AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION TANTRA-VARTIKA K U MA K 1 ite जय पाद Pir ^ ADHYAYA Ii PADA JI TReatina or (पष ARTHAV§DA. A. क) ADHIKARANA (1). (On the authority of the Arthavada passages, ) phorism (1): “The purpose of the Veda | down of actions, those (parts of 4t) whi purpose are useless ; and in these is the Ve 5 all round, the A 1018, Arthavddas and The foregoing P he authority of the Veda tn general; and the author now p ith the authority of the various portions of the Veda, r, ib may be, that ha ving ascerta 188 established roceeds to deal taken separately. ined the authoritaghes character of the Fide I has been dealt with by the author in his he Jated for this Series —Nos. G65 ef ] 1 w hioh jh en trang. 2 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA Il—ADHI I. Veda, the author now proceeds to explain the usefulness, with regard to Dharma, of the whole of the Veda, consisting of Vidhis (Injunctions), Arthavadas (valedictory passages), Mantras and Names, each of these being considered separately with reference to its own specific uses Now then, on this point we have the following POURVAPAKSHA! ‘ Having begun with the declaration that ‘the nature of Dharma ‘“Jies in a purpose having the Veda for its sole authority,’ it has been “shown that the means of knowing that Dharma is the Injunction ; ‘and the final conclusion arrived at (in the foregoing Pada) was that the ८ objects of Injunctions were laid down for the purpose of Actions. This ‘clearly shows that the said authority belongs only to the Injunctions and “the Prohibitions (contained in the Veda). Consequently Dharma or ५ Adharma cannot be pointed out by any words other than these (In- “junctions and Prohibitions). ` “Tt has also been explained that words अ purpose save “that of expressing that which has not been“known before, Therefore it ‘may be that due authoyyy “belongs to to the passages included in the Injunc- _ sions snk tus rrohibitions, which serve to point out the Results, the ^° Means and the Methods of the various Actions; but as regards the pas- ‘sages other than these, viz.: those that fall in the category of the ‘ Arthavada, or the Mantra or the Name,—such f.7., as ‘S‘orodit,’ ‘ Ishe, “ &0. ' and the like,—though they may be independent of all human ‘‘authorship, and may be duly expressive, yet they cannot have any author- ‘ity in the matter of Dharma and Adharma ; for the simple reason that they “00 not serve any purpose with regard to these; specially as when taken in “their direct significations, these passages do not point out anything (with “regard to Dharma or Adharma); and as such their uselessness with “regard to them 18 quite patent. “If, by means of some indirect method of implication, the usefulness o “these be sought to be established, even then, there being no standard fo definitely fixing (these significations), it would never be possible to get a ‘any definite conclusions with regard to Dharma and Adharma (by mean “of such passages). Itis only that sentence which has been duly compre “hended (in a definite sense) that can be twisted about to afford othe ‘‘ mennings, by means of elliptical and other modifications ; consequently th ‘‘gentence being only in the form ^ S‘oredit’ (‘ He wept’), it may be taken't ‘have two (contrary) implications: (1) since a great man wept, we ought ¢ ‘weep; and (2) since even great men are subject to such disorders, we oughi ‘to try our best to avoid them. And thus inasmuch as we are unable to decide as to whether the passage is to be taken as an Injunction or 88 ४ Prohibi- “tion (of weeping), it cannot in any way help us to definitely ascertain, 1 The view of ‘the opponent. AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES: 2. “the character of weeping,—as to whether it is Dharma.or Adharma. On “ the other hand, it is quite clear that weeping is opposed to: direct scriptural “injunctions (which lay down the necessity of auspicious actions, while ‘‘ weeping is distinctly inauspicious). Then, again, the passage in question is “also clearly opposed to direct Sense-perception (inasmuch as it speaks of “the tears being silver, while as a matter of everyday perception, we find ०८ the tears to be liquid and quickly evaporating). It may be urged that they. ८८ serve to describe a certain state of things; but though they may be quite “true in this, the description does not serve any useful purpose; and as “such the uselessness of such passages (with regard to Dharma) remains ९ unchanged. “Similarly, such passages as ‘the smoke alone of the fire during ‘‘the day, d&ec.,’ are untrue, even in their direct significations, as we shall point out later on “* As for the fact of these Arthavdda passages being taken in connection ‘“ with other direct Injunctions, this only serves to spoil their own natural ‘forms; and for such interpretation, too, there is noauthority. Taken by ‘themselves (४,९.) even apart from any Injunctions) these passage are ° capable of giving some sense; and so long as they do point out something ‘definitely, the mere fact of their being useless (with regard to Dharma ‘“and Adharma) cannot justify our saddling upon them other implications, ‘‘ which may serve certain purposes (with regard to Dharma), but which ‘are not capable of being cognised directly (by means of the said passages). ‘For when we come across a piece of stone, the mere fact of its being ‘useless cannot justify the assumption that we have seen a mass of gold. “Tt is a rule with all means of right notion that they point to facts that “are directly amenable to themselves—be they either useful or useless ; “and it is in accordance with this that they are held to lead to such rosults ‘as the acceptance of that which is useful, the avoidance of that which is (५ harmful, and the neglect of that which is useless. [This diversity would “not be possible if they always pointed to useful things] when acceptance ‘‘ would be the only result. And again, it is only after the means of right ‘notion has appeared (and poiuted out its object), that we can ascertain “its usefulness or uselessness; and certainly this ascertainment does not +." coustitute the source of that means. Consequently, the usefulness or the ॥ uselessness of a thing must be ascertained with reference to itself, as soon , 88 it comes to be cognised ; and there 18 no:such rule as that only +° प्रपि] things should be cognised. HEvenin a case where the means of ५ knowledge (the Hye for instance) is absolutely at the person’s command, ‘such aruleis not possible; how, then, can it be applied to the case of such ‘things as are only cognisable by means of the Veda, which is eternal, and ‘has not been composed by an author? Nor bas it been ascertained that 4 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I-—PADA 11--ADHI I. ५५ {116 Veda points out only useful things; in fact, this is what we are consi- “ dering now—what the Veda has got to say with regard to such and such ‘‘athing; and having ascertained this we shall be able to act up fo its ८ direct declarations ; consequently we cannot, at this stage of the enquiry, ‘raise any extraneous questions with regard to the Veda—such, for in- ‘stance, as does the Veda speak of useless things P—If 80, what is the use ‘‘of studying it and retaining it in memoryP MBecause in the matter of “the Veda, all men are mere interpreters ; and as such they are all depen- ‘‘dent upon it; and it is only after the Veda has been duly studied, that ‘‘there arises an occasion for examining its contents ; no one can ever com- “‘mence such examination, without having previously fully studied the “Veda. And when, subsequently, he does come to examine it, his previous ‘study does not help him in arriving at any conclusions, if he has studied ८ {116 Veda, without comprehending its meaning; as we have shown in the ‘foregoing Pdda. ५ For these reasons, the instance of the passages dealing with the Agni- ५५ hotra, whose uselessness is denied on the ground of their use being dis- “tinctly perceptible, cannot lead to the conclusion that the passages in ‘question (Arthavddas) also have their use. Because for such investiga- ५५ tions we can do nothing better than duly comprehend what is directly laid ‘‘down. People undergo all the trouble of assuming (through a far-fetched “connection with an indirect Injunction) that the passages in question “imply either glorification or villification । ; but these do dot fall within the ५५ three factors of the Bhdvand (denoted by the Injunction), and as such ‘‘cannot be accepted (as in any way connected with the Injunction) ; ५८ because what is not included in the Bhadvand does not serve as the basis “for either Injunction or Prohibition; and that which is not thus related ‘Sto these is far from constituting a desirable end of man. “Then, again, if such passages were assumed to signify glorification or “ willification, there would be a mutual interdependence ; inasmuch as it is “ only as consisting of such glorification or villtficatvon, that these passages ‘can be taken along with direct Injunctions; and this connection with “direct Injunctions also depends upon the implication of the latent glor ५५ fication or villificattion, None of these two are ordinarily recognised a “being the real basis of another; and hence nothing definite can be < 1 If by these you mean the fact of the particular action leading to desirable or undesirable results, or that of. its being enjoined or prohibited, then, inasmuch as these are expressed by other means, they cannot be said to constitute the use of the Arthavada passages. There 18 no other purpose that can be served by these in connection with In- junctions: nor can these latter be said to be indicated by the Arthavdda passages. And hence they could serve sonie purpose if they fell within the Bhdvana; but this they do not do. | | ~ AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 5 “tained (in the matter of such interdependence). For these reasons we “conclude that inasmuch as these passages stand apart (from the Injunc- ^“ tions) it 18 far more reasonable to regard them as absolutely useless, “Says the Bhashya: ‘ This is an attack upon only a part of the whole ‘ gentence. Though the Arthavdda is distinct from the direct signification “of the Injunction, yet it is spoken of, by the Bhdshya, as being a part of ‘the (Injunctive) sentence, in accordance with the orthodox Mimansa tenet ‘(that the Arthavada is to be taken along with the Injunction). This is not ‘“‘in accord with the view of the Objector, who treats of the Arthavada as a ° sentence entirely distinct (from the Injunction). Or the words of the Bha- ‘‘shya may be taken to mean that the attack is only upon a few of the sen- ‘“‘tences (of the Veda, viz., the Arthavdda passages). As for those that are ‘‘ accompanied by direct Injunctions, thera is no question (as to their useful- ‘ness or authority) ; and as for those that, containing injunctive words, and ‘thereby capable of expressing direct injunctions, even without the Artha- ‘vida passages, subsequently come to be related to these latter, and thereby ‘‘ become mixed up with the relation of the glorification and the glorified,— ‘the authenticity of such passages is questioned only so far as their connec- tion with the Arthavadic signification is concerned, and not with regard ‘* to their usefulness to man, based upon their injunctive character. ‘‘ Such passages, however, as only describe certain present events, and “are incapable of any injanctive signification, without the help of the “ Arthavada,—e.g., ‘one who uses a Sruva of the Khadira wood, offers, as ‘“‘it were, the very essence of the Vedas’,—have been attacked (in the Sutra), ‘by means of a questioning of the authority of a part of them (namely, the ५८ Arthavdda).” Aphorism (2): ‘“ Also because of the contradiction of the scrip- tures and directly perceived facts.” “* Whether the theft and the lie exist or not, in the mind and the speech ‘respectively, the declaration of such facts (in the Vedic sentences ‘ sténam ‘““manah,’ ‘anrtavddini vak’) with reference to Dhkarma,'! cannot have any ‘‘ authority, even with regard to their own direct denotations. If an elliptical ‘construction be put upon the sentences,—they being taken to mean that ‘inasmuch as the mind and speech are the principal factors in the body, the ०५ said conduct of these ought to be imitated by the other sense-organs,—then ‘we havea contradiction of the scriptures. “Tt-may be urged that these sentences serve to point out the alternative 1 Because the mind can never steal, and speech can never tell a lie, the two . sentences fail even in their direct significations. Even if they be held to be expla- natory of certain unseen events, then, too, serving no useful purpose in regard to an action, they can bave no authority. 6 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA H--ADHI I. “course of conduct (to that which is laid down in such sentences as ‘ never “commit a theft,’ ‘never tell alie’) inasmuch as the theft and lying. ave ‘enjoined (by the sentences in question), and are also prohibited (by other ‘‘sentences). But this theory is not tenable, on account of there- being a ‘‘ difference in the processes of the said Injunction and Prohibition, inas- ‘‘much as the former has got to be assumed by means of an elliptical. con- ०८ struction, &c., while the latter is distinctly laid down (by a direct prohibi- “ tive Injunction). | ९८ Objectton!: ‘But even though a Direct Injunction be weak in itself, ‘‘vet it. becomes equal in strength to the Prohibition that owes its very ‘* existence to the former, as will be shown later ou, under the first aphorism ८ 0 the eighth Pdda of the Tenth Adhdya.’ “ Reply: True; in acase where the action prohibited is such as can be ‘‘ nerformed only in obedience to a certain Injunction contained in the Veda, “there may he such dependence (of the Prohibition upon the Injunction). ‘ But in a case (like the one cited) where we have the Prohibition of an ‘‘ action that 18 performed, under the gonad of passion (for wealth f.i.), the: ८५ Prohibition asserts itself independently of any Injunctions; and as such ‘it becomes stronger in its operation, as we shall explain in the Pada ‘above referred to, in the second aphorism, following the one quoted above. “ Stealing and Lying are performed independently of any Vedic texta ९८ 61110101 these actions; and as such the Prohibition of these 18 indepen- “dent of all Injunctions; and this prohibition cannot but set aside any “Injunctions that might be assumed. For this reason we conclude that the ८५ Arthavada passage in question 1s absolutely useless, “We now proceed to prove the uselessness of Arthavdda passages, as ५५ shown by their own meanings and implications. ५ [४ 18 a fact of common experience, that during the day as well as during ८ {116 night, we perceive, in the fire, both smoke and flame; and we cannot ‘say either that it is purely smoke, or that it is.only flame (while this is ‘what 18 done by the Arthavada passage ‘Smoke alone is perceived during “the day’). Nor is it possible to ascertain definitely that during the day “the flame of the fire enters into the Sun, while during the night, the San ` “enters into the flame (in support of which the former Arthavdda passage ‘seems to have been brought forward); because the fact that has been ‘‘adduced in support of such mutual transferences of the Sun and the Fire, “has not yet been fully established as true “Or, again, the ‘ non-ascertaiument’ (spoken of in the Bhdshya} may । Though the Prohibition may refer toa particular case, yet without.a general Injunction, no such Prohibition can be possible; and thus both being equally indispens- able, we cannot but accept both as equally reasonable alternatives ; such ia the sense of the objection. i AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. | “mean that it is not possible for-us to assume this passage to have been ‘said in ‘praise of the fact of the sun'shining only during the day and fire ‘shining only at night; because this-latter statement is not true. Or, the ‘non-ascertainment’ may.mean that it is not possible to de- “finitely specify that the mantra ‘Stryo jyotih, §c.,’ is to be employed in “the morning, and ‘ Agnirjyotzh, &c.,’ in the evening. ‘Or, lastly, it may mean that we are not able to ascertain that the ‘‘ whole of the Veda is an authority for Dharma. “ The Bhdshya has first of all cited an instance of the contradiction of ‘‘scriptures (in the shape of the assertion of stealing and lying with refe- ‘rence to mind and speech) ; and then it has cited two instances (the seeing “of smoke alone during the day, and the mutual transference of the Sun “and Fire) of the contradiction of direct perception; and again it has ad- ‘duced an instance (‘We know not whether we are Brahmanas or non- ‘‘Brahmanas’) of the contradiction of scriptures. And the reason for so ‘many similar examples being cited, as also for the want of proper sequence “in their citing, 1168 im the fuct uf the Bhdshya having in ‘view the sense “and the ‘order of the subsequent Sutras, that embucy-the fina! pocitionof “the Siddhdnta, and which meet each of the arguments now adduced in the “* Purvapaksha. ‘The passage ‘ We know not, &c.,’ is meant to be taken along with the ‘Injunction of theappointing of the Arshéya priest. But inasmuch as the ‘passage does not signify either this action (of appointing) or anything ‘related to it, it cannot be accepted as having any authority bearing upon “that Action. For certainly, no iguorance, doubt or misconception, with ‘regard to Brahmanahood could be of any. use in the Sacrifice. Nor can “we admit that asa glorification which is contradictory to direct Percep- “tion. Nor, again, can ‘the passage have any authority, so long as it only ““speaks of mere ignorance of Brahmanahood. ९ [६ may be asked how this declaration of ignorance contradicts a fact “ of direct Perception, when, as a matter of fact, among a certain number ‘“‘of men resembling one another, the fact of one or many of them being a ¢ Brshmana can be ascertained only by means of scriptures. But in reality “ this is, not a subject for scriptares ; because the class Bréhmara is as much ‘an object of ordinary perception as the class tree Question: ‘How cau the class Bradhmana be known by ordinary “ men?’ “ Answer: It is known by direct Sense-perception. “ Question: ‘But, then, how is it that even when the person is before ‘our eyes, if we do not know the details of his parentage, &c., we are ‘‘gnable to ascertain whether he is‘a Braéhmana or not, until someone tells “ugsof it?’ 8 TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADH. I-~PADA I!-—ADHI I. “ Answer: Well, the reason for this lies in the absence of proper facul- ‘‘ ties in us for perceiving the Brahmanahood ; exactly in the same way as we ९५ are unable to recognise a certain objeot as the ‘tree’ until the meaning of ४५ {116 word has been explained to us. “The following arguments might be urged against us: ‘The cases of “the Brahmana and that of the Tree are not quite identical; because even ‘before the explanation of the word tree, the partioular class denoted by ‘‘the word has ever been recognised as differentiated from other classes, and “inhering in all individual trees,—these latter appearing in the shape of “a certain object with leaves, branches, &c. ; while in the case of the class ५८ Brahmana such is not the case (because there are no perceptible marks ‘‘that could differentiate the Brahmana from other men); and, again, in “the case of the Brahmana, even when one has fully comprehended the ‘‘meaning of the word, he is unable, in the absence of other means, to as- “certain the fact of a particular person being a Brahmana. For instance, “neither the wearing of the sacred thread, nor the study of the Veda, can ‘be the means of such ascertainment; because these two features are ‘‘common-to all the thrée “higher castes; as for the work of teaching ०५ ( 1100 is laid down for the Brahmanas exclusively), inasmuch as such ८५ Kshatriyas and Vaicyas as have transgressed the limitations to their daties, ‘are also found to beengaged in that work, this can serve only as a very ‘‘doubtful index. In fact, all these can belong to Qudras also,—such of ‘them as are not mindful of their own specified duties and transgress the ५५ limitations laid down in the scriptures. Consequently none of these can ‘‘serve as a sure index of Braéhmanahood. And if one were to accept a ‘manas a Brahmana, without proper consideration, such a person would, ‘as reasonably purchase a {1606 of shell, thinking it to be silver P ’ “These arguments, however, do not touch our position. The dissimi- ‘larity of the case of the class free cannot affect our conclusion with “regard to the perception of the class Brahmana; specially as it has ‘“‘ulready been explained (in the section on Akriti, in the Clokavartika) “that there are different methods for the cognition of different classes. “(Consequently the fact of the process of cognising the class Brdhmana “not being exactly similar to that of the cognition of the class free, cannot “in any way invalidate our perception of the former). “Thus, then, just as, in accordance with the exigencies of each indi- ‘“‘ vidual case of the cognition of a class, we admit of various causes, in ५५ the shape of, (1) the sense of vision; (2) the remembrance of a word that ‘has its denotation extending over many individuals; (8) proximity to the ‘ greatness of a certain individual ; (4) the perception of a particular form, “and so forth,—exactly in the same manner, we could assume the ‘“‘remembrance of the caste of the progenitor (as the cause of the cognition AUTHORITY 0 THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 9 “of the class Brahmana, with reference to any individual Brahmana). “ This relation of the progeny and the progenitor is directly perceptible “only with reference to the mother; while that with regard to others, it “will have to be cognised either by means of Inference, or upon the “ Verbal Testimony of a trustworthy person. “Nor is it necessary that the cause of sensuous perception should “always be such us has itself been perceived by means of the senses; ५५ because we find the Eye, and the other organs of sense, often serving as “the means of perceiving such objects—as have never been cognised ‘“‘before ; and we have also proved (in the chapter on Sense-perception— ‘‘ Clokavartika)—that we often have a perception in accordance with the ‘contact of the Senses, which is mixed up with an intervening element of ‘“memory; and it has also been shown that if a certain thing does not ‘happen to be perceived on the spur of the moment, it can never be ‘perceived even if a concentrated effort be made to bear upon it. “The Bhashya itself says that on account of there being chances of the “mother having misbehaved, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain “the relationship of the child (with the father of a particular caste). ५० But this difficulty cannot deprive the cognition (of the class Braéhmana) “of the character of Sense-perception; for certainly, if we have to climb ‘up to the top of a mountain in order to see an object, the character of “° Sense-perception is not denied to the perception of that object. Then again, “because we may have found a certain woman to have misbehaved, that ^" cannot enable ug to assume the same misbehaviour in the case of all women ; ‘because such an assumption, being directly contradictory to ail ordinary ‘experience, could never be valid; as we find that women of respectable ‘families always try their very best to save their character (and with (° 8४06688). Aud it 18 for the sake of making their respective castes duly “and authoritatively recognised, that the Brahmanas and Kings have in- “troduced the system of writing up and preserving their genealogical trees, “५ 11011 serve to preserve and perpetuate the names of their forefathers. “And as these records distinctly point out the particular excellences “and defects of each family, it is always in accordance with these that; ‘we find people being attached to, or repulsed from, particular families. “ Nor is it necessary that the misbehaving of @ WOMAN ,,,०००१००१०००५००० ००१०७ १०१७००११०११११११०१०१०५,०५.०.०००५०००... SHOUld produce a child of a mixed caste ; Ue guuanwacd gees te asuikunaawiaesuerenced: 1 ७ 9. 101 “quite possible that such misbehaviour might subject the woman to “unpleasant experiences hereafter ; but it can in no way make thechilda ८ bastard. 2 {0 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. J-—-PADA II—ADHI. I. “ Nor, again, is it necessary that the misbehaviour should be with a ‘man of different caste; and a child produced by one of the same caste as ‘the mother cannot be said to be of a mixed caste. ‘It is also laid down in the Smrtis that even the bastard regains the “original purity of the caste of his either parent, by a continuous excel- ‘lence, or otherwise, of conduct and relationships, when he reaches the “fifth or the seventh generation downwards (४,९.) if the conduct and rela- ‘tionship of each descendant remains good, the caste of the family ५५ reverts to the caste that is the higher of the two parents, and vice versa). ०८ And in this matter, the only factor for which we cannot have any author- “ity than that of the scriptures, is that of the specific number of genera- ‘tions being five or seven; the rest is all based upon facts of ordinary ५८ experience. “Thus then, just as in the case of some birds, though both the male ‘and the female are exactly similar, yet we can easily distinguish the sex ५५ ० each by certain characteristic marks,—so, in the same manner, we ‘can recognise the class Brdhmana, by means of direct Sense-perception, ‘‘as aided by a remembrance of certain facts directly perceived (in times ‘‘ gone by) aud handed down to us by an unbroken line of tradition. ४५ Hor these reasons, the assertion ‘we know not whether we are Brah- ८५ 0911 88, &c., must be admitted to be contradictory to direct perception. ‘‘This contradiction remains just the same even with regard to such “‘neople as have their Brahmayahood based upon their own individual “ood conduct (as in the case of Vigwamitra); though as a matter of ‘fact, there is 110 authority for differentiating castes by individual con- “duct. Because certain special rules of conduct are laid down as per- “taining to the Brihmanas that already exist; and so if the strict following ८५ 0{ such rules were the cause of Brahmanahood, there would be a mutua- “interdependence—the rules being based upon Bréhmanahood, and Brah- ‘‘manahood being based upon the following of the rules. And further, ‘‘one and the same man would be a Brahmana when performing a good “deed, and a Cidra when doing a bad one; and thus there would be no ‘fixity of the castes. Similarly when a man would be found to be per- “forming an action that would give pain to a person, as well as afford him “relief (as in the case of surgical operations), the person would come to ५८ 06 considered a Cidra and a Brahmana at one and the same time, which ५५ would be an absurdity “se “The upshot of all these arguments is this: Brahmanahood is not an “aggregate of Pennance, &.; nor is it a certain purification brought ‘“‘about by these; nor is it a caste manifested by these; what it really is, ५५ 18 a caste signified by the cognition of the caste of the parents; and as “such, it is cognisable directly by Sense-perception. AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. LI “Thus, then, the differentiation of the castes being accomplished in ९५ 66 manner shown above, such declarations as ‘ by doing such a deed for ‘a month the Bréahmana becomes a Cidra,’ and the like must be taken “either ag decrying the particular action, or as pointing to the fact of the ९९ person being no longer entitled to the specific duties laid down for the ‘‘three higher castes. ^“ And as before, the direct perception of the caste cannot be accepted “to have, for an optional alternative, its non-cognition, which latter can ° only be held to be based upon the authority of a Vedic Injunction assumed ‘(for the sake of the particular Arthav@da in question). But no stch ‘Injunction can be possible in the present case; even though it were ‘quite possible in the former case of stealing and lying, which are actions ‘(and as such capable of forming the object of optional Injunctions) ; ‘ because the caste is 8 concrete object; and as such, being of one uniform ‘ character, can never form the subject of any optional alternatives. ‘As for the passage— who knows what exists or not in the other ° world,’— as we have already shown above, no Ignorance, Doubt or Delu- ‘sion can be of any use with regard to Dharma; and as such, passages (° like this cannot but be admitted to be useless; and even intrinsically, the ‘‘declaration is useless, because (it is false; as) that which is herein said ‘to be incapable of being known, is actually known to such persons as are ‘assured of the authoritative character of the Veda, and are well posted ‘‘up in all branches of the three Vedas. “Then as regards the possibility of the passage laying down an optional “alternative, this cannot be; as we have shown above, with regard to the ९८ former passage (‘ we know not whether we are Brahmanas,’ etc.) Sutra (3). “Also because of the absence of results.” “ With reference to the Gargatrraira-Brahmana, it 18 said—‘ The face ५ 0 ona who knows this brightens up ;’ and again, ‘ a horse is born for him.’ ‘‘ Now, if, at the time of knowing the particular Brahmana and Mantra the ८४ brightness of the fuce and the birth of the horse already exist, then a mere “mention of these cannot serve any purpose with regard to Dharma. On ‘‘the other hand, if these do not exist at the time, the passages become false ‘even intrinsically by themselves (as declaring what does not exist). If “the passages be held not to refer to the present state of things, (but to lay “down certain results that would follow at some future time),—then they ८५ become contradicted by the fact of our never perceiving the occurrence of ‘any such results. ‘And ag all learning is meant to capacitate the agent for the perform- ‘ance of sacrifices,—these, being complete in themselves, exactly like the “bathing of the sacrificer at the sacred places, cannot be accepted as the 12 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I —PADA II—-ADHI. T. “Tujunctions of Results, as will be shown in the first Adhtkarana of the “third Pada of the Fourth Adhydya. “Tt may be urged that as the matter will be fully dealt with in that ‘place, the question should not have been repeated here; but then, there ८18 a difference; as what is proved in that Adhikarana is that the ८८ passages in question are no Injunctions of Results, but mere Arthavddas ; “while what we are declaring now is that the Arthavdda passages in ‘‘ question are absolutely useless (and as such there is no repetition). ५५ Nor can these passages be taken as mere plorifications; because as a rule ‘‘ false statements cannot be accepted as constituting (proper) glorification. Sutra (4). “Because of the uselessness of others.” ‘The aforesaid arguments suffice to prove the intrinsic uselessness of “such passages as—‘ By means of the Purndhuti one attains all that he ‘desires,’ ‘ He who performs the Pagubandha conquers all worlds,’ ‘ He who ‘performs the Agwamédha, as well as one who knows this, passes beyond ‘death,’ etc., etc. “The present Sétra, however, admits, for the sake of argument, that “these are real Injunctions of Results; and then proceeds to point out ८५ other discrepancies with regard to them: Asa matter of fact, none of the “passages quoted cau be the Injunction of Results; because (1) the ५ Piynaihutt is only a particular step towards the due consecration of the “ Bire; (2) the Pacgubandha sacrifice only helps in the due performance of “the Jyottshtoma; and (3) the knowledge of the Agwamedha sacrifice only “serves to prepare the sucrificer for the action. But we grant for the ५८ sake of argument, that these are Injunctions of Results; even then we find “ that they lead us to believe other actions (laid down in the Veda) to be “useless. In the case of a number of actions, which, though leading to “the same results, are yet performed independently of one another, it is “open to us to perform anyone of them; and none of them need be “rejected as entirely useless. The cases of the Puirndhutt and the Pagu- “ bandha, however, are different. Because without the Pirnéhutt, the Agnt- ‘‘hotra cannot be completed; and similarly, without the Papubandha, the ८१ Jyotishtoma cannot be complete; and as the specified results will have “been accomplished by these smaller actions, as explained under XI, i, 43, ५४ 11616 would be no need of performing the other elaborate actions (of the Agnihotra and the Jyotishima) ; and as such, the Injunctions of these «५ Jatter would become entirely useless. “To this effect, the Bhdshya cites the instance of one going in search “of honey, etc. The person may go on to the mountain in search of ‘‘honey, by a path other than the one whereby he could find the honey in the way itself; but he cannot go along, if he happens to pass by this AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 13 “latter road and finds the honey in the way without going all the way “to the mountain. Thus then, in order to establish the anthority and “nsefulness of many direct Injunctions, it is certainly advisable to acccpt 4 {6 uselessness of the Injunctions that have been assumed (on the strength “of the Arthavada passages in question). | ८ Nor can these Injunctions be said to lay down new actions for those “who would desire better results, than those obtained by means of the “former actions; because no difference between the two is mentioned. ‘And when the direct assertion of the Veda is the same in both cases, we ‘cannot assume any exceptional results to follow from any particular ‘actions, specially when we are unable to perceive any such results. And ‘“‘ we have already said that the declarations being found to be false, can- “not be accepted as glorifications. Sutra (5). “Because of the negativing of that which is not “capable of being negatived.” “In the feda we find the sentences—‘ Fire is not to be laid on the ८ earth,’ ‘it 18 not to be laid in the sky,’ ‘itis not be laid in Heaven’; and ‘‘ each of these contain a negation of that which is not capable of negation. “That it is to say, as for the Sky and Heaven, no laying of fire in these ८ 18 possible ; and as such, any negation of these 18 wholly irrelevant. Nor “oan these be taken as exceptions, because (the laying in Heaven and ‘‘in the Sky never beiug possible) these could not rightly be held to be the ८५ 00166४8 of exception; because the laying is always found to be done “on the Earth, which is neither Sky nor Heaven. “Tf the two sentences be said to be a mere description of the natural ‘state of things; then they cannot be held to serve any useful purpose with “regard to the performance of sacrifices. And as for the first sentence— ८८ 00४ on the Karth ’—any negativing or excepting of the laying on Earth ‘“‘is not possible, without setting aside the Injunction of the laying itself ; “and this setting aside would render a direct Injunction wholly’ futile. ““Hiven if the two sentences be taken as laying down optional alternatives, “then, too, there would be a partinl setting aside (in one case) of the ‘direct Injunction. Specially as the Veda itself lays down many alter- “natives with regard to the laying of fire, as done with a view to different ‘results ; and as such it is not right to accept Prohibitions for the mere “ pointing out of optional alternatives. ‘And then, this Prohibition, too, would be extremely weak [that is to ‘say, it cannot be said that even in the absence of any particular desires, ८ ४16 Prohibition would serve the purpose of pointing out optional alter- ‘natives; because, in the absence of any desires, there can be no perform- ५ 8006 of such actions as have been laid down'simply for the fulfilment of 14 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I--PADA II-~ADHI. 1. ५५ eertain definite ends, and as such no prohibition of these is necessary (or possible); and if the Prohibition be taken as pointing ont mere qualifi- “cations,—then as such, being only an assumed factor, with regard ‘“‘to the sacrifice, it would be too weak to rightly point out any optional “ alternatives |. ‘When the prohibition is taken with regard to the Earth, then ५ (४8 no such prohibition of the Earth as the place of laying could be “possible, unless there were a likelihood of the action of the laying ‘being performed) it would be necessary to assume an Injunction of this “laying; (and then as all the places where the fire could be laid,— “the Earth, the Sky and Heaven,—are negatived, by the sentence under ‘“‘ consideration, such negation would lead us to the assumption of an “Tnjunction wholly prohibiting the aforesaid laying); and this is what ‘‘is meant by the ‘ self-contradiction’ mentioned in the Bhashya. “The said prohibition would also contradict other direct Injunctions ‘‘—-such, for instance, as ‘the Fire should be laid after the golden plate “has been put in,’ and ‘the Fire is laid upon bricks’ (both of which dis- “tinctly mention the Earth as the place on which the Fire is to be laid). “Nor is it posible for the sentences to be taken as only meant to attract “ people, to a certain course of action, and not as a regular injunction. Sutra (6). “Because of the mention of non-eternal (objects).” ‘In the case of such passages as—‘ Babara Pravahani desired’ and “the like—, from among all possible significations, the words ‘ Babara “ Pravahani,’ &c., cannot be taken as pointing to anything else (either “anything in connection with sacrifices, or a glorification) except ५५ Babara, the son of Pravdhana; and (as such a person cannot be said to be ५८ eternal) this comes to be a mention (in the Veda) of a transitory object. “The mention of such objects, when brought forward and urged against “the authority of the Veda as a whole, can be explained in some way or ‘‘other (as has been done above, in I—i—21). But when we make use of ‘our discretion in the matter of authoritativeness, and accept, on the ground ८ 0 80116 reasonings, the absolutely authoritative character of only the Vidht (Injunction) portion of the Veda,—exactly as among all verbal De- ‘‘clarations, the Veda alone is held to be absolutely authoritative—then, “in that case, just as we deny the authority of the other portions of the ८ 9 609, 80 too we could deny that of such portions of it as make mention “of transitory objects, on the ground of such mention itself; and there ° would be nothing to prevent us from doing so. ‘Therefore, in the case of such passages, all that we can do 18 to take “no notice of their siguifications, and to assume particular results to < follow from the mere repetition of these. Or,it may be more reasonable AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 15 “to admit of the fact of such texts being read up only for being rejected ; “just as we accept the Arthavada passages as only meant to be disre- ‘* garded, ‘“‘It may be asked—‘ Why cannot these passages be used as Mantras ‘‘in the Actious, in connection wherewith they happen to be read ?’ ‘They cannot be so used, simply because they (not pointing to any actions) cannot possibly be taken along with any action. As for Man- ‘tras, they too are employed at sacrifices, not only because they happen ‘to be mentioned in the Veda, but because their words distinctly point ‘out their connection with those sacrifices, In the passage in question, ‘however, there 18 no such implication. “Or, lastly, we may take these passages as meant to be accepted in ‘their mere verbal forms (without any .heed being paid to their signi- (५ fications), exactly as has been done in the Pdrvapaksha relating to the ‘““Mantras (Vide below, Sitras 31-39). “The word ‘ anitya,’ in the Sitra, refers to living beings, and not to ‘that which 1s useless (as in I—ii—1).” In reply to the above Purvapaksha, we have the following :— SIDDHANTA—the Orthodox 21711754 view. Sutra (ध). But they are taken along with the injunctive pas- 88068 ; and as such could be (authoritative) as eulogising the particular Injunctions. [The Bhashya cites the passage—‘ Vayurvai kshépishtha dévata’—as an instance of Arthavdda; and on this, the Vartika starts with the question |.— ८८ It was proper for the Bhashya to put forward its own view with reference to the same Arthavida passages that have been cited in the Pérvapaksha ; for what special reason then, does he bring forward a different passage P "° In reply to this, some people assert that as the bearing of all Arthavadda passages 1s the same, it does not make any difference, whether this or that passage be cited in the Purvapaksha or the Siddhanta. But though this may be the case, yet the citing of a new example always implies an ulterior motive (in the mind of the author); and this motive we proceed to explain: As regards the passages cited in the Purva- paksha, even their literal significations are open to doubt ; and consequently to begin with them would entail the additional initial effort of proving them to be true ; and inasmuch as this initial effort would be of no consequenee, and as such not very desirable, the Bhashya has cited a passage, which, in its literal siguification, is universally recognised to be true ; whereby it becomes 16 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I--PADA II-—~-ADRI. I. easier to explain, that such passages are glorifications, to be taken aleng with the Injunctive passages, and as such come to help in the knowledgo of Dharma. And to facilitate the matter still further, the author of the Bhashya proceeds to show the use of Arthavddas as glorifications, by means of a passage which is instantly recognised as one to be taken along with (and forming part of) a direct Injunction, But before proceeding further, we have to explain the following difficulty: “Why is it thatthe natural form of the Veda is perverted, with ५५ & view to establish a forced syntactical connection P Or (if it be declared “that we have recourse to this in order to establish a direct relationship “of the Veda to human ends) how 18 it that the Veda is said to be for the “sake of man’s ends? It might be urged that these assumptions are made, ‘‘ because such is found to be a fact, in the case of ordinary human assertions. “But, then, the case of these latter is entirely different; as what they speak ‘‘ of is cognisable by other ordinary means of cognition ; and, on the strength ‘of these latter, such far-fetched assumptions are admissible; whereas in “the case of a Vedio passage, treating as it does of supersensuous things, “even if the slightest change be made in its original form, it becomes a “creation of the human mind (and thereby loses the very basis of its “authority). Even in the case of human assertions,. when the subject ‘spoken of is not amenable to the other means of cognition, save verbal ८८ Testimony, we do not have any changes in the form of the. assertion.” To this, some people make the following reply: It will be proved in the next Satra that the whole of the Veda is meant to serve some useful purpose for man. And certainly, if it did not serve some useful purpose, the intelligent people of old would not have made such efforts to preserve it and hand it down in an unbroken tradition. Though it is just possible that a single man may have erred in his estimate of the usefulness of the Veda; yet there is no reason for saying so, with regard to the extremely intelligent enquirers that have gone before us. And for this reason, it is only right that we should even break up the natural form of the Veda,.in order to make it serviceable to man. | This explanation, however, does not appear to be quite sutisfactory ; because, if such be the case, then the authoritativeness of the Veda would © depend upon man. If we were to assume even such meanings as are not signified by the actual words of the Veda, and if the usefulness of the Veda to man were to rest on the sole authority of the efforts made to present it, then the authority of the Veda would become dependent upon our own efforts. If the preserving of the Veda by another be held to be the cause, then, too, that other person would base his authority upon the efforts of another man, and so on and on, we might go backwards, referring it to the efforts of other. people; and this would be like a. deserip- AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PANS\GES. 17 tion of colour handed down among blind men; and there would be no fixity for the authority of the Veda. Specially in the case of each man, the idea that we would have would be that ‘this man knows it thus,’ and not that ‘such is its meaning.’ Consequently then, though, in the case of particular students, we might infer the fact of their knowing the Veda to be useful to them, yet, as there can be no secure foundation for this notion, the authority of the Veda cannot rest solely upon that fact. Therefore it must be admitted that until the Veda itself does not directly declare itself to be serviceable to man, it cannot be accepted as authoritative. But we can explain the difficulty in the following manner: As for the whole of the Veda, its study is directly enjoined in the sentence ‘ Suva- dhydyo dhyétavyah.” (“The Veda should be duly studied ),”’—the sense of which is that we should accomplish something by means of the study of the Veda. And as for what is to be accomplished,—though the ‘study’ itself presents itself as the object, yet, inasmuch as an Injunction, which has the power of persuading people to action cannot but have for its object some- thing that is of use to the man, the mere ‘study’ ceases to be accepted as the object to be accomplished, and becomes mixed up with the instrument or means of the said accomplishment; because this instrumental character is quite compatible with its nature, and is the most proximate (the sense of the Injunction thus being that the desirable object is to be accomplished by means of the study). What next appears to be the object to be accomplished is the getting up of the mere letters of the Veda, in accordance with the maxim that anything ‘that 18 capable of being accomplished 18 the object.’ But this, too, in itself, can be of no direct use to man. However, this getting up of the letters points to the knowledge of the words, which in its turn points to the knowledge of the meanings of these words, which last points to the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences composed of those words; and this leads to the acting (in accordance with the injunctions contained in these sentences), which acting finally leads to the attainment of such desirable results as Heaven and the like. And itis only here that the object to be accomplished being duly ascertained, all the information required (in connection with the injunction ०५ {116 Veda should be studied ’’) becomes fully supplied. And thus in the case of all Injunctions, there is no resting until we get at some purpose of man (to be accomplished by means of the action therein enjoined). But itis by no means absolutely necessary that, whenever we meet with an Injunction, we must assume such results as Heaven and the like (to follow from the action enjoined); because when we find that a certain action is actually capable of bringing about the accomplishment of a cer- tain result, we conclude this latter to be its effect. And hence, whenever we find an action directly capable of bringing about a certain result, even Z 3 १8 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1—PADA TI~—ADHI. I. wfter the lapse of a certain period of time and space, we cannot rightly’ assume any other result; because the soundness of the Vedic Injunction is established also by means of such results as follow after the lapse of time: (and not only by those that follow immediately after the Action) ; and as such there is no Apparent Inconsistency (in the Injunction) that could lead us to the assumption of other results. In those cases, however, in which we do not find any particular desir- able results following, either directly or indirectly (from the Action), —a8, for instance, the action of the libation reaching the Fire, and being burnt to ashes,—we give up the idea of the necessity of the desirable element in the result, and assume a transcendental result to follow from the action itself. In all cases, however, we have to bear in mind the following: In the case of a certain action (the threshing of the corn, for instance) that is laid down in the Veda, and stands in need of a result, if we find, following from it, a series of actions, not of the nature of a result,—and then, in the middle we find laid down something (in the shape of the making of the cake) that would help the sacrifice, or one (the offering itself) that would accomplish a desirable result,—we conclude these latterly enjoined actions to be the means of the two latter results; and the original Injunction (of the threshing of the corn) is accepted as merely helping in these latter actions (and not having its efficiency reaching up to the final accomplishment of the agent’s desires). As for the other actions (of pounding, &c., of the corn) that are laid down by a subsequent Injunction, these are to be taken as helping in the previous- ly enjoined action (of threshing, specially as they are its necessary con- comitants) in the accomplishment of the cake (which could not be made unless the corn were pounded after the thereshing),—exactly like the burning of the fuel (which:is a necessary concomitant of the sacrifice). And these actions of pounding, &c., are not held to be the direct means of accomplish- ing either the threshing or the cake, because they are not found to have ‘been laid down before, with any reference to the relationship of means and consequences. That is to say, if we had any assertion, prior to the Injunc- tion of threshing, of the pounding of the corn being a means of accom- plishing the cake, then alone could the latter be held to be the direct means of the making of the cake; but, as it is, we find the threshing laid down first of all, and the pounding, &c., are only mentioned afterwards (merely as concomitants of that threshing). Hence we are led to conclude that it is the threshing that is the renl means of the accomplishment of the cake, and that the pounding, &c., are to be taken only as helping the threshing in that accomplishment In such cases, however, in which nothing that forms part of ‘the series AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 19. is laid down in the middle, it is the directly enjoined action alone which is to be taken as the means of accomplishing the final result, through all the various actions that are laid down in connection with it. Thus, then, all the Injunctive passages that lay down the means of accomplishing the directly mentioned, or the assumed, ends of man are included—even up to the ascertaining of such causal relationships—in the Injunction that “ the Veda should be studied.” (That is to say, in this case the study is held to be for the purpose of the ascertaining of the said relationships, exactly as the threshing is held to be the means of accomplish- ing the cake; and the intermediate actions of getting up the words of the Veda help in the final result, exactly as the pounding, &९. do in the making of the cake). ` As for the result accruing from the ascertaining of the meaning of Vedic texts, such result has been pointed out by other texts (such as: “ That Action alone has a strong influence which is performed with a full know- ledge, faith, &c.”); and as such the former Injunction of Vedic study is not made to extend so far (as to the pointing out of its result). Aud as for the other Injunctions that are found in the same connection, they are also to be taken as serving, by means of the getting up of the verbal text, &o.,. to help towards the fulfilment of the single result, in the shape of the comprehension of the meanings of Vedic sentences; and they cannot be taken as, in any way, directly helping the performance of any sacrifices. Because the performance of sacrifices depends, for its procedure, only upon such means 88. bring about supersensuous results ; and as such, they can have no connection with the mere getting up of the Verbal text, which serves only a visible purpose; and as such the action of such getting up is accepted only as helping towards the fulfilment ef the final result (of comprehending the meaning of those texts). Thus, then, we find that the subsidiary sentences or Injunctions (of get- ting up the Vedic text) are similar to the principal sentence or Injunction (of the due comprehending of the meaning of the Veda) (in 80 much as both are equally related to the human purpose mediately, through an inter- vening agency), though the subsidiary Injunctions themselves are one degree further removed. (As for instance, the Injunction of the com- prehending of the meaning of the Veda gives a knowledge of the sacrifices, which fulfil the desirable end of man, there being, in: the case, only one intervening agency; in the case of the subsidiary Injunctions, on the other hand, we find that they lay down the getting up of the verbal text, which brings abeut a cognition of the meaning of these texts which point out the sacrifices that fulfil the desirable ends of man,. there ‘being, in this case, two intervening agencies) .; In the snme manner, the. passages speaking of the washing, &९. (of thie 20 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-—PADA II—ADHI. I. Vriht), having their sole purpose in the purification of the corn, are found to be very distantly related to the principal sacrifice, through the in- tervening agencies of the Rice, the Flour, the Cake, and the Dvyavaddana Offering, d&o. Similarly, we may explain the connection (with the principal sacrifice) of such secondary passages as are not found in the same context, and as such help the sacrifice only indirectly, as well as those that are of direct use. And the only peculiarity with the relationship of these is that the Principal Action is connected only with whnt these passages signify, and has nothing to do with the mere words, as the passages are not m the same context. The passages speaking of the ‘laying of the fire’ and such other ac- tions, have their sole use in the preparation of the sacrificial fire, whicl: forms a part of the principal sacrifice leading to certain definite results ; and as such come to have all their relationships fulfilled by means of the remote Result (of the Principal Sacrifice). In the same manner the Upanishads have their existence justified by their explaining the real nature of the person that performs the sacrifices. And as for the Mantra and the Names, we shall explain their uses, tn their respective places (at the end of this Pada and in the fourth Pada). Thus, then, it is established that all parts of the Veda are included in the Bhavana (which is denoted by the direct Vedic Injunctions). It has been argued above that the Arthavada passages not being included in any of the three factors of the Bhdvana, they cannot be recog- nised (as parts of the Vedic Injunctions). On this point, we offer the fol- lowing explanation: Itis true that the Arthavada is not so recognised apart, by itself; but it is actually included (io the factors of the Bhavana). ‘How’ ? In the following manner: In the case of the sentences which contain Injunctive words, there are two kinds of Bhavand that are always compre- hended—one consisting of the words, and another of their significations. Those of the latter class do not stand in need of the Arthavida passages ; but these passages are certainly included in those of the former kind (४.6., the Verbal Bhavana). The Verbal Bhavana operates in the following manner: The Injunc- tion of the study of the Veda serves the purpose of employing all other In- junctions, as also the ‘ self’ (‘Swa’) mentioned in the word “ swidhydya ” ; and this employing or urging is in the form-—" should think of accomplish- ing.” Andin this the Injanctive Word is the nominative of the prompting, and the Person is its objective. Hence when the question srises—‘ What is to be accomplished (by the Injunctive passage) ’ ?—the answer, that presonts itself is—‘‘ The activity AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. "` 21 of the Person.’ If, however, the peculiar character of the said Injunction were taken to signify the action of Injunction itself—in the form, ‘should prompt,’—then the Person himself would become the objective (the mean- ing being that the Person should be prompted or urged to activity). Though, on account of the inanimate character of the Injunctive, such actions of prompting or urging are not possible, yet, as the Person himself being the object prompted cannot be its nominative, we conclude the power of prompt- ing to belong to the Injunctive, through the Intelligence of the Person himself. For if some such assumption were not made, then the Injunctive could never be called ‘the prompter.’ Secondly, when the question arises—'By what is it to be accom- plished’ ?—we have for the reply—‘ By means of a knowledge of the Injurfotions, as guided by a previous experience of certain relationships (of particular actions with certain definite results).’ And lastly, to the question—‘ How is the prompting to be accomplish- ed’ P—we have the answer—‘ Through a knowledge of the excellent charac- ter (of the particular Action).’ The explanation of all this is very simple. People with any degree of intelligence, when proceeding to do a certain action do not engage them- selves in it, until they have ascertained that it is really good and well worth the doing. It is in this work of attraction that the potency of the Injunction fails; but in this it is helped by the cognition of the ex- cellence of the Action enjoined (as described in the Arthavada passages). And as for the result of the Action, which is always in the shape of something desired by man, the Agent is known to be naturally attached to it; and as such that does not stand in need of any description of its excellence, by the Veda. But as for the means (of attaining the Result), and the method, the excellence of these has to be be pointed out, to the person who has not engaged himself in the Action; and this can be done only by means of the Arthavdda passages ; and it is in this that lies the use of these passags. Now then, when the question arises—‘ By what means shall I obtain a knowledge of the said excellence’ ?—the answer may, in the first place, be presented by the mention of the particular Result, which leads to the conviction that inasmuch as the Action brings prosperity, ४८ ४5 good and well worth doing; or (2) the excellence of the Action may be pointed ont by.the fact of its being enjoined in the Veda, which is free from all discrepancies; or (3) it may be recognised by means of the fact of its being connected with excellent Deities, Materials, and Methods. As for the word that expresses the Result, as it has a distinct purpose to serve, in the shape of the pointing out.of the Result, it cannot be dragged to any other use (such as the indicating of the excellence of 22 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1--PADA Il—-ADHI. f. Actions); and also because the desire to learn its excellence arises orily: after one has become acquainted with its Injunction, in which, too, the word mentioning the Result is always put first; and as such, this word cannot be accepted as supplying an answer to the above question; it cas only be held to indicate such excellence, &c., indirectly ; but such indirect indication cannot be rightly had recourse to while there is a possibi- lity of a direct expression of the same fact; and, lastly, a double function at one and the same time would involve a self-contradiction. For these reasons the words mentioning the Result cannot be taken to point out the said excellence. And we shall explain under the Parnamayi-Adhikarana, how,—when a certain text (f.1. the text, ‘He whose Juhi is made of leaves does not hear evil of himself’), has a totally different purpose (the praising of the parti- cular Juha) to perform,—even if it be found to indicate a certain means to an end (in this case, the Juhu of leaves as leading to a particular Result )— no authoritative significance can be attached to such indication. For these reasons, the word mentioning the result cannot be rightly accepted as point- ing out the excellence of the Action ; because if that word were so accepted, then no significance would be attached tothe Result mentioned; exactly as in the case of the text cited, where the expression, ‘ He hears not evil of himself,’ is explained not as pointing to a result, but only as praising a certain object. For this reason, in the case in question, as the words mentioning the Result have this distinct purpose to serve, even though they in- dicate the excellence of the Action, yet no significance can be attached to this idea of the excellence thus obtained. And, as a general rule, we know that whatever happens to be indicated or implied by a text, does not come to be recognised as the purpose or chief end of that text. As for instance, when it is said ‘the former man runs,’ though this implies the exis- tence of the ‘ latter man,’ yet this latter is not accepted as connected with the action that is spoken of with regard to the former. In the same manner, though the excellence of the Action and the consequent attraction of the agent to it are indicated by the word mentioning the Result; yet, as. this has other functions of its own, it cannot be accepted as having anything to do with the pointing out of the excellence. Because such indication could .be accepted only on the ground of Apparent Inconsistency ; but we know that १४ is only when all other means of knowledge have failed that Apparent Inconsistency can be had recourse to; and this failure of the other means of knowledge, too, can rightly justify a man to seek the aid of Apparent. Incon- sistency, with any degree of correctness, only ofter he should have tried his very best to seek for aid from those other means. Hence, if we failed: to obtain an idea of the excellence, either by direct teaching or by supplementary , AUTHORITY OF. THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. '23 -dectarations, then slone could we assume a double potency or signification for the Injunction itself; just as when we have no Sruva at hand, we pour the libations into the fire by means of the spoon. But in case this idea of excellence were obtainable by any other means, however remote, then it would be absolutely necessary to follow up this means; for until this means is duly found to afford the requisite notion of excellence, the needs of the Injunction remain unsatisfied. Similarly in the case of such passages as—" Vayurvat kshépishtha- dévaia ( ^“ Vayu is the swiftest deity” ) and the like,—we believe them to have been laid down with reference to the accomplishment of certain purposes of men, on the ground of their forming a part of the Veda, a full study whereof has been enjoined for men. But inasmuch as a mere Arthavida by itself is not capable of being directly related to the Injanc- tion (as not having the forces of the Injunctive affix, &.), so long as it is not recognised as leading to the accomplishment of the purposes of man, it can only be taken in the literal meaning afforded by the words (composing the passage), which consists merely in a description of a certain state of things as they exist; and as thus far it is not found to serve any useful purpose, it remains deficient on an important point. That, however, which is implied by such description—namely, the excellence of the sacrifice offered to Vayu indicated by the fact that, the effect being similar to the cause, the sacrifice offered to a swift Deity al- ways accomplishes its result quickly,—is clearly needed by the Injunction found in close proximity to it; and as such the passage in question comes to be recognised as helping in the accomplishment of the man’s purpose ; and hence it is accepted as forming an integral part of the Veda, whose study has been laid down as necessary. And this mutual dependence of the Arthardda and the comprehension of excelience is based upon their mutual requirements ; exactly as in the-case of two charioteers, if the horse of one-dies, while the other’s chariot itself is burnt, the horse of this latter is yoked to the former chariot and the needs of both become supplied. Thus, then, when such close relationship between the two is possible, though the Injunctive and the Arthavida passages actually stand in need of the Declaration of Excellence and Injunction respectively, yet innsmuch as this Declaration of Excellence and Injunction are expressed by the Arthavdda and the Injunctive passages respectively, we cannot reasonably assert that Excellence is expressed by the Injunctive, and the Injunction by the Arthavada passage. And as the words of the Arthavdda ‘passage cannot do anything else except the declaring of Excellence, we conclude, from the very fact of both the Arthavada and the Injunctive passages appearing in the Veda, that they express two’ distinct things (४४०, “Ex: 24, TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-—PADA II—ADHI. 1. cellonce and Injunction, respectively) (¢.e., the fact of both appearing in the text of the Veda leads us to some such conclusion as that ‘it is only the performance of such an Action as is enjoined by the Injunctive passages, and rendered attractive or pointed out as excellent by the Arthavida passages, that can accomplish the desired results to the fullest extent’). | In the same manner, we can explain the deprecatory (Arthavdda) passages also, as serving the purpose of creating an aversion (in the mind of the agent), which is a factor necessary for all Prohibitions; because, unless the knowing person comes to have an aversion to a certain course. of action, he does not desist from it; and this aversion is brought about by the cognition of the non-excellent, or evil character of the action; and inasmuch as this idea of the evil character cannot be duly brought-about by the negative expressions in the Prohibitive passages themselves, which serve to lay down the mere negation, along with its result and procedure,— and not either the excellence or non-excellence of the action,x—a clue of knowledge of its non-excellence cannot be obtained by any other means save by the deprecatory Arthavddu passages, which, too, have no other purpose to serve. Thus it is that the Arthavdda comes to be taken along with (1.e., as forming a part of) the Injunction; specially as it is always found that it is only the continuations of the Injunctive and Prohibitive passages, res- pectively, that become the means of ascertaining the praise or the depre- cation of the action concerned. Nor is the character of Praise or of Deprecation altogether exclusive; because we often find a praise expressed in the form of a deprecation, and vice ४९१७८ ; as will also be declared later on that—‘‘a depreecatory passage is added not with a view to deprecate that which is evil, but to indirectly praise that which is good and has been laid down as to be performed.” As, for example, in connection with the Tratyambaka Cake we read (in the 10th Adhyadya): “If one performs the Abhigharana, he throws his cattle into Rudra’s mouth, while if one does not perform it, he does not throw them into His mouth”; and in this case, though it is the non-performance of the Abhighdrana that 18 praised, yet it has not been accepted as the right course of action ; whereas, though its performance is deprecated, yet it has to be accepted as the proper course laid down as to be performed, on the ground of its being subsequently directly enjoined. In a case where it is not quite cleary whether Praise or Deprecation 18 really meant, 8 definite conclusion can be arrived at on this point by referring to the context; as, for instance, we shall find later on the sentence ~——‘ We know not whether the Asuras are praised or censured, ’—~which is said on the occasion of the declaration (referred to in the 9th Adhyadya)— . MUYTHORITY’OF THD ANTHAVADA, 24886108, ‘25 ¢ य one:sings:the Rk, the, Asurad come alorg, ce.” , It is doubtful whether this: ie to be taken as praising the action, in that it subjugated even, the Asuras. to the will of the sacrificer; or it is a deprecation.of the action, in that 16 attracts such undesirable companions &8- the Asuras; arid: on: this point, inasmuch. as towards the ond 10 is the singing of the Sdma that is enjoined, we conclude the passage to be a deprecation of the singing of the {२ verses 1 dim the.case of all Arthavdda passages there are certain words that express either praise or deprecation ; and it: 18 as taken along with thése words that other. passages (such'as ‘He wept’ and the. like, which do not express either the'one or the other) come, indirectly, to indicate such praise or deprecation, Even in a case where we have no such words, we can admit of Indication, or, even of Indicative-Indication, on the ground of the (otherwise). Apparent Inconsistency. (That 18 to say, in the case of the sentence ‘the water is calm,’ we have no word expressive of either Praise or Deprecation; yet we find, close to it, the sentence ‘ He draws tho fire either by'means of the Vétasa branch, or by the Vaka’; and on. tho ground of its proximity to this latter Injunction, we take the former passage to indirectly indicate the praise of the Vétasa and the Vakd, which are laid down in the latter passage. Here we have pure Indication, while if we take the passage to be a praise of the drawing of fire, thon it will be a case of Indicative-Indication). Specially as Injunctions and Prohibitions are always accompauied by Praise and Deprecation, respectively: whenever we find the one, we can always infer the other, and thereby complete the full sentence. The above explanations apply also to the passages occurring in the Mahabharata, and Puranas, ‘&c., as with regard to these, we have the express injunction— One should recite these before persons of the four castes,” — which shows that they are the means of accomplishing certain desirable ends; and when we proceed to seek for this desirable end, we do not aceept the mere recitation of the words as bringing about any result; and find that the true result lies in a full comprehension of the causes of Dharma, Artha, Kama and Moksha, as also of their contraries, Adharma, Anartha, Duhkha and Sansaira,—for the purpose of acquiring those of the former set, and avoiding those of the latter And in certain portions of these works,—as in the chapters on ‘ Dana ‘ Rajadharma’ and ‘ Mokshadharma’ of the Cant-Parva of the Mahabharata we meet even: with direct Injunctions; while in others there are Artha- vidas—in the two forms of ‘ Parakria’ (those that describe certain actions as having been done by other good men) and ‘ Pur@kalpa ` (those describing vertain dictions a8 having been done by good men in bygone nges). ‘As for the other portions; those containing descriptions of events and 4 96 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA II—ADHI. f. stories,—if we accept these in their literal sense, then, with reference -to these at least, the Injunction of reciting them would become useless (as no purpose could be served by these mere descriptions); hence we take these to indirectly imply the praise or deprecation (of certain courses of action). And as these descriptions have been inserted with the sole purpose of such praise or deprecation, they need not be necessarily taken as absolutely correct with regard to facts Guided as they were by their study of the Veda, Valmiki, Vyasa, and others composed their works on the same lines as the Veda (and hence it is that we find in the works of these men, as in the Veda, many apparently useless stories, &c.); and as those for whom these works were intended wero persons of varying degrees of. intelligence and diverse tastes, it was only proper for them to insert every kind of matter in their works (so that they might be of use to all men). Hence it is that in certain parts we find pure Injunctions, while in others the Injunctions are mixed up with Arthavadas; and among these latter, too, some have only brief Arthavidas, while others have extensive ones; the sole motive for this diverse procedure lying in the making of the work attractive to all men. Some of these Injunctions (in the Mahabharata, &c.), are based directly upon the Veda; while others are based upon considerations of ordinary pleasure and pain, as experienced in the world. Similarly, among the Arthavadas, too, some are those that appear in the Veda, some are based upon ordinary experience, while there are some that are purely ima- ginary, like ordinary poetry. But all of these have an authoritative- ness based upon the fact of their praising (the enjoined Actions). As for those portions of the Pura&nas, however, which are not capable of being taken along with any Injunction, some of them are such as give pleasure in the mere listening to them,—such are the descriptions of the Gandhamidana, &c.; and some, as for instance, the descriptions of wars, &c., serve to encourage the brave as well as the coward, and thereby serve a distinctly useful purpose for the Kings of men. In those cases, how- ever, where none of these is possible,—such, for instance, as the hymns to deities, which woe do not find capable of bringing abont any perceptible resujlis,—we assume an unseen result. (Here ends the explanation of the main Siddhanta.) Says the Bhashya: Thongh such passages as ‘ Vayurvat kshépishtha dévata’ and the like, are not related directly to any actions, yet inasmuch as they can be taken along with an Injunction, they are accepted us authori- tative. Some people explain this passage in the following manner: “ From “the assertion of the Bhashya—Why should there be a praise? Becayse . AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES, 27 “without praise, how could people be attracted to, and perform, such ac- ०९ ४0048 ' 7--1 seems that the Arthavdda serves to bring about the perfor- ५ 7081166 of an action by means of praises, or the avoiding of other “actions by means of deprecations ; and as it is these very facts—per-’ “formance and avoidance—that are expressed by the Injunctions, we “conclude that both (Arthavdda and Injunction) serve the same purpose. “ And inasmuch as those that have the same purpose to fulfil cannot be taken ८ together,—hence in the case of such Injunctive affixes as are without any “ Arthavadas, or such Arthavddas as are without Injunctive affixes,—we can “take them with reference to their own particular subjects exclusively ; “‘and thereby accept them as Persuading or Dissuading from particular ‘*‘ courses of actions. In those cases, however, where we have a mixture ‘‘ of both, as only one of them would suflice for the fulfilment of their common ‘* purpose, it becomes necessary to reject one ; and under the circumstances, ८० 1४ is always necessary to show preference to that which 18 more exten- ‘Ssive; and hence, in accordance with the maxim—that ‘one should ‘* renounce & single person for the sake of the whole family’—we come “to reject the Injunctive affix (in favour of the much more extensive ८ Arthavada) ; and not being of any use with regard to its main purpose, “the only purpose that the Injunctive affix can serve is to amplify that ‘Injunction (of actions) which is indicated by the Persuasion contuined “in the Arthavada that has the sole purpose of aiding it (by such per- ८ suasion ) ‘And as an instance of such amplification by the Injunctive affix ‘Swe have the passage—‘ satrddudavusadya prshthacamaniyéna yajéran?— “where the Injunctive affix in ‘yajéran’ has been explained as’ only “amplifying the performance pointed out by the past participle affix in ५५ ‹ Tdavasiya. “Thus, then, in the passage in question—‘Vayavyam ०९८८१०९7५7१९८व ०८ bhatikdmah, Vayurvar kshépishtha dévatt’—when the Injunctive affix has ‘‘been set aside, all that 18 meant by it 18 the seizing and killing of the (०2८९ ९८ consecrated to Vaya ; and it is this seizing that is spoken of (in the Bha- “ shya) as ‘ Vidhyuddeca’ (the subject of the Injunction). And as an action ‘Scan be praised only after its connection with a desirable result; has been ‘‘established, 16 18 the sentence ending with the clause ‘bhiitikamah’ that is ‘‘taken as referred to by the word ‘Vidhyuddepa.’ | ‘‘We interpret the Bhdshya in the above manner, as meaning the set- ५ ting aside of the Injunctive affix, because if the Bhashya had meant that the ८८ nereuasion is accomplished by means of the Injunctive affix, then it should ‘‘not have put inthe word ‘ Uddéga’ (but should have simply said ‘Vidh@ya’). “In reality, however, it is not possible for the Arthavida to be takén sf along with thé Injunctive affix,-as pointed ont in the’ S#ir'a ; and it is this 28 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA JI—ADHE, 1, ‘impossibility that is spoken of in the Bhdshya—‘ The sentence cnnriot be — ‘*construed.as that one desirous of prosperity should eeize “The assertion of the Bhishya—because prosperity follows from 1t— ८ noints out the relationship of the praise and the praised, that has been accept- ‘‘ed (in reference to:the passage in question ) in preference to that of the * Injunctive and the Hnjoined, which has been rejected. Thus alone can the ‘fact of the bringing about of prosperity be construed with the passage “(that 18 to say, when the fact of the seizing bringing about prosperity has “been laid down, the question naturally arises—how is it that it brings “about prosperity r—and in answer to this we have the following Arthavada, which serves to point out the reason for the said potency) “The Bhashya says—these two facts are entirely different; and the facts ‘‘referred to are the two relationships (of the Praise and the Praised, and “that of the Injunctive and the Hnjoined), (and the sense of the Bhashya “ig that if wo admitted both these relationships in the passage in question, “as they are entirely different from one another, we would have a syntactionl “split: consequently we must reject the relation of the Injunctive and the Wnjoined, and admit only that of the Pratse and the Praised). & # “Says the Bhishya—If we-are asked, for what purpose we have the Praise —......; and the sense of the question is that when you have 86४ ` aside the Injunctive affix (the action cannot be enjoined, and) what ‘would be the use of praising that which is not enjoined P Or, the qués- “tioner may have in his mind the argument that, inasmuch as the persuasion ‘that you hold to be the purpose of the Praise can be accomplished by “means of the Injunctive affix itself, there is no need for the Praise. “And the Teacher (7.e., the anthor of the Bhashya),—bearing in mind ` (८ the fact, that even when the Injunctive affix has been set aside, our pur- ५६ [00808 are served by the Arthavada alone, and that when both are possible «५ preference is to be given to the Arthavdda,—says: How else, could it be ^" attractive ? “The questioner, however, puts forward his position more clearly : ५ ४ When the purpose of pointing out the performability of the Action has “been already served by the Injunctive affix, there could be no need for the ०८ Praise “The Bhashya replies: Not so; because in all cases where there is a “long (involved) sentence, the smaller sentences composing it have no “authority or significance of their own (that is to say, the meaning of the ‘latter cannot have any preference over, or stop the functioning of, the “longer sentence), exactly as when: # higher number (twenty, f.i.) is ‘spoken of, no importance is attached ‘to the lower numbers (sight, ten ^ twelve, Sc.) It is only when the smaller sentences are uttered by them- “selves that they have any authority or significance ; because, in thas - AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA , PASSAGES. 29 “gage, they do not stand. in‘ need of anything else ; as, for instance, the “small ‘sentonce—‘The cloth exists.’ -But the mere fact of this small ‘‘sentence serving all necessary purposes when it 18 used by itself. cannot ‘justify the conclusion that ‘in all cases (even where this sentence is used ‘‘ as the part of a longer sentence) all that 18 wanted-will be accomplished by “this small sentence alone.’ For a senteuce is accepted to be complete only ` “when it is not accompanied by such expressions as are significant (of a sense ‘‘more extensive than that afforded by itself); and when there happens ५ ‰0 be such an expression, people who think over it intelligently find that 6 there 18 something wanting in it over and above the said expression. But “when this something is not perceived, the feeling of want (or defi- ५ ciency) ceases (and we conclude that there is nothing more really want- “ing). Hence it is only where this something more is actually perceived “that we construe the additional expression along with the former sentence; “while when it is not perceived, even though the expression may be “there all the same, we do not take it along with the original sentence; “and it is only in such cases that the smaller sentence. can have any significance apart from the longer one,—and not in the former case, ‘where it can have no significance of its own. “Tt is with, all this in view that the Bhadshya says; When there are no “ waledictory expressions, the necessary persuasion is accomplished by the In- ५५. ६16८8४6 affix itself ; but when there & a valedictory sentence tt is by means of that that the persuasion 18 fulfilled “Objection: ‘What you say is quite right, as regards such cases in “ which the purposes of the longer sentence and the shorter are different ८८ ag for inatance, in the case of The cloth (exists) and is red: In the case “in. question however, the purpose of the two sentences (the Injunction ५४ and the Praise) being the same, is it right that the longer. sentence should “be used to set aside the shorter one? This is what is meant by the “ Bhadshya passage—That longer sentence which subverts the injunctive potency ५ of the shorter sentence may well be got rid of, the persuasion being accom ५ lished by the Injunctive expression itself + "८ ¶० this the Bhadshya replies: It 1s true that the persuasion will be “accomplished by the Injunctive expression, even without the valedictory sen- “tence; but as a maiter of fact thie latter does exist, etc.. The sense of this ‘Sis that the above objection should have been addressed to the author of the Veda (if there were such a one)-—namely, that, when it was possible “for him to express the persaasion by the shorter Injunctive sentence, why ‘‘should he haye had recourse to the longer Valedictory one. But as there ig no such author, any such objection would be entirely ont of ८८ place. ‘In any case, the objection cannot have much force; for the using of a 30 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA If—ADHI. I. ‘longer sentence for oxpressing that which could have been equally well ‘ex- ^ pressed by a shorter one, would, at the worst, be only like going toa village ‘by a circuitous route (literally by the way round the pastures around the “ village); and it could not be said to fail in its object, which would be attained all the same, though with greater effort and fatigue. It is often “that wo meet with such roundabout methods of expression; as, for in- stance, though the single letter kha would be enough to signify Space, we often make use of longer words, such as ‘ Aka@ea’ and the like; and “certainly, we are not taken to task for doing so. In the same manner, in “the case in question, though the persuasion could be accomplished by “means of the Injunctive affix alone, yet the Veda has made use of the ^ Valedictory sentence for the purpose “There is yet another explanation that may be given: exactly as over “though there are many means of performing a sacrifice, yet it is only ५५ whoen it is done in the way pointed out by the Manira, that it brings about “the best results,—so, in the same manner, though the Injunctive persua- ५‹ 810४ could be got at by other means (such as the Injunctive affix, &.), ‘vet it is only when it is expressed through the agency of the Valedictory ‘passage, that the Action in question can lead to the best results.. ` “ Another objéction is raised in the Bhdshya ; ‘ Even though the vale- ५८ dictory expressions exist, yet as the preceding sentence is in the form of an In- “Junction, this Injunctive form cannot be disregarded “The sense of this objectionis this: ‘ What you say is all right, as re- ५ wards caces where the roundabout method is adopted before the shorter one ‘ig known; but in the case in question, such is not the case; as the shorter “and simpler method, that of the Injunctive affix, which is also the more ५ efficient, is already used before the other is introduced ; hence exactly as ८८ {71 the instance you bave cited, when one has used the word ‘ Kha,’ he does ‘not, ab that very time, make use of the longer word ‘ Akdca,’ so also in ८८ the present case, when the necessary persuasion has been accomplished by ‘means of the Injunctive affix, there is no need of having recourse to the ८ valedictory expressions. It may be urged that in that case, these vale- ८ dictory expressions would become absolutely useless. But what of that P ** Let them be useless “The reply ४० this 18 that we have already proved above the useful- ८८ 11688 of these valedictory expressions; as a matter of fact, they can never “be absolutely useless; as we have already shown that when the purpose ५८ 0 persuasion is capable of being served by both (the Injunctive affix and ४८ the valedictory words), inasmuch as the latter is perceptibly capable of “being construed with the former, we accept its utility (on that score) in ‘ preference to that of the former. - “The Bhashya puts forward another objection: ‘ The persuasive 74 unc- AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 31 ५८ tion may be comprehended by means of the Injuncttve sentence independently «५ of the valedictory words.’ ‘An opponent objects to this objection being raised over again, it ‘being already included in the former objection. But there is a difference . “between the two: the former was brought forward with a view to the ‘total rejection of the valedictory words ; whereas the sense of this second % objection is this: ‘ Though the compound sentence, as a whole, may be ‘taken as signifying Praise, yet it cannot be denied that the first part of < {6 signifies a distinct Injunction $ and if the expressive potency of the In- ‘‘junetive be once set aside, there being no means of reviving it, it would “(come to be absolutely incapable of any significance.’ | “And to this objection we make the following reply: Jtis true that “‘the first sentence has an injunctive potency: but this potency can very ८ well be discarded ; specially as the fact of its being discarded in one place ‘“‘cannot deprive it of its expressiveness in all cases; and conversely, the ‘fact of its having manifested itself in one place does not necessitate its ‘manifestation in every other place. As a matter of fact, in the case in ‘question, when the valedictory expressions signify something entirely < different, then the potency of the previous Injunctive is fully operative ; ‘‘whereas when the former expression manifests a potency of its own, ‘which sets aside that of the latter, this latter entirely disappears, lest ‘‘there be a syntactical split. It is this probable syntactical split, already «८ noticed before, that 18 again pointed out by means of the ‘present ques- ‘tion and answer (in the Bhdshya). Hence we conclude that, inasmuch ‘‘the purpose served by both (the Injunctive and the Valedictory expres- ‘‘ gions) is exactly the same, the necessary persuasion should be taken as ‘‘ fulfilled by means of the Praise expressed by the latter. ‘Says the Bhashya: Stutigabdah stuvantah kriyam prarocayamana ८ anushthatrnamupakarishyants kriydyah (1.¢., the valedictory expressions in ८ praising the Act, tend to make it attractive, and thereby help the actions ‘‘ of the agents). | , “In regard to this, a grammatical difficulty is raised: The word ५४ anushthatr should have had the Dative affix (in accordance with Panini’s ¢ Sutra I—iv—33), as it denotes the persons for whom the actions are made ‘attractive. It cannot be rightly urged that the said Sra mentions the * particular root ruct, while in the.seatence in question we have an entirely ‘‘ different root roci. Because, whether the root be ruci or १०८४, the sense of ८ attractiveness remains the same, and that is the only condition laid down ++ in the S#tra (for the application of the Dative). Nor can it be argued. ‘“‘ that the Genitive affix is due to the fact of the relationship expressed ` “being general, and not any special relation (such as that of the Dative). ‘ Because this cannot be rightly asserted, when we actually have a 32 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA YI-—ADHEI. ‘I. ‘particular relation (that of being attractive) distinctly mentioned. ‘Con- “sequontly we must construe prarocayumand with kriyfyaih; and as for the ‘“pergons to whom these Actions are made attractive, the context naturally “ points to the performers. Or, Anushtatrndm may be taken with upakartshy- “anti (the meaning being that they help the performers),:‘the word ‘kriyayah, “in this case, being faken as the Ablative—the meaning being that the’ “ valedictory expressions serve to make the action attractive; much more “strongly than is done by the Injunctive expression (the word kriya being’ “taken in the sense of Injunction). Or lastly, the word kriydyah in the “Genitive may be taken to mean for the sake of the Action “In the sentence kancidurtham stuvanti, &c. (in the Bhashya) the word ८८ ५९१८४८१८," 18. ६0 06 taken as a present participle (Plural, Neuter); and the ‘“ meaning is that while eulogising a certain object,—viz.: the object meant to “be laid: down, or something related to it—they lay down the Action: ox “something else related to it; and this laying down is by means of the ‘Praise; hence the authoritative character of the Arthavdda passages can “be established, only by discarding the Injunctive affixes.” == ` ~The above interpretation of the Bhashya is not accepted (by the orthodox Mimdisaka; and that for the following reasons): When thé Injunctive affix is discarded, there is nothing to express the Injunction of the action ;-and as such there would: be nothing that would be in:need of the Praise. For there is, in this case, no desire, on our part, to learn the method of the Verbal Bhavana Though it is possible to assume a desire to learn the why and whereforé of the Bhavana, et this, too, could only be with reference to the method of the Injunction; because the Praise is only meant to help the Injunction; the only difference of this why of the Verbal Bhavana from the method of the Injunction lying in the fact of its being expressed in different words Then, again,:even this want is possible for the person only after he has ‘been enjoined or prompted to do. an Act, and not when the Action is merely mentioned (by name). For certainly, when the mere action, the seizing of the Cvéia consecrated to Vayu, is mentioned, so long as it is not asserted whether this seizing should be done or not, there is no desire to know whether the Action is praiseworthy or otherwise. And when the idea of Such praiseworthiness is not desired, the Arthavdda passages themselves literally only describing certain facts, would not imply amy such ex- cellence, & And as for the denotation of the verbal root itself, there is no chance of any person having any relations with it, or having any desires with regard AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA RASSAGES. oo to it ; because all these desires, &c., belong to the 2184114. And as this Bhavana will have been set aside by the discarding of the Injunctive affix, what would be there that could be in want of anything ? Hence when all the three factors will have been set aside (along with the Injunctive word), we could have no ideas, either of Prosperity as the result, or the Sacrifice as the means, or anything else as the method. Under these circumstances, even if the excellence of the Action should happen to be expressed by the Arthavada,—unless this declaration of excellence be capable of being taken as an answer to the query as to why the Action should be performed,—the mere recognition of the fact of a certain Action being good,—unless this fact is recognised a3 a reason for its performability,—could not give us any idea of the performability of the Action. Even if, somehow or other, a notion of performability (Kartavyaté) were got at, the meaning got at would be ‘pragastah kar- tavyah’ (i.e., the Action should be made praiseworthy) ; exactly as we have the expression ‘ Patah kartavyah’ (the Cloth should be made). And so long as a direct Injunction of the Action is not assumed, alt such notions would be absolutely useless. And certainly to reject n direct Injunctive expression, and then to assume such Injunction indirectly, through the Arthavdda, would be a very objectionable method to follow. Then, too, inasmuch as the necessary Injunction is already directly ex- pressed by the Injunctive expression, there can be no reasonable ground for making any indirect assumptions of it. The Injunction could be indirectly got at by means of the Arthavdda, only if it had not been ex- pressed by other more direct means; and as, in the present instance, it is clearly pointed out by the direct Injunctive expression, there is no such inconsistency (to avoid which we should assume an Injunction by indirect means) So, too, if the Arthavdda, by itself, did not serve a distinctly useful purpose in the persuasion,—as in the case of mere descriptions of events, then it could be discarded. But we have already shown above that it does serve a useful purpose in the persuasion, and as such it is not discarded; and hence if the necessary persuasion could be accomplished by other means, then there would have been no need of the Arthavdda. But, as a matter of fact, the persuasion, finding no other means of itg accomplishment, seeks the help of the Arthavdda itself. And in all matters relating to the Veda, the assumption of words is based upon the sole ground of the apparent inconsistency of certain well-recognised facts; and from this assumption of words follows the neces- sary accomplishment of the objects. Hence the persuasion could only lead to the assumption of the Injunctive word, and not to that of actual Injune- tion, But on the occasion of such assumption of the Injunctive word, the 9 4 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-—PADA 1- 470प्ा, 1. direct appearance of such a word, in the shape of ‘ Glabhéta (should seize) would bar the way to the inference of any other expressions ; exactly as in the case of the passages dealing with the ‘ Aindra’ and the ‘ Vayvya,’ as soon as the injunctive sentence—‘ Soména yajéta’ (should sacrifice with the Soma)—presents itself, no other sacrifice is assumed. Then, again, it is only when two sentences express the same meaning that there can be either a rejection of the one by the other; or they may be taken as optional alternatives. Butin the case of the Injunctive word and the Arthavida, we find an absolute difference between their meanings, the former dealing with that which is to be helped (by the praise), and the latter with that which helps (7.¢., the Praise) ; and as such we cannot but take them jointly, construing them together into a single complex sentence. If there were a setting aside of the Injunctive affix, then there would be no trace left of the fact of the action being for one’s own sake or for that of others,—a fact that is pointed out by the number, &c., of the nominative agent (which in the present case is expressible only by means of the Injunctive affix). It may be argued thnt what we set aside is only the factor of tnjunction, and not the ideas of the number, &c. (denoted by the Affix). But this is not possible; because if the affix be retained for the purpose of denoting the number, &c., it could never fail to denote the Injunction also. And what has been once denoted and duly cognised can be rejected only in two ways: (1) either on account of its being not in contact with the Injunction,—as in the case of the ‘oneness’ of the vessel (Vide. III-1-12 et seg,)—, or (2) on account of its being a mere explanatory description—as in the case of the Homa done for the snke of one who wants the sense-organs. The Injunction, however, cannot itself be said to be not-Injunction (hence the first condition is not applicable to the present case); nor can it be taken to be a mere explanatory description ; because till the Injunctive expression is uttered, that which it enjoins has not been enjoined or pointed out by any other means. As the fact that is pointed out by the passage in question, is not in the form that—‘the seizing of the Cwétu dedicated tv Vayu, which should be done, is good or praiseworthy, —but in that— it should be done, because it is good or praiseworthy.’ In the example of the Udavasdniya that has been cited above, the participial affix ‘ktvd,’ while indicating the mere Action, independently of any notions of Injunction or Prohibition, has clearly pointed out (literally, attained the position of) the Injunction; and as such it cannot serve asa proper example. For if it did not point to the Injunction, then the denotation of the verb itself would fall into the place of the object to be accomplished ; and as such 1४ would become absolutely useless. AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 35 Thus we find that the Arthavada can be said to be taken along with the Injunetion, without in any way subverting the Sutra. Hence has the Bhashya declared: The real indicator of the Injunction extends up to the expression ‘desiring prosperity’ (in the sentence * vdyavyam cv8tamalabhéta bhitikamah’), which shows that the Injunction itself 1s included in it; for if the Bhashya did not mean the Injunction to be 80 included, it would have declared the meaning of the verbal root only to be the indicator of the Injunction; but the mere fact of the meaning of the verbnl root embodying an action is not enough to justify us in holding it to be the indicator of Injunction. Consequently, we conclude that it is the Injunctive Affix alone, which, as signifying the Injunction, is held to be the indicator of Injnnction. As it 18 not possible for the Arthavdda to be taken along with that which is pointed out by the Injunction (which is a particular Action), the Bhashya has added the word ^ Uddéea’’ to the Sutra (the expression ‘ Vidhyuddéca’ meaning the indicator of Injunction, which, being in the form of the Injunctive affix, can be taken along with the Artha- vada). The addition of the clause extending up to the word ‘ desiruig prospertly ’ is made with the purpose of affording an occasion for the Praise, after the Action has been comprehended as bringing about a particular desirable result. Objection: ‘Under the circumstances, in a case where tho verb is in the present tense (f.i. ‘ Dadhna juhoti’ ), there being no desire to seek after any other thing, the Arthavadda passage could not be taken along with it.” Reply: Though it is so, yet no other means of cognition being applicable, the Arthavdda comes to be connected with the Injunction, which is assumed [to be pointed out, either (1) by the instructions of method (contained in the Br&limana passage in connection with the sentence ‘ Dadhna@ juhoti,” or (2) by the fifth verbal mood (Lét), or (3) by the Apparent Inconsistency of the Present Tense, which remains inexplicable without the assumption of the said Injunction]. Even in a case where we assume an Injunction, on the sole strength of the Arthavdda passage, our only refuge lies in the Apparent Inconsistency (or Inexplicability of the Praise contained in the Arthavdda). And so long as we have these resources at our command, itis not right to have recourse to the uselessly elaborate processes (detailed above, by the Opponent). It has been urged above that if this interpretation be accepted, there would be a syntactical split on account of the sentence being made to ex- press two distinct relationships. But we have sailed clear of this objection by putting the sense of the passage in this form: One should seize the Cvéta, on account of such seizing being good or praiseworthy. This does not 36 TANTRA-VARTINQA, ADH. [—PADA I[—ADBI. I. give rise to any syntactical split, because that which is enjoined stands in need of Praise (for the sake of persuasion) ; and as such, there being no necessity for having recourse to any breaking up of the sentences, the two factors (viz.: the Injunction and the Praise) can very well be taken to- gether. Then, again, if the delineation of such distinct relationships were to be marked down as causing a syntactical split, then the pointing out of such factors as the Means, the Result, and the Method (as is done by all Injunctive passages) would also have to be rejected as giving rise to such a split. It is in connection with these facts that we should take the Bha- shya passage: This relationship is not what is meant to be expressed. That is to say, the former half of the passage by itself is not meant to be taken as expressing the Injunction with all its accessories ; because in that case, the Injunction having been duly accomplished by the former half, it is only indirectly, through this Injunction, that the Persuasion, meant by the Intter half, could be accomplished ; and this process being much too complicated, a syntactical split would be inevitable. The question (in the Bhashya)—‘ What is the use of the Praise ?”’—is pul with a view to the fact of the necessary persuasion having been accom- plished by means of the former (Injunctive passage. And the reply that is givon—Hovw else could there be a persuasion ?— is based upon the fact of the Injunction being helped (in its potency) by the Persuasion expressed in the snbsequent Arthavdda. The sentence in the Bhdshya beginning with nann pradgapt explains what has gone before. The passage na hi, &., means that it is only when there is no direct Praise that the Injunctive passage can be assumed to have the double signification (of the Injunction as well as the Praise) ; and this assumption is not allowable when the Praise can be expressed by another sentence. In that case, if the Arihavdda be neglected, the Injunction of the action to be performed by one desirous of prosperity would remain incomplete. The clause yatha patah has alrendy been explained above. The passage-—Vidhigabdéna tada prarocand—serves to point out the manifold purposes served by the Injunction and the Praise. The meaning of the objection—“‘nanvévamapi, §c.”—is that, ‘when the Injunction itself 1s capable of persuading, why should it require an Arthavdda passage to do this P” The reply to this is given by the sentence—satyam, &c. That is to say, 16 18 only when there is no valedictory sentence,—and not when there is such a direct sentence,—that the purpose of the Praise can be held to be served by the Injunctive sentence itself. This purpose is none other than Praising; and it cannot be 5४4 to be served exclusively AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 87 by the Arthavdda alone; because the object praised being pointed out by the Injunctive sentence, and no praise being possible without the object that is praised, the Injunctive sentence must also be accepted as serving the prrpose of Praising. But it is only when there 18 no Arthavada pnrss.ge that we have recourse to the highly complicated process of attribut- ing the signification of both (Injunction and Praise) to the Injunctive sentence exclusively. The sentence—‘ nanu satsvapi, &c.,’ 18 to be explained as before. Ther. we have the sentence-—ato’smadvidhéh, &c.; and the meaning of this i4 that we comprehend the Praise not from the Injunctive sentence itself, Fut from such sources as the Genitive case-ending, the supplemen- tary syntences (in the shape of the Arthavdda), and the like. Then there is another objection—“ nanu nirapékshddapi,” &c. ; and the sense of this objection is this: ^ When in certain cases, even in the absence of any mention of the method of the particular Action enjoined, the Injunc- tion is accepted to have the capability of urging men to that action, where- fore should it stand in need of anything else (that may be sought to be expressed by the Arthavdda)?P And hence, as a matter of fact, even when such Arthavada passages actually exist, it 18 best to disregard or reject them.” The Author of the Bhashya replies to this objection in a jocular style: This may be the case where we have the Injunctive expression appearing alone, by itself, independently of all else; because in that case, there would be no contradiction. But this is not possible in the case in question; be- cause in this case, the Injunction 18 expressed by certain words that stand in need of other factors (as Praise and the like). Any single sentence can be accepted as laying down or expressing only one relationship of a certain thing; hence if we make the Injunction indicate the two factors (of In- junction and Praise), then there would be an inevitable syntactical split. The sentence—esha hi guno, &c.—shows the persuasive force of the Arthavida, as eulogising the factors pointed out by the Injunctive sentence. For these reasons, we conclude that the Arthavdda passages have a distinct purpose to serve, as helping the Injunctions, by being taken along with these latter. Sutra (8). The connection of long-established tradition also 18 equal. + With a view to justify the word ‘ca,’ the Bhashya has introduced the Sitra with the objection: ‘The Arthavddas may be accepted as entirely useless.” And the reply is that this cannot be; because the aforesaid reasonings have shown that they serve a distinctly usefil purpose. Ny 33 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-~PADA II—ADHI. f. Or, the passage supplying the reply may be interpreted as—This ८८10110} be (tanna), because of the usefulness having been shown in this (aforesaid ) manner (evamarthdvagamat), and also because the connection of tradition, &c., &c.,—the Sdira being thus construed along with the reply to the assumed ‘objection. There are certain rules and regulations (Dharmas) laid down with regard to the study of the Veda; and these have the sole purpose of keeping up the traditional system; because the regulations are distinctly laid down in the Smrtis, as calculated to preserve such a system; and, secondly, because the said regulations can have nothing to do with such other human ends, as the attaining of Heaven, and the like; nor have we any authority for postulating a different purpose for these regulations, and for rejecting the fact of the proper accomplishment of the traditional course of study, which in itself is admitted to be distinctly useful, and is most closely connected with the said regulations. In connection with the tradi- tional system of study, the strict observance of these regulations serves the distinctly useful and much-needed purpose of removing obstacles from the way of such studies ; and we admit the fact of these regulations serving the purpose of removing the obstacles, on the ground of these having been laid down with this avowed purpose ; specially as any other use that may be assumed could not, in any way, help in the process of study. For if the attainment of Heaven be assumed to be the purpose served by the said regulations, then these would come to be the means of accomplishing a direct purpose of the agent (and would have nothing to do with the proper completion of Vedic study). It may be assumed that it is only when the Veda is studied in accordance with the said regulations that the sacrifices can bring about their proper results (and as such the Regulations serve the purpose of help* ing in the proper accomplishment of the results of sacrifices). But, in that case, the Regulations would have only an indirect use, helping some- thing (the sacrifice) very remote from itself. For these reasons, we cannot but conclude these Regulations to serve the extremely useful purpose of helping a man in the proper accomplishment of his study of the Vedic texts (by the removal of obstacles). Then, again, we do not want the obstacles to be removed from the way of a thing that is absolutely useless. Because obstacles to such useless things are always desirable ; so as there may be no useless trouble in accomplishing that which does not serve any useful purpose (but, on the other hand, hinders it.) Thus we find that inasmuch as the Arthavada passages are treated, by students, with as much respect and attention as the Injunctive passages which are apparently useful, we must accept the former also to be equally AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 39 useful. And as the said Regulations are based upon the Veda (and these are observed equally with regard to the Injunctive and the Arthavade passages), this equal regard must be regarded as authorised by the Veda itself. And this regard could not be possible, unless the Arthavida passages actually served a useful purpose; and thus, we arrive at the general fact of the Arthavdda being distinctly useful. And then, in accordance with the reasoning embodied in Sutra [—iv—30, finding these passages to be capable of signifying Praise, we come to the conclusion that they serve the useful purpose of praising (that which has been enjoined in the Injunctive ४8 sages). It is with & view to all this that we read in the Bhdshya: The remem- brance is quite strong. Or, this passage may be taken as pointing to the fact that the useful- ness of the Arthavdda passage can be inferred from the fact of all men keeping up a firm hold (or remembrance) of the text of the whole Veda, which could not have been possible unless all men had heen fully con- vinced of the usefulness of the whole of it (the Injunctions, the Arthavddas, the Mantras, &., all included). The fact, too, of people having this firm conviction of its usefulness is implied by certain sentences; and as such it cannot be said to be (based upon mere Inferential assumption, and as such) wanting in true authoritativeness. If it were not so, and people considered certain portions of the Veda to be useless, they would neglect such portions, and study only certain portions of it—either the Injunctive passages alone, or the Arthavddus alone. And in that case, there could not be a firm remembrance of the portions thus neglected. But, as a matter of fact, we find that people have a firm remembrance (of the Arthavada passages, as much as that of the Injunctive passages) ; and hence we cannot reject these as useless interpolations. And from this too, we cannot but admit them to be distinctly useful, The Sara may also be interpreted in another manner: The Vedic text --* 1168 Veda shonld be studied ”—of which the sole purpose is the establishing of a long tradition (of study), and which has been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the eternal tradition of Vedic study,—refers equally to the Arthavada and the Injunctive passages; inasmuch as both of these equally constitute the Veda; and hence, in accordance with the arguments propounded abovo, there being no chance for their usefulness apart from the accomplishment of certain purposes of man, the Arthavdda passages must be accepted as capable of expressing Praise, and thereby serving the useful purpose of pratsing (an Action which has been laid down as bringing about a certain desirable result, and thereby persuading the man to its performance). 40 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I--PADA I1—ADHI. I. Sutra (9). The aforesaid objections are not applicable; be- cause there would be a contradiction only if these pointed out an action; but as it is they do not point to an action; and hence there is no incongruity. With this Siétra begins the refutation of the objections urged (in the Piirvapaksha Sitras) against the authority of the Arthavida passages. The objections that have been urged above—viz.: the contradiction of the Scriptures and facts of ordinary perception, §c.--against the assumption of Injunctions in connection with Arthavadas,—we do not find to be applicable to our theory. Or the Sitra—when ‘ apraiptim’ is read as ‘apraiptam’—may mean that we do not find the above explanation of Praise to be open to the said objections. : And the reason given is that if the sentences (Arthavadas)——that speak of the ‘weeping,’ ‘ cutting out of the fat,’ ‘misconception of the quarters,’ ‘theft,’ ‘uutruthfulness,’ &.—were taken as laying down certain Actions to be performed, then alone could there be a contradiction (of Scriptures or of ordinary facts of perception). But, as 2 matter of fact, we do not take these sentences in their literal sense ; nor do we supply into them words from without, in order to make them signify a direct Injunc- tion; all that we hold them to signify is Praise only; and certainly, there can be no contradiction in this; and hence there can be no incongruity in our theory. | Or, the expression (in the Sw#ta)—Cabddrthustu—may be taken to mean that the Arthavéda passage serves the purpose of helping the Injunctive words; and as such, not being connected with the performance of any action that may be mentioned in itself, it does not come to be put into practice ; and as such it cannot be incongruous. There are three different readings of the S#ira: (1) Apraptancanu- papattim,—in this case the words ‘we find’ have got to be supplied; the meaning being—we find the said objection to be not applicable, 4८. (2) Aprap- tancanuppattim,—in this case we have to supply the words ‘our explana- tion’; the meaning being—our explanation ts not open to the said objection. (3) Aprapta cinupapattih,—the meaning in this case being —The objection 1s found to be tnapplicable to our theory,—the words ‘ found in our theory ’ being supplied from without. Sutra (10). It is indirect description. [This Stra meets the objections urged in Sita (1).] A question 18 now raised: ^“ The Arthavdda may be taken along with the Injunction, when both of them refer to the same subject; but how can they be said to be so related, when their subjects are totally different ’’ ? AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 4) The reply to this is that there can be an indirect relationship between the two. As for instance, when a certain object connected with a certain Action is praised, that praise indirectly applies to the other relatives of the same Action also; or, when a certain object has got to be praised, we praise the source from which it proceeds. And as both in the Veda and in ordinary parlance, the praise of one object is found to be applicable to another object related to it, this indirect method of praising a thing is often resorted to. And as such, the fact of the subject-matter of the Arthavada and the Injunction being different cannot in any way affect our aforesaid conclusions. The signification of such Praises will be exemplified and explained later 01) ;—e.g., when the water is praised as calm, it is indirectly taken to signify the fact that anything connected with, or proceeding from water, being a Source of calmness or peace, would remove the troubles of the saorificer. The present Sutra by itself directly meets the cases of the three Arthavadas: (1) ‘He wept, and from his tears silver was produced’; (2) * Prajapati cut out his own fat’ and ‘ The gods having ascertained it to be a sacrifice to the gods knew not the quarters.’ And the following Sitras too will be taken as bringing forward arguments in support of the conclusions arrived at under this Séira. As for the means of ascertaining the fact of the Arthavddas under ques- tion having secondary or indirect significations, only a few of them will be explained now; the rest will be explained in detail under Sétra [—iv—23. In the case of the Arthavada—“ He wept, &c.”’—each factor of the Artha- vada is to be taken along with each factor of the Injunction, because of their mutual requirements. That is to say, the word ‘ He’ (‘sah’) refers to the subject spoken of ; because this word always denotes the subject treated of. Or, the expression ‘tatpratyayadt’ (in the Bhashya) may be taken as pointing out the fact of the pronoun ‘ tat’ being well-known to refer to the subject in hand; and hence whenever the word “Sah” is used, it imme- diately points to its base ‘Tat,’ and thence to the subject spoken of. Hence the construction of the aforesaid Arthavada passage should be thus ex- plained: ‘That which followed as his tears is the ‘Silver.’” And all this is said in support of the subsequent deprecation and prohibition (of the giving of silver); and hence after the Prohibitory Passage (that silver should not be given), it is only natural that we should have the Deprecatory Passage under question. The Bhdshya cites the said deprecatory passage: ‘One who gives silver at the Varhi-sacrifice, falls into some trouble (that makes tears flow in his family) before the year closes.’ The reason why this trouble befalls the giver of silver is next explained: The effect always being similar to the Oause, if one makes a gift of silver, which is a product of weeping, it is 6 42 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-—-PADA IT—ADHI. 1. Only natural that it should bring about an effect similar to itself, in the shape of some tear-producing (heartrending) calamity ; and from all this 1४ follows that silver should not be given, And thus we find that the Arthavida—“ He wept, &c.”—serves, & distinctly useful purpose, being, through the said Deprecation, supplement- ary to the Prohibition of the giving of silver. This Indireet Assertion too is based upon words,—the fact of weeping (Rodanw) having been inferred from the mere verbal sound of the word ° Rudra.’ And the silver comes to be deprecated on account of the mere assuntption that if drops of tears, could be solidified, in as much as they are white, they would be like silver (and as such this metal being similar to tears, should not be given); or, silver may have been spoken as produced by weeping, on account of the fact of an expenditure of wealth (of which silver always forms the principal portion) bringing tears to the eyes of persons related to the spendthrift. Aud thus we find that in some way or other a due comprehension of the Deprecation invariably helps us in getting at the real Prohibition ; and as such it does not matter, if the Arthavdda is unable to point out the Prohibition directly. The same process of construction is also applied to the passage speak- ing of Prajapati having cut out his fat. This passage is taken as prising a good action, thus: ‘A good action is performed even at such personal discomfort as the cutting out of one’s own fat,—what then can be said with regard to the spending of one’s external possessions over a good action’ ? For instance, even in ordinary parlance, we find people eulogising the ex- tremely charitable, as that ‘he gives a way even his very eye-balls.’ It is true that the passage in itself describes a certain event; but no Vedic passage has any authority in its mere descriptive form; there is always an element of truth in the Praise that is signified by it; and hence the passage having been recognised as true, in reference to this Praise, which is found to serve a distinctly useful purpose, it does not stand in need of having its signification trausferred to a mere description, which, even if true, could be of no use (in regard to Dharma). Or again, the Arthavadas may be taken as parts of the Verbal Bhavana (of an Injunction); and even then, their sole use would liein the giving rise, in the mind, to the idea of engaging in a certain action (‘ may I do this ); and in this, the literal signification of the passages (as consisting of mere descriptions) could have no use (the aforesaid idea being accom plished by the mere recognition of the excellence of the Action, independently of any descriptions of persons or things). (And in such cases as ‘He wept, and from his tears silver was produced,’ the literal meaning is apparently contrary to all seyse-perception, and as such totally inadmissible). But in the case of भ्व AUTHORITY. OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 43 such passages as point to the fact of Heaven being attained by means of the performance of a certain sacrifice, it is a well established fact, that there is no contradiction (of any facts of ordinary perception}. Nor can it be urged that there can be no proper Praise or Deprecation indicated by such descriptions as are apparently false. Because the implied Praise or Deprecation is always distinctly comprehended (even when the description is false). Asa matter of fact, it is only in the case of real des- criptions of facts that we find people saying—“ What is the use of inferring from it a Praise or a Deprecation, the Description itself is quite true, and admissibleP?’’ It is in the case of the false descriptions—where that which is generally known to be bad is described as good, or vice versé, —that people reason thus: “(1) Inasmuch as this sentence describes as good that which is generally known as bad, it is clear that it persuades me to have recourse to it; and (2) inasmuch as it describes as bad that which is generally believed to be good, it distinctly dissuades me from 1६! ; and having reasoned thus, they engage in the eulogised course of Action, which he finds himself unable to abandon. Thon again, it is admitted on all hands that the Veda is absolutely authoritative ; and it 1s also a well-recognised fact that the knowledge of the excellence or non-excellence of an Action known to the man is of help in his (t.e., 18 utilised by him in) engaging im it or avoiding 1t; and in the case of the Arthavadda passages, we find that such knowledge is brought about by the Veda itself; and hence we are led to the conclusion that we must regulate our actions accordingly. Kven in the ordinary world, we find that there are certain actions, which, though bringing about other results, are held by trustworthy per- 80118 to impart to the performer an excellent Memory (or Intelligence) ; and when seeking to persuade a person to do that act, they point ont to him the Action as leading to many other desirable results, such as wealth, good luck, &c., even though this may not be quite true. And having performed the Action, as urged by such descriptions, the man actually obtains the real result (Excellence of Memory). Though the person prompted knows full well that all the results that are described to him do not really follow from the Action, and are described to him in accordance with his own incli- nations, yet being convinced of the impossibility of trustworthy persons prompting him to absolutely useless (or harmful) Actions, he concludes that though all the results described may not follow, yet something desirable is sure to follow from the Action; and accordingly he engages himself in it. In the same manner, in the case of the Veda, though the real result may have been spoken of in the Injunctive passage itself, yet the Artha- vada, even though describing only imaginary results, may serve the pur- 44 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA II— ADHI. I. pose of making the enjoined Action more attractive to the Agent; and as such it does not matter whether the results described in it are false or real; specially as its sole use lies in the persuading of the Agent to do the Action (enjoined), which is accomplished equally well (even when the Results described are only false). And even though the results described in the Arthavdda are recognised to be false, yet the learned people do not abandon the Action praised by it; because they are fally cognisant of the fact that the result that will surely follow is the one mentioned in the Injunc- tive passage (and this is quite desirable by itself). For these reasons we conclude that the fact of the description being false does not in any way affect the question. For instance, when a man mis- taking a piece of shell for silver, picks it up, and if in picking up the shel), he comes across a piece of real silver, he is not said to have been wholly deceived (as to the silver). And as in this case, we have the shell as the real substratum of the notion of silver, so some such real substratum of truth can always be found (in the case of the false descriptions contained in the Arthavdda), through the similarity of Verbal sounds. That is to say, in the case of the Arthavdda—“ Prajapati cut out his own fat and offered it into the Fire, and there appeared the aja (unborn one or goat), by making use of which people obtain catile,’—the word ‘ Prajapati’ may be taken as denoting the Elements, as these support (‘ panti’) the creation or living beings (‘prajah’); ‘ Vapa@’ (‘fat’) =the innermost essence of these Hlements—as Rain and the Jike; and this was offered into the ‘ Fire’ which=(1) the fire of Lightning (into which Rain was offered), (2) the fire in the body (in- to which Air was offered, as the Air moves within the body, exactly as the offering does in the fire), and (3) the ordinary fire (into which its rays are offered, as it 18 into the fire that the rays become extinguished); thence came ‘ the unborn,’ by which are meant the seeds, &c., which are generally believed to be eternally continuous ; and having got there, men obtain cattle ; because all animals are only different modifications of the various grains. And this interpretation will supply the substratum of truth in the said Arthavada passage. But though this interpretation makes the passage appear as a truth- ful description, yet it entirely loses its euloyistic character; and hence we proceed to explain the passage in such a way as to represent it as truthful, and at the same time, accomplishing its appointed purpose of Praising. On the strength of the Mantras, Arthavadas, 21472045, and Itihdsas, we accept the fact of there being a Creation and a Dissolution of the Universe. Hence we deduce the following meaning from the said passage : ‘At the beginning of the Creation, Prajipati—who is spoken of as the Lord of Oreation, on account of His former righteous deedis—fi nding no other animal at hand, changed himself, by mere will-force, into the form of an AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. animal, and then cut out the fat out of his own body, &., c&e. ; aid before the offering, &c., were quite finished, a [1001688 animal (aja=goat) rose from sacrificial fire. This description indicates the fact of the particular sacrifice being so quickly efficacious as to bring about its result immediately after (or even before) its completion; and that it was for this reason that Prajapati took such a lot of trouble over its performance. And in this, the descriptive element (as well as the Praise) is quite true. Nor does the description of this particular event make the Veda necessarily non-eternal ; because like the 8108 of each succeeding season, it is possible for the same action to be repeated at each beginning of the Creation. Similarly too, in the case of the passage— Dévd ४८५४ dévayajzanam, §c.” —the word «' Dévah”’ =those who shine with cleverness in actions, v1z., the Sacrificial Priests; and these Priests, having comprehended the Dévaya- jana, and finding the actions in connection with the Soma to be entirely different to what they had been used to, during the performance of the Darga and the Pirnamdsa, become bewildered as to the course of action to be adopted ; and as such they are spoken of as ‘ not knowing the East from the West, &c.’ Thus it is that even in ordinary every-day life, when a man is bewildered as to the course of action to be adopted by him, he says: ‘Tbe quarters (East, West, &c.), appear to me confused.’ And it is as helping to remove this bewilderment that the Adtti sacrifice is praised (by means of the said Arthavida passage); and the bewilderment is removed on account of there being an interval of time for ascertaining the real character of the subject (on which the man is bewildered). That is tosay, during the time that the man is going through the performance of the well-practised primary actions in connection with the ‘Prayantya,’ he gets time to recollect his wits about the Actions that are to come next (about which there is generally a confusion in the minds of the performers). Other- wise (if the said actions were not performed), and there were no interim between the two Primary Actions, the agent would not have time to concentrate his mind upon what he would have to do next. And as this interim is afforded by the ‘ Adit?’ sacrifice, it is this that is praised as helping to remove the confusion in the Agent's mind. Sutra (11). (The indirect signification is) based upon form, and upon the character of the greater part. [This Sutra meets the first two objections urged in Sééra (2).] (The meaning of the Siztra is that the mind is spoken of as ‘ thief,’ in the Arthavdda passage, on account of its “ form”; ४.6.) just as the thief has his form or body concealed, &c.,so has the mind also; and thus the name of “thief” 18 applied to the mind only indirectly or figuratively. So also speech is spoken of as ‘liar,’ on the ground of the speech of people, for 46 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1- 24704 II—ADHI. If. the greatcr part, consisting of lies only; and hence the character of the speaker is figuratively attributed to the speech itself) In ordinary life, whenever something has got to be done, what the person does is to form a determination in his mind, and then to express it in words or speech, and then to do it; and as such even though the Mind and the Speech are very closely related to the Action to be performed, yet they are spoken of as of much less significance than gold, because they have the character of the thtef and the liar respectively. (The said Arthavadda appearing in the wake of the Injunction that one 15 to keep some gold in his hand). If the signification of the passage rested merely in the said Depre- cation (of Mind and Speech), it could only point to a Prohibition ; and it is only when signifying the Praise (of gold) that it can be taken along with the said Injunction; specially as it is only the supporting of the Injunction that is found to serve a visible purpose; as will be explained later on, under Suira X—vui—7. Sutra (12). Because of the greatness of distance. [This Sutra meets the third objection urged in Gdira (2).] The Arthavada—‘ During the day the smoke only is perceived ’—occurs in support of the declaration that ‘ During the day, the Fire goes away to the Sun.’ And as to the question—why should this declaration be made?—, we reply that it 1s with a view to eulogise the Injunction with regard to the mantra recited at the Agnihotra—viz: ^ Stiryo jsyotirjyotth stiryah swiha is to be employed at the morning offering, and 4410214 ४0141 ४०४४१. agnth swaha in the evening offering,” where we have mantras having their implications intermixed with one another. Question: ‘‘ How can these implications of the said mantras be said to be intermixed, when we find them referring to two distinct deities, Agni and Sirya P”’ To this question, some people make the following reply: ^ The word ‘Jyotth’ in the mantra ‘ Agnirjyotih, &c.,’ signifies the Surya, while in the other maztra it signifies Agni; and as such the significations of the two mantras become intermixed,” | But this explanation is not quite satisfactory; because the word ८५ Jyotth”’ 810010९8 Light in general; and as such can be taken as qualifying both the Agni and the Surya; specially if the word were synonymous with any one of these two, it could not be used with reference to the other. That is to say, in @ case where any two words are synonymous, if one of them is used, another is not used along with it; so that if the word ‘Jyotth’ were synonymous with ‘ Qérya,’ it could not be used iu the mantra of the morning offering— Suryojyotth, &c.’”’; while if it were syno- nymous with ^" Agni,” it could not be used in that of the evening offering. AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 47 Hence we conclude that the mantras have been wrongly cited. The proper mantras to cite here are: “(1) Agnirjyotirjyotih séryah swiha, (2) Suryo jyotirjyotiragnih swaha” (the former being enjoined as the mantra to be employed in the evening libation, and the latter in the morning one). And it is this Injunction that can be taken as eulogised by the Arthavdda in question ; because the Injuuction serves to set aside, in this case, the general rule that the mantra is to be employed in accordance with the implications of the words composing it; and as such the Injunction being one of intermixed implications, it comes to be supported by the said Praise. And the reason for this intermixture is [धत down as that, ‘during the day, Agni (Fire) enters into the Sé#rya (the Sun), while during the night the Sun enters into the Fire’; and hence it follows that the offerings are not to be made only to the deities pointed out in the mantras. In this explanation too, the former muntras (cited in the Bhdshya) serve as examples of the Injunction that is set aside by the latter Injunc- tion; and the latter mantras quoted by us, to which the praise of the Arthavada refers, were not quoted by the Bhiishya, because they are pointed out by the mention of the fact of “the implications being inter- 1112580 ' ` (which could not refer to the mantras quoted). Or, it may be that the Arthavada in question occurs between the two sets of mantras (the one set quoted in the Bhdshya, and laying down the libations to be offered to the Deities mentioned in the mantras, and tho other set quoted by us, where the implications of the two mantras are mixed up in the Injunction). For the latter Injunction we may have some other Praise; the Praise in question referring to the former (which lays down the moruing libation to be offered to the Sun, and the evening one to Agni); and this praise may be explained thus: Inasmuch as during the day the Fire enters into the Sun, the Sun 1s the only light ; and similarly as at night the Sun entersinto the Hire, Fire is the only light ; and as such it is necessary that the morning libation should always be offered to Surya and the evening one always to 40144. Question: ‘ But how is it that the passage speaks of the smoke alone, &c. ?”’ Answer: The explanation of this lies in the fact, that during the day, when we look at the Fire burning aé u greut distance, we see the smoke only ; while at night we distinctly perceive the light (and not the smoke) ; and as such this statement of a well-known fact serves as a sort of basis for the aforesaid Praise. Sutra (13). Through the failings of women, the son is often found to belong to the man, [This Sutra meets the fourth objection arged in Sura (2). ] - It 18 laid down that,—“ during the recounting of the Pravaras (the 48 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA II——ADHI. 1. particular Rshis among one’s ancestors) the saorificer should say—Dévah pitarah, &c.” +: asa praise of this recounting of the Pravaras, we have the declaration that even a non-Brahmana becomes a Brahmana by this recount- ing. , Against this some people raise the following question: ^“ In the case of those whose Bréhmanical character is well-known, the acquisition of the said Brahmanahood would be useless (and as such the recounting of the Pravaras cannot be necessary for well-recognised Brahmanas).”’ It is in anticipation of this question that we have the declaration—“ We know not whether we are Bréhmanas or non-Braihmanas.” The mention of the known as the ‘unknown’ implies that it ts hard to be known; because that which cannot be known easily 18 as good as unknown ; and certainly, the fact of any person being a Brihmana is extremely difficult to ascertain, on account of the fazlengs of the woman. But even in the case of the womau’s failings, if the son always belonged to the mother or to her master, the caste of these two being always well- known, there would be no difficulty in ascertaining the caste of the son; the caste of the Parents also being ascertained by that of the grand-parents, and so on and on, the caste of all the ancestors from the very beginning of time, could be easily ascertained. But we find such declarations in the Smrtis as—“* The mother is only a leathern bag, the son belongs to the father”; and as in the case of the woman having been led astray, it 18 not easily ascertained who the actual “father” is,—and it being quite possible for him to belong to a caste other than that of the woman,—tlre offspring, in this case, would be one of an uncertain, or even a mixed caste. In the Veda too, we read—“ one should carefully guard this thread (of 6०56), -- which shows that the caste is liable to be lost; and as such this passage could be explicable only if the caste of the offspring be accepted to be regulated by that of the man. Because if the caste were not liable to such changes, it would remain intact, even when not guarded ; and as such there would be no use of the Vedic Injunction just quoted. Thus we find that there is an occasion, or use, for the said Praise (of the recounting of one’s Pravaras) ; the meaning of the Praise being that a re- counting of the Pravaras or Ancestors of universally recognised Brahmana- hood shows that the person so recounting is a descendant of such great Brahmayas; and thereby he himself comes to be recognised as a true Brahmana. Sutra (14). There is a desire for present comfort [This Sara meets the fifth objection urged in Stra (2). That which appears at the present time is spoken of as “ dkalika”’ ; and certainly that which dves not take much time to appear is what 18 PADA I—ADHI. I—AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 49 desired by all men. And hence in the making of the sacrificial House, the making of windows is particularly eulogised; because the windows serve the immediately useful purpose of allowing an easy exit for the smoke; and thereby remove one great canse of discomfort to the persons connected with the performance of the sacrifice. Whereas the final Result—Heaven, &c.—that would follow from the sacrifice, can appear only after the lapse of some time. And hence the meaning of the Arthavdda—“ who knows whether there is a Heaven, &c. ' -18 that, who knows now whether the great result will follow from the sacrifice ?—because, the means of knowing that the result will come lies in the scriptures; while we know from direct sense-per- ception that the letting out of smoke brings immediate relief; and hence it is in comparison with this latter fact, that the fact of the sacrifice lead- ing to Heaven has been spoken as “ unknown” (or doubtful),—a process which only tends to eulogise the making of windows. The form “ @kdlika” (signifying that which has its beginning and end at the same time) is in accordance with Panini’s S#étra “ akalikadadyanta- ४८०८१५३ `` [V—i—114]. Some people read « Akdlika” ; and in that case the word means that which does not tuke time in its appearance. The word “ kala ”=remoteness of time: “kdlika” =that which appears at a remote point of time (kala + than); and hence that which is not so is “ akdltka. ” Sutra (15). Itis a praising of the knowledge. [This 62८14 meets the objections urged in Sutra (3). | The Arthavadas—“ His face shines,’ and ‘“* His children become weal- thy "—appearing in connection with the passages enjoining study, they cannot be taken as laying down the results of an Action; they must be taken simply as deseriptions of the ordinarily perceived facts of the face becoming beautiful and the person obtaining horses. For the beauty of the face, there is not only one standard. Such pecu- liarities as the symmetry of form, the general pleasing properties, and the peculiar loveliness of sheen, pertain to the faces of woman ; while in the case of learned persons, itis when they are found to be making excellent declara- tions, in keeping with good form and reason, that their face is said to be “beautiful.” And hence, in this case, the word ‘shines or becomes beautiful’ need not be taken in an indirect sense, the direct meaning being quite compatible with the fact of the passage being a praise of the learned person. And as for the declaration that “his children become weathly, ’’—the wealth referred to may be the wealth of Brahmic glory ; and though in this case the word would be taken in a figurative sense, yet that could not 7 50 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADRYAYA f. militate against the fact of the . passage being taken as a pratse of the learned. Sutra (16). The mention of ‘all’ refers only to that which the agent is entitled to. [The S#éra meets the objections urged in Sara (4)]. The Arthavada—that by the Parnahuti one obtains all that he desires— referring to a particular action in connection with the preparation of the fire, it cannot be taken as laying down certain results. But it can be tuken as a praise of the Purzdhuti,—the substratum of truth in this Praise being found in the fact of the character of the consequence being attributed to the means; that 18 to say, the meaning of the sentence—‘ He obtains all that he desires ’—is that he obtains the fire wn all zis forms, these being the general means of the performance of all actions bringiny about all desirable resulis. And the Sétra may be explained in the following manner: Inasmuch as the person has duly laid the Fire, he is entitled to the performance of all actions, which are the means of obtaining all that is desired; and it is with a view to eulogise this fact of his being entitled to the performance of all actions, that the passage in question has figuratively used the word ‘all’ with reference to the actual obtaining (of the results that would follow from all the actions, to the performance of all of which the person offering the Pérnzadhuti becomes entitled). The following objection may here be raised: ‘There are certain “results, such 88 the reaching of the Akdga and the obtaining of celestial ‘‘damsels, which are absolute impossibilities; and these would also be ५ included in the category of ‘ all that is desired.’ But certainly, for these, ४ 1६ is not possible to be described as actually coming about, even figura. “tively, through the means, in the shape of any action laid down in the “Veda. (That is to say, in the case of the results that are laid down as “following from certain sacrifices enjoined by the Veda, it is possible to “explain the word ‘all’ referring to them, as referring to the Actions “bringing about these results, to which the person becomes entitled ; on the “other hand, in the case of the said impossible results, which are also “included in ‘ all,’ we cannot take the word ‘all’ as referring to the Actions ‘bringing about these results, &c., &c.; for the simple reason that there ‘are no Actions laid down as bringing about the said results).” There being a great deal of truth in this objection, we offer another explanation of the Stra: In ordinary parlance we often come across such assertions as—“‘all the rice has been cooked’; and in this case we do not mean all the rice in the world, but only that which had been set apart for being cooked for a special purpose. In the same manner, when the Veda says: “one who offers the Pirnahuti, obtains all that he desires,’ all that is PADA I—ADHI. I—-AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVADA PASSAGES. 91 meant 18 that the person becomes capable of obtaining all the results that follow from the Actions that are performed in connection with (conse- crated) Fire. And as such there can be nothing incongruous in the said Arthavada. Sutra (14). The result being accomplished by means of Actions, there would be a difference in the results in accordance with the measure, or extent of the Actions, as in the ordinary world. The assertion made in the St#itra would be of use in the consideration of such sacrifices as the Agnihvtra and the like, all of which lead to the same result, in the shape of the attainment of Heaven. All effects being similar to the cause, all the results that would follow from the mere Pirndhutt, would be in small measures. And hence for one who would want to obtain the results in great measures, the Veda lays down other Actions—such as the Agnthotra and the like; and hence the Injunctions of the Actions cannot be said to be useless. Against this the following objection is raised: ‘In the ordinary world “we actually perceive the results of such actions, as the cultivating of fields, ०८ &0,, to be in keeping with the causes; while in the case of the Purnahutz, “the matter resting altogether upon the authority of the scriptures, inas- ‘much as no distinct result is specially mentioned (as following from it), on ८८ what basis can we make the said specific assumptions with regard to its “results? For as a matter of fact, there is no difference between the “Heaven as attained by means of the Agnihotra, and that reached by “the Jyotishtoma; nor in such a transcendental matter, can we have any ८५ functioning of Inference ; (and as such we cannot admit of any difference ‘‘ between the result as obtained by means of the Piérnadhuti and the same ‘as acquired by means of certain other sacrifices).” To this we make the following reply: The specification that we have assumed is based upon the strength of the Injunction itself. That is to say, if the result obtained by means of the simpler Action were exactly equal to that obtained by the more elaborate Action, then, in that case, the desired result having been obtained by means of the former, no person would ever be inclined to the more elaborate and difficult one; as says the proverb —‘If one can find the honey in his own house, why should he go to the distant mountain for it?’ And hence the Injunction (of the elaborate Action) would lose all its efficiency (which only lies in urging people to Action). But as a matter of fact, the efficiency of the Injunction can never be set aside; and ४8 such the very Injunction of the elabo- rate Action points to the fact of its results being greater than that of the simpler Action,—as 18 explained under the S#tra I—iv—30. Conse- quently aa the assumption of the particalar result of the Vicvajit’ sacrifice ०72 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA 1. is accepted na authoritative, so also is the differentiation of the measure or quality of the result (following from the Parndhuti as differing from the same as obtained by means of other Actions). And when of two actions, one is greater than the other, even though no difference in their results is directly mentioned, yet there must always be a differentiation of the extent of the results, based upon their respective positions. That is to say, in a case where the subsidiaries are mentioned in the same order as the Primary, that which is mentioned first is performed with the first Primary, and soon ; and exactly in the same manner, in the case of Actions, when the smaller Action is performed, the result that appears in its connection is always of the same character (४,९,) small); and so on with the great Action, it is only a great result that appears; and thus we find the results differentiated on the ground of their respective positions. We also meet with direct scriptural declarations that support such differentiation. For instance, with reference to the Caturmdsga Homa, we have the following Arthavada with regard to its result: र When one performs the Agnihotra, he obtains a result ten times that of the household sacrifice, inasingle night .... .- । By the due performance of the smaller Agnihotra for ten years, the person obtains the result equal to that of a single performance of the Darga— Pirnamdsa” ; and this clearly shows that the smalluess or greatness of the Action makes the result also small or great respectively Sutra (18). What has been said above applies to the last two (Sutras ofthe Purvapaksha). Just as. the deprecation of Speech and Mind have been shown to signify the praise of gold, so also the prohibition of the laying of the Fire on the bare ground would, in accordance with the Sttra X—viii—7, mean the praise of the placing of a plate of gold on the ground, and not a mere prohibition. And the prohibition of the laying in the sky or in the Heaven may be taken as the statement of a bare fact, laid down with a view to support the prohibition of the bare ground. The meaning of the passag< would thus be that—‘ just as the laying of the fire is known to be impossible in the Sky or in Heaven, so also is it on the bare ground without a plate of gold, —this being the praise of the use of the golden plate. As for the mention of non-eternal things in the Veda, this has already been explained under S#ira I—i—3]. The use of. this discussion lies in the consideration of the Ratrisatra sacrifice, in connection with which the Puérrapaksha is that the result of this sacrifice is the attainment of Heaven, while the orthodox view (Siddhanta) is that its real result is that which is mentioned in the Arthavada passage relating to it. 3 ADHIKARANA (2). [Treating of the Arthavadda passages that have the form of Injunctions. | Sutra (19). “It would be an Injunction, as laying down some- thing not known before; because a mere description would be useless.” Those Arthavidas that contained mere descriptions of facts having been explained above, we now proceed to consider those that appear in the form of Injunctions. And with regard to these, the following are the grounds of doubt: In the former Adhikarana it has been shown that as the Arthavadas serve no purpose directly by themselves, they have to be taken in the indirect sense of Praise. But in that case, even the Praise would be as good as useless. As for the factor of Injunction, however, it cannot be got at from any other source; while it has been already shown above that Persuasion (which is the avowed object of Arthavadas) can be got at through the indications of the Injunctions themselves. And again, in all cases, the In- junction is the primary, and the Praise the secondary, factor; consequently, when a certain assertion can be taken as related to the primary factor, it must be taken as such (and not as related to the secondary); and it is only when the indication of the Injunction has been fully accomplished that there can beany use for the Arthavdda. And it is while the Injunction is being comprehended, that all the factors of the Bhavana present themselves; specially so the factor of the Result, as it is the first and the most important factor (in the Bhavand, and as such the first to be com- prehended, in the indication of the Injunction). It is with a view to these facts that the Parvapaksha in the Stra speaks of its laying down something not known before; and hence it is in comparison with this that it declares the mere expression of Praise to be useless At the very outset, of the discussion, however, the following objection is raised against the Adhtkaraga as a whole: “ We have a consideration of ‘such Injunctions and Arthavddas of Results, later on under the S#tras “TV—ii—] ef seq; and as such it is not proper to introduce the same: dis- ५ 01788100, in this place. 54. TANTRA-VARIIKA. ADHYAYA TI. 1. To this, some people make the following reply: ‘As the discus- sion that is repeated in the Fourth Adhydya is introduced here for the first time, the above objection should be raised with reference to that Adhydya and not to this.’ This may be true enough; but if by postponing the discussion till the Fourth Adhydya, we can procure a better reply to the objections against Arthavadas, it is only right that we should seek for it there. Inasmuch as, however, 1४ was equally reasonable for that same reply to have been given on the present occasion, there could not be much harm in its being put for- ward here. 2. Others reply to the said objection as follows: It is only the denial of the fact of the passage cited being an Injunction of Result that is explained in the Fourth Adhydya, whereas iu the present Adhikarana, it is the character of the Arthavada that is denied (in the Puérvapaksha) ; because the clause—it would be an Arthavdda (in the Sétra [V—iii—1)—must be taken as denying the fact of its being an Injunction. But thia explanation is not right; because those Arthavdda passages, that would be denied (in the Fourth Adhydya) the character of Injunctions, and would thereby become open to the charge of uselessness, have already been shown, in the foregoing Adhikarana, to serve the distinctly useful purpose of praising ; as has been shown with regard to the sentence—" His face becomes beautiful, &c.” 3. Some people meet the aforesaid objection thus: It is only right that sentences like ‘ Vayu is the eftest deity’ should be taken as Praise; but the case of such sentences as the one cited in the present instance is different; and though the present Adhikarana serves to make it a mere Praise, denying it the character of an Injunction,—yet there is something left to be done; and it is this: just as the character of Injunction is denied to the said passage, so also can the character of Praise be denied to it, as the case of the present passage 18 not similar to that of the former passage ; and hence it is absolutely necessary that we should accept it as an Injunc- tion, so that any dissimilarity to passages appearing at a different time would not affect its position; and it is this latter point that is very rightly raised in the Fourth Adhydya. But even this explanation is not quite satisfactory; because even though the collective argument, that there is a clear disagreement with the Veda, may be a new one, and as such, in this much, there may be: no repetition, yet the bodies of the Adhikarazas remain the same.. As for the ‘disagreement’ (or dissimilarity), too, there is none of these that has not been met and explained under 6४८7० I—ii—10; and hence these very argu- ments could be brought forward again, whenever any such disagreement would be put forward against any Arthavdda passage PADA l1—ADHI. II—ARTHAVADAS HAVING THE FORM OF INJUNCTIONS. 55 4, With a view to all this, some people offer the following explana- tion: The present Adhikarana, in its Pérvapaksha, speaks of “ Injunc- tions” in general, without any specifications ; while in the Fourth Adhydya, we have the expression ^“ Declaration of the Result”’ (‘ Phalagrutth’); and hence the passages considered in the present Adhikarana are such of the Arthavidas as have the form of the Injunction of all such factors as the Substance, Property, Action and the like; while those treated of in the Fourth Adhydya are only those that have the form of the Injunction of the Result only. For instance, Sé#tras 23 and 24 of this Pada, are found to refer to such instances as—“ The Horse has its origin in the water, and the Cane also has its origin in the water,’ and the like (which treat of the mere forms, &c., of Substances) ; and if the present Adhikarana also referred only to such Arthavddas as have the form of an Injunction of Result, the citing of the said passage would be entirely irrelevant. But though it may be so, yet in that case the subject matter of the Adhtkarana in the Fourth Adhydya would be ouly a particular phase of that of the present Adhikarana ; and so would be included in it; and as such, the repetition would remain unexplained. Consequently some people dis- regard the examples cited in the Bhashya and set about citing other in- stances, with the restriction that under the present Adhtkarara they cite only those Arthavidas that have the forms of the Injunctions of the Sub- stance, &c., while under that in the Fourth Adhydya they cite those that have the form of the Injunction of Results. But upon this, we have to make the following observations: Is it abso- lutely necessary to have two Adhikararas that we should put this restriction upon the examples to be cited? Then again, as a matter of fact, a mere difference in the examples cited does not make the Adhikaranas necessarily distinct ; because in that case, there would be no repetition in a case where certain discussions, having been carried on with regard to the sacrificial post as made of the Khadira wood, should be repeated again with the sole difference that in the latter case the post as made of the Udumbara wood would be cited as the instance. As a matter of fact, the subject matter of Adhikuranas being, not any particular examples, but certain rules (and arguments in support of the rules), it is only when there is a difference in the rules treat- ed of in the two Adhktkaranas that these can be accepted as distinct. And as for the Arthavddas having the form of the Injunctions of Substances, all of these too are not considered under the present Ad/iknrana,—some of these being considered under Sdéva [—iv—23, some under Sétrus I1I—iv—l, et seq ; some in the shape of ‘ Parakrta’ and ‘ Purdkalpa’ under Adhydya VI, some under I X—ii—29, and others, having the form of the Injunctions of the Jar: tilaand the Guvidhuk, in Adhydya >, And hence what we should say in reply to the aforesaid vbjection is that such repetition is not very objectionable. 56 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA 1, Or, we may justify the two Adhikaranas on the following four grounds 1. One and the same rule has one part of it discussed under the pre- sent Adhtkarana, and another part in that of Adhydya IV 2. Thesubject-matter of the the two Adhikarunas may also be explain- ed to be entirely different. What 18 done under the present Adhikarana is that all Arthavdida passages having the form of Injunctions are shown to be Arthavddas, and not real Injunctions. While under the Adhikarana in Adh- yaya IV, the purport of the Parvapaksha is this: “ When an Injunction has “been pointed out by the Arthavdda, it stands in need of a certain result “(for the sake of which it would lay down an Action); even though the “result that appears in the Arthavdda is mentioned with another osten- “sible purpose (that of Praising), yet this result is found to be related to ५ 1४ more closely than any other declarations of the procedure of sacrifices ; ‘“‘and when such relationship has been once ascertained, a specification “of the relationship becomes a compartively easy matter. Otherwise we ‘‘ would have to assume the Relationship itself as well as its specific form ; “and hence we conclude that just as the [ujunction of the Rdtrisatra “ sacrifice 18 one that enjoins the particular result—the obtaining of fame,— “‘so too, the passage speaking of the ‘ Ju/dé made up of leaves’ cannot but ^ be taken as an Injunction of the particular result—the not hearing of any “ eutl report with reference to one’s self.” And the Siddhanéa arrived at is that when it is possible for the passage to be taken in the light of another purpose (४.९ , of Praising), it is not right to attribute to it two purposes (that of enjoining the Result, and Pruisiny); and as such the passage in question must be taken as a pure Arthavdda. The same process may be employe in differentating the present Adht- karana from those dealing with Nivita, &c. (ILI—iv—1 ९८ seq). Or, these latter may be taken as consisting of some considerations and argumentations with reference to certain supposed objections and questions hased upon the Puérvapaksha of the Audumbura-Adhikurana (the preseut one) ; as ia these a question is raised as to whether the Arthavdda, that is accepted to be an Injunction, refers to the Agent or to the Sacrifice; and then the conclusion arrived at is that it isa pure Arthavdda. So also in the case of the Adhtkuruyas on Parakrit and Puradkalpu (as explained in Adhydya VI), a fresh question is raised as to whether the Action, (the eating of १7914 f.t.) that 18 mentioned in the Veda as having been done by a great man of old, is to be done only by the descendants of that great man, or by all men (and it is this extra question that is treated of in the Adhkikarana in Adhyiiya VI). The discussions with regard to “ Uhka” and “ Badha, ” as contained in Adhydyuas LX and X, are also of a similar character (i.e., dealing with extra questions), And as for the ७४८7५ L.—iv—23, it merely. PADA II—ADHI. II—ARTHAVADAS HAVING THE FORM OF INJUNCTIONS. 57 points out the several grounds for accepting a Word in its secondary or ‘indirect signification. And as such in none of these do we find any use- 1688 repetition 8. Or, the difference between this Adhikarana and that in Adhydya IV may be explained on the ground that the present Adhtkarana treats of only such passages as have the form of the Injunctions of Results, in which tle factor that expresses the Praise is distinct from that which mentions the Result; as for instance, the passage cited in the Bhdshya. The sentence, ‘The udumbara is powerful and so also are the animals,’ which signifies Prazse, 18 distinct from the sentence ‘ For the increase of power ” (appearing at the close of the passage) which points out the Result (that follows when the sacrificial post is made of the Udumbara wood); while in the Fourth Adhydya, the discussion is with reference to those cases, in which the same sentence may be taken either as Praise or as a mention of the Result. 4. Or, lastly, the difference between the two Adhikaranas may be explained thus: The first S¢tra of the Adhikarana in the Fourth Adhydya [1४ --111-- 1] lays down the fact of the passage being for another's purpose (pararthatvat) as the reason for the conclusion arrived at; and as it is only a well-known reason that can be brought forward in all discussions, the passages that can serve as instances for this Adhikarana are only those that are well-known to be for another's purpose,—e.g., the passage “one whose Juh@ is made entirely of leaves, &c.’”’ In this case it is necessary that the fact of being made of leaves should be distinctly mentioned with reference to the म; as the former is incapable by itself of having any independent relation with the result. It is a general rule that whenever a certain property (or qualification) is laid down, with special reference to n particular result, it stands in ‘need of a proper receptacle (or substratum) for itself; we cannot get hold of any such receptacle, apart from the context (in which the said passage occurs). And hence, if the passage— ‘one whose Juhi 18 made of leaves never hears any evil spoken of himself '’— be taken to imply the injunction—that one should think of obtaining the said 7९5041४ by means of the particular property of leafiness,—the question naturally arises: wheretn 25 this ‘property to exist (as the mere abstract property by itself can be of no use) P What is the object (which, having the property of lerfiness, would accomplish the said result) ? It cannot be the Juh#; (1) because that would lead to a split in the sentence; (2) and until the Action has been found (in which the Jah# is to be used) the Juha itself is not an accomplished ‘(fully comprehended) object {and as such cannot be taken as bringing’ about any results); nor is there any authority (in’ the sentence itself) for‘con necting the Juki with any action And‘ thus (not having all the necessary factors fulfilled, if we accept 8 58 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I. the aforesaid construction or explanation of the sentence) we are forced to have recourse to another explanation (or construction). We find that the said sentence occurs in the same context as the sentence—‘ one pours the libations by means of the Juhé” ; and when we come across this sentence, it becomes necessary for us to know the kind of the Juhi that is to be employed ; but the sentence itself does not afford us any information on this head ; and this want of information is found to continue until the men- tion of the fact of its being made of leaves; and as until this information is obtained, the use of the former sentence (‘‘ Pours libations by means of the Juhté’’) is not fully comprehended, the latter sentence (declaring the fact of the Juha being made of leaves) comes to be recognised as subsidiary to the former (declaring the fact of the libations being poured by means of the Juhu made of leaves). Thus then, all the information that 18 wanted in connection with the Juk@ having been obtained in this very sentence, there is no reason for the assumption of a result. And as such it is only proper that the sentence should be taken as an Arthavdda. (Such is the upshot of the Adhikarana in Adh. IV). In the present Adhikarana, on the other hand, we have for our example, the declaration of the fact of the sacrificial post being made of the Udumbara wood, which is met with in the context treating of the animal to be sacrificed at the subsidiary sacrifice; and the fact of this declaration being for another’s purpose is not fully recognised ; and as such this could not form the subject of the Adhikarana in the Fourth Adhydya. Specially because, in the present case, unless the post has been already recognised (from other sources), it is not possible to have any declaration of its character ; and the recognition of the post is accepted as fulfilled by means of the sentence treating of the Primary Sacrifice, which speaks of the post as made of the Khadira wood; and as such all the information (even that of kind or material), that is wanted with regard to the post, having been obtained by means of this passage itself, there is no use for any injunction of another material (the Udumbara wood) for it; and conse- quently the sentence (speaking of the post as being made of the Udumbara wood) is taken (by the Purvapaksha) as only an injunction of the Result (attainment of power). As for the information with regard to the substratum of the property of being made of Udumbara wood, this too is supplied by the mention of the “post,” in the sentence enjoining the Primary Sacrifice; and as such this too does not affect the former conclu- sion. Thus then, we find that, prior to the ascertainment of the sentence being for another’s purpose, it is absolutely necessary to connect the action therein spoken of with a certain definite result,—this connection being ascertained by means of other arguments (than those based upon the fact of a sentence being for another’s purpose, as done in Adh. IV). 7174 II—ADHI. II—ARTHAVADAS HAVING THE FORM OF INJUNCTIONS. 59 And as such the introduction of this present Adhtkarana becomes ne- cessary. There is yet another theory with regard to these two Adhikaranas: Both the sentences—the one dealing with the fact of the post being made of the Udumbara wood, as well as that speaking of the Juhw% being made of leaves—can serve as examples, in both Adhikaranas (the present as well as the one in Adh. IV). And inasmuch as two different factors of the Bhavana are treated of in the two Adhikaranas, they cannot be said to be mere repetitions of one another. Both of them are equally capable of being connected with certain means and consequences, only when they are put forward in their full efficiency, and not otherwise. And in the Adhi- karana in Adh. IV, the discussion is based solely upon the factor of ^ conse- quences,’ and that of the ^^ means” is either purposely disregarded or taken for granted ; and the discussion then turns mainly upon the following ques- tion :—Is the Resulé capable of being rightly pointed out by means of words that speak of it as being accomplished at the present time, without any mention of the word “Kama”? While in the present Adhikarana the dis- cussion is with regard to the factor of the ^^ means,” that of the “ consc- quences”’ being either disregarded or taken for granted; and the discussion turns upon the following question:—In the absence of any Injunctive affix, is it possible for certain Substances, Properties or Actions to be laid down as the means of obtaining definite results? Whatever may be pointed out in a certain form, it stands in need of the cognition of a certain definite co-relative, and comes to be related with such a one, as ex- pressed by another word. And hence when a certain sentence has been recognised as pointing out the Consequences, the rest is taken to indicate the Means; and vice versd; thus both factors being ascertained in their true forms. Consequently, the factor of the ‘“‘ Means” that is considered under the present Adhikarana, comes to be connected with the factor of the ‘“Consequence’”’; and it is this connection as here indicated that is accepted, in Adh. IV, as a well-established fact, and serves as the reason for the conclusion there arrived at. Conversely, the indication of the factor of the “ Means,” that we have in Adh. IV, is here accepted as a well- established fact, and is only slightly touched upon. And thus the two Adhikarazas are not mere repetitions. Objection: “But in that case, the present would be a discussion with — regard to the indication of the Injunction,—and as such could not have any connection with the Adhikarana on Arthavada.” Reply: This does not affect the case; because the signification of the Injunction is got at through the Arthavdda, That 18 to say, if the Action spoken of were, in the very first instance, comprehended as being enjoined, then the passage could not have the character of the Arthavdda ; but as it 18, 60 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA i. it is only through the Praise (as signified by the passage) that we compre- hend the Action as being enjoined; and as such the character of the Arthavada is not denied to the passage The sense of the PURVAPAKSHA embodied in the Séra is this: “That which is declared in close proximity to the Result, cannot but be re- “ copnised as the Means, even though it is not expressly laid down as such ; ‘ because on hearing of the Result, our only desire is to know the Means. ८५ And hence, just as in the case of the mention of the Result, we at once ‘‘comprchend the Sacrifice to be the means, on account of the expression ८८ ‹ Vagena’ (‘by means of sacrifice’) directly presenting itself to our mind ; “so in the same manner, the mention of the Result, in the case of the “ nassage in question, would at once bring to our mind, the expression “* Audumbaréna’ (‘by means of tho post made of the Udumbara wood’). “For, what could a direct Injunction doP It could only prompt the agent “to action. And as this prompting is done by the mere mention of the ८८ Result, what would be the use of a distinct direct Injunction? Or, the “passage may be taken as merely pointing out the connection of a certain ५ Result with that which has been enjoined in a passage laying down the “procedure of a certain Action. Or, the Injunction may be taken as ५५ expressed by the fifth Mood, Zé. And it has also been already explained “that the Injunction may, in certain cases, form only a part of the “ Arthavada. * Hence we conclude that the Dative euding in ‘ Avarudhyai’ denotes “* purpose; and as such the Result is pointed out (by means of this affix) “even more clearly than it would have been by the word ‘ kama’ itself ; “and hence it 18 with reference to this Result that the passage enjoins the ^ post to be made of the Udumbara wood. (It is in this way alone that the ‘passage can be interpreted as an Injunction). It can never be an Injunc- “tion of the Result; because it is shown under II—i—1 e¢ seq that there can “never be an Injunction of the Result. As for the sentence—‘ The Udum- “bara is power ’—it is a distinct Praise of the particular wood; and there ^ ‹ 18 nothing incongruous inthis. Consequently, inasmuch as it is possible for “the passage as a whole to be taken primarily, or directly, as an Injunction, “it ig not right to take it in its indirect sense—making it indicative of ‘6 mere Praise.’’ Sutra (20). ® Obj: ‘As in ordinary parlance, so here also.’ ‘‘ Against the above we may have the following arguments: ‘ In ordi- . {nary experience, we find that people never make use of the slightest expres- PADA II—ADHI. If—ARTHAVADAS HAVING THE FORM OF INJUNCTIONS. 61 % 8100; without some purpose. As for instance, in ordinary parlance we ‘“meet with such assertions as: TZ'his cow should be brought, ४८ giwes oa “large quantity of milk, §c., &c. And here the former sentence—The cow ° should be brought—laying down something to be done, the latter sentence ८ 18 taken asa praise of the cow, which lends more force to the former ‘ direction, and thereby prompts the person concerned to speedy action. And ‘the mention of the fact of the cow giving much milk is never taken as ० {16 injunction of any transcendental result; as it isa directly perceptible ८ {9९011 itself; and hence it cannot but be taken as the praise of the cow. ‘*The same reasoning can be employed in the case of Vedic passages also. ‘‘ And as for having recourse to indirect indication, as no direct assertion ५८ 18 possible, there can be no objection to it.’ Sutra (21). ^, Reply: Not so; because it is known before- hand.” “To the last 6८10) wo make tho following reply: The instance that ‘you cite does not apply to the present case. Because a Praise depends ‘upon certain conceptions derived from other means of knowledge; and as ‘the operation of such other means is possible with regard to the facts of ‘ordinary experience, we can accept such ordinary assertions in the sense ५ 0 Praise. Inthe Veda, onthe other hand, as we have descriptions of facts “not otherwise known, people would have no faith in them; as even in ‘ordinary parlance, people do not believe a person who describes what is ‘absolutely unknown. ° “Says the Bhashya: Purvavacanddiva; and this may mean that “people do not have any confidence in descriptions of unknown facts, “exactly as they have none in the Injunctions of facts already known; or ‘it may be taken as a simile of contraries, the meaning in that case ‘being that in the descriptions of unknown facts people do not have the ‘confidence that they have in those of well-known facts. ‘“‘ And then again, the mere mention of the fact of the cow giving much “milk does not serve to persuade the person; it is only when he “actually sees the cow giving much milk, that he is persuaded to take it. “In the Veda too, finding the Arihavada to be false, the person would “begin to suspect the authenticity of the Injunction connected with it; “and as such, he would not undertake the Action. And one, who would ‘neglect the Injunction and seek for the Arthavada, would be taken as an ५५ unbeliever of Injunctions. And if one has no confidence in Injunctions, ५५ wherefore should he have any in the concomitant Arthavada ? “ Then again, inthe Veda, we find a disagreement from the actual facts “of experience ; as for instance, the passage in question praises the action “as fulfilling a reservation of power at the present time; while no such 62 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I. “reservation is perceptible; and thus this declaration of the Veda would “be exactly similar (in falsity) to the description of a cow ४8 giving much ‘milk, when as a matter of fact it gave no milk at all. “ As a matter of fact, the Udwmbara is not found to have the character “of (strength-giving) food, which, for this reason, cannot rightly serve as ‘the Predicate of the Minor Premiss; nor is it found to be invariably con- ‘‘comitant with the appearance of power; and hence it cannot serve as the ‘“‘ middle term (the subject of the Major Premiss). That whatever is food “as also sacrificial post is a fact recognised, neither in the Veda nor in ‘ordinary experience; and as such the assertion is entirely absurd. "८ And thus, as by making it signify mere praise, we find it to be “incompatible (with facts of ordinary experience), it is much more “reasonable to take it as an Injunction than as a Praise, which stands in ‘need of the corroboration of experience.” In reply to the above we have the following :— SIDDHANTA. Sutra (22). The fact of its being indirectly implied by the sen- tence has alreay been explained. The sentence—‘ the Udumbara 28 strength ’—is to be taken together with the clause—‘for the increase of strength’; because it embodies a justification of this latter; and it is not a distinct Praise apart by itself. Because the mere assertion of the Udumbara being food does not serve to point out the fact of its being something excellently desirable for man ; while there is no doubt that the assertion—‘ for the increase of strength -- —serves to make the particular action specially attractive to him; and hence it is only right that the other sentence—‘ Udumbara is food ’— should be taken as justifying and supporting the said attraction (or persuasion). Therefore the whole passage may be taken either as point- ing out a definite result as following from the Action in question, or as persuading the agent to that course of Action. And even if there were an Injunctive word, a passage like the one in question could not but be taken as an Arthavdda; and it is all the more so, when the verb in the passage is only in the Present Tense, which has the sole purpose of accomplishing the Injunction. And when we fiud the context distinctly pointing to a definite purpose in the shape of the effect that it has towards the fulfilment of the sacrifice.—what could be our reason for assuming a separate result, for the expression of which we have no direct word? Nor canit be urged that, that which is indicated by the Context is always set aside by that indicated by the Sentence itself. Because in the PADA 11--^ ए पा, 1J—ARTHAVADAS HAVING THE FORM OF INJUNCTIONS. 69 case in question there is no contradiction of the one by the other. That is to say, 10 is only when two contradictory facts are indicated both by the Context and the Sentence, with reference to one and the same object, that there can be any rejection of the one by the other. But in the passage in question, we have the Context pointing to the injunction of the post being made of the Udumbara wood; and this Injunction takes within itself the persuasion expressed by the sentence ‘the Udumbara is strength ’; and certainly, there can be no contradiction of the Context, which, in this case, is found to indicate the Injunction of the Udumbara, as qualified by the said persuasion. Thus then, there being nothing to indicate any Injunc- tion of the Result, there is no possibility of the Context being set aside ; and as such we cannot very well disregard the signification of the said Context. (Even if the whole passage be taken as laying down a Result) the persuasion, which is held to be indirectly implied by the sentence, could never be accepted as being assumed through the implications of the Injunc- tion itself. Because in other cases it might be possible for the Injunction toimply a persuasion; but in the case in question, the Injunction itself is extremely weak (not being mentioned by any directly expressive Injunc- tive affix, &c.) ; and as such, what could it do with the persuasion P Then again, that which has once been made to serve the purpose of praising (a certain action) can never rightly be accepted as having any action towards the pointing out of any results, like the acquiring of fame (said to follow from the Juhu of leaves). In the case of the Hd@trisaira, we have recourse to a highly complicated assumption, because there is no other way out of the difficulty; while in the case in question, we have already shown that a particular purpose (served by the Action in question) is distinctly pointed out by the Context. The particular species (Udumbara) is, by its very nature, known asa part of the more extensive class ‘Wood’; and it can never be taken as pointing to any Result. The word ‘ post’ (Yépa) also denotes the piece ` of wood as affected by the sacrificial performance; and as such it can be taken as only indicating the post as it presents itself. And thus all the words being found to serve totally extraneous purposes, the sentence (con- taining them) cannot but be taken as an Arthavdda. It has been urged above that, inasmuch as no other wood—Khadira, §c.,—wonld be available, the ‘ post’ does not stand in need of any mention of the special class of wood (the Udumbara). But this is not quite correct, because just as in the case of the Cyéna sacrifice, the distinct mention of Reed as the special kind of grass to be employed sets aside the possibility of the use of any other grass—Kuga and the like,—the use of which is indicated by the fact of their being employed in other 64, TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADHYAYA 1. ` sacrifices; 40, in the same manner, in the case in question, the distinct ‘mention of ‘ Udumbara’ would serve to set aside all other woods. Nor is there any means by which this setting aside could be avoided; specially as it is admitted, even when the making of the post of the Udumbara wood is taken as bringing about a definite result. The only difference, however, between us is this: In your case, the making of the post of the Udumbara wood being an action for the sake of the agent (as bringing about a particular result), while the Khadira, &c., are for the sake of the sacrifice (which is helped by the post), the former would set aside the latter only indirectly, by the mere chance of their being related to the object (the post); whereas according to us, both being for the sake of the sacrifice itself, there would be a direct co-subjectivity between them, which makes the setting aside, of the one by the other, more natural. And when a certain definite kind of wood has been laid down with a view to a certain result,—just as the curd is laid down as the material to be offered, with a view to obtain for the sacrificer efficient sense-organs,— there is no idea of the substratum of the Class (and for this also we cannot admit of any such results following). That is to say, 1४ 18 the ‘ Animal sacrifice’ that is the primary action concerned; but this 1s found incap- able (of any relationship with the Udumbara wood) ; while the ‘ tethering of the animal,’ is found to be capable of such relationship, through the post (to which the animal is tethered) ; but this ‘ tethering ’ together with the post, does not form the primary action. Nor can the relationship, being found useless with regard to the primary, be transferred to its subsidiaries ; because it is only that which 18 laid down as helping the Primary that is held to be helpful to the subsidiaries ; which is not the case here; as in the present case, we have a certain property (the Udumbara-ness of the post) forming part of the Primary, which stands in need of a substratum for itself ; and though it has the Primary (Animal-sacrifice) in close proximity to it, yet, as this is not found capable of serving as the required substratum, we cannot but construe the Injunction in an altogether different manner ; and we can never rightly transfer the property downwards (to the subsi- diaries). Nor is the sentence itself found capable of affording the required substrate; because if it be construed in a manner supplying this ‘substra- tum, this would involve a syntactical split; because in that 6886 the séntence ‘would be declaring two relationships: (1) the relationship of the Property with the particular Result, and (2) that of the Property with its Substra- tum. And further, in that case, the property of ‘ being made of Udumbara wood’ would have to be taken, in two different forms, at one time (7.e., in the sentence ‘The making of the post of Udumbara wood brings about such ARTHAVADAS HAVING THE FORM OF INJUNCTIONS. 65 and such a result’) as the Subject, and at the other (1.¢., in the sentence ‘ the post should be made of Udumbara wood’) as the Predicate. Even if it be taken as the Predicate in both cases, then too, while being taken along with the result, it will have to be disjoined from the post; whereas when taken in connection with the vost, it will have to be separated from the result (and thus too there would be a syntactical split). As for the independent-spirited person who would take up the per- formance of certain actions, without any Injunctions, we can have nothing to say to him. The fact of any action bringing about a result desired by man is not recognised until an Injunction to this effect is met with ; because prior to this, the sentence is wholly taken up by the laying down of the object to be accomplished, which, in this case, is the making of the post of the Udumbara wood. It has been asserted that the connection of the Result would be laid down by the passage that would contain the necessary directions for the Action. But such a passage can have no reference to any result desired by man; as will be shown under the Giira ‘ asamyukiam prokaranat’ (TiI— 111--11 |. Forif itdoes happen to be laid down by such a passage, it comes to be an action for the sake of the Action itself (and not for that of man). As for the ‘ fifth Lakdra’ (L2/), as its form is similar to that of the Present Tense, its signification always remains doubtful ; (and as such the verb in the passage cannot be taken as the Injunctive 22८). For these reasons, we conclude that the result, in the passage in ques- tion, is described only with a view to persuade the person to a certain course of action; specially because the verb describing it is found in the Present Tense; and also because we shall prove in the fourth Adhydaya, that, any passage, not distinctly containing the expression ‘ with the desire for such and such a result,’ cannot be taken as actually laying down the real result of an Action. And as for the passages like the one in question being always taken as mere Praise, it 18 no use enquiring as to the truth or other- wise of the means spoken of in them; because they are meant to serve the sole purpose of bringing ubout a certain cognition; and also because they are in keeping with the descriptions of certain qualifications. But even if they must be taken as real means, they may be taken to be the means of fulfilling the pleasure or satisfaction of the persons concerned. Sutra (23). In some cases, such Injunctions would be useless ; hence they must be taken as expressing Praise; and the same may be said with regard to all other passages similar to these. If the passages in question were Injunctions, then all the Arthavada passages quoted before would also be Injunctions of Materials, Accessories or Actions; for instance, the sentence ‘ Vayw is the eftest deity’ would 9 66 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA II—ADHI. 11. mean that one should make Vayu the eftest deity ; and the sentence ‘ The horse has its origin in water’ would mean that one should muke the horse have tts origin in water ; and similarly we would have such injunctions as—‘ One should make the Vétasa or the Avuka, originate in water,’ ‘the water should be made peaceful,’ ‘the Udumbara should be made strong,’ and so forth. And though some of the Arthav@da passages are capable of being taken as Injunctions of Actions, yet the passages that we have been deal- ing with in the present Pdda can never be taken as such; because some of the descriptions—such as those of Vayu, Vélasa and the like— are mere statements of facts in nature (and these cannot be made or brought about by man); and the Udumbara, &c., too, cannot be brought about by man, however much he might try (and hence there can never be any Injunctions for making those). The Bhdshya proceeds to show what sort of praise the passage—(‘the horse proceeding from the water,’ &c.)—ex presses : The connection of the horse with the water, which ts pacifying, brings peace to the master of the sacrifice. The irrelevancy of this passage of the Bhashya in the present connection has been oxplained away by some commentators by the flat demial of this sentence forming part of the Bhashya text. The irrelevancy referred to is this: The passage does not mention any connection of the pacifying character with either the Horse or the Avaka, the Vétasa alone being mentioned ; while this latter does not appear in the above explanation of the Praise. The true explanation of this, however, is the following: The Avaka, &c., have been cited as instances, only on account of their similarity to the Vétasa ; and the said explanation does not assert any relationship between the Horse and the Avaka; all that it does is to declare these to be related to tho water ; and as this fact alone does not indicate any Praise, there is a need of another Arthavdda passage; and this is pointed out, in the sen- tence—‘ the water is peaceful’; and it is this latter sentence that, having lost the character of an Injunction, expresses the excellent character of the water; and certain things, ordinarily well known to be connected with water (f.1., the Vétasa), come to be praised by this praise of the water only ; while others (1.1. the Horse), come to be praised, through the declara- tion of their relationship with the water; and the meaning of the praise thus comes to be that— being related to the water which 1s known to be peaceful, the Horse also comes to be known as quiet; and hence the sacrifice, connected with this Horse, pacifies or removes all the troubles of the Master of the sacrifice; which shows that the sacrifice is an excellent one.’ In the same manner, the sacrifice that is offered to a swift Deity, brings about its results quickly ; and if the sacrificial post is made of foodstuffs, the sacrificer obtains plenty of foodstuffs. Such being the explanations ARTHAVADAS HAVING THE FORM OF INJUNCTIONS. 67 of the passages in question, we can say the same with regard to all other passages that may be found to be similar to these. Sutra (24). When a certain expression can be rightly taken in its own context, it is not right to transfer it elsewhere; specially as such an Injunction would have no use with regard to that parti- cular sacrifice. The taking of such passages as Injunctions is also open to the follow- ing objection: In the case of the sentence— That which is burnt becomes the property of the Rdkshasas’ (a sentence found in connection with tho Dargu-Pirnamasa)—if we take it exactly as it is, then it can only be taken as enjoining another Deity (the Rdkshasa) for the cake that is burnt; and this would necessitate the removal (or transfer) of the Deity mentioned in the original Injunction (of the sacrifice). [If the word ‘ Apakarsha’ be taken as that which removes, then tho meaning would be that ‘the newly enjoined Deity would remove the one mentioned in the original Injunction.’ } This setting aside could be possible, on the ground of its being for a definite purpose,—as we have in the case of the Abhyuditéshti—, but only if there were no other way of explaining the sentence. When, howevor, it can be taken in a different manner, no such setting aside can be allowable. Fighting shy of this argument some people might have recourse to a transposed construction of the sentence,—explaining it as ‘that which is to be offered to the Rdkshasas should be burnt’; but as the ‘ Rakshasa’ is not mentioned as a Deity in the present context, the burning of tho cake will have to be transferred to another context, where the Rakshasa may have been laid down as the Deity; and this would militate against the direct declarations of that context. Nor is such contradiction of the context allowable, when there are means of avoiding it. Hence we must tuke the passage as an Arthavdda, which does not necessitate any such transference or removal. Sutra (25). If these be taken as Injunctions, there would be a syntactical split. In the passages in question, if, on account of the praise contained in the passages, the verb in the Present Tense wore to be taken as being in the Lét (the Vedic Injunctive), then, by the same fact, we would have to assume a particular result to follow from the Action laid down; and this would bring about a split of the sentence [for instance, the construction would be—(1) The post of the Udumbara wood is excellent, and (2) this should be made for the obtaining of power], Hence we conclude that we cannot but take these passages as Arthavadus. ADHIKARANA (3). [Treating of such Arthavada passages as appear to contain reasons for the performance of certain actions]. Sutra (26), “They must be taken as putting forward reasons, because of usefulness and possibility.” As instances, we can have all the passages that appear—on account of the use of such words as ‘Az’ and the like—to contain reasons, though as a matter of fact they do not contain them—/(for instance, the passage ‘Carpéna juhoti, téna hi annan kriyaté).’ Some people object to this Adhikarana ; they argue thus: ‘‘Tf the.character of the reason be said to be enjoined by the passage, “then these come in the same category as those dealt with in the foregoing 4५ Adhikarana ; 1f not, then the character of the reason that is spoken of here must be taken in connection with the relationship of the Curpa-homa ; and. ‘Sas no such relationship can exist unless it 18 duly enjoined, for what could “the reason be brought forward? If however, the passage be taken only “as describing a fact in nature, then this would be in the same category as ‘‘the sentence speaking of Vdyu as the ‘eftest deity.’ Thus then, in ५४ any case, there appears no reason for introducing the present discussion.” To this we make the following reply: As a matter of fact the passage in question does not lay down the fact of the latter sentence containing a reason for what has gone before; nor is it the mere descrip- tion of a fact in nature: what it really does is only to assert by Apparent Inconsistency, a certain fact, which serves to set aside a certain doubt with regard to the performability of an Action which has been laid down (in the previous sentence) simply as a well-established duty to be performed; specially as all Reasoning pre-supposes a certain well- established fact (which, in this case, is the performability of the Ciurpa- homa). And some people hold that this statement of the Reason also serves the purposes of an Arthavdda, showing, as it does, why a person should perform it. Even when the sentence is taken as a pure Arthavada, it contains within itself a statement of the Reason also; and ARGUMENTATIVE ARTHAVADAS. 69 hence the Injunction comes to be taken as referring to the Homa by the Cérpa and all other articles whereby food is prepared (such as the Darvi and the like); and as sach the latter sentence might be taken as bringing forward a Reason (as held by the Pérvapaksha) as well as containing an Arthavada (as held by the Siddhania). On the main question then, we have the following :— POURVAPAKSHA. “Says the Bhashya: The fact of the Curpa being a means of preparing the ** food ws brought forward as a Reason for performing the Homa with the (दा. “And though what is directly enjoined is the relationship (of the Homa “with the Curpa), yet the Reason that is brought forward for this relation- ^ ship could also refer to the Homa. ‘An objection is raised in the Bhdashya: ‘A case (like that of the “ Cirpa and the food), where the relation of cause and effect ts not generally ८ recognised, cannot be rightly said to have been brought forwar’! as a Reason.’ ‘Some people explain this by pointing to the premiss that all Inference “must be one of cause and effect, as the Bhashya declares later on in “connection with the sentence—‘ One should offer a Homa of curd for the ‘sake of one who wants to acquire a sense-organ.’ ^ But this 18 not correct; because even in cases where there is no relation «4 of cause and effect, as in the case of the asterisms of Arttikad and Rohini, ‘following one another, we find that a perception of the former acts as ८ 8 reason (or 16808) for the cognition of the latter. (1) ‘* Therefore we must take the Bhdshya to mean only the relation- ‘ship of the comprehended and the means of comprehension, by the mention “of ‘the relation of cause and effect.’ It may, however, be urged that— ५८ ‹ gven the relationship of the comprehended and the means of comprehension “being cognisable only by means of an-Inference, it could not be asserted “ with reference to a fact not universally recognised.” True; but there ‘‘ being another relationship prior to the general recognition of the fact, ‘all that 18 meant by the bringing forward of the said relationship of ८५ the comprehended and the means of comprehension is simply to point ont ‘the particular relationship upon which all further Inferences are based. (2) “Or, the Bhadshya may be taken as referring to the potentiality ८ 0 things, the meaning of the objection in the Bhashya being that we ‘admit the character of true Reason only in cases where, at the time of ‘comprehending an invariable concomitance between the two things con- ‘cerned, we actually perceive in them a potentiality consisting of that ८८ causal relationship which consists of the relationship of the comprehended “and the means of comprehension. 70 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I—PADA II-—~-ADHI, III. (3) “Or again, the Bhdshya may be taken as only referring to the ५ specific instance cited,—the sense of the objection being that an invariable “‘concomitance between any two things, can be based upon many relations, “such as those of cause and effect, master and servant, or on mere associa- “tion, and the like; and as none of the others are possible in the case of ‘the fact of the GCérpa as the means of preparing food being asserted as the ‘reason for performing the particular Homa, we must accept it to be based ‹ 011 the causal relation only; and inasmuch as such causal relationship “is not generally found to exist between them, the assertion that the latter “sentence puts forth a Reason for the Homa is untenable. “In reply to the above objection, the Bhadshya says—T rue wt is, &c. ८ And the meaning of this is this: It is true that in the ordinary course of ‘business, before a person puts forward a certain Reason, he always seeks ८ {0 base 16 upon a well-recognised relationship ; but in the case of the Veda, ८ 01 account of the Apparent Inconsistency of the mention of a Reason, as ‘‘expressed by the use of such words as ‘hi’ (because), and the like, we “assume the existence of another sentence expressing the relationship “(upon which the aforesaid causal relation could be based),—such a sen- “tence, in the case in question, being that ‘whatever is the means of ‘preparing food should be used in the offering of the Homa’; and in the “light of this sentence, the Reason (brought forward in the sentence ‘ be- ‘cause the food is prepared by its means’) becomes quite relevant. “The Bhadshya puts the question—what special purpose would be served, “ie. if the Reason should become relevant ? The reply given is that the “use lies in the fact that it is only then that the Homa could be offered by ‘means of all things that are used in the preparation of food. “The Bhadshya puts another question—‘ why’? And this question may ८८ {6 taken as put by the Siddhantt ; or it may mean—‘ How can the Darvi “ &., be the means of preparing the food’P The reply given 18 that—we ‘actually find these of use in the preparation of food ; and it is this usefulness ५८ 81076 that is mentioned in the Sitra (by the word ‘arthavattva’). Tho “ Bhashya also adds—we can prepare the food by means of these also; and “this is what is meant by the word ‘upaputti’ (‘possibility’) in the “ Sutra. ‘‘ Against this explanation an objection 18 raised—‘ It seems that, in “this way, the words (arthavativa and upapatti) are synonymous (and as ‘such both should not have been used).’ ‘ But the mention of both words may be explained as pointing to “the capability of the same fact being expressed in two different ways : the “sense being that that which 18 of some use in an Action may, in a way, be ‘also spoken of as its means. Or, the word ‘arthavativa’’ may be taken as ‘ pointing to that which is expressed by the instrumental case-ending ; arid ARGUMENTATIVE ARTHAVADAS. 71 ‘inasmuch as it is the fact of the food being prepared, at the present time, by ‘means of the Curpa, &., that has been brought forward as the Reason “(which is not found to be applicable to the Homa, which is not found to “prepare any food at the time), the word ‘upapatii’ may be taken as ‘pointing to the possibility of the food being prepared by means of the ५ ०१४८ ; and this is what is meant by the Bhdshya—‘ the food can be pre- ८ mared by means of that also.’ “ Another objection is raised in the Bhashya: ‘The passage in question ‘distinctly says that the food ts prepared by means of it; why then, should “you say t¢ can be prepured’ ? “The reply given to this is that it is absolutely impossible to speak ‘of the Present Tense (because the Cuérpa is not found to prepare the food “actually at the tune that the Homa 1s being offered), ८५ Or, the Bhashya may be taken as replying to a self-raised objection ; “the sense in that case, would be this: If the passage be taken as ‘‘refering, not to the Gérpa, but to the Darvi, &c., on the ground of these ‘latter not being the means of preparing the food at the present time, — “then, the same might be said with regard to the Cérpa also; and the ‘passage would cease to be any Praise at all; hence just as the Siddhantr ‘would make the passage out to be a Praise, exactly in the same man- ८८ 761 could we also explain if as only laying down a reason for the ‘* Homa. “The Bhashyu sentence following this is ‘ Hétau ca Crutih,’ &९, ; and ८ 98 this is quite irrelevant as it is, we must take it along with the closing “sentences of the Bhdashya. ‘Says the Bhashya—there can be only an indirect indication of Praise ; ‘Sand this means that the sentence in question indicates the excellence of “the Homa, indirectly, through the fact of its bringing about a universally ५८ desirable result in the shape of food. “And in this case, the sentence—‘ Curpéna hi annan kriyaté’—is to “be taken as only describing a fact of nature, the general preparation of ५ food with reference to the particular object, Curpa. ` Or, the Sdra may be construed in the following manner: If we take ५ ४116 sentence as laying down a Reason, we have an ‘ arthavativa ’—t.e., 10 ८८ 86168 a much more useful purpose than if 1४ were a mere Arthavada ;— ‘‘and even though the relationship between the Curpa and the preparation “of food is not quite recognised, yet we have its ‘upapatt.’ (proof “or possibility) based upon the assumed Vedic sentence referred to «५ above. “For these reasons, we conclude that the sentence in question must be ‘taken as laying down a Reason for the performance of the Homa by means ५५ of the Gurpa.”’ 72 TANIRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA II—~ADHI, III. In reply to the above we have the following :— SIDDHANTA. Sutra (27). It is a Praise; because of its being preceded by verbal authority ;-while there is no Injunction of another. The Instrumental case-ending in the word ‘ Curpéna’ directly points to the performance of the Homa as to be done by the Curpa; and as such having the direct support of the Veda, it cannot be urged,—either as a mere acceptable alternative, or as an optional alternative, or as a companion alternative,—that the Homa is to be performed with the Darvi, &c., the instrumentality whereof is only pointed out by Inference, Because the Homa having all its requirements fulfilled by the Caurpa, does not stand in need of any other thing ; and as there is no direct Vedic text laying down the instrumentality of the Darvi, &., the mere recognition of the instru- mentality of the Curpa (as pointed out in the Vedic text) shuts the way of the inference of any Vedic texts (in support of the instrumentality of the Darvi, &९.) This 18 what 18 meant by the expression—There is no In- junction of another,—(t.e., of the Darvi, &c.) As for the pointing out of a reason (for the performance of the Homa in acertain way), this becomes accomplished by the Praise itself; and as such by taking the sentence as pointing out such a Reason only, we only court the necessity of having to assume unheard of instances. Then again, the direct assertion of the Carpa (as the instrument to be employed) falling within the scope of the Injunction, being found to be distinct, and not having any other purpose to serve, it cannot be altogether neglected. Hence, there are only two ways of taking the expres- sion —because it prepares the food :—(1) this expression having no direct connection with the Injunction ‘this should be done,’ we can take it as indirectly indicating the fact of the Gérpa possessing an excellent quality; or (2) 1t may be taken as directly expressing this latter fact. Any way, the expression by itself 18 incapable of being taken as laying down a Reason in support of the Injunction ; and hence it comes to be taken as mentioning the reason for the excellence which stands in need of the support of a Reason that happens to be mixed up with the force of the Injunction, and of which the object of the Injunction stands in need. The meaning of the said expression thus comes to be: The Ciurpa is an excellent instrument, because tt prepures the food. Both of these explana- tious are capable of being supported by well-recognised instances, and as such do not necessitate the Inference of any unheard of Vedic texts. Because it is a universally recognised fact that, (1) that which is excellent deserves to be done, and (2) that, that which is a means of preparing the food is excellent. ARGUMENTATIVE ARTHAVADAS. 73 The sentence—‘ there ie no Injunction of another’ may be explained in another way: According to you, all that is a means of preparing the food, will be the objects of Injunction ; but Darvi, &c., are not the means of preparing the food; because it is the action, of cooking f.1., that 18 known to be the direct means of the preparation of the food. This introduces the next Siira, : Sutra (28), Obj.: “Any praise of that which is useless is not allowable.” Some people might argue—“ If cooking, &c., are the means of pre- paring the food, the Carpa cannot be recognised as the means of its pre- paration; and as such there can be ०० such praise of it, as explained above.” To this we make the following reply :— Sutra (29). Reply: But there is a use for it ; inasmuch as it forms part of the Injunction; as even in the ordinary world. According to us, there is a distinct use which forms the object of the praise,—this use consisting in the fact of the Carpa being the means of the preparation of food. Inasmuch as it forms part of another sentence, the mention of such instrumentality is found only to serve the purpose of another (४.९. the Injunction), and thereby has only a secondary position ; and as such, it must be taken as thereby describing a certain fact, with reference to another object that forms the object of the Injunction. Such description again can be only of a fact that is well known; and conse- quently we find the very words (of the Vedic text) distinctly pointing to the conclusion that the sentence describes only sach useful instrumentality of the Gérpa as has been met with in ordinary experience ; (and as such the instrumentality of the Gurpa cannot be denied). This also explains the use of the present tense (in ‘ Kriyata’) ; but even though the present tense has been used, yet it is an admitted fact that, whether something %s to be done (in the future) or has already been done ,(in the past), whenever we have got to describe, or praise, such an object, we speak of it as being done (‘ Kriyat8’). As to why the present tense has been used in a Praise,—all that we can say is that it is due to the fact that men, as a rule, are more attracted to the present than either to the past or to the future ; and as a matter of fact, it is only by recalling the fact of the effects, that a certain action brings about at the time that it is performed, that people are attracted to it, even at other times; consequently with a view to praising the (2110, we have the sentence ‘it prepares the food.’ Or, we may take the sentence as praising the Cirpa, after having trans. ferred the present character of the capability of preparing the food to the 10 74 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-——-PADA II--ADHI. III. preparation itself (which would justify the use of the present tense in ‘Kriyat@’) ; because people are attracted more to what is actually manifested than to any latent capabilities; and as such the Praise could be duly effective only when describing a fact as actually manifested im the present, and not when merely pointing out a capability. On the other hand, in your theory, inasmuch as you hold the sentence to contain the Injunction (of a Reason), there would be a distinct harm done by the non-comprehension of the instrumentality of the preparation of food and the present character, (with direct reference to the (कन). “Why so” P Well, because, there can be an Injunction of only that which has not been got at by any other means; and hence in the case of an Injunction, the acceptance of anything apart from what is directly expressed by it is not allowable. This is what is meant by the Bhashya:—In the Injunction, there te no need of the meaning of any other words, because it is only in the case of indirect indication, that there is a need of the help of the meanings of other words. And it wonld be necessary to assume the word in the present tense (‘ Kriyaté’) to indicate the meaning of a word in the past (‘ Akdri’), and in the future (‘ K@rishyaté’), or that of a word denoting the present character of the Capability (such as ‘ Cakyaté’) ; and it is only when the word ‘ Kriya/é’ could be taken in accordance with these assump- tions, that the Instrumental case ending in ‘ Carpéna’ could be taken as denoting direct tnstrumentality. As a matter of fact, however, instances of such assumptions have never been met with; and as such they cannot be allowable. If, again, the words be taken in their direct signification, then, it would not be possible for the Veda to enjoin anything as capable of being brought forward, while it would be pointing out either the present time or the chief Instrument. That is to say, the Homa is not capable of being performed either by the (Cdarpa, &c., while these are actually being employed in the preparation of the food, or by the cooking which is held to be the chief Instrnment (or means) of the preparation of food. Therefore, in both cases, the theory is absolutely untenable. According to our theory, on the other hand, inasmuch as the sentence in question is taken only as explanatory of the foregoing, the words can be taken in their indirect significations. For instance, in ordinary parlance, we find such an expression as Balavaén Dévadattah, where though the affix ^ Maiup’ (in Balavan) has been laid down to be in the sense of Pacess, yet we do not find it clearly expressed as to in comparison with whom Dévadatta is strong; and the direct signification of the word ‘ balavdn’ would be that he is the strongest among all living beings ; but this is not possible because, as a matter of fact, there are many stronger animals, ARGUMENTATIVE ARTHAVADAS. 5 such as the Lion, &७. ; hence we take the word to signify the presence of a strength greater only than that of those animals that are known to be weaker than Dévadatta. ' Exactly in the same manner, we can speak of the Cérpa as the ‘chief instrument’ (in the preparation of the food), in com- parison to such objects as the plough and the like, which have a much more remote instrumentality in that preparation. It may be argued that—* in that case such comparative signification of the word would come to be its chief denotation; and it is for this reason that the word ‘ dalavan,’ used with reference to Dévadatta, is not admitted to have any indirect signification.” This is true enough, when the word ‘balavdn’ is used with reference to Dévadatta, im comparison with weaker persons in general; but when the word is found to be incapable of referring to certain weak persons in parti- cular, it would directly give rise to an idea of Dévadatta being stronger than even those who possess greater strength; and in that case, if we take the word to point to the fact of Dévadatta being stronger than those weaker than him, then this would be taking it in an indirect sense. In the same manner, when the fact of being the means of the preparation of food is taken to be brought forth as descriptive of the Gérpa, which forms an object of the Injunction,—then (1) such description may be taken in 118 direct signification—that the Cérpa is the more important means (or Instru- ment) in the preparation of the food, than the remoter instruments in general; or (2) it may be taken in its indirect signification, inasmuch as no such remoter Instrument is mentioned; and the meaning would be that the (érpa is the one principal instrument in the preparation of food (which is not true). In accordance with your theory, on the other hand, the sentence being an Injunction, and as such laying down something not got at by other means, the fact of the (काव being the principal Instrument, as also its present character, would have to be taken as mentioned with reference to the Action in question ; and as such there would be no ground for any Compart- son or Secondary (indirect) character; and hence there would be 4 greater difficulty in the interpretation of the sentence. And thus there is no equality between the two theories. Sutra (80). If it were a Reason, it would be restricted (to the Qirpa only); because of the specification. If it be urged that through singularity (the Darvi, &c., would also be taken as refer- red to),—then, in that case, there would be an indecisiveness of the Injunctions. This Sutra admits, for the sake of argument, the position of the opponent. Even if the sentence were an Injunction of the Reason that 16 = TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA II—ADHI. ttt, Injunction could not be taken as referring to the Darvi, &. Because it is distinctly with reference to the Curpa that the sentence lays down the Reason, in the shape of its being an instrament in the preparation of food. And specially as such instrumentality is not recognised in ordinary experi- ence, the ouly resource that we have, for taking the injunction to refer to the Darvi, &c., also, is to assume a Vedic text bringing forward an instance in support of the sentence in question. But for assuming such a text, the only ground that we can have is the apparent inconsistency of another direct Vedic text (the sentence in question); and as a matter of fact, this apparent inconsistency cannot justify the assumption of anything more than what is absolutely necessary for the consistency of the Vedic text in question. Then again, the connection of the Gérpa with the Homa having been laid down, the mention of the properties of any other things would be no reason for such relationship; and hence it would be necessary to mention a certain quality of the Gurpa alone,—viz., its instrumentality in the pre- paration of the food; and on account of the proximity of the description of the quality to a mention of the Gérpa, we conclude that the description refers to the Curpa alone. Even in ordinary parlance, we always find that when a certain property is mentioned in connection with a certain object, the quality is cognised, first of all, only as belonging to that object (as for instance in the argument ‘Fire, because smoke’; the smoke which is the Reason 18 cognised at first, as resid- ing in the particular mountain only); and itis only when the corroborative instance comes to be cited (‘ Whatever has smoke is fiery, as the culinary hearth’) that we come to recognise the fact that it is the smoky substance in general that is meant; as otherwise, with the particular case alone, there could be no unified collective idea of the presence of fire (that is to say, unless we have an idea that wherever there 28 smoke there is fire, we cannot deduce the presence of fire from the presence of smoke). In the Veda, the Reason is not cognised as appertaining to what has to be proved by it, either in its genuine or specific form; the particular sort of relationship has always got to be assumed in accordance with Apparent Inconsistency. And in the case in question, we find, (1) that a definite particular object (the Carpa) is distinctly mentioned, (2) any generic ijnstru- mentality is not ordinarily recognised, and (8) there is ०0 reason for reject- ing what is directly meutioned: and hence all the Apparent Inconsistency that there can be in the case is limited to the particular case (of the (arpa being employed in the Homa and its being the instrament for preparing food) ; and as such it can justify the assumption of only that text which. would show an instance corroborating that particular case only; because it would be, in the absence of this particular instance only, that the mention, ARGUMENTATIVE ARTHAVADAS. ry | of the Reason (with regard to the (क) would remain inconsistent. On the other hand, if we omit to assume the fact of the Homa being connected with such other implements as the Darvi and the like, there is nothing, either directly perceived or mentioned in the Veda, that would remain inconsistent (for want of such an assumption). Therefore the only instance that we could assume would be in some such form as—‘ whichever Curpa is found to be instrumental in the preparation of food, is also used in the offering of the Homa.’ The inference of such a text would be what is technically known as the ‘ Vigéshadrshia’ Inference. For ‘instance, even in ordinary experience, if the smoke that is perceived is recognised as proceeding from a particular grass, the fire that is inferred is also that proceeding from the burning of that grass, and not Fire in general; and again though the root ‘ gam’ is generally recognised as denoting ८० go; yet when perceived, in the word ‘93’ (cow) f.i., after the word has been found to denote the particular animal with dewlaps, &c., it comes to be recognised as pointing to the ‘ going’ of the cow only, and not tothato{ all moving things. Exactly in the same manner, inasmuch as the Reason—the Instrumentality in the preparation of food —has been mentioned in distinct connection with the ‘ Gurpa,’ it cannot be regarded as pertaining to any other things. Thus then, the meaning of the sentence would be this: ‘ Whichever Curpa 18 found capable of preparing the food should be used in the offering of the Homa’; and any other objects, the Darvi, &c., cannot be included in this. For instance, when a strongly blown fire is mentioned as the Reason for burning, it points to the fact that, if not strongly blown, the Fire would not burn, and not that the conch-shell, when strongly blown, would burn. Thus alone could any definite interpretation be arrived at. If however the: ‘ Instrumentality in the preparation of food, as men- tioned with reference to the Gérpa,’ be taken as pointing to its concomitant —viz., the great genus (‘‘ Instrument in the preparation of food”) —, then, whatever is perceived in the world could, in some way or other, be spoken of as an ‘ instrument in the preparation of food’ ;and as such, there being an indecisiveness (as to the Instrument really meant), the sentence could be taken as referring to all the objects connected with the Homa; and hence the expression ‘instrumental in the preparation of food’ would be abso- lutely useless. | For these reasons, we conclude that the sentence cannot be rightly taken as laying down a Reason; and as such we must take it as containing a Praise (of the Qiérpa as the one thing to be used in the offering of the Homa). | ADHIKARANA (4). (Treating of the Mantras. | Sutra (81). “Because the Scriptures lay down directions (for the use of mantras, they cannot be meant to convey any mean- ings). (A). Finding the word ‘ Anartha’ mentioned in the Pitrvapaksha in con- nection with the mantras, some people put forward the question of this Adhikerena as—‘ Have the maniras any meaning, or are they absolutely meaningless’ P But this 1s not quite the correct form of the question considered here. Because all words are distinctly found to convey some sort of a meaning ; and as such there can never be any question as to their having a meaning ; for instance, Fire being found to actually burn certain things, we do not proceed to consider whether or not 16 is capable of burning. As a matter of fact, in all cases, the potentialities of words are inferred from the effects that they actually bring about; and in the case of mantras, we find that as soon as they are pronounced, they convey a certain definite meaning. Nor are the Pérvapakshas on this point capable of being answered by the single Sttra 1-1-40, For these reasons, considering the above question inappropriate, the Bhashya lays down the question in the following form: “ Are the mantras meant to convey a meaning; or are they not so meant” ? It may be argued that for the aforesaid reasons, even this’ question cannot be a fit object for discussion. But this is not true; because even the sentences that have a definite meaning, we find to be of two kinds (some being pronounced for the purpose of conveying some meaning, while others are pronounced only for the sake of the verbal expression). And as a matter of fact, though the utterance of the sentence, and the con vey- ing of its meaning, always go hand in haud, yet it is possible that thé desire of the speaker may lie in only one of these; and in this there 18 some sort of a difference between the two; for instance, when a person desires to express a certain fact, the utterance of the sentence comes as & MANTRAS. 79 matter of course; whereas when he desires only to express the mere verbal forms of sentences, the expression of the meaning comes about only by the way (through the exigencies of the force of concomitant circum- stances); as we find in the case of Japa, and the repetition of mantras for the curing of poisons. And hence there is an occasion for discussion on this point. Oljection: “But what connection has this question got with the “treatment of the means of knowing Dharma” P Reply: We have already considered the Puérvapaksha that the Veda having the sole purpose of pointing out the Actions to be performed, that which is not found to serve such a purpose must be concluded to be useless and untrustworthy ; and hence the question of the authority of the mantras in the matter of Dharma being only a phase of this previous Pérvapaksha, tle answer that we have given on the former occasion would apply to this case also; and as such there can be no need for bringing up the question of the authority of the mantras. Specially as we all know that when even such apparently incohereut sentences as—‘ He wept and from that was silver produced ’—are capable of being somehow or other made out to be an authority with regard to Dharma, there can be no doubt with regard to the authority of the mantras. And hence all that we have got to cousider now is the question of the particular uses of the mantras. That the mantras are neither Injunctions nor mere Valedictory sentences will be shown by the Author himself later on, when it will be pointed out that they cannot be Injunctions, because they have not the form of an Injunction; and that they cannot be Valedictory sentences, because there can be no Praise of that which is laid down elsewhere. Then the only nse that is left lies in the employment of the words of the mantras ; and hence it is only natural to consider the question as to their being used for the purpose of conveying some meaning, or for that of giving evpres- sion to the mere words, In the case of the Sdmas too, though they have no meanings, yet we can have a doubt as to whetler they are pronounced merely for the sake of being pronounced, or for the sake of giving expression to the letters composing them. A question might here be asked—‘‘ How could the Pirvapaksha ac- count for the use of such mantras as are not connected with any direct direction in the Veda (and are used only iu accordance with their own meanings) ” ? To this, some people make the following reply: “It is with a view to stop the use of such mantras that the Pérvapaksht proceeds to establish the fact of the speaker having no desire to convey any meaning by the use of mantras, because he knows that no one ever uses mantras that have no meanings. Thus it is that the sentence in the Bhashya—do 80 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—-PADA II—ADHI. IV. the mantras help by the mere utterance—which savours of being the declara- tion of a well-established fact—ceases to be absolutely incoherent, And the evil motive lurking in the mind of the Parvapakshi is somewhat like this: ‘If the Siddhanti should declare that the mantras help by mere utter- ance, then I shall be able to show to him that such mantras can never be used.” And the Purvapakshi, in the Bhdshya, in pointing out the use of the mantra ‘ Varhirdevasadandamt,’ is found to be denying the fact of the mantra being used on the occasion of the chopping of grass; and what he means by this is to strike at the very usefulness of the mantra.” Or, it may be that the Pérvapaksha accepts the fact of the mantras being actually used, as being in accordance with the theory of persons knowing all about sacrifices; and hence not discussing this, it takes up another discussion. And as for the qnestion—‘ How is it that the theory of persons knowing the details of sacrifices has been left aside, and its correctness or incorrectness has not been tested’ P—, the reason why this point has been disregarded is this: That the mantras are actually used is a fact firmly established by the mere fact of their being accepted as such by all the best men of the three higher castes,—exactly like the works on Smrts ; this fact cannot be set aside; and hence it is the very source or basis of this fact that we proceed to consider. And if the Piérvapaksha theory turns out to be the correct one, then, there being no other authority for the said fact, we shall seek for itin the Inference of Vedic texts laying down the use of the manéra in question; while in accordance with the Siddhanta theory the Indicative Power and the Context of the manira itself would serve as the required authority. Or, the PUR VAPAKS8 HA (A) may be expounded in the followingmanner. ‘That the mantras serve a distinctly useful purpose of man is pointed “ out by the very Injunction of the study of the Veda; and hence whatever «4 18 found to be in contact with the Darca-Pirnamdsa and other sacrifices, ५८ either through syntactical order or through UContezt, is accepted as serving a “useful purpose; such for instance are the sentences dealing with the “ Praydjas, as also the forms of the mantras. Of these the former are found “to serve a purpose, by a distinct pointing out of what they directly signify 4८ (yiz., the performance of certain minor sacrifices) ; and hence though they “have certain verbal forms of themselves, they do not serve any purpose, “through these verbal forms. As for the mantras, however, they are found “to be expressing meanings, that are not of any use in tlie sacrifices; and ‘ag such we can have no need of these, so fur as their meaning is con- ‘gerned; as for the purposes of Praise, Injunction, and Remembrance, ‘these are found to be fulfilled by other means; and hence we cannot “but conclude that the only purpose that the mantras can serve 18 in the “use of their mere verbal forms, as is also pointed out by the passages MANTRAS. 