from common names “ive —cannot be ageerted ... sie aie Remembranoe—in cognitions mistaken on one —could not belong to cognitions as Repetition ... ove 2४8 oes Reply to objections against etarnality of soul... ५११ Results—of actions ... sas eve —their non-appearance dne to impediments —certain results follow certain actions ००५ 8 Sacrifices ... ०५० ०५१ ai eee Sacrificial slanghter—not sinful ... “ws oa Sam ०५१ ०५९ ०५७ ue sats Samanyaz... see es ०५ sae Samaviya ... ows ४ ४ Samvrti Reality—synonymous with falsity ... ese Samskara ... ०५५ ००५ र + San ghatah ... ०५९ ०५० eee * Sankhya Attributes... ove ०५१ Sat-necessity of the word tes “ed
Soriptural declaration and human aesertion ... Scriptures—oomposed by humau beings not authoritative Self—is both cogniser and cognised ses Self-recognition not the true result of Praémana Self-validity of Verbal authority .., Senses—their functioning explained —their number only five... Sense-organs—their mixed functioning te —thoir exclusive objects differenciated —different from ‘I’ or Sonl Sense-perception—not applicable to objects in future —explained precisely —applicahle to oertain kind of cognitions —definition. made by tat and sat —not the means of knowing Dharma ... —not applicable to Dharma... ८८ Sense-perceived relation ” ५६१ Sentences—impossibility of getting at their meanings —their reality and meanings—not [00881118
Page. 261 347 348 348 349 369 369 455 170 171 470 3६4 379 381 384
54 61 74
,,,208-06
9५ 119
276 and 280
317 363 73 213 89 1585 80 214 74 98
INDEX, Xt
Page.
Sentencestheir cognition not possible through words 487
-~cannot be constituted by connection or exolnsion of words 493
—no sphotaofthem ,,, 494.
-—their meanings expressed by words 502
—cannot exprees meanings directly 503
--॥061 eternality proved 551
—and their meanings ..., 505
—words capable of making them ca ~~ 506
Series of Cognuitions sie १
Series of Ideas—not tenable See are 387
—cannot be the object of recognition of ‘ I’ 404.
Signification of affixes, Nipatas, prefixes, eto 536
Signifioation of non-Brahmanhood 298
Similarity—of different kinds 225
—<different from properties 225
——of twins explained 225
—different from classes .., 226
— amenable to sense-perception 227
—~exists in its entirety in each member 4; 227
——hetween words prouonnoed differently ve sek 457
Simnltaneity of letters ; sea 277
Single idea of cow class—not falee oa sive १७ 887
81116688 of forest... ०७४ व sas ४ 341
Sonl ea sss ave ध ह 382, 388, 407, 408
Sonnd see ॥ ves vee re . 427, 428, 430, 434
Specialities of Time and Space... Ae Sag eine + =O
Speoialization—of two kinds क ae ,,, 837
Sphota theory a bs See 275, 276, 277, 280, 514 and 517
Subject-matter of the Treatise .., ee iss 9 -20
Subtle body—not 1068101 ar Be 8 श we 398
8९३1९41 81710 yajéta—reference to ध ose ००, 881 ग!
Teacher and Pupil—distinction between was ०७४ eee ,, 130 Theory of the Vaigéskas—ear is a part of space ist She „ 433 U Ultimate Entities—Usage not based upon them like atoms 48 we 50४ Utterance—imparts faoulty to the organ of hearing es 9९४ 417 —oanse of manifesting words ००५ ~ ०९९ one ,,, 417 —belongs to air and not to organs .., a ie ६. 01 —objections with regard to vee ss ००९ 418 —does not affect any change in the auditory organ ies oe 421
311 QLOKAVARTIKA.
Vv
Va—Force of the word ००७ tee ०५, Vaaa—other explanations of the word oo ००९ Vaiceshika Arguments—set down and refuted ‘ Various interpretations of the opening passages of the Bhashya
Vasana—no specification [00881016 ... soe —no proof for the existence of —never bring effects in serial order =... ००, —permanent 807] its sabstratum cis ध —no agency possible sa impossible, with regard to negative entity ००५ Vastutva—no snch clasa <a (९१ vee Veda~—ita authority questioned ... sie wes —its self-evident charaoter ... sas es —its andisputed authority ... ००० sve -—not due to human origin .. ५१९ one ~—~has no anthor ... : ५५७
—noot the work of ao omniscient author ~—absurdity incurred in denying its authority —~argamenota sopporting its anthority ... ०१
eee
aoe 5 5 3 ष 5 5 5
—~argamente supporting the view that it is composed by human hands
~-the only meaus of knowing Dharma —~could not have proceeded from any creator ~— objections againat its eternality
४6१९०४९. theory—controverted क oes ००, Vedic passages—their trathful character a ina Verbal authority—necessity of —... wai ६
—not incladed in inference ... श
—ita self-validity... ०५५ ove
—nou-applicahility of sense-perception ... Verbal Testimony and Inference .., ese ६ Verbs—no notion of negation sae ५५७ ‘sie Virtue—utilitarian theory not tenable er Sus Virtae 8०१ Vice—distinction between ate re Viruddhata—contradictory character see
Ww
Whiteness—eternality of such qualities oa Zz. Whole—not different from its parts ह Whole word—meaning of ap ०७५ ae Word—its authoritativeness ह
ee eee
—apparent identity with Idea and Object —consideration of its nature
—cognition by means of perception ais “ea —-name applicable before meaning ००५ —idea of sameness due to letters ५०५
85
39 43
553
358
254 207 209 214 376 308 321
59 130 195
479 343 276
22 100 261 262 262 343
INDEX, x11]
Page. Word—various theories regarding it aa a whole si क oe Te —not dos to human efforts tes ५; Soi ae. “SEIS —all-pervading and impartite vee : a .-„ 421 —cannot collectively produce any idea ... oe oe ,.. 488 —not 6001864 in parts oe ou ... 487 —connection with the theory of moving Auditory organ 3 440 —ohjections against the above is ‘ai a dae = BEL notion of diveraity got at hy meane of Inference ... ‘ve .., 442 —created by God with meaning—noit possible ei ... £56 —not perishahle ... <i Pe 465 —no destruction, suhtle, gross or momentary possible a ०, 481 Worde—not independent of the material form of objects us .. 102 —cannot give any idea nutil the object is known ... ध ts 105 —ohjecte do not depend on them or a थ .. 105 —only form of the object cognised throngh them ... a 105 —not mere verbal forms imposed upon them ave sof vay 113 —forme of ohjects not dependent on them ae Sis ... 106 —relationship with objects, eternal ae os श ग POG —their basic form distinguishable ais or 4 go) + —formiug parte of technical expressione si si 526 —signify a connected meaning in seftecces see ws ven, "926 —expressive of option ४ es ०५५ oes ... §42 —difference hetween them and sentence ee ‘ai we 549 Words and Denotations at ००५ न we 254 Words and lettere ee ८ ae Dns sah 507 and 509 Words—cansed 6116168 tes eg er sh ... +10 —as pronounced by different persons .., ००९ . 410 —caused eince brought abont by efforts me his 0 411 exist permanently, but not always perceived be ar ... 416 —non-eternality refuted ष aes ५, 454 —order, shortness, length, etc., marked by time which is only one and eternal vee oe 4 w» 408 —Inferential arguments regarding them 0५ . we 464 —their non-eternality rejected by scriptures des a. ,,„ 465 —Arguments proving their eternality tee 480 World—could have no begiaaing in time ००४ ia ४ sie. 130 —n0 personal creator possible os ५५. a » 836 World-relatious ee ‘es i Sis Dis “i cao Y Yogic faculty—uutenable for Banddhas 6 ai a we 138
POL a tl, Pt, tN LON NIN LON ~ Nl ^
INTRODUCTION.
The word ˆ Mimansa’—more properly ‘Parva Mimansa ’—is applied to the system originally propounded by Jaimini, The other names given to this system sare—‘ Parrakanda,' | Karma-Mimansa,’ = । Karmakanda,’ Yajnavidya,’ ‘ Adhvaramimansa,’ ‘ Dharmamimansd,’ and so forth—some people even speak of it as the ‘ Duvadagalakshni. ’
Inasmuch as the avowed object of this systeni is a consideration of Bharma it is commonly spoken of as‘ Dharmamimansa,’ Of the Veda, there are three sections or Kandas: The Karmakanda, the Upasanakanda, and the ‘Jnanakanda.” And it is only that portion of the Veda which is contained in the first of these that is dealt with in the Parva-Mimansa ; and for this reason Jit is spoken of as ‘ Parvukdnda, Parvamimansa, or ‘Karmamimansa.’ Though the Karmakanda of the Veda treats of many such actions as‘ Sacrifice,’ ‘ Giving,’ ‘ Offering,’ and the like, yet it is of the sacrifice that this system treats mostly, and it is full of discussions about sacrifices only. And for this reason people speak of this as ‘yajnamimansa’ or ‘ Adhvara-mimansa.’
This consideration of Dharma is found to consist of twelve parts; and these parts have been put by Jaimini in the form of twelve Adhydyas; and hence the system has come to be known by the name of ‘ Dvddagalaskshani.’
For a detailed explanation of the subject-matter of each Adhydya and adhikarana, the reader is referred to the Appendix.
While chiefly dealing with these subjects, Jaimini has in many places dealt with other things in connection with these. It is clear that all. that is treated of by Jaimini is chiefly Vedic. In the work known as the ‘ Veda’—beginningless and authorless;—were found mentioned here and there, at random, many sacrifices, offerings, &c. And hence it was very difficult to understand aud grasp the methods and procedure of the various sacrifices, &c.; consequently, at the time of the perform- ance of a sacrifice, at each step the performers would meet with serious doubts and difficulties. And all this difficulty has, once for all, been set aside by Jaimini, by means of the Sutras dealt with here. And it was only after the Mimansa philosophy had been duly propounded that the path of Karmakdanda became easy.
At the very outset, Jaimini divided. the Vedic sentences into two kinds: The Mantra and the Brahmana. The former is now known asthe ‘Sanhité’—fi. Rgveda sanhita, &c. There are many Brah- manas that are known as ‘Upanishat,’ 1.1. the Brhaddranyaka and
11
the Chandogya. Then again he proceeds to subedivide these two kinds into other sorts—the Rk, the Sdma, and the Yaju.
The definitions that he lays down for the differentiation of the Mantra and the Brahmana are embodied in the Sitras II—i—32 and 33; wherein it is said that, that which, at the time of the per- formance of a sacrifice, points out certain details in connection with it is called ‘Mantra;’ and the rest are called‘ Brahmana.’ But the earlier authors have distinctly declared that this definition of ‘ Mantra’ is only a tentative one; as there are many Mantras that do not fulfil the conditions hercin laid down, and are yet called ‘Mantras.’ The ‘Mantras,’ in reality, take the place of Aphorisms dealing with sacri- ficial details, and the Brahmanas are commentaries on them; in fact, they are frequently spoken of as such by Cankaracarya. |
Rk, Yajush and Sdma are the three sub-divisions of the said two divisions of the Veda. Among Mantras and Bradhmanas, that sentence wherein we have distinct divisions into ‘ feet,’ is called a‘ ह ' (Siitra II—i—35) ;—the other names of which are ‘Red,’ ‘Cloka,’ Mantra.’ The sentences that are capable of being sung are known as ‘S@ma’ (1-1-36). The rest are called ‘ Yajush’ (II—i—37).
The text of the 20160056 philosophy is the most extensive of all; the Sitras have twelve Adhydyas, divided into sixty Pddas, containing ahout 1,000 67705, dealing with 1,000 sections or Adhikaranas.
The word ‘ Adhikdvanad’ really means ‘ Discussion,’ ‘Consideration,’ ‘Inquiry,’ ‘Investigation.’ In the Mimansa we find that each Discusssion is made up of five parts: viz.: (1) Vishkaya--the subject-matter under consideration, (2) Vigaya, or Sargaya—the doubt arising in connection with that matter, (3) Purvapaksha—the standpoint of the opponent, and the arguments in support thereof, (4) Uttara or Siddh&nta—the demonstrated conclusion, (5) Satgatti—Relevancy of the disenssion with the particular context. Some authors explain ‘utara’ as the arguments against the view of the opponent, and instead of ‘Sangati’ they have ‘ Nirnaya’ which they explain as ‘ Siddhanta.’ This system of discussion is adopted, more or less, in all the Sanskrit philosophical systems.
The Saétras are all arranged in the above order of discussion. Buta mere reading of the Qéatras does not afford us any idea as to where a discussion ends, and another begins. For all these, as also for a proper understanding of the Sdtras themselves, we have to fall hack upon certain commentaries upon the Satras.
Of these commentaries, and commontarics on commentaries we have an almost endless series. The oldest commentary on the Sifras that
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is available now, is the Bhashya by Cavara Svami (published in the Bibliatheca. Indica); though we find this Bhashya referring to other commentaries, chief among which is the Vréti of the “ revered Upavarsha.”’ On the Bhashya, we have the commentary of Kumarila Bhatta, generally spoken of as “ Bhatta.” This work is divided into three parts, known under three different names: (1) The Clokavartcka, treating of the first, the Tarka, (Polemical) Pada of the First Adhyfya (published in the ‘Cankhambha Sanskrit Series,’ Benares); (2) The Tantravértika, dealing with the last three Pddas of Adhyaya I, and the whole of Adhydyas If and III (published in the ‘Benares Sanskrit Series,’ and being translated into English by the present translator) ;-—and (3) The Tuptika—dealing with Adhyayas IV—XII (published {in the ‘ Benares Sanskrit Series’). On the first of these, we know of two commentaries : (1) The Kacika by Sucarita Micra, and (2) the Nydyaratnakara of Parthasarathi Micra (published in the ‘Caukbambha Sanskrit Series,’ Benares); extracts from these two commentaries have been put in as notes in the present work; and (3) the Nydyasudha of Somé¢vara Bhatta. On the second, the only commentary we know of is the Nydyasudhd, gene- rally known as ‘ Ranaka,’ by Somécvara Bhatta (in course of publica- tion in the ‘Cankhambha Sanskrit Series,’ Benares). And on the third, we have only one proper commentary, the Vartikabharana by Vénkata Dikshita; the other, the Tanéraratna cannot he spoken of as a ‘ commen- tary’ in the proper sense of the word; as it isa semi-independent com- mentary on the S#éras themselves, though here and there, taking up and explaining certain passages from the Bhashya and the V4rtika. This closes the list of works, indirectly dealing with the present work.
The first Satra of Pada i, Adhyaya I, deals with the usefulness of an investigation into Dharma. In the remaining part of the Pdda, we have a treatment of the questions—What is Dharma? What is its definition ? By what means of knowledge is Dharma cognisable? and so forth. From the beginning of the second Pada to the end of the Adhyaya, we have a consideration of the means of Dharma, and its Result, as also the authoritative character of the Veda, as the sole means of knowing Dharma.
[8774 (1).]
The meaning of the Sara is that inasmuch as Dharma is a purpose that is conceivable by means of the Veda alone, and the Veda is the only authority for it, after the student has finished the study of the Veda, he should continue with his teacher a little longer, with a view to learn the details of Dharma.
lv
This Sutra contains two Adhikaranas, i.e., it treats of two subjects : (1) Is a stndy of the Veda necessary for all the three higher castes? (2) Is Dharma a subject for consideration ? It is only the latter aspect of the Sitra that has heen dealt with by the commentators; and the obvious reason for this is that with regard to the former, there can be no doubt in the mind of any person who is not an avowed Atheist, and as such not to be admitted into a philosophical discnssion.
The Adhikarana dealing with the latter question is thus explained in detail :—
(a) The subjgect of discussion—the passages that form the subject- matter of the discussion—are the following two: ‘One should study the Veda,’ and theu ‘one should perform the Conclusive Bath after having studied the Veda.’
(९) The doubt arising with regard to thesc sentences is this: ‘Should one perform the Conclusive Bath, immediately after he has finished the reading of the teat of the Veda, or shonld he postpone it, and continue his stay with the teacher, a little longer, im order to learn something about the nature of Dharma ?’
(€) The opposite view (the Parvapaksha) is that the Bath should be performed immediately after the study of the Vedic text has been finished.
(d) The Reply to the opposite view is as follows: The sentence ‘one should study the Veda’ does not mean a mere getting up of the verbal text, it also means a doe understanding of the sense of the scriptures. And unless one ponders over the passages, he cannot arrive at a due understanding of their sense. Consequently a mere reading of the text does not afford us a due knowledge of Dharma. without which the study cannot be said to have borne its true fruit; and hence we cannot admit that the Conclusive Bath is to be performed immediately after the text has been got up.
(e) The Siddhanta or final conclusion arrived at is that after the student has got up the verbal text of the Veda, he should continue his stay with the teacher a little longer, for the purpose of learning all about Dharma.
The above shows the way in which the writers on Mimansa put forward the varions Adhikaranas.
The commentators have pointed out that the Sara in question also implies the necessity of learning the character of Adharma ; as without such knowledge, one could not exactly know what he should pvoid. But none of them have gone into the details of Adkarma, simply because a knowledge of Dharma would naturally give us an idea of its being contrary ; aud as such no separate treatment of this was neccssary
v fSodrra (2). |
The questions dealt with in this Séru are: What is Dharma? What is the authority—means of knowing—Dharma ^
The meaning of the Séira is that ‘ Dharma’ is the name that is given to those actions resulting in good, that have been laid down by Vedic injunctions. The commentators have gone into very claborate details in connection with this Sutra; the upshot of which is this: When an action is performed, there arises in the soul of the performer a certain potential energy, in the shape of a particular property or character, that, at some future time, brings about an eminently saisfactory result; and it is this potential energy that is called ‘ Dharma’ ‘ Punya, ‘Cubhadrshta’ and so forth.
The Adhikarana contained in the Sitra may be expressed as follows:—
(a) The subject-matter is Dharma. (ए) The doubé 18 as to whether or not there is a means of knowing
Dharma. Is this means contained in Sense-perception and the other ordinary means of knowledge? Or, is Dharma knowable only by means of Vedic Injunctions? Is the action of these injunctions in any way helped by Seuse-perception and the rest ?
(c) The opposite view is this: Vedic injunctions are not the means of knowing Dharma. All sentences serve only to describe things that have been known by means of Sensc-perception, &c., and as such they cannot be accepted as independent means of knowledge. The conclusion led to by this view is either that (1) there is no means of knowing Dharm+t, ov (2) that Dharma is cognisable by means of Sense-percep- tion or Inference; or (3) that Dharma is perceptible by the senses, for the Yogis, while for us it is to be known either by means of Inference, or by that of Vedic injunctions; or (4) that it is known by means of Vedic Injunctions as aided by Apparent Inconsistency. The sense of this last theory is that unless we admit of a super- physical cause, we are unable to explain the gradations and differences that we meet with in the universe; and it is the Apparent Incon- sistency of these differences that points to the existence of such a cause in the shape of Dharma; and then it is the Dharma whose particular character is known by means of Vedic Iujunctions. In any case Dharma 18 not cognisable by means of Vedic Injunctions aloue.
(द) The reply to the opposite view is as follows: When we find that the idea given rise to by the Injunction is not contradicted by any produced by other means of knowledge, we cannot bat admit the undisputed authority of that sentence. And hence, so long as we have distinct words affording us the due knowledge of Dharma, we
1
cannot very reasonably declare that there is no means of knowing it. In the casc of the words of ordinary persons, there are various causes of mistake—as for instance, carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat, and so forth; and as such the authority of such words might very well be doubted. The casc of Vedic sentences, however, is quite different, as it has not been composed by human agency; and as such there being uo chance of any of the aforesaid causes of mistake, the words of the Veda cannot but be admitted to have a self-snfficient authority in all matters wherewith they may deal. As for Sense-perception and the rest, they are found always to point to things that exist in the present, and have nothing to say with regard to things in the future, As for the perception of Yogis also, this is based upon memory; and as this always pertains to pre-conceived things, even Yogic per- ception cannot apply to Dharma, which has never been perceived or thought of, and is yet to come.
(€) The Siddhdnta, or conclusion, arrived at is that Vedic Injunc- tions are the only means of knowing Dharma.
Wel have given above the sample as to how each Adhikuruna is worked up. The Mimansé Castra deals with a thousand of such Adhikaranas, each of which has been very tersely put in the form of one or more Sutras.
Inasmuch as the Sccond Sétru lays down the two fundamental propositions—that (1) Vedic Injunctions are tle only means of knowing Dharma, aud (2) that Vedic Injunctions are wholly authoritative as as snch means , tbat form the keystone of the whole system, people have come to speak of this Sutra as the ‘Pratijna’ Sdira. It 18 with a detailed working out and supporting of these propositions that the rest of the First Pada is taken up.
[Strras 3—5. |
Proceeding to examine the means of acquiring the due knowledge of Dharma, Jaimini comes to the following conclusions: (1) Inasmuch as Sense-perception consists of the cognition bronght about by the contact of the sense-organ with the material object,—and as such it can only pertain to things existing at the present time,—it cannot serve as the rightful means of knowing Dharma; because Dharma is not a material object, and it does not exist at the present time. (2) The relationship between the Word and its signification is natural and eternal; it is uot created by Couvention; couscquently, the cognition brought about by a Vedic Injunction is absolutely and unconditionally
Vii
true; it is a permanent authoritative means of ‘knowledge; its an- thority is self-sufficient and self-manifest. (3) When we have found with regard to any two things that they are related in such a way that wherever the one is, there the other also 18 preseut,—then when- ever on some future occasion, we actually 866 any one of these, we at once conolude that tle other also must exist; and this cognition is what is called ‘ Inference ;’ obtaining a knowledge of Dharma.
As the whole fabric of Jaimini’s philosophy is based upon the second of these conclusions—the Self-sufficiency of Verbal Cognition— he devotes a special Adhikarana to a full discussion of the question.
but this Inference is of no use in
[807185 6—1].]
The objections against this self-sufficient authority, embodied in Sitras 6—11, are based upon those against the eternality of all words in general, and of the Veda in particular. These may be thus snmmed up: (1) Itisa fact of ordinary perception that all verbal utterance is an action bronght about by human effort; and as such, having had no existence, prior to this effort, it cannot be believed to be eternal. (2) It is found, at best, to enjoy a very brief existence; and actually found to be destroyed as soon as uttered. (3) We find people speaking of ‘making’ an utterance, which wonld not be possible if the word were eternal; as then it wonld be ever-present, and would require no ‘making.’ (4) The same word is found to be uttered, at one and the same time, by various persons, at various places. This would not be possible, if the word were an eternal omnipresent entity. (5) Then again we find in grammar that words undergo several modifications,—f. ४.५ the letter (४) changes into (ya); and certainly that which is eternal can have no modification. (6) We find the volume of the word decreasing or increasing, according as it is uttered by one or more men; and certainly that which increases and decreases can never be eternal.
। 9718458 12—17.]
These are the six objections against the eternal character of the Word. Jaimini meets every one of these in Sutras 12-- 17. The argu- ments contained in these Séitras may be thus summed up: (1) The mere fact of the word not being heard before it is uttered, does not prove that it did not exist before, or that it has been created by the utterance; all that it shows is that it was not manifest to our perception, and the utterance serves to make it perceptible. (2) Similarly, the word is not destroyed after being uttered ; the factis that the effect of the manifestive agency of the utterance having passed off, the word reverts to
Vill
its original unmanifested state; there are many things in the world that exist, though they are not perceptible. (3) People speak of the making of the word; but that refers to the sound that manifests the word; and this manifesting agency is certainly due to human eifort. (4) As for the simultaneous utterance of the same word by many persons,— this is analogous to the case of the single sun being simultaneously per- ceived by many persons. That is to say, just as many people, at different places, simultaneously perceive the single sun, so do they utter and hear the same word also. (5) What the grammatical rules lay down is not a modification of the letters; it is not that the ‘2’ is changed into‘ ya’; but that the latter takes the place of the former. (6) The volume of the Word never undergoes increase or decrease; it is only the sound proceeding from the throats of men that increases or decreases.
(Strras 18—23. ]
Having thus met the opponent’s objections, Jaimini proceeds to bring forward his own arguments in favour of his theory. These arguments are contained in Sitras 18—23. (1) The word is ever present; because the utterance of it is only for the purpose of manifesting it to others; and it is only when the werd exists that such effort at manifesting it could he justified. (2) When the word ‘cow’ is uttered, it is always recognised to be the same word; and this recognition could not he said to be mistaken ; it is universally cognisable. (3) People speak also of uttering the word ‘cow’ three or four times, and not of uttering three or four such words. This common usage also points to the eneness and the eternality of the word. (4) We do not perceive any productive or destructive cause of the word, as we do of all transitory things; and hence we cannot admit of its pro- dnetion or destruction. (5) Some people have held that Word is produced from Air. But what they really mean to be produced from the Air, is the sound, not the word itself ; because as a matter of fact, we know that the vibrations produced in the air give rise to various degrees of sound; and when these vibratory waves reach the tympanum, they are sensed and per- ceived by the ear. And there can be no doubt that Word is something wholly distinct from sownd, which latter only serves to manifest it. (6) We have many Vedic texts distinctly laying down the eternality of words.
[Sorras 24—32.]
In this connection, the commentators have shown that though the word 18 cternal, and so is its signification, yet in all human utterances. there is always a chance of the man having mistaken 11000708 of both ; and as such there is no independent authority attaching to human
hed 1x
utterances. But as for the Veda, it is not found to have any author. It is self-existent, self-sufficient in its authority and eternal. As for the names of persons and places met with in the Veda, they are mere sound coin- cidences; the words having quite a different sense.
That Dharma exists and that it consists of the Sacifices, Charities and the Libations, &c., enjoined in the Veda,—are the two propositions with regard to which there is a unanimity among Mimdnsakas, We proceed to show the points on which there is a diversity of opinion,
Sacrifices, Charities and Libations, duly performed, bring about definite results; hence Dharma consists of these actions. The true function of these actions lies in the bringing about of a certain potency in the soul of the performer. And it is through this potency that the performer takes his future births, for the experiencing of such results as the pleasures of Heaven and the like. To this Potency is given the technical name of ‘Apurva,’ in Mimansd; while in other systems it is known by such names as ‘ Adrshta,’ ‘ Punya,’ ‘Dharma,’ and so forth. In accordance with this theory then, Dharma consists of the actions of sacrifice, &., which latter consist of elaborate preparations of materials, &c.; thereby the actual*form of Dharma is perceptible, though its function proper, in the shape of Ap#rva is invisible, and can only be inferred.
According to other people, it is along with the Sacrifices, &c., them- selves that there appears an Apirva, which is the name given to the potency that leads to Heaven and other desirable results. And con- sequently according to these Dharma consists of this potency of Apirva ; and it is only indirectly that the name ‘ Dharma’ is applied to the sacri- fices, &c. Just as people speak of the life-prolonging Butter, as ‘ longevity,’ so also do they speak of the Dharma-producing Sacrifice as ‘ Dharma,’
Dharma and Adharma, the effect of bodily, verbal and mental actions ; and they form the seed of all future happiness and misery. It is €. cause the results of Dharma accrue to the Individual in his future life, that it is held to be imperceptible either by ordinary or yogic perception. Hence the final position arrived at is that it is cognisable by Vedic Injunction alone.
In the fact of bringing abouta definite cognition, consists the autho- rity of a Verbal expression; and its authority is independent and self- sufficient; it is unquestionable. Though it is true that even a false assertion gives rise to a cognition, yet inasmuch as in all cases of false assertion, we always either find some deficiency in the means of cog- nition itself, or find it to be denied subsequently by a more authoritative means of cognition,—we do not accept it as authoritatively true. But the only deficiency in Verbal Assertion, as a means of cognition, lies in tho untrustworthy character of the person making that assertion ; consequently
2
x
inasmuch as there is no person concerned in the Vedic assertions, we never question the authority of these, specially as none of them isfound to be set aside by any subseqnent means of cognition; because inherent deficiency in the means itself and the subsequent denial of the idea given rise to by it are the only two grounds for questioning the authority of a Verbal Assertion
On this occasion, it will be necessary to consider in what way a man’s idea of the authoritativeness of any means of cognition arises. That is to say, the question to be considered is—People have an idea as to this being authoritative, and that unauthoritative,—does this idea proceed natural- ly from the cognition itself? or, 18 1४ brought about by another cogni- tion P or does it come about, after one has looked into the excellences and defects of its meaus, or after one has examined the real state of the objects cognised ? or, is it that authoritativeness is ever inherent in the cogni- tion, always appearing with itself, and it is rejected only either when one finds the actual state of things to be otherwise, or when some deficiency has been discovered in the means of the cognition? For, asa matter of fact, itis found that the idea of the true authoritativeness of a certain cognition appears and remains permanent, only when it is fonnd that the object really exists in the form in which itis cognised, that there is no more authoritative cognition to the contrary, and when no deficiency is found in the means of that cognition. For instance, that what we see is actually a serpent is believed to be perfectly true, only when itis found on due inspection, by finding it moving, f.z., that itis a serpent; secondly, when itis not found to be denied by the idea obtained by further ex- amination of it; and, lastly, when it is ascertained that there has been no flaw in the powers of vision concerned.
In connection with this, some Mimdnsakas hold that the potency of the Cause, to bring about its effect, is inherent in it; and hence it is Cog- nition itself that establishes its own authority or otherwise, with regard to its nature and powers. While others hold that the Cognition is not capa- ‘ble at one and the same time, of establishing the truth and falsity of its object ; because truth and falsity are two mutually contradictory properties and as such they could never co-exist, either in any object, or in any Cognition. Consequently it must be admitted that the truth or falsity of cognition is ascertainable only by the presence or absence of discrepancies ‘in its source.
Another class of Mimansakas declare that if, until the excellences and ‘defects of the source have been found out, the truthfulness or otherwise of the assertion emanating therefrom remain doubtful, then it would be neces- ‘sary toadmit the Cognition to be devoid of any characteristics or potentiali- ties. But this could not be very acceptable; consequently it must be
x1
admitted that, in the first instance, the cognition is untrustworthy ; but when subsequently, corroborative cognitions appearing, the untrustworthiness 1s set aside, its trustworthiness becomes accepted. Thus then, in the case of the Veda, so long as we do not recognise it as the work of a trustwor- thy author, we cannot accept it as true. On the other hand, we actually come across, inthe Veda, such apparently absurd assertions as ‘the trees performed the sacrifice,’ which distinctly point it out as being the work of an extremely untrustworthy person.
To this, the orthodox. Mimansaka makes the following reply: , 116 anthority or the evidential character of the Veda—or of any means of know- ledge—cannot be dependent upon anything outside itself; because if a cognition did not contain within itself, 1४8 own evidence, but depended upon another cognition, then in that case, this latter cognition.also would have to be justified hy another cognition, and so on ad infinitum: and it would be absolutely impossible to accept any cognition to be true. ‘Consequent- ly we must admit that all cognitions are self-sufficient in their authority. But this does not mean that all cognitions or ideas are true. In the case of many we subsequently find that they are not in keeping with the real state of things, or that they had originated from a mistaken notion ; and in such cases the formerly-conceived truth is set aside in view of these subsequent facts. But in cases where we have no such subsequent contra, dictions, we naturally admit the idea to he true. Thus then in all assertions of ordinary men, they are always. open to the probability of being false, on account of the character of the persons making the assertions; and hence these are not accepted to be unconditionally true. The case of the Veda, however, is different. There is no human element in it; and consequently there is no probability of any un- truthfulness vitiating its inherent self-evidential character. Nor have we, at our command, any means of knowledge that could show the Vedio assertions to be false; hecause the subject treated of in the Veda 18 not amenable to any of the recognised means of right knowledge. Then again, it has already been shown that all words are eternal : consequently the words of the Veda need not necessarily he attributed to a human author. And we find that the knowledge derived from Vedic words fulfil all the conditions of “right knowledge,” viz: it is incontro- vertible, it refers to things not known before, and is quite consistent with facts. The only chance of faultiness of such knowledge lies in the charac- ter of the speaker; and as there is no speaker in the case of the Veda, it is above all such faults.
This assertion of the Mimansakas is based upon the theory that Sound 18 as impartite and eternal an entity, as Time, Space, etc., and, it is not a mere property of Akaga; it is beginningless and indestructible; all that
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the speaker does is to help in the manifestation of certain sounds that he ‘has conventionally fixed upon as being expressive of certain things. ‘Then again, what is heard is not the Word, but only the Sound that serves to manifest it as it already exists eternally.
The Mimdnsaka does not hold the word alone to be eternal; but also its meaning, and its relationship to that meaning. That there is such a relationship is directly cognisable by Sense-perception; and the reason why it is not recognised by one who hears a word uttered for the first time is that the necessary accessories are not present; but that does not make the relationship non-existing ; for becanse the eye cannot see withont light, that does not mean that the eye is incapable of seeing altogether. This accessory in the case in question is in the shape of the knowledge that such and such a word denotes such and such a thing. This knowledge is obtained by the child from experience, by marking the words and the actions of his elders.
Nor have we any grounds for helieving that the Veda was composed by Brahma and handed to his sons, by whom it has been propagated in the world. The Mimdnsaka finds a greater difficulty in believing this than the eternal character of words and their meanings.
It is on such a Veda that Jaimini bases his enquiry into the nature of Dharma and Adharma. Of these Dharma is said to consist in the course of conduct, tending to the attainment of the four desirable ends of life, as laid down in the Veda; such, f.z., as the performance of sacrifices and the like. And Adharma consists of such conduct as is conducive to the advent of objects of aversion, laid down as such in the Veda,—e.g., the eating of games killed by poisoned arrows, etc. In the matter of these two, all requisite proof is afforded by the Veda, Smrti and the practical code of morality obtaining among good men. Of these the first is as al- ready shown above, self-independent iu its authority, while the other two owe their authority to the fact of their being based on the Veda.
The Veda consists of two parts: the Mantra and the Bradhmana. The Mantra serves the purpose, at sacrifices, of recalling to the mind of the performer, the substances, the Deity, and other things connected with them; and the Bra@hmana consists of sentences mainly declaratory; one important portion of this latter is made up of the Arthavdda (Sitra 1-11-7), which is made up of the Praising and Blaming of certain actions and things ; this is accepted as an anthority on Dharma, chiefly because it tends to the recognition of the excellence of the enjoined Duty, bnt only so far as it is capable of being taken along with the Declaratory Passages deal- ing with that Duty.
‘Such declaratory passages are of various kinds: (1) “ Karmotpatti- Vakya” — (passages declaring a duty) ; (2) “ Guna-Vakya” — ( passages
xiii laying down the materials, &c. ; (3) “ Phala-Vakya '' — (passages declaring the result) ; (4) ^“ Gura-Vakya, for a particular purpose ; (5) Saguna-Karmot- patti-Vakya”’—(passages declaring a duty together with the necessary materials), and so on.
(1) A “ Karmotpatti-Vakya” is that which simply points out that “such an action is to be performed”—eg., ‘ Offers the Agnihotra sacrifice ;” this sentence merely signifies the fact that the Agnihotra Sacri- fice is laid down as one to be performed.
(2) A “ Guna-Vakya” is one which lays down the Deity and the Materi- als, &c., necessary for the performance of the sacrifice—e.g., ‘“‘ Sacrifice with the Curd.” The very fact of the ^ Curd” being mentioned as part of the action constitutes its “gunatva’’ (secondary character). In the above proposition the character of the Homa as the subject, lies in the fact of its having been known from other sources of information, and being herein mentioned only as related to the Predicate; and if such a Subject were repeated in order to show its relation to the Predicate, this would constitute its “ Anuvadyatva” (another character of the Subject). And the primary character of such a term 18 due to its connection with the Materials, such as the ^ Curd” in the above proposi- tion. The character of “Curd” as the Predicate consists in the fact of its not being known from any other source (save the proposition in ques- tion); and its secondary (or subservient) character, in comparison with the Homa itself, is due to its being the material for (and as such subservient to) the Homa. And further, the acceptability of both by the agent is due to the action itself being such as is to be performed hy him.
The action having been mentioned, the question naturally arises 111 the mind of the agent—‘ what will be the result of this action?’ And the sentence that serves to lay down the connection of the Action with a de- finite result is called the—
(3) “ Phalavidht,”—e.g., ‘One desiring heaven should perform the Agnihotra Sacrifice.” The full connotation of this sentence is—‘ He who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra Sacrifice, as the means thereto’; and as such, this sentence lays down the result of the action (Agnihotra), which, in the previous passage, has only been pointed out as a sacrifice to be performed.
(4) A “ Gunavakya for a specific purpose” is that in which a certain material is mentioned, in connection with a known action, as leading to a particular result ;—e.g. ‘‘One ought to offer the libation of curds for the sake of one who is desirous of acquiring efficient sense-organs.” Here, for the specific purpose of ‘acquiring the senses,” a particular material (curd is mentioned in connection with Homa, an idea of which has already been derived from the passage enjoining the Agnihotra. The formal meaning
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of the above injunction is—‘ One is to realise the accomplishment of thé Senses by means of curds, in connection with (i.e., as forming the materials for) the Homa.” Another name for “Gunaphalavidhi” is “ guna- karmavidhi,”
(5) A “^ Sagunakarmotpattivikya” is a passage enjoining an action together with its accessories—such as the Materials, Deity, &८, As an example of this we have—‘One ought to sacrifice with the Soma.” This passage enjoins the sacrifice together with the Soma-plant, since the injunction of a qualified action (here, the Soma-Sacrifice) necessarily im- plies that of the qualification (here, Soma).
In certain cases, an “originative passage” (Karmotpattivakya) also mentions the result of the action,—e.g. ^ One desiring cattle is to sacri- fice with the Udbhid.” The ^ Udbhid Sacrifice” is not mentioned in any other passage; and in the passage cited 1४ is enjoined, as leading to the acquiring of cattle. Thus it is a single sentence enjoining the sacrifice as leading to a certain result,—thus serving the double purpose of laying down a 82011006, and also pointing out the Material with which it is to be performed.
The Primary Injunction (1.¢., the passage simply mentioning the action) is often such as to be construed together with its subsidiary injunctions (४.९० those mentioning the accessories to the action mentioned in the fore- going primary injunction) ; and thus both conjointly come to form a single sentence and make up the one complete injunction of the main action together with all its accessories ; and such an injunction is called a “‘ Prayogavidhi.” As an example of this, we have —“ One desirous of heaven ought to perform the Agnihotra Sacrifice’’; this passage means that “the Agent is to conceive of the acquiring of heaven by means of the Agnihotra Sacrifice.’ But there instantly arises the question of method: ‘How is this sacrifice to be performed ?' And this is answered, in regard to the Agnihotra, &c., by such passages as “set up the fire, put in the fuel, &c., &c.,”” which come forward as laying down the necessity of fire, fuel and such other thiugs, in the performance of the Agnihotra Sacrifice. And passages like these (‘‘ set up the fire, &e.”), forming with the primary injunction (‘‘one desiring heaven should perform the Agnihotra”’) one single ^ Grand Injunction”’ go to point out the Agnihotra Sacrifice with all its accessories, designed for the attainment of heaven,—the whole thus meaning that “ one is to attain heaven by means of the Agnihotra Sacrifice, performed with the help of its accessories, such as the setting up of fire, the putting in of fuel, the purification of the house and the like.” Such is the “ Prayogavidhs.”’ Other names for the accessories taken collectively are “ Itthambhava” and ‘'litkartavyata.” In the above iustance, Agnihotra is the primary action, and the setting up of fire, &c., are all auxiliary to it.
XV THE APURVA.
It does not appear quite reasonable that momentarily-disappearing actions should bring about any such future effects, as the attainment of Heaven and the like. But the fact 18 that, from certain Vedic passages, we come to know of the capability of the enjoined and prohibited actions. to bring about certain results; and iu order to render reasonable the pro- duction of future effects by means of momentarily-disappearing actions we assume certain intervening transcendental Agencies in the shape of “ Punya” (virtue) aud ^" Papa” (vice). Thus then, the causing of the attainment of Heaven by Sacrifices is not «tmmediate, but indirect through the unseen agency of virtue. This is what is called the Unseen Force (Adrshta) leading to a particular effect; and the cause of this Unseen Force is the primary action, fitted up with all its various subsidiaries preceding and following it, and not the primary action aloue by itself. For, in that case, the effects (attainment of Heaven, &c.) too might be said to be brought about by the primary alone; and such a theory would lead to the inevitable conclusion—the uselessness of the subsidiaries.
An objection is here raised: “It is not right to assert the production “of the Unseen Agency by the Primary Action together with all its ‘subsidiaries. For the Primary Action is no sooner performed than ‘destroyed, and as such cannot profit by the aid of its subsidiaries.”
To this, the Mimansaka replies that thongh no help of the sub- sidiaries is possible to the Primary by itself, yet such aid would be quite possible through au (intermediate) Unseen Force, brought about by the mere origination of the primary action (such Force having the conven- tional name of “ Utpattyapirva).”” Because for the fulfilment, to the Primary, of the full aid of all its subsidiaries, we conventionally assume the production by the Primary alone, of such an Apirva intervening between the Primary and the final Apirva directly leading to the (final result). In the same manner, the subsidiaries too, being only conjointly capable of helping the Primary, cannot help one another directly by themselves; and, as such, for the fulfilment of this mutual aid among the subsidiaries also, we assume the production of intermediate Unseen Forces—Utpattyaptrvas—at each step (2e., together with every sub- sidiary,—the one subsidiary helping the one following through the Utpattyapirva produced by itself).
The help of the subsidiaries towards the Primary, as a rnle, consists in turning the Primary towards the production of the “Great” Apitirva leading to the Final Result. With the Darga and Pirnamdasa, however, the case is different: that 18 to say, in these the subsidiaries together with the ‘Primary go collectively toformasingle Primary. First as to the Parnmasa.
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The sentence ‘“Yadaégnéyo ‘shtakapalo’ mavasyayanca paurnama- syaicacyuto bhavati” enjoins the Agnéya Sacrifice; and the sentence “ tabhyamétamagnishomiyamékadacakapalampurnamasyam prayacchat” lays down the Agnishomiya. In the Paurnam4asi again, the Upangu- Sacrifice is laid down by the sentence ‘ Tavahrtta, &c.”’ All these three Injunctions together lay dewn the ^ Primary” in the Paurnamasi. In connection with these three—the Agnéya, the Agnishomiya, and the Upancu—we have the sentence “Ya évam, &.,” where the werd “ Paurnamasi’”’ is iu the singular, and, as such, denotes the fact of all three together forming a single group. Hence, in tle Veda, the word ‘“‘ Paurnamasi ”’ is to be understood as denoting all these three —Agnéya, &c.—taken collectively.
Here some people raise the following objection: ‘‘In the sen- tence yaddgnéya, &e., d&e, there is no word denoting ‘ sacrifice ’; and as such, how can the sentence be said to enjoin a sacrifice ?” And the reply that is given is, that the werd ‘Agneya’=that (Puro- daga) which is consecrated to Fire as its Deity; and this word being co-ordinate with (7e, qualifying) Puroddéea, connotes the relation of the material (Purodaga) with the Deity (Fire). But such relation is not possihle in the absence of some sort of a sacrifice; and the word “Sacrifice” too signifies nothing more than ‘the offering of certain materials to a certain Deity.’ Therefore the relation of Material and Deity expressly laid down in the passage (by the word ‘ Agnéya’) must lead toe the inference of the passage being the injunction of a Sacrifice ;—the significance of the passage thus being “one is te cen- ceive of his aim by means of a Sacrifice to he performed on the Amavasya day, having for its Material the Puroda@ca consecrated to the deity Fire.” Similarly, whenever any passage declares the relation of Material and Deity—e.g., “ Sauryancarunnirvapét,’—we have to infer the injunction of a Sacrifice, by means of the relation of the Deity (Sun, in the example cited).
Another objection is here raised to the effect that the passage enjoin- ing the Upangu-sacrifice is devoid of any injunctive ending, and as such, it cannot be taken as a real Injunction. But the present tense in ‘¢Yajati” must be taken as standing for the injunctive: because wherever there is no injunctive ending we have to assume a like change. Others however, explain ^ Yajati” as helonging to the कैर् class, and thus having an independent injunctive signification of its own.
In the Darga-sacrifice too, we have three primaries—(1) & (2) the two Sdnndyya Sacrifices mentioned in the passages “ Aindraudadhi, &c.,” and “ Aindrampayah, &o.”; and (3) the Agnéya Sacrifice mentioned iv the passage “‘ Yadagnéya, &c.” And all these three form collectively a single
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group, expressed by the word “‘Amavdsyam ” in the accusative singular, occuring in the passage “Ya évamvidvanamavasyam, &e.” Hence, in the Veda, wherever we meet with the word “ Darga,” we have to interpret it as denoting all the above three taken collectively. Auother reason for making the words “ Darga” and “ Paurnamasa” each denote each of the two trios mentioned above is the explanation of the dual ending in “ Dargapaurnamadsabhyam svargakamo yajéta,’—which (dual ending) could not be explained if each were to denote severally each member of the trio individually, in which case, the plural ending would be necessary.
Thus then, the Praya@ja and the rest, mentioned in proximity to the fruitful Agnéya, are subsidiaries to the six sacrifices beginning with the Agnéya; and the meaning of the passage “ Darcapaurnama- sibhyam yajéta” would be this: “One is to produce the Unseen Force leading to Heaven by means of all the sacrifices that go collectively to form the two groups of ‘ Darga’ and ‘ Paurnamasa,’ taken together.”
Question : ‘How can the two sets, occuring at different times, be said to act together P’
Answer: Though they cannot act together by themselves, yet the three constituent factors of each would each produce a distinct Unseen Force; and it is through these several Unseen Forces, that the two sets would act conjointly.
Question : ‘How can the three parts of one produce a single Unseen Force ? '
Answer: Each of the three, when takeu together with the subsidiaries Prayaja, &c., are said to produce one Unseen Force for the complete set; and because each of the three cannot, by itself, be accompained by the whole host of subsidiaries, therefore the three sacrifices are said to produce three original Unseen Forces (Utpatiyapiirvas) ; and it is through these that each of the three becomes connected with all the subsidiaries. And because the subsidiaries, Prayaja, &c., cannot by themselves be taken with the Primary, therefore this conjunction too is to be accepted as accom- plished through the several original Unseen Forces. Further, there is a conjunction of the original Unseen Force produced by the Primary and those produced by the subsidiaries, Prayaja, &c.; and it 18 thig conjunction that constitutes the fact of the Primary being equipped with all its subsidiaries. Similarly, in the Paurnamaésa, the three Unseen Forces, produced by the three subsidiaries Agnéya, &c., in company with those produced by the Prayaja, &c.,.bring about the one Unseen Force, that belongs to the complete three-fold set. In the same manner, in the Darga, the three Unseen Forces, produced by the Agnéya and the Aindra, together with those produced by the subsidiaries, bring about a single Unseen Force, which belongs to the whole three-fold set. Thesetwo Unseen
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Forces of the two trios, brought about as they are by the three original Unseen Forces of the Agnéya and the rest, produce the final Phalapurva— the force from which proceeds the final result. Thus the meaning of the passage is that ‘One is to bring about Heaven to himself by means of the Darga—and—Paurnamasa, through Unseen Forces.’ Thus then, the fulfilment of the effectual Unseen Force necessitates the performance of the Primary, together with all its subsidiaries ; and the injunction that lays down this fact is the < Prayogavidhi.”
The Veda is again divided into 4 parts—the Vidhi, the Arthavada, the Mantra and the Namadhéya ; and we proceed to explain each of these in detail. |
VIDHI.
“Vidhi” (Injunction) is of three kinds: (1) ^ Apurvavidhi,” (2) ५ Niyamavidhi,” and (3) ^ Partsahkhydvidhi.”
(1) Of these the passage that enjoins an action that has not been laid down elsewhere is called an ^ Aptrvavidhi” (ht. the Injunction of something new); e.g., ^“ Vrihin prokshati,’ a passage occurring in connec- tion with the Darga-paurnamdsa—without this passage, we could in no way have any idea of the washing of the corn to be employed in the sacrifice.
(2) The passage that restricts the procedure of a certain action laid down in another passage is called “ Niyamavidht (Restrictive Injunc- tion)”; 6.8.) “ Vrihinavahanti,” a passage also occurring in connection with the Darga-paurnamisa. If we had not this passage, then, with reference to the Darga-paurnamdsa, as threshing does for the removal of the chaff from the grain for the purpose of making the “Cake” mentioned in the original injunction,—so, in the same manner, we could also have recourse to the process of removing the chaff by tearing each grain by the nails; and hence in the latter case, as the work could be done by other means, threshing would not be necessarily required ; aud as such if could only have a partial application (optional with the tearing by the nails). In the face, however, of the aforesaid injunction,—Vrihinavahanti—we have it distinctly laid down that the chaff is to be removed by threshing alone; and the nail-process 18 set aside once for all. Objection: “Since the nail-process serves our purpose as well as threshing, the restricting of the process to the latter alone is not reasonable.” Reply: Not so; because it is admitted that the removal of the chaff by the process of threshing produces a certain Unseen Force (not attaiuable by the other process) in addition to the visible
X1X effect in the shape of the speedier removal of the chaff. This Unseen Force .is added to the final effective Unseen Force, through the original Apirva of the Sacrifice itself. Thus then, as without the Unseen Force brought about by the Restriction, no final Apirva would be possible, the Restriction cannot be said to be purposeless,
(3) When two objects happen to be mentioned as equally applicable in @ certain case, the passage that serves to preclude one of them is called: “ Parisankhyavidhi”’; e.g., in connection with the Oayana, we read: “ Im- amagrbhnanrasanadmrtasyétyaguabhidhanimadatté,’—whereby the Mantra herein mentioned is found to appertain to the holding of the horse’s reins In the absence of this passage the Mantra merely mentioning the “ holding of the reins” would find itself appertaining to the holding of the reins of the ass, by means of the “linga” consisting of the capacity of the Mantra expressing merely the “ holding of the reins.” When, however, we have the aforesaid injunction, we have it clearly laid down that the said Mantra is to be employed in holding the reins of the horse, and not those of the ass,—which latter is to be held silently (without any Mantra). Thus we find that the passage quoted sets aside the application of the Mantra with regard to the reins of the ass, which, together with the reins of the horse, would, otherwise, be equally related to the Manira in question. |
We have said above that the Prayaja, &८, are subsidiaries to the “Darca-Paurnamasa.’ Now then, the “authority” for accepting such subordinate character is sixfold—(1) “@ruti” (Direct Assertion), (2). “ Linga”’ (Indirect Implication), (3) ^ Vakya” (Syntactical Connection), (4) “Prakarana” (Context), (5) “‘Sthana” (Position), and (6) “Sama- khya” (Name).
In the Agnihotra-passage—“ Dadhna juhuyat”—the ‘offering’ 18 expressed by the word “Juhuyat;” and with reference to this ‘ offering we find mentioned the ^ Dadhi,’’ which we at once make out, on account. of its instrumental ending, to be the Material that is to be offered. Thus then, in the present instance we find that the fact of the Dadhi being subsidiary to the offering is directly mentioned by the passage above quoted.
“Linga” is “Samarthya,” Power. It is twofold—belonging to the Meaning and to the Word. As an instance of the former, we have the following: The passage “ Sruvéna avadyati” asserts the general fact of ‘ Avadana’ (cutting) being accomplished by means of the Sruva; but the Power (or capacity) of the Sruva is such that any ‘ cutting’ by it can refer only to fluid materials, like butter, ©.) and not-to solid ones, as ००५३8 and the like; and as such the Sruva comes to be a subsidiary only to the
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cutting of the fluid materials. The Power of a word lies in its denoting a certain meaning, e.g., the mantra “Agnayé nirvapami” forms part of the ‘Nirvapa,’ simply owing to the denotation of the word ‘ Nirvapami (occuring in the body of the mantra).
“Vakya” (Sentence, or Syntactical Connection) consists in the mention of a certain word together with other words; ¢.g., the mantra ५ [815 tva, &c.,” is interpreted as being subsidiary to the ‘chopping of the reed’ on account of the syntactical connection of the mantra with the verh “ Chinatti ” (cuts or chops, occurring close after the mantra). Or again, in the passage “ Agnayé jushtam,” &c., the words are syntactically connec- ted with the verb “Nirvapimi” (following close upon the mantra); and as such the mantra is accepted as being subsidiary to the ‘ Nirvapa.’
८८ Prakarana” (Context) consists in “ mutual want.” As for example, in the passage ^ Dargapaurnamasabhyam svargakamo yajéta”—which means that ‘one is to bring about an unseen agency Icading him to Heaven by means of the Darca and Paurnamasa sacrifices ’—the first question that arises is—“‘ How, by what process, is the unseen agency to be brought about by means of the two sacrifices?” Again, in close proximity to the passage enjoining the sacrifices ‘Aguéya’ and the rest (which are parts of the Darca and Paurnamasa), with their results, we meet with such passages as “ Tantinapatam yajati, &c.,” without the mention of any results. Then with reference to these latter, there arises another kind of question—“what is to be the result of all these sacrifices ? ” Thus then, there being a want of result with regard to the “Prayaja,’ “ Agnéya,” &c., and that of the procedure with regard to the “Darga and Paurnamasa,”’ we find a mutual want between the two sets of passages—which want constitutes “ Prakarana,’”’—and thereby arrive at the conclusion that the ‘‘ Prayaja,” ^ Agnéya,” &c., are subsidiary to “ Darca and Paurnamasa.”
“ Sthana ” (Position) is proximity ; ¢.g., coming across with the mantra “Sundhadhvam, &.,” in close proximity to the “Sannayya” vessels (vessels for holding butter and curd) we infer that the mantra 28 subser- vient to (and has its application in) the rinsing of these vessels.
८ Samakhya” is naming. As for example, certain actions having been mentioned in the Adhvaryu Chapter, the fact of ^ Adhvaryava” heing the name (of the actions) leads to the conclusion that the Adhvaryus are the performers of these actions, and as such, are subsidiary to (é.e., form of part of) them. Again, in connection with the passage ‘ Ain- dragnamékadaga-kapalannirvapét prajikamah,” the “ Aindragni”’ sacri- fices 816 called by the name “Kamyéshti”; hence the naming of the mantras “Ubha vaimindragni, &c., &c.,” as the ^ Kamyéashtiyajya- nuyakyakanda” leads to the conclusion that these latter (mantras)
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are to be used as yasyanuvdkya (to the Aindragni sacrifices, called ° Kamyeshti”);—that is to say, these mantras are subsidiary to the Aindragni sacrifices.
When “ Direct Assertion” and the rest happen to have a common object of application, their respective authority depends upon the order in which they are mentioned above—i.e., “ Position” is stronger than ८ Name,” “Context”? than ^ Position” and so on, ‘“ Direct Assertion ” being the strongest of all. As for example, in the Agnihotra section we meet with the passage “ Kada ca nastarirasityaindrya garhapatyamupa- tishthaté’’; and here from the ‘“‘ Power” of the word “ Aindrya,” the mantra “ Kada ca na, &c.,” would from part of the adoration of Indra; whereas the direct instrumental ending in =" Aindryad,” and the accusative ending in “ garhapatyam”’ connects the mantra directly with the Garha- patya sacrifice; and therefore, the former connection of the mantra with Indra, based on “ Power,” is set aside in favour of the latter, based upon Direct Assertion.” This theory of comparative strength is based upon the fact that ‘‘ Direct Assertion” lays down directly whatever it has to assert; whereas “ Power’’ stands in need of the assumption of an inter- vening ‘‘ Direct Assertion; and the reason for this is that nothing can be regarded as authoritatively valid unless it is laid downinthe Veda directly. Thus, in the given example, finding the «^ Power” of the word “ Aindrya” referring to Indra, we stand in need of a ^“ Direct Assertion” in the form “ Aindrya Indramupatishthats,” before we can assert the application of the mantra to the adoration of Indra. But such an assumption is not warrantable because of another relation (of the mantra, with Garhapatya) being laid down by ‘ Direct Assertion.” In case, however, where there is no ^“ Direct Assertion ”—as in the case of “ Agnayé jushtan nirvapami ”— the “ Power” of the word ‘‘ Nirvapami” at once connects the mautra with ‘‘Nirvadpa,” through the assumption of an intermediate “ Direct Assertion” in the form—‘ By means of this mantra, one should perform the Nirvapa.” Because in this case, there is no objection to such an assumption (since in this case we have no ‘“ Direct Assertion” bearing testimony to any other interpretation).
Similarly, in the passage ‘‘syonanté sadanam krnomi ,,, tasmin sida,” the word “tasmin,” from its very nature, connects the latter sentence (“‘tasmin sida’) with the former (“syonanté, &c.”); and this syntactical connection would make only one mantra of the two sentences; whereas ^ Power” would make two different mantras of them, owing to the fact that the “ Power” of the former sentence indicates “Sadana” ( Home, Seat), and that. the latter indicates “Sadana” (making to sit). And
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because “ Power” is stronger than ‘“‘Syntactical Connection,” and as such sets it, aside, therefore we conclude that the mantra “syonanté, &e.” is related to Sadana, and “tasmin sida” to Sadana. The reason for. ‘‘Power” being stronger than ^ Syntactical Connection ”’ is that, as in the above instance, ¢ Syntactical Connection” will reduce the two sentences into one, and then will necessitate the assumption of the “ Power” of “Sadana,” and then, lastly, it will also stand in need of the assumption of a “ Direct Assertion” to the effect that “one is to perform Sadana by means of the two sentences taken collectively as one mantra.” On the other hand, in the case of the application of ^ Power” which directly indicates Sadana, all that is necessary is the assumption of a “ Direct Assertion” to the effect that “one is to perform Sadana by means of the mantra syonanta, &c.” And thus we find that the latter interpretation is a step shorter than the former. And the signification being thus complete, nothing more is required; and as such it precludes the neces- sity of assumiug another “Direct Assertion” through the assumption of another “ Power,” on the strength of mere ^^ Syntactical Connection.’’ It is for this reason that “ Power” is said to be stronger than “ Syntactical Connection,” which is a step farther, and more complicated than the former, and is therefare set aside by it,
In the same manner, “ Context’ is set aside by ‘Syntactical Con- nection,” “Position” by “Context,” and “ Name” by ^ Position;” and “ Direct Assertion ” sets aside all.
The subsidiary character of a certain action consists in its being mentioned for the sake of another (action); and this latter fact con- sists in its forming a helpful part in the performance of an action by the agent. This definition would apply to the Prayajas as forming parts of the “ Darca and Paurnamisa,” inasmuch as with regard to these latter, the former form part of the performance of these by the agent.
Subsidiaries are of two kinds: (1) The “ Sannipatyopakaraka” and (2) the “ Aradupakaraka.”
The Subsidiaries—which directly or indirectly make up the pri- mary Sacrifice, and then, though this latter, bring about its “ Original Apiirva”—are the “ Saunipatyopakarakas ;” ¢g., the various 008, Vrihi and the rest, and the “threshing,” &., of these, as also the Deitics (Agni, &c.) and the sacrificial mantras related thereto. The “ sprinkling of water’’ (over the corn) helps towards the “cake” through a certain sanctity, produced thereby in the corns; the ‘ threshing ” helps through the visible effect in the shape of the removal of the chaff; and lastly, the corn helps towards it by means of the flour, And by means of this
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“cake,” the above three bring about the Sacrifice and its “Original Apirva.” The form of the sacrifice itself is accomplished by the Deities directly, and by the sacrificial mantras indirectly, through the sanctifica- tion of the Deities. And it is by means of the form of the sacrifice that the “Original Apirva” is brought about. Because a sacrifice consists ouly in the offermg of certain materials to certain Deities; and further, because the material and the Deity are recognised as conjointly consti- tuting the form of the sacrifice.
Those that bring about an “ Apirva” inherent in themselves are called the «° Aradupakarakas,” ९.4.) the “Prayaja” the ^ Ajyabhaga, “ Anuyajya” and the like. These do not produce any sanctification, either of the Deity or of the material. They simply bring about the ‘“‘ Apirva”’ in themselves.
न्क
Actions in general are of two kinds: “ Arthakarma” (Primary) and “Gunakarma” (Secondary). The former are those that produce an ‹ Aptrva’’ in themselves,—eg., the “ Agnihotra, ^“ Darca-Panrnamasa, ”’ the “ Prayajas,” and the like. Of the latter kind are those that are simply purificatory in their character; 2.6.) which only serve to purify, and thus render fit for use, certain materials.
These latter (the Gunakarma) again are twofold: (1) Those sancti- fying the materials being used, and (2) those sanctifying the materials to be used hereafter. Of these the former are called “ Pratipattikarma ”— the word ^“ pratipatti’’ meaning the laying aside in its proper place of materials occupying the hands of the Agent, e.g., the “ eating of Ida,” the “ Caturavatta Homa” and the like.
An objection is raised in this connection: ‘The eating of the 13 consists in the laying ont of the ‘Cake’ which occupies the agent’s hand in a Primary Sacrifice; and as such it could reasonably be classed as ‘ pratipatti.’” But a Homa, on the other hand, does not tend to sanctify a material being used in the sacrifice; and as such how can that be called a ‘ Pratipatti?’ Because a Homa occurring simultaneously with the sacrifice, the materials purified by the Homa—such as tlie “ Caturavatta ” and the like—cannot be said to be in the course of being used. The reply is: A Pratipatti consists only in the sanctification of what is im course of use (in general), and not merely in what is in course of use in the Primary Sacrifice. For, if the latter were the case, then the ‘removal of the blood ” simultaneously with that of the “fat, heart, &ec.,” following the slaughter of the animal, would not be a ^ Pratipatti” ; because this would not be the removal of material being used in a sacrifice. And -further, the “casting away of the black horn” would
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not be a “Pratipatti”; for though the black horn is used in scratching the body (of the Yajamana), yet it is not used in the sacrifice directly, Therefore all that is necessary to constitute a ^ Pratipatti’” is the fact of the materials being in any way used in a sacrifice. And hence, as the fat, d&c., of the animal are also used in one way or the other, they come to be classed as “ Pratipatti.” And thus the definition would apply to ‘“‘Homa” also; because there too, the ‘“Caturavatta,” &., are used in some way or other, at sacrifices.
The “ Pratipatti” is of three kinds: (1) One following the Primary Action; (2) one occurring simultaneously with it; and (3) one preceding it. To the first order belong the “eating of Ida” and the like; and to the second “Homa” and the rest. In the ‘‘ Darga-Paurnamasa Section we read— Sakrdupastrnati,” “ Dvirhavisho’ vadyati,” “ Sakrdabhi.- gharayati,’ “Catnravattam juhoti.” From among these, in the last, it cannot be said that the Caturavatta passage being supplementary to Homa, enjoins the Catturavatta as a material for it. Because the Homa has not yet been anywhere mentioned by itself, and as such there cannot be a supplement to it. Nor can it be urged that Homa 18 mentioned in the passage ^“ Yadagnéya, &c.” Because this last passage is declaratory of the sacrifice (and not of Homa); and it cannot be said that Homa is identical with the sacrifice. Because a sacrifice consists in the offering of a certain material to a certain Deity, whereas Homa consists of the throwing of the materials into the fire. Therefore, though the passage “ Yadagnéya, &c.” is declaratory of the sacrifice, yet being unable to indicate the “throwing in” of the materials (and as such, not being declaratory of the Homa), the Caturavatta passage cannot be said to be supplementary to it The fact is that the passages laying lown the “spreading of the grass” (npastarana), “twice cutting ” (dviravaddna) and the “ pouring out of butter” (ubhighdrana) indicate the “ Caturavatta,” fourfold cutting; and the word “juhoti”’ lays down the “throwing in” thereof (in its proper place) as purificatory of it; and this “ purification’ is of the form of "^ pratipatti” pure and simple. For of the two alternatives—-(1) the pratipatti-ship of the ‘ Cake’ prepared for the deities Agni, &c., forming part of the primary sacrifice, in accordance with such passages as “ Agnayé jushtamabhigharayami” and the like, and being as such, only tndzrectly used in the sacrifice, and (2) the pratipatti- ship of the “throwing in” of the “avadaina” (cut portions) of the “Cake ’’ (which are used in the sacrifice directly),—the latter is de- cidedly the more reasonable. And this “ purification” is simultaneous with the Primary Action. For the Homa is enjoined as following the ५ Vashatkara” (the uttering of the syllable ‘ Vashat’), and the sacrifice by the Adhvaryu is also enjoined as occurring at the same time, and he is
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reminded of this by the mention of ^ Vashatkara ”; and hence the simultaneity of the Homa and the sacrifice, All this has been explained in the ‘“Vartika” on the ^ Pradhanddhikarana.” As an example of Pratipatti preceding the Primary, we have—the “removal of the blood, &e.,” which naturally precede the offering of the flesh. This is explained in the Vartika, under the siitra “ Pagavanalambhat, &c.”
The second kind of Guaakarma the ‘“ Upayokshyamanasanskara ”’ is also of various kinds: (1) The one directly sauctifying the material used, (2) the one sanctifying a material helping another which directly conduces to the action, and (3) one preparing a material to be presented later on, and so forth. Of the former class is the “ threshing of the corn ” which signifies the preparation of the corn already prescribed in a preceding passage,—‘‘ One ought to sacrifice with corns.” To the second class belong such actions as the “ fetching of the calf.” To the directly used material, the cow, calf is of service, as being neccessary for the milking of it, and the “fetching ” is purificatory of the calf, which is thus only indirectly an aid to the sacrifice. As an example of (3), we have the passage ‘‘ Puts curd into hot milk—this is the Vaigvadévi Amiksha.” Here the pronoun “this” lays down the future employment of “milk” in the Vaigvadéva sacrifice, and the “curd” to be put therein is thus the means of the preparation of the special form of milk required in the Vaicgvadéva sacrifice. The “ Pagn” and the “ Purodaca”’ sacrifices, on the other hand, are for the preparation of the Deities directly employed, as wellas of those going to be employed, and also for the pro- duction of a particular Unseen Force, with regard to the offering (of the materials to the Deities). Becanse the Deity Agnishoma is the object of embellishment by the “ Pacu,” the ^“ Purodaca,” &e.; and this Deity is already employed in the ^ Vapa-Yaga” and is also laid down as one to be employed in the sacrifice with the heart and other parts of the animal’s body. The ^ Svishtakrt”’ Sacrifice is for the preparation of the directly employed with regard to the material and the Deity, and also for the sake of the production of an Unseen Force, with regard to the offering. In the same manner, the “ Saktavakasadhanapramana” is preparatory of the Deity to be employed in the first Prayaja, aud as such belongs to the third class; and with reference to the materials, it is for the sake of an Unseen Force. The ^^ Fat-offering” (Vasi-Homa), preceding the “ sacrifice of the heart, &c.,” is a ^^ pratipatti” with regard to the calf; but otherwise it is for the sake of an Unseen Force.
Some people, however, define “ Pratipatti-karma” as an action consisting in an embellishment or preparation, other than that of the materials to be employed. The material “Caturavatta’’ having been burnt by the Homa, it cannot be said to be a matertal to be used in the
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Homa; and as such it cannot but be other than the Homa,—which thus becumes included in the above definition. The following is the only pecu- liarity in the above definition:—In an ^ Arthakarma” the Action is more important than the material which is subservient to the Action, 6.9. in the Agnihotra ^^ Dadhi” is the Material (and as such of secondary importance, being subservient to the sacrifice itself); while in a “Gunakarma,” it is the Material that is the essential factor, and the Action is subordinate to the material, e.g., in the passage ^" Vrihin prokshati,” since the accusative ending in ‘ Vrihin,” connotes the fact of the “corn” being tlie substratum of the Action “ Prokshana,” therefore we come to tlie conclusion that the Action is subordinate to the Material, which thus occupies the essential position.
Another division of ‘“Gunakarma” is into—(I) The “ Utpatti” (Productive), (2) The “Apti” (Acquisitive), (3) The ‘ Vikrti” (Modi- ficatory), and (4) the “ Sanskrti” (Purificatory). As an example of (1), we have the following:—The different kinds of Fires—Ahavaniya, Garbapatya and Laukika—though already placed in the Kunda, are yet said to be consecrated by such mantras as ^“ Agninadadhita’”’ and the like; and as such, are brought into existence in their new consecrated form. Consequently, the =“ Consecration,” bringing about an embellish- ment leading to the production of the Fires, is called the ‘“ Utpatti- sanskara” (productive embellishment). (2) As an example of the “ Apti,” we have the acquiring of the Veda by study, indicated by such passages as ‘ Svadhyayo dhyétavyah ” and the like. (3) As an example of “Vikyti” we have “ Vrihiuavahanti,” where the ^ threshing” is called the ‘modifying embellishment,’’ because it removes the chaff from the corn, aud thus produces a change in it. (4) As an example of ‘“Sanskrti’”’ we have “Vrihin prokshati,’ where the “sprinkling of water” over the corns is called ‘‘Sanskrti” because it produces a particular kind of sanctity in the corns. In the above, the “ consecration ” (of the Fires) and “ Study” are independent “Gunakarmas” by them- selves, and not as subsidiaries to sacrifices; whereas the ‘‘ sprinkling of water, &c.,” and “ threshing’ are secondary ^ Gunakarmas,” being subservient to the sacrifices.
Primary Actions (Arthakarma) are of three kinds: (1) “ Necessary ” or ^ Obligatory” (Nitya), (2) “ Periodical” or ‘ Occasional” (Naimit- tika), and (3) “Optional” or “Performed for some particular object” (Kamya). As an example of (1), we have the injunction of the obligatory performance of Agnihotra both morning and evening, to the end of one’s life. As an example of the “ Naimittika” we have the performance of the *“ Pathikrt” and ‘‘Ishti,” &c., for the removal of the impediments to the proper performance of the ^^ Darca” and ^^ Paurnamdsa.” The
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४९१३ । non-performance of these two kinds of actions constitutes a sin. But other people assert that the only peculiarity with these is that their performance does not bring about any definite result. A third class of people again lay down the “removal of sin” as the offect of these ;.and in support of this latter view, we have the following Smrti passage: “The performers of the Nitya and Naimittika actions have their sins destroyed.” Against this it cannot be urged that in that case, these two would become “ Kamya,” inasmuch as they have a definite result, Because the performance of these is not preceded by any desire on the part of the agent for any specific end; and again because such actions are not enjoined as leading to the accomplishment of any definite object; and as such, they cannot be called ^ Kamya.”
The “Kamya” again is of three sorts: (1) the effects where- of are confined to this world, (2) whose effects belong to the other world alone, and (3) whose effects extend to both (this life and the life to come). As an example of (1), we have the sacrifices “ Kariri,” which is performed by one desiring rain for the enlivening of the crops wither- ing for want of timely rain,—and not by anyone desiring rain at some other time or in his future birth. As an instance of (2), we have the “Darca” and ^^ Paurnamasa”’ performed for the attainment of Heaven; inasmuch as the pleasures of Heaven cannot be enjoyed in this world. As an example of (3), we have the sacrifice “‘ Vayavya,” performed for the attainment of prosperity (attainable in this world as well as in the world to come). `
It is necessary to explain the process of injunction by meaus of the declaratory passages (Vidhivakya). In the sentence ‘svargakamo yajéta,” there are two properties of the root “yaji” (=to sacrifice), due to the affix “ta”: (1) “Akhyatatva” (the character of the verb itself independently of affixes and terminations); and (2) “ Lintva” (the lit affix). The character of the verb as such is common to all moods and tenses; and the affix lit characterising the verb “ yajéta” connotes the “Arthi (actual) Bhavana,” which consists of the active energy of the agent.
This “ Bhavana” (Realisation or Bringing about) consists of three factors : (1) “What?” (2) “By what?” and (3) “ How?” Toexplain—on the utterance of the word “ yajéta,” the first connotation of the affix 18 that “ one is to realise ” ; hecause, as a rule, the ohject denoted by the declensional affixes are construed with those connoted by the conjugational ones, and as such the latter are the more important of the two; and then again, as the connotation of the affix is more importdnt than the denotation of
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the ८५०४, it is only proper that we should, before all, have a con- ception of the connotation of the affix. Then the verb “to realise ” being transitive,—inasmuch as it belongs to the same class of verbs as “kr” (“to १० ”),—the next question that arises is—‘‘ What is the object of this realisation?” In reply to this, we have “ Heaven,” as the object of realisation, though expressed by another word, Though the “sacrifice” (yaga) is expressed by the same word as the “ realisation” (४.९. yajéta), yet it cannot be construed as the object of realisation, be- cause itis in itself extremely troublesome and is thus incapable of con- stituting the end most desirable by the agent. ‘ Heaven,” on the contrary, consists in bliss, and as such can be the desired end; and hence it is that it is construed as the object of realisation. Thus the final notion arrived at is—“QOne is to realise Heaven.” Then comes the question of the means—“ by what (means) is Heaven to be realised?’ Aud in reply to this, we have the “ Sacrifice,” expressed by the same word as the Bhiava- ni” (i.e, “yajéta’’), presenting itself as the instrument (or means) of realisation,—the meaning being, “one is to realise Heaven by means of sacrifices.”’ Then, lastly, comes the question of process—‘‘ How, by what process, is Heaven to be realised, by means of sacrifices?” In reply to this, we have a series of passages, laying down the fact that Heaven is to be realised by means of sacrifices, by the perceptible help of the consecra- tion of fire, the threshing of the corn, &c., and the imperceptible help of the “ Prayajas”’ and other minor subsidiary sacrifices. Thus the “ conse- cration of fire” and the ^“ Prayadjas,” d&c., come to be construed as con- stituting the procedure ( ^ Itikartavyata) which supplies the answer to the question—“‘ How to realise?” As an example of this method of interpretation, in ordinary parlance, we have the sentence “ Desiring rice, one is to cook,”—where the optative affix (in ^ Pacét”) connotes realisation, rice is the object (of realisation), cooking is the means, and the blowing of the fire, &c., constitute the process;—the meaning of the whole sentence being, “ one is to obtain rice by means of cooking, by the help of fire, &c.’”’ The same process of interpretation applies to the Véda also.
This same optative affix also denotes the gabdi (verbal) Bhavana, which consists in urging or impelling (towards action) ; just as, in ordi- nary parlance, ou hearing the order of the preceptor—“ fetch the cow,”— the disciple becomes engaged in its fetching only when he perceives that ‘this preceptor of mine urges me to fetch the cow.” We thus find that on account of this natural concomitance, the recognition of some impel- ling agent is always the cause of an action. And, on a like concomitance, is based the idea that the knowledge of an impelling agency is brought about on the hearing of the verb together with the optative affix. This
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denotability of ‘“impeiling” by the optative is accepted by ordinary people; and consequently we postulate a like denotation in the case of the Véda also. The difference in the two cases, however, is this: The impulsion towards the ^“ fetching of the cow” consists in the recognition of a parti- cular intention on the part of the directing individual; in the case of the Véda, however, there being no directing personal agency, the impel- ling force resides solely in the optative affix, &c. It is for this reason that the ^“ Bhavana” is characterised by the impelling ageucy residing 7 the word; and this is called “pravartana” or ^ Prérana” (Impelling), in- asmuch as it urges people to the performance of Sacrifices, Homa, &e.
The “Verbal Bhavani” is also made up of three constituent elements. In this case, the factor entering as the result is the Arthi Bhavana,” consisting in the action of the agent. The instrumental factor 18 made up of the optative, &c., comprehended by a study (of the Véda) ; and the factor of procedure is supplied by the comprehension of the ex- cellence of the action as delineated in the eulogistic passages (Arthavada). The form of the cognition of the ^ Verbal Bhavana” may be thus briefly summed up: ^ Having acquired a certain amount of comprehending fa- culty by means of a systematic study of the Véda and its various appen- dages, the agents are to perform sacrifices, after having recognised the desirability of such performance, through the optative affixes, &., met with in the Véda, together with a knowledge of the excellence of the Actions delineated in the Arthavada passages.” ‘This performance con- stitutes “ Action,” and hence the action of the agent is quite rightly said to be the result of the “ Verbal Bhavana.”
The aforesaid ¢ Verbal Bhavana” is not recognised as one to be performed in the ‘“Jyotishtoma”’ and the “ Pratisvika”’; though in both of these it appears in its proper form;—the reason for this being that it is the “ Actual Bhavana” itself that is therein recognised as one to be accornplished. The ‘ Verbal Bhavana,” however, is recognised as one to be accomplished, in the passage “ Svadhyayo ‘dhyétavyah.” It cannot be urged that this latter passage also is declaratory of the ‘Actual Bhavana”’; because in this passage the “ Actual Bhavana” itself appears in the form of the “° Verbal Bhavana,” residing in all the declaratory passages, The word “ Adhyétavyah”’ is made up of adhi+root “i%” (to study) + tavya (accusative affix); and the object thereof is the “Svadhyaya” which consequently is the primary factor; and the =^ Adhyayana” being an embellishment of this, comes to be recognised as a “ Gunakarma ’’—like the ‘sprinkling of water’ on the corn. Next we have the question— ‘what is the purpose of the Svddhydya, as accompanied by an embellish- ment in the shape of a retentive memory brought about by study P’ In reply to this, we assert that the purpose (or aim) is the cognition of the
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meaning of the forms of sacrifice, &c., necessary for the performance thereof, obtainable from the deuotations of sentences with optative verbs, &c., appearing in the Véda (Svadhyaya); because it is the only percep- tible effect; and because by leading to the performance of sacrifice 1t indirectly leads to the attainment of hyper-terrestrial ends, in the shape of Heaven, &c.; and certainly no action can be performed, unless its full form and character have been comprehended (which is impossible without proper study). No Unseeu Force can be said to be the aim, because in the presence of seen results, the assumption of an unseen one is not allowable. Thus all “Verbal Bhavanis,” endowed with the three constituent parts, denoted by the optative verbs, &o., appearing in the Véda, are laid down as being objects of performance;—the full signi- ficance of such ^ Verbal Bhavani” being that—“the agents having acquired a full knowledge of the meaning of the optative, &c., appearing in the Véda, aided by the recognition of excellence delineated in the Arthavada passages, should thereby come to know of the necessity of the performance of the sacrifice, &c., with particular results, and should then become engaged in their performauce.’’ Thus then, like -the “ Actnal Bhavana,” the three factors of the “Verbal Bhavana” are: (1) the action of the agent, as the result, (2) the optative, &c., appearing in the Véda, as the instrument, and (3) the knowledge of excellency as the procedure. And it is solely owing to the peculiar character of the Injunction that even in this (Verbal Bhavana) there is an appearance of such desirable ends as Heaven, &c., being the result thereof. If the sacrifice, &c., did not lead to the fulfilment of the agent's purpose, then no Injunctions could urge him to activity; and therefore such Injunctions lead to the fact of the sacrifice—which is the object of activity of the agent addressed by the Injunction—being the means to the attainment of ends desired by the agent, such as Heaven and the like. Otherwise the Injunction would lose all its impelling force; inasmuch as the impelling consists only in the means of leading the agent to activity. In the case of the verbal affixes—such as those belonging to the First Preterite and the rest—there is no Injunction consisting of ampelling ; and as such there is no necessary rule as to the “ Actual Bhavana” pointing to the agent’s purpose, as the object of realisation,
“ Bhavana” consists in the action of urging to the coming (result), This definition applies to the “ Actual Bhavana,” because it consists in the action of urging to the coming result in the shape of Heaven, &e. It also applies to the “ Verbal Bhavana,” inasmuch as this too consists of the action of urging to a coming result, in the shape of the activity of the agont.
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NAMADHEYA.
Similarly, the names of various sacrifices are to be accepted as being based on the “ Law of Nomenclature” specified in the Castras, wherein this law has been divided into four classes: (1) the ^ Tatprakhya,” (2) the “ Tadvyapadéca,” (3) the “ Yangika,” and (4) the “ Vakyabhéda.” To explain these—the passage “ Agnihotranjuhoti” cannot be inter- preted as enjoming a secondary factor in the form of the Deity Agni: because this has already been done by other passages—such as “ Agnir- jyotirjyotiragnih sviha, &c.” The word “ Agnihotra” here has to be broken up like the “ Bahuvrili’” compound; and as such should be interpreted as being the name of the sacrifice in which the offerings are made to Agni, declared to be the Deity of the particular sacrifice, by such passages as “ Aonirjyotirjyotiragnih svaha, &c.”” It cannot be urged that the particle ‘hotra’ (in ‘Agnihotra’) denoting Homa, which is the instrument, the ‘Actual Bhavana” should bave the instrumental ending, like “ Jyotish- toména”; because the accusative ending in “ Agnihotram” must be taken as being indicative of the instrumentality by implication, inasmuch as ‘that an unaccomplished action cannot be an instrument’ is an univer- sally accepted maxim. Or, the accusative ending cau be explained on the ground of its being supplementary to the Homa declared elsewhere. Thins it is that ^ Agnibotra” is regarded as the name of a sacrifice; and this by the “ law of Tatprakhya.”’
In the same manner, in the passage “ Cyénénabhicaran yajéta,” the word ‘‘Cyéna” is the name of a sacrifice, and does not constitute an injunction of the bird ‘kite’ as an auxilliary to the sacrifice. Or else, we could not explain the simile contained in the passage “ Yatha ha vai gyéuo nipatyadatté Svamévayan dvishantam bhratrvyan nipatyadatts,”’ which means that “asthe kite darts upon and catches its prey, so does the performer of the Gyéna sacrifice attack and catch hold of his harmful enemy.” Because the simile can be so explained only if ^ Cyéna’”’ be accepted to be the name of the sacrifice. If, on the other hand, “4 Cyéna” were explained as denoting the bird as an auxilliary to the sacrifice, and as such, the passage were taken to be only a declaration of secondary objects, then the ^^ Cyéna”’ (the bird) itself would constitute both members of the simile; and this would be far from right. Consequently, on ac- count of the mention (Vyapadé¢a) of the similarity of the Cyéna, the word ‘Cyéna’ cannot but be taken to be the name of the sacrifice ;—the meaning of the passage “ Cyénénibhicaran yajéta”’ being that “one desirous of the death of his enemy, 18 to bring about his exorcisation by means of the ‘Cyéna’ sacrifice.”
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Similarly, in the passage “ Udbhida yajéta pagukamah,” the word “Udbhid” is the name of the particular sacrifice enjoined for the ac- quiring of cattle; and it cannot be taken to declare a material-~trees—for the sacrifice mentioned elsewhere. Because we do not know of any such material, as the “^ Udbhid,” in any way fitted for being used at a sacrifice, and the fact of “Udbhid” being the name of the sacrifice can be ex- plained by interpreting the word as "006 by which a certain result is produced” (Udbhidyaté phalam anéna).
Objection: “We might explain the word as ‘something boring into the ground’ (Udbhidyaté bhimaw anéna); and as such take it to indicate the ‘spade,’ f.i.; and thus the passage could be explained as laying down the ‘spade’ as an auxilliary to the sacrifice.”
We cannot assert such a passage to be a secondary declaration, on pain of landing on the absurdity of the entering of two mutually contradictory trios (in the same substratum). To explain this absurdity. The passage «१३०1११8 yajéta pacukamah” cannot be said to be supplementary to the sacrifice declared somewhere else; consequently it can only be taken as enjoining the sacrifice as an instrnment to the realisation of cattle. Thus then, the sacrifice comes to be an cbject of injunction, and becomes secondary, only inasmuch as it is found to he auxilliary to the result (acquiring of cattle). And the sacrifice also becomes acceptable (upadéya), inasmuch as the agent has recourse to it for the accomplishment of his desired ends. Thus then, we find that to the sacrifice belongs the threefold character (1) of ‘“ Vidhéyatva”’ (of being the Predicate of the Injunction), (2) of “Gunatwa” (of being Secondary), and (3) of ^“ Upadeyatva ” (of being acceptable). And again, if ““Udbhid” be taken to be a material for the sacrifice, then we shall have another threefold character with regard to the sacrifice—viz.: (1) “ Pradhanya”’ (Primary Character—opposed to ‘‘ Secondary Charac- ter’ above) with regard to the material, (2) ‘“‘ Uddécyatva” (character of the ‘ Subject” opposed to the character of the “‘ Predicate” above), and (3) “Anuvadyatva” (Supplementary Character—opposed to “ Upa- déyatva”’ above). Thus we. find ourselves faced by these two mutually contradictory trios with regard to the character of the sacrifice. Con- sequently the passage in question cannot be said to be declaratory of materials.
Similarly, in the passage “citraya yajéta pacukamah,” the word “Citra” is the name of the ^“ Prajapatya”’ Sacrifice. Because we meet with the passage “ Dadhimadhughrtamapodhanastandulah tatsansrshtam prajapatyam,” where we find the six materials, “curd,” “honey,” &c., mentioned together with ^ Prajapati,” and which connects them with that particular Deity; hence the object enjoined by the passage is the sacrifice
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° Prajapatya,’ inferred from this counection. And the question of result with regard to this sacrifice is answered by the passage “ citraya yajéta pacukamah,’—this repeated injunction coming in only for the purpose of mentioning the reswif. And this ^“ Prajapatya”’ sacrifice ( =a sacrifice whose presiding Deity is Prajapati) comes to be named “ Citra” (“ Variegated”), because it is performed with a variety of materials, Nor can it be urged that the passage lays down a subsidiary matter— the variegation of colour and the feminine character (as belonging to the animal)—with reference to the animal-sacrifice mentioned in the passage ‘“agnishomiyam pacumalabhéta.” Because this declaration, of many subsidiaries for a sacrifice declared elsewhere, would give rise to a manifest split of the sentence (Vakyabhéda); as is declared in the Tantra-vartika: ‘More than one subsidiary cannot be enjoiued for any action mentioned elsewhere ” ;—the accepted doctrine thns being that the injunction can be that of the sacrifice, inferred from the connection of the Deity and the material, qualified by many subsidiaries in the shape the Deity, the eightfold ‘Cake,’ ^ Amavasya,” ‘ Paurnima,” &c.,— only because it has not been declared anywhere else; as continues the Vartika: ‘“‘ With reference by an action not declared elsewhere, however, more than 016 subsidiary can be enjoined at a single stroke.”
Objection: ‘‘In the passage ‘Pacuna yajéta,’ with reference to a sacrifice declared elsewhere, we accept—as auxilliary to it—the injunction of the material ‘animal,’ its gender and number, &c., as being implied by the single word *pacguna,’ without any split of the sentence. In the same manner, in the passage at issue, we may accept the injunction of the ‘animal,’ as the material, with the qualifications of variegated colour and feminine gender, without leading to any split of the sentence. Thus it is that, (in the case of the passage ‘Paguna yajéta’) the declared animal being the acceptable material, its singularity is taken to be a part of the gacrifice,—the meaning being that the sacrifice is to be performed with one animal only. To think that the singularity of the secondary factor—t. 1.) the ‘pot’ in ‘ Graham sammarshti’—is not significant is said to be the real doctrine. Why? Because the accusative ending in ‘graham’ leads to the conclusion that 17 is the most desired, and hence the primary factor, because of its having a purpose; and that the ‘rinsing’ is secondary to the ‘pot.’ In accordance with the maxim that ‘with regard to each Primary, the Secondary is to be repeated,’ we have as many ‘rinsings’ as there are ‘pots’; consequently, there being no desire on the part of the agent with regard to the number of the pots to be rinsed, the singular number in ‘graham’ is not regarded as significant. In ‘ Paguna yajéta,’ ‘pacgu’” is the predicate, and as such subsidiary to the sacrifice; and since there is the maxim of the ‘non-repetition of the Primary for each
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Secondary,’ to the question—‘ with how many animals is the sacrifice to be performed? ’—we have in answer, the singular number of the Predicate (‘Paguna’), for knowing which there is a desire on the part of the agent, and which, therefore, is significant. Aud further, because the Predicate is the material in the shape of the ‘animal,’ as qualified hy the specific gender and number (all three indicated by the same word ‘ pacuna’),—therefore through this Predicate, the ‘animal,’ its singularity and its feminine gender, &c.,—which are subsidiary to the sacrifice,—come to be regarded as significant. Or again, the number and the gender being denoted by instrumental ending (in ‘paguua’), they are included (by the force of the Instrumental Case), in the material, the ‘animal,’ which is the chief noun. But when this relation is neglected, and the uumber, &e., are connected directly with the Action, then the two (the gender, &c., and the material ‘animal’) become connected together, in accordance with the maxim of the ‘one-year-old red cow ’;— the construction then being ‘the animal is mentioned as forming part of the sacrifice, and it 1s one only.’ (To explain the application of the above-mentioned maxim:) Asin the passage ‘ékaharya pingakshyad gava somankyrnati,’ the four qualifications ‘one year old,’ &c., though uncon- nected among themselves, become grouped together, as auxilliary to thie purchase of Soma, by force of the instrumental endings. But these qualities being incorporeal are not capable of helping the sacrifice in any way ; hence they connect themselves severally as characteristics of the ‘cow,’ which serves all necessary purposes of the sacrifice ; and then, subsequent- ly, they themselves become connected with one another,—the construction thus being ‘ the one-year-old cow, which is also brown-eyed and red, &c., &e.’ Thus we find the qualifications of the Subject are insignificant, whereas those of the Predicate are significant. In the same manner, in the passage at issue, the ‘animal,’ endowed with the qualifications of variegated colour and feminine gender, would be quite capable of being declared to be subsidiary to the Agnishomiya sacrifice, indicated by the
word ‘yajéta’; and as snch wherefore should we make it the name of a sacrifice P ”
The above position is not tenable; because if we do not regard ‘ Citra’ as a name, we land upon the absurdity of (1) abandoning the primary action; ४.6. the ^^ Prajapatya,” fully equipped with all materials and due results, and (2) the assumption of the secondary, १.९.) the ‘‘ Agnishomiya.” And inasmuch as both these contingencies are undesirable, ‘ Citra '* must
be taken to be the name of a sacrifice. In the same manner we can
explain the names of all other sacrifices—such explanation being based on one of the four “Jaws of nomenclature” explained above.
XXEV
ARTHAVADA.
The “ Arthavada ” passages are not sufficient in themselves, because they serve no independent purpose; butitis necessary that they should lead to knowledge resulting in some end ; therefore their acceptablity consists in their forming parts of the Injunctory passages, through the glorifica- tion of the objects of injunction.
These are of four kinds: (1) ^“ Ninda (deprecation), (2) ^^ Pracansa”’ ( glorification) (8) ^“ Parakrti” (the description of the doings of other persons), and (4) Purakalpa” (citing foregone examples). Asan example of “‘Ninda’’ we have the passage deprecating the giving of silver at a sacrifice, on the ground of such gift leading to some calamity in the house of the performer within the year. “ Pragansa:” “His face shines, who thus knows, &c.” and ^“ Vayu is the eftest Deity.” The “ Parakrti” Artha- vada is the passage purporting that such and such an action was perform- ed by some other great man, eg., “Agni desired, dc.” The ८८ Purakalpa” is the passage describing previous events, ¢g., ‘‘ He cursed him, &c.” The Deprecatory Arthavada leads to the glorification of the action enjoined, by the deprecation of its opposite. In the exam- ple cited above, the fact of silver having been produced ont of the tears shed by Prajapati sets aside that metal as useless, and by praising the non-giving of such silver, directly leads to the advisability of giving of other metals; and as such this instance 18 quite in keeping with the de- finition given. The Glorificatory Arthavada—e.g., the praising of Vayu— leads to the fact that ‘ Vayu being the eftest Deity, he is the best suited to lead a sacrifice; hence the sacrifice having Vayu for its Deity, is the best of all’; and this praise connects itself, by the glorification of the Deity forming part of the Injunction, with the passage directly enjoining such sacrifices. The ‘ Parakrti” Arthavada—e.g., ‘Agni desired, &c.”— points to the fact of the particular sacrifice having been performed by such a great personage as Agni; and hence the advisability of perform- ing the action by other agents also; and this praise connects itself by the glorification of the enjoined action, with the passage enjoining such an action. The other forms of Arthavada are to be similarly ex- plained. There are other purposes, too, of the Arthavada, €.4. we have an injunction to the effect that ‘one is to put in wet pebbles.’ Here the word ‘ wet’ denotes simply some sort of liquid; and the doubt, as to what particular liquid material is to be used, 18 set aside by the glorification of clarified butter, in the passage ^“ Téjo vai ghrtam”; and thus this Arthavada has its purpose iu the settling of a doubtful point.
। नरः
XXXVI MANTRAS.
Mantras serve the purpose of recalling to mind certain things con- nected with the performance of the sacrifice; and the knowledge of the Mantras too is for the purpose of the useful knowledge of the whole Veda, and not for any unseen result, for in the presence of a seen result, the assumption of an unseen one is not allowable. As the performance of an action is impossible without an idea of the action performed, the Mantras serve the purpose of imparting the knowledge necessary for such performance. It cannot be urged that the performance of the ac- tion would be possible even on the remembrance of the exhortations of the adviser. Because it is a fact accepted by all that the proper results are attained only when the actions are performed with the appropriate Mantras, and not otherwise. This rule leads to the assumption of the production, by the Mantras, of certain intermediate unseen forces, without which the final end (of the sacrifice) could not be attained.
Objection: “From what you say it is clear that Mantras are employ- ed in the actions implied by them severally. Such employment constitutes a relation of subserviency; and such supplementary character consists in the character of a subsidiary. Consequently the Mantra ‘ Imamagr- bhnan racanamrtasya’ has the power (by its denotation) of applying to the ‘holding of the stringing ’; thus then, since the ‘ holding of the string ’ becomes possible through the ‘ Linga,’ consisting in the denotahility (by the Mantra) of the ‘ holding of the string’; therefore (we ask), what is the purpose of the further adage—‘ Ityacvabhidhanimadatts’ ? ”
Reply : This adage serves the purpose of the ‘‘Parisankhya”’ (see above) : In the Cayana Section, we find the holding of the reins of the horse, as well as of those of the ass. And the aforesaid ^ Linga” would also apply equally to both; therefore the subsequent adage serves the pur- pose of setting aside the holding of the reins of the ass, aud declariug the advisahility of holding those of the horse alone. Thus the addage constitutes a ° Parisankhyavidhi,”’ denying the application of the mantra to the hold- ing of the reins of the ass.
This ^^ Parisahkhya ” is loaded with three faults : (1) the abandoning of its own purpose, (2) the acceptance of another’s purpose, and (3) the setting aside of the declared action. The purpose of the above adage is the holding of the reins of the horse with the specified Mantra ; 1 has been abandoned, since it has been explained as merely negativing the holding of the reins of the ass. “ Another’s purpose” is the disconnect. ing of the Mantra from the holding of the ass’ reins ; and this has been accepted. And lastly, there is the settting aside of the holding of the ass’ reins, declared elsewhere. Thongh loaded with thesc threo faults,
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yet we accept this “ Parisankhya,” since there is no other way out of the difficulty.
In the same manner, we have in some cases accepted “ Vikalpa ” (op- tion), though it has eight objections against it; because there is no other way for us. To explain—we have elsewhere accepted the ^ Agnéya-ashta- kapala Purodaga” (the eight-vesseled cake consecrated to Agui) as sub- sidiary to the sacrifice. Then, for the production of a specified destiny, we are in the dark as to the substance of which the cake is to be made; and we have the specification of such objects, as the “ Vrihi” and the ‘“Yava’”’ in the passages ^ Vribibhiryajéta ” and ^ Yavairyajéta.” Be- tween the two substances thus mentioned, both of which are for the same purpose of being offered, we have recourse to option. Similarly, we have the injunction “atiratré shodacinam grhnati,’” as well as its negative ‘“‘natiratré shodacinam grihnati;” and both of these being mutually contradictory, are not capable of application, at one and the same place ; consequently, we again have recourse to Option—adopting one course at one place, and the other at others.
This Option has eight objections against it: (1) If Vrihi is used, then we have the.abandoning of the meaning of the passage declaring ^ Yava”’ to be the substance for the cake; (2) the acceptance in the same passage, of weakness, consisting in the non-capahility of performing its function ; aud (2) when “ Yava”’ is used in the alternative case, then we have the the same faults reversed ; (3) the acceptance of strength consisting in the capacity to perform its function, that had been abandoned at first; (4) the abandoning of the weakuess that had been at first accepted—thus there are four objections in connection with the passage mentioning ^ Yava.” The same four objections are similarly applicable in the case of the pre- vious acceptance of “Yava’”’ with reference to ^ Vrihi.” Thus, both together make up the eight objections against Option.
This Option is based sometimes on the fact of both alternatives per- forming the same function,—e.g., ^ Vrihi’ and ‘“‘ Yava,” both serving the purpose of making the cake. Sometimes Option is based merely on the strength of Vedic passages,—e.g., we have an injunction of the “ Stotra ” named “ Vrihatprshtha” in the passage “‘ Vrihatprshtham hhavati,” and a like injunction of another “‘ Prshsta Stotra ° made up of ^ Sama,” in the passage “ Rathantaram prshtham bhavati.”” The “ Stotra,” like the ^“ Prayajas ”’ leading to a particular destiny, is an ‘‘ Artha-karma”’ (Pri- mary Action); whereas ‘“Sima” being the purificatory agent, is a ^ Guna-karma ”? ; inasmuch as ‘‘ Samas” are accepted as the means to “ Sto- tras,” on the ground of their leading to their embellishment, consisting in the expression of the letters of the “‘Stotriya”; and ^ Stotra” con- sists in the-recitation of the good qualities of individuals like Indra,
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Varuna, é&c., by means of the Mantras sung at the sacrifice. The mention of the qualities of individuals by means of wnsung Mantras constitutes the “Castra.” “Sama” is a particular form of singing.
The “ Stotriya” consists in the Rchas constituting the Stotra. The mention of special numbers—such as 3, 15, &c.,—with regard to these, constitutes the “Stoma.” These are the different forms of the Stotras. Though the ^^ Brhatpysharatha ” and the “ Rathantaraprshtha”’ are sever- ally specified for different unseen results, yet the option with regard to the acceptance of the one or the other is based on such passages as “ Brhad- va prshthankaryam,” “ Rathantaram va prshthankaéryam.” Sometimes we have the ^ Vyavasthita-Vikalpa” (Decisive Option)—e.g., in the second “ Prayaja,” &c., we have the option between the Mantras “ Nara- ९९88 ' and “ Taninapat,’—both being specified for the same purpose. But we have another passage, specifying the “ Naracansa”’ for the Ksha- triya, and the other Mantra for the others (Brahmanas, &c.). Thus this affords an instance of “‘ Decisive Option.”
Thus we have shown that the strength of Declaratory passages, otherwise called “‘ Codana” (Impelling or urging), depends upon their denotation of the three-factored Bhavané. The strength of the udbhid passage, for instance, depends upon its mentioning the name of the sacrifice; and that of the Arthavada passages on their indication of the excellence of the prescribed action; and that of the Mantras on their capacity of reminding the agent of the action to be performed. And in this manner we have established the authoritative character of the whole of the Veda, with regard to such unseen entities as Dharma and Adharma.
The Smrtis, propounded by Manu and others, are based on the Veda, and as such, lend strength to such actions as the “ Ashtaka-craddha,” &e., —not mentioned directly in the Vedas. Smrtis, in direct contradiction to Cruti, cannot be accepted as trustworthy, For instance, the Smrtis that lay down the appropriation of a certain sacrificial cloth by the Adhvaryu cannot be accepted as trustworthy, because such appropriation is directly opposed to the Veda, and is based upon sheer avarice (on the part of the Adhvaryu).
“Custom,” also, is an authority, being (indirectly) based on Cruti, through the Smrtis. Some custonis, however,—e.g., the marrying of one’s maternal cousin—is not Dharma, inasmuch as such marriage is dis- tinctly prohibited in the Smrtis, Thus has been explained the trust- worthiness of Cruti, Smriti and Custom with regard to Dharma aud
Adharma.
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Dharma is of different kinds, as is borne out by the different passages declaring them. To explain—Sacrifice, Oharity, and Homa are different from one another, inasmuch as they are each denoted by a separate verbal root. Out of these, Charity consists in the removing of one’s own proprietory right over a certain object, and the producing of a similar right therein of another person. With regard to the five sentences— “Samidho Yajati”’ and the rest—there is no such rule as would make one of them declaratory of the Action, and the rest of materials. Couse- quently, every one of them must be accepted as being declaratory of the Action. But the repeated injunction of the same Action is unnecessary ; and therefore the Action declared by one passage must be different from those declared by the others ;—this difference being based on the repeti- tion of the word ^ Yajati.” In “ tisra a@hutih,” though the Homa is only one, yet, for the sake of connecting the number *" three” with the Homa, we have to accept the difference of the three Homas,—such difference being based on number.
To exemplify difference of Dharma based on naming:—In the case of the passage “ Athaisha jyotih......éténa sahasradakshinéna juhoti ;” though the three “ Jyotiryagas’’ are mentioned in the “ Agnishtoma” Section, yet there is a difference between these and the ^° Jyotishtoma,” inasmuch as they are named apart from the ^^ Jyotishtoma.” And again the three ^“ Jyotiryagas ”’ themselves differ from one another on acconnt of being mentioned severally.
In the case of “ Vaicvadévyamiksha—Vajibhyo Vajinam,” &c., the former enjoins the Sacrifice of the material, Curdled Milk, for the Vigvéde- vas; and this is different from that declared by the latter; which has the ^° Horse” for the Deity and the “ Scum of Curdled Milk ” for the Material. And it cannot be said that the passage ‘‘ Vajibhyo Vajinam ” lays down the matarial “ Vajina” for the “ Vaicvadeva” Sacrifice. Because the “Vaicvadéva” Sacrifice has already got the “ Amiksha” (curdled milk) for its material ; and consequently it cannot be connected with “ Vajina.” Nor can you have recourse to Option, as in the case of “Yava” and ‘““Vrihi;” because the two are not enjoined in one and the same place ; and there can be no option in the case of those mentioned in different places. And further, the “Curdled Milk” (Amiksha) is declared to be the material in the very sentence enjoining the “ Vaicvadéva” Sacrifice itself; While, on the other hand, ‘“ Vajina’”” (scum of curdled milk) is mentioned in another passage. But of these two kinds of declaration of materials—the ^ Utpatticishta” and the “Utpannacishta”—the former is the stronger, inasmuch as it is mentioned as subsidiary to the sacrifice at the time of its origination; whereas the latter is recognised after the action (the Sacrifice) has been brought about; and as such, being the
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weaker of the two, cannot be admitted to apply to the foregoing action ; and further, being related to another Deity—the Vaji—it leads to the application of the passage mentioning it, to a different Action. Thus the above case affords an instance of the difference of Dharma, based upon the difference in Material—eg., the ‘Curdled milk’ is “ Amiksha” and the water left behind is “ Vajina.”
In the “ Kundapayina ” Chapter, we meet with the passage ^ Upasad- bhiccaritva ma&samagnihotranjuhoti.” Here we find that in the beginning there is no action mentioned in close proximity ; hence the passage enjoins, by means of “Context” (Prakarana), consisting in non- proximity to any preceding action, an altogether different action, having the character of the well-known “ Agnihotra” Sacrifice. The passage cannot be said to be declaratory of subsidiaries with reference to the ^^ Agniho- tra;” because, with reference to an action previously mentioned, if we make the passages declaratory of many subsidiaries in the shape of the “Month,” &c., we would have a split of the sentence. Therefore we must take our stand upon another kind of “ Context” in explaining the difference in the actions,—the “ Agnihotra,” being one the daily perfor- mance of which is compulsory. Thus we have explained the various sorts of difference with regard to Dharma, as based upon difference of Passage, Number, Mention (Sanjha), Naming and Conteat.
oO
We now proceed to consider the objects demonstratable by the Veda, ५८. These are of three kinds: (1) ^ Kratvartha” (for the sake of the Sacrifice), (2) “ Purushartha” (for the sake of the Agent), and (3) “Ubhayartha” (for the sake of both). To the first class belong the ८८ Prayaja,” &c. To the second belong the Means and the. Result— “ Jyotishtoma”’ and “ Heaven” respectively. To the third belong “ Curd, ” &e.,-these being “for the Sacrifice” inasmuch as they are mentioned in the passage “ Dadhna juhoti,” where the Result is not mentioned, aud “ for the agent” because mentioned in the passage "^ Dadhnéndriyakamasya jubuyat,” which mentious the Result (acquiring of Senses). In the “Kratvartha ” the impelling agent is the Sacrifice; and in the “ puru- shartha ” it is the Agent,—an impelling cause being that for whose sake the passage enjoins an action. The injunction of the ^^ Darca,” &c., leads to the performance of such sacrifices as the “ Darga” and like for the purpose of attaining Heaven; consequently it is the attainment of Heaven that is the impelling cause in the “ Darga, ” &e. Similarly the injunction of the ८८ Prayajas’’ leads to the performance of the Prayajas for the purpose of accomplishing the “ Darga;” therefore it is the “ Darga” that becomes theimpelling cause in this case. The injunction for the fetching of Curd
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leads to such fetching for the purpose of the “ Amiksha,” and not for the “Vajina” which would come of itself with the curd (because it is con- tained in it). Consequently it is the ^ Amiksha, ” and not the “ Vajina, ”’ that is the impelling cause in the case. Though the “ Purodaca- kapala” is enjoined as subsidiary to the removal of the Chaff, yet this removal cannot be said to be the impelling cause of the aforesaid Kapala;’’ because the “removal” is accomplished by the * Kapala” brought in for (holding) the “ Purodaca.” Consequently it is the “ Puro- déica”’ that is the impelling cause in that case.
Question :—“ An injunction lays down the performance of the Pri- mary Action together with its subsidiaries; and there being many such subsidiaries, there must be some order in which they are to be performed. What are the grounds for accepting a definite order of succession ? ” Answer: All necessary ground for such order of succession are afforded by Smrti, &c., themselves, e.g., the passage ‘‘The Adhvaryu initiates the Brahma ” after initiating the master of the house distinctly lays down the order in which the initiation is to be performed~-that of the master of the house precedmg that of the Brahma, This is an instance of ^^ Crau- takrama.”’
The order based on the order of the Injunctions, e.g., in “ Samidho yajati,” “‘taninapatan yajati”—is what is called the = Anushthana- krama,”
Iu the case of ^^ Agnihotranjuhoti,” “ Yavagimpacati,” we have to abandon the apparent order, and accept a different one—viz., the Homa following the Ovoking—on the ground that there can be no Homa before the ^“ Yavagti” has been cooked. This is an instance of “ Artha- krama.”
The passage “ Saptadacaprajapatyan paciinalabhate ” denotes the performance of Seventeeu Sacrifices having seventeen animals for the material, and Prajapati for the Deity. Of these, the first object, the “ Upakarana,’’ may be begun and finished with any one animal out of the Seventeen; the ‘“‘ Niyojana,”’ d&c., however, are to follow the order of the “Upakarana. ' In the performance of the primary “ Agnishomiya,” there being only one animal, all the subsidiaries—‘‘ Niyojana,” &c.,—are to follow close upon the “ Upakarana,” there being no intervening agency. In the case in question (7.¢. of the Seventeen Sacrifices) however, there are seventeen animals; consequently the ^ Niyojana,” &c., of one animal is to follow 16 instants (units of time) after its ‘““ Upakarana ;” because the ^“ Upakarana” of all the animals has to be finished before any ^^ Niyo- jana” can be done. And “ Niyojana,” d&c., are to be performed in the same order as the “ Upakarana ;”—7.e., the animal, whose “ Upakarana ”’ has been done first, will also have its «४ Niyojana” done first of all, and
6
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so on; otherwise we would be going against the spirit of the (astras. This is an instance of “ Pravrttikrama. ”
In the “ Sadyaskri Soma” Sacrifice, we find mentioned the Association of the ‘three animals (the “ Agnishomiya,” the ‘‘ Savaniya,” and the “ Annbandhya”’) to be killed in the न Agnishomiya” Sacrifice, beginning with the “ Aupavasathya,”’ ina definite order of succession (and not all together). And this association is applicable in the “ place” of the “Savaniya.” In this case, the former order is abandoned, and in the process of the injunction of Association by ^ Position,” the order is—(1) the “ Upakarana” of the “ Savaniya” Animal, (2) that of the “ Agnisho- miya, and (3) that of the “ Anubandhya.” This is an instance of ८ Sthanakrama;” viz., the “ Aharaupavasathya” preceding the ^“ Sutya- divasa.”’
In the ^ Darca,” though the performance of the details of the “ Sannayya” (the ‘‘cutting of twigs,” &c.) appears to come first, and that of the properties of the “ Agnéya” ( Nirvapa, ” &c.) appears to follow later on, yet, between the two primary Sacrifices—Agnéya and Sannayya—the former is the first to be performed ; consequently, follow- ing the order of the primary Sacrifices, the ‘‘ pouring” (‘ Abhigh4rana) to be performed first is that of the Purod&ca, remnant of the * Prayajas › (subsidiary to the Agnéya); and then follows the ‘‘ pouring ” of the milk (used in the “Sannayya”). This is an instance of “ Mukhya- Krama.”
Thus we have explained the order, of the performance of actions, based upon “Cruti” “ Artha,” ^ Patha,” “Sthana,” ^ Pravystti” and ‘“‘Mukhya.”’ Any order, other than those warranted by these, would leave the action incomplete.
Like all other philosophical systems, the Mim&nsa also, in course of its' dissertations, has treated of such subjects, as the Body, the Senses, the Mind, Soul, God, Brahma, the Origin of Creation, Heaven, Hell, Final Deliverance, Pleasure, Pain, &c, &c., and it will not be out of place to explain in brief what the Mimdnsaka has to say on these important topics.
Body, Senses, Mind.—The Body is made up of five.elementary sub- stances. The sense-organs ave also the modifications of these substances; only the organ of Hearing partakes of the nature of Space. The Mind also is a modification of these.
Igvara and Brahma.—The Mimansaka does not admit of these as they are represented by the Vedanta or the Nya@ya. There is no creator of the Universe ; it is eternal.
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Oategories.—There are seven Categones: Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Species, Inherent Relation and Negation. Of Substances, there are ten—and not nine as held by the Vaigéshika ; some hold even eleven, adding Darkness and Eternal Sound to the nine enumerated by the Vaicéshikas.
Atma or Self.—It is something different from the Material Body. There are many Selves, there being a self for each individual, each being imperishable, indestructible. This is what experiences Pleasure and Pain, cognisable by the Mind alone, asthe “I.” It is all-pervading; but its cognition is energised only in the body. It is not identical with Know- ledge, which is only a property or potency belonging to It.
Heaven and Hell —The former is a particular kind of Pleasure, and the latter a particular kind of Pain. Heaven has been defined as ‘ that Pleasure which is unmixed with Pain, and is not interrupted by it, which is the final goal of all longing.’
Final Deliverance.—This is a name given to the total negation of all Pleasure and Pain; it does not mean an annihilation of the pheno- menal Universe, but only an annihilation of the connection of the Self with it. According to the Mimansaka, the only bondage of the Soul consists in 18 connection with the Universe, which includes the Body, the Sense organs, and the material objects of enjoyment. And as soon as the Self is capable of disentangling itself from these, it becomes free, and it is this freedom that constitutes ‘Deliverance.’ When this is attained, there is no Body or Sense-organs, only the Mind subsists, and the Self retains only its Consciousness, Bliss, Hternality and Omnipreseuce.
When one ceases to perform all prohibited actions, as also those that are meant to bring abont certain desirable ends, and confines himself only to those that are laid down as necessary, or when he remains self-satisfied in his knowledge of the Self, then there accruing no further Dharma or Adharma, there is a total destruction of the very seeds of rebirth; and so long as the Body remains, he spénds up all his previous Karmic residue ; and hence when the Body dies, there is no more birth, and the Soul is free, has attained Final Deliverance.
True Knowledge of the Self is as necessary for the due performance of Sacrifices as for attaining Deliverance; as without it, there can be no cer- tainty about the results to follow from the sacrifices.
Adrshta follows from Actions. This is of two kinds: Good and Bad ; the former proceeding from actions that are laid down as to be performed, and the latter from those that are prohibited. This is what is meant by Virtue and Vice. The good Adrshta again is of two kinds—one bringing about Prosperity either in this world:or in the next, and another leading to Deliverance ; this latter proceeds from those actions that are performed without:any desire for particular results.
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Pleasure and Pain.—The two are entirely distinct ; they are not the negation of each other. They are of four kinds: Material, Imaginary, Mental and Egoistic. The eternal Bliss of the Self is different from these.
Means of Knowledge-—These are six. Sense-perception, Inference, Aualogy, Verbal Testimony, Apparent Inconsistency and Negation.
Creation, Subsistence and Dissolution—The Mimansaka does not admit of any absolute annihilation of the Universe, which is ever-existent; but there are partial or cyclic dissolutions.
Deity —The form of the Deity has not been dealt with in the S#tras of Jaimini. But the later authorities declare that the descriptions of gods and goddesses contained in the Puranas are mere Arthavada ; as there are no such deities actually in existence. All that these descriptions mean is that at the time of making the offering, one is to think of such and such forms. The Mimansaka admits of the Deity only as something to whom the offering is to be made; and this has no other form except the Mantras that are recited in connection with such offerings.
As for the time during which our author lived, the subject of these dates of the earlier authors is so shrouded in mystery, that there are no sufficient data leading to any definite conclusions; and as for conjec- tures, I am led to believe that it is mere waste of time to indulge in them ; specially as what concerns us most is what the author has written for us, and it does not much matter whether he lived a few centuries this way or that. Still for those who may be interested, it may he stated that our author lived sometime between 57 B.C. (the time when Cavara Svami is reported to have lived) and 841 A.D. (the time of Vacaspati Micra), and that he was a senior contemporary of the Great Cankaracarya.
All that remains for me now is the very agreeable duty of acknow- ledging, with thanks, the help that I have derived from the following gentlemen :—
(1) Foremost among them is Mah&mahopddhyaya Pandit Citra- dhara Migra, the Chief Pandit of the Darbhanga Raj, who taught me the work here translated, as also its continuation, the Tantravartika (a transla- tion of which is nearly complete), and but for whose help many passages would have remained wholly unintelligible. (2) My heart-felt thanks are also due to Dr. Thibaut of the Muir Centra] College and to Mr. Arthur Venis of the Queen’s College, Benares, who always favoured with valuable advice and helped to encourage me in the work that I had under- taken. (3) To Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad, Castri, of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, without whose constant help my task could not have
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been accomplished. (4) To Babu Bhagavan Dasa of the Central Hindu College, Benares, who rendered invaluable assistance, in the earlier portion of the work,—an assistance without which the translation would have remained more vague and unintelligible than what (I am still afraid) itis. (5) The last, but by no means the least, is Babu Govinda Dasa of Benares, that indefatigable worker in the cause of Sanskrit literature, who provided me with all necessary manuscripts and aids, and has all along continued to favour me with valuable hints and suggestions.
Notwithstanding all this help, however, there remains much room for improvement in the translation. This has been due mostly to my imperfect command of a foreign language, and partly to the fact of the text being extremely difficult—in fact some people speak of it as the most difficult book in the Sanskrit language. And I hope scholars will overlook the discrepancies that may have crept into the work and favour me with suggestions for corrections, and improvement which may be of use to me in my future work.
GANNGANATHA JHA.
ALLAHABAD : Muir Central College, July 1905.
CLOKAVARTIKA.
oy
APHORISM I.
1. Reverence to Him who wears the crescent moon,—Him wlio is embodied in pure consciousness, Him whose three eyes are the three Vedas, and who is the source from which all prosperity flows.
2, And then obeisance unto my Teachers, they that are even as Suns for the lotus intellects of their disciples, after which I may hope through their grace, to accomplish this work of the ‘“ Mimansa-Clokavartika.”’
3. May the learned look upon this effort kindly! The good and the generous-hearted free of jealonsy, accept graciously all that is offered to them in love and reverence.
। 4, And let not the mind be set over much on fanlt-finding alone: for they that set their hearts on discovering faults see them even where none exist.
5. How could learned people find any faults in the statements of people like me? They that endeavour to remove the misapprehensions of others allow none in their own works ?
6. And where can one find, among men, any case of unanimity as to what is faultless ? There are people who have something to say against Liberation and Heaven also.
7. Reverencing the Scripture as I do, let none reproach me, should I err (in my exposition). He that goes by the right path need not be censured, even if he slips (occasionally).
1 The notion of a God—and that too a bodied one—being foreign to the Miman- saka, Parthasarathi Micra, in his ‘“‘ Nydyaratnakara,” interprets the henedictory stanza thus : “Viguddha-jndnadéha’’—That whose body is the knowledge purified hy the Mimansa- Oastra. “ Lrivedidivyachakshushe” = That which is manifested by the three Vedas. “ Somardhadhariné”—That which is equipped with vessels of Soma. All these epithets, in {1018 case, are referred to ‘‘ Yajna.”
8 + Accept &c.” Literally—Listen with kind ears of the mind.
6 “To gay nothing of other things, even such faultless things, as Heaven and Liber- ation, the highest aims of man, are denied by the Atheists,” N. R.
1
as CLOKAVARTIKA.
8. Language (४.९. writing), commenced in any way as may be, even without polish or elegance, but following carefully the path of the three Vedas, is pleasing to him who has faith. :
9. My greed is great for the gem of Vedic knowlege, when shining with additional lustre in the light of the Mimansa-Castra,—(therefore I commence with an exposition of the Mimansa, rather than of the Veda).
10. For the most part Mimansa has, in this world, been made Atheisic ; and this effort of mine is made to turn it to the theistic path.
ee all
11. “Henceforth (proceeds) enquiry into (the nature of) Dharma” —such is the first aphorism, propounded with a view to explain that the purpose of the Mimansi-Castra is the (desire to know the nature of the) object called ‘‘ Dharma.”
12. For, who would begin (the study of) any science, or any action, while its purpose remained unexplained ?
13. And especially is this science of the ^ Mimans&,’”—depending upon (४.५ requiring the previous knewledge of) many other sciences as it does, and (therefore very difficult to master),—unlikely to attract stndy unless its purpose has been explained beforehand.
14. This statement of the purpose may not be necessarily desirable in the case of other scienccs ; yet, there is no fear of evil resulting from them (by snch omission).
15. But in the case of the Mimansa, if the purpose is not known, or ill-known for want of discrimination, great would be the defect (danger of going astray) in treading the path of the Law; hence the usefalness of effort (in explaining its purpose).
16. Therefore first of all, the purpose has been stated by the author of the aphorisms himself; (He did not leave this to be done by the commentators) for how could the commentators say so well and precisely what the author himself (could say and) has said ?
17. ‘‘ But the student proceeds to the study of only that science, which has a well-established purpose, and the relation of which (with its object) is also known. It is therefore necessary to state, at the commence- ment of a science, this relation (of the science) with its object, as well as the object itself.”
18. The science and the purpose (object), are the two factors (substrata) in which the conuection inheres: ‘his (connection or
8 “In any way” With great difficulty.
' Because in other soiences, if on account of the non-mention of the purpose people desist from them, there is not much evil there.
16 ^ Author’? Jaimini.
“Commentators” Savarasvami, Haridasa, Bhartrimitra, &o.
19 ^“ For Jaimini, the connection (or the cause of beginuing his work) is not any question from among his disciples; but for him such cause is the relation of cause and
APHORISM 1. 3
relation) is not mentioned separately because it is implied in the statement of the purpose.
19. ‘It is true that ordinarily, in all sciences, the relation (of the science with its object) is stated first; as it is only by such statement that the diligence of the student is secured.
20. ^ And so long as the relation of the science with the object is not explained, the talk of the teacher remains disconnected, and the result is incoherence (४.९. the student’s inability to follow).”
21. In the present case, however, the connection is explained in the Bhashya, by implication, by raising the question of the known or unknown character of Duty. Therefore any other is not mentioned.
22. In the present instance, this relation of the scieuce (to the object) is not expressed by the word ^“ Atha”; because this (word) denotes the relation between two actions ; and these are differeut from the science.
23-24. This relation of the science is explained by some, ont of the first word, (1) as a relation of either sequence to a preceding action (as the question of the student, or the propitiatory worship of some Deity), ov (2) the relation of succession to past teachers of the science). Bunt the presence or absence of such a relation does not affect in any particular whether the student should engage in the study of the science, or not do so, nor does it affect in anyway his knowledge of the science, or the scope of the scieuce.
effect that subsists between the treatise and the aforesaid purpose (the knowledge of Dnty). And without any questions from the disciples the revered Jaimini, intent apon public good, begun the treatise which is the means to a knowledge of Duty. And this connection is implied by the mere mention of the objects related (the treatise and the knowledge of Duty); and hence it is not mentioned separately.” N. (२.
19 And therefore, if Jaimini has failed to show any connection, the commentators ought to explain it.
4. Towards the end of the Bhashya on Aph. I.
2४ Some oommentators hold that the word ‘‘atha”’ in the aphorism, denotes the connection required, ४.९.) that of subseqnence to study. This view is set aside as not correct; becanse what is denoted hy the word “athe” is the relation between the two actions—study and desire to know; and certainly Mimdnsé (Deliberation) is some- thing quite different from Jijnasa (desire to kaow); though both are desiderative forms of verbs, yet the former is an action of the teacher, while the latter that of the learner. And lastly, it would not be true to fact to assert that Jaimini wrote the Sutras immediately after he had finished his study.
28.24 ‘I'he relation 18 mentioned in order to attract the attention of the hearer. But this purpose is not served by any of the relations here mentioned ; inasmnoh as none of them either attract the hearer to, or repell him from, listening to the tenchings. “ Traditional order, &¥c.’—which in the case of Miminsa is as follows— (1) Brahma, (2) Prajaipati, (3) Indra, (4) Aditya, (5) Vasishtha, (6) PardSara, (7) Krishnadvaipiyana and (8) Jaimini; and this last after being instracted in the tenets of the system, composed the Sntras.
1 CLOKAVARTIKA.
25. Therefore those who wish that the relation of the exposition of a science (to the factor or factors of that relationship) should form part of the explanation of the Siitra, should state only sucha relation as 18 reasonable and useful (as against those rejected in 22 and 24), and no other useless (relations).
9
26. Of the Bhashya passage, beginning with “ Laka,” six different interpretations are nsually given,—all in keeping with the Bhashya.
27. They 216 -- (1) Universal Explanation,” (2) ‘ Censure,” (3) “Disavowal” say others, (4) “ Specification,” and (5) ५ Praise ’’—say some; and (6) ^ Objections to the use of the word atha.”
28. (1) “The interpretations of the Sutras are of two kinds—General and Special. The ‘Special’ is that which belongs to each Sutra, and the ‘General’ (which holds good in the case of all Sutras, and in fact, means ‘General Rules” of Interpretation) is this (which is here given).
29. “The ‘affirmation’ (i.e, the affirmative Rule) applies to words alone; and the ‘negation’ (2.e., the negative Rule) to the aphorism ;— but only in cases not opposed to vedic assertions, and not in any and every case.
30. “Supplying of ellipsis and inverting the order of words are possible only in sentences; therefore (the pronoun) ‘these’ (in the Bhashya passage) refers to ‘aphorisms,’ even though it is the secondary (nonn in the preceding sentence).
31. ‘“ The word ‘ Hva’ signifies ‘ very little,’ (and it does not mean that the vedic passages alone are to be explained). The repetition (of the
26“ With its reason”’—i.e., with the grounds on which it rests, Snch purpose can be none other than that of cause and offect, explained above.
26 “In the Sutras, the words are to be taken in the same sense as they are fonnd to have in ordinary parlance. And they should not be interpreted indirectly either through ellipses, or special technicalities. Therefore it is vedic passages alone that
are explained hy the Sutras; or 6186, there wonld a donble effort of explaining the Veda, and also the words of the Sutra.”
27 Enumeration of the six explanations.
48 With this begins the detailed explanation of the (1) “ Universal explanation.”
29 The Bhashya has declared that “in the aphorisms all words are to be taken in their ordinary acceptation”—hereby laying down an affirmative rule ; and again it says—‘‘ Of these, new meanings are not to he created by nnnecessarily importing words into the Tezt”’—a negative rule. Here the pronoun “these” referring to the principal nonn of the preceding sentence—which is ^" words,”—the negative rnle would algo come to be applied to the case of “‘words’* And the present Karika serves to guard us against such — misinterpretation.
80 Because words are always complete in themselves, ond bave the same fixed unohangeable order of letters.
81 Hva”—ocourring after वेद्वाक्यानि in the Bhishya. When the Vedic passages have heen explained, little will be left that will require to be explained. “The repetition”—this gives the sense of the Bhashya-passago
APHORISM I. 5
explanation of the same words as occurring in the Sutra and in the Veda) would involve needless effort. Ifit be urged that ‘anything being well-
known does not require to be explained,’ (we reply) this is no fault in human speech.
32. ‘“‘He who requires the “supplying of ellipsis” and “ technical uses ”’—thinking these to be part and parcel of interpretation,—for such a one this is declared as a command.”
33. (2) “In the commentaries of some people we find the inversion of the ordinary meanings of words; and this (Bhashya passage) is a censure (or refutation) of these :
34. ^ Athatah is not ordinarily used in the sense of sequence ; as such interpretation thereof can only he possible as a technicality.
35. ‘The neglect of the accepted (uses of) words, and their assumed application to unknown ones—should not be had recourse to by the com- mentator, when the ordinary accepted use is possible.
36. ‘Because, for one who is thus perplexed in (the finding out) of the meaning of the aphorism, the ascertainment of the meaning of the Veda would be very distant (far more difficult) ; which would lead to (the necessity of) extreme heaviness of effort both on the part of the speaker and the hearer.”
37. (3) “ He will not explain the Sutras, being engaged in the inter- pretation of the ‘Injunction,’ (the Veda). It is the refutation of this
interpretation (of the opening sentence of the Bhashya) that is declared by this ‘ Disavowal.’
38. ‘ Efforts should be directed towards Vedic passages; what is the
beginning with “ दूतरथा : ” If the explanation once given in connection with the Vedic passage be repeated with regard to the Sutra, it would be useless. The objection noted in the karika is based on the opening sentence of the Bhasnya. “If all the words are used in a sense well-known to the people, there should be no need of an explanation of the Sutra or sentence in which such word occur.’ The reply that is given means that the fact of words being used in their well-known sense is no fault— nay, it is an ornament—of human speech.
82 The Bhashya passage in question.
88 With this commences the treatment of the second interpretation—" Censure,”
© Some people’ —e. g., Bhavadasa and others.
८४ This’”?—The Bhashya passage in question.
84 This karika explains the Bhashya as implying the refutation referred to. Bhavadasa has explained “ Athdatah”’ as signifying sequence. ।
81 With this begins the 3rd interpretation—“ Disavowal.” The Bhashya mentions the aphorism, and then takes a passage from the Veda, and begins to explain it. So with regard to this procedure, there may be three views—‘‘ That he omits the Sutra (1) becanse they are meaningless, or (2) because he did not know their meaning, or (3) becanse they were unexplainable.” Anditis for setting aside such doubts that the Bhashya has the opening sentences in question.
Injunction ”’ = Veda.
88 Gives the reasons for such “ Disavowal.” The Vedic passages are useful inasmnch
6 QLOKAVARIIKA.
good of any such towards the aphorisms ?—on account of their fruitful- ness and fruitlessness (respectively ).
38-39. “By these —as the means—, the meaning of Injunctions is to be explained; not both, because of the extreme heaviness of effort.
39-40, ‘he meanings of words being well-known, notbing is left to be explained. The Bhashya passage beginning with ‘Hvam ’ is rightly explained only in accordance with this view.”
40-41. It is only on account of the absence of the breaking up of words, that there is an idea of “ Disavowal.” Because the Bhasbya does explain the meaning of the Sutra, and it even explains Redundancy, &c.— eg. “This aphorism is not able to signify, &.,” and “ The aphorism 18 quite proper,” &c., &e.
42, And the Bhashya also speaks of non-suggestiveness, &c., with regard to the aphorisms—all these become self-contradictory, if the “ Dis- avowal’’ Theory is accepted.
42-43. Nor can one, not knowing the meaning of the means, be sure of the consequence,—from any other source ; because even those versed in the Vedas require the aphorisms and their commentaries.
43-44. As the ground of ‘ Disavowal,’ has been urged the well-known
as they are the means of the right notion of Duty; and as such any effort towards the interpretation of these is useful ; while on the other hand, the aphorisms are useless, and as such any effort directed towards explaining these would he equally devoid of any results,
88.39 “ {1888 ’—the Sutras. ‡
“Not both ”—2.¢., not the meaning of the Injunctions and also of the Sutra.
39.40 All ths words in ths Sutra being used in their ordinary senses, there is nothing left therein to he explained by the commentator, and it is only when we take the Bhashya passage to repudiate all attempt at the interpretation of the Sntra, that we can rightly construs the passage beginning with ‘‘ Evam.”’
40.41 People have accspted the “ Disavowal”’ theory only because they do not find, in the Bhashya, any hreaking up of the compound words, &c., of the Sutra; which leads them to think that the Bhsshya has entirely left off the explanation of the Sutra. With this begins the 4th interpretation—‘“ Spscification.’’ Because, §7c.—The Bhashya does not only explain the meaning of the Sutras; it even goes farther: it explains redundancies and supplies whatever is wanting in them to enahle them to give the proper sense. ‘‘ This aphorism is not able, 4c.”—this oconrs in the Bhashya on p. 5 (1-i-2), where after having urged that something is wanting in the Sutra, ths Bhashya explains away the objection by interpreting the Sutra in such a way as to enahle it, just as it stands, to afford the right 86988.
“The aphorism ts quite proper, ¥c.” This ocours at the closs of the Bhishya ou 1I-i-47, where after having urged the redundancy of the second half of ths Sutra, the Bhashya explains the necessity of it.
42 Refers to Bhashya on {1-211-10 ; where snch an objection is brought against the Sutra and refuted.
42.43 ‘The means of ascertaining the sense of the Veda, is the Sutra; and without a knowlege of the means, there can be none of the consequence; hence the Sntras must be explained ;—speoially as the meauing of the Vedaoan be got at from no other souros.
APHORISM I. 7
character of the meanings of words; but this would apply equally to Vedic seutences, aud as such, would preclude oven these from explanation.
44-45, If it be urged that ‘it is owing to doubts with regard to their meaniug that we have recourse to the explanation of Vedic passages ’— that too would apply equally in the case of the Sutra; and ‘ Disavowal ’ would be improper.
45-46. ° Disavowal’ would be perfect only in the form “it is not to be explained.” (But) since itis only faulty interpretation that is prohibited, those free from them (faults) do not become precluded.
46-47. (4) This view (Disavowal) being opposed to all direct fact, aud the former two (“‘ Universal Explanation’ and ^ Censure’’) being in- significant, and the middle view (Censure) also implying evil intentions,— “ Specification ” alone is appropriate.
47-49, Where Vedic sentences and those of Jaimini, contradict one another, in their direct signification, there this (‘ Specification’) has its use: The Sutra has to be interpreted by means of “ supplying the ellipsis,” &c., whereas the Vedic sentence bas to be taken in its direct siguification.
49. When Vedic sentences contradict one another, then may second- ary implications be applied to them also.
49-50. “Just asthe Vedic sentence is the means of the right notion of Duty, so is also Jaimini’s assertion our means of ascertaining the meaning of the Veda.
50-51. “On account of the similarity of the power of the sentence, as also of words and their meauings,—it is ouly the interpretation free from ellipsis, &c., that is everywhere proper.”
01-52. Thus the unlawful assumptions, that would be necessary on account of impossibility consequent upon the contradiction of one or the other, would become optional.
45.46 The author of the Bhashya, if he had any such Disavowal in view, would have clearly said: ‘“‘The Sutras are not to be explained.” Bunt we find him clearly prohibiting only snch explanations as have reconrse to supplying the ellipsis, &c., &c.; and this distinctly shows that hy the opening sentences he only wished to set aside such interpretations of the 8 01188.
$6.47 The theory of ‘ Disavowal’ is opposed to facts as we actually find the Bhashya freqnently explaining the Sutras.
“Is appropriate: ' because it precludes all mistaken interpretation of the Vedic passages, and as such has grand results.
49 In Sutra III-iii-2, we find the Bhashya having recourse to other methods of interpretation than the direct one, in explaining the Vedic sentences. And in order to meet snch cases, it is here urged that the reason of so doing was not the contradiction of the Vedic passage with the Sntra, but that of two Vedic passages themselves; and as such, the secondary implication is not nnlawful.
60.51 “ Bverywhere,” i.e., both the Veda and the Satra being eqnally important, both are to he interpreted, without having recourse to ellipsis, &c., &.
81.62 “Unlawful, &c.’—interpretation other than the direct. “ Optional ’—There being no difference between the importance of the Vedic passage and the Sutra, the
8 CLOKAVARIIKA.
52-53. On account of their prior functioning, as being the means (of the ascertainment of the meaning of the Veda), people might set aside the rightful Injunction, on the strength of the Sutra, taken in its direct denotation.
53-54. Hence, what 18 meant is “ Whenever the non-contradiction of the Veda is possible.” The rest is to be explained as it stands.
54. ° Of the remnants there should be disappearance’—here we have an instance of interpretation by supplying from without.
55. In the Sitra “Viprakarshat pagogca” there is a modifica- tion of the affix. In “ Loké Sanniyamat” there is intervention of a word.
secondary interpretation, that would be necessitated by their mutual contradiction might be applied in the case of either of the two—there being no reason for applying it exclusively to one or the other—both being equally important, on account of reasons just given.
68-54 The acceptance of the direct denotation, and the avoidance of ellipsis, &c., are to be had recourse to, only when such procedure does not contradict the “ Veda” and Reason, The affirmative assertion— Indirect interpretation 18 to be had recourse to, when it does not go against the Veda ’—is to be construed into a negative one: “ Such interpretation is not to be followed when it goes against the Veda ‘’—and thus it becomes an 10868066 of ‘ Specification.”
8५ The anthor now cites instances where the Bhashya has recourse to indirect interpretation, &c. In connection with the “Darga” and “ Paurnamiasa,” sacrifices, a question is raised as to what 18 to be done if the materials that are to be offered, become 810011४; and the Aphorism (VI-iv-12) answers it by laying down the necessity of pre- paring fresh materials. This with regard to the prinoipal libations ; with regard to the secondary ones, the aphorism says—'' Apt vi géshabhajam syat,’—in connection with which w doubt arises ag to the nominative of the verb “Syat;” and the Bhashya supplies the work “ Disappearance ; ^" and supports this interpretation with arguments.
5 Inthe “Jyotishtoma” sacrifice on the day of the ^ Sutya’’ ceremony, the sacri- ficial animal, as well as the cakes, have to be purified. Hence with a view to apply the procedure, laid down with regard tothe animal, to the case of the cakes, it is found desirable to have an Injunction to this effect; and with this view, we have the Aphorism *¢ Pacogea viprakarshastantramadhyé vidhanat,”—-in which the predicate is ‘ Tantra- madbyé vidhinam,” and the reason “ Viprakarshat,”—the meaning being “ on acconnt of the remoteness of the mention of the animal, there shonld be a mention of the cakes in the procednre,” the nominative case—ending of “‘ Viprakarshah ” being changed into the Causal Ablative, and the Ablative in ^ Vidhanat’”’ into the Predicative Nominative. It may be urged that the Vedic sentence, like any ordinary sentence, is of human origin ; and to meet this, we have the Aphorism— Loké sanniyamat prayogah sannikar- shah syat” (1-1-26); where the connection is interrupted by the word “ Sanniyamat,’?— the meaning of the Aphorism being “in the ordinary world, ४ word is used with regard to a certain object only, when there 18 some sort of interconrse between the objeot and one of the sense-organs; and thus all Speech functions under the restraint of seuse-perception. On the other hand, there can bo no such sense-contact, and the consequent restraint, with regard to Vedic objects, which are all, more or less, super- sensuous. This Sutra can also be accepted as an instance of “ Affix-modification,” “ Sannikarshah”’ being interpreted as “ Sannikarshat,”’
APHORISM I. 9
56. There is intervention of the Sitra in the case of the vomiting of the Sdma drunk (at the sacrifice). And in the case of the injunction referring to animal in general, the Sitra itself has been changed.
57. ^ Agnayacca Svakalatwat” and “ Déyadharmavapatanam ” have been explained by a split of the sentence.
57-58. And the following are the instances of secondary signification :
66 A question is raised as to the “ Acwapratigraha” sacrifice being necessary in the case of the acceptance of the gift of a 10186 in the world also, or only during the performance of a Vedic ceremony. The Aphorism (III-iv-28) lays down the wrong view, which is subsequently set aside by the Aphorism, III-iv-29. Then comes the question of offering the ‘“‘Somaindra” cake, in the cage of the sacrificer vomiting out the Soma-jnice that he may have drunk; and with regard to this a donbt arises as to whether such offering is to be made when one throws out the joice ordinarily, or only when it 18 thrown out at a sacrifice. This duubt is set aside by the Aphorism, III-iv-32, where the word ‘“tadvat”’ is made to refer to the case of “ordinary drinking,” other than the sacrificial, which was mentioned in Aphorism II[]-iv-28, which ia separated by no less than three Sntras, from the present Aphorism. Again, with regard to the Injunction of the qualifications of the animale to be sacrificed at the ^“ Jyotishtoma,” a question arises as to whether the [njanction refers to all the three animals, or to only one or two of them. And in reply, we have the Aphorism III-vi-18, which clearly applies the Injunotion to all three equally. But finding this view to be inconsistent with JII-vi-19,—which applies the Injunction to one animal only—in order to remove this inconsistency, the Bhashya holds the Injunction to apply to one—the ‘‘ Savaniya”’ animal; and accordingly modifies the former Aphorism, interpreting it as—‘‘ The Injunction would have referred equally to all the three animals, had there been no difference of context; but in the present case, we have a difference of context ; therefore the Injunction refers to the Savaniya animal only.”
61 The former is part of III-vii-39; the latter refers to 1X-iv-43.
61.63 (I) Though the word “ Autpattika” means “belonging to the origin,” yet, through Indicatioo, it is explained as ‘‘ Natnral.’’ (2) In the Aphorism ^" Gavyasya cha tadadishn,” though the word ‘‘gavya”’ means either something that is produced from the cow, or the limbs of the cow,—yet, ou १०८९०४०८ of the Arthavada passage ‘‘ Gavo va état Satramasata ’’—-which implies mere relation to the cow, the word “ gavya” comes to he explained ae the “path traversed by the cow.” (8) Having raised the qnestion whether all the Rik verses are to be introduoed or not,—the reply is that only those are to he introduced in the middle, that are named the ^“ Dhayya” Rik, while fresh ones pre- senting themselves are to be pnt in at the eud; and ths names of these latter are given as the ^“ Ushnik” and “ Kaknobh.” Then again, there is an Arthavada passage to the effect that the Ushnik and Kaknbh ‘are subsidiary to the Trishtup; hence,’ in accord- with the Law of Indication, that the cause is mentioned by the effect, the word ‘‘ Ughnikkakubhau” 18 made to indicate their parent, the Trishtup. (4) In this Sutra, the word ‘“ Abhyudaya” is made to indicate the ^" Dwadasaha” sacrifice, which is a means of ^“ Abhyndaya” (prosperity). The meaning of the Sutra thus comes to he ५८ 810९8 in the Dwadashaha sacrifice we find particnlar names given to the different sacrificers—such as the Halfers, Quarterers, Thirders”,—therefore the principal distri- bution of the gift 18 to he made in accordance with those names, and not equally to all sacrificers, or in accordance with the work done by each; that is to say, not consi- dering the work that each may have done, the Halfer should got half, the Thirder the third part, and so on,
2
10 CLOKAVARTIKA.
(1) ^“ Autpattikastn’’ (Aph. I-i-5), (2) ‘* Gavyasya” (Aph. # {1-1-18}, (3) “ Ushnikkakubhah” (V-iii-6), (4) ^ Darginacca vigeshasya tatha- bhyudayé”’ (See Note).
59. Or, the passage beginning with “loké” may be taken as signify- ing the praise of the author of the aphorisms: in explaining by means of well-known words, the disciples were not troubled by him.
60, “ Bhavitavyanta tena ’’—all before this taken as one sentence, or taking all before the passage containing the word “ Vedadhyayauam ”— we have the objections to the use of the word ^“ Atha.”
61. "116 ascertainment of the meaning of the Veda is only possible by means of the Sitras consisting of words of known meanings; but the meaning of the word ‘ Atha’ cannot be said to be well-kuown unless you postulate a certain foregone action.
62. 1628 only a word with well-known meanings that is proper to use; but such is not the case (with the word ‘“ Atha” as used here )— such is the objection. And again if the meaning of the words “ Atha, &e.,” be well-known, why should they be explained now ?
63. ‘It (such explanatiou) is simply for the purpose of showing (what the word means)’—say some.
63-64. Out of a composite of various signification—assumed by Bhava- dasa—, some people explain the meaning as belonging directly to only a portion thereof, as in the case of the beginning of the Eighth Adhyaya.
64. (Others again sas): ^^ Here we cannot have an explanation of the Veda, as such explanation has been censured as useless effort.”
65. Or again, it may only be an objection (againse the use of the
69 With this begins the 5th Interpretation—“ Praise.”
60 With this begins the 6th Interpretation—“ objection to tho use of the word Atha.”
61 This explains the meaning of the Bhishya, ending with ^^ Bhavitavyantu tena.”
62 With ‘“‘and again” begins the consideration of the Bhishya beginning with “ tatra loké, &c.”
63-64 Bhavadasa has taken “ Athatah” as a composite word, and has explained it as denoting ^" sequence;” but the commentators on the Bhashya explain the Bhashya— where it dilates upon the meaning of the word ‘‘ Athy ’’—as attributing the denotation of sequence to the word “ Atha” alone, and not to “ Atha” and “ Atah” as forming a composite word. A similar explanation of the word “ Atha” by itself, as signifying sequence, is given, in the first Aphorism of the Eighth Adhyaya.
64 The sense of this elliptical Karika is this: It has been urged that the explana- tion of both the Veda and the Sntra would be a nseless effort; and in the present case we don’t find an explanation of any Vedic passage; hence if the Sntra too were left unexplained, there would be no purpose served by the Bhishya. Consequently we have here an explanation of each member of the Sutra.
66 The passage “ Tatra 1018, &o.,” ohjects to the acceptance of the ordinary mean- ing of the word “ Atha,” on aocount of the impossibility of the sense of seqnenoe, in the absence of any preceding event. And after snoh an objeotion has been raised, it is only proper that the signification of the word “ Atha” should be fully dilated npon.
APHORISM TI. Ti
word ‘ Atha)’ as explained before (signifying sequence) ; because there 18 no event preceding it.
65-66. “If a word is always to be taken in its well-known sense, such cannot be said to be the case with the word ‘atha’; and therefore—there must be a supplying of ellipsis (and other modes of secondary interpre- tation).”
66-67. “The accomplishment of the study of the Veda, and the mention of the high character of the ‘ Bath’ are not recognised without
a full comprelicnsion of the meaning of the word ‘ Atha’; hence has this latter been explained,”
67-68. If the word were withont meaning, orif it had some other far-fetched meaning, the ordinarily known signification would certainly be set aside; tlierefore for the sake of the accomplishment of the direct meaning, a certain foregoing event has to be assumed ;—the knowledge of the specified ‘mark’ (middle term) leading to the comprehension of the specified ‘subject’ (major term).
69. Others have thought it impossible to obtain such a meaning from the Sitra alone, and have therefore said ‘It is not so.”
69-70. By the declaration of sequence, as also by the fact of its having
65-66 This gives the meaning of the objection as raised in the Bhashra.
66.67 Some annotators explain the Bhashyathns: This explanation of the word ‘Atha’ 18 not with a view to explain this word alone; but what 18 meant is that when there is an explanation of the word ‘ Atha,’—in the conrse of such an explanation, we would, by means of qnestions and answers, come to speak of the accomplishment of Vedie stndy, and the excellence of the conclnding “ Bath.” If we left off the explana- tion of the word, the mention of these facts would appear irrelevent.
67-68 [In the first five methods of interpretting the opening sentence of the Bhiashya, the sentence up to ^“ Prayatnagauravam prasajyéta” is taken as ८, single sentence; and the sentence “tatra loké, &९.* ˆ is taken as embodying the objection to the nse of the word ^“ Atha.” The two limits of this latter sentence are to be taken as before (in Karika 60). We have explained the sentence beginning with =" Bhavita- vyam,” as coustroed together with the foregoing sentence of the objection-passages. Bnt if we accept the first limit,—taking all the sentences, from the beginning, down to ^ Bhavitavyam,” as forming a single compound sentence—, then we have to take the sentence “ Bhavitavyam, &c.,” as supplying an answer to the ohjection raised, And it is this explanation that is given in the present Karika,] If the word ‘ Atha” had any other meaning than thot of sequence, then we would be going against itg direct denotative signification. So, for the sake of this,latter, we have to assume some pre- ceding event; and such an event is the ^" stndy of the Veda.” If ^“ Bhavitavyam, &c.,” be taken as forming part of the objection-passage, then the reply would consist of the sentence “tattu bodhyam, &.” The cognition of the ‘‘desire to know Daty ” leads to the comprehension of Vedio study; the argument having the form—‘“ Becanse there is a desire to know Duty, therefore there must have been a stndy of the Veda, preceding snch desire.”
69 This introduces the Bhishya—‘‘ Naitadévam, anyasyapi, &c.”
69-10 The sphorism itself declares sequence; and 1४ hag a visible end, in the shape of the desire toknow Duty; hence the ‘study of the Veda” must be taken as implied
12 CLOKAVARTIKA.
a visible end, a study of the Vedas is implied ; hence, why should there be the objection that it (study of the Veda) is not directly mentioned in the Sutra ?
70-71. That particular event without which the ‘desire of knowing’ is not possible, is the one, sequence to which is assumed to be the aforesaid visible end.
71-72. Any active “desire to know” would always follow upon something or other; and as such the declaration of snch something in general (withont any specification) is entirely useless.
72-73. Thongh it is true that without previous determination (Sankalpa) the desire is not accomplished,—yet this too being common (to all actions), does not need any special treatment.
73-74. Therefore it is an accomplished specific canse of the ‘ desire to know Duty,’ which is meant by the author of the Sitra ; and this can be no other than Study.
74-75. “ A study of the Veda having been precluded by the sentence ‘Anyasyapi, &c.’ (in the Bhashya), it is not proper to add ˆ Prégapi, &c.,’ as even there ‘something else’ is possible.”
75. “The desired meaning having been got at, by means of the foregoing (sentences), what is the 186 of the passage ‘ Tadricintn, &.’”’?
76-78. Itis only by over-looking what is to be described later on, that such an objection can be raised; for it is not yet proved that
by the aphorism itself; and it is not right to urge that such study is not mentioned in the aphorism.
71-12 The aphorism denotes sequence; but sequence in general need not have been declared; becanse, asa rule, anything that is done necessarily follows something else. So by declaring sequence the Aphorism mnst refer to sequence to something particular and this can be no nothing else but the ‘study of the Veda.’
%-13 This Karika anticipates the following objection: ‘‘ Determination is always fonnd to have a visible effect ; therefore why should we not accept sequence to such determination’? ? The sense of the reply is that determination is a common factor in all actions, and 88 snch no special mention of this is necessary.
74-76 The Bhishya 18 thns: “It is not so; because the desire to know Dnty may follow from other actions, even before the study of the Vedn’’; and the present Karika means that the first half of the sentence having already precladed Vedic study, there was no need of adding the words ‘‘even hefore, &c.’’; hecause even before such study, all that is possihle as preceding the desire to know Duty, is something other than the study of the Veda; and this has already heen pointed ont in the first half of the sentence.
16 The sentence “tasmin hi sati sa’vakalpyaté”’ implies the necessity of Vedio study; as without this, no “desire to know Duty” is possible. And the passage in question too refers only to such Vedic sindy, as one withont which the desire 38 not possible,
16.18 As Jaimini has only mentioned “Duty,” it cannot yet be known that he is going to prove the Veda alone as the means of knowing Duty, or that he is going to explain only Vedic passages. Hence, so long as we have not learnt these facta, we can very reasonably urge that “ bowing to Chaitya” is also a Duty; and as such, a desire
APHORISM 1. 13
3
“Tnjunction’’ is the means of knowing Duty; (nor 18 11 yet known) what sentences Jaimini will explain. As it is only “ Duty” that has been mentioned up to this time, a desire to know it might follow also upon a study of the assertions of Buddha and others;—and this is what is referred to by the passage “‘ Anyasyapi, &c.”
78-82. Or, the aphorism may be read as “ Having studied the Vedas, the investigation should follow immediately.” Then too the two intended implications would be: “not without having studied,’ and “not after doing something else”; but such implication cannot be got at (in a single sentence), because of the chance of syntactical split, consequent upon the duplicate construction, noticed hereafter. If the injunction simply said ‘after having studied,” then the investigation of Duty might follow after the ‘‘ Bath’’; for in snch,a case, there would be no injunction of ^ imme- diate sequence.” If however it be said to be an injanction of ‘‘ immediate sequence,” then the investigation following upon Vedic study might be made the snbject, (and thus the immediate sequence being referred thereto), we land upon the possibility of an investigation even prior to Study.
82. The passage “Tadricin, &c.,” specially serves to preclude the study of the sayings of Buddha, &९.
83-84. The stndy of the Veda being arrived at, through the implica- tion of the objection ^^ Pragapi, &.,’’ the denotation of neither of the two aforesaid sentences can be the object of Injunction. This is what is meant by the Bhashya, beginning with “ api ca.”
84. What is enjoined is explained in the passage beginning with “1170.
84-85. Some peovle construe the passage “ Parastaccanantaryam ” (by supplying into it words from without),—as “nor do we lay down its
to know Dnty may also be taken as following after a study of the Scriptnres of the Euddhists and othor Atheistic sects; and that such desire is not preceded necessarily by a study of the Veda alone.
188% ‘‘ Noticed hereafter ’’—in the Bhashya passage: “ Veddnadhityétyékasyam vidhiyaté anidyantaryam, viparitamanyasyam.”
83-84 The investigation into the meaning of Vedic sentences is not possible for one who has not studied the Veda. ‘Therefore the study of Veda being preved to be neces- sary, through the implication of the objection,—even if we have the Injunction in the form ‘‘only after Vedic study, &c.,”—the objections to this, urged above, cease to apply to the present case. ‘“‘ Bhdshya”—the passage referred to is: ‘‘api cha naiva pedadhyayanat pirvam...... arthaikatwaccatkavakyatam vakshyati.”
84 Beginning with ^ Kintn’’ and ending with “ upadécat,’—the sense of which passage is that the aphorism serves to preclude the “ Bath” (enjoined in the Smritis), which implies the end of one’s residence with his Teacher.
84-85 In accordance with this view, the whole sentence has to be construed thus: We do not prohibit investigation into the nature of Duty prior to Vedic stndy; nor do we lay stress upon its immediate sequence to it.
० Because of the fact of the aphorism, Sc.,’—because the aphorism refers to the preclusion of the cessation of one’s residence with lis Teacher. ‘‘ Because of such being,
14 CLOKAVARIIKA.
immediate sequence.” They construe thus, hecause of the fact of the aphorism referring to another subject: (Investigation) is not prohibited before Study, nor is its immediate seqnence enjoined, because this is accomplished by the power (of Study itself), and also on account of the necessity, in that case, of postulating an onseen effect. Therefore we can- not but have recourse to indirect signification (Indication).
86-87. (But) here (in the Bhashya) the theory of immediate sequence appears to have been accepted.
And itis without renouncing the direct meaning, that the indicated
meaning has to be accepted.
87-88. The investigation of Duty, being understood to follow closely upon Vedie study,—thus ocenpying a particular point of time—would imply the negation of ^ Bath” (at that time)
88-89. There being a contradiction in the simultaneity of both (Bath and Investigation occurring immediately after Study), there is a weak- ness in the claim of ‘ Bath,” on account of its ocenrrence at that time being
§'¢”—The form of the Injonction cannot he that “investigation 8110 पात् follow neces- sarily after study’; because this is implied in the very power of stndy itself, withont which natnrally, no investigation is possible, Again immediate seqnence cannot be the object of tbe Injunction; because the invastigation canld be as well carried on, even after ths lapse of a certain number of years after Vedic study; therefore no palpabla end is served by snjocining immediate sequence. Therefors in this case ws wonld have to postulate an invisible result, which is not allowabls in a treatise based upon Reason; specially in a case where such assumption is easily avoidable. For these reasons, we must have recomrse to an indirect method of interpretting ths Sitra, through Indication; whereby we gst at ths meaning just noted.
81 Taking the aphorism to indicate the preclusion of the csssation of one’s resi- dence with his Teacher, we are to givs np the direct meaniag entirely; but, at ths same time, we should bass the indicated msaning upon it.
87-83 “ Bath” and “Investigation”? nre mntnal contradictoriss $ hecanse by ^ Bath”’ here is meant the giving np of ths habits of the religious student; consequently,’ after the Bath, there could bs no longer residsnce with one’s Teachsr (which is also necessary for the religions student). But such departure from the Teacher's honse wonld mili- tats against a proper investigation into the nature of Duty, which needs the help of the Teachsr. Hencs when this investigation is nnderstond as following immediately after stndy, it naturally preoludes its contradictory, ‘ Bath.”
88-89 ^: Onposed to the Veda'’—The study of the Veda is for the purposs of knowing its meaning; 80, if after mere repetition of the Veda the student wers to go nway from his Teacher after the ceremonial “ Bath,” than the whole Veda wonld become 1861888 to him. Says ths Bhashya: ^ Vedamarthavantam prayojanarantam santamanarthaka- mavakalpayéma.” The immediats sequencs of Investigation to Study has thus bsen proved by the opposition of “Bath” to the Veda. But the Bhashya also mikes an effort to reconcils ths two Injunctions: “ Nacddhitavédasya, &o.” The senss of ths Bhishya is that the Qrati merely enjoins ths “ Bath” as to bs performed after Stndy— a mere ordinary sequence; and if nothing more important intervenes, it may be performed immediately after the Study. But such immediate seqnence of the Bath is precluded by its opposition to the Veda; thongh still there is no contradiotion of the Oruti injanction—which implies mcre sequence,
APHORISM I. 15
opposed to the Veda; and consequently this (Bath) would be superseded by ‘fuvestigation’ through its superior strength (support of the Veda).
89-90. The passage containing the expression “ drishtarthatvat,”’ and the one beginning with “lakshanaya tu” (occurring in the Bhashya) are left off by some (Commentators), as they think them to hea mere repetition and hence meaningless. (L#t., ou account of the fact of its meaning having been already arrived at by other sentences).
90-91. ‘To these we reply: Though ‘immediate sequence’? may doubt- less be said to be expressed by the “Ktwa”’ affix yet, pn account of non- contradiction, this affix, may be taken as indicating mere “ precedence.”
91-92. If one performed the ‘‘ Bath” immediately after having got up the mere text of the Veda, it would be contrary (to the fact of the Stndy having a visible end). But if we explain the word “Adhyayana” as ^ Adhigama” (comprehension,—deriving it from the root ‘ina,’—to go), then the contradiction ceases.
92-93. One who, having explained non-contradiction in this manner, would assert the necessity of the Bath, for the sake of a certain unseeu result, or as a purificatory rite ;—to him we make the following reply -
93-95. In this connection, the Injunction laying down the various re- straints —‘‘not-bathing”’” and the rest—for the religions student, not haviug laid down a limit to these,—these stand in need of an injunction laying down their end; and hence on account of this requirement, ‘‘ Bath ” must mean the cessation of “^ not-bathing and ihe rest” —which would thus come to be indicated by means of ‘ contradiction’ and ‘ accompaniment,’ for the sake of a visible purpose.
89-90 ‘he two passages referred to are: (1) ^ Drishtdrthaté cadhyayanasydnan- taryé vydhanyéta,” (2) ^ Lakshanaya twésho'rthah syat.’”’ The sense of these commen- tators is that the former is a mere repitition of what has been asserted in the passage: “ Drishto hi tasya@rthah, §c.,” and the latter is meaningless.
90-91 It has been declared in the preceding portion of the Bhashya that the affix ‘Ktvd’ does not signify immediate seqnence. Still we grant that it has such significa- tion in the present instance ; eveu then the fact of Stndy having a visible purpose, in the shape of the compreheusion of the meaning of the Veda, would he contradicted. Hence, in order to avoid this contradiction, we ought to interpret the affix ‘ Ktva,’ per Indication, as implying mere precedence.
92-93 Explaining ^“ Bath,” not as the ceremony closing the period of one’s residence with the Teacher, but only as a particular religions rite, bringing about certain invisible results, like ordinary sacrifices.
93-965 What is wanted here is the end of restraints put upon the religious student, and not mere ‘bathing.’ Therefore the word “ Bath” in the said Injnnction must be taken to mean the cessation of ity contradictory,~——‘‘ non-bathing,” as also the other restraints and duties imposed upon the religious student. Thus then the finishing of the Veda becomes the limit of these restraints; and consequently all other duties being only subsidiary to Stady, the end of this latter would reasonably put an end to snch
duties also.
16 CLOKAVARTIKA.
95-96. Thus then of the words—signifying respectively ‘ Study,’ ‘Bath’ and ‘the order of sequeuce of the Investigation ’—the above inter- pretations have to be accepted, for the sake of a visible purpose.
96-97. (Obj.): “If one were to carry on the investigation after the Bath, he would not be contradicting the Veda; and thus the contradic- tion (you have urged) ceases.” To one who thus objects, we make the following reply :
97-99. Justas the Smriti lays down the ‘ Bath’ to follow immediately after ‘Study,’ so also (does it lay down) another actiou, to follow after that (bathing), and another one after this last, (and soon). ‘Thus then as it would be absolutely necessary (for the sake of Investigation) to set aside something that has been enjoined by the Smriti, 1t is only reasonable that we should set aside ‘Bath’ asit is tlie first to come up at the time,
and as such the fittest for being set aside. 99-100. Thus it is understood that the order of sequence based upon
words, is set aside by the exigencies of the meaning. Or there being a coutradiction between the primary and the secondary, 17 is the secondary
that is to be set aside.
96.96 (1) The word, signifying study, in the injunction: ‘““The Veda should be studied,” has bean explained as implying the “ Comprehending of the meaning. (2) In the Injunction ‘‘ After stndy one shonld bathe,” the word “Bathe” has been explained as implying the ‘ceasation of non-bathing and the other habits of the religions student.’ (3) The word “ Atha” has bean explained as implying the prohibition of one’s removal from the Teacher’a house. All these interpretations have been accepted simply on the gronnd of their leading to visible ends.
91-99 In Smritis, we have such injunctions as—“‘one shonld take a wife, after having bathed,” and “ when one has thus become a Householder, hs should perform the Agnihotra,”—and so on, one after the other, leaving no tims nnoccupied, whioh conld serve for an Investigation into Duty, after the “Bath.” Hencs in order to carry ou the Investigation, which is distinctly laid down in the Veda, it is absolutely necessary that we should set aside at 18881 one action sanjoined in thea above Smritis. And as the fittest time for investigation ia just after the Study, we naturally sesk to sat aside that which the Smriti has laid down as following immediately after the study; and this is no other than the “Bath.” Again it is only the learned that are entitled to the par- formance of sacrifices; and as no one can be gaid to be learned unless he has fully mastered the nature of Duty, 16 beoomes incumbent on us to have finished the investi- gation into Duty, as also all other branches of learning, before the taking up of the honae-holder’s life and its attendant duties.
99.100 The immediate sequence of “ Bath” to Stndy—which ie laid down in the seutence “having studied, one should bathe”—is set aside by the immediate sequence of the Investigation, which ig implied by the fact of its arising directly out of the Study itself. That the order based upon words is ast aside by that based npon the eenee will be explained in the 5th Adhyaya.
“Order” 18 the seooudary factor in the meaning of words; hence if we accept the order based upon words, we set aside ‘study’ (whioh has besn explained as the comprehension of the meaning of the Veda), and which being the direct signification, is the primary factor of the word. Henoe we must reject the order based upenh mere word, and consequently set aside tho immediate sequence of “ Bath,”
APHORISM I. re
100-101. By ‘Bath’ here is meant the ‘return from the Teachevr’s house’; (and it is this latter which) would be set aside, as being opposed (to Study and Investigation), and not the tasting of Honey (or Wine), &,
101-102. Thus then we understand the Injunction te mean that “ Residing in the honse of the Teacher, but not abstaining from ‘ honey, meat, d&c.’ (because these are not opposed to the desired Investigation), one is to investigate Duty.”
102-103. And so long as the (final) return from the Teacher’s House is not accomplished, there is no ^ Bath;’ because (the Bath) means (the cessation of) all (the habits of the religious student, including residence at the Teacher’s House).
103-104. And so long as one has not finally relinquished the Teacher’s House, he is not called a ‘Snataka’; and so long too there can be no marriage ; because marriage has been laid down only for the Snataka.
104. The Smriti ‘ one is to bathe (after study)” has been quoted (in the Bhashya) after having been explained.
105. And though the sentence ^ [४2 samavartishta’”’ (do not go away from the Teacher’s House) occurs (in the Bhashya), immediately after the quotation of the above Smriti injunction,—yet as this is contrary to the Smriti, it is to be taken apart from that passage (Smriti).
106. The preclusion (of Bath), that has been explained to be due to (implied by) the word “Atha,” is here (in the Bhashya passage in question) shown to have a definite visible end (and it is not for an unseen super-physical result).
107. The non-abstinence from meat, honey, &c., on this occasion (end of study) has been indicated by the Smriti; and as such it weuld net leok well for the author of the aphorisms to be prohibiting these (meat, &c.), for the sake of an unseen result only.
108. Though after having ounce returned from the Teacher’s House {thus following the dictum of the Smriti directly), one could go there again, for the purpose of investigation ;—yet, this too (the former Return) could be (only explained as being) for the sake of an unseen result. Hence this explanation has not been tonched upon here (in the Bhashya).
109. For one who has had his ends fulfilled, the Return from the Teacher's House 18 seen to have a perceptible result, and so has it been declared inthe Smriti. And there could be no purpose in the Return of one who has not yet had his ends fulfilled (7+., one who has net yet finished all that he had to do at the Teacher’s House).
104 That 18 ta say the meaning of the Bhishya is that such alone can be the mean- ing of the Smriti Injunction.
INT “ Unseen. result’’—Because, not being oppased to the investigation of Dnty, abstinence therefrom could not have any visible end,—the only good being the unseen result proceeding fram such abstinence.
3
18 CLOKAVARTIKA.
110. “The fact of Vedic study being the canse (of investigation) Shaving been established by the word ‘ Atha,’ which signifies ‘immediate sequence, —what is the nse of the word ‘ Atah’?
111. Though the word “Atha” has signified appropriateness (of investigation after Vedic study), yet without the word “ Atab,” there ‘could be no knowledge of the fact that “that (Vedic study) alone is the cause.” |
112. In that case (in the absence of “ Atah”’), it (Vedic study) ‘would become a qualification of the persou; and for the cause of investt- ‘gation, (we would have to postulate) some such thing as his desire for certain things, &e.
113. “Study” (as the only cause of investigation) may be regarded as ‘implied by the word “ Atah.” Because if such canse were not mentioned, the word “ Atha” might be taken simply as a benedictory word.
114, Or again, the word ‘Atah” may be interpreted only as preclud- ing the ^“ Bath ”: because for one who has fitted himself (for investigation) by astudy of the Veda, there can be no idle staying (in the Teacher's House.)
(Here ends the discusston of the signification of the words ‘ Atha’
and ‘ Atah}.’
115-117. The desire, signified by the affix ‘ San,’ has for its object the knowledge which is nearest related to it (as occurring in the same word) ; so it belongs to the knowledge alone; and no injunction (or anything of the ‘sort) is implied thereby. Of the root ‘Ishi’ (im Icch@) the object is the extraneons (as ocenrring in another word) ‘ Duty,’ or ‘ that’ (Knowledge), or both. The affix “tumun” signifies co-subjectivity (४.९. the fact of ‘desire’ and ‘knowledge’ having the same nominative) ; and the ‘li%’ (in Icchat)
110 If ^ Anantaryopadécitvat” is taken with ‘“‘atahcabdéna,” then the latter half ‘wonld mean—" what is the good of the word ‘Atah’ signifying mere immediate sequs ence (which has already been indicated by the word ‘ Atha'’)” ?
112 If we had no ‘Atah,’ the meaning of the Sutra would be" a person who has Btudied the Veda is entitled to the Investigation of Duty‘; and as a cause of Investi- gation, we would have to postniate a desire for certain things, which could belong to a Qidra also, who would thus hecome entitled to the Investigation, and thence to Vedic study, which oan never be allowable.
1l6-Y The Bhashya referred to in these Karikis is— Dharmanjijnasitumic- chéta.” “It belonge, Sc.’—i.e., the part of the word ending in the affix ‘San’ signi~ fies only the desire for knowledge, and not any sort of injunction, &o0. The desiderative affix ‘San’ has for its ohject ‘knowledge’; and the root ‘ishi’ has for its object either ‘Duty’ or ‘knowledge,’ or both. So there is no repetition or redundanoy in “ jijnasitu- michchhéta.”’
“The second desire, S¥c., Sc.,”"—ss an instanco of Desire for Desire, we have, in ordinary experience, a longing for the desire for food, in the case of one who is afflicted by a want of appetite,
APHORISM I. 19
signifies injunction. Thus there heing various objects (signified by the several words of the Bhashya), there is no repetition in it.
The second desire in (iechét) has beeu employed for the sake of the accomplishment of the ‘desire’ mentioned in the aphorism.
118. (obj.). ^“ Because in the case of (the sense of the Dative being) jor the sake or purpose af (tadarthya), it is the effect (the modification) with the Dative ending that is componnded with its material cause, as in the cage of ‘ Yipadaru,’—therefore there can be no: such compound in: the present mstance (as ‘ Dharmaya jijnasa’).”
119. (Rep.). The clause “Sa hi tasya” (in the Bhashya) signifies the breaking up of the compound into ^ Dharmasya jijnasa” (changing the Dative into the Genitive), And the mention of “Dharmaya” is only with a view to show that the Genitive is in the sense of “ for the sake or purpose of.”
120. (obj.). “Tf the particular relation (of for the sake of ) be meant to be implied, then the Dative alone (and not the Genitive) would be correct; and if, on the other hand, only a general relation be meant to be implied, then why should there be any mention of ‘Tadarthya’ (being for the sake of)” ?
127. (Rep.). Though it is relation in general alone that is signified by the Genitive, yet it is the relation existing in a particular form that is here meant to be impHed by the Bhashya.
(Here ends the exposition of ‘ Dharmajrjnisa).’
122, The “semblance of means” will he found herein in the argn- ments used by the Pirvapakshi (the questioner or objector).
122-123. The means of one thing applied to the case of another constitutes what is called the ‘‘Semblance of Means,”—e.g., the mention of the means of sacrifices as pertaining to the ends of man (e.g., non- hearing of evil spoken of himself), and those of the latter as pertaining
118 In “‘Yipadarn’” we have the compound consisting of ‘‘ Yipaya daruh ’—the wood for the purpose of the post,— because the wood is the material cause of the post In the case of “ Dharmiaya jijnasa,” om the other hand, there is no such relation of cause and effect ; therefore it 78 not proper to break up the compound “ Dharma-jijaasa ” in this manner.
191 We do not mean that the Genitive implies ‘‘tadarthya”; we take it to signify mere relation in generat; but as such a relation, without any specification, would be impossible, the Bhéshya svecifies the relation as that of “tadarthya,” by means of the insertion of the Dative affix in ^" Dharmaya.”
12.23 “ Qéshalakshana’’~—Tothe question—“ what is the definition of Duty” P—the Bhashya replies by declaring that the definition is given in the second aphorism; and whatever remains nndefined there, is explained by ‘‘ Céshalakshana,”—n» word that occurs in the first aphorism of the Third Adhyaya; but there we do not find the explanation of all that we have yet to know about Dnty. For this reason, the Vartika takes the word “ Qéshalakshana” to mean the complete body of the aphorisms,
20 CLOKAVARTIKA.
to the former. The word “Céshalakshana” (the remaining definition) refers to the complete (Peatise.
124. “It is only what is known (to some people) that is capable of being known (by others); while what is already known is not desired, (to be known). (On the other hand) what is not known (to the people) being incapable of being known, (it would not be desired) all the more ”’ ;—there- fore (with a view to meet this difficulty) the Bhashya has thus declared :
125. Duty is to be enquired into, on account of doubts (with regard to it), and also becanse of its leading to bliss. A thing with regard to which there were no doubts, or which did not lead to a (desirable) end, could never be enquired into.
126. In the matter of the form, &c., of Duty there are two questions (with regard to its) ‘Pramana’ (the means of knowing it) and ‘Ripa’ (its proper form) ; and by means of these two, these preliminary questions are settled in this (1st) quarter (of the 18४ Adhyaya).
127-28. एला when the Veda has been proved to be the only means of knowing Duty,—with regard to the ascertainment of the meaning of Vedic passages, there is no agreement among learned people (lit. ` people knowing many things’), on account of various (kinds of) doubts. Some say ‘this is the meaning,’—some: ‘not that, but this”;—and it is also for the settlement of these (differences of opinion with regard to the meaning of Vedic passages) that the treatise, subsequent to this (1st Pada), has been composed.
Thus ends Aphorism I of Adhyaya I, Pada i.
APHOLISM IL, 2]
APHORISM II.
^“ Duty 1s a purpose having Injunction for its sole authority (means of conceivability) ” (1-i-2).
1. Duty in general having been established, its authority “Injunc- tion” is now explained; thence are its form, ctc., known; and in this aphorism, it is the form that is described.
2. Both are signified by a single aphorism, through direct significa- tion and implication ; the form of Duty having becu mentioned (directly), its authority comes to be signified by implication.
3. The affix becomes capable of Hnjoining, only when supplied with all its requirements, in the shape of ‘ what’ and the rest. Hence in this system the sentence which urges (to action) is called =“ Codana” (Inujunc- tion).
1 “Its proof of Injunction J'c.’—The declaration of Veda ag the hasis of Duty is in this form: ‘ Duty has the Veda for its authority,—the Veda alone is its authority,— aud the Veda is solely authoritative, it cannot he otherwise.’
“Form fc.”—te., the form and the special features of Duty. The form 18 explained in the following manner: The declaration of the authority points to the “ Agnihotra” &c., as forming part of the authority—the Veda, as positively represent- ing “Duty.” The particular feature is explained thus: The specification that Veda aloue is the authority implies that the character of Duty belongs to र Agnihotra,” 4८ , as forming part of the Veda, and not to tho worshipping of the Caitya, &c.
‡ “ Both” - ४.९.) the Form and the Basis, The form of Duty having been declared to he that which occurs in the Veda, this very fact implies that the Veda is the Basis or Authority of Duty. This Kariku refers to the passage in the Bhashya, wherein it 18 declared that the two questions—‘‘ what is Duty—and what is its Basis’? P—aro answered by the present aphorism. :
8 ^ Codanétt kriydyah pravartakam vacanaméhuh.’—Bhiashya. In connection with this, a question is raised whether the “urging expression” is the Affix (the Potential Imperative), or the Root itself, or the whole sentence? The karika accepts the last alternative. In all Injunctions, we require the following three factors—(I) What ?—i.e., what is to be accomplished; (2) By what ?—1i.e., by what means it is to be accomplished; and (3) How ?’—zie., by what process it is to be accomplished. It is only when the Potential Imperative Affix is accompanied by all three that it is able to urge a person to action ; but it is only by means of the complete sentence that the three requirements can be fulfilled. Hence tho sentence is the one urging agent; and
-
as such, it is named ^ Codan’ ”—Injunction,
22, CLOKAVARTIKA.
4. “That Injunction alone ts the authority” and “ Injunction 18 only authoritative’’—both these facts having been ascertained with regard to Duty, (the author of the Bhashya) thinks it to be wanting in something, and hence he has slightly touched upon reasons, with regard to the aforesaid facts.
5. Inasmuch as authoritative character is possible only to the Word, he has also pointed out the incapacity, with regard to such objects (as the past, ete.), of Sense-Perception and the rest, which is to be described here- after.
6. Even with regard to purely non-existing objects, the Word brings about some conception. And consequently, in the absence of any discrep- ancy, authoritative character must be accepted to belong to it by its very nature.
7. The Bhashya has explained the word “ Codan&” as signifying “Word” alone; for no “ Injunction” ever treats of the past &e.
8. So long as “ Word” (in general) is not established by means of the preclusion of the operation of the senses and the rest,—how can there be any opportunity of (speaking of) a particular form of it P
9-10. (The word) “ Lakshana’’ may signify either cause in general, or the instrumental cause, (of right notion). And as the instramental cause (i.e., if we accept this alternative) has been mentioned, either the word or the conception of the word, or the meaning of the word, or the comprehension
29
4“ Codand hi bhittam bhavishyantam ¥e., .....nanyat kincanéndriyam.”—Bhashya. That Injunction alone, and nothing else, is sufficient authority—euch being the sense of the aphorism, the Bhashya quoted hrings out argaments in enpport of this view ; becanse a mere declaration of a theory wag considered weak. These argnments are to be brought out in full detail in the following aphorisms.
1 The passage ^ bhdtam bhavishyantam &c.,” means that Codana can also treat of such objects; but, asa matter of fact, no Codana is ever found to he treating of the past ; 606 “ Codana”’ must be taken here as signifying “ word.”
8 When the authority of Sense-Perception, &c., hag heen set aside, we are to prove the applicability of a particular form of authority (means of right notion)—in the shape of the ‘“* Word ”’—with regard to past and future objects, &c. Bunt as yet we cannot assert this of Injunction, which 18 only ४ particular form of “Word.” And further, the assertion of applicahility to past and future ohjects &c., refers to “ Word ” in general, and not to any particular form thereof. Thns then, the 86766 of the Bhashya comes to be this: Injunction is the authority for Duty; because anthoritative character belongs to the ‘ Word,’ as it has the capacity of producing conceptions even with regard to such objects ag the past, future, &c., and Injnnction too is only a partionlar form of the Word; therefore it is only roagonable that this should be tho sole authority for Duty, whioh is snper-sensuous.
५ The Tnetrumental cause is optional, depending upon the speaker’s wish ; heuce the various alternatives of option ars pointed out,
“Tf the preceding ones &c.”’—When oither the Word, or its C ti it Meaning, is accopted as the Instrumental Cange, then the result 0 ec bengion of tho meaning of the sentonce ; and whon this last is taken to be the oanses then the result is in tho shapo of Accoptauco or Rejootion,
APHORISM 11, 93
of the meaning of the sentence. When the preceding ones are the means of right notion, then the character of the result belongs to the last.
11. If the word “Lakshana” be taken as used in the sense of “conception,” &., then the mention of «^ Codana& ” would indicate its effect, and also the effect of that effect.
12. If however (the word “ Lakshana’’) be taken as used in the sense of causein general, or in that of “ Word” itself as the means (of right notion), then, in that case, the word “Codan&” and “ Lakshana” would be co-extensive in their direct signification.
13. Later on we shall prove that the character of ‘Daty,’ belongs to the Material, Action and Accessory (of the Sacrifice, collectively). And though these are amenable to Sense-perception, yet it is not in their ordinary form, that the character of Duty belongs to them.
14. Because, of these, the capacity of bringing about auspicious results is cognised always through the Veda; and it is in this form (of being the means of auspicious results) that the character of Duty is said to belong to them. And as such Duty cannot be said to be amenable to Sense-perception.
15, The mention (in the Bbhashya) of “Senses” is only a hint, in
11 “Tts effeet”’—i.e., Conception, the effect of the Word; and the effeot of the Conception, in the shape of the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence. This karika snpplies an answer to the following qnestion: ‘If the word ‘ lakshana’ be nsed in tho sense of something other than the Word—+.e., in the sense of the Conception of the Word &c.,—how, then can it be co-extensive with ‘ Codania,’ which signifie ‘“Word’?” The sense of the reply is that, in that case, ‘Codana’ may be explained as indirectly indicating-— not the Word, but—its effects &c. &c., the aforesaid co-exten- giveness being explained per Indication.
19 This explanation is in acoordance with the view that the Sentence constitutes the ‘Codana’—as declared in the Bhashya. As a matter of fact however, in all cases, the co-extensiveness is through direct denotation. For ‘‘Codana” has been explained as ‘that whereby anything is conceived of;’ and, in the same manner, we can explain ५८ Codana ” 88 ‘that whereby a pergonis urged’; and this would come directly to mean 4५ Conception,” &€, $ as has been pointed out elsewhere: “Codana is that word, by means of which one has the wish ‘may I exert’; or it may be the notion which leads to such exertion.”
18 Material,” &0., will be described, as “ Duty,” in the Bhashya, beginning with “ya éva Qréyaskarah,’ and these are certainly visible to the senses; as such, it is not proper to restrict ‘‘ Duty” to Injunctions alone. But the fact is that it is not in their perceptible forms that these have been described as *‘ Duty.”
16 This karika and the next, anticipate the following objection: “The Bhashya only precludes the applicability of the senses ; and hence it cannot be taken as restrict- ing Duty to Codana alone; becanse apart from Sense-perception, we have still got the agencies of Inference &c.” The first solution of this difficulty is that the mention of ‘senses’? is only a hint; it includes all other agencies of knowledge—Inference and the rest. The second golntion is that “nanyat kinca” may be constrned with the preceding sentence,—the meaning, in that case, being that ^^ objects, past, future, &c., can be comprehended by means of Codan3, and by nothing else.”
24 QLOKAVARTIKA.
the manner of the author of the aphorisms, Or we may disjoin ^ Nanyat- kinca,”’ from what follows,—the meaning of the passage thereby becoming generalised.
16. And in order to establish the incapacity (of all other Means of Knowledge), there is a mention of ‘“ Senses.” Or ^“ Kinca ” may be taken by itseli—as signifying a question as to the reason (of the previous assertion).
17. Though Inference has its applicability to objects enunciated above (i.e., past, &c.), yet without the comprehension of relation, Inference itself is not possible.
18, In the case of Duty, however, there is no comprehension of the relation of any mark with either the generic or the specific (forms of Duty),—by which it could have been amenable to Inference.
19. “Butthe‘ Word’ too cannot function, without a comprehension of relation.” Yes, (that is the case with) the term; but ‘ Duty’ is denoted, not by the Term, but by a sentence.
20. The non-expressive character of the sentence, as also the fact of the meaning of a sentence being based upon the meanings of words in- dependently of any relation, will be established later on.
21. ‘Inasmuch as the eternality, d&e., of the Veda have not yet been fully established, the Bhashya admits it to be non-eternal, and thence brings forward the inauthentic character of the Veda, as being due to the preclusion, in its case, of the authority of a speaker.”
16 The Bhashya being explained as “nothing else is capable; why is it 80? Because of the incapability of the senses,’’—the incapability of the “senses” implying also that of Inference and the rest; as these too are based npon Sense-perception.
17 Inference can treat of objects, past, future, nnseen, &c.; but still it depends npen the comprehensicn of a certain relation expressed in the Major Prsmiss, which stands in need of sense agency.
18 We know of no mark or characterestic, bearing any relation, sither with the generic form of Duty, as such, or with its specific form, as ¢ Agnihotra,” &c. And a comprehension of such relation (of the mark or the Middle Term with the Major Term, which, in the present instance, is ‘‘Duty’’) is necessary in the Inferential procesa ; hence Duty cannot be said to be amenable to Inference.
20 This Karika anticipates the* objection that “ the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence also depends upon the cognition of certain relations; and hence ‘ Duty’ also cannot be expressed by the Sentence.” The sense of the reply as embodied in the Karika, is that such an objection wonld have been real, if we had attributed evpressive- ness to the ‘Sentence;’ ०४, as we shall show later on, no snch expressive agency resides in the sentence,—all snch agency residing in the meanings of words (making up the sentence), independently of uny relations. All this will be explainod in the ८ Tadbhitadhikarana.”’ (1-1-25 et seg.).
81 Now begine the ‘consideration of the Bhashya passage: ‘* Nanvatathabhi- tamapyartham vriydt codand, yatha yatkincana baukikam vacanam nadyastire panea phalani santiti tathyamapt bhavati vitathyamapi bhavati.” And against this it is urged that it was not proper for the Bhashya to raise this quostion; inasmuch the ordinary assertion quoted as an instance can never reasonably be brought forward in condemnation of Chodaua, whiob is eternal and faultless. The explanation given by
APHORISM If. 25
22. “It is always an object perceived by other means of knowledge, that is got at by the Word; and like *memovy,’ uo authority can belong to it by itself.”
23. ‘ Even in the absence of the perception of an object by one’s self, it is only proper that there should be an idea based upon trustworthy assertion, because it is an assertion of a person, who is believed to have perceived the object.”
24. ‘ Without some sort of Perception, &c.,—either of one’s self or of another person,—a ‘“‘ word”? has never been found to be true. So the same may be the case with “Ty janction,” also.”
25. “Thus then, as even when producing a conception (7 e., mental representation), Funcy, 4९.) are uo authorities by themselves, so we may apply the same rule to the case of Veda also.”
26. “ 41} Injunctions treating of Heaven, Sacrifices, &c , are false,— because their objects are not supported by Sense-Perception, &e., like such assertions of Buddha and others.”
27. “Or again, because they are not composed by a trustworthy person,—like the assertions of children and intoxicated people. Or, the authoritativeness of the Veda may be set aside, by reason of its eternality, like that of Akasa.”
28. “ And again, all Injunctions depeud for their authority upon some human being; or else, by themselves, these could not be authoritative,— because they are sentences,—like the assertions of ordinary people.”
the Karika&is that ordinary people, not knowing the eternal character of Chodana, night relegate it to the position of common assertions of hum1n origin, and as such would come to apply to it the rules and restrictions of ordinary speech. Under the circumstances, it was only proper to bring forward the objection in the Bhashya ; especially as the eternal character of the Veda has not yet beeu established. The Karika also considers another alternative: granted that Chodana is eternal; even then it would cease to be authoritative, because the authority of the speaker—whose veracity is the only ground for the anthority of an assertion—is precluded from this case, which is held to be free from all human agency; with this view “ more so” has been added.
24 Because Injunction 18 not said to be based upon Sense-perception.
25 By merely giving rise to some conception, the Veda cannot be said to be authoritative; because Fiuney also gives rise to certain conceptions ; but it can never be said to have any authority ; and is never believed to be trne. ^" By themselves ”’— i.e., devoid of any support in Sense-perception, &e.
26 This Karika brings forward a syllogsim in the formal style: “ Such asser- tions,’—“‘such‘’ is added in view of the fact that the declarations of Buddha also are found to be trne in certain places. ‘‘ Such ‘not supported by Sense-perception, &c.
> The first half of the Karika is a syllogsim ; but the conclusion is the same as that of the preceding argument. The second half presents the following syllogism : «८ Veda 18 unauthoritative, because it is eternal, like Akasa.”
38 The sense of the first half is that all Injunctions owing their authority to the persons from whom thcy proceed,—and there being no such person in the cuse of the Veda—tle Veda can have no authority.
4
26 CLOKAVARTIKA.
29. “Or, the anthoritativeness of all Words should be accepted as depending upon ‘man’ ;—because of its being connected with Words, just as unauthoritativeness also (depends upon man).”
30. “Ifthe speaker’s character be no ground of the anthoritativeness ‘of Words,—then how can their unanthoritativeness (untrustworthiness) be attributed to lis faults” ?
31. ‘“* Under these circumstances, whether there be a human agent or not, the authoritativeness of the Veda is hard to be got at; and it 18 with this in view that the Bhashya has brought forward the objection beginning with ‘ Nanu.’ ”
32. ‘The contradiction, here, applies to the assertion of Buddha also ; because from this latter also conceptions do arise. Hence the reply (to the above objections given 19 the Bhashya) is a fallacious or futile one.”
33. With regard to all conceptions, you must consider the following question: “Js the authoritativeness or unauthoritativeness (of any concep- tion) due to itself or to something else” ?
34. Because those that are by themselves false cannot by any means be proved to be true. Some people attribute both (anthoritativeness and its contrary) to (the conception) itself, Others attribute them to the proved excellences or discrepancies of its origin.
35, Both cannot be dune to (the conception) itself, because the two are mutually contradictory,—nor can both be due to something else, because in this latter ease, there would be no definiteness in the conception.
29 In reply to the above objections, the Bhashya has: “It is a mere contradic- tion that yon are asserting—that it ‘declares’ and then ‘falsely.’” The Karika objects to this reply, the sense of this objection being this: Fhe meaning of the Bhashya is that anything that is uttered, and duly gives rise to a conception, can never he false, Burt, says the Karika, the assertions of Buddha also are found to Bive rise to certain conceptions; and as such, these would come to he anthoritative; thus the Bhashya fails to establish the sole infallibility of the Veda alone,—the only fact that it songht to prove.
88 This Karikai serves as an introduation to the reply to the objection urged in the last Karika. The questions in all these igsnes are in the following forms: (1). Is the anthority or otherwise of the conception due to itself? (2) Are hoth of these dne to the excellences and discrepancies of the source of the conception? (3) 18 authority dae to itself, and the contrary to extraneous canses P (4) Is ovnauthoritativeness १०७ to itself, and the contrary to extransous causes ?
84 In the second view, the excellence of the source proves the authority of the oonception and the disorepanoy in the sonrce proves its unauthoritativeness,
80 The meaning of the first half of the Karika 18 that the faoulties of anthorita- tiveness and its contrary are mutually contradictory; and as snch, oannot belong to one and the same object. The second half means that if hoth be held to be due to proved exosllences and defects in the cause, then a conception having arisen, so long as snch excellences or discrepancies have not been ascertained, the conception cannot be accepted as anthoritative or otherwise,—theroby being without any definite charaoter, which is an impossibility.
APHORISM If. 27
36. How can it be possible that any one thing, independently of ait extraneous agency, should have contradictory characters? And wher devoid of both these characters, of what form could the conception be P
37. If ‘ non-contradictoriness”’ were possible with regard to different conceptions ;—even then, if nothing else 18 taken inte consideration, it cannot be ascertained which is which, and where.
38. “Therefore for those that hold the unauthoritativeness of conceptions to be natural (१.९.) due to themselves), authoritativeness must depend upou something else.”’
38-39. “In this connection, the following rule is laid down: ‘unauthoritativeness, being a negative factor, can never be due to the discrepancies of the cause; whereas authoritativeness, being a positive entity, 5 always based upon the excellences thereof (1.e., of the cause.) ’”
40. “If authoritativeness were inherent or natural (in conceptions) and its absence artificial (z.e., extraneous, to be determined by something else) then Dream-cognitions would be authoritative, self-supported ; for what is there to refute this” P
41. ‘‘In my theory, however; there can be no authoritativeness, in the absence of a particular canse ; and consequently there is no chance of the absurdity of a negative factor (unauthoritativeness) having a cause, in the shape of the said diserepancies.”
42. “The excellences of the Sense-organ, &., alone can be said to be the cause (of authoritativeness) ; but the authority of these is denied, for two reasons; (1) the- occasional disorder of the organs of Perception, and (2) the occasional absence (as during dreams) either of the organs themselves, or of their capabilities.”
43, “Itis ou account of this fact that you have the mistaken idea
86 The first half of this is in reference to the view expressed in the first half of the last Karika; and the second half refers to its second half.
81 That is, though one and the same conception cannot he hoth, yet the doublé character can he explained as referring to different conceptions, wherehy the contra- diction ceases. This cannot be; because, even then, if no extraneous influence is accepted, how conld it he ascertained which conception is authoritative and which not, and also in what place it is one or the other.
40 Conceptions being by themselves authoritative, even dream-cognitions would become authoritative, ag these are also conceptions; nor can their unanthoritativeness be said to be dune to discrepancies; since, as a negative entity, it cannot hut be natural, as shown above.
41 Anthoritativeness being due to a particular cause, and unauthoritativencss being natnral to a conception,—dream-cognitiona would be unanuthoritative hy themselves, until there appears some extraneous cause which lends anthority to them.
42 The sense-orgaus being the canse of the authoritativeness of conceptious, —-these heing inaetive during dream, dream-conscionsness can have no authority. ५५ Té?—1.e., auch canse,.
48 Because, as shown above, the falsity (or wnauthoritativeness) of a conception 18 due tothe absence of the excellences-of the source of authority; and you mistake suclt
28 CLOKAVARTIKA.
that ‘the cognition of falsity is due to discrepancies (in the cause),’ (Asa matter of fact) the invariable concomitance of discrepancies leads to (a cognition of) the absence of excellences; and this absence establishes the unanthoritativeness of the conception.”
44, “Therefore the purity of the canse must be admitted to be the means of the anthoritativeness of a conception; while unanthoritativeness, being natural, can only be indicated by the absence of such purity.”
45. “Through Invariable ‘Concomitance’ and ‘ Logical Difference’ also, unauthoritativeness cannot be said to resnlt from any discrepancy (in the canse): inasmuch as this (discrepancy) is not found to exist in the case of a non-perception that is due to the absence of the canse (of perception),”
46. ‘Therefore, inasmuch as there is no human agency,—or 6veu if there is any such, becanse of the impossibility of any purity belonging to it,—there can be no locus standi for the Injunction; and hence an authoritative character cannot rightly be said to belong to it.”
47, [Reply] Yon must understand that anthoritativeness is inherent in all Means of Right Notion. For a faculty, by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be bronght into existence by any other agency ;
48. since it is only for the sake of its birth (origination) that a positive entity requiresa cause. And when it has once been born (acqnired an existence), its application to its various effects proceeds naturally out of itself.
49-5). If even on the birth (appearance) of conception, the object thereof be not comprebended, nntil the purity of its cause has been ascertained by other means; then in all cases we should have to wait for the production of another conception from a new source; for nntil its purity has been ascertained, the conception would be equal to nothing (४.९. false). And this second conception too, would be true only on the
absence to be the presence of discrepancies. The absence of excellence leads to the cognition of the negation of authority, which is natural,
44 Judicated by the absence of purity in the camnse.
45 Unanthoritativeness is of three kinds: Donbt, Misconception and Non-concep- tion. Some people construe the Karika thus: Ajndné dosharyatiréké pi aprémanyanwa- yat na dosho nimittam— Because in the case of Nou-conception, even in the ‘absence ‘ of any discrepancy, we find the ‘presence’ of onanthoritativeness,—therefore discre- pancy cannot be said to be the cause of unauthoritativeness ”
47 With this begius the refutation of the above arguments, and the establishment of the standard Mimansaka theory.
49-61 Jf even a rightly-produced conception should be made to depend upon the ascertainment of the excellences of its ciuse, for, the purposo of denoting its object,— then, for the ascertainment of such excellences too, we would need another conception, which would be due to something other than tho aforesaid cause; and so on we would have to proceed ad injinitum. This Karika proves the propriety of the Bhashya: “ Vipratishiddamidamuchyalé bravit? vitathancheti;” for a conception that denotes some- thing is self-cvidont; and as such, cannot be false.
APHORISM LI. * 29
ascertainment of the purity of its cause; aud so on and on, there would be no limit (to conceptions upon conceptions).
52. In case, however, authoritativeness be accepted to be due to (the couception) itself, nothing else is wanted (for its cognition). Because in the absence of any cognition of discrepancies, falsity ( unanthoritative- ness) becomes precluded by itself (४.९. withont the help of any extraneous Means).
53. Therefore the authoritative character of a conception, cognised through the mere fact of its having the character of “cognition,” can be set aside only by the contrary nature of its object, or by the recognition of discrepancies in its canse.
o4. Unauthoritativeness is three-fold,—as being due to Falsity, Non- perception, and Doubt. Fiom among these, two (Falsity and Doubt) being positive entities, are brought about by discrepancies in the cause.
5d. In the case of Non-perception, however, we do not admit the action of such discrepancies. Becanse for us all non-perception is due to the absence of canse,—just as you have asserted.
56. ‘The fact of mere Unsuthoritativeness being due to discrepancies does not Jead to any regressus ad infinitum, as is found to be the case with the theory of the cognition of excellences (heing the cause of authorita- tiveness),—for ns who hold the doctrine of “ Se!f-evidence.”