81 “that lay down their uses. As for the Injunction of the study of the “Veda, this too, having its purposes fulfilled by the more proximate “‘verbal text of the maniras, cannot extend to the more distant deno- “tation (or meaning) of these mantras. In the case of the passages ‘“‘dealing with the Praydjas, &c., also, though our first impression is that “Sof these also, it is the verbal text only that is to be employed,—yet, such ^“ use 1s concluded to be improper, when it is found that they express certain “facts, that are distinctly useful in the actual performance of the sacrifices. “No such facts, however, are found to be expressed by the mantras. Then ‘again, it 18 only when the verbal text is not found to be of any use that we “conclude the purpose of a sentence to be in what it signifies; in the case “of the maniras, however, we find that it is their verbal texts that serve ‘distinctly useful purposes. And even if the meaning of a sentence be “held to be more important than its verbal form, it is only to the word ‘that a person has to be directed first of all; becanse the meaning is “ 62 0768880 after the word has been used. And hence we conclude that “it is the mere verbal form of the manira that is of use (in the per- “formance of sacrifices). And it is in view of these facts that we have to “‘take the following Purvapaksha Sitras. “Tn consideration of the order of the Siddhadnta 6826025, we should ‘“‘ehange the order of the examples cited, from the ‘ Abhrydddna’ down- “wards. The Bhkdshya, however, has not. paid any heed to the order of the “examples, because it was thought that the discussion would be equally ‘clear, wherever the examples might be cited, and hence he begins with “the mantra— Urupratha, Uruprathasva,’ &o. “Says the Bhdshya: Just as one who has eyes, &c. And the meaning “of this is that though a person who has his eyes intact, yet having his ‘vision blurred by some cause or other, when he is found being led by ‘another person, the irresistable conclusion is that he does not see with his “eyes; and exactly, in the same manner, when a person comes across the “text of a mantra, though his first impression is that it has a certain mean- “ing, yet, as soon as he finds another sentence laying dewn its uses, he ‘naturally concludes that the manira, itself, has not the capability of “indicating its own use; and this distinctly shows that the meaning of the ‘“‘ mantra is tobe disregarded altogether; for if any importance were attach- ८ 60 to the meaning, the use of the mantra would be indicated by the nantra ‘itself, through such a meaning । ५ An objection is raised in the Bhashya: ‘The mantra may have the “character of an Arthavada,—that is to say, as a Praise of the Injunction of ८ {106 manira inferred from the exigencies of its indicative Force and Context.’ ५८ 706 reply given in the Bhashya is that itis not 50 ; because Arthavadas ५५ 08१९ been shown td serve the purpose of Praising only when taken along 11 82 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-—~PADA II[—ADHI. IV. ८ with Injunctions ; in a case however where the Injunction, whether direct ५९ 01 inferred, appears apart from the passage in question, there being no ८ Praise found in proximity to the Injunction itself, the necessary persua- ‘sion 18 accepted as being acomplished by its own force; and as such, there ५५ being no need for any other persuasive agency, no remote Praise can serve “any useful purpose with regard to that Injunction. ५५ Similarly, too, in the case of the Abhryadana mantras, their very form ‘points to the fact of their being employed at the action in question ; and ५ &8 such the subsequent direction that ‘ one is to hold by all the four’ is “useless. HKven if this direction served the purpose of indicating the “number ‘four’ (which is not indicated by the mantras themselves), the ‘number thus indicated would be that which appertains to the mantras, and ५५ not to the Action ; because the property of one thing cannot be transferred “to another. The number too, not being an Action, could not be taken to be “laid down as an auxiliary to the Action. “hus then, the construction of the sentence would be somewhat in “this form: ‘These that are four in number, by means of these, one should “hold the Abkryas’; but these were four, even before the declaration ; ‘hence the assertion would be absolutely useless. And furtherthe number ‘not being auxiliary to the principal Action, and there being no collective ४ word, the potentiality in question would have to be accepted as appertain- ‘ing to each of the four Abhryas ; and as such there would be nothing to ५ set aside the contingency of these being taken as four optional alterna- ^ tives. ‘In accordance with our theory, however, the peculiar transcendental “result being only capable of being indicated by the repetition, there “would be no means of ascertaining its existence, before all the four had “been held ; and as such, it is only proper that these four should be taken collectively. “In the case of the sentence—Imamagrbhnam, 46.) ityacvabhidhani- ९५ madatié,—as for the holding of the reins of the Horse and the Ass, “it is distinctly indicated by the exigencies of .the circamstances; and “as such there can be no injunction for the holding of these. And as “for the mantra too, its use is indicated by its very form; and as such “the direction ityagvabhidhinimadatté cannot be of much use. ‘An objection is raised in the Bhashya—‘ The direction would serve “the purpose of rejecting the holding of the reins of the ass.’ ‘‘ And the reply given is—‘ na gaknoti parisankhydtum, porisanoakshdno “hi, &., &o. That is to say, in the word ‘ parisankhyd,’ the prefix ‘pari’ “signifying rejection, the word must be taken as denoting the idea of such “ rejection or exclusion ; and this idea could refer either to the holding of the ^^ reins of the ass, or to the using of the mantra at such holding ; and both these MANTRAS, 83 “altertiativea are open to three objections, viz: (1) if the direction be taken ५ 88 8) Injunction, then the said idea of the rejection would be that ‘such and “ such reins ‘are not held’; and in this the Injunction would be abandoning ८८ itg own original meaning or purpose (of laying down the holding of certain “ reins); (2) it would be necessary to bring in the meaning of another “ sentence—that the reins of the ass are not to be held (which is not signified “by the sentence in question); (3) we would have to set aside the “employment of the mantra at the holding of the ass’ reins, though such ०५ employment ia indicated by the form of the mantra itself. When how- “ever, the direction is taken as indicating a certain transcendental result, ८५ (as we hold) it could be taken along with anything we please, being ex- ‘actly like a blind man. In the sentence * ityagvdbhidhanimadatié, if there “were a certain definite relationship between the word ‘tz’ and the “word ‘acwdibhidhanim,’ then it could be taken as indicating the re- “ jection (of the holding of the ass’ reins). As a matter of fact, however, “there 18 no such relationship; because all case-nouns having the pur- “pose of accomplishing the work of the Verb, there can be no mutual “relationship among themselves; and for this very reason, the sentence ‘too would be connected with the Verb only ; and this is only one; and the ८५ exigencies of the context and the particular transcendental result apper- “tain equally to both holdings (those of the reins of the horse and the “ asa); and hence there can be no Paritsankhyd or exclusion, “The Bhadshya sums up the whole discussion thus :—Thus we conclude “ that the mantra, ‘ Varhird€vasadandami,’ cannot be ta Win as pointing “to the fact of the mantra being employed in the chopping of grass. And ‘‘we find that the Principal Direction (laymg down fthe procedure of ‘the sacrifice) itself distinctly points out all mantras to be employed at the ५५ Principal sacrifice; and as such having no use apart from the perform- “ance of this sacrifice, they could never have any connection with the “ subsidiary Actions. Nor would there be any chance of the mantras being “repeated in the wrong place; because the occasion of their use is “fixed by the order of the context in which they occur ; and hence there “gould be no chance of pedple ignoring the conditions of the sacrifices, and ‘repeating at once the whole of the Anuvdka or Adhyaya (of the Veda ५८ dedling with the sacrifices). Sutra (32). (B) “Also, because of the fixed order of the sentences.’ “Tn the case of the mantra— Agnirmirdha, &c.,’—the sense that would ८ 96 got from this form of the sentence would be exactly the same as that ५८ obtained, if the sentence were read as—‘ Mfirdhagnth, fe.’ ; and as auch, “any restriction or fixity of the order of the words would be useless (if any 84, TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. ~~ ए? II-——ADHI. IV. ०९ meaning were desired to be conveyed by the mantra). If, however, we take ८ 16 mantras as being repeated only with a view to a certain transcendental “result, following from a repetition of the words in a fixed order,—then ‘there would be no ground for believing the same result to follow if the ५८ order of the words were changed ; and as such the restriction of the order, ८17 this case, would serve a distinctly useful purpose. If it be urged that “there is a certain transcendental result that follows from the cognition of “the meanings of each of the words in the particular order in which they “occur in the mantra,—then (we reply that) such aresult would be accom- ‘plished by the mere repetition of the text of the mantra ; because the “particular order of the cognition of the meanings of the words depends ‘“npon such repetition only. “In a case where the restriction is found to serve a visible pur- ०८ nose,—for instance, the restrictions of roots, affixes and compounds, that ५८ 6 meet with in connection with such words as ‘ Indragni,’ * Nilotpalam,’ ‘S*Rdjapurushah, ‘ Citraguh,’ ‘ Nishkaugaimbth,’ and the like—it is only ५८ proper that we should have one; as, othérwise, the words would either be- ८५ 00106 incorrect, or signify something totally different, or become absolutely ५५ meaningless. The sequence of the words in the aforesaid compounds is ‘Sin accordance with such rules as that—‘ in a Dvandva compound the word “that begins with a vowel and ends with the letters of the at pratyahara ‘‘should be placed first’ (Panini II—ii—33), and the like; and hence the “compound ‘agnindrau’ would be grammatically incorrect; and the “ compound ‘ Pyrusharajah’ would have a meaning different from that of ५४८ Rajapurushah’; while the word ‘Kaugambinth ’ would be absolutely ‘““meaningless. If we meet with the word ‘ Agnindrau’ in the Veda, we “should explain the anomaly as being a peculiarity of the Veda, or formed ५३१ consideration of the fact of Agni being taken as the more important ‘deity of the two; when, however, both of them are considered to be ५ 0 equal importance, ‘ Indrdgni’ would be the only correct form, ‘Tt may be urged that—‘in the case in question also, any change in “the order of the words would make the sentence lose the character of a “mantra. But this would be the case only if no meaning were desired to ८ 6 conveyed by the mantra; while (if the meaning were desired to be “conveyed, then) inasmuch as a change in the order of the words would “not make any difference in the meaning of the mantra, we do not know “on what ground it could be said to lose its true character. “५ (1) And thus the present 62४72 could be taken as pointing to the fact “of the character of the muntra being established with regard to a certain “sentence, on the ground of the order of the words being fixed. (2) Or, it “may be taken as laying down the fact of a mantra being used at a sacri- ` fice in accordance with the rules laid down ina particular context, as a MANTRAS, 85 “reason for holding that no meaning is desired to be conveyed by the ५ mantra ; because if any significance were attached to the meaning of the “mantra, there would be no such differentiation, in the case of the same “manira, as that, ‘this belongs to one sacrifice and that to another.’ (3) ‘Or, it may be taken to mean that, inasmuch as the denotative power of all *‘sentences—whether occurring in mantras or in ordinary parlance—is *the same, any such restriction as that a certain sentence is a mantra “cannot but have a certain transcendental result in view. (4) Or, the ५८ 2688010 propounded in the Sitra may be taken as that, inasmuch as the ^ Deity could be thought of by such means as contemplation and the like, “ the fact of there being a restriction that it should be done by means of “the mantra only, shows that this restriction is in view of a certain trans- ५ cendental result ; because as far as the visible results are concerned, there (५ appears to be no difference between the manira and such other means as * contemplation and the like. Sutra (33). (C) “Because of the directions pertaining to the learned.” “We find that there is an Injunction,—‘One should move about, ^^ pronouncing agnid agntd’ ; and in connection with this it is urged that, ‘fin accordance with the law arrived atin an Adhikaraza of Adhydya III, “ ( ४46, I1I—viji—18) that an ignorant Priest is not in keeping with the ‘injunctions of the Veda, it becomes necessary for the Priest to know the ‘meaning of such words as ‘agnid’ and the like, before he begins the ^ sacrifice itself ; and as such the direction accompanying these words could ‘not be taken as pointing out the meaning of these words because (as for ^ 0116 who does not know the meaning, he is not entitled to the position of “the Priest ; while as for the learned priest) the pointing out of the meaning ^ would be a useless repetition ; and hence we conclude that the direction ‘must have been put forth only with a view to a transcendental result. ‘* Nor ean it be urged that the manira serves the purpose of reminding ‘the Priest (of the meaning of the words) ; because such remembrance 18 ‘‘ found to be accomplished by means of the expert character of the Priest, ५ obtained from a thorongh study of the Brdhmanas. And as for the means ‘‘of manifesting this expert character, we could accept either the completion “of the previous action, or the duly studied Bradhmana itself, to be this ‘“‘means; and hence the mantras could serve no |tseful purpose in connec- “tion with this manifestation. | ८८ एन the particular 64105 ठाद (or Capability), that is held to be ५ brought abont by means of the mantras, could be none other than # certain ‘transcendental result; and hence this theory | comes within the Péurva- ¢“ paksha itself. 86 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1—PADA II—ADRHI. 1Y. “Then again, even when a meaning of the mantra is accepted, it id “not found capable of serving any visible purpose; so in this case also, ५५ 6 becomes necessary to assume, in the end, a transcendental result. “Why then shotld not we asstime such a one, in the very beginning, “holding it to follow from the mere utterance of the mantra” ¢ Sutra (84). (D) “Because they speak of things that do not exist.” ‘We find a certain mantra speaking of ‘four horns’; and certainly ‘we do not perceive any such thing, in any way connected either with ‘the Primary or the Subsidiary Sacrifices. Even though it might be “taken as figuratively describing certain things in connection with the ‘sacrifice, yet’ as no such thing as the ‘four horns’ is found to be any ‘‘object of the performance (of the sacrifice), there can be no use ‘of “reminding one of sucha thing. Specially as it is not quite clear when “and where the mantra in question is to be employed. While on the “other hand, it is quite clear, from the text of the mantra itself, and the “order of its words, that if has got to be repeated; and hence the “theory of the Purvapaksha becomes duly established. “The mantras—‘ Ma ma hinsth’ (“Do not kill, &c., &c.’), being laid down ५ with reference to the altar, where the offering-material is kept, cannot “be admitted to be uttered with any desire to convey a meaning; because “such requests can never. be proffered to an inanimate object (like the ८८ altar); as it is absolutely impossible for the altar to ‘kill,’ itis simply “ absurd to request it ‘not to kill.’ ”’ Sutra (35) (EB) “Because they are addressed to insensate things.” “We meet with such mantras as— Oshadhé trdyasva’ (Protect us, ८८0 plant!), ‘Ornota gravanah’ (Listen, O ye stones!), which are ad- ‘dressed with the purpose of attracting attention to the action in ‘‘hand ; but no such attraction of insensate things is possible; nor can the ‘direction prompt men either to the protection of the animal, or to “the listening to the Morning Hymn; and hence if any significance is “attached to the meaning of these mantras, they are found to be absolutely “ useless.” Sutra (36). (®) “Because there are contradictions in the signification.” “In the case of the mantra— Aditirdyauraditirantariksham '’—we find “that the same object 18 spoken of both as ‘ Heaven’ and ‘Sky’; 80 also in “the mantra—‘ Eko rudré na dvttiyo’ vatasthé,......asarkhyatah sahasrint yé MANTRAS. 87 “‘vudrah, &e., &c.,’ we find the same Rudra mentioned both as one and as “many; and these are clear cases of self-contradiction. “Then again, how could Aditi, a Deity, be either the Heaven or the “Sky? Nor can these discrepancies be explained away as mere Praise; ५ because it is only such Praises as are connected with certain Injunctions “that are accepted to have any use; and as for the Praise contained in “the mantra, it cannot serve any useful purpose; and as such we can “attach no importance to it.” Sutra (37). (©) “ Because there is no teaching of the meaning, 98 there is of the text of the mantras.” “Tt is & universally admitted fact that the Veda is studied for the sake ‘of the performance of sacrifices; and as such only that part of it has “to be learnt by people, which is found to serve a useful purpose in “such performance. And as a matter of fact, we find that all revered “teachers learned in the Veda put forth their efforts towards the teaching, ५ #0 the students, of the mere Verbal Text of the mantras, and not to- “wards that of its meaning, though it is always in close proximity to the “text. And from this also we conclude that the mantras help in the ५ performance of the sacrifice, by their mere recital. Sutra (38). (H) “Because their meaning is unintelligible.” “In the case of certain mantras, we find that the meaning of some ८५ words cannot be made out; while in others we find whole sentences “unintelligible. Nor can the meaning of the mantras help the sacrifice by ४८ 18 mere existence, if it happens to be lost sight of at the time of the ८८ performance of the sacrifice. Hence we conclude that it is by its mere ‘reciting, which can, always be १०४०, that the mantra can help the ५ performance,” Sutra (39). (1) “Because they speak of transient things.” ‘In accordance with the theory that the manéra is always used with ८८ & view to the conveying of a certain meaning,—the mantra can only ५ point to that meaning, which belongs to it ; and we find that some mantras ५५ 816 capable of signifying only non-eternal (perishable) things; for in- ५ stance—‘ What do your cows do in the Kikata country’? This manira is ‘known to have been seen (propounded) by Vicwamitra, as is distinctly ^ pointed out by a well-established tradition current among the students of “the Veda; at a certain time, he asked Indra for a gift of riches in ८ order to enable him to perform a certain sacrifice ; and he 18 represented as ८८ asking Indra; ^ Lord of the Three worlds, what are your cows doing in the ५ Kikuta country ’ ?—the sense of the question being this—‘ the people of 88 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. E--PADA II—ADHI. IV. ५५ that country are atheists, and regarding 911 sacrifices. to be useless, they do “not perform any; and as such they do not milk the eows for the prepara- “tion of the Soma; nor do they warm the atmosphere (by the sacrificial ५५ 87008). ; and not warming the atmosphere they do not help in the bring- “ing of rain; therefore please carry the wealth that at present belongs to ५ Pramaganda, the king of the Kikata, to my country, the Naicaigakha ;- “TThe ‘bha’ for ‘ha’ in ‘dbhara’ is a Vedic anomaly; or the word ५ ५ Gbhara’ may be taken as equivalent to ‘ Vibhriht’=fatten.up forus}; and ८ 80, ° 0 Maghavan, fulfil this work of mine.’ [the long ‘ y&’ in ‘ sandhay@’ 18 “a Vedic anomaly. } “If this meaning were desired to be conveyed by the mantra in ८ question, then this being distinctly found to be speaking of many tran- sient objects, the Veda (containing this mantra) would come to have a ८ beginning, as composed by a human author; and this would wholly shake “its authoritative character. “Nor can the mantra be said to have another meaning; 98 it is not “found to express any other. ‘For these reasons, we conclude that in the case of mantras, we “should attach no significance to the presence or absence of their meaning, ‘‘and must accept them as helping the performance of sacrifices, by the ‘“‘ mere recitation.” SIDDHANTA. Sutra (40). But there is no difference in the signification of sentences (in the Veda from those in ordinary parlance). The repetition of the mantra ending in the mere comprehension of its verbal text cannot, by this alone, be recognised asin any way forming part of the sacrifice; specially as the mere letters of the mantra, like the materials used, not forming part of the Procedure of the sacrifice, can- not be held to be comprehended by means of the Context. Similarly, the cognition of the meanings of the component words also are wholly taken up by the indication of the meaning of the sentence (composed by them) ; and as such, this too cannot be said to be compre- hended by means of the Context. | The only element then, that is left unutilised is the meaning of the sentence: and as such, it is this alone that can be regarded as pervading throughout the Context; and being of the nature of an action, it supplies an integral factor in the declaration of the method of the action; and thereby it attains the character of the Procedure, inasmuch as it serves to remind us of that which has to be porformed. | MANTRAS. 89 And in this case, there is no ground for assuming any transcendental result (as following from mere recitation). Because the only ground for such an assumption is the Apparent Inconsistency of something laid down in the Veda; and when this latter is duly justified on the ground of the mantra having a distinct meaning, there can be no ground for assuming any transcendental result to follow from it. Even when there might be au occasion for such an assumption, the transcendental result could be tuken as following from a comprehension of the meaning of the sentence constituting the mantra, and not from the sentence itself, independently of its distinctly useful meaning. With regard to the visible and transcendental results of anything that has to be employed, we must bring forward evidences ; and in the case in question we find that the fact of the mantra having a visible use is borne out by the Indicative Power (Linga) of the mantra itself; whereas the fact of its having only a transcendental result can, at best, be supported by the Contezt alone. Then again, as a matter of fact, no amount of Context can rightly lay down the employment of a certain thing accomplishing that which it is absolutely incapable of accomplishing; and hence the long and short of the whole thing is that we should employ the mantra in the fulfilment of that which is capable of accomplishing. And as for the fact of the mantra bringing about any transcendental results, we have no evidences of it, either in the Veda, or in ordinary experience. Consequently, the Context also would point only toa visible result for the mantra, thereby becoming quite reconciled with the Indicatwe Power of the mantra itself. Thus then, the usage of persons learned in the sacrifices becoming supported (by the mantra itself) there is no need of taking all the trouble vf assuming any other grounds (for the usage). And hence it is only natural to conclude that it is the meaning of the mantra that is the chief factor (being of use at the sacrifice). An objection is raised: “It ts not so: because the mere fact of a “certain visible result having beon accomplished, cannot justify the con- “clusion that that is the sole use of the mantra ; specially as, if the mantra ‘does not bring about any result in itself desirable by man, the Injunc- “tion of the study of the whole of the Veda would become useless. Nor ‘can it be held to be necessary to assume the usefulness of the meaning of “the manéra, on account of the facts urged in Sétras 33, 34, and 35; and ‘‘when we cannot avoid the assumption of a transcendental result, in the ‘Cend, we must assume it to follow immediately from there repetition ; for ९८ there 18 no reason for postponing it; specially as the necessity of repeat- “ing the mantra 18 avknowledged by both of us; and it is this fact 1४ 90 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I--PADA IlI—ADHI. IV. “that gives rise to the assumption of the transcendental result in ques- “tion.” To this, we make the following reply: In the performance of sacrifices, the only useful purpose that the mantra can serve lies in the indicating of some- thing auxiliary to the sacrifice. Though such auxiliaries are not capable of being used like the ordinary things of the world, yet the mere indication of the forms of these would help the performers of the sacrifice. Therefore we conclude that it is only those parts of the mantra—as the words of address, &c., in the Vocative—that do not serve the purpose of indicating such auxiliaries, that can be said to be uttered, without any desire on the part of tho speaker, to convey a definite meaning ; and this mere fact cannot justify us in rejecting the significance of the whole muntra; specially as there is noth- ing in the world that is always of one and the same form and character. For these reasons, inasmuch as a theory must be in keeping with well- recognised facts, we must conclude that such mantras as—‘ Varhirdévasadan- dimt’—are always used with a desire to convey a definite meaning. As for the sentence ‘tancaturbhirddatté (Vide Bhashya on ७४६८५ 31) we offer the following explanation :— Sutra (41). The repetition is for purposes of qualification. Though the mantras are already got at by means of their own denota- tive power, yet the sentence 10 question, which lays down that ‘ the four mantras are to be repeated at the time of holding the reins,’*may be taken as laying down the number four. And hence, in accordance with the reasonings brought forward in connection with the passage—‘he purchases the Soma with an one year old cow, d&c.,’—the qualifications tend to limit one another ; and hence, if no collective potentiality be admitted, there could not be an Injunction of the holding of the reins with the mantras numbering four; con- sequently it 28 clear that this Injunction is a direct result of the collective potentiality of the qualifications. Or, 16 may be that long before we proceed to assume, with reference to each particular manira, a distinct Vedic direction, as indicated by the indicative power of the mantras themselves,—the direct declaration in the shape of the sentence (‘he holds it with the four mantras’) will have enjoined the mantras as qualified by the number four; and as such enjoining something not got at by other means, the sentence comes to be a pure Injunction. As for the pointing out of the mantras themselves, these could be pointed out by their own indicative power, even without the direction ; and as such the sentence in question could be of very little use in that con- nection ; consequently we take the direction to have the sole purpose of pointing out the number four, which is not got at by any other means. MANTRAS. 9} Sutra (42). There is an exclusion. So long as the purpose of the laying down of the mantra has not been duly realised, and the treatment of the subject-matter remains deficient in certain points, whatever assumptions we might make, for the accomplish- ment of these purposes, must be accepted as having the support of the Veda; while when all deficiencies have been supplied, if we make the slightest assumption, it cannot but be absolutely without any authority. And we shall show later on that Indicative Power, Context, &c., have no authority of their own, unless they point to a direct Vedic text. = It is with all this in view that the Bhadshya says—It ts only when there ts a sentence that the Indicative Power of Words can serve to point out the use of the mantra. That is to say, it is only when the Context enables to ascer- tain whether the manira is to be employed in the offering of the sacrifice or in the holding of the reins, that the addition of the clause ‘ the reins of the horse ’ can serve to restrict it. Says the Bhdshya: The construction of the Vedic direction is not that ‘with the mantra one should hold,’ but that ‘he should hold the reins of the horse’; and this refers to the relationship of the verb,—no relationship with the noun being possible,—and not to mere relationship in general ; and thus we conclude that the mantra is laid down as to be used, not in all holding, but in the holding of the horse’s revns. Or, it may be that what the sentence does is to bring forward the subsequent relationship of the noun in the Accusative case ; because this is all that is necessary for the particalar result aimed at (that is to say, the relationship is that of the particular Noun, and is perceived after the Injunction of the holding with the mantra of the reins of the horse). In any case the objections urged under S#tra 1-1-31 do not apply to our theory, if we accept the explanation thus put forward. If the direction contained in the Veda expressed exactly what is denoted by the mantra, then alone could we be subject to reproach. It may be urged that—‘in that case this comes to be an Injunction of something not otherwise got at; and as such it should not be spoken of as an Hzclusion.’ But inasmuch as we speak of it in accordance with what it actually comes to be, the objection cannot affect us. Because in all cases, except where we have the word ‘ Parisantkhyd’ (Exclusion) itself, or the word ‘ Hva,’ the Veda does not exactly mean that it is a real Parisan- khya@ (Exclusion) or Neyama (Restriction). Hence in the case in question it is an Injunction that is spoken of as ‘ Parisatkhyd,’ on account of the peculiar character of what it finally leads to. Question: “ What then would be the difference among Injunction, Restriction and Exclusion” ? 92 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I-—-PADA ^ पि. IV. Reply : An Jnjunction is of that which lays down something not got at by any other means; we have a Restriction where the thing in question is already got at partially; and we have an Exclusion where the thing is found to exist in two contrary positions. And thus we find that it 18 the Injunction itself, which, by certain qualifications, comes to adopt these three forms. For instance, (1} in a case where we find that the act in question has never been got at, nor is there any chance of getting at it by any other means but by the sentence in question, we cannot but admit 1४ to be a pure order; and this is what is known as ‘Injunction’ proper; e.g., ‘ Vrihin prokshati.’ (2) In a case where it is found that apart from the sentence in question, the act is partially got at by other means, then the Injunction that mere- ly supplies the part that is wanting, serves as a restriction, and as such is known as ‘ Niyama’ (Restriction) ; e.g., ‘ Vrihin avahanti,’ where we find that the threshing of the corn being pointed out by the mere fact of its serving the purpose of preparing the rice, the mere threshing cannot be held to be the sole object of the Injunction, which must be taken as sup- plying the element that is wanting (not being got at by any other means); because unless this additional something were pointed out by the Injunc- tion, the mere preparing of the rice being capable of being accomplished by other means also, these other means would also come to be the objects of Injunction. When however, the missing element is supplied by the Injunction, then the preparation of the rice comes to be only implied by the sentence secondarily, and not expressed by it directly. Nor can the Restrictive Injunction be taken merely as rejecting the other alternative (of preparing the rice by other means); because in that case it would be only a Parisankhya&. And the restricting of the means of the preparing of rice to threshing only is more proximate (to the sentence) than the setting aside of another alternative. So long as there was an idea of the rice being capable of being prepared by both means, there was no such restriction as that it should be done by threshing only; and hence when this restriction has been accomplished by the Injunction, all other alter- native methods fall off by themselves. And further, the Injunction is not found to have been luid down after we had cognised all the methods of preparing rice; and as such none of these could be set aside by the Injunction ; for 1४ 1s only that which has been cognised to be applicable that can be set aside; in fact, it was prior to any such recognition that the person was prompted to an action; and in the prompting, the potentiality of the thing in question to point to many methods having been restricted, only one of these has been pointed out by the sentence in question; and as for the setting aside of the other methods, this is cognised only as a MANTRAS. 9% necessary consequence of the former restriction ; and hence the sentence 1s not named in accordance with this setting aside (or Haclusion). (3) In a case where, prior to the direction contained in the sentence in question, both methods have been already coguised as applicable to the case in question,—and where there is a chance of both being employed,— we have a rejection of one of them in favour of another; and this is a case of Partsankhyd (Exclusion) ; ¢.g., the sentence already in consideration (‘ Agvabhidhanim, §c.’), and also in the case of the fifth alternative of the Grhamédhiya sacrifice. But in the case in question, the sentence does not appear actually after both actions have been pointed out, because we have not assumed any Vedic direction for the holding of the reins of the ass; hence all that we mean is that if we had not the sentence ‘ityagvabhidhanim, Sc.,’ then, the mantra could be employed in the holding of the reins of the ass also. Specially as in the case of all direct assertions of the Veda, we do not take them as serving the sole purpose of barring the way of all assumed sentences; (that is to say, if it were so, then the sole use of the sentence in question would be in this barring, and it could not be taken as setting aside the application of the manira to the holding of the reins of the ass) ; because what would be the use of having a sentence for a purpose (the barring of the way of assumed sentences) that could be served by other means? Hence for the sake of the Vedic sentence in question, we assume its purpose to lie in the setting aside of the application of the mantra to the holding of the ass’ reins. Thus then, taking for granted, for the sake of argument, the opposite contention, we offer the following explanation: If we had not the sentence in question, what would be the nature of the action performed? The mantra would come to be employed in the holding of the reins of the horse, and also in that of the reins of the ass. When however the use of the mantra is distinctly restricted by the sentence in question, all that we want to know being duly pointed out, no room is left for the assuming of Vedic texts laying down the common application of the mantra (to the reins of the horse as well as of the ass); and hence it comes to be definitely ascertained that the mantra 18 to be employed in the holding of the reins of the horse only; and thus there being uo repetition, the sentence in question is found to serve a distinctly useful purpose. Sutra (43). Or, it may be an Arthavada. In the case of the sentence—‘ With the mantra ‘O, magnificent one, become greatly magnified, he enlarges the cake,’’—followed, at a certain distance, by the sentence, ‘by this the master of the sacrifice himself becomes magnified,’'—though the latter, being in a different place, cannot be 94 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA II—ADHI. IV. taken as eulogising the former injunction of the mantra, yet inasmuch: as it is the magnifying or enlarging of the cake that forms the object of the Injunction, the whole sentence could be useful, only if it helped in persuading the agent to such. enlarging; and it is in support of such persuasion that we have the latter sentence. Objection: ‘As the cake itself could not be prepared without an enlargement (of the lump of flour), any Injunction of such enlargement would be absolutely useless.” Reply: This is not necessarily the case; for if the dough happens to be rather loose, it would be advisable to enlarge it by the addition of more flour; and hence what the Injunction does is to lay down that the flour should be kneaded in such a way as to leave it capable of being increased (by the addition of more flour), And thus too, it becomes clear that the enlarging is to be done by the Adhvaryu priest; because the mantra in question, when repeated, comes to be known as ‘ Adhvaryava mantra, and thereby restricts itself to a particular agent. As for that which is implied by the mantra itself, inasmuch as that could not form the basis of any name (of the mantra), it could not by itself definitely point to any particular agent. Hence even though the meaning of the mantra could be wholly got at from itself, yet we must comprehend its meaning by means of one subsequent sentence. Thus then we find that the praising of the enlargement serves a distinctly useful purpose. Objection : “ In that case the praise of the enlargement being accom- plished by means of the sentence—‘ verily it magnifies the master of the sacrifice himself,’—the mention of the mantra would be absolutely useless.’ Reply : Not so ; because the valedictory sentence has been added with the sole view of praising the mantra alone; and the whole thing comes to this: The enlargement should be done; the mantra serves as a means of this enlargement ; and to the mantra are also added the words ‘uru {8 yajnapatih prathatam’ (May your master of the sacrifice also become magni- fied!). And in that case, the sentence, ‘ Verily the master of the sacrifice himself becomes magnified,’ comes to point out a sacrificial accessory (in the shape of a few words to be added to the mantra). The Bhashya puts the question: ‘Is this then the sole purpose of the sentence’ (‘ Yajnapatimava, §c.’) P—and answers it in the negative ; because, as a matter of fact 16 serves the purpose of praising, in accordance with the rule laid down in the Sutra LV—iii—l. And though in the case in question, on account of the mantra being laid down as an Instrument (in the enlarging of the cake) we assume the fact of the master of the sacrifice being magni- fied to be the result following from the said enlargement, yet that which is described in the Brahmanza cannot but be regardedasa Praise. Specially as MANTRAS. 95 the mantra also, having its use pointed out by the indicative power of its own words, cannot, by itself, point to a Result. Anything, of which the use is pointed out by the Instrumental case-ending, cannot but be taken as bringing about a particular result, as otherwise any employment of it would be wholly inexplicable (apparently inconsistent). Whereas a text, whose existence is inferred from the indicative power of certain words in the mantra stands in need of the mention of an Action, and as such comes to be recognised as to be used merely in the pointing out of the Action. Consequently, even a mantra that is so inferred should be taken as a Praise, consisting of the description of the principal result (following from the action in question). The Bhashya raises the question: ‘ How is it that the sentence in ques- tion uses the word prathayati, when there is no real prathana (increase) ’ ? To this question an objection 18 raised: ‘To which prathana does this “ question refer P—(1) to the prathana of the cake that forms the object “of the Injunction, or (2) to the prathana of the master of the sacrifice, “mentioned in the Arthavada? In both cases, the question is not “quite proper; because, (1) as for the prathana of the cake, inasmuch ‹ 28 it is directly enjoined, there can be no question with regard to it; “and secondly, the question could not be taken as referring to the ““orathana of the cake; because the reply that the Bhdshya gives to “the question is that—‘ the existence of the prathana 18 pointed out by “ the mantra itself’ ; while as a matter of fact, we find that the prathana ‘of the cake is not so pointed out,—it being an entity in itself; and as “such the reply would be altogether irrelevant. (2) If again the question “be taken as referring to the prathana in the Arthavada—the question being “just like the question with regard to the Arthavada (‘ He wept ’)—‘ How ‘“‘ when there is no actual weeping, &c., doc.’ P—in that case too, the reply that ८ 18 given would be totally incoherent ; because the mantra being employed “by the Adhvaryu priest in the prathana of the cake, the prathana is dis- “tinctly found to be connected with the cake, and not with the master of ..“‘the sacrifice. Therefore the passage containing the question cannot be “accepted as a part of the Bhdshya and must be regarded as an inter- *‘ polation.” But as a matter of fact whichsoever of the two alternatives be accepted, there 18 no incoherence in the question. (1) Granted that the prathana questioned about is that of the cake; we find that the procedure adop- ted by some sacrificers is that they employ the mantra in describing the cake, after ४८ has been enlarged ; and it 18 one of these sacrificers that puts the question from his own standpoiunt—‘ how is it that one enlarges the cake with the manira, before the enlargement has been accomplished’? And the answer that 18 given half admits the contention,—it being, that ‘on 96 TANIRA-VARTIKA. ADH.—PADA (11--+1011), TV. account of its being pointed out by the mantra’: that is to say, inasmuch as the enlargement, being an already accomplished fact, could not be per- formed with the mantra, all that the mantra does is to describe it as an accom plished jfact. Or, it may be that in the case of all objects, the operations of the Prompter are always preceded by those of the Prompted ; and the same must be the case with words also. So in the case in question, the enlargement has been said to be enjoined, for the sake of the accomplishment of the object of the Praise. ८ @ this, the following question is raised: ‘“‘ No such Injunction is ^ possible ; because there can be no object of Injunction in this case. If ८८ 6 had any cognition of the action of the Prompter, then alone could “at refer to an Injunction; but as a matter of fact no action of the ‘*Prompted being mentioned, no action of the Prompter can be cognised ; “and hence, as unless the expression ‘should sacrifice’ has been pronounc- “ed, we do not make use of the words, ‘he sacrifices, 80 in the case 211 “ question, so long as the (prompting) words ‘should enlarge’ have no/, “been uttered, we cannot say ‘he enlarges’; nor have we any Injunction-— “either in the form that ‘the cake should be enlarged,’ or that ‘ the “mantra should be employed in its enlargement’; and in the absence of “such an Injunction, the declaration ‘enlarges’ must be regarded at an ‘ absurdity It is this declaration that is justified in the reply given in We Bhashya: ‘on account of its being pointed out by the mantra.’ That is to say, the Injunction is contained in the Brahmana words ‘ he enlarges,’ which contain the opening words of the mantra, that express the action of the prompted (man). Says the Bhdshya—‘ He who utters the words be enlarged enlarges the cake’; and this simply shows that all that the Adhvuryw priest does 18 to fulfil the making of the cake. Though another reply that was possible was that the word can very easily accomplish the functions of the Prompter, even without making any mention of the action of the Prompted, whose activity is taken for granted,—yet the Bhdshya has spoken of the fact of the priority of the mention of this latter, because of the richness of the materials for replying that it had at its command. (2). Or, the question may be taken as referring to the enlargement of the master of the sacrifice,—the sense of the question being that ‘all Praise having some sort of a basis, either in fact, or in mere words, what sort of a basis has the Praise in question got’? And the reply given is that the Praise is based upon what is described in the mantra. The assortion that ‘the AdAvuryu privst addresses the mantra to the Padumawati, Fasc. 1-4 @ 2/ sae see Rg, Paricista Parvan, (‘Text) Fasc. 1-5 @ /6/ each ... ie a Prakrita-Paingalam, Fasc. 1-7 @ /6/ each ina pee sii Prithiviraj Rasa, (‘Text) Part LI, Fasc. 1-65 @ /6/ each sae aa Ditto (English) Part II, Fasc, 1 Ses ae sei Prakrta Laksanam, (Text) Fasc. 1... Paracara Smrti, (Text) Vol. I, Fasc. 1-8; Vol. II, Faso. 1-6; Vol. III Fase. 1-6 @ /6/ each ... ane rae ie । Paragara, Institutes of (English)... oe ae Prabandhacintamani (English) Fasc, 1-3 @ /12/ each ae ५ *Sama Veda Samhit Text) Vols. I, Fasc, 5-10; IJ, 1-6; ITY, 1-7; IV, 1-6; V, 1-8, @ /6/ each Fasc. sre ae Sankhya Sutra Vrtti, (Text) Fasc. 1-4 @ /6/ each see oe Ditto (English) Fasc. 1-3 @ /12/ each _..., sis Sraddha Kriya Kanumudi, Fase 1-3 . swe eae rr Sucrnuta Samhita, (Kng.) 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Bat Varsa Krya Kaumudi, Fasc. 1-6 @ /6/ ve “ae *Veyun Purana, (Text) Vol. I, Fasc. 2-6; Vol. LI, Fase. 1-7, @ /6/ each ose ne Vidhano Parigata, Fasc. 1-2 oe wee Visnu Smrti, (Text) Fase. 1-2 @ /6/ each 1 ५८६ त Vivadaratnakara, (Text) Fase. 1-7 @ /6/ each ... oe प 17111 ४1118 Purana, (Text) Fasc. 1-6 @ /6/ 6 ८ Vrhat Svayambhu Purana, Fasc. 1-6 se sits प Tibetan Series Pag-Sam Thi S’‘1n, Fasc. 1-4 @ 1/ each nek Sher-Phyin, Vol. I, Fasc. 1-5; Vol. II, Fase. 1-3; Vol. III, Fase. 1-5 ८ 1iAfjeach .., Rtogs brjod dpayg hkkbri 38/19 (Tib. & Sans.) Vol. J, Fasc. 1-6; Vol. II Kase. 1-5 @ 1/ each ... idle ‘ Arabic and Persian Series ?Alamgirnamah, with Index, (Text) Fase. 1-13 @ /6/ each... ५५७ Al-Mugaddasi (English) Vol. I, Faac. 1-3 i12/ व क Ain-i-Akbari, (Text) Fasc, 1-22 @ 1 / each . 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Books are supplied by V.-P.P. a MANTRAS. 97 cake’ does not refer to the actual enlargement of the cr ; but what it means is simply that the priest addresses the cake—‘ May 4 master of ila r sacrifice become magnificent.’ The particle ‘it:’ afte prathasva ” t yused in the sense of etcetera, and not as pointing to ’ ४ word ‘prathasva.’ The sentence—‘ He who says become १८११4 le, 0.9 means that ‘He who says may your sade ih enlarged’; the »,paning Xe the sentence thus comes to be thats" on €who says ‘uy the .scrificer ¢ (ome maynificent thereby actully r,, 4% hi magnifi¢ent *,—this meaning एल्चण्ड got at by means of indirect J+ ngurat ve) indication. Or, the word ‘prathayatt’ may be explained in its direct original ‘ sense of ‘speaks of the enlargement ‡ and thus it 18 upom this mention of enlurgement that {<,,Praise may be said to be based. Sutra (44). The Assumption is not incSmpStible. It has been urged (under Sdtra 32) that the utterance of the mantra can have only a transcendental result. And for one who holds this view, it would be necessary to assume an altogether different transcendental result, that would follow from the particular order of the words in the mantra ; and inasmuch as we could also assume such a result to follow from the particular signification of the muntru there can 16 no incongruity in this assumption. The same reasoning applies to the argument based (11 the same ७ ४८१८) upon the fact of only certain sentences being recognised as mantra (as apart fiom other sentences having the same meaning). That is to say, even though there are other means of expressing the same meaning, it 18 only the particular form of a sentence that 18 recognised as a mantra. Yet the leaving off of the other menns, (and the employment of the par- ticular mantra) could be assumed to bring about a definite transcendental result. And hence it is established that the mantras are meant to convey a certain meaning. Sutra (45). In reference to the directions (relating to the mantras), there can be no objection based upon the reproach attaching to the action (of signification); because it serves the purpose of purification. It has been urged under 82८72 33 that, in the case of the sentence— ' Agnid agnid viharét ’—theie can be no significance of the mantra, because in that case it would expiess only what is expressed in the direction, which would be absurd; and that for this reason, the action of signification (with regard to the mantra) cannot be admisible. But this objection is not applicable ; because the direction in question serves the purposes of purification. That is to say, though the significa- 13 98 TAYARA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1--110/ LI—ADHI. ty. tion of the mawitra is duly comprehended at the time that it is studied yet, inasmuh, ag the idea obtained at that time is not capable of continuing in the man's’ mind, till the time when he is going to perform a certain sacrifice, 1४.06, "168 necessary for him to recall what has been learnt before and what ‘the ५ yuion does is to point out that the mantra alone is to be employed as tho +; 6825 for recalling that idea Or, we ma- explain † -€ clause ‘ shus, ¢ cuatvat’ in the following manne. If, the comprehension of the mantra had! ‘sed permanent, there would Be no room for any directions ; in tl.e case in question however, it is only ‘a slight impression of the former comprehension that remains in the mind and as such there js an occasion for a full manifestatic pf this impression, by means of the | ‘a produced by the said direct ; and hence the mantia caunot be rex, fd as meaningless. $ ९८६१०८८ (46), The significant mantra is an Arthavada. The sentence ‘ four horns, &c.,’ serves, through a Metaphor, ६७ eulogise the sacrifice; and as such serves the purpose of encouraging the sacrificer at the time of the performance. Lhe mantru is employed in reyafd to the Butter, of the Hotr priest, In connection with the Vishuvat Homa; and inasmuch as (1) this Homa is related to Agni, and (2) the Day has the Sun for its Deity—it is Agni that is praised in the shape of the Sun. 41108 then the “four horns” refer to the four parts of the Day ; the “three feet” to the three seasons, Winter, Summer, and the Rains; “ two heads =the two half-yearly periods ; ^ seven hands ” is meant as ४ praise for the seven horses of the Sun ; “ thrice bound ” refers to the three offering- times (morning, midday, and evening); ‘Bull (vrshabha)’”’ serves to eulogise the Sun as the cause of rain (०४८४) 5 ‘cries (roruviti)”’ refers to thunder; and the Sun, being known to all the world is spoken of as ‘the Grea‘: God, who entered into all living beings’’; and the meaning of this 18 that in serving the purpose of encouraging men He entered into their hearts. In tluit way then, the mantra is found to serve the purpose of revall- ing certain means of accomplishing a certain Dharma. Sutra (47). On account of the expression being figurative there would be no contradiction. It has been urged under ७४/7४ 36, that in such mantras as ‘ Aditi is Heaven,’ we find a certain contradiction of facts. 1३१४ the fact is that the sentence does not actually mean that Aditi is Heaven itself; all that is meant by it is the mention of Aditi; and the attribution of several proper- ties to this Aditi is with a view to the praise of that deity ; and the rela- MANTRAS. 99 tionship of the two may be explained through figurative inte: pretation ; just as in the case of the Adhikarana on ‘Audumbara.’ (Adh. I, Pada iii). Sutra (48). The fact of (the learning of the meaning of mantras) not being mentioned in the sentence laying down the study of the Veda is due to the fact of (such knowledge) not having any connection (with the actual performance of sacrifices). ` Though the 1dea comhbated in this Sdéra has not been bronght forward in the Purvapaksha, yet..inasmuch as it is quite possible that it may be brought forward, the Swiya offers an explanation ‘of it. If, at the time of the study of the Veda..the mention of the meaning were of any use, then it would certainly In islebeen mentioned in the Injunction; but as 8 matter of fact, such 18 not the case; as it bears no connection with the actual perform- ance of sacrifices, And as for the getting up of the meanings (in the same way as the text is got up), this is not enjoined, because, the ascertain- ing of the meaning of a mantra, being hke the ordinary acts of wash- ing, &c., is a much easier affair than the getting up of the mantra itself. Sutra (49). Moreover, there is an ignorance of really existing (meanings). It has been urged under Sitra 38, that the meaning of some mantras cannot be made out. But this is scarcely true ; because as a matter of fact, there is always a certain meaning present; and it is only when there 18 a certain discrepancy in the understanding of the man that he fails to com- prehend it. The means of getting at the meanings of mantras are the following : (1) The use of the mantra, (2) the Context, (3) the particular hymn in which it occurs; (4) the Deity to whom it refers, (5) the Ashe who propounded it, (6) such explanatory works as Nigama, Nirukta, Vya@karana, and the 11166. And the only reason why all these are kept up is that they help us in get- ting at the true meanings of mantras. And just as in the case of Grammar, as it always refers to well known words, such agencies as those of ‘delesion,’ ‘ modification,’ d&c., are brought in only as means to an end (the explanation of already existing forms of words); and yet ignorant people think that Grammar creates new words by these means ;—so in the same manner, in the case in question, in the matter of the comprehension of the meaning of eternal sentences (composing the mantras), the mention of the names of the fshis who propounded them,—though appearing to deprive the mantra of its eternal character—only serves as the means of getting at their real meanings. Then again, (1) we find that, while explaining a certain sentence, people often adopt the plan of speaking of the words as intelligent beings, and then 100 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1—-PADA II—ADRHI. IV. attributing to them certain functions of signification,—as when they say ‘this word says this while that word says something else’ and so forth; (2) and also when explaining a discussion, the two opponents are only assumed for the sake of a clear exposition of the two sides of the question; exactly of the same kind is the assumption that a certain mantra was propounded by such and such a 50 Or, 1४ may be that the १५८११८०१ were actually uttered by these Rshze ; but that does not mean either that they were compose! by them, or that they were not known to other people and were bronght out by them but the fact is that, just as even now-a-days whts a man wishes to say something, in order to strengthen his assertion, he at” 5 some old saying or verse instend of expressing the sume idea in his w xvords,—so in the same manner, in tle case in question, Bhrgn and other Rshis learned in the Vedas and having their minds fully saturated with Vedic sayings, quoted certain significant muntras, with a view to express their own thoughts, in their ordinary parlance, instead of framing their own sentences ; and it is owing to this that at present we come to take the mantras as inseparable from such meanings (as were expressed secondhand by these mantras) ; and it is thus that they come to be connected with non- eternal facts, &c.; and the recalling > the name of the Rshi is only with a view to show that the idea expressed is supported by authority. In connection with this, people relate a story to the effect that a certain 29141, Bhitanga by name, in order to conquer old age and death, addressed the Hynns ‘ Srnyéva, &c.,’ to the Agwins ; and as towards the close of the Hymn, we find the words ‘ Bhitingo Gwindh Kamamapra,’ this shows that the Hymn was addressed by the Rshi Bhitanca to the Agwins. And as for the words themselves, ^° Sruz’’=those that are driven by the Srnz or the goad,—viz.: elephants; the broad ‘a’ (in Sriny&) is a Vedic form of the dual; ‘jarbhari ’=having all the right parts of the body engaged in striking ; ‘¢urphart’=killing; ‘naitdshan’=fighting; or ‘ turphart naita- shan” =striking and killing like fighting soldiers; ‘ parpharika’ =bril- liant ones ; ‘udanyatth’ =the cataka birds born during the rains ; ‘7@manaw’ = having plenty of water (jémana, which has the possessive force) ; and the sense is that, just as these birds are intoxicated on obtaining water, so in the same manner, these are ‘ madéra ’=intoxicated ; and may these two make one ‘jardiyu mardyu ;' ४.९.) free from old age and death. Thus the purport of the whole seutence comes to be this: ‘The Acwins—who strike at their enemies and kill them, as if they were two elephants urged by the goad,—and though thus striking, they shine with beneficence; and being intoxicated with wine, just as the cataka birds are with water,—may {11686 Ag¢wins free me from old age and death !’ The Hymn beginning with ‘ Amyak sdtah’ proceeded from the Rshi MANTRAS. 101 Agastya; and he addressed it to Indra, with a view to obtain the wenlth of immortality ; hence it 18 that in the following verse, we find the asser- tion—‘ May you, Indra, give us that wealth.’ And itis in the light of this sentence that the verse in question should be taken. The verse, then, is found in the Hymn addressed to the Maruts, recited on the second day of the Chandomat ; and the word ‘ amyak ’=companion, being formed from the indeclinable ‘ama,’ (the same that 18 found in the word ‘ amdatya’); hence ‘amyaksd’=ama (saha) ancutt, i.e., that which lives together; ‘ Rshtz’ =a weapon thrown by the hand ; ‘asmé’=for us; ‘ sanémi’=ancient; ‘abhram’=water, the Maruts; ‘gunanti’=aprinkle; ‘ agnigcit’ brings for- ward asimile; ‘atus®@’=dry grass; ‘ gugukvan’=burnt; and ‘ just as the water gets at the island, so do you get at the foodstuffs.’ When taking the sentence as a whole, the first word-is to be taken with the third, and the second with the fourth ; and the prononn ‘sa’ implies n corresponding ^ yat,’ in the third foot of the verse ; the meaning being that ‘ that which appears like Fire among dry grass, such a weapon of yours, your constant companion, extremely dear to you, has become onrs, through your kindness; and those that sprinkle water in the form of rain, and hold all foodstuffs, as the water holds the island, these, being your dear friends, have become ours ; and thus having become like us please impart to us your immortality.’ The Hymn ‘ £kuyd, &., 18 also addressed to Indra, the meaning being— by a single effort, 2.8.) all at once, Indra drank, the ‘ sarfnsi’==the vessels filled with Soma; ‘ Kanuka’=desirous, the word being a Vedic modification of the word ‘ Kdmuka,’ while the broad ^ क ' indicates the particular case- termination; or the word ‘Kdnuka’ may be taken as synonymous with ‘ Kantakani,’ &., that have been mentioned in the Nirukta as synonymous with it. Thus then in the case of all mantras, it being found to be quite possible for learned people to get at their meanings even though they may not be generally known, yet there is nothing incongruvus in the acceptance of these meanings in the Veda. And as such the fact of mantras having certain definite meanings cannot be denied. Sutret (50). The presence of the mention of transient things has already been explained. That is, under the Satra 1-1-31. The Master of the Sacrifices is always the petitioner, and Indra the person appealed to; and as for the word ‘ Kikata,’ though it is the name of a country, yet this country is not transient; or the word may be taken as synonymous with ‘ Krpandth’ (Misers) thnt exist among all people. = ^^ Pramaganda” is the name of the usurer; be- cause such a one gives awny in the hopes of getting back more in return (which is signified by the parts of the word ‘ pramaganda’), ‘' Nicdcak- 102 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADM. I—PADA II-—ADHI. Iv. hah’ =the impotent man; and the wealth that belongs to him is “ Naiea- gakha"; and ‘as this wealth is of use in sacrifices, while they themselves do not perform any, therefore plense make over all that wealth to me.’ The rest is clear enough. Sutra (61). The teaching through expressive power shows that the mantra has the same meaning. In the sentence ‘ Agnéyydgnimupatishthaté,’ the fact of the word ‘Agnéyt’ pointing out Agni to be its Deity, through the indicative power of the word, distinctly shows that the mantra itself is capable of pointing to Agni. That is to say, the nominal affix in ‘dgn2yi’ is one that 18 possible only when the compound means ‘that whereof the Deity is Agni;’ and again it is a well recognised fact that that object (or Deity) which is directly pointed out by the mantra, is its own Deity ; and the fact of the mantra belonging to any particular Deity cannot be established by the mere mention of the name of that Deity, in the mantra; for instance in a mantra that is well known to belong to a single Deity, even though the names of many Deities may be present, yet that does not make the mantra pertain to these deities, And we cannot ascertain which Deity is directly expressed by the mantra, unless this latter be admitted to have a certain signification; and hence also the mantras cannot be absolutely meaningless. Sutra (62). 80 also 18 the Uha. As for au instance of wha, in the case of the sentence ‘the Mother grows not,’—as the growing of the age and fatness, &c., of the body of the mother is an apparent fact, it cannot be rightly denied; and hence, m accordance with the rule laid down under S#tra ILI—i—18, it is concluded that the denial of growth refers to the Word. But in case of the word, there can be no such growth as fattening, &c.; consequently the word ‘growth’ is taken in the general sense of ‘ more material ;’ and accordingly the denial is concluded to be that of the Dual and Plural numbers of the word. And such a denial is possible only when the sentence in question has a meaning, which points to the possibility of the mother, &c., of all animals being taken up, as also to the cognition of the presence 07 the ‘growth’ of other words. Though in the case of the Mother, Father, c&c., these words being relative terms, and thereby pointing to their relatives, the difference among them would be established by the difference ainong their respective relatives themselves, and as such there can be no #ha in this case ;— yet, inasmuch as it is a well recognised fact that there can be no wha in a case which is amenable to a definite law, while there is-an ¢ha in cases not MANTRAS. 103 amenable to any law, it is clear that in the case in question, a certain meaning must have been desired to be conveyed by the sentence. For otherwise, all the particular transcendental results would follow from the same word without its being in any way modified. So also the sentence—' tvam hi agné prathamé manoia, &c.,’ shows that though the animal may be dedicated to another Deity, the Manot@ hymn to be employed must be that which is sacred to Agni; and this meaning of the sentence would be possible only when the hymus sacred to other Deities —Vayu for instance—could be pointed out by Jha. So also in the sentences ‘usrdndm méshanam, &c.,’ the mention of the various animals—which are really pointed out by Jha only—could not but have been with a desire to convey a definite meaning. Otherwise, there would be two distinct transcendental results—one following from the rejec- tion of the original word, and another from the assumption of another. Sutra (53). 80 also are the Injunctive words. In the Brahmanas we find certain Injunctions, which very often make mention of the parts of certain mantras by means of synonymous words ; and this also shows that the mantras express a definite meaning. For if they liad no meanings, such Injunctions wonld be absolutely meaningless. For these reasons it must be admitted that the mantras are always used with a desire to convey a definite meaning. Thus ends the Second Pada of Adhydya I. PADA 1. TREATING OF THE SmMRrTIB. ne 0--~----* ADHIKARANA (1). Authority of the Smrtis. Sutra (1), “Dharma being based upon the Veda, all that is not Veda is to be disregarded.” We have already established the usefulness, with regard to Dharma, of the Veda, consisting of Vidhis (direct Injunctions) Arthavddas (vale- dicts passages), and mantras. We now proceed to consider the case of the Smrtis, of whose meaning and limits we are fully cognisant, as com- posed by such human authors as Mann and the rest,—and also the case of established Usages, not socompiled. And as there can be no discussion with- out a concrete example, we take up the Smrtis relating to the “ Ashtakd,”’ which is mentioned in the works of Manu and others ; and upon this we pro- ceed with the consideration of their authoritativeness or otherwise (with re- gard to Dharma). Note.~--The propriety of introducing this discussion here is explained in various ways: (1) We can form no idea of the authority of the Veda, until we have fully understood it in all its bearings; and as it is only by the help of the Smpytis and established Usage that it can be so understood, it is only right that the nature of these should be investigated. (2) Finding Smrtis and Usage to serve as authorities for Dharma, we might take exception to the conclusion arrived at, under Sitra 2, Pada I, that the Veda is the sole authority for Dharma; and in order to guard against this, it is to be shown that these are also based upon the Veda from which alone they derive their authority. (3) The subject-matter of this Philosophy has been declared to be the “ Inventigation of the nature of Dharma;” and after the authority for Dharma, in the shape of the Veda has been fully dealt with, it is only right that the nature of its other authorities should be considered. The consideration of the Smrtts precedes that of the ^" Namadhéya’’ (which is a portion of the Veda) because the latter do not in any way affect the former, though the former do at times help in the fall comprehension of the latter. . AUTHORITY OF SMRTIS.. 105 The reasons for doubt as tothe authoritativeness or otherwise of these are thus explained: Inasmuch as these Smrtis are dependent (upon human authors), we conclude that their authority is not self-sufficient ; and as for the absolute falsity (or untrustworthiness), this is set aside by the firmness (of popular acceptance and trust in them). To explain—The Smrytis of Manu and others are dependent upon their memory ; and memory depends for its authority upon the truthfulness of its source; consequently the au- thority of not a single Smriz can be held to be self-sufficient, like that of the Veda. And inasmuch as we find them accepted, as authoritative, by an unbroken line of respectable people learned in the Vedas, we cannot con- clude them to be absolutely false either. And hence, it is only natural, that there should be a doubt on the point. On this question then, we have the following :— PORVAPAKSHA. ‘The authority of the Smrizs cannot be accepted ; because it is only (८ the cognition of some previous cognition that is called Smrti or Remem- (° 0181106 ; and hence we can never consider it true, in the absence of such previous cognition. ‘lo explain further: As a matter of ordinary experience, we find “that all remembrances appear with reference to objects that have been ९८ previously cognised by Sense-perception, or some other means of cogni- ‘tion, and being always similar to this previous cognition, strengthen ` “the idea of the object cognised. Now, we have already proved (in the “ Tarkapadda) that Sense-perception and the other means of right notion ‘“do not apply to the notion of the capability of such actions as the ‘‘Ashtaka and the lke, to bring about superphysical results, like ‘“ Heaven, &c. “As for Verbal Authority too, though we find such authority (in “the Veda) for the Agnthotra, &c., we cannot find any texts in support of “the Ashtakd ; and as for the assumption of a Verbal Authority, inasmuch ‘‘as the object 18 not cognised by Sense-perception, such an assump- ‘tion would be a remote (and a far more complicated) operation than “the assumption of a Dharma, without any such authority. To explain “ further : Sense-perception is the only means of knowing such texts; and “if even when not so known, such an authority be assumed,—it would be ‘‘ far more reasonable to assume a Dharma, without any authority at all. ‘Nor can Inference help us in the assumption of a Direct Vedic In- “junction for the Ashtaka; because. Remembrance is not invariably con- “ 00010819 with such Direct Injunction ; nor do we know of anything else “that (being so concomitant) could lead to the Inference thereof. Just ८५ &8 there is no inferential mark to prove the existence of Dharma (as has 14 106 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I-~PADA III.——ADHI, I. “been explained in the Tarkapdda, Ch. on Inference), so, for the same rea- ८८ sons, we cannot have an Inference leading us to any Vedic texts with re- “ gard to the Ashiaka. ‘‘ Nor can we get at such Vedic texts by means of Verbal Authority— “either eternal or produced; because we can have no confidence in any ५ newly produced Verbal Assertion; and as for an eternal assertion, no “such is possible (with regard to the Smrtt, which 18 itself not eternal). ‘Though such texts, being amenable to Auditory perception, may be “capable of having their existence supported by human assertions, yet, ‘‘ inasmuch as human assertions are found to abound in deception, we can- ५५ not have any confidence in them; and as such cannot admit of the texts, ५८ 01 the sole authority of these. Even at the present day, we find many ५५ neople declaring certain facts to be supported by the Scriptures, though “asa matter of fact, there 1s no such support. «८ Consequently people who have often been put into trouble by deceit- “ful people naturally have grave doubts as to whether Manu actually ५ found a Vedic text laying down the Ashiakd, &,, and hence declared his ८८ Smrti to be based upon the Veda, or that without having found any such ‘text, he only made the declaration, in order to inspire confidence in his “assertions. And the mere fact of there being such a suspicion sets ८ aside the authoritative character of the Smrtts. ‘‘ And as for the Veda itself, this being eternal, can never set about “pointing out a basis for the Smrtis, that have a beginning in time. “The mantra, &c., themselves can never serve as such bases ; because these “are devoid of any direct Injunction; nor can they point to any other ‘reasonable basis, because they have other functions to perform. ‘Nor do we find a total accord amongst the many compilers of the “ Smrtis, themselves ; and hence on the mere strength of human assertions, ५ we cannot accept the Smrtis to be based upon previously cognised Vedic ८८ texts. ‘Nor do we know what sort of Vedic text these authors really came ८ across ; we find that by the Arthavada and other such supplementary texts, ‘many people have been led astray (¢.g., the author of the Kalpasitras, Vide ५ 01. IIT). That is to say, if we were absolutely certain that Manu had ‘actually found Vedic texts in the proper form of Direct Injunctions, then “the said assumption would have been possible; but as a matter of fact, “even at the present day we find many people being led astray, by the ५ Arthavada passages, which have entirely different significations (but are “mistaken as being Direct Injunctions). ^“ And hence we have our suspicions with regard to Manu and others ०९ also. “ And as for the fact of the authority of these being based upon texts AUTHORITY OF sMRTIS. 107 ‘‘ contained in such portions of the Veda as have been Jost to us, such on “assumption would be like a case meant to be supported by the evidence “ of a person that is dead; and if such an assumption were accepted, people “would be assuming such an authority for anything that they liked. ५८ For these reasons we conclude that Vedic support for the Ashtaka is * not cognisable by Verbal Authority. ‘‘ As for Analogy, it can have no application in the case of an object “that has never been perceived, and an object similar to which has never ‹ been recognised ; and as such, it cannot be the means of cognising a Vedic “ support for the Ashtaka. Though Apparent Inconsistency might be held to give an idea of such ‘‘ Vedic support, yet such Inconsistency could be equally urged in support “of the untrustworthy character of the Smrtis; inasmuch as mistakes “aro not impossible. If the Smrtis (Remembrances) were not possible “without an assumption of the Veda, then alone could they be accepted as “having a right basis (through Apparent Inconsistency) ; but as a matter ‘of fact, Remembrance is often found to be based upon (such untrust- ‘‘ worthy sources as) Dreams, &c. ; hence finding the ground of the said In- ‘ consistency not absolutely true, either Apparent Inconsistency or Inference ‘cannot be rightly brought forward (as giving rise to an idea of Vedic ०१ support for the Smrtzs). ‘“‘ Thus then such Vedic texts being found to be amenable to Negation “only (४.९. being found to be non-existing), though there may be other ‘‘ sources or supports (for the 6290८15) ) yet inasmuch as we do not find any ९८ such support as we should like to have, we conclude them to be absolutely ८ 02861688 (and devoid of authority). ‘“Says the Bhdshya (in opposition to the above arguments) : ‘ Those ८५ who know a certain action to be fit for being done, how could they declare it ‘* to be ancapable of being done ? And the meaning of this is that those who ०५ kuow a certain action as fit to be done in a certain manner, and as leading “to a particular result,—or (simply) those who know the action as capable “of being performed,—knowing this, how could they, only for deluding us ‘say that it ought not to be done P Though it may be urged that one who «^ declares it as fit to be done may be different from one who declares it to “be unfit,—yet, how is this difference possible ? For, in any case, we have ५8 due comprehension of the Smrfi, only when we know that the pro- ८ pounder knew and remembered it thus (the two factors belonging to “one and the same person), Or, the passage in the Bhashya may be “ (better) explained thus: If Manu and others, knew a certain action (f.1, “the Ashiakd) as not fit for being performed, how could they declare 16 to be (५ fit for being performed, and thereby lead astray the people of the present “day, who have done them no harm ? ’ 108 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA IlI.—ADUI. i. ५ Says the Bhdshya (in reply to this intermediate objection) : Because “of the wmpossibthty of remembrance. The notion (of Ashtaka) that the ८ neople later than Manu have cannot be said to be a Remembrance, because “they have never cognised it before; so, in the case of Manu also, if any ९९ means of recognising it previously were possible, then there could bea “remembrance of it; and not otherwise (but we have already shown that “none of the recognised means of right notion is applicable to the case ; ‘and hence we conclude that no remembrance was possible even for Manu). “(Says the Bhdshya, in answer to the question—‘ Knowing it to “be unfit for being done, how could Manu delude people by declaring the “ Ashtokd ag fit to be performed ?’|—A barren woman may declare that “a certain thing was done by her grandson; and then subsequently recalling “‘ the fact that she had no daughter, she could never believe her former assertion ५५ {0 be true; and to this an objection is raised: ‘ How 28 it that the Bha- ‘‘ shya has left off the Son or the Daughter, and cited the Grandson as an “example ? ' ‘The reason for this is the similarity of positions. That is “to say, Manu stands in the place of the Father, his previous cognition “stands in the place of the Son or the Daughter, and his remembrance ‘stands in the position of the Grandson; henco (the sense of the Instance “is that) just as the woman having thought of the absence of the Daugh- “‘ ter, concludes her remembrance of her grandchild to be a mistake,—so, “in the same manner, Manu could conclude his remembrance (of the ५ nerformability of the Ashktakd@) to be a mistake, when he would find that “it could never be cognisable by Sense-perception or any other means “of right notion (and as such there could be no incongruity in the fact of “his having, under a misconception, laid down the Ashtaka),.’ ‘Says the Bhashya (in answer to the above arguments) : ‘ Just as there “being an unbroken remembrance with regard to the Veda (it is considered “authoritative, so could the same ground be urged in favour of the Smrtis).’ “(And though this argument refers to the Verbal text of the Smrtis, yet “the opponent takes it as applying to an unbroken remembrance of their ९५ subject-matter, and proceeds to reiterate the fact of there being no basis ‘“‘ for them | : ५ {06 case of the Veda is entirely different (from that of the Smrtis) ; it ‘is amenable to direct Sense-perception ; and hence having by its means “° cognised its existence in another person, exactly as one would cognise the “existence of the jar at a certain place, people learn it from him, ‘‘and then remember it: and others cognising it as thus remembered, “get 1४ up in their turn, and give it to others, who go on doing the same; ‘‘and so the process has gone on eternally; and as the remembrance “of every individual is preceded by a rightful cognition of it, there is ^“ 00 want of proper basis in this case. All that is solely dependent upon AUTHORITY OF SMRTIS. 109 १ the usage of experienced people, is the fact that the texts thus learnt and “remembered are named Veda; but even prior to the recognition of the “name, people directly perceive it to be something entirely different in “character from other things, and (in the case of a particular Veda as “being learnt by a particular student) different from the other Vedas, ९५ [0 the form of the Rgveda (for instance) as consisting of mantras and ° Brahmanas different from all other things. The names of all these are “‘ eternal ; and by means of these, whenever, subsequently, they come to be ‘‘cognised, they are cognised by direct Sense-perception, as we have “already proved. “In the case of the Ashtaka, on the other hand, even when it is “seen as being performed by another person, and this performance ५ 18 cognised by Direct Sense-perception), there is no such basis for ‘“‘any idea of its having a causal potentiality (in leading the performer “ 0 Heaven), like the action of the potter (which is actually seen to ‘result in the ready made jar). If it be the mere form of the Ashtaka “that was remembered by Manu, then other people would also have re- ‘membered it, on having seen it with their eyes, like the ordinary action ५ of cooking, as being performed by others. But it 18 the causal potentiality “of the Ashtaka towards leading the agent to Heaven, that is said to be ‘‘ remembered (and 1s Jaid down as such) by Manu ; but no such capability ‘(of proceeding to Heaven) is seen to appear in another person (by ‘the performance of the Ashtakd) ; and as such we conclude the traditional “assertion of such causal potentiality of the Ashtiaka to be like the ‘description of a certain colour handed down by one blind person ८ {० another. “Such a rude simile has been brought forward, because people are “impudent enough to attribute Veda-like eternality to all such asser- ‘tions, on the ground of an assumed eternality of usage. Though as a “matter of fact, in the Veda, we have an eternality of faithfulness and ‘‘authoritativeness; while, in the case in question, we have an eternality of “falsity and inauthoritativeness. Specially because (in the case of the ‘description handed down by the blind man) the person that had the idea ‘‘in the first instance did not himself see the colour; and no authority ‘can attach to that which is not cognised by one’s own self independently. ‘Exactly similar is the case with the remembrance of the Ashlaka. “That is to say, we do not find any Vedic Injunction on which it is “based; nor can any such Injunction be inferred, when it has not had “any of its relations cognised (by Sense-perception). If the Smritie ‘had been invariably propounded, on the basis of certain Vedic Injunctions “that had been found (by the Authors), then such Injunctions would ““ 9180 have been handed down to us,—exactly as the subject-matter is said 110 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I——PADA III.—ADHI. I. “to be (by means of the Smrtis)—being pointed out as the source ‘from which Manu and others got their compilations. ५ [४ may be urged that the people of old were fully satisfied with re- ‘“‘membering the sense, and having thus neglected the original text, this “became lost through negligence. But this is not right; because it 18 not ‘possible that people should forget that upon which rests the authority ‘‘of the sense; as the remembrance of the sense has no self-sufficient ‘authority (like the Veda). All men are cognisant of the fact, that in "° such cases, nothing can be accepted as authoritative, until its source is ‘found in the Veda; how, then, could they forget it so completely ? “Then again, how is it that Manu and others did not make the ९८ 88716 efforts to hand down the original Vedic Injunctions, as they did ‘in propounding their own compilations P If even those Authors only ‘‘knew the sense, and had not found the original Veda, then we could ‘‘put the above question to their predecessors ; and thus the tradition “being found, at each step, to be without a basis (in the Veda), you would ०८ 1100 become free from the charge of your 611114४5 being absolutely baseless. “Tf it be assumed that they have a basis in the portions of the Veda, “that have become lost, then the authority of the Smrtis of the Bauddhas ‘‘could also be established, by means of a similar assumption. And people “would be utilising the authority of such assumed Vedic texts now lost, ‘“‘in support of anything they might wish to assert. ‘“Tf on the other hand, the Ashtakd had its authority in the Veda ८ 98 we have it, then other people could also find it, just as Manu may be “said to bave done; and it would, in that case, be a more proper course “to learn such facts directly from the Veda ; and as such, the compilation ५ 0 the Smrtis would be absolutely useless (if all that is said in the ‘‘ Smrtis were to be found by us in the Veda itself). ‘Nor do we exactly know the nature of the Vedic passage that Manu ‘“ found as his authority (for the Ashtakad),—whether it was in the form of ‘“‘a, direct Injunction (and as such possessed of inhorent absolute autho- “ rity), orin that of a mere Arthavdda (and as such of doubtful authority). ‘‘ And, as a matter of fact, we find that, in the dark, however much a “person may try with his hand, he can never distinguish white or black ‘(which could be done by the eye alone; and in the same manner the ‘‘ fact of the Ashtakd being enjoined in the Veda cannot be accepted प. ५‹ 1688 we actually find the Vedic Injunction in support of it). Nor can we ५ 06 convinced of its being based upon the Veda, by the declarations of ‘‘ Manu himself (as that ‘the whole Veda is the source of Dharma’ and so forth) ; because 16 is just possible that he never found any Vedic texts, “and made these declarations, simply with a view to delude the people. ५ For these reasons, we conclude that the Smrtis are not authoritat ive.” 111 SIDDHANTA. Sutra (2). But on account of the agent being the same, the fact could be established by reasoning (Anumfna). As a matter of fact, we find that the Smrtis have been compiled by Manu and others in a correct manner, unlike the compilations of the (Bauddhas), and also that the fourteen Sciences ( Purana, &c.), similarly compiled, give very correct explanations of their respective subjects. Consequently, inas- much as these Authors themselves are not to be met with now (and what they say is well said and as such cannot be without some sound basis), it becomes necessary to assume a certain unseen basis for their cognitions. And in this connection, only five assumptions are possible :—(1) that they were totally mistaken ; (2) that what they assert is based upon their per- - sonal observation and experience ; (3) that they learnt it from other persons; (4) that they have wilfully made wrong statements, with a view to delude the people; and (5) the last and the most simple and reasonable one, that their assertions are based upon Direct Vedic Injunctions. This last is the most reasonable assumption, as it is this alone that is in keeping with actual facts (viz.: the authoritative character of the asser- tions of Manu). That is to say, when it becomes necessary to make assump- tions of the unseen, we must try, as far as possible, to make only such as- Sumptions as are not contrary to directly perceptible facts, and do not, in their turn, necessitate the assumption of other unseen facts. Now, then (1) if we assume the fact of Manu being totally mis- taken in the assertions he has made, this assumption would be contrary to the directly perceptible fact of his works being excellent compilations (and containing many correct and excellent teachings, &९.) ; and it would also tend to set aside the universally accepted authoritative character of his assertions ; and this assumption would also necessitate many other gratui- tous assumptions,—namely: (a) that the people of his own days accepted and followed the mistake propounded by Manu; (®) the means adopted by Manu, in order to prove to others that it is nota mistake, and so forth. (2) In the case of the assumption that the assertions are based upon the compiler’s own personal observation,—(a) in the first place, we have to assume this observation itself ; (b) then we should have toassume an extra- ordinary faculty in the compiler, contrary to all that we know of among the people of the present day (by means of which they could directly perceive such superphysical entities as Dharma and thie rest) ; and the possibility of any such extraordinary faculty, we have already set aside, in course of the refutation of the omniscience (of Buddha, vide Glokavaritka Sutra >, Karikds 134 et seq.) (3) As for the assumption that these assertions are based upon those of 1129 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I-—PADA 17.८6 प्रा, I. other persons, this has already been set aside (in the preceding Siira), as resembling a description of colour handed down by blind men; nor does any such baseless tradition ever attain any authority. (4) Similarly in the case of the assumption that Mann has purposely sought to delude people, we have to assume, in the first place, this fact of his purposely deluding people ; secondly, we have to assume his motive in thus seeking to delude people ; thirdly, the fact of people having fallen into the mistake; fourthly, the fact of the continuation of the mistake up to the present time, and so forth, we shall have to make endless assumptions. Then again, this assumption would mean the denying of the authority of the firm conviction (of the teaching, of Manu being true); and this would be a contradiction of a directly perceptible fact. (5) Therefore it must be admitted that, instead of these, it is far more reasonable to assume a direct Vedic Injunction (upon which the asser- tions of Manu are based). In this case, we have to assume only one unseen fact (the existence of such an Injunction in the Veda); and itis only with this assumption that all other facts of the acceptance of the Smrtis by the great and the learned become reconciled. And in the case of Manu, it is quite possible that there should be Vedic Injunctions that served as the source of his conceptions. It is this that is meant by the Bhdshya passage,— For this reason, it becomes possible for the three higher castes, to be connected with the Veda. In the case of the Mleccha, and others of that class, for whom there is no possibility of any contact with the Veda, when we meet with the assertions of these with regard to supersensuous objects, and we set about investigating the source of these, there is no chance of the Veda ever being found to be their source; and as such we are obliged to seek for their source in one of the aforesaid four sources of misconceptions; and thereby conclude the asser- tions to be absolutely untrustworthy. In the case (of the Brahmana, &c.), where there is every possibility of the Veda supplying the source sought after, all other sources being thereby set aside, there is no chance of the assertions being: baseless; and as such we cannot but admit the source of these to lie in the Veda itself. Then, there is the question—“ How is it that this Vedic Injunction (of the 4517८012) is not found ?” To this, some people make the following reply : ‘Such Vedic Injunc- tions are always to be inferred; they are never directly mentioned ; exactly like those injunctions that are assumed on the strength of the implication of certain mantras (e.g., the mantra ‘I cut the grass, the seat of the gods” is accepted as pointing to the assumed injunction that this mantra should be recited at the cutting of the grass). Though it may be questioned how an injunction that is never uttered can ever be recognised as the requisite AUTHORITY OF SMRTIS. 119 basis,—yet that cannot affect our position; because, the fact of such In- junction being the source is established by an unbroken remembrance, which is as unbroken as the handing down of the Vedic text itself. (That 18 to say Manu also knew of the Ashtaka@ as having been laid down by previous teachers; and as this continued tradition is not otherwise expli- cable, 1t is quite reasonable for us to assume an original Vedic Injunction). Just as in the case of the text of the Veda, it is accepted as existing in its original form, only on the ground of its having been handed down by an unbroken line of teachers,—so too in the case in question, we can establish an unbroken line of such Vedic Injunctions, as are inferred through the (Apparent Inconsistency of the) declaration of the remembrance of the Ash- taka (1.e., by all teachers of the old times, one after the other).’ But this explanation is not quite satisfactory ; because the tradition has wlready been spoken of as resembling the description of colour handed down by blind men. As for the Vedic Injunction that is never uttered, as this can never be cognisable by any means of right notion, it is scarcely possible to prove its existence ; and thereby the Smrtt comes to resemble the grand- child of the barren woman (as urged under the last Sitra). As for the as- sumption of Vedic Injunctions on the strength of the implications of the mantras, these latter are eternal, and as such there is nothing contradictory in their having the eternal potentiality of pointing to the existence of Vedic Injunctions; whereas in the case of the Smrizs, they themselves stand in need of the basic Vedic Injunction, and as snch cannot rightly be made the means of inferring non-uttered injunctions). For these reasous, it would be far more rensonable to assume the Siartis to have their source in the Injunctions contained in such portions of the Veda as have been lost; nor is such disappearance of the Veda impossible, as cven now we fiud the Veda losing much of itself, cither through the negligence or laziness of the students, or through the gradual disappearance of people versed in it. It canuot be urged that any and every theory could declare itself to be based upon such authority; because such lost Vedic texts can be assumed only on the ground that without such texts, the firm conviction and remembrance of highly respectable people of the three higher castes remain inexplicable. Or, we may hold that the Simytis are based upon texts contained in the very portions of the Veda that are available now-a-days. If it ke questioned—how is it that they are not found P—we make the following reply : (1) Because of the various branches of the Veda being scattered ; (2) because of the negligence of the people learning it; and (3) because of the texts being contained in diverse sections of the Veda ;—we fuil to actually lay our hands upon those texts that form the basis of the Smrtis. lo 114 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I——-PADA III——ADII. I. There has been a further question—“ Why then were these Vedic texts themselves not collected together ” ? And the reply to this is that this was not done, for fearing of destroy- ing the natural order of the text of the Veda. It is only a fixed order of the verbal text of the Veda the study of which has been enjoined. And as for the rules of conduct dealt with in the Smrtis, these aro scattered about here and there, in various branches, chapters and sections of the Veda. And of these (as appearing in the Veda), some actions are laid down with direct reference to human agents, while some are such as are Jaid down in connection with the various sacrifices, but are, for some reason or other, explained as referring to the human agent also; as for example, we have such prohibitive injunctions as ‘One should not talk to his wife if she be, &.,” “ One should not threaten a Brahmana.” (These occur in the section on the "^ Darca-Purnamdasu sacri- fice; and as in connection with this sacrifice, it has already been laid down once before that if the sacrificer’s wife happen to be in a certain condition, she is not to be present at the sacrifice, the prohibition of any conversation with her becomes absolutely irrelevant, if taken as applying to the sacrifice; and for this reason it is explained as a general rule of conduct, to be observed in ordinary intercourse. The same is the case with the threatening of the Brahmana). And if Manu went about extracting only such texts (as bear upon the general conduct of men), and teaching these separatcly, then as_ the natural order of the Veda would be disturbed, he would be directly going against the injunction of tho study of the text of the Veda. And on the strength of this example set by Manu, people might leave off the A:tha- vada portions (as useless) and read only the Vidhi portions of the Veda, or only such portions of it as would be of help in the performance of the sacrifices ; and thereby the Veda itself would gradually disappear. Then again, Manu himself could not necessarily have studied all the branches of all the Vedas (and as such he could not always lay his hands upon all Vedic texts). What he must have done was to try and find out the texts from various students of the different branches, and then to have kept in mind the meaning of these texts, which he must have em- bodied in his compilation. Nor can 1४ be reasonably urged (as has been done in the Pirvapaksha) that, ‘we do not quite know whether the texts on which Manu based his rule were in the form of a Direct Injunction, or only in that of Artha- vidas’; because just as the firmness of the conviction in the Smpytz precludes the fact of its being based upon a misconception, so would it ulso preclude the chance of its being based upon an Arthavdda passage. For without doubt Manu was capable of distinguishing a Direct Injunc- AUTHORITY OF SMRTIS. 115 tion from an Arthavddu. And inasmuch as we find the Smrts itself to have the form of Direct Injunction, it could only point to a homogenous Vedic Text, which therefore must be admitted to be of the form of Direct Injunction ; and there can be no grounds for holding the Smryti to have a heterogenous source in an Arthavida. And further, the authors of the Smrtis themselves have completely bound themselves by such declarations as— The whole of the Veda is the root of Dharma,” ^: all of it is mentioned in the Veda,’’ and so forth ; and certainly these assertions could not have been blindly accepted by the people of their own days (without their having fully examined the truthfulness of these assertions, which could have been accepted only after the people had found the base of all that is laid down in the Smrtis, in direct Vedic Injunctions). Hence we conclude that the Smrtis have their authority through the Veda itself. । 80116 people seek to establish by Inference, the self-sufficient authority of the Smrtis, or the fact of their being based upon the Veda, by means of the premiss—‘ because the agent 18 the same.” But their argument becomes too wide, when we refer to such actions as are performed by the same people under the influence of some temporary impulse (which actions too would come to be equally authorised) ; and further, if the Smrtis be held to be proved “ self-authoritative,’’ then such an argument would be directly contradicted by the apparent fact of many SYmrtt Injunctions having their source in Direct Vedic Injunctions that aro easily accessible. For these reasons, we must admit Apparent In- consistency alone, as has been mentioned in the Sitras, as establishing the fact of the Smrtis having their source in the Veda; as there are no in- superable objections to this; and ^^ Apparent Inconsistency ” can also be called “ Anwmdana,” inasmuch as it gives rise to cognition, after or in the wake of —‘ anw’—Sense-perception (mina). Says the Bhashya—Asya ९९८ Smrterdradhimnah kdranam anumdsya- mahé; and this may be explained as—‘ we shall infer the source (of the ॥ The Author hag based his arguments in favonr of the fact of the Smrtis being based upon the Veda, on the Apparent Inconsistency of the facts therein treated of being remembered by an unbroken line of respectable people; and he has explained the expression “ because of the agent being the same” (of the Sutra) as only pointing to the possibility (in the case of the Smrtis of the three higher castes) of their being based upon Direct Vedic Injunctions. He now sets about refuting the view of some commentators who explain the Sitra in the sense of a direct Inferential Argument, seeking to provo, by means of the premiss, the fact of the Smrti either being self- authoritative, or having its source in the Veda; this argument being expanded into the following form: “The Smrtis are authoritative,—because the persons that per- form the acts laid down in them are the same as those that perform those laid down in the Veda,—just as the Veda (is authoritative),’’ and so forth. 116 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—-PADA ILI—-ADHI. I. Snrtt in the Veda) from the firmness (of its conviction and remem- brance)’; or as—‘ we shall infer the source of this firmness (of its convic- tion) (to lie in the Veda).’ Says the Bhdshya—LHEven in this life men are not found to directly per- ceive such facts (as the Ashtaka, &c.) And the sense of this is that inasmuch as the course of our existence is separated from another by a pro- cess of death that destroys all previous impressions, we can never be said to carry (in our present existence) any ideas, gained from direct perception, of certain courses of action leading to certain superphysical results (and as such the Smrtis of Mann, &c., cannot be said to have their source in any direct perception of their Authors). The Bhashya says—Because of the fuct of the performer of the acts laid down in the Smrtis being the same as thut of those enjoined in the Veda, it 25 possible that the three higher classes should have found the (requisite) Vedic texts; and this is said only in order to show that it is possible for a Direct Vedic Injunction to be the source of that contained in the 910} (४. Says the 812574/4- 1८ is possible that they (the Vedic texts) may have been forgotten. ` एला at the present day, we find people forgetting the texts, and the texts becoming lost. = [एला when the requisite texts had existed in other branches of the Veda, it is possible that. (at the time that the (91011८४ was being compiled) it may have been forgotten in which parti- cular branch the particular text was to be found (and this may have been the reason why Manu did not mention the corroborative texts) ; though he only carefully cherished the fact of his assertion being authoritative as based upon the Veda; and as for the direct recognition of such basic text, he did not consider it of much use, and so let it drop off. The Bhashya says that such rules of conduct Caid down in the Smyp- tus) as are laid down to be observed, as occasion for each presents itself— such rules, for instance, as ‘the Teacher is to be respectfully attended upon,’ ‘old men arc to be reverenced,’ and so forth—have their authority based upon their perceptible uses. But this is not quite right; because the standpoint upon which we have started is that the Smytis are an authority in matters relating to Dharma ; and as such it is not quite reasonable to assert their authority to be based upon ordinary perceptible purposes, and thereby make the duties therein laid down, similar to such ordinary acts as the tilling of the ground and the like (which have only १ visible use). We have not taken upon ourselves the task of establishing the authority of all actions ; as it is only the desire to know the nature of Dharma that is our sole purpose. If such actions, as the attending upon the Teacher and the like had ouly visible results, they would be like the ordinary actions of the AUTHORITY OF SMRTIS. 117 world, tilling the ground, §c.; and as such they could not have any authority bearing upon Dharma; and would be entirely irrelevant in the present connection. | It may be said that these have been mentioned as unauthoritative acts (and not as authoritative and as such bearing upon Dharma). But this is not possible ; because in that case they should have been brought forward under the fourth aphorism ^ Hétudargandcca”’ (I—iii—4) (where the un- authoritative portions of the Smyti are pointed out); and in that case, the citing of the example—“ Hence when the good one goes forward, the had one follows him ”’—would be entirely irrelevant and useless (as this is a Vedic passage, and as such cannot rightly be cited as an instance in support of an unauthoritative injunction of the Smréz). Nor again can the injunction ‘the teacher should be attended upon’ he said to have the visible end of propitiating the Teacher who (as the Bhashya says), thus propitiated, would teach well, and explain satisfactorily all the knotty points of the scriptures; because there is no such hard and fast rule as that without obeying the teacher the scriptures cannot be learnt; as we do find the Teacher being induced to teach, by means of requests and remonstrances. And in this les the use of the res- trictive Injunction (that “it is by means of attendance alone that the Teacher should be approached and made to teach”). And as for the fact of the visible use, in the case of all actions (Vedic as well as worldly) we can always point out in the way that the Bh@shya has done, some visible purpose or other, in the shape of acquiring a King’s assistance, protection of one’s self, acquiring of some form of pleasure and the like. As even in tho case of such actions as the “threshing ” of the coin, and the Kariri sacrifice (which arc laid down in the Veda), the fact of their having visible purposes does not make them devoid of Vedic authority. Thus then, even though the aforesaid Smyrti Injunctions serve visible purposes, yet it is quite possible that they may have a basis in the Veda; as for instance, the invisible result that 18 to follow from the restriction of the specified courses of action (as being the only one advised, out of many others leading to the same result) cannot have any other authority (save the Veda, which is the only true authority for superphysical facts). For these reasons, the attending upon the Teacher, §c., being of the uature of a ^ naimittika’’ Injunction (४.९. the Injunction of a course of action to be fullowed on a certain occasion), a non-performance of it would constitute a sin, which would be avoided by the performance of the said action (this 18 one transcendental result) ; and the visible result will be (as pointed out in the Bhdshya) that the Teacher being pleased with the pupil would teach him well; and the effect of the restrictive Injunction (of this particular means of acquiring learning) would be in the shape of an in- 118 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA ITI—ADHI. 1. visible potency that would enable him to finish his course of studies without any obstacles. And it is only when we accept this attendance upon the Teacher to have both visible and invisible results, that the discussion—as to whether such attendance is to be performed only once or over and over again, as propounded in Sz#éra 30, of the second Pada of Adhyaya VI—can he possible. [The conclusion arrived at, in the Adhikarana referred to is that, inasmuch as such attendance has both visible and invisible results, it is to be performed over and over again]; and if the action had only a visible result, there could be no question or doubt as to whether it should be repeated or not; as in that case 1t would be like the action of drinking water ; and asin the case of this latter, people raise no questions, but conclude that the drinking is to be repeated whenever one feels thirsty ; so too in the case of the action of altendance, people would conclude that as it has only a visible result, we may repeatit whenever we may want the particular visible result ; (and as such there could be no doubt on the point, and hence no ground for the aforesaid discussion). Then the assertion of the Bhadshya—that these have their authorita- tiveness based upon the fact of their bringing about perceptible results — must be taken as laying another strong point home to the opponent,— the sense of the argument being this:—yon may succeed perhaps in shaking the authority of such 602८४ Injunctions as have been laid down as leading to transcen- dental results ; but how can the said Injunctions, that are actually found to bring about the results that are mentioned, be said to be unauthorita- tive and false ? Though we do not assume any particular Vedic texts with regard to tho establishing of Assembly Rooms and the founding of water- drinking stations, yet all such philanthropic deeds become included in the Vedic text that enjoins the doing of good to others as a duty; and it 18 from this general Vedic Injunction that such actions derive their authority. (As for the Vedic texts in support of the particular Smrt: Injunc- tions enumerated in the Bhashya we have the following) :—(1) In connec- tion with the fetching of the Ishtakda, it is laid down in the Veda that in the cart the horse 18 to be yoked in front of the ass; and it 18 added “ when the good one goes along, the bad one follows him,” which indicates the neces- sity of the lower (disciple) following (and hence obeying) the greater (Teacher). (2) It is said in praise of a certain deity—“ you are a boon to others, just like the water-drinking station in the desert”; and this praise of the particular institution points tothe advisability of founding such sta- tions for the good of others. (3) Itis laid down in the Smrtis that one should have his Cikha (lock of hair on the head) done up in a definite way, in order to serve as a mark for the particular class of Rshis from whom he is descended. And in this case, the restrictive Injunction as to this particular method to be followed must have a transcendental result; and AUTHORITY OF SMRTIS. 119 hence the authority of this Injunction cannot be held to rest upon the said visible result alone; for certainly, there are many other means by which the particular class of Rshis could be indicated. Consequently, the real purport of the Injunction must be something else. And it is this: in order to regulate the number of “ avattas” (offerings) at sacrifices (which is in accordance with the Gotra of each priest), it is absolutely necessary that the name of the कनक should be distinctly marked; and in this Vedic fact would lie the foundation of the Smrtv Injunction of arranging the Cikha in a definite way ; and as for the restriction of this particular means, as we cannot find out any other reason, we are obliged to assume that this parti- cular method would produce a certain effect upon the man himself. And thus all Smrtis having distinct purposes to serve, thei authoritativeness becomes fully established. Amony the Smptis themselves, such portions as are related to Dharmu or Deliverance have their origin directly in the Veda; while those that have pleasure, &c., in view, are based upon the ordinary experience of the world. This rule also holds good respecting the exhortations contained in the Itihadsas and Puranas. As for stories met with in these, they serve the purposes of the Artha- vada, as explained above. The description of the various parts of the Earth (contained in the Puranas) serve the purpose of pointing out anid distinguishing the places fitted for the performance of Dharma and Adharma, and also for the proper experiencing of the effects of such performances ; and these are based, partly upon the Veda, and partly upon the common experience of the world. The histories of the various families (recounted in the Puranas) serve the purpose of differentiating the people of different. castes, and are based upon Direct Perception and Memory. The descrip- tions of the various measures of space and periods of time, serve the purpose of regulating the ordinary practices of the world, as also the sciences of Astronomy and Astrology ; these are based upon direct per- ception, as also upon inferences deduced from various mathematical thico- ries. The descriptions of the state of things to be in the future (as recounted in the Puranas) serve the purpose of pointing out the nature of the various periods of eternally-revolving time, and also the varievated character of the results of righteous and unrighteous conduct; and these have their origin in the Veda itself. Among the Auxiliary Sciences too, there are certain portions that treat of things that are of use in sacrifices, and these have their origin in the Veda, while other parts treat of such as are useful only in the serving of some visible worldly purpose ; and these have their basis upon ordinary experience. (1) In the Ciksha, the differentiutions of the organs of pronunvia- 120 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA IIIT—ADHI. TI. tion of letters, their accents and time, &c., have their perceptible uses ; while the assertion, that if a sacrifice is performed with a full knowledge of these details, there follows a particular result—eg. ‘If the mantra be recited without correct accents or pronunciation, 1t kills the sacrificer ''- is based upan the Veda. (2) In the case of the Kalpasttras, we have explanations of the real purport of the Injunctions deducible from the rules that are found scatter- cd in the various branches of the Veda, intermixed with Arthavdda, &c. ; and as such these explanations have their origin in these latter. In these we also meet with certain rules of conduct to be followed by the priests; and these are based upon considerations of their convenience; and as such have their origin in ordinary experience. (3) In the case of Vydkarana, the knowledge of correct and incorrect forms of words has a perceptible use, exactly like a knowledge of the differ- ences among trees; and as such, it is based upon direct Sense-peiception ; and the assertion—that the use of correct words fully accomplishes the result of the action performed, while that of incorrect words creates obstaclos in its frnition,—has its origin in the Veda. [(4) The case of Narukta is similar to that of Vydkarana, as it also serves the purpose of regulating the sense in which a word can be correctly employed, and hence this has not been mentioned separately |. (5) As for the science of Chanda, the correct differentiation of the Gadyatrt and other metres, 18 found to be of perceptible use in the Veda as well as in ordinary experience; and as such it is based upon direct perception, while the assertion—that a certain result follows from a sacri- fice when performed with a full knowledge of the metre of the mantra employed—is founded upon the Veda; as for instance, we find the follow- ing declaration in the Veda—‘‘ One who, at his own sacrifice, or at the sacrifice of others, makes use of a mantra or 1 Bradhmana of which he does not know the #&shz, the metre and the deity, &c., &c.”—which men- tions a distinctly undesirable result as following from such conduct. (6) In the case of the Science of Jyautishu, the knowledge of the dates and asterisms, —as computed by means of the various periods of time as divided into regularly revolving cycles, and by a knowledge of the revolutions of the sun and the moon,—is based upon inferences deduced from such mathematical theories as have been handed down from times imme- morial. In this science we also meet with the declaration that certain good and evil results, as following from previous good and bad deeds, are indicated by the good or bad position of the planets at the time of one’s birth; and it also lays down certain expiatory rites to be performed with a view to ameliorate the planetary conditions; and through these rites, the science comes to have its origin in the Veda, AUTHORITY OF SMRTIS. 121 The above remarks apply also to the sciences of Palmistry, Archi- tecture, &c. ; with regard to these two, however, we may assume such direct Injunctions as that ^“ when one comes across such signs in a man’s body, or such marks in the houses, he should take these signs to mean such and such a thing,” &., &c. As for Mimdusd, it is based upon the Veda, upon ordinary experience, and also upon Direct Perception and Inference, &c., based upon these; and it has been reared up by an unbroken line of scientific teachers; no single per- son could ever have been able to compile such vast collections of arguments. The same may be said also of the science of Reasoning. The meaning of Vedic passages is expressed by means of the meanings of words; but in ordinary usage, the denotation of words is found to be mixed up with the several factors of Class (Property, Action, and Name); and these can be directly discriminated, never by themselves, but only by means of Sense- perception and the rest, as distinguished by their respective character- istics, and as put forward by their learned expounders. The Veda itself being scattered over many branches can be rightly ascertained and made to serve its purpose only by these meaus of right notion; consequently, all these should be properly learnt by the help of the science of Reasoning: This has been declared by Manu also, who says: ^ Sense-perception, In- ference, and Verbal Authority, as based upon various scriptures,—these three should be well learnt by one who desires a (knowledge of) pure Dharma” ; and again— He who approaches Dharma by means of Reason- ing, he alone, and none else, understands it’’; and all these point to the necessity of the science of Reasoning. For the most part, now-a-days, people are much more prone to unrighteousness ; and thereby having their intuition blurred by ignorance, they take to evil paths. Consequent- ly (with a view to set these people right), what the science of Reason- ing,—as based upon experience, Arthavdda, the Veda, (direct Injunctions) and the Upanishads,—does is to point out the trend of the misconception and also of the correct conclusion (with regard to a certain point),—then to lay down the arguments in support of both,—and lastly, to arrive at the correct conclusion, after having fully considered the comparative strength of the arguments adduced from both sides. Ifit were not for such systematic argumentations, various arguments would be appearing to people at random, and would be giving rise to all sorts of misconceptions, through sheer ignorance (of the various phases of the question). And (if the correct conclusion were not properly shown, deduced from the proved premisses, and if only the arguments from both sides had been put down) people would be employing their own mistaken judgments in the choosing of the arguments, and in rejecting some and accepting others, without refer- ence to any definite standard. 16 122 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I——PADA III-——ADHI. I. And as for the dogmatically persistent acceptance and expounding of such entities as eternality and noneeternality, oneness and separateness, generality, speciality, distinction, and so forth, these are due to the fact of the impossibility of any definite conclusion being arrived at, unless a certain position is at first dogmatically taken up as the expounder’s own. As all the peculiarities of any object are not capable of being comprehended all at once, the expounder cannot but dogmatically take up each of them separately, in order to bring about a correct discrimination of the various denotations of words as they happen to apply to one or the other of the various factors (of the Class, the Property, the Action, or the Name). Otherwise such people as have not comprehended the arguments in favour of one or the other of the aforesaid factors of Generality, Speciality, and the like, could not, by mere personal observation, ascertain any definite factor of an object, as denoted by a particular word. The glortfications and the villzfications too, as contained in the Arthavada passages, come to be taken as forming parts of specific injunctions and prohibitions, only by means of absolute acceptance of the efernality or non- eternality, the oneness or separateness, of the various objects; and conse- quently, if it were not for the variegated character of objects as dogmati- cally propounded (at first), these glorificutions, &c., would become absolute- ly baseless. (And for these 7608008) the nature of all objects must be fully considered, and as a correct conclusion cannot be arrived at unless each individual theorist puts forth his own arguments in the strongest language possible, each separate system of philosophy has its use). As for the various theories with regard to the fact of the world originating from a contact of Primordial Matter and the Soul, or froma God, or from an atom, and to that of its being continually created and dissolv- ed,—these have all their origin in the ideas given rise to by the mantra and the Arthavdda, and point out the fact of the gross being a modifica- tion of, aud proceeding from, the subiile ; and the use of all this lies in the recognition of the relation of cause and effect, between the sacrifice and its results, the attaining of heaven and the like. The acceptance of creation and dissolution has its use in the proper differentiation of the scopes of Destiny and Personal Effort (and the point- ing out of the fact of Destiny being stronger than Effort) ; as in all cases (f.i. in the case of creation, though there is no Effort) the action is brought about by the sheer force of Destiny (as also in the case of Dissolution, though the efforts of all beings are pointed towards the con- tinuation of the world yet), there is a cessation of the creative process simply because the Destiny of Creation has ceased to operate. And as for the theories of Idenlism, momentary character of the things, denial of the self, &c.—all of which have their origin in the Up- AUTHORITY OF SMRTIS. 123 anishads,—they have been propounded, only with a view to dissuade people from cultivating an excessive affection for the things of the world. Thus then, all the Smrtis, as well as all Auxiliary Soiences, have been proved to be authoritative. In the case of such results as are to fol- low at a distant point of time, no personal experience can be found to serve as its basis; and consequently in all such cases we infer the basis to lie in the Veda itself. While in the cases of directly perceptible results, as in the case of the curing of scorpion-bites by means of incantations, we actually observe it to be true in the case of other people, and thence come to the conclusion that the science of such treatment cannot but be true and authoritative. This discrimination (of the basis lying iu the Veda or in ordinary experience) can always be successfully made. at, im eam em te em 29 धि, te Bw Ome em eS ~~ ew 2 & Fe we = ADHIKARANA (४), The greatest authority rests in direct Vedic declarations. Satra (3). When there is acontradiction between the Sarté and the Cawti, the former is to be disregarded; it is only when there is no such contradiction that we have an assumption of the Vedic text. The authoritativeness of the Smrtt has been established in a general way; and as such authoritativeness belong to all sorts of 8911415, the author now proceeds to lay down exceptions to the general authoritativeness established before, with special reference to the case of such 8011८45 as are found to be directly contradictory to universally-accepted Vedic texts. Whenever there is any such contradiction, the authority of the Smytis is to be totally disregarded; as itis only when there is no such con- tradiction that we have an inference of a Vedic text in support of the particular Qmrizi injunction. The contradiction meant here is that of Vedic declarations, when such declarations do not lend any countenance to (on the other hand directly Jay down the contrary of) the declarations in the Smritz. The present Adhikarana (of the Bhishya) cites such instances of the Smytt as are directly contradictory to direct Vedic Injunctions, and then having considered all the arguments bearing upon the point at issue, comes to the above conclusion. The Doubt, that gives rise to the Adhikarana, is expressed in this form: Is such contradictory Smriti also to be accepted as an authority with regard to Dharma, or is it an exception to the authoritativeness of Smriis in general ? The reasons for suchdoubtarethusexplained: The Smrti contradicting tho Veda, being capable of having this contradiction explained insome way or other, and the authority of the Vedic Injunction assumed as the basis of this Smriz (in accordance with the last Adhikarana) having an authority equal to the direct Vedic Injunction that the 6117८८18 found to contradict, therenatural- ly arises the question,—Is such a Smyli to be accepted as authoritative ? DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 125 or is it to be totally disregarded, on account of such contradiction, not allowing of the application of any one of the two aforesaid reasons to the case of such 67८८6 2 When two notions are found to present two contradictory ideas with regard to one and the same object, they are said to contradict one another; and the question, as to which of the two is to be accepted to the preclusion of another, is decided accord- ing to their comparative strength (or authority). (1) Under such cir- cumstances, when we come to suspect a certain Smrti injunction of being contradictory to a direct Vedic Injunction, it is just possible that the suspected contradiction could be explained and set aside, by show- ing that the two do not exactly refer to the same subject; or even when they do treat of the same subject, as there would be no contradiction, if one could be explained as a General Injunction, and the other as the prohibition of a particular phase of it, the two texts could be accepted side by side; specially as in another case (where the particular prohibi- tion would not be applicable), both of them could be found to be equally applicable, and as such they could both be accepted as optional alter- natives, both equally authoritative; and thus there would be no absolute contradiction between the two texts. And secondly, the idea brought about by the Vedic text assumed in support of the particular Qmrti text boing Vedic in its character, as that produced by a direct Vedic Injunction, and thereby both being equally strong in their authority, both the texts could be accepted as equally authoritative. And consequently, with reference to the particular subject, the authority of tho Smrtt could not be absolutely disregarded. (2) On the other hand, when we find that however much we may try, we are unable either to explain the con- tradictory texts as referring to two distinct subjects, or to accept both of them side by side, as referring to the general and particular aspects of the same subject, or to admit of both as equally authoritative optional alternatives,—we cannot but conclude that the two texts contradict one another entirely. And as for the Vedic text that is assumed or inferred, and that which is directly laid down in the Veda, there is a vast difference in the authority of the two, as much as there is between ordinary Sense-perception and Inference. Consequently, then, there being no chance of both being accepted side by side, we cannot but totally disregard the authority of the Smrtz, im contradis- tinction to the direct Vedic Injunction which has been shown to possess a much higher authority. [These are the two ways of looking at the contradiction ; and both having a show of reasonableness about them, they naturally give rise to a doubt in the mind of the student, and thus give occasion for the present Adhikarana.] On this question then, we have the following :— 126 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA ILI—ADHI. 11. PURVAPAKSHA. ‘“ The conclusion that presents itself at first is in this form: ‘ Even when “there is a contradiction, the authority of the Smriz cannot be denied ; ८५ because if the Smréz be once held to be unauthoritative, it would be a sad en- ‘“‘ croachment upon the limits laid down before (४.९, there would be no per- ५५ manency in the notion of the authoritativeness of Smriis). In matters “relating to the performance of Dharma, we are always able to assert the ‘“ unfeigned authority of such Smrtts as have been found to be based upon “Direct Vedic Injunctions ; and with regard to these all suspicions of their “origin lying in Deception or Illusion have been set aside. If we once “ began to doubt the authority of the Smrtis, upon such grounds as the ८८ Contradiction of Vedic Injunctions, the presence of such reasons for actton as “avarice and the like (as shown in the next Sétra), mutual contradictions “among the Smrtis themselves, and other such like arguments,—then, how “could we ever be able to ascertain whether or not any particular Qmyét ‘is contradicted by any Injunction contained in the Veda; specially as the ५५ $ 6088 have an endless number of rescensions differing from one another ‘in whole chapters, and whose authority is of a variegated character,—being ‘based upon Injunctions by Direct Assertions as well as by Indirect Impli- “cations, and also upon Indirect Transference of relations by means ५ 0 significant names, &c.? Consequently people having their suspicions ९८ 0066 aroused could not come to have any confidence in any Smrtz Injunc- “tion; and this want of confidence would deprive the Smrtz of even the “slightest shade of authority. For if the Smrtt even once happens to “lose hold of its basis in the Veda, and comes to be attributed to its ‘source in the realms of illusion, &c., even Indra himself could not step “in to save it (from total submergence in illusion; and as such the efforts “made in the last Adhikarana to prove that the Smrti is not altogether “based upon Illusion would become useless). When the Smyé is once ‘decided to have its origin in one source (that of the Veda), then 16 is “only right that we should set aside the possibility of any other origin ‘for it (in the shape of Illusion and the like), in order to remove all! doubts ‘as to its authoritative character (and as such in our case the effort to ५५ prove that the Smrtt is not based upon Illusion, &९., becomes useful); but ‘‘this cannot be so, when there is no permanent fixity to the idea that the ५५ Smrtt has its sole basis in the Veda (in which case all the efforts of the “last Adhtkarana become absolutely useless). “And further, if there were no contradictions among the Vedic texts “themselves, then alone could the contradiction of the Veda by the Smrts ‘justify us in seeking for the source of the latter elsewhere (iu the realms “of Illusion, &c.) But as a matter of fact, we often find the Vedic texts DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 127 “themselves laying down contradictory courses of actions, such for in- “stance as the Injunctions—(1) Pours the libation before the Sun has risen, “and (2) ‘ Pours the libuiton when the Sun has risen’; ‘ Holds the Shodagz ५५ wegsels at the 4८110८12, and does not hold the 810400४ vessels at the 4८112८12, ८ and so forth,—where it is absolutely impossible to follow both the courses “laid down. “Under the circumstances, if by chance, a few 67011८४ Injunctions, “based upon certain texts of other Rescensions of the Veda, be found to “lay down certain facts in opposition to those laid down by the particu- “lar Rescension that one may have himself studied,--this mere fact of “their support not being found in what we ourselves may have read, ‘cannot justify us, who base our conduct upon the whole of the Veda “in all its several branches, to absolutely deny the existence of such “corroborative Vedic texts as are distinctly pointed out, by these very “ 81011८2, Injunctions, as having been found and duly studied by other ५५ nersons of bygone ages (Manu, for instance) ; specially as all Vedic texts “are equally authoritative forall men, as we shall show under the Satra.— “ The Veda is not addressed to any one person (ILI—iv—18) ; and also because “the Smytt is as good a means of ascertaining the Vedic texts, as a study “of the Veda itself. “ Therefore, just as you accept the authority of even such Vedic texts “as are mutually contradictory, in the same manner, you should also “accept the authority of the Vedic and Smrti texts, that may be found to ‘contradict one another. “Then again, from what you say, 16 would seem that when there is “no contradiction of the Veda, the Smrt: has its foundation in the Veda; ‘ while, when there is a contradiction, it has its foundation elsewhere (in ‘Tilusion, &e.) ; and certainly this would be a very half-hearted theory. ८८ [ Ardhavaicasa literally means half-killing |. “ Secondly, with a deal of effort it has been proved above (in the last Adhikarana) that the Smrt: has no foundation in anything else (save the “Veda); and to revive the question again, on the mere presence of a “seeming contradiction, 18 an excess that cannot be very well allowed. “ For these reasons, we must conclude that the Smrtt is always based “upon the Veda. For if even the slightest chance of other sources (as “that of THlusion and the like) be introduced, all hope for any authority “of the Smrtt might well be given up. “Then again with regard to the Smrti, in certain cases you would be “ denying the possibility of any such basis as those of Illusion and the like “ (with a view to establish their authority, as has been done in the previous ^“ Adhikarana) ; while in other cases you would be admitting the possibility “of such bases (in order to deny their authoritative character); and such 128 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA IlI—ADHI1. II. “a suicidal process (of reasoning) not being allowable, the denial (of “the authority of even such Smrtis as contradict the Veda) cannot be ‘“eonsidered right. Therefore, whether the Smriis be authoritative or “not, this authoritativeness or its contrary must be accepted as absolute- “ly undisputed; and there can be no half and half authority and absence ‘of authority (exactly as one and the same woman cannot be half young “and half old). “And certainly the authors who compiled the Smrtis must have been ८८ 00118806 of the fact of certain declarations therein contained being con- ‘““tradictory to the direct assertions of the Veda; and this clearly leads to “the conclusion that they must have braved this contradiction, only on “the strength of certain other Vedic texts, on which they based their ८ declarations. “Tf the mere fact of perceptible worldly motives being found for the ‘actions laid down in the Smrtis were to make them unauthoritative, ‘then, inasmuch as there is always a likelihood of some such motive “being found, in connection with all that is laid down in the Veda, all “the scriptures would have to be considered equally unauthoritative. For ‘instance, such grounds of the alleged unauthoritativeness of the Smrtis, ८८ 88 the presence of the motives of affection, aversion, vanity, recklessness, ८५ delasion, laziness, avarice, and the like, are capable of being attributed “to all actions (Vedic as well as non-Vedic). So long as our own minds “are pure and devoid of all wickedness, we can always admit the Smriie “to have a sound basis (in the Veda); and it is only when our own “minds become tainted that we begin to suspect their authoritative ^ character, ‘What performance of Dharma is there, in which some sort of a ‘perceptible motive cannot be found, and which cannot be found to be ‘‘coutradictory to some other Direct Vedic Assertions P (The chances of ८ contradiction are equally present in all Injunctions, whether the action “laid down be found to have a perceptible motive or not). And then “again, the terribly ignorant Atheists have no other business except find- “ing some sort of a worldly motive for all actions,—even those that are ‘not due to any apparent perceptible worldly motive. Even the actions “Jaid down in the Veda are made by them to be due to certain “worldly motives; and on the slightest grounds they explain one Vedic “Injunction to be contradictory to other Vedic texts. And under the “circumstances, if the Mimansakas once give an opportunity to the “ Atheists (and encourage them by borrowing their arguments, in dealing “with the Smrtz texts that contradict the Veda), thus encouraged, the ५४ Atheists would not leave the authority of any path of Dharma safe. ५५ Because these Atheists do not trouble their objectives until these latter DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 129 “themselves give them an opportunity of attack. And when they have “once been given an opportunity, by such persons as borrow their imag- ‘“imary attacks upon the authority of the scriptures, who (t.e., which “ scripture) can hope to escape alive, if once fallen in the way of their “ (argumentative) path ? For these reasons, itis not right for the Mimfin- ५ sakas to help the accomplishment of the purposes of the Atheists, who are «५ bent upon the destruction of all Dharma. “You have (in the foregoing Adhikarana) accepted the authority of “ Purdnas, Smrtis, Grutis, and Usage, at first by mere faith; and then you have «५ proved, by means of arguments, that the authority of these, as pointed “out in the scriptures, is quite sound; you should stick to this conclu- ^ 8107) by all means, and not slacken your faith midway; because such ‘slackening would lead to the destruction of the whole fabric (of the “authoritativeness of Smrtis as proved in the foregoing Adhikarana) ; "८ exactly likea cart, whose fastenings have become loosened. When a man “has accepted a certain theory, he should carry it through, fearlessly ; ‘otherwise he would lose it all, through fear, to the wicked intrusions of ‘such opponents as are always prone to attack timid people. “Then again, if the Veda itself were not found to lay down certain “actions, that have worldly motives, and some that are contradictory to “other Vedic texts,—then alone could these two facts be rightly turned 10 account to prove that the Smrtis that lay down such actions can have “no foundation in the Veda. As a matter of fact, however, we find the ‘* Veda laying down thousands of such actions as Threshing, Pounding, and “the like, which have only visible results; and then what is the harm “af such results are also found to apply in the case of actions laid down “by the Smrits ? There are also other actions laid down in the Veda, “which have only visible results (and which can be attributed to motives ८८०7 avarice, &c.), such as, the giving of the gifts to the priests, and the “sacrificer’s action with regard to the Tantnaptra butter. Under the “ circumstances, if these actions be said to be not based upon the authority “of the Veda (because of their having visible results), then, in that case “‘alone could the Smrtis laying down similar actions be also denied the “support of the Veda. And when we actually find many such actions “laid down in the Veda itself, how can the mere fact of the action ‘having visible results be accepted as proving the non-Vedic origin of “the Smrits enjoining them ? ° For these reasons it is rightly incumbent on the Mimdnsaka to carry “through the theory of the Smrtis being based upon the Veda, that was “arrived at before (in the foregoing Adhikarana) : and why should he “finch now ? We conclude, then, that even though the Smritis are found “to lay down actions with visible results, and also those that are contrary 17 180 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I-—PADA, (1 +70परा, Il. “to direct Vedic Injunctions, yet no sound arguments can rightly be “brought forward to shake their authoritativeness. Specially as it was “an unqualified authoritativeness of all scriptures that was established ‘in the foregoing Adhikaranza, it must be allowed to remain intact, even if ५५ they be found to be contradictory to direct Vedic Assertions.” SIDDHANTA. To the above arguments, we make the following reply : All authority of the Smyti becomes inadmissible, when it 1s found to be contradictory (to Vedic Assertions) ; and it is only when there is no such contradic- tion that the Veda affords an inferred basis for the authority of the Smrtt. Those Smyt: passages that we find to be in direct contradiction to the Veda must have their origin in Ignorance, &c., and can never be admitted to have any foundation in the Veda itself. In the case of the Smytz we do not admit of a self-sufficient authority ; and as for its authority being based upon the Veda, this 1s found to be con- trary to the perceptible fact (of its being contradictory to the Veda). We can assume a Vedic passage (in support of a Smriz) only so long as we do not find a direct Vedic text bearing upon the same subject; and when such a text is found (and found to be contradictory to the assertion of the Smyi:), then we can never allow of an assumption of any other Vedic texts in support of this latter ; for certainly, when we actually see the elephant passing before us, we do not seek to infer its existence by means of its footprints. And Smriis are the means of leading us to the inference of Vedic texts, exactly as the footprints lead to the inference of the elephant ; consequently when this efficiency of the Smryii is found to be contrary to a direct Vedic text, its efficiency (to Jead to the assump- tion of a Vedic text) is set aside exactly as in the case of the elephant. And 31724८८5 based upon such inferential assumptions can flourish only so long as their basis is not cut off by directly perceptible texts to the contrary. And when their basis has been so cut off, they have not a much longer span of existence left to them ; and die off exactly like the branches of a tree that has been uprooted. A direct self-sufficient authority is not possible for the Smrtis them- selves, by which they could be independent of extraneous support; and as for this support, we do not find any (in the case of such Smrtis as are contary to Vedic Texts). Nor can there be an inference of a Vedic text that is opposed to a direct Vedic text already extant; because, when all that people want to know with regard to a certain matter is known DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 131 by means of the direct text already available, there can be no necessity for an inference of assumed texts, If with regard to a certain matter, the Smrti text dealt with a phase of the subject other than that treated of in the Vedic Text (contra- dicting it), then to a certain extent, its authority could havea chance of being admitted (with reference to that particular phase). But when the subject mentioned in the Smytt has already been dealt with, either in the same or in a contrary manner, by the Veda, then, with regard to that object, the Smrit cannot be admitted to have any authority. Because in the case of any two means of cognition operating contrary ways, with regard to a common objective, the one that has a quicker action accom- plishes its object sooner, and leaves no chance for the accomplishment of the slower. And even if the latter is only one degree slower than the former, it is bound to lose in the long run, because its opponent will have reached the goal long before it. On the other hand, in a case where there is no swift opponent tending to deprive it of its objective, the weaker process might take its own time, and there is no chance of its being interrupted. Nor 18 there any such unflinching command as that which has once been found to be authoritative must always be accepted as authoritative. (And even though in certain cases the 601८ has been found to have an authority that can force us to admit its authority even in cases where it is contradicted by the Veda yct) it is a general rule that whenever a cer- tain thing is going to be brought forth, it comes to be accomplished only if it is not interrupted in its accomplishment by something that is contra- dictory to it. Whereas that, which has its very foundation cut off while it 18 not fully brought forth, or which has its very source cut off, can never attain an accomplished condition. (And this is the case with tho authority of the Smrtis in question). But even though it is not accom- plished, when interrupted by a stronger opponent, yet it does not follow from this that it would not be accomplished, even in the absence of such opposition. (Hence though the Smrt¢ that is contradictory to the Veda may not have real authority, yet that does not affect the authority of other Smrtis that are quite compatible with the Veda). Conversely, even though a thing may be accomplished in the absence of opposing forces, yet from this it does not follow that it will be accomplished, even when there are strong forces opposing its accomplishment. (Hence though the Qmrtts compatible with the Veda may be authoritative, yet that does not establish the authoritativeness of those that are contrary to it). Because, in all cases where we have 2 general rule and an exception, all cases cannot be covered by the general rule itself ; on the other hand, whilo the exception sets aside the general rule, in a particular case, it does not follow that the 132 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA. III—ADHI. II. general rule would be thus set aside in all cases. What 18 proper in such cases is to carefully differentiate the cases where the general rule and the exception may be severally applicable, and then accordingly, ascertain where the one will set aside the other ; which cannot be ascertained by means of a vague general perception. For one, who would base his actions upon such general perceptions, would succeed in allaying his thirst by the waters of the mirage (because in this case algo he has a general perception of water) ; conversely, having found his idea of water to have been an illusion in the case of the mirage, he would not perform his ablutions, even in a tank, fearing lest he be deceived in this casealso. Asa matterof fact however (in the case of the mirage) the notion of water is accepted as true, only so long as one has not acquired the knowledge that it ts not water, but only a mirage. In the same manner, then, Inference is accepted as true, only so long as its objective is not found to be covered by a Sense-perception contrary to it. Thus then, the authority of the Smri: can be accepted to be based upon inferred (assumed) Vedic Texts, only so long as the subject of that Smrii is not found to be covered by a direct Vedic Text contradictory to it. From these reasons, if we conclude that in certain cases the Smryiis are authoritative, while in some cases they have no authority, we cannot be said to be open to the charge of “half-heartedness.” Because just as the notion of water 18 found to be true, in the case of the perception of real water, while untrue in that of the mirage, in the same manner we can, as reasonably, accept the ७017८ to be authoritative when it is found to be in keeping with the Veda, while reject it as having no authority, when found to be contradictory to direct Vedic Texts. And it cannot be rightly urged that either all Smrtis should be accepted as authoritative, or, 1f its authority be denied in one case, the whole of it should be considered unauthoritative. Thus then, we conclude that the Smrtis that are contradictory to the Veda, have no authority, because any assumption of Vedic Texts in their support being precluded by direct Vedic Texts, they cannot but have their origin elsewhere (in Illusion, Ignorance, &c.) Question : “ Why cannot such Smrtis be accepted as laying down optional alternatives to those laid down in the Texts that they are found to contradict P ”’ Answer: All alternative options are open to eightfold objections (ex- plained below) ; and as such, it is not very desirable to accept them. And further if (by the acceptance of such option) a partial unauthoritativeness of the Smrtt be accepted, it becomes very easy for us to deny its authority completely (on the strength of the well-established authority of the Vedic Texts that it is found to contradict). Even in those cases where both alternatives are equally strong, there is an eightfold discrepancy attaching DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 133 to the option; and it is accepted, only under the pressure of necessity, when there is no other way out of it. How then can it be accepted in the present case, where the authority of one alternative is one step fur- ther removed from that of the other, and is got at by means of external aids? That is to say, before the particular Smrti would succeed in acquir- ing its authority (secondhand, from the assumed Vedic Text), it would be set aside by the Direct Vedic Texts, that are self-authoritative (aud as such not depending upon any extraneous authority). Thus then, in matters relating to Dharma, the Smrti not being accepted to be self-sufficient in its authority, it cannot be admitted as pointing out an alternative to the Veda, which could be done only if both were equally strong in their authority. And having its authority dependent upon extra- neous aids, the 61112८0 can never attain any authority, when it is just checked by Direct Vedic Assertion; and as such, it can never raise ita head again. The acceptance of option, even in a case when both the alternatives are equally authoritative, cannot be accepted until we assume the partial unauthoritativeness of both of them. And the assumption of such (partial) unauthoritativeness of that which is decidedly self-sufficient in its author- ity (४.९. the Veda) would be open to two objections : (1) it would set aside the eternally apparent and universally recognised authority of the Veda, aud would thereby run counter to a well-ascertained idea ; (2) such unauthorita- tiveness could be cognised only by means of Negation; but (in accepting the alternative theory) we would he denying the really existing authority (of the Veda), in the absence of any such Negation (४ ९. any assertion denying the authority of the Veda) ; this would be the second objection, based upon the fact of your making a contradictory statement with regard to Authority (that is to say, you assert that Authority ts non-authortiaicve). Even though in the first instance (1.¢., in the acceptance of one alterna- tive), you may, for some reason or other, accept the responsibility of the above two objections, yet when you would proceed to accept the other alter- native, you would render yourself open to two other objections: (1) You had asserted (in the former instance) that the Authority (of the Veda) is cognisable by Negation (that is to say, non est); and now (when you are accepting the authority of the Veda as the second alternative), you would set aside this assertion of yours, and thereby make yourself lable to the first charge of self-contradiction ; and (2) secondly, in the first instance, you had denied the self-evident authority (of the Veda); and now you would be reasserting this authority, and thus render yourself liable to another charge of self-contradiction. Thus then, in the case of a single sen- tence, we have shown the acceptance of Option to be open to four objec- tions; aud the same would be found to be the case with regard to any other sentence. 184 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA, III—ADHI. 11.’ But with all this an option has been accepted in the case of the two sentences laying down the Vriht and the Yava as the grain to be used at sacrifices; because in that case, there is no help; as if one proceeds to act according to the Injunction of the Vrihi, he is drawn away from it by the Injunction of the Yava; and wice versé; and thus being drawn from two sides, by these two texts, as if by two celestial women (equally attrac- tive), not finding any difference in the strength or authority of any one of them, and not finding any means of reconciling them, with reference to any one object, the person would naturally conclude that being mutually contradictory, both the texts are unauthoritative (partially), and in this case the unauthoritativeness of that which (being a part of the Veda) is fully capable of all authority, is accepted, because there is no help in the matter : if there were any way out of it, such an assumption could never be allowed. In the case in question, on the other hand, we can never deny the authority of one alternative (the Veda) ; and the unauthoritative character of the other alternative (the 80001४४) alone, cannot establish the unauthori- tativeness of both. Even in ordinary worldly affairs, we find that when a man falls in a position where he must lose cither one thing or many things, when there is a chance of all being lost, he gladly renounces half the number (and keeps the other half) (so in the case in question, when we are given the option of either denying the authority, at least partially, of both the Veda and the Smréz, or accepting the authority of the Veda and the Smyti in keeping with it, and denying that of the contradictory Smrti,—we cannot but gladly choose the latter alternative as decidedly the wiser and the more reasonable of the two) And when both are rejected, then we have a destruction of the autho- rity of both; which is also the case if the sacrificer offers at his sacrifice, mixed offerings of Yava and Vrihi; because no such mixed offering has been laid down anywhere. The Injunction of the Yava, as well as that of Vrihz, is a restrictive one; and each of these implies the incapability of any other substance being used at the sacrifice. And the Vrihi is pointed out as being, independently by itself, the article to be used at the sacrifice; so is also the Yava; and as such we can never get at any Injunction of the mixture of both. If the Vrthz alone, or the Yava alone, were found unable to ac- complish the desired sacrifice, and if, for that reason a mixture of the two were used, these facts would set aside the authority of both the Injunc- tions (of Yava as well as of Vrihi). Thus then, we find that this idea of employing their mixture is equal in all respects to the suspicion (that none of the two 18 able to accomplish the desired sacrifice) ; and as such this would also load to the complete denial of the authority of both ; and it would be far better to attribute unauthoritativeness to each of them by turns. This leaves the character of both extremely uncertain ; but no such uncer- 1761 VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 185 tainty is allowable where a certainty is capable of being arrived at. And in every case we can carry on our business only by means of such objects as have been duly ascertained to be of one definite nature. Consequently, that which is authoritative, must always remain authori- tative, while that which has no authority cannot be held ever to have any authority. If the same thing be considered authoritative at one time and _unauthoritative at other times, we can place no confidence in such a thing. And all this anomaly faces us directly, in the case of the alternative Injunc- tions of the Vriht and the Yava, where there is no way out of the difficulty. Specially as in this case there is nothing to justify us in adhering to any one of the two, exclusively, which one we shall accept as authoritative, while denying the authority of the other. On the other hand, in the case of the Direct Vedic Text and a contra- dictory Smrtt Text, we have two means at our command, by which we can definitely decide to accept the Vedic Text as absolutely authoritative and totally reject the Smyiz as having no authority at all. I. In the first place, to the Veda and the Qmryt: belong authorita- tiveness and unauthoritativeness, respectively, naturally by themselves; consequently, their respective unauthoritativeness and authoritativeness can be due only to extraneous influences. A property that is natural to a thing can be denied or set aside, only if we can finda strong reason for such denial; and in the present case an idea proceeding from a Smrti text can never have strength enough for setting aside or negativing that which proceeds from a direct Vedic assertion; while, on the other hand again, the idea proceeding from the Vedic assertion is admitted to be of superior strength, and as such is acknowledged to be capable of negativing that which is due to the Smrits. This comparative strength and weakness, as the ground for effective negativing, we have already explained in detail while treating of Sense- perception and Inference; and the comparative strength of Direct Assertion and Indirect Implication is also explained in III—iii—1, where it is shown that that which is nearer to its objective than the other is always to be accepted as the stronger of the two; and if we apply the same standard to the case of the Smrtt and Crutz texts, we find that the Crut: authorita- tively points out its objective, long before the 67८ succeeds, in establish- ing its own authority (by means of an assumed Vedic Text). (It might be argued that the Smit also would in due time come to indicate its own objective, contrary to the Veda, and as such it could be accepted as laying down an optional alternative to the course laid down in the foregoing Vedic Text; but this is not possible; because both the texts refer to the same object, and) it 18 not possible for the same object to have contradictory properties, And then too, when the objective has been 186 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA. II—ADHI If. already taken up by one that moves faster (in the present case, the Vedic Text), there is nothing left for the slower one (the Smyts) ; for instance, an object that has been taken away by horses can never be got at by asses. And it 18 always found to be the case that long before the Smrt: succeeds in pointing (for its authority) to an assumed Vedic Text in support of its own assertion with regard to a certain object, a contrary idea of the object has already been arrived at by other means (t.¢, by means of the directly perceptible Vedic Text), which is much swifter in its operation, not being hampered by the necessity of seeking elsewhere for its authority fi It is only so long as the person has nof quite ascertained what is to be done, that the operation of such means of the cognition (of Duty) can last ; when this has been duly ascertained, there is no more necessity of any means of cognising it. If the Vedic and the Smrt: texts were to point to their objective simultaneously, at one and tle same time, then there would be no ground for difference in them (whereby we could accept one to be stronger than the other); and in that case both could be accepted to be (optional alternatives) of equal authority. Or (the difference between the operations of the two texts may be thus explained): We find the Vedic Toxt pointing out its objective directly ; and if at this very point of time the Smrt: could also succeed in pointing out the assumed Vedic Text (that would serve as its authority ),—then, in that case, somehow or other, we could accept them to be of equal strength, as regards their being the means of cognition; because while the former would be acting as the means of cognising its particular objective, the Intter would also be operating towards the bringing about of a cognition of the assumed Vedic Text; even though this latter would still be further removed from the real objective, yet as it would have been found to give rise to some cognition, it could have been accepted to be a means of right. notion; and as it would have been found to be functioning simultaneously with the Vedic Text, we could have accepted both to be of equal strength But as a matter of fact, even when we find the Smyti providing an idea of its objective, while it looks about for a corroborative Vedic Text, without which it is not sufficiently established (in authority), it becomes set aside by a (contrary) directly perceptible Vedic Text, which is ever well-estab- lished in its self-sufficient authority. A Smrt that would not need a corroborative basis (in the Veda) would fall off from its position of ७01८4 (Remembrance, which is held to be that of a Vedic Text to the same effect) ; and as it stands in need of such basis, while it is without such basis, it is always set aside by a (contrary) Vedic Text This is the first method whereby we reject thé authority of the con- tradictory Smrts, before it has been allowed to attain the position of an optional alternative. DIREOT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 137 II. To explain the other method: we grant for the sake of argument that both the Veda and the Smrti are of equal strength, and that they are to be accepted as laying down optional alternatives. Even then as in this case also, the Smrtt would be accepted to be partially unauthorita- tive, it would be completely set aside. That is to say, even if we admit the contradictory 620८0 as laying down an optional alternative (to the Vedic Injunction), when we would be accepting the alternative laid down in the Veda, we would be admitting tie authority of the Veda; and then, we could not but admit the Smrti in question to bo unauthoritative; and this unauthoritativeness could not be said to be an entirely foreign property imposed upon it, as it is admitted to be in the case of the Veda; because the sole authority of the Smyii lies in the fact of its being based upon the Veda; and as such when we are admitting it to be unauthoritative, all that we are doing is to declare the fact of its not having any basis in the Veda. And as soon as the absence of such Vedic support has been duly ascertained, we are forced to seek for its origin elsewhere (in the realms of Delusion and the other causes, that have been refuted in the foregoing Adhikarana) ; and 1४ 18 fully admitted on all hands, that it has been compiled by human authors (Manu and others) ; and for these reasons, we cannot accept its want of origin or basis to be (like that of the Veda) duo to its eternal character; and (as it is found to have no basis in the Veda) we cannot but conclude that it has source in the realms of Deception, Illusion, Ignorance, &c. And if we assume, for the Qmyrti, any basis other than the Veda, this very basis entirely destroys its authoritative character. In the case of the Injunctions of the Yava and the Vrihi, on the other hand, at the timo that we accept the latter alternative and use the Vrihi at the sacrifice, we impose upon the former Injunction, an unanthoritativeness which is altogether foreign to it (as being a Vedic Text, it is self-sufficient inits inherent authority) ; and in the same manner, at the time that we accept the other altornative and make use of the Yava, the extraneous un- authoritativeness that had been imposed upon it is set aside by its own inherent anthoritative character ; specially is such the case because of both the texts being equal in their authority, both equally forming part of the same Veda, and there being no difference between the two, with regard to the proximity or otherwise of their respective objectives. In the case of the Smrti, on the other hand, when its authority having no basis in the Veda has been once lost in the pools of Illusion, Ignorance, &०., there can be no chance of its being picked up again. Because with regard to the same Smrti text, it is not possible that it should have its basis in an assumed Vedic Text, at the time that we do not accept the alternative laid down in the Direct Vedic Text; and that it should have 18 138 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I-~PADA. I[I—-ADHI. Ul, its basis in Illusion, &c., at the time that we accept the said Vedic alterna- tive (because one and the same thing cannot have one kind of origin at one time, and a totally contrary origin at another). The following arguments are urged (in support of accepting the aforesaid option) < * All that you say would be quite correct, if the person ‘“ accepting the option always found the Vedic Text before coming across “the alternative Smrtz text ; and then if, after having acted in accordance ‘with the former, he sought to follow the course laid down by the latter, ‘then alone could the authority of the Smyti be said to be totally destroyed. ५ But this is not possible, in a case where it is the Smyti text that is found ‘and followed first. “That is to say, in the case where a man has come across the Smrls “toxt alone, he at once infers that it has a basis in a certain Vedic Text; “and when he has once got a definite idea of such a Vedic Text (in support “of the Smrtz), even if a certain direct Vedic assertion to the contrary “ present itself subseyucntly, this latter cannot set aside the authority of “the former inferred Vedic ‘Text. Because when the ass (though slow) ‘has once reached its objective, the horse reaching it afterwards, cannot “deprive the ass of what it has already got. “There 18 no such law as that where a Smyti toxt is contradictory to a “ Vedic Text, it is the former that is always cognised first. Because when ‘“many people are conducting a number of enquiries, the various texts “present themselves to them in various orders; and no significance is “attached to the order of their appearance, in the determining of the ‘comparative authoritativeness of the texts. For certainly, when a man ‘is reading the Veda, if he finds the Injunction of Vrihi in the first chapter, “and that of the Yuva in the second, this does not make tho authority of “the latter at all less than that of the former (as you also hold these two ‘to be possessed of equal authority ). ‘We also find that the authors of the Kalpasitras, in making a com- ‘‘ pilation of the Injunctions contained in their own particular Veda with “those contained in other Vedas, always treat the latter Injunctions (when “any of them is found to be contrary to ono of the former) as laying “down another alternative course of action. (And as one’s own Veda is ‘‘ studied before any other is taken up, if that which is cognised first were ss to be always accepted as the most authoritative, then the Injunctions con- ‘ tained in one’s own Veda would always be taken as setting aside those “contained in the other Vedas; and as such the Kalpasitras could uot “treat them as equally authoritative and laying down optional alternatives). “ Such jaint compilation of all the Vedas is also what is favoured by Jaimini ^“ himself; as he also holds that that which is comprehended beforehang ^“ would set aside all subsequent Injunctions, DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 139 “ Consequently, we should attach no significance to the order in which “the texts appear; what we have to do is to follow the law Jaid down “under S#tra Il—iv—18:—The Veda is not laid with special reference to “any one person; and hence thosoc men,—whose ideas (of duty) are ‘dependant upon all the various branches of the Vedas, those that are ‘directly perceived as well as those that are only remembered, all being “equally authoritative, in that they aro cqually cternal,—when inves- ‘‘tigating the significations of the various texts, should attribute to the ५ weakness of their own perceptive faculties, the fact of one text being ^ perceived after the other, and should accept all of them to be equally ‘authoritative; just as even though the letters and words composing a "° sentence are copnised one after tho other, yet they are all taken to be ‘* equally important factors in the compreheusion of the sentence. And thus, ‘like the instructions received from one’s Father and Mother (those of the ° Mother always preceding those of the Father and yet both being accepted “as equally binding), they should, without the least doubt, accept all the “texts to be equally authoritative and binding. ८८ Otherwise if the mere fact of appearing beforehand were to be taken ५ &8 asure mark of superior authority, and that appearing afterwards were “taken as a mark of unauthoritativeness, what intelligent man could over “arrive at a decisive conclusion on the point of the authoritativeness or ‘* otherwise of different texts? (As there is no certainty that that which “ appears first at one time would do the same at all times). ५५ And again, if the mere fact of its appearing subsequently were made “the ground for relegating the Smytt to the realms of illusion, then even ८1 a case where the Smrti is not contradicted by the Vedic Text, it could ५ 106 be accepted to be authoritative (as in this case also the Smrii would “‘ be appearing after the Vedic Text). ‘ For these reasons, we must conclude, either that all 6101८८5 are based ‘‘upon the Veda (and as such equally authoritative), or that all of them “are the products of illusion; and there can be no admixture of their “ origin (that is, it is not right to accept some of them to be based upon “the Veda, and others to be based upon II]lusion.’’) ; To all this, we make the following reply: Though in a case where we come across a certain Smt: text, if we do not meet with a direct Vedic Text to the contrary, we can safely infer a Vedic Text in support of that Smit, free from all hinderances for the time being. एप प at some future time, we come across a direct Vedic Text to the contrary, we cannot but at once set aside the former Smyti (as unauthoritative) ; and thus all chance of its having any basis in the Veda having been set aside, we would be forced to the conclusion that it must have its origin in some sort of an illusion, &c. And thus after we have found the Vedic text to the contrary, we are natur- 140 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—PADA. IIT—ADHI. If. ally led to think that the idea that we have had from the Smriti is false; and from this we are forced to admit that this idea must have been false, even at the time that we had met with the Smrti for the first time. Even is ordinary experience, we find that a man who is unable to distinguish the false coin from a true one, uses the latter as the real coin; but from this it does not follow that he will continue to use and accept the false coin for the true, even after he has become capable of recognising its false character ; and his subsequent discrimination leads him to the conclusion that his notions with regard to the false coin are false, not only at the time when he 18 able to distinguish it from the true one, but that it has always been false, even at the time when he accepted it as true. (In the same manner, when we do find a Vedic Text, we conclude the Sirti to be false, not only now, but always, even when we first met it, and had not found the Vedic Text contradicting it). As the idea afforded by the ७०५८८ now (when we have founded the Vedic Text to the contrary) is just the same as that afforded by it before, this former idea too becomes set aside (when we find the contrary Vedic Text); for if the former idea were not falso, the latter, being identical with it, could never be false. Objection: “‘ Even when we have found the contrary Vedic Text, we must conclude that it contradicts, not the Smyti, but the Vedic text that had been assumed as the basis for that Smrti (and thus the contradiction being between two Vedic texts, these being equally authoritative, you can- not but admit of the theory of Option).” Reply: But this cannot be; because at the time of the performance of each individual action, there is an investigation into the character of its authority. For if one always depended upon the conclusion that he may have arrived at in one case, then the man, who has discarded the VriAz and accepted the alternative of Yava, at any one sacrifice, would always, throughout his life, use the Yava alone, and never use the Vrihi; and it would never be possible for both of them to be used by every man, as optional alternatives. Consequently, then, when a man happens to consider the authority of a particular action, which he ,98 going to perform for the first time, and he finds that he has not yet directly come across any such Vedic Text as he had assumed, in support of the Smrti text, on whose strength he had performed the action for the first time, he is again led by the Smrti text itself to argue that inasmuch as the Smrti has been com- piled by a person who is known to be an orthodox performer of all Vedic actions, it must have its origin in the Veda; and thus he again sets about inferring the existence of such a Vedic Text; but now, if at the very out- set, he be met by a direct Vedic Text to the contrary, he would find that the undoubted self-authoritativeness of this text could not be otherwise possible, and is forced to admit that the contrary Smt: text must be un» DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 141 authoritative ; and the final conclusion that he arrives at is that the origin of the particular Smit text lies, not in any Vedic Text (as inferred before), but elsewhere (in the realms of Illusion, &c.); and by this he is not led to impose an unauthoritativeness upon the Vedic Text that was assumed to be the basis for the ७1142 ; because the unauthoritativeness of this is directly perceptible by the mere fact of ita not being found anywhere (in the Veda; and as such there is no need of any such imposition). (And thus we find that the direct Vedic Text contradicts, and points to the unautho- ritativeness of, not the assumed Vedic Text, but the Smric text that was sought to be based upon that assumption ; and thus there is a contradic- tion, not of one Vedic Text by another Vedic Text, but that of a Smrti text by a Vedic one). You have argued above that, as there is no such fixed rule as that the Vedic Text must always be cognised, prior to the Smrtt, or vice versd, there could be no fixed idea as to the authoritative character of the one or the other, if their authoritativeness or the contrary were to be ascertained solely by their prior or subsequent cognition. But this non-fixity applies to your theory also: and as such, it should not be urged against my theory alone. In a case where we directly find a Vedic Text contradicting the Smrti text, and have no opportunity for assuming a Vedic Text in support of this latter, it is naturally concluded to have its origin elsewhere (in Illusion, &c.) ; and as such is completely set aside, And ina case where the contrary direct Vedic Text is found at some other time, even then, the contradiction and the consequent rejection of the Smrt is duly ascer- tained at that distant time; and this rejection of authority for ever after- wards, attaches to the Smrtz, which cannot clear itself of such unauthor- itativeness. As for those that cognise the Smyti text before the contrary Vedic Text, though they themselves may not be cognisant of the contrary Vedic Text and the consequent rejection of the Smrtt, yet, inasmuch 88 the author- ity of such a 37८४ text has been set aside elsewhere by a previous re- cognition, by other people; of the Vedic Text contradicting it, the Smrti can never free itself from this unauthoritativeness, attaching to it perma- nently. And even in ordinary experience, we find that the contradiction of the cognition of other people is by no means a very slight means of ascertaining one’s own cognition to be false ; as for instance, when (by some disorder of the eye) we see the moon as duplicate, or when we are mistaken in our notions as regards the various directions, we conclude our own ideas to be false, only when we find them to becontrary to those of other people. Objection : ^“ In the case of the Vedic Injunctions of the Yava and the Vrtht also, when one would decide to use the Yava, his conclusion would be contrary to that of another person who has decided to make use of 149 TANTRA-VARTIEA. ADHYAYA I—pPApA. rit—-ApRt. 1t. the Vriht and thereby the former conclusion would have to be accepted as wrong.” Reply : But in that case, both the Injunctions are equally of direct Vedic origin; and as such the authoritativeness or otherwise is only like the rising or sinking (of an object) (2.e., though the authority ever continues, yet when it rises up, we accept its authoritativeness, and we make use of one Jnjunction ; and when it sinks down, its authority is only hidden from view, and that of the other Injunction having come up, we accept this latter and act up to it); and as such both of them being equal in the eyes of all men, we are unable to find any other ground of difference (between the two). (If it were a rule with all people that they always cognised a Smrtz text before cognising any Vedic one, then it might have been possible for the former to have lcd to the inference of a corroborative Vedic Text and base its authority upon it; but) as a matter of fact, such people, as always cognise a 81771८८ text beforehand, are not to be found, in any number, the unauthoritativeness pointed out by the contrary Vedic Text cannot leave its hold upon the Smrtz. Further, in the case of Smriis, there 18 an inherent ground of unauthor- itativeness (in that they have never any authority of their own, but only one borrowed from the Veda); and the falsity attaching to them upon this ground alone renders them unable to set aside any direct Vedic Text. All that you can do is to impose upon the Veda an unauthoritativeness, which is absolutely foreign to its very effulgent self-authoritative character; and as this unauthoritativeness 18 actually found in the Smriti (contrary to the Veda), wherefore should you go about assuming it in the Veda (where there 1s no room for it)? When you find a Vedic Text and a Smrti text contradicting each other, it is absolutely necessary that you should re- ject the authority of one of them; and as you would proceed to assume the unauthoritativeness of the Vedic Text (your action in this resembling that of the covering up of a really existing thing with a piece of cloth iu order to deceive yourself into the belief that it does not exist), the inherent unau- thoritativeness of the ७१1४८ would present itself before you, and would set aside, once for all, all your doubts as to which of the two is to be rejected ; and would leave you no ground for assuming the absolutely unreal unau- thoritativeness of the Vedic Text. Even in the case of such Smyti texts as are not contradicted by a direct Vedic Text, the fact of their being based upon the Veda is by no means always quite certain. Though this fact can be got at by means of Inference, yet it can also be negatived by other similar means of cognition. Thus then, we find that the case of the Qmrti text contradicting the Vedic Text is not identical with that which is not found to be so contra- DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTMORITATIVE. 143 dictory ; because of the causes of the two being different (that of the formor being actually decided to be Illusion, &c., while that of the latter is only the particular cognition of the Author of the Smrti); and as for the origin of these texts, it can be ascertained, only in accordance with the bearing of their contradictories (.¢e., the Smrti that has a Vedic Text for its contradictory is decided to have its origin in Illusion, &c., while that which has not such a formidable contradictory is believed to have some authority). And thus we have proved that the charge of “half-heartedness ” cannot be laid at our door. Exactly as in the case of Direct Assertion, Indirect Implication, &c., (explained under Sutra III—iii—14), thoir comparative strength or weak- ness is ascertained, according as the one that follows is found to be contra- dictory to, or supported by, that which precedes it,—in the same manner we could also ascertain the authoritativeness or otherwise of the various Smyit texts, according as they are found to be contradicted or supported by Vedic Texts; and there can be no admixture of the two; nor can all Smrti texts (those contrary to the Veda and those not contrary to it) be said to be of the same class. [Another instance of contradiction of the Veda by Smrti, that is cited in the Bhashya, is that the Smrti lays down that the whole of the sacri- ficial post is to be covered over; while the Veda enjoins that the sacrificer should sing a certain hymn while touching the post]. And here, though the covering over of the post is laid down in the Kalpasitra, which is of a class different from the ordinary Dharmagastra = 81111८45, and which has been compiled with the avowed object of collecting together the precepts actually found in the Veda,—yet, we shall prove later on that the differ- ence between the Kalpasiira aud the ordinary Smrti is very slight; and also as both of them are equally the works of human authors, the Bhashya has cited the Kalpasitra in the same category as the ordinary Smrti. [The next instance cited is that in the Smrtis it is declared that as soon as the sacriticer has purchased the Soma, the priests can dine at his place; while the Veda declares that they can dine at his place only when he has completed the Agnishomiya-sanstha]. And here, though the former pas- sage 18 found in the Atharva-Veda,—yet (1) as we find that this particular Veda does not in any way help any sacrificial actions that are performed in connection with the sacred fire,—(2) as we find this particular declaration contradicted by the said declaration which is found in the three Vedas that are related to such sacrificial actions,—(3) andasthe point at issue is in re- ference to such a sacrificial action,—we follow the law laid down in the Sétra IlI—vi—9, where it is distinctly declared that authority which is directly related to the point at issue is stronger than that which 18 not 80 related ; and from this law we conclude the gaid declaration of the Atharya-Veda 144 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADHYAYA I—=PADA. IlI——ADHI. IT. to be weaker in its authority than the other declaration ; and for this reason, it has been cited in the Bhdshya, in the same category as the ordinary Smrtis. [Another instance of the contradiction is, that the Smytis lay down that the Brahmana is to remain a student for forty-eight years; while the Veda lays down the performance of the Agnihotra (and hence of marriage) by one whose hairs are not yet grey and who has got ason.| And here, though the period indicated by the absence of greyness in the hair is most indefinite, and it may be that he may not have got a son till then, yet we accept the particular period to be ‘ youth,’ as pointed out by such Smrtis as—‘‘one should seek after Dharma wlule he is still young,’’—or as ex- tending, at the very utmost, to ‘middle age’; while if one were to remaina ` student for forty-eight years, these forty-eight years added to the four or six years before the Upanayana, would bring the life of the religious student up to the fifty-second or fifty-fourth year of his age or even more than that (if the Upanayana be delayed to the 10th or 12th year) ; and this would cer- tainly be getting beyond the ‘ middle age’; (and as up to this time he could not marry, the person could not perform the Agnihotra) the contradiction between the two Injunctions becomes quite patent. In connection with the contradiction that has been pointed out with regard to the covering of the post, it may be argued that even when the post has been covered, it is quite possible for it to be touched (and as such there is no contradiction). But how can you deny this contradiction P Because Touching is the feeling of an object by means of the tactile sense; and when the post is covered by a piece of cloth, there can be no such feeling of it; because if the cloth 1s touched, that would not be the touching of the post; because the touches of these two differ in points of their genus, individual- ity, &c. If by the touching of an object connected with another object, the latter were also touched, then the touching of the Earth would also be the touching of the post (and as the sacrificer 18 always touching the earth, any Injunction of the touching of the post would be entirely irrelevant). An objection is raised: ^ ¥irstly, we do not think the Earth to be the Post, while we have a distinct notion of the post, even in a post that has been covered by the cloth; and as such there is a difference between the case in dispute and the instance you have cited. And secondly, even when the Odndala happens to touch the cloth that we are wearing, we can be- come pure only by undergoing the same processes of bath, &o., as those that are laid down for one who is touched by him directly.” Reply: True it is that we have got to bathe in the case you mention ; but that 18 owing to our contact with the cloth, that has been defiled by the direct touch of the Canddla. We are led to this conclusion by the fact that, even when a piece of cloth that we are not wearing is touched by the DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 145 Ofndala, if we happen to touch this cloth, we have got to bathe, &., exactly as if we ourselves had been touched. Another question is raised: ‘‘ How 18 it that you have brought forward a sort of defilement—that of ourselves by touching the cloth that has been touched by the Candala—which is not mentioned in the codes of morality P If such defilement were real, how is it that you do not accept such defile ment in the case of metals, wood, d&c.; when these having been touched by the Odndala, happen to be touched by us? Certainly, no reasons appear to help us here.” To this we make the following reply: With regard to wood, grass, &c., it is distinctly laid down that they are purified by the air itself; while there is no purification of the cloth, except by washing. It may be urged that this purification has been laid down as necessary only when the cloth happens to be besmeared with unclean matter. But we do not find the word “ besmeared ” in the text of the Qmrti, where it is simply said, that “an unclean cloth is to be washed”; and certainly the cloth that has been touched by the Odnddala cannot but be accepted as “unclean”; and as such, it can be purified only by being washed in water. Ob7.: “It 18 only for the man himself that the Smrtis have enjoined certain expiatory rites as to be performed when he happens to be touched by a Cdnddlu; and hence it would seem that such uncleanness attached to the man alone; and not to any other substance, like the cow or the horse. And when we come to consider whether the cloth, like the cow, is not made unclean, by the touch of the Cdnddla, or it is rendered unclean, like the man,— we naturally conclude that it is, like the cow, not made unclean by the touch.” Reply: But we findthe Smrt: laying down that a man when thus touch- ed 18 to dip into the water, with all his clothes on; and from this we infer that the clothes are also rendered unclean, and its case is not like that of the cow, &c. And then again, when we happen to touch the Candala, with our hand (and there being no direct contact of the Odndala with the cloth), even for this case, the ७721८ lays down that we should bathe with all our clothes on; and from this also it isclear that the cloth is rendered un- clean even by its contact with the human body which has been touched by the Odndala; and consequently it is not unreasonable to declare it unclean when it has been touched by the Canddla directly. As for the cow, horse &c., even when they happen to be touched by the (2101८, the Smrti Injunc- tions do not make it necessary for them to be washed ; and as such we do not accept the fact of these animals being defiled by such contact ; and as such the case of the cloth cannot be taken as identical with that of these animals. For these reasous, in the case in question, the touching of the cloth can- not be regarded as identical with the touching of the post (covered by it) 19 146 TAN TRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA 1--747+ HI—~-ADHI It. If the Injunction be explained as laying down the necessity of the priest singing the hymn, while touched by the post,—then too, it would be necessary for his body to be in direct touch with the skin of the post. And even if the Injunction, be taken to mean only that he should res¢ upon the post, then too the necessity of direct contact remains just the same; and as such, even this resting would not be possible if the post were complete- ly covered up. For, in that case, the priest would sing while resting upon the cloth (and not upon the post) ;- because even though the cloth itself, would be resting upon the post, yet it could serve as the rest or support of the priest. For these reasons,:we conclude that there is a direct contra- diction between the Smyti Injunction of the covering of the whole post, and the Vedic one of touching it; and as such it is only right that we should clearly discern which is to be given the preference. Says the Bhdshya (in support of the option theory): ‘“ But wherefore are not these two Injunctions not accepted as laying down optional alterna- tives?”? And this must be taken as basing the authority of the Sirti Injunction upon an assumed Vedic Injunction inferred to form part of a different Branch of the Veda; because, as it is, the Smrtz by itself has no injunctive power, and is not equal in its own authority to the contrary Vedic Injunction. The Bhdshya says (inreply to the above question): This cannot be: because we accept two statements as optional alternatives, only when we do not perceive one of them to be a distinctly mistaken one. And as we have shown above, one of the two Injunctions must be held to be a mistaken one; and in this the mistake cannot but be laid at the door of the Smriz. The compound =" Vyaimohaviygnainan”’ may be explained either as a Genitive-Tutpurusha—the meaning in that case being ‘ the ascertainment of another cognition’—or as a Karmadharaya, the meaning being ‘the mistaken character of the cognition itself.’ Says the Bhashya: One who would accept the theory of option in the present case would be accepting the authority of the Vedtc Text, when he would touch the post; and as this authority & that of a direct Vedic Text, if it ts once accepted, it can never be reasonably taken as having only a partial appli- cation. And this is to be taken as proving the fact that, inasmuch as all chance of the Omri: text being based upon the Veda is cut off, it can- not but be held to have its root in Illusion. And if such character of the 8११४४ once admits of the authority of its contradictory Vedic Text, the authority of this latter can never be suspected to be partial; because the Veda can never be reasonably open to an imposition of falsity ; itis with this-view that the Bhdshya says tt can never have a partial application. And as for the Smrti text laying down the covering up of the whole post, as 16 18 always shrouded in the cloud of unauthoritativeness, and is never DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 147 capable of being cleared from it, this Smrtz 18 also said in the Bhdshya to be never partial (in its unauthoritativeness). Or, if we accept the reading (in the Bhdshya) ^“ Pakshikanca” (instead of “ Apdkshikanca’), the meaning would be that even in accordance with the option-theory, at the time that we would accept the alternative laid down by the Veda, there would be no chance of the assumption of a Vedic Text in support of the contrary Smyéz Injunction ; and as such, we would be obliged to conclude the Smyti text to be based upon ignorance, &c.; and hence it could never clear itself from this taint of falsity, and so it could never be accepted as authoritative. As for the Vedic Text, on the other hand, when it has once got the slightest occasion for asserting its authority, 1t can never be set aside as false, because its opponent (the contrary Gmyii Text) is very much weaker than itself (and as such can never set aside the authority of the Veda). It 18 with this in view that the Bhdshya says: That which serves as the basis of the authority of the Vedic Text, at the time that rts injunction 25 accepted as the desired alternative, §c., &c. It cannot be reasonably urged that the reading of the Vedic Text (that is found to contradict a Smrit Text) is wrong; inasmuch as it appears quite possible for the Smrti itself to have its origin in such faulty sources as a wrong comprehension of the Vedic Text, or illusory dream-like cogni- tions. The Bhashya says: Thus then, 2४ cannot be assumed that the idea has been wrongly transferred to the Veda. And by ‘idea’ here is meant the idea of its authoritative character ; and by the negation of the expression wrong- ly transferred to the Veda, what is meant is the denial of the fact of assum- ing the partial unauthoritativeness of the Veda by the assumption of the fact of its consisting of mistaken statements. Or, 16 may mean that the idea brought about by the Smyti having previously (at the time when the Vedic alternative is accepted) found to be a mistaken one, it can never attain even to partial authoritativeness; and thus the passage may also serve to point out the fact of the Simrt: text being contradicted by the Vedic one, specially on account of the former having its origin in Illusion &९. Says the Bhashya: Because the origin of the Smrti ts the same in both cases. That is to say, inasmuch as the 6817212 has been set aside by a yery much stronger opponent, in the shape of the Veda, all possibility of the assumption of a corroborative Vedic text is closed for ever; and as such the Smrtt can never attain to any sort of authoritativeness. | Says the Bhashya: Api ca ttarétardgraye anyatahparicchéddt ; and in this sentence the expression ^ itar8tardcraya’”’ means mutual contradiction, as explained below. In acase where two means of cognitions are found to 148 PANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I—PADA i1I-—~ADHI it. contradict each other, exactly like the syllogistic Middle Term which is concomitant both with the Major Term and its contradictory, the point at issue can be decided only by a third means of cognition. The Bhdshyw here has used the expression “ pramandyam smrtau” and the Vditika raises a grammatical difficulty: “If the word pramdna be taken as equivalent to the word jnana (neuter),—or, even if it be explained as that which is cognised (made up with the nominal affix lyut),—we should have had the form pramdné smrtau, exactly as we have Védah pramanam ; if, however, it be explained as that by which something ४5 cognised (made up with an Instrnmental affix), it should have to be used in the same gender and person as the word it qualifies (the word ‘‘ Smrtt”); and as such a final ‘7’ will have to be added to the word, according to Panini’s Sitva 1 ४ -- i—15; andthe word having thus been transformed into pramdani, the above clause should have been pramdnyaim smrtau.”’ Finding the Bhashya to be grammatically inconsistent in both ways, with a view to defend the expression in the Bhdshya, we should have recourse to the following arguments: The Smrtz can be rightly spoken of as pramand,—this latter word meaning that which attains tts authority in a corroborative Vedic text, the word being formed by adding the affix Kvip to the root ‘ay’ (to go or to reach) (the meaning of the expres- sion being ‘when the Smrtt atiains an authority based upon a corrobora- tive Vedic text’). (The formation of the word ‘ Pramana” being thus grammatically explained, Pramana + ay + Kvip, the ya of the root being deleted, on account of its being followed by the Ka in Kvip, which 18 included in the pratyahdra ‘bal,’ in accordance with Panini’s 69/10 VI— i—66; and as for the letters of the ‘ Krip’ affix itself, it disappears entirely, the ‘K’ being deleted according to I—iii—8 the ‘v’ by VI—1 —67, the ‘2’ according to I—ni—2, and ‘p’ according to I—iii—8). Though the affix Kvip will be the first to be deleted, on the ground of its deletion being necessary in all cases, and thereby the ‘ya’ of the root will not have a following ka, yet we will have the deletion of the ya of the root, through the potency of the letter ‘%’ of the affix which leaves this potency behind, (even when the affix is deleted), in accordance with the Satva I—i—62. Nor can it be urged that there could be no such dele- tion, based upon the peculiarities of any letter ; because the 6४८१८ VI—i— 66 distinctly lays down the deletion of the letters ‘v’ and ‘y’ when followed by the letters included in the ‘bal’ pratyahdra (this ‘ bal’ being not a letter, but an afiv). Or, we may divide the Siaira VI—i—67, into two parts “véh” and “aprktasya,’’ and thus the first part would mean that the letters ‘v’ and ‘y’ when followed by ‘vi’ are deleted; and in accordance with this, the ‘y’ of the root ‘ay’ becomes deleted, on account of its being followed by the ‘vi’ in ‘kuip’ (the ‘k’ always disappear ing DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 149 as soon as the affix is brought in). And thus the ‘y’ having been de- leted, all that remains is Pramdna + a and then the feminine sign of ‘a’ being added, in accordance with the Sutra IV-—i—4, we have the form pramana + a + ठत, and the second ‘a’ blending with the final ‘ a,’ we have pramaina + ठ, according to the Satva VI—1—101, which also tends to the ‘@’ being blended with the preceding ‘a’, and we get the word ‘ Pramiind.’ The Vdrttka next proceeds to explain that the expression “ itarétarda- eraya”’’ of the Bhdshya, can also be taken in the ordinary sense of ‘ mutual interdependence.’ We find that the autloritativeness of the Smpéi text is based upon the unauthoritativeness of the contrary Vedic Text; and the unauthoritativeness of the Vedic Text is inferred from the authoritative- ness of the Smrii Text. Similarly, on the other hand, the unauthorita- tiveness of the Smrti is inferred on the strength of the authoritativeness of the Veda; and the authoritativeness of the Vedic Text is ascertained from the unauthoritativeness of the Smyit Text. And thus, for one who would accept the two texts to be optional alternatives, there could be no escape from the two “iwarétardgrayas”’ explained above; whereas for one who totally rejects the authority of the Smrti Text (contrary to the Veda), there is only one kind of ^ aarétardgraya,” (that of mutual interdepen- dence, just explained, and it is not open to the contradiction that has been shown to attach to the Option Theory). And as in the case of the mutual contradiction of two means of cogni- tion, the matter in question can be ascertained by a third means; so it becomes necessary, in the present case, to point out the third means; and this means has been pointed out by the Bhdshya (in the shape of a reason for accepting one text and rejecting the other): The authority of the touch- ing of the post ts a permanent entity (in the shape of the Veda), while that of the Smrtc Teat (laying down the covering up of the post) has got to be assumed. And here we find that this third means is not one that is alto- gether unconnected with the two objects of discussion (४,९.) the two texts). And the two texts we had found to be open to the discrepancy of “ ttarétara- praya’’; consequently, inasmuch as we do not find the discrepancy in the third reason pointed out, we are enabled, by its help, to come to a definite satisfactory conclusion. The Veda being self-sufficient in its authority, the authoritativeness of the Vedic Text has an unimpeded permanence; whiere- as the authoritativeness of the Smrt: being dependent upon the assumption of a corroborative Vedic Text, its authority has still got to be assumed. Thus we find that the authoritativeness of the 6711८ depends upon the rejection of the authority of a direct Vedic Assertion; while the authority of this Vedic Text is rejected on the sole ground of the authorita- tive character of the Smrit Text (which it contradicts); and this mutual interdependence cannot by any means be avoided. 150 TANTRA-VARTIKA~-ADHYAYA I—PADA UI—~AaDHI 1. As a matter of fact, however, no amount of assumed unauthoritative- ness can touch the Veda; and so long as this unauthoritativeness has not been established, there is no chance for the authoritativeness of the Smrés. For one, who is ambitious enough to think of acquiring glory by suppress- ing one who is stronger than himself, cannot but be quickly annihilated, ex- actly as the foot-soldier is destroyed by the elephant. And consequently, in the very action of the assumption of the authoritative character of the Smréi, its upholder becomes vanquished (by the superior strength of the Veda). On the other hand, when we proceed to consider the aforesaid ‘mutual interdependeuce,’ as applying to the acceptance of the superior authority of the Vedic Text, we find that here, it is through the authorita- tiveness of the contrary Smriz Text that the Vedic Text attains to an undisputed authority ; and consequently, when we proceed to seek for the ground for rejecting the authority of the ७7111६४, we find that from the very beginuing, the Smriz by itself (without the support of the Veda) is ever unauthoritative; and thus (before it has succeeded in pointing to an assumed Vedic Text as its authority) even a single moment having been found by the contrary Vedic Text, this latter fully asserts its own authority during that time (aud leaves no opportunity for the assumption of any texts). That is to say, when we have just found the Smrti Text, and have not yet got at its corroborative Vedic Text, we conclude, at least for the time, the Smrti Text to be without any authority; and by this mere fact the authority of the contrary Vedic Text having been established, its authority remains for ever unmolested; and this conclusion is got at by ४ means other than the two texts themselves. Thus then, we find that in one case, (४.6.) when we have the Vedic Text alone), the authoritative character of that Text is ascertained through its inherent self-sufficient authority ; while in the other case (t.e., when we have come across a contradictory ७०५८४ Text, the authoritative- 1688 of the Vedic Text is ascertained from the (aforesaid) momentary un- authoritativeness of the Smrii. And when the Vedic Text has once asserted its authority, at the first moment, basing it upon a certain basis (of the temporary unauthoritativeness of the Smriz Text),—it gets a firm footing in its complete form long before the next moment (of the assump- tion of a text corroborative of the ७४४८४) has fully appeared. The Bhashya explains this, in one way, in the passage—As the basts of the Smyti has still got to be assumed, its authority cannot be ascertained ; specially so long as its corroborative Vedic Text has not been found,—on account of there being no grounds for assuming it. The other way of explaining the same thing is that when once the Vedic Text has obtained an authoritative footing, it cannot but be kept up until finally its authority becomes beyond all cavil and dispute. DIRECT VEDIC DECLARATIONS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 15] In the cases of an acknowledged option—such as those of Vrihi and Yava, and the Brhatsdma and the Rathantarasdma,—we accept the option, because there is no way out of it; specially as the injunctions being found in the Veda, there is no difference in their force, as there is in the case of two men, one standing on a step higher than the other (४,९.) none of the two stand in need of the intervention of the authority of any assumed texts) ; and as such, both being of equal strength, we can have no reasonable pre- ference for either the one or the other; and hence in such cases, we must admit of option, as explained before. Thus we conclude that no authority attaches to such Smrti texts, as are contradictory to direct Assertions of the Veda. End of Adhikarana (2). ADHIKARANA (38). [Treating of the unauthoritative character of such Smrti Texts as have their origin in ordinarily perceived worldly objects]. Sutra 4. (Also because we find reasons). For the following reason too, the 811244४5 in question cannot be accepted as authoritative $ because we find them to be due to other causes, Nor 18 it possible to assume the existence of corroborative Vedic Texts either by pre- ference or by Apparent Inconsistency, on the ground of the authors of the Smrtis being such persons as were the performers of the actions laid down in the Veda. Because this reason is found to be too wide (and as such not invariably pointing to an authoritative text). For when the capability of the Smrti to point to a corroborative text has been destroyed by the contrary Vedic Text, we can have no inference of any such text; and then, when we proceed to look for the source of the Smyti elsewhere, we find its sources, sometimes in Illusion, sometimes in Avarice, and sometimes in perversions of arguments,—any or all of these being incapable of being denied as a sufficient cause of such freaks of imagination (as we meet with in the Smriis). These sources can belong only to such Smrtis as have been maimed by a contrary Vedic Text, and not to the Vedic Text itself ; because a contradic- tion of the Veda always sets aside the Smrti, and never vice versd. It may be argued that-—‘‘ Just as we are unable to find a basis for the Qmrtz in any Vedic Text, in the same way, we may be unable to find its basis any- where else (in Illusion, etc.).” In view of this question, the Bhdshya adds— It is more reasonable (and more in keeping with facts) to assume its basis in Illusion, etc., than in the Veda; because when we can find any perceptible basis (in Illusion, etc.), we can have no ground for an unseen one (in the Veda). [The above explanation makes the Sutra a part of the preceding Adhikaraga]. It may also be taken as an independent Adhikarana, says the Bhaishya. Whenever an alternative interpretation is suggested, there can be CERTAIN SMRTI TEXTS NOT AUTHORITATIVE. 153 only one of the following two reasons: (1) either that the former explana- tion is not quite satisfactory, or (2) that the second explanation brings out certain facts not got at by means of the former. And in the present case, the unsatisfactory character of the former interpretation consists in tho fact that when the unauthoritative character of the contrary Smrti Text has been already established on the excep- tionally strong ground of its being contradicted by Vedic Texts, it is not much use bringing forward further arguments in support of the same conclusion. On the other hand, when we take the Sara as a distinct Adhikarana by itself, we find it affording an argument, which, independ- ently of the former arguments (detailed in the preceding Adhikarana), is capable of setting aside the authority of the Smrti texts; and for this reason we oxplain 1४ as constituting an Adhikarana by itself. In the case of such Smrti texts, as are not directly contradicted by the Véda, and yet are incapable of any authoritativeness, we find other reasons for asserting this unauthoritativencss ; and: there is no possibility of such texts being set aside by any means (other than those pointed out by this Sdétra). For instance, the Smrli lays down— The Adhvaryu priest takes the cloth worn at the Vaisarjana Homa”; and it is in accordance with this that the priest takes away the cloth in which the Soma is brought, and also that worn by the Sacrificer during the performance of the Vatsarjana Homa ; and though this Injunction is not found in any of the metrical texts of Manu, &c., yet it is inferred on the strength of such being the practice of the priests. Similarly we have a Smytt injunction laying down the giving away of the ^ yzpahastt,” by which the cloth enclosing the sacrificial post is meant; and this acceptance of the cloth by the priest is also based upon an Injunction, which is itself based upon the fact of such being the recognised practice of priests. In the case of these Smrtis too, though 1६ would seem that, inasmuch as the performers of such deeds are the performers of Vedic sacrifices, these injunctions must havea basis in the Veda, yet no assumption of such Vedic texts is possible; because they may be explained as being due to avarice, &c. The priests know that the sacrificer is bound to them as it were, on account of the necessity of his finishing the sacrifice that he has commonced, and alsothat he would be free from their clutches as soon as it 1s finished ; and consequently, while he is still busy with the sacrifice, they beg from him various things, basing their petitions upon various claims, and also up- on imaginary texts laying down and eulogising the gifts asked for, where- by they seek to convince him of the sacred character of their petitions ; and in this they behave exactly like the slaves at the harvest, who prefer several requests to their master, basing their requests upon long established claims of sorts. And the Sacrificer too finds the texts that the priests bring 20 154 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I-~PADA IlI——-ADHI 71, forward to be similar to the well-known Vedic texts laying down other gifts ; and thereby being convinced of the necessity of the gifts asked for by them gives them the things they ask for; and consequently the Smrti texts may be those very imaginary texts, whose tradition has been kept up by a line of selfish priests; and while we have this suspicion, no assumption of a Vedic text in support of such texts is possible, And as shown above, it is far more reasonable to conclude them to be due to avarice, &c.; and so the uspicion becomes a certainty. And it may be pointed ont that this fact has already been hinted by the Bhdshya, by the expression “ Tulyakdranatvat ” (४.6. the fact of avarice being the source applies to the case of the Vaisaryana cloth, as also to the covering of the post). But with reference to the two foregoing Adhikaranas, the following points are worth consideration :— The fact of the Smrtis being based upon the Veda having been fully established, even if, perchance, a certain Smrti text be found to be con- tradicted by a certain Vedic text, how can we attribute it to such other causes (as Illusion and the rest) 7 It is a well-known fact that Vedic texts are scattered over various branches of the Veda, known to different persons; and that they do not occur in the Veda in the order in which they are used at the performance of sacrifices ; and consequently, it 1s only right that, with a view to protect intact the context of the whole Veda, the authors of Smrtis, when laying down the performance of certain actions, should not quote the Vedic texts themselves; but simply point to them, by means of expressing the 82116 sense in their own words, and then collect them as such in one place; and in so doing the words used by these authors serve to indicate the words of the Vedic texts (which are themselves not available), exactly in the same manner as certain distinctions of tone, accent, &c. (serve to indicate the different meanings of words, &c.) And as, when a student goes toa teacher with a book in his hand, when the teacher points out a certain text as forming part of the work, even though it be not found (in the particular book carried by the student) he accepts the text as true; in the same man- ner, the words of the authors of the Kulpasitras, occupying with us the same position as the words of the teacher, simply point to the existence of Vedic texts in keeping with themselves; and as itis only in this pointing out that their function ceases, they cannot be rejected as unauthoritative, on the ground of their proceeding from a human source; exactly as though proceeding from them, yet the distinctions of tones, accents, &c., are not rejected as altogether unauthoritative, OBRTAIN SMRTI TEXTS NOT AUTHORITATIVE. 185 Then again, that the Vedas are in such and such a form can be point- ed out by such men as either read or remember them; and no difference is made whether the one or the other means is employed. As at the time that the person is not actually repeating the Veda, even those who have read it all up, retain the Veda either by the impressions left by them, or by his memory (and in the case of Remembrance also, the text is retained by memory). Thus then those Vedic texts, whose sense is remembered and reproduced (by the authors of the Kalpasiitras), and as such clearly pointed out as really existing in the Veda, are equal in authority to those texts that are directly found in the Veda as one may have learnt it; and as such, on what grounds could they be rejected? If a single 91017४४ work could be found to be, through and through, against the Veda, then alone could we reject that work, and employ the others (in our prac- tice). (But no such Smrt: work is found). As a matter of fact, all the Smrtis that we know of,—such for instance, as those treating of the Upanayana, §c.,—are found to be based upon direct Vedic texts, of the several rescensions, the Katha, the Maztrdyani, and the rest; and if by chance any single sentence in such GQmrti, be found to be not in keeping with Vedic texts, we dare not conclude, on the strength of that solitary in- stance, that that particular Smyiz text must have its origin elsewhere (in the realms of Illusion, &c.) And when such a Smit text is rejected by some person, over-fond of logical reasoning, if he is soon made acquainted with a Vedic text, of a different Cakhd, corroborating that very Smrti, how sorry would the countenance become, of this clever logician? And (as the Smrti text would be found to be contradicted by one Vedic text and corroborated by the other) there could be no certainty as to whether its authority 18 to be rejected or accepted. As for the Smrtv text enjoining the covering up of the whole post, which has been cited as an instance of a text contradictory to the Vedic text laying down the touching of the post,—this Smryéz text 1s entirely corro- borated by direct Vedic texts ; as has been clearly shown by Jaimini him- self in his work the ^“ Chandogydnupada,” as also while dealing with the subject of the ^ Audumbari yipa” as laid down by direct Vedic texts of the Cakata@yant Bréhmana,—where it is pointed out that the people belonging to the Cakata@yanz Rescenion, should, in covering the post, have the “ thread-ends”’ at the top; which distinctly shows the necessity of its being covered by cloth, as is also pointed out by the following text: ^ ४०6 cloth is praised, the cloth is prosperity, the cloth 18 peace ;” and in connec- tion with this, Jaimini bas (in the aforesaid work) also explained the cover- ing of the Audumbari post by a piece of cloth as being based upon direct Vedic texts. And thus being based upon Vedic texts, how can it serve as the instance of a text to be rejected as unauthoritative ? On the other hand, it 156 TANTRA-VARVIKA—ADHYAYA I—PADA III—ADHI II. is only proper to accept it as laying down an optional alternative to the Vedic text ; as both have been found to be equally strong in their authority. As a matter of fact, however, there would have been a possibility of its being totally rejected, only if there were a real contradiction ; but in the present case, there is no contradiction at all ; for mere covering cannot be contradicted by the text that enjoins its touching. Because if the post were covered up, leaving a few inches uncovered, could not the touching be very well done? That the whole of the post should be covered is not laid down in the Kalpasttra; and as 8 matter of fact too, nobody covers it near the root of its ears. Even if the particle ‘part’ (in the Sdaira) were taken to imply the covering of the whole post, then too the Swtra would have its purpose fulfilled even if the post were left uncovered in the small place (near its ear). It has been said that this covering of the whole of the post can only have originated in the greed (of the priest for the cloth); but the greed would have been better satisfied by covering the lower and the upper parts by two pieces, exactly as two are used by females for the lower and upper coverings (which would give the priest two instead of only one piece) ; and then again, the priest should have laid down that it should be a splendid silk cloth ; and not that it should be one only, and that too without any qualifications. That the injunctions of the various coverings are not due to any greed on the part of the priest 1s amply proved by the injunction that the post is to be covered by Kuga grass; and it is after the post has been covered by the Kuga grass that it is covered by the cloth. Artd certainly in the case of the text laying down the covering by Kuca, no such cause (as that of greed and the like) can be found; and in the case of the cloth-covering also, we cannot find any such cause for the restriction that the cloth should have its thread-ends pointing upwards. As for the text that lays down the propriety of eating at the place of the Sacrificer when he has pruchased the Soma, it is a text from the Atharva Veda; and certainly there can be no reason for asserting its un- authoritativeness. Even though this particular text of the Atharva Veda does not serve any purpose in connection with sacrifices, yet what is there to set aside its authority with regard to other matters ? The performance of Cantt (pacification of evil influences), Pushti (actions meant to bring pro- sperity) and Abhicdra (killing of enemies, &.), are all laid down in the Atharva Veda, as to be performed for the sake of the same person (that performs the sacrifices), and by the very same priest; and thus we find that the Atharva Veda serves the purposo of explaining its own particular province of Actions, exactly in the same way as the other three Vedas do with regard to their respective subjects (of the performance of the various sacrifices, &c.) (And as such there is no reason why the authority of the CHRTAIN SMRTI TEXTS NOT AUTHORITATIVE, 157 Atharea Veda should be rejected in favour of that of the other three Vedas). And again, the Injunction of eating (at the place of the Sacrificer who has purchased the Soma) does not refer to any part of the sacrifice ; exactly as the actions of Canti, &c.,donotform part of any ; therefore both (the Hating and the (anti) referring simply to a desirable purpose of man, the authority of the Injunction of the said Hating cannot be reasonably re- jected (४.९. as the Hating is not a part of the sacrifice, the authority of the Atharva Veda cannot be doubted with regard to it). (The Hating does not form part of any sacrifice because) it has been laid down, not with any special reference either to the sacrificer or to the priests, but with regard to nll men in general. There are certain other texts that prohibit a man to eat at the place of one who has been initiated for a sacrifice ; and we find two texts that allow him to eat at the sacrificer’s place ; but each of the texts defines different limits of time,—one of them allowing of the eating only when the sacrificer has finished the ^ Agnishuma-sans- tha,’ and the other pointing out the “ purchasing of the Soma” as the time after which one could eat at his place; and (there is no contradiction between the two texts, as) they can be taken as laying down alternative restrictions ; exactly as there are alternatives laid down with regard to the cessation of the various ‘‘ Periods of Impurity ’—(where we do not reject any one alternative in favour of another). An objection is raised: ^“ The distinction that is made in the periods ‘fof ‘impurity ’ is due to considerations of the impediments to the perform- “ance of sacrifices; and for this reason the various limits of impurity ‘fare not equally authoritative; and as such they cannot be accepted as ‘alternatives. One who could become purified, or capable of feeding others, ९८ 17 a shorter time,—why should he wait for the lapse of the longer time P «Thus then, if the Brahmana could become pure after the lapse of either “one or threo days, how could the impurity ever continue for ten days 7 ८ Because by ‘ purity ’ is meant the disappearance of sin, or the capability ‘“‘of performing sacrifices; and how could these properties he held to be ९८ both existent and non-existent, before the lapse of ten days? In the same ‘‘manner, in the case of the food given by the initiated sacrificer, we can ‘never know it to be both pure and impure, before the Agnishomasanstha ५ 088 been finished. “Tt may be argued that—‘ The limit of the impurity in the case “of each person may be acknowledged to be that which he and his fore- “‘fathers have been accepting from before, exactly as whether the ९८ Agnihotra offerings are to be made before or after sunrise, is decided by “what the man himself or his forefathers may have been doing (and as we ‘“ accept the two times to be optional, so too we can also hold the limits of ‘* purity to be optional).’ 158 १ प 24 -४^ 1६111 + --- ^ 7 प्र & र 4 I—-PADA III—ADHI III. ‘‘But this cannot be; because in the case of the two times of “the Agnihotra, both are equally authoritative; and hence an option ०८ 18 allowable; nor, in this case, is any contradiction of any previous “text (as there 1s in the case of the food, the mention of its purity “ being contradictory to that of its impurity, before the finishing of the “ Agnishoma). Because the mention of the advisability of making the ‘offering before sunrise does not make that of making it after sunrise alto- ‘gether useless. And further in this case, the two alternatives do not “ differ in the least, inthe amount of trouble and expense that each in- “volves. While, on the other hand, in the case in question, if the purity “that is accomplished in a shorter time, be postponed till a much longer «५ time,—this action would in the first place be in direct contradiction to ‘such express injunctions (of Manu), as that one should not extend the period “of impurity ; secondly, the acceptance of the longer period involves a m) ८ greater trouble ; and as such no one could accept it ; and as no one w द, “accept it, the declaration of this longer period would become absolutely “aseless. Therefore until we can find out some reason or object for the two “declarations, we cannot admit them as optional ; and such object, or reason, ५५ {01 the lessening of the number of impure days, we have found to lie in the considerations of the impediments to the proper performance of sacrifices, ८५ (४.९. a8 the greater number of the days of impurity would keep the per- ५५ 8011 away from sacrifices for a longer time, the period is shortened) ; and. “in this case there is no extension of the period of impurity; and ५५ 98 for shorter periods of impurity, we find these limited to—(1) four “days, (2) three days, and (3) one day—in the case, respectively, of the “deaths of the child, (1) that has cut its teeth, (2) that after whom ‘another child has been born, and (3) that which has not had its tonsure ; ‘and in these cases too, there is no extension of the period of impurity. “ Says Gautama (laying down reasons for the lessening of the period of “impurity): It is done, for the sake of the proper transaction of business, in ५५ the case of the Kshatriya, and for the performance of sacrifices, 1m the cuse of “the Brahamana “Or, it may be that the injunction of not extending the period ‘of impurity may have its application in a case where another cause “of impurity comes about within ten days from the first cause, im ५५ which case the lapse of these ten days purifies the man from the “impurities due to both events. The meaning of the said injunction . “would, thus, come to be that one should not extend the period of ime ‘‘ purity, even if a cause for further impurity comes about; because the ‘period of the former impurity would apply to the latter also; and hence ५५ 16 is that when the ten-day period of impurity due to a certain cause has ‘begun, aud has not come to an end, before another event happens in the CERTAIN 8MRTI TEXTS NOT AUTHORITATIVE. 159 “anterim, the former includes this latter; because the number of day “limited to fen spreads over all these ten days completely, and as such it ‘is only proper that 16 should have its sway over any other event that ‘may happen within its limits, and thereby limit the period of impurity ‘ due to this latter. Purity and Impurity being imperceptible entities are ‘‘ accepted, just as they are declared to be in Vedic texts (and as such we “cannot always find a reason for the continuance or cessation of the “periods of impurity due to various causes). “In the case of the eating (at the place of the initiated sacrificer), “however, we do not find any cause or object for any limit; and hence (५ {16 longer limit would always be rejected in favour of the shorter. “Consequently it is absolutely necessary to find out an object for “the laying down of the two limits. It may be urged that—‘ in the ° 0886 of the said eating also, when it is impossible to wait for the “longer limit, or when the sacrificer happens to offer the food (which is ८ 906 considered right to refuse), then (under these two contingencies) ‘* his food may be taken, even after he has only finished the purchase of the “Soma. The Dharmagastras have often laid down certain secondary ‘‘ causes of action, to be followed, in times of trouble, when it is impossible “to follow the course primarily Jaid down; and in the same manner, it ‘may be held that when one is on the point of death by starvation, he ‘* can partake of the food given by the initiated sacrificer, even if this latter ¢ 4 may only have purchased the Soma at that time.’ Well, this is only “another way of declaring the injunction of the shorter limit to be un- ५८ authoritative; because, in the event of starvation, Vicvamitra even ate “of the thigh of a dead dog (which does not mean that the eating of the dog is allowable.” To all this, we make the following reply: In one case (as in the case of the eating of the dog) a certain evil deed is unavoidably done, which is not expressly permitted; and in another (as in the case of eating at the _ place of the sacrificer when he has purchased the Soma) that which is done as unavoidable, is also expressly permitted; and certainly, this con- titutes a deal of difference. It cannot be denied that there is a difference between ४16 general permission (that in troublous times men can, ‘under pressure of circumstances, do prohibited deeds), and a specific permission (that such and such an act is to be done); because there is no sin attach- ing to this latter act, while to the former, there is a slight taint of it. Manu also has laid down the following, with regard to the course of action permissible in times of trouble: ‘The sins committed during such calamit- ous times will be purified when such times have ९6१86 ; and the person, who has lowered himself by the performance of a slightly evil or a gravely heinous deed, can purify himself, when (on favourable times having 160 TANTRA-VARTIKAADHYAYA I—-PADA II[-—ADHI III. arrived) he is able to do so, by the performance of deeds of righteousness.’ And the first act of righteousness that will have to be performed would be in the shape of an expiatory rite; and when the man will have purified himself by its means, then aloue will he be entitled to the performance of such other acts, as will bring to him particular desirable results, (7.¢., the various sacrifices ), | | Thus then, it must be admitted that the injunction, that permits the eating at the place of one who has purchased the Soma, is meant to imply that, in a case where there is no other means of saving one’s self from star- vation, if he eats at his place, he does not, by that, commit a sinful act. And in this connection, it may also be pointed out, that in a case where one is able to abide by the primary injunction, if he has recourse to the se- condary alternative, he does not obtain the proper results,—as has been explained in the case of sacrifices. Thus then, inasmuch as the accept- ance of the simple alternative, without sufficient grounds for the renounc- ing of the chief injunction, has been condemned as useless (and not permis. sible), it must be concluded that when it is possible for the man to obtain food elsewhere, he should not, for mere worldly reasons, partake of food at the place of the sacrificer, (if he has only purchased the Soma, and not finished the Agnishoma-Sansthak). Or, we may explain the case in the following manner: The two courses of action referring to different points of time, and thereby not being cap- able of being taken as equally authoritative alternatives, we must explain away their seeming contradiction, by finding different purposes (or signi- fications) for them. (And this is done in the following manner): So long as the initiated sacrificer has not purchased the cow, any partaking of his food is never allowable; and when he has purchased the Soma (one might oat at his place, but), if one desist from such eating even then (and wait until the finishing of the Sansth@), he would be imposing upon himself a certain penance, which is by no means compulsory (though leading to excel- lent results), exactly as the not partaking of any food at the Craddha ceremo- nies, or of giving up the eating of meat,—which, as penances, are good and bring about very good results, though they are by no means compulsory; as neither the eating at Craddhas, nor the partaking of meat, is absolutely pro- hibited. Because what 18 absolutely prohibited is the eating at a place where a Crdddha is performed, within the ten days of impurity, as also (according to some authors) the eating at the Anniversary- Craddhas; and there is no prohibition of eating at all functions that are performed in honour of the Forefathers; and hence we understand that if one desists from eating at all such functions, he is performing a particular penance, which leads him to Henven. In the same manner, the eating of meat is absolutely prohibited on the sixth, eighth, fourteenth, and fifteenth (and the CERTAIN SMRTT TEXTS NOT AUTHORITATIVE. 161 thirtieth) days of the month; and from this it follows that the house- holder can eat it on the other days, if he so wish it; and hence if one desists from its cating, he acquires a peculiarly excellent merit; as has been expressly laid down (by Manu): ‘There is no harm in cating meat, or in drinking wine, &c.; such is the general inclination of men; but cessa- tion from these leads to excellent results.’ The opponent may argue thus: ‘ In the case of the eating of food at ‘‘a place where a Craddha is being performed, we find that there are in- ‘reality two distinct sentences; and as such we can interpret it as two ‘sentences; in the case in question, on the other hand, there is a single ‘sentence prohibiting the eating of any food at the house of one who has “been initiated for a sacrifice; and as such, how can the single sentence ‘express two (unconnected) facts, as that one should not eat before the “person has purchased the Soma, and also that if one does not eat at his ‘place before he has finished {116 Agnishomiya-Sanstha, he will be obtaining “excellent results £ ' 10 this, we reply as follows: The latter may also be taken as two sentences, as laying down distinct limits; the former general prolibition of eating ends with the purchase of the Soma; and we do not connect the second limit with this general prohibition; because this latter is one only (and as such cannot reasonably be connected with two limits). And then from the fact of there being a second permission (that one can eat at the place when the Sansiha@ has been finished), we infer that there must be some other prohibition of the eating referring to the time intervening between the purchasing of the Soma and the finishing of the 675८117 (and that the latter injunction sets aside the inferred prohibition). Otherwise (if there were no such intermediate prohibition, why should that, which has been already permitted (by the sentence that permits the eating after the Soma has been purchased), be permitted again (by the sentence permitting the eating after the Sanstha has been finished) 7 For instance, when the sacrifical pricst has got his permission at the very beginning, what would be the use of according him another permission for the performance of the Nirvapa? At the time that the priest 18 appointed, the sacrificer already accords him the permis- sion to do everything in connection with the sacrifice; and hence the word ‘prasava’ in the Mantra employed at the Nirvapa is not taken as indicating another permission by the sacrificer. In the same man- ner, the permission of eating accorded by the passage that lays down the purchase of Soma as the limit would be needlessly repeated in the permission accorded by that which lays down the finishing of the Sanstha as the limit; and in order to avoid this, we must admit, either that the desisting from eating between the two mentioned limits is a particular ४1 162 TANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I—PADA TILI-—~ADHI III, penance bringing about excellent results,—or that the latter passage permits the eating which has been prohibited by another (inferred) passage which operates between the time included between the two limits. And as the permitting of that which has been prohibited gives rise to the notion of an option, such a process is open to the eightfold disorepancies (of an Option, as explained above). For these reasons, we conclude that the permission is only of that which had been set aside as an oxception (by the inferred intermediate prohibition). That is to say, this intermediate passage (whose existenco we have inferred) serves to lay down, for those who may be desirous of ce:tain excellent results, an observance, in the shape of the not- eating of the food of the initiated person (even after he has purchased the Soma); because before such a passage, the second permission would be meaningless; specially as it cannot be accepted as a distinct Injunction ; as in that case we would have to assume an invisible Transcendental Result (to follow from the act of eating after the Sanstha has been finished). Thus then, the purpose and the object of the two passages (laying down the two limits of abstaining from the food of the sacrificer) being entirely different, they cannot be said to contradict each other. As for the Smrti text that enjoins tho life of the religious student for forty-eight years, this has been mentioned, in the Smrtis also, only as an alternative course; or,it may be explained as referring to conditions of life other than that of the prospective householder; and as such there is no contradiction by this of the said Vedic text. Manu speaks of the person “having studied the three, two or even one Veda, in due order”; and from this it is clear that the three alternatives are laid down, either in consideration of the diverse capabilities of different students, or as referring to different conditions of life. Gautama bas also declared that— “with a view to the studying of one Veda, the man should remain a student for twelve years’”’; and this 18 the first alternative, laid down for those desirous of soon entering into the householder’s state. And as the second alternative, he lays down the necessity of leading the student’s life, extending to twelve years for each Veda,—thus making up a sum total of forty-eight years. And in connection with these alternatives, we can make the following distinction: The longer period has been laid down for those that are either blind, or lame, or otherwise incapable of entering upon the duties of the householder. For such people, there is either life-long studentship, or a life of Renunciation ; and as such, they can very well accept the longer course of study, which is thus laid down for them, to prepare them, from the very beginning, for their religious life. Because it is only right that the Upakurvanaka student (who is incapable of affording any help to CERTAIN SMRTE 1122648 NOY" AUTHORITATIVE. 163 others, in the shape of wife or children), should spend the greater part of his life in long-continued study; as that would endow him with great knowledge; and as such having all his sins destroyed by means of pious deeds (of worship, Japa and the like), and thereby becoming duly purified by means of pure study, he would reach the desirable goal, even if he succeeds in fulfilling only a few of the ordinary duties of life. Dvaipayana and others have also declared thus—‘ The Bréhmana having all his duties accomplished by means of pure study, may or may not do any other actions; and he 18 called a ‘Maitra-Brahmana.’ ” Then again, we find it declared that the daily performance of such ace tions as the study and explanations of the three Vedas and the various Sé#iras, &e.—which go under the name of ‘ Brahmayajna’—bring about certain results, in the shape of Heaven and the like; and if these were taken to apply tosuch persons also as are capable of, and entitled to, the performances of the various sacrifices, then the Injunctions of these elaborate sacrifices (as leading to such results as Heaven and the like) would become abso- lutely useless ; and consequently we take them as referring to the life-long Student and the Renunciate, who are entitled only to such actions as Japu and Meditation; and as the results following from such actions become greater by a greater knowledge of the Veda, the Smrtis lay down twelve years as the time to be employed in the study of each Veda. Or, it may be that if a student turns out to be exceptionally clever, and quickly reads up all the four Vedas, not neglecting, within the same time, a full comprehension of the meaning of the Veda, he can certainly take his stand upon the Injunction—that the life of the religious student should last only so long as the Vedas have not been studied—and can accordingly enter into the state of the householder directly (7.e., even before he has completed the twelve years); and in the case of this person, the particular Injunction has set aside both the injunctions that lay down, respectively, twelve and forty-eight years as the extent of studentship. Consequently then, (inasmuch as these are only various alternatives laid down in accordance with the exigencies of particular circumstances) none of them can be cited as an instance of the coutradiction of a Vedic text. Thus then, we do not find any Smryéi text contradicting the Veda; the contradiction that we do meet with is only between two Vedic texts; but this also is capable of being explained in some way or the other. ([) Conse- quently, the Sutra (the third) must be taken to signify only the advisability of a certain course to be adapted at the time of action (where it is always desirable to accept the alternative laid down in the Veda); (II) or, if it be absolutely necessary to take it as laying down the rejection of the क्ण this ^ Smrtt”’ must be taken to refer to the Smriis compiled by people outside (the pale uf Vedic religion). ‘To explain— 164 TANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I--PADA II[—ADHI IIt. I, With a view to offer a salutary advice to the people, what Jaimini says in the 67८74 is that, in a case where we find the Vedic text laying down one action, and the Smr/i laying down another,—and thus there be- ing an apparent contradiction between the two, on that point—it is desirable that, in practice, we should adopt the course laid down in the Veda. (Nor can it be argued that even this would be an indirect rejection of the authority of the particular Smrtt text; because) even in the case of the alternative Injunctions of the Vrihi and the Yava, both of which appear in the Veda, if some person continues to employ only one of the two (the Yava alone, f.1.) at his sacrifices, throughout his life, he does not, by that, become open to the charge of having rejected the anthority of the alterna- tive Injunction (of the क्छ). In the samo manner, even when the Sinrte is found to be possessed of an authority equal to that of the Veda, if one adopts the course laid down in the Veda, there is no harm done to the Sinrti. Thus then, all that is meant is thatin cases where the Smrtz toxts have only expressed,’ in other words, the sense of certain Vedic texts, without taking the trouble of directly quoting such toxts,—they make their authority de- pendent upon the inference of the Vedic texts on which they base them- selves; the Vedic text, on the other hand, is self-sufficiont in its authority which does not depend upon anything else; and as such this latter be- comes more capable of confidence, which makes people have greater faith in these, and adopt the courso laid down by them, in preference to that laid down by the Smyti text. Thus then, the Sééra (the third) should also be explained thus: When there 1s a contradiction between the ideas erpressed by the Vedic text and the Smrtt, that which is independent of all else—(or if we read “ anupékshyam,” that which has not the need of resting upon anything else)—should be accepted as authoritative, the word ‘authoritative’ being supplied from the preceding ७८१८ ; and this is laid down with a view to the course that is udvisable to be adopted under the circumstances. Thus, wo tind that we cannot reasonably accept the absolute rejection of the Smrfz text, whon there is every chance of our finding it to be based upon an independent Vedic text, to be found in another rescension of the Veda. Nor will the adoption of the course laid down in the Smpéz render the person open to the charge of having neglected the action laid down by a direct Vedic text; because at the time that we actually find, in another branch of the Veda, the Vedic text in support of the Smryt:, both courses of action would become equally authoritative, and as such capable of being both accepted as optional alternatives. On this, it may be argued that—“ as in the case of the contradiction of the Smyti by the Vedic text, we only accept the former to be less trust worthy than the latter only (aud as such not to be given the preference) ; CERTAIN SMRTI TEXTS NOT AUTHORITATIVE. 165 so, in the same manner, when we find a course of action, laid down in another branch of the Veda opposed to that laid down in our own Veda, the former would be capable of rejection (in favour of the latter, which is more trustworthy for us).” It would certainly be so rejected, so long as, it is only known by hearsay; when, however, we actually come across it in the Veda, it does not in any way differ from the text met with in our own Veda. Thus, we conclnde that the S#tra points out this peculiar relation between the Smrti aud Vedic texts, that the former is not altogether set aside by the latter, nor is it equal to it in its authority. II. Or, the 62८८6 (third and fourth) may be taken as pointing out the fact of the unacceptability of the subsequent 670४ compilations on the ground of their being opposed to the Veda, and on account of their origin being found in the perceptible causes of Avarice, &c. These Smyiis that are not honoured by those who know the Vedas, are: (1) The compila- tions of ccertain texts relating to Dharma and Adharma, by Cakya, and tho propounders of the systems of Sdnkhya, Yoga, Pancaratra, Paégupata and the like, all of which have in them a certain mixture of the Veda, and are hidden under a thin cloak of righteousness, treating of the various means of gaining popularity, wealth, respect and fame, and based upon the strength of certain visible results, quite unconnected with the Veda, and upon arguments seemingly based upon Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy and Apparent Inconsistency; (2) those that lay down certain in- structions, with regard to the gaining of a living, but are slightly mixed with » Vedic touch, through the mention of such Vedic teachings as those of not-killing, trnthfulness, self-control, charity, mercy and the like, and as treating of certain Mantras aud recipes for the treatment of poisons, sub- jugation of the wills of other persons (hypnotism), mysteriously sending away of other people, &c., the efficacy whereof are based upon their success ina few solitary instances; and (3) the extremely foreign compilations that lay down absolutely repugnant practices fit for Mlecchas, such as the eating together of many persons, and the like. This rejection of the authority of such compilations has not been spoken of in any other Adhikarana (and as such it cannot be said to be a useless repetition here); nor is it altogether unnecessary to explain the reasons for their rejection ; because the aforesaid compilations have a wide circulation; and as such it is absolutely necessary to explicitly deny their authority, exactly as it is necessary to denounce the use of such current incorrect forms of words, as “ Gavi” (for “ Glauh’) and the like. If we altogether disregard such compilations, and do not strongly deny their authoritative character, then people might be led to think that their author- itativeness 18 too strong to be set aside, and thence they would come to 166 "14 ११२८ -४॥ 1२111८4 --^ एप #2 १4 I—=PADA Ul——ADHt fit. regard them as equal in authority (to the Veda and the Smrtis compiled in accordance with it); or, it may be that people might be more easily attracted to those Smrtis, either on account of the apparent beauty of the actions laid down by them, or on that of the comparative ease with which these actions are performed, or on being misled by their reasonings, or under the influence of the evil times we are living in; and thence men would become misled and deluded on all points relating to the various sacrifices and sacrificial slaughters, &c.; which would ultimately be entirely renounced; or finding them to be the compilations of Bra@hmanas and Kshatriyas, like Manu and others, even the intelligent and the well-mean- ing would be led to infer them to be based upon the authority of the Veda, like the works of Manu, &c.; and as such they would come to accept them, as laying optional alternatives to the courses of action laid down in the Vedas and the Vedic Qmrtis. Consequently, even in a case where the १९. clarations of these Smrtts would be found to be contradictory to one of Manu, people might adopt the course Jaid down in them (as they would consider both courses to be equally authoritative alternatives). Until all that is wholly contradictory to the Vedic religion has not been duly rejected and set aside, we can have no purity of Dharma (which will continue to be mixed up with false semblances of it). Because as for the authority afforded by the acceptance by great men, and by the fact of their being handed down by one’s forefathers,—the upholders of these anti-Vedic Smytis also bring these forwardin support of their own Smrtis, which, they urge, is accepted by great men of other countries. And thie only reason, that limits one’s choice of different courses of action, lies in his own faith; because each man is naturally inclined to follow in the path trodden by his own forefathers (and as such authority could be equally brought forward by the other party, there would be no means of dissuading him from it, until we actually explained why only certain Smrtts are to be accepted as authoritative). In connection with the compilations of Manu, &c, some people have held that they (at least in the portions that are not found to be supported by any Vedic texts) are based upon the Vedic texts that have become lost; but against these people, the Bauddha can very easily assert the fact of their 6111415 also being based upon similar texts. For, how could any limit be put upon the assumption of such lost texts 7 And then, any action that may have been accepted by some people for a certain time,—if found to be incompatible with the Vedic texts-—-might be assumed to be based upon lost texts; and as such would come to appear as of equal authority with the Veda. And it is with all this in view that the 6८77 has ex- pressly declared that when there 1s a contradiction, that which contradicts the Veda is to be totally rejected. CERTAIN SMRTI TEXTR NOT AUTHORITATIVE. 167 As for the fact of these compilations being dependent upon human agency, their upholders have also accepted it by their admission of the fact of their being compiled by particular personages ; and those that have listened to their teachings, infer the same from their theory that all words are non-eternal (which sets aside the possibility of any compilations being eternal). And as for the support of Vedic authority, inasmuch as they consider their own compilations to be equal to the Veda in their authority, they either cannot bear to think of seeking for its support, or feel too ashamed to seek it; and hence they absolutely disown any such origin, exactly like ungrateful childron who are eventually inclined towards their parents, and honce disown their real parentage. There is yet another point (of difference between the Smrtzs of Manu and those of the Bauddhas) : In the case of Mann, we find only one text, by the way, which is found to be contrary to the Veda; whereas in the case of the Smrtis of the Bauddhas, barring a few stray declarations of such virtues as self-control, charity and the like, all that they have to say is contrary, not only to the Veda, but to the approved conclusions of all the fourteen subsidiary sciences; and these latter are also compiled by Irreligions men like Buddha, whose practices were all opposed to the injunctions laid down in the Veda, and were taught to the deluded men of the lowest caste, outside the pale of Vedic religion ; and as such, they can never even be thought of as based upon the Veda. Then again, we find that the Bauddha teachings were given by one who was @ born Kshatriya; and as such, he transgressed the duties of his own class, in taking upon himself the works of teaching and recetving presents (which are the monopoly of the Brahmanas); and hence how can we believe that true Dharma or Duty would be taught by one who has transgressed his own Dharma ? It has been well said: ‘One who is found to be doing deeds opposed to a prosperous hereafter, should be shunned from a distance; because how can one who deceives himself offer any salutary advice to others?’ Such transgression of Dharma by Buddha is clearly mentioned in the Alankadrabuddhi (a Bauddha work), where Bud- dha is represented as saying—‘ May all the pain proceeding from the sins due to the Iron Age, rest in me, and leave humanity at large absolutely free!’’? And in connection with this, his followers eulogise his virtues in the following strains: ‘For the sake of tho well-being of humanity, He transgressed his own duties of the Kshatriya, and having taken up the duties of the Braéhmana, he taught, even to the people out- side the pale of Vedic religion, such truths relating to Dharma, as were not taught by the Brahmanas who were unable to transgress the prohibi- tion (of such teachings being imparted to outsiders) ; and thus prompted by his mercy to others, he even went to the length of transgressing his 168 _ TANTRA-VARTIKA—~ADRYAYA I—-PADA ItI[—ADHI IT. own Dharma!” And we actually find His followers behaving in a man- ner entirely at variance with the teachings of the Veda. Thus then, inasmuch as we find the authors of these Smritis, as well as their disciples and followers, behaving contrary to the direct teachings of the Veda, we cannot but deny the authority of the Smrtts themselves. Because, as has been shown above, they are professedly opposed to the Veda, and hence they have no capacity for leading us to assume Vedic texts in their support. As for the loss of certain rescensions of the Veda, no such com- plete loss would be possible, because the Veda has been proved to be eternal. Nor are the Bauddha Smrtis found to have any other perceptible basis. In the case of the Smrtz (Manu) texts relating to the Upanay- ana, &९., we find them in keeping with the texts of other branches of the Veda; but no such support is possible for such actions (laid down in Bauddha Smrtis) as the bowing to the Caztya, giving of gifts to Ciddras and the like. And as for assuming any other authoritative basis, we have already proved it to be impossible. On the other hand, we find that they are largely due to Avarice and other such visible causes, in the presence of which, there can he no in- ference of any other origin, And asa matter of fact, in the course of their teaching of Dharma, Buddha and others themselves never make any assertions that are not supported by arguments based upon actual experience. Nor do they, like Gautama and other Vedic Teachers, assert their teachings to be based upon the Veda; on the other hand, they put forward many such arguments, as are very far removed from true Dharma. It is these persons that should not be respected even by words; and they have been denounced (in the Jfanusmyti) as ^“ Heretics, Sinners and Sceptics,” And it is the compilations of these people that Manu and others have declared to be fit only for being avoided: ‘ Those Smptis that are opposed to the Veda, as also those that have evil tendencies, all these are absolutely useless; and have their basis in dark Ignorance.” And thus it is established that in matters relating to Dharma, such Simrtis as are outside the pale of the Veda should be totally rejected as abso- lutely devoid of authority. End of the third Adhtkarana. य णा 2 ० antl eather atte 0 9 amet aie ae ADHIKARANA (4). [The superior authority of the declaration of the Substance]. Sutra (5). If it be urged that, when there is no disturbance of the Vedic Injunction, the Smrti text cannot be held to be con- tradicted by it,— (This Sitra only serves as a means of introducing the next Siira, which embodies the real Parvapaksha of the Adhtkarana. ) As regards the Smrtzis dealing with the actions relating to the pur- poses of man, we have explained above (in accordance with the Bhashya) how they are to be accepted as authoritative, or rejected as unauthoritative, according as they are found to be supported, or contradicted, by the Veda. And under the present Adhikarana, we proceed to consider those Smrtz texts that deal with the actions in connection with sacrifices—such for in- stance as the Smrfi texts laying down the changing of the sacred thread, the rinsing of the mouth, the use of the right hand alone and the like, to be done during the performance of the sacrifices, laid down in the Veda, and. with regard to these we shall only consider whether they are contradictory or not to the Veda; and when this has been settled, the authoritativeness or its contrary will be inferred from the preceding Adhikarana. [The instances cited here by the Bhdshya, are the Smris texts that lay down the changing of one’s sacred thread as soon as it breaks, the rinsing of _ the mouth whenever one sneezes ; and the contradiction that is suspeoted is that if the sacrificer should stop in tho middle of the performance of the sacrifice, in order to change his thread, then there would be a break in the continuity of the sacrificial routine, which would involve a transgression of. the Vedic Injunction. Another instance is that of the Smris text laying down that everything in connection with sacrifices should be done by: the right hand alone; and if one were to adhere to this strictly he may not be able to finish all that has to be done quickly, and within the specified time,—which would involve a transgression of the Vedic In- junction |. | In the case of these texts, the only standard by which we should judge whether they are contrary or not to the Veda, would be the ascertain- a2 170 TANTRA*VARTIKA“ADHYAYA I-—PADA JII—ADHI IV. ing whether the acceptance of the Smyti Injunction would, or would not, in any way interfere with the proper accomplishment of the actions laid down in the Veda, That 18 to say, if we find that the changing of the sacred thread, as happening in the middle of the sacrificial functions, is either not allowed, or distinctly prohibited, by the Vedic texts laying down the action and its procedure, then we conclude that there is a contradiction; if, however, we find that such actions enter into the very constitution of the sacrifice, helping its accomplishment, like any other ordinary actions mentioned in the same context, and are supported by certain Vedic texts, assumed in accordance with the 6011८४8, and do not in any way interfere with anything that has been laid down by the Vedic texts in connection with the sacri- fice,—then we conclude that there is no contradiction. There is yet another way of putting forward the difficulty or doubt that has given rise to the Adhikarana: the question being—when there is a contradiction between the Sm7ti text and the Vedic text, it is doubtful which is to be accepted as the more authoritative, when it 18 found that the former deals directly with a certain definite entity (in the shape ofan Action), while the latter (at least that part of it which is found to be interfered with by the Smytz) is found to treat of secondary qualifications; because there is a difference in the acceptance of the comparative strength of one or the other, when both texts are dealt with merely as the means of cogni- tions, from that which is accepted when they are compared with reference to what they speak of. That is to say, we have already decided as to which of the two 18 to be accepted as of greater authority, when the Smrts and the Vedic texts are found to contradict each other; but when it happens that the contradiction is between a qualification or property on one side, and a definite entity or substance on the other, then it is to the Jatter that preference is shown; as will be explained under Sa#ira XII-ii-25. For instance, in the case in question, the Smrt: texts do not in any way tend to set aside or reject any definite action laid down in the Veda; as for the order or time in which the actions are to be performed (which alone is found to be interfered with by the Smrt: texts), these are always acknowledged to be the qualifications of the main substance of the Action. Thus then, if in this also, we depend upon the comparative strength of the € and the Veda generally considered as authoritative (means of knowledge), then, even though the Order, &c., of the Actions, being the qualifications, are weaker than the rinsing of the mouth, &c., which, as distinct Actions, are the stronger,—yet, inasmuch as the former are laid down by the Veda, which by itself is possessed of a stronger authoritativeness than that of the Smrti, the latter Actions will necessarily have to be set aside by consider- ations of the Order, &c., of the performance of the sacrifice. If, however, we accept the comparative strength as between the subject-matter of the DECLARATION OF SUBSTANCE MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 171 two texts, then, inasmuch as the definite actions of rinsing, &c., will always be stronger than the Order, §c., which are mere qualifications of Actions, even though the former are Jaid down by the Smrtt, which by itself is weaker in authority than the Veda,—yet being definite Actions, they will set aside the qualifications of the Order, &c., which, as qualifications, are in themselves the weaker of the two. The question being thus stated, the answer that suggests itself is that these Smrt texts, that lay down certain actions in connection with the Vedic sacrifices, are not contradictory to the Veda; because the perform- ance of the actions laid down by them does not interfere with the perform- ance of the Vedic sacrifice. Because, in the cases of the six means of as- certaining the meaning of Vedic Injunctions—namely, Direct Assertion, In- direct Implication, Oontext, Syntactical Connection, Position and Name,— among which there is a difference in the authority of each of them,—even when that which is pointed out by the strongest of these has been accepted as the principal course, all that is indicated by the others are not totally discarded, but accepted as helping, in their secondary or subordinate char- acter, the Primary Action; and as such come to be taken along with the pro- cedure, &c. of the Action as laid down in certain scattered passages; in the same manner, (just as in the case of the above six) also when the seventh means of knowledge, in the shape of the Smrit, or a long-established usage, happens to lay down certain actions, these may be accepted, as helping the Final Result, by being taken along with the Procedure of the Primary Vedic Action; even as certain actions laid down by !the Smrts (the 45/८2 for instance) are accepted as the direct means to a final Re- sult. That is to say, as no limit has been fixed to the help that may be accorded to the accomplishment of the Final Result, by means of various methods and processes,—whatever method or process may be pointed out by whatever means of knowledge or authority, as helping in the accom- plishment of that Result, it is accepted to be subsidiary to the Primary Action. Thus then, the rinsing of the mouth, &c., may, in accordance with this argument, be rightly accepted as-subsidiary to the Primary Sacrifice ; (and as such there need be no contradiction). On this we have the following 20 १५ २२8 ^ : Sutra (6). “This cannot be; because the limit is fixed by the Scriptures.” “That 18 to say, as the limit of all set Vedic Actions is distinctly fixed “by the Veda itself, any addition of new Actions will mean an exceeding of “its proper bounds; and who can transgress with impunity a limit that has ८ 0660 fixed by the Veda † 12 TANTRA*VARTIKA“ADHYAYA I—=PADA IlI[—-ADHI IV. “The limit of Actions is fixed by the Scriptures in three ways: ( 1) “by laying down a definite order in which the various actions are to be “ nerformed; (2) by distinctly laying down the extreme limits of the Action “itself; and (3) by laying down the necessity of finishing the Action “quickly (within a certain limited period of time). And this Scriptural ‘limit will certainly be transgressed (by the intrusion of such actions as “the rinsing of the mouth and the like). Because the Time, Limit and “the Order of the Primary Action, having been definitely laid down by ५५ means of the two sets of the six-fold means of ascertaining the details of “ Vedic Actions (viz., Direct Assertion, Indirect Implication, Syntactial Con- ‘nection, Context, Position and Name forming one set, and Direct Decla- ‘ration, Meaning, Context, Position, Principal Action and its Procedure “forming the other),—if any such actions as are laid down either by the “ Smrtis, or by long-established usage, were to be inserted in the middle of ५५ & Vedic sacrifice, these would certainly lead to the transgression of the “ aforesaid Order, &c. “It is distinctly laid down in the Vedic text that points out the “ method of performing sacrifices, that no actions in connection with the ५५ Principal Sacrifice are to be separated from it, in point of time. But “if, in the middle of the performance of such a Principal Action, we were “ to mtrude certain actions laid down either by the Smyti or by usage, or ^“ 17 we were to stick to the Smréz injunction of using the right hand alone ‘and thereby causing unnecessary delay in the main sacrifice, there would “certainly be a disturbance of the aforesaid proximity of the original “subsidiary actions with the Main Action; and the delay would cause the ५५ trausgression of the laws that lay down the morning or the mid-day as the * proper time for all Vedic Actions. The order of Actions is ascertained “by means of Direct Declaration, Meaning, Context, Position, Principal “ Action, and the Procedure of the Action itself (as explained in the Fourth ५ Adhyfya); and this Order, as affecting the Vedio Actions, having the “limits of their acceptance and authority duly recognised, would certainly “be disturbed by the intrusion of the.rinsing of the mouth after sneezing. “The same may be said with reference to the ७१४८४ Injunction of ‘putting on a fresh sacred thread, if, through continued bodily work, it ‘‘ happen to slip off the body. “And again, the intervening performance of the actions laid down in “the Smyt, has no fixed order laid down by the Veda; and for the order “and the limit of the Vedic Sacrifice, we do not admit of any authority “save the Veda itself. Therefore, in order to get together all the subsidi- “ary actions in connection with the main sacrifice, without neglecting the ‘‘ least amongst them, it is absolutely necessary for the priests to ascertain “the limits of the various Minor Actions constituting the Main Sacrifice, DECLARATION. OF SUBSTANCE MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 173 ‘ recognised by means of Direct Assertion, Implication, &c. Consequently, “if he happens to perform, in the middle, an action laid down by the “ Smrli,—which was not known before as one to be performed, and which “has cropped up only subsequently,—then, there would certainly be a trans- ‘ pression of the Order, &c., that has been ascertained before; and thereby ८ 06 would be unable to ascertain exactly what he has done and what he has “left undone (of the Main Sacrifice) ; and thus, being extremely suspicious “of the incomplete character of his sacrifice, he would fail to achieve the “confidence of having duly accomplished it; and thereby the potency of “the Final Result having been extremely weakened, the fruit of the “action accruing to him would come to be much lessened in quality, as “well as in quantity. But the potency of the Final Result has been duly “pointed out by the Injunction as taken along with the Arthavdada passage ; ‘and as such it can never bear a single jot of abatement; consequently it “ necessarily rejects the Smyti texts laying down such intrusions. (Or, the Sutra may be interpreted in a different manner). As the “limits and number of the subsidiary sciences of the Veda have been defi- “ nitely restricted to the Teachings and Commentaries in connection with “it, which are fixed within certain limits, there is no room for any other “science (as the Smriz) being admitted as another subsidiary to it. In ‘connection with any Vedic sacrifice, all the actions that are laid down are ८ understood as to be performed simultancously; and as such the priests go ‘through all the actions with a hurry (in order to preserve the simulta- ८ neity as far as possible) ; but as an absolute simultaneity 18 an impossi- bility, the Vedic text that lays down the procedure permits only such ‘delay (and consequent separation of the various actions), as is absolutely necessary, between the end of one action and the beginning of another. ‘* Hence, if one were to make an unnecessary delay, even when he were able “to avoid it, then such transgression could never be allowed to pass with “impunity, by the direct Vedic assertion of the particular Procedure. ‘* Thus then, we conclude that as the said Qmytis disturb the three-fold “ Order of the Vedic Actions, the performance of such actions as the rinsing ‘of the mouth, &c., (in the course of sacrifices) cannot but be rejected as “ contradictory to the Veda.” SIDDHANTA. Sutra (7). But when we do not find any cause for (the enjoin- ing of) such actions, we conclude them to be of use (at the sacrifice). Or, this Sutra may be taken to extend up to “ ‘éshvadarganddvirodhasya”’ (because we do not perceive any contradiction in them), which the Bhdshya 174, TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I--PXDA IJI—~ADHI IV. has transferred to the next Sdtra; specially as the next Sutra already con- tains the word ‘ Vipratipatti,’ which signifies the (absence of ) contradiction, it would be useless to add the aforesaid clause to it; while, on the other hand, in the present § ४८१, it is absolutely necessary to deny the contradiction which has been urged in the Puérvapaksha. Even if the clause had some use inthe next Sura, we could take it with both Sitras by means of transference, Just as the single eye of the crow is transferred from oue socket to the other. (The 6८५ is thus explained). Inasmuch as we do not find any visible cause for such actions as the rinsing of the mouth and the like, we cannot hold them to be in any way contradictory to the order of actions laid down in the Veda. When we find a certain Smit: text to be debarred by its con- tradiction of the Veda, from all chance of having any basis in this latter,— and then, if we could find out some other visible cause (as Greed, &c.,) which could be pointed out as possibly being the origin of the particular text,—then, in that case, a vory slight effort (of argumentation) would lead us to ascertain its absolute unauthoritativeness. But in a case where no such visible cause is perceptible (or even assumable), we cannot but admit that, inasmuch as it is not found to have its originin any such cause (as Greed, &९.), the Smriz text cannot but have its basis in the Veda. In the case of the ७071४ texts laying down such actions as the rinsing of the mouth, &c., we cannot attribute them to any such cause as Desire Greed, Anger, Aversion, Shame, &९. the possibility of which would have barred all their chance of having their origin in the Veda. Thus then, not finding the origin of the Smrtz text anywhere else, we admit of its origin lying in the Veda; and as such even if it is found to contradict any parti- cular Vedic text, 1४ does not, on that account, lose allits authority. As for the Limit, the Order and the 11८0016 that have been specified for each sacrifice, by particular Vedic texts, inasmuch as these are the qualifica- tions of the Action, they are unable to set aside the authority of the Smriz texts, which lay down the Actions themselves, which are stronger than the former Limit, §c., which should have been the stronger, on account of their being mentioned in Vedic texts (if they were not the qualifications of Actions, and as such of lesser importance than the Actions themselves). It may be argued that—‘ inasmuch as it is the comparative strength of the Veda and the Smryéz, considered solely as the means of knowledge, that is considered beforehand, it would seem that the conclusion arrived at by this consideration has a decided preference over that arrived at by the subsequent consideration of the comparative authoritativeness of their subject-matter. (That is to say, when it has been concluded beforeband that the Veda has an authority greater than that of the Smrlz, we must not give up this conclusion even if the Veda text be found to deal with quali- fications, and the 61011८0, with Actions).” DECLARATION OF SUBSTANCE MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 175 In reply to this we add—There is no inherent contradiction between the Veda and the Smriz, taken by themselves; nor is their strength com- pared with regard to themselves solely as two means of knowledge; all these considerations, as well as all the contradiction that there may be, is only with regard to the matter that they may severally deal with. That is to say, it 18 only when we find the matter dealt with by them, to be contra- dictory to each other, that we conclude that there is a contradiction between the two means of knowledge themselves. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the comparative authoritativeness of their subject-matter is ascertained at the very moment that they are found to be contradictory to each other. Aud (when considering this comparative authoritativeness of their subject- matter), when wo have once definitely ascertained the fact of the qualifica- tions of Actions being of lesser importance than the Actions themselves,— even if these qualifications happen to be supported by Vedic texts (as in the case 1n question ),—they do not regain their authority (in preference to that of the Actions) ; and conversely, when we have once ascertained the fact of the Actions being of greater importance than the qualifications, even if these actions happen to be based upon the wenker anthority of the Smrii, they do not lose their authority (in preference to that of the qualifications). Because it 1s only that which is absolutely and always without any autho- rity, that can be totally set aside; in all other cases, authoritativeness and unauthoritativeness are always correlative. Thus then, when the authority of a certain Smrti text has been ascer- tained on the ground of the superior authority of its subject-matter, this authority cannot bo set aside by any considerations of the comparative authoritativeness of the Smriz and the Veda, considered by themselves, as two means of knowledge, independently of their subject-matter. But, on the other hand, though the subject-matter of the Vedic text be found to be of lesser authority, yet that does not totally set aside the authority of the Vedic text itself; because the Smrii losing all its strength in imparting a greater importance to its subject-matter, it can never be able to reject the text as well; specially as in opposition to the Vedic text, it is enough concession to the Smrit that it is not itself completely reject- ed; and as for the setting aside of any Vedic text, the greatest of Smrtts can never do that. As a matter of fact, however, two Actions can be said to contradict each other only when they are based upon equal authorities, and are laid down as to be performed at one and the same time; in the case in question, however, we find none of these two conditions of contradiction; and hence we conclude that there is no real contradiction. Because the considerations of Time, Limit and Order always come at the end of all the Actions (the Primary as well as the Secondary) ; while the Actions, even though based 146 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I-—-PADA IfI-~ADHI IV, upon a lesser authority, have their turn long before them. Because it is only when the Actions have been performed that we stop to consider the Order in which they are performed ; and the Order that has been directly perceived with regard to the Actions that have already appeared,—by what could this ascertained Order be set aside P Specially as being the qualification of the Actions, and as such appearing after these, the Order is held to be of secondary importance in the performance of the Actions. As for the Zimi, that has been definitely laid down with regard to the Vedic Actions, it 18 never found to be Jaid down directly by any Vedic text; it is only indirectly implied by the necessity of not for- getting any the smallest action that forms part of the sacrifice; and as this Limit is always perceptible by itself, it is always accepted as subsequently including the Actions that may have been performed (during the sacrifice) in accordance with the Smrt: texts (and as such the perform- ance of these latter need not necessarily be a contradiction of the order. of the Vedic Action). That is to say, the Limit of an Action is not defined by any means of knowledge; hence we could accept the unflinching autho- rity of the declaration of a certain Limit, only if it was found that, apart from this declaration of the Limit, there were no other means of avoiding the missing of any Actions during the performance of the sacrifice. But even when such is actually found to be the case, 1t often happens that at certain sacrifices,even before we have come to the end of the Limit directly laid down by the Vedic Injunction, we admit the more extensive limits of Actions that are pointed out (as subsidiaries to the main Action) by the various means of Direct Assertion, Implication, Context &c.; and when we admit the limits laid down by these latter, there is no reason why those pointed out by Smrtz texts and well-established usage should not be equally accep- ted. (And the admission of the Actions laid down in the Smrtis being quite in keeping with the character of the Vedic sacrifices, these Smritis cannot be said to be in any way contradictory to the limits laid down for the Vedic Actions). Time too is only a sceondary element in the performance of sacrifices ; and as such comes to be considered only at the end of all the Actions; con- sequently, the limitations of Time that are laid down will always include that taken up by the performance of the Actions laid down in the Smyti texts as well. Because the Time that is laid down is that with regard to the per- formance of the main Action, together with all vis subsidiaries.—whether these be laid down in the Veda or in the ७1117८2 ; and because it is with reference to such Principal Actions as have many subsidiaries, that it has been laid down, that 16 18 not proper to separate them from (any of) their subsidiaries. For these reasons, we conclude that inasmuch as the time that is THE SUBJECT-MATTER MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 177 specified is with reference to the finishing of all the Actions—from what- ever source their injunction may have emanated in connection with the main Action,—it cannot be said to be contradicted by the performance of any of the subsidiary Actions therein included ; and itis this non-perception of any contradiction of these—Order, Time and Limit—that is meant by the clause “ téshvadarganddvirodhasya” ; or this clause may.be explained as referring to the non-perception of any contradiction in the performance of these,— Itinsing of the mouth &c. Then again, such purificatory actions as the Rinsing of the mouth, as also the wearing of the sacred thread, are not independent Actions by themselves ; they are only subsidiary actions meant to help in the proper accomplish- ment of the main Action; and as such, their performance cannot be taken as an interference in the Principal Action. That which can interfere in the course of one Action must always be an independent Action which is equal in authority to the former Action, and 18 not in any way subsidiary to it; and there can be no interference by an Action that is of a subsidiary character, and always serves to bring about the proper accomplishment of the main Actions. For instance, after having prepared the bundle of the Kuga grass, the Action that is laid down in the Vedas as to be performed next is the preparation of the Sacrifical Altar ; but 1, after the former action has been finished, the priest happens to sneeze, and he performs the con- sequent rinsing of the mouth, he is said to be engaged in the preparing of the Altar ; and the reason 18 that if he prepared the Altar, without rinsing the mouth after sneezing, there would be a certain impurity in it, and its pre- paration would not be properly accomplished ; and as the rinsing of the mouth would only serve to remove this impurity and to make the Altar per- fect, it could not be said to have interfered with the preparing of the Altar (and thus the Order of the Vedic Actions). It1is with a view to this that the Bhashya has said—such Actions as the rinsing, Sc., do not become the interfer- ing agents in the performance of the Vedic Action. For, if this assertion were made without the acceptance of the fact of these Actions being subsidiary to the Main Action, it would evince a sad lack of philosophic insight. Thus then, such actions as the Rinsing of the Mouth &c. being found to be forming parts of the main Action itself, they cannot be said to be contradictory to the texts that lay down the Order, Limit and Time of the performance,—all these coming to be considered only after the Action with all its subsidiaries has been duly accomplished. ४ 178 ‘TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I—-PADA III—ADHI 4(a). [The above is an exposition of the Adhikarana, in accordance with the inter- pretation of the Bhashya. And as this is not in keeping with the Author’s own view of the last two Adhikaranas, he proceeds to take the three foregoing Siitras in a different sense. | It is not quite correct to cite the wearing of the sacred thread as an action contrary to the Vedic Sacrifice. Because it is directly mentioned by the Veda, in connection with the Darga-Purnamdasa Sacrifice, that the wearing of the thread is a mark of godliness, which lays down its wearing as 9, necessary accompaniment of the sacrifice. The wearing of the thread has also been laid down as a general rule, in the Katha Rescension (of the Yajurveda), where it is laid down, not with reference to any particular sac- 11006, but as a necessary accompaniment of all sacrifices, as well as Vedic studies; says the text in question: “It was by means of the Prasria Sacrifice that the gods subdued the Asuras; and it was because the Asuras did not ‘employ the Prasrta Sacrifice that they were subdued by the gods; n Prasria sacrifice is that which is performed by a sacrificer with the sacred thread; and an Aprasrta Sacrifice is that which is done without the thread; if the Brahmana reads with the sacred thread on, he is per- forming a sacrifice by that act; therefore one must always wear the sacred thread when reading, sacrificing, or helping at the sacrifices of others; as it is thus that the Prasrta character of the sacrifice 1s duly accom- plished.’’ Similarly with regard to the Injunction of the rinsing of the mouth, we meet with the following text, which lays down such rinsing: ^ Having his sacred thread hanging from the left shoulder, on the right side, the sacrificer should wash his hands, and thrice rinse his mouth, wiping it twice, and touching, once, his forehead, eyes, ears, and breast; as by that, the Atharvan- girasis, the Brahmanas, the Itihdsas, the Puranas, the Kalpas, the Gathas, and the Nardgansis, all become delighted in him; he should then spread the grass, put his hands between the knees, and then sitting down with his face to the Hast, he should begin to read the Veda,” And though this passage occurs in connection with the Brahmayajna (the daily duties of the Brihmana), yet it distinctly poiuts out the necessity of the riusing of the mouth whenever the Veda has to be recited; and as such it comes to be recognised as a necessary accompaniment of all Vedic utterance; and as all sacrifices are accompanied by the recitation of Vedic mantras, we conclude the rinsing to be a necessary accompaniment of the sacrifice itself, Secondly the Vedic text, that “the mouth does not become impure by the tasting of the Soma,” prohibiting the rinsing of the mouth after one has drunk the Soma, distinctly points out the necessity of the rinsing at all other times (whenever any impurity attaches to the mouth). DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF THE THREE ७८145. 179 As for the Smrtt Injunction that ‘one should perform all actions by the right hand alone,’ it is an accepted general rule that it is the right hand alone that is to be always used at the sacrifices, except in the few cases where it is distinctly laid down that the left hand is to be used, and in which the right hand is not used at all; and there is no doubt as to the use of the right hand in all other cases. And we meet with the passage— ०९ As the right hand, so is also the sacrifice to the gods ’—which occurs In con» nection with the Injunction that the sacrificial altar is to be made sloping either to the East or to the North; and the said simile could be possible only if the using of the right hand were as necessary for the correct per- formance of the sacrifices, as the fact of the sacrifices themselves being offered to the gods. And thus we find that none of the three Smrt: texts, cited by the text, should have been brought forward as contradicting Vedic Injunctions. For these reasons, we conclude that the presentis not to be taken as a distinct Adhikarana, and that the three 8८145 may be interpreted as bring- ing forward and refuting certain objections against the preceding Adhi- karanas. The Fifth Satra may be interpreted as follows: “That which doos ‘not contradict any Vedic Injunction, and which is not unpleasing to good “men, such a declaration of the Buddha, &c.—as for instance, the injunc- “tions of the founding of resting places and public gardens, of dispassion, ‘meditation, practice, non-slaughter, truthfulness, charity, and the like— “can be accepted as authoritative, without any fear of contradicting the “Veda.” If this be urged by the opponent, then—we deny this; because of the number of authoritative Scriptures being limited. (661५ 6). That is to say, the number of authoritative Scriptures has been limited to the ‘fourteen or eighteen’ sciences, which alone are acknowledged by all good men to have any authority with regard to Dharma; and these fourteen sciences include the Vedas with its dngas and 41445, the eighteen Dharmasamhitads and Puranas, the Crkshad, and the Dandaniti. And we do not find the works of Buddha and others included among these. And even if we find in them certain facts in keeping with the said Scrip- tures, yet, as this might be only a pretence for doing something else (delad- ing people into Atheistic paths), we cannot accept it as having any bind- ing authority with regard to Dharma. Justas if a Pandit, when presenting the method of performing a certain expiatory rite as laid down by Mann, were to quote corroborative verses either composed by himself or by others, then (even though the subject-matter would be all right, in keeping with 180 TANTRA-VARTIKA— ADHYAYA I—PADA I1I—ADHI 4(a). the laws of Manu, yet, no person with any true regard for Dharma, would go to him for the prescription. And it is a fact ascertained once for all, that in matters relating to Dharma, we accept as authoritative, the assertions only of those persons whose names, which as words are eternal, are mentioned in the Vedas as of the propounders of Dharma,—persons who are found to be expounding the Dharma, in each succeeding Manvantaric cycle. As for instance, we find the passage in the Veda that, ^ the वरा verses of which Manu is the Rshi are the Sdmidhéni ;” and in continuation of this, it is declared ‘whatever Manu said was the very medicine of medicines ;” and what is meant by this is that the expiatory rites that Manu laid down are as effective in destroying sin, as medicine is in removing the disease. Nor can the mention of the name of Manu in the Veda be said to be a mere similarity of sound (and not as the mention of the name of any person) [as has been held under Siitra I—i—31]; because it 18 quite pos- .. sible for a name to be mentioned in the Veda, even though it 18 eternal ; because just as in each sacrifice there is a priest (who is mentioned by name in the Veda), so also in each Manvantara there is a Manu; as it 18 declared by Manu himself that in each Manvantara, there is a different Smrtt. And we know as a matter of fact, that there have been fourteen Manus, in all the cyoles, that have gone by, Thus then there is every possibility of there being a compilation by Manu in each cycle. And as such the continuous succession of Manus being unbroken (and as such as good as eternal), there is nothing incongruous in the person being men- tioned by name in the eternal Veda, which, in speaking of his declarations, does not necessarily become non-eternal; just &8 in each sacrifice there being sixteen priests (and this has always been the case, since time im- memorial), the Veda does not become non-eternal, by laying down the du- ties of these priests. To this effect, it has been said—just as in each suc- ceeding season, we find the marks of the same season in the past appear- ing; 80 in the same manner, the entities that have existed in one cycle, are found to appear in another cycle. Thus it 18 that. though the [tthdsas and the Purdnas are known to be composed by human authors, yet we find them mentioned, as sciences, in the Veda, which is itself without begin- ning. As we read in the (Chandogya) Upanishad (Narada saying to Sanatkumara). “Sir, [shall study the ARgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sama- veda, and the fourth Atharvaveda, and also the fifth, Itthaseas and Puranas.” Thus then, we conclude that in matters relating to Dharma, we accept as authoritative, the declarations of only such persons as are men- tioned in the Vedic mantras and Arthavddas, as being the authors of the propounded sciences, such authors being mentioned by names which re- main fixed, among all the endless changes of cycles and Munvaniaras. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF THE THREE 6900018. 181 (And in this we have the indirect support of the Veda also ; as for instance) we find in the Veda, that after-having laid down the expiatory rites to be performed, on the failure of such sacrificial accessories as are laid down in the Rgveda, it is added: ‘If there be a failure of something that is un- known, —and then another rite is laid down; and this latter ‘failure’ must be taken as that of something that has been laid down, as necessary, in the works of these Vedic authors; because all that is laid down in the Veda, is known directly from the Veda itself, and as such, could not have been spoken of as “ unknown;” and if we did not accept the authoritativeness of such Smyti works as are said tobe based upon the Veda, but whose ori- ginal Vedic texts have not been found,—then nothing that is of unknown authority could be possibly done at any sacrifice (as it is only that which is known as duly authorised that is performed at sacrifices); and then there could have been no use of laying down an expiatory rite for the failure of the “ unknown.” From these considerations, we conclude that Dharma brings about its due results, only when it is understood with the help of those scriptures that are recognised to be not incapable of having their basis in the Veda. On the other hand, just as we do not admit that knowledge of Dharma to be true, which is- obtained from an improper study of the Veda, or as learnt merely from the written book (without the help of a qualified teacher), or as learnt by the Cadra,—so in the same manner, in the case of such Authors as ave known to have a conduct against the teachings of the Veda, even when some of their declarations are found to be in keeping with the teachings of the Veda, we do not accept them as the valid means of knowing Dharma. And we also find it distinctly mentioned in the Puranas that during the Iron Age, Cakya and others would disorganise the whole fabric of Dharma. Under the circumstances how can we listen to anything that they may have to say? And just as the powdered alum sprinkled on melting gold, disappears iu the gold, so even the few Vedic truths that we find in their works are so mixed up with the rest, that they lose themselves in these, and so become equally unacceptable to ४8, That is to say, the few Vedic truths that are in them are found in the very midst of such misrepresentations of Dharma, as are based by them upon such arguments as—‘ the Analogy based upon Similarity of Actions’ (1.e., ag the sacrifice causes pain to the animal, it must result in pain to the sacrificer), ‘Inference from generals,’ (z.e., the Vedic slaughter 18 88 sinful as ordinary slaughter), and ‘Apparent Inconsistency,’ (ze. as pain is the only result of sin, the experiencing of much pain destroys a large amount of sin) ; and as such they are as milk put in the skin of the dog; and hence they are useless and incapable of commanding our confi- dence. Consequently, so long as even such truths are found only in the 182 TANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYVAYA I—PADA 1i—aDHI 4(a). works of the Bauddhas, and not in any of the above-enumerated Vedic Sciences, they remain unacceptable to us. And when they come to be found in any parts of these Sciences themselves, then, as we get at a full knowledge of the truths by means of these very Sciences, the works of Cakya and others remain useless for us. Therefore, we conclude that all that is apart from the Vedic Sciences enumerated above, we do not accept as having any authority in matters relating to Dharma; and as such, they are to be totally rejected. Then, we have the Seventh Sutra, which means that, those actions with regard to which we cannot find any perceptible cause, and are yet found to be performed, must be recognised as Dharma. And this Sitra is to be taken as forming an Adhikarana by itself, treating of the authoritative character of the practice of good men, of which we are going to cite a few instances, which will be shown to be the means of the accomplishment of the three ends of man (1.¢., all except Final Deliverance ). Among good men also, we find some behaving contrary to the Law, just like the Doctors leading unhealthy lives; and as such their practice fails to command our full confidence; and yet the fact of the act being done by a wise man would point to the fact of its being in accordance with a certain Vedic text; and thus, there being a doubt with regard to the authoritative character of such practice, the Parvapakshi would bring forward, against it, all the arguments urged by him under the first Satra of this Pada, or, in some cases, those under the third Sutra. The Pirvapaksha. “Even in the practice of good men, we often find a transgression of “ Dharma, and also certain extremely bold excessess as in the cases of Pra- “‘japati, Indra, Vacishtha, Vigvamitra, Yudhishthira, Kyshna Dvaipaya- “na, Bhishma, Dhetarashtra, Vasud6va, Arjuna and others, as also of ‘“‘many good men of our own days. “For instance, (1) we find Prajapati falling in an incestuous love “with his own daughter, Usha; (2) Indra, as also Nahusha in his place, “is said to have committed adultery; (3) Vacishtha, when stricken down “with grief on the death of his hundred sons, is said to have contemplated ^“ 9 terrible excess, in the shape of suicide; (4) Vigvamitra helped a Oun- “dala (Tyshanku) to perform a sacrifice; (5) Puriiravas thought of com- “mitting suicide, when Urvaci left him; (6) Krshna Dvaipayana, who “was under the vow of lifelong celibacy, brought forth children from the “wives of his younger brother, Vicitravirya; (7) Bhishma led a life con- “trary to all caste-regulations; and did an irregularity in performing sacri- “fices, even though he was unmarried; (8) Dhrtarashtra, though blind PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. १89 ८८ (and as such not entitled to the performance of any sacrifice), performed “many sacrifices, and that too with the wealth amassed by his brother ८ Pandu (to which he had no rightful claim); (9) Yudhishthira married a “wife that had been won by his younger brother (Arjuna), and told a “base 116 with the sole motive of causing the death of his own एको. ‘“‘mana-Preceptor; (10) Vasudéva and Arjuna are said to have been drunk to excess. ‘Among the people of modern days we find the Brahmaya women of “the countries of Ahicchatra and Mathura to be addicted to drinking; the ‘people of the North carry on the business of giving, and accepting in gift, ‘buying and selling, lions, horses, mules, asses, camels and the animals with “two rows of teeth; and they are also used to eating in the same dish with ‘their wives, children and friends; the people of the South marry the daugh- “ters of their maternal uncles, and partake of food while sitting upon ‘chairs; while among the people of the North, as well as of the South, there ‘are many such instances of gross transgression, as the partaking of the ^ food left by one’s friends or relations, taking of beetles touched by people ‘of all castes, the non-washing of the mouth after meals, the wearing of ५ clothes brought directly from the back of the washerman’s ass, the keeping “in society of people committing the greatest crimes, with the sole exception “of killing a Brahmana; and we also find endless minute transgressions of “the Dharma appertaining to each man’s family or caste. ‘Then again, the practices of the good people of different countries ८ 816 mutually contradictory; and many of these practices have their origin “in such visible causes as those of greed and the like. And certainly “people can have no confidence in such diverse practices, as having any “authority relating to Dharma. And further, you think those people as good whose conduct is good; “and you hold that conduct to be good which consists in the acts of these ४५ [60016 $ and thus there being an interdependence, none of the two * can be definitely ascertained. “It may be urged that ‘Manu and others have also spoken of the “practices of good men as an authority for Dharma ;’ but then, they have “also mentioned the agent’s own inner satisfaction as having an autho- “rity; and certainly there can be no fixity to this (satisfaction); be- “cause, as a matter of fact, we find that different people have differ- ८८ ent causes for inner satisfaction, on account of the diversities in their ५८ habits and dispositions,—some people being satisfied by the performance ५५ 0 good deeds, some by that of bad ones, while others, by that of such ५५ Actions as are neither good nor bad. Asan instance of people feeling sat- ‘“isfied in the doing of evil, we have Cakya, the Buddha, who was quite ५ pleased with himself at finding fanits and arguments against the Veda and 164 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I-—PADA ITI—ADHI 4(a). “the Brahmanas. And again, we find that the Brahmanas aresatisfied by “the performance of sacrifices at which animals are slaughtered; while ५५ the very same actions give pain to the Bauddhas, who have a great aversion “to them. Similarly too, certain Brahmanas are quite satisfied at eating “the food given by the Cudra; the people of the South are happy when they “ vat a chance of marrying the daughter of their maternal uncle; while other ९“ peopleare averse tosuch acts, considering them tobe most sinful. “ And just as the fact of the agent’s satisfaction being a highly fickle standard leads us to put a different interpretation to Manu’s declaration of ५ such satisfaction being an authority for Dkarma,—so, in the same manner, “ weregard the declaration of the authoritativeness of the practice of good ‘* men as to be interpreted in some such different manner. And again, the “authors of the Smrtis (Manu and others), in laying down the authori- “tative character of the Practice of good men, without having founda ५८ 08878 for these in the Veda, do not show themselves to avery great advan- “tage: hence the declarations of such authoritative character must be “held to have some other meaning. “Then again, all good men, to become good, should frame their con- “duct according to the injunctions of the Smriis; otherwise, by acting “by themselves, independently of these, they would become decidedly bad, “andnot good. Because, for the practices of good people we find no basis “in the Veda; butif there were any such authority in the Veda, such prac- ४ {1668 would have been laid down in the Smrtis (and not left to rest upon “the sole authority of the conduct of good men.) And thus, there being ‘‘no basis for the practices of good men, these are to be rejected (as having “no authority in matters relating to Dharma).”’ The Siddhanta. To the above we make the following reply: But as we do not find any causes, these, as actually in practice, should be accepted (Satra 7). - That is to say, when we find that certain actions are performed by good men, and we cannot attribute them to any such perceptible motives as Greed and the like, they should be accepted as Dharma. Such actions as are performed either for the maintenance of the body, or for one’s mere pleasure, or for some material gain,—are not considered, by good people, as ‘ Dharma,’ It is only those actions, that are held by the good people to be Dharma, and are performed as such, that are accepted as Dharma ; because the persons that perform these are the same as those that perform the sacrifices enjoined in the Veda. To the latter class belong the following actions: Charities, Japa, Homa, the offering of the oblations to the Fathers, such celebrations as those of the Cakradhvaja and other such like festivities in connection PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVA, 185 with various temples, the keeping of the married girls upon certain strict observances during the four days after marriage, [lluminations, the giving away, on the first day of the month, of sweetcakes and other uncooked foods, the various festivities held on the 7th and the last days of Magha and the first day of Phd&lguna, as also those held in honour of the advent of spring-time; and the authority for all this cannot lie any- where else except in the Scriptures. And the Authors of the Smrtis—in declaring the authoritative character of ‘the practices of good men’ and ‘ the usages of particular countries and castes, in keeping with Scripural teach. ings, —admit of the general authoritative character of such of these as are not contrary to the teachings of the Veda. (And the aforesaid festivities have the support of the Smritis and the Vedas) ; inasmuch as in the chapter on ‘ Holidays,’ is found (in the Smyiis) the following—“ Festivi- ties should be held after breakfast ;’’ and this serves as the authority for all festivities in any town or country. In the Veda too, we have the pas- sage in connection with the Mahavrata—‘ The Hoy priest gets upon the swing and 81118 ;' and in continuation of this, we read—‘ when people are holding a feast, they get upon the swing;” and this mention of the ५४ {6887 '' serves as an authority for the aforesaid festivities. It has been urged above that, inasmuch as Dharma and Adharma are treated of, with any degree of authority, only by the fourteen Sciences enu- merated above, the Practice of good men not being included in these, it cannot be admitted to have any authority. But this objection has already been set aside by the fact of the possibility of the inference of Vedic texts in support of the said practices. Nor can it be held that the asssertion of the Smyti that—“ the prac- tices of good men have an authority in connection with Dharna’’—is without any foundation in the Veda; because when we find pretty lengthy declarations of the Smrytis to be supported by the Veda, by the very slighest references to them, it is no wonder that we cannot lay our hands. upon the Vedic texts (though they really exist) corroborative of such brief assertions as the one declaring the authoritative character of the said Prac- tices. And it is quite possible for us to infer Vedic texts exactly like those in the 6194118. And the inference may be in this form: The Scriptural text, that declares the otherwise unknown results of actions performed by good men, has also its use (in the pointing out of the authoritative charac- ter of such actions),—-exactly as the milking of the cow, &० We do not hold that alone to be authorised by the scriptures, which is described therein in its detailed form; specially as all authorities take up only one of the many phases of the object they treat of ; hence though the external forms of the Practicos are cognised by Sense-perception, exactly like the prepar- ing of the curd, the milking of the cow and the like, yet the fact of their 24 186 TANTRA*VARTIKA“~ADHYAYA Y——PADA III—ADHI 4(a), bringing about particular results (in the shape of Heaven, &c.) cannot be got at by any other means save the scriptures. For the matter of that, even in the case of sacrifices, a perception of their external forms does not stand in need of any Scripural authority. It is only the fact of their lead- ing to certain definite results that, being not perceptible by the senses, stands in need of such authority. Nor can there be any inter-dependence (as urged in the Parvapaksha) ; because it is not always necessary that the good men, in all that they do, should always recall the scriptural authority for their actions ; the fact is that from times immemorial we have always found the prac- tices of good men to be in keeping with tho scriptures ; and hence people coming to recognise the authoritative character of such practices (and not always taking the trouble, to seek the further authority of the scriptures), take up these practices as the basis; and from that they deduce certain actions as leading to Heaven, &c.; and as such they lose sight of the fact of such actions being only occasional, and gradually come to recognise them as necessary. The ‘‘good men” whose practices are meant here are only those that inhabit the country called “ Arydvarta ”’ (the tract bounded by the Ocean on the Hast and the West, the Himalaya on the North, and the Vindhya on the South); and this limit, we may infer to be based upon Vedic passages, that speak of the ‘disappearance of the Sarasvati’ and the ‘ drippings from the Plaksha tree’ (the former expression really referring to the place where the ‘ Sdrasvata Satra’ was commenced, and the latter where 1४ was completed; but capable of being taken as implying the tract round Kurukséhtra, in the planes of which the Sarasvati river is said to have disappeared). The following objection may be brought forward: ‘‘The goodness of ८८ & man depending upon the fact of his acting in accordance with the “teachings of the scriptures, the mention of his practices, in the scrip- ८५ tures, as good, would involve a mutual intor-dependence.” But these people are called ‘good,’ not because of their good con- duct, but, simply because they are always found to be acting in accord- ance with scriptural injunctions. People come to be recognised as ‘ good,’ by always acting in accordance with the direct teachings of the Veda ; and when they have thus acquired the title of ‘good,’ even if they hap- pen to do something else, in accordance with a fixed tradition, (even though the ‘direct Vedic texts on the point may not be available), such actions are believed to be the means of attaining to Heaven, and to have the character of Dharma. And as for the ‘ mutual inter-dependence’ urged nbove, even in the case of the Veda, we read “If one who is learned in the Veda, learned in the sciences, eloquent, fully knowing the Veda, should read, &c., &.,’”’ where we find the “knowers of the Veda” ` PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. 187 mentioned in the Veda; but inasmuch as there is an eternal relationship between the Veda and the words it uses and the subject-matter it deals with,—and as such the precedence of one or the other is as impossible to be ascertained as in the case of the mutual relationship between Day and Night,—such mutual inter-dependence is not held to be faulty. And as for the Qmrii texts, laying down the actions already supported by the practice of good men (they cannot be said to be useless on the ground of all necessary authority for such actions being found in the said prac- tices as supported by direct or assumed Vedic texts) ; because it may be held that having come across the particular practice, or even the Vedic text in support of it, the Smrtt may have expressed its own acquiescence in it. It has been urged above that, inasmuch as we find such practices based upon perceptible motives of greed, d&c., they cannot have any basis in the Veda. But such perceptible motives being, also found in the case of the Actions laid down directly in the Veda,—this fact alone cannot Justify us in rejecting the fact of the practices having a basis in the Veda. That is to say, we find the injunctions of many actions in which there is always some touch of a perceptible motive ; and hence the presence of such motives in the practices of good men cannot debar them from having 9 basis in the Veda. However, there are certain actions, which are also common among the Mlecchas, for the performance of which there is no fixed rule or time— such things as are the means of physical pleasures; as for instance, agriculture, commerce, foods and drinks, soft beds, comfortable houses, pleasure-gardens, painting, singing, dancing, perfumes, and the like; but nobody ever thinks of these as Dharma; and hence the nature of these cannot rightly lead us to reject the authority of all practices of good men (that have any visible causes) ; nor can the fact of some such actions being accepted as Dharma establish the Dharmic character of all of them. Even among people who are similar to the Mlecchas, we find the preva- lence of such actions as the worshiping of the gods and Brdhmanas; and certainly we accept these to be Dharma, because they also appear in the practice of good men. Among ordinary people, certain practices are distinctly specified as good, while there are other actions, which are com- mon to all living beings (such as those of eating and the like, which help to keep the body), and which, as such, are performed by the good men also. But among all practices, those alone that are current among the good people only are called Dharma, and not all the Actions that are common to all living beings (and as such among the good also). From this it also follows that in the case of men, whose minds have 188 TANTRA-VARTIKA=~-ADHYAYA I-——PADA IfI—ADHI 4(a). been fully impressed with the idea that only such Actions as are laid down in the Veda are Dharma, their inner satisfaction is an anthority in distinguishing Dharma. And it is not possible for such people, as have their minds purified by a fill of knowledge of the Veda and its meaning, and whose intention always functions in accordance with the path of duty laid down in the Veda,—to have any ideas contrary to the Veda; and with a view to this, it has been said—“ whatever the man learned in the Veda utters, it becomes Vedic ’—1.e., having its source in the impressions left by the Veda, it becomes as authoritative as the Veda itself. Just agin the case of salt mines, and in that of Meru the land of bright gold, whatever is produced in them, becomes salt and gold (respectively),—so also in the case of the inner satisfaction of one who knows the Veda (which imparts Vedic authority to all that it touches). This idea has also been expressed by many learned people, and has been also poetically put thus: ‘‘ Whenever any doubtful point presents itself .. ` to good men, they are helped by their own minds, which always help them to come to the correct conclusion.” (Gakuntula, ActI). And asa matter of fact, for those whose minds are pervaded by the ideas imbibed from a long continued study of the Veda, it is not possible to have an inner satis- faction, in anything else save the doing of that which is Dharma; and hence that Action, which when performed gives them inward satisfaction, is accepted as Dharma. Or, we may accept the fact of the inner satisfaction of good men being a means of knowing Dharma, on mere verbal testimony (of Manu and others); and just as, even though many persons may perform any single pious act, yet a contemplation of these persons brings about excel- lent results to ordinary people (as it 18 laid down that whenever an evil thought enters one’s mind he should think of a pious person),—in the same manner, even though many actions may be connected with the inner satisfaction of the good man, yet they are accepted as being conducive to excellent results. And we may employ the same reasoning to the case of the practices of good men (which are laid down as authoritative, in the text “the practices of good men also, &., &c.”). Just as (1) in the case of one who has been favoured by some deities with a boon to the effect that anything he would utter would counteract the most virulent poison, when he utters some such thing, and it is found to effect a cure, people cherish that utterance of his, to serve them in curing similar cases of poisoning (in this case the mere fact of the Words being uttered by the favoured person, imparts to them the potency),—(2) in the science of snakes, it is laid down that whatever herb the mongoose hap- pens to hold by its teeth, it becomes a potent cure for all poisons—(in this case the mere touch of the animal’s teeth imparts the potency to the - PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. ` 189 # herb),—(3) whatever place a pious man happens to inhabit, that place (by his mere contact) attains a sanctity that purifies all other people coming to it,—exactly in the same manner, the practices and the inner satis- faction of such people as have their minds saturated with Dharma, them- selves become the means of Dharma; and as such they are to be accepted, by people seeking after a knowledge of Dharma, as laid down in the Veda itself. The Parvapaksha has brought forward certain specific instances of the admittedly evil doings of eminently recognised good men: for instance, that Prajapati made advances to his own daughter, that Indra had an inter- course with Ahalya&; and so forth; and from these instances of gross transgressions of the Law by recognised good men, it has come to the conclusion that the mere practice of good men cannot be accepted as an authority for Dharma. In the first place, the passages (in the Puranas and Vedas) that are in- terpreted on these lines, may be only a fortuitous coincidence of words and expressions (the texts never having actually meant what they seem to mean now) ; or, secondly, the prohibition of such actiovs may be held to pertain to men only, and not to superhuman beings; or, thirdly, the actions may be justified on the ground of the persons concerned being very powerful and super-human beings, and as such not subject to the same limitations (of conduct) as the weaklier human beings; or, fourthly, we can explain the said texts in such @ way as to deprive them of all repulsive significations. 9.0. (1) The word “ Prajdpati” means ‘ one who protects all creatures ;’ as such it can be taken as a name of the Sun; and it is an ordinary fact that towards morning the sun reaches the early Dawn, (‘ Usha’); and as the early Dawn is brought about by the approach of the Sun, it is called his “daughter ;” and it is the fact of the Sun letting his rays fall in (or on) the Dawn that has been figuratively spoken of as the intercourse of a man with a woman. (2) The word “ Indra”—proceeding from the root ‘ Idt’ which signi- fies great glory—-would signify one possessed of a resplendent glory; and as such it is taken as another name of the Sun; and he is the ‘jdra’—des- troyer (jarati-nagayati)—of ‘ Ahaly&’—(ahani liyaté) that which disappears during the day, ६.९., Night; as it is only when the Sun rises that the dark- ness of night is destroyed; and it is in this sense that we should take the sentence—" Indro’ halyay@ jarah,”—which cannot be taken in its ordinary sense, of an illicit connection with a Woman. (8) As for Nahusha, it is true that when he reached the position of Indra, he made advances towards CGaci, Indra’s wife; but through this unlawful act, he fell from his place and was bornas a big snake ; and this olearly shows that it was a sinful act that he had done; and as. for (क्म, as 290 TANTRA-VARTIKA™=ADHYAYA I--PADA II—~ADHI 4(a). she proved very constant in her devotion to her own husband, her greatness and effulgence become enhanced to a tremendous extent, which shows that such faithfulness is an act of Dharma. (4) In the case of Vacishtha, it is clear that his action was due to excessive grief, and hence nobody accepts it as Dharma. It is only that Action which the good men know to be Dharma, and perform it as such» hat is to be accepted as Dharma; while those Actions that, even when performed by good men, are clearly found to be due to an undue influence of desire, anger, greed, delusion, grief and the hke,—are to be classified as ‘Dharma’ or ‘ Adharma,’ according as they happen to be enjoined or prohibited in the scriptures (without any consideration for the fact of their being performed by good men). (5) Hence, in the case of Vigvamitra also, as he had reached a very high degree of penance, even though he did, in certain cases transgress the law under the influence of passion or anger,—yet we can allow such | transgressions to pass unnoticed, in accordance with the maxim that ‘ for a strong man everytbing is equally healthy’ (४.९.) for a pious man all actions are equally lawful); or, we may absolve him from all blame, on the ground that he would destroy all such sins by means of excessive penances, and the performances of proper expiatory rites, which would leave him as pure as over. But for people of lesser penances, such transgressions would be as irretrievably harmful, as the eating of the (poisonous) leaves of the Mahdavata for the elephant. (6) As for Dvaipayana, he, under his mother’s orders, got children from the wife of his brother (related to him through his mother), in accordance with the scriptural injunction: ^ A woman without a hus- band, if desirous of progeny, may, if ordered by her superior, have recourse to her husband’s younger brother;’’ and even if a transgression, it dis- appears in the light of his great penances, prior to, as well ag after, the committing of the deed. If there be another person with ‘an equal degree of Brahmic glory, he might do such deeds with impunity. (7) Réma and Bhishma, both considering the wife to be only necessary in the performance of the sacrifice they had undertaken, did not take to a wife—the former on account of his great love for his first wife Sita, and the latter because of his great reverence for his father to whom he had pro- mised that he would never marry; and as both were free from the debt they owed their fathers—the one by his direct offspring, and the other by the children of his mother,—there was no impediment to their sacrifices being duly accomplished. Then again, Rima kept by him, at the sacrifice, a golden image of Sité, because for the sake of reputation (he could not have kept Sita in person), and for the sake of showing that he was not cruel to the memory of Sité (he did not take another wife to him- PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. 19 self). And as for Bhishma,—the text of Manu laying down that if among many uterine brothers, even one gets children, all the rest become endowed with offspring, through these very children,—having beeg freed from the debt he owed his fathers, by the birth of the geet his brother, Vicitravirya,—he may have taken to a wife for the filfilment of the sacrificial conditions; and this we may iufer from fpparent Inconsistency of such an irregularity in the conduct of ~ heless person like Bhishma, who, [ Mahabharata—Anucisana Parva, - ५ ads of his father (who had appeared to him in person), in consideration mse-the scriptural texts that lays down the offering of the libations on the ground—(one who was so scrupulous in following the scriptural teachings) how could he, alone, without a wife, have dared to perform sacrifices P ) (8) As for Dhrtarashtra, we find it related in the Agcarya Parva that, through Vyisa’s favour, he got his sight for looking upon his sons; and from this we can infer that through the same agency he was able to see when the sacrifice was being performed (and hence at that time he was not blind). We are told of the Maharshi being capable of wonderful curses and blessings; hence, just as we know of Dhrtaraishtra to have been born blind in accordance with a curse pronounced by Vyasa; so we can infer, from the apparent inconsistency of a blind person engag- ing 10 sacrifices, that during the performance he got his vision through a blessing of Vyasa. Or, in the passages that describe Dhrtarashtra as per- forming yajnas, the word ‘ Yajna’ may be taken to mean ‘charity, gifts,’ as the root ‘ yajt’ 18 equally expressive of sacrifice and giving. And we find Charity laid down as leading to results similar to those of sacrifices ; hence the giving of charities may have been figuratively spoken of as the performance of sacrifices.” (9) The unlawful intercourse of the five Pandavas with a common wife has been very well explained by Vyasa himself: ^ Draupadi appear- ed, in the full bloom of youth, out of the sacrificial altar ; and as such she is Lakshmi (the goddess of wealth) herself; consequently, she does not be- come tainted by her intercouse with many owners.” To the same effect, we have also the foltowing: ‘' The Brahmarsli pointed out her wonder- fully beautiful form to besuperhuman ; inasmuch as the great-souled bean- tiful one (Draupadi) became younger day by day.” All this tends to show that she was not an ordinary human being; and hence she has been spoken of as “ superhuman ” (aud as such her actions are not to be judged by the ordinary standard of human proprieties). It is for the very same reason that Krshna himself promised to Karna that Draupadi would go to him on the sixth day (after having been with the five Pandavas for five days). If it were not on account of the superhuman character of the Reo TANTRA-VARTIKA“-ADHYAYA I—PADA III—ADHI 4(a). woman, how could such an-authoritative person'as Krshna himself have promised such a trans ९९0 Another expla aA 9 that there were five distinct D®iupadis; but as they were all ey have been spoken of as one; this con- clusion being led to by the apparent inconsistency of such a "धी appearing in the conduct of such blameless characters as श कुक aud 118 brotiters. | Or, it may be that she was the wife of Arjuna alone | she was actually won); and yet she is spoken of as being t all of them, simply with a view to show, by ४ hyperbolical tation, that there was not the slightest point of disagreement x the five brothers. Her superhuman character is further pointed oud by the faot that when being dragged to the assembly of kings, at the gambling, though she was not actually in her courses, yet, on the spur of the moment, she made herself look exactly as if she were so, simply with a view to show the action of Dhrtarashtra in the worst possible light. And her character of Lakshmi, too, is fully recognised, only when she 18 considered as the wife of Arjuna alone (who is Nara, the counterpart of Narayana). Then again, she has been spoken of, as the common wife of all the five brothers, simply with a view to show that thore was such a close friendship among them that even such an exclusive possession as the wife may be spoken of as belonging to all of them, and as such there was na. mutual distrust among them, and so much the less chance of apgyyiffer- ences arising. Thus then, when .all these apparent transgressions are found to be capable of various rational explanations, and when, as a matter of fact, all good men are actually found to avoid all that has its source in passion and greed, &c., it is not right to question the righteousness of the Practice of Good Men. (10) Thus too, as regards the action of Yudhishthira in telling a lie to compass the death of Drona, some authors have laid down that expiatory rites can be performed even when the evil is done purposely ; and as the rites laid down for the particular transgression, are the performance of an Agwamédha sacrifice, Yudhishthira did perform this-dacrifice, and thereby distinctly showed that what he had done was sinful; and as such it cannot be accepted as the ^“ Practice of good men.’’ (11) Then remains the case of Krshna and Arjuna being drunk with wine, and having married the daughters of their respective mater- nal uncles, both being instances of direct transgressions of the law. But it is only the wine distilled from grains, which is called ‘Sura,’ that 18 prohibited for the three higher castes; says the Smyti ९ ~“ Qura is the impure essence of the graius and it is evil-that is spoken of as impure; PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. 193 hence the Bréhmana, the Kshatriya and the Vaicya should never drink Sura.” As for the particular wines “ Madhu” (wine distilled from certain fruits, as grapes and the like), and the ‘ Sidhw’ (that distilled from molass- es), these are not prohibited for the Kshatriya and the Vaicya; as “ all intoxicating drinks” have been prohibited for the Brahmana alone. Though there is a passage that declares—“ all the three kinds of wine, the Gaudi (that distilled from molasses) Paishthi (that distilled from grains) and Madhvi (distilled from fruits), boing the same, they shonld not be drunk by the Brahmavadis, »—yet here the word ^ Brahmavadi”’ should be taken as denoting the Brahmanas only; as the word literally means ‘one who is capable of teaching Brahma,’ or ‘ whose duty itis to teach Brahma’, or ‘ whose excellence lies in such teaching’ ; and as the root ‘ Vada’ 18 Synonymous with ‘ Bra’ such duties are distinctly restricted to the Brahmana alone, by such texts as—‘“ from among the three higlier castes, the Brahmana alone should teach.”’ And it has also been pointed out in connection with the villificatory Arthavada, that are taken along with the prohibition of wines in general, that the Bréhmana, deluded under the influence of wine, might do many such things as should not be done, which shows that wine in general 1s prohibited for the Brahmana only. Hence we take the passage—“ All the three kinds of wine, &.,’’ to mean that just as the one, Surd distilled from grains, is not drinkable by the three higher castes, so are all the three undrinkable by the Brahmana. Other- wise, if the simple prohibition of wine in general were meant, then the words ‘ Yathaiva, &c.,’ and ‘ Brahmavadibhih’ would be totally redundant. The mention of ‘the three castes’ we shall supply from out of another verse, For this reason, the fact of Krshnaand Arjuna—both Kshatriyas— being intoxicated with ‘ Madhu’ (grape wine) is in no way a transgression of the law. And, as a matter of fact, we have Vedic texts that distinctly show (1) that the prohibition of wine is for others (7.e., Braéhmanas), and also (2) that it 18 distinctly permissible (in the case of others): For instance, (1) “That which was impure came out afterwards; wine is that impurity, this became.,attached to the Kshatriya; hence it is that superiors, daughters-in-law, and the father-in-law drink the wine and go on talking ; vil indeed is impurity; hence the Brahmana should not drink the wine; lest he be attached to evil”; and (2) “The Kshatriya should say to the Brahmana—‘the drinking of wine does no harm to him who knows this’”; and this latter is with reference to the ‘ Madhw’ and the ‘ Sidhu’ (and not the ‘Sura’ which is in 10 case allowed to anyone else but the Cidra). As for Kyshna and Arjuna, having married their maternal cousins, such relationships of brothers and cousins come to be mentioned, even 20 194 TANTRA-VARTIKA~-ADHYAYA I—-PADA 11--^ एप 4(a). where there is no blood relationship (and hence it may be that Krshna and Arjuna are spoken of as cousins simply because of their close friend- ship). Though Subhadra is spoken of as ‘Krehna’s sister,’ yet, we know that only three persons—Baladéva, Kryshna, and Ekananci— have been spoken of as uterine brothers and sisters; and hence we conclude that Subhadri must have been a distant cousin of Krshna’s, as 18 clear from the fact of her beivg married to Arjuna, who could be said to have transgressed the law, only if he had married a child of Vasudeva’s (who was his maternal uncle); and certainly he committed no transgres- sion in marrying one who was only a distant relation of Vasudeva. And how could such a great Law-giver as Kyshna, who is always cited as an example of righteous conduct, allow of an incestuous marriage, when he was fully alive to his position of a Law-giver, as is clearly shown by hi own declarations: viz.: “Q Partha, all men follow my path,” ^ Whatever the great one does, the others follow ; that which he authorises, people act up to it.” The above arguments will serve to explain the marriage of Krshna himself with Rukmini (who is said to have been his cousin), As instances of transgressions, in modern times, of the laws laid down in the Smrtis, the Purvapaksha has cited the drinking of wine among the Brémana women of the countries of Ahicchatra and Mathura, and the marriage with maternal cousins, current amongst the people of the South. In explanation of this, some people assert that as the Smrti and the Practice of good men are both independent of each other, being equally based upon the Veda, both of them are of equal authority, and as such whenever we find them contradicting each other, we can accept both as laying down equally authoritative altcrnatives; and as such the transe gressions need not be rejected as transgressions of Smrti laws, and as such sinful. But this explanation cannot be accepted as correct, in view of the statement of the comparativo strength of the various authorities of Dharma (where it will be distinctly shown that the Smrtt has a greater authority than the Practice of good men). Others again offcr the following explanation : All Laws are laid down with special reference to certain definite parts of the country; as Apas- tamba has distinctly pointed ont that certain actions are not allowed in one part of the country, and they are quite permissible in another. And hence we conclude that the said practices would not be sinful only for those whose forefathers have been used to them: as has been declared by Manu also: ‘The path by which one’s father and forefathers have gone on, by that path of the good should one proceed; as by such procedure PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. 195 alone does he not become attached to sin.” And, asamatter of fact, we find that those people, whose forefathers have not accepted the aforesaid practices whieh have been prohibited in other Smrtis, still avoid them; and if by chance they do become addicted to it, they are cast out by their own people. Bat this explanation too will not serve our purpose; because Gautama has declared that “all practices contrary to the Scriptures are unauthori- tative.” 1४ may be argued that as a matter of course, when we find the practices to be contrary to the Veda, we do not accept them as authorita- tive; and the term ‘Scriptures’ does not apply to the Smrtis. But this is not correct; because the term ‘Scripture’ 18 applicable to Smrtt works also. In connection with =^" Smarta Dharma” Cankha and Likhita have deelared “ Amnayah smrtidhdrakah,”’ which clearly shows that the works of Manu and others—called ‘ Amndya’ (Scriptures)—which were composed by them on the strength of their own remembrances of Vedic texts—have been laid down for the sake of the students of these works, for the purpose of ascertaining a definite basis for the said compila- tions in such rememberances. Hence, it 18 absolutely impossible for us to accept the authoritative character of such practices as are contrary to the laws laid down by Manu and others. As for the declaration of Apastamba, quoted above, it has been completely refuted by Baudhayana, who has cited many instances of practices contrary to the Smrtzs. Aud further, as we find all such practices originating from visible causes, such as passion and the like, we can never accept the fact of there being a Vedic basis, cither for such unlawful practices, or for the above quoted declarations of Apas- tamba. It may be asked—‘“ What is the text that prohibits the drinking of wine for Brahmana women?” Well, we have the text—“ For this reason, the Brahmana and the Kshatriya, and also the Kshatriy4, should not drink wine.” Against this, 1६ may be urged that the word *‘ Bréhmana” being in the masculine gender, the said text cannot be taken as prohibiting it for women; and as such the practice of the women of Mathura cannot be held to be contrary to the Smrti text quoted. Bat, in that case, even in the case of the prohibition—* A Brahmana should not be killed,” it may be the killing of the man alone that can be said to be prohibited; and in the same manner, a significance may be attached to the singular number in ‘ Brihmana’; and thence a man would only once desist from killing one Bréhmana; and he would conclade that he has obeyed the law fully, in that one desisting, and thenceforward he might go on killing Bréihmanas with impunity. Or, in the prohibition in question too, we find the word “ Brahmana” in the singular; and so the 196 TANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I—PAD& HH—-ADHI 4(a). law would have been fully obeyed by any single Brahmana desisting from wine; and thenceforth, we would have the same contingency as before in the case of the prohibition of killing (४.९, the other Brahmanas would go on drinking with impunity). The other party retorts: “As for the significance of the singular “number, as this may be applicable either to each individual Brahmana, ५ 0 to the single Brihmana-class (considered as one composite whole), ‘there would be no harm in accepting it. That is to say, even if the pro- "^ hibition of the killing, as well as of the drinking, refer to each individual ^^ Brahmana that may happen to become a fit object of such prohibition,— ^ ४8 the mention of this singularity would be a mere repetition, it could not “qualify either tke action (of killing or drinking) or the prohibition~(and “as such the singular number could not be held to have any significance) ; “specially if the singularity is distinctly found to refer to the Braéhmana- ^“ ९1485, (as this class is always universally recognised to be one), any ‘mention of its singularity would all the more be a mere repitition (and as ‘such in any case no siguificance can be attached to the singular number ; ‘though there are no such objections to the admitting of the significance “of the masculine gender). (Then, as for the argument that if the mas- “culine gender be significant, in the case of the word ‘ Brahmana’ as ^^ occurring in the prohibition, ‘ the Brihmana should not drink wine,’ the “same may be said in the ease of the prohibition ‘ the Brahmana should “not be killed ’] there is a deal of difference between the two cases; as in “the prohibition of killing, (‘ Brahmano na hantavyah’) the ‘ Brahmana’ ‘‘ being the real objective, appears in the form of the subject (on account ^ of the passive affix ¢avya) ; and as such no significance is attached to the “masculine gender in this case; exactly as in the case of the sentence ‘“*one desirous of heaven should offer sacrifices,’ no significance is at- ‘tached to the masculine gender in ‘ svargakamah,’ simply on the ground “ of its being the subject ; while in the case of the prohibition of drinking, “though the Brahmana, as the person warned off from sin, has the “ character of the subject, yet considered as the agent of the drinking, 4 116 becomes a part of the predicate, by means of the Nominative and “the Instrumental affixes (the real construction of the prohibition being ८८ ‹ Brdhinanéna-surapdnam padpajyanakam’); and assuch in this case, it be- ‘comes absolutely necessary to attach a significance to the masculine ‘‘ gender ; exactly asin tho case of the ‘ measuring of the sacrificial post’ by * the sacrificer, as the sacrificer is mentioned as the predicate, his gender “is taken into consideration. ८५ ¶0 further explain (how no significance can be attached to the mas- °“ culine gender in the word ‘ Brihmana,’ in the sentence ‘the Brahmana ‘should uot be killed’): The meaning of the sentence is that ‘one who is PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. 197 ५८ Br&hmana should not be killed’; and when this construction has been ‘“‘once comprehended, (the prohibition has been fully understood and) no ९५ 0167" gender, &c., can be predicated, either of the Brahmana, or of the ‘prohibition ; (because that would lead to a split of the original sentence), ‘which would have to be construed somewhat like this: ‘one who is a « Brdhmana should not be killed, and that Brahmana should be a male’ ; “which is not in any case allowable. That is to say, the Injunction in ‘* question serves to lay down a prohibition ; and as no prohibition of mere “killing (without an object) is possible, we take it to mean the prohibition “of the killing as qualified by (7.¢., as pertaining to) the Braéhmana-class ; “and its operation ceasing with this, if it be called into requisition again, ९ with a view to the injunction of any such peculiarities as the gender and “the like, with reference either to the Bradhmana, or to the Killing, or to “the Prohibition,—then it would be necessary to repeat the Injunctive ‘affix (which has once enjoined the non-killing, and which 18 now called ‘upon to lay down the gender, &c.) ; and as such, this would lead to the split of the sentence. Even for those who hold Injunction and Prohibi- “tion to be two distinct facts signified by Vedic sentences, the Nega- “tive (‘not’ in the prohibition ‘the Brahmana should not be killed’), “having its own denotation helped by that of the Injunctive affix, comes “ to have an additional meaning (in the shape of prohibition ), and serves the ‘‘ purpose of prohibiting that (killing) which has been signified by the In- ‹ junctive affix in (‘hantuvyah °); with special reference to the Brahmana- “class; because, as explained before, no prohibition of mere killing in the ‘‘ abstract would be possible ; dnd it cannot be again called into requisition “to prohibit auy such further peculiarities, as those of gender and the ८५ like, in connection with, either the Braihmana, or the Killing, or the In- ‘junction ; consequently, though a particular gender is mentioned in the ८५ sentence, yet, as it does not serve any useful purpose, no significance can “be attached to it. The construction of the said passage may be amplified “iu the following manner: ‘ That the Brahmana should be killed through “anger &., is not.’ But according to those who accept the Injunction to “be the only signification of the Veda (and explain the Prohibition as “only a negative Injunction), the sentence may be amplified thus: ‘ The “ killing of the Brahmana should not be done,’ or ‘He who is a Brah- “mana, him one should not kill,—the passage being thus explained, “either as the prohibition of the killing as pertaining to the Brahmana, ‘or as the prohibition of a killing which has its object distinctly pointed “out as the Brahbmana. In any case, we cannot escape from accepting “the Brahmana as the Subject; and as pertaining to the Subject, either ‘ the Gender or the Number can have no significance. ‘On the other hand, in the case of the prohibitions—‘ the Brihmana 198 TANTRA*VARTISA—ADHYAYA I—PADA HII—ADAI 4(a). ८ should not drink the wine,’ and ‘the wine should not be drunk by the ०८ teachers of Brahma ’—~, the ‘Brahmana’ has not the character, of either ^" the ‘ cause,’ or ‘ place,’ or ‘time’ or ‘ result,’ or ‘ the object of purifica- ‘tion, —-which are the only five possible forms of that which is already “known (1.¢., Subject) ; and in the former sentenee, the Brahmana has “the full character of the qualification of the nominative, and as auch, ८“ 28 capable of being defined by the singular number which is predicated “of it by the verbal affix (‘in pibét’) ; and in the latter sentence as the ‘Instrumental ending distinetly points to the subordinate (or predica- tive) character of the Brahmana, he cannot but be admitted to be ‘specified by the masculine gender. And in accordance with this, even ‘the former sentence should be taken as the prohibition of drinking, for ‘the Brahmana, as qualified by the Masculine gender.” *‘ And thus, as the drinking of wine is not found to have been pro- ‘hibited, for Bedlimana women, the drinking of wine by the women of the ‘countries of Ahicchatra and Mathura cannot be said to be a transgres- ८ 81010 of the law.” SIDDHANTA. This is not so; because even in the case of the prohibition of drinking, no significance can be attached to the gender, because the Brahmana is the subject, here also, exactly asin the case of the prohibition of Brahman- killing. As a matter of fact, the mere fact of a certain thing being yet to be known is not the only ground for attaching a significance to the qualifi- cations of the gender, &., because Predicability 1s the one important ground for such significance ; as that which is described—z.e., the Subject of a proposition—is described just as it is found to exist; and in connection with that, nothing more than what is necessarily required by the Predicate can be said to be predicated. Hence, if we had any such injunction as that ‘the Brahmana should drink wine’ prior to the appearance of the Prohibition, then alone could there be any chance for the subordinate and predieative character belong- ing to the Brahmana, which could justify our attaching a significance to everything (that is both the masculine gender and the singular number). But, asa matter of fact, we know that the only agent that prompts the Braihmana to the drinking of wine is Passion or Delusion, &c.; and so there is no possibility of there being any such Injunction (of the drinking of wine). And as for an Injunction being deduced from the prohibitive text itself (as urged above), no such deduction is possible, as all chance for it is barred by the fact of the sentence ending in a direct prohibition. There- fore, whether the said prohibition be construed as—‘ That the Brahmana should drink wine is not, ’—oras ‘ He whois a Bréhmana should not drink PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. 199 wine, ’—it being taken either as the prohibition of drinking as pertaiming to wine, or as the Injanction of a prohibition,—in any case, inasmuch as he is the object that is helped by being warned off from the drinking, the Braihmana cannot be held to be predicated either of the drinking or of the prohibition (and as such no significance can be attached to the gender, dc. ) Even in ordinary experience, we find that there is a chance of both the male and the female (Brahmana) being addicted to drink; and hence in the sentence prohibiting the drinking, the mention of the Brahmana must be taken as pertaining to both sexes (because as the Subject of the sentence, it must be taken exactly as it is found in ordinary experience). And it cannot be construed as ‘The Brahmana that should drink’—‘ and he be a male’; because such connection of the gender cannot be established without the operation of Predication (which is absent in this case). (That is to say, when the ‘ Brahmana’ has once been spoken of as the Subject, it is not possible to make it the Predicate without a Predicative word). (Butsuch Predication is not found in the present case). (Because the whole sen- tence cannot be taken as serving the sole purpose of predicating the relation of the gender; as the Injunction, or the Predication, does not proceed any further than the prohibition of drinking). Hence, we conclude that in both cases (1.e., in the case of the prohibition, ‘The Bréhbmana should not be killed,’ as also in that ‘ The Brahmana should not drink wine’) we cannot attach any significance to the gender or the number (of the word ‘ Brahmanza’ ). It may be argned that—“ if such be the cage, then the killing of the Braéhmana woman would be as sinful as that of the male Braihmana; and as such, how is it that the full expiatory rite, necessary on the killing of ० Brahmana, has been restricted (in the case of the female Bréhmana) to the Atrayi woman only (which shows that the killing of other Brahmana females 18 not equally sinful) P” To this we make the following reply: Who is there that denies the equal sinfulness of the killing of the female Brihmana? As for the expiatory rites being different, this is due to the fact of the one being a female and the other a male (but this does not show that there is any difference in the sinfulness of the two slaughters) ; and certainly the com- parative slightness of the expiatory rite does not remove’ the character of + Brahmanea-slaughter’ from the killing of the female Br&ahmana; because under certain circumstances the expiatory rite that has beon laid’ down as necessary for one who has killed even a male Bréhmana, is also compara- tively slight; and this fact would also come to imply the lesser sinful- ness of this killing (which is absurd). Therefore, because the expiatory rite Jaid down for 008 who kills a female Brahmana is comparatively 200 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I—PADA I1I—ADHI 4(0). slight, from that we cannot doubt the fact of the killing of the woman - being sinful and prohibited. In the case of the drinking of wine, however, we do not meet with any distinction in the expiatory rites that are laid down; and as such all chance of there being any support for such drinking by women having been lost, we conclude that the said practice of the Brahmana women of the two countries, is a direct transgression of the laws laid down in the Smrtis. It has been argued above that on the strength of a declaration of Apastamba, we can accept the two as optional alternatives; but as this drinking of wine by the Brabmana has been prohibited by the Veda itself—‘“ Therefore, the Brahmana should not drink wine’’—the mere equality of two contradictory Smrtis cannot justify us in accepting an option in the matter; and hence we cannot admit the authoritativeness of such practices. (The Adhikarana differently construed). With a view to establish the authoritative character of the Prac- tices of good men, we can construe both these Sutras as laying down tins same Adhtkarana. And this further consideration is based upon the in- stances of the practices of the good people inhabiting the part of the world known as ‘ Arydvarta’ which has been defined as that country where the black antelope is found to roam and graze. The question is—That which the Aryas (gentlemen of the said country) are found to perform, as Dharma, is that authoritative or not? And the ground of doubt is that on account of these persons being the same as the performers of Vedic sacrifices, we conclude their practices to be authoritative; while inasmuch as we do not find such practices duly coded and compiled, there is a chance that they may be unauthoritative. It may be argued that the Authors of the Smrtis themselves have declared the authoritativeness of such practices, in such texts as,—‘ the remém- brance and the conduct of people knowing the Veda,’ “the practices of good men,” “the practice that obtains in a conntry,” and so forth— and as such the authority of the practices is implied in that of the Smrtis. But this will not do; as the opponent might very rightly argue thus: ‘Inasmuch as we do not find such practices to have any origin (in the ^ Veda) and as we find them tobe due to other motives of gre the ८ 1116, we cannot accept them as authoritative ; because even of Smt: texts, “we admit the authority of only such of them as are found to have any basis in the various branches of the Veda; but on the sole authority of the pre- ‘ valence of certain practices, we cannot infer the existence of corroborative THE 1146688 OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. 201 61116 texts, and at the same time, that the Vedic texts in support of these ‘latter. Because the Authors of the Smrits must have seen these practices ५ exactly as we see them; and hence the Smrtis cannot point out any Vedic ५ basis forthem. Specially because, if these Authors knew of tho Vedic texts ‘in support of the practices, they should have included them among the other ‘acts laid down in their works. And hence, inasmuch as we do not find “them laying them down in their works in the same manner as they have ‘‘ done the other acts for which they had supports in the Veda,—and as they declared them to be authoritative, simply on account of the confidence ‘‘that they had in the good men of their day,—we can by no moans ‘ascertain such practices to have any basis in the Veda.” Consequently there is certainly an occasion for due consideration. The foregoing two Adhikurunas have laid down the conclusion that the Practices of good men are authoritative, because the people among whom these are prevalent aro the same as the performers of Vedic sacrifices, and also because wo do net find them to be contrary to the Veda or the Smrti. As a matter of fact, we do not find any practices of good men to be contrary to any ७711८ or Vedic texts; and as such, from the fact of the persons concerned being the same in both cases, they are accepted to be authoritative; and in support of this wo have the declarations of the Authors of Smrtis, who could not have lent their support to anything which they did not actually know to be based upon the Veda. Against this conclusion, however, we have the following :— PURVAPAKSHA. “Inasmuch as the scriptures are limited in their scope (Sutra 6), the ८८ practices of good men, devoid of Vedic support, cannot have any author- “ity, with regard to the ascertaining of Dharma or Adharma. The scope “of the scriptures has been limited to matters relating to Dharma and ८ Adharma: and the scriptures have been limited to the number fourteen, as ‘‘ made up of the Veda and its subsidiary sciences, none of which includes “any such thing as the Practices of good men; nor can such Practice be ` “ said to form a scripture by itself; nor can the Perception or the Perform- “ance of such Practices be said to form a scripture; because the former ५५ depends upon other persons; and as for the latter it is the subject-matter ‘dealt with by the scriptures, and cannot itself be the sciipture. And as “for the Smrtt text supporting the authoritative character of the Prac- ८८ tices, it has already been shown that it has no basis in the Veda. ८८ And if we proceed to consider the question, as to whether these “ Practices have ove basis or many,—we find that neither of the two is ८५ {00881016 to be inferred. Because for such Practices as are found to be ८८ different in different couutries, and among different communities and famt- 26 202 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I—PADA UI-——ADHI (4)a. ‘lies, it is not possible to be based upon any single Vedic text; uor is there ५५ any such Vedic text as would include all such practices; as it is absolutely ‘impossible for them to be spoken of either as distinct individuals, or as ५ forming a class by themselves, which are the only two possible denotations ‘‘of words. And if one were to assume a Vedic text foreach of these Prac- ८८ tices, he would be composing a Veda by himself; as it 1s not possible for “any single sentence to speak of, and give rise to, an indefinite number ५८ 01 practices; nor can it be said that, it was the finding of such a sentence ८ 171 the Veda that led the authors of the Smritis to declare the authoritative- ८४ 1688 of the practices; because in that case these would come to have as ‘* preat an authority as the other Smrytz texts that Jay down other duties ‘(on the basis of the Veda). And again, the Smrti text that would be ८५ composed after the perception of the Practice, cannot serve as its basis: ८५ 88 that would disturb all the rules that regulate the relations of the sup- ‘porter and the supported, and the comparative strength of the various “authorities. (Because in that case the Practice would serve as the origin ‘‘and basis of the Smriz text). ‘Hence, inasmuch as it is only amongst a limited number of scrip- ‘tures that the basis for any action can be assumed, as we do not find “any basis for many of the said Practices among the scriptures, we con- ८५ clude them to be absolutely baseless. Nor 18 it possible for us to assume a ८८ 8 Vedic text similar to the Smrf that could also be assumed as corro- ‘‘borative of the practices; becauso in that case, the Veda would come to have its origin in these practices; which would turn all ideas of the com- ४५ parative strength of the various authoritics upside down. That is to say, ० {116 Vedic text assumed would be in somo such form as—‘ The Practices ‘of good men are authoritative ;’ but this would imply the existence of the ८५ practices, prior to the Vedic text; and as that which follows cannot serve ‘Cas the basis for that which 1188 existed before it, such an assumed text ८४ cannot be held to be the basis of the practices which therefore remain as ५ baseless as before. “ Or, the Sutra (Gth) may be taken in the following manner: the scope ८ of the scriptures is limited to a definite number of subjects; and as the ““naumber of the practices is indefinite, they cannot have the character of ८ the scripture. “Or, 16 may mean that the subject-matter of tho scripture is “lemeted to such facts only as are not cognisable by any other means. ‘While in the case of the practices, we find many such visible motives as ‘‘ Greed and the like; and hence we cannot admit them to have any author- “ity in the scriptures. Hence we conclude that inasmuch as the practices ‘ave subsidiary to considerations of material pleasures, they cannot “have the character of Dharma. We find in the case of the Vaicyas, PRACTICES OF GOOD MEN AUTHORITATIVE. 9033 ५ Servants, and Doctors, and other people in the towns, that their practices ‘are based upon motives of material pleasures; and hence we conclude ^" the same to be the case with all human practices. ‘““ For these reasons, we conclude that the Veda and the Qmrtis are ° the only authorities in matters relating to Dharma ; and as for the conduct ‘and practices and inner satisfaction of men, they are just the same as ‘drinking bouts and jokes (current among ordinary people),”” [Sutra 7 would embody the Siddhanta in reply to this Pérvapaksha. ] Or, the three Sdtras (5, 6, and 7) may be taken as dealing with this same Adhikarana; and in this case, the practices current among the good people of Arydvarta may be cited as instances; and with regard to these, a question may be raised as to their authoritativeness or otherwise. And (the Pirvapaksha being supplied from without, on the same lines as shown ९००९९), all the three Sttvas may be taken as putting forward the Siddhdanta only, which would run thus: That which is taught ( Cishia’) in the Veda and the Smriis—if this is not contradicted by the practice of good men, such practice can be accepted, as an authority for Dharma; but whenever there is the least contradiction of the said teachings, then, as there would be a contradiction among the authorities, the Practice can never be admitted to have any authority in matters relating to Dharma. ADHIKARANA (5). | A word is always to be taken in the sense that ts attributed to tt in the scriptures |. A.—Tie ADHIKARANA EXPLAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BHASHYA. Sutra (8). “ The contest would be equal.” The clausc— becauso we do not find any contradiction amongst them”’—may be taken as the opening of this Sita. When we find even good men using a word ia two different meanings tho following doubt ariscs in the mind of tho listener: Inasmuch as a single word is used by good men in different senses, often contradicting one another, which one shall we accept as being the real meaning of the word ? For instance, the word ‘ yava’ (barley-corn) ‘ Varaha,’ (Boar), and ‘ Vétasa’ (Cane), are, in other countries, used in the sense of ‘ priyangy ' (long pepper), ‘ Vayasa’ (Crow), and ‘ Jamboo’ (Blackberry), respectively. Hence there arises a doubt as to the real significations of these words, in the minds of those who have not thonght out the difficulty, and who base all their ideas only upon what they actually perceive. And on this point, we have the following— PURVAPAKSIIA. “There should be no doubt at all on this point; because the usa ges of “all men are equally authoritative. In the case of overy word, in whatever ^ sense it happens to be used in a country, for that country the expressive- ९! ness of the word rests in that sonse alone; and this local denotation of “the word is authoritative for all men of all countries; specially as the “following arguments necessitate such universal authority : ‘The word cannot be said to have that sense for a few men only ; “nor can it be said not to have that sense forany men; the only difference “that is possible 18 on the point of such sense being known or not known “and it is only this difference that can be perceived, in connection with » Several men of various countries. Consequently, even if a certain sense THE SCRIPTURAL MEANING OF WORDS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 205 on (* of a word, be not known to certain men, they should accept it unhesita- “tingly; as it is as authoritative as the meaning that is known to ‘* them. “The reality, or the authority, of the denotations of words do not ‘depend upon either the groater or lesser number of persons using them ८५ 111 different senses; as in the case of such words (which are held to have ‘many meanings even by the same people) as ‘aksha’ ‘pala’ and the like: though only very few people use the word ‘ Aksha’ in the sense ८५ of the terminalia belerica, yet this meaning of it is admitted as freely as “that of the ‘ale of the cart.’ Similarly, too, it has been declared that “the root ‘ cava’ is used in the sense of moving among the Kambojas; while “tho Aryas use it to signify modification or putrefaction, as when they “speak of the dead body as a ‘ gava;’ and thero are many verbs and nouns “that are found to be used in different senses in differont countries. ८ Hence we conclude that the contest between (or the authority of) all the ‘* gignifications is equal. “So also in a case where a certain fact in connection with the subsidiary ८ sacrifices is mentioned by a word that appcars in the same form (though ८ perhaps in a different sense) in connection with the primary sacrifice,—we “accept the Subsidiary to have been performed exactly as the Primary, ‘and thereby quite in keeping with the Injanction that the Subsidiary is ९८ {0 be performed like the Primary. It 18 with special reference to such a “case only that the clanse—‘ because we do not find any contradiction ‘among them’—can be admitted (asa part of the 6८१८४) ; because it is ‘only in such cases that the diversity can be said to be non-contradictory . ८ 170 all other cases, there being no possibility of a co-existence of diversity ‘and non-contradiction. ‘Thus then the different usages being equally authoritative, we must ‘accept them to be optional alternatives.” To all this, we make the following reply : SIDDHANTA. Sutra (9). That which is supported by the scriptures (is the more authoritative), because that (the scripture) is the source of authority. The sense that appears in the scriptures is the more authoritative ; because the scriptures are the only source of authority; as for the sense accepted in ordinary parlance, such signification can be accepted as second- ary. Whenever there is a difference of opinion, the ordinary peopte of the world are not accepted as the decisive authority, but it 18 always that which has the support of the scriptures that is accepted as the most 206 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA 1—PADA III—ADHI (5)a. authoritative; because as for acceptance in ordinary parlance, all are equally accepted; while the latter has the additional authority of the scriptures, which makes 1t the most authoritative of all. Or, the Satva may bo explained thus: the sense in which the word ४8 used by those persons that take their stand upon the scriptures, ४5 to be accepted as the most authoritative ; because tt 18 more trustworthy than any other sense. It is a peculiarity with the people taking their stand upon the scrip- tures, that if there is even a slight discrepancy in what they assert, the whole purpose of the scriptures becomes defeated (that 18 to say, in the course of a sacrifice, if there is the slightest mistake in the pronunciation, &c., of mantras, the sacrifice becomes faulty, and fails to bring about the proper results) ; whereas in the case of ordinary usage, even if there be slight discrepancies, there is no such contingency. The doctors of medi- cine, when considering their own science of medicine, ascertain the mean- ings of the words ^ Yava” and the like (as they occur in particular contexts), in accordance with the taste, nutritious properties and digesti- bility of the particular article, that may be meant there; and the sacri- ficial priests procced to ascertain their meanings, with reference to the proper performance of Dharma. Therefore in the case of a work on medi- cine, a word should be accepted to have that sense (primarily) which has been given to it, from times immemorial, by the doctors of that science and so also in the case of sacrifices, only that sense is to be accepted which has been admitted by people learned in the sacrifices. And when itis thus possible to definitely ascertain the meaning of a word, we cannot accept it to be of an uncertain signification; nor can we admit of an option in the matter; because all options are open to eight objections (as shown above). As a matter of fact, whenever we find a word invariably used in the Veda, 19 the same sense, this definite ascertainment of its signification leads us to a similar conclusion, in the case of ordinary parlance also. As for instance, in the case of the word ‘ Yava,’ the Veda has laid down the injunction—‘ the post of the Udumbara wood is to be washed with the water mixed with Yava;’ and in connection with this passage, it is declared—‘ when all other plants are drooping, these continue to flourish Juxuriantly’. (This passage we meet with in various rescensions of the Veda; the Bhashya has cited that which occurs in connection with the Varunapraghdsa sacrifice; but as a discussion, as to which passage is really meant, would serve no purpose, we may accept it as quoted by the Bhashya). As a matter of ordinary experience, we find that in the THE SCRIPTURAL MEANING OF WORDS MOST AUTHORITATIVE. 207 month of Phdlguna (February-March) the leaves of all the trees fall off, and it is only the barley-corn that flourishes most Juxuriantly. On the other hand, the ‘ Priyangu’ (long-pepper) ripening during the Autumn, dis- appears entirely long before PhAdalyuna, and flourishes during the rains, when no other plants are found to be drooping, as all of them are in luxuriant foliage during the rains (hence we cannot accept the Long- pepper to be that which ‘ flourishes luxuriantly when all other plauts are drooping’). (Hence we cannot but accept the word ‘ Yava’ to mean barley-corn). In the same manner, the significations of the words ‘ Vétasa’ and ‘ Vardha’ are also ascertained from the sense in which they are used in the scriptures. (Here ends the Explanation of the Adhikarana according to the Bhashya). ॥ “क त [ Arguments against the above interpretation of the Adkiharana. ] In all the three words cited, the significations that have been sought to be supported by scriptural texts, are such as are already accepted to be the most authoritative, even on the authority of ordinary usage; and as such they cannot serve as examples of words having their significations defined by the authority of the scriptures. Kor in no country is the word ‘Yava’ used in the sense of long-pepper, nor the words ‘ Vétasa’ and ¢ Vartha’ in those of blackberry and crow respectively. Why then should we assume such usages and thereby create a difliculty for ourselves uselessly ? Inasmuch as under the Satra l—iv—29, it will be shown that in all doubtful cases, a definite conclusion is arrived at, by the help of subsequent passages ; and hence, the above instances coming under the same category, there is no need of considering them over again on this occasion. It is true that under the said Sidira, no notice is taken of the denotations of the words, the consideration referring solely to the object to be used (४.८. the point there to be considered 1s not what the word “ akia” anointed means, but that what is the material with which the gravels are to be anointed) ; and in the case as treated of there, the conclusion arrived at 18 only appli- cable to the particular time and place, and not everywhere (४.९, 1४ does not conclude that wherever there is to be an anointing, it 18 always to be done by butter, but only that in the particular instance, only butter should be used); while on the present occasion, what we are considering is the general denotation of the word (‘ yava’); and as such the conclusion that we arrive at is universally binding ; and from these facts it may be argued that there is no repetition. Yet with all this, the process of reasoning 208 TANTRA-VARTIKA--ADIIYAYA I-—-PADA III—ADHI (5)b. employed in the two cases 18 the samo; and exactly as under the said 9८१४, the butter is concluded to be the object that is to be employed, on the strength of the subsequent passages; so in the same manner, in the present case also, it is by the aid of the subsequent passage that we arrive at a definite conclusion with regard to the significations of the words ‘ yava’ and the like. And again, under the Silfra I—iv—23 we shall show that there are various causes of secondary (or indirect) signification, such as similarity and the like; and hence even if the word ‘ Vétasa’ be not admitted to be directly denotative of tho blackberry, the similarity of the two would enable it to bo used (indirectly) in that sense; (and as such, such signification being only indirect, it could not have the preference over the natural significa- tion) ; and hence no purpose is served by the citation of such words as the instances to be considered. Kor these reasons, we should base our consideration of the present Adhikarana upon other examples. [B. The Adhikarana as explained by the Vartika. | When thero happens to be a difference in the usages of the Arya and the Slléccha, there arises a doubt as to whether both are equally authorita- tive, or one 18 more authoritative than the other. And on this wo have the following - PURVAPAKSHA. “For all people that have to do only with perceptible things, the “contest would be equal ; as it is only in the case of invisible (or super-physi- “ cal) things that the Aryas can have any superior authority + in the case “of visible things, the authority of the Arya and the Mléccha is equally ८" strong. “Because all words are used with the sole purpose of expressing “certain things; and certainly the things that are thus talked of are those “that are met with, and are of use, in ordinary experience. Hence, ina “ease where we find exactly the same word being used in an entirely dif- ०५ {01616 sonse, among the Jflécchas, wo conclude the expressiveness “of the word to be eternal; exactly as we have the notion of eternality “with regard to the expressiveness of words used by the Aryas; as the ८८ reasons for accepting the eternality of the relations between the word and ‘its meaning are equally applicable in the two cases of the Arya and the (८ (12८८117. As among the Mléochas too, we cannot trace the beginnings of ‘the usages of words; and hence we can perceive no difference between “ two equally beginningless cxpressivo potentialities of words, For instance, MEANINGS RECOGNISED BY THE ARYAS MURE AUTHORITATIVE. 209 ८८ even among the Mlacchas, the perception of smoke leads to the conclusion ५ of the existence of fire; and hence (as we find their position correct in the ५४ 6886 of one means of knowledge) we conclude that the sense in which a ०५ ०८ is used by them is really one that is expressed by it. Consequently “then, in the case of the word ‘ pilu,’ as denoting a particular tree (accord- “ing to the Aryas) and the elephant (according to the Allécchas), tho “ contest between them (for authority) would be equal.” SIDDHANTA. In reply to the above, we have the Sutra (9), which can 06 explained exactly as it has been done above. And further, the notion of real exprossiveness that wo have with regard to the words used by the Mlécchas is as erroneous as the notion that we have with regard to those words that, though pronounced wrongly on account of ignorance, inability, &c., are yet perchance found to resemble another correct word. Thatistosay, exactly as we have corruptions of the verbal forms of words, so also we have thoso of meanings,—theso latter being १०९ to such causes as the indirect (secondary) significations of words, or the inability of the person to discern the right meaning, And these corruptions can be discerned only by those people that take their stand upon the scriptures, and are seeking aftcr the virtue that is attainable only by the correct performance of duties as correctly comprehended from the Veda; exactly as a false coin can be picked out only by those who are ex- perts in the art. And certainly, when there is an opposition between the cognitions of the learned and the ignorant, the former is always the stronger of the two; specially as it is very easy for us to get at reasons and facts upsetting the ideas of the ignorant. Hence we conclude that, inasmuch as the inhabitants of Aryavarta take their stand upon the scriptures, their ideas alone can have any author, ity in the matter of such significations of words as appertain to Dharma and its accessories. And even among these people themselves we should accept that sense in which the word is used by one who is more learned and more conversant with the scriptures, in preference to those sanctioned by the usage of people less learned in them. (0. The Adhikarana interpreted differently. } We may take the Adhikarana as dealing with the contradictions be- tween Smrtis and Usage. And on this point, we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. «+ Inasmuch as both have their origin cqually in tho Voda, the contest 27 210 TANTRA-VARTIBKA—ADITYAYA I—PADA IAD (5८). ८५ between them would be equal. Because, just as the authority of the Smptis ८ 18 based upon the fact of their being based upon the Veda, so too is that ८८ of Usage ; nnd as such we can perceive no difference between the two, in the “ noint of anthority. Or, we may go a step further: Usage is stronger in “its authonty than Smriz; because its results (in the shape of actions) ‘‘are directly perceptible, as leading to equally visible results ; and certainly, “that authority (or means of knowledge’ which is dissociated from its “result, becomes greatly weakened. The Vedic text, that would be the “basis of Usage, is perceived directly in the result; and hence, while “having found a Smrti text, we would be still looking after a Vedic text ८ {0 serve 8.8 its basis, the Usage, having obtained its footing long ere this, ८4 will have asserted itself; and certainly when a thing has once asserted ‘titself, how can it be ousted ? Therefore, wo must admit either that the ‘Usage is more authoritative than Smrti, or that both are equal in ‘ authority.” SIDDHANTA. But the 307४ is held to be more authoritative, because of its being based directly upon the scriptures ; and certainly the support of the Vedn is not equal in the two cases. Because the Ymrti has been compiled, in a proper manner, by trustworthy persons; and this fact directly leads to an unimpeded inference of its teachings being based upon the Veda. Whereas in tho case of Usage, the Usage leads to the assumption of a cor- roborative Smrtt, which in its turn Jeads to that of a Vedic text in support of it; thus in this case the support of the Veda being one degree further removed, its authority becomes weakened. And certainly there is no single Vedic text that sanctions the authority of all Usages at once; and at best the Vedic texts, supporting the Usag’es, are various and scattered all over the Veda; and as such they cannot be got hold of without the aid of the Smriis; specially as such Vedic texts are not found grouped together in a single Adhyiya; but they are scattered among variour chapters, and can be got at only here and there, and that too, with great difficulty. . For instance,—(1) In connection with the preparation of the sacriff- cial fire, we read—‘“‘ The sacrificer places the cake on both sides of himself, and hence it is that people carry the food with both hands, and then eat it; ’’ and here, though the passage itself gives reasons for the particular action, yet the fact cited as reason is not very well known; and hence this only Jeads to the inference of a direct Injunction, in accordance with the argument that ‘ things are enjoined by Vedic sentences.’ Nor can it be urged that the passage being merely explanatory of a certain useful method—like the passage “‘ as human children having lived iz the womb for SMATC 18 MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN USAGE. 211 ten months come to be bornin the eleventh, so do the mules, &c., &c.” ; and as such it cannot point toan Injunction, because the method described is not necessarily calculated to fulfil any purpose. Nor can it be said to be ex- planutory of a well-established natural fact—as in the case of the passage “hence people in old age are supported by their children” (because the said method of eating is not generally recognised as a well-established naturalfact). Hence though the passage has an entirely different meaning, yet the special ratiocinative style adopted serves to indirectly point to an Injunction of the particular method of eating. (2) The same process of reasoning is followed in the case of the passage—‘ because the food is kept on the right side, therefore it isonly by the rigth hand that one eats,” (which though referring to a particular action at sacrifices, is made to point to an Injunction of tho said method of eating). (3) Similarly, too, in the passago—the person initiated for the 8०१८५ should apply the collyrium to the right eye first, becanse men ordinarily are found to apply it to that eye first,” (which though referring to the sacrifice, 18 yet made to point to an Injunction whereby womeii are enjoined to apply the cuollyrium to the right eye first). (4) So also wjth reference to the passage—“ two strings were applied to each post, hence it is that a man takes many wives, though a woman does not take more than one husband ’’— which we find in the section on ‘ Yiapatkddaginé ’—(which is made to point to the injunction of one man taking many wives, and the prohibition of one woman taking many husbands). (5) In the same manner, in the chapter on Dargapirnamfisa, passing over the Injunction dealing with the Agnishomiya, we read a passage descriptive of the fact of the third part of Indra’s sin, consequent upon his having killed a Bréhmana in the person of Tvashtry’s son (Vrtra), having been relegated to women in their courses; and this description is made the means of pointing to the injunction of cortain observances for the woman in her courses, a fact which has nothing to do with the main subject, the Agnishomiya—these observances being sleeping upon the ground, 14८८ bathing, desisting from meat-euting, wnguents, collyruun, spinning, washiny of the teeth, patring of the nails, thread-twining, and so forth, all of which are to be kept up for three days. Thus then, we find that the Vedic texts, that can be chosen out ns lending support to Usages, are so scattered and difficult to get at, that any collection of them in any single place is impossible, without the help of the 91121८88 , and hence between the Usage and the Vedic text, we have to admit of an intervening agency of the Smyti. Consequently, long before the Usage succeeds in pointing to itscorroborative Vedictext through the Snirtis, 212 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA E—PADA II—ADHI (6d). the (contrary) Smrté gets at its own corroborative Vedic text, and succeeds in pointing out the Dharma (long before the contrary Usage has had time to assert its third-hand authority). 4 ठ क 4 ठ 1 [D. Another interpretation of the Adhtkarana. | Such words as ‘trivrt,’ ‘caru’ and ‘agvabdla’ are found, in ordi- nary parlance, to express mennings entirely at variance with those ac- eepted in the Veda, and by people taking their stand upon the Veda. And the question arises, whether, as all authorities are equally strong in the matter of the significations of words, the contest between the two authorities is equal, or the Vedic use has the greater authority. And on this question, we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. “In ordinary parlance, the word ‘trivrt’ is found to mean threefold, “agin the expressions ‘trirrt rayguh,’ ‘ trivrt granthih’; whilein the Veda it ८ 18 used in the sense of ‘ ninefold’; as we find that after having mentioned “the ‘trivrt Vahishpavamaua,’ the Veda speaks of it as consisting of the “ threefoldness of the triad of Rk verses, thus making, the nine Stotriya “tk verses, the word ‘ trivrt’ thus being found to denote nine. ‘Similarly in ordinary parlance, the word ‘carw’ is found to be ex- “ pressive of the saucer, while in the Veda it is found to denote tha ‘ rice.’ “ That is to say, people who are engaged in the performance of sacrifices are ‘always found to use the word ‘carw’ in the sense of cooked rice, which 1s “still hot, and from which the gruel has not been thrown out. In ‘the Veda, ६60, we find that, having spoken of the ‘ Prayariya Care as “belonging to Aditi,’ it gocs on to lay down that ‘ Aditi is to be appeased by “the offering of cooked rice,’ which clearly shows that the word ‘caru’ ४ 18 used in the sense of cooked rice. ८८ 90, too, in the case of the expression ‘ agvabala-prastarah,’ it would, “in ordinary parlance, be explained as ‘the bedding made up of horse- ‘hair’; whereas from the Vedic passages following the expression, it 18 ‘clear that the word ‘ agvaldéla’ 18 used in the sense of reed. The passage ८८ 111 question is that which describes the event that the sacrifice took the ‘shape of the horse, and tlying away from the gods, fell into the water, ‘and when the gods took hold of the tail, the horse freed itself from their ‘ grasp and ४116 disappeared ; and the hairs of the tail that were left in the ८“ hands of the gods being thrown on the ground became what is now known ९८ &8 the reed; and hence as the reed is so very pure (being a part of the “body of the sacrifice itself), the bedding is to be made of this material. “In the same manner, in the expression ‘atkshaviyam vidhrii,’ the word MEANINGS BASED ON.THE VEDA MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN THOSE ON USAGE. 213 “¢ aikshaviyam’ would ordinarily be taken to mean ‘made of sugar-cane,’ ‘while in the Veda, it means the roots of the reed. “in all these cases, inasmuch as the significations are different, “and as both are equally well comprehended, the two meanings of the ‘words must be accepted to be optional alternatives. Though it may be “urged that in matters relating to Dharma, the comprehension based upon “the Veda has always a greater authority than that based upon ordinary ‘parlance, yet no such superior authority is really possible ; because in “the matter of the significations of words, the Veda does not in any way “differ from the other sources of verbal knowledge; for it is only in ५५ matters transcending the senses, that the Veda 18 held to have a superior “authority. Consequently we conclude that the comprehension from both ‘sources would be equally authoritative. ५५ Or, inasmuch as ordinary parlance always precedes a reading of the ८८ Veda, it must be held to have an authority superior to that of the Veda. “That is to say, we fully comprehend the sense of all ordinary expressions “independently of the Veda; whereas we can never comprehend any ८८ Vedic expression without finding in 1t words similar to those that we ‘have met with in ordinary parlance. Hence among Vedic uses of words “we can accept only those that are not contrary to ordinary usage; ५५ because when they transgress the limits of such parlance, they are never ‘‘properly comprehended. “The clause—‘ because we do not perccive any contradiction among ५५ them’—refers to the absence of contradiction among the words employed ‘in ordinary usage. As for the passage quoted above—‘ the sacrifice ५५ bocame the horse, d&c,’—1in support of the Vedic 86४86, itis an Arthardda ; “and as such, cannot be admitted as a means of arriving at the real mean- “ings of words; firstly, because all Arthavddas have an entirely different ‘purpose; and as such they can at best have only an indirect secondary ‘bearing upon the matter in question; secondly, because all Arthavddas “have their sole purpose 1४ the accomplishment of the attractiveness of a ८५ certain course of action; as we find in the case of such of them as—‘ the “post is the sun,’ ‘the sacrificer is stone,’ ‘the Ahavaniya fire is the “ Heaven,’ and so forth; and thirdly, because they have no action in the ८५ matter of the creation and explanation of the expressiveness of words and “meanings. For, if the meanings of words were to be accepted according ‘to the Arthavdda (‘ the sacrificer 18 stone’ for instance), there would be “a direct contradiction of the Injunction (as whenever an action will be ‘‘ enjoined as to be performed by the‘ Sacrificer,’ we would represent the ‘action as done by a piece of stone). Hence the clause—‘ because we do ५८ 710४ perceive any contradiction, &c.’—may be taken to mean that, in- *asmuch as we do not find the aforesaid contradiction of the Injunction, at 914 TANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I—PADA Ilt—abitt (5d). “the actual performance of the sacrifice (1.e., 98 we do not find a piece of ‘stone substituted in place of the sacrificer) we conclude that Arthavadas ८५ (811110४ be accepted as regulating the significations of words. “On the point at issue, our position is supported by such authors as ‘“Manu and others, who speak of the ‘ cotton sacred thread of the 0181. ‘mana being threefold (trivrt), with a threefold (érivrt) knot.’ ‘‘ Hence we conclude that if not stronger, the ordinary Usage cannot ‘be denied to be equal in authority to the Veda.” SIDDHANTA. To all this we make the following reply: That signification of the word which is based upon the scriptures is decidedly the more authoritative: because the knowledge of Dharma, which consists of certain means and con- sequences, is gained by means of the scriptures alone. Even the significa- tion of words that is based upon the Arthavdda is stronger in author- ity than ordinary usage ; because the particular Arthavada (describing ४116 fact of the sacrifice having become a horse, &c., &c.), has no other purposé save that of explaining the particular meaning of the word ‘ agvabdlah.’ If a certain signification is once adopted in the Veda, whether it be secondary or primary, it is only that which can be accepted as the meang of accomplishing Dharma. As for the word ‘trirvrt’ when it has been tised in the Veda in ४116 sense of the nine Stotriya Rk verses, who can set aside this meaning, even if he were to be born a hundred times? Hence whenever we meet with the expression ‘ trivrt Agnishtoma,’ we must accept the word in tho sensé inparted to it by the Veda, Similarly, though the word ‘ stoma,’—in such ordinary expressions as ‘ Brahmanastoma ’—is found to signify a group, yet in the case of such words as ‘ stoma,’ ‘ trivrt,’ and the like, we cannot but reject their ordinary significations; because (1) we find the Veda making such declarations, as ‘the stoma is trivrt, (threefold),’ ‘the stoma 18 fifteenfold’ ; (2) the persons versed in sacrifices have laid down that stomu is the measure or limit of the prayer; and (3) we find the grammarians Jaying down the rule that the affix ‘da’ is added to the word ‘ stoma,’ simply for the sake of its connection with the words ‘ fifteen’ and the like (which distinctly shows that the word ‘ stoma’ is to be taken as denoting the threefold or fifteenfold measure of the Prayer). As for the declaration of Manu that has been cited in the Parvapaksha, as the assertions of human beings depend upon those significations that are founded upon ordinary usage, as also upon those adopted in the Veda, it is not to be wondered at that Manu has used a word in the ordinary popular sense. Or, even in that passage the word ‘ trivrt’ may be taken in the 8661188 of ‘ninefold’; specially because, as a matter of fact, each thread of the sacied MEANINGS BABED ON THE VEDA MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN THOSE ON USAGE. 215 thread is actually made up of nine-fold threads. The same may also be said in the case of the ‘trivrt’ character of the string (which may be held to be ninefold). Or, we may have recourse to the reasoning that, inasmuch as when the word ‘ ¢rivrt’ has been found to be used in the sense of ‘ nine’ with reference to the Stofriya verses, it can be used only in such cases where thore is a possibility of the number nine ; in cases where the object referred to has a different number, we can admit the Vedic signification to be second- ary, and the popular signification to be the primary one; and in such cases, inasmuch as the popular signification is the primary one, we should accept this in preference to the Vedic sense,—a point that we shall explain in detail in the following Sitra (the 10th). | In the same manner, the word " (८११८ ' having its प्7608078016 multi- farious expressiveness barred, it comes to be restricted to a single meaning ; and this single meaning is necessarily accepted to be ‘ cooked rice,’ which is sanctioned by the Veda as well as by the usage of persons versed in tho sacrificial science. As forthe words ‘ dgvabdlah’ and ‘ atkshavi,’ inasmuch as their signi- fications of ‘reed’ and ‘ the root of the reed’ respectively, belong to the words conventionally taken as independent wholes (apart from any idea of their component parts), and are sanctioned by the usage of the Veda, they cannot but be admitted to have an authority greater than that of the ordinary popular meanings, which are based upon the significations of the com- ponent parts of the words (which are admitted by all to be weaker than the significations that are based upon convention through and through). And from this, too, we conclude the signification sanctioned by the Veda to have a greater authority than that of popular signification. In the case of the ‘ Cyéna’ sacrifice which has been compared to the Cyéna bird, though the word ‘ Cyéna’ in this connection cannot but be held to have been accepted as the name of the sacrifice, only by secondary or indirect signification, yet it is this secondary signification (of fhe name of the sacrifice) that is accepted, in such passages as ‘ the other procedures are exactly like those of { 16 Gyéna’; where the word ‘ Cyéna’ is taken to mean the (४21४८ sacrifice, though it is the secondary figurative meaning ; simply because as sanctioned by the scriptures, it cannot but be accepted as of greater authority, in matters relating to Dharma. Even though the signification is an indirect and secondary one, yet it is the more authoritative; because as sanctioned by the Veda, it cannot by any means be set aside. A meaning that 18 accepted by the Veda can never be set aside by anyone, no matter whether it be the secondary or the indirect one, or got at by a splitting of the sentence. Nor can the Adhikarana, as thus explained, be said to be a mere repe- tition of what is going to be explained under the Sutra I—iv—29 ; because 216 TANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I—PADA INI—ADHI (8d). in the case treated of here, there is no doubt with regard to any of the two significations considered. That is to say, just as there 18 no doubt with regard to the popular signification being correct with regard to its own objects, so too there is none with regard to the Vedic signification ; and hence there is every likelihood of the latter being set aside by the former (whereas the Sdfra I—iv—29 deals with cases of doubtful significations of words ). For these reasons, we conclude that it is the signification based upon the scriptures that has the superior authority; and it does not resemble stray popular nsages, which are scattered far apart, and often ‘mixed (with mistakes and inaccuracies ). I ag a ng ae ag al ee क साः +) का | ADHIKARANA (6). [Treating of the authority of words as used by the Mlécchas. } Sutra (10). (The word used by the Mleccha) should be recognised as sanctioned by the Veda, because there is no contra- diction of any authority. There are certain words (used even in the Veda) that are not in use among the people of Arydvarta: (1) And we now proceed to considor whether or not we should accept the meaning that is given to thom by the Mlécchas. (2) The second point for consideration 18 whether greater authority is to be attached to the meaning that may be got out of the etymological or grammatical roots and bases of these words, or to that which is sanctioned by usage among the Mlécchas. Even though the authority of the supporters of the latter is distinctly weaker, yet it appears to be more authoritative ; because of the fact of the conventional meaning of the word as a whole being admittedly more authoritative (than that which is got at grammatically or etymologically). And we have now got to consider the point as to, between the weakness of the supporters and the inherent strength of the word itself, which should carry the greater weight. (3) The third point that will have to be considered, in connec- tion with this, is whether greater authority attaches to the meaning got at through the etymological and grammatical basis of the word, as being the one sanctioned by the scriptures, or is it the less authoritative, as being due to the breaking up of the component parts of the word. Thus then, there being many doubtful points on the subject, we have the following— PURVAPAKSHA. ‘The meaning got from the etymological and grammatical bases has ८५ 9, greater authority; because even though this would be a newly assumed ८८ meaning, yet, as being based upon (grammatical) scriptures, 1t cannot but “be held to have a greater authority. For certainly, it 18 better to accept “the authority of that which has a propor basis, evon though it be one 28 218 TANIRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I-—-PADA HI—ADHI (6). ‘that has got to be newly assumed, than that of one which, though well- ‘established, is faulty in its origin. ‘* How could words occurring in the Veda be taken in the sense that ८८ 18 recognised only among the Mlécchas ? Specially when the very sight ‘of a Mléccha, makes us atop our recitation of the Veda. Nor is it allow- “able for the people of Aryavarta to have a conversation or consultation ‘with the Mléccha; and hence how could we ever come to know tlie ‘‘ sense in which any word may be current among them ? ‘Thus then, not knowing any usage sanctioning a particular mean- ‘ing of a word, the person (that would depend upon the usage of the ९“ Mlécchas) would have to seek after such usage among all Mléccha coun- ‘tries; and there would be nothing left to be done by the commentaries ‘(upon the Veda). And then, too, the countries inhabited by the Mlécchas ‘being innumerable, how could one succeed in getting at all their usages ¢ ‘‘ Aud if any such usage were not found with regard to avy particular “word, the signification of that word would always remain doubtful; and ‘certainly it would scarcely be possible for us to ascertain the endless ‘usages of the innumerable countries of the Mlécchas. “And (not finding such usage with regard to any word) if we were to ‘deduce a meaning from the roots of the word, by the help of the commen- ‘‘ taries and grammars, this would come to be set aside and rejected, if after ‘two or three days, a contrary usage of the Mlécchas happened to be found ° out. ‘Qn the other hand, if we totally reject the authority of the usages of “the Mlécchas, then it would be quite practicable to hunt up usages (with “yogard to the signification of a word) in Aryavarta itself; and this «८ being a single country limited within reasonable bounds, the existence or ‘non-existence of a usage, would be easily found out in a short time; and “thereby the commentarics, d&c., also would come to have their use in the pointing out of meanings (with regard to which we could not find any “ usage). Thusthen, for the sake of the usefulness of these commentaries, ९५ &c., it becomes a necessity to reject the authority of the usages of the “* Mlécchas. “And again, inasmuch as the Mlécchas are found to have no regard ‘for Dhurma, it 18 just possible that they may have distorted the meanings ‘‘ of words, exactly as they are found to have distorted the forms of words, ‘“‘ because we do not find a single sanskyia (or correct) word in use among ° them. ‘‘ Though there are a few words in use among them that appear like “sanskrta words, yet these are found to be used in senses other than ‘those recognised by us; and as even theso are used without the neces- “sary affixes, &c., they are not properly expressive; and as such they THE AUTHORITY OF WORDS USED BY THE MILECCHAS, 219 “can never be held to have any real denotation. Even when an Arya ‘‘ attempts to find traces of his own (sanskria) words among those of the «५ Mlécchas, he can only find them by grouping together the letters of two ० different words (e.g., in ‘a custom,’ they find the sanskria word ‘ éka’); and ५८ sometimes he finds therein his own words, either a little too short, or 016 ०“ {00 long. ५ As for example, in the Dravida language, though all words are used ८८ &8 ending in the consonant, yet the Aryas are found to assumein them ५५ the affixes, &c., that can be appended only to words ending in vowels; ‘and thence make the words give a sense, in accordance with their own ८ (sanskria), language. For instance, when the Dravidas call ‘rice,’ “Seor,’ the Arya reads in it his own word ‘cora’ (thief), and comprehends “the meaning accordingly. And whenthe Dravidas call the road ‘ atar,’ ‘“‘he reads it as ‘atarah,’ and declares that as the road is difficult to cross, “itis really ‘atara’ (uncrossable). Similarly they call the snake ‘ pap,’ ‘and he takes it as ‘ papa’ (evil), and argues that the snake is really an “evil animal. So, too, in the case of the word ‘mal’ which they use in “the sense of the woman, the word is taken as ‘mala. The word “Cyqir,’ used by them in the sense of the stomach, is taken as ‘vatra’ ५ (enemy); and the use is justified on the ground of the hungry man “ being capable of doing many sinful deeds, which proves that the stomach ४ 18 an enemy of the man. ‘Thus then, when the Aryan stands in need of such groundless assump- ८८ tions, even in the case of the words current among the Dravidas (who “inhabit a part of Aryavarta itself),—how could we ever reasonably ८५ deduce sanskria words from those current among such distant peoples ‘Cas the Parsis, the Barbaras (Barbarians), the Yavanas (Greeks), the Rau- ५५ makas (Romans), and the like. ‘‘ Hence we conclude that those words of the Mlécchas that are accept: ‘ed (or used) by the Aryas can never be fully trusted in the ascertain- ८८ ment of words or their meanings. While those meanings, that are got ८८ {1011 the etymological or grammatical bases of the words—‘ prka,’ ५ ‹ 1120002," and the like—, can be the only true ones.” SIDDHANTA. To all this, we make the following reply: Even among the Mlécchas, if we find the word used by them to be exactly the one found in the Veda, we cannot but accept the sense that is imparted to it by them (in cases where the word is entirely foreign to our own vocabulary). As for the distorted forms of words, however, that are current in various dialects, as there have been many modifications, we cannot easily discern the real from the unreal. But when we find a certain word, 220 TANTRA-VARTIKA@-ADHYAYA I——-PADA II——ADHI (6). ‘mika’ for instance, used in the Veda and its subsidiary sciences, and then subsequently we find exactly the same word current among the Mlécchas used by them as having a certain definite signification,—we can accept the word to have the same meaning in the Veda also; specially as such signification is not contrary to any other authority. That is to say, in the case of such words ६81 ^ pika,” “néma,” and the like, when met with in the Veda, in connection with certain sacri- fices, when the matter is duly pondered over, if a person happens to be conversant with the two languages, he finds that the words are used in a certain sense among the Mlécchas; and from this he can reasonably take them in the same sense in the Veda also; specially when such inter- protation is not against the authority of the Veda with regard to Dharma. (The 2nd interpretation of the Sutra). And again, the action of man being dependent upon his comprehension of the relation between the moanings and the words (used in the Injunction addressed to him), it is quite reasonable for him, with a view to the correct comprehension of the sontence, to have recourse to any usage that he may come across, Hence in the case of the words ‘ pika,’ &c., the sense, in which we find them used by the Mlécchas, not being against any authorities, must be admitted to be pointed out by tho Veda itself. (The 3rd intepretation of the Sutra). The word ‘coditam’ (laid down, pointed out) may be taken with ‘prama@néna,’ 2.¢., ‘védéna,’ (by the authority of the Veda); and the meaning then would be that, inasmuch as such usage of the Mléccha is pointed out by the Veda, it can very well be accopted, specially as it is not against the Aryas, who actually stand in need of somo such usage (for the proper understanding of certain Vedic texts). Just as when such words as ‘loma’ (hair) are used in the Veda, the priests themselves do not quite understand what the word exactly denotes; and they ascertain its exact meaning only by referring to such people (always of the lowest classes) as are always engaged in [सा]. ing animals (whose authority is accepted on the point as unimpeach- able). In the same manner, it is laid down in the Veda, that at the ‘Nishadéshii,’ it is only a false coin that can be given as the final gift; and the point, as to whether or not any particular coin is false, is decided on the sole authority of persons (always of very low character) who carry on a business in such coins. Exactly in the same manner, when we find such words as ‘ pika,’ ‘néme,’ ‘ta@marasa,’ used in the Veda, and find that we cannot ascertain their meaning either from the Veda itself or from the usages of the Aryas, we can certainly accept the meanings THE AUTHORITY OF WORDS USED BY THE MLECCHAS, 291 imparted to them by the Mlécchas. Specially as such acceptance would be quite in keeping with our own authority; as it would not be contrary to our theory that the eternal significations of eternal words can be ascertained by means of the usages of men (and certainly the Mlécchas are also men), It has been argued above that the scripture being stronger in its authority the usage of the Mléccha cannot be accepted. But this is scarcely correct ; because when there is no contradiction, there is no harm in accepting the weaker; that alone is to be totally rejected which, on the very face of it, is distinctly untrue, and incapable of any support, exactly like the perception of the mirage and the like. And that (Usago of the Mléccha),.-which is rejected as unauthoritative on the solo ground of its being contrary to the stronger authority (of the Veda or of Arya usage),—cannot but be accepted as authoritative, when there is no such contradiction. And certainly wo can find no contradiction in the case of tho words ‘ pika,’ &c., with regard to which we know of no other usage (among the Aryas) that could be contradicted. It is for this very reason that in the case of the meaning of Vedic sentences, we can assert the superior authority of only such usages of tho learned Aryas as are bearing upon the words and objects in question. That is to say, it is only when there is a usage among the Aryas, that we accept it as of superior authority ; and the assertion of such authority in the ४080706 of the usage itself would be exactly like a description of the strength of the son of a barren woman. For instance, in the case of the Smt passages dealing with the Ashiakd, &c., which relate to things transcenden- tal, and have their origin in the Veda,—as also in the case of the words ‘cow,’ &c., and their meanings,—it is true that the Aryas are more trust- worthy and more competent. But in the case of the words ‘ pika’ and the like, all that the Arya usage does, is to point ont that they are words expressive of certain meanings, without hinting anything as to what these meanings are; and it is here that tho operation of the Arya usage ceases; consequently, then, we ascertain these meanings from the usages of the Milécchas,—these usages too, like the words, being such as pertain to the relations of words and meanings, based upon a beginningless use of the words for the purpose of the accomplishment of the comprehension of visible objects. And in this there is no contradiction of any higher authority ; on the other hand, a distinctly useful purpose (in the shape of the under- standing of the Vedic text) 18 served. As for the commentaries, &c., we do not find them pointing out any other meanings of the words in question, which would serve our purpose (of understanding the Veda), and thereby enable us to reject the usages of others (viz,, the Mlécchas). And there can be no doubt that a usage that 222 TANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I-—PADA tI—ADHi (6). is already well-established is more authoritative than that which is newly nssumed; and hence, so long as we have the former, there can be no room for the latter. As for the comparative strength of the upholders of different usages (viz., the Mlécchas and the Aryas), the superior authority of the latter has been laid down only in matters relating to Dharma directly ; as for the ordinary worldly things, such as agriculture and the like, all usages are equally authoritative. Consequently, in matters relating to menial service, house-building, and the like, we can freely admit the superior nuthority of the Mlécchas. In matters relating to the correct forms of words, however, we find that the Mlécchas are not very expert, and as such likely to be gradually losing the correct forms; and hence now no longer able to discern the correct from the incorrect. But if a certain word happens to retain its original correct form, even in their usage, this use of theirs would be as eternally traditional as any words in Arya usage; and as such how could he set them aside? Specially in the cases of such words as ‘patrorna’ (a silken or jute fabric), ‘vdravinag’ (armour) and the like, as these articles are produced only in the Mléccha countries, if they did not point out what they meant, how could we comprehend the words ? Hence, we conclude that the usage of the Mldccha cannot be held to be of an inferior authority. As for the Nirukta and other commentaries, &c., they operate only in connection with well-established facts and things, and that, too, only by means of such established things and facts: and they cannot function towards such objects as are not established (or known). That is to say, all that the Niruktas do, 18 to explain the words that are already in use among the people; and these too are explained only as pertaining to certain actions denoted by the roots, &c., that constitute the words. And all that Grammar does is to point out the correct forms of only such words as have their significations fully known; and it is only once in a way that the meaning of a word is pointed out. And as such, these two (the Nirukta and Grammar) cannot serve to set aside an usage, even though weaker, when dealing with subjects other than their own specified ones (explained above). In the case of a word, where we fail to find any usage, however much we search for it, we would be forced to have recourse to an assumption of its meaning, by means of the ctymological explanations afforded by the Nirukta, &c. Though such assumptions would be confused and in diverse forms, and as such giving rise to many doubts, yet when there are no other means at our disposal, we cannot but have recourse to them. Nor can it be urged that, inasmuch as the Nirukta, &c., would not THE AUTHORITY OF WORDS USED BY THE MLECCHAS. 923 help in pointing out the meanings of words, they would be useless. Because they have their ०86 in helping in the proper accomplishment of sacrifices: which 1s possible only by means of a knowledge of the Veda with all its subsidiary sciences. For instance, we read in the Mahabharata: ‘ Being great and relating tothe family of Bharata, this work is called the ‘Maha- bharata’; and one who knows this signification of the word, becomes freed from all sins.” And (1) inasmuch as the accomplishment of such results as Heaven and the 111९6 are brought about by means of only such actions as are per- formed with a full knowledge of them, derived from the Veda as aided by its six subsidiary sciences, the Nirukta and the like ;—and (2) as even though the forms of the words themselves are known, yet the real transcendental results do not follow, until one has duly comprehended the sentence with the help of a due cognition of the meanings of words, as pointed out by the component roots, &c., which are explained in the Nirukta,—we conclude that even with regard to the comprehension of such words (‘ pika,’ &c.), as are used among the Mlécchas only, the Nirukta, &., are not without their use (which lies in the helping towards the proper accomplishment of the transcendental results). + ग ne + स 9 = मि ' भि + a अ भ aie ~ ws „र ज~ ~~ + _ a ne rw र - ADHIKARANA (५). THERE 18 NO INDEPENDENT AUTHORITATIVENESS IN THE KALPASOTRAS. Sutra (11). If it be urged that “they constitute the science of rituals.’— With reference to the Kalpasitras, we proceed to consider the following points :— (A) Whether, like the Veda, the Kalpasitras are self-sufficient in their suthority, or are they, like the Mantras and the Braihmanas, a part of the Veda itself? (This inquiry is necessary, because) the case of these Sztras is not identical with the Smrtz, inasmuch as they are mere compilations of what is directly laid down in the Veda. Question: What are Kalpas? And what are the Sdtras ¢ The answer is that the Kalpas aro those treatises that point out the methods of sacrifices, in the form of well-established regulations ; and the Kalpasitvas are those that serve to point them out. They are called ‘ Kalpas’ because of their laying down (kalpandat) of the sacrificial proce- dure, and thereby helping in the accomplishment of sacrifices; and the Sutras are so called, because of their pointing owt (siicanadt) the said proce- dure. Inasmuch as, with regard to each sacrifice, the Kalpas themselves lay down the rules of procedure, they appear in the form of the bare state- ment of facts (without any explanations or embellishments), as we find to bo actually the case,in the works compiled by Baudh&yana, Varaha, Magaka and others. While the Satras serve to explain tho technical uses of words, and thereby to differentiate between general rules and excep- tions; and thoy contain arguments and instances (in support of what they lay down) ; hence it is only that which fulfils these conditions that can be called a ‘ Sifra’; such are the works compiled by Agvalayana, Vaijavapi, Drahyéyani, Latiya, and Katyayana. [A] And there is a great differenco between the status of the Kalpa- sutras and that of tho ordinary Smrtis; because, while the former lay down the rules of sacrificial procedure exactly as are pointed out in the Vedic texts that are directly availablo, the latter are compilations based presump-° THE KALPASOTRAS HAVE NO INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY. 225 ably upon such Vedic texts as have become lost, and whose existence can at best be only inferred ; and for this reason the authority of the Kdlpa- siitras could not be made dependent entirely upon the arguments that have been brought forward ina previous Adhikarana in support of the authority of the Smrtts. Firstly, because in that Adhikarana, the Pirvapaksha, as contained in the first Sutra of this Pada, bases its arguments upon the fact of the Smrtis not being based upon the Veda; and this could not be urged against the Kalpa- sutras; because texts in support of these are directly available in the Veda ; and for this reason they cannot be said to be devoid of Vedic authority. And secondly, because the Parvapaksha cannot declare these Sitras to be absolutely false, as it does in the case of the Smrtis. In the Adhikarana on Smriti, the Puérvapaksha having urged the unauthoritative character of the Smrtis on the ground of their having no basis in the Veda, the Siddhanta has established their authority as being based upon assumed Vedic texts (see above), And the Kalpasitras have not been included there advisedly; because the arguments of that Puérvapaksha are not applicable to them (as they cannot be said to be ‘agabda,’ ‘non-Vedic’). Then again, in the present Adhikarana also, we are not going to prove the authoritativoness of these Sutras, (because thore can be no doubt as to that) ; all that we proceed to prove is the fact that they have no authority of their own, as apart from that of the Veda. [B] Or, wo may admit that the former Adhikarana also rofers to the Kalpasitras; and the present ono applies to the Smrlis also; because these latter too have no independont authority of theirown. (The former Adhi- karana may be taken to have established the authoritative character of the Smriis, as also of the Kalpasiitras, and the present proving the fact of none of theso two having an authority apart from the Veda). Now then, if the Smrtis bo admitted to have any authority in matters relating to Dharma, then they would either become the Veda itself, or bo equal to the Veda in authority; and as such they could be said to have an authority of their own, independently of,inferred corroborative Vedic texts, [C]. Or, by the word ‘prayogagastra’ we can take the subsidiary sciences of (Cikshd, &c). And these may beconsidered equal to the Veda: specially as the Qmytis have spoken of them as being the Veda: “The name Veda is applied to the Mantra and the Brahmana, and some people 29 226 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I—PADA III—-ADHI (7). apply it to all the six subsidiary sciences,” where it is clearly stated that the subsidiary sciences are also called the ‘Veda.’ And hence, tho convic- tion might very well arise, that these also are the Veda, having an independent authority of their own. And for these reasons, it becomes absolutely necessary to consider the matter from a different standpoint. [D]. Or, the Adhikarana may be taken altogether differently, as dealing with the scriptures of the Bauddhas. The character of the Smrts having been denied to them (in a previous Adhikarana), they may be taken as similar to tho various recensions of the Veda; and this notion has got to be set aside. The Bauddhas are found to declare thus: “Tho scriptures of the Bauddha boing taken either as composed in accordance with facts, or as not being a product (of human agency) at all, there can be no doubt as to the eternal character of the Dharma as delincated in them.” Thus, then, if these Bauddha scriptures come to be as cternal as the Veda, then even those Dharmas (Duties) that are laid down in them would be such as have the Veda for their sole authority (which has been laid down as the sole characteristic of our idea of Dharma, which is quite contrary to that of the Bauddhas). And thus one (the Bauddha scripture) who was not allowed by the armed wardens of Smrts to enter into the village (of Dharma) would now enter it by the open highway (of the Veda). Thus, then, all the above four questions being capable of being dealt with together, the inquiry that is carried on with special reference to the Kalpasitras would apply to all others ; and it is for this reason that the Bhashya has cited the Kalpasitras only. On tho question of the status of the Kalpasitras, we have the following— PURVAPAKSHA. [A]. Kalpasiiras. “ There 38 nodoubt that the Kalpasitras constitute the science of «५ Rituals, and as such tho character of the Veda can never be denied to them. ‘Or, they may be taken as entirely independent of the Veda, having an ‘authority of their own, as the Veda itself has sanctioned their authority ५८ 10 matters relating to Dharma. Or, they may be taken as the Veda itself, ‘on the ground of there being many points of agreement between them “and the Veda, TITE KALPASUTRAS HAVE NO INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY. 907 “Tt may be argued that, on account of their having been composed by ‘human authors, they can be admitted neither to be the Veda itself, nor ८ ६0 be equal to the Veda in authority, But wecan prove the fact of their “being independent of human agency, exactly as we have done with regard. “to the Veda; the names of ‘ Macaka’ and the rest (as pertaining to the “* Kalpasiitras) may be explained on the same grounds as the names “<« Kadthaka,’ &c., as pertaining to the Veda. That is to say, just as the ८ Vedic texts repeated by Katha having come to be known by the name of “* Kathaka,’ the application of tho name does not debar us from proving “the eternality of these texts; in the same manner, we could also hold the ^ eternality of the Kalpastiiras that have only been repeated by Margaka and ‘others. Or, just as in the case of the different Sémas, even though each ८ of them is called after a distinct Rshi, that does not serve to deprive them “of their eternality ; so, in the same manner, the fact of the Kalpasitras ** being called after certain persons cannot deprive them of theirs. ‘ Because, even in the case of the Kalpasitras, we do not find any men- “tion of authors that are not Rshis; and as for the authorship of Rshis, ° 16 18 a fact common to these Saras and the Veda. For instance, we read “with regard to the mantra called Caigava: ‘It is called Caigava, because ‘‘ Angiras wasa child, and yet an author among the composers of the (८ mantra ’—where it is clear that the word ‘composer’ or ‘author’ means ५ ^ 0116 who used’ ( Angiras having brought the particular mantra into use). “In the same manner, the word ‘author’ as applicd to the compilers of “the Kalpasiitras may be taken as signifying ‘one who uses.’ ‘In connection with the injunction of the daily duties of the ^ Bréhmana, we read (in the Veda):—‘ knowing this, the Bréhmannashould ‘“‘read the Veda’; and then proceeding to lay down the details of this “study, the passage continues— ‘ he should read the Rk, the Yajush, ^ the Sama, tho Brahmanas, the Itihasas and Puranas, the Kalpas’; and as “this passage distinctly lays down the Kalpas as to be read every day like “the Veda, it is clear that they too are Arsha (a name applied to Vedic ८ mantras); specially as it is absolutely impossible for any works of ordi- “nary men to be mentioned in an eternal ( Vedic) injunction as accomplish- ‘ing a certain Dharma by means of its study. ८ Then again, (1) because some of the Brahmanas too—those of the “ Aruna and the Paragara Cikhas—are in the form of Kalpas ; (2) because ९९ persons learned in the sacrifices accept these Brahmanas to have exactly “the same authority as the Kalpas belonging to the Cakhds other than “their own; and (8) because a few mantras that are mentioned in the ८ Kalpas are actually employed at sacrifices, exactly like the mantras of the “ other Gakhis,—we cannot but accept the Kalpas to be equal tothe Veda ^ in authority. 228 TANTRA-VARTIKA--ADHYAYA I—PAvA tf1—ADHE (7). ‘Then, again, the word ‘drshéya’ 18 accepted as synonymous with ‘eternal ;’ and all the Kalpas are known as ‘ Grshéya ;’ (and this also points " to their eternal character). ‘The authors of the Kalpasitras too—such as Lati and Drahyayani— ‘while dealing with the authority of the Kalpas, have declared that “the Magaka Kalpa is found to lay down that which is directly percep- “tible; and as such being an Grsha, it does not stand in need of the “assumption of corroborative texts; this shows that they have “admitted the authority of the Arsha Kalpa to be superior to the “ injunctions contained in the Brahmanas. Katyayana also, in the section “dealing with the Lakshanasiira, has declared, in the closing sentences “of the section on the hymns laid down in the Brahmanas as to “bo sung at the sacrifices,—‘we will not act according to the ‘injunctions of the Brahmanas as apart from the Kalpas, as we will, in ८८ accordance with those contained in the Magaka Kalpa.’ So, too, in connec- “tion with the Prdyanitya Sama sung at the Agnishtoma, it is laid down “in the Pancavinga-Braihmana that thero is an option between the “ Vajndyajniya and the Jarabodhtya Samas; hence either the one or the ‘other may be sung; but under the Sutra ‘ Jarasat,’ Katytyana has laid “down that the Jardbodhiya Sama is to be sung as the third from the “ Gayatra Sdma, 88 occurring among the seven Sdmas that constitute tho ०८ Arbhava Hymn (and have nothing to do with the Prayaniya). In connec- “tion with the Arbhava Hymn, the Sama that appears next after tho “ Gayatra, has been named by him ‘ Sam;’ and next after this he men- “tions the Jarabodhtya referred to by him by quoting a part of the first “word of this Sdma; while by means of the word ‘dhé,’ which is the “name of the Agnishtoma Séma in connection with the Jyotishtoma, it has “beon shown that it 18 the Yajnayajniya alone that is held to be the “Sama belonging to the Agnishtoma. And certainly, if Katyayana would ‘have considered the Brahmana to be superior to the Kalpa, he should “ unhesitatingly have accepted the option that is distinctly laid down ‘in the Brahmana. ‘And certainly tho rule, that has been laid down by such a person “as Katyayana, who 18 known to have been learned in many Vedas, can “never be declared to be illogical, by people like ourselves (who have not “studied a single Veda fully). Evon the Veda itself has declared the ‘ unimpeachable authority of the declarations of great teachers; and certainly “the authors of the Subsidiary Sciences were all ‘ great teachers.’ ८८ Again, just as all rescensions of the Veda are admitted to be equal ‘in their authority, on the ground of their agreeing with one another,— ‘tin the same manner, and on the same ground, we could accept the Kalpa- ८८ sutras to be equal to the Veda, in authority. THE KALPASOTRAS HAVE NO INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY. 299 ५६ ‘“ Even the assertions of untrustworthy persons are accepted as ‘true, when found to be corroborated by other means of knowledge; how, ८५ then, can it be denied in the case of the assertions of persons universally “held to be truthful ? specially when the assertions of such persons, aro ‘“‘found to be in keeping with those in the Veda, and thercby ascertained “‘to be true,—who can reasonably declare otherwise ? “And again, as a matter of fact, we find the persons learned in ‘sacrifices to be performing sacrifices by the help of the Kalpas, even “ without (any knowledge of) the Veda; while with the help of the Mantra “‘and Brahmana portions of the Veda, without that of the Kalpas, they ‘are never able to perform any, “The authority of long-established tradition, too, 18 equal in the two “cases of the Mantra and the Kalpa, as is shown by the details laid “down in connection with tho injunction of Vedic study,—the sentence “above quoted containing the name of the Kalpas, together with those “of the Muntra, the Brahmana and the rest. And the agents of tradition ८५ (४.९., the genteel people of our own day), as also the students of the ८ Veda, are found to be making as great efforts to learn the Kalpasiitras, ‘Sas they do in that of the Mantra and the Brahmana. ‘*As the uses of the different portions of the Veda keep on continu- “ously revolving, like the moving of a pulley, no Veda is held to be ‘‘ complete in all its parts, without the Aalpasitras. “Hence, we conclude that this science of Rituals, the Kalpasitras, 4८.) ८ 7078६ be either the Veda itself, or equal to the Veda in authority. [Band C]. Kalpasitras and Smrtis. “The above arguments would also prove that the character of “the Veda belongs to the ordinary Smrtis, as also to the six Subsidiary ‘“‘Sciences; or these too, like the Kalpasutras, may be held to be equal “to it in authority. How can any person knowing the Veda deny the “character of the science or Scripture Method to such Smriis as have al- “ ways been known as Dharmagdastra (scripture of Dharma)? Specially as “the Vedas, its six Subsidiary Sciences, and the Dharmagastras, aro all ‘‘counted together, by persons knowing the Veda, as constituting the ‘* Fourteen Sciences. “And further, just as we find Afantras pointing to the actions laid “down in the Brahmanas, 89 also we find Mantras pointing to those laid ‘down in the Dharmacistras—snch nas the Ashtakd and the like. In the ‘‘same manner, such pennnces,—as the performance of the Avakirini “sacrifice, the Krechra, tho Candrayana aud the like,—bhbeing distinctly “pointed out by Vedic Mantras, how can they be said to be contrary to “the Veda? Then again, the description in the Mantras of the young 930 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I—PADA IlI—ADHI (7). “ Brahmana boy as being withont his Cikha, which speaks of the absendo “of his Gikha as 9 well-ostablished fact, cannot but be taken as authorising ८ the tonsure of the Brahmana, which 18 clearly enjoined in the Smrtis ; and as “such how could this tonswre ceremony be said to be contrary to the Veda P ‘Thus then, why should we seek to assume Vedic texts in support “of the Smrtz injunctions, when these latter themselves can be accepted ‘either as Veda itself, or equal to it in authority. If we have to assumea “ Vedic text, the fact of the injunction being based upon the Veda would ““‘make 1४ necessary for us to accept the injunction as eternal; and cer- ‘tainly it 18 much better to assert its eternality, just as itis found in the “ Smytt, without calling in the intermediate aid of the Vedic text. And ‘certainly, the Smyti-injunctions being themselves well-established facts, “it 18 far easier to admit them to be eternal in themselves; or they may “‘be accepted to bo Veda itself, on the ground of their dealing with the ‘the same subjects as the Veda. “Consequently then, inasmuch as we do not find any beginning of “these Smrtis, even during thousands of years, wo cannot admit them to ^ 06 non-eternal, but based upon an eternal basis. Because, as a ‘‘matter of fact, 1६ 18 far more reasonable to assume that the texts as we ‘find them in the Smrtis are tle very same that we assume to be present “in the Veda (and this does away with the assumption of a different text “for each Smrtz-injunction). ५ And it stands to reason that, while Inying down their teachings for the “‘snke of students learned in the Veda, Manu and others could not but “have brought forward the direct texts of the Vedas themselves. Conse- “quently, it would appear that these authors, in their compilations, have ‘only brought together the Vedic texts themselves. For in the presenco of “the Vedic texts (whose existence all partics admit), who could accept their “counterparts (as put together in the Smrtis) ? “Then again, inasmuch as we do not find any counterparts of the ५४ Dharmagastras composed, even till now, we cannot admit the composition “of any counterparts of the Vedas. It may be argued that Manu and others “did not bring together the Vedic texts themselves, for, in so doing, they “ would have disturbed the continuity of the verbal text of the Veda; but “by arguing on these lines, we would have to admit that they did not “compose the Smrtis. Because when they did not dare to quote the Vedic “texts in parts,—how could they have ever thought of writing a work, ८८ {0 replace the Veda itself ? “Tt is a fact admitted on all hands that the actions laid down in the “Veda can bring about their proper results, only when they are learnt ‘from the Veda itself; and not from those that are learnt from other works ‘of human authors ; as these would be similar to the actions inferred from THE KALPASUTRAS HAVE NO INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY. 231 ८ false semblances of the Vedic maniras, And it is evident that Mana and “others did not compose any counterparts of the Mantras, simply be- ‘cause they were sure of the fact of the incapability of such counterpart ८ Mantras to bring about proper results ; and on the same grounds, it must ‘be held that they could not have composed the counterparts of the Brah- ““manas either; as they knew it equally well that Actions that are not “५ 1810 down in the Veda do not bring about proper results. “Nor can it be held that the Smyiis are the orderly collections of ८ # 6010 texts scattered in different portions of the various Vedas (and as ‘such, they would be the products of human agency). Because the Smrtis “are distinctly recognised as independent works of a certain form. That ८ 18 to say, 10 is far more reasonable to hold that there is a distinct Veda in “the exact form of the Smriis themselves, than to assume that they havo ‘‘ their basis in assumed Vedic texts. Thus then, it is clear that the fact of the Smrtis constituting the ^“ Scripture of Action (Prayoga-gastra) cannot but be admitted, if they are to be “ accepted as having any authority with regard to Dharma. For when it ८ 128 been already ascertained that Dharma 1s that which has the Veda for “Sats sole authority, anything that is not Veda, even if it be a Brahmana, ‘cannot be accepted as having any authority regarding Dharma. “Thus then, it must be admitted, either that these 6171125 have no use “ with regard to Dharma, or that they are so many Vedas; there can be ५ 10 intermediate course. It cannot be rightly held that they point out “the Dharma, and yet have to point to Vedic texts for their authority. ८ Becauso their authority extends only so far as the significations of their ५* words allow. (That is tosay, in that case, the wholeforce of the Smrti will ‘‘have been taken up in pointing to the Vedic text, and they will be ab- ५ solutely incapable of any action with regard to Dharma). Specially as, ‘if we make the words of the Smrtis, renounce that (direct mention of ५८ Dharma) which they distinctly signify, and point to that (corroborative ८८ Vedic text) which is not signified by them, (on the ground of the incon- ‘sistency of the directly signified monning),—then (we ask), inasmuch as . ५ this latter assumed Vedic text is also made to signify the same (mention ‘‘of Dharma) that had been previously signified by the Smrti text, how ८ 087) there be said to be an inconsistency in this latter (which could be ८४ 86४ aside by the said assumption) ? (for if the mention of the particular ८६ Dharma is inconsistent, it is as much so when signified by the Smrtis, as ८५ when expressed by an assumed Vedic text). Hence, we conclude that in “the matter of that Dkarma which is directly mentioned by the Smrti ५५ {62४ itself, this text cannot but have an authority of its own, indepen- ५५ dontly of any intercession of the Veda. 232 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA I-—-PADA III—ADHI (7d). [D]. Bauddha Scriptures. “The fact of the works of Buddha and others being Smrtis having “been set aside (in a previous Adhikarana), we proceed to show that “they have the character of the Scripture of Action (Prayogagastra), and ‘as such are so many Vedas. ‘‘ We can prove the eternality of the Bauddha scriptures by means “of the same arguments that have been brought forward to prove the “oternality of the Veda. As in the Vedas, so in these scriptures also, ‘their authority is self-sufficient, because of their being perfectly ex- “pressive (and comprehensible) assertions; as we have no doubts as “to their meanings; nor have we any mistaken ideas about them. And “being, like the Vedas, without a human author, they are free from ८५ 911 discrepancies consequent upon such origin; because, as in the ८८ ए 6६8, so in these scriptures also, the possibility of a human author is “absolutely denied. As for the name ‘ Buddha’s Assertion,’ as applied to “these scriptures, it only shows that they were explained (and not com- ५५ nosed) by Buddha, or that 1६ was Buddha who saw (or found out) these ‘scriptures; exactly as the names Kdthaka, Angirasa aud the like are ५ applied to certain recensions of the Veda. In short, whatever arguments ‘may be brought forward to establish the authority of the Veda, can all “be used in proving that of the Bauddha scriptures. Consequently, just ८८ &8 the character of the Scripture of Action belongs to the Veda, so too “can it be quite reasonably asserted by the Mimansaka to belong to the “ Bauddha scriptures.’ SIDDHANTA. To all this, we make the following reply : Sutra (12). Not so; because of the want of proper regularity. (It is Purvapaksha [D] that is taken up first) What has been said above appears to be distinctly irregular (in its argumentation). As a matter of fact, with regard to any subject, people can have only one correct idea; as for other mistakon notions with regard to it, even though they do not appear in the man’s own mind, yet if they happen to be borrowed from another person, they cannot but be faulty (and incompatiblo with the former conviction). At the time that one is having a discussion with another person, it often happens that fresh arguments cross up in the disputant’s mind, being occasioned at that very time, by the reasonings urged by his opponent. Hence it so happens that though the person may be fully cognisant of his own standpoint, yet he is tempted to bring forward counter-arguments to those urged by his opponent, even though in 80 doing, they retain a mere semblance of his own theory. THE BAUDDHA AND OTHER SCRIPTURES HAVE NO INDEPENDENY? AUTHOKITY. 233 Thus it is that the Cakyas, Vaibhasikas and other Buddhistic sects, being afraid of thearguments put forward by the Mimansaka, lose their heads completely, and make the astounding declaration that their scripture also 18 eternal. They have such a hatred for the Veda, that they can never allow it any precedence over their Own scriptures; and desiring to base upon this fact of non-precedence of the Veda, the truthfulness of such assertions of theirs as arc contrary to those of the Veda, they declare even those of their assertions as speak of ‘non-slaughter,’ &c., to be independeut of the Veda, taking their stand upon pure reasoning. But in that case, their scriptures, being as they are composed by human authors, come to be taken as unauthoritative in regard to transcendental matters; and (in order to save themselves from this predicament) they are taken in and led astray (from their own path) by the semblances of the arguments that have been brought forward (by the Mimansaka) to establish the eternality of the Veda. Even an ordinary Mimansaka having proved the fact of human assertions having no authority with regard to transcendental matters, the Bauddhas find themselves unable to set aside the well-established and un- impeachable authoritative character of the Veda, from which all chance of discrepancies had been set aside by the single fact of its being independent of human agency ; and thus finding no cogent arguments to bring forward against the Mimansaka, they lose their heart by having to fall back upon the device of repeating the arguments of tke opponent; and having no reasons of their own to bring forward, they say—‘ Our scriptures are eternal” —forgetting in this all their own former declarations, and only apishly imitating the assertion of his opponent; and this action of theirs is exactly like that of an ignorant bridegroom, who was asked by his father-in-law what his gotra was; but not knowing what it was he said—“ My gotra is the same as yours” (not knowing that this would make his marriage impos- sible). And when taunted by the Mimansaka on the point of this argument belonging to the Mimadnsaka, and not tothe Bauddhas, they turn round and ~say—“It is our argument, stolen by the Mimansaka.” And certainly, if one were to shamelessly continue to bring forward such meaningless arguments, thereby seeking to deceive other people, he could never lose his point! But by asserting the eternality of their scriptures, in imitation of tho Veda, the Bauddhas give up their well-known theory of the momentary character ofall things. The Buddha has laid down the momentary character of all things that are brought into existence; such a text of the Bauddhas being—‘“ All sanskiras (tmpressions) are momentary; and how can im- permanent things have any action? barring the two non-cntities (Destruc- 30 244 TANTRA*VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I—PADA 11-^7ा1 (7d). tion and Void) all that is cognisable 1s a product and is momentary.” They have the following text also :—‘ Inasmuch as, in accordance with a rule of the Intellect, a word can be related to a certain definite object, there can be no eternal manifestation of the object by the word; because (whether the manifestation be held to bo brought about by a modification of the sense-organ, or by that of the object) in both cases such a manifestation would be highly objectionable,”—which clearly shows that the Bauddhas have always held the non-eternal character of the relations of words to their meanings; and under the circumstances, the declaration of the eter- nality of the scriptures, in contradiction to the aforesaid theory of non- eternality, would only make a laughing stock of the Bauddha. For certainly, if the weaver took up only the threads, and threw away tho shuttle, when proceeding to weave a cloth, he would be striking with his fist at the sky. So then, the cternality of words,—which is the staple wood on which the whole fabric of the eternality of scriptures stands—having been apparently burnt (denied, at least by the Bauddha) by means of the fire of fallacious arguments, it becomes impossible for the Bauddha to rear up the fabric anew (in regard to his own scriptures). As for the efernality of usage (of words) (which the Bauddha admits), it 18 syhonymous with the efernality of actions (of words) ; and when the very relations of words and their meanings aro declared to be transient, how can any usage based upon these (relations) be said to be eternal ? because upon what could the usage rest (in the absence of the relations) ? Consequently, those who do not admit the eternality of word, its meaning and the relation between the two, can never reasonably hold the usage, which would have no legs to stand upon, to be eternal. Because when the word, &c., will have disappeared, upon what could the usage rest ? Hence the assertion— This Dharma-scripture of the Bauddha is eternal’’—comes to be absolutely meaningless. Specially as that which is momentarily disappearing can never be pointed out or spoken of as ‘ this’; and hence it becomes all the more impossible for it to be spoken of as ¢ eternal.’ (1) Thus, then, there being no chance for the eternality of the scriptures ` of those who hold the words to be transient, and it being impossible for hu- man assertions, treating of transcendental subjects, to be accepted as ‘Scriptures of Action,’—the authority of the Bauddha scriptures (in regard to Dharma) is denied, on the ground of “ asanniyama’’—the meaning of this expression in this case being ‘the niyama, or acceptance, of assativa or transient character (of all objects in general, and of words in particular). ’ (2) Or, the scriptures of the Bauddha, the Jaina and others, being full of incorrect words, they cannot be accepted as “scriptures,” “ because of assunniyama’’—the meaning in this caso being, ‘because they are composed षभ} BAUDDHA AND OTHER SCRIPTURES HAVE NO AUTHORITY. 935 of incorrect words and expressions.’ Being full of vernacular words of the Migadhi and other languages, they are found to be very bad compositions. For instance, we meet in them with such expressions as—mama vihibhik. khavé kammavacca tsisavé, ukkhitté lodammi uvvé atthi karanam padané nat- tht kdranam anubhavé karanam ime sakkada dharma sambhavanti sakadrand akdrana vinasanti, anupyatit karanam, and so forth. Thus, then, the words themselves being unreal, how could the objects denoted by them be accepted as real? And when we actually find the words to have deteriorated forms, how can we accept them as eternal P Though in the case of the Veda too, we have such fallacious arguments us—‘ the Veda is non-eternal, because it 1s a collection of words and sentences, like the Mahabharata, &c.’—yet those can produce an idea of the transitoriness of the Veda, only so long as the actual form of the Veda has not been perceived. No sooner are the forms of the Rk, &c., per- ceived than the aforesaid conception of their transitoriness disappears entirely. Even when we know the mere beginnings of the Veda, we can nevor intelligently believe them to have been composed by human authors. In the ordinary world, we find that people, following the bent of ordinary experience, compose works of poetry, &c., in connection with the facts of ordinary life only by means of words that are in keeping with ordinary experience. And who could ever have composed the Rgveda, consisting as it does of words which have almost never been met with in ordinary usage, and which have definitely regulated accents, spreading over sixty-four Prapdthakas ? How could the first verse of the Rgveda—‘ I adore Agni, the foremost priest of the sacrifice, the glorious Deity, the Inviter, the receptacle of Jewels ’’—ever be the assertion of aman? Where could he have found such a metrical method of expression, by the help of which he would compose the verse? What, too, would be his motive for composing it? Where has Agni been seen to be a ‘priest,’ that one could describe him as such? Where, too, has anyone met with the word ‹ 2८2 ' in the sense in which it is used in the passage? Where again, hasit been found that Agniis the ‘ Deity’ of the sacrifice? Because the Deity of each sacrifice is defined by Vedic injunctions alone. There 18 no such material class as ‘Deity’—(a ‘Deity’ is only the name of one to whom offerings are made,—and this could not be perceived by the ordinary means of worldly perception). Nor does any man_ know tho fact of Agni, being either an “ Inviter” of the gods, or a ‘ receptacle of jewels ”’ ; and certainly it is not possible to eulogise those properties that one knows nothing of. Hence we conclude that such assertions could be made only by the Veda as independent of everything else. Similarly in the case of the first mantra of the Yajurveda: ‘ O 236 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADHYAYA !—PADA Ii—ADH! (7d). Grass, &c.”—, how could such an assertion be made by a human being ? How, tog, could people know of this mantra being of use in the chopping of the twigs ? Similarly, too, how could the mantra “ Urjé, &c.,” be known by any man, capable of understanding things before he does an act to be of use in the washing of the twigsP What man again could lay down that the mantra ‘ Vayavah stha ’ is to be used in the separating of each calf from its mother (at the time of milking 1६). That is to say, that the word ‘vayu’ in the plural indicates each of the calves as separated from its mother could never have been thought of by any human being, given to thinking over things, So, too, in the case of the first mantra of the Simaveda, such forms (in singing) as—‘ O gna 1,” &e.—could never have been composed by a human being ; as there appears to be no visible purpose for singing it in this form. That is to say, how could any intelligent person transform the fully expressive words of the verse—‘“ Agné dyahi, §c.”""—into the form ‹ ( gna,’ &९., which is never met with in ordinary parlance, and which is incapable of any grammatical construction P So also, how could any intolligent person, unless he had lost his head, transform the correct ‘i’ n ‘ Vitayé,’ the ‘ta’ into ‘ ८2, ` and the ‘ y&’ into ‘ aya’ P Thus, then, we conclude, that the form of the Veda itsclf establishes the fact of its being independent of human agency. There are only a very fow passages in the Veda, that resemble ordinary sentences ; but in these too the learned detect certain Vedic peculiarities. Hence, whenever the teachers, or the students, or other persons near them como to ponder over the words and sentences of the Veda, and their significa - tions, thcy at once recognise the fact of its being independent of human agency, which 18 clearly indicated by the Veda itself. And since this is not enough to convince the logicians outside the Wedie pale, all that the Mimansaka has done is to bring out such arguments from the Veda itsclf, as go to prove the independence of the Veda of all human agency ; and thus the Mimansaké has (by this unbeliof of the Bauddha) only obtained the glorious name (of having proved the independence of the Veda, which is really established by the Vedn itself) On the other hand, in the case of the Bauddha scriptures, even though wo como across, here and there, with words that appear to have been sorrectly used in their original forms ; yet, even in these cases we often find ouch uses as those of ‘ prajnaptt’ (in the sense of janalt), ‘vijnapli’ (—vijanatt), ‘ pagyata’ (instead of drigyatd) and so forth ; and hence itis very rarely that we find any purely correct uses of words. When such is the case with words that appear to be correct, what can be said of those that are found to be used in forms that are more deteriorated than even the deteriorated vernaculars? For instance, in the case of the word ‘ bhikkhavé’ Mik 2477074 AND OTHER SCRIPTURES HAVE NO AUTHORITY. 237 wd uoted abovo, even in the Praékrta, we have often found the letter 2 nt the end of Accusative Plural, but never in the Nominative oriu the Voca- tive; in place of the word ‘ savskria’ all that the Prakrta is found to do 18 to duplicate the ‘ K,’ delete the nasal‘ n,’ and change the ‘ry’ into ‘a’; and it does not add a ‘da’ sound, as is found to be done in the word ‘sakkada@’ quoted above which is thus found to have completely destroyed the unimpeachable form of the word ‘ sarskrta.’ Thus, then, we conclude that on account of their being composed of in- correct words and expressions, the scripture of the Bauddha, &c., can never be held to be either a Veda, or an eternal scripture. (3). Grammar supplies the onlv means of ascertaining the eternal and primitive forms of words. And while we find the Veda full of gram- matically correct words, we do not find the Bauddha scriptures to beso; and thus there being no strict observance of the grammatical forms of words in these latter, they cannot be accepted as scriptures. In this case, the expression ‘ asanniyamat’ would mean ‘ because of there being no strict observance of grammatical rulos.’ (4). Or, the expression ‘asanniyamat’ may be taken as referring to the absence of any permanence in the Bauddha works, which did not exist (prior to their composition by Buddha), as is clearly proved by the Buddha himself, who seeks to establish the transitoriness of all things, on the ground of the momentary character of all that exists. (5). Or, the expression ‘ asanniyama@t”’ may be explained as ‘asatim niyandt,’ which would mean that, inasmuch as these works invariably lay down such evil and false doctrines as the momentary character of things, the world being a mere void, there being be no self, and so forth—or inasmuch as they seek to establish their con- clusion by false reasonings,—no authority can belong to] those decla- rations of Dharma that proceed from the same persons as have laid down the aforesaid doctrines. Nor can these scriptures be held to be eternal, because thore is a clean remembrance of their authors (Buddha, and others). And hence in matters relating to Dharma, which is amenable only to an eternal scripture (as proved under Sutra I—i—2), we cannot admit of the independent autho- rity of the Bauddha scriptures. (The Pirvapakshas [B] and [C] and [A] are next taken up.) In the case of all the Subsidiary Sciences and the Smrtis too, inasmuch as we have a distinct knowledge with regard to their authors, they cannot be accepted as independent scriptures (in regard to Dharma). (As urged under Pirvapakshas, B and C.) 238 TANTRA-VARTIKA—-ADOYAYA I—PADA 11140 पा (7५४८). The same arguments also serve to set aside the independent authority of the Kalpastitras (as urged in Piarvapaksha A; because of these too we know the authors, which fact is enough to prove that they had no ex- istence before they were composed by these authors (and as such they cannot be held to be eternal). The arguments that have been brought forward in support of the eternality of the Veda, are not applicable to the case of the Kalpasitras, because of people having firm convictions with regard to their having been composed by human authors. That is to say, just as the teachers and students know of the existence of the Kalpasitras and other Smrti works, exactly in the same way are they also cognisant of their authors, Acvaliyana, Baudhayana, Apnstamba, Kityayana, and others. From this it is clear that they had no existence prior to their being composed by these authors ; and, for this reason, how can they be accepted as Scriptures of Action, either as a distinct Veda, or as similar to the Veda? (6). We do not base the fact of the Ka/pasitras having been com- posed by authors on the mere ground of their being called by the names of certain persons ; and hence our arguments cannot be met by the replies advanced under the Sitra 1-1-30 (‘* The name is due to their having been explained by certain persons’). The fact is that the idea of these authors is brought about by means of an endless traditional conviction ; and this is only supported by the said names as applied to the Kalpasiira, &c. In the case of the names “ Kdthaka” and the rest, as applied to the Veda, the names themselves can be held to be eternal, as based upon tl. fact of the eternal Rescensions of the Veda having been explained by such eternal personalities as Katha and others; but no such explanation is possible with regard to the names ‘‘ Mdgaka,” &c., as applied to the Kalpasitras, for the simple reason that these Sidtras are never recognised as eternal; because the words,—“ Magaka,” “ Baudhadyana,” and “ Apastamba + —distinctly point to individual non-eternal (created or born) personalities. and as such, they cannot serve as the basis for an explanation of these names belonging to eternal books. Hence the 9४ ८.८ may be explained as— ‘because the names ‘Mdcaka,’ &c., distinctly indicate the fact of previously non-existing (asatam) books having been composed (niyama@t) in the form of the Kalpasttras, &c., these cannot be accepted as Scriptures of Action. (7). It may also be explained as—‘ because in the Kalpasiiras, there are no such rules and regulations as there are in the Veda, they cannot be accepted as scriptures.’ ([‘asanniyamdt’=on account of the non-existence of niyamas. | (8). Another explanation of the Saéra is this—‘The Kalpasiitras cannot be accepted as scriptures, because there are no restrictions of time, &e., 4 THE SUBSIDIARY SCIENCES, SMRTIS AND KALPAS HAVE NO INDPT. AUTHY. 239 with regard to them, as there are with regard to tho Veda,’—as is distinctly mentioned in the 6८14 ‘The Subsidiary Sciences may be studied whenever one likes. ’ The Bhashya has explained the Si#tra as referring to the absence of accentuation in the Kalpasiitras. But this would apply also to the case of the mantras that are quoted in extenso in the Kulpas; as also to the Chindogya Brahmanas laid down in the Grhya-Sutras ; which would also come to be denied true scriptural character and authority. Because ४116 eight Brahmanas with their esoteric explanations, that are studied by the Chandogas, have got no definite accentuation; and this absence of accentuation would make them lose their Vedic character. Consequently we must take the Sitra to refer to the absence, in the Kalpasitras, of the self-evident eternality and independence of human agency (that have been pointed out with regard to the Veda); for though the Veda has a definite accentuation, yet this is not all that it has got (in contradistinction to other so-called scriptures). Sutra (13). Also because of the absence of explanatory passages. The fact of the Veda having explanatory passages also serves to point to tho same fact (of the Veda being independent of human agency). Inas- much as, in the Veda we find many such explanatory passages, as are not possible in ordinary parlance, we conclude, from this, that the Veda is not the product of human intelligence. For what intelligent human being could be capable of composing such Arthavdda passages, as—‘ Brhaspati sang for the gods,” ‘Indra killed Vrtra,” ‘ Prajapati cut out his own fat,’ ‘‘ Cows performed this sacrifice, hence they have their horns growing after ten months,” and soforth. Specially because, even as wo find the Arthavadas in the eternal Veda itself, it becomes extremely difficult to connect them with Injunctions ; and then, if a human author were to compose such apparently incongruous passages to be taught to his students, he would come to be marked as a fool. As a matter of fact, however, in the Kalpaséiras, we find nothing like such explanatory passages, which could lead us to conclude them to be independent of human agency. And further, the fact of these Kalpasitras, &c., being devoid of any- thing like direct Injunctions, distinctly establishes the descriptive cha)ac- ter of these (that is, since they do not contain any direct Injunctions, they must be taken os mere descriptions or explanations); and it also shows that they are not capable of laying down anything new (in the shape of Injunctions on Dharma). In the case of the Veda we find that verbg in the present tense, when rendered attractive by means of Arthavadu 240 TANTRA-VARTIKA—ADHYAYA I—PADA IlI—ADH1 (7ubc). passages, become endowed with injunctive force. While in the Kalpa- sitras, there are no Arthavddas (and as such there is no chance for the verbs in them, which are invariably in the present tense, to have any in- junctive force). (Norcan itbe held that these verbs are in the fifth mood, Lét, which has an injunctive signification, and not in the Lat, (Present) the forms of both being the same; because) the fifth mood (Lé) has been distinctly laid down, as to be used in the Veda only; and as the Kalpa- 5८108 are neither Mantras nor Brahmanas (which two alone constitute the Veda), it is not possible for them to contain any verbs in that mood. Though the declaration that ‘according to some pcople all the six Subsidiary Sciences are Vedas’ would make the Kalpasiitras known as ‘Veda,’ yet like the 21708088, they cannot attain to the position of Veda proper (metrical); because the regulations of Veda proper (metrical) - apply only to the Mantra and the Brahmana portions of the Veda. That is to say, in accordance with the Sutra of Katyayana— the Injunction, the Enjoined, and the Argumentative Science of Miménsa, all constitute the Veda ”"—though the name “Veda” becomes applicable to the Mimansa, which consists of a compilation of all the arguments connected with the Veda, yet, it does not becomo affected by the rules and regula- tions relative to Veda proper; and hence the Kalpusitras too, being exactly in the same position, cannot be accepted as forming a Scripture of Action, which is only another name for Injunction. It has been urged above thatas the Kalpasitras have been enumerated by the Veda, among the subjects to be studied in course of the Brahmayajna, they must be held to be eternal ; but this premiss becomes too wide; inas- much as the Itthdsas and the Purdnas are also similarly enumerated, That is to say, the said Vedic text has mentioned the Kalpas together with Itthisas and Purinas; which shows that even the products of human agency (such as the 1410545 and Purdnas are universally admitted to be) are included among the sciences (to be studied in course of the Brahma- yapua). (There is yet another explanation of the mention of the name of Kalpa in the Veda). There must have been other Kalpasitras before our present Kalpasitras were composed (that is to say, since the very beginning of time:, there must have always been some sort of a Kalpasiiira, in each Kalpa, exactly as ineach Kalpa, there has been a 8001८) ; because, in the absence of such S#tras, any thorough orderly comprehension of the methods pre- scribed in the extensive Vedas is absolutely impossible; whence it follows that ever since there has been a Veda, there has been a performance of sacrifices, and ever since then, there never has been a total absence of any of the Subsidiary Sciences (and it may be this endless series of Kalpas that has been mentioned in the Veda) ; as there is nothing against holding sUBSIDIARY SCIENCES, SMRTIS AND KALPAS HAVE NO INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY. 241 this series to be eternal; thongh any particular Kalpasiitra cannot be admitted to be independent of human agency. And as for the word “ Kalya,” it signifies nothing more than an ea- planation of the meaning of the Veda; and as a name significant of this, the ‘ Kalpa’ can very well be held to be eternal; and it 18 as such that it has been enjoined as forming part of the daily Recitation (of the Brahmana) ; but all that is meant by this Injunction is that the Brahmana should make it & point every day to recall to his mind (and go over) the procedure of the various sacrifices (laid down in the Veda); and though there can be no doubt as to this procedure being eterna!, that does not necessarily mark the books dealing with this procedure (viz., the books on Kalpasiitras) as eternal. As for the points of agreement between the Veda and the Kalpasitras, such agreement is quite explicable on the ground of the latter following (or being based upon) the former; and hence as they only follow what has been laid down in the Veda, the Kalpasiitras cannot be said to have any independent authority of their own. Further, no students have ever regarded the Subsidiary Sciences as Veda; as for the declaration—“ according to some, all the six sciences are Veda ’”’—, it by no means expresses the generally accepted theory. And again, as a matter of fact, whenever any two declarations are found to agree with one another, 16 is always concluded that one of them 18 explanatory of (and subsequent to) the other; and finding such agrce- ment between the Bradhmanas and the Kalpasitras, we instinctively con- clude that inasmuch as the former is replete with direct Injunctions, it cannot be held to be explanatory of the latter; and hence we are forced to the conclusion that it is the Kalpasiirus that are explanatory of, and sub- ‘sequent to, the Bradhmanas. Nor can the case of the authoritativeness of the Kalpasitras be held to be analoyous to that of the different recensions of the Veda; because of the same persons being the students of the Veda as well as of its Kalpa. In the case of the different recensions of the Veda, the students of each are distinct from one another (and hence the Injunctive authority of all of them is admissible) ; whereas in the case of the Kalpa, as each Kalpa only explains the meaning dealt with in detail in the particular Veda to which it belongs, and as such tho students of both of these being the same, the former can never be admitted to have an injunctive authority (apart from the Veda which supplies all necessary authority). Then again, we find that the authors of the Aalpas explain certain facts in accordance with the reasonings supplied by the Brahmanas; and as such, the Kalpas can never be held to be equal to the Brahmanas, in authority. ४1 242 TANTRA-VARTIKA ADH. I—PADA III—ADHI 7 (abc). We also find that the passage in the Brdhmana has a signification entirely different from what is assigned to it by the explanatory Kalpa ; and hence too, we cannot admit the Kalpa to be independent of the Brahmanas. Hence, though it is possible that certain similarities of subjects and expressions between the Brahmanas and the Kalpas may give rise to the misconception that the Kalpas are also independent Brahmanas by themselves, yet the above arguments instantly remove such misconcep- tions. It has been urged above that the Veda itself speaks of the independent authority of the assertions of the great Teachers (among whom the authors of the Kalpasitras are included). But there too, the word ‘Acarya’ in the Vedic text is only a chance coincidence of sound (that is to say, the world ‘dcdrya’ in the text does not mean ‘teacher’ but the ‘Veda’ itself, the word being explained ‘as that which improves (dctnot?) the intellect’). Or, it may be taken as laying down tlie absolutely trust- worthy authority of the Teacher, with special reference to the students whom he should be teaching the text and the meaning of the Veda. Manu has thus explained the meaning of the word “dacdrya”: ‘One, who having initiated his disciple, teaches him the Veda, with all the sub. sidiary sciences and esoteric explanations, is called the @carya”’; and in order that at the time of such teaching of the Veda, the disciples should have an implicit confidence in the words of the Teacher, the Veda has declared the authoritative character of the assertions of the Teacher; and this declaration of the Veda does not refer to the authors of the Kalpa- sutras. Sutra (14). Because of the action being laid down for all cases; and because of the proximity of scriptural authority. All assertions of human beings are not accepted to be true; because, as a matter of fact, their assertions are generally found to be false. Ags has been declared elsewhere: =“ Henco it is that speech speaks of both, truth and untruth, because it has been pierced with evil.” Such falsity of the assertions of the Kalpasttras is distinctly pointed out by the Veda itself; specially as we meet with many assertions that are contrary to one another (and to the Veda). This is what is meant to be pointed out by the first half of the sétra; the latter half meaning that the contrary scriptural passages being in close proximity, tho disagreemont (or contra- diction) is easily perceptible. The example of such disagreement that has been cited in the ए, that with reference to the ‘‘ Sihalipadka”’ of the sacrifice on the 15th day of the month, has been disregarded ; because in that case the declaration ६) व्र SUB-SCIENCES—SMRTIS AND KALPAS—HAVE NO INDEPT. AUTHTY. 243 of the Grhyasitra in connection with this sthalipaka has been attributed to the Kalpasitra which treats of the Darcga-Pirnamdasa; and as such it seems as if the {2६४ had purposely, with a view to entirely suppress the authority of the Kalpasttra, fastened a foreign assertion on to it. We have a declaration of the Grhyasitra to the following effect: ‘In the Akshata Homa, until the evening offering has been made the morning offering should not be given up; nor should the evening offering be aban- doned until the morning offering has been made ’’; and just as this passage is not taken as referring to the Agnihotra,—so too, the following passage of the Kalpastiira cannot be taken as referring to the Darcapiérnamasa : ** Until the offering of the last day of the month has been made, that of the fifteenth day should not be abandoned ; nor should the offering of the thirtieth day be abandoned until that of the fifteenth day has been made.’ And as such, there being no real contradiction of the Kalpasitia by the Veda (in this case), we must cite another example (for instance, the Kalpasttra says —‘‘ The Paryagni is made of all the sacrificial mate- rials,” which lays down the making of the Paryagni with reference to all the materials; while we have the Brahmana text which lays down the Paryagni as to be made out of the puroddga only; and there can be no doubt that there is a distinct disagreement between the two). Nat alia alleen “amt andthe 1 0 ai pei at ADHIKARANA (8). [The Holakd@dhikaranu—treating of the fuct of the Vedic teat assumed in support of a usage having universal application and authority. | Sutra (15). “Inferences being restricted in their application, usages can have only a limited authority.” With reference to certain popular local customs, the present discussion is started; the question being as to whether these customs have an authority limited within certain areas, or they have a universal application. In this connection, we have got to consider all the Injunctions and Prohibitions that are marked by tho acceptance or avoidance by certain people, taking each of these one by one. (11616 are certain customs that are followed by the Eastern people, though avoided by the exceptionally good amongst them; and we proceed to consider whether these customs have becn laid down for those people alone, or for all men. In the same manner, there are certain customs that are peculiar to the Southerners, some to the Wosterners, and others to the Northerners ; and we have got to take into consideration each of these. The first two sutras of this Adhikarana (viz: the 15th and 16th siitras) can also be taken as referring to the question as to the locally limit- ed or universal authority of such works as the siitras of Gautama, the Grhyasiitras and the like. That is to say, we find that, barring the Puranas, the Smrti of Manu, and the ८707545, all other Smrtit w«rks-— such as those of Gautama, Vacishtha, Gankha, Likhita, Harita, A pas- tamba, Baudhayana and others—as also the works on Grhya—are each studied exclusively by only certain sections of the Brahmanas, and each of them has its relation restricted to only a definite Veda, exactly like the Pratigakhyas. For instance, the s#tras of Gautama and Gobhila are accepted by the Chandoga (Sémavedi) Braéhmana only; those of Vacishtha by the Ryveds; those of Cankha and Likhita by the Vajasndyis ; and those of Apastamba and Baudhayana by the Krshna— Yajurvedis, Thus then, the fact of such limited accoptance of these sutras UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY OF VEDIC TEXTS ASSUMED IN SUPPORT OF USAGES. 245 affords matter for reflection; the question being—is each of these sitras authoritative only for the particular sect by which itis accepted ? Or, are they all equally authoritative for all people? And on this, we have the following :— PURVAPAKSHA. ‘“Tnasmuch es we find the stééras being studied only by the parti- “cular sects of the Brihmanas, we conclude that their authority is also ‘limited to these Bralmanas alone; specially as the authority of the sétras ५ 18 based upon certain assumed texts, which as the objects of inference, ‘can be belioved to have an existence only where the inferential indicative “Sthe Smrtt,’ exists; that is to say, the Smrti sutras being found to be “current only among certain limited sects, the Vedic texts pointed to by ‘these cannot have their existence outside this pale. Hence, whether it “be an Injunctive or a Prohibitive Vedic text, its existence cannot be in- ५ ferred outside those limits. “That is to say, the compilations of the séras, or the usages can ‘lead to the inferenco of Prohibitive or Injunctive texts (in support of themselves), only with reference to those persons among whom they ८५ themselves are current, and not among other people. For example, the per- “ception of smoke in one house cannot lead to the inference of the existence “of fire in another house ; nor can this latter be inferred by people who ‘ have not seen the smoke (hence the authortative Vedic text corroborating a ‘Usage can have no authority for those among whom the usage is not cur- ५८ rent). “Thus then, the Injunction of Agnihotra can refer to only those per- “ sons for whom the Upunayana and the Adhdna have been laid down. And “exactly as certain duties and rules of conduct are restricted to certain ‹ ‹ १९07116 families and castes, so too the duties and the rules of conduct ‘obtaining in a certain country would have their authority restricted “to that country alone. “Tf the Prohibitions and Injunctions had a universal application, ५ Usages (which are all based upon such Injunctions &c.) would also come ५ {0 have a universal authority, there being no reason for limiting the “scope of their authority. And then the Usage, based upon the texts that “have universal application, would be followed by the capable men of all “ countries, exactly like the Injunction of the Agnzhotra. ‘Asa matter of fact, however, we find the usages being followed ‘only by limited classes of people ; and hence we conclude that the Vedic ‘texts authorising such usages must also refer to these limited communities ‘only. Because the only reason for assuming the Vedic texts is to 246 TANTRA-VARTIKA I—ITI—8 (HOLAKADHIKARANA). “ substantiate the otherwise inexplicable usages current amongst the people; “and hence such texts could not have any application to those people “among whom the particular usages themselves are not current. And as ‘in the case of usages, so also in that of the Grhyasitra &c., the assumed “corroborative Vedic texts can have no relation to those people among “ whom the Grhyas are not current, And hence we conclude that these ‘“‘Usages and Grhyasitras &c., have only limited applications. ५ [४ has been shown under द्द 1-11-80, that, if the fact of the grains “having been prepared by means of the ¢urpa be taken as the reason for ‘‘making the offering by means of it, then the instance that has been ‘cited would also apply to that alone; hence the meaning would be that “inasmuch as the 1/1 is the means of preparing the grain, the offer- ‘“‘ing is poured by means of it; and there cannot, in such @ case, arise any ‘question as to the offering being poured by means of the darvi or the “mthara &. ८८ And, in the same manner, 88 we find all usages to have only a limited “local currency, we cannot but conclude that the corroborative Vedic texts “inferred in support of such usages, can have only a local application. ‘“Thus then, all inferences being restricted within certain definite limits “of place, time &., the Vedic text that is inferred cannot but be admitted “as having an authority only within those Jimits.” SIDDHANTA. Sutra (16). But the duty must be universal, because of the universal character of the Injunctions. In this stra we have the reply to the above Pérvapaksha : On account of the universal charactar of the Injunctions the Dharma- eastra, &c., must be takon as applying to all persons capable (of performing the duties laid down.) Having come across certain Qmriits and Usages, when we proceed to infer the Vedic texts in support of these, the inference that we can have must be of such causes as are similar to the effects (the Smrtis &o.),— according to the law that the effect always follows in the wake of its cause. And consequently the positive injunction, technically called ‘ Bhavana,’ that is inferred, must be that which lays down certain definite actions, sacrifices, charities, offerings, fastings and penances &c.—ex- pressed by means of verb roots,—as leading to specific results, like Heaven and the like, by means of certain specified processes ; and in the oase of certain actions of the body, the sense-organs and the mind, that are UNIVARSAL AUTHORITY OF VEDIO TEXTS ASSUMED IN SUPPORT OF USAGES, 247 shunned by certain people, the inference is that of a prohibitive text, pointing out the prohibited action as leading to undesirable results in the shape of Hell and the like. And thus we find that in both cases, the injunctions or the prohibi- tions distinctly refer to all persons that have the capability of doing the acts enjoined or prohibited ; and as such, none of these, Usages or Smriis, can ever be taken as having a limited application, as referring to any particular place, time or persons. Specially because as a matter of fact, we know that with regard to each action, the character of the agent is ascertained, only in three ways : (1) by capability (for instance in the case of the Agnihotra, we ascer- tain that anyone who has the capability of performing it, should perform it); (2) non-prohibition (asin the case of certain actions that are done with a special object in view, we ascertain that all men can perform the actions, except those for whom it is distinctly prohibited); and (3) by special qualifying words (as for instance, in the case of the Rdjasiiya sacri- fice, it is distinctly laid down that it is only the “ Raja” (Kshatriya) that can perform it. And in the case in question, we find that the capability (of doing the acts) laid down in the 8711८05 &c., belongs to the people of all castes and con- ditions, inhabiting the whole country of the Aryavarta, except the blind, the doaf, the mad and the dumb, who are precluded from such actions. The capability too, of doing the prohibited acts, we find existing in the two, three or four castes (7.e., certain actions that are prohibited for the Brahmana may be allowable for the other castes, and soon) ; and where wo find the avoidance of the action much more extensive, we conclude the capability of its performance to reside in the Mleccha (who are believed to be capable of all actions howsoever abhorrent). In a case, however, where we infer a Vedic text, in support of a certain usage, we do not find, in this text, any qualifying expressions, limiting its application to any particular countries or persons. Nor can we infer any texts that could prohibit the said usages, with reference to the people other than those among whom it is prevalent. 1४ certain cases it does happen that, though the capability of per- forming the action, belongs to all men, yet the action is distinctly re- stricted to certain definite classes of men by means of restrictive qualify- ing words ; as for instance the Rdjasiya is laid down as to be performed by the Raja (Kshatriya), the Vaigyastoma by the Vai¢ya; and so on. But in the cases in question, it 18 not possible for us to infer the ex- istence of one or many qualifying words (in the Vedic text), that would in any way spocify the persons among whom the authorised usago may 248 TANTRA-VARTIKA. 1-111-85 (HOLAKADHIKARANA). be prevalent. Because all denote either the 1८55 or the Individual while in the case in question, any such restrictive words that we would infer could not specify either the Class or the Individual. Because the restrictive words could be only such as ‘the Hasterners (should perform the Holdka)”’ ; but asa matter of fact there can be no such definite class as “the Easterners,” which would exclude all the people of the other parts of the country, and include all of the Eastern part; and as such we could have no such specification as that ^“ the Holdka is to be performed by the Easterners &1016, ' As for the classes, ^^ Man,” ‘‘ Brahmana ” and the like, that are found to include the Easterners, they equally include the men and the Brahmanas of all parts of the country; and as such could not serve to specify the text as referring only to those people (the Easterners) among whom the particular custom might be prevalent. As for the words denoting individuals—z.e., the proper names,—they refer to one person only, like “ Dévadatta ” and the like ; and the presence of such words could not point out the custom as referring to any number of persons. Nor is it possible to have anyone name for all the people of the Eastern country, because it 18 absolutely impossible for us to have any conception, either individually or collectively, for all the endless varieties of people inhabiting the Hastern part of the country. This also shows that words cannot signify individual persons, as endowed with certain particular propertics and actious and as belonging to a particular class. Because there are no individual properties, actions or classes, that could be capable of pointing to particular individual persons, as inhabit- ing particular parts of the country ; as each individual is found to be specified, separately (by means of the properties belonging to each singly by himself). Nor do words denote anything other than classes and individuals, and hence there is nothing upon which we could base the specification of the persons for whom the custom may be authoritative. It is with a view to this that the Bhdshya has declared that we can. not reasonably admit the qualifying word—that may be inferred to restrict the application of the Injunction that by its very nature refers to all capable persons—to be denotative either of the Class or the Individual. That is to say, such customs as those of the {1016८ and the rest, can- not be said to belong cither to a particular Class, or toa particular individual. Nor is it possible for us to have any name that would apply ouly to those people among whom the custom is prevalent. Some people read the Bhashya passage as— That qualifying expression can only denote the Class and not the Individual,” And what they mean is this: Under ऽद VI—i—8, 1८18 shown that the expression “ svuryakdmuh,”’ UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY OF VEDIC TEXTS ASSUMED IN SUPPORT OF USAGES. 249 (one desiring Heaven), though expressing the meaning that is signified by its component parts, is yet made to signify the whole class of human beings that desire Heaven, irrespective of the gender and number in the word “svargakadmah”"’ (which is in tho Masculine Singular); on the ground that, as the expression occupies the position of the nominative no significance can be attached to its gender &c., and hence tho injunction— “‘one desiring Heaven should perform sacrifices "—is made applicable to all human beings in general. In the same manner, in the case in question, because all local Customs and Observances, point to their being applicable to all persons that desire the particular results following from those actions, and are capable of performing them,—therefore it must be admitted that all men in general are entitled to the performance of such actions. There are other commentators however, who, in connection with the present passage of the Bhdshya, proceed to consider the signification of verbs ; and as such having found fault with this last reading, accept the former reading, (that we have explained above); and being led astray by the direct mention of the word “vidhina” in the sétra, and being unablo to perceive any difference between the Vidhi and the Bhavana, fight shy of having to differentiate the forms of these two; and consequently upset- ting the conclusion arrived at in the Bhdvarthadhikarana = (11-1-1-4), favour us with the following explanation :— “The Bhavana (signified by the Injunctive affix, d&c.,) is incapable of being specified by its properties, by means of any other words (save the Injunctive affix, &c.).”” And if some one, desiring to learn the real meaning of the verbal affix asks them—what is this ^ Bhava or Bhavana” ? —all that they can say is that 1४ is nothing more than the expression ‘kuryat’ (should do) itself ; because they hold it to be inexpressible by any other word, they can only speak of it by means of the Injunctive affix ; but any use of the affix by itself being impossible, they have re- course to the next best method of uttering the afiixin connection with the root ‘kr’ (to do), which is a common substitute for all verbal roots. [Though the conclusion arrived at in the Sdtra 11-1-1 is that, the Bha- vana is denoted by the Injunctive affix, and is not the Injunctive affix itself). And then they proceed thus: ‘All that is expressed by the word is either in the form of a Olass or an Individual ; but we find the verb to have passed beyond the Class and the Individual ; and hence we are forced to the conclusion that the signification of the verb is inexpressible.” [Though the Bhavarthidhikarana distinctly points out that the signi- fication of the verb lies either iu the Accusative or in the Instrumental. | (They proceed) ‘it is this very fact that is mentioned in the Bhishya passage in question: It (the verb) cannot be held to denote either the Class 84 250 TANTRA-VARTIKA—I—IlI—8 (HOLAKADAIKARANA). or the Individual ; the word ‘it’ bein g taken as referring to the word ‘ vidhana’ (in the séira), which is thus declared to be incapable of ex- pressing either the Class or the Individual. For when one says ‘should do’, the man has the conception ‘I do’; and as such the Vidhi, or the Bhiivané (as appearing in the word ‘ kurydt’) cannot be said to be either a Class or an Individual.” But all this is altogether irrelevant and groundless ; and is due toa mere chance similarity of words, which, though having quite a diff- erent meaning, have been twisted by the commentators, into a signi- fication entirely at variance with the Bhashyu, with the sole purpose of displaying their ingenuity ; exactly as the text—“ the bull with four horns; &c.,”-—has been twisted (by Patanjali) into a reference to the science of grammar (vide above, the section on manfra). The present passage of the Bhdshya occurs in connection with the treatment of the fact of local customs having a universal authority. And hence it can be reasonably taken along with the sitra, only if it bo ex- plained, as we have explained it, as denying the possibility of any res- trictive qualifications in the Vedic texts (assumed in support of customs and usages). But 1f this explanation is renounced, and the passage is taken as pointing out the inexpressibility of the Bhavana (which we hold to be denoted by the verbal affixes), on the ground of its being neither a Class nor an Individual, then the passage would become well worth rejecting, on account of declaring what is entirely irrelevant, useless and unreasonable in the present connection. For in that case the passage could be construed with the rest of the sitra, only in the following manner : ^ Because the verb cannot denote cither the Class or the Indivi- dual, therefore the action enjoined by it has an universal application !’’ And certainly this would be a truly astounding declaration! For all that it would mean is that, “if the Injunctive affix, &c., could denote the Bhavana or the Vidhi either as the Class or the Individual, then such customs as the Holaka, and the like, would have only a limited autho- rity ; but because as a matter of fact the meaning of the said affix, &c., is distinct from either the Class or the Individual, and as such, alto- gether inexpressible, therefore that which is signified by the said verb must have a universal authority | = And certainly this would serve as a first-rate example of irrelevancy. And having at first declared the Bhavana to be inexpressible, they speak of (express) it by means of certain synonyms of their own creation (such as ‘ Bhava’); and thus they contradict their own former declaration. That is to say, with a view to show their own vollubility, they have spokon of the absolutely impossible synonymous character of such words as ‘vidht. UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY OF VEDIC TEXTS ASSUMED IN SUPPORT OF USAGES. 25] (Injunction), ‘ upadéga’ (advico), ‘kartavyata’ (duty), and bhdvand (tho thinking of a certain result as proceeding from a certain action) ; and by this-they have certainly succeeded in proving the inexpressible character of the Bhavana! ! Even if the verbal affix denoted either the efficiency of the agent, or the substratum of his efficiency (the Accusative),—then too, having, as in the case of the expression “the Brahmana sacrifices,” its specifications based upon the qualifying words (as “ Brihmana”’), the fact of its signifying the Class or the Individual would depend solely upon such qualifications ; and as such any consideration of the question of the verbal affix itself signify- ing or not signifying the Class or the Individual, could not in any way help us in ascertaining the scope of the authority of local customs and Smrtts; and under the circumstances, any consideration of the significa- tion of the affix wonld become all the more useless, when it actually signifies only the Vidhi or the Bhdvand, independently of any denotation of the agent. And again, if the mere fact of the verbal affix not signifying either the Class or the Individual were made the sole ground of the universality of an Injunction, then, even in the case of such Injunctions—as ^" The Raja should perform the [djusitya,” “ The Vaicya should perform the Vutgya- stoma” and the like,—the verbal affix being as inexpressive of the Class or the Individual, as in any other Injunction, these too would have to be accepted as applying to all men ! If it be urged that—‘‘in these cases, though the affix is truly inex- pressive, yet the qualifying words, ‘ aja’ &., serve to restrict their ap- plication,’—then, in that case, it becomes clear that one who holds these customs &c. to have only a local authority, should argue that there are such qualifying words (in the Vedic texts assumed in support of the customs, d&c.,; while one who holds them to have a universal authority, should argue that no such qualifying words are possible. And this is exactly what we have donc, having rejected the possibility of such qualifying words on the ground that any indication (by such words) of 891 +a Class or an Individual, in accordance with particular customs, is absolutely impossible; and as such the Injunctions (assumed) cannot but be taken as referring to al/ men as a class, which 1s implied by the force of the Injunction. And it is only as referring to the rejection of the possibility of any such qualifying words that the next two, ezghteenth and nineteenth, stitras can have any connection in the present context. And hence, the Injunctions being always found to have a univer- sal application, we must conclude all local customs, as well as the 252 TANTRA-VARTIKA—I—111——-8 (HOLAKADHIKARANA). Grhyasitras, &c., that are prevalent only among certain sects, to have a universal authority. Sutra (17). The restrictions (in other cases) would be based upon direct perception. It has been urged in the Pérvapaksha, that the customs should be held to have a limited authority : as are the usages and duties that are res- tricted within the limits of certain families or sects, so, in the same manner we could infer Vedic texts (in support of the customs) having similar restrictions. But this is not possible; because in the cases cited—(viz: those of cer- tain special sects of Bralmanas having three locks, others having one &c., &c.)—-because we actually find (see with our eyes) restricted usages, we can admit of such restrictive qualifications as the class (‘Brahmana’) property, 6४९.) and which are all expressible by means of single words ; ex- actly as we find in ordinary experience that the number of quartering the sacrificial Cake differs in the case of different Brahmanas; and then finding that there are directly perceptiblo Vedic texts that specify these numbers for each particular sect, (in the same manner, actually finding the number of hair locks differing in different classes of Brahmanas, we may infer from that very fact, on the ground of analogy with the quartering of the Cake, that there are Vedic texts restricting the number of locks also). That is to say, in the case of the quartering of the Cake, we actually find that for those that belong to the family of Bhrgu, Vagish- tha, Gunaka, Atri, Budhnyacva, Kanva, Safkrti, and the Kshatriyas, recourse to the second praydja called the “ Nardgaisa,” while for others that which is called “ Taninapat,” is laid down; and thus finding this to be invariably the case, we are led by these very perceptible facts to the direct Injunctions of these restrictions in the Veda itself. And the same process holds good in the case of the usages, &c., that are actually found to belong to only certain particular families and sects—such as one sect having one lock of hair, while others have three and so on,—all of which point to direct Vedic texts in support of this. Whereas in the case of the Holaka, ५८८. this method is not applicable (as they are not actually found to be keeping stiictly within any definite bounds) ; and as such, there is a world of difference between the example and the fact sought to be supported by it. Sutra (18). Also because there are no distinguishing marks of any specific agent. It has already been shown that it is not possible for the text (assumed in support of a Custom) to have any qualifying words that would denote UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY OF VEDIC TEXTS ASSUMED IN SUPPORT OF USAGES. 2583 either the Class or the Individual (to whom it is restricted) ; and we now proceed to show that it is also impossible for it to contain any such quali- fications as that ‘one who has red eyes (should observe the custom ).’ The opponent declares: “ Though there may not be any restrictive ‘qualifying words in general, that could denote the Class or the Indivi- ‘* dual,—yet it is quite possible for the text to contain words that would “noint out the form, complexion and other qualifications of the person fol- “lowing the Custom,—exactly as the Injunction of the laying of fire lays “down such qualifications as ‘having a son,’ ‘with black hair,’ and “so forth,—which would restrict the authority of the Custom.” And in reply to this, we have the following: There being no distin- guishing marks, any specification of a particular agent 18 not possible. It is only by means of constant or exclusive distinguishing marks that any particular agent can be positively singled out; while in the case of such qualifications or distinguishing marks, as the having of red eyes, 4९.) that could be pointed out as belonging to the Southerners, we find that these marks are also common to other people, who do not observe the particular custom (of the Southerners) ; and conversely, we find the Custom being observed by people not possessing the said features (f.2.: those of the Southerners whose eyes are not red). Hence the authority of the Custom cannot be restricted by means of any such distinguishing characteristics of agents. The Bhdshya has taken the word ‘ nityasya’ (in the séra) as qualify- ing the word ‘“litzga” ; but in that case the compound “ lingdbhava ” would be inexpressive (or impossible) ; inasmuch as the word ‘linga’ being the subordinate member in the compound would (in that case, be dependent (t.e, connected with, or qualified by, something—viz., ‹ nityata ’—which is expressed by a word—‘ nitya’—that does not form a member of the Compound). It might be urged in reply, that the word ‘ lizga’ being ever depen- dent (upon that which possesses the Zinga or mark), it would always imply the other co-relative of its; and thereby not losing its efficiency, the Compound would‘be quite possible ; exactly as we have in the case of the ex pression—" Dévadattasya gurukulam.”’ But this 18 not possible ; because the present case is not similar to that of this last expression ; because the relations in the two cases are totally different ; the word ‘litga’ does not always stand in need of (7.e., has not its denotation dependent upon) constant (‘nitya’) ; while the word ‘ Guru’ (teacher) has its denotation ever dependent upon that of ‘ Deva- datta ’ (the disciple). Thatis to say the word ‘guru’ can have its de- notation only as with reference to the disciple (i.e., the Guru is always 254, TANTRA-VARTIKA—!—~III—8 (HOLAKADHIKARANA). recognised as the Guru of some disciple, and there can be no idea of the Garu, which is not accompanied by that of the disciple) ; and hence in the ९४80 Of the expression—“ Dévadattasya gurukulam”—the word ‘gurw’ 1188 its denotation included in its permanent relationship to the disciple ‘ Dévadatta ' ; and as such this dependance (of a word notin the compound) does not necessarily vitiate the compound. In the case of “linga” and “nityasya,’’ on the other hand, the word ‘“idinga’’ has its denotation dependent only upon a 21002, that which possesses the Litga ; and certainly the word ‘ nttyasya’ cannot be said to be in any way synonymous with this 12042; and as such the permanent relationship of the Liarg: and the Linkga cannot justify the compound “ nityasya Wagaibhavat.” Though it is true that the word “litga” is used only where there is a relation of the Indicator and the Indicated, (and this relation 18 eternal) yet the denotation of that word does not depend entirely upon ‘eternality ’, as that of the word ‘ Father’ depends upon that of the word ‘Son,’ or that of the word ‘ Teacher,’ on that of the word ‘ Disciple.’ And further, it is the word “ lingi” itself which, having its denotation fixed by those of its component parts, depends upon the word “linga ”’ ; and the word ^^ 1४74 '* does not stand in need of anything besides the verbal root from which it is formed. And inasmuch as the word ° (2042 '` denotes that by which something ts marked or indicated, there is a distinct dependence upon the relationship of the action of indicating ; and as such, though it is not spoken of as related to anything, yet 1t is not independent of the Object, the Instrument, &c., of the Action; and on this ground, we could justify the efficiency of such compounds as “ lingino lingadarganam,” specially because the denotation of the word “ling” depends upou that of the word “linga.” In the case of the word “‘nityasya,’’ however, 1४ 18 only after the denotation of the word ^ linga” has boen duly accomplished, that the word ‘“ nityasya”’ comes to be related to it as expressing, by means of the Genitive, one of its proper- tics; and hereby the need of this relutionship not being supplied (by the word “ lizga” itself), the compound, ‘ uttyasya lingadbhadvat ’ remains abso- lutely inefficient or inexpressive. For thesereasons, the word “‘ nityasya” must be taken as qualifying either the agent, as distinguished by certain definite distinguishing features, or the authoritative application of the text assumed in support of the Custom ; the meaning of the stra beiug that, inasmuch as there can be no exclu- sive distinguishing marks, that coald single out any particular agent, or point out the limits of the authority of the text assumed (in support of the Custom ),—it cannot be held that such customs as the Holadka and the rest have a limited authority as based upon certain assumed Vedic texts UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY OF VEDIC TEXTS ASSUMED IN SUPPORT OF USAGES. 255 containing certain words that point out tho distinguishing characteristics (marking out the particular agent &c., &c., &c.). Sutra (19) The name is based upon a connection with place. This sttra refers to such qualifying words as the names ‘ Easteroer’ and the like, which the Custom is found to follow in its entirety. Says the opponent: ‘ All local customs are observed by men, speci- ८८ fiod by such names as ‘ Hasterners, ’ ‘Southerners, ’ and the like ; and they “are never found to be prevalent among people that are without such “names; consequently the Vedic texts that are assumed in support of “such customs cannot but contain these distinguishing names; and as “such they must more roasonably be accepted as having only a limited ५८ authority.” To this we make the following reply: Because such names are ap- plied to the agent on the sole ground of his connection with certain places, we conclude that the Vedic Injunction assumed in support of the Cus- toms, must contain words that denote the qualifications of place. Then, as for the place, as qualified by a certain quarter (East or West, &c.) or in the shape of the quarters East d&c., themselves—there can be 110 one particular country in the world that can be exclusively and invariably known as the Hast (the inhabitant of which would always exclusively be known as the Husterners, &c.) (and even if there be such a fixed place) as a matter of fact the Custom in question (f.7., the Holadka) 18 not found to be limited exclu- sively and invariably within those limits; as we find that it is observed by many people residing outside the limits of the place called the ^ East’ ; while many pcople residing therein are found not to observe it Thus then, for such names, there being no basis other than the place, the Customs, supported by Vedic texts as qualified by the parti- cular places (indicated by the names) could not have their prevalence de- pendent upon avy other cause than the relationships of these places. But asa matter of fact, we do not find the prevalence of these Customs re- gulated by these, either positively or negatively; as we find that the Holaka is observed by certain people not inhabiting the Eastern country, and also that it is not observed by some men of that country ; and henco we conclude that there can be no assumption of Vedic Injunctions qualified by specifications of place by means of certain names pointing to certain places The opponent finding in the above argument a (fancied) support to his own.theory, springs forward with the following :— Sutra (20) “As the Custom could not be found to be 256 TANTRA-VARTIKA—I—IlI—8 (HOLAKADHIKARANA). prevalent in other countries (the names cannot be held to be based upon the specifications of place).” “Tf yon have succeeded in refuting the fact of the names being based “upon specifications Of place, we can easily point out another basis for “them. For certainly, if the names were based upon the specifications of ५५ 1866, then the Customs could not be found to be prevalent among other “countries ; therefore we must find for them another basis in the shape of * Class, &o. ‘Or, we may accept the names by themselves, as independent of any “causes; even then, they could serve to qualify the Injunctions (or the “ Agents). For, all that we have got to do is to find a basis for the Cus- “tom ; and this basis being found in the Vedic Injunction as qualified by ८ by such Names, we do not stand in need of any further enquiry into the “basis of these Names. That is to say, the restriction of the authorita- “tive application of the Custom having been accomplished by means of “the Names, independently of any basis for themselves, there is no reason “for assuming the fact of their being based upon specifications of place, “specially when such specification has been found to be distinctly faulty.” To this, we make the following reply :— Sutra (21) The names would be literally significant, like the word ‘ Mathura.’ The specifications of place are made on various grounds—as those of habitation, birth, or departure. That 18 to say, the name “ Easterner ” can- not be applied to any man, except upon one or other of the following grounds: (1) either he must be an inhabitant of the Eastern country or (2) he must have been born in that country, or (3) he must have come from that country ; and so forth. And thus we find that such Names are never independent of some sort of a connection with a place. And we have already shown that the prevalence of the Custom is not always in accordauce with these names; since we find many inhabitants of that (Eastern) country not observing the Custom (Holaka); while, on the other hand, certain inhabitants of another country, whose fathers or grandfathers had originally migrated from the Eastern country, are still found to be keeping up the Custom. And hence we conclude that the Names could not serve to restrict the authority of the Injunctions (sup- porting the local Customs). The Bhashya has explained the word “ Mathura” as also denoting one whe has started for Mathura; but the affix, that is present in the word UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY OF VEDIC TEXTS ASSUMED IN SUPPORT OF USAGES. 257 can be possible, only if the word be taken to mean ‘a messenyer going to Mathura’ in accordance with Panini’s sétra: 1४-11-85 ; or, 11 applied to all men-that may be going to Mathura, the word cannot but be held to he used as such by untrustworthy (ignorant) men; as the affix could not be possible in the case of all persons going to Mathura being meant. Having thus found it absolutely impossible to infer an Injunction with qualifications specifying the agent, the Opponent proceeds to the theory that the Injunction assumed must refer to the special places, as constituting a part of the Custom itself. : Sutra (22) “The specification of place may be a property of the Action itself, like the sloping &c.” ‘In connection with certain sacrifices the Veda has declared that the “nltar should be sloping towards the Hast and to the North, or to the ‘Hast only ; and just as these specifications of place are laid down as ‘‘narts and parcel of the sacrifices themselves (as itis only when per- ५ formed upon such an altar that the sacrifices can bring about their proper ‘“‘results) ; so, in the same manner, the specifications of the Hastern coun- “try may be taken as laid down by the assumed Injunction, as forming a “ constituent part of the Custom itself (z.e., the Holdka can bring about its ‘* proper results only when performed in the HKastern country ).” To this we make the following reply : Sutra (23) Bat this too is similar to the qualification of the Agent, Just as the qualification of the Agent has been shown (in sutra 18) to be inconstant (inexclusive) ; so also would be the qualification of place ; be- cause there is no strict fixity either of the “ Kastern Couutry, ” or of ८० {06 country with black soil”” (which are the two qualifications of place that have been cited in the Bhaishyaz). ‘That 18 to say, the country (/.1.,, India) which is ^“ Eastern” according to some people (of Afghanistan), is ‘¢Southern ” according to others (the Thibetans); and similarly there is no single country that could be exclusively spoken of as the “ Northern ” or the “ Western.” And as for the presence of ‘ black soil,” it is found in many countries, and as such could not serve to distinguish any particular country among these. 34 258 TANTRA-VARTIKA—I—1I—-8 (HOLAKADHIKARANA), For these reasons, we conclude that the Injunctions of the Holdka, &c., cannot be qualified by any specifications of place &c., with reference to the men (inhabiting these places); because, as a matter of fact, we find that many people actually inhabiting ‘a country with black soil’’ do not observe the Custom; while it 1s daly observed by people inhabiting other countries (with red soil) ; and hence any specifications of place can- not be accepted as regulating or restricting the authority of the Injunc- tions assumed in support of such Customs, &c. PR ge ge Re te कि, -9 ge ee = के, _ . ०५५ ADHIKARANA (9). [ Treating of the necessity of using the correct forms of Words]. PURVAPAKSHA. Sutra (24) “The Science of Grammar not having the charac- ter of Scripture, there could be no restriction to the usage of words.” ‘“‘In a case where a single word is found to be used variously with “entirely different meanings—e.g., in the case of the word ‘ yava’ which is ‘nsed in the sevse of the barley corn and also in that of long-pepper,— it “has been shown above (4४. 5) that both meanings cannot be held to be ‘‘optional alternatives, because of all options being tainted by eight dis- “ecrepancies ; also that the same word cannot be accepted as having differ- “ent meanings; 88 that would necessitate the unreasonable assumption cf ‘‘ various potencies in the same word ; consequently, the only method that ‘was found to be reasonable, was the taking of only ove meaning ns the “primary denotation of the word, all others being relegated to the second- “ary position; and then again, it has been shown that we accept that mean- “ing of the word as authoritative which is supported by scriptural usage, “and as such, reject those that have their sole support in ordinary usage. ‘ But in a case where the single object, Cow, is found to be spoken ८ by means of many words —such as ‘go’ (the Sanskrit word), and ‘gdavi’ “(and such other vernacular corruptions),—it 18 quite reasonable to accept ‘“‘the expressive potency of all these words, as they are found to be used ‘by old and experienced men; and there being no contradiction of the “scriptural forms of words by the vernacular forms, and the Scriptures “being in the form of sentences, their full functioning is always preceded ‘by that of the words (constituting the sentences) ; and as such the scrip- “ture can never reasonably have anything to do with the pointing out of ‘certain words as correct or incorrect (sidhw or asidhu); because in that ‘case there would be a mutual interdependence (between the Words and ‘the Scripture). That is to say, because the Action of the Scriptures 260) TANTRA-VARTIKA—I—PADA UI—ADHI (9). ‘‘ depends upon the ordinarily accepted significations of words, no words in ‘ordinary use can ever be differentiated by them as correct or incorrect. “In the case of Sentences, as uppearing in the Veda or in the Smrtzs, “or as giving expression to certain usages, we accept the one that pre- ‘“cedes to have a greater authority than that which follows ; because we “५ perceive a distinct contradiction among them. In the case in question, ‘however, this is not possible (४,९., the science of grammar pointing out “the correctness or incorrectness of words cannot be accepted to be more ‘authoritative than ordinary usage) ; because in this case, the order 18 “reversed ; that is to say, the correctness or incorrectness of words can “be acertained only by means of ordinary usage; specially as correctness ‘and «incorrectness are universally recognised as identical with expressive- “ness and imexpressiveness, respectively (४.९,) the word that expresses some ५५ meaning is accepted as correct, and that which is meaningless as incorrect ; ‘and whether a certain word expresses a meaning or not can be ascertained ‘‘only by ordinary usage). “It is only an indistinct sound, or single letters, ora conglomeration ‘of letters without any reference to their signification,—as for instance, ‘the letters of the alphabet repeated by the boy,— that can be said to be ५८ 27707९८४ (astdhu). Thatis to say, the sound made by the beating of a “drum, the single letters ‘ ga,’ &c., pronounced either singly by themselves ‘or together with all of the same class (7.e., ka, kha, ga,gha and 7),— ‘all these do not express any meanings; and as such are incorrect, And ‘ain this case, it 18 only from ordinary usage that we ascertain the fact of ‘these sounds expressing no meanings, and hence being incorrect. On the ४ other hand, the vernacular words, ‘ ga@vi ` and the like are found to be cap- able of denoting the Cow, just as well as the Sanskrit word ‘go’; in fact “they are quicker than the Sanskrit word in their action of denoting the ‘object, as they are used more commonly than the Sanskrit word. And “hence though all these words are denotative of the single object ‘** Cow,’ yet, inasmuch as they are quite capable of expressing their ‘meaning, they cannot but be recognised as correct ; exactly as the words ५ ‹ hasta,’ ‘kara,’ ‘ pdni,’—all signifying the hand—are all accepted to be ` ‘correct. “Thus then, if the words ‘ g@vi,’ &c , be declared to be incorrect on the “ground of their inerpressiveness (which has been shown to be the only ‘‘ reason for tncorrectuess), then such declaration, being in direct opposition ‘to a well-recognised fact of ordinary experience (that the words in ques- ‘tion do actually denote the cow), cannot be accepted (as true). “If the Correctness or Incorrectness of words be said to,depend on cer- “tain unseen transcendental facts, then, inasmuch as such correctness, &c., NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 261 ‘‘ are not found to be laid down in the Veda itself, they could not be accept- “ed on the strength of any other means of knowledge. (1) As for Sense- ‘perception, the letters of all words, Sanskrit as well as Vernacular, are “equally perceived to be pure letter-sounds ; and we do not perceive, “by the senses, the correctness or incorrectness, of these letters, taken ‘either singly or in groups. (2) Nor can these be ascertained by means of ‘‘ Inference ; because as they are not amenable to Sense-perception, itis not ९“ possible ever to perceive any invariable concomitance of these with any- ‘thing. (3) As allhuman assertions are based upon Sense-perception and ‘* Inference, and Correctness, &c., have been shown to be not amenable to ‘‘ these, they cannot be held to be capable of being ascertained by means of ‘such assertions. (That is, we cannot accept a word to be correct or in- ‘correct because a man pronounces it to beso). While as for Vedic ‘assertions, we have already shown (in the Arthavdda section) that when “they contain only descriptions of certain things or their properties, with- “out any counection with Injunctions or Prohibitions, they have no author- “ity. (That is, we do not accept the authority of a Vedic sentence that “would merely describe a certain word to be correct). And the correctness ‘or incorrectness of words not having the character of an Action, it can “never form the object of an Injunction or a Prohibition. “Tt may be argued that, as correctness and incorrectness appear as In- ^“ struments in the Bhavana of Denotation (४,९.) as we recognise the fact that “true denotation can be realised only by means of such and such words, ‘and that true denotation cannot be realised by means of such and such ° words), they can form the objects of Injunctions and Prohibitions. But ^“ {1118 18 not possible; because it is absolutely impossible to assume end- “less Injunctive and Prohibitive texts, referring to each individual word. ‘And then, too, when as a matter of fact, we have never come across any “authoritative list enumerating all the correct words, how is it possible “for us to have any idea of the Vedic texts authorising the use of each of ^ these words ? And as for the incorrect forms of words, their number 18 “even greater than that of the correct ones; and as such it is absolutely ‘impossible for the use of each of these to be prohibited singly, like the ‘prohibition of the eating of kalanju (the flesh of an animal killed by a ‘‘poisoned arrow). In the case of such objects as the Vrihi and the ‘“ Kalanja, we have distinct notions of the extent of the denotations of ‘these words, as restricted within certain well-defined limits of Class or ८ Property, &c.; aud as such they are found to form the objects of Injunction “and Prohibition respectively. While sofar as the words ‘ go’ and ‘ द, ’ “are concerned, they cannot form the objects of Injunction and Prohibition, “either as a definite Class or an Individual. Because correctness or tncorrect- 262 TANTRA-VARTIKA—I—PADA ITI—ADHI (9). ८५ ness 18 never perceived in the shape of a genus, either of objects or of proper- “ties, pervading over all individuals (४.९.) all correct or incorrect forms of ‘“ words are never perceived together as included in any class or as having ‘any property in common) ; and as such we cannot assume only two texts, “one a general Injunction (‘all correct forms should be used’), and another “a general Prohibition (‘noincorrect forms should be used’) (the former re- “ferring to all correct forms and the latter to all wncorrect ones). Because “all words—be they correct or incorrect—are equally included in the ‘general class ‘ Word,’ and there are no two intermediate secondary classes ‘that could refer to the two (the correct aud the incorrect word) separate- “ly. And hence if each individual word were to be enjoined or prohibited. ‘then we would have to assume as many Injunctive and Prohibitive texts ५८ 8 there are words ; and thereby the number of Vedic texts, assumed in ‘support of the various Smrtis and the endless number of words, would “be more than the whole universe could contain. And as a matter of fact “it is not possible for even a millionth part of these to be directly declared, ‘and the text that is not directly declared cannot serve as the basis of “any Smrtc; because we have already shown above that the Smrtzs cannot ८ 06 said to be based upon such Vedic texts as can only be inferred (and ‘not capable of being ever directly perceived), “Nor is it possible for the Injunctions and Prohibitions to be based “upon the expressiveness or tneapresstveness of words ; because all words “correct or incorrect—are equally expressive. Hence we can have no “such injunction as that ‘ one should use only expressive words’; because ‘such use 18 an established fact (there being no inexpressive words used) “(and as such it could not stand in need of an Injunction, which always “lays down something that is not got at by other means). Nor is it pos- ‘sible for us to have any such prohibition as that ‘ No inexpressive words “should be used’ ; because as there never is such a use, its prohibition ५ would be useless and umpossible. For we cannot have such Injunctions and ८ Pyohibitions as—‘ one should drink water,’ ‘oneshould not drink fire ’— ‘(because the former is unnecessary, and the latter impossible). “In the case of the Smrizse relating to the science of Grammar, it is “necessary that we should assume a Vedic text enjoining the use of ‘correct words, or one prohibiting the use of all incorrect words, or one “that combines the said Injunction and Prohibition. But writers upon “Grammar have preferably had recourse to the first alternative— bas- “ing their Science upon the Vedic text enjoining the use of correct “words. If the science of grammar were based upon the Prohibition of “the use of incorrect words, then,—inasmuch as these incorrect forms ‘are indefinitely innumerable, it would be absolutely impossible to have NECESSITY OF USEING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 200 any definite idea of the science ; and hence the writers have based it upon ९ the Injunction of the use of correct words, which naturally (through A ppar- ‘ent Inconsistency) implies the prohibition of the use of incorrect words ; ‘just as in the case of the Smrti injunction—‘ Only five of the five-nailed “animals are fit for eating, —it implies the prohibition of the eating of all “ other five-nailed animals. In the case of the Injunction of the use of “the correct words, these words have got to be :emembered. In both ‘cases, the one (Prohibition or Injunction ) implies the other also; and as “such the Injunction of the use of correct words also serves to give us an “idea of the impropriety of the use of incorrect words. ‘Thus then, in the case of the Science of Grammar, whichever of the “three alternatives is employed, it becomes possible to include all cases ‘within a definite compass ; and as such there may be some sort of definite- ‘‘ness ; whereas it is absolutely impossible to have any definite idea of the “Injunction and Prohibition with regard to each individual word ; because ‘it 18 not possible for us to read up an endless number of sentences. And ‘it was with reference to this impossibility that the Bhdashya has declared, ‘in the section on Holaka: ‘the word cannot be said to be expressive of ‘‘ either the Class or the Individual.’ And thus there being no basis for the ‘Science of Grammar, in any Vedic texts, 1६ must be concluded to be a ‘‘misconceived Smrét. “And again, a fact that is already established by other means can “never be the object of a scriptural Injunction or Prohibition; and the * word and its wse in a definite sense are such as are already accomplished ८८ (01 ascertained) by means of ordinary experience. “It may be argued that, even though the word is already known, from “ordinary experience, to have a definite meaning, yet the scriptures may “point it out, for the sake of Dharma (as it is only that which is laid “down in the scriptures that can be of any use in matters relating to ८ Dharma) ; and as such the the science of the usage of worda(z.e., gram- ८८ mar) cannot but be accepted to have the character of a scripture. “But this is not possible; because in the case in question there 18 19 ‘* object of restriction (Niyama). That is to say, it is only one whose appli- ‘cation 18 uncertain that is restricted in its application by the scriptures ; ‘‘while the word has its application or use always certain ; and as such it “can never be an object of restriction. And one that has no application “at all (e.g., the incorrect word) can never be the object with regard to ‘which anything else (the correct word) can be restricted. (That is to “say, that which is used cannot be said to be differentiated from that ‘‘ which has never had an application). And certainly the words ‘ कतः ’ ५५ &c. can be said to be such as have no application at all; in fact, we 264 TANTRA-VARTIKA—I-—PADA 1 —ADHI (9). “accept them to be actually used (or applicable to usage). Hence in both ‘* cases, there is no possibility of Restriction. “ And again, what sort of a restriction would you assume: (1) either “that one should utter only correct’ words, or (2) that one should always “utter the correct words ? If the (1), then it would not be a restriction ‘“‘ (or differentiation) from the incorrect words, because there is no chance ‘of these being used (as by ‘incorrect words’ we only mean ‘ words with- ‘Cont a meaning,’ and these cannot be anywhere used). And if the (2), “then the man who is silent would be incurring a grievous sin (as infring- “ing the injunction of the continuous utterance of correct words). “Tf the correct and the incorrect words were capable of being used “with regard to one and the same object, then alone could there be an oc- “casion for restricting the use to the correct word (and rejecting the in- “correct one); but according to you the incorrect word being absolutely ‘meaningless can never be capable of being used anywhere: and as such ‘any restriction of the correct word could not serve the purpose of pro- ‘“hibiting the use of such an incorrect word (because it is naturally pre- ‘eluded from usage on account of its meaninglessness). ८८ The restriction may be said to serve the purpose of setting aside such “forms of words, as happen to be used, either through the natural incapa- “city of the talker (to pronounce the correct word) or through his igno- “rance. But this is not correct; because, as a matter of ordinary experience ‘Swe find that if one is habituated, either through ignorance or incapacity, ‘to the use of an incorrect word, no amount of scriptures can dissuade ‘him from ita use. ‘If it be urged that, ‘we do find incorrect words being used for the “purpose of expressing certain meanings (and as such it cannot be argued ‘that there is no chance for an incorrect word being used ), ’—we make “the following reply: as for such expressiveness, we often find people “having recourse to certain gestures and squints of the eye, &c., for the ‘‘ purpose of expressing certain meanings ; but we do not find any restric- “tions that would prohibit the use of such gestures, &c. Nor again can ‘ restrictions be said to serve the purpose of negativing the contrary ; as this’ “ purpose is served by Parisankhya (or Negation) ; nor can the case in “question be said to be an object of Parisankhyad; because there is no ° simultaneity in the case (the incorrect word not being used simultaneously ‘with the correct one). ५ Nor can the use of the correct word be said to bring about a trans- ‘“cendental result; because when the necessary explanation is found in the ‘facts of ordinary experience, it is not right to have recourse to the trans- ‘‘cendental, That is to say, there is no Apparent Inconsistency in the cage NECESSITY OF USING CORREOT FORMS OF WORDS. 265 “that could justify the bringing in of the transcendental element. As for ‘the declarations of certain transcendental results following from a correct ‘“‘use of words, the sole purpose of these is to persuade other people to such ‘“‘usago ; and as such they can be taken as mere Arthavdda. ‘‘And when there is no transcendental result, we cannot assume the ““corréct use of words to bring about an Apirva (an unique agency that *“‘ would bring about certain results in the hereafter). ‘Nor can we ascertain the substratum of this agency of the Apirva that ‘would be brought about by the said Restriction (of the usage to correct ८ words) ; because such a substratum could be found only among the fol- “lowing: (1) the Word; (2) its meaning; (3) the Person addressed ; (+) “the cognition (of the word and its meaning) ; (5) the speaker ; and (6) “the utterance. But none of these is possible; because, (1) as for the ८ Word, as it is distinctly uttered for the sake of another person, any “ Apurva residing in it could be of no use (to the speaker himself). (2) ५ 4.8 for the meaning, though as being the object of denotation, it is the 4 primary factor in the case, yet 1t 1s found to be a part of the Word, even ८ in ordinary parlance, where there 18 nothing transcendental, in the shape “ofan Apéirva; and as such the Apérva cannot in any way help the meaning. ८ (3) As for the Person addressed, there can be no mention of such a per- ‘son in the Restrictive Injunction (which would be in the form ‘one should (४ use only the correct forms of words’); and any Apirva brought about by this “Tnjunction cannot in any way affect the Person addressed. (4) As for “the cognitions (of the word and its meaning), these last only for a mo- “ment; and as such cannot serve as the receptacle of the Apirva, “ which continues for a long time. (5) As for the Speaker, he occupies “only a subordinate position in the utterance of the correct word (7.e., in “the said Injunction, the primary factor is the correct Word, and the ८८ Speaker has only a secondary position); and as such he cannot be said “to be in any way affected by the Apirva brought about by the Restrictive “‘Tnjunction; specially as in this Injunction there 18 no word that could ‘assign the primary importance to the Speaker, as there is in the case of “the Injunction ‘ one desiring heaven should perform sacrifices’ (where the ‘‘clause italicised serves to attribute the primary importance to the ८५ Agent ) ; nor do we find the genitive signifying any relationship of the ‘Speaker, which could impart a primary importance to him. In the case “of such injunctions, as that ‘one should take his food, facing the East, ° ८८ and so forth, the 47४५ that is brought about by facing the particular “quarter is believed to affect the Agent, through the action of eating, which “serves a direct visible purpose of the Agent himself (the appeasing of ‘“hunger); in the case of utterance, on the other hand, the action (of ‘t utterance) is not found to serve any visible purpose for the Speaker ; and ५ 266 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. {—PADA 1-4एष्ा 9. ५५ 88 such its conditions cannot be held to be analogous to those of the ‘aforesaid eating, (6) Lastly, as for the utterance itself, as it is extremely ‘transient, it is absolutely incapable, like -Coguitions, to be affected by the ८८ Aptrva. “ Thus, then, the works relating to the Usage of Words (1.e., the works “on Grammar), not having a basis in tle Veda, they cannot be held to “‘serve the purpose of laying down rules helping the accomplishment of “ Dharma (cither directly or through the medium of an Aptrva); nor can “they be accepted to be Scriptures by themselves (independently of the “authority of the Veda). ८८ And it is with a view to this fact that we have the Sdétras [----111-11, 12. ५८ Nor again can the works on Grammar be said to have the same position «५ 88 the Veda, and as such a self-sufficient authority. On the contrary, as “their very existence is due to human agency, they can have no authority “atall. Because in the case of all human assertions, what we conclude ‘from such an assertion, is only that this person knows the matter thus, and ‘not that such 25 the real state of things. And hence as all that the works ‘‘on Grammar do is to give expression to the view of the speaker, thoy can “never rightly help in differentiating the really correct or incorrect forms ‘of words. ५५ Nor do we find any other Smriz treating of the snbject (of Gram- “mar) ; and as such, the matter resting upon the sole authority of gram- ‘matical works, the assumption of corroborative Vedic texts is not quite 80 “easy as in the case of the Smrizs treating of Upanayauna, &c. (which are “treated of in many Smrtz works). That is to say, the works of Manu, ५८ Vacishtha, Gautama and others, mostly treat of the same subjects, and १8 “such the authority of these being strengthened by the absence of any ‘contradiction among themselves, it becomes a comparatively easy matter * to assume corroborative Vedic texts. “The works on Grammar, however, do not treat of the same subjects “es the said works of Manu and others. And aa for the various writers “upon Grammar itself, there are endless contradictions among the asser- “tions of the Stra (Panini), the Bhdshya (Patanjali), and the Varétka ५५ (Katyayana) ; how then can one ascertain what the truth is P “And again, Panini has not mentioned any purpose of the Science of “Grammar. And it still remains to be explained how he forgot to explain “the purpose, in such an extensive work. It 18 a general rule that when- “over a work begins to be written, its aim is always definitely stated, in “order to eucourage the student in the study of the work; and as a ५८ matter of fact we actually find the aim definitely stated, even in the “casc of works whose aim is apparent from the vory beginning ; as also NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. °67 “in those for the getting up of which much effort is not required ; as for “instance, ‘we are going to explain Dharma,’ ‘ we are going to explain “ the sacrifices,’ and so forth. While, even though the Science of Gram- ‘‘mar is extremely difficult, yet the Author when composing the Siéiras, has “not stated either Dharma (Duty) or Artha (Wealth), or Kaéma (Pleasure), “or Moksha (Deliverance) to be the aim of the science. And certainly it ‘‘was not proper for him to disregard the most important factor (in the < treatment of a subject). Nor can 16 be held that the aim was too well- ‘* recognised to require a distinct mention; because it was so well-recog- ‘nised, that even till now there is no unanimity among Grammarians on ‹ {116 point ! (Nor is it possible for Dharma to be held to be the aim of the Science < अ Grammar, because) Dharma too is described to consist in such actions ८ 0 sacrifice, &c., as bring about certain definite results; and we do not ‘find any such Actions laid down in grammatical works. It is true that ‘“‘ writers on Grammar have held that the knowledge of the Science of ‘‘Grammar, or the using of words in accordance with the rules therein ^ [क्त down, constitutes a Dharma; but this too is not as it should be, in “ the case of scriptural works. That is to say, the purpose or scope of a ^ gseripture is always of a well-defined form ; while in the case of Gram- “mar, we find that there is no certainty upon the point. Ag for instance, ‘‘Patanjali has declared that the knowledge of Grammar constitutes ८८ Dharma ; and Katyayana, fearing that such a conclusion would make the “knowledge of incorrect forms of words also Dharma (as the knowledge ‘‘of Grammar includes that of correct as well as incorrect forms), १९. “clared that Dharma consisted in the using of words in accordance with ‘““Grammar ; and then again Patanjali reiterates his own theory that it ‘consists of the Knowledge of Grammar. And certainly, when there is “such a diversity of opinion on the point, we cannot ascertain exactly what “the Dharma is (that would be accomplished by the Science of Grammar). “Tt is a well-recognised fact that of two correlated things, if one is “held to have the character of Dharma, the other being only subsidiary “Ato it, cannot itself be recognised as Dharma. And hence (of the two ‘correlated things, the Knowledge of Grammar and the Using of Words “in accordance with grammatical rules) if the knowledge be accepted as ‘having the character of Dharma, then the wsage (of words) which is a ‘well-established fact of ordinary parlance, being accomplished by means “of the said knowledge,—even though it (the Usage) is found to accord ‘a distinct help, it cannot be recognised as having any direct use; just “as the water that is left in curd after the solid particles have been ‘removed is not accepted to have any direct nse of its own.. Con- “versely, if the usage of words according to grammatical rules be taken 268 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1—-PADA IIJ—ADRHI 9. “as constituting Dharma, then the Knowledge of the Science having all its “purpose fulfilled in the helping of the Usage, there is no desire on our “part to seek for any other use for it; and hence even if we meet with “any Vedic texts speaking of results (as following from the Knowledge of ‘‘Grammar), we must take them as mere Arthavddas, in accordance with ‘the arguments laid down under 67८72 [V—iii—i. And we have already “explained (under Sétra I-—ii—4) that when two things treat of the same ५८ subject, if one of them be recognised to be the means of accomplishing ५५ 9 certain result, the other is not cognised as accomplishing the same re- ‘sult; as for instance, in the sentence—‘ one who performs the Agva-. ८‹ médha sacrifice, and also one who knows this passes beyond all sorrow, “ &c. ’—if the knowledge of the sacrifice be recognised as really bringing “about the said result, why could any person engage in the elaborate “ sacrifice itself ? ०८ And again, as the Science of Grammar itself has had a beginning in ८ 1716) we can never admit the character of Dharma to belong either to its ‘* knowledge or to a usage according to it. Nor do we find any Vedic texts “standing in nced of Grammar. It is only when the knowledge is “afforded ky the eternal Veda that any action in keeping therewith can ८ 06 accepted as bringing about a transcendental result. The know- “ledge of Grammar, however, depends solely upon the works of human ‘authors ; and as such the mention, in grammatical works, of transitory ‘things &c. cannot be explained away by means of the arguments that we ‘have employed with regard to the mention of such things in the Mantras ‘‘and Arthavaddas of the eternal Veda; and as such, they cannot be held “to be treating of the same subjects as the Veda. ‘Nor is Grammar itself ever recognised as eternal ; because such ‘“eternality is set aside by the mere fact of our being fully cognisant of “its propounders. If the eternality of Grammar were to be assumed on “the ground of the eternality of the usage of words in accordance with its ‘“‘rules,—then too, the Science of Grammar being found to have been pro- “pounded by many authors, it can never be admitted to have any basis in ८५ the Veda; in accordance with the law contained in the Satra I—i—29 ‘(and hence not being eternal, it cannot be the means of accomplishing “© Dharma). ५ Nor is there any such (eternal) class as ‘ Vydkaranatva’; specially as ‘all collections of sentences (that make the works on Grammar) being “non-eternal (as composed by human authors), where could the eternal ‘‘ class subsist ? “It may here be urged that, ‘ the works on Grammar consisting of rules ८८ (lakshanas) and the subject of the rules (४.९., the words treated of and ९९ explained under the rules), though the former are the works of human } । ¢ } NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 269 “© authors and as such non-eternal, yet the latter being eternal, the existence “of (eternal) Vedic injunctions (in support of these) 1s quite possible. ° ८ But thia cannot be; because the words being innumerable and en- “tirely different (from one another), unless there 18 a rule or assertion “embracing all of them, it is not possible for them to be spoken of in “any Injunctions, as we have shown above, (that in the absence of an all- “embracing assertion, we would require an endless number of Injunctions. ८ And as the rules are non-eternal, there can be no Injunctions treating of ८८ them). “ Objection: ‘ But we find the eternality of Grammar indicated by the “ Veda itself when we read—tasmddésha vyakria vdgudyate (then comes “forth a syakrta sentence) P’ *\sut it 18 not so; because all Vedic sentences being vyakrta (sancti- «५ fied oi\ clarified) by a traditional course of study, the sentence quoted “refers to these same Vedic sentences that are uttered at sacrifices or ‘‘ during the study of the Veda. That is to say, the Vedic sentence,—hav- “ing its form definitely ascertained by means of the regulations with re- ८ vard to its consonants, vowels and accents, as handed down from teacher “to the disciple, in the course of an eternal tradition,—is spoken of as ८ ‹ ४१/९६ (clarified), in contradistinction to all ordinary sentences, “which are not so sanctified. And certainly there is a Dharma in the ९५ knowledge of such Vedic sentences, as composing the Mantras and the ८८ Brahmanas, as also in the performance of actions in accordance with In- ‘junctions laid down in these. “The Grammarians quote the following passage from the Veda, in “support of the theory that Grammar in itself affords the means of ac- “complishing Dharfna: ‘A single word correctly known, duly used, in “accordance with scriptures, becomes a means of fulfilling all desires in ‘Heaven and on Harth.’ But this also is in praise of Vedic study itself. “In continuation of the Injunction that ‘ one should read the Veda every- ‘day,’ we have an obligatory rule which lays down the necessity of the “daily reading up of even a single Rk, Yajush or Sama; and in reference “to this, we have the praise above quoted, which means that in a case oneis ‘unable to read up even a single complete Mantra, if he manages to utter “a single word as found in the scripture, that single word becomes a ‘ means of fulfilling all his desires ; the expression ‘ Cdstrfnvita’ thus mean- “ing that which is found in the Veda + ‘ correctly used’ =uttered or studied “in full accordance with the regulations of study—such as Initiation, “living with the tutor, attending upon him, with the sacred Kuga in ‘hand, and so forth. ५५ Another passage that they bring forward is—‘ Hence the Brahmana “should not behave like the Mleccha, ४.९.) he should not talk incorrectly, 270 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—-PADA III—ADHI 9. “because an incorrect word verily is Mleccha.’ But this passage only । “Inys down the prohibition of distorting the traditional readings of the “Veda. It is only the ordinary expression of the word that can be un- “derstood as ‘apacabda’ (incorrect word), as it would be at variauce with ५५ Vedic modes of expression ; and that which is at variance only with ordinary ‘‘ every-day expressions can never be known as ‘apagabda.’ Because even “guch words as ‘ 40497 › &., (which the orthodox Grammarian would call “an apagabda) are perceptible by the ear ; and as such they cannot but “be accepted as denotable by the word ‘Cabda,’ as comprehended under “the idea of ‘ Cabda,’ and as included in the class ‘Cabda.’ If it is abso- *lutely necessary to apply the word ‘ apagabda,’ to expressions at variance “ with ordinary expressions,—thon, we cannot apply it to the languages of «५ {116 Barbara and other countries not included within the sacred limits of “ Aryadvarta defined as the country included between the Himalaya and “the Vindhya mountains, where the black deer roam about; because ‘with regard to the languages of such foreign countries, we have the “ prohibition, ‘One should not teach the language of the Milecchas,’ and the ‘“‘ above-quoted passag 6 speaks of ‘ Mleccha word’ as synonymous with ‘apag- “abda;’ therefore we must apply the word ‘ apacabda’ to the words cur- “rent in foreign languages (which are at variance with those current in ५८ Aryavarta). And as all practices and usages of these foreign countries “are prohibited for the Arya, it is only natural that they should avoid “their languago also. And further we can never apply the word ‘ Mlec- ‘chic’ to any such words and expressions as ‘ g@vi’ &c,, that are current in ५८ Aryadvarta, because the Arydvarta can never be spoken of as ‘Mleccha ’ ; and hence these words can never be spoken of as ‘apagahbia’; specially ५ 88 an analogous word we have ‘apavrita’ (contrary conduct) ; and this “ig found to bo applied only to such conduct as is not permitted in ५८ Aryavarta. ‘Another passage quoted by the Grammarian is—‘If one who has ‘taken to the Agnihotra happeu to utter an apacabda, in expiation of ‘this, he should perform the Sdrasvati sacrifice.’ But this only lays down an expiatory rite that is to bo performed if the person happen either to ¢el/ ८ @ lie, or to distort a Vedic reading, or to pronounce a word of some foreign “Tunguage; and it does not refer to the use of words that may not be “sanctioned by the comparatively modern rules of Grammar. Because if “the use of words at variance with those sanctioned by these rules were “so very sinful, how could all Agnihotris deviate from this nghtful path ‹ (and we actually find them making use of such words as ˆ g@vi’ and the “like) ? Or, how could they escape from being cried down as vulgar ? As “s rule, we find that in the case of persons who have their minds always ५५ engaged in the performance of Dharma, it 18 only once in a away that they NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS, 271 ८ can be found slightly infringing any rules (of conduct or of speech). And as ८९8 matter of fact, we do not find the using of such words as ‘ gdvi, ’ and the “like marked down as an ‘infringement’; nor do we find people having ‘any doubts or aversion to their use, as they have to the cating of Kalanja “(flesh of an animal killed by a poisoned arrow). And even if we take the (° 08868 of a thousand Agnihotris, we do not find anyone of them to be ‘using only such words as are sanctioned by the modern rules of Grammar. ° Kven among the authors of the Kulpas, the Sutras, works on Smrté, “* Mimansa and the Grhyas, many excellent writers are found to be “making use of words at variance with the rules of Grammar. For “instance, in the Kalpa of Macgaka, we meet with such sentences as “ Samanamitaram Jyotishtoména,’ which is in imitation of the rule “* Samadnamitarat gyéuéna,’ and which has the ungrammatical form ५ ९ dtaram’ in the place of, ‘itarat.’ In the sé#tras, we read—‘ Sadasi “ stuviran,’ where ‘stuviran’ is in the A/manepada which is a highly un- ‘ grammatical form ; as the result of the action of hymning does not per- “tain to the person hymning, and as such the proper form would have ‘been the Parasmaipauda, as in ‘ yajyanti yajakih.’ So too we find A cva- “ladyana saying—‘ pratyasiiva prayagceitiam &e.,’ where the word ‘ pratya- “ sitva’ being a compound, the correct past participial affix to use would ‘have been ‘lyap’ (and not ‘kiv@’); and again, we find him saying ८८ Aiy6nakshini ayya,’ where there being no compound in ‘ajya,’ ‘ lyap’ ‘was not the right affix to use. Narada says in his Cuksha— pratyiishé ८४ brahma cintayét,’ where the word ‘ pratytshé ’ (instead of ‘ pratyitshasi ’) ५ 18 88 ungrammatical asthe words ‘ gavt’ and the like. We find Manu him- * self saying—‘ jnatarah santi métyukivad,’ where the correct form would ‘have been ‘ mé t/yukivd,’ and still he has disregarded the rules of Gram- ‘mar on the point and has merged the ‘i’ of ‘iti’ into the ‘8’ of ‘ms,’ ‘In the Mimans&, we have the séra ‘ gavyasya ca tadadishnu, ’ ( viii-i-18) “where tho word ‘ gavya,’ applicable, according to approved grammatical “oles, to something proceeding from the body of the cow, has been applied in “the sutra to the ‘ Gavémayana’ sacrifice. Then again, we have the 5४८१८ ¢ ¢ dydvostathéti cét, where the word ‘ dy@voh ’ is wrongly used for ‘ dydva- “orthivyGh.’ So also we find the author of the Grhyas speaking of mir- “ ‘dhanyabhijighranam’ instoad of ‘mitrdhanyabhighraénam.’ Through- “ out the Nirukta, we find many words used against all rules of grammar ; “such, for instance, as the assertion ‘ brahmané6 bravanat,’ which oceurs dur- “ing the interpretation of the word ‘brahmana’ as occurring in the mantra ८५ ‹ Samvatsaram (74040010 ' &c., where the word ‘ brahmana’ is explained “as apylying to one who is capable of speaking or explaining ; and here the ५५ proper form to use would have been ^ braéhmano vacand@é’ and not ‘ brava- “mnat;’ because in such cases the root ‘ bri” is transformed into ‘ vaci,’ 272 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA III—-ADHI 9. “ according tho sitra ‘ bruvé vacth’ (Panini II—iv—53). And as for Puranas ‘‘and Itihasas, there is no ond of such ungrammatical words in them, as ‘‘for instance, ‘wbhabhya’ which is applied by tamers of elephants, “ Royal Princes and others, to such elephants as are capable of striking with ५५ both tusks simultaneously; and this is not in keeping with any rules of “orammar. Even inthe Veda, we find many forms that are not in accord- ‘ance either with general grammatical rules, or with those rules that have “been framed with special reference to Vedic usage. ‘‘ Nor can these anomalies in the Veda be said to be in accordance with “such grammatical rules as lay down exceptions with reference to the ८८ Veda—as for instance, ‘ the rules with reference to the terminations &c., “are not always observed in the Veda,’ or that ‘in the Veda there are “many anomalies,’ and so forth. Because there are certain instances ‘‘where even these exceptions do not serve to justify the uses. H.g,, ९८ ‹ madhyé Gpasya,’ where the change of ‘ apdm’ into ‘ dpasya’ 18 inno way ‘justifiable; so also in ‘nicinavdram,’ where instead of the word ‘dvara’ “we have ‘vara’ which is found nowhere elso except in the Lita ‘‘ language. “ From these considerations we conclude that there is no use of hav- “ing any rules with regard to the uses of words as are laid down 10 gram- ‘matical works, for the simple reason.that no such rules can take in all “the words that are used. ०८ And further, even those who occupy the utmost pinnacle of gramma- ८ tical knowledge, are actually found to be making use of such ungrammatical ‘forms of words as ‘ 02४ ` and the like. For instance, in the Sétra (Pani- ५ 11); the Varttka (of Katyayana) and the Bhashya (of Patanjali), we ८ 0016 across many corrupt forms of words. And certainly those sitting ‘‘on the horse, could never forget of ४116 horse’s existence, if they had the “ slightest intelligence. ‘For instance, we have the sitra ‘ Janikurtuh prakrith’ (Panini—l-iv- 30), where we find two grammatical mistakes; the word ‘ Juni’ signifies “the root ‘jan’ (to produce), and certainly the satra docs not lay down “the Ablative termination for the producer (karta) of the root; and the “word ‘Janv’ never being capable of signifying ‘that which is produced,’ ८१ Jantkariy’ can never mean the ‘ producer,’ (which is what was really ८ 1671६) ; and hence we conclude that the word ‘ Janikartr’ is as in- ‘correct in the sense of ‘ producer,’ as the word ‘agva’ in the sense of ९९ ^ poor.’ (2) The second mistake is that the compound ‘ Janikartuh’ itself is “absolutely ungrammatical, being a direct infringement of the sitra (Pani- ८ 01 11-11-15.) that lays down that thore can bo no compounding with the ‘“‘nominatives ending in the affixes trc and aka; as here we have the com- “pounding of the word ‘kartr’ (kr and fre); so ४180 in the satire NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 273 ८ prayojako hetugea,’ (Panini I-iv-55) where we have tle compounding of * the word ‘ proyojaka ’ which ends in ‘ aku.’ “So also in the Vartika (of Katyayana), we meet with the sentence, ‘*dambhérhalgrahanasya gaitvdcakalvadt siddham,’ where the compound “¢satvvdgake ’ 18 an infringement of the siétra [1-11-15 (the word ‘ vdcaka’ “ending in ‘aka’). And again, we read—‘ dnyabhdvyantu kalacabdavya- ^“ vayat,’ and here, in the first place, the compound in ‘ dnyabhdvya’ itself ५५ 18 not easily explicable; and even when we are able to explain the com- “pound, the name ‘compound’ would preclude the name ‘ adjective’ ; and “as such we would have the affix ‘shyaw’ used in a word which is not “an Adjective; and this would be an infringement of the siitra of Panini “ ४ -1-124 (and then too the affix would be absolutely useless, as it would “not change the meaning of the original word). “In the Bhashya (of Patanjali) too, we find the expression ‘aviravi- “ kanydyéna, which is a, Tatpurusha compound containing within itself a “ Dvandva compound (avigca avikagcea = aviravakau, aviravikayoh nyayena= ‘ aviravikanydyena); and here,it was absolutely necessary to delete in the “ former compound the nominative termination in the first ‘ avth,’ in accor- ‘* dance with the si#ira of Panini II-iv-71; but this has not been done in ‘the expression cited (the correct form of which should have been ‘ avya- “vikanyadyéna’). And again, we read—anyathakrtva coditam anyatha- ९८ ८१८४८ paribéirah’; where we find that the affix ‘xamul’ has not been “used even though its use is distinctly laid down by Pa@nini in sttra “ TII-iv-27. ८ Nor can the use of the above expressions be justified on the ground “of their being ‘ntpdias’ (grammatical forms assumed to be correct) and “as such quite correct. Wecan apply the mechanism of the ‘ nipata’ “only to those words that are not found to be subject to any other rules. ०८ For those however that come directly under certain rules, their use is “entirely barred by such rules (if the use is against them). Because ८५ 6 have already shown above that when there is contradiction between “usage and Smrti, the latter always sets aside the former. And in the ‘‘imstance cited above, we find the expressions Janikartuh,’ &c., to be “directly against certain distinct rules. A word is said to be correct on ८ the ground of its being a nipata, only when it is not found to be against ‘any direct Rule; because in that case, there being no ७7४८४ (1.e., Rule) “applying to the word, the mere fact of its being used is made the ground ५५ of assuming a rule relating to the parts of the word; and thereby the “word may be justified. “Some people might argue that the rules (laid down by Panini) are ८ 70४ applicable to the language of the rules (the sitras) themselves ; be- “cause it is impossible for anything to have an action upon itself, and 35 274 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I---PADA 117--- च नघा 9); “because that which is the ‘ lakshana’ (the means of pointing out) cannot ‘itself be the ‘lakshya’ (the object pointed out), ^ But we cannot admit of any such arguments; because the word ‘‘ appearing in one stra can very well form the object of, and he amenable “to, the definitions (and rules) contained in another stéfra, exactly as.one “ word is always capable of being pointed out by another word. (And thie “ would not be a case of anything having an action upon itself). “And as a matter of fact, we find the Mahabhasbya itself applying ‘‘one rule or इद्र (of Panini) to another sitra’; 88 | for instance, we read “under sittra I-i-l—‘ why have we not here the K instead of the final, ©? " ‘this question distinctly showing that 52४7५ L-i-1 is meant to be amenable “to sétra VIII-ii-30; and again under sitra II-i-1, we raad—‘ koyam. gab- “‘ dah’ &c,, which goes on to explain the word in question in accordance “with another stra. And asa matter of fact, if sitras were not applicable “to sétras, whole works of grammar would form a mass of mistakes. And “any half-and-half application of the rules would make. the work entirely ^ untrustworthy. ‘‘ Some people might argue thus: ‘The rule that one should use only ^ correct words 18 laid down with special reference to the words used dur- “ing the performance of a sacrifice, and not ta those used in the s#éras or “in their commentaries.’ “ But this is not right; (1) because the using of correct words is “spoken of as ‘bringing about all desirable results in this world as well as ‘‘in heaven’; and (2) because otherwise the mention of ‘one who has “taken to the fire’ (Agnihotri) would be absolutely redundant in the “ Vedic text which lays down that if such. a person natters an incorrect “ word he should perform the Sdrasvati sacrifice, because the person enga- ५८ ved in a sacrifice is always ‘one who has prepared the fire’; and hence if ५ the using of correct words were necessary for hiw only, it would not be “necessary to mention such a person in the above text laying down the Sdrasvat? sacrifice. “In the chapter on Jyotuhtoma, we read—‘ tasmad bradhmanairne “ mlécchitavat’ (said with reference to the Vajasnéyis) ; and though thie ५ occurs with special reference to the performance of a. sacrifice, yet in this “case, the word ‘ mlécchitavat’ means the distorting of the readings of the “Veda established by tradition, or the using of the language of the Mlé- ८८ chas, a3 we have already shown above. (And hence this text can have ८०. “bearing upon the point at issue). “Then again in the Mahabhdshya, we find that, having put the question ‘which are the words here treated of P’ the author replies—‘ the “words Vedic as well as worldly,’ where the words used in the Veda are. re- ९५ presented as something absolutely different, from those. in ardinary use NHCESSIFTY OF USING GORRECT FORMS OF WORDS, 875 * But asa matter of fact, we find almost all the words in the Veda to ba “the same that are met with in ordinary usage; and as such only a very “slight differentiation, if any, was needed. And henee an assertion like “the above—expressing a8 it does an absolute differance between them— ८“ cannot be justified. ‘Again, the Mahadbhashya has cited the words ‘gauh,’ =! gavah,’ &c., “as being those met with in ordinary usage; but this is not quite right; be, cause all these words are found in the Veda also; and have been borrowe “ed from the Veda itself. It is only such words as are spoken of in the ^“ sivas as being used in ‘ ordinary usage only,’ thet should have been cited “(as the examples of words i ordinary usage). In the same manner, as ^“ examples of ‘ Vedic words,’ the Mahabhashya has cited —‘ Gunno dévirabhish- * tayé So. §c.;’ but this too is not correct; because the words contained in “* these-—‘ Cam &e.’—are also met with in ordinary usage; and the parti- “cular order in which they occur in the particular sentence cannot justify ‘‘ ug in speaking of them as exclusively ‘ Vedic,’ Nor does Grammar treat ‘of sentences, And hence it is only such purely Vedic forms ag ‘ grbh- “game, 'datvdydtha ’ and the like, that should have been cited here; and “not ‘Qanno dévi &c.’ But sych purely Vedic forms could not be com: ^“ patible with another declaration of the Mahdbhdshya—that ‘ the meanings (५ of words are known from ordinary usage’ (hecayse the purely Vedic forms ‘can never have their meanings ascertained by ordinary usage). ‘“ And on the other hand, if Grammar treated of only such words “as are met with in ordinary usage, it could refer to only sych words as 6 cave’ and the like; as it is only these that ave exclusively ‘ worldly,’ ‘never being met with in the Veda, And as for the words ‘gauh’ and “the like, they aan certainly be said to have been borrowed, in ordjnary ‘Susage, from the Veda itself, As says Manu; ‘ Hach of the various ‘works on Smt: &७.+ were composed out of the Veda itself.’ And as $ “matter of fact, even nowadays we find that persons learned in the ‘* Vedas, make use of whole sentences from the Veda, even in giving ex- (१ pression to thoughts relating to every-day life; and in that case, it is by ८ 0 means impossible for single words to have been borrowed from the ८“ Veda, ५ Then again, the words contained exclusively in the Veda, having their ‘‘forms indelibly fixed by the well-regulated traditional system of the 44 getéing up of each individual word therein contained, do not stand in ८५ need of auy rules or definitions (for the poiuting ot of the correct ‘‘ forms of words), specially as for these there ean be yo better, or more ‘‘anthoritative, means of comprehending than the Teacher himself, + And in fact Panini himself has declared the rules and definitions to be dependent upon the Veda, which clearly shows that these rules can have 276 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I—PADA III—ADHBI 9, “very little use, with reference to the purely Vedic forms of words. (५ Because the laying down of any rules with regard to Vedic words would ‘‘be as useless as the laying down of rules for agriculture &c., which are “matters of ordinary every-day experience. “The Mahdbhashya has pointed ont various uses of the Science of ‘Grammar, chief among which are (1) Raksha, (2) Uha, (3) Agama, (4) ५५ Taghu, and (5) Asandéha; but none of these is tenable; because all these ‘are accomplished by means other than Grammar, which is found to be ‘€ of very slight, if any, use in them. “ (1) As for ‘ Raksh@’ or the preserving of the Veda, the greatest ९८ means of this protection consists in the relationship of the Teacher and the ‘pupil; because it is a well-known fact that the form and order of the ^ Vedic sentences which have got nothing to do with grammar, have been ‘kept intact only on account of the fact of their being continually studied ; ‘and the slightest disarrangement in the order has been said to be a very “serious offence; (which 18 not pointed out by Grammar, according to which ‘‘any difference in the order of the sentence is not a matter of any conse~ ‘‘quence). And with regard to this, it has been said—‘ That by means “of which the object in question is fully comprehended is accepted as its ८४ lakshana or definition; and that which leaves off even the hundredth ५६ part of the object, can be accepted to be of very little use in the matter.’ ‘‘ That 18 to say, the traditional system of teaching the Veda is found to ५५ 1188 ever been the means of keoping intact, everything in connection “with it; while Grammar deals with the single factor of words, and leaves «५ off all the more important ones, of the sentence, its order &c.; and as “such Grammar cannot be held to be of much use, in matters relating to “the Veda, specially in the preserving (Raksha) of it. «५ We also find that even in what 18 known as the Sama Véda, there are “certain rules and definitions; and it is these that are proper and useful, helping the accomplishment of all things (in connection with the Samdé); “while, on the other hand, the Grammar has got very little use with xe- ८ yard to what should be done. That 18 to say, in the Aucchicya section “of the Sdmavidhina, we find all the parts of the Sdma defined in accor- ८ १8.108 with a definite order; and this helps us to all the information that “we want with regard to the form of the Sama; and these definitions ‘serve the further purpose of dividing the Sdama into its five parts of the ६ Prastiva &c., specially at the time that we are passing from one verse to “another. While as regards the Grammar, as its sole use lies in the defi- “ning of certain forms of words only, it can have but very little use in the “keeping of the Vedas, which are collections of various combinations NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 277 “of words and sentences, and which can never have their words newly created or formed. For a person who could keep up the words and sen- ०“ tences, and the various combinations of these, a8 contained in the Veda, “by the help of the rules &., detailed in the Veda itself,—he could cer- ‘tainly successfully keep up, by the same means, the idea of the roots and “affixes &c., (and for this small matter of roots &c., there can be no use ८ 0८ a different branch of study in the shape of Grammar). ‘‘And again, if the persons learned in the Veda would believe in the “fact of the Veda being kept up by means of the Grammar, whenever “they would have any doubts on any point relating to the Veda, they ^“ would proceed to the Grammarian to have them removed. But (asa ‘matter of fact the means of keeping up the Veda being contained in the ८“ Veda itself, why should the Vaidika seek the help of the Grammarian ; ‘“‘ because) when a person has a vessel full of water hanging by his own ०८ 8106, wherefore should he seek after other sources of water for washing ८“ 018 hands? And even in ordinary life we find that when a man wants ८ #0 know something, he betakes bimself to persons that are recognised to “be authorities on the subject in question. For instance, the Ayurvéda be- ‘“‘ing the science most needed in regard to medication, it is from the *“doctors of that science that people learn all about the nature and the ‘medicines of diseases. “In the same manner, whenever in the mind of the Vedic student “there arise doubts or misconceptions with regard to the words and sen- ८ {60068 of the Veda, the only persons that afford any help in clearing ‘““away the difficulties, are the more advanced among his own fellow- “students of the Veda, and not the grammarians. Hence, as a matter of ‘fact, we find that the whole of the Veda is kept up by means of these “students themselves; and even when there are actual mistakes in the “accents and the letters, the Vaidika student never condescends to seek “the help of the teachers of other sciences (which they consider to be far “beneath their own science of the Veda). And hence, the teachers of the ८ $ 808, who are exceptionally devoted to the good of their disciples and “always anxious to help them in their difficulties, are the only persons “that help in keeping up the Veda; and hence it is this traditional system ५५ of teaching alone that can be admitted to be the means of the Veda being ८ kept intact. ‘And thus we find that the Science of Grammar cannot be said to be “studied for the purpose of preserving the Veda. ‘And as for ordinary parlance too, all that 18 necessary, in the way “of talking and writing—even of poeticél works and the rest—is actually % found to be accomplished, even without any Grammar, by the help of the * languages themselves. 278 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I1--PADA IlI—aDHI 9. ‘‘ Even though found to serve no useful purpose in ordinary talk.” ‘ing &., the Science of Grammar may be held to have its use inthe composi- * tion of Sanskrit poetry, exactly as the rules and regulations contained in “the several Prikyta Grammar é&c., have their use in that of Prakrta ‘‘ poetry and drama &,,—~yet (we could explain the siira as that) the “Science of Grammar not affording the rules and regulations with re- ^“ regard to the composition of poetry, and such compositions being capable १९, being accomplished by means of the mere languages themselves, the “said grammar could not rightly be accepted as laying down any proper ‘“‘rules for the usage of words. Even in the matter of the ornaments of ‘Poetry, grammar is not found to be of much use; on the contrary, it is ‘only on account of the restrictions of grammar that authors are often ‘obliged to use distinctly unmelodious and unrythmical words and ex- ८ pressions. ^° पीना again, the mere fact of a certain word being grammatically ^“ correct, cannot justify us to use it, if it happens to be one that is not ac- “cepted in ordinary usage; and as for the words that are already estab- ‘lished in ordinary usage, any rules or definitions would be absolutely ०8९" ** less, ‘* And thus we find that even in ordinary parlance, Grammar cannot * serve the purpose of keeping up any words or expressions &९, + (2) As for Usa (Conjecture or supplying of ellipses), the Science of ‘‘Grammar can serve no useful purpose in this conjecture or supplying of #५ words; because this purpose is distinctly found to be served by other ¢ means, exactly like the differentiation of that which can be thus supplied ‘from that which caunot (which differentiation is done by the science of ४५ Mimdansa itself), ‘‘ For instance, the Mantras that are employed in the Primary sacri- ४ fice,—on such grounds as (1) the fact of their having a direct bearing ‘‘ypon it, (2) that of their serving a certain visible purpose with regard ‘4 to it, (3) that of their forming an integral part of the sacrifice itself,— ‘Sin these five cases, there can be no conjectural modifications made in the ** Mantras, when they come to be employed at the corresponding subsidiary “ sacrifices. While in cases other than those thus specified, the Mantras ‘undergo conjectural modifications, according to the special purposes that (4 present themselves. ‘‘ And when one can obtain all these infermations from other sources, independently of ths Science of Grammar, how conld he fail to get at the ५ proper words to give expression to these? At all times, the Veda is the ‘only Model or Receptacle (of words and expressions); and as such, people conld very easily get all the words that they want from the Veda “itself (and there would be no use of Grammar in this), And again, KROESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 279 “ when we find such words as ‘ 0507 ` and the like being actually used with ‘“yveference to certain definite objects, how could this well-established “usage be ever set aside ? “As regards the words signifying the names of deities, we have the “law laid down under siira X-iv-23, which shows that they are employed “in the sacrifices in the very form that is pointed out by the parts of the “ same or other sentences, in accordance with the procedure laid down in “ the original Injunction, without the slightest reference to any considera- “ tions of the correctness or otherwise of one or the other of the various “synonyms of words. And on this point we have certain Sciences, like “the Kalpasittras and the Mimansd, which serve to point out the use-of “the said names in regard to Dharma. ५ 4.8 for the words that signify the substances and their properties * &c., these have their complete forms pointed out by the objects lying near ‘‘the person concerned, and as such come to be used in connection with ५ the sacrifice; and hence there being no chance for the use of any words “not so pointed out, even though there may be certain words (denotative ५ of substances and properties) that are used with reference to an object ‘meant to supply the deficiencies in the Mantras concerned,—yet their ५ 786 cannot be regulated by the Science of Grammar, as this is not found “to have any bearing upon such usage. The use of Mantras in the Primary ८ sacrifice is in accordance with certain scriptural Injunctions, (contained “in the Veda), while in the subsidiaries, their use is regulated by the ** exigencies of the circumstances and objects concerned; and this does not “ necessarily consist of only such forms of words as are in keeping with < grammatical rules. “ As for the rules of Grammar itself, they cannot have any basis in the ५ Veda; and as they are the products of the human brain, they cannot have “an injunctive force; and as they are found to have their own authority “shaken by the additions and alterations, deletions and contradictions, “contained in the sitras themselves,—to contain in themselves endless ५ discrepancies in the modifications of roots and affixes that are gratuitous- ‘ly laid down (in grammatical works),—and to depend upon such known “human agencies as those of Panini and others,—they can never be ac- “ cepted as scriptures bearing upon the eternal use of words during the ‘ performances of the eternal sacrifices. ‘Thus then, those persons who are experts in the knowledge of the ५ sacrifices and their accessories, having all their necessary conjectural “ modifications accomplished by means of the usage of words in the Veda ‘Sand in ordinary parlance,—what would be the use of Grammar (in re- ५५ gard to. such Conjectures) ? “ And it is witha, view to this well-known incapability: of the Science 280 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-—PADA III-~ADHI 9. “of Grammar to accomplish any such conjectural modifications (in the ५८ Mantras) that the Commentators (on the Kalpasitras) have declared ५५ &8 follows: ‘ The subsidiaries (Purdndtyad, &c.), the names of relations ५८ (4 010८1९7," &९, ), the organs of sense (the Sun as the Hye)—these do not “undergo any conjectural modifications; as we find in the case of the “ Adhrigu Mantra (Dévyth gamitdrah, §c.)’ (this shows certain cases where “such modifications are possible, and certainly these cannot in any way be °“ affected by the rules of Grammar). (3) “The third use of Grammar that the Mahabhashya speaks of 18 “ Agama or Scripture; but in that case, wherefore has not the study of the ‘Veda been described as the result of sacrifices? Thatis to say, the scrip- “ture is known to be the origin of all that has to be done in the way of “sacrifices, and not as their purpose (and hence to assert the scripture to ^ 08 the purpose served by the rules of Grammar would be as reasonable “as to declare the study of the Veda to be the result of the sacrifices laid ‘down in ib). “Tf it be urged that what the Mahdbhdashya means is that the use of ५ Grammar is that which is pointed out as such, in the scriptures ;—even “this could not hold water; because we do not find any such use mentioned ‘in the scriptures; and also because the text that 18 brought forward in “support of the study of Grammar distinctly mentions the fact of such “study not serving any purpose. That is to say, the Vedic text in ques- “tion is—‘the Veda with all its six subsidiary sciences is to be studied “ without a view to any result’; and this distinctly shows that the study ५८ 0{ grammar has no use. As for scriptures, we do not admit of any such, “apart from the Vedic texts themselves; and certainly, how could the eternal ‘Veda contain any injunctions with regard to the study of the rules of ९८ vrammar, which have had a beginning in time P ‘Thus then, we see that the only Injunction that we actually have in “the Catapatha Brahmana is that ‘the Veda should be studied,’ which “lays down the study of the Veda alone; and this is the only Injunction ‘that could be found in the Veda; as this is the only one that refers to an “eternal subject of study. Aud as for the Injunction of the study of gram- ‘mar or any other of the subsidiary sciences, we do not find any such in “any branch of the Veda. And again that (grammar) which consists of “things (rules) that have had a beginning in time, cannot be said to have “the character of the Veda, or to have a self-sufficient authority; as both “these facts are dependent upon eternality. ‘And asa matter of fact, Grammar has got no claims to be count- ‘ed among the ‘subsidiary sciences’ of the Veda; because it does not serve any “necessary purpose with regard to the Veda; nor does it form an integral ‘part of it. That is to say, none of the six means of interpretation—~ NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 281 ८५ Direct Assertion, Indirect Implication, Context, Syntactical Connection ५५ Position or Name—points to Grammar as serving any useful purpose “with regard to the Veda; and as for being an integral part of the Veda ८ how could that which has had a beginning in time form part of that which ८८ 18 eternal P “For these reasons, we must explain the expression ‘the Veda with ०८ 108 six subsidiary sciences’ as referring to its constituent parts, in the “following manner: The ‘six subsidiaries’ referred to must be taken to ८८ 06 the six means of interpretation—Direct Assertion &.; as it is only ‘‘ when interpreted through these that the Veda becomes capable of rightly ° pointing out Dharma. ८८ An objection is here raised: ‘If the subsigiaries referred be taken ५५ &8 those contained in the Veda itself (2.e., Direct Assertion, &c.), and not “as anything outside it (as Grammar, Nirukta, &c.), then in that case the ० qualification with the six subsidiartes would be absolutely meaningless. “Specially as we can have a qualification, only when such & one is possi- (° 016, and when a qualification is actually needed for the purpose of set- “ ting aside certain incongruities (or contradictions); and certainly as there ५18 no incongruity in the Veda with regard Direct Assertion &., what ‘could be specified by a qualification of these subsidiaries? [That is to ‘‘say, Grammar not being invariably concomitant with the Veda, a ‘qualification is needed in order to make it an object of study together “with the Veda; while Direct Assertion, &c., are always contained in the ‘‘Veda; and hence any qualification of these would be absolutely mean- “ ingless |.’ “Reply: Our firm conviction is that one who studies the Veda, “with a full knowledge of these—Direct Assertion, &c.,—and a due differ- ‘‘ entiation of these, by means of the causes, forms and resu]ts (of actions) ,— ‘he alone fulfils in full the conditions of the said Injunction (that one ^ should study the ‘ Veda with its six subsidiaries ’). “Or, we might take the expression should study in the sense of should ‘ understand or know; and in that case the said Injunction would mean “thatone should know the Veda as consisting of Direct Assertion, &c. Or, we ‘could take the expression ‘ Vedodhyéyah’ as ‘ vedah dhéyah’ (and not as ‘““‘wedah adhyéyah’), the meaning of the Injunction being that one should ‘‘ contemplate on or ponder over the Veda, which has all its meanings mani- ‘‘ fested by means of Direct Assertion, &c. ‘Thus we find that the said Injunction lays down the pondering over ‘‘the meaning of the Veda, in the way shown in the Mimansa sitras; and ८५ 16 can never be taken as laying down the study of Grammar. “Then again, as a matter of fact, we have certain grammatical facts “in the Veda itself; and the said Injunction of the study of the six 36 282 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA 111—ApDuHrI 9. ५५ subsidiaries may be taken as referring to the Grammar that is contained ‘in the Veda. As for instance, the Veda points out the reason why the ‘ curd is called ‘dadhi,’ and so forth ; and in this way we have in the Vedic ५८ Arthavadas, many grammatical and etymological explanations of words. ‘And the said Injunction may be taken as laying down the study of the ५५ Injunctive portions of the Veda, together with the Arthavadas that con- «^ {817 such explanations. “Or again, there are certain Pratigakhyas in relation to each branch “of the Veda, which are studied with as much regard as the Veda itself ; ८५ 811 as these are actually found to be of use in matters relating to the “Veda, they can certainly be taken as the ‘Subsidiaries’ of the Veda. “That is to say, those that are actually found to have a certain use (or ५ operation) in regard to the Veda, cannot but be accepted, by that fact ९५ alone, as its subsidiaries ; but this cannot be said with regard to the works ‘of Panini and the rest, which only here and there treat of Vedic senten- “ces; and that too, only with a view to cloak it in Vedic authority. ‘¢ ]f it be urged that the grammars of Panini and others could beaccepted ९८ 98 ‘ scriptures ’ relating to Actions, just like the Pratigakhkyas,—we cannot “but deny 1६ ; because the grammars of Panini and the rest do not at all “treat of the form of the Veda itself; that is to say, all that these gram- ९ 77918 do is to Jay down certain purified forms of words, without any “reference to the form of the Veda. While the Pratigakhyas deal with “accent, conjunction of letters, hiatus, explanations, precedence and se- “ quence, &c., al] of which are directly connected with the study of the text ८८ 0 the Veda itself. And as such this fact distinctly points to the fact of “the Pradtigdkhyas, and not the grammars of Panini, &c., being the real ८५ © subsidiary ’ of the Veda. ^° Nor again is the declaration of Scripture (as being the purpose of “the grammars) quite compatible with what has been asserted before in “the Mahabhadshya. Because the Scripture that is here meant is the mere “ vetting up of the verbal text; while the Mahdbhashya has, on a former “ occasion, asserted the teaching of words to be the purpose of the Scripture ‘(and as nosuch teaching can be possible without a knowledge of the ९५ meaning of the Veda, the mere getting up of the verbal text cannot be “ accepted to be of any use in such teaching). “ And further, the said Injunction distincly lays down the study of the ५ Veda with its six subsidiaries, which does not bring any worldly results “to the students; and hence the assertion of the Muhabhdshya that ‘ tho ०८ knowledge of Grammar constitutes a Dharma,’ or that of the Vartika that “¢the using of words in accordance with grammatical rules brings pros- ५५ perity, cannot but be rejected as being directly contradictory to the afore- ५५ said Vedic Injunction. NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 2838 (4) “ Another use of Grammar that the Mahkdabhashya speaks of is that ‘it tends to simplify (make ‘ laghu’) the process of differentiating the correct ‘ from theincorrect forms of words. But this is only proper, being the only * resource left to him, when all other uses have been shown to be untenable; “and this is true enough | “ Qr, it may be that the ‘ simplification ’ spoken of really means ‘ com- ‘ plication,’ by the process of ‘contrary expression ’ (६,९,) ironical method), ‘exactly as the word ‘coward’ is applied to a really brave man! ‘That is to say, all that grammatical works are found to do is to point ‘out the forms of words that already exist and are known in the ordinary ५ world, after having gone through endless complicated processes, such as ‘the laying down of most difficult verbal root forms, and queer unddi and ‘other affixes, mixed up with an endless number of extraordinary nomen= ५ clatures aud postulates, dealing with gratuitous arguments and counter- “arguments. And yet with all this, there are only a few students who can rightly apply these elaborate processes to words other than those ‘ that are actually cited as examples. And thus we find that the process ‘“ employed is terribly complicated ; and then to speak of it as ‘simplify- ‘ing’ cannot but be taken as mere empty praise (ironical). ५ Some people have declared that the real character of words cannot “be known without Grammar. But it would have been as reasonable for “ them to say the same thing with regard to the perception of Colour, “Taste, Odour and Touch! Certainly, in regard to matters perceptible by ‘the senses, how could any person, knowing the real nature of the scriptures “and ordinary experience, declare them to he capable of being compre- ८ hended by means of the scriptures? Hence we must read the said declara- “tion thus—‘ the real nature of words is not known without the sense ‘of audition’; because on this point there is no difference of opinion; as ८ we actually find that there is no perception of words by the deaf, &c. (5) ‘ The fifth use of Grammar that the Mahdbhashya has spoken of is ‘that it helps to remove all doubts with regard to the meanings of Vedic ‘‘ passages (‘ Asandéha.’) But this also 18 not correct ; because grammar does ५ not in any way help us to ascertain the meanings of words or sentences. “For as a matter of fact, we find that many doubts with regard to the ‘Ss meanings of words are set aside by the observation of the usage of ex- ५ perienced and learned people ; and the few that are still left are cleared “ by the help of commentaries, etymological explanations, Kalpastitras, and “the persons versed in matters relating to the Veda; because all these ‘latter deal with the meanings (of words and sentences). On the other “hand, Grammar takes no notice of the meanings of words, dealing with ५५ merely verbal forms ; and as such it cannot in any way help us in ascer- “ taining the meanings of Vedic passages. 284 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. [—PADA lUI—ADHI 9. ५५ For instance, in the case of a certain noun, grammar points it out ५ &8 being made up of certain roots and affixes, aud as such connected with “a certain action (denoted by the verbal root), while, as a matter of fact, “we find that when the noun is actually used, there is not the slightest ‘idea of the said action: e.g., the word ‘Go’ is explained as made up of ‘the root gam (८० go) and the affix dé; and these would make the word ५ ‹ 96’ applicable to all that moves (or goes). But as a matter of fact we “find the word used with reference to a particular class (of animals) ; ‘and certainly the explanation of a word must be in keeping with “its generally recognised signification (and not an arbitrary one). In ५५ 16 same manner, we have the words, ‘ kugala’ and ‘ udadra’ which, 88 ‘“ grammatically explained, would mean, the chopper of grass, and one whose ‘* wife is good (respectively) ; but as a matter of fact we do not find these “words used in the sense fastened to them by the arbitrary grammatical “rule. And 80 also, though the words ‘ agvakarna’ and ‘ajakarana’ are . “grammatically explained as compounds (thereby being made to mean “the ear of the horse and the ear of the goat respectively),—yet in ordin- “ary usage, they are used in the sense of certain herbs, which have no con- “nection with the signification of the several constituent parts of “the words; exactly like the word ‘vrksha’ which grammatically “would mean that which ts being cut, while ordinarily, it is used im the “sense of the free. So too in the case of the word ‘ Rajanya,’ though ‘‘ grammatically it is made up of the word ‘ Raja’ with a patronymic affix “(and thereby it would mean the king’s son), yet the generally recognis- ‘ed meaning is entirely different from the said etymological one. “Then again, we find certain grammatical rules to be directly against “the Veda itself; and certainly, even if we accept these, they cannot be ‘accepted as subsidiary to the Veda. For instance, grammar points out “the word ‘kaléya’ to be made up of ‘kali’ and ‘dhak,’ and the word ‘““* Vamadévya’ of ‘ Vamadéva’ and ° dya’ ; and thus according to this, these ‘names as applied to the S&mas, would mean the Samas seen by Kali and ५ Vamadéva respectively, whereas in the Veda we find these names of the ‘Sama explained differently : ‘because plenty of riches flow forth from “it, the Sama came to be known as Vadmadévya’ and ‘ because the Sima “removed all impediments, therefore it came to be known as Kdléya.’ “And these Vedic explanations cannot but set aside the interpretation “supplied by grammar. In the same manner, we find in the Kalpasitira, ‘“‘ such expressions as ‘ Krshnagam vasah, ‘ Krshnavalakshé ajiné, used in the ८ sense of the cloth or skin that has black threads ; and such meanings can never ५ 06 got at even by the help of a hundred grammars ; all these being capable ‘of bemg learnt only from an uninterrupted tradition of the teachers and “students of the Veda; and so also ‘are words like‘ yipa’ and the rest, NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 285 “which are explained in accordance with the sequence and precedence “of Vedic passages. ८ And as in the case of these words we actually find their meanings “duly ascertained, independently of grammar, we conclude that even in ० (06 case of such words as ‘ sthélaprshati’ and the like (where the signi- ^ fication of the word depends upon the nature of the compound, which ‘‘ can be learnt only by means of the accent as regulated by grammatical ‘“‘rules), we can safely have recourse to the commentators themselves (for ५ {116 ascertaining of the actual meaning of the said words). And as such “there can be no use of Grammar on this point. ° Then again, with regard to the true meanings of sentences, thousands € 07 doubts arise in our minds; and Grammar is not found to be able to ‘“‘express even a siugle phase of the question (to say nothing of being “able to set aside the doubt completely and point out the true conclusion). “If the use of Grammar lay in the removal of all doubts with regard ०८ #0 the meaning of Vedic passages, then it would certainly have helped ९ {0 solve questions like the following: (1) Are the Arthaviada passages “‘capable of expressing independent meanings of their own, or are they ‘“‘only supplementary to the Injunctive passages ? (2) Is the mention of “the fact of the Udumbara wood being ‘ power’ to be taken as pointing out ८ & result that would follow if the sacrificial post were made of that wood, ' ^° or it only serves to eulogise the particular wood P (3) Whether a certain ८५ passage mentioning a reason is to be taken as an Injunction or an Artha- “vada P (4) Whether the use of a certain Mantra brings about a seen or ८४.8.71 unseen result ? (5) Whether it is only one or all the vessels that one ^ 1188 got to wash? &., &c. If it be urged that—‘ these questions being “treated of by the Mimans& are not taken up by grammar, ’—then, ‘‘inasmuch as we find many such words as ‘sthilaprshat’ and the like “having their meanings duly ascertained in the Kalpasiitras, with regard “to such words, 1६ becomes all the more improbable for grammar to serve ‘any useful purpose. ‘““And again, whenever there are any doubts as to the meaning of the ८ vrammatical rules themselves, the true meaning is ascertained through ८४ ६116 explanations contained in the commentaries; and certainly, there is “nothing to debar such explanatory commentaries appearing with refer- ‘ence to the doubtful words occurring in the Veda (and as such there “would be nothing left to be done by grammar). And inasmuch as “there is a postulate that explanatory commentaries serve the purpose “of bringing about specific ideas,—just as the fact of there being certain “doubts with regard to a certain grammatical rule does not deprive it of “its character of a ‘rule’; so too the mere fact of there being doubts “with regard to a Vedic passage cannot deprive it of its Vedic character. 286 TANTRA-VKRTIKA. ADH. I-—PADA III—ADHI 9. * And until one knows the actual meanings of certain words, he can never “ explain any Vedio passage by the mere help of Grammar; and as such “ this latter cannot be said to be the means of ascertaining the meaning “of the passage. And the explanatory commentaries to the Veda “being as eternally continuous as the Veda itself, such words as ०५ ‹ sthulaprshat’ and the rest are found to be explained, without the help of ८ Grammar, ५ [ Nor can the accents as treated of in Grammar be said to help in “the ascertaining of the meanings of words |. No words in ordinary “usage being found to be accentuated, we conclude that accents are some- “thing entirely beyond the pale of usage; and as such they cannot be पल ‘‘lised in ascertaining the meanings of Vedic passages. Asa matter of fact “the ascertaining of the real meanings of words is always accomplished ‘‘by means of the usage of experienced people. And as we meet with no ८ differentiation of accents,—as that the last word of the compound 18 acute “and so forth,—-in the usages of these people, any specialitics of accents ‘‘can never be accepted to have an effect upon the significations of “words. And if the cognition of the meanings of sentences depended upon “the specialities of accents, there would be no cognition of the meanings ८ 0 those Vedic passages, whose accentuation has not been ascertained. ५ But asa matter of fact, as we find the meanings of such passages duly ‘ascertained by means of Context, &c., (independently of the Accents), “the denotativeness of those meanings cannot be said to belong to the Ac- “‘cents. And hence we conclude that the accentuation of the Vedic texts ‘can have only an unseen (transcendental) result; specially as it is only ‘“‘found in connection with the reciting of Mantras at the sacrifices in- ‘cluded under the ordinary Brahmayajna (Daily sacrifices or Duties of the ^ Bréhmana). ८ And hence even the grammatical rules that refer to Accents may be ‘‘said to serve some sort of a purpose with regard to such transcendental “ matters; but never with regard to the words in ordinary usage; because ‘ Accentuation is found to have absolutely no use in ordinary parlance. ८५ And asa matter of fact, the Accentuation, as laid down in Grammar, is ‘never found to help us in ascertaining the real meanings (of words or ‘‘sentences); specially because what we find in grammatical works, “is only a teaching of the verbal forms of words, and not of their ‘* meanings. ५८ Thus then, we conclude that Grammar cannot be said to be necessa- “rily studied as serving the purpose of removing doubts with regard “to the meanings of Vedic passages; specially as it 18 not found to treat ‘‘of such Accentuation or uses of words, &c., as could be of any use in the ‘ascertaining of the meaning (of words or sentences). NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 287 “After having laid special stress upon the five aforesaid uses of ‘Grammar, the Mahabhashya proceeds to enumerate ‘many other uses’ of “it; but of these some are such as cannot be spoken of as ‘uses’; u few ‘are such as have the mere semblance of a ‘use’; while some are entirely ‘groundless. And again when the usefulness of the science has not been “ established by means of the five, that were spoken of as the ‘ primary “uses, that it will be proved by that of the secondary uses, is a hope too ^ sanguine to be realised ; and the attempt has all the resemblance of a ८ 010 क 71110 man catching at a straw. (1) “The Mahabhdshya quotes the Vedic text—' The Asuras ut- ‘* tered the (incorrect words) helayah, and hence they were defeated ... ‘* ... the utterance of an incorrect word is behaving like a Mleccha’; and ‘‘from this concludes that the use of Grammar lies in protecting us from ‘being a Mleccha. But what the real meaning of the word °Mleccha’ ० 18 we have explained above (as referring to the distorting of the textual «५ readings of the Veda). (2) ‘“‘ The second use spoken of by the Mahabhashya is that it protects “us from the misfortunes that befall those uttering incorrect words, as ‘“‘evinced by the text—‘a word pronounced incorrectly, either as to its ८ 80061168 or letters, becomes a thunderbolt killing the sacrificer, as for in- “stance the word indragatru (which was addressed to Vrtra, as the killer < of Indra, a Genitive Tatpurusha, but asthe accent that was used was that of ५ {6 Bahuvrihi compound, Vrtra became one whose killer was Indra).’ But ८ here the Mahabhdashya has substituted in this text the word ‘word’ for ^ Mantra,’ which is the reading known to many men; and this substitution ^ of a different reading only shows an undue degree of partiality to his own ‘‘theories. And as for the misfortunes of sinfulness befalling the sacri- “‘ ficer who employs incorrect Mantras, it is a fact that no one denies; speci- “ally as we have many texts,—f.i. ‘the sentence that is killed (spoilt) by ८ ४116 priest, kills the sacrificer himself ’—that clearly point to the fact of ‘the discrepancies in the use of Mantras by the Priests bringing about evil “‘results to the sacrificer. And itis because the text refers to the mistakes “of Mantra that it has cited the use of a Mantra—‘ indragatro vardhasva’ ^ —as an example. ^ (8) “The Mahabhsihya cites a passage from the Nirukta :—‘ That ^ which is pronounced simply verbally, without a knowledge of its meaning, ५ 18 not effective, being like dry fuel being placed where there is no fire to “burn it;’ and from this it concludes that the study of Grammar is neces- “‘sary, inasmuch as it helps us to know the meaning of Mantras, therehy ‘saving us from the predicament spoken of. But the text here quoted ‘we have explained in course of the explanation of the word aha in sittra «6 J—j—1, as authorising a postponement of the Final Bath, after the mere 488 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—~PADA III—ADHI 9. “ getting up of the text of the Veda ; and we have there shown thatif we did ‘not postpone the Bath, we would be making the Veda, which has a pur- ८५ [0०86 to serve, absolutely without a use; as the purpose that the Veda is “ found to serve is the pointing out of Duty (and this could not be pointed “out to the person that @nishes his study with the mere getting up of the “text and pays no attention to the meaning); and hence the meaning of “the text quoted is that ‘the Veda that is not explained, not expressing “any meaning, becomes totally ineffective’; and this is quite trae; “though in this, there can be no use for Grammar ; because it is a well- “recognised fact that the Science of Grammar has no bearing upon any “ thing relating to Action (or sacrifices). Nor can it be asserted that gram- “marisa scripture relating to words; because we have shown above that “there is no basis in the Veda for the rules of grammar that treat of ८८ words; and as such, these rules cannot be accepted as rightly regulating “the use of words either. Thus then, inasmuch as the meaning of the ९५ Mantras and the Brahmanas that one has studied can be ascertained only “by the help of the Kalpasitras, the Niruktas and the Mimansa, the use ५ nointed out by the Muhabhdshya should be attributed to these, and not “to Grammar (which is not fonnd to afford any help in the ascertaining of “the meanings of any passages of the Veda). | (4) “The next passage that is quoted by the Mah&bhaishya is—‘an expert ‘in the knowledge of the relations of sentences, who makes use of the “correct forms of words, obtains victory in the next world ; while by the use “of incorrect words he becomes tainted (with sin)’; and from this it con- “cludes that the use of Grammar lies in this leading to victory in the “next world (as it is by the help of Grammar alone that we can differ- ‘‘entiate the correct from the incorrect forms of worda). But this passage “also refers to the fact of the use of the correct forms of Mantras “and Brathmanas bringing about excellent results; exactly as the use of “the incorrect forms of these—7.e., not as they appear in the Veda— “taints the person with sin; and as such, we take the parsage to be ‘‘supplementary to another Vedic text—‘If the sacrifice fails in regard ‘to the verses recited, &c , &c.’—, which speaks of similar results follow- “ing from the distorting of the reading of the Veda, during its reading, “teaching, sacrificing, either directly or indirectly. Hence we take the “‘oxpression—‘one who is expert in the knowledge of the relations of ‘“‘ words —to mean the person who is fully cognisant with all relationships ‘of words as established in the ordinary usages of the word ; and as such, ‘with reference to the Brahmanas, the expression would mean one who “has ascertained the true forms of sentences, by means of a proper “ differentiation of the Subject from the Predicate, the Primary from the ‘Secondary, and so forth ; while with reference to the Mantras, we take it NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 289 ५ ४0 mean the person who is fully acquainted with the real character of “the Mantras, differentiating the enjoined from the unenjoined, as also ८ 076 that expresses its own meaning from that which expresses that of ‘another, and so forth P For these reasons we cannot take the expression ८ {0 mean the Grammarian; because Grammar is found to have no bear- ing upon the aforesaid facts (in connection with Mantras and Brah- manas) (5) ‘ The fifth text quoted by the Mahabhashya 18-- when the person saluting another is ignorant of the fact of the last vowel of a name being ‘acute, the person saluted should response as to a woman’; and from this it concludes that if we wish to avoid the treatment accorded to women, we should learn Grammar, which is the only means of learning the ‘“acuteness, &c., of vowels. But the fact of a vowel being acute is well- “ known through ordinary usage; and as such the condition laid down by ““Manu in the passage quoted being fulfilled by ordinary usage itself, any “science dealing with these conditions of acuteness, &c., cannot be admit- “‘ted to the position of a scripture relating to the performance of actions. ‘Nor does the above passage serve to point out either the fact of the ‘‘ differentiation of the correct from the incorrect forms of words being “necessarily due to a knowledge of the roots and affixes as dealt with in ‘‘rrammatical works; or to that of such knowledge being of any use in ‘the said differentiation. (6) “° The sixth passage cited is the Injunction—‘ The Prayajas are to “be performed with due attention to the grammatical terminations ’— ‘which is taken as laying down the necessity of learning Grammar (which ८18 the only means of knowing the terminations.) But in the first place “a knowledge of the terminations here spoken of is very easily acquired ८ by means of the direct teachings of persons versed in sacrifices; secondly, “all the seven terminations are found to be enumerated in the Shadaha “ section of the Chdndogya-Brahmana ; and lastly, we find all these termina- ४ {1078 duly pointed out in the Mantras themselves—as in ‘ Agni (nom1- “native) killed the Vyttras,’ ‘we address Agni (in the accusative) the ८ killer of Vrttra,’ and ‘the fire is lighted by the fire (Instrumental),’ and “so forth; and all this shows that even without the grammatical works, ‘ we can have a due knowledge of the said terminations, by merely paying due attention to the words having the terminations (as they are met with “in ordinary usage); and thus thereby the said Prayd@ja being duly per- ‘formed, Grammar cannot be held to be a scripture bearing upon its due ^ performance (7) “ Another passage quoted is—‘one who knows the science of ^« 8766९11, as consisting of words, accents and letters, he alone is capable of “rightly performing the duties of a sacrificial priest’; and this is taken to 37 290 TANTBA-VABTIKA. ADH. I—PADA I1I—ADHI Q. “ point out the necessity of grammatical study. But as a matter of fast, “this passage only speaks of the person who has duly learnt the Veda. (8) “The eighth passage quoted is—‘ there are four kinda of “ words; and it is only those Bréhmanas that knaw them that are said to “be learned; of these three are ८2४ pronounced by ordinary people, who “speak out the fourth only’; and the ‘four kinds’ are explained by the “ Mahabhashya as referring to Nouns, Verbs, Prefixes and Nipatas; and “as a knowledge of these cannot be acquired except hy the help of Gram- “mar, the passage is taken to lay down the necessity of grammatical “study. But in dealing with the ‘four kinds of words’ as mentioned in “this passage, the Niruktas have,—in accordance with their awn maxim “that ‘all words are to be explained in accordance with the similarities ‘of the letters therein contained,’—spoken of many quartets, such as— ५५ (@) the Pranava together with the three Vydahyiis, (6) the four Vedas, ५ (¢) the four kinds of speech, Parad, Ppyanti, Madhyam& and Vatkhari; “and certainly in regard to none of these can Grammar serve any useful “purpose. Even if the quartet referred to be taken as that consisting of ‘‘ Nouns, Verbs, Prefixes, and Nipatas, even then, inasmuch ag all these are ‘ learnt from ordinary usage itself, a knowledge of these could not stand “in need of grammatical study. But in reality, this cannot be taken aa “the quartet referred to; as in that case, the sentence—“‘ it is the fourth kind ८ alone that men make use of ’—would be absolutely: inexplicable, as men 4४ 916 actually found to make use of all the four kinds (Nouns, de.), There- ‘fore the Mantra quoted cannot but have the following meaning, which “isthe only one that isin keeping with the context (of the Mantra) : “The expression ‘ Vakparimitapadani=the four means of right notion,— ५ Sense-Pereeption, Inference, Analogy and Apparent Inconsistency,—by “which alone is speech (Vak) cognised (padyat® bodhyaté); thus thes ८५ {60016 do. not actually utter those three kinds of speech, or sentence which “ave cognisable by means of the last three of the said means of right “ notign,—viz: (a) Inference, (8) Analogy, and (c) Apparent Inconsistency,—+ “ which originate respectively, (a) in. the mention of the first word of the “sentence in an Injunction (as, for instance, we have the Injunction ८ ‹ [672४५८४ cjkham chinatti,’ where the mention of the first twa words “of the Mantra leads us to infer the whole of the Mantra, which does not “stand in need of being wholly quoted in the Injunction), (6) in the “similarity of the Subgidiaries to the Primary sacrifice (as for instance “we have the Injunction ‘prakrtivadvikrtih kartavya ’ which, through ‘“ Analogy, leads us to the conclusion that the Mantras used at the प्श ‘diaries are the same that are used at the Primary,—the Analogy thus “obviating the necessity of quoting all the Mantras in connection ‘with the Injunction of the subsidiaries), (©) and in the apparent NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 201 “‘explicability of a perceptible fact (as in the case of the Vigvajit sacrifice, “the fact of its actually being performed leads us to conclude that it “brings about a real result in the shape of Heaven; and as such, the ५ Mantras of the Jyotishtoma are employed at its performance) ; while that “part of the speech, which is cognisable by means of direct (Auditory) ८ Sense-perception alone, and not by the aforesaid three means of right “notion, is the only one that men—students of the Veda—pronounce—z.e., ““speak out directly or lay down completely. Ont of the six means of “right notion, generally accepted, two have been totally removed from “doing anything with regard to the cognition of speech ; one of these i ^ Negation, which refers only to non-existing objects; and as such cannot ‘“‘help in the cognition of speech ; another is Verbal Testimony ; and this ‘in itself consists of speech only ; and as such being a receptacle of that “ (speech) which has to be cognised, it could not be accepted as the recep- “tacle of that which brings about the cognition. Or, it may be that, that “‘which is amenable to Verbal Testimony is that which is directly ex- “pressed in words; and as such this being included in Auditory Sense- “perception, 18 not mentioned separately. (9) * Another passage quoted is—‘ The bull having four horns, three “ feet, two heads, d&c.......is the great God that makes a sound, and enters “all mortal beings’; and the ‘ bull’ here spoken of is interpreted by the “ Mahabhashya as Grammar itself, the ‘four feet’ being takén as the ‘above mentioned four kinds of words (Nouns, &c.), the ‘three feet’ as “the three senses, the ‘two heads’ as the twoshapes of words, the radical ‘and the modified, and so on; and in order that we may be like this great “ God, it is necessary, says the Mahabhashya, that we should study Gram- ‘mar, But this Mantra is spoken of with reference to the butter used “by the Priest at the Vishuvat sacrifice ; and what its real meaning is we “have already explained in the Adhikarana (of the 2nd péda of this ° Adhyaya) dealing with Mantras (under the Sutra I—ii—46). And in “this, there can be no use of Grammar. The interpretation of ‘four * horns’ as the four kinds of words, &c., &c., has got no connection with “the performance of Actions; and as such these interpretations (of ४ “passage occurring in connection with the performance of certain sacri- «५ 8068) can only be explained as put forth by the author of the Maka. ‘“‘bhadshya, with the sole purpose of showing off his cleverness acquired from a long-continued course of grammatical study ! - (10) “The Mahdbhashya has cited the Mantra—t Utatvah pagyan, &c.” “ which is taken as the praise of one knowing the science of words, and ag “such, laying down the necessity of studying Grammar. But in reality “the passage is in praise of one who knows the true meanings of words, ५ ge pointed out by ordinary usage, the Niruktas, the Kalpasiitras and the 292 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1—PADA III—ADHI 9. “tenets of the {1108088 ; and as such it cannot be taken as in any way “ praising a study of Grammar. (11) “There is yet another passage quoted which speaks of the ‘science of words having a purifying tendency ‘ like the sieve’; and this “the Mahabhdshya has taken to mean that it is the study of Grammar “that purifies all usage of words. But asa matter of fact the passage is “in praise of a due knowledge of the meaning of the Vedic text, purified “by a long course of uninterrupted study. (12) “The passage—‘ If the Aginhotri happens to use an incorrect ““word he should perform an expiatory rite’—has been taken by the (° Mahabhashya to signify the necessity of grammatical study. But the “real signification of this passage we have explained above. (13) “In connection with the naming of a child, the Kalpasitras lay “down that the name should begin with a cortain kind of letter, and that ‘16 should contain only two or four letters, and should be one made up “of a verbal, and never, a nominal affix, &c., &c.: and the Mahabhashya “urges that these detailed instructions could never be followed unless one ‘ studied and knew the rules, &c., laid down in grammatical works; as with- ‘out these, one could not know what ॐ verbal affix was. But, as a matter ‘‘of fact, these expressions—‘ having a verbal affix ’ and the like,—could ‘‘ not but have been borrowed by writers on Grammar from the vocabulary of “the day, which must have had a prior existence (and as such even now “we can very easily learn what they mean even without the help of a ‘“‘ grammar); as for the number of letters in a name, itis a fact of ordine ~ ‘perception accompanied by memory (and as such not dependent upon “any grammatical rules, &c.); as for the characters of the letters, &c., ‘‘ these can be learnt from the explanations contained in the Qikshas and “the Pratuakhyas. And we actually find people learned in the Vedas ‘‘very easily coming to a conclusion with regard to the naming of a ‘child. And hence we cannot admit Grammar to be a scripture govern- “ing the usage of words. (14) “ There is a Mantra addressed to Varuna, who is described as “having seven rivers, &c.; and the Mahdbhashya takes the Mantra as ad- “dressed to the science of grammar, explaining the ‘seven’ rivers as the ‘* seven case-terminations, &c., and from this it argues that it is necessary “to study Grammar, for the purpose of learning what is meant by these ‘terminations,’ &. But as a matter of factall that grammar does is only “to attribute the name ‘terminations ’ (Vibhaktis) to certain letters, &c. ; ‘but even this name it may have only borrowed from ordinary usage ; while “so far as the words made up of these terminations are concerned, they ‘are found by themselves both in the Veda and in ordinary parlance ; and ‘there can be no necessity of learning grammar on this score. Then NECESSITY OF USING CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS. 298 “again, even if it be absolutely necessary to explain the words ‘ sever “rivers” figuratively, as meaning something other than actual rivers,— ‘then, too, there are many septenaries in connection with sacrifices, that ‘‘ could be taken to be indicated by the said words ; for instance, there are “seven persons, including the priests and the master of the sacrifices ; ‘‘seven sentences pronounced by the Hoty priest; seven sentences ‘from the Sama and its parts ; and so forth. And all these being matters ‘dealt within the historical and sacrificial portions (of the Veda), there can ‘ be no need of grammatical study on the score of these.” ‘You seem to hold that it is only the words grammatically purified “that are correct ; and now it 18 for you to explain what it is that is puri- ‘fied, and in what manner. That is to say, if grammar be held to help ‘‘in the purification of words, it is not very easy to ascertain what it is that “is purified ; and also whether the purification is in the shape of produc- “tion, or acquisition, or modification, or fructification into an Apiirva, or ‘the bringing about of a fresh potency. “In the first place itis not possible for any individual of the class ‘‘*Cabdatva’ or of the class ‘ Varzatva’ to be the object purified ; “because this would apply to all words and letters, and as such there “could be no restriction (of the correct or the incorrect). And if the “class ‘Gabdatva’ were held to be the object purified, then any ordinary “sound (that of the beating of the drum for instance) would also come to ९५ ha spoken of as ‘correct.’ And if the class ‘ Varnatva ’ were held to be that ५ opject, then the letters contained in the words, ‘ gd@vi,’ &c., being ‘letters’ ‘(as much as those in ‘gauh ’), the case of these would be exactly similar “to that of the words ‘ gawh’ and the like. ८ 116 same argument holds also respecting the purification as belonging ‘to the individual letters ; and when the letter ‘ga’ has once been purified, “as occurring in the word ‘gd,’ it being the same in the word ‘ g@vi’ also, this “latter word could not but be accepted as correct. And thus all indivi- ‘dual letters having been purified, no word could ever be rightly held “to be incorrect. And as for the purification applying to the collection ५५ of letters, this cannot be possible, as no two letters being heard simulta- ‘neously, there can never be any ‘ conglomeration’ of these. “Those again, who hold all individual letters to be undergoing “momentary destruction, can never have any purification of letters; as “each letter being destroyed no sooner than produced, there would be “nothing left to be purified; and hence even though the letter be an “entity, it can have no existence at the time of the purification, it having ५ disappeared, even at the time that we may be thinking of purifying it. And ‘if it could be purified, no one would be able to perceive it in its purified RHA, TENTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I-—PEDA Itf—apunr 9. «form; and hence this purification of the letter would be exactly like that ‘of the flour that may be said to be purified by being offered into the fire ! “ That is to say, in the case of the sentence, ‘ offers the flour,’ the flour offered “into the fire having been burnt up by the fire, and as such becoming in- “ eapable of being seen or used again, if the Accusative ending in ‘saktan’ “be made the ground of accepting the view that the flour is purified by ‘“‘the fire, then, m that case, every factor of the Injunction (‘ offers .the ‘‘four’)——namely, the Flour, the Offering, the Bhavana and the Injunction “itself—would be absolutely meaningless; and for this very reason we ‘hold that there is no purification of the flour in the offering. Exactly “in the same manner, there would be a meaninglessness of all things “ goncerned, if we admitted of a purification of the momentarily disappear- “ing individual letters. “And the declaration of ‘uncertainty’ in the Bhashya,—as whether “the word be eternal or transient, the definition (of grammar) is equally ५५ applicable—only shows, on the part of the author, that he has either ‘been purposely fighting shy of the above arguments, or simply trying to ‘‘hoodwink his disciples ; and as such we cannot accept it. Specially as “itis ouly in regard to an object that is removed from us that there can “be any uncertainty; for who is there that has any uncertainty as to ‘“‘ whether fire is hot or cold ? “. and in this case we find that though the existence of the crows is not denoted by the word ‘ Déva- ‘‘datta’s house,’ yet 16 serves as & distinguishing mark whereby tho man ‘knows the actual house called ‘ Dévadatta’s house’; in the same manner, “though the Class is not actually denoted by the word ‘ Cow, ’ yet 1 will “serve as the distinguishing mark whereby we would know the actual ८ Individual called ‘ Cow.’ ‘The Bhashya has cited the word । Dandi’ (the man with the stick) ; “the sense being that just as the Dundu is nob actually denoted by the “word § Dandi’ though it serves as the distinguishing mark of the person “called ‘Dandi,’ in the same manner could the Class serve as the dis- “tinguishing mark of the Individual denoted. “ Against this example of the Bhashya, the following objections are “raised: (1) ‘In tho word Dandi its base Danda is actually found to ५५ denote the Danda ; how then can it be asserted that the word Dandi does ‘not denote the Dundu? (2) The fact that is under consideration 16 that “of the Class serving as the distinguishing mark; while the example that ‘has been citcd is one of qualification ` | : “But none of these objections affect the main position—(1) What is ‘meant by the assertion of the Denda not being denoted 1४ that it is 47 370 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1—PADA I1I—ADHI. (106). ५५ 1106 denoted by the affix (inz), in the word ‘ Dandi’, the sense thus being ‘that, just as in the case of the word ‘ Dandi,’ though the Danda 1s not “actually denoted by the affix, and yet it is found to point to a person ५ qualified by the possession of the Danda, in the same manner in the case in “question, though the Class is not denoted, yet the word would denote the ४ Individual as qualified by the Class. (2) As for the objection that the ५८ matter in question being the fact of the Class serving as the distinguish- ‘ang mark, it was not proper for the Bhiashya to cite an instance of qualt- ९१ ficutvon,—this 18 not a proper objection ; because the distinguishing mark “ too 18 only a qualificalzon after all. Or, it may be that the example cited ‘‘bears a similarity to the main question, in various phases of it— ** such as some may he similar to 1t on the point of non-denotability (as in the ०८ 08.80 of tho word ‘ Dandi’), while some may be so only on the point of ४५ 108 serving as a distinguishing mark (as in the case of ‘ Dévadatta’s house ’) ; ‘and thus there 1s nothing wrong in the example cited by the Bhashya. ‘And in this theory there can be neither a too narrow, nor a too wide, application of the word (as urged above) against the purcly Indi- vidualistic theory. ”’ But all this is not quite to the point, Itis true that the house of Déva- datta, and the man with the stick are denoted (by the words ‘ Dévadatta’s houso,’ and ‘ Dandi’); but the presence of the crows serves as the dis- tinguishing mark of the house, only when it is actually scen by the eyes ; and so also tho possession of the stick is recognised as the distinguishing mark of the Dandi, only by means of this latter word; while in the case in question, the class ‘Cow’ is not before us; and as such, not being in any way cognised, it could not serve as the distinguishing mark (unless it were admitted to be denoted by the word itself) ; and so long as the qualification (Class) has not been cognised, there can be no idea of the qualified (In- dividual). Nor is any portion of the word ‘ Cow’ found to denote the Class ‘ Cow,’ as the word ‘ Danda,’ forming part of the word ‘ Dandi,’ is found to denote the stick; and as such we cannot admit that the first portion of the word ‘Cow’ donotes the Class (the qualification) while the second portion signifies the Individual (as qualified by it) [just as in the word ‘ Dandi,’ the first part ‘ Danda’ signifies the qualifying stick, while the second purt, the affix, denotes the person qualified by the stick]. Thus then, if the Class be held to be denoted by the word ‘ Cow, ’ it is this alone that can be accepted as constituting the true denotation of the word. And (if not, then) that which is not cognised not being capable of sorving as the distinguishing mark, the contingency of the too wide an application of the word remains unexplained. In the case of the word ‘ Dandi,’ the case is a little different; as the word cannot be used with reference to the stick only ; and as such it cannot but be admilted to be denotative of the persen ~=a IT IS THE CLASS THAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD. 371 qualified (by the possession of the stick) ; whereas the word ‘Cow’ cannot be said to be incapable of being used with reference to the Class ‘ Cow, ’ and as such, necessarily pointing to the Individual as qualified (by the Class). Because in the case of such expressions as ‘ Cyénavita’ and the like, we actually find the word ‘ Cyéna’ used with reference to the Class. And also from invariable concomitance, both negative and positive, we con- clude that the word denotes the Class: for instance, in the passage speak- of the ‘ Cyénacita,’ wo actually find the word ‘Cyéna’ used with reference to the Class; and we never find any instance of a word being used with reference to the Individual independently of the Class. The above arguments also serve to reject all the other alternative theories that have been put forward with regard to the denotation of a word, And thus we conclude that the Word denotes the Class. The Pirvapaksha arguments—viz., of the impossibility of the Injune- tions of such actions as killing, washing, &c.—that have been summed up under— Sitra (34). “There would be no Actions, and the Injunctions would refer to something else, and not to Substances ”"— Are set aside by the following— Sutra (35). The performance of the actions 18 for the sake of a transcendental result; and there is no disjunction. All actions of washing, killing, &c., being performed for the sake of certain transcendental results, their performance must be taken as part of the means of the accomplishment of such results; and the means of fulfilling the transcendental results are the Substances, and not the Class ; as the former are pointed out by the sacrifices by themselves for their own accomplishment, while the latter 18 incapable of accomplishing any sacri- fices. Consequently the denotation of the Class must be accepted, for the . sake of the pointing out of the exact Substance, and not for the sake of the Class itself—(1) because a cognition of the Class by itself is not what is sought after; (2) because in that case a denotation of the Class alone would have only a transcendental result ; and (3) because, being incorporeal, it is not found capable of helping the sacrifice in any way. Even ina case when the Class as signified by a basic noun is recognised as the means of performing a sacrifice (as in ‘ 6०77४211 ˆ व ९८८), it 18 recognised only as pointing to a definite Substance, and not to itself independently, as by itself it is of no particular use in the performance of the sacrifice. Thus then, the denotation of the Class pointing to a definite Substance, 372 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA III—ADQHYI, and the Substance being quite capable of being related to the actions of killing, washing, &c., as also to Genders, Numbers and Cases,—there 18 nothing that can be urged against our theory, It 18 with a view to this that the Sutra says—there 15 no disjunction. That is to say, (1) even in accordance with the Class-theory, there is no disjunction of the actions of washing, §c., from the Substances; or (2) the denotation of the Class serving the purpose of pointing to a definite Sub- stance, there is no disjunction of the performance of the actions mentioned above; or (3) there being no absolute difference between the Class and the Individual, the Substance is pointed out, at times in the form of tho Individual, and at others, in that of the Class, in accordanco with the wish of the speaker; and as such words being found to denote both forms of things, even when the Individual is denoted (by the word), 1 does not necessitate any multiplicity in the performance of the action; or (4) the Class not being totally different from the Individual, the sacrifices per- formed with reference to the Individual may be accepted as performed with reference to the Class also, and vice versa; and thus in no case 18 if necessary to make any difference in the performance of Actions (or Sacri- fices); or (5) both the Class and the Individual serve the purpose of accomplishing a sacrifice; with reference to whichsoever of these two, the sacrifice may be performed, both of them come to be recognised as useful; and as such there is no disjunction (of the Actions) from the Substance. Thus then, even in accordance with the Class-theory, such Actions as killing, washing, &c., being quite possible, we conclude that it is the Class that constitutes the denotation of the word. Goin GEMS iL asa Thus ends the Third—Smrti— Pada of the First Adhydya. ADHYAYA I. PADA IY. TREATING OF THE Names oF Sacrifices. ADHIKARANA (1). (Divided into two Adhikaranas in the Varttka: A.—that such words as‘ udbhid, §c., also help in the knowledye of Dharma; and B.—that such words are names of sacrefices. ) Question: The authority of the Veda together with the Smrtis having boen established, the presont was the time for considering the meanings of Veda passages (which also aro the means of knowing Dharma); wherefore and in what connection, then, should the Bhashya before having furnished the consideration of the means of knowing Dharma, have taken up the consideration of the Names of sacrifices ? Some people offer the following explanation: “The question “dealt with is—do the words ‘udbhid’ and the like, point out the ‘materials (to be used at sacrifices) or the names (of sacrifices)? (Thus “ the question doaling directly with tho means of knowing Dharma,”) But this is not quite correct; because in this manner all books could be explained as the means of knowing; because all Sentences may be ex- plained as dealing with the question—does this sentence point out this fact or that ? Some people (notably the author of the Bhashya himself) take the Sutra (1) as the Parvapaksha and Sutra (2) as the Siddha@nia of the same Adhikarana; but it is necossary for these people to point out what there is in Sutra (1) that is not in keeping with the Siddhania (that it should be taken as the Parvapakshu). For certainly the assertion of the fact of the words like ‘udbhid’ being included in ‘that which serves the purpose of fulfilling an action ’ is by no means unacceptable to the Siddhanti. Hence we explain these two Satras as embodying the Siddhanta of the two Adhikaranas 374 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I—-PADA IV—ADHI (1) A. (A. & B.), the Pérvapaksha of both being supplied from without. [Our explanation dealing with the consideration of the authoritative character and usefulness of certain words with regard to Dharma makes the Siatras connected with the main subject of the Adhyaya. | ADHIKARANA (A). With regard to words like ‘ udbhid’ (as occurring in such passages as ‘udbhidd yajéta pagukadmah’), wo havea doubt as to whether they have any use in matters relating to Dharma, or १०४. And on this point, we have the following PURVAPAKSHA (A). “These words have no use with regard to Dharma, because they have “no connection with the performance of actions, while the Veda deals with “such performance alone; as has been declared elsewhere also: ‘ Only (१ {11166 parts of the Veda (viz., Vidht, Arthavadda and Mantra) have an “authority with regard to Dharma; and the words in question being ‘different from all these three, they can serve no useful purpose with “regard to Dharma; and as such they are absolutely useless.’ (1) Theso ९५ words cannot be said to be included in Vidhi ; because they do not signify “either the Means or the Result or the Method of any sacrifices; (2) “they are different from Arthavdda, because they do not signify any Praise ; ५ (3) they cannot be said to serve the purpose of » Mantra; because they ८ १० not indicate any accessories (Material, Deity, &c.) of sacrifices. And “apart from these three there is no other use of the Veda; and hence “the words in question caunot have any authority (with regard to ‘ Dharma).” ? In reply to the above, we have the following SIDDHANTA (A). Sutra (1). It has already been explained that the Veda helps in the performance of sacrifices; and hence the whole of it should be accepted as serving that purpose. That is to say, the whole of the Veda being divided into the aforesaid three parts, and the authoritative characters of the three parts having been proved by means of the arguments urged above (in Padas II and III), the authoritative character of words like ‘udbhid’ cannot be denied, on ‘UDBHID,’ &€., ARE NAMES AND 11.72 IN KNOWLEDGE OF DHARMA. 375 the ground of their being different from the three parts (because the three parts take in the whole of the Veda, and the words in question are found in the Veda). ADHIKARANA (7). It having been shown by the foregoing Adhtkarana that the words in question have the same use as one of the three parts of the Veda, we proceed to consider which one of these uses are fulfilled by them. Now then, (1) they cannot serve the purpose of the Arthavada; be- cause they are not found in connection with any other sentence. It may be asked—‘ How can they be denied to be supplementary to a sentence, when they are actually found in a sentence, exactly like the assertion—' Vayw 1s the eftest deity?’ Butitis not so; thatwhich is supplementary to some- thing that is enjoined, is what is known as ‘ Adrthavada’ ; while the words 21) question do not appear apart from the Injunction itself (‘ yajéta’); therefore they cannot be said to be supplementary to any Sentence; and we have already proved under the Audumbaradhika ana that that which 1s capable of being taken along with an Injunction caunot be taken as mere Praise. Nor have we ever found any Praise oxpressed by a single word; neither do we comprehend any Praise as expressed by the word ‘ Udbhid.’ Though the word conld be taken as Praise, inasmuch it is capable of being ex- plained as ‘that by which trees, &c., are cut properly,’—yet such an interpretation would be set aside by the most rational fact of tho ‘ udbhid’ being an Instrument (in the performance of a sacrifice), as is pointed out by the Instrumental ending in the word ‘ wdbhila’; for if mere Praise were meant, the noun would have had only the Nominative ending, as we have in the word ‘ Vayuh’ in the acknowledged Arthavada— Vayurvar kshépt- shtha dévaté.’ (2) Nor can the word ‘ uwdbhid’ be taken as a Mantra; because it is not recognised as one; and also because the students of the Veda do not remember any such Mantra, And being a single word it cannot be said to stand in need of something €186 (which it would indicate exactly as tho Mantra indicates the Materials and Deities of sacrifices) ; and as it is recog- nised as the ‘Instrument,’ it cannot be said to bring about an idea of any- thing else (in the shape of the Material or the Deity). Nor do we find the word itself denoting anything that would form the material part of a Sac- 11866 $ and no sentence that actually indicates anything not forming a material part of the Sacrifice, can be accepted as auxiliary to the sacrifice. If we 86४ about assuming a material to be indicated by the Mantra (in the shape of the word ‘ Udbhid’), it would be a most unwarrantable complica- tion of matters. Nor do we find any Vedic text, like the Saktavaika (which 76 TANTRA-VARIIK A. ADH. I—PADA tv—apul (1) 8B. lays down the fact of certain Mantras being employed at certain sacrifices) laying down the employment of this word as a Mantra; so that the afore- said assumption of the material too is not possible. Nor again 18 the word itself capable of being employed as a Mantra; so that we cannot even assume any Injunctions of its employment, as we do in the case of the Mantra ‘ 7512 tua’ and the rest. And lastly, it is evident that the word forms part of the Brahmana passage ‘udbhidd yajéta’; and 88 such, it cannot be taken as a Mantra. Thus then, it being clear that the word forms part of the subject of the Injunction itself, we procecd to consider the question as to whether the word constitutes the Injunction of a Matorial, or it is only the name of a Sacrifice. And on this point, we have the following PURVAPAKSHA (B). “Tt is tho material (ave) that is enjoined by the word ‘udbhida’; (1) ‘because the universally recognised fact is mostly authoritative; (2) be- “cause a distinctly uscful purpose is served ; and (3) because this inter- pretation is much more capable of prompting men to tho performance of “tho particular action, than any other. (a) That is to say, it is an uni- ५५ ए 0139011 $ recognised fact that the noun ‘ wdbhid’ literally signifies a “cutting mstrument (the Axe); nor is the word ‘udbhida’ known to signify “anything else; and the meani ng of a word that is not recognised in or- “dinary parlance cannot be got at from the Veda; because the relation- “ship of a word (to its denotation) is not fixed by the scriptures (but by “ordinary parlance). As for tho Instrumental ending, it signifies mere “ Instrumentality, and itis only a potent substance, or the potency re- “siding in the substance, that 18 known to be capable of serving as the ‘“‘Tustrument of an Action. And 16 18 only when the Injunction is found “to serve a distinctly uscful purposo that it can prompt people to tho “particular course of action ; that is to say, it is only those persons that ‘‘recognise the word ‘ wdbhid’ to be an Injunction (of the material) that “can engage themselves in the particular action mentioned ; for if such ‘an engagement could come about even without the recognition of the “fact of the Injunction serving a useful purpose, it would be as good ns ‘the engagement that is not preceded by any distinctly-uttered Injunc- ¢“ tion. ५ (९) Or, the word ‘uwdbhid&’ may be taken as the Injunction of a ‘material ; becauso of tho universally recognised meaning of the word “the ‘artharattva’ of the word may be explained as the ‘fact of its hay- “ing ४ meaning’; the sense of the argumeut in this case being that ina ए70एप्ा),' &C., ARE NAMES AND HELP IN KNOWLEDGE OF DAARMA. 377 “name the jiteral significance of the word is not always recognised (while ‘fit is recognised in the case of the word ‘ uwdbhid,’ which, therefore, can- ‘*not be a name). ““(c) Or, the fact of the word ‘ndbhid’ having a significance only when “taken apart from the ‘sacrifice,’ may be employed as an argument ‘‘ against its being taken as a Name; specially as the word ‘ wibhid’ serves ‘‘@ purpose totally different from that served by the root yajt (== to sacri- ८ 706, in the word ‘ yajéta’); and thus alone is it possible for the person “to be prompted to the particular action. “Tt may be urged that, ‘even a name while qualifying or specifying ‘the sacrifice, would serve to prompt the person to the particular course “of action.’ ८ But this igs not possible ; why ? Becanse the Class ‘ sacrifice ’ not being ‘fa fit object of Injunction, the root ‘ yaji’ itself points to the Individual “sacrifice ; and if the name (^ udbhid’) be held to denote the Oluss ‘ sacri- ९५ fice,’ then 16 ceases to be a name! That 18 to say, when the root itself is ‘‘ found to indicate the Individual sacrifice, on account of the Class (which ५८ 18 directly denoted by it) not being capable of being enjoined, then what «५ 18 left to be done by the name ? While if the name ‘ udbhid’ be held to ८ ‹ denote the Individual sacrifice, then a generic name not being desirable “for a particular sacrifice, the word would be altogether irrelevant; and “we shall explain later on that the object specified (४.९. the sacrifice) ८८ being itself a well-established entity, the name could not be accepted as “enjoining it. Even though at times it may be possible for words like ५ ८ ९८76012 ' to have a specific (and not a generic) denotation, yet even ‘(such specific denotation being invariably accompanied by the generic “element, it can have no connection with the root ‘ yaj1.’ ८ And further, the Injunction itself becomes much simpler, if the word “Sudbhida’ is taken as laying down the material ; because in that case, it ‘would be merely refering to the sacrifice enjoined elsewhere [that is ८५ {0 say, the meaning of the Injunction would only mean that one should ५ werform the sacrifice with the axe, the Injunction enjoining only the mate- “rial, its work being thereby much more lightened than if 16 had to en- «¢ Join the sacrifice also]. ८५ Against this it might be urged that, ‘in that case the force of the ‘Injunction having been exhausted in the laying down of the matcrial, ८८ the sacrifice itself would remain unenjoined ; and then, ns there would be ५ 0 sacrifice laid down, there would be nothing at which the enjoined ‘ material would be employed, and hence the Injunction of the material ‘‘ would be absolutely useless.’ | ८५ In view of this objection, it is said—prakriau gyotishtomé—z.e., the ५ sacrifice is enjoined along with the jyotishtoma, of which it is an auxiliary 48 378 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1-—-PADA IV——ADHI 1 (a) & (४). “It may, however, be urged that—‘if all names be taken as laying ‘down the materials to be used at the sacrifices, even the word ‘ Jyotsh- ‘toma’ in the Injunction ‘ Jyotishtoména yajéta’ would only point out a ‘material to be employed; and the sacrifice would remain as unenjoined ‘‘as over.’ Bunt, as a matter of fact, there is no other way out of this “difficulty than to admit one of these sentences (‘ Jyolishtoména yaj eta’ “and ‘udbhidd yajéta’) to enjoin the sacrifice (and not the material) ; be- “cause in the absence of an Injunction of Action, any laying down of ९८ materials is impossible ; hence we admit the word ‘ Jyotishtoma’ alone to ८५ 00 the name of a sacrifice (and not the Injunction of a material). Or, we ‘may take the sentence ‘ Jyotishloména yajéta’ to be the Injunction ‘of “a sacrifice performed with the particular material pointed out; while the ‘other words may be taken as Injunctions of materials only. “It may be urged that—‘in that case the Injunctions of all the “various subsidiaries of the Jyotishtoma, viz., the Hkaha, the Ahina, &c.— “being mere injunctions of so many materials, these sacrifices themselves ‘would not be different from the Jyotishtoma itself; and thus there being ‘‘no subsidiary sacrifices, the Jyotishtoma could not be the primary (Prak- ९८ 1.८) of any sacrifices ; and hence it could not be spoken of as such.’ ५ Some people reply to this that the assertion of the Jyotuhtoma as ‘the primary sacrifice is in accordance with the view of the Siddhante ८५ (who holds all such words to be names). ८ But wo can explain tho sentence ‘ Prakrtau Jyotishtomé’ in a differ- “ent way altogether. Prakrti is thata considcration of which has been in- ८५ troduced; hence the sentence would mean that the sacrifice, at which the “ulbhid would be used as a material, is enjoined in connection with the ८८ Tyotishtoma, (as the passage ‘ udbhidd yajéta’ is found in the same con- “text as the Jyotishtoma sacrifice). ‘Or, the Jyotishtoma could be spoken of as the ‘Primary’ (Prakréz), “in comparision with the various sacrifices recognised as distinct sacri- “fices (apart from the Jyotiushtoma),—being pointed out by the sen- “tences ‘ Athaisha Jyolth,’ &c., which being devoid of any Instrumental “terminations are unconnected with any verbs, and as such, are not cap- “able of being taken as Injunctions of materials. ५५ Another objection 18 raised: ‘As for the Jyotishtoma sacrifice, its “original Injunction itself lays down the Som and the Jyotishtoma as ‘materials to be employed at it, the Injunction of any other material for ‘it is not right. ’ ‘Bat the materials like ‘ wdbhid’ being laid down in view of the ob- “taining of certain definite desirable results, these would set aside all ५८ othor materials that may have been laid down in the original Injunction. “Tt is an admitted fact that the materials laid down in the original ¢ UDBHID,’ &C., ARE NAMES AND HELP IN KNOWLEDGE OF DHARMA. 379 ‘“Tnjunction can be utilised only at the necessary Actions (7.¢., the Actions “that aro performed as mere dulies and not with a view to the obtaining ८५ 0१ any desirable results). Or, it may be that though the original Injunc- “tion has laid down the Jyotishtoma as to be performed with certain defi- “nite materials, yet the subsequent Injunctions (like ‘ udbhida yajéta,’) ‘‘could be taken as laying down other materials for the same sacrifice, the “injunction of the sacrifice itself, without the material, being borrowed ‘from the original Injunction; and thus the material laid down by the “subsequent Injunction would bo in no way different from that laid down ‘fin the original one. Otherwise we would be, as the Bhashya thinks, ‘obliged to accept both materials as optional alternatives. ” SIDDHANTA (B). Sutra (2). That (word) must be a name, which at first ap- pears new; because it cannot lay down (the material). We proceed to explain the words of the Sétra: When a word—like “‘udbhid’—1is such that, when first heard, it ‘appears now ’—~.e., is not 00111864 as signifying anything definite,—then, if it be come across, first of all, in a Vedic Injunction, 16 must be taken as a name, on account of its co-extensiveness (with the sacrifice enjoined). Or, the clause ‘ ufpattdva- purvam’ may mean that inasmuch the word ‘udbhid’ would point out a definite sacrifice (not otherwise got at) it would not be useless. Or, it may be explained thus: The question being—‘ whose name would the word be ?’—, the Siira replies—‘the name belongs to that sacrifice, the per- formance of which would accomplish a particular transcendental result.’ ‘Now, what is the reason for holding the word to be a Name? Says the Sulra ‘ Avidhaykatvat ’—‘ Because it cannot lay down (the mate- rial), To explain—If the word laid down the material, the material could be laid down—(1) either with reference to the Result (the meaning of the In- junction being ‘one should think of obtaining cattle by means of the udbhid axe); or (2) with regard to the sacrifice (the meaning being ‘one should accomplish the sacrifice by means of the axe’); or (3) with reference to both taken together (the meaning being ‘ one should obtain the cattle by means of the sacrifice with the axe forits material.’) But none of these is possible. (1) If the Material were laid down with reference to the Result, then—(a) the Injunctive affix (in ‘ yajéta’) would lay down the relation- ship of words other than in which it happens to be (that is to say, the Injunction would refer to the causal relationship of the material udbhid, with the Result, obtaining of cattle, without having anything to do with 380 TANIRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA 1V—ADHI 1 (a) & (2). the sacrifice itself); (8) we would have to assume a direct relationship between the two words ‘udbhida’ and ‘ pagukdmah,’ which are mentioned (in the toxt) far apart from one another ; (c) the verbal root ‘ yajt’ having nothing to do with the Injunction, the sole purpose of its use would lie in that it makes the use of the affix possible; (ध) we would have to reject the Soma, which has been laid down in the original Injunction as the material to be used at the sacrifice; and (e) we would have the absurdity of the sacrifice being performed with a material (remnants of) which could not be eaten. (2) If the material were laid down with. reference to the Sacrifice, then—(a) the mention of the Result would be absolutely useless; nor could the Result be taken as qualifying the Jyotisktoma sacrifice, because this sacrifice has been spoken of as bringing about all desirable results ; and as such, its qualification by any one result would result in a syntacti- cal split; and the objections (a) (c) (d) and (e), pointed out above, would also apply to this theory, as also the contingency of the aze being accepted ४8 an optionnl alternative to Soma. (3) Similarly too, if the material be taken to be laid down as qualify- ing the sacrifice, then, (a) all the words in the sentence would have to renounce their own direct siguifications (as none of them has such a quali- fied mixed signification); (b) we would have to assume various denotative potentialities of the Injunction (as there could be no signification of the qualified without a distinct signification of the qualification) ; (©) we would have to resort to the indirect possessive indication, 11 the case of the word ‘udbhida’ (which would have to be taken as indicating ‘ udbhid- vata’=by that by which has the udbhid for tts material; (d) it would be necessary for us to reject the intimate relationship of co-extensiveness (between the ‘sacrifice’ and the ‘udbhid’) which is distinctly pointed out by the fact of the former being signified by a verbal root with an Injunctive affix (which has also an Instrumental force), while the latter has in itself an Instramental termination; and (e) lastly, the sacrifice would be performed with a material that could not be eaten. For these reasons the word ‘ udbhidd’ cannot be taken as laying down the material for a sacrifice ; and this 18 what is pointed ont by the Bhashya : (If it were the Injunction of a material) the sentence would directly denote the udbhid and indirectly indicate that in which ४४ would be employed as the material. ‘The Bhashya may also be read as—Vakshyanti lakshay& (the meaning being the same). Having thus explained the implications of the noun ‘udbhid,’ the Bhishya proceeds to show that the same facts are also pointed out by the Instrumental affix (in ‘ udbhida'): One should accomplish by means of the sac- rifice, ¥c. That is to say, whether the passage be taken as an independent ' UDBHID,’ &C., ARE NAMES AND HELP IN KNOWLEDGE OF DHARMA. 381 Injunction by itself or as supplementary to another Injunction, the Sacrifice is recognised to be the Instrument (of the accomplishment of o certain result) ; and hence the word (* udbhid@’) also with an Instrumental, ending, occurring in close proximity to the words signifying the sacrifice cannot but be taken as denoting the Instrument. The Bhasbya says—‘ From the Noun which denotes the karana’— (Instrument), &c. &c.; and against this, it may be argued that—,“‘ in all cases the case-significations being held to belong to the Terminations (as 18 distinctly laid down in such passages as ‘by meaus of the third case- termination which signifies Instrumentality, &c.’), how can the Noun be spoken of as expressing the karana (or Instrument)? ' But this does not affect the position of the Bhashya; (1) because what is meant by the passage in question is that the Noun signifies the Substratum of the Instrumentality. (2) Or, the assertion may be said to be based upon the fact of the Noun having a signification similar to that of the word ‘karana’ [that is to say the Noun ‘udbhid,’ means ‘that by which is shot forth (the particular result),’ and this is similar to the signification of the word ‘karaza’ which means ‘that by which some- thing is done.’] Specially as the word made up of the &rt affix ‘kvip’ (viz., the word ‘karunu,’ as also the word ‘ udbhid’) signifies a cortain sub- stance endowed with a definite case-potentiality, and not the potentiality alone, apart from the substance; and it 18 for this reason that we find the word ‘ karana’ taking other case-terminations also—as ‘karandya’) with the Dative), ‘karanam’ (with the Accusative) and the like; for if no sub- stance were signified by the word (‘karana,’) then the only case-termina- tion applicable to 1४ would be that which is indicated by the affix ‘kvuip’ (and this would be the Instrumental only); and the substance (that would be signified by the word ‘kurana’) would not be capable of any other case-potentiality; because one potentiality cannot have another potentiality. Thus then, all words with the kri affix being found to be significant of certain substances with definite potencies, it is only proper to speak of the Noun (‘udbhid’) as signifying the ‘karana.’ The upshot of all this is this: In the passage (‘ udbhiddé yajéta paguka- mah’) the Noun, that signifies what is recognised to be the Instrument, must take the Instrumental case-termination; and it is the Sacrifice and not the material, that is recognised to be the Instrument (or means) of obtaining the particular result, as we shall explain later on; and hence it is only when the word ‘ udbhid’ denotes the sacrifice, that it can have the Instrumental case-ending, and be capable of being properly taken along with (the word ‘sacrifice ’ in) the sentence; whereas if it has any other meaning, it woud be altogether irrelevant (and unconnected with any portion of the sentence.) 382 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—PADA IV—ADHI 1 (a) & (b). Objection: “ The fact of the word ‘udbhid’ signifying a substance ‘being cognised by means of direct sense-perception, exactly as in the ‘‘case of such words as ‘vrihi,’ ‘soma’ and the like, wherefore is “it sought to be set aside by the inference of the fact of its signify- “ing the Instrument 7 Thatis to say, in tho case of such sentences as ८ ^ 5014९10 yajéta, even though the sacrifice is recognised as the means (of «५ obtaining a particular result), and the word ‘ soména’ has the Instru- ५५ mental case-ending,—yet this 18 not taken alone (as co-extensive) with the “sacrifice (the Soma being taken as the material); and there is nothing "५ very incongruous in this; we could have exactly the same thing in the ‘‘case in question also. [ And, says the Bhashya, though this would “involve the necessity of having recourse to possessive indication in the ‘case of the word ‘udbhida@’ which would have to be taken as signifying “by that which has the udbhid for tts material, yet there would be no “harm in having recourse to such Indication ; because this is an ordinary “process of interpretation, while the assumption of something absolutely ‘unknown, for instance the fact of ‘udbhid’ being the name of a parti- “cular sacrifice would be a most unwarrentable liberty taken by the ५५ Siddhantt ] (The Bhashya uses the word ‘hatha,’ which means the “ greon scum found on the surface of water, which, when removed by the ‘hand, closes in again, and cannot be kept away ; and on the present occa- ‘‘ 8101, it is figuratively used in the sense of an wiuwarrantable liberty).” To this objection, we make the following reply:—A word, whose signification is unknown, when occurring along with words of well-known ineanings, has its meaning ascertained by means of these latter; whereas a word, the meaning of which is well-known, is never separated from this meaning. That is to say, such words as ‘ Vrihi,’ ‘ Soma’ and the like have their meanings so very well-known, that they can never be taken apart from these meanings; and hence in such passages as ‘soména yajéta,’ as they cannot be taken along with (as co-extensive with) the sacrifice, we are obliged to take them as laying down the materials to be employed at the sacrifices. On the other hand, in the case of such words as ‘ udbhid,’ and the like, the only meaning that is recognised 18 that which is derived from the meanings of the partscom posing the word (५६ + bhid + kvip); and as such the word is as capable of being taken as signifying the sacrifice (udbhidyaté pagu- praptih yéna, that which brings about the obtaining of cattle) as the material (udbhidyaté chédyaté anéna, that by which tree, &c., are cut); and hence we do not find Direct Sense-perception lending any support to either; as there can be nothing very objectionable in having recourse to Inference, for ascertaining the true meaning of the word. And, asa matter of fact, for the ascertaining of the true meaning of all words, the one most important means is the well-known relation of co-extensiveness ; and it is by this very ‘UDBHID,’ &C., ARE NAMES AND HELP IN KNOWLEDGE OF DHARMA. 383 means that the principal Instrumentality, having obtained its chief sub- stratum in the sacrifice, becomes capable of drawing the Noun (‘ wdbhid ’) also to its own purpose. And further, if the word ‘udbhida’ be taken as pointing out the name of the sacrifice, all that has got to be done by the word is to signify ४ concurrent Instrumentality in connection with the sacrifice (which is directly recognised as the Instrument); and the task of the Injunction becomes much lightened; while if the word be taken as laying down a material for the sacrifice, even the Number and the Case of the word will have to be accepted as objects of the Injunction. That is to say, in ac- cordanco with your theory, it would be necessary to assume a distinct potentiality of the Injunction with regard to the special termination (in ‘udbhida’). Thus then, we conclude that the various parts composing the word ‘udbhid’ are quite well-known as pointing to the sacrifice. Nor can it be urged that, inasmuch as the Jyotishtoma, &c., are also capable of bringing forth their results, the name ‘udbhid’ would belong to them also; be- cause the particles composiug the word (as occurring in the sentence in question) can refer to only that sacrifice, a co-extensiveness with which is pointed out in the sentence; and as a matter of fact (this co-extensivoness 18 perceived only with reference to the particular sacrifice that brings about the acquisition of cattle, and) we do not find the word ‘ udbhid’ ever mentioned along with the Jyotishtoma, &c. (and as such its co-exten- 81१61688 with these can never be recognised). Or, itis only by means of the Apparent Inconsistency (of the expressed co-extensiveness) that the bringing about (udbhédana) can be recognised as referring to a particular result only; and as there is no such Apparent Inconsistency in the case of the Jyotishtoma, &c., the name ‘ udbhid’ can never be attributed to them. We have in the Sutra, the word ‘ awdhdayakatvat’; and in explaining this, the Bhashya says: It will not enjoin (or lay down),&c. And the sense of this is that we do not take the passage in question as actually laying down the name ‘ Udbhid’ as belonging to the particular sacrifice, as we have ..Panini’s Sara I-i-1, directly laying down that the name ‘Vrddhi’ belongs to Atand Aic; (nor have we any necessity of taking the passage thus), because this fact is pointed out by the directly expressed co-cextensiveness (of the Udbhid with the sacrifice) and the well-known meaning afforded by the component parts of the word ‘ Udbhid,’ But all that the Bhishya means is that the passage does not mean that ‘one should obtain cattle by means of the sacrifice, and this sacrifice is named Udbhid’ (because that that would involve a syntactical split); but at the same time, it cannot be denied that the passage distinctly points to the fact of the name belonging to the sacrifice (as the only moaning that the passage can have is that 384 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I—PADA IV—ADHI 1 (a) & (6). ‘one should obtain cattle by means of the Udbhid-sncrifice’); because it is thus alone that the passage could point to a particular sacrifice. Though in the present case (the Udbhid and the Sacrifice not having the same case-ending) there is no direct co-ordination between the name and the named, yet the relationship between them cannot be any other than that of the qualtfication (name) and the qualified (named); because all that the name does is to point to'a certain object as distinguished by its own verbal form. [That is to say, it is only when the co-ordination is between what are signified by the words that 1t 18 necessary for these to have the same case-ending ; whereas in the case of the Name, it is by its mere verbal form that it specifies an object; and as such it does not stand in need of the co-ordination obtained from the fact of the two words having the same case-ending]. It may be urged that—‘in that case you would have a denotation (by the word ‘ Udbhida’) of the verbal form of the word (which is not quite compatible with your tenets)’ But, asa matter of fact, the verbal form of the word (‘ Udbhid’) being cognised by direct Auditory Perception, it is only that which is specified by that form that can be accepted to be denoted by thaz:~-d. And as for the law that there can be no idea of the qualified until there has been an idea of the qualt- fication,—all that this law lays down is that the qualification should be cognised (before there is any cognition of the qualified), and not that it should be expressed by a word—(and in the case in question we have a previous cognition of the qualifying form of the word by means of Sense- perception, and it is not necessary for it to be actually expressed by the word). Nor does this involve the imposition of the form. of the word (upon the sacrifice). [That is to say, it cannot be urged that the qualify- ing Name always bringing about an idea connected with its verbal form, this form would be imposed upon the object named]; because all that a word does, by differentiating its object from all other objects, is to draw out (and present to us) certain objects that already exist in the world (and as such any mention of these objects by these words cannot be said to impose the form of the word upon the object) ; as we have already explain- ed under ^ Sense-perception ” (in the Clokavartika). And again, it is only by such names as ‘ Udbhid’ and the like, that the sabsidiary sacrifices can be differentiated from their Primary ; otherwise, in the sentence ‘ Udbhid@ yajéia, &.,’ if the sacrifice were not specified by the name (Udbhid), then the sentence would come to be taken only as pointing out certain other Materials and Results in connection with the Primary sacrifice itself, and not as laying down any distinct sacrifice. Or, the relation of the qualification and the qualified (between the name ‘ Udbhid ’ and the particular sacrifice) may be accepted as based upon the fact of all names really expressing some qualification of the Actions BIBLIOTHECA INDICA: A (0110 OF (ष्म E „44161 रप THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. New Serizs, No. 1129. apa gp PTs A A [जै ' 9 s tt - ॥ THE TANTRAVARTIKA OY KUMARILA BHATTA TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY GANGANATHA JHA, M.A., Proresson OF 84 प्र ऽह पात, Muir Cenrratn (01.208, ALLAHABAD. FASCICULUS V. CP AP SS A ee CALCUTTA : (ERINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS, AND PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY, 57, PARK STRERT, 1905. 4 a rere PE ae, A Oe seek, ile Che, Big 8 > प अजाः जरा Wig LIST OF BOOKS FOR SALE AT THE LIBRARY OF THE AsIAT’S ˆ \CIETY OF 9 ENGAL, STREET, CALCUTTA, ANABLE FROM THE sNTS, Mz. 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Faso. -5 @ 1/ each Bala Bhatti, Vol. I, Fasc. 1-2 oe ६ Bandhayana Srauta Sutra, Fasc. 1-3 @ /6/ each ००५ ea *“Bhamati, (Text) Fasc. 4-8 @ /6/ each is ns Bhatta Dipika Vol. 1, Fasc. 1-5 ous eos Brhaddévata (T'oxt) Fasc. 1-4 @ /6/ each vie ae Brhaddharma Purana, (Text) Fasc. 1-6 @ /6/ each Bodhicaryavatara of Cantidevi, Fasc. 1-3 wea ove Catadusani, Fasc. 1-2 a eos ००७ Catalogue of Sanskrit Books and MSS., Fasc. 1-4 @ 2/ each Kas Oatapatha Brahmana, Vol. I, Fasc. 1~7; Vol. III, Fasc. 1-6 * Oatasabasrika-prajpaparamita (Text) Part I, Fasc. 1-10 @ /6/ each ... *Caturvarga Chintamuni 'Text) Vols. 11, 1-25; (11. Part I, Fasc. 1-18 Part 11, Fasc. 1-10 @ /6/ each; Vol IV, Fasc. 1-4 Olokavartika, (Kuglish) Fasc. 1-4 ... ३६ ००५ *Qrauta Sitra of Apastamba, (Toxt) Fasc. 6-17 @ /6/ each Ditto Cankhayana, (Text) Vol. 1, Fase. 1-7; Vol. II, Fasc 1-4; Vol. III, Fasc. 1-4 @ /6/ each; Vol 4, Fasc. 1 al Cri Bhashyam, (Text) Fasc. 1-3 @ /6/ each oe Dan Kriya Kaumudi, Fasc. 1-2... as Gadadhara Paddhati Kalasara, Vol I, Fasc. 1-7... cus Kala Madhava, (Text) Fasc. 1-4 @ /6/ each re Kala Vivekn, Fasc. 1-6 ... ह Katantra, (Text) Fasc. 1-6 @ /12/ each Katha Sarit Sagara, (English) Fasc. 1-14 @ /12/ each Karma Purana, (Text) Fasc. 1-9 @ /6/ each _.. ius Lalita-Vistara, (English) Fase. 1-3 @ /12/ each ००७ Madana Parijata, (Text) Fasc. 1-11 @ /6/ each Maha-bhasya-pradipGdydta, (Text) Faso. 1-9 & Vol. II, Fasc. 1-12 @ /6/ each. Vol. 111. Fasc. 1-2 eee = 9 @ ee6 Manutika Saggraha, (16४) Fasc. 1-3 @ /6/ each Markandéya Purana, (English) Fasc. 1-9 @ /12 each ५५७ ` ree *“Mimamaa Darcana, (Text) Fasc. 7-19 @ /6/ each ००० , ए, Nyayavartika, (Text) Fasc. 1-6 @ /6 ' ह न *Nirukta, (Text) Vol. [V, Fasc. 1~8 @ /6/ each eee * Nityacarapaddhati Fasc. 1-7 (Text) @ /6/ des क ous Nityacarapradiph Faso. 1-6 we aan ००० ००० Nysyabindutika, (Text) des 69 @ 9 ए € ४9 #> @ॐ> ^ 0 > ¢ © € ॐ ४ ^=“ हर @ ।= OD POP Whe OO कल Wr ee mS क mio £6 क © pat pa 0 &» 06 © ९ ५ @ BOQ jad P= वों © > © ४. ६७४७० HAO ‘upBAID,’ &., ARE NAMES AND HELP IN KNOWLEDGE OF DHARMA.” 385 just as the words ‘ Red,’ ‘ one-year old,’ &c., express certain qualities of the cow ; nor, in that case, can the mention of the sacrifice itself (by the word yajéta) be said to be redundant (on the ground of the name itself pointing to a particular sacrifice) ; because without the mention of the sacrifice by the root ‘yagi’ there would bo nothing to show that ‘ Udbhid’ was the name of a particulur sacrifice ; and it 18 through the mutual proximity (of the name with the ‘sacrifice `) that we get at the facts that the name belongs to a sacrifice, and that the sucrifice meant is that which 1s specified by the name, and not all sacrifices in general, or the Primary sacrifice of the Jyotishtoma; and thus the mention of both (the name and the ‘sacrifice ’) is distinctly useful, And as the Injunction is that of the sacrifices as specified by the name hecomhid, both of these are matters actually laid down by the Injunction ; and hence it cannot be said to bo a mere supplementary explanation (of another injunction). And thus we find that the fact of ‘Udbhid’ being the name of a sacrifice 18 not contrary to the fact of tlhe passage being an Injunction (though it is contrary to the fact of its being an Injunction of a particular material). And thus it is apparent that the assertion of the Pirvapaksha—that the word ‘Udbhid’ forms part of the Injunction of a material,—as laine assertion (of a scion of the Siddhdnti), that the Name is someching apart from the three portions of the Veda, the Vidhi, the Mantra and the Arthavadu,—are equally wrong. Nor can it be urged that, 1f the word ‘ Udbhida’ be taken as pointing out the name of a saov.fice, 1६ could be of no use in prompting men to the performance of any particular action. Bocause we actually~ find such names serving distinctly useful purposes in various periods of the perfor- mance of an action. For instance, during the appointment of the Rtvik priest, the Master of the sacrifice says, ‘I have got to perform such and such a sacrifice, where the mention of the mere name of the sacrificor is a very much simpler process of pointing it out than any description of the details of the sacrifice itself; so also when one is about begin the Darga-Pirna- masa, the Master makes such declarations as—‘ May such and such a result follow from the performance of the Darga and the Pdérnamdsa’ (when the name is mentioned in connection with the accessories of the sacrifice), and ayvain ‘desiring Heaven I perform the Darga and the Pérnamdsa (where the names are mentioned in connection with the Result); and none of these would be possible if there were no such names of sacrifices as the ‘ Darga’ and the ‘ Pirnamasa,’ &c. Thas then, we conclude that such words as ‘ Udbhid’ and the like are the names of particular sacrifices. 49 386 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I—PADA IV—ADHT (2). ADHIKARANA (2). [Treating of the fact of such words as ‘Citra’ and the luke being names of sacrifices). Sutra (3). That wherein accessories are laid down must be related to a Primary Sacrifice. We now proceed to consider those words that have a meaning fixed by convention, and not one that is signified by its component parts; such words, for instance, as ‘ Vrihi’ and the like, which denote particular Classes and Properties. The case of these words cannot be said to be inclu- ded in the foregoing Adhikurana, because the meaning of these word which is directly expressed by the words themselves, cannot be neglected for the sake of an Instrumentality that 18 only inferred. [That is to say, in the case of the word ‘ Udbhid,’ in the sentence ‘ Vdbhida yajéta,’ we reject its literal meaning, on account of the Instrumentality of the Udbhid in the bringing about of the Result in question; in the case of the word ‘ Citra,’ however, in the sentence ‘Citraya@’ yajéta,’ inasmuch as the mean- ing 1s directly denoted as fixed by convention, no amou -t of inferred In- strumentality can make us reject that meaning. ] Objection: ‘ The Bhashya should have cited such instances as the (५ passages (1) ‘ djyath stuvaté,’ (2) ‘ Prshthath stuvaté,’ ‘ bahishpavamanéna stuvaté, which are all original Injunctive sentences (and not such secon- ८९ dary sentences as ‘ pancudagajyani, &c.). Because it is only when the “fact of a word being a name, or laying down an accessory detail of the “sacrifice, has been ascertained in connection with original sentences, ‘that it 18 accepted in all ordinary usage; and as such it is only such ‘ sentences that should have been cited as instances.” All this may be true; but the Sdira itself had not such original sen- tences 1n view, because it distinctly mentions ‘ that wherein an accessory is laid down,’ which shows that it had only the secondary sentences in view. ‘“ But why should the Sitra have neglected to cite the original sen- tences P”’ Because there would be no difference in the main result of the discus- sion, whichsoever sentence be cited as an example. Or, it may be that secondary sentences have been purposely chosen, because it is only in the case of these that we have a syntactical split, which is the principal reason for rejecting the Piurvapaksha theory. Or, it may be that in the case of the original sentences, whichever of the two theories be accepted (2,९., whether the words ‘dajya,’ &., be taken as names or as pointing to ‘cirri’ IS THE NAME OF A SACRIFICE. 387 accessory details) there is a certain factor that remains wanting; and 88 such there is no means to ascertain definitely which one of the two theories is to be accepted; and hence this ascertainment being got at only by other means, these sentences could not have served as the appropriate examples. That is to say, the word ‘ajya’ signifying butter cannot be recognised as a name of certain hymns; and what is mentioned in' the passage is that ‘one hymns by those that are a@jya;’ and here what are those that are named ‘ajya,’ and how they are denoted by the word, cannot be ascer- tained by the original sentence itself, without some help from without ; and further, it is necessary to explain the reason why in the original sen- tences, the words ‘ d@jya,’ &c., abandon their conventional meanings, and become the names of the hymns, &c. And thus we find that the ‘Name theory ’ stands in need of some extraneous help, In accordance with the other theory also (in which case the sentence would mean ‘ one hymns by the butter’), it is absolutely impossible for the butter to be an Instrument of hymning ; and hence it would be necessary to take the word ‘ajya’ as indirectly indicating the Mantra related to that word ; and in that case we shall require another sentence laying down such relationship (of the word ‘ajya’ with a particular Mantra ; that is, we shall require a declaration that the word ‘aya’ means the ‘ Mantra that contains the word’) ; be- cause if the original sentence itself be made to give this meaning, 1t would be necessary to have recourse to Possessive Indication. These objections cease to apply if the word ‘djya’ in the sentence in question, be taken only as pointing out a meaning or relationship laid down elsewhere ; and thus in this case also the fact of certain Mantras being related to the ‘ajya’ has got to be ascertained from other sources. Thus then, we find that in the case of both theories, there is a certain element wanting that has to be supplied from extraneous sources ; aud hence the sentence comes to signify only the hymning, the sense of the word ‘ajya,’ &c., being ascertained by other means. As for the word ‘ pavamdna,’ some people hold that the word has a meaning (‘sanctifier’) that is pointed out by its component parts; and as such this has not been cited, on account of its being included in the fore- going Adhikarana. While others treat of the caso thus: The stotra cannot be taken as the nominative of the ‘sanctifying,’ as the sacrifice (in the previous Adhikarana) has been taken as that of ‘bringing forth;’ because it is the Soma that is the real sanctifying agent. And the component parts of the word ‘ pavam@na’ not being found to be capable of directly point- ing to any Action, the word will have to be taken as pointing to an Action in which we use a mantra that has a sanctifying meaning; and this would involve 87 ` indirect Indicution per Indication; and this process is 388 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I1--PADA IV—ADHI (2). undoubtedly more complicated than simple Possessive Indication ; and as such the case of this sentence also is met by the ‘syntactical split’ (that 18 to be shown in the Siddhdnia) ; and hence this too is a fitting example. In the Pdrvapaksha of this discussion also, the arguments based upon the universally recognised signification of the words, &c., &c., are just the same as those that have been detailed in the Purvapaksha of the toregoing Adhikarana. And inasmuch as the Siddhania speaks of the word ‘ (८72 ' having been taken (in the Puérvapaksha) as pointing to an accessory of the sacrifice, having the QOvira (variegated) colour, we infer that the Purvapahksha takes the sentence ‘ Oztraya yajéta’ as the Injunction of an accessory of the Agnishomiya sacrifice. And in support of this, they advance the following arguments :— PURVAPAKSAA. “The variegated colour and the feminine character are naturally ap- ५५ 1168016 to animals only; and as such the sentence in question cannot ८८ but be taken as subsidiary to the Datksha (Agnishomiya) sacrifice, which ‘is the root or Primary of all sacrifices performed with animals. That is “to say, the differentiation into Feminine, Masculine, &c., apart from ८४ animals, is based upon a mere likeness of words, while in the case “ of animals, it is based upon real facts of nature, The Principal sacrifice, “however, (in whose context we have the sentence ‘ Citraya yajéta’) hav- “ing Curds, &c., for its material, cannot be accepted as having anything “to do with the two characteristics of variegated colour and female character “denoted by the word ‘Qitray@’; and hence we extract these two ‘ characteristics out of their place, and take them as related to sacrifice in ‘general; but on account of the fact of such characteristics belonging ‘“ only to animals, they naturally tend mostly towards a sacrifice of animals ; “and thence, in accordance with the rule Jaid down in Satra ILI— ‘‘ vi—2, they become related to the Agnishom7ya sacrifice, which is the most ८ Primary of all such sacrifices. And though the connection of such an ‘animal (of a variegated colour and a female) would be in opposition to ‘the character of the animal for the Agnishomiya sacrifice, that is pointed ‘out in the original Injunction of that sacrifice as the black and the red ‘“male deer,—yet any one of these characters could be taken as rejecting ‘the other; or they may both be accepted as optional alternatives, as has “already been shown in a foregoing Piarvapaksha. “ Or, we may bring forward here the arguments that have been shown “under the Sutras I1[I—vi—9 ९८ seg. [That is to say, under these Sutras ‘it has been shown that the number seventeen being found to be mentioned ‹ 11.९4 ` IS THE NAME OF A SACRIFICE, 389 “in connection with the Samidhénis only, the connection of this num- “ber with any particular sacrifice cannot be definitely ascertained ; while ५ {16 relationship of the particular sacrifice with the number fifteen is ५ definitely ascertained; and hence it is only proper that the relationship ‘of the number seventeen should be set aside by that of the number fifteen ; “in the case of the varicyated colour and the feminine character, however, ‘inasmuch as these are found to be mentioned in connection with a sacri- “fice, their connection with a particular sacrifice of the Aynishomiya is as “ veasouable as that of the black deer, &c., because both of these are equally “ connected with animals, and the rnle laid down under the Sdtra TI— “vi—2 is equally applicable to both; and in the Purvapaksha of the “ Adhtkarana beginning with II{—vi—9, it has been argued that, inasmuch “as both the numbers fifteen and serenteen are equally related to the Saémz- (५ dhéni, both are to be accepted as optional alternatives; and in the same ‘manner, in the case in question, the two different kinds of animals are to “be alternatively employed at the Agnishomiya sacrifice], And the ५५ 6061186 of all this is that, as there would be no syntactical split, there ८ would be an injunction of many things mentioned by a single word, ‘‘as is distinctly pointed out by the fact of the animal as qualified by the “variegated colour and the feminine character being expressed by the “single case-termination (the Instrumental). And as for the word * nacukdamah,’ it may be explained as forming part of the acquiring of the ‘cattle for tho sacrifice, and as such 16 would be taken as only describing “an already existing fact, and not as pointing out the Result to be ‘obtained from the sacrifice; and certainly no animal-sacrifice can be ‘“‘ performed by one who does not want to obtain an animal (for the pur- (८ [00868 of sacrifice.) “Says the Bhashya: The sentence ‘citraya yagéta pagukdmah’ is de- ८“ scruptive of the sacrifice, as it 18 already well-known. The meaning of this “is that the Injunctive potentiality having, in all cases, been found to ‘have transferred itself to another word in the sentence, which is directly ‘“‘connected with the verbal affix, the root itself cannot but be taken as “merely describing a well-established fact. That is to say, whenever we ‘“ proceed to seek for something else that would be enjoined by the verbal ‘root, we are faced by the contingency of having to assume innumerable ८८ notentialities; and hence there at once arises in our minds a desire to ०५ take it as only describing an ordinary fact; and hence in such cases we ‘cannot admit of the presence of an Injunction, unless we are obliged to ‘do it (on account of the impossibility of its being taken as descriptive of “an ordinary fact). In the case of the sentence in question, however, ‘we know of a particular sacrifice, the Agnishomiya, being connected, “through the animal sacrificed, with the variegated colour and the feminine 390 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I-—PADA 1V—ADHI (2). ९८ character ; and as such there can be no difficulty in taking it as merely ८८ describing this relationship. “Says the Bhashya: If the result be held to follow from the material (८ atself, the root ‘ yaju’ becomes redundant. And on this there arises the ques- “ tion—‘' How is it that the Purvapaksha is represented as objecting to its ५ 01) theory of the sentence being the Injunction of a material P ’ “Some people meet this difficulty by the assertion that the sen- “tence that should have formed part of the Siddhanta, has been ‘inserted here by mistake. While others offer the explanation that by “attributing the result to the material, it would become the principal “factor in the Injunction, and thereby losing its secondary (or auxiliary “ character), the sentence could not be spoken of as an Injunction of an ८“ Accessory detail. “ But none of these explanations is quite satisfactory. Because in ‘any case, the assertion that the word forms the Injunction of an acces- “sory detailis always opposed to the view that it supplies the name of a ‘“ narticular sacrifice ; and even when the Resultis held to follow from the ‘accessory material thus enjoined, the fact of such injunction being ‘opposed to the fact of the word being a name remains unaffected. And “the Bhashya itself declares later on: It is only when this Adhikarana (५ ९१६5 that we can have any discussion as to whether the word is the Injwnic- ८ {1012 of an accessory material, or aname. EKven when the Result 18 attri- ‘buted to the particular material enjoined, there being no absolute co- ‘extensiveness of the material with the sacrifice, it would come to be ac- ‘cepted as the injunction of an accessory material. ‘Therefore, we must explain the Bhashya passage in the light of the “ following facts : ‘““On the point at issue, there appear to be three distinct theories: ५ (1) The word enjoins an accessory detail, as leading to a particular ‘“resuit; (2) it enjoins the accessory detail with reference to the sacri- “fice; and (3) it forms the name of a particular sacrifice. And any one of “these has got to refute the other two. Therefore one who takes his “stand upon the Piérvapaksha 1s represented in the Bhashya passage under ‘question, to refute the weakest of his two opponents (४.९. the theory that “the word enjoins a material as leading to a particular result) on the ९५ {21.011 that in that case the root ‘yajz’ will come to have a meaning ‘altogether irrelevant to the main subject. (९ For these reasons, we conclude that the word ‘cztraya’ lays down the ‘‘ material for a sacrifice, just as the word ‘ vrihibhih’ in the sentence ‘ vrtht- “ bhiryajéta.’ And though the ‘sacrifice’ is represented as the means ‘(of acquiring the Result), yet its instrumentality pointed out by the origi- ‘nal sentence laying down the sacrifice serves also to indicate the fact ‘crtRi’ I8 THE NAME OF A SACRIFICE. 391 ‘‘ of the sacrifice itself being an object to be accomplished (by means of the (८ ° Citra’ material); and thus we find that it is this objective character of ‘the sacrifice with reference to which the particular material is enjoined ; ‘and as such there is no need of having recourse to any Possessive Indica- “tion (the sentence being construed as—‘ one should think of obtaining ‘‘cattle by means of the sacrifice performed with the Citra material’). Or, ‘“it may be that the person who holds the word ‘Qztra’ to lay down a ‘‘material, accepts the fact of the material being with reference to the ८ sacrifice, which fact cannot be dispensed with; क 10116 the theory that the “ word lays down a material as leading to a particular result 18 open to all ‘the objections urged in the foregoing Adhikarana. ‘Similarly too, in the case of the sentence—‘ pancadagaj yd '—we must (५ presume the existence of some such word as ^ ८5८४ ' or ‘ bhavati,’ &e., the “sentence thus mentioning the existence of the fifteen djyas ; and it is to be ‘taken as an Injunction, because of its being a statement of the procedure ‘(of & sacrifice). * Objection: —‘ Such words as pancadagani aud saptadacani do not denote * merely the particular numbers, because in accordance with Panini, the ‘affix ‘da’ (in these words) has the sense of ‘ stoma’ (or collection of Rk ‘ verses); and this Stoma too does not signify anything other than the ‘particular number of Rk verses in the Hymn.’ “ Tteply:—This does not affect the caso; because the Stoma being ‘only a measure of the Eulogy, as limiting the Hymn which is the means “of the Eulogy, whether the limitation be done by means of certain Rk ‘verses, or by means of Butter, the number as the limiting agent is “always called ‘ Stoma’ on account of its being a measure of the Eulogy. ^“ {That is to say, the Rk verses being the means of the Eulogy, and the “number fifteen or seventeen serving to limit these verses, the Eulogy ‘itself comes to be limited by the number, which thus comes to be known ‘as the ‘ Stoma;’ and like the Rk verses the Butter (Ajya) also serves to ‘give rise to the Eulogy, and thus becomes one of its means; and as such ‘‘ there is nothing wrong in the presence of the affix ‘da’ in the word (५ ( mancadagani.’ (५ Nor 18 there any need of the Possessive Indication. Becauscit is only ‘“ when the sentence is found intact (in the Veda), that in assuming any ‘facts more or less than what is distinctly expressed by the sentence itself ° we incur the improper responsibility of having recourse to Indirect Indica- “tions, Syntactical Split and the like ; while there is no such danger when ५ the sentence itself 18 an inferred or assumed one. That 18 to say, in the case ‘of the sentence—‘ pancadagdnyajyani,’ the word ‘ajya’ being found to ° have no connection with the sentence as it stands, we must have recourse ‘to the assumption of the Injunction of a Procedure of Action, that would 392 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I--PADA IV—ADHI (2). “have some sort of connection with what is met with in the original sen- “tence, the apparent inconsistency of which is the sole ground for the “assumption of this new sentence; and this new sentence may be as- “sumed as having a word that would directly denote what 18 sought to be “got at indirectly by means of Possessive Indication (४.९. the sentence “assumed being somewhat in the form that ‘the Hymn 18 to be helped “by means of the Ajyas seventeen in number.’) “ Against this we may have the following objection: ‘The Ajya be- “ing a substance, it cannot form part of a procedure which consists of “something to be done; and as such it could not be pointed out by the “ Context, which only stands in need of a mention of the Procedure. ’ ५ But in the case in question, we have a distinct action, in the “shape of ‘existence;’ and as such there is no occasion for the said ob- ‘jection. It being always necessary for the subsidiaries to exist in the ‘same place as the Primary, the Ajya must always exist in close proximity “tothe Hymn. And hence, just as in the case of the sentence—‘ having ‘laid the fire, he proceeds with the hymn ’—the fire helps the hymning by “its mere presence, so tov, in the case of the sentence in question (the “ Ajya or the Butter would help the Hymning by its mere presence or ‘“existence). And as such, our theory not being open to any objection, we ‘conclude that the words in question lay down the accessory details of the “ sacrifices.” SIDDHANTA. 10 the above arguments, we make the following reply : Must be related {0 a primary sacrifice (sttra). That is to say, the mention of many things can be possible only when there 18 an Injunction of a Principal Action. In the case in question it is held that the accessory is laid down in connection with a well-known Action. But there is no mutual relationship among the anecessories themselves. And hence if any one of the accessories wore laid down, 1t could not indicate any other accessory ; and thus there being no Apparent Inconsistency in the matter, we would have to assume an endless number of direct Vedic Injunctions of the various accessories; and this would necessitate the frequent repetition of the Injunctive Affix, which would inevitably lead to a syntactical split, as has been well declared— Though the Bhavana directly implies the Injunction of many things, yet the Injunction of a qualification does not refer to any other qualification. And thus we find that even though the two qualifications (of variega- ted colour and female character) are denoted by the same word (Citra), yet we have just the same necessity of having recourse to the greatly compli- cated process of assuming more than one Injunctive Potentiality (in the word), ‘cIrRad’ IS TITB NAME OF A SACRIFICE. 392 And as a matter of fact, inasmuch as the original Injunction of the particular sacrifice has laid down a particular material, there can be no effective potentiality (in the Injunction of any other material). And it is a well-known fact that we can have the description of an Action just as it is pointed out in its original Injunction; and hence, when it has once con- nected itself with a particular material (f.1. the Black Deer) it can never have anything to do with any other material that is incompatible with the former. That is to say, in the description of a certain action, if it be ab- solutely necessary to describe its material, all its wants being found to be supplied (by that which is mentioned in the original Injunction), there can be no [Injunction of any other material ; specially as any such Injunc- tion would be based upon the fact of the Action being wanting on that point. Nor can it be urged that from out of the original Injunction of the Aynishomiya, we could take out the sacrifice itself (apart from the materials therein mentioned) ; and then have its materials laid down by means of the sentence—‘ Qitraya yazéta.’ Because in the first place the Action is always connected with the accessories mentioned in its own original Injunction; and hence any accessories mentioned in other sentences can never get at it apart from such natural accessories. In tho case of the alternative materials—V7r7hi and Yuva—mentioned in connection with the suerifice, as the two [njunctions function independently of each other, they ave both equally authoritative, and as such the two are accepted to be optional alternatives. In the case in question, however, 16 is only the original Injunction that would independently by itself lay down the ac- cessory of the action; which could not be done by this other sentence, which only describes the sacrifice as laid down in the original Injunction ; specially as there could be no description of that which has not already been laid down. And further, on account of the mention of the desire for cattle (in the sentence in question, inasmuch as this involves the acceptance of the denotation of a word other than the [njunctivo ("^ yajéla’’?) we have an inevitable syntactical split. That is to say, though the Result is not enjoin- ed, yet, (1) the sacrifice 18 enjoined, for the sake of the Result; and (2) the material Octra is laid down for the sake of the sacrifice, thus there being a most complicated syntactical split. And there would be a further objec- tion, that at one and the same time there would be an Injunction of the sacrifice with reference to the Result and a description of it with reference to the material. Nor can the word ‘ pagukamah” be taken as only describing the al- ready well-known fact of the presence of such a desire, as part of the de- sire for the acquiring of cattle for the purposes of the sacrifice. Because $^) 294 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. T-—PADA 1V—ADHI (2). all that is desirable for man is desired for itself; and as for the fact of persons engaging in actions for the means and auxiliaries of that desirable object, this is not due to any desire for such auxiliaries (the desire being only for the main object, the auxiliaries being sought after only as means to that end, and not as desirable in themselves). That 18 to say, when proceeding to perform a sacrifice, one docs not entertain any strong desire for the acquiring of the animal that would be required in the perform. ance of the sacrifice ; because even without any such desire, he proceeds to possess himself of the animal, because without that, he finds that it is impossible for him to obtain the particular result that he desires (which can be obtained only by means of a sacrifice performed with the animal). Aud thus, even though there may be a certain degrec of desirability in the animal, it could be spoken of as desirable zndirectly only. Therefore, it is only that which is found to be desired directly, in its direct denotation, that we recognise as the Result, which is mentioned in connection with the word ‘kama’ (Desire). We shall explain this in detail later on under the ७८1५ VI—1—z2. Tho result of the Aynishomiya sacrifice too, being a part of the sacri- fice, cannot quite definitely be ascertained, whether it 18 this or any other ; and as such there cannot bo any description of it. [That is to say, it can- not be urged that the word ‘ paguk@mah’ may be taken as only describing the particular result in the shape of the acquiring of cattle, which is pointed out to be a result of the Agnishomiya sacrifice by the fact of this sacrifice bringing about all desirable results ; because in that case any de- scription would be impossible, as a description of a secondarily indicated fact is absolutely 11861688 ; and if the word be taken as mentioning a parti- cular qualification of the Agnishomiya as pointed out by the fact of its bringing about all desirable results, there would be a syntactical split ; and then we can recall all the reasonings brought forward in connection with the word ‘udbhid’]. And this would lead to another anomaly, viz.— though the sentence occurs in connection with the Praja@patya sacrifice, yet the result coming to be taken along with the Agnishomiya, there would be a direct rejection of the context. On the other hand, if the word ‘ Oitrayai’ be taken as the name of a sncrifice, the sentence would only lay down a relationship between the sacrifice and a particular result; and there would be no room for any of the aforesaid objections. In the case of the expression ‘ pancadagijyani,’ the particular material (Butter), as also the number (Fifteen), not being found to be in any way connected with the Hymns, any one of these might be taken as being en- joined (by the sentence) with regard to another which might be taken as described by it. In any case, the material is not cognised (in the sentence) ‘CITRA’ IS THE NAME OF A SACRIFICE. 395 ag pertaining to any other Action; and if the sentence were to be taken as laying down a particular number with reference to the Butter employed in other Actions,—in that case (the sentence affording no idea of the Action), the Injunction would form part of the Material, and not of any Action (which fact would make the Injunction absolutely useless) ; and this would also lead to the rejection of the main Context (of the sen- tence). That it is not possible for the sentence to be taken as an Injunc- tion of the Material as qualified by the particular number, we shall show later on under the Sééira IV—i—1ll. As a matter of fact too, that which does not qualify a verb (Action) can never form the object of au Injunction ; because the Injunctive word has no direct relationship with nouns ; and in the sentence in question, we do not find any verb which would be the ob- ject of Injunction, and would, as such, point to many accessories (Materials, &c.). Nor is it possible for these (fifteen butters) to form the object of the sentence that lays down the recitation of the Hymns ; because they have not the character of an Action (or Vorb). As has been well said: ‘The principal Action (or Verb) cannot take in any accessories or Materials as constituting its procedure, unless there 1s an intermediate action, as- sumed in accordauce with the sentence.’ Nor can they be said to belong to the verb ‘ to be; ’ and it isa uni- versal rule that any particular thing can operate elsewhere only when it has acquired its own existence in one place; and as for mere existence (denoted by the verb ‘ to be’), its business onds with the pointing out of the fact of an object being an entity ; and as such the action of being can never be one that could be an object to be accomplished ; nor does it stand in necd of any other Action that could be taken as the object to be accom- plished ; and as such, there being no room for any help by the said number and material, these cannot be taken as forming part of the procedure of the action to be. Though in the case of the sentenco—‘ Rathantaran bhavati, &c.’ we admit of the fact of the Context pointing to such actions as those of being, &c., that are held to be enjoined by these senteuces,—yet this is due to a cognition of the relationship (of the Rathantaram, &c.) with certain intermediate actions that are indirectly indicated. Nor is the existence of Butter, &c., such as is not fully established in the world ; tard as such their ewistence cau uever be taken as the object of a Ehdvanad (such as‘one should think of establishing the existence of Butter,’ &e., d&c.). It may be urged that—‘there may 06 a Bhdvané of placing the Batter, &c., in proximity to the Hymn (which proximity is not an estab- lished fact).’ But this too is not possible; because no such proximity forms the object of any Injunction. In the case of the sentence— having laid the fire,’ &c.,—the proximity of the fire (to the Hymning) is distinctly 396 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I—PADA IV—ADHI (2). enjoined by the sentence itself; when this action (of the laying of fire) being apart from the action of mere existing (of the fire), is capable of being taken as constituting a part of the procedure. In accordance with the Siddhdnta theory the sentence being found to serve a distinctly useful purpose, there 1s no apparent Inconsistency that would necessitate the assumption of any sentence laying down the relationship of the 19 10 pw mh * The other Fasoiculi of these works are outof stook, and complete copies be supplied. 2 ७ € ४ ५ ४» #» 7 > ANSE jad नि | १८७८८ Chr © C © POCOMRGEMONNEA # १८ 0 {०७ oO ल < im {6 1 2 3. Mantakhabnu-t-Tawarikb, (Text) Faso. 1-15 @/6 each... 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The following objection might be urged: ‘‘Inasmuch as we do not find the Bhavana expressed by the roots ending in the krt affixes, we can safely assert that it is signified by the conjugational affixes, (and not by the roots ).” This is not right; because we find that no Bhavana is expressed by the conjugational affixes in ‘ bhavati,’ ‘asti,’ &c. Nor is it an absolute fact that it is not expressed by roots ending in kré affixes, because even when these latter are used, we do comprehend a certain portion of the Bhavana. For instance, in the case of kriya affixes, we meet with such words as ˆ bhéktavyam,’ ‘ yashtavyam,’ and the like; and the Bhavana that is signified by these is only slightly inferior to that which is signified by conjuga- tional affixes. And here too, in the case of the Passive krtya affixes as in ‘brahmané na hantavyah’ inasmuch as itis a substance—Brahmaza—that is the predominant factor in the sentence,—the Bhdvand denoted is much inferior to that which is signified by the Bhdava-Krtya affix (in ‘ Yashta- vyam’); and the reason is that in the case of the latter no prodominance belongs to the action of an Instigator, the meaning of the root itself being the most predominant factor; whereas in the other case ‘ brahmano na hantavyah ,’—the verb signifies the action of the Instigated as along with that of the Instigator. The same explanation holds respecting the conjugational affixes used in the sense ofthe Active and the Passive; because in the case of these also, the position of the action of the Instigator remains a subordinate one. And hence the case of the kré affixes cannot be said to be the same as that of the conjugational affixes. So also in the case of Indeclinable Kyt affixes, though these have the sense of the Bhdva (Active), yet the cognition of the Bhavana, cognised by itself, is slightly inferior to the foregoing. For instance—‘ abhikraman juhoti’ etc., etc.,—in all of which the Bhavana that is cognised 18 one that is dependent upon another Bhdvand. So also in the case of such words as ‘ pakvah,’ ‘pakvavan’ and the like, the cognition that is directly per- ceptible is that of a substance subservient to a Bhdvand in its fully accom- plished form; so too in the case of the words ‘ pdcaka’ and the like. Thus then, we find that in all cases, (of Kré affixes), there is alwayr a need of a certain relationship between the Noun and the Verb (and this could not be without a Bhavana); for if there were no Bhavana, there would be no need of any such relation, exactly as there is none in the case of the compounds of root-words and words with nominal affixes. And the name Karaka’ (relation between noun and verb) is not applicable unless ` 6] 482 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I——PADA I—ADHI (le). there is an action in the case; nor 18 thero any action, which docs not bring about something that did not exist before. Hence itis proved that the sense of ‘kuroti’ aud Uhdvayati’ is present (in the care of krt affixes also). And even without the fact of the Bhavana being shown in the process of accomplishment, we can show that the necessary co-ordination 18 present. For instance,—‘ What should be done?’ ‘ Couking should be done (puktavyam)’ (where we have a co-ordination between the cooking, paka» —and the affix tavya—‘should’). ^ Kathankdram juhoti?’ ‘ Abhikraman quhott, and soon. In the case of the conjugational affixes also, there 18 no other ground for the Bhavana, but the co-ordination (of the affix) with the root ‘ kr.’ Thus then we find that even roots do not entirely leave off the Bhavana, as has been well said (in Bhatti-kavya—‘ Just as the root kr employs all the roots in their various meanings, so, &c., &c.’” (?) It 18 not the form, but tho predominant character, of the Bhavana, that can be said to be directly signified, or indirectly implied, by the con- jugational affixes, exclusively. Olyectton: “In that case as soon as the word ‘yfgéna’ has been mentioned, the full meaning of the root ‘yajc’ becomes withdrawn from the word ‘ yajéta,’ and the Bhdvand having thus been signified by the root-moaning, there can be no reason for the use of another word bhavayét.”’ This argument does not touch our position; because, asa matter of fact, the root (‘ yajz’) has a twofold meaning ; and in poiriting out the two phases of the meaning separately, all that we do by mentioning the word ‘ yagéna’ is to point out, separately, the peenliar Instrumentality of the sacri- fice, which is a specific form of the signification of the root, the generic form consisting of the Bhavani, in order to point out which we make use of another word ‘ bhivayét.’ Or, it may be that there are certain facts—f.i., (1) Instrumentality and (2) the number of the Agent—that are signified separately by the root and the affix (respectively); whereas the Bhavana being quite compatible with both of them, we can hold it to be denoted by both (root and affix) to- gether. And it is for this reason that we find both the Stra and the Bhashya speaking of all ‘Karmagabdah’ (complete verbs) as being ‘bhavarthah’ (signifying the Bhavana), where thore is a distinct mention of coextensiveness (between whole verb-roots and uffives combined—and the signifying of the Bhavana). In the Mimanéa-Castra, however, tho Bhavana is always held to be signified by tho affix. The sense of this theory may he thus briefly explained: (1) The BHAVARTHADHIKARANA, 483 sense of the Affix is always expressed by the Root and the Affix taken to- gether; and asthe Bhavana isthe most important factor in this joint signification, it is held to bo signified by the affix. That 18 to say, though there is no other ground for differentiating exactly, by which of the two the Bhavani is denoted, yet, inasmuch as it isa well-established fact that greater importance is always attached to the denotation of the affix, —and in the case in question, the Bhavand is the most important fac- tor,—we naturally conclude that this Bhavana must be denoted by tho affix, (2) The Root and the Affix are always found to appear in a definite order of sequence; and as a matter of fact, we find that it 18 only when the Affix is heard to bo pronounced, that we have an idea of the Bhdavand ; and this too leads us to the conclusion that the Bhavana is denoted by the affix. Because the invariable concomitance of any two objects is not only such that one cannot exist in the absence of the other, but also of a kind which we find in the present case, where we find that it 18 only when a particular word—the Affix f.i.—is pronounced that there is a donotation of the Bhavana ; and as such, in accordance with the rnle that when one object is always seen to appear when another appears, there is always an invariable concomitance between the two,—we must admit that the Bhavana is denoted by the Affix. It has been argued above that—“ in the case of such verbs as ‘ast7,’ and the like, we find the Affix giving up the denotation of the Bhavana (and as such there can be no concomitance between the two).” But this objection is equally applicable to all the theories; for instance, oven if the Bhavana be held to be denoted by the Root, or the Root and the Affix लता. jointly, then too, the case of the verbs ‘astt,’ &c., would be incompatible with the theories. Hence the fact is that, whenever the Bhavana is coguised, it is always expressed by the Affix, while in a case where it is not cognised, there is no occasion for any consideration as to by what 10 is expressed. And we have already shown under the J'adbhitadhikarana (of the Yarkapdda) that any stray contrary instance cannot vitiate ॐ general rule. Or, we may show that the case of the verbs asiz, &c., does not, afford instances contrary to our general rule with regard to the denotation of the Bhdvand. Because even in the caso of the words ‘ast,’ &e., there is always a part of the Nominative agent that is yet to be accomplished | and hence there is always present a Bhdvand (accomplishing) of this unaccomplished portion; but the Bhavana, in this case, is not distinctly cognised, because it does not appear (as it does in other cases) in a rela- tion of subserviency to anything apart from the Agent himself. That is to sny, in the case of the words ‘ astt,’ &c., though there is no functioning 484 PANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1—PADA t—anut (le). of the nominative agent perceptible, on account of the Agent himself being still unaccomplished, and of there being nothing besides the Agent to be accomplished, yet it is on account of the inherent potentiality of the Affix itself that we recognise the element of Bhdvand. And (1) as for the object of the Bhavand, we have the Agent himself, there being no other object capable of being spoken of, on account of the unaccomplish- ed character of the Agent; (2) for the Instrument of the Bhavand, we have the act of being (bhavana); and (3) as for the Procedure, we have the method of the bringing about, one after another, of the various parts of himself. And thus we find that all the three factors of the Bhavand are supplied in one way or the other, by the act of being itself, specially as the case admits of no other action. Thus then, of the Agent himself, there are certain parts that are still being called into existence, ४.