57, Unanthoritativeness (falsity) is got at directly through the
88 The truthfni character of a conception is set aside, (1) when the object denoted thereby is snbsequeutly found to be of a character contrary to that formerly conceived of, —e.g., in the typical cage of mistaking the rope fora serpent, when it is found, on eximination, that it is a rope, the previous conception of the serpent is set aside; and (2) by the recognition of a certain discrepancy in the canse—e.g., one suffering from Jaundice, thinks the conch-shell to be yellow; but as soon as he recognises the disorder in his eyes, he attributes the notion of yellowness to the disorder, and accepts the conch-shel] as white, thereby setting aside his previous conception.
64 This 18 aimed against the arguinent urged above in Karika 38-39.
65 ** Absence of the canse”’ (of cognition).
66 ^‹ For us who hold the doctrine of self-evidence”’ may be construed as being the cause of the absence of any regressus ad infinitum. It is only when one thing is made to depend upon another of the same kind, that we havea vregressus ad infinitum. Con- sequently if we made nnanthoritativeness depend npon another unanthoritative object, (as in the theory explained ahove, authority is made to depend upon another authorita- tive thing), then alone conld we Jind ourselves in the regressus ad infinitum. But, as a matter of fact, we explain unauthoritativeness as being due to discrepancies (the contrary character of the object of conception), which is authoritative, (as based upon Sense-perception); and as such this latter comes to be self-evident; nnd here the matter rests, and we are saved the necessity of assuming conceptions over conceptions ad win,
67 Here 18 the conception of a snake with regard to the rope. Now this conception is set aside directly by another conception in the form, “‘ this is a piece of rope” (which is contrary to the previous character of the conception). And nndoubtedly one could nevcr have the latter conception until the former had bcen set aside.
30 OLOKAVARTIKA.
‘‘ Cognition (of its contradictory).” For, 80 long as the former is not set aside, the subsequent cognition (of its contradictory) cannot be produced.
58. Thongh the cognition of the discrepancy of the canse is known to refer to a different object (i.e., not the object which is the effect of the cause), yet we have co-objectivity (of the two cognitions) as being implied thereby ; and hence we have the preclusion of the former,—as in the case of the “ milking-pot.”
59. But this rnle applies only to those cases in which (with regard to the second conception) there is neither cognition of any discrepancy, nor any contradictory conception. In those cases, however, in which we have any of these two factors, the second conception becoming false, the first comes to be true.
60. But in that case too, the authoritativeness is due to the concep- tion itself, in the absence of any cognition of discrepancies. And in a case where there is no such cognition of discrepancies, there is no reasonable ground for doubt.
61. Thus (17 this manner) we do not stand in need of postulating more than three or four conceptions. And it is for this reason that we hold to the doctrine of ““ Self-evidence.”’
62-63. Asa rule, the chance of discrepancies in an Assertion, depends upon the speaker; and in certain places the absence thereof (7.e., of discre- pancies) is due to its having a faultless speaker; because the discrepancies, removed by his good qualities, cannot possibly attach to his word. Or
5B There is a general rnle for performing = certain rite by means of a certain vessel; bunt in a particular case, there is a special rnle, whereby, in that special case, the rite is performed by means of another vessel; and here both the rules are accepted as being coextensive in their scope, as having the common pnrpose of laying dawn a vessel for the same rite. In the same manner, in the case of the cognition of yellowness with reference to the conch-shell,—thongh the preceding cognition of such yellowness has for its object the yellawness of the’ conch, and the subsequent cognition of the bile in the eyes (the canse of perception having the discrepancy of being jaundice) has for its object, the bile in the eye,—yet, in this latter case 960, we mnst admit of a co- extensiveness of the scope of the two cognitions, as implied by their meanings. The cognition of yellowness leads to the cognition of the bile; and this bile, being the cause of the perception of yellowness in white, is found to exist in the eye, and thereby leads to the conclusion that its effect—the perception of yellowness —is wrong; and this conclusion, of the idea of yellowness being a mistaken one, oontradicts the former con- ception—of yellowness in the conch-shell; and hence this latter is set asido. The implied meaning of the second conoeption is that ‘there ig bile in the eyes, and the presence of this bile has given rise to the mistaken notion of yellowness in the conch- shell.
60 The second half guards against the following argument: "as the first ooncep- tion is set aside by the second, and this by the third; so, on and on we might go, and find every conception set aside by the one following it.” The sense of the Karika is that it is only the recognition of discrepancies in the means of the conception that sets aside the conception. Hence, when we do not come across any such disorepanocy we cannot reasonably doubt the correctness of the conception.
APHORISM Tf. aH
agaiu, in the absence of any speaker, there conld be no discrepancies, as these weuld have no substratum (to inhere in).
64. In (truthful) human (speech) we find two (factors)—absence of discrepancies, and (presence of ) excellence; and we have already explained that authoritativeness cannot be due to excellence.
65-66. Therefore excellences must be held to help only in the removal of discrepancies ; and from the absence of these latter (discrepancies), proceeds the absence of the two kinds of unanuthoritativeness ; and thus the fact of (authoritativeness) being inherent in Words remains untouched. And inasmuch as the Word gives rise to a conception, its authoritativeness is secured.
66. “If the absence of discrepancies be held to result from excel- lences, then there is the same regressus ad infinitum (that you urged against us).”
67. (Not se) ˆ because at that time (7.e., at the time of the conception of the abseuce of discrepancies), we do not admit of any active functioning of the excellences, though they continue to be recognised all the same ;— because in the conception of the absence of discrepatcies they help by their mere preseuce.
68 Then too, in the case of the Veda, the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put forward, because there is no speaker in this case; and for this reason the unauthoritativeness of the Veda can never even be imagined.
69. Thus then the authoritativeness of the Veda being independent of a speaker, your adoration of its Author is entirely outof place. For, such adoration could be possible ouly if you assume the Veda to be devoid of authority.
70. Hence the mere fact of the Veda not having been composed by an authoritative author, ceases to be a discrepancy. Of the syllogistic
r 65-86 ^" Two kinds” —i.e., ‘Contradictory Conception” and ^^ Donbt,”— Non-con-
ception’ being ont of the question in a case of ^^ Conception.”
67 Of the cognition of excellence were the cause of the ascertainment of authoritativeness, then even this conception would stand in need of another, for its confirmation,—and so on ad. injin., but asa matter of fact, excellences help the ascertain- ment of the absence of discrepancies only by means of their presence, which serves to suppress the discrepancies ; and these are not able to weaken the confirmed authorita- tiveness of the conception.
69 The latter half 18 read by some MSS. as “ Kalpyén-atmarthata bhavet” (‘then the assumption of sach would lead to the fanlt of self-dependence—-Petitio Principii”) ; and the meaning of this is that it is only if the Naiyayika hold the theory of the unanthoritativeness of the Veda itself that he wonld reqnire a shelter in its infallible author, whom he assnmes. Bnt then, this Infallible Author too would depend upon the Veda, for a proof of His existence ; and the infallibility of the Veda resting npon the infallibility of snch an Author,—the reasoning would become a case of arguing in a circle,
32 CLOKAVARTIKA,
arguments urged against us, we shall lay down counter-arguments here- after.
71. It is only human speech that depends for its authority upon another Means of Right Knowledge; and hence in the absence of the latter, the former becomes faulty; but the other (1.e., Vedic sentence) can never be so (on that ground).
72. Thus then, the very fact of the incompatibility of the Veda with other Means of Right Notion, constitutes its authoritativeness ; for if it were not so incompatible, it would only be subsidiary (to such other means).
73. Inthe case of the authoritativeness of other Means of Right Notion also, the reason does not lie in their compatibility (with other Means of Knowledge) ; because more than one (Means of Knowledge), when treating of the same object, become optional alternatives ; and hence the conception of that object can be due to only one of these (and the other ceases to
be of any use).
74. Thesubsequent Means of Knowledge could only serve to specify the conception of an object, only in a case where the preceding Means has failed to rightly ascertain its nature.
75. Ifthe authoritativeness of the subseqneut (Means of Knowledge) were to depend upon the preceding one, then we would require one such means for (the sake of the authoritativeness of) every Means of Knowledge ; and as such we would never come to an end.
76-77. If youn should admit of an inherent authoritativeness (self- evidence) in any one of these, then to what special cause is due your repug- nance to (such inherent authoritativeness belonging to) the very first con- ception? And again, if mere non-support of other Means of Knowledge were the sole ground for unauthoritativeness, then a perception by the ear would have to be considered false on the ground of its not being supported by occular perception.
77-78. [ई 1४ be urged that “one perception of the ear could be sup- ported by auother perception of the same sense,’—then in the Veda also, there would be conceptions, by the hundred, closely following upon its utter- ance (aud these would support one another). In both of these (i.e, the
12 ^“ Subsidiary ’’—to the conceptions otherwise obtained, and not, in themselves the means of any right notions.
18 Hence authoritubtiveness cannot be duo to the compatibility of the means; it is inherent in the couception itself,
18 When, even in your own theory, yon find it necessary to postnlate the self- evidence of a certain conception in the end, in order to avoid a regressus ad infinitum,— why should you not postulite such inherent authoritativeness in the very first concep- tion and thereby avoid the necessity of postulating many intermediate conceptions ?
18 In the Vedn, by frequeut repetition, the conception got at iu the first reading may be taken to bo the basis of the authoritativeness of that obtained in the second reading, and 80 on, the Veda would finally como to rest upon itself, as its anthority.
APHORISM If. 33
perception of the ear, as wellas the conception derived from the Veda) there is no conception produced from any foreign means (of conception).
79. Just as (in the case of the ear-perception) the ground of support may be ascertained to be another perception by the same sense, so too we may postulate a similar support in the case of the Veda also.
80. Therefore the conception that has been firmly (and fully) brought about, and does not stand in need of any support of other conceptions, must be accepted to be (trnly) authoritative.
81. Nor is the authoritativeness of “ Word,” &e., capable of being proved by Inference; so that all conception is saved from any dependence upon other means of congeption.
82. (Obj.): ‘But Sense-Perception and the rest are not comprehended as that ‘ these are authoritative’; nor is it possible to carry on any business by means of such perceptions, when they are not comprehended as such.”
83. (Reply): Even prior to comprehension, the Means of Right Notion had an independent existence of their own; and they come to be compre- hended subsequently (as such), through other cognitions.
84. Therefore the fact of its being comprehended as such, does not in any way help the authoritativeness (of the Means of Right Notion) ; because the idea of the object is got at through the former alone.
85. Even the unanthoritative Means would, by itself, lead to the conception of its object; and its function could not cease untess its falsity were ascertained by other means.
86. The falsity of an object is not, like its truthfulness, perceived by
81 If it were to be proved by Inference, then that Inference would require another Inference, in order to prove the instance cited therein, and 80 on ad injfini.
88 All business with such means is performed by their mere existence, even before they have been recognised as such means.
84 The sense of the latter half is thus explained in the Nydyaratnikara: ‘ We do not mean to say that authoritativeness is perceived on account of its connection with the conception; all we mean is that the authoritativeness of a conception lies in its conformity with tbe real state of things; becanse upon such conformity depends the application of the words ‘ authoritative’ and ‘Idea’ with regard to a conception. And this real state of things is perceived by itself, throngh the unknown conception; and there is no nse of any other means of cognition.”
85 Even the unauthoritative means do not, by themselves, advertise their false character; in fact, they also lead to the right conception of the object in their own way. The idea of silver really perceives the shell to be a piece of silver. Thus too, an unauthoritative means, by itself, signifies its own authoritative character and leads men to act accordingly—the man taking up the shell, as a piece of silver. Itis for the detection of its unanthoritativeness and for preventing people from acting in accordance with it, that is need of another means; consequently the unauthoritativeness of a con- ception can never be inherent; as itis always arrived at by extraneons means; e.g., in the above instance, on close examination by the eye, the real character of the shell is detected, and the man throws it away.
8 This is levelled against the objection tbat the unanthoritativeness of the Veda
3)
34 CLOKAVARTIKA.
its very first conception. For the recognition of unauthoritativeness, the only cause is one’s consciousness of the falsity of its subject itself, or of the faultiness of the cause thereof.
87, Thereby alone is falsity (of a conception) established ; and by no other means. And the truthfulness (or authoritativeness of a conception) is proved to belong to the state of its birth (i.e, is natural or inherent in it).
88. Therefore even in cases where falsity is proved by other means, these two (causes of falsity) should be noted, and not only certain points of similarity (with another false idea),
89. For one who would prove the inauthenticity of the Veda by means of Inference, who could avoid the preclusion (of Inference) on the strength of the conceptions derived from the Veda?
90. If it be urged that “ Inference is not to be thus set aside, because of the inauthenticity of the Veda,” then there results (the fault of) ^ Reci- procity ” (or mutual dependence); because apart from Inference you have got no other means whereby to set aside the Veda.
91. And the mere non-perception of an object by other means of knowledge does not prove the negation of an object—e.g., taste, &e. Because with these, it is a rule that their perception is due to the tongue, &e.
92. If it be urged that “the perception of au object is due to the consciousness of one Sense, or means of conception,” then the same may be said to be the case with Duty also.
92-93. Even when there are (correct) conceptions produced from the Veda, if you assert that ‘ (the anthenticity of the Veda) is not proved to me,” such assertion can only be due to malignity,—and as such it is not proper for truthful people. And certainly there can be no inauthenticity
might also, in the same manner, be arrived at throngh extraneous means—e.g., the series of inferential arguments brought forward above, in Karikas 26 et, seq.
83 ^ Similarity with another, §c.”—as has been done in the arguments bronght forward against the authoritative character of the Veda.
90 Yon depend upon Inference for setting aside the Veda; and also for proving the falsity of the Veda; and it is only after this falsity has been proved that your Inference can have any force,
91 Because a certain conception is not supported by more than one means, that fact alone cannot prove its falsity. We do not mean to say that we do not accept Inference; and yet, in the absence of any other means of setting aside the anthority of the Veda, we do not accept the preclusion of the Veda. All that we mean is that we can admit of no Inference that goes against the Veda.
92-98 The meaning of these Karikas is thns explained in the Nyfyaratnakara:
The anthority of the Veda has been proved to us; and hence we can never prove any fact that is distinctly denied in the Veda; and thus Inference comes to be set aside by the denial contuined in the Veda.” And the present Karika urges that it is not proper for the opponent to deny the authority of the Veda, when he can have certain unmistaken and correct ideas through it,
APIIORISM Il. 35
simply on account of (your) malignity, or on account of the fact of its not conforming (with your own views).
94. Nor can authenticity be proved merely by one’s own wish or command, For no one asserts the non-perceptibility of the pain due to fire-burn (which is not desired).
95. Nor can any desirable conception be authentic (simply because it is desirable).
95-96. Therefore like light, Veda being common to all persons, it is not proper to dispute its authenticity. The difference (of the Veda) from the assertions of Buddha, é&e., will be pointed out hereafter. On account of the imperfections of human agency there is every chance of the latter being open to contradiction.
97, While in the case of the Veda, the fact of its not being due to human agency, serves to establish its authenticity.
97-98. If the Veda wereof human origin, then those that would declare it to be true, as also those that would declare it to be false, would have to postulate, without any grounds, its anthor, his excelleuces and defects, aud its acceptance by great men, &c., &e.
98-99. By the Mimansakas, on the other hand, now, as always, nothing is postulated, besides what is directly visible (7.e., the Veda alone by Itself).
99-101. Thus has the Bhashya set asile (all chance of) mis- conception and doubt with regard to such a Veda, when it is found to be giving rise to (true) concep tious. And the assumption of a faulty origin of the Veda will also be set aside later on. Further, on account of the absence of human agency, there is not the least chance of the existence of these (Misconception and Doubt) being ever thought of (in connection with the Veda).
5-95 If the production of cognition he the sole ground for authority, then the scriptures of the Buddha wonld also come to be authoritative. But itis not so; the case of these is different from that of the Veda in many respects—e.g, in point of their origin. The Buddhistic scriptures have their source in human agency; and as no human agency is perfect, there is every chance of there being imperfections in thuse scriptures, which, for this reason, could be safely contradicted. It would require a deal of ingenuity and equivocal reasoning to establish the indisputable perfection of human agencies, and thence that of the Buddhistic scriptures.
97-98 “ Acceptance by great men.”—The supporters of the Veda would refer this to the Veda, in order to prove its authoritative character. Its opponent, on the other hand, would refer the same fact to the support of his own ssriptures, and thereby establish the unauthoritative character of all other scriptures, the Veda included.
99_I0l If the opponents of the Vcda—which has heen proved to he eternal and faultless —declare its unauthoritative character to be in the shape of Misconception or Doubt, then, we reply that all ohance of Misconceptiun and Donbt, with regard to the Veda, has been set aside by the Bhashya.
^ Faulty origin’’—any doubt as to the existence of discrepancies leads to donbts with regard to its authoritative character; and when the existence of such discre-
36 CLOKAVARTINA.
101-102. Sach being the case, falsity must always depend upon the nou-productibility of conceptions; and this is the contradiction urged ia the Bhashya passage “ Vravitz, &c., &c.”
102-102. In ^ tachchét pratyayitat,” (न pratyayita”’ means) ‘one who describes things as he sees them;’ and “indriyavishayam ” means ‘that which is based upon the action of the senses.’
108-104. (Some people explain the word ^ pratyayita ” in) “ tachchét pratyayitat”” as (meaning) ^ 016 who sees, and speaks the truth.” Be- cause (lf it meant) ‘“‘One who describes things as they are seen,” then we would, in their opinion, have to admit the truthfulvess of the assertions of untrustworthy persons also.
104-105. But (in that case), out of the two factors, ‘ trnstworthiness ’ and ‘amenability to sense-action,’ the absence of even one would constitute a counter-instance, which is al ways based upon the absence of one factor only.
pancies has heen ascertained, then there is a direct contradiction of it. The chances of both these contingencies are precluded from the Veda, by proving the non-existence of discrepancies in it.
101.102 ^ एव 2८४ २ = says, or asserts,—i.e., gives rise to a conception. = ^ Vitatha” = false, ४.९. that which has been proved to he identical with not giving rise to any concep- tion; and thus these two terms contradict each other, hence the sentence ‘asserts falsely ” becomes self-contradictory.
102.108 With this begins the consideration of the Bhashya passage ^ yat tu lawkikam vachanam tat chét pratyayitat purushat indriyavishayam vd, Sc.” The word “ Indriya” here includes Inference and all the other principal means of right notion; the meaning of the clause thus comes to be this: ‘‘ The assertion of the person who says as he 8688, having the support of one or mors means of right notion, 18 always anthentic; conse- quently if the instance of human speech brought forward in the objection refer to the assertion of such persons, then the instance does not apply to the Major Term of the argument, which, therefore, fails. On the other hand, the assertion of tntrnstworthy persons, not supported by any other meana of right notion, is always unauthontic ; because of ita very source being faulty. And if this is to which the inetance refers, then such an instance oannot shake the authentivity of the Veda; and thus too your argument falls to the ground,
104-105 This refntes the second interpretation: A counter-inetance is an instance brought forward in order to prove the weakness of ४ definition; and as such, the counter-instance should be based on the absence of only one differentia out of the many mentioned in the definition. Otherwiee, if the connter-ingtance consisted of the absence of all the differentias mentioned in the definition, then it would not apply to the case at all, being entirely apart fram it, As for instance, the definition of “Duty” isa *‘pnrpose described in the Veda;”” where we have two differentias—that of being a purpose, and that of being described in the Veda; and the counter-instance brought againat this definition is the case of the “ Syéna” saorifice, which is mentioned in the Veda, hut does not lead to tho accomplishment of any desirable end of man. And here we sce that the connter-inetance is wanting in one factor only, as a rule, and not in all the paints noted in the definition. In accordance with this interpretation however, ‘‘Trnstworthiness” and “‘Amenability to sense-perception,’—each by itself, consti- tutes authenticity; and hence the counter-instance wonld consist in the absence of each of these, and thence would result the absurdity explainod in note 103-106,
APHORISM 11. 37
105-106. And in the case of the untrustworthy speaker, we would have to admit the falsity of even such assertions as are based upon the authority of the senses; and the assertion of the trustworthy speaker too would come to be false, in the case of an assertion uot based directly upon the authority of the senses. And thus wonld result a self-contradic- tion in the Bhashya,
106-107. Therefore by the first epithet (‘pratyayita’’) is signified ‘trnthfulness ;” and by the second—“ Indriyavishayam’’—is imphed the fact of its having a sound basis.
107-108. The mention of the absence of discrepancy (want of sufficient basis) 18.01 the purpose of the preclusion of inauthenticity (and not for the accomplishment of authenticity, which is self-evident). The theory of authenticity being due to excellences has been thoroughly refuted before ; and having once been set aside, it cannot be held to supply the basis for authenticity.
109-110. In the first clanse, the word “ Va” has a collective force ; but in the latter, it has the alternative sense. It is for this reason that the counter-instances of these have been mentioned separately: viz: (1) even in the case of the capable, if (the speaker is) untruthful, there
106.108 This Karika lays down the deficiency of the ‘counter-instances. In the counter-instance of “ trustworthy,’’ we have ^ untrustworthy,” the absence of a trust- worthy speaker being the only ground of inauthenticity ; thns then the very sentence cited as authentic, being amenable to the sense of the hearer, and it being the assertion of an untrustworthy person,—this very sentencs would become inauthentic; and as such, wonld come to be cited as a counter-instance of itself. And again, with regard to ‘‘amenability to the senses” we would have as its connter-instance “not amenable to the senses ;”’ and thus the assertion of a trustworthy person, not heard by the listner, which has been accepted as authentic, would become nnauthentic, and thereby would come to be ॐ connter-instance of itself; and thns there would he self-contradiction. And further, if the expression ^ amenable to the senses” be nsed with regard to the assertion of an untrustworthy person, with regard to an object before one’s eyes, then the expression ‘‘ not amenable to the senses’’ must necessarily mean “that which is not perceived by the hearer ;” and then the Bhashya—“ it is impossible to be known by the person, without an explanation ’’—becomes inexplicable; because that which is not heard by the hearer cannot be comprehended even after an explanation. For certainly, it is not possible to know what the hearer does not perceive. Therefore the expression “amenable to sense’’ must mean “ based upon accepted means of right notion ; °" and the expression “not amenable to the 86186 › mnst mean that which has no such basis; thns does the Bhashya passage become explained. And again, the word ^ Pratyayita”’ signifies ‘one who has a conception and declares it;” and as this conception may be either right or wrong, so a “ pratyayita” person 18 not necessarily a ५५ trustworthy ’’ person, but only one who says what he sees. Hence the only correct interpretation is the one given in Karika 102-103.
106.107 ‘* Trnthfnlness 2 - १.९.) the fact of saying as one sees. ‘“ Basis ’—7.¢., the fact of its being based upon correct means of right notion.
109-110 In the first instance, the notion of falsity is due to disbelief in the speaker ; and in the latter, it is due the faultiness of the very origin of the assertion.
38 OLOKAVARTIKA.
is falsity ; as also (2) in the case of a truthful (speaker), if the fact itself be incapable (of being verified by proofs).
110-111. The passage in question does not set aside omniscience. Because in the clause ^ without a sentence, &c.,”’ what is signified is only the denial of omniscience in particular cases.
111. If there really existed a person knowing all things, through the six means of knowledge, how could such a person be denied ?
112. Butif a person be assumed to be knowing all things by a single means of knowledge, such a person wonld doubtless perceive taste and all other objects, by means of the eye alone !
113. That particular kind of the Means of knowledge which leads at the present time to the perception of a special class of objects, was of the same kind at other times also.
114. The difference of degree that we come across (10 the efficiency of the various senses), does not go beyond the precincts of the objects (amenable to each sense); and hence such difference would only exist in the cases of distant and subtle cognitions; and in no case could colour (the property of the eye) be amenable to the function of the ear.
115. With regard to objects in the future (such as Dharma, &c.), we do not ever find the applicability of Sense-Perception; nor that of Inference and the rest, in a case where there is no proper Mark (to serve as the Middle Term).
116. ‘‘Inasmuch as the assumption by others (the Banddhas) of an omniscient Person, as also that of the absence of human agency in the Veda by the Mimansakas, are both of the same type (there is no difference between the validity of the two),’’—those who assert this must think over the following (points of difference).
117. An omniscient person is not seen by us at the present moment ; nor, is it possible to prove (by means of Inference) that such a one ever existed before, as is done in the case of the negation of such a person.
110.11! “In particular cases’’—the clause servos to preclude the capability of know- ledge with regard to an object that ie beyond the senses, and is only amenable to words—e.g., Duty.
111 He who knows everything by means of the six means of right notion, would also know Duty, throngh the Veda; and this fact would not militate against onr theory that “Duty is knowable by the Veda alone;” hence it is not necessary for us to dis- prove such omniscience,
118 And hence it cannot be urged that such omniecience, hy a single scnee, is not possible now-a-days, though it was possible only in daye gone by.
11५ And ae euch, Sense-Perception too, by itself, cannot bring abont omniscience.
117 Neither Sense-Perception, nor Inference can prove the existence of an omniscient person. In Inference we require a middle Term, which we cannot have in the case of omniscience. On tho contrary, in support of the refutation of the existence of an omniscient person, we have the following inferential argument: “Tho past was without an omniscicnt person, because 16 was a point of Time, like the Present;”’ or again, Buddha was not omniscient, because he was a man, like ourselves,”
APHORISM I. {39
118, Nor can the existence of the omniscient one be proved by Scriptures; for in that case there would be mutual inter-dependence. And how can one ever believe the authenticity of a Scripture composed by another man ?
119. Nor can we get at any other Scripture (save the Veda) which is eternal. If the eulogies (occurring in the Veda in praise of an Omniscient Person) were eternal, then, non-eternality would belong to the Scripture itself.
120. The eternality of the Scripture (Veda) having been established, all other assumptions (of an Omniscient Anthor and the like) become needless. For men could prove the existence of Duty by means of the same (Scripture), whereby (you seek) to prove the existence of an omniscient person,
121. One, who, convinced of the truthfulness (of Scripture writers) with regard to their assertions in connection with the relation of the senses and their objects (1.e., in the case of ordinary perception), would base their authority, even in the case of matters of faith, on the fact of these latter assertions proceeding from one whose assertion has been found to be {1716 in the former case ;—
122. Such a one would thereby prove the anthenticity (of Buddha’s assertions) to depend upon sometliing else (7.e., our own Sense perceptions). For if the authenticity thereof (7.e., of Buddha’s assertions dealing with ordinary perception) were due to itself, then what need could it have of the senses, &c., of other persons ?
118 “ Mutual dependence.’ The Scripture depending for its validity upon the omniscience of the Author, and the omniscience of the Author depending npon the validity of the Scriptures.
119 Omniscience cannot 16 proved by any Scripture which is not due to hnman agency. ‘‘If the eulogies, §c.” This is added in anticipation of the ohjection hased upon gnch vedic passages as—‘“‘ He is omniscient”? and the like, which might he taken to prove the existence of an Omniscient person. The sense of tle Karika ig that such passages are only eulogistic, and not descriptive of a fact; and as such they cannot he accepted as eternal. For the Scripture, attrihuting omniscience to a corporeal man, would stand self-condemned as transiiory.
120 The eternal Scriptare,— that yon seek to employ in proving the existence of an Omniscient Person, who wonld he the sole authority of Duty— may he more reasonahly employed in proving the existence of Duty itself, thereby doing away with the necessity of postulating an intermediary omniscient agent.
४६ Here some people argue thus: ^ Granted that there is no omniscient person ; bunt Buddha and others might have heen rightfn] knowers of Duty. We find, in ordinary life, that Buddha is truthful to a nicety in matters of ordinary perception ; hence it wonld follow that even in matters of pure faith, such as that of Dnty, we might rest upon his authority ; and thereby prove the propriety of such actions 88 bowing to Chaitya, on the ground of their having heen declared hy him.’ The next Karika supplies an answer to this argament, the sense of the reply being that if snch he the ९५8९) then Buddha’s authority would rest upon the fact of owr cognition of the trnth- fuluess of his assertions with regard to the ordinary objects of sense.
40 CLOKAVARTIFA.
123, Just as the authenticity (of such assertions) is due to (our) sense-discrimination, so would it also be in the case of matters of faith ; and (its authenticity) would never be independent or self-sufficient.
124. Just as by the aforesaid cause (conformity with our perception) is proved the truthfulness (of the Scriptures); so, in the same manner is also proved the absence of their authority with regard to objects not perceived by others.
125. The ‘truthfulness of the trustworthy,” the “falsity of the untrustworthy ” and “the mere repetition (or reminiscence) of a previous conception’’—yon will have to accept all these (with regard to your Scripture), if you stick to the instance (you have brought forward in your argument).
126. And further, inthe case of (these scriptures) referring to super- sensuous objects, we would come to recognise their falsity, on account of the fact of all Scriptures besides the Veda, originating in hnman agency ; since in such cases the grounds of their anthenticity would be self- contradictory.
127. And then too, there results the absurdity of (your Scripture proving) the authenticity of subjects other than either Duty or Non-Duty. And so long as the Saukhya and the rest continue to exist, your instance too 18 hard to be got at.
128. Because, while being a human assertion, it refers to super- sensnons subjects ;—therefore too, on account of mutual dependence, the Scripture of Buddha and others would come to be false.
184 Becanse the assertions of Buddha with regard to such matters as Dnty are १०४ horne out by our experience; therefore his 98861108 are proved to be falee by the game reasou which yon sought to employ in proving their truthfulness.
120 If yon seek to prove the anthenticity of yonr Scriptnres by reason of the assertions of ite anthor conforming with your own experience, then, as in your own experience, yon come across valious cases like those mentioned in the Karika, so, in the same manuer, you will have to admit of the same discrepancies in the author of your Scriptures.
16 ^^ Self-contradictory ”’—-hecause the reason (human agency) brought forward to prove the truthfulness of the Scriptures may aleo be employed to prove their faleity.
127 ‘ So long as the Sankhya, Sc.’—The assertion of Buddha with regard to the momentary character of all external objects, has been said to conform with our own experience, which fact has been made the ground of proving his veracity. Bunt the Sankhya has established, beyond the least doubt, that all that exiets 18 eternal, and exiets for ever. Under such circumstances, so long as you have not fully refuted the arguments of the Sankhyae, you cannot hope to estahlish the authority of your Anthor, on the grounds that you have urged.
1४8 Just as human epeech, when referring to transcendental objects is almost always sure to be false, so, the speech of Bnddha tvo could not but be false. And when his assertions with regard to transcendental objects come to be falee, those with regard to perceptible objects too (such as the momentary character of all objects, &c.), become false, And as his veracity was sought by you to be proved on the ground of his latter assertions being true, it falls to the ground unsupported,
APHORISM II. Al
129. The antagonist who meets you for the first time would, while arguing, also have the following argument (at his disposal) against you.
130. “My assertion that ‘Buddha, &c, are non-omniscient,’ is true, because it is my assertion, like my assertion ‘ Fire is hot, and bright.’ ”
131. “The fact of this being my assertion is directly perceptible, and you have yet to prove that what you bring forward as Buddha’s declaration was really what he asserted. And thus mine is the (correct) argument, whereas yours is doubtful and incomplete.”
132. How can anyone postulate a thing, whose existence can be dis- proved by reason of its being contrary to Sense-Perception ?
133. Nor can your omuiscient Person be postulated on the ground of unbroken tradition. Because the tradition is disputed, has no bassis, and is only accepted by a few people (like yourself).
134. That ‘He is omniscient,” how could even his contemporary enquirers know, being (as they were) devoid of any conception of his cog- nitions and the objects thereof ?
135. Thus then you will have to assume many omniscient persons (among his contemporaries and their followers, so that each of these could be cognisant of the omniscience of his predecessor). For he who is himself non-omuiscient could never recognise auother person to be omniscient,
136. He by whom the omniscient Person could not be recognised,— how could such a person have any idea of the authenticity of his assertions ? (For these would be) to him just hke the assertion of any other ordinary person.
157. When (you declare Buddha to be) devoid of attachment, &e,, and free from activity,—then the injunctions (contained in your Scriptures) must have been composed by another person, specially in the absence of all definite (concrete) cognition (in the case of Buddha).
138. If you say that “ By mere proximity to such a Man (as Buddha) injunctions issue forth, spontaneously, even from the walls, jnst as from the Chintamani, i
180 This is a connter-argnment to the following reasoning of the Buddhists: ^: Bud- dha’s assertion with regard to his omniscience is true, because it is his assertion, like he assertion ‘ Fire is hot’ and {116 like.”
137 In ordinary experience we find that persons take to composing works,— (1) for some gain, (2) for commanding the respect of others, (3) for the sake of fame, and (4) for winning the affection of some person; and so forth. Bat yon deny the existence of any of these motives, in the case of Buddha; hence the scriptures attributed to him mnst have been composed by some other person; specially as you assert that Bnddha perceives the whole universe, in the abstract, and that he has no concrete cognition thereof. How, then, could he describe things, by means of words P For, certainly, no verbal description is possible without concrete cognitions.
128 ^ Chintamani’’ isa gem which is believed to give to its possessor all that he desires.
6
42 CLOKAVARTIKA.
139. Such assertions could only fit in the mouth of blind believers (like you); we can have no faith in such injunctions as proceed from walls.
140. For it is just possible that these may have been composed by Buddha himself, or they may have been uttered by certain invisible evil- minded Pigachas (spirits) (hidden in the wall), in order to deceive (people).
141. Similarly for those that have postulated for Jiva, as independent of the sense-organs, &c., pure cognition of objects past, subtile and the like ;—
142. Such an assumption could not be proved by anything except (their) Scriptures; nor again could the (authority of these) Scriptures them- selves be established without the above assumption (and thus there would be a mutual dependence). Nor can such a theoriser get at any similar instance among ordinary men (that could prove the particular faculty of their Jiva).
143. The idea of an eternal Scripture too, is to be refuted in the same manner. Because with regard to that also, there is no such belief as that “ This is seen by this person, or composed by him.”
144. Men are, generally, speakers of falsehood; therefore just as we do not believe in the people of to-day, so too, we could have no faith in those of the past.
145. The idea of such a notion with regard to the Scripture and its meaning, may he like dream-cognition ; and in that case, how could there be any authenticity iu the scriptures, with regard to which such a doubt is possible P
146. What you desire to establish is the uurivalled excellence of the
14! The Buddhist having been refuted, the Arhat. theory is next taken up.
142 ^ Without their Scriptures,"—For such an assumptions ia amenable neither to any ordinary meana of right notion, nor to the Veda.
143 The first half seeks to set aside the eternality of the Veda; as some people aay that the eternal Veda is heard by Prajapati. But the Karika means to say that, as the cognition of an omniscient psraon, so too, that of an uttered sonnd, is withont any cause. The second half anticipates the objection that by refating the eternality of the Veda, the author 8611168 at the very roct of his own syatem. The Nydyarat- nakara explains the second half thos: “ This theory is to he refuted, hecanse of the denial of the authenticity of the Veda, on the ground of its being composed by a human author.”
1५५ Some MSS. read, in the end, “tathd titérthakirtané.’ The latter half of the Karika, should then be translated thus: “ As we do not helieve people describing tho things of the present, so too, we wonld not belisve them, when speaking of the things of the past.
146 The attributing of the Veda to Prajapati has another fault: If hig knowledges and propounding of the Veda ho without any cause, coming to him spontaneously, then such knowledge may only be of the nature of a dream, falso and uurecliable.
146 With this Karika begins the refutation of tho theory that the Veda is Eternal, spontaneously heard and propounded in this world by Prajipati,
APHORISM IH, 43
Author, as also the eternality of the Scripture itself; and in that case yon will have to postulate the fact of His remembering the Scripture learnt in some previous birth.
147. If you postulate such ante-natal comprehensibility of the scrip- ture (to Prajipati), needless is your opposition to the comprehension of the objects thereof (as attributed by the Banddhas to their Scripture-writers— viz., supernatural knowledge of Duty and its opposite). For one who is able to comprehend sounds that have not been uttered, what can be said against his comprehending the meaning of such sounds themselves (which is much easier than the comprehending of unuttered sounds) ?
148. The author too, in the view of those people that postulate such comprehension of the meaning, would be independent. Whereas in the case of the mere verhal cognition of the Scripture, we would have both (Scripture and the author) depending upon one anothier.
149. (Whereas according to us) even in a single life the Veda is found to reside in (t.e.. known hy) many persons; and as such, either its remembrance or comprehension does not go against its indepen- dence.
150. For if any one person were to make any changes in the Veda, of his own accord, he would be opposed by many persons. And again, if the Veda were the outcome of the mind of a single person, then it would in no way differ from modern compositions.
151. For the same reason we do not acknowledge the agency of a single person even in the case of the traditional course of instructions (in the Veda). The very first persons (who commenced this traditional course) must havo been many, dependent upon one another, just as we find to be the case at the present day.
152. Thus then, while others make many (unreasonable) assumptions for establishing thcir own Scriptures, Jaimini does not have recourse to any—and is this the equality (of Jaimini) with others ?
153. Nothing more than what is directly visible is postulated by him (Jaimivi), with regard to the authenticity (of the Veda). Whereas the other theorists have to make various assumptions with regard to the imperceptible, even in proving the inauthenticity of the Veda (to say nothing of those that they have recourse to in seeking to establish the authority of their own scriptures).
154. The Atheist in denying the authority of the Veda, lands himself on the (absurdity of) setting aside the authenticity of a directly perceptible fact. Because when a conception has once arisen (and the self-evident authority of such conceptions has already been proved), any assumption towards its denial could only be needless and far-fetched.
143 ^“ Dependent upon one another.’—The Author depending upon the Veda for a comprehension of its meaning and the Veda depending upon the author, in order to gain its right form.
44 GLOKAVARTIKA,
155. The absence of human agency, with regard to the Veda, having been proved, it lies upon the Atheists to point out any difference between the Vedic conceptions and the perceptions due to faultless cognitions).
156. “There could be no instructions with regard to supersensuous objects, if the author had not perceived such objects’”’—hence is the “assumption of an objeet” (९.९. sueh is the form of the argument ‘‘Apparent Ineonsisteney’’—Arthapatti).
157. Or the passage may he (interpreted ) as an inferential reasoning : the “fact of being an instruetor’”’ is found to be invariably accompanied by that of ‘‘ betng preceded by the perception of the object” (of instruction). And the negation of this is laid down in the passage ^“ Nanu, etc.”
158. (The Apparent Inconsistency that yon have urged) may also be explained away otlerwise—as by reason of the perplexity (of the Instructor). Ov your ‘ Linga’ (the reason, the ^ middle term,”) may be said to be anomalous, inasmuch as there are such instances as the asser- tions of children, ete., (who are found to speak of things they have never seen).
159. Lf you say that ‘the Instructors (Manu, etc.), propounded their iustrnuctions after having eome to know of the objects, throngh the Veda’ —then you will only prove what has already been proved by us—this is what is meant by the passage “ Vedadapi, etc.”; and this refers only to Manu, ete., (who deelare themselves to be the followers of Veda, which too they deelare to be the only means of knowing the true nature of Dnty ; and not of Buddha, etc.).
160. = “^ Beeause a man, though knowing one thing one way, wishes to speak of 1t in another way,—therefore from the assertion of a person, there ean be no absolute certainty as to what 18 in his mind (.९., what he really knows).”
161. ^ We see that one who is coufused speaks something other than
155 Now begins the explanation of the Bhashya psssage—" Nanwavidusham wpadéco’ na@vakalpyaté, `" &c., &e , (page 4). “ Assumption of an object,” i.e., that of the fact of Manu and Bnddha knowing, by themselves, the nature of Duty.
1657 “Qne who 18 an Instractor is one who has seen the object "—this is ths affirmative premiss; the negative form of this is: ^ He who ig not a seer (or knower) of the object is not an Instructor ; ` and this latter is what 18 meant by the Bhashya passage qnoted above.
168 Kef. Bhishya ^ Upadéga hi vydmohddapi bhavanti” (pp. 4-5), which is said in reply to the objection moved in ths passage qnoted above. “ The middle Terme? st... the fact of being preceded by a parception of the objecot.
169 * Only prove, Jc.’—That is, this assertion of yours does not contradict our assertion that ^ Veda 71018 18 the means of knowing Duty.”
169 Ref. to Bhashya: “ Api cha paurushéyadvachanadévamayam purusho védéte bhavati pratyayah Sc.” (page 5), Tha Karika lays down the objections against this passage. It means that from the mere assertion of a man, we cannot oome to ths eonclusion that ‘hs knows thns’; becansa he might 78 knowing it ono way, and expressing it in quite another way,
APHORISM 11, 45
what he wishes to speak; therefore the assertion does uot always follow the wish (of the speaker).”
162. Itis only in the ease of the assertions of a trustworthy per- son, that his own mind, (7.e., what he really knows of the object) is known (by means of his assertions); while in the ease of an untrustworthy person, there is no certainty (as to what may be in his mind). Therefore it is only by means of a general rule and its exception, that the twofold powers of words, is here (in the Bhashya) explained.
163. The bringing about of the eomprehension of the meaning cf a sentenee depends npon the arrangement of Words and their Meanings ; and the form of this arrangement too depends upon the wish to speak, which, in its turn, depends upon previous conceptions.
164. With regard to objeets, different men are found to eonstruct sentences differently, when aetuated by different motives,—by means of additions (alterations) and subtractions (whichever seems to serve their respective ends).
165. Therefore when, by means of the assertion, the hearer has arrived at the comprehension of the object (spoken of), then verily there arises the notion with regard to the knowledge of the speaker—that “this (objeet) is known by him.”
166. When a person questions (the veraeity of) one who is following the assertion of a trustworthy person, then the latter points to the trustworthy person, saying ^ He knows it thus.”
167. On aeeount of being interrupted by the cognition (of the trustworthy persen), the Words in this ease become inoperative for the time being; but the manifestation of the authenticity thereof would be based upon the mere faet of their originating direetly from the eognition of the speaker.
168. Though the Meaning may have been eomprehended beforehand, yet it depends for its definiteness upon the faet of its originating directly from the speaker’s eognition; henee such a faet ean only be eomprehen-
162 This Karika offers the reply to the objections urged in the last two Karikas, ८८ General rule JSc.”—That based on the general rule being the power that is got at through the recognition of the source of the assertion,—the exception or negation being in the case of the assertion of nntrnetworthy persons.
1०8 This Kariki anticipates the following question : ^ Does, then, all comprehen- sion arise from inexpressive sentences’? ? The sense of the Kurika is that the com- prehension of the meaning of sentences 18 not verbal, but inferential ; and the proccss of this inference is shown.
16s How do you know that the arrangement depends upon the wish to speak? The Karika gives the reply~‘ by ५०४१०४० (Invariable concomitance) and vyatiéka (constant negation).” ^ Addition, §c.” of words, in a sentence.
161 “ Interrupted "—t,.e., 80 long as one has not recognised the cognition of the speaker, thongh there is a resognition of the meaning of words, yet itis as good ag non-existent; as its authenticity is recognised only when it is found that it rests upon a certain definite cognition of the speaker.
40 CLOKAVARTIKA.
sible through the comprehension of the Meaning. But in the matter of authenticity, it takes the first place.
169. Thus then, in the present case (of the Scriptures of Buddha, &c.), the falsity of these is proved by the fact of their being due to human agency. This character (of falsity) could not belong to the Veda, because in its case there is no author (human agency).
170. And thus there being no interruption by any notion of the author, the meaning of the Veda is comprehended directly through the meaning (of words); and it does not stand in need of the precedence of any cognition (of a person); nor, as such, can it ever 06 false.
171-72. ‘he assertions of Buddha, &c., that were brought forward (by the Atheists proper) as instances to prove the inauthenticity (of the Veda) are here shown to be non-concomitant. Because it has been shown above that the effects of these (Vedic assertions) are correct; while, as regards the meaning, they have got nothing to do with it.
173. With regard to objects outside the precincts of its applicability, there is a chance of the falsity of the Veda also. Therefore with regard to the arguments urged in the Purvapaksha, you would only be proving what we already accept.
174-75. Not kuowiug this meaning, aud only bearing in mind the
111.78 The Kaciké thus explains: “The anthor now explains the Bhashya in another way: For the proof of the anthenticity of the Veda, whatever ordinary assertions were bronght forward as instances are here shown to be non-concomitant with the Major Term, The second Karika shows this non-concomitance. The meaning is this: The Bhashya here takes the place of another party, and through him, replies toa third party. The Atheists bring forward the following argument: ‘ The Veda is false, because the objects treated of therein are not amenable to Sense-peroeption, like snch assertions of Buddha, &c.’; and the present passage replies to this argument, with a view to the Buddhist doctrine: your instance is non-concomitant with the Major Premiss; because according to Buddha, words are not accepted as the means of knowing objects ; for according to him, what the words do is simply to remind one of the object, neither adding to, nor substracting from, it any factor...... The words only express the meaning of the speaker; therefore that which has been said to be the subject of the assertions of Buddha,—with regard to this subject, such assertions are quite true,— such effect heing only what is in the mind of the speaker. And as these assertions correctly delineate what was in the mind of Buddha, they cannot but be acoepted as true. As for the objects, forming the denotation of words, the Buddhists do not accept any applicability of the words to them. Therefore there is no proof against the authenticity of the Veda; and it is this that has beeu shown above in Karika 163.”
118 ‘If any ordinary assertion bas been urged in regard to an object other than what is within its zone of applicability (१.९. objects other than the cognition of the speaker), then you wonld be proving what is already proved: of the Vedas too, we accept the fulsity, with regard to thoso objects that it does not treat of ; for we accept the falsity of everything that is urged in the Purvapaksha.””"— Kagild.
174.76 The meaning of the Bhashya is that ‘the mere fact of being an assertion is not 2 ground of falsity,’—not knowing this fact, und only bearing in mind the
APHORIsM It. 4.7
declaration of artificialily and non-artificiahty being the ground of correctness and incorrectness, the objector has said ^" Nunuw Samanyalo- drishtam, Sc.”
175. “Na, anyatvit ” can be no refutation ; because an instance is an instance ouly for reason of its being anotber thing, and it is not based upon its identity with the Minor Term.
176-78, Therefore the meaning of the author of the Bhashya is now explained: Accepting (for the sake of argnment) the function of tle Sentence with regard to the Object, this is what the Bhashya means : If even in face of the interruption (by the cognition of the speaker), the ordinary false human assertion were to be the instance, with regard to the external object; even then the Reason would he “too wide,” (2.e., applying to the conclusion to be proved, as well as to its contradictory proposition) : as even in the trne assertions of men, we find the character of a sentence; since even with regard to supersensnons objects we come across true assertions that may bave been uttered at random,
179. And the clause ^ Na anyatvat” denotes “ something other than the declaration of the Pirvapakshi”: (the meaning being that) this (your argument) is different from, and only a false semblance of, what the Parvapakshi takes it to be. Or by ‘anya’ may be meant the ८८ Vipaksha ” (that wherein the Major Term never resides, ४.९.) the contra- dictory of the Major Term).
declaration,—that ‘ that which is artificial—z.e,, composed by a human author—is false on account of the presence of discrepanciss in the author, and that which is inartificial i.e., not due to hnman agency—is trues,’ the objector has put forward his objection. The Kacikd explains “ Kritakdkritaka” as belonging to a trustworthy person or to an untrustworthy one. Bnt the translation follows thse interpretation of the Nydayaratnakara,
116 The difference of the Minor Term from the Instance is only proper. In ths proof of the falsity of the Veda, an ordinary assertion has been cited as as instances ; and the difference of this is no fanlt; as it is only proper that the instance should be something other than whatis to he proved; and the ‘Sapaksha” 18 that which has already been proved to be concomitant with the Minor Term.
176-18 Though there 18 an interruption of the speaker’s cognition, and the instances are based npon the natnre of external objects, yet the reason—“ the fact of being an assertion ’’—wonld be too wide, The cass would bs the same, even if the reason wers stated in the form—‘ the Veda is false, becanse being a sentences, it treats of super- 8687018 objects”’ (thus guarding against the chance of thse trnstfoiness of human assertions, which can never be absolately trne, with regard to supersensuous objects). For instanoe, when ons man says “There 18 no Indra,’’ another may say “ Indra does exist” ; and ons of these must be falss, and the other true.
179 ^“ Semblance, §c.”—the reasoning is fallacious, because of the middle term being too wide $ and 18268 yonr argument has got a mere semblance of reasoning; in reality, it is totally fallacious. ‘ Vipaksha’’—the meaning of the clause is that your argument is not valid, because your middle term—the fact of heing a human assertion —resides also in “ trath” which 18 the contradictory of your Minor Premiss,
48 CLOKAVARITIKA.
180. Or (it may mean) that ‘on account of contradiction, falsity belongs to that (¢.e., human assertion) and not to this, (i.e, Vedic asser- tion).’’ Or that, on account of the object (of human assertions) being something else (i.e., not the object itself, but the speaker’s notion with regard to it), there is non-concomitance (of your Instance) with the Major Term.
181-182. The passage ‘‘ Nahi anyasya, &c.’’ means that the falsity of one thing does not constitute the falsity of another: becanse the desire to speak is related to a false Object, that is no reason why the same falsity should attach to the Sentence also (for certainly, the fact of Devadatta being dark cannot prove Yajnadatta also to be dark, as in such an argu- ment) the fact of being a man putin as the Middle Term is an instance of the “ Width’ (of the Reason).
182. Or, on account of the argament of the Purvapakshi being utterly fallacious, na auyatvat may be taken as signifying its futility (or duplicity).
183. Or again, the fact of being something else may be taken as laying down an argument in favour of authenticity. And (if this argument be equal in strength to that urged by the Pirvapakshi, then his argument comes to be) concomitant with its contradictory, z.e., the conclusion arrived at by ns; or (if our argument happens to be stronger than his, then his argument) is set a side by means of Inference, (४,९.) the Inferential argu- ment urged below).
184. (1) The conception produced by the Veda, is authentic, because itis brought about by faultless means,—like the conceptions produced,
180 “ Non-concomitance ’’—The object of all human assertion ig the speaker’s cognition with regard to certain objects; and as, in this connection, a hnmau asser- tion is always true, therefore it cannot be cited as an instance of falsity.
181 The Inferential argument having “ sentenee” for its middle term, has, for its object, either a desire to speak, or the speaker’s cognition with regard to the object in question. On the other hand, the argument based upon the “desire to Speak’”’ ag the Midde Term, has for its Object, the object itself ; consequently the falsity of any one of these cannot lead to the falsity of another, as their objects are totally different.
18% “ Nevadatta is black, therefore Yajnadatta mmat also he black, because hoth are men.” Here, the Middle Term is too wide, as all men are not black. = «^ Futility ’’— literally ^ Vikalpasama’’ means the proving of the duplicate character of the argument (whioh really proves nothing definitely). It consists in the fact of showing the duplicate nature of the characterestics of the Major Term (which ig to be proved), through the finding of a new characterestio of the Middle Term. This .is thus explained in the Karika : “ Assertions are also found to he other than hnman,—f i., the assertions in the Veda; and some again are human; thus then, there being this duplicity in the character of the Middle Term (the fact of being an assertion), there naturally arises a doubt as to tho falsity or iruth or the proposition y prove.”
189 The author now formulates his own arguments,
ou seck to
APHORISM IT. 49
either by a correct Premiss, or by the assertion of a trustworthy person, or by direct Sense-perception.
185. (2) And again, (the oonception produced by the Veda is authentic) ; firstly, because it is produced by an assertion which does not proceed from an unreliable source ; and secondly, because it is free from all contradiction either in time or place,—like the conception produced by the assertion of a trustworthy person.
186. The applicability of these reasons (/azulilessness and the fact of not being composed by an untrustworthy author as applying to the Veda) will be proved by the well-established fact of the Veda not proceeding from an author. It was with all these ideas in view, that the author of the Bhashya said ^“ Na, anyatvat.”
187. The clause “ pratyakshastu, d&c.,” (in the Bhashya) may be taken to indicate either strength (firmness), or precedence, or self-evidence, or tnauthenticity through a foreign source.
188. 1f, however, falsity be said to consist only in non-conception, in the absence of the other two forms (of falsity—viz., doubt and mistaken concep- tion), then (verbal conception) would be a “ perception” for others (the Bauddhas) ; though to us (Mimansakas) it is got at through Inference alone.
189. Just as your argument would prove inauthenticity, so, in the same manner would it serve to prove that inauthenticity to he due to some
extraneous invalidating cause. 190. The mention in the concluding passage (of the Bhashya) of
187 Though the cenception got at through the Veda is not direct Senss-percep- tion, yet it is similar to 8001 perceptlon, in that it is firm, precedes inferential knowledgs, is self-svident, and owes its occasional falsity to some forsiga cause; and as such, it could, hy implication, be called ‘‘ Perception.”
188 The Buddhists hold cognition and non-cegnition to be perceptible; and Doubt aud Misconception have already beeu proved to be inapplicable to ४08 Veda. Therefore the only ground that could be urged against the authenticity of the Veda would be “non-conception” (want of conceptions through Vedio sentences). And as this ig amenable to Senss-psrception, according tothe Buddhists, it is not iniproper, in their minds, to declare Vedic conceptions to be “Perceptions”; though for the Miminsaka, it is a case of Inferential knowledgs; and it is, in accordancé with this, that the Bhashya has besn interpretted as above.
189 The Kacika thus explains: “ You seek to prove the inauthenticity of the Veda, ou tho groond of its similarity with ordinary human assertions. As such, what would be right fer you to say is that ‘the inanthentioity of the Veda must be of the game nature as that of ordioary human assertions.’ And in that case, we know that ordinary homan assertions are proved to be false only by certain invalidating causes ; and consequently the falsity of the Veda too must be based upon similar causes, But, in the case of the Veda, we do not find any 80००7 iavalidating cause; therefore it cannot but be anthentio.”
199 The sentence which closes the consideration of the kuowledgs of Duty being dne to the Veda alone: “ Codanilakshano’rthah Qréyaskarah,”’—whers the
7
50 CLOKAVARTIKA.
“ Créyaskara ” (producing bliss) with regard to Duty, is with a view to laying down the full siguificance of the word ‘ Duty.’
191. “Bliss” (Créyah) is man’s happiness; and as this is to be accomplished by means of the Materials, Auxilliaries and Actions, as laid down in the Veda,—therefore it is to these (Materials, &c.), alone that the character of ‘‘ Duty” can be rightly said to belong.
192. One who performs sacrifices comes to be called “^ Dharmika ” (“८ Dutiful” or Pious), by people who know nought of anything else (such as Apurva and the like) as resulting from such sacrifices,—which (name, ‘‘Dharmika”) we understand as being due solely to his counection with the sacrifices.
193-94, Asa matter of fact, the (acquiring of) cattle, &c., is found to result from the performance of “ Duty’ (Sacrifice) ; and these results are also said to proceed from the “^ Citra”’ sacrifice, as well as from the ‘‘milking vessel, &c.” (Auxilliary); therefore it is to these (latter) also that tle character of ‘Duty’ is said to belong.
194, Because of the mention of the word “ Dharmiani” (we infer that) the word ^“ Dharma,” as freed from the (marks of) Gender aud Number, serves as an instance (in the Argument).
195-96. We do not find the word ‘Duty’ used in either of the following senses:—(1) that of a particular function of the internal organ (the Sankhya Doctrine), (2) that of a peculiar mental impression (unconsciously left thereon by good or bad actions—the Bauddha doctrine), (3) that of the “ Body of Virtue.” ५. Punya-pudgala ”’_the Jaina doctrine), (4) that of “a specific property of the person” (the Vaigéshika doctrine ), or (5) that of “ Apirva” (@ peculiar unseen force, in the shape of ‘fate,’ &c., postulated by a scion of the Mimansakas).
question arises—why should the Bhishya substitute the word “ Créyaskarah” for ‘‘ Dharmah ” P
Ie ^ Gréyaskarah ”—that which hrings abont ‘Qréyah,’ happiness. And happi- ness is seen to be got at by means of the materials laid down in the Veda; therefore these alone constitute Duty. By ^“ materials” here 18 meant sacrifice in general.
19 ^ Any other thing to be accomplished *—in the shape of Apirva and the like (postulated by others), of which ordinary people know nothing,
193.94 We know the acquiring of cattle, &c., as following from the performance of Duty; andthe Veda aaserts these to follow from sacrifices ; eg. the “Citra” 88011006 has been laid down for one who desires cattle; and the fetohing of Soma in the milking vessel is also enjoined for the same purpose. that Duty consists of Saorifices as well as their Auxiliaries.
194 The Vedio passage—" Yajnéna yajnamayajanta dévastani dharmant fc, — shows the identity of “Sacrifice” with “Daty.” The difference of Gander aud
Number (^ Yajnam’ being in the Masenline Singular, and ‘ Dharmanj’ ; ४ ia only a Vedio anomaly. : rméni’ in Neuter Plural)
196.96 « Punya-pudgala”'—is the atomio body whioh forms the future body of the virtuous person. The compound “ apirvajanmani” is expounded as “na pirvam janma yasya’—- that which is not brought about before (an action),
So it comes to be implied
APHORISM It. 51
196. Nor can these (aforesaid function of the internal organ, &c.), be ever recognised by means of the Veda, d&c., as being the means of (the accomplishment of) the ends of man.
197. Nor can we recognise the ^ Apirva,’—as anything different from ‘Heaven’ and ‘ Sacrifice,—either in the shape of the means (like Sacrifice) or of the end (like Heaven), or in any form other than these.
198. Ou the other hand, we would be landed upon the absurdity of rejecting a thing mentioned in the Veda, and assuming something never heard of (therein),—if we were to assume the “Apuarva” to be identical with these (Sacrifice and Heaven). Aud lastly, if it were unlike both of these, it could have no form at all.
199. Therefore the “ Aptirva” must be accepted ag being only a peculiar form of energy (or capacity )—lying latent either in (the means) Sacrifice, &९., while they are functioning towords their ends,—or in (the ends themselves) the Cattle, &c., while these are undergoing the process of origination (or birth).
200. Inasmuch as the capabilities of objects are not denotable by names in the abstract, the ^" Aptrva”’ (which has been shown to be the capability of certain objects) cannot be said to be signified by the word ५ Dharma.”
201. “The word ‘Codana’ has been known, in the first instance,
198 “ Veda, §c.’—including also the scriptures of tho Buddhists, wherein what has been enjoined as Duty is only the bowing to the Caitya, which is an action, and not a mental impression.
183 By assuming the Apirva to be either the end or the means, we would be rejecting the declaration of the Veda, wherein Heaven and Sacrifice have been dis- tinotly laid down as the end and means respectively.
199 The Apirva is only a peculiar form of the energy of the means or of the end, existing in the form of aspront, to burst ont in time into the fnll grown tree of the Result in its entirety. And so, by postulating auch an Apirva, we sail clear of the necessity of assuming anything other than the Sacrifice or Heaven, and also of the chance of being open to the objection nrged against us—that the Sacrifice having been destroyed (on completion) at the present time, how could it bring abont the result at a distant future time, unless we assnmed an ‘‘ 4 [प ए2 ` apart from the Sacrifice itself. The theory here propounded is that the Apirva is a spront-like capability produced in one of the two,—7.¢., either in the means or in the end—which may be assumed to be undergoing a process of incubation during the time that the Resnlt has not appeared. This will be explained in detail in the ^ Apurvadhikarana ”’ of the Second Adhyaya.
200 The ‘Faculties’ are spoken of as “ Faculties,” “ Power,’ “ Energy,” &c., and not by the name of any particular object. And ^ 4 पार having been proved to be a “faculty” of the sacrifice, it cannot be spoken of as ‘‘ Dharma,” which is a name of the Sacrifice itself.
201 The next nine Karikis raise various objections against the following passage in the Bhashya: “ wbhayamiha codanaya lakshyate, &c., &e.” “ How can, Jc.,’—ns the counter-instance should he wanting in only one of the necessary differentias; in the
oz CLOKAVARTIKA.
to apply to postive injunetions alone; and as a ‘ Slaughter ’ is not of that kind, how can it serve as a counter-instance ” P
202. ‘‘Syéna’ and the like are here (in the Bhashya) spoken of as authorised by the Veda; and then, in the absence of any prohibition thereof, how can these be said to be sinful ”’ ?
203. “Though there may be a prohibition with regard to a subject referred to by a positive injunction, yet we do not apprehend any sinfnulness in connection with such eubjects,—as in the case of the shodastgrahana.”
204. “ Having said that ‘the Syéna is authorised by the Veda,’ it would be a self-contradiction to assert that ‘it 18 prohibited.’ And again, -while considering the injunction of the Syéna, &., it is not right to introduce the consideration of ‘Slaughter ’ in general.”
205. “Because Slaughter is only a resultant of these (sacrifices), differing from them in its most essential feature; inasmuch as it 60081618 entirely of the destroying of life, while the ‘Cyéna’ sacrifice is something entirely different, like the sword (which also helps in the killing).”
206. ‘The assumption of advice too is not proper with regard to a subject which is not fit for an injunction. And again if ‘ Cyéna,’ &c., be not said to form the objects of injunctions, what else could ’’ P
207. “It 18 a universal rule that ‘injunctions refer to two factors of a Bhavana (४.९. the means and the process),'—and this rule would be contradicted (if the character of Injunction be denied to the ‘ Syéna’).”
207-208. “The Jyotishtoma and others too that are held to be ‘Dharma,’ would cease to be so; because these are also accompanied by ‘Slaughter’ (of the sacrificial animals). Nor can an object, which is not enjoined, form part either of the result or the means of an action.”
present instance of the “ Qyéna,” however, it is neither “ Codanglakshana,” nor sn ०५ Artha,”’
408 Just as we have sn affirmative injunotion “ Shodaginam grihnati, ”“—and then again ite negation—" na shodaginam grihnati,’—where the latter negation only serves to preclude the holding of the Shodaci vessels; and in no case can it imply that suoh holding would constitute a sin. Similarly, in the case in question, slaughter (in the “^ Qyéna”’) is enjoined, while slaughter (in general) is prohibited ; where this latter would only preclude the slaughter from tho 8801866, and oannot imply its senfulness.
206 As the sword by which the animal is killed is not ^ slaughter,’’ 80 also the ‘““@yéna”’ (which brings about the death of the enemy) cannot, in itself, be called " glanghter.”
206 This refers to the passage—" tasyéyamab hyupdyah iti téshamupadécah.”’ ‘“‘Qould not be said’’—even in the face of such direct injunotions as “ Cyénéna yajata.”
a01 ^ Would be contradicted”—i.e., if the “Qyéna” (which is the means of killing an enemy) were denied to be the object of injunotion, then the universal rule wonld be contradicted, and would give rise to the absurdity noted in the following Kirik&,—~ “ Jyotishtoma,” &o., 8160 being only the means to the attainment of Heaven, &o.
। $07.808 Nor can, &c."—If “Qydna,” &o., were not the objects enjoined, then they could, in no case, form the necessary constituents of either their reanits or means,
APHORISM II. 53
209. ‘That which has been laid down as the means cannot be denied to be the object of the Injunction ; because either in the Veda, or in ordinary experience, it is not desirable for any action to be enjoined merely as a result.”
210. On account of these arguments, we must conclude that what is meant by the Bhashya is only an explanation of the signification of the word ^ Artha,” (as detailed below),
210-11. Huther in the case of activity towards, or cessation from, (a certain course of action), the conception, resulting from the hearing of the word, ४5 ° Codanad’’—this general definition (of “Codanai”’) was in the mind of the author of the Bhashya. The mention of the character of enjoining positive activity (in the Bhashya) may be explained as only citing an example (of Codané).
212. For if (‘‘Codana” were) restricted to the injunction of positive activity alone, then the subsequent explanations of the word ‘Artha’ could not be explained (as proved by the above objections). Or again, the mention of the Injunction of positive activity may be due to the occurrence (in the Stitra) of the word “ Artha,’”’ (which seems to restrict the definition to positive Injunctions).
213. Orthe definition (‘‘ pravartakam vikyam Codan&”) may be explained as refering only to such “‘Codanai” as forms the authority for Duty.
213-214. Such being the case, the comprehension of ‘the objects of positive injunctions as leading to merit, would be derived from Positive Injunctions; and the ascertainment of the fact of the prohibited vbjects being sinful, would be got at through the Prohibitory Injunctions. Thus then by the meution of “ Artha” (in the Saitra) what is meant is that the
210 By thia and the few following Kirikas, the Vartika meets the above objections. =" 11245, "-- ५.८.) as the meaning of the Bhashya is as explained below; and it cannot be taken literally.
219 * Occurrence of the word ‘artha,’”—i.e., 6८81186 in the aphorism, the word ‘Codana” ०८68 together with the word “ Artha’’! and that which is an Artha (positive virtue) is always an object of positive injnnction.
418 Positive Injunction is the sole authority of “‘ Dnty”; and as it is ‘‘ Dnty” alone that 1188 been defined in the aphorism, the Bhashya takes np the consideration of only the positive form of Codend@ (and leaves off the negative form, as not appertaining to the definition of ‘‘ Duty”); hence the Bhishya—*‘ Pravartakam vakyam Codané.”
213.214 Granted that Codand refers both to Positive Injnnctions and Prohibitions. Even then, the fact of the ‘‘ Agnishtoma,’’ &०, (which are objeota of positive injunc- tions) leading to Merit, would be got at, through positive injunctions alone; just as the fact of “ Brahmana-slanghter” (which is an object of Prohibition) being the canse of demerit (and thereby being sinful) will be got at through the Prohibitory Injunctions. Thus then the Positive Injunctions treat of the cause of Merit (Artha), and the Prohibitory ०1168 of the cause of demerit or sin (Anartha).
64 QLOKAVARTIKA.
character of “Dharma” (Duty) belongs only to the object possitively enjoined.
215, And the sinful character of the prohibited action is got at indirectly by implication, and is not mentioncd directly in the Sutra.
215-216, Therefore (in the passage “Ubhayam tha Codanaya lakshyate”) the word ‘‘Ubhayam” (both) would refer to two groups of actions, represented each by the performance of sacrifices, and the killing of a Brahmana, which form the objects of Injunction and Prohibition, respectively.
216-218. Though the “Cyéna” is also an object ‘of positive Injune- tions, and its result too (the death of the enemy) is a desirable one,— yet a sinful character is attributed to it indirectly, through (the character of) its results. This will be made clear by the clauses, “ Pratishiddha hi sa,” ^ Hinsahi s&” and ^ Nabhicarét.” If however thie sinful character of the ‘Cyéna, belonged to its own form, then the subsequent passages (Hins& hi sa, &c.), would become incompatible.
219. Because the (हप having been once positively enjoined, a prohibition can hardly be applicable to it directly.
219-220. If however the word “Codani”’ were restricted to posi- tive Injunctions alone, then the passage “ Ubhayam, &ec.,”’ would have to be taken to) refer to the Means and the Result.
220-221. The (causal) relation between the Means and the Result, having been established by the Positive Injuntion, both of these would form the objects of Indication ४.६.) by the mention of the relation between the two, the two themselves would become indicated ).
221-222. There are two sorts of results following from the per- formance of sacrifices (and these are mentioned in the Bhashya by the
416.17 Though “Cydna” and the rest are not, in themselves, sinful, for reasons shown above, yet a sinful character is attributed to thom, second-hand, on account of the sinfal character of their resnlts. (‘‘Upacara’’ is secondary, indirect or figura- tive application). As the character of the canse transfers itself to the effect, and vice versd, therefore the sinfal character of the Result (killing) transfers itself to the cause (the ^“ Cyéna” sacrifice). Because the mention of the fact of its heing “ prohi- bited’ cannot directly refer to the “ Qyéna,” which 18 not prohibited, we must accopt the Result alone as the direct ohject of prohibition. All the olanses quoted point to the fact that the Bhashya only means to apply sinfulness to the Results. For that which is declared to be sinful is the ^ slaughter,’ and certainly the “ Qyéna’’ isnot ‘slaughter,’ hnt only a cause that brings about “slanghter” ag its Result. Therefore, the assertion that “ slaughter is sinful’ oan be made to attribnte sinfulness to the ^“ Gyéna,”’ only indirectly—throngh the relation of Cause and Effeot.
al9 It 18 only the Result that is the direct objeot of prolibition, which can apply to “Cyéna” only indirectly ; and then too, only on account of the siufulness of its Results.
919.20 Tho meaning of the Bhashya being ‘ Both--the meang and the end— constitute the Codana.”
APHORISM II. DD
words “ Artha” and ^ Anartha’’). “Heaven” and the like (1.6.) Artha) are got at, without trespassing on any prohibition; while “ slaughter ”’ and the like (1.6.) Anartha) are accomplished only by trespassing upon prohibitions contained elsewhere in the scriptures.
222-223. The cognition of the Bhavana does not serve to lay down the Result,—as we shall explain later on, and as Jaimini has also declared that ‘the object of desire is got at per Indication, and not directly from the Injunction.”
223-225. Thus then, though the prohibition of “killing” (which forms part of the result),—understood to have a general application, and not set aside by the Positive Injuuction,—would signify the fact of (the ‘“Cyéna”’) leading to sin, yet the form proper of the “Cyéna” itself could not be sinful, the sinfulness attaching only to its result (killing).
225-226. The objector however, thinking the Result also to form the object of Injunction,—on account of its (the Result) being included in the Bhavana,—has taken exception to the fact of the sinful (‘‘ Cyéna” being enjoined as a Duty.
226-227. The clause “‘ Naiva” however serves to set aside the idea of the Result forming an object of Injunction. ‘ What then would be
22.208 “ The vesult does not, fc."—This antioipates the following objection: “ Slaughter is enjoined in the Injunction ‘Qyénéndbhicaran Yajéta’ and as such how can it be said to be prohibited’? The sense of the reply is that, as ahove explained, the operation of the Injunction does not extend to the Result ; and, in the present case, ‘slaughter’ is only the Result of the ‘ Cyéna” sacrifice.
“ We shall explain,” Sc.,in the Karika—‘Uddégdceca phalatwéna, &c.,. &o."" The same fact is also implied in tho Bhiashya “sénatyévamasau mayé kartavyam”—(He knows what is to be accomplished by him—i.¢., the Result)— ‘‘ updyantu na veda” (He knows not the meaus whereby it is to be accomplished)—, and it is this means that 18 enjoined in the Injunction ‘ Qyénéndbhicharan Yajéta.”
423-25 Though the positive Injunction— Qyénéndbhicaran Yajéta’’ enjoins the ५८ ($ 138. ” saorifice, yet it does not set aside the prohihition of “ slanghter ”—proceeding from the saorifice, The construction of the Bhashya would he explained in the following manner: “ Both the Result and the Means are indicated by the Codana ; the Result again is of two kinds—meritorious and sinful. In the question—what is ‘ Artha’ ?—the word ‘ Artha’ refers to the means leading to a meritortous Result—the ‘Jyotistoma,’ &c., being such means. In the question—what is ‘ Anartha’ P—we must apply the word ‘Anartha’ to the form of the sinful Result, making ‘ Qyénddih’ =the Result of the “ Cyéna”’ sacrifice, &c.,~-viz : ‘slanghter” Thus then the means leading to a meritorious Result is Dharma, and the sinful ends—‘ slaughter’ and the like— come to he Adharma; while the means leading to such sinful ends are neither Dharma nor Adharma.
225.26 The objector is made to say (in the Bhashya)—“ Kathampunaranarthah kartavyatayopodigyaté,”—this objection being based upon the misconception that the Result forms a constituent part of the Injunction. The fact however is that the Result is not what is enjoined; aud as such, the Injunction of the “G@yéna” sacrifice cannot be taken as enjoining ‘Slaughter,’ which is distinctly sinful,
36 CLOKAVARTIKA,.
the object of the Injunction in question” ¢ The Bhashya replies: “ Cyéna and the other sacrifices.”
227-228. In the question as well as in the reply, the afix “tavya ”’ (in “ Kartavyataya”) is used in the sense of “ Injunction,” and not in the sense of the «^ Result;” because this latter sense would not serve
any purpose in either case (question or answer). 228.229. Because the character of the Result is also held to belong
to what is sinful, and (as such) not enjoined; and that which is enjoined is always accepted as being meritorious, even when it does not bear the character of the Result.
229-230. By interpretting the Catri-affix (in ‘“‘Abhicaran’’) as signifying ‘a distinctive mark or attribute,’ and by speaking of the prescriptions of the “Cyana,” &९, the author of the Bhashya clearly explains what he means; otherwise (if the explanation of the Bhashya were rejected) there could be no ground for the injunction of such
sacrifices.
230-331. The word ‘adi’ in (Cyénddayah) would denote the fact of the process (of the “Qyéua’’) also forming an object of the Injunction ; therefore it must be only that form of sanctioned’ “ killing,’ which forms part of the Result, that is prohibited.
231-232. Those people that apply prohibition also to the “killing” occurring in the other two factors (of the Bhavana: viz., the means and
$28.29 The drinking of wine 18 alsoa sinful result, but 8.8 this ig not enjoined, it cannot be the ground of the above objection. And again, since the “ Milking Veesel ”’ which haa 1066 enjoined, and as auch, constitutes Merit, it is only the sétting aside of the fact of its being enjoined, that one—who would seek to prove its sinful character—should attempt; and not the setting aside of the Result.
429.80 “ How is it concluded that by naiva the Bhashya méane to negative the injunction of anything that is sinful’? ? The Bhashya explains the Present Participle Affix in ‘ Abhicaran’ as signifying “distinctive featnre,”"—the meaning of the word being, “one who is oharacterised by a desire to kill”; and donbtless, thie dietinctive characteristio does not stand in need of a Vedid Injnnotion; therefore “ Slaughtér ” oannot be an object of Injunction. And again, the Bhashysa says-— téshamupadécah, &०. (the prescription of these—“ Gyéna,” &c.); whereby it is shown that what ia meant to be proved by the foregoing sentences is the setting aside of the idea of the Result forming the object of Injunction;—and not the negation of the fact of “ Oyéna,” &c.,, being enjoined, becanee the Veda cannot reasonably prescribe anything that has not 66४ enjoined.
280.81 ^ Vedic killing,” te. that form of killing whioh happens to be mentioned in the Veda.
481.88 Some people (the Sankhyas, f. i.) apply the prohibition of ‘ Slaughter’ also to 80011 killing 86 ocours in the Means and the Process of positively meritorious aacrifices, like the ^ Jyotishtoma, ” &¢., whioh they thereby seek to prove to be sinfnl. This 18 to be set aside by the two aphoriams quoted. The meaning of the first aphorism is thie: “ It is laid down as & general rule that all libations are to he ponred into the Ahavaniya Fire; and in regard to the “ Soma” sacrifice it ig laid down as a
APHORISM II. 57
the process),—are met by the Sutras ‘“ Avigéshéna Yacchastram” and “ Vacanadva Cirovat Cyat” (vi-vi-2).
232-233. Then again an action which is not directly obstructed by a prohibition, cannot be sinful. And, (such sinful character not being amenable to Sense-Perception and the other means of right notion) any assumptions to that effect, would be groundless. For we do not perceive any fault (evil) in the (sacrificial) slaughter, during the time that it is being done.
234. Even with regard to the Slaughter that does not form part of the sacrifice, the disgust that we feel is only based upon the prohibitive scriptural texts (which we do not find in the case of the Sacrificzal killing).
234-235. The fact that we perceive the pain of the slaughtered animal could not lead to the inference of such pain reverting to the agent (the killer, in his future birth). Because such Inference is contradicted by facts occurring during the process of killing.
235-236. The form of such Inference would be ‘‘ Slaughter produces for the slaughterer, after his death, results similar to those that happen te the animal killed ;—because it (slaughter) 1s an action,—like Oharity in accordance with the Scriptures.”
236-2387. He who would say this, would be contradicted by such contrary instances, as, intercourse with the preceptor’s wife or the drinkeng of wine (which are admittedly sinful).
special rale that the libations are to be poured into the Fire prepared in a place where the seventh step of the cow (which is paid as the price of the Soma used) happens to fall; and in this partionlar case, the former general rule is set aside by the latter pecial rule.’ The second aphorism is thug explained: ‘As a general rule, the touching of the dead homan body is prohibited ; bat in regard to a particular sacrifice—, it is enjoined that a human skull 18 tohe kept in a particular place. Here too, the latter Injauction sets aside the former general Prohibition.’’ As in these two cases, o also, in the case of killing, though there is a general prohibition of killing, yet 10 regard to the “Jyotishtoma” sacrifice, the killing of the sacrificial animal is specially Inid down; and hence this latter Injunction sets aside the former general Prohibition. All these arguments are refuted in the ^ Tattwakaumudi” ou Sdénkhya-kdrika 2.
232.88 This 18 in anticipation of the objection that, thongh not directly prohibited, yet the killing of scrificial animals would he sinful.
#3».35 You infer that one who kills will have to suffer retributive pain in the fature; but then and there, during the “slaughter” itself, there is a contradiction of this ; inasmuch as we fiud the killer deriving pleasure from the act.
235.36 This formulates the inference referred to. Charity brings pleasure to the person receiving it; and the giver too is rewarded with similar pleasures in his next life.
236.87 Intercourse with the Preceptor’s wife gives pleasure to the object of the Intercourse (the wife); and as such, in acoordance with your reasoning, the perpetrator of this crime should be rewarded with happiuess in his future lives.
8
58 CLOKAVARTIKA.
237-238. And the premises too would be contrary to the conclusion ; because the result accruing to the slaughterer would, according to the reasoning, be similar to that which accrues, to the charitable person, viz : the attainment of the result implied by the injunction, and also the absence of pain.
238-39. The happiness (occurring) to the giver (in future birtb,) is not declared to be the same as that of the person who receives his gifts ; thus too your instance fails in establishing what you seek to prove.
239-40. In the case of Charity, the object (signified by the Dative case) is the person who receives it, whereas in that of Slaughter it is the object killed, which is signified by the Accusative termination—this too is a difference (between your instance and what you seek to prove). And if you assert the “ object” (similar to whose end you postulate the end of the agent) to be the object of ^ Sampradana ” (the receiver of a gift, signified by the Dative),—then you have a contradiction (of your Major Premiss) : because you hold that (in animal sacrifice) the ‘Sampradana’ object, the Deity (to whom itis sacrificed), becomes pleased (while in the case in question there is pain for the * object’).
241. If in Charity the object (given) be meaut to be the instance, (as in animal slaughter is meant the object killed),—then too, what sort of result (in the shape of pleasure or pain) could accrue to the object that is given away (namely, gold, silver and the like ) ?
287.88 “In a syllogistic argument, the Middle Term has an application that 18 in accordance with the Instance quoted. In the present cage, thia instance is ‘ Cherity ’; therefore the effect reeulting from ‘slaughter’ should be similar to that resniting from ‘Charity.’ With regard to ‘Charity,’ we have nnderstood the Resnlt to be the attainment of the end mentioned in its Injunction; and in accordance with your Major Premises, this same resnlt would also belong to the case of ‘slanghter.’ And throngh the Injnnction of ‘Slaughter’ (10 connection with Sacrifices) we come to the conclusion that its effect 28 Merit; and thereby it ceases to be sinful. Thne in seeking to prove (by means of your syllogism) that ‘Slanghter is sinfal,’ yon have proved ite contrary ; and further, when the Result is in keeping with the Injnnction, it cannot be painful.” —Kactka.
433.89 As the reenlt accruing to the Giver is not the same ss that which belongs to the Receiver, so, the Resnlt to the killer could not be the same ae that belonging to the killed.
489.40 “ Contradiction” —i.e., instead of establishing the sinfulness of ^ Slanghter,’ you would be premising the contrary. An animal sacrifice has for its ^ Sampradina” (the objects to whioh the offering 18 made), the deities, Agniand Soma. And ae these Deities become pleased by the offering, your argument wonld go to prove that the slaughterer (the sacrificer) wonld be reaping a harvest of happiness in retribution of the pleasure he gives hy the ‘slaughter,’—a conclusion which oannot be very palatable to you. Because in that oase, * slanghter’ ceases to be sinful; ag sin can, in no oase, be said to bring about happiness to one who commits it; and this is the conclusion derived from your argument; whereby yor songht to prove the sinfnlness of ‘*Animal-slanghtor ” !
APHORISM II. 59
241-42. Your argument may also be shown to be concomitant with its own contradictory, by means of such instances as Japa, Homa, &c.,, which are free from any source of pain to others—and by having the fact of sacrificial Slaughter being enjoined as the Reason.
242-43. For the comprehension of Dharma and Adharma, there is no other means save the fact of their being enjoined aud prohibited (respectively). Hence the introduction of an inferential argument in this connection is not proper.
243-44. For those who declare ‘Dharma’ to be due to helping others to happiness, and ‘Adharma’ to be due to causing pain to others,— for these people ‘Japa’ and ‘ wine-drinking’ would be neither Dharma nor Adharma.
244.45. And again one who, though with qualms of conscience, has intercourse with his preceptor’s wife, would be incurring a great Dharma; because thereby he wonld be conferring a great benefit of happiness to the woman.
245-46. And further, how can one, who would (in the matter of Dharma and Adharma) rely solely upon Reasoning, independently of any prohibitions or otherwise (scriptural), have any qualms of conscience, when he finds that his action does not give pain to any person ?
246-47. And further, he who would ascertain (the character of) Adharma independently of Scriptural prohibitions, would land himself on ‘Mutual Dependency ’—inasmuch as he would be attributing sinfulness (Adharma) to pain, and pain again to sinfulness.
247-48. Then the Mlechchhas who have got no qualms of conscience in the doing of any action, could never be said to be incurring any sin, if your theory (that the sinfulness of an action is due to the pain that it produces to either party) were true.
41.42 The form of the argument, in whioh Japa and Homa are instances, is this: ‘“Animal-slanghter at a sacrifice will bring about happiness,—because it has been enjoined,—like the Japa, &c.”’
243.44 Beoause “Japa,” which is acknowledged to be Dharma, brings pleasnre to none; nor does “ wine-drinking,” which is acknowledged to be Adharma, bring pain to others. This Karika and the next are meant to refute the Utilitarian theory of morals.
241.45 Becanse, accordiug to you, the only standard of Dharma is that it should bring happiness to others.
246-46 Reasonings based upon the utilitarian theory do nat condemn adultery ; and you accept uno ather standard of morality; how, then, do youn explain the qualms of conscience in one who commits that deed? For, certainly he is not conscious of having given pain to any person.
248.47 1f you hold ‘Adultery’ to be sinful, on the gronnd of the pain it brings, in the shape of the qualms of conscience to its perpetrator, then you land upon a mutual interdeoendence. Because, in that case, you would be attributing the qualms of conscience to the sinfulness of the deed, and again its siafaluess you woald base upon the qualms of conscience it produces,
60 OLOKAVARTIKA.
248-49. Therefore leaving aside pleasure and pain, and their opposites,—people, who wish to know Dharma and Adharma, ought to look out for positive injunctions and prohibitions (in the Scriptures).
249-52. ‘In one place (in the case of the killing of a Brahmana) Slaughter has been declared to have the capacity of causing sin; and this (capacity) cannot be set aside even by a positive Injunction (7.e., even if Slaughter be in another place, enjoined as a Duty); becanse the Scripture does not either add to or subtract from, the capacities of substances and actions; it simply serves to declare such faculties as already belong to them. And of a similar nature is this action (animal-slanghter in a sacri- fice); and therefore it is only in accordance with the Scripture—and not by Inferential reasoning,—that we declare the sinful character of sacrificial Slaughter.”
252-54. Those who confidently declare thns, should consider the following questions: (1) Does a Cidra go to hell for the drinking of wine P (2) Does the “ Vaicyastoma” bring about its result when per- formed by a Brahmana or a Kshatriya ? (3) Do proper effects result from the “Ishti” if performed on the fifth day of the month, (4) or from the ^" Aguihotra,” if performed in the middle of the day ?
254-55. Asa matter of fact, the specific result of an action belongs to another, only when ié is precisely of the same character, as is said in the Veda to belong to the former action, which is distinctly mentioned as bringing about that particular result.
255-56. The idea of sinfulness due to a prohibition, refers only to that sort of ‘ killing’ which is other than the two factors (of the Bhavana :
249.52 Some people base their theory of the 6०९०००88 of all kinds of killing on the scriptural prohibition ‘kill not = Brahmana’”’ ; and it ie thie theory, that is expounded in the Karika. “Killing” is one only ; and henoe if it be prohibited in one oase, by that fact aloue, it comes to acquire a sinful character, which becomea perma- nent and cannot be set aside by any number of passages positively enjoining it.
a62.64 Tf what is once declared in the Veda be held to be permanent and nnmodifiable, then (I) the “drinking of wine,’ which has beea prohibited for the Brahmana, woald come to be prohibited for the lower castes also 3 (2) The ^ Vaigyastoma ”’ sacrifice has been laid down for the Vaicya caste, bringing about certain specific resalts; and, in accordance with your premise, this 88011906 would bring about the same results, when performed by men of the other castes also; (3) the “Ishti’’ has been laid १०४०, as to be performed on the last day of the month, whea alone it can bring about ite proper result ; and according to your argament, the same 168681४8 would also come ahoat, evea when the “ Ighti” happens to be performed on other days of the month. (4) Similarly with the ५ Agnihotra” whioh has been enjoined as to be performed in the morning,
29 9-86 Tf a certain action with certain qualifications, be declared in the Veda, as leading to certain definite resalte,—then such results could belong to those actions alone, as qualified in the Veda, And hence, your argument loses ite ground. Beoause
the Veda hae declared only the killing of a Brahmana to be sinfal, and from this you infer the siufulness of all kinds of killing.
APHORISM 11, 61
Means and Process) ; elsewhere (४,९.) in the case of Slaughter enjoined as the means or as forming part of the process) such (idea of sinfulness) is set aside by the positive Injunction (which enjoins Slaughter either as the means to the accomplishment of a certain action, or as forming part of the procedure of a certain sacrifice).
256-57, Whatis got at from the Scripture is a comprehension of the faculties (of substances and actious), aud not any additions or substrac- tions (of faculties). These latter are regulated according to the differences among the actions themselves.
257-58. We find a certain difference in the character of the same thing, even in the case of actions with visible results—e.g., the (effects produced by the same) action of eating, on the healthy and the an- healthy.
258. Though the form of ‘Slaughter’ is the same, in all cases, yet there is a difference among the different kinds of Slaughter due to the fact of its being or not being subsidiary to a sacrifice positively enjoined.
259. If (even inthe face of such arguments) you declare that the resull is one and the same (in the case of all killing), then from the fact of every action being an action, we would have a Universal Confusion (Commixture); and on account of the similarity of having the character of a sucrifice, all the sacrifices “ Citra,” “ Jyotishtoma, &c., would come to have the same result.
260. If in these latter cases, you make restrictions through the differences among the sacrifices, we would have the same resource in the case in question also (there being a difference between the Slaughter enjoined as subsidiary to a Sacrifice, and one not so enjoined, but only forming part ofa certain Result).
260-61. Of all injunctions, the result is such as is desirable for men, either directly or indirectly ; therefore they cannot be taken to imply anything that is not so desirable.
256.67 Additions or subtractions of faculties are brought about according to the nature of the actions in question; and they oannot be said to belong equally to all cases.
251.68 We know that eating produces pleasure; but we find that an unhealthy person, who has no appetite and relish for his food, does not derive any [01628716 from eating. Thus we find that the same action brings about different results in different cases.
453 The “Slaughter” which is subsidiary to another act is not sinfal ; and that which is not a subsidiary, but an independent act in itself, is sinfal.
259 Every action has the general character of “Action”; and if a single point of similarity between any two actions be the ground for an identity in their results, then all actions would have the same result, because they are all similar, in having the general character of “ 8011012
460.61 And as the aim of the person cannot hut be happiness to himself, anything sinful cannot be the object of an Injunction.
62 GLOKAVARTIKA.
261-62. We do not find any sinfulness mentioned in connection with such Slaughter as is enjeined as subsidiary to certain sacrifices; nor 1s such (sinful character) to be assumed (in the case of such Slaughter) through other prohibitions. Nor can the result of these subsidiary slaughters be said to be the end of man; because of their occurring in a particular context,—whereby what we can postulate as the result of these, is euly the help, either perceptible (direct) or otherwise, that they would give to the primary Actien itself.
263. In such cases, we have ne occasion for making assumptions of sinfulness ; because we de not stand in need of any such assumption.
263-64. The help too, that the purification of the animal gives to the sacrifice, is not au indirect one; because we find that the sacrifice requires the accomplishment of the various parts (ef the animal’s body, ag offerings). Even inthe ^“ Gyéna,” sinfulness dees net attach to that Slaughtering which ferms part of the sacrifice itself.
265. Therefore we declare sinfuluess to belong te only that Slaughter which does net form part of a sacrifice. In the- case of the ^ Oyéna,” it is mentioned as the Result ; and hence, in this case, it cannot be said to be the ebject of an Injunctien.
266. Because though the Injunction belongs to the complete Bhavana (consisting of the three factors, Means, Proceduresand Result), yet it ceases te apply to the factor of Result. Consequently «^ Cyéna” and the rest, by themselves can be neither “ Dharma” nor “ Adharma.”’
267. It is through the sinful character of their Result, that the character of Adharma is attributed te them. The “« Cyéna”’ having all its requirements fulfilled by only one Result, it cannot have two.
#61-62 If the suhsidiary slaughter were to have any effect npon hnman wishes, then there might he some donhbts as to its being sinful. Bunt asa matter of fact, it is not so; 88 eoch slanghters are mentioned in an altogether different context. This is explained later on, ‘The direct help is such as when certain offerings have to he made out of the limbs of the animal killed.
283 What we require in that particnlar coutext is something that would help the eacrifice ; and as such, the “ Slaughter” is at once interpretted as affording such help. So there is no occasion for postulating 16 sinfulness.
266 The Injunction takesin only the Means and the Procedure ५१.८11 case of the “Qyéna” sacrifice, “Slanghter” is declared to he the Result, it cannot form an object of the Injunction.
26 “The Qyéna, Sc.”—This is said iu anticipation of the following objection: ‘wevonld make sin also the direct result of the Qyéna sacrifice, just like the death of the enemy, thus getting rid of the indirect attribntion of sinfulness throngh the Result.” The sense of the reply is that all the factors of the “ Bhavana ” (signified by the sentence enjoining the “QOyéna”) being fulfilled hy the death of the enemy as its Result, it १०९७५ not stand in need of any other Resnlt; and hence it is absolutely useless to postulate another Result, in the shape of stn, when all onr needs are satisfied hy the former Result alono. And ono “ Bhavana ” can have ouly 0116 Result.
APHORISM II. 63
268. Therefore the sinfulness (of the “Cyéna’’) is said to be due to “ Slaughter” which is an action other than the “Cyéna”’ itself.
268-69. That action alone is called “ Dharma,” which, even through its result, does not become tainted with sin; becuuse such an action cannot but bring about happiness to the agent.
269. (Obj.). “But the character of ‘Dharma’ would also belong to the “Cyéna,” &c., on account of these being the meaus of attaining a desirable end.”
270. (Rep.). But even then the Result of these would not cease to be sinful, And we must also consider the following points, in this connection :
270-71. If‘ Dharma’ be explained as that by means of which something desirable would be accomplished, without the least taint of anything undesir- able, then the ‘“‘Cyéna” and the rest would become excluded (from the category of “ Dharma’).
271-72. If anything that is laid down in the Veda as bringing pleasure to the agent were held to be “ Dharma,” independently of the property or otherwise of the performance thereof,—then alone could the ^ Cyéna” come under the category of ‘“‘ Dharma.”
272-73. But if by ‘Adharma’ we understand anything that causes puin either directly or indirectly, and which may have been laid down in the Veda,—then the “ C@yéna” would be included in the category of “ Adharma.”
273-74. He, who wonld attribnte sinfulness even to the enjoined (killing—as subsidiary to a sacrifice), on the ground of its being a ‘Slaughter,’ like any ordiuary slaughter (outside a sacrifice),—would he courting a contradiction of the Scriptures.
274-75. And if one were to argue, without any regard to the Scrip- tures,—he would also prove the incapability of accomplishing ‘“ Heaven” with regard to Sacrifices; because (they may urge that) these (sacrifices ) are actions, like ‘ eating’ and the like (which do not lead to Heaven).
68.69 Therefore the ^“ QOyéna” sacrifice can never be ^ Dharma,” inasmnuch as it is tainted with sin, through its Result ; and it has already heen proved in Karikas 267-68, that it is not ^“ Adharma.”
210 The Resnlt of “ Gyéua”’ has been proved to be sinful, and now we must consider the character of the sacrifice itself.
21011 This Karikaé and the next consider what ordinary people understand by 4५ Dharma” and ^ Adharma.”
ail.@ That is, explaining propriety of performance as capability of causing hap- Piness.
272.73 Thus, in reality, the ^^ Qyéua’”’ is neither “ Dharma” nor ८ Adharma.”
474.76 Because sacrifices are accepted as the means of leading to Heaven, on the sole ground of the Veda. And if one were to disregard this, no such capahility in the acrifice could be proved. In fact we would have an irrefutable argument to the contrary, viz., “ Sacrifices cannot lead to Heaven, because they are actions, like Eating.”
64 CLOKAVARTIKA.
275-76. The sinfulness (of sacrificial slaughter), postulated on the strength of passages from the Gita, Mantras, and other Hulogistic passages,—contradicts the direct assertions of the Véda (which distinctly enjoins sacrificial slaughter); and hence these (passages) must be taken to have some other meaning.
276-77, (Obj.). ‘The Siitra and the Vedic sentences being of equal importance to the student, and the incapability (of signifying something) also applying equally to both (in the mind of the student),—the clanse ‘not in the Sitras’ is no reply (to the objection raised in the Bhashya).”
277-78. (Rep.). This clause (‘xa siétreshu’) serves only to reply to the aforesaid “exclusive specification”: Because in the case of the interpretation of the Sdiras, this method (‘splitting of the sentence’ and other indirect methods of interpretation) is applicable (when the sense thus indirectly got at is supported by other evidences).
278. Or the Sitra itself may be repeated; or as a last resource, we may have recourse to °^ Tantra” (a conventional subserviency) in accordance
876.17 The Bhashya (pp. 6-6) having raissd the objection: ‘ Bat the aphorism is inoapable of giving ths two meanings” [namely, (1) that ths Veda is the authority for Daty, and (2) that Duty is that whioh brings aboot happiness],—replies by adding that the syntactical split that the objector has urged agaiost such donble signification, doss not affect the case of the aphorism. In the Karika, the objector says that the Veda and the Sutras are both eqnal, in the eyes of the student.
477.13 Though both ths Veda and the Sitra are equal to the student, yet com- mentators have been fonnd to explain the Sutras by double interpratations. It was with this view, that, in explaining the opening sentence of the Bhashya, we have taken it to signify ‘‘ exclusive spscification,’’—ths sense of the clauss “ satt sambhavé” having been explained as that “it is only when the ordinary signifioations of the words of the aphorism can reasonably be accepted, withont contradicting the Veda, that snch gignifications are to 08 accepted; otherwise, if such signification be found to militate against the Veda, then, iu interpreting the aphorism, wa 11086 have recourse to in- direct methods of signification.”
278 That is, in order to signify both the facts, the aphorism may be read over twice. The second part of the K&rik&a is not easily intelligible; hence ths explanation of the Nydyaratndkara is reproduced: “ Ths word ‘ Dharma,’ for instance, may be taken to be ntterad as a ‘ Tantra,’—7.e., it may be conventionally accepted as the subordinate word in the ssntence; and for {1118 reason, it would be constraoted with each of the other two words, simultaneously: when taken with the first word ‘Codandlakshunah,’ it would give the meaning that ‘ Duty has Veda for its anthority ;’ aod when taken with the second word ‘ Arthah’ it wonld signify that ‘Daty is the means of happiness.’ And as both thess constructions are acoepted eimaltanconsly ; there is no syntactical split, in reality. In this case, the word ‘ Codandlakshanah’ would bethe subject and ‘Dharmah’ the Predioats, of the first proposition ; while of the second proposition, ‘ Dharmah’ wonld bs the subjeot aud ‘ Arthah’ the “ Predicate.” The two propositions may be thus stated: (1) ‘ That which has Veda for its authority is Dharma,’ and (2) ‘ Dharma is the oause of happiness.’ The meaning that the Sitra would give, whesa the other two words ars made subservient to the word ^ Dharmabh,’ 18 explained in Notes 281-82,
APHORISM I. 65
with the difference in the siguifying power (of the three words constituting the Sitra)
279. Or we may make two Siitras out of the one, in accordance with the theory that the Sittra only gives certain portions (of two sentences)
279-80. These two’ (sentences constituting the Sfitra) are assumed to depend upon one another, on account of proximity. And the assumption of a portion (of the second sentence) is not meant simply to complete the sentence.
280-81. Though the sentence “Atha एत, &c.” (in the Bhashya) explains each of the constituents to refer to ‘Dharma,’ as qualified (by the definition afforded by another), yet the syntactical split remains just the same
281-82. Therefore the real answer (to the objection raised in the Bhashya) would be one of the following: either (1) that the ‘name (“ Dharma”) is subservient (to the other two factors) ; or (2) that the ‘name’ and the word “ Lakshana” may be construed with ^ Artha or (8) that the word ‘ Lakshana’ may be taken to be subservient to the words *“* Dharma ” and “ Artha.”
282-83. ^“ Dharma in general, being previously known, as soon as its
219 This is what the Bhashya has done. The sense is this: Sitras, heing extremely brief, are not expected to give every sentence in its entire form. The pre- sent Sitra is really made up of two Sitras—(1) ^“ Artho dharmah” (Dharma is the canse of happiaess), and (2) ^^ Codandlakshanah”’—this latter being only a part of the complete sentence: “ Codanalakshano dharmah”’ (that which is hased npon the Veda is Dharma).
279-80 If both these constituent Sttras were taken independently, then, the Sutra, ‘‘ Codandlakshano Dharmah’’ would make the “ Qyéna”’ also २ Dharma; and, on the other hand, the Sitra ^ Artho Dharmah ” would make any source of happiness a Dharma. In order to guard against these anomalies, the Karika adds that the word ५ Dharma,” in each of these sentences, is taken in the light of its definition afforded in the other; the Sutras are to be iaterpreted as interblended together, and forming only one Sitra,
431.82 If we accept the first alternative, then the construction of the Sitra would he this: ^ Codandlakshano Dharmah-Dharmo'’rthah.” In accordance with the second alternative, the construction would be—-“ Artho Dharmah-arthacodandlakshanah.”’ In the third cage, the construction would be “ Arthacodandlakshanah Coduandlakshano Dharmah.” The meaning, in the second case, would be “ Dharma is the cause of happiness,—and the cause of happiness too only such as is laid down in the Veda.” In the third case, the meaning wonld be~‘‘ The cause of happiness is as declared in the Veda,—and that. which is authorised by the Vedais Dharma.” The meaning obtainable in the first case, has already been explained in note 278.
232.83 The objection is that the word ‘“‘arthah” in the Sutra is superfluous; because when we know what Dharma 18, we know it only as bringing about happiness ; and hence, as soon as its authority has been declared, it at once comes to be recognised as the means of happiness (‘ Artha’’); and as such, there is no use of having this word in the Sutra.
9
66 CLOKAVARTIKA.
authority is declared, it-at once becomes 2 means of happiness ; and as such, why should the word ‘ Artha’ (‘means of happiness’ ) be mentioned in the Satra 7”
283-84. (Rep.): The fact of having the Veda for its authority comes to be predicated of “Dharma,” only by the addition of the word “ Artha ”’; otherwise there would be a doubt as to its real character.
284-85. For in that case, those that are declared (in the Veda), by means of prohibitions, to be the causes of sin, would also become included in “ Dharma”; inasmuch as these also are mentioned in the Veda.
285-86. Therefore that form of the sentence, whereby we could have the restriction of the definition to the single object ( ‘‘ Dharma,” ) —which is possible only if we admit the word ^ Artha,”—1is to be got at only by repeating the word “ Artha.”
286-87. The author of the Bhashya has also declared the result the exclusion of slaughter, &८,, to be dune to the signification of the word “ Arthe,” without taking it as qualifying (Dharma),
Thus ends the Vartika on Aphorism II.
233.88 If we had only “Codandlakshano Dharmah,” then even those Acts, whioh are anthorised hy the Veda in one phase, and prohibited in another phase of it, would become included in tho category of ^ Dharma’’; and the preclusion of such acts would not be possible, nnleas we added the word “ Arthah,”? which reatricts the definition to only such as are causes of happiness, and thereby excludes all that is sinful.
236-281 This anticipates the following objection : ^^ If the construction of the sentence be as yon have explained it to be, then, how is it that, in the Bhashya, the word ‘Arthah’ has been explained as qnalifying ‘Dharma?’ (Vide Bhashya: ‘anartho dharma ukto ma bhiditi arthagrahanam’).’ The sense of the reply as embodied in the Karika is that the Bhashya does not mean “ Arthah” to be a pnrely qualifying term ; because even withont such qualifioation, the Bhashya explains the exclusion of ‘‘slaaghter” and other siuful deeds as being १४९ to the direct signification of the word “arthah” itself. The Nydéyaratnakara and the Kacika interpret this Karika differently. They take it as embodying a reply to the objeotion urged, against the last sentence of the Bhashya on this Sutra, in Karika 280. The meaning of the Karika, in this case, would be this: “ we do not mean to say that the Siitra mentions ‘dharmah’ as qualified by ‘arthah ;’ all that the Bhashya meana ia that, even without such specification, the word ‘arthah,’ by itself, would directly lead to the exolnsion of ‘slaughter’ &c., by means of a particular construotion put npon the Siitra; and the Bhashya—‘ athavd, Sc.’ —only gives the form of the construction that is to be pnt upon the Sitra, in order to get at the exclusion of ‘slaughter, &c.’—the literal meaning of the Bhashya being ‘That which is an Artha (oause of happiness) has the character of Dharma, only when it is authorised by (distinotly enjoined in) the Veda,’ ”
APHORISN Wil. Ov
APHORISM III.
^ The examination of its cause (follows).” (I-i-3).
1-2. Though, besides simple declaration, the author of the Bhashys has also added the argument in favour of his own theory, to be explained later on; yet the statement that “the foregoing is a mere declaration (statement of a proposition) ” refers to what has been stated by Jaimini (in the aphorism). Or it may be that the Commentator has only pointed out the possible arguments—through the mention of the expression “ the past, future, &c.”’
Thus end the Vartcka on the third Sitra.
1.8 This refers to the following passage of the Bhishya: “ uktamasmdabhih codanani- mitiam dharmasya jranam ti pratijnamatrénokiam.” The sense of the objection is clear. The reply means that the Bhashya passage may be taken as refering to the Sitra alone, which only lays down a simple proposition, The second alternative suggested is that the passage may be taken as refering to the Bhashya itself,—the sense, in that case, being that what appears as the argnment is not bronght forward as an argument, but only as a simple declaration of the probable featnres of the object vf declaration. The latter sentence has bssn translated in accordance with ths interpretation of ths Nyayaratnékara and the Kagtké. Yt may also be translated thus: “ Or it may he that the anthor of the Vritti has declared the argument beginning with ‘ past, §c.,’ over and above what was necessary ” (and the Bhashya has ouly repeated the declaration of the Vritti)
68 CLOKAVARTIKA.
APHORISM IV.
“ Sense-preception, which is the cognition of the person, brought about by the correct functioning of the sense-organs, is not the means (of knowing Duty) ; because Perception only consists in the apprehension of what already exists.” I-1-4.
1. He,—who breaking up the aphorism into two, explains (the first half) as the definition of Sense-perception,—has to explain the connection of the aphorism (thus interpreted) with the former declaration ;
2. and also in what part of the declaration, the mere statement of the definition can help; and also the reason for the definitions of Inference and the rest, being not stated.
3. It is not that these (Inference, c&c.), are not means of right notion; uor can it he held that they are included in ^ Sense-perception nor lastly (can it be urged that) they have the same definition (as that of Sense-perception )
4. Nov again can these be (said to have their definitions) indirectly implied in the definition of ^ Seuse-perception.” Because, it is yet to he proved that all Means of Right Notion are preceded by “ Sense- perception.”
5. Norcan it be urged that “a statement of the definition of Sense- perception is not possihle withont a concomitant implication of the defini- tion of Inference, &c.”; and cousequently no indirect implication of these can he possible. |
6. For the definition of Sense-Perception cannot give any idea as to
४ There are twe factors in the declaration: (1) that the Veda is the only means of knewing Duty; and (2) that the Veda is always anthoritative; and donbtless none of these two propositions is helped by the definition of ^ Sense-preceptien.”
4 “ Indirectly.’—Siuce all other meana of knowledge are preceeded by Sense- perception, the definition of this latter may be said to include those of others also.
5 A definition can be said to imply only that, in the absence of which the definition itself remains incemplete, But the definition of Sense-perception 18 net incomplete withont that ef Inference, &e.
6 When the definition ef Sense-pereeption gives no idea, either of its precedence or non-precedence of Inference and the rest, it 16 as reasonable to accept the one as the other.
APHORISM IY. 69
its precedence or non-precedence (to other means of Right Notion); and under such circumstances, why should not the definition of Sense-perception be taken to imply the fact of Inference, &c., not beiny preceded by Sense- perception ?
7-8. Nor can the definition of Sense-preception 1n any way, give an idea either of the specific definition, or of the form, or of the extent (or limits), of these (Inference, &c.). And (if it be urged) that ‘these are not defined, only hecause they are well-known ”; then that would apply to the case of Sense-perception also.
8-9. Thus then, the aphorism would either denote the exclusion (of all other Means of Right Notion) ; or it might be explained as uttered by some silly person: for an intelligent person could never define only one among mauy such Means. And further, when the aphorism can reasonably be construed as a single sentence, it 18 not proper to split it np into two.
10-11. Nor 18 even Sense-Perception clearly defined by the aphorism ; because the definition applies equally to the false semblances thereof (:.e., mistaken Sense-perception) ; for the definition only serves to set aside ‘“‘Dream-perception,” which occurs without the contact of the senses with their chjects. If (perception be defined only as the cognition). following from the contact (of the Senses) with an object, then even false im- pressions wonld become included in the definition.
12. The definition does not specify the contact to be either with something perceptihle, or with something else,—whereby there could be any such specification as is to be mentioned hereafter
13. It was only when the author of the Vritti found the Aphorism (as it stood) unable to signify all that he wished, that he changed the reading of the aphorism into ^ Tatsamprayogé.”’
14. Therefore (the contact not being specified), the character of Sense- perception (as defined in accordance with the former interpretation of Bhavadiasa) would belong to such cognitions of cbjects as arise from the contact of the Eye, &c., with some other chject—(Sound, f. i.).
1-8 Granted that Inference, &c., are invariably preceded by Sense-perception; even then the definition of Sense-perception can give ns no idea of the specific definitions of the other Means of Knowledge—Inference and the rest.
10.11 If the only differentia were the fact of being produced hy the oontact of the senee-organs with an object, then only dream-cognition wonld he excluded, and all sorts of mistaken perceptions, &c., wonld become included in the definition.
18 The “ Specification’? referred to is the changing of the order of. words in the aphorism, as assnmed by Bhavadasa. The definition’ lays down mere “contact of the Sense-organs |
^ . 18 The change in the reading makes the 82, imply that the contact is with that whereof one has the perception.
1४ The eye sees an ohject, and this Perception recalls the impressions of other objects; then, these latter too,—being, though indirectly, due to the contact of the eye, though with a different object,—would come to be included in.“ Sense-perception,
70 त CLOKAVARTIKA.
15. If it be urged that “in that case the word ‘ Satsamprayoga’ (‘contact’) would become redundant,”-——(we reply) just so, that is what the opponent (of the “ Definition-theory ”) urges,—as also the deficiency of the definition itself (which has been proved juat to be too Wide).
16. The use of the expreasion Satsamprayogé would lie in excluding “‘dream-perception, &c.” Therefore (in this aphorism) to the unstated definition, cannot belong the character either of “direct declaration,” or of < supplementary explanation.”’
17-18. Therefore the construction (of the aphorism) cannot he this: “To the cognition, that is comprehended on the contract of the senses, belonga the character of Sense-perception ; and that which is ordinarily known as suoh ‘ Sense-perception ’ can be the cauae of the apprehension of only that which exists; and aa such it cannot be the means of knowing duty.”
19. The clause “ Hvanlakshanakam hi tat”’ in the Bhaahya is not meant to signify the form (or definition) (of Perception) ; what the author of the Bhashya meana to imply is the special form of Sense-perception, (by which it cannot be the Means of knowing Duty).
20. (The meaning of the said clause being that), because the character of consisting in the apprehension of already existing objects belonga to Senae-perception, therefore from this well-known character, we must infer the fact of its not being the Means (of knowing Duty).
21. The “fact of being a Perception” is the reason for proving the
16 This shows that even when we do not accept the “ definition” theory, the expression ^“ Satsamprayogé ” does not become redundant.
<< Therefore, Sc.’—Since the definition is not mentioned by name, in the Sitra, therefore it cannot he said to he either directly mentioned, or snpplementarily implied. The form of the direct declaration of the definition would he—“That which 18 Sense- perception bas this character” ; and the form of the Definition, 88 a ^ supplementary explanation,” would he, ^ That which has such a character is Sense-peroeption”; and 80 long as “ Definition’’ has not been mentioned hy name, it cannot be either the one or the other.
17.18 The constrnotion here denied is that whioh has been put on the Sitra by Bhavadasa, who hreaks it up into two parts; one part ending with “ Pratyaksham,” which he takes to be the definition of Sense-perception, and the rest of the Sitra forming the second part, which he takes as precluding the fact of such Peroeption heing the means of knowiog Duty. As this constrnotion necessitates a syntactical aplit, and as there are other objections to it also (88 noted shove), the Vartika denies 87670 an interpretation of the Sutra.
al These argoments are thus explained in the Nydya-rattakara. ^ Sense-percep- tion 18 not the means, because it consists of the apprehension of already existing objecta ; (1). It consists of the apprehension of existing objects, becanse it is bronght about by direct contact in the pregent ; (2). 1638 brought about hy direot contact in the present, becanée it 18 Bense-perception ;” (3). The Sat in “ Satsamprayoga” signifies present (००४. tact); and the contact too is co-snbatrate with the Perosption. Bhavadiea, on the other hand, has explained “ Sat-samprayoga” as ‘contact with something existing. The
APHORISM IY. ret
rest of the arguments; and as this is too well known (to need any explana- tion) in the case of our Sense-perception, it is explained only with a view to the Perception of the Yogi.
22. The connection (of the Sitra thus interpreted) with the principal subject (or proposition) is established through the signification of the unauthoritative character of all other Means of Right Notion, (with regard to Duty), the non-authoritativeness of the rest (besides Perception) being proved by the absence of premises (which could only be derived from Sense-perception ).
23. The unauthoritative character of others (besides Sense-percep- tion) is easily comprehensible (as implied by such character of Sense- perception itself) ; and hence it is not stated (directly) in the Sutra.
23-24, Nor can the objection of the unnecessary character of tho definition, apply (in our case); nor is the discrepancy in the definition of being either too narrow or too wide—applicable to our case.
24-25. What we refer to is such character of Sense-perception, as is well known; and then too, the character of Sense-perception does not belong to miragic (false) perceptions and the like. And as for the chance of these latter not being the means (of knowing Duty), we do not deny it.
26-28. ‘Even objects in the past and iu the futnre, and those that are
second balf of the Karika is added in order to guard against the absence of corrobo- rating instances. By making “Yogic Perception” the major term, we get ordinary ८ Perception ” to serve as a corroborating Instance in the syllogism.
44 ‘The Sitra, as interpretted by Bhavadasa, has been shown to have no 60४66. tion with the Principal Proposition: “The Veda alone is ths means of knowing Duty ”; and the present Karika explains that this want of connection does not apply in our oase; because we take the whole Sutra to mean only that Sense-perception is not the means of knowing Duty; and this implies that none other out of the various means of Right Notion—Inference and the rest—can be the means of knowing Dnty ; hecanse all these latter are based upon premises derived from Sense-perception, which being precluded from producing any knowledge of Duty, precludes the applicability of all ths rest ; and thereby serves to strengthen the original proposition that ^ Veda alone is the means of knowing Duty.”
28.2%, Because we do not interpret the aphorism as embodying a definition of ** Sense-perception.”
22.85, What we mean is that Sense-perception, which is known to have such a character, cannot be the means of knowing Dnty. ^ Then”’—i.e., by referring to the well-known character of Sense-perception.
26.28, ‘The Perception of the Yogis, brought about by contemplation, tonches all kinds of objects, even those of the past and the like; and as such, it would also com- prehend Duty, &c., as held by the Buddhists, And then again, the naturally omniscient sonls of men would also come to comprehend all such objects, when freed from the shaokles of the Body; and thus then these souls would also come to perceive Duty, &c., as held by the Arhats.” In reply to thess, the aphorism has brought forward tho following two arguments, aimed against the amenability of Duty, &c., to Sense-percep- tion :—(1) Dnty is not amenabls to Sense-perception,—because Sense-perception con- sists in the comprehension of objects in the present time, (2) Duty is not amenable
72 GLOKAVARIIKA,
extremely subtile in character, and also those at a distance,—some people hold to be amenable to the Sense-perception of Yogis, and to that of the liberated souls; and therefore (1) the premissing of the fact of ‘ Sense- perception consisting of the comprebension of objects existing in the present time,’ becomes inapplicable, in reference to such Yogis, &c., or (2) the reasoning based upon the future character (of Duty) would be con- tradicted by the fact of future objects being perceptible to the Yogis.” In order to avoid these two contingencies, Jaimini has added ‘‘ Sat” (present), which indicates something that is well known.
28-29. The Sense-perception of the Yogis too, cannot be any other than what is ordinarily known as such, And the very fact of these being ‘ Sense-perception’ would prove the fact of their consisting of the compre- hension of objects existing at the present time, as also the fact of their being brought about by present contact ;—like our own ordinary Sense- perception.
30-31. The notions that the Yogis have with regard to objects not present, cannot, for that very reason, be called ‘ Sense perception ; ’’— just like Desire or Remembrance; also because such notions of Yogis (with regard to remote objects), are not ordinarily known as “ Sense- perception,’”’—these being more like “ Fancy” than anything else. And it is the absence of both that is signified by “ Sat” (present).
32. Just as ordinary Fancy, independently of Sense-perception and
to Sense-perception,—because it is as yet only in the future, The fact of the Yogis being able to perceive objects of the past, future, &c., however, goes directly against the first of these arguments; because such Sense-perception is actually found not to consist in the comprehension of present objects alone. The second argoment is also contradicted by the fact that the Yogis do actually perceive future objects; and hence the mere future character of Duty is not eoough to render it unamenable to Sense- perception. The addition of “sat” (present), however, gnards against both these contradictions: because this addition restricts “Sense-peroep tion” to such cases alone, in which the contact of the senses is direct and at thé present time; and doubtless, such Perception oan only be of objects that exist in the present.
48.49 (1116 Perception of Yogis cannot be different from what is ordinarily known as ¢ Perception”; because the very fact of its being Sense-perception would prove it to have the two characteristics, mentioned in the last note ;—The form of the arguments being—“‘ The Perception of Yogis consists in the comprehension of objects existing at the present time, and is produced by present contact ; because it is Sense- perception, like any ordinary Sense-perception.
६0.81 ¢ For that very reason”—t.e., on account of suoh objects not existing in the present. ^ Absence of both’’—i.e., of the character of ‘‘ Perception,’ and of that ‘“Means of Right Notion.” That 18 to say, the “sat” in ^ Satsamprayogé”’ serves to imply that the Perception of the Yogi mentioned above is not true Sense-perception 9 aud also that there is no groand for accepting such Perception to he authoritative.
8 The Vaicéshikas assort that the means of the transcendental vision of the Yogi is not the ordinary channel of Perception, but a pecaliar faoalty developed in him, to which is given the name of “ Pratibla” (Intuition or Fancy). Agaiust this thoory, it is urged that we come across such intuitive Perception in the case of ordiuary
APRORISM IV. 73
the other (Means of Right Notion), is not able to give rise to any definite idea, so also would be the Imagination (or Intuition) of the Yogi.
33. If there ever was a sensuous cognition, produced by contact with objects not existing at the present time,—then alone could it apply
to Duty, which is yet to come. And it was for these reasons that Jaimini added “ Sat.”
34, Specially, because, Duty is not perceptible, prior to its perform- ance ; and even when it has been performed, it is not perceptible, in the character of the means of accomplishing particular results,
35. And again, like our Sense-perception, the Sense-perception of the Yogis too,—as consisting of the comprehension of objects existing at the present time, and as having the character of “ Sense-perception,’"—cannot be accepted as applying to Duty.
86. Ifthe word “ Sat’? were removed, how could we get at the denial of the character of (Scnse-perception) in the case of Yogic-perception, on the mere ground of the latter being brought about by a contact not at the present time ?
37, Though the signification of “Sat” could be got at through the
persons also; bnt this १००8 not lead us believe in all that the person may be saying; and the same disbelief may also affect the assertion of the Yogi.
88 In Karikis 26-28, the addition of ‘sat’ has been said to be for the purpose of avoiding the two contingencies thereia noted; and Karika 32 conclades the explana- tion of the avoidance of the first of those contingencies. With Karika 33 beging the consideration of the assertion that the addition of ‘sat’ serves to set aside the oon- tradiction dne to the amenability of future objects to Yogic-perception. The meaning of the Karika 18 that the word ‘sat’ serves to set aside all possibility of a porception withont direct contact with an object ia the present.
$9 The sacrifice has been said to constitute ‘ Duty,” only in the character of being the means to certain desirable ends, and not merely as appearing in the ritual; bence even when though the sacrifice may have beea performed, yet it does not yet manifest its aforesaid character, which comes to be manifested at some remote period of time; and as such it can never be amenable to Sense-perceptia; this amenability to Sense-perception being set aside by the addition of “sat,” which restricts “ Sense: perception” only to such cognitions as arise from the direct contact of the organs of Sense with objects existing at the present time. Such contact 18 not possible in the case of Duty; because Duty does not manifest itself in its true charaoter, uotil the performer is dead, aod there are no Sense-organs left, with which there could be any contact.
86 The Perception of Yogis, consisting of the comprehension of objects existing at the present time, cannot be the means of knowing Duty; and it cannot be sach means, also because even the Perception of Yogia is only “ Sense-perception” after all; and as such, cannot apply to such transcendental objects, as Daty and the like.
31 The Caasative Locative would imply that the “ contact’ must he the one at the present time ; a8 no cansativeness can belong to either the past or the future. Though such is the fact, yet some people assume that the perceptione of Yogis belong to the past and the futnre also; and it is with a view to remove this misconception that “ Sat’* has been added.
10
74 CLOKAVARTIKA,
(causative) Locative (in “ Samprayogé” ), yet the assumptions of others have to be negatived ; and hence the addition by Jaimini. ` 38.39. The word “Sam” is used in the sense of “ proper (or right) ”;
and it serves to preclude all faulty ‘ prayoga.’ And by “ prayoga ” is here meant the “functioning” of the senses with reference to their objects. In the case of the perception of silver in mother-o-pearl, the functioning of the Sensé-organ is faulty ; and hence such perceptions become precluded (by the prefix ‘Sam’ ).
39. In this way, the Sitra may be taken as a mere statement of the definition (of Sense-perception). =
40-41. The Banddhas have urged that “ The eye and the ear naturally functioning without direct contact with the object, the ‘contact,’ that you have put into your definition, as the common factor in all Sense-percep- tion, cannot be accepted to be so; and even if we grant the functioning of these by contact, there could (in the case of the Eye and the Ear) be uo intercepted perceptiou ; nor could an object larger than the Sense- organ, be perceived,—as we find to be the case with the skin, &e.”
. 42-43. Butall this does not militate against our theory, becanse we have explained “prayoga” as mere ‘function;’ or we may explain ‘‘ Samprayoga ” as ‘ confrontation ;’ or again ^ Samprayoga ” may be taken only as a peculiar capability, indicated by the effect. Butitis only after you have subdued the Sankhyas, &c., that you can seek to snbvert the ‘Contact Theory.”
44. These two (the Eye and the Ear) fnuction through contact,— because they are organs of Sense, like those of touch and the rest. On
89 When the words are explainsd in the above manner, the Sitra may be taken to mean the denial of the causality of Senss-perception towards a Knowledge of Daty, after having pointed out its definition ; and in that 0886, nons of the objections broaght against Bhavadasa’s interpretation would have any force. Becanse Bhavadésa has explained “ Satsamprayoga” as “contact with any existing thing,’ which makes the definition too wide, &c., &c.
40.41 “‘Intercepted or remote Perception "—i.e., The cognition in such cases as— We hear this sound at a distance,” “TI ses that object at a distance,’’ and thes like.
42.45 We do not explain “ prayoga” as contact; henos the objections urged by the Buddhist do not affect us.
“ Confrontation ’’—i e., the ohject directly facing the Sense-organ. If either of thess interpretations be accepted, the Buddhist objections cease to have any force,
५9 This sets forth the arguments in support of ths “ contacttheory.” ‘On the other hand, &c.” To the syllogism there is an objection, that the eye, which is in ths body, cannot possibly have any contact with the ohjects, that are at a distance from the body. It is for this reason that the Sankhyas hold the senses to 08 only modifications of Self- consciousness, the cause of Sense-perception bsing the fact that the function or Action of the Senee-organ proceeds out of the eye, and touches the object, which comes thereby to bs perceived ; and certainly there can be no objection against this invisible function or energy going forth from ths body.
APHORISM IY. 75
the other hand, some people, declare that the functioning of these is exterior to the body. |
45. And the medication too that is done to the substratum (in the body—the eye f.i.),—is only such embellishment (of the substrate) as goes to purify that which is supported (.e., the faculty or function of vision).
46-47, And the embellishment, even when belonging to a part of the body, pervades the whole of it; as we find that aids to the foot are found to help the eye. For these reasons, the mere fact of embellishment cannot always establish the location of the Sense-organ therein.
47-48. The external functioning of these two (the Eye and the Ear) are said to be gradually expanding outwards without interruption ; and it is for this reason that objects even larger than the organ itself are perceived, in accordance with the magnitude ef the functioning, in its various parts. And in the same manner, there would be a perception of remote objects also.
49. Just as the light of the lamp is extinguished on the destruction of the lamp, so to the faculty (of the Sense), even when outside, is destroyed on the destruction of the substratum (the Eye).
50. On the closing of the substratum (the organ), though the faculty exists, yet being disjoined from any effort of the sou], it does not apprehend objects, which thus cease to be perceived by the Soul.
51. The notion of “interception” too, is with reference to the body. With regard to Sound however, the notions of “ excess” and “interception ” are mistaken ones; because of the impossibility of these (in the case of Sound).
46.4; ‘I'le function of the eye operates without abandoning its position in the eye— just like the light of alamp. Hence medication to the eye aids the faculty of vision, though the former is external to it; just as we find that the rubbing of oil to the soles of the foot improve the vision.
$7.48 Like a ray of light, the stretch of vision goes on gradually expanding ; and the range of vision depends upon the extent of this stretch, which terminates at the object, beyond which the vision does not proceed.
49 This anticipates the following objection: “If the faculty of vision fnnction outside the eye, how ig it that vision ceases when the physical organ is destroyed ?”’
60 Though on the closing of the eye, the faculty of vision continues all the same, yet it is only when it is aided by an effort of the person that it 80666608 in apprehending objects ; hence though it exists, even when the eye is closed, yet it does not lead to any perception.
61 Because in reality, there can be no interception of an omnipresent functiou— such as we hold the functions of the Senses to be. ‘‘ With regard to sound, Sc.” This is said in accordance with the Mimansa theory. The Sankhya theory is that the functiou of the ear goes out to where the perceptible Sonnd exists; and thus, ia this case also, as in that of the eye, the notion of interception must be explained in the Section of Sound. The Sanukhya doctrine has been stated at length, only with a view to establish the *‘ contact theory,” in opposition to the Buddhist ; and not 88 an exposition of the anthor’s own view.
76 CLOKAVARTIKA,
52. The words “Person” and “ Sense-organs” (in the 82) have been construed by means of transposition (in the Bhashya).
52-538. The ^ Person” (here meant) may be either the one ordinarily known as such, or the one whose existence is to be proved in this treatise. Such modification of (the person) as consists of consciousness, does not militate against his eternal character.
53-54. By “ cognition-production” is meant that ^ cognition becomes authoritative as soon as it is produced.” In the case of all causes, we find that their operation is something apart from their birth (or manifestation). In order to preclude such character from the Means of Right Notion (Cognition), the word ‘ production ” has been added.
55. Not even for a moment does the cognition continue to exist ; nor is it ever produced as doubtful (or incorrect) ; and as such, it can never subsequently operate towards the apprehension of objects, like the Senses, &c.
56. Therefore the only operation of Cognition, with regard to the objects, consists in its being produced; that alone is Right Notion (Prama) ;
62 ‘he Bhashya passage here referred to is this: ‘ Indriydrthasambandhé hi ya purushasya buddhirjéyate’’—-which transposes the order of words in the Sztra.
63.63 ^ One ordinarily known as such’”—7.e., the Body. The Karika anticipates the following objection: ^ If the Person he the Body, then he csn have no perception, since this latter is insentient; on the other hand, if by ‘ Person’ be meant the Soul, then this, having a modification in the shape of the Perception, would come to he modifiahle, and hence non-eternal.’”’ The first half of the Karik&i means that we do not mean to discuss this question here, as it is not germane to the present aphorism As a matter of fact, however, by ‘“‘ Person” we understand the Soul, and this cannot he said to be non-eternal, on account of the Perception; because it is not such modifications that constitute trangitoriness.
63.64 The meaning is that Perception is no sooner produced, than it direotly becomes the means of right notion; and it depends upon no other operation than its own appearance.
66 It is only something that has continued existence even for some time, that can have any other innction besides its birth. Sense-perception however is no sooner produved than past and gone; and as no trace is left of it, that could carry on further operations, 88 soon it is born, it becomes absolutely certain and beyond doubt. There- fore the apprehension of the object being thus accomplished by the mere appearance of Perception, this latter cannot, for this very reason, have any subsequent funotions, as its sole purpose lies in the apprehension of objects; and this having been accom- plished by its mere appearance, it stands in need of no further operations, “ That it will, Fe.’—t.e, as it ig not produced as doubtful, it cannot have any snbsequent operation to go through, for the apprehension of objects, as the Senses have got to do.
66 This anticipates the following objection: “How can the cognition—which, as you say, is devoid of action—hbe either a meaus in general, or the means of a right notion in particular?’ The sense of the reply is that we do postulate an action for the oogni-. tion, viz: the action of being produced; and its effect—right notion—too is the manifesta- tion of the object ; and through the fact of its giving riyo to such a result, in the shape of right notion with regard to the particular object, the cognition itself comes to be iho Mouns of Right Notion (Pramana).
APHORISM IVs 77
and the cognition itself as accompanied by this Right Notion is the Means (of Right Notion: 2191508).
57. This “being produced” too has been explained by the anthor of the Bhashya, as identical (with the cognition itself). And it lias also been made the qualification of coguition (sensuous), in order to differen- tiate it from all past and future (cognitions )
58, Even 17 "^ production” were only a permanent relation (that of inherence), as held by the Vaicdshikas ;—the mainfestation of this relation would depeud upon the senscs; and it is for this reason that it is called +° 8618018 ” (belonging to the senses).
59. The character of the Means (of Right Notion) or that of the Result (Right Notion), may be attributed to any factor, as one may please ; but in any case, Sense-perception caunot be the means (of knowing Duty), because of its consisting of thc comprehension of something existing at the present time.
60. The Means of Right Notion may be (1) either the sense, or (2) the contact of the sense with the object, or (3) the contact of the mind with the senses, or (4) the connection of the mind with the Soul, or (5) all these, collectively.
61. In all cases, cognition alone would be the Result; and the character of the Means would belong to the foregoing, on account of their operating (towards cognition); for when there is no operation of these, then the Result, in the shape of cognition is not brought about.
62. The contact of the sense with the object is not with the whole of it; and hence there is no chance of the perce ption of all objects by means of a single Sense-organ, for those that hold the character of Pramaua to belong to the senses ;
63. Because they do not hold the relation of the sense to consist
61 The Bhashya passage here referred may be either—“ एढ buddhirjayaté tat pratyaksham”—or the subsequeut pussage—“ Buddhirvd janma va, &e.” If only ‘cognition’? were stated, then “ Sense-perception ” would become applicable to cogni- tions of past and future objects; the addition of ^" [ध्या ° however serves to exclude these,—the meaning being “‘ the cognition as produced.”
68 Even if we accept the Vaicéshika theory that production consists of inherence in the cause,—the production thus being something diff erent from the cause,—even then, this relation of Inherence could not be manifested, except through the agency of the Sense-organs ; and as such, this production is rightly called “ sensuous.”
61 ‘When there is no operation ’’—as during sleep.
68 To the theory of “the contact of the sense with the object being the Means of Right Notion,’’ some people object that, in that case, the sense of touch would give rise to the cognition of colour; as the sole cause of cognition, according to the aforesaid theory, is contact with the object cognised; and it caunot be deuied that the sense of toach has contact with the colour of a material object.
68 This Karika 18 thos explained 14 the Kagikd:—The objection urged in 62 would apply to this theory, if the relation of the Sense-organ with the object were held to be mere ‘ Contact, as being the Mexnus of Right Notiun. Bul such is not the vase; since
78 CLOKAVARTIKA.
in were contact; aud they deny such a relation simply with a view to avoid the absurdity of the sense of Touch, which is a means (of ॐ parti- cular class of perception), giving rise to the cognition of colour.
64. Just as in the accomplishment of the Pramana, the only cause is the fixed relation of the Sense and the Object, through their inborn amena- bility (to one another}, so would it also be in the case of the Result.
65. Though the contact resides equally in both (the Sense and the object), yet, it is only proper that it should be mentioned as residing only in one of the two. Or the Sense may be taken as the only nncommon substratum of the relation.
66. “If (the cognition were due) to the contact of the mind with the Soul, then there would be no co-objectivity between the Means of Right
it iy held that guch means ie the ‘contact’ as qualified by capability or applicability ; and thie “ capability’ is to be inferred, in accordance with the effect produced. There- fore to that alone, which comprehends an object on its contact with the Sense-organ, belongs the “ capability ’ or applicability of the “ contact.”
‘‘ In order to avoid, ¥c.’—“ The meaning is this: He, who holds the cognition itself to be the means, and thus declares ‘ contact’ to be the means of this means,—thereby denying the character of Pramdna to the ‘contact’—, even to such a theorist, the ‘ contact’ remains unspecitied ; and 28 such, it belongs to all the Sense-organs ; and thus there would be, in this cage aleo, the absurdity of the perceptibility of forme and colours by means of the Sense of Tonch. Therefore in order to avoid this absurdity, which is common to the two theories, both of them must deny the fact of the relation of the Sense-organ and the object consieting in mere ‘contact,’ "—Kagika.
64 In the latter theory, noted in the foregoing note, the npholders declare the cognition itself to be the Prama@na or the Means of Right Notion, and as a cause of thie, they lay down the aforesaid applicability, through propriety of the contact of the Sense- organ with the object perceived,—the absurdity urged above, being avoided, on account of the inapplicability of one sense to the objects of other senses. The Karika nieaos that the same means of getting clear of the abeurdity would also apply to the theory in which the contact is held to be the means of cognition, which latter is held to be the Regult, and not the Means.
66 Tho objection is that the contact resides as muoh in the Sense as in the object ; aud under the circumstances, why shouldit be attributed solely to the Sense? The sense of the reply is that such specification 18 not always wrong—as for instance, the Father of Rama and Lakshmana is rightly called “the Father of Rama.” “Or the sensc, Jc.’—this supplies another explanation of the Specification : The word ^“ Sense- perccption,” as here used, means “ concrete (definite) cognition; and what is specially related to this cognition alone is the sense only; while the object, ie also related to luference, and the other Means of Right Notion.
66 The Sense of the objection is that in the theory of the contact of the Sense and the Object being the means of cognition, we have a oo-objectivity of the Means (the contact) with the Result (cognition), both of which belong to the objeot of cognition. In the theory of the contact of the mind and Soul being the cause of cognition, there can be 110 such co-vbjectivity, as the Meaus (the contact) belonge either to the Soul or to Mind, whilo the Result (cognition) belongs to the object. The meaning of the reply ig that since both the contact and the coguition operate upou the object of cognition ituolf, there cuu bo uo want of co-objectivity.
APHORISM IV. 79
Notion, and its Result.” It is not so; becanse both operate upon the same Object (of cognition).
67, And if (by “co-objectivity ”) you mean ‘ co-snbstrateness ’ (४,९.) the sameness) of the substratum, which is something other than the object of cognition,—then the cognition residing in the Soul becomes naturally co-substrate (with its means, viz., the contact of the mind and the Soun)).
68. Being the best means, on account of close proximity (co-substrate- ness), this (the contact of the mind and Soul) is the only Means of Right Perception ; aud hence the true character of the Means of Right Notion, can belong to no other agency.
69. If such character of the Means of Right Notion be attributed to all the agencies (noted in Karika 60) taken collectively, there can be no objection to it. And for one, to whom the Sense is the Means of Right Notion, the sameness of the object is clear.
70. When to the cognitions of the qualification and the qualified, are attributed, respectively, the characters of the Means (of Right Notion) and the Result, then too the objection of the diversity of objects, would be set aside in the aforesaid manner.
71-72. When the object of cognition is the qualification itself, then the abstract (or nndefined) perception subsequently gives rise to a definite cognition; and in this case the character of Pramana belongs to the undefined Perception, and that of the Result, to the subsequent definite (or concrete) cognition.
72, When, however, there is no definite cognition, then the char- acter of 1010509 could not belong (to the foregoing undefined percep- tion ); because of its uot bringing about any definite idea with regard to any object.
73. If the character of Pramfina were attributed to the cognition of the qualified object, then the character of the Result would belong to the determination of shunning, &c. And if it be urged that these two
68 In this theory, the cognition and its mcans (ths contact) are found to inhere in the sams base—viz., the Soul; and therefore such contact is the best means of cognition.
69 ४ 47 these taken collectively ”’—The contact of the Soul with the mind is preceded by the contaot of the mind with the Sense-organ, which latter is preceded by the contact of the Ssnss-organ with the ohject perceived.
70 In the theory of cognition being the means, ths concrete cognition of an object is preceded by the cognition of its qualifications: and in this theory, the latter is held to be the Resalt, and ths former, the Means; and ths cognition of the qualification having its purpose in the cognition of the qnalificd object, we have the co-objectively of these, on acoount of the co-substrateness of their operations.
78 « Shunning, Sc.,” 1.e., shunning, accepting, and disregarding. If the objector insists upon the character of the Result heing attribnted to that which follows imme- diately after the Means, then, in that case, we would accept the rememberance to be the Result.
80 COLOR AVARTIKA.
¥
(the determination to shun, &e., and the cognition of the qualified object) are intercepted by the remembrance of the desirable character or other. wise (of the object cognised ),—then we would declare this (remem- brance) itself to be the Result.
74. He (४.९. the Bauddha),—who, desiring co-objectivity (between the Means and the Hesult), asserts the Result (cognition) itself to be the Pram&ana,—would be contradicting the well-known distinction between the Cause and the Effect :—
75. As, when the axe is applied to the khadira wood, the cutting does not belong to a log of the Palfsa,—so (we see that) in ordinary experience, there is no identity between the axe (the means) and the cut (the result).
76. 1 co-objectivity happens to please yon, by doing away with the distinction (between the Means and the Result),—through the rejec- tion of such identity, the said distinetion would be equally pleasing to others (the Naiyfyikas).
77. If you assume that the attribution of the character of the Means to the Result, is indirect (or Secondary),—then would not others be able, somehow or other (indirectly), to assume the desired co-objec« tivity also ?
78. The result being the specification of the object, the character of Pramana belongs, according to us, to that which immediately precedes it; and so, if the cognition be said to be the Pramana, then the Result must be held to be something else.
79. It is not proper to attribute the character of the result to “ Self-recognitiou, ’—as this will be refuted later on ; nor is it proper to
16 The mere fact of auy one theory pleasing your fanoy cannot serve as an argue ment in its support; for such grounds conld be urged in support of the most absurd
theories. परा ^ Would not, 4८, "- ^ 8 we have shown above, the oo-obje ctivity, through opera-
tion. 73 “If the Result be the specification of the object of cognition, then the Pramana would be the contact of the mind and the 8011) &., as the factors immediately preceding the said Result. Bnt if the cognition be held to be the Praména, then such character of Praména would also belong to abstract cognitions, the eubsequent concrete cognition (in the shape of the cognition of the specific properties, &c.), being ita Result.” —Kagika,
199 The “Santrantika” theory is that ‘‘Qognition in the shape of the object cognised—i.e., tho forms of ved, yellow, &c., imprinted upon cognition—is what is held bie Pramana ; because on this is based nll difforeutiation into Red, yellow, 0 Resnlt of this Pramdna is Se/f-cognition,—ie., the comprehension of the cognition by itself; and tho external objects ate tho objects cognised.” ‘Thia theory of “Self. recognition” is rofuted in the ^ ए पदप ” section of the Vartika, where it is shown that the cognition is only able to apprehend tho external forms of objects, and also the change that these produce in the cognition itself; because any snch “ Self. recognition” as held above would imply coutradictory actions in itself,
APHORISM IV. 81
State the “ form of the object” to be the Pramana, because of the diver- sity of objects.
60. ‘The ‘form of itself’ (४ €.) of the cognition itself) is not fonnd to be anything, other than ‘ Self-recognition,—which could he said to be the Pramaua with regard to ‘Self-recognition’ as the Result.
81. Nor can the ‘form of the cognition itself’ be defined, (or speci- fied) without another ‘form’; and so again of this latter, and so forth, there would be no end of ‘ forms.’
82. The ‘form of the cognition’ too can have no existence, unless it is defined (or specified). In the case of the form of the object being the object of apprehension, however, we find no other apprehender (and as such there conld be no specification).
83. The mind being a Seuse-organ, the idea of pleasure, &c., is also ‘ Sense-perception,’ because it is only when in contact with the mind, that the soul experiences them.
84. It is only an object existing at the present time, that, being in contact with the eye, &u., can be appreheuded; and the object thus
८ Diversity of objecta”—you hold the Pramana to hein the shape of the object; and this Pramdna has got the object of cognition for its object; and the objects of cognition too are Red, Blue, &o. Thns then the form of the object comes to have the object itself for its object; while “ Self-recognition” has cognition for its ohject,—thus there heing a diversity of objects hetween the Praména and its Result.
80 This Karika attacks the “^ Yogacara” position. The Yogacaras hold that cognition is naturally pure, and as such comprehends itself in the form of Red, Blue, &c., which has heen imprinted upon it hy external impressions, thus doing away with the necessity of external chjects; and as such, the ‘‘form of the cognition” itself is held to he the Pramdna, the form of the ohject heing the object cognised, and ‘“ Self: recognition’? being the Result. The sense of the refutation of this theory is that the ^“ form of cognition” is the saine as the ^" Recognition by the cognition of itself; ” and this being the Result, cannot, at the same time, be the Pramdna.
81 Tg the ‘ form of itself’ definite or indefinite ? If indefinite, no snch form exists. If definite, then as any one form cannot he defined hy itself, we would have to assume another form ; and so on, ad infinitum ”—Kagika.
88 “Tt has been urged that the form of the object as identified with the cognition is held to the chject of apprehension; but this cannot he; because such an object cannot he apprehended by the cognition, hecause of the absurdity of any operation in itself; and we cannot find any other agent that would apprehend such an object, of which, we wonld thus come to have a negation ”—Ka¢vka.
88 It ig nrged by the opponent—“ you too will have to postulate the Self-recognition of Cognition, in the case of the feelings of pleasure and pain, which are not directly perceptible hy any of the Sense-organs.” The reply to this is that we sail clear of such a contingency, by postulating mind as a distinct Sense-organ, whereby pleasure and pain are directly perceived.
8१ “The Saugatas hold that Sense-pcerception apprehends only specific objects ; while the Vedantists hold that it apprehends only the generic character (the class to which the object belongs). Hence the definition given in the Sutra is different from both; inasmuch as it does not make any definite assertion with regard to the
11
SZ CLOKAVARTIKA.
apprehended may be either generie or specific,—and hence it is not parti- cularly declared to be either the one or the other.
85. Whatever definitions are given, no Sense-perception, of the ordinary character (7.e., not of Yogis, &c.), can be the Means (of knowing Duty),—because it consists of the comprehension of objects existing at the present time.
86. If Sense-perception be said to consist in abstract (or undefined) cognition, then as a matter of course, it cannot be the Means (of knowing Duty); because the relation of Cause and Effect, is not apprehended without specification (४.९) without the comprehension of qualifications, which is wanting in all undefined cognitions).
87. “How ean Inference, &., be said to be preceded by Sense-per- ception, when Sense-perception itself is declared to be undefined,—on account of its ineapability of remembrance ?”
88. “Nor is there any comprehension, without specification, of either the Linga (the middle term of the syllogism), or the Lingi (the Major term), or the relation of these two (the premisses). In ‘ Analogy’ too, the comprehension of similarity being due to memory (it cannot be said to be preceded by Sense-perception ).”
89. ‘Apparent Inconsistency also does not apply to an object which has not been perceived by some one else; and the object, a cognition whereof gives rise to this (Arthapatti), is always concrete.”
object of apprehension.’’ The sense of the reply is that we hold the object of percep- tion to be only श्छ an object aa is capable of being perceived, aa existing at the present time, and as connected with the organa of sense; and such an object may he either generic or specific, according to circumstances. Consequently no anch specification of the character of the ohject is called for, in the Sitra.
85 ‘‘Sense-perception’’ only apprehends present objects; hence whatever its definition, it can never be the means of knowing Duty. The cognition bronght abont by meditation 18 only a case of memory; and ag such, it is not even anthoritative—to say nothing of its being ‘‘ Sense-perception.”’
89 Dnty is the means of accomplishing a desirable end; and hence there can be no comprehension of Duty, except in the form—*“ This ia the means to such and auch a desirable end”—which would not be possible in the absence of a well-defined idea of the cause as well as of the effect.
87 Karikas 87 to 94 bring forward objections against the passage in the Bhashya, wherein it is declared that “Inference,” ^" Analogy’ and the rest being necessarily preceded by “Sense-perception,’’ cannot be the means of knowing Duty. “ When Sense-perception, &c.,”—* Sense-perception”’ is a perception brought about by the fnnotion of the Sense-organs. But these organs themselves have not the capacity to remember things; and a well-defined cognition 18 bronght abont by the adjustment of the Genus, &c., remombered at the time; therefore “Sense-perception’’ oan, at ‘best, be only indefinite. Under such circumstancca, how can “TInforence” be said to be preceded by ‘“‘Sense-perception,” which is alwaya indefinite P
89 And as such 16 cannot be said to be invariably preceded by Sense-perception, as doseribod above.
APHORISM IY. &3
90. “In a case of Inference, where the Linga (the middle term) in the shape of the movement of the sun, is also such as is got at by means of Inference,—as also is the ‘Lingi’ (major term),—how can we assert the precedence of Sense-perception P ”’
91. ‘In the case of an object apprehended by Sense-perception, how can these (Inference &c.) have any authority P For when an object is only comprehended by means of these (Inference &c.), then it is not amenable to the organs of Sense.”
92. “If it is be urged that ‘the precedence of Sense-perception may be said to be due to the cognition of some object, (not necessarily the same as the object of the subsequent Inference, &c.),’-—then the futurity of the objcct (Duty) would not be a canse of its said non-cognisability.”
93. “Because, if such be the case, then any one object existing at the present time having been cognised by means of Sense-perception,— with this as the Linga (minor term of the syllogism), the sensuous percep- tion would lead to the cognition of Duty, even if 10 does not exist at the time.”
94. “And again, even the object treated of in the Veda, is known, only after the letters have been recognised by means of Sense-perception ; aud for this reason, the Veda too, being preceded by Sense-perception, could not be the means of knowing Duty.”
95. (In reply to the above) some people hold that the precedence of Sense-perception is not the cause (of Inference, &c., not applying to the
99 In a case, wherefrom the fact of the sun being found in different positions, one infers that the sun is moving; and from this conclusion we deduce the cause of the sun’s motion. This latter Inference cannot be said to he preceded by ^^ Sense- perception.”
91 If Inference &c. be said to be invariably preceded hy ‘‘ Sense-perception,” then they would be devoid of any authority. Because in that case, they wonld he only leading to a useless comprehension of such objects as have been already cognised by means of Sense-perception. If it be urged that both may have their uses at different times, then we reply that, if at the time of Inference, there be no Sense-perception, then the object of Inference would be only such as is not amenable to the action of the Senses; and hence Inference conid not be said to be invariably preceded by Sense-perception. For if the object were amenable to the Senses, then it could not be possible to have an Inference without Sense-perception; and it has been already explained that, at the time of Sense-perception, there is no use for Inference, which, in that case, can have no anthority.
9 The meaning of this Karika is this: if the other party say that they do not hold that the object of Inference is always perceived by the, Senses and such is the precedence of Sense-perception; and that what they mean by precedence of Sense- perception 38 that one of the three factors of Inference must be such as has heen previously recognised by Sense-perception ;—then we meet this position by urging that if such be the case, then the assertion that—‘‘ Duty is not amenable to Sense-percep- tion on account its being in the future’’—becomes false ; the reason for this is explained in the next Karika.
84, CLOKAVARTIKA.
case of Duty); all that is meant is that the authority which is due to the precedence of Sense-perception, does not apply (to the case of Duty).
96. Asa matter of fact, however, Inference and the rest can operate only after one out of the three factors, ‘Linga’ (minor term), &c., has been cognised by means of Sense-perception ; and certainly there is no such thing in the case of Duty.
97. Nor is here in this case, any possibility of Inference per Infer- ence ;—because of the impossibility of any pre-ascertainment of the pre- mises and the terms (of the Syllogism).
98. By means of Inference we do not arrive at the idea of the mere existence of anything. If it be urged that “by ‘Duty’ we would qualify some other object,’—then (we reply) that in that case, the ‘Paksha’ (major term) would be devoid of any definite properties.
99. Therefore, because of its never before having been found to be
96 The way of meeting the ahove objections, as showa in the last Kiarika would make the Bhishya passage in question altogether redundant. Therefore the Author offers another reply, more in keeping with his own views: we shall prove later on that we dco not confine Sense-perception to undeficed cognition alone ; bat we also hold the term to include well-defined concrete cognitions. Thus then, we oan have no Inference without Sense-perception; because all processes of Inference dspend upon the premises, which are got at solely by means of Sense-perception ; and certaialy, there can he no Inference without the premises. For instance, it is only when ‘‘smoke ” is actually seen to be accompanied by Fire, and thus to be its mark,—and only when the gavaya is seen to be like the cow,—that there can be a cogaition of the existence of Fire (through Ieference), and of the similarity of the gavaya tc the cow (by Analogy), In the same manner, it is established that it is the cognition of the principal object of Iufereuce that stands in need of Sense-perception ; and in the case of Daty, we oannot perceive hy the senses, eithsr any of ita marks or anything similar to it. Hence Inference, Analogy, and the rest cannot apply to the case of Dnty.
97 This hints at Karikaé 90, where it has heen asserted that an Inference per Infer- encs is net preceded by Sense-perception. This is net correct; becanse even in the instance there cited, until we have, through Senss-perceptioo, arrived at the relation subsisting betweea the motion and its cause, we can have no Inference of any sort.
98 In every case of Inference, the object of Inference is a certain object, endowed with certain definite properties, and not as a mere entity; while in the case of Duty, the only conclusion that 18 possible is—“ Duty exists,’ which, in reality, can never be amenable to Inference; hut it would become 80, if mere existence were the subject of Inference. If it be urged that—‘ For Inference as applied to the case of Duty, we could have an object, such as some person endowed with Duty (१.९. one who has per- formed the duties prescribed in the scriptures); and this would not he an Inference of mere existence,’—then we reply that even such an Inference cannot be ccrrect; inasmuch as we have not yet arrived at any well-defined properties of Duty—which is to be the major term of the syllogism; and until the properties of the major term be known, there can be no Inference. That is to say, Duty has not yet been proved, to be an entity; and so long as this has nct been proved, thers can be no Inference iu which “Duty” conld be the major term.
99 This Karika and the next bring forward two syllogisms in the proper style, to prove the inapplicability of Iaferenoe and Analogy to the oase of Duty. By ‘‘ uncommon pbject” is meant the “ Swalakshana”’ (the individual characterestic) of the Buddhist, which, acoording to them, is undefined, and as such, not amenable to Inference, &e.
APHORISM IV, 85
concomitant with any object, Duty cannot be amenable to Inference,—hke the specific (undefined) characteristics of objects (or ‘ uncommon objects’).
100. Because of its being similar to the unseen (invisible), and because of its own imperceptibility, Duty canuot be ameuable to Analogy,— like the said characteristics of objects.
101-102. ‘But then, ‘Apparent Inconsistency’ would become such (means of recognising Duty),—based upon the perception of diversity in the world: the distinction of ‘happy’ and ‘ miserable’ is not possible without some unseen cause; because all visible causes are found to be incapable of explaining this diversity; and because (conversely) we find such distinctions even in the absence of any seen cause; as we find that even when service and study are exactly similar, the result, in the capacity of the students, 18 not the same.”’
103. Such could be the case, only if it were possible to refute the action of natural idiosyncracies; or if there were any other cause of the diversity of the powers of Karma.
104. Just as with regard to the diversity of their results, there is the natural capacity of Actions,—in the same manner could the diversity in the world be due to the peculiarities of nature.
105. Then too, so long as, with regard to the action, the forms of Duty
101-108 These Karikas emhody an objection, the sense of which is thus explained In the Kaciké: ^ Granted that Inference and Analogy are not the means of knowing Duty; but we have always found Apparent Inconsistency to apply to objects beyond the action of the Senses; and on the seen diversity in the world, we conld base an Apparent Inconsistency: This diversity in the world cannot be explained, unless we postulate some such unseen agency as that of ‘Duty.’ We find in the world that though all worldly circumstances and advantages are equal in the case of any two persons, yet they are not seen to be equally happy; and like the fatness of Devadatta who does not eat during the day, such diversity cannot be explained by any seen canses; and, as in the case of Devadatta, the Apparent Inconsistency of fatness with fasting in the day is explained by postulating the fact of his eating at night, which is not seen by the people; so too, in the case in question, the Apparent Inconsistency of the equality o all worldly advantages with the inequality in the degree of happiness can be explained, only by postulating an unseen agency, to which is given the name of ^ Duty.’” “ Service or study,’—i.e., two persons serving the king equally well, are found to be rewarded differently ; and similarly two men stndying the same subject under exactly similar circumstances, are found to differ in their acqnirements. Aud these discrepancies can be explained only by the agency of Dharma and Adharma,—the former causing superiority, and the latter inferiority.
108 Even in the case of such actions as the ‘‘ Acvamédha” sacrifice and “ Animal- slanghter,” we attribute their diverse regults to the peculiar character of the actions themselves, and not to any extraneous cause. In the same manner, we could also attribute the diversity in the conditions of two men equally circumstanced to the peculiarities of their own nature, and not to any unseen extraneons cause, as you would seek to prove, by means of Apparent Inconaiatency.
106 The Jast Karikas embody one kind of reply to the above objections. But the Author finds this reply inadequate; becanse if nll diversity were due to nature, one
86 CLOKAVARTIKA.
and its contrary have not becu differentiated, what could be the use of the mere vague idea that “ there is something (the cause of diversity) ? ” 106-107. Would pain result from Sacrifice, &c., or pleasure from Slaughter and the like? And from what sorts of Action, what sort of effects—Heaven, children, &c.—would result ?’
Until one has a definite idea as to these facts, he is never led to tuke up any action. What is here sought after is the root (cause) of such knowledge as forms part of such activity.
108. Therefore though the Means in general may have been ascer- tained, no specification (of the Means) is possible, except through the Veda; andit is an enquiry into this special Means (of knowing Duty), that has been declared by the author of the aphorisms.
109. Aud when the special Means has been recognised, even the cognition of the Means in general, which is included in the former, would be got at through the Veda; and hence (Arthapatti) cannot be the means (of knowing even the generic form of the Means).
110. And as with Arthapatti, so too there could be no similarity (of the Veda) with Inference. If it be urged that Inference 18 based upon the
and the same man conld not be both rich and poor, even at different periods of his life; for his nature would remain the same all along. For this reason, he offere amother reply, the sense of which is that ‘‘ Apparent Inconsistency’ would only prove that there 11०8४ be some unseen cause for the diversity; but unless the character of the unseen cange—either as Duty or otherwise—is ascertained, the mere knowledge of the fact of there being anch a cause of diversity conld not serve any purpose; and certainly, ८ Apparent Inconsistency” could give us no clne as to the nature of the canse; and as such, it could never be the means of knowing Dnty.
107 The knowledge which forms an integral part of activity is based npon the Veda; and hence “ Apparent Inconsistency’ cannot have any application in this case.
108 “Apparent Inconsistency’’ only serves to prove that the aforesaid diversity has an nngeen canse.
109 This Karika anticipates the following objection: “Inasmuch as ‘ Apparent Inconsistency ’ brings about the idea of the cause in general, and the Veda that of the specific cause,—we should say that the means of knowing Duty consiats in ` Apparent Inconsistency and the Veda,’ combined; and not in the Veda alone.” The sense of the reply is that ‘‘ Apparent Inconsistency ° proving the general, is nnable to give any idea of the particular; whereas the Veda proving the particular would apply to the general also; because an idea of the former includes that of the latter.
110 Some people urge that the argument contained in the above objection is not an instance of “Apparent Inconsistency,” but one of ordinary Inference, per modus pollens, based upon the invariable concomitance of the cause in general, with the effect in general; and thus the Veda too comes to be nothing bat a part of Inferenoe. The Karika means that these people have also been refuted by the above refntation of ५ Apparent Inconsistency.”
Some commentators constrne “ ndnumdnopaméshyaté” aa “na anumdnam ishyaté, na upamadnam ishyaté;” but this construction is not right; in as much as the opponeut also denies the applicability of `" Analogy;’’ and as such it would be a useless effort to deny what the opponent also denies, as pointed out in the Kacika.
APHORISM IY. 87
Scripture ;—then (we reply that) in that case, the character of Pramana would belong to this (latter) (and not to the Inference).
111. The assertion,—that the ‘Linga’ (and other factors of Infer- ence) are not perceptible by the organs of Sense, because of the undefined character (of Sense-perception) ’—is not correct; because we hold Sense- perception to be applicable to well-defined (concrete) cognitions also, as helping the comprehension of the form of the object.
112. First of all, there is a cognition in the shape of mere observation in the abstract, which is undefined,—similar to the cognition of the infaut or the dumb, arising purely out of the object by itself (without any qualifications).
113. And at that time neither any specification nor a generalisation is recognised; what is cognised is only the object, the substratum of these (generalisation and specification).
114-116. Others (the Vedantists) lay down a “ Summum Genus” in the shape of “Being” (Sat), which they call “Substance”; and through this, they hold ^ generalisation’ to be the object of perception
The meaning of the second half is that if “Inference” be made to depend upon the Veda, for the sake of the cognition of special causes, then we would have the Veda itself, ae the independent oause of the cognition of the gensral as well as the particular.
111 Tt hae been urged that there can he no perception of the Linga, &c.; hecanse “Perception ” consists of undefined (abstract) cognition, which cannot give rige to any premises, as these latter consist of definite concrete 10688, It is thie theory that is controverted here; It ia not an absolute rule that all ^“ Sense-perception”’ must always consist of undefined abstract cognition; as we ehall prove later on that we apply the name ^° Sense-perception’”’ aleo to the cognition of the form of the object, which is well-defined and concrete, and 76 bronght about by the action of the Sense-organs, following closely npon the undefined abstract cognition, in connection with the same object; and it is quite reasonable to assert the precedence of euch concrete cognition, to “Inference” and the rest.
119 Some people deny abstract cognition, altogether. Their reasoning 18 this: “All cognition 16 concrete, because it is alwaye accompanied hy expression in worde. In ordinary experience, we do not come across any cognition, which is not accompanied by verbal expression. We enquire into the various means of cognition, only for the sake of ordinary experience, and we do not find any experience based upou any purely abstract cognition; in as much as all experience is concrete and definite. The cogni- tions of the infant also are accompanied hy verbal expression, in its suhtlest form, 4८, &e.”
114 These theorists hold that there is only one generality, in the shape of “ Being,’’— all others being only specifications of this; what is known as a “ generality” is that which is common to many individuals; and what is known as “epecific” is that which is restricted to a eingle individual; and it is the great generality that forme the object of Abstract Cognition, the rest being amenable to concrete perception. Because, if euch specific characters were not recognised, as being common to certain objecte, and ag not existing in others,—by what means could there he any discrimination hetween the perceptions of different objects ?
88 CLOKAVARTIKA.
(7.e., the undefined abstract cognition) ; the “specifications ” being cognised by meaus of well-defined concrete cognitions. Some of these specific characters again are peculiar to each individual, while some are common to many. And without such recognition of these (specific characters), through specification and generalisation, there would be no difference between the perception of the cow and that of the horse.
117. This is not correct; because (even in the case of abstract cognition) we find each individual object to be distinct from others ; and because the difference cannot be expressed, that is no reason why its existence should be totally denied.
118. Even in the case of an undefined abstract cognition, there is a perception of the object, in its two fold aspect (general and specific).
118-119. And this cognition (of the double aspect of an object) only serves to point out its real character; by the cogniser, however, it is perceived in its pure (unqualified) form only. It is not cognised as anything special, because there is no exclusion of others (objects); nor is it cognised as general, because there is no definite idea as to the inclusion of other special objects.
120. And it is only after some time that the object comes to he characterised by such specificatious as the “class” and the rest; and the
Ilt If the great genus “ Being’ alone were the ohject of Abstract Cognition, then we would have exactly the same cognition (so long as it remains undefined), with regard to all objects. But, as a matter of fact, such is not the oase; since we find that the abstract cognition with regard to one object differs from that with regard to another. Though this difference cannot verywell he expressed in words, yet this non-expressibi- lity cannot prove its non-existence.
118 That is to say, it is not only the general aspect of an action that is cognised hy Abstract Perception.
118.119 To this view, of Abstract cognition relating to the double aspsot of an ohject, it is ohjected, that, in the course of such abstract cognition, there is no idea of either the generic or the specific aspect of the object; and as snoh, ths above view sounds much like a contradiction of facts. The reply is that we do not mean that in the course of abstract cognition, there 18 any comprehension of either the inclusion or the exclusion of different objects, in or from the object oognised; all that we mean by mentioning ths ‘twofold aspeot of the ohject” is, to state the character of the object: that the object of Abstract Cognition is such ag has २ twofold aspect. What is comprehended hy the oogniser is the object, pure and simple, withont any qualifioa- tions, &c. ; and, in abstract cognition, this object is not cognised as anything particular ; hecause Abstract Cognition does not serve to exclude other ohjcots; nor is it perceived as anything general; because Abstract cognition does not include other objects, Therefore what is comprehended by means of Abstract Cognition is only the object, pure and simple; aud this object is such as has the twofold character of the gencral and the particular ; and this is all that we mean.
180 Abstract Cognition is followed hy a cognition which serves to specify the object, with referenco to “olass’’ “aotion” and “ property’? and this definito cognition is also held by us to be included in “' Sense-perception ” and this name thus comog to apply both to Abstract and Concrete cognitions,
APHORISM IV. 89
cognition, by means of which such specifications are arrived at, is also included in Seuse-preception.
121. And the reason for this is that the means of this latter cogni- tion is the sense-organ ; though the cognition is not actually located in it; For this reason, the fact of the sense-organ being incapable of remembrance cau not preclude well-defined (concrete) cognition (from Sense-preception).
122. Because the cognition is located in the soul; and it is this (the soul) that is found to be the cogniser ; and this (soul) has also the power of Remembering, as also of Recognising (the facts of past experience).
123. Therefore when the contact of the object with the sense-organ is present, the person,—though specifying the object, through Memory, by means of its own characteristics,—comes to have the sensuous perception of that object.
124, And this (perception) being dependent upon the Senses, is rightly attributed to them (५.९. called ‘ Sense-perception ’); and that which is produced without the contact of the senses is not called ‘ Sense- perception.’
125. All cognition, that follows from frequent specifications of this sort, is said to be ^“ Sense-perception,” in accordance with their connection contact or with the organs of Sense.
126. Because the objects ina lying-in room (which is closed on all sides) are not visible to those who have just entered it, from outside; that does not lead to the conclusion that such objects are not perceptible by the Senses.
19 It is urged that “it has already been declared that sense-perception is the cognition bronght about by the action of the sense-organs; the specifications however are arrived at through the remembrance of the class and action, &c., of the object; but the sense-organs have no capacity of remembering; hence a concrete cognition can never be sensuous.’’ In reply to this, it is said that this objection wonld apply to us if we held that the sense-organs serve to specify the objects, after having remembered the class, &c. As a matter of fact, however, we do not hold any such view; in fact, the sense-orgaus are only the means of cognition ; and the cognition and its memory in- here in the Soul. Therefore our theory is not open to the objection based upon the gncapability, of the senses, to remember.
128 A man happens to see a certain object helonging to one class; and after somo time when he happens to see another object of the same kind, he remembers the fact of his having previously seen the former object; and then he comes to recognise the two objects as belonging to the same class. And the latter object being still before his eyes, be comes to have २ well-defined and specified “ Sense-perception” of the object; in as much as the operation of the sense-organ continues all along.
199 That is to say, even though it is aided by Rememberance, the causal efficiency belongs to the senses themselves.
125 Thongh there may be many such specifications, yet, so long as they are brought about in accordance with Sense-contact, they cannot bat be included in the name ८ Seuse-perception.”
186 That is to say, the name ‘‘ Sense-perception ” is not restricted to snch percep- tions alone as are produced immediately after the operation of the Sense-organs.
12
90 CLOKAVARTIKA.
127. And just as in this case, the persons, at first, apprehending only a semblance of the objects, subsequently-come to have a clear and definite perception of their real form; so, in the same manner (would one come to have a definite cognition) of the specific properties (class, d&c.), of the object (after having had an undefined idea of these).
128. If, after having observed an object (in the abstract), one were to close his eyes and then determine the object (in the concrete) ,——this would not be Sense-perception, because of its not following from a contact of the Sense-organ.
129. The Soul and the rest could be the cause also of such concrete cognitions, as are not connected with the Seuse-organs ; therefore the only reason, why concrete cognitions are attributed to the Senses, lies in the fact that the Sense-organ alone isa means that brings about only such cognition as is connected with the senses.
130, In the undefined abstract cognition also, the Sense is not the
127 In the instance cited, though, at first, the person perceives only the semblance of the two objects, yet, anbsequently, he comes to have 8 definite peroeption of the objects themselves; but this too is brought ahont by means of the eyes alone. In the 82.106 manner, in the case of definite concrete cognition, thongh the firat contact of the sense would only give rise to an undefined abstract cognition, yet, anbseqnently—the contact of the Sense-organ continuing all the time—the person wonld come to have a well-defined perception of the various 8066180 properties—genus, property, &c.—of the objects; and it 16 this that conetitutes concrete cognition. And as the Sense-contact hae all along continued to operate, 600 cognition cannot but be called ^“ Senee-percep- tion.”
128 Becanse the closing of the eye has cnt off the Sense-contact.
129 (718 Karika anticipates the following objection: ‘‘The Meane of Coucrete Cognition are manifold,—such aa the Soul and the rest; in that case, why ehould enoh cognition be specifically attributed to the organs af Senge, and be called sensuous?’ The sense of the reply is that names are given to chjecta, in accordance with such an aspect of it, as belongs exclusively to the object in qnestion. In the present instance the agency of the senses alone is ench as belongs exclusively to Concrete Cognition, the agency of the Soul, d&c., belonging aleo to other kinds of cognition—euoh as the Inferential, Verbal, &o., and as such it ig only right that it shonld be called sensuous.
180 The 8४ half of this Karika implies that the objection pointed ont in the last note doee not hold. If it be urged that “the Concrete Cognition, following, upon Abatract Cognition, must be held to have thia latter for ite cause, and cannot be attri- buted to the senses,’—then, we reply that even then, inasmuch as it is bronght about, throngh the intervention of Abstract Cognition, by means of the eenses alone, it can be oalled “‘Sensucons.’ This would be qnite compatihle with ordinary usages ;—e.g., the name ^ pankaja” (clay-born) that ie given to the lotus, cannot belong to it literally 5 81066 the lotus is produced directly, not from the mud, but from the bulbous roct $ yet all the eame, the name does apply to the lotus, simply on the ground of ita being produced from the mud, through the intervention of the bulbous root. The assertion that— we would conventionally restrict the name Sense-perception to Conorete Cogni- tion "—impliea that if we did not oall in the aid nf conventional usage, the argament, baeed upon the fact of ite being intermediately produced by the senses, would apply to Inference also, whioh too would come to he called Sense-perception, as being produced
APHORISM IY. 91
only cause. Or, the name ‘Sense-perception’ might be said to apply, by conventional usage, to that which is produced intermediately thereby (५,९.) by senguous perception),—as in the case of the word ^ Patkaja.”
131. Or, this conventional usage too may not apply to the case of such concrete cognition as is of itself (naturally) known to be sensuous, which is not the case with abstract cognition.
132, For us all meanings of words, are comprehended, through the usage of old (experienced) people. And the sense in which a word has been used by these (old people), cannot be separated from it.
133. It is only the observation (and classification) of established facts, that ought to be done by enquirers; and a certain fact which is known to all men as established, cannot be set aside by (newly-devised) definitions.
134. Again, how can dependence on Sense-organ be said to apply to the Self-recognition of the cognition? If it be urged that “the mind would serve as the requisiste Sense-organ, in that case,”—then the same would also apply to the case of (such specifications of ‘class,’ &c., as) the class ‘‘ cow ” and the 1216.
135. If it be urged that it is only meant to be applicable to ‘ Self- recognition,’’—(we reply that) people do not mean it so. Therefore we must have recourse either to usage, or to conventional technicality.
186. And again, as the sensuous character of pleasure pain, &c., ig due to the fact of the mind being a Sense-organ, so, in the same manner,
by the senses intermediately. What the author 2169116 16 that the word ^ Sense-percep- tion’ is “ yagaridha.”
138 Thie anticipates the objection that we find people using the name “ Sense- perception” with regard to Concrete Cognitioa, and yet we find that the correct definition of the name does not apply to such Cognition.
134 If Concrete Cognition is not accepted to be sensuous,—how can the Baddhist pay that the cognition of the cognition, by itself, is due to the action of the senses? For such Self-recognition cannot proceed directly, from any Sense-organ.
135 “ Qnly meant to be, 4९. -- १9668 प88 the mind, being an internal organ, coald not apply to external objects; bnt the Self-recognition of Cognition is a parely internal process, and as snch, could be effected by the internal organ of the mind. The sense of the reply is that people accept the applicability of the mind even to the perception of external objects—like the class ‘cow’ and the like.
५ We must have recourse, Jc.”—The sensuous charaoter of Self-recogoitioa being thus denied, it ia only Coucrete Cognition that can be sensuous. And if it be urged that—“inasmach as the mind is an internal organ, and Concrete Cognition does not follow directly from Sense-contact, such Cognition cannot be sensugus,’’—we reply that since we have already proved the sensuous character of 0००५२९४8 Cognition, if yon do not find it to be directly amenable to the function of any of the eleven organs of sense, you must have recourse to technicality, or couyertional usage, on which would be baaed the fact of Concrete Coguition being ineluded in “ Sense-perception ;” sinoe the sensuous character of sach Cognitian cannot, ip any case, be denied.
189 The opponent aleo accepts Pleasure aud Pain ४9 be sensudwe.
92 । CLOKAVARMIKA.
would the sensuous character of the specification of class, &c., also be due to the same cause. car
137. Aud, as in your case, even when the fact of depending upon the mind is the same (in the case of all cognitions}, you specify it as “undefined abstract cognition,” and thus accept only certain’parts thereof to be seusuous,—so, the same could be done in our case also.
138. On account of the absence of the ‘ Linga’ (middle term), this (concrete cognition) cannot be said to be Inferential, &c. And on account of there being no notion of any contradiction, it cannot be said to 16 unauthoritative.
139. And again, on account of its not having been perceived before, it cannot be ‘‘ Remembrance.” Therefore it must be ‘ Sensuous’; such is also the common usage and belief.
140. ^ Olass, &c., being objects foreign to the object perceived, the notion thereof in connection with the object, which is not identical with them (Class, &c.), can only be a case of false attribution ; and as such it is similar to the ordinary misconceptions of the mirage and the like.”
141, It is not so; because it is not possible that the cognitions of a horse and other objects, should always be cases of false attribution; specially
137 Like Abstract Cognition, Concrsta Cognition is brought about by the mind; and yet the Buddhist defines sensuous perception, as undefined and abstract; and thereby confines sensuousness to ths eelf-recognition of Cognitions, and denies it in the case of such cognitions as that of the class ‘‘cow.’’ In the sams manner, sven when the fact of being produced by the mind is comman to Senss-perception, Inference, Analogy, &c., we could restriot the name tothe cognition of such ohjscts as are not removed from the Sense-organs. That 18 to say, as ths other party restricts the name to one class of Cognition, dogmatically, without any reasonable grounds for so doing,—we could also do the same. The Karika refers to the objection that—“ if the mere fact of being produced by the sense of mind bs the sole criterion of Sense-psrception, then Inference, &c., would also become included init.” The sense of the reply is that as the Buddhist dogmatioally excludes all other cognitions, except the Abstract, from «४ Ssnse-perosption,” we wenld 8180 dogmatically axclnde Inferencs, &९.
188 As Concrete Cognition cannot be sither Infersntial, or Verbal, or based npon Analogy; nor can it he said to be altogether untrustworthy $ it must bs accepted nas ‘“ Sense-perception’’ thers being no gronnd for our denying such acceptance.
140 This Karika embodies the Vedantic objection: “ We grant that Concrete Cogni- tion cannot be Inferential, &o.; but we cannot agres to its being always authoritative. Beaause Concrete Cognition consists in the attribution of Class, Action, &c., to an altogether different object (viz., the individual object of perception); and as such, it cannot bnt be false.”
141 Says the Nyd@yaratnakara: “Class, &., are not altogether different from the Individual. It is a fact of common experionce that the individual ‘cow’ is recognised as such, only when it is found to be identical with the Class ‘cow’ (without which it could naver he known 88 ‘cow’). This oonld not be, if the Indivi- dual wero totally different from ths Class. Such recognition of the identity of the Individual with the Class is the only means of knowing the Class; hence there must be an identity between the Individual and the Class.”
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as we hold that the 7455 (Action and Property) are not totally different from the Individual (object of perception).
142. If the qualification were entirely different from the qualified, then, how could the qualification always produce, in the qualified (object), a cognition precisely similar to itself ?
143. The perception, of the colour of shellac in a piece of rock- crystal, belongs only to the ignorant, and is false (mistaken),—for the wise, there is a recognition of difference (between the real form of the crystal, and the reflected one of shellac).
144. Whereas the individual object has never been seen as separated from Class, &c,; nor have these latter heen cver seen apart from the individual,—as is the case with the rock-crystal and the shellac.
145. In the case of the crystal and shellac too, if the difference were never perceived by anybody,—whereby could the apparent correctness of the perception of the red colour (in the rock-crystal) be ever set aside ?
146. Nor can there be any assumption of an extraneous relation subsisting among objects proved to be inseparable. Because there can be no such relation between unaccomplished objects. Andif a member of the relation be said to be accomplished (before the relation is established) then there is no inseparability.
147, Such being the case, there is no ground for postulating a
142 “ Qualification” —Class, Action and Property. ‘“ Qualified’*—the Individual object. If the Class were something other than the Individual, then the idea of the latter could not be invariably concomitant with that of the former.
143 The Vedanti urges that if ‘‘Sense-perception” were always authoritative, then the notion of redness in the crystal would also be true. The sense of the reply 18 clear.
144 The crystal and the lac are not alwaye found to be concomitant; while the Individual is invariably fonnd to be concomitant with the Class, and vice vers. Therefore the instance of the crystal and lac cannot apply to the present case.
145 If the crystal were always accompanied by the lac, and if it were inseparably connected with it, then the perception of redness in the crystal could not bnt be accepted as true.
146 The Vaicéshikas hold that Class, Action, &c., are entirely different from the Individual; and they are found to he invariably concomitant with the latter, simply because they are inseparably related to it, by the permanent relation of ‘Samavaya’ (Inherence). The Sense of the objection to this theory is that no relation can subsist between any two objects, that are not already known to be established entities; and thns, if either member of the relation be accepted as being an established entity, prior to the assertion of the relation, then the inseparability ceases. Hence no relation between inseparable objects being possible, there can be no such thing as “ Samavaya.”
141 “ Such being the case, 4८.77 - (616 being no inseparability, there is no reason to assert any such relation as the “Samavaya.”’ And thns no relation being perceptible, we could not recognise either the Individual or the Class. And there boing no gronnd, for relation, there could be no relation among the categories—among which the only relation held by the Vaicdshika to subsist is that of “Samavaya,’ which has been proved to be non est.
94 CLOKAVARTIKA.
relatiou (between the Class and the Individual); nor could we recognise any relation to subsist among the six categories themselves.
148. The separation from Samavaya would lead to mutnal separation {among objects said te be related by Samavaya); and if the existence of these were certain, then there would be no limit; because of its being accompanied by another, and so on, ad infinitum.
149. If it is urged that the “ Samavaya being identical with the form (of the objects themselves), no assumption of auy other relation 18 necessary,”—then on acconnt of this identity, the Samavaya may be only a particular form of the qualification and the qualified ( Class and Individual).
150. Because if it (Samavaya) is different from them (the objects Class and Individual), then it cannot subsist as a relation (between these two); if, on the other hand, it he identical with these two, then they
cannot be different (from one another).
151. “But the object—such as the ‘cow’ f. i-not being perceived apart from ita properties, it would he only an aggregate of these properties {and have no independent existence of its own,—like the forest and other like things).”
152. The Object is that which permeates through such (properties) as have the character of appearance and disappearance, prior to the
eomprehension of the properties themselves. 153. Therefore the object—that is perceived, by people, in the form
148 The question 38--^“ 18 the Samavdya itself related to the objects smong whom it is said to subsiet, or is it not?” If it is not, then there can be no Samavdya with regard to the objects. And 1 1४ is, then this relation of Samavaya with the objects would stand in need of another relation, and so on, there being no end of Samavayas.
149 The objection 18 that Samavaya is nothing more or less thau the forms of the objects themselves. The reply ia that in that case, the Vaicéshika drifts towards our theory; inasmuch as we 8180 assert that the objecte—the qualification ‘Class’ and the qualified ‘Individual,’ betwoen which you assert the relation of Samavaya—are identi- oal; and you also hold that the relation between them is thet of identity, which comes to the same thing.
181 The meaning of the objection is that the object is uot found to differ from its properties; it ie only an agglomeration of the properties; just as the forest is only the collection of trees in it; and further, we have only five senses; and 811 these have their purpoge only in apprehending five sets of properties. Consequently, as there is no sixth sense, we cau never perceive anything hesides these properties.
152 The sense of the reply to the last Karika is that the properties—colour, f£.i.— have the character of appearing and disappearing—e.e., the greenness of the frnit dis- appears, and yellowness appears; therefore it 18 that which conforms with both these properties (the oae going and the other coming), whioh is the object, the fruit; and this must be different from both greenness and yellowness; inasmuch as while the former hae disappeared, and the latter has appeared, the fruit itself has all along ०००. tinued the same; and it is [0881016 to have a cognition, (though only undefined and in the abstract) of the fruit, as apart from its properties.
168 This sums up the authoritative character of Conorete Cognition. = ^ Does not become, §c.’’—this refers to the Vedantio objection brought forward in Karika 140.
APHORISM IY. 95
of Class, &. (८ ¢., as specified by these)—does not, by this fact, become of another form; and henoe it cannot be untrustworthy.
154. That object, whose difference from its properties is clearly defined,—even of this, the identity (with the properties) being permanent, there can be no falsity (or untrustworthiness) of its concrete cognition.
155. It is only that which, while having one cognisable form, is cognised in another, that is false; and not that which is always coguised in its own permanent form,
156. That which is cognised by moré senses than one does not (only on that account) come to be of diverse forms; for if it were so, then any and every object would come to have diverse forms, on the ground of its being cognised by the (same) sense, as located in the bodies of different persons.
157. If it be urged that ^^ 19 this case the senses of all person would be of the same class, and as such in a way identical,’—-then we could have (the same in the other case also-—the non-difference heing based upon) the sameness of the class ^“ Sense-organ.” The class ‘ Being” too, is not diverse, because of its cognition being always the same (even though it is cognisable by all the five Sense-organs).
ˆ 158. Colour, Taste, Odour, &c., do not become identical with one another; because of the difference in their cognitions. The Singleness and
186 Thia anticipates the following objection of the Buddhiats: “ An ohjeot cognised by the 86568 of touch and sight would come to have diverse forms. For if even on the diversity of the comprehending organ, there were no diversity in the forms of the object comprehended, then there would be no difference between smell and colour, &>. If it be urged that the class ‘ Being’ is perceived by meana of all the five senses,—we deny this; beoause no such clase can he perceived by the five aensea. And if yon assert a commixtore of the Sense-organsa, then it would he superfluous to postulate more than one Seuse-organ—that of Touch, for instance; and the functions of all the other 8७868 might be accepted as congregating in thia alone.” The sense of the reply is that the mere fact of heing cognised by more senses than one does not conatitnta sufficient ground for postulating a diversity in ita forma. For if that fact were the 8016 ground for diversity, then even the object perceived hy means of a single 6९686, would have to be takeu as diveree; inasmuch as the object ie cognised by many persona, and as suoh there is a diversity in the comprehending cence—this diversity being that of the sensea as belonging to various persons.
1657 The objector says that though the one sense—of Touch, f.i.,.—may belong to different persons, yet everyone of these is the “Sense of Touch”; and as such there 18 no real diversity in the comprehending organ. The meaning of the reply 18 that thongh the Sense of Touch may differ from the Sense of Sight, yet both equally are ‘*‘Sense;” and as such, in our oase too, there is no real diversity. Though the class ‘ Being’ is cognisable by all the senses, yet its cognition being of the same form, in all cases, it cannot he eaid to have many forma.
158 In the same manner, colour, taste, &c., cannot be said to be identical; because all of them are goguised ta be of the same character. We can however call these “gingle,” taking them as forning parts of the class “‘ Being,” and “ many” or “ diverse,” when they are taken in their respective individual forms of colonr, taste, &c.
96 CLOKAVARIIKA.
mantfoldness of these may be explained as being due respectively, to their being considered collectively as “ Being,” or individually, as ‘ Colour,” ‘* Taste,” ^ Odour,” &e.
159. In some cases, there being a commixture of various Sense- functions, we conclude that the Sense-organ functioning is not one; because in certain cases we have a definite idea as to the respective importance of the various Sense-functions, based upon the comparative strength aud weakness of the Sense-organs.
160-161. As for instance, in the case of the Mind, we find that with regard to Colour, &c., it functions in conjunction with the eye, and the other Sense-organs; while with regard to pleasure, pain, &c., we find it functioning independently by itself. The absence of commixture in one case does not necessitate its absence in every case; nor does the perception of commixture in one case necessitate its presence in another case.
162. Because we find that there is a remembrance of sound, even on the destruction of the ear ; and also because we find that on such destruc- tion, there is no perception of any present sound ;—we conclude that there is a definite standard (regulating the relative importance of the senses).
159 This Karika refutes the objection of the superfluonsness of postulating more than one 86088. The meaniog is that, because two functions of two senses become mixed up in the cognition of a single object, it does not follow that there is only ons Sense-organ; since as a matter of fact, we find that one, whose sense of vision is strong, and that of audition weak, sees distant objects, but does not hear distant sounds, and vice versd. Such adjustment of the Sense-functions conld not be possible, if the Sensg-organ were one only. Therefore, even though any two Sense-functions may become mixed up in the cognition of an object, get the two Sense-organs remain distinct.
160.61 These Karikas have in view the objection that “Coming across a commix- tnre of Senseg-functions, in the case of the cognition of Substance, wo might also iofer the commixture to belong to the cases of Colour-perception and the rest.’ The sense of the reply is that, that which has been seen to exist in one case, oannot necessarily be said to exist in every other case. As for instance, we find that, in the case of the cognition of colour, &c., we find the mind fnnctioning with the help of the external organs, the eye and the rest, whereas in the cases of Remembrance, Pleasure, and the like, the mind is found to function by itself 81008. In ths same manner, of the external organs, the eye, &c., also, there would be a commixtnre in the case of the cognition of substance, while in the cases of the perception of colour, sonnd, &c., each of these organs would be functioniog, each by itself.
169 This Karika explains how we come to infer the fixity of the applioation of the mind, fanctioning as stated in the last Karika. Inasmnach as we find that one, who is totally deaf, remembers sounds, and feels pleasure, &0.,—we infer that, for remember- ing and feeling pleasure, &c., the mind functions independently of the external Sense- organs. On the other hand, we find that the deaf are incapable of perogiving any sounds at the present time; and thence we conclude that in the perception of such sounds, &c., the mind stands in need of the external Sense-organs.
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168. Ifthe Sense-organ were only one, in all cases, then either every- thing or nothing would be perceived. Ifit be urged that we postulate different capacities (or functions) of the same Sense-organ,—then, these capacities themselves could be said to be so many distinct organs of sense.
164. A deaf person would also hear sounds, if (in the perception of sound) there were a commixture with the eye, &c.; and also if the mind were independent (of the external organs) with regard to the cognition of present objects. i
165, The deaf person could not remember any sound, if the ear were the sole cause of memory; or (if you assert his remembrance to be spontaneous, and not due to any cause, then), like remembrance, he would also have a cognition of the present sound (which is not possible).
166. And on the other hand, there could not be any subsequent remembrance of the sonnd, if the mind had no share in its comprehension, at the time of its cognition by the ear; nor could there be the non- remembrance of all other things (at the time of the perception of sound).
167. If the person were not dependent upon the Sense-organs, then he would have a simultaneous cognition of all things at once; because by himself, he consists of pure consciousness.
168. Therefore in some places, we must accept exclusive fixity, as well
163 The postulating of five different functions for any One Sense-organ, is the same as postulating five distinct Sense-organs.
164 Jf there were commizture alone, there could be no restriction. “ If the mind, §c.’—Becanse though the deaf have no ears, yet they have their minds intact,
166 This Karika anticipates the following objection: ‘The cognition of sound could be explained as being due solely to the ear ; why oallin the aid of the mind?” The sense of the reply is that, there could not boa remembrance of any particular sound, if the mind had nothing to do with its previous perception. And further, we find that an absent-minded person, though with his eyes all right and qnite open, is nnable to see anything. And again, after «a certain ohject—sound, f.i—has heen perceived, one does not, by that means, remember all other objects, colour, and the rest. Therefore we conclude that the mind, the organ of remembrance, has got something to do with the perception of objects. Becanse if we were to accept the agency of the mind with regard to memory, without admitting the fact of its having something to do with the object at the time of its being perceived by the Sense-organ, then we would be landing ourselves on an absurdity,—that of the perception of one object bringing about the remembrance of all other objects ; since, in that case, there would be nothing to restrict the agency of the mind to any particular object.
धि A scion of the Vedanti asserts that the Self itself consists of pure conscions- ness; and as such, all cognition is only natural to it; whence there is no necessity of having either external or internal organs of perception. The Karika means to say that if such were the cage, then all sorts of cognitions, of all things iu the world, would he crowding upon the person, all at once.
168 Throngh the character of their effect, in the shape of cognition, we infer the capabilities of the cogniser and the cognised ; and from these, we infer that, in certain cases,—as in that of colowr—there is no commiature; while in others—as in that of substance—we have a comminture.
13
98 OLOKAVARTIKA.
as commixture, in accordance with the character of the cognition,—these two being assumed, from the capabilities of the cognisable (object) and the cognising (organ), in accordance with the effects of these, in the shape of the resultant cognition.
169. The divisions, of the eye, &c., as well as colour, &c., are limited to five only. Therefore though there are many such subdivisions as the Blue, Red, &c., yet there is no necessity of postulating innumerable organs (for the perception of each of these).
170. For this reason, we conclude that it is by means of all the five organs of sense that we have the cognition of the class “ Being” and the class “Quality”; of the “ Substance ” and the “ Shape” (of objects), the cognition is cansed by fwo (Sight and Touch) ; and of Colour and the rest, by ouly one (the eye, &c. one by one).
171. (Obj.). “ Though identical with the Class, &c., yet the idea (of an ohject) would be false, on account of its being brought abont, through identification with the word ;—as is the case with the idea of Colour and the rest.” | 172. (Rep.). The cognitions of objects, as produced, are not in the form of identification with words. Because the ideas produced by words are exactly similar to those that have been brought about before the use of the words.
173. (Obj.). “But the idea of the form of the cow, in the shape of the class cow, §c., never appears, until there has been a recognition of the relation subsisting between the word ‘cow’ and the object (it denotes).”
169 As we have the restricted applications of the Sense-organs, to such objects as Taste, Colour, &c.,—i.e., the cognition of colour is restricted to the eye and 60 on; therefore we accept these as five distinct organs; but in the case of Blue, Red, &९.)
there is no such restriction,—all colour being equally perceptible by the eye alone,— therefore these are not accepted as separate subdivisions.
110 This 808 up the conclusions arrived at.
1711 The 86०86 of the objection embodied in the Karika is this: “ The object being identical with Class, Action and Property, we grant the trustworthiness of the coguition of such identity; bat the word, in which this idea is expressed, i something quite different (from the object, and the Class, &c.); therefore the idea, as identified with (१.९. expressed in) the words, cannot but be false. Such words as ‘Cow’ and the like denote the Class, Action and Property; and as 6161, Specify such class as being specific forma of themselves; and then subsequently, they determine the particular individual object, as specified by auch Class, &८, Thus then though there is no falsity attaching to the object as identified with the Class, &0., yot the identification of the Class, &c., with the Words cannot be true. The proper name of different objecta too serve to represent euch objecta as identical withthe names; and this identification of objects with words cannot but be false.”
“The idea of colour, J’c.—t.e., just as the identification of the colour blue, with the word ‘bine ” is false.
119 That is to say, the idea that we have of objeots is not in the form of words ३ 1.6 our cognition of an object is not always accompanied by a verbal expression of the same’
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174. ‘And if that (which appears in the particular ‘ cow’) were the form of the Class, &c., then even one who does not know the word ‘cow’ would recognise the animal (as belonging to such and such a class, which is an absurdity), Thus then, both by Affirmative and Negative premises we couclude that the object is identical with the Word.”
175. (Rep.). Just as Colour, Taste, &c., are recognised, in their own form, as different from one another, even before their expression in words,— so would it also be in the case in question. The fact of these having different names (expression in words) is something quite different (from the objects themselves),
176. Nor can an object be said to be not cognised, simply because it bas not been specified by words. Therefore even he, who does not know the word, can recognise the class ‘ Cow,’ &e.
177. Even in the case of a cognition produced by contact with the sense of hearing, there is no attribution of identity with words ; because there is a difference between the object and the word, based upon the fact of these being cognised by the Eye and the Har (respectively).
178, It is only in the ascertainment of one property of an object with innumerable properties, that the word serves as the means; and it could in no case, be the cause of the imposition of its own identity (upon the object).
179. Nor is it possible for the form of the means to be imposed upon
7 ‘The affirmative Premiss is: ‘“‘ The idea of the class (‘cow’) is bronght about only when the relation between the word (‘cow’) and the object (the Class) has been duly ascertained”; and the Negative Premiss is: ‘One who does not know the word can have no idea of the object, as belonging to any particular class.”
176 Just as we have the cognition of Colour, Taste, &c., in the abstract, even before the cognition of any relation between the word aud the object,—so, in the sume manner, we could also have the cognition of Class, &c., even before they come to be expressed in words, in their own specific forms, and not in the form of the words (subsequently recognised as denoting them). One who knows the words is able to remember the names of the class, &c., as something over aud above the specific formg of the words; and thereby he comes to give expression to them in words.
116 Tt has been argued in the “ Vakyapadiya” that ‘‘one who does not know the word cannot have any idea of the class, because no expression in words is possible for him; and there can be no snch idea, in the absence of a corresponding verbal expres- sion.” It has also been declared that “In the world there is no idea which is not expressed in words; all idea is cognised only as expressed in words.” The Karika objects to this theory.
171 Hven in the case of = cognition accompanied by Words, there is no notion of an identity between the Word and the Object; because the object is perceived by the Hye, while the Word is cognised by the Har; and as such, the cognitions of these being radically different, they can never be identical.
118 Words have their ०86 only in defining or singling out one out of the many properties of an object; in no case do they lead to any notion of their identity with the object.
100 GLOKAVARTIKA.
its object; for it cannot in any way be held that the form of the lamp or of the Sense (of sight), is imposed upon the Colour perceived
180. If the class ‘Cow’ be always cognised in the form of the wo1 d,—. then, inasmuch as no other form is cognised, how could there be any difference between them, or any attribution of the form of the one to the other ?
, 181. And again, if there be nou-difference, in reality, there can be no falsity (in the identity); and if there be any difference in their forms, then there could be no chance of the suid imposition; and the assumption of such imposition would only be erroneous.
182. It is only by means of words that there can be any description (or mention) of the object that has been cognised. And for one who. would describe either the object or the word, or the Idea, the only expres-. sion that he could use is “the cow
183. And on account of this identity of expression (or description), 1116 hearer comes to conceive the identity, of the word, the idea and the object, with the expression (used by the speaker)
184. Though the cause of error is the same (in both cases) if is the cognition and audition that are known as imposed upon the object, and not the object upon those.
185. As a matter of fact however, the idea of the cow (the object) 18 in the form of ‘an animal with dewlaps, &c.’; of the ‘word’ (G4) is in the form of the letters ‘Ga,’ &c.; and that of the ‘zdea’ of these two is without any (external) shape.
186. If the object were always cognised to be identical, in form, with
180 If the Individual and the Class were both cognised in the form of the Word alone, then the Clase and the Word, ‘both being eternal, there wonld be an absolate non-difference between the two; and thereby there conld he no attribution of the form of the Word on the Object or Class. Thatisto say, the Class being cognised in the form of the Word, and in no other form, it would become non-different from it.
181 “ Tmposition "~ which has been noted and denied in 179.
18 That 18 to say, the Object, the Word, and the Idea of the objeot, can all be described by the expression ‘‘the cow”; the Word only serves 868 the means of describing to othera what one hae eeen. And it 18 from this fact that arises ths erroneous notion that the word is identical with the object
183 The hearer reasons thus: “ 26081186 the epeaker uses the same expression in
the case of all the three, therefore he must also, necessarily, have ths same idea with regard to them, &., &o.”
186 That is to say, the aforesaid imposition is ouly an error; as a matter of fact ths form of the idea is different in each case
186 Some peopls hold that the Word only serves to denote its own form; and they declare that there is an imposition of thie form upon the individual Object. The Karika objects to this view, on the ground that, if the object denoted hy the Word were identical with the Word, then we would have the absurdity of there being no difference between such objects aa the playing dice, the treo Terminalia belerica and other objects, that aro all expressed by the same word “ Aksha”; for the word romaining
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the word,—then in the case of such words as “ Aksha” (and others with several meanings), the (different objects), dice and the rest, would also come to be identical.
187. If it be urged that “ there may be such an identity,’”—(we reply) that such identity is never recognised before the use of the word. If it be urged that “the same may be the. case with the class cow, &c.,” we deny this; because in this latter case we always see only one form.
188. In the case of the plant terminalia belerica and the other two (denotations of the word Aksha), there is no conformity of any one property ; the only common factor being the denotability by the word ‘Aksha’; and thus it is different from words denoting a class (in which there 18 con formity of properties among the various individuals constituting the Class).
189. In the case of the word ‘Aksha’ however, we find three forms entirely different from one another. This could not be possible if there were any imposition of the form of the word; as there is no difference in the form of the word ^ Aksha,” (which continues to be the same, what- ever meaning it may be taken to denote).