९.) being accom- plished, while there are others that have already been accomplished, which serve as the Nominative agents. And the act of being, which exists in common in those that have been accomplished, as well as in those that are being accomplished, is spoken of as the Bhaivand. The same arguments apply to the case of such words as ‘ jayaié,’ ¢ nishpadyaté,’ ‘ siddhyate’ and the like. As for the word ‘asf’ (is) it expresses a condition of things just following that which is expressed by ‘ bhavati’ (becomes) synonymous with ‘takes berth,’ and as such accomplishes the present being of the self; and hence it is that it takes one of the conjugational affixes. And in this case also, the differentiation of the functioning of the Actor and the acted wpon is to be made as before, with reference to the common character of being that extends over the various parts of the Agent, while differing from another in the point of time of their individual accomplish- ment. However, though there 1s such a Bhavana, yet there can be no Injunction or Prohibition with regard to such Bhdvands; for the simple reason that they refer to the Agent, who is always a fully accomplished intelligent subject. The following argument is possible: ‘We do often come across Injunctions of such being, &c. For instance, ^ Rivija bhavitavyam,’ ‘ Rathan- taram bhavati,’ ‘ Adhvaryuh syat,’ ‘ Ukthyani sytth,’ §c.” The reply to this is that it is true that we meet with such Injunctions ; but in these cases the word ‘ ९१८४८८४ ' is not used in its ordinary sense; for instance, the meaning of ‘ Rivi7a bhavitavyam’ is that one should ac- complish the Rtvik-hood, necessary for the performance of the sacrifice, by means of such other actions as purchase, appointment und the like. So also in the case of the sentence ‘ Rathantaram bhavati,’ though the direct meaning of the text is with reference to the being (or acquiring existence) of the Rathantara, yet, inasmuch as the Rathantara is an inanimate thing, BHAVARTHADRIKARANA. 435 no such being is possible; and hence what the Injunction means is that one should accomplish the Rathantara—a distinct case of Bhavana. Whenever we have such sentences as ‘one should become this or that’ (bhavét),—the root ‘bhi’ having the sense of stays (tishthatz),—there 18 always a possibility of something to be accomplished, the sense of the Injunc- tion being that one should accomplish something by staying. For these reasons, we conclude that the true character of Bhavana belongs to the action of the agent that becomes, only when the verb used signifies the Past, Present or the Future,—and not when it is in the Injunc- tive, &c. In the expression of the Past, &c., also, when the complete action is signified by the verbal root itself, and there is no differentiation bascd upon the difference in the time of the appearance of the different portions of the Agent, then, in that case, the incongruity being patent, the significa- tion of the verb must be taken as restricted to the denotation of the root only, and not extending to the Bhdvand,—the Number, &c., of the Nom- inative being taken to be signified by the verbal affix. And we have already shown that any stray instance to the contrary cannot vitiate our general rule with regard to the Bhavana. It has also been urged that we find the verbal root signifying the Bhavana, even in the case of the Kré affixes (as in ‘ pakvah,’ &c.). True it is that the denotation of the root always accompanies the Bhavana; but for the very reason of the Bhdvand being indirectly implied by these denotations of the roots, it can also be said that the Bhavana 18 not directly expressed by the root. That is to say, in the case of all words ending in Kré affixes, tho character of the 817८4116 18 cognised as the secondary clement, being indirectly implied by the nouns signified by the verbal root,—which latter therefore cannot be said to directly denote the Bhadvand. Just as in the case of verbal affixes, inasmuch as action is the predominant element in the denotation of these, the Noun is always cognised as the secondary factor connected with the denotation of the verbal root; and hence the Nominative and the Accusative are not held to be directly expressed (by the verbal affix); in the same manner, in the case of the Kri affixes, the denotation of the Nominative, &c., not being otherwise possible, these would indirectly imply the Bhavana, which, for this very reason, cannot be said to be directly denoted by the word. And it is only with reference to this implied Bhavana, that we have such sentences as ‘ Kin karati 2 ' ‘ Pakam’—where the last word is spokenof as co-ordinate with the word ‘ karolt,’ exactly as the word ‘ Dévadatiah’ is used along with the word ‘pacati.’ And the relationship of the Noun too is possible only with reference to the indirectly implied Bhavana. Or, this relationship may be taken as with tho denotation of the root (and not with 486 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 11—PADA T—ADHI (1c). the Bhavana), because of the fact of tho nouns serving the purpose of accomplishing the denotation of the verbal roots, which are always sub- serviont to the Bhavand; and the denotation of the root too stands in need of these Nouns (a8 serving the purpose of accomplishing the deno- tation of the root); and the Bhavanad too refers only to such Nouns; hence there is no incongruity in the relationship in question. In the case of the Krtya affixes (tavya, &c.), also, inasmuch as they denote the ^ praisha,’ wrging,—even though there be no direct denotation of the Bhadvand,—the full signification of the word 1s not attained, until we have obtained a Bhaivand fully equipped with all its three factors. Because all these words serve to urge the person to a performance of his functions; and the form of this function 18 the Bhavana endowed with the three factors. That is to say, apart from his own function, a man cannot perform anything else; and the Praishas serve to make him perform these. Hence if these words did not, in some way or other, refer to the function (of the man), they could not urge him to its performance, and thus too, in this case also, 16 is found that there is an indirect impli- cation of the Bhavand (which is the name given to the functioning of the agent). As for the Praishas or Directions, contained in the Brahmanas, all these have the character of Vidhi, Injunction, since what they lay down is not got at by any other means; and hence, in these cases, the Krtya affixes cannot but bo accepted as having the Injunctive signification, even though this signification is not laid down by Panini. The only difference, however, between Injunction and Direction (Vidhi and Praisha) is that when the object is otherwise remembered, the urging (to it) 18 called ‘ Praisha’ Direction + while when the same urging is to that which is not otherwise got at, it becomes ‘ Vidhi’ Injunction. Thus 16 18 clear that the Bhavana is signified by the Affixes. Objection: “If Bhadvand be held to be a functioning of the Instigator, “then the character of the Bhavand will have to be admitted in such ‘actions asthe laying of the vessel upon the fire, &c., (in the case of cooking), “and those of the mental determination, d&c., (in the case of sacrifice) ,—these “boing the actions of the Instigating Agent. And as it is these actions ‘that are signified by verbal roots, you cannot but admit the Bhavana “to be denoted by the root.” Reply: This does not affect our position ; because though it is a fact that the Bhdvand 18 never cognised, entirely apart from the signification of the verbal root, yet the Bhdvand proper that is cognised in a general form (covering over many particular actions), is something entirely different. That is to say, in all the particular actions spoken of above,— viz. laying the vessel upon the fire, &c..—we always perceive a common generic action, in tho shape of ‘ karoti,’ ‘does. The action of being softened, BUAVARTHADHIKARANA. 487 laying on the fire, &c., that are spoken of by the words ‘ pacatz,’ ‘ cooks, &c., are such as inhere in the object and in the Nominative Agent. And among all theso actions, the mere action of cessation from inactivity, the mere moving towards the performance of an action, is what is meant by the word ‘ Bhavana’; while all the particular actions, that go to lend colour to the mere acfivity, and which inhere in tho object as well as in the Agent, become related to it, either in the shape of the Instrument or in that of the Process. Objection: “But in that case, Bhavand comes to be nothing more ‘than a goneric denotation of the verbal root.” Reply: True; the Bhavana does appear in a generic form; but it is only inthe shape of something to be accomplished, and not in the particular forms of the sacrifice, &c. Because the generic idea that accompanies the sacrifice is in the form of the Instrument, which is entirely different from the Bhavana, which 18 something to be accomplished. With reference to each person, the Bhaivund has its own peculiar generic and specific forms. And the sacrifice, &c., appear as Instruments in the Bhdvand; and all that the signification of the verbal root does is to supply the elements wanting in this instrument of the Bhavand; it 18 this generic denotation of the Root that is expressed by the word ‘ karmagabda’ ‘ Verb’; and inasmuch as the sacrifice, &c., serve to qualify the Bhavana, they are known as the peculiarities of the Bhavand, and not as the Bhavana itself. In scientific works, however, the words ' kriyigabda’ and ‘ karmagabda’ are used, sometimes with reference to the denotation of the verbal root, and sometimes with reference to the Bhavana, while at times, through proxi- mity, with reference to both; in any case they are never used to express the particular forms of any of these. Because the Bhavana or the sig- nification of the verbal affix, that is cognised in the case of a conjugational affix, 18 never expressed, in the same form, by any other word. ‘That is to say, the word ‘Bhdavand’ signifies something that is a substantial objective reality, in an accomplished form, as qualified by a particular Gender and Number; and thisis not what is signified by the conjugational affix (the Injunctive f.i.), whose denotation is entirely free from any element of Gender or Number. Similarly too, with the denotation of the verbal Root. For instance, the words ‘ karoti,’ ‘does,’ and ‘ bhdvayati’ ‘accomplishes,’ signify something entirely different from that which is expressed by the conjugational affix; since that which is signified by ‘karott’ and ‘ bhavayati’ is the Bhavana that has doing and accomplishing for its Instrument; and as this is not the form of the Bhavané that 18 signified in the case of the word ‘ yajéta,’ the two (‘karoti’ and the Injunctive affix in ‘yajeta’) cannot be said to be synonymous. And the sentence † 27027; bhdvayét should be explained, withont taking into 488 TANTRA-VAURTIKA. ADH, 1l—PADA I—ADHI (1c). consideration the Bhavand that appears to be signified by the affix in the word ‘ bhavayét.’ Consequently the sentence in question cannot be quoted in support of the theory that ‘ bhdvayatz’ or ‘ karoti’ is synonymous with the Injunctive affix in ˆ yajéta;’ because the use of the sentence can be ex- plained as based upon & certain degree of close proximity between the two and not upon an absolute identity of meaning. Thus we conclude that the Bhavana cannot be expressed by any other word. As soon as the Bha&vand has been cognised, first of all there arises a desire to know what the object of the Bhavana is; because the object is the most important factor in it,and also because the object does not stand in need of the desire for any other factor. And in every Bhavana that is endowed with an Injunction, this Injunctiveness, even if previously cognised, is not accepted, until the Bhavand, as equipped with all its three factors, 18 perceived to bo capable of being put into action. And before the Injunc- tive character asserts itself, we must always recognise the fact that the Bhavana should be fully equipped with all the elements that make it capable of being put into action. Any person that would do an act intelligently, is never found to be engaging in any action, unless he is fully cognisant of a certain desirable result that would follow from it, This desirable result too is never sought for anywhere else besides the object to be accomplished (by the Bhavana); because there is nothing more important than such a result, that could be the object to bo ac- complished. Thus then, if in any Bhavana, the object to be accomplished were some- thing different from that which is desirable to the agent, then no Agent would bo found to be engaging in any activity towards the fulfilment of such an object; and as such the very promptive potency of the Injunctive affix would become thwarted. Hence it is that, though the denotation of the Root (yaj), as related to the Injunctive through the fact of being expressed by a part of the same word as the Injunctive, comes forward to supply the factor of the object of the Bhavana,—yet, on account of its inherent incapa- bility (due to its not being something desirable by the Agent), it 18 set aside. (1) Because mere proximity is not the sole ground of any relation- ship,—the most important grounds being those of Capability, Mutual Want, &c., a8 we shall speak of Iater on. (2) Because all that the word ‘ yajéa’ directly donotes is the mere relationship between the denotation of the root ‘yuj’ and the Bhavana (signified by the Injunctive affix); and it ex- presses nothing with regard to the former entering into any of the three elements of the latter. That is to say, the potency of the word having ceased with the denotation of the Relationship, the matter, as to the en- tering of anything into the three elements of the Bhdvan@, should be decided on the sole ground of capability. Aud inasmuch as the denotation BHAVARTHADHIKARANA. 4.89 of the Root is not found to be capable of boing related as the Object, —on account of this factor being supplied by the [njunctive character, which, being expressed by the same Affix, is by far the most proximate (to the Bhavana),— we must conclude that it must be rolated in the shape of another factor (that of the Instrument). (3) The Affix can never scrve the purpose of prompting towards the Object itself, inasmuch as the Agent always knows what is desirable for him, (and it is only in tho mattor of the particular means, &c., that he needs a prompting). That 18 tosay, it is only in cases whiere the activity of the Agent is dependent upon Scriptural In- Junctions, that we seek for Proximity or Non-proximity (as pointing out the various elements of the Bhaivan@). The Object to be accomplished, however, in the shape of Heaven, Cattle, Offspring, Landed property, &c., are such as are already known as desirable, without any Scriptural In- structions to the effect. Hence as soon as there arises a desire to know whatis the object of the Bhavana, wo at once recogniso, even before we come across any scriptural text, that it 18 a certain Object desired by the Agent; and all that remains to be known is the particular Object so desired ; but this particular object too is not in the shape of something to be accomplished, but only as the object of the particaolar Bhavana in question. Hence it is that the element in question is supplied by Heaven, & , which, thouvh at a distance from the word, is yet found to bo the most capable of the said relationship. As for the relationship of the denotation of the Root, any acceptance of this as the Object, would be accepting something not required in the case at all; and as such the very potency of the In- junction being thwarted, there would be an inevitable contradiction of the Crutt. (4) Further, that alone,—which has been recognised as the nomi- native agent of the action of beng, either in the same or another scutence, —can have the character of the Object (of the Bhavani); and, as a matter of fact, in the case in question, the denotations of the Root, &९., are not cognised as having any connection with the action of being; while Heaven, &c., found in connection with the word ‘desiring,’ are actually perceived to be connected with the action of being. Because the desire in the mind of the man is in the form ‘May Heaven be mine,’—where Heaven is dis- tinctly cognised as the nominative of bezng; and it 18 for this roason that it is accepted to supply a desideratum, something to bo brought about, of tho Bhavana. The object of the Bhdvand@ having been thus ascertained, there arises a desire to know its Instrument—by what Means it is to be accomplished. And it is always the ‘y@ga,’ ‘Sacrifice’ (denoted by the root ‘yajz’ in ‘yajéta’) that is recognised as tho Instrument; (1 ) because the action of the Agent depending upon tho scriptural Instruction, we cannot but seck after what is pointed out by Proximity, &c., as appearing in the text in 62 490° TANTRA-VARTIRNA. ADH, (1—vApA raps (16). question (and tho root is always the most proximate to the Affix) ; (2) because Capability or Incapability too ean uot be recognised by auy other means of right notion, save the text itself; (3) because it is only the ‘sacrifice, the recognition whereof as the Instrument is not ineompatible with the tenor of the Injunction; (4) because there is no grqund for reject- ing tho denotation of the root (ya7i), that presents itself, as the Tustru- ment, through its close Proximity to the Injunctive Aflix ; and (5) be- cause, as a matter of fact, ro Bhavand of a particalar result is possible with- out the agency of that which is denoted by a verbal root. ‘Though the ‘Sacrifice’ itself 18 not an accomplished faet, yet, it can accomplish the Result, after it has itself been accomplished by means of its own particular Instrument. And it is a fact of uaturo that everything im the world 15, at one time, in an inaccomplished shape, and at another time, in a fully accomplished state. The xccomplishment too (of the sacrifice ) is of no parti- eular use, prior to the action of the Scriptural Injunction; because the only use that the accomplishnrent of the Instrument has 1s at the time of the Fulfilment of its particular result. And inasmuch as the Instru- mentality (of sacrifice) is actually found to be extending over all the three periods of time, there is nothing very incongruous m speaking of the sacrifice (even while unaccomplished ) as the Instrument (of the Bhavana). For these reasons, tho [nstrumentality must be admitted to bolong to the sacrifice, &c. But inasmuch as the Result appears at a time very remote from that of the performance of the sacrifice, the Instru- mentality of this latter could not be posstble, except through the interven- ing agency of the Apirva; 7४ is for this reason that the words denoting actions are said to bring about the recognition of the Aparva. And thus the moaning of the Sara might be this: Those *‘ Karma-cabdas ’—words denotutive of actions—which are ‘ bhavértha,’—which serve the purpose of ac- complishing the Bhavand—such as the roots ‘yagi’ and the like—lead us to the cognition of the agency of the Apirva. Olyection: “(1) In accordance with the rule above laid down in con- “nection with the relationship of the Object and the Instrument, it would +° 80०ा॥ that the Bhavana could be signified by only such conjugational “affixes as appear in connection with transilive Verbs; that is to say, the ‘factor of the olject being supplied only by such entities as are the most “desired (which is the definition of the Oljective), no intransitive verb “could ever have anything to do with such an object. (2) Or, all the ८ # 6108 would become transitive (if wo admit the relationship of all verbs ८ with such objects.) (3) Or, lastly, it must be admitted that thero is “no Bhavana signified in the cnse of intransitive verbs.” This, however, docs not effect our position; because the objective of the denotation of the root, as found in the case of Transitive Verbs, is BHA ARTNADTIIKAKANA, 49} something entirely different from that whichis referred to by the denota- tion of the Affix. Fer instance, in the case of such transitive Verbs as ‘ odanam pacate’ ‘ cooks the rice,’ ‘ gramam gacchati,’ ‘ goes home,’—the objec- tive of the roet-meaning is entirely different from that of the Bhavana. Though it often happens that the objective of the root-meaning itsel$ becomes also the objective of the Bhdvana,—the meaning of the sentence being * pakéne odanam bhavayati,’ ‘accomplishes the rice by medns of cooking ; -- $ ९५ it is often that the Bhavana, as accompanied by the root- meaning togethor with its own particular objective, has an Thdependent objective of its own,—- the meaning of tho sentences in this case being—‘ odanapakéna grdmagama- néna va svartham bhdvayati,’ ‘oue secks to fulfil his desired end by means of the ceoking of the rice, or by going to Ins home.’ Thus then, tho Objective of the Bhavand is found to be recognised, after the root- meaning, only as something to be acquired (and to be accomplished) ; and as such though it happens to be covered over by the meaning of another root (* Keémua,’ desiring), yet it is always recognised as the objective of the Bhavana; and this peculiar relationship of the Bhdvand and its objective is, in many cases, mentioned by the word ‘Kama’ (to desire). For instance, even in the case of intransitive verbs—such as the verbs ‘ Asa,’ to sit, and ‘ Ci ’ to lie down, — we have such sentences as ‘ sukhakama Gsita,’ ‘ one desiring comfort should sit down, and ˆ Svdsthyakiimo Gayita,’ ‘one desiring health should lie down.” And though these two roots are intransitive ones, yot thero is always a factor of ‘ karotsé’ ‘does,’ or ‘accomplishes,’ signified by the particular Affix ; and it is of this ‘karotz’ (transitive) that Comfort, &c., are cognised to be the objective. And this ‘xurote’ heing always transitive, even in the case of the conjugational afixes appearing in connection with Intransitiv© Verbs, thero is always a certain co-extensiveness between tho signification of the particular root and that of the word ‘ £uroti;’ as we actually tind, the questions—' Kin-karoti, ‘what is he doing-? ’—answered by ‘ dsté, ‘he is sitting,’ ‘ oété,’ ‘he is lying down;’ and thus oven in tho case of these roots we find the Bhavana having a definite objective (though the roots are intransitive). As a matter of fact, even in the case of the transitive verb ‘yagi,’ to sacrifice, thongh the real object is the Detty to whom tho sacri- fice is offered, yet the objective of the Bhacan& is something entirely different, in the shape of Offspring, Heaven, Cattle, and the like. Thus then, in the case of ‘Transitive, as well as in that of Intransitive Verbs, we have such sentences as ‘dsaréra bhdivayél sukhkan,’ ‘one should seek to accomplish his pleasure by stééing down. ’ Question: ‘What then would be the difference between Transitive and Intransitive Verbs.” Reply: In a case where the root-meaning is always direetly concerned with a certain objective, the root is Transitive; whereas in a case where 4.92 VANTHA-VARIIKA, ADH. 11—PADA I-- abit (Ie). the connection with an objective is only indirect, through the medium of the Bhavana, the root is Intransitive. For instance, in the case of the root to sit, to lie down, the objective is not always definitely cognised; and as such they are spoken of as Inétransitive; whereas the roots to cook, &c. ; are always accompanied by an objective, which is directly connected with it, through the actions of Softening, &c.; and as such these are spoken of as Transitive. But‘this does not make any difference between the two kinds of roots, when referring to a Bhavana, Tho Bhavana then having its two factors~—of the Objective and the Instrument— duly supplied, there arises a desiro to learn the process of this Instrumentality ; as without a certain process of action no real Instrumenta- lity is possible. And then, Sense-Perception, &c., not being found to be capable of helping tho Bhavana in any way,a cognition of the Procoss depends entirely upon the Scripture; and as such for a due cogni- tion of this, we must take our stand upon Proximity, &९. (of the Verbs occurring in the Scriptural Injunction); and when this is not possible, the Process is pointed out by some other means ;—either (1)directly by scrip- tural Injunctions, or (2) indirectly by the particular Implications of the generic Injunction, (3) or by the Apparent Inconsistency of an entirely transcendental help (required in the case). Thus, being duly equipped with all its three factors, the Bhavana be- comes capablo of being accomplished; and as such it becomes the object of an Injunction. And because the Bhavana is enjoined, it is on account of the Apparent Inconsistency of this, that we have tho Injunctions of sacrifice, &e., (as forming the factors of the said Bhavana). And thus the Sitra becomes duly established. 1 a Says the Bhashya:— There are certain Karmagabdas, &e.,” And though the proper words to be cited as examples were ‘ ydga,’ ‘ yajyana,’ & ९.) yet the Bhashya has cited the words ‘ Cyéua,’ &c., which are accomplished as such only through their co-extensiveness with the aforesaid words; and the words ‘ Cyéna,’ &e., are casily recognisable as Karmagabdus, because of their denoting certain actions occurring after the Injunction of such instru- ments as those of the ‘ y@ga,’ sacrifice, &c.; and thus these are dependent upon something else,—it being absolutely impossible for an independent word to be spoken of as ‘ bh@vagabda’ (and as such there is nothing incongruous or tautological in the sentence ‘bhavarthah karmagabdah’). Specially as the ‘ yaga,’ ‘ sacrifice,’ &c., by themselves, are capable of being inferred to be ‘ bhdvartha.’ There are certain ‘bhavirtha’ words that are not = ^ Karmacabdas.’ And in this connection the proper examples to cite were ‘ bhdvayét BHAVARTHADHIKARANA. 493 kuryat,’ &c.; but the Bhashya cites the words ‘ bhiti,’ &c., which signify the action of that which is promwted; and as such they are not capable of being cited as instances of ‘ bh@vartha,’ as explained above. And though ‘one of the words cited by the Bhashya could, by taking it in the causal sense, be spoken of as ‘ bhavdrtha,’ yet trae other two are not capable of such constructions; though these latter also cam have their denotation split up into two parts—one part being the action of t ९, © Prompter and another that of the Prompted ; and with reference to the Axttor, they can be spoken of as ‘bhavdrtha;’ and it is for this reason that\the Bhashya has cited thom. Or, it may be that, in accordance with the Nuterpretation in the following Sutra, the purpose of the Bhavana may be taken as served by only a partial signification (only that of the action of betmg); and hence even though the words in question do not signify the whole of the Bhavana, yet they can be spoken of as ‘ bha@vartha.’ Question: ‘‘Why should not these (‘ bhavartha words’) be spoken ४८ of as Karmagabdas, when all verb-roots are called Karmagubdas ? ” Answer: An undefined generic action (that of being) being incapablo of being performed, such words cannot be spoken of as Karmagabdas. And hence it 18 that it is only such verbal roots, as denote particular actions, that are recognised as Karmagabdas; and hence the question does not affect our position. . If the words ‘ Cyéna,’ ‘ Citra,’ &ce., (names of sacrifices) were directly related to the particular results (mentioned in the sentenco ‘ Cyénéndbhi- caran 2/९} ९८८, &e.), then the Sacrifice itsclf would not have any instru- 7, antal agency in the accomplishment of the results; and then the words ‘Cytna,’ &c., could not be taken as Names; because it is only because of the co-ordination of the Instrumental Sacrifice with the words ‘Cyénéna,’ &c., that these latter are taken as names; and then these words would have to be taken as laying down materials for the sacrifices (which has been shown above to be absolutely untenable). It is for this reason that the Bhashya has said—* When we have the present Adhikarana, etc., etc.” (That 18 to say, when, according to the present Adhikarana, the Sacrifice is taken as the Instrument of the Bhdvand, then the ‘ Cyéna’ cannot but be taken as a mere Name of the sacrifice). It may be asked why the fact of the sacrifice being the Instrument of the Bhavana was not ascertained on the provious ocension. But the reason was that the particular fact has no connection with the subject- matter of the former Adhyfya, which treats only ef the means of knowing Dharma. Then there 18 the question — why should not the fact of ‘Cyéna’ &c., being names of sacrifices have been left to be treated of on the present occasion ? But the reason of this is that this fact has no connection with the Marks of Difference (among Actions), which forms the subject-matter of १94 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1—PADA -- + का (Ic). the present Adhkyaya. Therefore the treatmunt of the two facts must be accepted in their present order of sequence, ` Says the Bhashya — ‘ Na caishama; thina, &c.’; and this refers to the word mentioning tho Result; 2.¢., tle mention of the Result has no direct concern with the word ‘ O:trayd.’ | Says the Bhdshya:— ‘ Vinzbhaktikatuat ;* and this may mean — (1) because of the disappearance of the Oonjugational affix that signifies the pecu- liar relationship ; or (2) because of the presence of the particular Declensional affiz which signifies an aczomplished entity. For these two reasons, tho words ° Citra,’ &., that denote certain substances, can have no connection with the particular results ‘mentioned; as has been declared — ‘The relationship of the स nd the object always rests in the Bhavana; and hence the said relationghip could never be accomplished without an affix denoting the Bhavana,’ Sutra (2): Objection :—“ But Bhavu forms the meaning of 7 words.” “Wo cannot admit of the fact of tho Aparva being expressed by tho “ Affix, or by the Root by itself directly; and as for oxpressing it in- «५ directly, this can be equally done by the Noun also. ८८ That is to say, if it were held that the Apirva can be expressible only “by that which denotes the Bhavana, or by the root alone by itself, ८ independently of the Affix, thon, the theory that it 18 expressed by Nouns ‘would have been untenable. As a matter of fact, however, just as the ८५ 1001, expressed by the Affix 1s capable of denoting the instrumentality (of “the Apurva), indirectly through the agency of the Bhavana, 80 also is the ‘¢Noun ; and as such there is no differenco in the two theories.” Sutra (3): Reply: Such words, on the utterance whereof the forms of the objects denoted are directly cognised, are Nouns; and as such these do not stand in need of anything else, on account of their being self-sufficient in regard to their denotation. It has beon already shown above that when the Apirva is expressed by any one factor of the sentence, all else becomes subsidiary to it; and we are now going to show the difference in the very characters of the different words themselves. For instance, we cannot admit of a distinct Dharma being mani- festod with each word of a sentence; because that would necessitate tho admission of many transcendental agencies; and we have yet to show that the Noun can have no direct relationship with the result of the sacrifice. Thatis to say, when the particular transcendental agency is held to be accomplished by any one word of +he sentence, all else 18 very rightly BUAVARTHADHIKARANA. 4943 taken as accomplishing certain visible results and thereby becoming sub- Sidiary to the former; and this theory appears to be tho simplest under the circumstances. If, however, for the sake of making the latter subsi- diary to the former, we have got to assume other transcendental results to follow from these, then it would be very much simpler to hold all the words to be equally related to the Result; nor will this entail the trouble of assuming diverse relationships in the sentence. Now then, if the Noun be held to bo directly related to the Result, we would have to call, to the aid of the former, the signification of the Root. This signification of tho root, however, being self-sufficient, could no: kring any visible help to the denotation of the Noun which is an accomplished ontity; nor does this latter stand in any need of such visible: help; because the denotation of the noun is recognised as a fully accomplished entity, at the very time of its being uttered; and because that of which it is said to stand in need (viz., the Sucrifice as signified by the Root) is yet to be accomplished. The word “ prayoya”’ in the Siitra, means that with regard to which the word is used, i.e., the object denoted by it; and it is through this that there is a recognition of the accomplished form of the denotation of the word. The form of the Action 18 said to be perishable, only with a view to point to the fact of that form not having yet appeared; specially as even when the action has beon accomplished, inasmuch as it is oxtremely transitory in its character, it always stands in need of repeated accom- plishments. Tébhyah parakinksha.—This may be explained (1) as that these Nouns do not stand in necd of anything else that would serve as their primary— in this case it being necessary to supply the words ‘na vidyaté;’ or (2) the need for anything else is far away from those. “How”? Tho reply is ‘ bhitatvat’—that 1s to say, because of these being accomplished entities; this has been added only with a view to show the real character of things; which serves as a reason for the view held by the Sdtra. Sutra (4): Such words, on whose utterance the objects denoted are not found to exist, are Verbs; hence it is by means of these that the 42 ८2०४८ is cognised; because of the object being dependent. It is always the denotation of the root, as contained in the Verb, that is cognised as something to be accomplishgd ; and when this is held to be connected directly with the Result, the Noun must be taken as serving only a visible purpose. 496 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH I—PADA I—ADUHE (lc). That is to say, from its very character, the denotation of the Root ig cognised as something to be accomplished, which latter is distinctly specified by such roots as form parts of particular verbs. Hence when such a denotation of the Root is laid down as the means to a Distinct Result, in- asmuch as the former itself is something yet to be accomplished, it stands in need of an Instrument; and what the Noun does is to lay down either the accessories of the sucrifice (denoted by the Root), or to appear only as the Name of a particular sacrifice; or do both; and thereby it becomes subsidiary to the denotation of the Root. Objection: “If you hold it to appear as tho Name, then, inasmuch “as the word that appears as the Noun would also be something to be ‘accomplished, this too would be equal in all respects to the denotation “of the Root.” | Reply: Not so: (1) Because if the Name be held to be directly con- nected with the Result, it would only be taken as an Accessory; and as such an accomplished entity (and this would strike at its very character of the Namc). And (2) because though the denotation of the root has the character of something to be accomplished, yet when it happens to be expressed by a Noun, it is always cognised as an accomplished entity, ex- actly like any ordinary substance. That is to say, though the denotation of the Root is in the form of something to be accomplished, yet whenever it happens to bo mentioned by a Noun, it is always accompanied by distinct notions of Gender and Num- ber, and as such a fully accomplished entity. And it is a reoognised fact that the syntactical needs of words depend upon the particular verbal expression, and not upon the real state of things described; hence it must bo admitted that such a need belongs to the Root, and not to the Noun. “ Because of the object being dependent,”’—this serves to point out the difference betweon the Noun and the Verb, as based upon the degrees of proximity to the words. In connection with the Bhavand,—which has the character of a particular activity of the person concerned—this person requires a certain relationship of the denotation of the Root; and as there is no reason for sotting aside this fact, thero is no need of the mention of the Noun; and this is a sufficient ground of difference, [क उ , PM tL fe ee tg a ee al et ag ne ae a et et on, ADHIKARANA (2). [The Existence of 4}, १४५. ] The above discussion, as to the means of the comprehension of the Apirva, has presupposed the existence of the Apdrva itsclf ; but imas- much as its existence is not generally accepted, the next sutra 18 introduced with a view to establish the existence of the Apiurva. Sutra (6) : There is an Apwurva; because of the Injunction. Inasmuch as sacrifices have been laid down for the purposo of certain definite results, to follow after the lapse of a long time,—such deferred fruition of the Action would not be possible, unless there was an inter- vening agency of the Apérva. That is to say, tho Apparent Inconsis- tency of the relationship of 89९10668 and such results as the attainment of Heaven, &c., laid down in the Voda,—points to the fact that the existence of the Apirva also is laid down in the Veda itself ; and as such it 18 quito authoritative. Some people—notably the author of the Vriti on the Sutras—thinking thomsclves to be exceptionally clover, seck to disprove the Apdrva in the following manner. And this serves as the PURVAPAKSHA (1) of the Adhikarana. ‘“ Being not amenable to cither of the first five means of right no- “tion, tho Apirva must be admitted to be amennblo to the sixth—Nogation. “That is to say, the first five means of right notion—Sense-perception ८ 8.04 the rest—serve the purpose of giving ideas of certain things; con- ‘‘gequontly an object which is not amenable to any of these, cannot but be “accepted to bo non-existent, being amenable to the sixth means of right “notion—Nogation. And, as a matter of fact, none of the former five “are found to be applicablo to the Apéirva ; and hence, being totally foreign “ (A-pirva) to the means of right notion, it is a non-entity, and as such the “name ‘ Apitrva’ is quite propor for it. 63 498 TANTRA-VERTIKA. “ADH. U—Pdpa [- 40 (2). ५ ( 1) The Aptrva is not cognised by means of Sense-perception, be- “eause not being of the nature of the objects of Sense,—Colour, &c.,—it ५ cannot be cognised by means of the eye, &c. ८ (2) Nor 18 1४ coguisable by means of Inference; because it has never “been found to be actually concomitant with any characteristic mark ५८ (that could serve as the middle term of the Inferential Syllogism); as “a matter of fact, no relationship—either general or particular—has ever «५ {0661 cognised, with regard to the Apiérva; and we have also shown ‘““above that Inference is never able to prove the mero existence of objects. “(3) We do not know of any word orsentence denotative of the ८५ Apirva; and hence it cannot be held to be an object of verbal cog- “nition. And as for its cognition being based upon the Veda, this “could be possible, ouly if 1६ were expressed by either a Word or a “ Sentence, And asa matter of fact, there 1s no word that is directly ‘“expressive of the Apirva. As for the word Apirva itself, it only “expresses the true state (non-existent) of any such thing; and as “such denios its existence totally. And as arule, words cannot apply to “a thing not eognised by any other means of cognition; as it has “already been shown that the Word itself is not an independent means of “notion. And as for the Sentence, it caunot serve as the means of cogni- “sing the Apirva; for tho simple reason that the sentence is totally “ incapable of expressing any such thing as an Apirva; because what is “expressed by @ sentence 18 either the idontity or difference, or some “sort of relationship between any two or more objects; while as a ०५ matter of fact, there are no such objects, of which the Apiérva could +" 06 either the identity or difference or any other relationship. Though “for the coynition of difference among objects, the S#iralays down “such means as Different Words, &९, and Direct Assertion, &c.,—yet “these also are applicable only to the differentiation or usage of such ८ obyects as have a natural oxistence of ther own; and they cannot “serve to point out the existence of anything; and as such they eannot “serve as the means of cognising the Apurva. And as for Indirect Im- “plication (Atidéga), this cannot apply to anything that has not been “cognised by means of Direct Assertion. And further, the whole of the “Veda treating of mere Injunctions and Prohibitions, it is never found “to point out the existence of objects ; and henee there can be no scrip- “tural authority for the Apirva, ८ (4) That which has never been seen, and hence anything similar ५ {0 which has never been seen, can never form the object of Analogy. In ‘fact, being nover perccived, the Apdrva could be held to be analogous “only to non-entities, liko the hare’s horns, which also are never per- * ceived. ON APURVA. 4.99 (5) Even Apparent Inconsistency does not show that there actually “is any such thing as Apiirva; because the relationship of the Sacrifice “and its Result is capable of other explanations. ‘That 18 to say, (a) as for the Apparent Inconsistency of something “actually seen, this can be shown to be as irrelevant here as in the case “of the proving of the existence of Dharma. That is, as a proof of the ^“ 61861106 of Dharma, people bring forward the fact of there being dis- “‘crepancios in the conditions of different people; but this discrepancy 18 “otherwise explicable,—being held to be due to the nature of the “ individuals concerned ; in the same manner, the relationship of the Sacri- “fice with its results being otherwise explicable, it cannot point to any “such thing as the Apurva. (9) As for the Apparent Inconsistency of ९ something that has been directly asserted, this applies only to such casos “‘where the Inconsistency is perceptible. In the present caso, however, “we have to deal with somethmg that is assumed; and certainly any “such thing cannot be said to bo inconsistent with something else. For “ iastance, when itis said that the material to be offered should be cut out by “the Sruva, it is distinctly perceptible that such materials as Meat, Cuke “and the like are incapable of being cut by it ; and as the general direc- < tion is applicable to these latter also, the direction is interpreted as that ib “is only the cutting out of liquids, or somi-liquids, that is to be done by thie ^ Sruva. And this assumed interpretation is not inconsistent with anything ; ५ because it does not entail the rejection of something directly laid down and “the assumption of somothing not so laid down. As for the Apiirva, it ‘“‘can never be conceived of as the means ton result; and as such it can- “not be urged that from among various means to the Result, all others “being inapplicable to the case in question, it is the Apdrva alone that “‘can be accepted as the means, by tho Law of Parigésha (Alternatives). ५ And further, if the mere fact of the inapplicability of other means ५८ were to serve as the sole ground for the application of the said Law of ‘Alternatives, why cannot we assume the Horns of the Hare to be the ‘‘means in question ? That is to say, the mere fact of the absence of any “other cause, cannot justify the assumption of Apuroa being the neces- “sary means; because the reason would be equally applicable to the ‘“‘agency of the ‘hare’s horns’ as well. ५ And, further, if the Apurva be held to be something brought about “by the Sacrificc, then that would mean a rejection of the Heaven, which “ig the directly asserted objective of the Sacrifice, and the assumption “of a thing not so asserted. And secondly, if the Aptrva be held to be “the means to the particular Result, that would mean the rejection of the “ Sacrifice, which is the directly asserted means to the Result, and the “assumption of something not so declared. And there is no third 500 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II-—PApA I—~aput (2). ‘character that could be attributed to the Apirva. Consequently, on ‘the strength of the Scripture, it must be held that the Result follows ‘directly from the Sacrifice. “If it be asked—how can the Sacrifice, being itself immediately ‘destroyed, bring about the result P—all that we have to say, in reply, ‘is that, when such an effectiveness is mentioned in the Scriptures, why ‘should it bother your head? For certainly, what is your authority for ‘holding that the long-standing (Apirva, left by the Sacrifice) brings ‘about the Result ? If it be alaw that it is only long-standing causes “that can bring about any effects, then why should it not be held that the “ Results are brought about by the Akdga, and such eternal things? If it be (ˆ urged that, ‘we assume the Result to be brought about by the Apirva, ‘‘simply because that alone is capable of a continuous existence other ‘than what is possible for that (Sacrifice) which is laid down as the “means ’—then, it wonld be far more reasonable to assume the Result “to follow from the Akdga, 4९. ; but in this latter caso, inasmuch as ‘the existence of these is univorsally recognised, you would have to as- “sume only their agency in the bringing about of the Result; where- ‘‘as in the case of the Apirva, you have got to assume everything, ‘beginning from its very existence, without any authority whatever. “1६ you mean to say that, ‘the Result must be brought about by ९" 80116 such agency as has some degreo of permanonce, and is connected “with the Sacrifice (which cannot be said of Akaca, d&c.)’,—even then, ‘“(1) 1४ would be very much simpler to assume the Result to be brought “about by the Soul of the Sacrificer, which is connected with the Sac- ^^ 11006, and is permanent. That is to say, the Sacrifice itself being tran- ‘“sitory, if the Result brought about by something connected with it “can be spoken of as brought about by the Sacrifice,—then certainly ‘it 18 vory much simpler to assume that it is brought about by the soul ‘‘of the person who has performed the Sacrifice. (2) Or, the destruction ‘of the Sacrifice could bring about the Result (all Destruction being per- ‘“manent); and tho assumption of this agency would not require any ‘* great effort on our part, inasmuch as it is correlative to the Sacrifice which “is directly laid down in the Veda. Thatis to say, the Sacrifice itsclf “being transitory, what we have to admit is that the Action itself is “destroyed; but on account of tho truthfulness of the Scripture, its ‘‘ Result is sure to follow at some other time. And itis a rulo that that which ‘leads to the cognition of something else is the means to this latter; and ‘in tho case in question, wo find that itis the destruction of the action ‘that gives us an idea of the occurrence of the Result at some other ‘time; and hence this Destruction must be admitted to be the means to ८५ the Result. ON APURVA. 501 “Tt may be urged that a non-entity 1s never held to be an effective “agent. But in reply to this, we ask—where have you come across that ५ effective agency of the Apurva, that you accept it in the present case? ‘ And when it becomes absolutely necessary to renounce the ordinarily ‘acknowledged character of the Means,—and we come to consider whether ‘‘we should assume the agency of the Apirva or that of Negution,—it ‘cannot but strike us that the assumption of the agency of Negation ‘‘ which is accomplished in itself, is far more reasonable than, and cannot “bo rightly given up in favour of, that of the agency of the Apirva, ८८ which itself has got to be assumed. ८ And further, if the words of the Veda itself could express the fact “of the Rosult following at some other time, then alone could we, on the “strength of that, assume the intervening agency of something else. “That is to say, the Vedic Injunction is found to serve the purpose of ८४ pointing out the relation between a certain Action and a Result; and no ८८ mention is found therein of any other time ; and hence from the naturo “of Actions in goneral, we would naturally assume the result of the Ac- “ tion enjoined to follow immediately after 1४; why then should we, in “the first place, assume the result to occur at some other time, and then, ५ secondly, assume the intervening agency of the Apirva P ‘Here it may be urged that—‘at the time that the Action is per- < formed, the Result is not found to appear immediately after it; and we “are forced to the conclusion that tho Result must follow at some other “time, and that the Apirva is the agent that intervenes between the perfor- “mance of the Action and the appearance of the Result.’ ५ But this is not correct; it is only after he has ascertained the pure ८८ meaning of of the Scriptural Injunction that a person engages in the per- ८८ formance of the Action enjoined ; and after the Action has been performed, “he does not trouble himself with the meaning of the said Injunction. “That is to say, none that is ignorant of Vedic Injunctions is entitled to “the performance of any Sacrifice; and hence prior to the performance ८८ 0{ the Sacrifice, 16 18 absolutely necessary for the performer to have “a full comprehension of all that is implied in the Injunctions. And ‘‘as a matter of fact, at the time of this comprchension, there is not “the least idea of the fact of the Result of the Action not appearing at ८४ {116 time of its performance. And that which, at the time of the com- ८८ »rehension of the Scriptural Injunction, has not been cognised as con- ‘tained in the Injunction—how can it be possible that it is always cog- ८८ nised subsequently ? “Then again, inasmuch in the case of all men, we find the Result “not appearing immediately after the Action —we can attribute this fact “to some deficiency in the performer himself; and as such there is no ९०७४ TANTRA-VARUIKA. ADH. IT—PADA 1-- ^+ (2), “Inconsistency in the non-appenrance of the Result, that could justify “the assumption of the Apadrva. That is to say, we actually find a certain “ deficiency (in the performer or in the performance of the Action), which “supplies the necessary explanation of the fact of the Result not appearing “immediately after the Action is performed; and hence there can be no “ground for assuming an Apirva, for the sake of the appearance of the “ Result at some other time. Because the authority of Apparent Inconsis- “tency being equally applicable to both assumptions, it is more reason- ‘“‘abie by far to assume some such deficiency, even when any such be not “‘perceptible, than to assume an altogether unprecedented agency of tho < Aptrva. “Nor can the Apiirva be assumed with a view to the appearance of “ Results during future lives. Because Heaven and Hell consisting of only ८५ Pleasure and Pain, respectively, these two are actually experienced by the ‘person during this very life, immediately after the performance of actions- “That is to say, there arc no Heaven and Hell either in the shape ex- “tremes of Pleasure and Pain, or in the shape of certain well-defined «५ localities,—so that these could not be experionced during the present life ; ^“ specially as if these were transcendental, we could not have any longing for ‘or aversion to them; and as for the ordinary pleasures and pains, these “appear immediately after the performance of the Action ; and so there is “no difference in the case of such results, that could justify an assumption “of the Aparva. ८५ Further, in the case of Prohibitions, the declaration of the Scripture “ig not found to bring about an Apirva; and hence any Apirva proceeding “from an infringement of the Prohibitions could not have the authority ‘“‘of the Scriptures. That is to say, in the case of the sentence—‘ the ५ Brahmana should not be killed,’ what is declared by the Scripture 18 “that one should desist from such killing; and such desisting cannot bring ‘‘about any result at any other time; and as such this does not stand in “need of the assumption of an Aparva. OF the killing of the Brahmana, ८५ however, the result is the fall into Hell; and if this Result could be ८८ 7180 the ground for assuming an Apiirva to be produced by such killing, “inasmuch as the killing is not enjoined in the Veda, the Apirva in ques- “tion would be brought about by an ordinary (non-Vedic) action; and as such it could not be said to rest upon the authority of the Veda. And “even if such an Apirva were assumed, being itself without any action, “it could not be capable of carrying the body of the person to any other ४ place, at some other time; and thus too it would be absolutely useless, ‘Nor is it possible for the Apirva to have any substratum $ because “the substratum of the action itself 18 the sacrificial Cake, and such other ‘things appertaining to the sacrifice ; und all these are destroyed with ON 47201९4. 503 “the Action; and nothing apart from such sabstrata of the Action could “serve as the substratum of the connected Apirva. . “The same arguments apply also to the rejection of the Subsidiary “ Apurvas, And further, if the Subsidiary Apuarvas be held to lead to the “ Principal Aptrva at a distance, then the subsidiaries not being directly ५८ related to the Principal Action, they could not servo any useful purpose. “That is to say, even if wo assume a subsidiary Apurva, this could not be “of any use, unless related to the Principal Action. Nor 1s it possible for ‘it to fall in with either the Principal Action itsolf or its Apdrva, because ‘of the immaterial character of these. ८८ As for the particular result that is said to accrue to the substance— ‘Corn, for instance—through its being washed ;—oven this ends with “that rosult ; and as such not moving any further, it could not in any ‘way help the Principal Apirva in bringing about the main Result of the ५५ Principal Action. “Tf the Subsidiary Apirvas were held to inhere in the soul of the “sacrificer, then, in that case they would become included in a purpose ‘desired by the agent; and as such it would lose its character of being “ subsidiary to the Action. ‘And further, inasmuch as all subsidiary actions are mentioned ‘simultaneously by a single sentence, all the subsidiary Apérvas would ac- ‘cord their help simultaneously ; but no sach simultaneous action is pos- ५४ sible unless they are related to one another ; as a matter of fact, however, ‘‘ there 18 no ground for any such relationship. Tho same argnments apply “to the simultaneous action of the Principal Apirvas towards the comple- “tion of the Result. Therefore we conclude that on account of the mere ४४ {४०५४ of its being performed, the Principal Action produces the Result im “the Man, and the subsidiary Actions bring about their results in the ९५ Principal Action. “ Nor again 18 it possible for the Apirva to be either produced or mani- ** fested. “ Because it could not be produced all at once, by a number of actions “that appear one after tho other; and being devoid of constituent parts “it could not be believed to be produced in any sequential order. And ५ hence it cau never be said to be produced. “ Nor can it bo manzfested ; because a manifestation is possible only “through somo sort of an effect produced upon the sense-organs, or the “objects of sense, or both of these ; whereas we do not find any such effect “to be produced by Sacrifice, &c. That 18 to say, all manifestations are “ brought about by means of the effect produced upon ono of the afore- ५५ said three (the sense, tho object, or both); and hence in the case in “ question, it becomes necessary to assume another such offect (Sarskdra), ९04 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. H—-PADA I—ADHI (2). “Then again, for the sake of this lust, we have to assume another Sars- ‘‘kara; and hence this theory cannot be said to have any authority. If the “ Apurva were perceived after the performauce of tlhe Action, then we “could speak of its boing manifested (because it is only that which exists ८५ that can be manifested ),—and that too, if there were some authoritative ‘means of cognising its existence. As a matter of fact, however, none of ५८ these two contingencies exist. Consequently, we conclude that there is “no such thing as Apérva, and that the present 6 ४८1४ does not treat of “any such thing; hence the said interpretation of the Sitra cannot be ‘accepted as correct.” To all this, we make the following reply : SIDDHANTA. The peculiar kind of Apirva that you have reared up in your own imagination, to have a tangiblo body, is nothing to us, and as such a refu- tation of that need not trouble us at all. For the simple reason that tho Apirva that we hold is not what you have refuted, but we mean by ita certain capability in the Principal Action or in the Agent, which did not exist prior to the performance of the action, and which is duly ,based upon the authority of the Scriptures. Before the Principal or the Subsidi- ary actions are performed, men are incapable of reaching Heaven, and the Principal Sacrifices are incapable of bringing about their results. And it must be admitted that both these incapabilitics—one in the agent and another in the Principal Action—are set aside by the duly performed Principal and Subsidiary sacr:fices, which then produce a certain capability inthem. Bccause unless the said capability be produced the Actions remain as good as unperformed. And it is this capability, in the Agent or in the Principal Sacrifice, that is called, in our philosophy, the ‘ Apirva.’ You have urged that the Apirva is not cognisable by any of tho re- cognised means of right notion, Sense-perception and the rest. This is true; inasmuch as the only meens of cognising the Apurva is the Apparent Inconsistency of something mentioned in the Veda; and hence your argument does not quite affect our position. Specially because we also hold only such Apparent Inconsistency to be the means of knowing the Apirva; and inasmuch as this Apparent Inconsistency forms a part of Verbal Testimony, our sole authority for the Apirva isthe Scripture itself. Thatis to say, there are certain Vedic passages which declare that attainment of Heaven proceeds from tho sacrifice, and that the subsidiary sacrifices, the Praydja and the rest, impart a help to the Principal Sacrifice ; and on account of such passages it must bo admitted that these actions, ON APURVA. 505- whether destroyed or not, have a certain potency for bringing about the results mentioned in the said passages; specially as no effects can be produced by an entity that 18 devoid of all potency. Now then, we must admit the said potency to belong to the Sacrifices, after they have been performed. Because all actions being transitory, it is not possible for even a single action to exert a simultaneous influence upon the Result; how then can this be possible in the case of many actions? That 18 to say, when the action 18 taken in hand, inasmuch as it is made up of many momentary parts, it is incapable of applying al at once to any Result, and this becomes all the more impossible when the Actions—such as the Darga-Purnamasa, etc.—are made up of many supple- mentary Actions. For instance, at the time that the Darga is performed, there 18 no Pirnamdsa; and by the time that the Pirnamdasa is performed, the Darga has long ceased to exist; and so also in the case of a single sacrifice, at the time that the Agnéya is performed, the Agnishomiya and the Upancn sacrifices do not exist; and when any one of these exist, the other two do not; and thus no simultaneity is possible. Consequently if the Darga-Pirnaméisa, or any part of it, were to be destroyed, without leaving behind any capability in the Agent, then they would be in the same position as that which they had before their performance; and as such any subsequent action not having any concomitance, either directly or through some potency left behind, with the foregoing actions, such performance of the latter Principal Action would in no way differ from this same Action, when performed alone by itself, without the foregoing subsidiaries (as at the time of the bringing about of the final result it would have, in both cases, to depend solely upon itself) ; and hence there would not appear the Result, which is laid down as following from the Principal Action as accompanied by the Subsidiary Actions; because neither the Darca by itself, nor any other Action, has been laid down as the means of that Result. Even those who declare that the Result must always follow imme- diately after the Action, will have to admit that the Result should appear at the end of all the Actions concerned ; and consequently, accord- ing to them, Action performed last being the immediate precursor of the Result would be the only means tothe Result, all the others having been long destroyed. If however all the Actions leave behind them certain capabilities, called ‘ Apirvas,’ then there being no use of the actual presence of the Actions themselves, even when their physical forms have ceased to exist, the functioning of the Result would have a simultaneity based upon such capabilities; specially as it is only such simultaneity that is found to be the basis of all usage. For instance, all objects are found to act their parts, in all ordinary usage, only by means of their capabilities; and hence 6-4 506 TANTRA-VARIIKA. ADH. U—-PADA 1-—ADHI (2). the usage can be accomplished by means of the capabilities, even 1f the physical form of the action exist at some other time and place. Even in the case of ordinary actions of the world, when the Results of such actions are found to appear at some other time, the said capability must exist; but this capability 18 not called ‘ Apirva.’ That 18 tosay, even in the ordinary world there are many snch Actions as, Farming, Hating butter, and Study &., the Results of which are found to appear at some future time; end inasmuch as these actions themselves cannot continue to exist till the appearance of the result, we must admit the Result to be brought about by certain potencies left behind them, which continue to exist all along. But imasmuch as these actions do not appertain to the Veda, these capabi- 1168 are not called ‘ Apirvas.’ Thus then, before the action is performed, at the very time that the Vedic Injunction of the Action has been heard, we at once recognise the Result therein mentioned to be capable of being brought about by the due performance of many Subsidiary and Principal Actions ; and having a firm faith in the veracity of the Veda, we at once come to the conclusion that all the various Subsidiary and Principal Actions must continue to have some sort of an existence, up to the time of the actual appearance of the Result ; and inasmuch as we find the physical forms of these actions to be destroyed as soon as they are performed, we conclude that they cau have no existence, except in the shape of some sort of a capability left behind. It has been urged that the assumption of the Apirva entails the rejec- tion of that which is directly mentioned in the Veda, and the assumption of something not so mentioned. But such 1s not the case ; because as a matter of fact, (1) either the Result may be said to be brought about by the Sacri- fice itself, through the said Capability, or (2) the Result itself may be said to have been produced, immediately after the action, in the shape of a cer- tain subtile potency. (1) If the Result were brought about by something totally uncon- nected with the Sacrifice, then the said objection would apply to us. As a matter of fact, however, that which is brought about by the potency left behind in the Agent by the Sacrifice, is brought abont by the Sacrifice itself; specially as all Causes in the world, in the bringing about of their particular results, stand in need of certain intermediate actions. (2) Or conversely, all effects, in the shape of the Curd, &c., when appearing from their causes, as Milk, &c., do not all at once appear in the thickened form (of the curd); in fact, in the interval (between the milk and the fully- developed curd) the milk undergoes, at every step, various subtile modifi- cations. Jn the same manner, a result, like Heaven, undergoes several intervening modifications, in the shape of the Apiirva, which is in the ON APURVA. 207 shape of a sprout (that would blossom forth into the fully-developed Heaven). And hence, in the appearance of this sprout-like 427८2, the Heaven itself becomes produced; and in this case, all the time that inter- venes between the determination to perform the sacrifice and the experi- encing of the last iota of the Result, is counted asthe Present. Ithas also been declared elsewhere : ‘When one says one should cook the food by means of fuel, the action of burning is understood; and as soon as the sprout has sprung up, if is taken for granted that the tree has grown.’ It has been urged above that before the Action has been actually performed, there can be no idea of any such thing asthe Apirva. But this is not true ; because all Means, either Vedic or of the ordinary world, are known to bo transitory; and then unless there 1s some idea of the permanence of some sort of a potency left behind by the Means, how could such a Means be enjoined in the Veda? That is to say, unless we actually recognise the fact that the potency left behind by the Means, which itself is past and gone, subsists till the final accomplishment of the Result,—there is no possibility of atranusitory Action being enjoined; and hence it is proved that the idea of the possibility of such a potency exists before the Action is performed. Nor can the Result be said to be brought about by the souls of the persons that have performed the sacrifice ; because, in accordance with your theory, there is no difference made in the soul, either by the performance or the non-performauce of the sacrifice. If the sacrifice were to dis- appear without leaving any trace bchind, then, being as good as not per- formed, what would be tho difference between the soul of the person that has performed the sacrifice and that of one who has not performed it ? Because the character of the sound exists equally in both ; and the character of the sacrifice too belongs equally to that which is performed and has disappeared, and to that which is not performed. And as for the character of the performer (of the sacrifice), it does not persist in the soul of the person who is at some other time devoid of the action, and occupies an altogether different position. Nor can it be urged that tho potency of the Performer subsists ; because the sacrifice being performed even before the appearance of this potency (which appears only after the action has been performed), it cannot be said to be any such cause of the Action as func- tions by its very presence. And further, if the Man (his soul) were the means of the Result,—then the means of all Results, pleasant and as well as unpleasant, being one and the same, all the Results would always be of one and the same kind. And again, the character of having performed sacrifices would inhere equally in one who has performed many sacrifices and one who has performed only one; and then there would be no difference in the results accruing to these two persons. And this argument would strike 508 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—-PADA I—ADHI (2). against all those that perform many sacrifices; specially because the verb not signifying the performing agent, how could it be cognised that such and such a person has the character of having performed many sacrifices. For one who accspts the production of Apirva, there is a distinct Apirva for ench action performed, and as such there would be no incongruity in the multiplicity and multifariousness of Results. And further, among the subsidiaries also, if the soul of the performer alone were the sole means to the end, then inasmuch as the traces left by the subsidiaries, as performed along with one Principal Sacrifice, would subsist in the soul of the performer at all times, there would be no per- formance of thé same subsidiaries, along with another sacrifice (in which two they are laid down as to be performed separately). That is to say, according to your theory, all the subsidiary sacrifices, the Praydju and the rest, being transient, there could be no proximity of the Result with the physical forms of these, and consequently, the help that the subsidiaries would accord to the Principal, must be done by the Performer; aud this help of the Principal too, in the absence of an Apérva, must accord its help to the soul of the Performer himself; thus then, one who has performed the subsidiary Praydja, &., in connection with the Principal Sacrifice, would remain ever-endued with the aid accorded by these subsidiaries; and hence—without performing these along with another sacrifice, which 18 laid down as to be performed exactly in the same way as the former Prin- cipal Sacrifice,—he would attain its Result all the same; and so there could be no performance over again of these subsidiaries ; and in that case there could be no room for such injunctions as that—‘ during the Praydjas one should offer the krshnalau (a material laid down as the substitute of the ordinary materials offered at the sacrifice in connection with one Prin- cipal Sacrifice). [६ might be urged that-—‘ the times of the performance of the two sets of sacrifices being different, the one performance of the subsidiaries could not obviate the necessity of performing them over again.” Butthe reply to this will be given under the Sutra ‘ Arthasydvi- krtatvat’ where it will be shown that the aid accorded by the performance of the subsidiaries being held to be in the shape of the soul of the Per- former, this aid would remain exactly the same, whether the object aided be near at hand or at a distance; and that thus it would make no differ- ence, even if the Principal Sacrifice to be performed were not quite proxi- mate to the subsidiaries. The above objections apply also to the theory that the Result pro- ceeds from the Destruction of the Action. Because one who holds the Result to follow from such Destruction could have no difference among the Destructions of good and evil actions, or between those of one or many actions, or among various kinds‘of negation itself—viz.: Prior Negatiou, ON APURVA. 509 Posterior Negation, &. ; because all of these equally are non-entities ; and as such there could be no diversity or multifariousness of results, For instance, one who has been cured of one disease, as well as one who has been cured of many,—1in the case of both .of these men, the fact of being cured is just the same. If the Destruction of each particular action be held to be distinct, then it becomes an entity; and as we know of no such entity, it is only the entity in the shape of the Apirva that would be called by the name of ¢ Destruction.’ And further, the Results are not mentioned as following from the Deatruction of Actions ; and specially as this Destruction is nothing more than the contradictory of the sacrifice, a result that would follow from it could not be said to follow from the sacrifice. That is to say, all that the Veda says is that—‘ one desiring Heaven should perform sacrifices,’ and not that he should procure a negation of sacrifices. And hence, the sentence being actually found to rest upon the causal relationship between two entities, 1£ one were to assume it to deal with such relationship between non-entities, he would be striking at the very authority of the Veda itself. Because that which proceeds from the Destruction of the Action cannot be said to be (causally) connected with the Action itself ; because of the two (Action and its Destruction) being contradictory to one another; for instance, the burning caused by the heat of fire cannot be said to be con- nected with cold. Or,1it may be that, just as when the Result is laid down as following from the sacrifice, you assumed it to follow from its destruction, so in the same manner though the result laid down is Heaven, yet it may be assumed to be the Negation of Heaven! It may be urged that the said objection applies equally to the Apirva theory also. But then, it is not 80 ; because it is only a capability brought about by the Action, and as such, it is not quite different from it. As we have already shown that that which is brought about by the Apurva is brought about by the sacrifice itself, and that in the production of the Apérva, the result itself is produced. Even in ordinary experience we never find any negation to have a causal action; even if any such may be shown, there too, we can always attribute the effect to some other entity. In the case in question, however, we perceive no other active entity save the Apirva. It has been urged above that in ordinary experience the Apirva too has never been perceived to have a causal action. But this is not correct ; because in gil cases we find the causal efficiency belonging to some sort of a Potency oy Capability in general; and the Aparva is nothing more than a ae ‘gort of Potency. Ang her argument that has been brought forward is that—‘ the f 510 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, (1—-PADA I—ADHI (2), Injunction does not speak of any Result following at any other time; and the only theory that is in keeping with the scriptural Injunction is that the Result follows immediately after the action has been performed; and hence it is only such immediate sequence of the result that cin be said to be enjoined ;"’ but in refutation of this we have already brought forward the fact that the Actions being many and all transitory, no immediate sequence to the Action is ever possible. As for Heaven and Hell also, these represent the very extremost degrees of Pleasure and Pain respectively; and as such are capable of being experienced only at some other place and time, and could never be experienced immediately after the performance of actions,—as we shall show in the beginning of the Sixth Adhyaya. Even such ordinary worldly results—as children, &c.—having the nature of appearing gradually, do not appear immediately after the per- formance of the action; and people do not over think of obtaining the Result immediately after the action. As for such results as thie acquisition of landed property in a village, such acquisition by itself does not constitute all the Result, which lies chiefly in the use to which the property is brought; and this takes some time, and could not be fulfilled without certain intervening causes. Inasmuch as such objects as landed pro- perty, &c., have their full fruition in the use to which they are brought, which requires a certain amount of time, such fruition would be impossible immediately after the Action; hence in the course of this time, whenever the activity of the cause would cease, the Result would be finished and done with all at once; consequently it is absolutely necessary that there should be some sort of a causal agency subsisting till the accomplishment of the last iota of the Result. And this fact being duly ascertained before the performance of the Action, it cannot be rightly urged that the Apparent Inconsistency of the fruition of the Result would be equally explicable on the ground of certain deficiencies in the character of the Performer, detected after the, i 17 formance of the sacrifice has been found to be not immediately followed by the Result. It has been urged that there 1s ०० scriptural Apfirva in the case of Pro- hibitions. But just asin the case a Scriptural Injunction, an Apirva fol- lows from the Act enjoined, so, in the same manner, in the case of Prohi- bitions, an Apirva must follow from that which is prohibited. That is to say, just as it is only certain ordinary objects of the world—such as certain materials, &c.—that becoming Vedic, after the particular Injunc- tion of the Veda has been laid down which connects them with a definite result, are found to bring about certain transcendental Apérvas, only amenable to the Veda;—in the same manner, though such prohibited ON APURVA. 511 actions as the killing of a Brahmana, are not ordinarily recognised as leading to a fall into Hell, yet when the particular prohibition (of such killing) has been met with, it naturally leads to the assumption of its bringing about an Apirva capable of leading the person into Hell; and this Apérva too is as Vedic in its character as the former Apérvas. Even though the Apirva is devoid of any such apparent actions as motion and the like, yet by a mere connection with the performer, it becomes capable of such actions as leading him to other places, &c.; and as such the absence of any apparent activity cannot be urged against it with any effect. And itis the soul of the performer himself that serves as the substrate of the Apirva; hence the said action also rests in this soul itself; as we have already shown, under the chapter on ‘Soul,’ that of all Actions the active agent is the Soul. That 18 to say, 10 has been shown that of all such actious as the cutting out of the Cake, and offering it, &u., it is the Soul that is the activo agent, through its specific action of determination, &c. And thus we conclude that as the said actions go on disappearing, one after the other, they leave behind them, in the Soul certain potencies capable of bringing about the experience Heaven, &c. It may be asked—‘ How can the potency of that which has been destroyed subsist ?’ But to this we make the following reply: If the potencies of actions were held to lie within themselves, then on the destruc- tion of these, they could not subsist; but when they inhere in the soul of the performer, there 18 no reason why they should not subsist. Question: “ But how can the potency of one thing inhere in another ? ” Answer: (1) There is no absolute differonce between the Action and the Soul of the Performer. (2) And as a matter of fact, when looking for a potency, inasmuch as its assumption rests upon its effects, we must always accept if to 116 im a substrate where it might be of the greatest use,—be this substrate the Action itself or something else. That is to say, when we find that a destruction of the Action makes entirely useless any potency that inheres in that Action,—and that it is absolutely necessary to postulate such a potency,—then, just as its peculiar form, so its substrate too, must be assumed to be such as would make it of the greatest use. And thus it 18 that the subsidiary Apirvas, resting in the Soul, become related to the Principal Apirvas, through the fact of both of them inhering in the same Soul; and hence, when proceeding to help (in the accomplishment of the Result), they do it from a distance, on account of there being left no place in the substrate (by the Principal Apérvas) for any direct functioning (of the subsidiary Apirvas). It has been urged above that, if the Apérva inherein the Soul, then it 912 TANTRA-VARTIKAe ADH. II—-PADA I—ADHI (2), becomes only an end in itself desirable by men. But this does not affect our position ; because one thing becomes subservient to another, only when its sole use lies in the serving of some purpose of this latter, and not merely when it rests in this; for instance, though the Red Dye is carried by the camel (and as such rests upon its back), yet it serves the purposes of the king (for whom it 1s carried). Nor can it be urged that there can be no relationship of the container and the contained in the case of an immaterial thing (like the Apirva). Because such relationship 18 as feasible as the presence of Pleasure, &c., in the Soul (which is immaterial). As for the effects produced in the corns by the action of washing, &c., this subsists till the action of the cutting of the cake into two parts ex- tend over the whole series of such actions as the setting aside up of the several conditions of the corn—as the Rice, &c.; and inasmuch as the Principal Action also inheres, to a certain degree, in the corn, the afore- said effect rests aside, only after it has helped in the accomplishment of the Principal Apurva. And it 18 for these reasons that, like the actions that help from a distance, the actions of washing, &c., are not accepted as helping in the fulfilment of the Principal Action, asa whole. Aud just as the connection between the Subsidiary and the Principal Aptrvas rests upon the fact of their inhering in the same Soul, so also the same may be said with regard to the connection among the subsidiary Apiirvas themselves on the one hand, and among the Principal Apirvas onthe other. And thus it 1s that the simultaneous activity of all these becomes possible. Question: “^ How is it that the Principal 4770045, appearing as “they do one after another, are helped all at once, by the subsidiary ८५ Apurvas, which also appear one after the other, some before and some “after the Principal Apiirvas ? ” ‘To this some people make the following reply: The Principal Action lying among the Subsidiaries, brings about its Aparva, by means of the Apirvas left by the subsidiaries gone before it, as also by those coming after it,—these latter also having been already moved intr activity, by the force of the fixed procedure of the Action as a whole. But being, like the Atzthyad and the Varhi offerings, common to many, the said subsidiary Apirvas do not become fully utilised in helping in the fulfil- ment of a single Principal 477४८ Question: ‘But how can any help be given by those Apirvas that are themselves yet to come ? ”’ Reply: This help is presupposed on account of the relationship being known to be absolutely certain ; just as when the action of eating 18 close’ at hand, the cups, &c., are washed beforehand. Question: ‘If it be such that while the subsidiary Apirvas are yet ON APORVA. 513. ‘to come, the Principal Apirvas are acomplished, then in that case, there ‘would be no need of actually performing the subsidiary sacrifices (as ‘‘ their purposes will have been fulfilled prior to their performance).” Fteply: But wherefore should they not be performed, when the matter is such that though the Principal Apirva is accomplished by the prospective help of the Apirvas of the subsidiary Actions to be performed, yet it does not bear its final fruit, until these actions have been actually performed ? Others, however, offer the following reply to the above question : Each subsidiary Action brings about its own Apirva independently of all othe subsidiaries ; similarly the Principal Action also—f.z., the Agnéya— brings about its own peculiar Apirva, by the mere help of certain old- standing Apirvas, inhering in the soul of the performer, independently of the Apiirvas of all its own subsidiaries—which it has not yet been equipped with,—and independently also of any other Principal Action, which has not yet appeared. Thus, then, in the case of the Darga-Piurna- masa sacrifice, taken as a whole, when the Apurvas of the Darca together with all its subsidiary 4), ४7४48 have been accomplished, then what the Apirvas of all the subsidiaries (of the Durga-Puirnamiasa) do is to bring all at once to the Principal Sacrifice,a help, in the shape of an Apirva, which appertains equally to all the correlated Subsidiaries and Principals, and which is assumed on tho strength of the Injunctive passage implying such simultaneity, specially as after the final feeding of the Brahmanas in connection with the Darca has been finished, the very same actions are not laid down as to be performed over again. And then through that the various Principal Apirvas also joining together bring about another Apirva, in the shape of the capability of bringing about a single joint Result,—and thereby become fully accomplished. And this joint Apirva continues unmolested till the last iota of the final Result has been attained. Question: ‘“ When asa matter of fact the Result is found to appear “at the proper time, without any impediments, then, is it absolutely ‘necessary to assume an Apirva?”’ Reply: Certainly ; because it has been shown above that without an Apiirva the fruition of the complete Result 18 not possible. Question: ‘*‘ How is it that each subsidiary 417४८ does not, by ‘itself, help in the Principal Apdérva, and each of the Principal Apirvas ५ does not, independently by itself, fructify into the final Result P ”’ Reply: True; but this does not affect our position; because in the case in question all that Apparent Inconsistency justifies is the assump- tion of a single Apurva ; and then for the fulfilment of this Aparva, we can postulate a number of other Apirvas. That is to say, inasmuch as 65 514 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PIDA I—aADHI (2). with regard to the main Result all the Principal Actions are mentioned simultaneously, and so are also the Subsidiary Actions with regard to the Principal ones,—all the necessary requirements of the said relationships being fulfilled by the assumption of a single Apirva, we conclude that there 18 no authority for assuming any other Apiirva. And then it 18 that finding that it is impossible for this Apiirva to be brought about, all at once, by means of a number of actions that are performed one after the other, we come to assume the existence of an Apirva for each of these Actions. And it is a rule, in all cases, that a large number of unseen agencies may always be assumed, when all of them are justified by some authority ; while even the hundredth part of an unseen agency should not be assnmed, if there is no authority for it. Here, some people urge the following objection: ‘If the subsidiary “ Apirvas brought forth on the day of the Paurnamdsi subsist till the day “of the Amdvdsyd, then all the purposes of the person being fulfilled on ‘both occasions, he would not perform the subsidiary sacrifices over “again (for the Darga); and in that case he would directly infringe “the Vedic declaration that there are thirteen libations at the Darga (५ sacrifice.” To this, some people make the following reply : There would always be a repetition of the subsidiaries ; because the Darga and the Paurnamdsa sacrifices, each with all its accessories, being performed at different times, the admixture of these two should necessarily be helped by all the subsi- diaries performed twice over. Or, we can offer the following explana- tion: The Instrumental case-ending in the word ‘ darcapaurnamasabhyam ' distinctly sgnifies the fact that it is only when the Pawrnamasi is equipped with all its subsidiaries that it can, with the help of the fully- equipped Darga, accomplish its purpose ; and consequently, in accordance with the aforesaid reasoning, we conclude that the three Principal Apirvas of the Paurnamiisi, aided by its subsidiary Apiirvas, brings forth one Apirva and ends there; while the one Apérva thus brought about, pre- ceded by such another Apiirva of the Darga, brings forth another final - Apirva. Thus then, the subsidiaries performed in connection with the Paurnamast having disappeared (after having helped in the bringing about of the Apurva proper of the Paurrnamdsz), there can be no reason for neglecting the performance of those subsidiaries in connection with the Darga. And thus there is nothing objectionable in the said repetition. The same course of reasoning might be adopted in meeting the objec- tions with regard to the impossibility of the Apirva being either pro- duced or manifested. It has also been declared that: “ Just as ina frequent repetition of the Veda, the impression made upon the mind is always gradual, being as it is, in the form of the various parts of the sentences, ON APORVA. 515 {006 by one); 80 also would be the case with the appearance of the Apirva,”” Nor 18 it an absolute rule that there can be no parts of an immaterial object. Because the aforesaid Apparent Inconsistency would also justify the conclusion that the immaterial Apirva is cognised in the form of extremely minute parts. Even though, the production of an absolute non-entity being impossible, the Apirva be held to have an eternal existence and only to be manifested (by the sacrifice),—yet inasmuch as if 18 held to be brought about by sacrifices, distinctly for each person, we must accept its manifestation to be in the form of turning the person towards the accomplishment of the Kesult,—such manifestation being entirely different from any functioning of words, &. And asa matter of fact the manifestation of things is not always in one and the same form ; consequently the manifestation of the Aparva would be in the Shape of its being brought out of the soul wherein it has all along been lying latent. Or, it may be that by its vory nature, the Soul of man is ever capable of obtaining all things ; and such acquisition being barred by certain impediments, it is these Jatter that are removed by means of Sacrifices (and in this removal of the obstacle lies the manifestation of the Apitirua). Thus then, we conclude that the Apiirva does exist ; and the Sé#tra tou cannot be taken in any other sense, that would be of any use in the present context ; and hence we take the meaning of the Sétra to be that the Injunction of the Action ts the Injunction (authority) of the Apirvu. [Says the Bhashya—TIf tt be wrged that ‘on the authority of the men- tion of the Result we could hold that the Action (sacrifice) itself has not been entirely destruyed’| ‘The view here tentatively brought foward emanates from one who finds the assumption of the Apirva to be utterly groundless, and hence prefers the comparatively reasonable theory of the non-destruc- tion of the Action. [. [In reply to this theory, the Bhashya says—we do not perceive any shape of the ction; and against this it is urged that] “ This assertion “ig not quite correct; because Action has been distinctly mentioned as “nerceptible by the Senses, under Sutra ;‘ Rupagabdavibhagacca | P =|. II. ^ Again [the Bhashya has said—That which carries its substrate to another place is known us an Action ; and against this 1t 1s urged that] ५ the subject-matter of the discourse is Sacrifice, which is not of the ‘nature of Motion; and yet the Bhashya cites a definition that applies “only tosuch actions as are of the nature of Motion ; and this cannot but ^“ 06 rejected as irrelevant.” To the above, we make the following replies : I. What is meant by the assertion that no shape of Action is 816 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I1—-PADA I——ADHI (2). perceived is that we are not cognisant of any such form of Actions as would enable them to function at a future time; and as for the impermanent forms of Actions that are perceived, these can be of no use in the bringing about of the final Result. That is to say, though a shape of the Action is perceived, yet, inasmuch as this does not continue for any length of time, 1४ can be of no use in the bringing about of the Result; and as such it 18 as good as ^" not perceived” and 1s spoken of as such. II. Though the subject treated of is the Sacrifice, yet the Bhashya has cited an instance of an Action of the nature of Motion, because, even in the Sacrifice, we have such actions in the shape of the throwing of the materials (into the fire). That is to say, the mere determination to offer, on the part of the Agent does not accomplish the Result, because the Result is laid down as following from the Action takeu as a complete whole, as made up of all its accessories and appurtenances of procedure ; and, as a matter of fact, we find that. in the body of the Sacrifices, there are such actions as the cutting up of the Cake, the throwing into the fire of the Material, the holding and collecting of the various utensils, &९. ; and inasmuch as all these actions consist of Conjunctions and Disjunc- tions, if they have to last for any length of time, they must have substrates of their own. And it is such a substrate that we do not find; nor is any manifested outward shape perceived. As for the actions of Determina- tion also, inasmuch as one Determination is always shronded over by another Determination, even this cannot have any lasting existence. As for this continuance too, this could be only either as inhering (A) in the Soul, or (B) in the materials offered. [A]. As for the Soul, no motion can inhere in it; because being omnipresent, there is no place from which it would be away, or to which it would go; and hence it can have no motion. As for the question—how can the Soul be omnipresent P—the only reply is that it is so, because we perceive its functioning everywhere, That is to say, the notion of ‘J’ (which is all the notion that we have of the Soul) always points tu .he mere existence of the Soul, which is of the natnre of pure Consciousness ; and does not in any way qualify it with any specifications of Time or Place. Consequently, that the existence whereof is not specified by time and place, being held to be eternal and omnipresent,—the Soul can- not but be accepted as omnipresent. Thus then we find that the expres- sion ‘the perception of its functioning everywhere’ only points to this unspecified idea of ‘I.’ Or it may be taken as referring to the experi- encing of Pleasure, Pain, &c.; because wherever the Soul goes, it 18 never without an experience of these. And we have already shown under the section on ‘Atma’ (in the Tarkapidu—Clokavaritka) that these experiences do not belong to the Body. Hence if the Son] were not omnipresent, then ON APURVA. a17 there would be an experiencing of pleasure, &c., only in such cases where the Body would be in contact with a Place occupied by the Soul. The upholder of the theory that the Soul is wholly encased within the Body, urges the following: ‘ The perception of tts functioning every- “avhere is a sure sign of the Soul having come from one place to another; and ८५ 88 such firstly, the reason that you bring forward in support of its ‘‘ominpresence proves to be contrary to your conclusion. Thatis to say, “if the functioning of the Soul were actually perceived at all places, at ‘‘one and the same time, then alone could suvh perception point to its ‘‘omnipresence ; as a matter of fact, however, the said functioning 1s ‘‘ perceived in different places one after the other; and as such the nature ४ 0 the Soul comes to be similar to that of the Body. That 18 to say, if ४ we could over perceive a functioning of the Soul, apart from the Body,— “ or if we could find the pleasure, &c., of one Soul appearing in another “body,—then alone could we accept the Soul to be omnipresent. As 1६ 18 “however, the functioning of the Soul is found only in that Body which “it occupies ; and as such wherever this Body goes, there, one after the “other, we come across the said cxperiences; and hence these function- “ings of the Soul together with the Body becomes (in its extension) “exactly lke those of the Body itself. Otherwise the Body would also “be held to be omnipresent. Thus then movement from one place to “another, being found in the soul also, it comes to be as active and ‘mobile as the Body itself. Secondly, the argument brought forward ‘““may be discarded as leading to an uncertainty : inasmuch as it can ८८ prove two coutradictory conclusions. For instance, it has been declared “that the Soul is mixed up with the Body, because it is always in contact “with it; and because, wt ts only wn such and such places that the function ‘of the Soul ts perceived.” It isin reply to these objections that the Bhashya has said: There is nothing incongruous in denying such mobility of the Soul. In the aforesaid objectton-passaye, some people read ‘na fu tadéva, &c.;”’ and in that case, we can take this passago as denying the argu- ment that could be brought forward by the opponent,—namely, that the perception of its functioning everywhere would point to the Soul’s moving from one place to the other; and then the next sentence gives the grounds for this denial. Objection: «^ How can the fact of there being nothing incogruous in ‘denying the movement of the Soul be any reply to the above arguments ? ५ Because tho mere absence of incongruity cannot establish any theory ; “specially as such absence of incongruity is equally applicable to the con- ‘‘trary theory ; as it is equally open to the opponent to say that there s 4५ nothing incongruous in admitting of the motion of the Soul.” 518 TANIRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1I—PADA I—ADHI (2). To this, we make the following reply: The absence of incongruity being found to be applicable to both theories, the assertion of the Bbashya, that ^ there is nothing incongurous, &c.,” clearly shows that it means that there is an incongruity in the contrary theory. That is to say, the sense of the reply is that 1f we deny the motion of the Soul, there is nothing incongruous, while if we accept its motion, there are many incongruities. We proceed to show these incongruities. (1) The Soul being itself immaterial, if can never be mixed up with material eloments; and being untouched by these elements, 11 cannot be taken from one place to another, That 18 to say, even in the case of extremely subtile particles of matter,—such as the hght emanating from the Sun or the Moon,—we find that they are not mixed up with grosser materials, like lumps of Karth, &c., or are carried about along with these ; how then can such mixture or movement be postulated with regard to the Soul, which is in its very nature purely immaterial, or a mere series of Ideas (as held by the Bauddha) ? Though the Jaina declares that “ the Souls in the state of bondage being never found apart from the Body, they can be held to be material,’’—yet such an assertion would involve a vicious circle ;—namely that the fact of the Soul being material would depend upon the fact of its being mixed up with the Body, while this latter fact would depend upon the material nature of the Soul. Con- sequently, drawing our conclusion from the case of the liberated Souls, we enn declare that in its very nature the Soul is immaterial; and as such it can have no materiality, based upon the fact of its contact with a material body. ‘hus then, the Soul being something different from the Body, and not iu material contact with it,—it cannot, on account of this absence of contact, be carried along with it; and hence when the Body would be moving from one place to another, the Soul (if an entity limited in space) would be left behind, exactly like the portion of space vacated by the moving Body; specially as the Soul cannot be wafted along either by Air or by Earth, &c., and as such it is absolutely incapable of being carried about, either by itself or by anything else. As for such objects as Flame and the like, inasmuch as these are tangible, they are capable of being carried about by air-currents, or along with lighted torches, &c., and as such these can move from place to place. On the other hand, if the Body were to move about by itself, 1t would be inanimate; when, however, the Soul is omnipresent, wherever the Body goes, it is always endowed with the Soul; and hence it is only right that the Body should always be followed by intelligence. Exactly as, when one point of space has been vacated by the Body, another point of space is at once afforded to it; and this is possible, only on account of the omnipresent character of space. ON APURVA. 519° (2) And further, in case the Soul be denied to be omnipresent, while occupying the Body, the Soul could be either extremely small as an atom, or of the size of the Body; but none of these is possible. And we have already shown (in the Tarkapada—Clokavartika) that the Soul is not a mere serves of Ideas. And the Soul being eternal, and located within the Body,— if 1 were extremely small, then it could not extend over the whole Body; and in that case, it would be absolutely impossible for us to have any experiences of pleasure or pain, throughout the Body. That is to say, if the Soul is extremely small, then it would be possible to have experiences of pleasure and pain of only that part of the Body, where the Soul would be located ; and hence it would not be possible, at one and the same time, to have an experience of pain in the head and in the foot. If it be urged that, ^“ being extremely mobile, the Soul would swiftly move from one part of the Body to the other, and would thereby make such varied experiences possible,’—then, all that we can say is that there are no grounds for believing in such mobility of the Soul; specially as we are not cognisant of any difference in the point of time of the pain in the head and that in the foot; and further, if the Soul would be constantly moving, there would be no point of time at which we could afford to have any sensation, and hence there would be no sensation in any part of the Body. Consequently we cannot but reject the offered explanation. And again, the various limbs of the Body are strengthened, and do not wither away, simply because of their being pervaded over by the Soul; because at death we find that they wither away quickly. Hence, if the Sonl were something very small, that point of the Body, wherefrom it would be absent, would be liable to instant decay. On the other hand, if the Soul were to be assumed to be of the exact size of the Body, as held by the Jaina, then too it would be necessary to make many gratuitous assumptions. For instance, we would have to make the following assumptions :— (1) that the Soul has many parts; (2) that these parts are innumerable; (3) that without any other agency, there isa conglomeration of these parts ; (4) that even though partite, the Soul is eternal; (5) that the Soul is capable of the very extremes of expansion and contraction; (6) that the Soul has a motion from one body to another, ou death; (7) that thereis a point of time intervening between ita departure from one body and the occupation of another; and (8) that there is some cause for such motion of the Soul. All the above assumptions—the existence of the Soul’s parts, &०.-- are such as are not at all amenable to Sense-perception, &c.; and as such they could at best be only the creations of one’s imagination, &c.; and as such. they should be rejected, in the same mauner as we have rejected (under 520 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. f1—PADA I—ADHI (2). the chapter on Words) the assumption of parts of words, Then again, when the Soul is only as large as the Body, we can never assume its parts to be innumerable or endless; and in the absence of any fluidity in these parts, it is not possible for them to conglomerate together in one compact whole; and unless they conglomerate thus, they can have no power of bringing into existence a single living being. And further (even if such conglomerations were possible), all Conjunction always ending in Disjunction, the living Soul would be, exactly like a jar, amenable to occa- sional destruction. Aud when one part of the part has been cut off, there is no ground for assuming that the particles of the Soul, that were con-- tained in that limb, escape from it when severed from the Body, and spread themselves over the rest of the Body. And as for the temporary mobility perceived in the severed limb, this is due to the momentum imparted by the severing stroke to the air enclosed within it, and not to the presence in it of any Soul-particles. Because in that case, there could be no- ground for believing in any expansion or contraction of these particles. As for the hght emanating from the lamp, its expansion or contraction is held to be possible, because we actually perceive such contraction and expansion. Though in reality, there is no contraction of thelight of the lamp; because even when the lamp is covered up by an opaque vessel, all the light outside the cover 18 destroyed; because the flame is cap- ablo of emitting a circle of light round itself, only when it 18 uncovered, and not when it 18 covered up. The same arguments hold respecting the expansion of such lights; the fact being that the apparent expansion of light is due to the appearance of new particles of light, added to one another, and not to the expansion of the former particles themselves. It is only in the case of such things as are tangible (and solid) that one cannot take the place occupied by another; and hence, when a number of such things appear, they forma gradually expanding series, which gives an idea of crpansion. ‘The particles of Soul however are immaterial ; and as such there being nothing impossible in all of them occupying the same point in space, they would ever remain in the condition of an atom (how: soever much their number might increase). How too, is it possible for the particles of the same Soul to expand or contract within the limits of the Body of an elephant or an insect (which the Soul inhabits during different lives on the Harth)? And further, this theory would necessitate many such groundless assumptions—as that at death the Soul-particles move into an intermediate body,—that such an intervening body exists, that though existing this body is not perceived, on account of certain obstacles (in the way‘of such perception)—and that this intervening body throws the Soul into the next body born into the world (after some time). For these reasons we must accept the Soul to be omnipresent. ON APURVA. 523 As for the declaration in the Upanishads that the Sonl is of the size of a grain of corn, &., &c.,—it is only meant to show the extreme subtility of the Soul, which has been elsewhere declared to be omnipresent. As for the assertion in the Mahabharata (Vana-parva Adh. 296—16763) that ४ Yama extracted the thumb-sized man from the body,” —thisis only a flight of poetry, meant to show up the clear practices of the Death-god, forming, as it does, a part of the eulogy bestowed upon the woman wholly devoted to her husband; and this passage is to betaken as an Arthavdda, exactly like that which speaks of Prajaépati having cut out his own fat. And we actually find the same Vyisa speaking, in many places in the Bhagavadgita, of the omnipresent character of the Soul. | Oljection: “If the Soul be omnipresent, a single Soul would belong to all bodies. ” | Reply: It is not so; because we actually find the bodies to be many, and each body to be endowed with distinct experiences of its own. If it were not so, all purposes of tle world being fulfilled by a single body, there would be no use of a number of bodies. Nor can it urged that for the same Soul, the existence of many bodies could be held to be as useful, as different bodies during different lives; because in this latter case, another body is brought into existence for the sole purpose of enabling the Soul to experience the particular pleasure, pain, &c., consequent upon his deeds in the previous life; while if a single Soul occupied all the bodies in the world, at one and the same time, each individual being would be experiencing the pleasure, &c., of all the beings in the world; and, as the one Soul would always carry on the functions of seeing, &c., by means of the organs present in any one body, there would be no likeli- hood of any persons being blind or deaf, &c.; nor could there be any difference in the actions laid down in the Veda, for men of different castes ; because the same Soul inhabiting all bodies, the same person would be- long to all castes. None of these absurdities appear, if Souls are held to be many; and even though all these Souls are omnipresent, there would be nothing incongruous in their simultaneous existence; inasmuch as being imma- terial, none of them would stand in the way of another. And it is on account of this indivisibility of souls, and also on accouut of all Souls being of the nature of pure Consciousness, that the Upanishads speak of all Souls as one. Question: ^" How is it that, the Souls being many (and omnipresent), and all of them being related to all bodies, the pleasure or pain of 0116 ५ being 18 not experienced by another P”’ ‹ To this question, some people make the following reply: Even when the Soul is held to be nothing more than the Body, just as the pleasure, &c., 66 ४४2 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA I—ADHI (2). ofithe Soul encased in the body of the child in the womb are not expe- rienced by the mother,—so, the same would be the case with the case in question. That is to say, even one who holds the Soul to be of the same size as the Body, would be open to the above objection; inasmuch as the Soul of the mother inhabits the same body that is also inhabited by the Soul of the child in her womb, the pleasure, &c., of the child would be experienced by the mother. And the explanation that would be brought forward in this case would also apply to the case in question. The above reply might hold good, if some reasons were brought for- ward; as it is, however, the mere fact of the amenability of the contrary theory to the same objection, cannot be counted as a reason in support of one’s own theory ; because a third party could effectively bring forward the said objection against both of these theorists. And further, the Soul being a modification of the organ of touch, and the position of the Soul in the space within the Body not being accepted as that of something apart from it, there is no contact of the Soul of the mother with the child’s body; and as such the said objection would not apply in this case. For these reasons, the above question should be answered in the following manner: The absurdity urged in the question would apply to our theory, only if mere spatial contact were held to be the sole ground of the experiencing of pleasure, &c.; as a matter of fact, however, we have an experience of only such pleasures, &c., as are capable of being eapertenced ; and as such there is no room for the said absurdity. That is to say, 1f, in the Soul’s experiencing of pleasure, &c., the sole cause were held to be the mere co-existence in space, then we would be open to the said objection ; asa matter of fact, however, as in the case of the eye, &c., so in the case in question also, the cause of experience is held to lie in the capability of the Soul. Consequently just as eventhough the colour of an object is existent in space with its touch, yet it is not perceived by the sense of Touch,—so in the case in question also, one Soul does not experience the pleasure and pain brought about by the Dharma or Adharma of another Soul. Thus then, the relationship between the experiencer and the experienced being that of ownership,—as explained under the chapter on Atma—our theory is not open to the said objection. Thus then, the Soul being omnipresent, it must be admitted that it can have no mobility (and as such the Actions cannot inhere in it). _ 8] Nor could the Action inhere in the materials (such as the pieces of the Cake)—because, says the Bhashya, such materials are always destroy- ed. Nor can this destruction be denied ; because we actually find that the cake that has been offered into the fire has become transformed into ashes. Nor can it be urged that at that time there are certain obstacles ON APURVA. 533 in the perception of the materials, in their own forms; for the simple reason that there are no such obstacles. Even if such obstacles were assumed on account of the apparent inconsistency of the non-percep- tion,—then too, we would have to assume many more groundless and absurd imperceptible things than the single Apairva. For instance, we would have to assume—(1) the continuation of the material in its un- destroyed form; (2) that it is not perceived (even though existing); (3) the existence of obstacles to such perception; (4) that there are obstacles to the perception of the obstacles, and so on and on ad injinitum; (5) the continuation of the action which is momentary ; and (6) the reason for the non-perception of this action, And certainly an assumption of the Apitrva would be a very much simpler process than this. These would be the arguments against the assumption of the continua- tion of the Action, independent of any substrate. If however it be held that the action is contained in the Soul itself, bringing about certain definite conjunctions and disjunctions,—this also would involve the contradiction of a directly perceptible fact, and the as- sumption of one not perceptible. And hence we conclude that it is by far the most reasonable process to assume the agency of the Apirva. The purpose served by the main Adhikarana may be thus summed up: (1) If the Result were directly connected with the material, &., the mention of the particular materials too would, like the Action itsolf, have transcendental results; which would make it absolutely impossible for any other material being substituted for the principal material (in case some- thing happened to it in course of the action). In case, however, the Result is directly related to the Action, the use of the material is a visible one, lying in the mere accomplishment of the Action; and as such its place could very well be taken by a substitute, which is known to be capable of serving the same visible purpose. Thus then, 1 the principal material of the sacrifice becomes spoilt, the following would be what our opponent will have to do, in order to save himself from the sin proceeding from the non-completion of a sacritice that has been begun: He will have to finish the action by any material that he could obtain; and it would not be necessary for him to try to obtain a material similar to the original material ; because (in the case of atranscendental result) the result would not follow even from a similar material (as it would also be other than the one which is laid down as leading to the particular result); and as for the Action, all other materials (similar or dissimilar to the original) being equally unprescribed, it would be equally completed by means of all $24 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. U—PADA I—ADHI (2). these mnterials. Nor cnn these materials be spoken of as substitutes of the orginal material; because they are not similar to it, and because they serve an entirely different purpose; because the original material was being employed towards the fulfilment of a particular transcendental result, while the material now taken up is used either with a view to ward off the sin accruing from the non-completion of the sacrifice, or to complete an action which is being performed for the sake of a minor result. (2) Another use of this Adhikarana les in connection with the ascer- taining of the Names of Sacrifices; and we have already explained this under ‘ Namadhéya’ (Adh. I, Pada IV). oe, eet me ee Oe Le Om, Oe Se ति ADHIKARANA (3). [ Division of Actions into Primary and Subsidiary. | Sutra (6): Actions are of two kinds—the Primary and the Subsidiary. It would seem from the above that there is always an Aparva in connection with each distinct Verb; consequently the Author now proceeds to differentiate the Subsidiary from the Primary Actions (which latter alone are followed by an Apérva). But on this point we have the following— PURVAPAKSHA. “ All verbs having the common character of a verb, inasmuch as the “notency of the objective, proceeding from the object to be accomplished, “is always brought about by fully accomplished objects, the actions de- “noted by all verbs are equally Primary. That is to say, so long as a ‘definite purpose can be assumed, it is only right that every action, being ‘expressed by a verb, should be accepted as serving a distinctly useful “purpose, and as such, being Primary, and the means of bringing about ५८ 81 Apurva. Consequently, like the verb ‘ yajatt’ (offers a sacrifice), the ५५ meaning of the verbs (avahantz ), and the like also have so many distinctly ४४ yseful purposec served by the Gorn, &c. ‘Thatis to say, just as the sacrific- “ing 18 accomplished by the materials offered ; so is the threshing accom- ‘plished by the corn that 18 threshed, And as such the threshing must “bring about an Apirva.” To the above, we make the following reply :- SIDDHANTA. In the matter of the relationship subsisting between the Noun and the Verb, that action alone of which we do not perceive any distinct purpose, can be accepted as leading to a transcendental result; which cannot bein the case of any other action; and such a supposition would be absolutely 526 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. N-—~-PADA I—apDHr (3). groundless. That 18 to say, in all cases where a certain Action is related to acertain material, inasmuch as no Action can be accomplished without a certain material, the Material, being in the first instance found to bring about the Action, is at once taken as serving the distinctly visible purpose of accomplishing the Action. Subsequently, however, in certain cases, the Action turns upon itself, and imparts an aid to the material itself (as in the case of Threshing which serves to purify the corn); while in other cases, the Action rests within itself, its sole purpose lying in its own fulfilment (as in the case of sacrificing). And in this latter case, there naturally arises in us a desire to know what the use of the Action would be; and as no visible purpose is found to 06 served, we can always assume a transcendental one (in the shape of the Apirva). In that case, how- ever, where the Action is found to have its sole purpose in the fulfilment of a visible purpose—such as the preparation of Rice for instance,—we can have no business to assume any transcendental purpose; and the Injunction of the Action having been justified by a visible purpose, the Action 18 not recognised as bringing about any transcendental result. ADHIKARANA (4) [The Definition of Primary 4611011. | Sutra (7): Those that do not seek to make a material, are Primary Actions; because the material is a secondary factor. Those actions which do not seek to make up, or prepare, a material either in its material from, or in that of a certain property of it,—such actions, for instance, as the Prayajas—those being the principal factors, with regard to their appurtenances,—they serve the purpose of bringing about transcendental results. (म 9 gel Gt ty, gl Olt a in त at दा ADHIKARANA (5) [The Definition of Subsidiary Actions. | Sutra (8): Those that are meantto make a material are re- cognised as Subsidiary ; because with regard to these, the material is the dominant factor. Those Actions, however, that either produce a material, ९.4.) the Fire by the Laying, or accomplish or prepare it, e.g., the preparing of the Priest by appointment, or purify it, eg, the purifying of the corn by the threshing, or the preparing of the rice by grinding—are all Subsidiary ones ; because they are always subservient to the preparation of the material. Objection: ‘‘ When, as a matter of fact, we find that, whether the ५ Action be one that leads to transcendental results, or one that brings “about only visible ones, it is performed equally well, what is the use of “ differentiating them into the Primary and the Subsidiary P ” Reply: Without the aforesaid differentiation, we would have the following anomalies: In accordance with the theory of the Parvapuksha (of Adhi. 4), even where the material to be offered is the rice of the Priyahgu, the threshing, which would be necessary for the preparation of the Priyanyu, would come to be applied to the Vriht corn; because according to that theory the threshing also is a Primary Action; and as such the material mentioned along with it (viz: the Vrihi) could not set aside the Subsidiary material ; just as in the case of the Butter in connection with the Prayajas; sud consequently the threshing could not be removed from the Vrihi. Whereas in accordance with the S:ddhanta, the Subsidiary materials would be set aside; because the material that is of use in the Primary Action, is affected by the preparatory actions also; and hence the Priyangu corn to be used at the sacrifice, would certainly have to undergo all the processess of threshing, washing, &c. Objection: “Even in accordance with the Purvapaksha theory, if the ‘primary threshing were applied to the Vrihz, it would serve no useful ‘ purpose in connection with the main sacrifice in hand; and hence in a ८५ 0886 where the material to be offered is the Priyangu rice, the threshing CLEANING Of SRUVA NOT A PRIMARY ACTION, 529 “could not be applied to the {720४ corn, which is not taken up by the “* Principal Action.” Reply: It is not so; because according to the Pirvapaksha, the relationship of the Vrihi, as mentioned in the Scriptural Injunction, with the Sacrifice and the Threshing, is equal; nor do we find, in the Vrihi, any such mark of uselessness, as is found in the case of the Vdjina. That is to say, we have two equally authoritative Injunctions—(1) ^“ One should offer the Vrihd corn in sacrifice,” and (2) ^ One threshes the Vrihr corn ;’’ and we do not perceive any reason for making any such distinction, as that this action (offering) is useful, while that other (threshing) is useless; nor is the threshing such an action as can be accomplished in the wake of another action, as we find in the case of the Vajina, which is the water of the milk left behind after the curdled masses have been removed ; nor is it one whose requirements are all fulfilled by an agency whose chief function lies elsewhere,—ns we find in the case of the Padakarma (rites in connection with the seventh footstep of the Cow given in exchange for the Soma), where the requirements are all fulfilled by the one-year-old Cow given as the price of the Soma, and no new cow has to be got; nor has the threshing the character of a part of a material, as we find in the case of the Uttarrardha (second half of the Cake) ; nor lastly has the threshing the character of the action of indicating any other purpose,—as we find in the case of the covering up of the chaffs by the cup in which the Cake is to be cooked; consequently the action of threshing cannot but be regarded as useful. Nor, according to this theory, is it absolutely necossary that the Vrihz corn should be threshed for the purposes of a sacrifice; because the serving of some useful purpose is equally present in an ordinary action of the word also. Nor, in the present instance, is there any authority for taking up the original action; because the Context does not serve to make any such distinction. Nor conld a differentiation be mado on the ground of the fact of that person alone being entitled to the threshing who is entitled to the per- formance of the Dargd-Pirnamasa: because of the reasons propounded under Sitra [X—i—19. When the threshing 18 taken as a purificatory action, then, in that case, no purification being needed for the corns employed for ordinary worldly purposes, the original action (of the sacrifice) would, with great difficulty, be got at, by means of the Specification, in the shape of the capability of bringing about the Apuérva. And in case the threshing be also accepted as a Primary Action, and as such serving the purposes of the sacrifice from a distance (transcendentally), then there would be no uselessness attaching to it, even if 1 were performed by the ordinary Vrihe corn; and as such, on the strength of direct Scriptural Injunction, it would be equally right to take up any Vrihi 67 580 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I11—PADA I--ADHI (5). corn. Specially because in that case the Threshing would be a pure Dharma; and as such it would have to be done but once,—exactly like the threshing of the Sarvaushadhi (a mixture of certain medicinal herbs, &c.),— and not to be continued until the preparation of the Rice; and as for the Vrihis to be employed in the Rice to be offered at the sacrifice, these could be done into rice even by the other processes—such as that of tearing the husks, &c. (the prescribed threshing being an independent Dharma by itself, and having nothing to do with the subordinate purpose of the preparation of the Rice). Andon account of the peculiarties of the context, the threshing would also come to form part of such sacrifices as the Sdnnayya and the Upangu, &c., as also in the various modifications of these (because it would have only a transcendental effect, and as such there would be nothing incongruous in its employment in all these actions). And it is with a view to these anomalies that the above distinction has to be made. ADHIKARANA (6). {The character of the Primary does not belong to such actions as the cleaning of the Sruva, &c.] Sutra (9): “In the case of all Dharmas, every Action would ‘‘be the Primary, because of the non-fulfilment (of anything visible) “ _exactly as in the case of the Pryaja.” The Bhashya has cited the cleanings of the Sruk, the Paridhi, the Agni and the Purodaga,—because each of these is differently related to the Principal Action. The sense of the Adhikarana is that even when the aid imparted by a substance to the Primary Actions is from a distance,— inasmuch as it is connected with a certain Action, the Substance cannot attain the position of the Primary. But, on the strength of the aforesaid definition of Primary Actions (in Sutra 7), we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. ‘The action that is accomplished by the substance itself is not found “to impart any aid to the Action; and consequently such actions as ५ Cleaning, &c., cannot but be regarded as Primary Actions.” SIDDHANTA. Sutra (10): But on account of the similarity of declaration, they would be similar to others (Subsidiary Actions). The differentia of the Subsidiary action is not that it should seek to make a substance ;—because it is distinctly shown in Adh. III that subserviency or subsidiary character does not consist in the imparting of acertainaidto the Primary, but in the fact of a certain action being for the sake of another; and we shall show later on that this latter kind of subserviency is based upon the authority of Direct Assertion, &c., 932 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA I—ADAI (6). and it does not depend upon the imparting of any perceptible aid (to the Primary). Question: ‘‘Why then should the Sara have brought forward the “ fact of the action seeking to make «a material ? ” Reply: The actions of threshing, &c., have been cited only with a view to show that there is no Apérva in the case of those Actions, which have been proved to have the character of the Césha (i.e., being for the sake of other Actions) and which are found to serve distinctly visible purposes. That is to say, in 8 case where the Subsidiary character depends upon the fact of the action seeking to make a substance, we should not recognise any distinct Apérva. The Parvapakshi, however, runs away with the idea that this is the sole definition of the Subsidiary Action ; and hence not finding it applicable to such actions as the said Cleaning, &c., he has concluded that these are Primary Actions. But the sense of the Siddhanta is that it is only when the fact of one Action being for the sake of another has been ascertained by means of Direct Assertion, &c., that we can find it actually serving a visible purpose, _or— in the absence of any such visible purpose—we can assume a transcen- dental result to follow from it. Thus then, the fact of the action of threshing, &c., being subservient to another Action, having been indicated by the Accusative case-ending (in ^ Vrihin’”’) by means of its signification of the predominance of the material, denoting, as it does, that which 18 the most desired (to be accomplished),—the action of threshing 1s found to serve a visible purpose; and thus 1४ has all its requirements fulfilled. Though such is uot the case with the aforesaid Cleaning, &c., which, for this very reason, are held to serve transcendental purposes yet that does not in any way deprive them of the character of Césha, or subserviency, which has been previously ascertained by means of Direct Assertion, &. Sutra (11): Objection: ‘But there is an injunction of the material”—if this be urged,— The opponent urges: ‘Though, by negative and positive concom- “tance, the subservient character (Céshaiva) is found to depend upon the ‘aid imparted,—yet the character of the Accusative case-ending is such “that it can never be concomitant with Predominance or Primary “* character. “That is to say, only that is accepted as the proper means of right ‘notion, which is universal in its application ; in the matter of Predomi- “nance, however, the Accusative ending has a doubtful application; CLEANING OF SRUVA NOT A PRIMARY ACTION. 533 “because itis found along with even such materials, as are distinctly “laid down as subsidiaries—e.g., the ending in ‘ Saktéin’ in the sentence ९ ‹ Saktiin juhdti ;’ and similarly we find the Predominance of the Ajya, “even when it is not accompained by the Accusative ending—e.g., 1४ the “sentence ‘praydjagéshéna ajyéna havinshyabhigha@rayati.’ Consequently “we conclude that in the case of the sentence ‘ Vrihinavahanti,’ though ‘‘ both characters are possible, yet, we conclude that the material ( Vrih) ‘‘has the primary character, because of the fact of its imparting .a ˆ“ distinct aid, and because of the Accusative ending. We find no such ‘‘aid, in the case of the actions of Cleaning, &८, ; therefore in the case of “these also (i.e. in the sentence ‘ Sruvam sammarshti’), the Accusative ‘ending must be taken as only laying down the material (and having ‘nothing to do with its predominance).” Sutra (12): Then the Reply is: It is not so; because it (the Action) 18 for the sake of that (material); just as in ordinary life: specially as that (Action) is subservient. Let the question of usage rest awhile; because the usage of words being mere usage is always set aside by the more authoritativo Smrti (Rules of Grammar) ; because the manner of expressing one’s thoughts is multifarious; while the Rule is ever one and definite. That is to say, if the usage were always of one uniform kind, then there would be no necessity of collecting and preserving the 6110८ Rules. As it is, however, usage is so confused that it can hardly be found in a definite form; and hence it is that right usage is preserved by means of Smrti Rules. And these Rules distinctly lay down that the Accusa- tive ending denotes predominance ;—Vide Panini’s Sutras Il—iii—2 and I—iv—49 ; and it is in accordance with these rules that we have such sentences as ‘ ghatam kurotz’ (in ordinary parlance) and ‘ Vrthinavahanti? (in the Veda). The Bhashya next proceeds to cite such instances met with in ordinary parlance, as appear to be against the said rules: (1) ‘ Zanduldn Gdanam paca, (2) ‘ (छद क gikhandakan kuru,’ (3) ‘ Vandulanddaya guh ५4101, In all these cases 16 seems clear that the accusatives in ‘ tandulan’ and ‘valvajdn’ have been used in the place of the Instrumentals ‘tandulaih’ and ‘valvajath’; and as such in these cases the Accusative cannot but have the sense of the Instrumental (which latter always indicates subservience). We proceed to explain these apparent anomalies. In all matters relating to cooking, the Rice, &९,, have a twofold form (the Primary and the Subsidiary) ; and itis in consideration of the Primary form that we have -534 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA I--ADHI (6). the Accusative ending (in ‘tandulan,’ &c.). That is to say, when the Rice is spoken of as the means of accomplishing something else, in the shape of the cooked rice, or the straw as that of bringing about something else in the shape of the bundle,—then alone are these to be used with the Instrumental ending ; when, however, (1) the Rice is spoken of as tiself being modified into the form of the cooked rice, in order to be capable of being eaten,—(2) or the straw itsclf being changed into the bundle, with a view to keep it soft,—or (3) after the rice has been found to be laid down in the Veda as an accessory in the Agnihotra sacrifice, when it so happens that the wife of the sacrificer has prepared some exceptionally fine rice, then, either with a view to show off her own excellent work, or with a view to the special result (strength) that is said to follow if the Rice is offered at the sacrifice, she addressing the sacrificer might say, ¢Sir, make an offering of rice to-day ’,—in all these cases the words come to take the Accusative ending. And it 18 a well-known fact, that in ordinary parlance people always seek to speak of the same thing in many ways. And it often happens that even that which is admittedly the subordinate element is often spoken of as the predominant factor, and vice versa ; at times it 18 spoken of as both, and at times as neither the one nor the other. Nor is there any authority for holding that the idea that is desired to be conveyed must be accepted as directly expressed by the words used. Because for the purpose of mecting the wishes of the speaker we have at our command such indirect means of expression, as Indication and the like; and hence no abandoning of the original meanings of words is justifiable. Consequently we conclude that the Accusative really ex- presses predominance only. Question: ^“ How is it then that in the sentence ‘ Saktin juhoti,’ ‘the Accusative 18 found to denote subservience ? ”’ Reply: In that case also, the Accusative by itself expresses predomi- nance only ; but this being found to be incompatible with the rest of the sentence, we accept it to indicate its correlative, subserviency. That is to say, by its own natural potency, the accusative always expresses the objective, in the character of the predominant; but this natural meaning is found, in the sentence in question, to be incompatible with something more authoritative; and as such it cannot be admitted then, finding that the character of the ‘Karaka’ or case-relation is also indicated by the Accusative, as its invariable concomitant, we accept this indicated meaning of the Accusative, as not incompatible with the rest of the sentence ; which thus comes to mean that the Saktu has something to do with the accomplishment of the Homa. But such generic agency not being of much use, we naturally seek for a specific function of the Saktu ; and thus come to the conclusion that it must be taken as the Instrument 5 CLEANING OF SRUVA NOT A PRIMARY ACTION. 535 specially in accordance with the law that ‘that which is an accomplished entity is laid down for the sake of that which is yet to be accomplished ’— as propounded in Sutra VI—i—1. Question: “ But in what way do you find the predominance of the ४४ Saktwu incompatible with the rest of the sentence ? ”’ Reply: Only that substance is held to be an object of purification or preparation, which has already been utilised or is to be utilised; as for the Saktu, it is never going to be used (after the Homa); nor has it ever been utilised before. That is to say, that substance which is found to have been utilised in some way, or which is to be utilised at some future time, is capable of any process of purification ; and as such it attains a predomi- nance with reference to the Action. And when the substance concerned is such as has never been utilised, not is going to be utilised, any purification of that would be absolutely useless; and hence any injunction of such preparation would be wholly purposeless. The Sakts« in question is such that it is never used before the Homa, nor can it be used after it, having been turned into ashes; specially as there is no Injunction as to any such ashes of Sakiu being used. Under the circumstance, the only alternatives that we have are—(1) that the wholo sentence is absolutely useless, or (2) that the Accusative is to be taken in its indirect sense. And the authority of the Veda having been an established fact, there can be no hesitation in accepting the second alternative. It is a common fact that the direct meaning of a word is always set aside as mistaken, whenever it 18 faced by such exceptional circumstances (of incompatibility), And the acceptance of the indirect meaning of a word is always due to the necessity of avoiding the uselessness of the sentence; otherwise if there were no such uselessnoss, it would be always possible to accept the original direct signification of the word. It is for these reasons that we accept the sentence in question to be an Injunction of a Homa with the Saktu as the necessary material,—such an Injunction being in keeping with the Context in which it occurs The Bhashya puts the question: ^ The Saktu being mentioned in the (° context, 16 would naturally follow that it is of some distinct use in the ‘sacrifice.’ And the sense of this is that the Saktw offered in the Homa would be distinctly useful, inasmuch as it helps the Jyotishtomu sacrifice, in whose context the said sentence occurs. The Siddhanti (in the Bhashya) makes a dodge, and retorts—‘ Who says it is not so? ’—his meaning being that the said usefulness be- longs to the Saktu as the material offered in the Homa. In all cases, we find that for all substances, there is no other use save the accomplish- ment of the Actzon connected with the sentence (in which the name of that substance occurs); because they have no connection with the procedure 536 TANTRA-VARTIKA., ADH. 11L—PADA I-——ADHI (6). of the action. That is to say, the Homa, being of the nature of an Action, stands in need of something to be accomplished by ४८; and consequently along with the principal procedure, 1४ is taken as forming the process of action helping in the said accomplishment. This, however, cannot be said of the Substance. Nor can the Substance alone justify the assumption of anything transcendental; because all transcendental results are brought about by Actions alone. Even in a case where a substance itself is laid down as leading to a particular result,—e.g., in the Injunction ‘one should sacrifice with the milking vessel for one who desires cattlo,—no Apirva would be possible, except through the agency of some other Action, though having a different end. Under the circumstances, how can any such assertion be made with reference to the Saktu, which is not found to be enjoined with regard to any particular result ? Nor is there any authority for making such an assumption. As for the Accusative in ‘ Saktén,’ this cannot serve as an authority for any such assumption ; because what the Accusative does is to directly express the predominance of the Sakiu; and as such it would point to the fact of the IIoma being for the sake of the Sakéu, and not to that of a certain Apirva following from the Saktwu. Thus then, through the help of the Accusative the Homa would be for the sake of the Saktu. How could the Homa be pervaded over by the Saktu? Because it could not serve any other purpose,—no such other use being mentioned, Thus then, it is only when the Homa has been performed that the Saktu becomes related to the Homa; and hence before the purpose has been served, the Accusative has had its end; hence even in the case of the useless Saktu, the Accusative becomes justified, in consideration of its predominance. And thus the meaning of the sentence having been accomplished, the Saktw could not be of any subsequent use, either to the Person or to the Sacrifice ; and having recognised this fact, we could either assume a transcendental result, on the strength of the sentence in question, or accept the notion of predominance (as expressed by the Accusative) to be a misconception. (And hence the only reasonable course left is to take the Accusative in its indirect sense of the Instrumental). It 18 in con- sideration of these facts that the Bhashya has said—the sentence cannot justify any assumption of the transcendental (Aptrva). It is far more reasonable to reject the notion of predominance (expressed by the Accusative); and hence we cannot but accept the indication of the Instrumental. It is in consideration of this fact that the author of the Mahabhashya has declared: ‘The Accusative is used in place of the Instrumental.’ CLEANING OF SRUVA NOT A PRIMARY ACTION. 537 Thus then, we find that there is a diversity between the Homa and the aforesaid Oleaning. Because the Saktu having no other purpose to serve, it is taken to be for the sake of the Homa; while such substances as the Cake and the like, inasmuch as they are subservient to something else, are capable of such purificatory actions as their being circled round by fire. When the true meaning of the scripture has been got at, it is only when we donot find any visible use, that we assume a transcendental result. And even in ordinary life, we find certain purificatory rites being kept up by usage with the sole purpose of something transcendental ; for instance, when a man returns from a journey, fire, salt, &c., are moved round his head, with a view to the pacifying of all evil influences impending over him. Nor can the fact of such rites bringing about something transcen- dental be denied; because the performance of these is based upon the authority of well-established usage. Thus then, we find that even those that lead to something trans- cendental have a subordinate character, because of the uniformity of assertion. Objection: ^ Such being the case, in all cases the predominance of the “substance would depend upon the fact of its serving a useful purpose ; ‘‘and hence it is not right to say—‘on account of the uniformity of ‘assertion.’ Or else, it should be shown how, independently of any ‘useful purposes served, predominance is denoted solely by the Accusa- “tive or, how the subordinate character is denoted solely by the ८८ Instrumental.” Reply: As for an instance of predominance expressed solely by the Accusative, we have it in the case of the sentence ‘ 4८14740 garhapatyamu- patishthaté,’ where the indirect implication of the name ‘ Aindri’ shows that the mantra in question is addressed to Indra; and then on account of its being mentioned along with the ‘garhapatya.’ If this ‘ gdrhapatya’ be taken only as the means of worshipping Indra, then the Accusative ending in it would be absolutely out of place; and hence it is only on the strength of the Accusative ending that we admit the Gdrhapatya to be the pre- dominant factor in the sentence. Similarly, as for an instance of the sub- servient character being expressed solely by the Instrumental, we have it in the case of the sentence—‘ Siklavdkéna prastaram’ where though both the Sdékiavaka and the prastara are equally useful, yet on account of the Instrumental ending, the former is taken as subservient to the latter. Thus then, the comparative predominance or subserviency being expressed by the case-endings themselves, all that uselessness does is to form an exception to the former general rule; and the usefulness or 68 538 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 11--7472+ I—aADHI (6). uselessness of any object can never be taken as the sole ground of differen- tiating the said predominance or subservience. The purposes of the present Adhikarana that are enumerated in the Bhashya are not quite acceptible (in the way therein put forward) for the following reasons :— (1) In the sentence ‘ Gamimayyah scrucah’” the fact of being made of Cami wood has been laid down with reference to all Sruks. But according to the Pirvapaksha, as also according to the Siddhainia, that qualification is recognised as applying to the Primary as also to the subsidiary sacri- fices. As for the Priyatrgu corn, the original Injunction distinctly lays it down as for the sole purpose of tho Primary sacrifice ; and as such it 18 only proper that it 18 not employed in the subsidiaries. As for the qualifi- cation of being made up of Gami wood, on the othor hand, it has been laid down simply with reference to the Sruk; and hence in accordance with the rule laid down in 6४2" III—vii—2, on account of the superior authority of Syntactical Connection, the said qualification 18 recognised as applying both tothe Primary and the Subsidiary, and not to the Primary alone, as shown by the Context (which is a much weaker authority). Nor do we find any qualifying clause, which would point out the Sruk as the one that is employed in the Primary Sacrifice; and even if there were such a clause, as it would only be a qualifying adjunct of the subject of the sentence, no significance could be attached to 1४ Therefore in ac- cordance with the Pérvapaksha also, it is clear that the Sruk of Cami wood appertains to all Primary Sacrifices, as also to all the Oleaning, &c., that help the Sacrifice from a distance (transcendentally); and as such there would be no chance of there being any cleaning of the Sruk made up of many woods. It might be urged that—‘in accordance with Sdtra WWI—viii—35, all the peculiar features of the Subsidiary sacrifices being subservient to the Primary Sacrifice, the Sruk of Gam?, in the case in question, cannot be said to be for the sake of both the Primary and the Subsidiary.’ But this is scarcely correct; because in a case where we recognise the relationship of an object with the Primary, as mentioned by a Sentence, there alone could such an assertion be possible; as a matter fact, however, no such thing is recognised in the case in question, For instance, in the case of the sentence ‘ yajndtharvanam vai kdmya whtayah, td wpargu kartavyah,’ we find the qualification ‘ uwpaipgu’ con- nected only with the Primary Sacrifices mentioned by the word ‘kdmyd@h ; ' and as such it cannot be taken as enjoined with reference to the subsi- diary, as we shall explain later on ; but in the case in question, we have no such distinct relationship with the Primary ; and this makes all the difference. CLEANING OF SRUVA NOT A PRIMARY ACTION. 539 Olyection: “It may be that the fact of the Sruk being of Gamé is for “use in the Primary, though it is enjoined by implication, also in the ^“ subsidiary sacrifices not yet fully mentioned.” Reply : This cannot be; because we shall show (in the chapter on Aivdéga) that the subsidiaries renouncing that which is enjoined in close proximity to themselves, become connected with their Primaries: because they stand in need of such aids as have been fully accomplished (along with the Primaries). That is to say, an Injunction of many things (by a single sentence) being unallowable, in the sentence in question, the Sruk must be taken as simply mentioned with reference to the fact of the Sruk being of Gam wood (which alone 18 enjoined). Consequently, even though the Sruk might be enjoined in connection with the subsidiaries, yet such an Injunction would stand in need of the fact of the employment of the Sruk of Cami at the Subsidiaries being got at by Implication (from its employment at the Primaries), And the time that 18 taken in this latter implication of the Sruk of the Primary is exactly the same that is taken by the direct Injunction of the Qruk of the subsidiaries ; and as such there is no difference between the two processes. And further, if the fact of the Sruk being made of Gami wood applied to the Primaries alone, then even in the Varunapraghdsa sacrifice, which is a subsidiary, we would have the employment of the Sruk used at the Primary sacrifices of the Prayaja, &c. And the means by which we could avoid these Praydja Sruks are the same by which the Gruks for cleaning are avoided. But this is not quite desirable; as there is no reason for such avoidance. Even though there may be some cause for the relation- ship of a certain Primary, yet, in accordance with the Rule laid down in connection with the ‘ Saumzkavédidakshina,’ the element required would be got at indirectly (by concomitance itself); and as such no collecting of the Primary Class would be proper. (2) Then again, the shape of the Paridhi vessel is pointed out by the uso to which it is put; and hence there could be no cleaning of that Paridhr which would not serve that purpose. That 18 to say, Paridht 18 the name of that substance which is used in the keeping intact of the fire; just as ‘Juha’ is the name of an implement used in the Homa. Then, in accordance with the Sutra IV-—i—26, we could speak of the QOleaning being useless. And then, on having heard of the Paridhi being made of the Banavat, if we were to clean the Palaga wood before it has been made into the Paridha, we would only be cleaning that which 18 not Paridhy If the Paldga be made into the Paridhi (before being cleaned), then the keeping of the Fire having been done, it could not serve any useful purpose in the Primary 88011806. Nor do we ever find a mixture of two things that serve the same purpose (the Palags and the Bazavat in the present case). Therefore 940 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1I—PADA I—ADHI (6). there would be no need for making another Paridhi. (3) As for the Avabhrtha, inasmuch as this is a new action, it ends wholly in what is directly mentioned in the Veda; and as the whole of this action, together with all its accessories, is laid down as to be performed in water, what could be that QOleaning, in which we would have to make use of Fire, and hence have to burn it P Thus then, none of the above three can be accepted as the uses of the present Adhikarana. There is only one example which has been rightly cited. In the case of the sentence ‘ mansantu savdniydndm’ in accordance with the Siddhania, the character of being made up of tarasa (meat), not being related to all Oakes, and thus being ‘asavaniya,’ it would not be connected with that 0५८ which has been purified by being carried round the fire, And the word ‘ GSavaniya’ is never used with reference to the subsidiary of the ‘Savaniya;’ because it deals with that alone which is related to the Savaniya. As for the subsidiary of the Savaniya, inasmuch as this serves no useful purpose in the Savana, it is impossible to have any cake in it made up of the 770८ corn; specially as the sentence ‘ Vrihibiryajéta ` distinctly shows that the Vrihi corn is to be employed in the Cake used at the Primary Sacrifice. And thus, it is not quite certain which is the material of which that Cake is to be made, which is purified by being taken round the Fire. And herein lies the use of the present Adhikarana. But even this is not quite correct. Because in that case in accordance with the maxim of the ^ Kadnsabhoji’ the conditions of the scriptural Injunction (that ‘the Cake is circled round the fire’) would be fulfilled by the circling of the Meat-Cake; and consequently there would always be a likelihood of the performance of an Action like what is described in the Siddhdnta. Thus then, the corn-cake having been taken up, in some way or other, tor the Primary Sacrifice, it must be held that the circling round fire is a means of accomplishing that Cake; especially as such is the inclination of the scripture. But even in that case, such an action being useless, in accordance with the maxim of the ‘one-year-old cow,’ there would be a total disappearance of that action. And 16166 71४ is in the avoidance of this disappearance that lies the use of the present Adhikarana. Or, it might be in the fact of there being no definite material for the Cake; nor does the maxim of the ‘ Ka@ssabhoji’ apply to the case; because the mere flesh does not represent the Cake. It it be asked, ‘ how this comes aboutin the Savaniya Cake?’ we reply that in that case it 18 not the 06 that is desired; what is enjoined by the sentence is the flesh itself, independently of any Cake in the place of the Cake; exactly a in the case of such corns as the Dhand. Because in no way is it possible to make such CLEANING OF SRUVA NOT A PRIMARY AOTION. 54] corns out of the flesh. Consequently, it must be admitted that in accord- ance with the maxim of the ‘ Priyakgu,’ it is only inthe Primary Sacrifice that the Cake is to be made up of the flesh. As for the circling round fire, this applies to the Cake only; and as for the material of this Cake, it may be uncertain, or it may be the Vrihz or the Yava, as is shown by the conditions of the Primary Sacrifice. As a matter of fact, however, the real uses of the Adhikarana are the following: (1) In the Primary Sacrifice, there being many auxiliaries to the Qleaning of the Sruk, we conclude that tho number of such auxi- liaries must be three only, in accordance with the maxim of the ‘ Kapiijala’ (XI—i—38-45) ; and hence even when there is a multiplication of vessels, —as in the case of the ‘ Pacucdturmdsya’, ouly three Sruks would have to be cleaned, in accordance with the theory of the Paérvapaksha. In accord- ance with the Siddhdnta, on the other hand, all the Qruks havo to be cleaned ; because of the necessity of repeating the purifiactory process with each substance. (2) And again, in accordance with the maxim of the *Pagu’ (ILV—i—11-16), significance attaching to the number ‘one,’ only one Paridhi would have to be cleaned, according to the Pérvapaksha ; while according to the Siddhanta, all the Paridhis would have to be cleaned ; and there would be some distinction made in a case where there is a multiplication of Paridhis. (3) And similarly, the circling round fire, believed (according to the Pérvupaksha) to appertain to one Cake, comes (according to the Siddhdanta), to apply to all the Cakes. (4) Similarly, according to the law ‘ Vishayé laukikam syét,’ in the case of the sentence ‘agnimupasamadhaya stuvate, the cleaning would pertain to the ordinary fire, according to the Pérvapaksha; while according to the Siddhanta, any cleaning of ordinary fire being absolutely useless, the Cleaning laid down must appertain only to such sacrificial fires, as the ‘Ahavaniya’ and the like. 6 ति ता ee eee ADHIKARANA (7). Treating of the Primary character of the Stuti and the Castra Hymns. (Mahéndradhikarana). Sutra (18): “The Stwté and the Casts a are subservient, exactly like the Yajya mantras,—because they distinctly signi- fy the Deity.” The case of the Stuts and the Castra has been introduced, as an exception to the general definition laid down in 6८८74 II—i—8. By the word “ Stutt” 18 meant a hymn; and the “ Castra”’ also is a hymn which is made up of mantras that cannot be sung. A Hymn is that which describes the relationship subsisting between an object and its properties ; and as such, in the first instance, it is accomplished by such objects and properties; specially as in the absence of these the Hymn would be mere words, and as such not capable of being called a “‘ Hymn.” Of these two again, inasmuch as the properties described do not form part of the Action to be performed, they serve no useful purpose with regard to the Action; and as such they are taken absolutely as serving the purpose of completing the Hymn itself. Then the question arises—The Hymn thus accomplished, does it serve the purpose of bringing about an idea of the object hymned, and as such, is subservient to this latter? or, is it some- thing independently by itself, leading to a certain transcendental result ? On this point we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. “Inasmuch as we actually find the Hymns perceptibly bringing ‘about a rememberance of (of the Deity) that serves to accomplish the ^ sacrifice, we cannot but admit them to be subservient to such Deities.” SIDDHANTA. Sutra (14): But in that case, the mention of the name of the Deity would have to be carried away by its meaning; because such mention is always subservient to the meaning. The Sitra points out the fact of the Pérvapaksha being contrary to other authoritative evidences. STUTI AND QASTRA HYMNS ARE PRIMARY: MAHENDRADHIKARANA. 543 That is to say, if the hymn in question consist of a Mantra, the object described in which does not exist at the time, then this object would carry away the Hymn from its present context, and as such, there would be a setting aside of that which isdirectly laid down. For instance, in a case where we have an Injunction laying down the use of a particular hymn on a particular occasion, if the Injunction happen to contain the name of a Deity—as in the case of a Hymn addressed to Indra being laid down as to be sung in connection with the “ Mahéndragraha”’ sacrifice,x—the Injunc- tion would depend upon the Deity therein mentioned ; and hence in a case where that particular Deity (Indra) does not exist, (as in the case of the Mahéndra sacrifice),—the particular Hymn will have to be carried away from the M@héndra sacrifice to another sacrifice where Indra might exist. And this would be a direct contradiction of what is authorised by the Order and Position of the Hymn, &c. The particular sequential Order that would be contradicted in the present instance is that in which the mantra is laid down as to be recited in the subsequent hymns; while the Position contradicted would be—either the mention of the Hymn by the Injunction of the Rathantara, or the particular Context in which they occur. Sutra (15): Objection: “But (in the instance cited) the word (that appears to make the Deity something quite different) would be only a qualificatory one,—exactly like the word ‘ barren’ (in the expression ‘Ajavasha’).”’ “The above objection does not apply to the case in question. Because “a carrying away of the Mantra could be possible only if it mentioned “something entirely different; in the case 111 question however, the “Hymn in question belongs to the same Deity that 18 referred to by the “name ‘Mahéndra’; because the words ‘Indra’ and ‘ Mahéndra’ are ‘“non-different. That is to say the Indra, that is hymned by the “Hymns in question, is the same that is sacrificed to in the Mahéndra “sacrifice; and as such the object referred to being actually present, ‘‘wherefore should there be any necessity of carrying it away from ‘its Context? Nor is it absolutely necessary for the Mantra to make ‘‘mention of every minute detail of the object connected with the sacrifice ; “because it is always found to mention something more or less than that, “in accordance with its own expression or capability (and as such it does not “matter if the Injunction of the Hymn speaks of Indra only, without the “qualification ‘ Maha’). Consequently, the Hymn should be taken as “pointing to Indra as apart from any atiributes, because much significance “does not attach to the attributes, as the attributes are pointed out 544. TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 1I—PADA I—ADHI (7). “by the context itself ;—all this being exactly similar to the pointing out “of materials apart from qualifications. Nor does the Deity consist of the “word alone—as we shall show under chapters LX and X. [And hence ८८ [11418 cannot be taken as different from Mahéndvra, simply on the ground “of difference between the words. | “Thus then, it must be admitted that that which is mentioned by the “word ‘Indra’ is the same that is mentioned by the word ‘ Mahéndra’ ; “specially as there is no reason for assuming the two to be distinct. “Consequently, there being no ground for the charge of the improper “carrying away of the Hymns, these must be admitted to be the subser- “vient accessories (of the Deity ` ). Sutra (16): Reply: Not so; because it forms part of the scriptures. It has been urged above that the Hymns pointing to Indra, as apart from all qualifications, there 18 no need for any carrying away. But this is not so; because the carrying away of the hymns is by no means avoidable. For, if there were sufficient grounds for holding the identity of Indra and Mahéndra, then alone would it not be necessary to carry away the Hymns; as a matter of fact, however, there is a distinct difference hetween the two. To explain--In the case of the word ‘ Mahéndra’ some people, seeking, to establish its identity with the word ‘Indra,’ explain it etymologically thus: ‘ Muhan’ + ‘Indrah’ = Mahéndrah (the Great Indra), and then Ma- héndro dévata asya’—‘ Mahéndra’ (That sacrifice of which the Great Indra is the presiding Deity). And in that case what the word ‘ Mahéndra’ would signify would be that of which the preceding Derty is Indra as endowed with the attribute of greatness. But such a connotation is not possible ; because the signification of a word taken as one complete whole is always more authoritative than that which is sanctioned by its etymological con- structions; and hence the word ‘ Mahéndra’ more directly denotes a dis- tinct Deity in the shape of Mahéndra, than it does the ‘ Great Indra.’ Then again, if the word ‘Mahéndra’ is broken up etymologically (as shown above), there is a distinct syntactical split; and if, in order to avoid this split, the etymological explanation is not resorted to, then the word ‘ Mahéndra’ distinctly denotes something entirely different from Indra. Says the Bhashya, the nominal affix in “ Mahéndra”’ would not be possible if the word ‘Indra’ stood in the need of a mention of greatness; and what is meant by this is that it is not possible for us to take the word in its etymological sense. And the chief reason for this is that in the due STUTI AND QASTRA HYMNS ARF PRIMARY: MAHENDRADHIKARANA. 545 functioning of a compound, as also in that of the Nominal Affix, capabihity 18 always laid down as the necessary qualification. Incase we have recourse to the etymology of the word the said qualification becomes impossible to get at, in both cases. That is to say, in the two sétras ‘ samarthah padavidhth’ (Panini [I~ i—i) and ‘samarthanam prathamadva’ (Ibid 1V-—i—82), it is distinctly laid down that ‘samarthya’ or capability is the necessary qualification in the functioning of both the Compound and the Nominal Affix. Con- sequently, in the absence of this capability, no functioning of any of these is possible I. For instance, if the Compound and the Affix were simultaneously explained—that is to say,if the word ‘ Mahéndra’ were explained as ‘ Mahan Indro devata asya,’ then there would be no capability in either of these. Be- cause, if the chief stress were laid upon ‘ greatness ’ as being needed (by the word ‘ Indra’), then this last word could not have any relationship with the Nominal Affix; and, on the other hand, if the factor chiefly needed: were the Affix itself, then there could be no connection with greatness. This ‘capability’ is explained by some to be in the shape of (1) ‘ékarthibhava’—the Identity of purpose, the fact of conjointly forming a single entity,—and by others as (2) ‘ vyapéksha ’—i.e., Relationship based upon mutual requirements. And neither of these two is applicable to that which stands in need of something else (1) That is to say, when one factor is independent of everything else— save the other factor in question,—then alone can there be any identity of purpose between these two. In a case, however, where one factor is distracted by other agencies, no such identity of purpose is possible. As a matter of fact, it 78 only when two objects are not distracted on many sides, that they can rightly be said to be dependent on one another, which is not possible when they are so distracted ; because in a case of such distraction, our perceptive faculties fail to function rightly. That object, which is pointed out conjointly by the two parts of a word as equipped with the two characteristics, is always the same thatis pointed to by each of these parts independently by itself. When, however, there happens to be a dependence upon others, there is always a doubt in the matter, and the whole does not point to any one definite end. Thus-then, in the case in question, there is no possibility of a capability in the shape of zdentity of purpose. | (2) As for the capability in the form of Vyapéksha (Relationship based upon mutual requirements)—the word ‘ Vyapéksh@’ itself distinctly points to the absence of Apéksha (dependence on others); and as such there can be no room for it, in a case where the object depends upon other factors ; and hence any such capability is not possible in the case in question, 69 546 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. IT-——-PADA I—ADRHI (7). That is to say, that which depends upon others can never be spoken of as ‘ Vyapeksha’ (free from dependence ). Thus then, there being no chance for the capability of any of the two kinds, it becomes absolutely impossible for either the Compound or the Nominal affix to function in the matter. These are the discrepancies in the case of the word ‘Mahéndra’ being all at once explained as ‹ Mahan Indrak dévata asya.’ II. If, however, the functionings of the Compound and the Affix be explained separately, one after the other, then, inasmuch as the words will have to be often times repeated, there would be a split of the sentence ; because in that case, after we have expounded the Compound, it will be necessary for us to give utterance again to the two words ‘ Mahat’ and ‘Indra.’ It is with a view to this that the Bhashya has declared—The word ‘Indra’ when taken up by the functioning of the Affiz cannot be connected with ‘greatness. The sense of this is that when the word ‘ Indra’ would be taken with the Affix it would be broadened (changed into ‘Aindra’) ; and as for ‘greatness’, inasmuch as it is always connected with a dis- tinct substance, it could have nothing to do with tho word ‘ Indra,’ which, as already forming part of the word ‘ Aindra,’ occupies only a secondary position. Thatistosay,in that case we would have the form ‘ Mahaindra,’ the qualification ‘great’ having nothing to do with Indra, because that which occupies & secondary position, and as such has its own denotation suppressed, cannot be connected with any other qualifications. The declaration of the Bhaishya—when taken up by the functioning of the Compound, &c., &c.—refers to the ‘split of the sentence’ mentioned above. Thus then, having explained the improbability of any gradual func- tioning, the Bhashya again brings forward the theory of simultaneous functioning, but only with a view to point out other discrepancies in the theory. In accordance with the maxim propounded in the Sutra I—iv—8, there would be another syntactical split consequent upon the fact of the word Indra’ being the predominant factor with reference to ‘ greatness,’ while it occupies a subordinate position with reference to the Nominal Affix. And there would be yet another syntactical split, on account of the Injunction having to serve the double purpose of pointing out greatness as the qualification of Indra, and that of declaring Indra to be the Deity of the sacrifice. For instance, what the Injunctive affix will have to do would be to point out—(1) that Indra is qualified by ‘ greatness ’ and (2) that ‘Indra’ is related to the material offered at the sacrifice; and this would lead to an inevitable syntactical split, STUTI AND QASTRA HYMNS ARE PRIMARY MAHENDRADHIKARANA. 547 For these reasons, the word ‘ Mahéndra’ cannot be explained as that Indra is the deity of the sacrifice, and that Indra is qualified by greatness. What is possible is that the word be taken as one independent whole, independently of the component parts; as in that case alone could the Nominal Affix be rightly explained. And thus it is established that Mahéndra is a deity other than Indra. Nor can it be urged that Indra himself came to be called ‘ Mahéndra,’ the ‘Great Indra,’ after ho had performed the grand feat of killing Vrttra, because in that case the Veda, in which the word ‘ Mahéndra’ occurs, would have a beginning in time. Consequently the mention of the killing of Vritra must be taken as only culogising ‘ Mahéndra,’ which 18 a name eternal and complete in itself. Sutra (17). Also because of names. That is to say, Indra must be distinct from Mahéndra, because of the difference in their names. Thus alone could there be any restriction with regard to the Mfantras in question ; as otherwise there would be an option ; and as such in one case, the mantra would be set aside from its legitimate purpose. And if there were no difference between Indra and Mahéndra, the only purpose that the mention of two distinct Mantras could serve would be to bring about a transcendental result, which is not allowable in the casc. Therefore, just as the Sun, &., are different from Indra, so also 18 Mahéndra; and as such it would be absolutely necessary to carry away the Hymn elsewhere (as shewn above). (Thus onds the exposition of the Adhtkarana in accordance with the Bhashya). The Vartika, however, takes exception to the above, and brings forward the following arguments against it :-— If we have recourse to the above explanation, and if the Nominal Affix were regarded as possible only in case the word were taken as one complete whole, then in that case, the same would be the case with such words as ‘ Agnishomiya’ and the like; and the word ‘ Agnishomiya’ could not be taken as pointing to the two deities Agni and Soma; and as such no action could have two presiding deities (which would set at nought all the rules of atidéga, &c., laid down below). ‘That is to say, just as in the case of the word ‘ Mahéndra,’ neither a gradual nor a simultaneous functioning of the Compound and tho Affix is possible, on account of the word ‘Indra’ standing in need of ‘ greatness’ and the Affix,—-so, in the 548 TANTRA VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA I~-ADHI (7). same manner, ‘Soma’ standing in need of ‘ Agni,’ there could be no Affix (in the word ‘ Agnishomiya’) ; and when it would stand in need of the Affix, there could be no compounding with ‘Agni.’ So also, if there be a gradual fanctioning—one after the other—of the Compound and the Affix, a repeated utterance would be necessary; and this would 1686 to a syntactical split; because, as shown above in the case of the word ‘Mahbéndra,’ when the word would be taken up by one functioning, \४ could not be taken up by another; and as before, there would be a diversity in the character of the word ‘Soma,’ which would be the predominant factor in one case, and the subordinate eloment in another ; and so also the Injunctive Affix would have to refer to more than one object. Thus, in short, all the objections that have been shown above, as applying to the case of the word ‘ Mahéndra,’ would apply tothe case of the word ‘ Agnishomtya’ also; and hence this word also will have to be taken as one whole in itself; and consequently thore would never be any case of any sacrifice having two presiding deities. But it is by no means possible for words like these to be spoken of as conventional wholes by themselves, because everywhere in the scriptures, the particular actions are laid down as having two presiding deities. For instance—(1) in course of the consideration of the texts dealing with the ‘quartering’ of the ‘dgnéya’ cake, the ‘ Indrapita’ and the ‘ Pishaprapishta, we shall explain how the words ‘agnéya,’ &., which point to Agnz alone as the deity, are incapable of including the ‘ Aindragna,’ the ‘ Agnishomiya, &c., which point to Agni, &c., as the deities, only in the company of some othor doity. (That is to say, the Aindradgna cake cannot be treated in the way that is prescribed for the ‘Agnéya’ cake; for if the word ‘ Agnéya’ were to refer to the ‘ Aindragna’ also, then, inasmuch as the word ‘ Agni’ would be dependent upon ‘ Indra,’ there could be no nominal Affix in the word ‘ Agnéya.’) If these words were conventional wholes, what would be dependent upon what ? (2) So too we shall show later on that the Aindrapaushna is held to be subsidiary to the Agnishomiya, &c., on the sole ground of both of them having two presidiug Deities (and this would not be possible if the words did not signify the presence of two Deities). (3) Similarly in the case of the sentence ‘ Médhapatibhyam médham,’ we shull show how two significa- tious are accepted, as explained under Sutra [X—iii—35. And again, (4) it will be shown under the ‘ Manotddhikarana’ (X—iv—42) that in the case where Agni and Soma are the deities, Agni alone is not a deity, though both are intimately related to the Action. (5) It is not quite reasonable for us to deny such etymological changes in the compound ‘ Agni + Soma’ as are due solely to the fact of its forming a duality of deities—such changes, f.7., EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO THE VARTIKA. 549 as the lengthening of the ‘2’ and the change of ‘sa’ into ‘sha’ (as ac- cording to Panini VI—iii—37, and VIII—iii—82, respectively). If no authority be attached to grammatical rules, then the rule laying down the addition of affixes, denotativeof Agni, &c., being the deity, would also be uuauthoritative, and as such Agni, Soma, &c., would cease to be known as deities. If, however, this latter fact is admitted, then on exactly the same grounds, it would be necessary to admit the duality of the deities also. And as such the word cannot be taken as a complete whole in itself in- dependently of its component parts. For the same 16४8008, it is not right to assert that the Dvandva-Com- pound in ‘ Agnishomiya’ could be explained as compounded, only for the sake of accentuation, &c., and having no other significance, as we have in the case of the words ‘ Agvakarna’ (the name ofa plant) and the like. Because a grammatical rule can be said to be for the mere sake of certain modifications of accentuation, &c., and to have no other significance, only in acase whero the senses conveyed by the word be, in some way or other, not in keeping with a well-recognised fact of ordinary perception. In the case of the words ‘ Mahat’ and ‘ Indra,’ it is certainly necessary to assume a distinct significance for each (because we do not find any disagreoment from a perceived fact); and inasmuch as these words signify, 000 tho qualification and the other the qualified, we come to the conclusion that one word qualifies the other. And as soon as these words are pronounced: together, we are at once led, by our previously-acquired notion of their relationship, to the joint cognition of the one as qualified by the other; and there is nothing to set aside this joint cogmition. Nor is there any reasonable ground for assuming, for tho compound, any sigai- ficauce, apart from those of the component words. ‘Then again, 16 18 only when the whole word by itself has been duly established as complete in itself, independently of the component words, that the denotation of this word, as such a whole, would set aside that which is provided by the component words (in case of course the two happen to be mutually contradictory ). But no such word could be taken to be a duly established entity by itself, until we actually found it used as such, apart from having anything to do with the signification of its component parts. And further, we find a great ditliculty in believing iu the existence of Indra; and it would entail a much greater dificulty to assume the existence of another and an altogether distinct deity in the shape of Mahéndra. As a matter of fact, we fiud that cvon in the case of a perceptible object, there can be no reasonable ground for assuming a multiplicity of denotative potencies for a word; and it would be very much more unreasonable to make any such assamption in a case where the very object — Mahéndra f.i.—has got to be assumed. We accept the existence of an 900 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. {1—PADA I—ADHI (7). object in the shape of Indra, simply on the ground that, otherwise, the use in the Veda of the word ‘Indra’ would not be explicable. And thus if the use of the word ‘ Mahéndra’ too were equally inexplicable, then alone we could have any ground for assuming the existence of an object in the shape of Mahéndra. Asa matter of fact however, the uso of the word ‘ Mahéndra ’ is quite explicable, as based upon the well-recognised denotations of the two words ‘ Mahat’ and ‘ Indra’; and hence the word is found to convey an idea of the same Indra as qualified by ‘ greatness’ ; and as such there 18 no ground for assuming the existence of any other object. And hence it is proved that Mahéndra is none other than Indra qualified by greatness. Further, when we expound the fuctioning of the Compound first and then explain that of the Affix, there is no incapability pertaining to anything; because at the actual time of the functioning of the compound, or that of the Affix,—there is nothing else that the factor stands in need of. Nor is there any syntactical split due to repeated utterance; because all that we do, by the repeated utterance, in expounding the compound, is to give expression to the many meanings that are expressed by the word pronounced but once. The word’ ‘Ma@héndra’ has a double functioning in the shape of the Compound and in that of the Affix ; each of these func- tionings represents a distinct sentence ; and it is the meanings of these two sentences that we give distinct expression to by the expounding of the Compound and the explanation of the bearing of the Affix. And as for the repetition that we have recourse to, in the re-expounding, it is not that of any Vedic sentence; because there is no such Vedic sentence as “ Mahanc- casdvindragca, Mahéndro dévataé asyart Mahéndrah.” Noris it the Vedic word itself that is so disjoined; because all disjunction being brought about by human agency, the word ceases to be Vedic altogether. The fact is that in the Veda, the word ‘ Mahéndrah’ occurs inits own complete form; and it is only the meaning of 1118 word that is explained by means of the afore- said disjoinings and etymological explanations &c., proceeding from human sources. As a matter of fact, words are endowed with various potencies, bring- ing about as they do, the cognitions of one or many meanings. And the meaning of a word is explained, sometimes by means of another word, and sometimes by means of a sentence, and that too being one or many, consisting of two or more words. For instance, the meaning of the word ‘Pika’ is explained by ‘ Kokila’; ‘ Aupagava’ is explained as ‘the son of Upagu,’ or as ‘one who was produced by Upagu from out of his wife.’ The verb ‘pacati’ (Parasmatpada—Present Tense, Third Person, Singular) is explained as ‘the action of cooking, affecting another person, as being accomplished at the present time, by the agent who is one—the action extending over many moments. And certuinly, in these explanations, EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO THR VARTIKA. 551 there is no syntactical split. Nor is the explanation found to refer to any portion that is not denoted by the word explained. In the same manner, when the meaning of the word ‘ Mahéndra’ happens to be ex- plained by persons cognisant of the various signications of words, who employ one or more words of their own, without touching the Vedic text itself—where is there a symtactical split 7 For our own sentence, even if uttered a hundred times, would not vitiate the Vedic sentence. And when the meaning of the Veda 18 oxplained, the word itself does not become human. And when a certain fact 18 being spoken of by a man, it is ne- cossary that it should be spoken of in a certain order of sequence, and that too in accordance with the due sequence of the roots and affixes —/f./. ` Mahdngcasavindrah, se.’ ; and certainly, inthis there is no dependence upon other factors. Then again, oven in the case of one factor depending upon another factor, there is every ground for there being a Compound, provided the former be the predominant factor; consequently if the word ‘Indra’ were dependent upon the Nominal Affix, it could be very well compounded, be- cause of the fact of its being the predominant factor, with regard to ‘ greatness. ` Thus then, even though, in case of the simultaneous functionings (of the Compound and the Affix), there is nothing incongruous in the fact of the factors being dependent upon other factors, yet the functioning in question is gradual. Because the word ‘ Indra,’ though dependent upon the Affix, is yet compounded on account of its predominant character ; and when dependént upon greatness it becomes subordinate, and hence the functioning of the Affix has to come inlater on. That is to say, in a case where the predominant factor is dependent upon something else, the func- tioning must be one of this kind ; and hence it is the compounding that comes in first. If, however, after the compounding has been done, the functioning be held to come in its wake, of its own accord,—then the result would be that Indra by itself would be connected with the Affix; and on the other hand, the same pure Indra would come to be compounded; and as such we would have, for the deity in question, Indra alone, without any qualifications; and as such the mention of the qualification ‘great’ would become absolutely useless. Nor is it possible to assert that, as in the case of the ‘red one-year-old cow,’ 80 in that of ‘Indra’ and ‘ Mahat’ also, the two coalesce in the denotation of the Affix, and as such serve to limit one another. Because where there is no Action in question, there can be no such simultaneous coalescence. Nor is it possible for that which is not an Action to draw within itself any qualifications. Even if it could so draw them in, it would come to denote the fact of ‘ Mahat’ and ‘ Indra’ denot- ing two deities. And thon, the words ‘ Mahat’ and ‘ Indra’ being more 552 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. TI—-PADA I—ADHI (7). than one, when not compounded, there would be no possibility of the Affix that we do actually find in it, because this affix 18 laid down as com- ing in only when the Deity in question is one (and hence the word ‘ Mahéndra’ would be possible only in case Mahéndra wore one deity, and not if the word ‘ Mahéndra’ contained the names of two distinct deities). And again, if the words ‘ Mahat’ and ‘ Indra’ were two distinct Nouns, with independent declensional affixes, then there could be no such noun as ‘ Mahéndra,’ and hence no chance for the affix in question; and if there are no such Nouns ending in declensional affixes, then they could not form a compound, For these reasons, simultaneous functioning is not possible; and hence through the aforesaid gradual functioning, we conclude that the object signified by the Compound itself 18 the deity. And consequently Muhéndru is none other than Indra qualified by greatness. Thus then, we find that for reasons above explained, the Pérvupaksha position appears to be quite reasonable; and hence we must have recourse to another line of argument with a view to its effectual refutation. And this wo are going to do now, in expounding what we shall call — SIDDHANTA (B). As a matter of fact, the Deity enters into the sacrifice, not in its material form, but in the verbal (2.e., in the form in which it happens to be mentioned in the scriptural Injunction) ; consequently, inasmuch as it is by the word ‘ Mahéndra’ that the Deity is mentioned, we cannot but accept Mahéndra as the Deity. MWven if the meanings of the two words ‘ Indra’ and ‘ Mahéndra’ be identical,—the deity in the particular sacri- fice in question must be that which is spoken of by the word ‘ Mahéndra’ in accordance with the law laid down under Sitra: ‘ Vidhigabdasya mantra- tvé, &८.' (X-iv-23)— and none other. And hence the character of the deity could not belong even to those mentioned by such names as ‘ Vrha- dindra, &c.,— words that are more akin to‘ Mahéndra’ than ‘ Indra,’ — to say nothing of such other words as ‘ Indra’ and the like. When we find a certain Deity in a certain form laid down im con- nection with a certain sacrifice,—even though the Deity be the object denoted, and not the merely Verbal form, yet, if we find the slightest difference from it in another otherwise expressed, we cannot admit this to be the Deity of that sacrifice. That is to say, the character of the Deity is such as is not cognisable by the ordinary means of cognition, Sense-perception and the like; and hence the only means of knowing it 18 afforded by Vedic Injunction alone ; hence we can be assured of the fact of the sacrifice having been performed in due accordance with the Injunction in the Veda, only when we actually EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO THE VARTIKA. 553 find that the Deity invoked has been exactly the same as is therein laid down. If however, the slightest difference is made in that,—the func- tioning of the Injunction having ceased with the laying down of the real Deity, &c.—, we will have to look for another authority for this slightly different Deity; but as a matter of fact, there is mo such authority; and 88 such the invocation of that Deity cannot but be unauthoritative. This will be explained later on, where it is shown that ‘ Agni is the Deity of the Ashtakupdla, and not of the Ajya’ (because with regard to the latter Agni 18 not laid down as the Deity). In accordance with this rule (1) when the Injunction has spoken of Indra as the Deity, the deific character cannot be attributed to Agni,—(2) when Indra is laid down as the Deity of Soma, He cannot be the Deity of the Cake,—(3) when Indra is laid down as the Deity of the pounded Soma, He cannot be the Deity of the creeper itself,—(4) when pure Indra is laid down as the deity, we cannot have him as qualified by some attributes ;—so in the same manner, when we find the Injunction laying down the qualified ‘ Great-Indra’ (Mahéndra) as the Deity, we cannot invoke Indra alone. Another reason for this is that, inasmuch as in the Injunction in ques- tion, the Deity is predicated of something else, due significance must be attached to its qualifications and adjuncts: specially as no such significance could be attached to them, only in case the Deity were that with regard to which something else was predicated, That 18 to say, if in the matter of the relationship expressed by the nominal affix (in ^ Mahéndra”’), the Deity were that with regard to which it was predicated, then we could not attach any importance to the mention of its attributes. If, however, the Deity were not predicated, it would not have the character of the Deity, and hence we cannot but admit it to be predicated. And as such, due significance must be attached to its qualifications; and hence the removal of the qualification would do away with the very character of the Deity. For instance, in such sentences as—‘ the white-clothed person should be fed,’ ‘the red-turbaned priests pass along,’ ‘the person with the stick repeated the Praisha Mantras,’—if we take away the qualification, what is left behind ceases to form a material part of the Sacrifice. If however, the qualifications were such as having something else predicated of them— fz., “bring in those that have white clothing’’—the men could very reasonably be brought even withont the white clothing (which they might lay aside before coming in). Hence, in the case in question, even if the Deity were to enter into the sacrifice, in its material form, we could not accept it as without its qualification ; as a matter of fact, however, we find that it helps the sacrifice, in its verbal form,—and consequently anything else, that would be mentioned by a word apart from the Injune- tion, could not be recognised as the prescribed Deity. 70 ०५54 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. --717/ I—-ADHI (7). And farther, when the Deity is mentioned by means of a compound, it would not be open to the fault of the Injunction referring to more than one thing. Hence the Deity that would belong to the ‘Mahéndra-graha’ could never be mentioned by the word ‘ Indra,’ That which is mentioned by this latter word can never be the Deity of that sacrifice; and as such in the case of an injunction of this sacrifice, any mention of that Deity would be absolutely useless. Thus then we find that the sense of Sifra 16 comes to be that the cognition of the Deity depends upon actual verbal expression; and the fact of a certain word expressing the Deity comes to be accepted only if it is found that such expression is in keeping with the character of the Nominal Affix. Hence we conclude that thore is a distinct difference between the deities Indra and Mahéndra. Question ; “ But how do you reconcile the Bhashya with the above explanation P ”’ Reply: It is as follows: What the Pirvapakshi urges is that there is no necessity of carrying aside the Hymn in question. And for one who holds that the mantra mentioning ‘ Indra’ need not be removed from the ‘ Mahéndra’ sacrifice, — inasmuch as it would be absolutely use- less to have expressed a Deity that is not needed in the Action, it must be desirable to admit that simply Indra is the Deity pointed out. But no such admission can be made by his mere wish; nor is there any other authority for its acceptance; because the only authoritative means of knowing the Deity, in the present case, is the Nominal Affix that we meet with in the passage laying down the ‘ Mdahéndra’ sacrifice; and this occurs in the “ Mahéndra”’ only. If this Nominal Affix were rent apart from the compound, and explained along with the word “ Indra” only, then, in that case, the mention of the Deity would be in keoping with the direct deno- tation of the Mantra. It is this position of the opponent that the Bhashya takes for granted, and hence it speaks of the word “ Indra” as withdrawn from tho word ‘ Mahéndra,’ in the passage: ^^ that Indra is the Deity is cognised by the presence of the Affix;’’ while, asa matter of fact, inasmuch as the word “ Indra’ stands in need of ‘‘ greatness,” so long as the compounding is not done, the word ‘Indra’ remains the subordinate factor, and as such incapable of any contact with the Nominal Affix. Says the Bhashya: ‘ When depending on contact with the nominal affix, ¥c., &c.” And the sense of this is that, though the compounding is quite possible when the principal factor is dependent upon something else, there is room for the nominal affix when it is in the pure condition of the Noun; but at the time that the affix appears, there being no declensional ending, no compounding would be possible. Thus then, the rule laid EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO THE VARTIKA. ७59 down by Patanjali— that ^ compounding is possible also when the factor dependent upon something else happens to be the predominant ०४0९ ` ` — applies to those cases in which a Noun witha declensional ending, stand- ing apart, stands in need of another word which is capable of being con- nected with it,—as for instance ‘ Rajpurushah gobhanah. ’ If there were a need of the Nominal Affix, before the compounding was done, then we would have to admit the appearance of the affix along with a sentence (in the form of ‘Mahdn Indrah’). On the other hand, if the affix were attached to the word ‘Indra’ only, then the qualification (greatness) would fail to enter into 1t. As for the gradual functioning (one after the other) of the Compound and the Affix, you do not admit of it. If the affix were attached in the first instance—i.e., before the coming in of the word ‘ Mahat’—then, we would be open to the two objections urged above (Text, p. 397)— viz: (1) the greatness would apply to the material of the sacrifice, and not to the Deity, which would become the subordinate factor ; and (2) the final shape of the word would be ‘ Mahaindra’ and not ‘ Mahéndra 4 - The mere word ‘ Indra,’ when functioning along with the Compound, could not be related to the nominal Affix. (This is what the Bhashya means). For these reasons, it will have to be admitted that in the single word, the relationship (between ‘ Indra’ and ‘ Mahat’ and the Affix) comes in all at once. And then, in accordance with the Sitra I—iv—8, we would as before be opon to the objection of the diversity in the character of Indra (it being the predominant factor in relation to ‘ greatness ’ while subordi- ate in relation to the affix). Says the Bhashya: It is clear that Mahéndra ts something totally dis- tinct from Indra. And the sense of this is that, prior to the compounding, the Injunction is one of more than one object, t.e., greatness and Indra this would also be got at from the words of the complete compound itself, and this would lead to a syntactical split, which is avoided by having recourse to compounding. U'herefore, says the Bhashya, the deity in question 18 not (mere) Indra unqualified by greatness, (but the qualified Indra). This would be the sense of the Bhashya, if we read it as ` amahattvavicishtah ;’ if, however, we read ‘ mahattvavigishtah,’ the meaning would be that the deity is not that which is mentioned by the mere word ‘ Indra,’ but that which is spoken of by that word qualified by ‘ Mahat;’ specially because the affix in question would be possible only if the noun were in the form of a compound. Says the Bhashya—Not by the relationship of the component parts; and this should not be taken as absolutely denying the etymological meaning of the word; all that it means is that the affix does not appear by means of the relationship of the component parts, because it is absolutely 956 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. U-—-PADA I—ADHI (7). impossible for any such part to be withdrawn from the compound (for the propose of being attached to the affix). Says the Bhashya— Therefore it must be a distinct deity. That is to say, even though the object Indra is one only, yet the twoare spoken of as distinct deities, on account of the difference between the unqualified (‘“‘ Indra’’) and the qualified (“‘ Mahéndra’’). For instance, we find the same man to be an uncle and a preceptor; and he is spoken of differently, accord- ing as the particular requirements of the time may refer to the one or the other phase of his character. As for the Vedic sentence “it was after Indra had killed Vrttra that he came to be called Mahéndra”—the Pairvapakshi thinks that (even in the case of the ‘ Mahéndragraha’) mere Indra having been previously recognised as the Deity, what the qualification ‘great’ does is to subse- quenty eulogise the character of the previously recognised Deity, and it does not enter into the deific character itself. The reply to this is clear in the Bhashya itself. Mahéndra thus being knownasa deity, distinct (from Indra), itis mere groping in the dark, to make such bold assertions as that—‘the word Muhéndra points to mere Indra as the deity,’ ‘the mere word Indra points to the qualified Mahdndra as the deity,’ ‘even though the Injunction distinctly mentions the qualified Mahéndra, yet the character of tho deity belongs to mere Indra,’ ‘though the word used be ‘ Indra’ only, yet the deific character belongs to the qualified ‘Mahéndra,’ and so forth. None of these assertions are reasonable. Consequently it must be admitted that the Hymns in question will have to be carried away to that place where there is a complete harmony 06. tween the Injunction and the Mantra (ie., a place where Indra would be the Deity ),—if we were to accept the Hymn to be subservient to the Deity (४,९.) if we take the Mantra as pointing to the Deity), as held by the Pirvapnaksha. Whereas in accordance with our theory, the Hymn isa principal action by itself, leading to a distinct transcendental result; and as such capable of being taken along with any and every deity; as in all cases 10 would, by means of its own specific transcendental result, help in the completion of the sacrifice; (and there would, in this case, be no need of carrying away the Hymn) Sutra (18): The mention of the qualification too would be absolutely useless, Whether the qualification be eternal or transient (i.e, natural op caused), if it be taken only as eulogising Indra, and not as entering into his deific character, then its mention (in the sentence Maheéndrgraha, &c.’) would be absolutely useless. Because the only purpose for which a deity EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO THR VARTIKA. 557 is spoken of or enjoined is to show how the particular Action could be performed with reference to Him. And whether the qualification be laid down or not, when the performance of the Action would be quite possible with regard to mere Indra, there would be no use of laying down the quali- fication. And further, the qualification not being included (in the Deity itself), it could only be mentioned after the Injunction of the Deity; or it would have to be mentioned as describing the Deity. But for you neither could be possible; because of the ‘qualified Indra’ not having been mentioned anywhere else. Thatis to say, the relationship of mere Indra with the particular ‘graha’ (the M@héndra) is not laid down anywhere; and hence it could not be possible for the qualification to be laid down solely with a view to the description of Indra contained therein; on the other hand, we have never found any such Deity as ‘Great Indra’ laid down; and as such it is not possible for ‘greatness’ to be spoken of as serving the purpose of pointing outa particular Deity. And thus the mention in the passage in question, of the word ‘ Mahéndra,’ being such as is not fonnd elsewhere, we must admit it to be the Injunction of a distinct Deity. Sutra (19): So also with regard to the Yajyai and the Puroruc. The difference of names in these also 18 to be explained in the same way as that in the foregoing Mantra. That 18 to say, 16 18 only in accord- ance with the aforesaid explanation that we could explain the separate mention of the Yaya and the Puronuvakya. Sutra (20): Inthe case of the ‘barren goat,’ we perceive the object as actually existing. [It has been urged above in Sutra 15, that the object laid down as the ‘barren goat’ is subsequently spoken of as ‘goat’ only, and hence the qualification ‘barren,’ and also ‘great,’ must be takon as qualifying the object, and not as having any independent significance. ] But the fact is that such objects as the ‘barren goat’ and the like, help the sacrifice, by their material forms; and as such all their specifications being directly perceptible, when it is found that the purpose is equally served by the use of a generic form ‘goat’ only, the Mantra does not attach much im- portance to the actual words (‘‘ barren goat ”) employed in the foregoing Injunction. Sutra (21): Objection: ‘“‘There may be (a carrying away of the Hymn in question) to an action wherever mere Indra might be the Deity; and as a distinctly useful purpose would be served by it (there can be nothing objectionable in it),” 958 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II——-PADA I—ADHI (7). The Sutra may be interpreted in two ways: I. “The Purvapaksha “could be rightly renounced only if it were found to be opposed to a “strong authority. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so; because “the authority of Litga (Indicative Power) of the words of a Hymn “is certainly much stronger than that of Order or Context, &c. ; and hence “we cannot very well give up the Parvapuksha theory.” II. “The word ‘Indra’ being a part of the word ‘ Mahéndra’ could “be taken as signifying the sense of the latter compound ; as by so doing “we reconcile the otherwise contradictory bearings of the 1.४0 and the “ Krama; just as we have in the case of the word ‘Agni’ as occurring in “the Manota (Vide X—iv—42). Thatis tosay, it would not be neces- “sary to remove the Hymn, as on account of close proximity, we could “accept the part ‘Indra’ to indicate the whole ‘Mahéndra’; specially ८५ &8 in so doing we avoid the contradiction between Linga and Krama, ‘and also the necessity of having to assume a transcendental result (for “the Hymn). For instance, in the case of the Agnishomiya, though we “find the word ‘ Agni’ alone in the Manota Muntra, yet finding, from con- “text, that it forms part of a compound (‘ Agnishoma’), we accept it ८५ 88 indicating Soma also, and assuch affording the sense of the whole ५ compound. “Consequently there is nothing incompatible, even if we do not “remove the Hymn from its place.” Sutra (22): Reply: This could not be the case with those (Mantras) that are directly laid down. Asa matter of fact we find that in many places we do not find the same meaning 10 all the Mantras that are laid down in that connec- tion, when these latter are removed from that context. For instance, in the case of the sentence ‘ ya@myah gansantt’ and the like,—inasmuch as Yama is not the Deity of the other Grahas, if the Mantras laid down in that context were to be removed from there, they could not point to him. And as in that case the very injunction of these would be useless, it would be unecessary to admit the fact of their leading to transcenden- tal results. And this may be said of all similar cases (as the one in question). Aud hence we cannot accept the Hymn to be merely subser- vient to the Deity. Sutra (23): Objection: “ But we actually perceive it.” (This Sutra proceeds to show that the removing of the Mantra would not make any Injunction useless). “Though Yama, &e., are not the Deities of the grahas, yet they could ‘“be indicated by the Mantras, as being of use in other actions. For EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO THE VARTIKA. 559 “instance—-(1) the Mandika Hymn is used in the Agni, as it is therein ‘laid down that the Fire is be drawn in with the Mandika sukta; (2) “the Akshasikta is employed in the Rdjasitiya, as therein it is laid down “that the gambling 18 done with the dice (aksha) ; (8) the Mushikasukta 18 employed in the Ekddagini, as in this the sentence ‘a@khusté, &e., ‘having doscribed the connection of a certain place, this makes the ‘‘ Hymn one oulogising that place. As for the ‘ Kushumbhaka’ and other “hymns, 77 we do not find any particular use of these, we can accept them ‘‘as having their use in those cases where the general term Mantra is “used in the Injunction (and no particular Mantra is specified); as for “instance, we find that all Mantras are laid down as to be employed in “the Vdcastoma. So too in the case of the Agvina sacrifice, it is laid ‘down that in case the sun should rise before the sacrifice is finished, all ‘Rk verses should be recited (as an expiatory rite). In cases like these, “however, inasmuch as we find that the Mantras laid down do not ‘mention any object that appears in the sacrifice in its material form, ८ 6 have to accept the fact of their leading to transcendental results. ‘But because a transcendental result is admitted in one case, that is “no reason, why we should reject a visible purpose, even when it is pre- “sent, and always assume a transcendental one. For instance, because “the reciting of the Vatshnuvi verse is found to serve only a transcen- “dental purpose it does not follow that only transcendental results fol- “low also from that of the Yda7y& and the like, which are found to serve “distinctly visible purposes.” Sutra (24): Reply: Because of the fact of the direct men- tion (of the Genitive, &c.), the words ‘stauti’ and ‘cansati’ ap- pearing in the context, would have to be taken as having their use in bringing about distinct transcendental results (Apirvas). It has been urged that like the word ‘ Agni’ in the Manotd, the word ‘Indra’ would indicate the sense of the compound,‘ Mahéndra.’ But this 18 not correct, because there being nothing incompatible in the directly ex- pressed meaning of the word ‘Indra,’ there is no reason why it should give up its direct denotation, (and take to indirect Indication)? And then again, as it would always be possible, by some sort of an indirect indi- cation, to find a visible result for all that is held to be leading to trans- cendental results,—this process of interpretation is by no means allow- able. | Then it has been urged that there would be nothing wrong, even if the Hymn were removed from its place. But itis not so; because Direct Assertion, as defined by Proximity, distinctly points to the fact of the Hymn in question forming a part and parcel of the collection of Hymns 560 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA 1—ADHI (7). with which it is mentioned. And as for the functioning of Linga, it can have no injunctive potency, until the recognition of a general rela- tionship (between the Mantra and the Deity). That is tosay, if the case were such that it was absolutely definitely ascertained that the Hymn serves a visible purpose,—in that case alone could the Direct Assertion, defined by Proximity, be set aside. When, however, the case is such that if 18 only after the Hymn has been employed that its use is sought after, and the commencement of the action does not depend upon the use.—then the Hymn having been employed in accordance with the authority of Order and Proximity, it does not matter whether wo assume a visible or an invisible result. As forthe Hymn, when removed from its place, we do not find any reason for employing it in any other place. As for Linga, all that it could do by its power of pointing to the Deity, would be to point out the form of the Deity (and not its relationship with any action); and in that case it would bécome absolutely useless, Zinga can have nothing to do with regard to the expression of any relationship between the Deity and the Action. As a matter of fact, Linga is found to have an actually enjoin- ing force, only when the general relationship of the Deity with the Ac- tion has been defined by some Mantra or other,—aud then there arising the question as to how the Deity would help the Action, what the Linga does is to point out the character of the Deity, thereby showing forth in what way that Deity is capable of helping the Action. In the case in ques- tion, however, we do not find any ground for such general relationship. Consequently if the Hymns are removed from these places, they cannot but become useless; and hence it is only right to accept the fact of their bringing about transcendental results. And further the various case-endings that we come across—v1z., the Locative in ‘ Kavatishu stuvatt,’ the Genitive in ‘ Indrasya viryani’ and the Ac- cusative ‘in praugam gansati’—as also the words ^“ Staut:’, Cunsati’ and the like, would have their direct meaning (only according to our theory); ac- cording to you, they will have to be taken as signifying something else. That is to say, the action of denoting the qualification and the qualified resting in the letters of a word, thus alone could the presence of the Locative be explained. If, on the other hand, the Kavati were taken as serving the purpose of pointing out the Deity, then the word would have to appear with the Instrumental ending. Nor can it be rightly urged that, “even if we accept it to be an Eulogy, the Kavatz remains a means and as such amenable to the Ins- trumental ending”’’,—because im our case the Kavati-hymn has the character of the substrate, as also that of the means; and hence it is quite optional in what way itis to be spoken of. As for the pointing out EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO THE भदा. ^. 56k oY mianifestation of the Deity, all such manifestation'in the first' instance must reside in (have for its substrate) the Self of the person; and ‘sub-: sequent to the comprehension of the character of the Action, the mani- festation of the Deity (as the Result) resides in the Deity; while’ as for the Kavatt, it must always remain the Instrument or means (of that manie. fegtation); and this makes a great difference between the two theories. Then again, the injunction or Bhavana of eulogy—in the words “Gtauti’, ‘Carsati’—is cognised as extending’ over a definite period of time; and in this Injunction, the denotation of the Root serves as the means; while all the other nouns, with the several endings, come to be related, only inasmuch as they help in the fulfilment of the Root. Thus then, when the muntras serve the purpose of accomplishing the Hymns, then, inasmuch as they accomplish something that is desired, they serve 8 purpose laid down in the Scriptures, and as such come to ॥ ४९९ a dis- tinctly useful end. When they do the manifestation of the Deity, on the other hand, they do something that is not laid down in the Scriptures ; and as such are found not to serve any apparent purpose. Hence it. is more reasonable by far to have the Hymns serving distinctly useful purposes Further, for. us, the genitive (in § Indraysa viryaai’ éte.,) directly expresses the subordinate character of tho Deity; and that which is subordinate cannot be the predominant factor; 16166 it being impossible for the Deity to be the predominant factor, tho manéras conld not be taken as subservient to them; and consequently predominance must be attributed to the Hymn. If in the case in question, predominance belonged to the Deity, then being expressible by a noun only, the word mentioning it would be found with the nominative ending, which could not express any- thing else,— as we find in the sentence ‘agnirmirdhd, &e.,’&c.’ In the crise in question, however, even that which we find having’ the nominative énding is actually found,—on account of tho fact of the homogeneity of tho sontence as preceded by the capability of the words used,—to be for the purpose of expressing the connection of the qualification; as for in- stance,—‘ Indro yato jangamasydvasitasya raja.’ And as there is 110 use of the qualifications, these cannot be accepted as the predominant factor: and hence the only’ reasonable course open to us is to accept the word expressive of the Deity to be subservient to the Hymn (which latter cnnnot be taken as subserviently pointing out. the Deity) ‘ There should be a stop in the Bhashya after the word ‘ Satyam? (as otherwise the word could not be construed in anyway) Thus then according to the laws of Arthavada, indsmuch as all other: words (save those with nominative endings) wonld, become useless,—even fHough, in the first instance, it is possible for the word expressing the 71 869 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 11--712; I—ADHI (7). Deity to be the predominant factor, yet the only rightful course is ta take it along with the sentence, only as subsidiary to the Eulogy. And thus the words ^ Stauti and ‘ Carsati* cannot in any way be taken as serving the purpose of the indirect indication (of the Deity); and as such predominance must be attached to the Bulogistic Hymn only. Siitra (25): Because of the distinctness implied by the word. We find it declared in the Veda that “the Agnishtoma 18 acccm- panied by twelve Hymns’’; and here the mention of the number ‘ twelve ' shows that each hymn is distinct by itself. If it were not so, and if all the hymns equally served the purpose of pointing out the Deity, there could be no mention of the number ‘twelve.’ If, on the other hand, the manifestation of the Deity by all the Hymns be not accepted to be identical, a distinct Deity would come to, be pointed by each verse, and by each word, and thus being innumerable, they could not be spoken of as‘ twelve” ` The opponent might urge—‘' Thesame argument applies to the case. ५५ 0 Hymns also; if all the Hymus be considered identical, then there is “only one Hymn; if they are distinct, then each verse would constitute ८ ® hymn; and there is no third alternative, which wonld be in keeping “with the mention of ‘twelve.’ If again, the collection of a definite ‘number of verses be taken as. one Hymn, in accordance with the musi- ४५ cal hiatus perceptible in certain definite places,—then we can have the ‘‘same definition with regard to the manifestation of the Deity also.” To this we mnke the following reply: Inasmuch as all actions have their end in certain definite results, they are counted in accordance with the number of results; and hence in the case in question, inasmuch, as we find twelve distinct transcendental results (Apirvas) appearing, we con- clude the number of the Hymns to be twelve also. Ou the other hand, if the mantras were to serve the purpose ot pointing out Deities, then, inasmuch as such pointing out would be done by each verse and each word,—and as there would be no means of ascertaining the end of the Action (of pointing out),—there would be no ground for mentioning the definite number ‘ twelve.” When, however, the mantras are taken to serve the purpose of bringing about, certain transcendental results, such results being cognisable solely by, means of Scriptures, there would be no ground for holding the appearance of that result prior to the appearance of the hiatus (that 18 taken as the closing sign of one Hymn); and the result would be found to be accomplished only by means of the collection of a certain number of verses; and the final accomplishment of this result being taken as the mark of the end of a particular Action (of Hymning), —the number ‘twelve’ of the results would naturally dotermiue the EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO THE VARTIKA. 563 number of Hymns also to be twelve. There is no ground for assuming thie appearance of such a transcendental result, either from each verse, or from all the Hymns taken together. Whereas in the case of manifestation (of Deity), we actually perceive the word and the Deity. Siitra (26): The mention would be absolutely useless. In the case of such sentences ‘ Ggn@y4 grahad bhavanti’ and then again, ‘agneyishu stuvantz’; inasmuch of Vedic verses are incapable of being assumed or tampered with, the former sentence being enough for the pur- poses of pointing out the fact of the ‘ Agnéyi’-mantras being the means of hymning Agni, there would be absolutely no use for the second sen- tence. That is to ‘say, if the word Agnéyi only served the purpose of pointing out the fact of Agni being the Deity, then the employing of these Hymns would be enjoined by the first sentence itsolf; and hence there would be no use for the second sentence. Asa matter of fact, how- ever, the second sentence should be taken as serving the purpose of pointing ont the Hymn as an independent Action Sutra (27): Because we distinctly find the meanings of the two to be different. All relationship bein® based upon a certain difference between the objects related,—inasmuch as we find the’ two sorts of Hymns ‘ Stotra’ and the ‘ Castra ` mentioned as related to each other, these two must be taken as distinct from each other, which could not be, if both equally served the purpose of pointing out the Deity. Objection: “ Both the Stotra and the Castra being equally stuti ८“ the above argument would apply to the case of that also. As for the ^ fact of the two being two different individuals, those grounds of difference 6 could be urged in favour of the Pirvapaksha also.”’ The reply to this would be in the shape of the arguments brought forward above in connection with the mention of the number ६०९४९. That is to say, the transcendental results following from the ७८०८८ and the Castra being totally distinct, it is on the ground of this difference in the results that the Actions themselves are held to be different; and on this difference would be based the mention of their relationship. While as for the manifestation of the Deity, there 18 no such difference either in the action of manifestation or in its results. Sutra (28): The mention too is accompanied by the ^©. cusative. I, Such mention as ‘pra-ugam gazsati, inasmuch as the Pra-uga- 064 TANTRA*¥ARTIKA. ADH. H—PADA I—ADRI {7). Hymn‘is spoken of “by means of the Accusative, this would be another argument in favour of the view that the Hyun is a principal by itself. The principal Action is always such as is desired for its own sake (and as such accompanied by the Accusative ending)—e. g., ‘ agnihotram juhott, ; ‘ aghdramagharayati.’ This could not be the case with the subsidiary Actions; which are wholly subordinated to others, and as such not desired in themselves. I}. The Sitva may be explained in another way: The very menyr tion of the two names ‘ Stotra’ and ‘ Castra’ is meant to point to the fact of these being principal Actions; otherwise the word used should have been prakacana (manifestation) only; or there would be no name at all, as in the case of the words ‘ avahaniz’ and the like. Sutra (29): Because of the fulfilment of the result. | The particular desirable results that are asked for in the Mantra would be possible, only if the Hymn were a principal action by itself ; be- ७९.०६९ requests are always preferred to one who occupjes the predominant position. According to you, on the other hand, the Results would be ‘asked for from the Deity, which you hold to be the predominant factor, as in the case of ordinary sacrifices ; because so long as the Master (Principal factor— Deity) exists, no one would think of preferring his re- quest to the servant (the Subsidiary-Hymn which serves the purpose of manifesting the Deity). PVA LNVIVPPORAPO PR PPL PVA ANAND AINA dP ७ ADHIKARANA (8). [Treatine (A) OF THE NON-INJUNCTIVENESS OF MANTRAS, AND (B) oF Denotation aS THE THIRD FUNCTION OF VERBS. |] Sutra (30): The Vidhi and the Mantra serve the same purpose, inasmuch as they contain the same words. In accordance with the Bhashya, the Adhikarana is explained as follows: Taking for example certain Mantras, there arises a quéstion as to whether or not the injunctive words occurring in them serve tlie purpose of enjoining, as do those occurring in the Bradhmana passages. And on this, the position of the Pérvapaksha is that, inasmuch as the words in the Mantra are the same as those in the Brahmana, there is no reason why the former should not have injunctive potency. And this is met by the Siddhanta, which holds that, inasmuch as it is a Mantra, and has its subject already laid down in other passages, it cannot have any injunctive potency; hence all that the Mantra does at the time of the performance of the sacrifice is to recall to the mind that which has been previously laid down in the Brahmana passage. That is to say, the action Goydga, for instance, spoken of in the Mantra is not different from the same action mentioned in the Braéhmana, because it is actually recognised as the same; nor does the Mantra lay down any accessories of the action (with regard to which it might be taken to have an injunctive potency ) ; nor, lastly, can it be taken as containing an eulogy of something enjoined in another sentence ; because the Mantra is an independent sentence altogether, and as such cannot be taken along with any other sentence. In contradistinction to serving the purpose of recalling to the mind that which has been laid down elsewhere, all that the Mantra could be taken as, would be an Injunction or an Arthavdada. As matter of fact, however, none of these is possible. In the first place, the form of the Action, that would form the object of injunction, is already known as laid down else- where; as for its accessories, in tho shape of the Material, the Result and the Occasion, none of these is mentioned in the Mantra, which therefore ‘cannot be taken as laying down these. Secondly, when the injunction in the case occurs in another (Bradhmana) passage, which has all its needs ‘already fulfilled, it is not possible for the Mantra to be taken as an 566 TANTRA-VARTIKA ADH. If—PADA I—ADHI (8). Arthavada to that Injunction. This we have already explained under the Adhikarana on Mantras (Adhyaya lI). For these reasons, Mantras should be taken only as recalling what has already been enjoined elsewhere. Against the above explanation of the Adhikarana we bring forward the following objections :— (1) What reason is there by which the injunctive potency of the verb is suppressed simply by the fact of its occurring inthe Mantra, and is enlivened by appearing in the Brahmana? We actually find verbs in Mantras serving the purposes of injunction, e.g., ^ Vasant@ya Kapinjalana- labhaté ; and conversely there are, sometimes, verbs occurring in the Brah- mana, not having the injunctive potency :—e.g., ‘‘ Yusyobhayam havirarit- १४2१८१९८, &c.”” Therefore there can be no such absolute rule as has been shown in the above Siddhanta. (2) Further, if the Mantra be taken as supplementary to the Brah- mana, siniply on the ground of the action having been enjoined in the latter,—why could not we take the Brahmana injunction itself as simply recalling the action previously enjoined by the Mantra? That is to say, there is no special reason whereby it could be ascertained whether the Mantra, having its injunctive potency suppressed by the fact of the Action having been enjoined by the Brdlmana, should serve the purpose recalling the action thus enjoined, or vice versa. Thus then, we conclude that, inas- much as neither the Mantra nor the Brahmana is capable of being taken as supplementary, specially as there 18 no feature in either that could point it out as distinctly supplementary, both are equally injunctive. And as for the repetition of the same Injuncvion—as occuring in the Man- tra and in the Brahmana—we can take the two as two distinct actions. As for the fact of the one being recognised to be the same as the other, we shall explain this under the “ Abhyds@dhikarana” (VI—ii—23, &c.), Therefore the non-injunctive character of Mantras cannot be taken as established in the above manner. Some people assert that, inasmuch as the Mantras are laid down by the Brahmanas, as instrumental in the performance of sacrifices,—exactly as the corn, &c., are,—they cannot have any injunctive potency, just as the corn, &c., have none. But these people also have only been led astray by a misleading sem- blance between the two cases. Because the mere fact of the Mantra being laid down in the Brahmana as to be employed in the sacrifice cannot do away with its injunctive potency, Therefore the Mantras would serve the injunctive purpose, and also, on account of their being laid down in the DENOTATION THB THIRD FUNCTION OF VERBS. 567 Brahmana, serve to recall that which has been enjoined by the Brahmana. Because there is no authoritative law which lays down that that which has been lnid down as to be employed cannot serve the purposes of an Injunction ; specially if it happens to be naturally endowed with the injunc- tive potency. If, however, the presence of this potency in the Mantra be denied absolutely,—then it would be altogether needless to bring forward the fact of its having been laid down as to be employed, for the purpose of denying that potency (because much reasoning is not required in denying what is impossible), Nor is there any self-contradiction in the fact of the Mantra performing both the functions. For instance, even the Brahmana, though in itself injunctive, could serve the purpose of recalling something enjoined elsewhere; this we shall explain under the ७7८7८ V—i—16. And further, mn the case of those Mantras that are not laid down in any Brahmana passage, as to be employed in a sacrifice, your argument being inapplicable, there would be no ground for denying the injunctive potency of these. Hence even this argument of yours does not help in the matter. र (7) As 2 matter of fact, however, there is no necessity of bringing in the Mantras, especially in the present Adhikarana, as they have no parti- cular connection with the present context. Hence we explain the Adhikarana otherwise, as follows :— Verbs have been declared, in the preceding Adhikarana, to be of two- kinds only—the Primary and the Subsidiary. And the question now started 1s as to whether these are the only two methods of the functioning of Verbs, or there is yet another method. And the position of the Piurva- paksha is that there is no third method. In reply to this Pairvapaksha, we have the following SIDDHANTA. 9२८४१, (31): But, because of the power of usage, the Mantra would express mere denotation. | There is a third method—that of denotation. Just consider the fol- lowing: Those verbs, that have their injunctive potency destroyed by the presence of such words as ‘ yat > and the like (words which make that which they precede, an Uddégya, and which therefore can never be the Vidheyd or object of Injunction), must, in all cases, serve the purpose of simple Denotation, ‘hat 18 to say, whether the verb occurs in the Mantra or in the Brahmana, wheu its injunctive potency happens to be set aside by 968 TANTRA-VARTIKA ADH. II—-PADA I--ADHI (8); the preserice of another word, then, in that case, the verb must be admitted to be denotative. Examples: (1) In‘ na tanaganti, §o.,’ the Injunctive having become suppressed by the word ‘yat,’ becomes supplementary. (2) In ‘ahe budhniya mantram mé gopaya,’ the suppression is by the Vocative end- ing. (3) In ‘damit grhnfimi,’ it is done by the First Person ending. (4) In ‘ yadt somamapaharéyuh,’ 16 is done by the word ^ yards.’ The fact is that such instances occur mosily in Mantras; and that is the reason why the Bhashya has mentioned the Mantras only ; specially as it 18 acommon idea that Mantras are not injunctive. In Bradhmanas, on the other hand, there are many Injunctive affixes, and that is why the Brahmana is commonly known to be injunctive. And it 18 only a very few instances where the Brahmanas are not injunctive; that is the reason why no Bradhmana passage has been cited as an instance. In the matter of the Brahmana or the Mantra being injunctive or not, there is no other reason save that which has been explained above (४४2, the presence or absence of such words as ‘ yat’ and the like) ; and the pre- sence or absence of the injunctive potency is not determined by the fact of the sentence being a Mantra or a Brahmana. But we do perceive the following point of difference (between the Mantra and the Brahmana): In the case of the Brahmana, the injunc- tive potency of the verb occurring in it having been suppressed (by the above causes), this Verb comes to be recognised as serving the purpose of pointing out something which affords the occasion for another action, and the mere verbal form of the Brahmana is not capable of being employed in the sacrifice. In the case of the Mantra, on the other hand, as soon as we learn its form—such as ddmi’ ‘ grhndimi, Fc. , = . ‘agnin vihara, &c., &c.,—we at once realise that even the verbal form can serve the purpose of recalling certain actions; and hence we come to the conclusion that the words of the Mantras are to be used in the sacrifice. Because in the performance of Actions, it is necessary that there should be a recalling (or remembering) of certain things; and inas- much as this recalling cannot be done by any means other than Mantras (vide Mantradhikarana Adh. I), we find it only accomplished by such. Mantras as have no other function. That is to say, at the time of the performance of a sacrifice, nothing can be duly performed, unless it is duly remembered, and thus the recalling of certain things being absolutely neccssary, it would stand in need of a fit means of its accomplishment; and as such 16 wonld begin to take up snch means as either the recalling of the words of the injunctive Brdhmana passage, or the recalling of what has been performed in the preceding moment, or the remembering of the Kalpasiitra bearing on the point, or the recalling of the very sentence’ 4 DENOTATION THE HIRD FUNCTION OF VERBS. 069 wlish gave the first idea of that action, or a certain witnessing priest chiefly employed for that purpose. Consequently when, at such a time, it is found that there are certain Mantras mentioned in the = con- text, which have no other purpose to serve,—-and which are taken along with the injunctive sentence, with a vague general notion that something might be done by them,—and it is realised that these Mantras are just the sort of sentences that are required for the purposes of reminding,—we come to infer, on the strength of Linga and Context, a Cruti passage laying down the employing of these Mantras ; and then these come to serve the purpose of simple Denotution. And it is also ascertained that it is only when we perform the action as recalled by these Mantras that the proper desirable results follow. Now we have to explain the Bhashya in accordance with the above interpretation of the Adhikarana. Tho assertion of the Bhaishya— “Na, asakrdapyuccarané tatparyat’’—does not refer to the fact of the Action having been already enjoined elsewhore. What it means is that on account of the presence of the word +“ yat,” the verb in the Mantra distinctly says that the Mantra speaks of something laid down elsewhere. If the Verb, with the words ‘ yat,’ &c., be uttered even a hundred times, it can never, by itself, give rise to any idea of an Apérva; and it is on account of this fact that we have the idea of the actiou being laid down elsewhere. | we ORF a ० यि ^ fet च, = * Fa 72 ADHIKARANA (9) Explanation of the name ‘ Mantra.’ Siitra (32): The name ‘Mantra’ applies to those of which the purpose is Denotation. As shown above, there is no significance attaching to the special citing of Mantras in the preceding Adhikarana: it is only by the way that the Sutra brings in 8 definition of what is meant by the word ‘ Mantra,’ as it occurs in the previous Sutra. And as it is introduced only by the way, thoro 18 no necessity why this Adhikarana should have preceded the last one (as mentioned in the Bashya). Specially as the last Adhikarana could have been discussed, without any reference to Mantras, basing the discussion upon any ordinary sentence. As for the Author of the Bhashya, he has laid stress upon the ordor of the Adhikaranas, simply because he attached importance to the use of the word ‘ Mantra’ in the last ७५८१५. The 80186 of the 8४८1 is that the name ‘ Mantra’ applies to those that serve the purpose of denoting or recalling,—the compound ‘ taccoduka ’ being explained as a Bahuvrikri. The Bhashya mentions the Genitive form, with a view simply to the verbal explanation. This definition has been given here, for the sake of its terseness, specially because it 18 thus thatit 18 spoken of among teachers and students and other experienced people, and also because it applies to almost all Muntraa. The Bhasbya (p. 125) says that a definition has been given, because it is not possible always to teach by the system of prshia@kota, And the sense of this is, that without a definition, the teacher would have to undergo the trouble of pointing out each and every Manira to 118 student, and this would be as painful a process as the curvings of the back undergone at the time when many things round one’s self have to bo pointed out to the standers-by. On tlis point we have the following verses: Even the great Sages, can never come to the end of all individual objects that have to bo defined; and it is only by means of a definition that the learned get to the end of such individuals. The Vrtti has given the following specific definitions of different kinds of Mantras: (1) Ending in ‘asi’; (2) ending in ‘tvam’; (8) making a request; (4) praise; (5) number; MEANING OF THR NAME ८ MANTRA,’ 571 (6) useless talk; (7) complaint; (8) direction; (9) searching; (19) question; (11) answer to some question ; (12) distant relationship; (13) employment; and (14) capability. As an example of (6) we have ‘ akshi té Indra pingalé duleriva’—‘ 4112 ` = 1010186. Of (12) we have ‘pratipundtu gabdamecchidréna pavitréna. By ‘capability’ (14) is meant the power of expression. In ‘ y& min dugdhavantasta éva nirdkrtavantah,’ we have the complaint (7) of the cow, In ‘Amutah somamihara,’ occurring in the story of Garuda, we have the direction (8) of Vinat&é to her son Garuda. In ‘ Véda karnavatim sirmim'—where ‘ siirmi’-pole—we havean instance of question (10). (For the example of others vide Bhashya, p. 126.) # णक ~, [9 Fun od — ae ~ = oN, किः ~=, णि क, a a ol ~~ ॐ “wh ~~ er ON „| ADHIKARANA (10). Explanation of the word ‘ Brahmana.’ Sutra (33): The name ‘Brahmana’ is applied to the rest. The Bhashya says: Since the definition of Brahmana could be inferredt from that of the Mantra—as all that ws not Mantra is Brahmana— therefore 1t 18 not necessary to give a definition of Braihmana. And at first sight the sense of the Bhashya appears to be that under tlie circumstances, 16 was not necessary to introduce the Sitva. But as a matter of fact, imasmuch as we find the word ‘rest’ in the 67८, which does not give any independent definition of the Brahmana, itis clear that the above passage of the Bhishya is only an amplification of the ७9 & (१८. Question: ‘What, then, was the use of bringing in this Satra ?” Answer: There would have been no use of introducing it, if it were known toall men that the Veda consists only of Brahmanas and Mantras. As a matter of fact however, there are many people who are ignorant of this fact; and since such people are liable to entertain the notion that there may be a third kind of Vedic sentence, therefore it is absolutely necessary to state clearly that all that is not Mantra, in the Veda, is Brahmana. The different kinds of the Brahmana are enumerated in the Bhashya: Parakrti(1) 18 the description of something done previously by a single person ; Purdkalpa’ (2) that of something done by many people ; ‘ Vyavadha- rana-kalpan@ (3) 18 that in which a fact that appears on the face of a sen- tence, is assumed to be otherwise on account of the peculiarities of the pre- ceding and following contexts,—e.g., we mcet with the passage ‘ Yo'gwum, pratigrthniyat varunistam praligrhnati,’ and as it is the passage means that 0116 who accepts the gift of a horse is seized by the disease of ‘ Varuna’; but on looking more closely at the context, we find that what is actually meant is that the disease seizes him who gives away the horse; and hence the word ‘ pratigrhniyat’ is changed into ८ pratigrahayati.’ The Bhaéshya uses the word ‘ Vidhilakshanam’; and in this the word ‘Vidhi’-Brahmana. ADIJIKARANA (11). [Treating of the fact of the Character of Mantra not belonging to the modifications un ४६. | Sutra (34): The character of Mantras does not belong to that which is not actually mentioned in the Veda, as it is only with reference to the sentences actually mentioned in the Veda that we have the above distinction. The Mantra ‘ Agnayé jushtam nirvapami ’—which is laid down as one to be employed in connection with the offering to Agni—is modified into ˆ Surydya, &., when the offering is made to Stirya; and here we have an instance of modification (‘ Uha’). And when the presiding Rshis of the family of the sacrifices are recounted, we have what is called the ‘Pravara. And when the Sacrificer, and his son, ctc., are named, we havo what is called ‘ Namadhéya,’ —e.g., in the Subrahmanya, the declaration is made that “it 18 Devadatta who is offering the sacrifice.”’ PURVAPAKSBA. [A] ८५ And inasmuch as all these are covered by the aforesaid definition of Mantra, and as they appear within the body of the Mantra, we must admit them to be actual Mantras.” SIDDHANTA. [A] And the reply to the above is that in all thatis found in the Veda, only those are Mantras that have actually been spoken of as such by the learned authorities; and mere denotativeness (of something connected with the sacrifice) is not a specific characteristic of Afantras. Another question in connection with this is:—‘‘ When only one word in a Mantra is modified, does the whole Muanéra lose its Mantric character, or it is only the modified word that does so? ” And on this we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. [B] “The whole Mantra ceases to be a Mantra, because the name ५ ‹ Mantra’ is applied to a certain conglomeration of vowels aud consonants “arranged in a definite order: and hence as soon as the slightest change 6४ TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 11—PADA I—ApHI (11). ८८ {8 made in this, the name ceases to apply to it. That is to say, when ‘in a Mantra the slightest part is changed from that which has been “known to be its form, it ceases to be recognised as that ‘ Mantra.’ “Tf it be held that the character of ‘Mantra’ would reside even in a “part (namely that which has not been modified), then all words, even ‘in ordinary parlance, would become Mantras, inasmuch as all of them “form parts of certain Manfras. Consequently the modification of even “the slightest letter having set aside the character of the Mantra, ५1८ ceases to be amenable to all processes attendant upon a Manira- “And then just as in the case of a modified Mantra, any mistake, whether “in the modified or in the unmodified part, would not make the “‘sacrificer hable to an expiatory rite, so also there wonld not apply “to such a Mantra any of those‘expressions that are laid down with reference “to the Mantra or the Veda; and hence even when a single word, or ‘““part of a word, happens to 06 modified, all the specific Vedic “processes (of grammar, accent, &c.) cease to apply to the Mantra; and “then what has to be used is the word of ordinary parlance.” To this we make the following reply :— SIDDHANTA. [B] Itis only the modified portion that ceases to be Mantra; because the generic form of the Mantra having been ascertained to exist in a cer- tain sentence, that generic character does not entirely disappear by a mere excess or diminution in a certain part of it. For imstance, when a swelling appears on the neck of tho cow, or when its horns have disappeared, it does not ontirely cease to be a ‘cow’; and the reason of this is that there are other parts of its body that are enough to show thatit belongs to the class ‘ Cow’; and we find that so long as even a part of the original body remains, the whole body is recognised as the same. In the same manner, it is a fact of ordinary perception that the character of a Mantra manifested by the presence of a number of vowels and consonants arranged in a definite order, does not entirely disappear on the slightest modification made in 1t. For instance, there are many cases where the change of a letter or its deletion, or some modification in the accent, is actually Jaid down in the Scriptures; and certainly when these changes happen to be made ina Mantra, it does not cease to be a Alantra ; e.g.—(1) we have the direction in the Veda ‘ Airam krivodygéyam’ (the Mantra should be recited after the word ‘giré’ has been changed into "378 ) ; (2) though a certain Mantra has three accents, at the time of the reading up of the Veda, yet it is laid down as to be recited in a single accent, at the time of the THE CHARACTER OF ‹ Mantra’ CANNOT BELONG TO MODIFICATIONS. 575 performance of sacrifices; and in neither of these two casos, do people cease to think of the Mantras (thas modified) as Mantras. It might be urged that in the cases cited, the Mantric character is not denied, because of the modifications having been made in ac- cordance with directions contained in the Veda. But this explanation is scarcely satisfactory, because all that the Vedic direction does is to lay down that the Mantra is to be used in a particular way, and it does not declare that the Mantric character does not cease thereby. Nor is it necessary that all that is laid down as to be employed has the character of the Mantra; for we find that Corns are laid down as to be employed in sacrifices ; and certainly Mantric character does not belong to these Corns; and thus it comes to tlis, that the said Vedic directions lay down the use of non-Mantric sentences. But the sentences cannot be said to be non-Mantric; as they are actually recoguised as Manfras. Consequently it must be admitted that the non-Mantric character belongs to the ;modified word ‘ara’ and the rest, and not to the whole sentence. But as a matter of fact, even of the modified words like those just cited, we cannot totally deny the Mantric character; because when we have looked into the whole of the Veda, from the very beginning, we come to the conclusion that in certain cases, the Mantra contains the word ‘gira,’ while in others it contains ‘7r@’ (this latter when we recall the direction ‘ Airam krivd, &c.) and that in certain cases, the Mantra has three accents, while in 06८1618 it hag only one. Objection: ‘If such be tho case, then all modifications would have “the character of IMfantrus; because even in the case of the modifica- “tions that are made in the subsidiary sacrifices in accordance with the ‘‘Primary ones, when we have looked over thedirection that ‘the Subsi- “diary is to be performed as the Primary ’—we could have the idea ‘(authorised by the said direction) that ‘in the Primary the Mantra ‘‘should contain the word ‘ Agni’ and in the Subsidiary it should contain _ “the word § Sarya.’” Reply: The two cases are not identical; because in a case where the change is in due accordance with an express direction of the Veda; the Mantric character is admitted; in case, however, of the changes being assumed, on the sole strength of reasoning, the Mantric character can never be admitted. That is to say, on looking into the Vedic direction we come to the following conclusion: in that case the Mantra is of this form and in the other case of that form. On the other hand, words like ‘Sitrya’ are introduced in place of the words like ‘Agni,’ simply onthe strength of the cxigencies of circumstances and reasoning; and certainJy no Mantric character can be ascertained by 676 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH.—-II—PADA I—ADHI (ir). mere reasoning, and this makes a deal of differeuce between the two cases. Objection: “Inasmuch as we find Afidéga (transference of words) “to be a process authorised by the Veda, we must admit all modification ०८ &c., to be so authorised ; or otherwise they would be wholly without ‘authority. For certainly, it is not a fact to be determined by Sense- “perception that a relation of subserviency subsists between any two “actions. Therefore there can be no difference between the change of ५८ ‹ Agni’ into ‘Surya’ and that of ‘ Gira’ into ‘ [ra,’” Reply: It 18 true that modification too is authorised by the Veda; in fact 1४ 18 for this reason that the Sitra denies the Mantric character in all thut ts not actually mentioned in the Veda. Of the Veda certain portions are directly perceived, while others are only inferred. And 1b is only that which is directly perceived that is said to be ‘ Amndta (‘ Actually Mentioned’). And, as a matter. of fact, we do not find any direct mention of the change of ‘ Agni’ into ‘ Surya, as we do that of changing ‘ Gira’ into ‘ Iva.’ Objection: ‘But we find the Vedic injunction ‘ Sauryam carwm “nirvapét’; and inasmuch as the Deity is ulways mentioned in the “text of the Veda, the said injunction would serve to lay down the use. ८ of the word ‘ Surya.’ ” Reply: The injunction you speak of does not lay down the putting in of the word ‘Sirya’ into the Mantra; as all that it does is to point out that at the time that the offering is being poured out, the name of ‘Siarya’ should be pronounced as ‘Surydya Svaha, and not that it should be introduced into the body of the Mantra, which could be done only by ‘ Afudégu’ (Transference). And inasmuch as all sentences laying down such ‘Transference’ are inferred by reasonings, they cannot be said to be ‘directly mentioned in the Veda.’ And consequently, the use of the word ‘Sirya’ being found to be laid down by sentences not directly mentioned in the Veda, no Mantric character can belong to it. Objection: “If such be the case, then, inasmuch as the Recounting “of the Pravara, and the Naming of tho Sacrificer, are directly laid down, ९८ they would have to be accepted as Mantras.” Reply : This would certainly be the case if the actual verbal forms of such Recounting, &c., were mentioned in the Veda. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the said Recounting, &., are done in accordance with the sense of a general injuuction,—eg, “The Pravara-Rshis should be recouuted,’’— und not in a form literally mentioned in the Veda ; ४५५ as such they are not included among Mantrus. 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MDCCXLVI-MDCCXCIN] TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY GANGANATHA JHA, M.A., Professor of Sanskrit, Muir Central Colleye, Allahabad, FASCICULUS VII. CALCUTTA : PRINTED AT THE, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS, AND PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIO SOCIETY, 57, PARK STREET. 1910 o~ ` =, ७.५ प | ॥ The ANT) LIST OF BOOKS FOR SALE AT THE LIBRARY OF THE fisiatric SoOcirETY OF PENGAL, No. 57, PARK STREET, CALCUTTA, AND OBTAINABLE FROM Society’s Agent»— Mr. BERNARD QUARLYUH, 11, Grafton Street, New Bond Street, London Mr. OTTO WARRASSOWITZ,. BookseLtier, Leipzig, Germany W., Oomplete copies of those works marked with an asterisk # cannot be supplied—~some eS SE SE pI eA SERENA DY | Ge PRAT A ET SUL I MINCE TING TAT, SL SEIS IIE TE IE LOIN OE GOT TE IE IEE TG TELE SEITE LT CE ATE AN NE AE EE AE IL POD of the Fasciculs being out of stock. BIBLIOTHECA INDICA. Sanskrit Serdes. *Aayvnita Brahma Siddhi, Fasc. 2,4 @ /10/ each Advaitachint&é Kaustubha, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ each *Agni Prrann, Fasc. 6-14 @ /10/ each Aitar Brahmana, Vol. I, Fase. 1-5; Vol. 11, Faso, 1-5; Vol. 88 isc. 1-5, Vol. LV, Faso. 1-8 @ /10/ each ध, ००९ Ail: ०८8.1) 8. — ००० ००० A hashya, Faso. 2-5 @ /10/ each A vinings of Saindilya (English), Fasc. 1 @ 1/- Astasihasrika Vrajfhlapiramita, Fasc. 1-6 @ /10/ each *Atharvana Upanishad, Fasc. 4-5 @ /10/ each Atmatattvaviveka, Fusc. I i Agvavuidyaka, Fasc, 1-5 @ /10/ cach ८ see Avndaina Kalpalata, (Sans. nnd Tibetan) Vol. J, Fasc. 1-7. Vol. Il, Fase. 1-6 @ 1/ each Bilam Bhatti, Vol. I, Fase. 1-2, Vol. IT, Fasc. 1, @ /10/ each Baudhayana Sranta Satra, Fasc. 1-3; Vol. 11, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ each *Bhimati, Fasc. 4-8 @ /10/ each Bhatta Dipika, Vol. I, Fasc. 1-6; Vol, LI, Fasc. 1, @ /10/ each Baudhyostatrasangraha ५ Brahma Siatra, Fasc. 1 @ /10/ each Brhaddevata, Fasc. [-4 @ /10/ each Brhaddharma Parana, Fasc. 1-6 @ /10/ each Bodhicaryavatara of Oantideva, Fasc 5 @ /10/ each ri Cantinatha Charita, Fusc. 1-2 .. Oatadisani, Fasc. 1-2 @ /10/ each Catalogue of Sauskrit Books and MSS., Fasc. 1-4 @ 2/ each at Qatapathn Brahmana, Vol. 1, Fase. 1-7; Vol. II, Fasc. 1-5 Vol TIT, Base. 1-7; Vol. V, Fasc. 1-4 @ /10/ each Ditto Vol. VI, Fasc. 1-3; Vol. VIT, Fasc. 1-3 @ 1/4/ each Nitto Vol. VIT, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ Qatasahasrika-prajiaparamita, Part IT, Faso. 1-13 @ /10/ each *Caturvargn Chintamani, Vol. TI, Fasc. 1-25 Vol. III, Part I Fasc. 1-18, Part LT, Fasc. 1-10; Vol. IV, Fase. 1-6 @ /10/ each Ditto Vol. IV, Fasc. 7-8, (@ 1/4/ each ... Ditto Vol. IV, Fasc. 8-9 @ /10/ Dlokavartika, ( Hing ish), Fasc. 1-7 @ 1/4/ eac *Oranta Saitra of Apastamba, Fasc. 12-17 @ /10/ each Ditto Oankhéyana, Vol I, Kasco. 1-7; Vol. Il, Fasc. 1-4 Vol. ITI, Fasc. 1-4; Vol. 4, Faso. 1 @ /10/ each = Ori Bhashyam, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ euch ee Dina Kriy& Kaumadi, Fasc. 1-2 @ /10/ each ... Gadadhara Paddhati Kalasara, Vol. 1, Fasc. 1-7 @ /10/ each ee; eae षः Ditto Acarasara, Vol. II, Fasc. 1-4 ... baie oe Gobhiliya Grhya Siitra, Vol. I, @ /10/ each ... eae Ditto Vol. IT, Fasc. 1-2-@ 1/4 /each ४६ Ditto (Appendix) Gobhila Parisista ‘ee sais Ditto Grihya Sangraha -9 9 9 eae ७9 HMaralata ... Karmapradiph, Fasc Kala Viveka, Fasc. 1-7 @ /10/ each Katantra, Faso, 1-6 @ /12/ each Katha Sarit Sagara, (English) Fasc. 1-14 @ 1/4/ each *Kirma Pordna, Fasc. 3-9 @ /10/ each Lalita-Vistara, (English) Fasc. 1-3 @ 1/- each Madana Parijaita, Faso I-11 @ /10/ cach Mahi-bhisya-pradipodyota, Vol. I, Faso. 1-9; Vol. TI, Base. 1-12; Vol. III, Faso. 1-10 @ /10/ each Manutikaé Saggraha, Faso. 1-8 @ /10/ each e064 eee ees een 268 608 1 a 1 1 6 4 2 2 1 ॐ 1 0 3 12 1 3 ॐ 4: 2 0 2 ॐ 3 4 1 8 14 3 1 8 3 fous 6 1 L 8 3 O 1 1 4 ॐ ॐ 2 2 0 i I 4 ॐ 17 ॐ 3 6 19 pI pos PNOBOAR © # ४ put 10 (५ it ‘A THE CHARACTER OF ‘ Mantra’ CANNOT BELONG TO MODIFICATIONS. 577 “injunction mentions only a pronoun, if the sacrificer pronounces another ‘name in its place, the character of the Mantra would not belong to it.” Some people admit that it would be so. But the fact is that there being an endless number of individuals, and these too not all exist- ing at one and the same time, it is absolutely impossible for all of them to 06 directly mentioned in the Veda; the only way in which the pronouncing of the sacrificer’s name, &c., could be laid down, 1s by means of a Pronoun (which refers equally to all nouns) ; and it is clear in this case that the Pronoun has been put in simply because the place could not be left blank; and hence that the Mantra actually contains the word (the name) that 18 being brought in (in place of the Pronoun). Otherwise, the Pronouns not being capable of bemg used, in case they did not serve the purpose of mentioning the particular names (to be subsequently brought in), the place in the Mantra now occupied by the Pronoun would be left blank and the form of the Mantra would be deficient in that part, and the use of the Pronoun would be absolutely useless. And the injunction of these being in the generic form, like those of the Recounting of the Pravara, &c., we assume the use of words in the places Jeft blank. And thus we find that such words are actually ‘directly mentioned’; and as such they could very well be endowed with the properties of the Mantra. The specific names of the Pravara, &c., on the other hand have not the slightest trace of themselves at the time of the actual reciting of the Muntru; because the Brahmana passage dealing with them, do not make any mention of the specific forms of these names; and as such, we could not attribute to them the Mantric character, even on the basis of the fact of the newly-introduced names being explanatory to the Brahmana. Consequently, in the case of the Subsidiary Sa “Sces, there being a chance of the whole Mantra being employed, 111 & ५८ nce with the denotation of the Mantra itself, as also the injunctions o rtain Rshis, certain other words are thrown into 1६, on account of the abs We of cortain conditions of the original Primary sacrifice, and the presence of new ones; and it is only these words that are of the character of ordinary parlance, and not of that of the Mentra; the reat, however, is just as it was originally laid down, and 1s actually recognised as a Mantra required by the Sacrifice; and consequently this latter cannot be absolved from the processes of accentuation, &c., conse- quent upon Vedic character ; nor would & mistake in this be free fiom the expiatory rites. [ह cat ae 2 2 ta atti a 2" 73 ADHIKARANA (12). Definition of Rk. Sutra (35): Among the Mantras, the name ‘Rk’ is given to those wherein there is a division into metrical feet, in accordance with the limitations of the meaning. Though the definition of these various classes of Mantras has got no direct connection with the subject-matter of the Adhydya, yet the Sutras treat of them, because a consideration of these 18 connected with Mantras, 9 consideration whereof was introduced in connection with the question as to their primary or secondary character. Inasmuch as the meaning of words is cognisable through the usage of old experienced people, even though the definition has been given by the Sitra, yet the Bhashya speaks of the teaching of trustworthy persons as the very root of all verbal denotation. In the case of the Rk‘ Agnth piirhvébhhih §&c.,’ there is no verb in the first foot, and as such, there being no sense completed within it, the division into feet in this case is in accordance with the metre and not the meaning. Objection : ^“ [9 the case of the Rk ‘ Agnimilé &c.,’ also, inasmuch ‘‘as the whole Rk contains the expression of a single sense, the sense “is not completed in each foot, and consequently in this case also the ^ division into feet cannot be said to be based upon the sense.” Reply: Why cannot it be said to beso ? In the first foot of the Rk we actually find the completion of a single sense. And as for the in- completeness of the sense of the other two feet, as a matter of fact, those two also are not incomplete ; as the sense of them also is completed by the supplying of the verb ‘7/é.’ Hence it is rightly said that in this case the foot-division is in accordance with the meaning. The Bhadshya does not mean that in this case the foot-division does not depend upon the exigencies of metre. And hence therecan be nothing against the fact of these Mantras having the character of the ‘ 2k.’ ADHIKARANA (13) Definition of Sama. Siitra (36): The name ‘Sama’ is given to songs. ‘Among Mantras ’—‘ ६९51210४ ’—has to be supplied to this Satra from the previous Sztra. In this case also the Bhashya brings in the authority of the teachings of trustworthy persons, in the same manner as in the last Sutra. The mention of the instances ‘Curd is sour,’ &c., should have been made in the preceding Sitra ; but the Bhashya did not do so; because it did not attach much importance to it, Or,it may be that the examples have been cited here, with a view to show that, ‘just as, even though there are many attributes in the Qurd and in the Sugar, yet the words ‘sour’ and ‘sweet’ only express the peculiar tastes of the curd and the sugar respectively, so in the same manner, the word ‘Sama’ expresses only the ‘ capability of being sung.’ Objection: “In the case of the ourd and the sugar, inasmuch as “their taste is perceptible by the senses, any teaching of trustworthy “persons on this point can be merely descriptive, and as such can have ८८ 10 special authority.” Reply: This does not touch our position; because the mention of ‘ate’ in the Bhashya distinctly points to the fact of the example being one of direct sense-perception ; and the sense is that just as the idea that ‘curd is sour,’ or ‘sugar is sweet,’ is authoritative (true), so also is the teaching of trustworthy persons. The ‘capability of being sung’ being a qualification, its cognition would precede that of the ‘Mantra’; and hence the denotability of ‘ Sung Mantra’ should be explained as being similar to that of the ‘Class.’ That is to say, just as in the case of the word ‘go,’ the word is found to denote an object (the cow) as qualified by one portion (‘Gdtva’) (of the cow),—and consequently the qualification is held to be denotable by the word,—so in the case of the word ‘Sama’ also, as it is found to denote the ‘Sung Mantra’ as qualified by the ‘ capability of being sung,’ this last qualification forms the denotation of the word ‹ Sama,’ ADHIKARANA (14). Definition of ‘ Yagzush.’ Siztra (37): To the rest, the name ‘Yajush’ is given. This Sitra is to be interpreted in the same manner as Séira 33. ADHIKARANA (15). Nigadas inoluded in ‘ Yayush.’ PURVAPAKSHA. Sutra (38): “The Nigada must be taken as the fourth because of its peculiar qualification.” Siitra (39): “Also, because of being named differently.” The word ‘ v@’ serves the purpose of taking exception to the sweeping assertion made in the last Séira. ८८ Nigada would be the name of a fourth kind of Mantras; because of “its qualification being other than those of the preceding three. When “we have such an injunction as that ‘The Nigada should be uttered ‘loudly,’ if the Nigada were the same as ‘ Yajush,’ then, by being “uttered loudly, it would lose the characteristic of the ‘ Yajush’ (which is ‘laid down as to be uttered qutetly) ; and hence with a view to avoid this “incongruity, we must hold the Nzgada to be something other than the “Vajush. If again the said Injunction be held to be only descriptive, even “that is not possible unless there is a distinct difference between the ८५ ‹ Vagush’ and the ‘ Nigada.’ ” SIDDHANTA. Sitra (40): They must be regarded as Yajush, because they have the same form as that. (1) In the passage ^“ Ahé budhniya mantram mé gipdya, §c. &c.,’’ we find the number of the kinds of Mantras distinctly mentioned as ‘ three’ only ; and we find that in the Veda, the word ‘ Nigada’ is used as identical with ‘ Mantra’; (2) it 18 quite possible for the Nigada to have its peculiar qualification, and to be named differently, even without renouncing the character of ‘ Yajush’; and (3) the aforesaid definition of ‘ Yajyush’ is found to be quite applicable to it; for these three reasons, the Nigadas must be regarded as ‘ Yazush.’ Sutra (41): It 18 on account of (the fact of the Nigada) being employed in indicating (to others) that the peculiar qualification of the Nigada is mentioned. The direction that the Nigada is to be uttered loudly, is based upon the exigencies of circumstances and reasoning; and as such being meroly 582 TANTRA-VARTIEA. descriptive, the loudness is uot spoken of as being enjoined. The sense of the Sutra is that the loudness of the Nigada is mentioned simply because, if uttered slowly, it would not serve the purpose (of indicating to others) for which it is uttered. Sutra (42): Also because a distinct purpose 18 served (by such indicating to other people). There isa distinct purpose served by the addressing, to other people, of such sentences as ‘ Agnid vihara,’ &c.: unless this were addressed to other people, the action of ‘ walking’ round the fire by the Agnidhra priest would not be accomplished ; and there would be no use of addressing, unless it were done loudly enough for others to hear; it is for this reason that the particalar qualification ‘loudness’ is mentioned. It is in this way too that the etymology of the word ‘Nigada’ becomes explained. As for the ‘quiet utterance,’ though it is directly enjoined by the Veda (as belonging to all Yajush), yet as such utterance would hamper our purpose, it could not rightly form part of the Action; and hence we take that injunction to refer to the Yayush other than the Nigadas. Sditra (43): The different naming is simply for the purpose of expressing the particular qualification. That is to say, the difference in name is to be explained as being similar to the assertion ‘ Feed the Brahmanas with curd, and the Parivraja- kas with milk ’; where the Partvrdjakas also are Brabmanas, but with a particular qualification, So in the case in question also, the Nigadas are Yajush, but with this qualification, that they are to be uttered loudly. Sutra (44): Objection: “The name ‘Nigada’ would apply to all.” Phat is to say, if the word ‘ Nigada’ be explained as ‘that which is recited lowlly (‘gadyats’), then all Mantras would become Niyadas (because the Rk and the Sama Mantras also are recited loudly); and hence the name cannot be said to be for the purpose of expressing @ par- ticular property. Sutra (45): Reply: Not 80, because of their being distinctly named as ‘ Rk.’ There can be no such incongruity as mentioned above; because we find Vedic texts laying down in certain cases the use of the Rk, after having’ denounced the Nigada (as forinstance, in the sentence ‘ Aydjya vai niyadah’). And if both Rk and Nigada were the same, then these texts would enjoin the same thing that they had denounced; and this is an impossibility. Nor is there any incongruity in the signification of the root ‘ gada’; because what it does:is to denote a particular property of sentences that have the char- acter of the Yajush (and as such it could net apply to the Kk andthe Sama). ADHIKARANA (16). Definition of ‘ One-Sentence.’ Sutra (46): So long as there is mention of the same object, the sentence must be regarded as a Yaojush, and as one sentence; specially when it is such that if it be broken up, the divided portions become deficient (in certain necessary elements). Some people interpret this Sara as affording a definition of ‘ Sentence.’ And there too, they declare as follows :— ८५ Though it is possible for the definition to belong to Vedic as well ८८ 88 toordinary sentences, yet inasmuch asthe reasons propounded are ‘known more easily as belonging to ordinary sentences, we must take ८५ 1 to be a definition of such sentences, and not of Vedic ones. Because ‘‘in ordinary parlance we find that a sentence is used with regard to “the object that has been cognised by other means of knowledge; and “it 18 only in such cases that we can ascertain the singleness of that “object; and as such it is in such cases that we can easily recognise the ८ fact of the sentence being one.”’ “That is to say, in the case of the sentences of ordinary parlance, ^ we find that the singleness of the meaning expressed by them, as well ०८ &8 the meaning itself 18 cognised by other means of xnowledge ; and hence “on the strength of this well-recognised fact, 1४ 18 possible for us to “recognise the singleness of sentences. In the case of Vedic Sentences, ‘on the other hand, the meaning expressed not being amenable to any “‘other means of knowledge, its singleness cannot be ascertained prior ९५ {0 the utterance of the sentence itself ; because until the object has been ‘¢ recognised, there can be no idea of its singleness ; and thus the definition in “question not applying to these, its Apparent Inconsistency would lead us ‘‘to a converse definition with regard to Vedic Sentences—v12., that the ५८ singleness of the meaning is due to the singleness of the sentence. That “is to say, just as the object—Sentence—denotes another object, in the “shape of the Meaning, so the property—Singleness—of the sentence ‘“‘would denote the property—Singleness—of the meaning. It has also “been declared elsewhere: ‘Inasmuch as the meaning of the Vedic ‘“‘ Sentence is always cognisable by means of the sentence, the functioning ‘“‘of the meaning of the Veda is always in keeping with the sentence ; ‘*‘and hence, as without the sentence there would be no menning, the ‘* (Vedie) Sentence cannot be said to be controlled by the meaning ? ” ‘Against the above interpretation of the Si#iva, we urge the following 584 TANTRA-VARTIKA. arguments: (1) When Jaimini is engaged only in the explanation of the Veda, by what connection would he lay down the definition of an ordinary sentence? (2) As fora definition of the Vedic sentence also, what connec- tion could it have with the chapter dealing with Differences (among Actions), (3) Why should not he have mentioned this definition in the chapter (first) dealing with the Means of Knowing (Dharma)? (4) There was no use of mentioning the word ‘one’; because the definition required would have been complete by merely mentioning that “ so long as one sense lasts, it is a sentence. (5) How is it thatin the course of dealing with Mantras, the Sitra proceeds to lay down something wholly unconnected with it? (6) We find the Bhashya expressly supplementing the Sitra with the qualification ‘among the yajush that are found to be read in close contiguity "' ; and this supplementing being quite reasonable, we see no reason why it should have been passed over in favour of another interpretation. (7) And further, if the Siira went about laying down a definition of the singleness of a sentence, having left off the treatment of Differences among Maztras, where—either in the Mantra, inthe Brahamana, or in ordinary parlance— could such a definition be of any use P As for the Rk and the Sama, the limit of these 1s well defined by the capability of each being used in connection with sacrifices; and as such in the case of these, no useful purpose could be served by a definition either of Sentence or of its singleness. So in the case of the Brihmana, the passages laying down the Agnthotra, etc., having effectually led the persons concerned to the accomplishment of the particular Bhdvand, as endowed with the three factors of the Result, the Means and the Process,—where would there be any use for a due knowledge of the character of the sen- tence or its singleness ? It might be urged that the use of such knowledge would lie in the avoiding of syntactical splits. But even this use is not possible ; because a syntactical split is nothing more than the incapability (of the sentence to have two distinct predicates)—on the ground of such double predica- bility necessitating the repetition of certain words, etc.; and this in- capability is always ascertained independently of all knowledge of the singleness or multiplicity of the sentence. That 18 tosay, the repetition of a word, or of a part of a word, or of a number of words—or the cutting up of the word itself—is known to be an anomaly, by people, independently of any knowledge of the singleness or multiplicity of the sentence. And in the case of the breaking up of the word there are yet other anomalies, vzz., the necessity of rejecting the perceptible connection (between the members of the sentence and that word), and also that of assuming various unheard of potentialities (of the words concerned). While in the case of the repetition of the word, etc., as such repeated DEFINITION OF ‘ONE SENTENCE,’ 585 words would not have the character of the Veda, they could not be equally authoritative. For these reasons we conclude that no useful purpose is served by a definition of the Singleness of a Sentence (in the matter of Vedic sentences). In the case of the sentences of ordinary parlance also, inasmuch as all usage is actually found to be carried on, independently of any defi- nition, any such would be of no use at all. Aud further, if the singleness of the sentence were to be ascertained by the singleness of the meaning expressed by it,—then, inasmuch as the only purpose served by the sentence is to bring about the cognition of 118 meaning, after this meaning, and also its singleness, has been duly cognised—what would be the use of a subsequent cognition of the single- ness of the sentence itself ? As for the speakers, their sole purpose is to express a certain fact to other persons, and for their own sake, they have no necd of any such definition, While as for those hearing him, when the sentence addressed to them treats of something wholly uuknown to them, for them, there is not much difference between such a sentence and a Vedic one; while if it treat of something already known to him, then it 18 A mere repeated description, and as such no importance is to be attached toit. Soin any case, even an ordinary sentence does not stand in need of such definition. Then again, (if the द्र be taken as embodying a definition of the ordinary sentence), wherefore should it not have laid down one of ‘Zedic sentences also? It cannot be urged that the definition of these Be, has been implied through Apparent Inconsistency. Because the ; pe व ar process would have been to directly lay down the definition of Vv चः ‘sentences, and then to imply, by Apparent Inconsistency, that of ordingry sentences. Asa matter of fact, however, no such Inconsistency 18 possible in the case in question ; because it 1s uot such that a know- ledge of the said definition of ordinary sentence is not possible without a (implied ) definition of the Vedic sentence. Further, it is not yet established that what you point out as the definition of Vedic sentences (as implied by Apparent Inconsistency), really applies to such sentences; because what the definition does is to bring forward the fact of the singleness of the meaning being based upon that of the Sentence. Then again, inasmuch as it is quite possible to believe the original definition in the Sutra itself to pertain to Vedic sentences (and not to ordinary sentences),—or that the defini- tion of Vedic sentences may be something entirely different,—there is no inevitable Inconsistency in the matter. Nor can the definition be said to have the character of Partsaakhyd (that is to say, १४ cannot be 74: af 586 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. LI—PADA I1-~ADHI 16. said that the definition, while applying to ordinary sentences, also serves to preclude Vedic seutences as having the contrary character), because there is no mention made of the relationship of the general and particular. That is to say, if it were so that the general definition had been mentioned, and then that definition were subsequently pointed out as applying only to ordinary sentences, then alone could it be concluded, through Parisankhya, that the definition in question does not apply to Vedic sentences. But the definition in question cannot be said to bea particular one; because in that case there would be many irregularities. On the other hand, we can, quite reasonably, lay down the contrary proposition that—‘ Because of the multiplicity of the meaning, the sentence is one, specially when it is such that on being separated, there remains nothing wanting in it’; or that ‘ Because of the singleness of the meaning the sentences are many.’ Consequently none of the above posi- tions is rightly tenable. Further, how can the singleness of the sentence be ascertained independently of the meaning £ for certainly any such singleness of the sentence is not cognisable in the mere verbal form of the sentence. That is to say, it is always the singleness of the meaning that is ascer- tained from the singleness of the sentence ; and hence it must be admitted that the singleness of the sentence is always independent of the singleness of the meaning; and we do not perceive any limit of the sentence— be it made up of a hundred ora thousand letters. For when a certain number of letters not having their meanings known, are found to exist in one as well as in many sentences, we never come across a cognition of any hmit of the sentence. For these reasons it must be concluded that those words, on hear- ing which we are clearly cognisant of a single meaning, must be taken as forming a ‘single sentence.’ And it is only this definition that is not found incompatible with the character of any sentence—either ordinary, or of the Mantra and Brahmana. It has been urged above that, “prior to the cognition of the sen- tence, there is no idea either of its meaning, or of its singleness.”’ And to this we make the following reply: The meaning of the sentence is always signified by the meanings of words as known in the ordinary world; and hence it cannot be said to be brought about by means of the singleness of the sentence. That is to say, if the sentence had an independent denotation of its own, like the word, then, some- how or other, it might have been possible for us to hold the meaning of the sentence to depend upon the singleness or multiplicity of that sentence. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the meanings of words having been expressed by each word, independently of one DEFINITION OF ‘ONE SENTENCE.’ 587 another, it is solely from the connection among these word-meanings, that there follows the cognition of the meaning of the sentence (made up of those words), independently of any functioning of the words (towards this latter cognition); and it is from this that it is concluded that so many words form a single sentence; and towards this result we find nothing that is contributed either by the seutence or its singleness. And in this explanation there is nothing that is incongruous. Now then, that which forms the meaning of the sentence (in the Veda) is the Bhavana, qualified by its accessories ; and differences in the Bhavana are always found to be cognised by such means as: the presence of another word, and so forth (vide next Pada). ‘That is to say, in the case of a cojlection of words, where we do not find any other Bhavana expressed by such agencies as the presence of another word and so forth, we conclude that the sentence is one only; and thus its multiplicity would always depend upon the denotation of other Bhavanis. Consequently, inasmuch as both of these—singleness and multiplicity— are recognised by other means, the singleness of the sentence caunot be any reason for the siugleness of the meaning. In view of the above argument, then, we should explain the Sutra exactly m accordance with the Bhashya. In the Adhydya dealing with Differences, the special subject intro- duced being the Mantrus, the different forms of these, in the shape of the Rk, the Yajush and the Sima have been described; and then there naturally arising a desire for enquiring further into the subdivisions of these, each distinct Rk or Sama being definitely known, ench by itself, to the traditional generations of students, any definition of these is uot attempted. The Yajush, however, are found in the text, mixed with one another, and as such one Yajush could not be distinguished from another without a sort of a definition; consequently it is such a definition that the Sutra proceeds to give. Nor can 1४ be urged that each Yajush could be distinguished by means of the directions (contained in the Bralhmanas) which always mention the opening word of each Yajush. Because the Bralmanas do not contain directions with regard to all Yajush; nor is the rule that—‘the beginning of the second Yajush means tlie end of the first "—found in the Veda; it is only a rule that the author of the Sitras themselves have made with reference to directions contained in the Brahmanas. Thus then the Bhadshya explains the first part of the Sutra as—‘ that collection of words which 18 employed as one whole, in a sacrifice, 18 one Yajush’ ; and it will be evident that this explanation is based upon the etymological formation of the word ‘ Yajush’ (which has its source in the root ‘ yaj’= to sacrifice). As a matter of fact, we find that in the case of all 988 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA I—ADHI (16). Mantras, there is always in the first instance, coguised a direction—im the form ‘this Mantra is to be employed at sacrifices ’—inferred from the context (in which the Mantra occurs). It 18 after this that,—it being realised that the Mantra cannot, directly by itself, be utilised in the sacrifice,—we conclude that it helps in the completion of the sacrifice by the pointing out of its auxiliaries (in the shape of the Deity, etc.). It is for this reason that it has been said (in the Bhdshya) that that collection of words which serves to recall the auxiliaries of a sacrifice 18 one Yajush, and it is also known as a sentence (Vakya), because it has to be spoken out (pronounced or recited). A ‘ Vakya’ (sentence) is that which can be spoken out (uchyaté); and only that can be spoken out (at the performance of sacrifices) which is capable of serving its function,— nothing more or less than that; and it is by means of that much alone that the sacrifice is accomplished. Then arises the question as to the character of the Yajush; and this is answered by the second part of the Satra—‘ It is that which expresses a single fact, and has ts parts depending upon one another.’ Tf only so much were a Yujush, then any- thing over and above this must be taken as another sentence, and as such spoken of as a distinct Yajush. Thus, in all cases, be it from the beginning or from the end, only such words are accepted as a Yajush, as are cnpable of expressing a single fact, leaving aside all that is not so capable,— all those of the latter sort forming distinct Yajush by themselves. Says the Bhaéshya—IJnasmuch a sentence is known to be one on account of the aforesaid reason, we conclude that a collection of words expressing a single fact forms one sentence. The sense of this is that the definition of a single sentence being explained as above, through that, we also get at the definition of the distinctness of Yajush, as also that of the distinct- ness of sentences. The Bhdshya puts the question—What is the example ? This ques- tion emanates from one who takes the word ‘artha’ (in the Sitra) to mean ‘ stgnification ’ and thereby considers it impossible for the Sdtra to contain the two definitions (of the distinctness of Yajush and of the distinctness of sentences). And the sense of the question may be thus explained: ‘It 19 the word that would have a single signification (artha); “but it has not its parts depending upon one another; and the collection “of words (sentence), which hasits part dependent upon one another, “has not a single signification. That is to say, it 18 possible for the word ‘‘to have a single denotation in the shape of the Class; but it is not ‘such that when its component letters, roots or affixes are separated, there “is any element wanting in 16; because in that condition the word is ‘absolutely without any power of signifying anything. As for the collec- ‘tion of words, on the other hand,—its part, z.e., the words themselves, DEFINITION OF ‘ ONE SENTENCE,’ 589 ‘stand in need of one another, on beiug separated ; but they do not afford “a single meaning; because each word has a distinct signification of ‘its own, and the collation of these is not known to have any meaning ५ apart from that of the component words. And hence there being nothing “that could form the right object of the definition, it canuot be a definition ‘at all (in the sense that is attached to 16 by the Bhashya).”’ In reply to the above question, the Bhdsya has cited the Mantra ‘ Dévsya twa,’ etc., and the reply is based mainly upon the fact of the word ‘artha’ being taken in the sense of ‘ purpose’ (and not in that of ‘ signification ’). The opponent says in the Bhashya: ‘‘ The word ‘pada’ here has only one meaning ’’; and in this he further explains what he means,—the sense of it being this: ^“ When apartfrom the signification of the word ‘“ there is no signification of the sentence, as one impartite whole, then ‘ |istinction and Connection, as signified by the sentence, would only be “the properties of the significations of the component words themselves, “they being recognised as belonging to them, on account of extreme “ proximity.” With a view to all this it has been said in the Bhadshya: Even then the signification would not be one only; because by “ Distinction” is meant the mutual differentiation or specification among the words; and this cannot be one, as it 18 different with each word. In accordance with the theory that words signify Individuals, all individual cows being spoken of by the word ‘ Cow,” all that the qualifying words ‘ white,’ etc., can be said to do 1s to distinguish them from the black; and they cannot serve the purpose of signifying the connection (of whiteness with the indivi- dual cow) ; and as for the connection of this qualification, this being in- cluded in the signification of the word, it cannot form the meaning of the sentence; and hence what is cognised is only the distinctness (of the objects signified by the words), in which the said connection enters as a secondary element. And just as the distinctness belongs to the word ‘cow’ because of the word ‘ white’ differentiating it from the ‘ black,’ etc.,—so in the same manner the distinctness belongs to the word ‘ white’ as differentiated by the word ‘Cow’ from the ‘ Horse,’ etc. And thus the objects to be differentiated from (or set aside) being many, there is no authority for declaring the singleness (of the Connection or Distinctness). If recourse be had to ^“ Distinctness’ in general, then this class ‘ Dis- tinctness’ being always one, all sentences would become synonymous, If again, the meaning of the sentence be said to consist of the meanings of the component words, as, accompanied by the said distinctness, then the ‘ Multiplicity ’ becomes an established fact. So also (in the case of the theory that the meanings of the com- 990 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA 1—ADHI (16). ponent words consists in their Connection), this Connection among the denotations of the words is only a mutual attachment among them; and as this differs in each couple, no singleness could be cognised. Hven in accordance with the theory that the denotation of the word consists of the QOlass,—the classes ‘ Whiteness’ and ‘Cow’ as denoted in their respective forms, would, on account of proximity, exert a mutual attachment; and as this would constitute the meaning of the sentence, the distinctness whereof would be indirectly established. This connection too—either in the shape of whiteness in the class “cow,” or in that of the ‘cow’ in ‘ whiteness ’—would be found to reside completely in each indivi- dual (cow) ; and as such it could not but be many. Though in the case of a sentence containing only two words, it might be possible for the connection to be the same in regard to both words,—yet in the case of sentences containing many words, there would be various places where each set of two words would come into contact; and the connection thus being found in 80 many different places, 1४ could not but be many. And further, the meanings of words being self-important, both Distinctness and Connection are only their properties; and as such they would always differ with the difference in the objects of which they are properties ; and hence they could never be one. That is to say, so long as we do not admit of a singleness or unity of purpose among certain words, the significations of these being all self-sufficient, could never bring about any unity; and as such each of them would bear with itself independently the said distinctness and connection. And for this reason also they would be many. Though for us, who hold’ the “Class” to form the denotation of a word, we donot hold the said Distinctness to form the signification of a sentence (such signification being held only by the upholders of Apoha—the Bauddhas),—yet, inasmuch as the Purvaipakshi had brought up that also as an alternative, there is nothing incongruous in our accept- ing it for the sake of argument. And as for the explanation of the Siddhania itself, this is very rightly done by taking the word “ artha” (in the Sitra) in the sense of “‘ purpose” (and in this it 18 not necessary for us to accept the Apoha or any other theory contrary to our tenets). Thus then, it 18 also possible to declare that it is only the object denoted by a single word that is the principal factor, and it is only as the qualification of that object that everything else 18 mentioned; and as such on account of the Distinctness and the Connection of that object there can be only one Distinctness or Connection. And thus, as being in intimate relationship with the action, the Mantra being found to serve a distinctly visible purpose in connection with the action, the function of the whole collection of words forming the Mantra lies in the pointing out DEFINITION OF ‘ONE SENTENCE.’ 59} of the action of Nirvapa, as qualified by the denotation of the words ‘Savitri’ and the rest; and as such the example is found to be quite apt. The opponent, however, not realising the fact of the Nirvipu being the predominant factor, is made to ask, in the Bhashya— Nanvatra devasya, etc.” And in reply to this the author says that such would have been the case only if the word Nirvapami were construed in one place and also in another; because such double construction would be possible only when the Nirvaépa would be the secondary factor. But, as a matter of fact, we find that this cannot but be the predominant factor, ae it serves a distinctly useful purpose; while as for Savitz, etc., inasmuch as these do not form part of the action, they are only subservient to the actiou of Nirva@pa; and hence all the words have one and the same purpose (namely that which is served by the Nirviipa). Another objection has becn raised in the Bhashya: ^“ Wherefore should the Sutra have laid down both the conditions?” The sense of this question is this: (A) ‘‘In a case where a number of words together “serve a single purpose, it naturally follows that, when separated, they ‘“would be wanting in certain elements (because each by itself could not “serve that purpose); and as such it is not necessary to mention the second ‘condition separately; (B) conversely each of the words separately ‘“eould not be wanting in a certain element, unless they were so placed “that they all conjointly served one and the same purpose; because it ‘is always possible for each of them by itself to serve distinct pur- ^“ 00868 ; and hence the first condition being already implied in the ° second, there is no need for mentioning both.” In reply to this objection, the Bhashya proceeds to cite counter- instances. (A) In this connection it is shown that the single purpose of pointing out the division of the Oake is served by the words indepen- dently of one another. (That is to say, if we left off the second condi- tion, then “ bhago vam wibhajzatu uryama vam vibhajgatu”’ would become one Mantra, which, as a matter of fact, itis not; and this is avoided by the mention of the second condition, because each sentence bhaygo vim vibhajatu, when separated from the other, is not found to be wanting in any element). Though the objection as tothe multiplicity of the Cake-division has already been answered before, yct it has been brought forward again, with a view to show that there being no qualification collectively mentioned, as the word ‘vibhajatw’ is repeated, there is no fault of the aforesaid anushanga’ (४,९.) there is no necessity of carrying the same ‘ vibhajatu’ from one place to another). The reply to this objection is that we shall show later on how, even o92 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. If —PADA I-~ADHI (16). when there are distinct independent accessories mentioned (as for instance, Bhaga and Aryamda in the case in question), the action is not more than one. And we have already set aside all chance of the pre- dominance of the Accessory; and hence any specifications due to the accessory, not forming an integral part of the action, cannot be regarded as significant; and hence both the sentences—‘ bhago vam wibhajatu’ and ‘aryama vam vibhajatu’—must be taken as only expressing the ‘ Division ’ in general; and as such both being found to serve the same purpose (they would come to be taken as forming a single yajush, if we left off the second condition in the Sétra) (B). In the case of the sentence ‘ varhirdévasadanam dame tasmin sida’—if we leave off the first condition, then, even though the latter sentence ‘ tasmin sida’ is dependent upon the former, yet, the purposes served by the two being distinct, they are taken as two distinct sentences (which would not be possible if the serving of a single purpose were not laid down as a necessary condition ). For these reasons it must be admitted that the two conditions to- yether form the required definition. ADHIKARANA (17). Oonditions of the Diversity of Sentences. Sutra (47): When the sentences are equally independent of one another, then they are “ distinct.” PURVAPAKSHA. ५ [11 the case of those sentences, the fact of whose intimate relation- ‘ship with the action is not perceptible, and the use whereof is laid down “only by direct directions (in the Braéhmana), in the absence of any ‘indication of such use by the words of the sentence itself,—we must “accept all that extends in the text up to tho point where the next ° (well-known) Mantra begins, to form a single Mantra. Because the ‘direction of its use being wholly verbal, it would be necessary to assume “an imperceptible result (as following from such use); and on this score “it 18 the assumption of the least possible Imperceptible Result thut can be ‘permissible; and when a single purpose being thus assumed for the ^“ whole, if they would be separated, they would be found wanting in some ‘‘element (and as such both the conditions of the previous Siafra being ^° fulfilled, the sentence must be regarded as one). That is to say, ‘‘imasmuch as there is no authority for making unnecessary assumptions “of many imperceptible results, we are led to assume a single result ‘‘as following from all the sentences in question; and hence each part of ‘‘the sentence being incapable of bringing about that result, we have the ‘condition that when separated the sentences become deficient; and “as such the sentence must be regarded as one (in accordance with “the two conditions laid down in the foregoing Sutra). ‘The following questions might here be brought forward: ‘(1) In “accordance with this theory, how do you account for such distinct ‘directions (contained in the Brahmana) as—‘ he should cut the branch of ‘‘the tree with the Mantra ishe tvd,’ ‘and should wash it with =< tua’ “(which distinctly lay down each part of the sentence as a separate ८ Mantra) ¢ And (2) how do you account for the plural number in “klriptth in the direction klriptirvacayat: where we find each hope (kiripti) ‘“‘mentioned distinctly as dyurme kalpatam, prano me kalpataim; if all of “these hopes were taken as forming a single sentence, why should there ‘“be the plural number in Alriptih ?’ 79 १०4 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, 11I—PADA I—ADHT (17). “To the above question we make the following reply: (1) It 18 ‘quite possible for a single Mantra to be spoken of by means of several “words (contained in it), and (2) we have kliriptth in the plural, ‘because the word ‘ kalpatdm’ is often repeated. “That is to say—(L) a Mantra can be pointed out by pronouncing ‘any word therein contained—be that word in the beginning, in the ‘middle, or in the end; and there is nothing incompatible in this; ‘henge in the case in question, so long as the direction will continue, “the whole Mantra will have to be pronounced with each distinct action ‘because any mere part of the Mantra is wholly useless ;—(2) and inas- ‘much as we find the word ‘kalpattm’ repeated frequently, there 1s “ nothing incompatible in the plurality of the kiriptth.” SIDDHANTA. To all this we make the following reply: The above view cannot be maintained; any idea of the employment and the purpose of the Mantra is possible only after its verbal form has been duly recognised ; and hence first of all if becomes necessary for us to ascertain the verbal form of the Mantra itself, before we proceed to examine whether all its constituent parts are distinct Mantras, or they collectively form a single Mantra. For the present we shall leave aside the ordinary argument in favour of our position—such, for instance, as the presence of distinct purposes, or the presence of distinct directions for each part. As a matter of fact, the form of the Mantra cannot be said to be ascertained after its purpose or use has been ascertained. Because the form of the Mantra is always found to be definitely ascertained directly from the Vedic text itself, independently of all use or purpose, etc.; and the employment or the Purpose of the Mantra is always accepted in accordance with its singleness or multiplicity as cognised at the time that the text of the Mantra is ascertained. We have already shown above that there is nothing wrong in assuming many imperceptible factors, or results, provided that we have sufficient authority for such assumption. And, as a matter of fact, we find that at the time that the text of the Mantra (Ishe tvd, etc.) 18 ascer- tained, we have no idea either of the fact of its various portions being dependent upon one another, or of all of them serving a single purpose. And for this reason there being nothing against the conclusion that each part is distinct by itself, even subsequently we do not find any ground for taking them as one only. Nor is it possible for us rightly to assume a mutual interdependence among the several parts, when no such dependence has been actually perceived. And though, even in the absence of this dependence, it would be possible for the several parts CONDITIONS OF THE DIVERSITY OF SENTENCES. 595 to serve 8 single common purpose, yet as one of the two chief conditions (of syntactical unity) would be wanting, the whole Mantra cannot be taken asa single sentence. And hence 1६ is all the more impossible for it to be taken as one when we find that the text of each part being different, there is a different use laid down for each; and the uses of these being different,—even though they may bring about imperceptible results,—the purposes:served by the various parts cannot but be distinct. Our opponent also will have to admit that there must be a distinct, purpose with each direction. The only difference then between us is that while you hold all these results to follow from the whole Mantru, according to us each of them follows from each distinct part of the Mantra. Nor, in our Case, is it necessary to assume any imperceptible results as following from each part of the Mantra, as each of them actually serves a distinctly useful purpose laid down in the Brahmana. (1) And for the sake of the due fulfilment of these purposes it. becomes incumbent on us even to supply whatever words—as ‘ chenadmz’ and the lke—might be wanting in the Mantra as it stands, to duly accomplish the purpose ; for instance the cutting of the branch, mentioned in the Brahmana. (2) Or it may be that—as in the case of the Brahmana direction— that ‘the Mahendra hymn is represented in the rumbling of the chariot,’ even though the rumbling is not significant of any meaning, yet, at the peculiar time, by the mere remembrance of the Brahmana- direction in question, people recognise the rumbling as the actual singing of the hymn,—so, in the same manner, on account of the Br&éhmana- directions in connection with the Mantra ‘ Ishe tua,’ etc., the various parts thereof—'‘ ishe tud,’ ‘ urjé tua,’ etc.—would bring about the idea of cutting, etc. (and in this case it would not be necessary to supply the word ‘chinadm? ). Both of these processes (1) and (2) are equally authoritative ; and hence the authors of the Kalpasiitras have recourse to one or the other in different places. Thus then in any case, we must come to the following conclusion Inasmuch as it is absolutely impossible to make use of a senten wanting in a necessary factor, and as 1४ is not right to make use of non significant words, we must have recourse to the supplying, from without, of the wanting word. Or, inasmuch as the Mantra should be used exactly as it is found in the Veda, we must convince ourselves of the fact of the words of the Mantra, as they actually stand, bringing about the idea of all that is necessary. The acceptance of the one or the other alternative is optional in the performance of the sacrifice. And hence we find that the various parts of the Mantra in question must 696 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1I——PADA I—ADHI (17). be taken as distinct sentences, also on account of the difference in the distinct perceptible purposes served by each of them. Farther, each part of the Mantra being found to have a distinct function of its own, a8 pointed out by the Brahmana-directions, each of them by itself must help én the sacrifice ; and this alone constituting the etymological meaning of the word ‘ yajush’ (ijyaté anéna), each part must be admitted to be a distinct yayush by itself. In the same manner, in the case of the sentences—‘ @yuryajnena kalpatim,’ ‘prano yajnena kalpatdm,’ etc.,—though the same purpose 15 served by all the sentences, yet they cannot be taken as a single sentence; because each 18 distinctly perceived in its own form, indepen- dently of the others. As a matter of fact, however, they do not even serve the same purpose, because the ‘kalpana’ (preservation) of ‘ayu’ is distinctly different from that of ‘ prana’ and the rest. Nor can it be urged that, ‘‘as in the case of the sentence agvinorbihubyam nirvapani pushno hastabhyam, the nirvapa is accepted to be the same in both cases ; so in the case in question also the ‘ preservation’ would be the same in all”; because we find the word ‘ klriptth’ in the plural number, in the Mantric Injunction. Then again, in this case, the ‘hkalpanas’ not forming an integral part of the sacrifice, much significance cannot be attached to them; and the only purpose of the Mantras hes in its recitation; and in the Mantra we actually find mentioned many ‘kalpanas ’; and as the difference of kalpanas is not possible without a difference in their significations, we regard the significations, that are subservient to the letters of the word, to be many. The Bhashya has said that the mention of particular kalpanas has a distinctly perceptible purpose; and this is with reference to the accomplishing of many Mantras. The Bhdshya speaks of an objection: “ Zhe kalpana spoken of in “each case may be taken in the sense of kalpana in general, as in the case of “the Cake-division with reference to the sentences Bhago vam vibhajatu “and Aryamad vam vibhajatu.” And the citing of a fresh instance is based upon the fact that the case of the kalpanas is different from that of Nirvapa, in that this latter is mentioned only once (whereas the kalpana and the ०674८ are repeated). The sense of this 18 that, just as though frequently repeated the ‘ Division’ (‘ Vibhaga’) is not accepted to be many, even though the Instrumentality thereof (in the shape of Bhaga and Aryama, etc.) is diverse,—so, in the same manner, in the case in question there would be no diversity of kalpanas. The reply to this is: {८ & not so; because in the case in question no useful purpose 18 served by taking ‘ kalpat@m’ in the sense of kalpana in general. CONDITIONS OF THE DIVERSITY OF SENTENOES. 597 Or ‘yatha ०८४1742 * may be construed with the Reply, the sense thereof being that ‘as in the case of the Division, so here also, etc., etc.’ Objection: “As a matter of fact, there is a diversity in the case “of the Division; and as such it was not right to put this instance in the ““mouth of the objector.” Reply: In that case we will explain the citing of that instance to be, not for the purpose of pointing out unity, but only with a view to identify- ing the case in question with that of the instance, and thereby making the former open to alternative processes; just as we have in the case of the Vibbaga (where there is an option between the agency of Bhaga and that of Aryama). The sense of the objection thus comes to be that ५ 6 have an option in the case of vibhaga,—why then cannot we have the same in the case in question also ? "` The reply to this is that this cannot be; because there is an option only in that case where the subject is the same in both alterna- tives. In the case in question, however, we do not find anything to show that the significations of all ‘kalpanas’? are the same (in the Shape of kalpana in general); and hence we cannot take them all as synonymous, as in the case of ‘vibhdga’; specially as we find that each sentence expresses a hope for dyu’ (longevity) and the rest, as qualified by ‘kipiptt’ (preservation). In the case of ‘wibhdga’ inasmuch as no important purpose is served by the accessories (in the shape of Bhaga, etc.), the action of wibh@ga (Division) in general itself comes to be the predominant factor; and as such it is this action alone that is indicated by the Mantra (and the matter of the instrumental- ity 18 left optional). In the case in question, on the other hand, what are hoped for are a ‘long life’ (त) and the rest; and as such it 18 these that are the predominant factors ; and 1६ 18 as qualification of these that we have the mention of ‘kalpana’ (preservation); and it 18 not the kulpana as qualified by ‘long life,’ etc., that 1s indicated by the Mantra ; because no useful purpose would be served by this indication. Even if this Action ( Kalpana) were the predominant factor, then, too, there being a clear difference between fiyu, préina, etc., the action (preservation of these) also could not but be many. And in support of the theory of diversity, we have the fact of each of them serving a distinct perceptible purpose. Or, it may be that the word ‘kirzpiv’ in the mjunction ‘ klypitir vacayatt’ does not refer to the Mantra ( ‹ Ayuryajnena kalpatam.,’ etc.) ; what it does is to denote the multiplicity of the actzon (of kalpana); be- cause all words depend upon the objects they signify. Consequently, firstly, because the plural number distinctly denotes a diversity of Actions, and secondly, because a distinct diversity is accepted as based 098 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1I—-PADA I—ADHI (17). upon the diversity of the qualifications ( ८ Ayu,” etc.),—the Mantra (Ayuryajnéna kalpatdm, etc.) in question comes to be taken as referring to Kalpana as qualified by Ayu, etc.; and in this manner they come to fulfil what is laid down in the Bréahmana-direction (‘ klriptirvdcayatz’) ; thereby coming to serve distinctly perceptible purposes, each part must be taken as having a distinct purpose of its own. Objection: “In that case, how is it that the Brahmana uses the “word ‘vicayatt ’? because the object of this Verb must be a word (while “the word ‘kiripti’ has been explained as ‘something qualified by Ayu,’ ५ which could not be the object of ‘ vdcayati,’ = ९६८.) which means ‘ makes ‘to pronounce’)? ”’ Reply: This is no incongruity at all; because the word is used in both senses. That is to say, just as people use the word ‘ vacayat:’ with reference toa person uttering a word, so, in the same manner, when a person is found to speak of a certain object by means of a certain word, then with regard to the person who makes him speak of ४६, we use the word ‘vicayatz? (=makes to speak). Hence the sense of the injunction klriptir vacayate comes to be that when the sacrificer proceeds to pronounce the word expressive of the action of Klriptt (or Kalpana), then the Adhvaryu priest makes him pronounce it (‘vdcayatc’). And inasmuch as the Mantras (‘ Ayuryajnena kdlpatam’ and the rest) indicate so many distinct Kalpanas, it is only when each of them is accepted as a distinct Mantra by itself that 1४ 18 found to serve a perceptible purpose and hence in such cases the sentences must be admitted to be distinct. ow ध षि Te ee eR Le श प वि श ADHIKARANA (18). [ Definition of Anusharga. | Sutra (48): Anushanga is the means of completing the Sen- tence; because it is such as is equally applicable (to it). In connection with the Jyotishtoma, three Homas are laid down (viz., the Agneyi, the Saumi and the Vaishnavi); and it is laid down—by the sentence ‘agnimanikam,’ etc., that in the beginning of each of these the Agneyt Homa has to bo offered. And the three Mantras enjoined for the Agneyi, accompanying the first of these, the Braihmana lays down in its complete form—e.g. (1) ‘ Yate agné aydgayad taniirvarshishtha, eo ee swahad’; and those for the other two are mentioned only in their incomplete forms—such as (2) ‘ Yaté agnué raydgaya’ and (3) ‘ Yaté agné hardcaya.’ In the case of these two, inasmuch as the subject is introduced by the word ‘y@’ (that which), which is in the feminine gender, the sen- tences cannot be complete without some word denotative of a feminine object. And no use can be made of an incomplete sentence; conse- quently, with a view to avoid this inconsistency , 1t becomes necessary to supply a part of the sentence that would supply the missing factor. Because in the Veda, not even a single incomplete sentence is found to be used ; consequently in cases where the sentence met with happens to be incomplete, the factor necessary for its completion must be sought out from‘somewhere else. Nor, too, 18 actual sensuous Perception the only means of cognising Vedic Mantras; because they can be cognised by means of Inference and the other means of knowledge just as well as by means of Sense-percep- tion. Hence it is only when all the five means of knowledge have 116, that a certain sentence can be relegated to the sixth one of Negation (z.e., actually denied). In the case in question we should not rest idle; no sooner we find Sense-perception not affording us the requisite knowledge of the completing factor, if we also find Inference and the rest all equally inoperative, then alone we should conclude the Mantra to be made up of that incomplete sentence alone. If, however, any one of these means of cognition supplies the knowledge of the missing factor, then the Maniva is to be taken as made up of the sentence thus completed, which, before the addition of this factor, was wanting. Thus then, it is by Apparent Inconsistency that we are led to the general conclusion that there is a 000 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA 1—ADHI (18). missing factor. Aud thus there being no room for the functioning of Negation, the incomplete sentence is wholly incapable of being used. Thus then, there arises the question as to whether this missing factor is to be supplied out of the Veda, or out of certain sentences of ordinary parlance,—in the former case the missing factor being found in the preceding Mantra, in the shape of ‘ ¢fanirvarshishthd,’ etc. PURVAPAKSHA. “It 18 to be supplied out of sentences of ordinary parlance. Because ‘‘a part of the Vedic sentence, being naturally bound up with this “° 8९४७०९९, cannot go to any other place; sentences of ordinary parlauce, “on the other hand, can be used anywhere and for any purpose that one “likes. That is to say, just as such Vedic objects as the ‘ Ahavaniya’ ‘fire and the like never tarn aside from their purposes as definitely ‘“‘laid down in the Veda, so, in the same manner, a part of a Vedic “sentence 18 bound hard and fast to that sentence of which it actually ‘forms part in the text; and as such it cannot be used anywhere else. ‘“A part of the ordinary senteuce, ou the other hand, is not so bound ‘up; and as such it can be used anywhere one likes; and as such there “would be nothing incongruous in its being taken up for the purpose “of the supplying of the missing part of any sentence. Consequently, “it 18 only « part of the ordinary sentence that can be brought in to ‘complete two Mantras in question, “On the ground, however, of the Vedic sentence being found ready “to hand, and as such its use being much easier, while the ordinary “sentence has to be composed,—if someone were to supply the missing ९९ 109१६ out of a Vedic sentence, taking it only as an ordinary sentence, “then nothing can be said against it. All that we mean is that “any such sentence, separated from its proper place, should not be “considered as Vedic. For instance, when during the reading of such “works as the Mahdbhdrata and the like, if we come across certain ‘Vedic sentences, we read them as ordinary sentences, and not with the ‘‘ restrictions of pronunciation, etc., attendant upon the Vedic sentence. “And further, if,—on the ground of the sentence ‘ydte rujdgayai ° ‘‘ being as closely proximate to the sentence ‘ tanirvarsishth@’ etc., as the “first sentence ‘ya@t@ ayadcaya’—the ‘tanirvarsishtha, etc., should be “taken along with ‘ ya@té rajdgayd,’—then in that case the Mantra should <" 06 pronounced exactly as it would be found in the text (४.९) it should ‘be read as ‘tantérvarshishtha . . = . svahd& ydte rajdguyd’), which ‘would be absurd. For this reason, too, the missing factor cannot be ‘supplied out of the Vedic sentence.” DEKINITION OF ANUSHANGA. 601 SIDDHANTA To the above we make the following reply: It is only when the Veda has ceased to function towards a certain end, that there can be an occasion for the functioning of ordinary sentences ; and the functioning of the Veda can be believed to have ceased, only after all effort and attempt to find it out has totally failed. That is to say, a Vedic sentence can be completed only by supplying the missing part from out of a Vedic sentence, and not from out of an ordinary sentence ; because the Veda is the only means of knowing Dharma. If, however, the most diligent search on our part fails to show us a Vedic sentence duly functioning towards the required end, then alone can the Veda allow of the completing of its sentence by the help of ordinary sentences. And this search proceeds from what is most proximate (to the incomplete sentence) to one remvute from it. For instance, a meaning thatis not found in the root is looked for in the affix; that which is not found inthe whole word is looked for in another word (of the same sentence); that which is not found in the same sentence is looked for in another sentence (of the same context); if again १४ 18 not found in any such sentence, it is looked for in another context altogether. | That is to say, wheu a certain fact as expressed by the root or the afhx is found to be wanting in a certain factor, then if another meaning capable of supplying the missing link is found in the same (root or affix), then it is all well and good. If it 18 not found in the same root or affix, then, without being idle, we must look for it in the affix or the root (respectively). If, however, it is not found in any of these, then it should be looked for in the word preceding or following it immediately. 17 it is not found in the immediately proximate word, then it is looked for in another word, a step or two removed from the original: word. If it is not found in the same sentence, then in the same manner as in the case of the word, it should be sought after in other sentences in the same context. If not found even there, then it should be looked for in other contexts, in the order that they may present themselves. If, however, it is not found anywhere in the Veda, then alone can we reasonably seek for it in the sentences of ordinary parlance. When not found even in these, then we must conclude it to be non-existent; and then accepting our notion of incompleteness to be a mistaken one, we must accept the Mantra to be complete, just as 1४ is In all cases, when we do not find the missing factor in a sentence close to the incomplete sentence, then we can bring it in -from one removed from it. But in case one happens to be found mneh nearer, 76 602 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 1I—-PADA I—apDHI (18). the bringing in of a remote sentence is as unauthoritative as if it were non- Vedic. Hence in the case in question, the missing factors of the two sentences—‘yd 18 rajdgaya’ and ‘yd t8 haracaya’—not being found either in any one word contained in the sentence, or in the sentence itself, we conclude that this missing factor must be found in another sentence. And just the same factor that is wanted in these sentences is found in another sentence, which immediately precedes the one incomplete sentence, and 18 only one step removed from the other—(that is to say, the sentence ‘y@ ट agné ayagayd tanith,’ etc. Though this factor (‘ tanurvar- sishtha,’ etc.) having got all that is necessary for it in the first Mantra, does not stand in need of the subsequent Mantras, yet inasmuch those two Mantras are incomplete without that factor, and not finding anyr thing else mentioned in closer proximity to themselves, they lead the person concerned to the following conclusion: ‘Though it was not possible for this missing factor to be read but once, and then in close proximity to all the three Mantras, and as it is not actually repeated over and over again, on account of its being got at by other means,—yet it is such that it is distinctly indicated by our purpose or need also,—and as such, people should not be led away, by attaching undue significance to the fact of proximity, to connect it with one (the first) Mantra only.’ Though itis true that the factor, ‘tanizh,’ etc., actually precedes the Mantra, ‘ Ya té rajagayd,’ yet it can be supplied only in that place of this Mantra where it is actually wanted to complete the sentence. Because that sentence appears in the place that it does, only with view to point. out that it forms part of the next sentence also; and a due consideration of its capabilities and its position in the second Mantra is regulated in accordance with that in the previous Mantra. The sentence being actually mentioned only once, it is absolutely impossible for it to be mentioned in that part of the subsequent sentences where it is required ; and hence it is mentioned in its due sequential order in connection with one Mantra only ; and as for the other two, its indication 18 just enough to show that it forms part of these also. Thus then, being duly compre- hended to be so, (1) because it is naturally incapable of occupying any other position; (2) because the incomplete sentences themselves do not want it in any other place; and (3) because in the case of the first Manira it has been found to be capable of occupying a position at the end of the sentence; therefore even in the case of the other two Mantras it 18 only at the end that it is added. The author of the Bhashya, however, holds that inasmuch as the factor in question is read between the first and second Mantras, it is not expressed to which of these two it is more intimately connected ; and hence to both DEFINITION OF ANUSHANGA. 603 of them it must be taken as equally proximately related ; and then he raises a doubt as to its connection with the third Mantra, from which it is one step further removed ; and iu order to meet this difficulty of intervention what the Bhashya does 1s to take the second and the third Mantras together as forming a single composite whole, which removes the difficulty due to the intervention of the second Mantra, between the missing sentence and the third Mantra; but then there arises the difficulty that in that case the missing factor would complete the composite whole (formed by the two Mantras), and not both of them separately ; and this is met by the declaration that, inasmuch as the composite whole is incapable of being employed (at a sacrifice), the missing factor must be connected with each part of it; and hence it 18 concluded that both parts being equally predominant, and both being equally incapable of being otherwise com- pleted, the whole of the missing factor is to be connected with each of them, Having arrived at this conclusion, however, the Bhashya proceeds to offer another explanation : ‘ Ap ca sdkatkshasya sannidhau, etc.,—the sense of this being that when the missing factor will have been introduced in the second Mantra, it would immediately come to precede the third Mantra also, and thus there would be no intervention. Some people hold that the Bhashya has mentioned the two explana- tions as equally correct, and as such optional. But others declare, that not satisfied with the former explanation the Bhashya has offered the second. The reason for the said dissatisfac- is as follows :— The two sentences have never been composed by any person as a single composite whole; and if they were so, we do not see any reason why they shonld have been again composed separately. That is to say, any two sentences can be taken as one composite whole, (1) either when they serve the same purpose, or (2) when they contain the same words. In the case in question, however, we find none of these two conditions present. It may be urged that they actually have the same purpose in the shape of being completed by the same sentence. But one who brings for- ward this argument would evince, on his part, a grand conception of the fuactions of Afaniras ! The being completed by a sentence would only con- stitute a want on their part,—how could it be an action or purpose of theirs? And as the senteuce supplied is only a missing factor, on the sole strength of this, it is not proper to speak of the two Mantras as forming one composite whole. And when you also subsequently come to acknowledge its relationship with each Mantra separately, we do not see how you can make a single composite whole of the two Mantras, The assertion that they become a composite whole, and then each of them becomes 604 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I1—PADA I—ADHI (18). connected with the missing factor, would be as unbridled as the freaks and tricks of a single (and favourite) son of the king. And further, in that case, because the missing factor precedes the composite whole, it would have to be added in the beginning. Nor can it be rightly urged that there is no difference between the relative positions of the Mantras with regard to the missing factor. Because there 18 a distinct difference of locality which makes a difference in the relative position of the Mantras; for instance, we find that the missing sentence is actually found, in the first Mantra, in the same place that it is required; while it is not so in the other two Mantras. For these reasons the only explanation that is reasonable is the following :— Akaiksha (Want), Sannidhana (Proximity) and Yogyata (Capability),— these three conjointly constitute the yround of relationship, aud not mere zmmediate sequence. That which, being one, is yet mentioned as related to many things, must be in closer proximity with only one of these ; and it is not this proximity alone that is accepted as being the only ground of relationship. Because even in this case, tho relationship is based upon all the aforesaid three grounds (and not upon mere immediate sequence), What the Proximity does is to give rise to @ mis- taken notion (as to relationship), ou account of its bringing about an idea of its own substrate. And this mistaken notion ceases when some other related object is pointed out, conjointly, by Want, Proximity and Qapabelity. Just as the idea of Bhaivunt being denoted by the verbal root ceases on account of the capability of the Bhavana to take up the accessories that can never belong to the meaning of the verbal root. The conclusion arrived at in that case is this: (1) The missing factor being mentioued for the sake of all incomplete sentences (in ques- tion) ;(2) it being impossible for it to be mentioned in the immediate sequence of all of them; and (3) the sentence being one only—it is found in close proximity to one of them. Consequently mere zmmediate sequence can be no ground of relationship. By the word ‘sannidhi’ (in the Bhashya) is meant the moviny abou in the mind ; and this is possible when there is immediate sequence as well as when there is an intervention. In fact the intervention of a word that is related to the factor to be related is only a sort of immediate sequence. Because that which is related to the first would (when thus related) be in immediate precedence of the second also; and when appearing in the second, it would come to have an immediate proximity. to the third also. Thatis to say, the missing factor required by. the Mantra ‘ Ya 12 rajagaya’ not being found in the passages follow- DEFINITION OF ANUSHANGA, 605. ing it, is looked for in the preceding passage, and is therein found, in the form of ‘ tantirvarshistha’ etc; and when attached to this second Masira, it becomes immediately proximate to the third Mantra ‘Ya té hardgaya,’ and thus becomes related to this last also. And beyond this, no other Mantra being mentioned, the factor in question rests there. Thus then, in all cases, the wants of a sentence, extending both backward and forward, takes its stand upon one and thereby becomes closely proximate to another sentence; and 1 goes ou taking in all that is required, until it fails to find something capable of being related to it, and comes across something altogether incapable of it. And then having taken in all that it has extended over, its operation comes to an end. Though on account of the Mantras being pronounced one after the other, wecome to cognise a proximity and remoteness (in the case of the Manirus ‘ y@ té ragadgayda, and ‘ya té haragaya’),—yet the Veda being eternal, whether the sentences be proximate or removed, their mutual requirement and relationship are always simultaneous (because though pronounced one after the other, all words of the Veda are equally eternal, and there is no real precedence or sequence in the case of Vedic words) ; and hence the mere fact of a sentence appearing subsequently does not make any difference in its authoritative character. Thus then, the relationship of words 1n a sentence, and that of sentences in the context, remain-intact, so long as all the intervention that there is, 18 Only by such words as (1) are themselves wanting (in a certain element), (2) are capable of the same relationship, and (3) are capable of making the other sentence also equally proximate (to the factor of relationship). Says the Bhashya : Avyuvaudhdné viccehédé’yi ;—and the sense of this is that when there is no intervention, even though there is no proximity, the factor becomes related, so long as the intervention of a sentence nt a distance is not by means of a word which 18 contrary to such relationship. For these reasons Anusharga is a ‘sama@pic’—re., the means of completing a sentence (samipyate anéna = ४८४ samiptrh = that which completes ). SUPPLEMENTARY ADHIKARANA TO ADHI (18). Question: The above discussion applies to those cases where a sen- tence itself is wanting in an essential part. There! are cases, however, where the sentences are complete in themselves, and if is only a cer- tain part of the sentence that is found to be standing in need of sen- tences to which it could be attached; as for instance we have a series of 606 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II-——PADA I—ADHI (18). complete sentences—‘ Citpatistvd pundta,’ ‘Vdakpatistva pundiu,’ ‘ Devasiva savita pundtu’; and at the end of these we find the words ‘ acchidréna pavitrena,’ And in this case how would this last be construed ? On this we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. “The concluding words would have become fully satisfied by being “construed with the sentence that immediately precedes them; because ‘all the other sentences being complete in themselves, there would be “no reason for admitting of an Anushanga, ”’ SIDDHANTA. To the above we make the following reply: If the words formed part of the whole of that sentence which precedes them immediately, then it could be as asserted above. But as it 1s, they are found to be related only to the verb ‘pundéw’; and as such they cannot but be construed with all the three sentences (as all of them contain that same verb). ‘That is to say, independently of any immediate sequence, the words in question become related to the verb ^ pundtu ; and as this verb is the same in all the three sentences, the meaning of this verb too must be the same in all, Nor can the difference of nominatives—Oziputz, Savitr, etc.—make any difference in that meaning as connected with Citpati or Vakpati or Savitrx or Deva. Nor is the action concerned (४,९., of purifying) subservient to the instrumentality (of acchzdra pavitra) whereby it would rest satisfied with its single contact with such instru- mentality. Thus then the instrument (acchidrena pavitrena) being subsi- diary to the action (Verb: ‘ punatu’), the words denoting the instrument will have to be used as often as the verb would be used, just as the fuel is used so long as there is cooking. The following argument might be urged here: ‘‘ Though the action of purifying is one, yet, that which should be connected with the instrument, is the Action which is qualified by that nominative, in connection with whom the relationship of the Iustrument is found to be mentioned directly. For instance, (1) in the Jyotishtoma ‘sacrifice, the cooking in milk is fouud to be spoken of in connection with that Agent who is connected with the Mavtrdvarunagraha (and not the other grahas mentioned along with it); and hence the said cooking is not found to go beyond that which 18 qualified by the Mattravarunugraha ; and (2) the nominative ‘ Oztpati’ is joined to one ‘pundiu’ only aud uot to all the three. (In the same manner, the ‘ acchidréna pavitréna ° would be joined to that pundtu only which has for its Nominative ‘ Savit7’ and not all the three).” DEFINITION OF ANUSHANGA. 607 To the above we make the following reply: The restricted application of the aforesaid ‘ cooking’ is due to the fact of each graha giving rise to a distinct Apiirva (Result); and in the case of the second instance cited, the nominative ‘ Oitpatz’ is not construed with all the three ‘pundtu, simply because of the distinct mention of other nominatives (in the shape of Vakpati and Savitr’). That 18 to say, inasmuch as the repetition of the grahas, such as those of the Aimdra, Vdydava, Maztrdvaruna, &§c., serve to bring about transcendental results, the difference among these results restricts the applicability of the ‘cooking. ’ Jn the case in question there is no such restrictive agency. Because, as for the Instrument, it is used up in serving the purposes of the Action; and hence by means of the expression of the Instrument, it 18 the same action that comes to be expressed over and over again. And the action being the same in all the three cases, it stands, in each case, in need of a mention of the Instrument. Though the mention of the nomina- tive ‘Vdkpatc’ sets aside the nominative character of ‘Cztpati,’ as both have exactly the same action of purifying yet, in no case do we find any other Instrument that could take the position of the ‘ acchidra pavitra’ and oust 1४ out of the sentence. Nor is the Instrument due to the Nomina- tive ; and as such, a difference in the Nominative could not necessarily make a difference in the Instrument; because all cases of nouns being taken up by the verb, they have no relations amongst themselves. Objections “In that case the instrament in question would have “to be construed with the word ‘pundtu’ in whichsoever Mantra it might ° 06 found.” That does not touch our position: Just as in the case of the Dargapiirna- masa sacrifice certain purificatory rites are laid down in connection with the grass therein used (and they are not applied to the grasses used in all sacrifices), 80 in the case in question also, the particular instramen- tality mentioned would not belong to any and every ‘ pundtu’; all that it would mean would be that the instrumentality of the acchidra pavitra belongs only to that action of the word ‘ pundiu,’ which is meant in this particular context. Andasa matter of fact, we actually perceive that this action is the same in all the three Mantras in question, and not in any other Mantra; because in other Mantras, the action denoted by the word ‘ pundiu’ is the purification of other materials (and not the one meant to be purified by means of the three Mantras under consider- ation). Objection: “In that case, all the three having the same action, the ५५ Mantras would become optional alternatives.” Reply: True it would be so; but in the absence of an Injunction distinctly laying down the number ‘ three’ with the regard to the Mantras 608 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. IT——-PADA [—ADHI (18). to be used,—how do we know that all the three Mantras are to be employed conjointly (that is to say, there is nothing incongruous to the three Mantras being used alternately). All the three ^ pun&iu’ continuing in the mind, when the words ‘acchidréna pavitrena’ are pronounced, the requisite proximity of these latter with each ‘pundtz’ becomes quite possible in the case of the three Mantras under consideration ; and this could not be said with regard to any other Mantras. Thus then, we conclude that though the word ‘ pund@iu’ occurs णो all the three Manéras, yet being (in all cases) taken up by the instrumen- tality expressed by the words ‘acchidréna pavitréna’ it is always as qualified by that instrumentality that the Verb ‘pundiu’ comes to be wanted (in all the three Mantras). That is to say, the words ‘acchtdréna pavitréna’ occurring at the end of all the repeated Mantras, and having no other refuge, they take their refuge in the word ‘ pundtu’; then the Verb comes to be in the form ‘pundiu acchidréna pavitréna’; and as the word ‘ pundtu’ in the sentence immediately preceding these words is the same as that in the other two Maniras, at the time that the connection of the action < pundtw’ with the instrumentality of ‘acchidrépa pavitréna’ is expressed, (and as such the Verb is taken up by that instrumentality), the other words of the sentence standing in need of an action, they admit of an action as together with the said instrumentality; and hence we must admit of the Anushanga of the words in question in all the three Mantras. When through this Anushanga the words ‘acchidréna pavitrena’ should be repeated with each sentence, if people pronounce the Mantras as they are, leaving the relation of the instrumentality to be understood, it must be regarded as due to mere idleness. And as we have shown above that the missing factor may be found either in the preceding or in the following sentences, the assertion of some people—that it is to be taken from a preceding sentence only—should be taken only as showing how the Anushatga works in a generality of cases (and it does not preclude the possibility, in special cases, of its being taken from the following sentences also). ADHIKARANA (19). [Treating of the absence of Anushanga in cases of interruption. | 92८६2 (49): There is no Anushanga where there is an inter- vention (of unconnected words). This Adhtkarana is brought in simply by way of a counter-instance to the functioning of mere Proximity (in the matter of the Anushanga). As it is found that where the intervention is by words not connected with the factor to be brought in, we do not accept an Anusharga in view of the incongruity involved. For instance, in the case of the sentences (1) ‘Santé vayurvaténa gacchatam,’ (2) ‘Sanjayatracrangani,’ and (3) ‘ Sanyajnapatiracisha,’ — though the missing factor ^ gacchatdm’ is admitted as forming part of the first Mantra, itis found to be incapable of being taken along with the second, because of the plural number of the noun ‘angdnz’ (which would take the verb ‘ gacchantam’ and not ‘gacchatém’); and thus the fac- tor in question not being equally construable with all the Mantras in question, it cannot be taken along with the third Mantra, though the nominative in this—‘ yajnapatch’—is in the singular and as such quite compatible with the singular of ‘ gacchatam.’ [It 18 on account of the intervention, of the unconnected second Mantra, between (1) and (3), that this verb ‘gacchatém’ 18 not taken with (3) |, And thus the missing factor of (2) and (3) not being found in the Veda, we are forced to admit one out of ordinary parlance; and hence in both of these we supply the necessary word from without. And though the words ‘gacchantim’ (in the second Mantra) and ‘gacchataém’ (in the third) are not actually pronounced, yet their exis- tence must be admitted; as otherwise the signification of the sentence would remain incomplete (for want of a Verb). Thus then in the case in question there 1s no Anushanga. The use of this discussion lies in the fact that, if certain words formed an Anushanga, they would form a Mantra; and as such any mistakes, etc., in the pronunciation of these would have to be accompanied by expiatory rites ; whereas if the words supplied are out of ordinary sentences, they do not constitute a Mantra, and hence any mistakes in pronunciation, etc., are not so serious as to entail an expiatory rite. To this end it has been declared that—(1) that which is directly mentioned in the Veda, and (2) that which is brought in by means of an Anushanrga, are counted as having the character of Mantras, where- as all sentences of ordinary parlance, being similar to assumed sentences, can never be recognised to have the character of Mantras. Thus ends the First Pada of 414४५ IT. 77 ADHYAYA II. PADA II. ADHIKARANA (1). [Treating of Difference in the Apurvas of Subsidiary sacrifices. | Sitra (1): When there is a different word, there is a different karma, because of its being specially qualified. In the foregoing introductory chapter we have dealt with all matters connected, directly and indirectly, with the subject under consideration ; and now we are going to take up the subject-matter of the Adhydya in the shape of the difference among actions on the ground of the difference among words, etc. etc. And first of all we take up the differences caused by the difference of expressions, because it is this difference that points out most clearly the difference among actions. In connection with this we should have cited the examples of all verbal forms connected with one or many verbal affixes—such as ‘ yajatz,’ ° कवक, ` ‘ juhotr,’ ‘nirvapatz,’ ete. The Bhashya has cited only three—‘yazati,’ ‘daddti’ and ‘yuhoti,’ because, inasmuch as all these denote the giving away of something, their significations are all akin, and as such they naturally appear to have identical meanings. And on this point, inasmach as there are three kinds of Pirvapaksha introduced in the Bhashya, it seems as if the doubt on the point in question should also have been expressed in three ways. | These are:—(1) Do the three Bhaévands—denoted by the three ^ ords (४१०४४, &c.)—bring about a single Apurva, or three distinct Apa (१४८७ ^ (2) Do the three denotations of the three roots qualify a single Bhé tvana, or three distinct Bhdvands? (3) Do the three roots denote a single ( abject or three distinct objects P The Bhashya uses the word ‘karya’ equally with regard t¢ 6 the Apivva, the Bhavana and the object denoted by the roote, because er ach of these is equally helped by something else; inasmuch as (a) the B} ५4/90 serves to produce the Apurva, (b) the denotation of the root qualifi les the 81749019, and (¢) the root expresses the denotation of the root j:and as DIFFERENCE IN APURVAS OF SUBSIDIARY SACRIFIOES. 0171 such these latter three are spoken of as ‘helps’ to the former three respectively. The ground of doubt is this : We find that things exert their causal efficiency in two ways, v2z., singly and collectwely; and, consequently, whenever we find certain objects actiug, there naturally arises a doubt as to the character of the object themselves. As a matter of fact, however, there is only one doubt in connection with this subject: In the case of the three verbs, is there only one Bhavana as qualified by the denotations of the three roots, or is there a distinct Bhavana for the denotation of each root ? What the word ‘karma’ (in the Sutra) denotes is the Bhivand as qualified by the denotation of the root. And 1४ is the Bhavana that would be differentiated by means of different words, etc. As for the Apérva, inasmuch as it is not directly ex- pressed by the words in question, and as it follows in the wake of the action itself, it cannot form a subject of separate treatment. Though the “unzty of three root-meanings” spoken of in the Bhashya is not possible in the case of all root-meanings, yet it might be mentioned, somchow or other, in connection with the roots ‘ yajz,’ etc., 1n question ; but in the case of these, though it may be possible, yet much stress should not be laid upon this unity. Thus then the root-meanings being really different, there seems to be yet another ground for doubt in the mind of the Pirvapakshi, viz., [8 the Bhavand mentioned as subservient to the root- meaning, and as such does it end with each Root-meaning ? or are Root- meanings subservient to the Bhdvand, and as such they conjointly serve to qualify it ? On this we have the following PURVAPAKSHA (A). “It 18 conjointly that the Root-meanings qualify the Bhdvanda. ‘‘Tuasmuch as the Bhashya often uses the word ‘samudaya’ (‘combin- ‘‘ation’)—as in the sentences, ‘ samuddyaccikirshitah,’ ‘samudadyadékam- “aptrvam, ‘na cagabdah samudayah, etc.—and as it speaks of the Apir- ‘‘va as one only, it seems clear that the idea desired to be conveyed “was that a single Aptirva follows from all the three Bhavandis. And in ‘‘ support of this idea the Bhashya brings forward the following arguments: “In the first instance, that which is not seen is concluded to be non est ; ‘and also so long as (in the absence of the unseen factor) there appears ‘no imcompatibility in what is actually seen (with what is spoken of), “ 1 18 concluded that the unseen does not exist; it is only when there: ‘is a contradiction between the seen and the spoken, that we can rightly ‘assume the existence of the unseen ; and hence, when the contradiction ५ 18 removed by the assumption of only one such unseen factor, there 612 TANTRA-VABRTIKA. ADH. 11—-PADA II—ADHI (1). ‘need be no assumption of many such factors. It is witha view to this ‘“‘ that it has been declared : ‘When there is a contradiction, then alone ^“ (क्षा an unseen factor be assumed, whereby the seen or the heard would ‘become supported.’ And under the circumstances if there were no “ difference—on the ground of simplicity—between the assumption of one ‘and that of many factors, then we might go on assuming many factors ; ‘but, as a matter of fact, we do perceive such a difference; hence it must “be admitted that a single unseen ‘ Apirva’ follows from the combination “of the three Bhavands.”” [Thus 18 Purvapaksha A. | This statement of the Parvapaksha, however, is open to the following objection: ‘What is that word that has laid down the Combination of Bhavanas, wherefrom the single Apurva would follow?’ And in view of this objection the Bhashya states the Purvapaksha somewhat differently as follows :— PURVAPAKSHA (B). Says the Bhashya: “Atha va yajetétyétasya purvo bhago, etc. And “the sense of this is that the words denote a single Bhavand as qualified “by the denotations of the three roots. In support of this we have the ‘following arguments: Inasmuch as (in all verbs) it is the denotation “of the Affix (which is the Bha@vana@) that is the predominant factor, ८ 1 cannot, as such, be different with each Root; inasmuch as the Root- ‘meanings are spoken of as subservient to that denotation of the Affix, “they must be taken as collectively (qualifying it). That is to say, ‘af, in the case of verbs, the Root-meanings formed the predominant <“ factors, then alone would the Bhdvand@ be subservient to them, and “as such would be different with each Root-meaning; as a matter of ‘‘fact, however, in all verbs, predominance belongs to the Bhavana ; ‘and specially as the Root and the Affix are both parts of the denotation ‘of the Affix (४.९. the Bhavana), it must be admitted that the Sucrifice ‘(denoted by the root ‘ ya7’ in ‘yajati’), the gift (denoted by the root ‘““¢da’ in the word ‘ dad@tr’), and the bation (denoted by the root ““ha@’ in ˆ guhote’), all conjointly qualify a single Bhavana; just as in the ५८ case of the sentence ^ Arunayd pingdkshya ékahdyanyd gavd somam krinati,’ “all the adjectives mentioned conjointly qualify the cow. Then (as to “why, if the Bhdvan@ meant is only one, there are three distinct “ affixes, along with the three words ‘ yajati,’ efc.), though it is not ५८ 0881016 for the principal object to be repeated with each of its ५ subsidiaries (qualifications), yet, inasmuch as it is absolutely impossible ‘“‘for the Root by itself or the Affix by itself to be used in a sentence, it “becomes necessary for us to repeat the Affix with each root, at least ९ with a view to making the use of the root possible (as without an affix “the root could not be used, and a use of the root s necessary, as DIFFERENCE IN APURVAS OF SUBSIDIARY SACRIFICES. 613 “pointing out the qualifications of the Bhavana). If we met with the ‘‘ affix alone, as we do with ‘ Krind@éz’ (in the sentence before quoted), ‘then, though pronounced but once, it would become connected with “all the roots, just as the verb ‘krindtz’ becomes connected with all ‘the adjectives, ‘arunaya’ and the rest. But as the Affix by itself ‘‘could never form a word, no such can ever be met with; and it has “to be repeated. And we have often met with instances where there are ^° repetitions for the sake of the connection of different qualifications, e.g., ^° ' Gyuryajnéna kalpatam ’ and ‘ pradno yaynena kalpatam’; aud again ‘Dadhna ८८ guhott’ and ‘ payas@ juhoti’ ;—‘ Aindravadyavam grhnati’ and ‘ mattravaru- “nam 071977८2," and so forth. We even find a repetition of the same action, “for tmstance, the ‘ Jyotishtoma’ is performed many times over, with a “view to connect it with the various Deities laid down in connection with it. “Thus then, inasmuch as all the verbs concerned serve the single ८८ purpose (of denoting the Bhavana), all of them—‘ yajdiz,’ ‘dadatz,’ “and ^ } 2८160८4 "—must be taken as forming a single sentence; and thus the ° Action being one, the resultant Apiirva must be one only.”’ It is only this second statement of the Pérvapaksha that is the correct one ; and not the former one, which was based upon a combination of all the Bhavands. Because (1) when the Bhdavands are distinct, their results, the Apiirvas, must necessarily be many; and (2) because the Bhavanas could not be taken as forming a single collective whole, unless they be expressed by a single word. That is to say, (1) if the Pérvapakshi admits the Bhavanas to be distinct, then, inasmuch as this distinctness could not be possible without their resultant Apirvas also being distinct, he would have to admit these latter also to be distinct and many; and then what useful purpose could be served by the statement of the Parvapaksha?P (2) And we can admit of a collective whole being formed of many individuals, only under two conditions, véz.: (a) when we find that many are spoken of, subse- quently, by a single name; e.g., having laid down three sacrifices, the Veda concludes with ‘one who performs this Paurzamdsi sacrifice, etc.,’ where we find the single name ‘ Paurnamasi’ applied to the previously enjoined three sacrifices ; and (6) when many actions are found to conjointly lead to a single result; e.g.,‘one should offer the Rajaséya if he desires the Kingdom of Heaven,’ where the name ‘ Rdasilya’ is given to # number of sacrifices, which together lead to the specified result. In the case in question, however, we find none of these two conditions ; and as such we cannot admit of a single collective whole being made up of the three Bhavandas. Odjection: “But we do meet with the sentence ‘pyotsshfoména,’ etc. 614 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. U.——PADA (--4 णपा (1). ‘from which it is clear that a single composite whole is formed by the ८८ ‹ yajats,’ etc.” Reply: But it.is not so; because the word ‘ Jyotishtoma’ identifies itself only with the root ‘yajz’ (to sacrifice); and as such it would point to the sacrifices only. For these reasons the former representation of the Ptrvapaksha 18 not tenable. We have therefore to interpret the portion of the Bhashya that appears to be a statement of the previous Pirvapaksha, in the following manner :-— The Purvapaksha comes to be this: “The Action laid down by the “three sentences 18 one only, but variously coloured, like the rainbow, “by the denotations of the three roots; and in support of this the “following arguments have been brought forward: If we accept this “conclusion then it is necessary to make but a slight assumption of “the unseen factor. If the actions are held to be different, then it “would be necessary to assume many unseen factors, for which there “could not be the least justification. For these reasons ‘ a single composite ८८ 18 meant to be expressed, —-by which it is meant that thore are many “parts of a single Action. Therefore we must conclude that in the word “*vagéta,’ the first part ‘yajz’ signifies the sacrifice, and the second part “signifies the Bhdvand, and so forth. Some people seem to think that the ‘expression ‘atha v@’ in the Bhashya isa mistaken reading. But it could ‘be very well explained in the following manner: The Bhdshya has brought “forward two sets of arguments in favour of the Parvapaksha; having ‘explained the first of these, in the shape of the advantage of assuming “less of the unseen than what 18 necessary in the other theory, it is only ‘right that it should introduce the second by ‘atha va’ (‘ or, secondly ’). “That is to say, the sense of the Bhashya comes to be this: It is not “necessary for us to point out the disadvantage, in the other theory, of ‘having to assume much more of the unseen element; as it is by means “of the words themselves that we shall prove thy Bhavana to be one only. ०८ And it proceeds to do this by showing that though the first parts of the “verbs differ from one another, yet inasmuch as all of them have “the same afhix, their denotations are identical. This is what is meant “by the sentence (in the Bhashya): ‘tathd वकद piirvo dadaityartham “uttarastaméva bhdvayédiir.’ The latter portion of this seems at first “sight to mean that éhe second part shows that the object of the Bhavana ‘as the Root-meaning; but this 18 not what is meant; because it has been “shown that in all cases that which is denoted by the Root can never ‘be the object of the Bhavani; and also because any such assertion “could never be of any use to the Pirvapakshi. In the same manner DIFFERENCE IN APORVAS OF SUBSIDIARY SACRIFICES, 615 “it -annot be said that the lRoot-meaning 1s described by the second ‘‘nart of the verb. Therefore we must construe the sentence as follows : ‘“In the word ‘daddati,’ the first part (the root ‘d@’) signifies to give ; “and the second part (the affix) serves to describe that—Bhavanad—which ‘“‘bas been previously denoted by the affix in ‘ yajéta,’—the only purpose ० of this descriptive reiteration by ‘daddtz,’ of the previously denoted Bha- ‘‘van® being the connecting of the said Bhavana with the denotation of a ‘root other than the former (‘yajz’). The same may be said with regard ८० the word ‘juhotz’ also. That such is the sense of the Bhashya “18 also shown by the fact that in connection with the word ‘ yajéta,’ ‘the Bhashya does not make use of the word ‘ anuvadati’ (describes), 4 76 only reason whereof being that in this case there is no Bhavana (८ previously expressed, that could be described (by the affix in ‘ yajéia’), “If the Bhadshya had meant the denotation of the Root to be the object ‘‘of the Bhavana, then this would apply to the first verb, as well as to the ‘“‘other two (and thus there could be no difference in the way of “explaining the signification of the three verbs); and the Bhashya could “not have left off the first verb (‘yajéta’) and made the declaration “(of the root denotation being the object of the Bhdvund) with regard “to the last two only, Consequently we must take the Bhashya only as (° pointing to the singleness of the Bhavand. Thus then, there is a single `" Bhavana, aud a single Action, in the case in question. “The Bhashya passage—‘ ४८८४९ yajatigabdena vihitam, etc.,—must “be taken as pointing out the fact of the meaning of all the three roots ‘‘in question being the same, because in all three we have the common ‘factor of giving up one’s possession. FKiven if, for purposes of takiug the “verbs ‘dadadtz’ and ‘juhotz’ as merely descriptive of ‘ yazéta,’ we have “to have recourse to indirect indication (by those two words),—then “too, this would be fur more reasonable than the assumption of many «५ ynseen factors, which would be necessary, in case we took the three words ०८ ‰8 expressing three distinct actions. Specially as in descriptions, the ५५ [0100688 of indirect indication is not objectionable, because the purpose “ofthe ‘ description’ is to lay down a particular accessory. For in- ‘‘ stance, in the case of the sentence (‘dtreydya hiranyam dadat:’), the < first sentence lays down the action of giving, the gold as the object to “be given, and Atreya as the person to whom it is to be given ; and what ‘‘the following sentence does is simply to lay down the ‘Dakshina’ as the “object to be given away. It might be urged that ‘ Dakshipa’ being “the name (of a sacrifice) it could not be taken only as laying down ‘‘an accessory detail: (the object to be given away). But the reply to ‘this is that the word can be taken as a mame, only if we accept the “sentence, in which it occurs, to. be an injunction of a certain action. 616 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. U1.—~PADA 11—ADHI (1). ‘“ As a matter of fact, however, we hold it to be only ‘descriptive’ of what “has gone before; and hence, as otherwise the sentence would become “absolutely meaningless, we must admit it to be the injunction of an ‘accessory detail. Thus, then, it must be admitted that it is with refer-- ‘fence to the denotations of the verbs ^ yajatz,’ ‘ dadatr,? and ‘juhots,’ that “the Bhashya has declared ‘ékam kadryam,’ which only means that the ५ signification of the roots is one only; and hence, in accordance with “the maxim ‘that ‘anything besides a certain object must be for its sake, ‘““we conclude that the roots implya single Apirva and the verbs denote ५ different actions.” SIDDHANTA. To all that has been urged above, we make the following reply :— Whenever there 18 a difference in the denotations of the Roots, we must conclude that the Bhavané also is distinct in each case. And when a Bhdvand has once appeared as qualified by the denotation of one Root, it is १०४ possible for the same Bhavana to be snbsequently qualified by others as well. That is to say, though the word denoting the Bhdvand is one only, and its denotation—the Bhdvana—forms the predominant factor, yet whenever there 18 a difference in the qualifying Root-denotation, the Bhavana must be admitted to be distinct also. Nor is it possible for three Root-denotations to fall in within a single Bhavana. Nor can they form a single composite whole, because all them equally have the same purpose of expressing the instrumental factor (of the Bhavan@); and also because each of them 18 expressed by a different word, quite independently of another. Nor is 1t possible for a single Root-denotation to include within itself three Root-denotations ; and it is not possible for three Roots, independent of one another, to be laid down, ina single word> for the sake of any Affix; because in the matter of the adapting of affixes Panini nses the word ‘dhdatdh’ (III-i-91), where great significance attaches to the singular number (and this shows that in one word one root can be adapted to only one affix). Nor is it possible for the three: verbs to form a single sentence; as they do not serve the same purpose, they do not appear incomplete on being separated (and as such they do not fulfill the conditions of syntactial unity); and it is not possible to make a single sentence out of them, by assuming a single Apirva (as following from them); because such an assumption has been negatived under Sdtra II-i-47, and also because the difference or non-difference among 4९01008. 18 not dependent upon a difference or non-difference among Apirvas; as a matter of fact it is quite to the contrary (i.¢., the difference or non-difference of 4०87४25 depending upon that of Actions). And further, if it were possible for the Bhdvand by itself to be DIFFERENCE IN APURVAS OF SUBSIDIARY SACRIFICES. 617 expressed by any word, then alone could it be possible for it to be referred to by the other verbs, and to be referred to and simultaneously qualified by the denotations of the three roots, ०४६.) the Sacrifice, the Gift, and the Libation, like what we find to be the case when a single cow 18 qualified by many adjectives ‘red,’ etc., occurring in the same sentence, or when the action of Homa is qualified by many materials ‘Dadhi’ and the rest, mentioned in many sentences. As a matter of fact, however, we never find the Bhavana by itself to be even expressed (by the Affix) apart (from the Root); and hence we must conclude that in the case in question, the Bhavani must be brought about either by one, or by all, of the verbs (‘dad@ti,’ etc.). Then, if it be held to be brought about by all of them, then, inasmuch as there could be no bringing about of that which would have been once brought about by one ( word— ° (८4८1 ' ), we could not but admit each of these verbs to express different actions. If,on the other hand, the Bhavani were held to be brought about by only one of the three verbs,—then, there being no reason in favour of any particular word, it could not be ascertained by which one of them it is brought about; and it would be taken 88 brought about by any one of the three; and under the circumstances, it could not be qualified by any root other than that which occurs in the word denoting it, And further the Bhavana, having primarily appeared in connection with one root-denotation, this denotation, as based upon Direct Denota- tion, would be the most authoritative of all, and as such it would never admit of any optional alternative qualifications in the shape of the denotations of other Roots. Aud then, these other Roots having been set aside from that Bhavana, they must come to qualify distinct Bhavands of their own, signified by the words in which they themselves occur. Thus then we find that in the case of each of these Bhavanas, the qualification by means of the Root-denotation mentioned in the same word as the Bhavanét would be such as is inborn (or natural) to them, and based upon direct denotation (of the word); whereas a qualification by the denota- tions of other roots could, at best, be something extrinsic, and would be based upon the exigencies of syntax and the context (and as such the former would be by far the most authoritative process). For instance, if the word ‘dada@t¢’ would attend upon the Bhavana bound up with the word ‘yajatc,’ then as the Bh@van@ would not be mentioned in the same sentence) as the word ‘dadd@i:’ itself) and as it would be following in the wake of an altogether different word (‘ yajatv’), 2४ could get at that Bhavané only through the peculiarities of the context or the syntax. And 80 also with the other words ‘ yajatz,’ and the rest. Question: ‘When the Bhavana would be mentioned by the word ५४ ‹ dadati,’ it would be directly recognised as the same (as that which 78 618 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA II-—-ADHI (1). ‘*was previously expressed by the word ‘ yajatt’); and as such it is not “riyht to assert that the relationship of the word ‘ वदत" with that ५, Bhavana would depend upon the syntax and the context.” Answer: Who is there among the upholders of the theory of the Actions being different, that does not accept a generic unity (४.९.१ as a ८८८55 weall revard ‘ Bhavana’ to be one only; just as the class ‘cow’ 18 one though it is the cndtvidual cows and the individual Bhavanas that are different and many). Question: *‘ But in the case in question, there is no ground for “holding a multiplicity of Individual Bhavanas.” Answer: How do you say that there is no ground, when, as a matter of fact, we actually find that the Bhavani is distinctly recognised as different with each word, on account of the presence of different Roots ? Question: ‘Just as in the case of words, we hold their apparent “difference to be due to attendant accessories, and not real, so in the ‘‘same manner, the apparent difference in Bhdvands also may not he ९८ 1681 (but only due to accessories ).’’ Answer: It is not so; because even in the case of words, there is no one who does not accept, to be real, the differences of ‘ga’ and the other letters; in the same manner, in the case in question also, the difference among the Bhdavands having been established by the difference among the Root-denotations, ‘ Sacrifice,’ etc., we come to think of all Bhavands as one under the class ^ Performance’; just as we think of all words as one under the class ‘Cubdatcoa.’ Then again, in the case of the word, we have such agencies as those of sound and the like, which, being distinct from the Word itself, make unreal any such distinctions of words as into the ‘Short,’ etc.; whereas in the case in question, the sacrifice, etc. (which are signified by a part of the same word as the Bhavana) are neither removed nor totally distinct from the Bhdvunda itself ; and as such the distinctions based upon those (sacrifice, etc.) cannot be said to be unreal. For these reasons the actions expressed by the three verbs must be held to be different, In support of this we have the following: When a piece of rock-crystal has been spoken of as red, the mention of ‘black ’ could not but be taken as referring to another piece of crystal; in the same manner, when one word has spoken of the Bhdvand as connected with one Root-denotation, the mention of other Roots could not but be taken as referring to other Bhavands. Further, with regard to the denotation of the Root and the Affix, there is always a definite order,—based upon grammatical rules as also upon actual usage,—in which they appear; and hence when the com- prehender will have been taken up by the denotation of the Root which DIFFERENCE IN APURVAS OF SUBSIDIARY SACRIFICES. 619 appears first, the Affix coming in after this, it could not but signify its object as connected (with the denotation of the Root), It is for this reason that we never come across the pure denotation of the Affix by itself. It has also been declared that ‘tlhe terminations, Accusative, ete. appearing from out of nouns, always show that the denotation of the noun 25 their qualifier, ’ Says the Bhashya: ‘ PrayogavakyageshabhGvéna hi samuddyasya satia- sambandhah’ (the collective whole is believed to exist only-on account of the supposed Directive Sentence that recapitulates all the subsi- diaries as belonging to a single Primary). The sense of this 18 this: 1116 opponent has based his declaration of the Bhadcund being qualified by the three Root-denotations collectively, on the sole ground of the assumption of a single Apirva. And it is a well-known fact that an Apiiiva is assumed only with a view to rationalise the connection between « certain Action and a certain remote Result; and it is also known that it is only when the sentences laying down the subsidiaries are all taken along with a single supposed Directive Injunction, that they become connected with the particular result with which, by them- selves, they have no connection at all, And what the supposed Directive Injunction does is to take in only those Actions whose particular forms have been duly ascertained; and thus when once the distinct form of each of the Actions has been ascertainod, they come to be recognised as distinct from one another; and then it is not possible for them to be unified into one composite whole. Nor again, in the case of the words ‘dadati’ and ‘juhotc’ do we find them forming part of any supposed Jirective Injunction, because the only such injunction that we have is ‘yajéta svargakimah’; and this mentions the ‘ ydga’ (sacrifie) only. Nor can the word ‹ ४74० ' be said to indirectly indicate the ‘Dana’ and the ‘ Homa,’ because that would entail the word ‘ yaya’ renouncing its own signification ; for if the word ‘yaga’ were to signify the ‘sacrificing ' and at the sume time indicate the ‘giving,’ then we would have the absurdity of Direct Denotation appearing simultaneously with Indirect Indication, For these 1 6898018 there can be no reasonable assumption of any combination. Thus, then, the fact of the roots being different making the words themselves different, it is cognised that the Bhavana 1s qualified (by the Root-Denotation). And this cognition is not found to be sublated by any other cognition. Nor ayain can the denotations of all the three Roots be said to be identical, because while ‘yaga > means the mere giving up of ones own ownership, ‘Homa’ means this giving up plus the action of pouring into fire; and ‘Dana’ means the creation of the ownership of another person over and above the giving up of one’sown. Nor can it be 620 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—-PADA II—ADHI (1). held that ‘ Dana’ aud ‘ Homa’ indicate the mere giving up of one’s ०1८१ ownership; because the Direct Significations of the words are quite compatible with the sentences in which they occur (and as such there can be no ground for having recourse to Indirect Indication), Nobody knows of any such material as the ‘ Dakshinanz,’ and hence on account of the word occurring along with ‘juhoti’ (which denotes the action of Libation), we must accept it to be the name of an Action. And then, with a view to avoid the sentence becoming absolutely meaning- less, we accept the Homa to be enjoined by the word ‘juhott. ’ In the case of ‘ daddti,’ if it were taken as laying down a material with reference to the ‘ydga,’ then, inasmuch as it would be necessary for the sentence containing that word to express the relationship of the giving with the given,—the gold and the person Aéréya (as the recipient ),— there would result a syntactical split; and hence in this case the difference of the action of ‘Dana’ from that of ‘ Yaga’ would be based upon the difference of the accessory materials, and not on that of mere difference 21 words (which is what is meant to be exemplified here); and hence we should cite as example another ‘daddtz’ (2,९.) other than the one occur- ring in the sentence cited in the Bhashya),—which would have either only one accessory material, or none at all. [हि gl. gag Ng yo Ct og lg ig a ag get पकः, ADHIKARANA (2) [ Treating of the difference in the Aptirvas of the Samit and other sacrifices.} Siitra (2): The repetition of the same word also (is a means of differentiation); because if there were no such specification, the repetition would be useless. After the Adhikarana treating of the differentiation of actions by means of different words, what comes in the mind foremost is the idea that ‘there can be no snch differentiation when the same word is repeated’; and hence it is that the Bhdashya now introduces the Adhikarana with this Piérvapaksha Having quoted the sentences—‘ samidho yajati,’ ‘ tantinapaitam yoiatt,’ ctc.,— what the Bhashya does is to leave aside the words ° samidhah’ and ‘tanunapatam, ` ete., and then to put forward the question: ‘“‘ The word ‘yajatt’ is found to be mentioned five times; and does it all express a single action, or do the five express five distinct actions ? ”’ This way of putting the question, however, is objected to by some people, as follows: ^" 106 words ‘ samit,’ etc., could be taken either as ५ 1100165 of actions, or as expressing accessories of actions; and as these “two facts would duly differentiate the actions laid down by the sen- ‘* tences in question, the mere repetition of the ‘ yajati’ would have nothing ८ ८0 do with that differentiation. There are six means available for the “differentiation of actions; and each of these should be shown distinctly “as functioning in due accordance with the special capability of each ; ‘ consequently in the case in question, so long as we have not set aside “the capability of the Accessory and the Name to differentiate actions, “it 18 not possible for the Bepetition to have any influence in the matter, “which rightly lies within the jurisdiction of others. And hence, we ‘should cite another example. As a matter of fact, however, no such ‘* example is possible, because, in the whole Veda, a verb is never used alone ‘by itself; and whenever a noun happens to be used, it must be either “as a Name oras nn Accessory; and so there would be nothing in the “way of differentiation left to be done by the Verb. For instance, ‘in the case of all such sentences as ‘aindravayavam grhnaic’ and “the like, we find that the Actions mentioned in them differ from one ‘another, on account of the fact of each of those Actions being intimately ‘connected with a distinct Accessory of its own. And in the case of “such sentences as ‘ bhinn® juhoti,’ ‘skanné juhott,’ and the like, as ‘each of the Actions is mentioned in connection with a distinct occasion, 622 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA II—ADHI (2). “they are regarded as different from one another, as shown under Sutra “ TJ—iii—25: And in this case, as each ‘7uwhotz’ serves the purpose of con- ५ necting the action of Homa with each particular occasion, it cannot be said ‘to be useless ; and as such, it cannot be the means of differentiating the ‘Actions concerned. Some people quote, as an example (of the differ- ‘entiation by Repetition), the sentences ‘ Pancagdradiyéshu tan paryagni- “krian, tan paryagnikrtan,’ etec., but they lose sight of the fact that the “repetition im this case 18 merely descriptive of the same Primary Action “(and as such no differentiation is possible); nor do we find in these “sentences the word ‘yajuti,’ a repetition of which would express a ‘difference among the Actions. And hence we conclude that no example “of differentiation by Repetition is available,” We base our reply to the above side-objection to the Bhadshya, on the very sentences that lave been quoted by the Bhashya. Asa rule, when- ever a Noun appears in connection witha Verb, it is almost always sub- servient to this latter; and hence it is the Verb, as the predominant factor, to which belongs the capability of expressing the difference or non- difference (of Actions), T'hatis to say, those nouns that express an object of predication are subservient to the Verb, and as such, always following in its wake, they stand in need of the functioning of the Verb. Hence when the Verb has entered into the Primary Action, the noun also becomes either a name of the same Action, or mentions an Accessory for it; and if the Verb points to an Apiirva, then the noun also belongs to that 47५7४ ; and thus the difference or non-difference of Actions having been duly recognised (by means of the Verb), the words ‘Samit’ and the rest, coming in subsequently, become useless and indifferent (as regards thie pointing out of the said difference or non-difference) ; and it is for this reason that we leave aside these words, and take into consideration the Verb only. Question: ‘‘In that case, (1) the Name, and (2) the Accessory would ‘never be the means of the differentiation of Actions.” Answer: Certainly they would serve the purposes of this differentia- tion, in cases where the Verb does not operate (towards it) ; the examples of such cases, to be cited Jater on, are (1) ‘athaisha jyotih, ete.’ and (2) ‘ एतं {20140 vajinam, etc,’ [in (1) the differentiation being due to the nume and in (2) to the accessories]. In the latter sentence we do not find any verb; and in the former, though we do find a verb, yet, inasmuch as it 18 possible for it to become related to the Primary Action by way of serving to point out the connection of the particular Result with the particular Accessory,—the differentiation required will have been done by the names ‘jyatih, etc.,, which have a prior operation. Even in a case where the force of the verb makes its connection with the Primary Action impos- DIFFERENTIATION BASED ON REPETITION OF THE SAME WORD, 623 sible, there is laid down an Accessory not otherwise possible; and in this case too the differentiation is done by the Accessory; as it will be shown (in the Adhikarana dealing with tle Accessory as the means of differentia- tion), by the Bhashya after accepting the facts brought forward by the opponent—‘ this connection of the Deity and the Sacrifice being enjoined etc., etc., etc.’ (the sense of which 18 that the sacrifice having been enjoined in 8 previous sentence, what the repetition of the same does 18 to point out its connection with an Accessory, in the shape of the Deity). But a differentiation by the Accessory is possible, only when the Verb is found to have lost its differentiative potency ; and hence it is only right that first of all we should consider the Verb (as the menns of differentiation). The Bhashya puts forward the question in the form—‘ kimekamapir- vam ?’;—and this implies the question of the difference o1 non-difference of the Actions; orit may be taken as ^* १०६8३ the word ‘ yajatz,’ repeated fivetimes, lay down one Action and one ‘ Apirvu,’ or five Actions and five Apitrvas ?” And on this question, we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. ५८ They indicate only one Apiirva; because, as shown in the previous ५५ Adhikarana, though the signification of the affix be the same, yet a ‘¢ difference in the Roots serves to differentiate the Actions ; when, however, “the Root also is the same, what would be there to point out the Actions ‘‘to be different ? “Further, on the utterance of the first sentence —‘ sanuidho yazuti ’— ‘‘an idea of the Action ‘ yaga’ presents itself to the mind; and hence when ‘the same Verb is pronounced again, the Action denoted by this is at ‘once recognised as tle same that had previously come to the mind; and ‘“as such the repetition does not point out any difference in the Action. “That is to say, when the word ‘yajatt’ has been once directly “heard, if it happens to be pronounced again, it is at once recognised ८८ 88 the same word that had been previously heard, and no difference 18 “perceived between the two words; so also in the case of its denotation “(which being comprehended once is always recognised to be the same, ५८ whenever that word is uttered). Andin the case in question, all that the ‘second ‘yajatz’, though directly heard, does 18 to express over again that “same Action of yaga which has already been cognised (by means of the “first ‘yajatt’); and though, as such, it becomes redundant, yet it “ cannot make the two ‘ yajati’s ’ distinct words ; and in the same manner, a “repetition of the word, even though becoming otherwise superfluous, “could not make the meaning of one ‘ yajati’ different from that of the “other. For certainly ‘superfluousness’ (like Inconsistency) is not a 624 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Il-——PADA II-——-ADHI (2). “means of right knowledye. Only that which the Veda lays down ‘should be accepted as the authoritative means of knowledge, by people “taking their stand upon the authority of the Veda, And in the case ‘‘in question, we find that the Veda, in using the same word ‘ ४4 4४, ‘distinctly points to a non-difference between the Actions; and hence ८८ |© who would hold them to be different, would be going against the ‘authority of the Veda itself. And as a matter of fact, there is “‘nothing wrong in the admitting of the superfluousness of certain words, ‘if such superfluousness happen to be necessitated by a higher authority. “But we have the following ways of avoiding the said superfluous- ness :— ८५ (1) The word ‘yujatt’ as repeated in the second and the following ‘sentences, being touched by the supposed Directive Injunction dealing ‘“with the Primary Action together with all its subsidiaries, could be ‘‘taken as not affording any meaning, but only as laid down for the sole ‘‘ purpose of being verbally repeated. (And in this way there would be “no repeated mention of the Action of ‘ ydga’). (2) The repetition may be taken as only serving to emphasise the “same fact. We actually find that in ordinary parlance, people go on “repeating certain words (by way of emphasising)—even more than “twice—until the idea meant to be conveyed by them is fully compre- ‘‘hended by the person to whom the words are addressed. So also, in the ‘scriptures, we find, in course of the story of ‘ Pancendra,’ that the old ‘spinster asks for a hushand five tumes. And though in the case of this ‘story, the person to whom the request was preferred was a Deity ‘“‘(Indra) capable of playing pranks (whereby he gave the spinster ८५ {2९ husbands, taking her repeated requests as distinct demands),— ‘‘vet, in the case in question, we have no such playful person to deal ‘with ; and hence we cannot take the five repetitions of the word ‘ yajati’ ५८ 88 denoting five distinct sacritices. ५ (3) The Injunction of the Action being accepted to reside in all “the five utterances of the word ^ yajuati,’ the Action enjoined comes to ५५ 06 one only ; just as though we find the injunction of the ‘ Jyottshtoma’ ‘in many Vedic Rescensions, yet we accept the ‘ Jyotistoma’ itself to be ८५ 0116 sacrifice only. Thus then, as when many words have the same mean- ‘ing, they come to be taken as optional alternatives, so we conclude that it ‘is the same sacrifice that 1s enjoined, at one time, by the sentence ‘ samidho “yajati, and at another by the sentence ‘taninapaiam yajati.’ And ‘(in the case of optional alternatives, there can be no superfluousness “in the matter, which could lead us to take them as expressing distinct ‘‘ Actions; because) when we find the Vrthi and the Yava serving the DIFFERENTIATION BASED ON REPETITION OF THE SAME WORD. 625 *‘same purpose, we do not accept one of them to be useless, and as such “serving an altogether different purpose. ५ (4) The subsequent sentences may be taken as laying down distinct ‘* Deities—‘ Taninapat’ and the rest—for the sacrifice; and thus too, ‘the repetition would not be useless. If the second ‘ yayatc’ enjoined ‘an Action, then alone could the word ‘ taniéinapat’ be taken as the Name “of the Action; as a matter of fact, however, the second ‘yajatz’ only ‘refers to the same sacrifice that has been expressed by the first ° yajatz’ ; ‘and as such the word ‘ taniinapdt’ cannot be a Name ; it must be taken “as laying down an Accessory (Deity) for the same sacrifice. And thus ‘too, the repetitions cannot be taken as pointing out different actions. “And further, as a matter of fact, the same word or object, ‘even when appearing in places far apart, is always recognised ८ 88 the same; and in this case it cannot be said that they are different ; “just as when a man returns home after a long absence, and recognises ‘his people to be the same as those he left behind him, they are not ‘taken to be other than these. And when such 18 the case when they “ occur in distant places, how could it be otherwise in the case in question “when the two sentences occurring close together, the impressions pro- ‘‘duced by them are still present in the mind while the second is uttered. “If there were a distinct mcaning each time that the word were “pronounced, then the denotation of each word would consist of ever- “changing individuals (and not of an eternal class, as held by the Miminsaka), ‘‘And further, in the case of the sentences in question there is no ‘such thing as the class ‘Sacrifice’ as apart from the Individual Sacri- “fices, just as there is no class ‘gatva’ apart from the individual “letter ‘ga’); and thus the word ‘ ४74५ ' being restricted to an individual “ Sacrifice, how could there be a different action (expressed by the word ‘“Svajutt’ in the second sentence for instance)? That is to say, “even though with a view to justify the repetition of the word, the “sacrifice might be performed five times over, yet the Action would be “one and one only; as we find that, though the Jyotzushfoma is performed ‘‘ thrice, yet it is admitted to be a single Action (though in the case of this “latter we have a distinct Injunction of its being performed thrice). ‘In the case in question, however, we have no such ground for repeating “the performance; because all that the repetition of the word ‘ yajaiz,’ “with ‘taninapat,’ etc. does is to lay down alternative Deities in con- ‘nection with the same Sacrifice. ‘For these reasons, we conclude that in the case in question, the ५५ Sacrifice pointed out is one and one only.” 79 626 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA 1-^ एप्त (2). SIDDHANTA. To the above, we make the following reply :— The repetition of the same word would also be so :—+.e,, exactly like different words, that also would be a means of differentiating Actions. Because, by its direct denotative potency, the Verb, in the first instance, lays down the Action; and it is only when this potency has been forestalled by another—7.e., when the Action has been already mentioned by another word—, that it requires that Action to be referred to along with itself. If the mere fact of the ‘sacrifice’ continuing in the mind of the person (at the time that the second ‘ yajati’ is pronounced) were the sole cause of this latter ‘yajatz’ referring to the ‘sacrifice’ denoted by the former ‘ yajatz,’ then alone would it fail to give us an idea of a different Action. Asa matter of fact, however, the mere fact of such continuance in the mind is not sufficient cause for making the second ‘yajate’ a secondary reference (to what has gone before) ; the fact is that it is only the particular form of such reference (Anitivdda) that is shown by the idea born of the context; and the generic fact that there is an Anuvada is shown by the sentence itself. That 28 to say, when the Injunctive potency of the Injunctive Affix, is removed from the denotation of the Root, then, in that case, there being no potency for more than one Injunction, we look for a mere secondary reference to the denotation of the Root; and this want is sup- plied by the aforesaid continuance (in the mind, of the idea of the previously- expressed Action). And the removal of the Injunctive potency from the Root-meaning is duc to the fact of the Injunctive potency having taken up another object for Injunction (and to the said continuance); as for instance in the case of such supplementary sentences as—‘ Vrihibhiryajeta, ‘dadhnii 2 70८४ ` (the verbs ‘yajeta’ and ‘juhotv’ are repeated only for the pur- pose of laying down other materials for the ‘ sacrifice’ and the ‘ Homa’ which have been laid down in the preceding sentences, and which are only referred to by the verbs in these supplementary sentences). In all these cases, where many objects are mentioned in various sentences,— inasmuch as it 18 not possible to have a multiplicity of Injunctive poten- cies,—we naturally conclude that there is only one object of the Injunc- tion, which one should be referred to by all the subsequent verbs; and when looking for that one particular object, we come to the conclusion, that it must be that which keeps continuing in the mind. And hence it is that in the case of the sentence ‘dadhna@ juhoti,’ as itis only the dadhi that has not been mentioned before, we take the Verb (‘ juhoti’) as only referring to a previously-expressed Homa, with reference to which the DIFFERENTIATION BASED ON REPETITION OF THE SAME WORD. 627 sentence lays down a fresh material in the shape of the dadhi. When, however, there are not many objects meant to be enjoined, then, in the case of that sentence we do not look for anything that would be referred to by the subsequent verbs. And hence, so long as the sentence itself does not give us any general idea of the presence of such secondary reference, what useful purpose could be served by the said ‘ continuance,’ which depends upon a due fulfilment of the general idea of the presence of an anuvdda, and which is the sole ground for admitting of a particular form of refereuce (Anuvedda)? Thus then the definition of ‘ Anuvdda’ is, not that ‘that which has been previously laid down, is referred to sub- sequently,’ but that ‘that (1) with regard to which there is an idea that it ought to be referred to, and (2) which happens to have been pre- viously laid down, is that which is referred to; and there can be no such Reference, when neither of these two conditions is absent—z.e., neither by the mere desire for reforence, nor by the mere fact of its having been previ- ously laid down. Consequently then, though there is a desire for Reference, yet, inasmuch as the object is not one that has been laid down before, we cannot but admit it to be an Injunction of an Action with certain qualifications; and conversely, even though the object may be known to be such as has been previously laid down, inasmuch as there is no desire for a secondary Reference, we cannot but admit the Injunction to refer to a different Action altogether, notwithstanding the fact of the Root as well as the Affix being actually recognised to be the same (as in the case of ‘ yajatz’). | It has been urged above that the proximity of the previously- mentioned sacrifice being very strong, even if the word ^ yajati’ were to be pronounced a hundred times, the idea of that sacrifice would not disappear. But all such disappearance would appear quite possible if the Opponent only knew the comparative strength or weakness of the various meaus of knowledge. For instauce, it is by Direct Signification that we recognise the Actions to be different, while it is by means of Proximity that they are cognised as identical; and hence for those who are cognisant of the fact of Direct Signification of the word being more authoritative of the two, how could the Actions appear to be one and the same? When the Injunctive word (‘yajatc’) has not its injunctive potency thrown aside from its legtimate object, then it is taken up with the meaning of the Root and the Bhavana (signified by the Affix) ; and it is with regard to these that that word gives birth to an Injunction, which has for its object something not otherwise got at; and as such it tramples under its foot the idea of the sacrifice (mentioned by the second ‘ yajatz’) having been already laid down (by the former ‘ yajatz’); and thereby leads us to the conclusion that the object of this Injunction is such another Action 628 : TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA II—ADHI (2). as is quite capable of being enjoined by it. And hence if this Injunction should follow the Direct Word, it points to a distinct Action; while if it should follow Proximity, then the Actions are identical, If, however, the Injunctive Word is taken up elsewhere—for instance, the laying down of the material, etc..—then in such a case, we admit of the Actions being identical, as pointed out by Proximity ; because in this case such an assumption is not contrary to any higher authority. Consequently, it must be admitted that the idea of all the various Actions being identical is a mistaken one,—due to the fact of all these ‘sacrifices’ imparting the same aid to the Primary Sacrifice, and as such being spoken of as ‘sacrifice’ in general. There is no ground for recog- nising each individual ‘sacrifice’ to be the same as the one mentioned before. That which is actually recognised as one in reality, there is no difference of opinion as regards the unity of that, For instance, in the different kinds of sacrifices—the ‘ Pagu,’ the ‘Soma’ and the ‘ Ish{z’—the gencric character of ‘sacrifice’? is one and the same, and itis only with reference to specific Individuals that we think of any difference among them. Objection: ‘In the ९086 in question, it is the direct mention of the “same word ‘ yajatt’ which distinctly points to the identity of the ५ Actions ; and as such it cannot be said that the idea of oneness is “based upon Proximity, and not upon Direct Word.” Reply: 1४ is not so; because all that the Direct mention of the word ‘yagatv’ does is to give rise to the simple idea that what it speaks of is ‘a sacrifice’; and it has nothing to do with any idea as to whether it 18 the 88.116 as the one mentioned before or different from it That is to say, the second ‘ yajatz’ does not mean that the ‘sacrifice’ denoted by it 18 the same as that denoted by the previous ‘yagati’; and thus the denotation of the word being actually silent on this point (of difference or non-difference), people, not cognisant of the fact of the notion of identity being due to Proximity, are led to the mistaken conclusion that the recognition of sameness is based upon Direct Word. Objection: ‘Inasmuch as the word does not denote the Individual ‘“(according to the Mimansaka), it is only the single ‘class’ ‘sacrifice’ ‘‘that would be denoted by the word ^ yajati,’ whenever if may be used ; ‘and as this class is always one and the same, the sameness in question ‘“must be admitted to be denoted by Direct Word.” Reply: It is because the Individual is not denoted by the word, that the Direct Word points out the Actions to be distinct. For instance, what are laid down are the Individuals (sacrifices) as qualified by the Olass (‘Sacrifice’) and hence in the case of all Injunctions, all consideration of difference or non: lifference should be with regard to the Individuals, DIFFERENTIATION BASED ON REPETITION OF THE SAME WORD. G29 That is to say, the generic entity, that forms the real denotation of the word ( yajati’ for instance), being incapable of being performed, it cannot form the object of an Injunction ; and hence in all cases it is the Individuals that form the objects of Injunctions. Hence it must be admitted that the sentence ‘ Samidho yajati’ lays down one specific individual sacrifice, and ‘ Tantinapdtam yajzati’ lays down another. And in the case in question we have the Injunctions of five such distinct individual sacrifices. It has been suggested above that “just as there is no difference ‘between the letter ‘ga’ and the ‘ gatwa’ so,in the same manner, there “may be no difference between the individual sacrifice and the class ८८ ‹ sacrifice,’ ” True, there is no difference; but itis only after we actually conclude from the very form of the Action that it 18 one only, that we can be sure of there being no difference; prior to such conclusion, we are absolutely certain of a difference. [or example, in the case of the letter ‘ga,’ when we found it to form a member of the classes of ‘ Letter,’ ‘Sound’ and ‘ Pro- perty,—we concluded that the differences perceived in the various tones of the letter ‘ga’ itself, must be due to the specific properties of quickness, etc., which belong, not to the letter itself, but to the organ of its utterance; and hence (there not being distinctin dividual ‘ga,’ we did not admit of any such generic entity as ‘ gatwa’ (the cluss ‘ ga’); in the same manner, when we find that all the sacrifices—down to the ‘ Samit ’— form members of such classes as ‘ Entity,’ ‘ Action,’ and ‘ Sacrifice,’ we conclude that each of these sacrifices does not become distinct, by the mere fact of the time, place or agent of its performance being different; because these differences are not in the sacrifice itself; and as such are exactly in the same position as the properties of ‘ quickness’ etc., in the case of the letter ‘ga.’ ‘That is to say, the ‘Samit sacrifice’ performed on the Paurnamfst day is nothing distinct from the same sacrifice performed on the Am@vdsya day; so also a difference in the performer, or in the places of performance, does not make the Action different. But as a matter of fact, it is not that we admit of an actual differ- ence only in cases where the difference is cognised by direct sense- perception; because on this point there 18 no difference between the authority of Sense-perception and that of the Word (Vedic). Hence we must admit of a difference among Actions, only in so far as is shown by the six means (enumerated in the present Pada)—such as ‘ Different words’ and the like. Because in the case of the sacrifices—‘ Ishfz,’ ‘ Pagu,’ ‘Soma’ ‘Ekaha, ‘Ahina’ and ‘Satra’—the idea of difference among them that we have is never actually found either to be due to any extraneous properties or circumstances, or to be other than correct, Hence when 680 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA II—ADHI (2), the individual ‘ 75712 ' etc. are always found to be the objects of Injunc- tions, the words giving expression to them naturally become regarded as different; and it is from these individuals that the Results follow ; though all of them belong to the single class ‘Sacrifice,’ and there are no sub- classes (as ‘ Ishtitva’ and the like). Objection: ‘‘ But such sub-classes as ‘Hkahatwa’ and the like are (५ admitted.” Reply: Not so; because the fact of many sacrifices being all called ‹ 11012," and recognised as such, 18 only due to the fact of all of them being performed in a definite period of time (one day) [and not to the fact of their belonging to any such class as ‘Hkahatwa’|; just as the word ‘ Dandi’ (with stick) applies to many persons (not on account of all of them belonging to any such class as ‘danditva,’ but only on account of all of them happening to hold sticks). That is to say, certain sacrifices are called ‘kaha,’ because they are finished in a single day; those that take from two to eleven days are called ‘ahina’; those finished in twelve days are spoken of as both; while those extending from twelve days to a thousand days (‘samvaitsara’ in this case has been explained as ‘day’) are called ‘ Satra’; those in which the offering is of food-grains are called ‘ Ishf.’; those in which animals are offered are ‘Pacgu’; and those in which the material offered consists of vegetables (leaves, plants, creepers, etc.) are ‘ Soma.’ If, however, you insist on assuming suh-classes, that does not touch our position at all adversely. Thus, too, even if there happen to be such classes as ‘ Jyotishtomatwa’ etc., and if each performance of the sacrifice (‘Jyotishtoma’ for instance) becomes a distinct sacrifice by itself,— then too our position remains unsullied. So also, conversely, if all sacrifices be taken as one only, on the ground of all of them only consisting of the offering of certain materials to certuin Derties,—then too, inasmuch as the performance of each would be distinct from that of the other, there would be no hindrance to their ordinary performance, ctc. Objection: “In that case, the repeated performances of the Samit “sacrifice would not be distinct Actions ; just as the repeated performances “of certain actions during the performance of the Jyotishtoma are not ‘recognised as so many distinct actions,” Reply: In all cases, the differentiation of Dharmas is based upon the difference in the Apiirvas brought about by them, (and as arule,a distinct Apirva always follows from an Action each time that it is repeated). And it is on account of the following reason that in the case of the repeated performance of the ‘Samit’ sacrifice, we have an idea of each of them being a distinct Action, whereas in the case of the Jyotishtoma we take the difference to lie only in the repeated performances DIFFERENTIATION BASED ON REPETITION OF THE SAME WORD. 63k (and not in the Action). In the former case we have an Injunction of the Action or performances of all the sacrifices distinct from one another ; while in the latter case, the various repeated performances are all in- cluded in the single name ^ Jyotishtoma’; and hence though the character of ‘sacrifice’ belongs to each repeated performance, yet the character of ‘ Jyotushtoma’ does not belong to it; and thus it is that we come to look upon each repeated performance as a part of the one sacrifice ‘ Jyotishtoma’; but such is not the case in the repeated performances of the ‘Samit,’ because in this case we do not have any composite whole made up of these performances (as we have in the case of the Jyotishtoma), And thus the conditions of the two are not identical. - What is the special purpose of all this differentiation, we shall show later on under Sitras 11-17-20). Says the Bhashya: Hence the sacrifice has got to be repeated; and this assertion 18 in accordance with the view that the name ‘ Prayfjya belongs to all the five sacrifices (expressed by the word ‘yajatt’ repeated five times), just as the name ‘Jyotihfoma’ belongs to the repeated performance of certain Actions. Or it may be taken as referring to the fact that though the individual ‘ Sacrifices’ are distinct, yet, inasmuch as the word ‘yajatv’ in all cases denotes the class ‘sacrifice’ (to which the individual sacrifices belong), we must take the performance of the five sacrifices to be the repetition of that of the single class ‘ Sacrifice. * An objection is raised in the Bhashya: “Jt has been said that it és ‘incapable of enjoining another ०१ ९८ ; and the sense of this is that the “injunctive potency of the second ‘ yajatz’ having been taken up in “laying down Janiinapdt as the Deity, there is no incompatibility of this “Injunction with that of the previous ‘ yajati,’ an idea of which is ८८ 81111 present in the mind.” But in accordance with the rule laid down the Sa#tra I—iv—4, the words ‘Samit’ etc. come to be recognised as names of sacrifices, on account of their relationship with the Deities pointed out by the words of those Man- tras which contain those words ( ‘ Samit’ etc.), and which come to be employed in the Samit and other sacrifices, in the same order in which they are found in the text (that is to say, the first Mantra 18 employed in the Samit sacrifice; the second in the Zantinap@t, and so forth; and the words of these Mantras distinctly point out the Deities of each of these sacrifices); and hence, the Deity being 168 $ once pointed out, it cannot form the object of another Injunction by the sentence ‘ Taniina- pitam yajatt’; and as such the injunctive potency of the sentence would be thrown aside from its legitimate object. | This is what the Bhdshya should have said in reply to the opponent, What it actually does, however, is to grant his contention, and then 632 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. U-—-PADA II—ADHI (2). crush him on his own ground. The sense of the Bhdshya is this: You accept the first ‘yajgati’ to be the Injunction of a ‘Sacrifice’ on the ground of this latter not being laid down before; but this is scarcely correct; because the ‘Sacrifice’ has already been enjoined in the sen- tence ‘ Dargapitrnamdsdabhyam yajeta’; and as such the first ‘ yajati’ also can be taken only as merely referring to the ‘sacrifice’ Iaid down before (just as you take the second ‘yajati’ as referring to the ‘sacrifice’ laid down by the previous ‘yajatz’). And then all the ‘yajati, being mere references to the previously enjoined ‘ Sacrifice,’ what the words ‘Samit’ and the rest can do is to lay down either the material to be offered or the Deity to whom the offering is to be made; (in connection with the ‘ Sacrifice’ laid down by the sentence ‘ Dargapiirnama- sibhyaim yajeta’; but we find that both of these accessories of that sacrifice have already been laid down in the sentence ‘ Agneyo'shtakapilo ’ (where Agni 18 mentioned as the Desty and the cake as the material)— a sentence which is found directly connected with the original Injunction itself; and hence if it were to have these accessories pointed out by the sentences ‘samrdho 1} ८४ ' etc., this would be directly contrary to the former mention of the accessories (as the former sentence has not been found to mention the ‘Samuit,’ etc., as either the Deity or the Material). Then, inasmuch as (according to you) it is absolutely necessary to make the sentence ‘samidho yajzatz’ Iny down the relationship of the Deity (Samit) with a certain sacrifice,—and this is impossible without another sacrifice (being mentioned by another ‘yajatz’; because the ‘ &त के ' in the same sentence you have taken as referring to another sacrifice) ; and hence, too, you have to admit the sacrifice denoted by one ‘ yajatz’ to be different from that denoted by another ‘ yajati’,—even when you take the sentences as Injunctions of Accessories. Thus then, inasmuch as it would be impossible for each succeeding sentence to lay down the Accessory for the sacrifice laid down in the preceding sontence, all the sacrifices must be taken as different from one another. And as such all your trouble over the taking of the sentences as Injunctions of Accessories becomes wholly lost. As a matter of fact, however, no such Injunction of Accessories 18 possible in the case in question; because the material to be offered can never be spoken of by a word like ‘ samidhah ’ (Accusative Plural)—as we have explained under Sutras II—i—11-12; specially as the verb ‘ 14/८४ ` can have no connection with a material which is mentioned by a word with an Accusative ending (as an Instrumental ending is what would be necessary in that case); nor can it be au Injunction of the Deity ; as we Sliall show later on, under the ७४८1८ [IX—i—9 Thus then, we conclude that the sentences under consideration must be the injunctions of distinct Actions ADHIKARANA (3). | T'reating of the Relation of Subserviency between the 40702045 and the Agnéya, etc. }. Sutra 3: The context refers to the Paurnamasi (as the principal), specially as none of the details are mentioned (of other sacrifices). The Bhashya has quoted all the Injunctions of the Sacrifices, in connection with the ‘ Darga-Purnamdsa’; and then the question started hy it is as to whether all the sacrifices enjoined are distinct primaries, or it is Only some of these that are so. An objection is raised against this statement of the question of the Adhikarana: “The consideration of the question of primaries and “subsidiaries forms the subject of the fourth Adhyaiya; by what “connection, then, has it been introduced in this Adhyfya, which deals “wholly with the Differences of Actions ? ‘That is to say, after having “dealt (in the foregoing Adhikarana) with the differentiation of Actions “by means of Repetition, it was necessary to consider the differentiation by “means of Number; and yet how is it that having taken no notice of that, “the Bhdshya starts ॥ question which is of no use in the subject-matter of “the present Adhyfaya ?” {10 this some people make the following reply : ‘ The question started “by the Bhashya forms a declared subject of the Adhydya, because at “the very outset of the Adhydya, the Bhashya on Sutra [I—i—1 has de- “ clared—‘ after that the Primaries and the Subsidiaries will be taken into “ consideration.’ “But this is scarcely correct; because in that place (४,९.) the Vartika “on I1—i—1) we have rejected that interpretation of the Bhishya, which “we have explained in a different manner ; we have shown there that it 18 “for the purpose of showing the difference among Apdirvas treated of in ५५ Adhyaya ILI, that the question of Primaries and Subsidiaries was “intvodaced in the Bhashya on II—i—1, The question of the relation of ‘‘subserviency between Actions, however, can in no way be connected “with the subject of the present Adhyaya. Specially as we shall devote 80 684 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA II—ADHI (3). ‘a great deal of time and trouble for establishing such relations among ८८ Actions—under Sutras I[V—iv—29-33. And the bearing of this Adhi- ५५ karana being quite clear, it cannot be explained in any other way. Conse- “quently the question of the relation of subserviency between Actions ८८ need not have been considered here. Nor can any of the questions—‘ whe- “ther the sentences ya @vam vidvan amavisyayam yajatt and ya ९४८१2 “ vidvan paurnamasyAm yajati conjointly refer to the Primary sacrifices, or “they are the Injunctions of two independent Actions, and the other “sentences are all Injunctions of Accessories "—have any connection with “the Adhikarana in the way that it has been suygested by the Bhashya. “And if it is these questions thnt are to be chiefly considered in the ४५ Adhikarana, then there would be no use in introducing the question of ८ Relative Subserviency. And further, it has been shown above that ८८ Difference of Words and Repetition are capable of pointing out Differ- ‘ences among Actions; how is it, then, that these have been brought in “by the Bhashya, as establishing the equal importance of all Actions P To utilise the means of establishing Difference in establishing egual im- (८ {09101966 18 certainly a very queer process of argumentation. Nor, in “the very body of the two Adhikaranas, do we find the conclusions and ८५ {16 Premises stated apart from one another; and as such we cannot “bring in the Premises of the one to the proving of another conclu- ८ gion.” In view of the above objections we must justify the Bhdshya in the following manner: The present Adhikarana had to be introduced as dealing with the exceptions to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing Adhikarana; and hence from among all the sentences quoted, we must take only éwo as the basis of this Adhikarana; viz., ‘ya evam amavasydyam yajati’ and ‘ ya évam paurnamasyim yajati. And then the question comes to be this: Do these two ‘ yajati’s lay down two entirely independent Actions,—or being qualified by the words ^ 27680546 ` and ‘ paurnamis,’ which denote actions connected with the times expressed by these, the two ‘ yajatt’s only refer to the six primary Actions (the ‘ Agneya’ and the rest that go to form the ‘ Darga-Purnamasa’ sacrifice) ? Then again, the difference of the Agnéya and the other five Primary sacrifices from one another being established by the difference in their Accessories, that between the subsidiary Prayatjas themselves being estab- lished by Repetition, and that of the subsidiary 4016705 by means of the difference of words,—the Bhashya has brought in the two declara- tions of ‘equal importance’ and ‘relative subserviency’ only; such ia the real upshot of the real Parvapaksha and the Siddhanta of the Adhitkarana, (That is to say, if the ‘ yajati’s lay down independent Actions—as held by the Parvapaksha—, then all the various sacrifices— RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN 16 प्र 4६48 AND AGNEYA, ETC. 630 the Agnéyd, etc., as well as the Prayajas, etc.—would be of equal importance ; while if the two ‘ yajati’s be taken only as referring to the previous six primary sacrifices—the Agnéya etc..—then these alone would. be the Primary sacrifices; as on account of their being referred to by the two sentences, and as being related to the enjoined times of the Amavasya and the Purnimd, these two words would be taken as the names of these six sacrifices, which alone would, therefore, come to be connected with the Result; and in that case the Praydjas, etc., would all become subsidiary to it). And these questions of ‘equal importance’ and ‘rela- tive subserviency’ have not been introduced as forming integral parts of the Adhikarana itself; and so these two are not to be taken as embodying the Purvapaksha and the Siddhania, respectively. Thus then, the three stages in the position taken up by the Parvapak- sha come to be these: (1) ^ The two ‘ yajatz’s are independent injunctions ; (2) the actions enjoined by them are distinct from any previously enjoined ; and ($) the Prayijas and the Aghards are all primary actions of equal predominance ”’ ; and in these three stages the one that follows is the direct outcome of that which precedes it; and thus all three are inseparably linked up with one another. In the same manner, the three stages in the Stddhanta are these: (1) The two ‘ yayatz’s only refer to the sacrifices mentioned before; (2) the Actions expressed by them are not different from the previously mentioned (Agnéya, etc.) ; and (8) The Aghdras and the Praydjus are subsidiary to the Agnaya and the rest. And in each of these trios, each member is so inseparably connected with the others, that if one of them happens to be established as true, the others necessarily follow as its corollaries. And hence the Bhdshya, thinking that the desired purpose would be served by establishing any one of the three positions, hag brought in the third and the last, because it is the final outcome of the preceding two, and as such necessarily leads up to them. And though the difference or non-difference (of the sacrifices expressed by the two ‘ yajati’s from those previously laid down) would be implied by the truth or otherwise of the Siddhdnta as put by the Bhashya, yet, towards the end of the Adhikarana, in summing up the whole discussion, the Bhashya men- tions the ‘ Difference or Non-difference,’ simply with a view to make it clear to the student (that this follows from the conclusion arrived at in the Adhtkarana). Objection : ‘ How 18 it that having neglected the subject of Difference “and Non-difference, in the beginning, the Bhashya has thought it fit to “bring 1६ in again, through the question of equal importance or relative “© subserviency” ? Some people reply to this that it is only a method of exposition peculiar to the Teacher; for instance, in the foregoing Adhikarane also, 636 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADU, JI-PADA II—ADHTI (ॐ). he spoke of the Difference of Apiirvas (and through that, of the Difference of Actions). Or it may be that the ‘ perception of the indicative feature ’—in the shape of the fact of the Prayajas occurring among the sub- sidiary sacrifices—that will be spoken of in the eighth sutra below, is not capable of directly precluding all chance of the sacrifices being different (from the previous sacrifices)—(because all that the said feature indicates is that the Prayaja, etc, are not primary actions, and not that they are different actions altogether); and as such all that the said feature would do would be to set aside the ‘Equal Importance’ of all the sacrifices concerned ; and when this is set aside, there would follow the setting aside of the fact of the two ‘ yajétu’s being distinct Injunc- tions by themselves, inasmuch as this latter has been shown to be the invariable concomitant of the theory of ‘Equal Importance’; and thus we find that the question of ‘Equal Importance’ has been brought in only with a view to utilising the fact urged in the sutras, which would be absolutely inoperative, if the question were only with regard to the differ- ence of actions. On this question then, there are two kinds of Pi vapaksha: “ (A) “The Agnéya, etc., being all of equal importance, the two ‘ yugali’s men- ‘tioned along with the words ‘ ’aurnamasi’ and Amavisya, are distinct ‘Injunctions, and as such lay down sacrifices other than the Agnéya and ‘the rest, 6९.” (B) The two sentences—‘ ya évam vidvan paurnamaysan ‘“yajait’ and ‘amavdsyGim yajuli’—are the only injunctions of sacrifices, ‘all the other sentences quoted being only the injunctions of accessories * of these two sacrifices.” PURVAPAKSHA (A). First of all we take up that Purvapaksha which holds the two ‘sacri- ices’ (enjoined by the two ‘yajat?’s to be distinct from the Agnéya, ete. ‘Inasmuch all the sacrifices in question are mentioned by different words ‘and also by repetitions of words, they must be all of equal importance. “Though these two reasons—Difference of words and Repetition—are not “connected directly with the fact of ‘Equal Importance,’ yet they are “taken along with this, through the difference in actions (that these “would indicate), which is also implied in the assertion of ‘ Equal ‘‘Importance’;(as shown above). That is to say, the sacrifices denoted by ‘the two ‘ yagéta’s are shown to be different from those of the Actions ‘(mentioned along with the Darga-Ptrnamasa) that are not yaga (but ‘‘ Homa, etc.), by the difference in words ; while they are shown to be “different from the y@yas, by the repetition of the word ‘ yajate’; and “hence they must all be taken as of equal importance. (That is to RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA, ETC, 637 “say, when each ‘ yazéta’ mentions a distinct sacrifice, all the sacrifices ‘mentioned in the passages quoted become independent of one another, ‘and as such all equally are primary sacrifices). “Nor could any special purpose be served by taking the two “yajatt’s in question as mere references to the previously enjoined ‘sacrifices (because the only purpose that is found to be served by such ‘‘references is the pointing out of fresh accessories) ; and as a matter “of fact we do not find any accessories in the shape of materials etc. “mentioned in the two sentences in question; and as such we cannot “make the injunctive potency of these ‘ yajéa’s give up the function ‘fof laying down the actions themselves. ‘“Nor do we know of any such names—as ‘ Paurnamitsya’ or ‘Amdéa- ‘ vasya '—as belonging to any particular sacrifice, “Though we find the verb ‘yajaté’ in the Present Tense, yet we ‘can take it as injunctive, by accepting it either asa Prayogavacana (Direc- “tive Injunction), or Arthavdda (Wulogistic word), or as in the ‘ L&’ Mood “(which has the injunctive signification though the form of the Present ‘'Tense),—just ss we have in the case of the sentence ‘ Samitho yajate’ “(where the word ‘yajati, though in the Present ‘Tense, is admitted ८४ {0 have an Injunctive meaning). ४८ And though we find the sentences introduced by the word ‘ yat’,— “in ‘ya evam, etc.’—(which always precludes the injunctive character)—, “yet we can not very well deny its injunctive potency; because on “this point too it 18 exactly like the sentence ‘ yaddgneyo shtikapdalo, etc,” which has been accepted as an injunction. ‘“Norcan it be urged that ‘thetwo yajéta’s, though having the injunc- “tive force, are yet not the injunctions of independent actions, but ‘are only the alternative injunctions of the same sacrifices as those pre- “viously enjoined, just as we admit of the Injunctions of the same (° Jyotishtoma sacrifice met with in the various Vedas being only “alternative injunctions of the same sacrifice.’ Because in the latter ‘case, the different Vedic texts are meant for different persons, and ‘‘as such the different injunctions of the same sacrifice would not be ५५ 11861688, In the case in question, however, there is no such difference ‘in the character of the persons addressed, and as such the repeated “mention of the word ‘yajafé’ can serve no other useful purpose, save ‘the laying down of distinct sacrifices ; specially as they can not be taken “as enloyvising any other injunction, because they are not capable of ‘being taken along with any such other Injunction. “It may be asked—what are the Materials and the 762८265 of the two ५५ sacrifices laid down by these two ‘ yajate’s? And to this we make the ‘following reply :—The butter kept in the Dhruva vessel ts the material 638 TANTBA-VARTIKA, ADH. I1--PADA II—ADHI (3). ‘common to all sacrifices; and the Deities would be that which would “be indicated by the words of the Mantrag recited at their performance ; “and thus, these two sacrifices being found to have their details fully “supplied, they must be taken as enjoined distinctly by themselves. “That is to say, we have the Vedic declaration that ‘the butter kept “in the Dhruva is used at all sacrifices,’ and hence just as we take this “butter as the material of the ‘ Updngu’ sacrifice, so could we also do “with regard to the two sacrifices in question. And as for the Deity, we “find that in connection with Ajyabhdgas there are four Anuvdkyd verses ‘mentioned in the same order as the Ajyabhayas ; two of theso addressed ‘to Agni, and twoto Soma. And im accordance with the authority of Syn- “tactical Connection, which is always stronger than that of Order, the said “ verses are separated from the Ajyabhdgas and joined on to the two sacri- ‘‘fices in question; and the Syntactical Connection that would authorise “such transference would be of the text—‘ Vartraghni paurnamasyaim ‘“unicyélé, vrdhanvati amdvisyayam’—because there are no other actions, ०८ 8४४० the two sacrifices in question, that could be spoken of as ‘ Paurnu- ५५ 12052 ' and ‘ Amavdsya@’ (and ‘ Vartraghni’ and ‘ Vrdhanvuli’ are the names ‘of the two pairs of the said Anuvakya verses). It may bo argued that the “sentence quoted only lays down the times at which the verses have to be ‘“ recited, and they do not refer these verses to any actions. But, we ask, ‘6 what would be the use of laying down the connection of the verses with “any particular time ? Nor can the fact of the words ‘Paurnumdsyam’ and “ SAmdvasyfiyim’ having the locative ending be urged against us; because “we actually find many instances where sacrifices mentioned by words with ‘“locative endings are accepted as primary ;—e.g. ‘ yéna karmanertsét tatra “jayam guhuyat, where the principal action is that which is referred to by “*tatra.”’ Thus then the two ‘Anuvakyas—the Vartraghni and the Vrdhun- ‘vatt —being found to serve the same purpose, they come to be taken “as optional alternatives. And then again (as the Anuvadkyd verses “are recited before the performance of the sacrifice, and as such could “not serve the purpose of indicating the Deity) it becomes necessary to “assume the corresponding Ydjy@ verses (which are recited during the ‘performance, and as such are capable of indicating the Deity.) Or it “may be that the two Anuvakyds being simultaneously enjoined, they ‘may be taken (and used) conjointly; and thence we are led to the ‘conclusion that the sacrifice has two Deities connected with it; and con- “sequently it becomes necessary for us to assume two त्‌ ४/5 correspond- “ing to each pair of Anuvakyds (which Yajyifs would indicate the two “ Deities). Or we might assume a single Ydajy& with reference to the “single (joint) Deity Agni-Soma. Oragain, we might take one of the two ‘“*Vartraghni’ verses, and also one of the two Vrdhanvati verses, as the RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA, ETC. 689 “required Ydjya in each case. And thus we find that in whatever way “we might get at the Ydjya, the apparent inconsistency of the declara- ८४ tion—in the Vedic text ‘Vartraghni paurnamasyam etc.,’—of the relation- “ship between the Mantra and the Sacrifice, leads us to conclude that in ‘the two sacrifices, Agni and Soma are the Deities concerned. Then as “for the Ajyabhagas, from which the Mantras (indicative of the Deity) ‘“have been separated, their Deities are already mentioned by a sentence in ‘the form of the Purdikalpa Arthaviila—‘ Yasyaikasyaicit dévatayai “havirnirvapannijyasyaiva nau purastidyajan, Then as far the Mantras “in connection with the Ajayabhagas, the Yajyas have already been laid “down (and these have not been separated from them), and the Anuvakya “ Mantras (that have been removed elsewhere) also would come in, in ‘accordance with the direction : ‘ ddgatayibhyah kartavyuh’; and thus there ‘is nothing incongruous in the way that we have dealt with the subject. “And thus even when the sacrifices enjoined by the two Yajati’s ‘in question are distinct from the Agnéya etc., they are found to have ‘distinct forms of their own; and hence they must be admitted to be “distinct actions; and as such, there being nothing to show that the ‘ results follow from the six primaries Agneyd and the rest only, (because (९ {116 only sentence that had been accepted as showing this was ‘ Ya evam ५८ etc., which, however, has been shown to be the Injunction of a distinct “sacrifice altogether), the character of the primary belongs equally ८ {0 all the sacrifices mentioned in the various sentences quoted (z.c., “to the Praydja ete., the Aghara etc., as well as to the Agnéya etc.). PURVAPAKSHA (B). “We admit that the sacrifices are distinct; but we can not admit “of the fact of the character of the Primary belonging equally to all. ५ Because the names ‘ Amdvasya’ or ‘ Darga’ and ‘Pauraamis?’ would ‘apply only to some of the sacrifices, and not to all; and the result is ‘spoken of as following from those that are qualified by these names ; ‘‘and as such there can be no equality in the character of all the sacrifices. ‘That is to say, the words ‘ Darga’ and ‘ Paurnamdsa’ denote sacrifices “with a qualification (that of being named by these words); and as from “the sentence— Darcapaurnamasibhyam svargakamo yajéta'’—it 18 clear “that it is only from such qualified sacrifices that the particular result “ could follow, we must take these alone as the primary sacrifices ; and all ‘other sacrifices mentioned along with them (and without any distinct re- ‘sults of their own) must be accepted as the subsidiaries of these two.”’ ! 1 It may be noted that this second Pirvapaksha is at variance with the Siddhanta only as regards the difference of the sacrifices mentioned by the two ‘ Yajeta’s from the primary sacrifices of the Dar¢é-Purramdasa. 040 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA IT—ADHI (3). The upholder of Pirvapaksha (A) objects to the Pirvapaksha (B) on the following grounds: ‘That which is itself well known serves to qualify or specify that “which is less known; and hence in the case of the sentence— Darga- "° purnamisabhyaim swargakamo yajeta’—the signification of the names ०८ ° Darga’ and ‘ Pirnamdsa’ must be ascertained with reference to that ‘of the root " Yaz.’ That is to say, in all cases, where we have the ‘Injunction of an action with a name, these two being recognised to be "^ co-extensive, it 1s sometimes the particular signification of the root ‘ $ दद ’ ‘‘(sacrifice) which is defined or specified by the xame; while at other “times it is the sacrifice that defines or specifies the name, And between ‘these two, that which happens to be the better known of the two, turns the ‘other to its own purposes. For instance, (1) in the case of the sentence “* Jyotishtoména yagéta’ we find that the name ‘ Jyotishtoma’ is better “known from beforehand,—on account of its being related to the three ‘“stoma songs, called ‘ Jyotth’—; and hence this name serves to restrict ८ {16 signification of the root ‘ Yaji’ in this case to the Somayéga, ‘after having alienated it from the Dikshaniya etc.; and (2) in the case ५ of the sentence ‘ Rajasiyena yajéta,’ the name ‘ Rajasiya,’ not having its ‘signification pointing to any relationship with sacrifices, is taken up by ‘the root ‘ yaji,’ whose signification has been well known from the previ- ‘‘ously mentioned primary sacrifice. “Thus then, in the case in question, we find that the significations of “the two nouns (Darga and Purnamdasa), of the compound (Dargapiirna- “ masdibhyam), and of the dual number (in this compound), are not kuown (° beforehand (as in any way connected with the performance of sacrifices) ; ‘and hence the root ‘ Yaji’ cannot be taken as having its signification ‘‘yeferring to (or ) defined by that name. On the other hand, the root “*Yagu’ is applicable to all sacrifices; and as such, through the mention ‘of the particular result (Svarga), it comes, in the case in question, to be ‘“‘apphed to the sacrifices mentioned in the context under consideration ; “and as such it would apply tho word ‘ Dargapirnamasa’ to its own ८“ object (vz., all the sacrifices—primaries as well as subsidiaries—that ‘happen to be mentioned in the context), “For these reasons, we conclude that in the word ‘ Darcgapiirna- ‘masabhyim’ no significance is to be attached to either the component “words, or to the compound, or to the dual number—because thie “word is only a particular combination of letters, simply pointing out ‘‘ the instrument, or means, in connection with all the sacrifices mentioned ; “exactly as in the case of the word ‘ Rajasiya.’ And as for the dual “number, we can explain it, in accordance with the rule ‘ Supadm supo bhavantt,’ as having been used in the place of the plural, or in that RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA, ETc. 641 “of the singular—this singularity being based upon the fact of all the “sacrifices being taken as one complete whole. ‘ Objection: ‘How can the word ‘ Darcgapirnamasabhyim’ be said ‘to have its signification not well known, when, as a matter of fact, we ‘find that, from among the sacrifices mentioned in the context, there are “some (the Agneya etc.) which are laid down in connection with the points “of time (Amdvasy@ and Pirnamdasi) signified by the words ‘ Darga’ “and ‘ Pirnamasa’ ; whilo there are others (the Ajyabhaga etc.) which are ‘‘spoken of in the dual number; and certainly the signification of the (° word ‘Dargapiirnumasabhyam’ is well-known to be applicable to these “sacrifices. That is to say, a word renounces all its own meaning, and ‘waits upon the signification of other words, when even a certain portion “of it is found to be unknown; in the case in question, however, we “actually find that certain sacrificos—Agnéya etc.—are connected with “the time ^ Amdvdsya’ and ‘ Purnamdsi’ (signified by the words ८ ‹ Darga’ and ‘ Parnamasa’), while others—-the Ayyabhaga etc.—are “connected with the dual number (which we find in the word ‘* * dargapirnamasabhyam’); and under the circumstances, it 18 not proper “to speak of the signification of the word ‘ Dargapitirnamdsdbhyam ’ ‘(being unknown as applicable to any sacrifices) and as such to be ‘ renounced.’ “To the above, we make the following reply :—It is the Base and (° Affix (1.e., the compound ‘ Durgapiirnamdsa’ and the dual termination) ‘taken as a joint whole, that can specify or qualify the root ‘ Yajatz’; in ‘the case of the Agn&ya etc,, on the one hand, and the Ajyabhaga etc., on “the other, each of these is devoid of any connection with one part “of the word. That is to say, though in the ‘ Agnéya’ etc., we find a (° 0006९४10 with the times denoted by the words ‘ Darga’ and ‘ Pirna- ‘“mdsa,, and as such the signification of the Base (Durgapirnzamasa) ‘would reside in them,—yet, inasmuch as these sacrifices are many, < {06 signification of the dual termination ( 111 ‘ Dargapirnamdasibhyam ’) ‘‘sannot apply to them; and as such the word ‘ Dargapiirnamdsdbhyam ’ ‘“‘as a whole is incapable of applying to the Agnéya otc. And also, ‘“thoagh we find duality in the Ajyabhaga etc., yet the Base ( Dargaparna- ५५ mas@) is absolutely inapplicable to these; and so the word as a whole ° cannot apply to these either. Nor 18 the co-extensiveness (of the sacrifice “and the ‘ Dargaptirnamadsdbhyam’) clearly mainfested either by the ‘meaning, or the context, or the use of different words; and as such “it 18 not possible for the name ‘ Dargapuirnamisdbhyaim’ to be taken as “referring to the sacrifices,—either on the ground of the similarity ‘Sof certain letters (in accordance with the law of the corruption of names “by which a slight difference in certain letters does not completely 81 642 TANTRA-VANTIKA, ADH, 1——PADA 11—ADHI (3). “alter the uame), or by taking the word ‘ Dargaptirnamadsdbhyim’ in ‘‘its secondary signification as indirectly indicating the sacrifice. “ Question :—‘ Why can not we take the sentences (Ya enam uidvain “amavisyayam yajate and ya evam paurnamasaydm. etc,) as laying down ‘‘these two independent sacrifices for the accomplishment of the result ° "^ For, even in accordance with the Siddhiinté theory, these two words (yajaté) ‘‘will be said to lay down these two as composite actions (made up of the ‘‘gix primary sacrifices) towards the fulfilment of the particular result. It ‘‘might be urged that the expression Darcapurnamasaé being different “from the expression Amavdsyapaurnamasa, the actions referred to in ‘the sentence mentioning Svarga as the result could not be recog- ‘“nised to be the same as those mentioned by the two ‘ Yajate’s in the ‘‘sentences in question. But this objection is equally applicable to all ‘parties. For instance, for the upholder of the Purvapaksha also, what ‘are meant to bring about the result are the two composite sacrifices “named Paurnamdsya and Amavasya ; and certainly these are not recog- ^“ 11860 to be the same as those in the sentence Darcapiurnamiasabhyam “ svargakamo yagéta. If it be urged that in this case, though the names “are not the same, yet, the names would be applicable to the composites “because of their being performed at the points of ४८४१८ expressed by the ‘“words,—then, the relationship of the time is equally present in my ‘case also; the meaning of the sentences being that one should perform “(yqéta) the Paurnamasa on the Paurnamasi day, and the Amdavisya “on the Amavasyad day.’ ‘‘ Answer :—This cannot be; because this relationship of the time “being common to these two sacrificos, as also to the six sacrifices “ Agneya and the rest, we do not see any reason why the result should “be attributed to these two only. That is to say, when all the eight “are equally connected with the particular time, there is no reason for “ attributing the result to the two only. “It might be urged that from among those cight the result might ‘be attributed to any two sacrifices. ‘But this would be most improper; because without any particular “reason, such attributing of the result to any two sacrifices would be a ‘‘most unauthorised procedure; and secondly, the relative subserviency ५८ 0 these eight would become a matter of option; and this leading to a “great anomaly, could never be allowed. ‘hat is to say, unless we find “a special reason for doing so, as long as we find the relationship of the ५ specified time equally present in all the eight sacrifices, those two that “would be chosen out as leading directly to the result, would make “all the other six subsidiary to them; and inasmuch as these six have all “the marks of primary actions, there would be a very great; anomaly. RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA, ETC. 643 “It might be urged that the said importance being a matter of option, “it could, by turns, be attributed to all the pairs concerned; but in that “case, there would bo another anomaly, viz, the same sacrifice would ‘at one time be the primary, and at the other subsidiary ; and further, “from among those having the characters of both the primary and “the subsidiary (as it is only that which is subsidiary in the Agnéya “that is said to be capable of being introduced into its corresponding “ Praydja), a certain sacrifice would, in its subsidiary character, be liable “to be introduced in the corresponding Prayfjas of the Agnéya etc. ; while ‘the same would, in its character of the primary, be incapable of ‘being so introduced; and thus there would be an eternal doubt as to ‘“‘what should be really introduced into the Praydjas. Aud further, as ५ 8 matter of fact, all numbers subsist in the objects numbered, only through ८ & certain secondary property ; in the case in question, however, either “in the two independent sacrifices (meant to be enjoined by the sentences “in question), or in the Agnéya etc., we do not find in any part of these “any such sub-class or secondary property, whereby we could recognise “their duality. Specially as whichsoever of them would be taken up, “its duality would be directly set aside by the plurality of other sacrifices “and also by the singleness of that sacrifice itself. And thus we do not ‘find the dual number applicable to any of tho sacrifices in question. ‘In accordance with the Siddhinftu, on the other hand, the two words “(Darga and Pirnamisa) express two composite sacrifices; and as such “there being a distinct dissimilarity from the theory in which all the sacri- “५ 0९68 are not taken as forming «ny composites, we find the requisite ‘“sub-property (in the form of the compositeness), and as such the “connection of duality becomes possible; and through this there would ‘‘be a relationship with the specified t7me also; and thereby in a. way, the “application of the nouns ‘ Darga’ and ‘ Pirnamdsa’ also becomes *‘ possible; and thas in this case it becomes possible for the word ‘ Darga- pirnamisabhyaim’ to be takea as qualifying the sacrifice. In accor- “dance with the Pdarvapaksha, however, this is not possible; because, “inasmuch as it does not admit of any composite sacrifices, the number two ‘can not in any way be applicable (and 1167106 it could never admit of the “result to follow from any two sacrifices) ; and hence the result must be ५५ attributed to each and every one of the sacrifices nentioned in the context. ‘“ The following question might be put to us: ‘Why cannot we have “all the eight sacrifices, as qualified by the duality of the times Amivasya “and Parnamusi, as enjoined by the sentences in question (in this ease “the duality pertaining to the points of time and not to the sacrifices) ? “Just as in accordance with the Srddhanta, wo have the six primary “sacrifices enjoined with regard to the duality of the two composites.’ 644 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I1—PADA II—~ADHI (3), “To this the reply that we make is that such hazy processes can not “get aside the verb from each and every one of the sacrifices mentioned ; “because it actually reats upon every one of these. And then, too, the “time being something entirely diffierent from the sacrefice, the number “belonging to the former can in no case appertain to the latter. In “the Séddhanta, the case is different; as according to that, there 18 “no absolute difference between the component parts (sacrifices) and “the two composite wholes (to which latter the number belongs); and ‘“as such there is nothing incompatible in connecting the number of the ^“ छ 11016 with the component parts. ‘Thus then, we conclude that, in accordance with the Parvapaksha, ‘as the application of the names Darga and Paurnamfsa depends upon ‘ the signification of the root‘ Yajz,’ all the sacrifices in question must, ‘be admitted to be equally primary.” SIDDHANTA. To the above, the Siva makes the following reply: “ Prakarana ”—that which is performed—wonld be the substratum of the words connected with ‘ Paurnamdasya’ and ‘ Amavasya’; or the context would help these two words; and consequently we must accept that alone to be enjoined which is denoted by these. That is to say, in all cases, we find that the Injunctive word prompts us to certain specific sacrifices; and in case the sentences ‘ ya évam ete.’ are taken as enjoining independent sacrifices, as they do not make any mention of the material or the deity related to these sacrifices, people would never be found to take up the performance of such unspecified sacrifices. That is to say, the words ‘ yajate’ in these sentences, or the words ‘Amavdsya’ and ‘ Pirnamdsa,’ do not denote sacrifice in general; nor do you (who hold the sentences to lay down two independent sacri- 7068) admit of these words pointing to all the sacrifices in question. Then all that you can do 18 to make them lay down two independent sacrifices. But in that case, inasmuch as the details (material deity &c.) of these sacrifices are not mentioned, no one would be found to perform them; and hence the sentence would become wholly futile. If, however, they are taken as referring to the sacrifices mentioned in the context, then, the materials and the deities of all these sacrifices, as also the particular points of time at which they have to be performed, being found to be duly mentioned, the full form of the sacrifices becomes known; and as such the sentence becomes utilised (in pointing out the time at which they should be performed). RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA, ETC. 645 It has been argued above that the Material and the Deity of the four sacrifices are also clearly cognisable. But though it is true that. the common material, Dhrauva, might be taken as the material to be employed, yet inasmuch as there 18 no mention of a Deity, the sacrifice remains as indistinct as ever. Nor is it possible for the Deity to be indicated by the words of the Mantras employed; because the Mantras in question are distinctly pointed out, by the Order in which they occur, to belong to the Ajayabhagas. Nor is it possible for this Order to be set aside by the Sentence ; because in the case in question there is no direct antagonism between these two ; because when it is possible for the sentence ‘Vartraghni Amavasyayaim etc. ’—to be taken in such a way as to be quite in keeping with the indica- tion of the Order, then we cannot but renounce, as untenable, any other theories that might entail a contradiction between the two. In the sentence ‘ Vartraghni amavasyayaim etc.’—if the words ‘ Paurnamdst’ and ‘Amavasya’ denoted Actions, then the antagonism (between the Order and Sentence) could not be romoved: (because in that case the Sentence would refer the Mantras to those Actions, while the Order refers them to the Ajyabhaga). As a matter of fact, however, these words only denote tume; and as such there is no antagonism between the two. And when there is a common ground for both the Sentence and the Order, it is incum- bent on us to lend support to that theory which reconciles them. And further, at the very outset, the words ‘ Amda@vdsyai’ and ‘ Paurnamasi’ denote particular points of time; and it is only subsquently (if the denota- tion of the time be found to be incompatible with the rest of the sentence) that they can indicate the Actions, through their connection with those times ; and hence by priority (and because there is nothing incompatible in it) we admit the words to be denotative of time. Lecause if the commonly recognised signification of timo (by these words) were not compatible with the sentence, then alone could we reject it and take the words to be indicative of Actions. Then again, we find that the Locative termination (in the words ‘ Amavasydyam’ and *‘ Paurnamasyam') is more compatible with the signification of time (than with that of Ac- tion); because Time is always known as the Adhikarana (Substratum, Container) of Actions; andas it is not possible for Actions to be such an Adhitharana, the Locative ending, in that case, could hardly be explained in any way. It has been argued above that uo purpose is served by such connecting of the Mantra with any particular time. But if tadarthya (being for the sake of) were the only relation possible, and if it were this relation that were asserted by us (as between the Mantra and the Time), then the said objection would be all right; but, as a matter of fact, the case is this: The Mamnira appearing (by the particular Order in which the 646 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, LI—PADA tI—ADRAI (3). Mantras are mentioned) to have been laid down as for the sake of the Ajyabhigas, it remains doubtful as to which Mantra is to be employed in which particular Ajyabhdga; and hence what the mention of the words ‘amavdsyayam’ and ‘paurnamasyam’ (in the sentence ‘ Vartraghni’ etc.) does is to point out that the Mantra known as the‘ Vartraghni’ is to be used in the Ajyabhaga performed at one time (the Amd@vdasy@), and that called ‘Vridhanvati’ in that performed at another (the Paurnamds7). And further, according to our theory, inasmuch as the Ajyabhagas are already known to have a particular Deity, the Injunction (of time) is found to serve a visible purpose (that of pointing out the time), In your case, on the other hand, it becomes necessary to make many gratuitous assumptions. That is to say, in all cases, the relationship of things 18 ascertained by means of their mutual requirements; hence the Ajyabhagas, that have their Deity already known, standing in need of Mantras capable of pointing out that Deity, would at once take up such Mantras, and it would not require any very great effort on our part to connect the two. In your case, on the other hand, the sacrifices denoted (by tho sentences in question) being altogether new, their Deities are not known ; and as such they do not stand in any immediate need of Mantras (indica- tive of those Deities) ; hence it becomes necessary for yon to make the following assumptions: (1) you will have to assume the Mantra, and its duality, thereby makiug the single Injunction have many meanings ; (2) you will have to assume the existence of many Deities indicated by those Mantras, while it is not necessary for a single sacrifice (which is held to be enjoined by the sentence in question) to have more than one Deity or more than one Anuvakya; (3) there is an assumption of a Yajy@ verse (not found in the Veda) (4) 9s also fresh Puronuvakyds, not mentioned in the Veda, for the Ajayabhagas. It has been declared above that ^ 016 of the two Vartraghnis, as also one of the two ‘ Vridhanvatis’ would be the Ydajya, while the other is the Anuvdkya. But this is scarcely possible, as the taking of any of these as Ydajy@ would be contrary to the fact of their being named ‘ Anuvaikyf.’ Further, since you admit the potency of pointing out the factors to be employed in the particular sacrifice, to the Sentence, and to the Mantra,—and since the Sentence (‘Vdariraghni amdvasyayam, etc.’ does not speak of the instrumentality of the Mantras (Vartraghni and Vridhanvati ) in the sacrifice, tt becomes necessary for us to assume the recitation of these Mantras to have certain invisible results—just as we have in the case of the recitation of the ‘Vaishnavt’ verses; and as such the Mantras could not be taken as serving the visible purpose of pointing out the Deity ; specially as the Manéra is not required at all by that which has to be pointed out. And under the circumstances, instead of assuming a RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY KETWEEN AGHAKAS AND AGNEYA, ETC. 647 Deity to be indicated by the Manira, it would be far better to assume the Mantras to exert an indirect influence towards the accomplishment of the Action, On the other hand, the Ajyabhagas being two, and they also being recognised as having two Deities (Agni and Soma),—the Mantras indicative of those Deities are actually required by them (for the purpose of lending authority to their cognition); and these Mantras. heing pointed out as to be used at the sacrifice, by the indications of the Mantras themselves, as also by tho order in which they happen to be mentioned,—they come to serve a distinct visible purpose. And thus, the Mantra and its duality etc., all having been pointed out, what remains to be done by the sentence (‘Vartraghni, etc.’) is to lay down distinct restrictions with regard to the time at which the various Mantras are to be used ; and this process is certainly much simpler than that involving the nbove-mentioned endless assumptions. Nor, in this case, does the said sentence become altogether useless . because the aforesaid restriction with regard to time cannot be accom- plished by mere Proximity (and hence the use of the sentence lies in this restriction ). For these reasons there can be no Injunction of the Deity, through the sentences brought forward; because these have been shown to have no connection with the matter. And hence the sacrifice held to be en- joined by the sentence ‘ Ya evam, etc.’, not having its details of material and Deity clearly mentioned, it cannot be taken as one different from those previously laid down. Question: ‘What would be the use of making the इलो. “tence ‘Ya evam, ete.’ a mere reference to the other sacrifices—Agneya “and the rest? Because an Injunction that fails to enjom anything “expressed by a word, by its part, or by a sentence, can never be of any ‘use in matters relating to Dharma, (and hence as in the case of Heference, ‘the sentence in question would not contain any of these injunctions, 1t “could not be of any use in regard to Dharma). Answer: Just as the sentences laying down the various sacrifices (Agnéya and the rest) form parts of the Joint Direction (‘ Dargapirna- masaibhyam svargakamo yajéta’), so also do the two sentences 111 question (‘ Ya evam, elc.’); because it is these latter alone that render the Dual number (in ‘ Dargapiirnimasdbhyam’) compatible with the whole thing. That 18 to say, firstly, it is only when the two sentences in question have spoken of the Primary sacrifices as two composite wholes, that the Dual number in ‘Dargapirnamasabhyam’ becomes possible ; and herein lies a distinct use of the two sentences; and there is no such rule as that it is only an Injunctive Sentence that can be of use; specially (0.4 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. H—PADA H—aADH1 (3). as we find many non-[njunctive sentences (such as the Arthavida) serving useful purposes, in association with Injunctions ;—secondly, the mention of the various sacrifices—Agnéya and the rest—extending#@over many sentences, they can never be spoken of as ‘two,’ except i the two sentences in question (‘ya evam, ete.’). And it is with a view to this fact that the Bhashya has mentioned, as the Siddhdanta, the fact of there being « Relation of subserviency among the sacrifices, which necessarily follows from what we have explained above. Otherwise, it would have becn impossible to bring forward the theory of the two sentences in question merely referring to the previous sacrifices, until the chunce of wuselessness urged in the second 5८१८ (in favour of the repetition of the same verb denoting distinct Actions, to which the case of the sentences considered in the present Adhikarana is meant to be an exception) has been removed by showing the distinctly useful character of the reference (by the two sontences in question to the previous sacrifices). Thus then, it must be admitted that there is a distinctly useful purpose served by taking the whole seutence as merely referring to the previous sacrifices; and there is no incongruity in this theory. Question: ‘‘ How is it possible to speak of many distinct sacrifices ८५ &8 one or two composite wholes ? ” Answer: It is quite possible; just as many trees located in one place are spoken as a single composite ‘ forest,’ so though the sacrifices are many and distinct, yet imasmuch as they are all performed at the same time, they can very well be spoken of as a composite whole. That 18 to say, when we see many trecs in a place, we havo an idea of a composite whole, and we come to think of them all as ‘a forest’; in the same manner, when we find many sacrifices performed on a singlo day, it is only natural that we should come to think of them as a single composite whole; and it is only on account of the singleness of this composite whole that we have the singular number in ‘ paurnumasim.’ Though, as a matter of fact, the words ‘ Paurnamdasi’ and ‘ Amavasya’ really denote the component sacrifices, yet they take the singular ending, on account of the singleness of the composite whole indicated by these sacrifices ; and these words are not the names of the composite wholes themselves. Because it is only on account of the co-extensivencss (of the ‘sacrifice’ as signified by ‘yazéta’ with the name ‘ Darga’ and ‘ Purna- masa,’ mentioned in ^ Dargapiirnamasdbhydm ’ ), that we take these words to be the names of sacrifices; and certainly the character of sacrifice belongs to the individual sacrifices ‘ Agnéya’ and the rest, and not to the composite whole made up by these, That is to say, in the sentence ‘paurnandsim yajate’ (or in ‘dargapiirnamasdbhyam yajéta’ ), inasmuch RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AQGNEYA, ETC. 649 ४8 the sucrifice denoted by the root ‘yaji’ is found to be co-extensive with the name ‘ paurnamdasi,’ we canclude that ‘ Paurnamdsi’ is the name of & sacrafice; and the character of sacrifice does not belong to any composite whole made up by the Agnéya, etc., but to the individual Agnaya, etc., them- selves; and hence just as the root ‘ yayz’ (sacrifice) is applicable to each one of these sacrifices, so also is the name in question. Nor is it possible for the whole composite to appear at one and the same time, because at the time that the Agnéya, otc., are performed, they are performed inde- pendently of one anothér; and hence at that time there does not appear any idea of their forming a composite whole. And hence even in consideration of the time of actual performance, we can say that the name belongs to each individual sacrifice. And further, if the two words were the names of the composite wholes, independently of the component sacrifices, then the Directive seutence-—‘ Darcapurnamasabhyam svurgakimo yajéia’—would also lay down the composite wholes towards the fulfilment of the particular result ; and in that case, the component sacrifices not being the means of bringing about that result, there would be a single 40707५४५ proceeding from the composite whole itself; and thus there being no individual Apirva with each individual sacrifice, there would be absolutely no use of performing (or laying down) so many distinct sacrifices, And further, the actions laid down in counection with the various sacrifices, all tending towards a single Apirva, there would be no restriction as to which action should be performed in the course of which particular sacrifice; nor would each of the sacrifices be connected with any specific method of performance; and consequently, there would be no use for the consideration (in subsequent Adhydyas) of the questions as to the repetition of the Actions performed in course of the Agnéya in another sacrifice; and further the ‘ Saurya,’ for instance, being a form of the ‘ Agnéya,’ there would not be any method of performance applicable to it; as there being no such method applicable to the Agnéya only, the only method that would be available would be that of all the three Primaries (Agnéya and the rest); and as the ‘ Saurya’ is not a form of these three, any such method could not be applicable to it; nor again could we have such declarations as—‘ The Paurnamasi has only one cake,’ ‘the Amdvdsy@ 18 without the sdnndyya,’ and so forth; because the number of cakes would be the total of all that are employed in all the sacrifices that go to form the composite whole, and that number could not be applied to the lesser numbers—‘ one,’ etc.,—because the number would be exactly lke the number ‘ thousand,’ which is not applicable to any part of itself. We meet with such declarations as—‘ because of the composite whole not being enjoined,’ and ‘because the composite whole is an accessory, 82 690 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1I—PADA II—ADHI (3). and so forth ;—we must conclude that such words as those in question signify the component parts (and not the whole); as otherwise, being denoted by the word, it would be the composite whole that would be enjoined ; and as such, being directly connected with the result, that would be the Predominant Action (and as such both the above declarations would be false). For these reasons, it must be concluded that the words ‘ Paurnamdasi’ and ‘ Amdvdsya’ denote the individual sacrifices as qualified by the two composite wholes. And, though, these sacrifices being many, the name would have to take a Plural ending,—yet the singular number is due to the indication (of the single composite whole by the individual sacrifices) ; and it is with a view to this that the Bhdshyu has declared— samuddyagabdataydvakalpayishyate (It would be taken as indicating the composite whole). So again, the Bhashya doclares—bhavati hi bahinamé- kavacanantahkh samuddydpékshak (the singular ending in the case of many things is possible, as referring to the composite whole) ; where the Bhashya also has spoken of only an ‘ apeksh@ ’—indirect influence—of the compo- stte whole, and it does not speak of this latter as being actually signified by the word. The words ‘crowd,’ ‘ forest’ and the like can be taken as similar instances, only when these also are taken as signifying the compo- nent individuals as qualified by the composite whole; if, however, they signify the composite whole, then they can serve as instances only so far as the singular ending based upon the singleness of the composite whole 18 concerned, From the above it also follows that the words ‘ Darca’ and ‘ Pirnamdsa’ are synonymous with ‘ Amdvdasya’ and ‘ Pirnamdsi’ re- spectively (because only under the above conditions could we have the dual ending in ‘ durgapirnamasdbhyam ’). Thus then we find that the reference to the composite whole (formed by the sacrifices), by the two sentences in question, has its use in making possible the two singular endings (in ‘paurnamasim’ and ‘ amavasyaim’), as based upon the fact of these two names indicating two composite wholes; and this will be explained later on, under sé#iva 1V ~1V—34., And the words ‘ Darga’ and ‘ Pirnamdasa’ also following the duality of the composite wholes, come to refer to the same (1.e., to the Amavasya and the Paurnamds?); specially as there is much similarity between the words ‘pau namast’ aud ‘ piirnamdast’; and on account of the word ‘darga’ appearing along with ‘ piurnamdsa’ (while ‘ Amavdsya@’ appears with ‘Paurnamdast’), the word ‘darga’ also comes to be synonymous with ‘amavasya’. Or it may 06 by the figurative method of ‘contrary expres- sion’ that it would be easier to get at the comprehension of the Amavasya by 6६०8 of the word ‘ Darga ’—just as the blind is spoken of derisively RELATION OF SUBSERVIENOY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA, ETC. 651 as ‘one having eyes’; because it will be declared later on that “ because the moon 18 not seen on the Amavasy4, therefore, the Amavdsy 6 is (derisive- ly or figuratively) spoken of as ‘dargu’.”’ So also at the close of the ‘Anvarambhaniya’ sentence, it will be shown that the words ‘darga, and ‘amavasya’ are synonymous. Thus then, the Result being found to follow from only those sacrifices that go to form the composite wholes, all the sacrifices other than these must be taken as subsidiary to them (the former ones, the Agnéya and the rest, being taken as the Primary Sacrifices ; and as such they are not all of ‘equal importance ’). Question: ‘When all this has been fully dealt with in the present “ Adhikarana, there is no use for introducing the same discussion in the “ Fourth Adhydaya,” | Answer: There is nothing very wrong in this: Because it is only when the conclusion in the present Adhikarana has been arrived at, that the possiblity of the root ^ yaji’ pointing to all the sacrifices mentioned in the context gives rise to the corresponding Adhikarana in Adhyaya IV, and the Srddhdnta too of that Adhikarana would be arrived at only by the help of the present Adhikarana; otherwise the Piurvapaksha would have to be admitted as the Stddhanta; hence the Adhikarana intro- duced in the fourth Adhydya is only by way of a deduction from the present one. There is yet another useful purpose served by the Reference (Anuvada) in question. Itis by means of that alone that we get at the direction—‘ The Amdrasya is to be performed on the Amdvisya day and the Paurnamasa on the Paurnamasa day,’ which lays down the time for the performance of the two sacrifices in question. Against this, the following objection might be urged: ‘ Even this ‘direction is absolutely useless, because the time for the performance 18 ‘duly pointed out by the sentence which originally enjoined the sacrifico— “wiz: the sentence ‘ yaddgnéyo ’ shtakapalo amavasydyam paurnamdasyanca- “cyuto bhavati.” To this we make the following reply: In the sentence that we have found, we find the ६८४८ forming part of the means (of accomplishing the Result); whereas in the original Injunctive Sentence, we find it, very differently from this, connected with various sacrifices independent of one another. That 18 to say, in the original Injunctive Sentence, we find the Time mentioned in such a way that it is connected with the Primary sacrifices —Agnéya, etc.,—independent of one another, and wholly devoid of their subsidiaries. In the sentence that we have brought forward, on the 652 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. If-——PADA II——ADHI (3). other hand, the Time is mentioned by words with the Instrumental termination; and hence it forms pars of the Means (of the accomplish- ment of the particular result); and the instrumentality of these 18४8 been cognised as belonging to the Primary Sacrifices together with their subsidiaries, as connected with one another, in accordance with the Directive Sentence (‘ Dargapirnamasabhyam gvargakamo yayeta’) ; and hence any further mention of the Instrumentality of these would not be necessary ; specially as they are laid down only with reference to the particular Time. And inasmuch as what is meant to be so connected with Time is the Trio of Primaries, together with the subsidiaries, and connected with one another, one of these trios being connected with the Paurnamdasi, and another with the Amfvasya@ day. And the relationslip of the sacrifices is such that the moment that one of the trio having been begun is being completed,—at that very moment, the other two are also taken up; and thus each trio comes to be performed as forming a single action. If they were to be performed in accordance with the time laid down in the original injunctive sentence, then each of the three would come to be performed by itself, separately from the subsidiaries. And thus there is a distinct difference between the two ways of taking the sentences. Objection: ‘In that case, as the result would be brought about by the two trios with all their subsidiaries, there would as great a necessity “for the two Trios being performed together, as there is of the performance ९० the subsidiaries along with the trio of Primaries; and hence just as ‘the subsidiaries of one trio are recognised as to be performed at the “time of its performance, so also would the one trio—the Pirnamdsi— “have to be performed together with the Amdvasya (on the Amdvasya ५५ day), and vice versa; and hence both of these would come to bo performed “on both days. Nor would such performance be contrary to the restric- “tion of time in the original injunctive sentence, because the Paurna- “masa would be performed on the Paurnamasi day (and also on the ९९ Amadvasya). For if one performs the Amdvdsya on the Paurnamdasi day, “it does not follow that it can never be performed on the Amdvasya day ; “so also with the Paurnamdsa. Nor does the original Injunctive sentence ‘prohibit the performance of the sacrifices on days other than those “mentioned therein; because all that the sentence does is to lay down “the performance of the sacrifice on that particular day.” To the above we maka the following reply: That sacrifice of which the specific time is not known, and of which the specific form does not disappear (in the absence of such knowledge of its time),—if the time of such a sacrifice is said to depend upon something else, there is nothing wrong in this, RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA, ETC. 653 That 18 to say, the Amavdsyd sacrifice, having its time duly mentioned in the original Injunction, does not look out for another time, in the shape of the Paurnamasi day, which it would get at, by means of its association with the Puurnamasi sacrifice; and similarly the Paurnamdst sacrifice would not look for the Amdvaisya day; and under the circumstances, if these two trios (the Paurnamasa and the Amfvasya) were performed at any other times, such performance would not be in keeping with the correct forms of these sacrifices as laid down in the original Injunctions ; and as such they would altogether cease to be the ‘ Darga’ and the ‘ Pawrnamasa ’ (as not performed on these days). As for the subsidiaries, however, any parti- cular time for the performance of these 18 not mentioned ; and as such they look forward to the mention of such a time; and consequently, there being no chance of an incompatibility with the time mentioned in the original Injunction, there is no impediment in the way of their being connected with the time that is indicated by their peculiar associations. Ou this point we have the following objection: ‘The subsidiaries ‘always being performed at the time that their respective primaries are ‘‘performed, we would have a clear idea of their time, even without such ‘a sentence (as that ‘amdvdsyayim amiavasydyaya, etc.), and hence this “sentence cannot be admitted to have anything to do with the pointing “out of the time of the subsidiaries.” 10 this objection we make the following reply: That the time for the subsidiaries is the same as that of the Primaries is not declared by any mantras ; outhe other hand, it is this very sentence (that you have objected to) that forms the basis of that assertion. Objection: ‘Those (subsidiaries) that are far removed (in point ‘of time) cannot in any way help the Primary.”’ Reply: Whence have you got such a law that it is only when a certain thing is in close proximity with another, that it can afford any help? For it is only in accordance with the declarations in the scrip- tures that we ascertain whether or not one Action will help another. Hence until we have met with a declaration to the effect that it is only proximate objects that can render any help, there can be no authority for asserting that that which is remote cannot help. Objection: ‘The performance of the Primary together with the ५५ subsidiaries is pointed by a sentence other than what you bring forward. ‘For instance, we have the sentence—‘ ya ish{ya pagunad soména yagéta sa “qmiavasyaya paurnamasya yaséta,—where the word ‘Ishti’ has the “Tnstrumental ending; and being laid down with reference to the ६८१५८ “of the performance of itself together with all its Component Sacrifices “and subsidiaries, the required mention of the time is got at by that ‘* means.” 654 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. M—~PADA II—ADHI (3). Reply: True, it 18 got; but the desired performance is not accom. plished. Because the word ‘zishf{z’ refers either to the whole collection of sacrifices (Primaries and Subsidiaries) or to each of them singly; and it never refers to any ‘trio of sacrifices’; consequently, a performance based upon that word would be altogether different. That is to say, it is ascertained that the word ‘zsh{i’ does not refer to any ‘trio’; and thus the word applying to each sacrifice (as ‘ tsh{7’ is etymologically equivalent to ‘sacrifice,’ ‘yajta’), it would follow, from the sentence you have brought forward, that each one of the sacrifices, singly, would be per- formed on one Amfivdsya or on one Pérnamasi day. (That is to say, one sacrifice would be performed on one Am@vdsy4 and another on another Amiavisya) ; and as such a proper performance of the sacrifices will not be accomplished. It might be urged that—‘‘ the word ‘ishfti’ might be applied, by a particular convention, to all the sacrifices Agnéya and the rest, and the word would thus be as applicable to each ‘trio’ as itis to the Soma.” But thus too, inasmuch as the Directive sentence —‘dargapitirnamisibhydm svargakamo yajéta’—is one only, both the composite sacrifices the ‘ Darga’ as well as the ‘ Paurnamasa’ would be performed either on the Amdvasy@ or on the 1400125४ day; and in this there wonld be a contradiction of the restriction of time laid down in the original Injunction. It might be urged that, “in deference to the original Injunction (and also to the signification of the sentence we have brought forward), we can accept the two points of time as two alternatives,” But then also, just as in accordance with the original Injunction, each Primary Sacrifice would be performed alone by itself upon a distinct Amavdsya day,—so also, inasmuch as the Subsidiaries are not differentiated as to some of them belonging to the ‘Amdavisya’ while others belong to the Paurnamasa, the performance of all of these Subsidiaries would be done in any one place only. And hence, the sentence that you have brought forward cannot serve the same purpose that is served by the sentences ‘Amavasydm amavisyaya, etc.’; and as such it can be of no use with regard to the Primary Sacrifices; hence all that it could do would be to connect the particular time with the other modifications of the Primary Sacrifices. Objection: ‘“‘The performance of all the sacrifices, together, as one “action, could very well be brought about by the sentence—‘ samé darga- ०“ pirnamasabhyam yajéta’; because inasmuch as no significance could be “attached to the place (denoted by the word ‘same’=on level ground), all “that the sentence does is to show that all the sacrifices (the Primary “along with its subsidiaries) have to be performed together. (Because ‘the sentence speaks of ‘ dargapirnamisa’ as the means; and they could be ‘mentioned as the means only when accompanied by all their Subsidiaries, ‘‘as urged above by the Siddhdnti himself).”’ RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA, ETC. 655 Reply: Allthat the sentence quoted does is to point out that the fact of the ground being level (sama) applies equally to all the Sacrifices ; and hence the sense of the sentence would only be that in all the sacrifices one should have a single level platform, and not many platforms, That is to say, even when the sacrifices are performed separately, as they are not performed in different places, the mention of a place applies commonly to allofthem. It might be argued that, “the common application that the sentence would imply being that on account of the peculiar relationship between the Davca and the Pirnamdsa, one of them becomes connected with the level platform at the same time that the other does.” But in that case, inasmuch as all the six primary sacrifices are mentioned simultaneously, it would be necessary to perform them simultaneously also; and this would be incompatible with the restriction of time laid down in the original Injunction. If, however, they were to be performed in accordance with the original Injunction, then it would be necessary to bring about an association of all these sacrifices,—each of which would be connected with the prescribed time,—with reference to the ‘level platform’; and as such the whole performance would end with the per- formance of the six Piimary Sacrifices only; and as for the Subsidiaries, they would have to be performed, as not restricted by the time specified for the Primaries (because the original Injunction does not prescribe the time for the Subsidiaries); and as such they would come to be performed between the performances of two Primaries (7.¢, between the two Amdavasyds on which the two Primaries would be performed). And further, as it is only right for the Subsidiary to be repeated with each Primary, each Primary with its Subsidiary would be completed by itself (and there would be no composite sacrifice}. It might be argued that, ८ we should connect all the sacrifices with the level platform simultaneously, only leaving off that margin of time which would be contrary to the prescription of the time in the original Injunc- tion.” But in that case, both the ‘trios’ being performed on one Amavasy4, or on one Paursamasi day, the Subsidiaries would be performed in proximity to any one of them only. Or again, it would also be possible for the Subsidiaries to be performed on any day during the fortnight (be- tween the Amavdsya and the Pirnamidsi). Because in a way the whole of this fortnight would be the time for the performance of the Primary ; because all that can be meant by the Injunction that the Subsidiaries should be performed at the same time as the Primary is that they should not overstep the time-limit of the Primary, and not that they should be performed close upon it; because this latter woutd not be possible. And thus then, even the sentence that you bring forward would not accom- plish the desired performance, 656 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 11--0404 II—ADHI (3). The above arguments also apply to the case of the senteuce ‘darga- pirnamasabhyadm svargakadmo yajéta’ = (४.९. even this sentence cannot serve the purpose of pointing out the time); because like the place (mentioned by ‘samé’ in the sentence brought forward by the opponent), the Result also cannot form the object of a sentence ; and hence what this sentence would lead to would be the performance of all the Primary Sacritices—connected with one another and accompanied by all their Subsidiaries—at one and the same time, and thus, too, the desired method of their performance would not be achieved ; and a single result would be brought about by Sacrifices performed at different times. It might be argued that—‘ the sentence may be taken as directly “laying down that at the time of the actual appearance of the result, we ‘should perform, simultaneously, all the Primary Sacrifices, together with ‘Call their Subsidiaries, which would show how, and by means of what, the ‘appearing Result could be brought about; and as such there would be ‘no difference of time in the performance of the sacrifices.” But in that case, too, we would have an anomaly in the shape of the simultaneous performance of two composite sacrifices. Or, on the other hand, in consideration of the original Injunction, each of the sacrifices would come, as shown above, to be performed on distinct Amdavdasyd days. Nor is the time of the actual appearance of the result perceptible to us; ws that time also is specified only by the time of the actual procedure of the sacrifice. Thus then, in consideration of the time prescribed in the original Injunction, we would conclude that the time of the appearance of the Result would be that time which 18 taken up by the actual per- formance of the Primary and its Subsidiaries; and that the said simultaneity would be only so far as that time is concerned; and thence the completion of all the Primaries with their Subsidiaries would rest elther in the six Primaries—the three Paurnamdsas and the three Amdvasyas, or in the two composites (Darga and Paurnamdsa) only. And then the Subsidiaries would come to be performed, either along with any one of the two Composite Sacrifices, or on any day during the fort- night, as shown above. For these reasons we conclude that even this sentence—‘ Dargapirna- masabhyadm svargakdmo yajeta’—cannot bring about the performance of each ‘trio,’ together with its Subsidiaries, at the proper time; and this must be got at by means of other sentences,—such as the one we liave pointed out above, viz: “amdudsydyam amavasyayd, etc.,”’ which thus comes to serve the distinctly useful purpose of pointing out the time for the performance of eich of the two ‘ trios,’ etc., etc. Objection : ^ 1n that case, the mention of time in the original Injune- tion would be superfluous.” RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA. 657 Reply : Why should it be superfluous? Just look for a moment upon what follows: If the original Injunction did not mention the connection of the sacrifices with a particular time, then there would be no ground for t7.king the sentences ‘ ya erdm etc.’ as references to the two composite sacrifices ; that is to say, the words ‘ Paurnamdsya ` and ‘ Amdvasy@’ in the sentences ‘ya evam etc.?—are held to refer to sacrifices connected with the times expressed by these words. And unless we had a mention of tlie time in the original Injunction, we could never know which sacrifices are referred to by these words. And this being unknown, as the sacrifices denoted by ‘yajuté,’ in the sentences ‘ ya evdm etc.’, would not be specified by the words ‘ Darga’ and ‘ Pirnamasa’ as comprehended in their true signi- fication, the sentences ‘ ya evdm etc.’ would have taken in all the sacrifices mentioned in the context ; and as such all these equally would bo Primaries. Consequently, it becomes necessary that the sacrifices should have been previously connected with particular points of time. Itis on account of this being absolutely necessary that even though the sentence ‘@jyasya ma nau upingh paurnamasyaim etc.’ forms part of a ‘ Purdkalpa Arthauvadu’ (and as such is not a pure injunction), yet it has been quoted by the Bhashyaas the original Injunction of the Upangu sacrifice, (which is the one next to the Agnéya), simply because the sentence contains the word ‘ paurnamdsyam, and as such connects the Updnew sacrifice with a particular point of time (which is not done by the sentence which is the real original Injunction of the Upangit). Sitra (4): Also because we find a peculiarity (in the shape of the appearance ofthe subsidiary Prvayaja in the modifica- tions of the Primaries) ; (we cannot hold all to be equally Primaries); because they (the Prayajas) could not appear in them (the modifications) 2 all were equal. If the sacrifices mentioned by the sentences ‘ ya evdm etc.’ wero dis- tinct from al] others, then the Aghara and the other Subsidiaries would all equally be Primaries ; and hence, in accordance with the sétra VIIT. i, 20, the subsidiary Praydjas etc., also, like the Agnéya and the other Primaries, would enter into the instrutmental factor (in the bringing about of the principal result) ; and as such they would no longer be able to supply the want of the method in the Bhavana (bringing about) of the modifications of the Primary, which has its Instrument or Means already laid down; and as such these modifications would no longer take into themselves these Prayd- jas etc.; they are actually found to be taken up by these modifications; as otherwise we could not have a text enjoining ‘ Krshnala’ as the material to be used at the Pravdja, when performed in connection with the modifications. 83 658 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—-PADA II—ADMI (3). Consequently in order to establish the fact of the Praydja etc. boing subsidiary to the Agnéya and the rest, we must take the two sentences in question as referring to the previously mentioned Sacrifices. Sutra (5): Objection: ^“ The sentences (‘yadagneya ९५ etc.’) lay down accessories, because of the direct men- ९५ tion (of the root ‘ yaji’ in the other sentences).” “If we accept distinct sacrifices to be [धिव down by the sentences ५ + 2 evam etc.’, then we have the following advantages : (1) The singular ‘number in the word ‘ paurnamdsim ’ becomes quite explicable with refer- “ence to the noun itself, without having recourse to any indirect indication, ‘by the word, of the composite of sacrifices. (2) If we accept these ८८ sentences as Injunctions, we havea further advantage, ८८ : the root ‘ yajt’ ८५ 18 found to be directly mentioned, and 1४ is not necessary to infor it ‘from the mention of the Deity (as you have got todo im the case of ८८ holding the Injunction to 116 in the sentence ‘ yadagneya ete.’). (3) In ९८ $ 0४1, case the sacrifices enjoined by these inferred ‘ y@jzs’ being more than “ono, their Aptirvas would also be more than one; and thus in compari- “son with the process of taking the sentences as referring to the before- ‘mentioned sacrifices, that of taking them as independent Injunctions is far ‘‘more advantageous. As for the appearing of the Praydjus in the modifi- ८८ 0811018 (urged in the preceding Sitras), it can be explained, cither by “qualifying tho injunction of Krshnala in the performance of the “ Prayadjas in the modifications, by adding the condition ‘in such cases “where there are sentences that must be taken as anwvdda’,—or by taking 1४ “as laying down a material for the Prayfija occurring in the Primary it- ५९ self,” “Tt is with reference to all this that the opponent says (in the Bhsathya): “These two alone are the Injunctions of Sacrifices; all other are mere ‘injunctions of the accessories.” The opponent next proceeds to meet the objection that these two Sacrifices have no details, Materials or Deities, mentioned: “The words 8 Amavasya’ and ‘ Paurnamasi,’ occurring in the sentences ‘ yadégney- ५ o'shtakupalo otc.’, refer to the sacrifices enjoined by the sentences ‘ ya evam “ete.” ; and as those sentences—‘ yada@gneya etc.’—distinctly lay down the ‘‘ Deities, etc., we have the Deities of our two sacrifices mentioned ^“ directly by the Vedic sentences themselves.” 977८2. (6): Reply: But they are Injunctions ; as otherwise many accessories would be declared simutl- RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA. 659 taneously; because & they appeared after the sacrifices had been enjoined, then their such appearance could be only for the sake of the accessories; and as such we would have to admit of an injunctive word with each accessory. The sentences ‘ yadagneya etc.’ cannot be takon as laying down the accessories of the sacrifices enjoined by the sentences ‘ya evan etc.’ Be- cause it 18 a well-recognised rulo that when the Action is one that has been already enjoined (by a previous sentence), we cannot lay down more than one accessory with regard to it; as itis only when the Action has not been otherwise enjoined that even a number of accessories could be laid down by a single effort (of that Injunction). That is to say, in all original Injunctions of Actions, the Injunctive Affix proceeds to enjoin only the Bhavana, because 1४ 18 only this factor that 18 not got at by other means. And 80 longasthis Bhavana is not fully equipped with all its factors, by means of the Denotation of the Root, and the other factors in the sentence (denoting the various auxiliaries of the sacrifice ), it cannot be brought to action ; and hence until all this has been fully laid down, the Injunction is not complete. And when it so happens that by the apparent inconsistency of the generic character of the auxili- aries that are recognised as constituting the factors of the Bhavanad,—this inconsistency leads us to look for a specification of the said auxiliaries,— then it is that the Bhavundi comes to bo specified by those specifications which are implied by the Instrumental case-endings found in the same sentence, and which also aro on the look-out for the Bhavana (as the object to be specified), And in the case of each word, the Class, Gender aud Number, that belong to an object,—all these come to be recognised, by means of the direct signification of the particular case ending, as auxili- aries to the Bhavana@; because all these (Class, etc.), on account of being expressed by the samo word, have among themselves the relation of the qualification and the qualified, and are not recognised as belonging to, or depending upon, one another (and as such must be concluded to form part of something clse ; and that is the Bhavana). And thus it is that all words, near the Bhavana, or removed from it, fallin with the Bhdvand, notwith- standing their remoteness or proximity,—in the way that wo have explained under the Adhikurana on Anushanrya im the foregoing Pada of this Adhyfya. Anditisonly then that, having got hold of a Bhavana fully endowed with all its qualifications, the Injunction becomes complcte. And ag in all such cases the Injunction laysdown the qualified Bhavana by a single effort, it does not entail any such anomaly as the assumption of various potencies in the Injunction. Because it 18 only when tho direct 660 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1- ए474 I11—ADHt (3). functionings of words are multiplied that it becomes very complicated ; and when the words end in expressing a single fact, then there is nothing in- compatible in the zzdirect ¢mplication of many things. Thatis to say, the direct Injunction having been once utilised in the laying down of the qualified Bhadvand,—if it were taken again to directly function towards the laying down of something else, then it would be necessary to repeat the Injunctive word over again; and this being incompatible with the Veda, would not be warrantable; when, however, the Injunctive word has ceased its functioning with once having laid down the Bhavana, then, on account of the apparent inconsistency of its own signification, it would give birth to (7.¢., indirectly imply) other Injunctive words expressive of such qualifications (as would be necessary for removing the said inconsis- tency) ; and in this the original Injunctive word would not have to give up its one form as appearing in the Vedic text; although it would serve all the purposes that would be served by various repetitions of itself. And though in this manner the Injunction of the qualification would appear after the original Injunction of the Bhavand itself, yet, in accordance with the law laid down under the Adhikarana on ‘ Akrti’ (in the first Pada of the first Adhydya), the qualifications themselves will have appeared before that. That is to say, though, asa matter of fact, the Apparent Inconsistency due to the fact of the Bhavana being qualificd, Mppenring subsequently, leads to an idea of the Injunction of the qualifica- tion, long after that of the original Injunction (of the Bhdvant),—yet, in accordance with the rule arrived atin the Adhikarana on ‘ Akrti,’ as it is impossible for the Bhavana to be qualified, in the absence of the qualifica- tions themselves, it must be admitted that these must have been full- fledged entities from before ; as it is through these alone that any idea of the Bhavana being qualified could be brought about. All these Injunctions (of qualifications), pointed out by the apparent inconsistency of a perceptible fact, operate either simultaneously or one after the other. And thus we find that if we admit a sentence to be the Injunction of a fresh Bhavana, then it becomes an casy matter to get at the Injunctions of its accessories, by the help of the original Injunction of the qualified Bhavand, which is capable of giving birth to various Injune- tions. On the other hand, however (if the sentence be taken as only referring to a Bhavana previously enjoined by another sentence), this is not possible. Because, as a rule, it 18 only when the Primary is carried to a place, that it draws with itself all its accessories; while if it is one of the accessories that is carried, it does not carry with itself another Accessory, because these two are not so intimately connected. Thatis to say, when the Bhavana is such as has been got at from another sentence, then the Injunctive word in the RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA. 661 sentence in question cannot enjoin that Bhdvana@ over again—as a repeated injunction of the Bhdvand would be as useless as the powdering of that which has already been powdered ; and then, not performing its in- Junctive function, 16 does not become the means of giving birth to various Injunctions with regard to things connected with that Bhadvand; as it is only when the Injunctive word enjoins the qualified Bhavana that it makes possible the assumption of such Injunctions ; and this is not possible in the case in question ; henco the Injunctive Affix is found to be such as has its direct exprossive potency quite inoperative (towards the injunction of the Bhavan@); and hence, in accordance with the rule laid down under the sittra ‘adnarthakya&t tadangeshu,’ that Injunctive Affix comes down from the Bhavand and directs itself towards the auxiliaries con- nected with it. And thon those qualifications of Class, Gender and Number, which qualify the auxiliary expressed by a single word, serve to point out that auxiliary,—exactly in the way that we have explained in the case of the Injunction of a qualified Bha@vand : and as such these qualifica- tions are all enjoined ; and hence, in the case of a single word, even though the Bhavana has been enjoined by another sentence, it 18 possible to have the Injunction of many things (in connection with it). When, however, there is a combination of many auxiliaries mentioned by many words (as in the case of the sentences ‘ agnéyosh{dkapalak etc.’),—then, in that case, there being no sort of relationship among these auxiliaries themselves, the words expressing them also remain unconnected (with one onother) ; and hence when the Injunction betakes itself to one of them, it has nothing to do with any other; and when it would betake to this latter, it could not have anything to do with another, and so on ; because of all of them being wholly unconnected with one another. For these reasons it is not possible, in this case, to have the one implied by the other, as we had in the case of the Injunction applying to the Bhavana. Thus then in this case, the original Injnnction not giving birth to other Injunctions, the former, being one only, would be wholly taken up in the laying down of one auxiliary ; and then the declaration that it lays down another also, would not be possible, unless we meant to repeat the original Injunction; this would entail the anomaly of all these repented Injunctions being of human origin (and as such having no authority). This is what is meant by the second half of the s#éra, which means that if the sentence were taken as laying down an action that has been already previously enjoined, as such laying down could only be for the purpose of mentioning the accessory, the Injunctive word would have to be repeated for the sake of the Injunction of each one of the accessories. The Bhashya says :—‘ parasparasambundhe ८0507 etc.’ (when there is no mutual connection etc.) ; and this is meant to show that when there is no 662 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH 1-- 7476 1- 47 (3). such connection, there is no apparent inconsistency that could serve as the ground for having an injunction of the qualified Bhavand. Even in everyday life, we find that when the chief man—the king, for instance, is carried toa place, he always carries with himself all his invari- able attendants ; whereas when one of these attendants goes to a place, no other attendant moves a single step; for the carrying of each attendant, it becomes necessary to make a fresh effort; and it is absolutcly impossible to move all the attendants by a single effort; hence it is im- possible for many accessories to be taken up by a single Injunction. It is this fact that the Bhdshya proceeds to explain in detail: The sentence ‘ dynéyoshtakapalak etc.’ cannot be taken as laying down the ashtakapala with reference to the Paurzamisi sacrifice (held to be enjoined by the sentence ‘ya évam etc.’) ; because the mention of the form of the Ashtakapala has still got to be mado; and as such mention could be got at with very great difficulty, how could the sentence serve the purpose of laying down any other object P This is what is meant by the assertion (in the Bhashya) that ‘ there being no relutionship of the word bhavati, there 1s no connection (of the sacrifice) with Ggnéya’ [that is to say, in the sentence ‘ ashttkapalo bha@vati’ the word ‘ bhdvati’ denotes the existence of the usta@akapdala, and as such the Paurnamasi is connected, by means of this sentence, with the usfakapala, and not with the Aynéya, because this latter 18 in no way connected with tho ‘bhavati’]. If, however, tho sentence be taken as laying down the Aynéya with referenco to the Paurndmasi sacri- fice, then too, we have the same difficulty of having a mention of the actual form of the Agnéya ; and as this difficulty in both cases is exactly similar, the Bhashya has not noticed it in connection with this second alternative, and has only pointed out the fact of the sacrifice, in this case, not having connection with the ashta@kapdala. Kven when we take the sentence as meaning that ‘the Agnéya qualified by the Puurnamdasi sacrifice is ashtakapala,’ or that ‘the ash{akapala qualified by that sacrifice is Agnéya,’— in any case we are faced by the following difficulties: (1) the mention of the origin of that Agnéya or Ashfakapala which is described ; (2) the difficulty of connecting them with the Paurnamdsi sacrifice; (3) the mention of the origin of that (Agnéya or Ashtakapala) which is enjoined (with reference to another) ; and (4) the difficulty of connecting the Aynéya and the Ashtakapdla with each other; and thus the whole thing would be- come too complicated. If the word ‘ paurnamasi’ be taken with both of them atone and the samo time, then, in the first place, it would be necessary for us to have origins for both; and secondly, we would have to assume & mutual relationship among them. Nor can the two be said to qualify (or restrict) each other—as is done by the various qualifications mentioned in the sentence ‘arunaya pingdkshya ekuhftyanya gava soman krindty’ ; RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY BETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA. 663 because that would entail the anomaly of having a qualified Injunction. Consequently, it must be admitted that it 18 tho Paurnamas?, as unaffected by the Astakapala, that is connected with the Agnéyu, or thatit is the Paurnamasi, as unaffected by the Aynéya, that is connected with the Astakapdla; and as such there can be no conncction between the Ayneyu and the Ashfakapéla. With a view to meet this difficulty if ono were to take the sentence at the very outset, as laying down the material ( Ashfakapdla) and the Deity (Agni mentioned in the word ‘ Agnéya'’) of the Paurnamasi sacrifice, then he would have to face the following difficulties : (1) the mention of the actual forms of these two (Agnéya and Ash{akapala), (2) the injunction of one in regard to another, (3) the connecting of these two with one another, when both are enjoined at one and the same time; (4) and then over and above all these, the connecting of these two with the Paurnamdasit sacrifice (which is held to be enjoined by another sentence—‘ Ya évam etc.’) And then, for the purpose of meeting these difficulties, it becomes necessary to take the sentence ‘ yaddgneyak etc.’ as only laying down the connection of the Ashtakapdla in connection with the sacrificc, with reference to the Deity mentioned in some other sentence: this is what is meant by the Bhashya, ^“ kena cit Ggnéyah sankalpitah '' ; some people take this sentence as meaning that ‘if one were to bring in the Agnéya that had been given away. by another performor” ; but this does not appear correct, because such bringing would be tantamount to stealing, in the midst of his per- formance, the material prepared by another person. Therefore, we must take the word ‘sankalprtak’ as containing a double causative affix,—the moaning of the sentence thus being “if we take Aynéya as laid down in another passage,—for instance, the one that contains the word ‘ rukkamah’ (desiring a bright complexion, ctc.). In reply to this argument itis said that in that case, the word Agnéya (as understood from that other sentence) being taken as simply mentioned (in the sentence ‘ yadagneyak etc.’) for the purpose of establishing the connection of the Ashfakapala (with the Paurnamfsi sacrifice), then it is not known what is the Deity in the Paurnamasi sacrifice ; and if it be held that the Agnéya is laid down with reference to the Ashtakapdala as qualified by the Paurnamast, then there is a syntactical spht; and in this way we can go on showing the ondless syntatical splits consequent upon all the various constructions that could, in accordance with the opponent’s theory, be put upon the sentence—the constructions that have been shown under the Adhikurana on Akrti in Pada i, of Adhyaya I, Thus then in the sentence ‘ Agnéya etc.’ we must havo the injunction of the connection of a material and a Deity; but this connection 18 not possible with regard to any sacrifice that may have heen previously 664, TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA II—ADHI (3). enjoined by other sentences; and hence, in accordance with the sitra ‘ gunacgcapirva-sambandhak’ we must admit a distinct sacrifice to be actually enjoined by this sentence (‘ yad@gneyah etc.’) ; and then we have the same ‘ripavacana (non-mention of the form)’ that was urged in the third sifra ; and as such the sentence ‘ ya évam etc.’ must be taken as only referring to the sacrifices enjoined by the sentence ‘ yadagnéyak, etc.’ And by this we are forced to have recourse to indirect indication, etc., for the purpose of explaining the singular ending (in ‘ Paurnamdasim ’). And further, the sentence ^ yaddgneyak etc.’ cannot be complete until it lays down an action not laid down by any other sentence; and so long as its own full signification is not complete, it cannot require the aid of another sentence. That 18 {0 say, that ‘the Ashtakapala becomes’ is not a functioning by the human agent; nor is it possible for a sentence to lay down only the functioning of a cake ; because such functioning would not have the character of any particular Bhdvand. And thus it being necessary to assume a particular functioning of the human agent, we naturally fall upon the assumption of the sacrifice. And though when ॐ functioning (that of the cake) is actually perceptible, itis not quite right to assume an inferred one,—yet, in the case in question, the sentence being not incomplete, and (as such not standing in need of another sentence) the mere fact of the root ‘ yajz’ (signifying the sacrifice) being found in the sentence containing the words ‘amdavasya’ and ‘ paurndmdaysi’ (८,९.) the sentence ‘ya évam etc.’), which 18 not in close proximity to the sentence in question, cannot preclude the aforesaid inferential assumption. And when the ‘sacrifice’ has been inferred, the sentences ‘ ya évam etc.’ are found to have the exact form of mere description (or reference); and for this reason they are actually admitted to be as such. And further, because in the sentence ‘ yaddgneyo etc.’ the word ‘yat’ is co-extensive with (refers to) the Action (of being, of the cake), while the ‘yat’ in the sentence ‘ ya évam etc.’ refers to the agent,—and as it is the latter kind of ‘ya,’ and not of the former, that precludes the injunctive function—the mere presence of tle word ‘yat’ in the former sentence cannot be in the way of its being taken as an Injunction. On _ this, we have the following declaration :—‘‘ When connected with the verb, the word ‘yat’ does not disable the Injunction; when, however, it is connected with the Agent, then it distinctly points to the fact of the sentence being a mere reference to something that has been enjoined in a previous sentence.”’ Sutra (7): The mention of these also is like that. If the Amavdsya were a single sacrifice, then the two materials—the Sdnnayya (Curd and Butter) and the Oshadhi (Herbs)—would be RELATION OF SUBSERVIENCY RETWEEN AGHARAS AND AGNEYA. 665 optional alternatives; and then, why should there be any mention of the preparation of one of these before the other, (as it would be necessary to employ and prepare only one of the two alternative materials) 0 When there are various sacrifices, thon the Sanndyya and the Oshadhi come to be taken as both forming the materials to be offered in various sacrifices, and as such all the various materials having to be prepared for the Amivdsya sacrifice, it becomes quite relevant to speak of the prepara- tion of one of these before the other,—which would 06 entirely irrelevant in any other case. And further, in accordance with the Pirvapaksha, over and above the three sacrifices, there would be a fourth (in the shape of that enjoined by the sentence ‘ya évam etc.’); and as such the passage quoted in the Bhashya would refer to them as ‘«tfarant’ (in the plural), and not as ‘uttaré’ (in the Dual) (which refers to the two composite sacrifices, the Darga and the Paurnamdasa). Sittra (8): Also because we find (in the Veda) éudica- tive words. If the sentences ‘ya évam etc.’ enjoined two distinct sacrifices, then the number of sacrifices would be more, and if they enjoined accessories, the number would be less than ‘thirteen’ and ‘ fourteen,’ which are the num- bers that are mentioned in connection with the Libations in the Darga and the Puurnamasa. Because these numbers could be possible only if in the Paurnamésa there were three, and in the Darga two, primary libations (and this would not be the case if the sentences ‘ya évam etc.’ are taken either as the Injunctions of independent sacrifices, or as the Injunctions of Accessories). For these reasons we conclude that the sentences ‘ya évam ete.’ merely refer to the two previously mentioned composite sacrifices, To this effect, we have the following declaration: ‘‘(1) Because the enjoined sacrifice has 110 form (material, ctc.), (2) because the words of the sentence directly denote the sacrifices mentioned in the context, and (3) because it is only in these latter sacrifices that we find distinct forms and details,— we must admit the sentences ‘ya évum etc.’ to be mere references to the two composite sacrifices laid down in the preceding sentence.” 34 ADHIKARANA (4). [Treating of the First Exception to the foregoing Adhikarana. | PURVAPAKSHA. Sutra (9): * The case of the upancau would be like the Paurnamasi.”’ The following three Adhtkaranas trent of the exceptions to the general rule arrived at in the foregoing Adhikarana. [There is one sentence :—‘ 7am va eladyajynasya kriyaté yadancau puro- dagau, upincuyijamantarad yagati,’ and then we have a set of sentences— ‘vishnurupinen yashfavyoxamitvdya, prajyapatirupangu yashtavayo'7ami- tydya, agnishomavupangu yashtavyavajamitvaya’; and on these there arises the following question : does the expression ‘ upfnguyagam’ in the first sentence only serve to speak of (refer to) the whole batch of sacrifices men- tioned in the latter set of sentences ? or does it serve to Iny down an in- dependent sacrifice by itself? And on this question, we have the pirvapaksha embodied in the sttra; and in support thereof we have the following argu- ments. | “To the sentence ‘ updinguydjam etc.’ apply all the conclusions arrived ‘atin the foregoing Adhikarana,”’ ८५ Because, inasmuch as the sacrifices laid down in the latter set of ८५ sentences have their accessories in the shape of the respective deities duly ५४ mentioned, while that which is mentioned in the first sentence has no “such accessory mentioned, we cannot but conclude that this latter ‘sacrifice depends upon the former sacrifices, ‘That is to say, in the three sentences, we have the affix tavya with “the verb; and as such they have the character of absolute Injunction, “and hence, if we were to assume these sentences to enjoin independent ८५ sacrifices, then we would render ourselves open to all the aforesaid objec- ‘tions of the details of these being unknown, and also of the neccessity of ‘having to assume many unseen factors.” ५ And further, we find each of the latter three sentences mentioning the ‘‘removal of the evil effects of the yam (a technica] flaw in the perform FIRST EXCEPTION TO ADHT (3). 667 “ance of a sacrifice, explained below); and it is with regard to this flaw of “the 7@mz that the first sentence mentions the updngu sacrifice. That is to “say, looking at the whole section, from the first sentence to the last, “we find that the mention of ‘7@mz’ (in the first sentence) and the ‘removal of 7ami’ (mentioned in the last three) form one subject ; and ‘‘ from this it is clear that it is the last three sentences that contain the real “Tnjunctious, whereas in the first sentence we do not find any distinct “ Arthavada or Injunction (by which it could be taken as containing the ‘* Injunction of a sacrifice). Then again, the special purpose served by the ‘first sentence referring to the whole set of the three sacrifices (laid down ‘‘in the latter sentences), is that 1t is only thus that any one of the three ‘sacrifices (laid down by the three sentences) can be taken as a sacrifice in- ‘dependent of the other two; itis only by making the first sentence (which “mentions a definite point of time, in the shape of the interrim between “the offerings of two cakes) supplementary to the last three sentences, that ‘all the three sacrifices becoming connected with that particular time, ‘each of them comes to be taken as an independent primary sacrifice. ‘The Bhashya has represented the opposer of the Piérvapakshau as ‘bringing forward the objection that the first sentence might be taken as “laying down a sacrifice with the uwpdngu as its accessory (and as such the ‘sacrifice luid down by it cannot be said to be without a definite accessory). ‘“And some people take exception to this sentence of the Bhadshya, on the “ground that the Detty and the Material to be offered being the only two ‘‘ accessories of a sacrifice, one ‘ updngu’ cannot rightly be spoken of as such ‘an ‘accessory. But this is not a very effective objection ; because any- “thing that characterises or specifies a sacrifice (distinguishes it from other ^“ sacrifices) is its accessory ; and there 18 no doubt that the ‘ updn¢gu '-ness (८ (४.९. the quietness with which the Mantras are recited) serves to dis- ‘tinguish a sacrifice: and as such it can very well be spoken as an ‘© accessory.” “The Pirvapakshin meets this objection by declaring that such ८ word as upanciyajn cannot very well, etc. And the sense of this is that “Gf the word ‘ upangaydja’ be etymologically explained in a way that “would point out upangu as the distinguishing feature of the sacrifice, ५८ ६.९., if the compound be explained as updngi wyate yah sa—then “the resultant word would be ‘upaucityaga’ and not ‘ upangiyaza, ` ‘in accordance with Panini’s sitra VII—iii—52. While on the other hand, “if the word ‘ upancuydaja’ be taken as the name (of the whole set of three “sacrifices, and not ag laying down the accessory of an independent ‘ sacrifice), inasmuch as 110 etymological explanation of a name is “necessary, there would be no room for the grammatical anomaly—the ‘word being taken as a complete whole by itself.” 668 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, H—PADA II—ADHTI (4). ‘The opponent brings forward another objection—ndnvévam sati ete. ८५ And the sense of this is that even when the word is taken as a Name, then “an accordance with the stra I—iv—4, the applicability of that name ^ (upinguyaja) to the set of three sacrifices would depend solely upon the ‘‘ presence 171 each of these three sacrifices, of the feature of upingu-ness,— ‘which presence is laid down by the sentence ° vishaurupingi yashtavyah’ ‘“ete.: and then the etymological explanation and the consequent anomaly ‘cannot be avoided.” ‘The Purvapakshin replies to this objection by declaring that it 18 not “necessary for us to take the word ‘ upanguydja’ as referring to the set of ०५ threo sacrifices, as this reference can be made by the word ‘ yazatz’ in the ‘same sentence (and all] that we mean is that the first sentence only “refers to the three sacrifices). Then, too, 1t is only in the case of an ५ Injunction that it is necessary for each word to fit in with the particular “ sacrifice ; while in the case of the Name, the applicability of this word 18 ‘“made to rest upon the fact of the root ^ yayt’ only referring to the set ‘of three sacrifices ; and thus there being even a slight ground of “similarity, there would be nothing incongruous in the applicability of the ‘Name (and hence it 18 not necessary to have recourse to an etymological ‘explanation ; and hence there will be no occasion for the grammatical ‘‘anomaly).”’ SIDDHANTA. 92707८1 (10): But ६४ is an Injunction, because of there being no other sacrifice mentioned in the context. The sentence ‘updneiiydjam yajati ’ is the Injunction of an indepen- dent sacrifice; and it is not a mere reference to the set of three sacrifices mentioned in the three sentences. (1) Because there being no other sacrifices mentioned in the context, the sentence cannot be taken as a mere reference; and (2) because no sacrifice is actually enjoined by the sentences ‘vishnuk etc.’ In the case of the sentence mentioning the Vazgvanara sacrifice, we find that from beginning to end the text treats of ‘twelve cakes,’ aud hence the mention of the numbers ‘ezght’ and the rest come to be taken as forming part of the ‘ twelve’ ; and as such the sentences mentioning these smaller numbers are not taken as separate Injunctions of those numbers. In the same manner in the case in question, we find that the Injunction is introduced by the words ‘7am va état’ which describe a certain flaw in the sacrifice ; and it is clear that such mention of the flaw must have some bearing on—and be needed by—a certain enjoined sacrifice ; consequently it appears that the sentences ‘vishnuhk etc.’ speaking of FIRST EXCEPTION 10 ADHI (3). 669 the removal of that flaw serve the purpose of enlogising that enjoined sacrifice. When it so happens that between the offering of two cakes there is no other action to be performed, then we have what 18 called the flaw of ‘7am’; and hence the mention of the ‘removal of 74m2z’ must be taken as eulogising that action which would be laid down as to be per- formed between the two offerings; and from this 1४ follows that in the case iu question, what has to be eulogised is the sacrifice Upangu, which 18 dis- tinctly laid down as to be performed “in the znterrtm’’; while in the sentences ‘vishnuh etc,’ we find described the ‘removing of the ‘7ama’ which is the eulogy required by the aforesaid Updangn sacrifice; and consequently we disregard the injunctive character of these sentences, because their injunctiveness is nowhere found to be required; and hence all of them come to be taken as mere eulogistic sentences. Specially as we do not find the “interrim’’ mentioned as the time, in the sentences ‘vishnuh etc.; and as such the ‘7am,’ with a mention of which the context was introduced, not having any direct connection with these sentences, these cannot be taken as embodying the Injunctions of any actions for the removal of that ‘j@mi’; and hence too the “removing of 210४८ '' mentioned in these sentences cinnot be taken as eulogising these latter Injunctions. On the other hand, that action, which is mentioned directly in connection with the time “interrim,” is distinctly found to be the object of Injunction by the sentence that begins with the mention of ‘7a@mi’ ; and then on this ground, the other sentences come to have their use in eulogising that Action ; under the circumstances, it is scarcely right to accept an Injunction that would entail the assump- tion of many imperceptible elements. And further, in the case of the sentences ‘ wishnuh etc.’, these being taken as connecting the sacrifices with Vishnu etc., the ‘ sacrifice’ would be wndirectly implied as subordinate to that connection; and so long as a directly-expressed sacrifice 18 available (in the sentence ‘ upangum etc.’) it is not right to accept an indirectly implied sacrifice to be en- joined. That is to say, the affix ‘ tavya’ in ‘ yashtavyah’ 18 in the passive, and as such the predominant factor in the sentence 18 ‘ vishnu’ to whom the ‘sacrifice ' 18 subordinate (the sentence meaning etymologically that Vishnue is the objective of the sacrifice) ; and the performability of the sacrifice could be only inferred indirectly from the sentence,—the factor of the ‘ sacrifice ’ being extracted out of the word «^ yushtavyak”’ ; and this would be scarcely proper ; because we have a direct Injunction of the Sacrifice in the sentence ‘antara yajati’. Kven though it were possible for the seutence ‘ vishnwh » to be taken apart from the sentence ‘antara yajati’, yet all that they could do would be to lay down the Deities for that sacrifice which is laid down 670 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. TI—PADA II—ADHI (4). as to be performed “in the interrim ” (in the sentence ‘ antard, etc.’) ; and they could not lay down distinct Actions. As a matter of fact, it is not possible even for the Deity to be laid down by such sentences. Because the word ‘yashfavyah’ in these does 106 signify either the Dezty or that to which something ts given; because all that they actually signify is a material subordinate (belonging) to the sacrifice ; consequently what we have to do is to take the potency of the objective as the predominant element ; and as such what the word would signify would be whatis signified by the Accusative case-ending ; and certainly that does not establish the character of the Deity. Because the root ‘yajz’ meaning ‘to give away, its actual objective is that which is given away ; and henco the only possible explanation would be that the Deity approached by the object given away, comes subsequently to be Indirectly connected with the Sacrifice. Butin this way, the words come to have two objectives ; and hence, in accordance with the siitra ‘samaptzh cabdarthah,’ [ [1-1४-23] what happens is that the objective, in the shape of the thing given away, is set aside, and another, in the shape of the Deity worshipped, becomes manifested ; and the verb thereby coming to be re cognised to have only one objective (in the shape of the Deity worshipped ), it is Only after its Dative potency has been wholly suppressed, that the Deity could be spoken of as the objective, asin the sentence ‘ vishnum 2/4) {2 ` (in the Active voice) or ‘ vishnuryushtavyah’ (in the Passive). And certainly in this we do not find any denotation of the Deity ; all that we find is that the character of Deity (of Vishnu) is indirectly indicated by the apparent inconsistency of its objective character. Objection: “The root ‘yaji’ signifying the worshipping of a Deity, “the word signifying the objective of that root would be synonymous with “the word ‘Deity’; and hence itis scarcely correct to say that in the “sentences quoted the Deity is only indirectly indicated.” Reply: As a matter of fact, the root ‘yaji’ does not directly signify the worshipping of a Derty ; because if that were the case, then Hymning also, which 18 a kind of worship, would come to be denoted by the root ‘yajt’; but we shall show later on that when there is a Hymning of the Deity, that Deity cannot be said to be thereby worshipped, in the way that ¢the guest is worshipped. That 18 to say, at the time that one is hymning a Deity, even if he be engaged in actual worship, it is not said ‘sa yajaté.’ And inasmuch as, in this case of Hymning, the actual form of the sacrificial Deity (namely that of being one to whom an offering is made) is not present in the Deity hymned, that Deity does not attain the character of an object of worship, like the Guest. And further, that the root ‘ yaju’ does not signify worship, we shall show later on, in Adhyaya 1X. Kven when the root ‘yari’ is taken to mean ‘giving’, the Deity to whom the gift FIRST EXCEPTION TO ADHI (3). 671 is made cannot be said to have the character of the objective; as for instance, the Teacher who is worshipped by means of gifts 18 not found to have the character of the objective. Objection : “In that case, the word mentioning the Deity would “always have the Dative ending (and then how would you explain the pres- ‘ence of other case-endings in words actually mentioning the Deity) P”’ Reply: The sampradanatva (the principal element in the Dative) of the Deity is never of the same precise type as that of the Teacher; be- cause the Deity is not the actual recerver of the gift (not having a body, etc.). And further, we do, in certain cases, find the Dative ending with words mentioning the Deity, for instance, ‘ yidabhyam grihitva somaya yajate ete.’ But, in all cases, the Deity has got neither the precise character of the sumpradaina (receiver of the gift), nor that of the particular objective ; nor by itself could it be either the receiver of the gift or the objective, with reference to the root ‘ yayt’ (sacrifice). Then the character of one of these two is attributed to it, simply because, while being actually found to help in the accomplishment of the Action—and thereby having the character of the ‘kdraka’ (Instrument)—there is no seventh case that could fit it exactly. Nor by itself, in the form that is signified by the word oxpressive of the Deity, does the Deity become related to the denotation of the root ‘yajzz.’ Under the circumstances, even though the actual receiving of the offering 18 not present in the case, yet by the mere fact of the offering being made with regard to it, we assume the presence of the complex conditions of the Dative ; and hence speak of the Deity in the Dative; and at times, the character of being reached, that belongs to one with regard to whom the offering is made, 18 assumed in the case of the offering ; and as such the Deity is, sometimes, spoken of as the objective of the whole root ‘ yaj2 Thus then, (1) ina case where we find an Injunction wherein the Deity 18 mentioned in the Dative Case, for instance, ‘ somaya yajgaté, we must ex- plain it as meaning that ‘ the offering should be made to that Deity, as if creating its right of ownership in the object offered’ ;—(2) when we meet with an Injunction in which the Deity is mentioned as the objective (for instanco, vishnuryashtavyah), its meaning is that it is the Deity refer- ence to whom should be made for making the offering. It is for this reason that in a case where the only action of the Offerer lies in referring to (or thinking of) the Deity, and there is no actual offering made, we find the direction ‘hotaryaja’ (where all that the Hotri priest does is to think of the Deity to whom the offering has been made) Thus we find that both of these—the Dative and the Objective character —apply to the Deity ouly indirectly. And of these two again, we find that ^ the character of the Dative is more closely related to the Deity (than that 672 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA II—-ADHI (4). of the Objective), because it is the Dative alone that is an invariable con- comitant of the action of giving, though its complete applicability has been found to be open to objection; while as for the Objective, we find that it is present also in actions other than giving, and as such not being a necessary concomitant of the action of giving, 1t is not so closely related to the Deity. Hence it is concluded that the character of the Objective of the root ‘yaji’ is uot fully applicable to the word ‘Deity’, just as the character of the Deity too is not found to be wholly applicable in the case in question. Because, asa rule, the Deity is always mentioned either by the use of the word ‘Deity’ itself, or by the use of a word with a nominal affix which signifies the Deity; and never by means of any of the case-endings. For instance, when laying down the appearance of the Nominal affixes signifying the Deity, the words that P&énini employs are notin the forms ‘idama- gnayé › (with the Objective ending) or ‘ téna kritam’ (in the Instrumental) ;— that is to say, in all the rules laying down the use of Nominal affixes, we find that its use is laid down by means of words with ५0086 very case- endings, which themselves are capable of signifying the same meaning that is meant to be expressed by the Nominal affix laid down; for instance, we have such rules as (1) ‘tad vahati’ (with the Objective), (2) ‘tena krtam’ (with the Instrumental), (3) ‘ tasmaz hitam’ (with the Dative), (4) ‘tata dgatahk’ (with the Ablative), (5) tasyapatyam (with the Possessive-Genitive), and (6) ‘tatra bhavak ’ (with the Locative);—in the case of the Deity, however, we find that the appearance of the Nominal affix expressive of the Deity, is laid down by such words as ‘ sa’sya devata,’ and not as ‘ tasyai idam’ (with the Dative) or ‘ ta@manéna’ (with the Objective). And hence we conclude that the Deity is not denotable by any other means save by the actual mention of the word ‘ Deity’ itself, or by the Nominal affixes specially laid down as expressing the Deity. Thus then, it must be admitted that the sentence ‘ Vishnurupancu yashtavyah’ does not serve the purpose of pointing out a Deity. And consequently, in taking this sentence as an independent Injunction, we would have to get at the requisite Bhavana only by undertaking all the trouble of assuming a Deity. And certainly in comparison with all these assumptions, it is more reasonable by far to take the sentence as a mere Arthavada (of the sacrifice laid down in ‘ antaré yajati’). On the other hand, in the case of the sentence ‘ antara yayati ’—though it might be argued that it is an injunction of the time (of the sacrifice) as the “interrim”,—and as such it cannot be taken as laying down the sacrifice itself,—yet, as there is no other way of taking it, we take the sentence to be an Injunction of the sacrifice as qualified by the particular time; specially as we find that this sentence cannot be taken otherwise, not even as an Arthavida like the other sentences (‘vishnuh ete.).’ Markandeya Purana, (English) Fasc. 1-9 @ 1/- each 4 Rs. 9 0 *“Markaydeya Purana, Fasc. 5-7 @ /10/ each ... sas see 4 14 *Mimamaea Darcana, Faso. 10-19 @ /10/ each 9 > SS 4 Nyfiyavartika, Fasc. 1-6 @ /10/ each ४ 9 ee > 12 *Niruktn, Vol TV, Fasc. 1-8 ट /10/ each 3 a sie. 0 { *Nitisara, Fasc. 3-5 @ /10/ each ae oe 1 14 Nityaicarapaddhati, Fasc. 1-7 @ /10/ each sau 4 9 Nityacirapradipa, Vol. इ, Fasc 1-8, Vo). 11. 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Sanskrit Sertes. *Advaita Bralima Siddhi, Fasc. 2,4 @ /10/ each Advaitachint&é Kaustubha, Fasc 1-3 @ /10/ each *Agni Purina, Fasc. 6-14 @ /10/ each : Aitaréya Bralhmanya, Vol. I, Fuse. 1-5; Vol. Ti, Hasso. 1-5; Vol. IIT, Fasc. 1-5, Vol. (V, Fasc. 1-8 @ /10/ each Aitareyalovana *Anu Bhashya, Fasc. 2-5 @ /10/ each Aphorisms of Sandilya (Knglish), Fuse. 1 @ 1/- Astasahiasrika Prajiiiparamitad, Faso 1-6 @ /10/ each *Atharvana Upanishad, Fase. 4-5 @ /10/ ench Atmatattvaviveka, Fasc. I vie Agvavaidynka, Fasc. 1-5 @ /10/ each ००५ -. Avadéina Kalpalata, (Sans. and Tibetan) Vol. I, Fasc. 1-7. Vol. 11, Faso. 1-6 @ 1/ each Biulam Bhatti, Vol Fasc. 1-2, Vol. TI, Fasc. 1, @ /10/ each Baudhiayana Srauta Sitra, Fusc. 1-3; Vol. IT, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ each *Bhamati, Fasc. 4-8 @ /10/ eac Bhatta Dipika, Vol. I, Fasc. 1-6; Vol. IT, Fasc. 1, @ /10/ ench Bauddhastotrasangraha Brahma Satra, Fasc. 1 @ /10/ each Brhaddevata, Fasc. 1-4 @ /10/ each Brhaddharma Parana, Fasc. 1-6 @ /10/ each Bodhicaryavatara of Qantideva, Fasc. 1-5 @ /10/ each Cri Cantinatha Oharita, Fasc. 1-2 ... Qatadtsani, Fasc. 1-2 @ /10/ each Catalogue of Sanskrit Books and MSS., Faac. 1-4 @ 2/ each Qatapntha Br&ihmana, Vol. I, Fasc. 1-7; Vol. IT, Fasc. 1-5 Vol ITT, Faso. 1-7; Vol. V, Faso. 1-4 @ /10/ each Ditto Vol. VI, Fasc. 1-3; Vol VIT, Fasc. 1-3 @ 1/4/ each Ditto Vol. VIT, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ ००० Oatasdéhasrikaé-prajfiaparamita, Part T, Fasc. 1-13 @ /10/ each *Caturvargn Chintadmani, Vol. II, Fasc. 1-25; Vol. III, Part I Fasc. 1-18, Part IT, Fasc. 1-10; Vol. LV, Fasc, 1-6 @ /10/ ench .,. ॐ Ditto Vol. IV, Fasc. 7-8, @ 1/4/ each =... pe Ditto Vol. IV, Fasc. 8-9 @ /10/ Qlokavartika, ( Hing ish), Fasc. 1-7 @ 1/4/ each *Orautn Sitra of Apastamba, Fasc. 12-17 @ /10/ each _.. se Ditto Oankhayana, Vol I, Fasc. 1-7; Vol. If, Waso. 1-4; Vol. IIT, Fasc. 1-4; Vol. 4, Fasc 1 @ /10/ each sae: 4 Ori Bhashyam, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ each श शरद Dana Kriy& Kaumnudi, Fasc. 1--2 @ /10/ each ... Gadadhara Paddhati Kalasira, Vol. 1, Fasc. 1~7 @ /10/ each Ditto Acarasara, Vol. II, Fasc. 1-4 ... Gobhiliya Grhya Sutra, Vol. I, @ /10/ each ... Ditto Vol. If, Fasc. 1-2 @ 1/4 /each Ditto (Appendix) Gobhila Parisiata Ditto Grihya Sangraha Haralata = Karmapradiph, Fasc. 1 Kala Viveka, Faso. 1-7 @ /10/ each Kiatantra, Fasc. 1-6 @ /12/ each a wie Katha Sarit Sagara, (English) Faso. 1-14 @ 1/4/ each : *Kurma Parana, Fasc. 3-9 @ /10/ ernoh Lalita-Vistara, (English) Faso. 1-3 @ 1/- each Madana Parijita, Fasc 1-11 @ /10/ cach as oo: vue Maha-bhisya-pradipodyota, Vol. I, Fasc. 1-9; Vol. Ul, Paso. 1-123; Vol. IIT, Fasc. 1-10 @ /10/ ench cas थ ace Manutikaé Saggraha, Fasc. 1-3 @ /10/ each ee ¢ © ४»? @ 0 © OF & जी = Pum 09 €, 6 © 9 4> € © ।=* (¢ DOM ७ ^“ 09 6 धै Clete | च, © ४» #> (9 १ 0 © © ॐ ¢ ७ #> ~ ee ese oes ६9 £ & &@ he + > OMe @> THe bo ४> bo & anal aed © ९७ १७ क & ४» © NNhAS pent ped #> #> OO aoe [इ । ced णै mH @ ९9 &> ° के Per O aA +» © > 009 ~ EXCEPTION TO ADHI (3). 673 Objection: “‘But we have shown above that the sentence ‘ antara, etc. “has its use in speaking of the three sacrifices (to Vishnu, etc.) as one ‘composite whole”’. Reply : How the sentence cannot serve this purpose we shall show later on, when explaining the siitra ‘anyAirthadarganat ’ ( 11-11-29]. And further, in this sentence we find that inasmuch as the ‘interrim? is a point of time, 1४ cannot form the predicate of a sentence; and as such (the ‘interrim ’ not being an object of Injunction), we admit the Action to be the object of the Injunction contained in the sentence; and then too, as we find that the sacrifice in question, that could be connected with the time, is not laid down (in any other sentence), we have also to admit the sentence (‘ antarda, etc.’) to be the original Injunction of the sacrifice also. That is to say, in the sentence in question, we find that a distinct self-sufficient Bhavana, with all its accessories, is laid down with reference to a point of time (the ^ interrim "’) which, by itself, could be the predicate of the sentence ; and we do not find any such Bhavana denoted by the sentences ¢ vishnuryashtavyah, etc.’ ; and hence there is nothing incongruous in accept- ing the former sentence as the original Injunction (of that Bhavana). Hiven if the sentences ‘ vishnuk, etc.’ could be taken as injunctions of sacrifices, the particular sacrifice laid down by the sentence ‘antard, etc,’ must be an entirely distinct one ; and this sentence could not be taken as merely referring to these sacrifices. Itis with a view to this that the Bhashya has declared —karmdntarasya vacakah syat. As there is nothing incompatible in the Deity being an object of Injunction, the sentences ‘vishnuh, etc.’ could be taken as laying down dettzes for the sacrifice (enjoined by the former sentence) ; and thus too we find that it 18 these sentences (‘vishnuh, etc.’) that serve the purpose of referring to a previously enjoined sacrifice (for the purpose of laying down its Deities), and not the former sentence itself. Even if these sentences are taken as Injunctions of Sacrifices, though there is an original sacrifice (in the shape of that enjoined by the sentence ‘antard, etc.’), yet there are no such original sacrifices as have Vishnu, ete., for their Deities ;—this is what the word ‘ aprakriatvat’ inthe stitra means. Or the Bhadshya— karmdantarasya vacakak syat’—may be explained in the following manner: the sentence ‘ antard, etc.’ would denote only that sacrifice which is enjoined as distinct from the Agnéya and the rest. Consequently on account of the time ‘“interrim”’ not being capable of forming the predicate, it must be admitted that the sentence is the absolute Injunction of a sacrifice; and as such the other sentences must be mere Arthavddas. And as for the Injunctive affix (in antard yaj7aiz), it would be functioning more closely when laying down the denotation of the root with reference to something else (in the shape of the particular point of time). 85 674 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, TI—-PADA II—ADHTI (4). Says the Bhashya—sa iu vidhiyaté wpinguwyagasambandhah ; and the sense of this is that the word upanguydjam lays down an accessory detail of the sacrifice (viz., that the sacrifice 18 to be performed with mantras quietly recited ). Against this view it has been argued that “the word ‘ upangu-yajyam + ८८ cannot be taken in that sense, as in that case the form of the word would ‘become ‘ uwpanguyagam.’ ” " And in reply to this we urge that this objection applies equally to the opponent also; because in the case of all words, what is desired first of all is the cognition of the relationship between the word and the meaning it denotes; and itis only after this cognition that we come to ascertain that meaning to have the character of an Injunction or that of a mere Reference. That is to say, when the fact of a certain meaning being denoted by a certain word has been duly ascertained, it is only then that the object thus denoted comes to be taken either as Injunction or as the enjoined, as the referred to or as the reference; in all these cases, however, the relationship of the word to its meaning continues to be the common factor, and as this relationship always remains constant, whatever its character might be (and it is only on this latter poimt that we differ), the excellences or defects in that relationship would be equally applicable to both of us; and hence any such defect should not have been urged against any one of us only. On this point, it might be argued that—“ as a matter of fact we find ‘“that a descriptive reference 18 made even by such words as are not ‘‘directly expressive of the object described ; but no injunction 18 ever “‘ found to be brought about by means of non-expressive words ;and as such ‘‘ the objection 18 not equally applicable to both of us.”’ To this we reply that in our case also, the sacrifice being enjoined by the word ‘ yajaiz,’ the word ‘ ४7 द ' could be taken as referring to it ; and the upanguiva mentioned along with ‘ yaa’, being taken as connected with the aforesaid Injunction, there would be no incongruousness at all. Nor could the word ‘ upaneguyaja’ be taken as the name otf a sacrifice according to the sttra I—iv—4 ; because ‘ wpangu-tva’ has not been enjoined by any other text. For instance, it cannot be taken as enjoined by ti sentences ‘vishnukh, etc.’; because these have been shown to be mere Arthavadas ; nor by the sentence ‘ updncu paurnamasyadm’; because this sentence is wholly taken up by the laying down of the time (paurnamdast), and it is not capable of further injunctions. Therefore, we must admit it to be enjoined by the word ‘updngu’ occurring in the original Injunction itself (‘antard, 67९.) ; this will be pointed out in the next sétra also. As for the removal of the flaw of ‘j@mz,’ this is known to be possible in various ways—for instance, (1) by means of a material, (2) by EXCEPTION TO +एषा (3). 675 accentuation, or (3) by means of a Deity. And hence in the case iu question, when it is found that a ‘jamz’ has occurred, we find that for making it up some sort of a sacrifice—whether to Vishnu, or to Prajapati or to Agni- shoma, or to some other Deity—is enjoined ; and then no definite Deity being recognised, as the one to whom the requisite sacrifice has to be offered, the Veda, meaning to show the fact of the Deities of the sacrifice being various, mentions Vzshnuk and some other well-known Deities ; and hence though in the sentences in question Vishnu etc. are not the only Deities to whom the sacrifice has to be offered, yet the mention of these, though only by way of eulogising (the sacrifice through these well-known Deities), may, somehow or other, be taken as laying down the accessory (Deities) of the sacrifice. The Bhashya represents another party declaring that—* these sacrifices (to Vishnu Sc.) are enjoined in the texts of other rescensions of the Veda.’ But no such texts are cited; and if any weight could be attached to such vague assertions, then there would be nothing that would want a corroborative proof; and further, we find that in Adhyaya X, sitra 49, the question of the Deity has been raised, and answered in siira 52, by showing that the Deity is one that is indicated by the words of the mantra employed; and all these discussions would be futile if we had any such texts as declared by the opponent. And as a matter of fact, that the opponent himself had doubts on the point of there being such a text is clearly shown by his own half-hearted declaration—“ even tf they be not laid down by such a text, etc.” Then the opponent has declared (in the Bhashya) that—“ the property of ‘ upancgu’ having been laid down, some action is performed in honour of Prajapati, during the sacrifice.” But this too 18 scarcely correct ; because that would upset the syntactical order of the word; as we have no such sentence as that ‘ that which 18 upaneu belongs to Prajapati ’,—the sentence that we havo is in the form ‘that which belongs to Prajépati is updncu.’ Therefore the mere property of ‘ wpangu’ cannot point to the fact of be- longing to Prazapate. Then again, the Bhdshya itself declares that we actually cite the teat enjoining Agni and Soma as the Deities, And against this assertion, the following objections have been raised: “° The sentence cited in the Bhashya ‘cannot serve the purpose of laying down the Deity, because it is neither “the Dative ending, nor the Deific-nominal affix, nor the words of a mantra ‘(which three are the only means of mentioning the Deity). (2) Be- “cause Agni and Soma made a certain declaration, what would that ° matter to the sacrificer, who would remain in the dark as to that declara- “tion pointing to him the Deity to be sacrificed to? (3) The sentence ‘being a distinct injuuction of the time (Pirnamdas7), it cannot serve the 676 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. T1-——-PADA TI-——ADHI (4). ‘further injunctive purpose of laying down the Deity; and if it be taken ‘as the Injunction of the Deity, it would have to renounce its injunctive- “ ०688 with regard to the ४८१६6 ; and then the sacrifice could not be referred “to by the word ‘Paurnamdsi’; and not being expressible by the “word ‘Paurnamdsi’ (and thereby having no connection with the ८ sentence ‘ dargapiirnamasabhyam, etc.’) it would cease to be a primary, ‘‘and become a subsidiary sacrifice. The author of the sitra also, in “ Adhyaya X, has brought forward the sentence cited as an Injunction of ‘time, with the sole aim of showing that the ‘ Amdvdsyd’ is not an ८ Upainguydja.” In answer to these objections we have the following arguments: It has been found that the Deity is indicated by the words of the mantra. In the order of the upainguyaja, we find mentioned the mantras dedicated to Vishnu, Prajépati and Agnishoma, as also the pairs of Yajyas and Puronu- vakyds ; and as all of them serve the purpose (of pointing out the Deity for the Updnguydja), they come to be taken as optional alternatives ; and consequently, the choice of a Deity also becomes optional. And it is that section of the Veda where these mantras appear which has been spoken of as the ‘muntra’-section of another Rescension of the Vedic text. In fact, even in the ‘ Adhvaryava’ section we find the mention of the Yayyds and the Anuvaikyds, in the shape of the Haitiéra; and the mention of ‘another Rescension’’ may be with reference to this fact (of the Hattra appearing in the Adhvaryava). And the mention of the qualification ‘upaincu’ too is for the purpose of showing this fact of the mantra belong- ing toanother Rescension (viz: that of the Yajush ; as itis the Yajush that is recited quietly), Otherwise if another Deity (that of the Rk for mstance) were to be brought into the Upanguydjza, then 1४ would have to renounce its own characteristic of loudness (belonging to the Rk) and to take up the foreign characteristic of quietness (belonging to the Yajush) ; and this would entail a great incongruity. It would be very incongruous again if we assume another Deity in place of Agnishoma. In the case of Vishnu and Prajapati, however, we find that their properties are quite close to them, and hence there is no incongruity in this case (that 1s to say there is no incongruity if we assume another Deity in place of Vishnu, etc. ; and hence: though the objection applies to the Puérvapaksha, it does not apply to our case). The declaration of the Bhashya-—‘ tatha’gnishomayostu, etc.’—means that no injunction of the Deity being possible, the Deity 1s accepted according to circumstances; and hence in the sentence laying down Pairnamdsi as the time, a reference to Agnishoma strengthens the introduc- tion of the Deity (without which the said Reference would be wholly in- consistent). EXCEPTION TO ADHI (3). 677 ७६7८ (11): Because of the mention of the Property. That action (is enjoined by the sentence ‘antard, etc.’) in connection with which we find the property of ‘ updncu’ mentioned in the sentence ‘updngu paurnamdasyam yajan’, which serves the purpose of laying down the time (Paurnamdst) for the sacrifice. But this sentence is not the original injunction of the said property ; because the sentence not em- bodying an injunction of a sacrifice, the said injunction of the property would involve the injunction of many things (which is highly objection- able). And for this reason we must take the sentence ‘updngu paurna- masylim, etc.’ as only describing that which has been enjoined by the sentence ‘ antara etc.’ Stitrva (12): Because of the mention of the ° Praye.’ We find the sentence ‘ hrdayamupdnguyajah’, which eulogises the Upangu sacrifice as धु it were (prdya) the principal limb (heart) of the Sacrificial Person; and thus clearly shows that it 18 8 Primary (and not Secondary) sacrifice. Question : ‘*‘ But how does the puérvapaksha make tlie Upangu a sub- “gidiary sacritice ? ” Answer: The Upangu being (according tothe puérvapaksha) taken as referring only to the three sacrifices to Vishnu, etc., as one composite whole, it is the Agnishomiya sacrifice alone that would come to be enjoined as to be performed on the Paurnamdsi ; that is to say, in that case, the men- tion of ‘ Pirnamdsa’ would point out, as leading to the particular result, only that one sacrifice—connected with the particular time—and having Agnishoma for its Deity—which is mentioned by the sentence ‘ tdvavrita- magnishomau, etc,’ And inasmuch as the sacrifices to Vishnu and Prajapati are subsidiary to that sacrifice, the whole sentence declaring the primary character of the Updncu sacrifice (viz.: ‘hrdayamupanguydjah’) becomes incompatible and incongruous. . Objection : ‘In your case also, there being the anomaly of various “optional alternative Deities, the character of the Primary would belong “to the sacrifice only when Agnishoma would be the Deity sacrificed to ; “and hence, even according to you, the mention of the everlasting “ Primary character of the Updngu is not altogether compatible.” Reply: This does not touch our position ; because we do not find the sentence ‘ tavavriiaim, etc.’ enjoining any connection between the tme (Paurnamdst) and the detty (Agnishoma) ; and as for the Action itself, which is meant to be indicated by the time and detty,—it is found to exist in other places also (for instance, in the sacrifices to Vishnu, etc.). That is to say, if the sentence were to lay down the connection of 678 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, I—PADA II—ADHI (4). Paurnamdasi with the deity Agnishoma alone, then such connection would not be present in the case of Vishnu or Prajapati being the deity. What, however, the sentence actually does is to mention the connection of the time with the Action qualified by the deity Agnishoma, And in every case we find that when the qualification 18 absent, the qualified object becomes cognised by itself, as we shall show under the sitra—‘anapdyagcu kalasya lakshanam hi puroddgau.’ Nor is it possible for the same Action to be the primary at one time, and subsidiary at another. Such double character would be possible only if there were many Updangu-sacrifices ; but this multiplicity of the Upangu 18 not 00881016 ; in view of the singleness of the Updnegu sacrifice, we must admit, as an Injunction, only the sentence ‘ updnguydjamantara yajate ’ (and not the sentences ‘ vishnurupdngu yashtavyah, etc.’ ). me ee कने lia cat, OE itll EE aan ca ci a worn ADHIKARANA (5). [ Treating of the independent character of the Aghfra, ete. } Siatra (13): ^^ The words ° Agharam’? and * Agniho- tram’ (are mere references) bBecduse they are without accessory details.” [This adhvkarana 18 based upon twosets of passages. (1) We have the sentences ‘ uérdhvamaghdrayati, ‘santatamagharayali, and ‘ rjumaghara- yatt,’ followed by ‘ dghfirumaghirayati’ ; and (2) we have the sentences ‘dadhna juhotz,’ and ‘ payasa juhoti, etc.’, followed by ‘ agnihotram juhotr’. And the question is as to whether the two sentences ‘aghdramagharayati ’ and ‘agnthotramjuhotz’ lay down actions totally distinct from those men- tioned in the preceding sentences, or they only refer to those same actions ? And the position taken up by the Paérvapaksha is that the sentence ‘dgharam- dgharayati’ only refers collectively to the set of actions mentioned by the sentences ‘iirdhvam, etc.’ ; and so also with the sentence ‘agnihotram guhott’. Nor can this Adhikarana be said to have been included in the foregoing one; because] The ‘dghd@ra’ and the ‘ homa’ that present them- selves to the mind, on the utterance of the sentence ‘ érdhvamdaghdazayati ’ and ‘ payas& .7 ९८0८८ !, are exactly as they are pointed out by these sentences ; nor in this case 18 there a suppression of the Bhaivands of the ‘ yaga’ and the ‘homa’ by the supervening character of the material ; as we have in the case of the sentence ‘ vishnurupaingu yashtavyah.’ And further, in the ५५86 in question the various sentences cannot be taken together as forming a single sentence (as 111 the previous Adhikurana); nor does any of the two parties admit of the fact of the sentences being mere eulogistic ones ; and hence the Injunction would be an absolute one, of the Action, just as (in the previous case) you hold it to be that of the Accessory. That is to say, we do not, asin the case of the sentences ‘ updngu, etc.’, admit the fact of all the sentences in question forming a single sentence; nor do they serve the purposes of glorification; and hence according to both parties, the sentences come to be accepted as Injunctions ; and the only question that arises is as to whether the Injunction 1s one of the Accessory only, or that of the Action as accompanied by that Accessory P And on this we have the following— 680 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 1-ए&70+ II—ADHI (5). PURVAPAKSHA. “ The Injunction is one of the Action. Because the Injunctiveness, “being mentioned by the Affix, can never belong to the Noun. It may be “urged that the Injunction of the Noun would follow from the Bhdvana, “but in that case, it would be the Bhavana that would be enjoined first. “That is to say, the Injunctive character does not rest with the “words ‘dadhi’ and the rest; and being expressed by the Affix, that “character could not be related to the Curd, etc., except by means of “the Bhavana and the Hoot-meaning. For we have no such sentence as ५ ‹ dadhnii-yat’ (the ‘yat’ being the injunctive affix only, apart from the ‘Verbal Root); the sentence that we have is ‘ dadhna@ kuryat’ where the “relationship of the dadhi with the affiz is through the root ‘kr.’ Thus ‘then, the performability of the dadhz, etc., being due solely to the Bhavana “and the Root-meaning,—how 18 it that these letters are denied to be the “ objects of Injunction ? For, certainly, without the injunction of these, we ‘can never point out any injunction of the Accessory. Because no sooner ‘do we proceed to show such an Injunction than the Injunction of the ०८ Bhavana and the Root-meaning presents itself forcibly. Consequently we ‘must admit that what is enjoined is either the Homa or the Bhavana as ८५ qualified by the dadhi, etc. ° And then, each of these Bhdvandas, being duly recognised as having ८ distinct accessory details of its own, the very fact of their following one ‘after the other, points to the fact of their forming a single collective ‘‘ whole; and it follows that it 18 this collective whole that is referred to “by the sentence ‘ agnihotrum juhotz.’ And the use of this reference lies “in the unification of the Injunctions of the Means and the Result of these “sacrifices. And thus dadhi and the other materials, each belonging to a “ distinct Action by itself, we are saved the undue necessity of taking them ८८ 88 optional alternatives. ‘In the same manner, in the case of the sentences ‘ ardhvamdaghara- “ yatt, ete. etc.’,—though we do not find the material or the Deity of these ‘‘ mentioned, yet, in accordance with the rule laid down in connection with ५५ ‹ ९004५ ’, qualifications of ‘ardhva, etc.’ may bo taken as specifying “ differentias; and through these those Actions being taken as having ‘““their accessories mentioned, it is only the action mentioned by the “sentence ‘dghadramaghdrayaic’ that remains without a mention of its ८८ accessory details; and as such, being wholly incapable of attracting men “towards itself, it has to be taken as a mere reference to the pre- “viously mentioned sacrifices. And in this case too, the use of such ५ reference lies in the unification (of the three sacrifices) which is necessary ‘* for the purpose of the employing in them of the mantra ‘ida ardhvyo AGHARA AND AGNIHOTRA ARE INDEPENDENT AOTIONS. 681 ‘“‘adhvara, eto.; and the connection of the single Deity mentioned in the ५ sentences ‘ tasyaghdramagharya, etc.’ Sittra (14): ° Also because of the application of the ‘names (‘aghara’ and ‘agnihotra’),” “ And further, names are employed only with a view to pointing out “a certain definite peculiarity; and in the case in question we do not “ perceive what these peculiarities are (that are pointed out by the names ‘“.“aghdra’ and ‘ agnihotra’ unless we take them as referring to the fore- ‘“‘ going sacrifices). If the name ‘ agnzhotva’ were taken only as pointing to ० Homa tn general, then, inasmuch this is already known, it would not be “any new Action (mentioned by the word). And as already known, there “is nothing in it that has to be kuown; and as such no injunction of that ‘would be possible. “Then again, Actions, not having the character of Nouns, could never ‘be connected with the Accusative ending (1.e, if the word ‘agnthotra’ “lays down an Action, it could not take the Accusative ending). As for “the collective whole (formed by the various actions), this can very “well serve as the objective, because such a whole is actually brought “about by the constituent actions. “That is to say, the presence of the Accusative in the words “‘aghdram’ and ‘agnihotram’ would be possible only for a Noun that “would be wanted by the Verb; and certainly the actions of ‘homa’ and ५८ ‹ aghdra’ could never want to get at themselves ; because such self-activity “would be incompatible. As for the collective whole (of Actions), how- “ever, inasmuch as it is mentioned apart from the constituent actions, by ‘means of another word, it can very well be spoken of as something to be “accomplished ; just as in the case of the sentence ‘ odanpakam pacati’ the “ particular kind of cooking is wanted by the generic cooking mentioned by “the Verb; and as such it is spoken of in the Accusative. “ Objection: “The whole having no existence apart from the parts, it “can never have the character of something to be accomplished; aud as ‘such, oven in this case, the Accusative ending is not proper ”. “ Reply: Not so; because the whole is something that is actually “ brought about by » conglomeration of the constituent Actions. It is only “from the constituent parts taken together that the whole cannot be held to ५ 6 different: from each of them individually, however, there is no doubt “that the whole is totally distinct; and it being impossible for the whole “to be accomplished without the individual constituents, there is nothing “incongruous in the Accusative character of the former. | ५ Objection : “ All such words (as ‘ agnthotra’) have been on a former 86 682 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA II—aADHI (5). ‘occasion shown to be expressive of the constituent actions; and hence “the undue self-activity of these constituents remains as incongruous “as before.” “ Reply : This does not affect our position ; because even though the “noun may directly denote the parts, it could be taken as indirectly in- ‘“‘dicating the whole; and as such, like its singleness, the accusative ५८ character also of the whole could very well be perceived. Nor is 1४ ८५ possible, as in the case of the cooking, for the same action to be expressed “ by the Verb and also by the Accusative, through its two-fold character ८ of the general and the particular; because in the case in question, we do ‘not have the general and the partecular actually mentioned. “The above arguments could be applied, on behalf of the s¢ddhdnta, “to the case of the sentence ‘ puurnamdsim, etc.’; and hence also it “follows that like the word ^ paurnamdsi’ ‘agnihotram’ also should be ‘““taken as a mere reference to the foregoing sacrifices. Sitra (15): * Because of tts not being Prakrta (related to the Context).” “ Objection: ‘ Under stétra II—ii—5, the view was stated that the ‘ Action would obtain its accessories from the other sentences, which ‘are Injunctions of accessories only; and in the same manner, in the ‘‘case in question, the sentence ‘ agnihutram juhott’ may be taken as the ‘‘ originative injunction of an Action, which would have its accessories as “mentioned by the sentences ‘ tandulatr puhots ', ‘ dadhna juhott, etc.’ ^ Reply: This cannot be; because in the case cited the doubt as to ‘“‘the particular words being mere references rested upon the words ** paurnamasya’ and ‘amavasyG@’ occurring in the sentences themselves ; ‘‘in the case in question, on the other hand, we do not find the word ८ ‹ agnihotra’ in the sentences ‘ tandulatv juhoti, etc.’; the word ‘guhote’ ‘that we do find in these 18 common to all Homas; and as such cannot be ‘taken as pointing to the injunction of the Agnzhotra alone. “ Objection: ‘ The particular Homa would be indicated by the Pra- ^ (८८१८. (Context, or mutual want).’ ^“ Reply: Not 80 ; because of there being no prakarana. That is to say, “in the originative sentence (‘agnthotram juhoti’) we do not find any ८ ५ orakarana’ of Actions ; because it is only after the action has been “connected with a particular result, that there arises a prakarana (or desire) of knowing how that Result is to be brought about by means of “that Action ; and as such the Prakarana could only proceed from the ‘assumed sentence that would sum up all the three factors of the Bhdvand «५ 0 connection with the Action in question. “The following may be arged against us: ‘The Agnihotra would be AGHARA AND AGNIHOTRA ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 683 “connected with its Deity and Materzal, when it would appear in the “assumed sentence you speak of (and thus it would be an Action by ८ itself).’ “Tn reply to this it is urged that an Action that has its accessory “details unknown, could never be enjoined with reference to a definite ‘result; and hence it is only such actions as have their details fully “known that can be mentioned in the aforesaid assumed sentence, (and ८५ {11686 Actions are the various actions mentioned by the different ‘juhot:’s). ५ Objection: ‘We have such sentences as tasyagharamdagharya, etc., “sda irdhvo, etc., Aghadram, etc.,—which are found to point out the ८८ material and the mantric Deity ; and as such the mere mention of the ‘name (AghGra) would point out its accessory details.’ “ Reply: Not so; because the word ‘ dghdra,’ apart from the denota- “tion of its verbal Root, cannot serve the purposes ofa specification. A ‘name expresses a peculiarity only in that case where the name has ‘been applied with a distinct reference toa certain peculiarity. In the ८८ 08.86 in question, however, we have in close proximity such sentences as ८५ ‹ ardhvamaghirayat:’, where the literal denotation of the verb is found to “be quite perceptible ; and as such even inthe sentence ‘ dghdrumighira- “yatt, the word ‘aghadram’ cannot be taken in any other sense, save the ‘literal one of pouring; and as such it cannot be taken as pointing to “any particular pouring. ‘ Objection: ‘The particular pouring would be got at from the Pra- ८५ karana,’ ‘‘In reply to this, we have the present sitra, which means that the ०" @ghara is not the ‘ prakrta’; because it occurs in a context dealing with “the Darga-paurnamasa : and certainly the Prakarana of one Action can “have no application in the case of another, * Objection: ‘The particular action could be pointed out by means of ५९ proximity.’ ५ {प reply to this also we have this samo siltra,—the sense being that ‘what you say is not possible, because it is only the superior authority of ८ Syntactical Connection that can establish a relationship with something ८ not occurring in the same context. And thus thereis an agreement be- “tween Syntactical Uonnection and Oontexi, when the originative sentences ^“ themselves are admitted to have within themselves the mention of the ‘material and the Deity. Itis only when even a slight detail of the “ Action is mentioned, that the character of the Action being thereby duly “ascertained, other details come to be connected with it, in some way or “another. And in the cases in question, we find that in regard to each ‘of the actions, we have such details as ‘ érdhva,’ etc , and ‘ tandula’, etc. ; ८८ whereas we have not the slightest details mentioned in the two 684, TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, II——PADA II—ADHI (98). “sentences ‘ agharamaghérayat: ’ and ‘agnthotram juhot:.’ Consequently “these two sentences cannot but be taken as merely referring to the “ former Actions.” SIDDHANTA. Stra (16): They are injunctions (of independent Actions); Decause the words distinctly express something to be performed ; and the repetition of the same words is for the purpose of laying down the accessory details. The Bhashya speaks of the sentences being the Injunctions of other actions ; though what 18 meant is that they are Injunctions of Actions ; hence this assertion of the Bhashya should be taken as shown above (on p. 486 of the text, Translation, p. 674). It is clearly perceived that the words ‘dghdrayate’ (in ‘ dghara- miaghdrayaiz’) and guhoty’ (in ‘agnthotram juholt’), not having their Injunctive potency taken up by any other word, cannot but distinctly express the injunction of definite actions. Nor can it be urged that the actions of ‘ Agh@ra’ and ‘Homa’ are already enjoined by the sentences ‘irdhvam, ete.’ and ‘ dadhnd,’ etc.; because the Injunctive potency of these sentences is taken up by the laying down of the accessories in the shape of ‘a@rdhva’ and ‘ dadht’, which are not laid down by any other sentence; and as such we cannot very well discard the idea of these sentences merely referring (by the words ‘ aghar@yatz’ and ‘ juhott’) to the actions of Aghdra and Homa (enjoined by the two former sentences). Nor 18 the Jaw of ‘ Qualified Injunction’ (stra I—iv—9) applicable to these sentences, because of the saving clause ‘tf they are not enjoined by another sentence. It 18 this that is meant to be shown by the Bhashya :— dn the case of the sentences ‘ irdhvam, etc.’ the injunction of the action of the Aghara and Homa could not be indirectly indicated by the expressed relationship of the ‘dadhi’ and ‘ urdhva’; because so long as we have direct injunctions of these actions (in the sentences ‘ayhdram, etc.’ and ‘ agnihotram, etc.’), they cannot be taken as indirectly indicated, etc. And the sense of this is that so long as we have direct Injunctions, we cannot have them as indirectly indicated by any relationships ; or that so long as we have an Injunction of a member of relationship, the other sentences may be taken as laying down accessories, and as such we cannot accept mere relationship. Consequently it is not possible for the actions of Aghdra and Homa to be indicated by the injunctions of relationships, independently of the two sentences (* dghiram, etc,’ and ‘ agnihotram, etc.’) ; and as such on the mere strength of any such indication, these latter sentences cannot be taken as mere references to previously enjoined actions. AGHARA AND AGNIBOTRA ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 685 It may be argued that—“no Injunction could ever give up the Bhavana and the Root-meaning, and betake itself to the Dadh: (as held by you)”, This is quite true; but we do not dissociate the Injunction from the Bharané altogether ; what we mean 18 that the accessory—dadhi— is touched by the Injunction as pertaining to the Bhavana; specially as the case-ending (in ‘ dadhn@’) serves to throw that accessory into the Bhavana. Thus then, the upshot of all this is that, whenever we come across an Injunction of a qualified Action, what we have to consider, in the first instance, is what factor of the object of Injunction is such as has been laid down elsewhere, and what is not 80 ; and when this has been duly dis- criminated, the Injunction comes to be taken as pertaining wholly to that factor which has not been laid down elsewhere; in the case of the sentence ‘ dadhna juhoti’, as the object of injunction is the action of Homa as qualified by Dadht, when we find that the Homa has already been laid down by the sentence ‘ agnihotram juhoti ’, we conclude the Injunction in question to pertain to the Dadhi only, and the Bhavana and the Root- meaning (denoted in ‘dadhn&i juhoti’) are said to be mere references to those enjoined elsewhere; and it is never said that from the very begin- ning the sentence ‘dadhn@ juhotc’ enjoins only the accessory with reference to the previously enjoined Bhavana and Root-meaning. Thus then, it is this subsequent restriction of the Injunction with a view to exglain which, to people of dull intellects, our Author has laid down a sort of a rule which is not very accurate ; and some people have been led to regard this to be the actual view of the author himself : and as such with a view to lead people astray, just as they themselves have been led astray, these people laid down the following eight methods of the Direct Injunction (of Actions), where the one that follows is held to be weaker in its authority than the preceding one: (1) the injunction of the Root-meaning; (2) the injunction of the qualified Root-meaning; (3) the injunction of the Root-meaning with reference to something else; (4) theinjunction of the qualified Root-meaning with reference to something else; (5) the injunc- tion of something else with reference to the Root-meaning ; (6) the injunc- tion of the Relationship of the Root-meaning with the other two ; (7) the in- janction of the Relationship of the Affix as qualified by the Root-meaning with the other two; and (8) the injunction of the Relationship of the other two, apart from the Root-meaning, | Now then, as an instance of (1), people cite the sentence ‘ agnihotram 7410८ १. But this is scarcely correct ; because it is never the case that the Injunction renounces the Bhavana and betakes itself to the Root-meaning ; nor does a man ever engage himself with anything other than the Bhavana ; because it is the Bhdvand wherein is centred the activity of the agent; while the Root-meaning often rests in the Action only; as for 686 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II——PADA II—ADHI (5), instance, the offering (which is the meaning of the Root in ^} 706८ ' ) rests in the purtition of the cake (offered); and certainly the action of one can never be performed by another ; consequently it must be admitted that the meaning of the Root ‘hi,’ as qualified by the dadhi, etc., is enjoined only as specifying the particular Bhavana (and not independently by itself). And it has been already explained under sifra I[--i—1l that the Root- meaning is never enjoined as something to be accomplished (but only as an Instrument); and when itis not an Instrument (but something to be accomplished), it does not stand in need of another object to be accom- plished ; and as such it could not be enjoined, by any other sentence, with reference to any definite Result. As an instance of (2), they quote ‘soména yajéta’; but here also, in accordance with the method laid down under [—i-—20, the Root-meaning and the various objects spoken of in the sentence, bearing no definite relationship among themselves, just like the ‘ redness,’ ‘one year old’, etc. in the sentence ‘ arunayd, ९८९. come to help one another only after they have been connected with the Bhavana; as we shall show further on, in the beginning of Adhy&yas VII and [X; and as such there can be no Injunction of the qualified Root-meaning. And if the ‘yaga’ (the Root- meaning), having the character of the Instrument towards the Bhavana, were to be an objective to the material offered, then we would have the anomaly pointed out under 5४८1८ I—iv—8; and hence there can be no Injunction of the qualified Root-meaning. As an example of (3) they quote ‘ vrihin prokshati’ ; but in this case we are cognisant of no such relationship, as ‘ prokshanéna vrihin’; (be- cause both are kdrakas and as such cannot be related) and hence both of these being related to the sense of ‘karott’ (the sense of the sentences being ‘prokshanena vrihin kuryat), it is not the meaning of the Root (‘ proksha’) that is enjoined with reference to the vriht. If its [njunction be spoken of as referring to the Bha@vana, then such injunction of the Bhavana being present in all cases (there would be no difference in the various methods of Injunction): consequently the present method of Injunction could not be any weaker, on the ground of its having a qualified object ; and as such there is no reason why it should be given the third place. As an instance of (4) they cite ‘dagapavitrena graham sammarsh{i’ ; but the arguments urged against the last two apply to this also; and hence 1४ is not right to accept the Injunction of the qualified Root-meaning with reference to something else. As an instance of (5) they quote ‘dadhna juhoti’; but in this case also the words do not signify that the person does the dadhi in the Homa (‘dadht homé karoti’); because the Homa is neither expressed by the word, AGHARA AND AGNIHOTRA ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS, 687 as a place ; nor 18 it so, in the actual state of things; nor is the dadhi some- thing to be done, because it has always the character of the Instrument. This method of Injunction is more authoritative than the two methods of qualified Injunction; because so long as the Ivjunction of one only is possible (as in the present instance), it is not right for it to appertain to many; and as for the anomaly of the Injunction pertaining to something removed from it, this is common to both parties ; and as such cannot be brought forward against any one party only ; andthe remote object is ad- mitted only because of the impossibility of a more proximate object; and where both (the Remote and the Proximate) are accepted, the anomaly of the simultaneous acceptance of two contradictory objects, as also of the simultaneous possibility and impossibility of the same, would be admitted, only because there is no way out of it; and in cases other than these, it would not be any more complicated than the Injunction of the qualified Root-meaning ; and as such this should have been placed in the fifth place. In fact it should have been mentioned either immediately after the Injunc- tion of the pure Root-meaning, or after that of the Root-meaning with regard to something else. As an instance of (6), they quote ‘ prakagau adhvaryavé dadati,’ where, it 18 held, the relationship of the Prakaca with the Adhvaryu is enjoined with reference to the meaning of the verb ‘daddiz’. But this is scarcely correct ; because such an interpretation bespeaks a sad want of a due un- derstanding of the syntax of the sentence ; as in all sentences that which is introduced by the word ‘ yat’ 18 the subject, and that whichis mentioned by the word ‘ tat’ is the Predicate. Consequently, in the sentence in question, if it were meant to enjoin the relationship of the Prakdga and the Adhvaryu, in that which is given (‘yat daddti’), then inasmuch as this latter clause would refer to all ‘ 2४21445 ', the sentence would come to mean that all sacrificial gifts are to be transformed into the Prakaca; and as for the capability of enjoining more than one thing (४.९.) the Adhvaryu and the Prakdga), it has not been denied in the case of the action being an €. joined one. Whenever a relation is enjoined, it always implies the members related ; in the case of the injunction of the Root-meaning, how- ever, there is no relative member to be laid down; for otherwise the Relative would be subordinate to the Relationship, and not to the Action. Here it may be argued that—‘“‘the affix accompanied by the Root- meaning, while laying down the Relationship, would lay it down with refer- ence to the Root-meaning.” If this be meant, then the next two (7 and 8) methods of Injunction would be included in this; and it would be useless to speak of them separately. Either in the sentence ‘ vdyavyam pveta- malabhéta’ (cited as an instance of 7) or in ‘ dadhnéndriyakdmasya guhuyat ’ (cited as an instance of 8), the Affix accompanied by the Root-meaning 688 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA II—ADHI (5). does not lay down the Relationship; asa matter of fact, the root ‘ alabha,’ being uttered only as a mark of the Primary Sacrifice in question, does not in any way help, by its colouring, in the injunction of the Relationship between the material (णद) and the Deity (Vayu); nor can this rela- tionship be accomplished by means of the root ‘dlubha’; because the Deity and the Material appertain to the sacrifice (and not to the alambhana, touching killing). If, in the accomplishment of the relationship, the Root did anything besides the bringing about of the utterance of the affix, then, in the case of the injunction of the Relationship between the Dadhi and the sense-organs, why should the Homa have been left out P Or again, why should the Homa be taken only as pointed out by the context? Therefore we conclude that there can be no injunction of the relationship of something else, with reference to the Root-meaning. And as shown above, we should deny tle fact of the Root-meaning being a place, and also that of the karaka (or thing) being something to be done. And it has already been explained that prior to the connection of the Bhadvand, there is no injunction of even the Relationship, with reference to the Root-meaning. Thus then, we cannot take the sentence as laying down the Relationship with reference to all givings. If the giving be taken as qualified by the Adhvaryu, or the Adhvaryu be taken as qualified by the giving, even then, as these would be a qualified reference, there would be a syntac- tical split. If the reference be to the Adhvaryu alone, then, though the giving would certainly be implied by the Dative ending (in ‘ adhvaryavé’), yet, inasmuch as the peculiar relationship between the object given and the person receiving the gift would not be possible without the verb ‘dadat7’, we would have to assume the latter ; just as the verb ‘ yaj@tz' has to be assumed from the relationship of a certain material with a Deity ; and hence there can be no form of the sentence, wherein there could be a relationship of the other two, with reference to the Root-meaning. As a matter of fact in the case in question, the gzving and the Adhvaryu being such as have been laid down elsewhere, what the sentence in question does is to lay down only the two Prakdgas; and in this case the injunction of the Relationship is implied; and hence it is not right to bring this forward as a distinct method of Injunction, This will be farther explained under the ‘ Jaghanyddhikarana’ (stttras I1I—iii—20-22), where it is shown that where out of two things, any one is such as has not been previously laid down, it is this latter that is enjoined with reference to the former (which has been enjoined elsewhere), and their Relationship is implied ;—while in a case where both are such as have been laid down elsewhere, or where none of them is so, we have the injunction of the Relationship only. In all these three (the sixth, the seventh and the eighth) cases, the fact of the Relationship being implied by the Affix is common ; and as such there AGHARA AND AGNIHOTRA ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 689 can be no difference in the strength or weakness of their authority. Nor is 16 possible for us ever to be faced by a contradiction of these three methods, when all of them happen to apply to the same cases—where a knowledge of their comparative strength or weakness could be of use to us; and hence the mention of these in a definite order does not serve any useful purpose. Thus then, in all cases, we must, in accordance with the present Adhtkarana, admit the injunction to be of the qualified Bhivand; and whatever else may be found to be mentioned in the Bhashya, it must be taken only as a means of making clear, to the dull intellect, what is not easily intelligible to it in the strictly accurate form. The mention of § proximity’ and ‘ remoteness’ is with reference to the fact of the objects spoken of being the qualifications of the Bhdvanda, wherein the injunction all along rests. Question: ^° How could the Bhavana be enjoined when it 18 already laid down by another sertence ? ” Answer: The Bhavana qualified (as it is in the sentence.in question) has never been laid down before; and hence it would be in the qualified form that the BhNvand would be enjoined ; and what it really comes to is that the Injunction is for the sake of the qualification, as we shall explain later on. Objection: ^ [11 that case, the injunctive word not functioning over the qualifications, if it were to lay them down through the Bhavan4, then, even “in the case of the injunction of an action that has already been laid down, ८५ 16 could lay down many qualifications, in the same manner as it does in “the case of an action never laid down before; and as such a case would “not be amenable to the law that ‘when an action has been enjoined, what- “ever 18 mentioned is for its sake, and hence particular qualifications would ८ 6 mentioned for particular actions.’ ” Reply: This does not affect our position; because even though the in- junctiveness appertains to the Bhfivand, there is always a distinction made as to whether it is for the sake of that Bhadvund only (or for that of some- thing else) ; and it is only when there are many qualifications that there occurs a split of the sentence. That 18 to say, in a case where the In- junctiveness pertaining to the Bhavund is taken as being for the sake of the Bhivand itself, the injunction of the qualification comes to be implied by it; and in this case we do not perceive any syntactical split. When, however, the Injunnctivness is ascertained to be for the snke of the qualification of the Bhavana, then, inasmuch as this wonld entail the removal, toadistance, of the Bhavana, which naturally has had a proximate position, —there being a contact of many qualifications, the injunction could be of that qualification alone, for whose sake it would have been ascertained to 87 690 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 1I—PADA II—ADHI (5). be, and not of any other, even though this latter may be located in the same place,—just as the eye does not pertain to touch, ete.; and thus there would he the necessity of splitting up the sentence into various sentences. And we have already shown that even though the Injunctiveness, in all cases, extends over the same place, yet, in point of fact, it is actually moving from one place to the other, and resting itself upon one object after the other, And thus we do not find any incongruity in this, As for the objection that in the case of the injunctions of the Abhyu- ditesht¢ and the Praka@ga, there would be the anomaly of the Injunction serving various purposes,—this is applicable to all parties; and as to how it does not apply to us, we shall show under the sections treating of those subjects. O [The Varttka now proceeds to deal with certain questions and answers set forth in the Bhashya. | 0 (The author has declared that the sentences ‘ ददवा juhott etc.’ serve the purpose of laying down the qualification of the Bhavana of Huma, and on this the objector puts the question). ८८ The qualifying word might very well qualify the object denoted by tt ; “but as a matter of fact, we do not, in the case in quesiion, perceive any * functioning of the qualification. And the sense of this is that so long as the ८ qualification is not directly laid down, the Avent could not engage him- “self in it; and as such even if he wonld perform the particular “sacrifice, without taking any notice of that qulification, he would feel ८८ that he had done his work.” In reply to this objection, the Author puts the question— What would happen then? And this question refers to the fact of the Injunction being in the form of a sentence. The author proceeds to make his point clear by adding —even though the qualification would be inoperative, the meaning of the word would be duly ascertained. This latter sentence of the Bhashya may also be taken as emanating from the objector, who is cogitating over the matter in his own mind. It is with a view to this that we have the next Question and Answer. Question: “ What would be the nse of the prowimity of the word denoting ५८ the qualification (when the Qualification will have been expressed by the ५५ Injunction) P” (And the answer to this 18 that ४८ may be taken as useless). Question: “ How cana word of the Veda be useless ? This question ५ refers to satra 1-11-8." Answer ¦ When there 78 actually no use, what else could we say? And the 16814 AND AGNIHOTRA ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 691 inner purport of thisis thatitis the objector who makes the word useless, by denying all functioning of the qualification. According to our theory, it .serves a distinctly useful purpose; and as such it cannot be said to be useless. Objection : ^“ In that case the injunction of the qualification would rest “upon the authority of syntax,—that is to say even though the Injunction, ‘pertaining to the qualified Bhavana is a direct one, yet, in the way you ‘pat it, it would come to rest upon the authority of the syntuz.” Answer: So long as we have a certain fact expressed by direct Assertion, we donot have recourse to the implications of the syntua ;—that is to say, we may have that (7.e., Bhdvand) itself as the object of the Injunction, through which the Qualifications come to be enjoined. Objection: “ True, tt is so; but when thut Bhivand 28 not meant to be ५५ enjoined, then we could have the Qualification as the object of the Injunction. ८ 17 support of this the transference of the Injunetive potency will be “dealt with under the 5६४7 ‘na cedanyena (50156 ' (I—iv—9).”’ Answer: Why should it not be meant to be enjoined € This question is put with a tonch of pity for the opponent; or it may be taken as an assertion of the Author himself The Bhashya concludes—-Thus zt 15 proved that the repetition of ‘dadhna guhote’ ts for the pu pose of laying down the qualifying matertals. Thesense of this is that, ^ becanse of its proximity ’--7.e., because of the fact of the qualification having entered into the Bhavana, 1४ becomes an object of Injunction ; or that because of the proximity of Qualification, there is a transference of the Injunctive Potency ; or that because of the proximity of the Injunction (by another sentence) of the Bhavand and the 00४. meaning (of ^ } ६८70८ *), the Injunction (in the sentence in question) is that of the Qualification, specially as there is no incompatibility between Direct Assertion and Syntax. Says the Bhashya—The utterance of ‘ juhoti’ (in the sentences ‘dadhna juhote’, etc.) is with a view to referring to the previously enjoined Homa, for the purpose of connecting ४८ with the matercals (dadini, etc.), Though the mention of the word ‘guhoti’ was quite clear, yet the Author has explained it only with a view to show that by that he refers to all verbs under similar circumstances (for instance, ‘d@ghdrayati ’ and the rest) Question: ‘If the word ‘guhoti’ only serves to refer to the Homa, by “what word zs the qualifying material enjoined ?” Answer: You should not run away with the alea that I declare zt to be enjoined by the word ‘dadhi’. This bearing of the sentence is to be ex- plained in the manner shown under the Adhikarana on ‘ Vajapéya’ (I—iv —6-8), The answer is that in the word ‘juhote’ (iu ‘dadhna suhoti’) “the affix serves the purposes of enjoining (the qualifying material), and it is 699 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I—PADA I1—ADHI (5). only the Root that serves to refer to a previous Homa, (and thus there is no difficulty about the said Injunction). Question: “ If the words are injunctive, when the object in question has “ already been laid down, why should they be pronounced again? That 18 tosay, “ when the Bhavand has already been previously enjuined, how can there ५५ be another Injunction (of the same) P” Answer: The words are pronounced again for the purpose of laying down what is expressed by the whole sentence (‘ dadhna guhoti’), Inasmuch as the material dadhi is expressed by the single word ‘ dadhi’ it cannot be said to be expressed by the sentence ; and hence what the answer means is that what is enjoined is the Bhdivand as qualified by dadhi (as it 18 this that is actually expressed by the sentence in question), Thus then we conclude that the sentences ‘agnihotram juhott’ and ‘aghiramighdrayaty’ are the injunctions of Actions, This should be ex- plained in the same way as we have pointed out above (text, p. 486, trans- lation, p. 674) with regard to the ‘ upancu’. [We now proceed to meet the arguments brought forward by the Parvapaksha). (1) As for the names ‘ Agnihotra’ and ‘ Ayhara’, they can be explained as serving the purpose of pointing out the pecniiarity indicated by the verbs ‘fuhoti’ and ‘ dghdarayali’ ; and in the present instance, they serve to distinguish the two actions in question from all other actions (of Homa and Aghdra), on the ground of these two being enjoined. (2) == + ADHIKARANA (6). [Treating of the fact of the ‘Pagu’ and the ‘Soma’ being independent Actions. } ७2८६2. (17): Because of the connection with certain neaterials the words ‘ pacu, etc.’ and ‘soma, etc.’ contain injunctions; as in the context the mention of the mere material would be useless—specially because the words do not serve the purpose of laying down accessory materials. [(1) We have a sentence ‘ pagumilabhéta’ ; and in continuation of this we have the sentences ‘hrdayasydgre’ vadyati, atha jrhvayad atha vakshasahk.’ (2) Then again we have the sentence ‘soména yajéta,’? and in its con- tinuation, the sentences ‘aindravdyavam grhnatt, mattrdvarunam grhnair, etc.’ And the question that arises is this: Is ‘dlabh&ia’ a mere reference to the actions laid down by ‘avadyat:’ ? and is ‘ yajéta’ a mere reference to those laid down by ‘grhknits’? or do they lay down independent actions by themselves ? } The case of ‘pagu’ is mentioned first, because it is the more difficult to be explained. Asa matter of fact, in the sentence ‘ pagum, etc.’, there are two words that are suspected of being mere references to a number of actions taken collectively ; these words are ‘ pagu’, and the root ‘ yajz’ (to sacrifice) which (though not actually present in the sen- tence) is implied by the relationship of the pagu with the deity Agni- shoma; because the sentence (‘agnishomiyam pagumalabhefa’) in its complete form would be in the form of ‘ agnishomiyéna pacund yajéta’ whereof one part is directly mentioned, while another 18 only inferred (from the relationship mentioned in it). Thus then, the form of the question too becomes this: Is the word ‘ pagu’ a mere reference to the ‘hArdaya, etc.’, and the word ‘yajz’ to the sacrifices implied by the word ‘ avadyati’ ? or do they lay down an independent ‘ yaga’ and pacu (as its material), the other sentences only serving to point out their accessory details 7 In the same manner, the question with reference to the other set of sentences is this: Is the word ‘ ydjéfa’ a mere reference to the sacrifice 702 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. YI—PADA II—ADHI (6). implied by the relationship of the material and the Deity, as mentioned in the sentences ‘ arndravayavam, etc.’, and the word ‘soma’ to the juice used at those sacrifices ? or the sentence ‘ soména yazéta ` lays down an in- dependent action together with the material to be used in it P The Bhadshya has said: Kimavadyatigrhndtibhyam coditanadm karma- nam, etc. But, inasmuch as the actions of ‘avadyati’ and ‘grhnati’ are not synonymous with ‘sacrifice’, we must take the Bhishya as refer- ring to those actions that are inferred from the relationship of the actions of ‘ avadyatt’ and ‘ grhn@ti,’ and which aro laid down by means of the conjugational affixes in these two verbs. And as a matter of fact, the word ‘ alabhéta’ also serves the purpose of indicating the sacrifice that is implied by the action of ‘ dlabhati ’ (killing). Or, it may be that no mention is made by the Bhdshya of the fact of the action of ‘ avadyati’ indicating the sacrifice at all; what then is meant to be the question is as to whether the word ‘ @labhatz’ (‘=killing’) is a mere reference to the ‘killing’ implied by the action of ‘ dvadyati’ (=cutting) ;—and the fact of each of these pveces cut being related to a definite deity leads to the inference of so many sacrtfices,—or the ‘ killing’ mentioned by ‘ Glabhéta’ leads to the inference of a single sacrifice of the Pacu’? In the same manner, in the case of the other sentence, does the ‘ sacrifice ’ (indicated by the word ‹ 077८2 ›) consist in the mere ‘holding’ (‘ grahana’) of the material? In this manner the words of the Bhashyu, embodying the question, could be taken literally. On this question, then, we have the following :— PURVAPAKSHA. “The words in question are mere references to a number of actions ‘‘ taken collectively. ‘“ Because, as in the case of the sentences ‘ yad@qneyoshtakapalah, etc.” ‘“‘ the real end of the sentence 18 not served until the ‘sacrifice’ has been “inferred (because the Cake cannot be spoken of as ‘ dgneya’ until it has “been offered in sacrifice to the Deity Agnz),—so also, in the case of the “sentences ‘aindravdyam, etc.’, their full signification would not be ‘accomplished until they implied a ‘ sacrifice’ (at whichjthe Soma would “be offered to Indra-Vayu, when alone it could be spoken of as “‘qindravayavam’). That is to say, the relationship of the Deity and the ‘material mentioned in the word ‘ aindravdyavam’ cannot be complete ‘until a ‘ sacrifice’ has been implied; and so long as the sentence itself is ‘“‘not complete, it cannot stand in need of any other sentence (in the shape “of ‘ soména yagéta ’, for which, according to the Szddhanta, it would lay “down an accessory detail); and as such the sacrifice mentioned by the PACU AND SOMA YAGAS INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 703 “sentence ‘soména yajzéta * could not yet come in as the ‘sacrifice’ sought ‘after; nor, on the other hand, would it be possible for the sentences ८८ ‹ gindraviyam, etc.’ to lay down the Deities for the sacrifice laid down by ‘the sentence ‘soména yajéta’, which, having no Deity mentioned, is “wanting in an accessory detail. When, however, the sentences ‘ aindra- “yayavam, etc.’ have implied a ‘sacrifice’, then, inasmuch as one ‘ sacrifice 1 ‘cannot serve as the accessory detail of another sacrifice, we are forced to “admit that that spoken of in the sentence ‘soména yajéta’ is a mere ‘‘referonce to those sacrifices that have been laid down in the context (by “the sentences ‘ aindravaiyavam 0702242, etc.’). “ As for the anomaly of having to accept a qualified Injunction, this is “found in your theory also; because, according to you also, what is enjoined ८८ 18 the sacrifice at which Soma ts the materiul offered. In fact you have to ‘admit a qualified injunction in the case of the Aguishomi7ya as well as in ५५ {116 case of the Aindravdiyava sentences; whereas we have to admit it “only in the latter; and this makes a vast difference between our (८ 00811018. ‘Further, the kind of Action that you will seek to have enjoined (by “the sentence ‘soména yugéta’) can never form the object of an Injunc- “tion, as we have shown above, in connection with the Agnihotra, where “it has been pointed out that the mjunctive potency pertains directly to “the directly-mentioned materzul (soma); and as such the sentence could ‘“‘not serve the purposo of enjoining the sacrifice; and as such we cannot but ‘admit the ‘ yajz’ (in ‘ yayéta’) to be a mere reference to certain pre- ‘viously mentioned sacrifices ; what, then, the sentence does, in connection ‘‘with the said sacrifices, is to specify the material (soma), which had been ‘‘ generally implied by the verb ‘grhnatz.’ Or, it may be that the Soma-juice ‘being mentioned by certain auxiliary sentences in the same context—such, “for instance, as ‘somam krindtz’, ‘ somamabhishunoti,’ ‘somampavayati,’ “etc.’,—it 18 with reference to this gudce, that we have the Injunctions in “the word ‘ grhnaiz’; and thus then, Soma cannot be the object of Injune- “tion (in the sentence ‘ soména yajéta’); and consequently, inasmuch as “the word ‘soma’ has the Instrumental-ending it becomes co-extensive (or “ gynonymous) with the ‘sacrifice’ whichis the material Instrument (in “the accomplishment of the result); hence in accordance with sitra ५ T—iv—4, the word ‘ soma’ becomes the name of the sacrifice (the mean- “ing of the sentence thus being that ‘ one should offer the sacrifice called ५५ Soma ’). ‘ Objection: ‘We have already got a name for this sacrifice—‘ Jyotish- ‘toma’; what then would be the use of another name P ’ “ Reply: What harm is there if we have another name? Very often ५५ 6 find people speaking of one sacrifice by two names, 704 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA II-—ADHI (6), “The useful purpose served by such reference to a number of sacrifices, ‘6 as we hold, is that it 18 only when all these sacrifices are referred to “collectively as one, that they could be spoken of in the singular num- “ber, in the final sentence that sums up their performability (v7z., the “sentence ‘/yotishtomena svargakadmo yajéta’). Hence we conclude that “the sentence in question is a mere reference to previous sacrifices. ५ Objection: ‘What you say may apply to the case of the sentence ‘“soména yajéta, because the sentences aindravfiyavam, etc., express a “relationship between the materzal and the Deities; in the case of the “sentence pagumilabheta, however, we find that in the sentences hrdaya- “ sydyre vadyatz, etc., we have the mere verb avadyati,—exactly as in the “sentence vatsamalabheta, which 18 connected with the material only, in the “shape of the hrdaya, etc., without any connection with any deity; and as ‘such how could such a verb as avadyati lay down a sacrifice? And how “then could the mention of the word ‘pucu’ be a mere reference to the ५ hrdaya, etc, 7 ' ‘ Reply: Justas in the case of the mention of ‘ pagu’ (animal) in general, ४८ {116 mantra leads us to believe that the goat is meant,—so, in the same ‘manner, the mention of the limbs hrdaya, etc., points to that animal ‘itself, as the source (or material cause) of those limbs. That is to Bay, ‘the hrdaya, etc., stand in need of a source from which they would “come forth; and the mantra having pointed to the goat, it is the ““naguiva’ of this goat that is referred to by the word ‘ pagu’ (in the “sentence ‘ pacumalabheta’); and the Deity of the actions mentioned in “these sentences (‘ hrdasydgre’'vadyati, etc.’) being laid down by the “sentence ‘agnishomiyam pagumialabhéta, there would be nothing in “the way of those sentences laying down the sacrifice. “Or, if may be that, in accordance with the law ‘sanndyyam va ‘‘tatprabhavatvat’, the ‘avadyati’ (of the sentences ‘ hrdayasya, etc.’) “may be taken as a part of the ‘avadyati’ in connection with “the Sdanndyya; and this latter is wellknown as serving the pur- “pose of preparing (or purifying) the material for the Darga- ‘“Purnamasa sacrifice; and hence it is only when the Ardaya, etc., “are the materials used at the Darga-Pirnamasa, that they become “connectable with the verb ‘ avadyati’ ; consequently, just as, when we ‘““meet with the sentence laying down the pounding of the Putika ८ (88 a substitute for Soma), we conclude that it must be connected ‘‘ with some sacrifice—ecven when no such connection is directly mentioned “because otherwise, there would be no use of the said ‘pounding ’ ;—s0, in ‘the same manner, in the case in question, there being no use for the avadyati’, unless it implied a sacrifice, we conclude that there must bea sacrifice connected with it; and it is these sacrifices, *~ferred in connection nd | 4 PAQU AND SOMA YAGAS ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS, 705 ‘‘ with each of the limbs (hrdaya, grivd, etc.) mentioned, that are referred “to by the word ‘dlabhéta’. And as the necessity of such inference of ‘sacrifices 18 equally present in your theory also, it cannot be brought ‘forward as a special weakness in our theory. “Further, if there were, as you hold, a single Soma-sacrifice (for “which the sentences ‘ aindravaiyavam, etc.’ would lay down accessory “ details), then, inasmuch as ‘Indra,’ ‘ Vayu,’ and the rest would all “serve the same purpose of the Deity at that sacrifice, they would ‘‘become optional alternatives; and as such they should not have ‘“ been mentioned in a definite order, one after the other; nor should “they have been subsequently mentioned collectively, That is ५0 say, just as in the matter of the making of the sacrificial ५ post, when we have many kinds of wood mentioned,—though all serve “the same purpose of a tethering post for the animal,—in the shape ‘fof the Paldga, the Khadira, etc., we take them as optional alternatives, ‘‘—go, in the same manner, in the case in question we must regard the ‘various Deities as optional alternatives. In our theory, on the other ‘hand, each of the Deities belonging to a distinct sacrifice, and all the ‘‘ Deities and sacrifices serving to bring about transcendental results, it is “only natural that all of them should be laid down by a single word ‘(*syotishtoma ’) with regard to the Result (attainment of Heaven) ; and “as such there is nothing incongruous (in their being mentioned ‘collectively, or in a definite order of sequence). (And as all the sacri- ‘fices are laid down collectively with reference to the result, they have ‘all to be performed, and they cannot be taken as optional alterna- (° tives). ‘“ Though in the case of the ‘ Pagu’ also, we find that the various ‘* avadyate’s’ ave mentioned in a definite order, one after the other— ^“ ‹ hrdayasyagre’vadyatt, atha gihvayadk, atha vakshasak’; and then again ‘we find them mentioned collectively, in the sentence ‘ é&kddaga vai pagora- “vadinani’; yet this has not been mentioned above (along with the “ soma) ; because even in a single sacrifice, the eleven pieces could be offered “one after the other (and as such each ‘avadyati’ would not necessarily ‘mean a distinct sacrifice). Specially as evenif the hydaya and the other ‘limbs had not been mentioned collectively, there could have been no “ offering of the whole animal, as mentioned in the original Injunction ; in “any case a cutting out of the various limbs would be a necessity, because “there is an established law that only those parts of the body should be ‘ offered in sacrifice which are not thrown aside according to other texts ‘(for instance, the blood, is always to be thrown aside). In the case ‘of the Soma, however, even the original Injunction does not lay down “the whole Soma (४.९. all the Soma in the world); and hence this alone 89 706 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1I-—-PADA 11-40षा (6). ‘has been mentioned in connection with the sequential mention of the “various ‘grhnat: ’s. ८५ For these reasons, we conclude that the sentences in question must ५ 06 taken as mere references to previous sacrifices.’’ SIDDHANTA. To the above we make the following reply : It is only when the sacrifice mentioned in a sentence is actually recog- nised to be the same as those mentioned before, that we take it to be a mere reference to these; in the cases in question, however, we do not find this to be the case. That is to say, if in the case in question we recognised the sacrifice to be exactly the same in all its details as those mentioned before,—as we do in the case of the Paurnamdsa sacrifice,—then we could take the sentence as a mere reference. If again, the sentence were held to be a reference to the root ‘yajs’ alone, then we could conclude it to be a reference bereft of the qualifications. In the cases in question, however, we find that the sacrifices mentioned before are (1) those that have the ‘ hrdaya, etc.,’ and (2) those having the Juice, for the material to be offered; while the sacrifices men- tioned by the sentences in question have, for their materials, the Pagu and the Soma respectively ; and thus these latter not being recognised to be the same as the former ones, we cannot take these sentences to be mere references to the former sacrifices. It might here be argued that—“ inasmuch as the modifications are ‘‘wenerally spoken of as the original substance, we could take the words ५५ ‹ {00८ ' and ‘soma’ as indirectly referring to their respective modifications, ५८ {116 limbs ‘ Ardaya, etc.’ and the juzce,”’ But this cannot be; because without sufficient reason we cannot have recourse to such indirect indication. It is only when we find a word spoken of as co-extensive or synonymous with another word that has an al- together different signification, (as in the sentence ‘ agnirmadnavakak '),—or when the direct meaning of the word is found to be incompatible with the rest of the sentence,—that we can have recourse to the-secom iry indirect significations of words. In the case in question, we have none of these two conditions; because there is nothing incompatible in the fact of the sentences in question laying down distinct sacrifices, at which the Animal and the Soma—which are directly expressed by the words used, ‘ pagu’ and ‘soma ’—would be the respective materials offered ; nor is there any in- congruity in the fact of these words not finding a place in the midst of the former sentences, Consequently, even though the verbs ‘ avadyati’ and PAQU AND 80704 YAGAS ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 707 ' 410790८४ ' be taken as laying down certain sacrifices, these must be totally different from those laid down by the sentences in question. ९८86009 : ‘‘ Why cannot we take the sentences in question as laying “down the Pagu and the Soma only as the material origin of the materials ° Jaid down for the sacrifices laid down by the other sentences P”’ In answer, the Bhashya has said—g¢rutyad hi rasa aindravdyavah : According to the Pirvapakshin, who denies the sentence ‘ pagum, etc.’ to be the originative Injunction of an Action, it must be taken only as laying down the Deity (Agnz-Soma) for the previous sacrifices ; and as such the other accessory, in the shape of the material pagu, not being capable of being enjoined by the same sentence (because the sacrifice having been laid down by the sentences ‘hrdayasya, etc,’, the subsequent sentence ˆ pagum, ete.’ could not lay down more than one accessory ; on account of the law ‘ pripié karmani nianéko vidhutum gkyate gunak’); and for this reason, in answering the above objection, the Bhashya mentions the case of Soma only; the sense of the Bhashya is that the injunction of the Soma plant (as the material for the previously-mentioned sacrifices) could only be by means of Syntactical Connection (Vakya), while that of the juzce is by means of Direct Assertion (in the senteiice ‘ azndravdyavam, etec.’); and thus when the former would be pitted against this latter, it could have no connection at all with the sacrifice in question (because of the admittedly superior authority of Direct Assertion over Syntactical Connection). Question: ^“ The Injunctions of the Azndravdyava, etc., not mentioning ‘any particular material, how can the juzce be said to have been laid ‘‘down by Direct Assertion? Asa matter of fact, it is indicated only by “the Contest; and as the Context is always weaker in authority than “ Syntactical Connection, the Soma-plant which is laid down by this latter “must be admitted to be more authoritative than the juzce.”’ Reply: The connection with some sort of a material is directly men- tioned by means of the Deific Affixes (in ‘ Aindravdyavam’, etc.) ; and what the Context does is only to specify that material. We shall show below, under 50८2 23, thatthe Direct signification of the nominal Affix having connected, with the Deity, a particular material that is pointed out by the indications of Syntactical Connection, Context, etc., there arises a question as to what this particular material is, and then it is only this pointing out of the particular material that is done by Syntactical Connection, ete. ; and it is not these latter that lay down the connection with the Deity. And farther, we find that the jucce is laid down by the originative Injunction itself, whereas the Soma-plant is got at from another sentence ; and as such the plant cannot but be less authoritative, for one who is seek- ing after the previously mentioned sacrifice only. And thus, even on the ground of the difference in materials, there 708 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I1—-PADA II—ADRI (6). would be a difference between the sacrifices laid down by the former sentences, and that enjoined by the sentenco in question, These arguments, however, can be successfully met by the opponent who will argue as follows : “in the case of the ‘ ashtakapdla’ cake, etc., though we find that these ‘‘ cakes are directly laid down ns the materials, yet we accept the Oorn ( Vrih¢) ‘as the material, though this is pointed out only by Syntactical Connec- “tion; and in the same manner we could accept the Soma as the enjoined “material. It 18 only when there isa contradiction between two things “that the stronger sets aside the weaker; and this is not the case when ‘the two things are quite compatible with one another. In the case in “question we find that the Soma is quite compatible with the juice, ‘ because this latter stands in need of something from which it could be ‘extracted, and the Soma-plant comes in as fulfilling this requirement. ८४ For instance, in the case of the sentence | त01221/0 shtakapdalah, etc.’, though “we find that the ‘ ashtakapd@la’ is directly laid down by the sentence, yet ‘when the Vriht and the Yava come to be laid down as the materials, there ‘‘is no contradiction ; for these corns are actually required as the material ‘out of which the ashfakapdla cake would be made ; and certainly, in taking ‘up the Vrihi one does not give up the making of the Ashtakapdla; and ‘“ hence in this case the action with reference to which Vrihi is laid down as ‘‘ the material is not recognised as any other than that for which the ‘ Ashta- ( kapala ` has been laid down, Exactly in the same manner, in the case in “question, in taking up the Soma-plant, one does not give up the juice ; ‘and hence there being no incompatibility between the two, inasmuch as “the ‘ Soma’ mentioned in the sentence in question can very well be taken ‘‘as the material for the sacrifices laid down by the other sentences, the “sentence in question cannot be taken as laying down a distinct Action, “merely on the ground of a difference in the materials mentioned. And “further, the argument applies equally to the Siddhanta also ; becsuse the “ Suddhanta also does not hold that the unpounded Soma-plant ig to be offered “at the sacrifice; and hence just as for you the Plant would only be the “source of the Juice, so also would it be fur the Paérvapakshin. As a matter ‘‘of fact, it is your own theory that would be the more incongruous of the ‘two. For in yorr case, if the Plant, as mentioned in the originative In- ‘junction, were to be the sole means of accomplishing the sacrifice, then it ‘ would never do to turn it into Juice, in accordance with other sentences. “In our case, inasmuch as the yuzce would not be possible without its origin ‘(in the shape of the Plant), our sentence would always be on the look- ‘‘out for the mention of this source; and hence even if such source happens ‘to be mentioned by another sentence, there is nothing incongruous in our “having recourse to it. In your case, on the other hand, inasmuch as the PACU AND SOMA YAGAS ARE INDEPE ENT ACTIONS. 709 “original Plant itself is quite capable of being offered bodily by itself, it ८८ १०९8 not stand in need of any mention of its modifications ; and as such “any connection of these would be wholly incompatible; consequently, we “conld not accept any such connection as Jaid down by other sentences.” In view of these arguments, based as they are on the firm ground of such examples as the aforesaid injunction of Vrthi, etc., which completely shut our mouth, it is best for us not to start the question of the Injunction of Materials, and to confine ourselves solely to the refutation of the view of the sentences in question being mere references to previonsly mentioned sacrifices, In the case of the ‘ Pagu’, however, as the animal ns a whole is not capable of being bodily offered at a sacrifice, the above arguments of the opponent would not apply ; and hence for this case alone, the argument of the Injunction of different materials would be a good one for the Siddhanta. But in the case of ‘ Soma ’, it becomes necessary for us to refute the opponent’s arguments based upon the Injunction of the Vrithz; and for this purpose we have the next siéra. Or, we may take it thus—that having refuted the former Siddhanta arguments (by means of the arguments based upon the Injunction of Vrihz), the true conclusion is arrived at by means of the arguments em- bodied in the following 571१५. Or, lastly, we can take the present siitra as embodying the Pirva- paksha, and the next sitttva,—in which the ‘ca’ may 106 taken in the sense of ‘tu’ (which is a sign of the Siddanta-sitra)—as putting forth the Siddhanta, It may be asked how the present stra can be taken as expressing thie Puirvapaksha. his we proceed to explain as follows : The question being,—do the sentences ‘ hrdayasya, etc.’ and ‘ aindra- vdyavam, etc.’ serve the purpose of laying down accessory details, like the Dadhi, etc.; and the subsequent sentences (‘ pagum, etc.’ and ‘soména, etc.’) are the originative Injunctions of the sacrifices concerned P—or do the former sentences themselves serve as the Injunctions of sacrifices P— we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. “The sentences ‘hydayasya, etc. or ‘aindravdyavam, etc.’ do not ‘“serve the purpose of laying down accessory details, like the sentences ८८ ‹ dadhna juhoti’ and the rest; in fact these themselves are original In- “junctions. Why? Because of the mention of ma tertals,—zv.e., because of ५ {6 mention of such materials as Ardaya, etc., these sentences are the 710 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I[—-PADA Il—ADHI (6). “ Injunctions of the Pagu and the Soma. As otherwise, through the Con- “text, the connection of Hrdaya, etc., would become subsidiary to the “ sacrifice; while as a matter of fact, it is not possible for this connection “to serve as its accessory ; because that would be contrary to the ‘ pagu’ “and the ‘soma-plant’ laid down in the original Injunctive sentences. “Or, in accordance with a previous law, the ‘Pagu’ and the ‘ Soma’ ‘having been obtained from other sentences, the mention of the con- “nection of materials, in the present context, would, in your theory, “be wholly useless. In my theory, on the other hand, the word ‘Soma’ ५ (77 ‘soména yagéta’) 18 the name of the sacrifice, and the sentence ५" “agnishomiyam pagum, etc.’ serves the purpose of laying down the Deity ८ Agni-Soma ; and thus none of these two sentences making mention of “any material, the mention of materials in the other sentences 1s not at ‘all superfluous. Consequently we conclude that the real Injunctions of “the sacrifices are contained in the sentences ‘hArdayasya, etc.’ and (५ aindravdyavam, etc.’ (and the sentences ‘agnishomiyam pagum, etc.’ and ८ ५ soména yajéta’ are mere references to these sacrifices taken collectively,— “the former serving the purpose of pointing out the Deity for the offer- ‘ings of the pieces, and the latter supplying the name of the sacrifices “ taken collectively ).”’ SIDDHANTA. Stitra (18): But as (laying down) purificatory rites they cannot be injunctive (of independent Actions). The sentences 1n question cannot be taken as mere references to pre- vious sacrifices, because of these latter not being the sacrifices treated of by the context,—an argument that has already been explained on a previous occasion, in sittra II—1i—10. Question : “ But how is it that these are not the sacrifices treated of ५५ by the Context ?”’ Answer: Because the words ‘avadyati’ and ‘ grhndtiv’ are not in- junctive of sacrifices ; as what they do is only to lay down certain purifi- catory or preparatory rites; because they are actually found to end with them: as when a sentence is actually found to have its sole ending in the pointing out of such rites, there is no ground for assuming a sacrifice to be indirectly indicated. Because such a sacrifice, if it could be assumed, could only be assumed in the following manner: ‘ when a substance is taken up with reference to a certain deity, unless it is connected with some sacrifice, it does not become dedicated to that Deity’. Butin this no sooner do we proceed to assume a sacrifice, on account of. the said apparent Inconsis- PAQU AND SOMA YAGAS ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 711 tency (of the fact of the substance having been taken up for a particular Deity), than we are faced by a direct mention of the ‘sacrifice’ in a sentence close by (viz: ‘soména yajéta’), which at once makes possible all the relationships between the substances and Deities in question; and as such, it completely shuts the door of any authority for assuming another sacrifice ; and when no such sacrifice would be mentioned by the sentences (‘ 01004८४, etc.’), to an aggregate of what would the sentence in question be a reference 7 (1) It has been urged above —that ‘‘as in the case of the sentence ८५ ‹ agneyo shtakapalo, etc.’, until the sentence (‘ grhndtz, etc.’) has actually ^“ indicated a sacrifice, it cannot stand in need of any other sentence (for “instance, ‘soména yajéta’’ which would supply the necessary element ५८ 01 the ‘ sacrifice ’).”’ To this we make the following reply: In all cases a sentence is completed by means of a direction for the activity of a human agent; and so long as this direction is not got at, the sentence remains incomplete ; while when that direction has been got at, it 18 complete, and can very well be taken along with other sentences. For instance, in the sentence ‘dgnéyo shtadkapalo bhavati,’ we do not perceive any other action of the human agent than the sacrifice; and hence until this sacrifice has been duly indicated the sentence remains incomplete. In the casein question, however, the sentence ‘atndravdyavam grhnai:’ serves to direct the human agent to take up (the vessel containing the juice, etc.), and thus, even without the indication of a sacrifice, it has got a distinct object for its injunctiveness, and as such is quite complete in itself; and that the sentence stands in need of something else is quite another matter (having nothing to do with the completeness of the sentence) ; because in all cases, even when the sentence is complete in itself, it does not, by that fact, give up all its need for other factors; nor does the fact of its being in such need make the sentence incomplete; and as we recognise the fact that this need is supplied by another sentence, there can be nothing incongruous in the fact of a complete sentence bing related to another sentence. Consequently when we proceed to assume a sacrifice in connec- tion with each of the sentences (‘atndravayavam grhniti,’ etc.), the ‘sacrifice’ mentioned by the sentence ‘somena yajeta’ at once presents itself (and thus puts a stop to the said assumption) ; and there is nothing incongruous in this, ` In the case of the sentence ‘dgneyo .... bhavatz,’ the action of ‘being’ does not belong to the human agent; and as such until the ‘sacrifice’ 18 assumed there is no object, either enjoined or pro- hibited, and hence the sentence being incomplete, and as such having no capability of requiring the aid of any other sentence, the ‘ sacrsfice 712 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—~PADA II—ADHI (6). (necessary for the completing of the sentence) has got to be inferred ; consequently no ‘ sacrifice’ that is mentioned in any other sentence, comes to be related to it; and herein lies the great difference between the two sentences ‘ dgneyo, etc.’ and ‘ aindrdvadyavam, etc.’ (2) Another objection urged above is that the ‘ pagu’ and the ‘ soma’ ‘“ being laid down in the originative injunction, 16 cannot be proper for us ‘to modify them (into juice and the limbs, respectively, as laid down by “ the various ‘ grhnati’s’ and ‘ avadyati’s’).”’ The following is the reply to this objection: Itis only when the two substances concerned are wholly different from one another, that there can be any comparison between their respective authoritative character ; 111 the case in question, however, through the guice and the various limbs also, 1t 18 only the soma and the animal that form part of the sacrifices concerned. If the sentences wholly renounced the Soma and the Animal laid down in the originative injunction, and laid down other substances wholly different from them, then alone could there be a contradiction (between the substances enjoined by the two sentences) ; as it is, however (what the subsequent sentences lay down is that), the sacrifice is accomplished by means of the Animal itself, through its various limbs, as also by means of the Soma, through its juice; and certainly there can be no contradiction in the presence of (different) methods of procedure. For the Animal and the Soma, being laid down as the means of performing the sacrifices, stand in need of the method of that performance; and it is this method that is supplied by the mention of the fact that the animal has to be cut up into its several limbs and then offered in sacrifice, and the Soma has to be pounded into juzce before it is offered; and thus the mention of the ‘ hrdaya, ` etc., and the ‘ ४८८ ' only serves to help the original mention of the substance, and there is no chance of contradiction. (3) Another objection is that— the Soma having been mentioned, as “ the substance to be offered, by other sentences in the same context, such “as ‘somam krinati,’ etc., the further mention of the same substance ^^ “soma ' (by the sentence ‘ soménad yajeta’) is wholly superfluous.”’ In reply to this, we have the Sétra itself; the sense being that those sentences—‘ Somam krindt:,’ etc., do not serve the purpose of enjoining either the Soma or the Animal; as all that they do is to speak of the method of preparing these. That is to say, the substance (Soma), as laid down by the sentence ^ somena yajeta’, having been recognised as tending, in some way or other, to accomplish the sacrifice, what the sentences, ‘somam krindti,’ etc., do is to lay down that the sacrifice is to be performed by means only of such Soma as has been purchased in a certain manner, and prepared into the form of Juice by pounding, etc. (4) Nor are the words of the mantris capable, as urged in the PAQU AND SOMA YAGAS ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 713 Parvapaksha (text, p. 507), of pointing out the goat, which has not yet been laid down; what those words do is to set at rest the uncertainty with regard to the character of the ‘ pagu’ as laid down by the sentence ‘pacunti yajeta.’ Nor does the verb ‘ avadyati’ necessarily imply ‘ sacri- fice’; and even without the ‘sacrifice’ the verb would mention the mere ‘cutting,’ which would, by itself, be of use, either in connection with the Veda, or in ordinary life. On the other hand, the peculiar relationship between the Substance and the Deity, as expressed hy the word ‘ aindrava- yavam,’ would not be possible without a ‘ sacrifice’; and as such there is a great difference (between the inference or implication of the ‘ sacrifice ' by the sentence ‘azndravayavam,’ etc., and that by ‘ hrdayasydvadyati,’ etc. (5) The ‘avadyatz’ of the Qanndyya is not laid down in connection with the Primary Sacrifice of the Context under consideration ; because it is only indirectly implied ; and as such the qualifications and accessories of that ‘ avadyati’ could not be transferred to the ^ avadyatz’ in question. Nor is the fact of being for the sake of the sacrificial substance the method of the ‘ avadand’ (cutting); and thus too, the said fact could not be transferred (as it is only the method that can be thus transferred). Nor in such cases, can we have any operation of the Samdnyatodrshta Infer- ence (towards the inference of the ‘sacrifice’). As for the pounding of the Putikd, and the eatiny of the Phalacamasa, itis by means of Syntactical Connection and Context that they are cognized as helpingin the comple- tion of the sacrifice; and consequently the case of the pounding of the Putikd is not identical with that of ‘avadyat:’ in the matter of the implication of the ‘ sacrifice.’ In the case of the sentences dealing with ‘Soma’ also—(‘Somend yajeta, atndravayavam, etc., etc., etc.’), the qualified Injunction (of the sacr¢fice by means of the Soma) being dzrectly mentioned, there is no room for any ¢mplied sacrifice; and as such the case of these too is different (from that of the ‘pounding of the Putika’). (6) In the case of the sentences ‘ atndravdyavam, etc.,’ even if they are secondary sentences laying down accessory materials, there is no syntactical split, as in the case of the sentence ‘ dgnéyo’shtakapdlo, etc.’ Because, though as mentioning more than one deity (Indra and Vayu), the sentence has more than one object of Injunction, yet, on account of there being another action (in the shape of the ‘ grahanu’), there is every possibility of the Injunction being that of a qualified object. That is to say, the sentence can very well be taken as an Injunction of the Bhavana of the‘ grahana’ qualified by the deities Indra, Vayu and the rest. Or, it may be that the ‘ grahana’ being necessarily implied , the sentence serves the purpose of laying down a single joint Deity (Indra-Vaéyu) mentioned by means of the Dwandwa compound; and thus there would be no 90 714 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. If—~PADA II—ADHI (6). incongruity in the case. And as the connection of these with the Primary Sacrifice (Jyotishtoma) is pointed out by the Context, there would be no incongruity, even if the sentence in question were taken as a secondary sentence (laying down accessory details). Thus then, the actions (mentioned in the sentences ‘ aindravayavam etc.’) having the character of mere Preparatory Actions, they stand in need of the mention of a ‘ sacrifice’ somewhere else; and as such there would be nothing incongruous in the fact of such a‘ sacrifice’ being laid down by another sentence (‘ soména yajéta, etc.’). And our way of taking the sentences has the following advantage: (1) The singular number in ‘ jyot¢shtoména’ becomes capable of being taken directly (and not figuratively, as necessitated by the Purvapakeha, which makes it refer to many sacrifices); (2) we are saved the useless trouble of accepting the word ‘ soma’ (in ‘ soména yajeta’) as a second name for the Jyotishtoma; (3) nor is it necessary for us to accept the apparently useless fact ofthe sentence in question being a reference to all the other sentences, as in the case of the Purvapaksha in connection with the Agha@ragnihotra. For these reasons we conclude that the sentences in question are injunctions of the Animal and the Soma sacrifices. Saitra (19): Because of difference, there is a repetition of the Action; as the substances are distinct, it would be useless (to mention another connection); hence there 18 a difference (in the grahan a’); specially as it is subservient to the substance. [Setree (20) 25 not specially dealt with by the Varttka; wt 25 thus: The preparatory action does not differ, because the substance being for the sake of something else, it has a subordinate position.] [७१६१५ (19) embodies the reply to the objection urged in the text on p. 509, beginning with the words ‘ cakyaparthadrantwidam.’ | As the opponent has not urged the objection based upon the fact of the ‘ avadyati ’s* being mentioned in a definite order, etc., etc., with reference to the ‘ Pagu,’ we lay aside this sentence for the present, to be dealt with under Sitra X—vii—l ९८ seq., where we shall deal with the question as to whether the offering should be cut out from the whole animal, or from each of its limbs, or from only one limb, or only from those enumer- ated, namely, the Heart and the rest. What concerns us now is the meeting of the objection with reference to the ‘Soma’ (as it is with reference to this alone that the objection has been levelled against us). And to that we make the following reply :— If the Deities of the sacrifice were separately mentioned directly | by the sentences, then alone could they be taken as optional alternatives ; PAQU AND SOMA YAGAS ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS, 715 as a matter of fact, however, we find that all of them are mentioned as being connected with the sacrifice simultaneously. In a case where the sentence mentions a relationship independently of everything else, there alone could all the deities, serving the same purpose of accomplishing the sacrifice, be taken collectively. That is to say, if we had such direct injunctions as ‘ aindravdyavena 478८ › or ‘Indravayubhyam yagam nirvartayét’, then, inasmuch as the Deities would be pointed out as serving the same purpose, by sentences independently of one another, they would come to be taken as optional alternatives. As a matter of fact, however, in the case in question, we find that they are mentioned as in connection with ‘ grahaza,’ and become connected with the ‘sacrifice’ only indirectly by means of Context (and not directly by the Sentence). And as for the Context, 1४ does not operate variously (or separately); and as such it could not connect, with the ` ५ sacrifice,’ each individual Deity independently by itself; consequently, what actually happens is that all the various ‘grahanas’ having been simultaneously taken as constituting the method (of the sacrifice), the Deities mentioned in connection with these (grahanas) not having their ends duly fulfilled by that (grahuna) alone, all of them at once, being required by the ‘sacrifice’ dealt with in the Context, become simultane- ously connected with it; (and as such there is nothing wrong in their being mentioned collectively ). As a rule, too, we accept a number of things to be optional alterna- tives when they are mentioned as employed for the same purpose, inde- pendently of one another ; and the reason for this is that in such cases, the individual capability of each of these, by itself, is distinctly expressed by the sentence ; and hence if they were to depend upon one another, this individual capability would be destroyed ; and hence they are all accepted to be optional alternatives. In the case in question, however, the capabi- lity of accomplishing the Jyot¢shfoma is not found to belong singly to each one of the deities mentioned—Indra, Vayu, etc, ; because we have no direct declaration of such capability. Though each one of them has the capability of accomplishing a sacrifice in general, yet, the particular sacri- fice, in the shape of the Jyotishtoma, can be accomplished only in the way laid down in the scriptural text; and hence each of the deities men- tioned does not serve the same purpose. On the other hand, we find the two kinds of corns, the 7771६ and the Yava, serving the same purpose; and hence they are taken as optional alternatives; specially because each of them is laid down as independent of the other, by independent sen- tences, as to be employed in the sacrifice. Objection : “ We find that we have actually a sentence ‘ acndraviyavam ८५ orhnatc’ laying down the deities Indra and V&yu; and hence the 716 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1]-—~-PADA II——ADHI (6). “ sentence that follows ‘mattrdvarunam grhnatc’ is distinctly recognised “as capable of pointing out a deity, independently of the preceding ‘* sentence.” Reply: It 18 true that with reference to the ‘grahana,’ the deities are laid down independently of one another; but in that ecnse, all of them do not serve the same purpose; because being only a purificatory or preparatory action, the ‘ grahanas’ can have only transcendental results ; and thus varying in each case, and not serving the same end, the various deities mentioned cannot be taken as optional alternatives. Question < ‘“ But how do you conclude them to have only transcen- ‘* dental results 7 ”’ Answer: When a certain thing, having been mentioned in connection with the Primary Action, happens to be directly mentioned in connection with the Preparatory Action, then in that case, such a thing serves a visible purpose; and so also when, as a matter of fact, the Preparatory Action cannot actually be accomplished without that thing. That is to say, (1) if the deities having been previously connected with the ‘sacri- fice’ (in the sentence ^ soména yajeta’) were again directly mentioned with reference to the grahanas,—as they are mentioned in connection with the nirvapa and the 4vahana; or (2) if without these Deities, the ‘ grahana’ could not be accomplished ;—then the mention of the Deities in connection with the ‘ grahanas’ would be for the purpose of a visible end, in the shape of recalling to the mind the Deities in connection with the coming sacrifice. In the case in question, however, we find that the Deities Indra, Vayu, and the rest have not been previously mentioned in connection with the Jyotishtoma; nor is it that without those Deities, the ‘ yrahanas’ could not be accomplished ; and consequently, under the circumstances, when we find the ‘ grahana’ mentioned along with a certain Deity, this cannot but be taken as fulfilling an imperceptible transcendental result. Objection : ‘‘ When we have come to know that these deities belong ‘“ to the sacrifice, then, even without a previous mention of these (in con- ‘ nection with the primary sacrifice), we could take all of them as serving ‘‘ the same visible purpose of recalling the Deities in connection with that ‘* sacrifice.” Reply : lt is not so; because as a rule, it is at the time of the actual Injunction that the purpose served by the factors enjoined is sought after ; and hence it 18 with reference to that time that we should ascertain whether the purpose served is a visible or an invisible one. That is to say, 1४ 18 at the time of the operation of the sentence ‘ aindravdyavam 97070८४ ` that we have a want to know what purpose is served by it; and though at that time, we do, somehow or other, come to ascertain, through the Context, the connection of the ‘ sacrifice’ with ‘ the grahana,’ PACU AND SOMA YAGAS ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 717 which embodies the method (of that sacrifice), yet, inasmuch as the Deities themselves are connected with something (2.e., the ‘ grahana’) other than the sacrifice, and as they themselves have not the form of actions, they are not pointed out, by the Context, as serving the purpose of accom- plishing the sacrifice; and consequently, the use (of these Deities) in connection with the ‘grahana’ must be taken as something independent of any connection with the ‘sacrifice’; and such a use cannot but be invisible (or transcendental). And this transcendental purpose having been ascertained at the time of the operation of the Injunction in ques- tion, if at the time of the actual performance of the Action therein laid down, a certain visible result is found to come about, how could the previously ascertained transcendental result be set aside by that? Nor could any such visible result (appearing by the way) control the operation of the Injunction in question. And thus the connection of the deity, mentioned in each of the sentences in question, cannot but fulfil certain transcen- dental purposes; and as such all the deities in question must be taken as all conjointly (helping the accomplishment of the sacrifice through the said transcendental results). And unless the ‘grahana’ is not repeated (with each deity), the separately mentioned deities can not be connected with the ‘ grahana’ in accordance with the law that ‘that which is done in connection with the Samzt is not done in connection with the Zaniinapdia’; and hence there must be a ‘ grahana’ (holding) of the Suma, with reference to each deity. Thus, then, the Sutra must be taken as follows: ‘ tadbhédat, ’—+7.e., on account of the connection of the deity being different in each case,— ‘ there must be a repetition of the action’ of grahana; because ‘ on account, of the distinctness of the substance’, that is to be prepared ‘or purified by means of the grahana in connection with the said deities, if any other connection were mentioned, ‘zt would be wholly useless’; as it would not be performed ; and hence ‘ there is a difference’ of the grahana, ‘ because ४४ ४5 subservient to the substance’ to be purified (by that grahana). Tnasmuch as these ‘ grahanas’ in connection with the various deities are mentioned in a section dealing with sacrifices, it follows that, without a ‘sacrifice,’ they cannot prepare the substance ‘ Soma’ for the sake of any deity; and this leads us to the conclusion that there must be a cer- tain sacrifice, that would establish the relationship of the substances with the deities in question. On the other hand, we find that the ‘ sacrifice ' (laid down iu the sentence ‘soména yajeta’) has no deity laid down (by the original Injunction) ; nor is the requisite deity pointed out either by Direct Declaration, or by Indirect Indication by the words of the text, or by those of any sentence; and as for the Oontext, it can have nothing to 718 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II-~PADA II—ADHI (6). do in connection with that (7.e., the Deity) which is not an Action; and hence the Context comes to point out the fact of the ‘ grahanas ' being per- formed (in connection with the sacrifice in question), These ‘ grahanas’ too, not being laid down separately (by the Context, which never operates separately), and serving to accomplish only invisible (transcendental) results, come to be taken all at once (simultaneously) ; and through these ‘grahanas’ we come to take the deities (mentioned in connection with them) also collectively. | Objection : ““We find that even when certain things are pointed out ५ by the Context, if they are found to serve the same purpose, they are “taken as optional alternatives ; as for instance, the mantras employed at “ the dividing of the sacrificial cake.” Reply : It is true that they are so taken; but in that case it is not the Context alone that operates towards the pointing out of them ; because the fact of each of the said mantras being connected with each Division being pointed out by the Direct Declaration inferred from the indications of the words of the १४1५८745, all that the Context does, in this case, is to point out that it is at the Division of the Cake in connection with the Darga- Pirnamisa sacrifices that the mantras have to be employed ; because of their being of no use at other divisions. Hence even if the Darga and the Piirnamdadsa were to take up all the mantras collectively, those sacrifices would have no capability of taking them up, independently of the inter- vening agency of the Division (of the Cake); and this agency is found to be connected with many alternatives, and not in a collective form. In the case in question, however, the conditions are totally different ; because in this case, the intervening agency is that of the ‘ grahanas,’ and it 18 with reference to these that the deities are found to be mentioned collectively ; and hence even though the collection, or aggregate, of the deities may be capable of being taken up with each ‘ grahana’ separately, yet inasmuch as it 18 through the agency of the ‘ grahanas’ that the deities can be taken up, what could it do in this case (but point to the performance of the collective performance of the ‘ grahanas’ also) ? Objection: .‘‘ As a matter of fact, we find that each of the ‘ gra- ‘‘ hands’ has got the capability of helping the Primary Action, by means ‘of the bringing up of the substance (Soma), and also by pointing out ‘“ the requisite deity ; and thus the case of these grahanas being identical ‘‘with that of the aforesaid mantras, they must be taken as optional ‘* alternatives.” Reply : Such could have been the case, if the sacrifices in question had been previously cognised as having many deities (connected with them) ; as then alone could the various bringings up of the substance be taken as being for the sake of those various deities. As a matter of fact, however, PAQU AND SOMA YAGAS ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 719 we find that in the case in question, no such sacrifice with various deities has been previously cognised ; and hence the mention of the various pre- sentations of the substance must be taken as serving only an imperceptible (or transcendental) purpose. These presentations of the substance, too, must differ from one another, on account of the difference among their qualifications (the deities) ; as with a single presentation of the substance, it is not possible for many deities to be taken, either singly or collectively. Because as for their being taken collectively (simultaneously), this is precluded by the sentences (‘aindravdyayam 0701767, ' ‘maitravarunam grhnati’ etc.) which speak of them as appearing one after the other; and (even if such simultaneous taking of many deities with a single material were attempt- ed) we would have an aygregate (of deities), which would not have the character of a sacrificial deity at all, as we have no authority for asserting any such character with reference to an aggregate of Indra, Vayu and the rest; specially because we find each of them mentioned separately by means of nominal affixes with each word. Nor is it possible for all of them to be taken separately (in connection with the same pre- sentation of the substance); because the substance is always laid down with reference to the deity ; and it is not possible for a single substance to be laid down (by a single sentence) with reference to more than one deity. If the substance could be referred to the deities, either prior to, or after, the ‘ grahana,’ then that would be doing something not enjoined by the texts. And further, a substance is always referred to a deity in such terms as ‘ this belongs to such and such a deity’; and hence if the same substance were to be referred to another deity, the former offering would certainly be done away with. That is to say, a certain Soma juice having been set aside with the expressed idea that ‘this is to be offered to Indra and Vayu,’ it is as good as already offered ; and as such the sacrificer no longer having any control over it, how could he speak of the same juice as to be offered to ° Mitra and Varuna?’ For if an offering once made to a deity, were to be made again to another deity, it would have to be snatched away from the former deity. Or, in view of the previous determination (to offer the substance to one Deity), the subse- quent determination (to offer it to another) could never be taken as true; and in any case, such an action would mean a most unworthy procedure, and not the fulfilling of the Vedic Injunction. For these reasons, we conclude that the ‘ grahana’ must be distinct, with each of the deities in question. Further, even without the actual ‘grahana’ of the substance, it would be quite possible for us to refer it to a certain déity, no matter in what plince the substance may be; and as such the injunction of the 720 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—=PADA II—ADHI (6), ‘grahanas’ could only be with regard to certain transcendental results. That is to say a ‘sacrifice’ consists of the action of giving away of one’s ownership in favour Of a Deity; and this giving away of one’s owner- ship or possession over the Soma would be quite possible, in whatever condition the Soma may be, either in the state of being clarified (without putting it into separate vessels), or in any condition after it has been purchased ; and hence the injunction of the various rites, purificatory and preparatory, of the Soma must be taken as with a view to certain trans- cendental results. In a case where the substance laid down is the Cake, or some such thing, such preparatory actions as the threshing and shifting, etc., of the corn, are-found to have a visible result in the shape of the preparation of the Cnke (as without those actions, the Cake would not be made). In the case in question, however, we have no such Injunction as that the offering must be made out of the Soma kept in the. sacrificial cup, etc.; because all that the Injunction lays down is the Soma- plant ; and consequently the ‘grahanas,’ or holdings, of the Soma in the various vessels, though serving to bring about distinct transcendental results, must be taken ns collectively (helping by these results the accom- plishment of the sacrifice). Then again, in the same Context, we find the sentence ‘ daga mushtir- mimité,’ which serves to jay down the measure of the quantity of Somu to be employed; and hence we eonclude that this sentence qualifies the Injunction ‘somena yajéta,’ which comes to mean that ‘ the sacrifice is to be by means of ten handfuls of Soma.’ And then this definite quantity of Soma having been pounded with a fixed quantity of water, could not be kept in small cups, unless it were ‘held ' (in the hand) each time that it would be kept in a cup; and as such these ‘ holdings’ (‘ grahanas ’) must be many and distinct (as there are many cups to be filled with the Soma juice); and it 18 by means of the Soma thus held in the vari- ous cups, that the sacrifice is to be performed. And as, unless the sacri- fice is repeated over and over again, all that has been just said (with reference to the offering of the Soma juice in the various cups dedicated to various deities) is not possible,—the sacrifice comes to be repeated, for the sake of a definite purpose. In view of these facts, we can also take the Siira (19) as follows: ‘ tadbhedat, '—7z.e., because of the diversity of the prepared Soma-—‘ there £5 a repetition of the action’ of Sacrifice ; ^ because of the separateness of the matertal’ accepted ;—if all of them were not offered up, the whole ‘ would be useless’ ; and hence even though in the original Injunction, the ‘ sacrifice ’ has been mentioned but once, yet ‘ there 7s a diverstty’ of its performance, because of the fact of the originally enjoined ‘ substance being subservient’ to the various conditions mentioned in other sentences. PACU AND SOMA YAGAS ARE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. 721 The substance, too, must be offered in the same way as it has been held in the various cups ; as, if the whole thing were to be mixed up again, the previous holding into separate cups would become wholly useless ; and the deities, to whom the cup-fuls have been previously dedicated, would not become connected with (possessed of) their specified shares ; nor is it possible for all the deities to be referred to at the time of the (single) offering ; hence it is not possible for people, afraid of repetition, to mix up all the juice and make a single offering of it; specially as even if this were done, 1४ would lead to a confusion of the. shares (previously specified). And when the shares have been once separately specified, it becomes necessary for the other party to clear up the said confusion, unless of course he has a scriptural text distinctly laying down such confusion. Thus then, it being necessary to make the offering as previously deter- mined, it is only when all the deities (and the ygrahanas) are taken collectively, that the following sentence—dagaitdnadhwaryuh praitahsavane 010100८८, Agwino dacamo grhuati, tum trtityam guhoti, etc., etc. (laying down the definite order and the summing up of the various ‘ grahanas’ ) —becomes explicable. Thus then we conclude that the whole forms a single action (of the J yotishtoma). The use of the present Addtkarana lies in the fact that, according to the Pirvapaksha, among the sacrifices subsidiary to the Soma sacrifice (the Jyotishtoma), we would have the performance of the details with regard to one cup, and that, too, only once; whereas, according to the Siddhanta, the whole thing has to be done exactly as in the Primary Sacri- fice (the Jyuotishtoma). 0 सा a ऋ FPL NN र # क + त वि जा ol = + = ^ „क 4 क ६, क > 91 ADHIKARANA (7). [The Differentiation of Actions by means of Number. | Satra (21): Because of the fact of its inhering in separate- ness, Number would serve to differentiate the Actions. The treatment of the three exceptions to the Law relating to the Repetition of Words has been finished, and we now proceed to show how Actions are differentiated (or distinguished) by means of Number. In this connection we should cite such sentences as ‘tisra Ghutirju- hoti® ‘dwadaca dwadagadnt guhoti,’ which are laid down as co-extensive with the actions enjoined by previous originative Injunctions, and which are accompanied by definite numbers. And on this, we have the following :— PURVAPAKSHA (A). ८५ Inasmuch as the word ‘7uhotz’ is mentioned but once, the action laid down 18 one only ; and as for the Number (‘three’ ete.) it could be made up by frequent repetitions of the same Action.” SIDDHANTA (A). Tio the above we make the following reply: In the case in question the Number is mentioned in connection with the Homa, while it is being enjoined, and not after it has been enjoined, as in the case of the sentence ‘ skadagaprayajan ' ; and without an idea of ‘ separateness’ the Number does not attain its true character. Nor can the Number be said to be made up by a repetition of the same Action; because it is only when there is no other way of explaining the number, that it is held to be made up by Repetitions, as in the case of the Praydjas, the Upasadas and the like, which have had their own limits previously specified. In the case in question, however, inasmuch as no other Number of the Action has been previously specified, the Number (three) must be taken as pointing out the separate character of the Actions themselves. And hence as the Number DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS BY NUMBER. 723 is found to inhere in the separateness of the actions themselves, we cannot accept it as referring to the separateness due to the mere repetitions of the same action ; as we shall show later on, under the s#itra ‘ digamifdvu® bhydsas- yagritatwit ’ (X—v—16). Objection: “ Inasmuch as in the first instance, a single Homa has ‘been expressed by the word ‘juhold,’ it is clear that the Number ८ ‹ three’ 18 to be made up by repetitions of the same Homa.” Reply: Not so; the action denoted by the word ‘ juhoti’ having no material reality (४.९.) being incapable of being connected with any Gender, Number, etc.), the number (‘one ’) cannot apply to it; as for the Number (singular) that 18 denoted by the affix in the word ‘juhotz,’ it applies to its Nominative, and not either to the Bhavana or to the Root-meaning. Conse- quently when the word ‘ juhoti’ would proceed to indicate a single Homa indirectly by means of the fact of its (the word ‘juhoti’) being mentioned only once, we would be stopped, at the very outset, by the number ‘three ' mentioned directly in the sentence, and would beled to accept the Homa as qualified by this latter Number, and the’action (Homa) would come to have so many distinct forms. And hence the three Homas must be taken as distinct actions. 0 Though the above was the proper representation of the Adhikarana, yet the Bhashya has expounded it in connection with the sentence ‘ sapta- daga 22770 त ८1/01) etc.’, because he means that he will establish the fact of the Number pertaining to the material also serving to distinguish the Actions—a fact that is very difficult to prove. The ground of doubt in connection with this sentence may be thus explained. In the word ‘prijdpatyan’, is the compound ‘ekagesha Dwandwa’ to be taken as being formed after the appearance of the Nomi- nal Affix (in ‘ prajapatyan ` ) ?—or is the Affix to be taken as appearing after the compound his been formed? ‘I'hat is to say, if the word were explained as “° 280 ca, 25/८८ ca, esha ca, tti, ‘été’ (the Bhkugesha compound ) —Prdaja- patih esham dévata ite ‘ Prajapatyak’ (‘ Prajapati’+the deific Afiz), tin” ,—then the word would denote the relationship of a single substance mentioned by the Pronoun ‘esha,’ with a single Deity (Prajapati) ; and in that case the action referred to would be one only. If, how- ever, the word be explained as ^^ Prajapatih deviita asya itt ‘ Prajapatyah’ (*Prajapati ’+the Affix),—Prajapatyagca Prajapatyagca Prajapatyagea tte ° Prajapatyah’ (the Ekacesha compound), tén,—then the word would clearly point out seventeen distinct connections of the deity; and each of these connections implying a ‘sacrifice,’ the Actions referred to could not but be seventeen distinct ones. 724 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA 11—ADHI (7). In connection with this doubt, we have the following :— PURVAPAKSHA (ए). ५ The Action referred to is one only, because in the word ‘ Prajdpa- (५ tyan’ we find the plurality distinctly belonging to thnt which is denoted “by the Affix; and as the Hkagésha compound is due to that plurality, the compounding could not be of the basic noun. That is to say, one who ‘‘ explains the words as ‘ Pr@japatyacca Prijapatyagca, ete.,’ takes the com- ५४ »nound as belonging to the basic noun as well as tothe Affix; but the only ८५ {31*0प्र7ात for this lies in the Apparent Inconsistency of the plurality in ८८ ‹ Prajtipatyan’; but as a matter of fact, we find that the Plurality is ५८ not found in the basic noun; and as such, this latter cannot be com- “ nounded into an ‘ IWkagesha’ ; nor is it such that the Plurality cannot be ८ referred to the denotation of the Affix, without there being an Hkugésha ८८ 0{ the basic Noun; because this Plurality is distinctly expressed, at the- १ time that the formation of the word ‘ Praja@patyan’ is explained, by the “ Pronoun ‘ésham,.’ Thus then, we conclude that the Deity ‘ Prajapati,’ ‘‘ mentioned but once, is connected with many materials. “ Further, when only a little assumption 18 found to serve our pur- 4 pose, it would never do to assume a number of actions, not directly ‘ mentioned, and their Apurvas. That is to say, even if we were to ‘accept the latter of the two explanations of the word ‘ Prajapatyan,’ we ८८ could not rest with the mere fact of having the compound formed after ‘the application of the Affix ; as it would be necessary for us to assume a ५८ number of unseen and unheard-of Actions and their Api vay; and that “we cannot assume any number of these at our will has already been ८८ shown in the Cabddntaradhtkaraaa (in the beginning of the present ८ Pada), where we have shown that we can assume, by means of Appa- ५८ rent Inconsistency, only that much of the unseen and unheard of, with- ‘out which the connection of the mentioned Deity with the enjoined “ material remains inexplicable ; as the said Apparent Inconsistency does ८५ not warrant any more of the unseen and unheard of, It would, however, ५ 6 necessary for you to assume from one to seventeen Actions and as ‘many Apiirvas. But as the assumption of the very first of these would ५ complete all the Primaries (as in the case of the Prayajas),—7.e., as the ‘* determination to offer the first animal to Prajapati would apply equally ‘to all the other animals, whose case is not found to be different from that ‘of the first,—the performance of that single offering will have connected “all the rest with the sacrifice; and as such, we could not carry on the ‘“ assumption any further, “Then again, the difference of one thing cannot bring about the ‘‘ difference of another; for certainly because of there being distinct DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS BY NUMBER. 749 “ pieces, in the shape of the Heart, etc., it does not follow that there are “ different Actions also, That 18 to say, if the diversity of the materials ५८ were to make a diversity among Actions, then there would also be a diver- ‘sity of Actions on account of the diversity of the pieces of the animal’s “body. Asa matter of fact, however, no such diversity is possible, as ५ we shall show later on, under S#itra VI—iii—12 ; where it is shown that “ the whole animal having been laid down as the means of accomplishing “the Primary sacrifice (of the Agnishtoma), and the Animal having to be ‘‘ given away also as a whole, the fact that the sacrifice is to be accom- ५ plished by means of the Animal, only as being the source from which “ the eleven pieces would be obtained, is got at from other sentences ; and ५ 88 such the ‘cutting of the pieces’ becomes a qualification of the “ Animal, and not that of the Sacrifice. In the case in question also, all “the seventecn animals being known as the means of accomplishing the ‘“ sacrifice, the implied direction would apply the process of one animal € (of its being cut into eleven pieces) to all the seventeen animals; and ‘as such there would be nothing very incongruous in the fact of a single ‘sacrifice taking up (utilising) all the seventeen groups of ‘eleven pieces “each. And for these reasons we conclude that the Action referred to 18 ‘one only.” SIDDHANTA. To the above, wo make the following reply : -- If there were only one Action, there would be a single Injunction (in the form of ‘the Subsidiary Sacrifices are to be performed in the same way as the Primary’); and thereby the material to be employed being pointed out as a single ‘ eleven-piece’ group (as the Primary makes use of only one such group), there would be no use for all the seventeen animals. That is to say, the sentence in question does not rest with the declaration ‘ Prd7a- patyain pagiin, as there is yet another part of the sentence to be supplied, viz. ‘prakrtivat.’ And if there be a single Action, it is the ‘ Savaniya, ’ that 18, the Primary in question; and as at that the sacrifice is _per- formed by means of a single ‘eleven-piece’ group, it follows that in the action in question there should be only one such group ; and as thi group, too, in the case of the Primary Sacrifice, is supplied by a single animal—which is mentioned by a word wherein tle singular number is meant to be significant,—it would be the same in the action in ques- tion also. And thus the action having been accomplished by means of a single animal, none of the other sixteen animals would become connected with Prajapati; and thereby we would be neglecting the Plurality expressed in the same word (‘ Prij@patydn’), as also the number ‘ seven- teen’ mentioned in the same sentence. When, on the other hand, the idea accepted is that there are ‘seventeen’ sacrifices, then the said 726 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. H—PADA II—ADHI (7). Injunction ‘ prakyrlivaé, etc.,’ coming in for each of the sacrifices, would point to as many ‘eleven-piece’ groups; and for the sake of obtaining these groups, we could have as many animals, even if they were not actually laid down ns ‘ seventeen’; and there can be no doubt on the point when the Number 1s distinctly laid down Objection: “It does not appear quite proper to reject the directly “perceptible singleness of the sacrifice, and assume its plurality on the “ground of an implied injunction (‘ prakrtivat, etc.’). For whether the “sacrifice is one or many is ascertained at the time that the sacrifice 18 ८ enjoined ; and it is on this Direct Injunction thatan Implied or Hatended ८५ Direction (Atidéea) is based; and it is never the case that the Direct “ Injunction is based npon the Extended Direction. That is to say, it is ‘at the time that the Action is originally laid down, that we ascertain the ‘ fact of its being one only or many; and in all cases the original mention “of the Action is by means of a Direct Injunction, and not by an Implied ५ Direction. For, until the Action has actually appeared (as enjoined), “there is no question as to its method; and until the method has ap- ‘ peared (and is found to be wanting in certain factors) there is no hxtended ‘Direction. Consequently as the Extended Direction (‘ prakrtivat, etc.’) ८ 18 found to appear long after the unity or diversity of Actions has been ८ ascertained, no such Extended Direction can rightly be taken as leading ‘‘ns to accept a diversity of Actions.” To the above we make the following reply: It has been shown abovo that whenever there is a doubt, it is always set at rest either by means of ‘supplementary sentence’ (Silva I-~iv—29) or by means of Indirect Implications (I—iv—30); and in the case in question we find that we have both these means available for ascertaining the doubtful point. That is to say, 111 the case in question, it is not by means of the Extended Direction alone that we come to accept the Diversity of Actions ; in fact it is by means of the Direct Injunction contained in the word ‘ prajdpatyan’ itself, As this Injunction had, at the first instance, been cognised only in the form of the material, the Deity and the ‘Sacrifice’, it had nothing definite to say with regard to the measure (or number) of that sacrifice, because of the doubt (in regard to the word ‘ praj7apatyan’) attaching to the precedence and sequence of the Nominal Affix and the ekagésha com- pound, as pointed out above (see above, p. 723) ; and this doubt is removed by the said number being ascertained (1) by means of the ‘supple- mentary sentence’ in the shape of the aforesaid Extended Direction, and (2) also by means of the capability of the word itself to imply that num- ber. Though it is true that the Extended Direction appears afterwards, yet, as inthe case in question, from the very beginning, the presence of that Direction is known to be as sure as anything else; and hence the DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS BY NUMBER. 727 Direct Injunction also comes to be taken in a sense that would not be incompatible with that Direction. Consequently, even though the interpre- tation of the sentence in question is begun with explaining the word ‘ prdgapatyain’ as ‘ Prajapatirdévata esham, tan, ’—yet inasmuch as this interpretation is subsequently found to be incompatible with what follows (in the Extended Direction), the interpreter, if an intelligent person, does not fail to conclude that he had committed a mistake, at the very outset, in explaining the said word. There is no such rule as that the Extended Direction must always be in keeping with the idea taken up by us in the beginning. Nor is the Extended Direction capable of referring the seven- teen ‘eleven-piece’ groups—not mentioned in connection with the Primary ˆ Savaniya '—to a single Action; nor again can a single animal be the source from which all the seventeen ‘eleven-piecce’ groups should be obtained ; nor is there any donbt on this point, that would be removed by menns of the Direct Injunction (in the sentence in question). Nor is there an absolute contradiction between the Extended Direction and the Direct Injunction, because the full bearing of this latter is still doubtful ; and hence there would be nothing to set aside the employing of a single ‘eleven-piece’ group at one sacrifice. The fact, too, of the Action referred to being one only is not directly enjoined. And in all cases, it is an accepted law that so long as there can be a compatibility (between the Direct Injunction and the Extended Direc- tion) we cannot take them as contradictory to each other; and in the case in question, we find that the two can be made compatible with each other by taking the Actions to be many. And hence the construction of the word in question must be taken as—“ Prajdpatirdevata asya, ite ‘ Prajapa- tyah,’”’ and the ekagéfha would imply the mention of the seventeen Prija- patyas. And thus, the connections between the Deity and the Material being diverse,—just as in the case of the ° Agnéya,’ the ‘ Agnishomiya,’ etc..—the ‘sacrifices’ referred to cannot but be accepted as many and diverse. It has been urged above that— the cutting into eleven pieces being a “ property of the animal, it would be different with each of the seventeen “ animals, even when the Action is accepted to be one only.” But this’ is not quite correct; because in the case in question, the Implied Direction does not refer to the Method of the Material ; because the want of a Method always arises with reference to an Action; and as such it stands in need of the properties and qualifications of the Action (and not that of the Material). That is to say, the desire for the method is in the form—‘ In what way is the result to be accomplished by the sacrifice of the Prajapatya animal ’ P—and not as ‘how’ by the animal?’ In the Primary Savaniya sacrifice also, we find that the property of being 728 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—-PADA 1I—ADHI (7). accomplished by means of the ‘eleven-piece’ group obtained from a single animal belongs to the sacrifice, and not to the animal, as the mention of a property of the Animal would be useless; because if the property belonged to the Animal, then all that the proporty would do would be to purify the animal ; and there would be no use of -such a purification, as the animal will have been destroyed (before the offering 18 made). As for the sacrifice, there is a distinct purpose served by its accomplishment, as also by the accomplishment of its Apirva; and hence the cutting of the eleven pieces, etc., could all very well be taken as the method by which the sacri- fice and its Apéirva would be accomplished. Thus then, a single sacrifice cannot take up more than one ‘eleven-piece’ group; and when no more than one such group would be used, more than one animal too could not be taken up. ‘T'hongh some people might think that ‘the fact of the source of the pieces being one only is set aside by the mention of the number seventeen, and hence we can take the single group of eleven-pieces out of more than one animal, '—yet, even then, only eleven animals would be necessary (for the cutting out of the eleven pieces), and not seventeen. The Bhashya represents the opponent as declaring that—“in a single sacrifice, we could make an offering of the seventeen eleven-piece groups.” And the sense of this assertion is this: ‘ Fearing the necessity of having to assume an unseen factor, we take the word ‘pagu’ as indicating the ‘ Piece-Group’ through its proximity to the Sacrifice, and the number ‘ seventeen’ may be taken as specifying that Group.” But this cannot be; because in the case in question we find no ground for the said Indication. So long as there is no incongruity (in the Direct Signification) we cannot rightly have recourse todndication. And then what the sense of the sentence comes to be, according to you, is this : ‘Seventeen animals should be taken up, and a single sacrifice should be accomplished by means of a single eleven-piece group obtained from a single animal’; certainly such a performance would never be 08. sible ! ; If it be urged that the Number mentioned in one place could be taken elsewhere,—then too, it would come to be taken along with the sacrifice, on account of the greater proximity of this with the Apirva (and thus we would have seventeen sacrifices, and not one). And we have already explained above that we cannot rightly set aside any part of the Injunc- tive sentence, unless we find it to be actually incompatible. As for the necessity of assuming an unseen factor, so long as there is sufficient authority and ground for. such an assumption, there can be nothing wrong in it. The Bhashya brings forward another theory, in the sentence—‘ yadz DIFFERENTIATION- OF ACTIONS BY NUMBER. 729 grrgabhipraya varndbhiprayd ripadbhiprayd va abhavishyan.” This has been brought in as a solvent for the sentence that lays down the whole animal as the offering ; and the sense of the sentence is that— from among “various animals that may have either seventeen horns, or seventeen ५ colours, or seventeen shapes, one is to be made the Prajapatya.” In reply to this it 18 said in the Bhashya: But the animals are subse quently laid down clearly as ‘black, horniess, (and hence the ‘seventeen- coloured’ or the ‘seventeen-horned’ ones could not be meant). And hence we conclude that there are seventeen sacrifices. The use of the Adhikarana is this: Though the Péirvapakshi does not wish it, yet, in accordance with his theory, only one animal would be the means of accomplishing the sacrifice, and the other sixteen would be taken up only for the purpose of making up its enjoined number (‘ seven- teen '); and hence the Pieces would have to be cut out of that one animal ; consequently if there would be anything amiss in this cutting out, it would be necessary, not to take up another animnl for the cutting out of the pieces only, but also another batch of sixteen for the purpose of making up the enjoined number with reference to this newly-brought animal. Or again, when the purification of the first batch of sixteen would be only half done, if even one becomes amiss,—with reference to that, then and there, it would he necessary to repeat all of them over again (while according to the Siddhanta, each animal being used in a distinct sacri- fice, if there was anything amiss with one, that one alone would have to be replaced, and not all). Objection: “In the case of the contiguous (or 010४) performance of ‘many sacrifices, we find that if there is anything wrong with the ५ nerformance of any one of them, then, in accordance with the law laid sa [त under the Sutra + [--ए- 56, while the other sacrifices have yet to “be performed, what is performed over again is only that one sacrifice, ८५ and not all of them; and the same rule might very well hold in the case ५ 771 question, where we have a combined or joint material.” Reply: This is not possible ; because in the case in question, we find that the capability of accomplishing the sacrifice in question inheres in seventeen of the same object, z.e., the seventeen animals taken as a single object ; and as such, like the number, it appertains to all of them taken col- lectively ; consequently the purificatory rites—upaikarana and the rest—of these should be performed as such a whole; consequently, when even a single animal out of these would die during the purification, there wonld be a destruction of the exact Material for accomplishing the sacrifice; and hence, even though the other animals be quite intact, the purificatory rites of the material as a whole would have gone wrong; and as such these rites would have to be done all over again. But even when a fresh 92 730 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1I-—-PADA II—-ADHI (7). animal would be brought in, the rites would appertain to that animal only, as forming the Material for the sacrifice; and as the exact character of the Material would not be attained by that ove animal unless it be accom- panied by the other sixteen animals,—it would be necessary to bring in a fresh batch of seventeen animals, each time that there may be the slightest, mistake during the performance. In accordance with the Szddhdnita, on the other hand, each of the animals has the character of the Material, independently of the others ; and what is done is only the performance of the sacrifices together ; and hence in this case if there is anything wrong with regard to one animal, it is that one alone that has to be replaced. Objection: ^“ If what you say is true, then, according to the Paérvapak- ‘‘ sha, in the case of the Injunction ‘ Stotracastréshu tancaturbhiradatté,’ ‘if there happens to be something wrong in the reciting of one Mantra, ५ all the Mantras would have to be repeated.” Reply: Not so; in that case each Mantra forms a distinct means by itself, and what the Injunction does 1s only to mention them collectively, As a matter of fact, in all that the Mantras do, with regard to the making up of the Hymns, etc., they have each a distinct capability of supplying a distinct want (in the shape of the pointing ont of the requisite Deity, e.g.) ; a8 otherwise all of them would form a single sentence (according to the Sutra I1—i—46). Thus then the fact is that each Mantra having fulfilled its own specific function, the effects of all these functionings com- bine to bring about another effect (in the shape of a transcendental potency, etc.), and the character of aiding the sacrifice does not belong to the Mantras taken collectively. In the case of the seventeen Animals, however, it is found to belong to them taken collectively as a single whole. Objection: “° 16 effects of the Mantras, then, acting conjointly, if ‘‘ there were anything wrong with one, all of them would have to be ‘* repeated.” । Reply : Not so; because when there would be nothing wrong in the cause (the Mantra), there could be none in its effect. Specially as the action of man appertains to the Means (of accomplishing a certain action), all performances should be regulated by mistakes in these Meuns (and not by those in the effects). ~-~— FN EOE Be et ee ee, Le Lm me FN elf ADHIKARANA (8). [The Differentiation of Actions by 2५८११65. ] Stitra (22): Name also (serves to distinguish Actions); be- cause of its occurring in the originative Injunction. The Differentiation of Actions by means of Accessories and Context, bristling with many discussions, is postponed for a future occasion; and we proceed to consider the case of Name. [In connection with the sentence ‘athaisha jyotik, atha vigvajyotih, atha 5१४५} ०४20, ` there arises the following doubt—Do these names only serve to refer to the Jyotishtoma, for the purpose of laying down ‘a thousand’ as the sacrificial gift in connection with it? or do they lay down other Actions at which that is the sacrificial gift P And on this we have the following]— ` PURVAPAKSHA. ८ Inasmuch as the words ‘ atha’ and ‘ésha’ stand in need of some- “ thing that has gone before, and as the rejection of the original subject ‘“ and the taking up of another is a faulty process,—it follows that the ‘* various names apply to the single sacrifice ‘ Jyotishtoma,’ for which, as ‘Sin the case of the Dakshayana sacrifice, another detail (in the shape of ‘‘the gift of ‘a thousand’) is laid down. And when we already have a ५ sentence (‘ Jyotishtoména svargakiimo yajéta’) that lays down the con- ° nection between the Material and the Result, if we accept the words in ० question to be the names of the same Action, we are saved the neces- sity of assuming (1) another Action, (2) an Apirva in keeping with ०० that Action, and (3) wholly unheard of methods for the accomplishment ‘of that Apiirva, etc., etc.; and there would be the further advantage that ‘as the mention of the gift of ‘a thousand’ could be taken as laying ‘* down a method of procedure with regard to the Jyotishtoma, we would ‘“not have to set aside this sacrifice (which forms the original subject ५५ of the Context). If the sentences in question were to be the Injunc- ‘ tions of other Actions, there would be no use for the word ‘ atha,’ which ‘refers to something gone before; for one sacrifice does not stand ‘““in need of another; nor does any significance attach to any order of 732 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 11——PADA II—ADHI (8). ५५ sequence among the sacrifices, (that are independent of one another) ‘6 og we shall show later on. And hence the word ‘atha’ cannot be taken ८५ 88 signifying this order of sequence. “Nor does the Name express a Bhdvana; nor is the Huot-meaning “found to be mixed up with the Name, in the sentences in question, as ५ {8 the case with the root ‘ yajz’ (which is often mixed up with names of ८८ sacrifices) ; and as such there could be no idea of difference among the ‘ Root-meanings. Nor again is the Name an injunctive word, whereby it “could urge people to other actions (than the Jyotishtoma); and ८८ 80 long as the human agent is not urged into activity, even if a ‘‘ difference could be cognised, we could attach no significance to it, “exactly as we do with regard to the singular number in ‘ gruham’ “(in the sentence ‘graham sammfrshti’). The injunctive word (in the ८५ sentence ‘ éténa sahasradakshinéna yajeta’) that we have in connection ‘‘ with these sentences, is taken up by the mention of the accessory deta! “(in the shape of the sacrificial gift of ‘a thousand’); and as such it ‘“‘ cannot pertain to the form of any Action. If the Injunctive word were ०५ not thus set aside, then too, the difference of the two ‘sacrifices ’ would “be based upon the repetition of the word ‘ yajéta,’ and not upon the ‘* Names. ‘The mention of a Result also does not give rise to the idea of dif- ‘ference among Actions, in accordance with the Sitra I]—iii—26. Or, it ‘may be that inasmuch as the ‘gift of a thousand’ rests upon the ‘‘ previously mentioned Jyotishfoma, the particular result mentioned in “ connection with this gift may be taken as following from the employ- ° 160 of this accessory ‘gift.’ in connection with the same Jyotishtoma ; ‘just as the employing of different accessories (at the same sacrifice), “such as ‘dadhi,’ and ‘ milking vessel,’ is laid down, with a view ‘ to particular results, (in the shape of the obtaining of an organ of sense ‘‘and Cattle respectively). And thus, too, the Action referred to cannot ‘* be a new one. ८“ [711 the case of the words ‘ Jyotch,’ etc., there 18 a further peculi- “arity: they form part of the name ‘Jyotishtoma’; and as such they ‘‘ cannot fail to give an idea of the Jyotishtoma. Specially as we find the Jyotishtoma actually spoken of as ‘ Jyotih,’ in the sentence ‘vasante vasanté Jyotisha, ` etc. ८ For these reasons, we conclude that, inasmuch as in the case in “question, we find none of the abovementioned grounds of diversity,— ‘‘vtz., Difference of words, Repetition of the same word, Number, the “ mention of an Accessory incompatible with the original Action, and a (° Difference of Context—the Actions referred to cannot be any other than ५ the original Jyotéshtoma.” 133 SIDDHANTA. + To the above we make the following reply: When no word expres- sive of the Action has been used, the name that happens to be mentioned first cannot but give rise to the idea of something new. That is to say, in a case where the Action has been already laid down by means of a previously pronounced Verb, before the Name comes to be mentioned, the unity or diversity of the Actions concerned having, in this case, already been ascertained elsewhere by means of the verb, the subsequently appear- ing Name would not distinguish the Actions. In the case in question, however, we find that the name is mentioned in connection with an Action that has yet to be laid down (by the subsequent sentence ‘ ééna sahasradukshinéna yagéta’) ; and as such, like the Number, it must be expressive of Separateness. Because in all cases, it is most improper to use one word in more than one sense, or to express one thing by more than one word; and hence whenever we come across a new thing, we look for a new nume; and vice versa, whenever we find a new name we look for a new thing. When, however, we directly perceive both of these to be the same that has been known before, then this perception sets aside the weaker authority of the aforesaid character of the Name. But so long as there is no such recognition of identity, there is nothing to set aside the idea of difference naturally afforded by the difference of Names. For instance, in the case in question, we find that entirely different from the previously mentioned Jyotishtomu, there 18, later on, a new name ‘atha gauk’; and as this latter has apparently no connection with what has gone before, 1४ cannot bring about any idea thereof; and hence it gives rise to the notion of something else coloured by itself (४.९. the name ‘gauk’). And then we proceed to look out, in what follows as well as in what has gone before, for that thing of which this is the name; and we find that all the ‘yajatzs’ that have gone before refer to, and have been absorbed by, the Jyoteshtoma ; and as such cannot refer to anything else, or have any other name; but as for the ‘yazatz’ that comes after- wards (in the sentence ‘ ééna sahasradakshinéna yajéta’) though, on account of the mention of the Result, the Injunctive potency is taken up by the laying down of something else (7.e., the accessory gift of ‘a thousand ’), and as such the Injunction itself does not serve to distinguish the Action,— yet, inasmuch as, according to Sutra I{—-1—49, on account of the inter- vention of an unconnected word ‘gauk’ (between the passages dealing with the Jyotishtoma and the sentence ` athaisha jyotik, etc.’), the word ‘gauk’ does not very well fit into what has gone before; and hence the idea of what has gone before not presenting itself at the time that the sentence ‘atha gawk’ appears, the continuance of the previous Context 734 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. (1--7द्04+ II—ADHI (8). is broken off, nnd the mind naturally seeks for something else; and the subsequent ‘ yayéta’ presenting itself to this expectant mind, and being incapable of referring to the Jyolishtema sacrifice, which is already possessed by another name,—and turns itself to an object other than the taking up of that the continuation of which has been broken off. Consequently then, the subsequent ‘yajz’ being separated from the previous Context, by the river of the name (‘gauk’), cannot go over to it; nor does the previous context go over to it; and hence perforce it goes over to another object. Thus, then, the word ‘atha,’ not being able to be taken as signifying either a reference to what has gone before, or immediate sequence, is taken as serving the purpose of introducing another Action. The word ‘esha’ also, being expressive of that which is perceptibly near it, is as applicable to what has gone before as to what appears subsequently, because both are equally perceptibly proximate to it; and hence the signification of this word does not affect the discussion. As for the rejection of the previously mentioned and the acceptance of that which has not been mentioned, as it has to be accepted on the strength of the Direct Mention of the Name, there is nothing wrong in it. Says the Bhashya: Nastinimah punakcrutayah (these are not mere repe- tutions of those); and the sense of this is that as the Names in question have heen used for the very first time, there can be no question of their beiny mere repetitions, Thatis to say, they are not mentioned with refer- ence to a previously enjoined Action. And further (according to you), the whole of the sentence ‘ athatsha, etc.’ would become redundant; as even without these, the accessorics, in the shape of the ‘ gift of a thousand,’ etc., could very well be laid down. Then, too, in accordance with the view that the names refer to the same Action as the previous one, inasmuch as the gift of ‘twelve- hundred’ has already been laid down in connection with the Jyot¢shtoma, the mention of ‘a thousand,’ with reference to the same, would lead to these two gifts being taken as optional alternatives, as both would serve the same purpose ; and this is not quite allowable. When, however, the Actions are different, there 1s no such anomaly. Nor can it be urged that the mention of the latter accessory has its end in connection with a new Result; as the substratum of the accessory (the Jyotishtoma) being hopelessly rent asunder by the intervention of the Name, there is no idea of that substrate at the time that the latter Accessory is laid down. | And further the relationship of the Name, the Accessory and the 9 DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS BY NAMES. 735 Result with the ‘sacrifice’ mentioned subsequently, is based upon Syntac- tical Connection ; while that with the previous Jyot¢shtoma would be based upon Context (which is weaker than the former) ; and for this reason also the Actions must be regarded as different. Nor are the words ‘ Jyotik’ etc. in the case in question (necessarily } the parts of the word ‘ Jyotishtoma’; because the name ‘ Rathantara’ (of one kind of Sama) 18 not recognised as a part of the name ‘ Kanvarathan- tara’ (another kind of Sama). As for the sentence ‘vasanté vusanté Jyotisha yajéta,’ we take the word as indirectly indicating the Jyotishtoma (and not directly expressing it), because of this fact being pointed out by other means of right notion. In the case in question, however, we do not find any such other means, whereby the word ‘Jyottk’ could be taken as referring to the ‘Jyotishtoma.’ As for the use of the word ‘ Jyotish’ with reference to the Trivit, etc., in the sentence ^ दत jyotinshi, etc.,’ such use must be taken in a secondary sense, »llowable in this sentence alone, on account of the fact of the two being spoken of (in the sentence) as co-extensive ; and as such this sense could not be accepted in all cases. For instance, though in the case of the sentence ‘ 8८१76 mdnavakah,’ the word ‘sirha’ is taken as referring to the Boy (Manavaku), only in its secondary sense of Brave, etc., yet when the word ‘sinha’ is used in another sen- tence, 6g., ‘Sinhamalabhéta,’ it is not taken in the same secondary sense (but in its direct sense of the Lion). Thus then, we conclude that in consideration of the direct significa- tion of the words ‘ Jyot¢h,’ etc., these names must be taken as differentiat- ing the Actions referred to by them from what has been mentioned before. ADHIKARANA (9). [Differentiation of Actions through their Deities. ] Siitra (23): Anaccessory also (serves to differentiate Actions), when it is a new one, and incapable of being connected with the foregoing (action); because both the sentences are equally (inde- pendent of each other). Before dealing with the differentiating of Actions by Context, we proceed to consider the Diversity and Unity of Actions based upon their Accessories. In connection with the Odturmdsya sacrifices, with reference to the Vuigvadeva Parva, we find the sentence ‘vaigradevydmiksha,’ which serves to lay down the sucrtfice implied by the connection between the Material and the Deity herein mentioned ; and following on this we find the sentence ‘va@jzbhyo vaijinam. And on this point there arises the following doubt: Does this second sentence lay down an accessory Mate- rial for the sacrifice laid down by the former sentence, or does it serve to lay down a distinct sacrifice implied by the particular connection of the Material and the Deity mentioned in itself ? Though there was a third alternative also possible, namely, that both the Material and the Deity mentioned in the second sentence are laid down with reference to the previous sacrifice, yet this has not been put forth ; becanse it has been shown in the Adhikarana dealing with the Paurnamasi sacrifice, that it 18 not possible for many accessories to be laid down in connection with an Action that has been already enjoined by a previous sentence. Thus, then, the question comes to be this: Is the material vajina connected, in the previously laid down sacrifice, with the Deity (Vigve- devas) of that sacrifice, or is it connected with another Deity (Vajz), another sacrifice and another Apirva ^ On this, we have the following :— PURVAPAKSAHA. “ The second sentence serves to lay down the material Vajina with ‘‘ regard to the previous sacrifice. DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS THROUGH DEITIES. 737 ‘“ Because of the word ‘ Vaji’ being taken as one who has vaja or Food, ‘and the Food meant being the @mzksh@ that has been laid down in the “immediately preceding sentence (‘ Vacgvadevyamiksha’), it is the ० Vigvedévas themselves that are denoted by the word ‘ Vajzbhyah’; and ९५ the action too referred to in this second sentence being the same as that ८५ Jaid down in the former sentence, what this second sentence does is to ‘‘ lay down a new Material, in the shape of the Vajina. ‘ That is to say, we do not know of any such deities as the ‘ Vajis ’ ; ‘and no unknown meaning of words can serve to complete the meaning ‘of a sentence; but as a rule, whenever the meaning of a word as a ‘‘ whole is unknown, what we do is to accept the meaning that is afforded ०८ by its constituent parts ; and in the case in question we find that in the ‘‘ first sentence, the Vigvedevas are represented as ‘V@ji’ because of “their having the Amiksha (which is a Food, ‘ Vaja’) ; and then these ‘‘ same Deities being understood, in the second sentence, to be connected ‘‘ with the material ‘ Vajina,’ they cannot be set aside from this connec- ‘tion (because there is no other known meaning of the word ‘ Vdji’ as ८ 8 whole). These Deities (the Vigvedévas) are already impressed with ‘ the connection of the sacrifice previously implied by the first sentence ; ° consequently, when, with a view to establishing their relationship with ‘the material Vajina, we come to assume a ‘sacrifice,’ we find that ‘‘ there is no reason why we should set aside the sacrifice that is pointed ‘out by the word ‘vf4jt’ (which is synonymous with Vegvédevds, and as ‘‘ such points to the sacrifice implied in the former sentence) ; and while ‘“we have that sacrifice, there arises no further Inconsistency with ‘regard to anything else; and hence we conclude that in the second ‘sentence we have the same sacrifice, the same Apirva and the same ‘* Deity as those in the previous sacrifice ; and as such there is no reason “ for assuming any other sacrifice. ५ For these reasons we conclude that in view of the two sentences in ५ question, the two Materials, Amiksha and Vajina, must be taken as pertaining to the same sucrifice, to be employed in it either as optional ‘‘ alternatives, or both jointly “ Though it is true that the Amiksha is laid down in the same ‘* sentence that lays down the sacrifice (and as such this being the more ‘ authoritative of the two materials, they cannot both betaken either as ८८ alternatives or conjointly),—yet what the sentence could do would be ८८ to extract the ‘ sacrifice’ from the previous sentence, and then lay down ५८8, fresh Material (Vajina) for it (and inthis way both the Materials ८८ woald be equally authoritative), Though, as a matter of fact, the ०५ ५ sacrifice’ is implied by the connection of the Deity and the Material, ८, and it is not mentioned directly as extracted (from the previous sen- 93 738 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—=PADA II—ADHI. (8). ‘‘ tence), yet there 18 always an idea of the sacrifice being something that ८“ 18 imphed as apart from the Material, etc.; on account of its having ‘the character of an Action. Or it may be that what is implied in the ‘second sentence is the word ‘ yaga’ (from the previous sentence) ; and “this does not disappear even when the Amdksh@ (of the previous sentence) has ceased to exist (in the second); and the word ‘ vdjt’ “Cin ‘vajibhyah ’) too is put in only for the purpose of indicating the ^“ sacrifice implied by it (as synonymous with ‘ Vigvedévas’ of the pre- “vious sentence). Nor is the connection between the ‘ Vajz’ and the ““Vajina’ understood to be independent of that sacrifice; because ^ there can be no mutual relationship between the two nouns them- ‘* selves. ‘For these reasons we conclude that the action mentioned in the ‘“ second sentence is not different from that laid down in the first.” STDDHANTA To the above, we make the following reply :— Inasmuch as the sacrifice laid down by the first sentence has already a Material mentioned for it, another Material (mentioned in the second sentence) cannot possibly belong to it; and hence the mention of such x» material, for the sake of establishing its relevancy, could not but indicate another Action. The menning of the Sitra thus comes to be this: Inasmuch as the ‘Guna’ (material) is new and incapable of being connected with the pre- vious Action, it gives rise to the idea of a distinct Action; specially as the two sentences are equal, z.e., independent of each other. ‘That 18 to say, each of the two connections between Deity and Material (that the two sentences speak of), not allowing the presence of the other, as incom- patible with itself, lays down a distinct Action Objection: ‘It is true that when the subsequently mentioned acces- ‘‘ sory is found to be inapplicable to the previously mentioned Action, it “ indicates another Action. But in the case in question, why cannot the "^ accessory, ‘Vajina,’ be connected with the previously mentioned sacr7- (^ fice or its Detty ? ” Reply: The only reason for this non-connection lies in the fact of that Action having its material already laid down as something else. ^“ But why cannot both the materials be used jointly ? ” Because when a number of things are found to serve the same purpose, they are always taken as optional alternatives, as we shall show under the S#ira XII ~iii—19. ‘ Then they may be taken as optional alternatives.’ DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS THROUGH DEITIES. 739 But that is not possible; because the two are not equally strong in the authority of their applicability to the same sacrifice. We proceed to show this inequality: The connection of the Vigve- devas and the Action mentioned in the first sentence, with the Amikshd, is One that 18 directly mentioned by the word (‘ Vatcvadévi’) ; while that of those with the ‘Va@jina’ is indicated by the sentence (‘ vdjibhyo vdjt- nam’). And inall cases, there are three methods of mentioning the Deity : (1) By means of the deific nominal affix, (2) by the Dative case- ending, and (3) by means of the words of the Mantra used; and among these that which precedes is always more authoritative than that which follows. Objection : ‘* The mantra being non-injunctive, it is only natural that ‘it should be weaker in authority than Direct Assertion; but why ¢" should there bea difference of strengtb between the Nominal Affix “and the Dative case-ending ? ” Reply : It is by Direct Assertion that the connection of the Deity is mentioned by means of the Nominal Affix; whereas in the case of the Dative ending, that connection 1s expressed by the syntactical connection between the two words lying in close proximity to each other. For instance, in the case in question, in the case of the word ‘ vatcvadevt,’ the presence of tle Deity (Vigvedévas) 18 expressed by the Direct Denotation of the word; while in the case of the Dative ending (in ‘Vajibhyak’) it is implied indirectly by the proximity (and syntacti- cal connection) of the two words in the sentence ‘ vdjibhyo vajyinam’ (and certainly Direct Denotation is always stronger than Indirect Im- plication by syntactical connection). Objection: ^“ In the case of the sentence ‘ vazgvadevydmiksha’ also " the connection between the Deity Vigvedévas and the material ‘ Am- ‘‘ dksh&’ is expressed by the proximity of the two words in the sentence ; ‘‘and thus in both cases the fact of the connection being implied by ‘ gyntactical connection is equally present. If it be urged that the ^“ character of the Deity is mentioned directly by the word ‘ vfigvadevi,’ ५ ए 11116 it is only the connection of the material ‘ @mikshi’ that is ‘‘ implied by the syntactical connection,—then this is also found to be the ५५ 08.86 in the other sentence, where the character of the Deity being ‘mentioned directly by the dative ending (in ‘vdjibhyah’) it is only ‘the connection of the material Vdjina that is implied by syntactical ‘connection. If again it be urged that the connection also with mate- “mal in general having been mentioned by the Nominal Affix, what ‘ syntactical connection does is only to specify that material,—then, this “too would be found to be the case with the other sentence as well. ‘‘ Because the single word ‘ vajtbhyah’ directly denotes the character of 740 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. (-127+ II—ADHI. (8). ५५ the receiver of the offering ; and as this character would not be possible ५५ without an object to be offered, some such object in general would be ‘indicated by the said Direct Denotation itself; and all that the “ proximity of the word ‘Vajina’ would do would be to specify that object. “And further, granted that the Direct Denotation of the Nominal “ Affix mentions the connection with some material in general; even then, “ inasmuch as the ‘Vajina’ also is included in the ‘ object in general,’ there ५ would be nothing incongruous in taking this latter also as the specified ‘material for the same sacrifice (as held by us): the only incompati- ‘bility would be between the two particular materials, the Amiksha and “the ‘ Vagina’; and both of these being equally indicated by syntactical ‘ connection, there would be no difference between the authoritative charac- ‘ter of these. And as such they must be taken as optional alternatives.” Reply : The Nominal Affix does not denote the Deity of the material in general; what it does is to express the Deity of the particular material mentioned by the word ‘ asya’ (which is present in the expression ‘ sa’sya daévata,’ which expresses the presence of the Nominal Affix). For instance, in the case in question, the Nominal Affix in the word ‘Vutgvadevi’ being explained as ‘ vigvédevd devata asyahk’, the pronoun ‘asyGk’ expresses, not the material in general, but the particular material in close proximity with itself; specially as it is only a particular object, and not the indefinite generic class ‘ object ’, that 1s capable of being utilised. Consequently that the object expressed by the basic noun (‘ Vigvedevah’) is name of the Deity of the particular materia] pointed out by other means, is the direct denotation of the Nominal Affix in ‘Vazgvadévi.’ Thus then, the idea of the particular material. as bearing in itself the parti- cular relationship, and as being subservient to the Deity, is brought about directly by the word with the Nominal Affix, independently of every other word ; and we proceed to look out for the particular material whose Deity has been mentioned by meaus of the Nominal Affix; and then it 18 that this is pointed out by means of the word ‘ @mikshd.’ And thus as the connection (between the Material and the Deity) has been mentioned before the appearance of the qualified idea, there is in this case no need of an Indirect Indication. ‘hough as a matter of fact, in the case of a)l words, the basic noun and the affix have independent significatious of their own that follow closely apon each other, and it is as between these two that the Relationship in question is cognised,—yet, in the case of the word in question (‘ Vazgvadevi’), as the relationship (of the Material with the Deity) appears in the same word (as the members relnted), it has a distinctly stronger authority than that which is indicated by means of the proximity of two words (° vajibhyo vajinam’); and it is for this reason that it is spoken of as ‘directly denoted by the word.’ DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS THROUGH DEITIES. 741 Thus then, in the sentence ‘ vaigvadevydmkeha’ there are two relation- ships: (1) the Relationship of the Material with the Deity, and (2) the Relationship of the qualifier and the qualified; and of these the former is directly mentioned by the word, while the latter is indicated by Syntac- tical Connection. For this reason, the qualification of the word ‘@miksha’ by the word ‹ ९८४४०९४१ › is not through the meaning of these words; as it is in the case of the expression ‘ xt/otpalam’' ; what the fact is, is that the Nominal Affix itself directly denotes the Amiksha together with the Deity (Vigvedevadh); and the particular material referred to (by the pronoun ‘asyak’ in the expounding of the Nominal Affix) is indicated by the proximity of the word ‘ dmiksha.’ That is to say, in the case in question, it 18 not that the word with the Nominal Affix denoting one object, and the word ‘ Aamiksha’ denoting another, the qualification of one of these by the other »pplies sub- sequently; because this relationship is expressed, at the very outset, by the word with the Nominal Affix; but what actually happens is that the word vith the Nominal Affix having the capability of expressing that which cannot be utilised (that is, the Material in general), it stands in need of the proper particular object for itself; and then what the additional word (Amiksh@) does is to present to it this particular object ; and thus, as a matter of fact, through the proximity of the word ‘ dmiksha,’ the word ‘vatgvadévi’ itself denotes the material ‘a@msksha.’ Nor does the word ‘amiksha’ in that case come to be a mere reference to the ‘dmiksha’ denoted by the word ‘ vazgvadévi’; because without that word, the ०११ with the Nominal Affix is not cognised as having that (Amiksh@) for its object. Nor does the Amiksh@ become the meaning of the sentence; because that which is denoted by the word with the Nominal Affix is not known to have a separate existence. As a matter of fact, we havea sentence, only when there are at least two independent denotations of words. Thus then, all that the word ‘aAmiksha’ does is to bring forward that which is denoted by the word with the Nominal Affix; and as such it does not remove to a further distance (and thereby render weaker) the direct denotation of the Nominal Affix. It is with a view to all this that we have the following declaration : *‘ It is by the Direct Denotation of the pronoun ‘ asydh’ that the meaning of the second word (‘ dmiksha’) is denoted ; and as that is expressed by the Nominal Affix, all the three (the Pronoun,the Affix and the Amiksh@) become deno- ted by the single word (with the Nominal Affix ‘ Vazgvadévi’).” Thus then, what is denoted by the word ‘ vaigvadevi’ is that ‘ that which is the Amiksha is to become connected with the Deity Vigvedevah.’ And hence in this case, the co-ordination is between the words, and not between their denotations. 742 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. iI—PADA II—ADHI. (8). In the case of the sentence ‘Vajibhyo vajinam’ on the other hand the case 18 wholly different Because, firstly, in the sentence ‘ vajibhyo vajinam,’ the material to be offered is not denoted either by the noun ‘ व; ', or by the Dative affix (in the word ‘ vdj7¢bhyak’); nor do any of these express the connection of that Material with the Deity ; and hence we cannot cognise these by any other means save the syntactical connection (of the two words). That 18 to say, in the word ‘ v@jibhyak,’ either the basic noun, or the affix, or both of them together, express either the material in general, or a particular Material, or the connection of some Material with the Deity ; all that the word denotes is that the object signified by the noun 25 the reciptent ; and certainly there is no idea of the relationship of the material included in the word; and hence it has to be cognised by means of the syntactical connection, based upon the proximity of the word ‘ vdjinum.’ And secondly, in the case of the word ‘ vazguadévi’, we find that the signification of the Pronoun ° ५३/06 ' 18 included in the Nominal Affix; but in the case of the word ० ८०१4८ ‰ ' the Dative is not laid down in the sense of ‘that of which the object signified by the basic noun is the receiver of the gift.’ That 18 to say, in the case of the former, we find that. the Nominal Affix has been laid down by grammarians in the sense of ‘that of which the object signified by the basic word is the Deity’; while the Dative has not been laid down in the sense that ‘that which is signi- fied by the basic noun is the receiver of that (a certain gift) ’; and as such in the case of a word with the Dative ending, there can be no indication of the meaning of the Pronoun ‘asya’; and as a matter of fact, what such a word actually expresses is the mere character of the Recipient; and hence, it is only on account of the inconsistency of the mention of a ‘ recipient,’ without the ‘ object to be received,’ that the word with the Dative can give rise to a desire on our part for some such thing ; and certainly this does not make this thing to be directly expressed by that word ; as, in that case, all that is signified by the sentence would become the denotation of that word. All that the said destre (raised by the Dative) does is to bring about the requisite relationship when the other word is uttered; for if there were no such desire raised by the first word, even the second word could not bring about the said relation- ship. Thus, then, though the Dative Affix directly denotes the deific character (of Vajin), yet its relationship with the Material {vdjina) is indicated by syntactical connection alone. Our contention is with regard to this relationship (of the Material and the Deity) ; and there is no doubt that the relationship of the Material vajina (with the Deity 77/00) (as indicated by syntactical connection) is very much weaker in authority DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS THROUGH DEITIES. 743 (than that of the Amiksha@ with the Vi¢gvedevas, because this latter 18 men- tioned directly by the Nominal Affix in the word ‘ vazgvadevi.’ Further, it is a well-recognised fact that that which is expressed directly by the word is more nearly related to it than that which is indicated by syntactical connection, this latter being very much remoter than the former ; and hence we proceed to show how, what you hold to be the sense of the sentence ‘ vdjibhyak, etc.’ is far remote (from the direct signification of the words). (1) For instance, in the case in question, the relationship of the amiksha (with the Vigvedévas) being in close proximity to the word, is recognised as being eapressed directly by the word; while the relationship of the vajina with the Vicgvedevas being far removed, is recognised as indicated by syntactical connection. Though the Nominal Affix (in ‘ Vaigvadévi ' ) does not express the fact of the Vigvedévas being the Deity of the particular Material (@mzksh@), yet 1 does express the fact of their being the Deity of some Material in general; while the word with the Dative ending does not express anything with regard to any material, either general or particular; and this makes a great difference between the two cases. It has been argued above that the material in general expressed by the Nominal Affix in ‘ Vazgvadévi ’ could also pertain to the vajina (which would thus come to have the Vigvedévas for its Deity ). But this is scarcely correct; because in the word ‘ vargvadévi ' we find a feminine ending, which, though appearing in connection with the generic term, yet distinctly points to the fact that the material meant must be that which is mentioned by a word in the feminine gender that may be found in close proximity with the former word ; and none of these conditions (which are folfilled by the @mitksh@i) are found to be fulfilled by the ४१५4, as it is neither mentioned by a word in the feminine gender, nor is it in close proximity with the word ‘ vazevadévi’; and as such this lntter is not accepted as the material in connection with the Vicve- dévas. (2) The relationship of the vajina with the Vajzns is not mentioned in the form ‘vdjibhyo vajinam kurydé’ ; and hence for the mention of that relationship, we must supply some word expressive of ‘giving’ and the like. As for the word ‘ kuryat’ (denoting performability), this has got to be supplied even in the sentence dealing with the @mikshad, either from above, or out of the final sentence laying down the actual performance of the Action in question ; and as such the question of the expression of this performablity has not been urged against the opponent. In the sentence ‘ vpiigibhyo vajinam, however, the said relationship is wholly uncognisable, until the root ‘d@’ (=to give) is supplied from above; though in the expression ‘vaipuvadévytmiksha’ (we have the relationship directly expressed by the Nominal Affix, which leaves nothing that could have to 744 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 11—-PADA II—ADHI. (8). be supplied from above). And the reason for this is that in all sentences, there are only two ways in which the relutionship of nouns is expressed ; viz., either by the mention of co-extensiveness, or by the word in the genitive case; and in the sentence ‘ vd7tbhyak’ etc., we do not find either co-exten- siveness or the genitive word ; and as for the case-ending in ‘ vajibhyahk,’ it cannot (being a case-ending) be related to any word other than the verb; and we do not find any verb mentioned; hence it becemes neces- sary to supply the verb from above; this 18 one ground for the aforesaid remoteness. And the other lies in the extremely complicated nature of the connection among the three words (‘wfigibhyah,’ ‘vdjinam’ and ‘ dadyat’). It may be argued that—‘“ in the case of the sentence ‘ vaigvadévi’ etc., also there is an equal necessity for supplying the verb ‘sacrifice.’ Butthe two cases are not parallel, because in the case of this latter sentence, the ‘sacrifice’ is inferred after the relationship of the a@miksh@ with the Vigvédevas has been fully cognised ; and the cognition of the relation- ship does not depend upon the verb ‘to sacrifice.’ For you, on the other hand, the mere fact of bringing about the ownership of another person (which is implied by the Dative ending) being impossible (without the mention of the ‘ sacrifice’), the ‘sacrifice,, would be necessary for the bringing about of a cogent relationship among the factors expressed (by the word ) ; and hence, from the very beginning, it would be necessary to assume the verb ‘to give,’ for the sake of the establishment of the syntac- tical connection between the word denoting the Material and that denot- ing the Deity. It is only when this verb ‘to give’ has been supplied, that the nouns, previously disjointed, become joined in a common bond of relationship ; and thus both these words, having tle same purpose, come to restrict each other; and this process is very complicated. In the case of the sentence ‘Vaiguadévyaimikeha’ on the other hand, there are no such complications, and the process is very much simpler. (3) Though the Vajin and the vdyina are directly related to each other, yet (none of their terminations being such as to express & co- extensiveness between them), there is a distinct remoteness between them. In the cnse of the sentence ‘ Vargvadévyamiksha’ on the other hand, there is ‘a distinct co-extensiveness (expressed by the common Nominative euding); and hence we have a proximity between them; as we shall explain, later on, how ‘the words having the same endings are more cap- able than those with different endings.’ (4) Forther, all that the Dative in ‘v47ibhyak ` could do would be to denote the fact of the एतश heing Recipients; and it is only by a far- fetched process that the Vajins can be indicated as the Deities related to the DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS THROUGH DEITIES. 745 vagina, Because the Dative is not, like the particular Nominal Affix, laid down by grammarians as denoting the Deity; as all that it is said to express is the character of the Iecipient; and certainly the ‘ Recipient ` ix not the same as the ‘ Deity’ ; for in the sentence ‘he gives the gold to Atréya,’ Atreya cannot be taken as a Deity. If the Deity were the (same as the) Recipient, then there would be no difference between giving and sacrificing. Then again,'that object which operates towards the accepting of a gift, is called the ‘ Recipient’; while we do not find the Deity operating towards any such accepting; therefore all that we can have the Dative do is to indirectly indicate the Deity as one with reference to whom the gift would be made, which is something that comes before the Recipient ; or, it may be taken as indicating the ownership that follows after the possession of another person (the Recipient) has been brought about ; because the character of the Deity is known to be identical with such ownership, Even if the character of the Deity be held to be that of the Recipient in the shape of one not denying the gift, this would entail the indication of a character not compatible with the general character (of the Deity) ; and this would be a very far-fetched and com- plicated process. (5) There is yet another cause of remoteness, in the shape of the doubtful nature of the word ‘ viyzbhyak,’ which can be taken both in the Dative and the Ablative ; whereas in the case of the Nominal Affix, there being no such doubt, the intellect has not got to be over-strained. That is to say, when we come across the word ‘vdzibhyak,’ until we have set aside (on certain grounds) its ablative character, and decided to take it as the Dative, the mind is in the tossing state of uncertainty. The opponent argues that—*“ the signification of the Nominal & ड (in ‘ vazegra- devi’) is also doubtful, inasmuch as there are many meanings of that Affix, in the shape of the Patronymic and the rest.” But this argument is not quite relevant, or on the same lines as ours ; because what we have urged was the verbal doubt (in connection with the word ‘ vaj7bhyak’) ; while you have brought forward a doubt with regard to the meaning; for in all cases, whatever the meaning, the word ‘“ vaigvadévi”’ can not lose its character of ending in a Nominal Affix; and as for the meaning, we settle upon its denoting a Deity, because we find none of the other signi- fications of the Affix compatible with the sentence. For you, on the other hand, even when (after a long cogitation) the word ‘ vajzbhyak’ has come to be ascertained to be in the Dative, inasmuch as there are many meanings of the Dative, there always remains a doubt as to whether the Dative in question is an Upapada-vibhakti or a Karaka-vibhakic ; and thus also the latter being accompanied by a double doubt, this 18 certainly more far-fetched than the former. Specially as the doubt with regard 94 746 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Il—-PADA.II—-ADHI. (9). to the meaning, being common to both of us, cannot be urged against any one of us only; while as for the doubt with regard to the word itself, it occurs in your case only, and not in mine, and as such can very well be brought forward against you. (6) Then again, the @mksha is related to the sacrifice (to the Vicve- devas), which is pointed out (as implied) in the same sentence where it is itself mentioned ; wherens the vdjina is, according to you, related to the sacrifice (the same as the above) which is pointed ont in another sentence. Aud there can be doubt as to the greater authoritativeness of that material which is mentioned in the same sentence along with the sacrafice at which it is employed. (7) Nor is it possible for the second sentence to draw out the ‘sacrifice’ only from the former sentence, and then to lay down another materiul (the vajinu) in connection with it; because the impropriety of this has been shown under the Adhitkaranas dealing with ‘ Citr@’ and ‘ Vaigvadéva’ (Pada IV, Adhydya 1). (8) Then again, in accordance with the rule laid down under the Adhikarana on ‘Vaigradéva, the sentence mentioning the vfijina would stand in need of the further help of the Context. Because the relationship of the Deity and the Material (spoken of in the sentence ‘ vajzbhyo vaqi- nam’) only stands in need of sowe sort of a sacrifice; and that this sacrv- fice 18 the same as that at which the previously mentioned @mzksha has been employed, could ovly be ascertained by means of the Context. That is to say, the ४०१४१०८, not being capable of being related to the Deity ‘ ८702205 ’ without a ‘sacrifice,’ stands in need of some sort of this latter; and then the conclusion, that the va@ginu also is a part of (४५. 18 to be employed at) the same sacrifice as that at which the @mzksh@ is used, can be got at by means of the Context alone. Thus, then, even though it be by Syntactical Connection alone that the Vzgvedévas are pointed out as the Deity for the offering of the dmiksha, yet we find that the dmiksha is mentioned independently of anything else; and inasmuch as the ४१0४१४4 could be taken as forming part of the same sacrifice, by means of a Syntactical Connection that depends (for such signification) upon the Context,—the employing of the ऋक is found to be dis- tinctly more authoritative than that of the vfjina ; and this makes a great difference between the two theories. If then, the vajzna be con- nected with a sacrifice, independently of the Context, there being no other known sacrifice cognised along with it, we would come to conclude that it belongs to an independent sacrifice by itself; but in this, the vdjina being separated from the Vazgvadava sacrifice, you would be land- ing upon the Siddhanta standpoint. And we have already explained above, in connection with the word ‘a@gneya,’ that in the case of all such DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS THROUGH DEITIES. 747 sentences as do not directly mention the action of the human agent, until some sort of a ‘sacrifice’ has been inferred in connection with them, they do not stand in need of the help of any other sentence. (And in the case of the sentence ‘ Vajibhyo vajzinam ` when the sacrifice has been inferred, or implied, within itself by the relationship between the Vajins and the vagina, this relationship becomes duly established; and as such the sen- tence could have no need of any other sentence of the Context such as ‘ Vaigvadévyimik sha’; and consequently there would be nothing to show that the sacrifice spoken of in this latter sentence is the same at which the aforesaid ‘ एत्‌) ४१८ ' would be employed.) (9) In the case of the sentence ‘ vazgvadévi,’ etc., the ‘ Vigvedévas ’ aus connected with the Gmiksh&i are expressed by means of the fully recognised signitication of the word ‘vigvedéva’ usa whole (contained in the word ‘ vaigvadévi’); while with the एव दत ( mentioned in the other sentence) they could he connected only by means of the far-fetched signi- fication of the broken-up constituent parts of the word ‘ vdjibhyahk. ' That is to say, the Vicvedevas could be spoken of as ‘ v@jins’ only by taking this latter word in the sense afforded by its component. parts. And as such a signification of the word could be got at by joining to- yvether the sense afforded by the two parts of the word (vdja+zn); and this would be exactly like the meaning of a sentence which 18 got at by joining together the meanings of its constituent words ; and as such it could not but be very much weaker in authority than the well-recognised meaning of a word as a whole, which 18 always obtained by a mere men- tion of the word ; and for this reason too the connection of the Vajinu with the Vaigvadéva sacrifice is very much weaker than that of the Amiksha. (10) The word ‘ vdjin’ as a whole is actually found to have such well- known significations as the ‘horse’ and the like; and hence to take it as signifying the Vigvedérus would entail much needless trouble. Because, as for the character of the Deity, it must always be taken in precisely the same form as that mentioned by the word, no attention be- ing paid to the capability or incapability of that which isso mentioned ; and that character does not depend upon the generic class ‘ Dévatitva’ ; and hence too the word ‘ vd@j7in’ could not (by the mere generic character of ‘ Dévattitva’) be taken as referring to the Vigvedévas. ‘hus then the word ‘ vajzbhyak’ would directly denote the fact of the Horses béing the Deity ; and hence to take it as referring to the Viguvedévas would necessitate, without sufficient cause, the taking of that word in the much less authoritative sense afforded by its constituent parts; and this makes another great difference between the two theories. (11) Even when the word ‘ vajin’ is taken in the sense afforded by 748 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, II—PADA II—-ADHI. (9). its constituent parts, as that sense would equally refer to all the Deities that may be connected with the offering of the Cake (because the Cake 18 a food, ‘vaya,’ just like the 7१५८४७१2) ; and hence to restrict the word to the Vicvedévas alone would entail a further effort. For instance, all the deities, Agni and the rest, would come to be pointed out by the word ‘vdjin,’ on account of their being connected with such ‘foods’ as the Cake and the like; and hence your theory would, at the very outset, necessitite the gratuitous assumption that the word ‘food,’ ‘ v@7a’ (in the word ‘ vfiyin’), refers to the A@mikshd, and not to the Cake, etc. ; and then again, there would be another assumption that, thongh the word ‹ ४70८ › refers to @miksha in yeneral, yet 1४ points to that particular amiksh&@ which is offered at the Vaigvadéva sacrifice, and that as such the word ‘ vfijin’ indicates those (४,९.) the Vigeedévas) to whom that parti- cular Gmiksha is offered. Thus then it comes to this: ‘Though the word ‘vajin’ directly by itself refers to many other Deities, yet, by means of the Context, itis restricted to the particular Deity (the Vicevedévas). And we see no ground for this recourse to the Context; because the Deity is always mentioned only as an accessory detail; and as such if it were spoken of as something to be purified or prepared like the ‘ vriht’ in the sentence ‘Vrthiu prokshati,’ then somehow or other, on account of the fact of such purification helping the Apirva of the sacrifice, there could be established « connection with the Deity mentioned in the same Context ; [that is to say, in that case, as the purification of the Deity spoken of in the second sentence could only be the cause of a certain transcendental result, the sentence could be taken along with the Deity of a certain previously mentioned sacrifice}. In the case in question, however, we do not find the Deity mentioned as something to be purcfied ; because even without its having the form of such purification, the action mentioned is found to serve a distinct purpose. Even if the sentence could be taken as mentioning a purification, this latter could only be in the form of the utilising of the vdjina, and it would have nothing to do with purifying the Deity. For even if the sentence were to refer to the Deity mentioned in the same Context, there would be no certainty as to which one Deity is meant, as there are many Deities, Agni and the rest, that are mentioned in the Context. It may be argued that—‘“ inasmuch as all the Deities would be included in ‘ Vigvedévas’ (which word means all ८८८८९ + ) it is the Vigvedévas alone that we take as referred to by the sentence in question.”’ But this is scarcely right ; because there is no authority for the collecting of all deities. If it be urged that—“ all are included, on account of the direct mention of the Plural number (in ‘ vajzbhyak),’’—we deny this ; because the Plural number may rest with three only. It might be argued that there is no reason why the number should be limited to three DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS THROUGH DEITIES. 149 only. But we have such a reason, as shown under the Satra ‘ mukhy- avicapttrvacodanat lokavat’ (XII—ii—23). Therefore there is no ground for taking the Vigvedévas (as referred to by the word ‘ vajzbhyah ’). (12) It is only when the Deity stands in need of some fact for making its mention explicable, that it becomes connected with a Mate- rial; and in the sentence in question, inasmuch as, in accordance with your theory, the Deity mentioned by the word ‘ va@j;zbhyah’ has its Material nlready supplied (in the shape of the ‘ एत्‌ ’),—and as such it is actually coguised as having all its wants duly supplied by the same word,—it cannot be taken along with any other Material (in the shape of the vajina, whose connection would be based upon syntactical connection). And as such there is a deal of difference between the authoritativeness of the two theories. (13) And further, it 18 always by means of Direct Assertion that the Deity becomes connected with its sacrifice; and in the case in question we find that the direct mention of the Vigvedévas by the word ‘ Vajin’ is hardly possible. If in connection with the offering of the v@jinu also, the V igvedévas themselves be accepted as the Deity, then, in all places where the sacrifices are recapitulated, it would be necessary to pronounce the word ‘ Vicvedéva.’ But in the case in question we find that this word is not mentioned in the sentence that serves as the Injunction of the Vajina offering (1.e., the sentence ‘ vazzbhyo vajinam,’ which uses the word ‘ एत्‌ 20 ' and not ‘ Vigvédéva `) ; and as such a direct mention of the Vigvedévus in this connection is hard to be got at; as the only way it could be got at would be in the following manner: (1) the word ‘ vdjin’ has a literal signification; (2) as the sentence in which that occurs does not men- tion the sacrificial detail (in the shape of the Deity), the woid indicates (indirectly ) the word ‘ Vigvedéva’ ; and (3) then this latter word comes to be laid down as the one which is to be uttered at the time of the offering of the (द. ‘This would be a highly complicated process. Then, too, if the denotation of the word * v47:n’ were to indicate a word, this latter could be in the forms ‘ sarvé-dévdh,’ ‘ niscéshd-dévatah,’ and so forth, all of which are synonymous; and as such it would be extremely difficult to get at the precise form ‘ Vigvédéva.” And when some other word (‘sarvé-dévah’) is pronounced, it cannot point tothe fact of the particular Deity of the Vigvedévas being the Deities concerned ; as we shall show later on, in Adhyaya X, that the Deity of an Action is always recognised precisely in the same form as 17 18 mentioned iu the Injunction (X—iv—23). Inthe sentence ‘ vajzbhyah, etc., we find that the human agent 18 urged to the offering of the material to the Deity mentioned by the particular word ‘vf@jin’; and as such, at the time of the actual offer- ing, the Deity should be mentioned by pronouncing the precise word 750 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1--1404 LI—ADHI. (9). ‘payin’ (and not any of its synonyms). Thus then, even if it be granted that the same Deity of the Vigvedévas is mentioned by means of the word ‘ vajin’ (in connection with the offering of the v4jina), and by the word ‘ Vicvédéva ’ (in connection with that of the dmiksha)—yet, in ac- cordance with the law laid down above in connection with the words ‘Indra’ and ‘ Mahéndra’ (vide Sittras IT—i—-15-16),—inasmuch as the Deities in question are mentioned by two distinct words,—they must be regarded as wholly distinct; and consequently the second sentence must be taken as mentioning a quite different relationship of Deity and Mate- rial; and then, inasmuch as it 18 not allowable for many accessories (in >the shape of the Material ‘ vaj7na’ and the Deity ‘Vajin’) to be laid down in regard to a sacrifice that has been previously enjoined (2.e., the Vatgvedéva sacrifice), we come to the conclusion that in the case in ques- tion the mention of the accessory (‘ vajinam’) serves to distinguish this latter Action from that which is laid down by the former sentence. Sutra (24): When, however, the word mentioning the pre- vious Action is not accompanied by the mention of any Ac- cessory (the mention of an accessory in another sentence does not make it the injunction of another Action). This Sitra mentions a counter-instance to the foregoing. ‘lhe sense of it is that when a certain Action has not got any definite .Accessory laid down by its original Injunction, if another sentence is found men- tioning an Accessory, this latter sentence can be taken as laying down the Accessory for the same sacrifice that has been laid down by the previous sentence ; and hence in such cases, the mention of the Accessory does not serve to distinguish the Action (from the previous one). ADHIKARANA (10). [67८१५ 24 has been taken by the Bhashya as forming a distinct Adhikarana—the tenth—by itself. Its sense is explained as that when no other material is mentioned in the second sentence, the Actions spoken of in the two sentences must be accepted as being one and the same. | ADHIKARANA (11). (The mention of certain materials—dadhi, etc.—is with a view to distinct results. ) Sutra (25): “Because of the mention of a distinct Result, “there would be a distinct Action (laid down by the sentence) ; “specially as the Result is always connected with a definite ‘* Action.” Tu continuation of the sentence ‘agnihotrum guhoti,’ we find the sentence ‘ dadhnéndriyakdmasya jguhuyat’; and this gives rise to the following doubt: Does this second sentence lay down an Action different from that laid down by the former sentence? or does it only serve to mention n distinct result as following from the offering of a particular material at that same sacrifice Two conclusions have been previously arrived at: (1) If the original Injunction of the Action contain the mention of no accessory, the accessory mentioned in a, subsequent passage pertains to the Action laid down by that injunction; (2) if the original Injunction contain the mention of anaccessory, there being no possibility of the connection of more than one enjoined accessory, the mention of another accessory per- tains to another Action. In the case in question, we find that the sentence laying down the original Action—‘ agnihotram juhoti ’°—does not mention an accessory; and the other sentence cited mentions more than one accessory (viz., the Material ‘ dadhi’ and the Result ‘acquiring of sense- efficiency ’) ; and there arises a doubt as to the likelihood or otherwise of these latter appertaining to the former Action. For the purpose of settling this doubt, we have got to settle at first the question as to whether the Result mentioned in the second sentence follows from the Homa, or from the particular Material Dadhi. (४८९8४८01 : “° How is it that the Bhashyn has totally neglected the "° sentence ‘ godohanéna pagukamasya pranayet,’ which had been cited in ‘connection with the present Adhikarana by the author of the * Vrtts ८ `` Reply: The only reason is that the sentence in question is of no use in showing whether the two Actions are identical or different. If the question at issue were as to whether the particular Action serves simply to MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO RESULTS. 1903 help the completion of the sacrifice, or it accomplishes sometliing that is desirable ` {07 the agent, then, in that case, there would be a difference between the case of the sentence cited by us and that cited by the Vrtti; as however at present we are dealing witl: the question of the diversity or identity of Actions, it is necessary that the sentence cited should be one that would help in a satisfactory conclusion being arrived at, in connection with the question at issue. The ‘“ bringing in” (pranayana), spoken of in the sentence cited by the 24८, being of the nature of carrying a certain thing from one place to another, is not affected one way or the other by the diversity or identity of the Actions concerned ; as whether the Result follows from the ‘ milking vessel,’ or from the ‘ bringing in by means of that vessel,’ in any case, the performance of the main Action would be exactly the same. In the case of the sentence cited by us, on the other hand, if the Result followed from the material (Dadhz), then Dadh: would be the material that should be offered in the morning and evening Libations (of the Aynzhotra) ; whereas if it followed from the Homa, then this Homa of the Dadhi, having no fixed time for its per- formance, would be wholly different from the Agnihotra-Homas, the time for which is fixed; and thus having the character of an independent Action by itself, like the Darvi-homa, it would be performed only once, and independently (of the Agnzhotra) ; and thus in this case a great difference is made in the case by the Action being different. Objection: “ 14४९ if the Result followed from the Homa, in sccordance ‘ with the law ‘ Sannidhau tvavibhagat ' (1-111-26) ) the Action laid down ९१ would be the same, just as the actions laid down in the sentences ° ˆ yavagzgivamagnihotram juhuyat’ and ‘agnihotrum guhuyat svargakamah ' ‘are the same as the original Agnihotru.” ITteply: It is not so; because as a rule, if the Action subsequently mentioned be recognised as not being different from the one mentioned previously, then the Actions are taken to be the same ; otherwise they are concluded to be different. When an Action is laid down with reference to ace:tain Result, and in connection with a certain occasion, ete., 1६ could not be connected with these latter, unless it had been previously enjoined ; and hence it proceeds indirectly to acquire the character of the oriyinative Injunction. Thus, then, if 111 the sentence mentioning the Result, the original form of the previous Action put forward by the more authori- tative proximity of the mental image partake of the form of that Action, then, in that case, on account of the incompatibility of the independent originative potency (of the sentence mentioning the Result), it is concluded, on the strength of recognition, that the Action mentioned in this sentence is the same as that mentioned in the previous sentence. If, however, we happen .to perceive the slightest difference in the 95 754 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—-PADA I1—ADHI. (11). subsequent Action from the one previously mentioned, then there is no idea of the two being the same; and hence, in this case, the sub- sequent sentence becomes an originative Injunction by itself, and not. having its injunctive potency set aside by another Injunction capable of laying down exactly the same Action ; though apparently pointing to some- thing else (7.¢e., the material dadhz), yet as this something 18 mentioned with reference to that (i.¢e,, the Result) which by itself cannot be taken up for performance, it serves to distinguish this Action from the one previ- ously laid down. Thus it is that in the case of the sentence ‘dadhnéndriyukdmasyu jquhuya&t,’ inasmuch as the Action of the Homa qualified by Dadht is men- tioned with reference to the acquirement. of sense-efficcency, the idea, brought about by the sentence, of the said qualified Homa, is not set aside by another sentence putting forth the origination of that same Action. Because the Homa mentioned in the previous sentence (‘Agni- hotram juhuyat’) is pure and simple, while that which is mentioned in the sentence in question is qualified by the Dadhz ; and as such this latter is cognised as different from the former. That is to say, the Action oviginally laid down in the sentence ‘agnihotram juhoti’ 1s Homa pure and simple, while that in the sentence is one qualified by Dadhi, and hence we do not have, in this case, the ^“ non-difference ” spoken of above as the only gronnd for identity ; and consequently the Action is con- cluded to be different from the previous one. Objection: ‘* The Homa qualified by Dadhi is also found to be previ- ८८ ously laid down by the sentence ‘dadhnd@ juhotc’ (found in connection “ with the Agnihotra) ; (and as such the sentence ‘ dadhnéndriyakamasya ५ Juhuyat’ cannot be taken as laying down an Action never mentioned ¢" before).”’ Reply: Not so; because the sentence ‘dadhn@ guhoti’ is not the originative Injunction of any Action; because the Action, for which this sentence lays down an accessory material, has been originally laid down by the sentence ‘agnthotram juhote’ where it is not qualified by the Dadhi ; while the sentence wherein it is qualified by Dadhi (1.e., in the sentence ‘ dadhna juhotc’) is not its originative Injunction, as has been fully established under the Sutra “tatsannidhérgundrthena punahcrutth”’ (1-11-16). When the originative potency of the sentence mentioning the Result is set aside by another originative Injunction, then alone is the possibility of the Action mentioned by the former being different from that which 18 laid down by the latter set aside by the said originative Injunction ; and this can never be done by a sentence which (like the sentence ‘dadhnd@ jguhoti’) only lays down an accessory detail (for the previously mentioned sacrifice) ; because such a sentence never serves MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO RBSULTS. 755 as an originative Injunction, And the sentences in the Context that lay down such accessory details as the Material, the Result and the Occasion, etc., are al! related to the originntive Injunction of the Context, and not among themselves. Because all these accessory details stand in need of the original mention of an Action ; and because this ort- ginal mention is found in close proximity to those sentences ; while as for the details themselves, inasmuch as they are not related to one another, they would be removed from one another (by the originative Injunction). That is to say, inasmuch as an Action not originally laid down cannot be connected with any accessory details, all these details stand in need of the original Injunction of the Action; and there is no ground for any mutual relationship among the Details themselves. As for the origina- tive Injunction, inasmuch as it pervades through all the sentences laying down the accessories in connection with the Action enjoined by that In- junction, itis not interrupted by any foreign factor, in its relationship with each one of the details. As for the Accessory details on the other hand, inasmuch as they are ‘pardrtha’ (for the sake of something else, vide Sutra [1 1-1-22), they are not related to one another; and consequent- ly when they happen to be interrupted by even a single unconnected element, none of them can be taken along with another. And for this reason, the sentence ‘ dadhni juhoti’ does not present itself in connection with the sentence ‘dadhnéndriyakimasya juhuyat.’ ‘l'lis will be further explained under the Adhikarana “ ékasya tibhayatvé sanyoguprthaktvam ” (IV—iii—5). The following might be urged here: ‘ The same originative “ Tnjunction (‘ aynthotram juhoti’) as qualified by the Dadht mentioned ‘in another sentence (‘ Dadhna guhott’), might present itself in connec- "° tion with the sentence ‘ Dadhnéndriyakamasya juhuydat,’ and set aside ० the idea of the diversity of Actions.” But this would be scarcely possible; as, in that case, just as that Action (Agnithotra) is qualified by the Dadhi mentioned by another sentence, so in the same manner is it also qualified by many such materials as ‘tandula,’ ‘payak’ and the 111९6, also mentioned by other sentences (‘tandulazrjuhott,’ paydsa guhotr, etc.) occurring in the same Context ; and hence the Action could not be of one form (if in the Injune- tion itself any signification were attached to the mention of accessories in other sentences), That is to say, in the originative Injunction (‘ Agni- hotram .} 1८102 ' ) the Action is found to be pure and simple; and hence this cannot be recognised as the 8076 (as that mentioned in the sentence ‘dadhnéndriyakamasya guhuyat’). If it be held that the original Injunc- tion is taken as qualified by the sentences laying down the accessory details, occurring in the same Context (f.1., the sentences ‘ dadhn& juhoti’ 750 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. JI—-PADA 1--^+एप्रा. (11). etc. ), -- ४1611, too, inasmuch as, in that case, the Action would be cognised as qualified, not by +» single material, Dudhi, but by many such materials, as the fandula and the rest, the Action mentioned by the sentence ‹ dadhnéndriyakamarya juhuyadt’ cannot be recognised as the same as that mentioned by the sentence ‘agnihotram guhoti’ qualified by that subsi- diary sentence १1016 which mentions the dadhi (7.e., ‘dadhna 72070४8 ’). Objection: ^ Inasmuch as the sentence ‘ dadhnéndriyakamasya ५ guhuyat’ requires the mention of the dadhz alone, even though there ‘may be many such materials as the tandu/a and the rest, in connection ‘with the original Action of the Aynzhotra, yet they are rejected as “being not required, and as such as good as non-existing ; and conse- ^“ quently the daudhi alone of the previons Action is taken up when the (५ same Action comes to be mentioned by the sentence in question.” Reply: In that case, it will come to this, that the sentence ‘ dadhna jguhoté’ would be the originative Injunction (connected with the sentence ‘dadhnéndriyakdmasya ‘guhuyat,’ which thus would have no connection with the sentence ‘agnihotram juhoti’); and this contingency we have already rejected above. Further, in connection with the Agnihotra, dadhi is only one of ten alternative materials; 11116 in the case of the sacrifice performed for acquiring sense-efficiency, it is the only one material to be employed. In the original Agnihotra, if all the ten materials, dudhi and the rest, were offered conjointly, then it might be admitted that the same variegated Action has been mentioned in the sentence in question, though only by the mention of only one constituent of its mixed material. As a matter of fact, however, the dadhi and the rest are optionnl alternatives; and hence the chance of any one of them being employed in the Agnthotra is as one to ten. Consequently even if the sentence in question were to refer back to the sentence ‘dadhn@ guhoti,’ this latter sentence would point only to the dadhi that 18 one among the ten alternatives. But the dadht spoken of in connection with the ncquiring of sense-efficiency is the only one all-important material ; and as such the Actions cannot be recognised as identical (because the Action mentioned in the sentence in question has for its material the all-emportant Dadhi, while that mentioned in the previous sentence has ‘dadhi’ as only an alternative material). Nor can the sentence in quéstion be construed as ‘yad dadhnd juhott tad indriyakdmasya’; because this would make the Result the object of the Injunction, which is absurd. The real construction of the sentence is this: ‘when one desires sense-efficiency he should offer the Homa of dadhi and dadhi alone’; and there is no doubt that no such Homa has been laid down anywhere else. Objection: “ The form of the Homa alone would be recognised as MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW 10 RESULTS. 157 “ the same; and this recognition would establish the identity of the two “ Actions. As for the non-recognition of the sameness of the materials, “that cannot be a ground for making the Actions different from one “another. Hence it must be admitted that what the sentence in question ‘does is to mention the same Action as the previous Agnzhotra, with the ८८ additional mention of an accessory (Dadhz).” Reply : It is not so; because we have already shown above that with reference to an Action previously laid down, more than one accessory detail can never be laid down; and in accordance with what you say, the sentence in question would come to lay down more than the relation- ship (vzz., that of the Material ‘ dudhz’ and the Result ‘ sense-efficiency ’). And hence the sentence in question laying down the relationship of the dadht and the Homa, and then again that of the Homa and the Result, there would be a syntactical split. And for this reason you must accept the sentence to be a qualified Injunction. And thus it must be admitted that this mentions a distinct Action (as such a qualified Action has never been found to have been laid down by any other sentence). Just as when the Action laid down being the Homa alone pure and simple, there 18 an indirect implication of that which employs various indefinite materials,--and then the special mention of the dadhi restricts the Injunction to one substance only,—so in the same manner, though the Homa mentioned by the sentence ‘ dudhnéndriyakamasya, etc.’ may be assumed as employing ten alternative materials, laid down by ten in- junctive sentences independent of one another, yet the mention of ‘dadhna@’ serves to specify the one material dadhi to be particularly employed, setting aside the turdula and the rest. But as this specifica- tion of the Action with the single materinl is not mentioned by any other sentence except the one in question (‘ dadhnéndriyakamasya, etec.’), the particular result (‘ sense-efficiency’) cannot but be taken as following from the Homa itself ; and as such the Homa mentioned by the sentence in question mnst be wholly different from that laid down by the previous sentence (‘ aygnthotram guhoti’). 0 Thus then there being every reason for a doubt in connection with the sentences in question, we proceed af’ first to deal with the follow- ing ह PURVAPAKSHA, “ Though in the case in question, the previons sentence (‘ agnthotram “ 7१८१०८४”), mentioning the Action, does not make any: mention of the “ material, yet the sentence in question (‘ dadhnéndriyakamasya juhuyat’) ‘lays down a distinct Action ; because this latter contains, 7.e.,, distinctly 758 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, 11—PADA U—apuHI. (11). ५५ mentions, a Result (‘sense-efficiency ’); and it 18 only from an Action “ that a Result can follow. “The whole of the Bhavdrthadhikarana (II—i—1-4) serves as the “present Parvapaksha. Because the conclusion therein arrived at was “that it is only Verbs, and not Nouns or Adjectives (laying down the “ material or other accessory details), that are connected with the word “ speaking of the Result; and hence inssmuch as the Result is always “ connected with an Action, when there is a distinct Result mentioned, ५५ the sentence in question must be taken as laying down n distinct Action, “and not as only pointing out another material (dadhz) for the previ- * ously-mentioned Action (Agnihotra). ५ Because the Material having been already mentioned once, the same ‘cannot be enjoined over again; and if you hold the sentence to lay “down a material that has not been already laid down, then the men- “tion of the Result would be altogether superfluous (as no Result can ‘ever follow from the mnterial, dadhi). That is to say, in a case where “the word speaking of the Action does not speak of a Material, we can ‘‘take another sentence as laying down that material, only if either “that material does not happen to have been laid down already by ८ 8 previous sentence, or if the sentence in question is not found ‘capable of asserting anything more than what has already been men- ५५ tioned. In the case in question, however, we find none of these condi- ‘tions present; as the material, dadhi, has been previously laid down “by another sentence (‘dadhna guhoti’); and the sentence in question ‘mentions a Result (‘ sense-efficiency’) over and above what has heen “ spoken of before. Itis with a view to all this that the Bhashya has “summed up the Pérvapaksha in the words: we find a distinct result mentioned in the sentence in question, and a (distinct) Result can, rightly speaking, follow from a (distinct) Action only. । + । क -~ [The Vartika now proceeds to explain the words of the Pirvapaksha Bhdshya. | In the Bhadshya here we meet with the words kin drshtam hi karmanak phulam, This sentence appeats to be capable of a double interpreta- tion: (1) The subsequent sentence ^ nés bramah, no hyetauddrishténa- néna siddhyats ' embodying a sort of a disavowal of the Parvapakshu, and as such affording a glimpse of the final Szddhanta, the question ends with ‘kin’; the meaning being ‘ how (ts it that rightly speaking the Result follows froman Action) ?’—and the reply to this is drshtam hi karmanah phalam—because we actually see the Result following from the Action. And MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO RESULTS. 799 then we have the retort, ‘été bramak, etc.’ And in this way various questionings and answerings go on up to the sentence ‘ tasmdnnatvan- jatiyakeshvétad bhavati’ (2hashya, p. 159, 1. 20). In accordance with this interpretation, the sole question—‘ How is it that rightly speaking the Result follows from the Action ? ’—would emanate from the Siddhantin. And as this appears to be wholly uncon- nected (or irrelevant) immediately after the Parvapakshin has summed up his own declarations, we must interpret the sentence in the following manner :— (2) The Piérvapakshin having declared ‘tacca kurmano nyfyyam,’ the Siddhantin, with a view to avoid the meaninglessness of the woid ‘dadhi’ in the sentence in question, finds the conclusion arrived at under the Bhavarthadhikarana (II—i—1l) to be incapable of applying to the case in question; and thereby finding the sentence in question wholly incapable of expressing (the connection between the previous Homa and the Result, ‘sense-efficiency ' ), he puts the question: ‘Do you conclude that the particular Result mentioned follows from the Homa, on the basis of an Inference from the similar case of Fveld-cultivation, where the Result is actually found to follow from the Action?’ Though as a matter of fact, Dharma has been declared to be cognisable by means of Vedic Injunctions alone,—and it has been shown that Infcrence and the other means of knowledge do not appertain to such matters,—yet the operation of these means of knowledge has not been denied with regard to the considera- tion of the bearings of the Vedic texts; and as such there could he nothing objectionable in the introducing of an Inference, in connection with the consideration of the meaning of the Vedic sentence in ques- tion. | In reply to the above question of the Siddhantin, the Parvapakshin having his mind imbued with the Bhdvarthadiikarana retorts thus : “ Do not you taunt me with having been forced to bring forward an ‘“‘ Inference, by the fact of the incapability of the words themselves, of ‘ directly expressing what is held by us; because, as a matter of fact, < when we have words directly supporting our view, it is not an Inference “that we put forward in the sentence ‘drshtam hi karmano nydyyam.’ ५ Specially as such an Inference from similar cases does not support ‘our standpoint ; as such an Inference is beset with many such fallacies as “Sasiddha’ (the probans being unknown or not universally accepted), ५ ‘Anatkanitke’ (doubtful character of the Premises), ‘ viruddha’ (premises «^ proving the contrary conclusion), and so forth. ‘For instance, if the inferential argument put forward be in the form—‘ the Homa brings the result, as ४ 7s actually seen to bring about “ the Result, ’—then, inasmuch as the premises (bringing forward of the 760 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 11 —PADA 11—aADHI. (11). ‘ Result) form part of the conclusion, it is wholly incapable of right- “ly leading to the said conclusion. If again, the premises were in the ४८ form—* because the actions of Field-cultivation and the like are found to “ bring about Results, ’—then in that case the premises would not speak ‘* of the Probans as having any connection with the Minor वला (Homa) ८५ fand as such the conclusion would not be a legitimate one]. “TF it be urged that—‘even though the Probans is not connected ‘with the Minor ‘erm, yet we could deduce the conclusion, simply "५ because we wish it to follow from the premises,’—-then, in that case, “the premises could, equally legitimately, be taken as lending to the con- ‘clusion that the Result follows from the Material (Dadh:) “It might be urged that—' we could deduce our conclusion frum a ० similarity with well-known cases (such as those of Field-cultivation and ‘ the like), which similarity 1s found to exist between the Actions of “ Oultivation and IZoma, in the fact of both being actions, and not between “the Oultivatton apd the Materéal; because this latter is not an Actéon. “ But there is certainly some sort of a similarity between Oultivation ‘and the Material also; and if you deny this similarity, in the case in ‘question, simply because of the nearer similarities of other things “ (with Cultivation), —then, inasmuch as there are things which have a ‘ much closer similarity with Cultivation, than the Homa has, we could, ८८ 011 this very ground, set aside this similarity also; this is what is meant “by the Bhashya—the Homa is also dissiimalar;—that is to say, because it «८ differs from Crltévution in its Means, Horm und Result. The sentence “of the Bhashya—‘atha ०१५४८८८ sddrgyam grhyaté taddravyusydjr sadu- ८५ nityum’—shows what we have just explained ; that is to say, the Mate- “ vial also has some sort of a similarity with Cultivation, in that both are १ ephemeral , are connected with substances and are effects. ५५ [४ might be argued that - ‘thdre are other things more similar to “the Cultivution than the Material ; and as similarity is always compara- “ tively relative, when we are looking for something very similar, that ५ which is only slightly similar 18 as good as not similar at all ; and hence ८ when we are looking out for the common character of Action as inher- “ing in the Cultivation and in Homa, the similarity of the transient ८५ character, etc., of the Material becomes far removed; and as such 16 18 ५५ taken as dissimilar.’ ८ But in that case, inasmuch as we find mauy other Actions, such as “ Hating and the like, which have a still closer similanty with Oultiva- ५५ tion (than the Homa), as these Actions (like Qultivution) bring about ५ visible results (which the Homa does not do);—in view of this ‘much closer similarity between Hating und Cultivation, that between ५८ Cultivation and the Homa may be rejected as being as good as non- w~ ~ | +| “~ ७6 ८४ ८६ MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO RESULTS. 761 existent. And as such, this similarity could not serve as the means of getting at the desired conclusion. “This has also been declared elsewhere, in the following words: Wedo not find any absolute similarity between Qultivation and the Homa; and as for the presence of a sltyhé similarity, this is found in the Material also; und as such the fact cannot be ascertained (on the sole ground of similarity). “The Bhadshya has said—na cattut siddham, The sense of this is that, by the mere citing of an analogous instance, or by the inference of mere similarity, itis not right to conclude all the properties of one thing to belong to another, until we have actually found an invariable concomitance between the two factors. As otherwise, all things in the world would become one and the same (as there is some sort of a simi- larity among all things). And the Bhashya has already said (under Sitra I—i--2) that, because Dévadatta is black, 1t does not necessarily follow that Yajfiadatta is also black. For though the Guvayu is similar to the Cow, yet we do not find the presence of the Dewlap, etc., in the former ; and though the subsidiary sacrifices are laid down as to be sumelur to the Primary, there are certain elements of the latter—such as the Result and the like—that are not found to be present in the former’. ‘Says the Bhashyu— When u certain thing has been found to be u cause, in connection with un already known object,—i.e., with that which is cited as the Instunce in connection with the Inference,—if the same thing huppens to be cognised as the cuuse, in connection with the subject- of the Inference, then, in thut case, such a thing proves ihe conclusion. ‘‘ Some people take this declaration of the Bhashya to mean that in all cases of Inference, it is only the Cause that can rightly point to the effect (and vice versa). But this interpretation of the Bhdshya is not correct ; because we actually find such properties as ‘ krtukatva’ (that of being a product) leading to the conclusion of ‘anityatva’ (imper- manence), in which case there is no relation of cause and effect. And even between the cause and the effect, the cause does not serve the purpose of pointing out a particular effect, in the same way as the effect points to the cause; because there are many effects of a single cause; and as such there is always a chance of mistake in the former case. Therefore it must be admitted that what the Bhashya means 18 that, in all cases of Inference, when a certain characteristic has been found to be present 17 . (४.७. concomitant with) a well-known object, and as such to indicate the existence of this latter, then such a characteristic ‘(serving as the Probans of the Inference) comes to be recognised as “serving the purposes of indicating (the existence of the subject of the £6 762 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA II—ADHE. (11). ‘‘ Inference). This has been fully explained under the Hé@tvadhika- rana. (I, 11, 26—30.) ‘This is what is made clearer by the Bhashya in the sentence—lIt ‘* should be duly considered whether the similarity even though eaisting, does, ८८ or does not, lead to the desire conclusion. And if on th.s examination, ~ it is found that the similarity is such a cause, and as such points to the desired effect, then the form of the argument would be—‘In the sentence, dadhnéndriyakdmasya, etc., that which is the Action brings about the Result, because it is an Action, hke Cultivation,’ or that ‘the Result mentioned is to be brought by an Action, because it 16 a Result, hke the growing of corns.’ “The Bhashya puts forth another syllogism—that which 25 an Action has a distinct Result, etc. And this serves to present a counter-argument that makes the efficiency of tho previous arguments doubtful. As the Bhashya proceeds to explain that there are cases where, even after the * Action of Substances—that of the threads for instance—has ceased, we find certain distinct results in the shape of another substance—the cloth —following (not from the Action but) from the conjunction of those substances (the threads). The mention of the cessation of Action 18 meant to show that Results are brought about even apart from Actions. ‘It might be argued that—‘It may happen that in some cases the Result may be bronght about by means of Actions.’ And in reply to this the Bhashya hus indicated a counter-argument,—that in the sentence ‘ dadhnéndriyakamasya, etc.’ the Dadht brings about the Result because it is a substance, like the aforesaid threads; or that sense- efficiency is brought about by substances, because it is a Result (or effect), hke the aforesaid Oloth. “ Says the Bhashya—the Oultivation ४6 not found to bring forth an im- ‘perceptible Result. This shows the contradictory character of the inferential argument in question. The sense is that it may be that your premiss based upon similarity (‘ because Homa is an action like Oultiva- ‘ tion’) proves the fact of the Action bringing about the Result, or that of the Result being brought about by the Action; but it would also prove the fact of the Homa bringing about a visible result, or a result in some such form as the growth of the corn and the like (and certainly this would be far from desirable, even for you). “Thus, then, inasmuch as we have all these discrepancies cropping up, if we accept the aforesaid causal relation, it does not follow that because a certain thing is seen in one case, it must be present in ‘ nnother place also. ५ At this point of the discussion, the Siddhdntin might retort— MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO RESULTS. 763 ८५ ‹ When you yourself have set aside the inference that the Result follows ‘the Action, how is it that you hold to the position that rightly speaking, ८८ the Result follows from une Homa ?’ “ [This retort, as put in the Bhashya, may be taken as extending as “ far as ^ 2८2 `. ९९ But we have the following rejoinder ready: That the Result fol- ‘lows from the Homa is cognised directly from the words themselves (of ‘the sentence in question); as has already been shown in detail under “the Bhavarthadhikarana (Il—i—1). Therefore we conclude that the only ‘ rightful conclusion 25 that the Result follows from the Homa. “The Bhashya adds—and ४४ 28 not riyht to say that the Result follows ५५ from the Material Dadhi; and the purpose of this apparently useless “ repetition of a fact already implied in the previous sentence is simply “to show that the two theories are not equally authoritative; as the ‘‘ previous sentence might leave an impression that both might be right- “ ful conclusions. ८५ And further, the Dadhi zs not capable of doing both (t.e., the accom- * plishing of the Homa and the bringing about of sense-efficiency). ८ Because the Dadhi has no instrumentality of its own (towards the bring- ‘ing about of the Result), apart from an Action; and as such, it could “not, by itself, be connected with any Result. Consequently then (if ‘the Dadhi had such an instrumentality) it would be necessary to dis- ° tinctly lay it down as accomplishing both (the Homa and the Result) ; ९९ but no such laying down 18 possible. . “It might be urged that a double purpose could be served by the Dadhi (without two distinct Injunctions) ; just as we find that the act of ^“ washing the blanket with the feet serves the double purpose of wash- ‘‘ ing the blanket and cleansing the feet ; this argument may be taken as urged, either with a view to show the fact of the connection of an Action being only something by the way (and very immaterial), or to set aside the fact of the incapability of substances (to bring about ° double results); because the opponent’s assertion that the Dadhi is not ‘‘ capable of doing both—is found to distinctly speak of the incapability ‘ of a substance, Dadhi). ‘The reply to this is that we do not mean to say that a single “ substance cannot serve two purposes. ‘That 18 to say, we do not mean ‘to deny the capability of Substances; all that we mean is that even ^^ though the Substance (Dadhi) were capable (of serving two purposes), ‘it could not be utilised as such, in performance, unless it had been dis- “ tinctly enjoined (as to be so utilised); and consequently, it would “become necessary for you to take the sentence in question as laying ° down the Dadhi, both for the fulfilment of the Homa and for the accom- é € € é¢ 764 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, II—-PADA II—ADHI. (11). ‘‘plishment of the Result—‘ sense-efficiency.’ But this would not be ९५ nossible, as such a procedure would entail a syntactical split. ‘Then again, in all cases, we find that 1t 18 only when the factor (of ९८ the root-meaning), which is more proximate (to the Injunctive word), “is not capable of being taken as the object of Injunction, that we accept “ the remoter factor (of the material) to be its object. In the case in ques- “tion, we find that the connection of the Dadhi with the Homa 18 very ‘‘ much more proximate than that of the Dadhi with the Result ; and as “ gach if both these connections were laid down simultaneously, we would “have to accept, at one and the same time. both the probable and the ‘improbable. And hence when it becomes necessary to give up one of “the two, there remains no chance for your theory (becanse that would “mean the acceptance of the Remoter, and the rejection of the Nenrer, ‘“‘ factor) ; and hence, on account of close proximity, we come to connect “the Dadhi with the Homa, and the Homa with the Result, “And thus, the Action (mentioned in the sentence dadhnéndriya- “kamasya juhnuyat) being found to be connected with the Action (of ‘* Homa), the sentence in question cannot but be taken as laying down a distinct Action.” ee (~) कनन SIDDHANTA. Sutra (26): The two sentences not being exactly similar, the second sentence should be taken as laying down an accessory for the previously-mentioned Action. The sentence in question is not similar to those with reference to which it has been concluded, under the Bhavarthidhikarana (1I1—i—1), that the Result follows from that which is expressed by the Root. Because 80 long as the potency of the Injunctive has not been removed from that which is expressed by the verbal root, whatever Result is men- tioned is taken as pertaining to that Root-meaning ; when, however, the potency of the Injunctive is transferred to the Accessory, if a Result happens to be mentioned, then, inasmuch as this mention of the Result would be touched by the Injunction of the Accessory, it is along with that necessory that the Result comes to be taken. That is to say, the Injunctiveness, in reality residing in the Bhavana, is transferred from one to the other factor, according as that factor comes to be recoguised as helping that Bhavani. And at the time that the Injunctiveness, as transferred to the Root-meaning, gets at the Bhivana with a particular result,—it is the Root-meaning that is made the Instrument (of its accomplishment); and everything else becomes MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO BESULTS. 765 subservient to that Root-meaning. This (fact of the Injunctiveness pertaining to the Root-meaning) is found to be the case, in connection with the sentence ‘agninotram juhuyit seargakimah’, where the name (‘ Agnthotra’) is incapable of wresting, for itself, the operation of the Injunctive. On the other hand, in the case of the sentence in question (‘ dudhnéndriyakimasya juhuyat’), the word ‘dadhe’ has got none of the various characteristics of a Namadhéya (Name of a Sacrifice) (as detailed in the Fourth Pdda of the First Adhyfya) ; and hence it must be taken as something enjoined; and as such it wrests to itself the Injunctive opera- tion that had been pointing to the Root-meaning. Thus then, the Bhéivanai in question, affected by its contact with the 7 (117, comes to stand in need of a reference (to a previons Action) by means of the Root- meaning in the sentence ; and consequently, when we find a Result men- tioned, we at once conelnde this Result to be something to be brought about by the instrumentality of the Dudhz, and not by that of the Hom: (expressed by the Root-meaning of ‘ juhuydat’) ; specially because those that are not enjoined can never be accepted to have the character of the Instrument; and when we have accepted a certain other thing to be the object of the Injunction, we can never take the sentence as laying down that from which the Injunctive operation has been wrested, as we have already shewn ahove (under Sitra I[—1u—16). Just as on account of the Injunctive operation being wrested by the Dadhi we deny the fact of the sentence enjoining the Hom, 80, in the same manner, on account of the presence of the word mentioning the Result, we cannot take the ` sentence as enjoining the dadhi with reference to the Homu (because of the chance of syntactical split, etc., etc.) ; hence what we hold is that the sentence enjoins the Dadhi with reference to the Bhavana ; and as such, it must be admitted that the Result follows from the Dadhi. Question (Bhiishya): ‘ In the sentence in question, which ts the word “that denotes the exertion of a personal agent ? The sense of this question ‘is that the words ‘ dadhi’ (denoting the material) and ‘ indriyak@macya’ ‘ (denoting the Result) not serving the purpose of expressing the Bhavani, they cannot directly form the objects of the Injunction ; and as such * we would Jook out for a verbal affix (that would express the Bhavana ‘or the personal exertion, and afford the object of the Injunction); and “ then, in accordance with the Satra IL—i—4, 1t becomes impossible to “entirely reject the Root-meaning (because the presence of the affix ‘would be impossible without a verbal root) ; and consequently, the ५ Result must be admitted to follow from that Root-meaning.” The reply given to this is by a single word ‘juhnuydat’ ; that is to say, the word expressing human exertion is ‘ juhuyft,’ wherein the Siddhinti separates the Affix from the Root, the former serving the purpose of 766 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, II—PADA II—ADHI. (11). expressing the object of Injunction, while the latter serves only as a reference (to a previously mentioned Action). Objection :—“ But the word ‘juhuyat’ directly denotes something con- ‘nected with Homa, while it would be by means of the indirect method ८ of syntactical connection that 1t would indicate the connection of Dadhi. ‘This passage of the Bhashya serves to clear up the position of the “opponent. As human exertion too 18 said to consist of the Bhavana as ८५ connected with the Injunction (the word ‘juhuyat’ cannot be said to he < expressive of that exertion).” The reply to this is that thongh, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at under the Bhavarthadhikarana, what you say has been found to be the case, on account of the stronger authority of Direct Assertion, in regard to other sentences,—yet, in the case in question, those who would admit your theory would be all the more contradicting Direct Asser- tion. Because in your theory, (1) you would have to admit many objects of Injunction, while it is quite possible for very httle to be its object ; (2) it would be necessary to have recourse to Possessive Indica- cation ; (3) or else, there would be a total rejection of the word (‘ dadhi ’). That is to say, (1) in all cases, it is a well-established law that when it is possible for a smaller number of things to form the object of an Injunction, it always rejects a larger number. Secondly, according to you, the Homa being the instrument in the accomplishment of the Bha- ४१४९ of the Result, the meaning of the sentence would be ‘ bhavayét in- driyam hoména’; and thus the Homa would come on an equal footing with Dadhi, which is distinctly mentioned as the instrument (by the word ‘dadhn@’) ; and thus both the Homa and Dadhi having the same instrnu- mental character, no direct relationship between them would be possible ; and as such it would be absolutely necessary for us to have recourse to Possessive Indication, taking the word ‘ dadhn@’ as = ‘ dadhimataé’,—the sentence thus coming to mean ‘ dadhimatd hoména indriyam bhavayét’ ;— and there is absolutely no ground for this Possessive Indication, Third/y, inasmuch as the word ‘dadhz’ fulfils none of the conditions of a Namua- dhéya, it cannot be taken as one ; and thus the word ‘ dadhz’, falling from the position of a Ndmadhéya as well as from that of the Instrument, be- comes altogether useless ; consequently for the sake of the property of a word, in the shape of its proximity (whereby the root signifying the Homa 18 taken as the object laid down by the Injunctive affix, appearing in the same word ),—you come to reject the word (‘dadhz’) itself ; and certainly this entails a greater contradiction of Direct Assertion than that involved in our theory. If, however, the sentence be taken as laying down the Dadht as the Instrument in the accomplishment of the Bhavana of the Resnit, then there is no rejection of any word (or its property ). MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO RESULTS. 767 It 18 argued—‘ That way of takiny the sentence would set aside the word ‘ } ८0४. ` ”’ The reply to this is that in any case zt would be absolutely necessary to use the word ‘juhiyat’, (and as such the root ‘juhoti’ would not be rejected). Because there could be no connection between the Dadhi aud sense-efficiency, unless there was an affix expressing the Bhdvand ; and no affix could he present, except along with a verbal root. That is to say, it is absolutely necessary to pronounce the Affix, for the purpose of laying down the Bhavana qualified by Dadhi and Sense- efficiency ; and as the affix can never be pronounced by itself, and as it is absolutely impossible for an affix to be present apart from a verbal root, it must always be used in the wake of a root; and thus when it comes to the using of some such root or other, the particular root that comes to be admitted is that which expresses the Homa, inasmuch as this 18 pointed out by the Context. And as for the relationship of this Homa with Dadhi, it would only be in thé form of the relationship between the 6५525 and the based (container and the contained),—which relationship also would only be referred to in the sentence in question, as it has already been previously mentioned in the sentence ‘ dadhna juhoti ’. In the case of the sentence ‘graham sammarsh{:’,it has been shown that the case-ending (in grahanv) does not serve the only purpose of ex- pressing the singular number; as the only purpose served by such an ending is the mere fact of the word being an active noun; but when- ever it is uttered, is has to be uttered along with a certain number which is its invariable concomitant ; and thus even though no real significance is meant to be attached to this number, yet the word signifies it all the same. In the same manner, in the casein question, even though the Root may be used only for the sake of making possible the use of the Affix, yet, on account of the powerful character of the relationship (between the Root and the Affix), it could not but signify its own meaning, even though no real significance might be meant to be attached to it. Hence (in order to meet the objection that our theory would mean the rejection of the Root as useless) we must insist upon the fact that the signification of its own meaning is not the only purpose that can be served by the Root, Objection: ^ Nanu ucyamane’pi, etc. That is to say, even though ८८ pronounced only for the purpose of making the presence of the Affix ‘“ possible, yet the Root must express its own meaning also; and there ‘is no reason why no significance should be attached to it—as to the singleness of the vessel in the sentence above cited ; consequently, inas- “ much as it is absolutely impossible to express mere ‘karote’ (a generic ‘verb, simply affording room for the presence of the affix), what you say ८ 18 most unreasonable.” 768 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, U-—PADA (1—AbHI, (11). Reply: That does not touch our position; because even when there 18 w connection between the Dadhi and the Homa, the sense of ‘ karotd’ is not absent (४,९., 1618 present along with the ‘ Homa’); and our pui- pose is served by that much also of its presence (i.¢., the utterance of the Root ceases to be useless even if it expresses only that much) ; specially as the peculiarity attaching to the ^ kurotd’ (by its connection or combination with ‘ Homa’) does not militate against any of our theories; as that peculiarity might serve to specify the Bhdvand in a manner other than that of the Instrument. Objection : “° In thut case, there vs the sume diserepuncy ; that is to say, “when the ‘Homa’ is not set aside (but is admitted to the present), ‘then it wonld make itself obvious as the Instrument.” The reply given by the Szddhantiis that itis the frequent repetition of the word ` juhuydt’ in the context, in many other sentences (‘ aynihotrum jguhuyat’, ‘dadhnua juhuyai’, and so forth), that leads you to believe, wrongly, that Homa ८5 the Instrument. Because when we come to look into the matter closely, we find that in the case in question, though, on account of the proxunity (of the Root-mecaning with the Injunctive Affix), the Huma might appear to have the character of the Objective (of the Bhavana), yet being (on account of 1ts not being something in itself desir- able for the agent) found to be incapable of that character, it is removed from that position; and in the same manner, in consideration of the presence of the word ‘ ददद ` (which has the Instrumental cnding, and 18 not capable of being taken as anything else), the ‘Homa’ could not but be denied the character of the Tistiument also; and just as in the former case the Homa 18 coznized only as qualifying the Bhavana, through another «/ement of it, so, in the case in question also, it would qualify it by serving as the ०८५८९८४ or substratum for the (oporation of the) material ‘dadht’. It is weth reference to this that the author of the Vrttd has declared--‘ The Result would be brought about by the material as bused upon the Homa.’ Question: “Is this relationship of the basis und the based (held ‘to exist between the Dadhi and the Homa) something distinct, or non- ‘* different, from the three factors of the Bhavana, viz.: the Objective, the Instrument, and the Method of Procedure?” To this some people make the following reply: ` It is wholly distinet ‘from those; because just as in other caser, the Bhdvand 18 cognised as ‘standing in need of the snid three factors, so, in the case in question, the ‘ Bhavana, being qualified by a distinct material, stands in need of the ‘fourth factor. 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MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO RESULTS. 769 ‘certain material is distinctly laid down as the Instrument,—so that it 1s ‘only in the character of the Instrument, and not in that of a disinterested ‘onlooker, that the said material could help to accomplish the Result,— ‘inasmuch as it could not have the real character of the Instrument until ‘it helped to bring about that which is expressed by the Root, there ‘naturally arises a fourth uced for the Bhdvanda, as to the exact character ‘of this something expressed by the Root. by bringing about which the ‘Instrumental Material would accomplish the Result. And that some- ‘thing expressed by the Root which would be the object. brought about ‘by it 18 spoken of as the baszs or substrate of the Material, as it 18 by the ‘help of that that the trac Instrumental character of this latter is attain- ‘ed. Thus then, the sentence in question itself being wholly given to the ‘mention of the relationship between the Material and the Result, and ‘being itself incapable of affording the required basis, on account of the ‘chance of a syntactical split,—we are led by the Context to the conclusion ‘that the Agnihotva Homa is the basis required (for the operation of Dadhz). ‘And being thus got at, the Home is ouly referred to by the Root (in puhu- ‘yat), which is used for the purpose of making the presence of the Affix ‘ possible, and which as such, forms a necessary feature of the Injunction ; ‘just as in the case of the use of the word @labhéta, we accept the fact of its ‘being a reference to a previously mentioned action of Glambhunu (८.९.) 111 ‘the case in question, we accept the Root to serve the purpose of referring ‘ to the previous Homa) ; and hence, in accordance with the law—that when ‘the Aptrva follows from a single cause, everything else ts subservient to that ‘cause—, we come to take the Root-meaning as helping that which is ‘expressed by the noun (Dadhi). But, as a matter of fact, we दना very reasonably deny the fact of there being any need of ४ fourth factor, in the casein question. Because all that we find is that it is only the need forthe Instrumental factor that has been extended a little further; that is to say, by means of the Root-meaning the Bhavana is wecomplished more quickly than is done by means of the Material—inasmuch as the Instrumental character of this latter 18 accom- plished only after the connection of the Action (expressed by the Root) has been established. (And thus all that is done in the case in question is that that functioning of the Instrument is removed one step); and consequently there are only three factors needed by the Bhavana. Thus then, the Materia! being taken as having its Instrumentality accomplished through the Homa, and as leading to a distinct Result, there arises a question as to the Method to be employed ; and this is answered by the Method of Procedure employed in connection with the previ- ously mentioned Agnihotva. It 18 this what is meant by the Bhdshya— anay@ gnihotrétikartavyataya —which only serves to point out the said fact, 97 770) TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. LI-——PADA LU-—ADHL. (LL). —ifter the conclusion of the present Adhikurana itself has been arrived ut, -- which really forms the subject of the ‘ Sansthadhikarana’ (Sittras 111, vi, 41—47). Some people take this sentence of the Bhashyu to mean that the 4 112८0017 ttself ४5 the required method. But this is not correct; because the Method is something wholly distinct from the Instrument, and the Homa (constituting the Agnihotrw) has been shown to be non-different from the Instrumental factor (of the Bhavana). Consequently we cop- clude that what is meant by the expression ‘ agnthotrétikartuvyata ` is the ugeregate of such actions as the preparing of the Fire, and so forth (that ure performed during the Agnihotra). Objection: “ How is this? That is to say, how is it that that which “as not signified by the, Root (ie. the Dadh’) is connected with the Method ?” Keply: Phalustidhanasyu dadhnak, That is to say, just as in your case, 1t is only on acconnt of its being the Instrument (in the accomplish- ment of the Result) that the Homuw (expressed by the Root.) comes to be helped by the Method,—so, in our case also, it is on acconnt of the very same reason (that of being the means of accomplishing the Result) that the Dadhi becomes connected with (and helped by) the said Method. There are two other arguments bronght forward by the Bhashya :— (L) beranse of the proximity of this Method (of the Agnihotra), and (2) because we find the denotation of the root ‘quhoti’ present as «a feature of the Injunction. But none of these arguments appear to be quite proper; hecause as for the former, 1t entails an acceptance of * samanavidhinatoya ` (the fact of the equality of Injunction), which is distinctly denied under the Sansthadhikaruna (111, vi, 41-—47); while as for the latter, inasmuch it only brings forward the law of Atidega, it is wholly irrelevant. And further, if the requisite relationship is accomplished by mere prowimity, what would be the nse of the presence of the said feature of Injunction P And conversely, if the presence of this feature were the reason for the relationship, there could be absolutely no use for the mention of ‘ proxi- mity ; because that reason would apply equally to one that is at a dis- tance (and not in proximity ). In view of these objections we must explain the said expressions of the Bhaishya as follows:—(1) Becanse the said Method ४५ made closely prozimate by means of the particular Homa, which is found to be most helped by that Method; and (2) because we find the Root-meaning of ‘quhoti’ which is « feature of the Injunction, and which affords a ground for Atidegu. And becanse the Root-meaning of ‘/uhoti,’ appearing through the Context only, as a feature of the Injunction, is only referred to (in the sen- MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VIEW TO RESULTS. tél tence in question ),—therefore the Affix (an ‘ guhuyat’) cannot be taken as enjoining cither the appearance of that Action (of Homa), or the Result as following from it. Question: “* By what has the Homa been previously mentioned, to which “ Homa the ‘ juhuyat’ in question would be a reference ?”’ Answer : You donot certainly mean to say that there is no other sentence laying down the Hoa. Some people explain this last sentence of the Bhashyu differently, us meaning that it is not the case that apart from the ‘ sense-efficiency ° brought about by ‘ Dadhz’ there are no results, in the shape of Heaven and the like, following from the Homa of the Agnihotra ; because such a result, in the shape of Heaven at least, is mentioned in the very sentence that lays down ४6 Agnihotra itself (‘agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah’). But inasmuch as this interpretation would represent the Bhashyu aS saying something wholly unconnected with the question put forward, and as such being wholly irrelevant,—we must accept the former explana- tion as being the more reasonable. Thus then, we conclude that the Action mentioned in the sentence in question is not different from the previous Agnihotra; all that the sentence does is to declare that 17 Dadhi is employed at the Action, ‘ sense- efficiency ’ 18 the result that follows,—bhy the help of Homa (which serves to make possible the use of the Dudhi). Or, the sentence may be taken as declaring that the Result follows, neither from the Dadhé nor from the Homa, but from the connection of the Dudhi and the Homa,—and the words ‘dalht’ and ‘homua’ only serve the purpose of expressing that connection ;—(1) because for reasons already given, the word ‘ dadhd’ cannot be said to have been wrongly inserted; and (2) because the Result could not follow from the Dadhi alone by itself. In this case, however, in accordance with a rule explained above, the sentence that has previously mentioned the relationship of the Homa and the Dadhi (wiz., the sentence ‘dadhnf& juhoti') not being capable of being tuken nlong with the sentence 111 question (‘ dadhnéndriyakdmasya juhu- yat’),—-the said relationship of the Dadhi and the Homa cannot be taken as accomplished (for this latter sentence) ; and hence this relationship not being capable of being taken as pointed out by the Context, we must conclude that itis the sentence in question itself that establishes that relationship ; and then lays down the Injunction of that relationship, in reference to the particular Result ; «nd thus the sentence containing the [njunction of more than one thing, there 1s a distinct syntactical split. For these reasons we conclude that the former interpretation—that the result follows from Dadhi—is the only correct one. The final sum- ming up (in the Bhdsaya) also is in keeping with that mterpretation : it 172 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. W—PADA 11—aDuHF. (11). being in the form —therefore we conclude that the result follows from the Dadhé as connected with the homa. And hence the sentence ‘atha vf, etc.’ must be taken only as pointing another possible alternative. Some people, however, declare as follows: ‘It is one and the same ` view—that the result follows from the Dadhi—that is put forward from ‘beginning to end, with all the arguments in its favour (and there is no ‘mention of any alternative) ; and hence the proper reading of the Bhas- ‘hya is—dadhicabdasya vivakshitatvat, and the words atha णके afford a ‘ wrong reading’. But this assertion—that the alternative explanation is not possible and that the reading is wrong—can be refuted in the following manner : As soon as we construe the sentence in question as that ‘for one desiring sense-efficiency, the result should be accomplished by means of Dadhi `. we at once become cognisant of the fact that the Result follows from the Dadhi as the Instrumental means; and this instrumental charac- ter, not being otherwise possible, points to its connection with some sort of an action ; and as the relationship of the agent and the Action is always in the form of a potency, the said connection 18 included in the [nstru- mental ending; and then, inasmuch as that which 1s denoted by the affix is the principal factor in the sentence, what the sentence comes to do finally is that it lays down, for the sake of the Result, the connection of that of which what is expressed by the basic noun (‘ dudhi’) is the subor- dinate element. And when that connection has been laid down, then. as before, the Context serves to point to a particular Action, in the shape of the Homa. And, then, in accordance with the law regulating the relation- ship of the Material and the Deity, the connection of the Result with the relationship of the Action and the Agent having been brought about, there aiises a question as to the character of the particular Agent of Action ; and hence, for the purpose of establishing the relationship of the Qualification and the Qualifed (between the Dadhi and the Homa), the Homa is brought up by the Context. And hence itis that the Bhdshya speaks of the connection between the Dadhi and the Homa betng laid down for the sake of the Result. Thus then, the reading ‘atha v&i’ is found to be quite correct ; though the conclusion and the final summing up are those of the former interpretation. Or even these might be taken as those of the latter inter- pretation; as in that case also, inasmuch as what is mentioned is the Dudht as connected, this connection is that of which the Dadhi is the subordinate element; and as such there would be no incongruousness m this. Obyection : ‘In the case of the sentence in question (if it be taken as ‘laying down the Result as following from the Material), the Injunction MATERIALS MENTIONED WITH A VLEW TO RESULTS. 773 ^ would involve the functioning of two words—‘ (21142 ' and ‘tndrtyaka- ०५ masya’ ; and this would give rise to a syntactical split १. Reply: This is no argument against us; because the mere fact of a sentence expressing various relationships does not bring about a syntactical split ; 1४ 18 only when the potency of the Injunction itself is manifold, that we have that split; and as a matter of fact, we have no such manifold potency of the Injunction in the case in question. ‘That is to say, it is quite possible for many things to be connected together by means of a single sentence; und in this fact alone, there is no split of the sentence. Because it has been distinctly pointed out that it is only the multifarious- ness of the Injunction itself that brings about a syntactical split. There 18 no such multifariousness in the case in question ; because the Result is not an object of Injunction. The construction of the sentence thus comes to be this: the accomplishment of sense-efficiencvy (this being a mere reference and not an Injunction) zs to be brought about by means of Dudhi. As a rule, when a person desires something, he exerts himself to its attain- ment; and hence for the acquiring of such a desirable thing as sense- efficiency, the person would exert himself naturally (withont any Injune- tion from outside) ; and hence what the Injunctive affix in question does is to lay down the Bhaivand with tts Instrumental factor, with refer- ence to the same Bhdavanii as endowed with the objective factor (i.e, the Result) ; and thus the object of Injunction being one only in the shape of the Instrument (as the Result is only referred to),-—there is no syntactical split. Consequently, we conclude that for the sake of making the word ‘dadhi’ serve a useful purpose, the sentence must be taken as laying down the Result as following from the Material Dadhi, and not as laying down a distinct Action. ee ee Ne ee eS Ne, ९ १ ADHIKARANA (12). [The Varuvantiya, etc., are distinct Actions. | Sativa (27):—When the sentences are similar (the Results) would be connected with distinct Actions. We now proceed to deal with an exception to the foregoing 44/८८ - karana. The subject of the Adhkikarana is thus shown: (1) we have tle sen- tence--' érivrdagnishtudagnishtomak, tasya vayavyaisu éekavingamagnish- tamasima krivd brakmavarcasukamé yajgéta’; and then in continuation of this Agnishtut sacrifice, we have the sentence ‘ vdravantiyumaynishtomua- sitma karyam,’ which laysdown an accessory (in the shape of the r@ravan- tiya); and then we come to the sentence, (2) ^ etusyaiva révatishu varavantiyu- magnishtomusima krtvd pagukamé hyéténa yajéta’. [The difference between the bearing of the two sentences being that when the Vdravantiya is sung in connection with the Vayavya verses then the result is in the shape of ‘ Brahmic glory’, while when the same is sung in connection with the Révati verses, the Result is in the shape of ‘ Cattle.’ ] Here too, we have, as before, the following doubt:—Does this last sentence enjoin an ¢nadependent action, distinct from that laid down in the previous sentence, as qualifed by a distinct material (in the shape of the Viravantiya in connection with the Révati verses) ? Or, does it only serve to lay down this distinct material only, with reference to the same Action, just as in the case of the sentence dealt with in the foregoing Adhikarana ? And on this, we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. “Tn view of the reasons detailed, and the conclusion arrived at, in the ‘foregoing Adhikarana, it must be admitted that the sentence in question ‘serves only to lay down the Result as following from a particular acces- ‘gory (In connection with the previously mentioned action). Because, as ‘a matter of fact, we find that the Injunctive potency of the sentence is “taken up by the connection between the Révati and the Vdravantiya: ‘and then we find a Result mentioned along with this Injunction; “consequently we cannot take the sentence as laying down the Sacrifice (as VARAVANTIYA, ४1८, ARE शप्त ACTIONS. (४, “that would entail a dual functioning of the Injunction, thereby leading “to syntactical split). And as for the connection between the Révatt “and the Varavantiya, this would be brought about, without a repetition “of the Injunctive affix, by the word ‘kriva’ which is mentioned dis- ‘tinetly by itself (and as such this would not involve the said syntac- ‘tical split). “That is to say, itinight be argued that—* inasmuch as the sen- ‘tence involves the Injunction of the appearance of the connection “between /tévat? and the Varavantiya, and then an Injunction also of that “Connection with reference to the Result, there would be a repetition of ‘the Lnjunctive affix, which would give rise to a syntactical split’. But ‘ 11118 reasoning would be scarcely valid; because the Vedic sentence itself ‘enjoins only the Result,—the fact being that the said connection having “been established by the clause ‘ révatishu varavantiyum krtva’, what ‘the [njunctive affix following after the root ‘yajz° (in ‘yajéta’) does ‘is to lay down only the relationship (causal) of that Connection with the ‘particular result. And thus there is no chance of the anomaly result- ‘ing from a repetition of the Injunctive affix. “Then too, inasmuch as the ‘ Mévati verses” are spoken of as the “substrate or basis (of the Sama), they are distinctly subordinate im “their character ; and hence it 18 the Varavantiya sftma which, on account ‘of its predominant character, comes to be enjomed with veference to “the Result. “That is to says 1 11 the sentence in question, on avconnt of the ‘mention of an Accessory, the potency of the Injunctive, being removed “from that which is expressed by the Verbal root (‘ 2/४ 2), serves to lay ‘down that accessory, for the sake of the particular result; aud as such “at is found to lay down that which has not been cognised as subservient “to anything else. As for the Révuti cerses, inasmuch as they are “spoken of in the Locative, they ave subservient to the Varavautiya sama ; “and as such not standing in need of any other purpose, they could not “be connected with the Result ; while the Varavantiya, having the hévate ‘verses for its subordinate accompaniment, is coguised as the predominant ^" factor, on account of its being mentioned in the Accusative ; and as such ‘it becomes connected, in the manner of the Root-meaning, with the ‹* Bhavana denoted by the verb ‘krtr@’; and thus being on the look-out ‘for a purpose, it becomes connected with the Result “Or, in this case also, we can reject both the Révati and the Varavan- “tiya, and hold the Result to follow only from the Connection of these two. “Thus then, we distinctly recognise the following facts in connec- “tion with the sentence in question : (1) that at the time of its utterance, “the idea of the previously mentioned ‘sacrifice’ is still present in the 076 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. Il—PADA I—ADHI, (12). “mind: (2) that the word ‘état’ (in ‘étasya’) distinctly points to that which has been spoken of before; (3) that the genitive (in ‘ etasya’), ‘appearing after that ‘etat’ which is co-extensive with (refers to) the ‘* “sacrifice `, signifies the relationship of the Baszs and the Based, pointed “out by the Context, betwecn that sacrifice and the Accessory as leading “to the Result; (4) that the word ‘éva’ serves to preclude any other “ hasis or substrate for that Accessory, because no such other substrate is ‘ possible: (5) that the Varavantiya qualified by the connection of the * Aynishtomasima is already laid down by the previous sentence. And "all these facts distinctly point to the conclusion that the Action (‘ sacri- fice’) mentioned in the sentence in question is none other than that laid ‘‘down in the previous sentence; and as such, imasmuch as that same "* Action is referred to in the sentence in question, the Injunctive affix in this “sentence will not be put to the trouble of laying down the Action. over and `" above the Accessory). While if the sentence be taken as layiny down a distinct Action, “as m that case nothing will have been previously laid down, the "* Injunctive affix would have to enjoin all that is necessary. “And as a inatter of fact, no such injuuction of all things is possible ; because the Injunctive, by its very uature, is always endowed with a ‘single potency; and when its purpose is fulfilled by the Injunction of “even a little thing, it can never enjoin any more than that. “Thus then, we find that the word ‘ {एदि ` establishes the connection ‘between the 7९४५४ and the Varavantiya, while the [njunctive affix lays ‘down only the relationship of that Connection with the particular result. ‘And as such, there being no necessity of accepting a manifold potency of ‘the Injunctive, there can be no doubt as to the superiority of the theory “that the sentence in question serves only to lay down an Accessory “(with reference to a previously mentioned Action). ^° As all the references cnumerated above are included in and based ‘‘npon the reference of the ‘sacrifice’, it isonly this last thathas been ‘spoken of in the Bhashya, and all the rest have been left to be inferred. ^“ For these 1088008 we conclude that the sentence in question does not ‘lay down a distinct Action.” SIDDHANTA. To the above we make the following reply: When there is an Acces- sory which accepts the previously mentioned Action as its substratum, then slone 18 1t so that we do not perceive any difference between the Actions (mentioned in the two sentences) ; and the reason is that in such a case, what the latter sentence does is only to refer to the previous Action for the siuke of its connection with the new Accessory. VARAVANTIYA, ETC., ARE DISTINCT ACTIONS. 777 That is to say, we find the sentence in question, ‘ efasyaiva raévatishu, etc.’, containing the mention of ‘sacrifice’ directly by means of the root ‘yajz’ ; under the circumstances, if the exact sort of ‘sacrifice’ that is herein mentioned had been previously mentioned in another sentence, then alone could we conclude that the one mentioned in the sentence in question is not a distinct sacrifice. As for instance, in the case of the sentence ‘ dadhné- ndriyukamasaya, etc.’, we find that the sentence directly lays down only the relationship with the particular Result; and then the Context helps to supply the other substrate of the relationship,—in the shape of Homa ; and in this case we admit the mention of ‘ Homa’ in the sentence to be a mere reference to a previously mentioned ‘ Homa’ ; and another reason for this is thatthe Dadhi by itself also is capable of directly accomplishing the Homa. In the case in question, on the other hand, we find that the Varavantiya qualified by “the Revati verses is uot, by itself, capable of directly accomplishing the Sacrifice; because it is neither a Deity nor a Material (which two alone are capable of directly accomplishing the Sacrifice) ; because the Sacrifice requires, for its accomplishment, no other helping factors, except those of the Deity, the Material, and the Performer ; and hence it is never accomplished directly by means of a Sama ( Varavan- tiya and the like). Thus then, though, through the peculiar character of the Context, the ‘Sacritice’ (previously mentioned ) is present in the mind, yet it does not become cognised as the -ubstrate of the said Samu, because of its inherent incapability of having that character ; and hence that ‘ Sacrifice’ cannot be accepted as referred to by the sentence in question (“‘ Révatishu, etc.’’) ; specially as we have no grounds for believing that the ‘ sacrifice’ herein mentioned is the same as the one previously mentioned. As for the Hymn- iny, that forms a part of the previous ‘ sacrifice ', and which, being accom- plished by means of the Varavanttya Sdma, 1s capable of being taken as its substrate, —it is not pointed out by the Context; because the presence of Hymning in the previous ‘sacrifice’, the ‘ Agnzshtut’, 18 only based upon an indirect: implication. Tt is with reference to this, that it has been declared that—thouvh the Samu is inherently capable of accomplishing the Hymnzing, yet as no such Hymning is pointed out by the Context, it cannot be taken as the substrate of the Sama in question. The following argument might be brought forward by the other party: “The Sama could base itself upon the Qucrefice, in that very ‘capacity whereby it would help the performance of the sacrifice; and “conversely the ‘ Sacrifice’ also would become the substrate of the Sama, ° 170 whatever capacity it would be able to act as a true substrate; such ‘‘ cognition being based upon the general rule whereby the meanings of all 98 778 VANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II——PADA II—ADHI. (12). “verbs are ascertained in accordance with the capacities of things. And “then (even though the Sama may not be able to help directly in the ‘‘ performance of the sacrifice itself, yet) in accordance with the Satra “TII—i—18, it would be quite capable of directly accomplishing the ५ Hymning which forms an integral part of the ‘ Agnishtut’ sacrifice ; and ‘“as such, there would be no incongruity inthe said relationship of the ८५ Basis and the Based (between the S@ma and the ‘ Sacrifice’), which ‘‘would be due to an integral part of the latter, in the shape of the “ Hymning.”’ Reply : That is not possible; because we have already shown that that alone can be taken as the subsidiary part of a sacrifice which has been actually laid down as such a part; that, on the other hand, which appears distinctly as independent by itself, can never become a subsidiary part, That 1s to say, in the case of the sentence ‘ Saptadagdratuirvdjaptyasyu yipah’ (the sacrificial post at the Vajapéya is to be seventeen cubits in lenyth), we find that the ‘seventeen-cubit-length’ is distinctly laid down as a subsidiary detail; and then, inasmuch as it is not found to be capable of being directly connected with the (तवनव sacrifice, we conclude that it should help in the performance of this sacrifice in what- over way it can; and consequently it comes to be taken as a qualification of the sacrifictal post which forms an integral factor in the performance. If, in the case in question also, the Varavantiya had been laid down as a subsidiary detail of the sacrifice,—then alone, being found incapable of directly serving the Sacrifice, would it come to be taken as helping the Hymning, which forms an integral part of the sacrifice. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the Varavantiya, being laid down in regard to a particular result, stands in need of a substrate, or basis, in the shape of an Action; and under the circumstances, if it could find any Action, already previously mentioned, that could form its substrate, then it would directly connect itself with that Action ; when, however, it finds no such Action already mentioned, then the sentence in question distinctly points to something else (a fresh Actzon hitherto not mentioned) as the requisite basis. Nor would the Varavantiya become wholly useless, by not being connected with any previously mentioned Action; as it will have its use in the new Action that would be laid down by the sentence in question. And further, inasmuch as the action of Hymning is wholly differ- ent from that of Sacrifice,—by accomplishing the former, the Varavantiya cannot be said to have accomplished the latter. And hence, even if the Sama helped in the Hymning, it would remain as unconnected with the Sacrifice, as if it had been mentioned and performed in connection with another sacrifice altogether. In the case of the sentence ‘saptadaga- VARAVANTIYA, 01८, ARE DISTINCT ACTIONS, 779 ratnirvdjapéyasya yilpak, on the other hand, we find that the Genitive In ‘vydgapeyasya’ signifies mere relationship in general; and as such, there is, in this case, nothing incongruous in the relationship subsisting indirectly, in the subsidiary details. And as such there can be no similarity between the sentence ‘saptadaga, etc.’ and the sentence in question, Even though it be possible for the Sacrifice to form the substrate (of the Sama), indirectly, through the Hymning,—yet, in that case the Sama would come to be connected with all kinds of Hymns; and as such the Specification, in the sentence in question, of the Hymn as the ‘Agnish- toma Sama’ would be wholly meaningless. For if the Hymn called the ‘Agnishtoma Sama’ be takenas the required substrate indicated by the sentence itself, then there would be a syntactical split (the sentence laying down the fact of the Vdravantiya being based on the Agnishfoma Sama, and also that of its bringing about the particular Result). Then again, if the sentence be taken as indicating «a general relationship (of the Varavantiya) with the Aynishtoma Sdma,—this general relationship being specified by ‘the expression ‘ étasyatra’,—then too there 1s a syntactica! split; and the pronoun ` étasya’ indicating the relatiouship of that which has gone before, this would make the Vaéravantiya connected with all the Hymns of the previous. sacrifice; and then 1४8 specification as Aynishtoma Sama’ would also entail a syntactical split. And lastly, in view of the great complications arising from making the Varavantiya con- nected (at one and the same time) with the Revatz Ak, as well as with the Aynishtoma Sama,—they remain as before. Objection: ^“ When the Aguishtut sacrifice is obtained as the required “ substrate, all the rest that is required would be obtained from the previ- ‘ous Injunction; andas for the Va@ravantiya, when it would rest upon a ‘‘ sacrifice, it would not exist in any place except that wherein it 1s found ‘‘to help the Sacrifice; and the Sacrifice too would not seek for the Vdara- “vantiy in any other Hymn (save that which forms part of itself). And ०८ 8 there is no reason for rejecting the Vdravantiya that 2s connected with ‘the Agnishtoma Sama of the Sacrifice previously mentioned in the Content, “there canbe noquestion as toa connection with any other Hymn or ‘* Sacrifice.” Reply : It 18 not so; we could have all this only if the sentence in question—‘ Hévatishu, etc.’—stood in need of the previous sentence laying down the Varavantiya in connection with the Ayneshtoma Sama; as a matter of fact, however, we find that there is no such need; because we have already shown above that there is no mutual relationship between sentences laying down such things as the Accessory and the like. Then ayain, the relationship of the Sacrifice with the V@ravantiya that 780 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADI. U—PADA T—ADHI, (12), is mentioned in the sentence in question, is wholly different from the previ- ous relationship (because in the previous case the Vdravantiya was in connection with the Vd@yarya@ verses, whereas in the sentence in question, it is in connection with the Révafi verses); and as such it could never attain to the position assumed by the previous relationship. Specially ०8 in the previous sentence, the Vararantiya, forming a part of the Action itself, is recognised as connected with the Agnishtoma Sama of that (Agnishfut) sacrifice; while in the case in question, we find it mentioned as being something in itself desirable by man (as is indicated by the distinct mention of the word ‘kriva&’); and as such the Veda could not, relegate this latter to the same position as the previous one. And as for any assumptions based upon the Sdméanyatodrshfa Inference, we have already shown above that snch things as we are dealing with are not amenable to Inference. To the same effect, we have the following declaration: That Sama — which is laid down as independently, by its own form, bringing about the Result,---stands in need of the text of the Veda only, for the propose of its appearance. That is to say. if the Varavantiya Sama had originally appeared, first of all, at the Agnishtut sacrifice, then we could not but take it as apper- taining to that sacrifice, even if such connection were not meutioned. As a matter of fact, however, we find that in the case in question, the Sama depends, for its appearance, on the Vedic text only: and it is as taken directly from the Veda that it is laid down for the sake of a definite result. And consequently the Agnishtut sacrifice and the Aguishtoma Sma counected with that sacrifice do not in any way differ from other Sacrifices and Hymns,—in the matter of their being connected with the Virarantiya SG@ma mentioned in the sentence in question. (That is to say, the Sama is as unconnected with the Agnish{ut sacrifice as with any other of the previously mentioned sacrifices, ctc., etc. ). If the sentence in question had laid down a certain purification of the Va@ravantiya, then we could, somehow or other, identify it with that which had been previously mentioned (in connectiou with the Agnishtnt sacrifice),—-as we do in the case of the sentence ‘ vrihin prokshati’ which lays down a purification of the corn. But, as a matter of fact, the sentence in qnestion does not lay down any such purification. Con- sequently we conclude that the Varavantiyu of the sentence in question has no connection with the Agnishtoma SAma of the previous sacrifice. Objection: “Though the Varavantiya serves to fulfil an end desired ‘by the human agent, yet, so long as it does not help to bring about the ‘completion of the sacrifice, it cannot fulfil that end either ; and thus the ‘* accomplishment of the sacrifice also being indirectly indicated, the said VARAVANTIYA, ETC., ARE DISTINCT ACTIONS, 731 ‘“ Sama attains the position that had been previously found for it (at that ‘ sacrifice), just as though the Ourd and the Milk help in the performance ‘Cof the sacrifice, yet they become connected with the details of the “ Pranita vessel.” Reply: Such 18 the case only when the details are mentioned as qualifi- cations. In the case 11 question, however, the -Agnishtoma Sama is not a qualification of the Vdravantiyu. [t could be such a qualification, only if the sentence in question actually referred to its context—which latter fact has still to be established (by the Pirvapatshin). Lf, in some way or other, a certain relationship of the Varavantiyu with the Agnishtoma Sama were cognised, then there would be nothing to interfere with the application of the details of the latter to the former, like those of the Pranita to the Curd and Milk. Thus then, even this last argument of the Pirvupukshin does not affect the reasoning of the Szddhanta; and hence it is only by taking the sentence as laying down an independent Action that we can avoid a syntactical split (and make the sentence a single whole). Because in that case, even when all the elements of the latter sentence are such as have not been previously mentioned, all of them are capable of being laid down by the process of ^“ qualified Injunction’; while there can be no difficulty as to such an Injunction, when, as a matter of fact, many of the details spoken of in the sentence in question are such as form part of the details of the previously mentioned Agnishtut sacritice, and are applied to that mentioned in the sentence in question, ouly by indirect implication. For instance, (1) the word ‘ ९८८५४ ` (in ‘ élasya’) would refer, by indica- tion, to the details of the previous sacrifice, specially as such indirect indi- cation is not fanlty in the case of a Reference or Description (as it is in that of an Injunction). Or the pronoun might directly denote the Action to be immediately mentioned ; as the pronoun ‘ ésha’ does in the case of the sen- tence ‘ athatsha jyoteh, etc.’ ;—(2) as for the Varavantiya, it appears in the previous sentence as helping in the performance of the sacrifice; and as such, in that form, 16 would become referred to in the sentence in question, as appertaining thereto by indirect implication ;—(3) and the operation of the Injunctive also would he very much simplified by making it enjoin only the sacrifice as qualified by the peculiar relationship of the Révati and the Varavanizya as pointed ont by the word ‘ kriva’. Objection: “^ Inasmuch as what would be enjoined in this case are— ९ (1) the relationship of the Agnishtoma Sama with the Révati and the “ Varavantiya, as well as (2) the sacrifice,—-the case in question would be ८५ 8 great deal different from other cases of ^ qualified Injunction ”’ (as in all ‘these cases, the object of Injunction is the sacrifice only). Because ९82 LANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, 11--ए41 1--+1प।, (12). ‘the qualifications of two distinct Actions cannot be amenable to tlie ‘same (injunctive) effort, when an Injunction has served to lay down one ‘Action, we should have recourse to another Injunction for the purpose “ of Jaying down another Action. That is to say, those properties and quali- ‘fications that belong to a single Action sre all implied by that Action ‘when it is enjoined, and as such, they do not necessitate any diversity in “the operation of the Injunctive word ; while, on the other hand, when the ‘qualification belongs to an Action other than the one that is enjoined, “it is not implicd by the enjoined Action, because it is not in any ‘ way related to this latter,--and as such, for the sake of such qualifica- ५४ tions, it would be absolutely necessary to repeat the operation of the ^" Injunctive; and this would certainly involve a syntactical split.”’ Reply : The latter Bhavana (which is signified in the word ‘ yajéta ' ) takes in, as its subject, only that which is denoted by the word ‘ kriva’; and that | Bhavana) too which is denoted by this latter word would take in only that qualification which belongs to its own specific object. Then, when the new sacrifice (mentioned in the sentence in question) has taken up the Ak ( Révati) and the Sama (Varavantiya), the position assigned to the 7६९४५८7 would be im accordance with the S@ma that has its position already ascertained. That is to say, while the denotation of the word ‘ kriva,’—after hav- ing established the relationship between the Révati and the V &ravantiya— 18 waiting on the look-out for the second Bhavana [that denoted by the word ‘yajeta’], 16 becomes taken up, as specified by its qualification (in the shape of the said connection between the Varavantiya as based upon the Révati verses), by the ‘ Sacrifice’ (mentioned by the root ‘ yaj¢’ in ‘yajéta’). And consequently what the ‘ sacrifice’ implies is its own quali- fication (and not that of any other Action). That, however. which is denoted by the word ‘krivi’—1.e., accomplishing or bringing about—is not directly connected with the said relationship (of the R& and the Sadmu); and as such, inasmuch as that relationship comes to have a subordinate character, 16 1s relegated to the subsidiaries of the sacrifice ; and consequently, in accordance with the Varavantiya, which has its position ulready known by indirect implication, the Révati verses also come to be referred to the same (Vadravantiya). Thus then, though the sentence in question does not lay down the Agniskfoma Sama, yet the qualification of the ‘ Sacrifice’ extends to that Sama, and as such there is no incongruity in this. For the above reasons, it is clear that, in your theory, there is no relationship between the sacrifice in question and Varavantiya. Because itis only when the qualifications or accessories have not themselves the character of Actions that they betake themselves to an Action; as for VARAVANTIYA, ETC,, ARE DISTINCT ACTIONS. 783 the Varavantiya, inasmuch as it is sung (and as such forms an action in itself), what can it have to do with another Action (the Sacrifice, for instance) ? That is to say, in the case of such accessories as the Dadhi, the Milking vessel and the like, we find that, without an Action, their very character of ‘ Instrument” cannot be attained ; and as such they stand in need of some such Action. As for the Vdravantiya, however, inas- much as it is denotable by the root ^ gdyatv’, it is an action in itself; and as such, even without any other Action, it is capable by itself, just like the sacrifice, of accomplishing the desired result ; and thus not standing in need of another Action, it would not be connected with any such, it would, when sung by itself on the basis of the Révati verses, bring about. its result, independently of the performance of any such sacrifice as the Agnishtut. And in that case, the words—‘ étasya’, ‘ agnishtoma-sima ’ ‘“kriva’ and ‘ yajéia’—would all become wholly unconnected (and relevant) with the previous sacrifice (the Aynishtut). Consequently we must conclude that the Result (mentioned in the sentence in question) follows from the Sacrifice; and this sacrifice, being spoken of as qualified by properties wholly at variance with those of the previously mentioncd Agnishtut, is wholly distinct from that sacrifice. The Bhashya explains the Sitra as— Saméshu évanjadtiyakéshu bhin- nuvakyéshu karmayuktam phalam bhavet, In this the word ‘ saméshu ’ expresses, either the fact of the (previous) sacrifice (the Agnishtut) and the (latter) accessory (Varavantiya) not standing to each other in the relationship of the Basis and the Bused, because of the inherent incapa- bility of the two,—or that of the Varavanttya, which is an Action by itself, being wholly independent of any other Action. The expression ‘ bhinna- valeyéshu ’ means that though in the case of both theories—z.e., whether the sentence in question be taken as mentioning a particular result following from the employment of a certain accessory in connection with the action mentioned in the previous sentence, or as laying down an altogether distinct Action,—the meaning of the second sentence would be different from that of the former, and as such the sentences would be distinct ; —yet the distinctness of the two sentences would be better justified by both of them laying down two distinct Actions; because otherwise, there would remain a certain semblance of the two sentences forming a single compound sentence (which would not be quite justifiable in face of the distinctness of their significations). Says the Bhdshya—nahyé@tusya revatyak santi, etc. It is just possible that some people might construe the sentence in question as that— ‘étasya ya rvévatyah, tdsu vdravantiyam kyrtvd’; but, though, in this case, in view of the Context, the reference to the former qualified Sacrifice 784 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADI, t1—-PADA U—ADHL (12). would not involve a syntactical split, yet, inasmuch as the fact of bring- ing about (or employing) the Mévati verses themselves has not been previously laid down, any reference to this (as is inevitable in the said construction) cannot be quite allowable. And hence the sentence will have to be construed as—(1) ‘ tutra révutyak prayoktavydh, (£) tise ca véra- vantiyam, eéc.’; and this would involvea syntactical split, and make the word ‘étasyu’ wholly redundant. The following argument might be brought forward: “ For the sake “of the word ‘etasya’, we could take the sentence as follows—(1) the ‘“Injunctive part: ‘étasya revatyah kartavyaih, tisu ca Varavantiyam, “taccu phalaya’, and (2) the reference part ; the word ‘ yojeta’ being taken “as merely referring to the previously mentioned Agnishtut sacrifice.” But thus too, the sentence is made to lay down three distinct facts ; aud as such syntactical split becomes inevitable ; and further, as for the Agnishtoma S@ma, we cannot speak of its connection as being either enjoined or only referred to (in the sentence in question). If this connec- tion were enjoined, then inasmuch as the mere presence of the Agnish- toma Sama has been pointed out by the previous Injunction, the word ‘etasya’ would be absolutely useless ; and such an Injunction would also involve a syntactical split. This is one way of taking the said text of the shashya. Some people, however, take the word ‘état’ in the sense that is pointed out by its position,—namely, that of qualifying the ट्ण. And in that case, the construction of the sentence in question would be like this: ` ९६4१ yd Revatyuah tasu varavuntiyam Agnishtoma sama krivd” But in this case also, inasmuch as there 18 no specification of the sugréfice fat which all this is to done),—as the word ‘@tasya’ 18 wholly taken up in qualifying the Hévat?, we do not take it with ‘ Agnish- foma’, as ‘etusy@ agnishtoma’ ; specially as even Uf such a relationship between the two words were meant to be expressed, there would be a syntactical split. Though the question—‘ how do you yourself avoid the syntactical split ?”’-—should have been put by the opponent, after all the possible constructions of the sentence in question, in accordance with the Pérvapa- ksha, ad been refuted,—yet the Parvapakshin reasons thus in his mind: ‘When we have so thoroughly refuted the position of the Stddhfntin, all these syntactical splits that he has brought forward are mere magical illusions in the void (of his own intellect); and so I will just put him the question,-—how do you yourself avoid the said syntactical split ?’ The Siddhanti replies by putting forward the following construction : ‘Nevatishu rkshu vairavantiyam siima krtvd pagukaimo yajéta’; and the sense of the reply is that when the sentence in question is taken as laying VARAVANTIYA, ETU., ARB (1511८. ACTIONS, TRA down a new Action, it is quite possible for this Action to be laid down in a qualified form (in the way shown in the construction put forward) ; and as such the sentence having a single predicate, there would be no syntactical split involved. Question: “ Nanu arthabhedah: yfgaccaivam hyapirvah kartavyah, ०५ Revatishu varavantiyam apurvam’. That 18 to say, inasmuch as the ‘sentence would involve two Bhavanis mentioned in the sentence—viz., tle one mentioned by the word ‘krtva@’ and another by the word ‘ yujéta ’, there could not but be a split in the syntax.” Answer ;: Not so; because what we mean is that the sentence lays down only one principal Bhavana (that signified by ‘ yagetu’) as qualihed by another secondary Bhavand (signified by ‘ krtva@’). Objection: ^° 'Therelationship of the Revati and the Varavantiya could ‘ not be enjoined ; because as there could be no injunction of a qualification ‘ of qualifications (7.6., of the connection which 18 a qualitication of the brenaye- “ang about, denoted by the root in ‘ krtv@’, which again, according to ‘you, is the qualification of the ‘ yaya’) ;—any such connection could not ‘be enjoined by means of the Injunctive Affix (Lin.); and as for the affix “* ‹ (धक ` (in ‘krtva’), it has not becn mentioned by Panini, as having “the function of the Injunctive. ence, though the Bhavun@ may he ‘spoken of as connected, yet, inasmuch as the activity of the human “agent should depend upon an Injunction, he wonld take that Bha- ८ ८८/2९ to be as good as non-existent. Thus then, both the Revati and the “Varavantiya being qualifications of the Bhavana of the ‘ sacrifice’ only, ‘they could not be employed outside the sacrifice itself; and as there is “no ground for either of the two restricting the employment of the other ‘(that 18 whether the Revatz restrict the Vdaravantiya or vice versé is not ascertainable), both of them would come to refer to one and the same “ stotra (Hymn); and then there being no such एव] as that both of then * should be employed in one and the same place, there would be many other Samas—the Gayatri, and the rest-—that eould be based upon the Revuli “verses (there being no rule restricting the Meati verses as the basis of “the VParavantiya Sama only) ; and conversely the Vdravantiya Sama also “would come to be based upon other verses-—-such as the (नै, the ^“ Brhatt and the like. And nuder the circumstances, the idea brouglit, ‘about by the expression ‘ Revatishu Vararatiyam’ would become abso- ‘‘lutely useless. Hence it must be concluded that the sentence seems tea ‘“lay down the Revati verses, in reference to the | aratantiya, which has ‘had its position duly ascertained (in connection with the previous ५" 1८01४151 {1८६ 58611066}. ` Reply: The above arguinent does not affect onr position , becauae though the word SArlva’ does uot liner (7y axpress an Injunction. vet an ५१ TRG TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, II—-PADA If—-ADHt (12). such cases as the one 1 question, 16 18 taken as pointing to an Injunction all the same. That is to say, whenever we meet with a sentence like ‘idam kyrtva idam kuryat’ (having done this, one should do that),—if the action denoted by the verb with the ‘ ktvd’ affix is one that has been proviously mentioned elsewhere, then its mention in this sentence is simply in the shape of a motive canse or occasion (for the performance of the second action) ; when, however, that action 18 not one that has been previously mentioned, then it is a means or instrument of the accomplish- ment of the second Action ; because that Action, which is distinctly laid down as to be performed after the accomplishment of a previous Action (that which is mentioned by the word ending in ‘ ktva’), cau never be performed, unless that previous Action has been performed; and as such _ the performance of the Action being found to be absolutely necessary, it 1s admitted to be as good as directly enjoined. Thus, in the case in question, the relationship of the Revati and the Vdaruvantiya (mentioned by the word ‘fkrtvt’) is such as has never been mentioned prior to the Injunction contained in the sentence in question ; and as such it canuot be taken as a mere motive cause for the ‘ sacrifice’; and hence it cannot but be accepted as something to be actually performed or accomplished. Objection; ^“ If the said connection comes to be something tu be accom- ‘plished, how is it that it becomes related to the sccond Bhavana, which “also is something to be accomplished ? ” In reply, the Bhashya says: dvavétavarthan krivétyésha cabdah (01012 vaditum, abhinétrertiim pirvukalatanca (the word ‘kriva’ is capable of signifying both accomplishment aud sequence) [and as signifying sequence itis only natural that it should point to something that would be performed afterwards}. As to how a single word can have two significations, the Bhaishya suys—we find this to be the case in certain instances,—as, for in- stance, in ‘conamanaye’ (bring the cona),— where thougl. the ‘ bringing ’ has been previously cognised by other means, yet, the word ‘ gona’, though used in the sense of the ‘red horse’, and as such taking the place of the two words ‘red’ and * horse ’, does not entail a syntactical split (and the only 16801 for this 18 that the single word signifies both redvess and the horse). In the same manner, in the case in question, the affix ‘ktvai’ would signify accomplishment as well as sequence. [Tt has been argned above—T ext, page 563—that the Injunction of the qualification of a qualification is not possible ; but this does not affect the case in question ; as] the qualification of a qualification can not be enjoined only in that case where that qualification, forming part of the Material, 18 not recognised as part of the Action itself. That is to say, we shall show under Sutra LV—-i—ii that itis only the qualification of the sacrificial material that w uot touched by the Injunction As for the connection VARAVANTIYA, ETC., ARE DISTINCT ACTIONS. 737 between the Révati and the Vdravantiya, it serves as a necessary quali- fication of the action of “accomplishment” (denoted by the root ‘Ar’ 11 ‘krtva@’); because mere “ accomplishment’ being a generic term, unless it were qualified, it could not be recognised as something to be brought about. Thus then, in accordance with the declaration “ mrshydmahé harisha viceshanam '' it must be admitted that the ‘accomplishment’ (denoted by ‘kr’ in ‘krtv@’), which serves to qualify the Bhavana expressed in connection with the root ‘y@jz’ (in ‘yazéta’), is itself qualified by the connection betwéen the Révaté and the Varavantiya. Thus 16 is, too, that certain Materials and Deities, qualifying the Praydjas that are quali- fications of an Action (the Durga-Pirnamdsa), come to be Inid down as to be utilised in those sacrifices. For these reasons, we conclude that the sentence in question serves to specify the Rk (Révati) and the Sama (Varavantiya) in connection with the Bhavana (expressed in ‘ yayéta’), which is qualified by a certain relationship (of that Rk and that Sama) that has been duly accomplished (as expressed by the word ‘friva’). And in this case, the word ‘krtva’ should be taken as denoting the particular order of sequence in which the various factors of the sacrifice are to be thought of (or deter- mined upon), and not as denoting actual performance; because the Sama is not employed before the Sncrifice itself (and if the word ‘kytra’ expressed actual performance, then the s@#ma would have to be nsed_ before the sacrifice, as indicated by the sequence expressed by that word); and hence we donot take the sentence to mean that we should perform the sacri- fice after the Varavantiya Sama has been sung in connection with the Révati verses; all it does denote is that we should think of the singing of that Sama as to be performed, and then proceed with the actual performance of the sacrifice. Objection: ^“ Thus too, there are many objects of the Jnjunction—the * Révati verses, the Varavantiya, the relationship of these, the Sacrifice, and ५८ (6 desire for cattle. That is to say, the Injunction being assumed in “connection with each object that happens to be mentioned in the sen- ‘tence, there come to be many objects for it ; and that leads toa syntacticnth “ split.” Reply : This does not affect us; because we have already explained that the multiplicity of objects spoken of does not bring about the multi- plicity of the object of the Injunction. If, however, what you mean is the multiplicity of those that are en- joined as fulfilling some useful purposes,—then, we offer you the following reply : Even though many such useful objects may be mentioned, yet there isonly one that forms the object of the Injunction ; and this one object, in the case in question, is the qualified Bhavand counected with the ` yacritiee ’. ~ 4 14६ (1६4४ ।६।६५. ADH, TI—PADA --+पत्ा. (12), (7, ८८६101४ : “The Révati verses also are found to be enjoined in tlie sentence in question (over and above the said Bhavana). Your reply “would be all right, if the said multiplicity of objects depended only ‘upon that which is directly mentioned ; in the case in question, however, “we find that all of the objects-—Révati, etc.—are distinctly enjoined as “useful; and as such there can be no doubt as to the said multiplicity.” Reply: All that happens to be predicated is not spoken of as ‘ artha (meaning or object of the Injunction); that alone is spoken of as the ‘ ob- ject.’ which is connected with the principal Injunction ; and there can be no doubt that there is only one such object in the sentence in question. This is what is meant by the Bhashya—nahyatranékasya proyojanatvéndbhi- piétusyanékam padam vidhityakam. That is to say, inasmuch as all other minor actions spoken of in the sentence form part of the principal action of the Sacrifice, their cognition cannot be complete until that of the Bhaivand of ‘Sacrifice’; and when this qualified Bhdvand has been en- joined, there remains nothing more to be looked for. Thus then, we conclude that the real object of the sentence being one only, there 18 no syntactical split; while we have shown the many 80118 that are consequent upon the taking of the sentence as the Injunction of an accessory detail for the previous Agnishtut sacrifice. The Bhasbya brings forward another argument of the opponent: ०५ Athocyéta Hevatyddisarvavigeshanavigishto yaga étasyagnishtutd vidht- yité.” ‘This argument has been brought forward with the sole purpose of justifying the use of the word ‘@/asya.’ Though this argument admits of the Action mentioned by the sentence in question being distinct from the previous Agnishtut, yet, Inasmuch it makes the sentence lay down the Result as connected with the Action,—yet it is opposed to our own view ; and hence we shall refuteit. The argument may bethus explained: “The ‘text in question may be construed thus—Révatishu Varvantiyam agni- ^‹ shtoma sama {एद्‌ étasyaikgéna yagéta (Having sung the Varavantiya in “the Révati vorses, one should perform this sacrifice, as subsidiary to the ‘previous Agnishfut). The advantages attendant upon this construction “would be two-fold: (1) there would be no reason for rejecting that “which is pointed out by the Context, and (2), the use of the word ५५ ‹ etasya’ would be justified as pointing to that (Agnishtut) which is “in close proximity with itself, in the Context.” To this argument, we make the following reply: The above con- struction is not possible ; because that would make the word ‘ pagukdimak ’ wholly irrelevant; and if you do not reject it as such, its inclusion would involve a syntactical split; as a single Action cannot, at one andthe same time, be laid down as forming part of another sacrifice (the Agnishtut) and also as accomplishing a certain result (Cattle). VARAVANTIYA, ETC,, ARE DISLINCT ACTIONS, 789 Objection: “‘ Athaivamucyéta ‘ Revatishu krtena viaravantiyena pagu- kamo yajéta.’”’ Though this view has been already dealt with, yet it is brought for- ward again by the Bhashya, with a view toshow another discrepancy in it. Or it may be that, in all cases where an Injunction mentions the fulfilment of a desirable end by means of certain accessories, people performing sacri- ficcs have two distinct notions :—(1) some people, like the Mimdmsakas, believe the Result to follow from the Accessory, (2) while others believo that the Accessory only helps in the Sacrifice, and it is the Sacrifice thus aided that brings about the particular result. And it is in accordance with this latter view that the above objection has been put forward. The construction of the texts, in accordance with the above argument of the opponents, would be as follows :—“ ‘ Desiring Brahmic glory, we “should always perform the Agnishtut ; but if we desire the acquisition ‘of cattle, then we should perform the same sacrifice as qualitied by the ९८ Révatt verses (and the Varavantiya sung in connection with पह). In ‘this case, we find that the Injunctive affix (in the ‘Yajefa’ of the sentence ८५ 771 question) would serve to enjoin what 18 in close proximity with it ५ (४2४., the Agnishtut sacrifice); but being taken up by something else ९५ ४.९.) the qualification), it would not lay down the original appearance of “that Action; and as for the qualified character of the sacrifice, this “would be based upon the Injunction. That is to say, inasmuch as the “affix would enjoin the sacrifice with reference to the Result, 1# would not ‘have to bo removed from its legitimate sphere ; and as not pointing to the ‘appearance of any Action, it could not lay down any such appearance ; “then as for tho Injunction of many things,—just asin thecase of the “sentence Jaying down theoriginal appearance of a distinct Action, ‘such Injunction of many things 18 said to be for the purpose of the said ८ Injunction of the Action ; 80, too, would it be in the case of the sentence “being the Injunction of the Result; as in this case also what is actnally ५८ enjoined is the Action itself, with referenco to the particular result. It is “with a view to all this that we have said—‘atha févatishu krtena “Varavantiyéna pagukimo 2" ९/९. As for the Instrumental ending in ‘ Vdr- “ vantiyéna,’ it actually denotes Instrumentality, inasmuch as the Vara- “vantiya is an Instrument that helps, through the Stotra, the performance ‘of the sacrifice. Or it may be taken as denoting a characteristic,—the “ sense of the sentence being that ‘one desiring cattle should perform the ५५ Agnishtut sacrifice as characterized by the Va@ravaniiya, etc.” To the above, the Bhadshyn makes the following reply : nazvam gakyam, rgantarapragandt vigeshahanat vaigunyam. That is to say, if the Action meant in the sentence in question be the same as the previous Agnishfut sacrifice, then, inasmuch as the previons sentence has laid down the “90 LANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH I(——pPAbDA If— 41014. (12). Ayntshtoma sama, in connection with that sacrifice, as based upon the Vdayavyad verses,—if in accordance with the sentence in question, the sume sama were to be sung as based upon the Revati verses, that would cause a flaw in the sacrifice, as being deprived of the previously mentioned basis of the s@ma, in the shape of the Vdyavyd verses. Objection: ‘‘When you yourself were faced by the argument that— ५५ + 71907 ए other sfimas also come to be sung in connection with the Revati ५५ verses —you urged in defence the argument that—‘the word kriva “serves to lay down the fully accomplished telationship of the Revati and “the Vdadravantiy. for the sake of the sacrifice, for the word is quite capable ‘of signifying two meanings etc., etc., etc., etc.” (And so we too could ‘bring forward the same argument in support of our view. )'' The Stddhdanti, however, thinks that an Injunction of many things 18 possible only in the case of the sentence laying down a new Action, and not in any other case; with this in view, he makes the following reply: What we say is possible in our case, because there ४5 a direct declara- tion to the effect; while, in your case, as there is no such direct declaration, it would be impossible to obtain the Revatt verses by merely getting hold of the Varavantiya ; and as such, the said argument cannot help you. The opponent retorts—" Z'hen we too may have a direct declaration— ‘such as‘ pagukamo Révatishu vitravantiyamabhinirvartayet tato yajeta ' ;— “that is to say, the Injunction would be that of a qualified Action with ‘reference to a particular result; or that the word ‘kriva’ being the ‘required Injunctive word, the ‘yajeta’ may be a mere reference to the ‘ previously mentioned Agnishtut sacrifice; and the sense of this is that ‘‘even though the Injunction lays down the accessory with reference to the ^“ ६८०४५८८, there is nothing in the sentence that lays down the original ‘“ appearance of the sacrifice.” In reply to this, the Siddhanti proceeds to show his own desirable con- clusion that he draws from the Apparent Inconsistency of the said ‘ Injunc- tion of many things:’ If any such declaration as you bring forward becomes an established fact, then the fact of the sentence in question lay- ing down a distinct Action, and not the mere accessory of the previous Agnishtut, becomes fully established. Objection: ‘“‘ Nanu tato yajéta iti yaganuvadat yagénasythgaprayo- ‘“ganasambandho bhavishyati. [In that case, the word ‘yajéta’ referring ‘‘ to the previous sacrifiie, what is laid down in the sentence in question would ^“ be taken as related to the Agnishtut as tts subsidiary. }”’ In this the opponent only reiterates (in the Bhashya) his former argu- ment, not admitting the defeat meant by the Siddhanti to be inflicted by the bringing forward of the ‘direct declaration.’ He is met by the assertion (in the Bhishya), This te not possible, ete. The senso of this VARAVANIIYA, Efu., ARK DISTINCE ACTIONS, 101 argument of the Siddhants is that if the Varavantiya qualified by the Revaté verses be taken 98 181 down (by the sentence in question) with reference to the sacrifice (the Agnishtut),—then, in that case, it would be necessary (for the sentence in question) to make a reference to that sacrifice; and hence as it would be merely referred to in the sentence, it could not be related either to the accessory or to the Result mentioned in the sentence; and as such the reference itself would be wholly superfluous ; if, on the other hand, it be related to any or both of them, there would be a syntactical split. If again the sentence be taken as laying down a sacrifice as qualified by certain accessories,—then, inasmuch as there would be no reason for recognising this sacrifice to be the same as the Agnishtut, it could not but be admitted to be a distinct Action by itself. Nor could the sentence be construed as ‘yat pagukamo yuzéta, etc.’—the reference being to the Result; this would not be possible, because as the particular result herein mentioned is not mentioved previously in the context, there could be no reference to it. This argument also scts aside the view that the sacrifice (Agnishtut) is the motive cause of the Injunction of the Varavantiya. Thus then, inasmuch as there would be no very strong ground for connecting the Vdravantiya with the Zvervati verses (and not with the other verses), the rejection of the particnlar Vayavya verses previously mentioned would make a deficiency in the sacrifice. (८) ९८८४029 ; ‘“ Atha ydgasambandho'’nuvaddak, prakaranéna cangata. “That 18 to say, the result following from the Accessory, what the sen- ‘“‘tence does is to refer to the fact, pointed out by the context, of that “being subsidiary to the sacrifice.” It might be argued, against the Bhdshya bringing forward this objec- tion, that there is no difference between this objection and that brought. forward with regard to the particular relationship of the Busis and the Bused, that has been already refuted (see Text, page 558). But there is a distinct difference between the two cases. On the for- mer occasion, we have refuted the application, to the case in question, of the law laid down ander द्र (LI—1—18; that is to say, that application could be possible only on the recognition of the said subsidiary character, and hence the relationship of the Agnishfoma-sima would become very easy. {9 the above objection, the Bhdshya makes the following reply : The Syntax ts always more authoritative than the (०५८6८. The said relationship of the Basis and the Based could be accepted only when it is found to be pos- sible, as being in keeping with the connection of the particular result ; but wo have already shown that no such connection 15 possible: while the rela- tionship of the Primary and Subsidiary (ov Whole and Part) could be pos- sible only hy being mcluded in the Procedure of the Sacrifice : as a matter 792 PANURA-VARTIKA, ADH. Il--PADA H—ADHI. (12), of fact, however, it is not so included, as we shall show under Satra 11-11-11, where it is mentioned that that which 25 not connected, etc., etc., becomes included tn the Procedure,—while we find the sentence in ques- tion connected with a particular Result. ‘hus then, there being no incongruity, the sentence in question must be taken as laying down a distinct Action qualified by a particular Acces- sory and a definite Result. The following argument might here be brought forward: ^" [ग्ला “though the sentence may lay down a distinct Action, the Result would ‘* follow from the Accessory as helped by that Action.” This is refuted by the well-recognised fact of the Result following from the sacrifice, as is distinctly indicated by the proximity of the In- junctive affix (with the root ‘ yajz’), as has been shown under the Bhavar- thadhikarana (II—i—1), wherein the two alternatives (as to the result following from the Accessory or the Action) have been duly considered. Consequently the sentence in question must be taken as forming the injunction of an independent Action. Oljechon: ‘The qualified sacrifice being the object enjoied, how ‘could the Agnishtoma-séma, whichis an Action other than that sacrifice, ८ 0९ connected with the particular qualification (in the shape of the “ Varavantiya as sung in connection with the Revati verses) P”? ८८४ : It 25 by direct assertion. As shown before, the assertion meant here 18 the one whose existence is cognized by mtans of indirect implication, in the form—‘ the connection of the Revat? and the Vdrav- antiya 18 to be wrought out of the Agnuishtoma-saima.’ Though as a matter of fact, there exists no such particular sima named ‘ Agnishtoma,’ out of which the Varavantiya might be wrought ont,—yet what is meant 18 that 1४ 18 to be wrought out of the Yujndyaziiiya-sdma, which 18 men- tioned in the context. Or, the expression ‘out of the Agnishtoma-sima’ might mean that the Vdravantiya would exist in the midst of the effects of the Stotra (the Agnishtoma), as serving the purpose of accomplishing it. For these reasons we conclude that in the case of similar senteucos, the Result would be connected with the Action. ADHIKARANA (13). [A single result follows from the Saubhara and the Nidhana.] 927६2८९ (28): ‘Because of the mention of human effort in ‘connection with the Saubhara, there must be a distinct desirable “result connected with the Nidhana.’” From among the Ukthya Hymns, the Saubhara is the Brahmasama that has been laid down in connection with the Jyotishfoma ; in connection with this we have the sentences ‘ Yudz Iathantaram,’ etc., which serve to lay down certain motive causes ; aud then later on, we meet with the seutence -— (1) ‘ Y6 vrsh{ikamo yo'nnddyakamé yah svargakamak sa saubharéna stuvita’,— which mentions the three results in connection with the Saubhara which is ® necessary accompaniment of the Jyotishfoma sacrifice, in accordance with the rule that all such desirable results are connected with the neces- sary accompaniment, because this is equally present in all cases; and it will be shown later on, under Sétra 1V—ili—5, that such an accompani- ment can be only that which helps the sacrifice and fulfils a desirable end of the human agent; and under Satra IV—iii—26, that the several results mentioned follow from the said necessary accompaniment, alternatively. Then again, with reference to the aforesaid Saubhara, we have the follow- ing sentence—(2) ‘ Hishitt vurshtikd@maya nidhanam kuryat, tirgityannad- yukamaya, in ४८४ svargakadmaya.’ [* Nidhanam’ is the concluding part of the sama.] | In connection with these two sets of texts, we proceed to consider the following question: Does the Suubhura (mentioned in the former sentence) bring about its result by itself, independently of the Nidhanas, ‘hish’ and the rest (mentioned in sentence (2) ), which bring about sepa- rate results of their own (apart from that of the Saubhara),—or these ‘hish,’ 6६९.) have been laid down as the various instruments which, when employed in connection with the same aforesaid Suubhara, help it in bringing about the said results ? Though this question has nothing to do with the difference or non- difference of Actions, yet it has been introduced here as in a way con- nected with the subject. Or, it may be that, like the difference and non- difference of Actions, the difference and non-difference of the resultant Aparva also forms the subject-matter of the Adhydaya., 100 794 TANTRA-VARTIRA. ADH. f£1—PADA II—ADHI, (123) Specially as the question herein introduced affects the actual per- formance of the Action also: for instance, at the time that the Suubdhkara has been commenced by one who wants Rain (1), would the other two Nidhanas ( ४26 and 2%) be used at the time (along with the Saubhara), with a desire for the other two results (Food and Heaven), and a distinc- tion be made between the two desires for ८1५ also,—if the three results mentioned in the latter passage as following from the three Nidhanas were different from those very results mentioned in the former passage as follow- ing from the Saubhara itself; (2) or the latter sentence only serves to specify the particular Nedhunas for the same Suubhara (as leading to the three particular results), and hence at the time that one has commenced the Saubhara for the sake of १५८११, he should make use of the ‘* HHish"’ Nidhana only, the Rain mentioned (in the second sentence along with this Nzdhana) being the same (as that mentioned previously along with the Suubharu) ;—-and similarly with the Saubhara, when performed for the sake of Food or Heaven. As tothe origin of this Doubt, some people explain it as lyimg in the two peculiar constructions that the Bhdshya has put upon the sen- tence in guestion; and accordingly the question becomes reduced to a verbal one, ४2 : =“ Are the words ‘hish,’ etc., connected directly with the words ‘ desire for rain, etc.,’ or with the word ‘ Nidhana' only?” Though the word ‘ Nidhana’ 18 uot mentioned along with ‘ dry’ aud ‘ a,’ yet there is always a desire on our part to learn what these are; and through proz:- mity they come to be recognised as ‘ Nidhanuas.” On the above question, we have the following PURVAPAKSHA (A). “The ‘hish’ and the rest mentioned in the latter sentence bring “about distinct results of their own,—(1) because they are laid down ‘over again, (2) because the distinct mention of the result in the latter “sentence could be justified only if these results were distinct ; and (3) ‘because this interpretation makes possible the acquisition of many ५५ 11016 desirable results. “ That is to say,—(1) If the results mentioned in the latter sentence ‘were the same as those that followed from the Saubhara itself, then ‘“ their repetition (in the latter sentence) would be wholly useless; be- ‘ cause in that case, there would be nothing that would be laid down by ‘the sentence in question; because the ‘ hish’ aud the rest are already ५* known, from other Vedic texts, as the Nedhanas of the Saubhara (and the “only other object spoken of in the sentence is the result, and this you “ take to be the same as that previously mentioued ; and so the sentence “would have nothing vew to say). Nour can it be urged that the ONE RESULT FROM Suubsara ann Nidhana. 495 ‘sentence in question would serve the purpose of restricting the Nedhanas “because these be:ug directly laid down (in other Vedic texts) as the ‘* Nidhanus to be employed, they can not rightly be set aside on the ‘strength of any such implied restrictions. As a matter of fact, in all ‘vases, restriction, as serving the sole purpose of setting aside something, “is highly objectionable. But when all other objects are indirectly im- “plied, then it ig possible for the one that is directly laid down to set ५८ 8816 those ; in the case in question, however, the use of the ‘ hish’ and ‘“‘ the rest is not implied indirectly ; and hence the injunction of any one 4 ० them cannot set aside the rest. Because we find that they are all “ directly laid down by the text that Isys down the Saubhara; and under ‘the circumstances, it is scarcely right to take any one of them as set- “ting aside the rest, on the mere ground of a repetition actuated by an “Injunction ; specially when this latter admits of another explanation. “In accordance with onr theory, however, the use of ‘ hish’ and the rest “ having the capability of bringing about distinct results of their own, ‘‘ would be more desirable, for the agent, than those that have been men- “tioned as forming part of the Saubhara and thereby helping in the “accomplishment of the sacrifice; and on the ground of this greater “ desirability the former would very rightly set aside all the latter. ८ (2) The sentence in question would serve a useful purpose, only ‘if it laid down the relationship (causal) between the ‘ Rain,’ etc., and “the ‘hish,’ etc., which is not laid down in any other sentence. And “this would also save us from the anomaly of taking the word ‘ {157 (६. “kamak’ as a mere qualification of the Saubhara, in a sentence which ५५ would be taken as serving to restrict the Nidhanas,—while itis quite “capable of being taken directly by itself (as mentioning the result following from the Nidhanas). “(3) In the Veda, which consists of Injunctions, we always want n “lot of desirable results, because that makes it easier for the Injunctions “to urge the human agents to action. ८ For these reasons we conclude that the results following from the ‘ Nidhanas are distinct from those mentioned as following from the ‘* Saubhara itself.” SIDDHANTA Sutra (29): Inasmuch as those mentioned in the sentence in question are exactly the same as those mentioned before. the mention of the Results would refer to the Saubhara: and the repetition would serve the purpose of restricting the Nidhanas. lo the above Purvapuksha we make the following reply— 796 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—~pADA -- +. (13). SIDDHANTA (A). The ‘hish’ cannot be connected with the Result, because that would make the mention of the nzdhana wholly redundant; while if the nidhana be taken as connected with the Suubhara, the Result could be taken as qualifying the Saubhara. That is to say, if we were to take the sentence as-—‘ one should bring nhout rain by means of the hish, and by that as a nidhana of the Sau- ९१०१८ ` --, there would be a syntactical split ; for if the ‘ hish’ were not con- nected with the Saubhara, then the sentence would be wholly redundant. In accordance with our theory, there is nothing without some use; and out of the things spoken of in the sentence in question, the Saubhara, as bringing about Rain, etc., mentioned in another sentence, has already been laid down elsewhere, as also the Results themselves ; and hence all that the sentence has got to lay down is the relationship between the ‘ hish,’ etc., and the Saubhara ; and as such there is no syntactical split. Nor is the sentence altogether useless, as it serves the purpose of restricting the particular nzdhanas. Even apart from any consideration of the one being more desirable, there is, in the case in question, a distinct setting aside of the one by the other, on the ground of one being more generic in its character than the other ; as for instance, the word ‘ Saubhara’ applying to all parts of that s@ma,it is only by indirect indication that all its १६८14१25 (hish, etc.) could be mentioned by the sentence speaking of the ‘ Saubhara’ ; while the sentence in question mentions the particular nidhanas directly ; and as such this latter 1s more authoritative than the former (and as such this would very well restrict the use of the nzdhanas implied in the former sentence). And just as that which is implied is set aside by that which 18 directly mentioned, 80 is also that which 18 indirect- ly indicated, Or, the sentence in question does not set aside any thing of the song mentioned by the word “ Saubhara’’; because all that it does is to lay down certain letters ‘ hish’ for instance; and as such it would set aside certain other letters only (and not the song itself). If the sentence had laid down the part of some other song, then the part of the Saubhara would be set aside by that ; as a matter of fact, however, the restriction of the nidhana only serves to preclude certain letters of the stobha (the sima). And as such there is no anomaly of the preclusion of that which has been directly laid down. For these reasons, we conclude that the repetition of the Results in the sentence in question serves to restrict the nidhanas. There is something to be said against the above interpretation of the Adhikarana ; and this we proceed to show as follows :— ONE RESULT FROM Saubhara ano Nidhana. 797 As for the form of the Doubt itself, there can be no such doubt; be- cause the constructior. of the sentence in question is wholly different from that on which the abovementioned Doubt has been based ; because (in the sentence ‘ hishili vrsh{skdmiaya nidhanam ’), ‘ hish’ cannot be taken along with ‘nzdhanam,’ because of the intervention, between them, of the word ‘vrshtikhamaya,’ as it would be very undesirable to take the sentence as ¢ hish 1s the nidhana, etc.’ (This is the case of the above representation of Pirvapaksha.) So alsoin the case of the above representation of the Siddhanta, if the sentence be taken as laying down the ‘hish’ with reference to the ‘nidhana’ as qualified by ‘ desire for rain, —then, inasmuch as it would contain a reference to a qualzfied object, there would be a distinct syntac- tical split. If it be taken as laying down the hish with reference to the nidhana only (not qualified by ‘ desire for rain’), then the mention of the Result would be wholly useless. Because the connection with all nidhanas has already been laid down by the mere mention of the ‘ Saubhara’ ; and hence no useful purpose would be served by the sentence laying down such a connection only. If again, the sentence be taken as— vrshtika- miya yat saubharam tasya yannidhanam tatra hish padamprayunjita’ (one should use the word ‘ hish’ in the nidhana of that Saubhara which is sung for the sake of Rain),—then, inasmuch as this would involve various predications, there would be a syntactical split. Though ‘desire for rain,’ ‘Saubhara’ and its ‘ntdhanas’ have all been mentioned before, yet, inas- much as there are many other nidhanas present in the Saubhara, it is neces- sary to make an attempt to preclude these; and thereby the sentence would come to serve more purposes than one; and that would entaila syntactical split. Then again, the Siddhanta, as represented above, has not quite effectu- ally refuted the Pirvapaksha ; as the fact of the hish, etc., being nidhanas is mentioned by the Veda itself. For the above reasons, we must explain the Adhikarava as follows :-— The hish being taken with the word ‘ vrshiitkamdaya,’ there arises a doubt as to whether the sentence points to its connection with the Result or with the Means. That is to say, the sentence being taken as ‘ hishits urshtickamaya, there arises a doubt as to whether the htsh is related directly to the Result, or to a particular Means (in the shape of the Saubhara) as qualified by that Result ? In fact, itis this construction of the sentence that has been shown in the Bhashya, by means of the sentences—hishitz nidhanamiti, état phalam. bhavatitt. The sentence—vrshtikdmiyeti saubharavicéshanum (Bhdshya) —means that the Saubhura not being mentioned by name in the sentence in question, it 18 only by means of indirect indication that it could 798 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADE U—PADA IT—ADABT. (13). be qualified by the Result therein mentioned. The assertion—na hisha sambandhdat—means that the hish has no connection with the form of the result. And then, inasmuch asthe position of the Purvapaksha based upon the repetition of the Injunction would be established otherwise, through the force of the collective Injunction relating to the sacrifice in question, we proceed to put forward the following position of the POURVAPAKSHA (B). ‘Tf every one of the nidhanas were restricted with reference to the “ Saubhara as engaged in fulfilling its own function,—then, inasmuch ५५ 88 the Injunction of the hish and the rest would be established by the “very fact of these being brought forward by the collective Injunction of ५ the sacrifice in question, there would be no use of another Injunction of “them (in the sentence in question), No such collective Injunction, how- “ever, is capable of expressing the independent relationship of the hish “ with the particular Result ; and as such, in giving expression to this rela- “ tionship, the sentence would be serving a distinctly useful purpose. “And further, the word ‘ vrshtikamaya’ having directly mentioned ५५ (16 human agent concerned,—it is only natural that when this agent ‘‘eomes to look for the means of accomplishing that Result, this want is “supplied by the mention of ‘hish’, etc. Otherwise (if the result be- ‘longed to the Saubhura, then) this Saubhara could be mentioned as the “means sought after, only through indirect Indication, based upon the “fact of its occurring in the same context and being capable of bringing ८८ about the Result in question, And certainly there can beno ground for ‘having recourse to such an indirect Indication (so long as the want is ५८ found to be supplied by means of direct Assertion) ‘‘ This representation of the Pirvapaksha appears to have been intended “by the Bhashya, as is shown by the sentence—tathtgrutilakshand vishayé (eg 9१ SIDDHANTA (7). The Siddhanta, in that case, would be represented as follows : ~ The previous sentence having spoken of a certain Result as following from the Saubhara as a whole, what the sentence in question does is to restrict the particular nidhanas of the Saxbhara with reference to each one of the results mentioned (and thus the mention of the results in the previous latter sentence is a reference to the very same results mentioned in the sentence). That 18 to say, inasmuch 28 the results mentioned in the sentence ONE RESULL FROM Suubhuru AND Nidhana. 499 in question are distinctly recognised as being the same as those mentioned previously in connectie: with the Suubhara as a whole,—we can never believe them to be distinct results (following from the particular कए dhanas). To the question—“ Why then should there be a repetition ? "—the answer 18s—Nidhaundrtha punahkgrutih (the repetition is for the purpose of restricting the Nidhanas ). Question: ‘* Why should not the Hish, etc., be taken as connected with “the Results mentioned in the same sentence with themselves ? ” Answer: Just asin the previous Adhikarana (II—ii—27) the Vdaravatiya was found not to obtain its desired substrate in the ‘ Sacrijice,’—so, in the case in question also, the (17257, etc., do not obtain their proper receptacle in the Results. That is to say, if we take the sentence as meaning that ‘one should accomplish the particular result by means of the Hish,’—we ‘are at once led to look for the substrate, resting upon which the Ilish would accomplish that Result. And then, the ‘Saubhara,’ that happens to be mentioned in the Context, cannot be cognised as the required substrate ; because it is the whole sdma that 18 expressed by the word ‘ saubhara’; and certainly the whole sama cannot be accomplished by means of the ‘ Hish,’ in the same manner as the Homa is accomplished by means of the Dadhs ; because the Dadhi is capable of extending over the whole of the Homa, while the ‘ Mish’ cannot extend over the whole of the Suubhara; which is made up of many letters ; and so long as the ‘ Hish’ does not accomplish the Saubhura, there cannot be any such relationship between them as that of the Basis and the Bused. What the ‘ Hish’ can accomplish, by pervading over it, is the NidAuna ; but that does not form the subject of the Context ; and as such, it could not be the required substrate (of the ‘ Hish’), except on the authority of the syntax (of the sentence in question). And thus, the sentence itself serving the purpose of pointing out the relationship (of the ‘Hish') with the result as its substrate,—there would be a distinct syn- tactical split. So also, if we take the sentence as laying down the relationship of the ‘Hli-h with reference to every one of the Nidhunas, then, that would set aside the Context, and make the ‘ Hish ' connocted with all the Samus; and then it would be necessary, somehow or other, to specify the Sdma as the ‘Saubhara’; and this would require a deal of mental effort. Then again, even though the ‘Hish’ could be the means of accomplish- ing the Saubhara, through one of its parts,—yet inasmuch as the Suubhara consists of many parts, it is not quite clear where the ‘ Hish° is to be put in. That is tosay, as a matter of fact, the accomplishment of the Nidhana, which is a part of the Saubhura, does not accomplish the Saubhara itself that forms the subject of the Conteat, because the part is not known as 800 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, II—PADA -- ^ एष्ा, (13). the Guubhara; and we have already shown above that the Saubhara would be taken as the substrate of the ‘ Hish’, in whatever way it could be found to be capable of being such a substrate, But even if we grant the fact of its being the substrate,—-inasmuch as the Saubhara is made up of many such parts as the ‘ Prastdva’ and the like, it is not quite known in which part the ‘ Hish’ is to be inserted ; specially as it cannot be said to be inserted in the Prast&va, in accordance with the law laid down under Sittra XI1—ii—23 ; because in that case it could not be referred to as ‘ Nidhana’ (which is the concluding part of the Sdma). The following argument might be brought forward: ‘In the case of “the Ukthyas (Hymns) laid down for the sake of certain results, we find “that they have their substrate in the Jyotzshtoma, whichis pointed out by ५ {116 Context, and over the whole of which they do not extend ; and though ‘‘it has many constituent parts, yet the said Hymns are, in accordance ५ with another text, always placed at the end; and in the same manner, ८५ 7 the case in question also, the ‘ Hish’ and the rest, laid down for the “sake of certain results, would have the Saubhara for their substrate ; and ‘therein their position would be fixed by the Veda itself as the end of the ८ Sama; and it would be this their character of ‘ Nidhana ` that would be ‘‘ referred to in the sentence in question.” To this we make the following reply: What you say is not possible ; because in the case of the Hymns, inasmuch as they could not be employed at any other place, their position was fixed ; as for the ‘ Hish’ on the other hand, it is capable of occupying many positions ; and hence it 18 not quite surely indicated at which place it should be inserted. That 18 to say, as for the Hymns, inasmuch as they are never found in any other place, and are something superphysical, it is only right that they are never in- serted in the midst of the sacrifice ; as a matter of fact, we have never found them occupying any other place ; and so long as their position is not as- certained, their true form cannot be ascertained, nor can they be connected with any result ; and if they existed anywhere else, they could not be spoken of as ‘ Ukthya,’ which 18 a name applied in accordance with the form (of the Sama); and as for the particular position that is pointed out by another sentence, itis not found to help the sacrifice in any way ; and as such that position comes to be taken along with the mention of the particular Results ; and hence 1t comes to be recognized as helping in the accom- plishment of those results. In the casein question, however, the natural position of the ‘ Hish’ pointed out by the Veda has been mentioned by the Injunction of the Saubhara as helping the sacrifice and also as helping the accomplishment of a desirable result for the human agent; and in the sentence in question, inasmuch as the ‘ Hish’ is laid down independently hy itself, with regard to the particular result, there is nothing to show ONE RESULT FROM Suubhura and Nidhana. -801 whether it (the ‘ Hish’) is to be used in ordinary parlance, or in a Vedic sentence, or in another Cama, or in another part of the Sama, or in that part of the SA@ma which occurs in the Context. If the ‘ Hish’ were recog- nised as laid down in connection with that (part of the Saubhara) which forms the subject of the Context, then, inasmuch as the place of this part is already known, there would be no doubt as to the exact posi- tion of the ‘ Hish.’ Objectton: ‘As the word is one and the same, the word ‘ Hish’ that “ would be used in the case in question would be the same as that em- ‘‘ ployed in ordinary parlance ; and as such to whatsoever the ‘ Hish’ may “be cognised as pertaining, it would always occupy the same posi- ४ tion.” Reply: This cannot be; because, even though the word be one only, it has a diversity of potencies, as with reference to the purpose served by it; and hence the position that the word occupies at one time, could not bo the same at another time, when the purpose served by it would be wholly different. That is to say, the mere fact of the word being one does not lead to the conclusion that the position in which it has been found to be effective, in one place, would be its position in all cases ; for certainly the position occupied by Devadatta while taking his food is not the same as that occupied. by him when fighting; as the particular position that a thing would occupy depends upon the purpose to be served, and not upon the form of the thing itself; and the form remains always the same, what- ever the position may be. Consequently, when the purposes to be served are different, a single thing comes to occupy different positions. So, in the case in question, the positiou of the ‘ Hish’, as helping the accomplishment of the Saubhara, cannot be believed to be the same as that occupied by it while accomplishing a desirable result for the human agent. Objection: “Asa matter of fact the Hish, in both cases, serves to ‘accomplish the desirable result of a human agent; and it is only by tho “way that it helps also in the accomplishment of the Saubhara (and thus ‘“‘the purpose remaining the same, there would be no difference in the ९५ position ).”’ Reply: Itis not so; because before the particular position of the ‘ Htsh’ has been duly ascertained, the Saubhara cannot be laid down as accomplished by 16 ; and then, what you say would involve a mutual inter- dependence: the position of the Hish being ascertained by the fact of its helping in the accomplishment of the Saubhara, and this latter fact being based upon that position of the Hish. Objection: ^" Justasin the Abhyuditéshfi, even though the madhyama- ‘“‘tandula, etc., are mentioned, yet the tandula that is used is the same “that has been mentioned in the Context,---so, in the case in qnestion 101 802 - TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 11-—PADA 11—abut, (13). “also, the Hish, etc., would be taken as those referring to that (Saubhara) ५ which is mentioned in the Context.” Reply: What you say is quite proper in the case of the Abhyudetésht: ; firstly, because we find the éandula that 18 mentioned above to be referred to by the sentences mentioning the connection of Deities, which supply the element wanting in the sentence containing the word ‘ Vibhdjutt,’ which distinctly points to that which has been mentioned in the Context; and secondly, because the division of the Madhyama, etc., which are mentioned by means of the word ‘ Yat ’, does not give rise to any idea apart from that of the fagdula mentioned in the Context; and hence no other tazdula is taken up. In the case in question, however, we find none of these reasons applying to the case of Hish, etc.,and hence there 18 nothing to set aside the idea obtained through the ordinary method of comprehen- sion. Thus then, inasmuch as the meaning of the sentence cannot be as the Purvapakshi explains, we offer another explanation. When, look howsoever much we do, we do not find any relationship of the Result directly mentioned (in the sentence in question), then, in order to save the Direct Denotation of the sentence from being rejected, we take it as referring to the means of accomplishing the mentioned results, which have been previously spoken of in the Context ; and hence the mean- ing of the sentence comes to be this: ‘The word hish is subsidiary to the means of accomplishing the Rain, etc., that have been mentioned in the Context.’ The word ‘ urshitkima’ in this sentence pointing to that ‘ ursti- kama’ which has been mentioned before, comes to indicate only the Saw- bhara, as the means of accomplishing itself, and nothing else; nor is it cognised as indicating the means of the accomplishment of any other result. And even though the ‘ Hish,’ etc., may have been already laid down (as part of the Saubhara), yet the sentence in question would serve the dis-. tinctly useful purpose of restricting the Nidhanas, as has already been ex- plained above (under Siddhdnia, A). And these, ‘ hish,’ etc., would be restricted by the sentence in question, exactly in the same form as that in which they are implied by the Saubhara; and (this form being that of the Nidhana), their character of Nidhana, becoming accomplished even without the actual mention of the word ‘nidhana,’ it is this character that is merely referred to in the sentence in question (thus there being no occasion for any syntactical split), This is what is shown in the 2145740 — urshiikamadyu saubharamastyeva, etc., etc. This Adhikarana embodies the exception to two of the foregoing Adhz- ८०११४८५, vtz., that the result follows from the Accessory (11-11-26), and ONE RESULT FROM Saubhara and Nidhana. 803 that it follows from the Action and not from the Accessory (II—ii—27). Because what 18 hereix shown is that the sentence in question does not lay down the Result, but only indicates the ^ Hish,’ etc., as part of the Saub- hara leading to the aforesaid results. The syntactical split that had been urged against us, would have been possible, if we admitted of a relationship of the Nidhana (with the Hish, etc.) orif we took the Nidhana as directly qualifying the Saubhara. As a matter of fact, however, we do none of these; as we hold the relationship to exist between the Hish and the word ‘ urshtikama’; and the fact of the Nidhana being the qualification of Saubhara, we deduce from the Context; and certainly the peculiarities deduced from the Context do not cause a syntactical split. And hence the anomaly of syntactical split does not quite apply to us. [ SUPPLEMENTARY ADHIKARANA.] There is yet another point to be considered, in this connection: (1) Does the sentence in question serve to restrict the Hish, ete., with reference to the means of accomplishing Rain, etc., in the shape of the Saubhara: in whatever Rescension of the Veda the Sama may be found to appear P or is the Saubhara to be employed for one desiring rain, in that form in which it appears in that Rescension wherein it is found with the Hish as its Nidhana? Similarly with the other two Nidhanas—Urg and Un. And on this point we have the following PURVAPAKSHA. “Ag all the Saubharas appearing in the thousand Rescensions of the “‘ Samavéda are recognised as optional alternatives, what the sentence tn ५५ question does is merely to restrict the Hish, etc., with regard to the Destre ‘sfor Rain, etc., (the Saubhara being of any Rescension of the Samaveda).”’ SIDDHANTA. To the above we make the following reply: As a general rule, the song to be employed for the sake of Rain, etc., must be of that particular Rescension in which that song appears with those particular Nedhanas. Because in order that the form of the song may not be utterly destroyed, one song 18 never connected with the parts of another song ; and hence what is recognised as the alternative to be employed is the whole of the song (together with its N¢dkana and other parts); and as such all its restrictions should always follow the way in which it appears in the Veda. That is to say, the form of a Sdma is ascertained wholly from the 04 TANIRA-VARIIKA, ADH. 11—PADA 11—aput. (13). Veda; and hence even the very slightest difference made in its text makes it wholly unrecognisable as the same. Consequently if the Nidhkana of one Rescension were to be employed in the song of another Rescension, the song itself would become wholly changed. Nor are any modifications of the song allowable, except in cases where we have a direct Vedic declara- tion of such modification,—as in the case of the word ‘gira’ being changed into ‘airam’; and also because of the possibility of the con- tradiction being avoided by taking up the song of the same Rescension, there would be nothing to warrant the modification; as in all cases we admit of the modification, only on the ground of the original form being impossible to be used. In the case in question, however, we have a distinct song (wherein the Nidhana is quite compatible) ; and hence it is with regard to this song of the Saubhara with the Nidhanas ‘ Hish,’ etc., that 1४ appearing doubtful as to which of the Nidhanas is to be em- ployed, the sentence in question serves to restrict the use of each Nidhana. And as the many alternatives conceived of are all in the form of the whole Sama (Saubhara, as with the one or the other Nidhana), and not in that of its parts, there can be no room for the Nidhana peculiar to other Rescensions. And the sentence in question restricting the part (Nidhana), the whole of the Sama becomes restricted thereby (as the restriction of the part cannot be possible without the whole being affected at the same time); just as when the Pupil is enjoined to eat out of a Kénsya vessel, and that too of the food left by his Teacher, it becomes necessary for the Teacher also to eat in a vessel of the same metal (as otherwise the Pupil could not eat of the food left by him in the Kansya vessel). The sentence in question is capable of yet another interpretation. The sentence lays down the mere relationship between the Saubhara and the Hish, both of which have been mentioned previously,—the construction of the sentence being: ‘yat vurshtikamdya saubharam, yacca hishifyevam nidhanam, tadékatra sampadaniyam. ’ Thus then, we conclude that the sentence serves to restrict the use of the whole Saubhara-sdma (with reference to the various results ). | THUS ENDS THE SECOND PADA OF ADHAYA JU. ADHYAYA IL. Pipa III. ADHIKARANA (1). [The Grahdgrata is subsidiary to the Jyotishtoma. } Satra (1): “The Accessory, being in connection with the "Sacrifice, would bring about a distinct Action, because the con- ‘nection is in its entirety.” In connection with the Jyotishtoma, from among the various alternative Samas, the Brhadrathantara has been Jaid down as the means of accom- plishing the particular Hymn (Prshtha) ; and then we find the sentence— ‘Yadt Rathantarasdma somak syft aindravdyavdgran grahan grhniyat, yads Brhatsdma gukragran’ (‘If the Soma is connected with the Rathantara sdma, precedence should be given to the holding of the vessels dedicated to Indra and Vayu, etc., etc., etc. ’). And in connection with these two sentences, there arises the followin ® question with regard to the Action with its Accessory, that is mentioned in the latter sentence: 18 it an action distinct from the Jyotdshtoma, or 18 it the same Jyotishtoma mentioned over again, for the purpose of pointing out the reason for the precedence of the various vessels at the same sac- rifice, as characterised by the Ruthantara Sama ? For the sake of this question, we have got to consider the following question— Is the Rathantura related to the sacrifice in its entirety (t.c., is the Ruthantara the only Sama to be used at it) P or is it related by mere existence (४,९., the Rathantara is one of the many used in the sacrifice) ? And this leads us to yet another question—Is the Rathantura ac- cepted as qualified by the Sacrefice, or the Sacrifice as qualified by the Ruthantara ? Objection: ‘‘ Inasmuch as the presence of the word ‘yadi’ distinctly “ points out the Ruthantara as a conditional motive, and as that forms ‘‘ the subject of the proposition, there could be no relation of the quali- ‘* fication (between the Sacrifice and the Rathantara).” ४060 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, -7404 I1t1—apDut. (1). Reply: The Rathantara could be taken as a conditional motive, only if it had been mentioned elsewhere, in the form that it is cognised as having in the case in question. When, however, such a Rathantara has not been mentioned elsewhere, we must admit its injunction by means of the sen- tence in question. And then, if the Jyotishfoma were always of the same character as that which is mentioned in the sentence in question, as having the conditional character, then, in that case, the mention of it in the sentence in question could be taken as serving the purpose of laying down an accessory detail for the same Jyotishtoma; if, on the other hand, the Jyotishtoma 18 not of that character, then it would be necessary to impose upon it that character, and then make it serve as the condition. That, without whose relationship the conditional character does not appear, be- comes the qualifier of the Condition also ; as it will be declared under the Artyadhikarana (VI—iv—22, 28) that ‘ we can allow of a qualification by the material offered’ (Bha., p. 683). And thus there would be no anomaly in the form of the reference being made to a qualified object (as the refer- ence would be to the object only) The conclusion that would suggest itself at the first sight, in connec- tion with the above questions, would be as follows: The action mentioned in the sentence in question is none other than the Jyotishtoma itself—(1) because the presence of the Rathantara Sama, as also that of the Brhat Sama, is mentioned by another sentence; (2) because the word ‘yad?’ distinctly points to the conditional character, which depends upon the pre- vious mention of that which is laid down as the condition ; (3) because the particular precedence of the vessel is included in the collective sentence laying down the whole procedure of the Action collectively ; (4) because the Accessory mentioned in the sentence is not set aside by any other Acces- sory mentioned more authoritatively elsewhere; specially so, in accord. ance with the Sutra 11-11-16. In opposition to this position of the Siddhania, we proceed to put forward the Pirvapaksha as embodied in the 5४८१८ :- PURVAPAKSBHA. ‘¢The Action mentioned in the sentence in question is a distinct Action “because a compound is possible, only when the words compounded have “a certain capability ; and this capability is held to exist in the qualifying ८५ Sama ; and the qualification serves to differentiate the object qualified; “while in the Jyotishtoma, we do not find the Rathantara differentiating “the sacrifice (by precluding all other Samas). ५५ [४ has been explained above, under Satra II1—ii—23, that it is only ‘‘when the Accessory mentioned is wholly unconnected with the pre- ‘viously mentioned action, that it serves to differentiate the Action Grahdgratad svBsipiaRy to Jyotishtuma. 807 “ mentioned in the sentence from that mentioned before. In the case in ९९ question, however, we fiad that the existence of the object expressed by the ८५ Bahuvriht compound —‘ Rathantarasdma’ — is pointed out, by the word ५५ ‹ yadt', as the condition (for the precedence of the vessel) ; and the charac- ‘ter of the condition 18 not found to belong to the existence of the mere “ Rathantara; as that has only a subordinate position in the compound ‘ (being only a qualification of that which 18 expressed by the compound). ५ Specially as in the sentence, we do not recognise the Iathantara to be ५ qualifiea by the Sacrifice, ~ we could not very well take the existence of ‹‹ {116 Rathantara as the condition. Nor is it possible for the Sama ( Rathan- ९५ tara) to be differentiated by the Sacréfice; because that (Samu) exists ‘elsewhere also. It could have been so differentiated, if the Ruthantara (९ was the Sama peculiar to the Sucrifice in question alone ; but as a matter ८ of fact, this is not so. ‘Therefore we must take the compound as expressing the fact of “the Rathantura being the only Sama connected with the particular sacrifice ; “and inasmuch as we do not find either the Jyotishtoma, or any other ‘“‘ sacrifice, connected with that Sdma only, the presence of the mero ८ Rathantara could not be the condition of any such sacrifice. Thus then, having to renounce all notion of condztion, we find the “word ‘ Rathuntara.dma’ to be inexplicable; and from this apparent ‘inconsistency of the word, we come to take it as laying down an alto- “gether distinct Action, at which the Rathantara would be the only ‘Sama employed. Specially as that distinct Action is quite capable of “being performed. And the mere existence of the Ruathantara can- “not be a qualification; as it does not extend over the whole of the “sacrifice; and not being a qualification, it cannot have the capability, ‘(of being compounded) ; and without the cnpability, there can be no “compound ; but as a matter of fact, we find the Samdsa actually present ‘in the case in question ; consequently the Action mentioned in the sen- “tence is not recognised as being the same us the one mentioned before. ‘‘ Question: ‘ Wherefore should we not take the Jyotishfoma itself, as ८५ having, in one alternative case, the Rathantara Sama only ? ’ “ Answer: It cannot be taken in this way ; because such an assump- “tion would be a direct contradiction of the Injunction of other Sdmas ‘mentioned in connection with the Hymns directly laid down with “regard to the Jyottshtoma. The Rathantara sima, though mentioned “ag eonnected with the Sacrifice, is found to be of no use in the ५८ nerformance of the Sacrifice itself; and hence, in accordance with the “ Sutra ITl—i—18, comes to be inderectly taken along with the IHymns “(sung at the Sacrifice) ; while the Gdyatra and the other Samas are laid “down directly in connection with those Hymus ; and as such the presence 808 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. LI—PADA III—ADHI, (1), ‘of these latter is more authoritative than that of the Ruthantara ५५ (whose presence is only implied indirectly), When, however, the sentence ५५ 18 taken as laying down a distinct Sacrifice, it would directly lay down “the Ruthantara as related to that Sacrifice ; and as such in this case the “ Buthantara would be more authoritative than the other Sdmas, which are ५५ all mentioned along with the original Injunction ; and so in this case ‘there 18 nothing incongruous in the mention of the Rathantara. “Thus too, the word ‘ Rathantarasima’ being taken as referring to “something distinct from that which is denoted by the words ( ‘ Rathan- “tura’ and ‘ sama’ ) themselves, —the presence of the Bahuvriht compound «५ would become justified; as the predominant factor in that compound “is always something apart (from that denoted by the component ‘“ words). Otherwise (४.९.) if the Rathantara be taken as the qualification ८८ of the previous sacrifice) the compvund in question would have to be ‘‘ taken as pertaining to the subordinate element (as the qualifying ad- “junct always occupies the subordinate position in a Bahuvritht com- ०५ pound ; just as in the case of the compound ‘lohttoshnishak’ (in the ५ sentence ‘ lohitoshnisha rtovjah pracarantz , where all the other factors ५ being found to have been previously mentioned, the sentence is taken ५५ 88 laying down only the redness of the turban). ५८ {{? again, the word ‘ Rathantarasima’ be construed along with “the sentence that lays down the Precedence of the particular vessels, ‘then, there would be two diverse Injunctions, that of the “ Rathantara and that of the Precedence ; and hence they could be accom- ‘ nlished through the Injunction of an altogether fresh Bhdvand (of a “ distinct Sacrifice). The expression ‘somah sydat,’ through the extreme ‘proximity of the two words, would directly point to the fact of the ‘Soma being something to be brought about; while the accomplishment * of the fact of the Sacrifice having the Ruthantara sama, could, at best, be ‘assumed only indirectly. And in accordance with our view, all that the “word ‘somah’ would do would be to point out that the new Sacrifice ‘(laid down in the sentence in question) 18 only a modification of the ५५ Jyotishtoma ; specially as the word ‘somah ’ distinctly points to the pri- ‘mary original of the Sacrifice in question. ‘Hence we conclude that the sentence in question is the Injunction ८ of a distinct Action. “This is what 18 shown in the Bhdshya, by means of the sentence— ५५ ५ vadi Rathantarasdmétyasya ko'rthah, etc., etc., etc,’ “Ag for the particular precedence of the vessels, it would apper- “ tain to the other Action (laid down by the sentence), either by means of ९ syntactical connection, or by the sub-contexzt, Though the intervening ५१ component sentences have no authority, in the face of the whole taken as < (६1211414 ES SUBSIDIARY TO JYOTISHTOMA., 809 “one compound-complex sentence, yet uo useful purpose being found to ‘‘be served by that complete sentence as a whole, no significance can he “attached to it; and as such the having recourse to the intervening com- “pnonent sentences could not adversely affect the Injunctive potency in ‘“‘ question. ‘With a view to the fact of completing a certain factor (viz., that “which forms the denotation of the Bahuvriht compound) by supplying “its deficiencies being more reasonable than its rejection, the Bhashya “adds—atha va yadt icchéta, etc. (1f one desires, etc.); because, the ‘element of Desire is always implied by the fact of the Action being ‘‘something to be performed, the supplying of this element in the sen- ‘tence in question must be accepted as authoritative, and not a mero ‘“‘ gratuitous assumption. ‘‘In consideration of the fact, that in comparison with this supply- “ing from without (of the element of Deszre), 1६ would be far simpler to ‘‘ accept the indirect function of the word itself as taken with another “word removed from it by certain steps, as this would entail only the ‘‘ disregarding of the property (proximity) of words (and leave the words ‘‘intact),—the Bhashya takes up another position, by citing the instance ‘‘of such sentences as ^ धव gdlim bhunjita tatra dadhyupasincéla ' “(that is to say, just as this sentence 18 accepted as laying down tho “eating of Cali, so, the sentence in question may be taken as laying “down the fact of the Soma-sacrifice having the Hathantara for its “ Sama. “The opponent, however, retorts by putting forward the fact of the “corroborating Instance itself not being duly established—‘ How does the eating of Cali come to be laid duwn by that sentence ?’ “The answer is that the said laying down would be got at by invert- “ing the order of the sentence, which really means that—‘if one wants ९५ {0 mix curd with his food, he should eat Cali’; that is to say, the ‘ Lin’ **(Injunctive) affix in ‘ vpansincéta’ is taken as having the force of the “ Destderutive, in accordance with = 09 11118 sittra—‘ kdmuprarvedané, etc.’ “ (111--111--153). ‘And in accordance with this const:uction, the meaning of the sen- ‘tence in question comes to be this: ‘ If one wishes to accord precedence ‘‘to the vessels dedicated to Indra and Vayn, he should perform the sacrifice “at which Rathantara is the Sama employed.’ And thus the real Injunctive- ‘ness comes to belong to the two words ‘ Somahk syft,’ apart from the ‘conditional ‘if’ (‘yadi’). And though in this case the word ‘ grhniyiit ° ‘is deprived of its direct injunctiveness, yet, being taken as serviug the ‘‘ purpose of denoting ‘desire,’ it would, in reality, come ‘to serve the pur- ‘pose of the Injunctiye also; inasmuch as one always does what he desires 102 SLO TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 11—PADA IN—ADHE (1). ‘“Or, it may be that the Injunctive (in ‘ griniyat’) lays down the prece- (१ dence of the particular vessel, as desired by the agent. “The Bhashya puts forward yet another explanation, in consideration ‘of the fact that the following explanation does not require any sack ‘indirect and remote constructions as necessitated by the foregoing ‘‘explanation. The explanation is put forward by the Bhashya, in. the ‘ sentence—The Injunctive affis denotes the causal relationship, in accord- ‘ance with the laws of Panini. That is to say, (1) the Injunctive in ०८ । Somak syat’? denotes the ८९८5९, while that in ‘ grkniydat’ denotes pure ‘Injunction itself; and the sense of the sentence, in that case, comes to ‘be this:—One should hold the vessel with due precedence of those ‘‘ dedicated to Indra and Vayu, as caused by that Soma-sacrifice which em- ‘“ wloys the Rathantara sdma; andas ४1118 latter Sacrifice could not serve the ‘‘purposes of the Cause, until it is itself duly accomplished, the injunc- ‘tion of its performability also comes to be implied in the sentence ;—(2) ५९ 01" the Injunctive in ‘ grhniyat’ may be taken as denoting the effect (that ‘‘which is caused), that in ‘ sydi¢’ being taken as denoting the Injunction ; “though in this case, the Soma-sacrifice would not be directly mentioned (५ 8.8 the Cause, yet its causal character would be implied by its proximity ‘“with the effecé (as mentioned in ‘yrhniydt’), and the meaning of “the sentence would thus come to be that—ore should perform the “sacrafice, as being the cause of the according of a particular precedence to ^" the vessels dedicated to Indra and Vayu. ‘The various alternative theories here put forward are summed up “in the following verse: ‘““(L) The rejgection of the conditional ‘yadi’; (2) thesupplying of the ‘element of ‘ Desire’; (3) the inverting of the construction of the two paris ‘of the sentence; and (4) the taking of the Injunctive Affiw as denoting the causal relutronship. ८५ As every one of these theories will be of use in tho S¢ddhdnta of the “next Adhikarana (dealing with , AVESHTI IS A DISTINCT SACRIFICE. | 817 “ there could be no doubt as to the sentences in question mentioning the ‘connection of the castes only by way of pointing out the conditions for “the inserting of the Bdrhaspatya and the rest.” Reply : It is not so; because we find that the 4०९6८ is already re- cognised (through the sentence ‘Raja Rajasuyéna, etc.’) as one to be per- formed by the Kshattriya,—-and that the other sentence also (‘éfay& anna- dyakdmam, etc.’) does not lay it down as to be performed by Agents other than the Kshattriya; cousequently, we find no ground for the perform- ance of the 4४९९५ apart from the Rajasiya; as such it comes to be taken as forming a part of the Rd@jusiiya itself; so we conclude, in accordance with the law laid down in the 6८74 [V—i—5, that the ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ (‘ svdrdjya’) (mentioned in the former sentence) 18 the result common to the djastiya and the Avesh{1; while the ‘ food ' (‘annidya’, mentioned in the sentence quoted by the objector) is the result peculiar to the Avéshfi itself. Andeven if the 4४९८0 {ए be performed apart from the Rajasitya, it would be performed by the Kshatriya only, when desiring the particular result of obtaining Food ; and as such there would be no connection with the other two castes. As for instance, the Action of suudying the Veda and the laying of Sacrificial Five being known as to be performed by the three higher castes only,—even though the sacrifices depending upon these two Actions may be found connected with any and every agent that may be desirous of obtaining the results following from those sacrifices, yet they come to be finally recognised as to be performed only by the non-Cudra castes ; and as in the case of the RAjasiiya itself, even though all men may be equally desirous of the ‘ Kingdom of Heaven’, yet on account of the Action being specified for the Raja only, it is the Raja alone who could be the acquirer of that result (by the performance of the Rayjasitya ) Thus then there are only two alternative theories to be considered : (1) The -4 ४267 {४ (as connected with the three castes) is laid down in the sentence laying down the Rajasiiya, and (2) it is laid down by the latter sentences, And on this question we have the following PURVAPAKSHA, ‘In view of the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing Adhikarana, ‘it must be admitted that the latter sentences only serve to Jay down the ‘conditions \ ir the particular znsertzons, ५ 470 ५१ the performance of Rdajasiya, all the three castes are entitled, ‘as shown b ‘ithe word ‘ Raja’, which signifies ‘one who performs the "^ functions o\ a king.’ Because all through the world, it is only one’ 103 ५ 1 818 TANTRA-VARTIIKA, ADH. I—-PADA III—ADHI. (2). “ performing the kingly functions that is spoken of as ‘ Rajd.’ And it is ‘thus alone that the text in question can have an extended application. ५ That is to say, when it 18 possible for the word ‘ Raja’ to be taken ‘‘ both ways (४.९. as signifying the Kshaitriya, and as signifying ‘ one who ‘‘ performs the kingly functions ’), itis far more advisable to accept the sig- “nification of all the three castes; because this interpretation alone ‘‘ would be compatible with the mention (in the subsequent sentences) ‘‘ of the conditions (^ yadt Bradhmanak, etc,|’), and with the Context, etc. ; ‘‘and also because this interpretation would not curtail the scope of the ‘declaration of all the three castes being entitled to the performance of “the Rajasiya. “For these reasons it must be admitted that persons of all the three ‘‘ castes, performing the functions of a king, are “ (दद कड ; and these func- ९ tions are well known to consist in the protection of the people and the “removal, from among them, of all troublous factors. ‘The Bhashya speaks of the word ‘ 207 क ' being used in the above ८4 86086 by the people of Arydvarta (North India); and this is meant to “show the authoritative character of the signification, in accordance with “the S#tra I—ii—9. ८ Objection: ‘ The Bhdshya, by declaring that trustworthy people use “the word Rajya in the sense of kingly functions, admits the independence “of the word I?474, which forms the base of the word Rajya. (That 18 to “say, the said declaration makes the signification of the word Rajya de- ८६ nendent upon that of the word #aja, which 18 the word appearing in the ‘‘ text in question ; and hence what the declaration does 18 to seek to ex- “plain the word—Rdazya—not in the text—by the help of that—Raja— ‘‘ which occurs in the text; and consequently the word Raja being inde- «५ pendent, it could not be explained as Rajyyakartad). Because the word ५ Udamégha is not comprehended by being explained as related (as father) “to Andaméghi; in fact it 18 the word Audaméghi that is comprehended by “the help of Udamégha, which itself is independent. (And so the word ५४ 7770 क cannot be rightly comprehended by the help of the word Rajya).’ “‘ Reply: Though the people of old comprehended the word ‘ Raja’ ‘by itself, and deduced from that the meaning of the word ‘ Rajya ’,— ६ vet for us, people of the present day, it is quite the other way. ८ That is to say, when the direction ‘ Gamdnaya’ is used, the person “using it and the person comprehending it, understand it as—‘ yo gauk ५४ 50 Gnétavyah’; (that which is the oz is to be brought), and yet the ‘third person standing by, who is ignorant of the meaning of the ५५ word ‘gam’, but knows that of the word ‘ dnaya’, takes the direction to “mean that ‘ya anéshyaté sa gauk’ (that which will be brought is the ‘“on),—just as the ‘suortficial post’ is recognised as such only when the AVESHTI IS A DISTINCT SACRIFICE. 819 * sacrificial animal is tethered to it. In the same manner, though such an- “cient writers as Panini and Manw have declared—‘ yo Raja téna janapa- “darakshanam kartavyam, yacga Raja tasya karma Rajyam’ (‘He who is «१ {116 king has for his duty the protection of the people, and he who is the ‘“‘ Raja, his function is Rajya’),—yet we, who are not quite sure of the “ signification of the word ‘ Raja’ though quite sure of that of the word ८८ ‹ Rajya’, comprehend the said declaration of Manu, etc., in the follow- “ing way: ‘Inasmuch as the Smrtis have made the above declaration, “we must conclude that they understood the word Rajd as signifying “something capable of doing Rajya (४.९. performing the functions of the ‘“‘king),—just as the word ‘yiipa’ is applied to something to which the < sacrificial animal can be tethered. “This ‘ Rajya’—kingly function—is found to be performed by people € 07 all the four castes; and hence all of these are BRajds. But inasmuch ‘as, in accordance with other laws and regulations, the word ‘ Raja? is ‘‘found to have its ends fulfilled among the three higher castes only, “the Cudra becomes naturally precluded by the fact of his being devoid ‘of Vedic study, etc. There is, however, no such ground of precluding “any other caste; and hence we conclude that all the three higher ५ castes are entitled to the performance of the Hajasiiya. “ Objection: ‘As a matter of fact, the kingly functions have been “specially laid down for the Kshattrrya ; and hence it is only by an unlaw- ‘“ ful assumption of others’ functions that the Bradhmana and the Vazgya “perform those functions; and as such these latter cannot be rightly “called Rayas.’ “Reply: This argument does not touch our position; because by ५५ {06 mere fact of having performed the kingly functions, these two castes “also acquire the title of ‘Raja’; and this (performing of the kingly func- “ tions) is all that is required by the Rdjasiiya-Injunction. As to whether ‘‘these functions are performed lawfully or unlawfully, that 78 a question “affecting the character of the performing agents, and as such cannot “ have anything to do with the sacrifice (Ka@jasiya). “ Objection (in the Bhdshya): ‘ We find the word Raja applied even to “such Kshattriyas as do not perform the kingly functions of protecting the ‘< neople, etc.’ “This argument has been brought forward here as forming the ‘‘ basis of the Siddhaxta; and hence we proceed to refute it; but before ५ 4zing that we must find out what it means. It means simply this: ‘It ‘(has been said above, in connection with the words varhih, ayyam and “the like, that when even a single part of the word has been found to sig- “nify the Olass, we cannot assume any other signification for 1६ (and so in “the cage in question also, when, even in the case of a single person, the 820 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. [—PADA TII—ADHI. (£). “word 12776 has been found to signify the Kshattriya-class, we cannot very ८८ well assume any other meaning for it).’ “The reply to this 18 that in the case of the word ‘ 77९ `, we find the ‘literal signification (that afforded by its constituent parts) to be more “reasonable than any other (that 1s dependent upon mere popular con- “ vention). This is what 18 meant by the Bhashya, when it says—praka- ८८ vanavagat, yadigabdasamabhivyaharacca. “Then, concludes the Bhashya—na karmdntaram vidhadyishyaté. ‘This means that the sentence would not lay down the performance of the ५८ 422871८ apart from that of the Rajasiiya: (the word ‘karmdntaram’ being ८५ taken indirectly inthe sense of prayogdntaram); or it may mean that—if we ‘““ndmit of the same construction as that shown above, in the case of the “sentence ‘yadt ¢alim bhunjita dadhyupasincet’, then the same sentence “could not serve to lay down both the connection of the Bréhmaan, as ८८ well as the insertion of the Baérhaspatya; and in this case the word ‘ kar- “ mantaram ’ of the Bhashya would be taken directly in the sense of ‘ another ५८ Action’, and not indirectly as in the former case. ‘The above reply to the objection has been given by admitting both ८५ significations of the word ( ४.९. that accepted by the people of the Andhra “‘ country, who use the word ‘ #@7@’ in the sense of Kshattriya, as well asthat ८८ accepted by those of Aryavarta, who apply the word to the performer “of kinyly functions). But we now proceed to show that there is no reason- ‘able ground for applying the word ‘ Raja’ to a person devoid of kingly ९ functions. “Tt will be readily admitted that that which is accepted by all men ‘must set aside that which is not accepted by all of them (and there oan ‘be no doubt that all men apply the word ‘7aja@’ to real kings, while it is ‘only the Andhra people that apply it also to one without the functions ५ of a king, simply if he happens to be a Kshatiriya),. ‘* Another argument brought forward in the Bhashya is—That which ८ ८5 admitted by people without contradiction 1s more authoritative than that ७५ which 25 decried, though accepted. But this is the same argument as the ‘‘ former, only expressed differently, for ‘decrying’ and ‘non-decrying’ are ‘nothing apart from ‘non-acceptance’ and ‘acceptance’ respectively. Or, ‘it may be that the former argument brought forward merely the existence, ‘‘or otherwise, of the acceptance of the significations; while the latter ‘speaks of their contradiction or non-contradiction. And as there is a ‘clear difference between Ignorance and Mistaken Knowledge, the two argu- “ments cannot be said to be mere repetitions of each other. Says the ‘“ Bhashya—drydavartanivdsindm ....mlecchébbyah samicinatara acaro bhavn- “ti; and here the mention of ‘ Arydvartanivasindm’ only serves to show, “as before, the greater authoritativeness of the: one signification, in AVESHTI 18 A DISTINCT SACRIFICE, 821 ‘accordance with the Sara --111--9 ; while the clause ‘ samicinatara “ aciro bhavatt’ refers to tue wsuge of the word. “For the above reasons, we conclude that the sentence in question ८८ serves to mention the Bradhmana, etc., already mentioned in the former ५५ sentence as conditioning the insertion of the Barhaspatya, etc. Specially ५५ because, there can be no doubt as to the sentence ‘ yadz rajanya aindram’ “ mentioning the Rajanya (Kshattriya), already mentioned in the previous ८५ sentence (for there can be no doubt as to the Kshattriya being spoken of ५ by means of the word ‘ Raja’), simply as conditioning the insertion of ‘the Aindra; and then the cases of the other two sentences—‘ yadi Brah- ४८ manak,’ etc., and ‘ yadt Vaicyak, etc.’—being exactly similar, the same ‘ must be admitted with regard to these also.” SIDDHANTA. To the above we make the following reply :— The sentence in question serves to lay down the connection of the Brahmana, etc., with the Sacrifice ; because such connection has not been mentioned before,—the mere performing of kingly functions not sufficing to make one known as ‘ त त. That is to say, the word ‘ haa’ denotes the Kshattrzya, and cannot be taken in its literal sense. Because the literal meaning might consist either in the performing of the kingly functions, or, according to the signi- fication of the root ‘raj,’ in Brightness or Hffulgence ; and both of these are impossible ; because we find the word having a well-known meaning apart from the Izteral; and even though this meaning may be known in one part of the country only, yet it will always set aside the applica- bility of the Jzteral meaning ; and then too, there is no one definite literal meaning that is recognised as universally applicable ; as on the one hand, the word ‘ Raja’ is not found to be applied to such bright things as Fire and the like ; nor, on the other, to such representatives of the king as are not duly anointed, though performing quite well the kingly fune- tions of protecting the people, and the like. Objection: “As for the Representative of the king, inasmuch as he “performs those functions by being appointed to it by another person, “the word ‘ Raja’ is not applied to him; just as the word ‘ sacrificer? % (* yajamana') is not applied to the sacrificial Priests.”’ Reply: This is not right; because we actually find the word ‘Raja,’ in many cases, applied to the Rulers over smaller subsidiary estates, to which they have been anointed by the all-powerful Emperor, to whom they are subordinate. Question: “Then, inasmuch as the word is found to be applied to $22 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I--PADA ITI—ADHI. (2). ‘those that have been anointed to the functions of a king, it may be “taken as expressing that ‘anointment’ (and not the ‘ Kshatiriya’ ‘* caste),”” Answer: That would not be possible; because, the Anointment also is declared by the knowers of Law to belong to the Kshatiriya only, just like the word ‘ Raja’; and hence that too could not belong to a non- K shattriya. The word could be recognised as expressing Anointment, if this formed the independent and absolute cause of the application of the word (४.९. 1 the word were applied to anyone and everyone whom we would anoint); while, as a matter of fact, we find this Anoutmeni restricted, by all Smyti laws, to the Kshatiriya only; and as such it is only at the time of its Injunction (by thesentence ‘ Rajanam abhishincéta ’) that it becomes connected with the word ‘ Raja ’,—just as the ‘ chopping’ becomes connected with the word ‘ grass.’ It is for this very reason that the word ‘ R4ja@’ is not taken as signi- fying, like a compound word, both of these—the ‘ Kshatiriya’ caste and ‘ Anointment ’—conjointly (7.e., the word is not accepted in the sense of the ‘anointed Kshattriya’). Specially because the word could be so taken, only if it were always actually found to be applied to the Kshattriya and the Anointment conjointly, and never to the Kshattriya caste alone,— or if the ‘Anointment’ were laid for other castes also. Asa matter of fact, however, we find that the word is applied, in the very Injunction ‹ Rajanamabhishincéta’, to the person to be purified by Anosntment, long before the Anointment has actually taken place. Hence we conclude that the word ‘ 7 क ` 18 generally accepted as denoting the caste ‘ Kshatiriya.’ Nor can it be urged that—“ the Injunction ‘ Rajanamabhishincéta ` serves to point out a name to be applied in the future (its meaning being that one should anoint that person who would, after that Anointment, be known as ‘ Raja’).” Because a name is always found to be used as already pertaining to the object named; and itis only when such application has been found to be impossible that, in certain cases, we admit of a name being based upon future applicability. In the case in question, however, we find that one signification (the caste Kshatiriya) is an established entity already ; and so we cannot rightly assume another signification (in the shape of the anointment), as the use of the word is found to be quite possible even without such an assumption. And even if the word be taken as signifying ‘ Anointment,’ people knowing the Law do not apply it to a non-Kehatiriya ; while as for one who would so apply it, disregarding the Law on the point, such unlawful appli- cation could not be recognised as the basis of the word’s signification ; AVESHTI IS A DISTINCI SACRIFICE. 823 just as if a Ciédra happen to lay the Fire, that Fire does not come to be recognised as the ‘ Ahavaniya’ (‘sacrificial ’) Fire. And further, the Word, its Meaning, and the Relation between them, —all three, being eternal, pertain to the natural state of things existing ; and as such they do not base themselves upon impermanent causes, gra- tuitously assumed by us forthe occasion. For instance, in the case in ques- tion, the word ‘ Raj%’ being eternal, its signification too must be one that is permanent, because there can be no real relationship between the Per- manent and the Impermanent. This permanence is cognised as depend- ing either upon the nature of things or upon an expressed Vedic Injunc- tion. Then, as for the Anointment, it is not found to be permanently in- herent in any person, like his caste; and hence its permanence will have to be accepted as based onan Injunction; but as a matter of fact, we do not find any Injunction laying down the applicability of the word ‘ Raja’ to a non-Kshattriya ; and hence, after all, we come to the conclusion that it is the caste ‘ Kshattriya ’ only that is the invariable signification of the word ‘ Raja’; and hence that alone must be accepted as denoted by it. The above argument also serves to preclude the possibility of the signi- fication of the word = वक ` being based upon the performing of kingly functions; because those functions also are found to be connected with the Kshatiriya caste, only after they have been laid down as pertuining to the Raja,—just like the said Anointment. And, asa matter of fact, we have found the word ‘ aja’ applied to one who has neither been anointed, nor performs the functions of the king,—and not to such persons as have been anointed and perform those functions, but are not Kshatiriyas (this latter usage is met with among the Dravidas). Hence too we conclude that persons of all the three castes cannot be called ‘ 1206." Further, all grammarians explain the word “ Rajanya” as ‘ Raju apatyam,’ deriving it from the basic noun ‘ Hdjan’; and yet the word ‘Rajanya’ has no other meaning but the Kshattriya caste. If the word ‘Raja’ were applicable to all the three castes, then the off-spring of the other two castes would also be spoken of as ‘ Hdjanya.’ Because the word ‘ Rijanya’ is apphed by universal convention to the Kshatirtya; while if all the three castes were ‘ dyads’, will you please explain to me why the word ‘ Rajanya’ should not be applied to the off-spring of the other castes ? Objection : ^“ If the word ° Rdajanya ’ denotes the Kshatiriya only, what ‘‘ would be the use of the patronymic affix? Becaase the word ‘kshattriya,’ ‘“‘denotiug the caste, is equally applicable to the Father and the Son; and “hence in all cases the Hdjanya should always be spoken of as ‘ Raja.’ ‘That is to say, just as the offspring of the crow is called the ‘ crow,’ so ‘‘ the offspring of the Raja would be ‘ Raja,” 824 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I-PADA UI—ADHI, (2). Reply: This does not quite affect our position ; because though as a matter of fact the word ‘ Rajanya’ is synonymous with ‘ Raja,’ yet it is only by way of showing its grammatical formation that it is explained as ‘Rajiah apatyam’; and the said explanation is possible only when both refer to the same caste, as the offspring always belongs to the same caste as the Father. Objection: “ The word ‘ Rajanya’ would denote the Kshatiriya caste, ‘on account of the sééva ‘when the patronymic is affixed to ‘Rdjan’ it de- ८४ notes the class’ ( Varitka on Panini Sutra 1V—i— 187), and not on account ८५ of the word being explained as ‘ Rajrak apatyam’; and consequently the ‘‘denotation of the word ‘ltdjanya’ could not affect that of the word C6 6 Raja.’ 9? Reply : It is not so; because inasmuch as the Vartika you quote does not mention any particular class, it might be taken as referring to the com- prehensive class ‘Man’; and so, according to this Vartika, the word ‘ (दतै - anya’ would come to denote that class ‘ Man’ (and not the ‘ Kshattriya’). Objection: ^ 48 a matter of fact, we find the teachers of Law and ८५ Sacrifices laying down different duties for the टत क and the Bajanya, ‘‘which shows clearly that the word ‘ Raja’ is different from ‘ Rajanya.’ ” Reply: True, we meet with such differentiated duties ; but that is in accordance with the maxim of the ‘ Brahmanaparivrijaka’; that is to say, the word ‘Raja’ refers to the particular Rajanya who has undergone anointment (just as the word ‘ Parivraijaka’ is applied to the particular Brahmana who has gone through the rites of Renunciation), Tt has been argued that—‘ the word ‘ Raja’ being found to be cap- “able of having both significations, ४.९.) the Kshatirzya caste, and the perfor- ‘mer of kingly functions,—it 18 the latter that comes to be accepted, in the “ present instance, as being more in keeping with the Context, etc.” And it is this argument that we now proceed to refute, as follows : Both the words—‘ 006 ` and ‘ Rajya ’—could not have their significa- tions wholly independent of the other ; because the fact is that when one of them has its signification fixed by convention, that of the other follows from it. To explain this further: when the word ‘ Raja’ has been known, by convention, as signifying the Kshattriya caste, then the signification of the word ‘ Rajya ’—explained as ‘ the function of the Raja ’—comes to be based upon that of the word ‘ Raja’; and so long as this is possible, it is not right to assume an independent denotative potency for this latter word. As even without such an independent denotative potency, there would be nothing incompatible in the usage of the people of Arydvurta (who apply the word ‘Rajya’ tothe ‘kingly functions of protecting the people’ and the like). If, conversely, it be held that—‘ the word ‘ Ieajyu’ itself AVESHTI 18 A DISTINCT SACRIFICE. 825 has its signification of the function of protecting the people fixed by con- vention, before that of the word ‘ Raja’ is known, ”—then too, the word ‘ Raja’ would, as based on the word ‘ Rajya’, come to be applied to the performer of that function; and it would not be necessary to assume any independent denotative potency in the word ‘ Raja’; and as such there would be nothing incongruous in the usage of the Dravidas, who apply the word ‘ Raja’ tothe Keshatiriyas, who are capable of the said functions of protection, etc. Though the particular usage is peculiar to the Dravidas, yet the Bhashya attributes it to the Andhras, becuuse these also, like the Dravidas, inhabit the southern part of India, For the above reasons, we conclude that the words ‘ a7a’ and ‘ ©} - anya’ cannot be regarded as both having their meanings fixed by con- vention, independently of each other, or as both having only such sense as is afforded by their constituent parts. And when it comes to the acceptance of one of the two words having its independent signification fixed by convention, it is distinctly more reasonable that it should be accepted with regard to the word ‘Raja’; because, as a rule, whenever there is a doubt caused by a disagreement between usages, a satisfactory conclusion is always arrived at by the help of the stronger authority of a properly compiled Smrtz. That is to say, Manu and other writers of Smrt: declare that the function of protecting the people, etc., which is expressed by the word ‘Rajya,’ belongs to the Kshattriya ; Pénini and others also expound the word ‘ Rijya’ as ‘the function of the Rajd,’—wherein, they hold (vide Pa- nini, Sitra V—i—~124), that to the word ‘ तत =, which has its signification independently fixed by convention, the affix ‘ shyatt’ is added (to make the word ‘ Bajya’). Other grammarians explain the grammatical formation of this word (‘ Rajya’) as with the affix ‘ yak,’ which is'an affix particu- larly laid down for the word ‘ 47a’ which appears to be mentioned in the group of words beginning with ‘ patyantapurohita’ (Panini, Sutra I~y— 128); and it isthus alone that we could have the presence of an accentuation that is peculiar to the affix ‘ yak,’ and that of the "वकद accentuation in the beginning of the word. For these reasons, we must take the Bhdshya onthe poimt as declaring that it is the formation of the word ‘ Rajya’ that should be evolved out of the word ‘ Radja,’ and not that of the latter from the former. For if the formation of the word ‘ Raja’ were evolved out of the word ‘ Rajya,’ then there should be certain definite gramma- tical rules laying down either the elision of the letter ‘ya’ (in ‘ Radjya’), or the modification of the word ‘ Rajya’ into ‘Raja.’ For these reasons, the construction must be explained as ‘ Rajtiah karma Rajyam’ (the function of the Raja is ‘Rajya’), and not as ˆ Rajyasya karia Rajya’ (the performer of the kingly functions is § Raja’) 104 826 TANIRA-VARTIKA. ADH. (1 -- 2274 II—ADHL (2). Nor can the latter explanation be accepted on the mere ground of the apparent inconsistency (of the use of the word among the people of Arya- varta) ; because such usage of the word ‘ Ra7@’ is known 10 another part of the country. And even if the Apparent Inconsistency were rightly brought forward, the aforesaid Smrtis of Manu and others would dis- tinctly point tothe fact of the functions of protecting the people, etc., belonging to the Kshattriya ; and as such it would be the Kshatirzya that would come to be known as ‘ J?dja.’ Then again, as a matter of fact, we find that the whole of the word ‘ Raja’ is present in the word ‘ Rajya’; and hence it is only right that the latter should be held to have its denotation governed by that of 178 con- stituent part (‘ 7a"); which, however, cannot be said of the word ‘ Raza ` whercin we do not find the whole word ‘ Rajya’ entering into its constitu- tion. Objection: ^ True; in this way the word ‘ Rajya’ does come to have ८८ 18 denotation fixed by that of its constituent part ‘Raja.’ But in that ५८ case, the word ‘ 17१९ ' could never be applied to a non-Kshattriya who may ‘perform the functions of the king; and hence it cannot be denied that ५४ there would be an incompatibility of the usage common among the people “of Aryavarta; as the said explanation of the word ‘ £aja’ would at once ‘mark down as incongruous such uses of the word as ‘na Gidra-rfijzyé ““nivasct’ (one should not live in a country where a (पवा is the ^^ 1270). Reply: Yogat lokah prayunkte: that 18 to say, the word ‘ Rajya’ is explained as formed by its connection with the ‘Raja,’ and then the pres- ence of the Rajya (kingly functions) in the Brahmana, etc., makes the word ‘ 47a’ indirectly applicable to these latter castes also. Question: “In that case, you admit the fact of the word ‘ 17570 ‘being taken as formed by its connection with ‘ Rajya’ (kingly func- “tions).”’ Answer: That does not touch our position ; because we hold the word + Raja" to be only zndirecily (or figuratively) applicable to the Brahmana, etc. It would be only if we made the word directly applicable to these, that the Adhikarana would be wholly reversed. While as for the indirect application, inasmuch as it is always set aside by the direct application, even if it were admitted, 1६ could not set aside the Szddhdnta. Hence it must be admitted that the word ‘ 2474’ 18 applied to the Brahmanza, etc., only in consideration of the fact of these latter being the proxy of the Kshattriya, in the performance of his legitimate functions (of protecting the people). This is what is meant by the Bhaishya when it says—na fvévam smarants Rajydyogat Rajéli; which must be taken to mean that wsuge being much AVESHTI IS A DISTINCT SACRIFICE, S27 less authoritative than Smyti (vide Adh. I, Pada iii), the said usage must be explained as being figurative or indirect, It has been urged above that—‘‘as the word ‘ Audameyha’ gives us an idea of its basic noun ‘ Udamegha,’ so the word ‘ Rajya’ could afford an idea of its basic word ‘ Raja.’” But this Indirect Inference is set aside by the Direct Perception of the usage common among the Dravidas. If the performer of kingly functions were to be spoken of as ‘ हलति, ’ then, in that case, it wonld be necessary for us to infer the existence, firstly, of the said relationship of Action and its Performer, and, second!y, of certain grammatical rules definitely laying down the presence of that relation- ship in the case in question. And certainly very much more authorita- tive than any such znferred grammatical rule, is the already existing rule that lays down the formation of the word ‘ Rajya’ as ‘ Rajiahk karma’ (the functions of the ha7a) The opponent argues thus: ‘ YO yé rayyam karoti, etc., ete. “That is to say, the relationship of the Denoter and the Denoted 18 always “ascertained by invariable concomitance or non-concomitance ; and ‘‘there is no doubt that the word ‘ Raja’ 1s always concomitant with ‘““the presence of the performance of kingly functions (and as such the “word ‘aja’ is taken as denoting the performer of kingly functions) ; ‘while the word ‘ Rajya’ is not found to be always concomitant with “the functtons of the Raja (and as such this latter word cannot be taken “as denoting these functions). Thenas for the grammatical rules brought “forward above, all that such rules do 18 to differentiate between the ५८ correctly-formed and the incorrectly-formed words; and as such, they “can have nothing to do with the case in question; because both the “words ‘Raji’ and ‘ Rajya’ are equally correctly formed; and hence the “ bringing forward of grammatical rules is altogether improper.” To the above we make the following reply: It is true that such is the common usage, and the grammatical rules have nothing toe do as to what word has its denotations governed by the presence of which other word; though it is so, yet, 1t 18 by the explanation of the correct or the incorrect formation of words that the fact of certain words governing the denotation of other words is pointed out; as for instance,in the case in question, the formation of the word ‘ Rajya’ being explained as ‘ Rajfiak karma’ (king’s functions), it is clearly pointed out (by this formation of the word) that the denotation of the word is fixed by that of the word ° Lay a.’ Thus then, the greater authoritativeness of the grammatical smrtis distinctly points to the fact that it is the word ‘haa’ (and not ˆ Rajya’) that bas an independent denotation of its own ( fixed solely by convention), And as for the particular usage that you have brought 823 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 11—PADA 11—ADHI. (2). forward in support of your contention, we find that it is not observed among the Dravidas. According to us, on the other hand, no special Importance is attached to usage; and as such the fact of our theory not being in keeping with the usage of Arydvarta does not in any way tar- nish it. But, as a matter of fact, even in Arydvarta we do find the presence of kingly functtons whenever the word ‘ 72474’ is used; and thus there can be nothing incongruons in our theory; as all that it does is to explain what is used, and leave off the explanation of the fact of the word not being used (by the people of Arydvarta) with reference to those Kehuttriyas that are devoid of kingly functions. And further, in all cases, a qualification is such as is peculiar to the object in question ; and hence the word ‘ Rajya’ refers only to such functions as belong to the ‘R772’ alone, and not to such other actions ns thinking and the rest. That is to say, protection of the people is the distinctive function of the King; and hence it is this that is spoken of as ‘Rajya’; and as for such actions as those of thinking, winking and the like, inasmuch as these are found to exist in kings as well as in other men, they do not serve to distinguish the king, and as such, are not spoken of as ‘ Rajya.’ Thus then, even though the fact of the word ‘ R474’ denoting the Kshatiriya may not be countenanced by the usage of all men, yet, in accordance with the Sitra I—~1i—9, we cannot but admit it (to be more authoritative and acceptable). And it has been shown above, under ७४८१५ 1-111-10, that in matters of merely verbal usage, which pertains to ordinary perceptible things, a certain authoritativeness attaches also to the inhabitants of countries lying on the frontiers of Arydvarta. Thus then, the Rdjasttya sacrifice being concluded as being for the Kshatiriya only, the sentences 10 question must be taken as laying down the Bradhmana, etc., as performers of the Avéshtt (which is an Action distinct from the Rdjasttya). And hence the particular Result—obtaining of Food (mentioned in the sentence ‘ &aya annddyakamam, etc.’)—would follow from the perform- ance of the Avéshit, apart from the Rajasitya. Because the performance of the Av&shtz in the midst of the Rdjastya will have been completed hy the obtaining of the Ktngdom of Heaven (the specific Result of the Rajastiya); while its performance apart from that would be in need of the mention of a Result for itself (as that of the Rdyjasiiya can no longer appertain to it) ; and consequently the Result (Food) subsequently mentioned would naturally attach itself to this latter performance. Objection: “The obtaining of food must be accepted as the Result “following from the Avésh?#i in all cases; because it is mentioned directly ‘‘in connection with this Sacrifice,—in the sentence ‘étaya annddyaka- AVESHTI IS A DISTINCT SACRIFICE. 829 ‘mam, etc.’; while the Result spoken of in connection with the Rdjasiya “could apply to the Avéshfi only ztndirectly; and there can be no doubt “that what is mentioned directly would set aside that which is only ‘indirectly pointed out.” Reply: It is not so; because there is no contradiction between the two Results. That is to say, if the two Results were found to be mu- tually incompatible, then it would be necessary to admit the fact of one setting aside the other; as the accepting of both would necessitate the assumption, either of the fact of the two as optional alternatives, or of the repetition of the Action in question (for the bringing about of the two results) (and such assumptions have been often shown to be extremely objectionable]. When, however, the two Results are capable of being reconciled by means of the limiting of their scope, there is no need of any such objectiouable assumptions. As a matter of fact, there is nothing incompatible in the fact of a single Action of the Avésh{i bringing about many results; because distinct results might very well follow from its distinct performances. As for Repetition, it will be shown later on, that it 18 objectionable only when the Results are spoken of as following conjointly (from the same Action). Specially in the cuse of the Avéshti, a repetition is inevitable, as 16 has been laid duwn in connection with the Brahmana, etc., on the one hand, while, on the other, 16 18 also included in the Rajasiya (which cannot be performed by the Brahmana). If the sentence ‘8iayat annaddyakdmam, etc.,’ were the originative Injunction of the Avésh{z, then it could reject the applicability to the Avéshti of the subsequent Rajasitya-Injunction. As a matter of fact, how- ever, we find that both thesesentences—‘ étay4, etc.’ and the Rajasiéya Injunc- tion—mention results in connection with the Action of the 4०९०2, which is originatively laid down in the sentence ‘@gnéydshtakapdlo, etc.’; and as they do not mention the two results as appearing at one and the same time, we do not perceive any difference between the authoritative char- acter of the two sentences (and hence the one cannot set aside the other); because just as the Hajasiiya-Injunction is found to mention a result in reference to the Actions mentioned in close proximity to something else, so also is the sentence ‘étayd, etc.’ ; specially as neither of them makes mention of the ‘ 4४९९0 ' by name. Because the word ‘ Rajasiiya’ is not @ generic name (applying to many sacrifices), like the word ‘ Paurna- mast’; as what it denotes 18 the Avéshfi as a part of the sacrifice as accom- panied by the complete group of sacrifices mentioned in connection with it (while the word ‘ Paurnamdsi’ applies to each of the sacrifices composing it; and hence the word ‘ Rajasiéyena’ cannot be taken as dangtizs the | ing the Avéshti). And so, on this ground too, 2906 - the two is found to be 830 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, 11— PADA 1I—ApnI. (2). weaker than the other. The only difference between the two is that while the one (Hdjasitya-Injunction) mentions many sacrifices, the other (‘ éayd, etc.’) mentions only a few; and certainly this does not make any very great difference (in the authoritativeness of the two sentences). “Objection: Inasmuch as the pronoun ‘étay@’ points directly “to the Avéshfi mentioned in the Context, there is a distinct difference ‘between this and the Rajastya Injunction which refers to it only indirectly.” Iteply: This would have been quite true, if the pronoun ‘ efat’ (in ‘&tayé’) were connected with the Result, or if it pointed to some- thing, to be spoken of, as we find inthe case of the sentence ‘atha Gsha jyotth.’ As a matter of fact, however, we find that even in the sentence ‘ étay@, etc.,’ itis on account of the proximity of the root ‘yajz’ to the Injunctive Affix (in ‘yjayéfu’) that the Result—food—is men- tioned in connection with the Avésht:, which is indicated by that root (‘yaji’); and this indication of the Avésh{z is found to be done also by the root ‘yajz’ occurring in the Lt4ajastiya-Injunction ; and so even this does not make any difference in the authoritative-character of the two Results. Then again, even though the pronoun ‘etayd’ refers to the Avésh{z laid down in the Context, yet it could not refer precisely to the Avéshtz, without the help of the sentence ‘ agnéyoshtakapalak, etc.’; and with the help of this sentence, the Rajastya-Injunction also would refer to the Avéshti equally well; and thus also, both must be admitted to be equally authoritative. Objection: “There is a distinct difference between the two, on “the ground that the sentence ‘éfaya, etc.’, occurs in the particular sub- “context (of the Avéshtz), while the Rijusuya Injunction is a general “statement (and as such takes in the Avéshft also, among many other “ sacrifices that go to form the Hajusiiya).”’ Repiy: But this is just the same as what we have pointed out before—viz., that the only difference lies in the fact of the one referring to many more sacrifices than the other; but at the time of the actual referring to the Avésh{z in particular, both are equally authoritative. Further, if there were an absolute non-difference between the Avésht¢ of the Rajastiya, and the Avéshtc performed by the Brahmana, etc. (which latter is the one referred to by the sentence ‘ étayd, etc.’)—-then what you say might have been all right (7.e., then alone could the mention of the two Results be said to be incompatible). As it is, however, we have just shown that the two Avéshfis are wholly distinct. And thus the very fields of the two results—Kingdom of Heaven and acquiring of Food —being aigtinct, there is no contradiction between them. But though the two Aveshfzs may be different, yet, the mention of AVESITI IS A DISTINCT SACRIFICE. 831 only such details as the inserting of the Barhasputya, etc., distinctly indicates that the origin of this Avésh{z also is the same Avéshti that has been previously mentioned in the Context. Then as for the “ Rajasiiya’’ (spoken of in the sentence ‘ yad: rijanyah, etc.’),—inasmuch as his activity also (towards the performing of this distinct Avésht:) would be equally possible, specially as the word mentioning the result of the distinct Avéshti (7.¢e., ‘ Food’) is equally connected with the sentence ‘yadi rajanyah, etc.’,—by him also, this ` Avésh{ti would be performed, either as a distinct sacrifice by itself, or as arepetition (of the 4४९5८ that he may have performed along with thé 000} 057 ॥८ } . And for the Rajanya also, the mention of the 99567८10 of the Aindra in the middle would be possible, only if the Avéshtc were performed by him, independently by itself, as a single sacrifice made up of the various minor offerings of the Cake to Agni, to Indra, to Brhaspati, etc. (as thus alone could the Aindra—offering to Indra—be offered as the middle offering) ; whereas when the Avéshti is performed in course of the Rijastya, inasmuch as the sacrificial gifts (of each of the offerings that go to form the Avésh{i) are different (from each other, as also from that of the Rdjasttya), each of these offerings (Jshtis) to Agni, Indra, etc., would be performed independently by itself; and as such (all of them not constituting a single performance), the mention of putting any one of these ‘in the middie’ would be wholly irrelevant (as there being no single performance made up of these performances of the several Ishtis, of what would this be the ‘ middle’ ? ). Yor these reasons, it must be admitted that the sentences in ques- tion serve to lay down the connection of the Brahmana, etc., not men- tioned before. | ADHIKARANA (3). [The Adhana 28 an object of 7भु 1664011. ] Sutra (4): The laying of fire forms an object of Injunction, because it does not form an integral part of all sacrifices. In connection with the sentence ‘ vasanté Brahmano'gninddadhita,’ there is a doubt, as in the previous instance, as to whether the a@dhana (Laying of Fire) has been previously mentioned elsewhere, or not. If it be found, in some way or other, to have been mentioned, then even in the absciice of the conditional ‘if’, the sentence would be taken as laying down the condition (for the particular season to be chosen); and in that case, the construction of the sentence in question being,—" yad Brahmana adadhita tad vasanté”—the ‘vasanta’ and the ‘Brdhmana’ would come to restrict one another (४.९०) the Spring would be the time for the Brahmana, and the Brahmana would be the performer iu the Spring time). While, on the other hand, if the Laying of Fire be not found tohave been previ- ously mentioned, then the sentence in question would become the Injunc- tion of the Laying as performed by the Brahmana at the time of the Spring; and the following would be the advantages of this latter interpretation :— (1) In the three sentences—(a) ‘ vasant® Brahmano’ gninddadhita, (6) gri- shmé Rajanyah, (©) garadi Vaigyak’,—inasmuch as the Laying mentioned in the first sentence would be wholly taken up by the accessories (Brahmuna and Vasanta) mentioned in the same sentence, the Accessories mentioned in the other two sentences would point to distinct actions (of Laying); and as such there would be three Layings of Fire; (2) the presence of the Atmane- pada affix in ‘Adadhita' would point to the necessity of the sacrificer him- self laying his own Fire; (3) the Gadra would become precluded (from sacrifices, as only the three Layings of Fire are laid down, and without the laying of Fire, no sacrifice could be performed). If, on the other hand, the sentences be taken, not as Injunctions of the Laying, but as simply laying down conditions, then we would have the reverse of all these three advan- tages. What is said in regard to the sentences in question would also apply to such other passages as—‘vusanté Brihmanamupanayita grish- mé Rajanyam, garadi vaicgyam’; as the condition of these sentences is exactly like that of those dealt with in this ddAcskaranu. ADHANA IS AN OBJECT UF INJUNCTION, 833 The Adhikarana may be briefly summed up thus :— THE PURVAPAKSHA. “ The Laying of Fire having been implied by an Injunction of a sacri- ‘‘ fice tn general (as ‘svargakdmo yayéta), ov laid down by a general Injunc- ‘tion (such 8.8 ‹ Ya evamvidvanagninadhatté, etc.’),—its mention over again ‘‘in the sentences in question must be taken as mentioning the various ‘* castes as conditions for the particular times of the Layzng. ८ That is to say, in the first instance the first argument in our favour “18 that, inasmuch as the Injunctions of such actions as the