190. If it be urged that “the word ‘Aksha’ may be different (in each case) ”’—we deny this; because as a matter of fact whenever this word is. used, there is always a doubt as to its present signification, which would not be possible, unless the word remained the same (in the case of all its significations) ; and secondly, we also actually find that the form of the word is precisely the same (in all cases).
191. In the case of such words as “bhavati” and the like,—-where
the same, the forms of the objects, being identical with it, could not be different: from one another.
187 The objection in the first half belongs to the Bauddha theory that the function of a Word lies only in the exclusion of everything other than the object denoted by it; and as such the meaning of the word “ Aksha’” would only be the “ negation of all that is not-Aksha”; and in this form, there cannot but be non-difference among the objects denoted by the Word. The Author replies that we do not recognise any such identity, prior to the use of the Word; and without the recognition of such a relation (which according to the Buddhist is necessary in the denotation af the Word), the Word cannot have any meaning, The objection raised in the second half of the Karika means that “ the Mimansaka also holds the Class ‘Cow’ to he one only; and as such, he will also have to face the absurdity of the non-difference among thonsands of individual cows.” The reply to this is that, for the Mimansaka, there is no such absurdity, inasmach as all the individnal cows are actually found to he identical (similar) to one another, in their main shape, (the only difference being in the miuor details),
190 Whenever a word with several meanings is used, there is always a doubt as to its true signification, which would not be possible, if the word did not remain the same in all cuses. The theory here refnted is that the Ward does not really consist of the letters, hut of the “ sphota,” which is held to be peculiar to each word, and on which depends the signification af the word.
८ 19 ^ Bhavati”’—(1) the Locative of ‘Bhavan’ (you), and also (2) the form in the ‘Present Tense, Third Person, Singular of the root.‘ bhi”? (to be). .
102 CLOKAVARTIKA.
there is a difference based upon (the word in one case being) a Pronoun, and (in another case) a Verb,—the form remains the same; and as such, if there were any imposition (of the form of the word upon the object), we would have non-difference in the two meanings (of the word taken as a Pronoun, and as a Verb).
192. The formation of the word being precisely the same in both cases (bhavati, as a Prononn, and as a Verb), how can the verbal expression be said to have the character of something to be accomplished? Or agam, how could the shapeless (immaterial) word have a shaped (corporeal or material) signification ?
193. If the words ‘cow,’ ‘horse’ and ‘white’ were independent of the form of the objects denoted, how could there be any restriction as to the denotations of these, as resting in ‘class’ ‘ quality,’ &९. ?
194, The difference between the words ‘“‘Tree’’ and “The Fig-tree” being exactly the same as (that) between (these and) the words “Jar,” &c.,—how could there be in the case of the former couple, any relation of the general and the particular, if we did not take into consideration the forms of the objects (independently of the words) ?
195. Nor could there be any co-substrateness (of the object denoted and the Idea produced by the word), as (there is none) in the case of the
192 Ag in the case of the pronoun, so also in that of the Verb, the Werd is equally complete and accomplished. And then if the ferm of the Word were imposed upon (and identical with) that of the Meaning, hew conid the meaning of the Verb be said to be in the course of compietion? Fer the verb ‘ pachati’ does not eignify the completion of the action of cooking; it only signifies that the ‘action of cooking is in progress. Some people, again, hold the ehject to be a particular modification of the Word; and this is refnted by the latter sentence of the Text. The meaning of the K3rik’ 18 that a material modification can beleng only to a material primary. In the case in question, however, the word being immaterial, cannot have material medifica- tions in the shape of the jar, &c.
193 If it was the mere form of the Word that was imposed upen the ebject deneted,— witheut any idea of the class, &c.—how could we say that “ euch and such a word denotes the class, and another denotes the property.”
199 You say that the form of the object aignified hy the Word is identical with the form of the Word itself. But you see that the difference hetween the words ‘“‘ Tree” and “Fig” would, in that case, be exactly the same as that between the werdsa ‘‘ Jar” and “Tree”; and then what does this lead to? It cannot but lead te the conclusion that the relation that eubsiste between the twe ebjects Tree and Fig is exactly the same as that which anhsists hetween the Tree and the jar; which would mean that there 18 no relation between the generic term ‘''Tree”’ and the particular term ^ Fig.”
196 In such inatances as the “ blue lotus’? (where there is a co-substrateness between the property blueness and the class lotus), aa there is no co-substrateness hetween the Word and the Idea, there would be none between the Idea and the Object denoted ; because, acoording to you, it is the Word itselfthat is denoted; and as there are two words in the compound “ bine lotus,” the object denoted hy it cannot be one ; and as the ohjeota are two, there can be no co-substrateness between the concept “ bine lotus’? and the objects denoted by the two words. If it be urged that “‘as in the case
APHORISM IY. 103
word and the Idea. Nor can two distinct Ideas cohere in one undefined (abstract) cognition.
196. If it be urged that ‘the coherence is in the Substance (in general) ’—theu, all such words, as ‘cow,’ ‘horse,’ &c., would come to
have one and the same meaning; because all these words signify a substance.
197. The expression ‘blue lotus’ too is not used with reference to a particular case of non-difference (between blueness and lotus); for if it were so, then the expression could not be used elsewhere (४.९.) in the case of another blue lotus); whereas we see that such use is desirable.
198. Nor do you accept the object “blue lotus” to be one only, (and reasonably so),—-because (in the compound ‘blue lotus’ ) we recognise a
of the theory of tle denotnation of Class, &., by the Word, the words ‘blue lotus’ give rise to only one conception in the abstract, (7.e., the abstract Idea of the Blue Lotus), 80, in our case too, we could assert that there is co-substrateness between the concept ‘blue lotus,’ and the aforesaid abstract Idea,’——to this we reply that ia your case, there is nothing to regulate the abstract signification of the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus.’ In our oase, we assort the word “blue” to denote a property and ‘ lotus’ to denote an individual of the class ‘‘lotus;’ and hence we find the relation of the qualification and the qualtfied subsisting between the two ; and thereby we make “ lotus” the chief member of the componnd, which {20८ serves to restriot the abstract Idea to the lotus and not to the blueness. While according to you, both words signifying their abstract Ideas, there would he nothing to restrict the abstract denotation of the com- pound to anyone of the two objects, Says the Kagika: “Two ideas are said to be co-substrate only when they are found to inhere in the same substrate. In accordance with the Imposition Theory, where can they cohere? For they cannot do so in the specific Abstract Property (‘‘Swalakshana,”) ; because this is not definable. In onr theory however, there can be such co-inherence, inasmuch as we assert that a portion of the denoted object enters into the Abstract Idea produced by the Wood,”
196 Tt hag been shown above that there can be no co-inherence in the ‘ swalakshana’ of the signification of the compound “blue-lotus.” Under the circumstances, if the co-inhierence be held to be in the substance in general—t.ec., if the co-substrateness of ‘lotus’ and ‘blue’ be held to be located in their generic character of ‘ Substance ’— then inasmuch as this latter is the same in the case of all siguificant words, all objects denoted hy words would become co-substrates with one another.
191 If the expression “blue lotus” were held to be restricted to one such lotus in particniar, then there would be no use of the expression in the case of any other such lotus; and this is not desirable.
198 You do not admit of any such class as “blue lotus”—which would include many individual blue lotuses; and as such, you cannot base the use of the compound upon any snch class, which is the only way of applying one name to many objects. And further, you do not even admit any single object, as blue lotus; which you conld very reasonably accept, in accordance with your theory that the objects are identical with the words denoting them. Though such acceptance would not be right, inasmuch 28 “blue” and “lotus” are two distinct words, and as such they form the two members of a compound, and accordingly they have two distinct forms, whence they must be taken to signify two distinct objects; for the simple reason that the imposition of the forms of two distinct words caunot result in the denotation of a single object.
104 GLOKAVARTIKA.
difference, of words and meanings, based upon the (two) members (of the compound). |
199. We also come across cases of the imposition of two words (upon the same object) ; e.g., in the case of synonyms; and in such cases, these too would become co-substrate, like the expression ‘ blue lotus.”
200. A word is never used with reference to any object that has not been perceived before; and then, at the time of the comprehension of the relation (between the word and the object), what sort of object would be cognised ? |
201. Because at that time it is not possible for the form of the word to be imposed upon that of the object; nor is the relation (of the word), .¢omprehended in reference to the particular object spoken of.
202. And if the power of imposing its own form belonged to the word, independently of the comprehension of the relation,—then, we would have such imposition of forms, even in the case of a word that is heard for the first time.
199 If in the case of ‘blne-lotus,” you assert the co-snbstrateness to consist in the fact of the two words being used in close proximity, then in cases where two synonyms are pronounced together, when the meacing of a certain word is being explaiced to others—e.g., ‘Utpalam Kamalam ’’—you wonld have to admit a co-sab- strateness of these words also, which is an absardity.
200 Says the Kacikd: ‘ A word is not able to signify an object, unless its relation to it has been ascertained; and, no stch relation can be ascertained, unless the object has been perceived. Therefore it wonld be a hard nut te crack, for the upholder of the Imposition Theory, to explain what sort of object is perceived at the time of the com- prehension of the said relation.” The qnestion implies that the object cancot be cognised in any way—ia accordance with the Imposition Theory. The next Karika explains why there can be no 8001 cognition of the object.
201 “ Because, Jc.” —t.e., becanse it is only after the relation has been ascertained that there is a conception of the idectity of the word with the object. The Kécika adds: “The object being, according to you, of the same form as the word, it cannot bring about any idea of snch form, unless it has itself been fully comprehended before- hand. Thus then the compreheusion of the relation wonld depend upou the imposition, and this imposition too would depend npoc a full comprehension of the relation; and we wenld have the fault of mutnal Inter-dependence.”
४४ Nor is the comprehension, ¥c.”—The relation of the word with its denotation is not comprehended with reference to any oue particular object—fi., the individual cow; for if it were 80, then the word (the name ^“ cow’) conld not be nsed with reference to any other individual of the same class (“cow’’); inasmuch as the relation is, as held by you, restricted to the former individual. And thns we would have to postulate endless relations—in fact, as many as there may be individuals that we come across.
202 1118 is to say, this would give rise to the absurdity that the meaning of a word would be fully comprehended, even by one who hears it for the first time, just as well as any other person, who may have kuown it for ever so long. If the imposi- tion of the form of the word on the ०9606 wore independent of any comprehension of the relation subsisting between the word and the object, then one who hears the word “cow” prououoced for the first time would also understand that it signifies a certain animal with dewlaps, &c.,—which is an absurdity, :
APHORISM ण, 105
203. For us, however, no remembrance of the object denoted results on the first utterance of the word, becanse the person does not yet know the object (it denotes). Whereas according to you the form of the object would be perceived in that of the words.
204. Justas with regard to objects, that form the denotations of unknown words, there is no idea of these (words as denoting such objects) ; 80 Similarly, in the case of words whose denotations are not known, (there is no idea of the object as deuoted by such words), even when the word has been heard.
205. Thus then, the denotations = (२.९. the objects) do not depend entirely npon words; on the other hand, since words have the function of recalling the (pre-cognised) object, therefore we come to recognise the dependence of these (words upon objects, and not that of objects upon words).
206. For these reasons, we conclude that it is only the form of the object, cognised at the time of the comprehension of the relation (between words and their denotations), that is cognised through the word also; and the (original) form of the object is in no case totally suppressed.
207. We do not in any way cognise the identity of the word, in the sdea, that is produced by the word, either iu the case of activity, or in that of cessation from activity.
208. If we accepted the theory of the imposition (of the form of words upon the objects they denote), then we would comprehend different meanings from the (synonymous) words—“ kara,” “hasta,” etc.; because there is a difference in the forms of these words.
209-210. The imposition of the identity of anything is found to be due either to similarity or to reflection. In the present case, however, we
208 The above objection does not apply to our theory ; because we hold that the comprehension of the meaning of a word depends npon a certain relation that subsists between the word and the object it denotes; and in the case cf the hearing of > word for the first time, as the hearer is unable to recoguise the relation that subsists between that word and its denoted object, he cau derive no conception from this word. Thig argument however does not serve the Imposition Theory ; because according to this, the form of the object is identical with that of the word; and hence as goon as the word igs heard (even though it be for the first time), there must follow the conception of the ohject, which is absnrd.
206 “ Supp essed ’==changed ; that is to say, when the word is used, the form of the object does not become changed into that of the word, as held by the Imposition Theory.
207 And heuce there cau be no “imposition ’’ of the form of the word upon the object.
209.210 We find that there is an “imposition ’’ of the identity of silver in the shell, on the ground of their similarity. There is also an imposition (or attribation) of identity in the case of the redness of the rose and the crystal, on the groand of the yedness being reflected in the crystal. But in the case of the alleged identity of the forms of the word and the object, we find none of the aforesaid grounds for imposition. Therefore we conclude that there is no such identity in this last case,
14
106 CLOKAVARTIKA.,
do not find in the word, any similarity with the ohject; nor can there be any reflection of the word,(on the object) which is at a distance from it ; uor could any reflection from a distance be possible in the case of an object which has no (bodily) shape.
211. And if the proximity (of the word) to the object were said to be due to the all-pervading character of words,—then every object would come to he reflected upon by every word.
212. And again, anything that is perceptible by a different Sense- organ cannot be the reflector of an object; for the perception of the sock erystal, even when having the reflection of shellac, is uot brought about by the Senses of Touch, ete.
213. If we accepted “ Imposition,” then Inference and Verbal Testi- mony would both become false; aud because of the falsity of all specifica- tion, there would also follow a negation of all things (through falsity).
214. If the opponent were to say “let it be so,’—then his own words also becoming untrustworthy (for the same reason), how could he make any true declaration? For certainly, no truth is cognised through false (untrastworthy) assertions.
215. Also from the arguments (we shall bring forward later on) against the Cinyavada, we infer the functions of the Uognition and Word ta be true; but the form of the object can never be dependent upon the word.
216. Therefore, even before the use of the word, those objects that are cognised by the ideas of distinctness, oneness, ete.,—of such objects, tl:e existence is ever real.
217. Kven in the case of such objects (Virtne, etc.), as are known only by words, though there can be no idea of the object, in the absence of the word,—yet the form of the object is not totally destroyed (४.९.) cannot be denied).
218. (As for instance) in the absence of tle eye, the form of colour is not perceived; but from this we do not conclude that the form of colour has been destroyed (and dves not exist).
219, The relation (between the word and the object) being eternal, it
212 The reflected and that which is reflected upon must both be perceived by the same Sense-organ,
28 1f all concrete cognition be said to be false,—as it must be in accordance with the Imposition Theory—, then all the Means of Right Notion, Inference and the rest, wonld become false; since every ene of these is based upon well-defined (concrete) cognitions. =“ Everything ’—i.e., all worldly affairs.
४16 After the use of the word, the conception of the object is always in keeping with some foregoing perveption. Hven in the case of objects, whose names are not known to us, we have such notions, as that of its being different from other objects, being only one in number, and so forth; consequently the existence of suoh objects oan uevor be denied.
219 1118 Karika has the following objection in view: “We grant that the form of the object is different from that of the word; tleu the case will be this, that in the vom.
APHORISM IV. 107
cannot be said that the object is never perceived in the form of the word (which is held to be imposed upon it); because alt men do not, at. one and the same time, pereeive the object in another form (१.९. in a form different from that of the word).
220. Ifit be urged that “the same (argument) would apply to the ease of (the cognition of the object as) being of the same form (as the word ),”—then (we reply that) when both of these cases are true, just consider whether the object itself is incapable of being denoted by that
word, or the cogniser himself is incapable of comprehending the significa- tion of the word ?
221-22. The negation and affirmation (of the denotability by the word) in the object, cannot both be possible; because of the two being mutually contradictory; whereas it is quite reasonable to lay down denota- tiveness and non-denotativeness (of the word), in accordance with the difference (in the capabilities) of the cognising persons ;—as in the case of the blind and the non-bhnd, with regard to the (perception of) colour (presented) before them. For these reasons the cognition, in the object, of the form of the word (2.e., the denotability of the object by that word),
prebension of the relation of the word and the object, the object wanld not be perceived in the form of the word; and it would be only after euch comprehension of the reja- tion, that the object would be cognised in the form of the word; and this would ultimately mean that the object, which hus not the form of the word, would come to be cognised as having the form of the word ; and this idea cannot but be wrong.’ Tha sense of the reply is that the relation between the word and its denotation being eternal, 1118 relation, even before its comprehension, subsista al! the same; and the object all along has the ‘capability of being denoted by that word; and it is only this capability tliat becomes manifested, after the dae comprehension of the aforesaid relation; and again it is thie capability that is meant, when we aay that “the object has the form af the word,”—which statement does not mean that the forma of the word and the object are identical. ‘But how do yon know that this capability is eternal?’’ For the eimple reason that, from the mere fact of one man not knowing tlie relation snbsisting between the word and the object, we cannot conclude that the relation is not known to any person in the world; and hence we cannot assert that all men, at one and the game time, are ignorant of the denotability of the object by the word. That is to say, thongh one may not know the object cow by the name ** Cow,” yet there are sure to be others who will know it by that name; and thus we find that the denotability of the object by the word cannot be,entirely denied at any time.
220 The sense of the objection is that, as has been said in the case of the denot- ability of the object,—that all men do not all at once recognise the object by a particular name—, 80 may it also be asserted that ‘all men do not, all at once, come to recognise the denotability of an object by a particular Word.’ It is said in reply that the reason- ing might truly apply to both cases; but if a little consideration 18 given to the point as to which of the two alternatives is the more reasonable,—(1-) either that the object itself ie not denotable by the word, because one man does not know it by that name, or (2) that such individual non-recognition only implies a certain incapacity in the man himself—, it would appear which is more acceptable and compatible with well- ascertained facts.
108 CLOKAVARTIKA.
belongs only to one who knows the word (as denoting that special object), and to none else.
223. (Obj.). “In such words (proper names) as ‘ Dévadatta’ and the like, we find a beginning of the assertion of the relation (subsisting between the name and the person) ; and therefore the object being (in this case) non-eternal, its conformity to the word (denotability ) would also be non-eternal.”
224, (Rep.). In such cases also (४.९.) in proper names) we accept the eternal character of the power of producing a cognition of the form of the word (with regard to the object), as belonging to the signified object and the signifying word; it is only the application of the name to a particular object that can be non-eternal (having a beginning in time).
225. Prior to such conventional application, no one ever cognises the denotability (by the word, of the particnlar individnal) ; and hence some people accept the falsity of (these), in accordance with the theory of Imposition.
226. The denotativeness of the word is held to be true, whenever the word serves as the 1068118 of bringing abont the idea of an individual object, exactly as it had been perceived before the word had been heard.
227. Or, granted that it is only after such conventional application,
928 In the case of proper names, the object and (hence) the relation being both transient, the denotability of the object by the name wonld also be transient; and hence it cannot be denied that the form of the word (which is not that of the nbject) is falsely attributed to the object. That 18 to say, the denotability of the object by its name is not always eternal; and 88 such, the argument based upon the eternality of such relations falls to the gronnd.
424 The word ^^ Dévadatta,” by ita natural denotative power, signifies the benedie- tion: may the gods give him to us; and in this sense, the name “ Devadatta”’ too, like the word ‘‘cow,’’ would have an eternal relation with its denotation, the afvresaid benediction ; and hence even in thia case there would be no false attribution of the denotubility of the object by any particular word. It is only the application of these proper uames to particular persoos or things, which has a beginning in time, and is, consequently, transient.
446 ‘The denotability of the individual by the name does not really exist; it only comes to be cognised by conventional application,—prior to which, ench denotability does not exist; and for the matter of that, it cannot exist, in reality, after the conven- tion either; and as such, all proper names are cases of false attribution.
226 The last Karika states the reply to the objection, according to a certain section of those theorists who hold the Imposition theory. The present Karika nffers a reply from the author’s own standpoint. As a matter of fact, there is no imposition ; all that the word does is to remind the hearer, of a particular individual, exactly as this had been perceived at the time of the comprehension of the relation of the word and the object. In no case does the word impose its own form upon the object.
327 This Karika anticipates the following objection: ‘‘Snoh names as Dittha and the like have never been used, before they were conventionally attached to certain objects ; and as such, these words cannot be said to remind one of an object.” The seuse of the reply is that tho capability of an object, of beiug remembered by means of a certain
APHORISM IV. 109
that the word comes {० indicate the denotability of the object thereby ; even then, this could not establish an identity of the object with the word.
228. Conventional restriction is put upon the case of the object which is denotable by all forms (of words), as also upon the case of the word which 18 capable of denoting all forms of objects.
229-30. In the case of the cogniser, who remembers (at the time of comprehending an object by means of a word) the relation between the word and the object,—the Idea that is produced, by the remembrance of a formerly perceived object, with reference to the object befvure his eyes, cannot but be accepted as Sense-perception.
230-31. (Hven in this case) the objects, severally amenable to Memory and Sense-perception, are distinctly discriminated: what are remembered are the word and the relation (of this word with the object seen before), and the character of Sense-perception may not belong to (the cognition of) these; but the mere fact of the non-sensuous character of these does not preclude Sense-perception from applying to the cognition of the object (before the eye).
232-33. Though the perception of the Cow at the present time is tainted by memory, yet itis perceived as clearly distinct from the previous concep- tion, both in iudividuality and in the ¢ime (of perception) ; and herein lies the occasion for the right notion (to be got at exclusively through the Senses).
name, 18 permanent, and as such, must be accepted as belonging to the object, even before the name bas been fixed by convention; and all that convention helps in doing is to manifest this ever-existing denotability ; and in no case can it serve to identify the object with the word.
2४8 Says the Kacika: “To the objeot itself belongs the capability of being denoted by all words; and hence whichsoever word may happen to be applied to it by con- vention, it comes to be accepted as being specially expressive of that object. Conversely, a word is also naturally capable of expressing all objects; and it comes to be restricted to य particular object, by mere convention, Thus far the author has set aside all chance of an identity of the object with the word.
229.39 With this begins the refutation of the theory that “verbal cognition is not trustworthy, because it is mixed np with memory.” When a person sees a particular cow, he at once remembers the cow he had seen 06016, and then remembers the relation which thaé particuar cow at that time had with the word “cow,” and then, lastly, Comes to recognise the object before him to be a “cow.’’ Though memory enters into the element of snch verbal cognition, yet as the cognition is that of an object before the person’s eyes, the fact of its being a perception (and as such authoritative) cannot be denied.
230.81 “* The mere fact, §c.”"—Because these conceptions are not ‘‘ Perception,” it does not necessarily follow that the cognition of the object too is not ‘ Perception.”
432.33 That is, the cow, that is seen at present, is perceived, not as being the same that was perceived in childhood (at which time it was pointed out to the person, for the first time),—but as something quite distinct from it individually (though belonging to the same class); and it is this individuality of the object that forms the subject of Sense-perception, which thus comes to be true.
110 - QLOKAVARTIKA.
233-34. That portion of Sense-perception, which had been perceived before, (i.e, the notions of the word and its relution), cannot be said to be perceived (exclusively by means of the Senses); but the present existence (of the individual object) is not got at by any previons con- ception.
234-35. That “it is only such cognition as is prior to remembrance that is called Sense-perception’’—there is no such command either of a king, or of the Veda.
235-36. Nor is the function of Sense-organs, after remembrance, precluled by any valid reason; and therefore this (fact of its follow- ing after remembrance) 81016 cannot make it (the function of the Sense- organs) faulty.
236-37. For these reasons we must accept, as ^ Sense-perception,” every conception that is produced by the contact of the Sense-organs with the objects (of perception),—whether it appears before or after remem- brance (it does not affect the fact of Sense-born conceptions being “ Sense- percepiion’’).
237-239. Just as those that are absent-minded do not recognise objects even in contact with their Senses, so also those that are deluded by similarity, &. But this does not imply the falsity (or untrnst- worthiness) of the perception of the object, by another person who can distinctly recognise it (rightly), even if it be of an extremely subtile character, by rightly discriminating it from other objects that may be similar to it.
239-41. Just as one who has been well instructed in music, is able to discriminate between its different notes, both ordinary and Vedic, such as the Shadja, Rshabha, &.; and those who have not been so instructed know all notes merely as music; but the non-recognition by these latter cannot lead to the couclusion that the recognition of discriminating persons is false.
241-42. For these (discriminating persons) correctly recognise the differences (between the different notes of music), even when the names (Shadja), &c., ave not mentioned.
233.84 This Karika seems to distinguish the part amenable to Memory from that amennble to present Senee-perception.
234-85 ‘hat is to say, we could accept such an apparently absurd assertion, only if either a king commanded its acceptance, or if it was directly laid down in the Veda.
237.39 If one man, either through absent-mindednese, or being deceived by the similarity of objecte, should fail to recogniae an object correctly,—thia alone cannot be snfficient ground for concluding that the conceptions of auch men 98 are attentive, and capable of detecting the minntest differences among objects, would also be wrong.
441.42 Joven whon the singer doe not name the different notes of the music, people knowing music and having trained ears, cun eneily detect the subtlest differences among them,
APHORISM IV. 111
242-43. So in the case of such objects as the class ‘“‘cow”’ and the like,—those that are not practised in the uses of words recognise the object only indistinctly ; whereas those that are well posted up in (mean- ings of) words cognise it distinctly.
243-44. Just asin tle case of objects endowed with Colour, Taste, & , a mau coguises only those factors (from among colour and the rest), whereof he is endowed with the corresponding Sense-organ; he can coguise nothing else, because he is without the requisite means (in the shape of the Sense).
241-45. Similarly among the means of discrimination (words), which- soever he comprehends,—of the denotation of such (a word) alone has he any cognition, through the help thereof.
2145-46. Therefore so long as the person has not found the means of discrimination (words), his cognition remains undefined.
246-47. For this reason, too, itis only when an object is recognised in the character of some other object, that there can be any falsity of the means of cognition; aud not when the object is recoguised in its own character.
247-48. Thus it is proved that the character of sensuousness (per- ceplibility by Sense-organs) belongs to Class, (४.९ › the different factors of Inference in general) as also to the Relation (asserted in the premisses) ; and hence it is only when preceded by Sense-perception, that Inference, &e., can be rightly accomplished.
248-49. If Sense-perception were always accepted to be undefined (abstract), then we could not have Inference, &c.,—this we shall prove in the section ou Inference.
249-50. (Obj.). “If sach be the case, then, like the cognitions of the class Cow and the like (properties, actions, &c.), we would have to assert the character of Perception to belong to such cases as the idea of the warmth of fire when seen at a distance.”
242-43 «^ Recognise indistinctly ’—i.e., have only a confused idea of it. “ Distinctly "— i.e., a8 helonging to a particular class, and having definite properties, actions, nume, &c., &c.
243-44 In the case of such an object as has both tuste and colour—f.i., the mango— the hlind cau perceive only the taste, hecanuse he is devoid of the organ of Colour- perception.
245-486 So long as one does not remember the word, related to the object hefore him, his cognition can only he undefined and indistinct.
245.41 That is, wheu an object is recognised as something else,—f.i, the piece of shell known as silver.
249.59 The sense of the objection is this: “If you declare the character of Sense- perception to helong to all the conceptions that one may have, duriug the time of Sense-contaot,—then, in that case, when we see fire at a distance, and have simul- taneously an idea of its heat, this latter idea of heat would also come under the cate- gory of Sense-perception, as the object remains all along in vontact with the Sense of Sight,”
11४ CLOKAVARTIKA.
250-51. (Rep.). In the case of the (cognition of the) class ‘ Cow,’ we do not accept, as Perception, any other cognition which could be in closer contact (with the Sense-organ, the mind, and the Soul, than the Cow itself) 5 therefore we cannot accept any other idea as perception, except that of the Cow.
251-52. There too, when the cognition belongs to one who is not conscious of the contact (of the object with the organs of sense,) we do not accept it as ^“ Sense-perception.”
252-53. 1† is only when there is contact with the Sense of Touch, that the cognition of warmth can be said to have the character of ^ Sense- perception ;*’ and hence it can only be non-sensuous, when the fire 1s perceived (at a distance) by the eye alone.
253-54. Therefore the Sense-organ having been ascertained to appre- hend a certain object, ~ it is only when there is contact with this Sense. organ, that the cognition (of that particular object) can be accepted as “ Sense-perception”; in no other way conld ^ Sensnousness” belong to the cognition of that object.
255. Though the method of specification is similar (in the cases of the class ‘Cow’ and the heaé of fire), yet the character of sensuousness can belong only to that case where the cognition follows from actual Sense- contact. And such is ^“ Sense-perception’’ known to be, in the world (2.e., among ordinary people), independently of any elaborate definitions thereof.
Thus ends the V@rtika on the 4th Aphorism Treating of Sense-perception.
250.51 The Sense of the reply ie that in the case of the idea of the heat of the fire at a distance, we have a preceding cognition of the fire iteelf, which we accept as sensuous ; and from the existence of fire—cognised hy the eye—we come to infer its heat; and thus the foregoing notion is in closer contact with the 6611, &o., than the enbseqnent one of heat. On the other hand, in the case of the perception of the class “Cow,” we do not find any other preceding cognition with regard to it, which conld he in closer contact with tbe soul, and from which the idea of the Cow could be inferred. And it is on account of thie closest possible proximity that we accept the cognition of the class ^“ (0 ˆ to he ^“ Sense-perception.”’
262.53 ‘* Non-sensuous ’—(in the present caee) Inferential.
255 That is, even those people, that are ignorant of the elaborate definitions of “ Senge-perception,” know that the name can belong only to sach cognitions as follow directly from Sense-contact,
APHORISM ए, 113
APHORISM V.
*“Constant is the relation between the Word and its Denotation ; and the means of knowing it is the ^^ Upadéca”’ (Injunction), (which is) incapable of contradiction; it is authoritative with regard to the object not perceived (before), because it is independent,—so says Badarayana.” 1-1-5.
Section (1).
1-3 (Obj.). “Though Sense-perception and the rest have been set aside, yet Duty and non-Duty (Virtue and Vice) could be rightly dis- cerned, throngh ordinary usage,—like the distinction of the Brahmana and the like. (1) As those that give pleasure (to others) are known as ‘Dharmika’ (Virtuous), and those that give pain (to others) are known as ‘ Adharmika’ (Vicious). So says the son of Pardsara (Vyasaj with regard to this subject: ‘ That this ४5 Virtue and that ४5 Vice—these two ex- pressions are well known among men—down to the lowermost Candala; and hence there 18 not much use of the Scripture (on this point).’”
4, (Rep.). On account of the impossibility of this Usage being without a foundation, it is examined here, by means of proofs with re- gard to such source or foundation.
1.8 After having set aside the applicability of Sense-perception, Inference, &c., to the case of Duty, the Bhashya, in introducing the present Aphorism, says— *‘ 012४0 ’pi nasti”—‘“‘ Even Negation is not”; and these three Karikag embody the 00] 66४०8 against this introductory sentence of the Bhashya. The sense of the objection is that there could be a doubt of the applicability of Abhava, only after all sources of positive cognition had been exhausted. Asa matter of fact, however, we have yet one resource left, in the shape of ‘ordinary usage’’—to which we can rightly attribute the character of the source of all notions with regard to Duty and ita contrary.
4 The sense of the reply is that Usage must have some basis; and it is this hasis whigh is enquired into: 18 the use of the word ‘Daty’ baseless? Or is it based 100 Sense-perception ? Or is it based upon the Veda? Now then Senge- perception, Inference, Analogy and Apparent Inconsistency having been discarded, only two are left to be considered: Qabda (Veda) and ^ 018 ए२ (Negation). Hence it ia only proper that the acceptance of the applicability of Qabda should be in- troduced by the denial of Abhaya,
lo
114 CLOKAVARTIKA.
4-5. Sense-perception and the rest, have been set aside (as not applicable to the case of Duty); and people do not accept any proofs, apart from these.
5-6. For the Atheists (lit. those that hold ‘slaughter’ to be ‘ deliverance from the shackles of the world’) Slaughter is accepted as Virtue; and they hold ‘Penance’ to be a Vice. And inasmuch as there is this diversity (of opinion) among the Mlecchas and the Aryas, Duty eannot be said to be ordinarily known (and based upon nsage).
7. Nor can there be any special point (in favour) of the Aryas, until the Scripture has been resorted to; and the Usage (or well known character) of an object can be said to be based upon the Scripture, only after the authority of the Scripture itself has been established.
8. Therefore if “Injunction” were not able to rescue ‘ Virtue” (or Duty) and “Vice” from the mouth of Negation, then im our very sight, would these become swallowed up by it.
9. ‘The Jnana thereof becomes the Upadéga’—such is the construction (of the Bhashya). “Jnana” here is that by which it is known, because it is spoken of as being co-extensive (syonymous) with ‘ Upadég¢a.’
10. The mention of the word “Constant” removes all discrepancies of the Means (“ Word” =Veda); “ Avyatiiéka” implies its undeniability . and thence follows its Self-authoritative character.
11. All (Means of Right Notion) apply, with effect, to only such objects as have not been already perceived (by any other means) ;
6.6 Ag there is no consensus of opinion among different people, the notion of Duty cannot be said to be based npon Usage.
7 When there is a diversity of opinion, we cannot accept either the one or the other, withont snfficient grounds. The view of the Aryas—that slanghter is sinful— eannot be accepted until we have recourse to the Scripture.
8 The meaning of the Karika is that if the notion of Dnty be vot based npon the Veda, tlen no notion thereof is in any way possible, and it would altogether seize to exist.
9 The passage of the Bhashya here referred to is ‘‘ Autpattikastu Cabdasydarthéna Sambandhah tasydgnihotradilakshanasya dharmasya nimittam katham? Upadéso hi sa bhavati.’ And a question is raised as to the construction of the latter sentence, which is explained in the Karika. It implies that nntrustworthiness based upon the fact of its being unkown cannot apply to the present case. In ‘Jnana’ we have the nomiual affix lyut.
10 The first half implies that untrustworthiness based upon disorepancy in the means cannot belong to the notion of Duty. And the second half means that it is incontrovertible.
11 Ihe idea of an object that has already been, at some past period of time, perceived by other means, can ouly be due to Memory, Therefore the anthority of all Means of Right Notion is restrioted to objects never peroeived before, ४.९. peroeived for the first time by the Means in qnestion. The seoond half is added in anticipation of the objeotion that what the author sought to establish was the authoritativeness of Codand, while what he 18 here driving at is that of Upadéga,
APHORISM V. Lid
otherwise it is only a case of Memory. ‘“Codana”’ ‘ Upadéca’ and ‘ Vidhi’ are all synonymous terms.
12-13. (Qbj.). ^“ When any ordinary sentence could serve our purpose, why should we lave recourse to Injunction? Specially as the relation of cause and effect is signified equally by all verbs; and since every sentence has a verb, all the requirements of the student would be fulfilled (by any ordinary sentence). And as for activity, it is due to desire, while cessa- tion from activity is due to direct prohibition.”
३4. If Injunction is not resorted to, then the ‘end of man’ would not come to be the object to be accomplished ; and then, Heaven and the rest, that are directly mentioned in the Veda (as desirable objects), would be set aside; and any ordinary denotation of the verb (as occurring in an ordinary sentence) would come to be the object to be accomplished.
15. If, on the other hand, Injunction is resorted to, then this (meaning
12.18 The meaning of the objection ie that when an ordinary sentence—‘ He asacri~ fices’—wonld be able to signify the performability of sacrifices, why should we restrict the notion of the Veda only to ‘ Injunotiong’—seuch as ‘One ought to sacrifice’? Duty ia the meane Of prosperity ; anch means of prosperity 18 got at through the Bhavana; and thia Bhavana 18 present in every verb; and a verb exists in every sentence. Thue then all requirements of the investigator into Duty having been fulfilled by the ordinary sentence—‘ He sacrifices’—, he would naturally conclude that the performance of sacri- fices brings abont the desired result; and hence that this is Duty; and he would thne come to recognise the caueal relation between Sacrifice and Heaven. Under the circumstanoee it would be needleas to have reconrse to a direct Injunction. Ae for the activity of people towarde the performance of Sacrifices, it can be dne to a desire for certain desirable ends—Heaven for instance—on the part of the agent. An Injunction too only serves to point ont that the performance of Secrifices leads to Heaven; whence the agent desires to ^ Reaoh Heaven by meane of Sacrifices.’ This 16 exactly what 18 done by the ordinary eentence— He Sacrifices and goes to Heaven.’ Why then shonld the notion of Duty be reetricted to Injunctions exclusively ?
1¢ If there were no Injunction, then it would be the meaning of the verb that would fall in with the Bhavana; because both of those—the Bhavané (Bhdvayti) and the meaning of the verb would form part of the denotation of the same word—‘ Sacri- fices’; and the senteace ‘He Sacrifices’ wonld signify that one should seek to attain Sacrifice by the Sacrifice; and thie Bhavan@é could have no connection with Heaven which 18 at a distance from it. And the sentence conld not convey the notion that the performance of the Sacrifice leads to a desirable end in the shape of Heaven. In the case of Injunction, on the other hand the Injnuctive affix (in Yajéta) which denotes the Bhavana, ie also accepted as urging the person towarda activity ; and thus the Bhavana falle in completely with this urging (which 18 more nearly related to the Bhavana than the denotation of the verb which is something other than the affix); and hence this urging of the person makee Heaven, etc., (t.e., ends desired by the agent towards which alone he could be urged) the objects of the Bhavani; consequently the Sacrifice aleo comes to be recoguised as being the means of attaining such desirable ends, as Heaven and the like.
16 This Karika explains the word ‘Anapékshatvat’ in the Aphoriem; the meaning being that inasmuch as Injunction does not stand in need of corroborations, either frou one’s own cognition or from that of others, it cannot but be authoritative.
116 1.0 ^ १2714.
of the verb) is passed over, and Heaven, &c., come to be recognised as the objects to be accomplished. And it is only when such is the case, that the means of reaching Heaven, é&c., come to have the character of Duty.
16. In the case of the assertions of untrustworthy persons, one needs (the corroboration of) another cognition of his own. In the case of the assertions of trustworthy persons too, (such as the Smritis), one needs (the corroboration of) another (i.e, the Veda). In the case of ‘Injunction’? however, no exterior corroboration is needed.
[Thus ends the Varttka (proper) on Sutra V.}
Section (2). THE VIEW OF THE VRITTI.
17. The word ‘Adi’ has ‘M’ at its end; for if there were a deletion thereof (of ‘M’), the connection (of the word ‘Adi’ with the rest of the sentence) would be too strained. The negative (‘na’) is supplied m the Aphorism, from without.
17-18. Itis on account of the commixture (of right and wrong) that the objection is raised: “(There must be) investigation (into the means of Knowing Duty), because of misconceptions arising from an ignorance of the means of knowing it, and their correct definitions.”
18. With the expression “that is not Sense-perception,” the theory of the unnecessary character of the investigation has been summed up.
19-20. Falsity attaches to something else, while Sense-perception
17 Karikae 17 to 26 expound the view of the anthor of the Vritti (Bhavadaga).
This refere to the Bhashya passage: ‘“‘ Vrittekarastwanyathémam grantham varnayaneakara tasya nimttaparishtiriityévamadim.”
“The negative, §c.’—The Vritti explains Aph. 3, as ‘na nimittam parikshitavyan’ and this is only possible, if an additional ‘na’ 18 aapplied from withoat,
17-18 Thig refers to the Bhashya passage: ^ Nanu Vyabhicdrat partkshitavyam nimittam, Jc., §e.” The sense of this ohjection is that in the absence of a कला. defined and accarate definition of Sense-perception, people would have mistaken notions with regard to it: for example, they would accept the cognition of silver in the shell as correct Sense-perception. Therefore inasmuch as correot ideas of these Means of Right Notion are mixed up with inoorrect ones, it is necessary that we shoald investigate the means of knowing Daty, and hence the Sitra as interpreted in the Vritti, becomes objectionable,
18 To the ahove objection the Bhashya replies thue: “ That which is Sense-percep- tion 18 never mistaken, and that which 18 niestaken is not Sense-perception.” And it is to this that the Karika refers.
19.20 When oae object (the shell) is cognised as another (silver), then it is the cognition of this latter that is false; but no falaity attaches to the perception of an object that happens to be before one’s eyes. And it is only such cognition that is denoted by the word ‘ Sense-perception,’ —the fall definition of which is that it is a
APHORISM ए, 117
itself remains intact and true. Because Sense-perception is held to follow only when there is contact (of the sense) with the object that is percéived. This is the full definition (of Sense-perception), wherein the words {५४ and sat (of Aph. 4) have to be transposed.
20. The word ‘Sat’ would (in this case) mean ‘right. Or we may . take the Aphorism to be elliptical.
21. Through ^ Arthapatti” also, we come to attribute the character Of the ^“ False Semblance of Sense-perception ”’ to all cognitions other than those mentioned (iu the last Karika).
21-22. The idea of negation cannot be got at without the denial of
cognition that results from the contact of the Sense-organs with the object as conceived by the perceiver. This definition is arrived at by construing the fourth Aphorism as— ‘ Tatsamprayogé purushasyéndriydnam buddhijanma sat pratyaksham.’ And when the cognition tallies exactly with the object before the eyes—i.e., when the rope 18 cognised as the reope—it can never be said to be wrong. It has already been explained that the fourth Aphorism as it etands cannot be taken as a definition of Sense-perception ; because as it stands the Aphorism would apply equally to correct as well as incorrect perception $ for the Aphorism only signifies that ‘‘ Sense-perception ” is that cognition which 18 prodaced by the contact of the sense with some object existing in the present ; and this wonld also include the case of the cognition of silver in the shell; becanse this latter too would be acognition prodnced by the contact of the eye with an object. But if we transpose the words Tat and Sat then the meaning of the Aphorism would be this: ‘The idea produced by the contact of the sense with that (t.e., with the objeot as conceived), is correct Sense-perception,’ and this would exclude all incorrect perceptions.
20 ‘ Elliptical ’—that is to say, sapplying the word ‘Grahya’ (=that which is per- ceived) between the words Sat and Pratyksham,—thereby getting at the same meaning that is obtained by the aforesaid transposition.
al § Arthdpatti’—when correct Sense-perception is defined as that which is prodaced by the contact of the Sense-organ with the object as conceived, then all others—those cognitions that are not produced by such contact—naturally come to be known as ‘false (semblances of) Sense-perceptiou’ ?
21.82 * How do you know that a certain cognition is not prodnced by such contact ?’ The Bhashya replies: We come to know of this by finding that the cognition is negatived by ४ subseqnent cognition. On this point the question is raised: ‘ What especial grounds have we for accepting the denial of the preceding cognition by the snbseqnent one, and vice versa’? The reply to this 18 that it is not possible for us to have any subse: quent cognition to the contrary until the preceding cognition hss been negatived; and since in the present case of the shell and the silver we do have a subsequent contrary cognition, therefore we conclude that it is the preceding cognition that must be negatived by the senbsequent one. ‘ Bat in that case, you would have a Reciprocity,— the negativing of the preceding cognition being due to its falsity, and the falsity being due to the fact of its being 80 negatived.’ The answer to this is that the subsequent cognition only serves to indicate the falsity of the preceding one; 1t does not create any such falsity. And as such there can be no reciprocity ; specially as the falsity of the preceding cognition is due to certain discrepancies in the means that gave rise to it. ‘ Bnt why shonld we not accept the preceding cognition as negativing the subseqnent one?’ The reason is obvious: at the time that the preceding cognition is produced the
118 CLOKAVARTIKA.
the preceding (cognition); and we have this (in the present ease, where the preceding cognition is set aside by the following cognition). And there being only an indication (of fulstty), there can be no ^" Recipro- city.” While, on the other hand, the true form of the preceding cognition is got at without any denial of the (subsequent) cognition, which has not yet appeared.
23. Even where there is no rejection (by means of any subsequent notion of the cogniser himself to the contrary), the recognition of some discrepancy in the cause (of the cognition, would establish the falsity thereof). Nay, even insuch a case, we have the contrary notions of other persons (that would lead us to reject the cognition).
24. That cognition,—whereof all persons, at all times, have the same idea,—can never be rejected. Because in that case, the conviction of any discrepancy in the cause is not strong enough.
25, Inacase where the idea of: “class, etc.,’’ has been produced, and subsequently, on accounts of its impossibility, comes to be rejected by means of arguments,—in such a case ‘ Reciprocity ’ is patent.
26. And in this case (of the notion of ‘class’), there is a definite (true) cognition based upon the self-authoritative character (of the idea), through
aubsequent one does not yet exist, to ba negatived ; and as eoon aa the subseqnent cognition appeara, in ite very appearance it negatives the preceding one. And thue this latter being at once rejected could not negative the former.
98 1f it 16 absolutely neceseary to have eome contrary idea, for the purpoee of rejecting a certain misconception, then the correct cognitione of one pereon would be set aside by the contrary cognitiona of other pereons. But as a matter of fact, this 16 only an asanmption ; the real cause of falsity lying in the discrepanciea in the meane bringing abont the conception.
*# Thie ia in anticipation of the objection that—even in the absence of any direct cognition to the contrary if any notion could be rejected, then the notion of “clasa’ would alao come to he rejected. The sanee of the reply 16 that only that notion ia rejeoted which is found to be contradicted by well-ascertained facts. The notion of ‘clasa’ however is never fonnd to be so contradicted, hence it cannot he rejected. Because any idea of the discrepancy in its causa, even if existant, cannot be atrong enough to reject it. ।
28 ‘ Reciprocity ’—the appearance vf the idea of rejeotion being due to the falsity of the notion of ‘ clasa, and thia falaity heing due to the idea of rejection.’
86 The Karika anticipates the following objection: ‘‘ Even if the notion of ‘ class’ be not falee there ia the same Reciprovity: the non-falsity being based npon the absence of contrary notions, and thie absence being based upon the non-falsity.” The aenee of the reply ia that in the case of the ‘ claas,’ a certain idea is rightly brought about ; and inasmuch aa this idea ie self-authoritative, ita non-falsity 18 baaed upon rea- aoning, and as euch, doea not etand in need of any absence of contrary notions; and when thie non-falaity haa been definitely ascertained, there 18 no chance of the appearance of any contrary notions; spedially 98 in the case in question, the idea of the exiatence of the ‘ clase’ 18 not controverted; because evon those that deny the existence of the ‘olngs’ admit the fact of ovoryone having an idea of such class; and thus then there ia uo reciprocity spoken of.
APHORISM ए, 119
the indication of its existence; because even those that deny tlie existence of a ‘class,’ admit an idea of it, all the same.
[Thus ends the expounding of the view of the Vritti.]
Section (3). THe NigALAMBANA-V ADA. ( Idealism.)
1-3. Authoritativeness and Non-anthoritativeness,—Virtue and Vice and the effects thereof,—the assumptions of the objects of Injunctions, Kulogistic passages, Mantras, and Names,—in short, the very existence of the various Chapters (of the Sutra) based upon the various proofs,—the differentiation of the Question from the Reply, by means of distinctions in the style of expression,—the relation between actions and their results in this world, as well as beyond this world, &c,,—all these would be groundless (unreasonable), if Ideas (or cognitions) were devoid of (corres- ponding) objects (in the External World).
4, Therefore those who wish (to know) Duty, should examine the question of the existence or non-existence of (external) objects, by means of proofs accepted (as such) by people,—for the sake of the (accomplish- ment of) Actions.
5. ५ रला if only the ‘Idea’ (or sensation) is accepted (to be a real entity), all this (that is ordinarily known as the ‘ External World’) may be explained as ‘ Samuriti Reality’; and as such it is useless for you to persist in holding the reality of the (external) object.”
6. But there can be no reality in ‘“Samvriti” (Falsity); and as
1.8 The Bhashya: “Nanu sarva éva nirdlambanah swapnavat. pratyayah, Sc.” An objection is raised in the Karika to the neoessity of the discussion raised in the Bhashya. Tho Karikas are meant to show that if all cognitions were without corres- pouding objects in the external world (as held by the Bauddha-Idealist), then all the doctriues and subjects treated of in the Mimansa would be baseless, and a treatment of these altogether uurcasonable; since thers would be no realities corresponding to such words and phrases as: “anthority of the Veda,” ‘‘ Incapahility of the Sense- perception, &c., to give any idea of Duty,’ “Duty in the form of the Agnihotra,’’ ‘“Vice in the shape of slanghter,’ “ Duty leading to prosperity,” “ Vice leading to Bell,” ^ Urging as the object of Injunctions,” ‘ Attracting the object of the sulo- gistic passages,’ ^“ Manifestation of Action the object of the Mantras,” ^ Significa- tion of materials, &c., the object of Names,” ‘‘the differeutiation of Actious into the Primary aud the Subsidiary, in accordauce with, Direct Revelation, Power, 8615०06) Context, Position and Name,” &c., &c., and so forth.
¢ Tbe Bauddhas hold that there are two kinds of Reality : False and the True ; and they attribute only a false reality to the External World.
120 CLOKAVARTIKA.
such how can it be a form of reality? If it is a reality, how can it be ‘Samvriti’? If it is false, how can it be real P
7. Nor can ‘ reality’ belong, in common, to objects, false as well as real; because the two are contradictory; for certainly the character of the “‘ tree ” cannot belong in common to a tree as well as to a lion.
8-9. Thus then the words ‘ Samvriti’’ and ^ Mithya” (false) being synonymous, the assumption (of ^ Samvriti Reality”) is only meant to hood-wink ordinary men, just like the word = ^ Vaktrasava” (mouth- wine) as used with reference to the saliva ;—with a view to remove the stain of atheism (from the Bauddha doctrine). And so is also their theory of the assumed reality (of external objects) ; because there can be no assumption of the indivisible (‘ consciousness which alone is real, for the Bauddha) in the void (1.¢,, the external world, whose existence is denied by the Bauddha).
10. Therefore it must be admitted that that which does not exist, does not exist; and that which really exists is real, while all else is unreal ; and therefore there can be no assumption of two kinds of reality.
11. There is a theory current (among the Bauddhas) that the experi- ences (of Heaven, &९.), are similar to the experiences of a dream; and it is for the refutation of this theory that we seek to prove the reality of external objects.
12-13. It cannot be for the mere pleasures of a dream that people engage in the performance of Duty. Dream coming to a man spontane- ously, during sleep, the learned would only lie down quietly, instead of performing sacrifices, &e., when desirous of obtaining real results. For these reasons, we must try our best, by arguments, to establish (the truth of) the conception of external objects (as realities).
14-16. (Among the Bauddhas) the Yogac&ras hold that ‘Ideas’ are without corresponding realities (in the external world) ; and those that hold the Madhyamika doctrine deny the reality of the Idea also. In both of these theories however the denial of the external object is com- mon. Because it is only after setting aside the reality of the object that they lay down the ^ Samvriti’’ (falsity) of the ‘Idea.’ Therefore on account of this (denial of the reality of external objects) being common (to both), and on account of (the denial of the reality of the ‘ Idea’ ) being based upon the aforesaid denial of the external objeot,—the author of the Bhashya has undertaken to examine the reality or uureality of the external object.
8.9 They hold that the external objects have an assumed reality. But this too is only meant to deceive people.
19.18 If the pleasnres of Heaven were only like dreams, then these would come to people, spontaneously, and would need no efforts of the person; and people would not stand in need of the performance of elaborate sacrifices, &o.
16-16 Tho Madhyamikas hold that, inasmuch as the external object is unreal, no cognition based upon it can be real.
ApnoRism v.: Niradlumbana-Vada. 121
17-18. The denial of the external object is of two kinds: one is based upon an examination of the object itself, and another is based upon reasoulug. Of these, that which is based upon a consideration of the object may be laid aside for the present; that which is based upon reasoning, and as such is the root (of the theory), is what is here examined,
18-19. Here too the denial has been introduced in two ways: at first through Inference, and then, after an examination of the applicability of Sense-perception, through its inapplicability (to external objects). And 16 is the Inferential argument that is urged (in the Bhashya): “ Nanw &ec.” And this has a connection (with what has gone before, in the Bhashya).
20-22. Ob7: (1). It has been declared that ‘ Sense-perceptiou’ is only that which is produced by a contact (of the sense) with the particular objeet; but there is no relation between the objects and the Sense-organ, in reality; while, as for an asswmed contaet, thisis present in a dream also; therefore it 18 not possible to have any such differentiation (in reality) as that into (cognitions) produced by such contact, and (those) not so produced. (2) And again, it has been said that falsity is ouly of two kinds, and not more; but here it is added that all (cognition) is false; why then should there be any such specification P”
23. “The cognition of a pole is false, because ib 18 a cognition; be- cause whatever is a cognition has always bcen found to be false,— fz. the covuitions iu a dream.”
17.18 “ Based upon an examination of the object itself”’——Say the Bauddhas : “ Neither atoms, nor an conglomeration of atoms, are amenable to the senses, as the aggregate too can have no existence apart from the atoms themselves. Nor can the emhadied substance he sensed; because this has no existence apart from the constitnent atoms which are beyond the reach of the senses. For these reasons, we conclude that there is nothing in the External World that could he perceived by means of the senses.” The Bhashya does not take np this aspect of the question; becanse this is only a deduction from the cardinal doctrine of the Banddhas; and hence it is only this latter that is examined. Karikas 17-19 may be taken as an introdaction to the Pirvapaksha passage of the Bhashya: ‘ Nanu, 4९."
13.19 “ Connection ” as explained below, in two ways—vide Karikas 20-27,
20.2 Karikas 20-27 explain the Pirvapaksha passage of the Bhashya, whichrunsthus: “ Nanw sarva éva nirdlambanah svapnavat pratyayah pratyayasyapt Nirdlambanatés- vabhadva upalakshitah svapné; Jdgrato’pt stambha wi va Kudya iti va pratyaya éva bhavati; tasmat so’pi Nirdlambanah.”’ ‘The first connection of this Purvapaksha is that it objects to the definition of Sense-perception, as embodied in the Aphorism. Tho second connection is this: ‘The Vritti has said that there are only two kinds of false notion—viz: (1) That of which the origin is faulty, and (2) That which is contradicted by a subsequent stronger cognition ; it is to the latter that the Parvapaksha objects, ou the ground of all cognitions heing equally false.
28 This Karika formulates the inferential argument contained in the Pirvapaksha.
16
122 CLOKAVARTIKA.
24-25. “Inorder to avoid partial ‘Redundancy’ (Proving of the proved), ‘the absence of the instance,’ and ^ the uselessness of the word eva’ —(which would be irremediable) if the argument were urged with a view to prove the falsity of all cognitions—‘ Sarva 6va’ must be taken to signify only waking consciousness.
And further, because of the acceptance (by the Bauddhas) of the reality of the idea of the cognition itself, what is here denied is only the reality of the external objects of perception.”
26, “ Pratyayasya, &c., serves to point out the instance of the Hétu (Middle term—Pratyayatvat) as concomitant with a portion of the Major Term ; the sentence Jagrato’pt, &c., serving to point ont the Hétu, by means of an ‘Upanaya’.”’
27. ‘Since there is no case of the negation of the Major term (the fact of being without a corresponding object), theretore the negative argument
24.25 If ‘all cognitions’ were declared to be withont corresponding chjective realities, then ‘dream-cognition’ would also be inclnded in the same category. And then, inasmuch as the Mimansgaka also admits the absence of a corresponding reality, in the case of this latter, the argument would become partially redundant. Secondly, ५८ Dream-oognition “ having become included in the Major Term, there wonld be no cogni- tion left which could serve 28 the instance, in the aforesaid argument. Thirdly, the word ^ éva” would become redundant; becanse this word only serves to differentiate the object in qnestion from its connter-relative or contradictory ; and as such the meaning of the sentence wonld be that—‘it is not only waking cognition that is so, but all cognition, &c.”’"—which is not the meaning desired to be conveyed: becanse % all cognition ˆ“ wonld also include the cognition of the cognition itself, which is held by the Banddhas to be real, as having a corresponding reality.
26 This Kariké anticipates the objection that the argument as laid down in the Bhashya has no Middle Term; and as such, no Instance is necessary. ‘‘ Upanaya” means the application of the Hétu (Middle Term), as qualified in the Major Premiss or in the Instance, to the case in qnestion (7.e., to the Major Term); hence the Karika must be taken to mean this: ‘In the sentence, pratyayasye ...... svapné,—which is meant to serve as the Instance in the sylogism—the character of being @ cognition has heen shown to he invariably concomitant with the character of being without a corresponding reality in the objective world, and then the sentence fagrato’pi, &e., ... .. bhavati,—which is meant to serve as the Minor Premiss of the syllogism—serves the purpose of applying the Middle Term, Character of being a cognition, to waking cognition, the Minor Term.’ The syllogism, then, should be stated thus: ‘All cognitions are without corresponding realities—e.g., Dream-cognition; Waking-cognition is cogni- tion ; therefore, Waking cognition is without a corresponding reality.
a7 ‘ Negative argument.’—‘That which is withont a corresponding reality is not a cognition.” The second half of the Karika anticipates the objection that in the argument —‘ waking cognition is without a corresponding reality because it is a cog- nition’—thoe middle term (oognition) would form a part of the conclusion. The senso of the reply is that the Idealist accepts no cognition to be free from the character of being withont a corresponding roahty; and as such, the middle term (oharacter of cognition) conld not exist apart frem the Major term; hence the statemont of the negative argument would be superfluous.
APHORISM ए, : Niralambana-Vada. 123
is not stated. The Hétu being a Universal one, it would not be open to the fault of forming a part of the Minor term.”
| Here ends the explanation of the Bhishya Pirvapaksha.]
28-29. In waking cognition there is (you say) a distinctive fea tnre—that it is certain and well-defined. But the connection with the external object (whereby you seek to prove the well-defined character of waking cognition) is net accepted by your epponent (the Bauddha). And hence, the reply that 18 given by the author of the Bhashya comes to be either ‘Vikalpasama’ (doubtful) or ‘Vaidharmyasama’ (contradic- tory).”
30. Some people admit the Reply to be a faulty one, on tho ground that the Purvapaksha itself is faulty; others however explain it as pointing out the fact of the Purvapaksha conclusion being contrary to well-asertained directly visible facts.
31. When we shall be able to clearly reject the self-cognisability (of cognitions), then your theory weuld simply come to bea pure denial of everything that is cognisable.
32. The object of Sense-perception, &c. then, cannet but have an existence in the external world; and hence one who would deny this (external object) would have his theory contradicted by these (Sense- perception, &c.).
%8-29 With this Karikai begins the explanation of the Siddhinta Bhashya, which runs thnus:—‘Stambha itt Jadgrato buddhih supernigcitd katham viparyéshyati’? and Karikas 28-29 raise ohjections to this passage, ‘ Vikalpasama’—among cognitions some would be well-defined and have corresponding realities while others would not be go, on acconnt of there being cognitions, like dream-cognition; thence the reply given, which is based upon the fact of waking-cognition being well-defined, would become doubtful. ‘Vaidharmyasama’—the fact of waking-cognition being a cognition, Jike dream-cognition, would prove it to be withont a corresponding reality, while the fact of its being well-defined would prove it to have a cerrespouding reality, thence the reply wonld be contradictory. For technical definitions of Vikalpasama and Vaidhar- myasama, Vide Nyayasntra V—2.-4,
80 The second half expresses the Anthor’s view.
81 That is to say when it shall be proved, (and you will not be able to deny it) that the cegnition cannot be cognised hy itself, then in that case yonr denial of the reality of the external objects of perception wonld come to be a pnre denial of all thiugs cognisable ; and as such yonr theory would be open to contradiction by the direct perception of cognisable objects. The contradiction of direct perception may also be explained thus :—when self-cognisability has been rejected, itis only an exter- nal object that could be the object of direct perception, hence the denial of such an object wonld be contradicting direct perception itself.
82 ‹ Then ’—That is when Sense-cognisability has been rejected,
124 CLOKAVARTIKA.
33. The expression “ well-defined” serves to point out the greater strength of these (Sense-perception, &c.), based upon the fact that in the absence of any cognitions to the contrary, they cannot but have real authority or trustworthiness.
84. It is only the denial of an object, comprehended by means of a faulty cognition, that can be correct. If there be a denial of every con- ception, then your own theory too cannot he established.
85. The Predicate and the Subject (the Major and Minor terms of your Syllogism) being (according to you) incapable of being cognised (४.९. being no real objects of comprehension),—you would be open to the charge of having both the Subject and the Predicate, or only one of them, such as has never been known.
36. If the cognition, of the Subject and Predicate, as belonging to the speaker and the hearer, were without corresponding realities, then both of them would stand self-contradicted.
37. Nor would any differentiation be possible, between the Subject and the Predicate. For these reasons the declaration of your conclusion, cannot be right.
38. ‘* But we do not admit of any such entity, as the Character of having no real corresponding object; therefore it is not right to raise any questions as to the absence or otherwise of such entities.”
39. If the cognition is not areal entity, then in what way do you wish to explain it to us? Or, how do yon yourself comprebend it P
39-40. If it be urged that “ we assume its existence and then seek to prove it,’—then (we reply), how ean there be an assumption of some- thing that does not exist ? And evenif it is assnmed, it comes (by the mere fact of this assumption) to be an entity. If it be asked—‘* How do you (Mimansakas) apply cognisability to Negation (which is a non- entity) ? ’,—(we reply), that we hold Negation to be a real entity.
83 The euperiority of Sense-perception over the inferential argument brought forward hy the Parvapaksha, lies in the fact that the former must always continne to be w trustworthy means of right notion, so long as there are no cognitions, equally etrong, that contradict them.
84 If every conception ia denied, then the objector’s theory too being a conception would he denied.
36 When nothing can be known, the subject and the predicate of the Pirvapaksha could never have been known; and an inferential argument with an unknown Subject and Predicate can never be expected to be valid.
88 One who would deny the reality of hie own Subject and Predicate wonld be courting Self-contradiotion.
87 Since no such explanation is poasible, until the Subject and Predicate have been actually recognised as distinct from one another.
88 The sense of the objection is that the foregoing Karikas only serve to point to thia objection :—‘ Does the character of having no real corresponding object belong to auch and such a cognition, or does it not’? But in as much as such character is not an entity, it is not right to quostion its 10860९6 or presence,
APHORISM V.: Nardlambana-Vada. 125
41. Then again, is the word “ Pratyaya”’ (made up of) an accusative affix, or a nominal one? If the latter, then there would be self-contra- diction ; and if the former, then the syllogism would not serve any useful purpose.
42. Because we also accept the fact of the cognisable objects— Colour and the rest—being without substrates in the external world; inasmuch as (according to us) these objects are not mere Ideas; and as such they do not stand in need of any external substratum.
43. If either the nominative or the instrumental affix (he accep- ted), then the words (‘ Pratyayah’ and ‘Niralambanah’) too would them- selves become (included in) the Minor term (of your syllogism). And when these become devoid of a substratum, your Minor term itself ceases to exist.
44, Without a distinct object of cognition, no nominative (or in- strumental) is possible; hence if you mean the word “ Pratyaya”’ to signify these, there is a contradiction of your own assertion (Vide note 41).
45. If however, you hold the word “ Pratyaya” to have a con- ventional signification (and not one based upon the meaning of the root and affix constituting the word),—then, in that case, we would say that by usage (or convention) the word ‘ Pratyaya’ is proved to be a real entity comprehending another real objeci—exactly as held by us.
4l Karikas 41-48 embody the objections against the validity of the Subject of the syllogism contained in the Pirvapaksha. The word ‘ Pratyaya’ with an Accusative affix signifies that which is cognised, t.¢e., the object; with a Nominal affix, it would mean cognition; with a Nominative affix it would mean that which cognises; and with an Instrumental affix, it would mean that by which anything is cognised, that 18, the Sense-organ. ‘ Contradiction’—if the word Pratyaya be held to end in the Nominal affix, then the very name ‘ Pratyaya’ (cognition) would indicate an object which would be comprehended by the cognition; and hence to assert that such cognition has no corresponding reality in the external world wonld be a self-contradiction. If on the other hand the word be held to end iu the Accusative affix, then your conclusion would simply moan that the object of cognition, the Jar and the like, is without asubstratum in the external world; and this we do not deny; hence your reasoning becomes superfluous. And as for the cogniser (signified by the Nominative affix) or the means of cognition ( signified by the Instrumental affix), none of them is possible in the absence of a cognisable object.
43 Becanse words are not only the instruments, but also the nominatives, of cog- nitions; ¢.g., in the assertion, “The word cow produces the cognition of the cow ;” and hence a denial of the substratum of these would mean the denial of the substra- tnm of the two terms of your syllogism. And again the fact of these words having no substratum wonld mean that they have no significance; and as such, cannot be used in any sentence, which means that your syllogism ceases to exist.
46 The usage of the word lends no support to your theory. By usage, the cogni- tion and the corresponding external object, are proved to be relative to ono another. ८५ Another object ”—i.e., the cognition docs not cognisc itself, as held by the Banddha.
126 CLOKAVARTIKA.
46. And if you seek toargue (as you do) after having accepted this (usage), then your own accepted (usage) becomes contradicted (by your argument). And your argument becomes one that has an unrecog- nised Subject (Pratyaya). While this fault would apply to us, only when you have for your Minor term (a “ cognition”) which 18 not such (as comprehends a real external object).
47. Whether (you have, for your minor term, “ cognition’) as a property of the soul, or independently by itself,—in any case, your argument has the same fault (of having the Subject unknown). Nor is there any such thing as simple “cognition” (without objects, d&c.), because such cannot be recognised or specified.
48. Though there is for others (Mimansakas) a specification in the shape of the mere signification of a word,—yet such can not be the case with you; for you do not accept any difference between the word and its signification.
49. If you seek to prove the fact of being devoid of a substratum, as Universal,—then you are open to the faults of having your predicate unrecognised, and that of the absence of an instance.
50. If (on the other hand) you assert the fact of being devoid of substratum, only partially, we also admit the cognition of taste to be devoid of colour, and your argument becomes superfluons.
47 If the “cognition” of your syllogism means a property of the soul, as you hold it to be, then, inasmuch as snch a cognition is never recognised by you, the very subject of your syllogism—becomes such as is not recognised; and this renders yonr argument fallacious, If, on the other hand, you hold that “ cognition ’ means cog- nition by itself (4.e., without the notion of the cogniser and the cognised); then, we add, that suoh a cognition is not recognised by us; and this also makes your argnment fallacious ; inasmuch as the minor term of a syllogism must be such as is accepted by both parties.
48 This Karika anticipates the following objection: “The sort of fallacionusness urged above would apply to all arguments. For example, the Mimansaka argnes that sound is eternal. The Bauddha might retort: Is sound a property of the Akica, or that of Air? If the former, we do not accept it as such; if the latter, the Mimansaka does not admit it. The Mimansaka might say that by sound, he means only that which is signified by the word sound; but the Banddha would add that the word Pratyaya only means that which is signified by the word Pratyaya.’ The sense of the reply as embodied in the Karika is that tho Bauddha does not accept anything denoted, apart from the word itself ; and hence, he has not the same facilities, 88 the Miméausaka, for sailing clear of the above fallacies.
49 Because the Predicate—“ Niralambanah ”—would also come to bo devoid of a substratum ; and as such, incapable of heing recognised. Nor could you have any corroborating instance; as, even in a dream, there is not a total absence of all substratum ; since during dreams, there are distinct notions of place, time, &c., which are all real,—the only uureality in the dream lyiug in the particular counoctions in which the timo and place, &o., are cognised.
60 Because we do not hold any cognition to have for its substratum, everything in the world,
41107140 v.: Niralambana-Vada. 127
91. And again, if you seek to reject only such substratum as the form in which the cognition appears; then (we say that) inasmuch as you accept the cognition of the cognition ttself, sach denial (of the form of the cognition) would be a self-contradiction.
52. If by the absence of external substratum you mean the absence of such ideas as ^“ this (object) is external (to the cognition,”)— then in that case, there being no such feeling with regard to the pole, &c., your argument becomes superfluous.
53. And if you meau that the cognition has no such substratum (in the external world), as the pole and the like,—then this would contradict a visible fact.
54. If you urge that “the same would be the case with the per- ception of the duplicate moon,’”’—we say—no ; because in this latter case, we deny the reality of the substratum (duplicate moon), on the ground of its being beyond the reach of the Senses, and not on account of the absence of the coguition of the object.
55. For us, on the other hand, the reality or the unreality of a cognition is based upon the contact of the Sense with the object ;—and it is on the strength of this that we accept the cognised object, as real or unreal.
56. For you, however, there being no Sense-organs, there can be no other ground for holding the fact of the cognition having a real substratum, than the cognition itself; and as such a denial thereof is not reasonable.
57. Since you recognise no externality, how do you seek to prove thereby (te, on the ground of externality) the theory of the absence of any real substratum (for the cognition) P For under such circumstances (४.९. if you deny the externality of objects), which is the adjunct of your minor term, the minor term itself cannot be recognised.
64 The sense of the objection is that on pressing the eye with a finger, you per- ceive the moon to be duplicate; and then if you say that the moon is one only, this assertion of yours contradicts a fact ascertained hy means of your own eyes. The meaning of the reply is that we deny the duality of the moon, because such duality is heyond the reach of the senses ; and it 18 for 1118 reason that we declare the idea of the daplicate moon to be without a real objective substratum ;—this idea being dae to an extraneous discrepaucy temporarily imposed npon the eye. We do not base our denial of the duality upon the denial of all objective sabstratum for the cognition itself,
65 Where the sense is in contact with the object, just as it 18 cognised, the cogui- tion and the object are both real; where it is not so, they are both nnreal.
66 Becanse such denial would mean the denial of the cognition itself. (The Bauddhas deny the reality of the sense-organs).
87 If yon mean to assert that yon only deny the fact of any external object heing the substratum of cognition,—then we would say that, since you do not recognise the reality of any external object, how could you have such a minor term as “a cognition which appears to be external,”
128 QLOKAVARTIKA.
58. Just as when there is no recognition of the qualification (or adjunct), the minor term (or the conclusion) is not acertained, on account of the incapability (of such a term) of rightly expressing an idea; so for the same reason, wonld there be a non-ascertainment of the conclusion, if the adjunct of the adjunct too were not recognised.
69. For, so long as the meaning of the word has not been fully recognised, the meaning of the sentence cannot be ascertained. And we shall prove later ou that the minor term really consists of the significa- tion of the sentence, because it follows from such recognition (of the meaning of the sentence).
60. (By saying that “ cognition is devoid of any substratum apart from itself” you may mean) either the exclusiou or the negation of all extraneons objects; any way, the wholo world being (according to us also) non-different, through predicability, your argument becomes superfnous.
61. And again, if you assert “the absence of substratum” witli reference to (a substratum) totally different (from the cognition) (then too, your argument becomes superfluous). If, on the other hand (you assert it) with reference to (a substratum) only partially different (from the cognition), then your conclusion would contradict your previously postulated (difference).
68 This anticipates the following objection : “It is only the non-recognition of the adjunct of the minor term that vitiates an inferential argument. In the present case, however, what is not recognised is only the externality of the objects qualifying the minor term; and this is only the non-recognition of the qualification of the adjunct; aud as such it does not vitiate the argument.” The sense of the reply is that, in both cases, the faulty character of the Inferential argument is based upon the fact of the term heing incapable of giving any sense, in the case of its necessary adjuncts not being recognised.
69 Your minor term is necessarily mixcd up with the signification of snch words as ‘‘external,’’? &c.; and again, it is by the significations of such sentences—ag “the cognitions have no extcrnal substratum ’”’—that the minor term is constituted. And as such, the minor term can not be recognised, until the siguificationus of the consti- tuent words have been fully ascertained.
60 If you mean to exclude extraneous objects, your conclusion would be of some such form as: “ Cognition has for its snhstratam, something that is not extraneons to it.” While if you mean to deny it, the couclusion would be in the form: “ Cognition hag no extraneous substratum.” Any way your couclusion would not go against our theory; inasmuch as we also hold all things to bo identical, on the ground of all things having the common character of predicability ; and hence, according to us also, nothing being extraneous to anything, the substratum of the cogniton cannot be said to he oxtraneous to the cognition. Thus then yonr argument loses its force, aud becomes snperfluous.
61 «‹ Becomes superfluous ”’—because wo also hold that tho cognised object is not totally extraneous to tho cognition. “If on the other hand, ५4८. Sc.”—If your concla- giou mean tbat ‘Cognition is devoid of any substratum that ८९८11 partially differs from it,’—then yon also admit a slight differenco, though only assumed, between’ tho vbjocl of cognition and the coguiticn,
32
ApHORISM ए. : Nirdlambana-Vada. 129
62. And on account of its appearing in the form of the objective, it is held (by us) to be devoid of any substratum (and hence your argument becomes superfluous). While if you assert the non-difference (of the cognised object) from the Cognition, then that would go against the (theory of) distinct faculties (of the cognised Object and Cognition).
63. If you seek to prove the fact of the absence of any substratum for the coguition, at the moment of its being produced,—then, this being an apparent fact, we also accept (the cognition at the monent of production) to be devoid of any external object of perception.
64. You, however, do not accept its correctness or reality at any time ; as this too has its end iu itself, like the ideas of the mirage and the like.
65-66. If such cognitions as that of Caitra and the like were to have the fact of being devoid of any real substratum as their necessary character, &c., then they could never be comprehended by cognitions arising out of inferential arguments. And hence, on account of there being a multifuriousness of objects, and also on account of the form (of such cognitions as those of Caitra, &c.,)\—how could the correct notion of cognitions having real substrata be dispensed with,—when it is not actually set aside by any contradictory of itself ?
67. If you take the word ‘ pratyaya’ to be the cognition, (thus forming
62 Tt 18 in the generic character of “Cognition,” that an Idea has an external object for its substratum. When, however, this happens to be in the form of an , then it is accepted by us also to have no substra-
inanimate object—the jar, fit. : tum as such.
68 We hold that in every perception, there is a threefold process: (1) at the first moment, there is a production of the cognition; (2) at the second, the referring of the cognition to a concrete fact; and (3) at the third, the full comprehension of the cognition, And as snch we also hold the cognition to he devoid of an external substra- tum, at the first moment, And hence your argument hecomes superfilnous,
64 ^! Correctness ’’—i,e , the fact of its having a corresponding object in the external world. We hold the cognition to he without a corresponding reality, only at the moment of its production; but what we assert is that subsequently, at the second moment, this cognition comes to be referred to a concrete object. Thus then, it is only after the moment of production that we part company with you, who assert that at no time 18 the Cognition able to have any such corresponding reality ; and that at all times it has an end in itself, and is, like miragic perceptions, always false.
65 You hold all Cognition to end in itself, without referring to any corresponding object extraneons to it. But then, the Cognition or Idea, arising ont of the argument you urged against us, conld never rightly comprehend one fact of the absence of any real substratum as belonging to cognitions in general; and hence there heing multifarions objects of Cognition —-when the existence of the snhstratum is not directly denied by any counter-notion of the ahsence of such substratum,—how could one totally deny the existence of the substratum, specially when we are examining the form and character of such cognitions as those of Caitra and the like?
67 If the opponent were to interpret the word “ Pratyaya’”’ as the means of knowledge, then it would come to siguify the word ‘ Pratyaya >; andin accordance with
17
130 (LOKAVARTIKA.
the minor term of your syllogism),—and thence if you seek to sef aside the fact of the cognition (of this word) having any substratum (in the post and other external objects) ;—then your argument becomes superfluous.
68. If again, (by your argument) you seek to set aside the capability (of the word cognition) to bring about a conception (or Idea), then your major term becomes incapable of being ascertained ; because the argument itself could not be brought forward in the absence of such capability of producing couceptions.
69-71. There is no denotation without connection ; and this (connec- tion) is not possible without some difference (between the word and its denotation). Nor is this difference possible in the absence of an dea expressing such difference; and this idea too is not possible unless the questioner distinctly comprehends the sentence and also the several members of the syllogism, such as the minor term, the middle term, the Instance, and the two members of the discussion. Jf you bring forward your argument after accepting all this (४.९) the fact of the above-men- tioued cognitions having real substrata), then this conclusion would militate against your previous assertion.
72-73, Without the difference between Virtue and Vice, and that between the Disciple and the Teacher himself, being aseertained in its reality, there could be no instructions with regard to Duty, &., specially as we come across the actual performance of duty, (we conclude that) the difference of the idea (of Duty from Duty itself) is accepted (even by your Teacher Buddha) (and as such in denying the reality of exiernal objects of perception, you contradict your own Teacher).
73. And since we find that the Buddha has accepted (such differences) in other Sutras (the “‘Saddharma”’ f.i.) ; there would be a contradiction of your own scriptures too Gf you were to totally deny the reality of the external world).
74. And your conclusion on this point is also contradicted (and hence rejected) by facts known to alk persons (who always recognise objects apart from their cognitions).
74-75. If you hold the idea of all arguments to be false (as having
this, if he were to interpret his argument as proving that “such object as the post and the like cannot be the substratum of the word ‘ Pratyaya’, ”"—then we would reply that we do not deny this conclusion ; and as such your argument loses all its force.
68 If by the proposition ^ Pratyaya is niralambana,” you mean that the word ‘ Pratyaya’ is incapable of having any denotation, then your minor term (the denota- tiou of this word ‘ Pratyaya’) being unrecognised, your conclusion cannot be proved.
69.71 The argument cannot he brought forward unless there is a distinct idea of the words employed in the argument, and their siguifications, &c., and uutil such ideas have been duly recognised to have oorresponding realities. And if you acoept these,
Fyou contradiot your owa assertion of all coguitions being devaid of corresponding
realities. Thus then you are placed upon the two horns of a dialemma.
74.75 You hold all cognition to be false. And in accordauce with this, the
Apronism v.: 0107८10 - 74. 131
wo real substratum), then there would be a universal negation ; and the deficiency of the minor term, &c., could also be urged (against your argu- ment). And, if (in order to aveid these) you were to hold these (cogni- tions of your minor term, &c.), to have real substrata, then on the ground of such cognitions themselves, the middle term (ef your syllogism and hence the major premiss also) would become non-conclusive or doubtful.
76-77. ई you urge that your conclusion has fer its subject “ cogni- tions other than those of the factors of the syllogism”’—then (we say that) the idea of this distinctness (7.e., the notien that such and such cognitions are other than such other cognitions) would be false. And when this happens to be false, all that has gone before becomes incapable of being ascertained. Nor would, then, there be any difference between the cogni- tion of the post (you employ as an instance) and that of the argument (you urge against us).
77-78. As your cenclusion goes on signifying (the falsity) of cogni- tions other thun those of your argument,—there would be falsity of all the rest; and hence whatever goes before, becomes set aside; and thus either your middle term becomes concomitant with its own contradictory, or your conclusion itself comes to be rejected by (your own) inferential argument.
79-80. (Because) in opposition to all the alternatives (open to you) we would bring forward this ceunter-argument :—‘ Cognitious have real substrata in the external world ; and this notion (of cognition having a real substratum) is correct; because it is a notion free from contradiction ;— like the notion of the falsity of dream-cognition.”
significations of all argumentative assertions would be false; and hence your argument comes to be a denial of the truth of all arguments, Or again, any and every fanlt— in the shape of the deficienoy of the various factors of your syllogism (the idea of all of which you declare to be false)— could be urged against your argument. ^ Non-con+ clusive” : The middle term of the syllogism is ^“ Pratyatwat = (‘‘ Becanse it is a cognition, therefore they have ne real snbstratum.’’) Butif you admit a single cognition to hinve a real snbstratum, the said middle Term becomes doubtful, and as snch vitiates the argument.
18.11 Becanse you accept only the reality of the cognitions of the varions mem- bers of your syllogisin. ^ Ceases to be ascertuined”’—becanse the idea of snch distinct- ness being false, the conclnsion of your syllogism becomes faulty in its subject: and hence the whole argument falls to the ground. “ Nor would then §c.”—Because when all notion of distinctness is false, there can he no difference between two snch cogni- tions, as those of the post and your argument,— a palpable absurdity.
77-18 If in order to avoid the difficulties urged above, you have ‘for the snbject of your conclusion, such cognitions as are other than that of such dtstinctness,—then all other cognitions would come to be false; whence all that has gone before~-even your own previous argument becomes false. Thus you will bave to bring forward arguments ad infinitum ; and then too yon will never come to an end; becanse each argument will negative all that may have gone before it, Thus then either your own argument will have to be admitted to be fallacious, or (if yon avoid this) your conclusion will be contrary to the Premises,
132 QLOKAVARTIKA.
80-81, And if you urge that this notion (of tic falsity of dream- coguition) is also false ; then dream-coguition would never be (contradicted and hence) false; and consequently it could not supply the instance (of falsity) in the argnment you have brought forward against us.
81-82. And in the same manner, if you were to accept the correct- ness of the notions of the momentary character, distinctness and existence of cognitions, then your argument (7.e., the middle term) would become non-conclusive or doubtful; while if you accept the falsity of such notions, you contradict your own theory.
83. And again, there could be no such distinction as that into the “bound” and “ liberated,”; and hence you would have the absurdity of the frintlessness of any attempt towards Liberation.
84-85. 17 you urge that you accept as false, only such notions of the existence, &c , of cognition, as appear in concrete (well-defined) forms :— then (we say that) in this case, we do not find the application of any other means of right notion; and thus, there being no such means, the existence, &e., of cognition can be scarcely ascertainable.
85-87. Thus then all our cognitions would come to be false, on account of their being (concretely) well-defined; and it would be scarcely possible to get at (the ideas of) proximity and remoteness, reality and unreality, &e. And (thus) the falsity of cognitions being common to all systems of philosophy, it is not proper to reject the Sankhya, é&c., and be partial to the Bauddha philosophy alone.
80.81 This Karika puta the opponent in w fix: If he accept the falsity of dream- cognition, he can have nothing to say againet the counter-argument urged in ह. 49-80; and he completely loses his ground. If, in order to avoid this, he do not admit the falsity of dream-coguition ; then be contradicts himself; in aa much as he haa bronght forward ‘“‘dream-cognition” as an instance (of false cognition), in the inferential argunient he hae urged againat the Mimaneaka. Thia argument, in the absence of a corroborating instance, would fall to the ground.
88 If you deny the distinctness of cognitions, you land yourself upon the Vedan- tic theory of the ‘‘ unity of knowledge”’; and in that case, the notion of Bondage would be identical with that of Deliverance.
84.85 It may be argued that you accept only the faleity of concrete cognitions ; and that, cognitiona can have their existence, &c., in their abstract forms. But thie is not right; because euch notions, as—“ the world ia only an idea,” “all cognitions are momentary entities” and the like—are not comprehended by any person, in their abatract forma. Asa matter of fact, it is only by meana of Inference, &o., that auch notiona are aacertained ; and 86 euch, they cannot bni be concrete, and hence (accord- ing to you) false. Consequently, the notions of the existence of cognitions, and their momentary obaracier, &., cannot be got at.
The Kaciké adds that if the Bauddha admita the reality of abstract cognitions, such reality wonld belong also to the abstract notions of the post, &c., and this would establish the reality of the external world.
86-87 If all cogintiona were false, there oonld be no idea of the comparative reality or unreality of objects, as १०९ to the prowimity or remoteness of objecta, in regard to the Sense-organ concerned,
APHORISM श्र, : Nirdlambana-Vada. 133
87-88. If a cognition be false, would it not be liable to rejection ? If it were to be false even without being rejected, then there would be no restriction (as to the reality or unreality of a cognition).
88-89. For us, dream-cognition would certainly be falsified by the perception of a waking cognition contradicting it; while for you, what would constitute the difference (between the reality of waking-cognition and that of dream-consciousness, both of which are held by you to be equally false) ?
89-90. Of waking cognition as such, there is no proper (correct) contradictory cognition,—the perception whereof would establish the falsity of such (waking) cognitions as those of the post and the like.
90-91. The fact of waking cognitions being the contradictory of dream- cognition is known to all persons, and, as such they differ from dream- cognition (which is known only to particular individuals), just like the cognition, which serves to reject (a particular dream-cognition),
91-93. Obj.: “Of such waking cognitions as those of the post, &c., invalidating cognitions do arise in the shape of those of the true Yogis (who know all things worldly to be false); and this would certainly make these waking cognitions equal to dream-cognitions (in point of falsity). And such invalidating cognitions too (as those of Yogis) would belong to all living creatures when tley reach the Yogic stage; and hence the fact of waking cognitions having invalidating counter-cognitions becomes established.”
93-94. But, such Yogic cognition is not found to belong to any per- son in this life; and as for those who have reached the Yogic state, we know not what happens to them.
94-95. Our Yogis too could have only such invalidating cognitions as would be either subversive of or contrary to your asscrtion.
87-83 The sense of the Karika is that if even waking cognitions were false, they too, like dream cognitions, wonld be liable to rejection hy subsequent cognitions; but such is not the case.
99.91 Waking cognition, as distinguished from Dream-cognition, is known equally to all men; while Dream-cognition is confined to only particular individuals, under the influence of sleep. Therefore, just as, in the case of a cognition rejecting a certain foregoing dream-cognition, the former is recognised as contradictory of the dream- cognition,—so, in the same manner, the character of being the contradictory of dream- cognition would belong to all such waking cognitions, as those of the post and the like ; and it is in comparison with such waking cognitions that dream-cognitions are said to be false.
91-9 The sense of the objection is that, though Waking cognitions are not invalidated by ordinary cognitions, yet they do become invalidated by the contrary cognitions of Yogis.
94.95 Ags yon urge the cognition of yonr Bauddha Yogi against our theory, so could we also bring forward the cognitions of our own Yogis, as invalidating your theory. “ Subversive”’—such as the recognition of the true character of the shell, after it has been mistaken for silver. न Contrary”—e.g., the idea that ‘this is not silver’, as dis- tinguished from the idea that ‘ this is a ghell.’
1:34 CLOKAVARTIKA.
95-96. And further, you can have no instance to prove that the cognition of the Yogi is such as you assert it to be. As a corroborative instance of our assertiou we have the oognition, as ordinarily perceived.
96-97, If you were to argue that “such cognitions as that of the post and the like, have got counter-cognitions which invalidate them, simply because they are cognitions,—like the cognitions of the murage, d&e. ; --
97-98, (We reply) we do not deny the fact of waking cognitions having counter-cognitions, in the shape of the cognitions of the mirage and the like; and in that form, they also become capable of being invali- dated, as also through their cognisahle object; and your reasoning is also incompatible, with (the cognitions of Yogis, which you hold to be correct, and as such) the invalidating agent; and if you qualify the pre- miss by the phrase ^ other than that’’, then as before, (there would be several discrepancies in your argument).
99-100. For according to you, to dream-cognitions would belong the character of heiug the counter-cognitions of false cognitions (in the shape of such waking cognitions as those of the post, &c.) ; and (in the case of Yogic cognitions) such peculiarities as you may attribute—f.z., the fact of its being comprehended through the suppression of passion and
95.98 You are not to understand that your case 16 exactly eimilar to ours; 1660786 your argument hae no corroborative instance ; while our assertion, of Yogic cognitions having real enbetrata in the external world, 18 based upon an Inference supported by the case of any ordinary cognition ; Even at the present day, we find that the cogni- tions of all men are based upon external realities ; and this would rightly lead to the conclusion that the cognition of the Yogi ehonld 8180 have a real substratum.
91.98 It 28 troe that waking cognitions have counter-cognitions in the shape of wrong conceptions. And just 88 12.186 cognitions and their objects are invalidated by the fact of there being counter-cogaitions, so, in the same manner, correct cognitions too, having (like 18186 cognitions) the character of cognition—, and their objects too having (like the ohjecta of falae cognitions) the character of object—, and having too, in common with false cognitions, their counter-cognitions,—would he capable of being invalidated. We do not deny this fact; and so your argument becomes enuperfiuous. But, inasmach as right cognitions are capable of heing invalidated, the cognitions of Yogis too conld not be free from this capability ; and aa it is these Yogio cognitions that you hold to be the invalidatore of ordinary cognitions, your reasoning hecomes inconclusive and doubtful. If you argue that all cognitions, save those of the Yogi, are capable of heing invalidated, then too, you would be open to all the 01661008 urged in 1९811188 76 &८.5९य.
99.100 You find that Dream-cognition has for ite counter-coguition, the waking cognition ; and the cognitions of Yogis, which are hoth false; consequently the wak- ing cognitions too would be invalidated only by such Yogic cognitions 88 are falee. Thas then the Yogic cognition invalidating the waking cognitions having become false, you will have to reject all such exceptional characterestics of Yogio cognition, as the fact of its proceeding from the sappression of pagsions, &o., from which you conclude euch coguitions to be correct, And in this way your reasouing becomes self-contradictory.
4110789 v.: Nidlambana-Vada. 135
meditation, &c.,—would also become rejected ; and thence your argument would become self-contradictory.
100-101. There being no rejection (of waking cognitions), by great men, these would be like the Yogic cognition which you accept as invali- dating present cognitions; and thence we would either urge the rejection of your inferential argument, or bring forward a counter-argument, and recall the discrepancies in your previous argument.
101-102. And your previous argument is also open to the fault of having the middle term unrecognised by both parties, because it is non- different from the major term (or conclusion), and is (hence) unmention- able (as the middle term).
102-203, As for the ‘ class cognition’ in general, you do not accept it as being both different and non-different (from the individual cegnitions) ; and as for its being totally different (from the individuals), there is no such ‘class’ accepted by us.
103-104. That there is neither similarity nor the exclusion of others,
100.101 We can bring forward the following counter-argument: ५ Waking cogui- tions are correct, hecauso at present they are not rejected hy able men,—like your Yogic cognition.” Then if this argument of ours is eqnalin strength to that whereby yon seek to invalidate all waking cognitions, then ours is only a connter-argument. If, on the other hand, our argament is stronger than yonrs, then your argument falls through. Any way,our argument closes the way of yonr argument. ^ Previous argu- ment :” ४.९; the argument whereby you seek to prove the absence of any rea] snbstra- tum in the external world, for cognitions.
101.102 Over and ahove the discrepancies in your argument, pointed ont above, there is yet another point against it: your middle term “ Pratyaya” is not one that is recognised by both parties; inasmuch as the “fact of heing a cognition” cannot be made the middle term; becanse it forms part of your conclusion, and as such, is not accepted hy your opponent. Your conclusion is that “all cognitions are devoid of sub- stratum’’; and for your middle term, too, you have ^ cognition”; by which yon pre- suppose the fact of cognitions being devoid of substratum—thus incurring the fallacy of Petitio Principii. Thus then your argument becomes devoid of a proper middle term, which must always be such as 18 already accepted by hoth parties.
102-108 Yon may urge that yon will have, for your middle term, ‘ Cognition” in general, what forms part of the conclusion heing only a particular kind of cognition, thereby sailing olear of the objectionable identity of the conclusion with the Minor term. But in reply to this, it is added, that the conception of sucha generic entity too ig not common to both of us. If you deny the identity of the Class with the Individual, then you have only two alternatives left: (1) either that it he both different and non- different, (2) or that it be entirely different, from it. Apparently, you do not accept the first alternative; because you do not admit the Class to be identical with the Individual ; and as for the second, we do not accept it. So even now yonr middle term remains such as is not acoepted by both parties.
103.104 It may be urged that “by class we do not mean a category including many individuals; but by Sémdnya (class) we only mean similarity (so cognition in general meaning cognitions that are similar) and exclusion of others (cognition in general then meaning everything that ४5 not non-cognition); and it is this latter that is technically called Apoha, the upholders of which declare that the word cow denotes neither the
136 CLOKAVARTIKA.
we shall prove later on. Thus then, there is no general middle term which is common to hoth (of us).
104-105. Nor can the character of the middle term belong to the two particular cognitions (waking and dream cognitions), as they constitute respectively the Minor term and the Instance of your syllogism ; and because the former is incapable of syntactical relation (with the Minor term), while the latter cannot in any way belong to (or qualify) it.
105-106. Nor can the “ cognition’ devoid of its object be the middle term; as it bas been already explained that on account of the non-recogn1- tion of the subject, there follows the fault of having the substratum undefined.
106-107. Thus then your middle term too comes to he contradictory ; and the Instance becomes devoid of the predicate of the conclusion—both of these (faults) being indicated by the alternatives that were brought forward (above) for the (avoidance of the non-recognition of the predicate.
107-109. Evenin dream-cognition the external substratum 18 not altogether absent. In all cases there is a real substratum, though (in dreams) appearing under diverse conditions of place and time. As a
class nor the individual, but only the exclusion of all thatis not cow. Al) this will be refuted later on.
104.196 The two particular cognitions—waking and dream cognitions—cannot be accepted as the middle term; because one of these (waking coguitions, f7.) forms the Minor term of your syllogism; and if the same were made the middle term, your Minor Premiss would become absurd; as it would be—‘‘ waking cog uition is wakiug cognition.” And as for dream-coguition, it forms the corroborative instance of your syllogism, and does not belong to the Minor term; hence even in this case, no proper Minor Premiss wonld be possible,
105.106 The Banddha nrges that by “cognition” as their mindle term, they mean “ cognition pure and simple independently of the object cognised”. ‘I'he objection to this, however, is that a Minor Premiss, which is devoid of objective reality, cannot lead to any correct couclus‘on; specially as in such cases the middle term becomes devoid of any substratum; and as such, it hecomes amenablo to the same faults that we have urged against the Minor term that has its subject nndefined.
105.101 “* Above”—Vide Kiarika: Niradlambanata Céha Sarvatha Yadi Sadhyaté, 4८.) §c.,” where it has been shown, by means of alternatives, that an absolute absence of snbstratum is never met with; and from the negation of snch absence of snbstratum, we conclnde that even in dream-cognition, there is no snch ahsence. Thus then your Instance (Dream-cognition) becomes devoid of the predicate of your conclusion (which is absence of substratum). And waking cognitions too, being, for the same reason, not without real substratnm, the middle term becomes contradictory to the conclusion; inasmueh as no “cognition” is ever found to be without a real substratum.
107.109 We dream only of snoh external objcets as we have previously perceived. The only difference lies in the disorder of the time and place of the perception. Hence dreams too cannot be said to be totally devoid of real substratum in the external world.
APHORISM ए: 11496441 Vada. 137
matter of fact too, what is comprehended by dream-cegnition is (seme real external object that has been perceived) either during the present life, or in some past life, or at any other time, and which comes to be cognised in dreams, either in connection with the same time and place, or under different circumstances.
109-113. The cause of misconception in the notion of the “ fire-brand- circle” is the fire-brand whirled with extreme rapidity;—in that of ‘‘imaginary cities,” the particular shape of the clouds, as also some precon- ceived houses, &c. ;—in that of the ^ Mirage,” preconceived water, or sand heated by and reflecting the rays of the sun. And of the notion of “the hare’s horns” the cause would be either the hern of ether animals, or the peculiar character of the hare itself. And of the negation of the hare’s horus, the cause is the baldness of its head (४.९. the absence of protu- berances). Of the notion of empiiness in the ebject, the cause is (the place) untouched by any other object. And in the case of improbable utterances (such as ‘‘ Hundreds of elephants on the tip of ene’s finger”) the cause lies in the ebjects themselves (as under the influence of extreme proximity giving rise to such misconceptions).
113-114. Even such objects as are never perceived (such as the Sankhya ‘Prakriti’), are found te be comprehended by cognitions; and the origin of these cegnitions lies in (its constituent elements) the earth, &c.
114-115. It is a peculiarity of ^“ Sense-perception”’ alene that it comprehends only such objects as exist at the present time, and also that it functions over objects in contact (with the senses); such restrictions do not apply to other kinds of cognition (Inference, &c. )
115-116. (If you ask) ^ How could an object, not existing, bring about a cognition P”—(we reply) whence do you conclude the incapacity of non-existing ebjects to produce cegnitions ?
116-117. The point at issue between us rests in the fact of (cognitions having) external substrata; and hence, even if there be no
109.118 The external canse of dreams has been explained. These Karikas explain the external causes of the ordinary misconceptions of the senses. Aud it is shown that even misconceptions are not totally devoid of extcrnal realities,—to say nothing of correct Perceptions.
113.14 Tt is only the elements—Harth, Water, &c.,—in their subtlest forms, that are called ^“ Prakriti.”
114.16 The notion of “ Prakriti” is got at by means of Inference, whercin it is not necessary that the conditions specified should apply. Hence the objection based upon the imperceptible character of Prakriti loses its force.
115-16 That which does not exist at the present time cannot perform any action, &c.; bnt this does not mean that it cannot bring abont cognitions; as we have cogni- tions of many past and future objects.
116.17 Becanse the absence of proximity does not imply tho absence of tlie cxter- nal substratum of cognitions.
18
138 QOLOKAVARTIKA.
proximity of the object (with the Sense-organ), how could that affect our theory ?
117-119. Therefore it is only that (cognition), which comprehends an object otherwise than in the form it exists in, that can be said to be “devoid of substratum ;” and that Cognition which has ‘ negation’ for its object 18, in fact, one that has a real substratum ; because this ‘ negation ’ too is not au independent entity by itself; for it is not so comprehended. For you, however, both of these (‘absence of substratum’ and ‘ negation as the substratum’) together with their causes, can never be ascertained.
119-20. And like the discrepancies of your conclusion, the contra- dictory character of your middle term too would be chargeable (to your argument) ;—inasmuch as it leads to the subversion of the forms of the predicate, subject, &c.—taken severally as well as collectively (in the premises).
120-21. The discrepancies of the instance too become chargeable to you ; inasmuch as in any single object, it is not possible to have the con-
ception of parts of the major term and the middle term, and also that of invariable concomitance (of these two).
121-22. Some people urge against you the objection that in your argument you do not mention any instance of dissimilarity. If you urge that “it is not mentioned because there is no such instance”; then (they would reply) you have not got here the opportunity (for making uch an assertion, as) such an assertion could only be made in the case of the conclusion being an affirmative one.
117-19 By ‘‘cognition without a substratum” is meant a wrong cognition or miscon- ception,—and uot one that cognises itself. And the notion— this is not a jar”—has also areal substratum; inasmuch as this negative concsption is nothing mors than a positive cognition, having for its object, the absence of ths properties of the Jar in the particular object. For the Banddha, on the other hand, there can be no cogni- tion devoid of real substratum; becanss the cognition, according to them, cognisss stself.
119.20 Your conclusion has bsen pointed ont to bs such as has its subject not known, &c., &0. In the same manner, ws are going to show that yonr middle term is contradictory. Your middle term would prove the falsity of all cognitions; and a such, it would also prove ths falsity of the cognitions the Snbject and Predicate of your conclusion; and as such it would establish the contradiotories of your con- clusion.
120.21 The Instanos, ^^ Dream-Cognition,” is such as is devoid of your Major term, ५८ Absence of substratum’; it is also devoid of the middle term, “ths oharacter of cognition’? ; it is devoid of the combination of these two; aud lastly it is also devoid of the concountance of these. “In u single odject, Fc.”’—i.e., in oognition, taken by itself, indspendsntly of any substratum.
121.88 “Instance of Dissimilarity”: f.1., ‘where thers is no abasncs of substratum, there isno cognition.” “ft is not mentioned, §S'c.”’: The ssuse of this is that when the conclusion is an affirmative ono, its negation is its contradictory; and when it is wa negative one, then, its negation being a ९१०१५ ths middle term oould not apply to it, Henco it is not necessary to an instance of dissimilarity, in the case
APHORISM प्र: Nirdlumbana Vada. 139
123-24. The citation (of the instance of dissimilarity) is possible, even in the case of the contradictory (of the major term) being a nega- tive one ;—e.g,, “that which is not transient is not an effect, as ‘ Sky- flowers,’ &c.,” an assertion which is quite reasonable.
124-25. In the case of your argument, however, we have a negative major term (or conclusion) (‘‘ devoid of substratum ”’) ; and hence its con- tradictory (presence of substratum) is positive; and as such it is necessary that the contradictory of your major term should have been supported by an Instance.
125.26. And if you were to mention any such, the double negation would signify only an affirmation; and no affirmation could be made if the object were non-existing.
126-27. Under the circumstances, in the case of the negation of the omniscience (of Buddha) we would have the following form of reasoning - “There is an incapability of His sense-perception, &c., (to apply to all things), like our own (sense-perception, & ९, ).”
of oor argument. The meaning of the Author igs that the Bauddhas do not make this assertion with reference to the argument in question ; becanse for them there is no case of affirmative sense-perception; as according to them, there can be no joint cognition of the middle term accompained hy the major term (ie. of the major premiss). It is for this reason, that they always hase the applicability of their middle term npon its capacity to preclude the contradictory of the couclusion; con- sequently, in the absence of an Instance of Dissimilarity, there can be no precln- sion of the said contradiotory ; therefore, in the Banddha theory, it is always neces- sary to cite Instances of Dissimilarity. Their Major term—“ absence of substratum” —however, is a negative one; and hence its ocoutradictory cannot bnt he positive— **9 real substratum ”’; and it is quite possible that the middle term should reside in this latter, positive entity: so in order to deny this possibility, it was necessary to cite an Instance of Dissimilarity.
123.24 Even in the case of an affirmative conclusion, as च matter of fact, tho citing of an instance of dissimilarity is not necessary; but such citing 18 not impossible ‡ because even when the contradictory is च negation one, such instances are alwaye possible ; hence those that are clever at inferential reasonings must always be able to cite such instances, the omission of which would be aserious mistake. An example of such an Instance 18 given: In the argument, “sound is transient, becanse it is caused,” we can cite an instance of dissimilarity, such as “ that which is not transient 18 not cansed, as Sky-flowers.”
125.28 If you were to cite such an instance, it could be only in the form—“ That which is not devoid of substratum is not a Cognition,” and the double negation—“ that which is not devoid of ’’—wounld mean “ that which is endowed with ;”’ and this affir- mation conld not be made, if there were no real substratum.
126.87 1110 Bauddha would retort that these discrepancies could be charged against all negative arguments,—even to that argument by which you seek to deny the omni- acience of Buddha. In order to avoid this charge, the Anthor says that the form of our argnment against such omniscience would be this: ^ Buddha’s perception cannot apply to such objects as exist in the future &c.,—becanse it is seuse-perception,—like our ordinary seuse-perception,—f.t., words”; and thus we sail clear of the above charges; aS the citation of the Instance of Dissimilarity —* That which comprehends, &©, ~ is quite correct.
140 CLOKAVARTIKA.
127-28. In a case where no contradictory (of the major term) is possible, other theorists declare that this (non-citatiou of the instance of dissimilarity) is no fault; inasmuch as even without such citation the reasoning is conclusive.
128-29. Then again, it is only those who admit of real means (of argument) that can engage in a discussion; and the Cuinyavadi is net entitled (to any discussion), because he accepts no means to be real.
129-30. (Obj.). “ But all the arguments that we have brought fer- ward are such as are accepted by you (to be real, though not by us) ; and as such, wherefore should you have brought forward so many cbjec- tions—by means of alternatives—, in order to invalidate the argament as such P”’
130-31. You who are versed in legical rnles—why sbould you argne thus, with a view to deceive us, as it were ? Have you not heard that an argument (to be effective) must be such as is accepted by both parties P
131-33. In the case of an argument which is net accepted by your opponent, and which is brought forward as recognised by yourself alone— you have a remedy at hand; but in the case of an argument which (as you say) is not recognised by yourself, what procedure can you adopt ? Because if you were to establish (such an argument) you would be con- tradicting your own previcus cenvictions (such as the denial of the truth of the original argument); while if you left it un-established, your oppo- nent could not be convinced of the truth of your conclusions.
133-34. (Obj.). “That which is not recognised by the opponent can never convince him; and hence it is only reasonable that the real character of an argument should not belong to such. But that which is
127.23 Having exponaded the view ef “some people”, the Author proponnds another theory: The Inetance of Dissimilarity ia cited only with a view to avoid the chance of the middle term heing either too wide or too narrow, and therehy making the reasoning inconclnsive. In cases, however, where the contradictory ef the Major term does not exist, there is no chanee ef such a contingency ; and hence there 18 no necessity for citing the said Instance. But by this we do not admit your argu- ment as conclusive; in face of the namerous objections urged above.
128.29 Only those who accept the varions factora of an argament to be real, can carry on any discussion. The Ginyavadi denies the reality ef all these factors ; and as such, he cannot be admitted into the discngsien.
129.30 The Qinyavadi says: “ Though we do not accept the reality of any factor ef the argument, yet we bring forward arguments, in order to convince yeu of the truth ef our theery; and as these arguments are in due accordance with your ewu tenets, it ie not proper for you to attempt to invalidate it; as by invalidating my argament, you will be only invalidating your own tenets, upon which my arguments are all based.”’
120.81 ^“ Have you not, 4८. "—Ag tanght by your own teachor Dinniga.
181.85 Tf an argument is aceepted by you, and not by your opponent, then what you havo te do 26 to bring forwfrd other arguments in support of your erigiual argn- ment, and thereby convince yonr adversary, But there is no course epon to yon, if you do not accept, as real, the argnment that you yourself bring forward,
apporism ए: Nivalambana Vada. 141
not recognised by myself—what can that matter ? The fact of the necessity of the middle term being such as 18 recognised by both parties is not mentioned with a view to any transcendental result, (that we shall accept it upou any verbal authority). Any person would become convinced of a fact only through reasoning recognised by himself.
135-36. “If you urge—‘ How can you assert what you do not recog- nise ? ’—(we reply) what is even that to you? I may assert the conclu- sion or the argument either recognised or not recognised by me; do you not come to ascertain it (through my argument) to be true P”’
137. “‘Itis where the conclusion (a certain notion) depends solely upon a person (his utterance), that the question 18 raised—‘ whence did this man know it ? ` Such a question, however, does not arise in tlie present case (which is one of inferential argument)”’.
133. ‘For if it were so (and the conclusion depended upon my assertion) in the present case, then the mere assertion of the conclusion would lead to your conviction, solely through the non-recognition of any discrepancy (in my argument).”’
139. ‘* But because this (conclusion) stands iu need of argumenta- tive reasoning, therefore it is to this (reasoning) that authoritativeness belongs, and the use of the verbal utterance lies only in the recalling of the reasoning to the mind (of the questioner).”
140. ‘Therefore just as one who would be convinced of the con- clusion only through a recognition of the middle term as concomitant with the major term (i.e., of the major premiss), does not stand in need of (knowing the character of) the speaker, so would you also be convinced of our conclusion without wanting to know what we ourselves believe.”
141. ‘Inthe case of such cognitions of yours, as Sense-perception, &c.,—is there, in the case of these,any reasoning or conclusion that is recog- nised by us,—that you should persist upon such (being accepted by me) in the case of my present (inferential argument) ? ”
142. ‘For these reasons, it is not befitting of learned people to assert in reply that ‘since the reasoning 28 not recognised by yourself, therefore it cannot convince me. ’”’
143. (Rep.). All this would have been quite true, if the only result (sought after by your reasoning) were my conviction alone ; in that case the reasoning would be enough for me, even if it were not recognised by you.
144. But when the case is such that you, holding that the idea alone is a real entity, are asked by one—‘ what are your reasons ? then it is not possible (that you should say something which you yourself do not recognise).
145. And certainly yon could not have been convinced of your theory, through any reasonings, that are not accepted by you, but by me.
146. And no argument is brought forward against a questioner save that which states the grounds of the speaker’s own conviction.
147-48. And again, how do you know that such and such an argument
142 CLOKAVARTIKA.
is recognised by us? How could there be any desire on your part, for asserting (an argument), when you do not recognise the meaning (of the argnment) which you knowingly hring forward for me, when 1 present myself only as an enquirer (and not as your opponent)? = It was with a full recognisance of this fact that your teachers asserted the necessity of the reasoning being accepted by hoth parties.
149. Hence, justas by means of yonr argument you seek to instil into me a recognition of your conclusion, so by means of objections to your argument, I shall seek to instil into you the non-acceptance or negation (thereof). |
150-52. Just as you, having asserted a conclusion, and not recognis- ing any argument in support of that conclusion, become deprived of any conviction (with regard to such a conclusion); so would also yonr questioner, desiring to understand such a conclusion, and then becoming conscious of the discrepancies of the reasoning (in favour of snch a concln- clusion), fail to be convinced of the correctness of that conclusion ; and if he knows the reasoning to he true, then the reality of the reasoning heing firmly established, your conclusion itself hecomes impossible; and so he naturally does not become convinced of its truth.
153. Therefore you should entertain no such hope as that ‘even when the reasoning is asserted by me unknowingly (i.e., when not recognised by me as such), the other party would become convinced of the correct- ness of my conclusion by the direct acceptance of my argument.’
154. The contradiction between your reasoning (the major premiss) and the conclusion is clear, as declared by Gantama. And it was without a recognition of this fact that others (the Bauddhas) declared snch con- tradiction to he no fanlt.
155, (Obj.). “ But it is just possible that I may have been previously convinced of the conclusion by means of reasonings recognised by ordinary people; though this (reasoning) may have no existence in reality.”
156, (Rep.). That which is now known to be non-existent in reality ,— how could that have been a reality before? And if it was not a reality, how could it have been accepted as sound reasoning P
157-58. If it is a correct reasoning, it could not but have a real existence. Because uo reality can be proved by an unreality ; for we have never known such notions as that of the ‘‘hare’s horns” to lead to any correct notion ; and the notion of the existence of fire, based upon the idea of the existence of fog (which is not smoke), cannot but be false.
159. Therefore your idea of reality, originating in an untrue reason- ing, cannot but be unreal; because nothing real can be indicated by that which is itself false.
160. The different marks, &c.,—which are takeu to indicate the
150.52 Since your conclusion denies the roality of tho substratum of all cogni-
tions, therefore an establishment of the reality of the object of yonr premisses ren- ders your own oonclnsion impossible,
APHORISM V: Nirdlambana Vada. 143
alphabetical letters,—these, too, in their own forms (of marks) are not devoid of reality.
161. If you urge that these (marks) are not real as letters,—(we reply that) such is the case with all entities: nothing is accepted to be real in the form of something else.
162. When the natural form of the object itself is manifest, then the form appears as such (and heuce is real); when, however, such form of the object is not ascertained, then it is neither real nor unreal.
163. Your reasoning, §c.,—(i.e., the middle term and the major term)— however are unreal in their own forms ; therefore their agency (towards producing notions) is similar to that of the fog (producing an idea of fire), and not to that of letter-marks.
164. (Obj.). ‘The form of the means has, for us, only the character of a ‘Samvriti’ (falsity); and in that form they are accepted to be real ; and thus liow can they be said to be false in their natural forms ? ”
165. (Rep.). The character of ‘ Samvriti’ exists only in word,—and as such it can never be the cause of true reality.
166. You have got no ground for distinguishing between true and ordinary worldly ‘reality’; and as such how could true reality belong to a thing which is amenable to worldly means (४,९.) that whereto you attri- bute the character of ‘Samvriti’) ?
167-68. (Obj.). “But even in the absence of the external object, only by means of the ‘Idea’ in the mind, would (all worldly activity) be accomplished,—through the differentiations of specifications based upon ‘Impressions’ and ‘ Words’. The followers of the Nyaya too have de- clared that ‘it is only when the predicate, &c. (of the propositions forming an argument) have become the objects of ‘ Idea’, that all functioning of inference and the rest become accomplished,—and not when these (predi- cate, &c.) exist in the external world.’ ”
169. (Rep.). True, there is such an assertion of theirs ; but just ex- amine it for a moment—how could there be any differentiation of that which is a nonentity, through any representation either in Idea or in Words ?
170. And again, how could there be any specification of Words or Idea, with regard to that which has no real existence P Even specifica- tion by word there can he none, because you deny (the reality of) the word itself.
171-72. And if even such specifications as do not exist, and are
167.68 Inference, Analogy, &c., could be explained as based upon the ideas of the subjects and predicates of the constituent propositions; and these ideas do not stand in need of the external reality of objects. Through differences in Impressions and Words we could have the differentiations into the false and thereal factors of an argument, &c., &o. “ Followers of Nyaya,” £ €.) Dinnaga and others.
109 “* Hare’s horns” can have no differentiation, based upon any specification of either words or ideas.
171.12 Tf mere existence in idea were the sole test of the reality of a proposition,
144 CLOKAVARTIKA.
only brought about by an Idea (४,९.) have no existence save in Idea), were to bring about the action of the major, middle and minor terms ;—then, even with regard to your argument, all the faults that we urge against it may be such as have real corresponding ideas, -and as such your argu- ment would become subject to all these faults,
173. The mystic incantation that you have urged,—viz., ‘ that Inference, &c., are accomplished only when the subject, &c., have appeared in idea, and that there is no need of any external object, ’—would also apply to the fallaciousness, &c. (of your argument), urged by me.
174-75. For you, who base all usage upon representations in Idea, the objections urged by us would also have to be accepted as established ; but not so the argument brought forward by you. Because we base all- usage upon external objects; and as such, for us, even when the Idea has appeared, we cannot in any way have any usage devoid of the external object.
176, (Obj.). ^ But just as we do not accept the reality of the rea- soning, so we would not accept the objections (agaiust it); and hence, in the absence of any objections, my argument remains unsallied.”
177. (Rep.). Then in that case there is no need of objections,—when by the mere denial of (the truth of) yonr reasoning, you have accepted the non-conclusiveness of your argument, which is all that we seek to prove.
178-79. Again, there can be no specification by the Vasana (Impres- sion or Tendency ), because of the impossibility of any cause (for such speci- fication), for you. If you urge that ‘the difference of Idea (or Cognition ) would be the canse’—then, whence the difference of this (Idea)? If it be urged that this latter is based upon the difference of Vasana, then you land upon ‘Reciprocity.’ And of the pure form of Idea, by itself, you can have no differentiation.
180-81. And further there 18 no evidence either for the existence of
then, inasmuch as we have very distinct ideas of the discrepanoies in your arguments, you cannot deny the reality of these discrepancies.
176. You base usage upon mere Idea; hence yon cannot very well deny the objections we have urged against you. We, on the other hand, hold to the necessity of a real substratum for the Idea; and hence your argument caunot be binding upon ug, as it is devoid of a real substratum in the external world.
173.79. With this Commences the refutation of the Bauddha theory of “ Vasana.”
173.19, ‘ And of the pure, &c.”—This anticipates the theory that the Idea being self-differentiated, there is no Reciprocity.
130.31, This anticipates the objection that the said Reciprocity being eternal, like the relation hotween the seed and tbe sprout, oannot be faulty. The sense of the reply is that the fact of the mutual dependence of the seed and the sprout is well- known; and as such the mutual dependenoe in this case is considered to be faulty whereas in the case of the Bauddha “ Vasana,” there is no such testimony of general acceptance. Even if the existence of the Impressions he granted. these could only tend to recall preconceived perceptions, and would, in no case, he able to bring abont the objects of perception, suoh as Red, Blue, Fe. “ Because, §‘c.”—Impressions left upon the mind by past cognitions, tend to bring about a remembranco thereof.
APHORISM V. 145
the Vasana, or for the differentiation (thereof); (and even granting its existence) the Vasana wonld only bring about the differentiation of the ¢ Apprehender”’ (the Idea or Cognition); and then, by what would the differentiation of the ‘“‘Apprehended”’ (object of perception) be bronght abont ? Because appearing in consciousness alone the Vasana could only bring about a remembrance.
181-82. (1) Ideas being momentary (transient), and (2) their des- trnction being total (४८. without leaving behind its least trace), aud (3) there being no association of the impressed and the impresser (2.6.) since the two do not in any case appear together),—there can be no Vasana.
182-83. And again, the next moment having not yet appeared, cannot be impressed by the foregoing moment; and the following moment having been destroyed (as soon as it appears), there can be no impression, thereby, of the foregoing; and even if the two moments appeared to- gether, they could have uo relation (between them); and hence there can be no ‘ Vasana or Impression.’
184.85. Both (the preceding and the following moments) being momentary, they cannot operate upon one another: how can that which is in the course of destruction be impressed by another which too is under- going destruction P It is only the permanent entities (7.e., those that last for some moments) that can be impressed upon by other entities, which are also permanent.
185-86. (Obj.). “If the subsequent cognition, which is permanent, did not differ from the preceding one, then there could be no Vasana ;
182.33, By “moment” here is meant the ‘cognition appearing at the moment, The Bauddhas hold all cognition to be momentary, being destroyed as soon as pro- duced ; and hence, according to them, no two cognitions can exist at the same time; and conseqnently one caunot impress the other, This explains the third reason for the denial of Vésand.
184.85, “ Being momentary, Jc.” —Thia explains the first reason for denying Vasand. “Yt ts only, 4८. --9 8101108 the second reason for denying Vasané@; that which is totally destroyed cannot be impressed upon; nor can any impressions be produced by that which has itself been totally destroyed.
135.86, You have urged that permanent entities are. impressed upon by others. But this 18 wrong: hecanse that which is permanent mnat be accepted asa having the same form at all times, past, present and future; and hence the form of the cognition that appeared before would be identical with that which would appear subsequently ; and thus on account of this identity, there could he no impression. While if cognitions are held to be undergoing momentary changes, then, the time of the subsequent cognition being different from that of the previous one, and yet there being a similarity between the two cognitions, we could have a Vésand, which wonld solely consist in the fact of the subsequent Idea appearing in the form of the previous Idea. Therefore it is only when the previous cognition impresses its form upon the subsequent cognition, that the former 18 said to impress the latter ; aud as such, there is no need of any operation, which would not be possible in the momentary cognitions, And further, the relatiou subsisting between the two would be that of the cause and elect; and thus all your objections against our Vdasand fall to the ground,
19
146 GLOKAVARTTIKA.
because of the absence of any difference between the two. When however these are transient, then there can he a Vasana, based upon similarity and difference (betweeu the two cognitions ).”
187-88. (Reply). But for you, who accept the momentary character of cognitions, there can be no such similarity. And again, the preceding cognition can bring about no effect, until it has itself appeared ; nor (can it bring about effects) when it has (itself) been destroyed ; and in tts accom- plished state, it has no continuance even for oue moment. Therefore (according to you) the cognition being destroyed as soon as produced, there can be no moment which would allow for its bringing about its effects.
189-90. Then again, since the cognition is destroyed totally (without leaving any trace behind), whence can there he any such similarity ? As, in the subsequent cognition, there exists no such property as helonged to the preceding cognition; and barring the sameness of properties, no other ‘similarity ’ is possible.
190-91. And if the Vasan&i were due solely to similarity, then in the case of an idea of the Elephant following upou that of the Cow, there could be no Vasana, because the two are entirely different. And then (there being no Vasana in keeping with the idea of the cow) after that, there would never be any idea of the cow, becanse of the absence of its cause (which you hold to he none other than the aforesaid Vasana). And, in fact, no other idea would proceed from auother which is dissimilar to it.
192-93. And again, there being an absence of all help from any external object, and hence not being influenced by any extraneous circum- stances, and having the peculiarity of being totally destroyed,—how could the Impressions (Va@sandas) bring about any effects iu anything like 2 serial order ?
181.83, Therefore your assertion,—that “the relation of causes and effect subsists’ between the two Ideas ”—is wrong.
189.90, If the property of the previous cognition persist in the subsequent cogni- tion, the former caunot be eaid to have been dostroyed totally.
192.98, In onr case, as we admit of external objects, the Impressions are held to reside in the soul, which is permanent; and hence whenever one object is fonnd to be similar to another perceived before, thie similarity serves to rouse the dormant goul-impression into activity, and it brings about ite effect; and this effect we hold to be nothing else, save the remembrance of the object. But, in the case of the Bauddhas, as they admit of the existence of nothing but Ideas, their Impressions oan- not have any aids, on which would depend their activity, or in the absence of which they oonld not operate. Hence their theory will he open to the absurdity of all the impressions,—al] equally independent of external aids—functioning at one and the game time ; and there would be no order in our cognitions; and at one stroke, wa would come to have Universal Consciousness. But this too wonld disappear, the very next moment, leaving ns devoid of atl cognitions, which you hold to disappear so completely as not to leave any traoe behind them.
‘APHORISM VY. 147
` 1953-9. It 18 only on the destruction of the cause—and not other- wise—that the effect is held (by you) to appear. And hence the destruc- tion of a single Idea would bring about the destruction of all impressions (based thereupon). And then, the Universal Idea, that had been bronghit about by all these (Impressions), would all in a single moment, dis- appear,
195-96. If even on the destruction of the substratum (Idea), you hold its potentiality (in the shape of Impressions) to subsist, then its mo- mentary character disappears; and there would be no bringing about of the effect consequent upon such character.
196-97. Jf again you hold the flow of Impressions to be like the flow of Ideas (1.९) uninterrupted and continnons),—then (both being indepen- dent) no Impressions could be produced from Ideas; nor would any Ideas be brought about by Impressions.
197-98. In that case each (Idea and Impression) would bring about effects similar to itself; and one could not bring about the other. Nor 18 there (in your doctrine) any such peculiar cause (besides these two) as would lead to the production of dissimilar effects.
498-99. Therefore {1118 (your) ^^ Impression ” must have been assumed only as a “false reality” (samoritt-satya), aud not as a true reality, But then, no effect can ever be produced by such (false) entities.
199-200. He, for whom there is a permanent comprehender (in the shape of the “ Soul’’), can quite reasonably have this Soul as the sub- stratum of Impressions—this (the Soul) becoming so through repeated cognitions. Or this (Soul) itself may be said to be the “Impression”? itself.
200-201. In a case where the Laksh& water is sprinkled on the
198.95, ^ Would bring about, Jc.”’—because you. accept no other cause of the Impressions, besides Ideas.
195.90, = ^“ There would be, Jc.”’—hecanse you hold that the effect is produced, only ‘upon the destravtion of tho Cause ; and in the present case, your cause, the particular Idea, is held to persist ; and hence there could not appear any effects, in the shape of Impressions.
197.98, Ideas woold produce Ideas, and Impressions would produce Impressions : ५८ Dissimilar effects” —i.e., inasmuch a3 you accept no other cause besides Ideas and Impressions, you can assert no reason for tle fact of an Idea producing an Impression, ‘or vice-versd,
199.253, The Impressed Idea does not differ entirely from the original cognition ; nor is it indefinite, like the original abstract peroeption. Hence the Impression cannot be said to be either different from its canse, or identical with it. And the fact of the ap- penrance of another condition does not militate against its permanent character; specially as people recognise the two states of the sime Idea to be contiguous. If the condition and the conditioned Were held to be identical, then the Sonl itself, as endowed with the Impression of the original cognition, would he the Impression; while if the conditioned be held to differ from the condition, then the said Soul would only be the substratnm of the Impression; and the Impression woold be located in the Soul.
200-201, +! TLaksha’”’ is ६ kind of red dye produced ont of « certain species of cochineal. If this dye is sprinkled over a lemon-blossom, the fruit becomes red.
148 (ा,0्^ ए. द्ग प्र,
lemon-blossom, it is only the colour (of the Laksh&) that is transferred to the fruit. For these reasons (detailed above) there can be no such thing as # 88818.
202. As a matter of fact, this demial of (the reality of external) objects,~-following upon the assumption of such an “ Impression-theory,” which is incorrect and devoid of reason,—was declared by the Buddha, with the sole object of alienating the aftections (of men from such worldly objects) ; and sonrchow or other, some people (the socalled followers of Bauddha) fell into a mistake (and accepted it to its utmost extent, as the denial of all external snbstratum of cognitions).
Thus ends the Ntv@lambanavada. [The Refutation of Buddhistic Fdealism.]} Tar CUNYAVADA.
1. The discrepancies of the inferential argument having been pointed out, on the strength of the (nattre of) cognitions,—another (scion of the Bauddha) comes forward with an argament based upon the incapa- bility of the effect of cognitions (to give rise to any notions of external objects).
2. You stick to Sense-perception, and the contradiction thereof yon urge as an objection against our argument; flow just consider the following points.”
3. “Is ita fact that a cognition is able to function, only when such objects, as the post and the Jike, have an existence in the external world P Or is it that tho cognition rests only in itself as the object cognised, and not in any extraneous object ?”’
4. “Tf it is only the external object that is perceived by the cogni- tion, then the objections urged by you are right enough ; but if it is the cognition itself which is cognised, then each and everyone of them falls to the ground.”
5. “Here then, it must be admitted that all living creatures are cognisant of the well-established fact that cognisability belongs to objects in the shape of blue, yellow, long, short, &c., &c.”’
6. “And we do not perceive any difference in the shape of the cognition and the cognised; nor do we have any clear idea of such and such properties as belong either to the one or to the other.”’
7. “Only that which is cognised can be said to have an existence ; there can be no existence for that which is not cognised ; inasmuch as such a thing cannot but be unreliable. Therefore it must be admitted that
४02, Buddha himself never meant to entirely deny external objects. By such denial ho only meant to impress upon the minds of his disciples that worldly objects
were not worth striving after ;—thus only echoing the Vedantic denial of the external world,
APHORISM Y¥. 149
there does exist an object with ashape, inasmuch as it is found to have the character of cognisability.”
8. ‘Therefore to those whe are thus investigating the matter, if the Cognition itself appear as having a shape; then the trustworthiness (of the existence of the form) would rest selely in the Cognition; and there would be no ground for postulating an extraneous object.”
9. “If however, the shape belonged to the external object, then such an object would have to be accepted as existing, on the sole gronnd of its being cognised ; and for the accomplishment of (this perception) we would also have to accept the existence of the cognition.”
10. “Now then, which (of the two alternatives) is correct ? Itmnust be the cognition itself which has the form (as perceived). Why? Because we have found that it is one and the same object which has the shape, and is cognised as snch.”
11. ‘And hence if, what has the form were held to be some extrane- ous object, then its cognisability not being otherwise possible, we would have te postulate something else as the cogniser.”
12. “And in this, over and above the well-defined and ascertained cognisable object having a form, we would be postulating a groundless cogniser, which would be formless and something altogether foreign to the cognisable object.”
“13. “And if,in order {0 avoid the postulating of such a groundless entity, you were to attribute the character of the cogniser to the object itself,—then the difference between us would be one of names only, as both of ns would be holding the existence of only one entity.”
14. “In any case, all that we do is to assert the identity of the cogniser (Cognition) and the cognised (object of cognition) ; the assumption of either externality or internality we hold to he utterly groundless.”
15-17. “In my theory, though the real character of Cognition is naturally pure, yet in this beginningless world, there is an agglomeration of diverse dispositions (or impressions) born of foregoing cognitions ; and throngh these, the cognition comes to appear in the various shapes of blue, &c., tinged with the character of the cognised and the cogniser, which latter, however, appear as if they were something quite apart (from the Cognition itself) ; and as such, the cognition does not stand in need of any extraneous object. The reciprocal causality of the Cognition and its faculty (in the shape of dispositions) is without a beginning (and as such, not faulty).”
18. “The assumption of one is certainly better than the assumption
18, Yon would he holding the external object to be both the cogniser and the cognised ; while we hold Cognition itself to be both.
15-11, Not faulty »—Just ag the reciprocal causality of the seed and the tree is not considered faulty.
18. We accept only one entity, the Cognition alone; and you accept two, the Cog: nition and the Ohject. Though we also postulate a faculty of cognition, in the shape
150 QUOKAVARTTIKA.
of many; and then again, the assumption of a diversity in the faculty (of an object) is more acceptable than that of a diversity in the objects themselves
19-20. “ For tliese reasons, inasmuch as it is accepted by both of us, it is far more reasonable to postulate the form to belong to the Cognitiou itself ; for yon however, such postulating would be possible only after you have postulated an (extraneous) object; because so long as this object has not been established, the Cognition can have no function (itself being without a substratum); and lence there wonld be a certain degree of remoteness (between the Cognition and the forms, blue and the rest) Whereas in my case, the Cognised would be such as is in close proximity and connection (with the Cognition).”
21. ‘For the following reason too, it is the Cognition which must be held to have the form; because being self-luminouns, it is accepted, even by you, to be the means of illumiuating the external object, which in itself is devoid of any luminosity.”
22. ¢ And so long as the factor of Cognition has not been compre- hended, there can be no definite idea of the object apprehended thereby ; because such apprehension depends upon the Cognition, like the jar under the light of a lamp.”
23. ^° 0 एढा when the objects have appeared, there is no cognition of these, either because there is no illumination (of Consciousness), or because there is some impediment (to their cognition).”
24. ‘For the Cognition however, when it has once appeared, there can be no impediment; nor 18 it ever non-luminous; hence it cannot but be comprehended.”
25. ‘Mven prior to the comprehension of the object, you accept the appearance of the Cognition; as such, we would have the comprehension of the Cognition (even prior to that of the object). And if (even in the absence of any impediments) such comprehension were denied, then we could as reasonably deny its comprehension at all times (४.९.) even after the comprehension of the object).”’
26, ‘Because, what is that which wonld accrne to the Cognition, subsequently (2.९. after the comprehension of the object),—which did not belong to it before,—and accompanied by which it has never been really comprehended, but only comes to be kuown subsequently as ‘ conipre- hended’ ?”
27. ‘The luminosity (४.९. the appearance of Cognition) too does not stand in need of the appearance of another Cognition; for if it were so then the comprehension of one cognition would require that of another, and so on ad infinitum; and there would be no resting ground for any Cognition.”
of Impressions, yet the postulating of properties is simplor than that of the objects the-n:clves.
APHORISM $, 191
28-29. ‘* We find that, even in the absence of external objects, we have a reminiscence of the forms of such objects, following upon mere ideas thereof; and how could these reminiscences be possible, if, as you assert, the Cognition were not to appear as embracing the form of the object, and if, even in the past, the object were not comprehended only as pre- ceded by such Cognition ? ”
30. ‘Even with regard to the cognitions of objects existing at the present time, we find people asserting —‘ this object is blue, because with regard to it I have such a notion.’”
31. ‘Therefore it is only when cognitions have been previously comprehended, that there is a comprehension of objects. Nor is any comprehension possible when the Cognitions are devoid of any definite forms.”
32. ^“ Because there is an absence of any discrimination (between the objective form and the Cognition), and because it is only such objects as have forms that are capable of being comprehended,—therefore it is Cognition alone (and not any extraneous object), that can ever be compre- hended as having that form.”
33. ‘No such assumption is possible as that—‘ in the beginning it is only a formless idea that is comprehended, and then latterly is compre: hended the object endowed with a form ;’”’
24. ^“ Because such an assertion could be made only after the differs ence between pure Cognition and the Cognition as endowed with a form has been only recognised. And prior to the compreliension of the Cogni- tion, there can be no comprehension of the object,—as we have already proved.”
38. ‘ Nor can the form of the object be comprehended as superimposed upon the Cognition ; because such a form cannot enter into the inner (cog- nition) ; nor is it able to suppress the object (as it would have to do, if the form were to be imposed upon the Cognition).” :
36. “Nor could any evidence be brought forward in favour of such character (of the form of the object), For this very reason, we do not accept the position that the form 18 reflected upon the Cognition (as held by the Sautrantikas).”
37. ‘“Itis only the man who has seen the surface of water, during the day, as without any reflection of the Moon,—that, seeing at night the moon in the sky, can recognise its reflection in the water.”
38, ‘ Whereas in the case of Cognition, it has never before been seen without a form; nor has there been any idea (in the absence of Cognition) of the external object heing endowed with a form; and hence in this case, there can be no such notion of - reflection.”
39. ‘“‘And again, what sort of reflection could there be, in the case of (incorporeal objects like) sound, odour, taste, &c. ? And how could there be any notion of the form belonging to the object, when it is distinctly comprehended as belonging to the Coguition ?”
152 QLOKAVARTTIEA.
40. “Being, as they are, located (separately) in the external world, and inside (the man),—there can be no mutual contact between the object aud the Cognition ; and hence no amount of stupidity could give rise to any notion of the identity (of the form of the object and the Cogni- tion ).”
41, ‘Since we do not find any person who is not so deceived, there can be no such assumption of stupidity (as held by you). And even if such deception could be assumed, it would apply equally to both (Cognition and Object).”
42. “And for this reason, it is not proper to assert that the ‘form’ is a property of the contact (of the Cognition with the Object) : there can be no such contact, because of the difference of their positions, and because of the Cognition being immaterial (and incorporeal) and the Object being material (and corporeal).”
43. “Such contact cannot be said to consist of contemporeinity or (coevality) ; because that would apply to the whole Universe. Nor 18 thore any such position of the object as is face to face with the Cognition.”
44. If such contact be held to be universal, then taste, &c., would come to be perceived even by means of the eye; and of all entities, the atomic forms therein encased would also come to be perceived.”
45. ‘Nor can it be held that the mere existence of the object, as an object of cognition, constitutes the said contact; because of what sort would the character of the object be, prior to the comprehension of its forms P”
46. «^ Because no entity can be said to be an object of cognition, unless it has been recognised. Then, the fact of its having such and such a form would depend upon its character of being the object of cognition ; and the fact of its being such an object would depend upon the fact of its having such a form (and thus there would be the fault of ‘mutual inter-depend- ence’).”
47. ^“ 716 assertion of the existence of the two (Cognition and the Object) as free from all form, and also that of their contact, and the like, would be possible only when the (Cognition and the Object) have been rightly discriminated in their real forms.”
48-49, ‘But in the present case the existence of the object is not
40 The Object exists in the external world, while the Cognition is within the man’s miud; therefore no one conld mistake the one for the other. This is aimed at the theory that the form rsally belongs to the object, while, through close proximity, it is mistaken to belong to the Cognition.
48 Besoauss Cognitions havs no face.
५५ If the oognition of the jar wers held to ho in contact with the jar, in all its forms, then the taste of ths jar, as well as its atomio molsoules would be perceived, on the pressntation of the jar to the eys,—which is an absurdity.
43.49 “Or after” ——-beoausc according to the Bauddha, the Cognition is no sooner produced than destroyed, For this reason, unless the two are perceived together, and
APHORISM Y, 158
comprehended either prior to or after (the comprehension of the Cognition ). And it has already been asserted that the cognisable object does not exist apart from the form. Therefore your theory of the contact of Cognition with the Object is without any foundation.”
49-50. “Nor can the assumption of the object be said to be for the sake of the diversity of Cognitions. Because where have we fonnd such diversity to be due to objects, that we will have snch an assumption ? ”
50-51. “ And again, how can there be any production, of Diversity and Form by means of something (7.e., contact) that is itself formless ? Nor is it pessible that the form of the Cognition should originate in an object which is itself formless. Thus then your position becomes very precarious.”’
51-52. ‘It is only by means of Memory and Dream-Cognition that you could support (your theory of) formlessness; for in these, there is no contact with an object; mere ‘Impressions’ being held to be the cause (of the forms of such Cognitions) ; therefore itis (the agency of) these Impressions alone that could apply to waking Cognition also.”
53-54. “Thus then, both by affirmative and negative inference, we get at the fact of the form belonging to the Idea. Nor is there any ius- tance to show the existence of an external object, independently of the Idea,—as we have of the Idea, independently of the external object. There- fore your ‘ Contact-theory’” could be tenable, only with reference to Impres- sions, even if the Idea were accepted to be formless.”
55. ‘Nor is there any reason to suppose that ‘both (Idea and Object) have one and the same form’; (1) because of the difference in their positions, (2) hecause of the absence of any contact, and (3) because of the absence of any definite notions of the two as distinct.”
56. ‘Thus, for the same reason, (inasmuch as the two are not recognised as such) it cannot be held that ‘ the non-discrimination of the one from the otheris due to the extreme likeness of the two,; because it is only when the difference has been recognised, that there can be any notion of likeness,—which could not be possible if such difference were not already recognised; for in that case, it would be as unreal as ‘sky flowers.”
57. ^ Similarly in the case of such misconceptions as the ‘ duplicate moon ’ and the like, the real state of objects is other than what is perceived ;
their respective forms have been rightly discriminated, there can be no such notions as those referred to in the Karika.
60-51 You hold that before the contact, the Cognition and the object are both formless. Under the circumstances, how could mere Contact, which is itself formless, give rise to the form of Cognition and its diversity ? Nor is it possible for the object, which you bold to be formless, to impart a form to the Cognition. Your theory thus becomes untenable.
61.62 The forms of Dream-cognition, &c., could not be explained, except throngh Impressions ‘Therefore we could also attribute the forms of present (waking) Cogni- tions to the same agency of Impressions, which are without beginning, without end,
a0)
154 CLOKAVARTTIKA.
and hence the form that the Idea would take in such cases, could not be said to depend upon any extraneous object.”
58-59, ‘In the case of the use of such words as ‘Nakshatra’ (Neuter) ‘Taraka’ (Feminine), and ‘ Tishya’ (Masculine), and ° Darah’ (Masculine Plural)—it is not possible for contradictory genders, &c., to apply to one and the same object. And similarly (with regard to the single object, a fair woman, f.i.) there could not be such diverse notions as that of a corpse, &c., belonging respectively to an ascetic, a licentious person and a dog.”
59-60. ‘With regard to one and the same object we have the notions of its being long and short, in comparison with different objects; and with regard to the same object, jar, f.i. we have the notions of its beng agar, being earthy, being a substance, and being predicable ;—all these notions simnitaneously appear in the observer; ard this could never be the case, if there really existed any such single object (as the jar).”
61. “For in one and the same object, the application of contradictory forms is not possible. As for Ideas, they are different in each case, and as such adjustable to the (diversity in the) force (of Impressions).”
62. ‘That form which the Idea takes, independently (of any extra- neous entities),—in that form, you might postulate the object; but in no case, 18 any Idea brought about, in keeping with (or in accordance with) any external object.”
63. “Thus then, in as much as the form of the object depends upon the Idea, how can any one assume (the existence of the external) object. ? And as for the Idea, so long as no form has been imposed upon it, it could certainly rest in itself.”
(Thus ends the expounding of the Cinyavada) : (Now BEGINS THE REFUTATION OF THE OCONYAVADA).
64. It is not 80. Because you hold one and the same thing (Idea) to be both the cogniser and the cognised; whereas you cannot have any instance to show that such duplicate character belongs to any single object.
65. Because Fire, &c., that are known to be illuminators (of the
63.69 The words, ^^ Nakshatra,” ‘‘ Tara,” “ Tishya,” all signify stars; and so if the object star had any real existence in the external world, then names of such contra- dictory genders could not be applied to it. In the same manner, the word “ Dara” 18 always used in the Mascnline Plural, which could not be the case, if any such thing as the woman (signified by the word), really existed in the external world. And again, in tho case of a fair woman, the ascetic looks upon her as disgusting corpse, the licentions man looks npon her as au object of enjoyment, while the dog looks npon it as 811 article of food, which diversity would not be possible if the woman had a real existence.
£9.60 Qno finger appears long in comparison with one, while shorter in comparison with another finger.
62 ‘Ihe form of the Idea may be taken to formulate the form of the object ; not vice versd,
APHORISM ४. 155
jar, &c.), cannot be said to be themselves {८1104 816, because they do not stand in need of any other illuminator.
66-67. And whenever they come to be cognised, it is only a Sense- organ that could be their cogniser; while in the cognising of the Sense- organ, the character of the cogniser would belong to the Idea. And when this Idea itself comes to be cognised, we shall have another Idea for its cogniser; and in no case can the same object be both (cognzser and the cognised ).
67, ‘But even you hold the ‘Self’ (Atma) to have the character of both, cogniser and cognised.”
68-69. (Though the Self is really one, yet) being somehow or other, taken as diverse, in the shape of its diverse properties,—we attribute the. character of the cogniser to (the Self in the character of) the Idea, and the character of the cognised to (the Self in the character of) substance and the rest. Ifit be urged that ‘then, (even in your own theory) there is no absolute difference (between the cogniser and the cognised),’—(we reply) where have you found me accepting (or holding) such absolute difference ? The fact of the word ‘I’ applying only to the Pratyagatman is based upon the extreme proximity (of the cognising ‘I’ with the cognised ‘object’).
70. As matter of fact, the notion, intermixed with the use of the word ‘I’, is applicable to the nominative (karé@) of the cognition ;—though in reality it is really restricted to the agency of the Self only.
71. Nor is there any comprehension of the forms of the Means of Coguition, (ze. the Sense), the Cognition itself and the Cogniser (Self) ;. and consequently no cognisability can belong to the Idea, as before (in the case of the Self),—even though it is really non-different (from the other factors).
72. If the cognition of one form were to be accepted to have another form for its object,—then, why could not the cognition of an object be held to have the form of the Idea ?
73. And whenitis held that the cognising and cognisable entities are identical, then the comprehension of any one of these would briug about a comprehension of both.
74, Atthe time when such cognisable forms as the blue, &c., are
68.69 ‘The fuct of the word, §‘c.’—This anticipates the following objection: ^ Even in yonr theory, if there be a difference betwecn the cogniser and the cognised, how could the Bhashya assert that the word ‘I’ applies only to the Pratyagatma, the Hnman Soul?” ‘The sense of the reply is that the idea by itself is not the cogniser ; the character whereof belongs only to the Human Sonl as endowed with this idea; and again, it is this very Human Soul which, in the shape of substance, &c., comes to be the object of cognition, while substance &c., by themselves, can never be the object cognised, therefore though in the two cases there is = difference among the accessories, yet the substratum of these accessories—viz., the Human Sonl—beingouly: one, it is only right to hold the word ‘I’ to be applicable to the Human Soul
156 CLOKAVARITIKA.
comprehended, we do not come across any Idea which has the form of the cognising (cognition ).
75. And if there were a non-difference, we would have an idea of this (cognising entity) also; or else there might be no cognition of the cognised object either, just as there is none of the coguising factor,
76. In the same manner, the comprehension of the cognising factor would always lead to that of tle cognised object as well; the more so, as the Bauddhas hold the Cognising factor (z.e., Cognition or Idea) to be pure and formless.
77. But no such (pure) Idea would be possible, if it were to be non- different from the cognised Object (which has a form); orelse (४.९. if the cognised Object were not to be comprehended), the Cognising factor too would not be comprehended, just as the cognised Object is not comprehended (because the two are held to be non-different).
78. And again, as the comprehension of the cognisable Object would not lead to that of the cognising Idea,—and as the comprehension of the cognising Idea would not lead to that of the cognisable Object,—there would be non-comprehension of both of these (because they are held to be non-different).
79. The clause (inthe Bhashya), “it (cognition) is connected with the cxternal world,” serves to point out the fact that there is a comprelhen- sion of the cognisable Object, even without any idea of the Cognising Idea.
80. But inasmuch as the fact has to be proved to an opponent, we cannot have the fact of its relation to the external world, as a sound argu- ment for proving the form of external objects, (because the opponent does not admit of the rcality of an external world).
81. Therefore the sense of the Bhashya is that the word “ external” denotes the cognisable objects, blue, yellow, &c., as apart from the Cognising Ideas (or means of cognition), Sense-perception aud the rest.
62. This will be explained in the passage (of the Bhashya) ‘“ Cog- uition is not comprehended beforehand.” In some places- again, it is only the comprehension of the Cognising (‘ Idea’) that is indicated :
83. (eg.), ‘I do not remember if any object had been comprehended by me at that time,’—in such cases, people remember the appearance of the Cognising Idea, independently of the form of the cognised Object.
84. Thus then, if there were no difference (between the cogniser and the coguised), the remembrance of the one would have brought about the remembrauce of the other; whereas as a matter of fact, we find that there is, in the instance cited, a remembrance only of the Cognising Idea ; hence it must be concluded that it is the Coguising Idea alone that is comprehended (in the case referred to).
8 The Bhashya passage here referred to ig this: ‘It is true that the idea is originated beforehand; but it is not so comprehonded; inasmuch as somctimes we come across cases Where an object that has been known is spoken of as unknown.”
APHORISM र, 152
85. And the same conclusion also follows from the absolute invariable concomitance of the Cognising Idea with the cognised Object; and the reminiscence of the two does not appear in one and the same form. Therefore from both affirmative and negative concomitance we find that the two are entirely different.
86. (obj:) “Iuasmuch as it is a part of the cognised Object that is compreliended by means of a part of the Cognising Idea, it cannot be rightly urged that ‘ the Cognising Idea would also be comprehended ’, because there is no other cogniser (that would comprehend the former Idea).”’
87. ‘ And it is not possible that the Idea should be comprehended by means of the cognised Object ;—because this latter has not the faculty (for such comprehension). And if the Object were to be the cogniser, then the duplicate form of the Idea would entirely disappear.”
88. “१ And further, if the cogniser were also made the cognusied, then we would have only the cognised, all in all. And hence the absence of the form of any one of the two would lead to the uegation of both.”
89-91. “And again it is only by appearance (predominance) and disappearance (suppression) that we get at the comprehension of cogni- sability and non-cognisability (respectively) : e.g.. of the lamp-light, &c., we perceive (at night) only the form (and not the heat, &.,); while during the day, those that are close to the fire, comprehend only the tonch (warmth); and when there is proximity of an odoriferous snbstance, there is perception of the odour alone. And just as in all these cases the absence of the perception of other qualities is due to suppression,—so in the case of the Cognising Idea and the cognised Object, there wonld be no comprehension of any other formn (save the one that 18 not suppressed).”
92. “It may be that certain things, though they are non-different
87 If the object were made the cogniser of the idea, then both the idea and the object wonld possess the character of the cogniser; whereas the Miminsuka holds that an idea has two forms that of the object cognised and that of the cognising idea.
88 Yon wonld have no cogniser proper, every thing becoming the cognised. “ Hence the absence, Sc.” If the cognising idea and the cognised object he held to be identical, then, according to you, the two being dependent npon each other, if the one ceased to exist the other wonld also do the same; and hence the cognising Idea would become devoid of any form; this would be equal to a total denial of the existence of the cognising Idea.
89.91 At night the brightness of the Jamp predominates over its other properties ; while during the day it is the heat of the fire that predominates over its other charac. teristics, and so forth; whence we find that comprehension is due to predominance. For this reason too, in the case of the Idea and the Object we have the comprehension of the form of the one or the other according as one or the other happens to he the predo- minating element. That is to suy, we have a comprehension of the form of the idea, when the idea predominates over the object; while the reverse is the case when the object predominates over the Idea.
$2 This anticipates the following objection: ^ Colour, &ec., being comprehended 28 different from one another, it is possible that one may predominate over the other
158 GLOKAVARRITIKA.
from the cognised Object, may not be cognised (when the Object is cog- nised) ; just as, even when sound is perceived, such properties as its per- manence or transitoriness &c., may not be comprehended at all.”
93. “Orif you urge this objection, on the ground of non-difference
(of the Cognising Idea and the cognised Object),—then (we ask)—when one portion of it has been comprehended, how is it that the other portion is not
comprehended also. ?” 94, “ For these reasons, we conclude the fact to be that there is a
comprehension of that alone which is capable of being comprehended at the time ; and as for both--as urged hy you,—they cannot be so comprehended, simply because they are not capable of being so.”
95. (Reply.) When the objectis held to be absolutely single, whence should there be any possibility of its capability or incapability ? And again, how could you assume the appearance or suppression of the single object itself ?
96. And further, the suppression of one part of your object would also lead to the suppression of its other part; and thus the whole object being suppressed,—its comprehensibility would be impossible.
97. In the same manner, the incapability of an object too could only be based upon an assumption. As for the instances that have been cited (by the objector), in as much as there is a diversity of form, &c amongst them, such “appearance” and “suppression,” &c., could be bronght forward to support onr view also.
bat how can this be possible in the case of the cogniser and the cognised, which are both identical? ’’ The Sense of the reply is that we do not comprehend any cogoising Idea, to be noa-differeat from the cogaised object; and hence it is qaite possible that even when there is a comprehension of the one, there may be no idea of the other, Thongh the properties of permanence, &c., are sach as are not comprehended apart from the objects themselves, yet that is not the case with sach properties as Colour and the rest, which are perceived even apart from the objects to which they belong.
9? “ Objection ’’—-noted in note 92. If there be non-difference between the two, the comprehension of one mast lend to the comprehension of the other; and hence there can be no such non-comprehension as has been urged against 08.
% “Capable:”—-That which has appeared as predominating over othere is “capable.” It has been urged above, (K. 85 et seq.) by the Mimaneaka, that if the Qinyavada theory were accepted, then, ont of the two—the cognising Idea and the cognised object—, if one wero comprehended, both would be comprehended; and if one were not comprehended, none would be comprehended. The present Karika objects to this view, and says that both of them cannot be comprehonded at the same time, for the simple reason that st one and the same time, both of them conld not have the aforesaid ‘‘ capability ;” specially as the form of the one is boand to predomioate over and sappress that of the other.
% [With this Karika begins the refntation of the arguments brought forward by the Cingavada, in Karikas 86 to 94}. Because two contradictory properties belonging to the same object wonld split the object into two parts.
97 As before, 80 now, if incapability belonged to one part, the other part would also become invapahle, on acconut of the said identity ; and thence there ०० be no cum- preheusibility. ^ Instances ”—of the Lamp, &८ ; 88 shown in K. 89-90,
APHORISM ४, 149
98. Even if among Form and the rest, there were no absolnte differ- ence, there would be various diverse developments of the form of the substance itself.
99-100. You have asserted (in K. 92) that “ thongh there is non- difference yet it is not comprehensible ;” and (on this we ask)—when there is a difference between the notions of such properties as non-eternality and the like (apart from those of the objects possessing such properties), how can there be such a non-difference ? For, withont doubt, excepting the distinctness of the idea, there is no other ground for differentiating a comprehensible ebject (from others).
100. Nor is the difference restricted to (difference in) time and form only.
101. 1४ is the relation of the causes with the effects that is called ¢ non-eternality ’ (the fact of being caused); while in certain cases, it 18 the disjunction of the constituent parts that is known as ^^ non-eternality.”
102. In the case of such immaterial entities, as the Intellect and the like, destructibility (or non-eternality) consists in their existence in the pure fourm of the Self. By ^ Eternality”’ 18 only meant everlasting exist- ence (permanence); and it is this (existence) that is called “ Entity.”
103. Relation with the Means of Right Notion and Knowledge are called Predicability and Knowability (respectively). In all these cases, theie is a difference in some form or other.
104. Therefore, just as in the case of Colour &c., even in the absence of any difference of time, &c., there 18 a diversity, based npon a difference of ideas (or notions), so, in the same manner, you should accept in the present case also.
98 Though Substance being one, its properties of Colour &c., as identical there- with, would also be one, and as such the difference among them would not be absolute,— yet there is always an iustrinsic difference among them, as regards their form, &., and Substance tco, though in itself only one, becomes diverse, in accordance with the diversity of the various forms of its propertics,
99.100 [८ has been urged in K, 92, that, the properties of efernality, &c., are non- different from the object ‘ Sound,” yet we do not comprehend such properties, This Karika refutes that assertion.
100 There being many otber grounds of difference, chiefly the distinctness of the notion.
101 This Karika shows that we have anotion of non-eternality apart from none enternal substances, whence the assertion in R. 92 becomes false.
102 When the Self attains the state of purity, all its accessories, in the shape of the intellect and the rest, cense to exist $ and in this lies the non-permanent character of these latter. ‘“ This ”—that is, existence without the permanence is what is called ‘ entity.’
103“ Difference ”—of such properties as enternality and its contrary, from such objects as Sonnd and the like.
104 Yon should not restrict all difference to time and place only,
160 CLOKAVARTTIKA,
105. Absolute difference, we do not accept in the case of any object; because Objects, in the form of “ entities,” do not differ from one another.
106. All (such properties as) ‘non-eternality ’ and the like are com- prehended in reference to action, cause, &c ; aud when there is no cogni- tion of these actiou, &., then they (non eternality, &.), are not coguised, notwithstanding thetr (supposed) non-difference (from the objects possess- ing such properties ).
107. In a Cognition, however, there is no such difference; nor does it tand in need of anything else. If it be urged that there is a mutual need (between the cognition and the cognised ),—(we reply that) the two are always close to each other (and as such there can be nosuch need).
108. (Ohj.). “In the case of the cognition of blue, &c., there is no such idea as that ‘this is the cognition’ and ‘ that the cogniscd’; and as such, how can you assert mutual need ?”
109. There may not be such a need; but even then, the conception wonld have a dupheate form. Jor if there were no such conception, how could the duplicacy of form helong to the Cognition ?
110. The conception of the form of the cogmising Cognition, that is assumed throngh the peculiarities of cognitions one after the other, is ouly inferred from remembrance.
111-112. Jé the Cognition in the first be assumed to have only one form, then all other conceptions in connection therewith cannot but be of
106 Since all objects, as objects or entitics, are identical, therefore we oannot accept any absolnte difference ameng tliem.
191 Though the Mimansaka does not admit of any such mntual requirements, as asserted in the first hnlf,—yet even if it be necessary to accept snch requirement, when ene is in close proximity to the other there can be no requirement that is not already supplied.
109“ Duplicate form ’—that isas cognition and the cognised object, Thongh corni- tion is in reality one only, yet it consists of the character of both the cognition and the cognised ; and as such, even when it is perceived in its single form, there 18 a conception of its duplicate character; inasmuch as it includes the oharacteristics ef both.
[HO.Us These Karikas embody the view of the opponent in the mouth of the Mimansaka],
110 ^“ Assumed, ¥c.”—A cognition when prodnced has the ferm of the cognised object ; and snbsequently it appears in the form of tho cngnising cognition, Thus then ; owing te the peculiarities of one cegnition after the other, there is a remembrance that what now appears as cogniser is the same that had appeared as the cognised object ; and hence it is inferred that the cegnition appears in a duplicate form.
111-11४ Tf the first cognition of the Jar were in the form of the Jar alone, then the second cognition in ecnnection therewith—namely, the 1९60161 that ‘I know the Jar’—would also be of the same form; and ag such we could not assert any diffe among the series of cognitions in conneetion with any particular object. the first coguition were of the form of the cogniser and the cognised, then being an accumulation of different forms, there would be cognitions themselves,
rence If hewever 7) 16116, there w difference among the
CUNYAVADA, 161
the same form. And it is for this reason that the difference between the cognition of the jar and the cognition of that (cognition) is not fully estab- lished. It 28 only in the cenception of the form cf the cognising cognition that there can be any accumulation of forms.
113-114. Where the first conception appears in a duplicate form, and this is followed by a third conception (such as “JT have that conception ’’),— in that case, this third conception as well as the former two are both manifested ; and thus, there being an augmentation of forms, the following ones would differ from the preceding ones. And again, since there is a subsequent remembrance of the conception in the form of the compre- hended object, the comprehending conception must have been cognised before, as such.
115. But asa matter of fact, we donot come across any such accumu- lations of forms; nor can the cencepticn be defined, without mentioning the object (of cognition).
116. Therefore Cognition by itself being only oue, it is established that the difference in the conceptions is due to a diversity among the objects of cognition; and as such what business have we to postulate another form (for the cognition itself) ?
117. Just as between corporeal objects there is a natural difference, so too, in the present case, though two conceptions may have the simi- larity of being incorporeal, yet, could not these too have a natural difference between themselves ?
118. It is a false assertion that after remembrance, (the Conception is inferred to be duplicate). Because its cognition is at that time brought about by ‘ Apparent Inconsistency ” only.
119. You have asserted that ^° since both the conception and the com- preliended object are identical in form, therefore when one is compre- hended, the other is also comprehended ;” but it is not so; and certainly, you have not been questioned by me simply to afford you occasion for making any wild assertions you like.
120. No one recognises the character of both the Comprehender
06 With this commences the refutation of the arguments urged in K. 110-114. The meaning of the Karika is that the cognition or conception ia by itself pure; and ita object is an external one, which however does not assume the form of the cogni- tion. The reason, why the object is named in expressing a cognition, is that without the mention of the object the cognition oould not be defincd.
116 “ Another form’’—that ia, the duplicate form, partaking of the character of the cogniser and the cognised.
118 In fact there isno remembrance in the case of introapection—“ The Jar has heen known by me.” The fact ia that when we remember a Jnr, finding the remembrance to be apparently inexplicable, we assert it to be ९०6 to Conception. And it is only with reference to this conception that we nee snoh language 88 “I know the Jar.”
190 The Bauddha holds all cognitions to be resolved jnto perception; kenceho can
21
162 CLOKAVARTIKA.
and the Comprehended, with regard to one single object. Nor can such duplicate character be got at by means of Inference; specially when all conceptions are held to be only forms of Sense-Perception.
1४1. Itis only one form that is comprehended; and yet you assume a second ; why then cannot you assume a thousand such forms, to be included in that single conception ?
122. “But there is a natural difference between the Comprehender and the Comprehended.” That will only strengthen our theory. ^ But not so; because they are still identical in their common character of ‘conception.’ ”
123. But, then, how is it that of one and the same object, yon assume both difference aud non-difference? In so doing you accept the doctrine of the Saikhya, having renounced the teachings of Buddha himself.
124. For if the Comprehender and the Comprehended be one (as held by Buddha), whence this assertion of difference (between the two)? And if they are different, how could yon assert them to be one ?
125. The Comprehender and the Comprehended being both identical, and consisting in one and the same conception,—there could be a concep- tion of only one form,—be it either in that of the Comprehender (alone), or in that of the Comprehended (alone).
126. And then again, if one of the two (Comprehender or the Comprehended) were suppressed, the other would also be suppressed (since both are identical); and thus then there would be an absence of both the constituent parts of a conception, which would thereby lose its character altogether ; thence there would be an absolute negation of it.
127. Or again, on account of its non-difference from two mutually different entities (the Comprehender and the Comprehended), the character of conception too would come to be different,—like its own self. And thus would be established a double entity (the Comprehended object apart
never have recourse to inference, &c.; while by peroeption alone, no one oan ever recognise the said duplicate character.
18 The Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas hold that the two are different in them: gelveg, while both are non-different from Conception; and in this much, the two may. be 8814 to be identical.
199 ^ Assert them to be one”—as you must do, in accordance with Banddha’s teachings.
125 The Kacika thus exprosses the reasoning in the ayllogistio form: “The Com- prehended and the Comprehender, have only one character, becanse both are identical with Conception, which is uniform; and thus both being of only one form, the Concep- tion too would be in the form of the Comprehended alone, or in that of the Comprehen- der only.”
181 ^ Like its own self —i.e., just 98 it has the character of the Coniprehended, it must be different from the Comprehender,
CUNYAVADA, 163
from the Conception comprehending it, which you sought to disprove, and which is all that we seek to establish).
128. If, however, it be only as a matter of convention that you name these eutities “वृद्वा "°; then that may be so. Or the word ‘ Jnana,’ when applied to the object, may be explained as “that which is known” [the affix having an objective force]; and when applied to Cognition, the affix may be explained as either the Nominal or the Instrnmental (in the former case, the meaning being ‘knowledge,’ in the latter, ‘that by which anything is cognised’).
129. In any case, the duality of existence (in the shape of Compre- hension and the Comprehended) has been established ; and such being the case, you may make use of whatever words you like; and we have got nothing to say against the word.
130. If it is urged that—“ though there is a difference (between the Conprehender and the Comprehended) yet the Comprehended may only be in the form of another conception (and not any external object as you take it),”"—then, we ask, what is the ground for holding the Comprehended Cognition to be a Cognition at all? If for such grounds you urge only those that have been explained above (in K. 128), then we also accept them,
131. There is however no such character as “ Jnana’ (Conception or Cognition) that extends over both (the Comprehender and the Compre- hended) ; and as for any such distinct class as “Jnana,” you do not accept any (class apart from the individuals).
132. And even if there were any such class as “Jnana” distinct from both (the Comprehender and the Comprehended),—then (in that case) to these two, the character of Jnana could never belong, And thns there being a total absence of the form (or character) thereof (of Jnana), there would result an absolute negation of Jnana.
135. Then again, (in the case of Jnana being something distinct from the Comprehender and the Comprehended), it could be related to each of these, either one by one, or as pervading over each in its entirety; in any case, it would be open to the fault of being made up of constituent parts— a fault that is urged against the Vaicéshikas.
134, The objections that have been urged by the Bauddhas against the Class-theory, would also apply to the theory that the Class ^ Concep- tion” bears a definite relation to two mutually different conceptions (one following after the other).
135. If again the class “ Conception” be said to be identical with
128 If you accept any of these explanations we have nothing to say against you.
183 Tf the class ‘Jndna’ were distinct from both the Comprehender and the Comprehended, then these two could not have the character of Jnana; heuce the application of this name to them would only be a misnomer.
180 18 the ¢elass related to the whole of each individual, or does the one class
164 CLOKAVARTIKA.
these two, then the aforesaid (Karika 127) difference would apply to your case. And as for the theories of “Similarity” (between the Indivi- dual and the Class) and ^" Apoha”’ (negation of the contradictory), these will be met and refuted later on.
136. Butasthere is no other substance (than conception), even an “ Apoha” can not be possible for you. Because for the Idealist, there 18 70 such thing as “non-Idea” (or non-Conception) that could be said to be negatived (by the ^“ 4 {602}. वि
137. Then again, the negation of a negative factor 18 1m no way possible. (Granted that itis so, even then) this negative factor would be a substance other (than the Idea); as the character of a substance would doubtless belong to it on account of its being an object of negation.
138. Thus then, if an Idea (or Conception) were held to be the negation of non-Idea, you would have a new substance other (than the Idea). If you urge that “the negation would be only an assumed one (and so no new substance would have to be accepted),”’ we deny this, because there can be no assumption of that which can never exist.
139. Your assumed “non-Idea” too would only be an ^" Idea”’ partaking of the character of ^ non-Cognition,” and hence it would be ‘‘ Idea” alone that would be held to be the object of negation.
140. And certainly, in any theory of “Class,” there can be no uegation of the object (or class) by itself. For never can there be a negation of a tree by the tree itself.
141. If the Idea itself were to be negatived, then you could not establish your own “Idea.” For the character of a free caunot belong to other objects, such as the jar and the like, whicli are negatived by the ‘* 60.
142. Thus then, it would be > “ non-Idea ” (or non-Conception) alone that would be a real entity; and thence would there be an Identity (of the Comprehended with the Comprehender). And what substratum wonld this notion of ^ non-Conception ” have ?
143. For you cannot admit of any such object of comprehension as ‘‘non-Conception,” free from all touch of “ Conception ” (or Idea) itself. Ubjection : “ But, since it is only a substance (other than the Idea) that we
perneate through all the iudividuals ~ If the first, then there is a difference between the individuals and the class; while in tho secoud oase, it would bo necessary for the class to havo parts, in 81086066 wheroof it could not pernieate through all individuals.
141 If Ideas are negatived by Ideas, the character of “ Idea” could not belong to the Idea,—an absurdity.
13 You do not admit of uny entity save that of * Idea’; and certainly, this could net be the substratum of 1on-Conception,
1*४ In tho second half, tho Buddhist ur
ges thut he does uvt deny Negation, but only all stebsfances other than the Idea.
CUNYAVADA, 165
deny, why could not we comprehend the negation of the snbstanco denied ?”’
144. (We reply). One who does not comprehend positive entities (like the प, &c.), what can be said of him with regard to (the Compre- hension of) negations ? And as for the fact of having an end in itself, it 18 equally common to both (the Conception of a positive and thatof a negative entity).
145. Therefore (in any Idea) the object of comprehension could be either another “Idea,” or the self of the same Idea; and hew could we ever recognise a contradictory entity (such as non-Conception) to be the object of the comprehension (of a Conception) ?
146. Just as in the case of “heat,” there can be no conception of ‘“‘non-heat,”’ so too there can be no conception of ‘“ non-Conception ” with regard to a ‘Conception.’ For these reasons, if there were no other substance than the Idea, there could be no object of negation.
147. For these reasons, then, we conclude that the character of the “Idea” cannot belong equally to the Comprehended and the Comprehender ; and hence it must be held te belong te one of them only.
148-49, Theu too, we hold this character (of Idea) to belong to tlic Comprehender only; since this is admitted by both of us. And when tho duality of objects has been proved, names may he given te them in accordance with one’s choice: Both may be called “Idea,” or both may be called ‘ Object,” or even the Object may be called the “ Compro- hender.”
149-50. Since Ideas do not appear simultaneously, therefore two Ideas cannot have between themselves the relation of the ‘‘ Conceived” (object) and the ^ means of Conception” (as held by the Idealist)—this is what has been asserted (by the Bhashya) in the passage referred to: “It (Idea) is momentary, &c.’”” Therefore the object (of Cognition) must be something other (than the Idea itself. )
150-51. Even when the two Ideas appear simultaneously, in as much as they are independent of each other, there is an absence of any such relation (between the two Ideas) as that between the “ Conceived” (object) and the “ means of Conception; ” because both (Ideas) are equally devoid of action and instrumentality.
199 The Bauddha denies positive entities, such as the Mountain, the River, and the like, which, however, are comprehensible by all men. Under the circumstances, hew can he comprehend a Negation? If the Bauddha urges that his Conception has an end in itself, and ae such, there ie nothing impossible in the comprehension of a Negation,—we reply, that this ie equally applicable to the comprehension of positive entities; why then, should you deny these latter P
188.49 “८ Admitted by both of us”: the Bauddha attributes the character of “Idea” to the Comprehended as well as to the Comprehender; and it is to the former alone that such character is attributed by tho Mimanska. Thus thon in tho matter of the Com- prehended, there is ou agreement.
166 GLOKAVARIIKA.
151-52. Itis the Conjunction (or relation) of the Object and the Idea with':regard to a Conception—that 1s known as the “relation of cause and effect”; and we do not como across such (causal relation) any- where else.
152-53. And again, in the case of the right and left horns of an animal (two objects appearing simultaneously), there can be no such fixed rule as that ‘this is the effect, and that the cause’; nor can hoth be both, because that would lead to the fault of “ reciprocity.”
153-54. And people knowing the real character of the causal rela- tion, do not define it as mere concomitance, independently of all notion of Sequence. | ` ` 15458. (Conversely also) we find that though, at times, the cow would follow the horse, this mere Sequence could not constitute causal relation, Just as in the case of two moments (of Cognition), when appearing in different series of Cognitions, though occurring simultane- ously,—and also in the case of the different properties of the jar (though occurring simultancously),—(there can be no causal relation.)
155-56. For these reasons, an entity can he said to be the effect of another, only when the former is such that it can come about only when the latter has already existed.
156-57. You have brought forward the case of the lamp and the light amitted by it, as the instance of the simultaneity of the cause and the effect. But inthis case also, there is a minute point of time (intervening between the appearance of the lamp and that of the light) ; though this is impercep- tible ; just as 18 the case with the piercing (with a needle) of the hundred petals of the lotus.
158. The same refutation would also apply, even if you assert the simultaneity of the two parts (of Cognition, ४,५.१ the Comprehended and the Comprehender. )
158-59. Nor can it be urged that “ by means of a transference of potentialities, the substratificatiou would be gradual ” ; because in that case, the object of Comprehension would have passed away, and it would be unreasonable to assert (its) identity (with the present notion).
156.66 That 18, wheu there is a necessary and invariahle sequence between the two.
168 Tho reasons that havo been urged, in tho refutation of the definition of more swnultaneity constituting the causal relation.
168.9 The sense of the objection is this: ‘Granted that there is no simultaneity between the Comprehender and the Comprehended ; it may be that they may appear, one after the other; and thus the one that goes before may be the Comprehended object of that which follows; and though by the time that the latter appears, the former will have passed away, yet it will suroly have left traces of its potentialities upon the latter. The latter Conception is brought abont by means of the impressions left by the former Conception, which thus comos to be Comprehended by it.” The sengo of the reply is that that which has passed away can nevcr be Comprehendod as “ nrosent ;7 aud honco, no Comprohension of a foregouc Conception is possible.
CUNYAVADA. 167
159-61. What is comprehonded by Memory, too, is only the Com- prehended Object, as intermixed with its past character ; and the same‘could be said in the present case also (if things were to be as you assert them to be). In a dream however, it can never be so; because dream-conscious- ness is always false; as in a dream that which is not present is cognised as present; and this must be a mistaken notion, because it is always set aside by a contradictory Cognition (in the waking state). But there is no such mistake in the present case (of ordinary Conception ).
161-62, Therefore, of all ideas of Sense-perception, the past cannot be said to be the object; simply because it is past; exactly like the opera- tions of these (Ideas) in past lives. Or the fact of these ‘ not being Cog- nised as such (as past)’ may be laid down as the Reason; the instance (in this case) being ^ future entities.”
163. Even if it be the past, what proof have you got for the asser- tion that ‘it is not an Olject but a Conception’?
163-64. The past Conception that yon have assumed to be the object of Comprehension (by the present Conception),—is it of the form of the Comprehender, or of that of the Comprehended, or of both ? If it be of the form of the Gomprehended alone, then it comes to be a pure Olyect for you, only in a different name.
165-66. And in as much as it is not cognised at any time except its own (in the past), there could not be any transference of energy (or potentiality). Just as there cau be no such transference from a Conception that has not yet appeared, or from one occurring in another series, so in the same manner, there can be no transference from a Conception which is not strongly realised, and which disappears as soon as it is produced.
166-67. If (secondly), the past Cognition were in the form of the Comprehender alone, then it could never have the character of the Compre- hended; and then in comparison with (and with reference to) what would it be the Comprehender ?
167-68. As for the duplicate form of Conception, it has already been refuted (K. 64 et. seq.) And (if a Conception were to have snch
159.61, The objector urges that in a dream, past events are Cognised as present : and 18 met by the argument that Drcam-Cognition is always mistaken; and 28 such, cannot bo admitted as an instance of Right Notion.
161-62 The reasoning is put into the syllogistic form. “ Past lives”: jost as past lives are not objects of Cognition in the present birth. The second syllogistic argument 18 this: ‘‘ Ideas of Sense-perception do not comprchend past objects; because these are not cognised as such; like future objects.”
165-66 There 18 another discrepancy in this alternative: An Impression ig only snch as has coniprehended its object; and the former Conception is solely in the form of an object of Comprehension. Consequently, prior to the appearance of the latter Concep- tion, (of which alone the former could he the object), the former conld, in no Wsy, be Cognised. And as such, it conld not transfer its potentialities, in the shape of impressions ; and in the absence of this transference, we could not have the latter conception comprehending the former.
168 CLOKAVARTIKA.
2 duplicate character) it would also be ordinarily recognised as such (which is not the case); and even if such were the case, the latter Con- ception would not stand in need of another (foregoing Conception as the Comprehended object), for its full cognisance.
168-69, If you hold that a Conception has the duplicate form (of the Comprehender and the Comprehended), then all right notions would end in the Conception itself (as you declare that the Conception cognises itself) ; and hence, the past could never he an object of the Conception. If (the latter Conception were) of the same form as the former (Conception which you assert to be the) object of Comprehension, then (of the latter Conception) the very character of the Comprehender would disappear.
170. And if it were solely in the form of the Comprehender, then there would be no object (of Comprehension) ; because there is no similarity between the two. And as for the transference of potentialities (urged by you), we never come across any such transference.
171. And the absence of any such transference of potentialities, in accordance with your theory (of Momentary Ideas), has been proved (by us, in the Section on ^ Niralambana-Vada.’’)
171-72. In the case of Ideas occurring in the same series, we must deny the relation (between them) of Cause and Lffect, as also the relation of the Impressor and the Impressed,—because they are Ideas,—jnst like Ideas occuring in different series (of Cognitions).
172-74. Therefore that which is the Comprehender (of colour f.t.) must be different from its object, (colour),—because the conception of one is not always accompanied by that of the other;—as f.i. the Comprehenders of taste, &c. Similarly the Comprehended object is different from the Compre- hending (Idea) ;—because one who conceives of the one does not necessarily conceive of the other;—/.t. the Comprehenders of taste 4८.
174-75. Thus then, the two factors (the Comprehender and the Compre- hended) must be concluded to be different,—like taste, &c.;—because they are never conceived as identical;—as, f.z., the conceptions occurring in another series.
175-76. Again, an Idea cannot comprehend any portion of itself ;—be- cause of its originating iu an Idea ;—like its own potentiality (i.e., Vasana yi (and for the same reason) there is a denial of the comprehensibility of an
170, If the latter conception were solely in the form of the Compehender, thon the former could not he its object; heeause the two would be dissimilar—one heing the Comprehender, and the other being the Compehended ; and all Objectivity is baeed upon Similarity. “^ Proceas”—since no such process is possible for an Idea or Conception, which the Bauddha holds to he a non-entity.
11१11, Now followe a series of syllogisms.
116.76, The Bauddha holde that an Idea originates from an immediately preceding Idea; and it is an admitted fact that that which originates in an Idea canuot Compre- hond itself; aa for inetance, the Impressions produced by an Idea, which are never capable of being Comprehended by themselves.
CUNYAVADA. 169
Idea (by itself); because Impressions are not equipped with a duplicate character (that of the Comprehender and the Oomprehended).
176-77. Caitra’s conception cannot be the means of the cognition of the comprehensible part of the conception occurring in the same series;—because it is a conception ;—just as a conception occurring in another body (of another man), cannot be the Comprehender thereof, (1.e., of Caitra’s conception),
177-79. In the same manner is to be explained the refutation of the duplicate capability of conceptions. We admit of a multiplicity of facul- ties elsewhere (e.g-. in Atma), because such is proved by other means of right notion. Whereas in the present case (of conception) there is no gronnd for asserting such multiplicity of capabilities. And for these reasons we do not accept, as valid, the fact of your theory being simpler and acceptable to both us (which you have urged in support of the theory of the form belonging to the Idea, and not to any external object).
179-80. There is another reason too—that since conception is the means of comprehending the object, therefore it (conception) must be itself comprehended before the comprehension of the object; but this reasoning is unsound, because the case of the sense-organs—the eye, &c,— affords an instance to the contrary.
180-81. Then again, it has been urged that since the conception is not repressed, it must be comprehended as soon as it is produced. But, on this, we urge that the Conception could not be comprehended by itself (for reasons urged above); and none other (that would comprehend it), has till then been produced; hence, in the absence of any meaus of Com- prehension, it could not be comprehended (as urged).
182. If there were no ‘Idea,’ then we conld not, in any other way, explain the existence of objects; hence it is that after (the object has been perceived), we form an idea (of the Idea) as the means of a right notion (of the perceived object).
183. The mere fact of non-reppression by something else cannot lead to the Comprehension of anything. As a matter of fact, in the absence
171.79 “In the same manner,’’—i.e., ^ 44 conception cannot have a १०८००15 faculty, because it originates in a conception,—like Impressions.” = ^ Simplicity”,—we part company from youn when you sacrifice evidence to simplicity ; and certainly “ Gaurava”’ 18 no fault, when supported by proofs: = ^^ Pramdanavantyadrishtant kalpyant suba- hainyapt.”
The eye ie the means of cognising colour; and certainly, the Eye, as an organ, 18 not necessarily Comprehended, always, hefore the Comprehension of colour. Therefore the mere fact of the Idea being a means of Comprehension cannot afford sufficient ground for holding its own prior Comprehension. ।
182 The Anthor explains how the Comprehension of the 146६." is got at, He means to say that, if there were no Idea, we could not explain objects as we see them. Consequently, it is through ^ Apparent Inconsistency,” that we assume the existence of Ideas.
22
170 CLOKAVARTIKA.
of a fully efficient cause, even a (solid) object 18 not perceived (or com- prehended).
184, While functioning towards the Comprehension of the Object the Idea does not approach itself (४.९. does not render itself compre- hensible). Hence, though the Idea is the illuminator (or the means of the Comprehension of other things), yet for its own Comprehension, it stands in need of something else.
185. Or, the illuminative character (of the Idea) may be said to consist only of the Comprehension of the object; and there is no Compre- hension (by itself) of (the Idea) itself; hence it cannot be its own illuminator (or manifestcr).
186-87. As in the case of the Hye, &c., we find that, though endowed with an illuminative character, they have their illnminativeness restricted to (their specific objects) colour, form, é&c.,—so, we would have the same restriction in the present case also: viz.: the illuminativeness (of the Idea) would affect the external object, and not (the Idea) itself; for the simple reason that it 18 incapable of doing so (i.e, of manifesting itself or leading to its own Comprehension. )
187-88. ^“ {7 one (Idea) were to be comprehended hy another (Idea), then there would be no end of (such Ideas—one comprehending the other). Finding that there is remembrance of such and such (Cognitions), we must admit that all such Cognitions in a series are definitely compre- hended. If however all these were comprehended by a single Cognition, then, the comprehension of all would be explicable by that alone (and it would not be necessary to assume an endless series of Cognitions).”
189. Your assertion that “there is a remembrance of each of the Cognitions in a Series” 18 opposed to ordinary experience. For no ordi- nary person ever remembers any such Series of Cognitions.
190-91. (The ordinary experience is that) when such objects as the jar and the like, have been Comprehended, soon after this, there follows, through Apparent Inconsistency, the frequent recognition of certain concep- tions ; and this recognition goes on until one becomes tired of it; and hence subsequently, it would be only so many Cognitions, that would be remem- bered (and not an endless series of them). And as for any remembrance, prior to such recognition, of Cognitions, it would be like the remembrance of the child of a childless woman (2.e, an im possibility ).
192. The notion of remembrance that enters into the element of the subsequent Cognitions, isa mistaken one; because it is (really) only a remembrance of the object (and not of the Cognition). And it is
184 Being engaged in manifesting the object, it cannot, at the same time, manifest itself. Since two independent functions can never operate simultaneously.
19% It 18 the object that is remembered; and as thia could never be explicable without a former cognition, therefore the latter has to be assumed, through ^ Apparent Inconsistency,”
CUNYAVADA. 171
this (remembrance of the object) that leads to the cognisance of a previ- ous Cognition.
198. The recognition of the Series of Cognitions would continue only so long as one is not tired of it, even if the preparations for its conti- nuance be on a grand scale. And there is sure to be a break, either through fatigue, or predilection, or contact with something else ;—just as there is in the case of objects.
194. Asfor “ the remembrance of such and such ” that has been men- tioned (in ह. 188) ;—if this refers to the first cognition, then there would be a Comprehension of that one alone; and as such there would be no ‘* endlessness.”’
195. If however the remembrance belonged to every one of the Cognitions (in a Series), then we would have to accept an equal number of Compreheusions as well,—aud as such who could get aside the series (even though endless) wheu they would be in due accord with reason ?
196. If it be assumed that “they (i.e. the endless remembrances) have all got the first Cognition for their object,” then the differences, among the Cognitions (of the series) coming oue after the other, would not be possible,
197, For one, who holds that all conceptions have Cognitwns for their objects, the distiuction between the Conception of the gar and the Cognition of this conception, is scarcely possible.
198, And just as such a theorist, when remembering a conception, remembers it as devoid of any form,—so, when remembering a pre-cog- nised objeet, he would remember this also as devoid of any form.
199. When the remembrance follows ou the wake of a conception, it 18 becanse the conception (or Idea) is the means of (ascertaining) the exis- tence of the object, and nut because the conception 18 comprchendcd.
193 In the case of an object, perceived by the eye, for instance, we find that there is a cognition of the object, only so long as the Eye is not tired, or the person himself does not desire to withdraw to other objects, er until ne other object appears on the scene. The same 18 the case with the Comprehension of cognitions ; and hence there never ceald be an ondlese series of cognitions.
19% The expression conld apply either te the complete Series, or to the first unit alone. The former alternative has been refuted in K. 190-91, ९६. seq.
198 The series is made up of the firet Cognition of the jar, the Cognition of this Cognition, and so on ad infi. And certainly there is a certain difference among these, No snch difference could be possible, if every one of the endless Cognitioos, had the same Cognition for ite object.
193 The Bauddha ascribes a form te the Conception ; aud yet he says that when remembering it, he remembers it as devoid of form. So in the case of the Cognition of objects also, the remembrance weuld be devoid of all furm,—which is an absurdity.
132 li has been urged by the Banddha that, because Rememberance is fonnd to follow on Cenception, therefore it is the Cenception that is cemprehended. The Kiarika refutes this view by declaring that we have Rememberances following upon Conceptions because it is only through such Conceptious that we can have any idea of objects,
172 CLOKAVARTIKA.
200. “Proximity” and “ Relativity” (that have been urged by the Bauddha as reasons for the Comprehensibility of the Conception based upon its identity with the form of the object) are precluded (from the Con- ception) because of the impossibility of the Comprehensibility (of Concep- tious.) Or the two factors (of Proximity and Relativity) could be said to be based on the relationship of the object and sabject (subsisting between the Object and the Conception); and as such what good would result from their non-disjanction of place (7.e., identity) ?
201. It has been urged (by the Bauddha) that no form of an object could be possible in the case of a mistaken Cognition ; but we have already proved (in the Section on Nirélambanaviida) that in some cases (of mis- taken Cognition) we have only instances of the perversion of time and place.
2)2. Even Cognitions other than those of Sense-perception are brought about by means of past and future objects,—both during the existence and non-existence of Impressions.
203. In the caseof the object that has never been, or never will be, comprehended,—there being no impressions, how could the Bauddha too, have any Cognition P
204. If, even in the absence of Impressions, Cognitions were to appear; then that would contradict the causal efficiency of Impressions, which is accepted by you.
80) The Banddha argees thus: “The object Blue is not different from ite cogni- tion; becaase there can be no Cognition of anything that is not identical with the Cognition itself. And again, if there be no relation, there can be no Comprehensibility. Acoording to as, however, the form of the object is closs to, and identical with, cogni- tious; and it is on account of this that it is comprehensible.” To this the Karika offers the reply that both the Proximity and the Relativity (of the form of the object with the Cognition) become precloded from the Cognition, simply because this latter can- not he the object of comprehension. Thersfore you must accept the comprehension of a form of the object, which is neither related to, nor in closs proximity with, Cognition. Or again, even in the absence of any snch identity, (between the Cognition and the form of the object}, we conld assert the proximity and relativity of these two, to be based upon the relation of the object and snbjsct, which subsists between them, ‘‘Non-distiaotion of place” 18 identity ; and ‘ objectivity ” is the character of bearing the result of Cognitions; and this latter is the definition of “ Comprehensibility,”’ of which no 01187 definition 18 possible.
201 A wrong Cognition is only one of an object, in a place and at a time other than the correct ones; and it cap never be possible for any Cognitions, right or wrong, to affect such objects, and sach regions of time and place, as are not known to the agent.
203 Remembrances and Dreams occur only when thers are impressions; but Infer- ential Knowledge is attainable, through premises, evycn in the absenoe of impres- 81018.
208 Becanse the Baoddha asserts the forms of Cognitions to be due to the impres- sions left by previous Cognitions.
#04 You hold that cognitions are-always due to Impressions ; aud this theory would be contradicted,
QUNYAVADA, 173
205. And if there be any impressions in that case also, then, these must have been preceded by a cognition (if not in this life, at least in some former life); and such being the case, the object (to which the impressions belong) must have been cognised before at some place or other (so that this Cognition, at some distant date, must have given birth to the impressions 17 question).
206. Thus then, it is not proper ever to assert the absolute non-exis- tence of an object (with reference to a Cognition). And on account of the inexplicability (of strange dreams and impressions, without external objects), 1 becomes established that the object (dreamt of) had existed (and had been cognised) (at least) in some previous birth.
207. Sometimes it happens that Cognitions appear in an incorrect form ; but thia 18 due to certain discrepancies in the cognitions themselves. In the case of the earth &c., however, their forms would be cognised only through themselves (and not as based on Cognitions).
208. Barring these (objects like the Earth, &c.), we cannot ascribe any form to the objects of cognition. For ^^ Cognition ” too cannot attain to its character, unless it is possessed by an external object.
209. And again if this (form dreamt of), and other forms, were to be ascribed to Cognitions alone,—then what would be the distinguishing feature in dreams, which marks them as absolutely non est (or unreal) ?
210. For these reasons, it must be concluded that, this (dream) is a pure misconception, which, while comprehending an object for us, comprehends it in a way other than in which it exists ; and it can never be said to exercise any independent function by itself.
211. It is for this reason that the Cognition to the contrary (of any misconceived Cognition) gives rise to such a reasoning as that—“ though the object really exists in another form, yet this (false) form is imposed upou it by the mind (or Cognition) (under the influence of a certain delusion ).”’
212-13. The same is the case with such misconceptions 88 that of the
206 “ In some previous birth.” This has heen added, in order to guard against the instances of such Dreams, &0.) as are altogether new to the Agent, and as such, unlike all his experiences in this life.
201 Objection; ^ 0प6 can have no impressions of his own head being cut off; and then how can you explain a dream to that effect?” Reply: a man sees another per- son’s head being cut off, and by certain misconceptions, common in Dreams, the impression left by that event is trausferred to one’s awn head.
210 By Dreams also, we only camprehend certain objects, the only difference heing that during a Dream, the object is perceived ta be in a form other than the right one, Ae a matter of fact, Dreams could never have au end in themselves, as laid down by the Bauddha, with regard ta Cognition, in general,
lL This 18 all that a contradictory Cognition does; it does not absolutely nega. tive the existence of an external object.
212-13 Refer to the objections urged in Karikas 57-58. The first explanation meang that the difference in the Gender and such application of names to the same object is
174 QLOKAVARTIKA.
‘double moon ”; and in the same manner, inthe case of such synonyms as “taraka’’ (Fem.) (“ Nakshatra °" Neut.), &c., the feminine character, &., (1) would be such as has been perceived elsewhere (and attributed here by mistake); or (2) they might be somehow explained as being merely verbal; or (3) lastly they might be explained as being due to such perceived agencies as the excess or otherwise of the various attributes of Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas, as has been suggested by some,—notably, by Patanjali (in his Vyakarana-Bhashya).
214. Thus then, we find that the application of the three genders to the same object, is not un-reasonable. And since the diversity is based upon comparative difference (from other objects in the excess or deficiency of one or other of the attributes), therefore tliere 18 190 contradiction(if different genders be attributed to the same object).
215. The same is the case with the ideas of a‘“‘dead body,” &c., (with reference to a handsome woman), where the same object (the woman) being found to be possessed of all the three characters, the disposition of the cognising person leads to the recognition of one or the other definite character.
216. Inthe case of objects with many forms, the impression left after its particular Cognition (at a particular moment) would be the cause
a mistake, But inasmuch as we have no Cognitions whereby such use would be contradicted, and (hence) set aside, we offer the second explanation. The differences may be only verbal, and not real. But inasmuoh aa this aleo is « gratnitons assnmp- tion, we have a third explanation. Patanjali holde that the Gender of objects, and hence of Words is based upon the excess or deficiency of the several Gunas: That which abounds in Satiwa is mosculine; that which abonnds ie Rajas is feminine, and that abounding in Zamas 16 Neuter; this excess or otherwise of the Gunas however is purely comparative ; one and the same object may have an excess of 6८६८०) in comparison with one object (thus being masculine); while the same object may have a deficiency of Satiwa and an excess of Rajas, iu comparison with a third objeot (and as auch it would be called Feminine). Thue then, there is nothing unreasonable in the use of different Genders with regard to the same object. In the case in qnestion, the brightest stars may be said to be Masculine, the lesser ones Feminine, and the amallest nnes Neuter—called, respeotively, «^ Tishya,” “ Taraks ” and “ Nakshatra.”
#16 Thig refers to the objection urged in Karika 59. The Woman is possessed of the three properties of = dead body, = handsome person, and a mass of flesh. The Renunciate reooguises her a dead carcage (not fit for tonching); because having continually thought of the body withont the Self as dead matter, he recognises only a, dead body in the Woman. A licentious man, accnetomed to the company of women, recognises, in the handsome woman, an object ofenjoyment. And the Dog, accustomed to flesh-eating, recognises in her only a lump of flesh. The determining canee of eaoh of these recognitions is the impression that ig engraved upon the mind of each of the three Agents. By continuous practice, certain impressione are produced 0007 indivi- dnal minds; and these impressions predispose the mind to one or the other form of ideas.
216 The specifio form being that to which, more than to others, the Agent has been accustomed, aud of which the impressions are stronger and more permancat,
CUNYAVADA. 1 15
of determining any one specific form, and setting aside, for the time being all, other forms.
217. Similarly in the case of the notions of “ length” (‘ shortness,” with regard to a single object) and of “Ghatatwa ”(‘‘ Parthivatwa, ”’ with regard to the single object “ yar”), these will cease to be contradictory,— the diversity of forms being due to differences based upon comparison (of the object with various other objects).
218, And on the mere ground of the Cognition being of multifarious forms, it is not right to assert that there can be no form at all; because the diversity of forms may only be due to the diversity of comprehension (iu different Individuals).
219. And on the ground of the comprehension (by different persons being diverse), it 1s quite possible for contradictory forms to belong (to one and the same object). There is no such hard and fast rule laid down by God, that “one object must have one, and only one, form.”
220. We must accept everything just as it is perceived ; and even the singularity (or one-ness) of an object cannot be held to 06 absolute.
221. Therefore the forms of objects, consisting of appearance and disappearance, would be separately comprehended by means of Cognitions, brought about by the peculiarities of place (time), &e.
222. Among people who simultaneously comprehend (an object, as (‘jar’ ‘earthy’ &c.,)—he who happens to remember a word denoting a cer- tain form, comprehends the object in that form only.
223. Though the properties of colour, odour &c., reside separately in
217 This refers to the objection urged in Karikas 59-60. The same object may be long in comparison with one object, and short in comparison with another,
218 {† has been urged in K. 61 that since different persons have different ideas with regard to the same object, therefore any one form cannut be said to specifically belong to any object. The present Karika meets this by nrging that the diversity in the form 38 dne to the difference in the comprehensions of different persons, based npon individual idiosyncracies.
219 Becanse different persons have different comprehensions—this is enough reason to lead to the conclusion that it is possible fors single object to be impressed with diverse, and even contradictory, forms.
220 We must accept an object to be of one or of wultifarious forma, according 88 we perceive them; there can be no other criterion. There is no proof of the object being ons only. Therefore there is nothing contradictory in one and the same object being endowed with various forms,—when such are in accord with the cognitions of individual persons.
aal ^“ Appearance and disappearance ””—one form appearing in the cognition of one person, and disappearing in that of another. Thus then the object will have one form or the other, according as it happens to be cognised by this or that person. Such appearance or disappearance may be based upon the differences of time, place &c., 1.1. a well-armed wan in the jungle is recognised as «a huntsman, while in the midst of a town, he is only known as a policeman.
228 This refers to K. 30. Even these people do not become cognisant of the form of the Conception, prior to that of the form of the object,
176 CLOKAVARTIKA.
ajar, yet—their Cognition is restricted in accordance with the respective functioning of the Eye, the Nose, &c.
224. In the same manner, though the characters of ‘ Ghatawa,’ Pérthiatwa’ &c.—have their existence equally for all persons, yet their recognition is controlled by the remembrance (by different Individuals) of words expressing the various forms (of the jar).
925. Therefore the character of the object, though existing outside, is assumed to be the object of Cognition, according as it is approached or not approached, by the various organs of sense, the Eye and the rest.
226. Though ordinary people assert that “the externa] existence of the object is in accordance with the Conception we have of it,”’—yet even these people do not attribute a form tothe object by means of (and subsequently to) the recognition of the forms of the Idea.
227. Itis only asa means of Cognition that a Conception preseuts to us the Object—as that ^ such is the object” ; because it (Conception) is only the means (of recognising the form of the Object).
228. Thus then those who hold the existence of external objects do not admit their non-existence, which you seek to prove by meansof Infer- ences ; and passing over the Cognition of the Idea, they become cognisant of the form of the external object itself.
229, It is necessary for students of Philosophy to explain things ex- actly according to Cognitions met with in ordinary experience. And (in ordinary experience) the external object is never cognised to be of the same form as the internal (Idea).
230. ‘If atthe time of the Cognition of the Object, the Conception too were to be cognised as what has already appeared,— what would this fact accomplish for the Parvapakshin ? And again, how could he speak of another object ?”
231. (The meaning of the objection as urged in the Bhashya is that) the objector asks the upholder of external objects-—‘ Do you not hold that
#28 The cognition of external objecta 18 got at by means of Sense-perception; and you seek to prove the negation of these by means of Inferenoe. But hefore your Inference has had time to function, the existence of the external ohject will have been recognised by the prior functioning of Sense-perception.
229 The object is recognised as ^ blue,’’ and not ae ‘' [ ›› (which is the real internal form).
280 The Bhishya saya: “ utpadyamanaivasém Jndyaté JIndpayati carthantaram pradipavaditt yadyucyéta” (an objection urged from the standpoint of the Banddha) ; and the present K arika objecta to this as coming from the Bauddha. The fact urged hy the objector does not in any way help hie position ;in fact it only goes to weaken it, insamuch as he is made to assert “anothor object” (Arthantaram)—which is opposed to the purely Idealtstic theory.
281 1118 Karika eupporte the objection as. urged in the Bhashya. If there is no suppression, the object ia bound to he comprebended; and ag such, if you deny its suppression, how can you deny its Comprehension ?
CUNYAVADA, 177
there is no suppression of Conception while it comprehends another object ? '
232. 116 reply to this question is that we do not admit of such Comprehension, because there is no direct (sensuous) means of compre- hending (such another object) ; and also because there is no mark (Reason or middle term by which such Comprehension could be inferred).
232-33. Or, the objection may be taken as applying to other theories. In these other theories, the Idea is said to be cognised at the time of the Cognition of the Object ; and in that case, the existence of the Object would be struck at its root ; and it is for this reason that we bring the objection home to them.
234. “The passage beginning with ‘ Nanuv’ is irrelevant (as coming from the Bauddha) ; because it urges what is desirable for his opponent; and secondly, the mention of sequence contradicts what has been asserted before.”
235. ^“ And if it be urged that ‘both (Idea and Object) being momen- tary, the Cognition urged in the objection is quite proper, and that the fact of the object being cognised subsequently is mentioned only as a past event (by means of the past participle affix in Jnya@tah),—there would be a useless repetition of what has already been said before
282 This Karika explains the passage of the Bhashya, embodying the reply to the objection raised by the Banddha in the passage referred to above. Though there is no suppression there may be no means of comprehending the object; nor is there any such characteristic of it as would lead to the acceptance of its Comprehension.
232.83 This Karika interpreta the objection urged in the Bhashya, in a different way, as directed against the Vaigeshika doctrine that the Idea ie comprehended simnltane- ously with the Object. In that case, no external object could be proved to have a real existence; because the Comprehension of the Idea is not possible without that of the form ; and when the form hag once heen cognised in connection with the Idea, there would be no room left for the interception of the external object itself.
284 The Bhashya laya down another Banddha argument: ^ Utpanndydméva buddhau artho jnayaté, §c., ¥c.”—a passage which ends with the assertion that “at first there 18 an appearance of the Idea, and then follows the cognition of the object.” The Karika says that this is not opposed to the Miminsa theory, which also holde that the Object is cognised only on the manifestation of the Idea; and, to the contrary, the mention of the Cognition of the Object is directly against the Qanyanada tenets; and lastly, it has beeu urged above that the cognition of the Idea ie simultaneous with that of the Object; and this is contradicted by the present assertion, that the cognition of the Idea is followed by that of the Object
#36 The contradiction urged above is met by the assertion that in the second objection algo, we have only the aforesaid simultaneity in view. With regard to the Idea it has been said that itis being manifested (in the present tense), while the object has been said to have been cognised (in the Past). And for the Banddha, there cannot be any other alternative eave that of simultaneity ; becanse all things being momentary, any object that has once appeared and given rise to an Idea, conld not wait for another moment, to be cognised by {ऽद separately.
(It may however 16 noted that if this explanation is accepted, the secon] ohjection becomes the same as the first. |
23
178 CLOKAVARTIEA.
236. Here too, the Bauddha does not speak from his own standpoint the fact being that through the assertion of his opponent he is mistaken as to the theory of his antagonist and (while under this misapprehension) he has put the question (urged in objection 2).
237-40. “The simultanity of the manifestation and Comprehen- sion of the Idea being absolutely established,—we ask 11 these come before the Comprehension of the Object, or after it, or simultaneonsly with it ig This theorist (the Mimansaka) asscrts the Comprehension of the Idea to follow after that of the Object ; and then (in accordance with this theory) the Idea would be produced also after (the Object). Bunt this is not possible ; hence we declare the productiou (or manifestation of the Idea)
to precede the cognition of the Object ; and thus at the same time we would
also have the Comprehension of the Idea (and hence the Comprehension of the Idea would also precede that of the Object). And the prior Compre- hension of the Idea being thus established, there can be no proper discrimination between the external (Object) and the internal (Idea) (and as such by priority we infer the form to belong to the Idea and not to any external Object].’’ And it isin view of these reasonings that the objector has brought forward the aforesaid objections.
241. Even if the Comprehensions of the Object and the Idea were simultaneous (as mentioned in Obj. 1),—we could not recognise any form as belonging to the Object (because the form will have been cog- nised as being confined to the Idea), And itis for this reason that the Mimansaka first seeks to prove that the Comprehension of the Object pre- cedes that of the Idea (even though the Idea may have been produced before).
286 ‘his Kirika supports tha objection as quite propsr, as coming from the Banddha. The Miminsaka has asserted that the Idea of an object is cognised befora the Objact itself ; bat, at the same time, he has aleo said that when the Object has been ००६१88१, the cognition of the Idea follows by Apparent Inconsistency. And from this the Banddha has concluded the Mimansaka to hold that there is no cognition of tha Ideas before that of ths Object ; and from this he has 8180 oonclnded him to deny sven the manifestation of the Idea before the Object, And thus having misunderstood the theory of his opponsnt, the Banddha aska:—‘ But it is only when the Idea has appeared,” &., &c. (Vide Bhashya, quoted above)”,
281-40 Theas Karikas set out the procesa of reasoning employed by the Bauddhs aw based npon the aforesaid misconception of ths Mimansaka’s atandpoint. The procase shows that the sim of both objections is the sams—viz., the denial of the external Objact, and ths establishing of the fact of ths Idea being the sole entity.
241 The firet half of the Karika 81106 how the aim of the former objeotion too oon- 818४8 only of the denial of the reality of the external Object ; and the sense of the second half 18 that if we accept the comprehension of the Idea to be cognised, either prior to, or eimnitaneonsly with that of the Object, then we wonld he foroed to ascribs a form to the Idea, and dsny the exietence of the Objeot altogether. For this reason, the first business of the Mimausaka is to prove that the comprehension of the Objeot precedes that of the Tdea—which latter 18 got at suhsequently by means of Apparent Inconsisteucy.
QUNYAVADA. 179
242. The portion of the Bhashya that follows after this has already been explained above.
942-43. ‘ Because the character of the Object comprehended is not remembered (at some future time), just like an unknown object,—that is no direct reason for asserting the previous non-Comprehension of the Idea. Therefore with what, and on what way, is the previous non-Comprehen- sion of the Idea connected or relevent to the present discussion P”
244. Tor these reasons the present passage must be explained as being a refutation of the theory that “the form belongs to the Idea, because of its prior cognition’—because the notion of the form belonging to the Idea is the result of the argument based on its prior Compre- hension.
245. The passage “ Kamam buddhéh”’ denctes the fact of the Idea being dependent on the Object.
246-47. As a matter of fact apart from the form of the Object, there is no recognition of Ideas. And the Idea being recognisable by another’s form, it cannet be the object of cognition, because it 18 like a Mirage. Thus then, for you, the cognisability of Ideas would be in accord- ance with a comprehensible object, which you hold to be non-est. And since the form of the Ideas themselves is a tabula rasa, their cegnisability could only be assumed to have been caused by the disturbance of Vasana {predispositions or tendencies). And as such the Idea itself could not be cognisable, in reality.
248. ‘The fixity of cause’ 18 equally applicable to both the theories because the upholders of ‘ Idea’ as well as the upholders of “ external objects” equally take their stand upon the peculiar faculties of their substances.
249. ‘* How 18 it, that for you too the objects in the shape of threads
242 ^ The portion of the Bhashya,” Sc— satyam pirvam buddhirutpadyaté na tu jndyaté”—explained above in Karikae 82-83.
42.43 This Karika taker exception to the Bhashya passage in reply to the above objections: The passage referred to is: ^ Bhavatt hikhalw kaddcidetat yajnato’- pyarthahk sannajnatavaducyaté.” It is often fonnd that Of two objects cognised at on- time, only one may be remembered in the future; consequently it is not right to assert that—“‘ beoause the Ideais remembered when the objeot is not, therefore there could have been no cognition of the Idea together with the Object,”
244 This 18 in defence of the Bhaehya: Though the direct denial of the prior conception of the Idea is not quite relevant, yet what we mean by 8101 denial ie only to strike at the root of the resultant theory: namely that the form belongs to the Idea, and not to the Objeot.
445 Bhauhya : ^ Kamamékaripatvé buddhiréva bhavati’—i. e. Even if the Idea and the object were identical, it would be more correct to attribute the form to the Object than to the Idea.
845.47 Ideas, heing naturally plain (according to the Bauddha), could not have any forme of their own.
#43 12111538 248-52 take exception to the Bhashya : Api ca niyatanimitta, 4८.) §c.”
180 (1.01 ^ए६ 71164.
bring about ouly such effects as the cloth ? Wherefore could not these (threads) bring about a gar ? Or how is it that the cloth is not brought about by lumps of clay” ?
250. If you object to the Ideas of ‘ thread’ and ‘ lump of clay’ (as having the power to bring about ideas of the ‘cloth’ and the ‘ jar’ res- pectively), then in the same manner, you would have an objection to the objects (‘ thread’ and ‘ lumps of clay” as having the properties whereby to bring about the objects ‘ cloth’ and ‘ jar’).”
251. “Ifthe fixity of the creation (or causation) of objects were said to depend on the restrictions of faculties (or capabilities—such as the faculty of causing a cloth is restricted to the thread alone and so forth), then who could deny the same capabilities in the restriction of the causation of Ideas (४,.९., we would also have the Idea of threads such as having resricted within itself the power of bringing about the Idea of cloth) ?”
252. ‘Therefore when the objection is common to both theories and when the means of meeting the objection too is similar to both,— such an objection should not be brought forward by one against the other, during a discussion over a subject.”
253. But for the upholder of the ^ Object” theory, we have such means (of meeting the objections) as the specialities of time, place and the like, which serve to control the capabilities of the causes, in (the manifesta- tion of) their particular effects ; (which resource is not open tothe Idealist who denies space, time, &c., in fact everything besides Ideas).
254. The capabilities of objects too are such as are postulated through the ^“ Apparent Inconsistency” of the effects;~and as such these are known to be real, having their application restricted to their respective effects.
255. For you, on the other hand, any such capability, either different or non-different from the Idea, is not recognised as real,—apart from its assumed (unreal) existence.
256-58. Itis VAsand (Disposition) alone that you describe by the
४४५ When we find that a certain characteristic in the effect oannot be otberwise explained, we postulate a corresponding potentiality in the canse, to which souroe we relegate the said characterestic.
465 To assnme that the potentiality has an unreal existence is only a tacit denial of the potentiality ; and hence a restriotion of the causal efficienoy.
266.58 Yon hold that the operation of the canse is restricted by Vasané. That any such controlling agency, as that of the Vasani, is not possible, we have shown under the section of Mirdlambuna-Vada. “ Not dependent, &c.”’: For us, the Vasana resides in the Soul, whioh being, for us, permanent, it may be possible for the opera- tion of the underlying Vasana towards the reetriotion of the Causal efficienoy to be delayed to = certain extent. But the Banddha holds the Vasana to reside in the Idea, which is held to be momentary. Under the circumstances, how oonld Vasana (which
CUNYAVADA. 181
word ^ Cakti” (capability). And the restriction of causalty, that yon base upon the Vasands, becomes impossible, firstly, because such Vdsands cannot exist, and secondly, because they cannot be said to serve the purpose of any other object. Nordo you accept any such controlling agencies, as those of Time, Place, &c. It is with all this in view, that the author of the Bhashya has urged, against his opponent, the argument beginning with “apica”, &e.
258-59. Therefore it does not meet our objection to your theory, merely to assert that ^^ just asfor you, cloth proceeds from threads, so for us too, the Idea of cloth would proceed from the idea of threads.”
259-61. Thus then (we conclude that) the negation of the external object is not proved hy the first two means of Right Notion (Sense- perception and Inference) ; Of Verbal Authority there is no application in this case (denial of external object),—in fact it is applicable to the contrary ; Analogy is not applicable, because you admit of nothing else that would be similar to Idea; neither does Apparent Inconsistency serve your purpose; because it proves quite the contrary. Hence we conclude that such denial of the external object can only be amenable to “ Negation” (z.e., the denial is only capable of being denied).
261. Some people, finding that external objects being aggregates of atoms are incomprehensible, have asserted the Negation (Cinyata)— thus proved to be unamenable to any means of Right Notion—to reside in the predicable object itself ;
262. buton account of the impossibility of any comprebensibility belonging to an internal (Idea) as shown above,—even these people will have to admit of the comprehensibility of something else. As for atoms, neither do we accept them to be comprehensible; and as such, we must describe the aggregates of these (atoms) to be real (and as such, objects of comprehension).
too cannot but be momentary) exert any controlling influence over the operation of (२868 ? In fact the Bauddha’s Vasana becomes devoid of any substantial eubsetratnm. Nor does the Banddha admit of any other controlling agenoy ; hence all hie Cansal operations would beoome erratio in the extremeat degree,
a9.61 ^ Verbal authority ”’—snch as Injunotiona—laying down sacrifices, &c., and 88 euch bearing testimony to the reality of external objecta. ‘‘ Apparent Inconsistency. Various forms perceived in the world having been found to be inexplicable, we infer, from Apparent Inconsistency, the reality of the existence of the various objects in the external world. And this goes directly against the Qinyavada. Thng then all these Means of Right Notion being found to contradict the denial of external objects, the only remaining Means of Right Notion ie Negation, Anda theory that is amenable to Negation alone cannot but he denied in its totality.
261 Finding that Qunyatd ig not established by any Pramana, some people seek ४0 rest it in the Praméya,—their reasoning being this: Atome are invisible; therefore the aggregate of atoms must be 10181016 ; therefore all objects areinvisible aud incom- prehensible : and therefore they do not exist.”
862 ^! We must describe, ¥c.’’—as we shall prove later on.
182 CGLOKAVARTIKA.
263. Thus then (the reality of) the external object having been established, there can be no unreality of the Idea (either) ; and for those who know the true character of both (the Object and the Idea), this (the Couple, Object and Idea) is really a fit object for being made the axle of the wheel of “ Investigation into Duty.”
Thus ends the Cinyavada.
(SECTION 5.) INFERENCE.
1. Since ^“ Sense-perception” has been proved to be not a mistaken process, therefore, for the same reason, there can he no question as to the validity of Inference and the rest, as defined below.
2. The epithet ^ known—relation” either belongs to the cognising agent; or it refers to a substrate of the middle term; or the com- pound may he explainedas a Karmadh&araya—the words “ one-substrate ” referring to each of the two members of the relation (postulated in the
Premiss ).
3. Or the epithet may refer mutually to both members of the relation itself,the words ‘one substrate (or part)’ in that case, signifying (severally) the two members themselves.
4. The “relation ’’ meant here is that of invariable concomitance of
268 Jnat as a pair of horses is fit for pulling a car, 80 these two—the Object and the Idea-—are fit for supporting and carrying throngh an Investigation into Duty, for those who know the real character of the Object and the 168, (४.९., the Mimansakas).
1 Because Inference and the rest are all based upon Sense-perception.
8 The Bhishya passage here referred 10 18 this: ‘“ Anumdnam Jndatasamband-
hasya, 4८.) ¥c..” Ifthe compound “Jnitasambandha” be explained as an Accusative Bahauvrihi— ^“ He by whom the relation is cognised’’—then the meaning of the definition would be that “ Inference isthe cognition of that person who has _ previonsly recognised the relation, &o. &«.” If however, the compound be explained as a Gene- tive Bahurrihi— That whereof the relation has been cognised’—then, the definition wonld mean that ‘‘Inference is the cognition, in another anbstrate (Fire), bronght abont by the perception (in the mountain, of amoke) whichis a part of the relation of concomitance with Fire, perceived in such substrates as the culinary hearth, the relation whereof with the smoke has been previously recognised.’ Thirdly, the com- pound may be explained as a Karmadhiaraya—“ known relation; in that case the defi- nition would mean that ^“ Inference is the cognition, in another member of the relation, bronght about by the perception of the smoke, which is another member of the known relation.”
8 Taking the compound to be a Bahuvrihi, there can be yet another explanation : That whereof the relation is known belongs to both members of the Minor Premiss taken together ; and “one part’’ of this may be each of these taken severally.
4 In the stook example, “There is fire, because there is amoke,” smoke is the maans of the cognition of fire ; and certainly it oocupies less space, and is seen leas ofton, than the fire.
INFERENCE. 183
the character of the Middle term with the Major term. To the ‘ Per- vaded’ (Middle term) belongs the function of bringing about the conception (of the Major term), and the ‘Pervader’ (the Major term) is held to be the subject of the conception (arrived at through the Infer- ence).
5. Because the ‘ Pervaded ’ is that which, in space and time, is either the equal or less in comparison with another; and that which is equal er more is the ‘ Pervader’ ;
6. therefore it is only after the ‘Pervaded’ has been recognised, that its ‘Pervader ’ can be cognised ; otherwise there would be no such relation hetween them as that of the ‘Pervader and the Pervaded’ ( १.९.) that of Invariable Concomitance).
7. Though itis a fact that the ‘Pervaded’ is (sometimes) cog- nised as the ‘ Pervader; yet even ifits greater extension (in time and apace) may not be contradictory, it could not (in that particular form) bring about the conception of the ‘ Pervaded.’
8. This is found to be the case in the instance of the ' cow’ (pervaded) and the ‘horned animal’ (Pervader)); where the ‘cow’ being the ‘Pervaded’ gives rise to the conception of the ‘Pervader’ `“ horned animal.’
9. Therefore even in such cases, where both members may in certain cases be accepted as the ‘ Pervader’and the ‘ Pervaded,’it is the char- acter of the ‘ Pervaded’ alone, and never that of the‘ Pervader,’ that forms part (as the cause) of cognition.
10-11. Thus then that form of the ‘ Pervaded’ which brings about the conception of the ‘ Pervader ’ is precisely that alone which has at some previous time been perceived, at a definite time and place, as located in 016 substrate, and which is subsequently perceived, exactly in the same form, in another substrate.
12-13. The Invariable Concomitance of two general objects is recog- nised through a repeated cognizance (of their concomitance), and through the removal of all doubt as to their difference (non-concomitance). At times (there is an invariable concomitance) of particular objects also ; as for instance, the perception of the appearance of the constellation of “ Krittika”’ gives rise to the notion of the proximity of (its neighbour) “ Rohini.”
7 As in the oase of the argument—“ non-eternal, because, caused ’’—a case where both are eqnally co-extengive, and both may be the “pervader” or the ‘**Pervaded ;”” Even if we admit the greuter extensivenesa of any one of these, though this will not be contradictory, yet any anch member of greater extensiveness conld not always give rise to the conception of another of lesser extensiyenese ; because the former can exist even in the absence of the latter.
10.11 The smoke has previonsly been perceived to co-exist with Fire, in the oulinary hearth ; and aubsequently, it is perceived in the mountain,—and instantly gives rise to the idea of the Fire existing in the mountain.
184 QLOKAVARTIKA.
13-15. In the cognition of an Invariable Concomitance the cause is acertain property, with regard to which there issuch a notion as that ‘zt is only when this exists that such and such a thing can exist ’ ; (proper- ties) other than this only tend to add support to concomitances brought about by other means. And wedo not admit of any ascertainment of concomitance on the perception of only such properties as these latter.
15-16. Those that employ such (secondary properties) for the accom- plishment of their conclusions are frequently led away by the discre- pancies of counter-arguments, that crop up quite easily in their way.
16-17. These persons are also open to the faults of ‘ ccntradiction of the scriptures,’ ‘and contradiction of their own ends’ ‘ (self-contradiction), ’ ‘unheard of argumentations ;’ and such illogical argumentations should be avoided by all reasonable men.
17-18. Animal-slanghter is sinful, simply because it is prohibited. In the absence of such prohibition, the mere fact of its being ‘ animal slaughter’ could not prove it to be sinful.
18-19. The falsity of all ideas is based on two causes (the discre- pancy in the means of arriving at the idea, and the suhsequent cognition of some idea setting aside the former) ; andthe arguments asserting the facts of an Idea being an idea, and of having an origin, are of no use (in proving the falsity of any Idea).
19-20. The capacity of leading to Heaven belongs to sacrifice, &., when performed by the first three castes ; and hence it cannot be ascribed to those that are performed by the Gudras, on the sole ground of these latter being performed by human beings, just like the former oues.
18.15 The objection, that the Karika is meant to mest isthst “if the pervaded be admitted to lead to the inference of the pervader, then the mere fact of its being a slaughter would lead to the inference that the slanghter of animals in the sacrifices is 817] ; because there is a concomitance between Sinfulness and Slaughter, in the case of Brahmans—slaughter and the like.’ The sense of the reply is that such concomitance is not admissible ; because we have no such general proposition, 88 that ‘t whenever there is sin, there is slaughter.” The property that must he admitted 88 the basis of concomitance, in the case in question, must be the character of being prohibited ; because no one can deny the trnth of the assertion that ‘“ whenever there is sin, there is also something that is prohibited in the scriptures.’’ Ths basis of concomitance, in all cases, must be such as is capable by itself of being directly connected with the Major Term. Such however 18 not the case with Slaughter, because even in its absence, we coms across sinfulness— e.g., in wine-drinking, &c.
16.11 “ Contradiction of scripture’’—e.g., in the cass of the alleged sinfulness of animal sacrifice in the ** Agnishtoma,”
17.18 This cites an sxample of the “‘ contradiction of scriptures.”
18.19 This gives an example of ^“ Self-contradiotion.”
19.20 Some people might urge the argument that “ sacrifices performed by Qiadras lead them to Heaven, because they are performed by human agents, like the sacrificos performed by the highcr castes.” Besides being fallacions in itself, such au argument would be directly contradictory to facts laid dowu in Lho scriptures.
INFERENCE. 185
20-21. Destructibility is based on the facts of having a begining in time, and on that of being made up of certain constituent parts ; and 1 can never be based upon such facts as that of being cognised after a certain effort on the part of the agent.
21-22. Inthe same manner the facts of belonging to a class, and being sensual (belonging to a certain organ of Sense) are common to all existing things (eternal as well as non-eternal) ; and hence, who else, except the Naiyayika, could bring forward these, as arguments for proving the non- eternality of Sound (or Word) ?
22-23. Therefore that, which by its very capability has been found to be the means of proving the existence of another, can be said to be the means of bringing about its conception,—and not that which comes to be related to it by mere chance.
23. By means of the double mention of the words ‘one member’ is mentioned the Minor term which forms one of the members of the relation.
24. If ‘smoke,’ &c., were not related to others (the Major and Minor terms) they could, by themselves, be ‘a member’ (of the relation) and it is the ‘ Paksha’ (Minor term) alone that contains both members (of the relation) partaking of the character of both the conceived (the Per- vader) and the means of (another) being conceived (४.९. the Pervaded).
25. With regard to the unascertained factor (Fire, 1.1.) the Minor term (Mountain) forms the object to be conceived ; while in relation to the ascertained (‘smoke’) it is the means of the conception (of another) ; and it may be mentioned either separately or identically, according to the wish of the speaker :
26. As an instance of the mention of the Minor term in a form co-extensive with its correlatives, we have “non-eternal, because it is originated”? and ‘‘the smoky is fiery”; and as an instance of the Minor term mentioned in a form separate from them, we have “there is fire in the mountain, which is smoky.”
27. Itis the Minor term as qualified by the Major term that forms the object of Inference. Independently of it (the Major term), the Minor term can never be the object of Inference.
28. The qualifying (Major term) by itself cannot form the object of
20.21 The fact of being cognised is urged as a proof of the destructibility of ८ Words” ; and the K&arika meets this argument.
42.23 That is to say, that alone could he regarded as snch means, with regard to which we have such a notion 88 that—‘ when this exists, that must exist’’—e.g., in the case of “heing prohibited,’ and “ sinfulness,” where we have a definite general proposition: ‘‘ Whatever is prohibited is sinful.”
24 Consisting of both, it must partake of the nature of hoth.
25 “Fire” (in the mountain) is not known by anyother meamus save that of Infer- ence; while the ‘ smoke’ is seen by the eye. “ separately’ i.€., apart from the two mem- bers. « Identically’—.e., in a form co-extensive with them.
28 All the members of the syllogism are already known ; and it is only the definite relation between the Major and Minor terms that forms the object of Inference.
24
186 CLOKAVARTIEA.
Inference, because it is already known. Nor can the qualified (Minor Term), or both the Major and Minor Terms, taken singly or collectively,
be the object of Inference, independently of the other. 29. Ifany of these singly were the object of Inference, then we could
not have any one member as the predicate (Linga); nor could we have any relation of this with the Major term (expressed in the Major premiss) :
30. Lg. ‘causedness’ is not a property of ‘non-eternality’; nor is there any relation between these and ‘sound’; nor lastly is there any
relation between these two themselves.
31-32. Nor is any relation possible between the snbject and predi- eate, taken each independently by itself, inasmuch as the relation is neither mentioned by name nor signified by the genitive affix. Nor is any predication of the relation with the Middle term exemplified; nor can it have two forms partaking of the character of the ascertasmed (Sadhana), as
well as of the unascertatned (Sadhya). 32.33. Therefore the denotation of the possessive affix (se., the
29.80 If * non-eternality” (as the qualification or the predicate) were the object of Inference, then, in that case, ^^ cansedness” not heing a property of it, the Middle Term (‘‘ Cansedness ’) would cease to he a part of the Minor term (‘‘non-eternality’”’) ; and under such circumstances, no Inference could be possible. If again, ‘“ Sound’ alone were to be the objeot of Inference, theu we could not predicate any relation between this (‘‘ Sound”) and ‘‘ Cansedness,” hecause there is no such propesition as that— ‘* wherever there is ceusedness, there 18 also sownd.’’ Lastly,if the “ non-eternality of Sound” (both conjointly), were the object of Inference, then we could not find any instance of the predication of any relation between the Middle Term ( “ Causednees’’) and the ** non-eternality of Sound.” Because, in the case of all other caused entities— the jar, &c.—we find a relation predicated hetween a caused entity anda non-eternal entity, and ८०४ between a caused entity anda non-eternal sound,
81.38 The conclusion is notin the form ^ Parvatasya agnéhnor as “ Agniparvata- sambandho’sts.”’ Saya the Nydy1 ratragera. "° The mere existence of Relation cannot he the subject of Inference ; because it haa already heen previously ascertained. Nor does Relation possess of ® two-fold character of the Sadhana and the Sadhana Ob- {6५४ and the Means), whereby, having made “ Relation” the Minor Term we could prove the fact of its heing endued with Fire. Becsuse » Relation, in general, can never he endued with Fire ; and as for any particnlar Relation, inasmuch as none such can he arrived at, previous to the Inference itself, it cannot be the Minor Term.” And the Kagika: “Is the Relation te he proved 88 a mere entity, or as qualified hy some property ? The mere existence of any object can never he the ohjeot of any Inference : and Relation has not, like the Mountain, adual form of the aseertained and the non- ascertained. Therefore Relation can never he the objeet of Inference.’’
ees The theory accepted is that it is the Minor Term as related to, or qualified hy, the Major Term, that forms the objeet of Inference. And it is true that no such qualified conclasion is possihle withont a qualification. Therefore it is held that such a qualification is the objeet of Inference, not by itself, but only as the implied necessary accomplishment of the conclusion. And since the other memhers of the conclusion are already known, therefore it is only qualification (or the special relstion)—but this only as forming part of the qualified conclusion—that constitutes the objeot of Inferonee pure and simple.
INFERENCE. 187
relation) can be the object of Inference, not independently by itself, but only as implied (in the qualified Minor term).
33. As for instance, in the case of such words as “ Dandi” and the like (the man with the stick) there being a cognition of the qualified object (the man with the stick), the relation (qualification) is recognised only as its necessary concomitant.
34. Therefore these two (Subject and Predicate) are to be conceived of only as in the forms of the qualification and the qualified. The relative predominance (of these two) is by some people held to be optional :
35. According to these theorists the qualification (nou-eternality ) of an object (sowxd) is reeognised by means of another qualification (causedness) ; and there is no definite specification as to which is the quali- fication and which the qualified.
36. In reply to this, some people assert that if the qualified object be the qualification, then it would become the secondary factor; and as such, its relationship with the qualities of the middle term, would not be quite clear.
37-38. It is only in its primary character that the qualified object is conuected, through a sentence, with the qualification. And itis only when no relationship with the qualification is possible, that it is assumed to be with the qualified subject. Gr wecould add the clause “ of Sound” (to Causedness).
38. At the time of the recognition of an universal affirmative proposi- tion, the secondary character of the qualification, which is mentioned separately, is not a fault
39. If the Fire, as qualified by the place (mountain), were to be accepted as the qualified subject, then we could not have the definition, of Paksha (Minor Term) given below. Because such qualification of Fire could only be in the following seven forms :—
40-42. (1) ‘The Fire, that has been seen in some place or other, exists’; (2) ‘ the pre-experienced Fire exists in space’; (3) ‹ Fire is related to this (mountain)’; (4) ‘the Fire that has been, seen is connected with this.” (5) ‘This Fire is connected with space. (6) ‘This Fire is
36.57 Tf the conclusion were in the form— Anityatwam (abdagatam”—then the Qabda would be only a secondary element ; and as such, it could not very clearly he connected with the Middle Term, *‘ Causedness.” Itis only an nnnecessary compli- cation to assert any relation with the qualified object. And again, the simple 1619188 — Krtakatvat”—will have to be changed into—“ yatah Qabdasya Krtakatvam,”—an unnecessarily cumbrons process.
83 This Karika anticipates the following objection: “Inthe case of the proposi- tion, ‘ whatever is caused is non-eternal,’ the relation perceived would be with the primary, ‘Sound,’ and not with the secondary, ` non-eternality.”’ The sense of the reply 18 that in this case, inasmuch as the word “ non-eternality” is mentioned again (apart from the conolusion), we have its connection with the permiss complete; and the secoudary position that it occupies in the conclusion, is uo fault.
188 OLOKAVARTIKA.
connected with some former space’; or (7), This Fire is qualified by this place.’
42.45. Among these, in the first two, we have the fault of proving the proved (rednndancy) ; and in the rest, self-contradiction. (3) There can be no invariable concommitance of the particular space with every Fire in existence. (4)-Nor is any such concomitance possible of a formerly seen Fire with the present space; (5) Nor can the particular Fire be quali- fied by all space. (6) Nor can it be qualified by any formerspace. And (7) how can it be asserted (before the Inference has been completed) that ‘this Fire is qualified by this particular place,’ when apart from the parti- cular place, there is no such specification as this ‘ Fire’?
45-46. Andin the present case itis the place (mountain) which is perceived hefore the Fire ; and since it is already perceived at the time of the perception of the Fire, it cannot be taken as the qualification.
46-47, As for the place, mountain, in as much as its form is perceived apart from, and prior to, that of the Fire, it is no fault to have another recognition of it as qualified by Fire.
47-48. For these reasons we conclude that it is the subject, as qualified by the property, that forms the ohject of Inference; and such, in the present case, is the place as accompanied by Fire. Some people however attribute (the character of the ohject of Inference) to the * smoke.’
48. Objection : ^ Asin the case of ‘ Word’ 80 in the present case also, it may be the qualification itself that is the object of the Linga (Middle Term).”
49-50. Notso: because in the case of the Linga, there cannot be an assumption of a multitude of applications; because it cannot be the object of Inference ; and thie subject too is one that has been previously
42.45 (1) That the Fire exists does not stand in need of proofs. The same is the case with the(2). (3) Certainly, the particnlar epace in question cannot contain all the Fire that exists in the world. (4) The Fire seen elsewhere cannot reside in the place in question. (5) The Fire seen now cannot occupy all the space in the world. (6) No former space can be occupied by the Fire seen at the present time. (7) Inas.- much as the Fire is not peroeptible by the sense, and as such, is not capable of being designated as ^“ this Fire,’ it is not poasible to have as the objeot of Inference, “ the Fire as qualified by a particular place.” :
48 Thai is to say, as in the case of a word—f.i. “ cow’’—though there is an idea of the class ‘ cow’ as defined by the individual cow, yet the Mimansakas accept the force of the word to 116 in,the class alone ; 80) in the same manner, in the present case 8180, the force of the Linga may 16 accepted to 116 in the quulifioation, Fire, alone, and not in the place as qualified by Fire.
49.60 The sense of the reply is that the qualification, Fire, is perceived only at the time of the recognition of its relation with the Subjeot; and as such, it can serve to qualify the Sabjeot, which is remembored at that time. Consequently it cannot bo assumed that like a “‘ Word,” the “ Linga has its force iu the “ qualifioation.” Nor can the Linga he said to have auy such application in the Subject, either: because the Subject is such as has already beeu previously percoived, by some other means.
INFERENCE. 189
perccived. As a matter of fact the object of Inference is the subject as qualified (by the Fire) ; hecause this alone is such as has not been previously perceived.
50-51. Objection : ^ If ‘smoke’ were the subject qualified, then the Middle Term would become a part of the Minor Term.”
Reply: Itis not so; because the object of Inference is a particular ‘smoke,’ whereas the Middle Term isin the general form, the class ° smoke.’
01-52. If the character of the means of right knowledge be attributed to the ‘smoke’, or to‘ its conception,’ or to the ‘ remembrance of its connection,’ then there would be an identity of the objects with the final result, through its action (२.९. the action of the smoke, &.), as has been described before(in the case of Sense-Perception).
52-53. ^“ But the author of the Bhashya holds that it is the cogni- tion of the object that is the means of right knowledge.” True; but the uncertainty, spoken of (by the Bhashya) as attaching to the case of Sense- Perception, applies equally to all Means of Right Notion.
53-54, One, who wishes to prove by Inference something that ho has learnt by Inference, must first of all lay down the Minor Premiss, as explained above.
54-55. Itis with reference to the subject (Minor Term), that the property of the predicate (Major Term) is laid down; and by means of
60-61 This is an objection against the Naiyayika theory of the “ Smoke” being the object of Inference. ‘‘ Smoke ” is the Middle Term; and if it he made the Minor Term also, this would hring about an absurd admixture. The reply to this objection is based upon the ground that the ohject of Inference is a particular ^ Smoke ” in the monntain, while the Middle ‘erm is the general ‘‘ Dhimatwa.”
61.62 The action of smoke and the rest tends towards the recognition of the ohject of knowledge ; and thus there is an identification of the Object of the Means with that of the Result. Inthe chapter on ^ Sense-perception,’’ with a view to this identity between the Means and the Result, the Bauddha has declared the “Idea” alone to be both the Means and the End (of Perception) ; and in that place it was pointed ont by him that exactly the same would be the case with Inference also. Consequently the reply that was given to the Banddha, in the previous chapter, would serve our purpose, also on the present occasion: viz: “ Such identity directly contradicts the universally accepted distinction between Causes and Effects” ; and again—‘* Who canrightly uphold any identity of the ave with the cutting ? |
52.55 “ Such being the view of the Bhashya, how can you hold that there is an uncertainty with regard to the smoke, its cognition, the rememberance of its connection, &c.P” True, but in the section on Sense-Perception, the Bhashya expresses itself in douhtful language: “ Buddhirva janma vd, &o.”’; and this uncertainty applies to the case of every Pramdna.
63.54 An argument is that by means of which one seeks to prove something to another; and such an argument is made up of the Conclusion, the Reason, and the Instance $ and the Conclusion consists of the mention of the Minor Term (Mountain)
f.1.) as qualified by the Major Term (Fire); and it is this that ought to be laid down first.
190 (00४42४५,
this predication, what is implied is the preclusion of only such properties as are contrary to the said predicate, and not of those tbat are compatible with it.
55-56. The addition of the phrase “ not in proximity ” serves to set aside two things : (1) definite recognition (by some other easier means) of the object in the same form in which it is sought to be proved by the Inference ; and (2) recognition (by some easier means) of a form contrary to that sought to be proved.
56-58. Because that which has already been ascertained some way or the other does not stand in need of any other Means of right Knowledge. That is to say, if an object has been definitely known beforehand in the same form (as that which is sought to be proved by Inference), then this Proof becomes useless. And if object has been known (by more trust- worthy means) in a form contrary to the one sought to be proved, then there is no room for another proof. Because even before the appearance of the source (of Inference), its object will have been snatched away (by another and stronger proof).
58-59. In the case of all the six means of right knowledge—Sense- perception and the rest—if an object is ascertained by means of one of them, then 216 is by means of the same that the functioning of another means of Right Notion is barred; because in such cases there can be no option. |
59-60. The imperceptibility of Sound, &c., is contradicted by Sense- perception ; and the assertion of their being not amenable to the Sense of audition is contradicted by Inference.
60-61. Amenability to the sense of audition is not cognised by means of Sense-perception ; itis cognised by means of affirmative and negative premisses, with reference to the case of the deaf, &ec.
61-62. The contradiction of Verbal Testimony is three-fold —with
65-66 The Bhashya speaks of «५ Asannikrshte'rthé buddhih” ; and by this 18 meant the faot that any object, which, in a definite form, is known beforehand by some easier means (Senae-Perception f. i.) im that very form it cannot be the object of a more compli- cated means of knowledge (f. i., Inference) ; and aleo that if an objeot, in a definite form, is cognised previonaly by a stronger means of cognition (Sen ae-perception) then the same object, ina form contrary to thia, can never be the ohjeot of a weaker meana (Inference).
66.68 “ Snatched away, ¥c..”—-The ००766 of Inference consists of the perception of the Middle Term and the rememberance of Invariahle ooncomitance, &o., &o.; and before these are accomplished, the Ohject of Inference will have been already proved— either in the affirmative or in the negative—by some other atronger proof, (Sense-Per- ception) ; and in that case, there wil] be no room for the aotion of Inference.
69-60 An Inference 18 set aside hy another Inference, only when the latter happeng to be simpler in 168 prooess and more direot and easier of comprehension than the former.
60.51 ¢“ Deaf.'—Affirmative premiss: “ Wherever there ig Senge of Audition, a sound 18 heard, as in the cage of ordinary people.’ Negative premias : ^^ Where there 18 no Sense of Audition, there is no perception of Sound ; as in the case of the deaf,”
INFERENCE. 191
reference to (1) Present declaration, (2) Former declaration, and (3) a universally recognised fact.
62-63. (1) ^“ Ihave all my life been silent” is contradicted by the mere assertion. (2) If all assertion be declared to be false, then the very mention of the subject of the proposition (“all assertion”) makes it self- contradictory. (5) Inthe assertion “ Because I was born therefore my mother is barren,” there is self-contradiction in the mention of the reason (^ because I was born”).
64-65. (2) To the Banddha the assertion of the eternality of ‘ word’ is contradicted by his previous assertion (of the momentary character and non-eternality of all things.) And (3) he who denies the fact of the moon being signified by the word “ Candra” is contradicted by the idea of the moon derived by all men from that word,
65-66. If any one were to argue, to one who is cognisant with the form of both the ‘ cow’ and the ‘ gavaya,’ that “there is no similarity between the ‘cow’ and the ° gavaya’’”’—he would be contradicted by ० Analogy.”
66-68. If anybody were to argue, with reference to Caitra who is alive and whose existence in the house is ascertained, that ‘ he is not outside the house’, he would be contradicted by ^" Apparent Inconsistency” (based on Negation); so also the arguing of the non-burning power of Fire (which would contradict “ Apparent Inconsistency’ based on Sense- Perception); the arguing of the non-denotative power of a word (which would contradict “ Apparent Inconsistency ” based on Inference) ; the arguing of the non-existence of the Sense of Andition (which would also contradict ‘‘ Apparent Inconsistency ’’ based on Sense-percep- tion) ; and lastly, the arguing of the non-eternality of word (which would contradict ‘‘ Apparent Inconsistency ” based upon another “ Apparent Inconsistency ”’).
68-69. There is contradiction of ‘ Verbal Apparent Inconsistency,” when eating during the day having been denied by a trustworthy person eating at night be also denied by means of arguments, And there is con- tradiction of ‘‘ Negation” if the existence of (such non-entities as) ^ hare’s horns ” be argued to exist.
70-71. Thus has been exemplified the contradiction of the relation of the qualification (Predicate). We are now going to describe the contra- diction, with regard toall the means of right knowledge, of tbe natural form and specific property of the Predicate, the Subject, and both of these (taken together), denoted respectively by direct assertion, and indirect implication.
62.68 The examples of the three-fold contradiction of verbal authority are : (1) one who says ‘‘ I am silent” contradicts himself ; (2) If ‘‘ all assertions are false,” the asser- tion of the speaker also is false; (3) If one is born, his mother cannot be called “ 1087160.
192 CLOKAVARTIKA.
71-72. If one were to argue, from the existence of certain pieces of burnt straw in ice, that the Ice contains fire, then its specific property ‘heat’ would be contradicted by the cold, which is directly perceptible by the Sense of Touch.
72-73. ‘The prescribed (animal-slaughter) is a Sin, inasmuch as it produces a certain degree of pain to the killer) ’—in this argument the mention of “ prescribed Sin” contradicts itself; and similarly its specific property, of bringing about pain, also stands self-contradicted.
74-75, In the assertion “ all cognition is unreal’, lies the contradic- tion of both, by its form and specific property ; inasmuch as it is also the cognition of these that is proved to be unreal (by the general statement) ;
the specific properties here contradicted are momentariness and Absolute unrealrty.
75-76. By the mention of ^ the perception of one member” (in the definition of Inference laid down in the Bhashya), are set aside such cases where there is doubt, non-cognition and contrary conviction in the mind of either one or both of the disputants.
76-77. In such instances as “ Fire cannot burn, because it is cool,” ८ word 18 non-eternal, because it is amenable to the sense of sight, and the like,”—there is a contrary conviction in the minds of both disputants.
77-78. If the facts of ^“ being caused,” and ^ being a property” be brought forward by others as reasons against the Mimansaka, (with a view to prove the non-eternality of Sound) then the reasons would be coutrary to the firm conviction of one of the disputants (the person addressed, i.e., the Mimansaka) ; and ifsuch reasons be brought forward by the Mimansaka himself, then they would be contrary to the conviction of the person addressing (४.९., the Mimansaka himself).
78-79. Ifin any case, ‘smoke’ be doubted to he “fog” by one or beth of the dispuants, then it would be three-fold “ Asiddha.”’ Such are the forms of the direct contradiction (of the Middle Term).
7119 This ts the contradiction of a particular property of the Predicate.
%.78 This 18 the contradiction of the form and the specific property of the Subject.
“ Contradicts its own form.”—Becanse what is enjoined cannot be siufnl. ‘ Specific property, Jc.’’—Because what has been enjoined cannot bring pain to one who does it.
74.16 Specific properties contradicted, §e.”’-—Becanse by the general statement, “ all cognitions are falge,” the cognitions of momentariness and unrcality would also become false.
16-76 Uptill now, it has been proved that the mention of the word “ Asannikrshta,’’ in the definition laid down in the Bhashya, serves to preclude all mistaken forme of conclusion. And with thie Karika begine the treatment of the Fallacies—‘ Asiddha,” ‘* Anaikantika” and “ Viruddha.” And firet of allit 18 shown that the mention of Hkadécadarcanat ” serves to set aside, from the definition, all forms of the Fallacy of ५५ Asiddha.”’
78.17 Sinoe no dispatant will admit that that Fire is cool, or that Sound is amen- able to the function of sight, therefore the Middlo Term is contrary to the notion of both.
78.79 “ Therefore, Jc.” i.c., the donbt resting in ono disputant, and in both disputants.
INFERENCE, 193
79-80. These would be the different forms of the contradiction (of the Middle Term as based on that) of its substratum (६.९. the Minor Term, the subject of the conclusion), inasmuch as even if the Middle Term be known by itself, it does not actually serve as the Middle Term until it comes to be predicated, or related to the Minor Term.
80-81. Inthe case of the argument “ the soul is omnipresent, because its action is found everywhere,” we have a Middle Term whose substra- tum (the soul) isnot accepted by the Bauddha; and with regard to which there are doubts even iu the minds of ordinary people.
81-53. Since there can be no processes on mere verbal non-accept- ance, therefore it is only the assertions of such facts as are known by both parties to be false that can be accepted as fallacies in au argument. | Any other reason will have to be accepted as ए811त, 11 the other party proves it to be so (to impartial umpires) ; bnt incase that the invalidity of the Reason be proved by the first party, it will constitute a discre- pancy in the argument of the other disputant.
83-85. The two causes of a fallacious Reason, Doubt and Contra- diction, are set aside by the mention of ^ Jnitasambandhah.” For only three are the grounds of Doubt, or uncertainty ; (1) when the Middle Term exists in the Major Term as well as in 108 contradictory, (2) when it does not exist in either (existing only in the Minor Term), and (3) A case where in one member (of the conclusion, either the Major or the Minor Term) exist two contradictory attributes.
85-86. In the case of such Major Terms (predicates of the conclu- sion) as ** eternal” “not arising from an effort,” “caused by effort,’ and ° eternal,”’—such Reasons, (respectively) as ‘‘ kuowable,” non-eternal,”
19.380 It is only as related to the Middle Term, and thereby forming the Minor Premiss, that the Middle Term can be accepted as such.
81-83 This is to gaard against such unreasonable disputants as would bring forward the fact of their own non-acceptance of the Reason, 28 an argument against all that they may fiod to be going against themselves. By this safegaard, the dispatants can briog forward ouly such factsas are universally recognised as forming part of the theory that they may be upbolding.
83.85 (1) isa case of ‘‘ Sédhdrana”’ (2) that of “ Asdédhdrana” aud (3) that of Virud- dhavyabhicar?.
86.88 The first syllogism is: ‘* Word is eternal, becanse it is kaowable;” bnt know- ability exists ia eternal objects, like the Soul, &o., and also in non-eternal objects, like the jar, &९., and thus it is Sédharana (or Common, Too Wide). The second syllogism ig thus: ^ Wordis not caused by an effort, because it isnon-eternal ;” bat here, non- eternality is such as is found in the jar as well asin the Lightning, the former of which is brought abont by the effort of the potter, while the latter is not caused by any effort. The third syllogism is this : ‘‘ Word arises from effort, because it is non-eteraal 5 ” in this too we have the same fallacy as in the last. The fourth syllogism is: ^ Word is eternal because it is immaterial,” where too immateriality is sucb as is found in eternal things like Space, &c., and also in non-eternal things, like Action, &e,
25
194 CLOKAVARTIKA.
‘“non-eternal,” and “ not endowed with aform”’ (Immaterial), are com- mon to both (the Major Term and its contradictory). [ “ Non-eternality ” has to be taken twice in the former half].
86-87. Inthe case of the argument “earth is eternal, because it is endued with smell,” we have an “° uncommon” Middle Term ;and it is a cause of uncertainty inasmuch as it is wanting in one of the grounds of certainty.
87-89. The ‘“‘ common” Middle Term too isa cause of doubt, inasmuch as it is found to give rise to a dual notion (those of the Major Term as well as its contradictory), and because two contradictory notions cannot belong to the same subject. So 8180 in the case of the ^ uncommon,” wherever (either in the Major Term or its contradictory) it does not exist, by means of the negation of that, it would point to the contradiction of the negation of both ; and as such it would become a cause of doubt,
89-91. The fact of these being causes of doubt, refers only to certain particular objects, because with reference to certain other objects these are found to lead to certain definite conclusions, through negative and affirmative concomitance,—as for instance, in the case of proving ‘‘ absence of action ” by “‘ immateriality,” and in that of the ‘“ presence of smell” being ascertained in a certain particular form of earth ; and such Reasons
88.87 Since ‘ Odour” resides in the Earth alone. The grouads of certainty are : (1) “ Existence of a substrate other the Minor Term,” (2) ‘ Non-existence in any place where the absence of the Major Term has been ascertained.” In the ‘ Commca ” or ‘Too Wide” Reason, though the former grouud is present, the latteris oot; while in the ‘‘ Uacommon,” we have the latter, and not the former.
87.89 The “ Uncommon” has been called the caase of oncertainty, in accordance with the Bauddha theory ; and the Vsrtika hasia another place, negatived the fact. The ^ Common ” isa cause of donbt, not because it leads to a false conclusion, 111६ because such a Middle Term cannot rightly lead te any conclusion at 211. The fact is that siece it is seen in both, it leads to the remembrance of both its substrate ; and the remembraace of two mutaally contradictory sabjeots bara the dae ascertainment of either, acd as such becomes a canse of donbt. While in the case of the “ ancom- men,” it 18 found in no other place save the Minor Term,—i.e., neither inthe Major Term nor in its contradictory,—and so brings about the idea of neither ; and as such, it ९१०००४५ be said te be a cause of doubt.
89.91 In the case of the proving of ^ eternality,”’ the reason of Immateriality 18 one that exists in शला things as Action, &c., which are non-eternal; hence the Rea- gon does not serve to preclude such things as ^ whereia the absence of the Major Term has been ascertained ;” and as euch, it becomes a canse of doabt ; when however we proceed to prove *‘ abseuce of action,’’ the reasoa of Immaterality becomes sach 88 is not found in anything that has any action; aud as such we have the negation of the absence of the coatradictory of the Major Term; and henceit leads to ५ definite con- clusion. Inthe same manner, the presence of “Odour '' gives rise to a doaht, when “ Marth’? is made the Minor Term : but when a certain partioular form of “ Earth ” (the jar, f.i.) is the Mioor Term, then, inasmuch as we have the affirmative concomi- tance of the presence of Odour 16 other particular forms of Earth, it gives rise to a definite conclusion.
INFERENCE. 195
serve the purpose (of proving certain conclusions with regard to another particular form of earth).
91-92, Where the non-perceptibility of air is sought to be proved by the absence of shape—we get at the ideaof the perceptibility of Air from the fact of its being felt by tonch; and in this case, we have the concomitance of contradictions ( Perceptibility and Imperceptibility).
92-93. Some people call this “ Jatyantara.” Others again call it ‘common ” in parts, or “uncommon” in its totality.
93-94, When the conclusion of a certain argument is negatived by the aforesaid means of right notion (Sense-perception, &c.),—then from the refutation of this argument, we have a definite conclusion (based on the arguments whereby it has been ncgatived), because this latter itself has not been negatived.
94-96. Sometimes, two Reasons though giving rise to Doubt, when taken separately, each by itself, yet on being combined, lead to a de- finite conclusion (as in the case of proving a certain object to be a post) we have the terms “ Vertical height” and “ presence of crows.” Two such reasons, as are not mutually contradictory, are able to lead toa definite conclusion, both severally as well as collectively. Therefore it is only snch Reasons taken severally as are mutnally contradictory that have been de- clared above to be canses of uncertainty.
96, The contradictory character (Virnddhata) of the Middle Term has been said to be six-fold, four-fold, or one only (by different theorists).
97. When the conclusion—either the directly expressed or the one implied—is negatived by the Reason, (then we have its contradictory). In the case of the proving of ‘ eternality’ by ‘ causedness,’ we have the contradictory character of the Reason based on the contradiction of the predicate of the conclusion (because ‘ cansedness’ is opposed to ‘ eterna- lity’).
98-100. We have the contradiction of a particnlar form of the
92.98 When one of the two contradictories exist, in parts,in the ^“ Sapaksha” and the “ Vipaksha,” it is a case of the “Common ;’’ and when both of them do not exist anywhere in common, then we have the “ Uncommon.”
94.95 Simply Vertical Height by itself is not able toascertain whether a certain object is a post or a man; 80 also the mere fact of the presence of the crow is not enough for the ascertainment of the post, But when the facts are taken together, then they lead to the definite conolnsion thatit is a post. “ Not mutnally contradictory, &.”— such as the presence of smoke, and that of a smell arising from burning—both of which lead to the conclusion as to the presence of Fire.
$7 Contradiction of the Predicate.
98.100 “ Tmplied conelosion”—because when a word has heen ascertained to have its purpose of signification satisfied, with reference to its shape, then there is no far- ther necessity of admitting any other signification. ^ Cannot have its signification, Se.” —thns the fact of the shape of the word having a meaning becomes contradicted by the reason, “ preseace of affix,” which proves the presence of meanings other than the
—-
196 GLOKAVARTIKA.
predicate (Major Term) when we havean argument such as—‘“ the shape of a word has a meaning even before the ascertainment of its connection with its recognised meaning,—because it has an affix,—as after (the ascertain- ment of its recognised meaning).” In this case, the implied conclusion is that a word has its meaning restricted to its shape; while ^^ afterwards,” the word with an affix is found to havea meaning other than the shape; therefore even before the recognition of such signification, the word cannot have its signification apply to its shape.
100-102. In the case of such arguments as—‘‘ Samavaya (Inference) is distinct from Substance, &c.,—because with regard to it we have tlie notion that ‘ it is here,’—as for instance, ‘ conjunction ° (Samyoga) in such cases as ‘this jar is here’ ’’—-we have the proof of the ^" absence of Samavaya”’ in the shape of “ Conjunction” (Samyoga). Thus in this case we have a Reason directly contradicting the form of the subject (^ Samavdya”’).
102-103. In proving the unity of ‘‘ Samavdya,” like ^ Satta” (earstence), we will have the contradiction of a particular property (unity) of the Subject ; because, like ‘‘ Samyoga” we have a diversity (of ^ Samavayas’’ ).
103-104. When one is proving to the Sautrantika the fact of the eternal existence of the Self, by reason of its being impartite, like the Akaca,—we have the contradiction of the forms of both (Subject and Predicate).
104-105. There is contradiction of the specific characters of both (Subject and Predicate) when there is such an argument as—“ The eye, &c., are for auother’s (Soul’s) purpose because they are made up of a coglomer- ation of parts, like a bed, &c.”
105-106. In the ^“ bed’’ we always have ^ coglomeration ” and “ the being for another's purpose,” where both are with regard to material objects ; aud hence by this example (of a bed) we cannot prove “the being for another’s purpose ” with regard to the Soul or Self (which is imma- terial) ; and thus we have a contradiction.
106-107. Whatis sought to prove is the fact of ( “eye, &c.,”) being for the purpose of an impartite (Soul or Self). While, what tie argument proves is the material (or partite) character of the Soul. And further,
shape which is the contradiction of a particular property of the Predicate: viz., the fact of the shape of words having meanings.
100.108 The contradiction of the form of the Subject of the conclasion (Minor Term). The reason here assigned as proving the existence of the “ Samyoga ” is found to prove ८ Samyoga ” which is not Samavdya.
103.104 Because to the Sautrdntika, the Akdca is nothing more thsn the “ absence of oovering;” Akaga being a mere non-entity, there can be no ohance of its eternality. Thus then, by means of the same example, the Reason (tmpartitenesa) would negative the form, as well as the eternality of the Self,—in a ९०86 where the former is the Sub- jeot and the latter the Predioate of the conolusion.
106.107 “ Setf-consciousness.”—In the Bed, the coglomeration is such as is invariably concomitant with gross materiality, which is devoid of all taint of the evolution of
iNFERENGH. 197
there would be another unwished for conclusion—viz., the fact of the ‘ eye,’ &c., not being the evolutions of ^ Self-consciousness.”’
107-108. The instances of the similarity and dissimilarity of the Predicate (Major Term) are cited with a view to describe the invariable concomitance of the Reason with the Predicate.
108-109. And it is with refereuce to the Reason that the Major Term is predicated. It is the “ Dharma” whieh is the pervaded Subject, and the pervader is the other (४.९.) the “ Dharmi”’).
109-110. The characteristics of the Subject are—(1l) the mention beginning with “ which,” and (2) mention previous (to that of the Predi- cate) ; and those of the Predicate are (1) mention by “that,” and (2) “ eva ”’ (definite).
110-111. As a matter of fact,a word denotes its meaning, indepen- dently of the wish of the speaker ; and the fact of such meanings being the causes of the conclusion depends upon the power of invariable con- comitance alone.
111-114. Hence when, not knowing this (peculiarity of Invariable concomitance), the speaker wishes to laydown mere assoczation (of the Reason with the Major Term), or when by mere perversity of his attacli- ment to a contrary conclusion, he does not lay down the invariable conco- maitance of the Reason, or even when desiring to make a mention of it, he does not use the proper words suited to that purpose, eg, ‘in the jar exist causedness and destructibility”’ or “ the destructible is invariably con- comitant with the caused,’—then in such cases the character of the Reason would belong not to what is desired to be so, but to something else which is altogether undesirable as the Reason. Therefore that which is meant to be the Reason must be mentioned, as being ०८८५१६८ conco- mitant (with the Major Term). self-consciousness. Thus then, the Reason—the presence of a coglomeration of parts— would come to prove, thongh example of the Bed, that the eye, &c., have nothing to do _ with the evolutions of Self-consciousness—a conclusion not quite palatable to the Sarikhya.
101 With this begins the consideration of the discrepancies of exemplification.
108.105 In the syllogism, ^^ non-eternal, becanse caused,’? ‘‘causedness” is the Reason, and “ non-eternality ” the Major Term ; and the example in its snpport is —‘‘ what-
ever is caused is non-eternal, as the jay,” where ‘‘ whatever is caused”? 18 the Subject and ** non-eternal ” the Predicate.
110.11! A consideration of the Subject and the Predicate is necessary, inasmuch as 16 is on the expressive power of words alone that the denotation of meanings depends : and only such meaniogs or Objects can be used as Reasons in an argnment, as are fonnd to be invariably concomitant with the Major Term.
111-11४ “ Lay down mere association, §’c.,” e.g., “ Word is non-eternal, becanse it is caused, (for instance) in a jar,‘ destructibility, is causedness. “ Contrary conclusion, J§'c., &c., &c., &९.; not suited, &c.’’—for example, ^ Destrnetibility is concomitant with caused- ness.” Wheu soch 18 the case, then catsedness ceases to be the Reason, the character whereof passes over to Destructibility. And for the purpose of precluding such false argunientations, a correct statement of an Instance is necessary.
198 CLOKAVARTIKA,
114-116. Even when the reasoning is correctly laid down, the sen- tence fails to give the desired meaning rightly, on account of the absence (in the Instance) of —(1) the Major Term, (2) or the Middle Term, (3) or both the Major and the Middle Terms, or (4) invariable concomitance,—e.g., “Sound is eternal, because it is shapeless,—like (1) action, (2) atom, (3) a jar, and (4) Akaca.” And to one who denies the existence of this last (Akaca) (apart from a mere negation), the Minor Term (Sound) itself becomes a non-entity ; and thereby too the Instance fails in its purpose.
117. Even if the positive existence of Akaca be admitted, thongh it is mentioned as endowed with both eternality and shapelessness ; yet finding, in the case of Action and the like, shapelessness not concomitant with eternality, we can have no invariable concomitance of the Reason,—hence the preclusion of the argnment.
118-121. When by invariable concomitance, (affirmative instance of) similarity has been mentioned, the mention of an instance of Dissimi- larity is not required. (1) When, even on the mention of the instance of similarity, the questioner, having his mind turned to mere association, does not notice the invariable concomitance ; or (2) when he does not even look for instances of similarity; or (3) when the speaker himself mentions only simple association, or (4) when there is contradictory affirmation; then (in such contingencies), with a view to counteract these, our end is accomplished by ( an instance of) dissimilarity, wich serves to remove all preconceived notions to the contrary. And in this, the ^ Reason ” is helped, to a certain degree, by the aforesaid ^“ mere association.”
121-122. The relation of invariable concomitance (of the pervader and the pervaded), subsisting between the negatives of any two entities, is found to be exactly the reverse of that subsisting between the entities themselves.
122-124. For instance, the existence of “smoke” being invariably concomitant with that of ‘* Fire” the absence of “ fire” would be precluded
114.116 (I) In the argument “Sonnd is Eternal, because it is shapeless, like Action,” the instance—Action—is devoid of eternality (Major Term). (2) If Atom be the Instance, then we have an instance that is devoid of the Middle Term; as an Atom is not shapeless. (8) If jar be the Instance, then inssmuch as the jar is neither shape- leas nor Eternal we will have an absence of the Major and the Middle Terms. (4) If Akaga be instaneed, then we have a total failure of invariable concomitance itself ; since the Sautrdntika holds the Ak&ga to be nothing more than a negation of covering; and so by citing Ak&ca as the Instance, we make the Minor Term, ^ Sound,” a non-entity; and thence the premisses themselves fall to the ground entirely. The failure of Invariable Cencomitance is farther shown in K. 117,
18.181 With this begins the consideration of Instances of Dissimilarity.
122.124 Positive: ‘‘ Wherever there is smoke, there is fire—ie., there can be no smoke witbout fire.’ Negative: “ Wherever there is no fire there is ne smoke,—i.e., all cases of absence of fire are pervaded by cases of absence of smoke” In the former ‘¢Smoke” is the concomitant of “fire”; while on the latter, “the absence of fire”’ is the concomitant of tho “ absence of smoke,”
INFERENCE, 199
from that (“‘ smoke’), and would co-exist with the absence of ‘ smoke,” and thus become the invariable concomitant of this latter (non-smoke). Con- versely the “ absence of Fire” being invariably concomitant with ‘absence of smoke,” “smoke” would be precluded from ‘absence of Fire” ; and thus having 10 room anywhere else, it would become the invariable concomi- tant of ^ Fire.”
124-125. When “existence” and ‘“‘absence” are both mentioned (in the instance of dissimilarity) as being the pervader (vyapaka), then we can not assert the preclusion of the ^ Vipaksha ” absence of Fire, which is the ascertained substrate of the absence (of the Major Term), from the “ per- vaded ” (smoke).
125-127, Therefore when the existence of fire is sought to be proved by the presence of smoke,—it is always proper to assert the ^“ absence of Fire” to be the invariable concomitant of the ^ absence of smoke,” and not otherwise. (Because) when there is (assertion of) mere association, or when there is contradiction of the premisses,—then either the matter in question is 106 helped, or something quite to the contrary comes to be proved by it.
127-128. (Noris the matter in question helped) when the meaning (of the instance) is devoid of both together or one by one, eg., ^ That which is non-eternal has shapo, as ‘ atom,’ ‘ Conception,’ and ‘ Akaca,’”
128-129. For the accomplishment of the invariable concomitance (of the Middle Term) with the Major Term, we have the assertion of the
124.185 When, in the instance of Dissimilarity, the Vy¢paka is the negation of that which is the Vydpaka in the original argument—i.e., in the case of the proposition ‘“where smoke is, fire is”—if, in the instance be asserted the proposition that ^^ where there is absence of fire there is absence of smoke,” then we cannot get at the preclasion of the “‘absence of fire” from + smoke,”’—i.e., we cannot have the proposition that ‘‘ where fire is not, smoke is 1101."
126.27 ^ It is always, &c.’’—It is necessary to assert that ‘‘ where fire is not, smoke 18 not,’’
127.28 ‘‘ Both’’—i.e., the negation of the Reason, and the negation of the Major Term. Inthe case of the argument ‘‘Sound is eternal becanse it is shapeless,” if, as an instance of dissimilarity, be cited the proposition that “that which is not eternal is also not shapeless, as an atom "'—we have the instance devoid of the negation of the Major Term; inasmuch as the atom being eternal, it is impossible to speak of its absence. If ^ Conception "° were cited as the instance, then we would have the instance devoid of the negation of the Reason; because Conceptions being shapeless, it is im- possihle to assert the absence of shapelessness with regard to it. The instance of & 1६5९४ would be devoid of the negation of both the Reason and the Major Terms; inasmuch as the Akica being both eternal and shapeless, it would be impossible to assert the absence, either of eternality, or of shapelessness with regard to it.
128.49 With this begins the oonsideration of the Fallacy of Deficient Premisses—Lit, Deficiency of invariable concomitance. When snch is the case, the premisses them- selves become impossible, and hence there is no need of citing any instance of dissimi- larity ; for in the absence of the premisses themselves, no amoynt of instances could help us to arrive at the correct conclusion,
200 CLOKAVARTIKA.
negative relation (of the Middle Term with the negation of the Major Term). For one whi is not cognisant with this (negative relation), the Middle Term is not invariably concomitant with the Major Term (7.e., he can have no Major premiss).
129-130. Therefore even where association 1s perceived, we caunot have all objects of the class as the predicate (of the conclusion) ; because mere association is no relation, and by itself 1४ cannot constitute invari- able concomitance.
130-131. (As for example) though the “ jar” is accepted as endowed with shupe and non-cternality, yet it cannot be accepted as the instance, because, in the case of ‘* Action,” &c., we find that there is no invariable concomitance (between the presence of shape and non-eternality).
131-1382. Though with reference to Inference a negative Instance is required in the argument,—(1) because of its being accepted by all (both parties, the Bauddha and the Mimansaka), and (2) becanse of the non-percep- tion (of a certain thing) being much easier,—yet this fact alone is not able to preclude (affirmative Instances) from forming a part of an Inferential argn- ment, reasons for which will be detailed in the section on ** Words ” (in considering ^“ Apoha’”).
133. There would be no chance of tle comprehension of negations, because there is no invariable concomitance among them. And since there is such a thing as ^ Samanya “ (class, generality, homogenity) among objects, therefore we could comprehend, in tliis, an invariable concomitance (of the particulars).
134. Some people hold that even after a general affirmative instance has been cited, it is equally necessary to state a negative instance, for the purpose of a definite preclusion (of piopositions contrary to the Premisses).
135. ^“ When (the invariable concomitance) of the Middle Term in the Major Term has been ascertained by means of the affirmative instance, it implies the preclusion (of the Middle Term) from every other
129.50 In the case of the instance, “ That which ie not eternal is not shapeless as the jar, S’c.”—we can lay our hands upon the association of the two negations in certain cases; bnt even then the instance will not suffice to prove the eternality of everything (of Sound, f.i.) by reason of shapelessness; inasmach as though some shapeless things, ag Akaca—are eternal, yet there are shapelesa things—Aotions f.i.—that are not eternal.
130.31 Because Action is shapeless and yet non-eternal.
131.82 The Bauddhas hold that it is only the negative instance that has te be brought forward and not an affirmative one. In an affirmative instance, they urge, it is extremely difficnlt to get at any general proposition—snch as “ all cases of exiatence of smoke are accompanied by oases of presence of fire.” In fact it is impossible to have any idea of ‘all smoke”—past, present and future. On the other hand, all negative propositions are easily comprehended.
188 That there 18 such a thing as “Siminya” will be proved in the section of ^ Akyti.” And when there is ench a thing, the difficulty of the comprehension of the goneral affirmative proposition vanishes,
0.1 :1.121.10110 201
thing (which is an absurdity generally); therefore (a negative instance) serves the purpose of restrioting the preclusion to a definite object (the absence of tle Major Term).”
136. This has not much significance because this is already implied in the mention of the Minor Term (in the conclusion) as it is only the negation of the pervader from which the pervaded is always precluded.
137. It 18 for this reason that when the whzteness of cloth 28 asserted, there is a preclusion only of such propetties as are contrary to ^ whiteness,” and not of others, like “length,” &c. Wo could apply the same law to the case in question.
138. ^“ The double form of Inference is not possible ; because just as the relation of five and smoke is known by Sense-perception, so also is that of motion and approach (so both are of the same kind).
139. “Ifit be urged that these (motion and approach} are not cog- nised by Sense-perception in the case of the sun, then (we reply that) nor (28 the existence of fire and smoke) cognised (by Sense-perception) in the place before us (the Mountain). If it be urged that the concomitance of fire and smoke has been so cognised elsewhere (in the culinary hearth), then (we urge) in the case in question also, we cognise (the concomitance of motion and approach) in Dévadatta, by means of Sense-perception.
140, “If itbe urged that (in the case of the sun) there is the necessity of another substrate of the Middle Term, and in this lies its character of being the SGmdnyatodrshta Inference,—then (we urge), the same case holds with ‘ Fire and Smoke.’ ”’
140-142. Hence (in order to meet the above objections) that alone should be called a case of ^“ Sense-perceived relation,” where it so happens that 10 the case of two particular forms of objects—such as the ‘fire’
186 The expression, “the mountain is fiery’ is meant to preclude the negation of fire alone. That ‘fire existe ’’ does not necessarily mean that the fire alone ewists; hut simply that the fire itaelf exists,
188 Thia Karika heging a series of objections to the following passage of the Bha- shya. “Tat tu dwividham, pratyakshato-drishtasambandham samanyatodrishtasamban- dhanca, tatra pratyakshatodrishtasumbandham yathaé dhimalkrtidargandt agnydkrtivijnénam, samanyatodrishtusambandham yathd Dévadattasya gatipirvakan degantarapraptimupaluk- shya a&dityagatismaranam.”
189 That is to say, then too, the two inferences cited cannot but helong to the same class.
140 The meaning is that if the upholder of the Douhle Theory asserts that he has perceived the concomitance of motion and approach to a new place, in the case of Deva- datta, and accordingly he infers (from the special case noticed hefore) the concomitance . of motion in general with approach in general, and then refers back this general conclu- sion to the particular oase of the Sun, which latter inference thua comes to have the character of the Sémanyatodrishta Inference ;—the Bauddha would retort that the same way he said with regard to such cases as have been cited as instances of the Pratyakshatodristhta Inference.
26
202 CLOKAVARTIKA.
produced by burning dried cowdung and the ‘ smoke’ issuing from that partc- cular fire—there is recognition of particulars alone; and then subsequently even when the observer has gone to another place, he happens to recog- nise the existence of “ fire’? by means of (a remembrance of) the parti- cular * smoke ’ noticed before.
142-143. On account of his former cognition (of the concomitance of ‘Fire’ and ‘Smoke’) such a person suspects the existence of ‘ fire’ whenever he sees any ‘smoke,’ and finds (on inspection) that in every case, (1118 suspicion is justified and) ‘fire’ does exist. The frequent repe- tition (of such suspicion and its subsequent verification) gives rise to a definite general premtiss (that ‘the existence of smoke is always accom- panied by the existence of fire’), It is the cognition of such particular relations that has been laid down by Vindhyavasin.
144, Since the relationship of the Minor and Major Terms rests in the class, throngh some specification of it, therefore the particular form 1s not mentioned (in the Bhashya).
145. Though ‘fire’ and ‘smoke’ (other thau the particular forms of these forming the subject of the argument) may be cited as forming an example of a ^^ Samanyatodrshta” Inference, yet the example of the ‘sun’ has been cited here, with a view to pure ^^ Sdmanyatodrslhita.”
146. The fact of “Samanya ” being an object of Sense-perception, has already been proved, and hence it is that the ^ Samanya ” comes to be recognised asan entity. And now we lay down reasons (inferential) 111 sup- port of both these facts (४.९. the fact of ^ Samanya” being a distinct entity, and its amenability to Sense-perception).
147. The inference of ‘ Fire’ from “ Smoke ” has a distinct entity for its object,—because it is a means of right notion other than negation,— like anditory coguition with regard to such objects as are amenable to, and in close proximity with, the particular Sense-organ.
1*५ The Karika anticipates the objection that if the example just cited is based upon the cognition of a particular form, why does the Bhishya mention the word “ Akrti” (Class) 7 The sense of the reply is that though the instance cited is that of a particular fire, yet it has been cited with a view to the class (*' Fire’’), in which the parti- cular fire is contained.
196 Thongh the example of another Fire, &c., would do well enongh ; yet the case of these is intermixed with the Pratyakshatodrshta, which aspeot it generally bears in ordinary parlance. While in the caso of the Snn, we have an example of the pure Samanyatodrshta, unmixed with any apparent finge of the Pratyakshatodrshta.
146 This is levelled against those who deny the ‘“‘Samanya’ asan entity. In the section on Sense-perception, the Samanya” has been proved to be a distinct entity in the section on ^" Akrti.”
147 For instance, any cognition of Sound, produced by the organ of andition, has got, for its object, a distinct entity, Sound, The same may be said with regard to Inference also. This argnment is aimed against those Bauddhas who deny the faot of any Inference having 8 distinet entity forits object. “ Amenable ’ and “in 01086 proxi- mity,”’ &., have been added, in order to preclude all chance of mistake,
INFERENCE. 203
148. ‘Samainya isa distinct entity,’ and is amenable to Sense- perception,—because it is a cognisable object other than negation,—like the specific character of an object.
149-153. (1) Since there can be no Inference without the Middle Term, and (2) since no one accepts as the Middle Term anything other than the ‘Samanya,’ and (3) since no uncognised Middle Term can lead to anything,—therefore for one, (the Bauddba), who admits of no ‘Saminya ’ apart from the Inference, there is no other way (out of the aforesaid threefold difficulty) except having recourse to an Inference (for the purpose of having a recognition of a‘Samanya’ to be utilised in another Inference). But this Inference too could only be brought about hy a Middle Term associated with the notion ofa‘ Simanya’; and this (Middle Term, ‘ Samanya’) too, heing only an object of Inference, could he conceived of only by means of another Middle Term through an inferential argu- ment, and soon. If such be the course of assumptions, then, there being an endless series of Major and Minor Terms, Middle Terms and Inferences with regard to a single object (‘‘ Samanya’’), even thousands of sons would not suffice for the recognition of a number of objects (by means of Inference).
154. “Even if the Middle Term he a Samdnya we could have 168 cog- nition from something else.’ If this be urged, then (we ask)—lIs this ‘something else’ a correct means of right notion? or is it purely {2186 ? If the former, then form the same source you could also have the cognition of the Major and Minor Terms also.
155. And thus you would have the complete annihilation of Inference itself ; inasmuch as the idea of ‘ Samanya’ would be got at by means of other proofs (and that of particular forms 18 of course due to Seuse- perception).
156. If (however you stick to the second alternative, then), the idea, of the Major and Minor ‘lerms, arrived at through a Middle Term recog- nised by means of an incorrect means of knowledge, would always be a false one,—like the notion of ‘ fire’ derived from the perception of ‘ fog.’
157. ^ But just as the Remembrance (of the relation between the
164 The Banddha adds: “ We have the notion of the specific character of an ohject by Sense-perception; and this gives rise to the specification of the particular object ; and it is this specification that appears to have the character of Sense-perception, (thonght in reality it is not. so). And from this specification we can have the notion of a Middle Term, even if it be of the nature of your Samanya.”
From the same source, §'c. ‘“‘The Bauddha does not admit of any proofs besides Inference and Sense-perception.’”’ If that ‘‘something olse’’ be dependent upon the contact of the senses, it becomes Sense-perception, pure and simple; if not, then we could arrive at the notions of the Saémanya of the Major and Minor Terms exactly in the same way as that of the Middle Term.
167 That is to say, just asa Remembrance, which is not a proof, brings about true cognition of Major and Minor Terms; so 8180 the notiou of the Middle Term, though
204 CLOKAVARTIEA.
various terms), though in itself not a correct means of knowledge, becomes the means of arriving at the correct notion of the Major and Minor Terms ; so would also the notion of the Middle Term (be a means of arriving at a correct inference ).”
158. There (in the case of Remembrance), to the previous cognition (which is the origin of the Remembrance) belongs the character of a correct meaus of knowledge; and the purpose of Remembrance lies in the mere recalling of that previous cognition.
159. For the comprehension of the Middle Term, no means (of know- ledge) is possible ; and in the absence thereof, Remembrance can in no way apply in this case.
160. If anyone urges that the comprehension of the specification of an object has the character of ‘ Remembrance,’ inasmuch it is not different (from the comprehension of the specific character of an object, which, in the opinion of the Bauddha, isa matter of Sense-perception) ;—then vorily, such a person will also have the power of having a Remembrance of the son of a barren woman !
161. Nor can the specific character of an object be the cause of the cognition of its ‘‘Samanya”’; because we have never perceived any invari- able concomitance of the former with the latter.
162. And, further, the comprehension of the relation (of concomitance) of the specific character would make this character a ‘Samanya,’ hke ‘“cansedness”’ ; specially as no unique (specific, asadhdrana) object exists, or has ever existed before.
163. Nor can the character of a Middle Term belong to one which (like the specific character of an object) is devoid of specification and (hence) unnameable,—without previous recognition.
164, Even such particular properties as are specified cannot become
itself not true (ae having its origin in a falae meaus of knowledge) could bring abont a oorrect Inference.
\68 The true character of the proof of Remembrance 18 denied, only 0608786 it refers only to suoh objects as bave already been recognised. Though it is unable to have au independent objeot of ite own, yet it owes its origin to च correot recognition of a real object, at some previous time; and when it succeeds in recalling that object correotly, it becomes a oorrect means of knowledge. Hence the similarity cited in the last Karika does not hold good ; and the position of the Banddha remains ae weak 86 ever.
161 The cognition of the speocifio character of an objeot is not always accompanied by that of the “Ssmanya”’ or olass to which it belongs. Therefore the truth of the former cannot helong to the latter.
168 The specific character of an object could prodace a notion of the Samanya, ouly if it could be the Middle Term; but thie it cannot be; because of the epeoifio obaracter of an object, no relation oan be asserted. If any relationship be asserted, then it would become # ^" Samanya,’’ like ^ Krtakatwa.”
16% When specified properties canaoot form the Middle Term, without beiug related, bow can nnspecified entities be 80 ? If neither the specific object nor the Saménya be the Middle Term, then the Ideas oannot be so; becaase of their beiag unrelated,
INFERENCE. 205
the Middle Term, unless they are related (to something else). And for the same reason even the idea of these (unrelated) entities cannot be the Middle Term.
165. And if the Middle Term be accepted to be of the form of a ‘Samanya,’ then you have the same endless series (K. 149-153). If any relation perceived in connection with something else (be admitted as giving rise to the Inference of a ‘ Sima@nya,’ other than the one with reference to which the relation has been cognised) then any and everything will give rise to the cognition of anything (there being no restricting agency).
166. The recognition of the relationship of the Major and Minor Terms ought surely to be looked for (in all cases of Inference). But, prior to the action of Inference, the Bauddha can have no idea of it.
167. Nor isa knowledge of the Middle Term possible, through mere impression (Vasana); for (in that case) the cognition of the Major and Minor Terms too would be arrived at in the same manner, and not through the three-membered argument (in the form of an inferential syllogism).
168. Where the Middle Term is a negative one, 1४ cannot be an object of Inference, since it is amenable ta other means of knowledge (Sense- perception) ; hence the aforesaid discrepancy does not apply to it.
169. One, to whom cognition of the Major and Minor Terms arises from a Middle Term, which is cognised by Sense-perception,—for such a one, there is nothing more to be desired.
170. Even ina case where the cognition of the Major and Minor Terms is due to an inferred Middle Term,—the first Middle Term must be one that has been cognised by Sense-perception.
171. In (such Middle Terms as) ‘“causedness ” and the like, the character of the Middle Term belongs either to the action (of being cansed) or to the agent (the ‘ potter’ 1.1. } ; and both of these being amenable to Sense-perception we have not to look for them (for the accomplishment of the cognition of the Middle Term).
172. Similarly Verbal Testimony and Analogy, &c., being based on “Samanya,” any discrepancy in the cognition of it (““Saminya”’) causes discrepancy in all of them.
173. Thus then, forall the means of right knowledge, it is necessary
166 There can be no recognition of any relationship between unrecognised Sadmanyas of the Middle Term and the Major and Minor Terms; and these Sadmanyas cannot, in your opinion, be cognised without Inference. Therefore there is the same endless series of Inferences as pointed out iu Karikas 149-153.
168 If negation were not amenable to Sense-perception, and if it were an object of Inference, then the cognition of one negation wonld depend npon that of another and 80 on, ad infinitum $ 80 the aforesaid fanlt of endlessness would apply here also.
170 That is to say, the Inference of the Middle Term (of the argument in question) must have a Middle Term that has been cognised by Sense-perception.
206 CLOKAVARTIKA.,
to be preceded by Sense-perception. And “Samanya” must be amenable to Sense-perception; since there would be no other means of cognising it.
174. Or else, how could even a particular object, (cow, f.i.), be said to be amenable to Sense-perception, when in comparison to other objects (2.e., its own constitnent parts), it is also said to be a “ Samanya.”
175-176. For instance, colour, &c.,’ are all ^“ Samanya” in comparison with “ Blue, Red, &c.” ; these latter again have the character of ‘Samanya’ in comparison with particular forms of themselves (different forms of Blue, &c.); these particular forms again would be “Samanya;” s0 on and on, till we come to atoms; for the colour of evena binary compound is common to the two atoms composing it.
177. There is no process (of reasoning) based upon the final atom as a specific entity ; nor does amenability to Sense-perception belong to it, either singly, or in masses.
178. Those that are not cognised separately, cannot be comprehended as a whole either ; nor is it possible for distinct (atoms) to be the object of the cognition of non-difference.
179. And again, for the Bauddha there is no such thing as a concrete whole; and it is not possible always for all people to have their cognitions brought about by an object which is non-existing.
180. Then too, there can be no concrete whole without many indivi- duals belonging to the same class. Therefore even when these (atoms) form a concrete whole, their atomic character remains unaltered.
181. And thus itis proved that even in an invisible object (atom) you have a ^ Samanya ” (the class “ atom”). Because it 18 only in what we call a “ Simanya” that there is an idea extending over a number of homogenous objects, eveu if we do not hold them to form one concrete whole.
182. Just as we have the sensual comprehension of a “Samanya”
118 Inference of the rest are all based upon Senge-perception.
171 Then, says the Bauddha, we will have the final atom us a pnre particular entity, which could be amenable to Perception ; and this would form the hasis of 311 snbsequent Inferences, thus sailing clear of the rock of endlessness urged in K. 149 153. The Karika meets this assertion of the Banddha.
118 The objection is that that though atoms are not visible singly, Masses of them will be clearly visible, like masses of Sand. The Sense of the reply is that the grains of sand are such as are distinotly seen individually, which cannot be said of atoms.
८८ Nor is it, Ye.” Those that are distinct cannot be comprehended as identical.
179 The Banddha holds to the existence of parts and denies the existence of w whole constituted by these parts. Honce a collection of atoms, considered as one concrete whole, is not admitted by him; and henoe he cannot reasonably base all con- ceptions upon this non-entity.
182 This anticipates the following : “ We may havo sensnous perception of such ns avayavi (concrete whole ) ; but bow can there bo any such conception of the class cow as inhering in an individual cow?” The sonse of the roply is that the naturo of porcep- 110 18 identical in both these cases ; and so there can be uo difference.
ON WORDS. 207
that extends over ccrtain homogenous objects (as forming a concrete whole), so we would also have a similar perception of a ^ Samanya’”’ that inheres in each individual.
183. The Mimansakas, again, do not necessarily admit the existence of atoms; and so upon that ground you cannot postulate the falsity of a perceived eutity.
184. One, who would deny the visible concrete whole, by means of invisible atoms, wonld also assert the absence of the hare, through its horns !
189. It is only when the existence of a concrete whole is established as a fact, that the existence of atoms is postulated, and that simply aga means for the accomplishment of the idea of the whole.
186. Therefore an object is to be accepted, just as it is always per- ceived,—be it either as a ^“ Samanya” or otherwise (specific entity).
187. In comparison with the genus (Samanya) ^ Being,” the class ‘cow,’ comes to be accepted as a specific entity. Therefore one who holds the specific entity to be amenable to Sense-perception, need not deny the existence of the ‘Samanya’ (Genus).
188. If it be urged that “itis notas a genus (*‘ Samanya’) that a ‘Samanya’ is perceived by the Sense,’—then (we reply) Js there any such idea of any object perceived being a specific entity ? (The fact is that) whatever a person comprehends can be spoken of in both ways (te., as a class and as a specific entity).
Thus ends the chapter on Inference.
(Secrion 6.) ON WORDS. (VurbaL AtTHorIty.)
1. Obj. “ While treating of Sense-perception, &c., what should he laid down is the definition of Verbal Authority in general; how is it, then that the definition of Scripture has been put forward (in the Bhashya)
188 If the perception of atoms militate against the theory of concrete wholes, formed of these atoms, then we can safely say that the postulating of atoms 18 by no means » necessary element ia our theory. We admit of the atom, merely as a hypo- thesis to explain the existence and formation of concrete wholes.
183 Just as we do not always have a recegnition of the cow as a class ; So toe we do not always have the recognition of the anspecified specific entity. Hence, if the mere non-recognition of the Sémdnya as such be sufficient ground for denying its Sense-perceptibility, then, on the same ground we conld also deny the Sense- perceptibility of the unspecified specific entity (accepted by the Banddha). For these reasons, we conclude the fact to be that all that we perceive is perceived iua two-fold character—z.e., (1) an unspecified abstract idea of thing, and (2) the thing as belonging to a particular class, and endowed with certain properties.
1 Bhashya : “ Castram cabdavijnéndt asannikroté rthé vigndnam,”
208 CLOKAVARTIKA.
80 hurriedly—(t.e., without Verbal Authority in general having been defined) P
2. “To leave off the definition of the generic term and then to men- tion the definition of the specific term isa most absurd process; for this reason too the definition of Scripture should not have been given (now).
3. ^ The cognition of an object produced by the knowledge of words, mentioned without any specification, cannot be the definition of a parti- cular form of Verbal Authority (Scripture).
4. “*Seripture’ is the name given only to such ‘ words ’—either caused or eternal—as lead, either to the activity or to cessation from activity of certain human agents.
5. “If there be a description of the form of any (action), that too becomes ‘Scripture,’ inasmuch as it forms an integral part of the ‘ word,’ as leading to the activity or otherwise of the person addressed.
6. ‘Since it is only when the Bh&vand is praised (or decried) that there is activity or cessation from activity ; therefore itis to that alone that the name ‘ Scripture’ cau correctly belong, and not to mere words.”
7. Rep. The anthor of the Bhashya has got to explain the fact that the Means of Knowledge need not be examined; and itis only in the course of 11118 that he lays down the definitions of these; and so he does not chatter away about things that are not directly essential to his own Scripture (Veda).
8. If he were to lay down the definition of ‘word’ as occurring in ordiuary human parlance, it would not have served any purpose of one wishing to explain the Veda.
9. The definition of “ Sense-perception” has been given, because it is of use in the deciphering of letters, &c., at the time of learning the meaning of the Scripture.
10. Since it would have served no purpose to define such words as occur in ordinary parlance, as “ bring the cow,” &c., therefore the definition has been stated in a form snitable only to the ` words’ constituting the Scripture.
Il. Since there can be no specific term withont its corresponding generic term, therefore after having exemplified the specific, it is always easy to get at the definition of the generic term.
12. Hveu the generic form (the cognitions of objects by means of words) is here restricted to the specific form (Scripture) ; because of the peculiar context. It has already been laid down that ^ Codaua” (urging) -and “ Upadéga” (Hxhortation) are both (synonymous with) =^ Castra ” (Scripture).
6 e.g., ‘' Arthavada passages.”
¶ The definition of Word in general wonld not gorve any purpose of the Mimansaka,
19 “ Context. "Since the definition is given in the oourse of a cousideration of Codund, which is synonymous with Scripture,
ON WORDS. 209
13. Justas the word ‘“‘ Codana” refers to the ‘ Vedic codana ” alone, so the words “ the meaning of words” and “ cognition of objects” (occurring in the definition given in the Bhashya) refer to those occuring in the “ Scripture” only.
14. ^: Sense-perception and the rest” have been declared to be no proper subjects of enquiry; and since “Scripture’’ is included therein the fact of its being no subject for enquiry is implied in the same declar- ation.
15. The Bauddhas and the Vaicéshikas declare this (^ Verbal An- thority ’) to be included in “ Inference.” The Sankhyas hold the two to be distinct, but do not lay down any adequate grounds of difference.
16-17. They declare that the ground of Inference is that the speci- fication of sentences and final letters (of words) endowed with impressions of foregoing ones—and the desire to utter, are not found in the case of (the terms of an Inference) “ Smoke, &c.” But here they are encountered by a double fallacy: (1) “ Vaidharmyasama ” (the similarity of dissimilarity), and (2) “ Vikalpasama.” (The similarity of doubt). Even among In- ferences of such objects as ^° smoke,” ^ non-eternality,”’ “‘ Horned-ness, ” &c., there is a difference; but that does not make any difference in their com- mon character of ‘‘ Inference.”
18. So long as any discrepancy in the tripartite character (of In- ference) is not shown, one who would speak only of very slight points of difference, would become open to refutation.
19. (They urge that) ‘in the case of words we have cognitions in accordance with optional usage, which is not the case with smoke, d&c.”;
*
18 As the generic term ^ Codana”’ is restricted to the specific term Vedic “ Coda- na,’ so the genenic termin the given definition would refer to the specific term “ Scripture.”
16-17 “ Similarity of dissimilarity ”* The Bauddha argnes: “ Verbal Anthority is nothing but a case of Inference ; because it is brought about by affirmative and negative premises ; just like the idea of fire obtained from «a sight of the smoke. The Sankhya meets this by a counter-argument : ^ Smoke, &c., are devoid of any verbal specification which is present in Verbal Authority; and on acconnt of this vital difference between them, the two processes can never be identical.” This, however only serves as a counter-argament, and does not quite refute the Bauddha reasoning. “ Similarity of dowbt ”: Even the prodaction of cognition by means of affirmative and negative premises is, in part, devoid of verbal expression $ e.g., the cognition of fire from smoke $ while in certain cases it is accompanied by snch expression; as in the case of Verbal Authority. Thus one part becomes Inference, while the other does not. (For Vaidharamyasama and Vikalpasama, See Gautama’s Nyaya-Sutras). ‘That does not, Sc.’—The mere fact of the presence of a point of difference does not necessarily make them different in class.
19 Signs and gestures are understood to express something; and surely there 18 no articulate wtterance in this case, the meaning being comprehended hy means of pre-concerted signs.
27
wiC CLOKAVARTIKA.
but here also, we have Self-contradiction with reference to signs made by the different parts of the body.
20. Asa matter of fact, gestures of hands, &c., are capable of expressing correct meanings, when their meanings have been previously settled ; consequently these meanings come to serve as the middle terms (helping to arrive at a correct conclusion by means of Inference).
21. Inthe case of “dependence upon man” (as a ground of differ- ence) too, we have the same Self-contradiction ; for in that case, there would be no truth in words and Vedic sentences (none of which depend upon human option),
22-23. “The recognition of relation” (between words and their meanings, urged as a ground of difference) is also found to be peculiar to the case of the different forms of Inference: in the case of Verbal Authority the relationship depends upon human agency (the utterances of a trustworthy persou are true) ; that of ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’ rests upon (sameness of) place; and another case (that of the rise of the ocean- tide on a fullmoon night) rests upon (the peculiarity of) tume. In fact the fact of depending npon human agency is made, by the Bauddhas, a ground for asserting the non-difference of ‘“‘ Verbal testimony ” from In- ference—hasing their assertion upon the invariable concomitance between ‘trustworthy assertions” and ^ correct assertion.”
24, The difference of only a few such words as “apirva,’” aud the like (words whose relations are not perceived by any means save that of Verbal Authority, and which therefore cannot in any way form subjects of Inference) is not enough for asserting the difference of all (‘ Verbal testimony’); nor are these few words distingnished from such words as ‘ Horse, &c.,” because both have the common character of being words.
25. A word, whose relation (with objects and meaning) has not been recognised, cannot express anything. Therefore the absence of any relation (with regard to these few words) cannot serve to differentiate them from Inference,
26, Nor can a difference (between Verbal testimony and Inference) be asserted on the ground that in the former there 1s identity of form among ^ word,” ‘its meanang,’’ and the ^^ idea of these”; becanse this (identity) has been fully refuted (in the Chapter on Sense-perception),
22.23 The mere difference of the ground of expressiveness ig no sure sign of difference ; aa even in various oases of avowed Inference, the bagie of each Inference is peculiar to itself. ‘’ Basing their assertion, ¥c.”" The argument being: ‘ Trustworthy agsertion is true, beoauee it is in keeping with the real state of things.”
४6 Even euch words as “ Apirva”’ and the like etand it need of the cognition of certain relations, without which they cannot give any meaning. Thus then, if they have no relations, they cannot express any meaning ; and if they have relations, they booome included in Inference.
ON WORDS. 211
27. Witha view to the case of reflections (in the mirror), the argu- ment (based upon identity of form) becomes doubtful. A person under- stands his own face to be exactly like the reflection that he sees in the mirror; but that does not preclude this cognition from being a case of Inference.
28. Even if the cognition of the similarity of the face with its reflection be accepted to be a case of direct Sense-perception, we will find the argument contradicted by other instances; e.g., when from foot- prints in the sand, we infer the identity of the prints with the feet of persons that may have passed by that way.
29. By a single sentence uttered but once, there cannot he an indica- tion of many meanings (simultaneously) ; therefore the mere fact of a word expressing contradictory and non-contradictory meanings, cannot serve as a ground for asserting its difference (from Inference) ;
30. because (in the case of Inference {00} we find the same thing with regard to the Middle Term, both when it is a true Reason, and when itis not. Ifit be urged that “since there is contradiction, there can be no Inference,’—then, for the same reason, you too could have no Serip- ture (on account of the contradictory significations of words).
31. In whichsoever sentence we have only one meaning, there we cannot hut admit of an identity with Inference ; and certainly if a sentence is uttered only once, the meaning desired to be conveyed cannot but be one only.
32. The fact of the appearance of many ideas, as formiug the deno- tations of words whose meanings have not been ascertained, is present also in the case of such Middle Terms as are not very explicit (in their appli- cations) ; therefore that cannot form a ground of difference.
33. The non-mention of an Instance (in the case of “Verbal Testi- mony,” as a ground of its difference from Inference) is found to be too wide, inasmuch as it is found to be the case in (Inferences from) ‘ smoke,’ &c., where the Middle Term being too well known, the Instance is not cited.
27 The experience of common people is that they cannot see their own face directly, it is only its reflection that they perceive in the mirror ; and in the cage of the hand, &c., they find that the reflection in the mirror tallies exactly with what they see with the eye; aud from thie fact they infer that the face too mnst be exactly like the reflection in the mirror.
80 The perception of ‘smoke,’ proves—(1) the existence of fire, (2) its heat, (3) ite capacity to burn, and (4) origin from foel—all at one and the same time. 1018 18 the case when the Reason 18 valid. In the case of an invalid reason, also—e.g., ‘Sound is eternal, because it 18 caueed’——-we find that the argument as stated proves the eternality of Sound, while the same reacon, through well-ascertained invariable con- comitance also proves its non-eternal character. Therefore the mere fact of express- ing diverse and contradictory meanings cannot serve asa ground for asserting any absolute difference between Verbal Testimony and Inference.
89 ¢.7., when the presence of Smoke hag not 0667 quite ascertained.
83 “ Not cited ’—as ५180 in the case of Inferences employed for one’s own conviction,
212 QLOKAVARTIEA.
34, In the case of a word not often used, people stand in need of the rememberance of some object related to it (in order to comprehend it rightly); and with regard to which word, one comes to remember that ‘this word had been used in such and such a sense.”
35-37. Here, the arguments, that the opponent brings in support of identity (of Verbal Authority with Inference), have not been refuted (by the Sankhya in giving proofs of the difference of Verbal Authority from Inference). (These arguments are): ‘Verbal Authority 18 identical with Inference, (1) hecause of the existence of affirmative and negative premises ; (2) because in the case of Verbal Authority (as also in that of Inference) cognition is preceded by the recognition of a certain relation, due to the previous sensuous perception of one of the members; (3) because, not touching objects of Sense-perception, it is a means of know- ledge other than Sense-perception; (4) because its object is a Sdama- nya; and (5) because it refers to all the three points of time (past, pre- sent and future),—exactly like the Inference of Fire from smoke.”
38. Certain Mimansakas seek to prove the difference (of Verbal Authority from Inference) on the ground of the difference in the object (of Verbal Authority); since, they argue, Scripture has its application in such cases as are not touched by the former two (means of knowledge: Inference and Sense-perception ).
39. But, in that case, no Verbal Authority could helong to human utterances. ‘‘ Be itso.” Then by what means will you have the cognition of the meaning ? ‘ From the idea present in the speaker’s mind (inferred from his utterance).” But from where do you get at this ‘ speaker’s idea’ ?
40, This idea cannot be the characteristic mark (and hence the Reason, Middle Term) of the meaning of a Word: nor can this (mean- ing) im any way be the characteristic mark of the speaker's idea. By means of these is brought about the cognition of particular objects; and hence the character of Inference (which always has a‘ Samanya’ for its object) must belong to it.
84 ‘The word had been used, &c.,”—and only then is the meaning of the word duly comprehended, And this is a case of pure [nferenco: ‘“ This word has such and snch a meaning, becanse (I remember that) knowing people had used it in that sense —exactly like the word ‘ cow.’ ”
85.31 ‘The instance in each of the five syllogisms is the same : “ the Inference of the existence of fire from the perception of smoke.’”’ In the case of (2)—in Inference we have a sensuous perception of the Smoke, which leads to the rememberance of the inva- 11016 concomitance between Smoke and Fire, as perceived in the Culinary hearth. In the case of Words also, we have a sensuous perception (auditory) of the word, and then follows the rememberance of the concomitance of this word with « certain sensation.
89 ^ From where, Sc.,’—withont nnderstanding the constant relationship between the Word and its Meaning, how could you got at any notion of the idea present in the mind of the speakor P
ON WORDS. 213
41, Therefere when the meaning of the speaker is not amenable te Sense-perception, &c., then (in that case) even a human utterance becomes a Verbal Authority for the listener.
42, (Says the Bauddha) “Even then, you (the Mimansaka of K. 38) fail to prove that the meaning of the Scripture is not an object of Infer- ence. For there too we have the Word as the characteristic (Middle Term), just as ‘smoke’ is ef the‘ fire.’
43. ‘The mere fact of its not being an object of Inference, does not prove it to be the ebject of ne other means of knowledge; for certainly, the mere fact of ‘celour’ not being an object of the sense of Hearing, dees not prove it te be imperceptible by the organs of Sense.”
44.45. Under the circumstances, some peeple ef our own party, net caring to trouble themselves with the subtleties ef argumentation, admit that ^^ Verbal Authority” is a particular ferm of Inference, and as such, the means of obtaining a notion ef Duty; fer in the case of Duty (which is yet te ceme) what has been denied (by the Bhashya) to be the characteristic Middle Term is only one in the form of an object (and not in that of a werd).
45-46, (To these people we reply): Well, we do not object to your desire to call ^“ Verbal Authority” by the name of ^ Anumana.” If, hew- ever, there be an identity of form and character between Verbal Autho- rity and Inference, then the knowledge due ४७ the Veda ceases te have any validity, because this latter has not got the character of Inference.
47-48. In human utterances, it happens to be endowed with validity, on account of its similarity to Inference, inasmuch as (in that case) yeu have the cencomitance of “trustworthy assertion” and “ correspondence to the real state of things,” as the basis of the inferential argument. In the case of the Veda, on the other hand, since there is no trustworthy personality attached to it, and as such there being no concomitance
41 Therefore it is only when the idea of the speaker has not been duly recoguised by Sense-perception that his utterance can have any verbal anthority ; and not that the recognition of the apeaker’s idea produces the recognition of the meaning of his utterance.
44.45 In the case of Duty, 3’c.—The Bhashya hae laid down the fact that, in the case of Duty, which is yet in the futnre, and not amenable to Sense-perception, there can be no Inference. Hence if Verbal Authority were made only a special form of Inference, then the Veda wonld cease to be an authority for Duty. With this objection in view, these “some people of our own party” seek refuge in the assertion that “it 18 only a Middle Term of an objective form that has been denied with regard to Duty; and as we can hold the Word to be a Middle Term applicable to the case of Duty, there can be uo contradiction.”
46.46 If you give up all the necessary ingredients of Inference, then Verbal Anthority comes to be called “ Anumina” only in name ; and as the word “ Anumana” only means a “ cognition, following upon certain other coguition,’ we do not object to this name being applied to Verbal Authority.
214 CLOKAVARTIKA.
(recognised), the character of Inference cannot apply to it, and it ceases to be valid.
49. ‘ Even the accepted truth (as perceived by other means of know- ledge) of even one part of the Veda, would give it the character of In- ference: F.i. ‘The passages treating of Agnihotra, &ec., are true, because they are Veda, like the passage declaring ‘deftness’ of the God of Wind (which is found to be true in ordinary experience)’’’ ?
50. It will not be so, because the argument fails in the case of the passage which declares the sun to be a post; or again, the Agnihotra passages too would come to have a snbsidiary character, like the passage “The sun is the post.” And further (if Verbal Authority be accepted to be a form of Inference) then there would be no end to the connter-argu- ments (proving the invalidity of the Veda), as described before (under Sutra 2).
51. For these reasons itis only when Verbal Authority, in the Veda as well as in human utterances, has its validity apart from the character of [1676०९6 (which is sought to be thrust upon it), that the validity of the Veda can be established.
52, For the same reason too we cannot have the fact of being the exhortation of a trustworthy person, as a definition of “ Scripture ”’ ; because in the Veda, there is no possibility of any trustworthy speaker; and in the case of ordinary human utterance too, Validity cannot rest solely upon that fact.
53. This has been explained before (under Sutra 2). Therefore the idea that is produced by Verbal testimony must have its validity in itself,— provided that its coutradiction is not perceived (by other and simpler means of right knowledge).
54, The only similarity that this (Verbal testimony) has with In- ference, is that both are valid. The opponent has however tried hard
80 ^ Subsidiary character, Fc.’ Inthe caseof the deftness of Air (as declared in the Cruti passage *‹ Vayurud Kshépishthd dévata”), we find it to be true, because it tallies with other means of cognition. Thsrefore in ths cass of the Agnihotra passage also, we would have to admitits truth, on the gronnd of the results tallying with the reaults obtained by other meanea of knowledge. And thus thess passages would come to be only secondary passages, laying down the excellences of objects coguised by other meana of cognition. Jnst as the pasaage ^^ The Sunnis the poet” is accepted as laying down a peculiar excsllence of the Sun. “ Counter arguments’? :—these are des- cribed in full uuder Aphorism 2,—and these have been refuted on the sole ground of ths Veda being self-evident, and as auch depending, for its validity, upon nothing 8186 save its own inherent strength. If, however, it is admitted to he only a form of Inference, then all the arguments, urged by the Bauddha against the authority of the Veda, would rebound with doubled vigour, utterly damaging the cause of the Mimansa philosophy.
68 The definition given in the Bhashya is the only correct ons.
6@ Verbal Testimony is twofold: in the form of Word, and Sentenos. The Word has bsen precluded by the qualification “ asannikrishta,” in the definition given by the Bhishya; inasmuch as the Word being before us, perceived by the Ear, cannot be said
ON WORDS. 011
to prove the two to be identical; hence it is that we also consider this question (of tle validity of Words) here.
55-56. Of the characteristic Middle Term (cof an Inference) and of the Word, we find the objects to be entirely different : 10 will be shown hereafter that the Word has a‘ Samanya’ for its object; and it has been already proved that the Minor Term is an object endowed with a particular qualification. Therefore, so long as it has not got such a qualified object for its object, Verbal Authority cannot be (called) Inference.
57, In the case of Verbal authority, anything other than the “ Sam- anya’ belongs only to the sentence ; even when no second word is uttered it is always inferred through the force (of the uttered word).
08-59, Ifit be urged that “even in a single word, we have the denotation of a certain object, as characterised by a certain Number, &c.”—(we reply) such is not the case with “ Avyayas ” (Indeclinables). Even where these (Number, &c.,) are denoted, they only qualify the particular individual (and not the whole class ) ; because the action, signified by a different word (the verb), belongs to the Individual (and it is with reference to the verb that the Number of the nominative is determined).
59-60. Even in the case of sentences where, such (qualified) words as ‘‘Gomdn ” (‘one who has cows’) are used,—though the word 18 qualified, yet it cannot serve as the Minor Term of an inferential argument, because it is already a definitely established entity. Specially as (in the case of such words) the denctation is only so much as has been previously ascertained (and hence there cun be no ground for the interference of Inference).
to be ^* asannikrishta.” Consequently it is not necessary for us to prove the difference of Word-cognition from Inferential cognition. Still, eince the Bauddha has laboured hard over the identification of Word-cognition with Inference, we cannot but spare a little space for its consideration.
66.66 “ Hereafter ’—i.¢., in the Chapter on “ Akriti.”’
67 This anticipates the following objection: ‘A wordis also found to denote a qualified object ; as for instance, when one asks—‘ who is going’ ?—the reply is: ‘The King ’; the meaning of the reply being—‘‘ The King is going.’?’’ The sense of the Karika is that the instance cited is one of the use of a Sentence, and not of « Word, the reply being really in the form of a complete sentence: “ The King is going.” The wanting words are inferred from the force of the Nominative ending in ‘ Raja,” which stands in need of a verb, to complete its nominative signification.
63-59 The class is always one; the difference of Number helongs to the individual, which, according to our theory, is not directly denoted by the Word, which denotes only the Class,
59.60 “ Cannot be the Minor Term”—lIt is only a known object, sought to be proved as having a property not yet known, that can be the Minor Term in au inferential argument. Inthe case in question, however, prior to the utterance of the Word, nothing is known; and when the Word has been uttered, the qualified object is at once recognised ; and there is nothing left to be proved, which could form the Major Term of any Syllogism.
216 CLOKAVARTIKA.
61-62. Evenin this case however, there is a difference (from the quali- fication of the terms of a syllogism), inasmuch as there is a difference between the meaning of the noun (“ Go,” cow ) and that of the (possessive) affix (^ Matup”). Noris there (in the case of the word) a cognition of the qualification and that of the qualified object, independently, each by itself. And again, in the case of Inference, the cognition of the object with a qualification is preceded by that of the object itself; whereas in the case of the Word, the case is quite the reverse.
62. (Objection): ^ But wherefore is not the ^ Word” made thie Minor Term (object of Inference), as with regard to its having a definite meaning (as the Major Term) P”
63. In that case the Reason (Middle Term, “ Cabdatwa”) would be a part of the conclusion. It is only when a particular ‘smoke’ (the one seen issuing from the mountain) is the Minor Term, thatthe class ‘ smoke’ in general, is made the Reason (Middle Term),
64-65. We cannot (in the same manner) have “ Gabdatwa” (the class ‘ word’ in general) as the Reason ; and that there can be no such class as ^ Gocabdatwa ” will beshown later on. Itis only the one particular individual (word) (and not a class) that can serve as the Reason. If it be urged that “it can be so through the difference in the manifesting cause of the same word (as forming the Hétu, and as forming the Minor Term)” ; (we reply) we are cognisant of no idea (of any such difference based upon difference of tlle manifesting agency).
65-66. And again, what sort of specification can you have in the case in question ? It cannot be one either of time or of space. If it he
61.62 And hence the whole need not be taken as one word. “ Nor is there, §c.” :— in the case of an inferential argument, the smoke, for instance, is perceived by itself ; and go also 18 the Fire, and so again the Mountain. Whereas In the case of the Word ‘' Goman”’ the word cannot hring about any separate cognition of the siguification of the possessive affix by itself. And again, Jc.’ The Mountain is recognised hefore its qualification (the existence of Fire) ; while in the case of the word ^ Gomdn’’ we have the cognition of the Cow hefore that of the person possessing the cow.
62 The syllogism being : ^“ Gabdo’rthavan (the Word has meaning) Qabdatwat (he- cause it 18 a Word), Ghatapatadivat (like the words ghata, pata), Jc.”
64.55 What we have got to prove here is the presence of a definite meaning; and certainly the class “ Qabdatwa ” oannot,.in any way, help to prove such presence. “ It is only, S¥c.”—It 18 only the particular word in question that can he asserted as the hétus and inasmuch 88 this is also the Minor Term, the objection, viz, the anomaly of the Middle Term (or the Minor Premise) being a part of the conclusion—remains untouohed “ Tt can be so, Jc.’-—the difference in the manifesting agency of the Word in the two places will suffice for all the difference that is necessary for the argument.
65.66 What sort of specification is asserted with regard to “° Word’? as the Minor Term? “ What remains,” Sc.—all that is sought to be proved is that snch and euch a word has got such and suoh ४ meaning; and so, when, before the conolusion of the Inference has been arrived at, the Word is recognised as having a definite mean- ing, thore is nothing more left to be cognised, for the sake of which wa should have recourse to Inference.
ON WORDS. 217
urged that “ it 18 taken as specified by the cognition of its meaning,” then (we ask) what then is left behind that would form the subject of Inference ?
66-68. Nor is any such power, as that which causes the meaning to be cognised (inferred) as belong to any particular (word). No such power can belong to a part of the particular object, as it does to (a part of) the class ‘ Fire.’ Because power can belong to the class alone ; and for the Minor Term and the Middle Term too, you cannot but have the Class ; hence Inference cannot apply to the case of words as endowed with a certain meaning.
68-72. And again, how do yon define the fact of ‘ Word” being the property of the Minor Term? Asa matter of fact, there is no relation- ship except that of action and agent. The King being the supporter of the man, we have the expression “the King’s man”; the tree exists in the branches or the branches in the tree ; hence ‘the tree’s branches’; in a place occupied by Fire, we have the agency of smoke, with regard to the action of existence. In all such relations as the causal and the like, there is always a certain action. And until the form of the relation has been recognised, there can be no such assertion as that “the relation exists’; nor, in the absence of a relation, is the ^“ Genitive-Tatpurusha” possible; therefore the fact that the Word is ^ pakshadharma ” (property of the Minor Term) can never be rightly ascertained
73-74. When (in the above. manner) all other relations have been precluded (from the compound ‘ pakshadarma’), if some people were to assert the fact of Word heing the pakshadharma (property of the Minor
66.88 If that which is inferred be not the meaning, but w power to make the meaning comprehended, then—we ask—to what factor does this power belong ? If it belong to the word “ Cow” then we become open to all the objections urged in K, 68 et seq. In the case of “Fire,” the class has been found to extend over all indivi- dual Fires; hence the remembrance of the Fire and the Smoke in the culinary hearth leads to the inference of the existence of fire in the mountain. There can, however, be no such pervasion in the case of an individnal which therefore can never he the object of Inference. ^ You have the same, Sc.’ Since a Sdmanya (class)—“ Word” alone is your Minor Term; and the Middle Term—“ Cabdatwa ” is—also a Sdménya 80 also is the Major Term. In snch a case, then no Inference is possible
68.1% In an Inference, there are three factors ; with regard to the Middle Term: (1) the fact of its having a relation with the Minor Term, and thus constituting the Minor Premiss ; (2) its existence, in common with the Major Term, ina certain substratum, and thus constituting the Major Premiss and the Instance ; and (3) Non-existence in a place, where the Major Term never exists, and thus helping the formation of the Major Premiss. Kirikas 68-84 prove that in the case of “ Word’’ as the Middle Term, the first factor is not applicable; Karikas 85-90 set aside the application of the second factor, and Karikas 95-98 that of the third “ Genitive Tatpurusha”: the compound word ५ Pakshadharma,” we oan analyse ag" pakshasya dharmah
13.14 “Like negation ’’— १.९.) just as absence 18 held to be the object of negation.
28
218 01074 एदा ४6.
Term, Meaning) in consideration of the relationship, that the word bears to the meaning, viz., that the meaning forms its object—as in the case of ‘ ne- gation,’ —then those people too will have to explain in what manner the Word has the Meaning for its object. There is no coexistence in place or time, &c., hetween the two ; nor is there any proximity (of the one to the other).
75. For these reasons the fact of the Word having the Meaning for its object can be explained only by the fact that the Word brings about an idea of which the particular thiog (denoted by the word) is the object ; and in this ^ bringing about” alone lies the action (that would justify any relationship between the two).
76. ‘hus then the expressiveness of the Word (with regard to the particular meaning) havimg been previously established, such a ° paksha- dharma’ cannot be the means of the cognition (of the meaning) ; and hence for this reason too, there can be no Inference.
77. (Because) the fact of the Word being a property (of Paksha) would rest upon its expressiveness (of the meaning); and its expressiveness would depend upon the fact of its heing the property (of the Paksha in order to fulfil the conditions of Inference),—and thus there is a mutual interdependence ; and hence this assumption, too, will not hold water.
78-79. Such people as are not cognisant of the relationship (that the Word hears to the Meaning), do not know the Word apart from its form (as heard) ; and hence there is nothing else on which the notion of the Word being a ‘ pakshadharma’ could be based; for certainly it is not on the mere shape of ‘smoke,’ &c., that their character of = ^ pakshadharma,”’ is based.
79-80. Nor can the character of ^ pakshadharma’”’ depend upon any previous relation. For even if this relation (of Smoke and Fire) has not been previously recognised, one has the notion that this mountain has “‘smoke in it,” which asserts the fact of smoke (Middle Term) being the ` property’ of the mountain (Paksha). And it is in this point alone that lies the difference (of pakshadharma) from the second factor (sapakshasattwa).
79.80 “ The relation of the Word with the meaning has been recognised by some other people beforehand ; and this might serve as the bases of Pakshadharmatd.” This cannot he : because, even if the relation of the Smoke and Fire, &e.,&c., &o. It is in this point, fc.’ Since the Pakshadharmata (i.e., the relation predicated in the Minor Premiss) does not depend upon any previous recognition of the relations of the Middlo Term ; therefore it is upon this ground alone that it differs from the Sapakshas satta (t.e., the relation predicated in the Major Premiss), which does not depend upon the recognition of any relation at the present time,—being as it 18, only a general state- ment of relations between the Middle and Major Terms, perceived beforehand ; whereas the Minor Premiss is the statoment of the partionlar relation that the Middle.Term bears to the Minor Term,
ON WORDS. 919
81. In this case (of Inference with regard to Word), since the Minor Premiss (pakshadharmata) is nothing more than the previously recognised relation (7.e., the Major Premiss); and since there is no relation previous to the recognition of the Meaning, therefore, such a Minor Premiss can never be any means (of getting at the Meaning of a Word).
82-83. Nor (in the case of Word) is the Minor Term previously cog- nised ; therefore there can be no Minor Premiss based upon it; (in the case of the inference of fire from smoke) however the place ‘ Mountain,’ is such as has been known, prior to the recognition of its property (smoke). And that (meaning) which is here assumed to be the Minor Term, is also the one which is sought to be cognised by means of Inference.
83-84. Andso long as that (Minor Term) has not been cognised, the predicate cannot be ascertained ; and if it be such as has been already cognised before even the Minor Premiss has been ascertained, what else remains, that would 16 learnt by means of the Inference got at by means of the subsequently cognised Minor Premiss.
85-86. Nor can you ascertain any affirmative concomitance of the Word with the Object (Meaning) songht to be proved by Inference. For it is by means of a certain action that we arrive at the notion of the concom1- tance of anything e.g., where smoke is, there the presence of Fire, as an invariahle concomitant, is clear; but we have no such certain idea that ‘ whenever word is, meaning 1s sure to exist.’
87. For the meaning is not recognised as being concomitant with tlie word, either in time or place. If it be urged that '' Word being eternal and all-prevading, we can always have an idea of such concomi- tance” then (on that ground) we would have (the notion of concomitance with word) of everything (and not only of the one definite meaning).
88. In this way, the Word being omnipresent, and (for the same reason) there being no negation with regard to it, every word in existence would bring about the notion of all things in the world.
89-90. Thus then, there being no affirmative concomitance, either in time or place, if some one were to assert the cognition of the (form of the) Word as concomitant with the cognition of the Meaning ; —then (we reply) even this (concomitance) does not exist; because we find that, even with- out any idea of the Meaning, there is a cognition of the Word,—in the case of illiterate people.
8! The Minor Premiss 18 not any advance nponthe Major Premiss, towards par- ticularisation.
82.88 ^ That whieh, §c.”—If the object sought to be cognised by means of the Infer- ence be already previously cognised, what is the use of the Inference ?
88.89 , Cannot be ascertained "— १.९.) we can have no Minor Term.
99 Illiterate persons quite rightly comprehend the form of the word only by the Ear, but they may not understand its meaning.
220 CLOKAVARTIKA.
91. - (If it be urged that) ^" we may assume such concomitance, when the Word is repeated (to the person not comprehending its meaning the first at utterance ’;—(we reply) in some instances we find that even if the Word is repeated a hundred times, its Meaning is not compre- hended. r ;
92. (Objection). ^“ But we have a clear case of concomitance, in a place where the words are such as have their relations (with meanings) definitely ascertained.” (Reply). Well, if the relation be ascertained prior to the comprehension of the comcomitance, then such concomitance cannot be held to be the means of getting at the idea of the meaning.
93-94. Itisan acknowledged fact that Inference owes its origin to invariable concomitance. But when the concomitance proceeds after the expressiveness of the Word (withregard to its Meaning) has been recog- nised, how can such concomitance be said to be the canse of the cognition of such expressiveness ?
95. Therefore it must be admitted that the expressiveness of a Word 18 recoguised independently of any such concomitance. Whereas (in the case of Inference) prior to the cognition of the concomitance of smoke (with fire), we do not get at the notion of the presence of this (smoke) bringing about the cognition of the presence of fire.
96. If there be the recognition of a negative relation between the idea of the Word and the Meaning not yet known; even this, occurring afterwards, cannot be the means of bringing abont the recognition of the meaning.
97. The relation, that we will lay down as being the means of the ascertainment of expressiveness, will have both affirmative and negative bearings ; but these (affirmative and uegative relations)cannot belong to the recognition of the Meaning (of Words).
98. Thus, as to Sense-perception, so to Verbal testimony” too, the character of Inference cannot belong ; (1) becauseit is devoid of the three
91 ^ Hundred times.’’—The pressnt day readers of the Veda repeat the whole vf it like a parrot, and this too, very often; bnt they do not comprehsnd its meaning.
86 The negation cannot be in the form—* where there is no object, there is no word denotiog it ”; becanse thongh Rama himself does not now exist, the word con- tinues allths same. If the negative premiss be in the form—“ Where there is no idea of the meaning there is uo idea of Word,”—then this becomes untrue, with regard to illiterate persons. If it bs asserted that the premiss holds with those who know of the rplation between the Word and its Meaning,—then, in that case, there being no other relation save that of expressiveness, the negative premiss based npon this appears only after its purpose (४.6. the recognition of the expressiveness of the Word) hss been fulfilled ; and as such, it becomss useless, as a factor in the bringing abont of the recognition of the meaning of the Word.
98 The three factors of Inference having 0960 proved to be inapplicable to the case of Verbal authority.
ON WORDS. 221
factors, and (2) because an object like that of Inference is precluded (from being the object of ^ Verbal testimony’).
99. Itis only when the “ Word” is accepted as a means of know- ledge that, we can discuss (as above) its difference or non-difference (from Inference). But, as a matter of fact, the meaning of a word is not recognised by means of the cognition of the ‘ word.’
100. Because a word when used, is used with reference to four kinds of objects : (1) object directly perceptible by the senses, (2) object not in contact with the Sense-organs, (3) object that is previously known, aud (4) object that is not previously known.
101. The word, that is used with reference to (3) the object that is already known (é&c.), that which is perceived directly by the senses, is used only with regard to objects that are already cognised (by other means) ; and thus, there being nothing more denoted by the Word, all that it does is to describe (what is already known, and hence is not, by itself, a meaus of knowledge).
102. With regard to (4) an object not known before, there is either no kuowledge (produced by the Word), or there is a cognition of mere relationship (between Word and Meaning). This ‘ Relation’ is not the meaning of the word ; and that which is the meaning (of the word) is got at by other means of knowledge.
103-104. In the case of (2) an object which is not in contact with the senses, and which is not known, there can be no idea of the meaning expressed (by the Word). And in the case of an object which is behind the Senses, but known, we can have only a remembrance. And since it is only to objects already cognised (by other means of knowledge) that Remembrance applies, 1t cannot have the character of an independent means of knowledge. Because such character (of the means of know- ledge) depends upon the means leading to the specification (or deter- mination, of something not so determined by any other means).
105. “ Inasmuch as it brings about an independent determination at the time (of remembrance), wherefore should not we assert the character of an independent means of knowledge to belong to Remem- brance, as we do Recognition (Pratyabhijna) ? ”’
106. By means of Remembrance we cognise only so much as has
% In our opinion, it is the Sentence, and not the Word, thatis, the means of cogni- tion. In that case, there can he no occasion for the above discussions,
108 ** By other means, Sc.” —The object denoted by the Word is cognised by means of Sense-perception, and not by that of the Word.
106 At the time thatthe object is remembered. it is not perceived by any other means of knowledge.
106 ^ Recognition” proves the existence of the object at the particular time ; and as snch it is held to 86 8 “‘ Pramina”; whereas at the time that we remember an object, we do not know whether ५८ that tume, the object exists or not.
222 QLOKAVARTIKA.
been previously determined ; but ,in accordance therewith we have no idea of the existence of the particular object (remembered), at the time of re- membrance.
107. The Word too does not differ from the means of remembrance, inasmuch in the case of that too, that which is expressed is nothing more (than what has been previously determined by other means of knowledge). If there be anything more that happens to be cognised, it cannot be expressed by the Word.
108. Even though cognition by means of the word be an object of Inference, yet inasmuch as Verbal authority is attributed (by us) to the meaning of a sentence, it does not touch the position of those who assert “ Verbal testimony ” to be a distinct means of knowledge (apart from In- ference). (i.e., We, the Mimansakas).
109. Since in the case of the meaning of a Sentence, the cognition is produced by means of the meanings of words (making up the Sentence), without the recognition of the relation (of invariable concomitance) neces- sary in Inference,—therefore it (recognition of the meaning of a Sentence) must be held to be distinct (from Inference), like Sense-perception.
110. This Reason (the fact of the meaning of a sentence being arrived at by means of the meaning of words contained therein, without the recogni- tion of invariable concomitance) will be established in the Chapter on ८ Sentence”? (Sutra, Adhyaya 11). And none of the arguments urged by others (in support of the identity of Verbal Testimony with Inference), can apply to the case of a cognition brought about by a Sentence.
111. It was only on account of not having perceived any Sentences with definite meanings, that finding cognition to be brought about by the mere cognition of the meanings of words, the Bauddhas and Vaigeshikas, —hbeing afraid of the difference from Inference being established (af cognition by means of a Sentence were accepted),—have laboured hard to prove the identity of the ^ Cognition by Word ” with “ Inference.”
Thus ends the Chapter on Words.
(87८1710 7.) ON ANALOGY. 1-2. ‘Being asked by the town-people” ‘like what is a gavaya’ ?
111 If cognition hy means of a Senteuce be admitted, then there can be no qnestion of the identity of Verbal Authority with Inference. It is for this reason that the Bauddhas purposely evade this fact, and only seek to establish the identity of “ Word” with ‘ Inference,’—hoping thereby to prove such identity of ‘ Verbal Authority ”’ algo, which would, therefore, have to be rejeoted as 8 distinct means of right notion.
1 Says tho Bhashya: ^ Uramdnamapt sddrcyam asannikyshterthé buddhimut- padayatt yatha gavayadarganam gosmaranasya.”’ (Analogy also is similarity and bringe
ON ANALOGY. 298
if the forester says that a‘ gavaya is just like the cow’—then we have what is commonly known as “ Analogy.’’ According to the vicw of Cahara however, this is nothing apart from ‘‘ Verbal testimony”; and hence ‘ Analogy’ is explained in a different manner.
3. Because in the above instance the object (of Analogy) is got at by means of the personal recognition of a man, and is also recognised as explained by him, hence it is ‘ Verbal testimony’ pnre and simple.
4-5. How can any validity belong to the recognition of an object by means of (the perception of) another object similar to it,-- such recog- nition being exactly similar to remembrance brought about by constant pondering, &c.? In other cases (e.g., that of Pratyabhiyna, Recognition) the object is specified by different time, place, &c.; it 18 not so in the case of the instance cited, because here the cow is remembered only as being an the town.
6-7. According to some people,—the name ‘ Analogy’ belongs to the cognition of the gavaya in the forest, when belonging to such people as have heard the assertion of the similarity of the cow to the gavaya,— such cognition being tinged by an idea of similarity with the cow. In this case too, in the case of the gavaya we have Sense-perception, and in that of ‘ Similarity ’ we have mere remembrance.
7-8. “ Butin the recognition of the object as tinged with similarity, there can be neither remembrance, nor any application of the organs of Sense.” Well, if the perception of the gavaya does not produce any ideas over and above that which is due to the previous assertion of the forester, then such recognition would be nothing more than remembrance; and as such being mere repetition (of a former cognition), 1 could have no validity.
9. If there 18 anything in excess (of the former assertion), it is only such as 18 anienable to Sense-perception ; because it has already been proved that so long as there is contact of the Sense-organ with the object, the cognition that we have is Sense-perception.
10-11. Invalidity attaches to the factor of remembrance, as differen-
about the cognition of an object not in contact with the senses; eg., the sight of the gavaya reminds one of the cow).
4.5 The definition given inthe Bhashya means that when one object, on being produced, produces the recognition of auother object similar to it, then we have what is called Analogy. Against thisitis urged that this would only be a case of remem- brance. Pratyabhijné (Recognition) is considered valid only because, over and above the mere recognition of the object, it cognises the object as being the same object that wa perceived before, but occupying another place and time in the present. There is, how- ever, no sach fresh specification in the case of the gavaya and the cow,
6.7 In order to avoid the objection urged above, these people add “ tinged, &c.,”’ 8 a fresh specification, on which they rest the validity of Analogy.
9 ^“ Tt has been proved ”—under ‘‘ Sense-perception.”’
10.11 Even in the case of Remembrance, invalidity does not attach to every part of
224. CLOKAVARTIKA.
tiated from the factor of Sensuous perception. Even the fact of a know- ledge of the assertion of similarity is not of much help, inasmuch as this (recognition of similarity) happens also in the case of such people as have never heard of the assertion of similarity, but having known the cow, bappen te see the gavaya in the forest.
12. Ifit be urged that “in the case of such people there is no idea of the name ‘ gavaya’ ”"—(we add) the name is not the object ; and this (the object gavaya) is completely recognised by them (as resembling the cow).
13. Nor then can the relation, between the word (‘gavaya’) and its meaning (the object, animal), be said te be the object of recognition ; because when the object, (animal, gavaya), has been ascertained to resem- ble the cow, the relation of the animal with the word (‘ gavaya’) is recognised by the help of the previous assertion of the forester.
14. Norcanit be urged that in the forest, there is a recognition (Pratyabhijna) of this fact (of “gavaya” being the name of the parti- cular animal) ; because the denotations of words being beyond the Senses, the present instance cannot be anything more than mere Rememberance.
15. The factor of Sense-perception has been proved to enter also into the case of such cognitions as are intermixed with Verbal expressions.
it ; the factor of Sense-perception that enters into it, in the shape of a perception of the object before the eye, cannot but he valid. But the invalidity attaches to the factor of remembering something that has gone before. The specification—‘t the remem- brance of such people as have heard the assertion of similarity,’—too, does not add any validity to the remembrance, because we have notions of similarity, even in the cage of euch people as have no idea of the said assertion, and yet recognise a similarity of the well-known caw with the gavaya, whenever this Jatter happens to be seen in the forest.
18 The Nyaya theory—that the object of Analogy is the recognition of the denota- tion of the name ** gavaya’’—is here controverted. No sooner hae the man geen the gavaya, and found it to resemble the cow, then he remembers the previous assertion of the forester, and from that he directly concludes that the object that he hae seen resembling the cow, must be the “ gavaya”™ that the forester had described. Thns then, we find that the recognition of the name “ gavaya” is due to pure Verbal Antho- rity, the assertion of the forester, and the element of Analogy does not euter into it. Then’ —1i.e,, 17 cages where the person knowe of the previone description by the forrester.
14 In Pratyabhijna, there ia a present factor of Senge-perception, upon which its validity reste. The opponent seeke refugein thie fact, and saya that the man has known the name ^ gavaya”’ to belong to something that resembles the oow, and hence ae soon as he 8668 such an object ia the forest, the name flashes upon him, the factor of the perception of the animal lending validity to the remembrance ot the name. To thie it is replied, that the denotation of the name can never be amenable to Senge-perception, and hence the idea of the name must be a pure case of Remen- brance, and as such, it could not have any validity.
16 Objectian. ‘‘ One who is not oognigant with the previous assertion of the forester has an idea of the gavaya resembling the cow, unmixed with any notion of words;
ON ANALOGY. 1
Therefore you must mention some peculiar transcendental object, endowed with resemblance, to be the subject (of Analogy).
16. And further, when you accept the fact of Sense-perception hav- ing the character of a positive function, how is it that Resemblance cannot be cognised by means of that, just as ^° class, &c.,” are.
17. For those also who hold the theory of unspecified abstract percep- tion, this cognition of resemblance 18 a semblance of Sense-perception. But they attach no validity to it, inasmucli as according to them, there exists no such thing (as Resemblance).
18. The fact of ‘ Similarity ’’ (or Resemblance) being a positive entity, however, cannot be denied; inasmuch as it consists of the pre- sence, in one class of objects, of such an arrangement (or coglomeration) of constituent parts as is common to another class of objects.
19. The similarity of constituent parts, between the lotus-leaf and the eye, would rest upon the fact of the presence, in one object, of parts of the same class as those in the other.
20. Thus then Similarity comes to be of different kinds, inasmuch as it can rest upon one, two or three of the following points—birth, property, substance, action, power and specific character.
21. These properties themselves do not constitute Similarity; nor again is it the multiplicity (or repetition) based upon these (properties). It is only the “ class,” or “ genus,” &c., as qualified by multiplicity (or re- petition), that is cognised as similar.
and such an idsa may be amenable to Senss-perception. In ths cass of one who knows of the previous agsertion, the factor of verbal expression cannot bs so amenable; and it is for the sake of this that we have recourss to Analogy.” The sense of the reply as given in the Karika is, that we have just shown how the factor of Sense-perception enters into the latter case also. Therefore in order to establish Analogy, as an independent means of knowledge, the Naiydyika, will have to assert the existence of a peculiar object, which ressemblee an object that has been seen, and which cannot be perceived by the senses, But sach an object does not exist ; therefore the Nyaya theory {8118 to the gronnd.
16 ‘I'he Banddha holds Sense-perception to belong toa specific abstract entity (^ Swadharma’’) alone, devoid of all concrete specifications. So he can very well deny resemblance to he an object of Sense-perception. The Naiyayika however holds the Class to be amenahle to Sense-perception ; so he cannot very well deny ths fact of Resemblance being amenable to it.
17 "५ Semblance, Jc.’’—because it is qualified and conorete.
19 That is to say, where the Similarity lies, not in the fact of ths objscts themselves resembling each other in the arrangement of thsir constituent parts, but in that of the parts, severally, of each of the two objects.
80 “ Of birth,” e.g., Agni and Fire both have their origin in Prajapati’s mouth. ८८ Property ’—ae, in the case of two pictares. = ^ Substance’’—as in the case of two men waaring similar jawels. ‘“ Action”—as between the kite, bird—and the Oyéna sacrifice. ५ Power ”—as between the Lion and Dévadatta. = ^ Specific character’’—as between the Panchavattanarécansa sacrifice and the escond Praydja.
2. Similarity is au inherent relation, and as such, it resis in the Class, and not in mere Property.
29
226 GLOKAVARTIKA.
22-23. If it be asked—“ how then do you explain the similarity of twins? ”’—-(we reply) we accept if because we actually see it so;—how strange, that you should ask such a silly question! For Similarity helongs sometimes to many, and sometimes only to a few; and this pecnhiarity does not in any way affect the fact of similarity heing a positive entity.
23-25. These classes have their end, in the end (or destruction) of their substrates. Then the fact is that, inasmuch it inheres in innumerable (many) substrates, the destruction of any one of its substrates does not lead to its utter annihilation. But this fact does not necessitate thie hypothesis that all classes are eternal ; nor do we accept the utter annihila- tion of any cluss, inasmuch as every class has got its substrate somewhere (even when many of its substrates have disappeared).
26. And Similarity differs from the (classes) in that it rests upon ॐ coglomeration of classes; whereas the classes appear also severally among objects of Sense-perception.
27. In such cases too as where we recognise the similarity of paris, we have the Similarity resting upon the fact of the homogenity between the parts of each of these parts.
28. Thus then, we shall have a Class devoid of Similarity, at a point (in an atom) where there can be recognition of identity with anything else.
29. Inacase where we have the recognition of a single class as belonging to the principal objects themselves (and not to the parts), there we have a notion (of identity) such as “this is that very thing”; and where there is difference, there we have the notion of Similarity only.
80. ^ What would he the class, ina case where we recognise simi- larity in pictures” P There too we have the resemblance of the various earthly colours, &c.
81, From among colour, taste and odour, we have the resemblance of one or other, in different places. It is not necessary thatthe notion of Similarity should rest upon absolute resemblance in all the parts.
42.43 ^ Tf similarity lies in the Class, how can you explain the similarity of twins”? The reply is given jocnlarly, “ This peculiarity "—of belonging, at times to many, and at times to a few only.
23.26 “ Substrates ”—+.e., the individnale constituting the Class.
:9 That which gives rise toa notion of similarity constitntes sddrcya. In acase where we recognise a class—“‘ cow” fi.—pervading over principal wholes, we have the notion of identity. It is only when the principal classes “cow” and “ gavaya” differ from one another, that we have a notion of Similarity,
80 Because in the picture, we have not got the members of the human body ; colours, ¥c.”—we have, in the pioture, a resemblance of posture, colonr, &o.
४। This anticipates the objection that, in the picture, there is no odour or any other such property. The sense of the reply is that Shuilarity can rest even upon the resem- blance of a single property ; and iu the picture we have many reseniblanoes, snch as thuse of colour and the like.
ON ANALOGY. pat |
32. In the earth, &c., all these (colour, odour, &.), naturally exist (always) ; but one or other of these is perceived according as they become manifested in the various manifestations of it.
33. Nothing, that is a non-entity even in potency, can ever be brought into existence. Properties are not different from their sub- strates ; nor are they identical with them; they occupy a middle posi- tion.
34. Thus then, Similarity having been‘proved to be a positive entity, wheuever it happens to be in contact with the Sense of sigbt,—be it per- ceived in one or both of the members (between whom Similarity is cog- nised)—, the fact of its being an object of Sense-perception is not dis- puted.
30. Like a Class, Similarity too exists wholly in each of the two members ; therefore even when the corresponding member is not seen at the time, a notion of Similarity is possible.
36. Hence though (in accordance with the Naiyayika explanation) in the case in question, the recognition of Similarity follows upon the remem- berance of the cow,—yet since Sense-contact at the time lies in the ‘ gavaya’ (seen at the time), therefore the Similarity must be an object of Sense-perception.
37. Forthis reason, it is the member remembered, recognised as qualified by similarity, that forms the object of Analogy ; or it may be the Similarity as qualified by that member.
38. Though Similarity is recognised by Sense-perception, and the ‘cow’ 18 remembered, yet the ‘ cow as qualified by similarity,’ not being re- cognised by any other means, Analogy comes to be recognised asa dis- tinct means of right knowledge.
39. H.g., the place (mountain) is seen by the eye, and the‘ fire’ is remembered (as being concomitant with smoke) ; and yet since the object to be cognised is a qualified one (the mountain as containing the fire), therefore the character of a distinct means of right knowledge is not denied to Inference.
40. In a case where a notion of similarity is bronght abont by means of objects that are not really similar, we have only a (false) semblance of similarity.
82 As a matter of fact, odour, &c., also exist in the picture, but are not manifested.
33 That is, that which does not exist in the cause,can never be brought about. c.f. Sankhya Kariki 9. ^ Properties.”—This is in reply to the qnestion,—“‘ 18 similarity different from, or identical with, its substrates ”’ ?
४५ Whetber the cow and the gavaya be both seen at the same time, or only one of them be seen at the time of the cognition of similarity.
88 The Nyaya theory having been set aside, it must be admitted that the defini- tion given in the Bhashya is the only trne one. It is not the similarity of the gavaya that is the object of Analogy, which pertains to the cow, as remembered at the time, and recognised as similar to the gavaya that is directly perceived by the eye.
223 CLOKAVARTIKA.
41-42. This is said to be a false semblance of similarity, becanse it is subsequently set aside by an idea to the contrary, ¢.g., the similarity of an elephant in a stack of hay ; in which case when one is sufficiently near the stack, he realises that there is no real similarity between the stack and the elephant. That notion of similarity, which is not set aside even on close proximity to the object, is a case of real Similarity.
43-44. This (Analogy) is not Inference; becanse in it we have no assertion of any relation of the Middle Term (i.e., we have no premises) - Prior to there cognition of Similarity (by means of Analogy), the similarity is not known as a property (and as such cannot be asserted to qualify any terms) ; since that which is perceived in the ‘gavaya’ cannotbring about an Inference (of its existencc) in the cow.
44.45, That (similarity) which resides in the cow, cannot be the Middle Term; because it (the similarity of the cow) forms part of what is to be proved. The ‘gavaya’ too (as qualified by similarity) cannot be the Middle Term, becanse it is not in any way related (to the Minor Term, the ‘cow,’—and so there can be no minor premiss). Even the similarity (of the gavaya in the cow) has not heen perceived by all men, as being invariably concomitant with it (the cow).
46. Inacase wherever only one object (cow) has been seen (by the person), whenever thc other (the ‘gavaya’) happens to be seen in the forest, the cognition of this latter is produced simultaneously with that of similarity (between that object and the one seen before).
47. Ifthe ‘cow’ beasserted to have the character of the Middle Term, because of the concomitance of the class ‘ horn, &c.,’ (in the ‘ gavaya’ which ig seen);—even that we deny; becanse theaction of recognition of the class ‘horn, &c.,’ ends with the mere recognition of the ‘gavaya’ (as similar to the cow).
48. Evenifthere were any idea (cf the cow) produced by these
44.45 [£ 18 the similarity, in the cow, of the gavaya, that is the trne object of Analogy; whereas that which is perceived by the eye is the similarity as located in the gavaya ; and the latter could not give rise to any Inference that wonld bring about any idea of the similarity in the cow.
45-48 “ Buen similarity, §c.’—Thie anticipates the objection that there isa rela- tion between the oow and the gavaya, namely, that of similarity, and the assertion of this relation would constitute the Minor Premiss of the inferential argnment. The sense of the reply is that the cow has not been recognised by all men to he invariably concomitant with the gavaya. Hence though there is a relation, there can be no such concomitance as is necessary for an Inference.
#17 Analogy cannot he said to be a form of Inference, because it is found to function even in a case where none of the two members have been perceived by the eye. Even one, who 1188 never seen the gavaya before, when he sees it for the first time, he at once recoguises its similarity with the cow, even though this latter is not before bim at that time.
48 “* Mere recognition, §c.”—The presence of horns lesds to the recognition of
the fact of the gavaya being similar to the cow; and there itonds. So it can have no
ON ANALOGY. 229
(horns, &c.), it would be devoid of any notion of similarity; because the ‘cow ’ is similar, not to horns, &., but to the gavaya.
49. Having got at the notion of similarity (of the cow in the gavaya), following upon the recognition of horns, &c ,—the idea of the ‘cow’ (as being similar to the gavaya) is brought about by that of the gavaya.
50. Ifthe fact of the similarity of the parts (horns of the cow with those of the gavaya) be brought forward,—then (we say that) we would have an Analogy of these parts) ; and certainly the existence of the cow is not inferred in all cases where horn, &c., are seen to exist.
51. For, one who would infer thus, would only be landing upon mistaken notions ; and the idea of the cow as existing in the village is nothing more than rememberance.
52. Analogy being thus proved to be distinct from Inference,—there being no concomitance (of the factors of procedure, fire, §c.), with the passages enjoining the “ Saurya,” &c..—how could mere similarity bring about the association of fire, §c., (with the “ Saurya’”’) P—In this lies the nse of Analogy.
53, In the case of the corn “ Vrihi,” kept for the sacrifice, being spoilt (or stolen), we have the use of the “ Nivara,” &c., which latter are the recoguised substitutes of Vrihi, simply because they are similar to tt. This too forms an instance where Analogy has its use.
53-54, Ina case where a substitute is denoted by the subsidiaries, if by means of others (not subsidiaries) we get at something which is
inflnence in the recognition of the similarity of the gavaya, im the cow, which is the real ohject of Aualogy.
49 The horns might recall the cow, but they cannotin any way bring about the idea that the cow is similar to the gavaya, which is only possible when the similarity of the cow has been perceived in the gavaya.
60 (1) First of all, we have the perception of the horn ; then (2) follows the recog- nition of the similarity of the cow, in the gavaya ; and then (3) lastly, appears the notion of the similarity of gavaya (seen now) in the cow, that had been seen before. Thus then, there being an interval between (1) and(3), the former cannot be said to he the direct cause of the latter. ‘“ Cases ’’—of the perception of the gavaya, for instance.
81 That wonld give rise to a notion of the similarity of the horns, &c., and not to that of the cow.
62 If the horn alone is perceived, and the similarity of the gavaya tothe cow is not recognised, then alone could the former be the Middle Term for the Minor Premiss of your Inference. But in that case, there being no recognition of the similarity of the gavaya to the cow, we could have no notion of the similarity of the gavaya, in the cow. All that we conld have would he a notion of the cow as we knew it in the village ; and this would be a case of rememberance only. Thus then, the notion of the eimilarity of the gavaya, in the cow remains untouched by yonr Inference. And as it is this simi- larity that we hold to be the object of Avalogy, this cannot butbe accepted asa dis- tinct means of right cognition.
88 No snch concomitance being recognised, we could have no Inference. No other means of cognition is applicable in the case. Between the ^ Agnéya” and the
230 CLOKAVARTIKA.
more like the original (than the one denoted by the subsidiaries) ,—then the former, which has only a slight similarity becomes false, on the ground of its greater dissimilarity. Andfurther, we have a quicker recog- nition of the second (i.e., that which has greater similarity), even in the absence of any idea of the former (z.¢, that which has only a slight similarity) ; and it is for this reason also that itis set aside (in favour of the one which has greater similarity). Thus ends the Chapter on Analogy.
(Section €.) On APPARENT INCONSISTENCY.
1. A case,—where, in order to avoid the contradiction (or irrelevancy) of any object ascertained by means of any of the six means of right notion, an unseen object (or fact) is assumed,—is known to be one of ^“ Arthapatti ” (Apparent Inconsistency).
2. “Unseen” means ‘ not cognised by any of the five means of right notion’; because that produced by ^ Verbal Authority ” has been declared to be apart from the “seen” (perceived); inasmuch as tins latter (Verbal Authority ) comprehends also the means of cognition (Cabda) [whereas the other five comprehend only the object of cognition], and in this lies its difference from the other five.
3. (1) The assumption, of the burning power of fire, based upon thie facts of its burning a certain object ascertained by means of Sense-perception (constitutes an example of the first kind of “ Apparent Inconsistency ”’) ; and (2) the assumption of the mobility of the sun, based upon the fact of his movement from place to place, which is ascertained by means of Inference (is an instance of the second kind of Apparent Inconsistency based upon Inference).
4 (3) Apparent Inconsistency based upon ^ Verbal Authority ” will be explained hereafter. (4) The assumption of the fact of the compre- hensibility of the ‘ cow’ (as similar to the gavaya), based upon the fact of the ‘cow’ having heen perceived by ‘ Analogy’ to be similar to the gavaya (is an instance of Apparent Inconsistency based npon Analogy).
5 The assumption (5) of the eternality of words is based upon the fact of the expressive power of words, which is ascertained by means of ** Apparent Inconsistency” (resorted to) for the purpo se of the definition of tle denotation of words
^“ Saurya ” there is the similarity of having a common Deity. Therefore the proper- ties and appurtenances of the ^“ Agnéya"’ cnn be said to apply themselves to the “ Sanrya” only through Analogy.
2 ^ Kive’—leaving out Verbal Anthority.
6 This is Arthapatti based upon another Arthipatti; it is explained in the follow- ing Karika.
ON APPARENT INCONSISTENCY. Zoi
6-7. That is to say, inasmuch as the denotation of a word cannot be otherwise defined, we assume (by Apparent Inconsistency) a expres- sive power (iu words); and as the latter is not otherwise possible, there- fore we arrive, by means of another “ Apparent Inconsistency, at the notion of the eternality of words. All this will be explained under the aphorism “ Darganasya pararthatwat ” [ I —i—18].
8-9. The absence of Caitra from the house having been cognised by means of ^ Negation,” we arrive at the notion of his presence outside the house ; and this latter lias been cited (by the Bhashya) as an instance of another (sixth) kind of ^ Apparent Inconsistency ” based upon “ Negation.” The instances of other forms of ‘‘ Apparent Inconsistency ” have been de. tailed under the treatment of the discrepancies of the Minor Term (chap. on Inference, K. 66 e¢ seq.).
10. From the perception (by means of ‘ negation’) of the absence of Caitra (in the house) we get at the notion of his presence outside the house,—and this is different from the process of Inference, inasmuch as in this case we have none of the appurtenances of Iufer ence,—such as {116 assertion of the premises, &c., &c.
11. Because, whether the object to be cognised be (1) the object (Caitra) as qualified by existence outside, or (2) an outside as qualified by the existence of Caitra,—any way, how can ‘ non-existence in the house’ (which is brought forward as the Middle Term) be a property of the Minor Term ?
12-18. “The house, as qualified by Caitra’s absence” cannot be the property of any (of the two alternatives pointed out in the last Kavika) ; becanse at the time the object (Caitra or outside) is not recognised as quali- fied by absence in the honse ; for it is only the ‘ house ’ that is recognised, and not Caitra.
13-15, Nor can non-visibility (of Caitra in the house) be a Middle Term, as will be explained in the chapter on “ Negation.” Therefore ८ because he is not found in the house” cannot be accepted as the Inferen- tial Reason. The non-visibility having led to the ascertainment of the negation of the object of cognition (Caitra), there follows the notion
6.1 No Denotation is possible without expressiveness; and this latter could not be possible, if the words were not eternal. |
ll “ Object to be cognised ’—which will be the Minor Term of your syllogism. Those who assert Apparent Inconsistency to be a form of Inference, put forth the following syllogism: ^ The living Caitra exists ontside the house,—becanse he is living and is not found within the house,—like myself ” : where “living Caitra” is the Minor Term, “exists outside” the Major Term, and “ non-existence in the honse,” the Middle Term.
12-18 * At the time’’—i1e., when we goto hig house and find that Caitra is not there. वि
18.15 Because *‹ non-visibility ” is one step further removed, being intervened by the notion of the absence of Chaitra from his house.
232 CLOKAVARTIKA.
of his ewistence outside the house; and hence this notion canuot be said to be caused by ‘ nou-visibility.” And (even if) the character of the Middle Term belong to the absence of Caitra, this resides in the house (and not in the Minor Term, Caitra; and as such no premiss would he possible).
16. Nor can such an object, (Minor Term) as has not been perceived before, can ever be the object of cognition (by Inference); and in the present case, neither ‘ outside,’ nor ‘ Caitra’ has been perceived before (as concomitant with the Middle Term; hence no premiss is possible).
17. Obj. “Ina case, where from rise in the river-surface you infer that there has been rain in the higher regions, how do you recognise the relation of the Middle Term (rise in the river) with the unseen higher regions (Minor Term) ?”
18. In this case we cognise the fact of the falling of rain over the higher regions with reference to the region where the river has risen. Or this too may be explained as only an instance of ^“ Apparent Inconsistency.”
19. Inthe former case in question the ^ absence in the house of one who is living’’ is made the Middle Term; but the coguition of this is not possible until ^“ hs existence outside” has been ascertained.
20. (In the case of the Inference of fire) the existence of smoke 18 cog- nised independently of the existence of fire; because at the time of the per- ception of the existence of smoke, there is nothing that depends upon fire (for its existence).
21. «^ Absence in the house,” pure and simple,—apart from devoid of any idea of the person being alive,—is also found to apply to dead per- sons ; and as such it cannot be the means of getting at the notion of 118 existence outside.
22, Whenever the notion of his absence in the house is accompanied by the notion of his being alive, Caitra, being precluded from the house, is con- ceived to exist outside (without having any recourse to process of In- ference).
23. The notion of a general “absence in the house,” by itself (with- out any reference to any particular individual), cannot bring about any notion of Caztra’s existence outside.
11 This caso is admitted, by the Mimiansaka also, to be one of Inferenoe. Hence the objector brings it forward as equally open to the arguments urged by the Kéarikd against the theory of Apparent Inconsistenoy being only a special case of Inferential reasoning.
18 The syllogism being—“ The region where the river has risen (Minor Term) is such as had rainfall over its. higher regions (Major Term), because of the rise in the river (Middle Term),.” Finding this explanation uot suitable he relegates this instance to Apparent Inconsistency.
19 ^“ Abseuce in the house, of one who is living” oannot be accepted as trne, so long as we have not become cognisant of hig ewistence outside ; till then, the former proposition has all the appearance of absurdity. Therefore the Middle Term becomes dependent upon the conclusion, which vitiates the validity of the Inference,
ON APPARENT INCONSISTENCY. 233
24 1६ 18 only when the fact of his being alive has been established, that the uotion of his absence in the house can point to his existence being outside, having precluded it from within the house.
25. Thus then we find that absence in the house, independently of any idea of his being alive, is (also common to dead persons, aud as such) con- trary (to the conclusion); and itis only the character of being not cun- tradicted that is held to belong to the conclusion of your Infereuce.
26. ‘Therefore the huuse being coguised by ‘‘ Sense-perception,” and the absence in the house by means of “ Negation,’—the idea of his existence (being alive) [which is all that 18 left of the Middle Term, after the first two factors, have been cognised by means of ‘ Sense-perception’’ and ‘‘ Negation ' | is the same that is recognised as being outside.
27-28. Itis only for the accomplishment of the Minor Premiss, that ‘existence outside” has been introduced ; in 88 much as it is only as qualified by this that the person can be the object of Inference, hy meaus of the concomitance of the Middle Term and the Minor Term, &. Thus theu, if the cognitiou of the Minor Premiss, &c., be produced by the cog- nition of “outside existence,” and that of ‘ outside existence,” by the Minor (and Major) premisses,—then we have an unavoidable mutnal inter- dependence.
29. In the case ^ Apparent Inconsistency” on the other hand, this fact of being contaiued in the object to be proved does not constitute a fallacy, because it is actually meant to be recognised as such,
24 In that case, your conclusion becomes only an implication of the premiisses, and not an independent proposition.
2 In your inferential argument, if mere absence in the house be made the Middle Term, then it applies to dead persons also, and as such, contradicts your own conclusion. 16 is only when the idea of absence in the house ie qualified by that of the person being alive, that you can have the conclusion of his being outside. This has been ehown in K. 22, to be ouly an implication of the premiasses, and not an indepeudent proposition. Thus then you must admit that in fact your conclogion is nothing but the premisses themselves stated differently.
*6 The conclusion—-existence outside--becomes only a part of the Miaur Premiss. The Middle Term consists of three factors: (1) non-ewistence (perceived by means of Negation) (2) in the House (seen by the eye) (3) of one who ts alive. The first two are cognised by other means of cognition, and the third implies his existence outside, and as such the conclusion is no advance npon the Premisees.
a7-28 Thus then, ¥c’’—The faot of his being alive cannot be recognised, until his existence elsewhere (other than the House, from where he is found to be absent) hus been ascertained ; and ag this 18 a necessary factor in tle Middle Term (and hence in the Minor Premiss), therefore it seems that the premise itself depends upon (the recog- nition of) outside ewistence ; and as this is what 18 sought to be proved by means of the premisses, there is an absurd matual inter-dependence.
2) In the case of Apparent Inconsistency, the inclusion of the object to be cognised in the notion of `“ absence from the house,” accompanied by that of his being alive, does not affect ita validity adversely ; because it is = peculiarity of this particular niesis of cognition that it leads to the assumption of something else, in order to avoid the
30
234 CLOKAVARTIKA,
30-31. Invariable concomitance too, in the case, could be recognised only when his existence outside has been ascertained. And inasmuch as it has not been recognised before, it cannot be the means of the cognition (of outside existence), even though it exist (subsequently); because “ ab- sence in the honse” and “ existence outside’ have never been perceived to be invariably concomitant.
31-32. In the matter of such concomitance, there is no other means of kuowledge, save “Apparent Inconsistency,” by means of which the notion of one (absence in the house of one who is alive) brings about that of another (existence outside). If there be no such assumption (of the one by means of another), then we cannot get at their concomitance.
33. Therefore at the time of the cognition of this relation, one of the two members related must be held to be recognised by means of “ Apparent Inconsistency ”’; and after this the Inference might follow.
34-35. If one, sitting at the door of the house, were to assume Caitra’s existence ontside,—(thinking that) * when he exists in one place (४.९., the garden where he is seen) he does not exist in another place, ( the house)’ ;— even then, the fact of his non-existence everywhere cannot be recognised (by means of Inference); because there could be no invariable concomitance between the Middle Term and ‘ non-existence in one definite place.’
36. (Obj). “ Well, non-existence in a place before us 18 cognised by
apparent irrelevancy of two well-recognised facts,—in the present case, absence from the house, and being alive, the inconsistency whereof could be avoided only by the assnm- ing of the fact of his beiog outside.
80 The existence of the Minor Premiss has been refuted in the above Kirikas. Now begins the refutation of Invariahle concomitance (embodied in the Major Premias), as applied to cases of Apparent Inconsistency.
६1.88 ‹ Their ’—i.e., of = «^ exiatence ontside,” and “ absence from the house.”’
83“ Inference, ¥c.”—but by that time Apparent Inconsistency will have done its special work, and thus justified its distinct existence.
64-35 Some people might urge that one whois sitting at the door is cognisant of the concomitance of Caitra’s absence from the house with his existence outside somewhere in the garden (where he is seen by the man at the door); and hence this man seeing him thus could conolude that inasmuch as he is in one place (in the garden) he cannot be elsewhere (in the house); and thus he could recognise the concomitance of absence from the house with existence outside. In reply to this, it is urged that thongh this may be possible, yet the fact of one who existain one place not existing elsewhere, cannot form the subject of Inference; becanse even the manat the gate cannot be cognisant of any concomitince with regard to each universal absence. The Objcctor urges: ‘‘ We recognise the fact that one who is present in one place is not preseut in another place (both places being hefore onr eyes): and upon this fact we can base the Inference of his absence from every other place in the world except the oue in which he is secn.’ The reply to this also is the same as before. The concomitance that 18 cognised ia with reference to the absence from one definite place; and this oannot form the basis of any Inference with regard to absence from all other plaoes.
88 In Inference, yon urge the inapplication of invariable conoomitance, &e., but Negution does not stand in need of suoh accessories. Therefore just as wo recognise
ON APPARENT INCONSISTENCY. 235
means of Negation; and, in the same manner, this means of knowledge (Negation) requiring no special effort (on the part of the cogniser), we would get at the notion of absence, from everywhere else, of one who if found to exist in one place.”
37. But Negation too cannot lead us to any correct idea of ^ non- existence everywhere else”; because such negation would also apply to the case of objects that are positive entities, but are at a distance,—so long as we have not gone to that particular place.
38. Itis only when we have visited different places, and found cer- tain objects not existing there, that, in the absence of any other means of knowledge (of the objects), we conclude that they do not exist (in those
places). 39. “(Ifsuch be the fact) then we could have no concomitance
between the absence of fire, and the absence of smoke, because we have not visited every place (where there is negation of fire).”
40. He, for whom the object of Inference is “ absence in another sub- strate” (४.९. of the Middle Term in a snbstrate where the absence of the Major Term is ascertained, ४.९.) the ^ Vipaksha’), will be liable to the above objection. Ags for ourselves, the mere fact of our not seeing (the smoke, in two or three cases of the absence of fire) is enough to bring about an idea of the absence of its concomitant (fire).
41. ‘Well, in the same manner, in the case in question also, the relation (of concomitance) between the absence of Caitra (in the house), and his existence (outside),—being recognised by means of Negation,— becomes quite possible.”
the non-existence of something in a place near us, so could we also do with regard to its absence from all other places. And the concomitance of absence from the honse with existence outside being thus arrived at by the man at the door, the course of In- ference would be clear ; and there would be no need of any distinct means of knowledge in the sbape of Apparent Inconsistency.
87 Mere Negation we have also got with regard to such real existing objects as are at a distance—dne to the mere fact of our not having gone to that place. So mere Negation cannot be held to be a sufficient proof of non-existence.
38 The Objector urges : ^ Yon have a Negative premiss in the case of your stock example of Inference ‘ where fire is not, stnoke is not.’ Now, this would become impossible ; because so long 88 yon have not visited every place where fire is not, you cannot assert any concomitance between the absence of fire and the absence of smoke.,’’
40 We do not stand in need of any idea of the absence of smoke, in all cases of the absence of fire,—only two or three instances are sufficient for onr purpose, jast as we do not standin need of ascertaining the existence of fire in every case of the existence of smoke.
41 When affirmative concomitance has been ascertained (between the Fire and the Smoke), if only afew instances of the concomitance of their contraries be necessary, as you urge, for 8 successful issne of the Inference,—then the existence of Caitra in one place (the garden) being found to be concomitant with bis absence from another place (the house),—and thus evenia one place, the concomitance of absence from the
236 CLOKAVARTIKA.
42.43. But the fact is that in the case of Fire and Smoke, the exten- sion of these being limited, their concomitance is well-known, and even in the absence of any idea of concomitance hetween their negations, the exis- tence of smoke is enough for the recognition of the existence of fire. In the case in question on the other hand, one of the concomitants (absence everywhere else) having an endless extension, even an idea of concomitance 18 not possible.
44. ‘But the recognition of another place without Caitra, is in this wise: ‘Another place is such as Chaitra is absent from there,-—hecanse that place is other than the one where he is found to exist,—like another place before us (where he is found not to exist).’ ”
45. This argument is such 88 is also applicable to a contradictory con- elusion,—the process of reasoning being ‘another place is snch as Caitra is present there,—because it is a place other than the place hefore us (where Caitra, does not exist),--like the place (before us) where Caitra is seen to exist.’
46-47, When the person, as a whole, is found to exist in one place,— this not being otherwise explicable, we naturally eoncl ude that he cannot bnt be absent from everywhere else. Therefore even the recognition of your invariable concomitance can enly be arrived at by means of “ Appa- rent Inconsistency.” Soalso in the case where a sight of the effect leads to the notion of a potency, in the cause, ef bringing about the effect.
48-49. If it be urged that ‘‘the effect may be mads the Middle Term (and thus the case may be proved to beone of Inference),”’—(we reply), no; becanse (the arriving at the notion of the peculiar potency does not stand in need of any relation (of invariable concemitance). The Potency could be recognised (by means of Inference) enly when the fact of its being related (by concomitunce) had been ascertained, and not otherwise. Butin the recognition of this Potency, any application of Sense- perception, (Inference, Word, Analogy and Negation) is impossible ;
honse with existence in the garden having been ascertained,—the mere fact of the non- recognition of any fact to the contrary would lead us to the invariable concomitance of presence in one place with absence from another; and thus the road of Inference would be clear.
42.43 ‹‹ Hatension being limited ’’—hbecanse the clase ^^ Fire "` and the claes ^ Smoke ” inhere, in their entirety, in every individual fire and emoke, and thus their eoope being limited, the recognition of their concomitance 18 easily arrived at; and hence it 18 well known not to stand in any urgent need of the idea of the concomitance of their nega- tives.
46.47 Thus thon. Apparent Inoonsistenoy has a distinct and independent object of its own. In the ease of Canse and Effeot the existence of the effect would not be other- wise explicable ; hence it ia by means of Apparent Inconsiatency, that we are enabled to asenme the existence of a peculiar potency in the oause of bringing abont the parti. oular effect.
48.49 ^! Potency ” is not amenable to Sense-peroeption.
ON APPARENT INCONSISTENCY. 237
hence this can be cognised only by means of “ Apparent Inconsistency,” which is a correct means of knowledge (even) in the absence of the three factors of Inference.
50. In the case of the snake and the mongoose, the idea of their res- pective defeat and victory, based upon the fact of their standing to each other in the relation of the killed and the killer, 18 not cited (as an instance of ^^ Apparent Inconsistency”), becanse it does not differ from Inference.
51. Onthe hearing of such assertions as that“ being fat, a person does not eat during the day,” we arrive at the idea of his eating iu the night ; and this is a case of Verbal “ Apparent Inconsistency.”
52-53. Some people refer this to the Meaning, and others to the Word; and they declare it to be identical with ^ Verbal Authority.” Because, they assert, itis by means of this (Verbal ^ Apparent Incon- sistency’) that all Vedic rites are regulated; hence if this were different from ^ Verbal Authority” (and Scripture), such rites would become non-scriptural.
54. Others hold that the fact (of the person eating at night) forms the actual denotation of the statement heard (that ‘heing fat, he eats not in the day’). While there are others who hold it to be the deno- tation of another Sentence, intermixed with the denotation of the said statement.
55. The fact of his eating at night cannot be held to be the deno- tation of the statement heard ; hecanse a multifariousness of denotations is not proper (in words), and expressiveness does not belong to the Sentence.
56. The meaning of a Sentence is recognised, only in the form of a (syntactical) connection amoug the meanings of the words (constituting 16) ; and the denotation of ‘ night,’ &c., is not got at by means of the Sentence containing the word “ Day” (i.e, ^ He eats not in the day’’).
59 Other commsntators have cited thie as an instance of Apparent Inconeistency ; but the Bhashya 1188 not accepted it ४6८६186 it 18 only a process of Inference.
63.63 Some peopls hold that the result in this case is the fact of his eating at night. Others assert that the result is confined only tothe assertion, “‘he eats at night.”
¢ Vedic Actions, ¥c.”—Ths “ Apirva” ia aesumed, because the Causal Efficiency of the Sacrifice itself towards the final result ie not otherwise explicable.
९४ Hven among those who confins it merely to the word, there isa difference of opinion : Some hold that he eats at night forme part of the direct denotation of the 26867101 ^“ being fat hse eats not in the वक्ष. Others hold that the denotation of this assertion 16868 to another, viz: ‘‘ He eats at night.’? And the result of Apparent In- consistenoy 18 said to be the denotation of this latter aseertion as mixed up with, and led to hy, that of the former.
66 Therefore the fact of his sating at night cannot form part of the direct dsnota- tion of the Sentence ^“ be eats not in the day.”
238 QLOKAVARTIKA.
57. “ Hating at night” cannot constitute the syntactical connection of the Sentence containing the word “ Day.” Nor are “night, &c.,” parti- cular forms of ^ Day, &c.,” whereby these latter would be expressive of the former.
58. And again, since the Sentence (‘‘eats not in the day’’) has its full function in the denotation of another meaning (the denial of eating in the day), therefore no second meaning (in the form of eating at night) can he attributed to it. And for thig reason, this meaning (that of eating at night) must be (held to be) denoted by another Sentence (“‘ He eats at night”) present in the mind of the person (who has heard the assertion, ‘ Being fat, he eats not in the day ’’).
59. Though this Sentence (in the mind of the person, ४८2.) “ He eats at night’) partakes of the character of ‘“ Verbal testimony,’ yet, we have got to assert what, from among ^" Sense-perception”’ and the rest, is the means of getting at an idea of that Sentence.
60. Thus then, to a Sentence not uttered, % Sense-perception” cannot apply. Nor can Inference ; becanse this (Sentence—“ Hats at night ’’) has never been seen to be comcomitant with the other (Sentence—‘ Fat, 16 eats not in the day ’’).
61. Even when any relation (with the Sentence ५ Eats not in the day’) has not been recognised, if it be accepted to be the Middle Term (in the Inference of another Sentence, “ Eats at night,” which has not been found to be related to the other Sentence “ Hats not in the day’’)—then the mere utterance of such a Sentence would bring about tlhe idea of al] Sentences.
62. Nor are all Sentences, that are amenable to “ Apparent Inconsis- tency,” found to be related to all Sentences; and therefore there can be no Inference with regard to them. ^
63. Neither mere existence, nor any specific entity, can be recognised by means of Inference; 1n the present case, what is inferred (according to you) is only the mere existence or a particular Sentence (‘‘ Hats at night ’’).
64. And so, in the present case, the object of Inference is not (as it ought to have heen) an object, whose independent existence has been previously ascertained, as specified by a property the independent existence of which also has been previously recoguised.
6L ५५ All the Sentences.’”’—When there 18 no restriction as to the existence of the rela- tion of coucomitauce between the Sentences “ Kate at night’? and “ Eata not inthe day,” then, any and every Sentence could be taken to bring about the idea of all other Sentences in the world ; which is an absurdity.
68 The object of Inference has been proved to be a“ Simanya”; and hence mere existence, or any specifio entity can never form ite object.
64 In the present case, 16 would only be the existence of a definite object that would form the subject mattcr of Inference.
ON APPARENT INCONSISTENCY. 239
65. “ What we recognise (by means of Inference) is the Sentence that is heard (‘ Hats not in the day ’) as qualified by the other Sentence (‘ Eats at night’).”’ But in that case you would have a Muiuor Term such as has an unknown qualification.
66. Andagain, if you hold this (“ the Sentence heard ”’) to be the Middle Term, because of the absence of any other characteristic Middle Term ; then you will have the Middle Term (Minor Premiss) forming a part of the conclusion, as in the case of the Word.
67. In the same manner, we can disprove the fact of the Sen- tences having the character of objects and properties: If the Sen- tence “ Kats at night ” has not been ascertained, it cannot qualify the other Sentence; while if it has already been ascertained, it cannot be the object to be recogniscd by means of Inference.
63. In the abseuce of the particular relationship of action and agent, there can be no property ; and since one Sentence is not the denotation of another, therefore it cannot be 118 qualification, in the form of its object.
69. Ifit be urged that * inasmuch as one Sentence leads to the recog- nition of another, it must be held to be expressive of it,’—then in that case, we have the absurdity of a multiplicity of denotations, And the character of property, derived from Inference, would be useless,
70. Noris that Sentence (^ Hats at night”) cognised by means of the meanings of words (contained in the Sentence “ Hats not in the day”); because it is not in any way connected with them. The character of words is such that they indicate the particular forms of their denota- tions, because of the inconsistency of their general forms of these (in con- nection with the Sentence in which they occur).
85 ८* Unknown qualification ”’—becanse the Sentence “ Hats at night” can never be recognised as a qualification of the Sentence ^^ He does not eat in the day.”
66 That is to say, if the Middle Term be the same as the Minor Term,—viz., the Sentence that is heard. ‘ In the case of the word”—i.e., asin the argument brought forward to prove the fact of words having distinct denotations (see above).
68 ^ Since one Sentence, &v.”—The relation subsisting between the object and its 8 11081186 is not possible; because one Sentence 18 not the ohject of another. This rela- tion would he possible only if one Sentence were the expressed denotation of another.
69 ^ Derived from Inference, ¥c.’—This anticipates the following objection: ^ We grant that one Sentence is not the denotation of another; but one Sentence is clearly auch as if inferred from another,—and hence the sentence Hats not in the day, being the object of Inference hased upon the other sentence as its Middle Term, itself becomes the Middle Term $ and assuch could be laid down as the qualification of the other Sentence.”
The sense of the reply is that the Inference having been got at before hand, the subseqnent ascertainment of one Sentence being the qualification of another is entirely useless.
10 ^ The character of words, &c.’’-—The word “ jar ” denotes the class; but inasmnach as thia denotation is not consistent with the particular Sentence “ bring the jar,” it is accepted to indicate an individaal jar. There is no such relation of Clauss and Indivi- dual between the two Sentences in question.
240 CLOKAVARTIKA,
71. There is nothing in the words “ Fat, eats nut im the day ” that could not be compatible without the other Sentence (“ Hats at night `). Nor is there any other way in which the words ^ Eats not at day” can be related to that particular Sentence (^ Hats al uight’’).
72-73. Ifitbe urged that ^ we can assume a different Seutence denotative of the Sentence, ‘ Mats at night’ ’—then (we reply) tliat the same objection (of want of connection, &c.), wonld apply to this assump- tion also; for any number of such assumptions cannot hberate it from the (objection of) want of connection. Hence it would be far better to accept its denotation by means of the first Scntence.
73. And further, in the case of your Inference, both negative and positive concomitauce would he denied to exist, as in the case of the Word.
74. Noris there any similarity between the Sentence heard (‘‘ Kats not in the day ”’) and that which is not heard (“ Hats at night’). Hence the case cannot be oneof Analogy. Similarly with the meanings of the two Sentences.
75. Both similarity aud the character of being the characteristic Middle Term, having been precluded frum belonging 10 the Sentence, the same would be the case with the meaning (of the Sentence) also; hence the question caunot be included iu either of the other Means of Right Notion (^ Sense-pereeption, ’ &.)
76. The Sentence “ Eats at night” is assumed, because withont such a Sentence, the meaning denoted by the Sentence heard (“ He is fat, and Hats not in the day”) would be absolutely inconceivable,
77, ^“ (1) Why should not the above case be explained as—‘ because
72-13 “ Want of connection,’—hetween the words of the assumed Sentence and the Sentence “he eate at night.” For the sake of that connection, yon will have to assame another Sentence,—and 80 on Sentence after Sentence, ad infinituwn ; but uot, withstanding all these endlese assumptions, the want of connection will continue just the same; and in the end yon will have to accept the fact of = Sentence being recog- nised by means of an unconnected Sentence; and then the aesumption of a new Sen- tence becomes 1881688. And it has heen already proved that thereoan be no denotative relation between the two Sentences themselves. Hence your theory falle to the gronnd.
18 There is neither a positive invariable concomitance between the two Sen- tences, nor any conoomitance between the negatives of the two Sentences, &c., &o., &o., १8 wae explained in course of the refutation of the theory that meanings belongs to Worde.
1 “ Similarity.”—Since there is no similarity hetween the meanings of the two Sentenoes,
76 The Sentence heard ie, on the very face of it, impossible, and ite meaning conld never be conceived of as being in any way posaible, unless we reoognised the faot of his eating at night, whioh alone can render the meaning of the Sentence possible, to a certain extent. Andthne, inasmuch as the new Sentence is cognised simply with a view to avoid the inconsiastenoy of the Sentence heard, it mnet be admitted to be a cage of Apparent Inconsietenoy, pure and simple.
Tl "1118 ohjection emanates from one who holds that the object of Apparent Inconsisieucy is the meaning of the Senteice “ he eats at night” and not the Sentenoe
ON APPARENT INCONSISTENCY. 241
the meaning of the Sentence heard is not possible without that of the other Sentence, therefore it is this latter meaning that is assumed ’P And (2) like the meaning of a Sentence, why should not this also be included in ‘Verbal testimony ” ?
78. But all specially qualified cognitions are such that they presup- pose the words (that give expression to such cognitions). When the Sen- tence has once fulfilled its purpose, anything other than that cannot be held to form the object of ^ Verbal testimony.”
79. “If there be no connection (hetween the two Sentences ‘ Kats not in the day’ and ‘ Eats at night’), or even when existing, if it be not recoguised,—then (in that case), the Sentence (‘Eats at night’) being recognised would not be true, as it would not be based upon any Means of Right Notion.”
80. Is there any heavenly ordinance declaring the fact of such conne °. tion being a Means of Right Notion ? In that case, how can the character of such Means of Right Notion belong to ‘ Sense-perception,” which is ‘devoid of any such connection (or relation of concomitance) ?
81. If it be urged that ‘in the case of Seuse-perception there is connection between the object and the Sense-organ,” then (we reply that) at the time of the perception by the Sense, such connection (between the object and the Sense-orgau) is uot recognised by all persons.
82. एला one who recognises such connection does so only after he bas had the Sense-perception; and hence this connection cannot form part of the means of right knowledge (‘‘ Sense-perception,”) itself ; since so far as the functioning of Seuse-perception is concerned, the connection is as good as non-existent.
itself. (2) Just as, because the connection of the meanings of words is not possible, therefore even though it is not denoted by words, yet the meaning of the Sentence is assumed, and is accepted to be amenable to Verbal Testimony ;—in the same manner, in the case in question, the meaning of the assamed Sentence "^ He eats at night” being recognised in order to avoid the inconsistency of the meaning of the other Sentence, ९००1१ be accepted as an iustance of Verhal Testimony.
3 The first half of this Karika meets the (1) and the secend the (2) objection of the 1886 Karika. The object of Apparent Inconsistency—the cognition of the new Sen- tence—is a specified cognition, and as such, presupposes the existence of words (consti- tuting the assumed Sentence) ; and since the meaning will have been signified by these words, it could not be the object of Apparent Inconsistency. “‘ When the Sentence, Sc.’ —so long as the Sentence has not attained its object, whatever may he signified by it, must be accepted to be its denotation; and hence the meaning of a Sentence becomes the object of Verba) Testimony. So long as the words constituting it have not been construed with one another, the Sentence remains with its object unfulfilled. And as soon as the construction of the Sentence has been got at, it attains its object ; and when this has been fulfilled, if anything else happens to be implied by that Sentence, such snbseqnent implication cannot be accepted as the objoctof the Verbal Authority of that Sentence.
88 ‘* As good as, §c.’—Becanse it does notin any way help the cognition of the object, coming, as it does, ouly after sach cognition has been arrived at.
ol
242 CLOKAVARTIKA.
83. Some people (the Bauddhas) hold the “ Eye” and the ^^ Ear” to be such as to lead to the cognition of their various objects, without coming in contact with them ; and just as these people hold the fact of the cognition by means of these (Eye and Har) to be true (as being cases of Sense-perception), so we would also have in the case in question.
84. Therefore in the existence, or non-existence of connection: whatever cognition we have—provided that it be permanent (2.6. not con- tradicted by any subsequent correct cognition)—must be valid.
85. No one denies the fact of this (“ Apparent Inconsistency ”) being a valid means of right knowledge. The only difference of opinion is on the point of its difference or non-difference (from other means of right knowledge, Inference, &c.) And on this point we have arrived at a correct conclusion ( that ^ Apparent Inconsistency” is distint from all the other five means of right knowledge; and as such must be accepted as a distinct and independent means of right knowledge).
86. Ina place where, in the absence of connection, no cognition is produced, there is no help. But even in that case the connection does not constitute the ground (or cause) of validity.
87. Inthe ^ Mimansa-Castra” (1) Wherever a Crnti is assnmed on the ground of another Cruti, (2) When a passage is assumed to apply to a definite sacrifice through ‘ Power, é&c.,” and (8) Where the result, &c. (of a sacrifice) are assumed from ontside,—in all these cases we have no conception of any (inferential) connection.
88 Eye—and Ear—cognition is held to be trne even in the absence of any contact between these organs and the object (as held by the Banddhas) ; and hence jnet as want of connection does notin any way affect the validity of these oognitions, so too, in every other case, we conld not allow the validity of any cognition to be denied on the only ground of the ahsence of connection.
8५ The existence or ahsence of connection does not in any way determine the vali- dity of a cognition.
86 ^ There is no help ’’—7.e., we must admit the presence of connection to he a neces- sary concomitant of the validity of that particular cognition. “ Ground of validity. ’— The only such ground that we admit of isthe absence of any cognition to the contrary.
87 All these are cases of the application of Apparent Inconeistenoy. (1) In the absence of a certain Qruti,a Smriti passage appeare irrelevant or inconsistent; and with a view to thie a Qruti is assumed by means of Apparent Inconsistency, e.g., in the case of the Smritis treating of the Ashtakd, whose basis in the Qruti 16 only assumed. (2) A certain sacrifice 18 enjoined; but ite deity is not named there; and as withont a Deity, the sacrifice itself would be impossible; and with u view to remove this incon- sistency, we get at the name of the Deity throngh the force of a certain word in the mantra mentioned in connection with the sacrifice. (3} Inthe same manner, in the caso of the Vigwajit sacrifice, the result 18 not mentioned, and ag the injunotion re- mains incomplete and inconsistent in the absence of a result, we asenme a result, in the shape of the attainment to Heaven. And in all these three cases, the only way of getting at ४ satisfactory oouolusion is by moans of Apparent Inconsistenoy. And though in all these cases, no connection is recognised, yet no one can deny the validity and correctness of the assumptions.
ON NEGATION. 243
88. All these and such like cases would be inexplicable, if “ Ap- parent Inconsistency” were not different from “Inference.” If, even when having such a distinct form and character, the name “ Inference ”’ be given to it, then you may have your wish.
Thus ends the Chapter on ^ Apparent Inconsistency.”
(Szcrron 9). ON “NEGATION.”
1-2. Inthe case of an object where the aforesaid five means of knowledge do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object, we have Negation as the sole means of cognition. The ascer- tainment of the non-contact (non-existence) of an object depends upon the validity of this (Negation) as a means of cognition.
2-4, The nou-existence of curd in milk is called “ Prior Negation” (Pragabhava) (1) ; the non-existence of milk in the curd is called ‘“ Des- truction ” (Dhwansa) (2) ; the negation of the horse, &c., in the cow, and vice versé is known as “ Mutual Negation ” (Anyonyabhava) (8) ; the lower portions of the hare’s head, being devoid of hardness and a supernu- merary growth in the form of horns, is called ‘‘ Absolute Negation” (Atyantabhava) (4).
5-6. If Negation were not accepted as a (distinct) means of cogni- tiou, then we would have the existence of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of the jar in a piece of cloth, of horns in the hare, of intelligence in the earth, &c., of shape in the Soul, of odour in water, of taste in fire, of form together with these two in the Air, and of tangibility and these three in the Akaca.
7-8. Noragain could we have any usage with regard to the differentiation of causes and effects, &c., if Negation were not classified into
88 All that we want to prove is that the form and character of Apparent Incovsis- tency are distinct from those of Inference. ‘his having been satisfactorily proved, if even then, you persist in oalliog it ^! Inference,’ yon may doso. The word may be explained as that which is the means of something cognised after (or in the wake of) some- thing else (Anu=pagcat, miyaté anéna); and whea thus explained, the name * 4 01108108 7? 18 applicable to all the means of right notion. And as such, we have no objection to the name being given to Apparent Inoonsistency.
1-2 Says the Bhashya: ‘‘ Negation too, being an absence of all other means of notion, gives rise to the notion it exists not with regard to a remote object.” To this aa objection is raised: ‘‘ That which consists of the absence of the means of right notion cannot itself be the means of right notion”; and with a view to this objection, we explain the word ‘‘ Pramanabhava” (absence of the means of right notion) as the absence (or non-application) of the aforesaid five Pramanas. By means of these five objects as cognised as existing, while by means of Negation they are coguiseg as non-existing.
1.8 This Karika is levelled against those who hold that Negation being a non-entity can never be a means of right notion ; the curd does not exist while the milk lasts, it
244 CLOKAVARTIKA,
those of different kinds, such as Prior Negation, &c. Nor again is such classification possible with regard to a non-entity. Therefore Negation must be an entity. For what is the negation of an effect, other than 116 existence {continnance) of the cause ?
9. Or again, Negation must be an entity, like the cow, &c.,-because it is capable of forming the object of the notions of collective affirmation and differentiation ; and also, because it is an object of coguition.
10. Nor can it be asserted at will (without any grounds for so doing) that such a notion is only an (incorrect) imposition, or that it 1s 9 mis- taken notion; therefore the fact of the character of general and particular belonging to Negation cannot be said to be false.
11. By means of the word ^“ Pramanabhava” (in the Bhashya) is meant the non-appearance of ^ Sense-perception”’ and the rest. And this is either a particular modification of the Soul, or the cognition of another object.
12. With regard to an object, which is ever both extant and non-
ia only this prior negation of the curd wherein 1168 ita character as an effect. No sooner does the curd come into the exiatence than the milk ceaaes to exist; and itis in this subseqnent destruction of the milk that lies its character 98 the cause. The other examples of negation shown above wonld be impossible if we did not admit of the aforesaid classification of negation. And aince no olaasification ig possible for a non- entity, therefore we conclude Negation to be an entity ; the more so, becanee the nega- tion of an effect consists only in the existence of the canse, ९.९.) 80 long as the cause continnes to exist there is a negation of the effect.
Il If Negation be accepted to be a particular modification of the Sonl,—i.e. (in the present case), the negation of the particular modification of the Soul in the shape of the sensuone perception of the jar,—then, ench negation cannot bot be accepted ०6 २५ 1116008 of right notion ; inasmuch as it brings about the cognition of the non-existence of the jar ; and the effect of this means 18 the knowledge that the jar does not exist. If however, thia cognition of non-existence, arising with regard to a distinct object in the shape of the ubsenee of the jar, be called “ Negation,” then the effect thereof would be the acceptance or abandoning of the object, &c., &. The meaning of the aforesaid Bhashya passage would thoa come to be thia: “The absence of Sense-perception and tho reat giving rise to the idea that it is not, constitutes ‘ Negation,’ which is a distinct (the sixth) meana of right cognition.”
12 Every object has a donble character : with regard to ita own form, it exiats (7.¢., as jar, ॐ jar existe); while with regard to the form of another object, it does not exist (i.e. and as cloth the jar doea not exist). Both forma are eqnally entities ; sometimes people cognise the one and sometimes the other. This 18 levelled against the objection that inasmuch as thereigno anch independent entity ag Negation, apart from the 1 condition of the gronnd (६.९. as the non-exietenoe of the jar ina particular place is none other than the place devoid of the jar), and thie latter is amenable to Sense- perception, there is no room left for any other independent means of cognition in the shape of Negation. The sense of the reply is that the fact of the non-existence of the cloth in the jar simply 06808 that the Cloth in its non-existent form inheres in arother object, the jar, and as enoh, prodnces the cognition of its non-extant form
in the jar, And certainly this non-existent form of the cloth oonld never be cognisable by meana of Senae-perception, &c. Hence we obtain a distinct and independent
object for Negation, as a distinct means of cognition.
ON NEGATION. O45
extant with reference to its own form and that of another object respec- tively, some people cognise only certain forms at certain times.
13. We have the comprehension of the cognition of that form, which has come into existence, and with regard to which there is a desire (on the part of the agent) for comprehension, and itis by this that the cognition is named.
14. Bnt during all this time the other form continues (latent) helping the cognition of its connter-entity. Because in the cognition of each of these we always have the touch of the other.
15. The ascertained definite notion of positive existence—sncli as “ this is (the jar) and nothing else”—is not possible, without a tinge of the cognition of the absence of everything else.
16. Nor is the cognition “it (jar) does not exist” possible, withont a notion of the object itself ; for there can be no cognition withont an objective substratum.
17. ^“ Sense-perception ” and the rest apply to such cases where there 18 a comprehension of the positive (extant) form of an object; where, however, the object of comprehension is the negative form, the only action of these (Sense-perception) consists in their non-appearance.
18. The idea that ^ this is not’”’ is never brought about by means of the Sense-organs; becanse the Sense-organs are capable of having contact with positive forms only.
19. ‘Well, you have asserted that ‘ non-existence ’ is non-different from ‘ existence’; hence the Sense-organs conld have contact even with non-existence.” Not so; because we do not admit of an absolute identity between the two (what we do admit of is only comparative non-difference); as in the case of colour, &c.
20. Even when there is an identity of the object (as in the case of a fruit, which is only one), we admit of acertain difference among its properties, colour, taste, odour, &c. And the comprehension of these exis-
18 When the jar has appeared in its extant form it becomes cognised, and the cog- nition is called the ‘‘ cognition of the jar.” When, ou the other hand, it is the non-existent form of the jar that has appeared in connection with a particular place, we have a cognition of this non-existent form ; and this cognition is called the “ cog. nition of the absence of the jar”; and this latter cognition is the ohject of Negation.
16 In the cognition of the jar,an idea of the absence of the jar ever continnes latent, helping (hy its negation) the cognition of the jar itself, and the cognition of the absence of the jar is admittedly accompanied hy an idea of the jar itself.
19 Just as Colour, Taste, &c., are each different by themselves, hnt are considered non-different, as co-hering in the same substance.
80 Just as in the case of Colour, &c., there is difference in reality (though there is 2180 a seeming identity), so also inthe case of existence and non-existence; thongh they arereally different, yet they seem to be identical inasmnch as hoth of them inhere in the same object. The difference between the two is also proved by the fact that one of them (existence) is comprehended when it has appeared and the other (non- existence) has disappeared, and vice ४९15८.
240 CLOKAVARTIKA.
tence non-existence depends upon (the) (appearance of the one) and disappearance (of the other).
21. The ground of difference, too, is found to be this : In the compre- hension of existence we have contact of the senses as the means, while that of non-existence is independent of such contact,
22. Of colour, §c., too, some people explain in the difference to be based upon the difference in the means of their (respective) comprehen- sion ;—just as in the case of one and the same person having the character of Son (with regard to his father) and father (with regard to his Son).
23. (According to us) the difference among colour, §c., is always based on mere cognition. They cannot be held to form a composite whole on the ground of the identity of their location.
24. Colour, Taste, §c., are held to be one, on the grounds of their being entities and properties,—and as being both identical with the substance and each of these again is held to be different from the other, when considered individually in its own specific character.
25. In the same manner, if, in the case in question, we had not the difference based upon asimilar consideration of the individual specific character of each (existence and non-existence), then in other places we could not have any idea of the positive and negative characters of a cognition.
26. When there is a contact (of the Sense) with the object, then we have a cognition of its form and the notion that ४ 7s. On the other hand, the notion ¢ ¢5 not is due to the absence of such contact.
22 Some people hold that colonr is cognised by the eye and odonr hy the nose’; and in thie lies the difference of colonr from odonr. Just &8 the character of the Son is cognised with reference to the Father, and that of the Father with reference to the Son, sv, in the same manner, we conld have the difference between existence and none existence (as correlative entities).
#3 They are different simply because they are cognised to be different. ^ They cannot, §c.’—This 18 levelled against the ubjection that ‘‘ if anch be the case, then we would have an eternal difference between colour and taste, and between existence and non- existence ; and the idea of identity could be explained as being due to the fact of their existing in one and the same place ; and thug forming a single composite whole, which is cognised as the object (fruit, 1.2.) ” The sense of the reply is that this is not correct, inasmuch as an independent object forming the substratum of properties has been proved tu have an independent existence apart fram its properties (vide Chapter on “ Sense-perception ”’).
a6 If hetween existence and non-existence we do not accept buth difference and non- difference, in accordance with the afuresaid considerations, then, with regard tou one and the same object (jar f.i.), we could not have the cognitions of both its existence and non-existence, as based respectively upon its positive and negative forms.
48 The form of the place, heing in contact with the sense, is at once comprehended ; and the game place being (in the shape endowed with the presence of the jar) not in such contact, we have the notion that the place is devoid of the jar, and § छ, The Nydya-ratnakara enters into a lengthy disoussion as to the various relationships of this uon-existence.
ON NEGATION. QA7
27. After the object (the place where the jar is not) has been perceived (by the Eye), and the counter-entity (the jar) has been remembered, then follows the notion that ४ (the gar) 7s not, which is purely mental (and as such) independent of the Sense-organs.
28. Having (at first) seen the mere form (of a place), and latterly happening to remember a little of it, if one is asked as to the non-presence, in that place, of another object, he at once becomes cognisant of such non- presence (by means of “ Negation” pure and simple).
29. Nor (in the case of Negation) do we find the character of Infer- ence; because there isno Middle Term. If it he urged that “ we have for such term, the positive form (of the object whose existence is denied),” then (we reply) this cannot he, because the positive form does not form an object of cognition at that time,
80. There 18 an appearance of the cognition of the negative form only when the positive form does not form an object of cognition. When,
27 This anticipates the following objection: ‘‘The Hye perceives the place, and Negation brings ahout the idea of the non-ewistence of the jar; how, then, conld we have the notion of this non-existence as qualifying, or residing in, the particalar place P ” The sense of ths reply is that the process may be thas explained: (1) The place is ssen by the Eyes; (2) the jar (which has heen seen before, and which could have been seen if it had heen present) is remembered ; (8) then there follows a purely mental process which gives rise to the notion of thea non-existence of the jar. The qualified notion of such non-existence in a place can be explained as having besn brought abont by the collective action of all the aforesaid three processes.
23 A person has paseed the morning at acertain place;and all along he notices ouly the hare place, and nothing else enters into his mind. And in the afternoon he is asked if a tiger had been to that place in the morning. He calls np the place in his mind, and at once hecomes cognisant of the fact that no tiger had heen to the place ; and he replies to the same effect. Here we find that the non-exietence of the tiger had not been cognised while he was at the place; iu fact, no idea of the tiger had entered his head, so he could not have realised its ahsencs at that time. Noris the place 16018 his syes, when the question is put to him. Therefore tle idea of the non-existeace of the tiger that ha now has cannot bs said to he due to the action of the senses; nor canit hs said to be dus solely to the non- perception of something that could have heen perceived if it were present (it is spe- cially against this alternative of the Naiydyzka that the present Karika is levelled) ; hecause this would be thse cause of such notion of the tiger’s absence as would appear at the time the person was at the place. Asa matter of fact, however, in the above instance, we find that so long she was there the idea of the tiger never entered his head; and so the non-perception of the perceptible cannot he the canse of his 811166- qnent oognisance of thetiger’s absence, which mnat, therefore, he admitted to have heen the result of ^ Negation” pure and simple, as aided by the former perception of the place and the slight remembrance of it in the afternoon.
29 ^ At that time—i.e., when its non-existence was cognised. That which is not cognised cannot constitutes the Middle Term.
80 At the time that the object ie cognissd to exist, it cannot be coguised to be non-extant.
248 SLOKAVARTIBA.
on the other hand, the positive form has heen cognised, then there can be no coguition of the negative form.
31. Nor can this ( positive form) he the predicate of the Minor pre- miss, asin the case of the Word. And, again, no positivity is held to be concomitant with all negativity.
32. Even if we come across sucha case as where the existence of one thing (place) is accompanied by that of another (jar), even then, we may also come across a case where in the same case (of the existence of the place) we find the non-existence of another (jar).
33. Ina case where the non-existence of an object has never before been cognised, even in th at case, we find that the comprehension of its non-existence is independent of auy conception of invariahle concomitance.
34. If there be a cognition of the relation of invariable concomitance of the existence of any object with the non-existence of another object, then we would have the comprehension of everything in the world by means of such invariable concomitance.
35. Even when the existence of one object has been comprehended all people do not necessarily have an idea of the non-existence of every other object ; and thus, this being a case of non-coucomitance, the cognition of existence cannot serve as the Middle Term.
36. When any relation is comprelended, it is necessary that the members related shonld he cognised. And hy what means would yon have the cognition of non-existence (which you assert to be related by invariable concomitance, to existence) ?
37. At that time (i.e, prior to the comprehension of the relation). the cognition of the memher related could not be due to the Middle Term (because it has not yet heen recognised as such). Hence the cognition of non-existence must be asserted to be due to some other means of know- ledge (besides Sense-perceptiou, Inference, &c. ).
81 This is levelled against the view that the existence of the place (and not that of the jar) may he accepted to be the Middle Term. The sense of the reply is that it has been already shown (in the chapter ou “ Word”) that the Word cannot be the property of its denotation ; and the same process of reasoning may bo employed to show that so long as the non-existence of the jar has not been oognised, the evistence of the place cau- not he cognised as qualifying it. 5668०86 in the absence of the substratam where would the qualification subsist P
82 Though the presenee of the placo may be found in one case to be concomitant with the absence of the jar, yet at, another time we conld find the jar existing in the same place. No invariable concomitance botween the two is possible.
84 If, without any restrictions, the concomitance of the existence of the cloth with the non-existence of the horse were tobo avcepted as a means of obtaining a notiou of the uon-existeuce of the jar, then such an uanoontrolled premiss would be an universal solvent, briuging about the notion of everythine in the world.
85 Whenevor wo percoive a place it 18 not necossary that we musb directly become coguisant of the absence of everything 6186. Thus, thon, we find that no caso of exis- tence 18 invariably concomitant with non-existouce in genora),
ON NEGATION, 249
38-39. ^“ The non-appearance of Sense-perception and the rest, would constitute the Middle Term.” There can be no relation between this (non- appearance) and any particular case of non-existence. Then, there wonld be a distinct relation between this and non-existence in general. But non- existence in general 18 not capable of bringing about any cognition. And inasmuch as there is non-concomitance of this (non-appearance) with the particular cases, how could these be comprehended by means of that non-appearance) ?
88.89 Thies objection emanates from the Bauddha, and his positionis thue outlined in the Nydya-ratnékaré: “If that which 18 capable of being seen at a place happene to be not seen, then it cannot be existing in the place; and since I do not see a jar here (which I should have seen ifit had existed), therefore it does not exist here at this time. This is only a natural inference. Non-perception is nothing more than the per- ception of ane of the two objects of a relation; as,in the case ofthe place and the jar, we 666 the place alone; and this constitutes the absence of the jar. Thue then this non-perception heing only a phase of perception, we oannot have the endless series of negations urged ahove ; hecause the perception of one of the two memhers of a relation is cognisahle by means of the Sense-organe; and this 18 held to be identioal with the absence of the other member (the jar ) ; forthe sake of suoh usages 86 have been shown above. For these reasgone, the non-appearance of Sense-perception can very well serve as the Middle Term, in the case of Negation. Or the inferential process may be otherwise explained. The existence of a visible object is always accompanied by its perception ; consequently, the abeence of perception 76 mean the denial of oexie- tence.’? The 6666 of the reply is thus explained: The abssnce of the jar cannot he rightly inferred from the mere negation of Sense-perception, &c. Because euch = pre- miss could only lead to the inference of a general non-existence. Whileasa matter of fact, there never is any notion of such non-ewistence in general (which could be pose sible only at the time of the Universal Dissolution); the cognition of non-existence always reste in some partioular case of non-existence; and this cannot be inferred from a general negation, &c., inasmnoh ag even when the jar exists, we have a general form of negation (in the negation of the cloth). Thenthe non-perception of the jar may he the Middle Term. But we aek—whatis this non-perception of the jar? Ifit is, ४6 you say, only the perception of the bare place,then this latter is a general assertion, and is possible during the existence as wellas the non-existence of the jar; and as euch cannot lead to the Inference of the absence of the jar. Then, the perception of ००९ of the two members cannot serve as the Middle Term; because we have snch perception of one member, also when hoth the members are perceived. If the non- existence of the jar be explained as the non-perception of the jar,—then, at the tima of the inference of such negation, and aleo at the time of the compre- 16768107 of the affirmative premises, we would stand in need of a 8661168 of non- perceptions, one after the other, ad infinitum; and as in the cognition of the Middle Term, eo also in that of the Minor Term, we would have the same endless- ness ; hecanse you seek to prove the absence of the visible chjeot by means of the abeence of ite perception; this absence of perception also, heing an absence, could be cognieed (according to you) only by means of another absence ; and 80 on, ad infinitum. For these reasons, we must admit that the non-appearance of Seuse-peroeption, &o., is the means of the cognition of Negation, by itself, and not by heing made the Middle Term of an inferential argument;and when this has once bsen admitted, then upon this basis yon can raise any amount of infersntial fabric.
32
250 OLOKAVARTIKA.
40.42, Anythingjthat is not fully known cannot serve as the Middle Term. If it be urged tliat this (non-appearance) is well known,—then (we reply that) this too, being a negative entity, could have been cognised only by means of another negative entity (7.e., another non-appearance), as_ the Middle Term; this latter Middle Term too would have been compre- hended by means of another,—for nothing that is uncognised could ever be the Middle Term; and this cognition too could only be by means of another Middle Term ;—7.e., the Middle Term and so on, we weuld have an endless series (of Middle Terms). In the case of the Negation of the Minor Term too, we would have the same endless series. Therefore (in order to avoid this endlessness) you will be forced to admit of a resting- place where this (non-appearance, a negation) itself would be the means of coguition, even in the absence of a Middle Term.
43-44, An effect, in the shape of the notion ‘it is not,’ is seen to proceed directly from the non-appearance of Sense-perception, &c. ; and it is fer this reason that we accept the fact of this non-appearance being the means of the cognition, because of its immediate (and invariable) prece- ence. You (the Bauddha) hold that cognition to be inferential which is brought about by means of the threefold relation (the two causal, and one natural) ; and certainly a case of non-appearance (a negation) does not stand in need of a cause (and hence no causal relation is possible in the case in question).
45. Ifit be asked ^ how can negation bea means of cognition ? ” (we reply) of what form is the object thereof? Just as the object is negative, so would the means of cognising it be also negative.
46. Just as in the case of a positive entity, nothing negative can be the means of its cognition; so in the case of a negative object, nothing positive could he the means of its cognition.
47. There is no royal command to the effect that only a positive entity can be the means of cognition. The character of being the means of cognition would, in the case of both (positive and negative entities), rest upon the fact of their bringing about definite concrete cognitions of their respective objects.
48-49. Ifyou deny the fact of negation being a means of cognition, simply on the ground of its being a negative entity, taking your stand on the belief that in all cases it is only a positive entity that has been seen to be the cause,—then, in that case, a negative entity (non-appearance) could not be either a Middle Term, or an object of any cognition. And under such cireumstances, you could not explain the common usages shown above.
50. Neither the non-appoarances of other means of cognition, nora
43.44 “ Threefold relation.’—The Bauddhas hold that all Inference is hased upon only three relations : (1) that of the causo with the effect, (2) that of the offoct with the ८४९९) and (8) that based upon the epecific nature of the things ooucerned.
60 ^ 1९ place, Fc.,” because the place is seen, and is amenable to visual perception,
ON NEGATION. 99॥
negation, can be the property (or predicate of any thing). The place, where we have the negation (of the jar), ig not related to this (non- appearance).
51. The non-appearance may be related to something else, that is not near (us at that time). But this something else cannot be the object of cognition,—because it is devoid of thecharacter of predicate as well as that of the subject.
52. There would be relation of this (non-appearance) with Nega- tion, inasmuch as it has a negation for its object. But this fact of nega- tion being an object depends upon a comprehension of the negation; and when this (negation) has been comprehended, nothing is left that could be the object of the Inference (having the ‘ non-appearance’’ as the Middle Term).
53. Between the two there is no other relation, such as conjunction or Inference. Thus we see that 80 long as Negation is not comprehended, the character of the predicate cannot belong (to ‘non-appearance, &c.’) ; and when this has been comprehended, then your inference would become redundant (as proving what has already been comprehended, even before the comprehension of the premises).
54-55. (1) The absence of the other five means of cognition differs from these, ‘‘ Sense-perception,” é&c.,—becanse it is denoted by the Word “ Negation, ’—just as among the objects of cognition (by the six means of cognition), the object of “ Negation’ is negative, while those of the other five are positive entities. (2) Negation (or non-existence) is cognised by a means similar to itself (1.e., Negative),—hbecause it is an object of cogni- tion,—just as positive entities. Therefore ^ Negation” must be distinct from all things positive.
56. That all actions do not become related to all the results, that all sacrifices do not become related to all the subsidiaries, and that all these subsidiaries do ०५४ become related to one another,—all this is cognised by means of this (Negation).
57. Thus, by means of arguments, as well as by Verbal testimony, the six means of cognition have been differentiated aud defined in the Bhishya. Besides these (six) two other means of cognition are accepted by some people. But these are included in the aforesaid six. Hence the sixfoldness of the means of cognition is established.
58. The notion of “ hundred” as existing inthe ^ thousand ’’—ex- plained as being due to “ Probability ’—is only brought about by the fact of the invariable concomitance (of a hundred with a thousand) ; and as
81 A positive entity cannot be a subject having a negative entity for its predicate nor can it be the predicate of a negative subject ; because the two are mutually con- tradictory.
61 Verbal testimony,”—i.e., ou the authority of Jaimini, who has enunciated only six means of right cognition.
252 CLOKAVARTIKA.
such, it is identical with Inference. And much of what is known in the world as “ Tradition” is not always trne; and whatever happens ४ be true that does not differ from ^ Valid Testimony.”
Thus ends the Chapter on Negation.
Section 10. CITRAKSHEPA.
1. In the first instance, our opponents (the Bauddhas, &c.), had objected to the Vedie passages appertaining to supernatural results (as Heaven and the like); whereas in the present passage it is passages ap- pertaining to worldly results (acquirement of cattle, &c.), that are objected to,—-and this too by the author of the Sutra.
2-3. “ (1) Passages, treating of the Citra sacrifice, &c., as leading to such results as the acqnirement of cattle, &., are false,—because, though they treat of perceptible objects, yet no such objects are actually perceptible. And again, that which is so (treating of perceptible objects, and found to be devoid of any such objects) is alwaye found to be false,—just as the assertion of a liar that ‘there are fruits on the river bank,’ when no such fruits are found to exist.
4-5. ^“ (2) And again, the Citra sacrifice cannot lead to the acquirement of cattle,—becanse it does not bring about such a result at the time of its performance, as do bath and feeding, &. Or, (3) the acquirement of cattle cannot be the result of the Citr& sacrifice,—because it is not seen to exist at the time that the sacrifice is performed,—like Heaven, and the pleasures of satisfaction. As a negative instance for both these syllogisms we may have pleasure attending upon shampooing.
6. “If it be urged that immediate sequence is not meutioned (in the passage Cttrayd yajéta pngukdmah),’—we deny this, because such im- mediate consequence is clearly implied by the assertion; and it is also signified by implication, which also forms part of the Word.
I“ At first,’—i.e., when the validity of the Veda was questioned. (Vide supra). This refere to the Bhashya passage—“ Sense-perception and the rest are the meane of right cognition; but how is the Word, &c., &c.” The former objection wae aimed at the passages mentioning superphysioal resulte, and emanated from opponente. The present objection however is aimed at the passages speaking of worldly results, and is made by the author of the Vritti to proceed from the aphorism itself,
2.3 ‘ Absence, &c.,’'—i.e., cattles are not geen to follow immediately after the sacrifice.
4-5 Bath and Feeding produce resnits at the time of their accomplishment. Heaven, &c., are not found to exist when the ‘Citra’ gacrifice i performed ; and as such cannot be said to be its effects. The same may be said also of such 76168 aa the acquisition of cattle, &o. Pleasure is felt at the time that the shampooing is done. But euch is not the case with the Citra sacrifice and the acquisition of Cattle,
9 The sense of the objection to the objections is that the above arguments fall:
CITRAKSU EPA. 0
7, ‘Because no other time is specified, and because such is the character of actions in general, therefore immediate sequence must belong to the case of such enjoined sacrifices as the Citra and the like.
8. “In the above instance we bave non-agreement with ordinary perception ; in another case we have utter contradiction ; becanse we see with our eyes, the body being burnt to ashes, which is contrary to a journey to Heaven.
9. ‘The passage mentioning ‘ yajna@yudhi,’ &., is false,—because of its contradiction by Sense-perception. As an affirmative instance (of simi- larity in this syllogism) we have the stone-passage (^ Stone is floating ”) ; and as a negative instance (of dissimilarity) the assertion of a trustworthy person.
10. “If the sacrificer he said to be something apart from the body (that is burnt) then, in that case, that something could not hold the sacrificial implements (and hence could not be called ‘ Yajndyudhi’). Nor again, could the character of yajamdna belong to this something. In fact the very fact of the existence of any snch thing (apart from the body) can hardly be believed.
11. “ If this (passage of heaven-going) werea direct injunction (like the Citra passage), then there would have been no difference between this and the instance of non-perception (instanced in the Citra passage) ; and ag such it would not have heen mentioned separately.
12. ‘ And again, if the passage were an injunction, then the contra- diction could have been removed, by assuming the result to follow at some future time. Asa matter of fact, however, the passage is only an assertion of an event affirmed to happen at the present time; and as such it does not admit of any such explanation of the contradiction.
to the ground, becanse the passage does not lay down that the acqnisition ot cattle 16 to follow immediately after the performance of the sacrifice. But the original objec- tor replies that thongh such immediate sequence is not directly mentioned, yet it is distinctly implied by indication, which is only a particular form of verbal denota- tion.
8 Another case,”—1.e., the passage “ sha yajndyudhi yajamanah anjasad swargam lokamyati,’—-referring to the sacrificer, who is dead, andis placed upon the funeral pyre with all the sacrificial implements in his hands,—lays down that such a sacrificer proceeds directly to Heaven. The sense of the objection is that inasmuch as the body which bears the implements, is seen to be burnt to ashes, the mention of its journey to Heaven is contradictory to direct Sengse-perception.
9 The assertion of a trustworthy person 28 always in keeping with facts of Sense- perception ; and it is only as such that itis trae. The present case is not so; hence it must be false.
ll This Karika refers to the Bhashya passage“ na ca na yatzti, &.,” and is with reference to an objection that such an assertion of the Bhashya is snperfluons; because whether the passage is a Vidhi or not, it makes no difference in the above arguments. The sense of the Karika is that the Bhiashya adds this in order to differentiate the pre- sent passage from the Citra passage,
2544 CLOKAVARTIKA.
13. “Though, asa matter of fact, the body being burnt, the as- serted result could not belong to it, even if the passage were an injunc- tion,—yet on the strength of (such) aninjunction there could be an as- sumption (of something apart from the body, to which the result, Journey to Heaven, would appertain); and it is such an assumption that is set aside hy the Sentence (‘Na ca na yatiti vidhih’).
14. “Such (contradiction of facts of Sense-perception) is found to be the case with almost all Arthavadas and Mantras; hence all these may he made the subject of the above proposition (४.९. asserting the falsity of such vedic passages as those above cited ‘ Usha yajnayudhi, &९., &e.)
15. “Such being the case, falsity would also belong to the passages laying down the Agnihotra, &c. ;—because they are parts of the Veda,— like the Citra passage, &c.”
Thus ends the Chapter on Citrakshépa.
Secrron 11. SAMBANDHAKSHEPA.
1-2. The argument proving the theory of the author is this: (1) Vedic assertions are not false,—because in regard to their own siguifica- tions, they are independent of the speaker,—like the notions of the word and its denotation. (2) Or, Ideas originating in the Veda are trne,—because they arise from sentences that are eternal,—like the signification of a Sen- tence. And iu this case we also have the support of the arguments shown before (under Aph, 2).
8-4. Taking his stand upon the fact of the relation between word and its meaning being eternal, the author of the Bhashya has set aside the invalidity of the Veda in order to establish its self-evidential charac- ter. And after this has been done, the objector declares its falsity on the ground of its originating in the absence of any relation (between word and its meaning).
4-5. That there is a relation, and that it is eternal have been declared, by the assertion ^ Autpattikastu, &c.,” with a view to set aside the falsity (of the Veda). Both of these facts are denied by the objector; of these two, that there is no relation between Word and Meaning is here consider- ed; and that itis non-eternal will be considered laterou. (Kadrikds, 45, 46).
19 That is to say, since the condition of contradiction is the same, such Mantras may also be held to be false, on the sole ground of their being contrary to Sense- perception.
1.2 In the Bhashya, we have ^ autpattikastu, 4८.) ` which proves the theory of the trustworthiness of the Veda, &c., and leaves for a while tho objections urged in the “ Citrakshépa ” ; becanse when the anthentioity of the Veda has been once established, on the strength of that, we would have all objections answered.
8.4 Says the Bhéshya: ‘The word has no relation with its meaning, whence oould it be due to human origin?” The meaning of this is that when the relation
SAMBANDHAKSHEPA. 255
6-10. Since no other relation is possible, contact or connection alone remaius 06010. And it 18 in this relation alone that we have the sure cog- nizance of ordinary people. Consequently it is the presence of this relation (between word and the object denoted) that is denied (by the objector) in the following manner: “The word is not related to the object denoted,—be- causeit is not fonud to exist simultaneously in the same place with the other,—like the Vindhya is not related with the Himalaya.” In the same manner non-relation may be proved with regard to the object denoted, or with regard to both of them. In order to establish the minor Premiss of the ahove argument (that they are not found to exist in the same place), the instance of the ‘razor,’ &c., has been brought forward (by the objector in the Bhashya). Men of the other party (that of the author himself), taking their stand upon the relation of denotativness (expressiveness ), say: If the objector seek to disprove the existence of the relation of contact, then your effort is superfluous (because we also deny this in the case of the word and its meaning); if, on the other hand, you seek to disprove the existence of all relation, then your argument is contradicted by such cases as those of the words “ Father” and ^“ Son,” &e. Similarly Gf all relation be denied) then the predicate (absence of all relation) of the conclusion fails, in the case of the instance of the Vindhya and the Himalaya, which bear to each other, the relation of existing on the same Earth.
11-12. If the relation of expressiveness he denied, then there is con- tradiction to ordinary usage; and contradiction also to the objector’s own declaration,—because it 18 not possible, by means of words devoid of all relation (with their meanings), to explain one’s theories to the other party.
between the Word and its meaning has been ascertnined to be eternal, it wonld also imply the eternality of the members related; and being eternal, these could not have any discrepancies, in the shape of falsity and the like,—and these having been set aside, the self-sufficient anthority of the Veda would become established. Consequently, in order to strike atthe very root of this reasoning, the objector is made, in the Bhashya, to deny all relationship between the Word and the Meaning.
6-10 Says the Bhishya: ‘ If there were any relation between the word and the meaning, the utterance of the words ‘ Razor’ and ‘Sweet Cuke’ wonld bring about a cut in the face and its filling with sweets respectively.” It may be objected to this assertion on the part of the objector that there 18 no such rule as that the two mem- bers related should always co-exist in the same place. With a view to this it has been declared that no other relation save that of Conjunction or Contact is possible, between the Word and its meaning ; and hence whenever one of them would exist, the other would snrely exist. ‘ The other party, &§c.”'—says the Bhashya: ^ That relationship which can be here pointed ont, d&c.”’
6.10 ^“ Pather and Son.”—In the case of these words, there is certainly a relation between their denotatious,—and as such a total denial of the relationship between the denotations of all words is not true.
11.1% ** Devoid, &c.”—as declared by the objector.
296 ` QLOKAVARTIKA.
12-13. Then, as a matter of fact, in the action of denotation (or ex- pression) the objective character belongs to the object denoted, and that of instrumentality or agency to the Word ;
13-14. Since both (word and meaning) are predicates in the com- prehension (of assertions), and as such both are accepted to he concomi- tant ; and the relation of the word and its meaning consists iu the fact of both of them being restricted to one comprehension.
14-15. Though there can be no relation between the different cases, yet in the case of an.action, we have the fact of one thing being the helper and another the helped, cognised through the connection of that action; and it is this (fact of the meaning being tle helped and the word the helper) that constitutes the particular relation between Word and Meaning.
13.13 The action of denotation, belonging to the Word, has for, its result, the com- prehension of the meaning; and this is none other than a knowledge of the Word which, when considered in relation to its result in the shaps of the comprehension of the object denoted, is known as the action of denotation, And in such a case, that which is the object of comprehension, is accepted to be the object denoted by that Word ; and the Word 18 sither ths msans of coomprehensicn, or the agent that makes the meaning comprehended hy the person; the consideration of these two alternatives is reserved for a future occasion.
18.14 This anticipates the following objection : “ Even if the above facts be accepted, all that they oan prove is that the Word and ths Meaning belong to a single action of denotation, and not that they are in any way related to one another.” The sense of the reply is that in the case of the predicates of propositions (as both the Word and the Meaning are in the present case), the fact is that by the force of the action in which they cohere, they are made concomitant ; and therefrom results the relation of mutual restriction. Even between ths Sabject and the Predicate, there is this con- comitance. The subject draws the action to itself, and the action reverts to it only - after it has taken with itself the Predicate which forms a part of its own. In the case in question, the predominant factor is the object denoted; and this, witha view to the accomplishment of its comprehension, takes to the action of Denotation ; this latter, in its turn, takes to the Word. And thus, between the Word and its Meaning, there is the relation of being restricted fo the same action (of Denotation). This rule of restriction is thus explained: That action of Denotation which has the word ^ Cow” for its instrnment has for its objective, the object cow; and conversely, that whioh has the object cow for its objective has the word ^ Cow” for its instrument. Thongh this restriction could not apply to the case of words with many meanings, or when the same object is denoted by many words,—yst asa rnle, we do not admit of auch words and synonyms; as this would make the signification of the words in a particular context doubtfal. However ina case where we do come across such words, anthorised by the scriptures, we are forced to accept the chanoe of doubifulness. But the relation above explained remains intaci, in the generality of oases, the other cases bsing only exceptions to it.
14.16 The Word being the imsirument and the meaning the objective. The Word helps to make | the meaning comprehended and thns capable of usage; and thus, there is between tho Word and its Meaning, this relation of the helper and the helped, which is the same as that of the expressor and the expressed.
SAMBANDHAKSHEPA. 257
16. It has already been proved (above) that invariable concomitaice is not the means (of signification).
16-18. “If by the Word ‘Sanjna’ (name) be meant the fact of its being the means of comprehension, then it could not be the integral part of denotation. The name is postulated by usage according as the Word is found leading to the comprehension (of the meaning); and the name itself १५९३ not signify the meaning, so long as the relation (of the name with the meaning) has not been ascertained. Therefore the expressiveness of the name follows subsequently, as in the case of smoke (which leads to the inference of fire, after the tmvariabla concomi- tance of the two has been ascertained). And hence, like the smoke, it (name) would not form the integral part of denotation.”’
18-21. This (Sanjna&) is not of the same character as smoke, &c. Because in the case of these latter, the imference (of fire from smoke) results after the invariable concomitance (of fire and smoke) has been ascertained, before which there is no idea of the smoke as being the means of comprehending (the existence of fire); whereas in the present case (of Verbal denotation) there is no idea of invariable concomitance before that of the denotativeness (of the Word). Whenever the relation (of the Word and the Object denoted) is recognised through the asser- tions of old (knowing) people, there—and in no other form—at once follows the idea that the Word is the means of the comprehension (of the said meaning).
21-24. In some places old people assert that ‘such and such a meaning is to be understood by such and such a Word;’ in other places they say ‘this is the expressive (Word) and that the expressed (mean- ing);’ while in other cases, younger people find that there is an action (of the middleaged person following the Verbal utterance (of an old person directing him to a certain course of action), and thereby they infer that the middleaged man must have comprehended the meaning (of the older man’s utterance), and decides that ‘ because the middleaged man has understood the Word to denote such a meaning, therefore ordinary people know these to have the characters of being the expressive and the expressed respectively.’
16 The concomitancs is recognised only after the denotation has bsen accomplished, and never before that.
18.41 In the cass of smoke, the comprehension 18 preceded by the idea of invari- able concomitance, whereas in the cass in question, it is quite the reverss.
94.26 This anticipates the following objection: ^ Inasmuch as it is only a Sen- tence uttered by the old man that is found to express a meaning, dsnotativensss must belong to the Sentence, and not to the Word.” The sense of the reply is that though at first there is such a mixed np comprehension, when the Sentences ‘ bring the cow’ 18 pronounced,—yet when it is followed by another direotion—‘ take away the horss,’ and the other person acts accordingly,—then the boy looking upon the scene comes to comprehend the meanings of the words ^ cow = and “horse,” apart from the Sentences.
33
258 QLOKAVARTIKA.
24-25. Thus, though, in the beginning, the denotativeness (of a Word) is found to he mixed up (in the Sentence), yet, subsequently, by means of affirmative and negative concomitance, the meaning of the Word is asser- tained apart from the Sentence.
25-26. On account of the presence of such multifarious denotations, partaking of such diverse factors as class, property, substance, action, and the manifold sub-divisions of these, quickly brought about both directly and indirectly (by indication),—ordinary people have no cause to enquire into a definite ascertainment of the one specifie object of denotation.
27-29. People versed in Syntax (the Mimansakas) however only dis- criminate itin order to get at the comparative strength and weakness (among the diverse significations of a Word). (For instance) a word denotative of the class is weak when expressing a particular individual through. indication, because such indication (of the particular individual by a word denotative of the class) is intervened by the class (intervening between the word and the individual indicated). Therefore it is necessary that some discrimination be made as to how much forms the (direct) denotation of a Word, and how much is indicated by means of the denota- tion, through an eternal relation.
29-31. Since when the general word (‘cow’) 18 used, and there is no mention of any particular kind (of cows), we find the former (general name) applying to the particular (kind of cow) also; and again since when a higher genus is named (1.2. ‘living beings’), if the particular
When the werd ^ cow ” is uttered, the person brings a particular animal, which ie not bronght when that particular ie net nsed. Snch are the affirmative and negative pro- cesses hy which the denotations of individual worde come to be ascertsined.
27.29 The sumnum genus is the class ‘eubstance,’ and as the species inclnded therein, we have the classes, ‘ Earth,’ ‘living beings,’ ‘cow ’—the one following being 9 species under the preceding class, “Earth” isa specific of the class ‘ snbstance,’ aud generic with regard to ‘ living beings.’ Now, if the word ‘ Earth’ be made to express the specifie class of ‘ living beings,’ it can १० 8९० only by directly denoting the clase £ Warth,’ and thereby indicating the class ‘living beings’ as included within itself ; this indication being necessarily intervened by the denctation of the class ‘ Earth,’ and thereby being a little weakened in the 110०6668, We have a Sentence in the Veda—“ Ahavaniyé juhoti”; here the word ‘juhati’ directly denotes the hama in general, and indicates, through that, the particular Hama, the “ Patnisanyaja,” for instance. Another sentence ise—“ Garhapatyé patnisanyajan” ; which directly denotes the particular Hamas as to be performed in the Gdrhapatya fire; and hence we find that the relation of the Patnisanydja to the Gdérhapatya ie much closer than that with the Ahavaniyas; and accordingly this latter is eet aside in favour cf the former. If the comparative strength of denotation, &c., were not determined, then we would have no standard by which to arrive at a definite conclusion in the case cited.
29.31 When the word “Cow ” isnttered, even if the partioular ‘‘red” kind of cow be not mentioned, the former generic name ^ Cow” is found to apply to all the different kinds of cows; and thus we see that wherever we have the class ‘cow’ we havethe name “Cow.” Onthe other hand, when a higher Genne—‘“ Substance” or “ livings beinge’—is named, even if there is no mention of any other species than the
SAMBANDHAKSHEPA. 259
1
81066168 of this (‘cow ’) be not named, the former name (‘ hving beings’) does not give any idea of (the particular ‘class cow’); therefore from such affirmative and negative concomitance, there arisés the idea that the word ‘cow’ denotes only that object which has the dewlap &c.
31-32, Thus we find that at first we have (in the word cow’) the character of signifying (the object cow); and based npon this is its deno- tativeness (or expressiveness) : and this 18 the relation, of the name and the named, which is here spoken of as a restricted particular relation, ‘ wva- riable concomitance.’
33. ‘Inasmuch as, prior to the recognition of the relation (between the word and its meaning), the words ‘cow,’ &c., do not signify the object,—such words cannot have any denotative power,—like the words ‘Devadatta’ and the like.”
34, Just as it is by usage alone that a word is cognised as signifying an object, so it is in the same manner that we have the cognition of its Denotative power, which is recoguised to be the means of that sig- nification.
35. Just as the cognition of the form of the word helps the final result (in the shape of the recognition of the meaning of the word), so also does recognition of the relation (between the word and meaning) ; and this does not take away the denotative power of the word.
cow, we do not have the word “cow `" applying, in the absence of the definite class ‘Cow.’ Thus we find that when the cow exists, the name र Cow” applies toit; and when it does not exist, the name does not apply,—snd accordingly we conclude that the object cow, as characterized by the presence of the dewlap, &., 18 denoted by the word “ Cow.”’
$1-38 The particular means of signification are threefold:{1) the senses, which, by their mere presence, give rise to the idea of the object, as heing in contact with themselves ; (2) the Inferential Middie Term, which gives an idea of the conclusion through the premises; (3) the expressive power of Words, which gives an idea of the ohject, immediately after it has been ascertained that euch & word signifies such an object. Inthe case cited, we find that 88 8007 ss the mere fact of the word ^“ Cow ” signifying the object cow has been ascertained,—even if no other relation between them is recognised—, west once obtain an idea of the signification of the word ^ Cow,” whenever it happens to be pronounced ; and from this we conclnde that euch a 81111. fication, in the absence of sny other relation, must he based upon 4 relation other than those of the Sense-organs and the Middle Term ; and to this particnolar relation, we give the name “ Denotative” or ^" Expressive”; and it is this relation that has been culled 4 invariable concomitance ** above ; becanse in the case of the Word and ite meaning, we cannot have the ordinary invariable conoomitance based upon the identities of location or duration.
83 The objector has been made to urge, in the Bhashya, that “if the wordis ex- pressive of the object, wherefore does it not signify it the first time that it is heard by a person ”? This argument is explained in the Karika: just as the word “ Devadatta” can have no inherent denotativeness, &o., &c.
89 “ Means *—i.e., the process whereby the object is signified by the word, This
act_does not strike at the denotative power of the word.
260 CLOKAVARTIBA.
36. In fact, whatever is known to be the means of the accom plish- ment of anything, it always stands in need of auxilliary causes; but this does not destroy the power (or capability) of the former accepted cause.
37-38. There is no cause, either in the ordinary world or in the Veda, which does not stand in need of an accessory aid, afforded by a knowledge of the process (of the cansal action), which latter is necessary for the accomplishment of a full idea of every causal relationship.
38-39. The cause is distinguished from the process, by means of a discrimination of the intimate (cognate) from the foreign (h eterogenous) ; and sometimes the said distinguishing depends upon the option of the speaker; for when one is much troubled by darkness, he is fonnd to ex- claim ‘ what is the use of my eyes, when my seeing has to be brought about by the aid of the lamp’ ?
40. Butasa general rule, we find that, since a blind man cannot see even by means of hundreds of lamps, therefore in the case of the perception of colour, &c., the only manifesting cause is the eye (and not the lanip).
41. The eye is accepted to be the canse, (1) becanse it is cognised to be stronger (in the case of the specific visual perception) than the con- nection of the body, soul and mind, on the ground of (these latter being common to all perception, and the eye itself) having a specific relation (to the perception in question), and (2) becanse it is found to be in closer proximity to the seat of visual perception (than the accessories, lamp, &c. )
42. In the same manner, in the casein question, the cognition of the relation (between word and meaning) is only an accessory. If you
86 It is not the Word alone that stands in need of an accessory in the shape of the cognition of the relation between the word and ita meaning; suoh ia the case with everything that 18 known to be 8, cause.
ध Even in the cage of visual perception we have the need of light; but thie does not in any way affeot the fact of the eye having the faculty of vision. In fact, a knowledge of the procees of the operation of the canses,—of the Hye for instance,— 18 necessary for the full recognition of its causal efficiency.
38-89 This anticipates the following objection: ‘‘When both the cause (the denota- tive power of the word) and the process (the oognition of the relation between the word and mesning) are expressed by the word, what standard have you got to differentiate the cause from the procedures’??? The reply isthat that which ie more cognate ie the cause, and that which 18 lees 80 18 the process.
41 This anticipates the following objection: “We do not see even when the eye is fully aotive, if there is no relation between the Soul and the Body, and the Soul end the Mind (i.e., if there is absent-mindedness), therefore it is this latter connection that must be accepted as the cause of perception.” The sense of the reply ie that the me connection is a factor common to all perceptions, and ae such, cannot be acoep- ted as the apecific cnuse of s particular perception,—that of the eye for instance.
42 The real 08.786 18 the word, on account of its 01086 proximity to the denotation. If even then you persist in holding the cognition of the relation to be the cavse, you are welcome to it; and we will not try to persuade you any further.
ON SPHOTA. 261
hold it to be the cause, on the ground of simplicity, then wherefore should anyone dissuade you from such a course ?
43. The passage of the Bhashya beginning with “ just as the eye, &c.,” points out the contradiction (involved in the argument brought for- ward by the objector, in Karika 33). And, as a matter of fact, even in the case of ‘ Devadatta’ (cited as an instance,. in the same Karika), people accept the presence of a latent (denotative power).
44, Inasmuch as even in the presence of external lights in the shape of lamps, colour, &c., are not perceived by the blind, and because of the immediate sequence of the final result (visual perception) (to the action of the eye), the Eye is accepted to be the cause (४,९.) the means of visual perception)
45, ‘ The relation of the name and the named (४.९) the denotative relation) has its recognition dependent upou human agency; and as such it does not exist prior to the existence of men. If such relation be desired, then it cannot but be caused (६.९. not eternal).
46. ‘Since the two are located in different places and time, therefore, there is no similarity between these two (Name and the Named), —just as between the jar and a piece of rope, and hence there cannot be any natural relationship between them.”
Thus ends the chapter on ^ Sambandhakshépa.”
Section 12, ON “ SPHOTA.” 1, When the substrate has been recognised, the comprehension of the object of which it is the substrate becomes an easy matter. And
because the enquiry deals with the relation, therefore the Bhashya has said ‘now, in the word ‘ cow,’ &.”’
43.“ Latent,” ¢.e..—bronght about in full force, as eoon as the name is given to a particnlar individnal—( Vide ch. on “ Senss-psrception”’),
46 “ Human Agency ’”’—the cognition of ths meanings of words has bssn shown to be dependéni upon the ntterances of experienced persons, &o. This shows that, prior to the oxistencs of thess psople, ths relationship between ths word and its msaning did not exist, And as such it cannot be eternal, as laid down in the Bhashya.
46 It isa fact of ordinary sxperience that a relation isfonnd to subsist between two objects that are in some way identical. The name and the named (i.e, ths word and ite meaning) however, aro in no way identical, sither in extension or in duration, as shown by the Bhashya: “The word isin the mouth, 4८.) /c.,”. Just as, there being no natural connection between ths jar and the rope, their only connection is bronght about by human agency,—so, in the same manner, in the case of the word and its meaning, thers being no natural relationship, the denotativenoss of words cannot but 06 accepted to be crsatod by human agency; and as anch, it cannot bs said to be sternal,
I Saysthe Bhishya ‘‘ Now then in the case of ‘Ganh,’ which is the word” ?
262 QLOKAVARTIKA.
2. Who by himself would give any reply to such theorists as hold theories contrary to the facts of Seuse-perception ? Consequently the Bhashya cites the opinion of a revered person.
3. Those, who hold the cognition of the word to depend upon tbe comprehension of its meaning, may rest for the time being. At present we consider the cognition of the word as (it appears) through Sense- perception.
4. Our “Sense-perception” is not incapable (of giving rise to the cognitiou of the word) ; and when the object (the word) has been ascer- tained by means thereof, no other more capable means is possible, with reference to which (the cognition of word) could be considered.
9. Therefore when tlie word 1198 been cognised by the Ear, whether if denotes its meaning or not, it has the character of the Word; and it is only thus that the fact of common experience is not contradicted.
6. Ifthe capacity of the word ‘ Word’ depend upon the compre- hension of the meaning, then an eutity, other than the Word, will have to be postulated,— because the word ‘ Word’ is not ordinarily known to be so dependent (upon the comprehension of meaning).
7. Because smoke, &c., leading to the comprehension of the existence of fire, &e., cannot be said to be words; and again because they do not give any sense,—the name ^ Cabda’’ could not be denied to single letters.
8. Even prior to the comprehension of the meaning, if a word be duly cognised by the Ear, the name ‘ Word’ cannot be denied to it. Con- versely, even if a meaning be comprehended, the name‘ W rd’ cannot apply to that which is not comprehended by the Ear.
The Karika anticipates the objection that the opponent has objected to the presence of any eternal relation between the word and its meaning; and hence what wae necessary for the Bhashya to do was to prove the eternality of ench relation. The sense of the Karika is that after the nature of the word itself has been ascertained, the considera- tion of its relations becomes an easy matter,
2 Says the Bhasya: “The word ‘Ganh’ is nothing more than the letters ga, au and the Visarga—as declared by the revered Upavarsha.” The Kariké means that the name of Upavarsha is given, not with a view to ehow that the opinion is not a— greeable tn the Author himself, but only tc cite the authority of a revered person; asthe Auther dare not contradict, by himeelf, the pet theories of snch clever people as the Vaiyakaranas, who hold the word to be something quite apart from the letters it is composed of,—a theory that is opposed to a directly perceptible fact.
8 The word “ Word” is known in the world to be that which is perceived by the Kar; and the Har only hears the letters; hence we conclude that word is nothing more than the component letters.
9 “Entity other than the Word, ”—1.e., based upon the denotation of the meaning by the word, which could not be expressed by the word, “Word”; because that wonld contradiot all accepted naage.
7 Ifthe mere fact of bringing abont the comprehension of something were the sole differentia of the class ^ Word,’ then smoke wonld aleo become included in that class; because it brings about the comprehension of the existence of Fire. And again,
ON 8 प्त 614, 263
9. Asa matter of fact, we find that independently of one another, by means of auditory perception are comprehended, in their respective forms, the letters (constituting a word), and not either a preceding or a subsequent object.
10. Even when the letter is uttered with the least effort, it is either clearly recognised as a full letter, or it is not recognised at all.
11. Apart from the letter itself, its constituent parts are never cog- nised ; nor are these (parts) ever found to be intermixed with the letter, as the threads are with the piece of cloth.
12. And since these parts are never cognised (by means of Sense- perception), they can have no cogniserin the shape of a Middle Term. Nor is there any scripture laying down such cogmition with regard toit. And 81166 1 is not perceived (by the sense) Analogy cannot apply to it.
13. Nor would there be any inconsistency in the letter, if the existence of such parts be denied ; just as there is no inconsistency in the case of such parts (of binary compounds, as atoms) not having any further parts (of themselves).
14. Why too, should not the letter, devoid of any constituent parts, be cognisable by Sense-perception ? As in the case of the Akaca, so in the case in question also, we would have for the Middle Term (in an inferential process leading to the cognition of such partless letters), an idea (of the letter) devoid of any notion of the parts.
15. Like Akaga too, even when there is difference of locality, there can be no real difference among the letters themselves. ^“ But then if they
if that were the sole differentia, then a single letter, not capable of giving any sense, would cease to be included in the said claes. Both these, the inclusion as well as the exolusion, are equally abeurd.
9 The letters ga, &c., are those that are heard by the Ear; nothing besides these can bo so heard. By the phrase ‘ preceding object’ are meant the constituent parts of a letter, and by ‘ aunbsequent object’ are meant the classes ‘ Gatwa,’ ‘ Antwa’ and ‘ Gocab-. datwa,’ tbe word ‘ Guuh ’ considered as one component whole apart from the letters, and such other assumptions as the ^" Sphota” and the reat.
10 Thie kariké proves that asa fact of Seuse-percaptinn, no constitnent parte of letters are ever cognised. Nointermediate course is possible. Eveu when the letter 18 only whispered, it ie either fully reengnised as the letter, or being not heard it ia not cognieed at all.
19 They are not cognised by means of Inference.
18 The atom which is a part of the binary compound, ie accepted to be without any parts of its own ; and if there is no inconsistency in this, there can be none in the denial of parts to lettere. Therefore the cognition of any such parte of letters cannot be said to he due to Apparent Inconsistency.
14 “ Middle Term’’—The argument may be thns stated—“ Letters are without parte—because we have a sensnons cognition of these as devoid of parts—just as we have one of Akaga.”
16 Though the letter ga may be fonnd in different places, yet it is the aame every- where, just as the Akaga isthe same everywhere. Witb thie Karika begins the denial of the ‘‘ subsequent objects *—spoken of in K. 9. And the Anthor begins with the denial of the class ^! Gatwa.”’ The meaning is that all ‘ga’ is one and the-same, the different
264 CLOKAVARTIRA.
wore all the same) there could be no idea of difference among them.” (Reply). How then, have you the idea of singleness (of the class ‘Gatwa’) ?
16. Question: ‘* We have the idea of singleness with regard to the class (‘Gatwa’), and that of diversity with regard to the individual ga’s. We do not hold to the diversity (of the individuals) alone; and therefore it is not impossible for us to have an idea of singleness (of the class).”
17. But in the case of letters, apart from the class “Word” (‘Cab- dutwa’), we have no other class applying to them as distinct from the indivi- dual (letters). And if there is no other class (applying to the individual letter), it can only be a letier (and not a class).
18. The idea that it is the same (letter) does not savour of similar- ity, because there is no similarity in the absence of a similarity of con- stituent parts, and there are no such parts in letters.
19. Because the letter ga is an object of Sense-perception, therefore the preclusion of tts contrartes can be of no use (in its cognition) ; nor, at the time (of the cognition of the letter ga), is any denotative word or any Middle Term, cognised (and as such the cognition cannot be either verbal or inferential).
20. Question: ‘Just as in the case of ga, &c., we postulate the class ‘Word’ (‘Cabdatwa’), and as in the case of the different species of cows, we have the class ‘Cow,’—so in the same manner, why could not we postulate the class ‘ Gatwa’ (as applying to all ga’s) ’P
21-23. Answer: When the different individual cows, and the different ga's, have been recognised in the form of individuals, they become, as such, incomprehensible by any idea of class; and itis for this reason that we admit of (such) classes (as ‘Gatwa’ aud ‘ Cabdatwa’ to admit of the com-
places where they occur not making them distinct individuals. Henoe as there is no multiplicity of individnals, there can be no such class aa “ Gatwa.” The objector urges that if there were no multiplicity of individuale, we oould have no auch notion aa that + thie ga is long and that ga ‘is short.’ &0. The Anthor meets thie hy a connter- queation.—‘' How can you havo any idea of the aingleness of the clase ‘ Gatwa,’ when you hold the individuals to be entirely diatinct ” ?
18 That the ga is the same aa the one seen elsewhere.
19 The Bauddhas assert the preclusion of the contrary (Apéha) to be the means of cognising an object. The Karika meane to eay that the oognition of a letter cannot be amenable to this negative meana, hecause it is found to be perceptible by the senses $ nor do we know of any word that can denote the letter; therefore a cognitiou of this latter cannot be held to be Verbal ; and aa no proper Middle Term is possible, it cannot be inferential.
80 It is proper for the Bauddha, who denies all class, to deny tho class ^: Gatwa’’ also. But the Mimdnsaka admits of suob olasees aa “ Qabdatwa” and “ Gotwa’’; why then should he deny the clase ^“ Gatwa” which ia similar to these P
21.25 We derry the fact of ^ Gatwa” being a class, not without reasona; our chief reason for doing 60 is that we are not cognisant of any such claeas, apart from the olass “ Qabdatwa”; among the many “ga’s” we have an idea that ‘thia ga is a Qabda, and that ga is a Qabda,’ just as in the case of different kinds of cows, we oonoeive
ON SPHOTA. . 265
prehension of the individual cows and ga’s). Whereas in the case of the presence of such diversity as the long ga, the short ga, &c., the one indivi- dual ga is not recognised as distinct from another individual ga. Therefore the letter (ga) being one only there cau be only one Idea (with regard to it). The presence of such diverse specific cognitions (as the ‘long ga,’ the ‘short ga,’ &c.), must be explained as being due to the diversity of the manifesting cause (the uttering of the letter with different degrees of effort, &., &c.)
24. Justas your class ‘ Gafwa,’ even when cognised by means of such particular instances as the long, &c., is accepted to be one only,— so would also be our individual letter. |
25. You accept the diversity (in the individual case of the long ga, the short ga, &c.), as caused by a diversity in the specifio characters of the individuals constituting (lit, manifesting) the class; and we could also explain the diversity (iu the case of the long ga, the sliort ga, &e.), to be caused by the diversity in the degrees of effort used in the utterance of each of these.
26. Therefore all that is necessary in cognition we can get from the letter alone ; and whatever is perceived (to be distinct) im different indi- viduals is well explained as being due to the different degrees of effort in utterance. Hence such notions, as those of the class ‘ Gutwa’ and the like must be rejected 88 useless.
27. Evenif such a class as ‘ Gatwa’ were subsequently assumed, it would be extremely difficult to prove the facts of its being omnipresent, eternal, and inhereing in every individual (ga).
28-29. The individual letter, on the other hand, 18 accepted by both of us ; then, just as you attribute eternality, &c., to the assumed (class ‘ Gatwa’), so you can attribute it to the individual, which is an established eutity for both us. Thus too there would be no difficulty in accepting its inhereuce in the individuals (because all the individuals being identical, the character of the letter ga must inhere equally in all).
that ‘this is a cow and thatisa cow,’ &c., &c. Sach notions of every ‘ ga’ being a QYabda would not be possible, if there were no such class as ‘ Qabdatwa,” which latter therefore we cannot deny. In the case of such notions as the‘long ga,’ the short ‘ga” and the like, the diversity is due to the difference ia the degrees of effurt in the ntterance of each letter ; and the diversity being thus explained, it is not admissible to postulate 8 distinct class in the shape of ^“ Gatwa.”’ The length, shortness, &c., are the properties of the same individnal ` ga,’ just as‘ bravery’ ‘cowardice,’ &., are those of the same individnal Devadatta.
26 7 ए6प when you admit of the class ‘ Gatwa, ’ yon cannot deny snch diversities as those of the long ‘ ga’, the short ‘ ga,’ &c. You would explain this as being caused by the diversity in the specific characters of the individnai long ga’s, short ga’s,&c. But in our case also, though we hold the letter to be one only, we could explain the diver- sity as being based upon the different degrees of effort in the utterance of the long and the short ‘ga,’ &e.
34
266 CLOKAVARTIKA,
29-30. In the case of the consonants, we have no such diversity (as the Iong, short, &c.),—which diversity is recognised only on account of the tinge of the vowel {accompanying each consonant); and with regard to this diversity, we discriminate the fact, that 10 is not found to apply to the pure consonants (by themselves, apart from the accompanying vowel).
84. Hvenin the case of the vowels, the notion of long, short, &c., would only be due to extraneons influences (of the different degrees of effort in utterance ),—because it belongs to the letter,—just as the notions of the class ‘ letter” and the ‘consonant’ belong to the lIetter, and are dune to extraneons influences.
82. The letter ‘ga’ 18 not recognised to be the substrate of the class ‘ Gatwa,’ as abstracted (from the individual ‘ ga’}),—because it 18 not compreliensible by any other idea save that of the mdividual ‘ga ’—like the class ‘ Gatwa’ which is assumed by others (Vaicéshikas).
33-34. Since our conclusion is a negative one, and since the two premises also are negative, the fact, of the instance heing such as is not accepted by any one of the two parties concerned, does not in any way affect our argument. Or, forthe above conclusion (“that the letter ga 18 not recognised to be the snbstrate of the class ‘Gatwa’”)}, we can have another reason (Middle Term or minor premiss) based on the fact of its being a letter,—like the letter ‘dha.’ This conclusion is not contrary to Sense-perception, because a contradictory proposition is never cog- uisable.
35. Im denying the class ‘cow,’ on the other hand, there would be a decided contradiction of a fact of Sense-perception; because (in the absence of such a class) there would be no such notion of the class (‘ cow’) aud the individual cow {as belonging to it), which is a fact ordinarily perceived by the Sense.
36-37. In this latter case (of the class ‘cow’), if the object were one only (2.e., ifall individuals were identical, a31n the case of the letter ga), then (in that case) we could not explain the diversity (of the ‘black cow,’
33.34 This anticipates the objection that inasmuch as the Mimansaka himself does not admit of the class ^ Gatwa,” how conld he cite itas an instance in his argument ? The Sense of the reply is plain. = ^^ Contradictory proposition’””—that there is a class ५५ Gatwa”’ which inheres in each individual “ ga.” The meaning of the Karika ig that no such class being perceptible, our conclugion cannot be said to be contrary to Sense- perception.
86.37 In the case of the lettor ‘ga,’ we have proved that all the individuals are identical, because tho letter “ ga”? 18 one only. In the case of the cow, on the other hand, we have many distinct individual cows, 81071 as the red cow, the black cow, &c., all of which have the common character of the “cow,” consequently, inasmuch as the character of the * cow ” is found to inhore in many distinct individnals, we oannot but admit of the class “ cow,” in order to comprehend all the different kiuds of cows, by a singko word,
ON SPHOTA. 267
the ‘red cow,’ &c.), as being due to the diversity in any manifesting agency, Because (in the case of the class ‘cow’) there is uo other manifesting agency save the individual cow; thonghin the other case (of the letter ‘ga’) we have the difference of degree in the tone of utterance. The class ‘cow’ is always found to be indicated by the individual cow; hence 16 is that among the different individuals we become cognisant of the single class ‘ cow.’
38. Question: “ One, to whom both are objects of auditory perception, could have the dual couception; for you, however the tone of utterance being supersensuous, how could any specific cognition (of individuals) be brought about by means of these (tones of utterance) P”’
39. In reply to this, some people assert that when asound is cognised by the Ear, as affected by the difference in the degree of tone,—then it is that there is a comprehension of thjs degree of tone, brought about on account of its being mixed up with the letters.
40. Or, that there is no cognizance of these (dhwanis) ; it is the mere cognizance of Cabda that is hrought about by means of dhiwanit. Hven the Vaicgéshika becomes cognisant of the intensity, &., of the Sound only through affection (of the * dhwanz’ ).
88 Tho conceptions of the individual and the class are, in Our opinion, both objects ef auditory perception ; and as such, itis qnite possible for the objects of these con- ceptions themselves to be perceived by the same organ of perception. Your “ Nada,” on the other hand, consisting as it does of differences in the intensity of the vibra- tion of the air particles, cannot be amenable te such perception ; and as ‘snch this conld not bring abent any conception of the letter ^ ga,” whichis an object of anditory perception.
89 The degree of tone is neither airy, mor consisting of the conjunction and dis- junction of air-waves;it is only a property of the Air, a particular form of Sound known as ‘ Dhwani’ or ‘ Nada,’ &c. Sound is of two kinds~one being in an entirely nndifferentiated state, and the other consisting of the various letter sonnds ; both of these eqnally belong to the class ‘‘Cabda.” Of the latter sort, are the letters ‘ ga,’ &c., while the sonnd of the drnm 18 of the former kind. Thus then, Gabda in the form of Dhwani is a property of the Air; and it is this that 18 the manifesting agency of the letters ‘ ga,’ &c. Consequently, as soon as the air-waves, in the form of Dhiwani, have struck the tympanum, the Ear becomes affected by them; and by means ofthe Ear thus affected, the Dhwanz becomes perceived,and is comprehended, sometimes, as an undifferen- tiated sonnd, as in the case of the drum, while at other times, it 18 fonnd to manifest a certain distinct letter—sound; and having thereby become mixed up with the ntter- ance of the letters, it comes to be cogniged ag thns mixed np. Even in the utterance of letters, We are cognisant of the mere sound, as apart from the Jetters, specially when we differentiate the distance of sounds, through a difference in their intensity. Therefore in our case also, Dhwani is an object of Sense-perception, being perceptible by the Har; and hence even for us, a dual conception is not an impossibility.
40 This Karika presents another solution of the difficulty raised in K. 38. Even the Vaicéshika, who admits of the class ‘ Gatwa,’ accepts the presence of the different degrees of intensity—high, low, &c. Bunt these he cannot represent as the properties of Sonnd, which according to him is itself a property (of Akacan) and as such
208 CLOKAVARTIKA.
41-44. (1). Those who have their min1s affected by the perversities of bile, perceive ‘sweet ` to be ‘bitter,’ ‘and ‘white’ to be ‘yellow’; (2) similarly those who are running fast, or moving in a boat, mistake tlie fixed mountains, &c., to be moving ; ( 3) aud again those who have applicd the fat of the frog to their eyes, mistake a piece of hamboo to be a serpent. In the same manner people havean idea of the class ( ‘Gatwa’) as having the properties of highness and lowness, by means of the highness and lowness of individual letters ^ ga,’ &c. ; just as inthe above cases, there is a mistaken cognition of the manifested bitterness, &c, even in the absence of any cognition of the element of mistake in the manifesting agency (per- verted Sense of Taste, &c.), broughtabout by the recognition of their trne causes (the perversities of bile, &c.).
45-46. Some people hold the short and long sounds of the same vowel ( ऋ } to be distinct individual letters; because, like the high and low sounds (of consonants), the utterance (of the sound 4) is not neces- sirily concomitant (with that of 4). And thus they postulate a class ‘ Atwa ’ as belonging to the three individuals (a, 4, and 4).
incapable of having any property of 108 ०९0. [The Mimansaka holds Sound to be a distinct substance]. Consequently, the Vaicgeshika holds that thongh Higliness or Low- ness cannot belong to the Sound, yet they are cognised hy means of a conception which is affected by the differenoes of intensity of the tone of the utterance. In the same man- ler, in our cage 2180) when the has Dhwani entered the Ear, and leaves it soon after, then, iu that case, the affection of the Ear caused by this speedy striking and return continues for a very short time ; and thereby the Sound too comes to be produced, at that very time, in accordance with the afotesaid affection of the Ear, and disappears 8001 after; and this speedy appearance and disappearance constitntes whst 38 known as the shortness or lowness of the Sound, its highness consisting of a longer stay in the Ear of the air waves (Dhwani), and heuce also of the Sound itself. And thus, though the shortness, S'c., really belongs to the manifesting agency of the Dhwani, yet through extreme proximity, they come to be attributed to the manifested Sownd; and the Dhwant only becomes the means of rendering the Scund cognisable ; and ass such, it can be the means of differentiating the individual letters, as short, long, & ८.
41.4% This anticipates the following objection: ‘ When Dhani, the cause of the mistaken notions of shortness, &o., 18 itself nncognised, how can the shortness, &., be 6012860 ? '› In reply, the Author proceeds to cite a number of well-known examples, where people have mistaken notions even inthe absence of any recognition of the agency that brings abont such misconceptions. People, with disordered bile, perceive tlie conohshell to be yellow, even before they are oognisint of their bilions disorder. So too, in the case at issue, we can have mistaken notions of the shortness, &o., of a letter, based upon the said characteristics of the Dhwani (that precedes the partioular letter—sound), even in the absence of any cognition of this Dhwani itself.
$5.46 Whether the consonant sonnd—of ‘ga’ for instance—be high or low, it is always accompanied by the same ga— sound. In the case of the vowel however, we have the long vowel expressing eomething entirely different from that afforded by the short, —e.g., in the word ^ Agamanu” (coming) and “ Agamana” (not going); this difference cannot be denied; though both ‘a’ and‘ a’ and the tripple ‘a’ belong to the same vowel -olass ‘ atwa,’
‘ON SPHOTA. ` 269
46-48. Others however assert, that the assumption of such a class is not proper; because the name ‘ Atwa’ could not apply to the long and the acute (which are pronounced 4, and %); in tle same manner, the name ‘ Atwa’ would not belong to the short and the acute; nor could the acute belong to the other two; inasmuch as it cannot be recognised as belonging to. each of the three,—as we have the name ‘ cow’ applying to all the cows—be tliey hlack, or red.
49, The word “ avarna-kula” may be explained as being based upon the identity of the location of the utterance in the body,—like the forest and the like. It is only an expression denoting a collection (of vowels), and it is not indicative of any such class (as ‘ Atwa’).
50. The distinction of the letter itself into long and short, would be contradictory to the theory of the eternal character of words: for, how can the letter, which is eternal, be said to be measured (in its utterance) by duration (of its pronunciation) ?
51. Therefore it is the utterance of the vowel that depends npon the duration (length or shortness) of prounnciation, as lasting for two or three moments. The letter itself cannot be affected by such duration.
52. Odj. ^ Butin that casethe length, &., of the vowels would (like highness, §c.), cease to form an integral part of the letters ; inasmuch as (ac- cording to you) it will have nothing to do with the expressive (letters and words).” ep. For us, the means of denotation are the letters recognised as such (long, short, &c., by the specialities of pronunciation).
53. A meaning is got ont of only such letters (either long or short or acute) as have previously been found to be denotative of that particular meaning. If it be asked—‘‘ how can there be any (correct) comprehension of meaning hy a mistaken means?” (We reply that) the mistake does not affect the comprehension of the meaning.
49 This anticipates the following objection: ^ If there is no such class as ‘ Atwa’ how wonld you account for the presence (in the Mahabhashya of Patanjali) of such an expression as ‘ Avarnakula,’ as applied to all the vowels?” The sense of the reply is that the said expression only serves to indicate all the vowels taken collectively ; exactly as the word ‘‘ forest” indioates all the trees considered as one corporate whole; and the comprehension of all the vowels by means of thesingle expression “ Avarnakula ” is due to the fact of all vowel-sounds proceeding from the threat.
60 The meaning of the expression ‘‘a short vowel” is ‘a vowel that lasts fora short time’; and this would be: contrary to the theory of the eternality of Letters.
8 The ‘ Hraswa ’ (short) is held to last for one moment, the “ Dirgha” (Long) for two moments, and the “ Pluta’”’ (Extra Long) for three moments.
53 The fruit, mango, is once found to be expressed by the word ^ Amra,” as ut- tered by an experienced person. Latterly the young man will comprehend the frnit only as denoted by that particular combination of sonnds which he has heard from the older man. Thus though the length, &c., are the properties of the pronunciation, yet they are so mixed up with the Letters themselves that they are mistaken to be the properties of these latter; and hence they come to be accepted as forming integral parts of these,
270 OLOKAVARTIKA.
54. Justas the speed of the horse, though a property of another (the horse), may be indicative of the (dashing or urgent) business of the rider, 80, for us, could the specialities of pronunciation be attributed to letters.
59. “Butif length, &e., be not eternal, the expressive word would also become non-eternal.” This objection is to be set aside ina manner similar to the treatment of the order of letters forming a word.
56. In the same manner the comprehension of the accents, broad, &., depends entirely upon the speciality of pronunciation (and does not belong to the Letter), We never recognise any difference based upon accents, af we do in the case of the length, §c.
57-58. If we accept the accents to be forms of one and the same Letter, then we could explain their difference (as broad, &c.), in the same manner as we do the highness, &c. (of pronunciation). In this case (of the differently accentuated vowels) we do not stand in need of any other sound, as we do in the case of another Letter. And itis these sounds (and not the vowels themselves) that have to be accepted as endowed with the characters os softness, acuteness, d&ec.
58-59. Even when the Letter is one, the sound isof two kinds,—one serving the purpose of indicating the forms of Letters, and another
५५ Does not affect, &c.’’—The mistake lies only in the attribution of the properties of length, &c., to the Letters, and in nothing else heyond that. Hence though the means of comprehension is a mistaken one, yet that does not tonch the truth of the comprehen- sion itself. 2#.g., the notion of the redness of the crystal, which is a mistaken one, leads to the inference of the presence of a red object near it; from which we conclude that though the means may he a mistaken one, the effect may he qnite true.
64 Therefore the vowel is only one; and the properties of length, &c., belong in reality to the duration of its utterance, and are only falsely attributed to itself,
55 ** Become non-eternal ’—hecause the word depeuds for its denotation upon the length or shortness of the vowels constituting it. Just as thongh the ordcr, in which certain Letters appear in a word, is not everlasting, yet the word itself is eternal ; so in the same manner, though the specialities of the pronunciation may 09 non-eternal, yet that does not affect the eternality of the word itself,
66 The length, &e., of a vowel are at times found to ohange the meaning of words; and in this they are found to produce—though only as a mistake—the notiou of a differ- ence hetween the long vowel and the short ; but no sueh difference is found to exist in the case of accents. So the claims of these latter are even mach weaker than those of the properties of length, &c.
67.58 “ In this case, S¥c.”’—This autieipates the following objection: “Iu the case of the different accents, we cannot but postulate so many different sonnds as helonging to the Letter; and hence, wherefore should we not accept a difference among the varions phases of the same vowel, instead of assuming so many distinct sounds”? ‘The sense of the reply is that, of any one Letter,—-whatever its accent, &c., might he—the sonuds are always of one and the same kind; and as such we have not got to postulate many sounds. It is only in the oase of another Letter, that a distinct sonnd has to be admitted:
68.69 The sonnds that conjointly and simultancously define the word are those that bring about the comprehension of the Letters; and those that define it gradually are those that follow at the heels of the comprehension,
ON SPHOTA. 271
extending throughout the comprehension (of such forms) ;—these two being the means of bringing about the definition (of the Letters) immediately and gradually (respectively).
60. Thus then we have the comprehension of the long, &c., when there happens to be a coglomeration of the sounds of the former sort. Since it is the Letter itself that is comprehended by means of these sounds, as lasting during the specified time.
61. And the recognition of the Broad and the rest is by means of these (sounds) aggregating simultaneously. On the aggregation of the others (४.९.) those sounds that operate gradually) we would have the differ- ence of pitch: viz: low, &c.
62. Though the character of the Letter has been recognised (at the first moment), yet the sounds gradually bring about a cognition of the same Letter, (during the subsequent moments) ; and it is not any other Letter that is cognised.
63. Even if among Letters, there be an absolute difference, based upon the existence of individuals and the class,—then too, Jaimini’s theory (of the eternality of words) remains untouched.
64, Because, in that case, all the arguments, in favour of the eterna- lity of the individual ‘ ga,’ would be transferred to that of the class ‘ Gat- wa’; and the mention (in the Bh­a) of the Letters ‘ ga,’ ‘an,’ &.,
60 “ Svecified time”’—one moment for the short vowel, two for the long, and three for the acnte. The latter part of the Karika anticipates the following objection: ८४ The long vowel is comprehended only when the sound is found to last for two mo- ments, The sonnd would, in this case, extend all along the comprehension; and as such, the long and the rest must he admitted to be comprehensible by means of the sounds of the second sort.” The sense of the reply is that thongh, as a matter of fact these sounds are those of the gradual sort, and as 8611, bring abont the defini- tion of the vowel sound only gradually, and extend all along the comprehension, yet even during the long time of 2 moments, itis only the letter that is comprehended. And as that alone which helps the denotation of the meaning ia accepted to constitute the form of the Letter; it 18 only with regard to this denotation that its long form 18 comprehended ; consequently, even thongh this form may have been comprehended at the first moment, yet itis recalled to the mind only subsequently. For these 16880118 the sound must be admitted to tend to indicate the form of the Letter; and hence it is qnite correct to say that the Long, &., are implied by means of the sounds that help in the recognition of the forms of Letters.
61 Thongh the text reads ^ Drutadikah ” (High and the rest), yet inasmuch ag in the case of the High the sound does not extend thronghont the cognition, the Nydyarat- nakara explains the compound as “those that are proceeded by the Druta (High), &c.” —i.¢., the Medium and the Low.
6४ A vowel, either short or long, having been cognised, all that the euhsequent sounds (in deeper accents) do, is to help in the expression of the same Letter; no other Letter is expressed.
68 Hence itshould not be understood that we deny the class ‘ Gatwa’ with any ulterior motive of favouring the theory of the eternality of words. We deny it simply becanse we do not find any good reasons for accepting it.
272 CLOKAVARTIEA.
would be explained as referring to the classes ‘Gatwa,’ ‘ Autwa,’ &c.; aud as such there would be no contradiction.
65. The Letters cannot be said to bring about an aggregate word, because each of the Lettersis indicated by individually distinct efforts, and each of them is eternal and all-pervading.
66, And when the word ‘go’ is not thus brought about, how could we have any such class as ‘ Gocabdatwa’? Nor is an assumption of any such class possible, just as a class of letter ( ‘ Gatwa’ } (is not possible, as shown above).
67. The notion of the sameness of a word (as uttered yesterday and to-day) is to be explained as being due to the identity of the Letters compos- ing the Word. In the same manner is to be set aside the asssumption of any aggregate whole, apart from the componert Letters.
68. The assumption of an aggregate identical with the Letters how- ever, does not militate against (our theory of) the character of Letters. In- asmuch the Letters have the power to signify the meaning (and as such they are capable of forming an aggregate word, which, however, can have no existence apart from these Letters).
69. Letters should be aecepted as being denotative of a meaning only according as they are known (conventionally and traditionally) to have the capability of expressing such meaning.
70. With reference to these Letters, subsidiary as they are to the denotation of meanings, we have also to admit of the facts of their collo- cation, and of their being uttered by a single person, uud that too in a certain definite order.
71. The fact of the speaker of all the Letters being one and the same, and that of their being uttered in a definite order, being the means of the signification,—what determines such siguification is that order of the Letters, in which it has been previously found, by the present speaker, to have been used by experienced persons. 4
72. The simultaneity of the utterance of the Letters being impossible; it is not accepted (as in any way aiding the denotative process). In that
65 An aggregate whole can be said to be brought about only by such oonstituent parts as happen to exist simultaneously. Bunt the Letters are not so perceived; as each of them is brought ahont by a distinot effort pecnliar to itself. If the mere fact of all the Letters existing at the same time (even though not so perceived at the same time) were to be the cause of the complete word being accomplished, then, inasmuch as all the Letters are eternal and omnipresent, every Letter—a combination of Letters— could be said to be the cause of any and every word.
69 This anticipates the objection that each individual letter cannot signify the meaning of the word, and the whole word cannot he comprehended at any single moment,—how then can there be any signifioation of meanings P The sense of the reply is that the denotations of Words are based upon Convention.
7 Any number of letters oould be uttered at one and the same time, only by different persons ; hat as a matter of fact, we find in ordinary life, that a word—
SPHOTA. 273
case (४.९.) 70 the case of such simultaneity) the only possible course would be to have a multiplicity of speakers. But wo do not find such multiph- city in the case of any denotation.
73. Those objects, that are capable of an action only when acting simultaneously, are net able todo the act when they are not united ; just as those that are capable of acting separately, one after tlie other, in a certain order, are unable to act conjointly.
74-75. In the case of the sacrifices ^ ए प्रावा 288 ' and the rest (six sacrifices constituting the “ Darca-Pirnamasa’”’) we find that they have an order of action (three being performed on the Amavasya and the remaining three on the Paurnamasi),—though they act conjointly (in bringing about a common result, in the shape of heaven); and in the same manner, in the case of acquiring the Veda, we find that learning (consists of a gradual process of learning a letter, then a word, a Sen- tence, and soon, and yet all these processes have a common result, in the shape of an acquirement of the Veda). In fact everywhere we find that the Means, &c. (the three factors of a Bhavana), though gradual in their function, yet lead up to an action at one and thc same time. There- fore there can he no objection against the gradual (utterance of Letters constituting a Word).
76. Allactions are recognised as complete in themselves, and any subtle differences among the actions themsclves are never recognised.
77-78. When, however, the various parts of an action, though inher- ing ina single process (lif: means to an end), are separately recognised distinctly,—then, in that case, the idea of simultaneity is a mistaken one, How then could there be any simultaneity in the case of many and dis- tinct actions, inhering in separate processes, and occurring ina gradual order of sequence ?
whose component letters are pronounoed, not by one, but by many persons—is incap- able of expressing any meaning.
18 The bearers carry a Palki conjointly, which they could not do if they went at it one after the other. In the same manner cortain letters, combining in a definite way, are found to express a meaning, whioh they could not do, if all of them were uttered simnitaneously (by different persons).
14.75 “ Three factors,” viz.: the Result, the Means, and the Process.
76 All 80008 end in their respective results; and when the result has heen attained, then alone is the Action realised in its complete form, and as such an Action is always recognised as complete, १.९.) with its resnit duly accomplished. The joint action of letters is only through its result, in the shape of the full denotation of the meaning ; and as for the suhtle functioning of each individual letter (comprising the word) towards this result, it is never cognised separately.
17 Even in the case of the single action of Homa—where the different actions of naming the Deity, powring the libation, &., are each separately noticed—there is no real notion of simultaneity. Hencethere can be no such simultaneity 1u the case of the Darca-Purnamaga sacrifices, which comprise many actions.
35
274 CLOKAVARTIKA.
79. Inacase where an action, from the commencement of its first functionings, to the final fulfilment, of its result, is recognised at one and the same time, as constituted by all the various functionings,—with refer- ence to such an action we have the use of the Present Tense.
80. Therefore in the case in question (of the Word), we would have the present tense applicable to its action,—inasmuch as it is recognised in its entirety, as functioning from the very beginning in the shape of a desire to speak (on the part of the speaker), to the final result in the shape of the recognition of ifs meaning (by the listener).
81. The distinct actions of the individual letters (constituting the word) (though extant) could not be recognised in the absence of the ful- filment of the final result; but this fact (of non-recognition) does not prove the non-existence (of such individual functioning).
82. Thus then the action being inferable from the final result, the present tense becomes applicable to the action of the Means (Words, Sc. ), in accordance with its position with regard to the result.
83. In the aforesaid action (of signification) the close proximity of. something is necessary. But the mere fact of the others being to a certain degree removed from the final result, does not lead to any notion of their not forming an integral part (of the Word).
84-85. With regard to the signification (of the object cow), dune potency certainly belongs to both ga and au, though the former is removed
19 This Karika anticipates the following objection: “If there is no eimultaneity how do you explain the nee of the Present Tense in connection with them?’ The 86०86 of the reply ia that the Present Tense is used with regard to that action which is seen from ite beginning to the end, and as euch no eimultaneity 18 necessary.
82 Thongh the action isto he inferred from the resalt, yet when we have once seen that a number of letters, in a certain definite order, leade to the signification of a certain meaning, and from this signification, when we have once inferred the action of the Let- tere,—then, at any future time, whenever we find the same Lettera arranged in the same order, we come to apply toit the Present Tense. This anticipates the following objec- tion: “ At the time of the fulfilment of the result, in the shape of the signification, the fnnotioning of the Letters will have ceased, and thus become past; how, then, conld the Present be applicable toit?’? The sense of the reply is that the final result has already been once seen before, and the fanotioning of the Letters has also been inferred from that reeult ; hence latterly, whenever the Word is found, the functioning of the Letters is at once inferred and recognised as Present, as on the previons occasion.
88 This anticipates the following objection: “If all the Letters be accepted to be the means of expression, then, it becomes necessary that we should oasume an impression produced by the Word taken as a whole, which would he the direct meane of the cog- nition of the meaning ; and this impreeeion would, on account of its closer proximity, always helong to the last letter of the Word.” The 66786 of the Karika is that, though it ia eo, yet the proximity of the other Lettere ie equally necessary, and hence these Lettere should also be admitted to form integral parts of the Word.
84.85 In the case of all Words, it is uecessary that certain Letters ahould come together in a certain definite order ; otherwise they lose all their significance, and be- come absolutely useless.
SPHOTA. 275
by two steps (from the impression of the word as a whole), and the latter by only oue ; because, it is only when they are located in this order that they can (conjointly) signify (the object). Just as the Visarga has a significance, only when it is at a distance from the other letters composing the word,— 80, in the same manner, in the case of those (¢ and au) also, the signi* ficance does not depend upon the immediate proximity of the one or the other (to the final impression of the complete word).
86. And where one letter is incapable (of signifying an object), it does not follow that all (taken together) are also incapable. Because we see that the parts of the cart are incapable of carrying corn, &c. (and yet the cart as a whole is capable of carrying them).
87-88. ^ But in the case of the cart, each part of it has a certain capability of its own,—all these individual capacities conjoining towards the accomplishment of the carrying; whereas, in the case of Letters (composing a word) the only capability (of signifying an object) belongs to their aggregate, while no such capability is found to belong to the indivi- dual letters; inasmuch as the Letters individually—each one by one— do not signify even the least portion of the object (denoted by the complete word composed of those Letters).”
89. But the action of carrying paddy, &c., for instance, that is per- formed by the cart, 18 nevcr found to be done by its constituent parts, as you would wish it.
90. If it be urged that the parts of the cart too are capable of carry- ing something (if not the whole cart load), then (we say) in the present case too, we have, among individual Letters, the capability of bringing about a notion of themselves (if not that of the object signified); and in some cases single Letters are actually found to signify even objects (as in the case of the letter ka= Prajapati).
91. Even he, who holds that an impartite Sphota is implied by the ideas of the Letters, is not frec from the above objection (urged against
the Mimansaka). 92. For, in that case too the Sphota of the word is not implied by
91 * Above objection”’—against the theory that it is the Letters constituting a word that signify the object.
9 Even in thecase of the sounds (of Letters) it is necessary to admit their proxi- mity, the fact of their heing uttered by the same person, and also the fact of their occurring in a particular order. And since those that oconr in any order cannot he simultaneons, therefore we shall have to assume an impression produced hy the whole word, over and above the assumption of the Sphota. And the objection against us,— viz.: that if the individuals have no power, then their aggregate can have none— applies to the Sphota theory also; because even in that the Letters individually are not held to signify the Sphota; for if anyone of the letters signified the complete Sphota, there would he no nse for the other letters. Hence the Sphota—theory would algo stand in need of the assumption that the Sphota isimplied hy all the Letters taken collectively, the Sphota itself signifying the impression that leads us to the
276 CLOKAVARTIKA.
each individual Letter (composing it). Nor is the Sphota indicated in parts ; and in its absence we cannot have any cognition of it.
93. And those that are individually incapable, are incapable, also when taken collectively. And the arguments that you (the upholder of Sphota) would bring forward to meet these objections, would serve our purpose.
94. The existence (of Sphota), its distinctness (from the Letters), and the denial of any parts (of the Sphota)—these three assumptions you would require over and above what is necessary for our theory. And it is for this reason (of avoiding unnecessary assumptions) that we seek (to prove the fact of the Letters themselves) signifying the meaning.
95. (Even if we do not admit of a residual effect Sanskara) there would be no inconsistency in the cognition of the meaning. Because for this cognition we will have, for the cause, that which immediately precedes it.
96. (The cognition of the meaning) always appears subsequent to the cognition of the last letter of the word, after the cognitions of the two (letters ga and au) have gone before. Therefore it is such (cognition of the last letter) that we hold to be the cause (of the cognition of the meaning).
97. Even without any residual effect (Sanskara), this last Letter would come to signify the meaning,—being helped to this capability by the letters that immediately precede it (and through this precedence help it on to full significance).
98. And it is this (help) which some people call “ residual effect ” (Sanskara), Because it is only this that is found to be free from the assumption of anything unseen (and transcendental, or merely ideal).
99. Or, it may be the Impression (produced by the letters) that is called the ^“ residual effect.’’ Because all persons think that there is a ‘residual effect’? in the case of all objects cognised by any definite cognition.
100. The only diversity of opinion lies in the fact of this (Sanskara) being the means of the cognition of the meaning (of words) ; and as a mcans
of ascertaining this (causality) too, we have an invariable concomitance, as in other cases.
meaning. Andocertainly it is mueh simpler than this to assnme a potency, in the Letters taken collectively, of signifying the impression that weuld denote the meaning of the word.
99 That there is such a thing as Sawskéra is admitted by all men; the only differ- ence of opinion lics on the point of its being the means ef eoghising the meaning cf the word $ and here tee, we have te admit its eansal potenoy, on the ground of (invari- able) concomitance=-as is explained in the following Karikd.
100 We have the cognition of the meaning, only when there is an impression; and this invariable eoncemitance helps us to establish the fact that Impression is the means of the cognitien of the meaning.
SPHOTA. 277
101. If the Sanskara be groundless, then the assumpiion of pre- cedence (among letters) also becomes groundless; and hence there could be no help (as mentioned above in Karika, 97).
102. Though it is an acknowledged fact that “ Satskara”’ 18 the cause of remembrance, yet that does not preclude its applicability to other purposes.
108. Therefore it is not that the Bhashya has assumed the existence of a (useless supernnmary in the shape of) Saiskadra. The only impercept. ible fact that it has laid down is that of its being the cause of the cogni- tion of the meaning (of words).
104. And even the Sphota—theory is not free from an imperceptible factor; as the capacity of signifying the effect (the meaning) is equally applicable to Impression and Sphota.
105. And, inasmuch as the incompatibility (of Sanskara signifying the meaning) thus disappears, it cannot lead to the assumption of Sphota. And the assumption of a Savskara too, preceding (the manifestation of Sphota) is very necessary for you.
106. We would not admit of anything besides sound (Sphota) with regard to the cognition of meaning,—only if such sounds were perceptible by the sense, or if the Letters themselves were 1101 amenable to Sense-Per- ception.
107. If you are over-anxious to have a simultaneity of Letters, then we may allow that on the ground of their eternality and all-pervad- ingness (which makes all the Letters simultaneous) ; but this simultaneity cannot be said to constitute their capacity of expressing the meaning.
108. Thus then, in the case of Letters that are comprehended gra-
101 The Letter is destroyed as soon as it is uttered, and if we deny the fact of any Impression being left by it, then there would be nothing of it left to help the following Jetter ; and when this help would be denied, then the precedence of the former would be useless; and it would be impossible to get at any correct theory with regard to the significance of words. Therefore we cannot totally deny the existence of Sanskdra or Impression.
108 The Sanskéra spoken of by the Bhashyais none other than 7254202, which is the admitted cause of memory. The only thing that the Bhashya has assumed and which is not amenable to direct Sense-Perception, is the capability of the Vdsana, to bring about a cognition of the meaning of Words.
105 You too must necessarily postulate a certain unseen force that could imply the Sphota, which would signify the meaning. Thus then, our theory is simpler than yours, inasmuch as it does away with the intervening agency of the Sphota; and certainly, the Savskdra is as capable of denoting the meaning as the Sphota.
108 This anticipates the following objection: “Yon deny the Sphota on the ground of Sanskadra which signifies the meaning ; but why should you not deny the agency of the Letters also, and hold the signification to be due to the sound only?” ‘The sense of the reply is that Letters are perocived by means of the senses, and as such are more reasonable to hold than any imaginary Sphota.
107 For in that case all words would signify all meanings,
278 OLOKAVARTIKA.
dually ina definite order, their position—be it either simultaneous, or otherwise—is the only cause of the cognition of meaning.
109. Or (the fact may be that) when the Letters have been gradually comprehended in a definite order, there follows a recapitulated (or recalled) cognition of all the Letters (in the form of the complete Word) ; and it 18 this complete recapitulated cognition which is the means of the cognition of meaning.
110. And in this (recapitulated cognition) we have the simultaneity of Letters. But the cognition of the meaning does not necessarily depend upon the fact of this simultaneity being perceived by the senses.
111. Some people assert that this cognition (of the Word) is ofa variegated character, consisting as it does of the existing (the last Letter) and the non-existing (the previous Letters that have some before); as in (the cognition of each word, the last Lettcr is always comprehended (at the time that the word is recalled as a whole).
112. Others however hold that when the last Letter has been com- prehended, there is a simn]taneons remembrance of all the other preced- ing Letters, brought about by the impressions left by each individual letter.
113. Thus then, though there are gradual cognitions (of the Letters In a definite order), yet, all theorists admit of a mental recognition of all the Letters as constituting a whole word.
114, For, if this be not admitted, then in the case of the perception of a certain number (one hundred, for instance) of the same object, each of which is perceived one by one,—there would not be any collective re- cognition of all of them as making up a hundred (such objects).
115. Thus, then, though the previons cognition, by the ear, of Letters, is one by one, yet subsequently there is a collective remembrance of the whole, which is purely mental (t.e., perceived by the mind).
116. And the Letters thus recalled are not, in any degree, removed from the cognition of meaning; and hence it is that ordinary people make the assertion that “the cognition of meaning is obtained from the Word.”
109 This is the view favoured by tho Author himself. According to this theory
the pronunciation of the second letter 18 accompanied by the remembrance of the pre- ceding letter.
111 When the last letter has been hesrd, all the rest are recalled $ therefore the cognition of the last letter is direct sensual perception, and that of the othera remem- brance; and hence the variegated charaoter of the word-cognition.
112 This alternative does away with the variegated character, because the final cognition of the whole word is made to follow after that of the last letter, and not simul- taneously (aa in the previous alternative), Thus then the final comprehension of the Word becomes 9, case of Remembrance pure and simple.
116 Because the cognition of tho meaning follows immediately after the recogni- tion of the complete word.
SPHOTA. 279
117. Being led astray by the aforesaid variegated cognition, some people hold that apart from the Letters composing it, there is a distinct cognition of the word “ Gauh,” and that this cognition is amenable to Sense- Perception.
118. We admit of the fact of this cognition (of the whole) being something different from the cognition of each of the Letters. But the cognition of the Word cannot be anything totally apart from that of the Letters composing it.
119. Even though the cognition of the whole word (Gauh) be something other (than that of the Letters), yet any cognition of the three (Letters 4 @tand:) cannot belong to anything besides the three Letters themselves.
120. We do not deny the fact of the cognition of the word ^ Gauh,” as a single component whole. This idea of the singleness of the Word is due to the fact of the word (as composed of the three Letters) being the object of a single cognition, and also to the fact of the whole (trio of Letters) having a single end (that of signifying the object cow).
121. In the case of the word “ Gauh,” the idea of one-ness may he due to the fact of the Letter wt following very soon after a, and also to that of there being very little interrim hetween the two syllables. In the case of such words, however, as ^“ Devadatta,” and the like, the dif- ference between the Letters is quite clear. (As a matter of fact the idea of one-ness 18 a mistake).
122. The construction of the Bhashya passage ought to be “the word ts not subsidiary,’—hbecause the causal efficacy (of signification) belongs to the Letters (composing it ); and it is on this view that we have the ordi- nary assertion (“ the cognition of meaning is got from the word >).
128. The Ablative in “Cabdat” (in the sentence ^ Cabdat arthapra- titih’”) signifies causal agency. In your theory too, there would be an inter- vening factor between the cognition of meaning (and the cognition of the Word,—the manifestation of Sphota being the intervening factor).
124. That is said to be subsidiary, which, being known in one shape, is used in another. And (in the case of the Word) we are not cogni- sant of any other form of causality (than the one we lay down).
117 The Grammarians hold this view of the perceptibility of the Sphota. They are led to this hy a false analogy to the perceptibility of the last letter of the word. (See above). ^ There is a cognition, #c.,” ९.९. in the form of the Sphota.
12 This Kirikaé refers to the following Bhashya passage: “ Gauna ésha cabda iti ét na gauno ’ksharéshu nimittabhdvah.” This is objected to on the gronnd that the reply portion seems to imply that the word ‘gauna’ qnalifies ‘akshra.’? The Karika however, explains it thus : ‘na gawnah gabdah aksharéshu nimittabhavah.’
124 All causes have their own operation intervening between themselves and their effects; and in the case of Words also, we have only this mnch of interrim; and as such, this cansality is none other than the one we are cognisant of in the case of all
280 CLOKAVARTIKA.
125. The intervention of the operation of the cause itself is common to all causes ; and in the case of the Word, it is only this operation of itself (which is found to intervene between the Word and its signification) ; therefore this is no real intervention at all.
126, When, as a matter of fact, people do not give the name “Word” to anything besides the Letters, how could there be any such assertion as ‘meaning is got from the word,’ with regard to a meaning signified by them («¢., the letters composing the Word) (when you hold that it 18 the Sphota that signifies the meaning) (and hence the said as- ertion is not compatible with the Sphota theory ).
127. If the cognition of the meaning be said to be brought about by the Sphota, manifested by the Impression produced by the cognition of the Letters,—then the causal agency of the Word becomes subsidiary to the greatest degree (inasmuch as between the Word and the cognition of the meaning, we would have two intervening factors: the Impression and the Sphoia).
128. The utterance of the word is not for the purpose of bringing about the Sarsk@ra; this Sanskdra appears gradually in connection with the word, used with a view to the signification of the meaning.
129. Therefore a Word is called (the cause of the signification of meaning) with a view to its effect,—being, as it is, used for the sake of that signification, and in the manifestation of the whole Word (by means of the Letters composing it), there is no intervention. (In our theory, the Letters are held to manifest the word directly, without any intervening processes).
150. Or, the previous residual effects (Sanskdras) may be taken to be parts of the process of the signification of the Word; and the last letter of the word would be the manifester of that 8८757212 ; and since this (last letter) is a word, therefore we would have the primary character (of the ordinary assertion—“ the meaning is signified by the Word”) [this is in accordance with the theory that the meaning is signified by the last letter of the word as helped by the impressions left by the preceding letters |.
131-182. ‘In words and sentences, either the Letters, or the Sounds (thereof) do not point to any such agent of signification, as the Sphota,— just as the lamplight (does not point to any intervening mainfester) ;— because the Letters have existence,—like the * jar,’ &c.’:—these and other arguments like these could be easily brought forward against the assump- tion of things not cognised by ordinary people.
133. And again, the Sphota cannot indicate the meaning ,—be- cause it 18 something altogether apart from the Letters (composing the
other causes. Ienco the causality in this present case cannet be said te be of a secoudary or subsidiary character.
SPHOTA-AKRT1, 281
Word),—like the jar, &c. Nor is there any contradiction (in this) ot perceptible facts,—because the object (Sphota) itself, is not established (as an entity).
134. He who would deny the existence of Letters would be thereby contradicting the perceptible fact of the cognition of the meaning follow- ing immediately on the perception of the Letters (composing the Word),— Just as the denial of the moon (contradicts a visible fact).
135. Or (we may cite another argument): ‘The cognition of mean- ing proceeds from the Letters, because it follows immediately after the cognition of these ;—because that which is so (7.e., follows immediately after something,) necessarily proceeds from it,—as the notion of Fire from that of Smoke.’ [That is to say, as the notion of Fire following immediately after the perception of Smoke, the former is accepted as proceeding from the latter}.
136, Or like the lamp, the Letters Ga and the rest are the indicators of the objects ‘ cow,’ &c., because these objects are always recognised on the utterance of the Letters; and because the Letters are always recog- nised prior (to the cognition of the object).
137. “‘ The denial of the Sphota as apart from Letters, is of very little use in regard to Words.” But we have made the above attempt (to refute Sphota) simply with a view to establish the truth of the effects brought about by the different members of the Sentence.
Thus ends the Sphota—V Aba.
Section 13, On “ ARTI.”
1. If the denotation (of a word) be something apart from the Akriti (class or form), then we could not establish either the relationship (of mean- ing with the word) or the permanence of that relationship. Conscious of this (difficulty) we now proceed to establish the fact of the Class (Akrti) being the object of denotation by a word.
181 The sense of the objection is this: ^ You deny the Sphota to be anything apart from the Letters; but in that case we can accept it as a part of the Word, and not of the Letters ; and as such the Sphota theory would remain intact.”
The position taken up by the reply is that in accordance with the Sphota theory, no parts of sentences are held to be operative,—the sentence alone, as a whole, being accepted as indicative of its meaning 45 a whole. Hence by the denial of Sphota, we establish the reality of the operative faculty of the parts of sentences.
1 If in every case, the Individual alone were the ohject of denotation, then, in as much as such Individuals could not be omnipresent, there could be no relation hetween the Word and its Meaning, The Class or Form on the other hand, is eternal; and as such, quite capable of relationship with the Eternal Word.
36
282 CLOKAVARTIKA.
2. In course of this we shall also try to establish the existence of the Akrti, and in order to prove the strength or weakness (of its claims to de- notability) in comparison to the Individual, we shal! later on (in the Akrtyadhikarana) lay down the grounds for accepting the fact of the Akrti matter being the object of denotation.
3. It is the Class itself that has been called “ Akrti’’—which signi- fies that by which the Individual is specified (or characterised). It is that which is common to all the individual objects, and the means of a collective idea of all these (individuals) as forming one composite whole
4. As the means of such collective idea, there is a commonality, which is signified by the word (‘dkrtz’),—this fact is admitted by all; and in this there is no difference among the several theoristis.
5. With regard to all objects there is a double idea, in the shape of one consisting in its differentiation (as an individual apart from others), and another (a collective idea) consisting of its homogenity (with others resembling it. in certain respects, and thus, with it, forming a Class, a corporate whole), And this double idea is not possible without the double character of the object (as an individual, and as belonging to a class).
6. If the object were perceived merely as an individual, then there could be no idea of (its helonging to) a Class. And (vice versé) if the Class alone were perceived, then there would be no occasion for any iden of the Individual,
7. Nor can any of the two ideas be said to be either mistaken, or of only secondary importance ; because the conviction of the double idea is always so firm, that the mistake must lie on the part of those who assert that the double idea is a mistake—(therefore the double notion is absolute- ly necessary ).
8. And further, since the two (the Individual and the Class) are no- where perceived in their primary form, therefore there can be no assump- tion of the secondary character (of the idea of either the Individual or the
2 The denotatibility of the Class is denied on the following gronnds: (1) becanse it does not exist; and (2) because its acceptance is absolutely useless. Conseqnently we must begin with the proof of the existence of Class; and then we shall, in due course come to take the second point, the reasons for accepting it, in preferenoe to the Indivi. dual, by comparing the arguments in favonr of eaoh; for whioh the reader is referred to the latter half of the Smritipdda.
8 The words ‘ Akriti’? and ^ Jati’ are synonymous terms. The Jati is accepted | because it is the only means of having a conorete collective idea of a number of indivi- duals possessing certain properties in common among themselves.
8 It 18 only in the oase of words signifying certain objects, that the idea of the Indi. vidual and the Class can be realised. Ifthese be said to be secondary, where else could
we have them as primary? An Tdea can be accepted as secondary in one place, only if it can be found elsewhere in its primary character,
AKRII. 283
Class). (Nor can any of them be said to be false or mistaken, because) it has already been proved (in the ^^ Nirdlambanavada”) that all ideas have counterpart realities, as their objects, in the external world.
9. There is mutual dependence between the Individual and the Class: the Class belonging to the Individuals, and the Individuals to the Class.
10. A Class devoid of Individuals does not exist, (—becanse of the absence of Individuals)—like the horns of a hare. And in the same manner, because of the absence of Class there could be no Individuals (without a Class).
11. Or, these two premises may be mentioned in the forms “ because one does not possess the character of the other.” By this change, there ceases to exist the slightest difference between the Individual aud the Class,
12-13. If one were to assert the capability of the Individuals to bring about ideas of commonality, without (admitting of) a separate entity (in the shape of “ Class ”),—for such a person, of what sort would be the capability of denotation? (1) Will this capability be cognisable, or non- cognisable ? and (2) will it be different in each Individual, or one (and the same for all)? It it be one and cognisable, then it comes to be a Class only mentioned in other words.
14. If the capability be non-cognisable, then the Idea (of singlenéss or commonality) becomes devoid of any basis (and as such false). Because no object 18 accepted by mere existence (unless it is, in some form or other actually cognised).
9 If there wsre no Individuals, there could be no Class; and the only peculiarity of the Individual is that by its individualistic character, it specifies the commonality (of the Class); and hence without the Class, there could be no Individual.
10 The two arguments are: (1) The Class without Individuals (as assumed by others) does not exist : because it is without Individuals—liks the 81618 horns. (2) In- dividuals without the Class do not sxist: because they are without the Class,—liks ths hare’s horns.
11 The premiss—because of ths absence of Individuals’”—implies that the Individua is something different from the Class; and in order to avoid this absurdity, the premises of ths foregoing arguments are stated as follows: (1) ‘because of the absence of tho individualistic character’; and (2) ‘because of the absence of commonality,’ The argument thus changed becomes capable of proving the non-difference of the Class from the Individuals. Bscause ths premiss signifiss that the difference of the Class from the Individuals is concomitant with unreality; and it follows from this that their non-diff. erence must be concomitant with reality—i.e. real.
12.13 This meets the following Bauddha argnment: ‘ Even when you admit ofa Class, you have to assume that it is capable of producing ideas of similarity; why should we not, then, attribute the same capability to the Individuals themselves ?
1# It is only the cognition of the common character that can be said to be capable of being implied by the Individual. If, however, the capability itself becomes 10.60.
284 GLOKAVARTIKA.
15. Inasmuch as the Individuals themselves are different from one another, they can never be cognised by a single Idea; because (being many and diverse) they cannot have (any notion of single commonality for) their object. Andas for the capability itself, it does not belong to these (Individuals).
16. If the capability be different (in each Individual and something wholly different from the Individual itself), then there cannot he one idea (embracing all the Individuals). Andif the capability of each Individual were identical (with it), then too, we could only have ideas of the Individuals (and uot of all of them collectively as one corporate whole.
17. For these reasons you must also admit of the Glass, which is apart from the Individuals and their capabilities, and yet embraces all Individuals, and pervades through each of them.
18. Thus then, for us, there is a distinct object of the Ideaof single com- monality ; and it isa natural property of the Individuals. And as snch, it may be named either ^ Samanya,” or “ Akrti,” or “ Jati,” or “Cakii.”
19. (Obj.): ५ Well, even in the case of such (summum genuses) as “Satta” and the like, we have an idea of their forming a Class ;—how could
nisable, how can it lead to the cognition of something else? If the capability is not cog- nised, how can that which is said to be the object of this capability be cognised ? And hence all ideas of any single commonality must be rejected as utterly gronndless.
16 This anticipates the following objection: ‘It is not the capability that is the basis of the idea of single commonality; the Individuals themselves constitute this basis,” The sense of the reply is that the Individuals being many and diverse, thoy can never he the basis of any idea of single commonality, which must he the object of a notion of something which is one only. It is only a single form that can be the object of a single notion; but you do not admit of any single form embracing all Individuals (as that would be nothing more or less than admitting the Class); hence you cannot reasonably hold the Individuals to bring about any notion of single commonality. As for the capability, though you admit of its existence, yet, in as much as you deny its cognition, it oannot serve asthe hasis of any notion of single commonality: hence with regard to the case in question, it is as good as non-existeut.
16 tsthe oapability different from the Individuals or not ? It appears as one; but if it be different, it could not appear 88 one. And again if it be different, how could it denote any single commonality, by means of the Individuals, that are many snd diverse ? If however it be identical with the Individusls, we could have no other ides save that of Individuals. And these Individuals being many and diverse, they could not form the basis of any notion of single commonality.
11 “ Therefore”—i.e. since neither the Individuals nor their capability are found to be fit to be the basis of the notion of single commonality; “ yet, J‘c.”—The Class resides as a whole is each of the Individuals,
18 Though there oau be no Class of Classes—such as +! gotwatwa,” (as this would Jead to an eudless series of clagsos), yet, evon in the absence of such further olasses, we have the idea of a Class of Classes, as one iu which many diverse classes, such as
AKRTI. 285
there be any such idea without the existence of another more extensive Class P”’
20-21. (Reply). This argument that you bring forward is exactly met by the case of the forest. For even though the idea of the further Class is mistaken, that of the Minor Classes ^ gotwa,” &c.—can not beso. Be- cause prior to the utterance of the words (‘gotwa, &.,’ in the case of the classes ‘ gotwa,’ ‘agwatwa, d&ec.), we have no one notion of commonality with regard to all (such Classes), as we have with regard to the individual cows (in the case of the Class ‘Cow’).
21-22. Some people assert than cven in this case (of Class of Classes) there is a perceptible similarity consisting in the fact of their being ‘things’? (and thus constituting the Class “ Vastutwa’’). But if such assumptions were admitted, then there would be an endless series of Classes ; 111 as much even between the summum genus “‘ Vastutwa’”’ and the minor Classes “‘ gotwa,” &c., there may be assumed to be a similarity (con- sisting in the fact of both being Classes, and so on, ad infinitum ).
23. And since the Individuals too are things, there would be an Idea of Class (** Vastuéwa”) with regard to these (Individuals) also, just as in the case of “ Satta,” Sc. Therefore, there can be no such class (of Classes) as “‘ Vastutwa.”
24. Therefore, in the case of “ Satta,’ &., the application of the word
‘© gotwa,” ¢ acwatwa,” are found to be included. But in as mnch as there can bs no Class of Classes, thie idea connot but be admitted to be a mistaken one. “And,” urges the objector, ‘on the same grounds, why should we not reject the idea of the Class ‘gotwa’ also, as being a mistaken 0118 ?”
20.31 © Forest.’—The Forestis nothing apart from the trees in it. And hence though the idea of the “ Forest” apart from the trees is clearly a mistaken one, yet the idea of the trees themselves cannot be so. Similarly, in the present case, though the idea of the Class of Classes may be mistaken, that of the Classes themselves cannot
he 80. ८८ Because prior to, Jc.’—In the case of the idea of the Class of Classes, the idea
of singleness is merely verbal. When the similarity of the bovine characteristics is perceived to exist in a number of cows, withont an expression of the idea of similarity in the word “ Gotwa,” we have not the remotest idea of any other class, as “ Acwatwa.” It 18 only when the word “ Gotwa” has been nttered, even withont the perception of any similarity, &c.—that we remember similar words, like ^ Acwatwa’’ and the like; and the idea of similarity among these various classes (“ Gotwa,”’ “ Acwatwa,” &c.), lies only in the verbal form; in as munch as there is nothing common among them except their ending in the abstract affix “twa.” And hence such an idea cannot but be a mistaken one.
23 Individuals are things, as much as the Classes; and hence, if the Ideas of Class be said to be based upon verbal expression only, the Individuals would be ae entitled to the Idea, as the classes themselves.
24 How then, 18 a single word ^" Saémanya” applicable in common to all classes? Inasmuch as it has been proved that this similarity is only verbal, and it does not
286 CLOKAVARTIKA.
“ Samanya” (commonality) is due either to the fact of the one (name) apply- ing to many and diverse classes (as ‘gotwa, ‘agwatwa,’ &c.), or to that of bringing about a single Idea (with regard to the various classes).
25. The Class resides in the Individuals, because the Class is not perceived in the interval between the perception of two Individuals. And we do not admit of any (omnipresent) Class like “ Ahaga.”
26. Or, even if it be admitted to be omnipresent, its manifestation would depend upon certain capabilities (in the Individuals composing it). And such capability would be inferred from its effect in the shape of tlie manifestation (of the Class).
27. Therefore that (Individual) alone would be considered to be capable, the presence of which would bring about the manifestation (of tive Class). It 18 for this reason that the Class (‘gotwa’) is not perceived in the presence of any and every individual.
28. Thongh (all Individuals, cows, horses, &c., are) different (from all Classes ‘‘ gowta,” “acwatwa,” 4८, ), yet the capability (of manifesting one Class) belongs only to certain (Individuals) ; while some (Individuals) are wholly without such capability. And certainly no exception can be taken to the natural capabilities of things.
29-30. For instance, to such facts, as the burning of fire and not of Akagu, who could take exception ? Itis merely accepted as a perceptible fact, and no other reason for it is looked for. And the mere absence of any other reason, does not make the cognition of she fact (of fire burning ) groundless (४.९.) false).
30-31. In the mere fact of pointing out (or manifesting of the Class
constitute a real Class in the shape of “ Samdnya,” this application of the uame to all classes must be explained as being due to extraneous influences; and as such influences, we have the facts that the name ^! Sdéménya,” though only one, belongs to all the various classes, and brings about a single idea embracing all olasses.
86 ^“ And we do not §c.""—The Class can have no existence apart from the Indi- viduals; and hence it cannot be said to bs omnipresent, like ‘‘ Akica, which has an independent existence of its own.
26 Tt 18 not perceived in the intervals; becanse at that time there is no individual eudowed with the requisite capability.
#7 Only that Individual can be said to be “capable,” which manifests the Class. The olass ‘‘ Gotwa” is manifested by the individual cows alone; and hence no other individuals—as horses or elephants—cau be said to manifest that Class.
४१ Though the individual cows and horses are equally different from the classss * Gotwa’ and ‘ Agwatwa,’ yet the individual cow is capable of manifesting the former ९1888 and not the latter.
४9 That which is perceived by the Scuse does not reyuire any other proof to substantiate it.
69.61 If the Idew of the Class were produced by Inference, we would stand 1४ need
AKRTI. 287
by the Individual) no concomitant property need be looked for; because such manifestation is not inferential; and in the case of sense-perception, what would be the use of any further definitions, &c. (of marks and characteristics, &c.) ?
31-32, Then again, the relationship between the Individual and the Class is purely natural, and not based upon any reasoning. Consequently we do not require any other Class, for the estahlishment of such relation- ship. And like the aforesaid capability, the natural (character of the relation) cannot he questioned.
33. Or, even if the relationship were hased upon some reasons,—siuce it is only a reason or ground, in some form or the other, that is required,— therefore when certain Individuals have been perceived, (they themselves would supply the necessary grounds for the relation), and uothing else (in the shape of a fresh Class) wonld be needed.
34, Question < ‘Wherefore do other Individuals not signify the Class?” Answer: Simply because such manifestation is not seen to follow from them. And since such non-application of one set of individuals to another Class is only natural, no other grounds for non-manifestation, need be songlit after.
35-36, Question : ‘Since you do not admit of any further ‘Simanya’ (a higher Class) for the controlling of the application (7.e., the relation bet- ween certain Individuals and Classes), therefore, why should not the notion of the individual cow be independent of any such controlling agency as that of the Class ‘Cow’ P And just as, even though (all individuals are) equally different (from the Class) yet the capability of relationship belongs only to some of them, (independently of auy other causes), so too we would have
the cognition of the individual ‘cow’ (naturally by itself), without any other causes.”
of a concomitant property. But asa matter of fact, it is only a case of Sense-percep- tion. This anticipates the following question: ‘“‘By what mark do we know that snch an individua] will manifest such a Class?” The sense of the reply is that it is only Inference that stands in need of such a mark; Sense-perception does not reqnire it.
$1.82 This anticipates the following objection: ‘‘The individnals being many, they cannct be the cause of any one relationship,—and as such we shall require another Class for the establishing of the said relationship.” The reply is that the relationship is natural, and net based upon any extraneons grounds.
84 How is it that the individual cow does not indicate the class ‘ Horse’ ?
88.86 Tf many and diverse individnals be the grounds of the existence of a single Class, we may have the same Individuals as the canses of the single notion of the individual cow; and we need not have any 81९1 thing as the class ‘cow.’ And just as among oertain individuals, equally different from the Class, only a few have the natural capability of being related to the Class; so also we conld have a 7180781 cognition of the class ‘Cow’ without any other cause.
288 CLOKAVARTIKA.
37 Answer: Inasmuch as we do not admit of the appearance of any cognitions, in the absence of objects,—we necessarily require a Class, apart from the Individual.
38. All Ideas, appearing without corresponding objects, must, in the absence of such objects, be rejected as false. And the existence of the class (“cow”) here cannot be said to be faulty, on the ground of the absence of another (Class).
39. If the Class were not admitted, then there could be no function- ing of Verbal Testimony and Inference (as means of true cognition). Because there could be uo relationship among individuals, on account of the endless number (of these).
40. And further, this (relation) is of use to the person (in arriving at Inferences and Verbal Testimony), simply because of its being so perceived. Whereas in the case of the relation between the Individual and the Class, there is no need of perception.
41-42. When the object, in the shape of the Class ‘cow,’ has been coguised by means of the Senses, Apparent Inconsistency leads to the ac-
37 With regard to the differeat kinds of cows, we have an idea of a single com- monality consisting of a character that is common to all cows. And sincé there can be no ideds without their coanterpart realities, therefore we must admit of a single class «४ Cow,” independently of the specific characteristics of the individual cows.
68 Tt is a fact of common experience, in the case of different kinds of medicine effecting a cure of the same disease, that even many and diverse agents conspire to bring ebout a single end. Therefore even in the absence of any farther assumed Classes, it is only reasonable that the diverse Individuals should directly point toa single Class.
89 Verbal Testimony is based upon the relation of Word and Meaniog; and In- ference 18 based upon the relation subsisting among the various terms of the syllogism. If we had no Classes, all relationships would have to be based upon Individuals; and as all Individaals (innumerable) conld not be perceptible at any one time, no relation- ship would ever be perceived.
40 In the case of Inference, a relationship is of use in the argument, only when it has been duly ascertained, as existing among the terms concerned. Of the Class, however, the relationship with the Individual ia based pon the very nature of the two; and as sach ib does not stand in need of being actually realised in perception.
41.42 Kven though the capability (of producing a single idea of oommomility possessed by certain Individuals) exists, yet, in as much as no Idea can exist without its counterpart reality, we oannot but admit of the reality of the Class, as the real object of the single notion of commonality produced by the aforesaid capability ; and hence if the Class be denied, the capability itself becomes untenable.
“The capability, Sc.’—This is in anticipation of the argument that the capability itself might be accepted to be the object of the notion of commonality—thereby doing away with the necessity of postulating the Class. The sense of the reply is that the exiatence of the Class is realised by Sense-perception; and ag such it is far more
AKRTI. 289
ceptance of a single capability as the controlling agent (of such relation between the Individuals and the Class); and this (capability) being now ‘established, cannot set aside its own cause (the idea of the Class). The capability itself cannot be the object of this (single) notion (of common- ality); becanse it is not perceptible by the Senses.
43. The regressus ad infinitum, that you urge on the ground of (the necessity of having further and further) other Classes, could only tend to the rejection of (all ideas of) Class. But such rejection is opposed to facts perceived by the Sense.
44, Hither the relation (between the Individual and the Class), or the basis thereof, is not the means of cognising the Class. It is only when the individual object has been perceived (by the Sense) in its true form, that the Class is subsequently definitely ascertained.
45, Since the dewlap, &c., and the class‘ cow’ are both connected with the same object (cow), therefore the existence of the dewlap, &c., tends simply to point (to the Class as related to the same individual objects of which it itself is the qualification). And it is not necessary that any- thing that serves to point to something else must be an integral part of it,
46-47, And when there is no absolute difference between the dew- lap, &c., and the individual cow, and again between the cluss ‘cow’ and the individuals (composing it), then the reply to the question—‘“ how is it that the class ‘cow’ applies only to the objects endowed with the dewlap, &c.?”’—would be that it does so simply because the Class consists of (is identical with) it (the individual endowed with the dewlap, &c.) Then as for the question—‘“ Whence this identity ?”—you must understand that it lies in the very nature (of the Class and the Individuals composing it).
reasonable to admit the Class as the real object of the notion of commonality, than the Capability, which, at beat, can only he inferred.
44 Thns the ascertainment of the Class ie independent of the relation, &c.; and as auch cannot be rejeoted. 3
46 This ia in anticipation of an chjection to the Bhashya passage, where it is declared that the Clase (‘cow’) is qualified by the dewlap, &c.; this theory makes the cognition of the (1868 ‘cow’ dependent npon that of another Class ‘dewlap’; and this goea against the standard theory of the independent cognisability of the Class ‘ cow.’ The eense of the reply is that when the Bhashya raised the question—what is the meaning of the word ‘Cow’ ?—the reply given was that the signification of the word coneiated of the class endowed with the dewlap, S§c., meaning thereby the object endowed with these. The peculiar wording may be explained on the ground of both the dewlap and the Class ‘cow’ heing related to one and the 68116 object, the individual cow; and in no case can we admit the dewlap as qualifying the Class. ‘‘ dnd it is not necessary, §c.’—i.e,, becanse the dewlap is not an integral part of the Class * cow,’ that is no reason why it eshonld not be accepted as defining (or specifying) it.
41-48 This supplies, from the Author’s own standpoint, an answer to the question—
87
290 GLOKAVARTIKA.
48-49. Thus the fixity (of relation) is established in accordance with ordinary sense-perception. And the difference among the various classes ‘Cow,’ (‘Horse’), &c., are based on the very nature of things, and are not due to any difference in their respective manifesting agencies; for if it were so, then like the shortness, &c., (of letters), the difference among classes would become false. Then again, we ask—On what depends the difference between the manifesting agency (the summum genus ^ Vastutwa’’) and the individual objects, elephants, &c.? If it be said that the difference is natural,—we can say the same (with regard to the difference of the Minor classes themselves,—thus doing away with the intervention of a summum genus).
50. Ifit be urged that the difference is due to the peculiarity of the manifested class ;—then there would be mutual dependence. Therefore the difference between the classes (‘cow’ and ‘elephant’) and the individuals (cow and elephant) must be held to be based upon the very nature of things.
51 Objection : “Since the Class extends over many (individuals) and the Individual over nothing but itself, therefore they (the Class and the Individual) cannot properly be held to be identical; and hence (in the cognition of the Class) there must be some secondary imposition.
what is the ground of the peculiar relationship between the Class and the Individual ? This ground is held to be mere identity.
48-49 ¢ The difference, §c.”—This is levelled against those that hold that all classes are identical in the swmmum genus ‘Vastutwa,’ and that their differentiation into the minor classes is due to certain manifesting agencies in the shape cf the words ‘ Gotiwa’ ‘agwatwa,’ and the like; just as in the case of Letters, the only difference lies in the Intonations—short or long, high or low, &c.
“ We can say the same, &c.”—In the case of individnal cows also, there is a natnral difference among them. Thna, then, thongh ‘ Vastutiwa,’ is one, yet, owing to the differ- ences among the individual cows and elephants, if it be held to appear manifold, in the Shape of the minor classes, ‘‘Cow” and “ Elephant,”—then, in the same manner, in as much as there are natural differences among the individnal cows themselves, these jndividuals conld be taken as forming 80 many minor classes; especially as the only ground for ‘ Vastutwa’ appesring in the forms of the minor classes ‘‘ Cow,’ ‘‘ Elephant,” &c., is the fact of its difference from the individual cows and elephants. This 18 ६ palpable absurdity ; consequently, we cannot but admit of a class ‘Cow,’ which is distinct from the elephant, &c., and yet embraces, within itself, all individual oows, And in this manner, the necessity of the minor class ‘cow’ is established, apart from sny manifesting agency in the shape of a summum genus.
00 “ Mutual dependence”’—The cognition of the manifested depending upon the manifesting agenoy, and the difference of this latter from the individnals, necessary for the said manifestation, depending npon the pecnliarity of the manifested class.
6} In as much as they cannot be identical, the idea of the Class must be either mistaken, or only a secondary characteristic imposed upon the Individual.
दपए, 291
52. “We must admit the difference (of the Class as extending over each different individual),—becanse the Class is identical with those that are different (among themselves)—like the specific character, (of the indi- viduals). And again, we must admit the singleness of individuals,—because they are all identical with the one (Class).
03. Then again, “how can one and the same thing, (the Class aud the Individual being ideutical, and thus one aud the same), be both one (in the form of the Class) and many (in the form of the ludividuals), and then too, extend over others (as a Class) and be restricted within itself (as an Indi- vidual) ? How too, can the same be both the Class and the Individual ? These among others are the inevitable contradictions involved in your theory.”
04.55. Reply: It 18 not proper to urge these contradictions (as they do not apply to our theory); because it is only when the Individual is cognised as being identical with the Class, that it can extend over many things ; and the class too is known to extend to nothing beyond itself, only when it is perceived to have become identical with the character of the Individual. (Thus there ceases to be any contradiction).
00-56. In the same manner is to be set aside the (contradiction based upon the) fact of (one and the same thing) being both diverse and one because in one shape (that of Class) we may have singleness, and in another (that of Individual), diversity.
06-57. He who urges the diverse character of the Class is to be shown that (the Class has that character) when it isin the shape of the Indivi- duals; and hence we accept this character, as also the single character of the Individuals, only as appearing in the shape of the Class.
& The sense of the objection 18 this: “The Class is identical with all Individuals the Individuals differ from one another; hence the Class as affecting one Individual must be different from that which affects another. Secondly all Individuals being identical with the one Class, they must all be one and one alone. ‘Thns then, the theory of the identity of the Class with the Individuals militates against two of yonr most cherished notions. The first syllogism, brought forward in the Karika does away with the very character of the Class—viz that of being one and embracing many Individuals, and the second syllogism strikes at the character of the Individuals, which are held to be many and diverse.
6¢.65 Tt is only whon the Individual has acquired the character of the Class that it can extend over many Individuals; and the Class too is restricted within itself only when it has acquired the character of the Individual.
65.56 The Class ‘Cow,’ in the shape of the red cow, differs from the black cow; where- 28 ए" its own generic shape—of the Class ‘Cow’—it cannot but be identical with the black cow also, And this does not constitute any self-contradiction, as it is always pos- sible for one and the same thing to bear one relation to one thing, and the opposite relation to ancther thing.
64.67 The contradictory character is admitted, as explained in the foregoing Karika ; hence your syllogisms become entirely superfluons.
292 OLOKAVARTIKA.
57-58. As in the case of the variegated colour, we can optionally fix upon any one of the various colours (without any contradiction), simply because the object (colour) is of a variegated character,—so, in the same manner, we could fix upon the diversity or uuity (of the Class or the In- dividual, without any contradiction, because in different shapes both are capable of having the two characters).
58-59. He who would seek (by the above arguments) to prove the diversity (of the Class), after having separated the Class-character (from the Individuals), will have his premiss failing, And if the premiss were to be fulfilled, then it would simply be proving the proved (i.e., redundant).
59-61, When the Class is cognised as identical in form with the divers Individuals, then the object appears only in itsindividual form; and when this (individual character) has appeared (to consciousness), the (character of) Class continues to lie latent in it, helping its existence ; and though a real entity, this (character of the Class) appears to us to be non-existing, because it is (at that time) not perceptible (by itself, apart from the Individual).
61-62. When we are coguisant of the Individuals themselves as non- different from the Class, then it is the Class itself that is perceived (and the Individuals continue to lie latent).
62-63. When, however, an object of variegated character is cognised at once (without any concrete cognition of details), then difference, non- difference, diversity and all things else become latent.
63-64. But no word can express such an object (in the abstract) ; (in as much as) all words apply to the generic forms (of things).
68.69 The premiss is in the form— because it is identical with diverse Individuals.” But when the Class-character is removed, then the identity ceases to exist; becanse itis only the Class that is one and identical, embracing all Individuals. Thus then if the ldentity is accepted, the Class-character of the Individual cannot but be admitted.
61.62 Thus then, the Individual and the class are cognised, equally, in the same manner, according as occasion presents itself. Therefore none of the two can be denied. These two cases are of concrete cognition ; while the next Karika cites a case of nn- qualified abstract cognition,
63.64 The first half of the Karika anticipates the following objection: ‘If the form of the object be as described in the foregoing Karika, then, how can you explain the assertion of the Bhashya that ‘ the class is the denotation of the word’? For it is the real form of the object (which has been shown to be abstract) that a word onght to denote , or else, it becomes entirely disconnected from the object‘sought to be signified.” The sense of the reply is that no word can have any significance with regard to the variegated character of a0 object taken in the abstract $ since words apply to oertain portions of the object, and this portion is the generic form of the object,—that is to say, the tdea
of the Ciass as contained in the idea of the Individual is what forms the object of verbal signification.
AKRTI. 293
64-65. In view of the object as a complete whole (not signified by the word), some people assert the separation of certain parts of the denota- tion of the word to be false. But the fact of the generic idea (of Class) being a part (of the denotation of words) cannot be denied.
65-66. He, who explains “ Class” as being merely the similarity among individual objects (should explain), what he understands by the word “similarity.” If it be the fact of the various individuals having one and
the same form (and character), then this is exactly what we mean by the word ‘‘ Class.”
67-68. If however, by “ Similarity’ you mean the Similarity of form, then you must explain whose, and with whom, is this similarity. For, 19 their particular forms, the cow that is red is not similar to that which 18 black. If Gt be urged that) the former are similar to the latter, in that they have similar limbs &¢.,—then (we say that) the idea of simi- larity that we would have would be in the form “ like the black cow”; and
this could not give rise to the notion of (both sorts of cows belonging to) a common Cluss ‘Cow.’
09. Even by mistake we could only have the notion that “ this (red cow) is the black one”; and not that “it belongs to the Class ‘ Cow ’.” For the form of the red cow 18 not the form of cow in general.
70. There would be no idea of “ Cow” with reference to any other
64.65 Since words do not touch the complete forms of objects, as they exist ; therefore, on this sole gronnd, some people assert that the separation of the generic from the other elements of the object is a mistake. The sense of the last sentence added to the reply given to this view is that, though this separation may be considered a mistake, yet no one can deny the existence of various elements in the idea of an object; nor can any one deny the fact of the generic idea (of the Class) being one of these elements. Therefore Words, according to their capabilities, must be taken to touch only certain elements of the object (and not all of them); and this fact cannot be rightly coustrued into a disconnection of the Word with the real character of the object.
67.68 If the similarity were to rest in the Individuals, then, we could not perceive any similarity between the red cow and the black. Even if there he certaiu similarities of bodily shape, limbs, &c., all the idea we could have would be that—‘ the red Cow is similar to the black Cow,’ and this could never he the source of an idea of the comprehensive Class ‘Cow’—in the form that ‘both the red cow and the black equally belong to the Class Cow.’
69 If it be urged that the idea of Class is a mistaken one, based on similarity,— even then, in the case of the two cows, red and black, the idea would be that ‘the red cow is the black cow.’ For sny idea—either correct or mistaken—of the Class ‘Cow, in this case, there 18 nocanse. ‘ The form of the red Cow Sc.” For if it were 89, then the black or the white cow would cease to be called a ‘ Cow.’
10 The generic idea of the ‘ Cow” is found to belong to all cows—black, red, &e., and yet you seem to restrict the name toonly red ones. Therefore your theory dis- tinctly militates against the well-established fact of the generic idea of Cow tn general,
294 CLOKAVARTIKA.
cows besides tlie black one, even if they were very much similar toit. But such an idea (of ‘“‘Cow”’) is actually found to exist. And yet you do not admit the existence anywhere of such a generic form as the “Cow” in general.
71. Nor is any other “Cow” known to exist, on which you could base the notion of similarity (extending overall! cows). And again, with regard to two objects that are similar, no idea that “it 18 that” (2e., no idea of absolute identity) can exist for ever.
72. Since the idea (of Class) belongs to all men (at all times), it can- not be a mistaken notion ; specially as it is never fonud to be (contradicted aud) set aside (by any perceptible fact). And if (cven in the absence of any such contradicting fact) we acceptan assumption (of its unreality), theu all ideas conld be rejected as false.
73-74. Asa matter of fact, we do not perceive any particular virtue in any particular individual cow; what, then, is that one individual, which would be called a “ Cow ” (aud on a similarity with which we would apply the name ‘ Cow’ to other individuals)? If some pristine individual (the first cow created by God, f.1., were said to be such an Individnal),—then, inasmuch as we have never seen this pristine individual, and hence can never have any idea of similarity (with it), we could never have any generic idea of ‘Cow’ in general (through that individual Cow).
U “Nor, ¥e.”"—This is in anticipation of the following argument: “The class cow is not the similarity of the black cow, bat a similarity with a cow which is simi- lar to all cows in existence.” The sense of the reply is that you do not admit of any such generic entity as the ‘Cow’; and yet you cannot reasonably deny its existence, cognised by all persons,
“ And further, Sc.”—In every case of mistaken notions—as in the case of silver and shell—one is for a moment deceived by similarity, and takes the one for the other ; bnt soon after he perceives a difference, he is undeceived, and ceases to have any idea ofthe identity of the two objects. Such ig the cage with all mistaken notions : they always disappear in due conrse of time. In the case of the idea of the Class ‘Cow’ however, we find, as a matter of fact, that all along eternity, all men have had the idea that all the various kinds of Cows belong to the Single Class ‘Cow’ ; and certainly such a long-continued universally recognised idea cannot be disregarded ag a figment.
14.78 Similarity of body means that all cows have bodies that beloug to one and the same Class, But one who denies all Class cannot admit of this explanation; and hence it is yet to be explained what is meant by ‘Similarity’ ^ For an idea, §-c2°— This refers to the following argument: “ Even in the absence of Classes of body, ve Individuals themselves, aided by certain everlasting (52125, would bring ahout ideas of the commonality of the bodies, and thereby also the idea of the said Simlar- ity.” The sense of the reply is that in the absence of an all-embracing Class (of Bodies), the many and diverse Individuals themselves cannot, in auy way, bring abont any idea of single commonality—as we have already shown above.
AKRTI-—APOHA. 295
74-75. And further, there can be no idea of similarity, in the absence of Classes, of the limbs (of the cow); for an idea of a Class is not pro- duced by the individuals alone.
75-76. Then, as to the question, whether this similarity is different, or not different, from the individuals,—(it must be admitted that) simi- larity must consist either in the Class (ze, if it be said 10 be different from the Individual) or in the [ndividual itself.
76-77. It is for this reason that in his own work Vindhyavasin has explained that ^* sameness of form ”’ (Sardpya) is not an object absolutely different (from the Individuals). And itis only by mistake that “simi- larity ’’ has been asserted by (Vaiceshikas, on the basis of Vindhyavasin’s assertion) to constitute what we call a Class.
Thus ends the Chapter on AKRTI.
Section 14. ‘ APOHA.”
1. Those, who have assumed the Class (‘ Cow’) to he a negation of the absence of Cow,—even these people have clearly, by the assertion of the negation of the absence of Cow, admitted of an entity in the shape of ‘* gotwa ” (the Class ‘ Cow’).
2. It has been proved before (by the Banddhas) that a negation is only another form of positive entity ; and hence, please tell me what is that positive entity, which consists in the negation of “ Horse”’ &c,
3. The specific (abstract) form cannot be held to be such an object, because it is undefined (abstract and unqualified). Nor could it apply to
76.16 This is in reply to the following theory: “ Similarity does not mean the Simi- larity of bodies, but an entity altogether different from Individuals and Classes’’ The sense of the reply is that we have never come across any similurity, which is distinct from the Class, and yet different from the Individaals (vide Chapter on Azalogy),
76.77 Vindhyavasin has said —‘ Sariipyam Samanyam’; and this only means that the Class (Samany4) consists in Saérwpya,—that is in the one single form which 1s common to all the Individuals (composing that Class) ; and yet people have mistaken his ‘ Saripya ` for ‘Sddreya’ (Similarity), and have gone about asserting that it is something distinct from Individuals, &c., &e.
i The Bauddhas assert that the Class ‘ Cow’ is only the negation of all that is not cow. This is what they mean by ‘ Apoha.’
2 Besides the class ‘Cow,’ there can be no other positive entity that could be the substratum of the negation of ‘ not-cow.’
8 To that which is undefined cannot be attributed any positive character—to say nothing of a negative character.
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the individual black cow, &c., because that would not be common (to all cows).
4. The forms of the black, red, &c., are not common to one another, and for you (Bauddhas), there is no one entity which conld be common to the rest, for, in that case, there would be an endlessness of the meanings (of that one entity).
8. All non-cows (horse, &c.), cannot be negatived directly by any in- dividual (cow); because it is not the idea of the black cow which is brought about by the negation of non-cow.
6. The idea of the black cow is brought about by the negation of cows thatarered, &e. (२.९.) the negation of all cows that are not black). If} on the contrary, this idea of the black cow were to negative the absence of cow in general, (and thus be tantamount to the idea of cow in general), then,—just as it does not negative itself (since it itself is a cow),— so it could not negative the other kinds of cows (red, &c.,—becanse these too would be as much Cows, as the black one), (and thus the well-established fact of the black cow negativing the other kinds of cows would be contra- dicted).
7. ‘Thus then, if you were to assume that there is partial non-nega- tiving, while there is general real negativing,—then this simultaneons affirmation aud negation would involve a self-contradiction.
8-9. For these reasons, there can be no negation of the * non-cow’ by such individuals (cows) (as have their forms confined within themselves ) Nor is a conglomeration of these (individual) cows) the means of negativing
¢ “ And for you, J'c.”—For ns, there is a class ‘cow’ which is common to all indiv- dual cows, and which we could have as the substratum of the negation of ‘ not-cow.’ As for the Bauddhas, they do not admit of any such Class. Hence if they were to admit of any snch single entity as ‘cow,’ then, in that case, inas much as there are many kinds of cows, the one word (signifying the single entity) wonld come to have so many distinct denotations, separately, with regard to each separate individual. And such endlessness of denotations would be far from desirable. Specially as we can conceive of no relationship of a word with endless denotations. Hence such a word could never he used. That is to say, if particular kinds of cows were to he the substrate of the negation of ‘ not-cow,’—and thns form the denotation of the word ‘cow’—then, inasmuch as there are endless kinds of cows, the word ‘Cow’ would come to have in numerable denotations.
6 The negation of ‘not-cow’ wonld he the cow in general, and not any particular cow.
1 Tf the theory above criticised were to be acoepted, then the individual black cow: in accordance with a perceived fact, would negative the existence of all other kind- of cows; and yet the same black cow—being the suhstratnam of the negation of all ‘non-cows,’ and as snoh having the same character as the ‘cow’ in general—would also include all other kinds of cows, whioh it has previously negatived. Suoh would be the contradiction.
APOHA. 297
‘‘non-cows.” Becanse, in that case, we could have an idea of ‘cow’ tn general, only at a time when all the individual cows would be simultan- eously perceived (which is an impossibility) ; and then too, the idea of the cow in general would be only such as would rest in all the individual cows taken together as one composite whole; and we conld not have the name ‘cow’ apply to each individual cow taken separately by itself; and as for applying to a conglomeration of all individuals, this is impossible (because all individuals, past, present and future can never be perceived at one and the same time).
10. Therefore that one form alone, which resides in its entirety in each and every one of the individnals, can be the means of having an idea of cow (in general). And this (form) is none other than ‘cowness’ (7.¢., the character or property of belonging to the Class ‘Cow,’ which is common to all individual cows).
11. Obj: ^ Butin the case of the different sorts of Negation, you do not admit of any Class in the form of a positive entity.” Reply: Eveu in the case of these (we hold that) the Class (is a positive entity, in the shape of) existence itself qualified (or limited) by non-appearance, &e.
12-13. When that (existence) is qualified by appearance (contin- nance), &c., then it is known as a positive entity ; and when that (very exist- ence) is qualified by a negation duo to the presence of other entities (like the curd, &c., in the case of milk), then it is known as a negative entity (negation of milk 1.2.) Non-eternality (or Destrnctibility = Pradhwansa- bhava) belongs to a positive class (consisting) of the action of being destroyed.
18-15. “ What would non-Brahmanahood be with respect to Kshatriyas, &c.? Manhood belongs to all the four, and as such cannot be said to be synonymous with ‘non-Brahmanahood’; aud the idea produced by the word ‘non-Brahmana’ does not refer to any one individnal caste; becanse it equally signifies 811 the three, Kshatriya, &c. Nor can it be held to signify the three conjointly, because this notion of ‘non-Brahmanahood ’
11 ‘Pragabhdva’ signifies an existence that has not yet appeared, and 80 on, the various phases of negation may be explained in terms cf positive entities.
12-13 Thig explains how, in accordance with the above theory, we could differentiate between entity and non-entity.
18.15 In this case, the idea of non-Brahmanahood belongs equally to the Kshatriya the Vai¢cya and the Qadra; and yet non-Brahmanhood cannot be held to be a positive class ; specially because we do not know of any such class as would inclnde all the three castes; the one that is possible is the class ‘manhced’ but it includes the Brah- manas also. Hence in this case, you cannot but admit a negative class; why, then, can you not find your way to accepting a general Apoha? ‘‘Hach of the three, Sc.”—tie., A Cidra is as much a non-Brahmana as a Kshatriya.
38
298 QLOKAVARTIKA.
belongs to each of the three separately. Therefore, the only class that we could have in the present case would be ‘non-Brahmanahood’ (negation of Brahmana) ; and this is a negative entity. And just as we have the notion of Class with reference to a negative entity like ^ non-Brahmana,”’ so, in the same manner, we could also have such a notion of Class with reference to the ‘Class’ (when we explain it as the ‘negation of non- cows ’).”
16-17. (In reply to the above abjection) some people hold that ‘non- Brahmana’ is only one word, like the word “aksha,” applying to (signi- fying) each of the three castes (Kshatriya, Vaigya and Ciadra). But this explanation could not apply tothe case of “non-jar.” Because in this case (of non-jar) there being endless individuals that are not jar, we are cognisant of the fact of this word ^" non-jar” heing common to (i.e., de- noting) all of them, For this reason (some people hold that) the reason for the denotation of the word ^^ non-Brahmana” applying to Kshatriyas, &c., lies in the fact of certain actions and properties belonging to these latter, and not to the Brahmanas,
18. The trne exaplanation however, is that the Class ^ Manhood,” common to all the four castes, is precluded, by means of the negative particle (11) the word ‘“‘non-Bralmana”), from all Brahmanas,—and 28 snch, the class “ non-Brahmanahood (signifying manhood precluded from Brah- manas) is cognised as a positive entity ;—just as in the case of the men- tion of (special) purposes, 4८.
16.17 ^^ Like the word Apoha, &c.,’—that is to say ‘non-Brahmana’ is not a class con- sisting of Kshatriyas, Vaigyas and Cudras. It is only a word that has three denotations, pointing to the Kshatriya, the Vaigya and the Qadra; being in this like a word that has several meanings. The word ‘non-jar’ cannot be said to have different significa- tions. For, in that case, this one word would have endless meanings, in as much as it can refer to 211 things in the world, only excepting the Jar.
“Some people, §c.’—But the explanation is scaroely correct; because it will not apply to the case of the word ‘non-jar.’ Because in the case of the word ‘non- Brahmana’ we are fully cognisant of such properties, as Valonr, &c., and Actions, as fighting, &c., that belong to the Kshatriya, and not to the Brahmana; while we know of no such properties as, not helonging to the jar, belong to al) other things in the world.
18 ^“ As in the case of the mention of special purposes &c.”—-When it is said—‘ bring a man for carrying a flask of wine,’—the special purpose for which the man 18 wanted— viz: the carrying of the wine—being incompatible with any other caste but the Cidra the word, ‘man,’ in this case, is taken as signifying a person belonging to the Qidra class only. In the same manner, in the case in question, the force of the negative in ‘non- Brahmana ’ which takes the place of the special purpose (in the instance cited) serves to disconnect munhood from the Brahmanas, and as such signifies all men that are not Brahmanas, which refers to all the other three castes equally; and as snch can be taken ag 8 positive entity.
40 प्त ^. 299
19. Though there is no caste in—between (“ manhood,” and “ Brah- anahood,” ^^ Kshatriyahood,” 46.) , which resides in the three castes (Kshat- riya, Vaigya and Cidra), yet, through the force of the negative (in “ non- Brahmana”), the class “ manhood” is cognised as inhering in the castes (Kshatriya, &.)
20. Through the diversity of the denotative power of words, we have a diversity in the cognitions with regard to the Castes,—as when in its natural form, the class ‘manhood ” is cognised as residing in four substrates (the Brihmana, the Kshatriya, the Vaigya and the (udra), and yet, through the preclusion (of Bralimanas, by means of the negative in non-Brahmana) it is cognised as residing in only three substrates (Kshatriya, Vaicya and (२०).
21. Just as to the eyes of the eagle and the crow belong the faculties of seeing a thing at a distance and in close proximity respectively; so too, 10 8 single class ^ manhood” would belong the capability of denoting (a general object) “man,” as also (the more specific object) ^" non-Brab- mana.”
22. In a case where we have to use a sentence in the form “ manhood” residing in objects other than Brahmanas, there we use the word “ Abrah- mana ’’; and such actually is our cognition also.
23. In the case of “non-jar,” on the other band, all the cognition we have is that of the class “ earthy substances” other than the gar,
24. A word (“^ Brahmana” f. i.),—being precluded, by means of the negative, from its singular (individual) character (of Brahmanahood),— comes to reside in only its generic form (‘‘manhood”’) devoid only of that (aforesaid individual character).
9 This meets the following objection : ^° The single class ‘manheod’ cannot reside in four and three substrates.” The sense ef the reply is that thengh the organ of per- ception—the eye,—is the same, and the ebject—dead body—is the same, yet the eagle sees it from a great distance, while the crow only when it is very clese te it.
22 We know of many instances where compounds are used in the place of sentences. In the same manner, the word ‘ abréhmana’ could stand fer ‘men other than Brah- manas,’ the explanation of this fact being that the negative in ‘abrahmana,’ while de- noting directly the preclusion of Braéhmanas, indicates indirectly the class ‘man,’ as re- lated to Bréhmanahood. Consequently, to mention the word ‘ abrahmana’ is as much as to say ‘men qualified by the absence of Brahmanas.’
#4 The werd ‘ Brahmana’ directly denotes the single class Bréhmana, and indirectly indicates the classes Man, Living being, &c. When the negative particle is attached te this word,—in the ferm ‘ abrahmana’—it serves to preclade the individual character of Brahmanahood alone. And as such, the word cannot but fal] back, for its denotation, upon the nearest generic character of manhood (which is net negatived), which, hew- ever, must be free from the singular character of Bréhmanahood, which has been pre- cluded by the negative.
300 OLOKAVARTIKA.
25. When the particular form (Brahmanahood) has been thus pre- cluded, the word (५ non-Brahmana”), standing in need of a Class ( which it could denote), is restricted, by the next higher Class, within itself (४.९. within such a Class).
26. Because there is no ground for setting aside the first (Class “manhood” that comes next to the one precluded), therefore what is left behind (as the denotation of the word “ non-Bralimana ”) is “ manhood "` as apart from “ Braéhmanahood.”
27. The negative having once precluded (the singular character of) ‘ Brahmanahood,” and thus having once become the qualifying adjunct (to the specific character), if some one were to assume the preclusion, by the same negative, of “ manhood,’—then it could be so only in an indirect way.
28. Therefore whenever any specific form (Brahmanahood f.1.) of a Class (५ manhood”) are negatived, it is this same Class that is nataorally cognised, as located in other specific forms (Kshatriya, Vaicya and Cadra). And such is the experience of ordinary people.
29. Though the idea (of manhood’) is common (to all the four castes, including Brabmanas), yet the negation (of Brahmanas) is accept- ed asa matter of course. And the meaning thus being accepted as being (that Class) devoid of that (negatived element) alone, we have an idea of the others (Kshatriyas, &c.) also through similarity.
30. Or, in the case of such words as “ non-Brahmana,” &c., we may accept similarity alone as being the object of denotation. And this is
25 Brahmanahood being precluded, the denotation rests upon the next higher class ‘Man,’ and cannot go beyond that, to ‘ Living being’ for instance. For so long as the needs of denotation are supplied by a lower class, it is not right to go beyond it,
21 This anticipates the following objection: “The negative in ‘abrahmana,’ while precluding the directly expressed Brahmanahood, might also preclnde the indirectly indicated manhood.” The sense of the reply is that Brahmanahood being directly expressed, the negative cannot but qualify it; and when the negative has once served the purpose of qualifying it, it cannot be taken to apply to another entity, which is only indirectly indicated by the word in question.
४8 Inasmuch as a Class cannot continue withont the Individuals composing it, when one set of Individuals 18 negatived, the Class muet fall baok upon other sets of Individuals.
29 Though it is common, yet, inasmuch as the negative particle serves to preclude (and negative) Brahmanahood, the class ‘manhood’ must be accepted to reside in the re- maining three castes—Kshatriya, Vaigya and Qudra. “ Similarity”—The denotations 18 that of the Class devoid of Brahmanas ; and instead of accepting, by this, an alto- gether foreign positive entity, it is far more reasonable to accept the Kshatriya, &c., whioh are similar in character to the caste precluded by the negative; and the cogni- tion of these is far casier than that of any thing else.
80 Inasmuch as people recognise the Kshatriya, &c., by the word ‘abrdhmana,’ we may accept similarity to be signified by tho negativo particle, the word ‘ abr&hmana :
APOHA. 301
based upon a similarity of parts. In fact, it is also in the absence of atiy such (sunilarity of parts) that the similarity is perceived.
31. In some cases, even without any similarity, we can have a sig- nification by means of a word accompanied by a negative,—this being due to such causes as proximity, &c.,—as will be explained later on, in connec- tion with the case of the “ non-seeing”’ (of the rising sun).
32. In this case (of ‘non-seeing,’) we require an action other than seeing ; and we do not recognise any such action other than the formal de- termination (Sankalpa), because of the proximity (of this latter, to the injunction “ one should not look at the rising sun ”’).
33. The negative particle, occurring in conjunction with a noun ora verbal root, does not possess the actual negativing faculty. For the words ‘non-Brahmana” and ‘tnon-Virtue” only signify such other positive eu- tities as are contrary to these.
34, Hven where, in connection with a verb, the negative brings abont the cognition of a negation,—there too, the listener recognises only a positive entity, us indifferent (or apathetic to the action signified by the Verb).
30. Thus then, all negations ( Apoha) would rest in positive entities.
being =a caste similar to the Bréhmana. This similarity too consists in the similarity ef the Individuals composing the Brahmana class with these composing the class Kshatriya, &c. Though there can be no similarity of parts among the various objects that are not-jar, yet similarity dees not always consist solely in that of the parts; it often consists of a similarity of relationship, as has been already shown above, under ‘Analogy.’ And ameng all the objects that are not-jar, we find a common relation- ship,—in that they are all of the earth,
81 This refers to the objection that if similarity were expressed by the negative, then, how could a negative have any meaning in a place where there is no similarity ?
32 The negative accompanying the verh ‘ to see’ (in the sentence in question) signi- fies only the negation of seeing, and indicates the determination—‘ I will not see,’ &c., &c., hecanse this is mentioned in close proximity to the Injunctien. And the Injunc- tion toe is not a negative, but a positive one, being, as it is, mentioned among the observances laid down for the Religious Student. The meaning of the Injunction thus conies to be this—‘ one is to make a formal determination that he will observe the rule of not looking at the rising 8011.
83 ‘This refers to the objection that the negative particle, having the sense of negativing, how can it have an affirmative meaning ? “ Abréhmana” = castes other than the Brahmana; and ‘Adharma’= Vice.
४५ Even in such instances as ‘na pibét,’ the meaning 18 that the ‘person addressed 18 to be free from the action of drinking ;’ thus the object signified by ‘na pibét’ is the person himself as free from the specific action of drinking—which is distinctly a positive eutity.
8 The substrates of all negative ideas having heen proved to be pesitive entities, as qualified by certain limitations,—inasmuch as the Individual, tle black or the red
302 CLOKAVARTIKA.
And agaiu, if (211 generic ideas) be assumed to rest in negative entities, then, until we reach the final individuals (atoms), we could not get at any positive entity.
36. And asa matter of fact, none of our usage is based upon such final individuals (atoms which are imperceptible); nor is any definite cognition of these (atoms) possible. Consequently, the word “ Apoha” is only (a subterfuge) to express a void (Cunyata=negation of al] exist- ences), in other words,
37. And in accordance with that theory (of Canyavdda), all the ideas of Horse, &c., would have to rest in their own specific (sensational) forms. And in that case it would be an useless assumption to state that those ideas signify the negation of (objects) other than themselves (४.९.) the Apoha).
38. And (the ideas signifying themselves), you would have a Class, in the form of a positive entity, in the shape of the Idea. And therefore it was an useless effort on your part to have assumed an Apoha, as forming the denotation of objects, and yet independent of any external (real and positive) objects.
39. And this Idea appears, in the shape of areal entity, with refer- ence to the signification of words. Therefore we must admit of a positive entity—uot in the form of the negation of other ideas (Apoha)—to form the object signified (by a word, ^" Cow ” f.1.)
40. Just, as even in the absence of any external objects, we have a cognition (in a positive form, and not in the form of an Apoha) of the mean- ing of a sentence,—so, in the same manner, we could also have with regard to the word; and why should we assume an Apoha ?
cow, could not be the eubstrate of an idea of all cows,—you must admit of a positive entity in the shape of the class ‘cow.’ If all generic notions be held to rest upon negative entities, then, for an idea of positive entities, we wonld have lo go down to indi- vidnal atoms, which alone are wholly free from a generic character. But as a matter of fact we do not fall back npon atoms in our ordinary usages. ‘Therefore all generic ideas cannot he held to rest upon negatives.
26 It 18 only for an explanation of the gross forme of things that we postnlate the existence of atoms; hence when the gross forms themselves would be negatives—i.e., non-existences—then the atoms could never be oognised. Thus then, it wonld come to a negation of all existences. The Apoha theory thus comes to be only a round-about way of putting forward the Qényavdda, which hae already been met before.
87 The Qinyavadi holds that inasmuch as there are no entities in the world, all ideas have their own specific forme for their objects.
88 The object of tle ldea of a Horse would be that Idea itself—a positive entity ; and thus the Idea itself would constitute a class including alt Horses
89 This meets the theory that the above idea is only a negative eutity, an Apoha. The sense of the reply is that the idea that we have is in the form of a cow, which ie distinctly a positive entity.
APOHA, 303
41. In the case of all ideas, we are not cognisant of any rejection of ather uleas (Apoha). Since the idea ends only in bringing about its own form, therefore it does not bear the burden of any other (ideas).
42. Words signifying different Classes, as also the words signifying different individuals, would all come to be synonymous, if the significa- tion of words were to consist in Apoha.
43. Obj : ^“ But, 81066 the Apohas (of different words) are different, therefore this objection cannot apply. If however, you base your objec- tion upon all Apohas considered as constituting a single class ` Apoha,’ then, the same may be said even with regard to your positive entities.”’
44-45, Reply: As for us, our Classes, being positive entities, differ from one another; and, not being mixed up with one another, they never attain to unity. Whereas, for you, how could there be any difference among Apohas, being, as they are, devoid of any specifications in the shape of commixture or unity or multiplicity, &.
46. Or (if you admit of differences as belonging to Apohas, then) inasmuch as it would be different (in different individuals), it must be a positive entity—like the specific (idealistic) forms (of Ideas). And if the character of a positive entity be denied to it, then it cannot be many; and ns such you are not freed from (the absurdity of) making all words synonymous,
47-48. ¢ : “ Well, we could have a difference among Apohas on the ground of difference among the objects negatived by such Apohas.” Reply :
91 We might apeak of an Apoha as being the denotation of a word, if we were ac- tually cognisant of any such signification in ordinary parlance, As a matter of fact, however, whenever the word ‘cow’ 18 nttered, we have no euch notion as the rejection of all that is not cow. Hence we cannot admit of any such signification in the form of Apoha, which is contrary to al] experience.
$2 All words signifying Apoha, they wonld be all synonymons.
43 The sense of the objector is that “ ‘cow’ 18 = Apoha of non-cow; ‘horse’ ig = Apoha of non-horse ; and thos the varioas Apohas being different, the words cannot be said to be synonymons. If however, Sc.—If even in the face of different individual Apohas, you base your objection upon the unity of Apoha as a class composed of the varions Apohas,—then in tbe case of your positive entities 8180 the significatioas of all words may be said to rest in a single 61888 ‘ Vastu > (Thing); becanse there can be no doubt as to all objects belonging to that clase. And on this ground, we could urge against yon, the fact that such being tlie case, all words woald become synonymons.”
441.45 Difference is a property that can only belong to positive entities, and not to the negative, which is devoid of all specification.
46 Specific forms of ideas differ from one another, and are, on that very ground accepted to be positive entities (vide ^ Cinyavada.’)
47-48 The ohjects negatived by the Apoha of ‘cow’ are the horse and other animals, and those negatived by that of ‘horse’ are the cow, /c. Thus there ia a differeace among the objects negatived in each case. Any secondary imposition
304 001९4. ए द 14.
But there is no natural difference among Apohas; and if their difference be sought to be based upon something else (the object negatived, f.i.), then such difference can only be secondary (imposed upon them from outside, and not belonging by nature to themselves). And for the same reason itis not right to assume a difference (among Apohas) on the ground of the diver- sity of the substrates (of negation).
48-49. Nor on the mere gronnd of the diversity of relationships, can any difference be accepted even among positive entities ;—how then could it be declared with regard to a negative entity (Apoha), which is neither definitely cognised, nor related (to anything), nor differentiated (from other things), nor endowed with any definite specific form £
50. For these reasons, just as even when there is a difference among the individuals (cows) no difference is held to belong to their Apoha,—so, in the same manner, the Apoha cannot be many, even if there be a differ- ence among the objects negatived.
51. Then again, if such difference (among Apohas) be accepted, then the rejection of non-cow (i.c., the Apoha of ‘ non-cow’) wonld reside in each individual (cow) ; and such being the case, you conld not hare an Apoha which you wish to be common to all individual cows—the black, red, &c.
52. When even their substrates, that are connected with those Apo- has, are not able to differentiate them (into distinct Apohas), then, to as- sume that they would be differentiated by the objects negatived by them that are altogether extraneous to them! (what a stretch of pluilosophic insight ! )
53-54. ` 10 (the signification of) ^ non-cow”’ the only element in excess (of the signification of ^ non-horse”’) is the horse ; and again iu (the significs-
cannot affect our argnments. ‘‘ Substrates of megation.” The individnal cow, horse, &c.
#9 One and the same Devadatta may be in one place one day, and in another place on the next day; and though his relationships will be changing, yet it cannot be held that the Devadatta in the two places is not one and the same. ५ What then, §’c.”— How can such an indefinite thing be cognised as different on the mere gronnd of the difference of relationships? For certainly no relationships with it can be cognised.
59 Thongh the individual cows differ among themselves, yet you accept a single Apoha as embracing them all. Why, then should you hold the Apoha of ‘ Horse’ to be different from that of ‘cow,’ on the mere ground of there being a difference among the sets of objects rejected by the two Apohas?
61 Thorcby your Apoha would lose its generic character; and as euch it could not be a substratum of our Class. This would bo the case if the difference of Apohas were based upon the difference among their substrates, and not upon that of the objects rejected.
68.56 ^ Non-cow” = all that is not cow; i.e., the horse + other animals. In the same inanner “‘ non-horse” = 81} that is not horse; १.९.) the cow + all other animals,
APOHA. 305.
tion of ‘*non-horse,” the only element in excess (of the signification of ‘ non- cow’) is the cow; the rest of the objects negatived—the elephant, &c., are common to both (^ non-cow ” and “ non-horse”). Thus then there may be a difference (between the significations of “ non-cow ” and “ non-horse "") on ac- count of a single point of difference ; while on account of many points of non- difference there will be non-difference ; and thus inasmuch as the property of an object is based upon that element which exists in the greatest quantity, we must admit of non-difference (among Apohas); specially as in the Signification of two Apohas just mentioned, the element of non-difference is much more than that of difference. !
59. The “cow,” consisting in the negation of the elephant, &c., can- not be differentiated from the “ horse’? (which also consists in the negation of the elephant, &c.) And hence if the “cow” were to negative the “horse,” then the identity (proved above) would be contradicted.
56. Obj: “In all words it is only one object negatived (by each) that exceeds (those negatived by the others). Hence on the ground of this one uncommon element we would accept the fact of that word negativing that one object alone.” |
57. Reply: Inthat case, the lion and all other animals, being the objects negatived by the word ^ horse,” and also bearing the negation of ‘non-cow ’—which is the ground of the negation by “horse’—would come. to be named “ cows.”
58-60. If anyone hold that all (auimals other than the cow) constitute the Apoha (of the word “cow”) then (we ask) in
65 The non-difference among the individual cows is based npon the idéntity of objects rejected by their Apoha. Thus, inasmuch as the elephant, &c., are re- jected by the Apohas of ‘cow’ and ‘horse,’ these latter would belong to the same ९1988 ; exactly like the individual cows. Andsothe rejection of the cow by ‘horse? would be exactly like the rejection of the one cow by the other cow.
66 In the case of ‘horse’ and ‘cow,’ the element in the signification of ‘ NOn-cow, which is different from that of non-horse, is the horse; exactly as the cow is, in that of ‘non-horse,’ different from that of ‘non cow’? Thus then, on this gronnd of difference, the ohject rejected by “cow” must be the horse only, and vice ८९६, And thus 18 established a difference between the objects rejected by ‘cow’ and by ‘ horse.’
61 If ‘*non-cow” = horse only, then the animals that are rejected by ‘“horse’’ (which is identical with non-cow) would bear within themselves the rejection of non-cow’ which is the ground for the rejection by “horse”; and thus, being the rejections of “ non-cow,”’ they wonld he identical with the cow; andin this way, the lion and other animals would come to he called ‘ cows’!
58.60 «४ And in one, S§c.”—Becanse in any individual cow—a black one, f.i.—we would have Apohas of all other cows and other animals—an endless number. Specially no one Apoha would be possible, such as wonld embrace ail individual cows. “ And hence, §c.”—not content with having an endless number of ‘classes, embracing ‘the individual cows, we would come to think that, just as the horse belongs to at
39
306 CLOKAVARTIKA.
what manner can this (Apoha) be asserted? If it be held to apply to each individniul animal other than the (cow), this cannot be; because. (1) in that way there would be an endless number of the objects ne- gatived, (2) on account of the diversity of the objects negatived we would have a diversity of Apohas (and not a single Apoha) embracing (all cows), and (3) inoneand asingle individual we would have the inherence of many classes. For these reasons you could not have a single generic denotation of tle cow that would be held to be signified by the word ‘‘cow.” And hence we would have an idea that these (individual cows) belong to a class other (than the “ cow”), just as we have with regard to other classes ^ Horse,” ^^ elephant,” &c.
61-62. ‘Nor can the character of being negatived belong to thie animals (other than the cow), taken as one corporate whole ; because they cannot be considered as a corporate whole in the absence of any 0116 pro- perty (that would be common to them all); nor, as a matter of fact, do they co-exist either in time or place.
62-68. Then again, there is 110 whole apart from (the individuals) themselves. And if it be non-different from (each individual) then we have the same endlessness.
63-64. If it be asserted that “the individnal animals are nc- gatived (by the word ‘cow’) in a generic form (of ‘non-cow ’),”—then they cease to he positive entities. And how could anegative entity be, in that case, negatived)? Then again, that which is negative can never be positive. And further when a negative is negatived, the resultant is always positive.
class other than the cow, 80 alao do all the individual cows; becanse if these latter be held to belong to the clasa cow, we cannot but admit an endlese aeries of classea— one class for each aeparate individual.
61.68 The character of being an animal belongs to all other animala, as well aa to the cow ; consequently that could not be held to be the * property of objects to be reject= ed by the word ‘ cow’”’; ०९८६०86 that property belonga to the cow alao.
62.68 The number of individuals is endlesa; and if the whole ia identical with each individual, then there must be ag many wholes aa there are individuals; because ove individual ia totally different fromthe other.
63.84 Objection: “* All individuala are included in the generic term ‘non-cow’; and it iain thia form that they are rejected by the word ‘cow.’’’ The 86188 of tho reply is that a negative entity cannot be either the rejector or the rejected. Ina place where we have the rejection of a negative—e.g, “That the jar ia not here is not”— the result is always an affirmative one—viz., “the jar is.” In the aame manner, the idea of the cow also,—if it be held to be only the Apohka of a negative entity (viz., ‘non- cow’ including all the animala other than the cow),—would be in the form of ` non- cow,’ which ia the ‘cow,’ a positive entity. Thua then you finally have to accept oar view of the cage.
APOHA, 307
65-66. (In your theory) there could be no definite cognition of any difference among the individual animals negatived,—because there is no diversity of character ina negative entity, If it be asserted that ‘their difference would be due to the difference among the Apohas them- selves, —then, you have mutual inter-dependence; the diversity of “non-cow”’ depending upon the diversity of the Apohas signified by the generic term “cow” (as just asserted), and the diversity of Apohas signified by the generic term ‘ cow” depending upon the diversity of the “ non-cow” (which has been said to include all the animals nega- tived by the word “ cow,’—see Karika 47).
67-69. If the horse, &c., were all ‘‘non-cows,” then they would all become distinct negative entities, with reference to (individual horses) the ‘* Karka,” &c., and these (the ^° Karka,” &c.,) too would have the same character of negativity, based upon the fact of these too being generic
65.66 All other animals being ‘ non-cow,’ how do you differentiate each indivi- dual among them? For, certainly, the negative, non-cow, cannot be said to be endowed with diverse forms; and inasmuch ag no diversity among the objects rejected can be recognised, your assertion in K. 47 falls to the ground. ‘If it be asserted,’ &c. The sense of the objection is that in order to avoid the fact of such words as ‘ horse,’ ‘elephant,’ &c.—the ideas whereof are rejected by the word ‘cow ’—being synony- mous, we have been obliged to hold (vide K. 43) that there are distinct Apohas, for each distinct individual animal, rejected by that word. This leads to mutual inter. dependence, as shown in the text.
61.89 This anticipates the following objection: “ Non-cow is not only a negation of cows, but also other animals, the horse, &c.; and as such, there ceases to be any mutual inter-dependence.” Thesense of tle reply embodied in the Karika is that the term, ‘‘ Horse” isa generic term, as compared to ^ Karka,’ &c. (the names of in- dividual horses); and a generio idea, according to you, is only an Apoha, a negative entity. The same is the case with the “elephant,” “lion,” &. Consequently, the *‘ horse’ too being a generic term, and hence {according to you) a negative entity, —and inthe same manner, the elephant, the lion, &c., all being negative entities,— on account of this common negative character, there could not be any difference among the various animals (see K. 65). It might be urged that the difference among the horse, the elephant, &c., could be based upon the difference between individual animals. But then, even the individual Horse, or the Hlephat, is a generic entity, with reference to its particular limbs, &o.; and thns being a generic entity, it cannot (in accordance with your theory) escape the negative character. Hence, there could be no difference based upon individuals. This reason could be extended so far down as the atoms. And thns all these having been shown to be generic entities, and hence nega- tive, what would be the object to be rejected by the word ‘“‘cow.” The individual cow also cannot escape the negative character; and it is only the individual cow that hag been held to be the substrate of the Apoha, which however it cannot be, on acconnt of its negative character. ‘ In ordinary, &c.”’—all verbal nsage is based npon a cog- nisance of relationships perceived by the senses. The atoms being imperceptible, we can never be cognisant of any relationship of these; and hence no verbal usage could be based on them.
308 QLOKAVARTIKA.
entities in comparison with their specific limbs, &c. Such being the case, what would be the object rejected ? And where too, would be the Apohas ? Because in the case of the individual cows we would (in the same manner) have the same: (character of generality and negativity). Therefore, both these characters (of being the object rejected, aid that of being the dabstrate of the Apoha) could only belong to the final atoms; bnt as a matter of fact, in ordinary parlance these (two characters) are not cognised as belonging to these (atoms).
69-70. Between the atoms of the cow and those of the horse, there is no such difference based upon the difference of form or of class, or of position, or of modification. And hence, even in the case of atoms, it cannot be differentiated as to which (atom) is the object rejected, and which the substrate of the Apoha.
71-72. No person is able to cognise all individual cows (or horses, &c.), as all equally being the subtrates of Apoha, so long as any positive similarity among them is not recognised. Nor is any person able to ascer- tain the objects rejected—horse, elephant, &&.,—unless one single property be cognised as belonging to (all or everyone of) them. And therefore no Apoha can be possible.
73-74, Hither Inference or Verbal Testimony cannot apply in a case that is devoid of a positive relationship, And without these (Inference and
69.10 The atoms composing all animal bodies are only those of the esrth; and these do not differ among themselves. The objects rejected are those of a different class; and the substrates of Apoha area all of the same class. As no difference of class 16 cognised among atoms, no differentiation of such character is possible.
11.18 Leaving atoms sside, even in the case of gross individual cows, there can be no differentiation of objects rejected and the snbstrates of the Apoha, so long asa positive generic term is not admitted. For so long as no positive ground of similarity is recognised as belonging to all the individual cows, they cannot be cognised as belong- ing to the same class; and hence they cannot be regarded as the substrates of the Apoha (signified by the word ‘cow’). In the same manner, unlessa ground of simi- larity is cognised as belonging to all cows, nothing can be recognised as being dissimilar to them. Hence, the horse, the elephant, &c., can never be cognised as being the objects rejected. “And therefore, Jc.”—Dbecause unless there 18 some ground of simi- larity among these various objects~a ground not applying to the cow—they can all be regarded as commonly being the objects rejeoted. And consequently the Apoha theory would fall to the ground.
13.19 This anticipates the following objection: “‘ Among the individual cows, we have a common element, in the shape of Apoha; and this would form a sufficient ground of similarity.” Tbe sense of the reply is that a Class is perceptible by the senses; and hence all the objects, in which we perceive this existence of this clasa, are oognised as belonging to that class; and those in whioh this olaseis not found to exist are cognised as belonging to a different class. Your Apoha, on the other hand, ia not perceptible by the senses; and as suoh it could only be cognisable by Inference or Verbal Testimony. Both of these however depend upon the affirmation of a definite
APOHA, ` 309
Verbal Testimony), the existence of the Apoha can not be established ; nor can there be (cognised) any positive relationship with the unspecified abs- tract specific forms (of objects). And since the Apoha itself has not yet been established, where could we have perceived any positive relationship (with the Apoha) ? And further, no positive relationship being recognised, there can be no validity to any Inference or Verbal Testimony that could be brought forward in support of the dpoha.
75. Nor, on the mere ground of non-perception (of the contradic- tory), could there be any conclusion arrived at by means of these two (Inference and Verbal Testimony). Because, since nothing is perceived nothing is left that could be indicated (by Inference and Verbal Testi mony)
76. If, then, even in the absence of any grounds of similarity (among individnal cows),—there be an assumption of Apoha,—why] should not the rejection of non-cow apply both to the cow and the horse
positive relatiouship, But ०8 a matter of fact, no cognition of any such relation is poseible, with regard to the undefined specific forms of objects; because these latter are not amenable to any of the recognised means of cognition. And inasmuch ae this specific form is the only entity, besides Apoha, that yon admit of,—when no relation- ship with such forms is cognised, how can there be any Inference with regard to the Apoha? The relationehip, necessary for the establishment of the premises cannot be based upon the Apoha itself; because prior to the cognition of the relationship and the subsequent Inference based thereupon, the Apoha has no existence. . And inas- much as no positive relationship is cognised, how can there be any validity to the Inference or the Verbal Testimony, that wonld apply to the Apoha? Thus then, the Apoha itself, not being established, there can be no notions of homogenity or hetero- genity, based npon it.
76 This anticipates the following objection: ‘‘ Inference and Verbal Testimony would establish the fact of negation by means of the Apoha (of entities other than that of which the Apoha is cognised, fi. of the cow), on the eole gronnd of the non- perception of any premiss contrary to the conclusion, which is aleo a recognised ground of Inference.” The sense of the reply is that when a positive relationehip ie not perceived, and (according to you) its contrary too is not perceived,—then, in that ९५३6, nothing of the relationship being perceived (either in the positive or. in the negative form) how could Inference or Verbal Teetimony, in anch a case, lead to any conolnsion? For instance, just ae the word ‘cow,’ not perceived in connection with non-cows (horse, &c.,) signifies a negation of these latter; so in the same manner the same word, having never before been perceived in connection with the cow itself (ac- cording to the alleged basis of the Inference of your Apoha) could also signify the negation of this also. And thus, signifying the negation of both, the cow and the non-cow, the Word, as well as the Inference based npon a non-perception, would lead to the coguition of nothing!
16 If there is no similarity, the distribution of the characters of the Apoha (the object rejected by the Apoha) and the Apoha must be at random, without any control ing agency. Andin that case, both the horse and the cow could. be -asserted to be the objects rejected by ‘non-cow’—a palpable absurdity ! ४
310 CLOKAVARTIKA.
77. Difference from the black cow is common both to the ved cow and the horse. And if no generic term (as the class ^ cow”) is accepted, then whereto could the Apoha of the cow apply ?
78. The rejection of non-cow is not recognised by means of the senses; and the function of the Word too does not apply to cases other than those (that are perceived by the senses); for on (the basis of) the perception of what could the Word function ?
79. For reasons detailed before (in the Chapter on ‘“ Negation”), Inference cannot apply to the present case. And for this reason, there can be no cognition of any relationship (of the Apoha with any Word).
80. Those people that do not know the meaning of the negative word (“not”) can veverbe cognisant of (any such negative entity as)
7 Though according to our theories, Apoha could bs the object of Negation, which ws hold to bs a distinct means of right notion—yet in the absence of a positive generio entity, on what grounds could similarity or dissimilarity be ascertained? For, Apoha means mutual negation; and this would apply to the case of the Red and ths Black Cow, just as much as to the case of the Red Cow and ths Karka Horss. That is to say, just as the Red Cow diffsrs from the Black Cow, so also does ths Karka Horss differ from the Red Cow, specially as you do not admit of any such generic property as belongs in common to the differsnt kinds of cows, and not to the horse. Therefors, just as the rejection of the Karka Horse is common to the Red and the Black Cows, so also is the rejection of the Red Cow common to the horse and thes Black Cow. Thus then ths Red Cow would be as homogeuons to the Black Cow, as it is to the Karka ए ०188, Consequently, there is no ground for specifying the grounds of any Apohea (of the “Cow” f.i.) If the mere fact of rejection by any one entity be the sols ground of homogenity, then, inasmuch as this could belong to the most dissimilar and heterogenous substances,—like the Tree, the Lion, &c.,—being, as all thess objects ars, capable of being rejected by a single word ^ 10188 °, the Tres, the Lion, &c., wonld all be regarded to bs homogenous!
18 1† is only thoss objects that have been perceived before by ths senses that can be mentioned by words; the Apoha however 16 not so perceived; and ths only other entity that you admit of is the specific forms (of ideas); but these too are not percep- 11018 by ths senses. Under the circumstances on what oould you base the use of your words? In fact the upholder of the Apoha cannot explain the use of words at all,
19 Ths only ground of inferring the existences of something that is not perceptible by ths senses is the fact that, though it is not perosived now, yet it is present eleswhers, and if it were present it would certainly be perceived. And in this case, the ground of Infergncs would bs the non-perception of something otherwise perceptible; and inasmuch as this too is only a negative faotor, we would require another Infersncs for its estab- lishment; and this again would havs to be based upou another negation; this nega- tion too upon another Infersncs ; and 80 on and on, ws would have an sndless series of negations and Infsrenoss, which would bs very far from desirable, = ^ For this reason, &e.”’ Sincs ths 4201८ 18 not amenable either to senge-perception or to Inference.
80 Ths horse, &o., must be regarded to be the objects rejected, only in the form of the ^ non-cow”’ ; this is a negation ; and a negation is not perceptible by the senses
APOHA. 311
the “non-cow ;”’ (and yet they may be found to have an idea of the cow) hence there can be no (reasonable) denial of a Class (in the form of a positive entity),
81-82. And further how would you get at the fact of any object being deuotable by the word “‘non-cow’? (If it be urged that) “we would understand that to be so denotable, in connection with which we would not find the word ‘ cow’ applying, १६ the time that any relationship with the object so denoted is asserted,”—then (we reply that) if you were (in the above manner) to have, from a single individual (whose relation will have been asserted, on which basis you would get at the denotation of the word “ non-cow”), a coguition of all that is different (from that Individual), —-then all these latter would be the objects negativted (by the Apoha of “cow’’); and thereby no denotability would belong to any generic idea.
83-84, It is an established entity, the cow, which is negatived (by the 41010 ; and this Apohais only the negationof the cow. Hence (in order to explain this 42074 the cow should be explained. Andif this (cow) be said to be the negation of the non-cow, then there would be mutual inter- dependence.
84-85. And if you admit of the cow as au (independently) estahlished entity, for the sake of having an object for your negation Apoha, then the assumption of the Apoha would become useless (inasmuch as the idea of cow is admitted to be established independently of it). And in the absence of an idea of the cow as an established entity, there can be no idea of non-cow; and as such how could you explain the idea of the cow to be based upon the idea of the non-cow ?
85-86. Between two negative entities there is no such relationship as that between the container and the contained, &. Nor is any specific (abs- tract) positive entity ever cognised as related to Apoha.
86-87. How, too, could any relation be assumed to subsist between a negative Apoha and a positive entity (the specific forms of ideas) ?
and hence it could not but he cognized by means of the word. Then those that do not understand the meaning of the word “non”—f.i,, small boys—cannot nnderstand the word ‘non-cow”, and yet they do have a cognition of the meaning of the word “cow.” Hence we conclude that the word “cow” must signify a positive entity, in the shape Of the class ^^ cow.”
8३.86 The npholders of the Class-theory can assert the denotability of the indi. vidual as qualified by the class (thongh this is not what is admitted hy ns), As for you, on the other hand, you can never be cognisant of the denotability of anything qualified by the Apoha. Because one Apoha cannot be qualified by another, as hoth of them heing negative, between them, there can be no such relationship as that of the con- tainer and the contained, and the like. Nor can it be asserted that the specifio forms of ideas may be qualified by the Apoha; ag no such specific forms are signified by words
26-81 ^ That which colours, &c,”—Since the specific forms of ideas are not cognised,
312 CLOKAVARTIKA,
There can be no qualification to anything (like the specific forms of ideas) which merely exists (and is not signified by the word). Because it is only that which colours the qualified object by its own idea, that can be called a ८ qualification.”
88-89. In fact, no cognition of Apoha is produced from the words “horse,” d&c.; and the cognition of the qualified object cannot be such as is withont any idea of the qualification. Nor can a qualification of a certain character bring about an idea of a different character. Hence, when the object has been cognised to be of a certain character, how can a qualification, which is of an opposite character, be said to belong to it P
90-91. If even iv face of the opposite character of the object, a qualification (of the opposite character) be asserted to belong to it,—then any . qualification would belong to any object (without any restriction). Hence, when the qualification Apoha is of a negative character, no posi- tive character can belong to the qualified (specific forms of ideas). There- fore you cannot have, as the denotation of the word, any positive entity qualified by Apoha.
92-94, Though Verbal Testimony and Inferential premises cannot properly fanction towards an idea (or object) which is devoid of (not qualified by) the Apoha, yet the cognition of the cogniser (brought about by a word) rests upon a positive entity alone. And since no entity in the shape of the specific forms (of objects) appears in our cognition (of the
they cannot be affected (colonred) by the idea of anything; and ae snch, they cannot have any qualifications.
88.89 The cognition produced by the word “ horse” is of the form of a posivtie entity, in the shape of a horse; and never inthe negative form of an Apoha. Conseqnently apart from any pecnlisrities of the qualified (specific forms), the Apoha itself can never have the properties of a qualification. Inasmach as the Apoha is not cognised as the qualification, there can be no idea of anything qualified by it.
‘ Non-cow, Se.”—Your qualification, Apoha, being of a negative character, it can never be oognised as belonging to the idea of a positive entity,
92-95 This anticipates the following Banddha argument: ^ The only positive entities that we admit of are the nndefined specifio forms of ideas; and these, being amcnable to Sense-perception, cannot be treated either by Verbal Testimony or by Inference; hence, ag an object denoted by a word, you must accept the aforesaid specific form (which is u positive entity) as qanlified by the Apoha.” The sense of the reply is that, thongh a word cannot, in accordance with your theory, signify an object nnqnalified by the Apoha, yet, inasmnch as ordinary experience supports the १80४ of a word signifying a positive entity (withont any negative qualifications),—we cannot bat accept the truth of such denotation of a positive entity, even without a qnalification in the shape of an Apoha; becanse we cannot very rightly deny a fact of common experience. ‘Thos thea ५ it being established that the denotation of a word must be a positive entity, and for the aforesaid reasons, the 8066100 forms of ideas not being capable of being the objects denoted by a word,—we cannot but admit of a generic positive entity—in the form of a positive class—as being the object denoted by a word.
Apoha. 313
denotation of words),—and again since this (specific form) cannot be the qualified, because it is an unqualified abstract entity,—and, lastly, since it is sheer recklessness {0 assert sometliing not signified by the word to be the qualified entity ;—therefore, we must accept a positive generic entity to be the object cognised and denoted by the word.
95-96. When the character of being the negatived cbject cannot be- long to individuals,—because these are not denoted by the Word,—then it 18 only the generic form (class) that could be the object negatived (Apoha) ; and because of the fact of its being negatived, it must be admitted to be a positive entity. Because no negative entity can be the object negatived, on account of the impossibility of the negation of a negative entity (as such continued negation would give rise to an endless series of negations, as shown in the chapter on Negation).
96-97. In the case of (tle cognition of) one Apoha, we have a clear perception of another Apoha, in the shape of the rejection cf some generic positive entity. If the negation of a negative entity were different from the negative entity itself, then it could only be a positive entity; and if it were non-different from it, then we would have (the absurdity of) the cow being the non-cow.
98-99. Though in the case of other words (like “cow,” &c.), we could somehow or other, have positive entities as the objects negatived,— yet, in the case of the word “ entity ” (sat), the object negatived by it can- not be other than “non-entity” itself; and then (if you were to hold that objects negatived must be positive entities), to non-entity would be- long a positive character—an absurd contingency surely ! And further, without the ascertainment of the xon-entity, we could not have any idea of entity; and the son-entity (being only a negation of entity) cannot be cognised (without the cognition of entity) (and this would involve a most undesirable mutual interdependence).
100. Nor can either the difference or the positive character of the
95.98 Individuals cannot be the objects of denotation by Words ; because that would give rise to an endlessness of denotations, the number of individuals being endless.
98.91 In the case of the Apoha—in the form of the negation of non-cow—we have the rejection of a positive generic entity—in the shape of the class ‘horse,’ or “ele- phant,” &c.; and thus all the objects rejected by an 4yoha would come to be positive generic entities. If, however, the object rejected be asserted to be of a negative character, then its contradiotory—i.e., the class ‘cow’ as rejecting the ‘ non-cow ’— could only be a positive generio entity ; otherwise, if the negation of a negative entity be 881 to be non-different from it, then we wonld have ‘cow ° = ` non-cow, —a palpable absurdity.
100 The Banddbas declare that though the denotation of a Word 18 always cognised in a positive form, yet inasmuch as learned men are incapable of recognising any positive ground of similarity among objects, different from one another, the
40
314 CLOKAVARTIKA.
ohjects negatived be explained on the ground of the diversity of Vasands. Because there can be no Vasana with regard to a negative entity.
101. And further, excepting rememberance, to no other action can the function (or force) of Vasan&é apply, Therefore the Vasan@ cannot, with regard to an object endowed with a certain definite character (negative or positive), produce a cognition of another sort (or character),
102. And for you, the difference of Words (from the objects denoted by them) cannot be based upou the Vdasan@; because the specific (abstract) forms of Words cannot have any denotability, inasmuch as these (specific forms) are never actually cognised.
103. And on account of the diversity of these (momentarily changing specific abstract forms of Words), these forms cannot bring about the idea of a single Vasana (which could be the means of getting at an idea of any generic entity). Nor do you accept any such single positive generic entity, as ^ Word,” that conld bring about the said (single) Vasana.
104, Thus then a generic entity, in the form of the Apoha of another word (८.९०) the Apoha of ‘non-cow’), being accepted (as the denotation of the Word “ cow’’),—inasmuch as this too is in the form of a negative entity (the regection or negation of “ non-cow’’)—we cannot admit of any difference among the objects denoted (by the Word “ cow ’’).
105. And just as there would be no difference between two expressive Words, so, in the same manner, there would be none between the ex- pressive (word) and the expressed (meaning). And it has already been proved above that there can be no such difference based npon the difference among the objects negatived.
denotations of words cannot but be admitted to rest in the negatives of their contradio- tories ; and that though this is of a negative character, yest it is cognised ag positive, on account of eternal Vésands that help to bring about such cognition. This is denied in ths Kariké on ths ground that a Vdsand. . 18 produced only by perceptions; and as Perosptions belong to positive entities alone, no ए 26422 oan belong to a negativs entity.
101 The only use of ths {7254102 lies in its being the means of remembering or recalling the objects perceived in the past. “ It cannot, 4८. ~~ with regard to a posi- tive entity, it can never produce 8 notion that it is negative, as held by the Bauddha.
102 Difference is & property of positives entities; and inasmach as ths only positive entity that you admit of is the undsfined 87080100 forms of words (as yon admit of no othsr specifio forms 88.९७ those of the idsas of objscts)—and 88 theses undsfined forms can never be cognised as bearing any relationship (because no relationship can bs cog- nised in connection with undéfinsd sntities)—ths Word oannot but cesse to have sny denotability $ and hence you oannot base the differenos between Words and the objects denoted by them, upon 2801025.
104 Just 86 no difference is [08810016 among the denoting Words, 80 too there would be none among the denoted objects.
Apoha. 315
106-107. The Apoha of a Word, so long as it is not comprehended, cannot in any way signify anything. As a matter of fact, it is not perceived, to be so capable, by the sense-organs ; nor are there any infer- ential premises or authoritative assertions (asserting any such capability), that could lead to the comprehension of that Apoha. If we were to assume any such inferential premises, &c., then we should urge that, in that case, we would have no resting ground, in the absence of any founda- tion based upon sense-perception.
108. The characters of being the expressed and the expressive can- not belong to the two Apohas (of the Meaning and the Word respect- ively),—because according to your theory these (Apohas) are non-enti- ties,—just as (no such character can belong) to ^ hare’s horns’ and “ sky- flowers.”
109. If you were to urge that—the aforesaid premiss (“‘ because they are non-entities’’) is faulty, inasmuch as we have the inference of the absence of rain from the absence of clouds (when both these absences are non-eutities),—then (we reply that) according to us negations too are only positive entities, (see above); in fact, the task of explaining the validity of this inference also rests upon you (who hold xegation to be a non-entity).
110. One, who does not admit an object in the shape of a word to have a positive charactcr, cannot possibly admit of any negation thereof ; inasmuch as negation is always preceded by affirmation (that is to say, it is only the positive character of an object that is negatived by its negation).
111. Asa matter of fact, even the negation of a negative entity, which is expressed by a double negative, can pertain only to a positive entity,— and not to a negative entity, because there can be no conception of this latter (which is devoid of any substratum).
112-113. “ Well, then, by the same argument (we conclude that), the Apoha does not differ from a positive entity; and thus the aforesaid
108.107 «८ No resting place ’’—because for the accomplishment of this premiss, we would require another premies ; and so on and on,,ad infinitum.
110 Thus then, Negation depending upon the positive character of things,—and thie latter, according to you, being only the denial of the negation,—you strike your- self against the immutable rock of mutual interdependence.
111 Like the Apoha of an object, the Apoha of the Word too, being devoid of a real substratum, can never be conceived of; and the specific forms of these, being ouly in the abstract, can never be realised in conception. Consequently we cannot but admit of a positive generic entity. As for example, even the nee of २ donble negative— This is not non-cow’—can pertain only to २ positive entity, the cow. cf: above: ‘apohyamané cabhavé bhava évdvagishyaté.’
112.118 The 86086 of the objection is this: “One Apoha does not differ from snotber, because both are non-entities; in the same manner, no Apoha would differ from a
316 OLOKAVARTIKA.
objections cannot affect it.’ True, but that would only lead you to my position, And, as a matter of fact, you can have no loophole for escape (except accepting my position).
118-114, (Then the question is) have we an idea of positivity with regard to an object. which is in reality negative,—or that we have negative notions belonging to an object which is in reality positive? But in the case of an object of negative character, any idea of positivity would be totally groundless; whereas in the case of a positive entity, even negative conceptions are quite possible, in view of another entity.
115-117. Again, if to all objects we attribute the character of being denoted by the Apoha,—then, in the case of such expressions, as “ the blue lotus,” which have mixed denotations, we could not have the relationship of the qualification (blue) and the qualified (lotus), and also that of co-exten- siveness (of the property blue with the object lotus), Because the negation of non-blue is not always followed by the absence of non-lotus, nor vice-versd ; therefore they could not be cognised as the qualification and the qualified.
117-118. Nor could these relationships belong to the words (‘ blue’ and ˆ lotus’) themselves, independently of their denotations; because there can be no co-extensiveness between the two Apohas (of the words), inas- much as these (Apohas) are entirely different from each other.
positive entity; becuse this latter too 18 in reality, only a non-entity. The positive entities however differ among themselves, throngh their abstract specific properties, and upon this difference, we conld base the difference among the varioue Apohas: and 11108 we gail clear of the absurdity of making all words synonymons (ae urged above).”’ The sense of the reply is that if you once admit that Negation being a property of the entity, cannot absolutely differ from it,—yon come fo accept a positive generic entity Because harring this acoeptance, you can have no means of asserting any difference among the varioug Apohas; ag the specific properties, that you speak of, cannot afford the requisite means; inasmuch as they can never, by themeelves, he conceived of. Then the only point at dispute, between you and me, is what we show below.
118.116 The only एणा of difference between the upholders of Apoha and ourselves now, is, that, while, admitting, like ourselves, the final conception to be of a positive oharacter, they hold the real character of the object to be negative; while we hold thia also to be positive; and even the negative oonceptione that we have, we refer back to the primary positive character of the objects. The sense of the latter half of the Karika ie that the notion of positivity with regard toa negative entity cannot hut be regarded as a mistake; but a mistake we can never have unless there 18 some ground for it. And as we have shown that there 18 no anch ground, this alternative cannot be tenable, On the other hand, in the case of a positive entity—the cow f.i.—we can alwaya have a negative conception, that of its not being something else,—the horse f.i., For these reasons, we cannot but admit of a positive generic entity in the shape of the class ‘cow,’ &., &.
11.118 ^ Entirely diferent, &a."—-The Apoha of ‘Blue’ 18 different from that of ‘lotus’; and as such they can never oo-exist.
Apoha. 317
118-119. If such co-extensiveness be held to belong to the denotations of the words (‘ Blue’ and ‘ Lotus’),—then, we ask—in what manner can they be confained in any one substratum (in order to be co-extensive) ? We know that an abstract specific entity is never cognised; and any entity besides this you do not admit of. Then, 98 for the uncognised co-extensive- ness of the words (as based upon the abstract specific character of their denotations),—of what use can this (uncognised fact) be ?
120. If it be held that what is denoted by one word (f.i., “ cow’’) is an object qualified by the negation (Apoha) of other objects,—then too, the pervasion (i.e., denotation) by the word becomes weak (or impossible), on account of the dependence of this (denotation, upon something else).
121-122. Just as in a piece of sugar, the sweetness not denoting the wkiteness—on account of the difference in the negations of these—, there is no notion (produced by the expression ‘ sweet-white’), and (hence) there is no relation of qualification and the qualified (between the two); so, in the same manner (in the expression ‘ San-ghalah’) the meaning (of ‘ San’ according to you) being the negation of non-existence (non-San), the word (‘San’) would not touch that part of the denotation which consists in the negation of non-ghata.
123. If it be urged that there could be such relation (between the
118.119 A negative entity can never be the contained. Co-retentiveness can belong to two words, only when both of them signify the same object, either directly or in- directly. This is not possible, in your case; while in my case, as we hold the Class (‘ Lotna’) to be identical with the property (‘ Blue’),—though the word ‘ Blue’ signifies the property ‘Blae’ and the word ‘Lotue’ siguifies the Clase of Lotases,—yet, inasmuch as both of these co-exist in the individual Lotas before us, there can be no discrepancy in our theory.
180 If the word by itself were to denote an object, then, in the case of the expres- sion ‘ San-ghatah’ the object signified by the word ‘San’ would be precisely the same as that signified by the word ‘ Ghatah’; and 19 this case, it 16 only right that there should be a co-extensiveness, On the other hand, if, as yon hold, the denotation of > word consisted in the negation of other objects—upon which negation the denotation would be totally dependent,—then, the word ‘San’ would signify an object qualified by the negation of non-San; and this would certainly be totally distinct from the negation of non-Ghata, Similarly, the word ‘ Ghata’ would signify the negation of non-Ghata, which would be totally distioct from the negation of non-San. And thus, the denotations of the worde being totally distinct, there could be no co-extensivenees between them.
121-122 In the 6886 of the expression ‘tikio madhurah,’ even when 1४ has some meaning, this can only be in reference to the sagar-piece itself ; and the only reagon of thie non-signification lies in the fact that the one word ‘ ttkiah,’ according to yon, de- notes only the negation of non-bitter, and the word ‘madhura’ the negation of non-sweet ; and these two denotations being totally distinct from each other, there could be no co-extensiveness between them, So also, in the case of the expression ‘San ghatah.’
128 If it be urged that the denotation of the word ‘ San’ lies in the object qualified
318 GLOKAVARTIKA.
denotations of ‘ San’ and ‘ ghatah’), in the form of objects (signified by each of these),—then (we say, that) such relation conld only be based on the class “ entity ” (sattd) ; aud certainly no one denies that the objects belonging to the class “ Jar” are included in this class (“ entity ”’).
124. Such an implication, of the word by the class (“entity”), cannot be denied on the ground of that class being a positive entity. Because with regard to the recognition (of the meaning) the action (of the word, in signifying that meaning) is the same, whether the class ‘ entity ’ be a positive or a negative entity.
125-126. The form of positive objects (in the case of ‘ San ghatah’, though impartite, is yet expressed by words, only in parts. Because the cognition of the word ‘ San’ alone does not lead to the cognition of the jar. Therefore (in your case also) you have the fault of ^ non-signification ” (of the San by the word ‘San’) and you have also (equally with us, the fault of ^“ secondariness.’’)
126-127. Since it is the qualifying adjunct, therefore the Apoha, hke the class, must be the primary element (of the denotation) ; and hence (just as you have urged against the Class theory) there can be no denotation of an object as qualified by that Apoha,—because such an object would be only secondary (and as such cannot form an object of denotation). If you urge
oy the negation of non-San, and that as such, this would also tonch the negation of non- ghata,—then, we would reply that thie assertion would be a tacit admiesion of the Class theory ; 06687866 an object qualified, Fc. S§c., must be a positive entity $ and in that case the necessary co-extensiveness becomes qnite possible.
124 That the class ‘entity’ is a positive entity cannot be a gronnd for denying ita signification of objecte qualified by existence; hecause whether the object denoted by the word ‘ San’ be positive or negative, so long as it denotes an object, an implication by it, of the ghata, cannot be denied.
125.126 Thia Kariké anticipates the fellowing objection: “ In the Class theory, the objeot denoted (by ‘ San’ f.i.) being always positive and concrete, cannot but be partite ; and hence even if one part of it is oogniased, the other parts remain nncognised; whereas on the Apoha theory, the object denoted being negative and abatraot, the mere negation of non-San would lead to the oognition of the impartite whole, all at once; and hence the functioning of words, according to the two theories, cannot be held to be similar.” The sense of the reply ia that even if you hold the object denoted by ‘ San-ghatah’ to be impartite, yon mnst admit the word ‘San’ to denote one part while the word ‘ ghata’ denotes another part; and it is only enbsequently that the two join together and produce a joint effect, in the shape of the denotation of a single object, And even in thia case, you are open, like oureelves, to the fault of ‘San’ not signifying the ghata. Then agsin, yon have nrged againat us the objeotion that the class being the primary denotation, that of the individual becomes only secondary: But both of us are equally open to this objeotion, as shown below.
196.127 We hold the object to be qnalified by (belonging to) the ०288 ; and yon hold it to be qualified by Apoha; the result is the same,
Apoha. 319
that Apoha, being a negative entity, cannot be the primary element,—then (we say that), in that case, it could not be a qualified adjunct either (and hence the object denoted by ‘San’ could not be one that is qualified by the Apoha of ‘non-San;’ and this would mean the total giving up of your ground ).
128. The object qualified by your Apoha could only consist of different individuals; and yon have yourself explained that these (individuals) can- not be the objects of denotation, because of endlessness and contradiction, And certainly, you do not admit of any single object qualified by Apoha (that could embrace the individuals in one corporate whole, like onr ^" Class.’’)
129-130. There can be no such thing as “ Apohavatiwa” intervening between the Apoha and the individuals (contained in it). Even if you were to assume some such intervening entity, we would ask,—Is this a positive or a negative entity P If it be positive, then it is the same as ‘‘class”; and if it is negative, then all the aforesaid objections (urged against the denotation of the Apoha alone) would apply to it.
130-131. Or again, if this (intervening entity) be assumed to consist of the relation (subsisting between the Apoha and its substrate); then (we reply that) the denotability of such a relation cannot be desirable to you (since you have urged many arguments against such denotability.) Nor 18 there any such single object, as would serve as the substrate of Apoha, and as such, exist in another object. And for this reason too, no generic entity is the object of denotation ; nor lastly, can it 06 the qualification.
128 The Apohists have urged against the Class-theory the objection that individuals can never be the objects of denotation, because that would give rise to eudless denota- tions on the one hand, and many overlapping and self-contradictory denotations on the other. The same objection is shown to apply to the Apoha theory also. In faot, the upholders of the Class theory escape the anomalies by postulating the Class, which forms for them the true denotation of the word, and which, as occasion presents itself, is cognised as qualifying distinct individuals. This loophole for escape is not available for the Apohist; because if he admits of such a corporate whole, embracing all in- dividuals, he wonld only. admit the Class theory.
130.131 ^ You have urged, §c.’’—The Bauddha has argued that if the denotation of a word consisted in the relationship between the Class andthe Individual, then there would be no co-extensiveness. This same argument may be applied to the denotability of the relationship between the Apoha and its substrate. = ^^ Nor is there any such single object, Sc.”—If yon accept any such single object as the jar to be the substrate of Apoha,—then, this object conld not exist in any other object; and bence such a word could not denote a generic entity.
८ Too °—i,e., it 18 not only on acconnt of the want of the co-extensiveness of such a single object with any other object, that the said generic oharacter is impossible, but it is also impossible for the following reason: Even if you hold to the theory of the denotability af the substrate of Apoha,—inasmuch as, in that case, there is no single word that would include all such snbstrates,—no generic character could belong to it, It
320 QLOKAVARTIKA.
132. The Apoha of ‘ Asan’ does not indicate the particular Apohas (of the non-jar, &c.), while these latter do not inhere in the former; conse- quently, the Apoha of ‘Asan’ cannot be qualified by those (Apohas), in the same manner as “ Blue’ is (qualified) by the successive higher degrees of its shades.
133. On account of its doubtfulness we cannot have even an indirect implication (of the Apohas of non-jar, &.), as we have that of the object (fire) by means of its characteristic (smoke). Because the Apoha (of Asan) in its general form is not such as cannot be accomplished without those (Apohas of non-jar, &c.)
134. In the same manner, there could he no implication of the object (the substrate of Apoha) by means of the Apoha. Because the Apoha (that the Banddha holds) would apply also to the “ hare’s horns” ‘and certainly in this case, the Apoha could not be said to indicate a real object; inasmuch as there is no such thing as agagavishinavyavrite ).
135. And further, no gender or number, &c., could possibly belong to an Apoha (a pure negation). Nor could there be any relationship through the individuals (said to constitute the Apoha),—because these (individuals) are not (according to you) denoted by the word (which you restrict to the denotation of the Apoha).
136. Nor can the individual be said to be implied by the Apoha, because (you hold) the individual to be a specific abstract entity. And that which is not understood as thus implied (or indicated) cannot be the object of any such specification (as that by gender, &c.)
18 for this reason that when any one object is spoken of as qualified by ‘existence,’ the game word cannot be applied to any other object ; and hence even snch a word as ‘ Satta’ can not serve as the qnalification.
189 Jnet 88 the claga ` sat’ does not indicate the class ‘jar,’ which latter does not exist in it, and hence the former is not qualified or specified it,—gso the same would be the case with the Apoha of ‘ Asat,’
188 ^ 75 not such, &c.’’— Without fire there could be no smoke. There is no snch relationship between the Apoha of Asat and the Apohas of non-jar, &५. The Apoha of Asat could belong to the Apoha of the jar also. So all that we oan aay is that the Apoha of Asat wonld raise a donbt with regard to the Apoha of non-jar, Sc.
18५ If the word be held to denote the substrate of Apoha, then we would have the absurdity of the indication of another Apoha, as shown above, If on the other hand, it will be held to denote the Apoha only, then, there can be no indication of the real objective substrate of the Apoha. Because the Apoha heing a negative quantity,—and as such being applicable to such absurdities as the ‘ hare’s horna,’—caunot be taken to be necesgarily indicative of a real objeot.
186 In the Class theory, thongh the word denotes the Claas, yet this latter implies the individnals, to which apply all such specifications as those of Number, &¢. But this is possible only when we accept the individual to be a definite conerete entity; but you hold to be an nndefined specific abstract entity; and as such, according to yeu no specification can belong to it.
APOHA. 321
137. Then again, the Apohas of gender, number, 4९.) cannot by them- selves be the objects of specification; and as for the objects themselves, how can they be cognised, by means of words, to be the objects to be specified (inasmuch as you hold the objects to be indefinite and abstract and as such not denotable by words) ?
138. And further, asa matter of fact, without (the particular means of right notion which we have termed) ‘“ Negation,” there can be no notion of any negativity. And as for the objects “cow,” &c., we do not find them to be in any way amenable to the said means of Negation.
139. And again, in the case of verbs, we are not cognisant of the negation of something else (the necessary factor in an Apoha) ; because in this case there is no object of negation in the shape of any exception (or prohi- bition), &e.
140. Even the double negative ‘ na-na’ (that he cooks not is not) only serves to deny the negation (of the action of cooking); the verb ‘ cooks,’ on the other hand, by itself stands on its own unnegatived (positive) form.
141-142. And further, the specification of verbs as unfinished (‘ pre- sent’) and ‘ past,’ &c., would become groundless; inasmuch as the Apoha (a negation) is always a finite and complete entity (and as such, can never be either unfinished (i.e, present) or past, Fc. And in the case of an injunction and other similar cases (invitation, &c.), we are not cognisant of any negation of other things.
142-145. And again (1) of what form would be the negation (Apoha) of a negative connected by another negative (na-na)P (2) And then too, in the case of (conjunctions like) ‘and’ (cha), &c., where there is no negative element, there can be no negation (Apoha). (3) The meaning of a sentence cannot be said to consist in the negation (Apoha) of something else. (4) In the case of such words as ‘ ananydpoha’ (the negation of something that is not different), we cannot conceive of any meaning. (5) And, lastly, where could we find the objects to be negatived by such words as “‘nameable,” «८ knowable,” &c. (which are universal, and as such do not leave anything untouched that could be negatived by themselves) ? If you were to assume a new object to serve as the object of negation by these words (‘nameable,’ &c.),—(we say) 16 would be far more reasonable to accept a positive (generic) entity (which would form the denotation of such and other words).
145-146. Since it has been proved (in the chapter on (2१०४०१५)
139 The expression ‘na pacati’ simply means the absence of the action of cooking, and not the prohibition of the action. ष ४ 140 ‘The latter ‘na’ serves to negative the former ‘7a’ and the verb by itself in its
own pristine positive form remains free from negation. 16.46 It ig only an external object that oan be either denoted or negatived,
41
322 QLOKAVARTIKA,
that the denotation of a word does not consist of a mere Idea (or cogni- tion),—therefore denotability cannot belong to any factor within (the mind of man) ; nor can (such an internal factor) he the object of negation. Therefore Apoha cannot apply to these internal factors (Ideas, &c.) And again of such words as ‘évam,’ ‘ili’ and the like we can conceive of no Apohya (object to be negatived).
147. If you were to assume the Apohas of particular individuals, on the ground of one particular being the contradictory of another,—then you would have the notion of such contradiction based upon Apohas, and that of Apohas upon the contradiction (mutual interdependence).
148. Even the specifying specification of the same Class is not in a positive form. The fact is that the word “ Cingapa”’ (a kind of tree) particularises the generic term “Tree,” only after it has negatived the Palaga,” &e. (as being not-Cingapa),
149-150. Even the non-negation (Anapoha) of the Class, &c., cannot be postulated, on the ground of their non-contradictory character, Because
Hence it cannot be urged that the object negatived by the verb ° cooks’ is the idea of non-cooking. Since this idea 18 not an external object, the argument must fall a victim to the reasonings brought forward in the ohapters on Qa#nyavada and Nirdlambanavada,
147 The particnlar tree of the mango will have such trees as the Banyan, Jc , for the object of its Apoha; and 80 071, ‘“ Mutual, §c..—because there can be no notion of difference, unless we have a notion of the thing itself; and this latter notion cannot but be based, according to you, upon Apoha; and this Apeha you now base upon a difference among the particular individuals.
148 This refers to the objection that the contradiction among individuals is due, not to the Apoha, but to the fact of each of the individuals belonging to the same class. The sense of the reply is that inasmuch as the Apohists do not admit of a positive class, they cannot base the contradiction of the individuale upon any such Class, “ Their specification, §c.”’—It is true that the contradiction lies in the fact of their belonging to the 88716 class; but this specification too is alwaye preceded by the Apoha. Because the word ‘ Qingapa’ hae no positive signification, in the shape of any particular tree, there- fore it is not in thie positive form that it can be asid to speoify the tree. Asa matter of fact, the word ‘Qincapaé’ in the first inetance, according to you, negatives all that is not Qingapé, and then withdraws the name ‘tree’ from the ‘ Paldga,’ Sc., and restricts it within itself; and thue at last, it is the Apoha that 18 the sole basis of the contradiotion. Snch a negative signification also gives rise to another absurdity : ‘ Gingapé’ being taken to negative all that is net Gingapa, may be accepted ss negativ- ing the ‘tree’ also; because the tree also is not-Cingapa.
149.160 Thia refers to the view that, a particular term ‘ Qingapé’ does not negative the general term ‘tree’; becanse there is no contradiction between these. The sensa of the reply is that the Apohists have no means of ascertaining euch s non-contra- diotion, so long as they do not admit of 8 positive class to which the different kinds of individuals could belong. Because so far as the words themselves are concerned, apart from the objects that they might denote, we cannot he oognisant of either the contradio- tion or the non-contradiotion of these. And secondly, as for the objects that the words may signify, the Apohist cannot base his idea of the oontradiotion on these; because he does
APOHA. 323
the contradictory or the non-contradictory character does not belong to the verbal forms of words (independently of their significations); nor can this (contradiction, c&c.), depend upon the forms of objects (to be denoted by the word); because (according to the Apohist) the objects have no rela- tion with words. And as for the Apohas themselves, we can never re- cognise the contradictory character, é&c., of these, before the word has already functioned (to its fullest extent).
151. As for the Word itself, it functions only with regard to such an object as is not amenable to another (means of right notion); and as such, in what form can it be said to belong to any generic class ?
152. Ifit be said that the cognition of the negation of the contradictory (any@poha) could be based upon the specific forms of the words them- selves,—then, there being a difference between the words “Vrksha” and’ “taru” (in form, though both denote a tree), how could you deny the negation of the one by the other?
153. As a matter of fact, without a touch of (the action of) words, the Apoha cannot be cognised, even by means of inferential premises.
not admit of any definite concrete object being denoted by aword. The ouly alternative then left to him is that of the Contradiction, &c., being referred to the 4pohas signi- fied by the words. 8 7४ even this will not hold. Beoanse inasmuch as these Apohas are not recognized before the word 1148 already functioned, we can never have any notion of the cantradiction, &c., of these Apohas. And it 18 for the comprehension of the full signification of the word that the Apohist has had recourse to the determination. of the contradictory character, &c. And thus there is an inevitable mutaal inter- dependence.
121 The sense of the Karika is that we have no means of ascertaining the fact that the particular term ‘ Qincapd’ is not contradictory to the general term ‘ Tree,’ Because no saoch cognitian is possible, until we have become cognisant of the relation horne by the word in question ta a certain Apoha. That is to say, it ie only when the Apoha, १.९.) the denotation of the word—has been comprehended, that we can attribute any character to 1४, And 890 long as the farm of the Apoha is not cognised,—how can it be known that this Apoha is generio and that specified. Nor have we any other means at our command, save the ward, for acquiring any idea of the Apoha. Hence in thia alsa, the Apohist cannot be free from the aforesaid mutnal interdependence.
168 This anticipates the theory that—“ prior to the functioning of the word, we could ascertain the form of ite Apoha, ita generic or specific character, and the contra- diction, &c., of theae,—by means of Inference; and then we could have ideas of the oa-extensiveness, &c., of the word and its signification, &c.” The seuse of the Kérika is that an inferential premises can have for its subject only such a thing as has been already cognised to have certain relations with certain other things ; and consequently, so long as the Apoha has not 66 ascertained, we cannot be cognisant of any relation- ships borne by it; and as such how could there be any inferential premises dealing with 80011 an uncognised Apoha? That 18 to say, until we have understood what the word and its Apoha mean, how can we make any inferences with regard to them?
324 CLOKAVARTIKA.
Nor can these premises ascertain the contradictory or the non-contradic- tory character of these Apohas.
154-155, We have already refuted the theory that the negation (or contradiction) of one (i.e., Paldga) by the other (the word “ Gingapa&’’) is based upon the fact of the former being never seen to be expressed hy the latter. And (if negation were based upon the mere fact of one word not being used to express a certain object) then, since the generic term (‘tree’) is not held to be expressive of the individuals (Palaga, Cingapa, &e.), therefore a negation in this case (of the individual trees by the generic term “tree”—an absurdity) would be inevitable. And as for a word being applied to an object, somehow or other,—we have the appli- cation of the word ^ kshatriya” with reference to a Brahmana (endowed with warlike propensities) ; and in that case we would have no negation (of the Brahmana by the word “ kshatriya”’).
156. Non-negation, based on the fact of the one being in need of another, is equally applicable to the case of the verb and the noun; and thus there would assuredly be non-negation of the verb ‘stands,’ by. the noun “ the tree” (an absurdity).
157, And again (in the case of “ Rajnah purushah”) if ^ Rajnah”
164.155 ^ We have already refuted”—under the Kdérika ‘ sarvatraiva hyadrshtatwat pratyayo navagishyate.’ The sense of the refutation is that so long as the word is not folly comprehended in all its bearings and relations, and then used,-—it is never found to express anything; and as such the word ‘ Gingapd’ would negative not only the ‘ Paldca’ but everything elee, even the व(द tree itself.
155 ¢ Somehow or other.’—Though we find the general term applied to particnlar individuals, yet euch application can be based only upon indirect indication, and not upon direct denotation. For the word ‘tree’ cannot be said to directly denote the Qingapa. And if we were to attach much importance to such indirect indications, we would have a difficulty in the case of the word ‘ Kshdiriya’ when figuratively applied toa Brahmana, who is endowed with the qualities of the warrior. For this single instance of the figurative use of the word would annul the sole condition of negation (by a word)——the only such condition, according to you, being ‘adrshtatwa,’ the fact of the word never being used with reference to the objeot; and so the word ‘ Kshdtriya’ would never negative or preolude the Brahména. And as for direct denotation even the general term does not directly denote the individual.
156 This refers to the theory that inasmuch as the general term ‘tree’ stands iu need of every one of the individual trees, it must be taken to he related to every one of them, none of which could be negatived by it. The sense of the Karika is that if the mere faot of being in need be sufficient ground for non-negation, then we would be met by the absurdity pointed out in the second half of the Kériké, where it is shown that the verb ‘to stand’ needs a place, and the place ‘tree’ requires a verb; and henoe on account of this mutual need, the word ‘tree’ would not negative the verb ‘ stands,’ and the two words would become synonymous.
161 In both cases you aro faced by an absurdity.
APOHA. 325
were to negative “ purushah,” then, this latter could not be qualified by the former. On the other hand, if it were not to negative it, then there would be an identity, as in the case of “ blue lotus.”
158-159. It is asserted (by the Apohists) that in the case of the series of words—“ tree,” “earth,” “substance,” “entity,” and “know- able’’ (where the one following is more extensive than the preceding), taken first in one, and then in the reverse order,—if we were to accept a positive denotation, we would have the (absurdity of) every word denoting all the above five objects. But this assertion is not correct; because as a matter of fact, all words are not found to be applicable to all cases.
159-160. (Ifa word be held to denote all the various parts or shades of an object simply because of) the location (of all these parts) in a single substrate, then, we would also have the functioning of the eye towards taste, 4९.) also (simply because these reside in the same substrate, a fruit, as the colour). And just as the cognisability of the different objects (colour, &c.), is restricted to each separate sense organ, the eye, &c., so, in the case of words too, we have the applicability of each word restricted to definite classes of objects ; and so there can be no such admixture (of denotations as urged above).
161. When the word (1.1, “ tree”) has ceased to function (after having denoted its specific object tree),—the denotability of “ entity,” &c., 18 possible, but only through concomitance and non-concomitance, as leading respectively to deficiency and excessiveness.
158-159 The sense of the objection is this: “If we were to accept the positive denotation of words, then, inasmuch as all objects are complete wholes, the words must denote the whole chjects; and in the case of the five words cited, a tree has got the character denoted by each of the fonr following words; and hence it is that the tree is always recoguised as having a five-fold character ; and consequently all the five will have to be accepted to be constituent parts of the tree. And then inasmuch as the Object tree is an indivisible whole, and it is as sach that 1४ 18 denoted by the word ‘tree,’ all the aforesaid parts of the tree must be held to be identical. The word ‘knowahle’ too, while denoting knowability would denote the tree and the other four of the aforesaid, but in the reverse erder. But 88 a matter of fact, we find that this latter process is not so sure as the former, and hence is net equally prehable; and in order te avoid this absurdity, we must deny the faot of words denoting positive objects.” The sense cf the reply is that all objects are not necessarily indivisible; and hence it is quite possible for a word to denote one portion of it, while other parts are denoted by other words, And thus, there can be no identity among the denctations of the words cited, That the cbhject is not indivisible has heen shown above.
161 The word ‘tree’ cannot properly be taken to signify the earth, &c., directly. The functioning of a word ceases as soon as it has served to denote the tree alone. After that it may indirectly indicate the higher genus of the earth, ou account of the class ‘tree’ being included in the class ‘Harth,’ Bat in this case, the indication of Earth will be deficient in ono point, having been dragged from the higher to the lower
326 CLOKAVARTIKA.
162. In fact, the objection you have urged would apply only to you, who hold general words to apply to specific objects. Specially as (in your theory) there is no difference between the objects (the specific entities) and the factor denoted by words.
163. And again one—who (like the Apohist) would attribute to negative entities, like the Apoha, such properties as singleness, eternality and pervasion over each separate individual,—could also admit of a piece of cloth witbout any yarns,
164, Vor these reasons, it must be admitted that we can have the negation of something else only in the case of such words as have a negative particle attached to them. In the case of words other than these, it is only the positive form of the object that can be denoted.
165. Some people (the Naiygyikas) argue that the denotation (of a word) has not the character of negativing things other than itself,—because it is a means of right notion,—like the senses of touch, &c. But this argument is rendered doubtful with regard to those words to which nega- tive particles are attached.
genus. So too, the same word ‘tree’ may be taken to indicate a particular tres—the Paldga, f.i.—, on account of thie latter being included in the clasa ‘tree’; and this indication will be a step higher, as in thia case thé lower 18 raised to the place of the higher. For these reasons, the word mnet, strictly apeaking, be taken as having ite denotation confined to a particular object only.
162 The Apohist 1018 that the general term ^ tree’ denotes only an abstract specific entity, which cannot but be held to be indivisible ; and as anch there could be no distinot factors in the object denoted; and hence it is only the Apohist that oan be a victim to the objeotions urged in the Karik’ Vrkshatwapdrthivadravya, &c. ^ Because, &c.” This meeta the following objections: «^ The Banddha does not hold the words to rest with the apecific entities, because this wonld land him in endlessness, &o.; what he actually holds to he the objects of words are the negations that have their distinct forma definitely individualised, either by the individnalities of the objects negatived, or by those of their attendant Vasandas ; and as these are different from one another, the above objection cannot apply to the Bauddha theory.” The sense of the reply is that according to the Apohist, there is no difference between the objects (specific entities) and the factors denoted by the word (viz. Negations), For if he were to admit of a Negation that wonld include varions epecifio entities, then that would amount to an admission of the Class ; and we have already refuted the theory that there can he any difference among the objects negatived based upon the difference of Vasand, &o.
166 The Apohist is constrained to attribute the said properties (that belong tos positive clasa) to hie dpoha; otherwiee he falls into the ditch of endlessness, &c. And it ia simply absurd to attribute positive properties to negative entities.
164 ^“ Non-cow” = negation of the cow; and not that “Cow” = negation of non-cow
165 Up to the last Karika, the refutation of the Apoha-theory has been based upon ordinary experience. The Natydyika seeks to refute it by meansof an inferential argu- ment—propounded in the present Karikd, This argument however is fallscions $ becanse negative words are meaus of right oognition, and yet they have uegative denotations.
APOHA. 327
166. And if all (words—positive and negative) are made the subjects of the conclusion, then the argument becomes doubtful (not universal and hence uncertain) with a view to negative arguments; and it also becomes opposed to certain facts accepted by all persons.
167. If your conclusion,—that “the word does not negative, &c.,” refer to the agency of the word (in negativing),—or, if it refer to the fact of words denoting negation alone,—then it would only be proving what is already an accepted fact (and as such hecomes redundant).
168. If the conclusion mean that ‘a word does not in any way apply to an object which is the negation of its contradictory,—then that would go against a formerly accepted view: for certainly, in the cow we havea negation of the horse, &c. (which are contradictory to, ४.५.) something other than, the cow).
169. The instance (that you have cited in your syllogism, that of the sense-organs) is such as 18 entirely at variance the conclusion. Because the eye, &ec. (the sense-organs) do, as a matter of fact, apply to objects that are the negation of something else, though they do not comprehend this (negative aspect of the thing).
170. If, again, the conclusion be taken to mean that ‘the idea (or cognition that we have from a word) is not coloured by any taint of the negation of other things,’—then too, the argument hecomes redundant; because though the denotation of a word is actually in the form of a negation, yet it is ordinarily known (by means of Vdsan@) as being a positive object.
171-172. Again, if the conclusion be taken to deny the fact of the Apoha being the means of the application of the word (to its denotation),—
166 If the conclusion also inclnded negative words,—7.e., if it be asserted that even negative words have no negative denotations,—then the argnment becomes doubtful 5 because as a matter of fact, even the Natyéyika admits of negative premises and arguments, whioh prove the conclusion only by negativing the contrary of the conclusion; and certainly, this goes against the universality of the assertion that no negative wards have negative denotations. And further, all ordinary people are cognisant of the nega- tive denotations of negative words; and hence the argumentin question also goes against a popularly-accepted notion.
167 What does yonr conclusion mean? Does it mean that the word is never a means of negativing ? If so then, it is redundant; hecause the Banddha does not hold the word to be such a means; all that he holds is that the word is expressive of nega- tion. Secondly, if yonr conclusion mean that words cannot denote negation only,— then too it becomes redundant; hecanse the Apohist does not hold words to have for their denotation negation pure and simple, by itself; though it is trne that he resolves the denotations of all words into the negative form of the Apoha,—yet he always bases this upon a palpable entity.
11117 “ Removal of a doubt”—with regard to a pole, there is a doubt—‘ ig this a
328 CLOKAVARTIKA.
then, this too would go against a formerly accepted theory : inasmuch as you do admit of negation (Vyatiréka) being a means (of denotation). In the case of Inference too, you have the same thing (inasmuch as the negation of the contrary of the major term is also accepted as a means of getting at the middle term and the premises); and so the very basis of your argument (z.e., the middle term) becomes doubtful. And lastly, your argumentis doubtful and inaccurate, when viewed as against a perceptible idea that we obtain on the removal of a doubt.
173. And further, your argument would also be contradictory; inas- much as a word resembling in action the sense-organs, Kar, &c.,—such words as ‘Self,’ “ Mind,” ^ Akaca,’—would cease to signify their meanings (because none of these objects are perceptible to the sense- organs).
174, Then again, “the application of a word to a positive object cannot hut be through Negation,—because the word is the means of infer- ential reasoning,—like negative premises.”
175. And again;—‘ the word cannot denote the Class, or an Indi- vidual as qualified by the Class,—because it is a means of right notion,— like the senses of touch, hearing, &c.”
176. It was in view of such counter-arguments 06118 available for the Apohist, and on findiug that by means of (inferential) arguments we cannot arrive at any definite determination of what does, and what does not, constitute the denotation (of words),—that we have treated of the question above wholly in accordance with Usage.
Thus ends the Apohavada.
post or a human body standing’? When we go near it, the douht disappears, and we have the idea—‘this is a pole, not a man’—which is thas found to partake fully of a begative element.
118 If in the matter of the denotations of worde, we were to depend wholly upon inferential arguments, without having anything to do with wsage,—then inasmnch as the self, &., are not amenable to the eenses, or to inference either, the very same argu- ment that you have urged above may be utilised in proving that the word “self” does not signify what it is accepted to signify—v.e., it does not signify Atméd,—heoanse it 18 a means of right notion,— like the ear, eye, &०, You cannot bring forward any arga- ment in support of the fact of the word “ self” signifying Atma, unless you have recourse to usage, For this reason, you must base all your arguments egainat Apoha, upon usage, and not upon any inferential reasonings.
119 Against the Naiydyika’s inferential argument, the Apohist pits another infer- ential reasoning. And without having a reoourse to uasge, there is no escape from the dilemma,
118 This embodies another counter-argument.
16 Therefore the Naiyéyika was wrong in oalling in the aid of Inference, for demolishing the atruoture of Apoha.
Vanavada. 329
Section 15. THE VANA-VADA.
1. Objection: “ How is it that it is asserted (in the Bhdshya) that the Akrti (Olass) 1s qualified by the dewlap, §c., when, as a matter of fact, ^ gotwa”’ (an Akrti), which is related to that (individual cow) which is endowed with the parts (dewlap, &c.), does not reside in these parts themselves ?”
2-3. Reply: These parts are related to the class ‘ Cow,’ only through their relationship with a certain individual (cow) endowed with these parts. Hence, inasmuch as these are peculiar to that particular Class “Cow,” they may be takeu as specifying that class.
In the individual (cow) there is an inherence of many classes, such as “entity,” 4९, ; aud the “ dewlap,” c&c., assuredly serve to specify (or distin- guish) the class ‘cow ’ from those other classes.
4, The dewlap, &., are not the manifesters of the class ‘cow’; nor are they qualifications (of it), like properties (gunas), For if it were so, then there would be no cognition of the class ‘cow,’ until these (dewlap, &c.), had been recognised.
9. (If the manifestation of one class ‘cow’ were to depend upon other classes ^ dewlap, &c.,”’ then) we would have to assume the cognition (mani. festation) of these latter themselves by means of other manifesters; thus there could be no resting place from such assumptions; and consequently there would be no definite cognition of the class ‘ cow.’ ।
1 This refers to the following Bhashya passage ‘atha gauwrityasya ko’rthah? 528. hadivicishta dkritiriti. The sense of the objection in the Kérikd 18 that it ia the indivi- dual cow that is endowed with the dewlap, &c., and hence the class ‘cow’ should never be spoken of as qualified by these.
2.8 By the declaratiou that the dewlap, &c., qualify the class ‘cow,’ it ia not meant that the relationship between these and the class ie that of qualification proper, ag in the case of blue and latus; but that the parta mentioned—the dewlap, &c.,— serve to specify the class “cow” and differentiate it from other classes. And thig specification is based upon mere relatianship in general. And inasmuch as the dewlap, &c., are related tothe class ‘ cow,’ through their direct connection with the individual cows,—even in the ahsence of an inherent relation (as in the case of blue and lotus),—it would not be uureasonable to accept them ag specifying or characterising the class “cow”; just as the ear-ring, though not hearing an inherent relationship to the wearer, serves to distinguish her from other persona, not wearing it. And though many other properties—such as ‘ existence’ and the like—inhere in the individual, yet inasmuch aa these properties are common to individuals of many other 0128868; they cannot he accepted 88 specifying the cow; which cau be specified only by the dewlap, &c., which exist in no other animals.
+ They are not the manifesters of the ^ cow ”—as the smoke 18 of the Fire. Because even before the existence of these has been dnly ascertained, with regard to q particular individual, this is recognised ag a caw, i.¢., belonging to the 91888 ‘ cow.”
42
330 CLOKAVARTIKA.
6, And further, if the dewlap, &e., were the manifesters of the dass ‘cow’ then) we could have an idea of ‘cow’ only when we would have cognised all of those (viz., dewlap, hoofs, horns, &९.) But, as a matter of fact, a simultaneous cognition of all of these is never possible.
7.’ ‘Therefore it must be admitted that just as the parts (making up the individual cow), by the mere fact of their existence, bring about the idea of eatension in regard to that individual,—so would they also (bring about the ideas) of the class (to which the individual may belong) and the properties attaching to it, &c., &९ ‘8, Question: “If so, then how is it that we have no idea of the class (cow) in a place where these (constituent parts the dewlap, d&c.), are not at all cognised (7.e., where these do not exist)” ? Answer The very simple reason for this (non-recognition of the Class) lies in the fact that the cognisable object (Class or Individual) does not exist in any other place than the one occupied by its constituent parts.
9-10. The truth is that when the Class ^ Cow” has been recognised there appears a cognition, of the dewlap, &c., as occupying the same point in space (as the “Cow ”),—this latter cognition being due to the inseparahi- lity (of the cognition of the ‘Cow’ from that of the dewlap, &c.) Or, on account of the absence of any absolute difference (between the dewlap, &c., and the individual cow, and also between the individual cow and the class “ Cow’), the Class may he said to be qualified by the dewlap, &c.
10-11. it is with a view to reject an inferential reasoning of the adversary that it is added (in the Bhashya) “being perceptible to the
6 ¢ Never possible” —and hence no cognition of the cow would be possihle!
7 Our idea of the extension of an object is १०७ to the fact of ths mere existence of its parts. That is to say, we helieve it to hs eatended, simply becanse of the existence of its parts; and it is not necessary for us to have a distinot cognition of each individual part before having an idea of extension. For if it were so, we could find no resting ground, 7061] we reached the Atom; i.¢., in the case of svery object, we ०४1१ have to be cognisant of its. Atom,—a palpable absurdity ! In the same manner, the mere fact of the existence of the dewlap, &c., is sufficient to give us an idea of the class “ cow”; and it is not necessary for us to have a distinct recognition of every one of its distinguishing fea- tnres, in the shape of the dewlap, the horns, the hoofs, and the like.
The sense of the reply is that our Class is not omnipresent, like that of the Naiyéyika; and we do not admit of its existence in any place, save the one where the individuals as characterised by the Dewlap, &९., exist. Therefore the non-cognition of the class is due to mere Negation,—in the shape of the absence of the said constituent features, and not to the non-cognition of these features
9-10 As a matter of fact, it has been shown that it cannot be the qualification ; but it eau be acospted to be so, on the gronnd that there is no very great difference among the three
10.11 Having put the qnestion—“Is the dkyti capable of being the subject of a
syllogism ” ?—the Bhashya replies—na pratyakshd sati sédhya bhavitumarhati (Being
Vanavdda. 331
senses, it cannot, &c.” And the argument employed by the adversary is this: ‘The Class is nothing apart from the Individual,—because in the absence of the cognition of these (individuals) there is no idea of that (४.९. Class),—just as is the case with a series, a crowd, a forest, &९, (where no idea is possible without an idea of individuals constituting these.”
12. We ourselves do not stand in need of the statement of any argu- ments (supporting our theory); because it is known, and accepted by, all men. And against our opponents trying to negative our theory, we can bring forward the fact of their theory contradicting universally-accepted ideas.
13. Objection: “ But in case the Class were perceptible by the senses,’ there could be no difference of opinion (with regard to its existence).” Reply: The very fact of there being such a difference with regard to the means of right notion themselves, whence could argumentative people (like you) agree as to these (fundamental bases of all cognition) ?
14. And even with regard to “colour, &c.”—objects that are accepted to be perceptible to the senses—these (worthies) have an objection! And, as a matter of fact, no sane person objects to the existence of the Class.
15. We find various usages based upon class—notions,—e.g., the case of offering curd, takra, &ec., to the Brahmanas and the Kaundinyas (respec- tively).
16. By the word “ Akrti” here (in the Bhashya) is meant Class, and not the shape. Because in the case of Air, Fire, Sound, &c., we are not
peroeptible to the senses it cannot be the subject of a syllogism). The sense of this is that our adversaries seek to prove, by inferences, that there is no such thing as Class; but all such reasonings are set aside once for all, by the fact of the Class being per- ceived, by the senses, to be something distinct from the Individuals; and as soch no amount of inferential arguments can shake our theory.
19 We do not require any inferential arguments, either for strengthening our own position, or for assailing that of the opponent. In both cases we take our stand wholly upon Popular Usage.
18 The objection is clear. The sense of the reply is that even with regard to such things as the means of right cognition, we have an endless divergence of opinions,— specially with regard to the forms and the source of such means. Consequently, if the mere fact of there being difference of opinions were considered sufficient ground for denying the existence of an object, how could the Banddha establish his own two means of cognition—viz., Sense-perception and Inference.
1* Colour, &c., are perceptible by the senses; and yet the Banddha denies their existence, and resolves the whole external world into mere Idea; and hence he cannot reasonably deny the perceptibility of an object, on the sole ground of there heing a difference of opinion with regard to it.
16 The injunction is in the form—“ give curd to the Brahmanas, but Takra to the Kaundinya.” Here, unless we accept the word “ Bréhmana"’ to denote the general class Brahmana (which includes the Kaundinya)—we could not justify the exception, with regard to Kaundinya.
332 CLOKAVARTIKA.
cognisant of any shape (thongh we are cognisant of the class ‘ Air,’ ‘ Fire,’ &e.)
17. And further, with each individual, we are cognisant of a distinct shape (and thus we would have an endless series of shapes, and no idea of commonality). And if the commonality were to consist in the conjunc- tion of the constituent parties, then it would be destroyed on a disruption of these (particles).
18. If it be urged that we could have “ shape” itself as (a class) common (to all shapes, thus avoiding endlessness and explaining the idea of commonality),—then (we reply that) this (class ^ shape”) would be equally common to the Horse, the Cow, &c. And, as a matter of fact, we are not cognisant of any such class as the “ shape,” apart from what is popularly known as the class ^“ Cow.”
19. And further, though we recognise a sameness of shape in all similar objects (1, the gavaya), yet we never have any idea of the class ‘*Cow” with regard to these. Therefore it must be admitted that the Class is something entirely different from the Shape.
20. In the mention of the Rucaka, &., the Bhashya has exempli- fied the classes ^“ Rucaka,” and the rest. (But this is done with a view to show that) in all these different (shapes of gold) we recognise a common class “ Gold.”
21-23. When the Vardhamdanaka being broken up, a Rucaka is made (out of the same gold), then the person who desires to have the former
¶ ^ And if, ¥c.”’—Shape is nothing more than a. conglomeration of certain particles ; and coglomeration as a whole is bonnd to disappear, whenever there is the slightest disjnnction of the particles. Consequently ‘any commonality hased upon this conglo- meration could never be anything permanent.
\8 The Cow, as well as the Horse, has shape; and hence if all the notion of com- monality that we have, with regard to all individual cows (taken together), were to consist in the mere fact of their having shape; then inasmuch as this commonality would belong to the Horse also, it would also come to be called “Cow.” As a matter of fact, even the notion of the commonality “ shapedness ” (covering all individual cows) is not possible without an idea of the class “ Cow.”
20 This refers to the Bhashya: = ^ Rucakah swasttko vardhamanakea itt hi pratyak- sham dreyaté.” This passage is explained with a view to prove the fact of Class heing perceptible hy the senses. [‘ Rucaka, &., heiog the names of different kinds of golden ornaments]. If the Class were not something different from the shape, then, how conld we have any such common name as “ Gold,” applying to objects of snch diverse shapes as the Rucaka; &c.
41-88 In this process of the breaking np of one ornament, and the making of another out of the same gold, the indifference evinced hy one who wants mere gold, would he possible only if he could perceive a certain character persisting in the gold, independ- ently of its three states—of destruction of one shape, the continuance as a mass, and tho remaking of it into another shapes. And the only common character that can be
Vanavada. 333
becomes sorry, while one desiring the latter ornament likes the process, while a third person who only desires gold remains indifferent, nnaffected. Therefore the object (gold) must be admitted to have a threefold charac- ter. Becanse unless the object partook of production, continuance and destruction, there could not be (with regard to it) the three notions (of like, dislike and indifference). There can be no sorrow (or dislike) with- ont destruction (of the object desired); and there can be no pleasure without production (or appearance of the object desired); and lastly, there can be no indifference without continuance or permanence (of the desired object). For these reasons there must be a permanence of the Class.
24. In the case of a heap of Mudga, Seasamum, Sc., too, where we are not cognisant of any difference in shape among the individual grains, we have an idea of a single commonality (belonging to all the grains, of Seasa- mum, f.1.), which is distinctly amenable to Sense-perception, &c.
25. In the case of a person seen at a distance, we have (in our minds) a doubt as to his belonging to the Brahmana-class, &c.; and this would not be possible if the Class were not perceptible to the senses.
26-29. The specification of the Class is brought about by certain agencies, in the shape of the peculiarities of colour, &c., and those of Time, Place, &c. (For instance) Gold is assuredly distinguished from Copper by its colour; Boiled butter is distinguished from Oil by its odour and taste; Fire covered over by ash is distinguished by its fouch; the Horse at a distance is distingnished (from other animals) by its
found to persist thus is the commonality “ Gold ;? and as such we cannot hut admit the class “gold’’ to he eternal. = ^^ Therefore the object must be admitted,” &c. Because we come across these three feelings, therefore we must accept the object gold to have a threefold character. ‘ Permanence of the Class”—It is only hecanse we have an object in the form of the gold, that we perceive it to continue during all the three states, through which the mass of metal has passed during the ahove process. And becanse it continnes thus, in all the three states, therefore the Class must be admitted to he some. thing permanent and everlasting.
26 This fact shows—(1) that the Class ("^ Brahmana,” f.i.) is something other than the individual, because even though the individual person is perceived definitely, yet there is a doubt as to the class to which he helongs; (2) and also that the class is amen- ahle to Sense-perception ; inasmuch as we find that when the person has come near us, we have a definite idea of the Class to which he belongs.
26.29 This anticipates the following objection: “If the Class is perceptible by the euses, how is it that we do not recognise Brahmanahood by means of the eye, as quickly as we do the fact of the object before us being an individual man?” Thesense of the reply is that the Class depends, for 1४8 due specification, upon certain agencies, in the shape of certain peculiarities of Colour, Time, Place, &c. ‘ And sometimes, Sc."— Ina place where man’s conduct is rightly regulated, there are certain actions that are performed by the Bradhmana alone. This would serve to distinguish the Brahmana from the other castes,
334 CLOKAVARTIKA.
neighing; the Jar, &c., are distinguished (from one another) by their shape; the (castes) ‘ Brahmana,’ &c., are distinguished by their origin (birth and parentage of the individual), and sometimes also by actions (where they happen to be) properly regulated by the King (of the realm).
30-31. The fact of the Class inhering in each individual being thus perceived (by the senses), it cannot be said to be contradictory (7.e., un- reasonable). And even though such is the case (7.e., though it inheres in every individual), it cannot be held to be many, because (with regard to the Class) the idea we have is that of single (commonality). Nor can the singleness of the form (of Class) be set aside by a difference among the individuals to which the Class happens to be related (by inherence). And the absence of omnipresence, as also that of parts, is to be proved in the same manner as (they are proved) with regard to sound.
32. Just as a single individual, even when met with at different times (and in different places), is recognised to be the same,—so, in the same manner, would also the Class, though inhering in different (in- dividual) substrates (be yet recognised to be one).
33. The question—whether the Class belongs to the individnal in tts entirety, or in parts,—is not proper with reference to the Class. Becanse apart from the individuals themselves, there can be no idea either of en- tirety or of parts (with regard to the Class, which, by itself, is impartite).
34, Therefore (it must be admitted that) we are cognisant of the mere fact that the Class inheres in the individuals. And there being no occasion for any further questions, the above fact (of the Class inhering in the individuals) rests within itself (z.e., we take our stand upon this well-ascertained fact).
35-36. The contact in parts, which we perceive in the case of the gar-
30.81 This refers to the following objection: ‘‘ Does the Class belong to each of the individuals, in ita entirety,—or does it pervade throngh all of them, like a thread passing through all the heads of a necklace? The former alternative cannot hold ; hecanse a single object cannot reside in its entirety, in more than one place; and as for the second alternative, how can there be a recognition of anything pervading over all individuals, of the past, the present, and the future? Consequently no idea of the class is possible.’ The sense of the reply is that the Class inheres in its entirety in every individual ; and as for the possibility of snoh inherence, in as mach as we actually perceive it to be so, its reality cannot he gainsaid. Nor is it altogether nnreasonable ; 88 it 18 quite possible for a single object to he similarly related to a number of objects, ४ Omnipresence, ¥c.”—A Class is such as is not limited in space ; and not that it exists everywhere. The faot of Sound being withont parts has heen proved nnder ^ Sphota’ ; and that of its being not omuipresent will be explained in the chapter on ‘ Qubda’ Jater on. |
86.86 The thread, through its parta, isin contact with every one of the beads,—=one
Vanaviida. 335
land and the thread (on which the garland is strung), and the contact in, entirety, which we perceive between animals and their . properties, and between the voice and its properties,—-all these are due to the partite character (of the thread) and the non-extensive (limited) character of the properties respectively. And inasmuch as both these characters are wanting in the Class, we can have none of the aforesaid contacts with reference to it.
37, There is no hard and fast rule restricting the methods of relation to two only. Because the three methods (explained in K. 20 et seg), just as the two just mentioned, are alse possible, on account of their being perceived by the senses (as described above)
38. Ifitbe urged that “the threefold relation perceived with regard to the Class is not perceived anywhere else (and hence no such relation can exist),’—(we reply that) in that case, the same would be the case with the garland, &c.; because there is no equality (or similarity) between those two (the relation of the string with the beads and that of the pro- perty with the animal), nor is there any (equality) of these with: the relation borne by the Class to the individuals.
39. For, the heat of fire does not cease to exist, on the mere ground of its not being perceived elsewhere. Nor is the relation borne by the Class to the individual got at by means of Inference, so as to stand in need of a corroborative instance.
40. Thus then, a relation (the one borne by the Class), which, in its proper form, is perceived by the sense, cannot possibly be rejected on the ground of the form of other relations,—specially when we are not cogni- sant of any (such) peculiarity in the former (as would place it in a position of weakness in comparison to the latter).
41. And again, it is not proper to reject a principal element (in the shape of the Class and its methods of relationship), on the mere ground
part of the thread being in contact with one besd, and so on. And the properties of whiteness, &c., of the animal, reside in it, in their entirety. The reason for the former fact lies in the fact of the thread having so many parts; and.that of the lstter lies in the fact of the properties not being omnipresent. The Class on the other hand, is omni, present; inasmuch as it belonge to all individuals of the pset, the present and the future; and as it is so perceived, it cannot be said to inhere in its entirety in each individual.
89 Beoause a certain property is not perceived anywhere, save in a single sub- atrate,—that cannot be a reason for denying its existence altogether. For instance, Warmth is found in fire only; and certainly 308 existence cannot be denied. “ Infer- ence.’—It has been shown above that the relation borne by the Clase is perceived by the Senses.
41 By laying stress upon the twofolduess of relationships you seek to prove the absence of the Class, But as s matter of fact, this method is subservient to the Indi-
336 QLOKAVARTIKA.
of the inapplicability of an element which is even subordinate to its subor- dinate. Because (in so rejecting the Class on the ground of the said in- applicability) you would be rejecting a fact of Sense-perception on the ground of Inference (an absurdity).
42. Therefore it is proper to reject only that element which is found to be wholly incompatible. But this cannot lead to the rejection of some- thing else which is quite compatible with actual facts.
48. Thus then (the cognition of Class being due to Sense-perception), the Class, all-pervading as it is described to be by the Vaicéshikas, is recognised only in that place where it happens to be manifested by the individual; just as a letter (though omnipresent, is cognised only when manifested by particular utterances).
44. Therefore (it must be admitted that) the idea of ‘cow,’ with regard to the individual cows, is based upon the single class ‘“Cow,’— because in the idea of all of these there is a tinge of the cow; and because the idea of all these (individuals) is of one and the same form,—just as
the idea of a single individual cow. 45. The idea of the ‘cow’ is not due to the “ black cow,”’—nor is it
based upon any other (particular cow) ;—because that idea of cow is pos-
vidual, which, in its turn, is subordinate to the Clase. Hence the fact of the inappli- cability of the two methods of relationship (accepted by you) cannot lead to the rejeo- tion of the Claas. ‘‘ Because, 4८. - 116 Class and ita methods of relationship are all matters of Sense-perception ; whereas the fact of the absence of any relationship on the ground of the inapplicability of the two methods, is got at by means of Infer- ence.
43 What 18 impossible is only the applicability of the two methods of relationship to the case of the Class. Therefore we muat reject this applicability. Bunt thie does not necessitate a rejection of the Class itself.
43 Though omnipresent, the Olase—‘Cow’ f.i,—is not perceived everywhere ; because that which manifests it—the Individual Cow—exists only in certain places.
44 Having proved the existence of the Class, as based upon Senee-perception, the author proceeds to cite certain eyllogistic arguments. The minor term of the ayllogism is the fact of the idea of one Individual being like those of other Individuals; the Major term is the fact of this Idea being dune to a single class (“‘Cow’’). And the reasons are :—(1) 2608186 the ideas of all these are tinged by the form of the ‘“‘ Cow’; and (2) because the ideas of all individual Cowe are of one and the eame form. Ezample:— That Idea which is tinged by the shape of the Cow, is always of one and the same form, and as such, must be based upon a single entity—e.g., the Idea of an indivldual Cow.
45 The Idea of Cow 16 not brought ahout by a partionlar Cow—the black one f.i. $ becanse the said Idea is present where the blackness is ahsent,—e.g., in the care of other kinds of cows, Just as the notion of “ Earth” cannot be said to be due to the notion of the Jar. The Karika mentions two conclusions that follow from the same premises : The first is what has been explained and the second is expressed in the sentence— “Nor is it based, Sc.”
Vanavada. R37
sible also in a place where there is absence of that particular cow,—jist as the idea of “earth” with regard to the jar
46. The idea of ‘cow’ has for its object something (1.e., the class “cow ”’) that inheres in every one of the individuals,—because with regard to every individual (cow) there is an idea of the “cow,” which is com- plete in itself—just as the idea of every single individual cow (taken one by one)
427. Though inhering in each one of the individuals, the Class is one,—because (with regard to it, there is a single idea of the class “Cow "’),—just as in the case of negative expressions (like ^ non-Brah- mana,” &c.), there is negation of the Brahmana, &c.
48. The idea of the “cow” is not based upon similarity (among the individual cows),—because, being valid (i.e., correct) it is brought abont by identity,—just as the recognition of a certain individual object (as being the same that was seen beforc).
49. And certainly, it cannot be argued that with regard to the class “Cow” any such single idea (as serves to embrace all the individuals in a single notion) is false. Because in this (recognition of a single idea) there is no discrepancy in the means (by which we recognise the single
46 The idea of the Individnal Cow resides in ite entirety in that Individnal; and aa such is held to have for ite object, the objective ‘Cow.’ In the same manner, the notion of “Cow” has for 1६8 object something that is commonly inherent among all individual cows; and this can only be the Class ‘‘Cow.”
41 That with regard to which there ie a single idea must be one; even if inher- ing in many individuale. For instance, the negative word ‘‘ Non-Brahmana” applies in its entirety to many individuale—viz : the Kshatriya, the Vaigya, &c.; and yet the negation of Bréhmanhood must be accepted to be one only; and thia because, with regard to all 6४668 of the absence of Bréhmanhood we have a single Idea,—that of non-Brahmanhood, Coneeqnently, even the multiplicity of snbstrates doee not lead to any multiplicity of the Idea itself. So also in the case of Class ; thongh it inheres in every one of the Indi. viduals conatituting it, it must be accepted to be one, aud one only.
48 The idea of the Cow is based upon a recognition of the fact of the Class ^“ cow” inhering in one Individnal being identically the same 88 that which ia found to inhere in another Individual Cow. And such an Idea could not be based upon similarity, which differs with every two Individuals. In fact, juet as a certain Individual—Rama, f.i..— haying been once seen, comes to be recognieed again, 86 being the came person ; 80 in the 88706 manner, in the case of the Claes «^ 00, '* when we have once recog- nised it as inhering in the Black Cow, if we happen to see subsequently a Red Cow, we at once conclude that the Clase inhering in thie Istter is exactly the same as that which inhered in the Black Cow. And so on, we come to have a general Idea of the Clase ‘‘ Cow,” apart from the Individual Cows
49 An Idea that has once been cognised can be rejected as false, only—(1) if at 80718 fnture time we come acroee 8 certain flaw in the meaus by which we got at the Idea ; or (2) if subsequently stronger convictions to the contrary present themselves, so strongly as to contradict, and, by its superior validity, set aside, the former Idea, In the
338 QLOKAVARTIKA.
idea); nor is there any stronger conviction, to the contrary, that would reject it. | |
` 60. Oby.: “Ina place, where the fact of the Class being something other (than the Individnal) has been proved on the ground of the cogni- sability of the Class apart from the Individual,—the instances of the ‘forest,’ &c,, are bronght forward, in order to show the non-absolute (i.e., doubtful) character of the argument ;—and as such how can irrelevancy be urged against this (citing of ‘forest,’ &c.) P”
51. If we were to bring forward the fact (of the perception of Class apart from the individuals) as an argument to prove (our position), then it would be qnite proper to urge the non-universality (of our premises). But as a matter of fact, we bring forward (the aforesaid fact of Sense- perception) only as an objection (against those who deny the existence of the Class altogether); and (it is with regard to the citing of ‘ forest,’ &., against this objection, which is not an argument, that) “ irrelerancy”’ has been mentioned (in the Bhashya).
case of the idea of the Class ‘‘Cow’’ however, we have none ef these two contingencies ; and hence the idea cannot he rejected as 1186.
60 Says the Bhdshya: “‘asatyapyarthantaré evanjatiyaké bhavati pratyayah, panktiryi- tham vanamiti yatha iti cét asambaddham vacanam, &c., &c.” And the chjeotor in the Kirika shows that the citing of the instance of the Forest, &c., is not “asambaddha,” inasmnch as it strikes at the very nniversality of the premiss brought ferward by the Bhashya to prove the fact ef Class being something different from the Individnal. Because the Forest is also recognised as something different from each पवा प्रवाण Tree in it, and yet aa a matter of fact the Ferest is nething apart from these trees; there- fore the mere fact of the Class being recognised apart from the Individnals censtitut- ing it ia not enengh reason fer holding the Class to he something different from the Individuals.
bl The fact of the Clasa heing something different from the Iudividual is perceived by the senses ; and as 8001, for preving thia we stand in need cf no arguments. The fact 18 that the adversary having denied the existence ef the Class apart from the Indivi- dnals, we present befere him the fact of the Class heing actually perceived by the aensesto be something different from its censtituent Individuals. And uns this is ne inferential reasoning that we hring forward, it is not right that you shonld seek te set it aside by citing an argument, based upen the instance of the forest. Specially as Sense-perception depends, fer its validity, only upon a correct functioning of the senses, and not upon any non-contradictien, &c. Consequently to bring ferward a solitary instanos of the Forest—even granting the validity of your reasening with regard to thie,—wonld never serve to invalidate a fact of direct Sense-perception. All that yonr instance can do is to show that such is not the fact in every case. But any such exceptional instance cannot affect any particular case of the Class which ie directly per- osived by the 86868) and as such, can never be set aside, except when we cegnise, by means of the senses, the fact that the class is net perceived apart from the Individuals. And 680 long as this ia not cognised, ne amount of instances can shake the validity of a fact founded upon direct Sepse-perception.
Vanavada. 339
92. By this (mention of the fact of the Class being perceived to be apart from the individuals) we only meaut to show that the arguments, brought forward to prove the non-existence (of Class apart from the Individuals), is coutradicted by a fact of direct Sense-perception. The argument brought forward by the adversary (with a view to prove the said non-existence of the Class, &c.), has already been shown above (in Karika 11),
53. Nor can the falsity of the above fact of Sense-perception be urged on the mere ground of the falsity of a like perception with regard to the forest. Because the falsity of one (Sense-perception) cannot lead to the falsity of all (facts of Sense-perception). And hence the citing of ‘ forest,’ &c., cannot but be declared irrelevant.
54. Justas by the falsity of the cognition of the forest, &c. (as some- thing apart from the trees), the cognitions of taste, &c., do not become false taste, &c..~—so would the cognition of Class too (as something apart from the individuals) (not be rendered false, by the falsity of the cogni- tion of the forest). Or else, you must mention some peculiarity (with regard to the cognition of Class) (that would differentiate it from the case of taste, &c., and thereby save your position).
55, The idea of singleness, with regard to a forest as cognised apart from the trees, may be a mistaken one, because of a discrepancy in the shape of remoteness (of the forest, from the person perceiving it from a distance). In the case of the 1८55, however, there is no such discre- pancy (and hence it caunot be false),
56. (In the case of the cognition of the forest as one), when one gets
68 This refers tothe following objection: “Even if such be the -case, the instance of forest, &c., may he accepted 28 invalidating the fact of Sense-perception, urged by the Mimansaka, and as such there would he no irrelevancy in the matter.” The sense of the reply is that becausc the perception of the forest, as something apart from the trees, is false—that cannot be any reason for denying the truth of other facts of Sense- perception, so even thns the irrelevancy remains just as before.
6# ^“ Peculiarity ’—no such is possible.
55 A cognition can be accepted to be a mistaken one, only when there happens to be some discrepancy in the means of that cognition. In the case of the person who (himself at a remote distance from the forest) makes the assertion that the forest is something apart from trees in it,—we may consider this to be a mistaken notion, because of the remoteness of the forest, which is a great discrepancy in the process of Sense- perception ; and there is every chance of such sensuons perception being mistaken. In the case of the cognition of the Class however, we have no such discrepancy, and as such it cannot but be accepted as correct.
66 Another reason for rejecting a fact of Sense-perception as false lies in the fact of its being such as is subsequently set aside by another conviction got hy a more authoritative means. The said Idea of the Forest way be so rejectable; but that of the Class ig never found to be rejected,
340 QLOKAVARTIKA.
near the trees, the singleness, of thé idea (of the forest) with regard to them, céases; whereas, by no means whatever, is the idea of Class (being au entity apart from the Individuals) ever found to be set aside.
57-58. The idea of the singleness (of the forest as apart from the
trees),—(based only upon perception), as considered independently of (the dendtation of) the word (“‘ Vana”),—has been rejected (on the ground of the remoteness of the observer, who could not be expected to see things rightly from a distance). And as for the Idea of singleness (of the forest) based upon (the fact of the forest being the only object denoted by) the word “ Forest,”—this (Idea) may also occur to one who is in the middle of ‘the forest (and not at a distance). But even this Idea may be taken to be false, because of the impossibility of its being amenable to (any means of ‘right notion) Sense-perception and the rest. As for the Class, it is always in the same character (of singleness, apart from the Individnals) that it is cognised by all the means of right notion (and as such, the idea of its singleness, &o., can never be set aside).
, 59. As a rule, a word is always used with reference to an object which has been cognised by other means of right notion. Consequently whenever it happens to be used, with regard to an object not (otherwise) per-
-ceived,—as in the case of the “ forest,”—it must lead to mistaken (notion).
60. (I.) Some people hold that the singleness of the forest is always cognisable hy the word alone; and, as such, it would al ways be true, even though there were no support from other (means of right notion); just as the (cognition of) taste is true, though it is not supported by the ear,
or any other means of right notion, save the tongue.
61. Falsity, caused by the non-support (non-cooperation of other means of right notion), could apply (to the case of the Idea of the singleness
of the forest as signified by the word) only if ४४ were not cognised. When ‘however, it has once been duly cognised, the mere absence of extraneous corroboration cannot in any way affect its validity.
62. That the word can apply only to such objects as are amenable to
other means of right notion, is not accepted as a rule applying to all words.
69 If the notion of aingleness were only based npon the word “ Yana,” then alone, being purely verbal, it could not but be false.
60 The author now proceeds to explain the various views taken of the above १५९९. tion. Some people hold that the idea of the aingleness of the forest ia got at by means of the word, and is trne; and as auch the case of this cannot serve to invalidate the notion of the singlenesa of Class. It is only the word that is the means of cognising the singleness of the Forest; and as such this idea of singleness would be false, only ao long as the word has not duly signified it. When however the idca has been once signified, it stands in need of no other support.
69 This rule cannot affect all words; because there are certain things—Dharma above all the rest—that are cognisable by word, and word aloue,
Vanavada. 341
63. (II.) In fact, however (in the case of the Idea of the singleness of the forest) we have the support (of other means of right notion), in- asmuch as the forest is only tho many trees (considered together); and these trees surely are cognised by other means of right notion (Sense- perception, f.i.); and as for the number (singularity in ^ Vanam”), this too is found to be cognised (by other means of right notion) in other objects (the jar, f.i.)
64. If it be urged that the many (trees) cannot be denoted by a single word “ (Forest’’),—(we reply that) we could have such denotation, as in the case of the ékagésha compound. And if it be said that in the case of the ékagésha the number is changed (into the plural),—then (we reply that) we may leave off this factor (of the change of number) (and yet the fact of the denotation of the many by a single word remains common both to the ékagésha in ‘ ghatah’ and the word ‘ Vanam”’ as signi- fying the many trees).
65. Thus then we find that the compatibility of singularity (with tho many trees) can be established by means of a universal affirmative premiss. And thereby we could have the number (singularity, applying to the trees as constituting the forest), even though it is not cognised by any other means of right notion ;—just as we do admit of the movement of the sun (whieh is not cognisable by any other means of right notion, but is established only by means of Inference).
66. Some people explain the word ^ Vanam” as denoting the com. monality or class of ‘ many” (i.e., Bahutwa = multitudinousness) as located in (i.e., belonging to) the tree. And certainly the class ‘“ multitudinous-
64 In the ékacéfha compound, many jars are signified by the single word “ ghatah.” The second objection means that the ékagésha iu ‘ ghatah’ ia Plural, whereas ‘ Vanam’ is Singular, and as such could not denote many trees. The sense of the reply is that though the word ^ Vanam” will differ from the ékagéfha in the point of its number, yet the fact of one word signifying many individuals remains the same in both cases; and it is this alone that we seek to establish.
66 As a matter of fact, singularity belongs to the trees themselves. Since the name ‘Vanam’ applies to many trees, and the relation of singularity (in ‘ Vanam’) with the many cannot be cognised by any other means of right notion,—therefore we must have recourse to a universal affirmative premias, whereby we could establish the compati- bility of the denotation of the noun (‘ Vana” denoting the many trees) with the denotation of the affix (the Accusative Singular). This premies ia that “ the affix that is found joined to a noun connecta its own denotation with the Object denoted by the noun.” From this premias, we conclude that there is a relation between the objects denoted by the word “ Vana” (i.¢., the many trees) and the singularity denoted by the singular Accusative affix in “ Vanam.”
66 Finding that no amount of Inference can lead to the compatibility of singularity with many trees,—because this would mean the accepting of Inference in the face of its opposition to a fact of Sense-perception,—the Karika throws out another suggestion.
342 CLOKAVARTIKA.
ness” is only one (and as such the singular number in “ Vanam”’ becomes quite compatible with the denotation of many trees). Or (we may accept the view that) the class “ Forest” resides in the trees (aud thus too the singular in ^ Vanam” becomes compatible, as the class “ Forest” is only one).
67. Even in the absence of any such single object that could be the substrate (of the denotation of the word “ Vana”), (such denotation is possible),—just as (though) the whole (has noone substrate apart from the parts constituting it, yet it is accepted) to be one, and so forth. And as, for the fact of the manifestation (of the single forest) by means of the many trees, not in contact with one another (like the parts of a whole) ,— ‘since such manifestation is perceived by the eyes (as really existing in the case of the single forest and the many trees), therefore it cannot be said to be incongruous.
68-69. The word “ Vana” may be the common (generic) name of denotation residing elsewhere (i.e., in the individuals): Just as we find the name ^“ wandering about” applying to the momentarily changing parti- cular movements,—so in the same manner, is distinctly cognised the Class ° Forest,” even though its substrates are many and diverse.
69-70. (III.) Or again, the “ Forest’ may be accepted as one, on the ground of (all the trees conjointly) bringing about a single effect (in the shape of the denotation of the forest),—just as the word ‘“‘Gauh,” though made up of several Jetters, Ga and the rest, is yet accepted as being (in
67 Just as the whole has no substratum apart from its parts, 80 the word “ forest” has no substrate apart from the trees contained in it. The two cases being identical, we cannot rightly deny the one while admitting the other. ^ Incongruous.”—Though the manifeetation of the single foreat by the many treee, or viee versd, is a fact eelf- contradictory in itself,—yet inasmuch as euch manifestation is cugnised by Senee- experience to have a real exietence, it cannot but be admitted to be true.
69.69 The movements that are always disappearing are also included in u generic term; and as for “forest,” though the individual trees, the enhstrates of the generic notion of the Forest, are many and various, yet, we cannot deny the correctness of the generic notion.
69.10 Though the letters, making up the werd “Ganh,” are many, yet, inas- much ag all these lettere conjaintly bring about the only effect, in the shape of the eigni- fication of the object Cow, the word ie admitted to he one only. Similarly, in the caee of the Forest, thongh it consists of many trees, yet inasmuoh ae all these trees con- jnintly bring about the single effect, in the shape of the manifeetatinn of the Forest, the collection of these trees is accepted as one composite whole. Those trees that are always found to exist singly by themselves cannot have any single joint action; in fact, they are the causes of so many diverse ideas (of various trees) ; and consequently these cannot be held ta be included in the denetation of the single word ‘‘ Forest.” And as a matter of fact, when trees are at great distauces from oue another, they are never called ^“ Forest.”
Vanavada. 349
the form mado up of these letters taken conjointly) one word (denoting the cow). And as for those trees that are always known to exist singly by themselves (apart from other trecs), the word ^ Forest’ is not meant to apply to these. |
70-71, (IV.) Or, in the case of such terms as “ Series,” «^ Group,” ‘‘ Forest,” &c.,—even in the absence of the singleness of the objects (denot- ed by these),—we may explain the notion of singleness as being indirectly indicated, through the peculiarities of place, time and action, &e.
71-73. We have the idea of “ Forest” with reference to a collection of trees;—but we could not hold the idea of the class ‘‘Cow” to belong to a collection of cows. Because the idea of the class “Cow” is similar to that of the “tree” (inasmuch as just as to each of the individual trees belongs the character of “tree,” so to each individual cow belongs the idea of the class Cow”). Nor can we assume (the idea of the Class “Cow” to belong to) a collection (of individual cows); because that idea of the class ‘‘Cow” does not resemble that of the ‘forest’ in the point of the non-cognition of this latter apart (from the trees constituting it).
73-74. Nor can a conglomeration of the dewlap, &९.) be the subs- trate of the idea of the Class (‘‘Cow’”’); because the operation of these (dewlap, &c.), ceases with the bringing about of the cognition of the individual (cow); whereas the idea of the class ‘‘Cow” rests in the com- monality of (४.९. the entity common to) these (individuals). Then, even if you deny a corporate whole (apart from the constituent particles,— as held by the Bauddha), the Class still remains (untouched).
75-76, By means of the arguments explained before (in support of the existence of QOlass apart from the Individuals), we could also prove
10.11 Taasmuoh as the trees conjointly exist in One place, or at the same time, or have the same joint action,—these special features indirectly point tothe notion of singularity with regard to the ‘‘ Forest,’ even thongh the objects denoted by the word—viz., the trees—are many and diverse.
1-18 Does not resemble, Jc.” —The forest is not perceptible, apart from the trees, whereas we are cognizant of the Class ‘‘Cow,” even apart from any individual cow that may come into our view.
#14 The conglomeration of the Dewlap, &.,is only capable of bringing about a cognition of the individual cow; whereas the idea of the Class ‘Cow’ extends over all individual cows, which are, on this very acconnt, considered as belonging to one and the same class. “ Therefore even, §c.”—The Bauddha holds that the Whole is nothing apart from the constituent particles; ४.९. the Jar is nothing more than a conglomeration of atoms. But we have shown above that the Class is something quite different from a conglomeration of parts. Therefore the denial of the whole does not affect the exist- ence of the Class.
16.16 We admit of the Class, simply on account of the fact of the cognition of a certain single commonality extending over many Individuals. In the same manner,
344 CLOKAVSRTIKA.
the existence of the whole also. But between this (Whole) and its constituent parts, there-could he no absolute difference ; inasmuch 88, like the Class from the Individuals, this Whole also is never cognised as wholly apart (from its constituent parts).
76-77. Both difference and non-difference (of the Whole from the Parts) have been affirmed and denied by some people. But between the two sets of arguments it has never been ascertained which is the stronger and which the weaker; therefore it is best to take the middle course (४,९.) admit of hoth difference and non-difference, partially).
78. Thus then, both difference and non-difference being affirmed as well as denied (with equally strong arguments), it must be admitted that (both these characters apply to the Whole, which thus becomes of a varie- gated character), like a multi-coloured object; and as such it is incorrect to assert that it has only one character (f.i. colour, in the case of the object).
79-80. This fact of the non-absolute character of an chject, does not render our cognition of it doutbtful (or invalid). Because it is only where the cognitian itself is doubtful, that we can have its invalidity. In the present case however, our cognition is perfectly certain, viz., that the object is of non-absulute (or doubtful) character (and as such, the validity of this cognition cannot be doubted),
80-81. The fact of the non-cognition of the Whole, when the parts have heen mentally abstracted, is also possible for the Aulukya (wha holds the difference—theory), on account of the destruction (of the Whole) also being in the mind (of the person who abstracts the parts).
inasmuch as we have notions of singleness—with regard to a jar, f.i., even though it is made up of many constituent atoms,—we must admit of the existeuce of one corporate whole, 98 something different (though not absolutely) from the oonstitnent parts.
16.11 ^ But between, Sc.’—The arguments on both eides are equally weak and equally strong.
19-80 The doubtful character of the object does not in any way invalidate our cognition of it. It is only where the cognition itself is doubtful—as in the oase of the doubt as to whether a certain ohject before us is a man or a post—that, there being no fized cognition, there can be no validity to-it. In the 0886 in question however, we have a definite cognition, not doubtful in the least, of the duplicate character of the object; and hence the cognition cannot be said to be doubtful pr invalid.
80.81 The upholders of the ‘ non-difference” theory urge as followa: ‘‘ When we men- tally abstract the constituent atoms, oue by one, from any object, we fiud that eventually nothing is left behind ; and hence we cannot think of any «whole apart from the parts,” The sense of the Kerika is that this argumont is not by any means exolusive; 0668186 even one who holds the whole to be distiact from the parts, admits the whole to be only an entity, due to an agglomeration of parts; and consequently, when the parts have been mentally abstracted, the agglomeration of these also ceases (mentally); and thus there being a mental destruction of the object itself, it could not be cognised (after
Vanavada. 345
81-82. The relation that the whole bears to the parts is recognised to be such as simultaneously extends over (all the parts); and hence the questions—whether the whole is related to each part in its entirety, &c., &c.—with regard to this, are to be rejected, just as they have been with regard to the Class.
82-83. If the idea of the Class “‘Cow”’ were due to (that of) the conglomeration of the various parts, dewlap and the rest,—then we could not have the notion of the Class “Cow” (which we may have cognised with regard to one cow) with regard to an individual cow (other than the one with reference to which the bovine character has been cognised) ; because the dewlap, &c., belonging to one individual cow are entirely different from those belonging to the other (and as such the idea of one could not apply to the other).
83-84. Nor 18 any commonality of the parts acceptable to the ad- versary (the Bauddha, who denies all positive commonality). Therefore 17 must be admitted that the idea of the class “Cow” is brought about by something other than the dewlap, &c.
84-85. The idea of “forest” that we have—with reference to a forest other (than the one that has been once perceived to be a collection of trees and so forth),— is said to have for its object the class “ {166 7 with many substrates (in the shape of the many trees making up the forest).
85-86. Just as, even though the Class by itself is one, yet it has multiplicity, in view of the individuals (included therein),—so too, though the individuals are many, yet they may be considered as one, in view of the Class (to which they belong).
the parts have been taken away). In the absence of the parts themselves, we cannot be cognisant of any conglomeration of them.
81.82 “ Rejected’”’—becanse there is no occasion for such questions. (See above: “na hi bhédavinirmukté kartsnyabhdga-vikalpanam).
82.88 Any idea—of the bovine character, f.i—brought about by the Dewlap seen in one cow, cannot be the same as that which is brought about by the same thing seen in anothercow. And thus we would have to postulate as many bovine characters as there are individual cows.
83.86 This strikes at the theory that the notion of the Class “‘Cow”’ conld pertain to all the cows, only if we had ॐ class in the shape of the parts of the cow $-- १.९.) the class “‘dewlap ” wonld include the dewlaps of all cows, and so on. But inasmuch as the Bauddha denies all positive Class, even this refuge is barred against him.
84.85 The idea of the Forest has been analysed above into that of the Class “ Tree” with many substrates; and the sense of the Ké@rikd is that this idea may be accepted as the commonality inhering in all forests.
85.88 The Class by itself is one; but in the shape of Individuals, itis many. So too, conversely, the Individuals by themselves are many; though one only, in the shape of the Class.
44
346 CLOKAVARTIKA.
86-89. In the matter of denoting either one or many (objects), words have their power (of denotation) irrevocably fixed by convention, Some (words), like “ Ambara” (sky), and the like, denote the individual with its own number (4.e., singular). In the assertion “ one corn is ripe”’ (said with reference to the sheaves of corn in a field), the word (^ Vrihih’’) denotes the class (^ Vriht”?) with its own number (singular). In the case of the “sannahanana (preparation) of the wife” (‘‘in accord- ing to the Injunction Patnim sannahyat”) the word (‘* Patntim”’) denotes the individual (wife) as qualified by the number (singularity of the Class). (In the Injunction ^ Vasantiya kapnijalan Glabhet’’) the word “ Kapin- jalan” signifies the class ^“ Kapinjala”’.
91-92. The word “ Darah,” whether used with regard to an individual (wife) or to the Class, 18 always used in accordance with the number of the constituent parts (7.¢., always in the Plural).
92-93. The word ‘ Vana” (used always in the Singular) on the other hand, signifies many individnal (trees) as qualified by the number (singularity) of the Class; or it may be taken to signify the (single) Class “ Tree” as located in many individuals.
93-94, Similarly in the case of all such words as ^“ Series” (“* Crowd’) &c., we always have some (singular) qualification or other, in the shape of conjunction, &c. (which serve to justify the Singular number). There. fore the notion of singularity (in these) is not groundless.
94.95. If the idea (of single commonality), that is common between the Forest and the directly perceptible Class, be said to be non-existing (i.e., false, with regard to the Class, simply becanse it is found to he false in the case of Forest),—then (even such known objects as) the trees, &c., being equal to the Class (on the ground of sense-perceptibility), (would
86.89 The Sky is oue; the Corns are many ; hence the Singular is based npon the Class, The word ‘ pain?’ refers to the wives of all persons performing the Darga-Pirna- masa sacrifice ; heuce the Singular number, in the word ^ patn?2m”’ as appearing in the Sentence mnst be accepted as referring to the singleness of the Class ^ Patn?.”” The class “ Kapinjale” is only one; therefore the Plural number must be explained as pertaining to the plurality of the Individuals.
91.92 This lays down the conventional rules.
93.94 The singularity of the word ^ Series” is based upon the fact of many indivi- duals being joined to one another in a certain fixed order; and thus this is based upon Conjunction.
94.95 The idea of commonality belongs to the Forest, and also to the Class. And beiag found to be false iu the case of the Forest, if it be said to be false in the case of the Class also,—then the well-recognised peroeptibility of the Class must algo be rejected as false. Following the same course of reasoning, sense-perceptibility being common to the trees, to the jars, in the samo way as to the Class,—inasmuch ag it hag been found to be false in the case of this last, it cannot bnt be rejected as false, with regard to the others also. And this wonld mean that no sensuons perception is true! !
Vanavada—Sambandhakshepa-parihara. 347
have to be rejected as false); and we would finally come to Nihilism (the theory of Cianyavada).
95-96. In fact the idea of “Forest” apart from the trees (contained therein) is only an object of what isa mere semblance of Sense-perception (६.९., mistaken Sense-perception) ; and as such, it cannot vie with (४,९.) cannot be held to be similar to) the (idea of) “ Class,” which is an object of direct (and correct) Sense-perception.
96-97. If you urge that “if there be equality between the Class and the Forest, then the Forest also becomes an en tity (apart from the trees),”— then by this assertion, you would 06 renouncing the (refutation of the) Class-theory, and pointing out objections against an altogether different theory (with regard to the nature of the conception of Forest, &c.)
98. Thus have we explained things in accordance with the nature of Words and their Meanings as accepted by all people. In fact, in philoso- phical treatises, we canuot use words in an arbitrary sense assumed by ourselves. As a matter of fact (as shown above), in accordance with ordinary usage, there is a difference between the (ideas of) Class and those of “ Series,” “ Forest,’ &c. If however, such difference be not found to be reasonable (in accordance with general popular usage)—even then that would mean no rejection (of our theory).
Thus ends the Vanavada.
(Section 16). SAMBANDHAKSHEPA-PARIHARA.
1. The Word and its denotation may be as you have described them to be. But you onght to explain the Relation (between them), for the sake of which you have taken all this trouble upon yourself.
2-3. ‘This relation having already been explained (before), why should the question be again asked? And the reply too (that the Bhashya
96.96 Therefore the instance of the ‘Forest ” cannot in any way affect the validity of the idea of Class.
96-91 If the case of the “ Class” ig exactly similar to that of “ Forest,’—then, just as the Class has an existence apart from the Individuals, so also would the Forest come to have an existence apart from the trees.
98 ¢ No rejection’’—hbecause, even in that case, we have already proved that the idea of “Forest” is not false; and so even if the case of the Forest were similar to that of the Class, none of the two could be false.
I This refers to the Bhdshya! ^ atha kah Sambandhah, &c., &e.” The sense of tle Kariké is that even if it be granted that the word is made up of letters, and that its denotation consists in the class,—we have yet to explain what relationship the denota- tion bears to the word.
2.3 ^^ Reply”—the Bhashya says that the relationship between the word and its meaning lies in the fact that the meaning is cognised on the cognition of the word.
348 CLOKAVARTIKA.
gives to the question) cannot be the correct reply, because it does not mention the form of the relation. If, on being asked ‘ what is the medicine for fever ?’—if one were to reply ‘that by which it is destroyed,’ —what information will have been afforded by this reply ? ”
4. In view of this objection, some people declare, that the author of the Bhashya, not being satisfied with the explanation (of the relation described) above (in a previous chapter), has again raised the question (of the relation between Word and its Meaning), with a view to laying down (and explaining) another relation.
5. Since the relation of “the name and the named,” (which is the relation that has been explained above as subsisting between the Word and its Denotation) follows after the comprehension (of the Word), and the comprehension must have been preceded by some other relation (because without some relation no comprehension is possible); therefore that relation of the ^ name and the named” cannot be a (causal) factor in the comprehension (of the word).
6. Even before one has come to know the fact of (such and such a word) being the name (of a certain thing), he comprehends its meaning through the cognition of some other relation; and it is later on that he comes to think of the word being the name; (therefore the relation of the “name and the named’”’ cannot be the means of comprehension).
7. Others hold the relation (between Word and Meaning) to be one of invariable concomitance ; inasmuch it is only this (relation) without (a cognition of) which, the comprehension of the word could not bring about the comprehension of the denotation.
8. This, however, is not right; because in the Bhashya there is no mention of such a relation (as that of invariable concomitance). If the reply given in the Bhashya alone be taken to imply this relation (even though it does not mention it), then why should the sentence in the Bhashya not be taken to imply the contrary (that even without the relation of invariable concomitance, comprehension is possible) ?
The sense of the objection is that thie alone cannot he sufficient; as this does not make quite clear the specific relationship borne; specially hecause the reply is a mere hegging of the qnestion. As the meaning of the Qnestion is—‘ what is the relation by which the meaning is cognised on the cognition of the word ?”—and the Reply that is given 18 only a paraphrase of this, just as in the counter-instance, “that whereby fever is destroyed” is only a paraphrase of the term “ fever-medicine.”
+ This supplies one anewer to the first question in K. 2.
7 The latter half of the Karika sets the relationchip into the Reply given in the 13112810 8.
8 ^“ Why should, 4८ -- प्र 06 the sentence denotss neither the necessity of the relation nor its contrary,—then it 18 as reasonable to infer one thing as the other There is no restrictive rule.
Sambandhakshepa-parithara. 349
9. And then again, the (application) of the relation of invariable concomitance (to the case of the comprehension of words) has already been set aside. And as for the Name, the fact of its (application to the case of the Word and its Meaning) comes to be recognised, through the usage of erdinary people; and even when the Word is not definitely recognised to be the ‘ name,’ we are still cognisant of its denotativeness (of the meaning),
10. Therefore it must be admitted that the (treatment of) ^“ Rela- tion” having been interrupted by a consideration of the natnre of the deuotation of words (in the chapters on Sphota, &c.), it is again brought forward simply with a view to the consideration of the question of its eternality or non-eternality.
11. The expression—“‘on the comprehension of the Word, the meaning is comprehended ’—alse points to the power or denotativeness (of the Word),—which (power) consists in the fact of the Word being either the agent or the instrament (or means) of the denotation (or significa- tion, of the Meaning).
12, Obj: “ The relation of denotability does not belong to the Denoter (Word) and the Denoted (Meaning) by themselves. And as for compre- hension, this is based upon certain conventional rules laid down by men (in Dictionaries) just as (we comprehend certain meanings from) cer- tain gestures of the eye.”
13. Reply: Is this ^ conventional rule” made in accordance with the requirements of.each individual mortal being, or of each utterance (of the
9 Ag a matter of fact, there 18 uo such invariable concomitance as is mentioned above (under “ Sphota’’). Even before the word is cognised as the name, it is known to be the denotation of a certain meaning; and this is due to the fact of our finding experienced old persons using it in a certain definite sense; and it is only when an old person says that such and such o word is the name of such and such a thing, that we become cognisaut of the fact of the word beinga Name. The Nydyaratnékara adds “Though the word is not definitely pointed out as being a name (at least not in so many words),—yet the Denotability, that we are cognisant of, and which is quite different from the sense-organs and the other meaus of right notion, is nothing more or less than what is meant by “Name” (‘Name’ = that which denotes). For this reason, it is certain that it is the relationship of the ‘Name and Named’ that is the chief factor in the comprehension of meaning. Consequently, the fresh raising of the question cannot be attributed to any aversion to this theory (explained above), and toa desire for pointing ont some other relationship in the shape of invariable con- comitance, &c. &c.”
11 “ Power,” ‘ Denotability,’ ‘Name,’ &o., are all synonymous—all signifying the fact of the word being either the agent or the means of signifying the meaning.
12 With a view to the refutation of the objections, urged in the chapter on ८ Sambandhakshépa,” against the Relationship, the Author first of all recapitulates the objections, The sense of the objection is that the Relationship not being natural, it cannot be held to be eternal.
350 CLOKAVARTIKA.
word) ? Or is it made once for all, at the beginning of creation, by some one person (Brahma f.1.) ?
14. And, does the relation differ with each (different person and utterance), or is it one only? If it be one only, then (being common to all individuals, of the past, the present and the future) it cannot be said to he caused (and hence non-eternal) ; and if it differ (with different individuals), then people would surely be cognisant of some such differences.
15. If the rule be different (with each different individual), then it would be necessary to assume a power (or denotativeness) with each of these different relations (fixed by convention). And then too, a person, who has recognised the denotability in accordance with (the rule laid down by) one person, could never understand the word when used by another person.
16. If it be urged that each word will be comprehended in accord- ance with the rule laid down (with regard to it) by some one person,— then, how could a word, with regard to which different conveutional rules (of denotability) are laid down by different people, be at all comprehended (to have a definite meaning) ?
17. 111४ be held that there is an option among the many significations of a single word,—this caunot be; inasmuch as the one (conventional denotability) necessarily rejects the other (and there can be no gronnd for option). Nor, in ordinary usage, are we cognisant of the (simultaneous) co-existence of these (different conventional denotabilities).
18. For, we find that all usage is based upon only one (out of the many diverse conventional denotabilities). Whereas, if the relation were to be governed by different rules laid down by different persons, no one (relation) could be the means of the comprehension (of the word).
19. Even where there is no difference in the (form of the) Word or in that of the Meaning (7.e., in a case where the same word is applied to
1b Because tbe Rule, and hence the denotability, differs with each person.
16 With regard to a word of which the convention is laid down by a single person, there will not be munch difficulty in comprehending its meaning. But with regard to a word where there is « difference of such conventional denotability (as in the case of the word “ plu” which is made by us to denote a tree, whereas the Mlecchas make it denote an elephant),—how could there be any comprehension ?
18 [t is only when there is a single relationship between the Word and its Mean- ing,—that we can say that suoh and snch a person 18 trnstworthy and the other is not. If, however, the meanings of words were to be regulated by different persons, in accordance with stray rules laid down by themselves, then, all persons would be equally trustworthy,—a palpable absnrdity,
19 We always comprehend the Word as bearing one and the same relation to its meaning. Hence there can be no option with regard to this relation: it must be accepted to be one only.
9111840041071187 ९} 4-00021 dara. 351
the same meaning),—if there be a multiplicity of persons (7.¢., if the relation subsisting between that word and its meaning be said to be different, in accordance with the rules laid down by different people) ;— then no option would be possible; inasmuch as the person comprehending the word) is not found to doubt whether this or that is the relatiou (between the Word and its Meaning).
20. And again, on the word “cow” being pronounced once,—the persons present, willing to comprehend it, being many,—if the relation were optional, then some people would comprehend the word, and others would not.
21-22. Ifitbe urged that “ we could have a simultaneous co-existence (of different relations) with regard to the difference among the persons (holding the different relations)”,—this cannot be; as such (co-existence) is impossible, on account of the speaker being one only (who must have used the word with regard to only one relation in his mind). And if there were a difference between the ideas of the speaker and the hearer (with regard to the relation borne by the Word to its Meaning), then all ordinary parlance would become faulty; inasmuch as the relation in the mind of of the hearer would be quite different from that in the mind of the speaker (and which latter he desires to be couveyed by the word he uses).
22-23. In order to point out a relation (for the sake of) the hearer what relation could the speaker have recourse to? If it be the one which he has already known, then the speaker cannot be said to point it out to him (because he already knows it); and if he points out an altogether new relation, then this latter not having ever been known by the hearer to lead to the comprehension of any meaning, (he could never comprehend the word used).
24. If it be urged that ‘‘in any case (whether the relation be one
80 It wonld be comprebended only by that person who had accepted the relation in which the word had been used.
21.8% “ Co-existence’—One and the same word may be accepted to bear the differ. ent relations, at one and the same time, in accordance with the opinions of different persons, “ Speaker being one only”—Since he can have only one relation in his mind therefore only those among his listeners will comprehend him who wonld have that relation tallying with that whioh they themselves hold. Other people wonld not com- prehend him, at least in the particular sense that he wished to be conveyed.
“ Parlance, &c.”—-Because the hearer not comprehending the meaning desired to be conveyed by the speaker, there would be an inextricable confusion, and all intelli- gent conversation would cease altogether.
22.23 This is the reason why Convention cannot be held to he different with different persons.
४५ It may be all very well with the hearer; bunt the speaker himself cannot nse a word in a certain sense, unless he knows for certain that the word wonld convey that
352 QLOKAVARTIKA.
known before, or not) the end of the hearer (viz., the comprehension of the word) would be accomplished all the same” ;—(then, we reply), that the other person ( ९.) the speaker) could not use the word with regard to a relation which he himself does not know to be the well-established (means of getting at the comprehension of the word). If it be urged that the objection urged in k, 22-23 applies also to the case of the jar, &c.,—(we reply) it is not so: becanse in the case of these itis the class (“ jar’) which is held to constitute the meaning (of the word).
25-26. Though (even in the case of the jar) it is not reasonable to point out (to the hearer) an individual which he already knows to be denoted (by the word), and the denotability that may be newly pointed ont is not known (by the speaker himself) to have the power of bringing about the effect (comprehension),—yet the denotability (of the individual Jar),—in the matter of fetching it £.1.,—is based upon the (fact of the) class (“jar” being the object denoted by the word, which fact is known both to the speaker and to the hearer). And this (“‘ Class”) has no beginning in time; whereas your relation has a beginning (depending as it does upon conventions made by persons).
27. If you admit of an eternal commonality (Class) (covering all the Relations), then our position is established (since you also revert to that). Bot still (even though you have modified your theory with mine, yet, it cannot be the correct theory, becanse) it is not possible (for the denotation of a Word) to have a double form.
28. Because the Relation is only a particular kind of potency (or Denotahility) ; and of this (Potency) there can be no different individuals. And further, the Potency being only inferable from its effect (which is one only), 1t cannot be many.
meaning. = ^ It is the Class, §’c.’"—And hence, even to a persen who ia already cegni- sant of thia denotation, we conld peint ont that “ this,” a certain individnal before ua, belongs to the Clasa ‘Jar ;” and this will be conveying a new information to him; and yet in due accordance with « word whose denotability the apeaker ia cognisant of. Censequently the objection urged in K. 22-23 cannot apply to the case of the individual jar.
26.25 ^ And this has no beginning, §’c."—Inaamnch ae the Clssa haa no heginning our theory ia unaffected by the qneetion—“ Before the Claes exiated where did the denotability exist?” Thia can only affect the other party who hold the relation to be a caused one, and hence not everlasting.
a7“ Double form”—that of the Class and the Individual—ia not pessible : and hence your theory cannot he correct; inaamnch aa you attribute this double character to the denotation of a Werd.
#8 The Potency heing one and one only, it cannot he divided into individuals; apecially as the existence of the Potency can be inferred only from its effects ; conae- quently it could be many only if its effects were many, As a matter of fact, however,
SAMBAUDHAKSHEPAPARIBARA. 353
29. In fact the existence of the Potency is assumed only because, without it, certain facts are inexplicable; and these facts being explained through one entity (Class) alone, it is not right to assume many in- dividuals.
30-31. At the time of the mention of the Relation (as fixed by the speaker himself), on the word “cow” (f.i.) being uttered, some people would understand the word by means of their comprehension of the (new) relation ; whereas others would not do so (being non-cognisant of the new relation fixed upon). Thus then, we see that if the relation did not exist (from time immemorial, and were only coined by different speakers) then, all persons could not understand the word. If it be argued that, “if the relation were ever existent, then all people would comprehend it (which also is not possible),”—we say it is not so; because the relation, though eternal, is not cognised by certain people at a particular time (and so the difference with regard to each person governs, not the relation itself, but the cog- nition thereof by different people).
32. The word, being the means of the comprehension of its meaning, stands in need of its own cognition (by the hearer). Hence even thongh ever-extant, the relation could not express (its meaning), so long as it itself were not duly recognised.
33-34, With regard to an object that exists, we often find that (in some cases, and by certain people) it is not perceived; whereas that which is absolutely non-existent, is never, by any person, known to be extant ; because the two properties of existence and non-existence, being mutually contradictory, can never belong (simultaneously) to the same object.
34-35. Obj.: “In the same manner, there is a contradiction between the known and the unknown.” Reply: The Cognition resides in the person; and since there are many persons, this (cognition of the relation simultaneously with its non-cognition) cannot be incompatible. Because the cognition does not contradict the non-cognition residing in another person.
we find the effect, in the shape of the denotation, to be one only, in the form of the Class; therefore the Potenoy cannot be many,
29 “ Fact "—of the denotation of a word; and this 18 quite reasonably explained, as referring to the one entity, Claas; and as such it ia not right to apply the denotation to the individuals, which are many.
89 The meaning of a word can never he comprehended nntil we cognise the relation subsisting between them.
$3.34 It 18 a fact of common experience that an object, though existmg, may not be perceived ; and it is quite possible that the relation, thongh existing, may not be per- ceived. If, however, it were wholly non-exiatent, it could never be perceived to exist.
84.85 The sense of the objection 18 that the properties of existence and non-existence can never belong to the Relation; and similarly the characters of heing known and not known could not belong to it at one and the same time, The sense of the reply is that
45
254 GLOKAVARTIKA.
36. On the other hand, between existence and non-existence there is a distinct contradiction, on account of both residing in (a single sub- strate) the Relation itself. And since a multiplicity (२.९. number greater. than one) of this (Relation) has been denied (in Karikas 28, 29), therefore we cannot base the compatibility (of existence with a simultaneous non- existence) on that ground (of multiplicity) (as we have done in the case of persons)
37. The white colour, placed before the blind and the not-blind, 18 not perceived by the blind, while it is perceived by the other. But this fact (of its cognition by one person and non-cognition by another) does not prove that it is both non-existent and existent
38. There is no contradiction in the former case, because there 1s a diversity, among the persons, based apon the fact of one (person with eyes) being capable (of perceiving colour) and the other (the blind person) being incapable (of perceiving it). And of perception (of the;colour) too, there is no other reason, save the fact of its existence.
39. Thus then, the cognition of usage being equal (on account of its efficiency to prove the existence of the Relation between Word and its Meaning) to the organs of sense-perception (which also infallibly proves the existeuce of the object perceived),—only those, that are endowed with
ths Cognition of the relation belongs toe several persons ; and hence it 18 qnite possible that at one and the same time, it may be known to one persen and unknown to another. Existence, on the other hand, belongs to the Relation itself ; and 88 this 18 one only, it cannot have both Existence and Non-existence at one and the same time.
87 The snbstrates of Perception and Non-perception are distinct $ whereas that of Existence and Non-existence is one only : viz., Colour. Consequently, thongh it is quite possible for one person to perceive it, while the other does not do se,—yet it cannot be sald that the colour is buth extant and non-existing.
88 “ And of perception, &.”—Thie anticipates the following argument: “ Granted that there can be both Existence and Non-existence of the Relation ; even then, we could hold that, inasmuch a8 Some people do not perceive it, it does not exist at 811." The 86786 of the reply as embedied in the second half of the Karika 18, that the mere fact of a certain thing not being perceived by some people can never establish its Non- existence; because the non-perception might be dae to some defect in the perceptive faculty of the man; and while the thing is not perceived hy one person, it may be perceived by other pereons. Asa matter of fact, it is the fact of a certain thing being: perceived that can conclusively establish its existence; for the simple reason that if the thing did not exist it conld never have heen perceived by any person. Conse- qnently even if the thing happene to be perceived by a single person, thie fact of 168 perception at once goes to establish, beyond donbt, the fact that the thing existe ` 89 Thé means of visual perception is the Eye; hence ane who is without the Eye can never 866 an Object, In the same, manner, the cognition of the usage of the. word ig the means of Gomprehending its meaning; and hence one who has not that cogui- tion,—i.¢., who does not know the eense in which the word is usod by ordinary people— ean never comprchtnd the meaning of that word
SAMBAUDHAKSHEPAPARIHARA. 356
the former (६.९, those that are cognisant of the usage of the word), will be abla to comprehend its’ meaning; while others (being devoid of the cognition, and thereby) resembling the blind (in the matter of visual per- ception), cannot (comprehend it)
40. And though this (usage) is one only, yet it will, by “ tantra,”— t.¢., tacit supposition—help (all future comprehension),—like the “laying of the fire” (at Agnihotra). The remembrances of it will, of course, differ,—like the fetching of the ^ Agnihotra” Fire.
41. To all persons ignorant (of the Relation of a Word with a certain meaning), the Relation comes in a well-established form, through previous traditions (z.e., from people who have known it before them, and so on ad infinitum) ; " छत् therefore there can be no beginning of the (application of the) Relation (to the Word) ; and (as such it must be held to be eternal).
42. ‘The theory, of the accomplishment (of the Relation) based upon (conventional rules made with) each utterance (of the word), has been rejected in thé Bhashya. And as for the fixing (of the relation) at the beginning of Creation,—(this cannot be; since) we do not admit of any such time (the. world being eternal and as such having no beginning in time)
43-44. Obj.: “ But, if there be such a Person as would create the world, and then set going the processes of Dharma and Adharma, and the uses and relations of words, for the sake of the world,—then, such a fact would not in any way vitiate the Veda.” Reply: Yet this theory:is as difficnlt to prove, as an omniscient person; hence we have not admitted it (in the 12110150 system)
40 One who performs the daily Agnihotra las not got to prepare the fire for the performance of any other sacrifice; as the once consecrated fire is used by him in all actions. In the same manner, when we have once cognised the usage of a word, this one cognition helps us to comprehend it in every case. And 86 in the case of fire, the Agnihotra fire has to he fetched from one place to another,—and this fetch- ing differs in each case,—so in the case of the nsage of words also, in every future case, we will have to rememher the usage, and this recalling to mind wiil always differ with different persons,
42 Upto K. 41, we have refuted the theory that the relation is governed by conven. tional rnles laid down with each different individual speaker and hearer, We now proceed to consider the other two alternatives, The theory referred to in the first half 18 refuted in the Bhashya, in the section on Words, where it has been declared that “a single utterance cannot accomplish the relationship ofthe word with ita denot- ation,.nor can it bring about its usage, &c., &c.’? We need not repeat that refutation on the present occasion. Then there remains the theory that the meaning of each word is fixed by the Creator at the very beginning of creation, and this theory is refuted in the next Karika by a total denial of any euch creator or beginning of creation, &
3.44 The opponent means that such a theory is not, contradictory to the Veda For a refutation of the “ omniscient” péraon, 866 above, Stra 2
3856 QLOKAVARTIKA.
45, At a time when all this (earth, water, &c.), did not exist, what could ‘have been the condition of the universe? As for Prajapati himself, what could be his position ? and what his form ?
46, And at that time (when no men existed) who would know Him and explain His character to the later created persons? (If it be held that He cannot be perceived by any man, then) without perception (or cogni- tion of some.sort, by some person), how can we determine this (fact of His existence) ?
47, Then again, in what manner do you believe the world to have had a beginning in time? (If it be held that it is brought about by 2 desire on the part of Prajapati, then) since Prajipati is (held to be) without a material body, &c., how could He have any desire towards creation ?
. 48-49, And if He has a body, assuredly this body could not have been created by Himself ; thus then we would have to postulate another creator (for his body) (and so on, ad infinitum). If Prajapati’s body be held to be eternal, then (we ask)—so long as earth (water, &c.), have not been produced, of what material would that body be composed ?
49-50, Then again, in the first place, how is it that He should have a desire to create a world which is to be fraught with all sorts of troubles to living beings? For at that time (of the beginning of creation) he has not got any guiding agencies, in the shape of the virtue (or sin), &c., of the living beings themselves. Nor can any creator create any thing, in the absence of means and instruments.
51. Even the production of the spider’s net is not held to be without some sort of a (material) basis; as (the net is spun out of) the saliva, which
#5 All place exists in one of the substances. Hence if these did not exist, where could Prajapati stand? And of what materials could his body be composed ?
$1 If Prajapati has 8 body, it muet be held to be eternal ; and when one body would be eternal, how could we deny the eternality of other bodies—our own, for instance? The only gronnd of the belief in the transient character of onr own body coneists in the fact of ita being corporeal or material ; and when one material body is transient, there is no reason why Prajapati’s body should be beld to be eternal. For if his body is eternal, ours also must be eternal.
49.50 People hold that all the trouble in the world is due to the vicious deeds of living beinge in the previous birth. This may be quite trne; but at the very beginning of creation, there being no previous birth, no such guiding principle would be available; and the blame of creating s troublous world would rest with the creating God.
61 Even granting the agency of Virtne and Vice, that alone could never suffice for the creation of worlds. Because it is always out of some such material as clay and the like, that a certain thing—tf.1., the Jar—is made ; while Prajapati has got no such materis] at hand; and as snoh there being no material basis on which He could proceed,
all that you supply Him with are the uuseen agencies of Virtue aud Vice $ and this could be of no initial help to Him.
SAMBAUDHAKSH BPAPARIHARA. 357
is produced out of the body of the animals (flies, &c.), eaten (by the spider).
o2. (If it be held that Prajapati creates the world, out of pity, then, we say) in the absence of objects of compassion (in the shape of living persons), no Pity (or Compassion) could be possible for Him. And if He were urged to creations by pure compassion, then He would create only happy beings.
53. If it be urged that “ without some pain, neither the creation nor the continuation of the world would be possible,’—then (we reply that) when everything depends upon the mere will of the Creator Himself, what could be impossible for Him P
54. And if He were to depend upon Laws and Agencies, then this fact would deprive Him of His (boasted) independence. (You say He desires to create the world,—will you let me know) what is that end which He desires, and which could not be gained without creating the world ?
55. For without some end in view, even a fool does not act. Then if He were to act so (withont any end in view), then what would be the good of his intelligence ?
56. If the activity of the Creator were due to a desire for mere amuse- ment, then that would go against his ever-contentedness. And (instead of affording any amusement), the great amount of work (required for creation) would be a source of infinite trouble to Him.
57. And His desire to destroy the world (at Pralaya) too would be hardly explicable. And (above all) such a Creator could never be known by anybody.
58. Even if He were known in form, the fact of His being the Creator could never be known. Because, at that time (7.e., in the infancy of creation) what could the living beings, appearing at the beginning of creation, understand ?
59. They could not understand wherefrom they have been born; nor
४8 It is we who recognise und how down to the law that without Pain the world could not exist. Yonr Creator, however, being all-powerful, could annul the said law,—if He were really moved to creation by aheer compassion—and create a world eter- nally happy.
55“ What would, §c.”—For in that case, the action being without any motive, your Creator would resemble the Pradhana of the Sankhyas. This Pradhana ia held to be non-intelligent, and as such it could not have any motive for its activity. Thus then, inagmuch as yonr Creator too wonld act without a motive He also would have to be admitted to be non-intelligent ; and certainly thie could not be a very palatable morsel for you.
66 One has recourse to an amnsement with a view to please himself. Hence if the Creator wants amusement, He cannot be said to be eternally happy and contented.
59 Because they have appeared after Prajapati has finished his operations,
358 CLOKAVARTIKA.
could they know the state of the world prior to creation, or the fact of Prajapati being the Creator
` 60, Nor could the idea that they would derive from His own asser- tion (with regard to His being the Creator), be altogether trustworthy ; because even though He may not have created the world, He might speak of having done so, in order to show off His great power.
61. In the same manner the Veda that would proceed: from him would only be doubtful, and hence could: not -be admitted: as a sure proof of His existence (and creative power). And as for that (Veda) which is eternal, how could it make a mention (of facts and processes with refer- ence to the creation of living beings, &c.) ?
62: For, if the Veda existed before the objects (created), then there can be no connection between this (Veda) and the objects created. Therefore the passages (occurring in the Veda) (which appear to describe the process of creation) must he interpreted as praising up something else (i.e., some injunctions of sacrifices, &c.)
63. The idea common among ordinary people (that the Veda men- tions of the creation as proceeding from Prajapati) is a mistaken one, caused by certain -valedictory passages (praising up certain injunctions). Because whenever a passage is not duly considered and interpreted together with the passages that precede and follow it, it is bound to give rise to a misconception.
‘64. The use of the Mahabharata, &., too to the matter of Dharma, &c., is in the form of telling stories (exemplifying and praising up certain duties and sacrifices), just like that of the Vedic passages (which seem to mention certain processes, while they only praise up certain sacrifices). Therefore the notion (of the creation proceeding from Prajapati) got from these (7.c. passages occurring in the Puranas, &c.), would also be only a mistaken one.
65. ‘Because mere story-telling cannot have any use, therefore in all these (stories making up the Puranas) we must admit of something that oould be the object of praise or dispraise (embodied in the stories) ;—and this something may be that which is enjoined either in the Veda, or in the Puranas themselves.
66. If there were any such thing as the first activity of the Veda
61 Since there is a mention of creation, it must have been composed after the event
62 “ No connection "—i.c., the Veda that existed before the creation came ahont could not speak of the event
64 The story of the creation mentioned in the Puranas must also be taken ouly as praising certain sacrifices ; it cannot ho taken as literally true
66 The second half-of the Kariké refers to the theory that during Pralaya the Veda lies latent in the hosom of Rrajaputi; and at the beginning of creation it is
SAMBAUDHAKSHEPAPARIBARA. 35Y
(towards injunction, d&c.), (this would mean that the Veda has had a beginning, and) then we could never have an idea of. the fact of its not being composed by anybody (but being eternal in itself). The theory too, that during universal dissolution the Veda resides in (the person of) Prajapati, could, at best, only be considered doubtful
67. If, however, you assume the eternality of the Creator and the processes of creation and dissolution,—then too, we could only admit of a gradual process of creation, such as we 866 in the case of present living beings (creating the Jar, d&c.) |
68. And as for a “ Pralaya”’ in the form of universal destruction, we find no proofs for admitting it. Nor could such an action (of destruc- tion) ou the part of Prajapati serve any useful purpose
69-70. And for such souls as have (the load of) actions (Dharma and
brought forth by Him into its full activity ; and this fact of being bronght into aotivity does not necessarily imply its non-eternality, The meaning of the Karikd is that the theory referred to is extremely improbable, and has already been refuted under Sitra (2).
61 With this कक begins the consideration of the Vaigéshika theory, which is thus summed np in the Nydya-ratnakara: = ^ The processes of creation and dissolution are eternal, After a hundred years of Brahma have elapsed during the existenoe of the world, there arises in the mind of God a desire to destroy the world; and in obedienco to this desire, there comes abont a universal disjunction of atoms, and in the end all that is left. behind, is only a nnmber of disjointed atoms of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Akdaca, (1.e., Space) and Soul; during this time all the Dharma and Adharma of indivi- dual men are kept in abeyance by Divine Will; these Dharma and Adharma lie latent in the soul of each individaal. When the period of dissolntion passes, the same God seeing the souls of men lying idle, without obtaining the regnits of their deeds and misdeeds, takes pity on them; and this pity gives rise to a desire on His part for creation, and direotly all homogenons atoms become .combiued,—these combinations bringing into existence all the varions objects of the world; and then the Dharma and Adharma of the men are let loose; and this going forth into activity comes to affeot the destiny. of each individual soul, throwing some of them down into animal life, while raising others to lives in nobler families, And then the same God creates the Veda, with a view to explain Dharma and Adharma to the world. Thns it is that the Veda comes to differ with each cycle of creation. But inasmuch as this process itself is eternal, the Veda, the Creation and the Dissolution, should all be considered eternal, and go also the Creator.” The sense of the second half of the Karika is that any such simultaneous creation as the Vaigéshika spsakes of, we never come across in ordinary life, where every process is distinctly gradual. Hence we cannot admit of any suoh simultaneons creation
68 And no intelligent creator could have recourse to such a snicidal process, unless it served 8018 very important purpose of his; and since we cannot think of any such purpose we cannot believe in a Universal Dissolution.
69.70 The Vaicéshika holds that during Pralaya the souls of men continus to exist with all their Dharma and Adharma lying latent, without bringing about any results ; this the K@rika denies. | ; ४
360 CLOKAVARTIKA.
Adharma) upon them, there can be no existence, during which there is 10 enjoyment of their results. Nor can the results of one action be res- trained by any other action (in the shape of the Creator’s desire, as held by the Vaigéshika) ; and it is not possible for all actions to continue to remain devoid of their results. Nor is there any single action, the result of which could be the non-fruition of all other actions (and which single action would thereby keep the other actions in check).
71. Then again, if all the actions (of persons) were to be destroyed (at the dissolution), then no future creation would be possible ; for, under the circumstances (t.e., if actions were destroyed), what could be the means of bringing out these actions (out of their. latent state) ?
79. If the desire of God be held to be such a means, then that (desire) in itself could be an efficient cause of the creation of souls. And if creation were dependent upon God’s wish, it would be useless to assume the (agency of) actions (Dharma and Adharma).
73. And it is not possible for the God’s desire too to be produced without any cause. If there be any such cause (of the production of the God’s desire), then that could also be the cause of the (production of the worldly) elements also.
74, If one were to argue that ‘ the production of the bodies of living beings is controlled by an iutelligent agency (in the form of God's desire),—because they are made up of certain constituent parts,—like a house, &c.,’—then, he should be answered thus:
75-76. If by “control” it is meant only the fact of some intelligent
41 The Vaicéshika holds that when the God desires to create again, then the Dharma and Adharma of men come out; and it is in accordance with these that he regulates the next creation. But when all actions are destroyed at Pralaya they would cease to exist and there would be no means of bringing them into activity.
72 It would he a needless complication to assume that it is God’s wish that manifests the destroyed actions which regulate the creation. God heing omuipresent and omnipotent, if His wish bad anything to do with the oreation, there would be no need for any other agenoy.
18 God’s desire too oaunot he eternal; ag that would lead to eternal creation or eternal disgolution. If, on the other hand, the desire be non-eternal, there must he 80116 oanee that gives rise to it in the mind of the Creator. And then for the activity of this cause also, we would require another cause, and 80 on, adinfinitum. Even granting the possihility of a cause for the God’s desire, if there-he such & cause, that alone could suffice for the creation of the world, and there would be uo need of postu- lating an intermediate agency, in the shape of the God’s desire.
75.76 «¢ Redundant ’—beoanse it only proves thst the world is affected hy intelli- gent agencies; aud as the actions of even individual living beings are such intelligent agencies, your argument does not occessarily establish the superintendence of a supra- mundane intelligent cause, in the shape of an omniscient God,
SAMBAUDHAKSHA EPAPARIHARA. 361
agency being the cause of creation,—then, inasmuch as all creation could be accomplished by the actions of all living beings (which are intelligent agents), your argument would become redundant (proving a fact already proved; for no one denies the fact that the diversity of the world is regu- lated by the actions of living persons). (And yon have the same redun- dancy) even if by “control” yon meau that the creation of bodies is preceded by the desire of an intelligent agent; becanse the actions (of living beings) too are preceded by it (४.९. a desire, to act, on the part of the acting persons).
If, however, you mean that the creation follows immediately after the desire, then (we say that) there is no such immediate sequence even in the case of your own instance (the making of a house not following imme- diately after the desire of the builder).
77. Your premises too are inconclusive (६.९. deficient and doubtful), with regard to the body of God Himself. For His body too must have had a beginning, inasmuch as it is also a body, like ours (made up of constituent parts).
78. If it be argued that ‘the production of the God’s body too is controlled by His own intelligence, and as such this (case of the God’s body) does not go against the conclusion (of the argument mentioned in K. 74),”-—theu (we reply that) the hodiless God, being like an emancipated soul, could not exercise any control.
79. And if in the case of the jar, &c, (that you cite as an instance) you refer to the superintendence of the potter, &c., then the control of the God would not apply to these (and as such the instance could not prove the fact of the creation of the body being controlled by God); if, on the other hand, you mean that the making of the jar zs controlled by God, then you would have the deficiency of the major term (that is to say, the fact of the jar, &c., being controlled by God is not recognised by us, and hence these could not serve as instances to prove the same with regard to the body, &c.)
80. And if yon take the instance (of jar, &.), as it is commonly
11 And thus the body of the God also wonld have to be controlled by an intellig. ent agent, in accordance with your argument. But you deny any such control over the divine body, and thereby you weaken yonr own argument.
18 ^" Bodiless God ”—If God were to control the production of his own body, then he could do so only in a bodiless state ; inasmuch as 80 long this controlling force has not been exerted, his body could not have been produced. And just as a soul that 1188 been emancipated from the world and has become bodiless cannot exert any controll- ing force over anything, so too a hodiless God could not exert any control.
80 The jar is fonnd to be made by the potter, who is not a god, and who is perish- able. Hence in accordance with this instance, the argument would stand thns: ‘‘ The body is not created by a God,—hecanse it is controlled by intelligence—as for instance,
46
362 CLOKAVARTIKA.
recognised, then the premiss would contradict (the conclusion) ; inasmuch as in that case (the instance would lead to the conclusion that) the body, &९., are produced by one who is not a God, and who is himself perishable.
81-82, Ifit be held that God does not Himself carry om any opera- tions, as the potter does (towards making the jar),—then, how could an insentient entity (in the shape of the atoms) follow His desire ? Therefore the creation of the atoms, &c., could never be bronght about by a mere desire of His.
§2-83. Of a Person who is Himself extremely pure, the modifications (in the shape of this universe) could not be impure (as the world is found to be). Dharma, &c., too being absolutely under His power, it is not night (and reasonable) that there sbould be pain (in this world). And if the activity (of the world) were to be dependent upon (2.e., regulated by) these (Dharma, &c.), then that would be accepting something else (४.९., an agency other than God’s desire).
84. The God himself being absolutely pure, and there being no other object (at the time of creation), what could bring about the activity of Nescience, which (in falsity) resembles a dream ?
85. If the mobility (to activity) were held to be due to something other (than Brahma), then you would have duality (since you would be admitting the existence of Brahma and something else to stimulate the
the jar, &0.; and thns the premiss that you brought forward to prove the creation to have been brought about by a God comes to prove something quite to the contrary.
81.88 The Kariké combats the theory that God does not actually work out the creation Himself, as all that he does is to express a desire, that is instantly obeyed by the eternal atoms of matter, which proceed to combine homogenously and thus form the endless substances. Agaiast this theory the question is put—how could the insen. tient atoms be cognisant of, and obey, the wish of the God ?
82.83 Now begins the refatation of the Sénkhya-Véddnta theory that the world is only the modification of a single Person, who is extremely pure, &c., &c. If then, it be held that the evils in the world are due to the past Adharma of the men,—then, inas- much as this Adharma also would be under His guidance, He might, on account of His extreme purity, remove the impurities of the world, which would be left absolutely pure and happy. Farther, if you grant the fact of the creation of the world having its oharacter regulated by Dharma, &c., then that would amount to an acceptance of agencies other than that of Divine Will, operating towards the oreation of the world.
89 Even the Védanta theory is not tenable by itself. Because when nothing but Brahma exists, what is it that canses the Nescience to operate towards creation? It could not be Brahma Itself; as That can have nothing to do with Nescience, which is a false entity and whose functioning is as १४८९६] as a dream.
86 If Nescience were natural, then to whom wonld it helong P Certainly not to Brahma; ag that consists of Absolute Knowledge, and as such could not have any con- nection with Nescience. Then the existence of Nesoience apart from Brahma would bring about Duality. And above all, if Nescience, like Brahma, were natural, it could never be set aside, and hence no Deliverance would be possible.
SAMBAUDHAKSHEPAPARIHARA. 363
activity of Nescience). And if Nescience itself were only natural (and as such not requiring any stimulation from without), then none could strike it off (and we could not have any Deliverance).
86. A natural existence (like that of Nescience) could be destroyed only by the influence of something unique (7.e., some such agencies as those of meditation, &९.) But for those who have their only means (of deli- verance from Nesciencc) in the Self, there cannot be any unique agency.
87. Even for those (the Sankhyas) who hold the Person (soul) to be inactive, how could there be any functioning of the Attributes, at the begin- ning (of creation)? Because till then there would be no karma (of the souls),
88. Nor at that time could there be any false cognition; nor could there be any attachments and aversions (that would disturb the equilibrium of the Attributes); because all these are functions of the Mind; and this Mind will not yet have been produced (at the beginning of creation).
89. Some people hold that the cause, of the bondage of souls, lies in their actions existing in a state of latent potentiality. But this is not correct ; inasmuch as the effect is not produced from a cause which is only latent (and does not fuuction towards its production).
90. The potentiality of the curd,—so long as it is only lying latent in the milk (and has not come out in the curd itself)—is not able to bring about the Dadhika (a special substance prepared out of the curd). This potentiality of the curd in the milk is the cause of the curd only (which is prepared directly from the milk); and as for the Dadhika, its cause is something else (४.९.) the potentiality of the Ddadhika itself, in the curd).
91. If the effect were to be produced from the cause still in a state
86 The Adwaiti holds that the only means of destroying Nescience is the know- ledge of self; but since this is not possible, and no other adequate means is ad- mitted, therefore Nescience, if held to be a natural entity, could never be destroyed.
81 Now begins the refutation of the Sdénkhya theory. That theory is that the soul does not operate towards the creation of the world, whioh is brought by a disturb- ance in the three Attributes of Primordial matter, that function along, and bring about the various objects of creation; and the agency that disturbs the equilibrium is that of the karma of persons to take their births in the forthcoming creation. The sense of the Karika is the first creation could not have been due to any such Karma; because till then none existed.
99 The Dadhika is made of the curd; and in milk we have the potentiality of the curd; vonsequently, if latent potentialities were to bring about effects, the Dadhika could be prepared directly from the milk, Similarly the child conld perform the feats of the grown-up man; as it has all the strength and energy of the man lying latent in it.
9 Because even when the effects of the action have been brought about, and experienced, the action is not destroyed (as an entity can never be destroyed), but con- {068 latent; aud if latent causes were to bring about their effects, what would be
364 CLOKAVARTIKA.
of latent potentiality,—then there would be bondage (to the soul) (by karma), even when this latter will have already produced its results.
92. Because it is held (by the Sankhyas) that even on its destruc- tion (by fruition) karma continues to exist in a state of latent potentiality. In fact even the performance of an action would be useless, as even before (it has been performed) its potentiality must exist (and this would bring about the result for the sake of which the action is sought to be performed.)
93. And then, why is it that you do not postulate Attachment (aver- sion), &c.,—in their latency (at the time of creation),—to be the cause of bondage (of the soul)? If yousay that you accept karma (to be the cause of bondage) because it has not yet produced its results,—this cannot be; because there could not be even a manifestation (or appearance) of that karma.
94, Then again, Knowledge could not be the cause of Deliverance; since it is not a counter-entity (contrary ) to the potentiality of karma (and it is this latter that you hold to be the only cause of bondage) ; for, assured- ly, Knowledge is not in any way contrary to the potentiality of karma.
95. Though it is understood that actions are, like attachment, &c.,
there to prevent this action from producing its own, in the shape of the bondage of the sonl; and thus no deliverance would be possible.
9 “Mnat exist, &c.,—hbecause the Sénkhya holds that everything that is dous or produced in this world already exists in a latent state,—finally in the Prakriti.
98 Because at the time of creation also, the attachment, &o., of the sonl must be continuiog in their latent state,—why cannot yon attribute the sonl’s bondage directly to these? And why shonld yon seek for its cause in the aotions only? The sense of the intermediate objector is that certain actions, before they had produced their results, had beee restrained in their activity, at the time of Dissolution, by the desire of God; conssquently inasmuch as these have to bring abont their effects, it is these that we hold to be the cause of bondage. The latter part of the Ké@riké rejects this explanation on the ground that, if a latent cause were to produce its effect, an action, endowed with sll its potentialities, would at once bring about its results, even before the action has had time to manifest itself. The purport of all this is that, as shown in the foregoing Kértka, au action would (in accordance with the activity of the latent cause) bring about its effects, evea before it is performed (and thereby manifested) ; and as such it conld not exist, for any length of time, without bringing abont its effects, in order to burst forth, at the time of creation. And it is eqnally impossible, in accordance with your theory, for the action not to produce its result at the time, as it shonld appear at the time of creation. Because, according to yon, au action must produce its effects straight off, as also that the aotion cannot manifest itself.
%5 Actions being brought abont hy ignorance, as soon as knowledge would appear, the actions would cease to be performed. But they would still continus to exist in their latent forms ; and inasmuch as these potentialities of actions would uot he the effeots of ignorance, no amount of knowledge could remove them. And, according to you, ateut oauses also bring ahont their effects; consequently, these latent potentialltles of actions would be sure of bringing about their effects in the shape of the sonl’s
SAMBAUDHAKSHEPAPARIHARA, 365
brought about by ignorance, yet Knowledge cannot set aside these (actions as existing in a state of latent potentiality).
96. That there is destruction of actions by means of Knowledge is not proved; as is also the theory that (through the force of knowledge) the Action exhausts itself by producing its result in the smallest degree (in order to free the knowing soul from bondage),—just like some crime com- mitted by a royal prince (which is let go after only a nominal punishment has been inflicted upon him).
97. If, even now-a-days, an action in a state of latent potentiality were to be the cause (of its effects), then it would be quite reasonable to speak of its causal efficiency even at the time (of Dissolution) when the only entity held (by you) to remain would be the Prakrtz.
98-99. In ordinary life, we find that it is the function (or active state) of the mind (of a person), that is the cause of (his) actions. But this (activity of the mind) does not exist at the time (of Dissolution). And (even if such activity of the minds were possible at the time of Dissolu- tion), since (at that time) all minds would be mixed up (in the Piakrti), there would be an admixture (of their functions, and consequently also) of the actions. Therefore that which is called ^“ Adhika@ra” (2.¢., the actions in a state of latent potentiality) cannot be held to be the cause of bondage.
99-100. ४ १९४ 1 ^“ Adhikara’’ be taken to mean capability, no separa- tion (of it from the Prakrti and the Soul) would be possible: as the capa- bility of the soul to enjoy consists in his intelligence, and that of Prakrti, to be enjoyed, in its non-intelligence. And these (capabilities) are never absent in them (Soul and Prakrti).
bondage, and no Deliverance would be possible. Therefore knowledge cannot be held to be the means of Deliverance.
96 There is no cause for believing in a destraction of actions by knowledge.
97 Because you hold that at the Dissolution, all things become dissolved into, and continne to lie latent in, the Prakrti-( Primordial matter),—to burst forth again into creation at a snitable time,—you must admit that the actions have their potentialities lying latent in the same Prakrti; as, according to you, nothing cau he totally annihi- lated. And thus, even at the Dissolution, there would be nothing to prevent the actions from bringing ahout their effects.
98.99 «¢ Admisture”’—all the minds and the actions due to them being mixed up In the Prakrti, the actions of a soul in bondage might belong to a soul that has been delivered, and vice versd.
99.100 Some people hold that in the assertion that ‘the cause of bondage is the Adhikara,” what is meant by the word ‘ adhikdra’ is not the potentiality of actions (to be performed), but the capability of the Prakrti to be enjoyed and that of the Soul to enjoy. The Kariké rejects this explanation, on the ground that neither the Prakrt! nor the Soul could ever be severed from this cupability; and as such, the cause of bondage continuing for ever, there could be no Deliverance; just as intelligence never leaves the Soul, so, iu the same manner, non-intelligence never leaves the Praktti.
366 -QLOKAVARTIKA.
101. If Ignorance be held to be the cause of the production of actions,—then from the destruction of Ignorance could result only the non- production of (fresh actions), and not the cessation of the results (of previous actions).
102. It is not by means of Sense-perception (Inference), &e., that Knowledge is cognised to be the cause of Deliverance. Nor does the Veda declare that deliverance results from Knowledge, such as it is held to be by the Sdnkhyas and others.
103. That “Self is to be known” has not been enjoined with a view to the attainment of Deliverance. All that it indicates is the fact that the knowledge of self is a cause of activity towards certain sacri- fices.
104. And when this (knowledge of self) has been recognised to be (enjoined ) for the sake of something else (i.e.. engagement in sacrifices), the mention of results (“ He doth not return,” &c.), that we find (in con- nection with the passage—‘ The soul ought to be known’’), must be taken to be merely as a valedictory declaration (meant to praise np the knowledge and its results in the shape of activity in sacrifices); and as for real results, there can be none other than Heaven, &c. (meutioned as the results of various sacrifices).
105. If Deliverance be held to be merely the enjoyment of pleasures, then it would be synonymous with ‘‘ Heaven ;” and this is perishable (and not eternal as you hold Deliverance to be).
106. Because nothing that has a cause (ze. that which is caused)
101 The destruction of the cause could only result in the non-prodnction of its further effects. Consequently, even when ignorance would be destroyed by knowledge, all that we could expect would be that no more actions would be bronght about. But the destruction will, in no way, be able to affect the fruition of the seeds sown by the 26010168 of the past; for the simple reason that this frnition is not the effeot of ignor- ance, whose destruction, therefore, could not affect the former.
102 The Veda, even seemingly, lends its support only to such knowledge as is held by the ,Védanti to be the means of Deliverance.
108 The knowledge discriminating the Soul from Prakrti is of use in the Jyotishtoma and other sacrifices that lead to 1681108 beyond the physical world; inasmuch as, unless the Soul is learnt to be diecriminated from the Body, how can people believe that such results as are not obtainable in this physical world conld be attained by men ? And unlesa one believes in the possihility of such results being obtained, he can never engage himself in the performance of those sacrifices of which the resulis are said to accrue to the performer in a superphysioal world. Consequently, it is with a view to making people take to the performance of snch sacrifices, that the Soul is enjoined to be distinguished from Prakrti. And having this perceptible result, the said kuowledge cannot be said to have any other, in the shape of Deliverance, &c.
108 Bondage consists of attachment to tho Body ; and it is the negation of this that constitutes Deliverance. Therefore Deliverance must be held to be the destruction of
JAMBAUDRAKSARBPAPARIHARA. 367
18 ever known to be imperishable (eternal), therefore one could be deli- vered (.९.; Deliverance would be possible) only through the absence of the cause (of bondage)—(an absence) due to exhaustion (by frnition) of all karma (karma being the sole cause of bondage).
107. Barrine its negative character, there is no other ground for the cternality of Deliverance. Aud no negation can ever be the effect of any action (therefore Deliverance cannot be held to be the effect of Knowledge).
108. The fact (as to the manner of Deliverance) is that for those that have come to know of the real character of Self,—all their past actions having been exhausted by fruition, and there being no subsequent residue (of actions),—the body is never again produced (and this is what is meant by Deliverance).
109. it is only for the purpose of enjoying the results of our past actions that our body is produced ; consequently, when there are no actions (left to bring abont their results), there is no cause left for such produc- tions (of the body).
110, One desiring Deliverance, therefore, ;would not engage in (४,९., per- form) such actions as are either prohibited or are enjoined with a view to the attainment of certain (material) results. But he would continue to per- form those that are enjoined as necessary (and to be performed daily) ; and those that are enjoined as to be performed on certain specific occasions (such as eclipses and the like),—in order to avoid the sin (accruing from the non-performance of such actions).
111. Tho effects (of the necessary sacrifices f.i.) are known to result
the present body and the non-production of any future body for the particular Soul, Bondage again is due to Karma; so when Karma is destroyed by fruition, the conse- quent Bondage ceases by itself on the ceseation of its inetigating cause (Karma); and thus Deliverance being of a negative character, would be eternal; in fact all total deg- truotions are eternal; and Deliverance too has been shown to be only the total destruc. tion of the present body, &e., &e.
1017 The result of knowledge is what has been explained ahove, in K. 108.
108 “ Body is never produced.” —Becanse it 18 only Karma that brings about the con- finement of the Son) ina body. Says the Kacika: ‘‘ Since all persons so delivered are also found to be knowing the character of the self, therefore we mnst admit that such knowledge is only an indirect auxiliary aid to Deliverance; but it cannot be held to he the real direct final cause of deliverance ’’ (see ahove).
110 This refers to the following objection: “If such be the case, then one who desires Deliverance would cease to perform the actions enjoined in the Veda; because if he were to perform such actions he would be sowing seeds for the reaping whereof he shonld bave to take another birth in the physical world.’’ The sense of the Kérikg is clear.
“To avoid sin, ¥c.’—If he does not avoid sin, he will bave to be born again, in order to reap the harvest of that gin.
111 This refers to the following objeotion: “Even of necessary actions—the Agni.
otra and the like,—certain results, in the shape of Heaven, &c., are mentioned in the
368 QLOKAVARTIKA,
only when they are desired by the agent; and as such they could not accrue to one who does not desire them. Aud as this (aversion to results) exists In one who knows one’s real self, it is in this that such knowledge oomes to be of indirect use (to the attainment of Deliverance).
112. It is not at all necessary for people who are conscious of their bodies (as heing the only impediment to Deliverance), to have an idea of Creation and Dissolution, beyond (thcir own bodies), with regard to the whole universe.
113. Therefore the theory of Creation and Dissolntion must be admitted to resemble the present every-day processes (of production and destruc- tion); and any particular idea of these with regard to the production and destruction of the whole universe cannot be established, for want of proofs.
114-116, Even the existence of a Creator is to be rejected in the same manner as an omniscient person. Any such Creator cannot differ from ordinary people, except through (an excess of) Dharma; nor is Dharma possible without performance (of actions) ; and performance is not possible without an idea (of the action to be performed) ; this idea is not possible except from the Veda; nor is (a kuowledge of) the Veda possible without (a comprehension of) words, &c. Therefore it must be admitted that all these (Words, &c.,) existed before the Creator. And again, such a creator may be proved to have been preceded by the Veda, on account of His being an intelligent being, like ourselves (who are preceded by the Veda).
117. Jt is impossible to give an adequate reply to the people who assert (the fact of the Creator being preceded by the Veda) on the ground of these reasonings (explained in K. 114-116), Therefore the followers of
Veda; conseqnently, even if one were to perform these necessary actions, he would have to be born again for the enjoyment of these results.” The sense of the reply is that the person desiring Deliverance performs these necessary actions, not with a view to their results, but simply with a view to avoid the sin accruing from the neglect of the necessary actions; consequently, the results of these actions can never accrue to him. ‘Indirect use, Sc."—If there were no knowledge of Self, the person would not have an aversion to results ; and ag such, he would perform actions with a view to their results, which would thus accrne to him, and he would have to be born again for the enjoying of these results. Thus we find that the knowledge of Self is of indireot 186, in that it indirectly saves the person from falling into the meshes of actions and their 1680108.
119 In order to establish the possibility of Bondage and Deliverance, it is only necessary to have distinct ideas of Creation and Dissolution with regard to the Rody. Therefore the mention of ‘‘Creation” and “ Dissolution” with regard to the whole universe must be taken to be meant only to enlogise Destiny, and hence to induce man to perform such sacrifices as would turn the tide of that Destiny.
114.116 Prajipati cannot be accepted as the Creator, unleas he be something greater than other persons. And as no such ereatness is possible without a knowledge of the Veda, the Veda must be accepted as having existed before Prajapati.
SAMBAUDHAKSHEPAPARIFARA. 369
the Veda must explain the usage (of Words) as being without a beginning (1.९. eternal),
118-119. Those persons—who, finding Sense-perception inapplicable to the case, seck to prove, by Inference, the existence of an Ordainer of the (meaning of the words) “cow,” &c,, on the ground of these being related (to the objects denoted), like the words “ Dittha,” &e. (proper names fixed by ourselves),—are to be met by this counter-argument: ‘all people come to know the relation of the words “cow ” (to their denotations) from other people,—because they use the words,—like myself.’
120. Obj.: “If such be the case, then even the relations of (proper names) ‘ Devadatta,’ &c. (with the individuals they signify) would come to be eternal (which is absurd, because the persons themselves are not eternal).”’ Reply: (Though the inferential argument just brought forward would justify such eternality of proper names, yet) this idea of eternality would cease on account of its contradiction (and consequent rejection) by a fact of Sense-perception (the perishableness of the persons named),— specially as this (Sense-perception) is more authoritative (than Inference).
121. Or, as a matter of fact, in the case of proper names too, the denotability may be regarded as eternal, even though its application (to a particular individual) may be non-eternal. And it is the non-eternality appertaining to this (application) that leads us (© mistake the denotability (to be non-eternal also).
122-123. In the case of (common names) “Cow,” &c., however, there 18 no such mistake; because, in this case, the application too is eternal. For, as a matter of fact, the Relation (between the word and its denotation) must be admitted to exist before all the people that are found to use it. The relation being thus established (to have existed before all persons using it, from times immemorial), there could be no beginning for that relation.
123-124. If a word be taken to signify its meaning on the ground of its being used by a trustworthy person,—and not through its own
118-119 “८ All people, J’c.”’—We find in our own case, that whatever word we use, we use it only in that sense which we have learnt from other people. So from this fact, we can conclude that all persons must ०8९ words only with such meanings as they may have learnt from other people.
122.123 We find that the relationship must exist before it can be made use of by anyoue. Thus then, inasmuch as the word had been found to have been nsed, since time out of mind, to express a certain meaning, we must admit that the peculiar rela- tionship between the word and that meaning must have existed, even before that time. Consequently the relationship cannot be conceived of as having a beginning in time, १.९.) we must admit it to be eternal,
123.184 The Bhashya says that we are not cognisant of any originator of the rela- tionship; and that therefore, there can be no such originator ; and the significance of words must rest wholly upon themselves, and not upon any personal agency.
47
370 CLOKAVARTIKA.
inherent denotability—, then, how is it that we have no cognisance (either direct or recalled to memory) of the trustworthiness (of that person) ?
124-125. For example, the Banddhas, so long as they do not recognise an assertion to emanate from Bnddha, &८. (their trustworthy source), they do not accept it as true, even though there may be an idea brought about by the sentence.
125-126. Ob/.: “But when a certain conventional rule is laid down by someone (as that ‘@ and ai’ should be known as ‘ wrddhz’), people accept क and ai to he styled ‘wrddhi,’ even when, subsequently, they cease to re- member Panini (the originator of the rule). Therefore the. remembrance of the originator cannot be regarded as necessary.” Reply: But the aphorism itself, carrying with it the name of Panini, wonld lead to an idea of Panini (being the trustworthy originator of the rule).
127. Then again (in the case of the word “‘cow’’), we have no asser- tion (of the rule) in the form that “the word cow is to apply to the object with the dewlap, &c.” In fact it is impossible to make any such (asser- tion), because the words (‘ dewlap, Sc.), (of which the assertion consists) could not have got theirown relations (with their individual denotations) known at that time.
128-129. For these reasons we could in no way have any comprehen- sion, withont (an idea of) the origiuator (of the meaning of the word).
124-125 Those who take their stand upon the trustworthiness of the sonrce of the assertion, do not accept the truthfulness of any assertion nntil they have found that it has emanated from one of these trnstworthy sonrces. So, if we held to the view that a word can denote a meaning, only on account of the veracity of the originator ef its connection with that meaning, then, in the case of every word, we wonld stand in need of an idea of the origiuator of the significance of that word, in order to be snre of the meaning applied being anthorised by a trustwortny origin.
125.126 This refers to Pdnini’s Sitra—‘ Vrddhirddaic’? (I—i—1). The sense of the reply is that as soon as the S#tra is oognised, it is directly known as one of Panini’a Sitras; consequently the S#tra must be held to carry, withiu itself, the authority of Panini’s name. Therefore every idea of the 8#tra and its meaning is necessarily accom- panied by an idea of the originator of the Stra. This is fonnd to be the case with all words whose trustworthiness depends upon the character of their originator,
127 Unless the meanings of the words, ‘dewlap,’ ‘animal,’ &., are all known generally and distinctly, how conld they be used in laying down any rules, &c. If one rule were held to be based upon another set of rules, pertaining to each word of the assertion, then these latter rnles would stand in need of another set of rules, and so on and on, ad infinitum.
128.189 In the case of visible things, such comprehension is quite possible; only because such things are capable of being verified by other means of right notion. In another case,—where f.i. Panini lays down the rule that “ one should use the Sanskrit word ^ Gauh,’ and not the vernacnlar word ‘ @iv?,’ because in nsing the former we acquire w certain Virtne,’—where the Virtue is not eapable of being verified by any other means of knowledge, if we use the word ‘Gauh’ in preference to the others, we wonld
SAMBAUDHAKSH EPAPARIHARA. 871
Though in the case of the words referring to ordinary perceptible facts— such as the case of ^ Vrddhi” noticed above—such comprehension may be possible,—yet in a case where the rule is based upon Dharma only (an imper- ceptible thing), we could have ‘no sure comprehension, without (an idea of the rule emanating from an authoritative source) Panini.
129-180. And again, the comprehension of the letter A in ^ Agwala- yana,” brought about by the change of the simple A (in Agwalayana) into the broad A (in Agwalayana=relating to Agwala@yana)—(in accordance with a rule of Panini’s that if the nominal affix kit be added to a noun, the first vowel is broadened),—is never recognised to be correct until it is known that the change is in accordance with a rule laid down by Panini.
130-131. In the case of visible objects, there may or may not be an idea of the originator (of the word); but as for the use (of words) in the Veda (where for the most part only invisible transcendental things are spoken of), such (use) would not be possible without a remembrance of the originator (of the meanings of words).
131.132. How do you apply the word “ Cow” to the cows existing in inaccessible places ? If it be said that certain persons (who have managed to get to the place) lave seen them (and found them to agree with the denotation of the word “ Cow,”)—theu (we may ask) why could not the (all- powerful) originator (of the meanings of words, as accepted by our oppo-
be sure of having what is right, only if we remembered the fact of the restriction having been laid dowu by a trustworthy person.
129.180 The word ‘ Agwaldyana, wheu pronounced with a broad ‘dé’ (iu the hegin- ning), could never be helieved to signify ‘ relating to Agwaldyana,’ nnless we knew that the word ‘ Agwaléyana’ had undergone a change on account of the addition of the kit affix,—a change authorised by a trustworthy lawgiver, Panini.
130.181 Inasmuch as we have no idea of such an originator as that spoken of in 1९. 128, the denotation of a word cannot be based upon the fact of its emanating from a trustworthy source; and consequently the Word must he accepted to denote its meaning, hy its own inherent denotative potency, which is uncaused and eterual,
181.182 In Sutra 5, we have the word ‘ Avyatiréka’; and this word is explained as absence of any.incompatibility, either (1) in time, or (2) in place, between the Word and its Denotation.- In conuection with this, the Bhdshya explains that, just as we find the word ‘Cow’ in one place, denoting the animal with the dewlap, ¥c.,—so0 would we ‘also find iu all other -places,.he they howsoever inaccessible. And consequently, inas- much as no human originator could reach these inaccessible places, how conld. the
signification of the word ‘Cow’ (embracing as 16 does also inaccessible cows) 06 based upon the authority of any such personal ageucy ? For this reason, the Denotation must he accepted as being due to the inherent denotative potency of the word itself.
With the present Karikd beging a series of objections against this interpretation of the Bhdshya; and the 86786 of these is that the Mimansaka could not be sure of the word ‘Cow’ heing not incompatible with the inaccessible cows. “‘ Could never be restrain. ed, §c.”—and as such the word could very well have its siguification based upon the trustworthiness of a personal agenoy.
372 QLOKAVARTIKA.
nent) go there? Certainly being all-supreme (God) His accession to any place could never be restrained.
133-134. As for the meeting together of the many (originators of word-meanings), who could deny a meeting convened for a special (im- portant) purpose? While, as a matter of fact, a rule laid down in ene place (by one person) is nsed by people in every ether place—e.g., the rule with regard to “ Vrddhi” (laid down by Panini). Therefore it is only the second interpretation (absence cf incompatibility in time) that can be accepted as correct.
134-135. If someone were to assert that the origination of the rela- tions (ef words and meanings) is based upon certain other relations that are accepted to be already existing,—then, it would be hard to say which (werds and relations) are the self-established ones (not requiring human agency).
135-136. Becanse it is not right to assert that words, other than those known now-a-days, are those that existed before (and en which the origination of the meanings of the present words is based). Nordo we perceive any difference among the words that are in use at the present time ; (and hence we cannot assert 80006 of these to have existed before the origination ).
188.184 This refers to the objection raised in the Bhdshye against the theory of the signifioance of words being based upon the trustworthiness of personal agencies. The objection is that, inasmuch as there must be many such trustworthy persons, ws could not know that all of them agres on the point of thse rules regarding the significa- tion of words. The senss of the Kérikd is that such important issues depending upon a committee of the trustworthy persons, it is just possible that there may bs such a 1118861 ; but as a matter of fact, we find that no such committse is necessary. “ Second interpretation.”—It has besn shown that the interpretation of ths word ‘avyatiréka’—as ‘absences of incompatibility in place’—will not do; as that will effect onr own theory as much as—if not more than—that of our opponent. Therefors ws must take it in ths sense of ‘absences of incompatibility in time’; that 18 to say, there 18 no point of tims at which the word ‘Cow’ does not signify the animal with the dewlap, 4, As for the aforesaid personal agencies, thess could not exist at the time of Dissolution ; and hence this interpretation will completely demolish ths position of our opponent. In our own case we could explain the significance of words as being bassd upon their own denotative potency, whioh ooutinues at all times,—a faot proved hy their nse in the Veda. Thus then, there can be no incompatibility in time between the Word and its dsnotation.
184.135 This refers to the Bhdshya: If no denotations were admitted tobe self author- titative, then no new significations could be attributed to words, Jc., Sc. (cf. Kariké 127), Soms psople dssire to escape from this dilemma by deolaring that they admit of the self-sufficiency of certain words (in affordiug their denotation). Ths senso of the Kariké 18 that this is not possible ; because it cannot he rightly defined which are the few words that are self-suffloiont in their denotativeness.
185.188 ^! Not right”—because nobody kuows of auy such words as existed before aud have ceased to exist now.
SAMBAUDHAKSH&PAPARIHARA, 373
136-137. Barring the eternality of the Word and its Meaning, there could be no other reason for (holding the eternality of the Relation (between these). Therefore (since the eternality of Words and Meanings
has been proved above) in the Veda, there can be no beginning for the relation (between them).
137-138. The inference of the origination of the relations (between Words and Meanings) is negatived by the fact of the absence of any means (of asserting or laying down that relation) ; and as for the inference of the non-assertibility (of a pre-established relation by us), it is set aside by a fact of direct perception.
138-139. The only means of comprehending the meaning of words lies in perceiving (and noting) the repeated comprehensions by experienced people (of words uttered by other experienced persons). And certainly this means is found to fail with regard to (7.¢., can be of no avail to) people, who do not comprehend the relation (between words and meanings, prior to the laying down of the rule).
186.181 We have proved, in the section on ‘ Words,’ that the Word is oternal ; and also, in the section ov ‘ Akrti’ that, its denotation is oternal. And then, inasmuch as ao Word can be nsed withont a meaning, we cannot bnt accept (even on the sole ground of the eternality of Words and their Denotationgs), the eternality of the relation- ship hetween them.
187.133 One who would give birth to the denotative relationship of words, could never utter any sentences himself; inasmuch as he would not recognise “any pre-established meanings of words. And as he conld not utter any sentences, how conld he lay down any rules with regard to the meanings of words (cf. K. 127 and 134-35)? On the other hand, those who, like us, accept the pre-established eternal relationship of words and denotations, can very well lay downand explain to others, in well-chosen words and sen- tences, the fact of euch and such a word having such and such a meaning; consequently, the argument of the opponent—that ‘a young hoy could not understand any sentences, becanse he would not know the meanings of the words used ’—becomes refuted by the perceptible fact that when certain words and their denotations have heen explained to a young boy, he readily comprehends the meaning of the sentences composed of those words. And no amount of Inference can shake the truthfulness of this perceptible fact.
133.139 Tt cannot be asserted that the Mimdnsaka cannot make any assertions with regard to the relations of words. Because, in the first place, according to the Miman- saka, no such assertion 18 necessary ; as yonng boys come to comprehend the meanings of words by picking up a word here and a word there, out of the conversations of older people. And then this knowledge comes to be supplemented by the explanations that he is fayoured with from these old people, who are cognisant with previously established relationships, and are capable of making any number of assertious with regard to these. For our opponent, on the other hand, none of this would be possible ; because before the meanings will have been laid down for him by his trastworthy persons, they did not exist for him; and as such, in what words could the ‘ ६1186. worthy person’ express the relationships, that he meant a certain word to bear a definite meaning? Nor could the trustworthy guide carry on any conversations, from which you could pick your knowledge of the words.
374 OLOKAVARTIKA.
139-140. Even such means, as gestures of the hand, &., could not exist at the first actions (at the beginning of creation). Because the meaning of these (gestures) could not be known unless there were other persons (using them).
140-142. (According to us) the young inexperienced observer (1) per- ceives the word, the experienced persons, and the object (talked of—the cow f.i.), by his senses (the Ear and the Eye),—(2) cognises, the fact of the hearer (the directed experienced person) having understood (the meaning of the word uttered by the older experienced person directing him to ‘ fetch the cow’ f.i.), by (a process of) Inference based upon the action (of the order- ed person,—going and fetching the cow),—and (8) Jastly, he comes to recog- nise, the fact of denotahbility resting upon both (the denoting Word and the denoted Meaning), through Apparent Inconsistency based upon the fact of the inexplicability [of the action of the directed person, except on the ground of the denotability of the Meaning (the object cow) by the word “Cow”; and the consequent resting of the denotability in both Word and Meaning]. Hence we find that the relation (between Word and its Meaning) is com- prehended by (the joint action of) three means of right notion (Sense- perception, Inference and Apparent Inconsistency).
Thus ends the Chapter on Sambandhakshepaparthara.
189.140 Tt cannot be urged that—‘ Sentences are not the only means of explaining the meanings of wards; as Gestures could be easily used for that purpose.’’? Becanse even Gestures could explain only snch meanings as wonld be known to have been established beforehand as expressible by such Gestures. And hence Gestures could not help yon any further than the Words whose meanings are laid down for you hy trnstworthy persons. Further, it is only when we find one person performing a certain act in accordance with the Gestures of some other person, that we realise that Gestnre to be significant of that act; there can he no other means of comprehending the meanings of Gestures. But at the beginning of Creation, there could not have been any person to noderstand, and aot according to, the Gestures of the Creator. Consequently, even the help of Gestures does not carry you a step further than your former theory with regards to Words having their relationships laid down by trnstworthy persons.
140.42 The Nydyaratnékava interprets the last line in a different way: It takes it to mean that, thongh Sense-perception and Inferenoe help in the cognition of the relationship, yet it is only Apparent Inconsistency which is the direct and immediate means of its cognition. The translation, however, follows the interpretation of the Kagika, hy preference,—inasmuch 28 the Vaértika iteelf, calling the cognition of the Relationship ‘ tripramanaka,’ does not appear to have made any difference in the degree of help accorded by each of the three means of cognition. The difference in the two
interpretations however is not of much consequence,—as it comes to the same thiug, after all, ।
CITRAKSHEPA-PARIHARA, 375
(Section 17.) CITRAKSHHE PA-PARIHARA.
1. The two arguments,—that have been advanced above (in the chapter on ^ Citrakshépa”’) to prove the fact of the “ Citra,” &c., not having any results (in the shape of cattle, &c.),—have their premises unproved (1.e., false); because the immediateness (of the result after the action) is not laid down (in the Veda).
2. The immediateness (of the appearance of the result after the action) cannot be held even to be indirectly implied (by the passage en- joining the performance of the Citra for the sake of acquiring cattle) ; because, as a matter of fact, 1t is not impossible for the results of actions to appear without some specification (with regard to time or place, &c.)
3-4, Since actions become mixed up with one another with regard
1 This referg to the reply given by the Bhdshya to the arguments on ‘ Citrakshépa.’ The passage referred to is the following: ‘ nahi ¢r#yaté krté karmani tavatyéva phalam, The Citrakshépa argument is mentioned in the Bhdshya thus: “ Karmakalé karma- phaléna. bhavitavyam, Yatkélam hi mardanam tatkalam ma rdanasukham na kélantaram.” And this latter has been resolved by the Vértika into two distinct argaments: (1) “The Citra sacrifice cannot have the acquisition of cattle for its result,—because it does not bring the cattle in its time,—like the Bath, &c.”; (2) ‘‘ Cattle cannot be ac- quived by means of the Citra sacrifice,—because at the time of the obtainiug of cattle, the Citrd does not exist,—like the attainment of Heaven.” Both these arguments are to be refuted in the present section ; and the present Karika strikes at the premises. The sense of the Karikd is that the premises—“ because the Citrd does not briug the cattle in its own time ”’—is false ; because the action’s ‘own time’ is not the time immediately following its oompletion; 0668186 the relationship between the Action and its Result cau be cognised only from the Veda; and the Veda does not declare that the Resalt is to follow immediately after the Aotion. Consequently by the expression ‘action’s own time’ (Karmakdla) we must understand that particular time at which, all impediments having disappeared, the fruition of the latent potency generated by the Action in the past manifests itself; and as this would be the exact time for the appearance of the Result, there would be nothing incongruous in the non-appearance of the cattle immediately after the completion of the Citra sacrifice.
2 ^ Because, Sc.’’—If we found that the Action could not bring about the Result, unless some specification of time and place is made, then, through Apparent Inconsist- ency, we could have made the passage enjoiniug the Citrd sacrifice to imply a specifi- cation of time,—viz.: that the result of the sacrifice would follow immediately after the completion of the sacrifice. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the result of the Citrd sacrifice can as reasonably appear daring this life, as during the next; and heuce we have no Inconsistency of either time or place, on which we conld fall back, for the implication of your “‘immediateness of sequence.” The peculiar potency of eacrifices is snch that, once performed, it persists for any length of time, till the Result has been fally accomplished. ;
` 8.4 This meets the following argnment: ‘“‘We infer such immediateness of the
376 OLOKAVARTIKA.
to space, time, &c., and it often happens that the result of one action has been only half-realised, therefore the fruition of one action is often found to be deferred (to appear at some future time), Therefore the idea of immediateness must be regarded as groundless.
4-5, The fact of Sense-perception, &c., not agreeing with (support- ing the declaration in question), it does not in any way vitiate the (validity of) its Verbal Authority. Because the disagreement (of Sense-perception ) with regard to immediateness cannot in any way set aside the injunction whose application is free from any specification (of either time or place) ; inasmuch as the defects of the two (the Sense-perception and Injunction) are totally different,
6. (On the contrary) it is the inference of immediateness, which you deduce from the similar instance of the “ rubbing,”—that would be re-
Result from the nature of actions in general.” The sense of the Karika ie that when once a certain action has begun to bring ahout its reanlts, even if uctions he performed, their fruition will he postponed till all the resnlta of the former action have heen ६०0११९९. Such heing the case, and we finding, in every-day life, one Action follow- ing so closely on the heel of another 88 to hecome mixed up, it is not possihle for the results of all actions to follow immediately after the completion of the Actions, Says the Nydyaratnakara: “In ordinary experience we find that certain actiona, by their very nature, have their results removed from them; e.g., the operations of agrioul- {16 ; some have their results removed on account of certain specialities of time, place, &८. ; while in the case of others, it may happen that the results of some other Aotion may not have heen completed. For these reasons the idea of the immediateness of the sequence of the Result cannot but be false.”
4.6 This refers to the ohjections brought forward in Karikads 2-3 of ‘ Citrakshépa.’ The sence of the reply embodied in the present Karikd is that the fact of the cattle not being seen to appear immediately after the completion of the Cuitrd saorifice cannot in any way adversely affect the Injunction of thie aacrifice; inasmuch se the Injunction does not specify the time for the appearance of the Cattle as being that which follows immediately after the sacrifice. ‘“ The objects of the two are diferent."—The non-peroeption of the Cattle ia restricted to the time immediately following the sacrifice; whereas the Injunction 1५78 down merely the acquisition of the Cattle, without uny restriction of time. Consequently the fact of the non- perception of the Cattle immediately after the sacrifice does not contradiot the fact of the appearance (and perception) of the Result at some other time; and as such appearance of the Result would be quite in keeping with the Injunction,—and it has been shown to be not incompatible with the fact of the non-appearance of the Cattle immediately after the sacrifice,—therefore we do not see how the Injunction can he in any way set aside by such limited non-perception of the Cattle. In fact, if the Cattle were to appear at some other time than that at which tho sacrifice is finished, —that alone would be compatible, both with the Injunotion (which specifies no time), and the said non-perception.
6 The opponent has argued that the Result of the Action muet always follow immediately after it,—as we find in the case of massage. The meaning of the Karikds is that what is proved by the Inference based upon this Instance is the immediate
8
CITRAKSH BPA-PARIHARA. STL
jected by the “non-perception” (of the cattle immediately after the sacrifice) ; inasmuch as both refer to the same object.
7. (In ordinary life) we find that even in the case of actions—as the attendance on one’s master—the ends of which are quite visible, even though the resalt (the satisfaction of the Master) has been accomplished, yet, through some impediment or other (either seen or unseen), it takes a long time in manifesting itself (in the shape of rewards, Sc.)
8-9. The final result (in the shape of the harvest) does not follow as soon as the cern is sown. If it be said that in the case of the coru we have an immediate effect in the shape of the sprout (growing out of the corn sown),—then (in the case of the Sacrifices whose result is the attainment of Heaven) we may held that the Heaven results immediately after the Sacrifice) (in a subtle and etherial form) and it takes time to mate- 1121156 into a condition of being enjoyed. For, in the case of every effect being preduced (from a cause), there is a certain marked sequence in the process (of its production), which is natural to each and every one of
them. 10. Even if (by the instance of rubbing) you seek to prove the fact of the Citra, &., having immediate results, then too, your argument
sequence of the Result to the Action; and as it is the immediate sequence that is nega- tived by the fact of the non-appearance of the Cattle immediately after the saorifice, and as this Inference would be opposed toa fact of Perception (negative), it is the former that should be rejected, and not the latter,
¶ Another instance is that of the effects produced by medicines, which appear sometimes very long after the medicines have been administered.
8.9 If it be argued, that in the case of the Corn, there is an immediate result in the shape of the minute form, which takes some time to develop into the final result of the Harvest, on account of the natural impediments in the way of its attainment,— then, we can say the same thing with regard to the case of Heaven, &c., also, that are brought about by means of sacrifices. We might argue that after each sacrifice there is immediately produced its result, in a subtle form, which takes some time to become sufficiently materialised for actual delectation, because of certain natural impediments in the way of snch accomplishment, And in both these cases, the orderly process, beginning with the appearance of the result in its subtle form and ending with its ultimate realisation, would be only natural; the interruption, in both cases being due to natural impediments in the way of immediate accomplishment. Thusthen, from the fact of our non-perception of the attainment of Heaven, or of Cattle, immediately after the completion of the Darcga-Paérnamasé, or the 1४7", sacrifice, cannot lead us to the inference that the sacrifices can have no such results,
10 The translation follows the reading ‘anantardéphalatwam, which has been accepted by the 64१14. The Nydyaratnakava however reads * anantarphalatwam’ ; and explains it thus: “If by the non-perception of the immediate result of the Citra sacrifice, you seek to prove the fact of there being no such immediate results, ~then, inasmuch as we also accept the fact of the results not being immediate, all your effor would be useless, as vou would be proving what we also accept as true.” Bunt this
48
378 CLOKAVARTIKA.
becomes redundant, proving only what we also admit; for (we also admit of such immediate production of the result in a subtle etherial form) ; or else, how could we have the fully-developed results at any other time (if we had no sprout-like germination in the beginning) ?
11-12. Finding a discrepancy in the case of service and other per- ceptible means (i.e., finding that service, &c., do not always bring about the results in the shape of cattle, wealth, &c.),—we must admit that for the acquirement of cattle (in this life) there is some unseen cause, other than those that we can perceive (to-day). And then, too, the application of the causes, other than what we accept, is groundless; inasmuch as such agencies as those of “ God’s wish” (held by the Vaigéshikas), ^ Potency” (of Matter and Soul, held by the Sankhyas) and the like, have been shown to have neither Verbal Authority nor Reasonable Premises, &c., in support of them. Therefore we must accept, on the strength of Verbal Authority, the Qitra@ sacrifice performed at some time (either during this or in some previous life) as being the cause of the obtaining of cattle.
13. The bringing about (of cattle) cannot be said to be withont any cause. Because (the necessity of every effect having a cause having been proved by all the means of right notion) all the means of right notion cannot be invalid. In fact, in the present case, the Word (४.९. the Veda indicating an adequate cause (of the acquirement of cattle: in the shape of the 2८17 sacrifice) cannot be said to be invalid (untrustworthy).
14. And those, who hold that the results of the Cztr@, &c., must appear in this very life, will not be able to show any cause for the appear- 2106 of their results (cattle, &c.), in favour of those who have never performed those sacrifices during their present lives.
reading and ita explanation do not quite clear up the last fect of the Kdarikd. Hence the preference given to the reading adopted in the Kacikd.
11.18 Unleas we admit of an Unseen Canse, we cannet explain the acquirement of cattle by one man, and not by the cther,—when their visible efforts are exactly the same. ‘Then the question is as to what this Unseen Cause is. All other cansal agencies, pestulated by the varicus philesophical eyetems, have already been proved to be inapplicable (under the section on ‘ Sambandhakshépa). It has been shown that no such agencies—as that of Divine wish and the like—are proved either by Verbal Testimony, cr by any precess cf Inference, or by any other means of right notion. Therefore, we cannot but admit that the person acqniring the cattle must have, at some time or other, performed the Citra sacrifice; and the gronnd for this belief is supplied by the Vedic injunction—‘ one desiring cattle should perform the Citra sacrifice.’
18 Tt cannot be urged that the appearance of the cattle is without any cause; 80 long as we have verbal authority distinctly pointing to the fact of the Citra sacrifice being an adequate means to ite attainment.
19 We find that persons who have not performed the Citré in this life have ob- tained cattle; and as we have shown that there is ne other means cf acquiring it, we myst admit that it is due to the man having performed the Citré in his previous life,
CITRAKSH EPA-PARIHARA. 379
15. Because (according to these theorists) the effects of the Citra, &c. (performed during some previous life} must have been exhausted in the course of that life; and portions of the (previous) enjoyment of Heaven cannot follow one to a new life.
16. Because actions, which have one definite result attributed to them (by the Veda) cannot accomplish other results for us. In the ascer- tion of Gautama too, the “residue” must be interpreted with reference to the Citra sacrifice (in the present case, where the effect under consi- deration is the acquiring of cattle).
17. If the effects were held to be merely natural (2.¢., brought about by chance, and not by any adequate cause), then even such results, as follow Immediately after the Action (९.4. the rains brought on by the ल sacrifice), would not be believed to have their cause in that Action.
18. And then (if this Chance Theory were truce) people conld obtain the results (Heaven, &.), even if they were, like the Mléchchhas, not to perform the actions enjoined by the Veda (as bringing about those
16 The latter half rejects the theory that the cattle may he a portion of the joys of Heaven that the person may have been lately enjoying before his birth into his present life.
16 This meets the following theory: “The cattle might be the remains of the joys of Heaven accomplished by means of the Jyotishtoma performed in w previous life; as declared by Gaulama (in the Nydya-swlras) : ‘The persou having cxperienced all the effects of his deeds, comes to be born in a station in life, which is fixed by the residue left of his past १6९९७. ` The Kérikad declares this to be impossible ; because the Jyotishtoma has been laid down as having the joys of Heaven for its result; and as such could never bring about any such result as the obtaining of cattle. As for Gautama’s assertion, it must be taken to mean that whenever we perceive a man possess- ing, in the present life, something for his acquisition of which we do not find any cause iu his present actions,—we must conclude that this acquisition must he the remnant of a like possession of his in his previous life, brought about, at that time, by his previous performance of a sacrifice whereof that acquisition is mentioned in the Veda as the specific result. Thatis to say, eveu if the obtaining of cattle during the present life be held to be a remnant, it must be the remnaut of the cattle, to which the persou must have been entitled by the previous performance of the Citra sacrifice, in some past life of his, and which he must have heen unable to obtain, in fall, during al! his intervening lives. And thus the obtaiuing of cattle could be the result of the Citra sacrifice only.
11 Because it is always easier to explaiu an effect as natural, than search for its cause, &c., and thug all effects wonld come to be looked upon as due to mere chance,
18 The authority of the Veda lies in the Injunction of certain sacrifices, with a view to the fulfilment of certain definite ends. If these ends were held to be fulfilled by mere chance, aud not by those elaborate sacrifices, then uo sane person would be willing to undergo all the trouble of performing these latter. And as 8 necessary consequence of this, people would cease to have any faith im, aud regulate their conduct by, the Veda,
380 CLOKAVARTIKA.
results). And consequently all the authority of the Veda would fall to the ground.
19. And again, if the cattle were always, as if by command, to follow immediately (after the sacrifice), then the sacrifice would come to have a purely perceptible result, and in this it would come to resemble the case of a purgative bringing about the movement of the bowels.
20. And in that case (ie., if all results were to appear during this life) we could not explain the declaration of the Bhashya— facts experienced in previous births are not remembered”; nor that of the Si#tra— the Scripture has its purpose in pointing out facts not got at (by any other means of right notion).”
21, Therefore just as the Injunction is found to be without any speci- fication of time (as to the appearance of the result),—so must it always be accepted to be; as anything (idea) beyond that (which is directly signified by the Injunction) is groundless, and as such cannot (reasonably) be com- prehended (in connection with that Injunction).
22. Even those (Naiyd@ytkas), who hold to the theory of immediate sequence (of the result), and explain the cases of non-appearance of
19 “Come to have a purely perceptible result.’—If the result of the Citra were always to follow immediately after the performanos of the sacrifice, or even at any time during the present life, invariahly,—then, the fact of the Citra leading to that resnlt would 0600९ an object of pure Sense-psrception and Invariahle Concomitance (Infer- ence); and as such thers would be nothing left for the Veda to enjoin, on the score of that sacrifice; and consequently, the Vedic sentence enjoining the Citré would come to he taken as merely descriptive of a fact of Sense-perception; and thus it would resemble an Arthavdda, therehy losing all its injunctive authority. In the cass of the Karr? sacrifice, the result of which appsars in this very life, the result does not always coms ahout as expected, hsing interrupted hy impediments; and hence we could not have any idea of invariahle concomitance (of the छा with its result, rainfall), Aud hence the removal of this uncertainty would be a fit object for the Vedic passage enjoining the ह 122. In order to distingnish the case cited in the Karika, from that of the Kérivi, we have the word ‘ niyogéna’ (—=always, necessarily, as if by the command of a supsrior authority, and not hy reason only).
20 In the Smrtyadhikarana (Adhyaya I, Pada iii) the Bhdshya says: ‘We do not recognise any causal relationship hetween the Action and its result necessarily in the present life....Facts sxperienced, &c., &c.’ And the theory, that the results of sacrifices must appear in the present life, would go against this assertion of the Bhdshya, as also against that of the &étra (in Adhyaya VI) which declares that the Vedio Injunction has its purpose in the pointing ont of something not yet coguised hy any other means of knowledge. For if, as shown 800९8, the result of the Citra were to appear in the present life, it would become an object of Sense-perception; and hence the sentence laying down the Citré would fail in its only purpose of pointing out something noé cognised by any other means of knowledge.
42 The Natydyika lolds that tho result of the Citra must appear during the preseut life,—holding us he dogs the theory uf tho unmediate sequence of Cause and Effect ;
८1112 एप्त 77.4.76 एप्त 4 14, 38)
results as being due to some discrepancy in the Action itself, are also in the same position as the upholders of the “Chance” theory.
23. The fact of (the attainment of) Heaven belonging to a future life will be proved in the first part of Adhyaya VI; and the absence of any fixity of time (४,९.) whether belonging to this life or the next) with regard to the acquirement of cattle, &c. (will be proved) in the adhikarana (section) on “ Yogasiddhi.” (1४-11-27, 28).
24, Results, in the shape of the acquirement of cattle, &c., are held to occur af any time possible (either in this life or in the next), and not belonging exclusively to the next life. Therefore even for one, who would be iu an extreme hurry (to obtain the result), the means enjoined (४.८ , the Citra sacrifice) would be the same (that is enjoined for the sake of the result to happen either in this or in the next life),
25, That (result) which is common to many persons—such as the obtaining of rains and the like—must naturally be accepted as such (common); and since by all persons it is only immediate (or approximate) rain that is desired, therefore it can be rightly regarded as belonging to this 1118 exclusively.
26, Though in this case (of the ‘ K@rirt’ sacrifice bringing about rains) the root ^“ Kami (to desire) ” is not qualified (by a specification of time; and as such it 19 similar to the case of the Citra) yet we indirectly get at the specification of the result (as belonging to this life), as otherwise it could not be desired. lf, in some cise, the Kariri, be found to be non-produc- tive of its result (in this life), we must conclude that, in that case, there undoubtedly exists (the force of) some other (contrary) action (performed by the person at some previous time) whose result is declared in the Veda (to be contrary to the obtaining of rains), and which has not been all enjoyed by this time.
Thus ends the Chapter on “ Citrakshépa-parihara,”’
and as such he is open to the objection against the ^ Chance” theory (Vide Karika 14) ; and he will not be able to explain the acquisition of cattle by one who is not found to have performed the Citra during the present life.
23 This meets the objection that if there be no specification of time, then Heaven algo may, sometimes, be attained during the present life.
24 Whether the person be in a hurry or not, the means is the same, viz., the per- formance of the Citra sacrifice.
26 ^" Indirectly,’—t.e., through Apparent Inconsistency. If the results did not belong to this world, they would not be desired. If the Karir? is found, sometimes, not to bring about rainfall, we must conclade that the performer has had some residues left of 6006 action done by him in the previons life, whose result must have been con- trary to that of the Karir?, which latter result has had no time to be spent up in realisation, and still persists in counter-acting the effects of the Kariri.
382 GLOKAVARIIEA.
(Section 18.) ATMA-VADA.
1. Though it is true that the Soul can have no direct connection with the sacrificial implements, yet it is possible for it to have an indirect relation, through the body.
2. The perceptibility (signified by “Esha,” in the sentence ‘ ésha yajnayudhi yajamanah anjasé swargam lokam yati’), though really pertain- ing to the Body, is indirectly referred to the Soul also (on account of its connection with the body). Conversely, the approach to Heaven, though really (primarily) belonging to the Soul, is indirectly (and secondarily) referred to the body.
3. By the denial of the Soul in connection with this particular passage, all the Veda is rendered open to objection. Because (if there be no Soul, then) the relations of the means and consequences laid down therein, become incapable of being established.
4, The Vedas have declared that the resnlts of sacrifices appertain to the performer, in some birth 01" other; and if the Soul were nothing more than mere Idea, then it could not have the character of the performer (of actions) and enjoyer (of results),
5, If, after the perishing of the body, nothing is held to exist, then many sacrifices failing to bring about their results (in this life), the Vedic passages, mentioning these (sacrifices as leading to supernatural results), become false.
6. Therefore, it is with a view to establish the authority of the Veda, that the existence of the Soul is sought to be proved here; even though the single passage in question (^ U’sha-yajnayudhi, &c.’), may be explained away as being an Arthavada (because the mere explanation of this one passage does not free us from the aforesaid difficulties with regard to the authority of the Véda).
L It has heen argued under ‘ Citrakshépa,’ that the Vedic sentence— ésha yajnayu- dhi, &e.,' is not true; &e., &o., &e. (Vide supra). And to this the Bhdshya replies— " Qarivasambandhad yat tasya ¢ariram so’pi tairyajnayudhi bhavati’ ; and it ie thie passage that the Kartké is meant to explain. “ Indirect,”—i.e., the implements are related to the body, and the hody to the Soul.
£ This meets the objection that the sentence in qnestion may be taken 88 a mere Arihavada, which obviates the necessity of having recouree to the above farfetched interpretatious. The sense of the Karikd is that the explanation of the particular passage 18 not what we are driving at; what we mean 38 that if the existence of the Soul be denied, then the Veda loses all ils authority. ^^ Means and Consequences.’— That a certain 88611606 leads to Heaven could not be true, if there were no Soul to experience the joys of Heaven; as the body is always left behind.
ATMA-VADA. 383
7. We hold that the Sonl is something different from the body, the sense-organs and ideas, and that it is eternal; while all the rest, the body, &e., are perishable.
8-9. Obj.: “If it be eternal, even when it has the character of the doer and the enjoyer, then,—as at the time of the enjoyment of the result, it is not cognisant of the relation between this result and the action (that it may have performed to bring it about),—having no such idea as that ‘these results that I am enjoying are the effects of such and such virtuous or vicious deeds that I had done (in my last life), —how could 1t have any liking (for a virtuous action as being the cause of good results, &e., &e.)?
10. “And when one does not recognise a result to have been brought about by any action of his own, then there can 06 no difference between the enjoyment experienced by one’s own Soul, and that by other’s.
11, ‘‘And even while doing a vicious deed, one might think that at the time of the enjoyment (of the result of this action) he wonld not remember it (to have been brought about by that particular action of his),—and therehy he would not avoid that vicious deed.
12. “Thus then, even in accordance with the theory of the eternality (of the Soul), you have, with reference to the result, the disappearance of
8.9 In the first place, it is not possible for an eternal entity to be either the doer, or the experiencer, 88 an eternal entity cannot bnt be free from all activity. But even if we admit such charactere, for the sake of argument, then too, inasmuch 98 at the time that the result is experienced, no person is fonnd to have any idea of the action leading to that resnlt, that he may have performed in hie past lives, he cannot bave an idea of any action bringing about any particular results either good or bad. Hence, he could not be attracted to the performance of any aotions with trauscendental results; and that would mean a total cessation of all sacrifices.
10 That is to say, we cannot be sure whether the results we are experiencing in the present life are the effects of actions performed by other Souls, or of those done by our own Sonl. And thus there being an inextricable confnsion, one wonld be tempted to give up all sacrifices, hoping to obtain the results of those performed by others; specially as there wonld be nothing to convince him after the fact that the results he would experience in his futnre lives must be only those of his own actions; because during his present life, he is never able to fix npon any relationship between the results he 18 experiencing now and the actions that he may have performed in his past livea,
11 The person would not avoid an evil deed; becanse he would be nnable to establish any connection between the evil effects he may be experiencing and any past deeds of his own, And thus he cannot be convinced that evil deeds bring about evil conseqnences. And as he would not avoid evil deeds, when tempted to them by the promise of temporary pleasures, of which he is quite snre,—he would be unwilling to forego these pleasures in consideration of future evil conseqnences, the chances whereof he finds to be, at best, extremely doubtful.
12 As shown above, it may happen that, even if the Soul be eternal, the person may not experience the result of his own deed, whereas he may experience those of
384 QLOKAVARTIKA.
what has been done (by the Sonl), and appearance of what has not been done, exactly similar to what you have urged against the theory of non-eternality ; and consequently (since you cannot avoid the objection) it 18 needless to prove the eternality (of Souls).”
18. Reply: This does not affect our theory: because, for us, a remem- brance (of the action) is of no consequence in the enjoyment (of its result) ; as neither engagement in, nor avoidance of, an action is due to any remem- brance (of it) at the time of the enjoyment (of its results).
14, An idea (of a certain action leading to a desirable end),—the existence of which, as the means to engagement in that action, is sought after,—is already distinctly coginsed, through the Veda, by the learned, before his engagement (in that action).
15, Even subsequently to the performance of the action (at the time of the appearance of the result), people versed in the Scriptures do have an idea of the result being due to a particular action in some previous life. And it is only such persons that are entitled (to perform sacrifices). And as for unlearned fools, it does not matter if they have no such idea (because such fools are not in any case entitled to the performance of
sacrifices )
16. Such ideas (or remembrances) need not, in every case, be amenable to all means of right notion ; therefore the idea got at by one means of right notion cannot be rejected on account of the fact of its not being got
at by the other means.
other 06001618 actions, And inasmuch as this seems to be the only important objec- tion that yon have urged against the non-eternality of Sonls,—it is no use trying to prove their eternality,—as this too has been found to be open to the same objection.
18 “ 48 neither, Se.”—The process is as follows: (1) the operation of the Per- former, (2) the Action itself, (3) the experiencing of the Resnlt; and we find that the experience comes three degrees later than the original operation; and hence this latter cannot be said to be due to that.
14 Even though one cannot have any idea, at the time, of the experiencing of a Result, or that of the Result being due to any particular action of his,—yet, the idea of a certain action leading to a certain desirable result is ubtained by us, from the Veda (where such causal sequence is distinotly laid down); and this idea would be enough to lead us to the performance of that action, for which we would not stand in need of any remembrance of the resnlt having been actually brought about by that action (in a previons life).
16 As a matter of fact, even at the time of experiencing the Result, learned people do recognise its relationship to a previoasly-performed action, And thus there wonld be no hindrance to these people becoming engaged in sacrifices ; and as for ignorant people, it does not matter whether they do, or do not, perform any sacrifices.
19 Tt 18 true that such an iden is amenable to the Verhal Authority of the Veda; and this is enongh to ostablish its correctness ; noiwithstunding the facts of its not being amenable to Sense-perception, Inference, &c.
ATMA-VADA, 3689
17. Qne who does not understand that from such an action such a result will accrue to him, must be an ignorant fool; and as such naturally he has no chance of performing the action (and hence even if he has not the idea necessary to lead him to a certain Vedic action, it does not matter).
18. As a matter of fact, even though at the time of the enjoyment of profound sleep, we have no idea of the enjoyment being due to the softness of the bed we had prepared,—yet we are led to prepare our soft beds beforehand.
19. And further, if one were to realise, at the time of enjoyment, the fact of its being the result (of a certain well-defined action),—then, as in the case of roads, &c., 80 in the matter of sacrifices also, the Veda would lose all its authority.
20. Obj.: “If your Souls be inactive (without any action), on ac- count of their eternality and all-pervading character,—and nunmodifiable by pleasure and pain,—what sort of the character of doer and enjoyer can they have ?
21, ‘If it be held that at the time of the performance of an action, and at the time of the appearance of pleasure, &., the character of the
Soul is transformed, then its eternality disappears.”
22. Reply: We do not deny the applicability of the epithet “‘ non- eternal” to the Soul; if “non-eternality ” mean only “liability to modi- fication ” ; as such liability does not necessarily imply destruction.
11 “ No chance”—because it is only the learned that are entitled to the perform. ance of Vedio actions. (Vide Adh., III.)
18 Asa matter of fact, no such idea is necessary, at the time of the experience of the result, for the taking up of an action.
19 If such an idea were possible, then it would be a case of connecticn between the Result and the Sacrifice being amenable to Sense-perception and Invariable Con- comitance. Consequently, just as in the case of the Road, the fact of its connection with the convenient passing cf the people is amenable to Sense-perception $ and hence the Vedic passage speaking of it comes to be taken as a Valedictory sentence describ- iug a perceptible result,—so really in the same manner, in the case of Sacrifices also, the relation between these and their results being held to be amenable to Sense-per- ception, the Vedic passages declaratory of the Sacrifices would have to be taken as Valedictory sentences describing a well-established fact; and as such, the Veda wonld cease to be the 8016 authority for such sacrifices,
20 ^: When he has no action, how can he be the doer? And when he is unaffected by pleasure and pain, how can he be the enjoyer ? As the only objects to be enjoyed are pleasure and 10920
al ‘Tf the principal character of the Soul can undergo a transformation, it cannot be eternal.”
22 We do not deny the Sonl’s liability to modifications; and if this is all that you mean by ‘non-eternality,’ then in that case, we could call the Soul ‘non-eternal,’
49
386 QLOKAVARTIKA.
23-25, If there ever was an absolute destruction of the Soul, then we could have the disappearance of the actions performed, and the appearance of those not performed by it. These, however, do not apply; if there be only a change in its condition, as from childhood to youth, &., we find people performing or avoiding actions in this life according as they think them to be productive, respectively, of either good or evil, at some other stage of his life. In fact in the case of no action do we find the result following at the same stage of the person’s life as at which it was per- formed. And since the Soul is not utterly destroyed, therefore people do not take thé enjoyer (of results) to be other than the doer (of actions) (even though there is necessarily a change in his condition).
26. According to my theory the Person (i.e., the Soul), while passing through the different conditions of pleasure, pain, &९. never, for once, relinquishes his character of an Intelligent snbstantial Entity:
27. If modification (change of condition) were identical with total destruction, then, when a man in trouble would regain happiness, he would either lose all those (character of Intelligence, &c.), or continue in a state of irouble (simultaneously with that of pleasure).
2६. Therefore an entire continnance or an entire cessation of all the traits of the Person (with the change in condition) being both impossible,
What we object to, in the case of the Soul, is the assertion of its destruction. For certainly, the fluctuations in the eurface of the sea do not bring abont its destraction ; and like the sea, the Sonl.can never he destroyed, notwithstanding the endless momentary transformations that it undergoes,
23.25 If the Soul were destroyed at death, the effects, accraing to one in the next hirth, of actionae performed in the previoas birth, would he accruing to one who has not performed the actions ; as the performing Soal will have been dead along with the performing body. But we holdthat Death means only a change inthe state of the Soul ; jast like the changes from childhood to youth, from yonth to old age. And certainly there is no gainsaying the fact that the person that performed the action (say of learniag the alphabet) in his childhood is the same that ie utilising it in bis youth. In fact all effects of one’s deeds affect him at a period of life other than that at which precisely the deeds are done; as the state of the person is undergoing momentary changes.
४6 During the varions stages that the Soul passes throngh, it all along remains an intelligent and substantial entity. That is to say, its inherent character remains the same. And mere changes in extraneons condition cannot mean destruction.
21 Or continue, Se.’—Yhat 18 to say, in order to keep up the character of the Intelligent, 4८. it would be necessary for it to keep to the same condition of pain; as change of condition would, for you, mean total destruction.
28 When = serpent has been lying coiled up ina circular form, and then resumes ita natural form by uncoiling itself, -we have the character of ‘Snake’ pervading all along, in hoth conditions; though the pesition has been ohanged. In the same manner, in thé oase of a person who has heen experiencing troublons times, if his state changes and he becomes happy and contented, the character of the Person—
ATMA-VADA. 387
we must hold that there is both partial continuance (as of the permanent characters of Intelligence, &c.), and partial cessation (as of the ephemeral state of pleasure or pain), like the serpent in the different positions of a circle, &&,
29, And the character of the doer and that of the enjoyer do not beloug to the conditions (of the Person’s life), but to the Person who is the substrate of all the different states ; hence it is always the doer that enjoys the result of the action.
30. And asa matter of fact, on the appearance of a new condition (of life), the former condition does not become totally destroyed; bunt being in keeping with the new condition, it merges into the common character of the Self (Intelligence, &c.)
31. It is only the Individual conditions that are contradictory to one another. Over all of them, however, equally pervades the common character of the Soul (Intelligence, é&c.)
32-33. In the theory of the non-existence (४.९) non-eternality) of the Soul, however, the person performing an action, would know beforehand that “IT myself (i.e, my Soul, that performs the action at this moment) having been destroyed (the next moment), either its result would not appear at all, or, if it appears at all, it would affect some other soul than mine ;’’ and hence he could never be tempted to perform any action; and as such the Veda would lose all its efficient trustworthiness. _
33-34, Hven if the upholders of pure Idea alone (the Banddha Idealists) were to admit of another birth (for the same personality), they could not but have the enjoyer (of the results of action) different from the performer (of the action itself),—because they hold the Ideas to be momentary (६.९. one idea does not exist for more than one moment) ; and further, because, being devoid of action and omnipresence, one and the same Idea could not reside in any other body (than the present one; and hence the “Idea” that would perform the action in this life, conld not exist in another body, in the next birth, at the time of the enjoyment of the results of that action). |
85. Obj.: ‘ We hold that the ‘Series’ (of Ideas) that performs the actions would also be the enjoyer (of the results) ; and we could explain the
Intelligence, &c.—would remain the same throughout the two states, even though the states will have been changed.
29 If the said characters belonged to the state of life, then inasmuch as the person’s condition at the time of the performance of the action would not continue till the time of the enjoyment of its result, the enjoyer conld not be held to be the same as the doer. According to our view, however, the common character of the Pergon, Intelligence, persists throughout his life; aud as such, the Person remaining the same, the enjoyer would always be the same ag the doer.
25 This series 18 eternal, as well as omnipresent.
388 CLOKAVARTIKA.
difference among the moments of Ideas in the same way as you have ex- plained the difference of conditions (of the Soul).”
36. Reply: In fact it is extremely hard for you to prove the fact of (momentarily changing) Ideas being the doer of actions extending over a long time ;—specially when there are thousands of Ideas (in your series), the performance of a single action by all these, would be like the “ Kula-kalpa”’ (in which an action extending over a long time being incapable of being finished by a single person, is finished by a large number of persons, one coming after the other).
37. Then again, if the Series be not held to be different (from the individual Ideas constituting it), theu the individual ideas (forming the Series) being non-eternal, you could get at no doer (of any action).
88. And (even if a doer were possible) he would be totally different from the enjoyer (whieh for you would be an altogether different idea, existing at the time of the enjoyment of the result of the action); and as such, you would have the fanlt of the result appearing in favour of an agent who never performed the action. And we do not urge against you the fault of the disappearance of the result for one who has performed the action; because (in accordance with your theory) there is none who can perform the action (and as such this latter fanlt does not apply to you).
39. On the other hand, if the Series be held to be identical (with the individual Ideas), theu the mention of the word “ Series” would come to be only another expression for the same individual Ideas ; and the objec- tions against such a course have already heen stated above. And further, the Series being itself a nonentity, could nevcr get at the position of the performer of actions.
40. Jf the Series be momentary, then you have the same objections. If it be regarded as not momentary, then thdt would be an abandonment of your theory (of everything being momentary), and you would have quite a new Substance (other than Ideas, which are the only cntities you admit of).
81 Because it is necessary for the Doer to exist all along, from the commencement of the action to its end. No auch continnance would he poasible for momentary 0.11. 2
88 “ There is none who can perform,” Jc.—As shown in Karika 37.
89 “ Nonentity.”’—Inasmuch ag all individnal ideas are heing momentarily des- troyed, the series comprising these cannot hut he a negative entity.
40 “Same objection.” —Ie., tha impossibility of any one doer for an action lasting for any length of time.
“A new substance.”—And thas, too, it would be au ahandoument of your theory that Ideas are the only entities, which yon hold to be momentary. Then, if the series were to be non-momentary, it will have tu be accepted as something other than the Ideas themselves.
ATMA-VADA. 389
41. If the Series be one, and yet non-diffcrent from the individual Ideas, then we would have their identity as well as difference, as in the case of the cogniser and the cognised.
42. Therefore the Serics must differ, either entirely or partially, (from the Individual Ideas); and thus this series would come to be the same thing as the Soul (held by the Vaigéshikas and the Sankhyas).
43-44, We could not have the notion that the “ Series” (that enjoys the result) 2s the same (that performed the action), unless there be an identity (between the two). As for instance, in the case of the Scries of Air, Lamp, &c., the genuine character of the Air, &c., continues the same. Aud a notion of identity, as (between the “ Series”) based on the fact of both of them having the genuine character of “ Cognition,” has been set aside in the chapter on “ Gényavada.”’ (Thus then, in accordance with your theory, the enjoyer cannot be the same as the performer). And we have also set aside (in the chapter on Niralambanavada) your theory of (^ Impressions,” which you hold to be left upon the mind by the actions we perform, for the purpose of bringing about their results.
45. And no mind (or Idea) can, in accordance with your theory of Universal Momentariness, continue for any such time as you hold the Impressions to subsist. And further, since your ^ 86168 ?' is a nonentity, it can in no way be “‘impressed ” upon by Actions.
46. Even if you were to hold the result of the action to be enjoyed by the ^ Idea” produced gradually by a Series of Impressions (appearing
41 “Case of the Cogniser and the Cognised.’—It has been shown above, under Ginyavada, that if the Cogniser and the Cognised were both identical with Idea, then we would have differences in the Idea itself ; inasmuch as, in that case, it wonld be identical with two different things; and along with this we wonld have an identity of the Cogniser with the Cognised. Inthe samo manner, the Series being identical with the Individual Ideas, all these Ideas would become identical; and at the same time we wonld have a difference in the series itself, as this wonld be identical with differeut individuals.
42 The Vaigéshika holds that the Soul is an intelligent entity, different from the Cognitions.
43.44 You cannot explain how the series is identical: and hence you cannot prove that the Exjoyer of the Result is the samo as the Performer of the Action.
Having in the ahove manner proved the enjoyments of Results, the Banddha has reconrse to the “Impression” theory. He holds that Actions, being momen- tarily fleeting, can never keep on till the day of its final frnition. The sense of the Kériké is that this’ loophole also is barred against you; as it has already been shown te be untenable, nnder "' Nirdlambanavada.”
45 Yon hold that the Impressien continues from the time that the Action 18 per- formed to that of its fruition. But inasmuch as no mind conld continne for such time, wherein could the Impression exist 7
46 This refers to the following theory: ‘Though no single Impression can last more than one moment, yet, the Impression produced by the Action in one Idea, will
390 (101६4 ए 811८4.
one after the other),—then too, there being no identity. between the enjoying Idea (and the performing Idea), you would be clearly open to the faults of the disappearance of the result for one who has performed the action, and an appearance of it for one who has not performed it.
47. And further, it will be extremely difficult for you to prove any dif- ference (of this enjoying Idea) from those brought about by other Series, on the ground of cause and effect. Nor would that remove the objections of these (disappearance of the result for one who has performed the action, &c., &c.)
48. If, even in the absence of any such causal relation, you were to prove (the identity between the enjoying Idea and the performing Idea) in some other manuer;—then, all other grounds (of identity) that yon can bring forward—such as the facts of their residing in tle same Earth, having the common character of “Idea,” and so forth—would belong equally to all Ideas (and as such would establish an identity, not only between these two Ideas, but among all Ideas).
49. In fact, even an idea of sameness (as in the sameness of the earth; &c.}, is not possible, without the continnance of one entity for some time (and as such it is not possible for you, who hold all entities to last only onc moment). Therefore it is wrong to assert that the “Series ” (that enjoys) belongs to the same “ Person ” (Idea) that performed the action.
produce another like itself in the next Idea, and so on and on, till the time of the final fruition; and it is the last of this series of Ideas, which is to he accepted as the Enjoyer of the Result.” The sense of the objection to this is that, even then, the Idea enjoying the Resalt would not be the seme that performed the action.
41 [fan Idea be held to be the Enjoyer, even in the absence of any ideatity between this Idea and that which performed the action leading to that Result,—then, any and every Idea could be held to be such an enjoyer. If you assert that, ^" the capability of an Idea to enjoy is regulated by the relation of canse and effect, and as 80011 no stray Idea conld be the Enjoyer,”—then, in that case, in accordanoe with yonr theory of Momentary existence, no snch cansal relationship wonld be possible.—as we have already shown under the section on ‘Nirdlambanavéda.’ Even if snch a relationship were possible, it could not save yon from the objection of “ disappearance, &c.”
48 Any other reasons that you will bring forward will be fonnd to apply to all Ideas ; aud as such they could not prove the identity of the performing with the enjoy- ing Idea alone.
49 In order to avoid the objection of “the Disappearance of the Result for one who has performed the Action, &o., &o.,” the Bauddha has asserted that what enjoys the Result of the Action is the “Series” continuons with the Idea that performed the Action, and as snch the eajoyer would be the same as the Performer. But the Enjoyer cannot be the same ag the Performer, anless both of them had a common substrate, which would continue from the time of performance to that of the appearance of its Result. As a matter of fact, however, uo such continuance is possible for the Bauddha who holds all thiogs to have only a momentary existence; and hence be cannot reasonably hold the enjoyer to be the same as the Performer, aud as such 106 can uever escape from the objection in question.
ATMA-VADA. 39]
50. Because the words “ that’’—“ which” (when used together) can- uot apply to differeut objects, therefore even the upholder of the theory of the “ Series ” of Ideas, must admit of a single permanent positive entity (like our “Soul,” that could pervade over, and be the substrate of, the Idea performing the action, and the Idea enjoying the result).
51-52. Obj.: ‘Just as the father is tempted to perform actions for the accomplishment of certain results for his son, though he knows the son to be other than himself,—so, in the same manner would the individnal Ideas (be led to the performance of actions, even though the results would be enjoyed by other Ideas). And just as the children of our people, though being as different from the performing person as the son of this latter, yet do not obtain the resnits of that action,—so, in the same manner, the Ideas appearing in one Series (would not enjoy the results of the action performed by an Idea appearing in another ‘ Series ’).”
53. Reply: But we are not cognisant of any such (disinterested per- formance of an action by one Idea, for the sake of another Idea obtaining the results), As for the father, he is led to support (and improve) his son in the hope of fulfilling a certain end of his own (support in old age). There can be no such motive in your case (because the performing Idea is destroyed in a moment, and as such cannot hope to be in any way bene- fited by the results accruing to another Idea).
54. People do not support their sons, &., with any other end in view, And certainly, that (person or idea) which is destroyed cannot obtain any benefit from supporting its own line or series.
55-56, One,—who, in accordance with the same instance of the father, &९., asserts the existence of another result (to distinguish the perform-
60 There is no other means of getting rid of the aforesaid objections. And if such a single pervading entity be admitted, it would be none other than whst we call ‘Soal.
61.62 ‘Series’? =Family; “Idea performing the Action” =the Father; “ Idea ex- periencing the Result” =the Son; and “ Ideas appearing in other series * =children of other families.
65.66 Says the Bauddha: “‘ Apart from the final result of the Action, which may not appertain to the Performing Idea, there is another result in the shape of the enjoyment by one member of the series of the result brought about by benefiting another. Ifa father benefits # gon, in order that the son may impart a benefit on the other son (fz. when the father exhorts the one not to beat the other), he has a certain end in view, though the Resnlt may not accrue to himself. In the same manner, the only end in view of the Performing Idea may be the henefiting of another Idea which would bring about the fulfilment of some purpose of snother Idea; thongh the result may nat acerue to the Performing Idea itself.” This theory, however, is not quite tenable ; because whut could be the motive of the second Idea in benefiting the third? If you make its end consist in the mntual henefit accorded to one another, then, such an sssump- tion would go on withont end; and the only possible restitg-ground would be the
392 ( LOKAVARTIKA.
ing Idea), brought about by the benefit of one member (४.९.) Idea of the same Series as the performing Idea), and enjoyed by another member (Idea, of the same series),—could have no resting ground, apart from the cujoy- ment of the result by the first (performing) Idea itself. Nor do you accept any subsequent individual Idea to be exactly like the performing Idea (and as such thinking the result to be one following from its own action).
57. The greater the distance of the appearance of the result, the greater its liability to destruction, on account of the greater interval (between the performance of the action and the appearance of the result).
58. The bringing up of children that we come across among animals, may be held to be due to their ignorance, but the action of knowing intel- ligent men cannot possibly be so.
59. It is not possible for the Ideas to transfer themselves into ano- ther body (at re-birth ; cf. K. 34); inasmuch as we are not cognisant of their exit from the present body.
60-61. The flame &c., move from one place to another, only when they are blown npon by the wind; whereas there is nothing that could move an Idea from the body in which it has appeared (which is its cause). Being immaterial (formless), the Idea could not by itself move from one place to another. And for the same reason (of immateriality) it is not possible for the Idea to move about even while the Body is living.
enjoyment of the Result by the Performing Idea itself. This, however, will not be possible for you; as you cannot, consistently with your own theory, admit the con- tinuance of the Performing Idea from the time of the performance of the Action to that of its Fruition; nor can yon accept the existence of any other subsequent idea tbat could oonsider itself identical with the Performing Idea, and thereby consider the result to have followed from its own Action; as all subsequent Ideas are equally different from the original performing Idea; and the only entity that could point to any such identity would be the positive one of the elass ‘Idea,’ which would not be very acceptahle to you.
6? The Performer can think the result to be his own, only if it follow contiguously with bimself. If, however, the Result be removed from him, then, the greater the degree of the removal, the more will be the chance of his ceasing to think it his own; and as such there wonld be all the less connection between the Performer and the Result.
58 Intelligent persons are led toaction, only by the idea of the Action being capable of leading to a desirable end; and this has been shown to be impossible for the Bauddha.
69 This is not possible because of the immateriality of Ideas. It is only a material entity that oan either transfer itself, or be transferred, from one body to another.
60-61 Even when the body is living, any motion of Ideas is not possible. Because if the Idea were material and moveable, then, it wonld very often lose connection with tbe Body; as both are moveable, and both would not be always moving together. And this severence of connection might oocasionally make the body non-intelligeut,
ATMA-VADA. 398
62. An intermediate (subtle) Body has beeu rejected by Vindhya- vasin. We too find no proofs of its existence.
63. That the subtle body, endowed with all sorts of subtle forms, &c., is suddenly brought into existence (at death), and as suddenly disappears (at re-birth), is only an imaginary assertion.
64. Even if such a body existed, there are no grounds for believing in the movement (४,९.) entrance) of Ideas into it. And consequently the assumption of the Ideas being thrown into the next body is also ground- less.
65. To assert that the Ideas exist in the embryo is a sheer piece of recklessness. Since no sense-organs have been produced in the embryo, no objects can be cognised (by It).
66. And of an Idea (or Cognition), we do not know of any other form than that of a cognition of objects. It is for this reason that no cognition is possible in a coma (even though the senses continue to exist).
62 Some people hold that the Ideas acquired by man during the present life are transferred to him at his future birth; and in tho interval, the Ideas continue to exiet in a subtle Linga Qartra, which lies eucased in the Body during life, and becomes dis- engaged from it at death, to ocoupy the next physioal body of the Person. And inasmuch as this subtle Body is ths seat of Ideas, these latter can be easily transmitted from one body to another. The Karika says that it has been shown by Vindhyavasin that such a subtle Body has uo existence at all.
63 Inasmuob as there is no cause for its sndden appearance, and as sudden dis- appsarance, the statement must be regarded as a figurative exaggeration and not य statement of faots. Beoause there is no Body apart from the five elements; and any Body composed of these cannot be subtle.
84 The Ideas bsing immaterial cannot enter into ths subtle Body; and for this reason they caunot be transmitted to any other Body.
65 If the Ideas of one Body were to be transmitted to another, then, the embryo would be already posssased of the Ideas of the previous life; as a matter of fact, however, the embryo cognises no objects; and in thse absence of the objects of cognition, there can bs no reason for asserting the presence of the Cognition or the Idea itself. It might be asked—‘“ How is it that yoor eternally intelligent Soul does not cognise objects in the smbryonio state?” Ths reply to this 16 that, though our Sonl 18 eter- nally intelligent, yet for actual cognitions, it etands in need of such accessories as the organs of 86०66, &o., and inasmaoch as these do not appear in the embryonic state, the Soul is unable to cogniss any objects. Then, as for mental coguition, the mind too 18 under the inflasnce of his former Karma; and as such its functioning is hampered in the embryonic state ; but as soon as the sinister Karmic influenos is set aside, con- sciousness is regained.
66 Tnasmnoh as, in a state of coma, there is no cognition of objects, we conoluds that thers 18 no cognition at all in that etate ; though the regaining of consciousness wonld indicate that certain cognitions existed in that state, yet, iuasmuch as we find the man not recognising any objects, we conclude that there are no cognitions or Ideas in his mind; and this cessation of cogaition must bs dae to the cessation of the functioning of the ssnse-organs.
50
394 QLOKAVARTIKA.
67. Nor can it be held that at that time (in the embryonic state) the Idea continues in a state of latent potentiality. Because, in the absence of any substratum for such potentialities, their existence cannot be admitted.
68. If the potentiality of Ideas resided in the material sense-organs, then these latter would have intelligence ; and there would be. no re-birth (inasmuch as the Intelligence and the Ideas would all die away with the death of the sense-organs, which being material, would be bound to die with the Body). |
69. And further, (if the potentiality of Ideas resided in the sense- organs) then, all Ideas would be brought abont by the sense-organs them- selves,—these helping the manifestation of the potentialities by modification, discrimination, &c. And hence the Idea could not be held to be preceded (and brought about) by another Idea (as held by the Idealist Bauddha).
70. In the same manner, you could have no instance to prove the as- sertion that the first Idea (of a person) after the embryonic state (2.९. at birth) has its origin in another foregoing Idea.
71. If in the embryonic state, the potentiality (of Ideas) he held to exist, without any substrate, for the sake of the accomplishment of subse- quent Ideas,—then, these would be nothing but (our) “Soul” under the name of ^ Potentiality.”
67 In fact, this potentiality cannot be anything other than the idea iteelf, according to the Idealiat.
69 We find that whenever intelligence 18 joined to the elements (€ g., with the clay in the making of the jar), the object, jar, being developed ont of the elements, we come to realise that the intelligence that took part in ita making is something other than, and to be duly discriminated from, the material form of the objeot. And in the same manner, if the potentiality were to reside in the material sense-organs, then we could get at the Ideas (of which those were the potentialities) only by discriminating the im- material factor from the material effects brought about by the seneca themselves; and the appearanoe of the Idea could not, for this reason, be said to be due to any previons Idea.
10 The Banddha aseerte that inasmuch as during life we find all ideag to be due to some previous Idea, we can from this deduce the fact that the very firat Idea that a person has at birth must be due to a previous idea; and as this latter idea must have existed in the embryonic state, we cannot bnt admit of the persistence of Ideas in that state. The sense of the Kartka is that the Bauddha bases his argnment upon the inatance of the second and subsequent Ideas appearing at the birth; but as a matter of fact, these ideas are due, not to any previous Ideas, but tn the sense-organe; and as such the argument becomes 08861688.
11 It has been proved that the potentialities of Ideas have no substrates ; hence the Karikd takes up the other alternative for consideration. ‘‘ Soul *—because we also hold the Soul to be without any substrate, and capable of moving from one body to the other. And as the Banddha holds his ‘‘ Potentiulity’’ to bave these two obaraoterestioa, we
admit the same entity, but with different names —we oall it “ Soul” while you name it ^ Potentiality.”
ल
ATMA-VADA. 395
^
72. If we were to assume any substrate for the potentiality, such sub- strate could be none other than the Soul. And as a matter of fact, the exis- tence of Ideas, lke that of flame, bubbles, &c., is not possible without a substrate.
73. Therefore you must admit that there is a Person (Soul), bearing the potentialities of Ideas, and being eternal, omnipresent, and capable of (mivrating into) another body. And as such, even though not actually moving, 1४ would become connected with another body.
74. On account of its active character, the Soul comes to be the per- former of sacrifices. Wedo not hold “ motion” to be the only form of action, as held by the Vuigéshtkas.
75. It is not always only such an action as inheres in (४.९.) belongs to the body of) the performer himself, that can be performed by him. All that is expressed by a verbal root would be an action (and hence motion cannot be held to be the only form of action) ; and we find that the charac- ter of being the performer of an action belongs to a person, even when the action properly belongs to (is performed by) another person, (and therefore it cannot be held that an action must always inhere in the performer himself).
76. Of the different forms of pure being and Idea, &९, (the immaterial factor) the Person (2.९.) the Soul) himself is the direct doer; and as for the motion of the material factors (४,९.) the body), these too are brought about, only by his superintendence (or guidance). |
77. As whatever actions are performed by the body, the sense-organs
78 The proof of its eternality consists in the fact of its being recognised as the same at different points of time, aud also of distinct Vedic declaratione to that effect. And as it is not material, it must be all-pervading, like the Akéga; and as such it could become easily connected with another body; which could not be possible if it were material and as such limited. It is only a material object that requires movement in order to become connected with new hodies. The soul, on the other hand, heing im- material and all-pervading, does not stand in need of any movement.
1# This refers to the following objection: ‘ Bemg omnipresent, the soul could have no action; and as such it could not be considered as the performer of sacrifices.” The sense of the Karika is that it is only action in the shape of movement that is not possible for an omnipresent entity ; other kinds of action are quite compatible with omnipresence. And, like the Naiydyika, we do not reduce all action to the terms of ^ motion.’
16 {11676 is no such rule as that all the actions that a person performs, must neces- sarily appertain to his own hody. For, we actually find that even when an action is performed by one person, another person is also accepted to be its performer, by reason of his having either urged the former to action, or helped him in it.
16 Without the guiding Soul, there could be no movement of the hands, do. And hence of these movements also the Sonl must be regarded as the Performer,
Tl “ With regard to him” —i.e., bacause he enjoys the results of all actions.
396 QLOKAVARTIKA.
&c., are all said to be done by the Person himself; because they are done with regard to him.
78. Since these—the body, sense-organs, &c.,—could bave no action without their belonging to the Person, therefore even with regard to the mo- tion (of hands, &c.), they cannot be said to be the doers, inasmuch as they are not independent (of the intelligence of the soul, even in this form of action).
79. Since it is only such body and sense-organs, é&c., as are earned by the Person for himself by means of previous deeds, that can perform the actious,—the character of being the performer of the actions must belong to the person; just as the actions performed by the “ Réwik”’ (sacrificial priest) and the “axe” (have their real performers, in the first case, in the Person who engages the priest and pays him for it, and, in the second, the person who uses the axe).
80. Just as, in the case of the sacrifice, the action is held to be per- formed by the mere instrumentality of the priest, on the ground of the Veda declaring the ‘‘ buying” (of the priest); so, in the same manner, on account of the Veda enjoining “ going” and other such actions (which are not possible for the Soul itself directly), we accept them to be brought about through (the instrumentality of) the Body, &c.
81. For, just as the “buying” cannot apply to the Soul, so too “ going” cannot apply to it. Therefore the fact of the Soul being the per-
.former of such actions, as declared in the Veda, must be accepted as being possible only through (the instrumentality of) something else (in one case, the priest, and in another, the Body, &c.)
82. And again, just as in the case of cutting, which resides in the wood, Devadatta is accepted to be the doer; so too, in the case of going, which resides in the Body, we conld hold the Person himself to be the doer.
83. If it be urged that, “im the case of cutting, the idea of the Person
18 Deprived of the intelligence of the Soul, these can have no action.
79 The meaning is that the Body, &c., are only the agents and instrnments of action ; end aa 6001 these cannot be held to be the ‘ doers’ ; aa the ‘ Doer’ is that persou who obtains these instrnments, throngh 118 former deede, and then ४868 them in hia present 8611008.
80 Buying”’—engaging him and paying him for his services. And 86 he is paid for the work, he cannot be the real ‘performer’ of the sacrifice. And inagsmnoh as the “buying” that ia enjoined cannot apply to the master of the sacrifice, he cannot but accomplish the sacrifice by engaging certain priests to perform the detaila for him, Similarly in the ordinary actions of moving, &o., enjoined for the person, not being found applicable to the Sonl itself, we must admit of the instramentality of the Body, &c., in the accomplishment of these actions, which would not be poseible without this instrumentality.
88 Determination and existence cannot belong to the Body; just as the manipala- tion of the axe ७९५०६ belong to the wood that is cut by it.
AYMA+VADA. 357
being the doer is based upon other actions (that of[manipulating the axe f.i.), which helongs to the Person himself,”’—then (we reply that) in the case in question too (that of going, §c.), the idea of the Person being the mover is based upon determination and existence (which belong to the Soul itself).
84, By the mere fact of its existence, the Soul becomes the doer of all actions in general; and it comes to be held to be the doer of particular in- dividual actions, on account of the determination (of the Person) which affects each action separately.
85-86. And the action of all the agents, performing a certain action, is not identical ; ¢e.g., the fighting soldier moves—the sword to cutting, by his movements; the commander of the regiment (moves it) only by his word (of command); and the King, who employs the servants, moves it at times hy his mere presence.
87. Therefore even though the Soul may not itself move, yet it may he held to be the performer (of motion); just as even though Devadatta is not cut (or pierced) (by the sword), yet he is held to he the performer (of the cntting).
88-89. The taking of the present body, &c., by means of the bodily actions (performed in his previous life) may be considered to be the actions of the Person with regard to his agency of the actions of his present hody, &c. And the actions of the previous life too may be held to he
84 By its mers existence, the Soul is the doer of all actions. And it is held to be the performer of a particular action, when it 18 fonnd that the action has been brought about hy a special determination on the part of the Person.
85.86 And yat all of them are accepted to be the performers of the action of cutting the enemies.
81 In both cases, the idea of the Person being ths doer is based upon the fact of his superintending and guiding the aotion.
88.89 Even if it be absolutely necessary to hold that all action is in the form of motion, then too, we could hold that the actions done by means of the hand, &e., by the Ego, in his last life, are his aotions with regard to the actions of bis body in the present life, &o., &c. The connection between the two seta of actions lies in the fact of present bodily conditions &c., being the effects of the Ego’s actions in the previous life. Just as we can trace no beginning in the use of the seed and the tree,—so too none can be traced for the Creation; and the process must be regarded as going on, eternally withont beginning, and without end. “ And on the disappearance, &e.” This refers to the following objection: “The body of other Egos is as different from the one Ego as his own hody. Consequently, if his actions were to be affected by those of his body,—- then, even when all his own actions will have been exhansted by fruition, he wonld still continue under the bondage imposed by the actions of tho bodies of other 1208 ; and as such no Deliverance would he possible.” The sense of the reply as embodied in the Kériké is, that the Ego is affected by the action of his own hody, only hecause he imparts the guiding force to these actions, and as such, is himself, in a way, the per- former of them. ‘As for the actions of the body of the Egos,—as one Ego has no guiding force over the action of other Egos,—they could not affect him.
398 QLOKAVARTIEA.
brought about by the Body, d&c., of the birth previous to it; and these too by other Bodies, and soon. And thus there is no beginning of these (and hence endlessness cannot be any fault), And, on the disappearance of all his own actions, the Ego cannot be affected by the actions of those bodies that are not his own.
90. In the case of the measure prescribed for the Udumbara Post, which is to serve as the connecting link (between the Master and the Priest),—the application of the form of the Sacrificing Ego is not possible ; and hence his agency with reference to this must be through the Body.
91. ‘Therefore just as the Scripture, though literally laying down the “Class” (“Vrihi” 1.1.), is made to refer to the individual (Vrihz) (on account of the impossibility of the use of the ‘‘ Class”’),—so the injunction (of the measure of the stick) though really referring to the Ego, must be taken to apply to the Body, &c.
92. First of all (before giving its own reasons) the (Bhdshya men- tions and) refutes the arguments brought forward by others ( Vaigéshtkas), to prove the) existence of the Soul. ‘Na’ (in the Bhashya) has to be separated from the following sentence (meaning that ‘breathing, d&e., are not properties of the Body’), because these (breathing, é&c.), are unlike other properties (of the Body).
०3. Says the Vaigéshtka: “(If Breathing be denied to be a property of the Body, on the sole ground that it does not last as long as the Body lasts, then) the fact of not lasting as long as the Body lasts would also apply to leanness, &c. And if it be held that ‘leanness’ is only a parti-
cular condition (of the Body), then we can hold ‘ Death’ also to be the same,”
90 It is prescribed that tbe Sacrificial Post is of the same size as the Master. The Ego, however, is illimitable; and hence as no post of thie illimitable size would be possible, we are forced to have it of the size of his body.
% This refers to the Bhashya: ‘ We infer the ewistence of the Soul from breathing, &c.’ The second 11817 refers to the sentence ‘na pranddayah gariragunavidharmanah.’ This latter sentence would mean that the breathing, &c. 876 properties similar to those of the hody. This not being qnite admissible, the के undertakes to explain it differently. The ‘na’ is taken as denying the foregoing objection (that the breathing belongs to the Body); and then, as a reason for this denial, it is added ‘ hecause the breathing, &c., are not similar to the properties of the Body, they cannot belong to the Body.’ These arguments, up to Kérikd 101, are exponnded by the Vaicgéshika. And then np to K. 106 we havo the refnotation of the Vaigéshika arguments from the Banddha standpoint; and lastly, from 107 the Mimdnsaka’s own arguments are put forward.
98 Leanness, &c., appear and disappear, and as such cannot be acoepted as coucomi” tant and coeval with the Body. ^" Death, &o.,”—just as the Leanneas of the Body, being only one of its varying conditions, reverts to it after the disappearance of the opposing condition of Fatness ;—so Death also, being a varying condition of the Body, might dis- appear; and with this disappearance, the breathing, etc., might return.
, 21114 -ए 274. 399
94. ‘There is only this much of difference between the two cases: that even while the Body continues in a perfectly healthy state, the breathing, &c., cease (as in cases of sndden death); and (of this cessation) there can be no other reason (than that the breathing belonged to the Soul which has left the body).
95-96. ‘Because (1) a property is destroyed when the substance itself is destroyed, and (2) when there is production of a contradictory property, then the former property is removed from the substance, and forthwith destroyed. In the case of Death none of these two (causes for the destruction of Breathing) is, by any person, found to apply; and yet we find that even while the Body is not destroyed (and remains intact), the Breathing, &c., cease altogether,
97. ‘*Therefore we conclude that Breathing, &c., are not the pro- perties of the Body,—because these cease to exist, while the Body is yet seen to exist, — just like the odour of flower-garlands and sandal-paintings.
98. - ^ Breathing, &c., having an existence external (to the Body), are perceived by other people’s senses (and as such may be said to be the properties of some exterior object); but Pleasure, &c., having only an internal existence, are not 8५ perceived (and as such, they can point to the existence of the Soul).
99. These (Pleasure, &c.,) are always cognisable by such inferential marks 28 a happy countenance and the like. If it be urged that—‘ (the Pleasure really belongs to the Body, but) is not perceived on account of its internal existence,’—(we reply that) even on tearing open the Body (at Death) we do not find the Pleasure, &c., there.
100. “On tearing open the Body, we can see the colour, &c., of the
95.96 All causes of the disappearance of properties are enumerated here; and as none of these is foand applicable to the case of the cessation of Breathing in a healthy Body, we must admit that Breathing is a property, not of the Body, but of the In- telligent Ego, that leaves the Body at death.
97 The Odour ceases even while the Body continues ; hence it is accepted to be a property, not of the Body, but of the garland.
98 This refers to the following objection: “ Breathing is found to consist of certain movements in the Air; and as snch, though it cannot be the property of the Body, yet it can belong to the Air; and hence it coald not prove the existence of the Soul.” The sense of the Kdariké is that the explanation might hold good for the Breathing, which, as having an existence outside the Body, is perceptible by other people’s senses. But the Pleasure, &c., of the person, which are only inferable from his countenance, cannot be so perceived; and hence these could not be attributed to any objects outside the Body.
99 If Pleasare belonged to the Body, occupyiag a position inside this latter, then at death, when the Body is torn open, we conld see this Pleasure encased there. In- agmuch as such is not the case, we conclude that it belongs to the Soul, and as such disappears with the Soul, at death.
400 CLOKAVARTIEA.
interior of the Body, but not Pleasure, &e. Therefore, like the Mind, and the Will, these (Pleasure, &c.), too cannot be regarded as properties of the Body.
101. “Pleasure, &९., being properties, must have a substrate, like taste, &c., and that which is the substrate of these (Pleasure, d&c.,) is the Soul.”
101-102. The Bauddha replies: “One who argues thus (as shown in Karikas 92-101) must be answered thus: It 18 only when a certain entity is established to be a property, that from the fact of its depending upon some other (substrate) we infer the existence of the object (or person) having that property. But for us Pleasure, &., are not established to be properties (and as such these, cannot prove the existence of the Soul).
108. ‘ How is it that the case of Remembrance (Memory), exactly resembling the case of Desire, is brought forward (in the Bhdshya) as something different? Both (are equal, since both) equally do not apply to unperceived objects, and both can be explained as being १८९ to ‘ Impres- sion’ ( Vasané).
101 It cannot be urged that “ Pleasure has no substrate, and 88 ench could not prove the existence of the Sonl.”
, 101-102 Beginning with thie, down to K. 106, we have the refutation of the above Vaicéshika argumente, from the standpoint of the Bauddha. Ae the Bauddha does not admit of Pleseure being a Property, the argument based upon thie snpposition can have no force for him,
108 The Bhaéshyoa, having established the inoapability of Pleesure proving the exie- tence of the Soul, pnts forward Desire as the property that would eetablish its exietence, This ia thne explained in the Kactka : ‘ Desire refers only to euch an object as hse heen perceived before, and found to be agreeable. Thus thie Desire cennot but belong to the game entity to whom this previone cognition belonged. Asa matter of faot, we do find a person desiring something to-day which he had perceived yesterday; and hence we must admit of the existence of an eternal entity, other than the Perceptione, which per- ceives the thing one day, and desires it on the next.’ To thie argument, the Idealiet is represented (in the Bhdshya), as making the following reply: ^ There ie nothing that 0811101 be cognised by the means of Right Notion, and as euch we cannot admit of any other entity eave the Idea; eo Desire also, ag apart from Perception, cannot be proved to us; and hence the mere existence of Desire could not convince us of the existence of the Soul. Then, 98 for the fact of the desiring entity being the same ae the perceiving entity, we could explain that on the ground of hoth—Deeire and Perception— belonging to the same Serres af Ideas, the Desire being brought about by the Impressions left by the Perception.” Having thue found Desire also unable to convince the opponent of the Soul’s existence, the Bhéshya pute forward Memory, ae affording the reason for the 90178 existence, the procese of reasoning being the same as in the case of Desire. And thie also the Idealist is represented as rejecting on the same grounde as before. It is with 8 view to this that the दक्र asks—'‘ When the grounde in enpport, ae well aa the arguments against, Memory are exactly the same as those in the case of Desire, why should the Bhashya have put forward Memory, after Desire had been rejected ? ”
ATMA-VADA. ` 101
104-105. “A Desire is produced by a mere remembrance (of the object) independently of any direct idea of the perception itself; and hence it is not necessary that the nominative of this (Desire) should always be the same as that of Perception. While, on the other hand, Remembrance is always in accordance with perception; and hence its nominative is always the same (as that of Perception) ; and it is for this reason that the case of Remem- brance is brought forward (in the Bhashya) again (i.e., even after the refuta- tion of the capability of Desire).
106. “In this case (of Remembrance) too, since the Impression (that causes Remembrance) is in the same ‘ Series’ (of Ideas),—therefore we can explain Remembrance (as being due to the same Impression), even though it be different (from Desire).”
107. The arguments of other theorists (for proving the existence of the Soul) being thus rejected, the Bhashya proceeds to show that the Soul is
itself directly cognisable by the notion of ‘ I.” 108-109. Though, in the assertion “I go,’ the word “I” refers to the Body, inasmuch as it is the Body that goes, going being impossible for
104.105 These Kdrikas point out the difference between the cages of Desire and Memory. It often happens that one man perceives an object and finds it agreeable; and then he degcrihes it to another person, who comes to have a Desire for that object; and thng it is not always the case that the desiring entity is the same as the perceiving en- tity. In the case of Memory, however, the person remembering an object could not but be the same that had previonsly perceived it.
106 This Ké@riké points ont the grounds on which the Idealist rejects the capability of Memory establishing the Soul’s existence. The Impression that canses the remem- brance, (and which is the hasis of Memory) always occurs in the same ‘Series of Ideas’ as that which causes the Desire. Consequently, even thongh the case of Remembrance might differ from that of Desire, in the point shown in the previous Kérikd, yet, inas- much as the fact of being brought about by Impressions 18 common to hoth, the ground of refutation too would he exactly the same in hoth. Just as the case of the desiring entity being the same as the perceiving entity has heen explained on the ground of the Desire being brought about by an Impression occurring in the same ‘ Series’ as the Perception,— 80) in the same manner, we could also explain the fact of the remembering person being the same as the perceiving one, on the ground of the Remembrance being due to the Im- pression occurring in the same ‘ Series‘ as the original Perception.
161 With this काद begins the explanation of the Mimansaka’s own arguments for proving the existence of the Soul. In accordance with this theory, the Sonl is the object of the notion of ‘1’ which is directly perceptible hy the Senses, and does not rest 7007 mere Inferences
108.109 Thongh the ‘I’ in ‘I go’ may be taken to refer to the Body,—and similarly the fact of our remembering a thing to-day as it was perceived some days ago, as alsa the fact of onr recognising a certain thing as being the same that was perceived by us a few days ago, &c., &c.—all these may be explained, somehow or other, as being due to ^ Impressions appearing in the ‘ Series of Ideas,’ &., &c.—yet the recognition of one’s own self as heing the same to-day as it was yesterday, cannot be explained except hy postulating an eternal
ot
402 QLOKAVARTIKA.
the Soul,—and though Remembrance and Recognition, with regard to other objects, may be due to “ Impressions ” ;—yet the recognition of the Cognising Self (by itself as being the same to-day as it was yesterday) is hard to be got at (by “‘ Impression,” &c.)
110. It cannot but be admitted that in the assertion “I know,” the “T” cannot but refer to the Knower ;—this Knower may be either the ^ Idea” (as held by the Bauddha) or the substrate of the Idea, the ‘‘ Ego” (or “ Per- son.’’)
111-112. The applicability of Intelligence to the material elements making up the Body and the Senses, &c.—considered either as one complete whole or severally (each element by itself), or as having been modified into a particular shaped Body to be discriminated from other material objects, Body, &c.,)—has been rejected by the Sankhyas and others, on the gronnds of the Body (1) being impure, (2) being a partite whole, (3) ‘having a Shape, (4) being material, and (5) being a Body,—like material elements
8०४1, Thus then, it 18 the recognition of the Self that is brought forward by the Bhashya as a fact proving the existence of the Soul. Itcannot be denied that the object of the previous cognition, and that of the subsequent recognition are one and the same. Con- sequently, even if you have recourse to ‘Impreesione,’ these must be held to be bronght abont by the previous cognition of the Soul.
110 In the case of ‘I go’ we admit of the fact of the ‘I’ referring to the Body, only becanse ‘going’ is not possible forthe Sont. But in the case of ‘I know’ the case is quit® the reverse, the ‘I’ refering directly to the Soul; as it is the Soul alone to which ‘Knowing’ could apply, as it could not apply either to the Budy or to the Sense-organs, The word ‘ I’ therefore muet be taken as referring to the Knower; and we shall prove later on—in K,115 et seqg.—that the Idea cannot be the Knower ; and hence ‘ I’ cannot bunt refer to the Soul.
11.119 ^ Considered either as one complete, Sc.’—The question is— Does Intelligence belong to each of the elements composing the Body, or to all of them, ounsidered ae one composite whole? Ag w matter of fact, it 18 not found to exist in the elements, earth and the rest, when these exiet separately hy themeelvee. Nor can it exist in all of them taken collectively ; because that which does not belong to the parts canuot belong to the whole. For the same reason the Intelligence oannot be regarded as belonging to these modified into a particular corporeal shape, for the purpose of beiug disoriminated from other Bodies. Because even then, the constituents of that shape remain the same earth or the rest, which have been foundtobe devoid of Intelligence. Thue then, innamach as [Intelligence cannot belong either to the Body or to the Sense-organs, these cannot be regarded asthe Knower referred to hy the ‘I’ in the sentence‘ I know.’ The ‘ impurity ' of the Body ९०81808 in its being made up of the three attributes—Sativa, &८. Just asthe elements, having the aforesaid four properties—being a partite whole, §’c.—are devoid of Intelligence, so must the Body aleo be; as this also has the said four properties. And just as the dead Body, having all the characteristics of the Body, is fouud to be devnid of Intelligence, co also must the living Body be regarded to ba; because there is no dif- ference between the material conetituents of the dead Body, and those of the living one,
ATMA-VADA. 403
(which is an instance applying to the first four premises), and like the dead Body (which is an instance applying to the last premiss)
113. If all (the material elements constituting the Body) had Intelli- gence, then all being equal (in importance) could not 6 related to one another. And if only one of them had intelligence, then the fact of the other (elements) being its auxiliary would become incompatible.
114. An embodied whole and a shape could never exist, except for the purpose of some other entity, If we have a distinct enjoying (expe- riencing) Agent (inthe shape of the Soul apart from the body), endowed with Intelligence, then the incompatibility ceases.
115-116. If the knower were only an Idea, then your knower would be a momentary entity ; and then there could he no recognition of any pre- vious cogniser (being the same as the one at the present moment) : as that €: [ knew this before, and I know it also now.”
117-119. Because of this (recognition), which +" Idea-moment ” would be the object ? With regard to the previous event (cognition in the past) we would have the notion “I knew”; and then the assertion “I know it also at the present moment” could not he true (with reference to the same cogniser), hecause the ‘‘ Moment-idea ”’ (that cognised the previous idea) does not cognise the present Idea (since the past idea must have disappeared in- stantly, and as such could not cognise any idea at the present time). And a cogniser at the present time is known from the assertion “I know”; and in this case, the assertion “ I knew it" wonld not be true (with regard to the present cogniser). Because the present cognising Idea could not (have been present at any past time, and as such could not) have cognised (the object) inthe past. If both (the present and the past cognising Ideas) were to be the objects of (recognition) then both would be false, inasmuch
118 * Could not be related, Se.’’—Those that are equally important cannot bear any relationship to one another,—as declared hy Jaiminiin the Sitra :-—‘ Subsidiaries, all being equal, in that they are subservient to others, cannot bear any relationship to one another.” (VI—iv—13). If one element were intelligent, then, it would not require the aid of the others, and the Body wonld be conatituted by that one element only
119 Of. Sankhyakdrika 17
116 With this begins the refutation of the Bawddha theory that the “Idea” is the knower.
116-19 “ Both would be false.’—The past and the present cognising Ideas being (in your opivion) different from ove another, could not be the object of the eubsequent recognition. Because this could be possible, only if both the cognising Ideas had joint- ly cognised the object, both on the former ocoagion and on the present one. This, however is by no means possible; because the present Idea had no existence on the former occasion; nor could the past Idea exist at the present moment. According to us, the Soul that cognised on the former 00098107 is the same that cognises at the present moment; and as such Recognition is only natural.
404 OLOKAVARTIKA.
as both of them did not cognise it in.the past ; nor do they both cognise it at the present moment
120. . ‘The “series” (of ideas) cannot be said to be the object of Recog- nition; because none of the two forms (past and present) can possibly belong to it. As the series did not cognise it in the past (as 16 did not exist at the time of the first cognition), nor does it cognise it at the pre- sent moment, because of its non-objective (unreal) character.
121-122: Nor is there any common element in the past and present cognising Ideas (as the Bauddha does not admit of any class notion) Tf it be nrged that Recognition is due to similarity,—then, we could not have any recognition in the case of dissimilar ideas; as in the case “I knew the cow before, and (the same) I know the horse now.”
122-123. If it be urged that both have the common character of being the cogniser—then, that would also belong to other persons, and, then, in the case of the cognition of all men, we would come to recognise the “ I.”
123-124, Even if both these (cognising ideas had the similarity of) appearing in the same “series’’ (of ideas),—then, too, all the recognition we could have would be in the form of “ That,”—just as we have with regard to the cognitions of other persons, or with regard to external objects like the jar, &c. (when seen twice).
124-125. ^“ Impressions” are able to bring about the recognition of
120 ^ Non-objective character.” —Because, according to the Bauddha, the “ Series” cannot he permanent $ nor can it be momentary ; as it is held to consist of many moment- ary Ideas. And as such this ^ Series” cannot he regarded as non-objective, or nnreal.
121.22 The Bauddha does not admit of any such class as “Idea.” =^ Dissimilar” —in the case cited, the previous cognition is that of the cow, and the present one is that of the horse; consequently there can be no similarity hetween the two cognisers, on the ground of the cognitions, which are not similar to one another; and hence the recogui- tion of the cogniser of the present cognition as heing the same as that of the previous one cannot he said to he due to similarity.
122.23 If the mere fact of both being cognisers were sufficient ground for the re- cognition of one as being the same as the other, then, inasmuch as one person wonld he as much w cogniser as another person, we would come to recognise the two persons as identical; and this would he an absurdity; as it would mean that, whoever the cogniser may he, he would always be recognised as ‘J’ !!
128.24 Granting that the two cognising Ideas have the similarity of appearing in the same ^ Series,” and that as such one could he recognised as being the same as the other,—even then, we could recognise the present, as heing the past, only in the form ‘ this 18 that ;’ and we could not have any notion of ‘I’ init. Beoanse the Cognition is as much different from the ‘I,’ as another person’s Cognition, or as any external objeot. Consequently, the recognition laid down by you cannot explain the recognition of the “I” in the assertion—‘I who see the cow to-day am the same that saw the horse yesterday.
124-25 We admit the ability of the Impressions to bring about the recognition of
ATMA-VADA. 405
the cogniser ; but they cannot bring about, with regard to an object, the idea of something that it is not; for ‘‘ Impressions” are not a cause of mis- taken notions (and the notion with regard to an object as being something that it is not, cannot but be a mistaken one).
125-126. And the notion of “1” is not a mistaken one ; as it 18 not set aside by any subsequent cognition; and naturally, this notion of “1” cannot refer to any other object than the cogniser, as we always find the coguiser to be known by the notion of “1.”
127. The notions of “J,”—as in “Tam heavy, or fat, or lean, d&c.,” when taken as referring to the Body,—must be held to be- mistaken ones. Becanse the fact of the Body being different from the “I” is proved by such assertions as that “my Body is heavy,” &e.
128. With regard to the sense-organs too, we find that they are al- ways spoken as being different from the ‘“‘I ’—e.g., in the assertions “ this my eye is so and so,” “my mind is wandering,” and the like.
129. Thus then, the fact of the body not being the cogniser having been established, if there be any notion of identity (between the cognising ५५ ] ** and the Body), even when the one is different from the other, then this cannot but be a mistake due to extreme proximity (of the cogniser with the Body)
130. The idea of “my Soul,” indicating differeuce (between the soul and the ‘‘I”’), must be explained as being due to the difference (from the soul) of “cognition,” which is a state of the soul (and hence often spoken of as such)
131. Of the word “My ” (४.९.) 1’) the direct denotation can be none
the present cogniser as identical with the past. But such recognition could be possible only when the two cognisers would be identical. On the other hand,}when there is a distinct difference between the two (and the Bauddha has failed to prove their identity), then, in no case could the one be recognised as the other,—even by means of Impres- sions; specially as such a recognition conld only be a misconception. 126.28 We always have an idea of our own self whenever we cognise an object to he the object of the notion of ‘I.’ Hence the notion cannot refer to the Body. 121 “J am heavy” always means that ‘my body is heavy.” Consequently the notion of ‘I’ in this expression, when made to refer to the Body alone, apart from all ‘notion of one’s self, cannot but he false. If there were no difference between the “1” and the Body, then we could have no such notion as ‘my’ body, and the like. 129 “ Any notion of identity” as in ‘I am heavy 180 This refers to the following objection: ‘‘ Just as we speak of my body, 80 we do also of my soul; and this wonld prove that the Soul is something other than the I.”’ The sense of the reply is that ‘ my-Soul,’ =my cognition,—cognition heing a condition of the Soul is spoken of as the ‘ Soul’; and certainly the cognition is something other than the ‘1.’ 181 ^ Aforesaid cause,” t.e., the fact of the cognition being different from the ‘I,’ and yet being spoken of as ‘ Soul,’ on account of the Cognition being a particular condi- tion of the Soul
406 QLOKAVARTIKA.
other than the “ Soul” ; therefore the notion of difference (expressed in “My soul”) must be due to the aforesaid cause, and the difference is due to the difference of “Cognition,” (and therefore the expression “ My soul” cannot be taken to point to any other soul than the one expressed by the “1” in the word “ My ”).
182. Those alone, who have no knowledge of the difference (of the soul from the Body), can have a notion of “I” with regard to the Body. But even in this case (they have this notion with regard to the Body, only because) they think the body to be the Soul, Hence the notion of “I” must always (be accepted to) refer to the Soul.
133. Those, however, who have a knowledge of the difference (be- tween the Soul and the Body), have no notion of “1” with regard to the Body. ‘And as for the notion of “I? expressed in “I know,” this 18 never set aside.
184. For, if this notion were absent in the Yogis, how could they have any ideas, while instructing their disciples? And we do find them thus engaged (in instructing) ; therefore we must admit that they are cognisant of the ^ Soul.”
185. In a case where only a half of a certain scripture, &c., has been learnt, if one were not to have any idea that “I have learnt this much,” then (when taking up the study of the work after some time), he would have to learn from the beginning again.
136. Thus then, we would have a rejection of the theory of the non- existence of the Soul, by means of the aforesaid Recognitions (of the Soul), experienced by all persons. And the following are the counter-arguments (against the arguments, brought forward by the other side, to deny the existence of the Soul). |
159 Though they think the Body as ‘I,’ yet, inasmuch asthe Body 18 ४180 thought of as the Cogniser, and aa eternal, &c., &c.,—they make no difference between the Body and the Soul; and thus for them, the Body being identical with the Sonl, it 38 only natural that the notion of ‘I’ should refer to tae Body $ and in this case, this would not he adverse to the notion that ‘I’ refers {0 the Soul.
183“ As for the notion, Jc.” This refers tothe following objection: “People who have reached the highest grades of knowledge, cease to have any notion of ‘I’ with re- gard to the Soul also; consequently the Soul too oannot he rightly regarded as the ob- jective substrate of the notion of ‘1.’ The sense of the reply ia that, though the notion of ‘I,’ as expressed in ‘1 go,’ ‘I rnn,’ &o., is set aside by a true knowledge of the Soul, yet such notions of ‘I’ as are oxpressed in ‘I know,’ are never found to be rejected.
189 We find even the great master of Yogis imparting instractions to Arjuna, and talking of himeelf as—“ I am the origin of this Universe, &¢., &o.”
185 We find that ono who had learnt the firat half at some previone time, takes
up the other half at a future time. This would uot he poasible if there were no one
। Soul occupying, the Body of the person, during the time ‘extending over the complete period of his study. ।
AYMA-VADA. 407
137-139. (1) The cogniser, known as the “I” yesterday,'is the same that continnes to-day, because—the cogniser of yesterday is known as the “J,” like the cogniser of the present time. (2) The present cog- niser must have been the cogniser yesterday,—becanse it is a cogniser, or hecanse of the aforesaid reason (7.e., because it is known as the “I ’’),— like the cogniser of yesterday. (3) Or, we may have the arguments based upon the ^ cognitions ” themselves as the minor term: all cognitions of the ‘“T” happening to-day or yesterday have one and the same object (Soul), —hbecause they are all the cogniser’s cognitions of the “I” connected with one and the same “series” (of Ideas),—like any ordinary single cognition of the “1.”
140. One who would seek to know the Soul by the help of the Veda alone would find himself contradicted by certain contradictory texts ; hence the citation of the Brahmanas (with a view to explain away the contra- dictory passages).
141, The Injunctions (of Sacrifices) themselves, standing in need of a permanent Soul, indicate its existence on account of the inexplicability of the Injunctions in case of the non-existence of the Soul; and the texts cited only serve to strengthen the idea of the Soul, indirectly indicated (by the Injunctions).
142, It being asked—“ (if the existence of the Soul he indicated solely hy Vedic Injunctions and texts), when the Word ceases to indicate tlie Soul, by what is it manifested ? ’—the reply is given by the text—It is self-luminous, meaning that The Soul is manifested by Itself.
143. By saying that it is ‘‘incognisable,” in general,—the meaning would seem to be that it is so (incognisable) by all persons (including even the Ego himself). But the assertion of “ self-luminosity ” distinctly indicates its incognisability by others. ‘
144. When an object (the ‘ yavaya’) is cognised by means of another object (the ‘ Cow’), we have a case of pure Analogy (or Simile). Where,
131.189 The Karika puts forward another argnment based npon the “ Cognitions ” :— ४ Yesterday’s cognitions were those of the Cogniser known to-day,—becanse they are cognitions like the series of to-day’s cognitions.”
149 Having established the existence of the Soul, by means of reagonings, the Bhashya has bronght forward certain Vedio texts in support of the same, and the Karika shows the nse of this citation of anthorities. ‘“ Contradictory texts”—snch as ‘na prétya, &८ (‘ There is no conscionsness after death’).
141 As shown above, the attainment of Heaven would not be possible if there were no Sonl. Hence it is absolutely necessary to accept the existence of the Soul, for the sake of the Injnnctions of actions leading to Heaven, &o., &c.
142 ^ Word ceases ”—1.e., when the texts are not being prononnced.
1५9 This refers to the Bhashya quoting the sentence—‘ I cognise the Soul to be ag you cognise it to be.’ This is objected to on the ground that there can be no Analogy in
408 CLOKAVARTIKA,
on the other hand, the similarity is indicated by Words alone, there we have a case of “ Analogy ” and “ Verbal testimony ” (combined).
145. We become cognisant of other people’s Souls, by observing their methods and actions, such as are not possible without the Soul ;—and also of such cognition of other people’s Souls as has been shown by Inferences (in K. 135 f.1.)
146. The text (* there is no consciousness after death ”) embodies an objection urged by Maitréyi, who had become confused by various pass- ages in the Upanishads, declaring the Soul to be existing and non-existing, perishable and imperishable; and (the text “This Soul is imperishable ” embodies) the statement (by Yajnavalkya) of the final well-ascertained fact.
147. The Soul, by Itself, is imperishable. And perishability be- longs to (its connection with) the senses, &., together with the capabilli- ties (of Dharma and Adharma). And the “absence of conscionsness (mentioned in the passage “there is no consciousness after death ’’) refers to the Material Senses, &c. (the meaning being that after death, the Soul ceases to have any coguition through the material sense-organs and body, &e. )
148. Thus has the author of the Bhashya, with a view to refnte Atheism, established, by means of reasonings, the existence of the Soul And this idea of the existence of the Soul (thus obtained) comes to be strengthened by studying the Védanta (i.e., the Upanishads).
Thus ends the Section on Atma-vada.
Thus ends the 5th Aphorism.
a oase of Verbal Assertion. The Karikd admits that this is not 8 case of pure Analogy ; it is one of Analogy and Verbal Authority combined.
145 The passage just quoted speaks of one’s own Soul as cognised through its similarity to other men’s Souls; and the Karikd shows how we become cognisant of the Souls of other people.
APHORISMS YI TO XXIII. 409
APHORISMS VI to XXIII.
On the Elernality of Words.
1, Question: “‘When, even in accordance with the theory of non- eternality of Words, meanings are comprehended from Words, and the usage too is without beginning, why should yon insist upon the eternality of words ?”
2. Answer: True: the theorists (holding non-eternality) do desire such comprehension of meaning ; still, we have to examine their reasonings; because the mere fact of acceptance by others cannot he regarded as sufficient ground for validity.
3. When the Word is momentary (as held by the Bauddha), then 16 18 incapable of giving any sense. Consequently, if the comprehension of meanings from momentary words he sought to be established, by means of arguments, then the comprehension of the Veda would become groundless.
4, In the face of the gronundlessness of these comprehensions (of meanings of Words), we could have some refuge in the case of percept- ible objects (which are amenable to sense-organs, and as such, are not totally dependent upon verbal expression). As for Dharma, however, depending as it does solely upon the Veda, it would lose its ground alto- gether.
5. And we should also reject the theory of an eternal usage being based upon objects having a beginning (and as such necessarily perish- able). In the case of the use of the jar, the idea of the (perishable) indi-
3 A momentary word can have no relationship with anything; and as such, cannot afford any meaning. If, in the face of such incapability, the Vedio sentences were to give a sense, it could only be in accordance with a human convention. But any such convention is held to be inapplicable to the Veda. Hence the Veda would become meaningless.
6 Words being momentary cannot be the objects of eternal usage. Thongh we find an eternal nsage—in the shape of the fetching of water—in the case of the jar ; yet such eternality is based only upon the idea of the class jar,’ which is eternal, The notion of the individual jar being an object of eternal usage is a mistaken one, for certainly any single jar could never be the object of eternal usage.
52
410 GLOKAVARTIKA.
vidual jar is a mistaken one, as it really pertains to the class “jar” (which is eternal).
6. We can have eternality of only such a usage as is based npon an unchangeable eternal entity. In the absence of one such unchange- able eternal entity (in the shape of the Class), there is nothing that could be the substratum of such eternality.
7. And further, we can admit of no nsage other than what is gener- ally recognised. Therefore it is for the sake of the validity of the Veda, that we seek to prove the eternality of Words.
Objections against the eternality of Words (embodied in Sitras 6-11).
8, “Since there is mutnal invariable concomitance between non- eternality and being caused, the Sutras lay down arguments in support of one of these.
9. “ Words are caused,—because many of us recognise it, stmultane- ously, in diverse places, in one and the same form ;—like the tracing of letters in writing.
10. ‘Or (the Sitra may be taken to mean that) there is a difference (in the same word as pronounced by different persons), because they are simultaneously recognised ; and because there is this diversity (or difference), the Word must be caused. Because a single object cannot be
6 It is only an eternal entity that can be the substrate of eternality ; anything else does not exist long enough to serve as such a substrate.
1 We find all usage to be based upon notions of Class—and not on those of Indivi- duals (vide supra).
8 From this 1८21442 down to K. 18, we bave the explanation of Sztras 6 to 11, embodying the arguments against the eternality of words. These Su#tras are: (1) ५५ Some say that the Word 45 caused, because it ts perceptible only after an effort’? (I—i—6) ; (2) ^ Because vt does not persist” (7); (8) “ Because of the application of the word ‘make’ with regard to it” (8); (4) “ Because it 1s found to be pronounced by many persons ut one and the same time’? (9) ; (5) ^ Because it undergoes change” (10) ; (6) "^ Because it zs intensified by u multiplicity of speakers” (11). Karika 8 refers to an objection urged against, Saira 7. This S#tra seeks to prove the non-eternality of words; while what the preosding S#éra 6 lays down as the conclusion to he proved is that the word is caused. The sense of the {८2744 is that it is a well-known fact that whatever is caused is also mon-eternal, and vice ४९154. ; and as snoh the argument that proves the one also proves the other.
9 11118 explains 62६12 (9).
10 One and the same word—“ Cow” f.i.—is recognised, at one and the same time, by many persons; and nnless it be all-pervading, like Akdca, this would not be pos- sible,—specially if the words recognised by differeut persons be non-different from one another; but as a matter of fact, we do find them to be different; and as snoh the word cannot but be regarded as caused by the effort put forth by each person,
APHORISMS VI TO XXILI—-ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 411
cognised simultaneously in different places, unless it be an all-pervading entity (like Akdca).
11. “ And that the Word is not an all-pervading entity is proved by the fact that in a single place it is perceived i tts entirety, like the jar, &e. Therefore the word (‘Cow’ 1.) uttered by one person must be (held to be) different (from the same word as uttered by another person).
12. “If the word (‘Cow’ f.i.) were one only, and as such १९५68. sarily existing in one place,—then, when it would be used by one person, ib could not possibly exist in the mouth of another speaker; just as the mouth of one person (cannot belong to another person).
13. ‘As, on the other hand, if the word be held to be a caused entity, then, since the actions (efforts of individual speakers) are different, it is only natural that the effects of these actions should be different from one another. And the notion of all these being one, must be held to be due to their extreme similarity (of form),—when the fact of their being different from one ancther is so clear.
14. ‘Then again, if the Word were eternal, there would be no ground for the mistaken notion with regard to it (in the shape of sameness, &c.) And the unity of the Word,—sought to be proved in the passage “ verily it is the positions (of the word) that are different, and not
11 An all-pervading entity, like the Aka@ga, ia never capable of heing perceived in its entirety. And if such difference as shown above is admitted in the case of one and the same word, yon cannot deny the fact of its being caused by the effort put forth by each individual speaker ; and as such, it cannot be eternal.
13 “ Bfects”’—in the shape of the word “ Cow” pronounced by different porsons. This word uttered by one person cannot bnt be different from that uttered by another ; the ordinary notion of sameness is due to extreme similarity.
19 When it is proved that a word nttered by one person is different from the same word uttered by another person, then we can explain the notion of sameness as being dne to similarity. If, however, the word he held to be eternal, then there can be no ground for any mistaken notions with regard to that. Because if there were any such grouuds, then the word would lose its eternal character, as shown later on. Thus if the word were eternal, the said notion of sameness would be quite real, and not mis- taken; but inasmuch as the sameness is shown to he false, the eternality cannot hut be rejected as false also. Hence if the word be held to be eternal,—in reality it has been shown to he otherwise—we could have no grounds for explaining the said notion of sameness. “ And the unity,” Jc., Ye. It cannot be argued that the identity or unity ocognised hy means of sense-perception cannot be rejected hy inferential arguments. Becanse it is only correct sense—perception that ie incontrovertihle; while that which is distinctly found to he incorrect,—-e.g., the perception of the sameness of the flame which is undergoing changes every moment is always set aside by means of well-established in- ferences, The fact is that the word ‘‘Cow” is diverse, because it ia perceived in several places; and hence the notion of sameness or unity with regard to that word cannot but be a mistaken one; and from this it must follow that the word is not eternal.
412 . OLOKAVARTIKA.
the word itself” (in the Bhashya on Sutra 15),—would be contradicted (and rejected, by the arguments brought forward in Karikas 9, 10, &e.)
15. “Nor can it be urged that the appearance (of the same Word) in different places (as uttered by different persons) is due to the difference in their manifesting causes (in the shape of the utterances of different speakers); Because a single jar does not appear diverse, as shown by lamps located in different places.
16. “And further, since the impartite Akdca is the sole substrate of all the manifesting utterances (of different speakers) together with the manifested (Word),—therefore, for you, the manifestation too (of the Words) would be in one and the same place.
17. “The letters ‘i,’ &c., are non-eternal,—because they undergo modi- fications into other letters (‘ ya,’ &c.), as laid down and regulated by the Smrti and similarity, just as curd, milk, and sugar, &. (being modifications of milk, grass, and sugar-cane respectively, are recognised as non-eternal).
18. “And again, since (the utterance of) the Word is intensified in accordance with the intensity of its origin, it must be non-eternal, like the jar. (The notion of intensity cannot be said to be a false one, caused by the intensity of the manifesting cause; because) even though we may have a thousand lamps illuminating a jar, the jar will not, on that account, become any larger.”
Reply to the above (embodied in Sutras 12-23).
19-20. In this (12th) Satra, and in those that follow, the Bhashya shows the inconclusive character of the above arguments. The fact of
16 A diversity in the manifesting agency cannot cause diversity in the mani- fested entity.
16 Hence you cannot explain the diversity of the word “ Cow” as being dus to the difference of the positions of its manifesting canses, in the shaps of the utterances of several psrsons.
17 1118 Kariké explains Sztra 10, The letter ‘i’ when followsd by the letter ‘a’ is charged into ‘ ya’ (vide Panini VI—i—77); and out of the modifications laid down in the S#tra—ya, va, ra, la,—it is into ‘ ya’ only that the ‘i’ is changsd, simply because of a certain similarity bstwsen these two letters; and certainly that which nndergoes changes can never 06 6681781.
18 This explains S#tra 11. No amount of intensity in the manifesting canse can bring abont an intensity in the effect. It ia only an increass in the material cause (Clay) that leads to the snlargement of the effect (jar). Inthe same manner, the in- tensity perceived in the word, when uttered by many persons simultaneously, must he held to bs dne to a osrtain increase in its material cause, and not to any in its manifest- ing causes. And thns, inasmuch as the word undergass modifications in accordance with the modifications of its material cause, and ag such it resembles the jar,—it can- not but be regarded as non-eternal, trausitory.
19.29 With this begins the reply to tho above arguments,—this reply beiug em-
APHORISMS VI TO XXILII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 413
“being perceived after a certain effort” does not militate against the theory of eternality either. Therefore (since the fact of being perceived after an effort does not negative the fact of its existence elsewhere), as the Word is perceived only after an effort, we recognise its existence through perception as qualified by recognition, at other times also, even though it is not then perceived directly by the senses.
20-22. If by your argument (“‘ because it is perceived only after effort’’) you mean the fact of its non-perception before and after the effort,— then the argument becomes doubtful—(1) for the Vazgéshika, with regard to “class,” (2) for the Sdnkhya, with regard to intelligence as residing in the Soul, and (3) for the Bauddha, with regard to the three entities held by him to be other than momentary: v7z., “Intelligent Destruction,” “ Non-intelligent Destruction,” and “ Akaga.”
22-24, When the destruction is preceded by an intelligeut process (e.g., the breaking of a vessel by means of the stroke of the stick), we have an idea of “ Intelligent Destruction.” And when the destruction is not so preceded by any intelligent process (as in the case of the tumbling down of a wall), we have ^“ Non-intelligent Destruction.” Both these (Destruc- tions), being imperishable are held to be uncaused also. The Bauddhas have asserted that Destructions are accomplished by themselves, and are (not caused).
24.25. Because that which is found to have a cause, is invariably found to perish,—as for instance, the sprouts, &c. And since there is no destruction of Destruction, it must be uncaused.
25-27. From the fuel as connected with fire, proceeds a series of
bodied in Sztras 12-23. 5६12 19 18 11708 ¦ The fact of being perceived after effort 1s equal (to the theory of eternality as well as to that of non-eternality).
20-28 The Vaicéshika holds the Class to he eternal; and yet the Class is not per- ceptible, before and after an effort on the part of the Perceiver. In the same manner, with the Intelligence of the Sankhya, as also with the three eternal entities accepted by the Bauddha,—none of these being perceptible before and after an effort.
22.24 That which is caused cannot bnt be perishable. Therefore, in order to be imperishable, the Destruction must be uncaused,
26.21 What are popularly known as cases of Destruction brought about by some cause are only cases of positive Prodnction ; f.i, the case of the burning of the wood is one of the production of ashes,
“ Not perceived, &c.”—Destrnction is natural to all entities; hnt it exists in two forms, the subtitle and the gross. So long as an ohject continues to be acted upon hy homogenous causes, its changes are all homogenous and positive; and daring all this process, the Destrnction continues in its subtile form; and in this condition it is not perceived. It, however, comes to be perceived when the object happens to he aoted upon by an external heterogenous agency,—such, f.i., as the stick in the case of the breaking of the jar; and it is then that the Destruction appears in its gross form, and as such becomes perceptible.
414 CLOKAVARTIKA.
fiery embers. And from the jar, as struck by a stick, proceed certain earthenware fragments, Destruction, being natural, and having an ex- istence in itself (without any agency from without), is extremely subtile,— and hence it is not perceived (to appear),—being, as it is, lost in a series of homogenous positive entities.
27-28. When, however, an external heterogenous cause happens to fall (४,९., operate) upon the homogenous series, then, by means of an heterogenous effect (thereby brought about), the Destruction appears in its gross form, and (thereby) becomes manifested (and perceptible).
28-29. Thus, then, it is an heterogenous effect that is brought about by the cause,—by which cause the Destruction is distinctly manifested, though it is not brought about by it.
29-30. Thus then, inasmuch as Destruction,—even though not appear- ing apart from an effort (in the shape of the striking with the stick, for instance)—is found to be uncaused, your reasoning (embodied in Sétra 6) becomes contradictory.
30-32. The Akaca too, being eternal,—when it happens to be covered up under the Harth or Water,—is rendered visible only by the removal of these (Harth and Water) by means of digging and pumping. And thus we see that here we have perception (of Akaga) ouly after an effort. Conse- quently your reasoning—“ since it (word) is perceived only after an effort” —becomes doubtful.
32.33. If it be urged that—“ in the case cited, we infer that the Akaga exists all along, though it is hidden under Earth and Water,”—then (we reply that, in the case of the Word too, from recognition, we infer that it ex- ists all along even prior to (and after) the effort put forth by the speaker.
33-34. When the Akaga is made to disappear by an effort in the shape of filling up the well, then we find that the argument—“ Because the Word does not continue to exist ’’—becomes doubtful.
34-35. In the well thus filled up, there is no cognition of the Akaga,
23.29 And this manifestation leads people to think that the Destrnction has been brought about by the cause.
29.30 Your argument is that, since the Word is found to appear after an effort, therefore, it mnet be caused. But as a matter of fact, all that ie so found to appear, is not caused, as we have shown, with regard to Destruction.
50.82 We now proceed to show that the argument fails with regard to Akdca also.
88.84 This refers to Satra 13, which refutes the argument put forward in S#tra 7. Since an uncaused and eternal entity, like Akdca, 18 found not to bave a continued existence, therefore the argument cannot be valid.
84.85 Just ae we have no cognition of the Word, which hae not yet been rendered perceptible by an effort on the part of man, so also, in the case of Akdca, we have no cognition of it until it is rendered perceptible by an effort in the shape of the removing of the earth from the well.
APHORISMS VI TO XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 415
—hbecause that which has been hidden is not perceptible,—just as the cognition of the Word.
35-36. Ifthe argument be brought forward in the form—“ because of the non-continuance of the Word” (thus saving the cases of the Akdga, &c.), —then it must be held, by the person holding the theory of the manifesta- tion (and not production) (of the Word), to be an unaccomplished (in- complete) one.
36-37. If (by “ caused”) you mean the fact of its depending (for manifestation) upon an action of the (manifesting) causes,—then (the argument becomes doubtful) with reference to the cases of the root (of trees) and Water under the ground. Because, though these (the root and Water) are caused (in the above sense of appearing after an action of the cause) yet they are not produced by the actions of digging, &c. (which only serve to render them perceptible).
37-38. In the case of the Word, there is no other action productive of it, save its utterance (by a person). = रला if the argument be qualified by the specification “in the absence of impediments,’’—then too, it becomes doubtful, with reference to the same facts (of the roots and water under- ground).
38-39. Because, even in the absence of any impediments (to the
35.86 ¢ Unaccomplished *— beoause the Word is not accepted by the Mimansaka to have a non-continnons existence. Consequently, an argument based npon a fact not accepted by him can never convince him.
86.87 What do you mean by the assertion‘ The Word is a caused entity?’ (1) Does it mean that it is produced by some canse, (2) Or, that it is perceived after a cer- tain action of that which is held to be the canse? In the former case, the argument--— ‘ 06087186 it is perceived after an effort ’-~hecomes useless; as it does not prove your conclusion. And in the latter case, in view of the case of the roots of trees, and the water under the ground, the said argument becomes very doubtful. Becanse, these are perceived after a certain action--of digging, f..—and as much, may be said to be ‘caused,’ though they can never be said to he * produced’ (brought into existence) by the digging; as they already existed under the ground. In the same manner, even if the Word he proved to be a caused entity (in the above sense), it conld not, on that account, be said to be ‘produced.’ Conseqnently, your argament fails to prove that Words are ‘ produced’ and ‘ non-eternal.’
$7.38 If the argument be stated in the form —“‘ because in the absence of any im- pediments of its perception, the Word is not perceived before and after an effort’’-- then, too, it becomes doubtful, with regard to such things as the water underground. Because these too, in the absence of any impediments to their perception, are not perceptible either before or after the presence of a lamp, or of other causes of their appearance. (Vide next K.)
88.39 The deaf does not cognise the sound of a Word; but that is owing to the absence of the manifesting cause, and not to the non-existence of the Word. And as such these facts of non-perception, before and after the effort, cannot prove the caused ness, and the consequent non-eternality, of the Word,
416 CLOKAVARTIKA.
perception of these), they are not perceived, on account of the absence of causes (favouring their perception). In the same manner, in the case of the Word also, we would have no cognition of it, on account of the absence of its manifesting agency (the ear, f.i.),—as we find in the case of the deaf. If the non-existence of the manifesting cause be said to form the inpediment (meant in the argument), then too the argument would be incomplete.
40, If it be urged that—“ our reason is non-existence (of the Word) before and after (the effort),”—then too, the reasoning is non-conclusive, and unaccomplished (non-convincing). Because, as a matter of fact, the Word exists all along; but is not perceived, on account of the absence of causes (favouring its perception, by helping its manifestation).
41, And the cognition of the Word depends upon a cause which is momentary; just as during a dark and cloudy night, our vision depends upon a flash of lightning (which is momentary).
42. Just as a lamp is held to be the manifester of the jar, &c., through the aid that it affords to the eye,—so (in the case of the Word) utterance (by the Speaker) would be (the manifester of the Word), through the impression 1 makes upon the ear (of the hearer).
43, This is not affected by the question—“In what form is the impression ?”” Because, just as in this case of production (of the Word in the ear), so equally in this case (of manifestation) also, the power (of manifestation) is beyond Sense-perception.
44. How can any objection apply to a power, which is even inferable
1 Incomplete’’—-Becanse the absence of such an impediment wonld mean the nega- tion of the absence of the manifesting canse~-which wonld he equivalent to the oxis- tence of the canse; and dnring snch existence there can be no non-perception of the Word (which is always perceived whenever the manifesting cause is present).
40 The objection means that it isnot the non-perception, but the non-existence, of the Word before and after the effort, that we lay down as an argnment against ite eternality. Bnt this argument is nnconvincing to the Mimansaka, who does not ad- mit such non-existence.
41 Since the cause regarding the already existing word lasts only a moment, therefore the word is not perceptible before and after the effort. Hence thie latter fact cannot prove the non-existence of the Word before and after the effort. Ag an example of the manifesting cause being momentary we hare the flash of lightning illuminating things in a dark and clondy night.
43 The agency producing the sonnd iu the ear is not perceptible to the senses. So the agency manifesting it too wonJd as reasonably be imperceptible. Hence the non- ascertainment of the form of impression cannot affeot onr position.
५9 So long as the Power suceeds in bringing about its effeot—in the present case, manifestation of the Word,—its existence and efficienoy cau never be questioned. And specially as snch efficienoy is proved by conoomitance: the cognition of the Word existing only when there is the manifesting agenoy of the utterance and not otherwise,
APHORISMS VI TO XXHI—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 417
from the effects (it brings about). The only ground for believing (the utterance to have the power of manifesting the Word) lies in the fact of the cognition (of the Word) appearing only when there is utterance.
45. Thus then, it is by means of supersensuous power alone, that these (utterances) impart a supersensuous facility (power) to the Sense- organ (the ear), and thereby, become the causes of the manifestation of Words. |
46-48. Ifit be urged that “the manifesting cause cannot be hetero- genous (to the manifested entity ”),—then (we ask), how can you hold the ear to be the manifester of sound? And, how could the fiery lamp be the manifesters of the earthy jar? And, lastly, what homogeneity could there be between the Conjunction of the Soul (with the Mind, which conjunction 18 held by the Vaigéshikas to be the manifester of all perceptions) and the objects (perceived)? If you take your stand upon some such genus (as the summum genus “ entity,” to which everything belongs, and through which all things may be said to be homogeneous ),—then, that would serve us also (as both the Utterance and the Word would equally belong to the genus “entity”’). Barring the means of cognition or perception (of the Word), nothing else can be rightly regarded as the manitfester.
48-49. Therefore just as an homogenous entity is accepted to be a manifester, simply on the ground of its being the-means of perception,— so too would also an heterogeneous entity (be held to be a manifester), on the same ground of perception being concomitant with (2.९. existing on the existence of) that manifesting cause.
49-50. Not knowing the fact of the Utterance belonging to the Air, and thinking it to belong exclusively to the palate and other (places of Utterance in the mouth), the objector (in the Bhashya) has urged the objection—“ even on the cessation of the (Utterance) the sound is heard, &९., &c.”—in order to prove the non-manifesting power (of Utterauce). .
46.48 If ntterances, being heterogeneons to Words, cannot be the chief manifesters, then the Har could not be the manifester of eonnd and so forth. “ Barring, &o.” Thie is added in anticipation of the objection that the himp being known to be a manifeeter of the jar, &o., it was right to bring it forward as an instance; when, as in the case of the Conjunction of Soul, people do not ordinarily know this as a manifester, it is not right to bring it forward. The sense of the Karika is that everything that brings about the perception of an object is its manifeeter, and the Conjunction of the Soul is the means of euch perception; therefore this too is as good a manifester ae anything else.
48.49 We have the same grounds for accepting an heterogeneous entity to bea manifester, as we have for accepting an homogeneons one.
49.60 The sonnd is heard even after the utterance, because it resides in the air. But the objector, who is made to speak in the Bhishya, is ignorant of the fact, and knows the sound too.to reside in the palate, &c,, woich ceases 88 soon as the speech has ceased,
98
418 CLOKAVARTIEA.
50-51. And it is with regard to the fact of its belonging to the Air (and hence continuing even after the speaking has ceased), that the reply 18 given (in the Bhashya) that in fact, the Utterances do not cease. Till the assertion (in the Bhashya) of the fact of (the sound) “ striking”’ (the Air), &e., &c., the above objection as well 28 its reply remain with their con- nections (and significations) obscure.
51-52. In the Bhashya passage beginning with “If, &c.,” the “ mani- festation,” that is spoken of, is possible in thres ways: It is possible (1) through a change (sazsk@ra) in the word itself, or (2) through that of the sense-organ (the Har), or (3) through that of both.
52-53. Objections: “If the change were in the Word, then all men would cogniss it. Becanss of an entity, which is impartite and all-psr- vading (as the Word is held, by the Mimanégaka, to be), there could be no change in any one portion.
53-54. ‘Nor is it possible forthe process of change to be regulated in accordance with the diversity of its substrates (7.e., the Kar of men hearing it). 8668088, being like the Akaga and the Soul, the Word (as held by the Mimdnsaka) can have no substrate.
54-56. “If the Akaga ४5 held to be the substrate (of the Word),— even then, the change cannot belong to a portion of the Word, inasmuch as 1t 18 itself impartite ; and also because people always cognise the Word, in its entirety. If the Word had undergone a change, only in a portion of it, it could never be cognised in its entirety, pervading, as it does, over the whole extent of the Akaga.
56-58. ‘If the Har be held to he the Akdga itself, it being all-pervad- ing, ths conjunction (with the Word uttered) would be equal (in the Ears of all men). And thus we would have the possibility of hearing words even from a great distance. And in this way (7.¢., if the Ear were to be Akaga), the Ears of all men would become one (since Akdga is one); and conse- quently when one person hears something all men wonld hear it (an
absurdity).
60.51 The ntterances do not cease with the speech. They continne in the Air for some time. The fact of the utterance helonging to the Air is known only when the Bhashya has asserted the sentence ^ Abhighdta, &o.”
61.68 The passage referred to is the Purvapaksha paseage: “If the connection and disjunction (of the palate, &o.,) were to manifest the Word, &0.”
68.58 Now hegine the setting forth of the objection raised in the Bhdshya referred to. The Word heing the change produced in it by ntterance, mnet belong to the whole of it. And as it is all-pervading all men would hear it.
68 It cannot he held that the change is prodnooed in the Word, only in so much ag 18 in conjunotion with the Ear of men near the speaking man.
66.68 The Har of all men being all-pervading, the sound made in America would be 98 well heard by us as by those near the speaker,
APHORISMS VI TO XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 419
58-59. “Inasmuch as the Akaga 18 impartite, it cannot be held— for the double purpose of regulating (the change produced by utterance, and the limitation of hearing)—that the Ear is that part of the Akdaga, which has been modified by the Virtue and Vice (of the person having the Ear).
09-60. ‘These objections also apply to the theory of the Vaigésh- kas (who hold the Har to be Aka@ga) ; and to the doctrine of Kapila (San- khya) also, 1s the Har, &c., being all-pervading (inasmuch as all sense- organs are modifications of Self-consciousness, which is held to be all-per- vading),—the same process of reasoning would apply.
60-61. “(If the change belonged to the Ear, then) the Har, being once changed (which, in the case of Har, means being made capable of cognising sounds), would comprehend all the Words. Just as the eye opened (and reudered capable of vision) for seeing a jar, does not fail to see the cloth also (if it be before the eye).
61-62. ‘*The same objections would apply, if the change helonged to the object (¢.e., the Word), Since the Word exists in the same place (as the ear), the change of the one is not different from that of the other.
62-63. “There would be a change in the ear, by the removal of the air filling up (the cavity of) the Har. But we always see that when a covering 18 removed we perceive everything that may have lain in the place (covered).
63-64. “The Word being held to be one only, it 1s not possible for it to be changed (for one person) and not changed (for another person) at one and the same time. Andif only one of these conditions (changed or not changed) he held to apply to it at a time,—then it wonld he either
58.59 Such modification by the deeds of persons possessing the Har, could explain the limitations in hearing. Because the deeds of each person heing different the capacities of their Kars would also he different.
60.61 And the ohjection, is that, if the change produced by ntterance were to belong to the Har. All Words being external and all-epervading, the Ear is always in proxi- mity to all Words; hence, if it were to he modified and rendered capahle of compre- hending Words, it would comprehend all the Words—which is an absurdity,
61 Since the Word heard is co-extensive with the Har, the change of the Word is open to the same objections as the change of the Har.
68.63 The only ohange that is possible in the Har and the Word is that which is bronght ahout hy the removal of the Air filling np the cavity of the Ear. But in that case the covering of Air, the only impediment of the Har, having been removed, if wonld comprehend all Words, because they also are inthe Har, which is all-pervading like Akac¢a, and hence all the Words exist in it ; consequently if the covering he removed, all the Words would equally be open to comprehension.
65.64 If the Word were to be changed once only, it would be so for all people; and hence all people would hear it. In the same way, if it were to be not-ohanged only, no person would hear it.
4,20 CLOKAVARTIKA.
cognised (heard), or not cognised, by all persons (at one and the same time).
64-65. “If the change be held to belong to both (the Ear and the Word),—then this theory would be open to all the objections that have been shown above, to apply severally to each (४.९.) to the change of Word and to that of the Ear). Therefore a partial cognition of the Word (.e., the cognition of the Word by some people and not the rest) would not be possible, unless the Word be held to be a caused entity.”
65-66. The Bhashya has given a reply to the above, based upon (the theory of) the change belonging to the Har. The hearing by different individual hearers 18 regulated by a diversity among their Hars.
66-67, Nor do we admit the Ear to be necessarily (identical with) Akaca. Nor, again, is the Akdga itself impartite; inasmuch as this (impartite character) has been denied (with reasons) by the Jainas and the Sankhyas.
67-68. Therefore the Ear could either be a part of Akdaga itself, or a distinct entity by itself (without being open to the aforesaid objections). And thus, in accordance with our theory, for each person, verily, there is a separate Har—this being inferred from the (otherwise) inexplicability of effects (in the shape of the hearing, of different persons, being different from one another).
68-69. (Granting the theory of Ear being Akaga), even thongh it (Ear) were one and all-pervading, yet, the change produced by utterance could belong only to the substrate of the auditory Akaga only. Therefore the Word would 06 cognised only by that Ear (auditory Akdga) which is affected by that change (and thus there would be no chance for the Word being heard, or not heard, by all persons simultaneously) (as urged in K. 63-64).
69-70. If the change be attributed to the organ of Sense (the Ear), ——even then, the change could (be held to) apply to the organ, through its substrate (viz., the tympanum in the body ot the hearer). And thus the Word would not be heard by that Ear, of which the tympanum has not been affected by the change (produced by the utterance).
65.66 This refers to the Bhashya; “One who holds the manifestation of words 18 not open to the said objections ; because the disjunctions and conjunctions of the palate, &c., of the speaker, do not affect the Har that is at a distance, &०., &e.
67.68 If the Ear of each person were not distinot, we could not explain the fact of a Word being heard by one person, and not by others.
68.69 Substrate of the auditory Akaga is the Kar in ths body,
69.10 And consequently we would not have the sbsurdity urged in ए, 63-64. That is to say, there could be nochanos of the Word baing either heard, or not heard, by all persons simultaneously,
APHORISMS VI TO XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 421
70-71. An utterance does not effect any change in the auditory organ, if it fails to reach the Ear (in the body). Therefore the applicability of the change (produced by utterance) is regulated by the diversity of the corporeal Kar (which is different for each person) (and consequently there is no chance of the absurdity of a Word being heard by all persons simul- taneously, or that of a very distant sound being heard with as much dis- tinctness as one near at hand).
71-72, Obj.: ^“ But then, the auditory organ, having been affected by the change in one corporeal substrate, would become the means of cognising (that Word) in all persons,—for those who hold all auditory sense to be one only (on the ground of its being identical with Akaga, which ie one).”
72-73. The cognition (audition of the Word) is held to be produced in the bodily organ of persons. Consequently the change (appearing in the organ of one body), appearing in a place other than the principal ele- ment (audition of the Word by other persons), fails in an essential factor (necessary for audition by others).
73-74. Even one soul, though impartite, and as such cognising (a Word) by its whole self, has the cognition in the body it occupies (and which it has acquired in accordance with its past deeds). And after this explana- tion, our theory no longer remains faulty (objectionable).
74-75. Just as the Aka@ga, though one (and impartite), comes to be diversely connected with several partite objects severally,—so in the same manner, would it also be open to change and non-change (in accordance with its substrates in the bodies of men) (and hence the change in one auditory 44660 could not lead to the cognition of another person, and so forth as urged in K@rikas 56-57 et seq).
75-76. Hven though Akdga is impartite and all-pervading, yet the “connection” (of Akdga with the partite objects, jar, &c.,) having a dual substrate (in the shape of Akaca and the partite object), depends upon the (partite objects) jar, &c., lying on the earth only (and as such, the connec- tion cannot be said to be all-pervading ).
11.18 The sense in one person being the same as in other persons: if it happens to be affected in the Ear of one person, and lead to his cognition of the Word, it wonld remain affected even in the Ear of other persone. Therefore when one person hears a sound, all others would hear it.
72.13 Change is a secondary element in cognition which is the principal element. And the secondary element, in order to be effective, must be in the same place as the primary. The cognition is to be produced in the bodies of men and nowhere else. Therefore the change affecting the eense in Rama’s body cannot bring about a cogni- tion in the body of Krishna. Becauee the ohange in Rama 18 not co-extensive with the cognition in Krishna.
16.16 THis is in anticipation of the objection that the connection of Akaca would also be all-pervading.
422 GLOKAVARTIKA.
76-77. Deafness, &c., are also regulated by the same cause (7.e., by the effects produced in the bodily organ). And this (deafness) is not experienced by another (7.e., any Soul other than the one to which the parti- cular body, with the deranged ear, belongs),—inasmuch as it is influenced by the virtue and vice (of that particular Soul).
77-78. Just as in the case of a village lord, when removed from the mastery over the village,—though he continues to reside in the village, yet he does not enjoy (the possession of) the village,—so, in the same manner, though the Soul of a deaf person continnes to reside in the body, yet, being deprived of its mastery (over the organ of audition), it does not hear any sounds, even when others (near him) hear 1४,
78-80. Even if (it be granted that), like the auditory sense, the Word and its substrate too are without any parts (7.e., impartite) and incapable of occupying any one place (7.e., all-pervading,—even then, the theory is not open to tle (aforesaid) objections. Because the air-vibra- tions, which are held to be the manifesters (of the Word), are both en- dowed with parts and capable of occupying different places (४.९. are neither impartite nor all-pervading). And (of these manifesting air-vibrations) there are different classes also,—on which (classes) are based the changes (produced in the anditory sense).
80-81. Just as, in your theory, the air-vibration (utterance) pnt forth for one Word, does not produce another Word,—so, in our theory too, the vibration, capable of producing changes, in the Har, enabling it to cognise one Word, will not be able to make a change for the sake of an- other Word.
81-82. Just as any one of the contacts of the palate, &c. (by the speaker), (put forth for the pronunciation of one Word) cannot, in your theory, produce another Word,—so, iu the same manner, any one of these
16.71 Deafness results when the bodily organ, Har, which is the substrate of andi- tory sense, becomes deranged. Hence both the ability and inability of the auditory sense must depend upon the effects produced (or changes brought about) in the bodily organ,
18.80 “ Manifester” =that which renders cognisable. “ Different clusses’*—For one class of Letters there is one olass of Air-vibrations; and so on with eaoh letter that ig pronounced. And the change produced in the anditory sense is none other than the contact with these Vibrations. The Har coming in contaot with a vibration, 00111868 only that letter (or Sound) which belongs to the same class as (t.e., is homogeneous (to that vibration. This Kariké meets the objection urged in Karikas 60-61,
80.81 Even one who holds the theory of words being caused finds it necessary to assert that Words can be produced only by suoh air-vibrations as are homogeneous to them.
This meets the objeotion urged in Kérikds 62-63 and shows how ५ त --लैग्मनमू?' is not possible. TEATYTY
APHORISMS VI TO XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 423
contacts of the palate, &c., which is capable of putting forth such sounds as bring about changes in the auditory sense favourable for the cognition of any one particular Letter, is not able to indicate sounds of other Letters.
82-83. Therefore, both in the theory laying down the production of Words, and that holding their manifestation, the diversity of all capabilities (for producing changes in the Auditory Sense, &c., &c.), is equally inferable from the (otherwise) inexplicability of certain well-known effects (every- day facts of ordinary life). And (from the same inexplicability) could also be inferred the diversity of effort and desire to speak (which inference too is equally possible in both theories).
83-84, If the change be held to belong to the object (Word), then too the change wonld apply to one Word only (and not to all, as urged in K@rikas 61-62). And even this one would not be heard by all men (simul- taneously), on account of a difference in their capabilities,
84-86. Just as (in your theory) though the Word is produced equally with regard to all men, yet it is not cognised by all (simultaneously), on account (as you explain) of the fact of (its cognition depending upon) the divisions of direction, place, &c.,—so, in the same manner (in our theory also) when a Word is affected by changes brought about by sounds produced in proximity to some men, the Word is heard by these men alone, and not by those that are at a distance (from those sounds).
86-87. Even if it be held that the changes belong to both (the Ear and the Word), the assertion (in Karikds 64-65) of this being open to both objections (urged against the change of ‘‘ Word”’ and change of “ Ear’) is nntrne. Because on acconnt of discrepancies in either (of these two changes of Word and Ear), all (Words) are not heard by all (Ears of all men).
87. A method (of the cognition of Word) must necessarily be laid down by such inguirers as strictly follow the universally accepted fact of the hearing (of Words) obeying the desire to speak (on the part of the speaker).
88-90. In this matter, some people (the Vatcéshikas) hold that the Word (sound) is primarily produced by Conjunction and Disjunction ; that
88.89 “ Difference in capabilities.’”—One who is at a distance is not as able to hear as one who is near. The latter half meets the objection urged in in Kérikds 68-64.
61.68 Just as your cognition of the Word is governed by Direction, &c., so are also onr changes of Words, &e.
86.81 A discrepancy in the Ear of people (caused by distance, &c.), makes it impossible for all men to hear = sonnd simultaneously. And a discrepancy of the Word (caused by the fact of one sound manifesting only one Word), makes it impos- sible for all the Words to be heard at one and the same time.
88.89 By Conjunction, as in the case of the drum struck by the stick, and by Dis. junction, as in that of the flute.
444 QLOKAVABTIKA.
from this (sound) is produced another sonnd similar to it; and that in a place next to this is produced another sound also similar to it, then follows another, and so on, in the manner of waves and ripples; and it is the last sound (of the series) that is caught by the Har.
90-91. But, in this theory, there are many assumptions of imper- ceptible facts. In the case of a sound, we are never cognisant of any multi- plicity of sounds (as held by the Vaigéshika)
91-92. Even the fact of one sound producing another is groundless inasmuch as sound has no action. Nor can au immaterial entity (like sound),—being, as it is, incapable of striking (against anything)—produce an effect in a place removed from itself.
92.93. Nor is there any means of regulating the production of sounds, with regard to the limit of their reach. Nor is there any canse that could account for the restriction of the direction (of sounds), and for the fact of (sounds) following the current of winds.
93-94. It is hard to prove that a sound produces another which is either similar or homogeneous to it. Nor are we cognisant of any grounds for believing the production (of sounds) to extend on all sides (specially 28 waves and ripples, which you cite as an instance of the method, proceed in a single direction).
94-95. And again, it is not possible for foregoing sounds, that are entirely destroyed (without leaving any trace), to produce the subsequent sounds, which had absolutely no existence before. And just as the possi- bility of a series of cognitions (has been rejected under Niralambanavada), so too 18 the possibility of a series of sounds (inadmissible).
95-96. Inthe case of the Waves,—since they have a certain velo-
90.98 We do not oognise the sound heard to be different from the sound uttered.
91-82 If an immaterial entity were to have such an effect, then such effeota (sounds) would be possible, even beneath the ground (i.¢., the sound produced above the ground would be heard in the nether world): because an immaterial object would never he re- tarded in its progress by any such interceptions as those presented by materia! objects, like the Earth, &o.
92-93 Sound being immaterial, what would be the means whereby we could accept the theory that tho series of these sounds stops short at a certain point, beyond which it does not go. And since no sach canse can be found there would be an endless series of a sound, which would thus come to he heard simultaneously by the whole world.
If sound be immaterial, how could we explain the fact of its being produced in one direction, or the fact of its being caused in the wake of word-carrents—both of which are possible only with material objects P
98 Since a sound cannot he a material cause, it cannot produce another sound.
94.96 A sound on being produced is instantly destroyed and no trace of it is left be- hind. How then can this he the cause of the next sound in the Series, whioh, till then, has had no sort of existence ?
95-95 A ripple has a certain velocity for a long time after ite first appearance, and
APHORISMS VI TO XXILI—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 495
city (motion) and action, it is possible for them to produce effects in places other than that of the cause (४.6. the first ripple, having motion, can pro- duce another ripple, even at a distance from it), Because the action of such (mobile) causes lasts so long as the velocity (or motion) lasts.
96-97. (Granting such a production of sounds) this production could not be impeded by the intervention of walls, &c., because the existence of an immaterial substance (like sound) in the midst of a material substance (like the wall) is not impossible.
97-98. And further, Walls, &c., do not serve either to destroy or remove the Akdga (and hence, sound being a property of Akadga caunot be destroyed or in any way intercepted by the Wall). Therefore, even inside the Wall, Akaea cannot be rendered imperceptible.
98-99, If Akaea did not formerly exist in the place, then the very ex- istence of the Wall,—as also of all its inner parts,—would be a contradiction (because all things exist in space, which 18 the same as Akdaga). Because these cannot have any existence in a material substance.
99-100. If it be held that “ the Akdca bears only the production of such sounds, which are free from any contact with a substance having the character of an interceptor,”—such a statement has no reasons in its favour.
100-101. This statement cannot be said to be proved by Apparent Inconsistency ; inasmuch as the fact (of sound being intercepted) is cap- able of being otherwise explained. And, as a matter of fact, this (Appar- ent Inconsistency) is not held to be a means of right notion by those who admit of only two such means (Sense-perception and Inference).
so long as this velocity lasts, it will go on producing other ripples. This 18 not possible in the case of sound, which has neither velocity nor motion.
97-98 Because, being immaterial and all-pervading, the Akéga mnst have existed in the place, prior to the erection of the wall; and since it conld not be in any way inter- cepted by the presence of the wall, it must be admitted to continue in the place even after the wall has been built.
93-99 ^ Becanse, &c.”—Since it ig so, they must be held to have their existence in au immaterial entity like Akaga.
99.100 This qualification is a saving clanse against the argument based on the intervention of the wall. The objection means to imply that, since the sonnd, in the case of the presence of a wall, is in contact with an intercepting substance in the shape of the wall, therefore it cannot he said to be produced when its progress has heen stop- ped by the wall. Hence, behind the wall, the sonnd is not heard.
100.101 It is only when a fact is not cognisable, and cannot be explained without the admission of a certain other fact, that this latter is accepted on the (otherwise) apparent inconsistency of the former fact. In the case of sonnd, however, all the facts are ap- plicable in accordance with the Miménsaka’s theory. Therefore, there is no Incon- sistency that would lend support to any new theory.
54
426 CLOKAVARTIKA.
101-102. Nor can the assumption be said to be due to Inference; in- asmuch as no relation (of concomitance) is perceived (to exist between pro- duction and any invisible entity, as the intermediate sounds propounded by the Vaigéshika). If it be urged that “we could have the Inference from a general affirmative premise,—” then, in that case, your reasoning would be contradictory.
102-103. Thus, (if it be argued that)—“a sound is productive of homogeneous sounds,—because it is a property,—like the Sense-organs (of Taste, &c.),”—(this would be met by the counter-argument based upon the same premise): viz: A sound is not productive of other sounds,—for the same reason (४,९.) because it is a property, and properties are not productive of other properties). (And if the production of other sounds were like the productions of the Sense-organs, then, as these latter appear in the same point of space as is occupied by the Sense-organ, so in the same manner, the intermediate sounds) would appear in the same place as that oceupied by the primary sound (and thus there could be no transmission of sounds).
103-105. Because (it is a matter of common experience that) the place, which is occupied by the parts of the piece of cloth, is also the place where all its properties exist, and it is the same place where the whole (piece of cloth) made up of the parts also exists; and the properties of the whole, too, occupy the same place (as is held by the Whole itself). Thus, we have co-extensiveness (of the properties of the Cause and those of the Caused). In the same manner (we could infer that), all the (subsequent intervening) sounds have no place other than that held by the primary (first) sound.
105-106. A sound does not produce another sound,—because it is a sound,—like the final sound (where the series of the Vaigéshika ends). Similarly, Conjunction and Disjunction (held by the Vaigéshika to be productive of sounds) (do not produce sounds)—hecause they are so (i.e., because they are Conjunction and Disjunction),—like any other ordinary Conjunction and Disjunction.
106-107. In fact, the theories of the movemeut of the sound, and that of the auditory sense,—as held by the Jaina and the Sankhya respect- ively,—are more reasonable than the above (Vargéshika) theory. But- these, too, become untenable, on account of the following reasons.
101.102 The Inference from general affirmation is shown in the first half of the Karika. ‘ Contradictory ””—also proving a proposition aimed at.
105.106 A syllogism proving the fact of sounds not producing sounds.
106-107 The Jaina theory is that the sound having been nttered travels bodily to the ear of the hearer. And the Sankhya theory is that the sense being all-pervading travele to the region where the scund is produced,
APHORISMS VI TO XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 424.
107-108. The travelling of sound, as proposed by the Jaina, is an imperceptible fact, as are also the materiality and tangibility (of sounds) the suppression of existing sounds, non-cognisability by the tactile sense (even in presence of its tangibility), and the existerce of many subtile’ fac- tors (technically called, by the Jainas, ^ Pudgala”’).
109. How can there be any production (of the final perceptible sound) by means of these (subtile factors), which are imperceptible (and as such incapable of producing perceptible entities) P And, from what sort of diversity in the process of production would proceed the diversity of the Letters (appearing in the sound) ?
110-111. In the absence of fluidity in these (subtile factors), how can they be said to be mixed up (into a complete whole, in the shape of the sound)? And (even if such mixing up. be admitted, 28 in the case of a lump of flour), how is it that in the travelling (from the region where the sound is produced to that where it is heard), the sound is not dissi- pated (and blown away) by the air-currents P—specially as these parts (४.९. the subtile factors making up the sound) are extremely light (being subtile) and are not bound together (into a composite whole) by any thing. And just as a lump of clay is shattered (into fragments) by striking against trees, so would the sound also (be shattered into its imperceptible component fragments by its striking against trees, &c., intervening in its path, from the place of production to that of its cognition).
112-113. (If the sound be held to be a component whole, made up of parts, then) having entered into the Har of one man, it could not be heard by others. Nor is there any cause for the multiplicity of intervening sounds. Nor, lastly, is it possible, for one and the same (componerit sound) to travel on all sides (in order to be heard by different persons).
113. Even in accordance with the theory that it is the Auditory Sense that moves (tothe region where the sound is produced ),—such (motion of the Anditory Sense) is not possible. And if (it be held that) it is the func- tion (or action of the Kar) that travels, then (in that case) it would mean the assumption of two imperceptible factors (since neither the function of the Har nor the travelling of the function is perceptible). And further,
107-108 This Kériké enumerates the various imperceptible facts assumed (without any reason) by the Jaina. ।
110.111 No mixing up is possible unléss the factors mixing np have a certain degree of fluidity and consequent visoidity.
The air-currents hlow away the flour; so would they blow away the sound into fragments ; hence it wonld ‘be impossible for any sound to be heard.
112.118 A material component object having entered one ear, will remain there in its entirely, as it is not possible for such an object to remain in more than one place at one and the eame time. And we have no grounds for holding that when a sound is produc. ed, many sounds follow in its wake and spread all round.
428 CLOKAVARTIKA.
(in this theory) you would have a modification (of the Auditory Sense) by a distant object (viz., the sound, which is always produced at a certain dis- tance from the Har).
114-115. If it be held that (the Auditory Sense) gets (at the distant sound), on accont of its all-pervading character,—then, this fact would apply equally well to the case of very distant sounds (and hence all sounds wonld be heard equally well) ; and, as such, the modification or non-modi- fication (of the Auditory Sense) would be brought about by all sounds equally, and not differently (the difference, in our theory, being based upon the distance or the proximity of the sound produced).
115-116. If it be held that the Auditory Sense is modified by those (sounds) that have no (particular) relation with it; then, as shown above, non-relation being equal (in the case of sounds near and distant), there would be no speciality in the near sound (whereby such sound wonld he heard, and not the one at a distance).
116-117, And further, the function of the Auditory Sense, being im- material, conld not be intercepted by any material obstacles; and hence, wherefore should an intercepted sound not be heard ?
117-119. If the modification were to belong to the Auditory Sense (which the Sankhya holds to be all-pervading), then there would be no rea- son for any limit (as to the reach of its cognition, -- ४.९. it would cognise all sounds) ; nor would it be possible for the function of the Anditory Sense to be urged mostly in the same direction ag the wind (and as such the greater reach of the sound in that direction would not be explicable); and it would be as possible for it to be intercepted in that direction and to move, with greater facility, against the wind (which facts militate, against the fact of the greater audibility of sounds in the said direction ); because, in that case, the help of the wind, belonging to the Auditory Sense, wonld not belong to the sound.
119-120. Those who hold that the sound is cognised by the Auditory Sense, without coming in contact with it,-—will have this non-contact applicable equally to the case of distant and near sounds (and hence there could be no difference in the hearing of these).
120-121, And in that case, both in the case of distant and near sounds,
118.116 Now begins the refutation of the Sénkhya theory.
16.111 “ Intercepted ` by obstacles, like a wall, &e.
119.180 This Karik@ and the next meet the Bauddha theory that the Auditory Sense cognises the sound without coming in any sort of contact with it.
120.121 Since all sounds would be equal in haying no contaot, and as such equally cognisable.
APHORISMS VI TO XXIIJ—-ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 429
cognition or non-cognition would be equally possible. And there would be no sequence, or intensity or lowness, &c., of sounds.
121-122. Therefore, we must now enquire into the process of hear- ing, from the standpoint of the Grotriya (the Mimansaka). It 18 an un- doubted fact (of perception) that (in speaking) the internal Air, being strnck by the mental effort (of the speaker) moves (out of the mouth).
122-123. And this (Air) requires (for going out of the throat) the conjunction and disjunction of the (tongue with the) palate, &c. And since the Air has a certain force (with which it moves), it moves along so long as this initiatory force lasts.
123-124, And it is also certain that, in moving along, the Air and its constituent particles come in contact with, and are disjoined from, the still (calm) Air (through which it passes).
124.125. Having reached the Akaga (Space) in the Ear, the Air im- parts a certain faculty, or potency, to the Auditory Sense; and since the sound is heard only when this (faculty) appears, therefore, we admit of its existence in the shape of a change (Sanskara, produced in the Sense),—and this is the only imperceptible factor that we assume.
125-126. And this “faculty” that we assume, is like the faculty of producing (the sound, held by the other party); and it is nothing more than that. And similarly (४,९.) as in the case of the opposite theory) we would assume particular faculties from the fact of the cognition of particular sounds.
126-127. The production of Words (and sounds) having been rejected,
121.122 With this begins the expounding of the proper Mimdanseke theory—Cf. the fol. lowing Karikds of Pinini—“ The soul having cognised the objects produces in the mind a desire to speak; it strikes the fireiu the body; and this fire moves the air inside; this air moving up strikes the head (brain?) and returns to the month, and there brings forth the Word.” Such is the production of the sound of the word; this sound strikes the outer air with a certain force; and so far as this force lasts in the outer air, up to that place, and till that time, the wordisheard. Itis shownin the Kérika that every item of this theory is amenable to perception, the only supersensuous element being that of the change produced in the Ear by the sound. Whenever the ordirary Air is struck by anything it moves; and so it must be with the Air in the body.
143.124 And since it comes in contact with the calm Air all round, therefore it is quite possible for the sound to be disseminated, aud spread along, on all sides of its source.
125.148 They too assume the appearance of a facnity in the ear, like us. They make the faculty productive of the sound, while we only hold it to be capable of mak: ing thé ear cognise the sound. So the fact of assuming an imperceptible faculty is com- mon to both of us.
128.121 The production of sounds is rejected under the Sitra “ Darganasya parars thatvat.” (1.1.18).
430 CLOKAVARTIKA.
—since the process of hearing them is not otherwise explicable,—we assume the (imperceptible) fact of specific changes being produced (in the Auditory Sense) by the sounds.
127-128. That which proves the existence of such a faculty of sounds (producing the charges) is the fact of (the change) appearing only when that faculty exists ;—just as in the case of the faculty of the Auditory Sense (which is proved by the fact of hearing appearing only when the faculty exists). And the intellect (that was engaged in the assumption, or explana- tion, of the production of the change) is taken up by the same (i.e., by the assumption of the faculty of sounds to bring about the changes).
128-130. The interception caused by a Wall, &c., is quite possible, in the case of the Air. Andthe striking against the tympanum (of which weare at times cognisant) is due to the great force of the Air-current. And since the Air has its own intensity, as well as that of its velocity, perishable,— and since it moves along in a certain order of sequence,—therefore, it comes to be the sole catise of the change (in the Auditory Sense) of the order of sequence (in the hearing of the sound), as also of the intensity and lowness, &c. (of the sound).
130-132. It is this “modification” (of the Auditory Sense) as the means of the comprehension of sounds, that some people, (Bhartrmitra,
&o.), thinking themselves to be learned, hold to be the “ Auditory Sense” itself. But this is only a changing of (or play upon) names; and yet they feel elated in their own minds (at having discovered a new theory) ; whereas this pride is only false, inasmuch as they have not discovered anything new.
132-133. The Bhashya too, has not mentioned the “ Auditory Sense”’ to be anything other than a change produced by the sounds. Beyond this, what else have they found to be indicated by the word “Auditory Sense” (that they seek to improve upon the Bhashya)?
133-135. People always use the word “ Sanskéra’”’ (“ modification ”’)
187.123 “ Tntellect, &८. when we enquire into the production of this change, we are satisfied by the assumption of such a faoulty in the sounds uttered.
123.180 By ^ 1९.97 are meant the facts of thesound being heard near and not at a distance, the fact of its greater reach in the same direction as the wind, its diffusion on all sides (caused hy the current of Air passing on all sides).
130.132 They hold the Modification to be the Sense. They admit of the Modification aird the Sense both; but change their names.
182.153 The only difference between our statement of the fact and theirs is, that they call the “ faculty” itself the “ Auditory Sense;” while we apply this name to an Entity (a sense-organ) endowed with this faculty. And that the latter faot 18 true is proved by our every-day experience.
APHORISMS VI TO XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 431
६8 & generic name applicable (in common) to all entities belonging to the same class (of “supersensuous entities,” to which the uforesaid faculty of the Auditory Sense belongs),—the existence of which entities’ is infer- red from their effects. But the word “ Crotra’’ (Auditory Sense) 18 not known (by people) to have any connection with the denotation of the word ^“ 90115074 ; and as such, the word ‘‘ Auditory-Sense” cannot renounce its own specific denotation (known to every person), and denote the Sanskdra” (which is always known to he only a generic entity).
(135-186).—The author of the Bhashya has laid down, in the begin- ning, the “non-optionality ” of the denotatious of words. And this (rule) would be surely violated by those (who optionally, without any grounds) attribute the word “Grotra” to the Sanskara.
136-137. The word “ Crotra” is known, by all men, to.apply to to something other than the Sanskdra. And hence (by asserting it to mean Sanskara) we would separate the word “Crotra” from its well- known signification, without any reason.
137-138. It is established, on the ground of Scriptures, that the Sense- organs accrue to the man, while he is yet in the womb; and this shows that they exist even prior to the appearance of their effects (cognitions). And
-this (Scriptural Assertion) is violated (by the theory that the Auditory Sense is identical with Sanskara).
138-139. And further, the relation of the word with the meaning,
cannot, in any way, be created (anew) by us. Ifthe Anditory Sense be held ‘to be momentary (as it necessarily must be, if it be held to be identical with Sanskara, which is only momentary),—then the relation of this (word “Crotra”) with its meaning (Sanskaéra, which'is produced by sounds, and as such a caused entity), ९००1१ not but be such asis created by us (and as such non-eternal). (And this would go against the th eory of the eternality of the relation of Words with their meanings, as held by all the Mimdansa- kas.)
139-140. If it be urged that “the same would be the case with the word ‘ Sanskara’ (which is admitted by the Mimansaka to denote Sanskaras, that are momentary and non-eternal),”—then (woe reply that) other Sanskadras remain (even when one Sanskdra has been destroyed; and we hold the denotation of the word “ Sanskara ” to apply to the class ^^ Sans- kara,’ which is eternal). (Apart from the 0,4.58) however, there are some individual Sanskaras (as those of the Yogi) that continue for hundreds of years. Hence, the relation of the word ^ Sanska@ra”’ with the Sanskara (considered either as a class, or as an individual) can never be destroyed..
187.188 «८ Violated’’—because the Sanskdra is concomitant with the cognition of the word; but there 18 no suoh cognition in the womb; while the Qruti declares. that the 8671868 accrue to the child in the 5th month after conception.
482 001 4.2५.
140-141. Then again, the word ^^ Crotra,”’—prior to the (production of the) Sanska@ra, as also after it,—is always known to apply to an object located in a certain place (part of the body, v2z., the Har).
142, And we can hold the continuance (permanence) of the “ Audi- tory Sense” on the ground of its being a sense, like the “^ Tactile Sense,” &c. And hence it cannot be said to be momentarily created (and as such cannot be identical with a ^" Sanskdra,”’ that is created and destroyed at every moment),
143. If by contact with sound, the ‘“ Auditory” Sense were to be produced (as held by those who hold the sense to be identical with Sans- kara, which is produced by the sound),—then how is it that it is not found (to be produced) in the case of the deaf person P
144. Because that which does not exist in a person, is naturally capable of being produced,—therefore, the ^“ Auditory Sense,” which is wanted (for the cognition of sounds), would be produced, even for the deaf (which is impossible).
145-146. If it be urged that “the same contingency would apply to the theory of Sanskéra (being produced by the sound),”—(then we reply that), the Sanskara cannot be produced in the Sense which has been destroyed (or deranged, as it is in the deaf). Sounds are unable to pro- duce any changes (Sanskdra) in the “ Auditory Sense” (of the deaf) which is covered over by derangements. But if it be held that it is the Sense (of audition) itself, which (being identical with Sanskara) is pro- duced (by sounds), then, in that case, there could be no obstruction (to the production of the Auditory Sense, even in deaf persons).
146-147, Those (Vaigéshikas) who hold the Senses to be material
140.141 This anticipates the following argument : The line of argument that the M?- mansaka follows with regard to the signification of Senskdra by the word “ Sanskara,” wonld also apply to the case of the signification of Sanskdra by the word “ Qratra.” The sense of the Kérikd ia that thie is not poseible, inasmuch as Sanskdra is held to be signified by the word ‘“‘Sanskéra,” simply becanse, apart from the Sanskara this word is found to have no meaning. In the oase of the word “ Qrotra,” on the other hand, even prior to, and after the Sanskéra has appeared and disappeared, it is found to denote the Har in the body ; therefore the word “ Qrotra” cannot be accepted to denote Sanskéras.
143 The Har of the deaf comes in contact with the sound ; and this contact, produc- ing his Auditory Sense, would wake the sound heard by him.
199 It cannot be urged that the deaf does not have the Sense, becanse he 128 not got it. Becanse it is only that which one has not got which can be produced by ade- quate canses.
145.148 The sense of this objection is that if the cognition of sound be due to Sanskara, it would be prodnced for the deaf also, and he would also hear sounds.
146.167 The word “ Sanskéras,” as applied to the case of the Anditory Senge (a well: known object), means the capability of the Sense to bring about an effect in the shape of
APHORISMS VI TO XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 433
(each Sense belonging to a particular material substance) hold a certain part of Akdga to be the Sense of Audition. And how would you (who hold that the Sense is produced by the sound) reject the fact of the existence of this (part of Akdga, as the Auditory Sense), even prior to the (production of the) sound ?
147-148. The capability, of a certain well-known object, to bring about a certain effect,—which (capahility) is brought ahout by other agencies,—is what is known to be denoted by the word “ Sanskara”; and on what grounds would you reject the fact of this denotation P
148-149. The mere denial (without any reasons) of facts ordinarily well-known, and supported hy the Scriptures, is a profitless waste of lahour (lit., useless shedding of perspiration),—like the (dog’s) chewing of the cows’ horns (which does not give it any food, and is mere waste of labour).
149-150. If it be absolutely necessary to deny the assertion of the Naiyayika (as to a certain part of Akaga being the Auditory Sense),—then you must seek to establish the fact of space (‘‘ Dik”) being the Sense of Audition, on the ground of its being laid down in the Veda.
150-152. “The Auditory Sense returns to the Quarters (i.¢., to Space)” —such is the assertion of the Veda, in the chapter on “ Dissolutions ”’ (where it is asserted that the various Senses return to the various material substances). And this assertion implies that the Sense returns to its primary condition (Space). Just as, with regard to the ‘ Sense of Vision,” we have the passage “the Sense of Vision returns to the Sun,” which means that the primary condition of the Sense of Vision is Five (or Light),—so, exactly in the same manner (the passage declaring the return of the Sense of Andi- tion to Space means that) the Sense of Audition is constituted by Space (which is its primary condition).
152-153. Space is all-pervading and one, and extends as far as the Akaca ; and when this (Space) is limited within the region of the ear (in the body), it hecomes the “ Auditory Sense,”—just as Akdga is held to he (by the Vat¢géshikas).
153-154. And the arguments,—that the Vaigéshika can urge in favour of the theory that the Anditory Sense is a part of Akdga,—will all apply equally well to our theory that the Auditory Sense is a part of Space. The only difference is that our theory is supported by the Veda (while the Vaicéshtka theory is opposed to it).
154-155. Therefore the “ Auditory Sense” must be held to be that
the cognition of sonnds; and this capability is due to the sound-waves in the air striking them. This 18 known to all men. And on what grounds do you seek to deny the fact of such signification of the word “ Sanskéra” ? e
163.164 The character of Space is much the same as that of Akdea.
154.156 ‘* Changed,” «6, the Sanskdra produced by the sound belongs to the part of
99
434 CLOKAVARTIKA.
part of the substance ‘Space,’ which is influenced by the virtuous and vicious deeds (of the person to whom the Sense belongs), and which (under this influence) comes to be limited within the hole of the Har (in the man’s body). And it is this (part of Space, as constituting the Auditory Sense) that is changed (by the sounds striking it).
155-156. Thus, then, the fact of the Sound (Word) not persisting (contining to exist) is due to (the absence of) other things ; and thns the argument (in S#tra_7) is inconclusive. If it be taken to declare the fact of the non-continuance of the cognition of the Word, then we have such non-continuance (of cognition) even in the case of the Akaga (contained in the Well which has) disappeared (४.९. been covered up by the filling up of the well) (and hence the argument becomes doubtful).
157-158. Nor can destructibility belong to a substance (like Akdaga) which does not consist of (is not cansed by) another substance. If it be urged that “in the case of Akdga we have an inferential argument which proves its continned existence (even in the case of the filling up of the Well),” —then (we reply that), in the case of the Word too, we have an Inference (based upon the fact of its being recognised to be the same as the one heard before, which proves that the same Word continued to exist all along).
158-159. On account of the use of the word “Karoti”’ (“ does,” with regard to Words), it has been asserted (in Sutra 9)—that the word 28 a caused
from which one infers the fact of words bsing caused,—then (we reply that) the mere Space as oonstituting the Sense of Audition, and renders it capable of oognising the sound. |
155 This recapitulates the arguments that have been urged against the Sitra ५४ Asthanat”? (1 -1-- 7). | The non-continuance of the Word is dne to the fact of the non-continnance of the object signified by the Word, and not to the destruction of the Word. And as for the non-continnance of the cognition of the Word, this cannot be any ground for asserting the Word to be caused, and non-eternal, Becanse if this be accepted to be snfficient groond for snch conclusion,—then that wonld apply aleo to Aka@ga, which is known to be caosed and eternal. And hence, the argument becomes doubtful.
167.158 With thia begins the consideration of the fourteenth Sitra, which meets the argument urged in the Sutra “*Karotigabdat = (I—i—8).
The word ^ Karoti” properly signifies the prodnetion of something that did not exist before. But this is not applicable to words; because even when we have the asser- tion “ Qabdankurwu” the word hae existed, before the assertion, and the utterance of the word by the person directed ; and as the word existed already, the person cannot be said to produce something that did not exiet beforehand, And hence your argument fails.
lf it be urged that it is not on the basis of such produotion that we aesert the fact of worda heing caused ; but it is on the fact of people making auch assertion as “* Qabdartkuru,”
APHORISMS VI 10 XXIIJ—ETERNALITY OF 0178, 435
entity. But the proper meaning of the word (“ Karoti”) is not applicable (to the case of Words), If the mere assertion (“Cabdam kuru”) be said: to he (the ground for holding words to be caused), then the argument becomes contradictory (not proving the desired conclusion),—for those who hold (the Word) to be caused (produced) hy the action of that person (who is directed as ५५ Cabdam kuru”). Because we meet with such asser- tions (or directions) even in the case of “ cowdung,” &e., which are not pro- duced by the person directed.
159-160. If it be urged that, ‘ the cowdung is certainly a caused entity anyway, —(we reply that) we also come across with such assertions as
akagam kuru’ (“ produce emptiness”)
160-162. If it be urged that “the Akdca,—being only a removal (Negation) of covering (aud this heing brought about by the action of the re- moval),—is also a caused entity,” then (we reply that) even to the Baud- dha (who holds all things to he momentary and non-eternal), a negation, being self-sufficient, is never produced. The effect of the action (of digging & well, in accordance with the direction “produce emptiness (@kdga) here,” is the removal of the Earth (fillmg up the space) to some other place (and not the production of Akaga). And the Akdga, being a negation of covering (granting this theory for once) continues ever permanent.
162-163. If it he urged that, “since there can be no production of an eternal thing (like Aka@ga), therefore this assertion (‘produce Akdga”) is either wrong or figurative,’’—then, we could have the same explanation with regard to the assertion (‘‘produce words”) with regard to the Word also. ,
163-165. Tbatwhich is the Hast of the people of Saurashtra, is the South of the Malavas; and the Hastof these (Malavas) is the North of those (Saurash-
fact of such assertion cannot prove your theory, because this assertion cannot prove that the person (directed) produces the Word; ०6५६०66 we meet with such directions as “ Gomayatkuru” (=collect cowdung); though the cowdung is not produced by the per- son addressed.
169.160 ^ Somehow or other ””—1.e., whether it be produced by the cow or by some- thing else.
If the instance of the cowdung will not do, we have such assertions even with re gard to such an eternal and uncaused entity as the dkdga.
160.162 If Akdea be only a negative entity (removal of covering),—it is all the more eternal. Beoause even the Bauddha does not hold negations to be non-eternal.
The direotion * produce Akéga here” = dig ont the Harth from thie place.
162.163 The sense of the objection 18 that Akdcga is eternal. Therefore such assertions cannot apply to it; the sense of the reply ie that the word is also known to he eternal from the fact of its being recognised (to be the same at different times) ; and as such this too being eternal, the assertion of production with regard to it mnst also he either wrong
or figurative. at 163.165 With this begins the explanation of Sitra 15: ^ The simultanetty (of the:
436 QLOKAVARTIKA.
tras). Therefore, the place of Sunrise would be different for the inhabit- ants of the two countries, even though the Sun 15 only one. And hence your argument (urged in I—i—9) hecomes uncertain.
165-166. One man sees the rising and setting of the Sun to happen at a certain distance from him; and, at the same time, another man, living at a certain distance hehind (to the West of) him, also sees (the Sun rising and setting) at the same distance from himself (as the former man).
166-167. Various Suns are never seen; therefore there cannot be a multiplicity of Suns. And again, at midday, all men see the Sun directly over their heads (and thus too we have this simultaneous perception of the single Sun at different places). |
167-168. The sun is seen to shine over a certain region (hill, tree, &c. ); and when the person goes over to these regions, then it appears to shine at
cognition) of words is like the (simultaneity of the perception of) the Sun” (I—i—16). This Sitra is in reply to I—i—9.
To both conntries the Sun rises in the Hast. But the Hast of all countries is not the same, therefore the place of snnrise must appear different to different countries. Thus then, jnst as though the Sun is one only, yet at one and the same time, it appears in different places, 80 too with the Word,—though this is only one, yet it is heard in different places at one and the same time. And just as this fact does not prove the fact of the Sun being a caused entity; so the argument urged by you in Sitra 9 fails to prove the causedness, and consequently non-eternality, of Words.
165.166 And as the Sun appears to be, at the same distance, in the same direction from two persons, one being behind the other at a certain distance; therefore we must conclude therefrom that the Sun appears to rtse and set at different places, though it is one only. So mere simultaneity of the utterance of a word, by many people, cannot prove its non-eternality.
166.1¢7 If the Sun were held to be many on the mere ground of two persons seeing it rise at equal distances from themselves,—then people who were not at a very great dis- tance from one another wonld see both the Suns (i.e., the oneat an equal distance from him, and the other at equal distance from his friend a few yards behind him), But as such different Suns are seen, it must be admitted that they do not exist,
५८ And again,—&o.” The translation follows the interpretation of the Nyayaratna- kara. The Kacika interprets thus: This shows another argument for proving the unity of the Sun. At midday all men see one Sun only; and this would not be possible, if there were many Sune.
167.168 This shows cause why a single Sun appears to be seen at different places, The fact of people thinking the Sun to appear at different places is due to the fact of people seeing the Sun and mistaking it tobe shining nearthom. (To people mistaking it to he near them, the idea appears that the Sun has appeared at “different places”.) As for example, we see the Sun to be shining over a hill, at a certain distnnce from us. And when we go over to that hill, from there too, we see it shining at the same die- tance from us as it appeared before. And 80 on, as we go on moving from one place to the other, we find the Sun shining at the same distance from us. And from all this we conolude that the Sun is one and shines at a great distance from us; hut people think they see it at different places, because each man seeing it thinks it
APHORISMS VI 10 XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 437
& certain distance from that place—this distance (sometimes) appearing to be (equal to, and sometimes) more than, the former distance (at which the Sun had appeared to shine from the former place.)
168-169. Even in the case of an object which is comparatively much nearer to us (than the Sun really is), we find that persons,—residing at places that are at different degrees of distance from that object, and conse- quently having their fronts decidedly different from one another,—mistake that distant object to be at equal distances from themselves.
169-171. Obj: “In the case of the distant Sun, it is possible that persons, not really seeing the place (at which the Sun really shines) should have mistaken notions about that place,—the mistake being due to the fact of every man thinking the Sun to be in proximity to him. But, how is any such mistake possible in the case of the Word (which is not at a great dis- tance from the person hearing it pronounced simultaneously by many per- sons)?” Reply: In that case too, the mistake is due to the all-pervading character of the Word: inasmuch asin all the places that we come across, we find the Word to exist.
171-172. The Word has no parts ; and as such, it cannot be cognised in parts (like any large object). The Word is always (cognised) as «a exists; and it always exists in its entirety (therefore it 18 only reasonable that it should always be cognised in its entirety, and never in parts).
172-175. But the Word is heard in certain definite places, because it
is shining near himself, and thus many people mistaking the Sun to appear in proximity to everyone of them, the idea naturally arises that there are so many dietinct Snne.
168.169 रा) in the case of comparatively near ohjecte—such as some great moun- tain—a man ata certain place sees it to be at the same distance at which it appears to another man at a certain distance from him. And since each man seems to see the object nearer himself, the notion is likely to arise that there are so many different mountains. In the same manner, when the chance of such mistake is met with even in case of comparatively nearer objects, such mistakes with regard to theextremely remote Sun is only natural.
169.17! Since a Word is heard in all places, it cannot he either material (corporeal) or caused, or non-eternal. Because in one place having known a Word, when we come acroes it in some other place, we at once recognise it to be the same Word. Thne the Word ig one only, and is manifested in the mouths of different people, who cannot be said to produce the Word. The Simultaneity that we perceive, when we hear the same word pronounced by different people, helongs to the utterance (manifestation) of the ever-existing, all-pervading word, in the mouthe of different people.
Iil-178 If the word were heard in parte then we conld never cognise the Word in ts entirety. 46 9, matter of fact, the Word is always cognised inits entirety. It is always cognised as it ewists (in its all-pervading character); and ue it always appears in its entirety; and like the Akdga it everywhere exists in ite entirety,—it is only natural that it should be always cognised in its entirety.
172.115 The Ear cognises a Word only if the manifesting utterance is made in @ place which is near enough to it.
438 QLOKAVARTIKA.
depends (for its cognition) upon the sounds (utterances) that serve to mani- fest it (४,९., render it perceptible tothe Ear). And sounds (ntterances) have not the power to pervade the whole Space; and as such, a Word once uttered is not heard continuously all over the world, (but only up to a place where the air-current carrying the sound-vibrations loses its force). And the Auditory Sense (of man) follows the differences of the place of utter- ance (of the word). And since (utterances) do not fill up the (time and space) intervening (between two utterances of the word), therefore there appears a break in the cognition (of the word, which is not-cognised in the intervening time). And since these (utterances) extend over a certain definite limited space, there appears a (mistaken) notion of the limited (non-pervading) character of the Word (manifested by the utterances ).
175-76. Since these (utterances) have motion and a certain velocity, therefore, from whatever place they proceed, the Word (manifested by these) appears, to the hearer, to come from the same place (though, asa matter of fact, the Word exists in all places, and is only manifested or rendered perceptible to the ear, by these utterances).
176-77. Obj. ‘The Sun is not seen, to appear at different places, by one and the same man.” Heply: It may not (be seen by one man); but, anyway, it is found to appear in different places (even though it be by different people.)
177-79. If you hold your premise (‘‘ because the Word is cognised simultaneously to proceed from different sources”) to be qualified (by the specification that, in case of the Word, the simultaneous cognition is “by one and the same person”’),—then, too, your argument becomes contradictory; inasmuch as (even in the case of the Sun), it (the sun) is seen, to appear in different places, by one and the same person. (As for instance) in many vessels filled with water, the Sun (being reflected in each of these) is simultaneously seen, by one and the same man, to be onc only. And there is no ground for holding these (reflections) to be different; inas- much as they are actually seen to be exactly the same (or similar).
179-80. Obj. “ But we say that the reflections appear, by some cause, separately in the different vessels, and are all cognised by one at one and the same time.”
116.18 These Kérikds explain the reasons for the mistaken notions of limitation, non-eternality, &c., with regard to words, and, as such, supply a full answer to the ques: tion put by the objector in Kariké 170.
116.71 The objector objects to the similarity of the simultaneity of the perception of Words with that of the perception of the Sun.
179.80 ^ By some cause” —i.¢,, by the {806 of our seeing a face reflected in only one vessel at a time; whereby, we see one refleotion of the Sun to be at oue time a@ocom- panied by the reflection of the face, which is not present in another vessel,
APHORISMS VI TO XXIII—ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 489
180-82. In reply to this, we say that the fact (of vision) is that the light from the sun strikes the surface of the water (and is reflected), and consequently, the light from the Kye (striking against the water), is reflected back in the wake of the reflected solar light, and thus it sees the Sun in 118 own region (४.९. in the place where the Sun shines), (and as such, it can see it as one only; but) it appears to he manifold and of various forms, (in the reflections), on account of the diversity of the vessels (in which the reflections occur). And, such being the case, how can the reflection be (said to be) diverse (not one) P
182-188. Just as when the eye is slightly pressed by the finger, a sin- gle object (the moon, ४.) is seen to be various, because of the diversity in the functioning of the eye (produced by the pressure); so, in the case in question (where the idea of the manifoldness of the reflection is due to the diversity of the vessels; and the diversity appearing in the same Word, as uttered by different persons, is due to the diversity of the utterances or sounds produced by the different persons, which serve to render the Word perceptible to the Har of the hearer).
183-185. Some people holding the view of the appearance of the re- flections (as something totally different from the reflected object) object to the above theory thus: ‘If it is the Sun itself that is seen (in the reflec- tion), how is it that the reflection is not seen above (over the head of the observer) ? And again, secondly, how is it that, in the case of re- flections in wells, &c., it is seen below (when the Sun is shining above) P And, thirdly, looking in a mirror, while facing the east, how is it that one sees the image facing the west P”
185-186. The fact is that the Sense (of vision in the present case) brings about the cognition of the object, in the body itself (and hence it is always in front of the body that the perceived object appears) ; and this explains the above facts—specially as the Sense is a means of cognition, only when located in the body.
186-189. When people are looking upon the Sun in the water, the func- tioning (the path of the rays) of his eye 18 always two-fold : one above, and
180.828 The reflection appears to be different, because the vessels are different and not because the reflections themselves are different. Because all the reflections are geen in the retina of the Eye, which is one only.
185.188 Thongh the Sun is overhead, yet it is always seen before, in front of the eye, and as such it is quite reasonable for the reflection to be identical with the Sun, and yet appears below us.
189 Even though, as a matter of fact, the Sun shines ahove, yet since in the cage of reflection, it is perceived hy means of the downward function of the Eye, it appears to be below us, in the water ; though even in this case what we really see is only the Sun shining ahove. Hence, the reflection is identified with the reflected object ; and the reflection is seen hecause it is in front of the body
440 GLOKAVARTIKA.
another below. And that Sun which is affected (manifested) by the upward function is not seen (by the Hye), because itis notin a straight line with the substrate of the Hye (1.e., becanse the Sun is not in front of the body) $ While the Sun, as it exists (in the water), is presented before the observer mediately (४.९. the upward function presents the image to the downward function, and this presents it to the observer), and is perceived by means of the downward function (of the Hye), (and it is for this reason that the Sun, though shining above, is seen below, in the reflection). And since this (downward function) is identical with the upward function (inasmuch as both equally are functions, and belong equally to the eye), therefore (when the Sun, though shining above, is perceived by means of the down- ward function), it appears to the observer as if it were below him. Hence, what is really seen below (in the reflection) is the Sun itself appearing (before the downward function of the Eye) through the medium (of the upward function).
189-190. Similarly (in the case of the image in the mirror the fnnc- tion of the Eye is two-fold: one proceeding to the east, and another to the west; and) the face (in the mirror) is mistaken to be looking to the west, because (in this case) it is presented, by the easterly function, to the westerly function of the Hye. (Hence, though the face is really looking to the east, it appears as looking to the west).
190-191. Even granting that the reflections occupy different places, —they are not known to be diverse, because all are cognisable by the same idea (7.e., all are recognised to be precisely similar, and hence (identical).
191-192. Even if we accept the theory that the Sense of Audition moves (over to the region where the Word is uttered), the fact of the Word being heard in different places (2.¢., from the mouths of different speakers) may be explained as being due to the diversity of the places occupied by these mouths (and not to any diversity in the Word itself), Andif (we hold the theory) that the cognition of the Word is produced in the region of the Auditory Sense itself, then we naturally get at the fact of the Word occu- pying only one place (the space in the Ear).
192-193. Even if the Sense (of audition) be something else (other than the tympanum as affected by the sound—vibrations of Air),—since even such a Sense can have no function outside its own substrate (viz., the Kar, in the body, as consisting of the tympanum, &c.); therefore, if we accept
191.19 This explains the Bhdshya passage wherein the analogy of the oase of Word with that of the Sun is worked out :—Jf the Auditory Sense were to go over to the place of conjunction and disjunction (of the palate, &o.), in the mouths of the speakers, &o., &o.
192.198 And such travelling of the tympanum of the listoner by the mouth of the speaker is an absurdity ; henoe the sense of andition cannot be held to move to the place where sounds are produced,
APH. ए-- रदा ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 44.7
the theory of (the Auditory 86४86) moving (to the regions where sounds are produced), we would find the tympanum, &c. (of the hearer) moving to the place of utterance (viz., the mouth of the speaker) (inasmuch as the Auditory Sense could not move to the region, independently of its substrate).
193-196. Obj: ‘All these assumptions of yours apply to the case where the speakers (of the same Word) are many, and the hearer only one. When, on the other hand, there is only one speaker, and many hearers, then itis quite the contrary,—(z.e., your arguments become upset). Because in this latter ease, the Senses (of audition) (cognising the Word) being many, the Word surely (even according to your own theory) appears in diverse
198.186 The Sense of the objection is thas summed np in the Ny@yarutndkara: You assume that in the theory of tha movement of the Auditory Sense (of the hearer) to the sound regions, the idea of a single place for the Word is the carrect one, and that of di- versity of its place a mistaken one. This assertion is possible if the speakers are many and the hearer only one. When, however, the Speaker is only one, and the Hearars many, your theory of the singleness of Word is upset, if the movement of the Auditory Seuse be not admitted ; becanse in that case, the idea of diversity of the place of (cognition of) the Word would be trne, whereas that of the unity of its place would bea mistaken one; be- cause, the hearers being many, the Word would be cognised in the Har of all theze persone ; and, 88 such, being cognised in many places, it could be recognised to have many places. And the idea of the Word having only one place could be true only if it were admitted that the single Anditory Sense (of the one hearer) moves over to the place of the ntterance of Sound. But since such movement of the Sense is not admitted, the notion of single- ness of the Word’s place must be a mistaken one; and hence, if in this case (of many hearers and one Speaker), the Mimangaka holds the notion of siogjeuess of place to be true, and that of a diversity of place to be mistaken, then he must admit the fact of the Auditory Sense moving to the sound regions. To this the Mimansaka may reply: ‘True: the no- tion of singleness of the place of the Word is really a mistaken one (even in our theory) ; inasmuch as the Word is all-pervading and never partial; but it is manifested by the sounds proceeding from a single source (the mouth of the one Speaker); and this single- ness of the place of the utterance of Sounds, is mistaken to be the place of the Word.’ But the objector retorts: Even in the case where there are many Speakers, and only one hearer, there too the notion of the diversity of the place of Word may be explained to be a mistaken one due to the diversity of the sources from which the Word is attered. Therefore, whether we admit the movement of the Auditory Sense or not, the explanation of the notion of singleness of the Word’s place, and that of the notion of diversity of ita place, are the same: both of these notions have been shown to be mistaken in different cases; und the explanation of the mistake is exactly similar in both cases—viz., the diversity of the manifesting Sounds. And then, if, as a matter of fact, both of these notions—that of singleness and diversity of place—be false, with reférence to the Word, which is all-pervading, then why should the Mimansaka cc tenaciously hold to the theory of Singleness, and fight shy of the theory of diversity of the place of the Word? And secondly, since the explanation of the mistake is the same —whether yon admit the movement of the Auditory Sense or not,— why shonld you roject the theory of such movement, and hold to the theory of the Word itself coming to the Auditory Sense ?
96
442 CLOKAVARTIKA.
places (the Sense of audition of the many hearers.) And it is only if we admit the fact of the Sense itself moving (to the region of the Sound), that there can be any possibility of the Word appearing in only one place (the oue mouth of the single hearer). If it be held that “ (in this case) the no- tion (of the Word appearing in a single place, wz., the mouth of the one speaker) is a mistaken one, due to the fact of the Sound (ntterance) pro- ceeding (from a single source), then the same may be said in the other case also (where there are many speakers, and only one hearer) where the ap- pearance of the diversity of the Word may be accepted to be due tothe di- versity of the manifesting agencies, in the shape of the palate, de. (of the different speakers).”
196-197. (True: the mistaken character of both notions 18 similar ; but) in the S#tra (I—i—9) the fact of the simultaneity (of the cognition by one man of a Word uttered by many persons) has been urged against us (hold- ing the eternality of Words); and hence, it is only in accordance with this (case of many speakers and one hearer, as urged against us), that the Bha- shya has asserted that “even though, &९.''
197-198. The notion of diversity of the Word, as being due to the diversity of the place of its appearance (utterance), is got at by means of Inference. Whereas the notiou (of recognition), that “this (Word) is the same (that I had heard from another person),” is got at by means of Sense- perception (the sameness of the Word being recognised by the Auditory Sense); and as such, this latter notion (being the more authoritative of the two) rejects the former (got at hy Inference).
496.197 It 18 true that both these 70106 are equally mistaken, and the explanation too ie the same. But the Bhdshya has not bronght forward the mistaken character of the notion of aingleness of place, because thie would be irrelevant; inasmuch ae the notion of singleness 18 false in the 0886 of many hearers and one speaker,—a 0886 which has not been touched upon by tho objector. The objector has only brought forward, in the ninth S#tra, the case of many epeakere and one hearer; and in this case, it is the notion of the diversity of place which is false; and since such falsity oan be proved only when the movement of the Auditory Sense is not admitted, therefore the Bhdshya ““Yadi crotram, &.,” (p. 28), 188 taken into consideration this case only in ordsr to meet the objector on his own ground.
197.198 This meete the following objeotion : ‘‘ What yon say with regard to the objeo- tion urged in the ninth Sutra may be trne. Bntin the oase of many hearers and only one speaker there is 8 real diversity of the place of the Word (in accurdanoe with your own theory). And thne the plnsoe being different, the Word mast he accepted as being different, 28 uttered by different persons.” The 86086 of the Karika 16 that Inference, however strong, is always 861 88106 by a fact of Senee-perception, if this latter be contrary to the oonclu- siou of the former. Inthe present case we have such a case. Therefore, even if there be a diversity of the place of the utteranoe of the Word, this cannot lead to the conclu- gion that the Word itself is diverse ; since such a conclusion would go against a well” established fact of Sense-psrception.
+ला. ण- ड्द ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 44.3
198-200. Just as Dévadatta, though gradually passing from one place to another, is not considered to be different (in different places) (simply be- cause he is known to be a single person) ;—so, in the same manner, a Word, having been known to be one, cannot be considered as different (even when uttered by different persons). And again, just as, being seen again and again, Dévadatta is not known to be different in consideration of the differ- ence of the time (of his being seen); so, too, the Word cannot be considered to be different, in consideration of the difference of the place (of its uitter- ance).
200-201. If it be urged, that, “(in the case of Dévadatta) the fact of his being recognised as one is not contradicted (by the fact of his being seen at different times) ; because, in this case, there is a certain sequence (and no simultaneity, in the different times of his heing seen) [whereas in the case of the Word being uttered by a single person and heard by many persons, there 18 simultaneity, and as such, contradiction is unavoidable],”—(then we reply that) we may explain (the appearance of a single Word in many places) on the ground of the all-pervading character (of the Word). And for the sake of establishing a perceptible fact, the assumption of any char- acter (or property) is allowable.
201-203. (In Séra 10) it has been argued that the Word 18 perish- able, because it is modifiable; and in support of the premiss, the objector has cited the ‘ similarity ` (of the ¥ which is changed into 4), and the‘ authority ’ (of Panini who enjoins that = followed by अ is changed into य). But the authority (that he has quoted) is ineffective (in supporting his premises); because the rule laid down by Panini is not such as that ^" produce the letter य by the modification of the =.”
203-204. Because it is only when the relation between Words and their meanings has been established, that the rules of grammar are laid
200.201 An all-pervading entity, thongh one, can be found 10 many places, like Akaga- Therefore in the oase of the Word too, there is no contradiction.
“The assumption, &९. How do you know that the Word 18 all-pervading? Be- cause we assnme such character of the Word; because if this be not assnmed, we cannot explain the perceptible fact of the single Word being uttered by different persons, at one and the same time. And such assumption is always allowable.
201.203 This considers S#tra 16: “The ya into which दू is always changed, is a different letter altogether, and not a modification (of the डू).
All that दूको यणचि means is that when दू is followed by ऋ, these two letters are set aside and the letter q is put in their place. If the letter q were held to he produced by this aphorism of Panini’s, then there could be no such letter before that rule had been laid down.
208.204 The Sitra दूको यणचि is laid down with a view to regnlate the nse of the letters दू, य, च, &८. And as such the letter q must have existed before the rnle was
4.44 GLOKAVARTIBA.
down with a view to regulate the use of these Words; and (then if the rules of grammar be taken to lay down the production of Words), the relation (of the Words and their meanings) cannot be regarded as established, prior to the laying down of the rnle.
204-205. While pointing out the correetness of “ Dudhi” and Dadhya” —known to be two different words,—the Sutra (‘ Iko yanact” Pan. V1-i-77) serves to point out the general character of the word “Dadhi”’ (in compari- son tothe specific character of “ Dadhya”) with a view to show the (root) form (of the word, ४.९. “ Dadht’’), and the (derivative) form of the word: i.e., ^ Dadhya”), (as a particular word due to the following ac). And both these are mentioned (in the Sutra) as if they were one, for the sake of the brevity (of expression) of the Castra (Vyakarana),
206-207. The word ‘“ Dadhi” having been mentioned (in another Sutra) as an accomplished word, wonld reject the word “‘ Dadhya” bronght about by the ach following (the 7) (becanse this latter is nowhere else men- tioned as an independent word). And (inorder to avoid this contingency) the presence of this (word “Dadhi”’) is denied by the Sutra (“ Iko yana- et”) which means that in a place where the ‘z’ is followed by an ‘ach’ we should have the specific word ^^ Dadhya” and not the general word * Dadhi.”
207-208. What the Sitra means is that when the “zk” appears (followed by ‘‘ac”) “Yan” is tbe correct form. And, as a matter of fact, there never was any modification (in the matter).
209-211. (Thns then, the authority of Panini, &c., having heen shown to be inapplicable to the theory of the modification of Words), the mere fact of similarity (between the z and the ya, as urged in K. 102) is also shown (in the Bhashya) to be mconclusive (donbtful, as to proving the fact that the case of 7 changing into ya is a case of modification). Specially as even between the flower Kundu and Curd, we find a similarity (of whiteness)
contemplated. If, on the other hand, the meaning of the Sdtra be that one isto produce (anew) the letter gy, then we will have to admit the non-existence of snch a Jetter (as यु) prior to the laying down of the rule.
204.208 One, who holds “ Dadhya” to be modified ont of “ Dadhi” will have to admit that the latter Wordis not an accomplished Word in itself. Therefore the Sazra mnst be taken to mean something else. And this meaning is that both words, Dadhi and Dadhya, are equally accomplished words by themselves; and the Satra is meant to show that both these are distinct words; and with a view to this it mentions ^ Dadhi” as the general form, and ^^ Dadhya” as a particular form, dne to the specification of the following ach; and thus the S#tra does not assert that दू is changed into य, but that both are eqnally distinct forms. And “Dudhya” is not mentioned as an independent Word; because that wonld lead to the enunciation of alt such words as sre included in the
Sitra, when it appears in its present form; thus the clearness of the statement has been sacrificed to brevity (by Panini).
APH. VI—XXIII ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 445
{and certainly the flower is not a modification of the curd). If it be urged that the similarity iu the latter case is not absolute (7.e., it is only partial), —-then, in the other case (of ४ and ya) too, the similarity is only partial as consisting only the sameness of the place of utterance. Thus then, both these grounds (‘authority’ and ‘similarity’) having failed (with regard to proving the fact of 7 being modified into ya), the original argument (based upon these, and urged in Sdéra 10) falls to the ground unsupported,
211-212. The fact of the increase or decrease (in the intensity of word-sounds) depending upon the (increase or decrease in the) cause (and the consequent inference of the word as being a caused entity), is not established ; inasmuch as neither a Word nor a Letter ever increases (or de- creases).
212-213. Becanse (a Word could be increased by the addition of new Letters; and if new Letters were to accrue to the Word, it would cease to be the original word; and it would be either no Word at all, or a dif- ferent word altogether.
213-214. And further the Letters having no parts, and as such, being like the Aka@ga, they cannot undergo either an increase or a decrease ; and hence the increase could not belong to the Letters within themselves.
214-215. If it be urged that “we have an idea of such increase (when the same Letter is pronounced by many persons, aud we may base our argument upon this idea of increase ),”—then too your argument would be contradictory ; because we have such an idea (of increase) even in the case of the Class ^ Word” (which you too hold to be eternal and uncaused).
215-216. And just as the notion of increase or decrease of the Class
211.213 With this begins the explanation of S#tra 17; “(The increase or decrease of) the intensity (of word-sounds) belongs to the utterance.” (I—i—17), which meets the argument urged in I—i—11.
313.218 If ड 6 added to qe it ceasesto be a word, and if स्ये 06 added to it, it becomes a new word,
213.21¢ This meets the following objection : ^ Without the addition of new Letters, there may be aa increase within the component Letters themselves.” Thie too 18 im- possible; becanse what sort of increase can there be to any letter gha, 1.1. Gha will reinain 9 gha, and it cannot undergo any 10016866 within itself,
214.216 Even in the oase of a class (** Word,” or ^" Cow” f.i.), we have an idea of its increase when we find fresh individuals being included in it; v.g., we have an idea of the class ‘* Word” having increased when we come to know, new words. And if this mere idea were enough ground for asserting non-eteraality, then the class too would have to be admitted to be a caused entity, and hence non-eternal, which cannot be very palatable to the objecting Naiydyika,
216-216 The increase that we are conscious of, when many persons are uttering the same word, is the increase of the utterance (and not of the Word). Because, whether the speuker be one or many, the word “ Ghata’”’ remains the same.
44.6 CLOKAVARTIKA,
depends upon the increase or decrease of the individuals (composing it), —so in the same manner (the notion of the increase or decrease of word- sounds) would depend upon the increase or decrease in the (intensity of the) wt/erance (manifesting, or rendering perceptible, the Word).
216-218. And further, your argument (as to the increase of word- sounds proving their non-eternality, &c.), is not conclusive ; because, even in ordinary life, we come across cases where such increase or decrease in accord- ance with the increase or decrease of the cause or manifester is fonnd to belong to the manifested object; as for instance, the face is found to in- crease or decrease in accordance with the increase or decrease of the size of the mirror (reflecting the face). And this fact caunot prove either that the face is not manifested by the mirror, or that it is produced by an ac- tion of the mirror. [Soin the same manner in the ease of Words, the notion of increase or decrease depends upon the increase or decrease of the inten- sity of the utterance manifesting the Word; and this fact cannot prove either that the Word is not manifested by the uiterance, or thatit is pro- duced by the action of utterance]. And there can be no other action productive [of the Word, save utterance, and hence, as it cannot be shown that the Word is produced by wtierance, it can never be shown to be a caused entity, and hence non-eternal |.
218-219, Just as in the case of (such an eternal object as) 4174 when a large pit is made in the greund, we have an idea of the largeness of space (.Akdga), and when the pit is small, we have a notion of its small- ness,—so too, even when the Word is an absolutely uncaused (and eternal) entity (we could have notions of its mcrease or decrease through the in- crease or decrease of the utterances manifesting them). Thus then (it must be admitted that) the idea of the increase of the Word (as urged in Satra 10) 18 a mistaken one, due to (the increase of) its appurtenances (z.e., the utterances rendering it perceptible to the ear),
220. As a matter of fact, we do not perceive either grossness (in- crease of volume) or subtlety (decrease of volume) to reside in the Word. The idea too, of the increase or decrease (of Words), is due to the intensity or lowness of the cognition (hearing of the Word).
221-222. And as a matter of fact, we find that our cognition of the jar is extensive whien it is lighted by a big light; and it is less extensive
220 In fact we have no idea of the increase of the Word either. When the Letter 18 uttered by many persous there is an intensity in the sound of it as heard; and thie intensity of the hearing (cognition) leade to the notion of the increase of the Word itself.
221.222 This shows that the intensity and lowness of cognition too depend upon the intensity, &c., of manifesting agencies. Soin the word too, the inorease, &o., belongs to the manifesting utterance, “ Length &o.” This meets the objection that if Words
APH. VI—XXII1 ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 444
when it happens to be illuminated by asmall light. And the length (short- ness), &c., (of Letters) are properties of the utterancc—as shown above(under ‘* Sphota’’).
222-223. £}. ^“ If either (conjunctions, &c., as) properties of the Air, or the Air itself as possessing these properties (of conjunction, &c.), be held to be (meant by) the word ‘ Sound’ (Na@da),—then, as Lettera alone are per- ceptible by the Ear, the sounds could not be audible by the ear (because Air is only perceptible by the sense of touch); and then, how could the souids of the conch-shell, &c., which do not consist of Letters, be heard ?”
224.225. (With a view to sail clear of this objection) some people hold that Sounds also (and not Letters alone) are perceptible by the Har. And (these people hold that) these (Sounds, as properties of the Air) are urged along with the Air (by meana of the conjunctions of the Air with the palate, &c.), and finally affect the sense of audition (and produce a change in it, which renders the Word audible). And as these (Sounds in airy vibrations) are perceived (heard) at the time of the hearing of Letters (as uttered and manifested by those sonnds),—the above theory cannot be said to contain the assumption of an imperceptible entity.
225-226. Others, however, who hold to the view of Sound as pre- viously expounded (in the Bhashya), explain the fact of sounda (of the couch-shell) being heard on the ground of the mutiplicity of winds.
226-228. Those (Airs or Sounds), that are urged (or set in motion) by the conjunctions and disjunctions of the palate, &c., manifest (render
and Letters were eternal, how could they be divided into long, short, &c.? The sense is that these do not belong to the Word or Letter, bnt to the utterance.
222-223 This objects to the assertion of the Bhashya that “ the oonjunctions and dis- junctions in the Air, manifesting the words, come to be known as ‘ Néda’ (sound).” The sense of the objection is thus explained in the Nydya-ratndkara—‘‘ If sound he held to be the conjunctions &c., of the Air, or the Air itself as possessing these properties, and if it (Sound or Nida) be not held to be in the form of a word,—then the Sound cannot be held to consist of any Letters; and it hae been held by the Mimansaka that Letters alone are perceptible by the Ear; therefore the Sounds that do not opn- sist of Lettere—e.g., those uttered by the conch-shell, &c.,~cnnld not be objects of audition? But we do hear suoh sounds. How do you explain this contradiction P”
824.225 If the Air were the manifester of words, then the Air being amenable to the tactile sense alone, the ahove objection would apply to it; but ae a matter of fact it 18 not the air bat the Sounds as properties of the Air that manifest words in the manners described in the Kariké. Hence the objectinn is avoided. When people are making a house at a distance, we hear only the sounds and no dietinot letter or word.
226.228 «° Adequate substrate."—This meets the objection that since no Letters are distinctly cognised the class “ Word,” muet be held to be at that time cogniced as without an adeqnate substrate. The sense of the reply is that though no distinct Letter isheard, yet, ae all Letters are all-pervading, they always—whether distinctly manifest- ed or not—serve as adequate substrates of the class ५ Word.” And aa for the individual
448 CLOKAVARTIKA,
perceptible) a distinct Letter; and others (that are not urged by such con- junctions and disjunctions) only manifest the ‘‘ Word” as a class, which comprises all Letters; (and as such they can be audible). And as Letters are all-pervadiug, the class (“ Word” as manifested indistinctly by the sounds) does not fail to have an adequate substrate. Nor is this theory open to the objection—“ in which individual Letters (are the sounds of the conch-shell, &c.), manifested P ”
228-229. And it is these (sounds) that have beeu shown above (under * Sphota’’) to follow the course of our conjunctions ; (and there itis shown that) the difference in the degree (of the intensity) of these sounds is due to the multifarious character of the collations of these (sounds),
229-230. Or, these (sounds) may (be held to) form a distinct class by themselves (included in the class “‘word”). And we can lay down the di- versity in the capability of sounds, on the ground of the effects,—just as in your own theory (of the non-eternality of words).
230-231. Ob7: ‘Evenif the utterance be found to be for the sake of others, what has that to do with the word itself, that this latter would be eternal on that account?
231-232, “Since we find the fact of the use being for another’s sake, applicable to non-eternal objects—such as the lamp, cloth, etc,,— ; therefore,
letter in which the sound of conch ie to be manifested, any Letter may he held to be 8००४ ; since all letters are equally eternal and all-pervading. Therefore that which 38 heard in the case of the conch-shell, is the class “ Word,” wherein no individaal word has heen manifested at the time.
288 -3:9 It hae been shown nnder “ Sphota” that even thongh the sounda he not aue dible, yet the diversity of the degree of intensity—quicknesa or slowness of the nt- terance of words—is regulated by the different degrees of the collations of sounds, When many sounds—of q@—collate together, then we have the acnte क; and 80 on.
429-289 “In the effects’’—we find that eonuds manifest words, and some mere 1778. tinct sounds, and hence we must admit of a diversity in the capabilities of sonnds.
Ae a matter of fact sonuds may either be the Air or included in the clase “ word.” If it he included in the class ‘‘ word,’ then since words are immaterial, no inorease could belong to them, and hence the word “ndda” in the Stra must be taken to in- directly indicate the Air of which these 80००8 are properties. And it is as an explana- tion of this indirect indication that we have the Bhdshya passage objected to, in Kari- kds 222.223.
430.81 With this begins the explanation of the Stra 18 whioh lays down the Miman- Saka theory of the eternality of eounde: “Word 18 eternal; 0609086 its utterance is for the sake of others” (I-i-18). Karikds 280-236 embody the objections against the Sitra. Because the utteranoe 18 “for another’s sake,” that oannot lead to the conclusion “ Word is eternal,’’ beoause “ being for another’s sake’ 18 nota qualification of the miuor term “ word.”
431-88 This anticipates the Mimanaaka assertion that the Sutra means “ Word 18 oternal, bocaase of its attorauce beiog for another’s gake,”” The objection embodied 1
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 449
even if this (the fact of use being for another’s sake) be a property (of the minor term “ word”), yet, this cannot be any reason (for proving its eter- nality).
232-233. “(If by “dargana” you mean “utterance” only, then, siuce utterance cannot bo found anywhere except in a Word) there being no in- stance eimilar (to your conclusion, your reasoning becomes invalid). And (Gif by “‘darcana” you mean “use,” then) your reasoning becomes contra- dictory, since in the case of atoms which are eternal, we find no use at all (either for others’ sake or for one’s own; and as such eternality cannot be said to be coucomitant with the property of being used for another’s sake).
233-234. “As for the signification of the meaning, the Word would do it by the mere fact of its existence (7.e., as 600 as the Word would be uttered it would at once denote its meaning), even without any permanent form of it (subsisting for any length of time);—just as certain actions bring about certain conjunctions, etc., (by their mere force, even though the actions do not persist for any length of time).
234-235. ‘And the idea of words used previously is due to the re- membrance of past events,—just as we have a remembrance of our past deeds (which do not persist for any leagth of time). Therefore, the fact of the word being used (now) cannot prove the fact of its having existed before from time immemorial) ;—just as the jar (which though found to be used now is not on that accouut held to have existed eternally).
235-236. ‘ Just as when an object has once previously been manifest- ed by a certain source of light,—then if subsequently, it come to be illuminated by an altogether new source of light, it is perceived all the same ;—so too it could be in the case of the Word.”
=o
the Karik&i means that in that case, the argument is fanlty. Because the “ utterance of a Word” ia its use by someone. And we find that even non-eternal objects are used for the sake of others—snch as “lamp,” &c., and such eternal objects as atoms are not found to be used for the sake of another.
238-234 This meeta the argument of the Bhashya that if a word were not eternal, it would not signify its meaning.
234-235 The fact of one having an idea of words used in the past cannot prove its eternality, becanse we have 87९11 remembrance of even non-eternal entities,
236.286 This meets the objection that unleas the word be known to have a certain signification (beforehand), it cannot afford any meaning (when heard.) The sense of the Karika is that we do find in the case of objects illaminated by a light, that when once the object has been shown by means of one light, at some future time, even an altogether new light manifests it equally well: So in the case of words, tho object cow, f. ४.) may have been denoted by some other word at some past time; and subse- quently even if it come to be mentioned by a new name, it can be comprehended,
5
450 CLOKAVARTIKA.
236-237. The urging of the faults of inconclusiveness, &c., against the fact of the use (of words) being for another's sake, is hke employing the fuel-burning fire to burn water.
237-238. Because all these—Inconclusiveness, &c.—can apply to in- ferential arguments; whereas the argument embodied in the s#éra is in the form of an Apparent Inconsistency, which does not stand in need of premises laying down correct relations between the Minor and the Middle terms.
238-239. If the denotability of a word be shown to be possible only when the Word is held to be also non-eternal (as well as eternal), or only when it be non-eternal,—then alone can you bring forward any real objection against us.
239-242. The Word having no particular result of its own, we infer from its denotative potency the fact that it is subsidiary to the signification and comprehension of meaning, which, in its turn, is subsidiary to the action (brought about by the words) “bring the jar,’ which has a definite result (the drinking of water &c., by the person addressing the injunction). And then, when engniring as to whether eternality or non-eternality belongs to the Word, we ought to admit of that one property (of the two) which does not in any way go against the primary factor (in the signification and comprehension of meaning, to which the word is subsidiary) ; because it is not proper to reject the primary result (bringing of the jar which would not be possible if the meaning were not signified and comprehended) for the sakeof (any
236.281 Here begins the reply to the above objections.
288.289 The argument based on Apparent Inconsistency oan be shown to be fanlty —when the inexplicability that supports the argument is shown to be explicable other- wise than by the acceptance of the conolngion sought to he proved. And 60 long as the objector does not put forth another explanation of the denotability of words than the one based upon its eternality, our argument remains untonched. Because our argu- ment 16 simply that, sinoe the denotability of a word is not explicable, if it be held te be non-eternal, therefore (by Apparent Inconsistency) the Word mnaet be held to be eternal. त
239.242 There is a maxim to the effect that when something that has no result hap- pens to be in the company of that whioh has a definite result, the former becomes sub- sidiary to the latter ; hence the word is subsidiary to the signifioation of meaning. Since the word hae the power of signifying a meaning, the comprehension of whioh leads to ॐ definite result, the word is asoertained to be eunbsidiary to thie reeult, indirectly through being subsidiary to the comprehension of the meaning by the pereon addressed.
‘It is not proper, &c.”—If we admit of non-eternality we oannot explain the signi- fication of meaning. And it is not proper to admit of such a property of the enbsidiary (“ Word ”) as would go against the primary element (comprehension of meaning). Theres fore the Word cannot be held to be non-oternal. Becauge if the Word be non-eternal
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 451
property of) that (Word) which is subsidiary to its subsidiary (compre: hension of meaning). But if (the Word be held to be) perishable (non- eternal), then this (the rejection of the primary result) is what would surely happen.
242-243. Because a Word, whose relation (with its meaning) has not been (previously) ascertained, cannot signify anything. Because if this could be the case (४.९.) if such a Word were to signify a meaning), then any previously-unknown (newly-coined) word would be capable of signifying any and every meaning.
243-244. And any such previous recognition of its relation (with meanings) would not be possible if the Word were non-eternal ; inasmuch as if it be established that its relation has been recognised, it is certain that the Word now used existed at some time other than that when it is used (at which other time its relation may have been ascertained).
244-245. Because that (Word) of which the relation may have been recognised cannot be any other than that which is now found to be significant (of a meaning, with reference to which it 18 now uttered). For, if the relation (of the object cow) be ascertained to belong to the word ४ Cow, ’—-the word, used to signify the cow, cannot be “ Horse.”
245-246. If it be held that, “‘even a Word other (than the one whose relation with the meaning has been recognised) would be capable of signi- fying the meaning, through its own inherent (natural) aptitude,’’—then, in the absence of any fixed rule (as to what Word will sigmify what meaning), it could not be ascertained which word would have a certain signification (since the inherent aptitude of Words is not perceptible to us).
246-247. If it be urged that, ‘‘we could know the action (brought about by the injunction) to be due to that word which is comprehended,”
it cannot Signify anything; and then the person addressed will not comprehend the injunction; and hence he wonld not fetch the jar; and the person addressing would have no drink.
248.24b ‘It is certain, &c.”—and this would lead to the eternality of the Word ; as will be explained under s#tra 21.
244.2465 That word which is found to be significant must be the aame whose relation (with the meaning) has been previously ascertained; otherwise, if the Word now nsed were not the one whose relation had been previously ascertained, the present Word could not signify anything. Anyway the two must be held to be identical. If it is the word “Cow” that has been recognised to bear a relation to the cow, then it must always he the same identical word ^ Cow ” that can be used to signify the cow.
246.241 Before the word has been uttered there can be no idea as to whether it has been comprehended. And it 18 the use (uttering) of the Word which stands in need of a previous recognition by the speaker of its relation with its meaning. And this latter fact cannot be explained to be based upon the comprehension of the hearer.
452 SLOKAVARTIKA.
—then, this may do for the hearers (who know for themselves what words they comprehend), but it cannot do (explain the action of uttering the word) for the speakers (who are not coguisant of what words have beeu comprehended by his hearers, specially, so long as he has not uttered the words),
247-248. Because, not knowing that word which is capable of signify- ing the object he means toname, what word would he use in the beginning (६.९., before the time of its comprehension by the hearer has arrived) ? And if he already knows it (the word as related to the meaning), then it must be admitted that it had been previously recognised by him (as bearing a relation to the object, which he now seeks to signify by that Word). And (as for the instance of previously unknown lights showing objects, as urged in Karika 235-236), since the light is subsidiary to the perception, we have a manifestation, even when the source of hight is altogether new.
249-250. If it be held that, “the meaning of a Word (thongh new) is comprehended through its similarity (with a previously known word)”— then (we reply that) even through similarity, the Word cannot signify the meaning ; because (out of the endless series of the word “ cow,” pronounced since time immemorial) through the similarity of which one, shall we fix upon the sigmification of another? Because all these are equal, in that none of them have the relation with the object recognised previously (to their being used).
250-251. If it be urged that “the word (‘cow’ f.i.) as heard first
247.248 The action of light does not stand in need of any previous recognition of the light, since the light is only au aid to perception. In the perception of an ohject it is the perception that is the primary element; and we do not care whether the light 18 known or nnknown ; any light will eqnally illumine an object $ whereas in the case of the word, its previons recognition is absolutely necessary; as, unless the speaker koows the Word to have a oertain meaning he cannot use it; and unless he ०868 it, the hearer cannot comprehend it; and nnless the hearer comprehends the Word, he cannot act in accordance with the words addressed to him, and henoe there wonld he no action (fetching of the jar, fi).
249.269 The sense of the objection is that the word that is now uttered has not heen previously known to have anyrelation. Its meaning is oomprehended on account of its resemblance to another word used and known from before. The latter part of this first half and the second half reject this theory; becanse there is no fixed rnie as to the similarity of what particular word would regulate the Bignification of a word. The objeotion means that the word “cow ” as now uttered is altogether different from the game word uttered at some other time, and the two are only similar; and the signi- fication of one would be regniated hy that of the other,
260.251 The sense of the objection is that the word “ cow” when heard first of all
was understood to have its denotation consist in the cow $ and so subsequently
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 453
of all, was comprehended to have a meaning,’’—-thcen (we reply), how cau that (previously recognised Word) persist for sucha long time? And (even granting that such continuance and cognition of its similarity are possible) as a rule, a Word does not come to be known to have a definite meaning, until it has been heard and comprehended twice or three times (at the very least).
251-252. And again, for aman (hearing the Word “cow” for the first time, and as such) not knowing any other words (^ cow” as pro- nounced by people before his hearing of it, and hence being unable to recognise any similarity), the word is meaningless ; and at the same time, for those that have heard other such words (as pronounced by persons in the past) it has a meaning—a most curious (collocation of contradictory properties).
252-253. If it urged that, “ (at all times) the Word has a meaning, which 1s not comprehended by some people (who hear it for the first time),’’—then the same may he said with regard to the subsequent use of the same Word,-—and as such, why should the signification be said to be through similarity (of previously-heard words) P
whenever one comes across the word “cow,” he at once recognises its similarity with the previously-known “cow”; and the rememhrance of the meaning of this latter brings abont the comprehension of the present word ‘‘cow.” The sense of the reply is that the word as 8001 88 17४ 28 heard is destroyed; and so it could not persist till the occasion of the subsequent hearing of the same word; and as such, it being non-existing, how could we be cognisant of any similarity with 1४? The second half means that the very data on which the objection is based is faulty; in- asmuch as any word, when heard for the first time, is not known as having a meaning ; the fact being that when we hear the word for the first time we do not know its mean- ing at all, nntil it is explained to us. And when we have had such explanations, at least twice or thrice from old people, then it is that we come to connect that Word with its particular signification.
261.252 “* Not knowing, &c.” = This is based upon the objector’s theory that there are many sach words as “ cow ”—the word pronounced at one time being different from the game word as pronounced at some other time. And aman who hears the Word for the first time does not know the word as pronounced previously by other persons. = ^" Con- tradictory propertics’’—-The same word being both meaningless and having a meaning at one and the same time.
862.253 The meaning of the objection is that even for one who hears the word for the first time it is not meaningless. And hence there is no contradiction of properties. The sense of the reply is that just as when one hears the word for the first time he does not know the meaning, though others know it; so too one could explain the signi- fication of the word when heard subsequently, as being natural to the word (as you hold in the case of the word when first heard, where yon assert that the meaning is natural to the Word, and fails to be known by the hearer only on account of a certain deficiency in the hearer himself); so in the case of subsequently-heard words too, we could hold the
454 QLOKAVARTIKA.
253-254. If it be held that, “the Word would be meaningless for those who have not heard any previous (utterances of the same) Word,”— then, since this fact (of being heard for the first time by people who have never heard it uttered before) is common also to all previous words, all words would come to be meaningless.
254-255. And further, that Word which is cognised by people who have heard it previously, as being similar to (and as such subordinate to) the previously-heard Word with a meaning,—would be the principal (or primary) factor for those who have not heard it before. And this (double contradictory character) is not possible for one and the same Word.
255-256, By the clause “ it has been explained,” the Bbashya refers to all the arguments that have been brought forward (under “ Sambandhakshé- paparihara”’) against the creation of the relation (of Words and their Meanings). And if the Word itself be held to be non-eternal (and created by speakers), then the explanation (of the relation of Words and Meanings) becomes all the more difficult.
256-258. Becanse ‘how can any relation be created (1.e., laid down) without the utterance of the Word? And that (word) which has been pronounced and immediately destroyed (as held by you) can have nothing
meaning to be natural to the word; and we can assert the non-comprehension of some people to be due to some deficiency in themselves ; and thus all the words woald come to have meanings natural to them ; and there would he no reason for holding the cogni- tion of the signification of a subsequent werd to be due to the remembrance of its simi- larity with a previously-known word.
268.254 The sense of the reply is that whenever a word is uttered there are al- ways some men who hear it for the first time. And hence, if the Word were to he meaningless for those who hear it for the first time, then all words would be meaning- less.
254.266 Both parties agree in thinking the Word uttered to be one and the same for all hearers; and as such one and the same word cannct possibly be both primary and secondary at one and the same time.
465.268 Jn the Bhaghya the 00160007 is made to say that the relation of the word and itg meaning may he held to he a caused one, laid down in the beginning of the world. And te this the Bhashya replies that this theory has been already refuted under “ Samban- dhaksheparihara.’ Even when the word is held to be non-eternal the creation of its relation with meaning has been shown to be impossible. And when the word 18 held to be eternal, then the creation of its relation with meanings hecomes all the more im- poseihle.
266-258 Ifthe Word be held to he destroyed as soon as it 18 uttered, then when lay ing down the relation of a Word, as soon as the Creator would pronounce the word it would be destroyed, and as the same word when uttered subsequently you hold to be different from the previcusly-uttered word, and the relation has been laid down by the
211 प्र41.1 ए OF WORDS. 499
to do with the relation. Therefore the Word, uttered for the first time, having been immediately destroyed, without having its relation (with its meaning) expressed,—it would be meaningless ; and then, how could the same Word, when uttered subsequently, be cognised to have a meaning.?
258-259. The actions of uttering the Word, the creation of its rela- tion (with its meaning), and its usage (in accordance with this) being such as to occur one after the other,—who could do all these (three actions) all at once (as held by the other party) ?
209-260. For those people, who exist at a time and in a place other than that (time of oreation wherein the relation of words and meanings is held to be laid down by the Creator),—prior to his hearing of the gubse- quent utterance of the Word, there cannot be any such one Word as has its relation created.
260-261. The theory, that the relation is asserted (and not created ) for such people, is also to be rejected in the same manner. Becanse the assertion cannot possibly belong to a Word (uttered at the beginning of creation and) which has since been destroyed, or is non-existing, or exists only at the present time (४.९. the one that is heard by the present hearer).
261-262. Which word would the speaker declare to the hearer, as having a certain meaning,—when he (the speaker) cannot utter the Word which he himself had heard at some previous time (to have that mean- ing) P—
Creator with regard to this latter, the laying down of the relation would bea ०591688, as its substratum in the shape of the previously-nttered Word will have been destroyed, and there would be nothing for whose sake you wonld require tha relation.
268.259 The uttering of the Word is not possible without a knowledge of the rela- tion; nor is the laying down of the ralation possible withont the utterance of the Word— a case of mutual inter-dependence
269.260 Hiven though it were possible for the relation of # Word to ba lsid down at the begininng of creation, yat those people who like us, happen to live at a time dif- ferent from that, hear only subseqnent utterances of the word; and as this subsaquant Word has not its,relation laid down,—that which has its relation lnid down being the first utterance of the word which has been destroyed,—for such people no word wonld have any meaning at all.
260.261 Tho assertion made at the beginning of creation could not apply to the Word that is heard at the present time.
61.462 The speaker heard the Word long ago, as having «a certain meaning and this word is, according to you, dsstroyed as soon as uttered ; and henoe he cannot speak of this word, at any subsequent tima, to have the meaning ; therefore what could that word be which the speaker could speak of as having the meaning ; the only word “oow 0? which he himself knew the maaning has been destroyed, and of any other word ^ cow ” he himself does not know the meaning.
456 CLOKAVARTIKA.
262-263. Specially as he dees not utter the Word having the meaning (i.e., the one with reference to which the relation of a definite meaning was laid down by the Creator, and which was destroyed immediately after it had been uttered by Him). And if he wera to utter a werd similar to the original one having the meaning,—then such a word cannot be recog- nised by the hearer to be similar to the original word having the meaning; inasmuch as this latter 18 not known to him; and the new word (that is heard by him) itself has no meaning (because the meaning has been laid down to belong to the original word uttered by the Creator).
264. And when one who is a speaker now becomes the hearer at some fnture time, then too, the same difficulties would appear (because the Word which he knows to have a meaning is not the one that he hears uttered by others, according to yon). And thus for all speakers (and hearers) no Word can have any meaning.
264-265. It may be possible that the relation of a certain Word is created at the beginning of Creation. But since we have never been cogni- sant of this Word (as created with a meaning), how could we have any notion of similarity with this (original Word) (of any subsequent Word that we may hear spoken) ?
265-266. Obj :—‘‘ Bnt the original word (as uttered by the Creator) has been fnlly comprehended and ascertained by persons (Kapila, &c. } preseut at that time ; and from the uses made (of the word) by these persons, we infer the whole series of similar words (beginning from the original word and ending with werd heard by us at the present time; and this notion of similarity with the original word, would bring back to our mind’s eye, the original meaning as fixed by the Creator).”
266-267. Reply: If this theory be admitted, then all the objections and arguments, urged (under ^^ Sambandhakshépaparthara’’) against the theory of the creation of the relation of Words and Meanings (by a Creator), crop up (since they apply equally to the theory just propounded) ; viz: that if such be the case, then we should have to remember the similarity of the present Word to the original word; because the comprehension of the meaning of the present Word depends upon such remembrance (of the similarity of the original Word,) (and such remembrance is not possible, inasmuch as we never hear the original Word), and so forth.
268-269. In the case of an object, which has subsequently come to differ from its original form, its similarity (with this original form) being traced out to a great distance (through all the endless series of such
268.269 And hence even granting your theory, the time and space intervening between the creation and the present moment is so great, that oven if there were a
ETERNALITY OF WQRDS. £59
objects intervening between the original form and the object before us), undergoes slight differences (with every intervening object), and finally disappears almost entirely. And such would particularly be the case with words, in the case of which great differences are brought about by the slightest change of tone, consonant or vowel :—e.g., in the case of such words as “¢ala” (house), “mala” (garland), “ bala’? (time), and “ gid,’ {stone) and the like.
269-270. If we were to arrive at conclusions through mere similarity, then there would always be a chance of mistaken notions: e.g., having perceived the relation (of concomitance) between smoke and fire, we would infer the (existence of) fire from (the existence of) vapour (because the latter is similar to smoke in appearance; and such inference conld only be mistaken).
270-271. If some one were to say “let it beso” (¢.e., "* the compre- hension of meanings of words may be mistaken—that does not touch our position, the whole usage of the Word may be mistaken, hut that does. not affect the non-eternality of the Word ”’),—(we reply) bué it is not so (ie., the comprehension of certain meanings of Words is not a mistake) ; because we do not find anything that rejects the comprehension as mistaken, And if it be urged that,—‘this (absence of a negative fact) estab- lishes the correctness (of the comprehension of Words through the simi- larity of these with the original Word) ”,—then (we reply that) (if the mere absence of a negativing fact were the sole criterion for the correctness of an idea) then the non-difference (identity) of Words would be established (since this idea of sameness of the word “cow” as used now, and tbat used at some other time, is also due to the similarity between them; and we have no more reliable facts that would deny this sameness).
271-272. And further, is the similarity (between Words) something different from the individuals themselves, ov is it non-different from them ?
similarity of the original word with words nosed in the begining of the world, this would have long disappeared in the endless number of words intervening hetween the original and the present words. The last half of the Karika gives instances of dif- ferences produced in words by the slightest ohange of a vowel or a consonant.
269.210 There 16 a similarity between “gad” and “mdiz,” and on the ground of this similarity the one wonld be taken to mean the other.
a10-21L We do not find, §c.—we do not admit any fact to be a mistake unless we find that there are certain other more reliahle facts that deny the former. And 98 we have no such rejection of the significance of words, this cannot 6 said to be mistaken. The fact ie that, as in the absence of a negativing fact, any fact cannot he eaid to he wrong, it must necessarily he accepted to be right.
The sameness of this word “ Cow” nsed now and that used at some other time, 18 not palatable to the other party.
58
458 01.0६4 एद ह11६.4.,
and is this similarity one or many? And, lastly, is it eternal or non- eternal ?
272-273. If if be different, one and eternal, then it is only another way of postulating a class (“ gatva” f.i., which would be the common ground of similarity among the individuals) (and the possibility of such classes we have already rejected above). And if it be held to be non-dif- ferent, non-eternal and many, then this comes to the same theory as above (namely the theory of the non-eternality of Words, which too we have already rejected).
273-274, And if the similarity be held to be something non-different from the individuals (Words), one and eternal,—then this would mean the eternality of the individual (Word) itself; and this is just what we seek to establish.
274-275. Similarity consists in the existence of common constituent parts; and no such similarity is possible for you. Because such (similarity of Words) would be possible only if the letters (constituting the words) were identical ; and such identity you do not admit of.
275-276. The postulating of such classes as ^ gopabdaiva,” < gatva, ” &c., has been rejected before (under “ Sphota”); (and hence you cannot base the notion of similarity between two utterances of the same word upon any such classes). Consequently (it must be admitted that) it is the individual Letters themselves, that are eternal and significant of the meaning.
276-277. For us the word “ gd" (‘‘ cow ’’) is eternal; and people have an idea of the cow from such vulgar deformations of it as न कणा," &c., only when it follows the original (correct) word (“go”); and such com- prehension is due to the incapability (of the speaker to utter, and of the hearer to comprehend, the original correct form of the Word).
215.276 Similarity consists of the existence of the aame constituent parte; Letters are the constituent parte of Words; therefore the similarity of Words means that the Letters contained in one Word are identical with those contained in the other—+t.e., the letter gha occurring in the word ^ ghata” as pronounced at one time, must he identical with the letter gha occurring in the word “ ghata = as pronounoed at a different time. It 18 only when there is an identity of constituent Letters that any words can he held to he similar. But since you deny suoh identity, you cannot have similarity.
276-271 In the Bhashya an objeotion 18 raised that—“ 1087 as even from the word ‘gave’ we get at the idea of the cow, simply 6680०88 it ig similar to the word ‘ go,’ so even if there he a slight difference hetween the word originally pronounced hy the Creator and the Word as pronounoed before ns, the signification would be all right.” The reply given is that the eternal deuoter of the cow is the word “ go’; and even where a man utters the word ^. gévi,”’ his desire is to utter the word “ go,” but being incapable of pronouncing the correct form, he utters the valgar form “gdvi." Aud this volgar
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 459
277-278. Because if the denotation (of the cow by the word “ gavi ”) were due to its similarity (with the word “gé”’), then we would certainly have the idea (of the cow) from the word “ gaura ” (which is more like “ go” than “ (दषे), Therefore we do not reject this (४.९.) the comprehension of the cow from the word “ ककय ”),—because, as a matter of fact, this com- prehension is due really to the correct word “gd” itself (as explained in Karika 277).
278-279, Obj: “ (Even thongh the Letters be eternal) since the arrange- ment of the letters (in a word) is non-eternal, that which signifies the meaning cannot be eternal. Because it is the Word that is held to signify the meaning, and the cognition of this (Word) depends upon the arrange- ment (of Letters composing it),
279-280. ‘“ Siuce the Letters are all-pervading, the order (or arrange - ment) cannot be inherent in them. And siuce the order (of the Letters in ® word) depends upon utterance, which is non-eternal, therefore it cannot be eternal.
280-281. ‘And because the utterance, or the order, follows the will of the speaker, therefore it depends upon the person, (and as such cannot be eternal). Therefore the (establishing of the) eternality of Letters is as useless (for proving your theory of the eternality of Words), as the eter- nality of atoms.
281-282. “ Justas, even though the atoms are eternal, yet the jar, made up of these (atoms), is not eternal,—so, in the same manner. even though the Letters are eternal, yet the Word (made up of these Letters) may be non-eternal.
282-283. ‘Nor are Letters, without a certain arrangement (or order), known to signify (any meaning). And it is the particular arrangement of Letters that we calla‘ Word’; and hence the aforesaid (non-eternality of Words).
283-284. “ Those (Vaiyadkaranas), who hold the Word to be something (namely ‘sphota’) other than the Letters, which is independent of the order of these,—for these people alone can the theory of the eternality of Words be of any use.”
284-285. Reply: But we do not admit of the Word being only a
form gives us an idea of the cow, only when we know that the man means the word ५५ go,” and not because the word ^ 920 ” is similar to the word ^ go.”’
283.286 Jt may be possible for these people to prove the eternality of the sphota which they hold to be independent of the non-eternal order of Letters. But as the Miminsaka holds the Word to be nothing more than a particular arrangement of the Letters, he cannot establish its eternality.
284.285 The Word does not consist solely of the arrangement, but of both the arrangement and the Letters.
46U OCLOKAVARTIKA.
particular arrangement (of Letters). Because the arrangement is not found to signify the meaniny, if it has any other substrate (than the Letters).
286. Therefore it is only when both (the arrangement and the letters) exist, that we have that which signifies the meaning (or object) ; (and the qnéstion is) whether this (that signifies the meaning) consists of the Lerrers as endowed with a certain arrangement, or of the ARRANGEMENT ‘as located in (belonging to) the Letters.
237-288. And does it require any arguments to prove that the Arrangement is subordinate to those to which it belongs (7.¢., the Letters) ? ‘Because the Arrangement is only a property of the Letters, and is not held to be a distinct entity by itself. Therefore (it must be admitted that} that which signifies the meaning is the Letters as perceived (in a certain order of seqnence).
288-290. But, as a matter of fact, the Arrangement too 38 not caused (and hence non-eternal); as it is always admitted by ns as an already accomplished fact. Because, the speaker does not use the Letters (as constituting a Word) in the order of his own choice; he always utters a Word in the same way (following the same sequence of Letters) as it is uttered by others. And other (subsequent) speakers too pronounce it in thesame order. So we have the eternality of the (Arrangement of Letters) also, just as we have that of the relation (of Words with their meanings).
290-291. Thus then, though the Arrangement is unchangeably eter- nal (te. eternally complete within itself), yet it is eternal in its usage. And we liave only to reject, by all means in our power, the fact of men being
281-883 When it is possible for the primary entities, Letters, themselves to be the signifier, it is not right to attribute the power to a subordinate element, the Arrange- ment. And thne it is the Letters themeelves, 88 occnrring in a certain order, that form that which signifies the meaning : viz: the Word; and since the Letters are eternal, the Word must also be 80.
288.490 Even the Arrangement of Letters we are never conscions of creating. We always accept the particular order of the letters gha and ta 88 an accomplished fact, and never know of any time at which this order of the Letters may have been created for the first time.
The arguments, advanced above to prove the eternality of the relation between Words and their meaninge, serve also to prove the eternality of the arrangement of of Letters composing a Word. Jnst as we do not know of any originator of the said relation, 80 we do not know of any originator of the particular arrangement of Letters,
290-291 The second half of the Kariké means that whether the Arrangenient be unchangeably eternal or eternal only in its nsage, yet it servea to prove that it does not depend npon the choice of the speaker ; and this is all that we seek to prove with a view to prove the eternality and the uncausedness of the Veda.
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 461
independent. (with regard to the significations of Words, and hence of the Veda).
291-292. Obj: “(If an entity can be eternal, even if it be not un- changeable) then you could have the eternality of Letters, even without nochangeability (and as such, why should you hold the letters to be un- changeable ?)” Reply: It is only when the Letters are (unchangeably eternal) that there can be an appearance of an (eternal) order (of these Letters), based upon usage. Just as it is only when the atoms are eternal thatit is possible for the jars &c. to he made ont of them.
293. Becanse in the absence of these (eternal Letters) we could not get at any arrangement, which, without the Letters, could have no substra- tum. And it has already been proved that there are no parts to Letters, as the atoms are (of the ordinary material objects).
294. That “I am nttering only such Letters as have been already, uttered by others” is the idea in the mind of every speaker; and this carries us to the Hternality (of Letters and their Arrangements). And there is no other characteristic (in the Letters).
295. And we have already rejected the theory of any such class
993 “It has been proved,’ &c—This is added in anticipation of the objection that ‘‘the arrangement may have for ite snbatrate the constitaent parts of the Letters, just as the snbstrate of the jar lies in the constituent atoms.” The sense ‘of the Karika ie that Letters are complete in themselves withont any parts.
49% This anticipates the objection that, “even withont accepting the Letters to be eternal, we could explain their arrangement, or sequence, to be due to the sequence of the conjunctions and disjanotions of the palate &c.; that ie to say, the sequence of Letters would be regulated by the order of their utterance by us.” The sense of the reply is that whenever we pronounce a word, we invariably have the idea that iu pronouncing it we are uttering the same Letters and in the same order as those pronounced by others. And since all men have the same idea, from times immemo- rial, such an idea leads to the notion of the eternality of Letters and their arrange- ments. ।
And there is no other characteristic, Jc, This anticipates the following objection:— “ When guch 18 the idea in the mind of all speakers, it means that all Arrangements and Words are recognised to be the same as those nttered by others. And since the ground of the Eternality of Letters too is the same fact of their being so recognised, then, why should you not hold the Arrangement to be as unchangeably eternal as the Letters themeelvea ?”” The sense of the reply is that when the Letters are known tu he eternal, these letters serve as marks whereby we recognise the Words to be the same 88 ased by others. But in the Letters there are no such marks; hence the differenoe between the eternality of Letters and Words.
425 There can be no homogeneity or similarity between the word ‘‘Cow” 8.6 uttered by us oow, and as heard by ०8 10 the past. And therefore their recognition as being the same oan be explained only if they be held to be one and the same.
462 QLOKAVARTIKA.
(as ^“ gatva’’) or a similarity (which would include all‘ ga’s’). And were you to put forward a homogeneity based upon (their belonging to) the class ‘‘ Word,’ then that would be equally applicable to all other words as well.
296-297. And justas the jar &c. are found to be rendered of use through a single cause (in the shape of the class “Clay ’’) so too, we could explain the utterance of Letters in a certain order (when pronouncing a Word) (as being due to a single cause in the shape of a class, like the “ palate” &९.). We find in all persons the class “ palate”? &c. (which include the palates &c. of all speakers); and it is through these, that the Speaker gives out different sounds (pronouncing Letters either long or short &c.).
298. And the causes of the utterance (or manifestation) of the Word are either the mutually exclusive classes of these ‘“ sounds ’’—which operate upon each particular Letter—or the individual sounds themselves as belonging to (manifested by) the aforesaid classes (^ Palate” &c.).
299. And the order of the utterance of these Sounds is regulated by the order of the Conjunction and Disjunction of the palate &c. (with the tongue) as operating towards the utterance of particular Letters. And Kternality belongs to hoth (the ^^ Palate”&c. and the ‘“ Sounds”), on account of the classes (“ Palate” and “ Sound ’&c.).
300. Just asin the case of certain movements (for instance), we have an order of sequence, which is regulated by the class “action” as inhering in the particular actions of the Movement,—so, in the same manner, we could also explain (the order of sequence) as belonging to the sounds as produced by the Conjunctions &८, of the palate &c. (this order being regulated by the class ^^ Palatal” &c. as inhering in each particular sound).
301. Or (even if there be no such class as ^^ sounds’), the individnal sounds themselves, being extremely subtile in their nature, might manifest the properties of a Class. And it is through this (the order of sequence of Sounds as due tothat of the Conjunction &ec. of the Palate &c.) that we come to recognise au order of sequence in the case of Letters, even though these latter are, by nature, all-pervading (and as such would exist every- where and could not have an order of sequence).
802, Thus it is that the Letters, following up (taking up) all the
#98 Each Letter of a Word is manifested hy a distinot sound (uttered through the palate &o.),—whether this sound he taken as a class, including all such sounds, or only as an individual affecting that particular utterauce.
४99 That Letter which is first operated upon by the action of the palate &., is uttered first, and so on, the sequence of Letters is to be explained.
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 464
eternal properties of the sounds uttered (and thus forming a word), come to signify the object (said to be denoted by the Word).
303-305. The order of Words, and the shortness, length and acuteness &c. (of the vowel sounds) only mark the different divisions of time; and thereby they come to qualify (or specify) the sounds. And Time is one only and eternal ; and yet it appears as if divided, just as Letters (each of which is one and eternal, and yet appears as if it were made up of different parts) ; and as such it comes to be manifested in connection with all entities, through the force of particular causes. And when it comes to be mani- fested in connection with the Letters (composing a Word), it becomes a part and parcel of the (means of) Comprehension (of the meanings of Words). And since its form is perceptible elsewhere also (i.e., in connection with entities other than the Word), it must, in itself, be regarded as eternal.
306. Thusthen, if must be admitted that these (the order of Letters and Length &c:) are not any non-eternal properties of the Word. Hence also the Word must be accepted as proved to be eternal, even for those who maintain the eternality of Letters.
307. Even properties, in reality belonging to one thing, at times, come to belong to others, just as the fleetness of the horse (is im- parted to the rider) (and hence though Order &o, are properties of the sounds, yet they come to help the Letters in the siguification of their meaning). And as for the ground of (holding) the eternality of all these (Letters, Words &c.), we have “‘ Apparent Inconsistency ” (as shown above).
308-309. Even if the Word be held to be an impartite whole (in the shape of the Sphota),—inasmuch as it could be manifested only by certain means (such as utterances) occurring ina certain order, it would depend upon persons (upon whose utterance alone it could be heard) ; and as such it would have no inherent absolute validity (since all facts having a purely human origin are only of doubtful validity). And we do find this to be the case in the case of sentences,—even for those who hold the sentence also to be an impartite whole (in the shape of Sphota.) Thus (it is concluded that) we hold the eternality of Words, only because certain facts (the significa- tion of certain meanings by certain Words) cannot be explained otherwise.
310. That property, by means of which the Word comes to he used
808.806 The author now proceeds to prove the unchangeable eternality of the Word in another way.
808.809 In the case of sentences, their validity is always doubtful, dependent, as it is, on the character of the person nttering it.
810 The author now shows that the s#tra may be interpreted as an Inferential
464 CLOKAVARTIKA,
for another’s sake, serves as the basis of an [uferential reasoning,—and this property is explained to be its dependence upon the relation (that the Word bears to its meaning. )
311. The 57८ does not seek to lay down the (inferential) argu- ment (in its proper form). Both the s#tra and the author of the Bhashya only explain (lay down) a fact (४25, that of the Word being used for ano- ther’s sake) which is capable (of leading to the proper Inferential argu- ment, as shown in the last harika.)
312. The Inferential argument in its proper form is here laid down, thus: Word is eternal,—like the classes “‘smoke,’’ =“ Cow,” &c.,— because it signifies a common object (7.e., its signification is comprehended by all men eqnally), while depending npon a comprehension of its relation (with that object).
313. Even if the Class be held toconsist of either the negation of others or of similarity ( of many individuals ),—yet, inasmuch as the Individuals themselves (individually) cannot constitute the Class, all Classes must be eternal.
314-315. Or, the fact of “the Word being used for another’s sake ” (as mentioned in the s#tra) may be taken as pointing the self-contradic- tions (in the theory of the non-eternality of Words): A proposition is asserted, simply with a view to have its meaning comprehended (by others) ; and it has already been proved (under ‘‘ Sambandhakshépa”’) that a non- eternal assertion cannot signify any meaning. Therefore, inasmuch as your own assertion (that “ Word is non-eternal”) signifies a meaning, it cannot but be eternal; and as such you have (in your own assertion) the denial of the non-eternality (of Words).
316. If the other party, after admitting the capability of Words to signify their meanings, seek to establish their position (as to the non-eter- nality of Words), such non-eternality would be rejected by his own pre- vious postulate (that Words signify their meanings, which has been shown to be impossible, if Words be not eternal).
argument explained, as it is, in the ह तताप. The meaning of the satra being, ^ Word 18 eternal,’ because it stands in need of its relation with meaninge, whereby it comes to be used for another’s sake, which could not be possible, if the Word had no relation with its meaning.
$18 Thie anticipates the objection that in the above Inferential argument the instance cited—that of Classes—is not right, because in that oase the argument would con- vince only those who admit the Class to be eternal, ‘he 6686 of the Karika is that even those who do not conour with the Mimansaka in his view of the Class, cannot deny its eternality. Because it is the Individaals alone that are perishable and the Claga 18 something more than the Individuals individually.
ETERNALITY ON WORDS. 469
317. The non-eternality (of Words) is rejected by the scriptures of ali theorists,—inasmuch as all scriptures admit of the capability (of Words) to signify (meanings).
318-319. And 16 is algo rejected by universally accepted facts, as shown above (by means of arguments based upon ^ Apparent Inconsis- tency”). And its rejection by “Inference” too may be shown in the aforesaid manner (as explained in Kadrika 312.) And the rejection by “ Sense-perception ” will be explained under the s#fra—‘ ou account of the absence of number” (I-i-20.)
319-321. And it should be mentioned (by the non-eternalist) what (sort of) Word it holds to be perishable: Is it the Word (of the Sankhyas) 88 made up of the three attributes (Sattva, Rajus, and Tamas) ? or is it (the Word of the Jainas) a dimunitive body? or is it (the Word of the Vuigéshikas) 9 property of Akaca? or, 18 it in the shape of mere Sound, (as produced by the conchshell, &c.) apart from the Letters (as composing Words ?) ov, isitaform of the Air, signifying certain meanings (as held by the author of the Ciksha 2) or, is it the Sphota of the Word and sen- tence (as held by the Vatya@karanas) ? or, does it (the class ‘ word ’) consist of similarity (as held by the Sankhyas), or Negation of others (Apoha, as held by the Bauddhas) ?
321-322. Words such as these may be non-eternal; we do not hold such (Words) to be eternal. And your argument (whereby you seek to prove the non-eternality of Words such as these) come to have au un- known subject (since Words such as these are not known to us, whom you seek to convince), and your premiss would be without a basis (for the game reason of such Words not being kuown to us.) And (if in order to escape from these fallacies) you hold the Word, as held by us, to be the subject (of your syllogism), then both these fallacies apply equally to yourself (who do not know of any such Word as held by us).
323. If Word iu general (without any specification) be asserted to be the Subject (of your syllogism ),—then in that case, the Class ^ Word” would come to be non-eternal. And this would go against all theorists, who (without a single exception) hold this (the Class) to be eternal.
324. A Class, of some sort of other (including all Words), is accepted by all, And if this were to be non-eternal, it could not pervade over (or include) certain individuals.
325-326. And it is not possible for particular Words to be mentioned by the generic name “ Word” (because in making such the subject of your syllogism, you would have an unspecified subject). And if these
824 If the Class “ Word” were held to be perishable, then the individual Words appearing during the time after its destruction would not be included in that Claas , and the Class would thereby cease tu be a Class.
59
466 CLOKAVARTIKA.
(particular Words) be asserted to be something apart from the Class (“ Word ”’), then you have the aforesaid fallacies (shown in K. 322) (inas- much as such particular individuals are not known either to us or to your- self), And if they (the particular Words) be non-different from their sub- strate (the cluss “ Word ”), then you would have self-contradiction, as in the case of the Class (that 18 to say, the Class being held to be eternal, the individual, as non-different from it, must be accepted to be eternal; and hence the assertion of its non-eternality would be a clear case of self-contra- diction). And (if the particular Word be held to be both different and non- different from the class ‘‘Word,” then), as before, you would have an unknown Subject (for your syllogism (because you yourself do not accept the Word to have such a dual character).
327. Anifby “non-eternality ’ you mean absolute destructibility, then for us, the subject of your syllogism comes to have an unknown predicate (because for us there is no such thing as absolute destruction).
328, Ifyou mean to prove non-eternality of some sort (aud not absolute destruction), theu (your argument becomes redundant, because) we too admit of the production (of Word) in the shape of manifestation (utterance), following after non-manifestation (and this producibility im- plies non-eternality).
329. And further, if Destruction (of Words) be held to be an absolute negation, then this would contradict the previous theories of the San- khyas and the Jainas (because they hold Destruction to be only a change in the condition of the object, and not its negation),
330-331. If you bring forward the fact of sense-perceptibility (of the Word) (as an argument against its eternality), then this would fail with reference to the Viacgéshikas (who hold that there isa series of the word “Cow,” and as such for them it is only the middle one of the series heard at the present time, that conld be perceptible ; and as such sense- perceptibility of the whole series would not be acceptable to them). And if (out of this series) the first and the middle ones be made the Subject of the syllogism, then there would be an endless number of Words (for the subject) ; and if the last (of the series) be said to be the Subject, then the premiss would become baseless for us (who do not admit of any such thing as the last Word) inasmuch as, the series is never-ending.
331-333. And again, if all Words be made the subject of your syllo- gism, then the premiss (“ because of perceptibility by the senses’) would be incapable of including them (since all Words are not amenable to per- ception at any time). And, in consideration of the Oluss (“ Word”) your premiss becomes contradictory too (becanse if the mere faet of amenability to sense-perception be the ground of non-oternality, then, on this ground the Class would also come to be non-eternal, because the Class is also
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 467
amenable to sense-perception, as shown under “ Akrti”). If you supple- ment your premiss by adding the qualifying clause, “‘ while belonging to a Class” (the premiss then being “ because, while belonging to a Class, it is amenable to sense-perception’’), then too it fails with regard to us, inas- much as with us, there is no such thing as an individual belonging to a Class different from it; and as for an individual belonging to a Olass non-different from vt, there is no such thing with you (since you do not hold the indivi. dual to be identical with the Class, as we do). And thus your premiss loses its efficiency.
333-334. If it be urged that the affix “matup” (in “ Jatimativé sali”’) may be attached to the properties of inclusion and exclusion (the form of the premiss being, ‘‘ because while having in itself, the character of being included in, and excluded from, certain others, (the Word is amenable to sense-perception ’’),—even then the argument becomes open to the same fallacy (as shown in the last Karik&é), inasmuch as even in a Class we have the idea of further Classes (and as such hecome included in your premiss).
334-335. Because even with regard to the classes ^ Cow, ” &c., we have a further generic notion of (as forming part of ) the Olass “ Class” (in which the particular Classes are capable of being included); and these (parti- cular classes) are also capable of being excluded from other particular classes (४.६. the Class “Cow ” 18 included in the class “ Class,” and exclu- ded from the class ‘‘ Horse’’). And thus, in this, these (particular Classes) are similar to Words. (And hence, tle premiss whereby you seek to prove the non-eternality of Words would prove the nou-eternality of Classes also, which cannot be acceptable to you).
335-336. And further, the property of eternality is such as includes all these (Classes), and is excluded from all non-eternal (particular) entities. If it be urged that “these properties (of inclusion and ex- clusion) are either only secondarily or falsely (applicable to Classes),”— then the same may be said with regard to Letters also.
336-337. Then again, for you (Vaicéshikas), the argument (based upon sense-perceptibility) becomes self-contradictory, with a view to
333.334 The sense of the objection is that a Word is inelnded in other words, in the form of the Class * Word,” and 18 excluded from other words in its own specific form; and thus our arguement remains untouched. The author objects to this on the ground that even the Class “‘ Word” in the formof a Class, 18 capable of being iuclu- ded in the generic class “ Class” andexcluded from other Classes in its specific form of the Class “* Word.” And hence the premiss would include the Class also, and so the
fallacy would remain intact. 334.385 If there be no Class, the fallacies urged above on the ground of Classes
would all fall to the ground, 835.338 Another way in which Inclusion and Exclusion belong to Classes.
468 CLOKAVARTIKA,
Atoms that are perceptible to the sense of yogis (and as such would have to be admitted to be non-eternal). Because though these are eternal, yet they are amenable to sense-perception.
337-338. And, ifin order to exclude this case (of atoms) you add “ (perceptible) to us (ordinary men)” (to the qualification of your premiss) ;—then too the premiss becomes contradictory, with a view to the Selves that are amenable to the idea of “I” (and as such, being percep- tible, these would have to be admitted to be non-eternal, a fact uot accept- able to the Vaicgéshika ).
338-339. In the case of pleasure, &c., we find the Self to be absolutely amenable to sense-perception due to contact with the Mind, even in the absence of any Inferential premisses or Verbal authority.
339-340. If you make ‘‘amenability to external senses” the qualifica- tion of your premiss,—then too it becomes contradictory ; on account of the fact of Classes also belonging to (other) Classes (and Classes are also amenable to external senses); inasmuch as a Class (‘Cow ”), happening to co-exist (inhere together) in a single object (the Cow) with another Class (“earthy ’’), comes to belong to a Class (and it is already proved to he amenable to eternal sense-perception ; and as such, in accordance with your argument, the Class also would come to be non-eternal).
341-342. If you assert the fact of its heing a substrate (of Inclu- sion and Exclusiou),—then (we reply that) since these (Exclusion and Inclusion) are immaterial entities, they cannot havea substrate. If you assert inference (to be the relation bearing between Exclusion and Inclusion and the Word),—then (we reply) that this (Inherence) as held by you, has already been rejected by us (above). If, lastly (by In- herence) you mean “identity” (as held by us), then such. identity is held to exist among Classes also (hence these also would come to be non-eternal).
342-343, So (you see) you take upon yourself the undesirable task of assuming many qualifications with a view to prove the Word to be other than eternal. It would be much better for you to enumerate all the enti- ties that are eternal (for both of us), and then to bring forward the fact of the Word being other than these as your ‘ reason’! !
343-344, But (in that case) we could also prove the eternality (of
558.889 The Vaicéshika holds the self to he perceptible by means of contact with Mind.
SH1.342 ८८ Identity amang Classes.” The Class “Tree” is identical with the Class
^“ Mango tree ” on the ground of both equally helonging to the Class “ Substance.”
842.843 = (१ Enumerate, dc.” That is to say you shonld frame your argument thus: ‘“‘ Word is non-eternal, because it is other than Akaga, &o., like the Jar.’? The aheurdity of the proposed argument is palpable, and it is only put forward ina joking spirit.
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 469
Word), like that of Akaca, on the ground of its being other than the trees, &c., which are non-eternal.
344-345, If you assert as your ‘reason’ mere amenability to senses, as held by the Sankhyas and the Banddhas (who deny the existence of a Class altogether),—then, too, the fallaciousness (of the argument) becomes clear, in consideration of the QOlass (the existence whereof) we have proved above.
345-847. Just asa “reason” becomes fallacious, if it fails to qualify the minor term, in accordance with the theory of the adversary,— 80, in the same manner (it wonld be fallacious) if it fails to co-exist (in a substrate) with the major term and to exclude its contradictory. Conse- quently, though, in the above instance the Class would not be an entity for the propounder of the argument (the Sankhya or the Banddha), yet the argument remains fallacious until 1t (the Class as held by his adversary, the Mimansaka) has not been rejected (४.९.) until it has been definitely established that there is no such entity as a Class).
347-348, And it ought to be clearly explained, what is this “ amena- bility to sense-pereeption’’ ? (1) Isit something other than its substrates ? (2) oris it identical with them ? and (3) is it distinct in each separate sub- strate ? or (4) 18 it the same in all substrates ?
348-349. In all these, in accordance with the alternative that may be accepted by the adversary, respectively in the order of the citation of the alternatives, you have the fallacies of (1) “ Asddh@rana”’ (1.e., the middle term ueither co-existing with the major term nor excluding its contradic- tory) (४.९.) if 1t be different from the substrate, and distinct in each individual substrate, then such qualification would exist only in the minor term, and nowhere else, and as such, could not prove anything) ; (2) ^ Doubtfulness ” (or “uncertainty ”) (i.e. if it be held to be different from its substrate, then since we do not admit of this, the premiss would be doubtful, and hence inconclusive for us), and (3) “ Absence” (non-relation) of the middle term in the major term (1.e., ifit were restricted to each particular individual, then the amenability that would reside in the minor term would no; belong to anything else, not even to the major term), and (4) “ Non-exis- tence in the Sapaksha” (४.९. the Instance cited) (because, like the last, the amenability belonging to the minor term could not belong to the Instance).
349-351. And further your “ reason” (amenability to sense-perception ) applies also to cases contrary to your conclusion, for the following reasons : (1) (The Word is eternal) because it resides in the Akaca alone, like its omnipresence—this argument applying to the Vaigéshika (who holds
845.847 So long as the Class is not rejected, the premias will be found to include
this (Class)—and this is contradictory to non-eternality; as the class is held by all to be eternal.
470 LOK AVARTIKA,
Words to belong to Akaca, which he holds to be eternal and all-per- vading). (2) It is eternal, because it is amenable to the sense of andition, ~—like the Class “Word.” And (8) its eternality may be proved on the ground of its aforesaid all-pervading character, like that of Akaca.
351-352. We must also consider the character of your Instance (Jar): If yeu nse it (the word ^“ jar’’) in its direct denotation (the Class ** jar”’)» then it comes to be without the major term (non-eternality) (inasmuch as the Class is always eternal). If you use it in the sense of an in- dividual jar, then too, we will ask~—-Is this individual different from the Class, or is it identical with it? If it be held to be different (from the Class), then the very subject becomes such as is not admitted by us (who doe not admit of any jar apart from the Class “jar ’”’); and if, on the other hand, it be held to be identical (with the Class) then it becomes suclias is not admitted by others (who do not held the individual te be identical with the Class).
353. Ifit be used in the sense of the undefined or abstract (nirvi- kalpaka) form (of the jar),—then too, this form could be neither absolutely eternal ner abselutely non-eternal, inasmuch as that facter (of this un- defined form ef an object) whichis known by the name ef “ Class” is universally held te be of eternal, being something other than the perish- able factor (embodied in the Individuals).
354. We must also consider the character of ‘“non-eternality ?` (your major term): If by it you mean utter destruction, then for us, the Instance (the jar) becomes devoid of the majer term (because even when the jar is broken, it continues te exist in the shape ef “substance,” and as snch it is never totally destroyed). And if by it you mean partial destruction, then you have the same discrepancy of the Instance, in accordance with your theory (of the total destructibility of the Werd). Such is the way of pointing out fallacies (in your argument).
$55, Asamatter of fact, all theorists accept the denetable form of the Word to be eternal (८.९ the Werd to be eternal in its denotability). The difference of opinion lies only with regard to the specific shape attributed to such (denotable form of the Word). And we have preved that it is the Letters (that compese the Word, which constitute the denotable ferm of the Word) (४.९. the Word is denotable only in the ferm given to it by the letters composing it). © 356. Question: “ What is the use of asserting the eternality of
858 The undefined form hae two factors, the Clasaand the Individual, the former eternal and the latter non-eternal, And since yonr inatance is neithor altogether eternal nor altogether non-eternal, therefore it cannot conclusively prove either the eternality or the non-cternality of the Word.
$66 Now begins the explanation of Aph, 19, The Bhashya on the Sitra proceeds
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 101
the relation (of Words and Meaning,) in thechapter on Words?” Ans: (The use is that) as a matter of fact, (even in this chapter) the real matter for consideration is the eternality of Relations, inasmucli as we enquire into the character of the Word, only with a view to get at the true character of the Relation (that it bears to its meaning).
357. Or, (the eternality of the Relation is introduced, because) the eternality of the Word is proved through (and on account of) the eternality of the Relation. For, if the Word were perishable, we could not have the eternality of the Relation.
358. Hven in a case where we are cognisant of eternal relations of non-eternal objects, the substrate (of the relation) is never absent; and hence the relation never ceases (to exist).
359. But (in the case of Words) the word “Cow” (as uttered by different persons) has nota similar continuance. Because, as a matter of fact, we are not cognisant of any difference between the Word (‘ Cow” as uttered by one person, and the same word as uttered by another), There- fore we assert the eternality of the Word (“Cow,” f. 1), which is one only (the difference lying only in the utterances that serve to manifest the already existing Word).
360. Though even if the Word and its Relations were caused (and as such non-eternal), there would be a Relation,—yet since such a Relation would end with its very assertion, it would belong to that particular in- dividual alone, and we could not recoginse the relation to belong to all in- dividuals,
361. And further, since in the individual Cow, we have an admixture of many classes,—such as “Harthy,” “Substance,” “Entity,” “ Tailed,” &c., &c.—therefore we could not recognise the bovine animal to belong to the class “Cow” until the word “cow” happened to be used (with
to lay down the eternality of the relation of words and meanings. And the first half of the Kirika objects to this. The reply 18 that the eternality of the Relation would not be possible if the Word itself were non-eternal.
858 This anticipates the objeotion that even of non-eternal objects (individual jars, &c.) we cognise eternal relations with the Class, &ce. The sense of the Karikais that even in that case some individual or other is always extant, and as such, the relation has always gota substrate ready ; so, for all intents and purposes, 8.8 far as the relation is concerned, that (individnal) which bears the relation to the Classis ever extant or eternal.
860 When no Word bears any permanent relation with any object, then if we were to use the werd ‘‘ Cow, ” we would ntter it, and point out the Cow before us as being the object denoted by it. And as such the relation of the word “Cow” would rest in that individual alone, and it would not be possible for us to have an idea of all the cows in the world following upon our hearing of the word ^ Cow.” Bat such is the case with all of us, hence the relation mast be admitted to he eternal.
472 QLOKAVARTIKA.
reference to the individual animal) several times (and as such on the first use of the word we could not ascertain whether the animal belonged to the class ^“ Cow,” or ‘‘ Earthy,” &c.).
362. Therefore it must be admitted that the Word is an uncaused entity, and as such never perishes,—because it is eternally connected with an eternal relation (with its denotation),—just like Akaca, Atoms, &c.
363. Or, the eternality of the relation is not asserted in the Sara at all. Even if it be taken to assert the eternality of the Word, then, too, the Bhashya (whereiu the eternality of the relation is directly mentioned) becomes explicable (as being applicable to the eternality of the Word).
364, (In that case, the meaning, of the Bhashya passage ^“ na cakrt- ya cabdasya sambandhah gakyaté kartum,” is that) since the Word, heard but ouce, refers to many Classes (^ Earthy,” &c.) in their abstract forms, it cannot definitely point out its own specific denotation (“Cow ”), as distinguished from the other aforesaid Classes (unless it were used several times).
365-366. Because, the word “Cow” would get at the denotation of the specific Class ‘“‘ Cow,” only after a long time, when it has been heard several times, and has thereby set aside, (1) the classes “living beings,” &c., (2) the property of ‘ whiteness,” (3) the action of “moving,” (4) the classes “ horned,” “ tailed ” and the like, (5) and also the individual cows, the ‘ white cow,” the ^ hornless cow ” and the like, indicated by the Word (on account of these individuals being included in the Class “ cow ” which is denoted by the word ^ Cow’’).
367. And if a word were to continue to exist for such a long time, who could destroy it after that? This we shall further prove under the twenty-first Sdtra.
368-369. The affix “krtvasuc” (as in “ashtakrtvah gicabda uccaritah ’’) is used when the actions are many and the active agent only one. And since we find’ its use (with regard to the action of the word), it becomes certain that what is (said to be) repeated (eight times) is the action of the Word (which ever continues to be one only). If the word (“‘Cow” as uttered now) were other (than the one uttered in the past), then we could not have the notion of repetition (which is possible only when both are one and the same Word). If the number (५ eight’) belonged to the Word, we would have ^ ashtau cabdah ucearitah ” (and not ashtakrivah gabda uccaritah.’’)
868.869 With this begins the treatment of Sitra 20. “ Because of the absence of numbor (with regard to the Word)” (1-i-20).
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 443
370. “But we do find such uses as ‘adya Brahmarah ashtakrtvo bhuktavantah,’ where we have a diversity of the active agents (Brah- manas); and hence (the argument based upon the use of the affix krivasuch is inconclusive ’—with this in view, the objector says (in the Bhasaya) “whatif it is so?” (te, what if we have the krtvasuch in (१ ashtakritvah cabda necaritah.”)
371. Therefore in order to meet this charge of inconclusiveness, the use of the krivasuc is interpreted as pointing out another proof (of the singleness of words): The use (of the krivasuch) indicates recognition (and this could be possible only when the two are the same).
372. But, as a matter of fact, even the argument based solely upon the use of the krivasuc is not contradictory ; inasmuch as even in the instance cited (that of the Brahmanas having eaten eight times) the idea that 18 meant to be conveyed is that with reference to a single Brahmana (z.e., the sentence means that each of the Brahmanas ate eight times,—the repetition lying in the action and not in the agent).
373. Hecognition is held to be a proof (or means of right notion), when it 18 brought about by means of a perfect sense-organ. The adver- sary however urges its inconclusiveness, on the ground of stinilarity, which serves to taint the object perceived.
374-375. But (in reply to this we assert that) in a case where the object (subsequently perceived) is always cognised as being similar (to the ene previensly perceived) ,—Recognition (of the one as being the same as the other) is accepted te be mistaken. But, in the present case (८.९. the case of the Word ^“ Cow,” f. i.) we invariably have the firm con- viction that the one (that we hear now) is the same (identically) (as the one heard previeusly). And the validity of Recognition (as a means of right notion) is established by the fact of its proving the cxistence of the
81 The use of the krtvasuc by itself is not a sufficient reason for asserting the singleness of the word. What it dees 18 to indicate the fact of the word as now used being recognised to he the same as that used in the past, and this fact of recognition proves the singleness of the word.
318 The meaning of the adversary is that even when the seuse-organ is in per- fect order, the recognition of a certain object as being the same that we had seen before, may he a mistaken one; inasmuch as it conld have been hrought about by ४ certain degree of similarity hetween the two ebjects—which similarity may have been mistaken for identity. And as such mere Recognition of the word as being the same as the one heard before, is not enough to prove its eternality.
314.815 What we had perceived at first was only the word “ Cow,” pnre and sim- ple. Latterly hearing the word repeated we conclude that the word we had previously perceived has again appeared at the present time—and this element of the present existence of the previously perceived word is not amenable to any means of right
60
4.74 CLOKAVARTIBA,
previously-heard word at the time of recognition—which fact (of such existence) is over and above the fact previously perceived.
376. (In the objection urged in the Bhashya) what is meant to be shown is the inconclusive character of Recognition (as a proof of eter- nality) ; and this is proved by showing that (if Recognition were the sole ground for eternality, then), even such clearly non-eternal entities (as Cognition and Action) would come to be eternal; inasmuch as we lave Recognitious of these also.
` 877. Obj: “That ‘ these are not: perceptible by the senses’ appears to be an irrelevant reply ; inasmuch as the objector has not asserted the eternality of these, on the ground of their perceptibility by the senses.
378. “(He has not songht to base eternality upon scnse-percepti- bility) lest eternality come to belong to such (perishable) objects as the jar, &e., on the ground of thcir being perceptibile by the senses, or such (imperishable) objects as Akaca, &c., come to be non-eternal, on the ground of their imperceptibility by the sense-organs.
379. ‘In fact, they have not even asserted Cognition and Action to be eternal, by themselves. What they have sought to show (by bringing for- ward the case of these) was the inconclusiveness (of mere Recognition as a ground of eternality); and this remains jast the same (whether Cogni- tion and Action be perceptible or imperceptible, eternal or non-eternal) (and hence the reply given in the Bhashya does not at all touch the question raised by the objector; and as 80011, the Bhashya is altogether irrelevant).”
380. Rep: By the denial of the sense-perceptibility (of Cognition and Action), all that is meant is that there is no Recognition of these ; in- asmnuch as Recognition is possible only through sense-perception.
381. Therefore all that the Reply scrves to do is that it admits these
notion other than Recognition. Thns having an independent object of its own, Recog- nition cannot bnt be accepted to be a distinot means of right knowledge.
816 This refere to the Bhashya passaye wherein the Parvapskshi is made to urge that ^" Cognition and Actien are also recognised to be the same ag these previously perceived,” by which the objector implies that if mere Reoognition were enonczh anthority fer the eternality of the object, then even saobh non-eternal entities «8 Cognition and Aetien wonld come to be eternal ; therefore the Recognition of the Word a; being the same as previensly heard, cannet prove its eternality.
87 In reply tothe above objection the Bhashya has put forward the argument that ‘ these are not pereeptible by the senses (and it is only these ebjecte that are so per- eeptible whese reeegnition anthorises the notion ef eternality).”? And the Karikas 811. 19 bring forward ebjections against this reply of the Bhashya.
818 “Tf one were to preve eternality on the gronnd of pereeptibility, then alt perceptiblo objects, Jar, &e., would come to he eternal—and all imperceptible objects, Akiga, &e.,—would becomo nen-eternal,”
WM TERNALILY OF WORDS. 475
(Cognition and Action) to be the contradictory of the major term (९८९. nality) (of the syllogism based upon the Recognition of words), but denies its relation with the middle term (recognition).. And (the alternative assertion “if they are amenable to sense-perceptiou, they must be eter- nal”) admits the relation (of these) with the middle term, and denies the fact of its being the contradictory of the major term (efernality).
382. And if the purpose (of the objection) be to prove the eternality of these (Cognition and Action),—(and not to deny the eternality of Words, 011 the ground of their Recognition,—then we will reply to it by pointing out the irrelevancy (of such au argument) (because while setting about to prove the non-eternality of the word, the objector would be proving the eternality of Cognition and Action, which has got nothing to do with the eternality of the Woid); just as was pointed out iu the case of
“group” and “forest ” (in the section on ‘ Vanavéda’).
383. The alternative reply—with regard to Recognition and (ल. nality (of Cognition and Action)—(without any definte assertion) —imphes a disregard (for the objection) ;—the sense (underlying this disregard) being that this youi vbjection does not in the least touch my origina] proposition (with regard to the eternality of the Word).
384-385. And as for the perishability (nou-eternality) of Cogni- tions and Actions, in their individual forms,—there is no Recognition of these; inasmuch as the idea (Cognition) of the Jar is never recognised in the idea of the Horse. Andas for their generic forms of potentiulity (of Ideas to denote their objects, &c.) and Class—on which is based their Recognition,—in these forms the Cognition and Action are always held to be eternal by all theorists, in one way or the other.
386. But this interpretation, (of the phrase “ perceptible by sense ” as occuring in the Bhadshya“ na té pratyakshé,” as meaning “ Recogni- tion,”) is too farfetched. Nor is it possible to reject the Rocognition of Cognition aud Action—being, as it is, known to (and accepted by) all men.
88 In the chapter on Forest the adversary while setting about to deny the Class, gaes to prove the perceptibility of the Forest; and there too we have pointed ont the irrelevancy of the argument.
234.85 The individual cognition that has appeared at one time is at once destroyed, aud cannot appear again. Therefore there is uo recognition of it,
An Idea is recognised as an Idea only on the ground of hoth helonging to the sume Class (of ‘ Idea’) and hoth having the power to denote their objects. Aundin the ‘form—of Class or potentiality-—-all things are held to be eternal,
3386 ‘I'he K. 3880—385 embody the Keply given by a certain section of the Miman- sakas. The author now rejects this Reply as being improper. Certain Coguitions aud Actions are always recoguixed to be identical, and it is uot proper to deuy this without
any reasouings,
476 GCLOKAVARTIKA,
387. And thosc means of right knowledge, that seem to bring about the cognition of Ideas and Actions, serve also to bring about the Recog- nition of these. Wherefore, then, should not this (Recognition) prove their eternality ?
388. (And when the Recognition of these is so palpable) a mere verbal (groundless) denial of Recoguition could also be made with regard to the Word (whose Recognition conld also be as easily denied if no proofs for such denial were required). (And if it be urged that the Bhashya only denies the perceptibility of these, and not their Recognition, then) as for perceptibility, apart from recognisability, its denial here (in the Bhashya) does not serve any purpose (inasmuch as the denial of the mere perceptibility of Idcas and Actions, does not affect the objector’s arguments, and as such, would be quite irrelevant).
889. And that Action is perceptible and eternal wil}! be proved onder the 52८7-2, “ Ripagabddvibhagicca” (‘since there is no differentiation of forms or expressions of these”); (and hence the denial of the percep- tibility and eternality of Actions by a Mimansaka would be a sheer self- contradiction. Therefore (for the above reasons) we must explain (the
= ११
Bhashya “na té pratyakshé,’ &c.) in the following manner :—
390-394. We do not accept mere Recognisability (of the word) to be enough proof of eternality; all that we mean (by bringing forward the fact of the Recognition) is to show that the theory of non-eternality (of Words) is opposed to a fact of sense-perception (their Recognition). And, as such (since our statement is no Inferential argument), it cannot be called Inconelusive (which is a fallacy applying to Inferences alone). Conse- quently, the objection (urged by the adversary) is an objection against an altogether foreign subject (the non-eternality of Actions, &.) : (the impli- eation of the objection being) ‘ Why don’t you Mimansaka deny the non- eternality of Ideas and Actions {on the ground of their Recognisability ) ?’ Even to such (an irrelevant objection) we make the following reply :— It 18 by Inference that we get the notion of the non-eternality of Words (whose eternality) is perceptible by the sense (of Audition); and hence the former (non-eternality as proved by Inference) is rejected (in favour of eternality) by the stronger (Sense-perception which proves the word to be eternal), On the other hand, in the case of Ideas and Cognitions, non- eternality is only inferred from their recognisability ; and the non-eternality
वि
899.894 The argument is that words sre eternal, becanse, being perceptible they are recognisable ; and Ideas and Actions not being perceptible, aven if they are rscogni- 88118, our premiss does not apply to these.
Perceptibility may mean audtbility; and thersby the premiss is restricted to words alone, ths full syllogism bsing—‘ word is eternal, because, being audible it is recognisable—like the Class ‘ Word. ”
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 477
also of these is similarly got at (by means of Inference) ; hence between these two, there is no difference of strength (and as such the one cannot be rejected by the other, as in the case of the Word) ; and itis with this fact in view that the Bhashya says, —“ these are not perceptible by tho sense ’’ (and as such both eternality and non-eternality of these are got at by Inference, and hence are equally strong in validity). Or, “ perceptibi- lity ” may be explained as a qualification of the middle term (the argument being “ Word is eternal, because, being perceptible, itis recognisable ”’) ; or perceptibility”’ may be interpreted as audibility ; and when this is made the middle term, we could have the Cluss “* Word ” as the instance.
395. Only such Action, as has a supersensuous (imperceptible) substrate, is called “ imperceptible’’; and the theory, that Idea is im- perceptible, has been rejected nnder “ Canyavada.”’
396. And these Actions, that are found to inhere in (belong to) perceptible objects, are accepted (by us), like Letters, to be eternal, on the ground of their Recognisability.
397. The fact of these eternal Actions net being always perceived is due to the absence of the proper manifesting agencies. That very agency which you would hold te be the producing cause of these (Actions which you hold to be non-eternal), will be held by us to be that manifesting cause.
398. And justaseven for you, the Class “ Word” and the Cluss * Action,” though eternally extant, are not always perceived, so, for us 160, Idea and Action (though eternal may not be always perceived for want of manifesting causes).
399. Or again, just as even when the potentiality (uf a certain action) is present (in the active agent), the Action is not brought about, for want ef some ether cause,—so, the same may be the case with its manifestation (which may not be brought about fer want of preper manifesting agencies and other auxiliary causes).
400-402. Then again, it is extremely difficult te establish the fact of the Action being semething different from the individual active agents.
391 Yon hold a certain entity to be productive of the action, and we bold that the very eame entity only serves to manifest the action to perceptibility.
400.402 This anticipates the objection that-—‘‘ When the cases for the production and manifestation of actions are equally strong, why should not we accept the Prodnetion theory? Thus Recognisability may be explained as being based upon homogeneity.” The sense of the reply is that in face of the strong arguments of the Bauddhas, it is extremely difficult to prove the Action to be something different from the active agent; and heuce it would be far more hopeless to establish innumersble Classes of Actions, and the inclusion of different individnal actions in different Classee, and 80 forth. Yon assume the different Classes of actions only with a view to explain the notion of identity thnt we have at the time of Recognition of one action (motion, 4.४.) xs identical with the same action met with at some other time. And
478 CLOKAVARTIKA.
And then it becomes a far more difficult task to establish—-(1) a thousand different Classes belonging to each of the innumerable kinds (of Actions), (2) as also the facts of each of these Classes being one and eternal and inheriug in each individual action, (3) and the further fact of the existence (iuherence) of these (Classes) in each of the diverse and distinct and (momentarily) perishable parts of Actions. For these reasons it muat be admitted that the idea (recognition) of the oneness (identity) of the action —‘‘ Motion,” f.7.—is due to the fact of the Action being one only.
402-403. And the notion of difference (with regard to one and the same action) is dne to the diversity in the substrate of the effort (bring- ing about the Action). (We attribute the difference to the diversity of external conditions, and not to any diversity in the Action itself) because we are 110४ cognisant of any distinct (mutually exclusive) individuals of the same Action, as we are of distinct individual Cows, the black, the red, &c. (we do not perceive any difference in the various Motions, as we do the difference in the various Cows, and as such we cannot have the Class ०८ Motion,” as we have the Class ^“ Cow)” and hence we cannot assume it (the Action, Motion, f.1.) to have a two-fold character (that of the Class ५ Motion,’ and that of the individual Motion).
404, Even the diversity, in the shape of hasty, slow, §c. (with regard to the same action, Motion, f.2.), may be (explained as being) due to the diversity (in the degree) of the effurt put forth (by the individual persons moving),—just as (even when you admit of such a Class as
when it 16 hard to establish a single action, it is impossible to postulate so muny Classes as ° Motion,” “Running,” “ Throwing,” &c.; in fact so many 1588868 as there are actions. And we have not only to aseume the Claeses, but eo many properties of aingleness, &v,, as are necassary in each Class—this ie 2180 a diffcultassumption to prove $ and over and above thie, iu the cage of euch Clagees, as ^“ Cow,’’ &., it is possible for ue to assume theses, inasmuch ae of such Claseee, we have permanent substrates, in the shape of ths individual Cows; while on the other hand, the individual actions—Devadatta’s motion, f.1.—are each so diverse and removed from ons another, and are undergoing momentary deetruction, that it ie impossible to have any such entity as a Clase which could inhere in and include and psrvade over all these periahahle actions. Therefore we mast admit all motion to be only one action; and the recognition of one Action occarring at present to be the same ae the one perceived before must he admitted to be due to the fact of the action—Motion, f.1.—being one ooly, and to thse fact of both belonging to the sume Class ^ Motion.”
492-403 We have un idea of the motion of Dévadatta bsing different-from the motion of Rama, because of the differences between Détvadatta and Kama and not toany diversity in the nction itself.
८ Substrate of the effort’’ is the person performing the action.
५09 Even one who admits of the Class“ Motion” hae to explain the notion of tle diversity productive of the Class—as being due to the diversity, &c., of the in- dividuals, and not as really belonging to the Clase. So we tooexplain the diversity in
RTERNALITY OF 01708, 479
‘Motion’’) the diversity with reference to the Class (^ Motion,” f.7.) is explained as being due to the diversity among the Individual (motions), or again, just as the idea of the production (or appearance) of the Class (“ Motion ”) is due to the production of the Individual.
405. Idea too we hold to be one and eternal, because it partakes of the nature of the Intelligence of the person (which Intelligence is one und eternal.) And as for the notion of diversity ( with regard to the Idea), it is due to the (diversity of) objects (of the Idea).
406-408, The Fire, though externally endowed with the power to burn, only burns combustible objects when these happen to be presented before it, and not otherwise; and a Mirror, or a clean piece of rock-crys- tal, reflects only sucli reflectible objects as are presented before it (though they are externally endowed with the power of reflection). In the same manner, the eternal Lutelligences, functioning in the bodies of men, com- prehend such objects, colour and the rest, as are presented before them by the various organs of sense. And it is this “ Intelligence” thatis meant by the word “ Idea” or ^^ (Cognition) ” in the Bhashya.
409. Thus then (it must be admitted that) the ldea appears perish- able, on account of the perishability of its conncetion with the organs (of sense) presenting objects before it; just as the Fire does not appear to have an eternal power of burning, on account of the non-proximity of any combustible object.
410. And itis only in the form of “Intelligence ”’ (or Cognition) that Ideas are recognised to be identical. And the diversity of the Ideas of the jar, the elephant, &c., is held, by all people, to be due to the diversity of these (objects).
411-412. Those who have the difference of the objects (Jar, &c.) in view, do not assert one Idea to be the same as the other; and, conversely, until one has the difference of objects in view, he cannot but recognise one Idea (to be identical with the other): (becanse apart from the objects all Ideas are identical in being ^ Intelligence”): It is with this dual fact in mind that the Bhashya has asserted ^“ these (Ideas) are eternal ?”
412-413. Inthe same manner is to be proved the eternality of (Qua- lities, such as) “ Whiteuess,” &c. In the case of these too, the notion of diversity is due to the diversity of the objects with which these (Qualities) happen to be related. And since the form (Whiteness) always continues to be the same, who could dare to postulate a Class, as ^ White” (because that which is one only cannot constitute a Class).
the shape of “ slow,” “hasty,” &c., of motions to be due to the diversity in the efforts put forth, and not as really belonging to the motion itself.
406.408 This explains why people do not cognise all objects at all times, when their Intelligence is eternal.
480 CLOKAVAKTIKA,
414. At one time Whiteness happens to be related to substances (Jar, &c.), and at others it happens to be related to other properties (such as blackness, redness, §c) ; and it is on the ground of the diversity of these relations that Whiteness comes to be known as diverse, in the shape of “bright whiteness,” “dusty whiteness” and the like (whiteness is known to be bright when in contact with a substance in the shape of Light, and it is known as dark when it is in contact with blackness ; any way the whiteness remains the same, the diversity resting in tle accessories).
415. 1 1४ be urged that, “though a flame is momentary, it 18 recog- nised to be the same (so long as it continues to burn) (and as such Recog- nition cannot be a proof of eternality ),’"—then (we reply) it is not so: in- asmuch as in this case too the ohject of Recognition is the Class (‘‘ Flame’’) ; and this is always eternal for us.
416. And that factor of the flame, on which would be based a notion of diversity, through the presence of some accessory or the other,—with reference to such a factor, Recognition is not possible, inasmuch as all possibility of such Recognition is setaside by the notion of diversity (a notion of Identity being the necessary element in all Recognition).
417-422. (1) The word “ Cow ” uttered yesterday, exists to-day also, because it is the object of the Idea of the word ^“ Cow, ”—like the word “Cow” uttered to-day. (2) The word “Cow” uttered now existed yesterday,—because of the aforesaid reason. (3) Or, in both of these arguments, we may have, for our premiss, the fact of both (the word “Cow” uttered to-day and thatuttered yesterday) denoting the Class “Cow.” (4) The Idea of the word “ Cow” uttered yesterday served to express tlie word heard to-day,—becanse both (the Idea of the word uttered yesterday and that heard to-day) had the word “ Cow” for its object,—like the Idea of the word “‘Cow” uttered to-day. (5) Or, the Idea of the word “Cow” heard to-day expresses the word “Cow” uttered yesterday,—becanse of the same reason (2.९., because the present [dea has the word ‘“‘ Cow” for its object),—like the previous Idea of the word “ Cow” uttered yesterday. (6) Or, both (the present Idea of the word “ Cow ” heard to-day and the previous idea of the word “Cow” as heard yesterday) express the same object,—(because both have the word ^ Cow” for their object)—like any other Idea of a single object. (7) All Ideas of the Class ‘“ Cow,” appearing at different times and at different places, are brought about by a single word “ Cow,’—because they arc Ideas of the ^ Cow,”—like the Idea of any single object (Cow, f.z.). (8) In the same manner, all Ideas of the word ‘Cow ” are brought about by the single word ^ Cow,”—because they have the word ^^ Cow” for their object,—like the 1468 of any single object.
#17.4°2 ‘These Karikas formulate the arguments proving the Etornality of the Word.
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 48]
423-424. And inasmuch as we have rejected (under “ Sphota”) any such Class as the “word ‘Cow,’”—it caunot be urged that the above arguments are redundant (because the unity of the Olass “word ‘Cow’” is admitted by the adversary also). And if one were to prove, (from the above arguments) the unity of the jar, &c. (such as “the Jar seen to-day is the same as the one seen yesterday, &९., &c.”),--then, since we too admit of this (singleness of the Jar), with reference to the Class “ Jar,” the argue ment (urged by the opponent) would become redundant (specially as no one can reasonably deny the Class “‘jar,” in the way that we have denied the Class “word ‘Cow’”). And if, by the above inferential arguments, one were to prove the unity of the individuals (jar, &.),—then against this we would urge the contradiction of a fact of sense-perception (the diversity of the jars, considered individually), which is proved hy all means of right notion (since that which is perceived by the senses obtains the support of all other Pram@nas).
425-426. Some people, finding the gross destruction (of objects) to be otherwise inexplicable, assume certain intermediate subtle destructions occurring every moment (which they hold as leading up to one complete destruction in the gross form). Even these people (the Bauddhias), in the case of the Word, are uever cognisant of its gross destruction, which 18 greater (and as such more easily perceptible) than momentary destruc- tion ; and hence they are unable to prove the destructibility (non-eternality) of Words.
427. And the momentary destruction of even such objects as the jar, &., 18 to be rejected by the aforesaid arguments (z.e., the arguments employed in Karikas 417-22 to prove the eternality of the Word),—inas- much as the jar is recognised to be the same now as it was a few seconds before (which would not be possibleif it had been destroyed at every moment) ; specially, so long as the jar seen (before us) is not destroyed (by some extraneous causes).
428, One who would seek to prove the momentary destruction of
425.423, The Bauddha holds that of all ohjects there is an intelligent destruction, and this they call ‘‘ gross destruction”; andin order to explain this they hold that even iu the iniertm—.e., dnring the time between the production and the destruction of the object—there are certain minute destructions going ou at every moment, which finally bring about the final gross destraction. And the Karika means that even these people are unahle to prove the destruction of the word. Because, of the word, they cannot perceive even the gross destruction, from which they could infer its momentary destrne- tion. Nobody is ever cognisant of the nutter destruction of the Word as we are of that of the jar, &c. Consequently, when even such avowed Destructionists asthe Bauddhas fail to prove the non-eternality of the Word, it is sheer daring onthe part of others to scek to prove such au impossible faot,
61
{६ (0६4 ए 41164.
objects on the strength of the instance of the Flame, would be opento the coutradiction of wellknown facts of Senge-perception (and Inference), as shown above (in Karikas 417-24).
429. (ven if we were to admit of the momentary destruction of the Jar) when, iy one moment, 16 would have been destroyed utterly (with- ont leaving any trace),—there would be no material cause for its appear- auce at the next moment, and as such (the appearance of the jar at the next moment) would be inexplicable.
430. Because, prior to tle destruction of one momentary form of the jar, the followimg moment (४.९.) the moment of the existence of the next momentary form) was absolutely non-existent; aud as such, at the time ef the momentary destruction #t could not have any aetion (whereby it could appear to view). And when, the next moment (which the Banddha holds to be the moment of the re construction of the jar), does appear, it is itself swallowed wp by nevation (because no sooner would it appear, than it would be destroyed, according te the Banddha), and as such, at what time could the subsequent moment operate (towards the recon- struction of the jar)?
431. Jnasmuch as both of these (the moment of the destruction of the jar and the moment of its re-appearance) are equally open to momen- tary destruction and re-construction, they are independent of one another; and as such there could be no eausal relation between the tsyo (2.¢., one moment cannot in any way bring about the next moment, and as snch the moment of the destruction of the jar cannot he said to be the cause of the appearance of the next moment of the re-constrnction of the Jar); for the simple reason that the action of the one (moment) conld net in any way affect the other (as the two do not exist at one and the same time).
432. Because an object (the next moment, 7.7.) which has not yet acquired existence cannot 06 an auxihary to another object (the foregoing moment); nor can an object, when destroyed, be so; and as fer any con- tinuance (of the objeet) during which rt conld operate towards any effect, there 18 no sucli thing (for the Banddha, who holds every object to be un- dergoing momentary destructions).
433. dust as the peculiar odour, &c., appearing after the destruction of the jar, ts not helé te he the effect of that destruction—so in the same
429 TF the jav were destroyed in one moment, how could it continue the next moment? specially as there is no trace of the jar left which conld serve to produce the far anew for the next moment.
921 Recoustraction all along mreang the appearance of the jar at the moment after momentary destruction of the jar. Because the Banddha holds that the object ig Wudergoing destruction and reconetrnelion cvery moment.
i ‘This is mroant to show thut mere autecedcuce is not enough to establish
WTERWALITY OF WORDS. 4९६.)
yranner would other subsequent’ forms of the jar also (not be the effect of the foregoing destroyed fori of it)
434; Therefore a Catise'is only that’ of which we finda certain action (necessarily) preceding tlie appearance of the effect; and mere antecedence does not (make a Causey. |
435. Elven in the case of the’ Flame, it‘oannot be proved that it under- goes destriction every morient. Tlie’ fact (in the' case of the Flame) is that its’ extremely subtle particles keep ‘quickly moving on (atid this gives rise to the idéa of it’ momentary’ destrtiction, though im fact there is no destruction at all).
436.437. Roundabout the burning wick a large quantity of Licht exists ina collected ‘form; and'that much of ib which proceeds upward, is known as the “ Flame”; and that-which goes even beyond this (Flame) is known. as. the: Radiance (diffused. by. the Flame); and that-which: goes even beyond this is.extremely subtle,-and is not cognised.at all; (and it is this: process of. regular motion or diffusion.of Light, that. gives rise to the idea that the Flame undergoes momentary destructions),,
438-439. The particles of Light cannot proceed upwards while the way: is. blocked by,.the foregone particles; consequently as these latter move on,.and clear the way, the former continue to come. Consequently even if these particles of Light happen to touch one another, ina heap of straw: for itistance,,they. do not become augmented (and hence do not- burn the. straw) (because they keep on. moving, and do not stay long. enough to have. any joint. effect). Similarly. inthe case of the Word, there is no.augmentation.of it, because of the extreme quickuess: of the sounds (manifesting the Word) («e, even if the word be pronounced several times, it. does not. undergo. an increase, because the sounds proceed so quickly as.not toform.any couglomeration of themselves, which alone could cansean lucreasé: in the: volume’ of: the: Word)
440). ` The youthfulness, &e., of the body are brought about by the modifications (0 the bodily molecules); avd’ (in the body) what is' recog. nised by people (to be the same to-day as it was yesterday) is only the arrangement (of the molecules, i.e¢.,.the shape of the body).
causal relation, which ` उर्व in greater need of a potetitiality in the cause, for bring ing about the efféct
488-489" Thi anticipates: the objection that, “grarted‘ that the Flame is not‘destroy- ed, why should'it move along? It may’continite to exist iri the satne pliice:”
440° The Katika ig aimed at tlie Viicéshikds: The body, they urge; 18 ` undergoing” momentary modifications, and”is perishable, and yet we have recognition of ' the body being’ the samie to-day as it was yesterday. The Kirika explains this by showing thas the object of recognition is not every’ particle of the body which is~being every moment modified ;—but the particular shape of the body which continues the same from childhood to old age,
484 CLOKAVARTIKA,
441. Inasmuch as the states (of the Body)—of production, existence, and destruction--are such as belong to it, as well as to others,—and as such are not absolutely identical with it,—there can be no contradiction (in the fact of the continuance of the body during all the time that its various states are being destroyed and reconstructed) ;—as this (contradiction) has already been rejected above (under “ Akrti’’)
442. The theory that Recognition (of an object as being the same to-day as it was yesterday) is due to the fact of the (two forms of the) object being related to the same series, is to be rejected by the same argu- ments, as have been used for the rejection of the ^° Series of Cognitions (as held by the Bauddha), based on the impossibility of the Series being either different or non-different from the members forming the series.
0
443. Thus, it having been proved (through Recognition) that the Word continues to exist (at least) during the time intervening between its first hearing and its subsequent recognition (as being the same),—no other arguments could prove its perishability (non-eternality).
444, In the case of the Cloth, &c., we find that they are destroyed cither on account of their being cut by instruments, or on account of their becoming too old; whereas, in the case of the Word, there are no such causes of destruction.
445. The arguments, that have served. to reject the theory of the Word being made up of the atoms of Letters (as held by the Jainas, and which atoms are) called by them “ Pudgalas,” would also serve to reject the theory of the Word being made up of the atoms of Air (and as such being
441 This anticipates the objection that, ‘“‘aince the states of the body are under- going momentary destruction and reconstruction, why should not these be attribnted to the Body as well, 10287106} as the Body is non-different from its states?” The aense of the reply 18 that if the Body were absolutely identical with its states, then the destruction of thease would bring about the destruction of the Body. But ag a matter of faot, there is no snoh identity, and hence there ia no contradiotion in the shape of the Body continuing the same, even while its states are undergoing momentery de- etruction and reoonstrnotion ; specially as it hag been shown, in the chapter on “ Akrti,” that every object haa three states—those Of produotion, existance and destruction.
442 The Banddba asserts that the jar is recognised to be the same to-day 88 yesterday, beoauae there 18 a series of destractiona and reconatruotions affecting the jar, and ib 18 on account of the present shape of the jar forming part of the same series as the form perceived yesterday, that 1४ is recognised to be the same. The Kiarika meane that against this theory we should urge the argumenta—e,g., Is the series different or non-different from the individual forms of the jar? and ao forth—that we have urgod above, against the possibility of the ^ Series of Cognitions,”’
443 This rofers to S#tra [—i—21.
406 This refers to Sé#tra [—i—22,
ETERNALITY OF WORDS. 485
made up of component parts). Therefore, inasmuch as people are never cognisant of any Canse (productive) of the Word, and as everywhere the Word is found in its own complete form by itself (and not as made up of component Words),—the Word must be (admitted to be) eternal.
End of the chapter on the Vternality of Words.
Se a प I a, tng agg
APHORISMS XXIV to XXVI. ON SENTENCE. Objections against the eternality of the Veda :—
1. “Even though you have proved the Eternality of Words, of the objects (in the form of Class) signified by words, and of the relations of these,—yet that dees not prove the validity (and eternality) of the Veda with regard to the meanings of sentences.
2-4. “Would the meaning of a sentence be expressed by the Words, individually, or collectively ? or, by a Word (in the shape of a syntactical Sphota) altogether different (from the Sentence and the words composing it)? or, by the meanings of words as before (individually or collectively) ? or, by the means of cognising these (Meanings of Words) ? or, either by the Remembrance (of these) or by the Relation (of Words and Meanings) or by an Idea of this (Relation)—and by these too, indivi- dually or collectively? None of these can be the means (of getting at the meanings of Sentences), because none of these is kuown to have any connection (with the meaning of the Sentence).
4-5, “One thing (the Word, &c.) being totally different from another (the sentence and its meaning), and being altogether unconnected with it, cannot bring about its comprehension. Because a relation (or connec- tion) which is not cognised, is as good as non-existing. In fact, the exist- ence too of that which is not cognised by the ordinarily accepted means of right notion, cannot be believed to be true.
6. “And again, the reality of the sentence and its meaning, as dis- tinct entities, is not possible;—inasmuch as they cannot be explained to be either different or non-different from Words and their meanings.
7. “Because they (Sentence and its Meaning) are never cognised
1 Now begins the consideration of Siitra 24 which embodies an | objection against the validity of the Veda. ‘Even if (words and their relations) were eternal, these would be iucapable of expressing (the meaning of Vedic Sentences), becanse the (cognition of the) meaning (of Sentences) is not due to these (words, &९.)* (I—i—24),.
4.5 ‘ Because, ¥c.”—Even if there be a relation between the words and tbe meaning of the Sentence composed by them; since we are never cognisant of any such relation {at the time of uttering a sentence) we may accept it to be as good as non-existing since being unknown, it is of no use.
7 If all the words were heard all at once, then alone conld the Sentence be said
?
ON SENTENCE, don f
apart from them (Words and Meanings). Nor can they be held to be aggregates of these (ze, the.seutence cannot be said to he the aggregate of Words, and the Mcaning of the Sentence cannot be said to be the aggregate of the meaning ef Words),—inasmueh as there is no simul- taneity.in their comprehension (i.e., the words are heard and understood one after the.other, and not all at once).
8. Mere simultaneity in existence (that is, the mere fact of the Words having the common character of eatsting) can be of no help in the usage (of Sentences). Otherwise, all (Words) being eternally existent, (we wonld always have a cognition of all words together, and) there would be no comprehension of any particular Werds.
9. “And again, even though there is simultaneity of existence, yet, since the cognitions (of the Words) are gradual (appearing one after the other), (11616016 there is no possibility of a collective cognition. And it 18 for this reason that the meaning of the Sentence is not cognised to be an aggregate of these (meanings of Words).
10-11, ‘It 28 an established fact that the Sentence and its Meaning are (necessarily) preoeded by (a cognition of) the relation (subsisting among the Words composing the sentence, and between the complete sen- tence and the meaning sought to be conveyed by it). Aud mutually in- dependent (unconnected) Words (such as ‘ House, Blephant, Cow, Grass, Man’) are never known as a Sentence. And no Relation is possible where there is no dependence.
11-12. “ Hither Words or Letters do not, by themselves (7.e., mde- pendently of their meanings), stand in need of one another,—as we find in the case of meaningless Words and Letters (which are never fonnd to be in need of one another).
12-18. ‘And again, se long as a Word lias not been ul-tered, it can- not stand in need of another. And as fer simultaneity (of utterance of two words one of which would require another), it is not possible. And when the Word has been uttered, it instantly disappears (since its utter- ance does not continne for any length of time) (and as such even after he- ing uttered, the Word does not continue long enough to stand in need of another Word).
to be au aggregate of these. Becanse in the absence of such simultaneity the words cannot be recognised as forming a single component whole,
10.11 ^< No relation, \c.’—i.e, unless, among the words forming a Sentence, it be shown that one word requires another, there can be no relation between them. And nuless there be some relation among the Words, they cannot form a Sentence, Asa matter of fact, the Word in itself cannot have any need of another word, and as such independently in themselves, the wnrds cannot be said to have any relation among themselves; henco they cannot be said to form a Sentence. (See next Karika).
488 GLOKAVARTIKA.
13-14, ‘“‘Hven if there be a dependence, there can be no Relation in any of the generally known forms of Cause and Effect or Conjunction or Inherence.
14-15. “If it be urged that among the Words there is the relation of inherence in a single object (viz: the Sentence),—then, all words equally inhering in the & {862 (and thus having a common relation among themselves, we could have a Sentence made up of all the words in existence); and consequently there could be no difference in the connection (of any Sentence) with Words,—whether they be uttered or not uttered, and whether they be capable or incapable (of such connection).
15-17. ‘And as for the (common) relation of being engaged in one and the same action (of bringing about a comprehension of the Sentence ),— such action could only be with regard to that which is manifested, or to ‘that which is produced (by the Words). As for the objects manifested by the Words, these are different (in each Word), on account of the differ- ence of the Words themselves. Consequently these (words) cannot bring about any one collective Idea (with regard to all the objects, denoted by the various words composing a sentence, considered as forming a single conglomerated whole). And as for the idea of the objects taken indivi- dually, they differ with each individual Word.
17-19. “Nor is it possible for any single Idea to be produced by these (Words), differing, as they do, among themselves, and appearing one after the other, And if (in the manner explained by yon) the cog- nition of the sentence were only in parts (according as we perceive the words one after the other), we conld never have an idea of the Sentence and its meaning, as a single whole in itself. And, in the absence of any contradictory fact rejecting it, we cannot assert the partial cognition (of the component parts of a Sentence) to he a mistake. For, how conld there be any truth in the mistaken notion of the singleness and impartite character (of the Sentence)?
19-20. “Hither mutual intimate relation (Sarsarga) or mutual
18.18 None of theese relations could make all the words into a single corporate whole.
11-19 ^ For how could, Jc.”—The only notion that could contradict and reject the cognition of the parts of a Sentence is the idea of the sentence as a eingle impartite whole. Bnt inasmuch as the cognition of the parts of a sentence is directly per- ceptible, and that of the sentence as a whole, at,best, only inferable; therefore there can be no doubt as to which of the two is to be accepted ag oorreot. Therefore the idea of the eentence as one and impartite being contradicted by the perceptible fact of the cognition of the parte of the Sentence severally, must be held to be wrong, and it oan never be the other way.
19.20 [४ has been shown that in the absence of any relation the worda cannot be held toforma Sentence. It is now shown that for the same reason of want of relation the
ON SENTENCE. 489
exclusion is not possible for Ideas,—because each of these has only a momentary existence; therefore either Intimate Relation or Mutual Exclu- sion (of the meaning of Words composing a Sentence) cannot be accepted to constitute the meaning (of the Sentence).
20-21, ‘If the notion of the word ‘Cow’ continued to exist at the moment of the appearance of the notion of ‘ White,’—then only could the notion of the ‘Cow’ be excluded, by the notion of ‘White,’ from others (black cows, é&c.), or be associated (in intimate relation) with it,
21-23. ‘And of notions there can be no association,—hecause it 18 impossible for them to have any such relation as Conjunction, 4९. And as for the fact of their inhering in the same Soul (that of the speaker or hearer) (which you may urge as a ground of the association or intimate relation of the notion of the ‘Cow’ and ‘White’),—this (relation) is conimon to the notions of the ‘ Horse,’ the ‘ Hlephaut,’ &c. (and as such you would have to admit such utterances as ‘Horse, Elephant, Camel, Grass, ५८९. to be properly expressive, which is an absurdity), The same may be said with regard to contiguous appearance (or entrance) (which too you may urge as the ground of intimate relation between ‘White’ and ‘Cow,’ but this too is equally applicable to the Sentence ‘Horse Elephant’). Nor is there any mutual dependence (or requirement, between the notions of ‘White’ and ‘Cow’), just as (it has been shown that there is no mutnal dependence) among Words; because the notions being all only momen- tary, there is no simultaneity in their existence; and as such, what notion could depend upon (stand in need of) another notion P
23-24, “And it is for this reason that the notions of the words ‘White’ and ‘Cow’ cannot bring about a single collective notion of
meaning of the Words cannot make np the meaning of the Sentence. The Miminsaka holds the meaning of the Sentence to consist of the mutnal intimate relation among the meanings of Words. According to them the word ‘‘cow”’ denotes only the class cow, and ig indifferent with regard to the individual cow. And when the word “White ’’ comes to be added, this only serves to express a relation of the class cow with a particular property whiteness. And when this relation has heen duly comprehended there follows the implication of the exclusion of all cows other than those that are white. Thus then, according to these people, the meaning of the Sentence ‘‘ White Cow” consists of the relation between the class Cow and the property whiteness. Those who hold the denotation of the word to be in individuals explain the meaning of a sentence in the same manner. This theory is objected to on the following gronnds: Do these Intimate Relation and Exclusion belong to the Words or to the notions of Words, or to the meanings of Words, or to the notion of these meanings? None of these ig possible. Becanse they cannot helong to the Words; nor can they belong to the notions of Words; because the notion of the word cannot continne long enough to become related to that of the word ‘‘ White.’ This is what is shown in the following Karika,
20.21 Bnt, as a matter of fact, each of these notious is only momentary and cannot continue for any length of time.
62
490 CLOKAVARTIKA.
the ‘White Cow’),—which (collective notion) alone could justify, for its own sake, the assumption of the mutual intimate relation among all the notions (of the individual words ‘Cow’ and ‘White’ severally).
24.25, “Inasmuch as such mutual intimate relation and exclusion appear internally (in the mind of the hearer),—if they were to appear externally in the shape of an object (the white cow, sought to be denoted by the Sentence)—they could only be similar to a dream, in authenticity.
25-26, “Asa matter of fact, no cognition is possible, in the absence of any external object (for its substrate) existing at any of the three points of time (past, present or future). And, in the present instance (of the cognition of Mutual Association and Exclusion of the notions of words) there is no possibility of any external object (such as Associa- tion or Exclusion, that could be assertcd to be the substrate of the said cognition),
26-27. ‘Thus then, the fact is that, even in the absence of the ap- pearance of any cognition (of the Association), you have an assumption of uch appearance. Or, the assumption of the Association (of Cognition ) may be due to the Association of external objects (४.९.) the Association really belonging to external objects is wrongly attributed to Cognitions).
27-28, ‘Thus then, the relation of the qualification and the quali- fied (z.e., Association) cannot belong to the Notions (of the Word and its meaning). Similarly, with the Word and the notion thereof, since there is no difference produced (in the Word either by Association or Exclusion, by any other Word) therefore even the Word and the notion thereof could not be held to constitute the Sentence.
28-29. ‘For even after the addition of the word ‘ White,’ the word ‘Cow’ remains just the same (as it was before). Even if the word ‘White’ be uttered before the word ‘ Cow,’ this latter remains the same; similarly with the notions of the Word also (the notion of the word ‘Cow’ is not changed by the addition of the word ‘ White’).
29-30. ‘Nor could there be any qualification between Whiteness and the class ‘Cow’ (forming the meanings of the word ‘White’ and ‘Cow’
44.45 This meets the argument that the mutnal intimate relation of the words “White” and “Cow” actually appear in the mind of the hearer. The sense of the Karika is that, even if this do appear, it can only resemble a dream in anthenticity.
धि -28 “No specification”—The Word “Cow” remains the same even after the word ‘‘ White” is added; the word “ White” produces no change in the word “ Cow.”
49.80 It has been proved that the notion of the meanings of words cannot have any Association or Exclusion, and 88 such the notion of the meaning of the word “ Cow” cannot undergo any difference by the notion of the meaning of the word “White.” It is now shown that even the meanings of the words themselves cannot have any qnali- fying effect upon another—and as such these oannot constitute the sentence,
ON SENTENCE, 491
respectively); because between these there cannot be either Association or Exclusion.
30-31. “Because neither the class Whiteness is affected (associated) by the class ‘Cow,’ nor is the class ‘Cow’ affected by the class Whiteness. Because these classes do not belong to (inhere in) one another; inasmuch as each of them inheres in the individuals (contained in it).
31-32. “Hven if Individual were affected hy them (7.e., even if the in- dividua Cow were affected by the individual Whiteness), this fact could not constitute any relation between the words (‘White’ and ‘Cow’) inasmuch as these (words) do not refer to Individuals (but to Classes).
32-33. “And when the Individuals (Whiteness and Cow) are not denoted by the Words,—even though they happen to consist in a single substrate (the white Cow), yet this fact alone cannot authorise any rela- tion between the Words themselves ;—just as in the case of the Cow and the Horse, both of which co-exist on the same earth (yet there is no rela- tion between them). And evon ina case where colour (smell) &c., co-exist in a single substrate (the jar, f.i.), there is no relation among these (Colour, &c.) themselves.
34-35. “And (as a matter of fact) there are no grounds even for as- serting the fact of the Oluss ‘Cow’ and the property ‘ Whiteness’ inhering in a single individual (the white cow); because this fact of the singleness of the individual (in which these would inhere) could only be hased on the ground of au inherent relation (between the denotations of the two
30.81 The Class ‘‘ Whitenesa” inheres in the individual ^ White,” and cannot inhere in the class ^" Cow.”
32.88 This meets the objection that, ‘even though the Individual Cow is not denoted by the word, yet there is snch a single individual Cow as in which the class “Cow”? and the property ‘‘ Whiteness” both co-exist. And thue thie fact of a eingle individnal being the Cow and having the property of whiteness leads to the conclusion that the Sentence “ White Cow” is one and has a single denotation (in the shape of the white Cow).
“And even, &.’—This meeta the objection that we do not hold mere singleness of eubstrate (as in the case of the Cow and the Horse) toconstitute the meaning of a sentence; what we mean is that the meaning ofa eentence is that object wherein inhere the denotatione of the words forming the sentence; and in the case of the
‘ White Cow’ we have such an object in the shape of the white Cow. The eense of the Karika is that even the fact of{inhering in a single substrate does not consti- tute a ground of any relation between the iuhering factors; because we find that in a single object, jar, smell and colour inhere, while there is no relation between (11686. Therefore even though the denotations of the words ^^ White” and “ Cow” happen toin- herein a single individual cow, yet this fact alone cannot anthorise any relation among the two words, on the ground of which relation we could hold the two words to form a single sentence, and the denotations of these words to form the single denotation of the sentence as a whole,
492 QLOKAVARTIKA.
words, if such relation exist at all); and this inherent relation too has been shown to be based on the singleness of the individual (in which they would inhere); and as such you have mutual interdependence.
30-36. ‘Nor is there any such (third) Word as would bring about the notion of the singleness of the individual. (Hven if there did exist such a Word) nor is the singleuess of the individual capable of being ex- pressed by the word. Even if the individual were so expressible, its singleness could not be (denoted).
36-37. “If you assume the relation (between the denotations of the two words ‘White’ and ‘Cow’) on the ground of the singleness of the object as conceived by us, then why could not we have the relation between the Jar and the Tree, in both of which we have a conception of the single indentical class ‘Harthy’ (४.९.) both are equally made of the Harth) ?
37-38. ‘The mention of ‘White’ does not serve to exclude the Class ‘Cow’ from the black Cow, &c. And hence the denotation of these (latter) (by the word ‘Cow’) being natural, is never set aside by the mere mention of ‘ White,’
38-39. ‘Even if the negation of the black, &c., be the denotation of the word ‘White,’—still the only ground for the inherence of this Whiteness in the Cow is mere proximity (of the word ‘White’ with the word ‘Cow’ in the sentencc),—and this is not a sufficiently strong proof (of the relation).
39-40. ‘‘And so long as it has not been distinctly expressed by the word that it denotes such and such an object,—if one were to determine its denotation of his own accord, all that he would fix upon as being the denotation of the Word would be such as is not at all connected with the Word.
40-42. ^“ Aud if such a denotation (as that ‘white’ means the white cow) were to be inferred from the proximity of the words ‘ White’ and ‘Cow, ’—-even then (since this inferred relation could only refer to whiteness and cow in general) the fact of the word (‘white’) referring to this particular object (before the speaker) could only be inferred from proximity (of the speaker and the hearer to the particular cow before them); and thus then, if we were to assume the denotation of the word (‘white’) to extend so far (as the particular cow),—then there would be
88.9 Becanse syntactical connection is very much weaker than direct assertion.
40.48 “ Being apart from six, ¥e.’—The direct assertion of the Word refers only to the class cow; hence by making the word refer to the particular cow Proximity goes against Direct Assertion; and as such oannot be inoluded in verbal Testimony ; ner oan it be included in any other means of Right Notion. Therefore it becomes groundless and invalid, and as such cannot serve as a proof of any relation of whiteness with the particular cow.
ON SENTENCE. 493
no end (to these assumed denotations). Hence, being apart from the six Means of Right Notion, Proximity remains without any footing (of validity) (as a ground of the relation of whiteness with the particular cow).
42-43. ‘Nor do we perceive, in the word ‘cow’ (in the expression ‘white cow’), the genitive affix, which could point to a relation (of the cow with whiteness.) And, as a matter of fact, even if there were such a genitive affix, the relation (between whiteness and the particular cow) could not be directly denoted; because the fact (of such relation being directly denoted by the Words) 1188 been rejected above (ou the ground that the direct denotation of the word ‘Cow’ refers to the class, and not to any particular individual Cow).
43-44. “(The word ‘white’ cannot be held to qualify the part:- cular cow, which is indicated, though not directly denoted, by the word ‘Cow’; because) An object (the particular cow) which is indicated (and not directly denoted) (by something, 1.1. by the word, ‘cow’) is never found to be qualified by another word (such as ‘ white’), or by affixes (attached to the word ‘Cow’),—as for instance, in ‘ Dhiémo’yam jvalaty’ ( Fire is indicated, through inference, by the smoke, and 16 cannot be held to be qualified, in the aforesaid Sentence, by the action of burning, or by the affix in ‘ dhimah’).
44.45. “Hven if (mutual) connection or exclusion (of others) be assumed to be the meaning of the sentence,—then too, inasmuch as this (Connection or Hxclusion) extends only so far as the object denoted by the Words, the connection, &., of the different words can never constitute a Sentence (as a complete whole in itself).
45-46, ‘‘ Because the Connection and Hxclusion are nothing apart from the Meanings of the Words. Nor can the words be said to produce a new entity (in the shape of the Sentence), by the help of these (Connec- tion aud Exclusion).
46-47. ‘For the Olass and Property (as denoted by the words ‘cow’ and ‘white’ respectively) do not produce any new object in the external World. And in the absence of any such object, if there be a notion of it, it can only be false, like a dream.
47-48. ‘‘OQne,—who holds that the object denoted by the sentence consists of the already existing particular objects (the particular cow as qualified by whzteness), manifested (or implied, by the Words, ‘cow’ and ‘white,’ which directly express the class and the property) through proz- imity (of the Words, as appearing in the Sentence),—even for him, this (denotation of the Sentence) cannot be one (because each word of the Sentence has a distinct connection with the rest, and as such in a single Sentence, the connections of Words would be many and not one .
494 QLOKAVARTIKA.
48-49. “And further, there is no ground for believing in the previous existence (of the particular objects), in the absence of any recognition of these; for the actual objective reality of these (particular objects) are not the cause of the Existence of the Words (inasmuch as the Words denote classes and not particular individuals).
49-50. “In the same manner, if it be assumed that there is a final conglomeration of all the Words from the first to the last (word of the Sentence), —even then the Words cannot be said to form the Sentence, inasmuch as there is no mutual help among the Words.
50-52. ‘For, if the first Word of the Sentence were specially affected (qualified or specified), by the other Words (of the Sentence), then this (first) Word alone would constitute the Sentence, the other words being only secondary qualifications (ouly serving to elucidate the object denoted by the first Word). The same would be the case with all other Words, taken severally. And (this is an impossibility, because) we never re- cognise any single Word independently (of other Words) as a Sentence.
52-53. “ And the fact of the existence of such a class as the ‘ Sphota ’ (of a Sentence as a whole) is to be rejected like (४.९.) on the same grounds as) the Sphota of the Word; and the fact of the sequence of Words constituting the Sentence on the same grounds as the fact of the Sequence of Letters constituting the Word.
53-54. ‘The sequence cannot be comprehended apart (from the Words) (as explained with regard to the Sequence of Letters in Words); inasmuch asit is always the Words themselves that are cognised as having that order of sequence,—like an anditory cognition (which is always cognised as endowed with a certain order of sequence).
54-55. ‘We find that the Words remaining the same, the order of the words is now one, and then another; and hence we would have a difference in the meaning of the Sentence, according to the order of the words (if a Sentence were only the order of sequence of Words).
55-57, “On the ground of one Word being for the sake of auother, some people hold that it is the Verbal affix that, being the primary element, constitutes the Sentence; and the meaning of the Verb consti- tutes the meaning of the Sentence. But if this were the case, (in certain cases) there could he no relation between the Verb and the Nouns —as they really exist in the external World. And as a matter of fact, we are not cognisant of any relation among the actions themselves, or the Nouns themselves.
64-56 If the order of words constituted the Sentence then the meaning of “ gauh cuklak” would be different from that of ^ guklo gauh,’’ which is not the case.
56.51 Now begins the attaok on the theory that the moaning of the Sentence lies in the meaning of the Verb, This theory is that the principal meaning of the Sentence
ON SENTENCE, 495
97-60. ‘‘In such an utterance as ‘in a vessel rice by means of fuels Devadatta may cook,’ there is no mutual connection among the objects (expressed by the Words); inasmuch as, firstly, they are totally different from one another ; secondly, every oue of them is an accomplished object in itself (there being no causal relation between any two objects denoted) ; and, thirdly, there is no genitive (indicating any relation among them) ;—and as such they are independent of one another (and hence cannot form a Sentence, which consists only of such Words as have their denotations dependent upon and related to one amother). And the pre- sence of the Instrumental case (in ‘kdshthaih’) removes all possibility of (the relation of) proximity (between the objects denoted). And as for the objects—Fnel, etc.,—themselves, they can he related (to the action of cooking) only by means of their action (of burning, and) not by their mere existence ;— inasmuch as we find that when the fnel is wet (and can- not burn), it does not accomplish the cooking.
60-61, “Ifthe capability (of objects) be held to be the cause (of their mutual relations),—then inasmuch as these (capabilities) are, by themselves, immaterial (incorporeal), they cannot, themselves, have any actions; and (in the inactive state, they can be of no use, because) even though they have tlie capability (of burning and thereby accomplishing the cooking), yet, they cannot accomplish the cooking, while they are inactive (i.e. until the fuel becomes active, and burns, it cannot accomplish the cooking). is the Bhévand; and this Bhavana is expresed by the Verbal affix; and hence inasmuch as the primary element of the meaning of the Sentence 18 expressed by the Verb, it 18 this latter that constitutes the Sentenoe; the other words serving only as qualifica- tions to the verbal affix, and ag such being only secondary elements in the Sentence. This theory is rejected on the gronnd that even though Words may serve to give us an idea of the relation between the action and agents (denoted by the verb and the nouns in the Sentence) yet they do not point out any relation hetween such action and agents as really exist in the outer world. For in certain cases we only have linked together in a Sentence, a certain verb, and some nouns, which may quite reasonably have a Verbal relation; but which can have uo relation in the actual existing state of things as exemplified in the following Karika.
61.60 “ Proximity ’—Proximity cousists of Sequence, and as such is weaker that Direct Assertion. In the present case the Direct Assertion of the Instrumental rejects the prowimity.
^ 45 for the objects themselves, &o.’’—The sense is thus explained in the Kagika :— The mere fact of the words being heard together does not establish any relation among the objects denoted by them, because such utterances as, ‘‘ wet with fire, &c.,”” cannot establish any relation between fire and wetness. And so in the instance in question fuel by itself is not capable of having any relation with the cooking ; consequently the relation between the action and objects accomplishing the object cannot be based upon the passive forms of the objects themselves but upon the active capacities of these objects.
496 CLOKAVARTIKA.
61-62. ‘‘ Even if there be a connection of these (fnel, d&c.) with the cooking, through their (action of) burning, &.—then too, inasmuch as an action (cooking 1.1.) is not capable of being accomplished by another action (of burning, f.i.), it (the connection, that of being the material cause between the fuel and cooking) remains as inaccessible as ever.
62-63. “Nor is any relation (such as that of an immaterial cause with its effect) possible, inasmuch as they (the cooking, and the burning) inhere in different subtrates (the cooking inhering in the rice, and the burning in the fuel). (Nor can burning or the fuel being the Instrumental Cause of cooking, because) that (cooking) which is produced by another cause or meaus (the action of Devadatta, &c.) cannot be said to have another cause (iu the shape of burning, &c.).
63-64. Those (Fuel, Vessel, &c.), that perform the actions of burning, &e. (and as such have independent effects of their own), conld never be the means (Canse proper) of the cooking; and hence, how could there be any connection between cooking and such objects (Fuel, &c.) as are not the cause of it? (Int.—How could they form any single sentence ?).
64-65. “If it he held that the capabilities contained in the burning &c., are indirectly (or secondarily) applied to the cooking (and this would constitute a relation between the two),—then (since the fuel, &c., are the agents of the burning, &c., and it is the capability of the burn- ing that is applied to the cooking), the Fuel, &c., would come to be the agents of the action of cooking, and it would be impossible for them to be instruments (as they really are, the real agents being Dévadatta).
65-66. ““ Becanse in the burning, we are never cognisant of various primary capabilities; and as snch, how could any such capability be found to be applying secondarily at the time of cooking ?
66-67. ^“ Because with the reference to their own actions (of which they are nominative agents), the Fuel, &c., cannot be instrnmeuts. Aud
61.62 The sense of the latter half is that the fnel could be the canse of the cooking, through burning—only if the hnruing were the cause of the cooking. But asa matter of fact the cooking not inhering in the burning this latter is not its cause.
63.64 ^ How could, &c.’"—Since there is no direct relation between them how can they form a Sentence? Because words that denote unconnected objects cannot compose a seutence, the necessary element whereof is that each word must bear some direct relation with another word in the sentence,
65.66 All secondary application is based npon some primary capability. And as a matter of fact, wa know that the Fnel, &c., are not possessed of sach diverse capabilities primarily, as those of the Nominative, the Locative and the Instrnmental. And as they are already cognised in their Instrumental capacity, they oan have no other in the shape of Nominative agency; and hence no snoh capabjlity oould be secondarily applied to the cooking,
ON SENTENCE, 497
we find the actions of softening, burning, holding (belonging respectively to the rice, fuel, and vessel) (and heuce these cannot be the agents of cooking).
67-68. ‘Nor can these (collectively) have any other action (than those enumerated), at the time of the cooking—justas singly each of them has - only one action (and no other). Hence (if they be held to have any action towards cooking) it must be as Nominative agents (which hag been shown to be impossible).
68-69, “And further, inasmuch as burning, &e., are not express- ed by the root ‘pact’ (=to cook), there can be no relation (through burning, &c., between the Fuel, c&c., and Cooking). Because the mere fact of the existence of these (burning, &c.) cannot make them the means of any relation (between Fuel, &c., and Cooking).
69-70. “Nor are these (burning &c.) expressed by any other Words (such as fuel, in the Sentence). Consequently the root ‘ pact’ must be admitted to be denotative of Dévadatta’s action, and as such, could not have any connection with the Fuel, &e.
70-71. “If the root ‘pact’ itself be held to dentoe all the actions (of cooking as well as those of burning, &c.) then, like Devadatta, the Fuel ; &c., would also come to be agents (of the cooking).
71-72. ^“ Because that case is held to be the Nominative, whose action is denoted by the root. (In the present case the root pact denoting the actions of burning, &c., belonging to Fuel and the rest, these latter could not but be accepted to be Nominatives). And since the relation with ˆ Bhavana’ (the conception denoted by the verbal affixes) too 18 equally applicable to all (Fuel, &c.), there can be no other definition of the Nomina- tive (that would not apply to Fuel, &c.).
72-73. “At times we do come across such assertions as ‘the fuelg cook’ (where, in the presence of various ohstacles, the excellent character of the fuel only -helps the accomplishment of the cooking); —and this would not be possible, if we had a definition of Nominative other than the one given above (viz., that whose action is denoted by the Verb),
67.68 Just as for fuel, &c., singly, there is no other action than the one of burning, &c., so collectively too they can have no other action than those mentioned in the last Kariké. And henoe if their actions are secondarily applied to the cooking, they oan only he nominatives and instruments (as they really are).
68-09 Even if there he such a relation, it could not he throngh burning, &.; since these are not even indicated hy any of the words iu the sentence, which therefore can- not express any relation hased npon burning, &e.
11.7% The latter half anticipates the objection that we will define the Nominative as heing that whioh is related to the Bhdvand. The sense of the Karika 18 that even this definition will not meet the difference urged in the former half of the Karika.
63
498 CLOKAVARTIRA.
73-74. “Among the actions expressed by a single root (as cooking, burning, &c., held to be denoted by the root ५८४); there can ke no differ- ence of predominance and subordination (all actions being equally denot- ed); and consequently we cannot define the Nominative as that whose action 18 more predominantly denoted.
74-75. “Thus then, either denotation or non-denotation of all these actions being equally predominant, it is not proper for the agents of these actions (Fuel, &९.) to have, at one time, different case-terminations (as in “ Sthalyam, kashthath, Dévadattah pacati’), and, at others, one and the Same case-termination (vzz., the Nominative, as in ‘ Kashthani pacantt ’).
75-76. “Nor can burning, &c., be held to be denoted by the affix (the tip in pacati); because this (affix) can only denote either the Nomina- tive agent (as held by the Vaiyaékaranas), or the action of the agent (as held by the Mimansaka), Consequently the Verb ‘ pacati’ cannot have any connection with the ‘fuel,’ &c.
77-79. ‘‘The denotation of the root (pact) too is not always con- nected with the denotation of the affix. Because that which is denoted by the affix is the Bhavana (conception); and with regard to this, the root cannot have any such denotation as will serve for either the object or the means (of the Bhdrand),—inasmuch as objectivity is denoted (by the Accnsative as) in ‘Padkam,’ and instrumentality (by the Instrumental) in ‘ Pakéna,’ and none of these is denoted by the simple root-form ‘ pac.’
79-81. “Inasmuch as the Injunction and the Bhavana, are both denoted by the affix, the former becomes connected with the Bhavana, before it comes to be connected with the denotation of the root. And thus, when the Injunction has found its haven in the shape of the Bhavana, even when the denotation of the root comes to be connected with the Sentence, it does not become the object of the Injunction.
81-82. ‘Though the denotation of the root is directly asserted (by the root), yet it conld never be (cognised as) an object of performance;
14.15 If all actions are equally denotable by the root ॐ, then all Fael, &., must have always one and the same case-termination, the Nominative.
11.19 Having shown the impossihiltty of any relation hetween the Verb and the other members of the Sentence, it is now shown that there can be no relation between the meaning of the root and that of the affix.
The Bhavana requires only three factors—the object, the means, and the process ; and none of these being capable of being denoted by the root ‘ paci,’ this latter (the root) cannot haye any relation with the Bhavand which is denoted by the affix,
19.81 It 18 now shown that the Injunction can have no connection with Vedic sen- tences. The Injunction heing more closely related to the Bhivand, naturally becomes conneoted with it and not with the subsequently appearing denotation of the root.
81.52 It is only that which is enjoined thnt can be performed ; and as the meaning of the root yaji has been shown to be unable of being the object enjoined, the yaqa
ON SENTENCE. 499
since activity (or performance) depends upon the Injunction which has been shown not to have the denotation of the root for its object). In the same manner we could show the impossibility of other objects (named in a Sentence), the auxiliaries viz: or subordinate Sacrifices being the objects of Injunction.
82-83. ‘Consequently, we should reject the fact of the Praydjas, &c. being auxiliaries to the Injunction (of the Jyotishtoma); because they have no connection with it (the Injunction), And this want of connection between these may be shown as between ‘White’ and ‘Cow’ (shown above):
83-84, “In that case (of the ‘Cow’ and ‘ White’) however, there may be a connection, in the shape of the object (the white cow); but (in the case of the Praydjas) there cau be no relation between these (and the Injunction), inasmuch as these are cognisable only by means of the various Vedic sentences, which have no connection with one another.
84-85. ‘Thus then, since none of the two (neither connection among the objects denoted by the Words, nor that among the words themselves) are found to have any other grounds, we would have mutual interdepen- dence (if we held that the connection between the various objects denoted by the words occurring in any enjoining passage is,based upon and author- ised by the Word alone). And thus, inasmuch as the Injunction is de- void of the three factors (necessary in the Bhavana), it becomes devoid of any object (since the Bhdvund too cannot, under the circumstances, be the object of the [Injunction which is devoid of the three factors, and as such incapable of any connection with the Bhavana).
could not be performed, And when the yéga, which is denoted by a part of the same word * yajéta,”’ of which the latter particle denotes the Injunction, cannot be the object of the Injanction, nothing else that is foreign to it—such as the soma, or the auxiliary sacrifices, which are expressed by other words—can never be the object of Injnanction. And as such Injaonction ceases to have any relation with Vedic Sentences; and Sacri- fices, &c., can never be recognised as being enjoined by the Veda.
83-84 In the case of the ^“ White Cow,” when one hears this uttered by an old man and sees a cow brought by another man, one can come to recognise ॐ connection be- tween whiteness and the cow; but in this case, the cognition of the connection is based not only apon the Word bat upon this as aided by Sense-perception, Inference, &c. In the case of the Praydjas, however, these are not amenable to any other means of know- ledge, bat the Word; and the Word, by itself, has been shown to be incapable of denot- ing any relation of these with the Injunction, therefore there can be no means of cog- nising any relation of the Prayajas with the Injunction. Specially as the Sentences mentioning the Praydjas with themselves are various and have no connection among themselves.
84.85 “ Mutual interdependence.’ Because so long as the relation among the objects is not cognised, the meaning of the sentence cannot be cognised. And until the mean- ing of the sentence is cognised, the connection among the objects cannot be cognised; since this connection has no other proof than the Vedic Sentence itself.
500 QLOKAVARTIVA.
85-86. “And this (Injunction) cannot be connected directly (without the intervention of Bhavan@) with the denotation of the root and the objects named (in the sentence); because the Injunction being interrnpted by the Bhavana (on the ground of both being denoted by the affix), the agent cannot engage in (the performance of) those (viz., the denotation of the root, dc.)
86-87. “Thus then, since all verbal connections are based upon the connection between actions and agents, &c. (and these have been proved to be imposible),—therefore all other kinds of relation must be rejected And this rejection would lead to the rejection of all such relationships as those of master and servant, father and son, a man and his friends, &c.
87-88. “Of Verbal prefixes and Nipatas there cannot be any connec- tion with any (factor of the sentence). And as for a relation among themselves, this is never accomplished, as also is the relation of these with nouns, independently (of the verbs to which they are attached).
88-89. ‘Because, unless the particles (known as Verbal affixes) qualify the verb, they do not acquire the character of the ‘ Verbal affix.’ And as for the meaning of the Sentence, they (the Verbal affixes) cannot qualify it,—simply becanse the meaning of the Sentence does not exist (४.९.; until the relation of the various words composing the Sentence have been ascertained, the meaning of the Sentence is not cognised), and as such, for all intents and purposes, 18 10१ est).
89-90. “If the relation of Verbal affixes, &c., be held to be throngh the Verb,—-then (we reply) such relation with the Verb is not possible for that which is nota Karaka (that is, a noun having one of the six case-ter- minations). And (Verbal affixes are not Kdarakas, becawse) a Nonn (or Karaka) cannot signify (or define) an object (which has no existence) (and Verbal affixes do not signify any objects at all).
90-91. ‘‘As a matter of fact, these (Verbal affixes, &c.) cannot have a qualifying capacity, inasmuch as they do not, and cannot, produce any positive effect upon the objects denoted by other words; because all that the Verbal affix, &c., are capable of doing is either to be meaningless, or change the original meaning (of the word to which they happen to be prefixed), or establish a meaning contrary to the original meaning.
91-92. “In ‘pralambaté,’ &., the prefix (pra) is meaningless (the meaning of pralambaté being the same as that of lambaté). In ‘ prasdda,’ the original meaning (of the root sad—to sit) is changed (into Favour,
86.88 The object engaged in must be the object enjoined; and the root-deno- tation cannot be such an object, on acoonnt of the Injunction having heen interrupted and located within itself by the Bhdvand, whioh has the strongest claim to it, on the ground of both being denoted by the Verbal affix
ON SENTENCE. 501
Kindness, &c.). And the meaning of ‘ pratishthate” (starts) is contrary (to the meaning of tishthati—sits).
92-93. “That alone, which adds something to the original meaning (of a word) without, in any way, affecting it to the contrary,—can be held to be a qualification; and not that which destroys (and completely alters) the original meaning (as the Verbal affixes do).
93-94, ‘“Hven in the case of such prefixes as signify such non-contra- dictory qualifications as ‘direction towards’ and the like (as in the case of udgacchati, &c.), these specifications belong to the agent (because it is the agent who is qualified by the Abhimukhya, and not the Verb); and as such, they cannot be held to form part of (or belong to) the denotation of the Verb,
94-95. “And with the agent, the Verbal affix can have no relation. And inasmuch as it (the Verbal affix) is distinct from the three factors (of the end, the means and the procedure), it cannot have any relation with the Bhavand.
95-96. “And further, in the case of negative and alternative Verbal prefixes and nipdias, any relation would only be a contradiction ,—becanse for those who hold the reality of external objects, such prefixes, &c., signify objects contrary (to those originally signified by the simple word without the prefix, &c.).
96-97. “Because by its own significant word, an object 18 denoted in its positive form; and as such, how can it be relegated to negativity by means of the negative prefixes, 4९. ?
97-98. ‘Because between the two direct assertions (‘jar’ and ‘non-jar ’) there is a contradiction, as between ‘is’ and ‘is not.’ And in the case of the alternative nipata (‘or,’ &c.) there is contradiction in a single word (a single word ‘ or,’ signifying two contradictory objects).
98-99. “Of these (verbal prefixes) there are no independent
95-96 Negative prefixos, &९.) signify an ohject contrary to the one signified by tho original word withont such prefix; and as such these prefixes cannot be said to be re- lated tothe originally signified objects—for such would bea mere contradiction, the prefix ‘not’ signifying the non-going and yet being related to going.
96-97 1f it be not held to be related to the jar, then the very natnre of this latter would be perverted; and this perversion of character cannot be held to bea case either of qualification or relation.
97.98 In the Agsertion “Jar or Cloth,” the “or” helonge equally to both; and as such simultaneously signifying two contrary objects, it is a contradiction in itself. |
98.99 Prefixes have no meaning of their own. The meaning of a Sentence is held to be made up of the meanings of the words composing it. Hence in the sentence “White Cow,” the meaning of the sentence ie that whioh is made up of the meaning and of the two words. And inasmuch ae both ‘these words have meanings of their own, each of them comes to have a certain relation with the Sentenoe as a whole through their
502 CLOKAVARTIKA.
significations, as we have of the words ‘cow’ and the like; and hence the meaning of the Sentence could not contain any such denotation (of the pre- fixes independently), through which they (the prefixes, &c.) would be con- nected in the Sentence.
99-100. ‘Since, later on, the Bhashya denies the fact of all the words of a Sentence collectively being the means (of cognising the meaning of the Sentence),—therefore the assertion of the Bhashya that the meaning of the sentence is cognised when all the words have been uttered—must be taken as showing (or indicating) the incapability of each individual word (to denote the meaning of the sentence).
100-101. “On the ground of the non-relation of the denotations of Words, as shown above, the collective denotability of Words is asserted to be non-existing, even though it seems to exist—because (on being duly considered) such collective denotability is not cognised.
101-102. “If each word inidvidually were to constitute the meaning of the sentence, then the ground (on which the meaning of the sentence 18 songht to be based) becomes inconclusive (doubtful) (becanse any indivi- dual word may be common to any number of sentences, and as such it could not invariably point to the meaning of any one particular Sentence). And if the meaning of the Sentence be held to be based upon the meaning of the Words taken collectively, then, since any particular combination of Words (forming a Sentence) is not perceived anywhere else, (such collec- tive denotation cannot be sufficient ground (for the meaning of the Sen- tence), inasmuch as, being unique, it cannot serve as the basis of any
specifio denotations. The prefixes, however, have no independent significations of their own; and as such there is no means by which they could become related to the Sentence or its meaning.
99.100 In order to show the groundlessness of the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence, the Bhashya has asserted that in the sentence, ^^ Agnihotram juhuyat svarga- kamah,” none of the words signify that Heaven follows from Agnihotra; and then again it follows with the assertion that ^ this meaning is got at when all the words of the Sentence have been uttered.” These two assertions appear mutually contradictory. Becanse the latter assertion shows that all the words are the ground for the idea of the meaning of the Sentence, which the former assertion seeks to prove to he groundless. It is this contradiction that the Karika refers to and explains. The explanation is that the latter 18 not a final assertion, becanse snch collective denotability is rejected later on; what it means is simply that the words individually are incapable of denoting the mean- ing of the Sentence.
100.101 The Bhishya denies the collective function of words. Butin face of indi- vidnal recognition of such collective donotability, this denial seems to be nnreasonable. The Karika explains this seeming oontradiction. It means that thongh the mutual relation among the meanings of words appears to exist, yet on careful enquiry, it is found that there is no such relation, and hence no collective denotativeness of words in @ sentence,
ON SENTENCE. 503
argument (just as the smell of the earth being unique in the earth alone, cannot prove anything with regard to any other thing).
102-103. ^ One who holds that the meaning of the sentenco is the meaning of the component words taken collectively, will also have some syntactical meaning out of such a sentence as ‘ Cow, Horse, Hlephant, &.’
103-104. “The meaning that the Word has when alone 18 not abandoned when it appears with other words. For if a word were to abandon its original meaninz, then we could never have any trusf in any Word and meaning.
104-105. ‘And (inasmuch as words only denote classes, when two or three words are uttered fogether) all that we could get from them would be the idea of two or three classes; because even when many words are uttered, they cannot denote particular individuals.
105-107. “If it be held that the Sentence denotes its meaning directly, independently of the meanings of the component Words, —then there would be no perceptible use for any cognition of the meaning of the Words. And hence even snch people as have not understood the meaning of the Words would directly cognise the meaning of the Sentence (which is an 171 [00881 bility). And if (in order to avoid this yon hold that) one stands in need of a cognition of these (meaninngs of words) then these would come to be the means (of the meaning of the Sentence). And this has already been ex- plained (to be impossible on the ground of the absence of any connected relation among the Words). Thus then, we find that there is no possibility of any ground for the cognition-of the meaning of a Sentence.
108-109. “Thus then, it must be admitted that the cognition of the meanings of hnman utterances could be brought about by a cognition of the relation of) objects denoted (by the component words)—({which relation of external objects is cognised by means of right notiou, sense-perception, &c., than the Words); and the meaning of Vedic sentences cannot but be groundless (inasmuch as the objects talked of in the Veda are not amenable to the other meaus of right notion, and it has been shown above that any cognition of the meanings of the component words alone cannot bring about a cognition of the meaning of the Sentence). Or, the deno- tation of the Vedic sentences may be based upon connections laid down by men, like the (conventional) denotations of such words as ‘ Gund, ‘Vrddhi, &c., (laid down by Panini as signifying certain accents, &c.). Or, lastly, it may be that the Vedic sentences have uo meaning at all— what they are made to signify is really non-existing,—being kept up hy the sacrificial priests (for the sake of emolnments accruing to themselves, from the performance of sacrifices, said to be enjoined by the Veda).”
109-110. ‘And with reference to this (explanation of the meaning
504 QLOKAVARTIKA.
of Vedic sentences being based upon Convention), it has been asserted (by Inference) that, in that case, being a conglomeration (of facts), like any common story, the Veda (as based upon Convention) must be a human production. And (under the circumstances), since we do not know of any trustworthy person as being its author (2.९.) of the Veda), (as we find in the case of ordinary human assertions made by persons known to be trust- worthy), the Veda must be admitted to be invalid (groundless and false.)”’
Reply to the above :—
110-111. Though we have no other ground (for the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence), yet we perceive that the meanings of the words (composing the Sentence) are such grounds,—inasmucli as the cognition of the meaning of a Sentence appears only when there is a cognition of the meanings of the words.
111-112. Itis true that it is not possible for the Sentence (as a whole, independently of the Words) to express any meaning ; because, inasmuch as the cognition of its meaning is otherwise explained (as being based upon the meanings of Words), it is altogether unwarrantable to assume an independent denotative capacity in the Sentence (as a whole, apart from the words composing it).
112-113, It is extremely difficult even to assume the denotativeness of the Word to lie in its component Letters (though even this has been proved to be impossible). And as for the denotativeness of the Sentence lying in the Sentence, it would be much more difficult to assume this inasmuch as one word disappears (as soon as it is uttered, and does not continue till the whole Sentence has been uttered); and if we assume the denotativeness of the Sentence to lie in the Letters composing the Words making up the Sentence, we would have to recall the innumerable Letters long disappeared = (६.९. 1u recalling the past W ords of the sentence we would have to recal! the Letters composing these Words).
114-115. And further (in thus assuming), we would have to assnme a further function (than the denotation of the meanings of words) of those (Letters) that have already had their use in (denoting) the meanings of words (composed by them). And by this we would also be rejecting
110.111 With this begins the explanation of Sztra I—i—25 with which the Sutra he- ging its reply to the ahove objections, detailed in Karikas I—110.
114.116 While there is this immediate sequence hetween the denotation of words and that of the sentence, the cognition of Letters composing the Word is followed first hy the oognition of Words, which is then followed hy that of the Sentence-meaning. And as such it is qnite unreasonable to assume the causality of the cognition of Letters which is one step removed, neglecting that of the words, whioh is followed immediately by the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence.
ON SENTENCE. 505
the recognised capability of Words (to denote the meaning of the Sentence) and, as a matter of fact, the meaning of the Sentence cannot forego the causality of the Words, inasmuch as there is a denotation of the Words and also that of the Sentence (the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence following immediately after that of the Word meanings).
115-116. (If it be held that the denotation of the Sentence is cognised by means of the impressions left by the Letters composing the Words, then) How could a single impression (left by the Letters) bring about two effects (the cognition of the meaning of the Words; and that of the meaning of the Sentence)? Nor are we cognisant of any other Impression (left by the Letters) than the previous one, which gives ns the idea of the (Words and their meanings).
116-118. Nor isa review of the past Letters possible at the time of the utterance of the last Letter (of the Sentence); inasmuch as such a review is rendered impossible by the interveution of the cognitions of the Words and their connection with the Sentence. Therefore the cognition of the Sentence, (and its meaning) as a single corporate whole cannot be of the form of the remembrance of the Letters (composing the Words of the Sentence) as previously heard (at the utterance of the Words). And for the same reason it cannot be held (as it is by the Vaiyakaranas) that the Sentence really is of the form of the Sentence itself (considered as a whole in itself, irrespective of the Words or Letters composing it).
118-119. By tho idea of a “Sentence” we do not comprehend the specific form of the Senteuce (irrespective of the meaning); nor can the idea of the meaning of the Sentence bring about the cognition of its specific form (irrespective of objects as actually existing in the external world);—both these facts having been shown to he impossible, under (° Canyavada.”
119-120. Those theorists, who hold the Sentence and its denotation to consist in single wholes (in the shape of sphota)—some of them hold- ing such sphota to have an external existence, and others confining it to the mental idea of these alone—, will have to assert, without any grounds, the falsity of the separate cognitions (that all men have) of the sever- alcomponent parts (of the Sentence and its denotation). For, even if one were to assume the falsity (of certain well-known facts and objects, such as the idea of the parts of the Sentence, &c.), this (mere assumption
116.118 The Kariké admits the statement made in the objection, that the Sentence 28 a whole is not denotative of the meaning of the Sentence, and also that it cannot be held that there is a Sphota of the Sentence which is denotative of its meaniug, this Sphota being irrespective of the Words and Letters and their mutual relations, &c.
64
506 GLOKAVARTIKA.
without any reasons) could not reject the (actual) cognition (that people liave) of the object itself.
121-122. The Words themselves, cognised as having only a slight capability (of denoting their own specific meanings), are capable of making up an endless number of Sentences, through the inclusion (of some) and exclusion (of others), and through the various combinations (of the words). And when the matter (of Sentences and their denotations) can be explained on the ground of these slight capabilities (of the words), it 18 quite unreasonahle to assume greater (and further) capabilities (of the Sentences) (as would be necessitated by those holding the signification of a Sentence to belong to the Sentence as a whole, irrespective of the Words). And (since the denotation of the Sentence can be explained on the ground of the denotations of the Words) therefore no Apparent Incon- sistency could authorise an endless number of Sentences and their deno- tations.
123-124. It cannot be urged (as it is done by the Vaiyakaranas) that the idea of parts (in a Sentence) is a mistaken one, dne to similarity (of the sounds manifesting the Sentences). Because, you do not recognise the primary parts of any Sentence, either apart from itself or in any other Sentence, inasmuch as you hold all Sentences to be impartite wholes. And it is among such parts as have a reality of existence, that there could be similarity or dissimilarity. (And as you deny such reality you cannot base any ideas upon similarity of these).
125-126. In the case of Narasiiha, (which is the instance cited by the Vaiyakarana) there is a partial similarity (with the man and the lion) because there are two such classes (of animals, as Man and Lion), And hence in this case, the parts perceived in the body of Narasinha have a previous and separate existence in the two classes,—some parts of each appearing (in the body of Narasinha) and others being absent {there- from). The hands, 4८.) are found to separately resemble those of the
121-28 “ Greater capabilities, Sc.’—becanse euch theorists will have to 98801018 & distinct capability for each separate Sentence over and above the capability of the Words. A certain nnmber of words oan constitute many sentences; and one who holds the capability of words alone will base all denotationus of the words as could be made up by the various combinations of the words, on the capability of words alone. Whereas ore who admits the Sphota will have to assume a separate capability for each separate sentence; because, for him, the denotability of the Sentence is irrespective of the Words
125.24 The Vaiyakaranas hold that the sound manifesting each sentence is distinct But in two sentences where oertain words are common, the sounds are much eimilar; and as snch there arises a notion of the Sentences having certain parts similar to those of the other sentenoes, and certain dissimilar parts. This gives rise to the idea of a Sentence having parts,
ON SENTENCE. 507
human body; and we have a separate cognition of all these (parts, hands &c.), in the various human bodies we have seen.
127. Hence the idea of the sameness of these (as appearing in the body of Narasiiha, and in any ordinary human body) may be explained as being due either to similarity or to the sameness of the class to which these, hands, &e., belong. And hence there is a likelihood of the recog- nition (of the hands, &c., of Narasiiha as being those seen in a human body).
128, And then, if you hold the recognition of the similarity of the parts of Sentences to be like this (similarity of the limbs of Narasinha),— then the reality of the existence of parts being thereby established, the assumption of Sentences being without parts becomes false.
129. The similarity, that one would assume, of a non-existent object with another non-existent object, would be exactly like the similarity of the horns of the Hare with those of the Ass!!!
130. If you hold that here too (in the case of non-existent things), there is a similarity of non-existence (which is common to all non-existent things), then such similarity would exist among all Sentences; inasmuch as, according to you, the parts of all Sentences are equally non-existent and as such, no two Sentences would ever be dissimilar.
131. In the case of an object of variegated colour, we see its various parts, as black, &c., severally; and in the case of wine, (having the sweet as well as the bitter taste) we cognise oné part (the bitter) to be similar to other objects (which are altogether bitter).
132. In the case of a mixed cognition, we are not cognisant of its parts. It 18 the object of that cognition which is variegated, and the object has parts also (therefore the case of the mixed cognition will not serve as an instance for you).
133. Therefore the notion of similarity with regard to Words and Letters cannot be based upon non-existence. Nor can there be, for you, any such similarity, (based upon parts) in a Sentence, inasmuch as you do not admit of any parts (of Sentences, which in your opinion, form com- plete wholes in themselves, in the shape of Sphoia).
184. Even if the Sentences were similar to one another (even in the absence of any parts of these), there could not be a detaching of Letters
182 The other side has urged as an instance that in the case of a mixed cognition, we have an idea of parts, even though really it has no parts; in the same manner thongh the Sentence has no parts in reality, yet it is cognised as having parts; and as suoh this cannot serve as an instance for the case of the sentence.
184 Ag a matter of fact we know of such instances as the detaching of one Word from @ sentence and the insertion of another,in its place, All this could not be if the
508 CLOKAVARTIKA.
and Words (from Sentences}. Hence there could not be an inclusion and ex- clusion (of Words), (as laid down by the Vaiyakaranas themselves), inasmuch as there would be no substrates of these (since for you, there are no such things as parts of Sentences, in the shape of Words, &c.)
135. Nor, in the absence cf Words and Letters as making up the Sentence, can you have any diversity of the manifesting (sounds of Sentences), cn which diversity you could base the apparent notions cf diversity in Sentences. Because Sounds (manifesting the Sphota of the Sentence according to you) are held tc be subtile (and hence imperceptible in themselves, and hence incapable of having their diversity perceptible).
136. (Being atomic themselves) the Scunds cannot produce any perceptible effects other than the atomic. Consequently, we could have cognitions only of the atomic factor of the Words (and we could never have any perception of Words as they are ordinarily known).
137. Even though there be diversity and sequence among the sounds, yet these sounds could ०७६ bring about any such (diverse and sequential) manifestation,—on account of the absence (according to you) of these (diversity and sequence) in the objects to be manifested (in the Sentences, which you hold to he impartite wholes).
138. (According to your thecry) you could have either the simul- taneous cognition of the whole Sentence (as a whole) cr no cognition at all. Because befcre the whole Sentence has been uttered, there is nothing fer you to cognise (inasmuch as you do nct hold words to form paris of the Sentences).
139. And (another difficulty that you will have is that) a single Sen- tence (‘‘the cloth is”) may he a complete sentence (at one time, by itself); and the same, when standing in need of something else (such as the asser- tion of the redness of the cloth), would be deficient (as wanting the asser-
Sentence wers 0116 inpartite whole. Becanse in your opinion the parts of sentences are non-sxisting; and there oan be no insertion or exclusion of non-existent entities.
186 The Vaiyakaranas hold that the Sounds manifestive of the Sentences are diverse and are endowed with a certain order of seqnencs; and it is these that bring about the notion of partiteness and sequence with regard to sentenoes which in reality havs no parte and no seqnence: The Karika shows that thie cannot be; inasmuch as the sounds held to be manifestive of the Sphota of sentences are subtile; and as such cannot have any diversity perceptible. Hence the apparent diversity in ths sentence cannot be due to the diversity of the sounds,
188 Thongh as a matter of fact, even when a certain sense is left incomplete, we do not comprehend ths worde that may have been nttered till then.
189 The opponent cannot assert that the Word expressing redness may be added to the Sentencs—hbeoause one who doss not admit of parts of the Sentencs oannot have these additions and subtractions, as shown above.
ON SENTENCE. 509
tion of redness); and this would be a contradiction; inasmuch as the same Sentence cannot be both complete and incomplete (deficient).
140. If it be assumed that the Sentence of three words, known to have a separate existence hy itself, does not exist in the Senteuce of four Words,—then the tree could be said not to exist in the forest.
141. If it be held that, “the Sentence (of three Words—‘ Bring white cow’) is other (than the Sentence of four words, ^ Devadatta, bring white cow”), because it is known to have a separate existence, and because it has a reality (by itself apart from the other Sentence,”—then Words and Letters too would come to be other than the Sentence (composed of these) (inasmuch as the words making up one Sentence are known to have an existence elsewhere also, and have a reality apart from the individual Sen- tence).
142. Therefore, just as the existence of smaller Sentences cannot be denied in a large Sentence (made up of these smaller Sentences) ,—so, in the same manner, the notions of Words and Letters cannot 06 said to be non-existent, in the cognition of Sentences (made up of these Words and Letters).
143. If it be urged that, “since these (Words and Letters) are never used alone by themselves (but only in Sentences; and hence they may he taken to be as good as non est),’—then the smaller Sentence too is used only in the bigger Sentence (and as such the former may also be non est). If it be urged in reply that the smaller Sentence is used to denote its own small meaning,—then, (we reply,) the Words too are used to denote their own meanings.
144. Though Words and Letters hy themselves are never found to form part of ordinary usage (४,९.) though they are never used as such by themselves) yet they have an existence of their own (apart from any Sen- tence), when the speaker wishes to use a single word.
145. When, on having cognised a certain specific fact, one wishes to express only the meaning of a word, he uses either the Word singly or a single Letter with some meaning.
146. At the time of studying (getting up) a certain book, one has re-
140 One who denies the fact of Words and Letters making up Sentences, must hold that the Sentence “Bring white cow” being a complete Sentence in itself, does not exist in the Sentence ‘‘ Devadatta, bring white cow.’ And if this were true, then, nasmuch as the tree in the forestis complete in itself, it could not be said to exist in the forest. This 18 as absurd as the other.
145 On being asked ‘ Who is coming ?’ the reply is simply ‘the King;’ or on being asked ‘ Who is the husband of Lakshmi?’ the reply is ‘A,’ १.९, Vishnu.
146 What the student fixes in his memory, first of all, are the Words and Letters by themselves. The getting up of the Sentences comes next.
510 CLOKAVARTIKA,.
course chiefly to the ascertainment (and remembrance) of Words and Letters, apart (from the Sentences composed of them).
147. And when, in such cases, these (Words and Letters) have been known to have an (independent) existence of their own,—such existence can never subsequently be denied; because the cognition of the denotation of the Sentence does not in any way contradict (८.९.) is inconsistent with) the independent forms of these (Words and Letters, as having an indepen- dent existence of their own).
148. Though these (Words and Letters) singly have not the power to bring about the coguition of the denotation of the Sentence, yet their existence remains uncontroverted,—just as the existence of the wheel even when (apart from the chariot and the horse) is by itself incapable of action (motion). |
149. Thus then the fact of not being used by itself (which you urge as 9, premiss to prove the non-existence of the Word) becomes 10९01619 - sive. The fact of those (wheel, &c.) being seen to exist even in the absence of the action (motion), has been shown to apply to the case of Words also (since these also are seen to exist apart from the Sentence). (So on this ground too, the cases of the Wheel and the Word are not dissimilar).
150. The counterblast (by the adversary) that,—“if there be an existence of Words and Letters (as parts of the Sentence), then there
i47 When the Worde have been known to have an independent existence apart from the Sentence, the denotation of the Sentence cannot in any way reject their existence.
148 Though the wheel cannot move, yet it exiets all the same. In the same manner, though the Words, by themselves, are incapable of giving the meaning of the Sentencee, yet their independent existence continues all the same.
149 The argument advanced by the opponent ie—‘ Words have no existence, be- cause they cannot ‘be used by themeelves,” and this argument is rendered doubtful and inconclnueive—incapable of giving the desired conolasion—with a view tothe well- known faot of certain well-known objects— as the wheel &c., which are known to be incapable of action by themselvee and yet have an independent existence of their own.
160 The advereary’s argument herein referred to ie that, jnet 88 Words have an inde- pendent existence as parts of the Sentence, 80 too will the Letters, as parte of the Word, have an independent existence of their own. And so with the parts of the Letters 88 well; so on and on, ad infinitum. And in order to avoid this endlessneee, you will have to reat upon some impartite entity ; then when it does become necessary to admit of an impartite entity in the end, why not admit of it in the beginning, admitting the Sentence to be such an entity, thne doing away with the necessity of parts, Words, &o.?
“As in the case of atoms.”—-Thatis, in the case of the jar, people go on assuming partite entities up to the atom where they rest; and those that oppose this thery of atome assert that when you have to admit an impartite entity, why not admit the jar itself to be suoh an entity, thus doing away with all the series of parts over parts?
ON SENTENCE, 5811
would also be an independent existence of the parts of these (Words and Letters) also; and thus (going on ad infinitum) we would have to ac- cept the non-existence of all of these as in the case of atoms,’—can onby serve to frighten children.
151. Because, just as even when there are (such) ultimate (parts as) atoms (of the cloth), the threads, &c. (as intermediate parts of the cloth, to the downward series of its parts up to atoms) have an established ex- istence,—so, in the same manner, even if there be parts (over parts of the Letters, &c.), this fact does not militate against the existence of the Let- ters (as intermediate parts of Words and Sentences).
152. And further, because a certain object is found to be partite, it does not necessarily follow that all its parts must also have parts; becanse though the jar isa partite object, yet the atom (of the jar) has no parts.
153. Thus then, the diversity of Werds and Letters (in a Sentence) having beon held to be amenable to Sense-perception, the “ Apparent Incon- sistency” (Impossibility) of the parts of Letters cannot reject it.
154. The adversary has cited the case of ‘‘Root-Forms” (original forms of Words) and “affixes” as instances proving the non-existence (of Words and Letters: independently of the Sentence). And these instan- ces are not sound, inasmuch as people are cognisant of the independent existence of these (Roots and Affixes). |
155. It cannot be said that grammatical words mention (Root-forms and Affixes by themselves only as showing) certain grammatical processes (and not as expressing the forms of these independently by themselves). Because the independent forms of these (Root-forms, Affixes, &ec.) are directly perceptible (by the Senses); and so (perceptible) is also the denotation of these, just like any other denotations (of Words or Senten- ces).
156. Because in a Word (‘‘vrkshéna,” 1.1.) the root-form (“vrk- sha’’) and the affix (the instrumental ‘‘ta”’) are recognised distinctly one
164 The adversary’s syllogism is—‘‘ Words aud Letters have no existence,—because they can never be used by themselves,---just as Roots, Affixes, &c.” And the Karika means that since we are cognisant of the independent existence of Roots, &., the exist- ence of these cannot prove the independent non-existence of Words and Letters. In fact, in rules of grammar Roots and Affixes are very often mentioned by themselves.
156 When “Vrkshéna” is uttered we have first of all a cognition of the original simple word “ Vrksha ” 28 denoting the tree; and then follows the cognition of the case— ending ta signifying sizgularity and instrumentality. Thus, as the two ‘are perceived distinctly one after the other, and their denotations too are coguised distinotly one after the other, they canuot but be admitted to have distinct independent existences of their own,
512 CLOKAVARTIKA.
after the other (since at 0186 we have an idea of the simple noun “vrksha,” and then of the instrumental and singular affix). And the denotations of these too, appearing on their own appearance, are also cognised distinct- ly, one after the other.
157-159. The denotations of these (basic nouns and affixes) are cog- nised distinctly also through affirmative and negative concomitance; inas- much as we find that while the affixes—am sud the rest—appear and disappear (1.e., even when the affixes are being changed) the denotation of the basic noun (“vrksha’’ f.i.) continues the same. As for instance, in the two words “‘vrksham” and ‘“‘urkshéna,” the class “vrksha” (be- ing the denotation of the simple basic noun ‘vrksha”) remains the same, while the accusative character (denoted by the am in the former word) disappears (in the latter), and in its place appears the instru- mentality (denoted by the ¢@in “vrkshéna”’). (So much for the distinct cognition of the denotation of the Affixes apart from the basic noun ; now as regards that of the denotation of the basic noun, apart from that of the Affixes). In the same manner, in the two words ‘“‘crksham”’ and “‘ghatam,” the accusative character (denoted by the am present in both words) continues the same, while the denotation ‘of the Word ‘orksha” disappears (in the latter), and that of the word “ghata” appears in its place.
160. Hence (it must be admitted that) the denotation (of a word or affix, or a sentence) is that which always accompanies (is invariably con- comitant with) these (Word, é&c.). Andin order to explain this otherwise inexplicable fact, we conclude the existence of such potentiality (of denota- tion) in them (i.e, Word, &.).
161. Though in the case of such Words as ‘‘yupa,” “kipa,” &e., the particle ‘‘apa” is common, yet there is no distinct denotation (of this com- mon particle) which would be common to both words (as the “vrksha”’ is in the words “wrkham’’ and “vrkshéna’’); and that this is so does not militate against Words (and as such the above fact cannot militate
against the partite character of words).
167.169 This shows that we are cognisant of the denotations of affixes apart from those of the hagic nonna, and ४६८८ versa,
161 The objection answered in this Karika is this:—“Ifthe Word ‘ Vrksha’ being common to the two words ‘‘ Vrksham,” and) < Vrkshéna,” has a distinot denotation of its own—the particle pa being common to the two words wonld also have a distinct signi- fication of ita own; and inasmnob 88 this is not the 0886, the distinct signification of the word ‘Vrksha’ should also be rejected; and hence also the fact of Words and Senten. ces being partite.’ The sense of the reply is that the mere fact of any common particle not giving a distinct meaning cannot strike against the denotativeness and partite oharac-
ter of all words.
ON SENTENCE. 513
162. Because mere concomitance—either affirmative or negative— cannot bring about the cognition of any altogether new denotation (never kuown before). All that is done by these (affirmative and negative con- comitances) is that, when a certain number of denotations appear to he connected (with a Word), they serve to restrict the (denotative) poten- tiality (of the Word) to one of them.
168. Thus then, a Word (“vrkshéna,” 1.1.) being of a variegated form (containing the basic noun “‘vrksha” and the instrumental case-ending (४2 71), and as such, signifying a variegated meaning (the tree and instrumentality) that meaning which is cognised at the appearance of a certain factor of such a word, is ascertained to be the specific denotation of that factor 1.1.) instrumentality being cognised only on the appearance of the affix ta, this affix is ascertained to have instrumentality for its specific denotation),
164. Though the dust, really appearing and disappearing on the ap- pearance and disappearance of herds of cows and horses, 4९.) may, for once, be found to be accompanied by (concomitant with) a line of ants (which may be passing by at that time),—yet it (the dust) is not the denotation thereof (of the line of ants); inasmuch as this has not the potentiality (of such denotation).
165. Among all big animals, such as elephants, horses, &c., we find a common cause of (throwing) dust, in the shape of their being hard bodied animals,—characterised by combination and distribution (producing an increase and decrease respectively in the quantity of dust thrown ont).
169 If the meanings of words were to be produced by such concomitance, then the presence of upd in y#pa and दद्द would lead to the conclusion that it has a meaning. But as a matter of 1806 concomitanoe 18 incapable of producing meanings. The only use of concomitance lies in this that, as for instance, on hearing the word “ Vrkshéna,” we find that the Word “Vrksha” may denote the tree or instrwmentality ; and then snbsequently finding the word “ Vrksha” to he preseut in “Vrksham,” and knowing that this word is the accusative form of ^“ Vrksha,” and the former is the instrumental form—and again finding that in “ Ghaténa,” though the instrumental affix is the same, the noun “Vrksha”’ is absent,—we conclude that instrumentality must be the deno- tation of the affix t@; and the tree only the denotation of the word “ Vrksha.”
163 Concomitance only serves to regulate the potentiality of words, &o., among al- ready existing meanings. ष
164 Tf mere concomitance were the ground of denotation, then in a case where dust has been thrown by the movement of cows, &c., if २ line of ants happen to pass by, we conld have the line of ants denotative of the dust, which is absurd.
165 It cannot he objected that, sinoe dust is seen to be thrown out by elephants also, cows, &0., cannot be the cause of the dust. Because it is not only certain animals that are its cause; but all hard-bodied animals—cows, borses, elephants all—are the canse of dnst-storms, inasmuch as they are all hard-bodied; and another gronnd for asserting these animals to be the canse of dust is that an inorease in the number of animals moving about brings about an inorease in the quantity of dust thrown
05
514 CLOKAVARTIKA,
166. And further, asa matter of fact, we find the'line of ants even without any dust;—hence even thongh it (the line of ants) may exist together with the elephants, &c., (causes of the dust), yet it cannot be the cause of it (the dust).
167. Basic Nouns and Affixes never being used separately by them- selves (apart from one another),—-just as their (separate) denotations are never seen, 80 also their non-denotability (separately, each by itself) can never be seen (hence it is as reasonable to assert their denotability as non- denotability). `
168. Objection :—-“In the case of Nouns and Verbs, we find, in certain cases (exemplified below in K. 169—178), that when they are taken in their complete forms they, do not invariably and necessarily give the desired meaning only, and when taken in their deficient forms (or even when these Words themselves are absent) (then too the desired meaning is expressed all the same); (and hence), it is found that their deuotability of an invariable definite meaning is impossible,—this impossibility being based upon the fact of the (denotations really belonging to) other Words and Sentences (४.९. the impartite Words and Sentences, in the shape of the Sphota of these).
169. ‘‘As instances of the incapability of words to express any defi- nite meaning, when they are taken in their complete forms, we have
ont, and so with decrease also. And it is 8 commonly acknowledged fact that a deorease or inorease in any effect, is bronght abont only by deorease or increase in its cause. And as the quantity of dust thrown abont is seen toincrease and decrease, according as the number of animals increases and decreases (as combining together or becoming dispersed),—therefore these animale must be admitted to he the canse of the dust. [It is to be noted that the ant is not a hard-bodied animal].
166 It is only an invariable and necessary antecedent that is a canse; and eince the ant is seen even without the dust, and the dust is seen without the ants, these latter oan never be the cause of the dnat.
161 We see the ants in the absence of the dust. But we never see either the hasio noun nsed withont the affix, or the affix used withont the basio nonn; hence it is as reasonable to assert that they have separate meanings, 88 to hold that they have no euch meaning. But we find that they have distinct denotations, as shown in Karikas 157 et. seg. Therefore there can be no ground for asserting their separate non-denota- tiveness,—while for asserting their separate denotativenesa, there are many grounds, as detailed in Karika 157, &c. Hence it must be admitted that even basio nouns and affixes have distinot denotations of their own.
168 From here up to K. 181 the Sphotavddi seeks to prove on the ground of the absence of ooncomitance—afirmative and negative—that words and their parts have no expressiveness. The word “ Bhimaséna” denotes Arjuna’s brother, who is also denoted by the word “ Bhima” alone.
169 “Vipra,” &o., are explained in Karikis 170-177; and “Rajni,” &o., in Karika 178
ON SENTENCE. 515
the words ‘Viprah,’ ‘Agvah,’ ‘pacaté,’ ‘ydtam,’ ‘Rajahastinyagat. And (as instances of the meanings of words being expressed even when the Words themselves are either deficient or altogether absent, we have) ‘“ Rajna Dadhyatra Gam,” where the Word (expressing the meaning)— appears in an entirely different form, and as such, (sounding) like another Word altogether. |
170-175. “The word ‘Vipra’ may be taken as consisting of ‘vi’ and ‘pra,’ two verbal prefixes expressing their meanings as such; and it may also be taken as forming a single word ‘Vipra’ denoting the class ‘Brah- mana.’ (Therefore there can be no invariable concomitance between the word ‘Vipra,’ and the expression of any one of these two meanings). Similarly, the word ‘ agvah’ may be a noun (denoting the horse) as well as a verbal form of the First Preterite (Second Person Singular, of the root ‘evas’ to breathe). The word ‘pacaté’”’ may be a verbal form (Present Tense, Third Person Singular); or it may be taken as two words ( paca’ and ‘¢é,’ in which latter case too ‹ 72 ' may be taken as the dual form of the Feminine Pronoun, or the Plural form of the Masculine Pronoun, or the Singular Dative or Genitive of the latter; or the complete word ‘pacat®’ may be the form in the Dative Singular of ‘Pacan’ (the root दलम), ending in the affix gatr (the Present Participle). Again ‘ yatam’ may be the verbal form (of the root ‘ya’) in the Imperative Mcod Second Person Dual,—or it may be read as ‘ayatam’ (when preceded by ‘macaté’), in which case, it would be a form of the same root in the First Preterite, (Second Person Singular); or the word ‘ydiam’ may be taken as a Past Participle (ending in kta, and qualifying a noun), in which case, it may be taken as Accusative Singular in the Masculine, or Nominative Singular (in the Neuter). And ‘Rajahasti’ may be taken as a com- pound (meaning the King’s elephant), or the word ‘Raja’ may be taken as (a separate word) a form of the root Raja in’ the Imperative Second Person. And in ‘Hastinyagat,’ ‘Hastini’ may be taken as the form (of the noun ‘Hasti’) in the Locative Singular (when taken as ending in the short 7), or (when taken as ending in the long 7) it may be taken as a Fe- minine form (in the Nominative Singular). And, lastly, ‘agat’ may he taken as a form of the root ‘gam’ in the Third Preterite (Third Person Singular), or as a form of the noun ‘aga’ (mountain) in the Ablative (Singular); or again ‘agat’ may be taken as a compound, ending in the kvip affix, and signifying one who eats (‘atti’) mountains (Sagan we
176. “Thus then, there being a doubt as to the real meaning (of words,) no definite ascertainment of the meaning of particular words 1s possible. On the other band, if an impartite sentence, in the shape of Sphota be held to be expressive of meanings (independently of the Words)
516 QLOKAVARTIEA.
then there is a definite ascertainment of the meaning, through the sentence 86 a complete whole in itself (in the shape of Sphota.)
177. “Then the meaning that is once found to accompany (06 ex- pressed by) a word, cannot be said to always constitute the only denotation of the word; inasmuch as the same form (of the word, ‘ Vipra,’ f.i.) when taken as a different word (i.e, when interpreted as the two verbal prefixes ४४ and pra,) is seen to be without any meaning at all.
178. ‘‘In the same manner, what 18 known to be significant (of the King) is the word ‘ Raj@;’ and this word is not found in the word ‘ Rajni’ (which too signifies the King). Similarly, the forms of the words ‘ Dadhi’ and ‘ Gauh’ (originally known to be significant of the curd and the cow) do not exist in the expression ‘ Dadhyatra’ and in ‘ Gam’ (though in both these we have the signification of the same objects).
179. ‘And when the relation of acertain meaning (the King, f.i.) has been recognised, with a certain particular word (‘ Raa,’ f.i.), no other words (‘ Rayna’ 07 ` ' Rajnah,’ &c.,) can be held to be expressive (of that meaning). Nor is it possible for us to be cognisant of the relation (of the meaning) with all the modifications (of the original word known to be significant of the meaning),—inasmuch as these modifications are end- less.
180-181. “ Therefore (the fact of the sentence being impartite having been proved).it must be admitted that the complete qualified meaning (of the sentence ) is signified by the Sentence, independently by itself—which is devoid of any meanings (of Words or Letters) on account of the non-signi- fication (by it) of any relations between classes and generic properties (which form the denotations of Words, the denotations of sentences refering to in- dividuals),—and which is also devoid (independent) of Words and its parts, in the shape of the basic nouns, and affixes, &c., &e.;—such independent signification by the Sentence being through the supposed agency of its suppos- ed parts, assumed and laid down as such in grammatical works, for the pur- pose of explaining tbe signification of the sentence to weak-minded persons
118 This explains the instances ^^ Rajna”’ &c. (urged in the second half of Karika 169) which are meant to show that even negative concomitance cannot explain the expreasive- 7688 of words, inasmuch as in the oases cited, the meaning continues to he expressed even when the word known to be expressive of it has ceased to exist, e.g., the word “Raji”? 18 known to signify the King; and the King ocontinnes to he signified even if the word ^ Raji” has been replaced by ^“ Rajna.”
119“ Modifications—snuoh 88 “ Rajni” “ Rajnah,” “ Rajni’? ^ Rajakiya,” &c.,—of the word “ Raja.”
180.181 The sentence ie independent of the words, &c., and the meaning of the sentence is independent of the meanings of the: words; inasmuch as worde signify classes, while sentences refer to individuals.
ON SENTENCE. 614
incapable of comprehending the meaning of the sentence as a complete im- partite whole in itself.”
182. To all this, we make the following reply: In all the above- cited instances (of ‘ Vipra,’ ‘ Agva,’ &c.) the real word is different in each case (the word “ Vipra’”’ as signifying the Brahmana heing different from the same word as made up of the verbal prefixes ० and pra),—this differ- ence being based upon the difference of some property (characteristic) or other,—e.g., in the case of the words “ Jara” and ^“ Raja” the difference is based upon the difference in the order of the Letters (which are exactly the same in the two words.)
183. And as for the purpose of ascertaining the real forms of words, learned people have recourse to many means,—such as Order, Deficiency, ८6655, Accent, Sentence, Remembrance, and Direct Assertion, &c.
184-185. The meanings of certain parts of the sentence having been definitely cognised in their true forms, the others are ascertained as denot- ing meanings in keeping with the former. As for instance, in the case of a word which can be taken both as a noun and a verb,—those, who have already got at the noun by means of other words in the sentence, stand in ueed of a verb, and hence conclude the doubtful word to be a verb; while those who have got the verb elsewhere conclude it to be a noun.
186-187. And again, the human shape being the same in any two persons, the fact of their being a Brahmana, &c., is ascertained by the Re- membrance of their parentage (lit. Father and Mother). In the same manner, the ascertainment of the fact of words being a noun or a verb is due to the Remembrance (smrti) of the rules (laid down by Panini) men- tioning the basic nouns and their affixes (as also verbs and their affixes), ,
188. Objection: ^ But those who are not acquainted with these
184.185 In the cage of the word “pacaté’’—which can be both a verb and a noun (the Dative Singular of ‘‘pacan”),——when it is fonnd in the sentence “ Bhoktu- kamah pacaté” there is a doubt as to whether it 18 to be taken as a noun ora verb; then comes the coguition of the preceding word as a noun, and then in order to.complete the sentence the other word is ascertained to be a verb. While in the sentence ** pacaté dakshinam déhi” the verb being recoguised in ‘ déhi,’ the ‘pacaté’ is ascertained to be a noun (properly as qualifying a noun). This is an instance of the ascertainment of.the meaning of words through Sentence.
186.181 This is an instance of the ascertainment of the meanings of words through Remembrance or Smrti. Whether the word pacaté is a noun or a verb can also be as- certained by knowing whether it is made up of the root pac + té (which are called verhal root and verbal affix respectively by Panini), or by the basic noun pacan + the dative terminatiou (called noun and. case affix, by Panini).
188 The fact of the non-discriminatién of Brahmanahood by those not. knowing the person’s parentage, cannot prove that Brahmanahood is not based npon parentage.
518 CLOKAVARTIKA.
(grammatical) rules could never thus distinguish (between nonns and verbs).” Reply: True: but this objection applies equally to the diseri- mination of the Brahmana, &c., by those who are not acquainted with the parentage of the person concerned.
189. Similarly, sometimes a doubtful word is ascertained (in its ap- plication) by means of Direct Assertion by those persons to whom the fact of certain words being nouns and others being verbs is already well-known; —this ascertainment being due to co-ordination.
190. Obj: “But there could be no such discrimination (of verbs and nouns, specially when the form is the same, as in ‘pacaté’), according to one who does not admit of classes of words (such as the class ‘noun’ &ec.’ And (hence) the same word (‘pacaté,’ f£.1.) could never be cognised as both 2 noun and verb.”
191. Reply: True: but who is such as does not admit of such (distinct) classes, 28 the four kinds of words (“ Noun,” ^ Verb,” ‘‘ Verbal Affixes” and “Trregular Forms”)? In fact (even among parts of words) we have the classes “‘ Declensional Affix,” ‘‘Conjugational Affix,” ^ Nominal Affix,” and “Taddhita Affix,’ as also the classes “Verbal Root,” &c. (“Basic Noun” and the like).
192. Eveu if the word be a single (impartite whole) (in the shape of the class “verb,” &c.),—even then, this fact does not militate against the
In the same manner the fact of the non-discrimination nf ०००७ and verbs by those not acquainted with grammatical rules, cannot prove that the grammatical rules do not regulate the discrimination of nonnsand verba.
189 “ Oo-ordination”—People whoare learned have never any doubts as to whether a word is a verb ora noun. All thedoubt that such people have is with regard to the exact meaning of words—s.g., in the passage ^ udbhidd yajéta” people have danbts as ta whether “ Udbhid,” isthat which sprouts up, or it 18 the name of a certain sacrifice And then they perceive that the word ‘‘udbhidd”’ qualifies—and as such is co-ordinate with—the sacrifice which ia comprehended in the said pasaage aa being the meana of the conception (Bhavana) of cattle—which is directly asserted by the above passage, to be attainable by meane of the “udbhid” saeriice. Thne through Direct Assertion it comes to be ascertained that “ udbhid” 18 the name ofa certain sacrifice which brings about the acquirement of cattle.
190 The aense of the objection is that, “in the case of Brahmanas we are cognisant of suoh different classes; whereas we are not cognisant of any such 0198868 as ‘Noun’ and ‘Verb,’ &c., hence how could the same word be saidtobe both noun and verb; 81०06 all that we are cognisant of is the form of the ward, which remaina the sume; how could it be both noun and verb of which, aa classes, we are never cognisant P”’
198 The objection that this Karika hasin view is this: ‘The Mimdnsaka holds the word to be a partite object made up of the Letters; while in postnlating such a ५1४68 as ‘Verb,’ for inetance, he admits the singularity of these since the class Verb is one only; and since words too, as being individuals of these nlassea, would be coguised as being indentical with ,the class, these would be one only; and as
ON SENTENCE. 519
class ““Word,”’ which does not entirely dilfer (from the Letters composing the word). What is meant by the Bhashya—“ Letters themselves are the word’’—is the denial of any absolute difference (of the word from the constituent Letters).
193. And like the class “walking,” this (class “‘ noun,”) too is manifested (made perceptible) by means of its various parts appearing in a certain order of seqnence. Or, the manifestation thereof may be due to the last Letter only, as helped by the impressions left by the preceding Letters.
194, Or, Letters would be capable of bringing about the cognition of the verb and noun, &c.,)—even if the form of the word were the same as in the case of pacaté,—by means of that property of theirs, whereby they are capable of manifesting another class (i.e., “Word”).
such this would be nothing more than the Vyakarana theory of Sphota.” The sense of the reply as embodied in the Karika is that_even though the word be identical with the classes ^ Verb,” &c., yet this cannot reject the class “ Word;” and this does not con tradict onr own previous assertions, inasmuch 88 what we have denied under Sphota is that form of a Word from which all distinction of Letters, &c., has been removed ; and hence if the word be held to be a 61588 not absolutely differing from, and based upon, the real Letters (composing the words), then too the passage “ Letters themselves are words,”’ wonld only mean that a word 18 the Letters belonging to (having the shape and character of) the class “‘word.” This passage denies the fact of words being different totally from Letters; hence if the word he held to be a class, not exclading (or totally differing from) the Letters, then the above passage is not contradicted.
Such is the interpretation of the Ké@gikd which is also followed in the translation. The N. R. however explains thus: The Karika anticipates the objection that if the word be held to be one with the component Letters, as laid down in the Bhiashya— ५ Letters are words”—then this means a denial of everything else besides Letters; and hence how conld there be any such olasses as ^ Verb,”’ &o. consistently with the ssser- tion of the Bhashyaé. The sense of the Kérikaé in reply is, that what the Bhashyaé means ie only the denial of such a thing as Sphota which 16 held by Vaiyaka- ranas to be something totally different from the Letters (and this is what is meant hy the Bhashya asserting that word is the Letters themselves and nota sphota). But the classes “ Verb,” “Noun,” &c., are such as are not totally different from the Letters, juat like the class ‘‘Sonnd;” and as such these cannot be said to be denied by the passage which only denies an entity—like the Sphota—totally different from, and having no connection with Letters, inasmuch as the class Verb, &o., as held by us 18 based upon Letters; and 9.8 8171011 is not absolately different from and unconnected with them.
198 Just 68 “Walking” is manifested by the variona motions of the body appear- ing one after the other, so the class “Noun” is manifested by the varions Letters composing it appearing one after the other in a certain order of sequence. In this view all the Letters are held to be the manifesters. In the view propounded in the second half of the Karika it is the last Letter of the word which is the manifester, the preceding ones only acting as its auxiliaries.
19 Having shown the possibility of such classes as “Verb,” &९, the author now gives up this position, on account of the uselessnoss of such an assumption; inasmuoh
520 QLOKAVARTIKA.
195. Though of these (verb, noun, &c,) there are no well-defined groups, like a Forest or a Line, yet it is possible to have distinct usages of the verb, &., as classes.
196. The same explanation holds good with the idea of the Verbal Roots, Affixes, and their Denotations, as forming so many classes. And these cannot be said to be conventional and as such non-eternal; because the forms of Taddhitas, verbs, and words ending in nominal and verbal affixes, are all recognised (remembered) by learned people to 06 eternal (inasmuch as we come across such words and expressions in the Veda also).
197. Nor can it be held that, like the affix ‘‘cap”’ (which 28 a con jugational sign assumed by Panini to lie between tle root and the termina- tion for the purpose of the pronunciation of the vowel ‘a’),—this division into nouns, verbs, &c., is merely optionally assumed, for the purposeof giving an optiona] name to words by which we could mention certain words toge- ther. (This cannot be held) because that (word), of which a distinct form (an the shape of individual nouns and verbs, &c.) is used (by persons, as well
88 the cognition of these, ^ Noun,” "^ Verb,” &c., is explained even without postulating any such classes as “ Nonn,” &c., as being brought abont by the Letters themselves, and the property wherehy Lettere are held to manifest the clase “ Word” is only the capa- bility of expressing some meaning ; and as this is spplicable aleo to the case of verbs and nouns, &c., we can qnite reagonably hold that the idea of these—Noun and Verb, &c.—is due to the Letters as expressive of a certain meaning, helped hy the impressions left by grammatical rnles, regulating the application of these names (Noun, &c.) to certain defi- nite words. Thus then, it 18 proved that (Noun, &c.) sre real entities, and the idea of these is not devoid of a real substrate.
195 In the case of a forest we find that it is a group of trees, and a Line to be group of living beings—elephants, f.i.; and this leads us to discriminate between the For- est and the Line. In the oase of Nouns, Verbs, &c., on the other hand, there are no well- defined groups of these wherein they are separately enunciated—as that these words are Verbs, and these Nouns. Even though there is no such distinct enunciation and grouping of these, yet we can always definitely asce:tain—whether a word is a Verb or a Noun—by meane of their significations, with the help of the rules and nomen. clatures Jaid dawn in grammatical works. And we can regulate the usage of these accordingly. The grammatical rnlea lay down distinct characteristics common to all Verbs, f.1., by which we could even use the name “ Verb,” as a class including all words having those characteristice.
198 The notian of Verb as a olase including all Verbs is based upon the fact of all words known as Verbs denoting certain actions of some objects, whioh are hereby in- cluded in the common name ‘‘ Noun,” because such is the character laid down in gra matical words as heing common to all Verbs. In the same manner, in the case of the common name “ Root” the commonality is based upou the fact of all that are known as “roots” denoting actions.
The second half means that though the common names “ Root,” “ Verb,” &o,, are based on grammatical rules, yet the individual Verb, &o., cannot be said to be non-eter- nal, as being based upon these human conventions; since the faot is that the individual
ON SENTENCE. 521
as in the Veda, as related to certain actions and objects) cannot be a mere means (optionally) assumed, only for the purpose of fulfilling some second- ary object, as the pronunciation of the ‘a’ in the middle of words, (as in the case of the affixes “cap,” &c.).
198. And our theory is not affected by the uncertainty of the limits (of Bases and Affixes) due to the difference (of opinion) among those laying down these (Bases and 4 > 68.)
199. Because (this discrepancy can be set aside on the ground that) that form (and limit) is correct which is authorised by trustwortly persons (11६९ Panini, &c.), Or, where there is an equal authority (for hoth forms), we must admit both to be correct, the acceptance of one or the other being optional.
200. In fact, (even though there be a difference of opinion, yet it is only m the details of the form of the Base or the Affix, as to whether it is to end in ६ or a; and) there is no difference of opinion as to a certain part of a word being the Base and the other the Affix. And as for the remain- ing, optional ‘cap’ or conjugational sign ‘a’ inserted hetween the Root and its termination for the sake of pronunciation, these may be optionally regarded to be subsidiary (either to the Base or the Affix) (and since these
words are always recognised to be eternal; and all that the rnles do is to lay down certain properties that sre common to all words signifying action (for instance) which on thie ground, come to he inoluded in the common name “ Verb.”
198 This anticipates the following objection: “If the division of words into Nouns, Verhs, Affixes, &c., be real and eternal, then there could be no difference of opinion as to the limits of these, while as a matter of faot, we find that there is such difference— €, 80006 people call the same affix ‘‘ sti,” while others call it “t’’; some people name the root (=cook), as “paca,” while others name it ^ pacati.” Thus, since there 18 thie discrepancy, the division into Verh, Noun, &c., mnet be admitted to be merely conventional, based npon the assertions of different persons.”
Why this disorenancy does not effect our theory is shown in tho following Karika.
199 The difference of opinion among authorities—admitted in the second Karika —refers only to accents, &c., (with regard to which certain acknowledged authoritiee differ) and not with regard to well-ascertained definite entities—like Nouns, Verbs, &c., with regard to which there ie, or can be, no difference among recognised authorities.
200 Since the Base has a distinct signification of its own, apart from that of the affix—there can be no difference of opinion as to a certain part of the word heing a Base, and the rest an Affix. The only differrence possible referring to minordetails cannot affect our position.
“ Optional Afizves.’—In certain instances it bappens that when a certain affix is added to a certain Base, the reanltant word becomes unprononncable—and then, for the sake of pronnnoiation, people assnme the presence of certain supernumary affixes which bring about the addition of certain vowels enabling us to pronounce the word :~— “‘cap” 18 one such affix.
66
522 QLOKAVARTIKA.
are optional, any difference of opinion with regard to these cannot affect our position). |
201. Just as in the case of smoke, it is only a certain part of it (the fact of its belonging to the class “smoke ”’) which leads to the Inference of Fire ; while its other parts (the fact of the smoke being dusty, vapoury, &c.) are common to many other objects, (and as such do not help to bring about the inference of Fire) ;—so, the same may be said to be the case in the present instance (of optional Affixes).
202. And just as in that case (of smoke), (even though the factor of its colour is of no use in the Inference, yet) that factor (of colour, &.) belonging to the smoke eternally, is not rejected (or removed from the smoke),—so, too, in the present instance, even though a part of the word (in the Optional Affix) is not expressive (being added only for the sake of the facility of pronunciation, and as such having no meaning), yet it con- tinues to exist as eternal.
203-204. In cases when the Affix being éliminated, the Base alone remains—as in the case of words ending in the affix kvip,— or, when the Base itself being eliminated, the Affix, pure and simple, remains,—as in the case of the word ^ adhuna ” (=now),— we must admit that the single factor remaining has the potentialities of both (Base and Affix), throngh the natural capability of words (which is diverse) ; as for instance, in a sentence the capabilities of words ending in nominal affixes are various and diverse.
205. Some people assert that in the above instances the simple Base or Affix expresses the double meaning (of both), because the presence.of the one part (Base or Affix) leads to the inference of another (Affix or Base respectively): Others declare that the one part of the meaning (of both) (denoted by oue factor) indirectly indicates that of the other (factor ),
206. But, this latter explanation is incorrect ; because in the cogni- tion (of the double meaning expressed by the single factor) there is not
201 In the case of a word within which an optional affix has been inserted, we could as reasonably oxplain that in the case of suoh a word it is only certain parts of it (snoh as the real Base and the real Affix) that bring about the Cognition of the denotation while the other part (consisting of the optional affix) is of no use in that cognition— just as the colour of the smoke is of no use in the inference of Fire.
208.204 The word “ Agnioit” is made up of “seni” +“oi”’+“kvip; ’ but the ro- sultant form is “ agnicit” only, there being no trace of the affix. Similarly “ adhuna” =“ Tdam ” +“ adbuni,” where there is no trace of the Base, “Idam.” Words ending in nominal afimes, Jc.—as f.i., the simple word “ Aupagava,” which morely looks like the
word “ Upagu”’ slightly transferred, douotes so much as ^ the son of Upagu from hia own lawful wife,”
ON SENTENCE. 623
the slightest tinge of indirectness or Indication ; inasmuch as in the case of words ending in kvip £.i., the meaning that we cognise is wholly in its primary and direct form.
207. And further (there can be no indirect Indication in the above cases, because) the science of grammar does not treat of such indirect functions of words, as Indication, etc. ; inasmuch as what the science does is to ascertain the direct denotation of the directly expressive word, when, in any word, there happens to be a commixture of the Indirect functions {of Indication, eto., with those of Direct Denotation).
208. [Nor can the double meaning be due to Inference as asserted in Karika 205 ; because] we are never cognisant of any concomitance between the denotation of the Base and that of the Affix (and without such con- comitance the presence of one cannot lead to the Inference of another), [Nor can it be urged that at the time that the compound, “ agnicit” is being expounded—as “ agnind cinoti ’—there is a concomitance between the meaning of the Base, the root “ect,” and that of the affix kuip in the shape of the ‘nominativity ’ to the present action denoted by the tip in " cinoti;’ and this concomitance of meanings would lead to the Inference of the meaning of one factor from the presence of that of another factor, because] the only means that there is of comprehending the meaning of ९ sentence, lies in the meaning of the words (composing the sentence), as they are used by persons, (and in the case in question, people always use the word “agnicit”; aud as such for the comprehension of the word we cannot reasonably have recourse to such words as have not been used).
209. And further, inasmuch as the root “cit”? is also found to be accompanied (at times) by verbal affixes (Imperative) (just as 1t is found to be accompanied by kvip in “ agnicit’’),-—the presence of the simple root (“cit” in “agnicit’”?) would also be free to lead to the cognition, by Inference, of the denotatious of those (verbal affixes) ; (and there would)
207 The sole purpose of the science of grammar is to show what words are directly denotative of what meanings: in order to distinguish these from the meanings in- directly indicated or soggested. Hence a word-—such as the one ending in kvip— which grammatically is always in the form of the Base alone, can never be said to partake of any indirect expressiveness $ because in that case such a word would never have a pure direot denotation, and hence we would have, in grammar, an affix which can give sense only when recourse is had to the indirect functions of words.
208 Another reason why sach concomitance cannot lead to Inference is that the meaning of the affix ^ ण is not always accompanied by that of the root “ cit ;” ncr is the latter. always accompanied by the former, inasmuch ag the affix kvip may be added to any root; and any other affixes may be added to the root “cit;” there- fore there being no invariable concomitance between the two, the most necessary ele- ment of Inference fails ; and consequently no Inference is ever possible, This is shown
in the following Kariké,
9 24 GLOKAVARTIKA.
be no ground for explaining “ agnicit” as “ agninad cinoti,” since it would be as reasonable to explain it as “ agnincinoti,” etc.
210. Nor is it proper to assume the presence of both the Base and the Affix in the single factor (Base or Affix left after the elimination of the other factor) ; because, (rather than have reconrse to such a complex and unreasonable assumption) it would be very much better (and simpler) to assume the presence of the dual potentiality (in the single factor).
211. Because knowing the exact extent of the word (be it either in the form of the Base 8106, or in that of the Affix alone)—how, in the first place, could we, in the absence of any such directions laid down in prammatical works, assume its multiplicity (7.e., the fact of its containing both the Base and the Affix)? and then the potentiality (of the two factors thus assumed to exist in a single factor, which latter assumption is still more difficult to make, as shown in the last Karika).
212-213, There remains the case of “ Dadhyatra,”’ where the word (denotative of the Dadhi) is not like the one originally known (to be de- notative of it). In this some people hold that the word (denotative of Dadhi, in “ Dadhyatra’’) is the same word (as originally known to be denotative of it), ouly affected by the immediate sequence of a vowel (the a in “atra”’); and inasmuch as the same word (‘Dadhi”) is recognised (in “ Dadhy- atra”’), the meaning too as cognised (by ‘Dadhi” in =" Dadhyatra’”’) is the same (as that cognised in “° Dadhi”’); the only difference that there is, is the cognition of the “i” (of “ Dadhi’””) as “ya” (in “ Dadhyatra”), which 18 due to the immediate sequence of the “a” (in “ atra”),
214, Or, the explanation of this, according to our own theory, is that even though (an “ Dadhyatra”) we have “ ya,’’—yet its potentiality
210 Beoause it is always simpler and more reasonable to assume new potentialities which are imperceptible forces, than to assume new objects, which are always percep- tible, and as such, any assumptions of such as are not to be perceived, look absurd on their very face,
४11 We know exactly how far the root “ Cit” extends; and then it is altogether प्रण. reasonable to assume that it contains both the root cit and the affix kvip; aud thug it becomes far more unreagonable to make the further assumption of these assnmed fastors having potentialities of their own. Itis much more reasonable to assume a multiplicity of potentialitics; because as a matter of ordinary experience, many words actually have various meauings based upon various potentialitios ; and as such it is not unreasonable to assume a multiplicity of potentialities in the root and “cit.”
212.218 For the diffioulty with regard to this, see Karika 178.
214 The word in “ Dadhyatra” is actually different from “ Dadhi;” still the mean- ing «lenoted by the one 18 the same 88 that denoted by the other; because the Sitra ‘*Tko yanaci” lays down that wheu ‘i’ 18 followed by ‘a’ &o., one ought to pronounce ‘ya’ in its place; and this means that the meaning of such a word ending in ‘ya ;
ON SENTENCE. 525 6f denoting the denotation of the word ^ Dadhi,” is recognised, in accord- ance with the specific definition (of ‘ ya’ as laid down by Panini in the sitra ८ Iko yanact”’).
215. And further, we find that one who has never heard the word “* Dadhyatra,” and who has never realised the definition (laid down in the sitra ** Iko yanact’’) does not comprehend the expression. ‘ Dadhyatra,”’ even though he kuows the meaning of the word “ Dadhi” (and this shows that the word contained in ^ Dadhyatra ” is not identical with “ Dadhi’’),
216. Aud the fact of the impossibility,—of the cognition of the rela- tion (of all the transformations of a word, ‘“Dadhi” ४. with the single denotation of the original word “ Dadhi”’) ou account of the endlessness (of the number of transformations) (as urged in K. 179),—can be explained on the ground that it would not be very difficult to cognise such a relation, in accordance with the specific definitions (of the various transformations, as laid down in Panini’s s#tras), or with the explanations (of the relations) supplied by (learned) people knowiug it (the relation) fully (४,९.) in all its bearings).
217. ८४} :—“But, (in the case of ‘Dadhyatra’) we have no definite coguition as to the extent of the word (signifying the curd)—as to whether it ends ina vowel (‘i’) or iu a consonant (‘ya’); and in the absence of such cognition (of the word) we cannot have any definite idea of its significations.”
218. To this we reply that if we were to analyse the expression (“‘ Dadhyatra,” separating the word signifying the curd), the word (as ending in ‘ya’) would become incorrect (inasmuch as there is no such word as “Dadhyu”’); while, so long as its form (‘‘Dadhya”’) remains in close contact (४.९. not separated from the following word), it is correct in accordance with the dictum (of Payiui—viz: “‘Iko yanact.”)
219. And hence in this condition (of contact) we comprehend the meaning of the word (signifying the curd), eveu though its limit is not ascertained. And hence, even when the words are not separated, they are cognised to he two different words, on account of the difference in their significations (distinctly recognised, one apart from that of the other).
220. Or, as a matter of fact, in this case, we do recognise the limit of
(ag “ Dadhya”) is the same as that of the word ending in ‘i’ (when the * ya’ 18 such as 18 pronounced in the place of ‘i’ followed by ‘ a’).
४१ The sense of this ohjeotion is that if the word (signifying the curd) as con- tained in ^ Dadhyatra” be held to be other than the original word “ Dadhi,” then it would be impossible to realise the form of snach a word; and hence it could not have any meaning; because unless the exact form of the word is cognised, its meaning oan- not be comprehended.
20 In “Dadhyatra” it is always cognised that the former word ends in a
526 CLOKAVARTIKA.
the word, knowing it to end in the consonant (‘“‘ya””); but we are unable to mention it (separately) (because in that case it would become incorrect). (It is so) since it is that (werd ending in “ya’’) alone which is always comprehensible (in analysis) only as the word “ Dadhi,’—as in the case of a ‘' Nityasamdasa,”
221. The above (explanation of the case of ^^ Dadhyatra”’) supplies the answer to the} (objections with regard to the) words ^" Raja” and “Rana” &e., (as urged in K. 169). Because (in “Rayna,” as in “Da- dhyatra”) a certain part (that part which signifies the Kung apart from instrumentality) is similar to, and synonymous with, the other word (“Raja”), though the two are different words altogether (like “‘ Dadhi ” and, ** Dadhya’’).
222-223. The fact of the non-cognition of the meaning of the word ‘‘Brahmana,” in the word “ Brahmana-vastra” (which is the technical name of a certain kind of cloth), is explained on the ground of the latter word being an altogether new word, and as such, having a limit alto- gether different (from that of the word “ Brahmana”). For, who is there that does not admit the fact of the general being set aside by the particular ? And hence, the word “Brahmana” being the general word, is neglected when appearing in a word which has another limit (ze, in the word °“ Byadhmana-vastra’”’ which ends in ‘ Vastra,’ and restricts the meaning of the word “Brahmana,” signifying as it does, a particular kind of cloth).
224. When, however, the word “Brahmana” is pronounced as ॐ
consonant; and thus as we havs a cognition of snch a word distinct from ths other word
the cognition of the different significations of the two words follows. The fact of ons being nnabls to eeparats ths words in eo many words cannot bar our cognition of their different csignifications. As for instanos in a “ Nityasamasa” = (^ Kumbhakdra” fi.) the fact of our being unabls to mention the two words (‘‘ Kumbha” and ‘ Kara”) separately, does not stop the dietinot oomprehension of the meanings of the two words. And again, just as ths word “ Kumbhakdra” 18 always analysed ae ‘“‘ Kumbham Karoti,” when the Karoti in the analysis is another word than the Kéra in the compound, thongh the two are synonymous and in analysis, the “ Kara” must always bs comprehensible as “ Kayoti”),—-so exactly in the same manner ^ Dadhyatra” is always analysable into “ Dadhi” and “atra” where “ Dadhi” is a word other than “ Dadhya,” though the two are synonymons, and the word “ Dadhya” must be comprehended, in analysis as ^ Dadhi.”
222-23 The sanss of thie 18 that the word “ Brahmana-vastra” has no connection with the word “Brahmana;” and as such it is only propsr that the meaning of the Jatter shonld not bs cognised in connection with the former; and hencs this want of cognition cannot affeot the partite character of words, &०. Beoanuss the word ^" Brah- mana-vastra” is an altogether different word having an altogether different signifioa- tion,
#4 When the word ‘ Dévydatta’ is pronounced as a whole, as a name, people do not
ON SENTENCE. .’ 527
distinct word, apart (from the word “ Brahmana-vastra), then, who can deny (or neglect) its own specific meaning,—as in the case of the words ** Dévadatta”’ and the like?
225, Similarly, in the case of the word “agvakarna,” since the wholé is known to be an independent word, having an independent signification of its own, in the shape of a particular plant,—the meanings of its parts (“agva” and “‘karna”’) are completely neglected.
226, Though the parts (of the word ‘“agvakarné@) have their signifi- cations sometimes neglected, on account of the compound appearing in a context which allows only of the distinct signification of the whole (as one independent word),—yet at times, even as members of a compound, as well as separate words, their own specific meanings are distinctly comprehended.
227. As for the words gs” (cow), “gukla” (white) and the like, we never find their specific significations neglected,—whether they appear in compounds or singly by themselves; and as such, where could they be said to be meaningless ?
228. And inasmuch as the meaning of a sentence is always compre- hended in accordance with the meaning of the words (composing the Sen- tence),—the fact of the sentence having a qualified (particular) signification cannot point to the fact of the sentence being independent (of the words).
229. For us, even in the ‘signification of the sentence, the words (composing it) do not lose their significance (potentiality) ; and it is only
mind the significations of the words ^ Déva”’ and ‘‘Datta.” When, however, the word “Déva” is pronounced apart, one 0001868 its own particnlar signification. What leads to the neglect of the meaning of the word—“ Brahmana’”’ in ^ Brahmana-vastra ” ig only the presence of another limit (Vastra)—when this presence is removed, the cognition of the meaning of the word ‘“‘ Brahmana”’ is olear and unavoidable.
286 When the word “ Acvakarna”’ ocoure in a oontext where plants are enumerated, there can he no cognition of the meanings of “Agva” and “ Karna.’ Bnt when a rider says “Bring the Agva” we comprehend the meaning of ‘Agva’ as « horse; simi- larly when one says “‘ pierce the Karna,” this word is comprehended as denoting the ear ; and also in a compound snch as in the chapter on ^ Agvamédha’—it is said “acvakarnam sammarshti” where we oannot but oomprehend the sentence as signifying “‘ washes the ear of the horse.”
287 Thug all worda must be admitted to have distinct significations of their own.
228 Since the sentence only signifies the connection of the meanings signified by the words composing it; therefore it can have no significance apart from the words; and as 87001 it cannot be an entity apart from, and independent of, the component words. (Note that the anthor of the Vartika is an “ Abhihitanvayavadi’’ as contrasted with Prabhakara who is an “ Anvitabhidhanavadi.’)
229 This anticipates the objection that if the meaning of the sentence he derived from the meaning of the sentence, then this latter 10866 all direct significance. The sense of the reply is that the eignification of the sentence is not entirely devoid of the poten- tiality of the words. And though the expression of the individual meanings of words
528 CLOKAVARTIKA.
because the direct function of the words ends in the signification of their own individual denotations, that we hold the meaning of the sentence to be deduced from the meanings of the words (and not from the words directly).
230. Evenif the signification of the sentence be not directly Verbal, yet the significations of the words cannot but be directly Verbal. Because in the case of these (latter) there is no possibility of any intervening agency between the word itself and its meaning,—as there is in the case of the signification of the sentence (between which and the words, the agency of the meanings of the words intervenes).
231, And these (words through their meanings) (as composing a sen- tence) signify a connected meaning, (which comes to be recognised as the meaning of the sentence) and which is necessarily concomitant with them; inasmuch 98 the existence of a generic entity (the meaning of the word, which denotes only a generic ‘class’) is not possible without particu- lar entities (the generic denotations of the individual words, as qualified and specified by the connection of one another).
932. Nor can the mere presence of such concomitance make the cog- nition (of the meaning of the sentence from that of the words) an inferen- tial one. Because inasmuch as the meanings of the words would form part of the conclusion, they could never constitute the inferential indi- cative.
233. The meaning of the sentence is always cognised as colored by
happens to intervene between the word and the meaning of the sentence,—yet this is only hecanse the words themselves can improperly express their own meanings; and since the expression of these 81098 (unconnected among themselves) cannot serve,any purpose in the sentence, we dedace from thess the meaning of the sentence, which is thus due to words 81008 $ and as such is as directly Verbsl as anything can be.
231 This is in reply to the objection urged above (in K. 4.) that the words cannot signify the meaning of the sentence, becanss the words signify something different from the mesning of the sentence. The senss of the reply is that the mesning of the sentence is nothing more than the relation subsisting between the meanings of the words composing it. And ss the generic denotation of each word is only specified by its relation with another word, thea meaning of the sentence is nothing more than the specified forms of the denotations of the words, And 88 the specified form is necessarily concomitant with the generic forms, the common faot of invariable concomi- tancs points to the agency of the words in the signification of sentences.
288 The conolnsion songht to be proved is that the meaning of the sentenos is the meaning cf the words specified by their mutual connection (which ccnnsction consti- tutes the meaning of the sentence). And in order to prove this, by Inferenos, if the premiss bs ‘becanss this connection is concomitant with the meaning of words,’—then the premiss becomes a part of the conclusion, And since this 18 so, the cognition cannot be said to be an inferential one.
238 This meaus that in an Inference the major term (“ Fiery”) ia something entirely
ON SENTENCE. 529
(६.९. in the shape of) the meaning of the words (connected together); and these latter (meanings of words) do not signify the former (the meaning of the sentence) independently of themselves;—as the smoke signifies the presence of fire (which ia totally different from the smoke itself).
234-235. Nor is it possible for these (the meanings of words) to qua- lify the meaning of the sentence (as the Fire qualifies the particular place, mountain); because, the latter is not cognised previously to the cognition of the former, as the place (mountain,) f.i. is (previously to, and apart from {116 Fire), Because, as a matter of fact, we obtain the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence, which is in itself non-existent (as an independent entity by itself), from (the meanings of words only); or else, how could it (the meaning of the sentence),—consisting, as it does, of the relations of nouns and verbs, &c.,—be cognised previously (to the cogni- tion of the meanings of the component words) ?
236. So long as the object (the meaning of the sentence) itself is not cognised, it is not possible to have any idea of its qualification; and pre- viously (to the cognition of the meanings of the words) there is no means of comprehending the meaning of the sentence. (Therefore the meaning of the words can never be cognised to be the qualification of the meaning of the sentence).
237. And if (the meaning of the words be at all cognised to be the qualifications (of the meaning of the sentence), after this meaning of the sentence has been duly comprehended,—then, the meaning (of the sentence) having already been known, what would be left (unknown) to be known (by Inference) ?
238. Hven invariable concomitance of the meaning of words, the meanings of sentences do not stand in need of. (That is to say, in bring- ing about a cognition of the meaning of the sentence, the meaning of words de not require invariable concomitance). Nor is this (invariable concomi- tance) easily cognisable, with regard to all the words at one and the same
distinct from the middle term (smoke); while in the present case the meaning of the sentence ia not so different fram the meanings of the words. This shows that the minor premiss of the syllogiam would not be possible.
434.285 The mountain is known previonsly, and apart from, the Fire: hence the latter ia latterly cognised aa exiating in, and ag auch qualifying the monntain. In the case in question, however, the meaning of the sentence 18 never known, either previous- ly to, or apart from, the meanings of the words composing it; hence it can never be qnalified by them.
281 The Inference is sought to bring about the meaning of the sentence; 06 no premisses are 0881016 until the meaning of the sentence has been daly cagniaed ; conse- quently the meaning of the sentence can never be said to be cognised by Inference.
68 The worde are not heard simultaneously; hence there can never be the cogni- tion and the concomitance of all these: simply because they are never conoomitant.
67
1980 QLOKAVARTIEA.
time, inasmuch as (at any time during the utterance of the sentence) some words have already gone before, some are yet to come, and some are yet hidden.
239. Nor is it possible to infer the meaning of one sentence from the relation (concomitance) of the meanings of the words (composing that sentence) with the meaning of another sentence,—because the meanings of words are different (in the two sentences). Or, if these (meanings of words) were exactly the same, the sentences could never be cognised as different (z.e., the words and their meanings being the same, the sentences would be identical; and the difficulty of a proper and timely cognition of invariable concomitance would remain the same).
240. Ifit he held that we are cognisant of the relation (concomi- tance) of words in general with sentences in general (and this concomitance would lead to the inference of the meaning of the sentence),— then (we reply that), in that case there would be no cognition of the meaning of any particular sentence; and all the cognition that we have, of the meanings of sentences, refers to particulars (and not to generalities) (and as such it could never be hrought about by any Inference based upon the relation of generalities, as held above).
241. It has been proved above that, even in the absence of any cog- nition of relations, we have the validity of the means of cognition (as in the case of Appareat Inconsistency, &c., where we have no cognition of any relations). And, as foracomprehension (of the meaning of the sentence), itis explicitly known to all men.
242, For, even when the meanings of the words (४.९. the objects de- noted hy them) have been cognised elsewhere, (7.e., in places other than the one talked of),—as in the case of the description of events in remote countries,—if the assertion comes from a trustworthy source, our comprehension (of the meaning of the sentence) is not in any way retarded.
243. Ifit be urged that, ‘this would he a case of inference from the fact of non-contradiction of trustworthy assertion (as the premiss)’”—(we reply that) such a premiss would only establish the certainty (of the truthfulness
489 This 18 in reply to the objection that concomitance may he recognised by the sentence, and may serve as the gronnd of inference of the meaning of another sentence.
241 The sense of the second half is that, even in the case of Inferenoe the validity of the conclusion is not based upon any cognition of relations; since a conolusion is valid only as not denied by any contradictory fact known to be trne; and this non-oontra- diotion of a well-recognised fact is also common to the case of the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence, when too we have a comprehension which is not opposed to any well-established faot; and hence the comprehension of the meanings of sentences, as cognised by all people, cannot but be valid,—even in the absence of any cognition of the relation of concomitance among the words or their meanings (as held by us).
ON SENTENCE. 531
of the assertion) and, as for the appearance of the comprehension itself, it could never be brought about by the aforesaid premiss.
244, And the truthfulness of the assertion, as ascertained by the fact of its coming from a trustworthy source, is one thing; while the meaning of the sentence is quite another thing, comprehended long before the former (7.¢., truthfulness, which is ascertained long after tho compre- hension of the meaning of the sentence, when a doubt has arisen as to the truthfulness or otherwise of the assertion contained in the sentence).
245. And, as such, even if you have an inference of truthfulness from the fact of the assertion coming from a trustworthy source,—how could the Inference apply to the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence (which has been shown to be a totally different thing) ?
246. The appearance (or production) of the comprehension (of the meaning of the sentence), on the hearing (of the sentence), is equal, — whether the assertion come from a trustworthy source or otherwise. And the three. factors of Inference cannot be of any use with regard to any- thing further than the appearance (of cognition; inasmuch as all the Infer- ence, we have, is in the shape of a cognition produced by the premiss).
247. Now we proceed to explain how, for the purpose of the ascertain- ment of the validity of ‘“ Verbal Testimony,”—we obtain a comprehension of the previously-unperceived meaning of the sentence, from the meaning of the words (composing the sentence).
248-250. (Ina sentence, “ svargakadmo ‘yajéta,” f.i.) the word signi- fying the Bhavana reminds ns (gives us an idea) of the Bhavana, just as in ordinary parlance. And, through positive and negative concomitance, some people hold that this (Bhavana is the denotation of the affix) in “yajzéta”’ ; others hold it to be the denotation of the verbal root (“ yazi”’) as aided by the proximity of the affix ; others again hold it to be the denota- tion of both (root and affix) together, inasmuch as it is by means of both together that we comprehend the Bhavana ; and because, just as we have no comprehension of the Bhavana by means of the words “ Paka,” etc., 80
24% Since the two are totally different the Inference of truthfulness cannot mean the Inference of the meaning of the sentence,
996 And 88 snch, inasmuch as the appearance of the cognition of the meaning of the 80060066 has been shown to he brought abont by means other than Inference—.e,, by tbe meanings of words, this cognition cannot in any way be benefitted by Inference,
848.250“ Very little use ’—all that we want is the signification of the Bhavana, withont which the meaning of the sentence cannot be complete. And it does not matter whether this Bhavana he signified hy one factor of the word or by hoth; 80 long as we have the signification of the Bhavana it does not matter whence we get at it.
532 CLOKAVARTIKA,
too, we bave none by the verbal affix in “paca,” etc. But, as a matter of fact, since it is very little use to differentiate (as to which special factor signifies the Bhavana), we may hold whatever we like with regard to the (signification of the Bhavana by the) words ^^ pacatz,” etc., (be it either by the root alone or by the affix alone, or by the two together).
251-252. And inasmuch as this (Bhavana) only signifies the End, the Means and the Process, in general,—it stands in need of a particularisation (of these generic entities), which can be got at by means of other words (^ svarga,” f.i.). And, on the other hand, the svarga (Heaven), having been cognised (by means of the word “ kamah ” =desiring) as the object (of desire) stands in need of the Bhavana (for its accomplishment). Hence, on the ground of proximity of the afix in “ yaséfa” as signifying the Bhavana, and the word “svarga” as signifying the end or object and capability (based upon mutual requirement, as shown above), we conclude that there is a certain relation between the two. ।
253. Having its relation (with the end) thus ascertained, the Bhavana further requires the means (by which to attain that end), And, as a matter of fact, there can be no such action (or performance) as has not its means such as is denoted by the Verbal root.
254. And the denotation of the root, in the shape of the “ yaga”’ or sacrifice—even though not ending in the Instrumental affix, yet, being in contact with the Bhavana—stands in need of an end (for which it would be the means).
255. And on the gronnd of extreme proximity between the root yaj?, in ‘‘yagéta ” as signifying the sacrifice as the means, and the word ^ svarga” as signifying the Heaven as the end, we conclude that there is a connec- tion between these two. And in order to show this clearly the aforesaid sentence is explained as ^^ yagéna svaryam bhdvayét” (clearly pointing out the fact of the “yaga” being the means, by means of tbe Insirn- mental ending).
256. (This explanation is not improper, since) just as the word “ aupa- gava,”’ is explained as ‘ the child of Upagu’? (Upagoh apatyam) where the genitive is not presentin connection with the word ^ Upagw” in the ori- ginal word (but is added in order to clearly point out the relation between Upagu and the child), (so in the present case also).
257. As a matter of fact, the character of being the means is not imparted by the instrumental alone; inasmuch as even if such character be denoted by other means, such denotation cannot be, in any way, contradicted (and set aside) by it (the Instrumental).
258. Hven though the Root is recognised as signifying the means, yet
#68 There oan be no Bhavana whose means is not denoted by the Root,
ON 8824186, 533
it cannot have the Instrumental ending, because it is not a noun, as the word “ yaga”’ 18,
259. Therefore the instrumentality of the root ^ ya7?,”” which is com- prehended through the (expressive) potentiality of words, is explained by means of the word ^“ ydgéna,” inasmuch as the root could not be used alone by itself (to show its instrumental character).
260-261. Similarly, standing in need of the manner (of its fulfilment) the Bhavana refers only to the Process. And the Process too, standing in need of something to be fulfilled, is restricted (related to the particular Bhavana), through capability and proximity, on the ground of the impossi- bility of any other explanation (of the character of the Process and the Bhavana, and the relation between these). And the Process 18 such as may be obtained from the same sentence (as in which the Bhavana appears) or from other sentences.
262. (And there is no incongruity in this, because) just as the Base and the affix stand in need of one another, and just as one word stands in need of another word,—so, in the same manuer, would a sentence stand in need of another sentence.
263. Without a process, the means do not accomplish any results. Otherwise (1.e., if the Bhavana of the Jyotishtoma and the means, in the shape of the particular sacrifice did not require a statement of the process, then) the declaration of the minor sacrifices the ‘Prayaja’ and the rest (which make up the Jyotishtoma sacrifice) would be fruitless.
264. Because, rather than make these minor sacrifices have any other use, it is far better to make their use 116 in the help that they impart to the means of the Bhavana of a certain definite result,—inasmuch as the means stand in need of such help, and the proximity (of the declaration of the Prayajas to the Jyotishtoma) leads to the same conclusion (that the Prayajas constitute the process whereby the ‘Jyotishtoma’ is to be per- formed).
265. The three factors (Means, Process, and Result) mentioned in connection with the same Bhavana, subsequently, come to stand, with re- gard to one another, in the relation of mutual auxilliaries (the one fulfill- ing the requirements of the other and so on, amongst all the three).
266. The Bhavana requires (to know) the means that would briug about its result, and also what (process) would help the Means,—thus re- quiring all the three factors intertwined with one another.
260-261 For the Process it 18 not absolutely necessary to be mentioned in the same sentence with the Bhavana, &c.
262 Jt cannot be said that the Bhavana appearing in one sentence could not stand in need of the Process mentioned in another sentence.
534 QLOKAVARTIKA.
267. Similarly in the case of such sentences as “bring the white cow,” there is mutual requirement based upon inseparability. And the mutual relation (between the class “cow” and the property “ white’’) is due to the fact of their being connected with the same action (of bring- ing).
268. And the fact of the property qualifying the class is based upon the individual object (white cow) ; as the one (class) inheres in the object which is qualified by another (the property of whiteness), with reference to the same action (of bringing).
269. And the fact of both inhering in the same object as their snb- strate, is due to the fact of their being taken up by an action, which does not stand in need of any other object. And, as such, there is no mutual interdependence (between the fact of both having the same substrate and that of one being the qualification of another).
270. And the mutual effect produced by one upon the other (on ac- count of their inhering in the same substrate) is naturally of help (in ascer- taining their relation). And as for the exclusion of the cows of other colours, this indirectly follows (from the relation ascertained, for the time being, as subsisting between whiteness and cow). And hence (it must be admitted that) there is no discrepancy in the relation (among Nouns and Verbs, &c., as appearing in a sentence).
271. Though the noun “cow” and the adjective ‘white’ by them- selves separately, having unlimited general applications, render many sen- tences possible, yet on account of their mutual exclusions (when appearing in the same sentence) we have the idea of that single sentence.
267 “‘Inseparability ’—7.e., the olaae ‘‘ Cow” denoted by the word “Cow” stands in need of a specification, inasmuch as the action of “bringing” is inseparable from indi- vidual cows (on account of the impossibility of its belonging to the class); and the property “ white”’ supplies thie need. Similarly, the property “white” standa in need of something to which it would helong, inasmuch as the property could have no existence separately from @ certain 01888 of individnala; and thie need is supplied by the word ‘‘cow.’ Thne, just asin Vedic sentences, 80 in ordinary sentences, the connection among the various worde (composing the sentenoe) is due to mutual requirement, the olass wanting the property and the property wanting the claas for ita substrate.
४89 This refers to the objection that the relation of the qualifier and qualified may he due to their inhering in the same substrate. But whence thie inherence? If it be said to he due to the aforesaid relation then there is mutual interdependence.
४10 ^“ Exolnsion”’-—This is in reply to the objeotion urged in ह, 37.
811 In the sentenoe “bring the white oow,” the word ^ bring ” denotes the olass “bringing,” and indicates individnal bringings, belonging commonly to all oows—blaok red, &o, The word “cow” too (ending in the acouaative, denotes accusativesin general andas euch indicatea any aotion in general of whioh it would be the object). So also the word white’ in the accusative. But when all these words are taken together, and:
ON SENTENCE. 535
272. Therefore even though this (cognition of a single sentence) is not a case of Inference based upon positive and negative concomitance,— yet the fact of the sentence having only one meaning exclusively (which would have been the sole result of the Inference) is got at by other means (४.९., by the close proximity of the words).
273. Injunctions as wel] as Prohibitions function properly when they have got at the fully-equipped Bhavana (४.९., a Bhavana endowed with all its three factors), as signified by a conglomeration of words (composing the sentence) and of sentences (such as serve to lay down the processes help- ing its means).
274. Thongh the Injunction refers properly to the Bhavana untonch- ed by anything else, yet, on account of sheer incapability (of pointing toa Bhavana entirely by itself, withont any of its factors), it does not end in that (Bhavana) alone (but also points to its other factors, inasmuch as there can be no idea of the Bhavana without that of its factors also cropping up at the same time).
275. The Injunctions serve to urge persons towards certain actions to be performed; and people do not perform the Bhavana, alone, apart from its factors.
276. Therefore, even thongh the Injunction has its function and form well started, yet it continues to standin need of something until the Bhavana reaches its full capacity and has no requirements (7.e., when it has been fully equipped with all its factors, and as such has no require- ments unfulfilled).
forming one sentence, the action of bringing signified by the root comes to be cognised as the same which is signified by the accusative ‘‘cow,’’ as also the word “white.” Thus all words come to indicate a single particular oase; and the action hecomes ex- cluded from classes and properties other than the “cow” and ‘‘ white;” and the class “cow” too comes to be excluded from other actions and properties; and the property ‘whiteness’? becomes excluded from other classes and actions; and this brings ns to the cognition of the one sentence, “ Bring the white cow.”’
27 The previons र, having set aside the objection urged in K. 101-102, the present Karika meets the objection urged in the first half of K. 4.
218 And since an Injunotion stands in need of all the factors of the Bhavana, it cannot be said that the Injunction refers to the Bhavana alone, and not to its means— the sacrifice, &c.
216 This explains the “incapahility.” It is only when the Bhavana is realised in all its parts—i.e., when people come to know that such and such a result will be attained by such and such means as aided by such and sucha process,—that we come to know all 1४8 faotors.
278 Thongh the Injunction begins with referring to the Bhavana pure and simple, yet it has not its function fully complete, until the Bhavana has appsared with all its factors.
536 QLOKAVARTIKA.
277. Hvenin the case of Verbal prefixes and Nipatas,—though they are always used with other words (Verbs, &c.) (and never by themselves; and as such appear to have no independent significations of their own), yet— these must be admitted to have a certain meauing (of their own), like the different members of @ compound, on the ground that a certain meaning is cognised only when these prefixes are present, and not other- wise—(as explained above with regard to Nityasamasa, &c.).
278, It is no use discussing as {0 whether these (Verbal Prefixes, &c.) are themselves distinctly denotative, or only serve to manifest a certain shade of the signification of the root. Because all that we mean is that they have distinct functions of their own (in the signification of a sentence); ——and this function may be either in the shape of direct independent deno- tation, or in that of merely helping (to manifest certain changesin) an- other (४.९.) the signification of the root).
279-80. (As a matter of fact, we do find independent significations of prefixes, &c.; e.g.) we find that the prefixes, expressing “‘slight,” 4९.) are directly connected with nouns; while others signify certain specialities through a Verb which is not used (but is suppressed) ; as for instance, the words ‘“‘fipinga” (slightly yellowish) and “pravayah” (whose age is much gone or advanced).
980-281. Sometimes “excellence,” &c., (as denoted by the prefix “pra” in “pravayasam rshabham dakshinim dady@t”) are comprehend- ed and taken as forming part of the Process, &c., and as such qualifying the Bhavana.
281-282. And thongh the “front direction” (signified by “abhi” in ‘“abhikriman”’) is a property of the doer (performer), yet it could belong to the Bhavana, on account of its inherence in one and the same object with the Bhavana (both the Bhavana and the direction inhering in the performer
211 “The root “hr” =take; while “ Vihara” =onjoyment; which latter meaning re- maing 80 long as the prefix “vi” remains, and disappears withit. Therefore it must be admitted that the prefix has a certain signification which alters the signification of the १००४, `
279.80 In “dpinga’”’ we find the meaning Of the prefix “a” (1.8. slightly) direotly qualifying the noun “Pinga.” And in “pravayah”’ we find that the prefix “pra” शद्ध nifies ^ muoh gone or advanced,” and this through the agency of the root “gami,” which however is suppressed in the compound “ pravayah,” which is expounded as “ pragatam vayo yasya”’ (one whose age is much gone or advanced).
230.81 In the example oited, exoellenoe is recognised as a part of the process of the performanoe of the action in whioh 00९06100 such a dakshind is laid down; and a 81101 it qualifies the Bhavana of such an Injunction. Another instanoe in this connection 18 “abhikraman juhoti;’’ and here the prefix “ abhi” is distinotly cognised as signifying “in front of (the sacrifioer)” and as suoh as being part of the Process, and thereby qualifying the Bhavana,
ON SENTENCE. 537
of the action). Because the direction cannot be taken as laying down the form and character of the doer only (because this would serve no pur- pose in the Bhavana; therefore it must be admitted that the front-direction qualifies the doer of the Bhavana, and as such becomes the process of the fulfilment of the Bhavana) |
282-283. 411 those (Prefixes) that completely change the expressive potentialities of the Root, and make it signify a meaning opposite to its original meaning (e.g., in the case of the Prefix “pra” added to the root “‘stha’’),—are held to be mere parts of the Root itself, inasmuch as they aré similar to any other parts of a Root (and as such they too have a connec: tion in the sentence)
283-284. As for instance, the Root “stha’”’ becomes expressive of “going,” when accompanied by the Prefix “pra,” and (it cannot be said that the prefix “pra” itself is expressive of going, becanse) when the prefix ‘‘pra”’ alone is uttered, we have no idea of “ going.”
284-285. A Verbal root (अद, f.i.) is at first cognised as having a generic significance, and this becomes specialised by the addition of the Prefixes, which have both (generic and specific significance),
285-286. And the specialisation thatis brought about in the Root (by the presence of the Prefix) is the appearance of a new significance. (And even if the original significance be altogether rejected, it does not matter, because) unless it relinquished the generic (significance) it could never be specialised.
285-286. (Specialisations or qualifications are of two kinds) some are qualifications of the signification or denotation itself (as in the case in question, the qualification by “pra” is of the denotation of the root “stha’’) and some are qualifications of the object denoted by a word (e.g., the word “blue” qualifies the object denoted by the word ‘“‘lotus’’); therefore just as (in the latter case) we have a rejection of the meaning (of the word “ Lotus,”’ as unqualified by any colour), so too (in the former case) we would have a rejection of the original potentiality (of the root ‘“stha” as signifying ‘to stay ’)
287-288. In the same manner, burning, &., may also be shown to have a connection with cooking; inasmuch as they form part of the Process helping either the cooking itself or its Result (the rice).
288-289. When the result to be attained is the cooked rice, then cooking is held to beits means; and since the cooking too has no existence unless it is performed, it stands in need of another means for itself
289-290. And as such means, we have the burning or the fuel. And
31.288 Thig refntes the objection that the fuel, &c., can have no connection with the cooking, through the actions of burning, &
68
938 CLOKAVARTIKA.
(we have the necessity of the means for both the rice and the cooking, because) the want of a Process appertains to all the Means (intervening be- tween the final result, cooked rice, and the first action towards its fulfilment).
290-291. The Process too can be a Means with reference to something else; (therefore though burning is the Process with regard to Rice as accom- plished by Means of Cooking, yet it becomes the Means with regard to Cooking; and thus indirectly the burning becomes connected with the final Result, as the Means of tts Means). And through the burning, the Fuel too becomes connected with the cooking (inasmuch as itis only by means of the burning of the Fuel that Cooking can be accomplished).
291-292. That an action (cooking, f.i.) should be accomplished by means of another action (burning) is not impossible, in accordance with our theory. Because we hold an action to be the means of another (Action), which (according to us) does not inhere in it.
292-293. (The burning is not held to be an independent Result by itself brought about by the Fuel, because) what is desired to be accomplished by means of the Fuel is not the mere burning, which appears only as a necessary accompaniment of the Fuel (and Fire) &., brought together for the purpose of Cooking.
293-294, Though these (Fuel, &c.) are agents (of the action of burning, &c.), yet they become endowed with Instrumentality, &c., with regard to cooking; inasmuch as (though their original potentiality lies in being the agent of burning, &c., yet), with regard to other actions, other potentialities (Instrumentality, &c.) appear in them.
294-295. With regard to burning, &c., they are held to have, by them- selves, the independent character of the agent; and it is only when the agent (who cooks) is cognisant of this independence (cf their active functions), that he uses them (in cooking)
295-296. But when they thus come to be employed, they become de- notative of Instrumentality, &c., on account of the suppression (of their active functions) by the newly-appeared principal active function of
291.292 In asserting one Aotion to he the means of another, we do not mean that the one inheres in the other; 2.९.) to say we do not hold an action to be the material oause of another action, inasmuch as it is only a subetance that can bea material cause. There- fore there is no harm in asserting an action to be a meana (not a material cause) of an- other aotion.
+ 292.293 Burning 18 only an accompaniment of the Means and can never be an eud de- 616 in itself
498.94 This shows that 17 18 not impossible for the same noun to bave different ohar acters ahd consequent case-endings
494.495 Tt is only when the man knows that the fuel will burn, and the Versel will contain the rice, that he ueee these in the act of cooking,
ON SENTENCE. 539
Dévadatta (who is the agent-in-chief in the sentence, being the agent of Qooking which is the principal Verb).
296-297, However, in cases where there is no such suppression (of the active function of fuel, &c.), we have such expressions as “the Fuels cook” (where the the active character of the Fuel is brought to the fore, in order to show, that while all other circumstances were against the accomplishment of the cooking, it was solely through the ex- cellent burning of the Fuel that it has been accomplished),
297-298. Hven though (the Active and the Instrumental characters are) cognised by means of one and the same word, yet one is held to be more predominant than the other (and there is no contradiction in this) ;—as we find, in the case of Verbal affixes (the Imperative, &c.), where the Bhavana, and the Number of the Nominative of the action are both denoted by the same (Verbal affix) (and yet the Bhavana is its primary denotation, while the other is only secondary).
298-299. Therefore, it must be admitted that the Nominative Agent is that whose action is primarily expressed by the Verbal root (i.e., one to whom the action denoted by the root primarily belongs); while those that have their functions subsidiary to this (principal action) have the character of the Instrumental, &c.
299-300. Then all these (Fuel, Burning, &c.), having functions sub- sidiary to the principal action (of cooking), are related to this principal action, as forming parts of the Process of the Principal Action.
300-301. There is a contradiction of the real character of things by either Negation or Doubt; inasmuch as what the negative denotes is ab- sence at some particular time, the Present, f.1.
301-302. And further, the negative, when in contact with a Noun or a Verb, denotes another (Noun and Verb, and not a Negation); and in such cases what is denoted is one object, as differentiated from another object (the latter being the one to which the negative is attached); and thus (the former object) isa positive entity, and as such, quite compatible (with the affirmative character of the sentence).
297.298 Tn the same manner, there would be the same comparative predominance or superiority in the various functions—Nominative, Instrumental, &o., of the Fuel.
498.99 As in the oase of “the Fuels cook,’ where greatest prominence being given to the action of the Fnel, this appears in the Nominative.
800-801 This refutes the objection that the negatives can have no conneotion in the sentence, inasmuch as they express either Negation or Doubt, bothof whioh go against the principal Action. The sense of this Karika 18 that the sentence “the jar is not’? does not deny the existence of the Jar at all times (and only then could the objection hold) ; but all that it signifies is the absenoe of the jar at the present moment; and oer- tainly this does not contradict anything.
540 QLOKAVARTIKA,.
302-303. And when the negative appears in connection with Verbal affixes, what it denotes is the regection of Ideas that are either unknown, or doubifal, or altogether mistaken (being contrary to what is really desired to be conveyed).
303-304, As for instance, when there is a doubt as to whether a cer- tain object exists or not, the negative (attached to the Verb “‘exists”) re- jects its existence, which is one factor of the doubt ; or, it may be taken as denoting non-existence, which is a real entity in itself (and not a negation at all).
304-305. And one who has not understood (a previous assertion of the negation of a certain object), comes to understand the non-existence (of such an object) (when he finds the negative in contact with it) (thus the negative having its function in the removal of Ignorance). While, one who has all along understood the object to exist, has his mistaken idea removed (by the negative, which, in this case, serves to bring about the rejection of @ mistaken idea).
305-306. Because, in this latter case, the Idea of existence disappears of itself, on account of its being contradictory to the subsequent cognition of non-existence (denoted by the Negative),—just as our previous cognition of the Mirage (as being a sheet of water) (disappears of itself, when sub- sequently we come to realise its real non-existent character).
306-307. This is the cass (with the denotation of the negative) even in cases where the means of cognition is not mere “ Negation”’ (४.९.) also in eases of ‘Sense-perception,’ &c.),—as for instance, in the case of the post (perceived as a man); in all such cases also, the Negative serves to reject Ignorance, and doubtful and mistaken notions in the case of the post, the subsequent negative—‘this 1s not a man”’—serving to remove the doubt, as to whether the object seen by the eye is a post or a man.
307-309. And, as a matter of fact, inasmuch as we have already (un- under “ Negation”) established ‘‘Non-existence” to he a real entity, it is similar (in all respects) to the jar, &c. And itis not at all negative in its char- acter; because, so long as the negative does not appear in contact with a certain positive declaration, it is nota proper negative at all. And (it is not necessary that. the negative should always appear in contact with some positive declaration, because) it is not necessary that a negation must al- cways be preceded by a previous affirmation (and even when it is so pre- ceded, the signification of the Negative lies in the removal of Ignorance, ‘Doubt and Wrong Ideas, as explained abéve).
309-310, And, as a matter of fact, a word (“Jar” 1.1. ) does not denote
क 209.810 If the word “jar” itself signified existence, then the addition of “is” would be ८६61९88,
ON SENTENCE, 544
the existence of such an object; inasmuch as what a word deuotes is only the lass (‘‘Jar’’), irrespective of existence (or non-existence) &c. And itis on account of this alone that the use of the word “ becomes possible (in connection with the word “Jar’’). 311-312. No one ever wishes to speak of either the existence or
the non-existence of the Class, (because this is eternal and as such ever existent). These two (existence and non-existence) are the qualificatious
of the individual which is indicated by the Class. Therefore there can be no contradiction between the negative and the directly denoted meanings of words (inasmuch as this latter'is the Class, while the non- eaistence signified by the negative belongs to the individual).
312-3138. Hven in cases (as “the jar exists not”) where having used the word “exists” (signifying existence), one uses the negative (signifying non-existence), (there is no contradiction, inasmuch as} the latter constitutes a specification of the former, and hence (the idea produced by the latter) serves to set aside that previously produced by the former (and there would he a contradiction only if both were cognised to be true at the same time).
313-314, Or, the word ^ exists” may be taken as bringing about the remembrance of a previously-cognised existence (of the ebject); and when the negative specification is added, it gives rise to the idea that that which existed previously does not exist now (and there is no self-contra- diction in this)
314-315. And as for the negative appearing in connection with an injunction—as in “ Do not kill,” “ do not drink,’ — such a negative lias not a negative signification,—all that it does is to prevent people from doing such and such an act (and there is no contradiction in this).
815-317. The ideas of negation, as those of affirmation, appear in quite another manner—inasmuch as they bring about the specification (in the shape of negation) of a certain definite external object. While, on the other hand, the functions of Injunction and Prohibition lead to
412.18 Thns then there can be no contradiction in the. sentence “the jar is not.” Becanse just as the additon of ‘‘ie” to the word “jar” signifies the existence of an individual] jar (apart from the class denoted by the word); so the addition of “is not a denotes the non-existence of the individual jar (apart: from the class: denoted by the -word “ jar’)
816.816 “ Do not kill”? does not mean the negative of killing, but it serves to prevent people from killing to whioh they may have been tempted by avarice, &c,
815-811 In the case of ordinary negations—euch as “the jar 18 not ° - 06 negative gives the idea of the non-existence of the jar, which is an external object ; whereas when the negativo appears with an Injunction—thereby oonetituting a Prohibition all ¢hat it does 18 to bring about an imternal determination on the part of the hearer. ‘Therefore there can be no similarity between the two. 1.
542 QLOKAVARTIKA. a certain determination in the mind (of the person addressed ),—inas- much as they respectively serve to urge and prevent a certain Bhavana
(of the mentioned results) which is yet to be produced, and has had no previous existence.
317-318. Option (vikalpa) too has its object in the two objects of these (Injunction and Prohibition). If it (the option) be with regard to such canses of action as have been previously enjoined, then it implies prohibitions (of one of them) ; and such an option has its end in prohibition ; while if it be with regard to those thatare not recognised as enjoined, then it implies the fact of their being an object of Injunction (and such an option has its end in Injunction).
318-319. It is impossible for us to have any cognition of two contra- dictories (Injunction and Prohibition, 1.) simultaneously, (at one and the same time), (even when they are mentioned as alternatives). What is possible is that there may be an operation of these (contradictories) by alternation (and in this there can be no contradicton, which is possible only if there be one idea of two contradictories at one and the same time).
319-321. And—either in the Veda, orin ordinary parlance—there can be no option with regard to those (contradictories) of which one is known (as enjoined) while the other is unknown. And where the two alternative factors are different objects—as in the cases of ‘Is this a post or a man P” and “Is he going or staying ?”—the word “or” signifies, not option but doubt; inasmuch as with regard to definite objects there can be no option (which is possible only with regard to alternative courses of conduct).
321-322. Asa matter of fact, Prohibition, &c., are possible only with regard to external objects; and nothing such is possible with regard to an Idea which is all in itself.
822-323, Because (in the case of “Jar 18 not”) the Idea (of existence)
811 Tt ia now shown that there is no contradiotion in the use of words expressing option—suoh as “or,” &o.
319.881 “ And where, &o.”—Up to this it has been proved that there is contradiction in an option with regard to causes of conduct. I} is now shown that with regard to definite objects, there can be no option.
sal.22 Tt has been urged by the Bauddha that the oontradiotiona above refuted ap- ply to one who holds the external reality of objects, and not to the Banddha Idealist. It is now shown that the fact is to the contrary, the impossibility lying only when the denor tations of words are held to consist of Ideas and not of any external objects. And it has been just shown that there is no contradiction if the denotations of words be external objects.
$22.23 Aocording to us whatis set aside by the negative is the mistaken oognition of objects, As for the Idealist, what oan it be that 18 rejeoted by the negative? Rejection
ON SENTENCE. 543
which bas been produced (by the word ‘“is”) cannot be held to be not produced at the same time (and it is this non-production of the Idea alone, that can, according to you, be the denotation of the ‘not’) (and hence a negative sentence involves a contradiction only when the signifi- cations of words are made to lie in Ideas alone). If it be held that the negative serves to destroy the previous idea (of existence), then, we reply, that) as for destruction, this would apply equally to true and false Ideas.
323-324. On the other hand, for one who holds the external reality of objects, an Idea, which is contrary to the true state of (external) things (as perceived by the eye, &c.), is said to be false; (and since he has this standard of falsity), there is every possibility of the rejection of a previous Idea (f.i., that of existence brought about by the word “is”
324-325. Even in this case, it 18 not the form of the previous cogni- tion that is either rejected or expressed (by the subsequent cognition). What is done by the subsequent cognition (brought about by the negative) is that the previous cognition is deprived of its fruits, in the shape of the abandonment (or acceptance) of objects.
325-326. Thongh for different people, different conceptions are pro- duced by a single sentence, yet we hold that of conception, as also of the sentence, the object must be external (since the conception too is of some object, and this cannot but be external).
is either in the shaps of non-production or in that of destruction. The former is not possible; because one that hag been prodnced, cannot be non-produced. And as for destruction, if such rejection be admitted, then true and false Ideas would all be equally liable to rejection, inasmuch as according to the Bauddha all Ideas are being destroyed every moment. And when all Ideas thus become equally rejeotiblse, there can be no standard whereby to judge the trnth or falsity of Ideas, inasmuch ag the only such standard is supplied by the fact that true Ideas are never rejected, while false ones always are
824.25 So long as the negative has not besn added, we have the oognition that the jar ewists,and so we set about taking hold of it in that place, and abandon its search elsewhere, As soon as the negative is added, the cognition produced by this sets aside the former cognition, and our condact ceases to be regulated by the previous cognition which thus becomes deprived of its 2868016 (the result of sentences being the regula- tors of the conduct of the hearer).
325.328 This refers to the view that the meaning of the sentence is the conception (or mental image) in the mind of the hearer,—as otherwise, from a 8118 sentence, differ ent people coald not understand different things; this could not be possible if exter- nal objects formed the meanings of sentences, becanse all external objects are perceived alike by all people. The sense of the reply as embodied in this Karika 18 that though the mental conception produced by one sentence is diverse in different persons, yet we hold that both of the senteaces and of the conception, the object exists in the external world. ^
544 QLOKAVARTIEA.
826-327. If by conception being the objéct of a sentence, you meau that conception is either the purpose or effect of the sentence,—then that does not in any way go against us.
827-328. The real denotation (of the sentence) consists of that exter nal object, which is referred to by the ideas produced by the words (com- posing the sentence)—ideas which are incapable of having themselves for their objects (and as such standing in need of external substrates).
828-329. We have already explained that the cognition (produced by words and sentences) is other than ‘“sense-perception,” and refers to ob- jects past, present and future; and aa such non-proximity (of the external object) cannot constitute a discrepancy.
329-330. And as for the diversity of the cognitions (produced by a sentence, f.i., there is a tiger on the road”’) of cowards and brave persons (the former construing the sentence to be a warning, while the latter tak- es it to be an encouragement) is due to (the difference in) their previons impressions (and character),—just as the ideas of foul mass (lovely woman and food, produced, with regard to a single woman, in the minds of an ascetic, an amorous person, and in carnivorous cannibals, respectively).
330-331. Inasmuch as it is always denoted by the Verbal affix, (and 88 such is present either clearly or otherwise in every sentence), the deno- tation of a sentence must be admitted to consist in the Bhavana, tinged by the denotations of various nouns expressing properties, classes, &c.
828.21 Woe 8160 admit that a sentence is uttered with a view to—and for the purpose of—produoing a conception (of ite meaning) in the mind of the hearer.
827.388 The incapahility of Ideas to have themselves for their objects 188 been proved under ‘Nira lambanavada.” This Karika ahowe that according to our theory the purpose of the sentence is the idea produced by the words; bnt since the idea too cannot but be without substrates in the external world, the existence of euch external objects muet be admitted.
328.889 This refers to the following objection: “It is not possible for objects that are paet to be of any use in the ideas produced by words 1608०86 you hold these objeots to be the cause of the ideas; and it is a well-known faot that, when the canseie not at hand, the effect is not possible. Therefore it muet be admitted that the denotation of the sentence consists of the oonoeption independently of any external objects.’ The sense of the reply ie that the proximity of the canse 16 neoessary only in sense- perception, and not in other means of right cognition, all of which latter refer to all ob- 16008, past, present and fnture. And sinoe verbal cognition is something other than sense-perception, nou-proximity of objects cannot be any discrepancy.
829.880 Just 88 with regard to a single objeot, there is a diversity of ideas, eo too in 8 single 66४61106 different sorts of people will have different ideas.
$30.81 Having proved that nothing else oan form the denotation of the sentence, the author deolares that it is the Bhavana that forms such denotation. Becanse if is to this that the nonne, &०,, become related on account of the Bhavana heing always 6008" nised as the prinoipal factor in the sentence. And even when the denotation of the
ON SENTENCE. 545
331-332. And this Bhavana is the object of a single cognition, which is of a variegated character, and which is brought about by a variegated conglomeration of the impressious left by the meanings of the words (com- posing the sentence).
332-333. Thus then, the connection among the words and their meanings is for the sake of this (Bhavana, which has been shown to be the principal factor in a sentence). Nor can the intervention of a word (be- tween the meaning of one wordand that of another) bea bar to the connec- tion (of the meanings of words).
333-334. Because a (real and successful) inéervener is said to be that alone, which is of equal strength (with the two factors sought to be con- nected), and which has no connection (with them); whilein the case in ques- tion, inasmuch as the words are subsidiary to their meanings, they could not interrupt any connection among their primaries, the meanings of words.
334-335. Because when one meaning has been comprehended (by means of a word), the other meaning too requires a means (in the shape of the word denoting it) by which it could be comprehended (and as such the intervention, of this latter word between these two meanings, is a necessity, and hence it does not interrupt, but only helps, the connection between them). And thus, inasmuch as the meanings stand in need of the words, these latter too acquire a certain relation (with the meanings; and as such being themselves related, the words cannot interrupt any connection among their meanings).
335-336. Thus it becomes established that words too have a certain connection in the denotation of sentences; hence it must be admitted as set- tled that the denotation of the sentence is always preceded (and brought about) by the denotation of the words (composing it).
336-337. We do not accept the sentence itself as evolving into the
Bhavani, is not complete, on account of the absence of any Verb clearly mentioned, even then it is always present, being denoted by Verbal affixes, without which no sentence 18 complete, and which is always understood.
831-832 The Bhavana as tinged by the denotations of nouns, &९., is cognised by means of a cognition whioh ia brought about by a simultaneons remembrauce of the meanings of previons worda—which being thue remembered simultaneously form by themselves a composite whole, which, on account of its being made up of tha impressions lett by various words, is of a variegated character. And inasmuch ag the Bhavana 18 cognised by means of such a variegated cognition, it is only natural that it should have a variega- ted character. _
833.384 The real ‘intervener’ ia explained in the Second Adhyaya,. Being subsidiary
they are weaker, and as subsidiaries they are not devoid of all connection with the
meanings, &c. 336.31 With this begins the refutation of th
69
© theory that it is the impartite sentence
546 CLOKAVARTIKA.
form of a denotation of the (same) sentence; because we have already proved (under “Sense-perception”’) that the denotation of a sentence is never cognised as identical with the seutence.
337-340. And further (the sentence being impartite, its denotation would also be impartite, and consequently) we could not properly have the occasional facts (of the supplying of ellipses, &c.), which are based upon the meanings of the words (composing the sentences) ; and we have, in ordi- nary parlance, instances (1) where there 18 a requirement [of only one fac- tor of the sentence: as when one says ‘‘close,” the person addressed desires to know what is to be closed, and then the other adds “the door,’”’—thus the two factors of the sentence “close the door” are separately uttered and comprehended | and (2) when there are questions with regard to unknown words ^ Pika,” &c., [as on hearing certain people talk of the cuckoo, one who does not know what is meant by the word “cuckoo,” asks “what isa cuckoo?” where it is only one factor of the sentence that has to be known, apart from the others]; and all this would become false (if the sentence and its meaning were impartite wholes). Nor cau such usages be explained by assuming (parts of the sentence and its meaning, which have no real exis- teuce, butare assumed for the sake of explaining the above usage) ; because we do not find the meanings of sentences brought about by the as- sumption of the ‘hare’s horns’; and, further, we have already explained that there can be no reality in a denotation comprehended by unreal (and non-existing) means. (Hence if the denotation of sentences were compre- hended by means of unreal parts assumed for the purposes of explanation, such denotations could not be real). And, as a matter of fact, we have never found that which is itself unreal and non-existavg to be a proper means of anything.
340-341. The Sutra declares the incapability of the sentence to denote meanings, which are all denoted by the words; and the reason (for
itself as a whole which evolves itself into Vedantic denotation, which, thus, is nothing beyond the sentence itself.
837-840 In fact, that which itself has no existence can never be the means of any thing. If there conld be the assumption of an unreal factor of areal thing (as of parts of sentences according to you) then we ocouid as reasonably assnme horns for the hare of which the hare is real, and we assume as unreal only a part of it inthe shape of the horns.
840.841 This explains the Sutra I—i—-25. A word can be held to denote something only when it denotes something not denoted by some other word. And ivasmuch as the denotation of the sentence is got at by means of the words, it is useless and gronnd-
less to assume the denotative onpacity of sentences (independently of the words com- ‘posing it).
ON SENTENCE, 547
asserting this incapability) is the fact of the meaning of the sentence be- ing due to those of the Words. Or, the siéra may be taken as asserting the fact of the meanings of sentences being based upon valid gronnds,— (the meaning of the satra being that) inasmuch as the denotation of the sentence is based upon the meanings of words, it cannot be said to be mistaken (as urged by the objector).
342-343, Though the letters (composing a word) directly denote the meanings of words only, yet they do not end in these alone, which, by themselves (i.e., when not forming parts of sentences), have no use. Hence for the purpose of bringing about the comprehension of the meanings of sentences, the functioning of these (Letters) is necessarily accompanied by the denotation of the meanings of words (composing that sentence), (in- asmuch as without a comprehension of the latter, there could be no com. prehension of the sentence, the words are as necessary for the sentence as for anything else),—just as the burning is a neccessary accompaniment of the Fuel, for the purpose of accomplishing the cooking.
344. Itisas the end or purpose (of the sentence) that Bhavana is held to be its meaning; inasmuch as by the expression ^ Kriyarthéna” (in the sttra) is meant the “purpose of utterance” (of the sentence).
345, The expression ‘white cow” is an instance cited (in the Bha- shya) only for the purpose of showing the relation subsisting between a sentence and its meaning,—and it is not to be taken as a real sentence (which must have a Verb, expressing the “Bhavana” as the purpose of the sentence).
346. Because a sentence is never uttered, apart from its purpose (i.e., it is always uttered with a certain purpose); nor is any word—excepting the Verb—capable of expressing the purpose.
347-348. But (as a matter of fact, there is no contradiction in agsert- ing the expression ‘‘ white Cow” to be a sentence), it is in such expressions
342.43 This refers to the objection that when words denote their own individual meanings, how can they be said to be necessary factors of the Veda—which is made up of sentences ?
8५५ This anticipates the objection that, if the denotation of the meanings of words also constitute that of the sentence, the Bhavana cannot he the latter. The sense of the reply is that in saying that Bhavana is the meaning of the sentence, by meaning we mean purpose, १.९. it is for the purpose of expressing the Bhavana that a sentence is nsed, whereas the assertion of the meaning of the sentence consisting of those of the words refers to denotation pure and simple. By saying that the sentence is “‘ Kriyartha ,” we mean that the implied meaning of the sentenco—Bhivani—is the end or purpose of the ntterance of the sentence; though the direct meaning of the sentences is that which 18 made up of the meanings of the individual words composing the sentence. This being the direct meaning, and Bhavana the indirect meaning of the sentence, there is no contradiction in our theory.
548 CLOKAVARTIKA.
as “cow horse, ”’—-where, what are denoted by these words are the classes “cow” and “horse”—that, if there be no cognitiou of particular individuals, there is a contradiction of the directly denoted (meaning of the aforesaid sentence) [inasmuch as the denotation of the sentence consists of individuals, while the sentence “‘cow 10786 * denotes only classes and there is no special purpose served by the company of the two words]; when however (as in the case of the expression ‘white cow”) we comprehend both the Class and the Individual as indicated by the words (“‘white—cow’”’), (there is a special purpose served in that) we give up the ideas of “black,” &c. (with regard to the individual cow), and hence there is no contradic- tion of the directly denoted meaning of the sentence (‘‘white cow,” which must be accepted to he a sentence),
849. The Individual having been indicated (by the word ‘“‘cow’’) there is a doubt (as to the property of this individnal); and when this doubt is set aside by the mention of the word,” ^ white,” what (direct meaning) can be contradicted ?
300. Asa matter of fact, the directly denoted meanings (of words) would be contradicted,in your theory (and not in mine),-—inasmuch as, in accordance with your theory, you can have no idea of “whiteness” (at the time of comprehending the sentence ‘‘white cow’’),—holding, as you do, the sentence to have no connection (with the component words and their meanings) and (as such) to have no special purpose (in the colleca- tion of the particular words).
351, The Bhashya passage “it may be the meaning of the sentence, &c.,” is an assertion made jokingly; and the assertion “not everywhere’”’ means that it is nowhere (so),
849 If the word “cow” only denoted the Class, then there would bes contradiction in the addition of “ white,” which cannot helong to the Class. When however we have the word “‘cow” denoting the Class snd indicating the individual, then the word ८१ छ 11116 ” serves the purpose of specifying the property of the individual cow; and 88 such there is no contradiction.
$51 The Bhishya passage referred to is this: ‘In 8. case where we conclude that the meaning of words having no special purpose, in the shape of the signification of the meaning of the sentence, hecomes useless (withont any denotation), it may he a meaning of the sentence, as consisting of the qualified meanings of words; but this no- tion of the qnalified meanings of sentences is not everywhere.” Here the 20850 ४ 80061019 the contradiction of direct denotations, only as a joke against the other party, inasmuoh as this contradiction has heen explained above.
The expression “it is not 80 everywhere” means that it 18 not always the cage that the acceptance of the individuals to be denoted by words is contradictory to their direct denotation (which is in the shape of classes);—auch is not always the cage, because, as
shown helow, in some 08868 the generio denotation is not cognised at all, the only oogni- tion heing that of particnlar individuals,
ON SENTENCE. 549.
302. Or, inasmuch as accusativeness, &e., fallin with the cognition of the basic noun (to which the accusative and other affixes are attached),— they acquire specific characters (and lose their generic character); and as such where would remain the direct denotation (that would be contra- dicted by the specific denotation of sentences) ?
303. Neither the basic noun nor the affix is ever used by itself (without the other)—and it conld be then alone (if they were used by themselves) that there could be a cognition of generic denotations, as de- sired by you.
354. Even in cases where these (47368 and Bases) are formed by themselves, as in “Adhuna,” &e., (““Adhuna” being only an affix), they are always accompanied (and specified) by the denotation of another,—as has been shown above (K. 203).
305-357, In fact this 18 the only difference between Word and Sentence on one hand, and Base and Affix on the other,—though all of them have their parts expressive (of some meaning):—As for Words, we find them used by themselves when they are in need of some factor to complete their meaning [as when it it is said ‘‘ close,” only one word uttered in haste, the question is “what,” the only word enquiring what is to be closed, and then the final reply too is only in one word, ‘door,”—in all these cases, the word used standing in need of something to complete its signification], when they are all comprehended independently by them- selves, as having some specific signification ; on the other hand, the Base aud the Affix are never found to be used in this manner (by them- selves); inasmuch as the signification of the Affix is always cognised as colourcd by that of the Base (and vice versa).
352 It has been shown that there is no contradiction. It is now shewn that at the time of the utterance of the word “‘gém,” the accusativeness {8118 in with the significa- tion of the “cow ;” and weare not cognisant of the pure generic denotation of the affix alone, as apart from the basic noun ^" 2.7 And thus there is no generic denotation of the affix which could he contradicted by the cognition of its being specialised with re- gard to the * cow.’
868 Tf either the basic noun or the affix were nsed by itself then alone could there be a generic denotation; but as there is no such separate use, the latter too cannot he cognised. Whenever the nonn or the affix is used, it is always the one with the other; and as such the generic denotation of each is specified by that of the other; and hence even though real, the generic denotation is never cognised.
854 The meaning of the affix is always specified by that of the Base, and vice versa.
$56.57 Just as words are expressive so are Bases and Affixes also; the only difference is that while words can be used by themselves alone, Bases and Affixes can never be so used. If the latter were also so used, then there wonld he no differcnce between these and words; since these too would have all the character and functions of words,
550 CLOKAVARTIKA.
358-359. When one 8668 the white colour, and hears the neighing and the clatter of hoofs, we find that he has the idea that “‘a white horse is running,” even in the absence of any such sentence; while, in the absence of some idea of the meanings of words we can never have any snch idea (as the above). Therefore the assertion of the non-perception of the sen- tence does not offer any reply to the assertion (of the Bhashya) beginning with “on account of some mental discrepancy,” &., (explained in the next Karika).
360. Those who, on account of their mental (intellectual) discre- pancy, do not comprehend the meanings of words, never comprehend the meaning of the sentence (composed of these words), even though they hear the sentence (distinctly uttered).
361. Therefore it must be admitted that the meaning of the sentence is not denoted by the sentence,—firstly, because it (the meaning) is com- prehended by means of others (.e., meanings of words), and secondly, because even when the sentence is clearly heard its meaning is not comprehended (so long as the meanings of words are not known),—just as the generic character of the “tree” is not denoted by the word “ Palaga.”’
362. Even Letters cannot be held to denote this (meaning of the Sen- tence)—-firstly, because they denote the meanings of those (i.e, of words) which are related (in the relation of the denoter) to the meaning of the sentence; and secondly, because even while these (Letters) are pre- sent, they do not bring about any comprehension (of the meaning of the
358.869 The Bhashya has cited this instance, with a view to show that, inasmuch as we have 8. idea of the signification of sentences, even in the absence of sentences, the signification of sentences must he admitted to he based, not upon sentences, bnt upon the signification of the words composing the sentence. Andin order to show that we have no idea of the meaning of the sentence in the ahsence of an idea of the meanings of words, it has nrged the oases where people that do not understand the words nsed—on acconnt of some deficiency in their intellect or mind—have no idea whatever of the meaning of the sentence, And in the face of these indisputable facts, it is altogether useless and unreasonable to assert that the absence of the cognition of the meaning of a sentence 18 due to the absenos of the cognition of the sentences itself. This has been shown to he false, inasmuch as in the instanog oited, we have an idea of the meaning of the sen- tence, “the white horse is running,” even withont any idea of this sentence. Thus hoth by negative and positive concomitance it is proved that the cognition of the mean- ing of the sentence is hased npon the cognition of the meanings of words composing the sentences.
861 The oharacter of the tree is oommon to trees other than the ‘“Palica” and is expressed by the word “Tree ;” and even when one hears the word “ 2218 68 this gives him no idea of the “tree” nnless he knows that characteristics of the tree helong to the Palag¢a.,
862 The letters denote the msauings of words, which denotes the meaning of the sentonce,
ON SENTENCH. 551
Sentence) (unless the Letters be recognised as formiug certain words, the meanings of which are known to the hearer),—just as the word “cinagapa” does not signify the class “tree.” [When “¢iracapa” denotes a particu- lar tree, which is related to the class ‘“‘tree,” and even while the word ‘“crragapa” is present, we have no idea of the class “ tree,” unless we know that the ¢izcapa is the name of a particular tree}.
363-364. It isthe meaning of the words that denotes the meaning of the seutence,—/firstly because, while the meaning of the sentence is doubtful each word is comprehended singly, and it becomes definitely ascertained when all the words are (heard and comprehended) together,—just like the uprightness and the presence of the crow with regard to the post [when, though one of the two facts leaves the matter doubtful, when both are con- sidered together, they lead to the defiuite conclusion that the object must be a post]; and secondly, because the meaning of the sentence is uot comprehended in the absence of the compreliension of the meaning of wovrds,—therefore (for this reason too) the former must be admitted to be comprehensible by means of the latter,—just as people hold Sound to be auditory (४.९. perceptible by the War), because it is not perceived when the sense of audition is absent (as in the deaf).
365-366. The eternality of sentences is to be proved in the same manner as the eternality of the Relation (between words and their mean- ings) (as shown under ^“ Sambandhakshépaparihara’’). And as for the argument (purporting to disprove the eternality of the sentence) based upon the fact of the seutence being a composite whole,—we ought to urge the following counter-argument against it: The study of the Veda is al- ways preceded by its study by one’s Teacher,—because it is mentioned by the expression ‘‘ Vedic study,”—like the Vedic Study of the present time (which is invariably found to be preceded by its study by one’s Teacher.
367, This argument would apply to the Mahabharata also; but it is countermanded by the distinct declaration of an author for it (in the person of Vyasa). As for the mention of names in the Veda (as being those of the composers), these must be explained as ‘‘arthavada” (purporting to show the excellent character of a certain Mantra or rite by coupling with it the name of some Rshi known to be great).
863.364 Those that singly leave a oertain matter doubtful and definitely ascertain it when considered together, must be accepted to be the means of the cognition there- of.
365.866 The atudy of each person being preceded by that of another person, this backward series would go on ad infinitum to eternity, making the Veda (and the sentences composing it) eternal.
502 CLOKAVARTIKA.
368. Because no students of the Veda have any idea of its author; aud as for the aforesaid ‘Arthavadas,” they too cannot be taken as point- ing to an author (as will be shown below); hence any idea of an author of the Veda caunot but be mistaken, as will be explained below.
369. So long as these Arthavadas continue to exist in the Veda, there can be no assumption of any other grounds (for declaring the fact of the Veda having an author) (because, in the presence of aground seemingly afforded by the Veda, no other can be assumed); as we find that even the people of the present day derive their notions of an author of the Veda from these (Arthavadas).
869 The sense of this is that in presence of these Arthavaidas, no other ground can be assumed, and as the Arthavada is proved below to be incapable of rightly pointing to an anthor for the Veda, all notions of such an author must be admitted to be groundless, mistaken and false,
End of the Chapter on Sentence.
APHORISMs XXViIL to 11. ON THE VEDA BEING WITHOUT AN AUTHOR.
1. Obj :—“Finding the Vedic assertions tobe similar to ordinary assertions, we have a general idea of the Veda having an author; and this becomes specified by the names ‘Katha,’ &., given to the different sections of the Veda.
2. “In the 21st Sitra it has been shown (in the Bhashya) that the fact of words being caused entities is based upon their having forms; and this is equally applicable to the Veda also, inasmuch as it makes mention of caused entities (such as the names of certain persons, &c., which can never be eternal).”
3. Keply:—Inasmuch as we have neither any rememberance of an author nor any need of any such,—no author is wanted for the Veda (as shown in K, 366); and since the ideas of particular authorship (as of Katha, &c.) depend upon the general notion (of such authorship), no names (such as ‘‘Katha”’ and the like) can point to any authors of the Veda.
4, Inasmuch as the names “Katha,” d&c., may be explained as signi- fying the fact of certain portions of the Veda being explained by such people,—these names cannot necessarily point to an author; specially as the affix (in the word “Katha”) is also laid down (by Panini) as denoting the fact of being expounded (by Katha).
5. And thus Name, being weaker than Direct Assertion and the rest, cannot set aside the facts based upon these latter. And further, inasmuch as this (Name) is a part of the Veda, it can never possibly set aside the whole of the Veda (by pointing to the fact of its having an author).
1 The name‘ Katha’ implies that that portion of the Veda has been composed by
Brahmanas of the “ Katha’’ class. This 18 an explanation of Sutra 27. ॐ This is an explanation of Sitra 28,
8 This explains Sutra 29.
4 This explains Sutra 30.
6 If there be an author of the Veda, Direct Assertion, &c., all lose their validity Hence we cannot base our notion of the anthor upon Names, which would thereby set aside Direct Assertion, &c,, which is an impossibility.
70
554 QLOKAVARTIKA.
6. Or these (‘‘ Katha,” &c.) may be taken as conventional names, given, without any reason, to particular sections of the Veda. And the fact of these names (appearing with regard to certain sections of the Veda) being only similar in sound, the same words (as signifying the fact of being composed hy Katha, &c.) is not to be denied on pain of any punishment (4.e., there is no law which lays down that the two do not resemble in sound only)
7. Even though the explanation of the Veda is common to all persons (and not restricted particularly to Katha alone), yet the name may be given to certain sections of the Veda, simply on the ground of the possi- bility (of its being explained by Katha); just as the Jyotishtoma is called “ Vairipasama '' (though many other Samas are chanted in the Jyotish- toma), simply because the particular Sama ^ Vairiipa”’ also appears in it.
8. The names “Katha,” &c., indicating the fact of Katha, &c., being the explainers, are not‘such as to restrict the explicability of those sec- tions of the Veda to those teachers alone, inasmuch as all that the name does is to show that the section of the Veda has been explained by that particular teacher also among others,—just as the mother of Dittha and Kapittha is called “ Dittha’s mother ” (which does not mean that the person is not the mother of Kapittha, but that she 18 also the mother of Dittha, among others).
9. The fact that, even though the relation of the section with all teachers is the same, yet it is named after one of them only, is due to the fact that such naming is not a-qnalification of the agent (९.९. the Teacher ) and as such it is not necessary to repeat it with regard to all the Teachers); hence the naming (in accordance with Teachers) being (a qualification) for the sake of another (2.९. the Sections of the Veda), the mention of only one of them is necessary.
10. (Even if the name “ Katha” were taken as implying the author. ship of Katha with regard to the Veda, then too) it is only an already existing cause (in the shape of Katha) that is signified (by the name ‘‘Katha’’); and it does not signify the production of something previously non-existent.
6 ‘Katha’ 88 name of the Veda is not the same as the word which signifies the fact of being composed by Katha, bnt resembles it in sound only.
9 Sinoe the naming in accordance with all Teachers, supplies the same qualifica- tion for the Veda, when this has heen accomplished by the name of one Teacher, it is not necessary to name other Teachers--this is the reason why the names of these sections are not in accordance with those of all Teachers of theory.
10 Even the word “ Katha” as aname is eternal, and not oreated by us; all that we mean by calling the Veda by the name is that we interpret it 88 signifying the authorship of Katha, which too is eternal, being signified by the word “ Katha,” which is eternal.
THE VEDA HAS NO AUTHOR. 555
And (as for the meaning of Vedic sections according to the name of only one Teacher, it is similar to the case where) a certain sacred place, though visited by many people, is named in accordance with only one of its visitors (such as Somatirtha,” &.).
11. And if the name “Katha” be not due to human agency, then it cannot indicate non-eternality; and if it be due to human agency, then how can its truthfulness be ascertained ?
12, Or ‘Katha’ as a Class (of Brahmanas) is held by us to be eter- nal; and it is this Class (as denoted by ^ Katha”’) which appears in the name “ Kathaka” which (means that the particular section of the Veda belongs to the particular Class of Brahmanas, called “ Katha” and) serves to distinguish that particular section from other sections of the Veda.
13-14. The Veda naturally abandons the denotation of non-eternal meanings,—inasmuch as such denotation is found to be impossible with regard to the Veda, by considering alternatives of eternality and non- eternality with regard to it. Because if the Veda be eternal its denotation cannot but be eternal; and if it be non-eternal (caused), then 1६ can have no validity (which is not possible, as we have already proved the validity of the Veda); andas for the theory that the Veda consists of assertions of intoxicated (and senseless) people, this theory has been already rejected above—(and as such the validity and hence the eternality of the Veda cannot be doubted. )
15. Thus up to this place, we have established by arguments, the fact of the Veda being the means of arriving at the right notion of “ Dharma.”
After this (in the succeeding three pa@das), after having divided the Veda into its three sections, we shall explain what is the meaning (and purpose) of each of these sections.
Thus ends the chapter on the fact of the Veda not bewng com- posed by any author.
Thus ends the “ Mimansa-Clokavartika” of Crt Kumarila Bhatta,
11 If the name be given by man, it cannot be infallible, &c., and as such this name alone cannot authorise the assumption of an author for the Veda,
13.19 This explains Sitra 31.
16 The three sections of the Vedaare Arthavada, Mantra,—Smriti and Names treated of in padas 2nd, 3rd and 4th, respectively.
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CLOKAVARTIKA
COMMENTARIES OF SUCARTTA MIORA (THE कप) ^+ प्रण PARTHASARATHI MICRA (THE NYAYARATNAKARA)
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1-5 @ 1/ each aes sit *Bhamati, (Text) Fase. 4-8 @ /6/ each Bhatta Dipiké Vol. 1, Faac. 1-2 fis a Brahma 87४19, (English) 788९. 1 ... tee ए Re Brhaddévata (Text) Fasc. 1-4 @ /6/ each ae ह Brhaddharms Purina, (Text) Fasc. 1-6 @ /6/ each छ ne Catalogue of Sanskrit Book MSS. in the Scciety’s Library, Fasc, I and. II @ 2] ०१४ ore ane iets an *Caturvarga Chintamani (Yext) Vols. II, 1-25; III. Part I, Fasc. 1-18. Part 11, Fase. 1-10 @ /6/each_ ... an i Qlokavartika, Faso. I... we ae He *#Ureuta Sitra of Apastamba, (Text) Fasc. 4-14 @ /6/ each
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*Advaita Brahma Siddhi, Faso. 2,4 @ /10/ each ive Ra. . Advaitaohinté Kauetnbha, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ each *Agoi Purana, Faso. 3-14 @ /10/ each pubes Aitaréya Brahmana, Vol. I, Faso. 1-5; Vol. Il, 7956, 1-5; Vol. III, Faac. 1-5, Vol. IV, Fasc. 1-8 @ /10/ each oes ०० 1 Aitareyalocana ००५ ००७ *Anv Bhashya, Faec. 2-6 @ /10/ each | Aphoriama of Sandilya (English), Faec. 1 @ 1/- Astas&hasrika Prajiiaparamita, Fasc. 1-6 @ /10/ each *Atharvana Upanishad, Faso. 3-5 @ /10/ each Atmatatviveka, Fasc, I wee क sis eh Agvavaidyaka, Fago. 1-5 @ /10/ each ora en tes 9४६१३०९ Kalpalata, (Sana. and Tibetan) Vol. I, Faac. 1-6; Vol. II, 1886. 1-5 @ 1/ each १४९ wpe ene A Lewer Ladakhi version of Keseraaga, Fasc. 1-3 @ 1/- each Bilam Bhatti, Vol. I, Fasc. 1-2, Vol. 11, Fasc. 1, @ /10/ each Bandhayana Sranta Sitra, Faso. 1-3 @ /10/ each one *Bhamati, Fasc. 4-8 @ /10/ each (४ ००० Bhatta Dipika, Yo). I, 1860. 1-5 @ /10/ each र Brahma 87०४8, Fasc. 1 @ /10/ each Brhaddévata, Faac. I-4 @ /10/ eaoh ee Brhaddharma Purana, 7980. 1-6 @ /10/ each Bodhioaryavatara of Cintideva, Faac. 1-6 @ /10/ each Qatadiisani, 7960. 1-2 @ /10/ eaoh ae see x Catalogne of Sanakrit Booka and MSS., Fasc. 1-4 @ 2/ each a Qatapatha Brahmana, Vol. I, Faso. 1-7; Vol. II, Fasc. 1-5; Vol. -TII, Fase. 1-7 @ /10/ each; Vol. 5, Fase. 1-4 aes (ataasaheeriki-prajnaparamita, Part I, Fasc. 1-12 @ /19) each cee *Caturvarga Chintamani, Vel. II, Fasc. 1-25; Vol. III, Part I, ` 1980, 1-18, Part II, Fasc. 1-10; Vol. IV, Fasc, 1-6 @ /10/ each ... 3 | Olokavartika, (Huglish), Fasc. 1-6 @ 1/4/ each = P, *Qranta Siitra of Apastamha, Faec. 9-17 @ /10/each =... re | Ditto Qankhayana, Vol I, Faso. 1-7; Vol. II, Faac. 1-4; Vol. III, Faso. 1-4 @ /10/ each; Vol. 4, Fasc 1 1 ea Bhashyam, Fasc, 1-3. @ /10/ each ove er des ari दढ Kaumndi, Fasc. 1-2 @ /10/ each ... ee Gadadhara Paddhati Kalaagra, Vol. 1, Fasc. 1-7 @ /10/ each Ditto Acarasara, Vol. II, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/each Gobhiliya Gribya.Sutra, Faec. 4-12 @ /10/ each sae , 0५ , _ Vol, II, Fase. 1 @ 1/५ /each Kala Viveka, Faac, 1-7 @ /10/ each e oe ay Katantra, Faac. 1-6 @ /12/ each =a = ee Katha Sarit Sagara, (English) Faso. 1-14 @ 1/4/ each 1 ‘Kirma Parina, Faso. 3-0 @ /10/ each ५ re aoe Lalita-Vistara, (Nnglish) Fasc. 1-3 @ 1/- each si *Lalitavistara, Fasc. 8-6 @ /10/ each न = (1 te es ie ३ -Mahi-bhasya-pradipodyota, Vol. I, Fasc. 1-9; एण. II, Fasc. 1-12; "Vol. 177, Faso. 1-6 @ /10/ each ¢ | इ ष Manntikd Sangraha, Faac. 1-8 @ /10/ each 4 ग Markandeya Purina, (English) Faac, 1-9 @ 1/= each. *Mérkandeyd Parana, Fasc. 5-7 @ /10/ each ,,. $ ode * 1108088 Dargana, Fasc. 6-19 @ /10/ each ee ह Nyiyavartika, Fasc. 1.6 @ /10/ each
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